Case Name: STOKES v. STOKES
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1908-11-27
Citations: 113 N.Y.S. 142
Docket Number: 
Parties: STOKES v. STOKES.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 113
Pages: 142–155

Head Matter:
(128 App. Div. 838.)
STOKES v. STOKES.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.
November 27, 1908.)
1. Appeal and Ebbob (§ 931 )—Review op Findings—Iebeconcilable Findings.
The rule that, where two findings are so irreconcilable that it is impossible to harmonize them, the appellate court must accept the finding most favorable to appellant, applies only where there has been a conflict in the evidence touching a fact found, and it does not apply where there is no evidence to support one of the findings which is also contrary to the concession of counsel in open court.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. § 3769; Dec. Dig. § 931.*]
2. Appeal and Ebbob (§ 987*)—Review op Facts.
The Appellate Division has on appeal the right to look into the evidence and review the facts.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Dec. Dig. § 987.*]
3. Appeal and Ebbob (§ 931*)—Inconsistent Findings—Review.
Where, in an action to annul a marriage on the ground that defendant had a former husband living, it was conceded that the marriage was contracted in good faith by both parties, and there was no evidence that defendant, at the time of the marriage, knew that her former husband was living, and the court found that she 'had no such knowledge, but adopted proposed findings, including one that at the time of the marriage defendant knew that her former husband was living, by a memorandum at the bottom, “Found except as indicated,” the rule that, where two findings are irreconcilable, the appellate court must accept the finding most favorable to appellant, did not apply, and the court on appeal will rely on the finding that defendant did not know that her former husband was living.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Gent. Dig. § 3769; Dec. Dig. § 931. ]
4. Mabbiage (§ 11*)—Validity—Statutes.
Under Domestic Relations Law (Laws 1896, p. 216, c. 272), § 3, providing that a marriage is void if contracted by a person whose spouse by a former marriage is living, unless such former spouse has been absent for five years without being known to be living, in which case the marriage is void from the time its nullity is declared by a court, a marriage contracted in good faith and in ignorance that the wife’s former husband, who 'had absented himself for ‘over five years was living, is voidable only.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Marriage, Cent. Dig. § 30; Dee. Dig. § 11.*]
5. Mabbiage (§ 60*)—Voidable Mabbiage—Annulment—Gbounds.
Where a marriage is voidable, the court will deny relief to complainant, where he fails to come into court with clean hands. -
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Marriage, Cent. Dig. § 125; Dec. Dig. § 60.*]
6. Mabbiage (§ 58*)—Voidable Mabbiage—Annulment—Gbounds.
In an action to annul a marriage under Domestic Relations Law (Laws 1896, p. 216, c. 272), on the ground that defendant had a former husband living, it appeared that the marriage was contracted in good faith after the former husband had been absent for over five years, that plaintiff and defendant lived together for some months before plaintiff heard that defendant’s former husband was living, and that subsequently plaintiff and defendant agreed to live together as husband and wife, which they continued to do for over two years. Held, that plaintiff was not entitled to relief.
[Ed. Note.—For other'cases, see Marriage, Cent. Dig. § 120; Dec. Dig. § 58.*]
Gaynor, J., dissenting.
Appeal from Special Term, Kings County.
Action by William A. Stokes against Elizabeth W. Stokes, sued as Elizabeth W. Hitchings, sometimes called Elizabeth W. Stokes. Erom a judgment dismissing the complaint, plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
Argued before WOODWARD, HOOKER, GAYNOR, RICH, and MILLER, JJ.
George W. Wingate, for appellant.
James P. Niemann, for respondent.
For other oases see same topic & number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
WOODWARD, J.
This is an action brought to procure a judicial decree annulling a marriage contracted by the parties, on the ground that the defendant had a husband living at the time of the second marriage. The trial court denied the plaintiff the relief sbught, and the appeal is from that judgment.
The essential facts are found in the decision by the trial court, and are that the defendant was married on the 24th day of March, 1875, at the city of Philadelphia, to one John M. Hitchings, and they lived and cohabited together until the 26th day of November, 1896, when Hitchings left defendant and his children and went to parts unknown, that the defendant continued to live in the city of Brooklyn up to the present time, that on the 18th day of January, 1905, the defendant married the plaintiff in this state, and that for more than five years prior to the second marriage the defendant had no knowledge that her former husband, Hitchings, was alive. The further facts, so far as-they are material to the disposition of this case, will be stated later in this opinion. The record discloses that plaintiff's counsel submitted to the trial court a series of requests to find, and among these requests was a proposed finding, "that at the time of the marriage of defendant with plaintiff, defendant knew that her husband, John M. Hitchings, was alive." Without strictly complying with the provision of section 1023 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which requires the court to "note, in the margin" of such requests, "the manner in which each proposition has been disposed of," the trial court made a memorandum at the bottom of the requests in these words: "Found except as indicated."
We are satisfied that the trial court must Have overlooked the proposed finding to the effect that, at the time of her marriage with the plaintiff, the defendant knew her first husband, Hitchings, was living, and that, had the trial court complied with the provisions of the Code by designating on the margin of the request its disposition, it would not have fallen into the error of making inconsistent findings of fact upon this question. We find, however, the record in this shape, and it is insisted by counsel for the appellant that the rule applies that, where two findings are so wholly irreconcilable and inconsistent that it is impossible to harmonize them, it becomes the duty of the appellate court to accept the finding most favorable to the appellant, and he is entitled to rely on them in aid of his appeal. Elterman v. Hyman, 192 N. Y. 113, 84 N. E. 937; City of Buffalo v. D. L. & W. R. R. Co., 190 N. Y. 84, 82 N. E. 513; Israel v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 158 N. Y. 624, 53 N. E. 517.
If this rule is to be applied to this case, it necessitates a reversal of the judgment, and the granting of a new trial, because, by section 3 of the Domestic Relations Law (Laws 1896, p. 216, c. 272), it is provided that:
"A marriage is absolutely void if contracted by a person whose husband or wife by a former marriage is living, unless either: (3) Such former husband or wife has absented himself or herself for five successive years then last past without being known to such person to be living during that time," in which event such "a marriage is void from the time its nullity is declared by a court of competent jurisdiction."
The question therefore is before us for decision, in the first place, whether the existence of apparently inconsistent findings on the question of the" knowledge of the defendant that her former husband was alive or not necessitates a reversal of this case. We think it does not, for the reason that the finding that she had knowledge is unsupported by any evidence in the case. The plaintiff's complaint contains no allegation that the defendant had such knowledge. Upon the trial it was conceded at the very outset that there was no question but what the marriage was contracted in good faith by both parties, and the case was tried out on that theory without the introduction of evidence showing the defendant in fact had notice. It does not, it seems to us, now lie in the -mouth of plaintiff's counsel to contend that the defendant in fact had notice that her former husband was alive, nor can he take advantage of the general rule enunciated in the cases above cited. We are of the opinion that that rule only applies to cases where there has been a conflict in the .evidence touching a fact found, and has no application to a case where there is no evidence whatever to support one of the findings, and such finding was made contrary to the concessions made by counsel in open court. This court, on appeal, has the right to look into the evidence and review the facts, and, having found a lack of evidence of knowledge on the defendant's part, we do not think this court is required to reverse the judgment on the assumption that she had knowledge, but should stand on the finding of fact made in the formal decision that she had no knowledge her first husband was alive. In that event the statute declares that the second marriage is void only "from the time its nullity is declared."
The questions then presented are: Can the court decline to give judgment annulling the second marriage? Is the statute mandatory, conferring on the plaintiff the right to the relief sought as a matter of strict legal right, or may the court, in the exercise of its equitable powers, inquire into the circumstances, and deny the plaintiff judgment where the plaintiff does not come into court with clean hands, and to annul a marriage would be highly inequitable?
The second marriage, when entered into in good faith and in ignorance that the first husband was alive, is not void, but simply voidable. Gall v. Gall, 114 N. Y. 109, 120, 21 N. E. 106; Taylor v. Taylor, 63 App. Div. 234, 71 N Y. Supp. 411. It has been held, in various cases where a marriage is not void but voidable, that the court will deny the complainant relief, where a party fails to come into court with clean hands. Tait v. Tait, 3 Misc. Rep 218, 23 N. Y. Supp. 597; McCarron v. McCarron, 26 Misc. Rep. 158, 56 N. Y. Supp. 745; Petit v. Petit, 45 Misc. Rep. 155, 91 N. Y. Supp. 979; Kerrison v. Kerrison, 8 Abb. N. C. 444; Taylor v Taylor, supra. In Taylor v. Taylor, 63 App. Div. 234, 71 N. Y. Supp. 411, a wife sued for a separation. The husband interposed the defense that at the time of thé marriage of the parties the plaintiff had another husband living, who had absented himself for over five years and was not dead, as he was supposed to be by her. He also interposed a counterclaim asking that his marriage to the plaintiff be annulled. It appeared he had lived and cohabited with the plaintiff for several years after learning the facts. The court not only decreed a separation, but gave the plaintiff alimony, and refused to annul the second marriage. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment. The judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (Taylor v. Taylor, 173 N. Y. 266, 65 N. E. 1098), although it would appear the affirmance was chiefly on grounds not necessarily involving the question of an absolute right to a decree of annulment.
It may be urged that to refuse a judgment of annulment would be-tantamount to recognizing the possibility of a person having two legal wives or two legal husbands at the same time.
Commenting on the force and effect of the statute relating to mar riages contracted under circumstances such as in the pase nqw under consideration, the Court of Appeals said, in the case of Gall v. Gall, 114 N. Y. 120, 21 N. E. 109:
"The section quoted seems to be based upon the probability that the absentee is dead, and is apparently designed to protect the person who, in good faith, acts upon the statute, from evil results if the absentee is actually living. The first marriage is suspended, or, as was held in Griffin v. Banks, 24 How. Prac. 213, it is 'placed in abeyance,' but it is not reinstated, by the return of the absentee, because the second marriage becomes void only from the time that it is so declared by a competent court. Otherwise, both marriages would be in force at the same time and to this extent polygamy would be sanctioned by law. The first marriage ceases to be binding until one of the three parties to the two marriages procures a decree pronouncing the second marriage void."
May not equitable considerations be presented which would require the court, in the interest of decency and fair dealing, to deny a party the relief of a decree of annulment? In the case now under consideration, the trial court found: That, after the parties to this action had lived together as husband and wife for about three months, the plaintiff heard that the defendant's former husband was living, but did not know where he was or could be located, which information plaintiff conveyed to the defendant, whereupon defendant asked plaintiff what he was going to do, to which he replied,. "Don't worry, don't bother, if he does come on, as long as you behave yourself, I will stick to you," and said plaintiff expressly promised and agreed to and with the defendant that he would protect and defend her in everything that came up in regard to their marriage, that they should continue the honorable relations of husband and wife so long as she behaved herself, and that he would not, so long as she faithfully discharged her duties and obligations as his wife, bring any action to annul their said marriage, and would not, so long as she complied with said condition, become a moving party to attack or question the validity of their said marriage. That thereafter the plaintiff continued to live and cohabit with the defendant as his wife, and continued to present her in public as his wife, received his friends and everybody at his house in the same way as he did before he heard the report or rumor that her former husband was alive, and their relations as husband and wife continued down to and including the day of the service upon said defendant of the summons in this action. The court further finds that the defendant did not, by act or omission on her part, fail to comply with the conditions imposed.
It thus appears that, for more than two years after knowledge of the facts, the parties continued to sustain toward each other the relation of husband and wife. Such a relation we cannot characterize as meretricious and legally immoral, because the statute expressly declares the second marriage shall be void only "from the time its nullity is declared." The decree of nullity does not relate back and render the marriage void from the time of its contraction, but its nullity dates only from the date of the decree.
It would seem that when the plaintiff became apprised of the fact that the defendant's husband was alive, after a reasonable opportunity to investigate the facts and circumstances, he was called upon to act, and to "act with reasonable expedition and decision; that he should, without unnecessary delay, have decided upon the course to be pursued; that the plaintiff was not at liberty to play fast and loóse with the defendant and the relationship created by the second marriage; and that it was unconscionable for him to induce the defendant, under promise of protection, to continue to cohabit with him as his wife, only at a later day to repudiate that relationship and bring an action to annul the marriage. His conduct as found was such which appeals to us as worthy of condemnation, and we believe we transgress no principles of law or equity in refusing the relief asked by him.
For these reasons, we think the judgment should be affirmed.