Case Name: Thomas DAVIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2015-01-14
Citations: 154 So. 3d 1203
Docket Number: No. 2D14-1413
Parties: Thomas DAVIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: VILLANTI, WALLACE, and CRENSHAW, JJ., Concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Third Series
Volume: 154
Pages: 1203–1203

Head Matter:
Thomas DAVIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 2D14-1413.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Jan. 14, 2015.
Thomas Davis, pro se.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Thomas Davis appeals the order denying his belated motion to withdraw plea, which the postconviction court denied as untimely without prejudice to file a motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Because the circuit court erred in not resolving the belated motion on the merits as if filed under rule 3.850, we reverse.
Davis's motion was styled as a motion to withdraw plea under rule 3.170(Z), and while the postconviction court correctly determined that the motion was untimely under that rule because it was not filed within thirty days of the rendition of the sentence, the analysis should not have ended there. When a defendant files a motion to withdraw plea under rule 3.170(i), but the time to file such a motion has passed, the postconviction court should consider it under rule 3.850 so long as it meets the procedural requirements under that rule. See Franklin v. State, 31 So.3d 948, 948 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (citing Houghtaling v. State, 670 So.2d 1019, 1019 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)).
As in Franklin, Davis's motion was timely, under oath, and raised claims that would be appropriate in a rule 3.850 motion. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the postconviction court to consider the motion under that rule.
Reversed and remanded.
VILLANTI, WALLACE, and CRENSHAW, JJ., Concur.