Case Name: James LESCHER, Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, Respondent
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2006-12-20
Citations: 946 So. 2d 1140
Docket Number: No. 4D06-2291
Parties: James LESCHER, Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, Respondent.
Judges: GUNTHER and SHAHOOD, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 946
Pages: 1140–1144

Head Matter:
James LESCHER, Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, Respondent.
No. 4D06-2291.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Dec. 20, 2006.
Richard W. Springer and Catherine Mazzullo of Richard W. Springer, P.A., Palm Springs, for petitioner.
Heather Rose Cramer, Lake Worth, and Thomas C. Mielke, Miami, for respondent.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner's Florida driver's license was permanently revoked on December 1, 2000, based on his four prior DUI convictions. He applied for reinstatement of his license on hardship grounds on August 3, 2005, as authorized by a statute which is no longer in effect. His application was denied administratively and upheld by the circuit court. We deny his petition for certiorari.
In the past, section 322.271(4), Florida Statutes, authorized a person whose license had been revoked for four or more DUI's to seek a hardship license after five years of revocation of the license. That provision was eliminated by Chapter 98-223, Laws of Florida, in 1998; but Chapter 98-223 was later held unconstitutional for violating the single subject requirement of the Florida Constitution. Art. Ill, § 6, Fla. Const.; Fla. Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Critchfield, 842 So.2d 782 (Fla.2003).
The legislature then adopted the provision as an amendment to. : section 322.271(4), effective July 1, 2003. The State acknowledges that there was a "window" during which a hardship license could have been requested, as a result of Critch-field, but that period closed on July 1, 2003, when the amendment held unconstitutional in Critchfield was reenacted.
In this case petitioner applied for reinstatement of his driver's license- as a hardship on August 3, 2005. Under Cantrall v. Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 828 So.2d 1062 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002), the statute in effect at the time of application for reinstatement of a driver's license controls, not the statute in effect when the driver's license was revoked. We agree with Cantrall. Hill v. Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 891 So.2d 1202 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).
Petitioner argues that when the legislature reenacted the law effective July 1, 2003, the elimination of the hardship license violated the ex post facto prohibition in the Florida Constitution, Article I, section 10, as to him. Petitioner's driver's license was permanently revoked in 2000. Petitioner primarily relies on Judge Klein's concurring opinion in Cornelius v. State, 913 So.2d 1176 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). In Cornelius this court held that the elimination of the hardship license would not be a basis for withdrawal of a plea in which the defendant had agreed to a lifetime revocation of his driver's license. In Cornelius, we held en banc:
The possibility of a reinstatement of driving privileges is not a direct consequence of the plea. ; Reinstatement depends upon the department's review of the applicant's entire driving record and fitness to drive. The granting of a work permit was not automatic, even under the statute in existence at the time of defendant's plea. It is an administrative proceeding and not part of the criminal proceeding.
Id. at 1178. The concurring opinion in Cornelius suggested that when the defendant applied for a hardship license, he might have an argument that the amendment, as applied to him, was unconstitutional as an ex post facto law. In one of the cases cited in the concurring opinion, on which petitioner relies, Waldrup v. Dugger; 562 So.2d 687 (Fla.1990), the Florida Supreme' Court held that an amendment to a statute which resulted in a decrease in incentive gain time for prisoners could not be constitutionally applied retroactively because it would be an ex post facto violation.
The State points out that in Waldrup, the ex post facto violation occurred because the punishment for a criminal offense was being increased after the crime had been committed. The administrative revocation of a driver's license for DUI, however, is not punishment. In Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Gordon, 860 So.2d 469, 471 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003), rev. denied, 872 So.2d 899 (Fla.2004), the court explained:
The administrative revocation of a driver's license for DUI is not "punishment" of the offender. See Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Grapski, 696 So.2d 950, 951 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). Rather "it is an administrative remedy for the public protection that mandatorily follows conviction for certain offenses." Id. (quoting Smith v. City of Gainesville, 93 So.2d 105, 107 (Fla. 1957)); see also Dep't. of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Vogt, 489 So.2d 1168, 1170 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). When a driver's license revocation is made mandatory by statute, revocation is an administrative function rather than the imposition of a criminal sentence. See Grapski, 696 So.2d at 951.
The Supreme Court of Florida has held that a law violates ex post facto clauses of the United States and Florida Constitutions "when it increases the punishment for a criminal offense after the crime has been committed. • See U.S. Const, art. I, § 9; U.S. Const, art. I, § 10, cl. 1, § 10, Fla. Const." Goad v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 845 So.2d 880, 882 (Fla.2003) (ruling that the retroactive application of a statute authorizing inmates' civil liability for costs of incarceration to the existing inmate population did not violate ex post facto prohibitions).
Because the ex post facto clauses of the United States and Florida Constitutions apply only to criminal legislation and proceedings, Goad, 845 So.2d at 882, and driver's license revocation has been held not to be criminal punishment, the amendment eliminating the hardship license, when applied to petitioner, is not unconstitutional as an ex post facto law.
Because we are seeing a number of petitions raising this issue, and anticipate that other districts will also face the same issue, we certify the following question as one of great public importance:
Does the amendment to section 822.271(1), Florida Statutes, which eliminated hardship driver's licenses effective July 1, 2008, violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws as to persons who could have applied for a hardship license before the amendment became effective?
Petition for Certiorari Denied.
GUNTHER and SHAHOOD, JJ., concur.
KLEIN, J., dissents with opinion.