Case Name: Baltazar RIVAS, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee
Court: District of Columbia Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: District of Columbia
Decision Date: 2001-08-23
Citations: 783 A.2d 125
Docket Number: No. 97-CF-304
Parties: Baltazar RIVAS, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.
Judges: Before WAGNER, Chief Judge, and TERRY, STEADMAN, SCHWELB, FARRELL, RUIZ, REID, GLICKMAN and WASHINGTON, Associate Judges.
Reporter: West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 783
Pages: 125–155

Head Matter:
Baltazar RIVAS, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.
No. 97-CF-304.
District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
Argued En Banc June 6, 2000.
Decided Aug. 23, 2001.
Jaclyn S. Frankfurt, Public Defender Service, with whom James Klein, Public Defender Service, was on the brief, for appellant.
Mary Patrice Brown, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom Wilma A. Lewis, United States Attorney, and John R. Fisher, M. Jeffrey Beatrice, and Elizabeth EL Carroll, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief, for appellee.
Before WAGNER, Chief Judge, and TERRY, STEADMAN, SCHWELB, FARRELL, RUIZ, REID, GLICKMAN and WASHINGTON, Associate Judges.

Opinion:
ON REHEARING EN BANC
GLICKMAN, Associate Judge.
Applying principles of constructive possession, a jury convicted appellant Balta-zar Rivas and his codefendant Jose Melgar of possessing, with intent to distribute, cocaine found in plastic bags that lay between them in the console of a car in which Melgar was the driver and Rivas the front seat passenger. A division of this court affirmed both convictions in Rivas v. United States, 734 A.2d 655 (D.C.1999) (Rivas I). We granted Rivas's petition for rehearing en banc in order to reconsider a rule followed in Rivas I and other recent cases that appears to ease the government's burden of proving constructive possession when drugs are found in the "close confines" of an automobile, as distinct from, say, a dwelling. The division relied upon this special "automobile" rule in rejecting Rivas's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence that he intended to exercise dominion or control over the cocaine in Melgar's car, stating that "our decisions . leave no doubt that the requisite intent may be inferred from the presence of contraband in an automobile, in plain view, conveniently accessible to the defendant." Id. at 657 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
We agree with Rivas that no categorical distinction based on where drugs are found — and certainly no lessening of the government's burden of proving constructive possession on that basis — is justified. A defendant's close proximity to drugs in plain view is certainly probative in determining not only whether he knew of the drugs and had the ability to exert control over them, but also whether he had the necessary intent to control (individually or with others) their use or destiny. Nevertheless, we make clear today that there is no "automobile" exception to the settled general rule that knowledge and proximity alone are insufficient to prove constructive possession of drugs beyond a reasonable doubt. A passenger in someone else's car, who is not the driver and who does not have exclusive control over the vehicle or its contents, may not be convicted solely on the basis that drugs were in plain view and conveniently accessible in the passenger compartment. As in all other constructive possession cases, there must be something more in the totality of the circumstances — a word or deed, a relationship or other probative factor— that, considered in conjunction with the evidence of proximity and knowledge, proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the passenger intended to exercise dominion or control over the drugs, and was not a mere bystander.
Applying this standard to the government's proof in this case, we also agree with Rivas that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. As the division itself intimated, the necessary "something more in the totality of the circumstances" beyond proof of proximity and knowledge was missing. Rivas was observed sitting in Melgar's car for only a few moments; "there was no evidence as to how long Rivas had been in the vehicle," Rivas I, 734 A.2d at 657, and there was no other substantial evidence against him. A reasonable trier of fact could not be certain beyond a reasonable doubt that Rivas intended to exert control over those drugs, i.e., that he was not just an innocent bystander. We therefore must reverse Rivas's conviction.
I.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, the evidence showed that two police officers in uniform, in a marked police cruiser, were patrolling on Hyatt Place, N.W., at around 1:00 a.m. when they saw an automobile stopped in the middle of the street. The officers pulled up behind the car, a two-door Honda occupied by the driver (Melgar, who was also the registered owner of the vehicle), a front seat passenger (Rivas), and two rear seat passengers. Seconds later the passenger-side door opened and Rivas stepped out; leaving the door open, he walked to the sidewalk where he engaged another man in conversation. Soon afterwards the Honda pulled over to the curb. The police officers activated their overhead emergency lights and moved in behind the parked car. As they did so, Rivas, who evidently saw the officers approach, left the man he was speaking with and walked a short distance around the corner onto Park Road. There he remained to talk with someone else, out of sight of the police until he was apprehended a few minutes later.
In the meantime, as the officers approached the car on foot, Officer Mitchell looked in on the passenger side and saw an open container of alcohol on the rear floorboard. The occupants were ordered out of the car, and as Mitchell reached in to retrieve the container, he saw two plastic bags containing a visible white rock substance in the console between the two front seats. Mitchell, who could see the bags because a streetlight illuminated the interior of the car, told his partner to secure the other occupants while he went looking for Rivas. He found him in the midst of conversation some twenty to thirty feet from the corner of Hyatt Place and Park Road.
The plastic bags taken from the console of the car were later determined to contain twelve and six rocks of crack cocaine, respectively, weighing in the aggregate 1,951 milligrams. This was enough, according to a police expert, to furnish 195 separate "hits" or uses of the cocaine. The expert opined, hypothetically, that if the eighteen rocks weighed the same they would sell individually for about twenty dollars on the street; in other words, that the cocaine had a total street value of a few hundred dollars. In the expert's opinion, the amount and configuration of the drugs (in small rocks) were inconsistent with possession for personal consumption.
There was no evidence to show how long Rivas had been in Melgar's car when the police arrived on the scene, or what he or anyone else in .the car had been doing. No evidence was presented that Rivas's fingerprints were found on the bags of cocaine seized from the car, or that Rivas had ever handled the bags or engaged in a drug transaction. No incriminating evidence was taken from Rivas's person, and he said nothing to inculpate himself.
II.
A.
To prove constructive possession, the prosecution was required to show that Rivas knew that the cocaine was present in the car and that he had both the ability and the intent to exercise dominion or control over it. See, e.g., In re 667 A.2d 573, 575 (D.C.1995); Bernard v. United States, 575 A.2d 1191, 1195 (D.C.1990). Constructive possession may be sole or joint, see Parker v. United States, 601 A.2d 45, 51-52 (D.C.1991), and may be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence. See Brown v. United States, 546 A.2d 390, 397-98 (D.C.1988).
No one disputes that the jury permissibly could find that Rivas knew the cocaine was in the console (given that it was in plain view), and that he had the ability to exercise dominion and control over it (given his proximity to it). The question before us is whether the jury rationally could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Rivas intended to exercise that power, in other words that he in fact "had a substantial voice vis-a-vis the drug[s]." United States v. Staten, 189 U.S.App.D.C. 100, 106, 581 F.2d 878, 884 (1978). In general, the settled rule in constructive possession cases is that "[m]ere presence of the accused on the premises, or simply his proximity to the drug, does not itself enable . a deduction" beyond a reasonable doubt that he had the requisite intent. Id., 189 U.S.App.D.C. at 106, 581 F.2d at 884 (footnote omitted); accord, Bernard, 575 A.2d at 1195. "Nor is mere association with another, standing alone, enough even when the other is known to possess the drug." Id. (footnote omitted). Rather, there must be something more in the totality of the circumstances that — together with proximity and knowledge — establishes that the accused meant to exercise dominion or control over the narcotics:
There must be some action, some word, or some conduct that links the individual to the narcotics and indicates that he had some stake in them, some power over them. There must be something to prove that the individual was not merely an incidental bystander. It may be foolish to stand by when others are acting illegally, or to associate with those who have committed a crime. Such conduct or association, however, without more, does not establish the offenses here charged.
United States v. Pardo, 204 U.S.App.D.C. 263, 277, 636 F.2d 535, 549 (1980) (emphasis in the original).
B.
In recent years, decisions of this court have attempted to distill at least one principle from constructive possession cases, which, when compared to one another, can sometimes seem "a thicket of subjectivity." United States v. Holland, 144 U.S.App.D.C. 225, 227, 445 F.2d 701, 703 (1971) (Tamm, J., concurring). Recognizing the normal difference in size between a room in a house or other building and the interi- or of an automobile, our decisions have stated that "the requisite inferences [of dominion or control] may be drawn from the location of weapons [or other contraband] in plain view and substantially within a defendant's reach in the closer confines of an automobile." In re T.M., 577 A.2d 1149, 1154 n. 12 (D.C.1990) (citing cases). In In re F.T.J., 578 A.2d 1161, 1163 (D.C.1990), we declared that "our decisions . leave no doubt that the requisite intent may be inferred from the presence of contraband in an automobile, in plain view, conveniently accessible to the defendant" — a declaration that the division echoed in Rivas I, as mentioned earlier. We.have suggested that "[i]t is reasonable to expect the law to require a somewhat higher degree of proof [of intent] where an apartment visitor is alleged to have possessed contraband located somewhere within the large space of an apartment, as opposed to that required for an automobile occupant who knows a pistol [or other contraband] is within easy reach under or behind the seat." Brown, 546 A.2d at 395 n. 3.
Rivas criticizes these statements, contending that they amount to an unjustified relaxation of the proof requirements when persons are found near drugs in automo biles. Rivas observes that there is nothing "about the nature of a car, except its limited size, that would necessitate a different standard [of proof] in constructive possession cases." Limited size, however, is of questionable significance in this context. Rivas persuasively argues that physical proximity to drugs in the "close confines" of a car, at least one occupied jointly with other persons, may be less probative of possession than proximity in some larger enclosure because a passenger "is greatly restricted in her ability to distance herself from contraband in plain view. There is simply nowhere to go," especially when the car is in motion. Moreover, Rivas points out, "the relationship of a 'visitor' in a car may be far more attenuated than a visitor to a house or apartment":
People offer or accept rides from colleagues or acquaintances solely because they are travelling to a common destination. We might pick someone up in bad weather, merely recognizing them as a neighbor. We arrange car pools, and drive people home from parties knowing only that we have friends in common. In all these circumstances, we find ourselves in cars with people whom we might never have occasion to invite into the privacy of our own homes. There is no reason to conclude that a "visitor" in a car, as a general rule, has any greater relationship to its contents than a visitor to a home.
We agree with these reasons why any categorical distinction between cars and other enclosed places in deciding issues of constructive possession is untenable. Whether constructive possession has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt in any given case depends, as the parties before us agree, on a fact-specific inquiry into all of the circumstances. A special exception for automobiles does not stand up to scrutiny. Thus, to the extent that language in our decisions may have implied from the normal size of a passenger compartment that proximity to exposed drugs in a car, without more, is sufficient to prove (beyond a reasonable doubt) the requisite intention to exercise dominion or control, we disavow that language.
C.
Lest our holding be misconstrued, we do not mean to suggest that close proximity to exposed contraband— whether in a car or in a room — has no bearing on the issue of control. It plainly does. Nor do we mean to say that inferences of possession may not be drawn more readily from a person's presence in a car with contraband in plain sight, particularly if that presence is more than momentary, than in other circumstances. See United States v. Tirrell, 120 F.3d 670, 676 (7th Cir.1997) ("[I]n close quarters such as a car, a jury likely would have an easier time concluding that multiple individuals exercised control over a particular weapon."). To acknowledge no such distinction between a car and other surroundings would ignore the judgment and common experience embodied in statutes such as the one considered by the Supreme Court in County Court of Ulster County, New York v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 60 L.Ed.2d 777 (1979).
In that case, three adult men and a 16-year-old girl ("Jane Doe") were charged with possessing two loaded handguns found in plain view in an open purse on the front floor or front seat of their car next to Doe after they were stopped for speeding on the New York Thruway. In accordance with a state statute, the jury was instructed that the presence of a firearm in an automobile is presumptive evidence of its illegal possession by all persons then occupying the vehicle. Ulster County, 442 U.S. at 142, 99 S.Ct. 2213. The three male defendants challenged that statutory presumption on due process grounds, claiming that the evidence supporting its application to them failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that they possessed the guns. See id. at 147 & n. 5, 166, 99 S.Ct. 2213.
The Supreme Court held that the statute established only a permissible inference or presumption, not a mandatory one. This meant that proof of the "evidentiary" or "basic" facts could "constitute pilma facie evidence" of "ultimate" or "elemental" facts, but that the inference was not binding on the jury. Ulster County, 442 U.S. at 156-57, 99 S.Ct. 2213. Such a permissive inference satisfies due process, the Court explained, as long as the ultimate or elemental facts are " 'more likely than not to flow from' [the basic facts]" and "the presumption is not the sole and sufficient basis for a finding of guilt." Id. at 165-66 & n. 28, 167, 99 S.Ct. 2213. Evaluating the application of the presumption on the facts before it, the Court observed that "[t]he argument against possession by any of the [male defendants] was predicated solely on the fact that the guns were [found] in Jane Doe's pocketbook." But the surrounding circumstances made it "highly improbable" that the handguns were in her sole possession, id. at 163, 99 S.Ct. 2213, and assuming that the jury rejected that hypothesis,
the case is tantamount to one in which the guns were lying on the floor or the seat of the car in the plain view of the three other occupants of the automobile. In such a case, it is surely rational to infer that each of the [defendants] was fully aware of the presence of the guns and had both the ability and the intent to exercise dominion and control over the weapons.
Id. at 164-65, 99 S.Ct. 2213. Moreover, concerning the analogous automobile/narcotics presumption in New York law, the Court quoted the drafters' statement that "[w]e do not believe that persons transporting quantities of contraband are likely to go driving about with innocent friends or that they are likely to pick up strangers." Id. at 165-66 n. 27, 99 S.Ct. 2213. "Legislative judgments such as this one," the Court said, "deserve respect." Id. at 166 n. 27, 99 S.Ct. 2213.
As the Supreme Court made clear, New York's statutory presumption of possession from presence in a car with guns could not supplant the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The presumption was available to the prosecution "as one not necessarily sufficient part of its proof." Ulster County, 442 U.S. at 166, 99 S.Ct. 2213. Thus, Ulster County does not support the proposition that a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt may be based solely on evidence that contraband was found in an automobile in plain view, conveniently accessible to the passenger defendant. Nonetheless, as in the passages that we have quoted in the preceding paragraph of this opinion, the Court unquestionably affirmed the probativeness of such evidence on all of the elements of constructive possession. Indeed, the Court noted, as evincing a reasonable distinction, that while the jury convicted the defendants of possessing the guns exposed in the passenger compartment, it acquitted them of possessing a loaded machine gun and heroin located in the trunk of the car. See id. at 155 n. 14, 162 n. 23, 166 n. 29, 99 S.Ct. 2213. The principal factor that explained this difference in outcome was the defendants' proximity to exposed weapons in the passenger compartment, and the rational inferences of knowledge and ability and intent to exercise control which that proximity supported. See id. at 166 n. 29, 99 S.Ct. 2213.
We need only add that the reasonableness of such inferences holds true even when a legislature has not made them statutory. As Judge Schwelb put it in Rivas I, "[i]f a legislature may indulge such a presumption, . it should not be unreasonable for an impartial jury to draw a similar inference." 734 A.2d at 658 n. 6.
D.
Acknowledging, then, the relevance of the evidence that Rivas was seen in close proximity to exposed drugs in the confined space of an automobile, we turn to the remaining issue. Was the evidence adduced in this case sufficient to prove possession by Rivas beyond a reasonable doubt? We hold that it was not.
Before discussing the sufficiency of that evidence, we think it useful to review the principles that must guide our evaluation; for this truly is a case that turns not on the absence of proof, but on the difference between the reasonable doubt standard and less stringent standards of proof.
The reasonable doubt standard of proof requires the factfinder "to reach a subjective state of near certitude of the guilt of the accused." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Proof of a fact beyond a reasonable doubt is thus "more powerful" than proof that the fact is "more likely true than not;" more powerful, even, than proof "that its truth is highly probable." (Darius) Smith v. United States, 709 A.2d 78, 82 (D.C.1998) (en banc) (approving formulation of reasonable doubt as "the kind of doubt that would cause a reasonable person, after careful and thoughtful reflection, to hesitate to act in the graver or more important matters in life"). This requirement, a component of due process, "'plays a vital role in the American scheme of criminal procedure,' because it operates to give 'concrete substance' to the presumption of innocence, to ensure against unjust convictions, and to reduce the risk of factual error in a criminal proceeding." Jackson, 443 U.S. at 315, 99 S.Ct. 2781 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970)).
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not merely a guideline for the trier of fact; it also furnishes a standard for judicial review of the sufficiency of the evidence. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 316-17, 99 S.Ct. 2781 (reasonable doubt standard is "more than simply a trial ritual"). Judicial review is deferential, giving "full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts." Id. at 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781. A court must deem the proof of guilt sufficient if, "after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. (emphasis in the original). But this formulation does not mean that appellate review of sufficiency of the evidence is toothless. "We do not . fulfill our duty through rote incantation of these principles followed by summary affirmance." United States v. Long, 284 U.S.App.D.C. 405, 409, 905 F.2d 1572, 1576 (1990). We have an obligation to take seriously the requirement that the evidence in a criminal prosecution must be strong enough that a jury behaving rationally really could find it persuasive beyond a reasonable doubt.
This requirement means more than that there must be some relevant evidence in the record in support of each essential element of the charged offense. "The fact that evidence is relevant does not automatically make it sufficient to support a criminal conviction." Jon O. Newman, Beyond "Reasonable Doubt", 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979, 996 (1993). Slight evidence is not sufficient evidence; a "mere modicum" cannot "rationally support a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson, 443 U.S. at 320, 99 S.Ct. 2781 (citation omitted). Moreover, while "[a] jury is entitled to draw a vast range of reasonable inferences from evidence, [it] may not base a verdict on mere speculation." Long, 284 U.S.App.D.C. at 409, 905 F.2d at 1576. "[T]he evidence is insufficient if, in order to convict, the jury is required to cross the bounds of permissible inference and enter the forbidden territory of conjecture and speculation." Curry v. United States, 520 A.2d at 263.
In short, "if the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the government, is such that a reasonable juror must have a reasonable doubt as to the existence of any of the essential elements of the crime," then the evidence is insufficient and we must say so. Curry, 520 A.2d at 263 (emphasis in the original) (citation omitted).
Turning now to the evidence in this case, it has the quality of a snapshot — a frozen instant in time and space, crystalized but devoid of explanatory context. The police discovered two bags of cocaine, worth a few hundred dollars on the street, lying exposed to view in the front console of Melgar's vehicle. Rivas had just been seen sitting for a few moments in the front passenger seat, in the company of Melgar himself and two other passengers. But there was no evidence as to how long Rivas had been in the car, how he had come to be there, or what he had been doing. There was no evidence that the occupants of the car were actively engaged in distributing drugs or preparing them for distribution when Rivas was present. When the police arrived, Rivas made no gestures toward the drugs and did not signal in any other way an intent to hide or dispose of them. No other evidence was presented that linked Rivas to the cocaine.
There is no serious doubt that at least one of the car's occupants was in possession of the drugs, and the jury could reasonably infer that Melgar, who was the owner and driver of the automobile and who was found with $236 in cash on his person, had control over its contents. But that does not mean that any of the other occupants shared possession of the cocaine with Melgar (indeed, the government did not charge the two rear seat passengers with possession), nor that Rivas in particular had a stake in it.
The government argues that the jury could find that Rivas jointly possessed the cocaine with Melgar in light of three factors. First and foremost, the government points to Rivas's proximity to drugs lying unconcealed next to him as one factor the jury could rely on to conclude that he possessed them. Second, the government argues that the jury could infer that Rivas was Melgar's ally in distributing drugs from his car from the fact that Melgar apparently entrusted Rivas with immediate access to the drugs. And third, the government argues that Rivas's actions after the police arrived suggested a person distancing himself from drugs in his possession; for having left the car door open, Rivas evidently intended to return to the car, but he changed his mind and took evasive action when the police signaled their intent to investigate.
Could a reasonable jury find that these factors add up to proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Rivas knowingly had the ability and the intention to exercise control over the cocaine? Knowledge of the cocaine, yes; ability, yes; but intention to exercise control over the cocaine, no — not beyond a reasonable doubt. A reasonable jury perhaps could find it more likely than not that Rivas jointly possessed the cocaine with Melgar. But that is where we think any reasonable jury would have to draw the line. In the record before us there is no substantial evidence of "some action, some word, or some conduct that links [Rivas] to the narcotics and indicates that he had some stake in them, some power over them." Pardo, 204 U.S.App. D.C. at 277, 636 F.2d at 649. If the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt means anything, the factors on which the government relies are not compelling enough to permit a reasonable jury to find Rivas guilty.
The first factor, Rivas's immediate proximity to unconcealed drugs in an automobile, certainly does make it more probable that he possessed the drugs. If the standard of proof were less rigorous, this evidence alone might have been enough to support Rivas's conviction. But the evidence that Rivas knowingly sat next to the cocaine in Jose Melgar's car did not by itself prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he "was not merely an incidental bystander." Pardo, 204 U.SApp.D.C. at 277, 636 F.2d at 549. Perhaps, for example, Rivas accepted a ride with Melgar not knowing there were drugs present until some time after he got in the car. Or Rivas may have been aware that Melgar had cocaine in his vehicle, but rode in the car anyway, intending to do nothing more than (foolishly) ride around with a friend who was also a drug dealer. The critical question is whether the other factors cited by the government add anything substantial to the mix, i.e., whether they reasonably combine with knowing presence to permit an inference of joint possession beyond a reasonable doubt.
The second factor on which the government relies is not about Rivas's state of mind; it is about Melgar's. The argument is that Melgar would not have been likely to let Rivas sit in the car next to the cocaine unless Rivas was part of his criminal operations. But whatever assumptions a jury might reasonably make about the usual operating procedures of drug dealers in general, and particularly those displaying large quantities of drugs, it is pure speculation that in this particular case Melgar — about whom we know nothing— was cautious rather than careless. Indeed, even if Melgar was cautious, he could have had many reasons to trust Rivas without Rivas having been part of his drug trafficking operation or having joint possession of his drugs. If knowing proximity to drugs is insufficient to prove guilt, being permitted to be in proximity adds virtually nothing unless the evidence also divulges why permission was granted. Melgar's unexplained willingness to let Rivas near his drugs in the circumstances of this case does not illuminate the intent of Rivas.
The government's third factor is Rivas's conduct after the police arrived: exiting the car when he (presumably) saw them drive up, leaving the door open behind him, and walking around the corner and out of sight when the officers approached the car on foot. We find these facts to be too equivocal to be informative on the central question of Rivas's intentions vis-a-vis the drugs. Rivas's behavior may have been evasive (though hardly stealthy or precipitous), but "[i]n our cases, we have looked for more than "walking away' to find manifestation of a consciousness of guilt." M.I.W., 667 A.2d at 577. We have appreciated that even "[ljeaving a scene hastily may be inspired by innocent fear, or by a legitimate desire to avoid contact with the police." Id. at 576 (quoting Smith v. United States, 558 A.2d 312, 316 (D.C.1989) (en banc)). "Headlong flight" may be "the consummate act of evasion: . not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but . certainly suggestive of such." Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000). But Rivas did not engage in headlong flight or anything close. Assuming that the jury could conclude that Rivas did mean to distance himself while the police were around, that might reinforce the implication that he knew there was cocaine in the car and did not want to be connected with it, but it does not show also that he "had some stake in" the drugs himself. Staten, 189 U.S.App.D.C. at 106, 581 F.2d at 884. The additional fact that Rivas left the car door open, while perhaps suggesting that he planned to reenter the car and hence that he may have been more than a momentary or casual occupant, is marginally significant at best. If Rivas's guilt cannot be inferred from the fact that he was in Melgar's car for an unknown length of time, it cannot be inferred from the fact that he expected to continue to be in Mel-gar's car.
In short, an innocent person in Rivas's shoes might have acted exactly as he did when the police arrived. On the issue of whether he exercised control over the cocaine, Rivas's actions were insolubly ambiguous. Cf. Speight v. United States, 599 A.2d 794, 798 (D.C.1991).
III.
When the government proves the presence of contraband in an automobile, in plain view, conveniently accessible to a passenger defendant, the additional evidence necessary to prove constructive possession is comparatively minimal. As Rivas acknowledges in his brief,
it could be a furtive gesture indicating an attempt to access, hide or dispose of the object, flight or other evidence of consciousness of guilt, evidence of participation in an ongoing criminal venture involving the contraband, an inculpatory statement, evidence of prior possession of the item, actual possession of paraphernalia relating to the use or sale of the contraband, control of the area or container in which the contraband is found, or the like.
In this case, however, such additional probative evidence was lacking. The jury could only speculate about whether Rivas possessed the critical intent to exercise dominion or control over the cocaine in Melgar's car, or just happened to be present in the wrong place at the wrong time. The circumstances were suspicious, and perhaps Rivas is probably guilty; but on the thin record of this case, a reasonable doubt about his guilt ineluctably remains. The risk that an innocent man was convicted is therefore unacceptably large under our system of justice. Fidelity to the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases requires that we reverse Rivas's conviction for insufficiency of the evidence.
So ordered.
. See Curry v. United States, 520 A.2d 255, 263 (D.C.1987).
. Melgar had $236 in small denominations of bills on his person.
. In Bernard, the first case in which this court fully and explicitly articulated the elements of constructive possession, we stated:
To establish constructive possession it is not sufficient for the prosecution to show that appellants were within reach of the drugs; mere proximity to an illegal item is not enough. Rather, the government must establish that appellants knew of the location of the cocaine and that they exercised dominion and control over it. Specifically, the prosecution was required to prove that each appellant knowingly had both the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion or control over the cocaine.
575 A.2d at 1195 (internal citations omitted).
. Nor is it disputed that, if Rivas constructively possessed the cocaine, he did so with the intent to distribute it. See, e.g., Earle v. United States, 612 A.2d 1258, 1270 (D.C.1992) (packaging of drugs "in ziplock bags, in amounts regularly sold and purchased on the street," sufficient to establish intent to distribute).
. As Judge Ruiz observed in her concurring opinion in Rivas I, automobile passengers
are of necessity in close proximity to the belongings of others and have an opportunity to see them and have ready access to them.... That knowledge and proximity, however, do not mean that we intend to exercise control over our neighbor's belongings .
734 A.2d at 663.
. The Court noted that New York had an "analogous [statutory] automobile/narcotics presumption." Ulster County, 442 U.S. at 165 n. 27, 99 S.Ct. 2213.
. The Court noted that the male defendants were not "hitchhikers or other casual passengers," that the guns were too large to be concealed in Jane Doe's handbag, and that the bag was open "and part of one of the guns was in plain view, within easy access of the driver of the car and even, perhaps, of the other two [male defendants] who were riding in the rear seat." Moreover, the Court reasoned, "[a]s a 16-year-old girl in the company of three adult men she was the least likely of the four to be carrying one, let alone two, heavy handguns":
It is far more probable that she relied on the pocketknife found in her brassiere for any necessary self-protection. Under these circumstances, it was not unreasonable for her counsel to argue and for the jury to infer that when the car was halted for speeding, the other passengers in the car anticipated the risk of a search and attempted to conceal their weapons in a pocketbook in the front seat. The inference is surely more likely than the notion that these weapons were the sole property of the 16-year-old girl.
Id. at 163-64, 99 S.Ct. 2213.
. Cf. Parker v. United States, 601 A.2d 45, 52 (D.C.1991) ("[Ajppellants, in an inconspicuous older model car, pulled to a halt in an area notorious for heroin trafficking at the time when daily drug sales typically begin.").
. Cf. Hamilton v. United States, 395 A.2d 24, 28 (D.C.1978) (gun found in car jointly occupied by appellant had been seen in his possession previously).
. As Judge Farrell ruefully observed in his concurrence in Rivas I, "[p]erhaps, especially in today's culture, the fact that a passenger has taken no steps to distance himself from drugs visibly meant for sale lying inches from him in a car driven by a friend says nothing, or too little, about whether he personally has 'some stake in [the drugs], some power over them.' " 734 A.2d at 659 (citation omitted). In this vein, Rivas complains that the government's position improperly "imposes on innocent citizens an affirmative obligation to distance themselves from contraband" that they are aware is at hand. The government counters that a jury should be able to draw guilty inferences from a person's failure to utilize readily available means of separating himself from marketable drugs, and that our cases have recognized as much. See Brown, 546 A.2d at 397 ("in full knowledge that [his code-fendant] was carrying the pistol, appellant knowingly and voluntarily continued his association with him"); Parker, 601 A.2d at 52 ("each [defendant] had control of whether to be present with the other at all"). We need not enter this debate in this case. Assuming that a passenger might remain in a vehicle containing contraband for so long a time and in such distinctive circumstances that his constructive possession of the contraband could be inferred, no such inference can be drawn in this case, given the total absence of evidence as to how long Rivas had been in Melgar's car and as to what he and the car had been doing before the police arrived.
. Although we indulge this interpretation of Rivas's behavior under our deferential standard of review, an alternative interpretation, also reasonable but favorable to Rivas rather than to the government, is that he left the car door open (knowingly exposing its interior to police inspection) and did not run away when he had the chance because he had no idea there were drugs in the vehicle.
. In Speight, this court deemed the evidence of constructive possession insufficient even though the appellant, who was found with others in a private apartment standing a few feet away from drugs and drug paraphernalia in plain view, gave a false name in order to conceal his identity at the time of his arrest. While we fully appreciated that engaging in elusive behavior to avoid detection can "indicate" consciousness of guilt, we held that appellant's use of an alias, combined with his proximity to drugs in plain view, "falls short . in establishing that appellant intended to exercise any dominion and control over the contraband in question or to guide its destiny." 599 A.2d at 796, 798. In words that might be applied almost verbatim to the present case, this court concluded:
Based on what the government has presented, there are at least three plausible explanations for appellant's presence: (1) he was innocently visiting a neighbor who happened to be engaged in illegal drug trafficking; (2) he was present in order to purchase drugs; or, (3) he was actively involved in the drug trafficking. The jury could only speculate as to appellant's actual role. We conclude that no reasonable juror could find that appellant's role was as a participant in drug trafficking in light of other plausible reasons for his presence.
Id. at 798.
.Needless to say, Rivas's listing of additional evidence that would, together with proximity to contraband in plain view, support a conviction for constructive possession is not exhaustive. We think it appropriate to add, as has already been intimated, that a claim of innocent presence becomes decidedly less plausible in an environment (vehicular or otherwise) that is rife with evidence of ongoing drug production or distribution, such as a manufacturing or cutting facility, a warehouse, or a staging or preparation area where a large quantity of drugs or drug paraphernalia is exposed to view.