Case Name: LUDWIG v. BRUNER
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1918-12-27
Citations: 203 Mich. 556
Docket Number: Docket No. 51
Parties: LUDWIG v. BRUNER.
Judges: Ostrander, C. J., and Steere, Stone, and Kuhn, JJ., concurred with Fellows, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 203
Pages: 556–565

Head Matter:
LUDWIG v. BRUNER.
1. Banks and Banking — Joint Deposits — Survivorship — Statutes — Joint Tenancy in Personalty.
Under Act Noi 248, § 3, Pub. Acts 1909 (section 8040, 2 Comp. Laws 1915), money deposited in a bank payable to husband or wife “either or the survivor,” on the death of the wife becomes the sole property of the husband.
2. Joint Tenancy — Personal Property — Survivorship.
Joint tenancy in personal property with its right of survivorship does not exist in this State.
3. Same — Estates op Decedents — Husband and Wipe.
Where a husband and wife, on the sale of a farm held by them by the entireties, took a purchase money mortgage “as joint tenants,” the husband as survivor of his wife did not take title to her interest in the mortgage, in the absence of testimony tending to establish a gift 'inter vivos or one causa mortis. Bird, Moore, and Brooke, JJ., dissenting.
See note in L. R. A. 1917C, 550.
Appeal from Kalamazoo; Weimer, J.
Submitted January 11, 1918.
(Docket No. 51.)
Decided December 27, 1918.
Bill by Samuel D. Ludwig against Henry W. Bruner, executor of the last will of Sarah E. Ludwig, deceased, to determine the title to a certificate of deposit and a mortgage. Defendant filed a cross-bill for an accounting. From a decree for defendant, plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed in part, and reversed in part.
David Anderson, for plaintiff.
W. J. Losinger, for defendant.
On October 9, 1883, plaintiff purchased a farm in St. Joseph county, Michigan, taking title thereto in his own name. On January 17, 1885, the title to said farm was placed in “Samuel Ludwig & Sarah E. Ludwig, husband and wife, as joint tenants.” At the time, the title to the farm was placed in the names of plaintiff and his wife as tenants by the entireties, Mrs. Ludwig contributed a considerable portion, perhaps more than one-half of the value thereof, which was used to pay off the mortgage thereon. From January 17, 1885, until December 11, 1914, a period of almost 30 years, plaintiff and his wife lived upon said farm. On the latter date they sold it for $3,500. Of this sum there appears to have been paid $1,800 in cash and a purchase money mortgage was given by the vendee to the vendors for $1,700. This mortgage runs to “Samuel Ludwig and Sarah E. Ludwig as joint tenants.” The mortgage was made collateral to a promissory note for the same amount in which the payees are described as in the mortgage. Of the $1,-800 paid in cash, $1,750 was at once deposited in the Kalamazoo County State Bank of Schoolcraft under a certificate made payable to “Samuel or Sarah E. Ludwig, either or the survivor.”
On August 30,1915, Sarah E. Ludwig executed with proper legal formalities a last will and testament by the terms of which she gave, devised and bequeathed all her estate both real and personal to her husband, the plaintiff herein, so long as he should live, with remainder over to her brother, Henry W. Bruner, defendant herein. On September 22, 1915, Sarah E. Ludwig died. Her will was admitted to probate without objection on the part of the plaintiff and a contest immediately arose between plaintiff and defendant, as administrator of Sarah E. Ludwig’s estate, as to the ownership of the certificate of deposit and the mortgage described. Plaintiff herein filed his bill in which the foregoing facts were set up and prayed that defendant be required to show by what right or title he claimed any of said securities or personal property. To this bill defendant filed an answer and cross-bill in which he prayed that plaintiff be compelled to account to defendant, as executor of the will of Sarah E. Ludwig, for said securities. The learned circuit judge filed an opinion in the case, by the terms of which the estate of Sarah E. Ludwig was held to be the owner of an undivided one-half of the proceeds of the certificate of deposit and of the mortgage, and a decree was entered in conformity with such opinion. From this decree plaintiff appeals.

Opinion:
Fellows, J.
(after stating the facts). SO' far as the certificate of deposit is concerned, we must hold that the court was in error, and that the property in the same rests solely in the plaintiff. There is not sufficient evidence in the case to lead us to conclude that the presumption created by the statute (Act No. 248, § 3, Pub. Acts 1909; 2 Comp. Laws 1915, § 8040) has been overcome. That act is applicable to the instant case. In re Rehfeld's Estate, 198 Mich. 249; People's State Bank v. Miller's Estate, 198 Mich. 783; Powell v. Pennock, 198 Mich. 573.
Touching the mortgage I think a different situation is presented. There is no testimony establishing or tending to establish a gift inter vivos or one causa mortis. This court has repeatedly held that in the absence of proof sufficient to establish either a gift inter vivos or causa mortis the survivor in case of joint title in personal property does not take the entire title by such survivorship. Wait v. Bovee, 35 Mich. 425; Luttermoser v. Zeuner, 110 Mich. 186; Burns v. Burns, 132 Mich. 441; State Bank of Croswell v. Johnson, 151 Mich. 538. These cases and others which might be cited establish to my mind the doctrine in this State that joint tenancy in personal property with its right of survivorship does not exist. I fully discussed this question in the recent case of Hart v. Hart, 201 Mich. 207, and shall not here repeat what was there fully considered.
I am impressed that under our decisions, neither by force of the language here employed or by force of the law, did the defendant as survivor of his wife take title to her interest in this mortgage. The doctrine of stare decisis, in my judgment, prevents us from holding that the defendant here takes the entire mortgage.
Wait v. Bovee, supra, was written over 40 years ago. It laid down a rule. It was a rule of property which has been followed by this court without deviation ever since. In the instant case the mortgage runs to the husband and wife "as joint tenants"; in the case of State Bank of Croswell v. Johnson, supra, the certificate of deposit was indorsed with a direction to issue a new certificate to the husband and wife "or the survivor of them." Had the argument here advanced by my Brother Bird been there accepted by this court there would have been no occasion to there consider the questions of fact involved. But this court there declined to deviate in the slightest degree from Wait v. Bovee and expressly stated:
"Our decisions that the law of survivorship does not apply in the case of joint ownership of personal property does not affect the right of a donor to make a gift to his surviving wife."
—and held that the transaction there involved partook of the nature both of a gift inter vivos and of a gift causa mortis. In Burns v. Burns, supra, the deposit originally stood in the name of the husband; by his direction the wife's name was added, the husband saying, "That it was as much her money as it was his money." The money was held to belong to the husband's estate.
I doubt that it may be said to be a matter of common knowledge that many married people iñ every community are holding their personal property in supposedly joint tenancies. I think it may be a matter of common knowledge that many of them have their savings deposited in banks payable to them or either or the survivor of them, or words of similar purport. The legislature of the State has taken cognizance of this fact and has provided a rule of evidence in such cases. Section 8040, 2 Comp. Laws 1915. But it has gone no farther. If, in legislative wisdom, it should go farther and apply such rule of evidence to personal property generally, affirmative action by that co-ordinate branch of the government should be required. This court should not reverse a rule of property which has been unquestioned for over 40 years, and under which, rights of creditors of decedents have, been protected and no small amount of revenue by way of inheritance taxes has been contributed to the support of the State government.
I think the decree of the court below as to the certificate of deposit should be reversed, and as to the mortgage should be affirmed. Plaintiff should have his costs in this court, but neither party should recover costs of the hearing at the circuit.
Ostrander, C. J., and Steere, Stone, and Kuhn, JJ., concurred with Fellows, J.