Case Name: William M. Estes, Appellee, v. Board of Supervisors of Mills County et al., Appellants
Court: Iowa Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Iowa
Decision Date: 1927-12-13
Citations: 204 Iowa 1043
Docket Number: 
Parties: William M. Estes, Appellee, v. Board of Supervisors of Mills County et al., Appellants.
Judges: Evans, C. J., and De Graff, Albert, and Wagner, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Iowa Reports
Volume: 204
Pages: 1043–1046

Head Matter:
William M. Estes, Appellee, v. Board of Supervisors of Mills County et al., Appellants.
December 13, 1927.
W. E. Mitchell and W. 8. Lewis', for appellants.
■C. E. Dean and C. H. Coolcfiífür appellee.

Opinion:
Morling, J.
Pony Creek Drainage District was established about 1902, and the improvements constructed. It seems that bonds have been issued, of which $5,000 are outstanding. There have been three clean outs, and some widening, remodeling, and relocating. The average annuaj expenditure since establishment has been about $76,000. The- evidence is that, to keep up' the improvements, work from time to time will-be-required. Since establishment, various tracts of land have been taken out of the district, by. formal or informal action of the board, and new classifications have been made. Defendant Vinton is the owner of land included in the district at the time of its original establishment. He endeavored to obtain drainage into the Pony Creek ditch, of water which it was claimed did not naturally find its outlet that wayl His effort was unsuccessful, and he thereupon petitioned the board to have his land excluded from the -district. He says:
"The board of supervisors proposed to me that they would take my-land-'out, and I would take the water across the road, and whenever I'got"'drainage, I paid drainage taxes."
The board, without notice to the other landowners, adopted a resolution excluding the Vinton land from the district. Vinton was one of the'three members of the board. All three voted for the resolution. The plaintiff owns land in the district. He knew of the action of the board in time to appeal.
I. Defendants urge that plaintiff had a remedy by appeal, and that his remedy by appeal was adequate and exclusive; that he therefore cannot resort to certiorari.- The action of the boapd in excluding land from the district, if without . . -jurisdiction,' .though reviewable on appeal, may ' x x 3 . also be reviewed on certiorari. The remedy by . . appeal is not exclusive when the action complained of is without jurisdiction. Berkey v. Thompson, 126 Iowa 394; Sinnott v. District Court, 201 Iowa 292.
II, Defendants rely on Mittman v. Farmer, 162 Iowa 364, 374, as authority sustaining the power of the board to take land out of an established district. That case was an appeal from the order of establishment, -and- is not in, point. No statute conferring upon the board powerto exclude lands from the district after establishment has beehvmlled- to' our: attention, and we think that the implication of such power would be repugnant to the; tenor1 and purpose • of the' drainage- laws. See Section 1989-a21, Code Supplement, 1913. This district was established before the-, adoption of the drainage law of 1904, Chapter 68, Acts. of:'the-.Thirtieth General Assembly. See-Chapter 67, Acts of the Thirtieth- General Assembly. The parties in argument apparently-assume the applicability of the drainage-law as it is now contained in the Code of 1924.
The inclusion- of land in a drainage district by Original establishment is conclusive unless appealed from. It cannot thereafter be asserted that such land is not benefited by the improvement; Thompson v. Board of Supervisors, 201 Iowa 1099; Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Board of Supervisors, 182 Iowa 60; Code Supplement, 1913, Section 1989-al2; Code of 1924, Section 7474.
- ' ' The classification as finally adopted shall remain the basis of-all future assessments for the purpose" of said district unless revised by the board in the manner provided for reclassification." Code of 1924, Section 7476; Section 1989-al2, Code Supplement, 1913.
See Code Supplement, 1913, Sections 1946, 1946-a to 1946-e, inclusive.
• The drainage law prior, as well as subsequent, to 1904 provided for the issuance of drainage bonds. Code" of 1897, Section 1953; Code of 1924, Section 7503. The district after establishment is under the control of the" board, Whose duty it is to keep the improvement in repair. The board may cause the drains to be enlarged, and the location chang-ed. Code of 1924, Section 7556; Code Supplement, 1913, Section 1989-a21. It is provided:
"The cost of such repairs or change shall be paid by the board from the drainage fund -of said levee or drainage district, or by assessing and levying the cost "of such change or repair upon the lands in the same proportion that the original expenses and cost of construction were levied and assessed, except " Code Supplement, 1913,- Section 1989-a21.
See, also, Code of 1924, Sections 7557, 7558, et seq.. Reclassification is provided for. Code of 1924, Sections 7492, 7494, 7562, and preceding statutes there referred to. See Code Supplement, 1913; Section 1946-a et seq. Provision is made for annexation of additional lands. Code of 1924, Section 7549 et seq., and citations to previous statutes. Also- for the establishment of a new district, to include a former one. Code of 1924, Sections 7554, 7555, and antecedent laws. The fact that these statutes, elaborate as they were when first enacted, and more só by amendment, make no provision for excluding lands from a district after final establishment, is significant of the intention of the legislature.
A drainage district is a co-operative enterprise. The improvements, frequently very large and valuable and expensive in maintenance, are constructed in reliance upon the liability of all the lands within it to contribute, not. merely to the original cost, but to upkeep. Long-time obligations are incurred. In many cases, the ditch is of sueh a character that it will become valueless in a comparatively short time unless repairs are made. Many drains require almost continuous repair and improvement. The.landowners are protected from unjust taxation originating in new conditions by the provision which the law makes for reclassification, for including other lands, .and for the establishment of a new district. If the board may take out one tract, it may ;take out another. Each- exclusion will furnish excuse for others. Supposed favoritism to one taxpayer will be urged as a reason for equivalent action in alleged • justice to another. Changes in boards will bring changes of sentiments and of favorites. Original physical conditions influential in the establishment of the district may be eliminated and forgotten, and present conditions may seem to call for exclusion of land that was originally greatly benefited. The legislature might well have considered that injustice was more likely to result, from denial than from granting to the board the power of post-establishment exclusion.
It is, we think, apparent, without farther elaboration,, that the board of supervisors was wholly without power or jurisdiction to exclude the lands in question from, the districtthat its order' now under review is void.- The .'writ of certiorari was properly sustained, and the. judgment is — Affirmed. .
Evans, C. J., and De Graff, Albert, and Wagner, JJ., concur.