Case Name: Frank Lester McCAIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2012-04-24
Citations: 84 So. 3d 1284
Docket Number: No. 1D10-5852
Parties: Frank Lester McCAIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: WOLF, PADOVANO, and MARSTILLER, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Third Series
Volume: 84
Pages: 1284–1284

Head Matter:
Frank Lester McCAIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 1D10-5852.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
April 24, 2012.
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Steven L. Seliger, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Charmaine M. Millsaps, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
The appellant in this case challenges his convictions for possession of pseu-doephedrine with intent to manufacture a controlled substance and for unlawful manufacturing of methamphetamine. The possession charge is a violation of section 893.149(l)(b), Florida Statutes (2010), and the manufacturing charge is a violation of section 893.13(l)(a)l., Florida Statutes (2010). The appellant asserts that under Shelton v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, 802 F.Supp.2d 1289 (M.D.Fla.2011), both statutes are facially unconstitutional because they require felony punishments for strict liability offenses.
We have previously rejected the argument that section 893.13 creates a strict liability crime. See, e.g., Flagg v. State, 74 So.3d 138, 141 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011); Williams v. State, 45 So.3d 14, 16 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010); Harris v. State, 932 So.2d 551, 552 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). "Shelton is not binding on this court or any other state court," Flagg at 140, and the appellant does not persuade us to recede from our settled precedent.
In addition, under section 893.149(l)(a), it is unlawful "to knowingly or intentionally" possess a chemical listed in section 893.033 with the intent to unlawfully manufacture a controlled substance. The plain statutory language thus rebuts Appellant's argument for strict liability.
For these reasons, we AFFIRM the appellant's convictions.
WOLF, PADOVANO, and MARSTILLER, JJ., concur.