Case Name: RICHARD v. BALDWIN LUMBER CO., Ltd.
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1915-01-11
Citations: 142 La. 829
Docket Number: No. 20901
Parties: RICHARD v. BALDWIN LUMBER CO., Ltd.
Judges: 
Reporter: Louisiana Reports
Volume: 142
Pages: 829–835

Head Matter:
(77 South. 645)
No. 20901.
RICHARD v. BALDWIN LUMBER CO., Ltd.
(Jan. 11, 1915.
On the Merits, Jan. 3, 1918. Rehearing Denied Feb. 7, 1918.)
(Syllabus by Editorial Staff.)
1. Appeal and Error <&wkey;810 — Hearing-Preferred Causes.
Act No. 17 of 1876 provides that certain appeals shall be placed upon the summary docket including appeals from judgments against sureties upon judicial bonds and injunction cases. Held, that this statute is in derogation of common right, and should be strictly construed, and therefore does not apply to appeals from judgments in injunction cases, but only to appeals from judgments against sureties on injunction bonds.
2. Appeal'and Error <@=>810 — Hearing — Preferred Causes — “Injunction Case.”
If act No. 18 of 1876, relative to the appeals to be placed upon the summary docket, applies to appeals in injunction cases, an appeal by plaintiff in a suit to enjoin the operation of a railroad in which no preliminary injunction was asked and no injunction was granted was not an “injunction ease,” as the statute must refer to those cases where property has been tied up by an injunction; there being no reason for a preference in other cases.
[Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Injunction.]
On the Merits.
3. Waters and Water Courses <@=>119(5)— Obstruction of Drainage — Liability.
Plaintiff who sold timber to defendant and also granted defendant a servitude of way across his land on the Gulf coast for a railroad for removing the timber was not entitled to damages on the theory that the railroad prevented the recession of the water from his land after it had been flooded by a tidal wave and a heavy rain, where, though it appeared that the railroad did obstruct certain comparatively insignificant coulees, it also appeared that it was the high tides in the Gulf, and not the railroad, that prevented the water from receding.
4. Railroads <&wkey;82(6) — Grant of Right of WrAY — Rescission — “Dissolving Conditions.”
Under Civ. Code, art. 2045, providing that the “dissolving condition” is that which when accomplished operates the revocation of the obligation placing matters in the same state as though the obligation had not existed, and that it does not suspend the execution of the obligation, but only obliges the creditor to restore what he has received in case the event provided for in the condition takes place, plaintiff’s remedy if the railroad in fact did seriously obstruct the drainage was in damages and by mandatory injunction and not by rescission, as the status quo could not be restored.
[Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, Second Series, Dissolving Condition.]
Appeal from Twenty-Third Judicial District Court, Parish of St. Mary; H. D. Smith, Judge ad hoc.
Action by Arthur Richard against the Baldwin Lumber Company, Limited. From a judgment for plaintiff for insufficient relief, defendant appeals, and plaintiff also appeals.
Judgment affirmed in part, and set aside in part.
Foster, Milling, Saal & Milling, of Franklin, for plaintiff. Borah, Himel, Bloch & Borah, of Franklin, for defendant.

Opinion:
On Motion to Put Case on Summary Docket.
PROVO STY, J.
This suit is to annul a contract by which plaintiff granted a servitude of way over his land for a skidder railroad. Plaintiff asks that the contract be annulled, and that the defendant be enjoined from operating the skidder railroad. No preliminary injunction was asked, but the prayer is simply tha^ judgment be rendered enjoining the defendant. This prayer was denied, and no injunction has been granted.
Act 17, p. 36, of 1876, provides that the following appeals shall be placed upon the summary docket: Those "from judgments against sureties upon judicial bonds and injunction cases."
Plaintiff asks that the present case be put upon the summary docket as being an injunction case.
Said provision apparently has reference only to judgments against sureties on injunction bonds. It does not say from judgments in injunction cases. And it being in derogation of common right (for all cases should be treated alike and preference shown to none), it has to be strictly construed. But if said provision can be said to refer to injunction cases, it must be held to mean those cases where property has been tied up by an injunction. Except where a writ of injunction has actually issued we can think of no reason why preference should be given to an injunction case. If in this case judgment had gone against defendant, and the party asking that the case be put on the preference docket were the defendant and not the plaintiff, there might be some show of reason for calling the case an injunction case within the spirit of the said provision when, construed as having reference to injunction cases; but judgment has gone against plaintiff and the injunction has been refused, so that there is in fact no injunction in the case.
The order for the case to be placed on the summary docket must therefore be rescinded, and it is so ordered.