Case Name: Beasley v. Owen
Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
Jurisdiction: Virginia
Decision Date: 1800-04-17
Citations: 3 Hen. & M. 449
Docket Number: 
Parties: *Beasley v. Owen.
Judges: 
Reporter: Virginia Reports
Volume: 13
Pages: 724–729

Head Matter:
*Beasley v. Owen.
Monday, April 17th, 1800.
Appellate Practice — Dismissal of Suits — Redocketing. —If the Clerk of the Court of Appeals be directed by the Court to set aside a judgment, and, by misapprehension. the entry of the order be omitted, it may be done at a subsequent term, and the cause re-docketed.
Statute of Frauds — Loan of Slaves. — Construction of the statute of frauds and perjuries, as to loans of slaves.
Same — Same —Case at Bar. — w. H. by his will, dated in 1789, gave a slave, then in possession of his son-in-law, W. B. to his two grandsons, J. B. and E. B. (sons of the said W. B. and at that time infants), as soon as they should come to lawful age; in 1792, he verbally lent the slave to his said son-in-law, “for the purpose of assisting in the maintenance of his children,” reserving the right to take him back whenever he should think proper: and, in 1796, four years afterwards, died; in the same year his will was admitted to record, the surviving grand-child being still under age; in 1801, when that grand-child attained his full age. the slave was taken in execution, and publicly sold as the property of W. B. It was held that the recording of the will, in 1796, was a sufficient declaration, within the meaning of the statute of frauds, to protect the right of the grand-child, in opposition to the claims of the creditors of the father.
At the last term, this cause was argued and decided; but, at Mr. Hay’s request, who stated it to be a case of the first impression on a branch of our statute of frauds, which was not to be found in the statute of 29th Car. II. and that it was of great importance that such an adjudication should be made as would most effectually prevent frauds, in the loan of personal property, the Court»consented to a re-argument at the present term; and accordingly directed the Clerk to set aside the judgment. The Clerk, not hearing the directions of the Court, omitted to make the entry; and the question now was, in what manner the cause should again be put on tlie docket.
Mr. Hay cited Thornton v. Corbin, as in point.
Mr. Call (as amicus curia) also cited Murray and others v. Carrot & Co. in which case, he observed, a similar order had been made.
The directions of the Court, in this case, were recollected by the bar, and noted by Judge Tucker, as well as by the reporters-
JUDGE ROANE considered this a much stronger case than Thornton v. Corbin. There the omission arose from a mistake of the counsel; here it was the act of an officer of the Court, whose duty it was to make the entry. He was in favour of re-docketing the cause.
JUDGE TUCKER said, that having himself taken a note of the resolution of the Court, and being assured also by the ^gentlemen who report its decisions, that such an order was made, he could have no difficulty in granting the motion to re-docket the cause, especially as it was warranted by precedents.
JUDGE EEEMING concurring; the cause was re-docketed by the unanimous opinion of the judges.
On the merits.
This cause was argued, at the last term, by M’Rae, for the appellant, (Beasley,) and Hay, for the appellee, (Owen,) and again, at this term, by George K. Taylor and M’Rae, for the appellant, and Hay, for the appellee.
The facts, as disclosed by the appellant’s bill of exceptions, (who was defendant in the Court below,) were, that William Hurt, grandfather of the appellant, lent, in the year 1792, a slave, the subject of the present controversy, to his son-in-law, William Beasley, (the appellant’s father,) to assist in maintaining his (the said William’s) children, reserving the right of taking back the said slave when he should think proper; that the said William Hurt departed this life, in the year 1796, before the expiration of five years from the time of the loan, and while the appellant was an infant; that the said William Hurt had previously, by his will, bearing date the 31st of August, 1789, which was partly proved in Nottoway County Court, in December, 1796, and fully proved on the 5th of January, 1797, (and which is set out in haec verba,) among other things, bequeathed the said slave as follows: “Item, I give unto my two grandsons, John Beasley and Edwin Beasley, the negro' man, now in possession of William Beasley, their father, as soon as they came to lawful age, to be equally divided between them, to them and their heirs forever. Item, my will is, that my son-in-law, William Beasley, shall not have any part of my estate, except what I had given him in the lifetime of my daughter Anne, his late wife;” &c. that John Beasley, the brother and co-legatee of the appellant, died in the lifetime of the testator; and that the *other distributees of the estate of William Hurt, the grandfather, had released all their right to the slave in question to the appellant; that the appellant became of full age in 1801, and was living, as a storekeeper, with a merchant in Petersburg, at that date, when the slave was seized, and publicly sold, by the Sheriff of Charlotte County, (about 90 miles distant from Petersburg',) by virtue of an execution ■against the goods and chattels of the appellant’s father, William Beasley; and the appellee became the purchaser, as the highest bidder, at the sale; (which was not proved to have been forbidden;) that the ■said William Hurt delivered the slave to William Beasley, more than five years before the seizure and sale aforesaid, and that he had continued possessed of the said slave from the time of such delivery, until he was so seised and sold by the sheriff; that, after the appellee (who was the plaintiff in the Court below) had purchased the slave as aforesaid, and had him in his possession, the appellant, in February, 1802, -possessed himself of him; to regain which possession, an action of detinue was brought, to which the defendant pleaded non detinet, and issue thereupon.
On the above statement of facts, the plaintiff moved the Court to instruct the Jury, that the peaceable and uninterrupted possession, by the said William Beasley, of the slave in question, by virtue of a loan from William Hurt, having continued from the year 1792 till the year 1801, subjected the said slave to the payment of the debts of the said William Beasley, by execution in the year 1801, although William Hurt, the lender, died in the year 1796, after having made a will, in which the said slave is bequeathed, as aforesaid, to his two grandsons. The Court did so instruct the Jury, and the defendant excepted to their opinion. Verdict for the plaintiff for the slave, of the price of 1401. and ISO dollars for detention. The defendant appealed to this Court.
M’Rae, for the appellant.
The ground of the instruction of the Court below was, that the loan made by William *Hurt was not a bona fide, but a pretended loan, coming within the meaning of the statute of frauds. We contend that it was a fair transaction.
On comparing our statute of frauds with the 29th Car. IX. it will be observed, that no provision exists in the latter respecting loans: it follows, then, that no adjudication of the Courts of England, founded on that statute, can apply to the case before us.
If the loan, which was made in 1792, had continued for more than five years, without demand, or declaration made shewing that the purposes of the loan were fair, there could be no question but the purchaser of the slave would be protected; but, according to the letter and meaning of the act, this loan ought to be considered as preventing the mere possession from giving a title. It is true, at the time of the loan, there was no declaration; but the person lending died in 1796; and the person enjoying the loan had had the slave in his possession for four years only, when the will of Hurt was proved, which made a disposition of the property, and was a complete declaration within the meaning of the act.
The five years not having elapsed, the right of the lender existed as fully then as when the slave was lent. The four years’ possession did not give a title. Where is the difference between the lender’s making a declaration by his will, and doing it the next day after the loan made? The possession not having given right, there was nothing to prevent the lender from disposing of the slave by his will.
No fraud appears in the whole transaction. The loan was publicly made, for the laudable purpose of supporting the infant grandchildren of the lender, who reserved the right of taking back the property whenever he should think proper.
Hay, for the appellee.
William Beasley was in possession of the slave in 1801: by virtue of an execution, he was taken and sold, in the year 1802, and the appellee (Owen) became the purchaser: it is now contended that Beasley was not the proprietor 1 It is not material whether he was *the proprietor or not. He had been in possession so long, that, according to the laws of the land, the property was liable to be taken in execution, lie had had the uninterrupted possession from 1792 to 1801; was the ostensible owner to all the world; and it is now insisted, that a fair purchaser of this property, under execution, shall be deprived of it!
There was, in William Beasley, (notwithstanding the intervention of the death of the testator,) a continued possession of the slave, sufficient to protect a purchaser. It is the possession, unaccompanied by a declaration at the item of the loan, or uninterrupted by process of law, which the statute regards. The question of fraud was not considered by the Court below. It was not a contest between persons claiming under Hurt, but between a purchaser for valuable consideration, and a mere volunteer.
The declaration in the will of Hurt, has been relied upon by Mr. M’Rae. But the loan was verbally made. A subsequent declaration that a person has made a loan, does not take the case out of the statute. The law requires that the declaration should be made by that deed, or that will under which the benefit of the loan is claimed.
It is no objection to the title of the purchaser, that Hurt died, and that his will was published before the expiration 454 *of five years. The limitation having once begun to run, it never ceases to operate. This principle was recognised in Fitzhugh v. Anderson, But, in truth, the slave vested in the executors of Hurt; and the time he was held by them is to be added to the previous time, so as to constitute one continued term.
The very point decided in Ritzhugh v. Anderson, exists in this case ; and although that occurred anterior to our statute of frauds, yet, on general principles of law and equity, and for the protection of creditors, it was held that the loan should be deemed a gift.
M’Rae, in reply.
The case of Ritzhugh v. Anderson, did not turn on the construction of our statute of frauds, and the cases are totally different in all their leading circumstances. In that case, the loan was for an indefinite period, and for no specified object: the son enjoyed the slaves for a great length of time; used them as his own ; removed to a distant county, and acquired credit on the strength of his possession. That decision may be very correct, and still a very different one might, with great propriety, be given in this case. Here the loan was for a definite period: the object was, the support of the grandchildren of the lender; and so far from being fraudulent, it was humane and honourable.
Wednesday, March-22. The Judges pronounced their opinions.
Appellate Practice — Dismissal of Suits — Redocketing, —The principal case is cited xa. foot-note to Thornton v. Corbin, 3 Call 221; foot-note to Thornton v. Corbin, 3 Call 233; foot-note to Thornton v. Corbin, 3 Call 381; Emory v. Erskine, 7 Leigh 269.
See monographic note on “Appeal and Error” appended to Hill v. Salem, etc., Turnpike Co., 1 Rob. 263.
Slaves — Loan of. — See principal case cited in foot-note to Jordan v. Murray, 3 Call 86; foot-note to Turner v. Turner, 1 Wash. 139; Collins v. Lofftus. 10 Leigh 10; London v. Turner, 11 Leigh 411; Land v. Jeffries, 5 Rand. 267.
See monographic note on ‘(Fraudulent and Voluntary Conveyances"appended to Cochran v. Paris, 11 Gratt. 348.
3 Call, 221, 232.
3 Call, 373.
The statute of frauds and perjuries was first passed in Virginia, in the year 1785. and took effect the first day of January. 1787. (See Rev. Code, v. 1, c. 10, p. 15.) The statute 39 Oar. II. was never adopted in this State. The clause respecting loans, is in the following words: “Where any loan of goods and chattels shall be pretended to have been made to any person with whom, or those claiming under him, possession shall have remained by the space of five years, without demand made, and pursued by due process at law, on the part of the pretended lender, or where any reservation or limitation shall be pretended to have been made of a use or property, by way of condition, reversion, remainder, or otherwise, in goods and chattels, the possession whereof shall have remained in another, as aforesaid the same shall be taken, as to the creditors and purchasers of the persons aforesaid so remaining in possession, to be fraudulent within this act, and that the absolute property is with the possession, unless such loan, reservation, or limitation of use or property, were declared by will or by deed, in writing, proved and recorded as aforesaid;” i. e. if it include lands, as conveyances of land: if personal estate only, by two witnesses.- — Note in Original Edition.
2 Hen. & Munf. 289.

Opinion:
JUDGE TUCKER.
By the statute of frauds and perjuries, it is among other things enacted, "that where any loan of goods and chattels, shall be pretended to have been made to .any person, with whom, or those claiming under him, possession shall have remained for the space of five years, without demand made and pursued by due process at law, on the part of the pretended lender, the same shall be taken as to creditors and purchasers of the persons aforesaid, so remaining in possession to be fraudulent within that act, *and that the absolute property is with the possession, unless such loan, reservation. or limitation of use or property, were declared by will, or by deed, in writing, proved and recorded as therein before directed."
It appears by the bill of exceptions, that William Beasley, the debtor, in whose possession the slave in question was taken, by virtue of a writ of fjeri facias, and sold at public auction, by the sheriff, to the plaintiff, Owen, had been in peaceable possession of that slave from the year 1792, to 1801, under a loan thereof, from one William Hurt, who died in 1796, having made his will, dated in 1789, whereby he bequeathed the slave to the appellant, his grandson, who was not of age until 1801; and that Hurt's executors proved his will, and qualified as executors thereto in December, 1796. The clauses in the will which are relied on, in favour of the appellant, as taking the case out of the statute of frauds and perjuries, are as follows: "Item, I give to my two grandsons, John Beasley and Edwin, the negro man now in the possession of W. Beasley, their father, as soon as they may come to lawful age, to be equally divided, &c. Item, my will is, that my son-in-law, W. Beasley, shall not have any part of my estate, except what I had given him in the life-time of my daughter." The will was proved in Nottoway County, where the testator appears to have resided. The seizure and sale | of the slave were made by the Sheriff of Charlotte County. There is no residuary clause in the will, so that the value of the labour or hire of the slave from the testator's death until his grandson came of age in 1801, was undisposed of; the legal right to the slave and to his labour and hire, until that period, was consequently in the executors.
Ip considering this case, I am much inclined to doubt whether parol evidence of a loan of a slave, or of the conditions of such a loan, be admissible in a contest between a creditor or purchaser, from the person in possession, after that possession shall have continued peaceably, and without demand, for five y'ears; upon the grounds of this Court's decision in the case of Jordan v. Murray, and in Turner *v. Turner, there being the same reason, I conceive, for rejecting such evidence of a pretended loan, .since the statute of frauds and perjuries, as of a pretended gift, under the act of 1758, c. 1. But, as no exception was offered to the admission of such evidence, I pass it over. The object of the statute of frauds and perjuries, seems to me to have been, to shut out all question respecting the property of a slave held in possession by a debtor, or vendor, for the space of five years, as between a creditor of, or a purchaser from, the person, in whom such possession has remained without demand for five years, and the person claiming such slave as his own absolute property, by virtue of any loan, reservation, or limitation of a use thereof, or property therein, unless, such loan, &c. were declared by wilt or .by deed in writing, proved and recorded, as by that act is required. In the present case, I doubt whether the bequest contained in the will of W. Hurt, is sufficiently clear and explicit to answer the purposes of the act, by giving notice to all persons that the paramount right, and absolute property' in the slave, whose name is not mentioned, still remained in the representatives of the testator, William Hurt, notwithstanding the possession was and (as would appear from the will) had been in W. Beasley from the year 1789, to the time that the slave was. taken in execution in the year 1801. But as a majority of the Court are satisfied upon that point, I shall urge it no farthers and only add, that I am of opinion, that the judgment be affirmed.
JUDGE ROANE
was of a different opinion, and assigned his reasons for reversing the judgment, which need not here be stated, his subsequent opinion in this, case rendering it unnecessary.
3 Call, 85.
1 Wash. 139.