Case Name: C. E. SAMPLE, T/A SAMPLE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY v. PATRICK H. MORGAN and wife, IRENE S. MORGAN
Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: North Carolina
Decision Date: 1984-02-07
Citations: 66 N.C. App. 338
Docket Number: No. 831SC120
Parties: C. E. SAMPLE, T/A SAMPLE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY v. PATRICK H. MORGAN and wife, IRENE S. MORGAN
Judges: Judge Braswell concurs.
Reporter: North Carolina Court of Appeals Reports
Volume: 66
Pages: 338–341

Head Matter:
C. E. SAMPLE, T/A SAMPLE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY v. PATRICK H. MORGAN and wife, IRENE S. MORGAN
No. 831SC120
(Filed 7 February 1984)
Contracts § 6.1— general contractor with a limited license —ability to collect only amount of limited license
Plaintiff, who held a limited license as a general contractor for a single project “of a value [not to exceed] one hundred twenty-five thousand dollars ($125,000)” under G.S. 87-10, could not collect more than $125,000.00 on his contract with defendant even though plaintiff calculated the total cost of the house as $139,998.90 under a formula orally agreed to by the parties.
Judge Eagles dissenting.
APPEAL by plaintiff from Allsbrook, Judge. Judgment entered 24 September 1982 in Superior Court, Currituck County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 12 January 1984.
This is a civil action wherein plaintiff seeks to recover from defendants $19,667.08 plus interest pursuant to a contract to build a house on defendants’ property. The evidence introduced at trial shows the following: plaintiff and defendants entered into an oral contract whereby plaintiff agreed to build a house on defendants’ lot at a price of “cost of materials and labor plus 10°/o.” Plaintiff held a limited license as a general contractor for single projects “of a value [not to exceed] one hundred twenty-five thousand dollars ($125,000) . . under N.C. Gen. Stat. Sec. 87-10. At the time plaintiff was first approached by defendants about building the house, plaintiff estimated the cost at $130,000.00. Defendants felt that this was “too much” and the plans were substantially revised, yielding a new estimate of $115,000.00. When the house was completed, the plaintiff calculated the total cost of the house as $139,998.90 under the formula orally agreed to by the parties.
At the close of the plaintiffs evidence and again at the close of all the evidence defendants made motions “for a dismissal” “pursuant to Rule 50 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.” The court “reserved” ruling on the motions and submitted the case to the jury, which returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $11,000.00. The defendants then made a motion “for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, renewing . . . previous motions filed pursuant to Rule 50,” which motion was granted. From a judgment notwithstanding the verdict for defendants, plaintiff appealed.
O. C. Abbott for plaintiff, appellant.
Trimpi Thompson & Nash, by C. Everett Thompson, for defendants, appellees.

Opinion:
HEDRICK, Judge.
Plaintiff first contends "the trial court committed reversible error in granting defendants' motion to amend their answer." Plaintiff recognizes the well-established rule that a motion to amend "is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge," Smith v. McRary, 306 N.C. 664, 671, 295 S.E. 2d 444, 448 (1982) (citation omitted), but contends that the court's action in the instant case constitutes an abuse of discretion. We disagree, noting that plaintiff has failed to identify any prejudice resulting from the court's ruling in this regard. This assignment of error is overruled.
Plaintiff next contends that "the trial court committed reversible error in setting aside the verdict and granting defend ants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict." The un-controverted evidence discloses that plaintiff, a contractor, seeks to recover on a contract for construction of defendants' house an amount in excess of the statutory limitations of his contractor's license. The rule is clear that a contractor who violates statutory licensing requirements may not enforce a construction contract against an owner. Builders Supply v. Midyette, 274 N.C. 264, 162 S.E. 2d 507 (1968). Plaintiff seeks to escape imposition of this rule, however, by invoking the doctrine of "substantial compliance" most recently recognized in Barrett, Robert & Woods v. Armi, 59 N.C. App. 134, 296 S.E. 2d 10, disc. rev. denied, 307 N.C. 269, 299 S.E. 2d 214 (1982). The theory of "substantial compliance" relied on by plaintiff has been specifically and emphatically rejected by our Supreme Court in Brady v. Fulghum, 309 N.C. 580, 308 S.E. 2d 327 (1983). On this record plaintiff cannot collect more than $125,000.00 on his contract with defendants.
Affirmed.
Judge Braswell concurs.
Judge EAGLES dissents.