Case Name: Mike Mehlman v. The State
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1922-04-26
Citations: 92 Tex. Crim. 557
Docket Number: No. 6932
Parties: Mike Mehlman v. The State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Criminal Reports
Volume: 92
Pages: 557–560

Head Matter:
Mike Mehlman v. The State.
No. 6932.
Decided April 26, 1922.
Rehearing denied November 8, 1922.
1. —Receiving Stolen Property — Other Offenses — Evidence—Guilty Knowledge.
There is nothing in the nature of testimony in the instant case which differentiates it from the rule which sanctions proof of other criminal transactions in solving the .issue of guilty knowledge in prosecutions for this offense, and there was no error in admitting such testimony. Following Morgan v. State, 31 Texas Crim. Rep., 9, and other cases.
2. —Same—Charge of Court — Guilty Knowledge — Name of Owner.
There was no error in refusing to instruct the jury to acquit unless the defendant knew that the alleged property was stolen from the original owner, as it was enough if he knew it was stolen, and it was not necessary that the name of the owner should he alleged or proved.
3. —Same—Rehearing—Owner—Knowledge—Fraudulent Intent.
It was not necessary to prove that appellant, in receiving the property, knew it was stolen from any particular party, if he received it fraudulently, knowing that the same was acquired by theft.
4. —Same—Accomplice—Corroboration.
Where, upon trial, of receiving stolen property, the testimony of the accomplices was sufficiently corroborated, there was no reversible error.
5. —Same—Other Offenses — Evidence.
Upon trial of receiving stolen property, there was no error in admitting testimony of other like offenses, under the facts of this case. Following Hanks v. State, 117 S. W. Rep., 150. Distinguishing Bismark v. State, 45 Texas Crim. Rep., 54.
Appeal from the District Court of Ellis. Tried below before the Hon. W. L. Harding.
Appeal from a conviction of receiving and concealing stolen property; penalty, a fine of $100 and confinement in the county jail for 30 days.
Tom Whipple, for appellant.
— On question of knowledge and ownership : McKay v. State, 49 Texas Crim. Rep., 120; Kobb v. State, 88 id., 593, and cases cited in opinion.
R. G. Storey, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.

Opinion:
MORROW, Presiding Judge.
— Appellant appeals from a judgment of conviction of the offense of fraudulently receiving stolen property— a misdemeanor.
It is charged that he received property from Jess Lee Jones and Burniee Winn. The defense urged is that he received the property from Winn and not from Jones and that he did not know it was stolen.
Jones and Winn both testified that the property was stolen and that they together sold it to the appellant.
Appellant, in his confession and testimony, admits that he received the property and that Jones was present, but denies that he received it from Jones. There was testimony to the effect that on other occasions appellant had received stolen property from both Jones and Winn and others who acted with Winn on different occasions.
There is nothing in the nature of testimony in the instant ease, as revealed in the bills of exceptions, which differentiates it from the rule which sanctions proof of other criminal transactions in solving the issue of guilty knowledge in prosecutions for this offense. On the subject, Mr. Wharton says:
"In prosecutions for receiving stolen goods, guilty knowledge is the gist or substance of the offense to be established by the prosecution; and evidence of collateral offenses is admissible to establish such knowledge." (Wharton's Crim. Ev., Vol. 1, See. 35, p. 135.) See also Morgan v. State, 31 Texas Crim. Rep., 9; Kaufman v. State, 70 Texas Crim. Rep., 438; Hennessy v. State, 23 Texas Crim. Rep., 355.
There was no error in refusing to instruct the jury to acquit unless the appellant knew that the property was stolen from Coleman. It was enough if he knew it was stolen. It was not necessary that the name of the owner should be charged or proved. See Penal Code, Art. 1349, defining the offense; and for form of indictmént, see Branch's Ann. Tex. Penal Code, See. 2530.
The other complainants made by appellant of the manner of the trial have been considered but a discussion of them is deemed unnecessary, suffice it to say that from them we discern no error.
The judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.