Case Name: Donald W. ANDERS, Jr. v. Tracy ANDRUS; Brian Boney v. Tracy Andrus
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 2000-12-06
Citations: 773 So. 2d 289
Docket Number: Nos. 00-00552, 00-00553
Parties: Donald W. ANDERS, Jr. v. Tracy ANDRUS. Brian Boney v. Tracy Andrus.
Judges: Court composed of JOHN D. SAUNDERS, JIMMIE C. PETERS, and GLENN B. GREMILLION, Judges.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 773
Pages: 289–294

Head Matter:
Donald W. ANDERS, Jr. v. Tracy ANDRUS. Brian Boney v. Tracy Andrus.
Nos. 00-00552, 00-00553.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
Dec. 6, 2000.
Daniel G. Brenner, Bolen, Parker & Brenner, Ltd., Alexandria, Louisiana, Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants — Donald W. Anders, Jr. and Brian Boney.
Howard B. Gist, Jr., Gist, Methvin & Hughes, Alexandria, Louisiana, Counsel for Defendanf/Appellee — Odyssey Reinsurance.
Edward Larvadain, Alexandria, Louisiana, Counsel for Defendant/Appellee— Tracy Andrus.
Court composed of JOHN D. SAUNDERS, JIMMIE C. PETERS, and GLENN B. GREMILLION, Judges.

Opinion:
[JETERS, Judge.
Donald W. Anders, Jr., and Brian Boney, who are both Alexandria, Louisiana city police officers, filed separate suits against Tracy Andrus, wherein each man asserted that Andrus defamed him with comments made during a public forum. After consolidating their suits, both An-ders and Boney joined Andrus' homeowner's insurance carrier, Odyssey Reinsurance Company (Odyssey), as a party defendant. This appeal is before us because the trial court granted Odyssey's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the insurer from the litigation. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment in all respects.
The litigation arose because of comments made by Andrus at a June 21, 1999 public forum held in the Alexandria City Hall regarding the Alexandria Police Department's conduct. In his petition, An-ders asserted that Andrus "stated that [Anders] had been arrested and charged with the crime of criminal neglect of family" two years before the forum. Anders further asserted that the statement was false, that it constituted defamation per se, and that Andrus made the statement "with actual or implied malice." Boney asserted in his petition that "Andrus stated that [Boney] had threatened to kill [him] in the elevator following [his] arrest" and that, while in the elevator, "Boney would make the event appear that Andrus had attempted to go for and obtain Boney's side arm."
Odyssey based its request for summary judgment relief on the specific language of its policy relative to excluded conduct. The policy provides personal liability coverage for any claim "brought against an 'insured' for damages because of 'bodily injury'... caused by an 'occurrence' " as defined by the policy. However, the exclusions to the liability portion of the policy provide the following:
Personal Liability [coverage] [does] not apply to "bodily injury"...
|2a. Which is expected or intended by the "insured"....
Initially, Andrus denied the allegations of both petitions. In a deposition filed by the plaintiffs in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Andrus stated that he did not remember making the statement concerning Anders, but admitted making the statement concerning Boney. However, he also testified in the deposition that it was another officer, and not Boney, who actually made the statements he attributed to Boney. Despite asserting that he did not remember making the comment concerning Anders, when questioned by plaintiffs' counsel concerning his motivation for making the statements attributed to him, Andrus had a clear recollection of the Anders comment and testified as follows:
A. My intention was clearly to reflect on the fact that Officer Anders in particular had some things in his past that were beyond reproach to him becoming an officer.
Q. Anything else?
A. And that the court has had to monitor him to make him pay for support of his child, something that he should automatically be doing without having to go through the court system and be charged with criminal neglect of family.
Q. Was it your intention to make him look less credible in the public eye?
A. Not less credible, just to reveal facts. It would be upon the public to determine how they are going to view him. I am only revealing facts.
When questioned in the deposition by his attorney concerning his motivation, the following exchange took place:
Q. Reverend Andrus, do you have any envy or malice toward police officer An-ders?
A. No sir, not at all.
Q. Any toward Boney.... ?
[aA, No, sir.
Q. When you made these [sic] the statement that you made, did you have any intention of maliciously harming them?
A. No, sir, not at all.
Andrus went on to say that, if he did state that Anders had been arrested for criminal neglect of family, "that was just a mess up on [his] part."
The trial court held that the statements alleged to have been made by Andrus were intentional torts and, therefore, the Odyssey policy provided no coverage. In their appeal, Anders and Boney contend the trial court erred in reaching this conclusion.
OPINION
Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo under the same criteria that govern the trial court's consideration of whether or not summary judgment is appropriate in any given case. Cormier v. Albear, 99-1206 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/2/00); 758 So.2d 250. In Babin v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc., 00-0078, pp. 3-4 (La.6/30/00); 764 So.2d 37, 39-40, the Louisiana Supreme Court recently addressed the conditions under which a summary judgment should be granted:
A motion for summary judgment will be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact, and that mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." La.Code Civ. P. art. 966(B). This article was amended in 1996 to provide that "summary judgment procedure is designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action . The procedure is favored and shall be construed to accomplish these ends." La.Code Civ. P. art. 966(A)(2). In 1997, the legislature enacted La.Code Civ. P. art. 966(C)(2), which further clarified the burden of proof in summary judgment proceedings, providing:
The burden of proof remains with the movant. However, if the movant will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the matter that is before the court on the motion for [ ¿summary judgment, the movant's burden on the motion does not require him to negate all essential elements of the adverse party's claim, action, or defense, but rather to point out to the court that there is an absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party's claim, action, or defense. Thereafter, if the adverse party fails to produce factual support sufficient to establish that he will be able to satisfy his evidentiary burden of proof at trial, there is no genuine issue of material fact.
This amendment, which closely parallels the language of Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986), first places the burden of producing evidence at the hearing on the motion for summary judgment on the mover (normally the defendant), who can ordinarily meet that burden by submitting affidavits or by pointing out the lack of factual support for an essential element in the opponent's case. At that point, the party who bears the burden of persuasion at trial (usually the plaintiff) must come forth with evidence (affidavits or discovery responses) which demonstrates he or she will be able to meet the burden at trial. See MaRaist and Lemmon, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise: Civil PROCEDURE, § 6.8 (1999). Once the motion for summary judgment has been properly supported by the moving party, the failure of the non-moving party to produce evidence of a material factual dispute mandates the granting of the motion. Hardy v. Bowie, 98-2821 (La.9/8/99), 744 So.2d 606; Hayes v. Au tin, 96-287 (La.App. 3d Cir.12/26/96), 685 So.2d 691, writ denied, 97-0281 (La.3/14/97), 690 So.2d 41.
The Louisiana Supreme Court examined the developmental history of the tort of defamation recently in Trentecosta v. Beck, 96-2388 (La. 10/21/97); 703 So.2d 552. Citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 558 (1977) in its analysis, the supreme court recognized the four elements a plaintiff is required .to prove in order to be successful in a defamation case: "(1) [A] false and defamatory statement concerning another; (2) an unprivileged publication to a third party; (3) fault (negligence or greater) on the part of the publisher; and (4) resulting injury." Id. at 559. While all four elements are at issue in the litigation, the only one at issue in this appeal is the fault element.
As pointed out by the supreme court in Trentecosta, prior to the United States | .^Supreme Court decision in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), "the common law imposed strict liability for publishing a defamatory statement about a person that turned out to be false." Id. The supreme court further noted:
In the Sullivan case, the Court ruled that the First Amendment prohibits a public official from recovering damages in a defamation action unless the official proves by clear and convincing evidence that the person publishing the offending statement did so with "actual malice"— that is, the publisher had knowledge of the statement's falsity or made the statement with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
Id. at 560.
Further, as recognized by the supreme court, "[t]his constitutional limitation was extended to 'public figures' in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S.Ct. 1975, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1967)." Id.
Both Anders and Boney are public officers as defined in the Sullivan ruling. See Trentecosta, 703 So.2d at 560 n. 12; FRANK L. MaRaist & Thomas C. Galligan, Louisiana Tort Law, § 19 — 2(b), p. 433 (1996). Thus, they must prove by clear and convincing evidence that Andrus made the defamatory comments with actual malice, i.e., he did so with knowledge of the statements' falsity or made the statements with reckless disregard of whether they were false or not.
As recognized by the trial court, this "actual malice" requirement makes defamation of a public official an intentional tort, an act excluded from coverage by the Odyssey policy. Therefore, we find no error in the trial court's summary judgment grant.
DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgment of the trial court dismissing Odyssey Reinsurance | (¡Company as a party defendant and remand these consolidated matters to the trial court for further proceedings against the remaining defendant, Tracy Andrus. All costs of this appeal are taxed equally against Donald W. Anders, Jr., and Brian Boney.
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.
SAUNDERS, J., DISSENTS AND ASSIGNS WRITTEN REASONS.