Case Name: L. D. Sanders v. Sarah A. Devereux
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1860-04
Citations: 25 Supp. Tex. 1
Docket Number: 
Parties: L. D. Sanders v. Sarah A. Devereux.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 25 Supp.
Pages: 1–13

Head Matter:
TYLER SESSION, APRIL, 1860.
L. D. Sanders v. Sarah A. Devereux.
A slave is denied the right of private property; and a contract of sale made by him, of property as his own, and not as that of his owner, nor made by him as his owner’s agent, is void. Such a contract, although accompanied by delivery of the property, and made with the knowledge and permission of his master or mistress, does not afford the basis of an action to recover the price stipulated, even in the name of the owner of the slave.
It seems that the owner cannot adopt the unauthorized and void contract of his slave, and make it his own, and thus give it vitality as to the person contracting with the slave.
Where the plaintiff, in hfer own right, and as guardian of her minor children, sued for the price of certain cotton sold to the defendant, and the proof showed that the cotton was the property of her deceased husband, which was unadministered: Mid, that the right of action is in the executors, and not in the plaintiff, as devisee and owner; and it will not be presumed that there had been a partial distribution of the estate, and that the plaintiff had received in distribution the negroes who made the cotton. It was not necessary, in order to defeat the plaintiff’s recovery, that the defendant should have contested her right to sue by plea in abatement.
Error from Rusk. Tried below before Hon. O. A. Frazer, one of the district judges.
This suit was brought by Sarah A. Devereux, in her own right, as well as in her capacity of guardian of the persons and estates of her minor children, Albert Devereux, Julian Devereux, William Devereux, and Charles Devereux, against Lorenzo L. Sanders, for $403 16, the price of certain cotton purchased by defendant.
The cause of action was set out in the petition upon two several contracts, in form similar to a declaration at common law by two counts, upon the same cause of action. The petition alleged, upon the contract first set forth, that, in the year 1857, certain negro slaves, owned and possessed by the plaintiff1 in her own right, and as guardian of the estates of her said wards, made crops of cotton, with her consent, on her lands, and with the understanding, and her further consent, that the proceeds of said crops should inure to the benefit of said slaves respectively, according' to the amount of cotton which each of them might produce. That said crops were separate and distinct from the crop made for and by the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleged that afterwards, A. D. 1858, in consideration that said slaves, at the special instance and request of said defendant, would sell and deliver to him twenty thousand one hundred and fifty-eight pounds of said cotton, in the seed, at the price of $2 per hundred pounds, then and there agreed upon between said slaves and the defendant, with the knowledge and approval of petitioner, amounting to $403 16, the said defendant promised said slaves and petitioner to pay them or petitioner said sum of money, whenever, after the delivery of the cotton, the defendant should be thereunto requested. The petition alleged a delivery of the cotton to the defendant in accordance with the 'terms aforesaid, and with the like knowledge and consent of the plaintiff.
The petition then set forth a contract, made between the plaintiff and the defendant, for the sale and delivery, at the same price above set forth, of a like quantity of cotton; averring a delivery, failure of defendant to pay, &c.
The defendant demurred to the plaintiff’s petition, and assigned as a special ground, that the petition sets up a contract unauthorized by law. The demurrer was overruled.
The contract proved on the trial was, in effect, that the defendant, with the consent of the plaintiff, purchased from the slaves their several crops of cotton, at the price heretofore named; that it was to he delivered at the plaintiff’s gin, and the overseer was to receive it for the defendant. It was proved by the overseer that the said slaves delivered, pursuant to the contract, twenty thousand one hundred and fifty-eight pounds of cotton, and that, according to the contract, he was to have given to each of the negroes a memorandum to show the amount of cotton by them severally delivered, on the presentation of which to the defendant, the price due was to have been paid by him.
It appears from the evidence, that the slaves belonged to the estate of Julian S. Devereux, deceased, and were given by his will to the plaintiff and her wards, and that they were under the management and control of the plaintiff, the executrix of the will of said Devereux, deceased; that the administration had not been closed; and that said executrix received the proceeds of the labor of the slaves, and used and appropriated them, for the purposes of said administration. There was a verdict and j udgment in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $403 16.
The defendant submitted a motion for a new trial: one of the grounds of which was, that the verdict of the jury was contrary to, and unsupported by, the testimony adduced on the trial. The motion was overruled.
The plaintiff in error assigned as error, the judgment of the court in overruling his demurrer, and the refusal to grant a new trial.-
Hyde Stedman, for the plaintiff in error.
—The demurrer to the petition should have been sustained, because it sets up distinct causes of action, having no connection with or relation to each other; one in favor of the plaintiff and her wards upon the contract with the slaves, and the other in favor of the plaintiff individually upon a contract with herself; and it is submitted, that the finder of distinct and incongruous actions or causes of action is not allowable.
The demurrer to the first count should have been sustained, because the slaves are made the equitable parties to the suit, and because it is based upon a contract made with slaves. A slave cannot maintain an action, unless to obtain his freedom, and then he must sue by prochem ami. (Susan v. Wells, 3 Brevard, 11.) With this exception, he can neither sue nor be sued, nor can he make any contract which either a court of law or equity can enforce. (State v. Van Lear, 5 Mo., 91.) An executory contract made with a slave cannot be judicially established either for the slave or his master. (Ikrive v. Walker, 3 Rich., 262.) And no executory contract with a slave, not acting as the agent of his master, can give a right of action either to the slave or master. (Gist v. Tookey, 2 Rich., 424.) He can make no contract obligatory upon himself or the other party. (Jenkins v. Brown, 6 Humph., 299; Gregg v. Thompson, Miller’s S. C. Rep., 394.) To permit a slave to contract or trade is not only against public policy, but it is a criminal offence to buy from one any valuable produce or other article whatever, without the written consent of the -master, mistress, overseer, or employer of such slave, (O. & W. Dig.,p. 542, Art. 669,) and a person is indictable for buying any valuable produce, or other article whatever, from a slave, on his own account, even if the owner has given his permission for that purpose, unless that permission be in writing. (State v. Hart, 4 Iredell, 246.) It being a violation of a criminal law of this State to trade with a slave, without such written permission of his master, &c., then such a contract is utterly void. (Story on Contracts, § 613; Wheeler on Slavery, 10; 1 B. & A., 272; 14 Johns, 290; 5 B. & A., 355; 14 Mass., 322; Gregg v. Thompson, supra.)
2. It is by no means insisted that the plaintiff had not a right of action for the cotton or its value, nor that the slaves could not, as the agents of the plaintiff, have made a valid sale of the cotton. But it is urged, that a contract made with a slave will not furnish a cause of action, either to the slave or any other person; and it will be observed, that the first count in the petition sets up a contract with the slaves in their own right, and not as the agents of, or in behalf of, the plaintiff. The contract with the slaves might have been waived, and suit brought for the value of the cotton, but this has not been done; on the contrary, the contract is made the foundation of the action.
3. The court erred in overruling the defendant’s motion for a new trial.
The evidence showed clearly, that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover in this action. By our laws, neither an executor nor guardian can make any contract, either expressed or implied, for the, sale of property of the estate of the testator or ward, without authority given by the will of the testator, or from the County Court, or some other court having jurisdiction over the subject-matter; nor can a person, who owns property in common with the estate or ward, sell the same, except by authority obtained in the manner aforesaid. Now, if the slaves belonging to the estate of Julian S. Devereux, deceased, raised cotton, it belonged to the estate of Devereux; and if the defendant obtained possession of that cotton, without a sale of it to him by the executors of Devereux’s will, under an order of the County Court, or by authority given by the will, the title to the cotton did not pass to the defendant, but remained in the estate of the testator; and tire executors could have sued the defendant for the cotton, or its value, if he withheld or converted it, not by force of a contract, expressed or implied, but by reason of the tort, in the wrongful detention or conversion - thereof. Or, if the slaves, belonging in common to Sarah A. Devereux and her wards, raised cotton, it belonged to her and her wards; and if the defendant obtained possession of it, without a sale of it to him by virtue of an order of the County Court, then the title to the cotton did not vest in the defendant, but remained in Sarah A. Devereux and her wards;' and she, for herself, and as guardian of her wards, could have sued the defendant for the cotton, or its value, if he withheld or converted it, not by force of the contract, but by reason of the tort, as above said..
How, it is insisted, that if there was no legal sale of the cotton to the defendant, there was no cause of action against him; and the proof shows, that the cotton was from the first to the last in the actual possession of the plaintiff; that it was burned while in her possession, and was never in the actual possession of the defendant: he could not, therefore, be held liable for a wrongful detention and conversion of the cotton.
M. jD. Graham, for defendant in error.
—1. A general demurrer was filed by the defendants, and two special exceptions were filed in the amended answer.
The first exception was taken upon the ground, that the contract sued on was illegal; and the second upon the ground, that the petition is multifarious, and sets up twx> distinct causes of action.
A very casual examination of the petition will suffice to show that the first special exception is unfounded. The legal effect of the facts alleged in the first count is, that the contract set out in the first count was made and entered into by petitioner and defendant. The averments connected with the slaves only tended to show that they acted a subordinate part in the transaction, not necessary or essential to petitioner’s rights, but necessary to a true history and a proper understanding of the case. It is averred that the slaves were owned and in the possession of the plaintiff in the right in which she sues, at the time the cotton sold was made. This averment was equivalent to .an averment that the cotton belonged to plaintiff", and that she, therefore, had the right to sell it. (Cobb on Slavery, §258; Jackson v. Long, 5 Cowan, 397; 6 Humphreys, 299.)
It is also averred, in the same count, that the cotton was sold for the consideration stipulated, with the knowledge and approval of petitioner. The effect of this allegation is equivalent to an averment that the cotton was sold by petitioner, for a consideration agreed upon between petitioner and the defendant. It is also alleged in the petition, that in consideration of the sale, the “defendant promised said slaves and your petitioner to pay to said slaves or your petitioner said sum of money,” &c. The breach of the promise is averred in the conclusion, and the prayer of the petition is for judgment in favor of petitioners, &c.
The most that can be said of the relation which the slaves occupy to the petitioner in the transaction, is, that they acted as her agents, and it matters not whether their agency was implied or positive, the contract was binding. A slave may “ act as agent for his master or employer, and where the master’s or employer’s affirmation of the agency is proved, he will be bound by the acts of his agency. This affirmation may arise from acts, as well as by express authority.” (Cobb on Slavery, §§ 261, 299.)
It is a general doctrine, well established, that the act of an agent, however illegal, when ratified by the principal, becomes obligatory, and cannot be revoked. (Story on Sales, §77.) There can be no doubt that after having consented and approved of the sale, that it was binding on the petitioner. This being true, it follows, necessarily, that it was binding on the defendant in the suit; because a contract, to be valid, must be mutually obligatory.
The authorities cited by the counsel for plaintiff1 in error to establish the illegality of the contract set up in the petition, are wholly inapplicable. The most of them are cases in which efforts were made to enforce executory contracts, made by slaves for their own benefit, and with which the master had nothing to do, and where the suits were brought for the use of the slaves.
' The case at bar, is where the slaves are merely used as the means of making the contract, the owner standing by and approving what was done; and the suit is brought, not for the benefit or use of the slaves, but for the benefit of the plaintiff.
Admitting, for the sake of the argument, that the contract of sale was made by the slaves and for their benefit, it does not -lie in the mouth of the defendant in this action to urge in his defense that a sale of produce, &e., by a slave, is a violation of the criminal laws of the State, and that, therefore, the contract is illegal and void. If any one has violated the law, it is himself; an,d it would be to allow him to take advantage of his own wrong, to allow him to avail himself of this plea. (Jenkins v. Brown, 6 Humphreys, 308.)
2. But whatever may be said of the first count in the petition, the second is undeniably good. The second exception in the amended answer is to the effect, that distinct causes of action are set up in the petition. I have yet to learn that this is a valid objection to a petition. (1 Ohitty PL, -228 and 229; Art. 563 O. & W. Dig.)
From the argument of the counsel for plaintiff in error, it is presumed that what is meant by this exception is, that different parties appear as plaintiff in the different-counts. If this is so, it might have been made fatal, if the exception had been properly taken; but it will be seen, from the exceptions, that the question was not raised in the court below. The position, however, is untenable. The beginning of the first count describes particularly the capacity in which the plaintiff sues. She is, in all, the subsequent portions of the petition, referred to as petitioner. How, then, can it be made to appear that she sues in different capacities in the different counts ? It is well settled, that when the parties have heen once named in the petition, it is sufficient after-wards to describe them as plaintiff and defendant. (1 Chitty PL, 282.)
3. The next ground on which a reversal of the case is asked, is, that the court erred in overruling the motion for a new trial, on the alleged ground that the verdict was contrary to the evidence. To support this position, it is urged that the proof shows that the slaves were held by, and in the possession of, the plaintiff, not in the right in which she sues, but in her right as executrix; and that she could not, therefore, recover in this action. It may be observed, that no objection was made in the court below to the capacity in which the plaintiff sued; no plea in abatement was filed; and the question is made in this count for the first time. It is true, that one of the grounds for the motion for a new trial was, that the verdict was unsustained by the evidence; but the variance between the verdict and evidence was not indicated. The question, if considered at all, therefore, is entitled to no favor. But, aside from this consideration, it may be confidently asserted, that the facts-proved fully sustain the verdict, and both agree with the allegata. The action is brought by the plaintiff in her own right, and as guardian for her wards named. The testimony shows that the negroes who claimed the cotton “ belonged to Sarah A. Devereux, Albert Devereux, Julian Devereux, and Charles Devereux,” and that they were devised to plaintiff and her said wards in the will of Julian S. Devereux, and that they were under the management and control of plaintiff. There is nothing in any portion of the petition which is in conflict with this evidence. It is true, the witness (the only witness in the case) testified that the negroes belonged to the estate, and that the administration was unclosed. But it is very obvious that the witness simply meant that the negroes constituted assets of the estate, and that the estate had not been finally settled. The conclusion to be drawn from the whole testimony is, that the negroes had belonged to the estate, but had been set apart to the legatees, according to law. Certainly the presumption will not be indulged, that because the estate is unclosed, therefore no partial distribution of the estate has been effected. If there be any room for presumptions, the fact that the record shows that the time allowed by law for a partition or distribution of 'estates had elapsed, will raise a very different presumption. In the ease of Easterling v. Blythe, 7 Tex., 213, involving the same question, this court said: “But if the heirs may not sue previously, they certainly may do so for whatever remains- of the estate after it has been fully administered and its liability to creditors extinguished. Such it is to be presumed was the case in this instance. The -deed in question was made to Coles,-as administrator, ten years before the bringing of the suit. The period of his administration was fixed by law at one year, and, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it.will be presumed to have terminated at that period.” Eor the same reason, it will be presumed in this case, that after the lapse of time prescribed by law, a partial distribution of the estate was made. (See Art. 789 O. & W. Dig.) If it were susceptible of proof, it could have been easily shown by the defendant in what right the plaintiff held the slaves. The plaintiff could not have been required to do so, as her right to sue had not been put in issue. The utility of a plea in abatement is easily illustrated in this connection, for if the plaintiff is required on the trial, in a case like the present, to. show the right by which he sues, of the tenure by which he holds property, without any previous notice, his rights may be easily defeated.
But, independently of this position, it will be observed that the proof shows that the plaintiff was the executrix of the will of Julian S. Devereux. It matters not, therefore, in what capacity she sues, as, in the event the claim belonged to the estate, she would be responsible to the estate for it. The defendant could not, in any event, be prejudiced by reason of. the suit being brought by her in her individual capacity, or as the guardian of wards. In another suit in ■ favor of the estate, on the same claim, his defence, that he had paid it to one of the executors, would be sufficient to protect him.
It is submitted, that the facts fully justified the verdict of the jury.

Opinion:
Wheeler, C. J.
—The right of private property belongs, in this country, exclusively to freemen. The slave is denied this right as completely as he is the right of personal liberty. His person and his time being entirely the property of his master, whatever he may accumulate by his own labor, or may otherwise acquire, becomes immediately the property of his master; and the master may maintain an action against any one who receives the property from his slave. He is incapable of making a sale of property, except with the consent, or as the agent, of his master; and can, consequently, make no delivery of it which will bind the master, unless with his consent, or as his agent. He can acquire nothing by contract. "But (it is said) if the contract with the slave be fully executed, the property conveyed to the slave becomes inslanter the property of the master, and the property conveyed by him, upon his master's implied' assent, vests in the contracting party. An executory contract, however, such as a promissory note, payable to a slave, vests no right of action in the master." (Cobb on Slavery, § 368; 2 Rich. S. C., 425; McM., 470; 1 Hill, S. C., 277; 2 Id., 378.) By the law of this State, trading with slaves is positively forbidden, under a penalty, " without the written consent of the master, mistress, or overseer." (O. & W. Dig., p. 542, Art. 669.) From an application of these principles to the case before us, it would seem to result, that the action cannot be maintained upon the contract first set out in the petition, it being a void contract; nor upon the second alleged contract, because not supported by the evidence. The evidence went to support the first contract set out, hut not the second. The action is founded upon the contract, and if it can be ' supported at all, it must be upon the ground that the owner can adopt the unauthorized and void contract of his slave, and make it his own, and thus give - it vitality as to the person contracting with the slave, Uo authority has been cited which maintains such a principle, and it would seem to have no support in any doctrine or analogy of the law. Upon this point, however, it is unnecessary to express an opinion, as the case will be disposed of upon other grounds.
The sale by the slaves did not pass the property in the cotton, and no doubt the owner might have resumed the possession of it, or, if withheld or converted by the defends ant to his use, an action might have been maintained by the owner to recover the property of its value. Whether, under the circumstances of this case, an action could have been maintained for a conversion of the property by the defendant, is questionable; but that question need not be now considered, as the action is not brought for the wrongful detention or conversion of the property. The suit is upon the contract, to recover the price agreed to be paid for the cotton by the defendant; and, in this aspect of the case, we incline to the opinion that the action cannot be maintained.
But there is another view of the case, which is decisive against the right of the plaintiffs to a recovery. The action is brought by the plaintiff in her own right and as guardian of her infant children, as owners of the property. The proof is, that it is the property of the estate of her deceased husband, which is unadministered. The right of action, therefore, is not in the plaintiff' as devisee and owner of the property, but in the executors. (8 Texas, 182; Cochran v. Thompson, 18 Texas, 652.) To this it is answered, that we may presume there had been a partial- distribution of the estate, and that the plaintiffs had received in distribution the negroes that made this cotton. If such had been the case, I apprehend it devolved on the plaintiff to prove it. But the proof is, that the plaintiff, as executrix, had the management of the slaves, and received and used the proceeds of their labor for the purposes of the administration. This repels the supposition that it was the property of the plaintiff and her wards in their own right. Again, it is suggested that the plaintiff's right to recover ought to have been contested by plea in abatement. But the answer to this suggestion is, that the objection goes to the title of the plaintiff, and not to the capacity in which she sues. As the title is not in the plaintiff, she cannot recover in the action. The court, therefore, erred in overruling the motion for a new trial, for which the judgment must be reversed and the cause
Remanded.