Case Name: Clifton T. HASTINGS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant-Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2014-07-01
Citations: 581 F. App'x 694
Docket Number: No. 12-35761
Parties: Clifton T. HASTINGS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 581
Pages: 694–695

Head Matter:
Clifton T. HASTINGS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 12-35761.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted May 27, 2014.
Filed July 1, 2014.
Clifton T. Hastings, Prineville, OR, pro se.
Adrian Lee Brown, Assistant U.S., Office of the U.S. Attorney, Portland, OR, Mathew W. Pile, Social Security Administration Office of The General Counsel, Seattle, WA, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before: D. NELSON, LEAVY, and THOMAS, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Clifton T. Hastings appeals pro se the district court's judgment affirming the Commissioner of Social Security's denial of Hastings's third application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
The district court did not err in holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to decide whether the Commissioner failed to meet an obligation to retain the record of Hastings's first application for benefits in 2000. The Commissioner's retention or loss of records is not a "final decision" subject to review. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Dexter v. Colvin, 731 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir .2013).
The district court also lacked jurisdiction to consider whether the Commissioner set an incorrect onset date when granting Hastings's subsequent, fourth application for benefits. The court had jurisdiction only to review the Commissioner's final decision denying Hastings's third application for benefits. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Dexter, 731 F.3d at 980.
Hastings contends that the administrative law judge erred by failing to order IQ testing because such testing might have established a listed impairment. This contention lacks merit because the record was adequate to allow for proper evaluation of the evidence. See Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459-60 (9th Cir.2001). The low average intellectual functionality reported by an examining psychologist would not meet or equal the requirements of the listings. See Kennedy v. Colvin, 738 F.3d 1172, 1174 (9th Cir.2013).
Any error in the ALJ's partial rejection, •without explanation, of the opinion of a non-examining psychologist was harmless because even if the ALJ had accepted the psychologist's findings, Hastings's impairments would not have met the listings. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir.2012).
We decline to consider additional issues unsupported by argument in the opening brief. See Indep. Towers of Wash. v. Washington, 350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003).
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.