Case Name: PEOPLE v. DREW
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1978-05-08
Citations: 83 Mich. App. 57
Docket Number: Docket No. 30877
Parties: PEOPLE v DREW
Judges: Before: J. H. Gillis, P. J., and Bashara and H. L. Heading, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 83
Pages: 57–67

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v DREW
Docket No. 30877.
Submitted November 1, 1977, at Lansing.
Decided May 8, 1978.
Edward L. Drew was convicted of armed robbery. Defendant appealed. Reversed, 67 Mich App 295 (1976). Defendant was retried in the Oakland Circuit Court, John N. O’Brien, J., and convicted of the same charge. Defendant appeals alleging prosecutorial misconduct, error in the jury instructions and prejudice. Held:
1. It was error for the trial court to give an instruction limiting the jury’s consideration of defendant’s prior criminal record to the issue of credibility where the court had previously agreed to withhold that instruction, but the error was harmless where the defendant was not prejudiced by the instruction.
2. Defendant’s allegations of prejudice arising from references by the prosecutor to "mug shot” photographs which were used to identify the defendant and from comments concerning defendant’s prior convictions during closing argument were within the bounds of fair comment on the defendant’s credibility and were not reversible error.
Affirmed.
Judge H. L. Heading dissented, and would find that it was fundamentally unfair and a violation of due process for a judge to renege on an agreed course of instruction, and that the references to "mug shots” were error beyond instructional cure where the defendant had not yet taken the stand and where defense counsel had not invited the error. He also would find that a jail identification bracelet which the defendant was required to wear over objection raised a potential of prejudice which outweighed the utility or convenience of the band. He would reverse because the totality of the errors denied defendant a fair trial.
References for Points in Headnotes
4 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 88.
5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 614.
46 Am Jur 2d, Judges §§ 199, 202.
Time for asserting disqualification of judge, and waiver of disqualification. 73 ALR3d 1238.
5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 801.
29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence §§ 784, 785.
Admissibility and prejudicial effect of admission of "mug shot”, "rogues’ gallery” photograph, or photograph taken in prison, of defendant in criminal trial. 30 ALR3d 908.
75 Am Jur 2d, Trial §§ 260, 269, 867.
75 Am Jur 2d, Trial §§ 867, 869.
5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 778.
Opinion of the Court
1. Appeal and Error — Judicial Disqualification — Timely Motions.
No error can be predicated on a trial judge’s failure to disqualify himself from presiding over a trial unless the defendant timely moves for such disqualification.
2. Criminal Law — Evidence—Photographs—Prosecutors—Mug Shots — Identification—Prejudice—Appeal and Error.
A prosecutor’s questions to a police officer at trial regarding "mug shot” photographs of the defendant and pictures received from police sources did not result in reversible error where the questions were for the purpose of establishing what photographs were used in a photographic lineup at which the defendant was identified and where the questions were not particularly inflammatory or deliberately prejudicial.
3. Criminal Law — Closing Argument — Prosecutors—Prior Convictions — Credibility.
A prosecuting attorney may relate the evidence adduced at trial in his closing argument and draw conclusions therefrom; he may discuss a defendant’s prior convictions where they are relevant to the issue of the defendant’s credibility.
4. Criminal Law — Jury Instructions — Prior Convictions — Appeal and Error — Harmless Error.
It was error for a trial court to first grant a defense counsel’s request that an instruction limiting consideration of the defendant’s prior convictions to the issue of his credibility not be given and later to give that very instruction; the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, however, where it was essentially in the defendant’s favor.
5. Criminal Law — Appeal and Error — Harmless Error — Definition.
Error in a criminal trial should be held harmless where it is not so offensive to the maintenance of a sound judicial process that it never can be regarded as harmless or, if not so basic, where the appellate court can declare a belief that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Dissent by H. L. Heading, J.
6. Criminal Law — New Trial — Fair Trial — Appeal and Error— Totality of Errors.
A defendant in a criminal case is entitled to a new trial where the totality of the errors committed during his trial deprived him of a fair trial, even where no one of the errors constituted clearly reversible error.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, L. Brooks Patterson, Prosecuting Attorney, Robert C. Williams, Chief Appellate Counsel, and Lawrence J. Bunting, Assistant Appellate Counsel, for the people.
Cooper, Shifman & Gabe, for defendant on appeal.
Before: J. H. Gillis, P. J., and Bashara and H. L. Heading, JJ.
Detroit Recorder’s Court judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
J. H. Gillis, P. J.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of armed robbery, contrary to MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797, and sentenced to serve 15 to 30 years in prison. He now appeals as of right, raising seven allegations of error, of which five merit discussion by this Court.
This is the second time that this case has come before this Court. Accordingly, facts will only be presented when warranted by our discussion of the issues. For a more detailed description of the facts, see People v Drew, 67 Mich App 295; 240 NW2d 776 (1976).
Defendant first contends that the trial court erred in failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing regarding the admissibility of a witness's identification of defendant.
Defendant was accorded an evidentiary hearing prior to his first trial. The trial court found that the witness's identification was admissible. This Court upheld the trial court's determination regarding the admissibility of the witness's testimony identifying defendant when this case was previously before this Court. As this Court stated:
"Under the circumstances in the case at bar, we believe that the prosecution showed by clear and convincing evidence that Mrs. Gossett (Phillips) had an independent basis for her identification of the defendant. Therefore, we ñnd no error in the lower court's decision to admit her identiñcation testimony." People v Drew, supra, 299. (Emphasis supplied.)
Defendant has presented no new evidence that would cause the trial court to determine that the witness's testimony would not be admissible. This Court's prior ruling in the instant case was and is "the law of the case". People v Bergin, 63 Mich App 526; 234 NW2d 687 (1975), People v McDonald, 239 Mich 253; 214 NW 186 (1927). We find no error in respect to this issue.
Defendant next contends that it was error for the trial court to preside over defendant's second jury trial after having presided at defendant's first jury trial on the same charge.
It is well established that no error can be predicated on a trial judge's failure to disqualify himself from presiding over a trial unless the defendant timely moves for such disqualification. People v Dudley, 393 Mich 762; 223 NW2d 297 (1974), People v Stockford, 59 Mich App 423; 229 NW2d 484 (1975). In the instant case, defendant made no such motion, and, accordingly, we find no error.
Defendant further contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion for mistrial based upon the prosecutor's line of questioning regarding "mug shot" photographs and pictures received from police sources. We disagree.
Our review of the record reveals that the testimony was elicited for the purpose of establishing what pictures were used in the photographic lineup which identified defendant. The testimony was not particularly inflammatory nor was it deliberately injected into the proceedings to prejudice the defendant. Under such circumstances we find no reversible error. See People v Swan, 56 Mich App 22; 223 NW2d 346 (1974), People v Hadley, 67 Mich App 688; 242 NW2d 32 (1976).
The penultimate issue which this Court will address concerns the prosecutor's comments during his closing arguments in respect to defendant's prior convictions.
Defendant claims that the references made by the prosecutor to his prior convictions were improper and require reversal of his conviction. We disagree.
It is well established that a prosecuting attorney can relate the evidence adduced at trial and draw conclusions therefrom during closing arguments. People v Davis, 57 Mich App 505; 226 NW2d 540 (1975).
The prosecutor stayed within these bounds by limiting his reference in regard to defendant's prior convictions to the issue of defendant's credibility. See People v DerMartzex, 390 Mich 410; 213 NW2d 97 (1973).
Defendant's final allegation of error concerns an instruction given by the trial court which was first requested and later withdrawn by defense counsel.
The instruction at issue was to inform the jury to weigh defendant's prior convictions in connection with his credibility only. Defense counsel withdrew his request for the instruction, apparently not wanting to remind the jury of defendant's past convictions. The trial court indicated that the instruction would not be given. However, the trial court later gave the instruction at issue.
Although it was error for the trial court to first grant defense counsel's request not to give an instruction and later give that very instruction, it was not reversible error.
The standard for harmless error is found in People v Swan, 56 Mich App 22, 31; 223 NW2d 346 (1974):
"The standards by which we measure error to determine whether it is reversible, or merely harmless, have become well settled.
" 'Where it is claimed that error is harmless, two inquiries are pertinent. First, is the error so offensive to maintenance of a sound judicial process that it never can be regarded as harmless? Second, if not so basic, can we declare a belief that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt?'
"People v Mobley, 390 Mich 57, 65; 210 NW2d 327, 332 (1973), People v Robinson, 386 Mich 551, 563; 194 NW2d 709, 713 (1972), People v Wichman, 15 Mich App 110, 116; 166 NW2d 298, 302 (1968)."
A review of the record discloses that this error was truly harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The instruction given by the court was in favor of defendant since it was to insure that prejudice did not result in the jurors' minds from defendant's prior felony convictions. The error was essentially in favor of defendant.
We also note that the evidence adduced at trial was overwhelming in respect to defendant's guilt.
Under such circumstances, we find the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Affirmed.
Bashara, J., concurred.