Case Name: BOOTH et al. v. CAMPBELL et al.
Court: Texas Courts of Civil Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1922-03-23
Citations: 240 S.W. 558
Docket Number: No. 2528
Parties: BOOTH et al. v. CAMPBELL et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 240
Pages: 559–563

Head Matter:
BOOTH et al. v. CAMPBELL et al.
(No. 2528.)
(Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Texarkana.
March 23, 1922.
Dissenting Opinion, April 26, 1922.)
1. Trial <@=3199 — Construction of written lease should not be submitted to jury.
Where the terms of the written lease between the parties were unambiguous, it was the duty of the court to construe the lease, and it was therefore error to instruct the jury that it should be construed strictly against forfeiture.
2. Landlord and tenant <3=3 137 — Lease held to authorize tenant to cut ail timber if he intended to cultivate all the land.
W7here a lease gave the tenant the privilege of putting more land into cultivation, and gave him the timber from the land which he put into cultivation, but required such land to be in rectangular shape adjoining the field then in cultivatipn, the restriction as to the shape and location of the tract to be cleared applied only in the event that the tenant did not intend to cultivate all of the land, and he could clear it all if he intended in good faith to cultivate it all.
3. Landlord and tenant <©=3 137 — Lease held not to authorize tenant to cut timber from land he did not intend to cultivate.
A lease giving a tenant the privilege of cultivating more land, and giving him the timber from the land he intended to cultivate, did not authorize the tenant to cut the timber from all of the land unless he in good faith intended to cultivate all of the land, so that, in an action to forfeit the lease for cutting timber, the question for the jury was whether the tenant in good faith intended to cultivate all of the land from which he was cutting timber.
4. Landlord and tenant <©=3137 — Jury’s finding held not equivalent to finding tenant intended to cultivate all the land from which he was cutting timber.
Where a tenant was entitled to cut timber only from land which he in good faith intended to cultivate, but the trial court, instead of construing the lease and submitting the question of the tenant’s intention to the jury, submitted to them the issue whether the cutting was being done in violation of the terms of the lease, which must be construed against forfeiture, the jury’s finding in favor of the tenant was, not equivalent to a finding that the tenant in good faith intended to cultivate all of the land.
5. Sequestration <©=20 — Judgment should not be rendered against sureties on sequestration bond in original suit to which they are not parties.
In a suit by a landlord against his tenants, where sequestration was issued, a judgment for the damages sustained by the tenants by reason of their eviction should not have been rendered against the sureties on the sequestration bond in the original action to which they were not made parties.
Hodges, J., dissenting.
Appeal from District Court, Tarrant County ; Bruce Young, Judge.
Suit by W. B. Booth against A. Campbell and another, in which the defendants filed a counterclaim. Prom a judgment dismissing the action and rendering judgment for defendants against the sureties on the sequestration bond given by plaintiff, plaintiff and the sureties appeal. Reversed and remanded for new trial.
August 24, 1919, appellant W. B. Booth and appellee A. Campbell entered into a contract by the terms of which the former leased to the latter for one year from December 28, 1919, 31 acres of land, a plat of which follows:
The land was inclosed by a fence. A part thereof, to wit, the 11 acres marked “field,” east of the land, was in cultivation, and was separated from the other part thereof, marked “timber land,” by a fence on the north and west.
Campbell was to pay Booth $10 a month as rent, and within times specified was to build a barn on the land, add two rooms to and repair a dwelling house thereon, and make and deliver a specified number of fence posts to Booth. The contract contained provisions as follows:
"(3) Campbell has the privilege but shall not be required to put more land into cultivation adjoining the present field fence all at his own expense and to cultivate what additional land he may put in in a good farmerlike manner, he shall have all of the timber off the land which he shall thus put into cultivation but the additional land which he shall put into cultivation must be in a rectangle, and he shall use no timber except that off the land which he clears and cultivates. * * *
“(9) If Campbell shall fail to perform the obligations herein undertaken and pay the rents in advance such failure shall at Booth’s election cancel this contract which shall then become null and void.”
Campbell took possession of the land under the contract, and was living on same with his family January 20, 1920, when they were evicted therefrom by the sheriff, acting by virtue of a writ of sequestration sued out by Booth and appellant L. Berry, who owned an interest in the land, on the ground that appellee had breached the contract by cutting and removing timber therefrom in violation of its terms. The writ of sequestration was also against appellee Will Ashmore, who was living on the land with his family, and they were evicted therefrom at the same time. In his answer to the sequestration suit Campbell denied that he had breached the contract as charged by Booth and Berry, and by a plea in reconvention sought a recovery against them of $15,697 as actual damages he averred he suffered as a result of the eviction, and in addition thereto of $1,000 as exemplary damages. By a like plea in his answer Ashmore sought a recovery of actual damages in the sum of $2,000.
At the trial Campbell testified that after he and Booth entered into the written contract he arranged with Booth to furnish material to build- a house on the land for Ash-more to live in, and-that, in connection with that arrangement, Booth agreed that he might clear all the land in order that Ash-more might have land to cultivate. Booth denied making such an agreement. Campbell further testified that he commenced cutting the timber adjoining the fence inclosing the “field” on the west, and cut north from thé Higgins tract, and had practically all the timber, except some adjoining and north of the fence inclosing the “field” on the north, when he was evicted from the land, and that he could and would have cut all the timber, and could and would have cultivated all of the land, that year if he had not been evicted. His testimony as to what he had done toward clearing the land for cultivation and as to what he could do was corroborated by .the testimony of other witnesses.
The court instructed the jury as follows:
“(1) Tou are instructed that the policy of the law is against penalties and forfeitures in contracts, and before the contract in evidence before you could be forfeited it must be strictly construed against such penalties and forfeitures and such provisions must be clearly shown to have been violated before the contract could be voided or forfeited by reason of the same. * * *
“(3) This case is submitted to you upon special issues in the form of questions, which questions you will answer, taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances introduced in evidence before you.
“Question 1. Prior to or at the time the writ of sequestration was sued out and served upon the defendant herein, and he was put out of possession of the premises which he occupied belonging to plaintiff, was the defendant cutting timber off of the premises in such a manner and place that said cutting was in violation of the provisions of the contract which you may find to have existed at said time and under which they were operating?”.
The jury answered: “No.”
“Or: Question 2. Was the defendant prior to or at the time he was put off of said premises cutting said timber in the manner and place as he had a right to do under the provisions of said contract?”
The jury answered: “Yes.”
The appeal is from a judgment that Booth and Berry take nothing by their suit, and that Campbell recover of them and the appellants J. W. Draughon and J. T. Brantley, the sureties on their sequestration bond, the sum of $3,000, 'and that Ashmore recover of the same parties $250, said sums being damages found by the jury.
Payne & Morris, Baskin, Eastus & Greines, and John L. Poulter, all of Eort Worth, for appellants.
Baltimore & Buck, of Port Worth, for appellees.

Opinion:
WILESON, O. J.
(after stating the facts as above). As we view it, the contract between the parties was unambiguous, and it was the duty of the court to construe it. Cook v. Dennis, 61 Tex. 246; Dunn v. Price, 87 Tex. 318, 28 S. W. 681; 6 R. C. L. 862. Therefore wo think the instruction to the jury in the first paragraph of the court's charge, as to the policy of the law with regard to "penalties and forfeitures in contracts," should not have been given.
The only limitation in the contract on the privilege accorded Campbell "to put more land into cultivation" was that the "additional land" should "adjoin the field fence," and should be in a "rectangle." The privilege conferred was without restriction as to the quantity of "additional land" Campbell was authorized to clear and cultivate. The court, therefore, should have construed the contract as giving him a fight to clear and cultivate all the timbered land. The limitation as to where he should clear, and the shape of the clearing, evidently was intended to apply only in the event Campbell elected to clear and cultivate less than all of the land; for it could have no application if he elected to clear and put all of it in cultivation.
It conclusively appeared from the testimony that Campbell had cut timber north of the Higgins tract, and was engaged in cutting timber in the northeast part of the tract in question here at the time he and Ashmore were evicted from the land. He testified that- he had done and was doing that for the purpose of clearing and putting all the timbered land in cultivation. If that was true, he had done and was then doing nothing he •was not entitled to do under the contract. Therefore the question for the jury was one as to whether he had cut and was cutting the timber, intending in good faith to clear and cultivate all the land. An affirmative answer to such a question would have established that he and Ashmore were wrongfully evicted from the land, and as a matter of law were entitled to recover such damages as the testimony showed they had respectively suffered. On the other hand, a negative answer would have established that Campbell had violated and was violating the contract, from which it would follow as a matter of law, there being no contention that Campbell's and Ashmore's rights were violated by the manner in which they were evicted from the land, that they were not entitled to recover anything of appellants.
Such being the case made by the pleadings and the contract and the other testimony specified, the judgment should be reversed for the error referred to, unless it ought to be said that the finding of the jury in effect was that, in cutting the timber as he had cut and was cutting same, Campbell intended to put all the land in cultivation. The answer of the jury to the first question submitted to them was that Campbell was not, and their answer to the second question was that he was, cutting the timber in a manner and at a place he had a right under the contract to cut it. In view of the fact that the jury were authorized by the charge to construe the contract, we do not think the answers can be treated as a finding that Campbell intended to clear and cultivate all the land. Their answer that Campbell was cutting the timber in a manner and at a place he had a right to cut it may have been based on a conclusion they reached that he had a right to so cut the timber, notwithstanding he intended to clear and put less than all the land in cultivation.
Of the assignments complaining of the action of the court in overruling exceptions questioning the sufficiency of allegations in Campbell's answer, the fourth and seventh are sustained, and the first, second, fifth, and sixth are overruled.
The assignments not disposed of present questions not likely to arise on another trial, and therefore need not be considered.
Attention is called to the fact, which seems to have been overlooked, that the judgment against the sureties on the sequestration bond was rendered in face of the fact that the action was not on the bond, and the sureties were not made parties to the suit by any pleadings in the case.
The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the court below for a new trial.
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