Case Name: James A. ZELLINGER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AMALGAMATED CLOTHING, et al., Defendants-Appellees
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1996-04-03
Citations: 683 So. 2d 726
Docket Number: No. 28,127-CA
Parties: James A. ZELLINGER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AMALGAMATED CLOTHING, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: Before SEXTON, HIGHTOWER and STEWART, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 683
Pages: 720-726–734

Head Matter:
James A. ZELLINGER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AMALGAMATED CLOTHING, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 28,127-CA.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
April 3, 1996.
Opinion on Limited Grant of Rehearing June 26, 1996.
Madeleine Slaughter, James A. Zellinger, in pro. per.
Robein, Urann & Lurye by Louis L. Ro-bein, Jr., Metairie, Andrea F. Hoesehen, Jefferson, for Appellees.
Before SEXTON, HIGHTOWER and STEWART, JJ.

Opinion:
11 STEWART, Judge.
The plaintiff, James Zellinger, filed a defamation action against Amalgamated Clothing Textile Workers Union, Inc. (ACTWU), Joan Suarez, the Regional Manager of the union, and Mike Hoagland, a member of the union. The defendants subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court, finding no genuine issue of material fact, held that the publications made by members of the union were privileged communications, and thus the parties who made them were protected from liability. The plaintiff now appeals the decision of the trial court. For the reasons assigned, we affirm.
FACTS
This cause of action is the result of a heated labor dispute in Monroe, Louisiana, between Amalgamated Clothing Textile Workers Union, Inc. (ACTWU) and Nouri Hakim, the owner of Monroe Manufacturing Inc., Contract Manufacturing, Inc., Embroideries, Inc., and Packaging Techniques, Inc. James Zellinger, an attorney not licensed to practice law in Louisiana, accepted employment as an attorney with the businesses owned by Hakim and was at the forefront of the labor dispute as Hakim's representative.
Although Zellinger passed the Louisiana State Bar Examination after a number of attempts, the Committee on Bar Admissions has denied his admission because he has failed to meet the good moral character requirements for admission to the bar. Zel-linger has appealed that determination to the Louisiana Supreme Court and is still awaiting a decision.
Once ACTWU members discovered that Zellinger was not licensed to practice law in this state, they included that information in several of its flyers and disseminated them. One of the flyers directed to Louisiana lawyers stated:
"MESSAGE: James Zellinger has failed to pass the Louisiana bar. Jimmy is a permanent resident of Monroe. Jimmy has three law offices |2in Monroe and has over 100 clients according to his testimony in court. Jimmy has used a letterhead which advertises that he is an attorney and appears in city state and Federal court [sic] on a regular basis.
Mr. Zellinger has filed pro hac vice motions as an out of state lawyer, even though he has a permanent residence here in Monroe. Several complaints have been filed with the bar association and the bar admissions office about Jimmy.
Jimmy appears in city court as assist, secretary of many of the companies he represents.
Is Jimmy practicing law without a license in Monroe? If you have any pertinent information on the above that can help resolve the situation, we would sure appreciate a call or fax from you."
Additionally, Mike Hoagland, a member of ACTWU, wrote a letter to John Gomilia, Chairman of the Board of Bar Admissions, stating the following:
"I am writing you in regards to the attached ease and ruling. I met with Tommy Hearns who is representing Newhaven Operating Co. It appears that Mr. Zel-linger has solicted [sic] outside clients in addition to his employer, Contract Mfg. Mr. Hearns conveyed to me that he is currently representing several clients where the opposing lawyer is James Zel-linger.
Although I am not a lawyer, I believe that Judge Joyce did address the issue of Mr. Zellingers [sic] status of appearing pro hac vice as being improper. Mr. Zellinger is currently appearing pro hac vice in a number of cases.
Mr. Zellinger currently has a residence in Monroe and all out of town law offices that he claims to have appear to be bogus.
I hope these documents explain my concern to Mr. Zellinger [sic] being admitted to the Louisiana bar."
Other members also notified the Louisiana State Bar Association (LSBA) that they believed the appellant was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. Additionally, one of the members of the ACTWU, with a pending EEOC claim, notified the LSBA that Zellinger interrogated her outside of the presence of her attorney.
Zellinger filed suit in the Fourth Judicial District Court seeking damages and injunc-tive relief alleging defamation as a cause of action. Appellant also filed an amended petition in the trial court claiming that he was also harassed, stalked, and became the subject of a malicious prosecution by ACTWU. ACTWU filed an ^exception of no cause of action as to the appellant's request for in-junctive relief. The court granted the exception and held that speech is generally not subject to injunction absent a clear showing of eminent threat of bodily harm. The court concluded that the appellant had failed to make such a showing.
ACTWU's motion for summary judgment was also granted. The trial court concluded that there was no defamation per se and that most of the documents were subject to a qualified privilege because the union had an interest or duty in communicating the information to the LSBA and its members. Zel-linger now appeals the trial court's determination.
DISCUSSION
In the appellant's first assignment of error, he contends that the trial court erred when it granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment.
A motion for summary judgment shall be granted when the mover establishes that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. LSA-C.C.P. Art. 966. The decision is made on the basis of the pleadings, affidavits and discovery documents in the record. Id.; Sassone v. Elder, 626 So.2d 345 (La.1993).
Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo under the same criteria that govern the district court's consideration of whether summary judgment is appropriate. Schroeder v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University, 591 So.2d 342 (La.1991).
In cases affecting the exercise of First Amendment liberties, proper summary judgment practice is essential. Summary adjudication may be thought of as a useful procedural tool and an effective screening device for avoiding the unnecessary harassment of defendants by unmeritorious actions which threaten the free exercise |4of rights of speech and press. Joyner v. Wear, 27,631 (La.App. 2d Cir. 12/6/95), 665 So.2d 634, citing Mashbum v. Collin, 355 So.2d 879 (La. 1977). Thus, in order to survive a motion for summary judgment, a defamation plaintiff must produce evidence of sufficient quality and quantity to demonstrate that he likely will be able to meet his burden of proof at trial. Without such evidence, there is no genuine issue of material fact, and summary judgment should be granted. Sassone v. Elder, supra.
In order to prevail in a case of defamation under the Louisiana law, the plaintiff must prove five elements: (1) defamatory words; (2) publication; (3) falsity; (4) malice; and (5) resultant injury. Cangelosi v. Schwegmann Brothers Giant Super Markets, 390 So.2d 196 (La.1980); Martin v. Lincoln General Hosp., 588 So.2d 1329 (La.App. 2d Cir.1991), writ denied, 592 So.2d 1302 (La. 1992); Roberts v. Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., 550 So.2d 809 (La.App. 2d Cir.1989), writ denied, 552 So.2d 398 (La.1989). Upon a plaintiff's failure to demonstrate even one of these elements, the cause of action fails. Roberts v. Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., supra.
Liability for defamation does not attach from privileged publications or communication. Martin v. Lincoln General Hosp., supra; Toomer v. Breaux, 146 So.2d 723 (La.App. 3d Cir.1962), writ denied. Such a privilege arises from the social necessity of permitting free and unrestricted communication concerning matters in which the parties have a common duty or interest, and acts to protect good faith communicators from liability if the statement later turns out to be inaccurate. Martin v. Lincoln General Hosp., supra; Henderson v. Guillory, 546 So.2d 244 (La.App. 2d Cir.1989), writ denied, 551 So.2d 635 (La.1989); Ward v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 339 So.2d 1255 (La.App. 1st Cir.1976).
15Good faith is one of the essential elements of a conditional privilege. Madison v. Bolton, 234 La. 997, 102 So.2d 433 (1958). In this context, good faith means a statement made with reasonable grounds for believing it to be true. Only when a statement is made without reasonable grounds for believing its truth can the author be said to have been actuated by malice or ill will. Elmer v. Coplin, 485 So.2d 171 (La.App. 2d Cir.1986), writ denied, 489 So.2d 246 (La.1986).
In light of the foregoing jurisprudence, we find that the defendants are protected from liability arising out of their communications. Although the parties were involved in a heated labor dispute, and it is apparent from a review of the record that this was an acrimonious situation, there is no indication that ACTWU members acted without reasonable grounds for believing that the plaintiff was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. It was a matter of common knowledge in Monroe and a matter of public record that the plaintiff had not passed this state's bar examination, but was acting in a capacity that could easily have been interpreted as practicing law without a license.
The courts of this state have long recognized the social interests of obtaining unhampered, full information concerning an applicant for admission to the bar and the importance of the requirement of high moral character, honesty, and integrity of candidates for admission to the bar. Freedom of action in that regard must not be restricted by the danger or fear of defamation suits. See Elmer v. Coplin, 485 So.2d 171 (La.App. 2d Cir.1986); Toomer v. Breaux, supra. Thus, the plaintiff's claims on this issue have no merit.
Next, plaintiff submits that because the members of ACTWU threatened to prosecute or institute criminal proceedings against the defendant for practicing law without a license, this was malicious prosecution. We disagree.
IftAn action for malicious prosecution requires: 1) commencement or continuance of an original criminal or civil judicial proceeding; 2) its legal causation by the present defendant against plaintiff who was defendant in the original proceeding; 3) its bona fide termination in favor of the present plaintiff; 4) the absence of probable cause for such a proceeding; 5) the presence of malice therein; and, 6) damage conforming to legal standards resulting to plaintiff. Taylor v. Town of Arcadia, 519 So.2d 303 (La.App. 2d Cir.1988); Johnson v. Pearce, 313 So.2d 812 (La.1975); Jones v. Wesley, 424 So.2d 1109 (La.App. 1st Cir.1982).
The facts of the instant case preclude the conclusion that the members of ACTWU maliciously prosecuted the plaintiff. First, the record indicates that the LSBA proceedings against the plaintiff are still pending and have not been terminated in his favor. Moreover, the record does not support the conclusion that defendants acted with malice. One is not guilty of malice for inaccurately reporting criminal conduct when there is no intent to mislead. Taylor v. Town of Arcadia, supra. Thus, the plaintiff's claims on this issue must also fail.
Additionally, plaintiff complains that the trial judge conducted an ex parte conference with opposing counsel without the presence of the plaintiff. However, plaintiff failed to lodge a contemporaneous objection to the alleged meeting at the trial court. Failure to object constitutes a waiver of the right to complain on appeal. Martinez, et al v. Schumpert Medical Ctr., et al, 27,000 (La. App. 2d Cir. 5/10/95), 655 So.2d 649.
Finally, we decline to address the merits of plaintiff's remaining assignments of error, in which he seeks recovery for intentional interference with contractual relations and for the intentional infliction of emotional distress, as both issues are subsumed by our holding on the defamation claim.
JtDECREE
For the reasons articulated herein, we affirm the decision of the trial court granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Costs are assessed to the appellant.
AFFIRMED.
Before SEXTON, HIGHTOWER, BROWN, STEWART and CARAWAY, JJ.