Case Name: GRIFF GLOVER, Appellant, v. CAPE GIRARDEAU & SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Respondent
Court: St. Louis Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1902-06-09
Citations: 95 Mo. App. 369
Docket Number: 
Parties: GRIFF GLOVER, Appellant, v. CAPE GIRARDEAU & SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Respondent.
Judges: Barclay and Goode, JJ., concur; the former on the authority of Wells v. Thomas, 27 Mo. 17.
Reporter: Missouri Appeal Reports
Volume: 95
Pages: 369–377

Head Matter:
GRIFF GLOVER, Appellant, v. CAPE GIRARDEAU & SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Respondent.
St. Louis Court of Appeals,
June 9, 1902.
1. Common Carrier: CONNECTING LINES: INITIAL CARRIER IS AGENT OE SHIPPER. Where goods are shipped to be carried over more than one line of transportation to reach their ultimate destination, the owner can not accompany the shipment, and in the absence of a contrary showing, the law assumes that the owner has stipulated terms with the carrier to whom he delivers his goods for shipment and treats this initial carrier as the agent' of the owner in giving directions to connecting carriers; and if his goods are by the fault of the initial carrier (his agent) forwarded to a wrong destination and he loses them, or if the initial carrier selects a circuitous route by reason of which the freight charges are more than they should be or would have been if he had selected a shorter and more direct route, the fault is the fault of the shipper’s agent and not of the connecting carriers, and his remedy is against the initial carrier.
Appeal from Stoddard Circuit Court.— Hon. James L. ■ Fort, Judge.
Aeeirmed.
J. R. Young for appellant.
(1) A common carrier is the agent of the consignee, and is bound “to carefully watch tbe interest of the owner whoever he may be,” “He is bound to do this to the same extent that a prudent man. would, were he present acting for himself.” “Pie must see that the previous charges are reasonable before he is authorized to pay them, for it is not every overcharge, which every extortioner through whose hands goods pass in transitu may see fit to impose upon them, that he is authorized to pay, and thus fix upon the owner a certain liability.” Armstrong v. Railroad, 62 Mo. App. 643; Steamboat v. Kraft, 25 Mo. 80. (2) “A carrier is not bound to pay unjust and unnecessary charges in order to continue transportation; and if payment is made without the consent of the owner, it is at the risk of the carrier.” Pierce v. Railroad, 89 Mo. App. 437. “It is not the policy of the law to permit a carrier, by any custom or usage, to protect itself ag'ainst its own neglect in not ascertaining whether the advance charges were correct and just.” Steamboat Vir. v. Kraft, 25 Mo. 80.
Kitchen <& Woody for respondent.
(1) The Adams Express Company, not having an office in Bloomfield, in the absence of contract or instruction, became the agent of appellant and had authority to select the connecting carrier; and respondent, in the absence of such instructions, had the right, and it was its duty, to accept the package and pay back charges, as is shown to be the custom of express companies. 8 Am. and Eng. Eney. Law (1 Ed.), 970; Briggs v. Railroad, 88 Mass. (6 Allen) 246, 83 Am. Dec. 626; Armstrong v. Railroad, 62 Mo. App. 639; Evans v. Railroad, 76 Mo. App. 472. (2) Respondent, being a common carrier (R. S. .1899, sec. 15, 16) had a lien on the goods for carriage and back charges paid by it in advance to prior connecting carriers as their compensation for carrying same, and had a right to possession of the same until all charges were paid. R. S. 1899, sec. 8481; 7 Am. and Eng. Eney. Law (1 Ed.), 569, 570; Wells v. Thomas, 27 Mo. 17; Moore v. Henry, 18 Mo. App. 35; 4 Elliott on Railroads, sec. 1570; 8 Am. and Eng. Ency. Law (1 Ed.), 669-675. (3) Appellant’s property can not be confiscated nor can “thrifty” companies “enlarge” their income in the- manner indicated by appellant, for appellant has his remedy against the wrongdoer for the damage he has suffered. His remedy in this case is against the Adams Express Company, the party guilty of making the mistake. Armstrong v. Railroad, 62 Mo. App. 639; Owen v. Railroad, 83 Mo. 454; Minter v. Railroad, 40 Wis. 294.

Opinion:
BLAND, P. J.
Plaintiff replevied from defendant one box weighing twenty-four pounds and containing one set of single harness. The package was marked, "From Englewood, Illinois, to Griff. Glover, Bloomfield, Mo." It was delivered by the consignor at Englewood (which is in the corporate limits of Chicago) to the Adams Express Company. It was carried by that company to Kansas City, Missouri, and there delivered to the American Express Company, who carried it to Cape Girardeau, Missouri, and there delivered it to a carrier having connection and a joint traffic contract with the defendant. These carriers carried the package to Bloomfield.
The charge of the Adams Express Company for carrying it to Kansas City was ninety cents, which the American Express Company paid and charged one dollar and ten cents for carrying the package- to Cape Girardeau. The connecting carrier at Cape Girardeau paid these express charges, amounting to two dollars and charged thirty-five cents for carrying the package to Bloomfield.'
The undisputed evidence is that had the package been shipped by direct line the total charge, according to schedule rates, from Chicago to Bloomfield would have been one dollar and ten cents. Plaintiff tendered this.amount to the defendant and demanded the package. Defendant refused the tender and demanded two dollars and thirty-five cents in payment of all the freight charges.
The evidence is that the Adams Express Company had an office in the city of St. Louis and one at Cape Girardeau and that the nearest and most direct route from Chicago by rail to Bloomfield is by way of St. Louis and Cape Girardeau and it is conceded that the Adams Express Company misrouted the package by sending it by way of Kansas City.
There is no evidence that any special directions were given, either by the consignee or consignor as to the route by which the package should be shipped.
The issues were submitted to the court without a jury. Plaintiff at the close of the evidence offered an instruction in effect that under the law and the evidence plaintiff was entitled to recover, which the court refused. No other instructions were asked or given. The court found the issues for the defendant. After taking proper steps to have the rulings of the court reviewed by an appellate court, plaintiff appealed.
It is conceded by appellant that a carrier who receives freight to be forwarded by it from a connecting carrier may pay the reasonable freight charges of the initial carrier and have a lien on the goods for the payment of both the advance and its own freight charges.
The contention is that the advance freight charges paid by the defendant were not the reasonable and customary charges for carrying a like package from Chicago to Cape Girardeau, and that what defendant paid in excess of schedule rates was at its own risk and that it should have no lien on the goods for more than the usual and schedule charges.
The consignor is ordinarily the agent of the owner of the goods and may stipulate the terms of the shipment, but where no terms are made and the bill of lading is silent upon the question, the initial carrier is regarded as the agent of the owner and is impliedly authorized to select the connecting carrier when the place of destination is beyond its own line, and that it may forward the goods to the place of destination by any of the ordinary routes thereto. 8 Am. and Eng. Ency. of Law (1 Ed.), p. 970.
In Briggs v. Railroad, 6 Allen 216, Briggs delivered flour to the Racine & Mississippi Railroad Company, taking a receipt in which the railroad company agreed to forward and deliver the flour to Franklin Foster at Williamstown, Massachusetts. By mistake the agents of the railroad company directed the flour to Wilmington, a freight station on defendant's road. The flour was carried by the Racine & Mississippi road to the end of its line and delivered to the carrier next in succession and then forwarded by successive carriers until it reached the defendant's line at Groton. The defendant paid all the freight earned by the preceding carriers and carried the flour to Wilmington and deposited it in their freight house. Diligent search and inquiry was made for Foster, the consignee. He could not be found as he did not reside at Wilmington and had no business place there. After keeping the flour for over two months and being unable to find the owner, the flour becoming sour, defendant sold it and received the proceeds of the sale and retained them. Plaintiff contended that as Williams-town was the place of destination, defendant had no right to receive the flour and was guilty of a conversion. In the discussion of this contention the court held that the initial carrier was of necessity invested by the consignor with authority to give requisite and proper directions to each successive carrier to whom,, in due course of transportation, the flour should pass over for the purpose of being forwarded to its ultimate destination and that as a result of this implied authority when the owner delivered the goods,to be carried over successive lines to reach their destination, he makes the initial carrier his forwarding agent, and if the several successive carriers carried the goods according to the direction of the initial carrier the "last carrier will be entitled to a lien upon the goods, not only for the freight earned by him on his own part of the route, but also for all the freight which has been accumulated from the commencement of the carriage until he receives them, which, according to a very convenient custom, which is now fully recognized and established as a proper and legal proceeding, he has paid to the preceding carriers;"
If the law and custom were otherwise, great inconvenience and hardship would often result to both the owner and the carrier. When goods are shipped to be carried over'more than one line of transportation to reach their ultimate destination the owner can not accompany the shipment. In the absence of a contrary showing, the law wisely assumes that the owner has stipulated terms with the carrier to whom he delivers his goods for shipment and justly treats this initial carrier as the agent of the owner in giving directions to connecting carriers and if his goods are by the fault of the initial carrier (his agent) forwarded to a wrong destination and he loses them, or if the initial carrier selects a circuitous route by reason of which the freight charges are more than they should be or would have been if he had selected a shorter and more direct route, the fault is the fault of the shipper's agent and not of the connecting carriers and his remedy is against the initial carrier.
The judgment is affirmed.
Barclay and Goode, JJ., concur; the former on the authority of Wells v. Thomas, 27 Mo. 17.