Case Name: ST. LOUIS, SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY OF TEXAS, Appellant, v. SPRING RIVER STONE COMPANY, Respondent
Court: Springfield Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1913-03-03
Citations: 169 Mo. App. 109
Docket Number: 
Parties: ST. LOUIS, SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY OF TEXAS, Appellant, v. SPRING RIVER STONE COMPANY, Respondent.
Judges: Sturgis, J., concurs in the result in a separate opinion. Farrington, J., dissents in a separate opinion.
Reporter: Missouri Appeal Reports
Volume: 169
Pages: 109–137

Head Matter:
ST. LOUIS, SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY OF TEXAS, Appellant, v. SPRING RIVER STONE COMPANY, Respondent.
Springfield Court of Appeals,
March 3, 1913.
1. CARRIERS OF FREIGHT: Rates: Differences Between Carrier and Shipper as to: Settlement Conclusive. A carrier and shipper cannot enter into a binding agreement for a different rate on. an interstate shipment than that prescribed by the schedule filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission. Nevertheless, the parties to this litigation, having reached a settlement of their differences and payment thereunder having been made, into which no fraud, disception or mistake appears to have entered, such agreement is a bar to further controversy. [Per ROBERTSON, P. J., FARRINGTON and STURGIS, JJ., dissenting.]
2. -: Settlement has Binding Force of Judgment: Can Only be Attacked in a Proceeding in Equity. Such a settlement has the binding force and effectiveness of a judgment and can only be attacked by a direct proceeding in equity on the ground of fraud or mistake. [Per ROBERTSON, P. J., FARRINGTON and STURGIS, JJ„ dissenting.]
3. CARRIERS OF FREIGHT: Rates: Differences Between Carrier and Shipper: Rule of Settlement Not Applicable. The rule of law which forbids the opening of a settlement of a controversy or the adjustment of a difference under a misunderstanding has no application to this case, because the act of Congress has entirely taken the right to contract and the ■ authority to settle away from both the carrier and shipper. [Per FARRINGTON, J„ STURGIS, J., concurring.]
4.--: -: Would Render. Nugatory Interstate Com- ' merce Law. To prohibit the parties from contracting in their own right and yet permit them to settle or compromise their differences as to rates would render nugatory the purpose of 'the Interstate Commerce Law. [Per FARRINGTON, J„ STURGIS, J., concurring.]
5. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION: Rates: Rules and Regulations: Must Be Strictly Complied With. The carrier and shipper must comply strictly with the tariffs, rules and regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission regarding the rates concerned in any transaction, and the courts are not given discretion to relieve against seeming injustices arising under particular eases. [Per FARRINGTON, J., STURGIS, J., concurring.]
6. -: Rates: Differences Between Carriers and Shippers as to: Must Be Hearing Before Interstate Commerce Commission in First Instance. Where differences arise between carrier and shipper with reference to rate to be charged under the rules and regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission, or with reference to damages accruing for failure to • perform certain duties required under said rules and regulations, before the injured party can proceed in the courts for redress «he must first obtain a finding and order in his favor from the Interstate Commerce Commission. [Per FARRINGTON, J., STURGIS, J., concurring.]
7. BILL OF LADING: A Contract of Carriage: Oral Testimony Cannot Contradict. The bill of lading reduced to writing and delivered by the carrier to the shipper, is a contract of carriage, fixing the amount of freight to be charged and is not subject to be varied or contradicted by oral testimony. [Per FARRINGTON, J., STURGIS, J., concurring.]
8. -: Binding on Shipper. It is the duty of the shipper to read the bill of lading and if plain and intelligible he is bound by its contract terms. [Per FARRINGTON, J.]
9.-: Necessary Notations On. To hold it to be the duty of the carrier alone to see that all proper notations are made on the bill of lading and waybill, and that the carrier’s failure to make them affords an excuse for evading the schedule rate, would open the way for discrimination, and render ineffectual the schedule rate. [Per FARRINGTON, J., STURGIS, J., dissenting.]
10. CARRIERS OF FREIGHT: Rates: Failure to Post; not a Condition Precedent. The binding effect of the tariff rate filed by carriers with the Interstate Commerce Commission, does not depend upon the posting of copies thereof by carrier’s local agent. The posting of these rates is merely a means of information to those interested and is not a condition precedent to putting the rates into effect. [Per STURGIS, J., FARRINGTON, J., concurring.]
11. -: Rate Filed With Interstate Commerce Commission: Effect of. The interstate Commerce Act makes the published rate of a carrier a contract with all the world and deprives both carrier and shipper of the power to make individual rate contracts which would be a substitute for or a change of the one uniform contract filed. A carrier’s agent can only give information as to what that rate is; he cannot alter it. [Per STURGIS, J., FARRINGTON, J., concurring.]
12. BILL OF LADING: Mistake in or Omission From: Attributable to Carrier. A bill of lading is a receipt which the Interstate Commerce Act requires common carriers to give to the shipper, showing that the property therein specified has been received by the carrier for transportation. Irrespective of whether the carrier or the shipper performs the clerical work of filling out the blank forms, it is the carrier’s bill of lading and it is incumbent on the carrier to see that all necessary and proper notations are made thereon, and failure to do so is attributable to the carrier.
13. CARRIER OF FREIGHT: Cannot Profit From its Own Neglect or Wrong. Where a shipper ordered a car of certain capacity, and the carrier for its own convenience furnished a ear of larger minimum capacity, the shipper by using the car thus furnished does not subject himself to payment for excess weight up to the minmum capacity of the car thus used. It is solely the fault of the carrier that the smaller minimum capacity car was not furnished and used. Neither should the neglect of the carrier to note on its bill of lading the reason for the use of the larger car subject the shipper to payment of a higher rate on the commodity shipped by him. Such a holding would allow the carrier to reap a benefit from its own wrong or neglect.
Appeal from Jasper Circuit Court, Division Number Two.- — Eon David E. Blair, Judge.
Affirmed.
8. E. West, McReynolds & Halliburton, and Roy F. Britton for appellant.
1. Common carriers by railroad engaged in interstate commerce are required' by tbe acts, of Congress regulating commerce to collect tbe rates published in the schedules or tariffs on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission. Act of Feb. 4, 1887, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3158; amended by the Act of June 29, 1906, U. S. Comp. Stat. Sup-., 1909, p. 1153, as amended-by the Act of June 18, 1910-, U. S. Comp-. Stat. Sup. 1911, p.. 1284; Railroad v. Hefley, 158 U. S. 98; Railroad v. Mugg, 202 U. S. 242; Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U. S. 56; Railroad v. Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426; Railroad v. Oil Mill Co., 204 U. S. 449; Commission Co. v. Railroad, 223 U. S. 573; Grain Co. v. Railroad, 12 I. C. C. Rep. 418; Blinn v. Railroad, 18 I. C. C. Rep. 430; Gerber v. Railroad, 63 Mo. App. 145. (2) Shippers are presumed to know the provisions of tariffs duly published and filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission, and rates named in such tariffs are not the subject of contract between carriers and shippers. Railroad v. Kirby (1912), 32 Sup. 648; Railroad v. New Albany B. & B. Co., 94 N. E. Rep. 906; Mires v. Railroad, 134 Mo. App. 379: (3) The shipping ticket prepared by respondent’s, employee and signed by appellant’s agent is a “bill of lading.” A bill of lading is the carrier’s receipt for goods delivered to it for transportation. It- may also contain the contract of carriage, but this is not necessary to make the instrument a bill of lading. Porter on Bills of Lading; Standard Dictionary; Webster’s. New International Dictionary; Century Dictionary; Coue v. Cordova. 2 Rawle (Pa.), 202; The Mayflower, 16 Eed. Gas. 1250; Hutchinson on Carriers. (4) Secondary evidence as to the contents of a written instrument is admissible where the original is beyond the jurisdiction of the court, or beyond the control of either party. Wigmore on Evidence, 1211-1213; Brown v. Wood, 19 Mo. 475; Afflict v. Streeter, 136 Mo. App. 712; Harvey v. Herr-man, 39 Mo. App. 214. (5) A tariff provision designed to change or effect interstate rate© or charges will not be effective unless. such provision is published, filed and strictly complied with. Item 81 of Texas Tariff 42-B. I. C. C., No. 524, in effect at the time these shipments were made, provides that when shippers order cars of specified capacity in writing, and the order is noted on the bill of lading, the capacity of the car ordered will be the minimum weight, but as neither of these conditions was complied with, the marked capacity of the car used is the minimum weight as provided in the tariff.
Thomas & Hackney for respondent.
(1) While the tariff rates, rules and regulations filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission become binding on the carrier and the shipper by reason of such filing, yet if the carrier negligently fails to post these rates, etc., in its station (which appears to have been the cause of the trouble in this case), it becomes liable to the shipper for damages sustained in consequence of such neglect. Railroad v. Lewellen Bros., 192 Fed. 540; Railroad v. Elevator Co., 138 Ky. 2201,127 S. W. 777; Freeman v. Kemendo, 148 S. W: 605. (2) Under item 81 of the rule read in evidence, it was the duty of the carrier to indorse on its bill of lading and waybill in each ease the capacity of the car ordered, the number of the order and date of same, where a smaller capacity ear had been ordered by the shipper and a greater capacity car liad been furnished for the convenience of the carrier. This duty in the very nature of the case devolved on the carrier who issued these documents, and if in consequence of its failure to discharge its duty, the shipper was required to pay the higher rate, a just claim for overcharge existed in behalf of the shipper. Authorities, supra. (3) “Where a carrier quoted a legal rate but- failed to advise the shipper of a certain limitation attached to it, and as a consequence the shipper failed to sign the released valuation clause, because of which he was forced to pay the higher rate, reparation was awarded. Cotton Oil Co. v. Eailroad, 18 Interstate Com. Eep. 180; Cotton Oil Co. v. Eailroad, 19 Interstate Com. Eep. 79; Miller & Lux v. Eailroad, 20 Interstate Com. Rep. 129. (4) Where as in this case a settlement is made, and with full knowledge of all of the facts money is paid, even under a mistake of law, it cannot be recovered back by the party making - the payment. Campbell v. Clark, 44 Mo. Appi. 249; State ex rel. Scotland Co. v. Ewing, 116 Mo. 129; Corbin v. Adair Co., 17.1 Mo. 385'; ITethcock v. Crawford Co., 200 Mo. 170; Trust Co. v. Bank, 154 Mo. App. 89, 108. (5) The basis of an action for a refund of money paid is that the defendant has received money which ex aequo et bono, he ought to refund. 2 Ency. P. & P. 1016.

Opinion:
ROBERTSON, P. J.
Plaintiff sued defendant in the circuit court to recover $323.12 from defendant and based its claim thereto on the following facts: In 1908 defendant was operating a stone quarry at Carthage, Missouri, and was negotiating with one J. B. Hoffman of Ft. Worth, Texas, for the sale of five cars of stone to be delivered to Hoffman at Ft. Worth. Defendant called upon the commercial agent of the plaintiff for a quotation of freight rates and received' a quotation of 27% cents per hundred pounds on cars of 50,000 pounds minimum capacity, the agent designating the St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad Company, which, had a station and freight office at Carthage, as the initial carrier. Upon this information the defendant quoted Hoffman a price on five 50,000-Ib. cars of stone to be delivered at Ft. Worth. This offer was accepted and the defendant company ordered 50,0004b. cars in each case, but not having that capacity accessible the railroad company furnished in each case cars of greater marked capacity than were ordered by the defendant. Defendant loaded the stone and estimated the weight, according to its dimensions, which was approximately correct, but as the railroad company had no facilities at Garthage for weighing the cars they were not weighed by the railroad company until they reached Monett en route to their destination. The correct weight was slightly in excess of the estimated weight. The shipments were made between November 30, 1908, and December 29 of the same year and when the shipments reached the destination plaintiff attempted to exact freight according to the marked capacity of the cars instead of according to the capacity ordered, though in fact the amount paid by the defendant corresponded neither to the actual nor the estimated weight of the shipments and was $30.52 less than the freight would have amounted to upon the marked capacity of the cars. On February 4, 1909, before defendant knew the actual weight of the shipments, it made a written demand upon the claim agent of plaintiff for $287.78 overcharge, giving the estimated weight. After making this claim the defendant on February 6, 1909, after learning the correct weight of the cars, reduced its claim to $263.73; and thereafter the .commercial agent of the plaintiff went to Carthage, made a full investigation and soon thereafter the defendant was paid $270.60 on account of the supposed overcharge.
The plaintiff bases its right to recovery in' this case upon the theory that the act of Congress, commonly called the Interstate Commerce Act, to regulate commerce and the tariffs and schedules filed in obedience thereto, fixed the rate on this character of shipments at 27 § cents per hundred pounds when the cars ordered and used were loaded to their capacity, but that by virtue of a rule then applicable in this territory that when the carrier could not furnish a car of the capacity ordered by the shipper and for its own convenience provided a car of greater capacity than the one' ordered by the shipper, it might use this car on the basis of the minimum carload weight fixed in the tariff applied on the size of the car ordered by the shipper,-but in no case less than the actual weight, the capacity of car ordered, number of the order and date of same to be shown in each instance on the bill of lading and the carrier's waybill, and that in this instance the required notations were not made on the waybill nor on the bill of lading and that, therefore, the plaintiff in the first instance should have collected 27 cents per cwt. on the marked capacity of the cars.
It was conceded at the trial by plaintiff's counsel that when the defendant made its. claim for the rebate and when the plaintiff adjusted and paid it that there was no intention upon the part of either of them to violate the law.
The trial below was to a jury and at the conclusion of the plaintiff's testimony the court directed a verdict in favor of the defendant. There is no controversy here as to the facts material to a decision of this ease.
In the ease of State ex rel. v. Ewing, 116 Mo. 129, 22 S. W. 785, an action was brought upon the official bond of the county collector to recover certain sums retained by him on settlements for commissions in excess of what was due him under the law. The defendants in that case, as in this, pleaded the settlements in bar, and a.t the conclusion of the testimony the court directed a verdict for the defendants. That case in principle is not different from this. The facts in that ease were that the county collector had charged and withheld greater commissions on sums collected than he was allowed by law, but the contention in behalf of the county was that as the commissions had been allowed by the county court upon a settlement with it contrary to law the defendants could not plead settlement. The defendants' contention was that notwithstanding the collector was allowed by the county court upon a settlement more by way of commissions than he was entitled to receive, the settlement with the county court had the binding force and conclusiveness of a judgment and could only be attacked by a direct proceeding in equity on the ground of fraud or mistake. This contention was ruled against the defendants and. it was held that the settlement could be inquired into and mistakes corrected in like manner as between individuals acting in their own behalf, and it was held that the settlement was binding on the county. A similar case is also found in State ex rel. v. Shipman, 125 Mo. 436, 28 S, W. 842.
In the case of Corbin v. Adair County, 171 Mo. 385, 71 S. W. 674, the circuit clerk undertook to recover fees paid by him into the county treasury under a mistake of fact, to which he was as a matter of law entitled at the time of his payment, but the court held that his action could not be maintained. To the same effect also is the opinion in the case of Hethcock v. Crawford County, 200 Mo. 170, 98 S. W. 582.
"While it may be true, as contended by plaintiff, that the parties to this litigation could not have entered into a binding agreement for a different rate from that fixed by the rules, tariffs, etc., under the act of Congress, nevertheless they have settled, as between themselves, their respective civil liabilities on account of the shipments, and it is. as essential in this case as in the cases where public officials received more than they were entitled to by law, that the right of controversy between the parties be foreclosed by their settlement; and it is our duty to follow the decisions of the Supreme Court. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
Sturgis, J., concurs in the result in a separate opinion. Farrington, J., dissents in a separate opinion.