Case Name: James DAVIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1989-01-18
Citations: 537 So. 2d 1061
Docket Number: No. 87-1654
Parties: James DAVIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: WENTWORTH, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 537
Pages: 1061–1065

Head Matter:
James DAVIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 87-1654.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Jan. 18, 1989.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 17, 1989.
Louis 0. Frost, Jr., Public Defender, and James T. Miller and Jeanine B. Sasser, Asst. Public Defenders, Jacksonville, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Gary L. Printy, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.

Opinion:
BOOTH, Judge.
This cause is before us on appeal of a conviction for three counts of sexual battery, two involving use of actual physical force likely to cause serious personal injury, and one involving slight force. Appellant argues that it was error to deny him a continuance, error to admit similar fact evidence under the rule in Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959), and that it was error to admit his wallet and its contents into evidence.
First, we find no error in the trial court's refusal to grant the requested continuance. The basis for the request was that the State gave notice of its intent to use similar fact evidence 11 days prior to the originally scheduled trial date, thus providing the defense with numerous new witnesses to depose. The notice was timely under Section 90.404(2)(b)l, Florida Statutes (1987), and the trial court did begin the trial three days later than originally scheduled. While we recognize that timely notice under the statute does not preclude a reversal on abuse of discretion grounds, we find that appellant did not demonstrate actual prejudice from the trial court's ruling. Appellant was able to depose all of the similar fact witnesses who actually testified at trial, and counsel did a very effective job of impeaching the credibility of the similar fact victim.
The trial court also correctly admitted the similar fact evidence. Contrary to appellant's contentions and without finding it necessary to detail the gruesome facts of this case, we find that the evidence of the prior sexual battery was strikingly similar to what occurred in the instant case. The trial court admitted this evidence on several grounds including pattern of criminality. Contrary to appellant's contentions, evidence under this theory has not been admitted solely in cases involving sexual abuse of children in the familial setting. Williams, supra, which involved a sexual battery of a woman unrelated to the defendant, expressly noted at 662 that evidence tending to reveal the commission of a separate and wholly independent offense is admissible "if it casts light upon the character of the act under investigation by showing motive, intent, absence of mistake, common scheme, identity or a system or general pattern of criminality so that the evidence of the prior offenses would have a relevant or a material bearing on some essential aspect of the offense being tried." (emphasis added).
Finally, we reject appellant's suggestion that his wallet and its contents, found at the scene of the crime, were without any probative value because he admitted his identity and presence at the scene. We hold that the wallet and its contents had probative value bearing on the consent defense, and that the women's photos had relevance to pattern or plan of criminality. The remaining items show the context of the relevant photos among the diverse other material, none of which approached the level of prejudice of the news clipping in Mason v. State, 286 So.2d 17 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973).
Accordingly, appellant's convictions and sentences are AFFIRMED.
WENTWORTH, J., concurs.
ERVIN, J., concurs and dissents with written opinion.
. The statute requires notice "no fewer than ten days before trial."
. Appellant's argument on this point stressed inability to effectively investigate and impeach the similar fact victim's credibility.
. We also note that the Williams court, in discussing pattern of criminality, explained its reasoning by citing to an earlier sexual battery case. That case, Talley v. State, 160 Fla. 593, 36 So.2d 201 (1948), also involved sexual battery on an adult woman unrelated to the offender. The similar fact evidence at issue therein involved indecent acts or assaults on five other adult women.