Case Name: Yvonne WENDELL, Et Al., Appellants, v. CENTRAL POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY, Appellee
Court: Texas Courts of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1984-06-28
Citations: 677 S.W.2d 610
Docket Number: No. 13-82-362-CV
Parties: Yvonne WENDELL, Et Al., Appellants, v. CENTRAL POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY, Appellee.
Judges: Before GONZALEZ, YOUNG, UTTER, KENNEDY and SEERDEN, JJ., En Banc.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 677
Pages: 610–629

Head Matter:
Yvonne WENDELL, Et Al., Appellants, v. CENTRAL POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY, Appellee.
No. 13-82-362-CV.
Court of Appeals of Texas, Corpus Christi,
June 28, 1984.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 31, 1984.
Carl Raymond Crites, San Antonio, for appellants.
James W. Wray, Jr., Kleberg, Dyer, Redford & Weil, Corpus Christi, for appellee.
Before GONZALEZ, YOUNG, UTTER, KENNEDY and SEERDEN, JJ., En Banc.

Opinion:
OPINION
GONZALEZ, Justice.
This is an appeal from a take-nothing judgment in a wrongful death action. Appellants, plaintiffs below, are the wife and children of the deceased, who was electrocuted when his rig came into contact with a power line owned by appellee. Appellants filed suit against appellee and alleged various acts of negligence. The jury found all liability issues against appellant. On appeal, appellants assert that the trial court abused its discretion in denying leave to file a trial amendment and also allege error in: (1) the submission and refusing to submit certain special issues, and (2) the exclusion of certain evidence. We affirm.
Central Power and Light Company (CP & L) owned and maintained an overhead electrical distribution system in Cove Harbor, a marine industrial installation owned by Ar-ansas County Navigation District No. 1. The waterfront dock and wharf areas are leased to private individuals and companies, and in November, 1978, the major activity of such individuals and companies was related to off-shore exploration and production of petroleum products. Lynn Wendell, husband and father of the plaintiffs, was a part owner and general manager of Lynn Wendell Marine Service, Inc., the third-party defendant, a lessee at Cove Harbor.
The Navigation District provided at Cove Harbor on Lot 43 a boat launching ramp and an adjacent parking area for the use of the public and the lessees. Lot 43 covers approximately 46,604 square feet (1.070 acres).
At the time of his fatal accident, Lynn Wendell, his brother, Bill, and an employee, Kenneth Jackson, were taking a barge out of the water, intending to position it in the parking area for routine repairs. Lynn Wendell was driving a winch truck to which was attached a trailer. The trailer had been backed down the ramp into the water, the barge positioned above the trailer and attached to the winch truck, then pulled out of the water on the trailer.
CP & L's poles supporting its overhead power lines were located in the right-of-way bordering Lot 43. There were wooden poles with cross arms on which distribution lines were laid at a height of approximately 32 feet above ground. Rising from both sides of the barge at a point approximately 15 feet to the rear of the barge were metal spud poles, which were approximately 28 feet in length. With the barge on the trailer, the spud poles were approximately 4 feet off the ground; thus, the metal spud poles stood approximately 32 feet above the surface level.
On November 27, 1978, after the barge and trailer had been removed from the water and moved part of the way into the parking area, Lynn Wendell stopped the tow truck. After determining that insufficient space was available for access by others to the boat ramp, it was decided to go further southwest from the ramp. There was misting rain, and Lynn was using Bill as a spotter in order to determine the point at which he would stop. Lynn drove the winch truck forward and stopped the truck so that the barge was at the point where Bill was standing. Smoke was seen coming from the tires of the trailer. Both Bill and Jackson, who was on the barge, testified that Jackson lowered a pail of water to Bill who then threw the water on the tires. Bill was knocked to the ground, apparently by electrical shock. Jackson testified that he jumped on a piece of canvas in order to try to insulate himself from the deck of the barge.
As Bill was thrown to the ground, Jackson looked toward Lynn and saw that Lynn was lying on the ground to the left of the left door of the winch truck.
The contact with the overhead power line occurred at a point 36.5 feet northeast of the westernmost pole and at an elevation above the surface of 32.8 feet. The wire made contact with the spud pole at a point approximately 2 inches from the top of the spud pole.
The drawings admitted during the trial were many and varied, and the witnesses' comments with regard to them were not always specific with regard to which exhibit was being discussed. However, from the entire record we have reconstructed a fairly accurate depiction of the relevant scene, as follows:
Lynn was pronounced dead. His surviving spouse and daughters brought suit against CP & L for wrongful death. Illinois Employers' Insurance of Wausau, the workers' compensation carrier for Lynn Wendell Marine Service, Inc., filed a Petition in Intervention. CP & L filed a third-party action against Lynn Wendell Marine Service, Inc.
The suit by appellants against appellee alleged that appellee had failed to:
1.inspect, make appraisals and survey transmission lines for unsafe condition; 2. place power lines at a higher elevation;
3. place the power lines underground;
4. place the power lines on the opposite side of the street; and
5. erect warning signs.
Appellants also alleged liability under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
Appellee filed a general denial, and alleged that Wendell was negligent in:
1. Failing to keep a proper lookout. 2. Coming into contact with the power line.
3. Moving the barge under the power line.
4. Failing to lower the spud poles of the barge before moving it.
5. Failing to notify appellee about moving the barge under the power lines as required by TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 1436c (Vernon 1980).
During the course of the trial, evidence was introduced that the power line extended 8V2 inches over into the parking lot where the accident occurred. Appellants complained that there had been a "taking without due process," and on the fourth day of the trial, appellants orally offered a trial amendment that interjected a new issue, that is, that the encroachment of the power lines into lot 43 was negligence and a proximate cause of the accident. Leave to file was denied by the trial court. The following day, appellants offered a written trial amendment. Without asking appellee to respond, the trial court again denied leave to file. Appellants' counsel again made reference to this trial amendment when the objections to the charge were being made.
The trial court submitted the case to the jury on the acts of negligence that were raised by appellants' pleading and also instructed the jury on standard definitions of ordinary care, negligence, and proximate cause.
The jury answered all the liability issues adversely to the plaintiffs and to the third-party defendant. Specifically the jury answered Special Issues No. 1, 3, 5, and 7 as follows:
SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 1
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Central Power and Light was negligent in failing to place its distribution line under ground?
Answer "We do" or "We do not."
We, the jury, answer We do not.
SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 3
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Central Power and Light's failure to erect and maintain the distribution line on the opposite side of the street at the location in question was negligence?
Answer "We do" or "We do not."
We, the Jury, answer: We do not.
SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 5
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Central Power and Light's failure to place the electrical distribution line at a higher elevation in the area in question was negligence?
Answer "We do" or "We do not."
We, the Jury, answer: We do not.
SPECIAL ISSUE NO. 7
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Central Power and Light's failure to erect and maintain warning signs as to the location and existence of the line, its voltage, and its height above ground in the area in question was negligence?
Answer "We do" or "We do not."
We, the Jury, answer: We do not.
The jury also found that Lynn Wendell had failed to keep a proper lookout, that he was negligent in failing to lower the spud poles on the barge prior to moving it, and that these acts were a proximate cause of the accident. The jury also found damages to plaintiffs of $3,503,300.00.
Judgment was entered that plaintiffs take nothing. From that judgment, Yvonne Wendell, Marcella Wendell, Gwen-dolynne Wendell and Barbara Wendell, joined by third-party defendant, Lynn Wendell Marine Service, Inc., brought this appeal.
Trial Amendment
Appellants, by their first point of error, allege that the trial court erred in denying leave of court to file their trial amendment and in refusing to submit related special issues. Appellant asserts that the issues were tried by consent and that a trial amendment should have been allowed to conform the pleadings to the proof under TEX.R.CIV.P. 66, 67.
The trial amendment and special issues in question were as follows:
Plaintiffs' Trial Amendment
1. Plaintiffs allege that CP & L owned and maintained the distribution line which came into contact with the spud pole in question, in and over Lot 43 of the area in question, and that constitutes negligence.
Plaintiffs' Requested Special Issues
SPECIAL ISSUE NO.
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the distribution line which came into contact with the spud pole was owned and maintained by the Utility Company in and over lot 43 of the area in question?
Answer: "We do" or "We do not."
We, the Jury, answer: _
If you have answered Issue No. _ "We do", then answer Issue No. ; otherwise do not answer Issue No._
SPECIAL ISSUE NO.
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that erecting and maintaining the distribution lines in question over the rigging area constituted negligence? Answer: "We do" or "We do not."
We, the Jury, answer: _
SPECIAL ISSUE NO.
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that such negligence was a proximate cause of the death of Lynn Wendell?
Answer: "We do" or "We do not."
We, the Jury, answer: _
PLAINTIFF'S SPECIAL ISSUE NO.
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Central Power and Light Company intended to install the high voltage wire in question over Lot 43?
It did so intend_-
It did not so intend
As we have previously mentioned, in their live pleadings, appellants had alleged that appellee was negligent because they failed to make proper inspections, appraisals and surveys for unsafe conditions and because the power lines were: (1) too low, (2) above ground rather than underground, (3) should have been located on the opposite side of the street, and (4) because they failed to erect warning signs. The trial amendment alleged another act of negligence, that is, that appellee was negligent in allowing the power lines to overhang the parking lot by some 8V2 inches.
Amendments to the pleadings during trial are permitted under TEX.R.CIV.P. 66, 67.
RULE 66. Trial Amendment
If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleading, or if during the trial any defect, fault or omission in a pleading, either of form or substance, is called to the attention of the court, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so freely when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the allowance of such amendment would prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense upon the merits. The court may grant a postponement to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence.
RULE 67. Amendments to Conform to Issues Tried Without Objection
When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. In such case such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made by leave of court upon motion of any party at any time up to the submission of the case to the Court or jury, but failure so to amend shall not affect the result of the trial of these issues; provided that written pleadings, before the time of submission, shall be necessary to the submission of special issues, as is provided in Rules 277 and 279.
A trial amendment may be filed only by leave of court, and the request for leave is addressed to the trial court's discretion; the trial court's ruling is reviewable only on a showing of abuse of discretion. Victory v. State, 138 Tex. 285, 158 S.W.2d 760, 763 (1942); 2 R. McDonald, Texas Civil Practice in District and County Courts § 8.07 (rev. 1982).
As stated in Keelin v. Hamilton, 430 S.W.2d 268, 272 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1968, no writ):
It is universally recognized that Rule # 66, T.R.C.P., which expressly authorizes trial amendments to pleadings, is to be liberally construed in favor of justice. (citations omitted) However, the law vests in the trial court sound judicial discretion with regard to trial amendments and something more than a request and a refusal must appear before a reviewing court may properly say that the trial court abused its discretion. The action of the trial court is presumed correct and is subject to review only on a showing of an abuse of discretion.
McDonald, in § 8.07 quotes Lightner v. McCord, 151 S.W.2d 362, 367 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo, 1941, no writ), which lists some of the factors which affect the exercise of the trial court's discretion as follows:
In the matter of allowing amendment . pending the trial in order to meet the proof, the trial judge should allow the amendment if it appears that the new matter contained in it was not known to the party seeking to file the same or, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, he could have ascertained the same when his former pleadings were filed, and that it does not involve new issues or inject into the case new matters which would interfere with the orderly progress of the court's docket or work injustice upon other parties . However, . when it appears that the new matter was known to the party seeking to file the amendment, or to his counsel, or, by exercising reasonable diligence, it could have been known . at such time as would have enabled them to include it in his former pleadings, or if it injects new matter . the request should be denied.
Appellants assert that the issue of appel-lee's negligence due to the encroachment of the power line over the parking lot was tried by consent because of the many references to the location of the power lines in the record that came in without objection. This does not amount to trial by consent since that evidence was relevant to issues raised by the pleadings. Watts v. Watts, 563 S.W.2d 314, 316 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
The mere introduction of testimony on an issue does not preclude one's opponent from complaining of the submission of an issue on the matter, and failure to object to that testimony is not fatal to a subsequent effort to prevent submission of issues supported by that testimony to the jury. As stated by our Supreme Court in Harkey v. Texas Employers' Insurance Association, 146 Tex. 504, 208 S.W.2d 919 (1948):
Certainly issues are not tried merely by the hearing of the testimony thereon; submission to the jury undoubtedly is part of the process. So although the complaining party does not object to the testimony on the issues but does object to their submission on some tenable ground, he cannot be regarded as impliedly consenting that they be tried when not raised by the pleadings, as contemplated by Rule 67.
208 S.W.2d at 922.
Granted, in the instant case, counsel for the appellee did not object to filing of the trial amendment. However, there was no opportunity to object. The trial court denied the trial amendment without giving appellee's attorney an opportunity to object, and the trial court likewise denied appellants' requested issues on this matter.
As stated by the court in Jay Fikes and Associates v. Walton, 578 S.W.2d 885 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.):
That rule [Tex.R.Civ.P. 67] does sanction an unpleaded issue to be treated as raised in the pleadings when it is tried by express or implied consent; but, the rule is intended to cover the exceptional case where it clearly appears from the record as a whole that the parties tried the unpleaded issue. It is not intended to establish a general rule of practice and should be applied with care, and in no event in a doubtful situation.
578 S.W.2d at 889. In Jay Fikes, a bench trial, there was a stipulation that if the court decided to assess attorney's fees, it would be at its discretion to determine the amount and that testimony concerning the value of the fees would not be necessary. The court wrote:
"If it be arguable that the stipulation constitutes the hearing of some evidence on the issue of attorney's fees, the introduction of evidence alone does not mean the parties consented to a trial of the unpleaded issue; there must be more." Id. (citing Harkey).
There are many reasons why the doctrine of trial by consent, as an exception to the general rule, should be given a narrow application. In Harkey, the Supreme Court pointed out that a defendant is under no obligation to object to testimony that defeats his opponent's claim, even though that very testimony raises an unplead issue on an alternative ground of recovery. 208 S.W.2d at 923. Furthermore, as we stated earlier, it may be that the testimony is relevant to an issue pleaded as well as one not pleaded. Under such circumstances, the doctrine should not be applied unless clearly warranted. Watts v. Watts, 563 S.W.2d 314, 316 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In the case at bar, the evidence of the power line encroaching on the parking lot was relevant on the other allegations of negligence that had been pleaded by appellants.
In determining whether the issue was tried by consent, we must examine the record not for evidence of the issue, but rather for evidence of trial of the issue. See Watts v. St. Mary's Hall, Inc., 662 S.W.2d 55, 58 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.). "The doctrine of implied consent applies only where it appears from the record that the issue was actually tried, although not pleaded." Watts v. Watts, 563 S.W.2d 314, 316 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Upon examining the entire record, it does not clearly appear that the parties tried the unpleaded issue. Because the issue was not tried by consent, TEX.R.CIV.P. 67 has no application, and the instant appeal is governed by TEX.R.CIV.P. 63 and 66.
In reviewing the action of a trial judge in refusing an amendment under TEX.R.CIV.P. 63, the Supreme Court has specifically held that the burden of showing an abuse of discretion is on the complaining party, rather than on the opposite party to show surprise. Hardin v. Hardin, 597 S.W.2d 347, 349 (Tex.1980). See Valdez v. Lyman-Roberts Hospital, Inc., 638 S.W.2d 111, 117 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1982, writ ref d n.r.e.). Our Court has applied that same test to TEX.R.CIV.P. 66. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Thurmond, 527 S.W.2d 180, 191 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (trial court granting plaintiff's amendment held no abuse of discretion); see also Garcia v. Caletka, 486 S.W.2d 880, 882 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (granting defendant's amendment no abuse of discretion).
Our Court has previously established what we believe to be the proper test:
Though Rules 63 and 66, T.R.C.P., which deal with pleading amendments should be liberally construed in the interest of justice, it is well established that the action of the trial court in granting or refusing the right to amend the pleadings within the seven-day period preceding trial is a matter within the discretion of the trial judge, and his decision will not be disturbed by an appellate court unless there is a clear showing of an abuse of discretion. The burden is on the complaining party to show that the trial court's action in granting or denying leave to file the amended pleading within the seven-day period before trial was either arbitrary or unjustified by the rules. Something more than a request and a refusal must appear in the record before an appellate court may properly say that a trial court abused its discretion or acted arbitrarily.
In this connection, where it appears that the new matter was known to the parties seeking to file the amendment, or to their counsel, or by exercising reasonable diligence, it could have been known at such time as would have enabled them to include it in their former pleadings, or if it injects new matter, the request should be denied. [Citations omitted.]
Plata v. Guzman, 571 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Applying that test to the instant controversy, we first note that nothing more than a request and a refusal appears in the record before us. In State v. Gilbreth, 511 S.W.2d 556, 560 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1974, writ ref'd), the court suggested that a showing could have been made by bill of exception, or other appropriate means, and then held: "In the absence of showing of the facts attending the presentation of the State's motion and action of the trial court in refusing to allow the amendment, this Court will presume that the trial court did not abuse its discretion." When confronted with a silent record, this Court will presume that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
Notwithstanding Gilbreth, we also are of the opinion that appellant has failed to meet the other criteria set forth by our Court in Plata v. Guzman. By exercising reasonable diligence, the matter sought to be added by trial amendment could have been included before this cause was tried. The evidence could clearly have been discovered by appellants well in advance of trial, for it came from their own expert.
For all of these reasons, appellants have failed to show an abuse of discretion. Appellants' first point of error is overruled.
Standard of Care
Appellants, by their fifth point of error, complain that the trial court erred in refusing to submit the following requested instruction:
A company maintaining electrical wires over which a high voltage of electricity is conveyed, rendering them highly dangerous to others, is under the duty of using the necessary care and prudence at places where others may have the right to go, either for work, business, or pleasure, to prevent injury.
The trial court denied the requested instruction and instead gave the standard instructions on ordinary care and negligence. Through their proposed instruction, appellants are attempting to impose a higher duty of care on appellee than ordinary care.
The Texas Commission of Appeals, in an opinion from which the language of the requested instruction is drawn, said:
[T]he duty is imposed, in a case like this, not only to warn, but to use at least ordinary care to have the premises in a reasonably safe condition; the degree of care required must be commensurate with the danger, (emphasis added.)
A company maintaining electrical wires over which a high voltage of electricity is conveyed, rendering them highly dangerous to others, is under the duty of using the necessary care and prudence at places where others may have the right to go, either for work, business, or pleasure, to prevent injury.
West Texas Utilities v. Renner, 53 S.W.2d 451, 453, 454 (Tex.Comm'n App.1932, holding approved). However, this "commensurate with the danger" standard does not impose a higher duty of care, it merely more fully defines what is ordinary care under the facts presented. In fact, the Court in Renner, set forth that:
[T]he meaning of the common-law rule of ordinary care is elastic enough to meet all emergencies; the amount of care depends upon the exigency confronted. It may require one thing to be done at one place, and something else at another place; the degree of care must be such as a person of ordinary prudence would exercise under like circumstances.
Id. at 453-454.
We believe that the concept of ordinary care is sufficient in this case and the instruction was properly denied. Appellant's fifth point of error is overruled.
Appellants, by their sixth point of error, complain that the trial court erred in restricting the cross-examination of appel-lee's expert witness. Appellants' attorney attempted to cross-examine appellee's employee, Walter Mosely, regarding the standards embodied in the National Electric Code.
If a book is recognized as authoritative by a witness or is relied on by an expert witness in forming his opinion, he may be cross-examined based on the reading of excerpts from that book. Bowles v. Bourdon, 148 Tex. 1, 219 S.W.2d 779 (1949); National Surety Corp. v. Rushing, 628 S.W.2d 90 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1981, no writ). Mosely indicated that his opinion as to the safety of the installation was based in part on the authority in question. Therefore, it would be error for the trial court to preclude a cross-examination of Mosely based on this Code; however, on the bill of exceptions, no relevant testimony was preserved. In the absence of testimony, showing that lot 43 was regularly used or was suitable for use as a sailboat rigging area, the provisions of the code regarding areas designed for rigging and launching of sailboats is not relevant and was therefore properly excluded. See Pittman v. Baladez, 158 Tex. 372, 312 S.W.2d 210 (1958). Appellants' sixth point of error is overruled.
Appellants in their second, third, fourth and seventh points of error raise issues relating to Lynn Wendell's negligence. We have reviewed these points of error, and they are overruled.
The judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
UTTER and KENNEDY, JJ., dissent.
NYE, C.J., and BISSETT, J., not participating.
. The plaintiffs did not request that the court submit special issues inquiring whether CP & L's alleged failure to inspect, make appraisals and survey the power line was negligence and a proximate cause of the accident.
. Appellants' first point of error reads as follows:
It was error for the trial court to refuse to submit Plaintiff's Trial Amendment, to-wit . and to refuse to submit plaintiffs' requested special issues in connection with such Trial Amendment, (emphasis added.) Nowhere does appellant assert that it was error for the trial court to fail to submit pleaded issues. Not in the trial court, nor in their brief. To completely remake appellants' point of error as Justice Utter has done is unwarranted.
. This issue inquired about an uncontroverted fact. CP & L did not deny ownership and maintenance of the power line nor that it hung over lot 43 in the area in question.
. There was no express consent to try the un-pleaded issue so our inquiry is whether the issue of CP & L's alleged negligence due to the encroachment of the power line into Lot 43 was tried by implied consent.