Case Name: John J. Croger, Respondent, v. F. A. Sales Co., Inc., Appellant
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1919-01
Citations: 105 Misc. 620
Docket Number: 
Parties: John J. Croger, Respondent, v. F. A. Sales Co., Inc., Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Miscellaneous Reports
Volume: 105
Pages: 620–626

Head Matter:
John J. Croger, Respondent, v. F. A. Sales Co., Inc., Appellant.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Term, First Department,
January, 1919.)
Contracts — sale of goods on commission — actions — evidence — trial — when judgment in favor of plaintiff affirmed.
Trial — charge to jury in assessing damages — when error harmless.
Plaintiff, hired on a certain day for one year, to sell goods for defendant on commission, was unlawfully discharged after working for about three months, and during the seven months next succeeding the commencement of his employment, the sales by defendant of goods in the territory in which plaintiff was employed to sell, amounted to about $5,000, on which the commissions would have been $1,250. The complaint in an action to recover a balance alleged to be due plaintiff did not distinguish between the cause of action for unlawful discharge and the cause of action for commissions earned during the term of employment, but plaintiff, without objection, gave evidence" as to the amount of sales actually made from the date of his employment to the date of his discharge and also to the end of the seven months’ period. Held, that the case having been tried upon the theory that there were two causes of action and two independent items of damages to be passed oh by the jury, a judgment in favor of plaintiff will be affirmed.
The trial justice charged the jury that in assessing the damages they might fipd two items, one for the amount due for unpaid commissions and the other for damages sustained on account of the unlawful termination of plaintiff’s employment, if they found there was an unlawful termination thereof. Held, that in so far as the charge, to which no exception was taken, failed to indicate defendant’s contention that the commissions were to be at a rate somewhat less than that testified to by plaintiff, the error was harmless because predicated upon the further instruction: “ If you find that the defendant’s version is correct.”
Delehanty, J., dissents.
Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Municipal Court of the city of New York, rendered in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $1,000 and costs.
Nathan Yidaver, for appellant.
David Bernstein, for respondent.

Opinion:
Bijur, J.
The complaint alleges that plaintiff was hired on November 14, 1917, for one year to sell goods in the state of Pennsylvania for defendant at a commission of 25 per cent; that he entered upon his employment but was unlawfully discharged February 23, 1918; that during the period from November 14, 1917, to July 1, 1918, the sales by defendant of goods in the state of Pennsylvania amounted to some $5,000, on which the plaintiff's commissions would have been $1,250, no part of which has been paid except the sum of $235.
The defendant, on the other hand, contended that the hiring was merely by the month, and that the commission was only 20 per cent.
No attempt is made in the complaint to distinguish between the cause of action for unlawful discharge and the cause of action for commissions earned during the term of the employment. See Perry v. Dickerson, 85 N. Y. 345. In this connection, the allegation as to the amount of commissions earned between the date of employment and July 1, 1918 — four months after the discharge — is meaningless and confusing. Appellant apparently now claims that the plaintiff was not " strictly speaking " entitled to recover in this action any commissions actually earned. On the trial, however, plaintiff, without objection, gave evidence of the amount of sales actually made from the date of his employment to the date of his discharge, and also to July first. Moreover, in a colloquy between court and counsel in the midst of the trial it was pointed out by plaintiff's counsel that the plaintiff made two claims to recover in the action, one for commissions actually earned and the other foT damages for wrongful discharge, and this evoked neither exception nor criticism from defendant's counsel.
No motion to dismiss the complaint was made at the close of the plaintiff's case, and at the close of the entire ease defendant's motion to that effect was based merely on the ground that " the plaintiff has failed to substantiate the allegations of his complaint."
Finally, the learned judge below, at the request of plaintiff's counsel, charged the jury that " in assessing the damages they (the jury) may find two items, one, the amount due plaintiff for unpaid commissions, and the other, for damages sustained on account of the unlawful termination of plaintiff's employment if they find there was an unlawful termination of the employment," to which no exception ivas taken.
"While, therefore, the complaint is undoubtedly unartificially drawn, the case was tried on .the theory that there were two causes of action and two independent items .of damage to be passed on by the jury. Defendant was really benefited by this mode of trial because from the record it seems to be apparent that had separate suits been brought the aggregate of plaintiff's recovery could well have been considerably larger than the jurisdictional $1,000 to which the present verdict was confined. In so far as the charge of the judge failed to indicate defendant's contention that the commissions were to be at a rate somewhat less than that testified to by plaintiff, the' error ivas harmless because it was predicated upon the further instruction: " If you find that the defendant's version is correct." It is self-evident that the jury rejected defendant's version of the entire transaction and adopted the plaintiff's.
I think, therefore, that the judgment should be affirmed with twenty-five dollars costs.
Guy, J., concurs.