Case Name: Clyde Cecil DOTSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1976-11-19
Citations: 339 So. 2d 693
Docket Number: No. 76-508
Parties: Clyde Cecil DOTSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: HOBSON, A. C. J., and BOARDMAN, J., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 339
Pages: 693–694

Head Matter:
Clyde Cecil DOTSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 76-508.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Nov. 19, 1976.
Jack 0. Johnson, Public Defender, Robert H. Grizzard, II, Asst. Public Defender, and John Robert Howes, Legal Intern, Bartow, for appellant.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Richard G. Pippinger, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

Opinion:
SCHEB, Judge.
On August 25, 1972, appellant was charged by a three count information with (1) robbery in violation of Section 813.011, Florida Statutes (1971), (2) carrying a concealed firearm in violation of Section 790.-01(2), Florida Statutes (1971), and (3) possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of Section 790.23, Florida Statutes (1971).
Appellant pled guilty as charged. The trial court adjudicated him guilty and sentenced him to a term of nine years and six months on each count with sentences to run concurrently.
Appellant filed a motion to vacate pursuant to Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.850, contending that the sentence imposed for carrying a concealed firearm should be vacated since that charge was a facet of a single transaction. The trial court denied the motion. We reverse on authority of Young v. State, 330 So.2d 235 (Fla.2d DCA 1976). The sentence on the charge of carrying a concealed firearm is therefore vacated; the remainder of the sentence is affirmed.
HOBSON, A. C. J., and BOARDMAN, J., concur.
. Appellant also contends that the sentence imposed for carrying a concealed firearm exceeded the statutory maximum. We agree as the crime was a felony of the third degree punishable by a maximum of five years under § 775.-082(2)(c), F.S. (1971).
. Appellee argues that the single transaction rule has been laid to rest by Chapter 76-66, Laws of Florida (1976). Since this law became effective after appellant's sentencing, we do not reach this argument.