Case Name: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Keith M. JACOBSON, Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1990-10-15
Citations: 916 F.2d 467
Docket Number: No. 88-2097NE
Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Keith M. JACOBSON, Appellant.
Judges: Before LAY, Chief Judge, HEANEY, Senior Circuit Judge, and McMILLIAN, ARNOLD, JOHN R. GIBSON, FAGG, BOWMAN, WOLLMAN, MAGILL and BEAM, Circuit Judges, En Banc.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 916
Pages: 467–476

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Keith M. JACOBSON, Appellant.
No. 88-2097NE.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted May 17, 1990.
Decided Oct. 15, 1990.
George H. Moyer, Jr., Madison, Neb., for appellant.
Jan W. Sharp, Omaha, Neb., for appellee.
Before LAY, Chief Judge, HEANEY, Senior Circuit Judge, and McMILLIAN, ARNOLD, JOHN R. GIBSON, FAGG, BOWMAN, WOLLMAN, MAGILL and BEAM, Circuit Judges, En Banc.

Opinion:
FAGG, Circuit Judge.
A jury convicted Keith M. Jacobson of knowingly receiving through the mails sexually explicit material depicting a minor. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) (Supp. V 1987). Jacobson appeals, and we affirm.
When police searched a California pornography bookstore, they discovered Jacobson's name on the bookstore's mailing list. Jacobson had ordered three items from the bookstore, two magazines featuring photos of nude adolescent boys and a brochure listing stores in the United States and Europe selling sexually explicit materials. Posing as a member of a hedonist organization, a postal inspector mailed Jacobson a sexual attitude survey and a membership application. Jacobson paid the membership fee to receive a quarterly newsletter from the organization and returned the survey expressing his preference for preteen sex. Later, a postal inspector mailed Jacobson another survey. Jacobson responded positively, "Please feel free to send me more information. I am interested in teenage sexuality." The postal inspector then mailed Jacobson a list of pen pals with similar sexual interests, and Jacobson began corresponding with pen pal Carl Long, the undercover identity of a postal inspector. Jacobson sent Carl Long a newspaper for homosexuals and two letters. Another postal inspector sent Jacobson a letter inviting him to order a child pornography catalogue. Jacobson requested the cat-alogue and then ordered Boys Who Love Boys, a magazine advertised in the cat-alogue. The catalogue described Boys Who Love Boys as "eleven year old and fourteen year old boys get it on in every way possible. Oral, anal sex and heavy masturbation. If you love boys, you will be delighted with this." Jacobson also ordered a set of sexually explicit photographs of young boys from another brochure a customs service agent mailed him. The photographs were never delivered to Jacobson. Following a controlled delivery of the magazine, postal inspectors arrested Jacobson when they searched his home and found Boys Who Love Boys.
All told, the postal inspectors mailed Jacobson two sexual attitude surveys, seven letters measuring his appetite for child pornography, and two sex catalogues. Jacobson responded with interest on eight occasions.
On appeal, Jacobson contends the government cannot begin an undercover investigation of a suspected person unless the government has reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts that the suspected person is predisposed to criminal activity. Although Jacobson did not raise this legal issue in the district court, both the government and Jacobson were given an opportunity to brief and argue the issue before the court en banc. We thus proceed on the premise that this issue is properly before us. In re Modern Textile, 900 F.2d 1184, 1191 (8th Cir.1990).
Apart from any question of whether the government's investigatory conduct deprived Jacobson of due process of law, Jacobson contends we should bar the government from obtaining a conviction in his case because the government did not have reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing on his part before targeting him for an undercover investigation. Jacobson argues this bar should apply even when the character of the government's investigation is not outrageous. We disagree.
In this circuit, we review the government's involvement in undercover investigations under due process principles. United States v. Irving, 827 F.2d 390, 393 (8th Cir.1987) (per curiam). The same is true of other courts of appeals. See United States v. Miller, 891 F.2d 1265, 1267 (7th Cir.1989); United States v. Driscoll, 852 F.2d 84, 86-87 (3d Cir.1988); United States v. Jenrette, 744 F.2d 817, 823-24 & n. 13 (D.C.Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1099, 105 S.Ct. 2321, 85 L.Ed.2d 840 (1985); United States v. Gamble, 737 F.2d 853, 856-60 (10th Cir.1984); United States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 932, 941 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 956, 101 S.Ct. 364, 66 L.Ed.2d 221 (1980).
Due process limitations "come into play only when the [government activity in question violates some protected right of the defendant." Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 490, 96 S.Ct. 1646, 1650, 48 L.Ed.2d 113 (1976) (emphasis omitted). Jacobson has no constitutional right to be free of investigation. United States v. Trayer, 898 F.2d 805, 808 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 113, 112 L.Ed.2d 83 (1990). Indeed, Jacobson does not claim the government's decision to investigate him deprived him of any right secured by the constitution. Nevertheless, Jacobson borrows from the rule of particularized suspicion that governs investigatory detentions, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1883, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), to narrow the government's power to initiate undercover investigations. There is no constitutional basis for this borrowing since the government's decision to investigate Jacobson did not encroach on Jacobson's "right to personal security." Id. at 9, 88 S.Ct. at 1873. Jacobson's demand for particularized suspicion runs against the grain "of the post-Hampton cases decided by the courts of appeals [holding] that due process grants wide leeway to law enforcement agen[ts] in their investigation of crime." United States v. Kaminski, 703 F.2d 1004, 1009 (7th Cir.1983); see also Hampton, 425 U.S. at 495 n. 7, 96 S.Ct. at 1653 n. 7 (Powell, J., concurring).
We thus join with the courts of appeals that hold the constitution does not require reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing before the government can begin an undercover investigation. See Jenrette, 744 F.2d at 824 & n. 13; Gamble, 737 F.2d at 860; United States v. Thoma, 726 F.2d 1191, 1198-99 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1228, 104 S.Ct. 2683, 81 L.Ed.2d 878 (1984); United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 609 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106, 102 S.Ct. 2906, 73 L.Ed.2d 1315 (1982); Myers, 635 F.2d at 941; see also United States v. Steinhorn, 739 F.Supp. 268 (D.Md.1990). But see United States v. Luttrell, 889 F.2d 806, 812-14 (9th Cir. 1989) (constitutional norms require reasoned grounds for undercover investigations), reh'g en banc granted, 906 F.2d 1384 (1990). To hold otherwise would give the federal judiciary an unauthorized "veto over law enforcement practices of which it [does] not approve." United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435, 93 S.Ct. 1637, 1644, 36 L.Ed.2d 366 (1973); see also United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 2049, 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977) (judges are not free to impose their personal notions of fairness on law enforcement officers under the guise of due process). In our view, when the government's investigatory conduct does not offend due process, the mere fact the undercover investigation is started without reasonable suspicion "does not bar the conviction of those who rise to its bait." Jannotti, 673 F.2d at 609.
Jacobson next contends the government's investigatory conduct was outrageous and violated his due process rights. This contention is without merit. We recognize due process bars the government from invoking judicial process to obtain a conviction when the investigatory conduct of law enforcement agents is outrageous. Gunderson v. Schlueter, 904 F.2d 407, 410-11 (8th Cir.1990) (citing Hampton, 425 U.S. at 492-95, 96 S.Ct. at 1651-53 (Powell, J., concurring); Russell, 411 U.S. at 431-32, 93 S.Ct. at 1642-43). Because the government may go a long way in concert with the investigated person without violating due process, United States v. Musslyn, 865 F.2d 945, 947 (8th Cir.1989) (per curiam), the level of outrageousness needed to prove a due process violation "is quite high," Gunderson, 904 F.2d at 410. Indeed, the government's behavior must shock the conscience of the court. Id. (citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172, 72 S.Ct. 205, 209, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952)).
We simply cannot characterize the government's conduct in Jacobson's case as outrageous. Having discovered Jacobson's name on a pornographer's mailing list, the government pursued its investigation over a period of twenty-nine months by mailing purveys, letters, and catalogues to Jacobson. Jacobson responded, remitting a membership fee, requesting more information, corresponding with another adult sharing his interest in child erotica, and finally ordering obscene magazines and photographs depicting "young boys in sex action fun." The postal inspectors did not apply extraordinary pressure on Jacobson. The inspectors merely invited Jacobson to purchase pornographic material through the mail. See Kaminski, 703 F.2d at 1009 (the offer of reasonable inducements is a proper means of investigation). Unlike face-to-face contacts, Jacobson easily could have ignored the contents of the mailings if he was not interested in them. Similar undercover operations aimed at child pornography collectors "have withstood the constitutional challenge [Jacobson] now raises." Musslyn, 865 F.2d at 947 (citations omitted).
Jacobson also contends he was entrapped as a matter of law. We cannot agree. The jury rejected Jacobson's entrapment defense. Jacobson argues, however, the evidence clearly shows entrapment: the postal inspectors originated the criminal plan, implanted the disposition to purchase child pornography into Jacobson's otherwise innocent mind, and Jacobson ordered the illegal magazine at their behest. See United States v. Pfeffer, 901 F.2d 654, 656 (8th Cir.1990). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government in deciding whether there is a jury issue on entrapment, id., and having done so, we conclude this is not a case in which the government was a manufacturer rather than a detector of crime.
Entrapment is established as a matter of law only when the absence of defendant's predisposition to commit a crime is apparent from the uncontradicted evidence. Thoma, 726 F.2d at 1197. Having considered the factors that bear on a criminal defendant's predisposition, id., we are convinced the district court properly submitted the question of Jacobson's entrapment to the jury. The government presented ample evidence that the postal inspectors only provided Jacobson with opportunities to purchase child pornography and renewed their efforts from time to time as Jacobson responded to their solicitations. Indeed, the panel's opinion recognized Jacobson's response to a survey mailed to him by the postal inspectors "indicated a predisposition to receive through the mails sexually explicit materials depicting children," United States v. Jacobson, 893 F.2d 999, 1000 (8th Cir.1990), and "justified] the decision to offer Jacobson the opportunity to purchase illegal materials through the mail," id. at 1001. Jacobson was not entrapped as a matter of law.
Finally, Jacobson contends the district court committed error in admitting certain evidence and in failing properly to instruct the jury. We have carefully considered these contentions and find them without merit.
We thus affirm Jacobson's conviction.