Case Name: The HOME INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. H. E. WIGGINS, doing business as Wiggins Men & Boys' Shop, Appellee; The TRAVELERS FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. H. E. WIGGINS, doing business as Wiggins Men & Boys' Shop, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1962-11-29
Citations: 147 So. 2d 157
Docket Number: Nos. D-274 and D-275
Parties: The HOME INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. H. E. WIGGINS, doing business as Wiggins Men & Boys’ Shop, Appellee. The TRAVELERS FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. H. E. WIGGINS, doing business as Wiggins Men & Boys’ Shop, Appellee.
Judges: CARROLL, DONALD K., C. J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 147
Pages: 157–162

Head Matter:
The HOME INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. H. E. WIGGINS, doing business as Wiggins Men & Boys’ Shop, Appellee. The TRAVELERS FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. H. E. WIGGINS, doing business as Wiggins Men & Boys’ Shop, Appellee.
Nos. D-274 and D-275.
District Court of Appeal of Florida. First District.
Nov. 29, 1962.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 27, 1962.
Beggs, Lane, Daniel, Middlebrooks & Gaines, Pensacola, for appellants.
James E. Hertz, of Fisher & Hepner, Pensacola, for appellee.

Opinion:
WIGGINTON, Judge.
This appeal is from a final judgment entered upon a jury's verdict awarding appel-lee the proceeds of two fire insurance policies covering a stock of goods, furniture and fixtures owned by appellee and located in a store operated by him. The action on the insurance policies was defended by appellants on the ground that the fire which destroyed appellee's property was wilfully kindled by appellee with intent to defraud appellants.
The sole point on appeal touching the merits of this case concerns a ruling by the trial judge which granted in part and denied in part appellant's objection to a portion of the testimony given by appellee's witness, Ralph Polise. The appeal presents no question with respect to the weight or sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment on the crucial issues of liability or damages.
At the trial appellee called Polise as an expert witness on the nature and origin of fires. After stating his qualifications as an expert, the witness was asked whether he had sufficient knowledge of the conditions which existed in the area where the fire originated to express an opinion as to its cause. Appellant's objection to this question was overruled whereupon the witness answered: "Assuming the door was closed and the building, all the widows shut on the east side of the house and the windows already boarded up or bricked up on the front of the building, if there was any event of spontaneous combustion would be very low, in my opinion." The witness then proceeded to elaborate on various conditions which would likely cause a fire to start by spontaneous combustion. The trial judge evidently construed this testimony as an expression of opinion by the witness that the fire in question could have or did originate by spontaneous combustion. After the witness had completed his testimony, the trial judge reconsidered his ruling on the admissibility of this part of the witness' testimony, and of his own motion stated to the jury that he had erroneously overruled appellant's motion to strike that part of the witness' testimony in which he expressed the opinion that the fire was caused by spontaneous combustion. The questioned testimony was then stricken and the jury was instructed to wholly disregard that part of the witness' statement which expressed such opinion.
Appellants contend that the trial court committed error in the first instance when over their objection he permitted the witness to express an opinion regarding the origin of the fire, which error was not cured by the court's later instructions to the jury to disregard such testimony. With this contention we cannot agree. The error, if any, was cured by the court's subsequent ruling and could not be said to have deprived appellant of a fair trial.
The witness Polise was also permitted over the objection of appellants to testify that a cardboard box placed on an energized electric hot plate would catch fire and commence to burn within a period of thirty seconds. Appellants contend that the admission of this testimony was erroneous for the reason that the witness had not demonstrated sufficient qualifications to express an expert opinion on this subject. It is well established in this state that the trial court has the initial responsibility of determining the qualifications and range of subjects on which an expert witness may be allowed to testify, and his determination will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing of an abuse of discretion. We find no demonstration by the record which indicates that the trial judge abused his discretion in determining that the witness was qualified to express the opinion to which objection was made. Even should it be considered that the admission of this testimony was erroneous, from the very nature of the testimony itself the error would be harmless and not sufficient justification for reversal of the judgment appealed. We consider the remaining point on appeal to be without substantial merit.
Reversible error not being made to appear, the judgment is affirmed.
CARROLL, DONALD K., C. J., concurs.
RAWLS, J., dissents.
. Krohne v. Orlando Farming Corp. (Fla.App.1958), 102 So.2d 399.