Case Name: A. G. ALIZZI and June McNeely Alizzi, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. EMPLOYERS INSURANCE OF WAUSAU and Kenneth DuBose, Defendants-Appellees
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1977-10-17
Citations: 351 So. 2d 258
Docket Number: No. 6085
Parties: A. G. ALIZZI and June McNeely Alizzi, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. EMPLOYERS INSURANCE OF WAUSAU and Kenneth DuBose, Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: Before HOOD, CULPEPPER, DOMEN-GEAUX, WATSON and GUIDRY, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 351
Pages: 258–264

Head Matter:
A. G. ALIZZI and June McNeely Alizzi, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. EMPLOYERS INSURANCE OF WAUSAU and Kenneth DuBose, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 6085.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
Oct. 17, 1977.
Rehearings Denied Nov. 10, 1977.
Writs Refused Jan. 11, 1978.
Hodge O’Neal, III, Alexandria, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Jack O. Brittain, Natchitoches, for defendants-appellees.
Before HOOD, CULPEPPER, DOMEN-GEAUX, WATSON and GUIDRY, JJ.

Opinion:
DOMENGEAUX, Judge.
Mr. and Mrs. A. G. Alizzi instituted this suit for damages for the death of their minor son, Warren Lee Alizzi. Alternatively, they demand workmen's compensation benefits. The defendants are Kenneth Du-Bose and his liability and workmen's compensation insurer, Employers Insurance of Wausau. The trial court rendered judgment for defendants. Plaintiffs appealed. We reverse.
The issue presented is whether the surviving parents of a minor child, who was employed without their knowledge or consent and was killed in the course of his employment, are restricted exclusively to a claim for workmen's compensation benefits as against the decedent's employer, when they did not have an opportunity to elect against workmen's compensation coverage on behalf of the minor.
Plaintiff's 12-year-old son, Warren Lee Alizzi, was killed almost instantly as the result of a motor vehicle accident which occurred on July 13, 1973. The accident occurred in the course of the decedent's employment by defendant DuBose.
Young Alizzi was employed by DuBose to "catch chickens" in connection with the latter's business, and he worked at that employment for two days, on July 11 and July 13, 1973. The accident occurred in the afternoon of the last mentioned date, while Warren was being transported from the place of his employment to his parent's home. He was riding in a pickup truck owned by DuBose and being driven by one of the latter's employees. The driver of the truck, like Warren, was acting in the course of his employment when the mishap occurred. The parties stipulated that the accident resulted solely and proximately from the negligence of the driver of the truck.
Mr. and Mrs. Alizzi did not know that Warren was working for DuBose on the day the accident occurred, and they did not consent to the employment. Late in the afternoon of July 11, Warren told his mother that he had worked for defendant that day, and immediately after he gave her that information Mrs. Alizzi instructed her son "never to go out again" or "not to do it anymore". She did not tell her husband that Warren had worked for DuBose that day. Mrs. Alizzi had to leave her home for a while on the morning of July 13, and shortly after she left Warren returned to work for defendant, contrary to his mother's instructions. She did not know that he had returned to work for DuBose on July 13, until after the accident occurred.
Some time prior to July 11 Mr. Alizzi told Warren that he could not work for DuBose, and he was not aware of the fact that his son nevertheless had worked for defendant on July 11 and July 13, until after the accident.
Neither Mr. Alizzi nor Mrs. Alizzi told DuBose, or any of the latter's employees, that they had instructed their son not to work for DuBose before the date of the accident. Neither of them, in fact, had contacted DuBose for any purpose prior to the accident, and there thus was no agreement of any kind between the parties relating to the employment.
Mr. and Mrs. Alizzi were not dependent on their son, Warren, at the time of the accident.
After the death of the child, the defendant insurer (also known as Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Company of Wisconsin) paid the sum of $1,000.00 by check to Warren Meadows Funeral Home, to apply on the funeral expenses of the decedent. The check was negotiated by the funeral home.
This suit was instituted on June 27, 1974. Plaintiffs contend that they are entitled to recover in tort against defendants, since their son's injuries and death resulted from the negligence of an employee of DuBose. Defendants resist, contending that plaintiffs' remedy is exclusively under the workmen's compensation law, and that defendants have discharged their full obligation under that law by paying $1,000.00 to apply on the funeral expenses of the decedent.
Judgment was rendered by the trial court rejecting plaintiffs' demands. Plaintiffs appealed, and that appeal is before us now.
The law provides that every contract of hiring between an employee and an employer engaged in a hazardous business shall be presumed to have been made subject to the provisions of the workmen's compensation act, unless the contract contains an express statement in writing, or unless written notice is given by one party to the other, that the provisions of that act are not to apply. LSA-R.S. 23:1039. The law also provides that the right of election, termination or waiver shall be exercised on behalf of an employee under the age of eighteen by his father, mother or tutor, or in default of them, by the court. LSA-R.S. 23:1041.
Adults must make their choice thirty days prior to injury. LSA-R.S. 23:1040. However, it is arguable that the provisions giving the choice for minors to their parents or tutors sets out no such limitation.
Plaintiffs contend that they have the right to elect now, after the death of their son, whether the employment should or should not have been subject to the provisions of the workmen's compensation act at the time of the accident. Their argument is that the law gives them the right to make that election in behalf of their son, that they did not have an opportunity to make such an election prior to the death of the boy because they were unaware of the employment, and that they should be permitted to make the election after the accident occurred, since that is the first knowledge they had of the employment and the first opportunity they had to make the election provided in LSA-R.S. 23:1039. We agree.
Defendant cites Bourgeois v. J. W. Crawford Construction Company, 213 La. 992, 36 So.2d 13 (1948), for the proposition that the presumption of an election binds all employees, even minors working without the knowledge or consent of their parents, and that the recourse of the surviving parents is exclusively under the Workmen's Compensation Act. This is true when the parents desire coverage, as was the case in Bourgeois. In a sense, the parent in that case was confirming the presumption of coverage after the accident occurred.
In the instant case, the parents are attempting to elect against coverage. The Supreme Court in Bourgeois expressly pre-termitted any discussion of the issue of making an election for a minor after the accident occurred. Therefore, the only controlling decision we have can be distinguished factually as well as legally.
We suggest that the appellate court decisions since Bourgeois have erroneously held that a parent cannot elect against coverage after the accident, calling the above noted presumption a "conclusive" one. See e. g. Matthews v. Buff Hottle Shows, 109 So.2d 261 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1959). We feel that these decisions misinterpreted both Bourgeois and the Act. Nowhere in the Act is there language making the presumption conclusive. In any event, in those cases it is not clear whether the parents knew their child was employed, or whether they were ignorant of the fact, as in the present case. Therefore, we are not persuaded by them.
There is no way that parents could make an election for their child if they are not aware that the child is employed. If the election provisions are to have any effect as to minors, the parents must be allowed a fair chance to remove their children from coverage if they so desire.
Therefore, we feel compelled to reverse the decision of the trial court and now hold that plaintiffs, having elected to remove their son from workmen's compensation coverage, were entitled to proceed in tort.
Since both sides stipulated that the accident was caused by the exclusive negligence of DuBose's employee, Jerry Grant, we now turn to the question of the award to be made to Mr. and Mrs. Alizzi.
The parents are entitled to recover for their grief, and for their deprivation of love, affection and companionship. Ogaard v. Wiley, 325 So.2d 642 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1975). In this regard it is appropriate to give consideration to the awards made in other similar cases, although these awards are by no means binding upon us. They are merely to be looked to for guidance. In recent years, the awards for the death of a child have ranged from the low of $25,-000.00 per parent, Dupuy v. Pierce, 285 So.2d 321 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1973) to $40,-000.00 per parent, Walker v. St. Paul Insurance Co., 339 So.2d 441 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1976), and Ogaard, supra.
Warren Lee Alizzi was only twelve years old when he died. He was an affectionate child, athletic and outgoing. He was very close to his parents. No one can say what the future held for him, and no one can put a dollar value on the effect of this loss to his parents. However, considering all the testimony, evidence, and surrounding circumstances of this tragedy, we feel that $40,000.00 per parent is an appropriate award and is in keeping with the current trend in these type cases. Additionally, Mr. Alizzi is entitled to the sum of $1,275.51 as special damages subject to a credit of $1,000.00, being the amount paid by defendant-insurer for funeral expenses.
For the above and foregoing reasons the judgment of the trial court is reversed and set aside and judgment is rendered herein in favor of plaintiff, A. G. Alizzi in the sum of $41,275.51 and against defendants, Kenneth DuBose and Employers Insurance of Wausau, in solido, subject to a credit of $1,000.00, together with legal interest thereon from the date of judicial demand until paid, and in favor of plaintiff, June McNeely Alizzi for the sum of $40,000.00, against the same defendants in solido, together with all legal interest thereon from the date of judicial demand until paid. All costs, both at trial and on appeal, are to be borne by defendants-appellees.
REVERSED AND RENDERED.
GUIDRY, J., concurred in the result.
HOOD, J., dissented and filed opinion and voted for rehearing in both applications.
CULPEPPER, J., dissented for the reasons assigned by HOOD, J., and voted for rehearing in both applications.
. These provisions were repealed by the legislature in 1975, but that repeal does not affect this case, inasmuch as it arose prior to the effective date of the repeal.
. In an attempt to avoid liability defendant insurer pleads alternatively an exclusionary clause in the policy which provides no coverage where one employee injures another employee. We find no merit to that position. Plaintiffs son was twelve years old and the driver of DuBose's truck was fourteen years old. See New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Soileau, C.C.A., 5th Circuit (1948), 167 F.2d 767, cert. den. 335 U.S. 822, 69 S.Ct. 45, 93 L.Ed. 376. The rationale therein applies here.