Case Name: Kenneth SINGLETARY, Appellant, v. MANGHAM CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC. and Aetna Life & Casualty Company, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1982-08-18
Citations: 418 So. 2d 1138
Docket Number: No. AI-78
Parties: Kenneth SINGLETARY, Appellant, v. MANGHAM CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC. and Aetna Life & Casualty Company, Appellee.
Judges: BOOTH and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 418
Pages: 1138–1140

Head Matter:
Kenneth SINGLETARY, Appellant, v. MANGHAM CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC. and Aetna Life & Casualty Company, Appellee.
No. AI-78.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Aug. 18, 1982.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 9, 1982.
Thomas E. Stone, Madison, for appellant.
James N. McConnaughhay of McCon-naughhay & Roland, P.A., Tallahassee, for appellee.

Opinion:
MILLS, Judge.
Singletary appeals the deputy commissioner's denial of temporary total disability benefits for aggravation of a prior work-related injury. We reverse.
The issue here is whether Singletary's act of stepping 16 to 18 inches off of a van was sufficient to break the chain of causation from a prior work-related injury.
Singletary was employed by Mangham Construction Company on 23 January 1980 when he was injured on the job. The com-pensability of this accident was not contested by the employer/carrier. Singletary reached MMI on 1 October 1980, with a rating of 12 percent permanent disability to the body as a whole.
In January of 1981, Singletary stepped out of a van to the ground, a distance of some 16 to 18 inches, and experienced a pain shooting up his leg. He injured the same part of his back that had been injured in the 1980 accident.
The deputy commissioner denied compensation for this subsequent injury on the basis that it was the result of an "identifiable trauma" instead of "normal activities."
The test for compensability for a subsequent injury is whether that injury is the direct and natural result of a compensa-ble primary injury. If the subsequent injury is attributable to claimant's own negligence or fault, the chain of causation is broken. Sosenko v. American Automotive Corp., 156 So.2d 489 (Fla.1963). In this case, Singletary was not engaged in negligent conduct as was the claimant in Johnnie's Produce Co. v. Benedict & Jordan, 120 So.2d 12 (Fla.1960). Singletary's activities here were as normal as those of claimant in Manatee Memorial Hospital v. Heiden, 389 So.2d 347 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), and, therefore, compensable.
Employer/carrier insist on referring to Singletary's "jumping" from the van. There is absolutely no evidence in the record to support such a finding, and the deputy commissioner did not so find in his order.
The deputy commissioner's test for compensability seems to turn on whether some specific, traumatic event has occurred. This is incorrect. In order to break the chain of causation, there must be some intervening negligent or unusual conduct on the part of claimant or some third party. See D'Angelo Plastering Company v. Isaac, 393 So.2d 1066 (Fla.1980), where the intervening negligence of a third-party tort-feasor was held to have broken the causal chain. There was no such negligent or unusual conduct here.
We reverse the order of the deputy commissioner and remand the cause with instructions that Singletary be awarded temporary total disability benefits for the contested period.
BOOTH and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.