Case Name: Williamson's Appeal. [Gray's Estate.]
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1889-03-04
Citations: 1 Monag. 241
Docket Number: Appeal, No. 206
Parties: Williamson’s Appeal. [Gray’s Estate.]
Judges: 
Reporter: Cases in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania; being those cases not designated to be reported
Volume: 1
Pages: 241–244

Head Matter:
Williamson’s Appeal. [Gray’s Estate.]
A judgment against the heirs and administrator is not a lien indefinite in its duration, as is a judgment recovered against the decedent in his life time, hut it remains a lien upon the lands of the decedent for only five years from the date of its entry.
The judgment against the heirs is de terris only, and, unless properly revived, cannot, on distribution, be paid out of the shares of the heirs in the proceeds of the real estate.
It seems that an order of the orphans’ court for the sale of lands to pay the debts of a decedent does not operate as a toll of the statute of limitations as to the debts scheduled.
Feb. 13, 1889.
Appeal, No. 206, Jan. T. 1888, from a decree of the O. C. of Delaware Go., dismissing exceptions to the report of an auditor, distributing the proceeds of an orphans’ court sale of real estate to pay debts, at Sept. T. 1874. G-reen and Clark, JJ., absent.
The following facts appeared from the papers and records offered in evidence and from the report of the auditor, W. Boss Brown, Esq.:
The decedent, William Gray, died on June 10, 1874, intestate, seized of a farm in Delaware county. Letters of administration were originally granted on the estate of the decedent to James Dunwoody and Beece Pyott on July 16, 1874. On Sept. 28, 1874, the administrators made application to the orphans’ court for an order to sell the real estate of the decedent for the payment of debts, and an order for the sale of the real estate was made on the same day. On Nov. 27,1874, the administrators returned “ no sale.” No further order was applied for or issued until April 6, 1885, when an alias order was issued to Henry C. Howard, Esq., to whom'letters de bonis non had been granted, on April 4,1885, the former administrators both having died in the interim. Among the debts of decedent, scheduled by the administrators in the original application for an order of sale, was a note of $90.00 to George M. Hunter, dated February 12, 1867. On April 18, 1878, Hunter brought suit on this note in the common pleas of Delaware county, against the then surviving administrator, James Dunwoody, and recovered judgment on May 20, 1878, for $140.00 and costs. On Nov. 19, 1878, a writ of sci. fa. to charge real estate was issued on this judgment in which Janies Dunwoody, administrator of William Gray, deceased, and Bobert Gray and Bebecca G. Tyler, heirs of said decedent, were named as defendants; to which the sheriff returned served on James Dunwoody and Bobert Gray, and nihil habet as to Bebecca Tyler. On Dec. 9,1878, an alias sci. fa. issued, naming the same parties as defendants, to which the sheriff made the same return, and upon which judgment was entered against the defendants, for want of an appearance, on Jan. 15, 1879, and damages assessed at the sum of $145.49.
The real estate of decedent was sold under the order of April 6, 1885. At the audit, a claim was made for the’ payment of the judgment of Jan. 15,1879, out of the funds. The auditor disallowed the claim. Exceptions to the auditor’s report were dismissed by the court, in an opinion, reported in 3 Del. Oo. B. 325, by Clayton, P. J.
Pending these proceedings, Hunter died, and letters testamentary were granted to Williamson.
The assignments of error specified the action of the court, 1, in confirming the report of the auditor, and decreeing distribution in accordance therewith; 2, in awarding any part of the fund for distribution to the heirs of William Gray, deceased, until all his just, 'and legal debts had been paid out of the same; 3, in not awarding to the appellant the amount of the judgment of Jan. .15, 1879.
H. C. Howard, for appellant.
The creditor did everything reasonably to he required, lie pressed his claim to judgment, and warned the heirs by sci. fa. This seated the claim upon the trust. McWilliams’s Ap., 117 Pa. 111; Shearer v. Brinley, 76 Pa. 300; Yorks’s Ap., 110 Pa. 69; Alexander v. McMurry, 8 Watts, 504; Buffington v. R. R., 74 Pa. 162; Murphy’s Ap., 8 W. & S. 165.
The Act of March 29,1832, provided that the lands of a decedent might he sold to pay debts. The Act of Feb. 24, 1834, § 20, makes it the duty of the administrator to sell. And it is to pay debts, not liens. If the sale had been made on the first order, the judgment would have been entitled to be paid. The fact that the court made no further order until 1885 will not affect the creditor’s rights.
The judgment is also entitled to be paid out of the fund for distribution upon the ground that it was a lien upon the lands at the time of the sale, at least upon the interests of the heirs of William Gray, against whom judgment was taken on the sci. fa. As against the decedent, the lien was indefinite. Price on Limitations, 283. His heirs stand in his shoes. Their rights rise no higher than his. On the same principle it has been held that a judgment obtained against one in his lifetime continues an indefinite lien as against heirs and devisees. Baxter v. Allen, 77 Pa. 468; Shearer v. Brinley, supra.
Hunt and Lehman’s Ap., 105 Pa. 128, rules this case.
Geo. E. Darlington, with him G. Heide Norris, for appellees..
—The claim was barred by the statute at the death of decedent. Yorks’s Ap., 110 Pa., 69; Man v. Warner, 4 Wh. 455; Micheltree’s Ad. v. Veach, 31 Pa. 455; McCandless’s Est., 61 Pa. 9; Campbell v. Fleming, 63 Pa. 242; Yorks’s Ap., 110 Pa. 69.
Where the fund arises from a judicial sale of real estáte, the lien is limited to five years from the death of the person indebted,, unless the lien be continued by suit or other proceeding prescribed by statute. Kettera’s Est., 17 Pa. 416.
A legatee or other person interested in the estate may' plead the statute. Hoch’s Ap., 21 Pa. 282; Ritter’s Ap., 23 Pa. 95 ; Yorks’s Ap., 110 Pa. 69.
An acknowledgment of a debt, made by an executor or administrator, either before or after the debt is barred by the statute, will not prevent the barring. Fritz v. Thomas, 1 Wh. 66; Steel v. Steel, 12 Pa. 64; Read v. Read, 46 Pa. 242; Campbell v. Fleming, 63 Pa. 242.
In the present case no notice of any action on the note was ever given to the two heirs and neither of them was made a. party to the original suit against the administrator or had notice of it. The judgment having been taken against the administrator in the first instance, without notice to the heirs, as required- by'the''Act .of Feb. 24,1834, the heirs are entitled to contest, the claim before-the court as fully as they could in an action in which they were jóitíéd as parties. Murphy’s Ap., 8 W. & S. 165; Atherton v. Atherton, 2 Pa. 112; Bindley’s Ap., 69 Pa. 295.
The judgment is irregularly taken, it being taken for want of an appearance on two returns of nihil upon writs of scire facias. There was no service to authorize judgment against Bebecca G. Tyler. Huckenstein and McKee v. Love, 98 Pa. 518.
In Hunt and Lehman’s Ap., 105 Pa. 128, the statute had not run against the claim before the decedent’s death, or before the suit was brought, and the question was not on the right to plead the statute against the claim.
In McWilliams’s Appeal, the wording of the will converted the realty, and it appeared that the reason for the non-presentation of the claim within six years was to enable the executors to carry out the intention of the testator, and that there was an agreement not to present the same.
March 4, 1889.

Opinion:
Per Curiam,
This was not a judgment recovered against the decedent in his lifetime, but against his administrator after his death. Had it been a judgment against the decedent, it must be conceded it would remain a lien upon his land in the hands of his heirs. It was recovered against the administrator May 20, 1878. Judgment was obtained against the heirs Jan. 15, 1879, and it was therefore a valid lien against the lands of the decedent for five years from that date. The lien expired Jan. 14, 1884. It could have been continued by a scire facias, but this was not done, and the lien upon the land was lost. The learned auditor correctly held that, as the judgment had lost its lien when the land was sold, it could not participate in the distribution of the fund xaised from the sale. The appellant contends, however, that, if the lien is gone, the order of the orphans' court for a sale of the land for the payment of debts, made in 1874, when the debt was a lien, has the effect of a trust to pay all debts existing at that time. This position cannot be sustained. An order of sale for the payment of •debts creates no trust; it is a mere authority to sell for the payment of such debts as may bé a lien upon the lands. If, pending the execution of the order, a lien is suffered to expire, it ceases to be operative so far as the lands are concerned, and the holder must look to the personal estate. Nor is there any force in the position that the lien was good against Bobert Gray and Bebecca Tyler, parties to the scire facias. The judgment against them was de terris; it was not a, personal judgment. We find no error in this record.
Judgment affirmed.
Note. — In Arndt's Ap., 117 Pa. 120, it is said that the question of lien, or the running of the statute, is determined hy the status of the claim at the time of the . confirmation of the sale.
In Keyser's Ap., decided Jan. 28,1889, to he reported in 23 or 24 Pa., it is decided, in an opinion hy Paxson, O. J., that a demand made upon executors for the jpayment of a debt accruing in the life-time of the testator, "will not stop the running of the' statute, overruling language in the first opinion in Yorks's Ap., . 110 Pa. 76, to the contrary.