Case Name: The TRIBUNE COMPANY, Petitioner, v. Norman CANNELLA, Chief Assistant State Attorney, Cynthia Sontag, Director of Administration of the City of Tampa, Robert DePerte, Robert Jones, and Roy Pierce, Respondents
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1983-09-30
Citations: 438 So. 2d 516
Docket Number: No. 82-1635
Parties: The TRIBUNE COMPANY, Petitioner, v. Norman CANNELLA, Chief Assistant State Attorney, Cynthia Sontag, Director of Administration of the City of Tampa, Robert DePerte, Robert Jones, and Roy Pierce, Respondents.
Judges: OTT, C.J., and HOBSON, BOARDMAN, CAMPBELL and SCHOONOVER, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 438
Pages: 516–531

Head Matter:
The TRIBUNE COMPANY, Petitioner, v. Norman CANNELLA, Chief Assistant State Attorney, Cynthia Sontag, Director of Administration of the City of Tampa, Robert DePerte, Robert Jones, and Roy Pierce, Respondents.
No. 82-1635.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Sept. 30, 1983.
Preston Moore and Steven L. Brannock of Holland & Knight, Tampa, for petitioner.
Joseph G. Spicola, Jr., City Atty., Luis G. Figueroa and Salvatore Territo, Asst. City Attys., Tampa, for respondent Cynthia Sontag.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Eric J. Taylor, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for respondent Norman Cannella.
R. Jeffrey Stull of Stull & Heidt, Tampa, for respondents Robert DePerte, Robert Jones, and Roy Pierce.
Sanford L. Bohrer and Franklin G. Burt of Paul & Thomson, Miami, for amicus curiae Lakeland Ledger Pub. Co.
George K. Rahdert of Rahdert, Anderson & Richardson, St. Petersburg, for amicus curiae Times Pub. Co.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
The Tribune Company, publisher of the Tampa Times, petitions for writ of certiora-ri to review the trial court's orders denying its petitions for writ of mandamus. Petitioner sought mandamus to compel respondents Norman Cannella, Chief Assistant State Attorney, and Cynthia Sontag, Director of Administration of the City of Tampa, to release the personnel files of Tampa police officers Robert DePerte, Robert Jones, and Roy Pierce, which petitioner requested pursuant to Chapter 119, Florida Statutes (1981), Public Records (The Public Records Act). After reviewing the legal arguments made and the authorities cited, we have determined to grant the petition.
FACTS
At 9:15 a.m. on July 1, 1982, Carl Croth-ers, a reporter for the now defunct Tampa Times newspaper, asked respondent Sontag for permission to review the personnel files of Jones, Pierce, and DePerte, who, according to information given to the Tampa Times, had attempted to arrest one John Emanuel Riley the previous night and had been involved in a struggle and an exchange of gunshots which resulted in Riley's death and a bullet wound to Officer Jones.
Sontag denied the request. The City of Tampa had adopted a policy of postponing compliance with the Public Records Act for seven days (now three days) pending notification of employees whose personnel records had been requested pursuant to the Act. The city had also adopted a policy that whenever the Tampa Police Department or state attorney is investigating any shooting by a police officer, all personnel records of such an officer would be withheld from public view, and compliance with the Public Records Act would be postponed indefinitely until the investigation was completed.
On July 1,1982, petitioner filed a petition for writ of mandamus against Sontag seeking to compel production of the personnel records it had requested. The trial judge, Judge Gallagher, heard the petition at 9:00 a.m. on July 2, 1982. At that hearing, the city attorney stated that after The Tampa Times had made its Public Records Act request, the state attorney had subpoenaed the personnel records and that the Department of Administration had delivered the records immediately and had not retained any copies. He also took the position that, in any event, the files were exempt from disclosure as active criminal investigative or criminal intelligence information. The trial judge agreed and ruled in favor of Sontag.
At approximately 10:00 a.m. on July 2, 1982, petitioner's counsel requested respondent Cannella to provide the personnel records in question. Counsel also requested a copy of the subpoena by means of which Cannella had obtained custody of the records. Cannella refused to provide the records or a copy of the subpoena and refused to discuss what exemption he was relying on under the Public Records Act.
Later that day petitioner filed a petition for writ of mandamus against Cannella, seeking to compel production of the personnel records. The trial judge denied that petition in a hearing held at 2:00 p.m. on July 6, 1982, ruling that the personnel files were exempt from disclosure as criminal investigative information within the meaning of Section 119.07(3)(d), Florida Statutes (1981).
On July 8, 1982, counsel for petitioner telephoned the city attorney to renew petitioner's Public Records Act request. Counsel for the City of Tampa said that the state attorney was concluding his investigation that day; that the records would be returned to the city attorney forthwith; and that, upon receipt, copies of the records would be made available to The Tampa Times.
On the afternoon of July 8, 1982, the state attorney held a press conference announcing the conclusion of his investigation into the Riley shooting. At this conference, David Dahl, a Tampa Times reporter, was told that the personnel records had been returned to the City of Tampa with no copies retained by Cannella's office. Tampa Assistant City Attorney Salvatore Terri-to informed Dahl that the records would not be produced until Monday, July 12, at the earliest, in order to excise certain information from the records and to allow time for the officers to make objections on the basis of federal rights of privacy. Dahl returned to the city attorney's office at 10:00 a.m. on Monday, July 12, 1982, and was told that the circuit court had held a hearing and entered a temporary restraining order forbidding release of the records.
That day the three officers filed an action for a permanent injunction against any disclosure of their personnel files by the city. A hearing was held the same day at which the city attorney and counsel for the officers were present. Petitioner had no prior notice of the filing of the action or of the hearing. Citing the privacy rights of the officers, the trial judge entered a temporary restraining order forbidding release of the personnel records until Friday, July 16, at 3:15 p.m., for which time a hearing was scheduled (with notice to petitioner) to decide whether the restraining order should be continued.
On July 15, 1982, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari with this court. On July 16, 1982, the officers filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida requesting that court to permanently enjoin disclosure of their personnel records by the city. The complaint was grounded on the claim that release of their files would violate their right to privacy.
The federal judge, Judge Krentzman, granted a temporary restraining order (TRO) the same day. At the July 16,1982, hearing in state court, Judge Gallagher reserved ruling pending action by Judge Krentzman.
On July 19, 1982, Judge Krentzman granted petitioner's motion to intervene in the officers' federal action. On July 22, 1982, he dissolved .his TRO, ruling that the officers did not have a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits. Upon learning of the dissolution of the TRO, petitioner renewed its Public Records Act request of the city. The city refused to release the records, asserting doubt as to whether the state TRO was still in effect.
At a hearing on July 23, 1982, Judge Gallagher expressly stated that his July 12 TRO was no longer in effect. Petitioner then sought a ruling on its petition for a writ of mandamus to Sontag. Judge Gallagher refused to act due to the pendency of the instant petition for certiorari.
An hour later the city released the records sought by petitioner.
JURISDICTION
In light of the policy of the legislature and the courts of this state to expedite proceedings involving denial of media access to public records and judicial proceedings, certiorari is unquestionably an appropriate vehicle for review of the issues involved here. § 119.11, Fla.Stat. (1981); State ex rel. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. McIntosh, 340 So.2d 904 (Fla.1977); News-Press Publishing Co. v. Gadd, 388 So.2d 276 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). Therefore, the jurisdiction of this court was properly invoked pursuant to Article V, Section 4(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution and Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.030(b)(3) and 9.100.
However, the issues raised are now technically moot, since petitioner has been provided access to the records sought. Nevertheless, we agree with petitioner that the challenged actions here are "capable of repetition, yet evading review," so that the mootness doctrine does not apply. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 95 S.Ct. 553, 42 L.Ed.2d 532 (1975). When, as here, the challenged action is of too short a duration to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration and there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subjected to the same action again, review will be allowed. Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 96 S.Ct. 347, 46 L.Ed.2d 350 (1975). We therefore conclude that the issues raised by petitioner are ripe for adjudication.
ANALYSIS
The sections of chapter 119 or portions thereof pertinent to the instant case provide:
119.01 General state policy on public records. — It is the policy of this state that all state, county, and municipal records shall at all times be open for a personal inspection by any person.
119.011 Definitions. — For the purpose of this chapter:
(1) "Public records" means all documents, papers, letters, maps, books, tapes, photographs, films, sound recordings or other material, regardless of physical form or characteristics, made or received pursuant to law or ordinance or in connection with the transaction of official business by any agency-
(2) "Agency" means any state, county, district, authority, or municipal officer, department, division, board, bureau, commission, or other separate unit of government created or established by law and any other public or private agency, person, partnership, corporation, or business entity acting on behalf of any public agency.
(3)(a) "Criminal intelligence information" means information with respect to an identifiable person or group of persons collected by a criminal justice agency in an effort to anticipate, prevent, or monitor possible criminal activity.
(b) "Criminal investigative information" means information with respect to an identifiable person or group of persons compiled by a criminal justice agency in the course of conducting a criminal investigation of a specific act or omission, including, but not limited to, information derived from laboratory test reports of investigators or informants, or any type of surveillance.
(c) "Criminal intelligence information" and "criminal investigative information" shall not include:
1. The time, date, location, and nature of a reported crime;
2. The name, sex, age, and address of a person arrested or of the victim of a crime except as provided in s. 119.07(3)(h);
3. The time, date, and location of the incident and of the arrest;
4. The crime charged;
5. Documents given or required by law or agency rule to be given to the person arrested; and
6. Informations and indictments except as provided in s. 905.26.
(d) The word "active" shall have the following meaning:
1. Criminal intelligence information shall be considered "active" as long as it is related to intelligence gathering conducted with a reasonable, good faith belief that it will lead to detection of ongoing or reasonably anticipated criminal activities.
2. Criminal investigative information shall be considered "active" as long as it is related to an ongoing investigation which is continuing with a reasonable, good faith anticipation of securing an arrest or prosecution in the foreseeable future.
In addition, criminal intelligence and criminal investigative information shall be considered "active" while such information is directly related to pending prosecutions or appeals. The word "active" shall not apply to information in cases which are barred from prosecution under the provisions of s. 775.15 or other statute of limitation.
(4) "Criminal justice agency" means any law enforcement agency, court, or prosecutor. . .
119.07 Inspection and examination of records; exemptions.—
(1)(a) Every person who has custody of public records shall permit the records to be inspected and examined by any person desiring to do so, at reasonable times, under reasonable conditions, and under supervision by the custodian of the records or his designee. The custodian shall furnish copies or certified copies of the records upon payment of fees as prescribed by law or, if fees are not prescribed by law, upon payment of the actual cost of duplication of the copies....
(b) In the case of records produced under this act, when the nature or volume of records is such as to require extensive clerical or supervisory assistance by personnel of the agency involved, the agency may charge, in addition to the actual cost of duplication, a reasonable charge, which shall be based on the actual salary rate of such personnel providing the service.
(2)(a) Any person who has custody of public records and who asserts that an exemption provided in subsection (3) or in general or special law applies to a particular record shall delete or excise from the record only that portion of the record for which an exemption is asserted and shall produce for inspection and examination the remainder of such record.
(b) In any action in which an exemption is asserted pursuant to paragraph (e), paragraph (f), or paragraph (g) of subsection (3), the record or records shall be submitted in camera to the court for a de novo inspection. In the case of an exemption asserted pursuant to paragraph (d) of subsection (3), an in camera inspection shall be discretionary with the court. If the court finds no basis for the assertion of the exemption, it shall order the records to be disclosed.
(3)(a) All public records which are presently provided by law to be confidential or which are prohibited from being inspected by the public, whether by general or special law, shall be exempt from the provisions of subsection (1).
(c) Examination questions and answer sheets of examinations administered by a governmental agency for the purpose of licensure, certification, or employment shall be exempt from the provisions of subsection (1). However, an examinee shall have the right to review his own completed examination.
(d) Active criminal intelligence information and active criminal investigative information are exempt from the provisions of subsection (1).
(k) The home addresses, telephone numbers, and photographs of law enforcement personnel; the home addresses, telephone numbers, photographs, and places of employment of the spouses and children of law enforcement personnel, and the names and locations of schools attended by the children of law enforcement personnel are exempt from the provisions of subsection (1).
119.11 Accelerated hearing; immediate compliance.—
(l) Whenever an action is filed to enforce the provisions of this chapter, the court shall set an immediate hearing, giving the case priority over other pending cases.
(2)Whenever a court orders an agency to open its records for inspection in accordance with this chapter, the agency shall comply with such order within 48 hours, unless otherwise provided by the court issuing such order, or unless the appellate court issues a stay order within such 48-hour period. The filing of a notice of appeal shall not operate as an automatic stay.
(3)A stay order shall not be issued unless the court determines that there is substantial probability that opening the records for inspection will result in significant damage.
Whether Personnel Files Are Public Records
It is beyond peradventure that personnel files of city or county employees are public records within the meaning of the Public Records Act and are therefore subject to the public's right of access. Douglas v. Michel, 410 So.2d 936 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); Roberts v. News-Press Publishing Co., 409 So.2d 1089 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). Section 119.07(3)(k) implies that the files of police officers are no exception by expressly exempting certain specified information that might be contained in such files.
We are constrained to further point out that Mills v. Doyle, 407 So.2d 348 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), held that personnel records, even grievance records of teachers, are public records within the purview of the Act. In the analogous case of Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Marko, 352 So.2d 518 (Fla.1977), our supreme court rejected the officers' assertion that their constitutional right of disclosural privacy precluded public disclosure of a grand jury presentment describing acts of misconduct by the patrolmen in the performance of their duties and containing critical statements about the officers, although not indicting them. "A public office is a public trust. The people shall have the right to secure and sustain that trust against abuse." Art. II, § 8, Fla. Const. The Public Records Act implements the fundamental policy that the public has the right to full disclosure of the conduct of its police officers in order to determine whether these officers of government are appropriately discharging their assigned duties and responsibilities.
Delay in Disclosure
As petitioner correctly points out, there is no specific provision in the Act for delay in public access to allow public employees whose files are requested the opportunity to assert Florida or federal constitutional privacy right. Moreover, as our supreme court has stated, "[n]ews delayed is news denied. To be useful to the public, news events must be reported when they occur." State ex rel. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. McIntosh, 340 So.2d 904, 910 (Fla.1977).
On the other hand, as noted in Roberts, any
statutory privilege or exemption or any constitutional right of nondisclosure will most often be personal to the employee and, therefore, subject to being asserted only by the employee and not by the custodian of the file . We conclude that a temporary delay in the right of access to personnel records, in order to allow an employee a reasonable time to determine whether to assert any existing right of exemption or confidentiality, seems only logical and reasonable. The Lee County resolution, we find, imposes . reasonable conditions in allowing employees twenty-four hours' notice.... [I]t is significant that section 119.11 requires that whenever a court orders an agency to open its records for inspection in accordance with the provisions of chapter 119, the agency shall comply with such order within forty-eight hours, unless otherwise provided by the court issuing such order. Thus, it seems that the practical effect of the Lee County resolution may be to lessen the time within which questionable items might be made available for inspection.
409 So.2d at 1094-1095.
While section 119.07(2)(a) places the duty of excising exempt portions of requested records on the custodian of those records, we do not believe that a public employee whose personnel file has been requested should be forced to rely on the records custodian to protect the employee's interests. The custodian will often be too busy performing his or her day-to-day duties and responsibilities and may be able at best to make only a cursory examination of the record to protect the employee's private concerns. We therefore agree with Roberts that it is only reasonable to allow an affected employee a reasonable opportunity, once his or her personnel file has been requested, to review that file for the purpose of determining whether to assert a right to exemption or confidentiality. The public has the right to know and have access to pertinent records. On the other hand, the employee should be accorded a modicum of protection, if for no other reason than one of fairness and equal treatment.
We also conclude, in accord with the reasoning of Roberts, that section 119.11 implies that a forty-eight-hour delay in releasing records is reasonable. We therefore reaffirm this court's approval in Roberts of a twenty-four-hour delay as reasonable. However, in accordance with the limitation on delay set forth in section 119.11, we now hold that an agency shall have no longer than forty-eight hours to comply with a Public Records Act request. Thus the City of Tampa's current delay period of three days is excessive and must be reduced to no more than forty-eight hours.
We also feel constrained to express our concern that the Public Records Act in its current form tends to make second class citizens of state and local government employees in Florida insofar as it opens their entire personnel files to public scrutiny. While the public clearly has a right to information such as salary and job attendance and efficiency reports, much of the information contained in an employee personnel file, such as marital status, number of children, home address, telephone number, and certain health records, appears to us to be of no legitimate interest to anyone but the employer and the individual employee. We believe that all government employees, not just law enforcement officers, see § 119.-07(3)(k), have a right to keep their home addresses and telephone numbers and family information away from public scrutiny. We therefore take this opportunity to urge the Florida legislature to statutorily limit the portions of public employee personnel files available under the Public Records Act to job-related information and to establish specific guidelines spelling out in clear and unmistakable language precisely what does and what does not constitute a public record in an employee's personnel file.
Transfer of Requested Records to Another Agency
Petitioner rightly complains that the city here improperly played a "shell game" by transferring the requested records to the state attorney's office, thereby rendering it temporarily unable to comply with petitioner's request. Tober v. Sanchez, 417 So.2d 1053 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). However, there is no simple solution to this problem. The city clearly had a duty to comply with the subpoena and, furthermore, had no duty, indeed, may have had no authority, to delay that compliance. Moreover, not only does nothing in the Public Records Act require that extra copies of files be made, but the Act affirmatively indicates that the costs of copies desired by a requesting party are to be borne by that party. § 119.07(l)(a). However, if no remedy is available, a party's access to requested information could be delayed indefinitely by repeated transfers between different state agencies.
We therefore set forth one possible solution. We hold that if a requesting party foresees or encounters such a problem in the future, it has the right to pay in advance for copies of any or all of the requested information, and, if it does so, the custodial agency shall have the duty to make the requested copies and make them available to the requesting party to the extent and within the time limits required by law. See 1980 Op.Att'y Gen.Fla. 080-96 (December 5, 1980).
Exemption of the Officers' Files as Criminal Intelligence or Criminal Investigative Information
Information filed before an investigative process begins cannot be criminal investigative information. 1980 Op.Att'y Gen. Fla. 080-96 (December 5, 1980). Neither can such information be criminal intelligence information, which is information collected in an effort to anticipate criminal activity. Id.
The criminal investigative exemption, section 119.07(3)(d), is a codification of the common law Police Secrets Rule developed by the Florida courts to exempt police investigatory and intelligence information from public disclosure. Id. The exemption has always had a limited purpose — to prevent premature disclosure of information when such disclosure could impede an ongoing investigation or allow a suspect to avoid apprehension or escape detection. Id.; see Glow v. State, 319 So.2d 47 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). Materials in the officers' personnel files prior to the incident investigated have no relation to that purpose.
Cannella based his exemption claim on the rationale that by subpoenaing the personnel records, he "complied" them within the meaning of section 119.011(3)(c). It is obvious, however, that the personnel records were "compiled" within the meaning of the statute when the custodial agency, the city, originally accumulated the materials in them. A law enforcement agency cannot withdraw materials from public scrutiny by deeming another "compilation" to occur simply because it subpoenas such records. See FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 102 S.Ct. 2054, 72 L.Ed.2d 376 (1982); Gregory v. FDIC, 470 F.Supp. 1329 (D.D.C. 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 631 F.2d 896 (D.C.Cir.1980).
Conclusion
We grant the requested writ of certiorari, and based on the foregoing analysis, we hold that (1) the officers here had no right to privacy in their personnel records; (2) a custodial agency may delay disclosure of nonexempt public records for no more than forty-eight hours after a request therefor; (3) an agency may not transfer requested records merely to avoid disclosure, and if a transfer is necessary, it must make copies of requested records at the expense of the requesting party if asked to do so before the transfer is effected; and (4) law enforcement officers' personnel records compiled and maintained by the employing agency can never constitute criminal investigative or criminal intelligence information within the meaning of the Public Records Act even if subpoenaed by another law enforcement agency at some point after their original compilation by the employing agency.
We also certify to the Florida Supreme Court the following questions of great public importance:
1. MAY DISCLOSURE OF NONEXEMPT PUBLIC RECORDS AUTOMATICALLY BE DELAYED FOR A SPECIFIC PERIOD OF TIME FOR ANY REASON?
2. IF THE ANSWER TO THE FIRST QUESTION IS YES, WHAT IS THE MAXIMUM PERMISSIBLE DELAY PERIOD, AND FOR WHAT PURPOSE OR PURPOSES MAY THE DELAY PERIOD BE INVOKED?
OTT, C.J., and HOBSON, BOARDMAN, CAMPBELL and SCHOONOVER, JJ., concur.
LEHAN and DANAHY, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part.
SCHEB, J., concurs with DANAHY, J.
RYDER, J., dissents, with opinion.
. In addition to the arguments of the parties, we have had the benefit of extensive and well-written amici curiae briefs from the Lakeland Ledger and the publisher of The St. Petersburg Times and Evening Independent (St. Peters-burg).
. GRIMES, J., did not participate in the decision of the court.
. We note that the 1983 Florida legislature enacted laws which affect the disclosure under the Public Records Act of teachers' personnel files and the personnel files of law enforcement and correctional officers. Ch. 83-135 and Ch. 83-136, Laws of Fla. These new laws, however, do not apply to the instant case.