Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. James RAYMOND, alias James Ramos
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1971-02-24
Citations: 245 So. 2d 335
Docket Number: No. 50605
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. James RAYMOND, alias James Ramos.
Judges: SUMMERS, J., concurs in the decree.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 245
Pages: 335–345

Head Matter:
258 La. 1
STATE of Louisiana v. James RAYMOND, alias James Ramos.
No. 50605.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Feb. 24, 1971.
Dissenting Opinion March 8, 1971.
Rehearing Denied March 29, 1971.
Makar & Whitaker, John Makar, Natchi-toches, for defendant-appellant.
Jack P. F. Gremillion, Atty. Gen., William P. Schuler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ronald C. Martin, Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appel-lee.

Opinion:
SANDERS, Justice.
This is a criminal prosecution. The charred body of a person identified as James Quinn was found in a burned building near Northwestern State College at Natchitoches. Medical experts reported that death resulted from a gun shot wound, rather than from fire. On November IS, 1967, the investigating officers arrested James Raymond for the homicide. The Grand Jury of Natchitoches Parish later indicted him for murder. After hearing the evidence, the jury found him guilty of manslaughter, and the trial judge sentenced him to a term of seven years in the Louisiana State Penitentiary.
The defendant Raymond has appealed, relying upon nineteen bills of exceptions reserved in the trial court. The main legal questions presented relate to the denial of defendant's right to a speedy trial, the sequestration of the witnesses at the trial, and the admission in evidence of an oral statement of the victim made before his death.
BILL OF EXCEPTIONS NO. 1: Denial of the Right to a Speedy Trial.
The defendant reserved Bill of Exceptions No. 1 to the overruling of his motion to quash the indictment, based upon the denial of his right to a speedy trial.
Article 1, Section 9 of our State Constitution grants to a defendant the right of a speedy trial in a criminal prosecution. The right to a speedy trial is also guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967).
In the recent case of Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 90 S.Ct. 1564, 26 L.Ed.2d 26 (1970), the United States Supreme Court vacated a state conviction for a seven-year delay. Through Chief Justice Burger, the Court held:
"The right to a speedy trial is not a theoretical or abstract right but one rooted in hard reality on the need to have charges promptly exposed. If the case for the prosecution calls on the accused to meet charges rather than rest on the infirmities of the prosecution's case, as is the defendant's right, the time to meet them is when the case is fresh. Stale claims have never been favored by the law, and far less so in criminal cases. Although a great many accused persons seek to put off the confrontation as long as possible, the right to a prompt inquiry into criminal charges is fundamental and the duty of the charging authority is to provide a prompt trial. This is brought sharply into focus when, as here, the accused presses for an early confrontation with his accusers and with the state. Crowded dockets, the lack of judges or lawyers, and other factors no doubt make some delays inevitable. Here, however, no valid reason for the delay existed; it was exclusively for the convenience of the state. On this record the delay with its consequent prejudice is intolerable as a matter of fact and impermissible as a matter of law."
In the present case, the defendant was arrested on November 15, 1967; the Grand Jury indicted him for murder on November 9, 1968; and the trial occurred on February 12, 1970.
The delay between indictment and trial in the present case exceeds one year. The defendant, however, filed no formal motion for an earlier trial. The record reflects that one postponement was at the behest of defense counsel. Moreover, the defendant has made no showing of trial prejudice. See Dickey v. Florida, supra.
Concededly, trial delays of the length disclosed in the present case are prejudicial to the administration of criminal justice. Such delays should be substantially reduced in the interest of improving our system of justice. When all of the circumstances are considered, however, the delay is insufficient to be an unconstitutional denial of a speedy trial, warranting the discharge of the defendant.
BILL OF EXCEPTIONS 2, 3 and 14: Sequestration of Witnesses.
On motion of the defendant, the trial judge ordered a sequestration of witnesses under Article 764 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure. He exempted from that order, however, the law enforcement officers and medical experts. He instructed the State's witnesses to discuss the case with no one except "counsel for the State."
Bills of Exceptions Nos. 2 and 14 complain of the exemption of the witnesses from the sequestration. Bill of Exceptions No. 3 complains of the trial judge's order to the State's witnesses limiting discussion to the district attorney. Defendant contends that these witnesses should have been instructed they could also discuss the case with defense counsel.
Article 764 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure provides:
"Upon its own motion the court may, and upon request of the state or the defendant the court shall, order that the witnesses be excluded from the courtroom or from where they can see or hear the proceedings and refrain from discussing the facts of the case or the testimony of any witness with anyone other than the district attorney or defense counsel. The court may modify its order in the interest of justice."
The purpose of this Article is to prevent witnesses from being influenced by the testimony of prior witnesses and to strengthen the role of cross-examination in developing the facts. See State v. Lewis, 250 La. 876, 199 So.2d 907.
The trial court, however, may modify the exclusion order in the interest of justice. A modification of the order will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of an abuse of discretion. In testing the exercise of discretion, the circumstances of each case must be considered. State v. Lewis, supra; State v. Barton, 207 La. 820, 22 So.2d 183.
In his Per Curiam, the trial judge states that he modified the order in the interest of justice, obviously meaning that he did so to facilitate the trial of the case with no prejudice to the defendant.
The two expert witnesses exempted were Dr. Charles E. Cook, parish coroner, whose duties prevented him from being present for the opening of the trial, and Dr. Willis Butler, an experienced forensic pathologist from Shreveport. The trial judge, of course, recognized that Dr. Cook could not conveniently be made subject to the rule because of his absence. A state trooper was also absent on the opening day of trial. Each of the remaining law enforcement officers testified only to the discovery of the crime or to a minor segment of the factual picture. The overriding factual issue was whether defendant had any connection with the crime. The circumstantial evidence linking defendant to the crime was brought forward by a score of other witnesses, placed under the rule and in charge of a deputy sheriff. We find nothing in the record to suggest prejudice to the defendant. Considering all the circumstances, we conclude there was no abuse of the discretion vested in the trial judge.
The instruction limiting discussion with the State's witnesses to the district attorney was also a modification of the order. As provided in Article 764, the normal instruction allows excluded witnesses to discuss the facts or testimony with the "district attorney or defense counsel." The primary purpose of the instruction, of course, is to prohibit them from discussing the case with other witnesses.
The authority given the trial judge to modify the order certainly includes the authority to make the instruction to the witness stricter than the normal instruction mentioned in the Article.
At no time during the trial did defense counsel request special permission of the judge to discuss the case with any of the witnesses. One of the witnesses excluded was summoned by both the State and the Defense. The defense, however, did not use this witness. A trial judge presiding in a criminal case has a far better knowledge of the conditions at the trial than does an appellate court looking at the cold record. Under all the circumstances, we are of the opinion he did not abuse his discretion in instructing the witnesses.
We conclude these Bills of Exceptions lack merit.
BILLS OF EXCEPTIONS 15 and 15A: Admission in Evidence of Victim's Statement.
The State called John Luther Jackson as a witness. He testified that on November 12, 1967, about 7:00 p. m., (several hours before the alleged homicide) the victim, James Quinn, was at Chip's Place. As the defendant approached in his automobile and inquired as to the victim's whereabouts, the victim moved behind a tree.
Over defense objection, the State elicited the following additional testimony:
"Q. Why did he say he was hiding?
"A. Because that punk [referring to defendant] would want him [to have abnormal sexual relations with him] tonight, and he hid behind the tree.
"Q. It was after he made the statement that he went and hid behind the tree ?
"A. That's right. He said that and then he hid behind the tree.
"Q. And who was coming at that time?
"A. Mr. Raymond."
We construe the testimony in this sequence: As the defendant approached, the victim declared, that punk will want me to have sexual relations with him tonight, and then moved behind a tree.
The defense strongly contends that the victim's utterance was inadmissible, be cause it was hearsay and connected the defendant with another crime, that is, sodomy.
The trial judge admitted the utterance as evidence of the victim's state of mind. He instructed the jury that the utterance was not to be considered as evidence of the truth of the facts recited.
Subject to several exceptions, hearsay evidence is inadmissible in a criminal prosecution. LSA-R.S. 15:434. The hearsay rule generally excludes out-of-court statements offered to prove the.truth of the matter contained in them. The reason underlying this rule is that such statements are made without an oath and their truth cannot be tested by cross-examination in the presence of the trier of fact.
In the present case, one factual issue is whether the defendant was with the victim at the time of the alleged homicide, several hours after the present incident. The state of mind of the defendant is important insofar as it either increases or decreases the likelihood that contact between the victim and defendant occurred. Hence, evidence of the victim's fear of defendant or his emotional reaction to the presence of defendant is relevant.
The victim's state of mind, of course, can be proved by circumstantial evidence, that is, by utterances from which the jury may infer the existence of fear or revulsion. When an out-of-court statement is offered to prove circumstantially the declarant's state of mind, it is non-hearsay. It is admitted in evidence, not to prove the truth of the facts recited, but to prove that the utterance occurred as a basis for inference. McCormick On Evidence, § 228, p. 465 (1954); 6 Wigmore On Evidence (3d ed.) § 1715, p. 60; 29 Am.Jur. 2d, Evidence, § 355, p. 404.
The victim's utterance immediately preceded his act in moving behind the tree. As phrased, the utterance does not appear to be a direct statement that the victim was afraid of the defendant. From it, however, the jury might well infer fear or revulsion. The utterance gives color to the victim's conduct in moving behind the tree. The utterance, as well as the non-verbal conduct, is circumstantial evidence of the victim's state of mind, or emotional attitude toward defendant. The testimony is non-hearsay and, because of its relevance, was admissible in evidence. See State v. Dunn, 161 La. 532, 109 So. 56; State v. Thomas, 159 La. 1076, 106 So. 570; State v. Morgan, 142 La. 755, 77 So. 588; Comment, Hearsay and Non-Hearsay as Reflected in Louisiana, Criminal Cases, 14 La.L.Rev. 611, 614.
Assuming arguendo, however, that the contested statement is hearsay, it would nonetheless be admissible in evidence under either of two exceptions to the hearsay rule. As a spontaneous declaration of apparent sincerity, it would be admissible under the "Declaration of Mental State" exception to the hearsay rule. See McCormick On Evidence, § 268, p. 567 (1954); 6 Wigmore On Evidence (3d ed.), § 1730, p. 93. It would likewise be admissible under the broad res gestae exception as applied in Louisiana. See State v. Reese, 250 La. 151, 194 So.2d 729.
The need for this type of evidence in a homicide case is apparent. The victim is dead. In many instances, the jury must determine the facts from a mosaic of circumstantial evidence. This is true in the present case. We conclude that the statement was properly admitted in evidence.
BILL OF EXCEPTIONS NO. 10: Admission of Photographs in Evidence.
Defendánt objected to the admission in evidence of photographs of the charred body of the victim. He asserts they had no relevance to any contested factual issue and, because they were gruesome, tended to inflame the jury.
In State v. Morris, 245 La. 175, 157 So. 2d 728, we summarized the law relating to the admission of gruesome photographs as follows:
"[W]e have on numerous occasions stated that the mere fact that photographs are gruesome and tend to prejudice the jury does not render them inadmissible in evidence if they are otherwise admissible. See State v. Johnson, 198 La. 195, 3 So.2d 556, State v. Ross, 217 La. 837, 47 So.2d 559, State v. Solomon, 222 La. 269, 62 So.2d 481, State v. Eubanks, 240 La. 552, 124 So.2d 543, and State v. Collins, 242 La. 704, 138 So.2d 546. We think, however, that this rule is subject to the reservation noted in the vast majority of the common law jurisdictions and expressed in 23 C.J.S. 353, verbo Criminal Law § 852 (l)c: 'As a general rule, where photographs are otherwise properly admitted, it is not a valid objection to their admissibility that they tend to prejudice the jury. Ordinarily photographs are not inadmissible merely because they bring vividly to jurors the details of a shocking crime or tend to arouse passion or prejudice, as in the case of unpleasant, gruesome, or horrifying photographs. The test .of admissibility in such cases is whether the probative value of the photographs outweigh their probable prejudicial effect. Accordingly, photographs should be excluded where there logical relevancy will unquestionably be overwhelmed by the inherently prejudicial nature of the particular picture; and photographs which are calculated to arouse the sympathies or prejudices of the jury are properly excluded if they are entirely irrelevant or not substantially necessary to show material facts or conditions.' "
The evidence in the present case was largely circumstantial. The contested factual issues included the identity of the body and the cause of death. The photographs, of course, were relevant to these factual issues and served as a pictorial foundation for the expert testimony. Under all the circumstances, we conclude they were properly admitted.
BILL OF EXCEPTION NO. 3A:
State's Challenge of Juror for Cause.
The State was allowed to challenge for cause prospective juror Perot, when he declined to state that he would follow the court's instructions as to the law in arriving at a verdict.
The responses of the juror to both the trial judge and district attorney were unsatisfactory and raised serious doubts as to his qualifications as a juror. We are of the view that the trial judge correctly sustained the challenge,
The defendant, moreover, has no cause for complaint, since the State did not exhaust its peremptory challenges.
Article 800 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure provides:

"The erroneous allowance to the state of a challenge for cause does not afford the defendant a ground for complaint, unless the effect of such ruling is the exercise by the state of more peremptory challenges than it is entitled to by law."
The remaining Bills of Exceptions Nos. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 16, 17, and 18 relate to the form of questions and correctness of procedures during the course of trial. We have reviewed them. None raises a serious question as to the fairness of the trial or the supportability of the conviction.
For the reasons assigned, the conviction and sentence are affirmed.
SUMMERS, J., concurs in the decree.
. In this court, the defense abandoned Bills of Exceptions Nos. 11 and 12.
. Defense counsel apparently wrote a letter to the District Attorney requesting a trial date before the ease was assigned for trial.