Case Name: TUCKER v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1926-02-10
Citations: 281 S.W. 869
Docket Number: No. 9731
Parties: TUCKER v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 281
Pages: 869–871

Head Matter:
TUCKER v. STATE.
(No. 9731.)
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Feb. 10, 1926.
Rehearing Denied April 7, 1926.)
Heidingsfelder, Kahn & Branch, of Houston, for appellant.
Horace Soule, Cr. Dist. Atty., and J. D Du Mars, Jr., Asst. Cr. Dist. Atty., both of Houston, Sam D. Stinson, State’s Atty., of Austin, and Nat Gentry, Jr., Asst. State’s Atty., of Tyler, for the State.

Opinion:
BERRY, J.
The offense is unlawful transportation of liquor, and the punishment is two years in the penitentiary.
The testimony is undisputed that appellant carried two suit cases containing whisky from a train to an automobile 34 steps away, and his defense was that at the time he transported said suit cases he did not know that they contained whisky. In support of his defensive theory, the appellant testified positively that he did not' know that there was any whisky in the baggage, never had any idea or thought that Brown, the party with whom he was driving in the automobile, was going up there to get whisky off of the train, and that he had no interest in any whisky, and did not go there with any intention of aiding Brown or any one else in getting whisky. He further testified that, if there was any whisky on the automobile seat, he did not know anything about it; that it was not his whisky; that he did not take any whisky on the way out- there, and did not drink any whisky.
In an attempt to present appellant's theory of the case, the learned trial judge charged the jury as follows:
"You are further instructed that', if C. Tucker transported or assisted in the. transportation of the whisky introduced in evidence without, knowledge on his part of the contents of the suit cases and hand bags, then, in so far as he is concerned, it would not be an unlawful trans-, portation, and, if he unwittingly assisted in 'the transportation without knowing the contents thereof, then the possession of the liquor was in B. B. 'Axton, and not Tucker, and no presumption of the law would arise as against the said Tucker."
The defendant objected to the manner of' the court's presentation of his defense, and suggested in his objections that the court should charge the jury that, if the defendant carried the suit eases from or about the train to the automobile, before he could be convicted the jury must believe beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew that they contained whisky, and if upon this point they had a reasonable doubt they should acquit the defendant. This was the only affirmative presentation of the theory of the defense, and the charge was further objected to because nowhere in the same is the reasonable doubt given in connection with such defensive theory. The question here presented was de cided in accordance with the appellant's contention in the cases of Jones v. State, 257 S. W. 895, 96 Tex. Cr. R. 332; Garcia v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 273 S. W. 856. The principle involved in those cases is identical with that in the instant case. Also see Carrier v. State, 271 S. W. 383, 99 Tex. Cr. R. 663.
Appellant objected because the court instructed the jury that the possession of more than a quart of whisky is prima facie evidence that the whisky was for the purpose of sale, but this presumption can be met and destroyed by evidence that there was no such purpose. Appellant specially criticizes the use of the word "destroy!' in connection above used. While not a great deal of importance is attached to this, it might be objectionable. The views of this court as to a correct charge on this statute have been fully expressed in the following cases: Stoneham v. State, 268 S. W. 156, 99 Tex. Cr. R. 54; Newton v. State, 267 S. W. 272, 98 Tex. Cr. R. 582; Caldwell v. State, 273 S. W. 608, 101 Tex. Cr. R. 75. In view of another trial, we think it proper to say that the language of the statute itself is appropriate in submitting this matter.
Por the errors above mentioned, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the cause remanded.
PER CURIAM.
The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the court.