Case Name: STATE of Florida ex rel. George RANALLI, Petitioner, v. The Honorable William Clayton JOHNSON, as Judge of the Court of Record In and For BROWARD COUNTY, Florida, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1973-04-04
Citations: 277 So. 2d 24
Docket Number: No. 41319
Parties: STATE of Florida ex rel. George RANALLI, Petitioner, v. The Honorable William Clayton JOHNSON, as Judge of the Court of Record In and For BROWARD COUNTY, Florida, Respondent.
Judges: CARLTON, C. J., and ROBERTS, BOYD and DEKLE, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 277
Pages: 24–27

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida ex rel. George RANALLI, Petitioner, v. The Honorable William Clayton JOHNSON, as Judge of the Court of Record In and For BROWARD COUNTY, Florida, Respondent.
No. 41319.
Supreme Court of Florida.
April 4, 1973.
Rehearing Denied May 23, 1973.
Joseph A. Varón, and Steadman S. Stahl, Jr., Varón & Stahl, Hollywood, for petitioner.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Andrew I. Friedrich, and Nelson E. Bailey, Asst. Attys. Gen., for respondent.

Opinion:
ADKINS, Justice.
The petition for writ of certiorari reflected probable jurisdiction in this Court. We issued the writ and have heard argument of the parties and, upon further consideration of the matter, have determined that the writ was improvidently granted.
George Ranalli was charged with five counts of bribery and an information was filed against him on March 30, 1971. On April 1, 1971, Ranalli filed a demand for speedy trial pursuant to Rule 1.191, CrPR (now Rule 3.191, CrPR), 33 F.S.A., which, by the terms of the rule, is deemed
"[A] pleading by the accused that he is available for trial, has diligently investigated his case, and that he is prepared or will be prepared for trial." Rule 3.-191(c), CrPR.
Two weeks after filing the demand for a speedy trial, Ranalli filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the information under which he was charged was so vague that he could not prepare an adequate defense. Trial was set for July 6, 1971, beyond the 60-day limit from the filing of the demand for a speedy trial. On June 9, 1971, Ran-alli filed a motion for discharge pursuant to Rule 1.191(d)(1), CrPR.
The trial judge denied the motion, giving three reasons. The District Court of Appeal, 250 So.2d 664, then denied a suggestion for writ of prohibition. Of the three reasons, given by the trial judge in denying the motion for discharge, only one is convincing. The others, if made by or expressly relied upon by a District Court of Appeal, would provide jurisdiction by creating direct conflict with decisions of this Court and the District Courts of Appeal. However, denial of a suggestion for a writ of prohibition does not necessarily adopt all of the reasoning of the trial court.
"The writ of prohibition is that process by which a superior court prevents an inferior court from exceeding its jurisdiction or usurping a jurisdiction with which it has not been vested by law." State ex rel. Paluska v. White, 162 So.2d 697, at 699 (Fla.App.2d, 1964). See also State ex rel. Hill v. Hearn, 99 So.2d 231 (Fla.1957).
Thus, the only statement of law attributable to the District Court in its denial of prohibition in the case sub judice is that the trial court had jurisdiction to hold the trial complained of. With this, there is no decisional conflict.
By filing a motion to dismiss alleging insufficient information for preparation of a defense, Ranalli admitted that his demand for a speedy trial was spurious, because that demand indicated that he was, or would be, prepared for trial. As we said in State ex rel. Hanks v. Goodman, 253 So.2d 129, at 130 (Fla.1971):
"After a demand for speedy trial has been filed, the court should not summarily dismiss a defendant at the expiration of the 60-day period provided in the rule. It is not only appropriate, but necessary, to ascertain whether or not the accused had a 'bona fide desire' to obtain the speedy trial and to determine whether or not the accused or his attorney 'has diligently investigated his case, and that he is prepared' for trial. If these prerequisites to the filing of the demand were not met, the demand for speedy trial should be stricken as being null and void."
In addition, as pointed out by 'the trial judge, the time for speedy trial may be extended "for hearings on pretrial motions." Rule 3.191(d)(2), CrPR.
The other reasons given by the trial judge are merely surplusage unless relied upon specifically by the District Court. It is elementary that the statements of the trial judge cannot be a basis for conflict jurisdiction before this Court, as our jurisdiction requires a decision of a District Court of Appeal which is in conflict with a decision of this Court or of another District Court. Fla.Const., art. V, § 3(b)(3), F.S.A.
We are without jurisdiction to consider the issues raised by Ranalli. Therefore, the writ is hereby discharged and the petition for writ of certiorari dismissed.
It is so ordered.
CARLTON, C. J., and ROBERTS, BOYD and DEKLE, JJ., concur.
ERVIN, J., dissents with opinion.
McCAIN, J., dissents with opinion.