Case Name: WILLIAMS v. KNIGHT REALTY CO. et al.
Court: Texas Courts of Civil Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1919-06-21
Citations: 217 S.W. 755
Docket Number: No. 9135
Parties: WILLIAMS v. KNIGHT REALTY CO. et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 217
Pages: 755–759

Head Matter:
WILLIAMS v. KNIGHT REALTY CO. et al.
(No. 9135.)
(Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Ft. Worth.
June 21, 1919.
On Motion for Rehearing, Oct. 25, 1919.
On Second Motion for Rehearing, Dec. 20, 1919.)
1. Appeal and error <@=>347(1) — Time for SUING OUT WRIT OF ERROR COMMENCES WITH DATE OF JUDGMENT.
In estimating the time of 12 months under Vernon’s Sayles’ Ann. Civ. St. 1914, art. 2086, within which writ of error should be sued out, the period should commence with the date of judgment, and not with the date of overruling of motion for new trial.
On Motion for Rehearing.
2. Appeal and error <@=>648 — Motion to CORRECT RECORD TO SHOW TRUE DATE OF JUDGMENT SHOULD BE FILED IN TRIAL COURT.
If plaintiff in error had desired to correct the record so as to make it show the true date of judgment in order to avoid dismissal of his appeal on the ground that his petition for writ of error was filed late, he should have filed his motion to correct the record in the trial court.
3. Appeal and error <@=>23 — Courts of Civil Appeals may ascertain facts not of record necessary to exercise of jurisdiction.
. While under Vernon’s Sayles’ Ann. Civ. St. 1914, art. 1593, Courts of Civil Appeals have power on affidavit or otherwise as thought proper to ascertain such matters of fact as may be necessary to proper exercise of their jurisdiction, the power is restricted to matters not appearing of record, and does not admit of facts contradicting the record.
4. Appeal and error @=>833(1) — -Denial op REHEARING ON DISMISSAL OP APPEAL FOB LATE PILING OP PETITION POE WRIT OP ERROR.
Where the Court of Civil Appeals dismissed for want of jurisdiction because petition for writ of error had been filed more than 12 months after date of judgment, and appellant moved for rehearing on the ground that judgment had in' fact been rendered later than was suggested of record, but did not request that the court hear any evidence on the point, and did not tender any evidence by affidavit, sworn plea, or sworn testimony, the motion for rehearing will be overruled, otherwise where affidavits of counsel, the county clerk, and trial judge make 'showing of the later rendition of judgment.
On Second Motion for Rehearing.
5. Brokers @=>66 — Secret agreement to POOL COMMISSIONS IS VOID.
A secret agreement between realty brokers representing different principals to pool or divide commissions if the transaction is completed is void as against public policy, and deprives them of right to compensation unless the principals know of the agreement and acquiesce, a rule applying though the principals themselves finally conclude the sale on agreed terms.
6. Brokers' @=366 — Broker who agreed to POOL COMMISSIONS CAN INVOKE RULE AVOIDING CONTRACT AS AGAINST OTHER BROKER.
A realty broker, party to a contract to pool commissions with others void as against public policy, hold' not precluded from invoking the rule avoiding such contract as against the -claim of another broker, who represented the other principal, for his share of the commission.
7. Brokers @=>66 — Party bringing brokers TOGETHER ENTITLED TO COMMISSION DESPITE INVALIDITY OP AGREEMENT TO POOL COMMISSIONS.
A realty company, which acted as mere middleman in bringing together two realty brokers who effected a sale, is entitled to the one-third of the two commissions received by the' brokers agreed by them to be paid it for assistance rendered in consummating the sale, though on account of lack of knowledge of their principals the agreement of the brokers to pool commissions was invalid as against public policy.
8. Brokers @=>66 — Can collect commission IP IT IS POSSIBLE WITHOUT SHOWING VIOLATION OF RULE AGAINST SECRET POOLING.
Though an agreement is made by brokers representing two principals to pool or divide commission, and without the knowledge of the principals, yet a broker may enforce collection of the commission agreed to be paid by his principal if to do so it is not necessary for him to plead and prove violation of the rule against secret sharing or pooling of commissions.
9. Brokers @=>66 — Agreement to pay other BROKER COMMISSION NOT ILLEGAL SHARING OP COMMISSIONS IN CASE OP KNOWLEDGE OP PRINCIPAL.
An agreement by a broker representing one of the principals to an exchange of land to pay the broker representing the other principal a commission is not unenforceable, under the rule against secret pooling of commissions by realty brokers, where the principal of the broker who was to receive the commission knew of the agreement.”
10. Brokers @=>66 — Basis op rule against SECRET SHARING OP COMMISSIONS.
The rule prohibiting the secret sharing or pooling of commissions by realty brokers applies, though there is no actual injury to the principals, the rule not being remedial of actual wrong, but preventive of its possibility.
Appeal from Wise County Court; J. W. Walker, Judge.
Suit by I. R. Williams against R. G. Hoge, in which the Knight Realty Company and A. L. Bane intervened. Prom judgment in favor of the interveners, plaintiff appeals.
Judgment in favor of the intervening company affirmed; judgment in favor of the individual intervener reversed and rendered in favor of plaintiff.
S. D. Williams, of Wynnewood, Okl., Ratliff & Spencer, of Decatur, and Sam J. Hunter, of Ft. Worth, for appellant.
McMurray & Gettys, of Decatur, for ap-pellees.

Opinion:
BUCK, J.
This is the second appeal of this case, the opinion on the first appeal being found in 193 S. W. 168. Upon this appeal we are confronted with a question as to our jurisdiction. The judgment in the trial court was rendered October 18,1917, the judgment overruling the motion for new trial was rendered December 31, 1917. The petition for writ of error was filed in the court below December 16, 1918, the bond being filed the same day. We conclude that the petition for writ of error came too late. In estimating the time, 12 months, within which the writ of error should he sued out, the period should commence with the date of the judgment, and not with the date of the overruling of the motion for new trial. Vernon's Sayles' Civil Statutes, art. 2086; Cooper v. Yoakum, 91 Tex. 391, 43 S. W. 871; Evans v. San Antonio Traction Co., 166 S. W. 408; Kolp v. Shrader, 168 S. W. 464; Ry. Co. v. Stapp, 171 S. W. 1080.
It therefore becomes our duty to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction; and it is so ordered.
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