Case Name: UNITED STATES of America v. Randall B. HUSAR, Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1989-02-14
Citations: 866 F.2d 1533
Docket Number: Nos. 87-3076, 88-3020
Parties: UNITED STATES of America v. Randall B. HUSAR, Appellant.
Judges: Before WALD, Chief Judge; ROBINSON, MIKYA, EDWARDS, RUTH BADER GINSBURG, STARR, SILBERMAN, BUCKLEY, WILLIAMS, D.H. GINSBURG and SENTELLE, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 866
Pages: 1533–1536

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES of America v. Randall B. HUSAR, Appellant.
Nos. 87-3076, 88-3020.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Feb. 14, 1989.
Thomas Lumbard, Washington, D.C. (appointed by this court), for appellant.

Opinion:
ON APPELLANT'S SUGGESTION FOR REHEARING EN BANC •
Before WALD, Chief Judge; ROBINSON, MIKYA, EDWARDS, RUTH BADER GINSBURG, STARR, SILBERMAN, BUCKLEY, WILLIAMS, D.H. GINSBURG and SENTELLE, Circuit Judges.
ORDER
Appellant's Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc has been circulated to the full court. The taking of a vote thereon was requested. Thereafter, a majority of the judges of the court in regular active service did not vote in favor of the suggestion. Upon consideration of the foregoing it is
ORDERED, by the court en banc, that appellant's suggestion be denied.
A concurring statement by Circuit Judge RUTH BADER GINSBURG, joined by Circuit Judges SILBERMAN and SENTELLE, is attached.
A dissenting statement by Chief Judge WALD, joined by Circuit Judge MIKVA, is attached.
A dissenting statement by Circuit Judge D.H. GINSBURG is also attached.
Statement by Circuit Judge RUTH BADER GINSBURG, concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc, in which Circuit Judges SILBERMAN and SENTELLE join:
Húsar was charged, tried, and found not guilty by reason of insanity in a federal court. Under the federal regime, he would remain in custody, for care and treatment, unless he carried the burden of demonstrating that "his release would not create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage [to] property of another due to a present mental disease or defect." 18 U.S.C. § 4243(d), (f) (Supp. IV 1986). Had Húsar been charged, tried, and found not guilty by reason of insanity in a Colorado state court, he would also remain in custody unless he could carry the burden of proving he no longer had an impaired mental condition. See Colo.Rev. Stat. § 16-8-115(2) (1986); see also id. § 16-8-116 (conditioning release of person found not guilty by reason of insanity upon report to trial court and prosecuting attorney, and a discharge hearing). Under the Attorney General's stipulation with Colorado officials, Húsar thus will be treated in a manner both systems deem proper for persons in his situation, i.e., persons found not guilty by reason of insanity.
By contrast, under Husar's analysis, his status, by reason of the federal-state transfer,' becomes solely that of a person civilly committed by state authorities. As such, he may demand a jury trial on the question of his continued commitment, Colo.Rev. Stat. § 27-10-109(3), (4) & (5), at which Colorado officials would have the burden of demonstrating, by clear and convincing evidence, the need for continued hospital treatment. Id. § 27-10-111(1). (Colorado's release-qualification regime for insanity acquittees, see supra, text at note 1, does not fit federally-tried Húsar; the state's regime is explicitly tied to prosecutions in state courts by state prosecutors.)
Were Husar's view to prevail, under which federal and Colorado officials could not cooperate as they have to their mutual satisfaction in this case, the Attorney General would hardly be assisted in his endeavors "to get the state to take over the acquittee's care completely." See dissent by Chief Judge Wald at 1535. As to "fundamental principles of state autonomy," and dramatic preemption of state authority, see id. at 1535, 1536 we note that only Húsar, not any Colorado officer, corn-plains.
The Federal Bureau of Prisons' letter of transfer, in sum, set terms the Colorado officials accepted. Those terms were designed to assure that Husar's status would remain that of a person who had engaged in felonious conduct, one who would therefore have the burden of establishing his qualification for release. We do not believe the "federalism" banner Húsar waves warrants unsettling the sensible, lawful arrangement the Attorney General made with the concerned Colorado authorities.
. Although the post-prosecution federal and state schemes are similar in that both place the burden on defendant to demonstrate his suitability for release, the regimes are not identical. Under federal law, for example, the burden on a person found not guilty by reason of insanity calls for proof of qualification for release by "clear and convincing evidence," 18 U.S.C. § 4243(d); under Colorado law, "a preponder- anee of the evidence" suffices. Colo.Rev.Stat. § 16-8-115(2).
. If Colorado, or any other state, is unwilling to accept the terms of transfer the Attorney General proposes, the state's course, to avoid federal interference, is clear:- just say "No."