Case Name: Van Rensselaer Cromer v. George W. Platt and Edmund F. Platt
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1877-06-20
Citations: 37 Mich. 132
Docket Number: 
Parties: Van Rensselaer Cromer v. George W. Platt and Edmund F. Platt.
Judges: Cooley, C. J. and Marston, J., concurred.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 37
Pages: 132–139

Head Matter:
Van Rensselaer Cromer v. George W. Platt and Edmund F. Platt.
Notice of Dishonor.
Notice of dishonor- need not be given by a notary; it may be given by any bolder for himself and in his own language; but it is not binding, whatever its form, unless the paper has been legally dishonored; and every endorser is presumed to know what action will bind him and what will not.
A letter addressed by the holders of a note to the endorser, describing the note and stating that it was unpaid and that the holders looked to him for payment, is a sufficient notice of dishonor.
The holders of a note demanded payment from the endorser, who replied that he had not expected to have it to pay, and that it was impossible to pay it at present. Meld, insufficient as a promise to pay.
Error to Berrien.
Submitted April 18.
Decided June 20.
Assumpsit against the endorser of a promissory note. On failure to find the maker, the holders sent to the endorser the following letter: “St. Joseph, Mich., February 4, 1873. Mr. Cromer — Dear Sir: We hold, a note given by Thos. A. Bunbury, dated St. Joseph, July 1st, 1872,-payable seven months after date to your order, for one hundred and fifty dollars with interest at ten per cent. The note being endorsed by you, and not paid at this date, we look to' you for payment of the same. Yours resply, Platt & Brother.” The following letters from the endorser were admitted-in evidence under objection: “March 18 th, 1873. Mr. Platt: I received your letter. I was in hopes that Mr. Bunbury had settled it up before this. I would like to have you write to him about it and see what he says. He is able to pay, and think he will. V. R. Cromer.” “April 30, 1873. Mr. Platt: Your letter is at hand requesting me to pay that note immediately as Mr. Bun-bury has run away. I did not expect to have that note to pay, as Mr. Bunbury was able to pay it, and I have made use of the money I brought with me. Therefore it is impossible for me to pay it at present. Y. R. Cromer.” The court below tried the case without a jury and gaye judgment for the plaintiffs, and defendant brought error.
Wm. R. Lyon and F. Bacon, for plaintiff in error.
To charge an endorser demand must be made from the maker at maturity, and notice of dishonor giyen to the endorser. May v. Coffin, 4 Mass., 341; Pierce v. Cate, 12 Cush., 190; Wheeler v. Field, 6 Metc., 290. The notice must coyer the facts of presentment and demand, and the refusal to pay, and must distinctly show that the note is dishonored. Platt v. Drake, 1 Doug. (Mich.), 301; Cicotte v. Morse, 8 Mich,, 428; Spies v. Newberry, 2 Doug. (Mich.), 426; Pinkham v. Macy, 9 Metc., 174; Townsend v. Lorain Bank, 2 Ohio St., 355; Story on Prom. Notes, §§ 348, 350; Redf. & Big. Leading Cases on Bills and Notes, 358-375; Edwards on Bills, §§ 470-1; Strange v. Price, 10 Ad. & E., 125; 1 Pars. on Notes & Bills, 470; Artisans’ Bank v. Backus, 36 N. Y., 100; Nailor v. Bowie, 8 Md., 251; Reynolds v. Appleman, 41 Md., 615; Routh v. Robertson, 11 Sm. & M., 382; Pahquioque Bank v. Martin, 11 Abb. Pr., 291; Hartley v. Case, 4 B. & C., 339; Solarte v. Palmer, 1 Bing. N. C., 194. If the maker has absconded, the notice must show it. Gilbert v. Dennis, 3 Metc., 498-9. In case of a note payable generally, simple notice of non-payment is not notice of dishonor. Edw. on Bills, 593; Dole v. Gold, 5 Barb., 490.
N. A. Hamilton and O. W. Coolidge for defendants in error.
A notice that states the fact of non-payment and that the holder looks to the endorser, is sufficient (Mills v. Bank, 11 Wheat., 431) or that puts the party on inquiry. Chewning v. Gatewood, 5 How. (Miss.), 552; Field v. Thornton, 1 Ga., 306. It need not set forth that a demand has been made or that the maker has absconded. Burkam v. Trowbridge, 9 Mich., 209; Clark v. Eldridge 13 Metc., 96; Robson v. Curlewis, 2 Ad. & El. [N. S.] 421; Hedger v. Steavenson, 2 M. & W., 799; Grugeon v. Smith, 6 Ad. & El., 499; Redf. & Big. Leading Cases on Bills & Notes, 358, and cases cited; Paul v. Joel, 4 H. & N., 355; Bailey v. Porter, 14 M. & W., 44. The authority of Solarte v. Palmer, is shaken by Everard v. Watson, 1 El. & Bl., 801. Cromer’s letters were a waiver of notice and recognition of liability. Parsons v. Dickinson, 28 Mich., 56.

Opinion:
Campbell, J.
This was a suit against an endorser, and his liability, upon the facts found, depended on the sufficiency of the notice of dishonor, inasmuch as the letters relied on as recognitions of liability are equivocal and not enough to indicate any promise to pay.
The notice was full in every other respect except as to the fact of demand and refusal. As to these it simply declared that the note was unpaid, . and the holders looked to the endorser for payment.
This left the facts of presentment and refusal to inference. The question is whether a notice of this kind is valid.
There are cases both numerous and respectable which have held such a notice insufficient. No particular form of notice can be laid down as requisite, and the discussion has always been concerning the sufficiency in each case to inform the endorser of what was claimed as fixing his liability.
We think that altogether too much force has been given to technical phrases in such notices. A notice, whatever be its form, cannot bind unless the paper has been legally dishonored, and every endorser must be presumed to know what action will bind him and what will not. Notice need not be given by a notary. Any holder may give it for himself and in his own language. Negotiable paper is used by all classes of men and for all manner of purposes, and in a large class, if not in the majority of cases, credit is given to the endorser and he knows it. He is entitled to have his liability established by the necessary measures. But there is no reason why courts should strain matters, as they often have done, to discharge persons from liability when they have not been misled in any way by the notices sent them. As a matter of fact every endorser who receives a notice of non-payment, and that he is looked to for payment, knows that such a notice would not have been sent unless it was supposed the proper steps had been taken to charge him. He learns this as well from one form of notice as from another, and when courts have theorized upon the forms of notice, and assumed that endorsers scan with the nicety of advocates every phrase and turn of expression, they assume what is not true in fact, and impose upon negotiable paper what seem to be unreasonable restrictions. The value of such a medium of business convenience is injured by every needless technicality, and honest holders of such paper, who have not read the law reports, are practically defrauded.
We think the notice in the present case was sufficient. The early case of Platt v. Drake, 1 Doug. (Mich.), 301, was overruled in Burkam v. Trowbridge, 9 Mich., 209, where we remarked upon the danger of over technical refinements in these matters. The more liberal doctrine seems to us the correct one. And while no doubt many cases, and possibly a majority of those reported hold otherwise, we do not think the popular usage has been changed by them, or that justice would be furthered by such a change.
The judgment must be affirmed, with costs.
Cooley, C. J. and Marston, J., concurred.