Case Name: Manuel LUCERO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Dan RUSSELL, Acting Warden, et al., Defendants-Appellees
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1984-08-28
Citations: 741 F.2d 1129
Docket Number: No. 83-3871
Parties: Manuel LUCERO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Dan RUSSELL, Acting Warden, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: 
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 741
Pages: 1129–1130

Head Matter:
Manuel LUCERO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Dan RUSSELL, Acting Warden, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 83-3871.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted Aug. 8, 1984.
Decided Aug. 28, 1984.
Manuel Lucero, in pro per.
Nick A. Rotering, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept, of Institutions, Helena, Mont., for defendants-appellees.
Before PECK , WRIGHT, and FARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Senior Circuit Judge for the Sixth Circuit.

Opinion:
EUGENE A. WRIGHT, Circuit Judge:
Manuel Lucero filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that officials at Montana State Prison violated his constitutional rights by administratively transferring him to maximum security without a hearing. We affirm the district court's dismissal' of the complaint.
The Due Process Clause protects only property and liberty interests arising from (1) the Due Process Clause itself or (2) state law. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466, 103 S.Ct. 864, 869, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983). Lucero's administrative transfer was well within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a prison sentence and did not infringe on any liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. Id. at 869-70. Lucero has not shown that Montana, through its laws or regulations, has created a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the transfer.
Prison officials have broad administrative authority over the prisons they manage while inmates retain only a narrow range of protected liberty interests. Id. at 869. To hold that "any substantial deprivation imposed by prison authorities triggers the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause would subject to judicial review a wide spectrum of discretionary actions that traditionally have been the business of prison administrators rather than of the federal courts." Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 2538, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976). The day-today operation of state prisons is not the business of federal judges. Id. at 228-29, 96 S.Ct. at 2540-41.
We also find no support for Lucero's contentions that prison officials coerced his guilty plea or used the label "administrative" to evade due process hearing requirements.
Affirmed.