Case Name: In re Gastown, Inc.
Court: United States Customs Court
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1964-01-23
Citations: 51 C.C.P.A. 876
Docket Number: No. 7024
Parties: In re Gastown, Inc.
Judges: Before Worley, Chief Judge, and Rich, Martin, Smith, and Almond, Jr., Associate Judges
Reporter: Court of Customs and Patent Appeals Reports
Volume: 51
Pages: 876–883

Head Matter:
326 F. 2d 780; 140 USPQ 216
In re Gastown, Inc.
(No. 7024)
United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,
January 23, 1964
Pcarne & Gordon, Albert L. Ely, Jr., for appellant.
Clarence W. Moore, for the Commissioner of Patents.
[Oral argument October 11, 1963, by Mr. Ely, Jr. and Mr. Moore]
Before Worley, Chief Judge, and Rich, Martin, Smith, and Almond, Jr., Associate Judges

Opinion:
MaktiN, Judge,
delivered the opinion of the court:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, 133 USPQ 630, sustaining the refusal of the examiner to register "GASTOWN" as a service mark for "automobile and truck supply maintenance services."
Appellant asserts that the mark is used by applying it to stationary pumps, globes, signs, and like displays associated with its services. Use since January 13,1949, is alleged.
The examiner's refusal of registration was based on the grounds that (a) the claimed services are not rendered in interstate commerce, and (b) "automobile and truck supply services" are not "services" within the meaning of the Trademark statute. The board affirmed only on the ground that the services are not rendered "in commerce" within the contemplation of Section 45 of the Trademark Act of 1946, and reversed the examiner as to ground (b).
The applicable provisions of Section 45 of the Trademark Act of 1946 read:
Commerce. The word "commerce" means all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Cotigress.

Use in commerce. For tlie purposes of this Act a mark shall be deemed to be used in commerce on services when it is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of services and the services are rendered in commerce. [Emphasis ours.]
It appears from the record that appellant operates a chain of automobile and truck service stations, all within the State of Ohio, some of which are located on federal highways, and that appellant's services, although rendered only in the State of Ohio, embrace services to customers who are engaging in interstate commerce. The board found that appellant used its mark in the sale and advertising of automobile and truck maintenance services and that such services involved, in part, the delivery of gasoline and other automotive products to trucks or other vehicles stalled on highways. The board also apparently accepted the assertion of appellant that a large segment of activ ities in connection with its services is "subject to regulation by Congress under such acts as the Federal Wage and Hour Act, the Child Labor Law, the Dealer Act, etc., and through such agencies as The Federal Trade Commission." Invoices on record show that customers domiciled in other states are billed for "Gasolines — Oils—Lubricants." Appellant also introduced into the record a specimen GAS-TOWN cash bonus stamp book offered to induce retail customers to patronize GASTOWN SERVICE STATIONS regularly for GAS-TOWN products and services featured on the inside cover of the attached book. The stamp book showed regular sale of GASTOWN products and services to a retail customer not residing in the State of Ohio, the stamp book being redeemed from a West Virginia resident. Ray Carmosino, President of Gastown, Inc., testified that one service definitely evidenced by the stamp book "that is consistently rendered by all Gastown Service Station attendants is the cleaning, not only of windshields, but all other windows and the headlights of a customer's car."
It is pertinent to here note that the provisions of the Trademark Act of 1946, hereinabove quoted, relating to the definition of "use in commerce" was amended by Public Law 87-772, approved October 9,1962, so that the definition now reads, insofar as here material, that the mark shall be deemed to be "used in commerce":
» on services when it is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of services and the services are rendered in commerce, or the services are rendered in more than one State or in this and a foreign country and the person rendering the services is engaged in commerce in connection therewith, t ]
The record clearly supports the findings of the board that the services rendered or performed by the appellant are confined to the State of Ohio. It is also apparent from the record that some of appellant's customers have their legal situs in other states; are themselves engaged in interstate commerce when served by appellant in Ohio; are extended credit and billed for services in their respective domiciliary states.
The narrow and precise issue is simply this: Where an operator of service stations provides automotive service and maintenance for customers who are travelling interstate on federal highways in the course of engaging in interstate commerce, is the operator rendering services "in commerce" within the meaning of Section 45 of the Lan-ham Act? We believe that this question must be answered in the affirmative. Part of the service rendered by the appellant at its serv ice stations includes delivering gasoline and other automobile products to trucks or other vehicles stalled on highways. Obviously the automobiles and trucks could not travel at all without the gasoline. Such services directly affect interstate commerce. Therefore, since appellant's mark is clearly "used in the sale of services and the services are rendered in commerce", the stated ground for refusing to register it must be reversed.
In Pure Oil Co. v. Puritan Oil Co., 127 F. 2d 6 (2d Cir. 1942), 52 USPQ 600, a defendant charged with trademark infringement operated a single filling station in Connecticut, from which it sold motor fuel and oils largely to residents of Connecticut, but it appeared that some part of the gasoline allegedly sold under an infringing mark crossed the state line. The court held in that case that assertion of federal jurisdiction under the Trade-Mark Act of 1905 on the ground that alleged infringing use was in "interstate commerce" was not so plainly unsubstantial as to require dismissal of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. In the course of the opinion reversing the District Court, Judge Learned Hand stated :
* » * Gars come to the "service station" from outside Oonneetieut to be filled; they carry away what they get and certainly some part of is crosses the border in their tanks. It is true that this is a small part of the defendant's total sales— apparently only about five percent — but the amount does not matter if pro tanto the business violates the act. Omitting irrelevant words, the section reads as follows: "Any person who shall imitate any trademark and affix the same to merchandise or to labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers or receptacles intended to be used in connection with the sale of merchandise and shall use such imitation in commerce among the several States." The defendant does affix an "imitation" of the mark to "receptacles intended to be used ⅜ in connection with the sale" of gasoline in interstate commerce, and it does not strain the sense to say that in so attracting customers it "uses" the "imitation" in that commerce. Faced with the strict necessity of deciding, we should perhaps not say that that was the kind of "use" intended; rather it would seem from the context that the "receptacles" or "signs" which bear the mark must themselves move in interstate commerce. If they need not, the section would cover any use of a registered trade-mark which facilitated an interstate sale; a doubtful interpretation at best, which arguendo we reject. Nevertheless, it does not appear to us so untenable an interpretation as to make an assertion of jurisdiction based upon it "plainly unsubstantial." On the contrary, we think it a not implausible theory that so to use a mark is to "use" it "in commerce." There can be no doubt that Congress might have so declared had it been minded; the Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 25 L. Ed. 550, do not stand in the way. The decision of a majority of this court in Treasure Imports, Inc., v. Amdur, 127 E. 2d 3, does not conflict with our conclusion. The jurisdiction of the court under the Trade-Mark Act had only sales made before registration to support it. [Emphasis ours.]
See also Martino v. Michigan Window Cleaning Co., 327 U.S. 173; Steele et al. v. Bulova Watch Co., Inc., 344 U.S. 280; Pure Food, Inc. v. Minute Maid Corporation, 214 F. 2d 792 (5th Cir. 1952), 102 USPQ 271.
Appellee has cited In re Bookbinders Restaurant, Inc., 44 CCPA 731, 240 F. 2d 365, 112 USPQ 326, as controlling authority applicable to the factual situation here. The issue in Bookbinder's was whether appellant's services were "rendered in commerce" as required by sections 3 and 45 of the Trademark Act of 1946.
This court affirmed the Commissioner's refusal of registration on the ground that the services in question were not "rendered in commerce," holding that appellant's services did not involve commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress within the meaning of the 1946 act since said services did not have a direct effect upon interstate commerce.
We think the factual situation here is distinguishable from the factual situation in Bookbinder's, for as the the court stated, "The record indicates that appellant opei'ates a single restaurant in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and that the services relied on are rendered in that city'1'' [emphasis ours], and "There are no affidavits or testimony of record and the application states merely that the mark is used 'for restaurant, catering and banquet services.' " The court referred to the fact that in response to an inquiry by the examiner as to how appellant's services were rendered in interstate commerce, appellant's attorney made an unverified statement "that the services were offered to customers and prospective customers in states adjoining Pennsylvania 'thereby inviting or inducing persons in other states to travel from such other states into Pennsylvania to obtain from applicant the aforesaid services at applicant's place of business. Services are also rendered by selling and supplying cooked or prepared foods for transportation into and consumption in adjoining states such as New Jersey and Delaware, and such foods are so transported into such other states for the purposes stated,' " and observed that statements similar to the last one quoted appeared in appellant's brief. No weight, however, was given to those unverified statements by the court in deciding Bookbinder's.
On the other hand, the present record shows that appellant operates a chain of automobile and truck service stations, some of which are located on federal highways. Some of appellant's customers have their legal situs in other states, are engaged in interstate commerce when served by appellant in Ohio, and are extended credit and billed in their respective domiciliary states. We think those circumstances clearly establish that appellant's services have a direct effect on interstate commerce.
As stated in the opinion of the Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, in Bulova Watch Co., Inc. v. Steele et al., 194 F. 2d 567, 92 USPQ 266, aff'd., 344 U.S. 280 (1952) "It would seem that in the Lanham Trade Mark Act of 1946, the Congress intended to regulate interstate and foreign commerce to the full extent of its constitutional powers." With this admonition in mind, we conclude that the activities of appellant were such that its mark is used in commerce within the meaning of section 45 of the Lanham Act. For these reasons we reverse the decision of the board.
The Senate Report No. 2107 that accompanies Public Law 87-772 states that the Public Law 87-772 "Is in large part a housekeeping measure, making minimal substantive changes in the trademark law." Regarding the amendment to the Use in commerce provision, i.e. the 15th paragraph of section 45 of the Trademark Act of 1946, the Senate Report states: "The amendments to the 15th paragraph amplify the definition of use in commerce with respect to service marks." (Emphasis ours.)