Case Name: PETTY v. WILKINS
Court: Texas Courts of Civil Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1916-11-01
Citations: 190 S.W. 531
Docket Number: No. 1579
Parties: PETTY v. WILKINS.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 190
Pages: 531–534

Head Matter:
PETTY v. WILKINS.
(No. 1579.)
(Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Texarkana.
Nov. 1, 1916.
On Motion of Appellee for a Rehearing, Nov. 23, 1916.
Dissenting Opinion, Nov. 25, 1916.)
1. Boundaries <&wkey;36(5) — Evidence — Surveys — Report to Commissioners’ Court.
It was error to admit against plaintiff’s objection as evidence of a boundary line a report to the commissioners’ court of a survey, where neither plaintiff nor any one under whom he claimed had anything whatever to do with the report, since his rights could not be affected thereby.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Boundaries, Cent. Dig. §§ 171-176; Dec. Dig. &wkey;36(5).]
2. Boundaries <&wkey;40(l) — Evidence—Question for Jury.
Evidence held to make location of boundary line a question for the jury.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Boundaries, Cent. Dig. §§ 196-203; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;40(l).]
3. Frauds, Statute of <§=^103(2) — Contracts for ¡Sale of Land — Option—“Accepted in Writing.”
An instrument, leasing land for one year and also giving exclusive option to lessee during the year, although signed by both parties, was not an option accepted in writing, and hence was not enforceable in equity, although within the year the lessee undertook to act on the option, since what the lessee accepted by signing the instrument was not lessor’s offer to sell him the land, but lessor’s agreement that he should have the exclusive privilege during the year to purchase it if he should so desire.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Frauds, Statute of, Cent. Dig. § 195; Dec. Dig. <@=»103(2).]
On Motion of Appellee for Rehearing.
4. Specific Performance <&wkey;97(l) — Performance by Pbaintiff — Option—Tender of Payment.
Where the title of the giver of an option on land was defective as to part, the option holder was not entitled to specific performance of the option as to the part to which title was good, where he merely expressed a willingness to buy that part and pay therefor a' sum estimated to be its pro rata value, and did not either pay or tender its proportionate value, at the price of the entire tract.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Specific Performance, Cent. Dig. §§ 286-290, 294, 295; Dee. Dig. <&wkey;>97(l)J
5. Deeds <&wkey;38(l) — Description — Uncertainty.
A deed, although describing land uncertainly, was not'void for uncertainty, where it also recited that the place was “known as the place built on by Thos. Davis and lastly occupied by G. N. Breckenridge,” since from such description the land might be identified by extrinsic evidence.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Deeds, Cent. Dig. § 65; Dec. Dig. &wkey;38(l).]
Hodges, J., dissenting in part.
Appeal from District Court, Franklin County; H. F.- O’Neal, Special Judge.
Action by S. A. Petty against J. M. Wilkins, in which defendant brought cross-action. From judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.
Reversed and remanded for new trial.
For a valuable consideration to be paid to him, appellant, by an instrument dated January 3, 1911, leased certain land situated in the town of Mt. Vernon to appellee for a period of one year from that date, for use by appellee as a site for an electric light plant, and by the same instrument agreed to sell the land to appellee for $400 if the latter should desire to purchase it during the term of the lease. Before the expiration of the lease appellee, having satisfied himself that other parties than appellant owned part of the land, purchased such part of them, ^nd then demanded of appellant a conveyance of tlie part he owned, offering to pay him' therefor a sum representing its ’ value at the rate of $400 for the entire tract. Instead of complying with this demand, appellant commenced and prosecuted this suit against appellee to try the title to the tract he had leased to appellee. Appellee by a cross-action sought, as to the part of the tract owned by appellant, to enforce a specific performance of his contract to convey. The trial resulted in a judgment, in conformity to the verdict of a jury, in appellee’s favor on the issue of title as to part of the tract, and in his favor for a specific performance by appellant as to parts thereof found to belong to appellant'. Much of the testimony •of witnesses offered for the purpose of identifying the land in controversy was with reference to maps and plats admitted as evidence, but omitted from the record sent to this court. As a consequence of this omission this court has been subjected to much greater labor than it otherwise would have been in the effort to understand the testimony referred to, and besides, and what is more serious, feel that they have not understood all of it and may have misunderstood part of it. Where, as is the ease here, the rights of' parties to an appeal depend upon the location on the ground of corners and lines of surveys relied upon to identify tracts and parts of tracts of land they respectively claim, it is of the utmost importance to an understanding by an appellate court of the testimony of witnesses offered to prove the location of such corners and lines on the ground that maps and plats referred to by them and admitted as evidence should be included in the record on appeal, and the parties to the appeal should see to it that they are included.
R. T. Wilkinson and H. L. Wilkinson, both of Mt. Vernon, for appellant. S. D. Goswick, of Mineral Wells, L. E. Keeney, of Texar-kana, and R. E. Davenport, of Ghickasha, Okl., for appellee.

Opinion:
WILLSON, O. J.
(after stating the facts as above).
It appears from a deed in the record that L. Collins conveyed to W. H. C. Davenport blocks 10 and 11, in the S.E. corner of the Mt. Vernon :town tract, and a strip •of land 20 yards wide south of and adjoining said block 10 and extending east and west the length of its south boundary line. The rights •of the parties, it seems, depended upon the location on the ground of the south boundary line of the strip of land referred to, and the location of its said boundary line depended upon the location on the ground of the ¡south boundary line of said block 10, which was also the south boundary line of the town tract. Over appellant's objection the court permitted appellee to introduce as evidence a report made by Cowan and King to the commissioners' court of a survey of the town tract and of lots and blocks into which it had been subdivided, made by them at the instance of said court. This report and a plat which was attached to and formed a part of it, but which is not in the record, it seems showed the south boundary line of block 10 and the town tract to be 74 feet farther south than the distance called for in the field notes of the town tract, if respected by the surveyors, would have placed same. Appellant insists it was error to admit the report to the commissioners' court as evidence, and further insists that it was error for the trial court to instruct the jury, as he did, that the south boundary line of the Davenport land was located 20 yards south of said block 10, "as shown by the map or plat of said town by the survey made by Cowan and King." W,e think both contentions should be sustained. Neither appellant nor any one under whom he claimed had anything whatever to do with the survey and report thereof made at the instance of the commissioners' court, and his rights could not be affected by it. Therefore the report was inadmissible as evidence against him. It appeared from testimony that, in the survey made at the instance of the commissioners' court, Cowan and King located the south boundary line of the town tract and block 10 74 feet farther south than the-distance called for in the field notes of the town tract, in order to give lots and blocks shown by an old plat they used in making the survey to be subdivisions of the town tract the dimensions north and south given them on the plat. When and whose instance the old plat was made was not shown. In this condition of the testimony the trial court should have submitted to the jury for determination a question as to the location of the south boundary line of the Davenport land, instead of instructing them as a matter of law that it was 20 yards south of block 10 as located by the Cowan and King survey.
The court instructed the jury to find in appellee's favor as to a part of the land on his cross-action for a specific performance of appellant's contract to convey same. The objection urged to the instruction is that it was unauthorized by the testimony because it did not appear that appellee had in writing accepted the option given him in the contract. Under the holding in Patton v. Rucker, 29 Tex. 408, which, though ignored by the Court of Civil Appeals in Anderson v. Tinsley, 28 S. W. 121, it seems has never been overruled, the objection is believed to be a meritorious one. In the Rucker Case, followed by the Court of Civil Appeals in Foster v. Land Co., 2 Tex. Civ. App. 505, 22 S. W. 260, Daugherty v. Leewright, 174 S. W. 841, and other cases, the Supreme Court said:
"In order to their enforcement by the courts, the.sale of land must be evidenced by writing. When the writing relied on contains within itself all the particulars of a concluded contract, it is sufficient if it be signed by the party against whom it is sought to be enforced ; but if, instead of being evidence of a concluded agreement, whatever may be its form, it is really a mere proposal, such a writing is turned into an agreement, and can be enforced in equity by the other party only by bis acceptance of it in writing."
And see Ansley Realty Co. v. Pope, 105 Tex. 440, 151 S. W. 525; 1 Warvelle on Vendors, § 125 et seq.
Other assignments, not in effect disposed of by what has been said, and also appellee's cross-assignments, are overruled.
The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded for a new trial.
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