Case Name: Fulton versus Moore
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1855
Citations: 25 Pa. 468
Docket Number: 
Parties: Fulton versus Moore.
Judges: 
Reporter: Pennsylvania State Reports
Volume: 25
Pages: 468–480

Head Matter:
Fulton versus Moore.
Where a testator devised as follows: “ I will that my son Ephraim have the home place, where I now live, by paying the legatees their respective shares, also the clock as it stands; also a horse valued at $75; a good saddle and bridle ; also a good bed and bedding.” And in a subsequent part of the will provides “ as my son Ephraim has these moneys to make, he shall have a rear .sonable time allowed him without distressing or incurring costsand further, it is my will that should any of my heirs die without lawful heirs from their . body, their part shall return and be divided equally amongst the surviving heirs:” Ephraim entered and paid the legacies. Skid, that he took a fee simple, and not a fee tail in the land.
Where a person accepts a legacy bequeathed, it is an election to stand by the provisions of the will.
Where the legacy was received in mistake, it might be refunded, but not after long acquiescence, and to the injury of third persons whose rights have intervened.
Where the party is in possession of land, a release to him will convey a fee simple without words of inheritance.
If a married woman in consideration of a release of real estate to her, joins her husband in conveying to the releasor a different part of her real estate, without a separate acknowledgment, and she and her husband afterwards convey the released estate, by a deed accompanied with a separate acknowledgment, she and her heirs will be estopped in equity from taking advantage of the defect in the first conveyance. . _
_ A judicial sale is not within the statute of frauds and perjuries.
■ Where a man is executor of a will in whieh real estate is devised, and permits the devisee to remain in possession of it, and attests as a witness a conveyance of it by the devisee, he would be estopped from claiming it as his own.
Error to the Common Pleas of Washington county.
This was an ejectment brought by Thornton L. Moore and Dorcas his' wife against Abraham Fulton, to recover the one undivided third part of a tract of land in Carroll township, Washington county, containing one hundred and eighty acres.
The wife of the plaintiff below, Dorcas Cooper, now Moore, was the daughter of one of the legatees under the will of John Cooper, deceased, under whom both parties claim.
The will of John Cooper is dated 15th September, 1821, and registered 24th of December following. In that will he devised the land in dispute to his son Ephraim Cooper, which devise with the legacies were as follows:—
Item 2d. “ To his wife Macy Cooper, to hold the third of the movables or the value thereof, to have a horse to ride when she chooses, one cow, the room she chooses in the house, and the two black boys, with the third of the interest of his real estate. -
8d. “ To his son Jacob $1200, subject to what had been previously paid him, the rest to be made in yearly instalments that can be made without distressing for it.
4th. “ To his daughter Susannah (afterwards married to Campbell) he gives a horse valued at $50, saddle and bridle, cow, two good beds and bedding, and $500, to be paid after Jacob’s legacy.
5th reads as follows: — “ I will that my son Ephraim have the home-place where I now live, by paying the legatees their respective shares, also the clock as it stands, also a horse valued at $75, a good saddle and bridle, also a good bed and bedding.
6th. “ To Dorcas he gives a horse valued at $50, saddle and bridle, cow, two good beds and bedding, and $500, to be paid in one year after Susannah’s.
7th. “ To his son John he gives the McCracken Place and $200, a horse valued at $70, saddle and bridle, bed and bedding.
8th. “ To his daughter Eliza (afterwards wife of John J. Lynn) he gives a horse valued at $50, saddle and bridle, cow, and two good beds and bedding; also $500 to be paid when she comes of age.”
9th. The testator provides, “as my son Ephraim has these moneys to make, he shall have a reasonable time allowed him without distressing or incurring costs: and further, it is my will that should any of my heirs die without lawful heirs from their body, their part shall return and be divided equally amongst the surviving heirs.”
Under this will Ephraim took possession of the property, and paid the legacies charged upon the same.
He died in 1833, unmarried, and without issue, having executed his will, dated August 22, 1833, and registered 17th September, 1833.
By his will he devises the property in dispute to his sister Eliza Lynn, as follows, to wit: “It is my will, and I do hereby devise to my sister Eliza Cooper, and my mother Macy Cooper, all my real and personal estate of every kind and description, and all my rights and credits whatsoever (except as above bequeathed), to be by them held and enjoyed in equal shares until the death of my mother; and after the death of my mother it is my will that her share shall also go to Eliza Cooper my sister, absolutely and entirely.
“ This devise I consider will embrace the home-place on which I live, as I have paid out of my own earnings and industry the shares devised to the other heirs of my father in his will.”
He also bequeaths to his sister Dorcas five dollars, which was paid to her by the executor.
Mrs. Macy Cooper, the widow of John Cooper, survived Ephraim, but died before the institution of this suit.
Eliza Cooper having intermarried with John J. Lynn, she and her mother took possession of this property in pursuance of the will of Ephraim.
Ephraim, during his lifetime, had taken out letters of administration upon the estate of his deceased brother Jacob, who had died seised of a certain house and lot in Williamsport, in said county. Ephraim Cooper, as administrator, presented a petition to the Orphans’ Court, and thereupon obtained a decree for the sale of the said projterty, for the payment of the debts of the intestate. An order of Court was thereupon issued for the sale of the property upon the premises, on the second Monday of August, 1831. There was no return made to the order, but the property was sold, as appeai-s by an entry endorsed upon the terms of sale, to Manasseh Reeves, for $800. Manasseh Reeves died shortly after, and no conveyance is found of the property to Ephraim. Ephraim Cooper, however, was in possession of the property at his death, and devised the same by his will to his sister Eliza.
John J. Lynn, the husband of Eliza, took out letters of administration, de bonis non, upon the estate of Jacob, and accounted in his settlement for the sum of $800, as paid by Ephraim, to the estate, which amount went to the creditors of Jacob.
After the intermarriage of John J. Lynn and Eliza Cooper, Dorcas, the plaintiff below, laid claim under the will of her father John Cooper, to a portion of the estate of Ephraim, then in the possession of Macy Cooper the mother, and Eliza, by the will of Ephraim; whereupon an agreement was entered into between the parties, Dorcas Cooper, Macy Cooper, and John J. Lynn and wife, for the settlement of all difficulties and their mutual claims. This agreement, under seal, was dated the 5th day of October, 1837, by which agreement John J. Lynn and Eliza his wife agreed to convey, and did thereby convey to Dorcas Cooper the house and lot before mentioned in Williamsport, then in her possession, in fee simple, and Dorcas, in consideration of the premises, “ released, acquitted, discharged, and conveyed to the said John J. Lynn and Eliza his wife, in right of the said Eliza, all right, title, interest, claim, or demand she had to the real and personal estate of Ephraim Cooper, or to the real estate or personal estate of John Cooper, deceased, under his will, and by reason of the said Ephraim haying died without issuewhich agreement was entered of record in the recorder’s office of the county.
On the 19th of May, 1842, John J. Lynn and wife by deed conveyed the farm in dispute to James Nicholls, which was duly' recorded; and oji the 26th of July, 1842, James Nicholls and wife conveyed the same by deed to Henry Fulton, the present owner and real defendant in this ejectment, undér whom Abraham Fulton, the party in possession, held at the time of the commencement of this action.
The defendant below submitted the following points:—
1. That by the 5th item in the will of John Cooper, Ephraim took a fee simple in the home-place.
2. That the latter clause of the 9th item does not limit the estate of Ephraim, but has reference merely to the former clause of the same item, by which time is given to Ephraim for the payment of the legacies given to the other heirs, and contemplates the contingency of some of the legatees dying before that time should expire, and provides in that event that “their part” shall be divided equally among the other heirs.”
3. That Dorcas, the plaintiff, having accepted a legacy under the will of Ephraim, cannot now impeach it and deny the validity of the devis.e of the land in dispute contained in it.
4. That the indenture tripartite of the 5th of October, 1837, between Maey Cooper, Dorcas Cooper, and John J. Lynn and wife, conveys to Lynn and wife the légal title of Dorcas (if any she had) to, the land in dispute, and that the subsequent neglect or omission of Mrs. Lynn to acknowledge that deed does not affect the title conveyed by Dorcas.
5. That if Nicholls, or the defendant, purchased upon the faith of the legal title thus vested in Lynn and wife, without notice of any fraud upon the part of Dorcas, or want of adequate consideration paid her, the defendant cannot be affected by either.
6. That to affect the defendant by fraud or gross inadequacy of price, the plaintiff must bring home notice to both Nicholls and defendant. If either of them purchased without such notice, notice, to the. other will not affect the defendant.
Upon these points the Court below (Gtlmore, P. J.) charged the' jury a§ follows:—
“The will of John Cooper is'proved on the 24th of December, 1820. Both parties claim under this will. The testator left six children living at the time of his death, viz.: Jacob, John, Ephraim, Susannah, intermarried with Patrick Campbell, Dorcas (the female plaintiff), and Eliza, intermarried with John J. Lynn. The three first died after the testator, unmarried and without issue. The three last mentioned are still living: The 5th item in the will is as follows: — ‘ I will that my son Ephraim have the home-place where I now live, by paying the legatees their respective shares, also the clock as it stands, also a horse valued at seventy dollars, with a good saddle and bridle, likewise also a good bed and bedding.’ In the 3d item he gives to his son Jacob $1200, deducting therefrom what he has paid for him. In the 7th item he gives his son John the McCracken Place and two hundred dollars, also a horse, and other articles. To each of his daughters he gives $500, a horse valued at fifty dollars, and some other specified articles, and appoints a time for the payment. The ninth clause in the will is as follows: 41 will that, as my son Ephraim has these moneys to make, he shall have reasonable time allowed him without distressing or incurring costs, and further it is my will that, should any of my heirs die without lawful heirs from their body, their part shall return and be divided equally amongst the surviving heirs.’
“ It is contended by the defendant that the limitation in the above recited clause of the will is applicable alone to the personal and not the real estate. But we are of a different opinion, and instruct you that Ephraim took an estate tail only in the premises in dispute, and he dying unmarried and without issue, the estate descended in fee to his sisters, the brothers having died unmarried and without issue.
“ But it is said that the tripartite indenture, as it is called, of the 5th of October, 1837, between Macy Cooper (the widow), Dorcas Cooper, and John J. Lynn and wife, conveys to Lynn and wife the legal title of Dorcas. We are however of opinion, from a careful consideration of said deed, that the same is inchoate, that something was contemplated in the deed to be done towards the perfection of the consideration, which was not done, but left to be completed at some future time, which made the instrument an unexecuted contract — and this writing being the foundation in part of the title derived from Lynn and wife, all persons were charged with notice of the fact, that it did not purport the consideration to be given to Dorcas. The want then of the acknowledgment of Eliza Lynn, left Dorcas without any other title to the house and lot (which was the consideration of her conveyance of the premises) other than what she possessed by virtue of heir-ship to her brother Jacob, who, it is admitted, died seised of it. This, then, disposes of the first, second, and fourth points put by defendant.
“In answer to the third point, we say that the acceptance of the five dollars willed to the plaintiff, Dorcas, by the will of Ephraim, will not preclude her from denying the right of those claiming her land under the same will. If the acceptance of this trifle could be construed into what is called a disappointment of the will, she could in equity now be permitted to make restitution : 2 Mad. Ch. 42.
“ We answer the 5th and 6th points in the affirmative, and say the law is correctly stated therein, if the title of Lynn and wife had been what is called a legal title; but so far as it was derived from Dorcas it was not legal, and the purchasers of it were bound to take notice that the consideration was not perfected in the tripartite deed.” ,
The jury found for the plaintiffs.
Whereupon the defendant sued out this writ, and assigned the following errors:—
1. The Court erred in instructing the jury that, under the will of John Cooper,'Ephraim took only an estate tail, and that at his 'death without issue, the premises in dispute descended to his sisters in fee.
2. The Court erred also in charging the jury in the negative upon defendant’s second point submitted, to wit: that the 9th item in the will of John Cooper limited the estate of Ephraim, &c.
3. The Court erred in charging that the tripartite indenture between Macy Cooperj Dorcas Cooper, and John J. Lynn and wife, did not fully convey the legal estate of Dorcas (if any she had) in the premises to Lynn and wife.
4. The Court erred in the charge in stating that the want of acknowledgment of the tripartite deed by the wife of John J. Lynn, defeated the conveyance of the premises by Dorcas to Lynn and wife, and that such want of acknowledgment was notice to purchasers of want of consideration and fraud.
5. The Court also erred in charging in the negative upon defendant’s third point, to wit, that Dorcas having accepted a legacy under the will of Ephraim, could not afterwards impeach the validity of that will.
' 6. The Court also erred while affirming defendant’s two last points submitted in stating that the conveyance by Dorcas was not a legal conveyance, and that purchasers were by the deed itself notified of want of consideration and fraud. '
Ewing, Grow, and Murdoch, for plaintiff in error.

Opinion:
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Lowrie, J.
The plaintiffs below cannot succeed in this action, and this judgment must be reversed, if the estate granted to Ejphraim Cooper, by his father's will, is a fee simple. There are certainly expressions relating to a dying without issue that are quite sufficient to turn any estate into a fee tail if they apply to it, and these seem at first sight to he intended to apply to all the devises and bequests, and to a general dying without issue.
But a more careful examination of the whole will suggests a doubt whether the clause relied on applies to all the shares given in the will. The words " any of my heirs" are large enough for this, and therefore we must look at the devises and bequests, and see whether words of entailment will apply to them.
To Jabob he gives $1200 — to Susannah a horse, saddle, bridle, a cow, two beds, and $500 — to Dorcas the same; to Eliza the same; to John a farm, $200, horse, saddle, bridle, and bed; and to Ephraim the home-place, a clock, a horse, saddle, bridle, and bed, and charges upon him the payment of the legacies; and it would seem that the horses, &c., were to be purchased by him.
Now, it is plainly impossible to suppose, from a general provision for a dying without issue, that he was thinking of entailing, all alike with the land, these gifts of money and chattels that perish in the using, or of giving a mere life estate in them, with a quasi executory devise over; yet such would be the effect of giving the clause in question as general an application as the words would allow. We are obliged, therefore, to presume and seek for an intent to give it a special application.
As words of entailment it seems to be especially applicable to land. Did the testator intend to. limit its application to the shares of John and Ephraim, and to give them mere estates tail ? Then he was thinking of John and Ephrajm, and would naturally have named them, and not said "if any. of,my heirs." We can derive no aid from the word "heirs," for it is an ordinary inaccuracy, and means here, or may mean, devisees and legatees. We discover no intent to distinguish the titles granted to John and Ephraim from those granted to the others, and it is very difficult to suppose that he was entailing Ephraim's title, for which he was requiring him to pay so heavily. These charges upon it were sufficient to imply a fee simple, without the introductory clause, and without words of inheritance.
We must therefore study this clause in its immediate connexion. The testator treats of nine different subjects in nine distinct paragraphs, providing in the first for his debts, in the second for his wife, and allotting one to each of his. children to describe their several shares, and in' the ninth is the clause that demands interpretation. It is. as follows: " I will that as my son Ephraim has those moneys to raise, he shall have reasonable time allowed him without distressing or incurring costs; and further it is my will that, shopld any of my heirs die without lawful heirs from their body, their part shall return, and be divided equally amongst the surviving heirs."
On account of the difficulties already suggested, we feel constrained to limit the application of the clause inv question by the principal thought in the paragraph in which we find it. The testator was thinking of the difficulty Ephraim might have in paying the legacies, and was providing that he should have time to do it, and then it was natural to think that some of the legatees might die during this delay without issue, and be provides for this by giving their shares, or any unpaid balance of them to the survivors. The clause is therefore intended to provide for this special dying without issue, and therefore it relates only to the legacies; and this is the most general application that it can receive. It is a clause selected from a form book, somewhat altered and not well applied, and yet it is no worse than is very commonly found in wills drawn by unprofessional persons.
This conclusion renders it unnecessary to notice any of the other questions raised by the assignments of error.
Judgment reversed, and a new trial awarded. '