Case Name: STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Luana Hall HAIG, Defendant and Appellant; STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. EAGLE BOOK, INC., Defendant and Appellant; STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. EAGLE BOOK, INC., Defendant and Appellant; STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Arthur ADALID, Defendant and Appellant; STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Arthur ADALID, Defendant and Appellant
Court: Utah Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Utah
Decision Date: 1978-04-12
Citations: 578 P.2d 837
Docket Number: Nos. 15286, 15288, 15289, 15290 and 15291
Parties: STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Luana Hall HAIG, Defendant and Appellant. STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. EAGLE BOOK, INC., Defendant and Appellant. STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. EAGLE BOOK, INC., Defendant and Appellant. STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Arthur ADALID, Defendant and Appellant. STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Arthur ADALID, Defendant and Appellant.
Judges: CROCKETT and HALL, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Pacific Reporter 2d
Volume: 578
Pages: 837–847

Head Matter:
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Luana Hall HAIG, Defendant and Appellant. STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. EAGLE BOOK, INC., Defendant and Appellant. STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. EAGLE BOOK, INC., Defendant and Appellant. STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Arthur ADALID, Defendant and Appellant. STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Arthur ADALID, Defendant and Appellant.
Nos. 15286, 15288, 15289, 15290 and 15291.
Supreme Court of Utah.
April 12, 1978.
Steven R. McCaughey, Salt Lake City, for defendants and appellants.
Neil Ayervais, Arthur M. Schwartz, Denver, Colo., for Haig.
Robert B. Hansen, Atty. Gen., Theodore L. Cannon, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, Robert L. Newey, Weber County Atty., Ogden, for plaintiffs and respondents.

Opinion:
ELLETT, Chief Justice:
These five cases are consolidated and the question raised is the constitutionality of U.C.A.,1953, 76-10-1201, 1203 which, so far as material, read:
76-10-1201. . . .
(1) "Material" means anything printed or written or any picture, drawing, photograph, motion picture, or pictorial representation, or any statue or other figure, or any recording or transcription, or any mechanical, chemical, or electrical reproduction, or anything which is or may be used as a means of communication. Material includes undeveloped photographs, molds, printing plates, and other latent representational objects.
(2) "Performance" means any physical human bodily activity, whether engaged in alone or with other persons, including but not limited to singing, speaking, dancing, acting, simulating, or pantomiming.
(3) "Distribute" means to transfer possession of materials whether with or without consideration.
(4) "Knowingly" means an awareness, whether actual or constructive, of the character of material or of a perform--anee. A person has constructive knowledge if a reasonable inspection or observation under the circumstances would have disclosed the nature of the subject matter and if a failure to inspect or observe is either for the purpose of avoiding the disclosure or is criminally negligent.
(5) "Exhibit" means to show.
(6) "Nudity" means the showing of the human male or female genitals, pubic area, or buttocks, with less than an opaque covering, or the showing of a female breast with less than an opaque covering, or any portion thereof below the top of the nipple, or the depiction of covered male genitals in a discérnably turgid state.
(7) "Sexual conduct" means acts of masturbation, sexual intercourse, or any touching of a person's clothed or unclothed genitals, pubic area, buttocks, or, if the person is a female, breast, whether alone or between members of the same or opposite sex or between humans and animals in an act of apparent or actual sexual stimulation or gratification.
(8)"Sexual excitement" means a condition of human male or female genitals when in a state of sexual stimulation or arousal, or the sensual experiences of humans engaging in or witnessing sexual conduct or nudity.
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(12) "Contemporary community standards" means those current standards in the vicinage where an offense alleged under this act has occurred, is occurring, or will occur.
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76-10-1203 (1) Any material or performance is pornographic if:
(a) The average person, applying contemporary community standards, finds that, taken as a whole, it appeals to prurient interest in sex;
(b) It is patently offensive in the description or depiction of nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, sado-maso-chistic abuse, or excretion; and
(c) Taken as a whole it does not have serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.
(2) In prosecutions under this part, where circumstances of production, presentation, sale, dissemination, distribution, exhibition, or publicity indicate that the matter is being commercially exploited by the defendant for the sake of its prurient appeal, this evidence is probative with respect to the nature of the matter and can justify the conclusion that, in the context in which it is used, the matter has no serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
(3) Neither the prosecution nor the defense shall be required to introduce expert witness testimony as to whether the material or performance is or is not harmful to adults or minors or is or is not pornographic, or as to any element of the definition of pornographic, including contemporary community standards.
Further, in U.C.A.,1953, 76-10-1204, it is stated that:
(1) A person is guilty of distributing pornographic material when he knowingly:
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(c) Distributes or offers to distribute, exhibits or offers to exhibit, any pornographic material to others; or .
The information upon which the defendants were charged and convicted is in this language:
Said defendants did unlawfully distribute or offer to distribute, exhibit or offer to exhibit, to others, pornographic material, to-wit: a magazine entitled 'HOT BITCH MOTHERS, Volume 1, Number 4'.
The evidence was stipulated to and the cases tried to the court. Included in the stipulation were exhibits consisting of the magazine in question. In finding the defendant guilty as charged, the court stated in its memorandum decision the following:
The Court holds the Statute to be constitutional. The Court, by applying contemporary community standards, finds that the average person would find that Exhibit 'F' contains material which would, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex and the material is patently offensive in the depiction of nudity, sexual conduct and sexual excitement. The material does not have serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value. The magazine in evidence as plaintiff's Exhibit 'F' constitutes pornographic material within the meaning of the statute and is not entitled to constitutional protection.
The finding of the court is not questioned by the appellants except as to the constitutionality of the statute. We paid our respects to pornography in the case of Salt Lake City v. Piepenberg recently decided by this Court. We reaffirm our holding by finding that pictures and articles contained in the magazine in this case are offensive to the sensibilities of any decent person. Those who, by hook or crook, seek to find loopholes in the law so as to permit traffic in such filth have no place in our society and should be relegated to that class of depraved people who enjoy looking at and reading the disgusting material.
As to the constitutionality of the statute, the claim is made by the defendants that it is vague and overly broad. A criminal statute is overbroad when it, in a substantial way, prohibits lawful acts as well as unlawful acts. In the instant case, it is contended that the statute in question impinges upon the freedom of speech. Our Utah Constitution guarantees to all persons the inherent and inalienable right "to communicate freely their thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that right."
A statute is vague when it fails to inform persons of ordinary intelligence what their conduct must be in order for them to be guilty of a violation thereof.
Whether or not pornography is within the power of the Supreme Court of the United States is of no great importance to us here. That Court, in the case of Miller v. California laid down the requisite standards for determining whether an article or a picture is pornographic. It held:
(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest,
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Our statute clearly states that the article must appeal to prurient interests in sex (U.C.A.,1953, as amended, 76-10-1203(l)(a)); it specifically defines the prohibited conduct and sets it out in U.C.A.,1953, as amended, 76-10-1201(7) and 76-10-1203(l)(b); and states that in order for the matter to be pornographic, it must have "no serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value" (U.C.A.,1953, 76-10-1203(2)).
Our statute thus complies fully with the requirements set out by the high Court. It does not offend against any constitutional provision. It is a valid statute and those who so flagrantly flout it must pay the penalty for doing so. These defendants have 13 appeals before this Court this month alone that involve pornography convictions.
The judgment is affirmed and the cases are remanded to the district court for the purpose of carrying out the sentences heretofore imposed on each defendant. No costs are awarded.
CROCKETT and HALL, JJ., concur.
. Utah, 571 P.2d 1299 (1977).
. Constitution of Utah, Article I, sec. 1.
. State v. Packard, 122 Utah 369, 250 P.2d 561 (1952).
.413 U.S. 15, 24, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 2615, 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973).