Case Name: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Marcia KUNTZWILER, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1991-09-11
Citations: 585 So. 2d 1096
Docket Number: No. 90-0349
Parties: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Marcia KUNTZWILER, Appellee.
Judges: DELL and WARNER, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 585
Pages: 1096–1099

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Marcia KUNTZWILER, Appellee.
No. 90-0349.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Sept. 11, 1991.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and James J. Carney, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Donald R. Spadaro of Roderman and Spadaro, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appel-lee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
The State of Florida appeals from the trial court's suppression of evidence obtained as a result of a bus search. We reverse on the authority of Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991).
Two detectives from the Broward County Sheriff's Department approached appellee on a bus while stopped in a bus station. The detectives wore windbreakers identifying themselves as law enforcement agents, and identified themselves to appellee, making a point not to block the aisle. One detective explained to appellee that they were part of a drug interdiction program and that cooperation was strictly voluntary. The detective then asked appellee if they could search her bag. She agreed. Appel-lee pointed to her bag and the detective again informed her that cooperation was voluntary, she again agreed to the search. The other detective opened the bag and discovered a hard square object wrapped in red tape, later determined to be cocaine. Appellee testified that she had not heard the detective say that her cooperation was voluntary and that she believed she had no choice but to allow the search.
The trial court denied appellee's motion to suppress evidence based upon the alleged involuntary consent. The court specifically stated:
There was no coercion whatsoever here under the circumstances. I find — I reject the defendant's version of what transpired. I find that it is untrustworthy of belief and practically absurd, nonsequitur, and I do reject it.
I do find — I find credibility of the testimony of the officers in this case.... So first of all, on the issue of whether or not there was a consent to search, the Court finds it was free and it was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances, and I so find.
Appellee filed for rehearing based upon the Florida Supreme Court's interim decision in Bostick v. State, 554 So.2d 1153 (Fla.1989). The trial court reaffirmed its factual findings, stating that he believed the consent to have been voluntary, but acknowledged that he was bound by the supreme court's holding regarding bus searches and granted the motion.
In Florida v. Bostick, the United States Supreme Court rejected the Florida Supreme Court's decision as being a per se rule regarding bus searches and held:
[I]n order to determine whether a particular encounter constitutes a seizure, a court must consider all the circumstances surrounding the encounter to determine whether the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.
Bostick, 501 U.S. at -, 111 S.Ct. at 2389, 115 L.Ed.2d at 401-02.
The record reflects that the trial court applied the correct standard of law to his factual findings originally denying suppression. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's subsequent suppression order and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
DELL and WARNER, JJ., concur.
GLICKSTEIN, C.J., concurs specially with opinion.