Case Name: FELLENI et al. v. CINI
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1915-03
Citations: 152 N.Y.S. 695
Docket Number: 
Parties: FELLENI et al. v. CINI.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 152
Pages: 695–698

Head Matter:
(89 Misc. Rep. 468)
FELLENI et al. v. CINI.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Term, Second Department.
March, 1915.)
Coubts <£=>188—Municipal Courts—Final Order—Vacation—Terms.
Under Municipal Court Act (Laws 1902, c. 580) § 253, providing that, where a final order in a summary proceeding is made without the service of process, the court may upon motion open such default, vacate its final order, “and” set the proceeding down for trial, the court had power to entertain a tenant’s motion to vacate such a final order on the ground that the tenant was not served, without the tenant’s appearance generally and submission to its jurisdiction, so that, if such motion was granted the case might be set for .trial.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. §§ 412, 439, 440, 442 447, 448, 451, 452, 454, 458, 464, 465, 467, 468; Dec. Dig. <£=>188.]
Appeal from Municipal Court, Borough of Richmond, Second District.
Summary proceeding by Eugene Eelleni and another, as landlords, against Antonio Cini, as tenant, in which there was a final order awarding possession to the landlords. From an order denying the tenant’s motion to vacate the final order, the tenant appeals. Reversed, and matter remitted to the Municipal Court.
Argued before JAYCOX, ASPINALL, and KAPPER, JJ.
George P. Foulk, of New York City, for appellant.
Harry Hartman, of New York City, for respondents.

Opinion:
JAYCOX, J.
A summary proceeding, in which a final order awarding possession of the premises to the landlord was made. The tenant, by an attorney appearing specially, moves to vacate the final order, upon the ground that the tenant was not served. The motion was denied upon the ground that the court was without power to entertain the motion unless the tenant submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court, so that, in the event of such motion being granted, the court could set the case down for trial as mentioned in section 253 of the Municipal Court Act. Decisions have been made both ways; the earlier decisions holding that the court had power to entertain the motion and grant the relief prayed for without setting the case for trial, pleading, etc. The later cases hold the opposite, and the decision below is supported by those decisions. Although this procedure has recently been consistently followed, it has not escaped criticism, even at the hands of those who followed it. In Duly v. Herman, 84 Misc. Rep. 26, 145 N. Y. Supp. 900, it is said:
"It is certainly an anomalous proceeding that, where a defendant seeks relief from a judgment obtained without jurisdiction of his person, he can obtain this relief in the lower court only by submitting his person to the court's jurisdiction, and by having the case set for trial, yet, under the construction placed by this court on the Municipal Court Act, the Municipal Court can pass on a motion for such relief only upon such terms."
I can see no reason for perpetuating the anomaly. The act, in my estimation, does not require it. Section 253 of the Municipal Court Act is an enumeration of the powers of the court; but there is nothing in the section requiring the court to exercise all its powers in each instance. It is given power to set aside, vacate, or modify any judgment or final order, or order in any such action or proceeding, and it may stop there. It is also given the power to "set the action or proceeding down for pleading, hearing or trial, as the case may require." This power is in addition to the power to set aside, vacate, or modify, and the conjunctive "and" is correct. In some instances the power to set aside, vacate, or modify is all that is necessary to afford appropriate relief. In other instances, to afford appropriate relief, the court must set aside or vacate and set down for pleading or trial, as the case may require. If the conjunctive "and" so firmly binds one form of the lease to the other that one form cannot be granted without the other, what must the court do when it modifies the judgment? Must it still set the case for pleading or trial ? The question answers itself. But an affirmative answer is the logical result of the present interpretation of this section.
Construed as I have suggested, it is logical, and other anomalous results are avoided. If construed as it has been in the late cases, it produces this result: A tenant, moving, as the tenant moves herein, to set aside a final order on the ground of failure to serve the precept, submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court and has his motion heard on the merits. If the motion is granted, that is an adjudication that the process was not served; but he does not yet obtain any relief appropriate to the situation. He is now in a position where he may have decided again the very question which has just been decided, viz., whether process was served on him or not. He may, under section 248, raise the question of the jurisdiction of the court, and, if he is so fortunate as to have the question decided the same way as before, the petition will be dismissed. The statute provides, and the courts should hold, that the Municipal Court has power in the first instance to vacate a final order and dismiss a petition in summary proceedings, when it is satisfied that the precept was not served.
Order appealed from reversed, with costs, and the matter remitted to the Municipal Court for action, upon the ground that the Municipal Court has power to entertain this motion without the tenant appearing generally and submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Upon the determination of the motion, if it shall be decided that the Municipal Court has not jurisdiction because of failure to serve its process, it has power to afford complete relief by dismissing, the petition.
ASPINALL, J., concurs.