Case Name: TACOMA RY. & POWER CO. v. REMMEN
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1915-02-15
Citations: 220 F. 617
Docket Number: No. 2424
Parties: TACOMA RY. & POWER CO. v. REMMEN.
Judges: Before GILBERT/ ROSS, and MORROW, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: Federal Reporter
Volume: 220
Pages: 617–622

Head Matter:
TACOMA RY. & POWER CO. v. REMMEN.
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
February 15, 1915.)
No. 2424.
1. Stueict Railroads &wkey;>117 — Actions for Injuries — Questions for Jury.
In an action for injuries to a person struck by a street car, the testimony of two passengers and a person on the street that the motorman was looking back into the car as the car approached plaintiff made a question for the jury as to defendant’s negligence.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Street Railroads, Cent. Dig. §§ 239-257; Dec. Dig. &wkey;l!7.]
2. Street Railroads <&wkey;98 — Liability for Injuries — Contributory Negligence.
The law imposes upon one attempting to cross a street car track the duty of vigilance and care.
TEd. Note. — For other eases, see Street Railroads, Cent. Dig. §§ 2(Mr-208; Dec. Dig. &wkey;98.'J
3. Street Railroads &wkey;>117 — Actions for Injuries — Questions for Jury.
In an actilon for injuries to a person struck by a north-bound car on a single-track street railway, where there was evidence that a car was approaching from the north, that plaintiff had seen a light leading him to believe that the north-bound car had turned onto a switch, and that ho heard a whistle which he took to be a signal to it to stay on the switch for the south-bound car to pass, there was such a doubt as to his contributory negligence as justified the court in submitting that question to the jury, though he at no time looked towards the south for an approaching car.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Street Railroads, Cent. Dig. §§ 239-257; Dee. Dig. &wkey;117J
4. Street Railroads &wkey;>98 — Liability for Injuries — Contributory Negligence.
A person crossing street car tracks had a right to assume that the street car company would exercise ordinary care in managing its road and operating its cars, and his failure to anticipate negligence on its part was not necessarily negligence.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Street Railroads, Cent. Dig. ss 204-208; Dec. Dig. &wkey;98.]
5. Trial <&wkey;252 — Actions fob Injuries — Instructions—Conformity to Evidence.
In an action for injuries to a person struck by a north-bound car on a single-track street railway, where the evidence tended to show that he took no thought of a car coming from the south, but only of one approaching from the north, and that he assumed that two cars could not be running at the same time in' opposite directions, though he also testified that about the time he was on the track he saw a street car, and thought he could make it, and tried to jump, an instruction that if plaintiff thought he had time to cross the track before the ear wfould reach him, and did not have sufficient time so to do, it was an error in judgment on his part, and he could not recover, was properly refused; there being nothing to indicate that he made any mistake in judgment as to his time to cross ahead”of a north-bound car.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Trial, Cent. Dig. §§ 506, 596-612; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;252.]
Boss, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Southern Division of the Western District of Washington; Edward E. Cush-man, Judge.
Action by Elling Remmen against the Tacoma Railway & Power Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.
Affirmed.
' The Tacoma Bailway & Power Company, the defendant in the court below, owned and operated a street railway on Yakima avenue in the city of Tacoma. Between Fifty-Sixth and Sixty-Fifth streets the road was a single track. At the juncture of the avenue with each of those streets there was a switch. The plaintiff was walking south on Yakima avenue, on the west side thereof, on an evening in December when it was quite dark. He testified that when he crossed Sixty-First street he saw a light ahead of him and saw it swing to the left,' and that he judged it to be a north-bound ear going onto the switch at Sixty-Fifth street; that he went a little farther, and a car came along and passed him, going south; that a little after that he heard a blast of a whistle to the south, and took it to be a signal given by the car which had passed him to the car which stood on the switch at Sixty-Fifth street to direct the latter to remain there, because another car was coming south behind the signaling car; that when he heard the whistle he had gone about 150 feet from Sixty-First street; that he proceeded southward on the sidewalk until he reached a point about 300 feet south of Sixty-First street, where the sidewalk abruptly ended, being obstructed by a fence and an inclosure which extended across the sidewalk and about 12 feet into the street; that within the inclosure there were trees which, together with the fence, obstructed his view of the track south of that} point; that he started to walk across the street to the east side, then thought he heard a car.coming from the north, and that he kept on walking and looking north to see if he could see the headlight of a car, and that he thought he saw one, and other lights, but that he did not see anything so close to him as to involve danger, and to use his own words: “So I straightened up again, and about that time I was on the street car track, and as I glanced ahead I saw a very short distance from me a street car, and 1 thought I could make it, and 1 tried to jump at the same time she struck me.” The car which struck the plaintiff was coming from the south, and he testified that at no time from the time he went out into the street did he look to see whether a car was coming from that direction.
John A. Shackleford and E. D. Oaklay, both of Tacoma, Wash., for plaintiff in error.
J. E. Eitch, B. F. Jacobs, and J. M. Arntson, all of Tacoma, Wash., for defendant in error.
Before GILBERT/ ROSS, and MORROW, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
GILBERT, Circuit Judge
(after stating the facts as above). Error is assigned to the denial of the motion of the defendant for a directed verdict in its favor, which motión was based upon the grounds, first, that there was no proof of the defendant's negligence; and, second, that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. So far as the first ground of the motion is concerned, we find in the record ample evidence to go to the jury tending to show that the defendant was negligent. There was the testimony of two passengers upon the car which struck the plaintiff that at the time when the car was approaching the point where the plaintiff attempted to cross the track, a point well lighted up by an electric light near by, the motorman of the car which struck him was not looking ahead, but had turned and was looking into the car,1 and that he had continued so to look back into the car all the way from Sixty-Fourth street to the place of the accident, a distance of 650 feet. -Similar evidence was given by a witness who stood on the street opposite the point where the accident occurred.
A more serious question is whether or not the plaintiff was in law guilty of contributory negligence. The law imposes upon one who attempts to cross a street car track the duty of vigilance and care; and in this case the plaintiff, upon his own admission, crossed the track at a point which was not a usual crossing place and looked only in one direction for an approaching car. His action in so doing, his omission to look at any time to the south, would doubtless constitute contributory negligence in law, were it not for the fact that the defendant, by its management of its cars, gave him reason to believe that a car could not be approaching from the south. His own testimony, and the testimony of one of his witnesses, indicates that at the time when he crossed the track a car going south had left the switch at Fifty-Sixth street and was coming south toward the point where the plaintiff was. We think there is ground for saying that he had the right to assume that the defendant would not be running another car north on the same single track toward a head-on collision with the car which he saw. That circumstance was sufficient, we think, to create a doubt upon the question of the plaintiff's contributory negligence, and to justify the court in submitting it to the jury. That there was a car coming south from Fifty-Sixth street is not contradicted by the defendant, nor does the defendant show that the plaintiff incorrectly interpreted the blast of the whistle which he heard.
The plaintiff had the right to assume that the defendant would exercise ordinary care in managing its road and operating its cars. Kerr v. Boston Elevated Railway, 188 Mass. 434, 74 N. E. 669; Deitring v. St. Louis Transit Co., 109 Mo. App. 524, 85 S. W. 140; Frank J. Lennon Co. v. New York Ry. Co., 108 N. Y. Supp. 995. And his failure to anticipate negligence on the part of the defendant was not necessarily negligence on his part. New York Lubricating Oil Co. v. Pusey, 211 Fed. 622, 627, 129 C. C. A. 88; Strauchon v. Met. St. Ry. Co., 232 Mo. 587, 135 S. W. 14. And so, if the defendant threw the plaintiff off his guard or placed him in peril, the latter's conduct is not necessarily contributory negligence. In re Estate of Kern, 141 Iowa, 620, 118 N. W. 451; Tacoma Ry. & Power Co. v. Hays, 110 Fed. 496, 49 C. C. A. 115; Seattle Electric Co. v. Hovden, 190 Fed. 7, 111 C. C. A. 191.
In view of the foregoing consideration, it was not error to deny the instruction, requested by the defendant, that if the plaintiff failed to look and listen, or take any reasonable precaution to ascertain whether- a car was coming from the south, his failure to do so would be negligence, or the further requested instruction that, if the plaintiff thought he had time to cross the track before the car would reach him, and did not have sufficient time so to do,, then it was an error in judgment on his part, and he could not recover. There was, as we have seen, no evidence to indicate that the plaintiff made a mistake in judgment as to his time to cross ahead of a car approaching from the south, or that he exercised any judgment as to danger from that direction. The evidence is that he took no thought of a car coming from the south, but only of the car which was approaching in the opposite direction, and that he assumed that the defendant could not be running-two cars at the same time on a single track in opposite directions. Under all the circumstances, we think the court properly submitted to the jury the question of the plaintiff's contributory negligence. , ,
We find no error. The judgment is affirmed.