Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. Emile C. AGE
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1981-12-14
Citations: 417 So. 2d 1183
Docket Number: No. 81-KA-0577
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Emile C. AGE.
Judges: DENNIS, J., dissents with reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 417
Pages: 1183–1192

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. Emile C. AGE.
No. 81-KA-0577.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Dec. 14, 1981.
On Rehearing May 17, 1982.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Harry F. Con-nick, Dist. Atty., Louise Korns, Madeleine Slaughter, Cliff R. Strider, III, John Craft, Asst. Dist. Attys., for plaintiff-appellee.
Calvin Johnson and Dwight Doskey, Orleans Indigent Defender Program, New Orleans, for defendant-appellant.

Opinion:
LAWRENCE A. CHEHARDY, Justice Ad Hoc.
Defendant, Emile C. Age, was charged by bill of information with the crime of attempted armed robbery, in violation of La. R.S. 14:27; 14:64. On January 23, 1980, he was tried before a twelve-person jury which found him guilty as charged. Thereafter, the court sentenced him to serve ninety-nine years at hard labor as a double offender under La.R.S. 15:529.1. Defendant now appeals on the basis of three assignments of error, all of which are argued.
The record establishes the following set of facts:
On June 28, 1979, Officers Kelly and Marie responded to an attempted armed robbery broadcast on their car radio. The description of the assailants was transmitted as two black males, wearing white hats and dark clothing. As the two officers turned onto Loyola Avenue, they observed two black males wearing white hats walking behind a third black male. Since two of the men fit the description, the policemen stopped all three (one was a juvenile), identified themselves as police officers and frisked them for weapons. No weapons were found on any of the three subjects but a pocket knife was recovered from the side of a building where the juvenile had thrown it just prior to the officer's approach.
Upon contacting the officers at the scene of the alleged crime, the policemen learned that only two men were involved in the attempted robbery. After brief questioning, the third subject was released, while defendant and the juvenile were returned to the scene where they were positively identified by the victim as his assailants.
According to the victim, one William Peterson, he was approached by two black males as he walked down St. Charles Avenue. The defendant herein grabbed him around the neck in an arm lock position as he came up with a knife in the other hand. The victim struggled back, grabbing both arms of the defendant, and kicking at the juvenile who confronted him, also with a knife in hand. Peterson's assailants ordered the victim to turn over his money or they would kill him. At that moment a witness from a motel balcony hollered at the subjects, who became frightened and fled the scene.
Defendant by assignment of Error No. 1 argues that the trial court erred in refusing to allow defense counsel to question prospective jurors as to whether their previous jury had recommended the death penalty after finding a defendant guilty of first degree murder in a previous trial.
The voir dire occurred as follows:
"BY MR. JOHNSON: (addressing a prospective juror)
Q What type of case was it?
A It was first degree murder.
Q Was there a jury verdict?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was that verdict?
A It was guilty.
Q Guilty as charged?
A Yes, sir.
Q Was there a sentencing hearing?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was the sentence_
BY MS. SLAUGHTER:
Your Honor, the defense attorney has asked — the juror has said he was on a first degree murder case, and the verdict was guilty, and now, the defense attorney is asking the juror if there was a sentencing hearing, and he's going to ask him what was the result of the sentencing hearing. I don't think that's a proper question."
After this objection, there was a bench conference at which the judge sustained the objection and refused to allow defense counsel to ask questions on the sentencing trial. His reasons for the ruling were as follows:
"BY THE COURT:
Since the law says that the sentencing of a defendant is of no concern to the jury, except in a capital case, and this is not a capital case, the court will sustain the state's objection to the question."
Defendant alleges that knowledge on how a prospective juror voted in a sentencing trial is relevant to jury impartiality to ascertain prosecution bias. Defendant claims that a death recommendation is more indicative of possible partiality than a conviction, thus, necessary information to exercise peremptory challenges.
Voir dire examinations fall within the scope of La.C.Cr.P. art. 786 and La.Const. Art. 1, § 17 which gives defendant the "right to full voir dire examination of prospective jurors and to challenge jurors peremptorily." Although wide latitude must be given to a defendant in a voir dire examination so that he may intelligently exercise his right to peremptory challenges, State v. Monroe, 329 So.2d 193 (La.1976), this right is to be exercised within the discretion of the trial judge who determines the scope of the examination under the prevailing facts and circumstances. State v. Nicholas, 397 So.2d 1308 (La.1981).
This Court in State v. Holmes, 347 So.2d 221, 223 (La.1977), overruled prior jurisprudence and held that:
" [I]t is permissible for defendant to ask prospective jurors during voir dire questions such as: (1) Have you ever served on a criminal jury before? (2) What was the charge in that case? (3) What was the verdict in the case?, etc. 11
In the light of this decision even if this Court would find the judge's ruling unduly restrictive, the disallowance of a proper question is not ground for automatic reversal. In evaluating the fairness of the ruling the entire examination must be considered. State v. Vinet, 352 So.2d 684 (La.1977).
The restrictions herein do not deprive defendant of his right to full voir dire examination, especially considering that the restricted questions refer to a sentencing procedure not relevant to the trial at bar. Counsel's assumption that jurors who render a recommendation of death after a finding of guilt are more oriented to the prosecution than jurors who merely return a verdict of guilty in a noncapital case is a matter of speculation only.
We hold that assignment of Error No. 1 is without merit.
In assignment of Error No. 2 defendant alleges that the court erred in finding defendant to be a multiple offender on the basis of a waiver of rights form rather than a transcript of the plea colloquy on the prior plea. The defendant pleaded guilty to simple robbery, a violation of La.R.S. 14:65, on April 20, 1978, at which time he was sentenced to two years in Parish Prison. Two years later, on February 22, 1980, this guilty plea was used to enhance defendant's sentence for his conviction of attempted armed robbery in the present ease. At this hearing, the state introduced the bill of information, the minute entry, and the Boykinization form used to record the guilty plea in 1978, in support of its charge against defendant as a double offender. Defendant objects to the use of the Boykin form to prove that he knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his constitutional rights. He claims that the state must produce a contemporaneously-recorded transcript of the Boykin colloquy.
In Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), the Supreme Court emphasized three federal con stitutional rights which are waived by a guilty plea: the privilege against self-incrimination; the right to trial by jury; and the right to confront one's accusers. The court then announced its unwillingness to presume waiver of these important rights from a silent record. Louisiana's construction of the Boykin, supra, decision was made applicable to all guilty pleas taken after December 8, 1971, by this Court in State ex rel LeBlanc v. Henderson, 261 La. 532, 259 So.2d 557 (La.1972). The court went on to say in State v. Lewis, 367 So.2d 1155 (La.1979), that a conviction could not be used to enhance punishment in a multiple offender proceeding unless the record affirmatively discloses that the Jackson requirements were met. The Court in State v. Holden, 375 So.2d 1372, 1375-1376 (La.1979), further stated:
"In State ex rel. Jackson v. Henderson, 260 La. 90, 255 So.2d 85, we held that a plea of guilty would not be considered as knowingly made with awareness of its consequences unless, at the time of the plea, the accused was informed of and made a knowing waiver of his right to jury trial, his right to confront his accusers, and his privilege against self-incrimination. We did not at that time require that the judge himself conduct the interrogation or that a contemporaneous record be made of it; but we did point out that, unless these were done, an eviden-tiary hearing would be required if post-conviction attack was made on the guilty plea because the record did not affirmatively show these waivers.
" Upon objection by defense counsel that the guilty plea does not affirmatively show it was taken in compliance with Jackson and LeBlanc, the state will have the burden to show as to these convictions that the defendant waived his constitutional rights as required by the cited opinions of this court."
The minutes of defendant's guilty plea show that the trial court interrogated the defendant as to whether he understood his constitutional rights, the Court explaining same and the defendant answering in the affirmative. Although this entry does not specify that all three Boykin rights were explained to defendant and that defendant knowingly and intelligently waived those rights, it is this Court's opinion that the minute entry reflection of the court's explanation of defendant's constitutional rights, inquiry as to whether defendant understood these rights and defendant's answer in the affirmative, together with the well-executed waiver of rights form, satisfies the intent of Boykin, supra, LeBlanc, supra, and State ex rel. Jackson v. Henderson, 260 La. 90, 255 So.2d 85 (La.1971).
The waiver of rights form signed by defendant and his attorney on April 20, 1978, at the time defendant entered a plea of guilty, clearly sets forth the pertinent constitutional rights waived by a guilty plea. The waiver provided as follows:
"264-092 R.S. 14-65 Emile Age Jr.
11070100166
1.Right to trial and free appeal if convicted.
2. Waives right to trial and free appeal by entering plea of guilty.
3. By pleading guilty waives right against self incrimination.
4. Waives right to confront and cross-examine witnesses and call witnesses on defendant's behalf.
5. Waives right to object to any evidence offered by the State.
6. (If applicable, withdraw all motions previously filed.)
7. Waives right to object to the composition and the way the jury will be selected to try case.
8. Inform defendant of maximum sentence (Parole - 0 - 7 yrs Probation - Hard Labor)
9. Defendant has not been forced, threatened or coerced into entering plea of guilty and states he is voluntarily entering the plea of guilty because he is in fact guilty as charged.
/s/ Emile Age /a/ James Brodtmann
PILED 4-20-78
MINUTE CLERK 'G'
This Court in State v. Tucker, 405 So.2d 506 (La.1981), accepted the minute entry concerning the abbreviated colloquy along with a well-executed "waiver of rights" form signed by defendant, his attorney and the trial judge as constituting a sufficient affirmative showing in the record that defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his "three right" constitutional privileges. It is this Court's opinion that in the instant case the reasoning of the Tucker case applies and the court properly upheld the use of defendant's plea of guilty in the earlier conviction to enhance his attempted armed robbery charge.
This assignment of error is without merit.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in imposing an excessive sentence of ninety-nine years (the maximum possible) as a multiple offender under La.R.S. 15:529.1. Defendant's prior conviction for simple robbery (purse snatching) was used to enhance his sentence for a conviction of attempted armed robbery.
After establishing the fact that defendant had a prior conviction which allegedly could be used to sentence him as a double offender, the court began the sentencing procedure under the guidelines of La.C. Cr.P. art. 894.1. The judge elicited the defendant's age (nineteen), his birth date and place. He described the evidence as overwhelmingly in favor of guilty, and noted that defendant was ineligible for suspension of sentence and probation, given the nature of the offense and his status as a multiple offender. The judge felt that the defendant needed a custodial environment because there was an undue risk that the defendant would commit another crime. The aggravating circumstance mentioned by the judge was that the defendant claimed innocence despite the overwhelming evidence against him.
In State v. Guiden, 399 So.2d 194, 200 (La.1981), this Court emphasized that "[wjhile the trial judge need not articulate every aggravating and mitigating circumstance presented in La.C.Cr.P. Article 894.1, the record must reflect that he adequately considered these guidelines in particularizing the sentence to the defendant."
This Court is of the opinion that the trial judge adequately satisfied the sentencing procedures under the guidelines of La.C. Cr.P. art. 894.1. Assignment of Error No. 3 is without merit.
The conviction and sentence of defendant Emile C. Age is affirmed.
DENNIS, J., dissents with reasons.
CALOGERO, J., dissents for reasons assigned by DENNIS, J.
LEMMON, J., dissents in part and assigns reasons.
Judges Patrick M. Schott, Lawrence A. Chehar-dy and Denis A. Barry of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, participated in this decision as Associate Justices ad hoc, joined by Associate Justices Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., James L. Dennis, Jack Crozier Watson and Harry T. Lem-mon.