Case Name: OLIVIER v. CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1953-02-13
Citations: 65 So. 2d 71
Docket Number: 
Parties: OLIVIER v. CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG.
Judges: THOMAS, SEBRING and MATHEWS, JJ-, concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 65
Pages: 71–76

Head Matter:
OLIVIER v. CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG.
Supreme Court of Florida, en Banc.
Feb. 13, 1953.
On Rehearing April 14, 1953.
Charles J. Schuh & Sons and James T. Smith, St. Petersburg, for appellant.
Lewis T. Wray, Harry I. Young, Frank D. McDevitt and Adrian S. Bacon, St. Petersburg, for appellee.

Opinion:
DREW, Justice.
Roberta M. Olivier sued the City of St. Petersburg charging that ' because of its failure to maintain its streets in a safe condition, her child was killed. The amended complaint stated that "on the 7th day of September, 1951, the City of St. Peters-burg was given proper notice as required by the Charter of the City of St. Peters-burg, Florida, of the time and place of the accident and of the injury to plaintiff's son." The defendant city admitted it had received the notice which is set forth in the opinion and order of the lower court, infra, but'denied "that said notice was a proper notice, that it complied with applicable provisions of law and that it notified this defendant of the time and place of the accident of plaintiff's son.
Motion was duly made by the city for summary final judgment because of the failure to give proper notice and the lower court upon consideration thereof rendered an "opinion, order and final judgment" which, due to the full treatment of the subject, we quote in full:
"Opinion, Order and Final Judgment
"This cause coming on this day to be heard on defendant's motion for a summary final judgment,and after argument of counsel, it appears to the Court that:
"This is a suit for personal injuries to one Roger R. Vaughn, instituted by his mother, the plaintiff, Roberta M. Olivier. The complaint alleged the injury to Roger Vaughn occurred on the 20th day of July, 1951, at -34th Avenue North near 23rd Street North in the City of St. Petersburg.
"Chapter 18,896, Special Acts of 1937, provides: 'that no suit shall be instituted or maintained against the City of St. Petersburg, Florida, for damages arising out of any personal injury unless written notice of such claim or injury is within sixty (60) days from the date of receiving alleged injury, given to the City Manager of the City of St. Petersburg with specifications as to the time and place of said alleged injury.'
"The pleadings disclose that notice dated September. 7, 1951, was received by the City Manager of the- injury to Roger Vaughn. The notice .being as follows:
" 'September 7, 1951
" 'Hon. Ross Windom
City Manager
St. Petersburg, Florida. •
" 'Dear Sir:
" 'This is to advise you that we represent Roger Robert Vaughn, sometimes known as Calvin Robert Vaughn, who lives at 788-44th Avenue North, St. Petersburg.
" 'This young man was seriously injured when a motor scooter upon which he was riding, at approximately 9:40 P.M., July 20, 1951, was thrown from under .him by a defect in the street caused by-resurfacing of' the street.
" 'The said Roger Robert Vaughn,. by and through his legal guardian, will bring an action against the city for damages and injuries he received because of this city's negligence.
" 'Respectfully
(Signed) Maurice R. Schuh' Maurice R. Schuh
"The defendant by answer attacked the sufficiency of said notice as to the place of injury, and filed motion for summary judgment, attaching thereto affidavit by the City Manager of the notice received by the City of St. Petersburg as above set forth.
"While the notice complies fully with the statutes in regard to the time, it is completely silent in regard to the place of said accident.
"It is contended by the plaintiff that since the notice stated that the injury 'was caused by resurfacing of the street' this would be adequate for the city to have determined where the work was in progress on the date alleged. This argument, however, cannot stand in view of the fact that the defendant City of St. Petersburg is a large city and has many miles of street and is constantly repairing and resurfacing the various streets within its limits. The notice could not therefore be construed to be even substantial compliance with the provisions of the Statute, but in non-compliance with the requirements that specifications as to place be given.
"The plaintiff does not set up any facts or circumstances that would excuse the lack of specifications as to the place of said accident in said notice or that could be said to constitute a waiver of notice by the defendant city or any official of said city.
"It is therefore the opinion of this Court that the motion for summary judgment is well taken and should be granted and that final judgment be rendered by this Court in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff. It is so ordered.
"Now therefore,, it is ordered and adjudged that final judgment be and the same is hereby entered for the defendant and against the plaintiff and that plaintiff have and recover nothing by this suit."
Subsequent to the date of the appeal in this cause, two 'cases have been decided by this Court pertaining to the question presented. They are Town of Miami Springs v. Lasseter, Fla., 60 So.2d 774, and Aspey v. City of Hollywood, Fla., 60 So.2d 726.
In the case of Town of Miami Springs v, Lasseter, supra, we held that notice to an insurance adjuster for a company which carried the liability insurance for the city in the manner there described was not a substantial compliance with a charter provision calling for notice to the City Attorney. In the case of Della M. Aspey and Verne L. Aspey v. City of Hollywood, supra, our records show that within four days after the accident the husband of the injured party, knowing of the provision of the 'City Charter requiring notice to be given the City Attorney, went to the City Manager's office for the purpose of informing the city of the accident, and was there informed that a written report of the accident, with photographs and witness statements had been made and forwarded to the City Attorney (by the Police Department) and that plaintiff relied upon this as notice; that the City- Attorney actually received such notice and made a further investigation. We held that such was not a compliance with the Charter provision requiring that written notice be given the City Attorney. The reasoning in these cases is clearly applicable to the question presented on this appeal, and, therefore, on the authority of these cases, the judgment below is affirmed. . .
Affirmed.
THOMAS, SEBRING and MATHEWS, JJ-, concur.
HOBSON, C. J., and TERRELL and ROBERTS, JJ., dissent.