Case Name: In matter of Isaac Negus, junior, an absconding debtor
Court: New York Court for the Correction of Errors
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1832-12
Citations: 10 Wend. 34
Docket Number: 
Parties: In matter of Isaac Negus, junior, an absconding debtor.
Judges: 
Reporter: Wendell's Reports
Volume: 10
Pages: 34–49

Head Matter:
In matter of Isaac Negus, junior, an absconding debtor.
ALBANY,
Dec. 1832.
A writ of error does not lie upon the refusal of the supreme court to set 'aside the decision of trustees under the statute relative to abscondiug debtors, upon an allegation of error in the adjustment of the demands due the creditors of the absconding debtor.
Negus having applied to the supreme court to set aside the decision of the trustees appointed in the matter of the proceeding against him, in respect to the amount awarded by the trustees to the attaching creditor, and the court after hearing the parties, having denied his application, see 7 Wendell, 499, fyc., sued out a writ of error to remove the proceedings into the court for the correction of errors. The writ was returned and filed on the 14th April, 1832; accompanying the writ was a schedule containing the affidavits and documents presented to the supreme court at the time of the application, but the rule or order of the court denying the motion was not returned. On the 23d April the attorney for Negus, without observing the omission, filed an assignment of errors, and on the next day the attorney for the creditor filed a joinder in error. The attorney for Negus now asked permission to withdraw the assignment and to issue a certiorari to bring up the rule or order of the supreme court, which had been omitted to be returned. At the same time a cross motion was made by the attorney for the creditor, that the writ of error be quashed or dismissed upon the ground that no writ of error will lie upon the matters contained in the return. The motions were brought on upon notices duly given.
I. L. Wendell asked leave to withdraw the assignment of errors, &c.
A. Taber & B. F. Butler
moved that the writ of error be quashed. They insisted that the determination of the supreme court upon the appeal from the decision of the trustees was not the subject of review by this court; that it is a well settled principle, that when a court of record acts in a summa ry manner, or in a new course different from the common law, a writ of error does not lie. 1 Salk. 263. 1 Ld. Raym. 213,252,454. Carth. 494. Comyn, 80. They contended that the determination of the supreme court in this case was in the nature of an interlocutoiy order; that no judgment had been rendered by that court, and no record made of the proceedings there; that at most, the determination complained of was a rule or order of the court, which, until enrolled, could not be considered as a record, and could not be brought up by writ of error, 6 Taunt. 19, 9 Johns. R. 287; that decisions on summary applications cannot be thrown into the shape of a record and become the subject of review in any other court, 14 Johns. R. 76 ; that a writ of error will not lie for the refusal of a court to set aside an execution, although the motion involves the rights of the parties ; and where such a motion was made and denied, and a writ of error subsequently sued out, it was said by Chancellor Kent that the rule or order of the supreme court denying the motion was not a judgment within the meaning of the constitution or of the statute organizing the court for the correction of errors; it was only a decision upon a collateral or interlocutory point, and could not be distinguished from a variety of other special motions and orders made in the progress of a suit, and which he said had never been deemed the foundation of a writ of error. Brooks v. Hunt, 17 Johns. R. 486. At all events, a record should have been made up and filed in the court below. In the case of Yates v. The People, 6 Johns. R. 402, which was a writ of error «pon the refusal of the supreme court to allow a habeas ™rpus, a record was made up; and so also in the case Clason v. Shotwell, 12 Johns. R. 31, where re-restituh»11 was awarded by the supreme court in the case of an indictment for forcible entry and detainer, on affidavits without a return to a certiorari, the proceedings were red«ced to the form of a record. The rules of court and the statutes regulating proceedings upon writs of error uniformly contemplate a record to exist, directing a transcript of the record to be made, &c. 2 R. S. 598, § 42. id. 618, § 34. Again ; the plaintiff in error might have presented his case in the form of a record, had he sued out a certiorari to the trustees, which he might have done, 2 Caines, 181, 6 Wendell, 278, instead of applying to the supreme court direct on motion. They further insisted that where a new jurisdiction is created, not proceeding according to the course of the common law, or when powers are conferred upon a court of record authorizing proceedings summarily in a course different from the common law, a writ of error will not lie to review the determination had, unless a record is authorized to be made up or a writ of error expressly given; and where a writ of error is given in a particular case in such summary proceedings, the legal intendment is that it will not lie in any other case in respect to such proceedings ; and they argued that inasmuch as a writ of error was given by statute where an absconding debtor or his creditor presents a petition to procure the discharge of a warrant issued against such debtor, and a determination is had upon such petition in the supreme court, 2 R. S. 602, § 67, the presumption was that the legislature did not intend it should lie in any other, or provision would have been made on the subject.
I. L. Wendell, for plaintiff in error.
The writ of error ought not to be quashed. The determination of the supreme court, upon the application of the debtor to set aside the decision of the trustees, was & final determination upon the rights of the parties, and as such is as much the subject of review as the judgment of that court in an action pending therein. It is the privilege of a citizen in every case to appeal from the decision of any tribunal finally passing upon his rights to the court of the last rfawrt, and that whether the determination complained of as erroneot>= be a formal judgment or an adjudication in the nature of a judgment. In the case of Yates v. The People, 6 Johns. R. 337, &c. which vr^s a writ of error to the supreme court for refusing to allow a habea* corpus, this principle was fully settled. In that case Chief Justice Spencer goes into a full examination of the cases, and comes the conclusion that there is no rule existing at the common law that a writ of error will lie only in cases where the judgment is technically ideo consideratum esi; but whether it be so or not, he contended that the court for the correction of errors had a revisionary power over all errors happening in the supreme court. Alluding to the statute organizing the court for the correction of errors, he says : “ I do insist that whenever a decision takes place in the supreme court which is final, and of which a record can be made, and which shall decide the rights of property or personal liberty, the statute gives jurisdiction to this court.” Clinton, senator, in the same case says : “ A judgment is a decision of a court upon the case before it; and the last 01'final determination of a tribunal is the proper subject for a writ of error.” He also insists that this court is established by the constitution for the review and correction of all errors in the courts of probate and chancery and in the supreme court. In the case of Clason v. Shotwell, 12 Johns. R. 31, the same principle was fully recognized. Sanford, senator, who delivered the prevailing opinion, says that the jurisdiction of this court is derived from the constitution of the state, and the right of appealing to it is given by the constitution. He considers it immaterial whether the decision complained of be denominated a judgment, an order, an award, a decree, or a sentence ; that to entitle a party to his writ of error, it is enough that the proceedings have all the essential characteristics of a suit or action, and that the court have closed the litigation by a definitive decision between the parties; that a final determination having been made in the supreme court, the party aggrieved has a constitutional right to bring the cause to this court for review. He says, “ the question is not to be determined by technical definitions and verbal criticism, or by the terms and phrases in which judgments have been or may be expressed. The true inquiry is whether the judicial proceeding constitutes a cause by itself, and has received its final decision in the supreme court; if so, the case contemplated by the constitution exists, and the cause may be brought to this court for revision.” In this opinion, he was supported by Lewis, late chief justice, and by Van Buren, senator. In Brooks v. Hunt, cited on the other side, Ch. Kent, although in favor of quashing the writ of error in that cause, admitted that a writ of error did lie upon a final judgment or final determination of a cause. The exposition thus given of the jurisdiction of this court in these several cases appears to have been adopted by the legislature in their last revision of the statutes, by expressly ex tending the writ of error as well to final determinations as io judgments in civil cases. Thus they say, “ writs of error upon any final judgment or determination in all civil cases are writs of right,” &c. and writs of error shall be directed to the justices, commanding them to “ cause a transcript of the record of the judgment or final determination” to be brought, &c. 2 R. S. 591, § 1, and id. 598, § 40. That it was the intention of the legislature to adopt the exposition given in the cases above cited is manifest from a review of the provisions of the former statutes, in which the words final determination are not found. 1 R. L. 142, § 1. id. 133, § 7. The provision in the revised statutes, cited on the other side, allowing a writ of error by an absconding debtor or his creditor in. a particular case, does not operate against the plaintiff here ; on the contrary, it way well be urged in bis support, as his case is clearly within the equity of the statute; for if a writ of error be allowed in the one case, why should it be prohibited in another equally within the reason of the statute. The party was not bound to sue out a certiorari. The supreme court having obtained jurisdiction of the matter by the report of the officer issuing the attachment, the trustees were subject to the order of the court in relation to the execution of the powers and duties confided to them. 2 R. S. 13, § 68, and idem, 49, § 46. It was therefore optional with the party to adopt either remedy. As to the want of a record, in cases of summary proceedings of this kind, it is not usual to make up records, nor does the practice of the court require it. Be that, however, as it may, the writ of error ought not for that cause to be dismissed; if required, the court will allow a record to be made up and brought in.

Opinion:
The following opinions were delivered :
By the Chancellor.
The general rule is that a writ af-
errar will lie only on a final judgment or an award in the nature of a judgment given in a court of record, acting according to the course of the common law. There are a great variety of cases where error will not lie on adjudications affecting the rights of parties. In England it is still an open question whether a writ of error will lie on the refusal to grant a habeas torpus, although upon the decision made when the prisoner is brought up, it does lie. In the case of Yates v. The People, this court did hold that a party was entitled to a writ of error on the refusal to allow a habeas corpus. So a writ of error will not lie on the denial of a mandamus or prohibition, but upon the judgment rendered in such cases error lies, since the statute of Jinn, although previous thereto it could not be sued out. In England also, in the case of awards, which is in some measure an analogous proceeding, error will not lie ; nor will it lie on a refusal to set aside an annuity. In England, it is well settled that error does not lie when the court acts in a summary manner, or in a new course different from the common law. The revised statutes to which we have been referred, declaring writs of error to be writs of right as well upon a determination as upon a final judgment in all civil cases, 2 R. S. 591, § 1, probably refer to determinations upon awards and canal appraisements, in which a writ of error is provided by statute. In the present case a writ of error does not lie. Previous to the revised statutes, there was no appeal from the decision of trustees under the absconding debtor act. Now an appeal is given to the supreme court; but there is no intimation in the statute that the determination of that court should be subject to review, except in the case specified in the statute of a petition to discharge the warrant issued against the debtor, 2 R. S. 602, § 67, and a writ of error being given in that case, the legal inference is that it was not intended to be extended to any other. I am therefore of opinion that the writ of error ought to be dismissed.