Case Name: AMENIA & SHARON LAND COMPANY, a corporation, Respondent, v. MINNEAPOLIS, ST. PAUL & SAULT STE. MARIE RAILWAY COMPANY, a corporation, Appellant
Court: North Dakota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: North Dakota
Decision Date: 1922-06-09
Citations: 48 N.D. 1306
Docket Number: 
Parties: AMENIA & SHARON LAND COMPANY, a corporation, Respondent, v. MINNEAPOLIS, ST. PAUL & SAULT STE. MARIE RAILWAY COMPANY, a corporation, Appellant.
Judges: Bronson, J., concurs.
Reporter: North Dakota Reports
Volume: 48
Pages: 1306–1340

Head Matter:
AMENIA & SHARON LAND COMPANY, a corporation, Respondent, v. MINNEAPOLIS, ST. PAUL & SAULT STE. MARIE RAILWAY COMPANY, a corporation, Appellant.
(189 N. W. 343)
Negligence — automobile driver held negligent; automobile driver’s negligence not imputable to occupants; negligence of railroad in approaching crossing held for jury.
Five actions were brought and tried together to recover damages against defendant railroad company for alleged negligence resulting in a collision uplon a crossing, know as McCarty's crossing, four miles south of Detroit, Minnesota. Those injured in the collision were riding in a one-seated Buick roadster. As it was going over the crossing it was struck by an engine pulling a freight train. It is held:
1. For reasons stated in the opinions, the judgments in favor lof the driver of the ear and of the owner who entrusted it to his care, should be reversed.
2. For reasons stated, the judgments as to the remaining plaintiffs, who were passengers in the car, are affirmed.
Opinion filed June 9, 1922.
Rehearing denied July 18, 1922
Appeals from judgments of the District court of Cass county; Cole, J.
Reversed as to plaintiffs A. E. Cure and Amenia & Sharon Land Company; affirmed as to remaining plaintiffs.
Young, Conwy & Young, for appellant.
Outside of the limits of cities, villages, and towns, no rate of speed of a railroad train, however great, is evidence of negligence. Railroad Co. v. Grablin, 38 Neb. 90, 56 N. W. 796 and 57 N. W. 552; Railroad Co. v. Hansen (Neb.), 66 N. W. 1105.
But the failure of a railroad company to ring a bell or. sound a whistle when approaching a crossing is simply evidence which tends to prove negligence on the part of the railroad company.’ It does not necessarily-demand an inference of negligence. Railroad Co. v. Metcaff, 44 Neb. 848, 63 N. W. 51.
“This court had already held that running a passenger train at a rate of speed shown by the record to have been the speed being made by the.train in this case, not within any city limits, was not negligence.” Omaha & R. V. R. Co. v. Talbot, 48 Neb. 627, 67 N. W. 599; Jordan v. Osborne, et al., 133 N. W. 32; Liverett v. Nashville C. & K. Ry. 65 So. 55.
“It is for the legislature, not for the courts, to say that the defendant shall change its train schedule, and this is what holding the defendant negligent on the ground of excessive speed would amount to.” 145 N. W. 1088; State v. Philadelphia B. & W. R. Co., 87 Atl. 496 (Md.)
Where the speed of the train is great, care in giving warning of the approach of the train commensurate with the danger must be observed. Railroad Co. v. Goetz’s Adm’x. 79 Ky. 442, 42 Am. Rep. 227; Parkerson v. L. & N. R. Co., 80 S. W. 468.
This being in effect a country crossing, the statute applies.” Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Molloy’s Adm’x. 91 S. W. 687.
“When the company and its agents conform to such legislative directions they are within the protection of the law.” New York R. E. & W. R. Co. v. Reaman, 23 Atl. 692-3.
“Where the whistle on an engine is sounded when the train is from a quarter to half a mile from a country grade crossing, so that it can be heard there, and the track can be seen for a distance of about 400 feet at a point 800 feet from the crossing ,and 74 feet from the crossing it can be seen for 990 feet, it is not negligence to run a train at the rate o.f 50 miles an hour over such crossing.” Newhard v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 26 Atl. 105 (Pa.)
“The duty of an automobile driver approaching a crossing with view of track obstructed is to look and listen before going on the track, and as soon as seeing and hearing are reasonably possible; to keep a lookout from there on such as an ordinarily cautions person would but for some sufficient diversion of his attention; to have his machine under such control that on discovering a train he, acting as a person of ordinary skill and prudence, can stop in time; to determine, acting as a person of ordinary care, on discovering a train, whether he can safely pass or should wait — all this, regardless of the train running at excessive speed and without signal.” * * * “Driver of automobile struck at a dangerous crossing, with which he was familiar, by train approaching at excessive speed and without warning signal, held, guilty of contributory negligence,, as a matter of law, in not observing after passing structures obstructing his view, or not having machine under control, or in taking chance of crossing ahead of train.” Corbett v. Hines. Director General of Railroads, 180 N. W. 690.
The following cases deal specifically with about this situation and hold there was contributory negligence as a matter of law. Central R. R. v. Barnett (Ala.) 44 So. 392; Aurelius v. Ry. 49 N. E. 857; Schufelt v. Ry. Co. (Mich.), 55 N. W. 1013; Tucker v. Ry. Co. (Mich.), 80 N. W. 984; Jobe v. Memphis Ry. (Miss.), 15 So. 129; Kelsey v. Ry. Co. (Mo.), 30 S. W. 339; Cleveland Ry. Co. v. Elliott, 82 Ohio St. 340; Glum v. Harris, 37 Atl. 515; Dehoff v. Ry. Co., 78 Atl. 104; Schneider v. Ry. Co. (Wis.), 75 N. W. 169; B. & M. Ry. v. McGrath, 179 Eed. 323.
“Relative to contributory negligence, a passenger in an automobile struck by an engine at a crossing could not rely on the driver, but had to look for approaching of the engine.” Kirby v. Kansas City, K. V. & W. Ry. Co. (Kan.), 186 Pac. 746.
“Where a husband and wife, traveling together in a conveyance which the former is driving, are injured in a collision on a railroad crossing, the court cannot properly instruct that, if the wife relied on her husband to look and listen and to exercise reasonable care, she was relieved from so doing herself, since she was bound to the same degree of care as her husband.” Willfong v. Railway Co., 116 Iowa, 548, go N. W. 358.
“The rule that the driver’s negligence may not be imputed to the plaintiff should have no application to this case. Such rule is only applicable to cases where the relation of master and servant or principal and agent does not exist, or where the passenger is seated away from the driver by an enclosure, and is without opportunity to discover danger and to inform the driver of it. It is no less the duty of the passenger, where he has the opportunity to do so," than of the driver, to learn of danger, and avoid it if practicable.” Rebillard v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co., 216 Red. 505-6.
Fowler, Green & Wattam, for respondent.
Wigmore Ev. 664; 2 Elliot Ev. 969; Cinadar v. Detroit, G. H. & M. Co., 159 N. W., at p. 3x5 (Mich.); Kaufmann v. C. M. & St. P. Ry., Co., 159 N. W. 552 (Wis.) ; Zenner v. G. N. Ry. Co., 159 N. W. 1087 (Minn.) ; Cotton v. Ry. Co., 1.09 N. W. 835 (Minn.)
“Statutory precautions imposed upon railway companies for the protection of travelers at crossings do not furnish the only standard of care or caution, but are cumulative merely, and do not exclude a liability on the part of the railway company for failing to take such other and further precautions as may be reasonably necessary under all the surrounding circumstances.” Thompson on Negligence, Vol. 2, § 1555.
“The statutory provisions of the state regulating the ringing of the bell and blowing of the whistle on approaching a public crossing are not the sole measure of the duty of a railroad company to protect persons and property at public crossing. Nor do regulations embodied in ordinances passed by city councils under statutory authority, regulating the speed of trains and the giving of signals at public crossings within city limits, constitute the sole criteria of the care to be used by such corporations in the management of their trains. The common law obligation resting upon such corporations to use proper care in the operation of their trains to protect persons and property is noRdiminished by such statutory provisions or ordinances.” Coulter v. G. N. Ry. Co., 5 N. D. 568 (Quotation from syllabus); Wilson v. Ry. Co., 142 N. W. 59 (Iowa). See especially Yinyon v. C. & N. W. Ry. Co., 92 N. W. 40 (Iowa), and cases cited.
“Railroad men’are not entitled to more credit, as a matter of law, because of their knowledge and experience as such on the question as to the speed at which a railroad train was run,* in an action for damages for a personal injury by being run over by such a train, though the fact of their possessing such knowledge and experience might properly be considered by the jury in determining what weight should be given their testimony” Louisville & St. L. Consol. R. Co., v. Gobin, 52 111. App. 565.
“The rate of speed, though not regulated by law, may be considered with other facts tending to establish negligence.” Artz v. Railroad Co., 44 Iowa 285. •
While it is not necessarily negligent'to run a train at the usual rate, or at 40 miles an hour, it is negligent to maintain the usual rate of speed without observing the usual precautions and danger signals to warn the public of its approach.”
“While the general rule is that no rate of speed by a railroad train in the open country is negligence per se, it is not less true that a railroad company running its trains across streets and highways must operate them with due regard to the rights and safety of the public at points where these avenues of travel and commerce intersect * * * this duty is emphasized where the crossing is made in surroundings which obscure the view or are of such a character as to render the ordinary signals less noticeable or less effective.” Wilson v. C. M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 142 N. W. 54 (Iowa).
“Travelers may, within reasonable limit, act upon the assumption that due care will be exercised in the management of trains and giving of crossing signals.” Jenkins v. Minneapolis and St. L. R. Co., 145 N. W. 40 (Minn.)
“Automobilists approaching a crossing have a right, if the contrary does not appear, to assume that the railroad employees will give the customary warning and will not run at a speed in excess of that allowed by ordinance.” Barrett v. C. M. & St. Ry., Co., 175 N. W. 950 (Iowa); Edwards v. G. N. Ry. Co., 42 N. D. 154; Wilson v. C. M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 142, N. W. 59 (Iowa); Pendroy v. G. N. Ry. Co., 17 N. D. 433. See also Stone v. N. P. Ry. Co., 29-N. D. 480; Hauff v. S. D. Central Ry. Co., 147 N. W. 986 (S. D.) ; Wallenburg v. Ry. Co., 126 N. W. 289 ''Neb.); Green v. Ry. Co., 69 Pac. 694 (Calif.) See also Barrett v. Ry. Co., (Iowa) 175 N. W. 950.

Opinion:
Robinson, J.
At a point about 4 miles south from Detroit, Minn., the Soo Railway crosses a highway; it is known as McCarty's crossing. There on a pleasant summer afternoon of June 22d, at 4 p. m., a freight railway train of 22 cars, going north at a speed of 25 miles an hour, collided with the rear end of a Forty-Five Buick roadster going east on the highway at a speed of 20 miles an hour — 30 feet per second. The mobile was badly demolished. Mrs. Cure, a lady of 42 years, was killed, and each of her four children sustained injuries. Mr. Cure, the grandfather of the children, who had assumed the place of the father, was the driver of the Buick, and he escaped serious injury. The Buick had but one seat, sufficient for only two or three persons,. Mr. Cure sat on the driver's side, which was the left end of the short seat. One girl sat on his right, holding a baby on her lap. On her right the mother sat, holding on her lap another child, and the boy of 11 years stood on the running board, holding onto the wind shield. They were out on a family picnic, and were going to Detroit for supplies. For a considerable distance before reaching the.crossing the road was parallel to the railway track and at a distance of about 200 feet. Approaching the crossing the road made a gradual turn to the east. When the car was within 60 or 70 feet of the crossing it was seen by a brakeman. The boy was seen with a foot lifted as if about to jump from the car. The alarm was given. The engineer applied the emergency brakes. The boy called'to his grandpa, and the collision was immediate. The parties injured assert that the negligence of the railway company was the direct and proximate cause of the accident. The company assert that the proximate cause was the negligence of the plaintiffs. Of course it is possible for an accident to happen without the fault or neglect of either party. But, certain it is, the railway train had the right of way. It did not have to stop, or even slow up, at a country road crossing. It was under obligations to blow the whistle at a whistling post set a quarter of a mile from the crossing. It is certain the whistle was duly blown. The engineer testifies that at the post he did sound the whistle two longs and two shorts, and he pushed the button which set in motion a continuous ringing of the automatic bell. His testimony is well corroborated by two brakemen. The whistling and the ringing was in accordance with duty and confirmed habit. The affirmative testimony in support of it far outweighs the negative testimony against it. Trainmen are anxious to save life and to avoid accidents. That is shown by the heroic conduct of the engineer, Mr. •Haygarth, who risked his life in rushing forward and catching the little girl, who was hanging onto the pilot beam, and hanging onto her till the train stopped. In all probability there was not one of the train crew who would not have risked his own life to save any of the children. Though in the railway service, "a man's a man for a' that."
And now for the negligence of the plaintiffs, Mr. Cure was an expert driver and speeder. He had in hand a new Buick Forty-Five roadster. He knew well how to use it. He went onto the crossing at a speed of 20 miles an hour, 30 feet per second. In one-fourth of a second more of leeway he would have made the crossing, and made Detroit before the freight train. As it was, the engine barely struck the hind.end of the car, which was laden with six persons. The car was made for only two persons. By reason of the fact that Mr. Cure was cramped, the action fo his hands his feet, and his mind were impeded. So the chances are that he lost a quarter of a second. The boy on the running board saw the fast approaching train in time to jump off, but he concluded that his fast speeding car would make the crossing, and of course there was danger in jumping off. The plaintiffs were guilty of negligence in piling into and overcrowding the car and thereby hampering the driver and obstructing his vision and hearing. They were negligent in not bringing the car to a full stop or looking both ways before crossing the track. By law when two trains approach a railway crossing each train must stop so that one cannot run into the other. But no railway train is required to stop or even slow up at country highway crossings. Before attempting to cross a railway track it is the duty of every pedestrian and every person to stop or look out for the cars. If he fails he is guilty of negligence, and must suffer the consequences. In cases of this kind and in thousands of other cases the children may suffer, and must suffer, from the neglect of those who control them. The owners of the roadster must suffer from the negligence of the person to whom they intrusted their car.
And now for the verdict, so far as material:
Q. 5. Did defendant, in view of all the circumstances and surrounding facts, exercise due and reasonable care as far as blowing the whistle? A. No.
Q. 6. Did defendant exercise reasonable care so far as ringing the bell is concerned? A. No.
Q. 7. Did defendant exercise due and reasonable care in speed of the train. A, No.
Q. 8. Was such failure the proximate cause of the accident? A. Yes.
Q. 12. Did Mr. Cure exercise reasonable and ordinary care and diligence in the manner in which and the speed at which he approached and drove onto the crossing? A. Yes.
Q. 14. What damages, not exceeding $7,500, have the children of Mary Cure sustained by reason of the death of the mother? A. $7,500.
The verdict is clearly the result of sympathy, pity, and commiseration and of little regard for the rights of the big corporation. It is not sustained by the evidence. It is clear the engineer, did blow the whistle and ring the bell, and there was no lack of care in speeding the train. It is also clear that the proximate cause, the direct cause, of the injury was the failure of the plaintiffs to stop and listen and look both ways before driving onto the railway track. There was manifest negligence in speeding the car up to and onto the track at the rate of 20 miles an hour. The speed was such that the boy who stood on the running board and saw the fast approaching train was afraid to. jump off. He must have thought that the speed of his car would take him safely across, or that the speed was such that it would be more dangerous for him to jump off than to remain on the car. Had the roadster been driven at 10 or 12 miles an hour the boy would not have hesitated to jump off, and possibly Mr. Cure would not have hesitated to apply the brakes and stop his car. But going at a speed of 20 miles an hour there was more danger in trying to stop the car than in speeding across the track in front of the approaching train.
.It was error for the court to submit to the jury question 7, concerning reasonable care in the' speeding of the train.
It was error to submit question 5, concerning reasonable care in the blowing of the whistle. There was no real dispute concerning the whistling.
It was error to submit question 6, concerning reasonable care in the ringing of the bell. The question should have been, Was the bell rung continuously; and, if not, then did the failure to ring it cause the accident ? When a locomotive is about to start and when it moves at a slow speed through towns, the bell ringing is a matter of great importance, because it can be distinctly heard. But when a locomotive pulls 22 freight cars, 25 miles an hour, the loud, heavy, and continuous noise of the locomotive and the cars drown the sound of a bell. When a railway freight train moves at the usual speed, it is commonly heard at a distance of one-half a mile. It is heard by people in their homes, hotels and rooms, and beds, but the sound of a bell is never heard. The bell is heard only by those who are near to a slow moving train; hence it is certain that the accident was not caused by any failure to ring the bell. It was caused by recklessly running the Buick roadster onto the railway track in front of a fast moving train.
v The above was written as the opinion of the court. Mr. Justice Christianson concurs by a special opinion. The other three judges hold in part to the contrary. Hence the decision of the court is that the judgment be reversed as to the car driver, A. E. Cure, and the owner of the car, Amenia & Sharon Land Company, and that as to the other three plaintiffs it is affirmed.