Case Name: Lloyd J. RITTINER v. Mrs. Patricia S. SINCLAIR, widow of Jack A. Bornemann, wife of Lloyd J. Rittiner
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1978-11-02
Citations: 374 So. 2d 680
Docket Number: No. 9421
Parties: Lloyd J. RITTINER v. Mrs. Patricia S. SINCLAIR, widow of Jack A. Bornemann, wife of Lloyd J. Rittiner.
Judges: Before REDMANN, LEMMON and BEER, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 374
Pages: 680–685

Head Matter:
Lloyd J. RITTINER v. Mrs. Patricia S. SINCLAIR, widow of Jack A. Bornemann, wife of Lloyd J. Rittiner.
No. 9421.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
Nov. 2, 1978.
On Rehearing Feb. 8, 1979 and July 27, 1979.
A. D. Freeman, Satterlee, Mestayer & Freeman, New Orleans, for defendant.
Samuel C. Gainsburgh, Kierr, Gains-burgh, Benjamin, Fallon & Lewis, New Orleans, for plaintiff.
Rene R. Nicaud, New Orleans (with Robert E. Jeffers, Jr. and Edmund T. Wegener, Jr., New Orleans, on the brief), for the Notaries’ Ass’n of New Orleans, amicus curiae.
Leonard H. Rosenson, New Orleans (with Albert J. Flettrich, Joseph V. Bologna, Moise. Steeg, Jr., C. Allen Hennesy, Philip Dev. Claverie, Allain C. Andry, III, and Jerry D. Williamson, New Orleans, on the brief), amicus curiae.
Before REDMANN, LEMMON and BEER, JJ.

Opinion:
REDMANN, Judge.
An ex-wife appeals from a judgment of divorce only insofar as it found the spouses mutually "at fault" and therefore denied her alimony. The ex-husband by answer also complains of the judgment's declara tion that he too was at fault, as well as of its failure to decide the validity of a premarital contract against community property-
The principal question is what is the nature of fault sufficient to deprive a wife of alimony? We conclude, from Kendrick v. Kendrick, 1958, 236 La. 34, 106 So.2d 707, and from the statutory history of and the interpretation of La.C.C. 160 in Pearce v. Pearce, La.1977, 348 So.2d 75, and Fulmer v. Fulmer, La.1974, 301 So.2d 622, and from C.C. 141 (added by Acts 1976 No. 495), that the only fault which defeats a wife's entitlement to post-divorce alimony is fault which is sufficient to constitute grounds within C.C. 138 for separation in favor of the husband.
Because the wife's fault was not sufficient to constitute grounds for separation, we reverse the refusal to reserve her right to alimony.
The wife did drink a great quantity of alcohol, but the husband drank apace, and both husband and wife "held their liquor" well. Home consumption approximately equivalent to 300 fifths of liquor during a year (a large part of which was spent travelling away from home) may have seemed to the trial judge excessive, and "fault" on the part of both parties. However, it is not the quantity of alcohol but rather the extent and habitualness of intoxication that constitutes "habitual intemperance" within La.C.C. 138 and therefore "fault" within C.C. 160 which would defeat a wife's entitlement to alimony. This wife and husband habitually drank, but they were not habitually intemperate. Proof of intoxication on two or three occasions does not establish habitual intemperance; Broderick v. Broderick, 1939, 191 La. 492, 186 So. 5, 120 A.L.R. 1173. Moreover, the drinking of this husband and wife did not constitute even mutual fault because each party consented to, participated in and encouraged the other's drinking noon and night. A course of conduct approved and consented to by both spouses is not mutual fault; Davieson v. Trapp, 1953, 223 La. 776, 66 So.2d 804; Denbo v. Denbo, La.App. 1 Cir. 1977, 345 So.2d 1257.
Almost all of the specific instances of misbehavior (argumentativeness, punching plaintiff in his back) are both related to the drinking and, in any case, occurred so long ago (as long as nine years ago) as to be considered condoned.
The purported "last-straw" incident involved the husband's son who was redeemed from teen-age illiteracy and brought to responsible and productive adulthood at least in part by the efforts of the wife. It is anyone's guess why she later became intolerant of and intolerable to that stepson; but it is not cause for separation under La.C.C. 138 that one's spouse does not get along with one's child. Nor was there cause in the argument between the spouses that resulted from the mother-stepson dispute on the day of the separation. The record presents the picture of two spouses who (in addition to being heavy drinkers) were both achievers and both assertive, perhaps a little too much so for each other. They doubtless had personality conflicts but the wife did not give the husband cause for separation.
We therefore conclude that the wife was not guilty of fault that would defeat her entitlement to alimony.
We agree with the husband that his demand for a declaration of no community should have been adjudicated. The termination of a marriage by divorce (without prior judicial separation) ordinarily terminates the community, and therefore a petition either for partition of the community or for a declaration that no community existed is an appropriate adjunct to the demand for divorce.
Despite the trial judge's refusal to allow evidence fully on the question there is testimony by both husband and wife that they went to the notary's office separately and signed at different times the purported "act before a notary and two witnesses" required by C.C. 2328 for a matrimonial agreement. Thus they did not execute the required authentic act (see C.C. 2234). The act is therefore invalid for want of form; Flores v. Lemee, 1840, 16 La. 271; Placentia's Heirs v. Placencia, 1835, 8 La. 573; Union Savings & L. Assn. v. Grand Co., La.App. 4 Cir. 1970, 239 So.2d 395, writ refused 256 La. 916, 240 So.2d 375.
The judgment is reversed in its refusal to decide the validity of the contract against community and there is judgment decreeing the contract invalid; and the judgment is further reversed insofar as it held the ex-wife at fault and there is judgment declaring the ex-wife free of fault within C.C. 160, reserving her right to alimony. The ex-husband is to pay all costs.
BEER, J., concurs.
. See also Planiol, Civil Law Treatise La.Law Inst, trans. 1959) II § 147: "When it is a case of a 'solemn' act, such as a donation, or a contract of marriage, for which the authentic form is an essential condition, everything is null, the juridical act as well as the writing."