Case Name: THE STATE v. DAVIS et al.
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1995-03-17
Citations: 217 Ga. App. 225
Docket Number: A94A2670
Parties: THE STATE v. DAVIS et al.
Judges: Birdsong, P. J., and Andrews, J., concur. Beasley, C. J., and Smith, J., concur specially. McMurray, P. J., Johnson, Blackburn and Ruffin, JJ., dissent.
Reporter: Georgia Appeals Reports
Volume: 217
Pages: 225–232

Head Matter:
A94A2670.
THE STATE v. DAVIS et al.
(457 SE2d 194)

Opinion:
Pope, Presiding Judge.
Defendants Roy Bradley Davis and Terri Lynn Davis are charged by indictment with violations of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, manufacture of marijuana and possession of more than one ounce of marijuana. The State appeals from the trial court's grant of defendants' motion to suppress evidence discovered pursuant to the execution of a search warrant. The entire record in regard to the issues on appeal consists of the affidavit submitted in support of the application for issuance of the search warrant.
"In determining whether an affidavit sufficiently establishes the probable cause necessary for issuance of a warrant, we employ the totality of the circumstances analysis enunciated in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213 (103 SC 2317, 76 LE2d 527) (1983), and adopted by [the Georgia Supreme C]ourt in State v. Stephens, 252 Ga. 181 (311 SE2d 823) (1984). . . . Under that analysis, (t)he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. And the duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. (Cit.) Gary [v. State, 262 Ga. 573, 577 (422 SE2d 426) (1992)]." (Punctuation omitted.) Munson v. State, 211 Ga. App. 80, 81 (438 SE2d 123) (1993).
The affidavit in this case stated that the affiant was contacted by a concerned citizen, within the past 24 hours, who had been in defendant Roy Davis's residence within the previous week. The concerned citizen stated that while in Davis's residence he observed 30 to 35 growing marijuana plants. This concerned citizen also stated that he knew Davis and that Davis sold marijuana from the above residence. The concerned citizen advised the affiant that he knew what marijuana looked like and that what he saw in Davis's residence was marijuana. The affiant specifically stated that the concerned citizen is in good standing in the community and owns his own business. The affiant also described the concerned citizen as a Glynn County property owner who had nothing to gain by providing information about Davis. The concerned citizen provided the affiant with a description of Davis and the property in question, both of which the affiant determined to be correct. The affiant contacted the Glynn County Sheriff, who informed the affiant that the sheriff had received information, from a reliable source known to the sheriff, that Davis was selling marijuana out of his residence. The affiant also checked the Glynn County Police Department records wherein he found a file on Davis, which confirmed Davis's address.
In his dissent, Presiding Judge McMurray cites Eaton v. State, 210 Ga. App. 273, 275 (435 SE2d 756) (1993) in support of the conclusion that the unidentified informant in this case was no more than a mere anonymous tipster. Eaton, however, is distinguishable from the case before us in that the affiant in Eaton specifically testified at the motion to suppress hearing that he did not know the informant and that the sole basis for his characterization of the informant as a concerned citizen was what the informant had told the affiant on the phone. Id. Here no such testimony exists, and the language of the affidavit clearly demonstrates that the affiant in this case had a personal familiarity with the unidentified informant thereby justifying the affiant's description of said informant as a "concerned citizen." This personal familiarity is demonstrated by the fact the affiant specifically stated that the concerned citizen is in good standing in the community; owns his own business; and owns property in Glynn County. The affidavit does not indicate that such information was merely provided to the affiant by the unidentified informant and thus does not bring into question the accuracy of such information.
"This court has always given the concerned citizen informer a preferred status insofar as testing the credibility of his information. Furthermore, where, as here, other investigation supports the information of the informant, this can be considered as a part of the reliable basis for the finding of probable cause." (Citations omitted.) Whitten v. State, 174 Ga. App. 867, 868 (331 SE2d 912) (1985). Considered in its entirety, rather than piecemeal, the affidavit also provides corroboration of the information provided by the concerned citizen. This is evidenced by the affiant's statement that he not only verified Davis's address, but that he also contacted the Glynn County Sheriff's Department and was told by the sheriff that another concerned citizen, known to be reliable, had stated that Davis was selling marijuana out of his residence.
Consequently, given the informant's status as a concerned citizen, the magistrate correctly concluded that the information included in the affidavit, viewed as a whole, provided a sufficient basis for a finding that probable cause existed for the issuance of a warrant. This is especially true in light of the fact that "[a] grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts toward warrants, is inconsistent both with the desire to encourage use of the warrant process by police officers and with the recognition that once a warrant has been obtained, intrusion upon interests protected by the Fourth Amendment is less severe than otherwise may be the case. A deferential standard of review is appropriate to further the Fourth Amendment's strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant. . . . Although in a particular case it may not be easy to determine when an affidavit demonstrates the existence of probable cause, the resolution of doubtful or marginal cases in this area should be largely determined by the preference to be accorded to warrants." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Munson v. State, supra, 211 Ga. App. at 83; see Mincey v. State, 180 Ga. App. 898, 900 (350 SE2d 852) (1986); see also Futch v. State, 178 Ga. App. 115 (342 SE2d 493) (1986). Furthermore, "there exists a presumption of validity regarding an affidavit supporting a search warrant. [Cit.]" Williams v. State, 193 Ga. App. 677, 678 (388 SE2d 893) (1989). The challenger of a search warrant has the burden of proving its invalidity. OCGA § 17-5-30 (a); State v. Slaughter, 252 Ga. 435, 437 (315 SE2d 865) (1984). In this case, defendants did not meet their burden. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court improperly granted defendants' motion to suppress.
Judgment reversed.
Birdsong, P. J., and Andrews, J., concur. Beasley, C. J., and Smith, J., concur specially. McMurray, P. J., Johnson, Blackburn and Ruffin, JJ., dissent.