Case Name: W. A. MELTON v. M. M. RICKMAN
Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
Jurisdiction: North Carolina
Decision Date: 1945-12-17
Citations: 225 N.C. 700
Docket Number: 
Parties: W. A. MELTON v. M. M. RICKMAN.
Judges: DeviN, J., concurs in dissent.
Reporter: North Carolina Reports
Volume: 225
Pages: 700–708

Head Matter:
W. A. MELTON v. M. M. RICKMAN.
(Filed 17 December, 1945.)
1. False Imprisonment § 1—
A cause of action for false arrest or false imprisonment is based upon tbe deprivation- of one’s liberty without legal process. It may arise when the arrest or detention is without warrant, or the warrant charges no criminal offense, or the warrant is void, or the person arrested is not the person named in the warrant. All that must be shown is the deprivation of one’s liberty without legal process.
2. Malicious Prosecution § 1—
To sustain an action for malicious prosecution the plaintiff must show malice, want of probable cause, and the favorable termination of the former proceeding.
3. Process § 15—
One who uses legal process to compel a person to do some collateral act not within the scope of the process, or for the purpose of oppression or annoyance, is liable in damages in a common law action for abuse of process. It consists in the malicious misuse or misapplication of that process after issuance to accomplish some purpose not warranted or commanded by the writ. Evil purpose alone is not sufficient. The bad intent must finally culminate in the abuse.
4. Process § 16—
In an action ex delicto for damages for malicious abuse of process, where the complaint alleges that defendant had a check of plaintiff, who had no funds in the bank and the check was dishonored, whereupon defendant caused a warrant to issue and plaintiff to be arrested, charged with a violation of the bad check law, the issuance of the warrant being in furtherance of defendant’s plan to collect his debt by criminal process, and at the trial plaintiff pleaded guilty or was found guilty, and pending judgment plaintiff paid the check and costs, defendant surrendered the check and notified the magistrate that same was paid and judgment was entered discharging plaintiff on payment of costs, no cause of action is stated and demurrer ore terms here sustained.
Sea well, J., dissenting.
Devin, J., concurs in dissent.
Appeal by defendant from Gwyn, at May Term, 1945, of Eowak.
Civil action ex delicto for damages resulting from the abuse of criminal process, heard on motion to strike certain allegations in the complaint.
The motion first came on for hearing before the clerk who allowed the motion to strike certain paragraphs and denied it as to others. When the appeal came on to be heard in the court below “the plaintiff, through counsel, states in open Court that he elects to sue upon malicious abuse of process only.” Thereupon the judge overruled the clerk and denied the motion to strike in toto. The defendant excepted and appealed.
The plaintiff alleges in substance:
On 31 March, 1944, he borrowed from defendant $25 to be paid in two weeks plus 10 per cent. At the same time he executed and delivered to defendant a check for $25 to be held as evidence of the loan. Defendant knew plaintiff had no funds in or credit with the bank on which the check was drawn but used the check as evidence of the loan for the purpose of falsely representing the loan as a cash transaction so as to enable him to force collection thereof by criminal process if necessary.
Thereafter plaintiff negotiated additional small loans on the same terms and conditions, but by reason of payments made and the credits to which he is entitled for penalties for usurious charges the plaintiff, on 3 January, 1945, was not indebted to defendant in any amount. On said date, notwithstanding the plaintiff owed him nothing, defendant, for the sole purpose of collecting the loan of 31 March, 1944, maliciously, etc., caused plaintiff to be arrested charged with a violation of the bad check law on a warrant issued on the complaint of defendant; that the issuance of said warrant was in furtherance of the aforesaid plan and device of defendant to collect his alleged debt by criminal process.
It being made to appear that plaintiff at the time he gave the check had no funds in or credit with the bank -on which it was drawn and that upon presentation payment thereof was refused the justice of the peace found plaintiff guilty of the violation of Gr. S., 14-106.
The judgment was held open for one week. Plaintiff was unable to pay counsel and give bond in any amount so as to appeal from the judgment that might be pronounced and “although this plaintiff was not indebted to the defendant in any amount, as his only alternative to remaining in custody and in jail until the February Term, 1945,” of the Superior Court, he, before the expiration of the week, paid defendant the sum of $25 plus $6.40 accrued costs; that upon receipt thereof defendant surrendered the check and notified the magistrate his claim and costs had been paid; that thereupon the magistrate entered judgment as follows:
“After hearing the evidence in this case, it is adjudged that the defendant W. A. Melton tenders submission. It is further ordered and adjudged that the defendant W. A. Melton be discharged upon payment of costs, as check has now been paid.”
Plaintiff did not submit. Instead he pleaded not guilty and gave evidence of the true nature of the transaction and was found guilty by the magistrate.
The purpose of said arrest was to collect the alleged debt and humiliate and embarrass the plaintiff to such an extent that he would be forced and coerced to pay same; that said arrest was used to accomplish a purpose not contemplated by law and constitutes an unlawful, etc., abuse of process which in fact accomplished its unlawful purpose.
He then alleges damages and prays the recovery of both compensatory and punitive damages.
D. A. Bendleman for plaintiff, appellee.
B. Lee Wright for defendant, appellant.

Opinion:
Barnhill, J.
Upon tbe call of tbe case in this Court tbe defendant demurred ore tenus for that tbe complaint fails to state a cause of action for abuse of process. Decision thereon is determinative of this appeal.
At common law there were a number of related causes of action devised to afford a remedy against tbe wrongful invasion of tbe liberty of an individual through tbe processes of tbe courts.
A cause of action for false arrest or false imprisonment is based upon tbe deprivation of one's liberty without legal process. It may arise when tbe arrest or detention is without warrant, Allen v. Greenlee, 13 N. C., 370; S. v. DeHerrodora, 192 N. C., 749, 136 S. E., 6; Cook v. Hospital, 168 N. C., 250, 84 S. E., 352; Hoffman v. Hospital, 213 N. C., 669, 197 S. E., 161, or tbe warrant charges no criminal offense, Rhodes v. Collins, 198 N. C., 23, 150 S. E., 492, or tbe warrant is void, or tbe person arrested is not tbe person named in tbe warrant. 4 Am. Jur., 81, see. 132. All that must be shown is tbe deprivation of one's liberty without legal process.
To sustain an action for malicious prosecution tbe plaintiff must show malice, want of probable cause, and tbe favorable termination of tbe former proceeding. Miller v. Greenwood, 218 N. C., 146, 10 S. E. (2d), 708; Carpenter v. Hanes, 167 N. C., 551, 83 S. E., 577; Stancill v. Underwood, 188 N. C., 475, 124 S. E., 845; Wingate v. Causey, 196 N. C., 71, 144 S. E., 530; Mooney v. Mull, 216 N. C., 410, 5 S. E. (2d), 122, 125 A. L. R., 893; Rawls v. Bennett, 221 N. C., 127, 19 S. E. (2d), 126.
One who uses legal process to compel a person to do some collateral act not within the scope of tbe process or for tbe purpose of oppression or annoyance is liable in damages in a common law action for abuse of process. 1 Am. Jur., 176; R. R. v. Hardware Co., 143 N. C., 54; Ludwick v. Penny, 158 N. C., 104, 73 S. E., 228; Wright v. Harris, 160 N. C., 542, 76 S. E., 489; Griffin v. Baker, 192 N. C., 297, 134 S. E., 651; Klander v. West, 205 N. C., 524, 171 S. E., 782.
So then, while false imprisonment is tbe arrest and imprisonment without legal process and malicious prosecution is tbe prosecution with malice and without probable cause, abuse of process is tbe misuse of legal process for an ulterior purpose. It consists in tbe malicious misuse or misapplication of that process after issuance to accomplish some purpose not warranted or commanded by tbe writ. It is tbe malicious perversion of a legally issued process whereby a result not lawfully or properly obtainable under it is attempted to be secured. 1 Am. Jur., 176; Stanford v. Grocery Co., 143 N. C., 419; R. R. v. Hardware Co., 138 N. C., 175; Griffin v. Baker, supra; Abernethy v. Burns, 210 N. C., 636, 188 S. E., 97; Klander v. West, supra; Martin v. Motor Co., 201 N. C., 641, 161 S. E., 77; Ellis v. Wellons, 224 N. C., 269; Rock v. Abrashin, 65 A. L. R., 1280; Anno. 86 Am. St. Rep., 397.
Evil purpose alone is not sufficient. Tbe bad intent must finally culminate in tbe abuse, for it is only tbe latter wbicb is tbe gist of tbe action. Carpenter v. Hanes, supra. Nor can a cause of action arise out of tbe issuance of tbe process alone. Abernethy v. Burns, supra. There is no writ until it is issued. Hence there can be no abuse of a writ before its issuance. That wbicb does not exist cannot be abused.
"Regular and legitimate use of process, though with a bad intention, is not a malicious abuse of process." 1 Cooley, Torts (3rd), 354; Wright v. Harris, supra; Ludwick v. Penny, supra; R. R. v. Hardware Co., 143 N. C., 54; Jerome v. Shaw, 172 N. C., 862, 90 S. E., 764; Italian Star Line v. U. S. Shipping Bd. E. F. Corp., 53 F. (2d), 359, 80 A. L. R., 576, Anno. p. 580; Anno. 86 Am. St. Rep., 397.
When tbe allegations of tbe complaint are considered in tbe light of these principles of law, it becomes apparent that no cause of action for malicious abuse of process is stated.
Tbe alleged conduct of tbe defendant in bis business relations with plaintiff, if true, is not commendable. Even so, bis conduct prior to tbe issuance of tbe warrant does not give rise to a cause of action.
Defendant bad in bis possession a check of tbe plaintiff. Plaintiff bad no funds in bank and tbe check was dishonored. Defendant caused a warrant to be issued and plaintiff to be arrested, charged with a violation of tbe bad check law. Tbe issuance of said warrant was in furtherance of defendant's plan to collect bis debt by criminal process. At tbe trial tbe plaintiff pleaded guilty (as shown by tbe judgment) or tbe magistrate found him guilty (as alleged by plaintiff). Tbe pronouncement of judgment was held open for a week. In tbe interim plaintiff paid tbe cheek and costs. Defendant surrendered tbe check and notified tbe magistrate bis claim bad been paid. Tbe magistrate thereafter entered judgment discharging plaintiff on condition be pay tbe costs.
Where then is tbe allegation of any act on tbe part of tbe defendant wbicb constitutes tbe misuse of tbe process of tbe court ? Tbe magistrate did not pronounce judgment immediately, but this was not at tbe instance or on tbe request of tbe defendant. Was it to give plaintiff an opportunity to raise tbe money due tbe defendant ? It is not so alleged.
Defendant did not demaud bis money under threat of prosecution. He did not seek a judgment requiring plaintiff to pay. His one and only act after tbe issuance of tbe warrant, as alleged by plaintiff, was to accept bis money together with tbe cost as tendered by plaintiff, surrender tbe check, and notify tbe magistrate that be bad been paid. In this there was no perversion of tbe writ.
"Defendant's suit may bave been unlawful, and tbe allegations upon which it was based may have been false in fact, but he pursued the regular and usual procedure of the law." Wright v. Harris, supra.
Jackson v. Telegraph Co., 139 N. C., 347, is factually distinguishable. See Wright v. Harris, supra.
As the complaint fails to state a cause of action for abuse of process, the questions presented by the appeal need not be discussed.
Demurrer sustained.