Case Name: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Richard DUCHARME, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2004-08-20
Citations: 881 So. 2d 70
Docket Number: No. 5D03-3433
Parties: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Richard DUCHARME, Appellee.
Judges: PLEUS and PALMER, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 881
Pages: 70–78

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Richard DUCHARME, Appellee.
No. 5D03-3433.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Aug. 20, 2004.
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee and Douglas T. Squire, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
James B. Gibson, Public Defender and Nancy Ryan, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
ON MOTION TO VACATE STAY
Richard Ducharme has filed a motion to vacate an automatic stay which was entered by the trial court pursuant to rule 9.310(b)(2), Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. The stay was imposed upon an order entered by the trial court which dismissed the civil commitment petition which the State had filed against Duc-harme under the Jimmy Ryce Act, sections 394.910-394.931, Florida Statutes (2000). Concluding that the automatic stay provisions of rule 9.310(b)(2) are inapplicable to this case, we grant the motion. However, pursuant to our inherent authority to issue discretionary stays , we stay the effect of the trial court's dismissal order to allow the State the opportunity to seek a discretionary stay in the trial court pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.310(a).
The State sought Ducharme's civil commitment under the provision of Florida's Jimmy Ryce Act. After conducting adversary hearings, the trial court found that probable cause existed to believe that Duc-harme should be detained under the Act. Thereafter, Ducharme filed a motion to dismiss the case on the basis that his continued detention was improper since his sentence had expired several days before the date the State filed its commitment petition. The trial court denied the dismissal motion concluding that, under the Jimmy Ryce Act, the trial court possessed jurisdiction over the case since Ducharme had been in state custody when the petition was filed, even though he had been "wrongly" in custody. Soon thereafter, the Florida Supreme Court held in State v. Atkinson, 831 So.2d 172 (Fla.2002), that the Jimmy Ryce Act applies only to persons in lawful custody. Ducharme then renewed his dismissal motion citing to Atkinson. Upon review, the trial court granted the motion and directed Duc-harme's release. The State immediately filed its notice of appeal and invoked the stay provisions set forth in rule 9.310.
Ducharme challenges his continued detention arguing that the automatic stay provisions of rule 9.310(b) are not applicable to cases involving detention under the Jimmy Ryce Act. The State responds by arguing that the case of State v. Mitchell, 848 So.2d 1209 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003), supports its position that the automatic stay provisions of rule 9.310(b)(2) are applicable in this case. The State is correct that the majority in Mitchell held that the automatic stay provision of rule 9.310 applies to State appeals of orders dismissing commitment proceedings filed under the Jimmy Ryce Act. However, we find the reasoning of Judge Padovano's dissent in Mitchell to be more persuasive than the position adopted by the majority. In that dissent, Judge Padovano concluded "that confinement under the Jimmy Ryce Act must rest on something more substantial than the effect of a mechanical rule that goes into effect by the unilateral action of the State." Id. at 1212. We agree with Judge Padovano that rule 9.310(b)(2) was never intended to apply to matters involving involuntary civil commitments:
The original purpose of the rule was to enable the state to maintain the status quo while avoiding the unnecessary expense of providing a supersedeas bond. A litigant who obtains a money judgment against the state should have no fear that the judgment will be uncollectible if the state losés the appeal. The state will always be subject to the jurisdiction of the court and a bond is not required because the state is a solvent litigant. These considerations, which prompted the adoption of the automatic stay provision in rule 9.310(b)(2), are not even remotely applicable to an involuntary commitment proceeding.
Id. at 1213 (footnote omitted). Due to our disagreement with the majority opinion on this issue, we certify conflict with Mitchell. Also, we certify the following question to the Florida Supreme Court as being a matter of great public importance:
WHETHER THE AUTOMATIC STAY PROVISION SET FORTH IN RULE 9.310 OF THE FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE APPLIES TO CIVIL COMMITMENT PROCEEDINGS INSTITUTED UNDER THE JIMMY RYCE ACT.
Motion GRANTED; Discretionary stay ENTERED; Conflict CERTIFIED; Question CERTIFIED.
PLEUS and PALMER, JJ., concur.
SAWAYA, C.J., concurs in part, dissents in part, with opinion.
. Rule 9.310 provides in relevant part:
Rule 9.310 Stay Pending Review
[b](2) Public Bodies; Public officers.
The timely filing of a notice shall automatically operate as a stay pending review, except in criminal cases, when the State, any public officer in an official capacity, board, commission or other public body seeks review. .
Fla. R.App. P. 9.310.
. See Gilliam v. State, 268 So.2d 379 (Fla.1972).
. Rule 9.310(a) authorizes the trial court, in its discretion, to grant a stay of its order pending appeal "conditioned on the posting of a good and sufficient bond, other conditions, or both." On remand, the burden will then be where it belongs, on the State, as the party bringing the appeal, to establish that grounds exist warranting the imposition of a stay. If guch a motion is filed by the State, within 10 days, our discretionary stay shall remain in effect until the trial court rules on such motion.