Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. Jarvis Dale CHAPMAN
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1983-10-12
Citations: 438 So. 2d 1319
Docket Number: No. K83-432
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Jarvis Dale CHAPMAN.
Judges: Before DOMENGEAUX, FORET and YELVERTON, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 438
Pages: 1319–1328

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. Jarvis Dale CHAPMAN.
No. K83-432.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
Oct. 12, 1983.
Stewart Thomas, Jennings, Charles L. Bull, Jr., Welsh, for defendant-respondent.
W. Gregory Amette, Jr., Dist. Atty., W.J. Riley, III, Asst. Dist. Atty., Jennings, for plaintiff-relator.
Before DOMENGEAUX, FORET and YELVERTON, JJ.

Opinion:
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
FORET, Judge.
We granted this writ of certiorari upon application of the State of Louisiana, to review the trial court's granting a new trial upon motion of a jury-convicted defendant. The major issue involved is what role does the standard set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), play in a motion for new trial.
FACTS
On the evening of October 5, 1981, the defendant, Jarvis Dale Chapman, entered the rear portion of a religious revival tent located in the community of Topsy, Louisiana. This particular portion of the tent was concealed from the view of the congregation by means of a curtain. Once inside the tent, the defendant killed the Reverend W.O. Bowman with one shot from a .38 caliber derringer. After the firing of the shot, several members of the congregation went to the portion of the tent where the shooting had taken place and apprehended the defendant. He was later indicted by grand jury for second degree murder in violation of LSA-R.S. 14:30.1 on October 19, 1981.
At arraignment, defendant pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. A sanity commission was appointed, consisting of Dr. David B. Regan and Dr. Young Kang. After considering the report of the sanity commission, on January 18,1982, the court found that defendant was not competent to stand trial. He was then committed to the forensic unit of the East Feliciana Forensic Facility where he remained until the staff found him capable to stand trial, in July of 1982.
The only issue at trial was the sanity of the defendant at the time of commission of the crime. A unanimous jury of twelve felt' he was sane and found him guilty as charged. On July 23, 1982, defendant filed a motion for new trial and that motion was granted on March 11, 1983.
The State of Louisiana has taken writs to challenge the trial court's granting of defendant's motion and bases its argument on three assignments of error. We shall consider the first and third assignments first.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER 1
By this assignment, the State contends that the trial court granted defendant's mo tion for new trial without first holding a contradictory hearing as required by LSA-C.Cr.P. Article 852. This article provides:
"A motion for a new trial shall be in writing, shall state the grounds upon which it is based, and shall be tried contradictorily with the district attorney."
The Official Revision Comment, paragraph (b) provides, in pertinent part:
"... The district attorney can be fully protected by the court's granting of additional time to prepare to meet a surprise ground that is asserted by the defendant. ."
The record shows that on July 23, 1982, prior to sentencing, defendant filed a written motion for new trial and the grounds upon which it was based. Both sides were present in court when the motion was made and both were given an opportunity to present their arguments. At no time did the District Attorney move to present evidence in opposition to the motion nor did he request any additional time to present a defense, even though the trial court took the motion under advisement and did not rule on it until March 11, 1983, some eight months after the initial filing by defendant. Where the minutes reflect that a motion for a new trial has been heard and argued by both sides, and no request for additional time made, then the requirements of LSA-C.Cr.P. Article 852 are met. State v. Zeno, 322 So.2d 136 (La.1975). This assignment is without merit.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER 3
By this assignment, the State contends that the trial court committed error in granting the motion for new trial because the effect of this ruling would be to usurp the fact-finding power of the jury by substituting the judge's own opinion in place of the jury's. This assignment is without merit. There is no doubt that a trial judge, under LSA-C.Cr.P. Article 851(1) and (5), has the power to do exactly what he did. To accept the State's argument would be to effectively repeal these sections of the article.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER 2
By this assignment, the State contends that the trial judge committed error of law in not applying the Jackson standard in deciding whether to grant defendant's motion for new trial. Simply stated, the question under Jackson is whether any rational fact-finder, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could have found the essential elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The State feels that the error occurred because the trial court did not view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution.
Defendant's motion was based on the grounds that the verdict was contrary to the law and the evidence and that the ends of justice would be served by the granting of a new trial. LSA-C.Cr.P. Article 851(1) and (5) . Under Article 851(1), it is the duty of the trial judge to determine if the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict. State v. Daspit, 167 La. 53, 118 So. 690 (1928); State v. Rollins, 351 So.2d 470 (La.1977). Where a trial judge grants a motion for a new trial on the grounds that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the jury's guilty verdict, the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution prevents the defendant from being retried on the same charge. Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40, 101 S.Ct. 970, 67 L.Ed.2d 30 (1981). Because of the power granted to the trial judge under Article 851(1) and considering that power in light of the Hudson decision, this Court feels that the same principles should be applicable whether there is a motion for a new trial based on insufficiency of the evidence or a review of the case at the appellate level. State v. Hudson, 373 So.2d 1294 (La.1979), at 1297. We therefore hold the Jackson standard is applicable in a motion for new trial based on the grounds that there is insufficient evidence to support the conviction. State v. Brown, 421 So.2d 854 (La.1982), at 858 .
The rule set forth above applies equally in a case, such as the one at bar, where the issue is the sanity of the defendant. In Louisiana, an adult defendant is presumed to be sane, and if he wishes to rebut this presumption, he must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was insane at the time of the offense. LSA-R.S. 15:432; LSA-C.Cr.P. Article 652. Our holding here does not affect the defendant's burden. We simply mean that the test to be applied by a trial judge in deciding on a motion for a new trial based on insufficiency of the evidence where the issue is the sanity of the defendant, is whether "a rational fact finder, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could not have concluded that the defendant had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was insane at the time of the offense". See State v. Roy, supra, at 669 .
When, however, a motion for new trial is based not on insufficiency of evidence to support a conviction but rather on other grounds enumerated under Article 851, we agree with defendant's contention that the Jackson standard is not applicable. In other words, the Jackson standard is to be used by a trial court on a motion for a new trial only if the grounds are based on insufficient evidence to support a conviction under LSA-C.Cr.P. Article 851(1). This is not to imply that a judge is precluded from granting a new trial under Article 851(1) when he feels that although the evidence may be sufficient to support a conviction, in his opinion the verdict is still contrary to the law and evidence. In that case, the trial judge sits essentially as a thirteenth juror, much like he does when he grants a motion for new trial based on the grounds that the ends of justice would be served thereby under LSA-C.Cr.P. Article 851(5). See Justice Tate's concurrence in State v. Hudson, supra, at 1298. See also Hudson v. Louisiana, supra, 101 S.Ct., at 973, footnote 5. In the exercise of his discretion as a thirteenth juror under Article 851(1) or (5), a trial judge is given wide discretion and his decision will not be disturbed on review in the absence of clear abuse. Official Revision Comment, LSA-C.Cr.P. Article 851(d); State v. Rollins, supra, at 472.
In the case at bar, it is unclear from the record what standard or what reasons the trial court used in granting the motion for new trial. It appears that the judge may have felt that the evidence was insufficient to convict. He states:
"... The lay testimony and the expert testimony lead this Court to believe that Chapman was legally insane within the meaning of Louisiana law and the Court further believes that no rational trier of fact could conclude otherwise."
He did not indicate, however, if he viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution as required by Jackson, and indicated at the July 23 hearing that he had doubts as to whether Jackson was the correct standard to be applied.
The trial court also stated that:
"To avoid injustice, this court will grant defendant's motion."
Thus, the judge may have ruled on the motion in his capacity as a thirteenth juror under 851(1) or 851(5) and therefore the Jackson standard would not apply.
Therefore, because of our inability to determine exactly what standard and reasons the trial court applied, the case shall be remanded to the trial court for further clarification on whether the ruling was based on his finding the evidence insufficient to convict under 851(1) or in his capacity as a thirteenth juror under 851(1) or 851(5). If he acted as a thirteenth juror and simply disagreed with the jury verdict, then the defendant shall be retried. If he applied Jackson and found the evidence insufficient, then Hudson v. Louisiana, supra, prevents retrial and the defendant shall be acquitted. If he found the evidence insufficient but did not view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution as required by Jackson, then there was error of law and the motion must be reconsidered.
DECREE
We, therefore, remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
DOMENGEAUX, J., concurs in part and dissents in part and assigns reasons.
. Jackson v. Virginia, supra. This standard of appellate review has been adopted in Louisiana. State v. Claibon, 395 So,2d 770 (La.1981); State v. Roy, 395 So.2d 664 (La.1981).
. LSA-C.Cr.P. Article 851(1) and (5) provide that a motion for new trial shall be granted whenever,
"(1) The verdict is contrary to the law and the evidence;
(5) The court is of the opinion that the ends of justice would be served by the granting of a new trial, although the defendant may not be entitled to a new trial as a matter of strict legal right."
. Defendant's able brief seeks to differentiate between a motion for new trial and a review of a case on appeal and maintains that different standards should be applied for the two. He states:
"... Granting a reversal based on Jackson is a final resolution of the case that precludes further prosecution. Granting a motion for a new trial is not." (Defendant's brief, page 6.) According to Hudson v. Louisiana, supra,
this argument is simply incorrect when a trial judge grants the motion based on insufficiency of evidence; in that case, since the trial court acts essentially as an appellate court, we feel the standard used by the appellate courts should also govern the trial court.
. We note that whenever the trial judge determines that a rational fact finder could not have concluded that the defendant did not carry his burden, then the defendant must be acquitted, not retried. Any confusion on this issue which remained after the Roy decision is now cleared up by the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Hudson v. Louisiana, supra.