Case Name: Richard Alan NOAH, Appellant, v. Elizabeth Anne NOAH, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1985-04-10
Citations: 467 So. 2d 426
Docket Number: No. 84-1219
Parties: Richard Alan NOAH, Appellant, v. Elizabeth Anne NOAH, Appellee.
Judges: DELL, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 467
Pages: 426–429

Head Matter:
Richard Alan NOAH, Appellant, v. Elizabeth Anne NOAH, Appellee.
No. 84-1219.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
April 10, 1985.
Rehearing Denied May 10, 1985.
Richard W. Glenn, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Martin L. Haines, III, North Palm Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
LETTS, Judge.
In this appeal from a final judgment of dissolution, it is conceded that the wife received almost all of the joint assets. She was also awarded periodic permanent alimony. We reverse in part.
We cannot quarrel with the award of permanent periodic alimony in this case. The marriage lasted ten years, the wife was found to have been a "good wife" and though employed as a typist, she has major health problems. The husband is healthy and has a successful career as a financial analyst at the same major corporation. Accordingly, under Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197 (Fla.1980), this periodic award cannot be disturbed.
The equity in the joint assets of the parties totalled approximately $109,000.00. All of these were awarded to the wife except for an automobile valued at $3,300.00. We conclude this disproportionate distribution was an abuse of discretion under the facts of this case and the controlling law.
The five principle assets of value were: A Condominium having a $35,300.00 equity.
A House having a $61,000.00 equity. Furniture valued at $9,000.00.
Her automobile, equity $600.00.
His automobile, equity $3,300.00.
We see nothing wrong with awarding her the house, the furniture and the automobile used by her, but the award of the condominium as well went too far. The Supreme Court version of Tronconi v. Tronconi, 466 So.2d 203 (Fla.1985) recently announced, permits equitable distribution. The distribution here was most inequitable.
Reading the final judgment, we note that the stripping away of nearly all of the husband's assets was in part predicated on the husband's adulterous affair. We are not personally unsympathetic to this predicate, but we believe it is contrary to the teachings of our Supreme Court in Williamson v. Williamson, 367 So.2d 1016 (Fla.1979).
From our reading of Williamson, which case we concede is somewhat equivocal, it appears that adultery can be considered to reduce or obviate alimony to an adulterous spouse claiming it. We also conclude that adultery can be considered adversely to the unfaithful spouse not seeking alimony, if the adultery is introduced to cancel out similar conduct by the spouse who is seeking the alimony. In other words, even if the claiming spouse commits adultery, that should not be held against him or her if the non-claiming spouse has likewise sinned. However, our reading of Williamson does not support the theory that adultery by the non-claiming spouse, can be used to punish him and reward the faithful claiming spouse. As Williamson opines, the primary standards to be considered remain need (in the case of lump sum alimony "justification" rather than need: See Tronconi) and ability to pay. It is true that under Williamson, there is yet another occasion when adultery by the non-claiming spouse might serve "partially" as a basis for lopsided distribution in favor of the claiming spouse. We refer to the situation "where there is not enough property or income to permit either party to live alone comfortably." Id. at 1019, a circumstance not inapplicable to the case at bar. However, though the one without fault may be entitled to greater consideration, Williamson does not appear to go so far as to say that such fault would in effect cause the spouse without fault to receive distribution of virtually all the assets. To us, to do that smacks only of punishment which Williamson concludes to be improper.
Accordingly, we hold that the distribution here was inequitable and an abuse of discretion. We, therefore, reverse the award of the condominium to the wife and remand for the entry of an amended final judgment distributing the condominium to the husband, together with his right to sole possession thereof. In all other respects the judgment is affirmed.
In conclusion, while we are confident that our reversal is appropriate, we are not so confident of our interpretation of Williamson. Thus, out of deference to a most competent and intelligent trial judge and in the belief that the matter is of great public importance, we certify the following question to the Supreme Court:
DOES THE WILLIAMSON DECISION PERMIT A TRIAL JUDGE TO MAKE A DISTRIBUTION OF VIRTUALLY ALL THE ASSETS TO A FAITHFUL WIFE, IN PART BECAUSE HER HUSBAND HAS BEEN UNFAITHFUL?
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
DELL, J., concurs.
BARKETT, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with opinion.
. We note an exception to this rule where the adultery of the non-claiming spouse has required the expenditure of funds which has affected his ability to respond in alimony and support. See McCloskey v. McCloskey, 359 So.2d 494, 496 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).