Case Name: Melissa BROADWAY and Jerry Broadway v. KELLEY BROTHERS CONTRACTORS, INC.
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2000-06-08
Citations: 803 So. 2d 1155
Docket Number: No. 1998-CT-01195-SCT
Parties: Melissa BROADWAY and Jerry Broadway v. KELLEY BROTHERS CONTRACTORS, INC.
Judges: PRATHER, C.J., PITTMAN AND BANKS, P.JJ., McRAE AND WALLER, CONCUR. SMITH, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY COBB, J. DIAZ, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 803
Pages: 1155–1159

Head Matter:
Melissa BROADWAY and Jerry Broadway v. KELLEY BROTHERS CONTRACTORS, INC.
No. 1998-CT-01195-SCT.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
June 8, 2000.
Rehearing Denied June 28, 2000.
Rhett R. Russell, Tupelo, Attorney for Appellants.
J. Stephen Wright, Ridgeland, Douglas G. Mercier, Attorneys for Appellee.

Opinion:
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
MILLS, Justice, for the Court:
¶ 1. Morris Robinson was employed by Kelley Brothers Contractors, Inc. (Kelley Brothers). His position entitled him to the use of a company truck. On Sunday morning, October 27, 1996, Robinson was driving his company truck to Elam Baptist Church, located in Clarke County. On the way, his company truck collided with a passenger vehicle driven by Melissa Broadway. Broadway's three-year old son, Alex, was killed. Broadway filed a wrongful-death action in the Clarke County Circuit Court against Kelley Brothers alleging vicarious Lability on the part of the employer. This action was dismissed on motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Broadway v. Kelley Bros. Contractors, Inc., No.1998-CA-01195-COA (Miss. Ct.App. June 8, 1999). We grated certiorari, and we reverse and remand.
DISCUSSION
¶ 2. We have stated:
This Court conducts a de novo standard of review when considering a lower court's grant of summary judgment. Short v. Columbus Rubber & Gasket Co., 535 So.2d 61, 63 (Miss.1988). This entails reviewing all the evidentiary mat ters before it in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion has been made. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Berry, 669 So.2d 56, 70 (Miss.1996). If, in this view, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment should be affirmed; otherwise, it should be reversed. Short v. Columbus Rubber & Gasket Co., 535 So.2d at 63.
Levens v. Campbell, 733 So.2d 753, 757 (Miss.1999). With regard to an employer's vicarious liability for the acts of its employees, this Court has held
When an automobile or truck is involved in an accident while being driven by the owner's regular driver-employee, it is presumed that the driver is at the time engaged in the scope of his employment. The burden of rebutting this presumption, thereby avoiding liability for the driver's negligence, is upon the employer. This can be done by showing a deviation so substantial as to amount to an entire departure from the employer's business for purposes entirely personal to the servant. Tullier v. Capitol Constr. Co., 190 So.2d 880 (Miss.1966); Colotta v. Phillips, 226 Miss. 870, 85 So.2d 574 (1956). On the other hand, where an employer merely loans a vehicle to an employee and the employee uses it for his personal business or pleasure in which the employer has no interest, the employer is not liable for the negligent acts of the employee while thus using the borrowed vehicle. Lovett Motor Co. v. Walley, 217 Miss. 384, 64 So.2d 370 (1953); Brown v. Bond, 190 Miss. 774, 1 So.2d 794 (1941).
Riverside Industries of Philadelphia v. Watkins, 195 So.2d 844, 845 (Miss.1967). We have also applied and cited with approval the general rule found at 35 Am. Jur., p. 989.
The test of the employer's liability for the act of an employee who departs from the employer's business for purposes of his own is whether he was engaged in his employer's business at the time of the accident, and not whether he purposed to resume it. The employee is, so long as he is engaged in affairs of his own or in pursuing some purpose unrelated to his master's business, acting as much outside the scope of his employment as he would be were his working day ended, or his task completed, and thus his employer is relieved from liability for the consequence of any tortious conduct committed by the employee during that period, however short it may be.
Seedkem South, Inc. v. Lee, 391 So.2d 990, 995 (Miss.1980). In Travelers Indem. Co. v. Watkins, 209 So.2d 630, 634 (Miss.1968), we applied the minor deviation rule and found where the use made by an employee is within the time, geographic and purpose limitations of the permission it does not constitute a gross deviation. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Bonner, 467 So.2d 955, 956-57 (Miss.1985).
¶ 3. To negate vicarious liability, the burden is on the employer to prove that an employee has engaged in some purpose of his own in which the employer has no interest, and a jury must resolve the issue if the evidence leaves such a question in doubt. See Pennebaker v. Parker, 232 Miss. 725, 100 So.2d 363, 367 (1958).
¶ 4. The Court of Appeals affirmed after characterizing the evidence as follows:
As it stands today, we can not impose liability upon Kelley Brothers for the mere fact that one of its employees had considered inspecting a company work site after church service — the church service clearly being a personal pursuit. From a review of the record, at best, we can say that Robinson was "thinking about going on over to Toxey, Alabama" to look at the job site after the worship service.
The affidavits of the company president and the company dispatcher indicate that Robinson was not assigned to work at the Toxey, Alabama site on October 27. The record is unclear as to whether Robinson had the authority to go of his own volition. Robinson's affidavit indicates that he was not just "thinking" about going to the site but had, in fact, decided to go. Specifically, he states as follows in his affidavit:
On October 27, 1996, I decided to go to the Toxey, Alabama site that morning. My plan was to go to the job site, which was within the scope of my employment with Kelley Brothers. Because this day was Sunday, I intended to stop and go to church, which was on the way to the job site, before going on to Toxey.
¶ 5. Thus, his testimony is in substantial conflict with the evidence presented by the employer. Further, his statement differs considerably from the facts cited in the Court of Appeals opinion. This material factual dispute must be resolved by a jury, not the trial court or an appellate court. It is for a jury to decide whether Robinson had the authority to determine his own itinerary such that he was within the scope and course of his employment at the time of the accident.
¶ 6. For these reasons, we reverse the judgments of the Court of Appeals and the Clarke County Circuit Court, and we remand this case to the Clarke County Circuit Court for a trial.
¶ 7. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
PRATHER, C.J., PITTMAN AND BANKS, P.JJ., McRAE AND WALLER, CONCUR. SMITH, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY COBB, J. DIAZ, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.