Case Name: KOUNTZ'S APPEAL
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1878-11-25
Citations: 2 Walk. 458
Docket Number: No. 251
Parties: KOUNTZ’S APPEAL.
Judges: 
Reporter: Reports of cases decided by the supreme court of pennsylvania which have been omitted from the regular reports
Volume: 2
Pages: 458–464

Head Matter:
KOUNTZ’S APPEAL.
A Court of Equity has not jurisdiction to set aside a judgment obtained in a. Court of Law on the ground that it was obtained by perjury of a witness.
Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas No. 1, of Allegheny County. In Equity. No. 251 October and November Term, 1878.
This was a bill in equity by W. J. Kountz and W. B. Neal,, against the Pittsburg National Bank of Commerce, to obtain relief against an alleged inequitable judgment obtained in a suit at law against complainants, on the ground that the. said bank, plaintiff, had procured the said judgment against the said Kountz and Neal, by means of fraudulent concealment, collusion, and perjury. The bill alleged that since the said trial and judgment in the Court below, and since the affirmation of said judgment by the Supreme Court, the complainants had discovered evidence to prove that the testimony of one Patterson, the president of said bank, and the principal witness for the plaintiffs, upon which the jury relied in finding a verdict for the plaintiffs, was entirely false, and was known to be so by the bank, plaintiff, and that the bank, plaintiff, knowingly and designedly used the said false testimony in collusion with the said Patterson, for the purpose of imposing on the Court and jury, and of defrauding the said defendants. The bill prayed for an injunction to restrain respondents from enforcing the said jndgment bj^ execution, and for such other relief as may appear to be equitable and just. Counsel for the bank filed the following.demurrer:
1. That the matters set up as ground for relief were such as complainants could, and in fact did, avail themselves of as a defence to the suit at law.
2. That if the complainants were entitled to the relief prayed for, the same could have been granted upon a motion for a new trial, and in fact, as will appear by reference to the'record of said suit, such motion was made, and the same reasons substantially were assigned therefore, as relied upon in the bill for enjoining execution of defendants’ judgment, but upon argument thereof, and after due consideration, a new trial was refused.
3. Want oí equity in the bill.
.¿The Court below sustained the demurrer and dismissed the-bill in the following opinion per:
Stowe, P. J.
A bill for an injunction to stay proceedings upon a judgment regularly obtained by trial at law should distinctly aver such facts as give a Court of Chancery a right to interfere ; and this-brings us to consider under what circumstances equity will restrain a party from proceeding to obtain the fruits of a judgment thus obtained.
Chancellor Kent, in Foster vs. Wood, 6 Johns, Ch. 89, says: “Chancery will not relieve against a judgment law on the ground of its being contrary to equity, unless the defendant in judgment was ignorant of the fact in question pending the suit,, or it could not have been received as a defence ; or, unless he was prevented from availing himself of it by fraud or accident, or ■ the act of the opposite party, unmixed with any negligence on his-part.”
In Insurance Co. vs. Hodgson, 7 Cranch 332, Marshall, C. J., says: “Without attempting to draw any precise line to which Courts of Equity will advance, and which they cannot pass, in restraining parties from availing themselves of judgments, obtained at law, it may safely be said that any fact which clearly proves it to be against conscience to execute a judgment, and of which the injured party could not have availed himself in a Court of law, or of which he might have availed himself at law,, but was prevented by fraud or accident, unmixed with fault or negligence in himself or his agent, will justify an application to a Court of Chancery.”
See also Truly vs. Wanzer, 5 Howard 141; Emerson vs. Udall, 3 Ver. 447; Insurance Co. vs. Fields, 2 Story 59.
A judgment will not be enjoined on merely legal grounds, however, plainly it appears that complainant had a good legal defence which was not presented or considered, through the oversight of counsel, or the error of the judge, or a failure on his part to collect the evidence in due season and present it in a way to be available. The only remedy in such case is by motion for new trial.
The rule is inflexible as regards every point that was, or might have been, presented at the trial, and will not yield to the •clearest proof that the judgment is wrong in law or in fact, or that the effect of allowing it to stand will 'be to make a party liable for a debt he never owed, or which was discharged before action brought; Hinrickson vs. Van Winkle, 27 Ills. 334; Vennum vs. Davis, 35 id., 568; Lyday vs. Douple, 17 Maryland 188; Brandon vs. Green, 7 Humphrey 130; Johnson vs. Lyon, 14 Iowa 431; Hendrickson vs. Hinckley, 17 Howard 443.
One cannot have relief in equity because he failed or omitted to make out his defence at law, however plainly it may appear that the right lay with him, and that his ill success was due to proof which has since been obtained. Where an application is made u>r relief against a judgment, the province of a chancellor is to rest the conscience of the parties and not the legality of the judgment, nor to correct the errors that may have been committed by the Court; Hood vs. R. R. Co., 23 Conn. 609; Church vs. Mayor, 6 Gill 391; Clapp vs. Ely, 2 Stockton 178; Price vs. Johnson County, 15 Missouri 435. A different rule would render the jurisdiction of chancery universal by converting it into a Court to which an appeal might be made in every instance ; Hawkshaw vs. Parkins, 2 Swan 550; Russel vs. Slaton, 38 Georgia 195.
The rule is that the decision of a Court of competent jurisdiction being res adjudícala, is not only conclusive and binding on all other Courts of concurrent jurisdiction as to the subject matter thereby determined, but also as to every other matter which the parties might litigate in the case, and which they might have decided. Surprise, resulting from forgetfulness, perjury, intoxication, or absence of witnesses, is not ordinarily a ground for the relief in equity.which can as well be obtained through a motion for a new trial in tile original form. In general, one Who seeks relief against a judgment, must show not only that it was fraudulently or unduly obtained, but that he has a good legal or equitable defence to the demand or cause of action ; Stokes vs. Knau, 11 Wisconsin 389; Way vs. Lamb, 15 Iowa 79, 83; Saunders vs. Albritton, 37 Ala. 716; Lawson vs. Bank, 30 Ga. 664; Calbreath vs. Gracy, 1 Washington 199; Bradley vs. Bichardson 23 Vermont 720; Nason vs. Smalley, 8 id., 118.
Equity will not enjoin unless the bill set forth distinctly his cause of grievance; Gamble vs. Campbell, 6 Florida 347. The matter or accident which prevented defendant from defending at law must be set forth with certainty and precision, and it must also be alleged that it was unmixed with any negligence of complainant while there.
The power of Courts of equity to look into, and, on the ground of fraud, to relieve against the judgments of other Courts, is well established. The rule must be taken as also settled that equity will not interfere on grounds of which the party could have availed himself at law, unless he was prevented from doing so by the fraud of the other party, undiscovered before the time that the Court, in which the judgment remains, has lost its ■power to grant a new trial.
As is sometimes said, the restriction upon Courts of equity as to their interference with judgment at law exists except where there is necessity for it, and a manifest injury would otherwise be done. Before a party can have relief, he must show that he has a good defence of which he had no knowledge till after judgment ; or that he was prevented from using it by the fraud or act of the other party; and the bill must state that the complainant was ignorant of the facts which would constitute such defence until after judgment; and also that he used due diligence to ascertain facts -necessary to his defence before proof. (Applying these principles, we find this bill states nothing which would avail as a defence that has -not already been passed upon by the jury.) The whole defence was, that the petitioners were not partners in the firm of Adams, Iloupt & Co., and that A. Patterson wg,s‘the actual holder of the note in suit, and a partner in said firm.
All these questions were made on the trial and were specifically passed upon by the jury. The only allegation approaching the rule, requiring that it should appear the complainant was ignorant of the facts necessary to his defence until after the judgment, is the allegation in section 4, that the material facts in section 8, were unknown at said time. (What these facts are, is not specified, and so far as we can see, there is no one that complainant could possibly not have known at the time of trial, except that the name, Adams, Iioupt & Co., was adopted at the suggestion of Patterson, to be used only in the dealings of the bank, (which is entirely immaterial), and that the notes were made by Iioupt & Patterson, at the time Patterson was a partner ■of said firm, which fact is also immaterial, if Patterson was not the real owner of the note sued on, and which the jury have already found he was not.)
(The alleged perjury of Patterson is no ground for interfer-ence by equity.) That was a matter which the Court were bound to consider on a motion for a new trial, if alleged. The testimony of W. H. Adams could have been — and the record of the trial at law shows — was known and considered at the same time. In short, there is nothing shown by the bill at all material to the defence at law, which was not the subject of inquiry, or might have been, on the trial, or on the subsequent motion for new trial. Without saying that the perjury 'of a witnesss will not be ground of equitable relief in some cases under special circumstances, as a general rule, and where the perjury is upon a main fact in the case, upon which there is conflicting testimony, and where the mistake of the jury may be considered on a motion for new trial, no chancellor, should for a moment entertain the idea of granting relief, however much he might be satisfied that the allegation of perjury was true. Any other rule would destroy all trial by jury and make equity a Court of appeal upon all matters of disputed fact in a Court of law.
If the plainest mistake in matters of law, by the Court, cannot be corrected in equity, as is an unquestionable principle, how much more clear does it seem, that matters of fact, material to the defence, and which have been submitted to a jury, should not be inquired into by the losing party simply on the ground of the alleged fraud or perjury of a witness in the cause.
(Discovering nothing in the bill which under well settled principles of law will justify a Court of equity in restraining ■execution upon a judgment regularly obtained, upon a contested trial and the verdict of a jury, the demurrer is sustained and the ■complainants’ bill is hereby dismissed at their costs.)
Kountz then appealed assigning for error the portions of the opinion in brackets and the dismissal of his bill.
John Barton and J. M. Caldwell, Esqs. for appellants
argued: “It is the well settled principle of this Court, that relief is to be obtained not only against writings, deeds, and the most solemn assurances, but also against judgments and decrees, if obtained by fraud and imposition;” Reigel vs. Wood, 1 Johns. Chancery Rep. 402; Shattenkirk vs. Wheeler, 3 Johnson Chancery Rep. 275; De Reimer vs. De Cantillon, 4 Johnson Chancery Rep. 85. Lord Hardwick says, in 1 Vesey 258, Case 146, “though this Court cannot set aside a judgment of a common law Court obtained against conscience, yet it will decree the party to acknowledge satisfaction on that judgment, though he has received nothing, because obtained where nothing was due ; so it cannot set aside a fine for being obtained by fraud and imposition. Yet on a conveyance so obtained this Court never sent the plaintiff to the C. B. to set it aside ; but considers the person obtaining the estate, even by fine, as a trustee, and decrees him to reconvey on the general ground of laying hold of the guilty conscience of the party.” See also Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 3 Stockton Ch. 514; Glover vs. Hedges, Saxton 119; Bulon vs. Scott, 2 Green Ch. 236; Vanmeter vs. Jones, Ibid 523; Gifford vs. Thorn, 1 Stockton 703. “Where the party makes use of false testimony, which he knows to be false, and thereby obtains a judgment, he practices a fraud within the meaning of the statute for which the judgment may be vacated;” 7 Kansas, 264. Appellants position is sustained by the case of Cochran vs. Eldridge, 13 Wright 365.
Thos. C. Lazear, Esq., for appellant,
adopted the opinion of the Court below as his argument.

Opinion:
The Supreme Court- affirmed the decree of the Court below on November 25th, 1878, in the following opinion:
Per Curiam.
The reasons and authorities which sustain the decree in this ease are so ably and fully set forth in the opinion of the learned Court below, that we deem it unnecessary to add anything. We are not furnished with a' copy of the record of the writ, the judgment in which the bill prays may be enjoined, and we must take it that the opinion truly states what was submitted to the jury and passed upon. If the perjury of a witness could be made a ground of equitable interference, even though not discovered until long after the trial, there would be a large crop of bills in equity. Interest reipMicae ut sit finis litium.
Decree affirmed and appeal dismissed at the costs of the appellant.