Case Name: PEOPLE v. LEE
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1983-05-17
Citations: 125 Mich. App. 714
Docket Number: Docket No. 59411
Parties: PEOPLE v LEE
Judges: Before: R. M. Maher, P.J., and Bronson and R. J. Snow, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 125
Pages: 714–723

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v LEE
Docket No. 59411.
Submitted May 7, 1982, at Lansing.
Decided May 17, 1983.
Leave to appeal denied, 417 Mich 1075.
David Lee was convicted, on his plea of guilty, of breaking and entering an occupied dwelling, Oakland Circuit Court, William John Beer, J. Defendant appealed by leave granted, alleging that: (1) there was no factual basis for the plea, (2) he was not adequately advised of his rights, and (3) the trial court lost jurisdiction to sentence him because of a delay beyond one year. Held:
Bronson, J., held, along with the other members of the panel, that an adequate factual basis for the plea was elicited at the plea-taking proceeding. He held, additionally, that the trial court’s use of a plea-taking form, in which the defendant acknowledged the rights he was waiving by offering a plea, does not excuse the requirement that the plea-taking judge must personally address the defendant to advise him of his rights pursuant to court rule.
R. M. Maher, P.J., agreed that reversal is required because of the trial judge’s failure to personally address the defendant as to the rights waived by a guilty plea. He wrote separately to distinguish the case from alleged precedent.
Reversed and remanded.
R. J. Snow, J., dissented as to the requirement that the plea-taking judge must personally address the defendant on each and every right. He would hold that the use of a plea-taking form does not require reversal where it appears on the record that the defendant has been adequately advised of his rights. Judge Snow also addressed the defendant’s third issue and would hold that the lower court was not divested of its jurisdic tion to impose sentence because of a delay of two days beyond the statutory one-year period allowed in the delayed sentencing statute. He would affirm.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1, 2, 4] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 473-478.
Court’s duty to advise or admonish accused as to consequences of plea of guilty, or to determine that he is advised thereof. 97 ALR2d 549.
21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 489.
21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 526.
Loss of jurisdiction by delay in imposing sentence. 98 ALR3d 605.
Opinion of Bronson, J.
1. Criminal Law — Guilty Pleas — Plea-Taking Form — Failure To Address Defendant.
The use of a written form, at a guilty plea proceeding, upon which the defendant acknowledges the various rights which he is waiving by pleading guilty does not excuse the requirement that the judge personally address the defendant to advise him of his rights; failure of the judge to comply with this requirement mandates reversal (GCR 1963, 785.7).
Opinion of R. M. Maher, P.J.
2. Criminal Law — Guilty Pleas — Failure To Address Defendant.
Failure of a trial court to address a defendant personally as to the rights waived by'a guilty plea requires reversal (GCR 1963, 785.7).
Dissent by R. J. Snow, J.
3. Criminal Law — Guilty Pleas — Factual Basis for Plea.
A factual basis for acceptance of a guilty plea exists if an inculpatory inference can reasonably be drawn by a factfinder from the facts admitted by the defendant even if an exculpatory inference could also be drawn and the defendant asserts that the latter is the correct inference.
4. Criminal Law — Guilty Pleas — Plea-Taking Form.
The use of a written form in a guilty plea proceeding, in which the defendant acknowledges the rights he is waiving by pleading guilty, does not require reversal of the conviction where the defendant in fact was adequately advised of his rights.
5. Criminal Law — Sentencing — Delayed Sentencing.
A trial court is not divested of jurisdiction to sentence a defendant pursuant to the delayed sentencing statute if sentencing is not completed within one year where the reason for the delay beyond one year is sound and where a good-faith effort was ■ made to comply with the one-year statutory requirement (MCL 771.1; MSA 28.1131).
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Louis J. Caruso, Solicitor General, L. Brooks Patterson, Prosecuting Attorney, Robert C. Williams, Chief Appellate Counsel, and Richard H. Browne, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Arthur James Rubiner, for defendant on appeal.
Before: R. M. Maher, P.J., and Bronson and R. J. Snow, JJ.
Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
Bronson, J.
I approve the statement of facts made in Judge Snow's dissent. I also agree that an adequate factual basis for the plea was elicited.
I do not agree that the use of a guilty plea form excuses the requirement that a plea-taking judge personally address the defendant to advise him of his rights under GCR 1963, 785.7(l)(g).
We have received little guidance from the Supreme Court in this area. Its peremptory order in People v Lockett, 413 Mich 868; 318 NW2d 31 (1982), has, if anything, obscured the issues involved.
Even if we accept the contention that the order in Lockett has precedential value, the facts of this case can readily be distinguished from those in Lockett. In Lockett, the judge personally addressed the defendant at length, omitting only advice of his right to question the witnesses against him. The omission was apparently inadvertent. In the present case, the plea-taking form was substituted wholesale for the judge's direct advice on the record required by GCR 1963, 785.7. In Guilty Plea Cases, 395 Mich 96, 114; 235 NW2d 132 (1975), the Court stated:
"While it would be better for the judge to cover all the points himself, as long as he assumes the principal burden of imparting the required information, the purpose of requiring him personally to address the defendant and in so doing observe his demeanor and responses is achieved."
Independent of the question of defendant's knowledge of his rights, the trial court failed to comply with the "personally address" requirement of GCR 1963, 785.7. This failure requires reversal. While a plea-taking form might be a useful supplement to compliance with the court rule, it cannot be considered an adequate substitute.
I decline to address defendant's claim concerning the court's jurisdiction to sentence him. In view of our reversal of his conviction, this issue is not ripe for review.
Reversed and remanded to allow defendant to withdraw his plea.