Case Name: The STATE of Texas v. Cory A. STEVENS, Appellee
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 2007-10-03
Citations: 235 S.W.3d 736
Docket Number: No. PD-0226-06
Parties: The STATE of Texas v. Cory A. STEVENS, Appellee.
Judges: COCHRAN, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which KEASLER and HERVEY, JJ., joined.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Third Series
Volume: 235
Pages: 736–741

Head Matter:
The STATE of Texas v. Cory A. STEVENS, Appellee.
No. PD-0226-06.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Oct. 3, 2007.
Robert T. Price, Angleton, for Cory A. Stevens.
Matthew Paul, State’s Attorney, Austin, for the State.

Opinion:
WOMACK, J.,
delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
The appellee was arrested for driving while intoxicated ("DWI") while he was on deferred-adjudication community supervision for involuntary manslaughter. The State filed a motion to adjudicate guilt. The trial court in the DWI case granted a motion to suppress all evidence collected during the appellee's arrest, and that case was dismissed. Subsequently, the trial court hearing the motion to adjudicate guilt also granted a motion to suppress all evidence of the DAW offense based on collateral estoppel. The State appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. We reviewed this case to determine whether the Court of Appeals applied the appropriate standard of review. Because the Court did not, we reverse and remand.
In 1995, the appellee pleaded no contest to involuntary manslaughter in Brazoria County and was placed on 10 years deferred-adjudication community supervision. In June 2003, the appellee was arrested in Tom Green County for DWI. As a result of this violation, the Brazoria County District Attorney's office filed a motion to adjudicate guilt on the involuntary-manslaughter offense in September 2003.
In January 2004, the appellee filed a motion to suppress evidence in the Tom Green County DWI case, questioning the validity of the initial stop of the appellee's vehicle. At a pretrial hearing, both the State and defense presented evidence. Among the State's witnesses was Sergeant Jeff Fant of the San Angelo Police Department. Officer Fant testified that he was dispatched to a "suspicious subject" call at Rio Vista School in the early morning of June 12, 2003. A few blocks from the school, Fant observed the appellee's large, four-wheel-drive vehicle parked sideways, at an angle to the road, in a ditch. Believing it could be the suspicious subject of the call or a stranded motorist, Fant approached the appellee's vehicle. As he approached, the vehicle "took off at a high rate of speed, jumped off the curb, spun the tires," and drove away. In so doing, the appellee violated several traffic laws, including a city ordinance against spinning tires, or "exhibition of acceleration." Fant activated his overhead lights, followed the appellee, and stopped the appellee's vehicle.
The Tom Green County Court at Law granted the appellee's motion to suppress. Although the Court confirmed that "the question before me is . was the officer within the law in stopping this vehicle," the Court made no express findings of fact or conclusions of law. The State subsequently dismissed the DWI case.
In September 2004, based on the findings of the Tom Green County Court at Law, the appellee filed a motion to suppress all of the evidence from the DWI arrest in response to the State's motion to adjudicate guilt in Brazoria County. The Brazoria County trial court, following two pretrial hearings, granted the motion to suppress. The judge determined collateral estoppel precluded an independent re view of the evidence regarding the validity of the initial stop in the DWI case. He stated on the record:
Being quite specific and quite narrow, all my ruling does is it shows that all the facts were considered by the Court and pretty clear on the record that all the facts were considered concerning whether or not there was reasonable suspicion to stop and — or probable cause.... It was the ultimate issue of fact in the case.
In its suppression order, the Court found the following:
[T]hat the Court of Tom Green County made its finding that the stop and arrest of Defendant was without reasonable and/or probable cause, and therefore that all facts regarding the unlawful DWI arrest and detention of defendant, Cory A. Stevens, have been decided by the County Court of Tom Green County, Texas were fully adjudicated as to factual findings resulting in Defendant's arrest, and were adjudicated in favor of Defendant, and thus, under the doctrine of collateral estoppel and in accordance with Guajardo v. State [109 S.W.3d 456 (Tex.Cr.App.2003) ] the Motion to Suppress all evidence from Tom Green County should be GRANTED.
The State appealed, claiming the Brazo-ria County trial court erred in applying collateral estoppel and granting the appel-lee's motion to suppress. The Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District, although acknowledging the collateral estop-pel ruling to be "questionable," affirmed.
The Court of Appeals found that the suppression motion in the Tom Green County DWI case was granted due to a lack of reasonable suspicion to stop the appellee. The Court presumed that decision to have been based on a credibility determination, which is afforded "almost total deference" by reviewing courts. The Court then extended this same level of deference to the Brazoria County Court, because "that ruling would likewise be correct under a theory of law that is applicable to the case and supported by the record, even if it was not a ground presented to, or relied upon, by the trial court."
We disagree with the Court of Appeals' application of the same standard of review to both the Tom Green County and Brazo-ria County cases. Although an "almost total deference" standard would be appropriate in the Tom Green County DWI case, because that court heard witness testimony and was in a position to make credibility determinations, the decision of the Tom Green County court is not under review here. The sole ruling under review is that of the Brazoria County court. As such, the appropriate standard of review should be based solely on the circumstances surrounding that decision.
The Brazoria County judge held two pretrial hearings, after the first of which he reviewed the entire record of the Tom Green County proceeding. He heard no witness testimony, only arguments of counsel. He made no credibility determinations or determinations of historical facts. The Brazoria County judge stated explicitly that his granting of the motion to suppress was based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
Courts reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress afford almost total deference to a trial court's determination of historical facts supported by the record, especially when the determination is based on an evaluation of credibility and demean- or. The same level of deference is granted to mixed questions of law and fact, or "application of law to fact questions," where the resolution likewise turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Appellate courts review de novo applications of law to facts that do not involve determinations of credibility and demean- or. A decision to apply collateral estop-pel is a question of law, applied to the facts, for which de novo review is appropriate.
Although the Court of Appeals was correct in stating that a reviewing court may affirm a trial court's decision if it is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case and supported by the record, no other theory of law applies to this case. The record from Brazoria County demonstrates that the hearings centered entirely on the question of whether collateral es-toppel precluded the presentation of evidence regarding the validity of stopping the appellee in Tom Green County. The record supports no other theory. An examination of the record of the Tom Green County hearing, although essential in determining whether collateral estoppel applies, has no bearing on this particular question.
We should not be understood to be saying that all collateral estoppel questions are legal questions. The doctrine of collateral estoppel "means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit." Any analysis of whether the doctrine applies will necessarily involve a thorough examination of the record of the first proceeding "to determine whether a rational factfinder could have grounded its decision on a fact other than the specific fact that the party now claims has been resolved in his favor. Collateral estoppel deals only with specific factual determinations, not legal claims or legal conclusions."
Conclusion
In short, the Court of Appeals erred in applying a deferential standard to the Bra-zoria County trial court's ruling. A de novo review of the trial court's decision to apply collateral estoppel is appropriate. We will reverse and remand to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration.
COCHRAN, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which KEASLER and HERVEY, JJ., joined.
. State v. Stevens, 187 S.W.3d 565 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 2006).
. We granted review on the specific question: Is an appellate court required to defer to a trial court's erroneous legal ruling where that ruling does not involve any explicit or implicit factual findings or credibility determinations?
. One of the terms of the appellee's deferred-adjudication community supervision required that he: "Commit no offense against the laws of this State or any other State of the United States or of any government entity."
. The motion also cited the appellee's failure to report to the supervision officer during March and December of 2000. This violation is not at issue here.
. State's Exhibit 1 (hereinafter, SX-1), at 10.
. SX-1, at 27.
. Although the appellee's motion requested that the court "Suppress the State's Motion to Adjudicate," the appellee's prayer for relief makes it clear that this was actually a motion to suppress evidence obtained during the ap-pellee's arrest.
. Reporter's Record, Vol. 3: 10-11.
. Stevens, at 567.
.Id., at 567-68.
. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Cr.App.1997).
. Ibid.
. Ibid.
. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970).
. Guajardo, 109 S.W.3d, at 460 (emphasis in original).