Case Name: John M. Dennis, Respondent, v. Charles Ryan, Appellant
Court: New York Commission of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1875-05
Citations: 65 N.Y. 385
Docket Number: 
Parties: John M. Dennis, Respondent, v. Charles Ryan, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 65
Pages: 385–410

Head Matter:
John M. Dennis, Respondent, v. Charles Ryan, Appellant.
Where one makes a false and malicious charge against another, and by means thereof procures the indictment and arrest of the latter, it is no defence to an action for malicious prosecution that the false accusation did not allege facts constituting the crime charged in the indictment or any other criminal offence. (Lott, Oh. 0., and Dwight, 0., dissenting.)
Defendant went to a district attorney and falsely and maliciously charged the plaintiff with erasing an indorsement of payment upon a money bond held by him; this the district attorney decided to constitute the crime of forgery, and thereupon he caused defendant to be subpoenaed before the grand jury. He appeared and was examined. Plaintiff was indicted for forgery, arrested and tried. The court directed a verdict of not guilty, upon the ground that the facts alleged did not constitute the crime charged. In an action for malicious prosecution, held (Lott, Oh. C., and Dwight, C., dissenting), that defendant was the procuring cause of the indictment and arrest of plaintiff, and that defendant was liable, although the charge made did not constitute the crime.
It seems, that if the statements made by defendant had been true the action could not have been maintained.
Leigh, v. Webb (3 Esp., 165); McNeely v. Brishill (3 Blackf., 359); Bennett v. Bloch (4 Ala. [1 Stew.], 494) distinguished.
(Submitted September 38,1874;
decided May term, 1875.)
Appeal from judgment of the General Term of the Supreme Court in the fourth judicial department affirming a judgment in favor of plaintiff, entered upon a verdict. (Reported below, 5 Bans., 350 ; 63 Barb., 145.)
• This action was for malicious prosecution in falsely and maliciously charging and causing the plaintiff to be indicted, arrested and tried for the crime of forgery.
Defendant went to the district attorney of Cayuga county and charged plaintiff and one William Dennis with erasing an indorsement of a payment made upon a bond conditioned for the payment of money; the district attorney gave it as his opinion that this erasure constituted the crime of forgery. The district attorney caused defendant to be subpoenaed before the grand jnry. He appeared and testified, and plaintiff was indicted. It was set forth in the indictment, in substance, that plaintiff and William Dennis knowingly, designedly and feloniously altered the bond by erasing therefrom the indorsement with intent to defraud and cheat the obligor and defendant, who had assumed and agreed to pay said bond. Plaintiff was arrested and tried upon the indictment. Defendant was sworn upon the trial. The court directed a verdict of not guilty upon the ground that the erasure of the indorsement would not constitute the crime of forgery; a verdict was rendered accordingly. Hpon the trial of this action the court charged, in substance, that the action could not be maintained unless they were satisfied that the accusation made by defendant, on which the indictment was found, was known by him to be false and unfounded; but that if defendant made this complaint to the district attorney, knowing that it was false and unfounded, and by that means procured plaintiff to be indicted and brought to trial, the action would lie, even though the charge made did not constitute the crime alleged, or any crime. Further facts are set forth, in the opinions.
H. V. Howland for the appellant.
Ho crime was imputed or charged by the facts or circumstances, or given before the grand jury. (State v. Thornburg, 6 Ired., 79; State v. McLaren, 1 Aikin, 311; State v. Horton, 3 Zab., 33.) Defendant cannot be made liable for a malicious prosecution. (McNeely v. Briskill, 2 Blackf., 259; Leigh v. Webb, 3 Esp., 165; Blunt v. Little, 3 Mass., 102; Murray v. McLane, 2 Car. L. R., 186 [3 Abb. Nat. Dig., 244].) The court erred in denying the motion for a nonsuit. (Foshay v. Ferguson, 2 Den., 617, 619; 3 Wash. C. C. R., 37; Miller v. Milligan, 48 Barb., 40; Besson v. Southard, 6 Seld., 236; Hall v. Suydam, 6 Barb., 86; Vanderbilt v. Mathis, 5 Duer, 304; Baldwin v. Weed, 17 Wend., 224; Scott v. Simpson, 1 Sand., 601; 3 Esp., 7; 9 East, 261; 6 N. Y., 240.)
F. L>. Wright for the respondent.
It was immaterial whether plaintiff could have been punished under the indictment. (1 Arch. Cr. Pr. and Pldgs. [7th ed.], 1410 ; Collins v. Love, 7 Blackf. [Ind.], 416.) Defendant was hable for malicious prosecution. (1 Arch. Cr. Pr. and Pldgs. [7th ed.], 470; 1 Hil. on Torts, 470; Forrest v. Collier, 20 Ala., 170; Collins v. Love, 7 Blackf., 416; Wicks v. Fentham, 4 T. R., 247; Fays v. Younglove, 7 B. Hon., 545; Gaslin v. Wilcock, 2 Wils., 302; Chambers v. Robinson, 2 Stra., 691; Padro v. Barnett, 1 Ld. Raym., 81; Morris v. Scott, 21 Wend., 281; 1 Am. Cr. Cas., 208, 209.)

Opinion:
Gray, C.
In all that pertained to the criminal prosecution of the plaintiff, the defendant was as much the complainant and prosecutor as if he had, unbidden by legal process, appeared before the grand jury and made the complaint upon which the indictment was found. He knew the district attorney to be a law officer of the county, whose duty it was to prosecute for such criminal offences as had been committed within its limits; he appeared before him and related his made-up and malicious story which, if true, constituted, in the opinion of that officer, a criminal offence. The result was that the district attorney, confiding in the truth of his statement, and, as in duty bound, caused him to be subpoenaed to appear before the grand jury and testify as to the matter of which he had complained; he appeared, testified, and the indictment followed. That he was the complainant was not questioned on the trial, nor is it raised by the appellant here. The crime charged was forgery; it was alleged and stated in the indictment to consist of an erasure of an indorsement of payment upon a bond. This, it is insisted on the part of the defendant, did not constitute the crime of forgery, and I am inclined to think it did not; and because, as the defendant insists, it did not, he claims that however false his accusation was, or with whatever evil or malicious intent he instigated the prosecution, and however much it may have vexed and injured the plaintiff, he is not liable in this action, and the reason assigned, in substance, is, that it was through the misjudgment of the district attorney and the grand jury that the indictment was found, a warrant issued, the plaintiff arrested and put upon his defence. I do not doubt that if the defendant's statement to the district attorney and the grand jury had been true, and that an indictment had been found and prosecuted upon his truthful statement, that this action could not have been maintained; in such case, the defendant would not have been guilty of any wrong. The oppression of the plaintiff would have been attributable alone to the erroneous legal conclusions of the district attorney and grand jury. Such, in effect, was the case of Leigh v. Webb (3 Espin., 165), McNeely v. Driskill (2 Blackf., 259) and Bennett v. Black (4 Ala. [1 Stew.], 494) and other cases which might be cited, and in not one of all of them which have fallen under my observation does it appear that the complaint was not honest and truthful, and that the injury was the result alone of a judicial error. Subsequent to the cases of McNeely v. Briskill and of Bermett v. Black, a case arose in the courts of the respective States of Indiana and Alabama which, in principle, uphold this action. In the former, a count for malicious prosecution was held good, although the charge upon which the prosecution was made did not authorize issuing the warrant. (Collins v. Love, 7 Blackf., 416). In the latter, it was held that in an action for maliciously suing out an attachment, the defendant could not raise the objection that the affidavit made was insufficient to authorize issuing it. (Forrest v. Collins, 20 Ala., 175). And in Anderson v. Buchanan (Wright's Ohio B., 725), it was held that although the charge made did not constitute a crime, yet, as it was false and malicious, it did not lay with the defendant to raise that objection. (Farlie v. Banks, 30 Eng. Law & Eq. R., 115.) Lord Campbell, Ch. J., in delivering the opinion of the court in a case not distinguishable in principle from the one under con sideration, said: " I think all that is necessary is that the defendant should falsely and maliciously cause the act to he done; and he did cause it, because, if he had not presented his petition and made a false affidavit, the judge could not and would not have made the adjudication. I should have been surprised and grieved to find any decision of our courts that the action was not maintainable. There is no doubt that if a person truly states to a judge, and the judge thereupon does an act which the law will not justify, the party who made the statement is not liable, because, in that case, the grievance complained of arises not from the false statement of the party but from a mistake of the judge. It would be strange if, where a court is put in motion by a false and malicious statement, it should depend upon a nice question of law whether there was a remedy or not." A case has arisen in oar own courts in which a party falsely and maliciously prosecuted another for a crime, before a court having no jurisdiction of the offence, and he was held liable in an action for malicious prosecution, upon the ground that falsehood and malice united was the qrmamm of the action; that " the sting of all this kind of actions is malice and falsehood and the injury resulting therefrom." (Morris v. Scott, 21 Wend., 281). That the plaintiff was, upon the complaint of the defendant, prosecuted, is not denied; that the complaint was false and maliciously made is established by the verdict of the jury, and now that he has put in motion the officers of the law, and by his false and malicious statement it does not, either upon principle or authority, lay with him to say by way of defence that the injury resulting from the wrong committed by him would not have been consummated hut for the innocent mistake of those imposed upon by him.
The judgment appealed from should be affirmed.