Case Name: In the Matter of the Construction of the Will of Benjamin S. Welles, Deceased. Marian K. Frelinghuysen et al., Appellants; William M. Cruikshank et al., as Trustees under the Will of Benjamin S. Welles, Deceased, et al., Respondents
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1961-03-23
Citations: 9 N.Y.2d 277
Docket Number: 
Parties: In the Matter of the Construction of the Will of Benjamin S. Welles, Deceased. Marian K. Frelinghuysen et al., Appellants; William M. Cruikshank et al., as Trustees under the Will of Benjamin S. Welles, Deceased, et al., Respondents.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 9
Pages: 277–286

Head Matter:
In the Matter of the Construction of the Will of Benjamin S. Welles, Deceased. Marian K. Frelinghuysen et al., Appellants; William M. Cruikshank et al., as Trustees under the Will of Benjamin S. Welles, Deceased, et al., Respondents.
Argued January 19, 1961;
decided March 23, 1961.
Thomas B. Gilchrist, Jr., and Thomas B. Gilchrist for appellants.
I. The will discloses an intention to achieve equality of distribution on a stirpital basis with preference for those of testator’s blood. (Matter of Buechner, 226 N. Y. 440.) II. The word “ grandchildren ” will be construed in its secondary sense to include descendants of deceased grandchildren when it is apparent that such was testator’s intent. (Prowitt v. Rodman, 37 N. Y. 42; Matter of Brown, 93 N. Y. 295; Matter of Paton, 111 N. Y. 480; Matter of Schaufele, 252 N. Y. 65; Matter of Villalonga, 6 N Y 2d 477; Matter of Weil, 151 Misc. 841, 245 App. Div. 822, 271 N. Y. 608; Matter of Mahlstedt, 167 Misc. 13; Matter of McKim, 115 Misc. 720; Pfender v. Depew, 136 App. Div. 636; Matter of Stecher, 190 Misc. 502.) III. Applying the aids and tests that this court has sanctioned, testator’s intention must be taken to have been that the word ‘ ‘ grandchildren ” in the second paragraph of article 8 of his will should include descendants of deceased grandchildren. IV. The result sought by appellants is dictated by decisions of this court in an analogous line of cases embracing adopted children within the meaning of “ lawful issue “ children ” and “ descendants ”. (Matter of Upjohn, 304 N. Y. 366; Matter of Walter, 270 N. Y. 201; Matter of Myres, 205 Misc. 880; Matter of Hilts, 5 Misc 2d 862, 4 A D 2d 1013; Matter of Charles, 200 Misc. 452, 279 App. Div. 741, 304 N. Y. 776.) V. The pronounced stirpital scheme of will precludes a per capita distribution. (Matter of Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 213 N. Y. 168.)
Edward R. Finch, Leon Schaefler and Nancy E. Le Blanc for Emily W. Bobbins, Ethel K. Anderton and B. Sumner Welles, respondents.
I. The word ‘ ‘ grandchildren ’ ’ has always been construed in its primary sense. (Matter of Mahlstedt, 167 Misc. 13; Matter of McKim, 115 Misc. 720.) II. The will provides for a legacy to persons constituting a specific limited class, i.e., 1 ‘ my grandchildren then living ’ ’. It excludes all others. (Matter of King, 200 N. Y. 189; Matter of Ruhl, 271 App. Div. 635; Matter of Tamargo, 220 N. Y. 225; Matter of Thompson, 279 N. Y. 131; Matter of Pulis, 220 N. Y. 196.) III. Without conceding their relevancy, the cases cited by appellants in which the question arose as to whether ‘ ‘ children ’ ’ includes ‘ ‘ grandchildren ” are readily distinguishable. In fact, they support the position of respondents. (Matter of Villalonga, 6 N Y 2d 477; Matter of Barnes, 2 N Y 2d 787; Prowitt v. Rodman, 37 N. Y. 42; Matter of Weil, 151 Misc. 841, 245 App. Div. 822, 271 N. Y. 608; Matter of Schaufele, 252 N. Y. 65.) IV. The burden rests upon appellants to establish “the unmistakable intent” of testator that “my grandchildren then living” includes great grandchildren. This burden they have not met. (Matter of Bisconti, 306 N. Y. 442.) Y. The attempted analogy of the case at bar to the decisions regarding adopted children is not in point. YI. If the English language ever means what it says, then our testator said as clearly as it is possible to say it, “ on Harriet’s death, I want the principal of her trust paid over to my grandchildren who survive her ”. (Matter of Watson, 262 N. Y. 284.)
Charles H. Stoll, as special guardian for infants, in person, and Aaron L. Rochman for Charles H. Stoll, respondent.
The language employed by testator in article 8 of his will clearly and definitely indicates testator’s intention to limit the gift of the remainder, resulting from the death of Harriet without issue, to those of his grandchildren then living and consequently such intention ought not to be changed by judicial construction. (Matter of Villalonga, 6 N Y 2d 477; Matter of Barnes, 2 N Y 2d 787; Low v. Harmony, 72 N. Y. 408; Wylie v. Lockwood, 86 N. Y. 291; Patchen v. Patchen, 121 N. Y. 432; Matter of Gautier, 3 N Y 2d 502.)
Richard S. Emmet, John L. Merrill, Jr., and Eunice M. O’Neill for William M. Cruikshank and Bank of New York, respondents.

Opinion:
Dye, J.
As we read this will, it seems clear that the testator intended what he said when he directed that the remainder of the Harriet trust be distributed " equally among all my grandchildren then living This will was made in 1892 and a codicil in 1898. It is reasonable to suppose that the testator employed the term " grandchildren" to designate a class as it was then understood, which he limited to those 1 ' then living ' '. To include great-grandchildren in that carefully designated class requires us to define the term1 ' grandchildren ' ' as including any descendant—however remote. We have never gone so far and should not do so in a case where the wording is so clear, precise and readily understandable as in this instance. Whenever the term ' ' children ' ' has been given a secondary meaning in order- to include the issue of a deceased child, it has invariably been for the purpose of giving effect to the testator's evident intent to prevent failure of the estate. In Prowitt v. Rodman (37 N. Y. 42 [1867]) and cases which followed it, the rulings were made to prevent a lapse of the estate. Here there is no possibility of such failure, since there are living grandchildren capable of taking the remainder. When this testator used the words "issue", " descendants " or " children", it was not in the sense employed in Prowitt v. Rodman (supra); Matter of Brown (93 N. Y. 295); Matter of Paton (111 N. Y. 480), and other cases in which such use was relied on to ascertain testamentary intent for the sake of preserving the estate but, on the contrary, whenever such terms were used by this testator it was in connection with the disposition of specifically designated funds not here involved. The distribution of Harriet's trust remainder was handled by different verbiage which, as we have pointed out, was to be " equally among all my grandchildren then living ", a specific, clearly ascertainable and definite class. In our view, the direction " that my property shall be enjoyed by those of my own blood ' ' was a further indication of his intent to confine the distribution to his grandchildren '£ then living ' '. Grandchildren are one generation nearer to the testator and it is not unreasonable to suppose that in 1892 this testator was using the term in the sense understood in common parlance of his generation and as reflected by the cases then decided. This view is reinforced by reference to the precision with which the testator in a preceding clause of the will directs division and distribution £ ' among all the children of my said daughter ' '. It seems to us that the only possible occasion justifying a more inclusive meaning would be to avoid failure of the estate.
If there were no " grandchildren then living ", we would find it easy to analogize the two situations and would gladly approve a construction that would save the estate by giving the remainder to the great-grandchildren, as we did in those cases where the designated remainderman class was a child or children, who had died leaving issue. Here we do not have that problem. There are living grandchildren.
To sum up, there is no good reason for saying this will means other than as written. Absent a clear showing of unmistakable intent to the contrary, no problem exists requiring construction. The wording is not unclear or ambiguous and the meaning is obvious. When the language used is given effect, the estate is preserved since there are living grandchildren capable of receiving the fund and it will thus he enjoyed by " those of my [testator's] own blood ", thus satisfying the testator's primary purpose and evident intent. To say he intended otherwise is to remake his will, and this we may not do (Matter of Villalonqa, 6 N Y 2d 477).
The order appealed from should be affirmed, with costs to all parties appearing separately and filing separate briefs, payable out of the estate.