Case Name: Ernest Amos, Comptroller, Appellant, v. Shelton J. Gunn, Individually and as Citizen and Taxpayer and as Member of the Legislature Suing on Behalf of Himself and Others Similarly Situated, Appellee
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1922-04-07
Citations: 84 Fla. 285
Docket Number: 
Parties: Ernest Amos, Comptroller, Appellant, v. Shelton J. Gunn, Individually and as Citizen and Taxpayer and as Member of the Legislature Suing on Behalf of Himself and Others Similarly Situated, Appellee.
Judges: Taylor and Ellis, J. J., concur.
Reporter: Florida Reports
Volume: 84
Pages: 285–398

Head Matter:
Ernest Amos, Comptroller, Appellant, v. Shelton J. Gunn, Individually and as Citizen and Taxpayer and as Member of the Legislature Suing on Behalf of Himself and Others Similarly Situated, Appellee.
First Opinion Filed April 7, 1922.
Petition for rehearing granted May 29, 1922.
Opinion reversing order filed August 18, 1922.
Petition for rehearing denied October 11, 1922.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County, E. C. Love, Judge.
1. The provision in Section 17 of Article III of the Constitution that all hills and joint resolutions passed by the Legislature be signed by the .presiding (officers of the “respective Houses, and by the Secretary of the Senate and the Olerk of the House of Representatives” is mandatory and requires such procedure to be observed while the Legislature is in session.
2. The provision in Section 28 of Article III of the Constitution that every “bill that may have passed the legislature shall, before becoming a law, be presented to the Governor,” etc., is mandatory and requires the presentation of every bill passed to be made to the Governor while the legislature is in session. WHITFIELD and WEST, JJ., dissent from the last six words.
3. The provision in Section 28 of Article III of the Constitution relating to the veto power of the Governor, invests the Chief Executive of the State with a power in trust to be exercised to the end that its full purpose of providing a check upon errors and protecting the constitutional rights of the people against abridgments be realized, and it cannot be ignored nor lessened by the legislature, nor its presiding officers.
4. A demurrer to a pleading admits the truth of all essential matters of fact as are well and sufficiently pleaded, but it does not admit as true allegations or averments of fact which the law would not allow to be proved or that are inconsistent with law.
5. An allegation in a bill of complaint attacking the validity of an Act of the Legislature that a certain document on file in the office of the Secretary of State purporting to be an official Act of the Legislature and purporting to be duly enrolled and signed by the presiding officers of the two Houses of the Legislature and their respective clerks and duly approved by the Governor, is not in fact an Act of the Legislature because it was never presented by that body to the Governor, nor signed by the presiding officers and clerks of the two Houses of the Legislature while that body was in session, is not susceptible of proof by parol evidence or other means aliunde the legislative journals or other public records in the office of the Governor or Secretary of State. And such allegation, standing alone, which does not also affirm the existence of a public record in the office of the Governor or Secretary of State which shows the alleged defects to exist is not admitted by demurrer to the bill of complaint. BROWNE, O. J., and TAYLOR, J., dissent.
6. A document on file in the office of the Secretary of State, purporting to be an enrolled bill duly passed by the Legislature and duly signed by the presiding officers and clerks of the two Houses of the Legislature is prima facie a valid.Act of the Legislature and may not be impeached by any evidence of less dignity than a public record .of an official executive or legislative Act. BROWNE, C. J., and TAYLOR, J., dissent.
7. The word “bill” as used in Section 28 of Article III of the Constitution providing that every “bill” that may have passed the Legislature shall, before becoming a law, be presented to the Governor; and as used in the proviso to Section 17 of Article III of the Constitution providing that all “bills” so passed shall be signed by the presiding officers of the respective Houses, etc., refers not to the original document containing the proposition as first submitted but to the last writing containing all the amendments, if any are made, by the Legislature in the “bill’s” passage. It is the original proposition in its altered or amended form.
8. A public record is a written memorial made by a public officer authorized by law to make it. It is required by law to be kept, or necessary to be kept, in the discharge of a duty imposed, by law, or directed by law to serve as a memorial and evidence of something written, said or done.
9. A document on file in the office of the Secretary of State purporting to be an enrolled bill duly passed by the Legislature and duly signed by the presiding officers and clerks of both Houses and duly approved by the Governor is a public record of an official act of the legislative and executive departments. BROWNE, C. J., and TAYLOR, J., dissent.
10. The approval by the Governor of a bill purporting to have been duly passed by the Legislature and presented to him in conformity with the requirements of Section 28 of Article III of the Constitution, is equivalent to a certificate by the Governor that it came to his possession in due course. Such a document is a public record' of a co-ordinate branch of the State government and the judicial branch of the government has no power to adjudge it to have been made in a manner not in conformity with the rules and regulations of law, in the absence of a specific and unequivocal charge of fraud on the pq,rt of the officials concerned, or the existence of some public record of equal dignity to show the abuse of authority or violation of law by them. BROWNE, C. J., and TAYLOR, J., dissent.
11. The court has no power to take judicial knowledge of facts existing in pais depending upon parol testimonoy to establish them, that will destroy the faith and credit which the law requires to be given to a public record, and leave the officer, whose duty, or power, in law it was to make the record, under suspicion of fraudulent conduct in the making of it. BRÓWNE, C. J., and TAYLOR, J„ dissent.
12. Judicial knowledge is confined to the record when an official act of the legislative or executive department is called in question and such record is authentic and complete in itself. BROWNE, C. J., and TAYLOR, J., dissent.
13. The invalidity of a statute cannot be proved by the admissions of parties in a cause in which rights are involved under such statute. BROWNE, C. J., and TAYLOR, J., dissent.
14. Section 5 of Articlce XIV of the Constitution providing that the “Legislature may provide for-a tax on licenses” is not a limitation upon the inherent power of the Legislature to impose excise, occupational or other taxes that are in the nature of license or privilege taxes. It is an express declaration of a power that exists in the Legislature.
15. The provisions of Chapter 8411 Acts of 1921 imposing a tax of five dollars for each place of business and one cent per gallon on gasoline sold, is not objectionable as double taxation. Both exactions amount to but one license tax.
16. An “excise tax” is one laid on licenses to pursue certain occupations, corporate privileges or sales or consumption of commodities.
17. An excise tax partakes of the nature of a license tax.
18. A tax of one cent a gallon on sales of products within the State after they have lost their interstate character is an excise tax which is in effect a license tax; and the lawmaking power of the State may impose excise or license taxes within its disccretion unless restrained by organic or paramount provisions of law.
19. The State and Federal Constitutions and Federal laws and treaties contain no limitation upon the power of the State Legislature to impose license taxes within its jurisdiction, except that due process, equal protection and contract rights shall be observed, and interstate commerce shall not be burdened or the exercise of Federal power interfered with.
20. The title and body of Chapter 8411 Acts of 1921, relate to the payment of license taxes and the taxes imposed are all occupational and excise taxes which in their essential nature are license taxes. Such taxes so imposed accord with due process of law, do not deny equal protection of the laws or impair the obligation of contracts or interfere with interstate commerce, Or with the exercise of any Federal power.
21. The tax of one cent a gallon on sales of gasoline imposed by Chapter 8411 upon dealers in such commodity is by the terms of the statute merely a tax on the first intrastate sale after . the product “has lost its interstate character.” It applies to all alike under similar conditions, does not interfere with any contract right, and can in no way burden interstate commerce or interfere with Federal authority. The fact that none of the products is produced in the State does not make the intrastate license or excise tax discriminate against the producing States.
22. Chapter 8411 is not arbitrary or oppressive or unjustly discriminating in its provisions; the penalties provided for are manifestly not excessive and the Act is not void for uncertainty.
23. The discretionary power of the lawmaking department to impose fines to redress wrongs done, is limited only by the organic provisions requiring due process and equal protection of the laws to be observed and forbidding excessive fines to be imposed.
24. Fines may be excessive within the prohibitions of the Constitution when they are so great or numerous as to shock the conscience of reasonable men, or are patently and unreasonably harsh or oppressive as penalties for the wrongs sought to be redressed, or so great -or numerous as to intimidate persons in asserting their rights to test the validity of laws or regulations which they may be required to observe, and thereby to deny due process and equal protection of the laws.
Ü5. 'There being no definitely fixed rules or standards for determining what are and what are not excessive fines, each case whether a statute prescribing fines or a judgment imposing a fine under a statute, must be adjudged on its merits, and the courts will not declare a statutory fine to.be excessive in violation of the Constitution unless it is plainly and‘undoubtedly in excess of any reasonable requirements for redressing the wrong.
Browne C. J., and Taylor, J., concur in these headnotes except as to Nos. 5, 6, 9,10,11, 12 and 13.
Order reversed.
Rivers Buford, Attorney General, and J. B. Gaines, Assistant, for Appellant;
C. M. Cooper, Chas. P. & J..J. G. Cooper, for Appellee.

Opinion:
Browne, C. J.
It appears from the record, and it is not controverted, that House Bill No. 702, published as Chapter 8411 of the Laws of Florida, Acts of 1921, was not signed by the presiding officers of the Senate and House of Representatives until after the expiration of the constitutional period of sixty days during which -a legislative session may last, and after the legislature adjourned sine die on the 3rd day of June, 1921.
This presents the question of the validity of the act, in which is involved whether or not in its passage through the two houses of the legislature, from the time of its introduction in the House to its signature by the presiding officers, all the constitutional requirements for making a bill a law, were complied with.
To decide this, we must consider and determine these two questions:
(1) Are the signatures of the presiding officers of the-two houses of the legislature essential before'a bill can become a law!
(2) If such signatures are essential, must the bill be signed before the legislature adjourns sine die?
To both of these queries, we are compelled to answer, yes.
The clause of the constitution on this subject is: "all bills or joint resolutions so passed shall be signed by the presiding officer of the respective houses." Art. Ill, Sec. 17, Constitution of Florida.
This is as mandatory as any other constitutional provision controlling the valid enactment of a law, and we have no hesitancy in declaring that the signing of a bill by "the presiding officer of the respective houses," is essential to the valid enactment of a bill into a law.
From saying that this provision of the constitution is mandatory, it must not be inferred that we regard any of the provisions of that great charter of liberties as merely directory, as we fully agree with what was said in the case of Hunt v. State, 22 Tex. App. 396, 3 S. W. Rep. 233. "But notwithstanding these decisions are by able courts, the great weight of authority seems to be the other way, holding that the courts nor any other department of the government are at liberty to regard any provision of the Constitution as merely directory, but that each and every of its provisions must be treated as imperative and mandatory, without reference to the rules distinguishing between directory and mandatory statutes. Judge Cooley, in his great work on Constitutional Limitation, upon this subject says: 'The courts tread upon very dangerous ground when they venture to apply the rules which distinguish directory and mandatory statutes to the provisions of a constitution.' " .
Judge Cooley also has this to say on the mandatory character of constitutional provisions: "If, therefore; a constitutional provision is to be enforced at all, it must be treated as mandatory. And if the legislature habitually disregard it, it seems to us that there is all the more urgent necessity that the courts should enforce it.
And it also seems to us that there are few evils which can be inflicted by a strict adherence to the law, so great is that which is done.by the habitual disregard, by any department of the government, of a plain requirement of that instrument from which it derives its authority, and which ought, therefore, to be scrupulously observed and obeyed." Cooley's Const. Lim. (6 Ed.). 180.
We come now to the second question: when shall the presiding officers perform this duty?
The signing of a bill by the presiding officer of either house is a legislative act, and after the expiration of the period of sixty days to which it is limited by the constitution and after the adjournment of the legislature sine die, neither the legislature, nor any membér thereof, including the presiding officers, can perform any act required by the constitution to be done in the passage of a bill.
If the duty of the presiding officer to sign bills properly passed by the body over which he presides, is not a legislative act, but merely a ministerial one it follows, (1) that a writ of mandamus would lie to require him to sign a bill,, and (2) that an injunction would lie to restrain him from signing a bill upon an application showing that he was about to sign an unconstitutional measure.
Such a construction would make the proceedings of the legislature subordinate to the judicial power. This proposition needs only to be stated to be its own refutation.
If the presiding officer of either house of the legislature may lawfully withhold his signature from a bill that had been regularly and properly passed by the house over which he presides, until after the sine die adjournment of the legislature, it would be within his power to defeat the passage of any bill by holding it until after the adjournment and then refusing or failing to sign it.
On the other hand, if this duty is one that must be performed during the session, and the presiding officer should refuse to sign it, he could be required to do so, or deposed from office-and another "presiding officer" elected, who would have authority and whose duty it woirld be to sign the bill.
One construction deprives the legislature of the power to control its presiding officers and lodges in either of them the power to defeat a bill otherwise regularly, lawfully and constitutionally passed.
The other permits the legislature to control its presiding officers and to require them to perform their duties.
The necessity for the presiding officers to sign an act before the constitutional term of the legislature has expired, seems to have been recognized by the presiding officers of the Senate and House of Representatives in signing House Bill No. 702, because, while it is admitted that each of these officers signed the bill at least twenty-four hours after the legislature adjourned sme die, the Speaker certified that it had "passed the House of Representatives this 28th day of May A. D., 1921," and the President of the Senate certified that it "passed the Senate this 2nd day of June A. D., 1921."
The use of the terms: "this 28th day of May," and "this 2nd day of June," means that these were the days and dates when the presiding officers affixed their signatures thereto.
If the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House had construed the constitutional requirement to mean that they could sign the bill any time after the adjournment óf the legislature sme die, the certificate of the Speaker of the House would have been and to this effect, "passed the House of Representatives the 28th day of May, A. D. 1921, "and "signed by me this 4th day of June A. D. 1921." And so of the signature of the president of the Senate.
The cases cited on both sides of the question under consideration, are not determinative, and no useful purpose would be served in discussing them. In some, the provi sions of the constitution differ from ours, in others a different situation was presented, and in two instances where the courts at one time held one way, later decisions seem to adopt or at least to favor a different rule.
We are firmly of the opinion that the presiding officer of either house of the legislature has no authority to sign a bill after the adjournment of the legislature sine die.
It is unfortunate that this situation has arisen, but this court has nothing to do with the manner in which the legislature performs its duties, and if it adjourns without having completed them, amopg which is to see that its presiding officers have signed all bills that have duly and properly passed both houses, it has allowed the bill to die, and this court cannot breathe into it the breath of life.
We are keenly alive to the seriousness involved in courts nullifying what purports to be a law enacted by the legislature, but we are as keenly alive to the sériousness involved in giving life by judicial sanction to such enactments when in their passage through the legislature all the constitutional requirements have not been observed. The rights of persons and property and human liberties, are not apt to be affected by legislative non-action, or by the failure of proposed legislation, but they may be seriously impaired if the courts sanction lax methods in attempting to enact laws, and treat as unessential, constitutional provisions governing the legislature and its officers in the enactment of laws.
The view which we take of this case precludes the determination of other questions involved.
As the requirements of Article III, Sec. 17 of the Constitution of Florida were not complied with, the act never became a law, and the judgment of the chancellor is affirmed.
Taylor and Ellis, J. J., concur.
Whitfield and West, J. J., dissent.