Case Name: STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Daniel Joe SANCHEZ, Defendant-Appellant
Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico
Jurisdiction: New Mexico
Decision Date: 1974-12-11
Citations: 87 N.M. 140
Docket Number: No. 1423
Parties: STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Daniel Joe SANCHEZ, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: HERNANDEZ, J., concurs.
Reporter: New Mexico Reports
Volume: 87
Pages: 140–143

Head Matter:
530 P.2d 404
STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Daniel Joe SANCHEZ, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 1423.
Court of Appeals of New Mexico.
Dec. 11, 1974.
Chester H. Walter, Jr., Chief Public Defender, Bruce L. Herr, Appellate Division, Don Klein, Associate Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, for defendant-appellant.
David L. Norvell, Atty. Gen., Andrea Buzzard, Jane E. Pendleton, Asst. Attys. Gen., Santa Fe, for plaintiff-appellee.

Opinion:
OPINION
LOPEZ, Judge.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of robbery while armed with a deadly weapon, to wit: a firearm, contrary to § 40A-16-2, N.M.S.A.1953 (2d Repl.Vol. 6, Supp. 1973) and § 40A-29-3.1, N.M.S.A.1953 (2d Repl.Vol. 6). Judgment and sentence were entered for robbery while armed with a deadly weapon, and defendant appeals. We affirm.
Defendant urges four points for reversal: (1) that the indictment was void, being based upon an unconstitutional statute; (2) that the defendant was improperly convicted and sentenced; (3) that the trial court erred in refusing to allow defendant to reexamine a witness; and (4) that the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion for a mistrial based upon alleged prosecutorial misconduct.
Constitutionality of § 40A-29-3.1, supra
Defendant contends that the combined use of § 40A-16-2, supra, and § 40A-29-3.1, supra, in the indictment unconstitutionally creates a new crime in violation of N.M. Const. Art. IV, § 18, which provides in part:
"No law shall be revised or amended, or the provisions thereof extended by reference to its title only; but each section thereof as revised, amended or extended shall be set out in full."
As further authority, defendant cites State v. Blea, 84 N.M. 595, 506 P.2d 339 (Ct.App.1973), wherein it is stated "that § 40A-29-3.1(A), supra, creates a new class of crimes." It is defendant's contention that the wording of the two statutes above, read together, creates a crime of robbery with a firearm, a third degree felony.
The Blea decision concerned the judicial application of § 40A-29-3.1, supra, for sentencing purposes to a conviction of statutory rape, as charged in the indictment. The problem in Blea was that the defendant was not charged in the indictment so as to advise him of the need to prepare his defense to meet the enhanced sentence imposed pursuant to § 40A-29-3.1, supra. The court in Blea did not declare the section unconstitutional but merely remanded the case to the lower court for resentencing in accordance with the crime with which the defendant had been convicted.
In the case at bar, no new crime is created by the combined use of § 40A-16-2 and 40A-29-3.1, supra, in the indictment. Section 40A-16-2, supra, defines robbery with a deadly weapon as a second degree felony. This is the crime of which defendant was convicted. Section 40A-29-3.1, supra, is superfluous to the indictment. It specifies various consequences for the defendant if a finding is made that the deadly weapon used in the robbery was, in fact, a firearm. The conviction rests upon § 40A-16-2, supra. Section 40A-29-3.1, supra, serves no other purpose in the indictment than to alert the defendant to the possible sentencing consequences following a conviction under § 40A-16-2, supra.
We hold that the defendant was validly indicted and that there was no violation of any constitutional provision.
Judgment and Sentence
The defendant asserts that the trial court sentenced him under both § 40A-16-2, supra, and § 40A-29-3.1, supra. The argument, as in point (1) above would have the court sentence defendant for robbery, a third degree felony, and thereafter apply the provisions of § 40A-29-3.1(B), supra. This is an improper reading of the effect of the two sections cited.
As we said in State v. Urban, 86 N.M. 351, 524 P.2d 523 (Ct.App.1974):
"The sentences imposed in this case . are authorized by § 40A-29-3, N.M.S.A.1953 (2d Repl.Vol. 6). There is nothing showing that § 40A — 29-3.-1(B), supra, has been applied to defendant's sentences. Defendant's claim that § 40A-29-3.1(B), supra, was applied to his sentences has no basis other than speculation. No reviewable question is presented. State v. Snow, 84 N.M. 399, 503 P.2d 1177 (Ct.App.1972)."
It is true that in the case at bar the jury found "that a firearm WAS used in the commission of this offense." There is, however, no indication that the trial court made any use of the provisions of § 40A-29-3.1, supra, in handing down the sentence. Defendant was sentenced to ten (10) to fifty (50) years imprisonment for "ROBBERY WHILE ARMED WITH A DEADLY WEAPON." Section 40A-16-2, supra. We hold that the judgment and sentence of the trial court were proper and are affirmed. State v. Urban, supra; see State v. Blea, supra. In so holding, we make no comment upon the defendant's assertion that sentencing under § 40A-29-3.1 (B), supra, enhances the penalty prescribed for conviction under § '40A-16-2, supra. As ' we view the record, that issue is not before us.
Recall of a Witness
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by refusing to recall a state witness for additional cross-examination. Defend ant apparently wished to attempt impeachment of the witness through his prior inconsistent testimony before the grand jury.
During the regular cross-examination defendant had ample opportunity to attempt to impeach the testimony of the witness. The defense did, in fact, cross-examine the witness on other topics. Further, the defense did not reserve the right to re-examine the witness. Our review is limited to consideration of matters disclosed by the record. State v. Buchanan, 78 N.M. 588, 435 P.2d 207 (1967); State v. Paul, 82 N.M. 619, 485 P.2d 375 (Ct.App. 1971). The matter of allowing recall and re-examination of a witness is within the trial court's discretion. State v. Rodriguez, 23 N.M. 156, 167 P. 426 (1917); State v. McAdams, 83 N.M. 544, 494 P.2d 622 (Ct.App.1972). After reviewing the record, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
\Motion for Mistrial
The district attorney asked the following question of a state witness :
"Q Didn't you state to that officer when you were questioned that you and the defendant, Mr. Sanchez, went to the Shell Service Station to buy some gas and that you went to sleep as you were leaving the Shell Service Station and that the next thing you remember is being at your house on Summer and that Mr. Sanchez, the defendant in this case, changed his shirt, shaved off his mustache — "
Defendant moved for a mistrial on the basis of this question, which motion was denied. The jury was instructed at that time to disregard the question and was later instructed that statements of counsel were not to be considered as evidence.
The transcript indicates that there was little, if any, prejudice created by the unanswered question. The admonition of the court to the jury adequately cured any prejudice which may have resulted. State v. Carlton, 83 N.M. 644, 495 P.2d 1091 (Ct.App. 1972). We hold that the trial court, in denying defendant's motion for a mistrial, did not abuse its discretion. State v. Thurman, 84 N.M. 5, 498 P.2d 697 (Ct. App.1972).
The conviction, judgment and sentence are affirmed.
It is so ordered.
HERNANDEZ, J., concurs.
SUTIN, Judge, specially concurring.