Case Name: ROBERT A. SHUPACK, P.A., Appellant, v. Herbert J. MARCUS, T. Patrick Ford, Jr., individually, and/or T. Patrick Ford, Jr., P.A., Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1992-10-13
Citations: 606 So. 2d 466
Docket Number: No. 91-568
Parties: ROBERT A. SHUPACK, P.A., Appellant, v. Herbert J. MARCUS, T. Patrick Ford, Jr., individually, and/or T. Patrick Ford, Jr., P.A., Appellees.
Judges: Before HUBBART, FERGUSON and GODERICH, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 606
Pages: 466–470

Head Matter:
ROBERT A. SHUPACK, P.A., Appellant, v. Herbert J. MARCUS, T. Patrick Ford, Jr., individually, and/or T. Patrick Ford, Jr., P.A., Appellees.
No. 91-568.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Oct. 13, 1992.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 13, 1992.
Lawrence B. Friedman, Miami, for appellant.
Badiak, Will & Kallen and John D. Fallen, North Miami, for appellee Herbert J. Marcus.
Thomas F. Martin, South Miami, for ap-pellee T. Patrick Ford, Jr., individually, and/or T. Patrick Ford, Jr., P.A.
Before HUBBART, FERGUSON and GODERICH, JJ.

Opinion:
CORRECTED OPINION
PER CURIAM.
The plaintiff, Robert A. Shupack, P.A., appeals the entry of final summary judgment in favor of the defendants, T. Patrick Ford, Jr., individually and/or T. Patrick Ford, Jr., P.A. [collectively referred to as Ford] and Herbert J. Marcus, and the denial of his motion for rehearing. We affirm.
On March 28, 1978, Judy and Lester Gunn [the clients] consulted with Marcus, an attorney, regarding a possible medical malpractice action against Jackson Memorial Hospital [JMH]. At that time, Marcus was employed by the plaintiff. The clients signed a contingency fee agreement which was executed by Marcus on behalf of the plaintiff. On March 31, 1978, the plaintiff sent notices of the medical malpractice claim against JMH to the various governmental agencies as required by law.
On April 11, 1978, the plaintiff and Marcus referred the clients' case to Ford. The three attorneys agreed that each would receive one-third of the attorney's fee. On April 13, 1978, the clients were advised of the fee sharing arrangement.
In early June, 1978, Marcus resigned and opened his own law practice. On June 14, 1978, the clients discharged the plaintiff. Thereafter, the clients signed a new contingency fee agreement with Marcus and Ford. On December 13, 1978, Marcus and Ford filed a complaint on behalf of the clients.
The case went to trial and resulted in a defense verdict on June 14, 1990. An appeal was filed, and on August 12, 1990, the case was settled. The trial court approved an award of $38,000.00 for attorneys' fees. The fees were distributed as follows: $15,-200.00 to Ford, $15,200.00 to Marcus, and $7,600.00 to the appellate counsel.
The plaintiff did not file a claim of lien for fees or costs incurred on behalf of the clients. The plaintiff, however, filed an action against Marcus on December 28, 1978. On April 6, 1983, the plaintiff amended its complaint adding Ford. The amended complaint set forth several causes of action, including an action seeking to declare that the fee sharing agreement is valid and enforceable.
The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. At that point, the only remaining issue was the validity and enforceability of the fee sharing agreement. The trial court granted the motion and entered final judgment in favor of Marcus and Ford. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion for rehearing and a motion to amend the amended complaint. Both motions were denied. The plaintiff appeals.
At the time the parties entered into the fee sharing agreement, such agreements were governed by Disciplinary Rule 2-107, Florida Bar Code of Professional Responsibility. Once the clients discharged the plaintiff and signed a new contingency fee agreement with Ford and Marcus, the fee sharing agreement failed to meet the requirements of Disciplinary Rule 2-107, and was, therefore, invalid. See Dade County v. Goldstein, 384 So.2d 183, 189 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (lead counsel may compensate co-counsel for legal services performed if done in accordance with DR 2-107); Bell v. Cristol, 373 So.2d 42 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (legal fees may be divided if agreement met the requirements of DR 2-107). See generally, Spence, Payne, Masington & Grossman, P.A. v. Philip M. Gerson, P.A., 483 So.2d 775 (Fla. 3d DCA) (agreement to employ attorney was void where agreement violated Section 877.02(1), Florida Statute (1981)), rev. denied, 492 So.2d 1334 (Fla.1986).
Accordingly, we affirm.
. Rule DR 2-107 reads as follows:
(A) A lawyer shall not divide a fee for legal services with another lawyer who is not a partner in or associate of his law firm or law office, unless:
(1) The client consents to employment of the other lawyer after a full disclosure that a division of fees will be made.
(2) The division is made in proportion to the services performed and responsibility assumed by each, provided that in case of the employment of an attorney for a contingent fee as defined in DR 2-106(E), a division of such fee may only be made between the attorneys involved when:
(a)The client consents in writing signed by him to employment of the other lawyer which writing shall fully disclose that a division of fees will be made and the basis upon which the division of fees will be made.
(b) Each lawyer agrees to assume the same legal responsibility to the client for the performance of the services in question as if he were a partner of the other attorney involved.
(c) Each lawyer involved shall be available to the client for consultation concerning the case.
(3)The total fee of the lawyers does not clearly exceed reasonable compensation for all legal services they rendered the client.
(B) This Disciplinary Rule does not prohibit payment to a former partner or associate pursuant to a separation or retirement agreement.
. We are mindful of the cases from other jurisdictions cited by the plaintiff. However, we find that these cases are factually distinguishable.