Case Name: Kenneth DINKINS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1990-09-04
Citations: 566 So. 2d 859
Docket Number: No. 89-1731
Parties: Kenneth DINKINS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: MINER, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 566
Pages: 859–861

Head Matter:
Kenneth DINKINS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 89-1731.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Sept. 4, 1990.
Roberto A. Arias, Jacksonville, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen. and Virlindia A. Sample, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Opinion:
WENTWORTH, Judge.
Appellant seeks review of a judgment of conviction and sentence for burglary, asserting reversible error in the jury selection process because the state peremptorily excused a black juror. Because appellant failed in his initial burden of demonstrating a strong likelihood that the juror was struck solely because of race, we find no error in the court's refusal to conduct an inquiry pursuant to State v. Neil, 457 So.2d 481 (Fla.1984).
During voir dire the state peremptorily excused a black juror. Appellant did not formally object or request a Neil inquiry. Appellant's counsel merely stated "for purposes of the record I would like to state that my client is a member of [a] cognizable racial group. The state has struck the first person of that racial group that's in the jury panel. They have offered no reasons for that strike." The court responded, "[tjhat's not significant enough for me to make an inquiry," and did not question the state. After the jury was accepted the state voluntarily disclosed its reasons for the challenge. No response was made by defense counsel. The trial proceeded and appellant was found guilty and sentenced.
The first question which this case presents is whether appellant properly objected to the state's exercise of the challenge. While counsel's statements might otherwise be insufficient to preserve the issue for appeal, the trial court's response indicates that the statements were understood to be an objection. We will therefore treat this issue as being preserved for appellate review. See Smith v. State, 562 So.2d 787 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Adams v. State, 559 So.2d 1293 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990).
Appellant contends that based on his assertions made after the black juror was struck, the court should have conducted an inquiry pursuant to State v. Neil, supra. In Neil, the court established the procedure to be followed when a party seeks to challenge the opposing party's peremptory ex-cusáis. Initially,
[a] party concerned about the other side's use of peremptory challenges must make a timely objection and demonstrate on the record that the challenged persons are members of a distinct racial group and that there is a strong likelihood that they have been challenged solely because of their race.
Id. at 486. Once this initial burden has been met, the burden shifts to the party making the peremptory challenge to show that the questioned challenge was not exercised solely because of the juror's race.
In the present case the trial court refused to inquire into the state's motives for the challenge. The court apparently found that appellant, defendant below, had failed to demonstrate the requisite likelihood that the black juror was challenged by the state solely on the grounds of race. This burden must be met by defendant before the trial court is required to inquire into the state's reasons for the challenge. State v. Neil, supra. Within the limitations imposed by Neil, the trial court has broad discretion in determining whether the defendant has met this burden. See Reed v. State, 560 So.2d 203 (Fla.1990). In this case appellant relied solely on the fact that the excused juror was black, which was insufficient to carry his initial burden under Neil. See Riggins v. State, 557 So.2d 185 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Reynolds v. State, 555 So.2d 918 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). Since appellant failed to satisfy his initial burden, the trial court did not err by declining to inquire into the state's motives for the challenge.
Here, unlike Smith v. State, 562 So.2d 787 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), because appellant failed in his initial burden, there was and is no need to examine the motives expressed by the state after the jury was accepted. In Smith, supra, the trial court requested that the state "voluntarily" give its reasons for the juror strike, while in the present case the court found no indication of improper motives sufficient to require such an inquiry.
The order appealed is affirmed.
MINER, J., concurs.
ERVIN, J., dissents with written opinion.