Case Name: Danny GILMORE, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
Court: Texas Courts of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 2001-10-04
Citations: 68 S.W.3d 741
Docket Number: No. 14-99-00895-CR
Parties: Danny GILMORE, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
Judges: Panel consists of Justices EDELMAN, FROST, and Senior Chief Justice MURPHY.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Third Series
Volume: 68
Pages: 741–747

Head Matter:
Danny GILMORE, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
No. 14-99-00895-CR.
Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (14th Dist.).
Oct. 4, 2001.
Joseph Salhab, Cornelius & Salhab, Houston, for appellant.
B. Warren Goodson, Jr., Galveston, for appellee.
Panel consists of Justices EDELMAN, FROST, and Senior Chief Justice MURPHY.
. Senior Chief Justice Paul C. Murphy sitting by assignment.

Opinion:
MAJORITY OPINION
PAUL C. MURPHY, Senior Chief Justice (Assigned).
A jury found appellant guilty of murder, and assessed punishment at life imprisonment. On appeal, appellant raises two points of error. First, appellant argues that the trial court's charge to the jury regarding the effect of "good-conduct time" on parole eligibility is unconstitutional as applied to his case. Second, appellant argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. We affirm.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that his time in prison might be reduced through the award of good conduct time because appellant was not eligible for such a reduction while serving a prison sentence for murder. Appellant did not object to the instruction at trial. Appellant's argument is not entirely without merit.
Because appellant did not object to the jury charge instruction, the appropriate standard of review is the statutory one for fundamental error in the charge. Article 36.19 of the Code of Criminal Procedure establishes the standard for fundamental error in the court's charge: "the judgment shall not be reversed . unless it appears from the record that the defendant has not had a fair and impartial trial." It is appellant's burden on appeal to show the erroneous charge resulted in such egregious harm that he did not receive a fair and impartial trial. See Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex.Crim.App.1984). This he has not done.
The First Court of Appeals, in Jimenez v. State, held that "the court's charge to the jury on good-conduct time as mandated in article 37.07, section 4(a) is unconstitutional ." because it required an instruction that is an incorrect statement of the law under the facts of the case. 992 S.W.2d 633, 638 (Tex.App.—Houston[1st Dist.] 1999), affirmed on other grounds, 32 S.W.3d 233 (Tex.Crim.App.2000). We have, however, considered this issue and determined that the "good-conduct time" instruction, mandated by article 37.07 is not unconstitutional.
In Edwards v. State, we held that article 37.07 did not violate appellant's due process rights because the instruction as a whole correctly described the calculation of parole eligibility and the role of "good-conduct" time in reducing the period of incarceration. 10 S.W.3d 699, 705 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. granted.). Specifically, the jury in Edwards was warned that the award of good conduct time cannot be predicted and they should not consider the extent to which good conduct time might be awarded to appellant. Id. The same information was provided to the jury in deciding appellant's punishment. Thus, the same rationale is applicable in our case. Accordingly, appellant has not shown egregious harm. Therefore, we overrule appellant's first point of error.
In appellant's second point of error, he asserts that his attorney's failure to request a continuance after the discovery of the murder weapon amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel denying him a fair trial. We disagree.
Appellant, in order to prevail on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, must establish that 1) trial counsel's acts or omissions fell outside the range of reasonably competent professional assistance, and 2) there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different absent counsel's deficiencies. Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 812-13 (Tex.Crim.App.1999). Appellant fails to satisfy the first prong of this test.
When appellant's trial counsel became aware of the existence of the murder weapon, he moved for a continuance until a ballistics test could be performed, or, in the alternative, a mistrial. The trial court granted a one and one-half hour recess, during which time the State determined how quickly a ballistics test could be performed. After the recess, the State informed the trial court that a ballistics test could be run on the gun the same day. The trial court then recessed until Thursday (two days later) so that test could be performed. Moreover, two defense attorneys were present when the ballistics test was conducted. There is nothing in the record to indicate that appellant's trial counsel's acts or omissions fell outside the range of reasonably competent professional assistance. Accordingly, we overrule appellant's second point of error.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.