Case Name: Isaac Bishop v. George D. Becker
Court: Hamilton County Circuit Court
Jurisdiction: Ohio
Decision Date: 1911-07-29
Citations: 14 Ohio C.C. (n.s.) 404
Docket Number: 
Parties: Isaac Bishop v. George D. Becker.
Judges: Jones, J.; Smith, P. J., and Swing, J., concur.
Reporter: Ohio Circuit Court Reports (new series)
Volume: 14
Pages: 404–405

Head Matter:
AS TO NEGLIGENCE IN LITTERING SIDEWALK WITH SAND.
Circuit Court of Hamilton County.
Isaac Bishop v. George D. Becker.
Decided, July 29, 1911.
Negligence — Gleaning Exterior of Buildings by Sand-blast — Ordinary Gare — Weight of Evidence.
It is not negligence per se to clean the exterior of a building by the sand-blast process, and a court will not presume such manifest danger arising therefrom to persons passing along the sidewalk below as would require more than ordinary care on the part of those operating the device.
Prescott Smith, for plaintiff in error.
W. A. Rinckhof, contra.
The plaintiff alleged that while passing a building, the walls of which were being cleaned by the defendant by the sand blast process, he fell'upon the sidewalk and sustained serious injuries. The- fall was alleged to have been due to the littering of the sidewalk with sand, pebbles and gravel which had been thrown against the building by the process employed. The jury found for the plaintiff and judgment was given thereon.
Jones, J.; Smith, P. J., and Swing, J., concur.

Opinion:
We have searched the record of this proceeding in vain for any evidence of negligence on the part of plaintiff in error.
One of the plaintiff's witnesses below testified that there was a man with a broom' sweeping sand from the sidewalk.
Another testified that they tried to catch all the falling sand by means of a canvas, but that same was impossible. He said "they tried to catch it all but couldn't."
We are not asked to hold, nor could we, that the cleaning of the exterior of a building on a public thoroughfare hy sand-hlasting is negligence per se. It seems that only upon such doctrine could the verdict in this case be sustained.
There is no evidence to show that sand scattered upon a stone walk is dangerous to pedestrians and we can not presume such manifest danger as would require of the defendant below extraordinary care.
Ordinary care is that degree of care which is commensurate with the danger naturally and necessarily connected with the act complained of.
There is a lack of evidence showing want of such care in this case and the judgment will be reversed.