Case Name: EMMCO INSURANCE COMPANY, an Indiana Corporation, Appellant, v. SOUTHERN TERMINAL AND TRANSPORT COMPANY, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1976-04-13
Citations: 333 So. 2d 80
Docket Number: No. Z-302
Parties: EMMCO INSURANCE COMPANY, an Indiana Corporation, Appellant, v. SOUTHERN TERMINAL AND TRANSPORT COMPANY, Appellee.
Judges: COX, JOHN S., Associate Judge, concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 333
Pages: 80–83

Head Matter:
EMMCO INSURANCE COMPANY, an Indiana Corporation, Appellant, v. SOUTHERN TERMINAL AND TRANSPORT COMPANY, Appellee.
No. Z-302.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
April 13, 1976.
Rehearing Denied June 30, 1976.
James M. McLean, of Rogers, Towers, Bailey, Jones & Gay, Jacksonville, for appellant.
William C. Owen, of McClure & Wig-ginton, Roy T. Rhodes, of Rhodes, Stephens & Bryant, J. Ben Watkins, of Watkins, Hill & Marts, Guyte P. McCord, III and Sam Spector, Tallahassee, for appellee.

Opinion:
SMITH, Judge.
Emmco, a marine insurer, appeals from a final summary judgment entered against it and in favor of appellee Southern for benefits payable under a protection and indemnity (P&I) rider on a policy insuring against liability, to the extent of their hull value, specified tugs and barges of Southern. Following a Mississippi River collision in which Southern's insured tug SUZANNE was at fault while towing Southern's uninsured barge CHEM-III, Emmco paid under the tug hull policy to the extent of the tug's hull value, less appropriate deductibles. However, since the collision arose out of and had a relation to towage by the SUZANNE of the CHEM-III, Emmco declined coverage under the P&I rider, which provided in relevant part as follows:
"The Assurer hereby undertakes to make good to the Assured . all such loss and/or damage . as the Assured shall as owners of the vessel named herein have become liable to pay and shall pay on account of .
"(4) Liability for loss of, or damage to, any other vessel or craft caused by collision with the vessel named herein, insofar as such liability would not be covered by full insurance under the [companion policies] . . . ."
"Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this policy, no liability attaches to the Assurer:
"For any loss, damage, expense or claim arising out of or having relation to the towage of any other vessel or craft ." (Emphasis in original.)
The trial court held that, since Emmco knew Southern's business is towage, there is an irreconcilable conflict or ambiguity between the insuring clause and the exclusion. The court therefore determined that the ambiguity should be resolved favorably to the insured, e. g., Nixon v. United States Fid. and Guar. Co., 290 So.2d 26 (Fla.1973), and entered judgment for the difference between the amount paid by Emmco in hull coverage and the amount of Southern's liability, plus attorney's fees and costs.
Clearly, the P&I policy insured Southern against liability for the fault of the SUZANNE, to the amount by which Southern's liability exceeded the hull coverage and did not exceed liability limits, not here pertinent, unless the loss was excluded from coverage as "one arising out of or having relation to the towage of any other vessel or craft." The policy unambiguously insured against liability for "the vessel named herein," and the SUZANNE was one of numerous tugs and barges, not including the CHEM-III, named in a schedule attached.
The critical question is whether there is an irreconcilable conflict between the insuring clause and the exclusion, as found by the trial court. We conceive that the exclusion clause may be given meaning which does not entirely defeat the insuring clause and, consequently, that neither should be held to cancel the other.
It is significant that the P&I rider is in a form designed primarily for the insuring of a single vessel, hence its repeated references to "the vessel named herein." We may therefore read the rider as though it listed and referred to the SUZANNE alone, because the CHEM-III, though surely a vessel, was not one "named herein" for which a premium was paid and P&I insurance provided. So clarified, the exclusion clause may be seen as negating coverage for any loss "arising out of or having relation to the towage of any other vessel or craft" except the insured vessel, the SUZANNE. The same language also excludes P&I coverage for a loss having relation to the SUZANNE's towage of the uninsured CHEM-III. Had the CHEM-III been insured by the P&I policy and at fault in the collision, e. g., Bisso v. Waterways Trans. Co., 235 F.2d 741 (5th Cir., 1956), P&I coverage would have attached regardless of whether the SUZANNE had been either at fault or insured. Similarly, had the insured SUZANNE been at fault when towing one of the "vessel [s] named herein," including any one of the several barges for which a P&I premium was paid, the collision could not be said to have arisen out of or in relation to the towage of "any other vessel or craft," as that phrase is employed in the rider, and there likewise would have been coverage. But in the absence of irreconcilable ambiguity, we are not at liberty to cancel entirely the explicit exclusion in the rider and thus convert the policy to one indiscriminately covering all towing activities of Southern's tugs, whether of insured barges or otherwise. The risk of collision and of damage by collision is affected by the towing relationship, as a combined tug and tow has reduced maneuverability and creates maneuvering problems for other vessels. G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of Admiralty, § 7-14, at 424 (1957). This being so, a marine insurer may competently contract to limit its liability to those collisions in which a premium has been paid for both tug and barge. We believe that was done in this case.
We have considered whether the exclusion clause is susceptible to yet another construction favorable to the insured, which of course would require affirmance of the trial court's judgment. The only remaining hypothesis suggested or occurring to us is that the exclusion clause's reference to loss "arising out of or having relation to the towage of any other vessel or craft" is in truth a reference to "[such] other vessel or craft," meaning the "other vessel or craft" which was damaged in the collision giving rise to Southern's liability. It would require the addition of only one word to the policy to effect this transformation, but we are unauthorized to add or subtract even one word from the bargain.
The judgment for Southern will be vacated and the cause remanded for entry of judgment for Emmco.
REVERSED.
COX, JOHN S., Associate Judge, concurs.
BOYER, C. J., dissents.