Case Name: KIKUCHI v. RITCHIE
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1913-02-17
Citations: 202 F. 857
Docket Number: No. 2,165
Parties: KIKUCHI v. RITCHIE.
Judges: Before GILBERT, ROSS, and MORROW, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: Federal Reporter
Volume: 202
Pages: 857–862

Head Matter:
KIKUCHI v. RITCHIE.
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
February 17, 1913.)
No. 2,165.
1. Attorney and Client (§ 96 ) — Contract of Retainer — Construction.
A sealing vessel having been seized, condemned, and her master and crew confined under a conviction and commitment for violating the United States sealing laws, the master executed a written contract retaining plaintiff as proctor and attorney for the schooner, the captain, officers, and crew; plaintiff agreeing to appear as proctor in admiralty to resist the forfeiture of the schooner in the District Court of Alaska and to undertake to secure the discharge of the captain and crew from imprisonment. The contract provided that plaintiff was tó receive $1,000 if the captain and crew were obliged to serve out their term of imprisonment, but the schooner was released on payment of $500 and costs, • and, if the discharge of the captain and crew was secured before the expiration of their sentences and the -entire prosecution and forfeiture abandoned and the schooner released without a fine, the attorney was to receive $1,500 and a deposit for costs, and, if the forfeiture case was appealed, the attorney was to receive such further compensation as should be agreed on with the owner. .Held, that the first clause of the agreement by which plaintiff was retained as proctor and attorney ⅛ all matters arising out of the alleged law violation referred only to the services contemplated in the District Court thereafter' specified in the contract, and not to services in the appellate court in case of an appeal.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Attorney and Client, Cent. Dig. §§ 139, 186-189; Dec. Dig. § 96. ]
2., Attorney and Client (§ 134 ) — Contract of Retainer — Breach—Measure of Damages.
The general rule, that the measure of damages in case of an employer’s breach of a contract for personal employment is the difference between what the employs received or might have received from others and the price agreed on, does not generally apply to breach of a contract for attorney’s services, but did apply to a contract for the employment of an attorney to prosecute an appeal, which was broken by renunciation before anything was done under it and before performance became due.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Attorney and Client, Cent. Dig. §§ 301-304; Dec. Dig. § 134. ]
3. Attorney and Client (§ 134 ) — Contract—Construction.
An attorney's contract of employment, after providing that he should render certain services in the District Court of Alaska for the release of the captain and crew of a schooner and the discharge of the schooner from forfeiture, provided that if the forfeiture case was appealed the attorney was to receive such further compensation as might be agreed on with the owner. Held that, since the instrument left the amount of compensation to be paid in case of an appeal to be determined by subsequent negotiation, tbe contract, so far as tbe appeal was concerned, was not complete, and the attorney could not recover damages for the client’s employment of other counsel to prosecute the appeal.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Attorney and Client, Cent. Dig. §§ 301-304; Dee. Dig. § 184. ] .
Ross, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Third Division of the Territory of Alaska; Edward'E. Cushman, Judge.
Action by E. E. Ritchie against Choemon Kilcuchi. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.
Reversed and remanded, with instructions.
The defendant in error brought an action against the plaintiff -in error to recover damages for breach of a contract of employment as an attorney at law to render services for the plaintiff in error in certain litigation, alleging the value .of the services which he was willing to have rendered, and which he would have rendered, had he not been prevented by the plaintiff in error, to be the sum of $1,800, of which $200 had been paid, and alleging his damages for the breach of the contract in that sum. The contract' was in writing and was as follows:
“Valdez, Alaska, November 12, 1910.
“Matsutaro Numasaki, master of the schooner Tokai Maru, seized by United States officers as forfeited for violation of the Alien Fishing Law of the United States, hereby retains E. E. Ritchie as pvoctor and attorney for said schooner and her captain, officers and crew, in all matters arising out of the alleged law violation.
“The said E. E. Ritchie agrees to appear as proctor in admiralty to resist the forfeiture of said schooner, in the District Court of Alaska.- He also agrees to undertake to secure the discharge from further imprisonment of said captain and crew, now confined in the federal jail at Valdez, Alaska, under an alleged conviction and commitment for violation of said fishing law. For the foregoing services it is agreed that said Ritchie is to receive the following compensation:
“If the said captain and crew are obliged to serve out their time and the release of said schooner is secured iu the District Court of Alaska on payment of the fine of five hundred dollars and costs, the said attorney is to receive one thousand dollars ($1,000) American money. If the discharge of said captain and crew is secured before the expiration of their sentences and the entire prosecution and forfeiture abandoned and said schooner released without fine, said attorney is to receive fifteen hundred dollars, American money, and the $245 already deposited for costs. If the forfeiture case goes to the Appellate Courts said attorney is to receive such further compensation as may be agreed on with the owner.
“[Signed] E. E. -Ritchie.
“[And the captain’s signature in Japanese.]
' “Witness: W. Kino.”
A demurrer to the complaint for want of facts sufficient to state a cause of action was overruled. Upon a trial had before a jury the defendant in error recovered judgment in the sum of $800.
Thomas R. Shepard, of Valdez, Alaska, and James Kiefer, of Seattle, Wash., for plaintiff in error.
John B. Van Dyke and Josiah Thomas, both of Seattle, Wash., and John Lyons and T. P. Geraghty, both of Valdez, Alaska, for defendant in error.
Before GILBERT, ROSS, and MORROW, Circuit Judges.
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am, Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
GILBERT, Circuit Judge
(after stating the facts as above). Error is assigned to the order of the court overruling the demurrer, and.to the instructions of the court to the jury whereby they were told that the contract contemplated that the defendant in error, if the case went to the Circuit Court of Appeals, should represent the plaintiff in error in that court.
The first clause of the agreement, whereby the defendant in error was retained as proctor and attorney "in all matters arising out of the alleged law violation," evidently refers only to the various services that were to be rendered in the District Court which were thereafter in the agreement specified, and not to services in an appellate court in case of an appeal. Kamm v. Stark, 1 Sawy. 547, Fed. Cas. No. 7,604; Berthold v. Fox, 21 Minn. 51; Hillegass v. Bender, 78 Ind. 225. It is not disputed that for all those services the defendant in error has received the compensation which was agreed upon. Jlis right to recover in the present action depends upon the construction to be placed upon the final clause, which is:
'"If the forfeiture ease goes to the appellate courts said attorney is to receive such further compensation as may be agreed on with the owner."-
The general rule as to damages in cases of breach of contract for personal employment is that the employé can recover only the difference between what he received or might have received from others and the price agreed upon. But the contract of employment of an attorney by a client is recognized as an exception to the rule. One reason for the exception is that such service is not easily partible or apportioned to the time or the labor performed or to he performed hy the attorney. Another reason is that often the most difficult and valuable services of the attorney to his client are rendered in advising him of his legal rights before any papers are prepared or appearances made in court. Another is that by the contract the attorney loses the possible opportunity of employment by the adversary party. Many cases hold that where, after preliminary services have been rendered under such a contract, the client without valid excuse discharges the attorney, the latter is entitled to recover the full contract price. Kersey v. Garton, 77 Mo. 645; Pennington v. Underwood, 56 Ark. 53, 19 S. W. 108; Walsh v. Shumway; 65 Ill. 471; Carter v. Baldwin, 95 Cal. 475, 30 Pac. 595; Moyer v. Cantieny, 41 Minn. 242, 42 N. W. 1060; Myers v. Crockett, 14 Tex. 257; Weeks on Attorneys at Law, § 366. But if it were conceded that the defendant in error here had a contract to render services on the appeal, none of the reasons on which the foregoing decisions are based would apply to the present case, for the contract was broken by renunciation before anything was done and before performance became due. The instrument, in referring to services on appeal, referred entirely to services that were to be rendered in the future. There is no allegation in the complaint that the plaintiff ever did render any services on the appeal. He rested his right to recover wholly upon the breach of his alleged contract for future services. In such a case the general rule should apply that the adverse party may recover only the damages occasioned by the breach, and not the value of the services which he would have been called upon to render in the future.
But as we'read the agreement between the parties there was no contract with reference to any services to be rendered by the attorney after the final judgment in the District Court. 'The subject of the services to be rendered by him in case of an appeal was one upon which the minds of the contracting parties never met. The instrument shows that as to the appeal there was no present intention upon the part of the plaintiff in error to assume liability. Agreement is the essential element of every genuine contract. The terms thereof must be complete. Here there was no binding promise on the part of the attorney to render services and no promise on the part of the client to pay therefor. The matter of such subsequent employment and services, as well as the amount of the attorney's compensation, was by the instrument left open to future agreement. There is no ground for holding that the client thereby assumed liability for the payment of reasonable attorney's fees on the appeal. He never assented to that. He reserved the right, if he should thereafter call upon the defendant in error to take an appeal, to have the amount of his liability for attorney's fees first fixed and agreed upon, and therewith he reserved the right to reject the services if no agreement were made. An instrument which leaves the amount of compensation to be determined by subsequent negotiation is not complete. Wardell v. Williams, 62 Mich. 50, 28 N. W. 796, 4 Am. St. Rep. 814; Gunn v. Newcomb, 82 Iowa, 468, 48 N. W. 989. The plaintiff in error so understood the contract in this case and called upon the defendant in error to render no service on the appeal, but engaged other attorneys.
The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded, with instructions to sustain the demurrer to the complaint.