Case Name: Roderick D. LEE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2003-08-15
Citations: 854 So. 2d 709
Docket Number: No. 2D00-1430
Parties: Roderick D. LEE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: STRINGER, J., Concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 854
Pages: 709–719

Head Matter:
Roderick D. LEE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 2D00-1430.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Aug. 15, 2003.
Elliott C. Metcalfe, Jr., Public Defender, and Christopher E. Cosden, Assistant Public Defender, Sarasota, for Appellant.
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Jennifer R. Haymes, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Ap-pellee.

Opinion:
SILBERMAN, Judge.
Roderick Lee appeals from a commitment order placing him in the custody of the Department of Children and Family Services pursuant to section 394.917(2), Florida Statutes (1999). That statute is contained in part V of chapter 394, which is commonly referred to as the "Jimmy Ryce Act" (the Act). Although Lee raises numerous substantive and procedural issues, none require reversal. As a result, we affirm the commitment order.
On March 30, 1999, the State commenced involuntary civil commitment proceedings against Lee pursuant to the Act. The petition for a probable cause determination alleged that Lee had been convicted of three counts of lewd, lascivious, or indecent act or assault upon a child under sixteen years of age and that he suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes him likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if not confined to a secure facility for long-term control, care, and treatment.
Prior to trial, Lee filed a motion requesting that "certain novel and allegedly scientific evidence" derived from tests or measuring devices that had been administered to him be excluded .from evidence. These tests included several instruments: the Rapid Risk Assessment for Sex Offense Recidivism (RRÁSOR), the Minnesota Sex Offender Screening Tool-Revised (MnSOST-R), the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide (VRAG), and the Sex Offense Risk Appraisal Guide (SORAG). Lee also challenged the admissibility of the Hare Psychopathy ChecklisNRevised (PCL-R). Lee asserted that these instruments had not gained acceptance in the relevant scientific community and that the State could not properly use them to establish his future sexual dangerousness or his classification as a sexually violent predator.
After conducting a Frye hearing, the trial court denied Lee's motion. The trial court concluded that the use of the instruments was not based on a new or novel scientific principle within the purview of Ramirez v. State, 651 So.2d 1164 (Fla.1995), and that the instruments had sufficient general scientific acceptance among experts who deal with sexually violent or dangerous individuals to satisfy the State's burden of proof. The trial court denied Lee's other objections, finding that they went to the weight of the evidence and not to its admissibility.
Lee also filed numerous motions attacking the constitutionality of the Act and seeking to exclude or limit the admission of certain evidence at the commitment trial. These motions were denied.
During the trial, the State presented evidence that Lee was at a very high risk of reoffending without secure residential treatment, that residential treatment was required, and that Lee suffered from a mental abnormality. In formulating their opinions, the State's experts reviewed records relating to Lee's prior offenses and interviewed Lee. The experts testified that Lee had repeatedly approached young boys and fondled their genitals, masturbating some of the victims. They described Lee's attraction to and molestation of boys and the significance of his prior offenses in predicting sexual reoffense. They stated that Lee's history was indicative of a very powerful urge to engage in the described behavior, and Lee was a high risk to repeat the behavior in the future. The State's and Lee's experts agreed that a person's prior sexual offenses and history are the single biggest or the best predictor of the person's future behavior, although one of Lee's experts stated that there are no highly accurate predictors.
While Lee denied any attraction to children, there was evidence that he harbored cognitive distortions about his conduct and characterized himself as a protector of children. The evidence also showed that he derived pleasure or satisfaction from committing sexual acts on children, and according to expert testimony, his distorted beliefs allowed him to engage in deviant behavior.
One expert diagnosed Lee as suffering from pedophilia and a personality disorder with antisocial and possibly paranoid features that placed him at a very high risk to commit future acts of sexual violence without secure residential treatment. The expert opined that Lee's severe cognitive distortions were a serious risk factor but that Lee was treatable and residential treatment was necessary.
Another expert diagnosed a sexual disorder and pedophilic tendencies, although the expert stated that he could not definitively diagnose Lee with pedophilia. The expert concluded that Lee had very poor impulse control, poor judgment, and strong deviant characteristics. He reiterated that Lee had difficulty controlling his inappropriate behavior and was a high probability risk for sexual recidivism. The expert testified that Lee believed he did not need treatment, and even if it were offered on an outpatient basis, he would not participate because he did not see himself as having a sexual disorder. A defense expert acknowledged that Lee had a high likelihood for reoffending due to his multiple sex offenses, his denial of responsibility, and his refusal of treatment.
The jury unanimously found that Lee was a sexually violent predator in need of commitment. On that basis, the trial court entered the commitment order.
In this appeal, Lee first challenges the trial court's admission of the State's scientific evidence, arguing that the evidence was unreliable and untested. When expert opinion testimony involves new or novel scientific principles, the trial court must use a four-step process to determine whether the testimony is admissible. Ramirez, 651 So.2d at 1166. The trial court must determine the following: (1) whether the expert testimony will assist the jury in understanding the evidence or in determining a fact that is at issue; (2) whether the expert's testimony is based on a scientific principle or discovery that has gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs; and (3) whether the witness is qualified as an expert to present opinion testimony on the subject at issue. Id. at 1166-67. If the first three steps are satisfied, then as the fourth step the trial court may allow the expert to render an opinion on the subject of his or her expertise, and the jury is then able to determine the expert's credibility and accept or reject the testimony. Id. at 1167.
As the proponent of the evidence, the State bears the burden of establishing the general acceptance of the underlying scientific principle and the testing procedures that were used to apply that principle to the facts of the case. Id. at 1168. The question of general acceptance must be established by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. Reliability of the evidence is fundamental to the issues involved in the question of admissibility. Hadden v. State, 690 So.2d 573, 578 (Fla.1997). Evidence that is "based on a novel scientific theory is inherently unreliable and inadmissible in a legal proceeding in Florida unless the theory has been adequately tested and accepted by the relevant scientific community." Ramirez v. State, 810 So.2d 836, 843 (Fla.2001).
Although there were conflicts in the evidence as to the reliability of the tests and the conclusions drawn by the experts, we conclude that the trial court did not err by allowing the test results to be presented to the jury as part of the experts' testimony. See Jackson v. State, 833 So.2d 243, 246 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (upholding the trial court's determination that the actuarial instruments "are generally accepted in the relevant scientific community as part of the overall risk assessment for sexual predators"). However, even if there were any error regarding the Frye analysis and the admissibility of actuarial evidence, a harmless error analysis must be undertaken. See Green v. State, 826 So.2d 351, 353 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002).
The expert witnesses discussed their clinical evaluations of Lee, the results of tests that were administered to him, and the basis for their conclusions and recommendations. While they differed in their views of the value of the test results, they acknowledged that the results were useful as one part of the evaluation process and to verify the conclusions that were reached. The record contains substantial evidence, apart from the test results, supporting the State's claim that Lee met the requirements for commitment under the Act. We are satisfied that even if there were any error in the admission of the test results, the error would be harmless. See In re Commitment of Williams, 841 So.2d ,531 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (determining that any error in the admission of the results of risk assessment instruments was harmless).
Lee next argues that the trial court erred in admitting unreliable hearsay evidence pursuant to section 394.9155(5), Florida Statutes (1999). That statute allows the admission of hearsay in civil commitment proceedings unless the trial court finds that the evidence is not reliable, and it prohibits the use of hearsay as the sole basis for commitment. Lee also challenges the constitutionality of section 394.9155(5) on due process, equal protection, and separation of powers grounds.
The State responds that the hearsay evidence discussed by the experts was admissible pursuant to the statute; the expert's opinions were not being used as conduits for otherwise inadmissible evidence; and in accordance with the requirement of section 394.9155(5), hearsay evidence was not the sole basis for Lee's commitment. The State also notes that experts are permitted to base their opinions or inferences on facts or data that may not be admissible into evidence, if the facts or data are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the subject to support their opinions. See § 90.704, Fla. Stat. (1999); Riggins v. Mariner Boat Works, Inc., 545 So.2d 430, 431-32 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); Bender v. State, 472 So.2d 1370, 1371 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985).
The record reflects that the trial court carefully analyzed the hearsay evidence that the State offered pursuant to section 394.9155(5). The court considered Lee's objections and challenges, and it excluded unreliable hearsay and hearsay that was irrelevant to the proceeding. The record also reflects that Lee did not dispute the accuracy or reliability of much of the hearsay evidence that was presented and that hearsay was not the sole basis of the commitment.
Although no Florida case directly addresses the constitutionality of section 394.9155(5), in People v. Otto, 26 Cal.4th 200, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 327, 26 P.3d 1061 (2001), the California Supreme Court considered arguments against a similar statute that permitted the use of hearsay in sexually violent predator commitment proceedings in California. The court noted that a defendant in a civil commitment proceeding is entitled to due process protections because the proceeding involves a significant deprivation of liberty. Id., 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 327, 26 P.3d at 1067. However, after analyzing the constitutional issues that were implicated by the California statute, the court concluded that the statute met constitutional requirements.
While Lee argues generally against the constitutionality of section 394.9155(5), he points to no authority that applies in the context of a civil commitment proceeding to support his conclusion. For the same reasons expressed in Otto, we conclude that Lee has not demonstrated the existence of any constitutional infirmity arising from section 394.9155(5); the protections afforded by the statute and the role of the trial court to exclude unreliable hearsay evidence suffice to meet constitutional re quirements.
Apart from the constitutional issues, Lee argues that the experts should not have been allowed to testify regarding factual details relating to his prior offenses that were contained in documents that the experts had reviewed. He also argues that the trial court erred in allowing the State to refer to his prior offenses during its opening statement and closing argument. Relying on Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997), and Brown v. State, 719 So.2d 882 (Fla.1998), Lee asserts that the trial court should have excluded evidence of his prior sexual offenses in exchange for his offer to stipulate to those convictions as establishing one of the elements required for commitment under the Act. The State counters that the experts necessarily had to consider certain details of Lee's prior offenses in formulating their opinions and that the evidence was specifically relevant to and probative of the issues involved in the commitment proceeding. The experts confirmed that the information was relevant and necessary in order to formulate their opinions and that Lee's past history was the best predictor of his future conduct.
There was no finding by the trial court, and there is little in the record to support Lee's argument, that the information utilized by the experts was unreliable. The evidence was admissible under section 394.9155(5), and it was of the type appropriately used by experts in formulating their opinions in commitment cases. Also, there was ample nonhearsay evidence presented to support the commitment. See Williams, 841 So.2d at 532; People v. Otto, 26 Cal.4th 200, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 327, 26 P.3d 1061.
Courts in other states have held that evidence as to prior offenses is properly presented at a commitment proceeding because the evidence is directly relevant to and highly probative of the issues that are involved, and any prejudice does not outweigh the probative value of the evidence. See In re Detention of Turay, 139 Wash.2d 379, 986 P.2d 790, 801-02 (1999); see also In re Detention of Williams, 628 N.W.2d 447, 457 (Iowa 2001); In re Hay, 263 Kan. 822, 953 P.2d 666, 677-78 (1998). Additionally, the cases cited by Lee, Old Chief and Brown, involved criminal prosecutions rather than civil commitment proceedings and are not controlling here. Indeed, in Westerheide v. State, 831 So.2d 93, 100 (Fla.2002), the Florida Supreme Court reiterated that proceedings under the Act are civil in nature. The proceedings are designed to address the risk that sexually violent predators pose to society and to provide for the long-term care and treatment for such individuals. Id. We conclude, based on the nature of commitment proceedings and the manner in which the evidence was addressed at trial, that Lee has not shown any reversible error.
Lee next argues that the Act is unconstitutional on multiple substantive due process, ex post facto, double jeopardy, and equal protection grounds. The Florida Su preme Court considered and rejected these arguments in Westerheide.
Lee's final argument is that the trial court erred because its instructions to the jury did not require a finding that Lee had a serious difficulty in controlling his behavior. The trial court instructed the jury, in pertinent part, as follows:
To prove that [Lee] should be confined in a secure facility for long-term control, care, and treatment, the State must prove each of the following three elements by clear and convincing evidence:
a. Roderick D. Lee has been convicted of a sexually violent offense. [Lee] has offered to stipulate that he has been convicted of a qualifying prior offense; the Court now instructs you that he has committed such an offense; and
b. Roderick D. Lee suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder; and
c. The mental abnormality or personality disorder makes Roderick D. Lee likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility for long-term control, care, and treatment.
"Mental abnormality" means a mental condition affecting a person's emotional or volitional capacity which pre-disposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses.
"Likely to engage in acts of sexual violence" means a person's propensity to commit acts of sexual violence is of such a degree as to pose a menace to the health and safety of others.
Lee did not object to these instructions, and they were similar to the instructions that were given and approved in Westerheide. See 831 So.2d at 107-09; see also Hale v. State, 834 So.2d 254, 255 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (relying on Wester-heide to conclude that a nearly identical instruction was sufficient).
In Westerheide, the Florida Supreme Court upheld a decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal and rejected various constitutional challenges to the Act. While four justices joined in the result, only three joined in the opinion. Regarding the adequacy of the jury instructions that were given, Senior Justice Harding, joined by Justices Wells and Lewis, concluded that the instructions were sufficient. 831 So.2d at 107-09. Justice Quince concurred in result only and expressed concerns as to the constitutionality of the Act. Id. at 113. She stated that she agreed with much of Justice Pariente's dissent, but she did not specifically discuss the jury instruction issue. Id.
Justice Pariente, joined by Justices An-stead and Shaw, concurred in part and dissented in part with the court's decision. Justice Pariente wrote, "My disagreement with the majority and my specific concerns are with the jury instructions." Id. at 114. She concluded that "the jury instructions did not properly instruct the jury that in order to find him a sexually violent predator, the State must prove that there is a 'high likelihood' of reoffending and that Westerheide must have 'serious difficulty in controlling his behavior,' " Id.
We are mindful that "[u]nder the Florida Constitution, both a binding decision and a binding precedential opinion are created to the extent that at least four members of the Court have joined in an opinion and decision." Santos v. State, 629 So.2d 838, 840 (Fla.1994) (footnotes omitted). In Westerheide, while four justices agreed to affirm the district court, only three justices agreed to the opinion. As a result, it appears, or at least it is arguable, that Westerheide does not resolve with finality the question of the sufficiency of the jury instructions. See Kogan & Waters, The Operation & Jurisdiction of The Florida Supreme Court, 18 Nova L.Rev. 1151, 1175 (1994) (stating that a "concurring in result only opinion" can constitute the fourth vote needed for a decision but the result is that there is no precedent beyond the specific facts of that case).
Because Westerheide upheld the commitment and rejected the challenge to the jury instructions, and because Lee did not preserve any error regarding the instructions, we affirm. However, in light of (1) the division of the supreme court in West-erheide as to the sufficiency of the jury instructions, (2) the significance of this issue and its potential impact in numerous cases arising under the Act, and (3) the fact that liberty interests are at stake in commitment proceedings, we certify the following question to the Florida Supreme Court as one of great public importance:
MAY AN INDIVIDUAL BE COMMITTED UNDER THE JIMMY RYCE ACT IN THE ABSENCE OF A JURY INSTRUCTION THAT THE STATE MUST PROVE THAT THE INDIVIDUAL HAS SERIOUS DIFFICULTY IN CONTROLLING HIS OR HER DANGEROUS BEHAVIOR?
We have considered Lee's other arguments and conclude that he has not demonstrated any basis for reversal. Accordingly, we affirm the commitment order.
Affirmed; question certified.
STRINGER, J., Concurs.
CASANUEVA, J., Concurs with opinion.
. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir. 1923).
. We also note that hearsay evidence is permitted in other proceedings in Florida in which life or liberty are at stake, such as the sentencing phase in death penalty cases and probation revocation proceedings. See, e.g., Zack v. State, 753 So.2d 9, 23 (Fla.2000) (noting that pursuant to section 921.141(1), Florida Statutes (1995), in a capital felony case hearsay evidence was admissible in the penalty phase provided that the defendant had a fair opportunity to rebut the evidence); Gammon v. State, 778 So.2d 390, 392 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (reiterating that probation cannot be revoked solely on hearsay evidence that would be inadmissible in a criminal trial, but it can be revoked based on that type of evidence together with evidence that is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule).
. Apart from the question of the adequacy of the jury instructions, the record contains sufficient evidence to establish that Lee either could not control his behavior or had serious difficulty in controlling his behavior. See Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413, 122 S.Ct. 867, 151 L.Ed.2d 856 (2002); Westerheide, 831 So.2d at 109.
. The record reflects that the jury was given a written copy of these instructions to refer to during its deliberations. However, when the trial court orally gave the definition of "mental abnormality," the trial transcript does not include the words "or volitional." This may have been a transcription error by the court reporter since neither party objected to the instruction read by the trial court and neither argues this point on appeal. Because the jury had before it the written instructions and there were no objections to the instructions, we decline to consider this issue for the first time on appeal. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.390(d); Ashley v. State, 265 So.2d 685, 694 (Fla.1972); Turner v. State, 212 So.2d 801, 803-04 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968).