Case Name: Kenneth DOZIER v. INGRAM BARGE COMPANY
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1998-01-28
Citations: 706 So. 2d 1064
Docket Number: No. 96-CA-1370
Parties: Kenneth DOZIER v. INGRAM BARGE COMPANY.
Judges: Before BARRY, PLOTKIN and MURRAY, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 706
Pages: 1064–1068

Head Matter:
Kenneth DOZIER v. INGRAM BARGE COMPANY.
No. 96-CA-1370.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
Jan. 28, 1998.
Michael D. Riley, Birdsall, Rodriguez, Ke-hoe & Riley, New Orleans, for Plaintiff/Appellant.
Don K. Hayeraft, Carol Welborn Reisman, Liskow & Lewis, New Orleans, for Defendant/Appellee.
Before BARRY, PLOTKIN and MURRAY, JJ.

Opinion:
Ji_PLOTKIN, Judge.
The sole question presented by this appeal is whether a suit filed by the plaintiff, Kenneth Dozier, within the three-year prescriptive period for filing claims under the Jones Act and general maritime law, but not served on the defendant, Ingram Barge Co., until after the prescriptive period had expired, is barred by prescription. Determination of that question in turn depends on whether Louisiana law or federal law applies. Finding that Louisiana law applies, we affirm the trial court judgment granting the exception of prescription filed by Ingram.
Facts
Dozier was allegedly injured on January 18, 1991 while working as a seaman on Ingram's vessel. He filed suit in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans on December 30,1998, asserting a claim in negligence under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.CApp. 688, as well as a claim for lack of seaworthiness under the general maritime law. The suit was not served on Ingram until March 21, 1994. Ingram responded by excepting to venue in Orleans Parish. The trial court maintained the ^exception and dismissed Dozier's claim. On appeal, this court affirmed the judgment maintaining the exception, and remanded the case to the trial court for transfer to a court of proper venue. Dozier v. Ingram Barge Co., 94-1646 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/16/95) (unpublished).
On remand, the trial court transferred the case to Plaquemines Parish. Thereafter, Ingram again excepted, this time on the basis of prescription, arguing that the filing of the petition within the three-year period allowed under the applicable law did not interrupt prescription because it was filed in a court of improper venue and was not served within the prescriptive period.
Analysis
Federal and state law provides rules prohibiting the enforcement of valid claims that have not been timely filed. In Louisiana, the doctrine of prescription protects defendants from having to defend against stale claims by requiring plaintiffs to file suit in a court of competent jurisdiction and venue within a specified time period and to pursue that suit in a timely manner. In most- eases, a defendant who claims that a plaintiffs case prescribed prior to the date it was filed is required to plead and prove prescription. However, when the facts alleged in the plaintiffs petition indicate that the claim has pre scribed, the burden of negating prescription rests with the plaintiff. La. C.C.P. art. 927 et seq. creates the procedure for filing and disposing of an exception of prescription.
Prescription, peremption, and lach-es . are procedural devices for barring valid substantive claims which have not been timely filed. Therefore, an exception of prescription is a technical objection that raises a mixed question of procedure and law. Procedurally, prescription is the method by which the litigants and courts ^determine whether a victim may prosecute a stale claim. The stale claim relates to the substantive law issue.
Under Louisiana law, a suit filed within the three-year prescriptive period in a court of improper venue, but was not served until after that date, is prescribed. La. C.C. art. 3462. Under federal law, so long as the suit is filed within the proper prescriptive period, it is not prescribed even if not served until after expiration of the three-year prescriptive period, provided it is served within a "reasonable" time.
In this case, the defendant claims that Louisiana procedural law applies in a state court case filed under the savings to suitors clause, citing American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 114 S.Ct. 981, 127 L.Ed.2d 285 (1994). Thus, the defendant claims, the plaintiffs suit is barred by prescription. The defendant's position is supported by both Mejia v. Lineas Maritimas De Santo Domingo, 570 So.2d 548 (La.App. 4th Cir.1990) and McKean v. Skipper Hydraulic, Inc., 592 So.2d 433 (La.App. 5th Cir.1991). In the Mejia ease, this court simply held that Louisiana's law on prescription applied in a maritime case. In the McKean case, the fifth circuit made the same ruling, addressing the exact question raised by the defendant here — i.e., whether federal law on prescription should apply under the circumstances, which were very similar to those of the instant case. That issue was not specifically addressed in Mejia.
The plaintiff counters the defendant's arguments by claiming first that application of Louisiana's law on prescription robs him of substantive rights under federal law, citing Lavergne v. Western Co., 371 So.2d 807 (La. 1979) for the proposition that a state court may not apply its procedural law if doing so would "modify or displace essential features of the substantive maritime law." He claims that the federal maritime law on prescription is "substantive law," despite the fact |4that the exact provision he cites is found in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The McKean case is simply wrong on that issue, the plaintiff claims. However, the plaintiff claims, the fifth circuit nevertheless reached the correct result in the McKean case because the suit in that ease was not served within a "reasonable time," since it was not served until 120 days after the suit was filed. The 81 days between the filing of the suit and the service in the instant case is "reasonable," the plaintiff claims.
We find that Louisiana law should be applied to decide the issue presented by this case. Moreover, Dozier's argument that prescriptive statutes are somehow "substantive" in nature, an argument that he fails to explain, is misplaced. The question of whether a cause of action is prescribed is considered separate and apart from other issues presented by a particular case. A plaintiff is not required to prove prescription as part and parcel of his cause of action; thus, Dozier's assertion that "[o]ne cannot think of a concept more substantive to the general maritime law than the concept of prescription" is nonsensical. Clearly, prescriptive statutes, including those governing interruption and suspension of prescription, are procedural, rather than substantive, in nature.
Granting the exception of prescription does not result in unfairness to the plaintiff in this case. The plaintiff timely filed his suit in a Louisiana state court; however, the suit was filed in a court of improper venue under the rules established by the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure articles governing that issue. He knew, or should have known, the consequences of failing to timely request that the defendant be served with the lawsuit, especially if the suit was filed in a court of improper venue. Since state procedural law clearly bars his claims under the circumstances of this case, the plaintiff cannot now recharacterize his maritime tort | ¡claims for the purpose of applying federal civil procedural rules to a case filed in Louisiana state court.
Conclusion
Accordingly, the trial court decision dismissing Dozier's action as prescribed is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
MURRAY, J., dissents and assigns reasons.