Case Name: Alice Stepp v. The State
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1908-03-11
Citations: 53 Tex. Crim. 158
Docket Number: No. 3859
Parties: Alice Stepp v. The State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Criminal Reports
Volume: 53
Pages: 158–161

Head Matter:
Alice Stepp v. The State.
No. 3859.
Decided March 11, 1908.
1. —Theft—Continuance.
Where upon trial for theft the application for continuance stated that the fact expected to be proved by the absent witness was that defendant was at home in company with said witness on the night and morning of the day on which the offense was committed, the same was too general as to time to cover an alibi; besides the diligence was not sufficient.
2. —Same—Evidence—Bill of Exceptions.
Where upon trial for theft objection, was made to the question by State’s counsel to prosecuting witness if he knew who took his hat, to which witness answered that some one on the train told him who he was, but the name of the party was not given in the bill of exceptions, there was no error.
3. —Same—Misconduct of Jury—Defendant’s Failure to Testify—Bill of Exceptions.
Where the bill of exceptions did not show whether the allusion to defendant’s failure to testify was made in the jury room before or after the jury reached the verdict, the same was insufficient to raise the question on appeal.
4. —Same—Evidence—Allegation and Proof.
Where upon trial for theft the information alleged that defendant committed the theft of a hat, and that the hat was the personal property of the alleged prosecutor there was no error in admitting testimony that the alleged hat was personal property.
5. —Same—County Judge—Affidavit.
A county judge is authorized under the statute, civil and criminal, to take affidavits and administer oaths, and is thereby not disqualified to sit as judge in the case wherein said affidavit is filed by the county attorney.
Appeal from the County Court of Mitchell. Tried below before the Hon. W. B. Crockett.
Appeal from a conviction of theft under the value of $50; penalty, thirty-live days confinement in the county jail.
The opinion states the case.
Sandusky and Albert Walker, for appelant.
F. J. McCord, Assistant Attorney-General, for the State.

Opinion:
DAVIDSON, Presiding Judge.
Appellant was charged with and convicted of the theft of a hat, the property of Bruce Stevenson.
The witness Stevenson testifies he was on the west-hound train about 2 o'clock in the morning of March 12, 1907, lying hack iri a scat with his hat partially over Iris face, shading it from the light, resting, but not asleep. Just as the train pulled out of the station at Colorado some one ran through the coach from the front end, jerked his hat off his face, ran through the car, jumped off at the back end and ran around behind some freight cars that were standing near by. He chased the party but failed to catch him, as the "train was pulling out." When he reached Big Springs, a station west of Colorado, ho phoned the officers to watch out for this party. Appellant was arrested about 11 or 12 o'clock that day. Appellant; when arrested had the hat in possession. The hat was thoroughly identified.
Appellant introduced no evidence, and made no statement in regard to the matter. The conviction occurred in November, the theft having occurred in March. When the case was called for trial, appellant sought a continuance for the testimony of Romain. The diligence is thus stated: On the 23rd of April, 1907, appellant caused a subpoena to issue and. placed the same in the hands of the sheriff' of Mitchell County on the same day. It was returned executed on the same day; Tins is all the diligence shown. What became of the case or the witness at the intervening courts from the service of process until the trial in November is not stated, nor is it shown or stated in the application whether this is the first or a subsequent application. The facts expected to be proved are thus stated: "That this defendant was at home in company with this witness on the night and morning of the 12th of March, 1907, the time alleged in the information herein, that the offense was committed. The facts are too general in statement. We do not think the court erred in refusing to continue the case.«
Another bill of exceptions states that while the witness Stevenson was testifying he was asked by State's counsel if he knew who took his hat. The witness answered that some parties on the train told him who he was. This was objected to as hearsay. As presented, there is no merit shown. The name of the party is not given, and the only fact stated is, if it be a fact, that some parties on the train informed Stevenson who the man was that took his hat, but the witness did not state who he was.
Another bill recites that appellant asked the court to hear evidence from the jury in regard to alleged misconduct on their part in arriving at a verdict, when came Clarence Prichard, who testified that he was a member of the jury, and the fact that the defendant did not take the stand and testify in the case was mentioned by the jury during their deliberations upon their verdict. This bill is approved with the statement that there were two other jurors who tried the defendant, examined by him on his motion for a new trial under oath, and both of whom stated, that if the fact of defendant not testifying was mentioned in the deliberations of the jury, they did not remember it. We have held that where the fact of the failure of a defendant to testify was discussed by the jury in their retirement, the error would constitute a ground for a new trial, but this bill is not sufficient, in our judgment, to raise the question. Three jurors testified, one of them stating that the fact that appellant did not testify was mentioned in the jury-room during their deliberations. Whether this was before or after the verdict is not stated, and nothing, except the broad statement was made, that it was mentioned. As the bill is presented we are of opinion that it does not require us to enter into a discussion of it.
Another bill recites that while Stevenson, McCauley and Key were upon the stand, defendant objected to their testifying as to the character of the property claimed to have been stolen as being personal property, because it was not so alleged in the information. The information alleges that appellant committed the theft of a hat, and that the hat was the personal property of him, the said Bruce Stevenson. We think that this bill has no merit in it.
Rinding no reversible error in the record, the judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.