Case Name: STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. Jerry DUNN, Jr., Appellant
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1998-02-25
Citations: 713 So. 2d 479
Docket Number: No. 30269-KA
Parties: STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. Jerry DUNN, Jr., Appellant.
Judges: Before BROWN, STEWART and GASKINS, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 713
Pages: 479–493

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. Jerry DUNN, Jr., Appellant.
No. 30269-KA.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
Feb. 25, 1998.
Opinion Reversing on Rehearing May 15, 1998.
Louisiana Appellate Project by J. Wilson Rambo, Monroe and H. Paul Garner, for Appellant.
Richard Ieyoub, Attorney General, Walter E. May, Jr., District Attorney, James R. Hatch, Jeffery Robinson, Assistant District Attorneys, for Appellee.
Before BROWN, STEWART and GASKINS, JJ.

Opinion:
BROWN, Judge.
Defendant, Jerry Dunn, Jr., was convicted of simple escape, adjudicated a fourth felony offender and sentenced to the minimum term of 20 years at hard labor. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural Background
On June 29, 1993, defendant appeared in the Second Judicial District Court, Claiborne Parish, Louisiana, for a preliminary examination in connection with several counts of illegal possession of stolen things. The court found probable cause and defendant was taken to a holding area for transfer back to jail. A deputy was stationed outside the only door to the room. Defendant, wearing orange prison clothes and leg chains, escaped by climbing out of the window, jumping down to a flight of stairs and shuffling away.
Defendant fled to Minnesota, where under the alias John Wayne Cooper, he was apprehended on outstanding charges in that state. After serving 18 months in prison in Minnesota, defendant was extradited back to Claiborne Parish where a charge of simple escape was added to those already pending.
Trial on the escape charge was held on September 16,1996. A jury found defendant guilty and the trial court sentenced him to five years at hard labor. Thereafter, this being defendant's fourth felony conviction, he was adjudicated a habitual offender and sentenced to the minimum term of 20 years at hard labor.
Defendant has appealed his conviction and sentence.
Discussion
Self-representation
Defendant urges that the trial court erred in finding that he waived his right to counsel, failing to advise him of the dangers of self-representation and failing to ^provide him with "stand-by" counsel. Defendant further asserts that he was forced to conduct his own defense in violation of his right to counsel.
When defendant was in court in 1993, on the day of his escape, he refused to be represented by Darrell Avery, the attorney from the Indigent Defenders' Office. At that time, the trial court tediously examined defendant concerning his education and choice not to use a public defender. • The court explained in detail the pitfalls of self-representation and emphasized that if defendant chose to be his own lawyer, the rules of evidence would still apply. Defendant steadfastly refused court-appointed counsel.
Following his extradition back to Claiborne Parish, defendant was arraigned on the escape charge. At his arraignment on March 5, 1996, he was represented by indigent defender Darrell Avery. Defendant and his court-appointed counsel were in court again on April 2, 1996, for a preliminary examination and bond reduction hearing; Probable cause was found, the bond was not reduced and trial was set for May 20, 1996. Defendant again objected to being represented by a court-appointed attorney and just before his trial date, retained Rick Chandler. Because he was new to the ease, Chandler obtained a continuance of the trial. On June 4,1996, based upon defendant's failure to pay his fee, Chandler withdrew. On this date, the trial court instructed defendant to obtain an attorney before his next court appearance, which was scheduled for June 24, 1996. Defendant appeared on June 24, 1996, for the court to determine whether he had hired an attorney. Although he was out on bond and employed, defendant had not secured representation and stated, "... I guess I'm going to have to represent myself." The judge quizzed defendant concerning his employment and reminded defendant that his case was hset for trial in September. The court ordered the record to reflect that at the present time, defendant was representing himself.
Defendant's case was on the trial docket for September 16, 1996. On that date, the state announced that it was ready to proceed and the following colloquy occurred between the court and defendant:
THE COURT: . Mr. Dunn has raised this issue saying, he at this time does not want to represent himself .
DEFENDANT DUNN: I didn't say I didn't want to represent myself. I said I haven't went through a proceeding to grant me the right to represent myself _(emphasis added).
THE COURT: Do you want to represent yourself?
DEFENDANT DUNN: Well, I don't have a choice, but I'm not prepared today to represent myself....
Considering defendant's refusal of court-appointed counsel, coupled with his failure to obtain counsel, the trial court found that defendant's conduct constituted a waiver of right to counsel. During the jury selection process, defendant told some prospective jurors that, "I asked for the right to defend myself."
U.S. Constitution Amendments VI and XIV, as well as La. Const. Article I, See. 13 guarantee an accused in a criminal proceeding the right to assistance of counsel for his defense. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963); State v. Carpenter, 390 So.2d 1296 (La.1980).
An indigent defendant has the right to court-appointed counsel; however, an indigent does not have the right to have a particular attorney appointed. An indigent's right to choose his attorney extends only so far as his ability to retain the attorney of his choice; however, he may not procrastinate in the exercise of this | ¿right to obstruct or thwart the orderly progression of the case. State v. Harper, 381 So.2d 468 (La.1980).
A defendant who wishes to exercise his right to retain counsel of his choice must do so at a reasonable time, in a reasonable manner and at an appropriate stage of the proceeding. State v. Seiss, 428 So.2d 444 (La.1983). An accused's unquestioned right to legal representation at trial can not be manipulated by him, by attempts at last minute substitution or otherwise, so as to secure unwarranted delays or otherwise obstruct the orderly administration of justice. City of Baton Rouge v. Dees, 363 So.2d 530 (La.1978).
Waiver of the right to counsel must be made knowingly, understanding^ and intelligently. Faretta, supra; State v. Strain, 585 So.2d 540 (La.1991); State v. Moore, 29,212 (La.App. 2d Cir. 01/22/97), 687 So.2d 647. A defendant may waive his right to counsel if he knows what he is doing, his choice is made with his eyes open and the record reflects his awareness of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. Faretta, supra; State v. Strain, supra.
The determination of whether defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel depends on the facts and circumstances surrounding the case, including the background, experience and conduct of the accused. State v. Carpenter, supra; State v. Moore, supra; State v. Kennon, 588 So.2d 1348 (La.App. 2d Cir.1991), writ denied, 600 So.2d 634 (La.1992).
A defendant's refusal to proceed with appointed counsel and his failure to retain counsel on his own may in some circumstances constitute a waiver of the right to counsel. See State v. Harper, supra; State v. McGowan, 359 So.2d 972 (La.1978); State ex rel. Johnson v. Maggio, 449 So.2d 547 (La.App. 1st Cir.1984), writ denied sub nom., State v. Johnson, 450 So.2d 354 (La.1984). If ajjjdefendant repeatedly fails to retain counsel, or if he appears without an attorney after being clearly and unequivocally warned by the trial court that the case will proceed to trial regardless, such fact may support a finding of implied waiver. See State v. Wisenbaker, 428 So.2d 790 (La.1983); State v. Batiste, 96-0526 (La.App. 3d Cir. 12/11/96), 687 So.2d 499, writ denied, 97-0174 (La.06/30/97), 696 So.2d 1003; State v. Mitchell, 580 So.2d 1006 (La.App. 3d Cir.1991), writ denied, 613 So.2d 969 (La.1993); State v. Jones, 565 So.2d 1023 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1990), writ denied sub nom., State ex rel. Jones v. State, 585 So.2d 565 (La.1991).
The court history in this case clearly reflects defendant's understanding of the right to counsel and his conscious choice not to accept representation by the court-appointed attorney. The record shows that defendant obtained one trial delay by the last minute enrollment of an attorney who later withdrew for non-payment of his fee. A hearing was thereafter conducted for enrollment of new counsel. At this hearing defendant was reminded of a future trial date and told to be ready.
The 1993 proceeding in which the court fully complied with all requirements to insure defendant's understanding of the consequences of his rejection of court-appointed counsel helps in determining defendant's knowledge, capacity and choice in this case. On the day of trial, defendant stated to the court that he was not claiming that he did not want to represent himself but was only stating that a hearing had not occurred in which he was granted the right to represent himself. The court then specifically asked defendant if he wanted to represent himself. He replied that he did but was not ready for trial. Obviously, defendant was attempting to manipulate the system to secure another delay. This assignment of error is meritless
1 insufficient Evidence to Convict
Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of simple escape. The standard of appellate review for a sufficiency of evidence claim is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
La. R.S. 14:110 provides:
A. Simple escape shall mean any of the following:
(1) The intentional departure, under circumstances wherein human life is not endangered, of a person imprisoned, committed, or detained from a place where such person is legally confined, from a designated area of a place where such person is legally confined, or from the lawful custody of any law enforcement officer or officer of the Department of Public Safety and Corrections.
Defendant argues that he was given permission to leave by Deputy Fratus, who was deceased at the time of trial. He argues that because no evidence was presented to rebut his claim that Deputy Fratus gave him permission to leave, the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction.
This argument lacks merit. Deputy John Drew testified that Deputy Fratus asked him to watch defendant while he attended to other duties. This clearly implies that Deputy Fratus did not give defendant "permission" to leave. Further, the fact that defendant jumped from a window supports the jury's rejection of defendant's testimony. See State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d 1305 (La.1988). This assignment lacks merit.
17Habitual Offender Adjudication
Validity of Enhancement For Simple Escape Conviction
Defendant argues that because he was convicted of simple escape, his sentence should not be enlarged by application of the habitual offender law. In support he relies on State v. Cox, 344 So.2d 1024 (La.1977); however, since State v. Cox was decided, the legislature has amended the criminal statute to make simple escape a separate and distinct felony. There is no enhanced penalty endemic to the simple escape statute as existed when State v. Cox was .decided. There is currently no bar to enhancement of the penalty for simple escape by application of the habitual offender statute. State v. Goodin, 550 So.2d 801 (La.App. 2d Cir.1989), wit denied, 556 So.2d 1276 (La.1990). See also State v. Townley, 94-1002 (La.App. 3d Cir. 05/3/95), 657 So.2d 129, writ denied, 95-2371 (La.01/26/96), 666 So.2d 669; State v. Harrelson, 590 So.2d 1240 (La.App. 1st Cir.1991). This assignment of error lacks merit.
Sufficiency of Evidence for Habitual Offender Adjudication
David Alan Yates, a criminalist with the North Louisiana Crime Lab Satellite Laboratory, took fingerprints from defendant. Mr. Yates testified that Exhibit S-2, a penitentiary packet from Minnesota bearing the signature of John Cooper, an alias used by defendant, and S-3, a reference, fingerprint card taken in the courtroom that day, were made by the same person. The packet showed defendant's convictions for aggravated robbery (1992) and escape from custody (1995) in Minnesota.
State's Exhibit 1, defendant's penitentiary packet from Wade Correctional Center, was not received into evidence upon defendant's objection.
IgAudie Edwards, a Louisiana probation and parole officer, testified that he was defendant's parole officer in 1987. He identified defendant as the individual he had supervised for approximately three months. Mr. Edwards believed, but was unsure, that defendant had been convicted of simple burglary.
Celeste Ware, court reporter for the Second Judicial District Court, identified a transcript from defendant's trial. The court admitted the transcript into evidence. The transcript contained a colloquy in which defendant admitted being convicted of "four or five" felonies and admitted being convicted of aggravated robbery in 1993. Defendant further admitted being convicted of illegal possession of stolen things (1988) and theft (1984) in Louisiana. The present crime of simple escape occurred in 1993.
The court found that the state had met its burden of proving defendant a habitual offender. Pursuant to La. R.S. 15:529.1 A(l)(e)(i), the court sentenced defendant to 20 years imprisonment, to be served consecutively with any other sentence, with credit for time served beginning upon the date of January 16, 1996 (the date of his release from the Minnesota Department of Corrections).
The state carries the burden of proof in habitual offender proceedings. La. R.S. 15:529.1 D(l)(b). Subsection F of that statute provides:
F. The certificates of the warden or other chief officer of any state prison, or of the superintendent or other chief officer of any penitentiary of this state or any other state of the United States, or of any foreign country, or of any chief officer of any parish or county jail in this state or any other state of the United States, or of the clerk of court of the place of conviction in the state of Louisiana, under the seal of his office, if he has a seal, containing the name of the person imprisoned, the photograph, and the fingerprints of the person as they appear in the records of his office, a statement of the court in which a conviction was had, the date and time of sentence, length of time imprisoned, and date of discharge from prison or penitentiary, shall be prima facie evidence of the imprisonment and of the discharge of the person, either by a pardon or expiration of his ^sentence as the case may be under the conviction stated and set forth in the certificate.
Although this statute designates the properly authenticated certificates of the warden as prima facie evidence of the imprisonment and discharge of the person under the conviction set forth therein, the necessary facts constituting proof that the accused is a habitual offender may be established by other competent evidence. State v. Barrow, 352 So.2d 635 (La.1977). The proof set forth in Section 529.1 F is neither sacramental nor exclusive to such a showing. Id. In a habitual offender proceeding the state is only required to establish a prior felony conviction and that the defendant is the person convicted of the earlier offense. State v. Shepherd, 566 So.2d 1127 (La.App. 2d Cir.1990). Identification of the accused may be by testimony of witnesses, expert testimony as to the fingerprints of the accused when compared with those in the prison record introduced, or by photographs contained in the duly authenticated record. Id. The sole issue on appeal is whether the evidence introduced at trial will support the finding that defendant is the same person as the previously convicted felon. Id.
Defendant's trial testimony affirmatively shows that he was a previous felon. Defendant admitted being convicted of aggravated robbery, illegal possession of stolen things, and theft. The Minnesota records showed an additional conviction for escape from custody.
Defendant objected to the introduction of S-2, a pen pak from an Minnesota showing that defendant was convicted under the name "John Wayne Cooper." Defendant objected that there was no photograph in the packet; that there was nothing to identify "John Wayne Cooper" as defendant, other than a letter from Louisiana to Minnesota authorities requesting the information; and that there was no certificate from the warden or chief officer of the prison as required by La. R.S. [15:529.1 F.i0 The trial court admitted the pen pak, relying on La. C.E. art. 902. Defendant objected.
Defendant now argues on appeal that the Minnesota pen pak lacked the proper certification or authentication required by La. C.E. art. 902(2)(a). However, the record reflects that the trial court admitted the pen pak pursuant to La. C.E. art. 902(1) as a domestic public document under seal.
Article 902 provides in pertinent part:
Extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condition precedent to admissibility is not required with respect to the following:
(1) Domestic public documents under seal. A document bearing a seal purporting to be that of the United States, or of any state, district, commonwealth, territory, or insular possession thereof, or the Panama Canal Zone, or the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, or of a political subdivision, department, officer, or agency thereof, and a signature purporting to be an attestation or execution.
Defendant's threefold objection at trial to the introduction of the pen pák included only one argument relating to authentication: that the state had not complied with La. R.S. 15:529.1 F. Although he objected to the trial court's reliance on La. C.E. art. 902 to admit the pen pak, defendant did not specifically argue that the requirements of Article 902(1) had not been met and certainly did not present the argument advanced on appeal relating to Article 902(2)(a).
Because defendant did not urge his present argument to the trial court, he is not entitled to have it heard on appeal. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected and a timely objection appears of record, stating the specific grounds for the objection. La. C.E. art. 103 A(1). See also La.C.Cr. P. art. 841; State v. Brown, 444 So.2d 1346 (La.App. 2d Cir.1984), writ denied, 449 So.2d 1343 (La.1984).
| iiExcessive Sentence
Enhanced Sentence
Article I, § 20 of the Louisiana Constitution protects individuals from cruel, excessive, or unusual punishment. The mandatory minimum sentences provided by R.S. 15:529.1 are not facially unconstitutional; however, it is possible that for a particular offense and offender that they would violate the constitutional protection against excessive punishment. State v. Pollard, 93-0660 (La.10/20/94), 644 So.2d 370; State v. Dorthey, 623 So.2d 1276 (La.1993).
The PSI reveals that this 30-year-old defendant had a significant juvenile record; eleven adult arrests since 1984; four prior felony convictions for theft, illegal possession of stolen things, aggravated robbery and escape from custody. If the aggravated robbery conviction had been found to be a crime of violence, defendant would have received a life sentence. At the time of sentencing, he faced a pending charge of illegal possession of stolen things in Claiborne Parish. While in prison, he was convicted for introduction of contraband. La. R.S. 14:402. Defendant had a high school education and was not married.
Under the circumstances, the trial court rejected the argument that the aggravated robbery conviction in Minnesota was a crime of violence. The habitual offender statute provided for a minimum sentence of 20 years and a maximum sentence of life. On this record, the 20-year sentence imposed is not excessive.
1 ^Original Sentence
Defendant attacks his original sentence imposed before his habitual offender adjudication. Any issues relating to that sentence are moot. State v. Keys, 29,369 (La.App.2d Cir. 05/07/97), 694 So.2d 1107.
Patent Error Review
The record reflects that at sentencing, the trial court failed to inform the defendant of the period in which to file for post-conviction relief. The trial court is directed to send written notice of this period to defendant within 10 days of the rendition of this opinion and to file proof of defendant's receipt of this notice into the record. La.C.Cr. P. art. 930.8; State v. Henderson, 28,932 (La.App.2d Cir. 12/11/96), 684 So.2d 1054.
AFFIRMED.
STEWART, J., dissents and assigns written reasons.
. This proceeding and the trial were handled by different judges.
. The state did not appeal this ruling.