Case Name: FOSTER, sheriff, v. BROWN et al., commissioners; et vice versa
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1945-05-08
Citations: 199 Ga. 444
Docket Number: Nos. 15181, 15184
Parties: FOSTER, sheriff, v. BROWN et al., commissioners; et vice versa.
Judges: All the Justices concur, except Bell, G. J., and Duckworth, J., who dissent.
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 199
Pages: 444–461

Head Matter:
FOSTER, sheriff, v. BROWN et al., commissioners; et vice versa.
Nos. 15181, 15184.
May 8, 1945.
Rehearing denied June 7, 12, 1945.
Houston While, for plaintiff.
Harold Sheais, W. S. Northcuit, John L. Westmoreland, and John H. Hudson, for defendants.

Opinion:
Jenkins, Presiding Justice.
Under the agreed statement of facts, the substance of which we have sought to set forth, the court denied the petition of the sheriff plaintiff seeking a mandamus against the county commissioners. The question sought to be raised by both of the demurrers and the exception to this order of court resolves itself into the question whether, under the law and the undisputed facts, Grimes or Smithwick is entitled to the office of chief deputy sheriff. The briefs are voluminous; but we will state as we understand them the contentions of the litigants. The commissioners, who seek to uphold the claim of Grimes, the old incumbent, contend that the two constitutional provisions as proposed and subsequently ratified were not self-operative, but merely authorized the General Assembly to enact legislation under the authority thus given; and that, construing the law as it stands, Grimes should prevail on either of two theories: either because the civil-service statute (Ga. L. 1943, p. 971), with respect to the tenure of the chief deputy, is so contrary to the previous provisions as to tenure in the chief-deputy statute (Ga. L. 1939, p. 565) that the former statute must give way to the later statute, with the result that the sheriff does not have the right -to appoint a chief députy except under and in accordance with civil service rules; or else — construing the two acts together in the light of the two constitutional provisions authorizing them, as being remedial in nature, the first statute having been enacted, not for the benefit of the sheriff or his deputy, but for the public, in that it provides a quick method of carrying on the duties and functions of the office of sheriff upon a vacancy arising, without the trouble, expense, and delay of an election, and the second or civil-service statute having been enacted to promote and reward efficient service and to obtain the benefit of tried experience — the effect of the two statutes when construed together in the light of their constitutional authority is to allow the chief deputy to accede to the office of sheriff, in the event a vacancy arises, for the period pending a future election, but to preserve his status as chief deputy sheriff while thus discharging, ad interim, the duties of sheriff, provided he does not offer himself as a candidate in the future election. On the other hand, the contention of the sheriff, who seeks to uphold the claim of the newly appointed Smithwick, appears to be that the constitutional amendments, which he says are mandatory and not merely permissive, themselves govern the case; and that, in construing them together as we should if possible, in the event of conflict the special provisions fixing the tenure of the chief deputy should be given effect over general provisions, that is, that any special provision fixing the tenure of the chief deputy sheriff should be construed as an exception to any contrary general provision under the civil-service amendment. Whether or not the two constitutional provisions, one the chief-deputy-sheriff amendment (Ga. L. 1939, p. 33), the other the civil-service amendment (Ga. L. 1939, p. 36) are, as claimed by the plaintiff in error, mandatory in character and therefore in a sense self-operative, or whether each merely authorized the legislature to enact legislation in pursuance of the authority thus conferred, would seem to throw great light upon the controlling question in the case. This is true for the reason that, if the latter interpretation be correct, if the amendments to the constitution are merely permissive, then in dealing with the two statutes — one passed in pursuance of the chief-deputy amendment, and the other in pursuance of the civil-service amendment — any actual conflict between any provisions in the two constitutional amendments would have to be resolved by the legislature itself; and, since it would not be compelled to follow either inconsistent alternative grant of authority, then the one it did actually follow would be effective; and, if by separate inconsistent statutes it' sought to follow both, then the statute last enacted would necessarily be controlling over a previous inconsistent statute. It is elementary that some provisions of the constitution are self-operative. Others merely delegate permissive legislative authority to the General Assembly, in which latter case enabling acts are required in order to effectuate any change in the law. The proposed chief-deputy amendment which was subsequently ratified provided that "The General Assembly may provide," etc. The Code, § 102-103, declares that the word "may" ordinarily denotes permission, and not command. Where the word "may," as used in a statute, concerns the public interest or affects the rights of third persons, it will be construed to mean "must" or "shall." This section appears to be a codification from language of this court in Georgia, Florida & Alabama Ry. Co. v. Sasser, 130 Ga. 394 (60 S. E. 997). This language, from which the Code section appears to have been derived, was used in a discussion with respect to a duty imposed upon a public official by a statute where the public interest or the rights of third persons are affected. It would strain the codified definition of the word "may" as used in "statutes" to make it apply to a constitutional proposal, especially where the language of the proposal itself contemplates legislative consideration. The ordinary meaning of the word "statute" is, a law established by legislative authority, as distinguished from the unwritten common law. Bouvier's Law Dictionary (Century ed.), 1129; An act proposing to amend the constitution is not a law. Goolsby v. Stephens, 155 Ga. 529 (2) 539 (117 S. E. 439). And then too the caption of the act proposing the amendment uses the language, '"the General Assembly shall be given authority to provide," etc., and it is well recognized that the language employed in the caption can, in case of ambiguity, be used to interpret the language of the act. Thomas v. Board of Commissioners of Chattooga County, 196 Ga. 10 (2), 15 (25 S. E. 2d, 647); Standard Steel Works Co. v. Williams, 155 Ga. 177, 182 (116 S. E. 636); Bentley v. State Board of Examiners, 152 Ga. 836, 839 (111 S. E. 379); Macon & Augusta R. Co. v. Little, 45 Ga. 370 (6), 387. Therefore it seems clear that all this proposed amendment to the constitution did was to authorize the General Assembly in its discretion to enact a statute in conformity with the authority conferred. Similar language is employed in both the body and the caption of the act proposing a constitutional amendment with respect to civil service, although the body of that act uses the words, "The General Assembly shall-have the authority," etc. As a matter of fact, it need not be conceded that the two proposed constitutional amendments would necessarily prove in any wise conflicting. The legislature did not and could not know which, if either, of the two proposals would be ratified by the people. If the chief-deputy-sheriff amendment should be approved, it could, under appropriate legislative enactment, be made to stand alone. If both were approved, the legislature could provide as it saw proper within the bounds of either of the two amendments. .What actually hap pened was that the legislature, to begin with, put the provisions of the chief-deputy amendment in operation by way of an anticipatory act, conditioned upon the subsequent ratification of that amendment; and then, several years later and after the adoption of both amendments, put the civil-service provision into operation by passing a statute which in one respect was in direct conflict with the prior act dealing with the tenure of the office of chief deputy sheriff. In our opinion, since it is the statutes which must give effect to either of the two constitutional amendments, the provisions of the latter statute, as being the last expression of the intent of the legislature, should prevail, provided only it be authorized by constitutional authority. In our opinion it can not reasonably be said that thé fixing of the tenure of the chief deputy sheriff in the chief-deputy amendment should be construed as constituting an exception to what the plaintiff in error calls the general provisions of the civil-service amendment, although this constitutes, as we see it, the strongest argument that he has so ably presented. We say this because, even though the legislature may have created the office of chief deputy sheriff for the tenure authorized by the constitutional amendment, we can see no reason why it could not thereafter put this office under civil service, as it was expressly authorized by constitutional authority to do. Not only was the act putting him under civil service authorized by express constitutional authority, and not only did it operate to extend what had been the previously prescribed tenure of office, but the civil service constitutional amendment, in order to make assurance doubly sure, by its terms expressly authorized the legislature "to enact laws establishing tenure of office for such employees and deputies," and it could hardly be said that the chief deputy is not a deputy. He is not only a deputy but the chief of all deputies, who under both the constitution and statute must be designated as such from among the list of deputies. He is either under civil service or he is not. Unless the chief deputies of the various offices of Fulton County be singled out from all the other deputies and excluded from the operation and protection of the civil-service act, passed in accordance with constitutional authority — unless this should and therefore must be done — there seems little if any ground for controversy. The civil-service amendment and the civil-service statute both seem to say plainly that these officers come within the bounds of such protection — certainly so unless the chief deputies be adjudged not to be deputies at all. The civil-service amendment states plainly that the legislature can, under civil service, "establish his tenure of office." The legislature has done that which it was constitutionally authorized to do, and, in order to avoid any possibility of misinterpretation, has by explicit language stated that the status of the chief deputy under the civil-service law shall not be forfeited because he complies with his legal obligation and qualifies to perform, and thereafter as directed does perform, the duties of the office in which a vacancy has occurred pending the ensuing election. We can see no reason why an officer whose ordinary tenure of office is prescribed by a constitutional amendment authorizing the legislature to create the office, can not thereafter under express constitutional authority be put under constitutionally authorized civil service, thereby extending his previous constitutional tenure, especially so when the amendment to the constitution authorizing civil service expressly empowers the legislature to "establish his tenure of office." In other words, the fact that the tenure of an office may be prescribed by a constitutional amendment authorizing the legislature to create it, does not prevent the legislature, when acting under additional constitutional authority, from putting such office under civil service, merely because without civil service the tenure of the office had been prescribed. This does not amount to a contradiction in the two constitutional authorizations, but merely authorized two separate procedures, one for the ordinary tenure without civil service, the other for such tenure as the legislature itself may prescribe should it see proper to adopt civil service.
But the plaintiff in error makes numerous other contentions. He submits that section 5 of the civil-service statute itself expressly excludes the chief deputy from its operation, in that by this section the unclassified service are "officers elected by the people and persons appointed to fill vacancies in such elective offices;" and the argument is that, because the chief deputy may fill out the unexpired term of the sheriff in the event of a vacancy, he is therefore, within the meaning of the statute, appointed to fill a vacancy in an elective office. It would seem that the legislature, in order to forestall just such an interpretation of its statute as provided by subsection 5 (1) a (1), used this language: "Pro vided, in the offices of the clerk of the''Superior court; tax receiver, tax collector, sheriff and ordinary, if the chief deputy in any of said' offices should elect not to be a candidate, in the succeeding election, he shall revert to his former status.in the classified serv-' ice." The plaintiff in error further contends that even if a chief deputy sheriff is included by the terms of .the civil-service statute, under the facts of this case it must be taken that no reference was made to the- old incumbent Grimes, who- refused to become a candidate for-the office of sheriff in the subsequent, election, but that the "reverter" clause in the act must be taken to refer ,to. McAuliffe, the-chief deputy appointed-by-Grimes upon assuming the-duties of the office of sheriff following the death of Mount,, the: former sheriff. Such a contention would seem wholly inconsistent, with the necessary import of secti.on 5 of the civil-service act, :aUd would, we think, render meaningless the language actually employed. The plaintiff in error further contends that, even though the provisions of the civil-service statute should be construed- as including the chief deputy, then the act -is unconstitutional as violating the provisions of the. chief-deputy amendment to the constitution..- This might be true'if the-civil-service statute, had not.been passed in conformity with the.constitutional authority implicitly conferred by the civil-service amendment -to the constitutiqn. Such amendment to the constitution can not itself be said to be unconstitutional. As we see it, had. not the constitutional amendment authorizing civil-service legislation been-adopted, the legislature could not have provided a tenure for the chief deputy sheriff other than as authorized by the chief-deputy amendment, but the people in fact adopted both amendments. This being true, it appears'that the only way by which the legislature could constitutionally extend the tenure of the chief deputy sheriff was by putting him under constitutionally authorized civil service. This, it did in explicit terms. It seems to be conceded by the plaintiff in error that the deputy sheriffs, some sixty in number, come squarely within the provisions of the civil-service law. No one seems to question that under the chief-deputy constitutional amendment the. new sheriff would be compelled to appoint his chief deputy from among the list of deputies holding under civil service. Therefore it would seem that all that section 5 (1) a (1) of the civil-service statute 'does is to freeze the chief deputy's .status under the civil- service law while serving out the unexpired term of the sheriff upon qualifying for such service as required both by the constitutional amendment and by the statute. Under the civil-service statute based upon constitutional authority establishing his tenure, he is not to be penalized for the performance of a duty imposed by law, but his' rights as chief deputy sheriff under civil service are to be preserved.
As set forth in the statement of facts, the judge overruled the commissioners' demurrer to the sheriff's petition and also overruled the sheriff's demurrer to the commissioners' answer, after which he heard the case under an agreed statement of facts, and refused the mandamus absolute. It appears from the language of the judge's order in overruling the commissioners' demurrer to the sheriff's petition, that his reason for doing so was not to adjudicate adversely upon the legal questions hereinbefore set forth, but that his action was brought about by a failure of the sheriff's petition to set forth facts, later embodied in the agreed statement, such as would show the right of Grimes to the office of chief deputy sheriff. We can see how this view of the trial judge could be justified, and therefore will not reverse his judgment in overruling the commissioners' demurrer to the petition; and we affirm his judgment in overruling the sheriff's demurrer to the commissioners' answer, and in denying, at the hearing under the agreed statement of facts, the grant of a mandamus absolute.
Judgment affirmed on both bills of exceptions.
All the Justices concur, except Bell, G. J., and Duckworth, J., who dissent.