Case Name: Louis Guenther, Respondent, v. The Ridgway Company, Appellant
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1915-12-30
Citations: 170 A.D. 725
Docket Number: 
Parties: Louis Guenther, Respondent, v. The Ridgway Company, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 170
Pages: 725–730

Head Matter:
Louis Guenther, Respondent, v. The Ridgway Company, Appellant.
First Department,
December 30, 1915.
Evidence—typewritten record on appeal inadmissible to impeach, witness—opinion—libel — charge of blackmailing — “blackmail” defined.
A typewritten record on appeal is not competent proof of the testimony of a witness to impeach his testimony given on a subsequent trial in another case.-
In an action for libel testimony to the effect that an investigation which the witness made as special district attorney did not disclose any evidence that the plaintiff was interested in a certain business other than in handling its advertising is inadmissible for the reason that it consists merely of his opinion.
A charge that the plaintiff was a blackmailer is libelous.
In an action for libel it is error for the court to rule that the defense of justification of a charge of blackmail requires proof of blackmail as defined in section 856 of the Penal Law.
It cannot be said, as a matter of law, that an allegation that the plaintiff was a blackmailer charged him with having committed the crime of blackmail. The word “blackmail ” has a broader meaning and has been construed as synonomous with extortion..
Laughlin, J., dissented in part, with opinion.
Appeal by the defendant, The Eidgway Company, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 5th day of November, 1914, upon the verdict of a jury for $17,000, and also from an order entered in said clerk’s office on the 12th day of November, 1914, denying defendant’s motion for a new trial made upon the minutes.
James B. Sheehan [Francis Rooney with him on the brief], for the appellant.
E. C. Crowley, for the respondent.

Opinion:
Ingraham, P. J.:
The plaintiff was the editor of the Financial World, a weekly periodical having a circulation of 12,000, published in New York by the Guenther Publishing Company, of which he was the president and treasurer and the owner of a majority of its capital stock; and he brought this action to recover damages for an alleged libel in the September, 1911, issue of the Adventure, a monthly periodical published by the defendant.
We are of opinion that it was error to receive a typewritten record on appeal in Kellogg v. United States to impeach the testimony given by the witness Eberman, for the certified case on appeal was not competent proof of the testimony given by the witness on that trial to impeach his testimony given on the trial of the issues herein.
We are also of opinion that it was error to receive the testimony given by the witness Olcott to the effect that an investigation which he made as special district attorney did not disclose any evidence that the plaintiff was interested in the business of E. S. Dean & Co. other than in handling its advertising, for the reason that it consisted merely of his opinion as to whether a thorough investigation conducted by him into the affairs of E. S. Dean & Co., consisting of the examination of the books of the company and interviewing witnesses and conducting a prosecution against one of the members of the company, showed that the plaintiff was in any manner connected with the company otherwise than in handling its advertising.
The court ruled and instructed the jury that the charge that the plaintiff was a blackmailer was libelous. These rulings are sustained by the decision of this court in Town Topics Pub. Co. v. Collier (114 App. Div. 191). Without, so far as the record shows, the point having been taken or claim made by counsel for respondent, the court announced when this question first arose that the only blackmail he knew or would recognize was that defined in the Penal Law of this State,, and that position was maintained by the court throughout the trial. The court read section 856 of the Penal Law to the jury, and ruled that the defense of justification of this charge required proof of blackmail as defined in that section, which relates to a threat in writing, and charged, as matter of law, that the evidence was insufficient to establish this defense. There was no evidence tending to show that the plaintiff had attempted to blackmail advertisers by written threats, but we are of opinion that the court erred in so limiting the proof of justification. It can not be said, as matter of law, that the libel charged the plaintiff with having committed the crime of blackmail. The word " blackmail " has a broader meaning. It is defined in the Century Dictionary as " Extortion in any mode by means of intimidation, as the extortion of money by threats of accusation or exposure, or of unfavorable criticism in the press." Blackmail has frequently been construed by the courts as synonymous with extortion. (Edsall v. Brooks, 17 Abb. Pr. 221, 226; People v. Davis, 156 App. Div. 279; Matter of Lenney, 169 id. 509; Mitchell v. Sharon, 51 Fed. Rep. 424. See, also, Holmes v. Jones, 50 Hun, 345; Hess v. Sparks, 44 Kan. 465.) We are also of opinion that the evidence presented a question of fact for the jury as to whether the appellant justified in the colloquial sense in which the word is ordinarily used and understood.
It follows, therefore, that the judgment and order should be reversed and a new trial' granted, with costs to appellant to abide the event.
Clarke, Dowling and Smith, JJ., concurred; Laughlin, J., dissented.