Case Name: Dyretha HAMBRIGHT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. John E. POTTER, Postmaster General, Defendant-Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2011-05-18
Citations: 433 F. App'x 593
Docket Number: No. 10-15694
Parties: Dyretha HAMBRIGHT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. John E. POTTER, Postmaster General, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: Before: B. FLETCHER and THOMAS, Circuit Judges, and ROSENTHAL, District Judge.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 433
Pages: 593–594

Head Matter:
Dyretha HAMBRIGHT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. John E. POTTER, Postmaster General, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 10-15694.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted May 12, 2011.
Filed May 18, 2011.
Richard Moreno Martinez, Esquire, Law Office of Richard M. Martinez, Tucson, AZ, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Christine Ducat Keller, Assistant U.S. Attorney, USPX-Office of the U.S. Attorney, Phoenix, AZ, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before: B. FLETCHER and THOMAS, Circuit Judges, and ROSENTHAL, District Judge.
The Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal, District Judge for the U.S. District Court for Southern Texas, Houston, sitting by designation.

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Dyretha (Dicy) Hambright ("Hambright") appeals from the district court's entry of summary judgment in favor of her employer, the United States Postal Service ("USPS"). We affirm. Because the parties are familiar with the factual and procedural history of the case, we need not recount it here.
The district court properly entered summary judgment in favor of the USPS on Hambright's claims of retaliation and race discrimination under Title VII. Even if we assume, arguendo, that Hambright made a prima facie case of retaliation, she has not offered "specific" and "substantial" circumstantial evidence raising a triable issue of fact as to whether the Postal Service's legitimate reason for its actions is a pretext for a retaliatory motive. See Nilsson v. City of Mesa, 508 F.3d 947, 954-55 (9th Cir.2007). Hambright failed to make a prima facie case of race discrimination because her proposed comparators are not "similarly situated" employees. See Moran v. Selig, 447 F.3d 748, 755 (9th Cir. 2006).
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.