Case Name: Nemecio De la Zerda et al. v. Louis Korn
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1860-10
Citations: 25 Supp. Tex. 188
Docket Number: 
Parties: Nemecio De la Zerda et al. v. Louis Korn.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 25 Supp.
Pages: 188–194

Head Matter:
Nemecio De la Zerda et al. v. Louis Korn.
Where the suit was for terminating a lease by the destruction of the premises, which had been rented for business purposes, it was error to toll the jury that the difference between the profits shown as likely to accrue to him in those premises, and the profits, if any, which he might make in another stand by the use of reasonable diligence and industry, and the • loss to his stock in trade, is the true measure of damages.
The general rule is, that where, there does not appear to have been a willful wrong, or gross negligence, remuneration is restricted to the immediate consequences of the unlawful acts. (For the cases upon the measure of damages, see Paschal’s Dig., Note 540, p. 351.)
Appeal from Bexar. The case was tried before Hon. Thomas J. Devine, one of tlié district judges.
Korn sued De la Zerda and Maverick for damages. He charged that De la Zerda had leased him the property in question, upon which he paid the rent and entered the premises; that the property was an excellent business-stand, where he was doing a thriving and prosperous business, when Korn sold a part of the premises to Maverick; that the house had been demolished and his business broken up; that De la Zerda had refused to furnish him another business-place, whereby his stock had perished, his business had been lost, and he had been damaged $2,000. There was really no charge in this petition against Maverick, except that he had purchased a pait of the property. The lease set out, was for a house and lot for two years.
The defendant plead a Idnd of license and the general denial; he also plead the sale to Maverick, and that Maverick agreed to pay the lessee all damages.
Maverick intervened, and plead his purchase with the knowledge of the lease, and his promise to pay any damages; that the lessee was cognizant; and that there was a stipulation in the lease to furnish another house for the lessee, should the one in question become untenable. The plaintiff amended, and averred the demolition of the house occupied by him by Maverick; that he had built another house on the property, and thus forced him to abandon it; and that De la Zerda had wrongfully terminated the lease, and that his damages were increased by his loss of business, &c.
The proof was, that in building a wall for Maverick, it became necessary to remove the wall of the house occupied by Korn; that Korn consented to this, provided it could be done in six days; that it was not so done; that in removing the wall, the cement-roof was broken and fell in, and Korn’s house made uninhabitable, and that he removed into the hack yard, and from thence to rent another house. Witnesses proved that Korn was a confectioner, and that his profits wer§ from $150 to $200 per month, and that his lease was worth $50 a month, which was an advance of over 100 per cent. The lease had five and two-third months to run when the domolition took place. Maverick had tendered- $100 as a compromise, and had offered in lieu of this a house in another street. An order of the city to remove Maverick’s wall, occupied by another tenant, had caused all the trouble.
The court instructed the jury as follows:
1. “ The first question for your consideration is this, did Korn give his consent, and was the damage done to the building occupied by him by reason of the rebuilding of the partition-wall between himself and Lavenburg.
2. “ If you believe in the affirmative, you will render a verdict in favor of the defendants.
3. “If, however, you believe from the evidence that plaintiff has been damaged by the acts of the intervenor or defendant, Maverick, after the sale of the house by De la Zerda to Maverick, then you will render a verdict in favor of the plaintiff as against De la Zerda and Maverick.
4. “If you believe that the injury to plaintiff’s premises were caused by the repairing or rebuilding of Maverick’s house, irrespective of the partition-wall, and before the purchase of De la Zerda’s house, then you will render a verdict in favor of the plaintiff as against Maverick alone.
5. “ If you should find in favor of plaintiff, you will assess the damages at the amount of lo'ss or injury caused to his business and stock in trade by the injury to the premises occupied by Mm.
6. “ The true measure of damages, if you find for the plaintiff, is, the difference between the profits, if any, which he might make in another stand by the exercise of reasonable diligence and industry, and the loss to his stock in trade.
' 7. “The wealth or poverty of parties to a suit has no bearing on this, cause, and should exercise no influence in finding or estimating damages.”-
Jacob Waelder, for appellants.
—1st, Did Korn give his consent; and, 2d, was the damage done to the building occupied by him by reason of the rebuilding (pulling down) of the partition-wall between himself and Lavenburg?
Did Korn give his consent? Kampman states, “That Korn said that he had no objection to the partition-wall being taken dowm, provided it was rebuilt within six days; and again, “that Korn removed into the back yard whilst the repairs were going on.”
The second proposition is as clearly established as the first. By referring to the testimony of the same witness, we find, “that in removing the partition-wall some of the roof was knocked down, wMch rendered it impossible for Korn to remain in the house, and that he removed into the back yard while the^ repairs were gomg on; and finally it became so disagreeable, that he was compelled to rent another house from Miller.” “ The house was untenantable when Korn left.”
If the evidence establishes the answers of the two ques tions embodied in the charge in the affirmative, then the verdict is contrary to the law as charged by the court, and a new trial should have been granted to the defendants.
“The jury find against the defendants, De la Zerda and Samuel Maverick, the sum of $750.”
It is believed that the verdict was found under the third charge of the court; no other charge contemplating that a verdict could be found against both of the defendants.
The third charge is based on the assumption, that there is evidence to prove the defendant Maverick a trespasser after the purchase of the property by him.
If he were a trespasser, evidence in mitigation, or going to prove that it was not a willful trespass, and that no damage resulted therefrom, is material.
The second assignment of error is, that the court erred in its fourth, fifth, and sixth charges.
As regards the fourth, as a principle of law, its correctness is admitted; yet, as there was no evidence before the jury for its basis, it was error so to charge.
The sixth charge is contrary to law, as it authorizes the jury to find prospective or speculative damages. Such damages being only allowable in those cases where the defendant is guilty of gross negligence, malice, or willful wrong; it is submitted, that they are not allowable in this, as there is no evidence to warrant them. (See Sedgwick on Measure of Damages, pp. 81 and 82, and the authorities therein cited.)
Teel Cotton, for appellee.
—The appellant assigns the following errors, upon which he relies to reverse the judgment:
1. The verdict is against the law as charged by the court.
2. The verdict is contrary to the evidence.
3. The damages found are excessive.
4. The refusal to grant a new trial upon the ground of newly-discovered evidence. •
5. The'court erred in its 4th, 5th, and 6th charges.
Korn consented, if the improvements were made in six
days; and thereupon De la Zerda contracted with the witness, Kampman, to execute the work, which was the rebuilding of a partition-wall. The wall was not built in the six days. Maverick ordered the witness, Kampman, to throw down the front wall and roof, which was before the lease expired, and shortly after Korn left the premises. Ko evidence whatever that Korn consented to that. By the throwing down of the front wall and roof the premises were rendered useless to Korn. Maverick purchased the property when Korn had an unexpired lease of five and a half months. Maverick made himself a party to the wrongs committed by De la Zerda. Both De la Zerda and Maverick admit that they are bound to appellee for all damages that are unavoidable. It will not be contended that the pulling down of the front wall and roof was not their act, as also the throwing down of partition-wall. It was for the benefit of the defendants, Be la Zerda and Maverick, that it was done. It is a well-established rule, that the wrong-doer is responsible for all the consequences which flow immediately from his wrongful act. It is solely a direct pecuniary loss. (Sedg. Meas. Dam., pp. 36 and 37.) It cannot be said that this well-settled rule of law is not wholly applicable to this case. All- of the damages arose from the "wrongful acts of Be la Zerda and Maverick. And, again, in Graham v. Roder, 5 Tex., 141, this court held, that when there is gross negligence or oppression mingled in the controversy, it permits the jury to give exemplary damages, which we think the jury in the present case did not do.

Opinion:
Wheeler, 0. J.
—There is little cause to doubt that a case proper for a recovery in damages was well made out against the defendant, De la Zerda. But as to the defendant, Maverick, it is not so clear that a case was made out in evidence.
The defendants had abandoned their other defenses, and relied on the general denial. The plaintiff did not read in evidence the plea which had been abandoned by the defendants, and without the admissions they contained, it is not very apparent upon what evidence the jury found a verdict against the defendant, Maverick. But there is another question in the case which renders it unnecessary to decide upon the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict; that is, the question of the measure of damages.
Though the case made by the evidence may have well entitled the plaintiff to a recovery against the defendant, De la Zerda, yet it is conceived the rule laid down by the court, by which to measure the amount of the recovery in damages, was not quite correct, and the jury may have been misled by it. The jury were instructed that the true measure of damages for the plaintiff was " the difference between the profits shown as likely to accrue to him in those premises, and the profits (if any) which he might make in another stand by the use of reasonable diligence and industry and the loss to his stock in trade."
The future profits likely to accrue to the plaintiff in the prosecution of his business we think a subject too remote and contingent to constitute the proper subject of computation as damages in this action.
The difficulty of laying down a precise and certain rule upon this subject, which shall be applicable to all cases, has been often recognized. The difficulty consists not so much in ascertaining a general rule, as in the application of any rule which may be stated as the result of the authorities to cases as they arise. But I apprehend it will be found, that future contingent profits of the character of those within the contemplation of the charge of the court in this case have not been admitted as the proper subject of compensartion in damages. They are too hypothetical and supposititious in their nature to constitute the legitimate subject of judicial cognizance, and are thence said to be too remote to be the foundation of an action. The general rule is, that, in cases of this nature, where, as in the present case, there does not appear to have been a willful wrong, or gross negligence, remuneration is restricted to the immediate consequences of the wrongful act. (Sedgw. on Meas, of Dam., 82, et seq.; Calvit v. McFaddin, 13 Tex., 324.) The value of the use and occupation, or rent of the premises, would undoubtedly be a proper subject of computation, and so would the injury to the defendant's goods, or stock in trade, in estimating the damages. But we think the profits which he might have realized, or which were likely to accrue to him in the future occupation of the premises, too remote to be made the ground of a recovery. We are of opinion, therefore, that there was error in the charge of the court, for which the judgment must be
Reversed and the cause remanded.