Case Name: G. H. Sherwood et al. v. J. W. Fleming
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1860-10
Citations: 25 Supp. Tex. 408
Docket Number: 
Parties: G. H. Sherwood et al. v. J. W. Fleming.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 25 Supp.
Pages: 408–430

Head Matter:
G. H. Sherwood et al. v. J. W. Fleming.
The 14th and 19th sections of the act to incorporate the Pacific railroad read as follows:
“All of the vacant and unappropriated public lands belonging to the State of Texas, east of the 103d parallel of longitude west from Greenwich, and embraced between the parallels of latitude 31° and 33° north, and all of the vacant and unappropriated lands belonging to the State west of the 103d degree of longitude, and embraced between the parallels of latitude 30° 30z and 32° north latitude, he, and the same is hereby, held in reserve by the State, for the purposes herein set forth, until the track of said road is located by said company; from and after which time, there shall be hel,d in reserve by the State, for the purposes above set forth, all of the vacant and unappropriated land belonging to the State, lying within thirty miles on each side of said road, until the same is surveyed and located in accordance with the provisions of the 13th section of this act: Provided, That, if there should not be a sufficient amount of vacant and unappropriated land, belonging to the State, embraced in the above last Reservation, to fully satisfy the amount of land to which said company may be entitled, by virtue of a compliance with the.provisions of this act, the Governor cause to be issued, by the commissioner of the general land office, certificates for six hundred and forty acres each to said company, for the balance they may be entitled to, which may be located upon any other vacant and unappropriated land belonging to the State, in such manner that no two sections shall join, except at one corner, at the proper cost and charges of said company or their assigns, which shall be patented to said company as other lands: Provided, That the alternate sections herein reserved to the State-shall so continue to be reserved to the use of the State, until otherwise directed by law. And further provided, That said surveys shall be made in a square, and those adjoining the road shall front one mile thereon, and no more, unless prevented by surveys made previous to the passage of this act.
“This act shall not be so construed as to affect any right of location or entry, pre-emption right or survey, heretofore acquired, in the district of county reserved and set apart for the use of said road.” (Paschal’s Dig., Art, 5308, Note 1107, p. 844.) [This act was repealed 26th August, 1856. (Id.) ]
The lands embraced within this reservation were reserved, during its continuance, from individual appropriation, and locations within its limits were void, and patents stood upon no higher ground.
A patent which has been issued contrary to law is void.
The issuing of a patent is a ministerial act. If issued against law, or of lands reserved, it is void.
But it is supposed that the confirmatory act of the 10th of January, 1860, “confirming certain patents," &c., “in the Mississippi and Pacific railroad reservation," validates the defendant’s title, by relation back to the issuance of the patent, and will thus enable it to override the plaintiffs’ location, which was made subsequently to the removal of the reservation, and before the passage of the act of the 10th January, 1860, to wit, “prior to the 1st of November, 1857.” A legislative act which should operate backwards, and divest pre-existing rights, would be a retroactive law, within the meaning of the constitutional inhibition.
A located certificate gives a right to land. (O. & W. Dig., Art. 2040; Paschal’s Dig., Art. 5303, Note 1149.) It is property, and as such is within the protection of the constitutional guaranties.
We are referred by the appellant to the case of Hart v. Gibbons, which is supposed to maintain the doctrine, that the government retains the power of absolute disposition of land until the patent issues, although it has been located and surveyed by the holder of a valid certificate. There is no decision of this court which maintains such a doctrine. That case has been often cited as supporting the doctrine, but an examination of the case will show that that question was not involved in the decision.
Any observations to the effect that incipient titles are not within the constitutional guaranties for the protection of property could only apply to such incipient titles as existed at the period of the revolution, and which were not recognized by the new government, and consequently were held to have no standing in the courts, as in the case of Trimble v. Smithers, 1 Tex., 790; or have reference to the power of the government to establish new tribunals of review to detect and defeat fraudulent and forged claims upon the government, as in Hosner v. De Young, 1 Tex., 769; and League v. De Young, 11 How., 203. Thus understood, the observation of the court in Hart v. Gibbons will not mislead.
Appeal from San Salía. The case was tried before Hon. Edward H. Vontress, one of the district judges.
The appellee, J. W. Fleming, who was plaintiff in the court below, brought an action of trespass - to try title in the District Court of San Saba county, against the appellant, John T. Davis, to recover a tract of three hundred and twenty acres of land, described by metes and bounds. The original petition was filed on the 19th day of March, 1860. By amendment, filed on the 25th day of April, 1860, he alleges, that the appellant, John T. Davis, pretends to claim the land by virtue of a patent, which is alleged to be void, as having been issued contrary to law, and held by the defendant in fraud of the rights of plaintiff, and asking to have the patent cancelled, so far as it covers the land claimed by him.
The defendant, Davis, answers by alleging, that he purchased the land in controversy for a valuable consideration from one Gr. H. Sherwood, and took from said Sherwood a bond for deed, with general and special warranty; that under that bond he took possession of the land; and asking that his warrantor be required to come in and defend the suit.
This answer was filed .on the 23d day of April, 1860. On the same day G-. IT. Sherwood, the defendant’s vendor, made himself a party to the suit, and answers for his vendee and co-defendant: 1st, not guilty; 2d, that if the patent under which the defendant claims was ever affected by reason of the land being situated within the bounds of the Mississippi and Pacific railroad reservation, and located and patented during the pendency of that reservation, all such defects were cured by an act of the Legislature of the State of Texas, entitled “An act confirming certain patents, and to validate certain surveys in the Mississippi and Pacific railroad reservation,” approved January 10, 1860. (Acts 8th Leg., 19-20; Paschal’s Dig., Art. 5038, Hote 1107, p. 844.)
On the 25th day of April, 1860, the case was, by consent of the parties, submitted to the court without the intervention of a jury, on the following agreed statement of the case:
“ 1. It is agreed, that a special act of the 5th Legislature of the State of Texas, convened November 7,1853, entitled ‘An act to provide for the construction of the Mississippi and -Pacific railroad,’ approved December 21, 1853, may be read and used as if it were a general law.
“ 2. That the land in plaintiff’s petition described was located by virtue of a genuine Fisher-and-Miller-colony certificate, at a time when said land was embraced in the limits of the Mississippi and Pacific railroad reservation, and- that a patent was issued on said location on the 4th day of April, 1856.
“ 3. That the certificate so 'located ivas the property of G-. H. Sherwood, under whom defendant, Davis, claims.
“ 4. That at the time defendant made his said location, there was vacant land enough to exhaust his said certificate within the limits of Fisher-and-Miller’s colony, and outside of the limits of said Mississippi and Pacific railroad reservation.
“5. That after said Mississippi and Pacific railroad reservation was opened to location, and prior to the 1st day of November, 1859, plaintiff located, in a legal manner, a genuine Fisher-and-Miller-colony land certificate, upon said land described in his petition, which said location is still alive, and the said certificate is the property of plaintiff”.
Upon which the court entered judgment for the plaintiff for the land described in his petition, and decreed that so much of the patent under which the defendants claim as conflicts with the land described in plaintiff’s petition be cancelled, and forever held for naught as against the said rights of plaintiff.
The defendant’s motion for a new trial was overruled by the court. They then perfect their appeal to this court, and assign as errors: “ 1st, The court erred in law and fact in giving judgment for plaintiffs; 2d, The judgment should have been for defendant; 3d, The court erred in overruling the defendant’s motion for a new trial.”
The case was submitted on printed arguments by S. Ii. Renick, for appellants, and M. EEL. Bowers, for appellees. The Reporter is obliged to cut down their briefs.
Sam. JET. Renick, for appellants.
—In the view which we take of the case, it must turn mainly upon the construction and effect to be given to the act of January 10, 1860, entitled “An act to confirm certain patents, and to validate certain surveys in the Mississippi Pacific railroad reservation.” (See Laws 8th Leg., 19 and 20.)
The effect of the statute -upon patents, upon which no location had intervened, will not admit of a doubt. A may confirm and adopt the acts of his agent, which are void for an excess of authority, or he may adopt the acts of a mere volunteer, who professes to act for him, so as to bind B, who dealt with such authorized person. (Story on Agency, § 239; lb. §§ 242, 243, 244, 245, and note 2, and authorities there cited.) The State may adopt the acts of her agents, which are void for want of authority, as fully as a private person. And such adoption and ratification will have the same effect, viz, to render their acts as valid and -binding, as if originally legal and fully authorized. Uo one but the State or principal can complain of the acts of the agents. (10 Johns., 132-138; 8 Mass., 468-472; 9 Mass., 151, 152, and 360-362; Melton v. Cobb, 21 Tex., 541.)
But upon this point we presume there will be no controversy. The appellee, with all his anxiety to secure rich land already well improved, would not risk a second location upon one of these patented sections since the passage of the statute.
The legislature intended to embrace land upon which there had been a second location. This is evident from the caption of the act, and especially from the proviso attached to it, allowing the conflicting locations to be lifted, which repeals the statute prohibiting the lifting of locations, so far as these lands are concerned. This proviso would, be useless verbiage under any other' construction. The statute then operated as a legislative grant of the land described in the patent; and as such conveyed to the appellant, Sherwood, under whom Davis claimed, all the title and interest which the State had in the land at the time of the passage of the act. The fee, the absolute title, was in the State at the date of this statute, and so passed to the holder of the patent. (Hart v. Gibbons, 14 Tex., 215.) A legislative grant is a title of a higher nature than a patent. The former issues directly from the granting power, whilst the latter is the mere ministerial act of the officers or agents of the government. The legislative grant is the title of paramount dignity. See Choteau v. Eckhart, 2 How., 354; Sligon v. Martin, Ib., 319, and LeBois v. Bramell, 4 How., 449, where legislative grants prevailed over imperfect titles secured by the treaty under which Louisiana was acquired.
It may be contended, in opposition to this view, that the statute is unconstitutional; that it is retroactive in its operation ; or that it impairs the obligation of a contract, so far as it operates upon the title to this land.
1. It is not every statute that operates upon past transactions that is to be deemed retroactive in the sense of the constitution. u Any law that divests vested rights acquired under existing laws, or which creates a new obligation, or attaches a new disability in respect to transactions already past, must be deemed a retrospective law.” (Per Story, J., 2 Gall., 138.) This is a clear definition of a retrospective law. This statute does not divest the appellee of any vested right. The only vested right he ever had, if any,, was to appropriate three hundred and twenty acres of the public domain. And this right is left unimpaired and undisturbed. This court has repeatedly decided that a location and survey are not vested rights. Hart v. Gibbons, above referred to, where the court says: “ The question cannot be regarded as open in this court at this time, as since the case of Hosner v. DeYoung, 1 Tex., 764, it has been the uniform doctrine of the court that the State does not surrender the dominion and control over the public domain until final and complete title has been issued.” (Hosner v. DeYoung, 2 Tex., 464; Kemper v. The Corporation of Victoria, 3 Tex., 135; Warren v. Shuman, 5 Tex., 455; Howard and Wife v. Perry, 7 Tex., 264.)
Statutes that are remedial in their character are never deemed retroactive. (Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet., 88-110.) There can be no such thing as a vested right in a remedy. (6 Pick., 501.) The act of 1860, above referred to, acts only upon the remedy, and therefore does not affect any vested right.
2. ¡Neither does this statute violate or impair the obligation of a contract. The only contract existing between the State and Fleming is, that he is to have three hundred and twenty acres of land, if he can find so much vacant within certain limits. The terms of this contract are be found in the certificate and the law under which it issued. (Hart. Dig., Art. 2245 to 2259.) This is what is termed a floating certificate. ¡No particular lands were designated; it only gives to the holder the privilege of locating it upon the unsurveyed portion of the colony granted to Fisher and Miller. Beyond this, it does not bind either party. The remedy provided by the State is the laws regulating locations,'surveys, and patents, by which the holder may perfect his imperfect title, or his claim for three hundred and twenty acres of land, into a patent or perfect title. The State might repeal all laws now in force upon this subject, and provide a totally different system for the procuring of patents, and the holder of certificates would have-no legal right to complain, even if this change took from them the right of selection and gave it to the State. The legislature may at any time alter, amend, enlarge, vary, or restrict the remedy, so always that some remedy is left. (Commonwealth v. Hamden, 6 Pick., 501.) There is a marked dis tinction between the obligation of a contract and the •remedy by which that obligation is to be enforced. The legislature may not impair the obligation, but it may control the remedy. (Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet., 88-110; 1 Tex., 250; 4 Tex., 470; 7 Tex., 348; Story on Const, § 1385, 2d ed.; Ogden v. Saunder, 12 Wheat, 288; Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat., 122-200; Mason v. Hall, 12 Wheat., 370.)
These authorities fully establish the proposition, that the remedy for the enforcement of the obligation of a contract is wholly within the control of the legislature, so long" as an adequate remedy is left.
In the case at bar, an adequate, nay, an ample and complete, remedy is left to the appellee, and he cannot complain. If these views are not correct, then the Pacific railroad reservation was itself unconstitutional, in so far as it lessened the quantity of land out of which the appellant as well as the appellee were to make their selections, and the patent is unaffected by it.
There never were any means by which he could have enforced this obligation against the State, if she had refused to comply with it upon her part. It is true that he might mandamus the ministerial officers of the State to perform their duty as prescribed by the legislature, and have compelled the performance of any ministerial duty or act necessary to complete his title. But suppose the State should repeal the law creating a general land office, or the law providing for the election of district surveyors; or suppose the whole of the lands upon which this class of certificates is allowed to be located, to have been reserved from location, how could he proceed against the State ? The only remedy that Fleming would have had, would have been an appeal to the political authority for compensation. And the presumption is, that such an appeal would not be unheeded. But then the redress would be a matter of grace and favor, and not a matter of right. (Hosner v. DeYoung, 2 Tex., 497; Kemper v. The Corporation of Victoria, 3 Tex., 135; Causici v. LaCoste, 20 Tex., 269.) The rights of the holders of certificates for land against the government, and the obligations resulting therefrom on the part of the State, are of the imperfect kind, binding only in conscience, in contradistinction to legal rights, which may be enforced by a suit at law, or equitable rights, which are cognizable by courts of equity. They are rights without remedy.
It will be remembered that this certificate is not one of those claims for land based upon previous meritorious services rendered to the government as its consideration, but was a pure gratuity upon the part of the government. The German Emigration Company had forfeited their contract with the government. The colonists, or emigrants, had complied with no single condition upon which they were to have land. But the legislature, influenced by liberal considerations, made to them a grant, in which the colonists were relieved from the performance of all conditions. (Hart. Dig., Arts. 2245 to 2259; Causici v. LaCoste, 20 Tex., 269; Melton v. Cobb, 21 Tex., 541.) How can claims of this character, resting in imperfect obligation, be said in any just sense to be vested rights or contracts beyond the control of the legislature ?
But this statute not only does not divest any vested right, nor impair the obligation of any contract, but it leaves-the remedy ample and complete, except as to this particular section.
There can be no doubt but the courts may, and it is their duty to declare a law, which is clearly unconstitutional, null and void; but it will never exercise this high and delicate authority except in a clear case.
, We conclude, that the grant made by the legislature is not in violation of any constitutional provision; that it Vested the title to the land in controversy in the defendants in the court/below; and that the court erred in not giving judgment for them upon the agreed statement of facts. W"e ask that for this error the judgment be reversed, and the proper judgment rendered by this court, as there is no controversy about the facts.
The case of Hamilton v. Avery is wholly different from the one at bar. That case turned entirely upon the saving clause attached to the act confirming Avery’s title. There is no such saving in this statute, and for this reason the case is not one in point.
M. BE. Bowers, for appellee.
—1. The location under which the appellants claim was and is void.
Many of the questions herein involved have been so clearly determined by this court in the case of Kimmell v. Wheeler et al., 22 Tex., 77, as to require no further argument. The land in controversy was held in reserve by the State, by the act of December, 1853, to “provide for the construction of the Mississippi and Pacific railroad,” (Special Laws, 5th Leg., § 14, p. 7,) from the time of the passage of the law until the reservation was opened to location, on the 1st day of January, 1857, unless the control of this land had previously been taken away from the legislature by some anterior appropriation or reservation.
The land in question was not one of the alternate, premium, or church sections, nor will it be pretended that it was, for if it were, then the defendants had no right to locate their certificates on it. To assume a position of this kind would be fatal to their title. Consequently they are not in a condition to deny the right of the State to make the reservation of this land for the use of the Mississippi and Pacific railroad on the 21st day of December, 1853. (State v. Delesdenier, 7 Tex., 76; Kimmell v. Wheeler, 22 Tex., 77.)
At the time, then, when the defendants made this location under which they claim, which was after the creation of the Mississippi and Pacific railroad reserve, “the land had been withdrawn from the mass of vacant land out of which they were entitled to make their selection, and set apart by the State for another purpose. They could not then lawfully appropriate it to their certificate, (during the existence of this reserve,) and their location was consequently void.” (Kimmell v. Wheeler, 22 Tex., 77.)
2. The patent under which the defendants claim is void. The location was made and the patent was issued during the pendency of the reservation.
It might be safe and proper to rest the argument of this point on the reasoning of the court in Kimmell v. Wheeler, but as in that case no patent had been issued, and as the existence of the patent in the case at bar was made the foundation of an argument in the court below, by which the defendants sought to sustain the subsequent legislation in regard to these claims, it may not be unbecoming to inquire into the nature and legal existence of the document which they present as a patent. If the defendants had not sought to bolster up and sustain their claim to a title by seeking and obtaining legislative assistance, and thereby attempting to infuse life and legal vitality into a perfectly stale and dead parchment, the appellee would not deem it 'necessary to enter at length into the examination and dissection of their still-born subject, which they have endeavored to quicken into some kind of artificial existence.
It may be insisted, that although the location is void, yet the location and survey, and all the preliminary steps, are merged in the patent; and, when it is once issued, it is conclusive evidence that all the requirements of law have been complied with, and that the officer who issued it acted in the legal discharge of the power invested in him. I do not believe that such a proposition as this can or will be sustained by the court. The commissioner of'the general land office may be a very discreet officer, and combine as much wisdom and prudence as is usually found embodied in any one man. Yet the policy and genius of our govern ment repels the idea that his ministerial actions can rise above and overreach the legislative power „of the State. We believe that, when the legislature says a particular portion of the public domain shall not be subject to location or appropriation by private claimants, it means the land shall not be granted to such a claimant, that the commissioner of the general land office is so far the creature of that law, and that his actions are so far restricted and circumscribed by it, as to render inoperative and void any attempt to pass the title to the land by the issuance, over his signature and seal of office, of a document on parchment filled out in the usual form of a patent, and that such a document is no more of a barrier against the rights of a legal adverse claimant than so much blank parchment would be. “If the executive officer had no authority to issue the patent, because the land was not subject to entry and grant, then it is void, and the want of power may be proved by a defendant at law.” (9 Cranch, 99; 18 How., 87.)
A leading case, and one more frequently referred to than any other on this point, is Stoddard et al. v. Chambers, 2 How., 284.
[Mr. Bowers gave the full history of this case.]
Justice McLean, in delivering the opinion of the court, says: “ On the above facts, the important question arises, whether the defendant’s title is not void. That this is a question as well examinable at law as in chancery will not be controverted. That the elder legal title must prevail in the action of ejectment is undoubted. But the inquiry here is, whether the defendant has any title as against the plaintiffs. And there seems to be no difficulty in answering the question that he has not. His location was made on lands not liable to be thus appropriated, but expressly reserved; and this was the case when his patent was issued. Had the entry been made, or the patent issued, after the 26th of May, 1829, when the reser vation ceased, and before it was revived by the act of 1832, the title of the defendant could not have been contested. But at no other interval of time, from the location of Bell, and its confirmation in 1836, was the land claimed by him liable to be appropriated in satisfaction of a Hew Madrid certificate. Ho title can be held valid which has been acquired against law; and such is the character of the defendant’s title, so far as it trenches on the plaintiff’s. It has been argued, that the first patent appropriates the land, and extinguishes all prior claims of inferior dignity. But this view is not sustainable. The issuing of a patent is a ministerial act, which musí be performed according to law. A patent is utterly void and inoperative which is issued for land which had been previously patented to another individual. The fee having been vested in the patentee by the first patent, the record could convey no right. It is true, the patent possesses the highest verity. It cannot be contradicted or explained by parol; but, if it has been fraudulently obtained, or issued against law, it is void. It would be a most dangerous principle to hold, that a patent should carry the legal title, though obtained fraudulently or against law. Fraud vitiates all transactions. It makes void a judgment, which is a much more solemn act than the issuing. of a patent. The patent of the defendant, having been for land reserved from such appropriation, is void.”
The principles embraced in this decision were sanctioned in the case óf Barry v. Gamble, 3 How., 53. And in the case of Mills v. Stoddard et al., 8 How., 345, the case was again thoroughly examined, and the points decided re-affirmed by the court. These cases were examined, and the principles therein decided approved and sanctioned by this court in the case of Mason v. Russell’s Heirs, 1 Tex., 721.
In the case of Marsh et al. v. Brooks et al., 8 How., 223, the court says: “ The patent of 1839 was, prima fade, a con- elusive title; but by the treaty of 1824, with the Sac and Fox Indians, the land in dispute was admitted by the United States to lie within the territory ceded by the treaty; and the Indian title, such as it was by the treaty, is reserved to the half breed. This Lidian title consisted of the usufruct and right of occupancy and enjoyment, and, so long as it continued, was superior to and excluded those claiming the reserved lands by patents made subsequent to the ratification of the treaty.”
Li the case of Ham v. State of Missouri, 18 How., 126, the reservation of section Ho. 16 in each township for the use of schools, by the act' of Congress of 1811, from the public lands lying in the State of Louisiana, which the President of the United States was authorized to offer for sale, was held by the Supreme Court of the United States to be such an appropriation and reservation of the land as to place it out of the power of the United States to patent the 16th section to a private claimant in 1839. The patent thus issued was decided to be void, because the land was, at the time of the issuing of the patent, reserved from sale or location. And see Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 Pet., 498; New Orleans v. The United States, 10 Pet., 662.
The court, in deciding the last case, says: “The land, having been dedicated to public use, was withdrawn from commerce; and, so long as it continued to be thus used, could not become the property of any individual. So careful was the King of Spain to guard against the alienation of property which had been dedicated to public use, that, in a law cited, all such conveyances are declared to be void. It -would be a dangerous doctrine to consider the issuing of a grant as conclusive evidence of right in the power which issued it. On its face it is conclusive, and cannot be controverted; but if the thing granted was not in the grantor, no right passed to the grantee. A grant has frequently been issued by the United States for land which had previously been granted, and the second grant was held to he inoperative; and in a case recently decided by this court, where the government had granted land to the State of Ohio as lands belonging to the United States, to satisfy certain military claims, it was held that the title did not pass under the grant.” (City of Cincinnati v. White, 6 Pet., 431; Barclay et al. v. Howell, Id., 498.)
In case New Orleans v. Armas et al., 9 Pet., 224, it was decided that a patent for a part of this quay was void.
In Kissell v. St. Louis Public School, 18 How., 19, it is decided, that the act of 1812, dedicating certain lands for 'the purposes of education, appropriated these lands, and reserved them from, sale, sa'far as to exclude a pre-emption claim. Speaking of these lands, and the reservation of them, the court says: “They were beyond the reach of the 'officers of the government; nor could their action lawfully extend 'to them, with the exception that they could be ascertained and designated to be within the power reserved.”
“In general, the validity of a patent for lands can be impeached, only for causes anterior to its being issued, in a court of equity; but, if it is absolutely void upon its face, or the issuing thereof was without authority, or was prohibited by statute, or the State has no title to the land, it may be impeached collaterally, in a court of law, in an action of ejectment.” (Patterson v. Wirm et al., 11 Wheat., 380.)
The decisions of this court, it is respectfully submitted, fully sustain the principles enunciated in the foregoing cases. In the State v. Delesdenier, 7 Tex., 76, the patent to Jones and Hall was decided by the special court to be absolutely null and void, because the island of Galveston had been reserved from location and sale.
In DeLeon v. White, 9 Tex., 598, Justice Lipscomb, in speaking of the grant in question, says: “It was void in its inception, and could confer.no right, nor interpose any obstacle to any one claiming adversely to it; that the pre tended grant, being a nullity from its inception, the land that it pretends to convey was subject to location by any one holding a genuine, valid certificate.”
In Lewis v. Mixon, 11 Tex., 564, the patent issued to Mixon was declared to be void, because of the previous equitable claim of Lewis, which appropriated the land, and severed it from the public domain. In Hart v. Gibbons, 14 Tex., 213, the patent issued to Hart on the 25th day of February, 1852, was declared to be void, because of the previous appropriation of the land by Gibbons’ location in 1842, and which had become forfeited, because the certificate and • field-notes had not been returned to the general land office in the time required hy law, but which was revived fifteen days before the issuance of the patent, by the extension of the time for their return.
In Hamilton v. Avery, 20 Tex., 612, that portion of Avery’s grant situated outside of the limits of Austin’s little colony was decided to be void, because of the want of authority on the part of the commissioner to issue the grant.
If we have succeeded in showing the absolute nullity of the appellant’s location and patent, we think it follows irresistibly that they acquired no title thereby. They acquired nothing by their void grant. (Sampeyreal et al. v. United States, 7 Pet., 222; Polk’s Lessee v. Wendell, 5 Wheat., 308.)
• Hor was their void location and patent affected or benefited in the least by the subsequent act of the legislature, opening this reservation to location. This law does not pretend to recognize or validate any locations made during the pendency of the restriction, but simply provides, that “any person holding a genuine land certificate, bounty land warrant, or other head-right land certificate, or railroad certificate, shall, after the 1st day of January, 1857, have the right to locate the same within the reserve alluded to in this act, as on'any other public domain of the State.” (Acts July sess. 6th Leg., p. 56, sec. 3.)
The defendants did1 not see proper to avail themselves of the privileges given them, to locate their certificate “in a legal manner” on the land, but left it open to location by plaintiff, which he did in a “legal manner,” as he had a perfect right to do. We do not believe this court will construe the law opening the reserve to location to relate back, and make valid the defendant’s void location and patent.
But it is insisted by the appellants, that admitting the nullity of their location and patent, the act of January 10, 1860, validated them, and made their claim good. We think a brief examination of the effect of this law will not sustain this position. If their location and patent had been only defective, and not absolutely void in its inception, and in every step taken to perfect it, the position might be tenable. The title they attempt to set up is not simply voidable, but absolutely void. If it were the intention of the legislature to make valid this void title, to the exclusion of the intermediate location of the plaintiff, we deny the right or constitutional power of the State to do so. This act is claimed by the appellants as a legislative grant, and they insist, that, as the fee had not passed out of the State, except so far as the claims founded on their patent may pass it, it was subject to the control of the sovereignty of the soil, and liable to appropriation at the will of the legislature. In reply to this position, the appellee respectfully submits:
1. A law creating a right, to the extinction of the legal claims of another, is unconstitutional, and therefore void. Such a law is very different from a law providing a new remedy for a just right, which had previously existed. (U. S. Cons., art. 1, sec 10; State Cons., art 1, secs. 14,16, 21; De Cordova v. City of Galveston, 4 Tex., 473.)
“A location is recognized by the government as his property, and not public domain, by being taxed and sold for taxes, th§ same as other titled lands.” “It gives a right which is the subject of possession, of purchase, and of inheritance. It is sold under execution, and administered in courts of probate.” (Hamilton v. Avery, 20 Tex., 612.)
Is this to be the practical construction of the great principles of liberty taken from the magna charta, and incorporated into our own constitution, that no man shall be deprived of his property, “except by due course of the law of the land?” If this be so, then a very large proportion of the lands in the State are held at the will and mercy of others; and no man can really know that he has any land, until the fee is passed out of the State by the simple ministerial act of the commissioner of the general land office in issuing the patent. Such a power cannot be exercised by the legislature; and such a construction, we confidently believe, will not be given to this legislation. It cannot affect the pre-existing title of the appellee. (New Orleans v. Armas, 9 Pet., 224; United States v. Arredondo, 6 Pet., 738.)
2. = The location of a valid certificate on vacant land gives the owner a right in the land so located, which the State is bound to respect as against herself, and as against individuals who have no older right.
The land was vacant at the time appellee located it; for, the defendant’s location and patent, being nullities, cannot be set up for anything. (Mason v. Russell, 1 Tex., 730.)
If the act of January 10, I860; passed after this contract is formed, can be construed to take the land he has so selected away from him and give it to the defendant, the obligation which binds the State, one of- the contracting parties, to perform her part of the contract, is impaired within the meaning of the constitution. (O. & W. Dig., Art 1166; U. S. and State Cons.; Mitchel et al. v. U. S., 9 Pet., 714; LeBois v. Bramell, 4 How., 449; Ingram v. Aster, 2 How., 344; Howard and Wife v. Perry, 7 Tex., 259; Hamilton v. Avery, 20 Tex., 612.) „
“ Contracts may be made by and with the State as well as an individual, and the State may contract with its own citizens. Bights once vested, privileges once granted or sanctioned by the law of the State, if within the constitutional limits, may be forfeited, but cannot be arbitrarily divested or withdrawn by future legislation.” (Woodruff v. The State, 3 Ark., 285.)
3. Although the State has the right of eminent domain, and before she parts with the fee by a legal patent can revive a dormant equitable claim, which was valid in its . inception, to the exclusion of a subsequent valid location, yet she cannot, after the location of a valid certificate, grant the land so located to one who, up to the date of the grant, had no claim to the land. Such is believed to be the effect of the decision in Hamilton v. Avery. The argument of the court in that case is respectfully referred to as establishing this proposition, and we believe this is as far as this court has ever gone. In all the 'adjudged cases, from Hosner v. DeYoung, 1 Tex., 764, up to De Cordova v. Jennings, 20 Tex., 508, the right of the beneficiaries of the legislative enactment “had legally attached to the land.” They each, at one time, had a valid equitable right to the land, which had become dormant, and these dormant equities were restored to “pristine life and vigor.”
4. The act of January 10, 1860, is not a grant of land, but simply makes valid that which before was void, and consequently cannot relate back further than its date. It' must deal with the rights of the parties as it found them. At best, it can only have the effect of a patent issued at that time. As there was no former legal entry, the inception of their title would be at the date, of their patent. In other words, they would have a patent founded on a junior entry, to interpose against a legal elder entry. The appel lee’s elder entry must prevail in such a case. (Finley v. Williams, 9 Cranch, 164; Polk’s Lessee v. Wendell, Id., 83; Brush v. Wear, et al., 15 Pet., 93; Ross v. Borland, 1 Pet., 665; LeBois v. Bramell, 4 How., 462; Warren v. Shuman, 5 Tex., 441; Lewis v. Mixon, 11 Tex., 564.)
The defendant’s patent cannot hear the date and take effect until the time when legal vitality was attempted to be breathed into it by the act of January 10, 1860. This was after appellee’s valid entry was made. The patent cannot, therefore, be sustained. (Hoofnagle v. Anderson, 7 Wheat., 212.)

Opinion:
Wheeler, O. J.
—The points of difference between the present and the' case of Kimmell v. Wheeler (22 Tex., 77) are, the patent in the present case, and the éonfirmatory act of the 10th of January, 1860.
In Kimmell v. Wheeler, we decided that the act of the 21st of December, 1853, "to provide for the construction of the Mississippi and Pacific railroad," withdrew the land embraced within the reservation from private or individual appropriation by a colonist or other certificate, and that a location made within the limits of the reservation during its continuance was void. Does a patent issued for lands within the reservation at that time stand upon any higher ground? It would seem, upon principle, that it does not, for the plain reason, that the officer had no authority to issue patents to lands thus reserved and set apart from the mass of the public lands, and the act of issuing the patent, being contrary to law, was void. It has accordingly been held, in numerous decisions of this and other courts, that a patent which has been issued contrary to law is void. (Mason v. Russell, 1 Tex., 721; The State v. Delesdenier, 7 Tex., 76; Stoddard v. Chambers, 2 How., 284; Mills v. Stoddard, 8 How., 345; Id., 223; 9 Cr., 99; 18 How., 87.) It is too firmly settled by the whole current of judicial decisions on the point to be now questioned, that the issu ing of a patent is a ministerial act, and must be performed according- to law; if it is issued against law, it is void. Such is the character of the defendant's title. His location was made upon land which had been reserved from location, and which was not liable to be thus appropriated; and this was the case when the patent was issued. It was therefore issued contrary to law, and is consequently void. It is an elementary principle, hot to be touched, that an act, in order to be valid, must be legal. An act which is done contrary to law must be held void.
But it is supposed that the confirmatory act of the 10th of January, 1860, "confirming certain patents," &e., "in .the Mississippi and Pacific railroad reservation," validates the defendant's title by relation back to the issuance of the patent, and will thus enable it to override the plaintiff's location, which was made subsequently to the removal of the reservation, and before the passage of the act of the 10th of January, 1860, to wit, "prior to the 1st of ¡November, 1859."
That the plaintiff's location was valid when made cannot be doubted, as there had been no legal appropriation of the land. The question then is, whether, after he had legally appropriated the land by his location, the act confirmatory of the defendant's patent could have the effect to divest his right, and transfer it to the defendant. On principle and authority, it is clear that it could not. A legislative act which should operate backwards and divest preexisting rights would be a retroactive law within the meaning of the constitutional inhibition. (De Cordova v. The City of Galveston, 4 Tex., 470.) A locative certificate gives a right to land. (O. & W. Dig., Art. 2040;) [Paschal's Dig., Art. 5303, Note 1149.—Rep.] It is property, and as such is within the protection of the constitutional guaranties. (Hamilton v. Avery, 20 Tex., 612; Howard v. Perry, 7 Tex., 259.) If, therefore, the act of the 10th of January, *-1860, were intended to operate a divestiture of the plaintiff's right, hy relation backwards, it could not be admitted to have that effect. But we do not suppose it was so intended. There is nothing in the act which requires us to entertain that supposition; and, unless such intention was manifest beyond a doubt, we cannot suppose the legislature intended to affect the "rights of third persons, or to erect itself into a judicial tribunal to decide the question of right between these parties. The respect which is due the legislative department of the Government forbids such a supposition. The fair interpretation of the act seems to be, that it was intended to validate the claims of those for whose benefit it was enacted, as between themselves and the government, and where two of them were in conflict, to enable either party to withdraw his location; but not to give precedence to their claims over the legally-acquired rights of others. Be this as it may, the valid, subsisting, previously-acquired rights of third persons were unaffected by the act. As between these parties, the defendant's right had its inception with the passage of the act in question. His location and patent being void, there was nothing on which it could operate by relation back to any antecedent time. The plaintiff's was prior in time and superior in right, and must therefore prevail. His was a valid appropriation of the land from the time of his location, and was title sufficient to maintain the action against one having no' prior equity. The court, therefore, rightly adjudged a recovery in favor of the plaintiff.
We are referred, for the appellant, to the case of Hart v. Gibbons, which is supposed to maintain the doctrine that the government retains the power of absolute disposition of land until the patent issues, although it has been located and surveyed by the holder of a valid certificate. There is no decision of this court which maintains such a doctrine. That case has been often cited as supporting the doctrine, but an examination of the case will show that that question was not involved in the decision. Any obser vations to the effect that incipient titles are not within the constitutional guaranties for the protection of property, f could only apply to such incipient titles as existed at the { period of revolution, and which were not recognized by { the new government, and consequently were held to have no standing in the courts, as in the case of Trimble v. Smithers, 1 Tex., 790, or have reference to the power of the government to establish new tribunals of review to detect and defeat fraudulent and 'forged claims upon the government, as in Hosner v. De Young, 1 Tex., 769, and League v. De Young, 11 How., 203. Thus understood, the observations of the court in Hart v. Gibbons will not mislead.
There is no error in the judgment, and it is
Affirmed.