Case Name: Alvin Bernard FORD, Petitioner, v. Charles G. STRICKLAND, Jr., Warden, Florida State Prison; Louie L. Wainwright, Secretary, Department of Offender Rehabilitation, State of Florida; Jim Smith, Attorney General, State of Florida, Respondents
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1982-04-15
Citations: 676 F.2d 434
Docket Number: No. 81-6200
Parties: Alvin Bernard FORD, Petitioner, v. Charles G. STRICKLAND, Jr., Warden, Florida State Prison; Louie L. Wainwright, Secretary, Department of Offender Rehabilitation, State of Florida; Jim Smith, Attorney General, State of Florida, Respondents.
Judges: Before RONEY and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges, and PITTMAN , District Judge.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 676
Pages: 434–456

Head Matter:
Alvin Bernard FORD, Petitioner, v. Charles G. STRICKLAND, Jr., Warden, Florida State Prison; Louie L. Wainwright, Secretary, Department of Offender Rehabilitation, State of Florida; Jim Smith, Attorney General, State of Florida, Respondents.
No. 81-6200.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
April 15, 1982.
Rehearing Granted April 28, 1982.
Richard H. Burr, III, Nashville, Tenn., Marvin E. Frankel, New York City, for petitioner.
Joy B. Shearer, Asst. Atty. Gen., W. Palm Beach, Fla., for respondents.
Before RONEY and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges, and PITTMAN , District Judge.
Honorable Virgil Pittman, U. S. District Judge for the Southern District of Alabama, sitting by designation.
Judge Hatchett is recused and did not participate in this decision.

Opinion:
RONEY, Circuit Judge:
Alvin Bernard Ford was charged with shooting a wounded policeman in the back of the head at close range while fleeing from an armed robbery. Convicted of murder, Ford was sentenced to death in Florida. He appeals the denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging essentially seven contentions: (1) improper admission of an oral confession; (2) failure of the Florida Supreme Court to require resentencing when it found three of the statutory aggravating circumstances unsupported by the evidence; (3) improper state trial court instructions on mitigating circumstances; (4) failure of the Florida death law to require a finding that aggravating circumstances must outweigh mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt; (5) failure of the Florida Supreme Court to apply a consistent standard of reviewing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the case; (6) ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing; and (7) review by the Florida Supreme Court of nonrecord materials in death cases, the so-called Brown issue. After examining each of these contentions carefully, we affirm the denial of the writ of habeas corpus.
Briefly, the facts giving rise to petitioner's conviction and sentence are as follows. On the morning of July 21, 1974, Ford and three accomplices entered a Red Lobster Restaurant in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, to commit an armed robbery. During the course of the robbery, two people escaped from the restaurant. Fearing police would soon arrive, petitioner's accomplices fled. Ford remained to complete the theft of approximately $7,000 from the restaurant's vault.
Officer Dimitri Walter Ilyankoff arrived on the scene. Petitioner allegedly shot him twice in the abdomen and, apparently realizing his accomplices had abandoned him, ran to the parked police car. Because there were no keys in the car, Ford ran back to the struggling, wounded officer. Petitioner asked Officer Uyankoff for the keys and then allegedly shot him in the back of the head at close range. Ford took the keys and made a high speed escape.
Petitioner was convicted in Circuit Court, Broward County, Florida, of first degree murder. In accordance with the jury's recommendation, the trial judge sentenced him to death. On direct appeal, both the conviction and sentence were affirmed. Ford v. State, 374 So.2d 496 (Fla.1979). The United States Supreme Court denied Ford's petition for writ of certiorari. Ford v. Florida, 445 U.S. 972, 100 S.Ct. 1666, 64 L.Ed.2d 249 (1980).
Petitioner thereafter joined with 122 other death row inmates in filing an application for extraordinary relief and petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Florida Supreme Court. The petitioners challenged the court's practice of receiving nonrecord information in connection with review of capital cases. The Florida Supreme Court dismissed the petition, Brown v. Wainwright, 392 So.2d 1327 (Fla.1981), and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari, Brown v. Wainwright, - U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 542, 70 L.Ed.2d 407 (1981).
Ford then filed a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 3.850 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure and applied for a stay of execution. Relief was denied. Ford v. State, 407 So.2d 907 (Fla. 1981).
Finally, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. The district court denied relief, and we granted a stay of execution so that the issues raised could be reviewed on appeal.
I.
Admission of Ford's Oral Confession
Ford was arrested in Gainesville, Florida on the day of the murder. He refused to talk with Gainesville police officers, indicating he first wanted to consult a lawyer. He was given an opportunity to talk to a public defender, but refused to accept that representation. He was Unable to reach his private attorney.
Fort Lauderdale police officers came to return Ford to Fort Lauderdale. The Miranda warnings were given and petitioner "wanted" to talk but would not give a written statement until he had contacted his lawyer. Petitioner's only statement at the time was "I didn't shoot that cop." On a small plane from Gainesville to Fort Lauderdale, another officer gave Ford Miranda warnings. Ford said he was willing to talk but would give no written statement until he had talked with his lawyer. After informing a Fort Lauderdale officer of his earlier unsuccessful effort to contact his attorney and his refusal of representation by the public defender, petitioner admitted participating in the Red Lobster robbery. Although denying participation in the killing, he admitted being left behind at the Red Lobster by his accomplices, seeing a police officer lying on the ground as he left the restaurant, and escaping in the police car which he abandoned for a green Volkswagen.
Ford claims admission of the above statement in his trial violated the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments and was contrary to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and its progeny, including United States v. Priest, 409 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1969), and Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). He argues that having invoked without waiving his right to counsel, his responses to subsequent police-initiated custodial interrogation without an attorney should not have been admitted into evidence.
Petitioner moved to suppress his confession, but failed to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion on direct appeal to the Florida Supreme Court. Based on Wain wright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977), the district court held Ford's failure to raise the issue on direct state appeal forecloses its consideration in this habeas corpus proceeding.
The Florida procedural law is clear. A criminal defendant's failure to raise an issue which could be asserted on direct appeal precludes consideration of the issue on a motion for post-conviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Hargrave v. State, 396 So.2d 1127 (Fla. 1981). Accordingly, the state courts refused to consider this contention concerning the confession.
In Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963), the Supreme Court held a state prisoner who knowingly and deliberately bypasses state procedures intentionally relinquishes known rights and can be denied habeas corpus relief on that basis. Recognizing Fay left open the possibility of "sandbagging" by defense lawyers, the Supreme Court narrowed its sweeping rule in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 89, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 2507, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977). The Court held that absent a showing of both cause for noncompliance and actual prejudice, habeas corpus relief is barred where a state prisoner has failed to comply with a state contemporaneous objection rule. 433 U.S. at 87, 97 S.Ct. at 2506.
While Sykes arose in the context of a procedural default at the trial level, we have applied its rationale in cases involving a procedural default during the course of a direct appeal from a state court conviction. See Huffman v. Wainwright, 651 F.2d 347 (5th Cir. 1981); Evans v. Maggio, 557 F.2d 430, 433-34 (5th Cir. 1977). Other circuits have applied Sykes in the same fashion. See Forman v. Smith, 633 F.2d 634, 640 (2d Cir. 1980); Cole v. Stevenson, 620 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir. 1980); Gibson v. Spalding, 665 F.2d 863, 866 (9th Cir. 1981). Applying Sykes in this setting accrues the dual advantage of discouraging defense attorneys from omitting arguments in preparing appeals with the intent of saving issues for federal habeas corpus consideration and encouraging state appellate courts to strictly enforce procedural rules, thereby reducing the possibility the federal court will decide the constitutional issue without the benefit of the state's views. Gibson v. Spalding, 665 F.2d at 866; Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 90, 97 S.Ct. at 2508. Additionally, application of Sykes to the forfeiture of specific claims on appeal promotes the goals of comity and accuracy identified by the Sykes Court. Forman v. Smith, 633 F.2d at 639.
Thus, in this Circuit a state prisoner can forego the opportunity to raise constitutional issues in habeas corpus proceedings by deliberately bypassing state appellate procedural rules or by merely failing to follow them without showing both cause for the default and prejudice resulting from it. Because this record does not reveal Ford's procedural default was the result of an intentional bypass within the meaning of Fay, we turn to the cause and prejudice exception of Sykes.
Cause and prejudice are sometimes interrelated. Huffman v. Wainwright, 651 F.2d at 351. While the Supreme Court has not explicitly defined cause and prejudice, our precedents have defined "cause" sufficient to excuse a procedural default in light of the determination to avoid "a miscarriage of justice." Id. Prejudice means "actual prejudice" which in this case must result from the failure to appeal the trial court's admission of petitioner's statement. See Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 96 S.Ct. 1708, 48 L.Ed.2d 149 (1976); Buckelew v. United States, 575 F.2d 515, 519 (5th Cir. 1978).
A careful review of the record reveals the Sykes exception does not apply in this case. Ford's argument that the procedural default is excused because of the position of Florida courts at the time on the issue must fail. The claim was perceived and asserted in the trial court, and therefore could have been asserted on appeal. Engle v. Isaac, - U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982).
If a defendant perceives a constitutional claim and believes it may find favor in the federal courts, he may not bypass the state courts simply because he thinks they will be unsympathetic to the claim. Even a state court that has previously rejected a constitutional argument may decide, upon reflection, that the contention is valid. Allowing criminal defendants to deprive the state courts of this opportunity would contradict the principles supporting Sykes.
- U.S. at -, 102 S.Ct. at 1572 (footnotes omitted).
Even addressed in terms of manifest injustice, see Huffman v. Wainwright, 651 F.2d 347 (5th Cir. 1981), under the circumstances of this case, imposition of the Sykes forfeiture rule does not constitute a miscarriage of justice. Petitioner does not contest the accuracy of the statement made to the Fort Lauderdale police. The statement admitted only presence and participation in the robbery; it denied participation in the shooting. The Florida Supreme Court, in discussing effectiveness of counsel, concluded and we agree that "[tjhere was abundant evidence apart from the confession, some by eyewitnesses, to place him at the scene as a participant." Ford v. State, 407 So.2d at 909.
II.
Failure to Require Resentencing When Evidence Insufficient on Some Aggravating Circumstances
After receiving instructions on the eight aggravating circumstances under Fla.Stat. § 921.141, Ford's jury recommended the death penalty. Finding evidentiary support for all eight aggravating circumstances, the judge sentenced petitioner to death. On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court ruled three of the eight did not apply because two lacked evidentiary support and one was based on the same aspect of the crime as another circumstance. Ford v. State, 374 So.2d 496, 501-03 (Fla.1979). The court upheld the five other aggravating circumstances, specifically finding the killing "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel." Id. at 503. In the absence of any mitigating circumstances, death was presumed the appropriate penalty and the sentence was affirmed. Id.
Petitioner argues that Henry v. Wainwright, 661 F.2d 56 (5th Cir. 1981), and Stephens v. Zant, 631 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1980), reh. denied and modified, 648 F.2d 446 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, - U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 90, 71 L.Ed.2d 82 (1981), require resentencing under the above circumstances.
In Stephens the Georgia Supreme Court had held unconstitutional one of the statutory aggravating circumstances presented to the jury. We held that the death sentence must be set aside because it was impossible to tell from the record the extent to which the Georgia jury had relied on an unconstitutional statutory aggravating factor in imposing the death penalty. Stephens v. Zant, 631 F.2d at 406. In Henry, we held the trial court committed constitutional error in admitting into evidence and permitting the jury to consider evidence of nonstatutory aggravating circumstances. Henry v. Wainwright, 661 F.2d at 60. These two cases are inapposite to the case at bar.
The instant case involves consideration of neither unconstitutional nor nonstatutory aggravating factors. That evidence was insufficient to support two circumstances and one circumstance was based on the same aspect of the crime as another does not compel the conclusion that the death sentence was unconstitutionally infected by consideration of extraneous evidence. The sentencing jury and judge considered only evidence of factors which could properly be considered by them. Where, as here, there were no statutory mitigating circumstances and the sentencer has considered only constitutional statutory aggravating circumstances, we perceive no reversible error where properly found statutory aggravating circumstances sufficiently support the sentence. The Florida Supreme Court's review has achieved the goals of rationality, consistency and fairness required under Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 258-60, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 2969-70, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976), and Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972).
Neither did the trial court commit constitutional error in instructing the jury as to all aggravating and mitigating circumstances permitted by the statute. To assure the jury understands the structure of the law as required by Proffitt, it seems appropriate that they be charged fully on the Florida statute, provided proper instructions on the burden of proof and the standard of evidence required to prove the factors are given.
III.
Instructions on Mitigating Circumstances
Instructing the jury on aggravating circumstances, the trial judge stated, "you shall consider only the following . .," and read the statutory language. With regard to mitigating circumstances, he said, "you shall consider the following .," again reading the appropriate statutory language. Ford neither objected to the instruction at trial nor raised it on direct appeal.
Relying primarily on Washington v. Watkins, 655 F.2d 1346 (5th Cir. 1981), petitioner argues the above instructions improperly limited the jury's consideration to statutory mitigating factors and precluded consideration of nonstatutory mitigating factors contrary to Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978). Lockett held "the sentencer . [must] not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death." 438 U.S. at 604, 98 S.Ct. at 2964.
With reference to aggravating circumstances, the Mississippi trial court in Washington instructed the jury to "consider only the following elements . . . . " As to mitigating circumstances, the judge stated, "consider the following elements . . . . " Washington v. Watkins, 655 F.2d at 1367. The state court concluded:
If you unanimously find from the testimony that one or more of the preceding elements of mitigation exist[s], then you must consider whether it outweighs the aggravating circumstances you previously found and you must return one of the following verdicts.. .
Id. at 1368 (emphasis added).
Reasoning that in determining whether aggravating outweighed mitigating factors jurors might have believed it was their sworn duty to consider only the two statutory mitigating circumstances enumerated in the charge, the Fifth Circuit reversed Washington's death sentence.
In evaluating the state court's instructions, we must pay careful attention to the words actually spoken to the jury to determine the interpretation a reasonable juror might give the instruction in question. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 514, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 2454, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979). The entire charge must be examined as a whole to discern whether the issues and law presented to the jury were adequate. Davis v. McAllister, 631 F.2d 1256, 1260 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 907, 101 S.Ct. 3035, 69 L.Ed.2d 409. Where some deficiency exists in the language of the charge taken as a whole, it must be shown that it so infected the entire trial process that a due process violation occurred. Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 94 S.Ct. 396, 38 L.Ed.2d 368 (1973); Washington v. Watkins, 655 F.2d at 1369.
Evaluating the jury charge in this case under the foregoing standard, we reject Ford's contention. While the instructions in Washington and the instant case involve similar use of the term "only," there are significant differences. Petitioner's jury was read the entire list of statutory mitigating circumstances and was not confined to two "preceding elements of mitigation," an important factor to the court's decision in Washington. 655 F.2d at 1370. More importantly, the sentencing judge's order which stated "[t]here are no mitigating circumstances existing — either statutory or otherwise — which outweigh any aggravating circumstances" reflects his con sideration of the nonstatutory mitigating evidence offered by Ford. The Florida statute does not restrict a jury's consideration of mitigating circumstances to those listed in the statute. It is reasonable to conclude the state trial judge's perception that nonstatutory mitigating factors could be considered was conveyed to the advisory jury. The language about which petitioner complains did not so "infect" the entire sentencing process as to present a due process violation.
IV.
Standard by Which Aggravating Circumstances Must Outweigh Mitigating Factors
Florida Statute § 921.141(3)(b) requires the sentencing court, in imposing the death penalty, to state in writing its finding "[t]hat there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances." Petitioner contends that because the statute, case law and jury instructions do not require the state to prove that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors "beyond a reasonable doubt," Florida's death penalty statute, on its face and as applied in this case, denies convicted capital defendants due process. Ford argues that the crime of capital murder in Florida includes the element of mitigating circumstances not outweighing aggravating circumstances, and that the capital sentencing proceeding in Florida involves new findings of fact significantly affecting punishment. Since the element is part of the crime, he asserts that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard is required by In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), and its progeny. We reject this argument for several reasons.
First, that the aggravating must outweigh mitigating factors for imposition of the death penalty under the Florida statute is not an element of the crime of capital murder in Florida. Under the Florida bifurcated death penalty statute, the sentencing proceeding is entirely separate from trial on the capital offense. Indeed, in certain circumstances the state judge can summon different jurors for the latter phase. Fla.Stat. § 921.141(1). Guilt of the capital offense having already been decided, the sentencing jury's sole function is to render an advisory sentence aiding the state judge in determining whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or life imprisonment. Id. Thus, that the Due Process Clause "protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged," In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364, 90 S.Ct. at 1072 (emphasis added), is irrelevant to deciding under the Florida statute whether there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh aggravating circumstances. The aggravating and mitigating circumstances are not facts or elements of the crime. Rather, they channel and restrict the sentencer's discretion in a structured way after guilt has been fixed. As the Supreme Court explained:
While the various factors to be considered by the sentencing authorities do not have numerical weights assigned to them, the requirements of Furman are satisfied when the sentencing authority's discretion is guided and channeled by requiring examination of specific factors that argue in favor of or against imposition of the death penalty, thus eliminating total arbitrariness and capriciousness in its imposition.
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 258, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 2969, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976).
Second, the United States Supreme Court has declared constitutional on its face Florida's capital sentencing procedure, including its weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The Supreme Court stated: Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. at 258, 96 S.Ct. at 2969. The statute, facially constitutional, was strictly applied according to its terms.
The directions given to judge and jury by the Florida statute are sufficiently clear and precise to enable the various aggravating circumstances to be weighed against the mitigating ones. As a result, the trial court's sentencing discretion is guided and channeled by a system that focuses on the circumstances of each individual homicide and individual defendant in deciding whether the death penalty is to be imposed.
Third, Ford's argument under In re Winship seriously confuses proof of facts and the weighing of facts in sentencing. While the existence of an aggravating or mitigating circumstance is a fact susceptible to proof under a reasonable doubt or preponderance standard, see State v. Dixon, 283 So.2d 1, 9 (Fla.1973), and State v. Johnson, 298 N.C. 47, 257 S.E.2d 597, 617-18 (1979), the relative weight is not. The process of weighing circumstances is a matter for judge and jury, and, unlike facts, is not susceptible to proof by either party. Petitioner's contrary suggestion is based on a misunderstanding of the weighing process, the statute and the guiding and channeling function identified in Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. at 258, 96 S.Ct. at 2969. Indeed, it appears no case has applied In re Winship in the manner Ford urges. The North Carolina and Utah cases cited by him which imposed a reasonable doubt standard in this situation turned on construction of state statutes rather than the due process rationale of In re Winship. See State v. Johnson, 257 S.E.2d at 617, and State v. Woods, 648 P.2d 71 (1981) [Utah 1981],
Ford's alternate argument, raised for the first time in his reply brief, is that the Florida capital sentencing proceeding involves new findings of fact significantly affecting punishment to which the full panoply of due process rights should be extended, including the requirement that the state prove beyond a reasonable doubt that mitigating factors outweigh aggravating factors. Again petitioner confuses proof of facts with the weighing process undertaken by the sentencing jury and judge. Because the latter process is not a fact susceptible of proof under any standard, we reject this contention.
V.
Florida Supreme Court's Standard of Review
Ford claims the Florida Supreme Court, in reviewing the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, violated the Eighth Amendment by failing to apply in his case the same standard of review applied in other capital cases. Specifically, he contends that under Florida case law, the court should have set aside two aggravating circumstances, collapsed two aggravating circumstances into one, and found the existence of one statutory mitigating circumstance and nonstatutory mitigating circumstances.
While petitioner characterizes this contention as the Florida Supreme Court's failure to apply a consistent standard of review, the district court correctly discerned that he is simply "quarreling" with the state court. Where in a capital punishment case the state courts have acted through a properly drawn statute with appropriate standards to guide discretion, Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. at 258-59, 96 S.Ct. at 2969, federal courts will not undertake a case-by-case comparison of the facts in a given case with the decisions of the state supreme court. Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582, 604-05 (5th Cir. 1978). This rule stands even though were we to retry the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in these cases, "we may at times reach results different from those reached in the Florida state courts." Id. at 605.
The Supreme Court of Florida is the ultimate authority on Florida law and we do not sit to question its interpretation of that State's statutes. See Stephens v. Zant, 631 F.2d at 405-06. Ford has not cited and we have not found any habeas corpus decision in which this Court has reversed a death sentence due to the state court's incorrect decision as to the existence or absence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
Moreover, examination of. the relevant Florida Supreme Court decisions reveals that its review of petitioner's death sentence was not arbitrary, capricious or in disaccord with the constitutional principles relating to sentencing in capital cases. Under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d), we presume cor rect facts properly found by the state courts. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 101 S.Ct. 764, 66 L.Ed.2d 722 (1981), after remand, - U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 1303, 71. L.Ed.2d 480 (1982). There is nothing in this record to show the Florida Supreme Court failed to apply the standard of review mandated by Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), and its progeny.
VI.
Assistance of Counsel at Sentencing
Petitioner contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing. Specifically he claims that although counsel called character witnesses and a psychiatrist to testify in mitigation, he "failed to focus the trial judge's and jury's attention on the critical factors relevant to the sentence determination." Careful review of the record and Ford's specific arguments reveals this contention is nothing more than an attack on the reasoned tactics and strategy of experienced trial counsel.
On reviewing ineffective assistance of counsel claims, we do not sit to second guess considered professional judgments with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight. Washington v. Watkins, 655 F.2d at 1355; Easter v. Estelle, 609 F.2d 756 (5th Cir. 1980). We have consistently held that counsel will not be regarded constitutionally deficient merely because of tactical decisions. See United States v. Guerra, 628 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 934, 101 S.Ct. 1398, 67 L.Ed.2d 369 (1981); Buckelew v. United States, 575 F.2d 515 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Beasley, 479 F.2d 1124, 1129 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 924, 94 S.Ct. 252, 38 L.Ed.2d 158 (1973); Williams v. Beto, 354 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1965). That an attorney's strategy may appear wrong in retrospect does not automatically mandate constitutionally ineffective representation. Baty v. Balkcom, 661 F.2d 391, 395 n.8 (5th Cir. 1981); Baldwin v. Blackburn, 653 F.2d 942, 946 (5th Cir. 1981).
That counsel for a criminal defendant has not pursued every conceivable line of inquiry in a case does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Lovett v. Florida, 627 F.2d 706, 708 (5th Cir. 1980). This is not a case in which counsel allegedly failed to adequately prepare and investigate. See Washington v. Strickland, 673 F.2d 879 (5th Cir. 1982). Ford's counsel was reasonably likely to render and did render reasonably effective assistance. Herring v. Estelle, 491 F.2d 125, 127 (5th Cir. 1974). Because the record reveals counsel's representation was constitutionally adequate and there resulted no prejudice to petitioner by any action or inaction of counsel, see Washington v. Watkins, 655 F.2d at 1362, Ford has not carried his burden of proving ineffective assistance of counsel. United States v. Killian, 639 F.2d 206, 210 (5th Cir. 1981).
VII.
The Brown Issue: Nonrecord Material Before the Florida Supreme Court
Petitioner alleges the Florida Supreme Court had a practice of receiving nonrecord materials concerning death row inmates during the pendency of the appeal of his death sentence. Ford specifically claims that in his case the Florida Supreme Court reviewed ex parte psychiatric evaluations or contact notes, psychological screening reports, post-sentence investigation reports and state prison classification and admission summaries. This practice, he contends, precluded adversarial testing of the information in violation of his rights to due process of law, effective assistance of counsel, confrontation and reliability and proportionality of capital sentencing. Additionally, he argues the court's receipt of results of psychiatric examinations which were conducted without first informing him of his Fifth Amendment rights violated his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to confer with his attorney before determining whether to submit to them.
This issue first surfaced in a petition for writ of habeas corpus directed to the Florida Supreme Court brought on behalf of 122 Florida death row inmates, of which Ford was one. The Court denied the petition with a full opinion. Brown v. Wainwright, 392 So.2d 1327 (Fla.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 542, 71 L.Ed.2d 407 (1981).
We reject the contention both generally and specifically as made for Ford. The function of the Supreme Court of Florida in these cases is to review sentences for procedural regularity and proportionality. The court does not "impose" sentence, and for that reason there cannot exist a due process violation under Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1980). As the Florida Supreme Court aptly stated:
The record of each proceeding, and precedent, necessarily frame our determinations in sentence review. Our opinions, of course, then expound our analysis. Factors or information outside the record play no part in our sentence review role. Indeed, our role is neither more nor less, but precisely the same as that employed by the United States Supreme Court in its review of capital punishment cases. Illustrative of the Court's exercise of the review function is Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980).
*
It is evident, once our dual roles in the capital punishment scheme are fully appreciated, that non-record information we may have seen, even though never presented to or considered by the judge, the jury, or counsel, plays no role in capital sentence "review." That fact is obviously appreciated by the United States Supreme Court, for it very carefully differentiated the sentence "review" process of appellate courts from the sentence "imposition" function of trial judges in Proffitt and Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976).
Brown v. Wainwright, 392 So.2d at 1332-33. We view the court's statement in Brown that such material would be irrelevant to its ultimate decision in these cases correct as a description of its function and as a state-' ment of law. Of course, review of the records in other cases is necessarily involved in achieving the United States Supreme Court's requirement of consistency and proportionality.
Specifically we reject the claim for three reasons. First, there is not an iota of evidence in this record to indicate the Florida Supreme Court viewed any extra-record materials in affirming petitioner's conviction and sentence. The court's reviewing such information in connection with death row inmates other than Ford would not render his death sentence unconstitutional. Thus, discovery on this issue, based solely on Ford's bare, unsupported allegations, would be nothing more than a fishing expedition in which it would be necessary for him to show that in his case the court received, viewed and relied on the information. Since the latter could not be shown in the face of Brown v. Wainwright, we affirm the district court's refusal to permit Ford to launch such a discovery expedition.
Second, there is absolutely no indication what material could have been received by the court which was prejudicial. By the specific description of the information set forth in his habeas corpus petition, Ford presumably knows something of the nature of the materials allegedly viewed. He made no effort whatsoever to demonstrate those materials were harmful to his case.
Third, in the face of petitioner's unsupported allegations to the contrary, we accord a presumption of correctness to the Florida Supreme Court's statement that its members properly perform their procedural appellate function in reviewing death sentences. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d); Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 101 S.Ct. 764, 66 L.Ed.2d 722 (1981), after remand, - U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 1303, 71 L.Ed.2d 480 (1982). In the context of a federal collateral attack on a state criminal conviction, comity and federalism demand no less. As the highest court in the state, the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of its procedural role is the law of the state and we do not question it. See Stephens v. Zant, 631 F.2d at 405-06.
These conclusions do not reflect the view that any court, including an appellate court, should review material extraneous to the record. We do not condone such a practice.
Conclusion
The Court has discussed above the seven issues as framed by petitioner in his brief. Although not required to do so, because of the now usual practice of challenging counsel's effectiveness in later proceedings, we have examined every issue asserted in the petition for writ of habeas corpus. These issues were set forth by headings in the pleadings as follows:
Grounds for Habeas Corpus Relief
A. Denial of Right to Confront Witnesses
B. Non-disclosure of Exculpatory Evidence
C. Denial of Right to Assistance of Counsel
D. Witherspoon Violation of Petitioner's Right to Trial by Fair and Impartial Jury
E. Sentencing Phase Instructions to the Jury: Permitting the Arbitrary, Unguided Imposition of the Death Penalty
F. Unconstitutional Shifting of the Burden of Proof at the Penalty Phase
G. Review by the Florida Supreme Court: Failure to Set Aside Death Sentence Despite the Substantial Erosion of the Basis for the Death Sentence
H. Review by the Florida Supreme Court: Failure to Assure the Imposition of the Death Penalty Fairly and Consistently
I. The Violation of Mr. Ford's Constitutional Rights by the Practice of the Supreme Court of Florida Reviewing, in Connection with Appeal, Unknown to Mr. Ford or His Counsel, Certain Documents Pertaining to Mr. Ford
J. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Guilt Phase
K. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Penalty Phase
L. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Appeal
Many of these grounds were asserted under different nomenclature on this appeal. The ones not raised for review by this Court were wisely abandoned. A review of the entire petition and the district court's decision reveals no grounds upon which relief should be granted in this case. The district court's decision is affirmed on every point considered by it.
AFFIRMED.
. The Eleventh Circuit, in the en banc decision of Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981), adopted as precedent the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit, decided prior to October 1, 1981.