Case Name: Charles E. and Martha F. WATERS, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. PHARR BROS., INC., et al., Defendants-Appellants
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1969-04-01
Citations: 228 So. 2d 91
Docket Number: No. 11190
Parties: Charles E. and Martha F. WATERS, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. PHARR BROS., INC., et al., Defendants-Appellants.
Judges: Before AYRES, BOLIN and PRICE, JJ-
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 228
Pages: 91–96

Head Matter:
Charles E. and Martha F. WATERS, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. PHARR BROS., INC., et al., Defendants-Appellants.
No. 11190.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Second Circuit.
April 1, 1969.
On Rehearing Sept. 22, 1969.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 20, 1969.
Writ Refused Dec. 19, 1969.
Mayer & Smith, Alex F. Smith, Jr., Shreveport, for appellants.
James M. Barton, Shreveport, for appel-lees.
Before AYRES, BOLIN and PRICE, JJ-

Opinion:
PRICE, Judge.
This is a tort action in which the plaintiff, Charles E. Waters, and his wife, Martha F. Waters, seek to recover damages for personal injuries and property damages arising out of a two vehicle collision on June 15, 1966, in Mira, Louisiana. The defendants are Pharr Bros., Inc., Coy Franklin Finklea, and Employers Mutual Fire Insurance Company. On this date, plaintiff, Mrs. Martha F. Waters, was driving a 1963 Chevrolet sedan automobile northerly on U. S. Highway 71 approaching the com munity of Mira in North Caddo Parish. A 31/2 ton dump truck, being driven by Coy Franklin Finklea, was following the Waters' automobile. Louisiana State Highway No. 169 intersects U. S. Highway 71 in the main business area of Mira, forming a "T" intersection on the westerly side of U. S. Highway 71.
At the time of this accident the shoulders of U. S. Highway 71, on the west side, were under construction and a portion of its intersection with Louisiana Highway 169 was blocked by a barricade. Mrs. Waters attempted to make a left turn from U. S. Highway 71 into Louisiana Highway 169 by proceeding through a parking area situated adjacent to the intersection on the northerly side. After the Waters car began its left turn it was struck by the dump truck driven by defendant, Finklea, who was attempting to pass the Waters vehicle.
Plaintiffs allege negligence on the part of the truck driver for passing in a prohibited zone, following too close, and failing to keep a proper lookout to see the indicating signal of the preceding vehicle.
Defendants deny any negligence on the part of Finklea; they contend the double yellow lines marking the prohibited passing zone were not visible due to dirt caused by the construction. Defendants further contend that Mrs. Waters was also guilty of negligence which was either the sole cause, or a contributing cause, of the accident. She is charged with negligence in failing to signal and in failing to keep a proper lookout, making a left turn without first making certain it could be made safely, and in making a left turn in the path o'f defendant's truck.
After a trial on the merits the district court found that the sole cause of the accident was the negligence of the defendant, Finklea, in passing in a prohibited zone and awarded judgment in favor of Mrs. Waters for $4,000.00 for her personal injuries, and awarded Mr. Waters the sum of $2,314.03 for medical expenses paid for his wife, and automobile damages.
Defendants have appealed to this court, urging that the district judge committed error in not finding Mrs. Waters was guilty of negligence which was the sole cause of the accident, or, alternatively, at least a contributing cause of same.
Plaintiff answered the appeal, asking for an increase in the award to Mrs. Waters for personal injuries.
The trial court heard the testimony of Mrs. Waters, her mother, and her fourteen-year old daughter, who were passengers in the automobile. They testified that the truck had been following their automobile a close interval for some distance; that Mrs. Waters turned on her left turn indicator some distance before making the turn; that the Waters car was proceeding at a speed of between 20 and 25 miles per hour just before turning and slowed to a speed of approximately 10 miles per hour as it turned.
Mrs. Waters testified that she had been aware of the truck behind her for some distance and that she looked back just prior to making her turn and that it was still in the lane behind her.
Mr. Finklea testified that he had attempted to pass Mrs. Waters on one occasion previous to the collision but was unable to do so because of oncoming traffic. He further testified that he was following at an interval of between 30 and 40 feet as they entered the community of Mira. He testified that a car in front of Mrs. Waters slowed to make a right turn into a private drive and that he seized this opportunity to attempt to pass Mrs. Waters. He further testified that she gave no signal of her intent to turn and that he was completely in the left lane when she began to turn. He also testified that the double yellow lines, indicating passing was prohibited, had been covered by dirt because of the construction in the area, and that he gave no warning by blowing his horn prior to pulling into the left lane to pass Mrs. Waters.
The investigating officers' testimony establishes the skidmarks of the truck at 32 feet, which were entirely in the left or passing lane. There was a conflict in the testimony of the two officers who investigated the accident as to whether Mrs. Waters stated she had turned on her left turn indicator. The deputy sheriff arrived on the scene first and testified that she definitely told him she had her indicator on prior to beginning the turn, A state trooper, who made out the accident report some time after the collision, indicated on the report that Mrs. Waters could not remember whether she signaled. He did not have any independent recollection and was relying solely on his written report. Both officers agreed that the indicator was working properly after the accident.
It is apparent that the trial judge found from the testimony that Mrs. Waters gave a proper signal. She was traveling in a zone where passing was clearly prohibited by law. The intersection into which Mrs. Waters intended to turn required more than the usual or normal observation by a driver in that a portion of the intersection was barricaded and a truck was blocking the other lane. Mrs. Waters testified that she intended to proceed into the parking lot of a cotton gin adjacent to the intersection to detour around the blocked intersection. It would, therefore, be reasonable to assume that she could not have maintained a constant watch to her rear and have negotiated the difficult turn. She had the right to assume that, because of the conditions that existed in this particular area and in view of the prohibited passing zone, no following vehicle would attempt to pass her at this time. She testified that she had looked behind her prior to making the turn and that the truck was still in her lane at that time. It may well be that, in the few seconds that she utilized in selecting her route through the barricaded intersection, the truck pulled into the passing lane and eluded her watchout.
There is no question of the negligence of defendant, Finklea, as the evidence shows that he attempted to pass a vehicle in a prohibited zone and at an intersection made additionally dangerous by the presence of road construction in progress. He admitted having passed through the area on previous trips, hauling gravel from Arkansas to Shreveport, either the same or on previous days and was therefore familiar with the prohibited passing zone even though the yellow lines may have been obscured by an accumulation of dirt.
In support of their position that Mrs. Waters was guilty of at least contributory negligence, the appellants have urged the application of the principles laid down in the cases of Washington Fire and Marine Insurance Co. v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 232 La. 379, 94 So.2d 295 (1957); Small v. Lyons, La.App., 198 So.2d 475 (2d Cir., 1967), and Wheeler v. Simonton, La.App., 215 So.2d 359 (2d Cir., 1968), imposing a high degree of care on a left turning motorist to make certain that his turn can be made in safety before executing the turning maneuver. We believe that the instant case is somewhat different from the cited cases.
In the case of Faulkner v. Ryder Tank Lines, Inc., La.App., 135 So.2d 494 (2d Cir., 1961), this court declared the duty of a left turning motorist in ascertaining whether or not the movement can be made in safety as to following traffic, as follows:
"In judging whether a left turn can be made in safety, a motorist has the unquestioned right to assume that the following traffic will observe all of the duties imposed upon it by law and common sense, such as that the following traffic is proceeding within the speed limit, will not pass at an intersection, and will not pass over a double yellow line, and is, moreover, keeping a proper lookout. Green v. Plummer, La.App., 1st Cir., 1960, 119 So.2d 862; Newman v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co., La.App., 1st Cir., 1959, 110 So.2d 816; Kelly v. Neff, La.App.2d Cir., 1943, 14 So.2d 657; White v. Neff, La.App., 2d Cir., 1942, 11 So.2d289."
The Faulkner case, and others cited therein, have been followed by the Third Circuit Court of Appeal in the case of Hudgens v. Mayeaux, La.App., 143 So.2d 606 (3rd Cir., 1962). We believe that the rules laid down in the Faulkner and Hudgens cases, supra, and the cases cited therein, are more appropriate to the facts of the case under consideration than the line of cases following the Washington Fire and Marine Insurance Co. v. Firemen's Ins. Co., supra, cited by appellant.
Under the facts and circumstances that existed in this case, we are of the opinion that there was no manifest error in the finding of the trial judge that the sole and proximate cause of this accident was the negligence of the defendant, Finklea, in attempting to pass Mrs. Waters in the prohibited zone and that the evidence is not sufficient to establish contributory negligence on the part of Mrs. Waters.
Appellants, in brief, have not complained of the award made by the trial court for personal injuries. Although the appellee has answered the appeal and asked for an increase in this award, we do not find any manifest error in the award made by the trial judge.
Mrs. Waters suffered a whiplash type of injury to her cervical area. The medical diagnosis was a moderate cervical sprain with some resulting occipital neuralgia. Mrs. Waters was hospitalized for two weeks and was treated with physiotherapy for a number of months thereafter. Complaints of headaches were attributed to the cervical sprain, and although they continued for a number of months after the accident, the treating orthopedist was of the opinion the headaches would subside with therapy or nerve blocks. The evidence does not indicate any permanent injury or disability to Mrs. Waters.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from is affirmed at appellants' cost.