Case Name: Louisiana STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, Individually, and on behalf of the University of Southwestern Louisiana, Plaintiff Respondent, v. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, Defendant Applicant
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1973-02-20
Citations: 273 So. 2d 912
Docket Number: No. 4191
Parties: Louisiana STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, Individually, and on behalf of the University of Southwestern Louisiana, Plaintiff Respondent, v. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, Defendant Applicant.
Judges: Before FRUGÉ, SAVOY and MILLER, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 273
Pages: 912–923

Head Matter:
Louisiana STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, Individually, and on behalf of the University of Southwestern Louisiana, Plaintiff Respondent, v. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, Defendant Applicant.
No. 4191.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
Feb. 20, 1973.
Rehearing Denied March 21, 1973.
Voorhies, Labbé, Fontenot, Leonard & McGlasson by J. Winston Fontenot, Lafayette, for defendant applicant.
Davidson, Meaux, Onebane & Donohoe by John Allen Bernard, Lafayette, for plaintiff respondent.
Before FRUGÉ, SAVOY and MILLER, JJ.

Opinion:
MILLER, Judge.
Applicant National Collegiate Athletic Association seeks to set aside the trial court's preliminary injunction restraining the NCAA " . . . from conducting any further proceedings or taking any other action whatsoever related to . . " its November 2, 1972 notice of inquiry directed to respondent University of Southwestern Louisiana. The injunction is in effect until August 15, 1973. NCAA moved for a suspensive and devolutive appeal, but the trial court granted only the devolutive appeal.
Pursuant to Rule XII, Uniform Rules of the Courts of Appeal, Vol. 8 LSA-Revised Statutes, NCAA applied for a writ of certiorari. The writ was granted to provide an expeditious hearing and determination of the matter. The delays incidental to an ordinary appeal would have denied a meaningful remedy to NCAA. Notwithstanding our efforts to provide a prompt hearing, our judgment may not become final for an additional forty-four days. Michigan Wisconsin Pipe Line Company v. Fruge, 201 So.2d 672 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1967); Discon v. Saray, Inc., 262 La. 997, 265 So.2d 765 (1972) footnote 4 at page 772.
The trial court was convinced that the NCAA was disregarding its own "Official Procedure Governing The NCAA Enforcement Program"; that USL was denied its right (under section 3 of the NCAA rules) to a hearing " . . . at a time and place which is mutually convenient"; that a January 3, 1973 notice to appear at a January 9, 1973 meeting in Chicago, Illinois was insufficient, particularly in light of the fact that NCAA was relying on undisclosed information obtained during an intensive twelve month investigation based in part on interviews with witnesses throughout the United States; and that USL would suffer irreparable injury because of " . . . the possible deprivation of the University of any TV or tournament funds to which they may or may not become entitled, by reason of any action of the NCAA . . . " On these findings the trial court enjoined the NCAA from holding hearings related to all complaints against USL until August 15, 1973. No statutory or jurisprudential authority was cited to support this action. Indeed, USL's counsel has not cited' statutory authority or jurisprudence from any jurisdiction which supports the trial court's action in enjoining a private voluntary association from holding a hearing to determine if one of its voluntary members should be disciplined. We reverse the trial court and dissolve the preliminary injunction.
USL makes a persuasive argument to support the trial court's judgment pointing out that it has not asked the court to consider the merits of the charges against USL Instead USL asks only that the NCAA be compelled to adhere to its procedural requirements to the end that USL may be afforded reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard. On the other hand NCAA has persuasively contended that the January 9 hearing was solely concerned with violations which USL had investigated and which were the basis for stringent restrictions imposed by USL on certain members of its athletic department, as reported October 9, 1972 by letter written by USL's president addressed to the NCAA. It further contends that all NCAA procedural requirements were complied with. We will not detail these arguments or make a determination of the issue of timely notice because the merits of these contentions are not properly before the court.
Respondent cites no authority in law or equity authorizing injunctive relief to prevent a disciplinary hearing by a private voluntary association. The jurisprudence construing LSA-C.C.P. Art. 3601 has carved out stringent prerequisites for the granting of this special remedy. The writ of injunction is a harsh, drastic, and extraordinary remedy which should only issue where the party seeking it is threatened with irreparable loss or injury, and is without an adequate remedy at law. Greenberg v. DeSalvo, 254 La. 1019, 229 So.2d 83 (1960), certiorari denied, Greenberg v. Dunker, 397 U.S. 1075, 90 S.Ct. 1521, 25 L.Ed.2d 809 (1970); Amacker v. Amacker, 146 So.2d 672 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1962). Injunctive relief should not be granted unless facts supporting its justification are clear and convincing. Olsen v. City of Baton Rouge, 247 So.2d 889 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1971). Irreparable injury is that injury, loss or damage for which damages cannot be measured by a pecuniary standard. Danzie v. Rutland, 232 So.2d 303 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1970); McBride v. Duckworth, 232 So.2d 122 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1969).
The injunction was improvidently granted because USL failed to show irreparable injury. USL's allegations of injury were at best purely speculative and conjectural inasmuch as no hearing had taken place and no penalties had been imposed. The allegations in respondent's petition illustrate the prematurity of the trial court's actions.
USL alleged that if " . . . the hearing is held, and/or if any violations of NCAA regulations are determined by the Council and/or any penalties are assessed against the University, its personnel or student athletes, grievous and irreparable damage will be done to those persons and the Institution." This barest of allegations cannot be held sufficiently precise or compelling to sustain the harsh remedy of in-junctive relief. There is no showing that if the hearing is held, USL will suffer injury, much less irreparable harm. It may very well be that USL will be completely exonerated of any wrong doing following a hearing by the NCAA. Until it is determined that a definite penalty will be imposed, the threatened irreparable harm is not imminent but is merely possible. If possibilities of irreparable harm were sufficient to serve as the bases for injunctive relief, courts could be called upon in the future to enjoin investigations by the NCAA of possible rule violations even before charges are made. The logical extension of USL's argument surely points in that direction. The sine qua non is infinite. It is for this reason that courts will only extend injunctive relief when irreparable injury is imminent. Standard Brands, Inc. v. Zumpe, 264 F.Supp. 254 (E.D.La.1967).
Courts will issue injunctions only when the irreparable injury is to rights which are the proper subject of judicial inquiry and protection. In this regard the trial court erred in taking jurisdiction of the dispute between USL and the NCAA.
Courts will not interfere with the internal affairs of a private association except in cases when the affairs and proceedings have not been conducted fairly and honestly, or in cases of fraud, lack of jurisdiction, the invasion of property or pecuniary rights, or when the action complained of is capricious, arbitrary or unjustly discriminatory. Elfer v. Marine Engineers Beneficial Association No. 12, 179 La. 383, 154 So. 32 (1934); Heuer v. Crescent City River Port Pilots' Association, 158 So.2d 221 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1963); Marino v. Waters, 220 So.2d 802 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1969); Sanders v. Louisiana High School Athletic Association, 242 So.2d 19 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1970), see also jurisprudence from other states noted at 242 So.2d 26, 27. And even in cases of fraud, op pression, bad faith or the violation of property or civil rights, the courts will not take jurisdiction unless the complaining member has exhausted such remedies as may be provided by the laws of the association itself. Elfer v. Marine Engineers Beneficial Association No. 12, 179 La. 383, 154 So. 32 at 34 (1934).
The general rule of non-interference has been consistently applied. The few cases in other states applying the exception involved either the deprivation of vested property rights protected by due process safeguards or instances of prior fraud, bad faith, or oppression which convinced the court that association proceedings against the member were undertaken purely for purposes of harassment. No such right is involved in the instant case, and no allegations of prior fraud are made. The severest penalty which could be imposed on USL is expulsion from the NCAA and the restriction against participation in NCAA sponsored athletic events.
Federal and state courts have defined participation in athletics as a privilege not protected by Constitutional due process safeguards. Mitchell v. Louisiana High School Athletic Association, 430 F.2d 1155 (5 Cir. 1970). Marino v. Waters, supra. When presented with cases involving disciplinary proceedings of private athletic associations, courts of this state and of other states, have uniformly refused to interfere. Marino v. Waters, supra; Sanders v. Louisiana High School Athletic Association, supra, see cases from other states noted at 242 So.2d 26, 27.
The preliminary injunction was improvidently granted and is hereby set aside. Costs of court both at trial and on appeal are assessed to respondent Louisiana State Board of Education, Individually, and on behalf of the University of Southwestern Louisiana, except insofar as they are relieved from the payment of costs by the provisions of LSA-R.S. 13 :4521.
Reversed and rendered.
FRUGÉ, J., respectfully dissents with reasons.
. The dissent cites two trade union cases from other states wherein disciplinary hearings were enjoined. We distinguish the cited cases as inapplicable to the factual situation here presented. Each case involved a finding by the respective court that the disciplinary proceeding was undertaken fraudulently and in bad faith for purposes of oppression. In Junkins v. Local Union No. 6313, Communication Workers of America, 241 Mo.App. 1029, 271 S.W.2d 71 (1954), the union was enjoined from re-trying a member after the original conviction by the union on the same charge had been vacated. The court found ". . . that the charge involved here was beyond the scope and powers of the union to file and an attempt to re-try plaintiff was fraudulent and oppressive and showed bad faith on the part of the union." In Collins v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Emjiloyees and Moving Picture Machine Operators of the United States and Canada, 119 N.J. Eq. 230, 182 A. 37 (1935), the court found officers of the union were actively engaged in (1) extortion, (2) malfeasance in office, and (3) unlawful diversion of union funds. After listing and discussing the enumerated wrongdoings, the court concluded that the officers of the union instituted charges against the complaining members because of their activities in support of the law suit against the union. The court held, moreover, that the controversy was not one strictly between the union and its members, but involved third persons. As a consequence, the court had concurrent jurisdiction over the dispute.
. "Art. 3001.
An injunction shall issue in cases where irreparable injury, loss, or damage may otherwise result to the applicant, or in other cases specifically provided by law; provided, however, that no court shall have jurisdiction to issue, or cause to be issued, any temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, or permanent injunction against any state department, board or agency, or any officer, administrator or head thereof, or any officer of the State of Louisiana in any suit involving the expenditure of public funds under any statute or law of this state to compel the expenditure of state funds when the director of such department, board or agency, or the governor shall certify that the expenditure of such funds would have the effect of creating a deficit in the funds of said agency or be in violation of the requirements placed upon the expenditure of such funds by the legislature.
During the pendency of an action for an injunction the court may issue a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, or both, except in cases where prohibited, in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter.
Except as otherwise provided by law, an application for injunctive relief shall be by petition."