Case Name: Tasse, Appellant, vs. Kindt, Respondent
Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Wisconsin
Decision Date: 1911-02-21
Citations: 145 Wis. 115
Docket Number: 
Parties: Tasse, Appellant, vs. Kindt, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: Wisconsin Reports
Volume: 145
Pages: 115–122

Head Matter:
Tasse, Appellant, vs. Kindt, Respondent.
November 19, 1910
February 21, 1911.
Real-estate brolcers: Middlemen: Commissions from both 'parties.
A broker wbo undertakes merely to procure a purchaser for land at a price fixed by tbe seller is in reality only a middleman and is entitled to tbe agreed commission for sucb service even though, by an agreement unknown to tbe seller, be is also to receive a commission from tbe purchaser. Siebecker, X, dissents.
Appeal from a judgment of the circuit court for Milwaukee county: W. J. TueNeb, Circuit Judge.
Reversed.
Tbis action was brought to recover a commission of $400 for services rendered by plaintiff in procuring for tbe defendant a purchaser of certain real estate owned by tbe defendant. Tbe defendant denied generally tbe allegations of tbe complaint. Tbe action was here on a former appeal. 125 Wis. 631, 104 N. W. 703. Tbe case was again tried in tbe court below and tbe following verdict returned:
“(1) Was it agreed between tbe plaintiff and defendant on or about August 15, 1899, tbat if a purchaser of the defend ant’s eleven acres should be procured by the plaintiff at the highest price obtainable and satisfactory to said defendant, that the defendant would pay the plaintiff two per cent, commission upon the amount obtained? A. Yes.
“(2) If you answer ‘Yes’ to question No. 1, then answer: Was such agreement modified on or about August 20, 1902, by the defendant fixing the price at which the plaintiff should offer said property, being a tract of ten acres, at $2,000 per acre ? A. Yes.
“(3) Was said eleven acres sold by defendant to Read and Neacy as' an entire piece, and at the uniform price of about $1,909.09 per acre ? A. Yes.
“(4) Did said plaintiff procure Read and Neacy as purchasers for ten acres of said property ready, willing, and able to purchase said ten acres at $2,000 per acre ? A. Yes.
“(5) Did the plaintiff, prior to August 20, 1902, accept employment at compensation from T. J. Neacy and Walter Read to purchase the property mentioned in the complaint from the defendant for them ? A. Yes.
“(6) If you answer question No. 5 ‘Yes,’ then answer: Did the plaintiff inform the defendant that he had an agreement with Read and Neacy to receive a commission from them for negotiating the sale with the defendant ? A. No.
“(I) If you answer ‘Yes’ to question No. 5, did such em-. ployment continue until aboiit September 10, 1902 ? A. No.
“(8) Was the plaintiff in the employ of both Read and Neacy and the defendant at the time he was endeavoring to effect a purchase and sale of the property ? A. No.
“(9) If the court shall be of the opinion that the plaintiff is entitled to recover, at what sum do you assess his damages ? A. To be decided by the court.”
Both parties moved for judgment on the verdict. The motion of the defendant for judgment on the verdict also included a motion that the answer of the jury to the first question of the special verdict be changed from Yes to No; that the answer of the jury to the second question be changed from Yes to No; that the answer of the jury to the fourth question be changed from Yes to No; that the answer of the jury to the seventh question be changed from No to Yes; and that "the answer of tbe jury to tbe eig'btb question be changed from No to Yes. On sucb motion tbe court changed tbe answer to the seventh question from No to Yes, and tbe answer to tbe eighth question from No to Yes, and denied defendant’s motion to change answers to other questions in the special verdict. The court denied plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the verdict, and ordered judgment in favor of the defendant dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint with costs. Judgment was entered accordingly, from which this appeal was taken.
Fred Doering, for the appellant.
Eor the respondent the cause was submitted on the brief of J. M. Clarice.

Opinion:
The following opinion was filed December 6, 1910:
KeewtN, J.
By the answers to the first, second, and fourth questions of the special verdict as found by the jury, which the court below refused to change, it is established that it was agreed between plaintiff and defendant on or about August 15, 1899, that if a purchaser of the defendant's eleven acres should be procured by the plaintiff at the highest price obtainable and satisfactory to the defendant, the defendant would pay plaintiff two per cent, of the amount obtained as commission, and that this agreement was modified on or about August 20, 1902, by the defendant fixing the price at which the plaintiff should offer defendant's property, being a tract of ten acres, at $2,000 per acre, and that the plaintiff did procure purchasers for said ten acres who were ready, willing, and able to purchase the same at $2,000 per acre. These findings of the jury are supported by the evidence, and alone are sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to recover independent of other findings in the special verdict, under the established rule of this court. Kilpinski v. Bishop, 143 Wis. 390, 127 N. W. 974; Donohue v. Padden, 93 Wis. 20, 66 N. W. 804; Barry v. Schmidt, 57 Wis. 172, 15 N. W. 24; Stewart v. Mather, 32 Wis. 344, 355; Orton v. Scofield, 61 Wis. 382, 21 N. W. 261. Under tbe modified contract, as found by tbe jury, tbe contract of tbe plaintiff witb tbe defendant was a specific one, namely, to procure a purchaser able, ready, and willing to pay $2,000 per acre for ten acres of tbe land. Tbe price was fixed by tbe defendant and tbe services to be performed specific, upon tbe performance of wbicb plaintiff was entitled to bis compensation. Tbe fact that plaintiff bad a contract witb tbe purchaser for a commission in no manner conflicted witb bis duty to tbe defendant. This rule is recognized by this court in tbe cases above cited as well as by other courts. Mullen v. Keetzleb, 7 Bush, 253; Rupp v. Sampson, 16 Gray, 398. Of course if tbe plaintiff occupied a position wbicb required diligence in obtaining' as high a price for tbe defendant's land as possible, or if tbe contract between tbe parties were such as to render tbe contract of tbe plaintiff witb tbe purchaser at variance witb bis duty to tbe defendant, a very different question would be presented. Both contracts could not stand together, because tbe two engagements would be inconsistent. This rule was aptly stated by this court on tbe former appeal (125 Wis. 631, 104 N. W. 703), at page 633:
"An agent who undertakes tbe duty of making a sale for another, or performing a duty in that connection involving diligence in promotion of the employer's interest, cannot recover commission if, without tbe seller's knowledge, be also be employed upon compensation to work in tbe interest of tbe purchaser."
This rule is relied upon by counsel for respondent on this appeal, but it is inapplicable. On tbe former appeal there was a general verdict, and tbe jury might well have found under tbe original contract that tbe plaintiff was to procure a purchaser at tbe best price obtainable, and of course under such an agreement plaintiff could not accept compensation from tbe purchaser and at tbe same time recover from tbe seller. But in the present case the jury found specifically that the original contract had been modified, and that the defendant had fixed his own price at $2,000 per acre, and the only duty which plaintiff owed defendant was to produce a. purchaser able, ready, and willing to pay $2,000 per acre. When he had done this he had performed his contract with defendant, and was entitled to his commission regardless of any contract which he had with the purchaser. Kilpinski v. Bishop, supra; Donohue v. Padden, supra. Where the character of the employment of the agent is such that compensation from the purchaser cannot affect his fidelity in the performance of his duty to the seller, as for example where ho is a mere middleman, or employed only to produce a purchaser at a fixed price, the rule that he cannot act for both parties does not apply. Tasse v. Kindt, 125 Wis. 631, 104 N. W. 703. It follows, therefore, that the fact found by the jury to the effect that prior to August 20, 1902, plaintiff accepted employment at compensation from Neacy and Read is not material, since under his specific contract with the defendant, as found by the jury, he was at liberty to do so. The distinction is clearly drawn in the decisions in this court heretofore referred to. In Stewart v. Mather, 32 Wis. 344, at page 355, Chief Justice DixoN, speaking for the court, said:
"A broker whose undertaking merely is to find a purchaser at a price fixed by the seller, or at a price which shall be satisfactory to the seller when he and the purchaser meet, is in reality only a 'middleman,' whose duty is performed when the buyer and seller are brought together, and as to whom the policy of the law which excludes double compensation has been considered inapplicable."
To the same effect is the late case of Kilpinski v. Bishop, 143 Wis. 390, 121 N. W. 914. It follows, therefore, that changing the answers to questions I and 8 from No to Yes in no way affected the plaintiff's right to recover, therefore tbe court should have ordered judgment in favor of tbe plaintiff upon tbe verdict.
By the Court. — Tbe judgment is reversed, and tbe cause remanded witb instructions to tbe court below to render judgment for tbe plaintiff.