Case Name: GATES v. NEW YORK LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1969-12-10
Citations: 21 Mich. App. 21
Docket Number: Docket No. 5,198
Parties: GATES v. NEW YORK LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
Judges: Before: Levin, P. J., and Holbrook and Daniiof, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 21
Pages: 21–35

Head Matter:
GATES v. NEW YORK LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
Opinion of the Court
1. Insurance — Death—Accidental—Double Indemnity — Proof.
An action to recover double indemnity benefits under a life insurance policy places the burden of proving that death was accidental upon the plaintiffs.
2. Insurance — Death—Accidental—Standard.
Whether an insured’s death is accidental depends upon whether his death was unforeseen, involuntary or unexpected, that is, ' not according to the usual course of things, or not as expected but if an insured’s death follows from ordinary means, voluntarily employed, in a not unusual or unexpected way, it cannot be ealled a result effected by accidental means or an accidental death.
References for Points in Headnotes
[I] 43 Am Jur 2d, Insurance § 2015.
43 Am Jur 2d, Insurance §§ 1219, 1221, 1222.
29, 30 Am Jur 2d, Evidence §§ 844, 845, 1082. 58 Am Jur, Witnesses §§ 675, 767 et seq.
43, 44 Am Jur 2d, Insurance §§ 1196, 1266, 1968.
44 Am Jur 2d, Insurance §§ 1965, 1968.
53 Am Jur, Trial §§ 340, 348, 350, 362, 385, 394.
30 Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 1165.
Am Jur 2d, Evidence §§ 1080-1087.
30 Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 1086. 53 Am Jur, Trial §§ 367-370, 388, 401.
58 Am Jur, Witnesses § 792 et seq.
44 Am Jur 2d, Insurance §§ 2049-2052.
53 Am Jur, Trial §§ 349, 361-363, 387, 390, 406.
39 Am Jur, New Trial §§ 12], 129-139.
3. Insurance — Death—Accidental.
Insured’s death was not an unforeseen or unexpected happening and therefore was not accidental where, knowing that he was wanted by law enforcement officers, he armed himself and put into operation a sequence of events which resulted in his death.
i. Evidence — Witnesses—Credibility—Prior Inconsistent Statements.
Prior inconsistent statements of a witness can be used only to attaek the credibility of that witness.
Dissenting Opinion
Levin, P. J.
5. Insurance •— Death — Accidental — Proof :— Prima Facie — Presumption.
A prima facie case of accidental death was established where plaintiffs proved that the insured was hilled by gunshot, as there is a presumption that a violent death is accidental, and this presumption is not limited to a presumption against suicide.
6. Evidence — Death—Accidental—Presumption—Rebuttal.
• The presumption that a violent death is accidental is evidence and remains evidence, although rebutting evidence is introduced, and a trial court, in deciding whether the rebutting evidence is so overwhelming that a verdict should be directed, should determine the propriety of a directed verdict just as it would in any other case.
7. Motions — Directed Verdict — Propriety —■ Evidence — Permissible Inferences.
A directed verdiet against a litigant is proper only if the evidence and permissible inferences therefrom, viewed most favorably to that litigant, leave no room for disagreement among reasonable men.
8. Evidence — Presumptions — Rebuttal — Inferences — Mandatory — Permissible.
A presumption, whether common law or statutory, establishes a mandatory inference in the absence of rebuttal evidence but if rebuttal evidence is admitted, that established inference is downgraded from a mandatory to a permissible inference.
9. Evidence — Presumptions—Witnesses—-Credibility—Interest— Evaluation.
A trier of fact must evaluate not only the credibility of witnesses but also consider their interest as it reflects upon their credibility where the question is whether a presumption has been overcome by the testimony of those witnesses.
10. Witnesses — Credibility—Interest—Evaluation.
Credibility and interest of two police officers testifying regarding the death of an insured in a shoot-out precluded direction of a verdict in favor of defendant insurance company where the officers’ versions of the shooting were contradictory, one of them was not only impeached by a prior inconsistent statement of his gimen to the state police on a crucial aspect of the circumstances of the insured’s death but also he admitted firing shots at the insured’s car after it had been stopped, and the other officer admitted Icilling the insured, it being evident that unless these officers’ explanations in justification for the insured’s death were believed, they both faced civil and criminal charges for what otherwise would have been a tortious and criminal Tcilling.
11. Trial — Jury—Directed Verdict — Evidence.
A verdict may not be directed where the evidence relied on to support that verdict is contradicted by any evidence or by any facts or circumstances, or where the evidence relied on is in any way improbable or discredited, or any- legitimate inference, inconsistent with a directed verdict, may be drawn even where there is no issue of witnesses’ credibility and no showing of interest on the part of those witnesses.
12. Witnesses — Contradiction—Impeachment.
A party may contradict his own witness, even if he cannot impeach him for if it were otherwise, an attorney would be at the mercy of his first witness.
13. Insurance — Death — Accidental — Evidence — Presumptions — Credibility — Directed Verdict — Propriety.
Plaintiffs, having the benefit of a presmnption that their insured’s death was accidental, established a prima facie case when they proved that the insured’s death was caused by a gunshot, and where the only evidence- contradicting that presumption was the inconsistent, contradictory, and partially impeached testimony of two police officers involved in a shooting fray with the insured when he was hilled, it was error for the court to direct a verdict in favor of defendant insurance company where a jury could properly have disbelieved the officers’ testimony and, relying on the accidental death presumption, could have found that the insured met his death by accidental means.
14. Motions — Judgment—Directed Verdict — Propriety.
A trial judge cannot substitute his own evaluation of witnesses’ credibility for a jury’s evaluation and it is error to grant a directed verdict, or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, based upon his judicial evaluation of the witnesses.
15. Trial — Juey—Perverse Verdict — New Trial.
If a judge thinks a jury has reached a perverse verdict, he may set it aside and order a new trial, but he cannot take upon himself the jurors’ functions, and their right of judgment.
Appeal from Benzie, William R. Peterson, J.
Submitted Division 3 February 13, 1969, at Grand Rapids.
(Docket No. 5,198.)
Decided December 10, 1969.
Complaint by Theodore K. Gates and Verna Gates, beneficiaries of a life insurance policy, against New York Life Insurance Company, a New York corporation, for recovery of double indemnity benefits. Judgment for defendant. Plaintiffs appeal.
Affirmed.
Philip A. Clancey, for plaintiffs.
Murchie, Galcutt & Brotvn, for defendant.
Before: Levin, P. J., and Holbrook and Daniiof, JJ.

Opinion:
Danhof, J.
Plaintiffs commenced suit against defendant insurance company, as beneficiaries of a life insurance policy on the life of the deceased, alleging that the death of the insured, their, son, was "accidental" under the terms of the insurance policy, and therefore, they were entitled to an additional $5,000 arising out of the double indemnity provisions of the policy. It is to be noted that the defendant company before the institution of the suit paid the face amount of the policy which was $5,000.
A jury trial was commenced in Benzie county circuit court by the plaintiffs. At the close.of the plaintiffs' proofs, a directed verdict was entered, in favor of the defendant. A motion for a new trial was made and denied, and from this denial the plaintiffs appeal.
On appeal all testimony must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. A review of the record discloses there was no error committed in granting the directed verdict. Since this was an action to recover the double indemnity benefits under the policy the burden of proving that the death of the assured was accidental rested on the plaintiffs, see Dimmer v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York (1938), 287 Mich 168; Turner v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Association (1946), 316 Mich 6. The standard in this state is whether the death of the deceased was accidental, unforeseen, involuntary or unexpected, that is, not according to the usual course of things, or not as expected; and if a result is such as follows from ordinary means, voluntarily employed, in a not unusual or unexpected way, it cannot be called a result effected by accidental means or accidental death. Turner, supra. Also, Furbush v. Maryland Casualty Co.. (1902), 131 Mich 234. See also Hooper v. State Mutual Life Assurance Company of Worcester, Massachusetts (1947), 318 Mich 384, which case quotes with approval Furbush, supra, stating on p 391,
"It is a well established rule that where insured is intentionally injured by another, and the injury is not the result of misconduct or an assault by the insured, but is unforeseen insofar as he is concerned, the injury is accidental within the meaning of accident policies." (Emphasis supplied.)
It is obvious from the record that the plaintiffs had not sustained the burden of proof required of them. The deceased, knowing full well that he was wanted by law enforcement officers, armed himself, and put into operation the sequence of events which resulted in his death. It is clear that his death was not an unforeseen or unexpected happening; to the contrary, it was quite predictable that great bodily injury or death will result from such activity. Accordingly, the death of the deceased was not accidental.
Nor do we think that the court erred in refusing to allow the out-of-court statement of officer Alear to be introduced as substantive evidence. It is well established that prior inconsistent statements of a witness can be used only to attack the credibility of that witness. See Rosenberg v. Mageda (1930), 251 Mich 696; Gabrish v. Morse (1960), 361 Mich 39.
Affirmed, costs to the appellee.
Holbrook, J. concurred.