Case Name: Benny LURK, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1961-06-22
Citations: 296 F.2d 360
Docket Number: No. 16407
Parties: Benny LURK, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
Judges: Before Wilbur K. Miller, Chief Judge, and Edgerton, Prettyman, Bazelon, Washington, Danaher, Bastían and Burger, Circuit Judges, sitting in banc.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 296
Pages: 360–366

Head Matter:
Benny LURK, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 16407.
United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued June 20, 1961.
Decided June 22, 1961.
Concurring Opinion July 17, 1961.
Certiorari Granted Oct. 9, 1961.
See 82 S.Ct. 110.
Mr. Eugene Gressman, Washington, D. C. (appointed by this court), for appellant.
Mr. Charles T. Duncan, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Messrs. David C. Ache- son, U. S. Atty., and Donald S. Smith, Asst. U. S. Atty., were on the brief, for appellee.
Messrs. Archibald Cox, Sol. Gen., Herbert J. Miller, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Oscar H. Davis, Asst, to the Sol. Gen., Miss Beatrice Rosenberg, Philip R. Monahan, Mrs. Patricia R. Harris, and Mr. Richard W. Schmude, Attys., Dept, of Justice, were on the brief for the United States, filed in the Supreme Court in Lurk v. United States, No. 669, Oct. Term, 1960, which was also considered by the court in this case.
Mr. Roger Robb, Washington, D. C., for Chief Judge and Associate Judges of the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, as amici curiae.
Mr. Francis Shea, Washington, D. C., with whom Mr. Richard T. Conway, Washington, D. C., was on the brief filed in the Supreme Court in Lurk v. United States, No. 669, Oct. Term, 1960, for Marvin Jones, Chief Judge of the United States Court of Claims, and Samuel E. Whitaker and others, Judges of the United States Court of Claims, as amici curiae, which was also considered by the court in this case.
Mr. Bennett Boskey, Washington, D. C., was on the brief for Mark Coppedge, Jr., as amicus curiae, filed in the Supreme Court in Lurk v. United States, No. 669, Oct. Term, 1960, which was also considered by the court in this case.
Before Wilbur K. Miller, Chief Judge, and Edgerton, Prettyman, Bazelon, Washington, Danaher, Bastían and Burger, Circuit Judges, sitting in banc.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
This case is here on appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, following remand from the Supreme Court of the United States. Lurk v. United States, 1961, 366 U.S. 712, 81 S.Ct. 1229, 6 L.Ed.2d 845. We heard argument in banc on the merits of the two contentions advanced by appellant's able court-appointed counsel, namely, (1) that certain evidence was erroneously admitted at appellant's trial for robbery in the District Court, a trial which resulted in his conviction; and (2) that the assignment of a retired judge of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals to preside at the trial was in violation of appellant's constitutional rights.
The first of these contentions is not tenable. The evidence complained of, which might perhaps have indicated to the jury that appellant had once been a prison inmate, was largely brought out by appellant's own trial counsel. The first reference to the matter came during examination of the complaining witness by Government counsel. *The latter, claiming surprise, asked that the answer be stricken. This was done. Appellant's counsel, after amplifying the subject through his own examination, received a limiting instruction and expressed himself as satisfied. We find no error.
As to the remaining question, several constitutional issues were raised, centering on appellant's contention that the trial judge, having been appointed to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, said to be a court constituted under Article I of the Constitution, could not constitutionally sit on an "Article III" court, i. e., the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Appellant relies on such cases as Ex parte Bakelite Corporation, 1929, 279 U.S. 438, 49 S.Ct. 411, 73 L.Ed. 789, and Williams v. United States, 1933, 289 U.S. 553, 53 S.Ct. 751, 77 L.Ed. 1372. The Government and the amici (except Coppedge) argue that these cases are not controlling, and that the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (as well as the Court of Claims) is a court created by Congress under Article III of the Constitution.
Deeming it our duty to dispose of the case with as complete an avoidance as may be of constitutional questions, see Harmon v. Brucker, 1958, 355 U.S. 579 at 581, 78 S.Ct. 433, 2 L.Ed.2d 503, we affirm the conviction and determine that the trial judge was qualified to sit, on the following ground: that the assignment must in any event be sustained under the plenary power of Congress over the District of Columbia and its courts, pursuant to Article I, Sec. 8, Cl. 17, of the Constitution.
The judge in this case was appointed to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in 1937. At that time there was in force a statute specifically providing:
"The judges of the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, or any of them, whenever the business of that court will permit, may, if in the judgment of the Chief Justice of the United States the pub- ' lie interest requires, be designated and assigned by him for service from time to time, and until he shall otherwise direct, in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia or the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, when requested by the Chief Justice of either of said courts." 28 U.S.C. § 22 (1934 ed.).
Thus, the post to which the trial judge was appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate was one which clearly included the possibility and prospect of judicial service on the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, now the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The Congress spoke of "service" on that court — by which it must have meant the exercise, of every type of jurisdiction possessed by the court. The statute is now not limited to the District of Columbia but includes assignments to judicial service throughout the country. Be that as it may, we think that at all relevant times Congress has specifically made available the services of the judges of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals to meet the needs of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. We think there can be no doubt of the power of Congress to do so, in view of the broad sweep of its legislative authority over the Federal District. See Kendall v. United States, 1938, 12 Pet. 524, 619, 37 U.S. 524, 619, 9 L.Ed. 1181; O'Donoghue v. United States, 1933, 289 U.S. 516, 545, 53 S.Ct. 740, 77 L.Ed. 1356; Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 1923, 261 U.S. 428, 443, 43 S. Ct. 445, 67 L.Ed. 731.
We need not examine the other contentions of the parties.
Affirmed.
FAHY, Circuit Judge, took no part in the hearing or decision of this case.
Statement of Circuit Judge Prettyman, Concurring in Opinion Filed June 22, 1961
. The assignment was made by the Chief Justice of the United States pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 294(d). Retired "judges of the United States," including retired judges of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, are available for assignment. Appellant acknowledges that the statute purports to authorize assignments of the sort challenged here.
. Not of counsel on this appeal.
. The witness was asked where he had previously seen appellant, and replied "In Occoquan." A District of Columbia workhouse or jail is located in Occoquan, Virginia.
. We are mindful, too, of our duty to expedite the hearing and disposition of appeals in criminal cases.
. The quoted statute goes on to provide: "During the period of service of any judge designated and assigned under this chapter, he shall have all the. powers, and rights, and perform all the duties, of a judge of the district, or a justice of the court, to which he has been assigned (excepting the power of appointment to a statutory position or of permanent designation of newspaper or depository of funds)."
. See 28 U.S.C. § 291-298 (1958 ed.).