Case Name: RICHARDSON v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1923-03-07
Citations: 253 S.W. 273
Docket Number: No. 7293
Parties: RICHARDSON v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 253
Pages: 273–278

Head Matter:
RICHARDSON v. STATE.
(No. 7293.)
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
March 7, 1923.
Rehearing Denied June 13, 1923.)
1. Criminal law <©=5633(1) — Refusal to have jury retire while aged witness was being assisted to and from stand1 not violation of defendant’s rights.
The court’s refusal to have jury retire while defendant’s and deceased’s aged and infirm mother, who testified for the state, was being assisted to and from the witness stand by deputy sheriffs, was not a violation of any rights of defendant.
2. Homicide <©=>163(2) — That deceased had been away for several years djd not render inadmissible testimony as to.his general reputation.
- That deceased had only been back at his old home-for a few months, following a prolonged absence of several years, was not good ground for rejection of testimony of qualified witnesses knowing his general reputation was that of a peaceable, law-abiding citizen.
3. Criminal law <©=>695(2) — Objections to evidence as immaterial and irrelevant too general.
Objections to testimony that deceased’s general reputation as a peaceable, law-abiding citizen was good, as immaterial and irrelevant, were too general.
4. Criminal law <©=>1043(1) — 'Trial court’s rulings reviewed from standpoint of objections actually made.
Appellate court will review action of trial court in rejecting or admitting testimony from standpoint of the objections made, and not from standpoint of objections which might have been made.
5. Homicide <©=5300 (7) — Charge that jury were judges of the facts proper, though there was evidence which, if true, raised presumption of deceased’s intent to kill.
Though there was evidence for-defendant of deceased’s possession and use of pistol, raising presumption under Vernon’s Ann. Pen. Code 1916, art. 11Ó6, of his intent to kill defendant, the court properly charged that the jury were the exclusive judges of the facts and the weight of the testimony.
6. Homicide <©=>276 — Whether deceased had pistol properly left to jury on conflicting evidence.
Where the evidence was conflicting as to whether deceased had a pistol, so as to raise presumption of his intent to kill, under Ver non’s Ann. Pen. Code 1916, art. 1106, the court properly left the question to the jury.
On Motion for Rehearing.
7. Homicide @=mi90(IO) — Evidence of deceased’s character admissible when threats proved though not communicated.
Where defendant introduced evidence of attack or apparent attack on him by deceased and of prior threats to kill or injure him, evidence of deceased’s good reputation for peace and quietude was admissible under Yernon’s Ann. Pen. Code 1916, art. 1143, though such threats had not been communicated to defendant.
8. Homicide <§=»190(10) — Evidence that deceased’s reputation for peace and quietude good admissible when threats proved; “peaceful;” “peaceable.”
Under Yernon’s Ann. Pen. Code 1916, art. 1143, providing that when proof of threats has been made it shall be competent to introduce evidence as to whether deceased was man of violent or dangerous character or man of quiet and inoffensive disposition, evidence that deceased’s general reputation for peace and quietude was good was admissible; as one is “peaceable” who is not. quarrelsome, and a “peaceful” man is one who is. quiet and harmless in his behavior.
9. Homicide <®==>i90(10)— Proof of general reputation of deceased admissible when threat proved; “reputation”;, “character.”
Though Yernon’s Ann. Pen. Code 1916, art. 1143, provides that when proof of threats has been made it shall be competent to introduce evidence of deceased’s “general character,” this does not confine such evidence to proof of general character as distinguished from general reputation.
[Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Character; Reputation.]
10. Homicide <s=x>348— Instruction .as to presumption from deceased’s possession of pistol held not ground for reversal.
Though instruction that, if deceased had a pistol under circumstances reasonably indicating intention to murder or inflict bodily injury on defendant, then the law presumed that he intended to murder or inflict serious bodily injury on defendant, was not in language of Yer-non’s Ann. Pen. Code 1916, art. 1106, it was not reversible error, under Vernon’s Ann. Code Cr. Proc. 1916, art. 743, relative to errors not calculated to injure accused, where court also charged that, if from deceased’s words or acts, viewed from defendant’s standpoint, it reasonably appeared that he was in danger of death or serious bodily harm, he should be acquitted.
Appeal from District Court, Van Zandt County; Joel R. Bond, Judge. '
Frank Richardson was convicted of murder, and he appeals.
Affirmed.
See, also, 91 Tex. Cr. R. 318, 239 S. W. 218, 20 A. L. R. 1249.
Gentry & Gentry, of Tyler, Stanford, Sanders & West and C. D. Hubbard, all of Canton, and E. M. Greer, of Wills Point, for appellant.
Butler, Price & Maynor, of Tyler, and R. G. Storey, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

Opinion:
LATTIMORE, J.
Appellant was convicted in the district court of Van Zandt county of murder, and his punishment fixed at 30 years in the penitentiary.
Serious complaint is made of the refusal of appellant's request that the jury be retired while the aged mother of appellant was being assisted to and from the witness stand during the trial of this case. The matter is made the subject of a bill of exceptions, in which it is made to appear that said witness was aged and infirm and that it was apparently necessary that she he assisted to and from the witness stand, and that in fact she was brought into the courtroom and to the witness box and assisted in leaving same by two deputy sheriffs. This court does not know how to properly appraise a complaint such as this. Necessarily large discretion is confined in trial courts in matters of procedure, and in order to call same into review by us on appeal it seems universally held that there must be an' affirmative showing of injury, or a flagrant abuse of the discretion of the lower court. We have been unable to find any authority holding upon the same or a similar state of facts that injury must be inferred from a refusal such as this. While the trial court might have well granted the request of appellant and thus avoided any possible claim of injury, we are not able to conclude that his refusal of such request was a violation of the rights of the appellant from which reversible error appears.
A number of witnesses for the state were permitted to testify over objection of appellant'that the reputation of deceased for peace and quietude was good. All the bills of exception complaining of this matter will be considered together. The record before us shows proof of threats made by deceased immediately preceding the homicide and also prior thereto. Appellant's witness Steele swore that just before the shooting occurred appellant asked deceased what he was doing at the house and that deceased replied, "I will show you what I am doing hereand that he went and procured and presented a pistol, and then called out to the mother of himself and appellant, "Move, ma, and I will show him what I am doing here;" that in a minute or two appellant shot and killed deceased. Other witnesses, including Charles Jones, Alto Jones, one Marmar, and Hon. N. A. Gentry, all testified to threats made by deceased at other times; no proof appearing of the communication of these prior threats. Appellant objected to the proof of the good rep utation of deceased on tiie ground that it was immaterial, irrelevant, and prejudicial and bore on no issue in the case, and that deceased had been away from the county on a prolonged absence until a few months prior to the homicide, and that the witnesses could not therefore have formed an opinion provable in court. The bill of exceptions as presented to the trial court contained the further ground of objection that there was no proof of communication of threats to appellant. The trial court refused to approve the bill with this statement in it, and appends thereto a qualification in which he states that no objection was offered on the ground that the threats had not been communicated.
That the deceased had only been back "at his old home for a few months, following a prolonged absence of several years, would not seem good ground for the rejection' of testimony of witnesses who qualified that they knew his general reputation for being a peaceable, law-abiding citizen and that it was good, but would seem rather to go to the weight of such . testimony. Objections that the testimony is immaterial and irrelevant are too general. There are numerous decisions holding that" this court will judge of the action of the trial court in rejecting or admitting testimony from the standpoint of the objections made, and not from the stand-, point of objections which might have been made but were not. Fluewellian v. State, 59 Tex. Cr. R. 334, 128 S. W. 622; Ward v. State, 66 Tex. Cr. R. 313, 146 S. W. 931; Irby v. State, 69 Tex. Cr. R. 619, 155 S. W. 544.
If the objection was specific enough, we still doubt the application and soundness of the rule sought to be invoked by appellant, that is, that evidence of the good character of the deceased will not be admitted except where the proof shows communicated threats. The only case in which the doctrine is directly held is Arnwine v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. R. 254, 96 S. W. 4. In a companion case, Arnwine v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. R. 477, 99 S. W. 97, the correctness of this holding as announced in the prior and companion case was vigorously assailed. We have searched in vain for authorities approving the holding in the first Arnwine 'Case. In Jirou v. State, 53 Tex. Cr. R. 18, 108 S. W. 655, while this court was graced by the presence of the eminent jurist who wrote the opinion in the first Amwine Case, this court, speaking through Judge Ramsey, after quoting the statute, article 1143, Vernon's P. C. (then article 713, P. C.), says:
"The statute makes no distinction in the rule laid down authorizing the introduction of proof of deceased's reputation, between threats communicated or uncommunicated, nor would there seem to be any reason why, as to communicated threats, a different rule should obtain between cases where the threats were communicated to a defendant and believed by him, in a case where they were made to him by the deceased in person.- To sustain appellant's contention we would have to ingraft an exception on the statute, which the statute itself has not made. We think, therefore, that this proof under the statute and decisions was dearly admissible."
The Jirou Case is approved in Canon v. State, 59 Tex. Cr. R. 407, 128 S. W. 141, in an opinion written by the learned judge who wrote, in the first Arnwine Case; also in Williams v. State, 61 Tex. Cr. R. 364, 136 S. W. 771, the same learned judge affirms the admissibility of similar evidence and makes no reference to the Amwine decision. Reference to the three authorities cited in the first Arnwine decision, supra, and an examination of them raises doubt of their applicability. Rhea v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. R. 138, 38 S. W. 1012, and Sims v. State, 38 Tex. Cr. R. 637, 44 S. W. 522, two of the cases cited in the Arnwine opinion, were both written by Judge Henderson, and neither of them lay down the rule that evidence of the good reputation of deceased will not be admitted except in cases of communicated threats, nor do we think either of them to contain any expression tending to support said conclusion. In the instant case appellant proved by his witness Steele a threat apparently accompanied by a demonstration on the part of deceased, immediately preceding the killing, and also introduced the testimony of several other witnesses of uncommunicatéd threats preceding the killing. Proof of prior threats has always been held admissible in cases of self-defense. If accompanied or followed by testimony of. a demonstration on the part of deceased, such evidence may afford justification for the killing. If the issue be as to who began the difficulty in a case wherein self-defense is set up, proof of un-communicated threats is held to aid in solving the issue. The statute makes no distinction between the admissibility of such testimony in a case of communicated and one of uncommunicated threats. The plain, pointed, and unequivocal terms of article 1143, supra, are as follows:
"In every instance where proof of threats has been made, it shhll be competent to introduce evidence of the general character of the deceased."
When the language used in a statute is not plain or its meaning not clear, resort may be had to rules of construction; but when it is plain the courts have no right to add to or take from the statutory utterance its unmistakable meaning. The admission of the testimony as to the general character of deceased was not erroneous.
In the charge of the court appears the following :
"You are further -instructed that, if you find and believe from the evidence that at the time the defendant shot and killed the deceased, if he did, that the deceased had a pistol in his hand, under circumstances which reasonably in •dicated an intention' to murder or to inflict serious bodily injury upon bim, then the law presumes and you shall presume that'the deceased intended to murder or to inflict serious bodily inj'ury upon the defendant."
It is urged, this was not a proper application of the law of article 1106, P. 0. In Kendall v. State, 8 Tex. App. 569, Judge Clark discusses article 1106, andi states how same should be given to the jury in application thereof to the facts of a given case. We quote from Judge Clark's opinion:
"The provisions of this article were directly applicable to certain phases of the evidence, and of paramount importance to the rights of the defendant. If the jury believed from the evidence that, at the time the fatal shot was fired by the defendant, the deceased, Brown, was making a violent attack upon Brook's, under circumstances which reasonably indicated an intention upon his part to murder or to maim Brooks, and the weapon used by Brown, and the manner of its use, were such ás were calculated to produce either of those results, then the law presumed that Brown designed to murder or to maim Brooks, and the jury should have been so informed in the most explicit terms."
Appellant has also an exception to that part of the court's charge wherein they are told that they are the exclusive judges of the facts and the weight of the testimony, contending that in a case such as this, and where the law of article 1106 may be demanded, the charge ought to instruct the jury that where the law creats certain presumptions arising, from facts the jury are not the exclusive judges of the facts. We are unable to agree to this. The state's theory, supported by its proof, was that deceased had no pistol and that he was not attempting murder or any other crime when killed. Appellants' testimony was to a contrary effect. Upon this condition of dispute as to whether in fact there was a pistol in the hands of deceased when killed, and as to whether he was attempting to kill appellant, no one 'could pass in judgment save the jury. Unless they found upon the facts, dependent on what the witnesses said and which of them the jury believed, that it was true that deceased had a pistol at the time he was shot, and was making a violent attack on appellant under circumstances reasonably indicating an intention on his part to kill, then no presumption of law could arise. It is figuratively Said, but is actually true, that a fountain cannot rise higher than its source; the presumption of law cannot arise until its facts be determined. These being in dispute, no one could settle them but the jury. In settling them the jury must be told in due and ancient form that they are to decide which of the witnesses told the' truth. How else would appellant have the learned trial'judge proceed? How else could this court decide? Appfellant's witnesses swore that deceased had a pistol. The state's Witnfess'es with' equal positiveness denied this fact.- If the trial judge had taken the settlement of this disputed issue away from the jury and decided it aga-inst appellant, we would promptly reverse the case. If he had decided it in favor of appellant, the rights of the state would have suffered irreparable injury. He should and did leave it where it belonged, in the hands of the jury for their decision.
We have weighed all the contentions made. The case has been here before. Richardson v. State, 91 Tex. Cr. K. 318, 239 S. W. 218, 20 A. L. R. 1249. The errors complained of, but not here discussed, have been considered. Appellant killed his brother. The shooting was in the presence of their mother. She was the state's main witness. She had made her home with appellant for years before the homicide. Other witnesses testified. The evidence was fully developed. The law seems to have been fairly submitted, and in its light and upon the facts the jury have decided the case against appellant.
An affirmance will be ordered.
<©=>For other cases see same topic and KEX-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
®m»For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes