Case Name: STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION v. SANDBURG
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1968-07-25
Citations: 12 Mich. App. 475
Docket Number: Docket No. 3,079
Parties: STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION v. SANDBURG.
Judges: Lesinski, C. J., concurred with' Quinn, J.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 12
Pages: 475–483

Head Matter:
STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION v. SANDBURG.
Opinion op the Court.
1. Eminent Domain — Access Rights — Evidence.
Ruling of trial court that the minds of the parties met and the highway department acquired access rights of property conveyed by deed stamped with language that “first party acknowledges notice that the land may be used for limited access highway purposes” held, not clearly erroneous; statute providing that agencies of the State may acquire private property and property rights and that all property rights acquired shall be in fee simple controls (CL 1948, § 252.58).
2. Same — Award—Evidence.
Award made within range of competent evidence in a land condemnation ease will not be disturbed by Court of Appeals.
3. Appeal and Error — Objection—Preserving Error por Review.
The Court of Appeals will not review question of improper and prejudicial argument of attorney where no objection was made at trial.
4. Costs — Deeds—Conveyance—Highway—Access Rights.
No costs are allowed on appeal from trial court holding that State acquired access rights to land conveyed to highway department by deed stamped with language that grantor acknowledged notice that the land could be used for limited access highway purposes where deeds conveying back to grantor to correct an error in description and reconveying to highway department made no mention of access rights.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1] 26 Am Jur 2d, Eminent Domain § 130 et seq.
[2] 27 Am Jur 2d, Eminent Domain | 471 et seq.
[3] 5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 624.
[4] 5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 1009 et seq.
[5-10] 26 Am Jur 2d, Eminent Domain § 132 et seq.
Dissenting Opinion.
Gilmore, J.
5. Deeds — Eminent Domain — Conveyance—Intention.
A written instrument conveying an interest in real estate must contain language manifesting an intention on the part of a grantor to transfer such interest in property.
6. Same — Formal Requirement — Words op Grant.
Conveyances must contain words of grant; to transfer an interest in realty the grantor owning the interest, with intent to do so, must execute an instrument sufficient to meet the requirements of lex situs of the realty.
7. Same — Estate Conveyed — Words op Grant.
Ordinarily no estate passes by deed winch is not embraced plainly within the words of grant.
8. Same — Conveyance—Intention.
The intent of the grantor to convey should clearly appear on the face of the deed so as not to leave a reasonable doubt in regard to it.
9. Same — Words op Grant — Conveyance—Notice.
Words stamped on face of deed conveying land to highway department that first party acknowledges notice that lands may be used for limited access highway purposes are not a conveyance of access rights because there are no words of grant.
10. Same — Access Rights — Limited Access Highway.
Access rights to a limited access highway are of value to owner of abutting land and a specific grant is required to give the right to the highway department.
Appeal from Ingham, Salmon (Marvin J.), J.
Submitted Division 2 May 4, 1967, at Lansing.
(Docket No. 3,079.)
Decided July 25, 1968.
Leave to appeal granted November 19, 1968.
See 381 Mich 787.
Complaint by State Highway Commission against Robert Sandburg and others for condemnation of certain lands for highway purposes. Judgment for plaintiff with compensation to defendants, Defendants appeal
Affirmed.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoshi, Solicitor General, Louis Caruso, Assistant Attorney General, and Bruce S. King, Special Assistant Attorney General, for plaintiff.
Rarely, Starr & Ferency, for defendants.

Opinion:
Quinn, J.
Defendants appeal from the denial of their motion to set aside the report of the commissioners and to grant a new trial in plaintiff's condemnation proceedings relative to certain property taken for US-127. On appeal, as on said motion, defendants contend that the trial court erred in ruling that the State had acquired the access rights defendants claimed they were entitled to be compensated for, that the award was against the great weight and unsupported by the evidence, and that the argument of plaintiff's attorney was improper and prejudicial to the extent of depriving them of a fair trial.
By warranty deed dated May 9, 1952, the then owners conveyed to Charles M. Ziegler as State highway commissioner a 200-foot right-of-way over the northwest quarter of the northeast quarter of section 17, T2N, R1W, Vevay township, Ingham county. This deed bore a stamp reading, "first party acknowledges notice that said lands may be used for limited access highway purposes". To correct an error in description, the grantee in this deed reconveyed to the then owner by quitclaim deed dated May 14, 1953, and the same day the owner reconveyed by warranty deed to Charles M. Ziegler as State highway commissioner. The land involved in this appeal is that part of the northwest quarter of the northeast quarter of section 17, T2N, R1W, lying east of this right-of-way; it is vacant land and it is zoned commercial.
At the time of the deed of May 9, 1952, CL 1948, § 252.51 (Stat Ann 1958 Rev § 9.1094[1]) provided in part:
"For the purposes of this act, limited access highways are defined as highways specially designed for through traffic, and over, from or to which owners or occupants of abutting land have no easement or right of light, air or access by reason of such abuttal."
and CL 1948, § 252.53 (Stat Ann 1958 Rev § 9.1094 [3]) provided:
"For the purposes of this act, the aforesaid agencies may acquire private property and property rights by purchase, gift, devise, or condemnation, and the provisions of any existing laws of this state shall apply. All property rights acquired under the provisions of this act shall he in fee simple estate."
The trial court ruled with respect to access rights:
"With respect to the question of acquisition of access rights to the highway, the court would rule that it clearly appears from the deed of May 9, 1952, that the minds of the parties met on the proposition that this was to he a limited access situation and that the highway department did acquire the access rights to this property."
This factual determination that the parties to the deed of May 9, 1952, understood the land conveyed thereby was for a limited access highway is not clearly erroneous (GrCR 1963, 517.1), and the statute controls. No access rights were involved with the land taken.
The award was within the range of the competent evidence and will not be disturbed. Department of Conservation v. Connor (1947), 316 Mich 565.
There was no objection to the alleged improper argument of plaintiff's counsel. No error is presented for review. Riste v. Grand Trunk Western Railroad Company (1962), 368 Mich 32.
Affirmed but without costs.
Lesinski, C. J., concurred with' Quinn, J.
Filed -under PA 1925, No 352, as amended (CL 1948, § 213.171 et seq., as amended [Stat Ann 1958 Rev and 1968 Cum Supp § 8.171 et seq.]).