Case Name: L. P. Hext v. M. P. Jarrell
Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1848-05
Citations: 3 Strob. 11
Docket Number: 
Parties: L. P. Hext v. M. P. Jarrell.
Judges: Richardson, J. and Evans, J. concurred.
Reporter: South Carolina Law Reports
Volume: 34
Pages: 11–21

Head Matter:
L. P. Hext v. M. P. Jarrell.
A deed which “granted,” &c. to the tenant and her children, so long as they or either of them should survive, “ the plantation” on which she then resided, “together with the house, outhouses, anjl appurtenances thereunto belonging,” • “ with as much land adjoining the improved plantation,” &c. as they or either of them might “ have occasion to occupy for cultivation,” “ and as much timber for plantation purposes as might be necessary,” was held not to convey a life estate in the whole tract (wood and cultivated) of which the “ improved plantation” formed a part.
The term plcmtaimi has no precise, fixed and definite single meaning; it may mean the whole body of land (wood and cultivated) which a man uses together for agricultural purposes, or it may mean only that part which is cultivated. The sense in which it is used, depends very much on the context, or the subject matter to which it is applied.
Before Frost, J. at Barnwell, Spring Term, 1848.
This was an action of trespass.- The pleas were the general -issue and liberum tenementum.
The plaintiff proved a trespass. Both parties claimed under Robert Mucklerath, who, it was proved, prior to 1797, under a survey and plat made for him in 1785, was in possession of a tract of two thousand acres, situate on both sides of the lower Three Runs, which divided the tract nearly into equal parts. The alleged trespass was on the part lying on the eastern side of the stream, and consisted in the defendant going into a field claimed by the plaintiff, which his ne-groes were clearing, and ordering the plaintiff’s negroes to stop their work and leave the land. Robert Mucklerath died in possession of the land, leaving his widow and five or six children surviving him. The widow married Daniel Miller, and had two more children, who are living, one of whom is the wife of the defendant. The widow of Mucklerath continued in possession until she died, with her children, who afterwards remained on the land many years, and successively moved off, leaving the defendant and his wife in the sole possession. The plaintiff produced in evidence a conveyance from Angrrs Patterson to himself, for 288 acres, part of the tract east of the stream, dated the 20th September, 1843; and a conveyance from the sheriff to Angus Patterson, of the entire tract of two thousand acres, under a judgment and execution against Juan, executor of Isaac Bourdeaux, dated the 8th April, 1828. It was proved that the wife of Juan and Isaac Bourdeaux were the only heirs of Daniel Bour-deaux. The plaintiffs also produced in evidence a deed from Daniel Bourdeaux to Daniel Miller and Jane his wife, by which Daniel Bourdeaux grants, bargains, covenants, &c. with Miller and his wife, that Jane Miller and her children, as well those of Robert Mucklerath as of Daniel Miller, shall have the “ use, possession, occupation and enjoyment of the plantation on which she now resides, on the east side of the lower Three Runs, together with the houses, out-houses, and appurtenances thereunto belonging,” “with as much land adjoining the present* improved plantation and buildings, fields and settlement, as she or they may hereafter wish to clear and cultivate, in addition to the present clearing, for her and their own planting, collectively and individually,” “ so long as such children, or either of them, shall survive, and collectively or individually shall choose to remain in the occupancy, enjoyment and possession of the premises aforesaid, after the death of the said Jane.”
The right of the plaintiff to recover, turned on the construction of this deed ; and it was held that it operated as a lease of the plantation or tract of land, on the east side of the stream, during the joint lives of Jane Miller and of her children, and of the survivor of them ; and that the defendant’s wife, in common with the other surviving children of Jane Miller, had an estate for life in the said tract of land, without impeachment of waste.
The plaintiff submitted to a non-suit, and moved the Appeal Court for leave to set it aside, on the ground that his Honor’s construction of the old deed from Bourdeaux was erroneous.
Bellinger, for the motion.
Bauskettj contra.
SOUTH CAROLINA, ) Barnwell District. \ COPY DEED.
To all to whom these presents shall come, greeting:
Whereas, by a deed of covenant, entered into between Daniel Bourdeaux, of the State and District aforesaid, of the one part, and Jane Mucklerath, the widow of Robert Mucklerath, deceased, and adriiinistratrix of the estate of the said Robert Mucklerath, of the other part, bearing date the 19th May, in the year of our Lord 1797, against whom, as administratrix aforesaid, the said Daniel Bourdeaux had obtained a judgment at a Court of Common Pleas holden at Orangeburgh, for April Term, in the year of our Lord 1795, which judgment was entered up, and execution thereon issued the 13th April, during the same term, and before the division of the district of Orangeburg took place. That the said judgment hath, since such division, been revived at Barnwell, and execution thereon issued the 30th March, 1801, for two thousand one hundred and forty-two pounds, six shillings, sterling money, equal to nine thousand one hundred and eighty-one dollars and two sevenths.
And whereas, in and by the said deed of covenant, among other tilings, it is therein stipulated, that notwithstanding the said judgment and execution, and the sale to be made in virtue of the same, of the property of the said estate. That nevertheless, the said Jane Mucklerath shall not be divested of, “ but shall continue to enjoy, during her natural life, quiet and peaceable possession of the plantation on which she now resides, on the east side of said stream,” (the Lower Three Runs,) “ together with the house, out-houses, and appurtenances thereunto belonging, as also the use of as much land on the east side of said stream, during her natural life, as she may for her own individual purposes have occasion to cultivate
Now know ye: That I, the said Daniel Bourdeaux, for divers good causes and considerations me therein moving, and also for the consideration sum of one dollar, current lawful money of the United States of America, to me in hand well and truly paid by Daniel Miller and Jane his wife, formerly Jane Mucklerath, at and before the sealing and delivery of these presents, the receipt whereof I do hereby acknowledge, have granted and bargained, and by these presents do grant, bargain, covenant, engage and agree, to and with the said Daniel Miller and Jane his wife, formerly Jane Muckle-rath, in manner following: That is to say, that the use, possession, occupation and enjoyment of the premises aforesaid, as are referred to in said deed of covenant of 19th May, 1797, shall not be limited to the life time only of the said Jane, as the said deed sets forth, but that such use, possession, occupancy and enjoyment thereof, shall be extended beyond the natural life of the said Jane, to the life times of the children of the said Jane by her former husband, Robert Mucklerath, deceased, namely: Margaret Thomson, widow, Elizabeth, John, Polly and Charlotte Mucklerath, as also to the children of the said Jane by her present husband, Daniel Miller, namely: Cornelia and Maria Miller, so long as such children, or either of them, shall survive, and collectively or individually shall choose to remain in the occupancy, enjoyment and possession of the premises aforesaid, after the decease of the said Jane, with as much land adjoining to the present improved plantation and buildings, fields and settlement, as he, she or they, at any time hereafter, may wish to clear and cultivate in addition to the present clearing, for his, her or their own planting and cultivating, either collectively or individually. But it is not understood, nor is it the intent and meaning of these presents, that the extension granted by this agreement beyond the natural life of the said Jane, shall go further than what relates to the plantation, houses, out-houses, and other improvements on the said plantation on the east side of the stream of the Lower Three Runs, with as much land adjoining to the present settlement, as the children of the said Jane by her former husband, Robert Mucklerath, deceased, as also by her present husband, Daniel Miller, during their and each of their respective life times, may have occasion to occupy for cultivation, with as much timber for plantation purposes as may be necessary. And to enjoy the privileges of grinding at the Grist Mill on the said Lower Three Runs, free of toll, at all times when the said Mill shall be in a state of repair capable of grinding. For full and ample performance of the foregoing covenants, stipulations and agreements entered into by the said Daniel Bourdeaux, with the said Daniel Miller, and Jane his wife, in addition and supplementary to those before, by him, entered into with the said Jane, while widow of Robert Mucklerath, deceased, on the 19th day of May, 1797, already mentioned and referred to, I, the said Daniel Bourdeaux, do hereby bind myself, my heirs, executors and administrators, unto the said Daniel Miller, and Jane his wife, his and her heirs, executors and administrators, in the penal sum of three thousand dollars, current lawful money of the United States of America.
In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and seal, this 10th of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and five, and in the twenty-ninth of the ( sovereignty and independence of the United States of America. (Signed)
DANIEL BOUKDEAUX, [l. s.]
Signed, sealed, and delivered ) Margaret Shields, in the presence of ) Peter Provost.
Proved before Gideon Hagood, J. P. by Peter Provost, 13th September, 1805, and recorded in book 12, Register’s Office, Barnwell district, page 264, October 28, 1805.

Opinion:
O'Neall, J.
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case, it has been supposed that the defendant, in the right of his wife, has an estate, for her life, in the whole tract of land lying east of the Three Runs. This depends upon the construction of the covenants by which Mr. Bour-deaux gave to Mrs. Mucklerath (afterwards Mrs. Miller) and her children, the use and possession of the plantation, on the east side. The term plantation has no precise, fixed, and definite single meaning — it may mean the whole body of land, (wood and cultivated,) which a man uses together for agricultural purposes ; or it may mean only that part which is cultivated. The sense in which it is used, depends very much on the context, or the subject matter to which it is applied.
In the recital of the covenant before us, a previous covenant is recited, whereby it was agreed that " Jane Muckle-rath shall not be divested of, but shall continue to enjoy, during her natural life, quiet and peaceable possession of the plantation on which she noto resides, east of the said stream," (the Lower Three Runs,) " together rvith the house, outhouses, and appurtenances thereunto belonging, as also the use of as much land, on the east side of the said stream, during her natural life, as she may, for her oion individual purposes, have occasion to cultivate." These latter words shew the sense in which the term plantation was used. It was not used in its broadest sense, but in the narrower one, by which it meant the cultivated land.
The covenant before us was intended, as it expresses, to extend the interest given to Jane, to her children by her former husband, Mucklerath, and also by her then husband, Miller, during their lives. It says that the " use,possession, occupation and enjoyment," shall not be limited to her life, but that such use, possession, occupation and enjoyment shall be extended to the lives of her children, or as long as they choose, collectively or individually, to retain the possession. Do these words impart a life estate, in the whole of the land east of the Three Runs? Surely not; they give a very qualified interest of occupancy. But the instrument does not stop there. It says the possession is to continue " so long as such children, or either of them, shall survive, and collective- ' ly or individually, shall choose to remain in the occupancy, enjoyment and possession of the premises aforesaid, after the decease of the said Jane, with as much land adjoining' to the present improved plantation and buildings, fields and settlement, as he, she or they, at any time hereafter, may wish to clear and cultivate, in addition to the present clearing, for his, her or their own planting and cultivating, either collectively or individually." How, after reading these words, any one can doubt that the use, possession, occupation and enjoyment of the plantation, covenanted to be allowed to Jane and her children, can be other than the cleared, cultivated and improved plantation or settlement, it is'hard for me to understand. The words giving it that confined meaning, are used; and then the covenantor tells the covenantees, in addition to this narrow use, I allow you to clear and cultivate, adjoining the improved settlement, as much land as you, for your own planting and cultivating, may need.
The instrument does not, however, stop at this plain expression of intention. It is stated by it, " but it is not understood, nor is it the intent and meaning of these presents, that the extension, granted by this agreement, beyond the natural life of the said Jane, shall go further than what relates to the plantation, houses, out-houses and other improvements, on the said plantation, on the east side of the stream of the Lower Three Runs, with as much land adjoining to the present settlement, as the children of the said Jane, by her former husband, Robert Mucklerath, deceased, as also by her present husband, Daniel Miller, during their and each of their respective life times, may have occasion to occupy for cultivation, with as much timber for plantation purposes as may be necessary." These words clearly shew that the life use, covenanted to be granted, was of the cleared land and buildings. Incidental thereto, the covenantor agrees they may clear adjoining as much as they may have occasion to occupy for cultivation, and with it, that they should have as much timber as was necessary for plantation purposes. These latter words, about the timber, plainly negative the notion, that a life estate was intended to be granted of the whole land, east of the Runs. If that had been so, no such covenant was necessary. For the law gave to the tenant, fire bote and fence bote.
Having gone through the covenant, and ascertained its meaning, how stands this case ? The old settlement has been abandoned, the defendant is now in possession nearly half a mile from it. He purchased from Mr. Patterson the reversionary interest in about 300 acres, including the old and the present settlement. He himself laid out the line, separating him from the balance of the land. For Mr. Patterson told him to lay off as much as he wanted. Beyond this line, the plaintiff is in possession, under a purchase from'' Mr. Patterson. When his clearing approached the defendant's line, he (the defendant) stopped it, and this is the trespass complained of. Stating the case, in this way, it is plain the defendant has no defence. He has the old and the new settlement, with much adjoining land. He has not entered upon the land to clear it. He has undertaken to say to the owner, the plaintiff, who, for the purposes of this case, is Bourdeaux, the covenan tor, under whom the defendant claims, you shall not clear your own land. To allow this, would make the tenant greater, in law and estate, than his landlord! Such an absurdity cannot exist. The most the defendant could ask, would be, as was done on the first trial, to leave it to the Jury to say, whether the land, which the plaintiff was about to clear, was necessary for the cultivation of the «defendant's wife, or whether the timber was necessary for her plantation purposes. This, however, is entirely for the defendant's advantage. If he does not choose to avail himself of it, his trespass is unjustified, without excuse, and without mitigation.
The motion to set aside the non-suit, is granted.
Richardson, J. and Evans, J. concurred.