Case Name: WASHBON et al. v. COPE et al.
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1893-02
Citations: 22 N.Y.S. 241
Docket Number: 
Parties: WASHBON et al. v. COPE et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 22
Pages: 241–247

Head Matter:
(67 Hun, 272.)
WASHBON et al. v. COPE et al.
(Supreme Court, General Term, Fourth Department.
February, 1893.)
1. Winns—Construction—Death without Issue.
In view of the fact that testator was 77 years old when he executed his will, and that his married daughter, aged 44, was childless, his will, which, after giving her a pecuniary legacy, and a share in the residue of the estate, provides that, “on her death without children, ” her shares shall go to testator’s sons, “or their heirs, share and share alike, ” cannot be construed as referring to the daughter’s death in the lifetime of testator, but to her death at any time; and hence, though she survives testator, her legacy will pass to testator's sons, and their heirs, on her death without issue. Merwin, J., dissenting.
2. Remainder-Men—Security from Life Tenant.
A legatee who, by the terms of a will, takes only a life interest in the legacy, may be compelled by the remainder-men to give security for the legacy, or to submit to the appointment of a receiver, if it appears that their interests would otherwise be imperiled.
Appeal from special term, Otsego county.
Action by Andrew G. Washbon and another against Nancy Cope and others to compel defendant Nancy Cope to give security for certain legacies received by her under the will of her father, Andrew G. Washbon, or to submit to the appointment of a receiver for such legacies. From a judgment dismissing the complaint, plaintiffs appeal.
Reversed.
Andrew G. Washbon died March 1,1867. leaving a last will and testament bearing date the 31st day of January, 1865. He was in his seventy-seventh year when the will was executed. The first clause of the will provided an annuity for his wife. The second clause devised a farm in trust for his son John G., with the remainder over to the descendants of John, “who shall be living at his decease, to whom I devise and bequeath the same, so that the descendants of each deceased child, if any, of my said son John G. Washbon, shall take together, and per stirpes, one share, as said deceased child, their parent, would have taken if living, and for the benefit of said descendants of said son John G. Washbon. ” The third clause devised a farm to his son Henry R, containing 188 acres. The fourth provision was as follows: “I give and bequeath to my daughter, Nancy Cope, wife of John Cope, Jr., the sum of ten thousand (10,000) dollars. ” The fifth clause gave a legacy of $2,000 to John Cope, Jr., husband of Nancy. The sixth clause contained a bequest to his second son, Robert, of $12,000. The seventh clause was as follows: “I give and bequeath and devise all rest, residue, and remainder of my property, real and personal, to my three children Robert Washbon; Nancy Cope, wife of John Cope, Jr.; and Henry R. Washbon,—to be divided equally between them. ” “Eighthly. I furthermore desire and direct that in the event of my daughter, Nancy Cope, wife of John Cope, Jr., shall die without children, the portion herein given to her shall be given to my sons John G., Robert, and Henry R., or their heirs, share and share alike. ” In the ninth clause there was a provision for his sister, and the tenth clause was as follows: “I furthermore direct and authorize my executors hereinafter named to sell all real estate which I may have, except such as I have otherwise given and devised in this my last will and testament for the benefit of my heirs, at such times as said executors shall deem best. ” “Eleventhly. I do hereby nominate and appoint my sons Robert Washbon and Henry R. Washbon, and my son-in-law, John Cope, Jr., to be the executors of this, my last will and testament, hereby revoking all former wills by me made. ” The special term held that the surrogate’s decree was not binding upon Nancy Cope, and, secondly, that she took under the provisions of her father’s will absolutely, under the provisions made in her behalf.
Argued before HARDIN, P. J., and MARTIN and MERWIN, JJ.
Carver, Deyo & Jenkins, for appellants.
Burr Mattice, for respondents.

Opinion:
HARDIN, P. J.
1. If Nancy Cope only took a life estate, or was "entitled to the use of the legacy during her life, and nothing more," then this action was properly brought, and the plaintiffs were entitled to some relief. Tyson v. Blake, 22 N. Y. 558; Livingston v. Murray, 68 N. Y. 485. Plaintiffs alleged, and sought to establish by evidence, that their interests would be imperiled, without some security required, and to bring their case within the qualified rule stated in Graham v. Trust Co., 46 Hun, 267, and In re Fernbacher, 17 Abb. N. C. 339.
2. When the will was made, Nancy Cope was about 44 years of age, having been married 10 years, and was then, and still is, childless. It is suggested, "the words of contingency refer only to a death in the lifetime of a testator. " In the tenth clause of the will the testator directs and authorizes his executors "to sell all the real estate " which he had, except such as he had "given and devised for the benefit of
my [his] heirs, at such times as said executors shall deem best;" and in the eighth clause he provides as follows: "I furthermore desire and direct that in the event of my daughter, Nancy Cope, wife of John Cope, Jr., shall die without children, the portion herein given to her shall be given to my sons John G., Robert, and Henry R., or their heirs, share and share alike." The language used indicates an intent on the part of the testator that the portion given to her, in the event she shall die without children, "shall be given," either to his sons John G., Robert, and Henry R., "or their heirs, share and share alike." Thus a provision is made for the giving of her share, upon her death without children, to his sons John, Robert, and Henry; and not being content to provide for their reception of it, only, he provides, still further, for the portion being given "to their heirs, share and share alike," using words apt to control the estate at a time so far in the future as might be subsequent to the death of John G., Robert, and Henry R., or either of them. Considering the language just referred to, as well as the facts and circumstances surrounding the testator at the time of his execution of the will, and the whole language of the instrument, and observing the rule "that all the parts of an instrument are to be taken together in ascertaining its meaning, and that no part of it should be rejected as inoperative if the whole can reasonably stand together," (Norris v. Beyea, 13 N. Y. 283,) the conclusion is reached that it was the intention of the testator to provide that the portion of his estate given to Nancy, in the event of her death without issue, should pass to those of the blood of the testator, and that the "words of contingency " used by the testator do not refer to - a death in the lifetime of the testator, (Moffat's Ex'rs v. Strong, 10 Johns. 12; Greyston v. Clark, 41 Hun, 125; Nellis v. Nellis, 99 N. Y. 513, 3 N. E. Rep. 59; Vanderzee v. Slingerland, 103 N. Y. 56, 8 N. E. Rep. 247; Buel v. Southwick, 70 N. Y. 581; Britton v. Thornton, 112 U. S. 526, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 291; and the opinion of Learned, P. J., in Mead v. Maben, 131 N. Y. 255, 30 N. E. Rep. 98.) In speaking of the rule referring to death without issue at a time prior to the death of a testator, Andrews, J., in Vanderzee v. Slingerland, supra, says:
"But the rule established by the courts applies only where the context of the will is silent, and affords no indication of intention, other than that disclosed by words of absolute gift, followed by a gift over in case of death, or of death without issue, or other specific event. Indeed, the tendency is to lay hold of slight circumstances of the will to vary the construction, and to give effect to the language according to its natural import. "
See, also, his opinion in Soper v. Brown, (N. Y. App.) 32 N. E. Rep. 768.
In Mullarky v. Sullivan, (N. Y. App.) 32 N. E. Rep. 762, O'Brien, J., in giving construction to a will, says:
"It is perfectly true that, in determining what the testator meant, every part of the will must be considered, and that the natural and ordinary meaning of the words of a particular clause may be modified by other provisions. "
3. As the foregoing views, if adopted, would lead to a reversal, it is not important to consider the effect of the surrogate's decree declaring a construction of the will in accordance with the views already expressed. There should be a reversal, and a new trial.
Judgment reversed, and a new trial ordered, with costs to abide the event.
MARTIN, J., concurs.