Case Name: James M. PARKS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1987-12-09
Citations: 746 S.W.2d 738
Docket Number: No. 213-82
Parties: James M. PARKS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
Judges: TEAGUE, J., dissents.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 746
Pages: 738–747

Head Matter:
James M. PARKS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
No. 213-82.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, En Banc.
Dec. 9, 1987.
Michael P. Gibson, Bob Gorsky, Dallas, for appellant.
Henry Wade, Dist. Atty. and T. Michael Sutton, Jon Sparling and Jim Johnson, Asst. Dist. Attys., Dallas, Robert Huttash, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

Opinion:
OPINION ON APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
McCORMICK, Judge.
In February of 1978, appellant was convicted of the offense of forgery after a trial by jury. The jury assessed appellant's punishment at four years' confinement and a $5000 fine.
We granted appellant's petition for dis: cretionary review to consider the admissibility into evidence of extraneous offenses. The prosecution, in its case in chief, introduced over defense counsel's timely objection evidence of two extraneous offenses of the same nature as the one for which the defendant was on trial. The State maintains that these two offenses, which were allegedly committed by the defendant and for which he was not indicted, were admissible to prove intent.
Appellant on the other hand contends that there was other evidence which was sufficient to show the appellant's intent to defraud. Appellant thus reasons that intent was not in issue in this case and that any evidence of extraneous offenses would be extremely prejudicial and have little or no probative value. In regard to this issue, appellant further contends that the Court of Appeals failed, in determining the admissibility of this evidence, to apply the balancing test established by this Court in Albrecht v. State, 486 S.W.2d 97, 99 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). See also, Hernandez v. State, 484 S.W.2d 754, 755 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). This test requires that a determination be made as to whether the prejudicial effects of admitting this evidence are outweighed by the probative value this evidence may have in aiding the trier of fact in reaching a verdict. Albrecht v. State, supra. See also Boutwell v. State, 719 S.W.2d 164 (Tex.Cr.App.1985); Williams v. State, 662 S.W.2d 344, 346 (Tex.Cr.App.1984). This "test" is really nothing more than a statement of a fundamental principle of evidence. The "test" has been further developed in the Williams case. For the sake of convenience it will be referred to in this opinion as the "Williams" test.
Because of the nature of the appellant's claim, it is necessary to review the evidence presented at trial. The appellant is accused of having executed a deed of trust to an individual in the amount of $55,000 on certain property located in Dallas County. After the time of the deed of trust's execution, a forged release of lien on the property in question was recorded in the Dallas County deed records. Appellant then executed a new deed of trust to Oak Cliff Savings and Loan on the same property in the amount of $60,000. Appellant was subsequently indicted for the offense of forgery. The State alleged he had forged the names appearing on the fraudulent release of lien. The lien in question was dated March 21, 1972. The names allegedly forged on the release of lien were Hubert Owens, Jean Schrang Williams, and Linda Smith, whose name appeared notarizing the release. This release of lien was introduced by the State as Exhibit 11.
The State also introduced into evidence, over appellant's objection, State's Exhibit 21, a release of lien on another piece of property. This release was dated June 1, 1972. The State also introduced another release of lien on a third piece of property dated September 6, 1972, as State's Exhibit 31. Evidence was then introduced to show that as a result of the execution and filing of all three releases of lien appellant was able to execute new deeds of trust on the three tracts of land and thus make a substantial sum of money. The evidence showed appellant was able to realize $57,-867 from the lien known as State's Exhibit 11, $70,370 from the lien under State's Exhibit 21, and $148,723.33 from State's Exhibit 31.
The State then presented evidence from each of the individuals whose names were signed to State's Exhibit 11. These witnesses testified that they did not sign the instrument, that they did not know who had signed their names to the instrument, and that they had not given anyone permission to sign their names.
Finally, the State was able to present expert testimony from a document examiner who testified that he could positively state that the appellant had signed another person's (Linda Smith) name to the release of lien introduced as State's Exhibit 11. He was also able to say that the appellant had signed two of the three names on the document marked State's Exhibit 21, and two of the three names on State's Exhibit 31. Evidence also showed that all three documents were filed and recorded in the Dallas County Clerk's office. The court's charge to the jury instructed them to consider the two extraneous offense for the limited purposes of determining the appellant's intent to defraud and/or his knowledge that the release of lien was a forged document.
The policy behind limiting the admissibility into evidence of extraneous offenses is well established. In our system of justice an accused person may not be tried for collateral criminal offenses or for being a criminal generally. Williams v. State, supra; Albrecht v. State, supra; Rubio v. State, 607 S.W.2d 498, 499 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). As this Court has often noted, evidence of extraneous offenses is of an inherently prejudicial nature and may tend to confuse the issues of the case. Albrecht v. State, supra. Such evidence carries with it the additional danger that an accused person may be called upon to defend himself against an implied charge of having a propensity to commit crimes rather than the specific offense for which he is on trial. Williams v. State, supra; Elkins v. State, 647 S.W.2d 663, 665 (Tex.Cr.App.1983); Bates v. State, 643 S.W.2d 939, 944 (Tex.Cr.App.1982); Albrecht v. State, supra.
This sound general principle of evidence has, however, several exceptions. This is because circumstances exist in a variety of fact situations which either mitigate the danger of such evidence or which justify the admission of such evidence in spite of the danger that this evidence will create unfair prejudice. Boutwell v. State, supra; Albrecht v. State, supra.
In Albrecht, this Court listed several common exceptions to the general rule of prohibiting the admission of extraneous offenses. In Albrecht, we stated:
"Evidence of extraneous offenses com-. mitted by the accused has been held admissible: (1) To show the context in which the criminal act occurred — what has been termed the 'res gestae' — under the reasoning that events do not occur in a vacuum and that the jury has a right to hear what occurred immediately prior to and subsequent to the commission of that act so that they may realistically evaluate the evidence. (2) To circumstantially prove identity where the state lacks direct evidence on this issue. (3) To prove scienter, where intent or guilty knowledge is an essential element of the state's case and cannot be inferred from the act itself. (4) To prove malice or state of mind, when malice is an essential element of the state's case and cannot be inferred from the criminal act. (5) To show the accused's motive, particularly where the commission of the offense at bar is either conditioned upon the commission of the extraneous offense or is a part of a continuing plan or scheme of which the crime on trial is also a part. (6) To refute a defense theory raised by the accused." (footnotes omitted). 486 S.W.2d at 100-101.
Although the list of exceptions appearing in Albrecht is an accurate and well written statement as to the current law of evidence, it has created much confusion. As we noted in Williams v. State, supra, this statement in Albrecht was not meant to be an exhaustive and exclusive list of exceptions to the general rule making evidence of extraneous offenses inadmissible. The statement in Albrecht is also not a rule, standard or test to determine the admissibility of evidence of extraneous offenses. Williams v. State, supra. Rather, the circumstances which justify the admissions of extraneous offenses are as varied as the factual circumstances of each case wherein the question arises. Albrecht v. State, supra.
It has become well established that such evidence is clearly admissible when the prosecution can show both that the offense or transaction is relevant to a material issue in the case, and the probative value of the evidence to the trier of fact is not outweighed by its prejudicial or inflammatory nature. Boutwell v. State, supra; Plante v. State, 692 S.W.2d 487, 491 (Tex.Cr.App.1985); Williams v. State, supra, at 346; Elkins v. State, supra, at 665; Murphy v. State, 587 S.W.2d 718, 722 (Tex.Cr.App.1979). Rubio v. State, supra, (concurring opinion).
We must determine first if the evidence of extraneous offenses is relevant to a material issue in dispute in the case, and second, if the probative value of such evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect. The Williams test is, therefore, a two prong one. In applying this test to the facts of this case, we find that the probative value of the evidence in question far outweighs its prejudicial effect.
In cases of forgery and fraud, it is difficult to prove intent. Robledo v. State, 480 S.W.2d 401, 402 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Harris v. State, 169 Tex.Cr.R. 143, 333 S.W.2d 142, 144 (1960); Verner v. State, 117 Tex.Cr.R. 112, 35 S.W.2d 428, 429 (1931). This Court has wisely held that intent or guilty knowledge cannot be inferred from the mere passing of a forged instrument. Albrecht v. State. Indeed, to hold otherwise would create the danger that the unknowing and accidental passing of a forged instrument could effectively become a strict liability offense. The issue of intent is of such overriding importance in a case of forgery that it effectively becomes the focus of the State's case. Establishing intent in such cases is so crucial and so difficult to do that, as a practical matter, evidence of extraneous offenses is nearly always admissible. Robledo v. State, supra; Harris v. State, supra; Vernon v. State, supra. While it is hypothetically possible that a case of forgery could be established by direct evidence, such as eyewitness testimony, most cases of forgery rest on circumstantial evidence. In the vast majority of such cases, the probative value of evidence of extraneous offenses will inevitably outweigh its prejudicial effect.
In applying the first prong of the Williams test to the case before us, we find the extraneous offenses alleged were relevant to a material element of the State's case. The transactions involved were very nearly identical to the offense for which the appellant was charged. Taken together, they showed that it was more likely than not that the appellant had formed an intent to commit the offense pursuant to a general plan to enrich himself. Therefore, the extraneous offenses were relevant to a material element of the State's case, that is, that the appellant had the requisite mental culpability necessary to establish that a crime had been committed. The first prong of the Williams test is thus satisfied.
The second prong of the Williams test involves the balance between the probative and the prejudicial aspects of the evidence in question. In assessing this balance between the probative value of the evidence versus its prejudicial effect, it is necessary to view the nature of the State's case. The State's case rested entirely on circumstantial evidence. The State's case consisted of evidence that appellant had passed the forged documents, and expert opinion testimony from a documents examiner. He stated that in his opinion the appellant was the person who forged Linda Smith's signature on the document marked State's Exhibit 11.
As we noted above, intent cannot be inferred from the mere passing of a forged document. Albrecht, supra. Therefore, without evidence of extraneous offenses, the strongest evidence of the defendant's guilt was the opinion testimony of the State's expert. Expert opinion testimony is just that, opinion testimony. The value of opinion testimony hinges on the personal credibility of the witness who offers it and upon the credibility of his qualifications. The trier of fact must determine whether the expert witness' testimony is accurate or believable, and the jury may choose to disregard the testimony altogether. See McDaniel v. United States, 343 F.2d 785 (5th Cir.1965). Furthermore, the testimony of expert witnesses is subject to cross-examination and impeachment. In this case, appellant's attorney was able to elicit from the State's witness the fact that he had no formal training in handwriting analysis, that he was paid by the State and that he had testified in fifty cases, each time as a witness for the State.
Standing alone, the expert opinion testimony in this case was not strong evidence that the appellant had even committed the actus reas necessary to establish the commission of a crime. It was even less evidence to show the necessary culpable mental state, that is, that the appellant committed this offense with the intent to defraud or with the knowledge that his acts would likely result in a fraudulent transaction harmful to someone's interest.
The probative value of the extraneous offenses was very great, and in point of fact, very nearly essential to proving the State's case in chief. Whatever prejudice attended the admission of such evidence was far outweighed by its probative value to the trier of fact. This is particularly true in view of the fact that the two extraneous offenses were nearly identical to the one for which the appellant was tried. This evidence made it far more likely that appellant had committed the offense in question. The similarity of the offenses further reduced the inflammatory impact of this evidence.
The second prong of the Williams test is also satisfied. After applying the principles of evidence established in Albrecht and Williams, it is clear that the evidence was properly admitted.
We, therefore, overrule appellant's contention and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
TEAGUE, J., dissents.
. Article 1008 (Penal Code, 1925)