Case Name: GRANDPA'S PARK, INC., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, et al., Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1998-12-04
Citations: 726 So. 2d 789
Docket Number: No. 97-838
Parties: GRANDPA’S PARK, INC., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, et al., Appellee.
Judges: JOANOS and WOLF, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 726
Pages: 789–793

Head Matter:
GRANDPA’S PARK, INC., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, et al., Appellee.
No. 97-838
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Dec. 4, 1998.
Rehearing Denied March 5, 1999.
W.O. Birchfield and Michael D. Whalen of Martin, Ade, Birchfield & Mickler, P.A., Jacksonville, for Appellant.
Pamela S. Leslie, General Counsel and Vance W. Kidder, Assistant General Counsel, State of Florida, Department of Transportation, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Grandpa's Park, Inc. ("Grandpa's") appeals a final judgment in an eminent domain proceeding. The Department of Transportation ("DOT") took 0.665 of an acre of land from Grandpa's for the extension of 1-295 near Jacksonville. The issues raised on appeal concern the valuation of the property taken and the effect of the taking on the remaining property. Appellant contends: (1) the trial court erred in precluding evidence as to the value of the property before its designation allegedly was changed in the city comprehensive plan from light industrial use to residential use due to the threat of the taking; and (2) the trial court erred in prohibiting Grandpa's from introducing evidence as to the diminution in value of the remainder resulting from the destruction of all permittable access to the property. We affirm the trial court's rulings.
Grandpa's position was that the condemned property and the remainder of its 107 acres was reduced in value due both to down zoning in anticipation of the project, and to impairment of access to the remaining property. Grandpa's proffered testimony was to the effect that at one time, the property in question had been designated by the city for light industrial use. At some point, following the announcement of plans to expand 1-295, the city changed its comprehensive plan and rezoned the property to low density residential. In addition to taking two parcels totaling 0.665 acre of Grandpa's property, alterations in another area of the extension project eliminated one of two routes which provided access to Grandpa's property. Only one of the two routes leading to the property had sufficient right-of-way to allow development of the property as either an industrial or residential subdivision, and that route was eliminated; however, it did not abut Grandpa's property.
Appellant proceeded under the exception to the general rule that condemned property is valued based on the existing facts at the time of the taking. According to that exception, if the value of the property has depreciated due to the prospect of the taking, compensation should "be based on value of the property as it would be at the time of the taking if it had not been subjected to the debilitating threat of condemnation and was not being taken." See State Road Department v. Chicone, 158 So.2d 753, 758 (Fla.1963).
In the present case, the trial court found that the partial taking did not cause the city to redesignate the land, and that it had not heard anything to indicate the city had been influenced by DOT in amending the city's comprehensive plan. The court also found there had been no collusion. We agree with appellant that a finding of collusion between the agencies involved would not have been necessary; however, we find appellant's argument concerning the highest and best use of the property to be speculative. Case law supports DOT's position that the proposed highest and best use was not one the property could be put to within a reasonable period of time, because of the additional work that would be required. See Yoder v. Sarasota County, 81 So.2d 219 (Fla.1955) (it is proper to show the highest and best use to which the property is being put or could reasonably be put at the time of the lawful appropriation or within a reasonable time thereafter). In Jacksonville Transportation Authority v. ASC Associates, 559 So.2d 330 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), review denied 574 So.2d 139 (Fla.1990), this court noted: "The supreme court admonished that '[ijt is not proper to speculate on what could be done to the land or what might be done to it to make it more valuable and then solicit evidence on what it might be worth with such speculative improvements at some unannounced future date.'" This case is distinguishable from Chicone because there the property in question was fully leased when the announcement was made, and almost vacant at the time of the actual taking, thus speculation was not required.
As to the damages to the remainder of Grandpa's property, appellant recognizes the general rule that just compensation does not include the decrease in value to the remainder, but contends this case falls within an exception to that rule found in Lee County v. Exchange National Bank, 417 So.2d 268 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982), review denied 426 So.2d 25 (Fla.1983), "where the use of the land taken constitutes an integral and inseparable part of a single use to which the land taken and other adjoining land is put." Appellant contends that since a portion of its land was taken for the highway project, and that same highway project also resulted in the diminution of access to its property, even though the taking itself did not accomplish that diminution directly, it is entitled to be compensated for damage to the remainder due to loss of access.
Even assuming, without deciding, that the Lee exception is appropriately applied in this case, we conclude it is necessary for the diminished access to have affected an abutting road. As recently as 1996, this court noted that " no compensation is ever paid for the loss of traffic flow or loss of access to a non-abutting road on the remainder of the appropriated property." See State, Department of Transportation v. Ansbacher, 672 So.2d 660 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). In addition, in State, Department of Transportation v. Kreider, 658 So.2d 548 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) review denied 669 So.2d 250 (Fla.1996), the court noted:
Before and after [Palm Beach County v.] Tessler, [538 So.2d 846 (Fla.1989)] the supreme court has narrowly applied the concept of compensable "loss of access." The trigger for beginning a Tessler analysis has been the destruction of direct access to property from an abutting road_ In Department of Transportation v. Gefen, 636 So.2d 1345 (Fla.1994), the supreme court found no compensable taking resulting from the closing of an Interstate 95 entrance and exit ramp which diminished the traffic flow by the landowner's property. Significant to the court's decision was the absence of any change in access to roads directly abutting the property.
Appellant contends it does not fall within the diminished access cases, because it has suffered a special injury, distinct from other area landowners, by virtue of having lost all permittable access which would allow it to develop the property as a residential subdivision. We disagree, as we believe this case; as presented, clearly falls within the rule stated above. Appellant's theory that, in effect, it has been deprived of all reasonable use of the property, is more appropriate in the context of an inverse condemnation claim.
AFFIRMED.
JOANOS and WOLF, JJ., concur.
BOOTH, J., dissenting with written opinion.