Case Name: Raywood Joseph BROUSSARD v. Terry SMITH, et al.
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 2008-12-03
Citations: 999 So. 2d 1171
Docket Number: No. CA 08-473
Parties: Raywood Joseph BROUSSARD v. Terry SMITH, et al.
Judges: Court composed of JOHN D. SAUNDERS, JAMES T. GENOVESE, and CHRIS J. ROY, SR. , Judges.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 999
Pages: 1171–1178

Head Matter:
Raywood Joseph BROUSSARD v. Terry SMITH, et al.
No. CA 08-473.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
Dec. 3, 2008.
H. Douglas Hunter, Guglielmo, Lopez, Tuttle, Hunter & Jarrell, Opelousas, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellant, Raywood Joseph Broussard.
James Louis Daniels, Ringuet, Daniels & Collier, Lafayette, LA, for Defendant/Appellee, Food-N-Fun, Inc.
Court composed of JOHN D. SAUNDERS, JAMES T. GENOVESE, and CHRIS J. ROY, SR. , Judges.
Honorable Chris J. Roy, Sr., participated in this decision by appointment of the Louisiana Supreme Court as Judge Pro Tempore,

Opinion:
SAUNDERS, Judge.
JjPACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
This appeal arises from a grant of summary judgment by the Sixteenth Judicial District Court, finding that no genuine issue of material fact remained as to whether worker's compensation benefits are the exclusive remedy available to appellant, Raywood Broussard (hereinafter "Brous-sard"). Broussard is the biological father of the children of Jeri Lynn Gary (hereinafter "Gary"), who was murdered while working for Food-N-Fun, Inc. D/B/A Player's Club (hereinafter "Player's Club").
Player's Club is located in a "high crime" area on the outskirts of Cade, Louisiana. Employees at Player's Club often worked alone and handled large amounts of cash taken from video poker machines in the club. This cash was kept in a safe behind the bar and was in full view of the patrons.
Charlene Babineaux (hereinafter "Babi-neaux"), manager at Player's Club, voiced concerns to her employer about her and her fellow employees' safety. Babineaux objected to the removal of a video monitoring system at Player's Club, and specifically voiced concern that sooner or later somebody would rob the safe.
At 9:30 p.m. on July 16, 2001, Terry Smith (hereinafter "Smith"), a frequent patron at Player's Club, crushed Gary's skull with a fire extinguisher, removed the key to the safe from her body, and stole $8,000.00 from the safe behind the bar. The murder was discovered sometime later when another patron entered Player's Club and saw the crime scene. Broussard asserts that, after having been warned of the danger, Player's Club's failure to provide a safer working environment was an intentional act that caused Gary's death.
Broussard appeals the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Player's Club and presents one central assignment of error.
^ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:
Did the trial court err in finding that there was no genuine issue of material fact and granting Player's Club's motion for summary judgment?
Summary Judgment
Broussard asserts that the trial court erred in granting Player's Club's motion for summary judgment, because there remained a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Player's Club's action constituted an intentional tort. We disagree.
A motion for summary judgment is a procedural device used when there is no genuine issue of material fact. The summary judgment procedure is favored and designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and shall be construed to accomplish these ends. La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(2).
Duncan v. U.S.A.A. Ins. Co., 06-363, p. 3 (La.11/29/06), 950 So.2d 544, 546-47. "Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo under the saipe criteria that governed the trial court's consideration.... " Spera v. Lyndon Prop. Ins. Co., 00-1373, p. 2 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/7/01), 788 So.2d 56, 58-59. Thus, summary judgment in this case is only appropriate if, upon review of the record before us, we find that there is no genuine issue as to whether Player's Club's actions constituted an intentional tort.
Generally, when a worker seeks to recover from her employer for injuries suffered during the course and scope of employment, recovery is limited through the Louisiana Workers Compensation Act, La.R.S. 23:1032, which provides immunity from civil liability in favor of an employer. Cole v. State, Dept. of Pub. Safety & Corr., 01-2123 (La.9/4/02), 825 So.2d 1134, 1138.
La. R.S. 23:1032(A)(l)(a) provides, in pertinent part:
| .¡Except for intentional acts provided for in Subsection B, the rights and remedies herein granted to an employee or his dependent on account of an injury, or compensable sickness or disease for which he is entitled to compensation under this Chapter, shall be exclusive of all other rights, remedies, and claims for damages, including but not limited to punitive or exemplary damages, unless such rights, remedies, and damages are created by a statute, whether now existing or created in the future, expressly establishing same as available to such employee, his personal representatives, dependents, or relations, as against his employer, or any principal or any officer, director, stockholder, partner, or employee of such employer or principal, for said injury, or com-pensable sickness or disease.
In interpreting the Workers Compensation Act, the Louisiana Supreme Court has held that:
[Cjompensation shall be an employee's exclusive remedy against his employer for an unintentional injury covered by the act, but that nothing shall prevent an employee from recovering from his employer under general law for intentional tort.
Caudle v. Betts, 512 So.2d 389, 390 (La.1987).
The "intentional act" loophole is the only exception to the Workers Compensation Act, and courts interpret this exception narrowly. Bridges v. Carl E. Woodward, Inc., 94-2675 (La.App. 4 Cir.10/12/95), 663 So.2d 458, 463, writ denied, 95-2735 (La.1/26/96), 666 So.2d 674.
In order to prevail in a case such as the one presented here, Broussard must show that Player's Club's failure to take action to insure Gary's safety "was an intentional action which was 'substantially certain' to result in injury to the plaintiff." Id. "Substantially certain" has been held to mean "nearly inevitable," "virtually sure," and "incapable of failing." Blevins v. Time Saver Stores, Inc., 99-383, p. 3 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/26/99), 746 So.2d 191, 193 (citing Jasmin v. HNV Cent. Riverfront Cory., L94-1497, p. 1 (La.App. 4 Cir. 8/30/94), 642 So.2d 311, 312-313, writ denied, 94-2445, 647 So.2d 1110). Lesser degrees of certainty, such as "reasonably foreseeable," and "should have known," may raise issues of negligence or gross negligence, but do not constitute an "intentional act," as required to recover outside of the workers compensation act. Adams v. Time Saver Stores, Inc., 615 So.2d 460, 461-62 (La.App. 4th Cir.1993), writ denied, 617 So.2d 910 (La.1993).
Player's Club may have been negligent in removing the video surveillance equipment and failing to take adequate safety measures. However, "Louisiana Courts have held that an employer's failure to provide even specifically requested safety equipment is not an intentional tort for purposes of the exception to the worker's compensation exclusivity rule." Dycus v. Martin Marietta Corp., 568 So.2d 592, 594 (La.App. 4 Cir.1990), writ denied, 571 So.2d 649 (La.1990), (citing Jacobsen v. Se. Distrib., Inc., 413 So.2d 995 (La.App. 4th Cir.1982), writ denied, 415 So.2d 953 (La.1982)). Furthermore, this court has specifically held that, "[a]n injury can not be considered as intentionally caused merely because there exists a high probability of an injury occurring ." Mahfouz v. J.A.C.E. Oilfield Sales & Service Inc., 569 So.2d 1074,1077 (La.App. 3 Cir.1990) (citing Hood v. South Louisiana Med. Ctr., 517 So.2d 469 (La.App. 1 Cir.1987)).
Player's Club's lack of concern for the safety of its employees is unconscionable. While this callous indifference is regrettable, it is clear from the record that Player's Club did not have an active desire to harm Gary. Therefore, the record supports the finding of the trial court that there is no genuine issue of material fact that could possibly allow the court to conclude that Player's Club acted intentionally to harm Gary. Neither are the complaints and knowledge of Player's 15Club manager, Babineaux, sufficient to confer upon Player's Club the requisite intent to satisfy the exception to the workers compensation exclusivity rule.
CONCLUSION:
For the above-stated reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court in all respects. All costs are to be shared equally between the parties.
AFFIRMED.
ROY, SR., Judge, dissents and assigns written reasons.