Case Name: KERLIN v. BRYCELAND LUMBER CO., Limited
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1914-01-05
Citations: 134 La. 463
Docket Number: No. 19,796
Parties: KERLIN v. BRYCELAND LUMBER CO., Limited.
Judges: PROVOSTY, J., dissents.
Reporter: Louisiana Reports
Volume: 134
Pages: 463–467

Head Matter:
(64 South. 289.)
No. 19,796.
KERLIN v. BRYCELAND LUMBER CO., Limited.
(Jan. 5, 1914.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 2, 1914.)
(Syllabus by the Goiwt.)
1. Corporations (§ 553*) — Appointment oe Receiver — Application by Stockholder— Condition Precedent.
A stockholder may apply for the appointment of a receiver to a corporation when the directors or other officers of the corporation are jeopardizing the rights of stockholders or creditors by grossly mismanaging, or by committing acts ultra vires, or by wasting, misusing, or by misapplying the funds of the corporation. Section 1, par. 2, Act No. 159 of 1S98, p. 312; Van Vleet v. Evang-eline Oil Go., 127 La. 919, 54 South. 286; s. c., 129 La. 406, 56 South. 343.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 2201-2216; Dec. Dig. § 553.*]
2. Corporations (§ 554*) — Appointment op Receiver — Application by Stockholder-Condition Precedent.
It is unnecessary for a stockholder to make a principal demand against a corporation in order to maintain an action for the appointment of a receiver to that corporation. Van Vleet v. Evangeline Oil Co., 127 La. 919, 54 South. 286. It is different with an alleged creditor. Saxon, v. S. W. Brick Co., 113 La. 637, 37 South. 540; Arent v. Liquidating Commissioners, 133 La. 134, 62 South. 602.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. § 2220; Dec. Dig. § 554.*]
Provosty, J., dissenting.
(Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.)
3. Appeal and Error (§ 339*) — Time eor Appeal — Appointment oe Receiver.
Acts No. 106 of 1908, which is a general statute fixing the return day in the order granting an appeal at not less than 15 or more than 60 days from the date of the order except by consent, does not apply to appeals from orders appointing receivers; such appeals being governed by Act No. 159 of 1898, § 4, providing that the “appeal shall be returnable in ten days from the date of such order.”
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 1883-1887; Dec. Dig. §
Appeal from Third Judicial District Court, Parish of Bienville; J. E. Reynolds, Special Judge.
Action by T. J. Kerlin against the Bryce-land Lumber Company, Limited. From judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals.
Reversed.
Wimberly, Reeves & Dormon, of Shreveport, for appellant. Barksdale & Barksdale, of Ruston, and Roberts, Goff <& Barnette, of Arcadia, for appellee.

Opinion:
On Motion to Dismiss.
SOMMERVILLE, J.
Defendant, appellee, moves to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it was not made returnable to the Supreme Court under Act No. 106 of 1908, p. 163, which is a general statute fixing the return day in the order granting the appeal to be not less than 15 or more than 60 days from the date of the order, except by consent of parties.
This general law is without application to appeals from orders appointing receivers, which is governed by a special statute, contained in section 4 of Act No. 159 of 1898, p. 312, wherein it is directed that "such appeal shall be returnable in ten days from the date of such order," etc.
The motion is overruled.