Case Name: INDIANA HIGH SCHOOL ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellant-Defendant, v. Jason CARLBERG b/n/f James E. Carlberg and Donna S. Carlberg, Appellees-Plaintiffs
Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana
Jurisdiction: Indiana
Decision Date: 1996-02-19
Citations: 661 N.E.2d 833
Docket Number: No. 29A02-9412-CV-724
Parties: INDIANA HIGH SCHOOL ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellant-Defendant, v. Jason CARLBERG b/n/f James E. Carlberg and Donna S. Carlberg, Appellees-Plaintiffs.
Judges: NAJAM, J., concurs.
Reporter: North Eastern Reporter 2d
Volume: 661
Pages: 833–836

Head Matter:
INDIANA HIGH SCHOOL ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellant-Defendant, v. Jason CARLBERG b/n/f James E. Carlberg and Donna S. Carlberg, Appellees-Plaintiffs.
No. 29A02-9412-CV-724.
Court of Appeals of Indiana.
Feb. 19, 1996.
Robert M. Baker, III, Johnson, Smith, Pence, Densborn Wright & Heath, Indianapolis, for Appellant.
James E. Carlberg, Ronald E. Elberger, Bose McKinney & Evans, Indianapolis, for Appellees.

Opinion:
OPINION
ROBERTSON, Judge.
The Indiana High School Athletic Association, Inc. [IHSAA] appeals the trial court's order enjoining the enforcement of the IHSAA's "Transfer Rule" against high school student, Jason Carlberg, who had transferred from a private high school to a public one for reasons unrelated to athletics without an attendant move by his parents. Under these circumstances, the Transfer Rule provided that Jason would have been ineligible to participate on the varsity swimming team for the year following his transfer. The IHSAA raises five issues with several sub-parts. However, because the resolution of this case is controlled by supreme court precedent, we consolidate our analysis under the following dispositive issue:
whether the IHSAA Transfer Rule is viola-tive of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution when applied to a student who transfers from one high school to another for reasons unrelated to athletics.
We affirm.
FACTS
The dispositive facts are undisputed. Jason Carlberg lives with his parents in Car- mel, Indiana, and had attended the Carmel-Clay public schools from the first through the eighth grades. However, Jason attended the ninth grade at Brebeuf Preparatory School for the 1993-1994 school year where he swam on the varsity swim team. At Brebeuf, however, Jason's grades suffered because he fell in with a peer group that had not been motivated to study. Simultaneously, his father's income from the practice of law declined.
Jason's parents decided, for academic and financial reasons, that Jason would transfer to Carmel High School for the 1994-1995 school year. Jason's transfer triggered the IHSAA's Rule 19, the Transfer Rule, which provides that, under the present circumstances, Jason has only limited eligibility to participate in athletics the year following his transfer. He is eligible to participate at the junior varsity level but not at the varsity level.
Jason exhausted his administrative remedies including a hearing before the IHSAA Executive Committee. Jason then sought judicial intervention alleging that the application of the Transfer Rule was arbitrary and capricious and violated his constitutional rights. The trial court heard evidence and enjoined the IHSAA from enforcing the Transfer Rule against Jason and ordered that he be permitted to participate on Car-mel's varsity swimming team. The trial court further enjoined the IHSAA from acting under its Rule 17-6, the "Restitution Rule" which provides that, if a student is ineligible under the IHSAA rules, but is permitted to participate under the terms of a court order which is ultimately found to be invalid, the IHSAA may, in the interest of restitution and fairness to competing schools, require team victories to be forfeited, individual or team records vacated, the awards returned, and the school's net receipts from any IHSAA tournament in which the ineligible student has participated forfeited. This appeal ensued.
DECISION
The resolution of the present case is controlled by Sturrup v. Mahan, 261 Ind. 463, 305 N.E.2d 877 (1974). In Sturrup, our supreme court held that the IHSAA Transfer Rule was unconstitutionally overbroad in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution when applied to deny a student eligibility to participate in varsity athletics where the student had transferred from one high school to another for reasons unrelated to athletics. 305 N.E.2d at 881.
Sturrup is out of the mainstream of case law on federal equal protection analysis. IHSAA v. Schafer, Ind.App., 598 N.E.2d 540, 553 (1992), trans. denied. In Schafer, we noted several cases from other jurisdictions which had specifically criticized Sturrup, and had found it to be incorrect. Id. n. 8. Nevertheless, we held that Sturrup, as supreme court precedent, was binding upon our court. Id.
In the present case, Jason transferred from one school to another for academic and financial reasons — reasons which were unrelated to athletics. Therefore, the IHSAA's application of its Transfer Rule was over-broad in violation of federal equal protection and the trial court appropriately enjoined its enforcement. Id.
Judgment affirmed.
NAJAM, J., concurs.
BAKER, J., concurs with separate opinion.
. There is a split in authority regarding whether the IHSAA Restitution Rule may be enforced. The IHSAA v. Avant, Ind.App., 650 N.E.2d 1164, 1171 (1995), trans. denied, court held that the rule was manifestly unreasonable and could not be enforced. However, the IHSAA v. Reyes, Ind.App., 659 N.E.2d 158 (1995), court held that the IHSAA could enforce its Restitution Rule. 659 N.E.2d at 169-171.
. The present case is factually similar to our recent case of IHSAA v. Avant, Ind.App., 650 N.E.2d 1164 (1995), trans. denied, in which we upheld the enforceability of the IHSAA Transfer Rule. However, the present case is distinguishable in that the student in Avant apparently did not challenge the rule on the basis of federal equal protection as applied by the Indiana courts.