Case Name: McDOWELL v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1924-01-09
Citations: 258 S.W. 186
Docket Number: No. 8094
Parties: McDOWELL v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 258
Pages: 186–188

Head Matter:
McDOWELL v. STATE.
(No. 8094.)
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Jan. 9, 1924.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 13, 1924.)
1. Criminal law <@=5938(1)—Nature of newly discovered evidence to warrant new trial stated.
Newly discovered evidence to warrant a new trial must be such as has come to accused’s knowledge since trial and could not have been secured at the trial by reasonable diligence and must be competent, material, probably true, affecting the merits, not cumulative, and such as would probably change the result on another trial.
2. Criminal law <@=5419, 420(1)—Testimony that witnesses had heard another than accused admit killing held incompetent as hearsay.
In a prosecution for murder, statements by witnesses that they had heard another than accused admit the killing held hearsay - and incompetent.
3. Homicide <§=5319—New trial on ground of néwly discovered! evidence held unwarranted.
Alleged newly discovered evidence by which it was sought to establish admissions of the killing by another than defendant held insufficient to warrant a new trial.
Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 2, Dallas County; C. A. Pippen, Judge.
Sam McDowell was convicted of murder, and he appeals.
Affirmed.
Currie McCuteheon, of Dallas, for appellant.
Shelby S. Cox, Dist. Atty., of Dallas, Tom Garrard, State’s Atty., of Midland, and Grover C. Morris, Asst. State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

Opinion:
DATTIMORE, J.
Appellant was convicted in criminal district court No. 2 of Dallas county of the offense of murder, and his punishment fixed at ten years in the penitentiary.
There is but one contention made on behalf of the appellant on this appeal, and that is that he should have been granted a new trial because of newly discovered evidence. In a general way the authorities sustain the proposition that to warrant a new trial on the ground that newly discovered testimony is presented, it is incumbent on the accused to satisfy the court that such testimony has come to his knowledge since the trial and that it was not known beforehand, and was not such as reasonable diligence could have secured at the trial; same must be competent, material to the issue and probably true, going to the merits and not merely cumulative, collateral, or to impeach a witness; and it must also appear reasonably probable that it would change the result upon another trial. Burton v. State, 9 Tex. App. 605; White v. State, 10 Tex. App. 167; Fisher v. State, 30 Tex. App. 509, 18 S. W. 90; Price v. State, 36 Tex. Cr. R. 403, 37 S. W. 743; O'Hara v. State, 57 Tex. Cr. R. 577, 124 S. W. 95; Haley v. State, 59 Tex. Cr. R. 338, 128 S. W. 1133.
Appellant attaches to his sworn motion for new trial the affidavits of his sisters, his uncle, and three other persons which present the matter relied upon as newly discovered testimony. There can be no serious contention that as to appellant, his mother, his sisters, or uncle,' that the matter relied upon was newly discovered. Upon his trial appellant relied upon an alibi and introduced his mother, sisters, and uncle, by whom he tried to establish that he was at his mother's home some seven blocks from the scene of the homicide at the time same occurred. We observe from his testimony that he swore as a witness in his own behalf that the first he knew of the killing was when the officers came out to his mother's home and arrested him, at which time he was sitting in his back yard with his mother and sisters. These same witnesses now testify by their affidavits that before the officers got to the house and after the shooting which they claim to have heard, one Herman Moore came through the yard and told appellant that he had got him, and that he had been there before that same afternoon telling him that he intended to kill deceased. The fact which they now seem to rely upon as excusing the disclosure of this testimony at the trial is that they were afraid Moore would kill appellant if he then told this, but this cannot give to the testimony any standing as being newly discovered. Two of the affidavits attached to appellant's motion are of persons who undertook to swear that they heard Herman Moore admit, after the killing, that he was the party who did the killing. Such statements would not be admissible in evidence upon another trial of the accused. Greenwood v. State, 84 Tex. Cr. R. 548, 208 S. W. 662. Such declarations on the part of said affiants would be but hearsay and incompetent. The newly discovered testimony attributed to witnesses Oldridge and Jones would be but comulative of other testimony heard on the trial of this case. That of Oldridge would easily seem to be that of a witness who could have been procured by the exercise of reasonable diligence, as he says in his affidavit that he was at the house where appellant was on the afternoon before the killing and saw Herman Moore there. The testimony of Jones, as reflected by his affidavit, would be that he was about 75 feet south of the point of the shooting and that it was done by a black negro man with a cap on. He said that after the shooting was over the negro ran north. This would be but cumulative of other testimony introduced upon the trial of this case.
We do not think the learned trial judge abused bis discretion in refusing tbe motion - for new trial. We do not think it likely to produce a different result upon another trial. The affidavits attributed to appellant and his relatives are contrary to their testimony as given upon this trial and the other falls within some one or the other of the classes of testimony enumerated in the general proposition above laid down, as not being that character of evidence for which a new trial should be granted.
This record shows that on Sunday night before the homicide on Monday night, appellant and deceased had a difficulty. Deceased struck appellant in the head with a brick, knocking him down and caused pain and bloodshed. Appellant thereupon shot at deceased with a pistol. After the affray was over, appellant went to a doctor for treatment, and the latter placed a bandage around appellant's head, which bandage was still on it when the officers arrested him after the shooting. Deceased was sitting out in front of a little store a few blocks from where appellant lived with his mother on Monday night. The shooting occurred at night. Directly after the shooting deceased made the statement that he was shot by appellant. A witness who was present at the scene of the shooting said that he saw the party who did the shooting run under a street lamp and that his head was bandaged. Two officers reached the scene within 10 or 15 minutes after the shooting and were told by deceased who shot him. They went at once to the home of appellant's mother and found him there in the back yard and in an excited condition. They asked him what was the matter and he said he had been engaged in a shooting scrape. These officers denied the presence of the, uncle and sisters of appellant at said house at the time. It appears altogether unlikely that the introduction of such of the evidence set out in the affidavits as would be competent would produce a different result upon another trial. i
No error appearing, the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.
<gn»Eor other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes