Case Name: Clifford J. RYDER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Narcisse LACOUR, Defendant-Appellant
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1975-10-02
Citations: 322 So. 2d 243
Docket Number: No. 5114
Parties: Clifford J. RYDER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Narcisse LACOUR, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: Before HOOD, CULPEPPER, and MILLER, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 322
Pages: 243–253

Head Matter:
Clifford J. RYDER, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Narcisse LACOUR, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 5114.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
Oct. 2, 1975.
Rehearing Denied Nov. 13, 1975.
Writ Refused Jan. 9, 1976.
Thistlethwaite & Thistlethwaite by Hugh William Thistlethwaite, Jr., Opelousas, for defendant-appellant.
Sandoz, Sandoz & Schiff by Gerald H. Schiff, Opelousas, Pavy & Boudreaux by Albert J. Boudreaux, Opelousas, for plaintiff-appellee.
Before HOOD, CULPEPPER, and MILLER, JJ.

Opinion:
MILLER, Judge.
In this petitory action, defendant Nar-cisse Lacour appeals the judgment recognizing plaintiff Clifford J. Ryder's ownership of the disputed 7.15 acre tract. We affirm.
The issues relate to burden of proof and title.
Plaintiff Ryder claims ownership by purchase and a chain of title to the heirs of the Boagni estate, who themselves acquired by judgment of possession in 1932. Plaintiff alleged defendant was not in possession. Defendant Lacour claims the disputed tract is included in his title or alternatively he acquired the disputed tract by acquisitive prescription of ten and thirty years. Defendant claims to be in possession of the disputed tract.
The trial court held neither party established possession during the year prior to trial and plaintiff established better title.
BURDEN OF PROOF
LSA-C.C.P. art. 3653 provides that possession is the factor which determines plaintiff's burden of proof, but that article does not define possession. Possession requires not only detention but also the intent to possess as owner. Planiol, Civil Law Treatise § 2263f, (Louisiana State Law Institute Translation). Therefore, the possession required to put the harsh burden on plaintiff of making out his title, is the same possession required to initiate the possessory action or to establish acquisitive prescription. LSA-C.C.P. art. 3660. The possession must have lasted for at least one year and the nature of the corporeal possession is governed by the use for which the immovable is intended. Gore v. Ronaldson, 200 So.2d 46 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1967); Clayton v. Langston, 311 So.2d 74 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1975).
Defendant alleges he established possession of the tract by cutting grass, grazing cattle and repairing fences. It is important to note that defendant is seeking to establish initial possession by these acts. His claim to title is rejected for reasons assigned hereinafter, so CORPOREAL, not constructive or continuance of civil possession is at issue.
Defendant himself testified repeatedly that when he first occupied his property and subsequently purchased the interest of his mother and co-heirs he did nothing with the disputed tract. He never farmed it (Tr. 152, 157) and didn't use it (Tr. 158, 168, 176). Some time beginning eight or nine years ago, defendant cut the grass several times (Tr. 158) and once saved the hay (Tr. 157). There is no evi dence the tract was especially good or only good for hay. No evidence or testimony indicates the tract has been used for hay before or since. While these acts were not inappropriate use of the land in its then existing condition, they do not establish corporeal possession.
Defendant makes a strong claim that he enclosed the property with fences. The eighty year old Lacour, his wife and daughter testified he repaired fences and (in 1970 or 71) took down one section of fence separating his 40 arpent tract from the disputed tract to create access to his remaining property. Testimony describing the state of the fences at relevant times and places varied a great deal, but all parties agreed to two things. The property had been fenced on its four sides long before 1930. The gap or gate connecting the disputed tract to plaintiff's other properties remained in operation until 1970 or 71 when defendant stretched a wire across the gap, long after ownership came into dispute. Relevant here is the fact that after Lacour allegedly reworked the fences, plaintiff granted a three year grazing lease to a neighbor which included the disputed tract. The neighbor grazed his cattle there and paid Ryder $45 or $50 as rental for this and the adjacent tract. Tr. 230-1. When Lacour was specifically questioned about this use of the property without his permission, his response was "maybe so" (Tr. 159). There is no manifest error in the trial court's credibility determination and his rejection of Lacour's testimony that he enjoyed continuous and exclusive use of the tract.
Further, Lacour's acts are not seriously inconsistent with usage of the tract at the sufferance of plaintiff's ancestors in title (Tr. 122). Therefore, defendant is not in possession in the sense required by LSA-C.C.P. art. 3653 to put on plaintiff the harsh burden of "making out" his title.
We note the long history of this dispute. Both parties testified to negotiations to settle the title dispute as long as fourteen years ago. Lacour testified he wanted "to get my piece of land back." Tr. 160. Car-riere corroborated Lacour's statement that he had disputed plaintiff's earlier ancestor's title. Tr. 214. During the many years of this title dispute, intermittent acts attempting possession have occurred on both sides. As a matter of policy, it would be unwise to allow the last corporeal act to radically alter the parties' situation. This would encourage physical confrontations and elevate self help to a status never enjoyed in a civilian jurisdiction.
Both the character of the alleged acts of possession of plaintiff's ancestor in title and plaintiff's subsequent acts amply support the trial judge's determination that defendant was not in possession.
PLAINTIFF'S TITLE
To succeed in the petitory action, plaintiff must establish his title to the property in question. The disputed tract lies within the boundaries set forth in the July 13, 1967 deed by which he acquired properties from S & E Realty Corporation. In August of 1958 S & E acquired the disputed tract from Danel-Ryder Inc. That corporation acquired it from James Dejean in October, 1957 and in 1948 Dejean acquired the disputed tract in a separate act from heirs of the Boagni estate. The Boagni heirs acquired it through judgment of possession describing the north boundary of this property as the south boundary of land belonging to defendant's ancestor.
Defendant attacks this chain of title in two ways. First, he contends the sale from the Boagni heirs is null since the estate had been seized and sold by executory process prior to Dejean's purchase. Secondly, even if plaintiff established title, he did not establish title beyond 1932. Defendant Lacour contends plaintiff's action must fail in that plaintiff failed to establish title "good against the world."
The trial judge held the description in the mortgage foreclosure and sale (of the Boagni estate) did not affect the disputed tract. We agree. The property description in the foreclosure begins by reciting the boundaries of adjoining estates, but specifically designates the acreage conveyed in terms of quarter section lines. The descriptive call pertinent to this dispute limits the seizure and conveyance to the southeast quarter of the southeast quarter of section 22. The tract in dispute is a narrow strip adjacent to and north of that line. The disputed tract was not involved in the foreclosure sale because the quarter section line is recited as the north boundary of the seized property.
A specific boundary is preferred rather than a general description or a recitation of the number of acres. Beugnot v. New Orleans Land Company, 139 La. 687, 71 So. 947 (1916); Lafayette Parish Police Jury v. Perroncel, 212 So.2d 152 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1968). There is no manifest error in the trial court's holding that Ryder has established a better title than that of Lacour.
Lacour's second contention is that plaintiff is required to go beyond record title to prove title "good against the world."
Since Lacour alleged both title to and possession of the disputed tract and was found to be without either, the present problem is distinguished from that considered by this court in Deselle v. Bonnette, 251 So.2d 68 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1971), approved in Pure Oil Company v. Skinner, 294 So.2d 797 (La.1974).
On the issue of plaintiff's burden of proof in the petitory action, those cases considered the effect of defendant's complete lack of title to support his possession. Despite the implication in the Official Revision Note for art. 3653, that this circumstance might affect the burden of proof and some prior jurisprudence to the same effect, the Supreme Court and this court held defendant's lack of title did not affect the burden imposed by C.C.P. art. 3653. Possession is the controlling factor. La-cour is not in possession. Therefore in this case, plaintiff is only required to prove better title.
DEFENDANT'S TITLE
Defendant asserts he has record title through a deed to his father, a subsequent judgment of possession, and his purchase of the interests of his mother and co-heirs. That title contained 40 arpents, more or less, bounded by properties owned by named neighbors to the north, east, south, and west.
The additional acreage made up by the disputed tract would increase defendant's tract by some 16% which is a substantial amount for the small deviation contemplated by "more or less."
Although defendant testified that he considered the disputed tract to be part of his 40 arpents, there is a plat of survey made at his request showing the disputed tract to be a separate tract. Tr. 36, 58. Furthermore, the servitude granted by defendant Lacour to Shell Pipe Line Corporation in 1942 separately describes the disputed tract — there as 7 acres.
Defendant has not seriously argued to us that he has record title to the disputéd tract.
PRESCRIPTION
Having held Lacour's title to 40 ar-pents does not include the disputed tract, and noting defendant alleges no other act translative of title, there can be no acquisitive prescription of ten years on his part.
The claim of thirty years acquisitive prescription is defeated by defendant's own testimony. He testified that when he acquired his 40 arpents, the disputed tract was being farmed for Dejean. He cannot benefit from the alleged earlier possession on the part of his father because of this interruption to which defendant himself testified (Tr. 176). Lacour testified at Tr. 152, 153, 157, that he did not farm or do other acts appropriate to possession. In response to a direct question, Lacour admitted he had done nothing during the twenty-five years he claimed possession prior to 1970 or '71 when he took down part of the fence between his 40 arpent tract and the disputed tract.
For thirty year prescription, possession must be corporeal at its inception. Chamberlain v. Abadie, 48 La.Ann. 587, 19 So. 574 (1896); Ree Corp. v. Shaffer, 261 La. 502, 260 So.2d 307 (1972). By defendant's own testimony, the only acts which might constitute corporeal possession commenced some eight or nine years ago. Tr. 158, 160. Finally, we note the unrefut-ed testimony that plaintiff's ancestors in title leased the disputed tract for farming and received a share of the crops. All this was subsequent to the alleged acts of possession by defendant's ancestor in title.
In conclusion, Ryder and his ancestors in title, Danel and Dejean, maintained possession of the disputed tract from 1948 until 1970 or '71 when Lacour tore down part of the north fence and stretched a wire across the gap in the west fence. Other than making these fence alterations, Lacour did not exercise acts of possession of the disputed tract — at least there is no manifest error in the trial court's finding that he did not. Plaintiff has shown a descriptive title to the tract in dispute going back beyond 1930. Defendant has shown no title. This satisfies plaintiff's burden under C.C.P. art. 3653 to prove better title to the property in dispute.
The trial court judgment is affirmed at appellant's costs.
Affirmed.
CULPEPPER, J., dissents and assigns written reasons.