Case Name: H. Miller, Assignee, v. The Widow and Heirs of Theodore Menke
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1881-01
Citations: 56 Tex. 539
Docket Number: Case No. 1319
Parties: H. Miller, Assignee, v. The Widow and Heirs of Theodore Menke.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 56
Pages: 539–564

Head Matter:
H. Miller, Assignee, v. The Widow and Heirs of Theodore Menke.
(Case No. 1319.)
I. Urban homestead exemption—Place of business.—Under the present constitution the urban homestead exemption embraces nob only the lots on which is the residence of the family, but, in addi tion thereto, the lot or lots where the head of the family exercises his calling or business, although the latter be not contiguous to the former, but entirely detached and separate therefrom.
2. Exemption of place of business — How kept alive.—When so detached from the residence, the exemption of the lots used as a place of business can only be kept up by the continued use thereof. An abandonment of their use as a place of business terminates the exemption of those lots, notwithstanding the lots on which the home of the family may stand may still be used as a home. In this respect the urban and rural homestead differ.
Note.—The record in this case was destroyed by fire at Galveston, and the statement of the case is taken from appellant’s brief, the correctness of which was admitted. The importance of the question involved will explain the liberal extracts made from the briefs.
Appeal from. Austin county.
H. Miller was appointed assignee of the estate of Theodore Menke (since deceased), by deed of assignment for the benefit of creditors, made December 2, 1880, conveying to him all the property of Menke not exempt from forced sale under the constitution and laws of the state. He sued to subject lots 4 and 5, in block F, in the town of Belleville, Austin county, as assets of the estate conveyed to him by the assignment, for the purpose of distribution among the creditors of Menke. The surviving wife and child of Menke claimed the property as homestead. The judgment of the district court was in their favor as follows: ‘(The said lots 4 and 5, in block F, in the town of Belleville, together with the improvements thereon, are, under the constitution and laws of Texas, a part of the homestead of the said Theodore Menké, and were such at the date of the assignment on, to wit, December 2, 1880, and as such did not pass to and vest in the assignee, H. Miller, by virtue of said assignment, and that the same belongs to the family of said Theodore Menke, now deceased, as a part of the homestead of said decedent.”
From this judgment Miller appealed.
Theodore Henke, at the time of making the assignment, and at the time of his death, was a married man and the head of a family, having his residence and place of business in the town of Belleville, Austin county. Belleville is regularly laid off into blocks and lots. At the date of the assignment, and for several years previous, Henke owned lots 4 and 5, fronting on the public or court house square, and did business as a merchant in a store situated on the same. During this time, and at the date of his death, Henke owned and resided with his family on out-lots 2 and 3, in the town of Belleville, some eighty or ninety yards from the court house square, on a street leading thereto and entirely disconnected from the store-house lots; said residence lots containing a garden, stable, and other usual appendages of a dwelling. Shortly before making the assignment Henke erected a brick store on the lots 4 and 5, in close proximity to the store he was then using; and after the completion of the brick building he transferred his business and most of his goods into it, and was doing business there at the date of the assignment and for several weeks previous. A portion of the goods were left in the old store, and it continued to be used as a warehouse in connection with the new store up to the date of the assignment. The old and new buildings each cover portions of both lots.
Henke’s sole business was that of a merchant, and was conducted entirely on said lots 4 and 5.
His residence above named was used for the purpose of a home for himself and family.
All of the lots of ground mentioned always have been, without reference to the value of improvements, of less value than $5,000.
The following plot shows the relative location of the lots:
The question involved was: Whether lots 4 and 5, in block F, constitute a part of the homestead of Theodore Henke and family under the provisions of sec. 51, art. XVI of the constitution.
Street & Kleberg, for appellant.
The first proviso in sec. 51, art. XVI of the constitution, defining the homestead of a family in a town, village or city, in the words following: “provided, that, the same shall be used for the purpose of a home, or as a place to exercise the calling or business of the head of a family,” neither restricts or enlarges the homestead exemption of “lot or lots, not to exceed in value §5,000 at the time of their designation as homestead, without reference to the value of any improvements thereon,” but requires (subject to the qualification as to temporary renting in the second proviso) that use either as a home or as a place of business shall alone constitute designation within the meaning of the constitution.
■ It prescribes, disjunctively, alternative conditions or status of the subject matter, one or the other of which must exist.
Subject to the qualification as to temporary renting, there can be no homestead unless the same shall be “used for the purposes of a home, or as a place to exercise the calling or business of the head of a family.”
The exemption is not of a home and a place of business, but of a homestead to consist of lot or lots, which may be used for either purpose and must be used for one or the other.
The language used is appropriate to convey this intention and no other.
The designation required under this proviso will be found to be one of the most important, if not the most important, distinction between the homestead provision of the present and former constitutions.
The constitution of 1845, so far as applicable to the character of case under consideration, reads: “ The homestead of a family-any town or city lot or lots in value not to exceed,” etc. In the constitution of 1870 it was sought to make the exemption more definite, more easily susceptible of ascertainment, by adding after “in value not to exceed,” etc., the words, “at the time of their destination as a homestead, and without reference to the value of any improvements thereon.”
' It was still, however, thought reasonable ground of complaint that the terms of the constitution failed to prescribe the indicia of homestead, and left so important an element vexata questio.
The convention of 1876, responding to this demand, has declared that designation,,shall be by one or the other of certain uses named; and in so doing it has wisely imported into the terms of the law the interpretation which previous constitutional provisions of the same general character had received from our supreme court in a long line of cases—an interpretation with which the professional mind was already becoming familiar, and one not intended now to be remitted to the realm of uncertainty but definitively to be perpetuated by express constitutional sanction.
In Hancock v. Morgan, 17 Tex., 585, the exempt homestead was only a single town lot of less value than $2,000.
In Pryor v. Stone, 19 Tex., 371,. “the only property sold was the one lot on the public square,” and the court say, “one room was occupied by the plaintiff (head of the family) as his bed-room; the depository of family portraits and remaining furniture. To this extent it was his actual residence, and its claim, as such, to exemption cannot be questioned.”
In Evans v. Womack, 48 Tex., 230, the eleven acres claimed as a part of the homestead were situated in the town with the residence lot, separated therefrom by in tervening streets and lots, as in this case, and were cultivated. The court say: “ This did not make it a part of the homestead, . . . though had it been a garden, or horse-lot, used in connection with the residence, as such appendages are commonly used in a town, its separation from the residence by a street would not have prevented it from being a part of the homestead.”
The principle of the case of Iken & Co. v. Olenick, 42 Tex., 195, is applicable to, and decisive of, the case at bar in favor of appellant.
Chesley & Haggerty, for appellees.
The point to be arrived at is the intention of the framers of the constitution.
In Pryor v. Stone, 19 Tex., 371, the court say the homestead exemption includes a place where the head or members may pursue such business as may be necessary for the support of the family.
This principle was repeatedly referred to with approval by this court in subsequent decisions, and came to be regarded by the profession as settled law. Moore v. Whitis, 30 Tex., 440; Ragland v. Rogers, 34 Tex., 617.
In 1875 the opinion of this court in the case of Iken. & Co. v. Olenick was rendered, holding that all questions of this character were to be determined by the use to which the property in question was applied; that is, if it was. the lot or lots upon which was the residence or mansion house, or if by its contiguity or use it contributeddo the convenience or enjoyment of the mansion,, then it formed a part of the homestead, otherwise not. 42 Tex., 201.
This decision, although based upon what we believe to be sound reasoning, dispelled the idea prevailing at that time in the mind of the people of Texas, that the place of business of a head of a family formed a part of his homestead.
In the following year, the constitutional convention assembled and changed the homestead provisions upon this point and no other, by adding the proviso, that ‘ the same (the urban homestead) shall be used for 'the purpose of a home, or a place to exercise the calling or business of a head of a family.”
This court had already decided (Iken & Co. v. Olenick) that the question of whether an urban lot formed a part of the homestead was to be determined by the use to which it was applied, and that the concrete idea of homestead did not include anything except the residence and such of' its surroundings as from their use or contiguity were necessary-to its enjoyment.
The first part of the constitutional proviso, viz., “that the same shall be used for the purposes of a home, ” expresses exactly the result of this decision, and then the proviso proceeds by adding, “or as a place to exercise the calling or business of the head of a'family,” thereby indicating, as we submit, an intention to make the constitutional homestead the same it had been generally understood to be during the period of about eighteen years from the time of the decision of Pryor v. Stone, down to the time of the decision of Iken & Co. v. Olenick.
This court has never held that it was necessary that the homestead lots should be contiguous. It has always been deemed sufficient if the lots were in fact used for the purpose of a homestead. Hancock v. Morgan, 17 Tex., 582; Methery v. Walker, id., 593; Pryor v. Stone, 19 Tex., 373; Williams v. Hall, 33 Tex., 212; Iken & Co. v. Olenick, 42 Tex., 201; Evans v. Womack, 48 Tex., 232.
Appellant’s argument that “the exemption is not of a home and a place of business, but of a homestead to consist of lot or lots which may be used for either purpose, and must be used for one or the other,” narrows the position into this:
1st. That the mechanic’s shop or the business house of the head of a family is exempt, provided he has no home; or,
2d. If he has both, then neither is exempt, or either the one or the other is exempt, according to circumstances, not defined in the constitution.
The vice in the argument is, that appellant seems to conceive of a homestead independent of its use, whereas the result of the constitutional provision is, that it is the use to which the lots are applied' that makes them the homestead.
The use for either of the purposes named in the constitution is equally efficacious, and the assumption that the use for both purposes would destroy the homestead character and leave the head of the family without a home, or a place to exercise his calling or business, sufficiently refutes itself.
We submit as a proposition:
That the proviso in the constitution is simply descriptive of the property that shall form the homestead, and that all property that comes under either of the two classes described is a part of the homestead.
Also the minor propositions:
1st. That the word “or” in the proviso “that the same shall be used for the purposes of a home, or as a place to exercise the calling or business of the head of a family,” is not used in a disjunctive sense, as claimed by appellant, but to connect with the previous sentence another class of property to be included- in the homestead exemption.
The use of the conjunctive word and would have practically destroyed the value, of the urban homestead, by requiring that the home, in order to be exempt, should also be the place of business.
We submit that the only alternative constructions of the proviso from that just indicated are:
1st. That the place of business is exempt provided the party has no home; but this construction lands us into the opposite position, which is equally tenable, viz.: that the home is exempt provided the party has no place of business, for it will be noted that the constitution makes no distinction between the two classes of property.
2d. That where the head of a family has a place of business and a home, either of them is the homestead, but not both, in the determining of which both the creditors and the head of the family have an equal interest.
This, we submit, is a position so full of novelty, when associated with the ideas of certainty, permanency and sanctity, that are the usual concomitants of a homestead, and of practical difficulty in the details of ascertaining in a given case which shall be the homestead, that it will hardly be presumed to have been the intention of the framers of the constitution, in the absence of any declaration of such intention.
3d. That the word “homestead” ex vi termini means the place of the residence, and that the mechanic’s shop or business house must be on that place to become a part of the homestead.
To this we reply that the constitution itself is, so far as Texas is concerned, a partial upsetting of the ordinary definition of homestead, and leaves us to some extent in a new field.
The question is, what is the intention of the framers of the constitution ?
That the lots forming the homestead need not be contiguous has always been the ruling of this court. The only thing heretofore held to be necessary as a governing principle is, that they should be used for the comfort or enjoyment of a home, and in recent decisions it has been suggested that the purposes for which they are used should be so apparent as to be an indicia that they formed a part of the homestead.
Now, taking the same rule of determination heretofore adopted, and it results that the place to exercise the calling or business of the head of a family must be ascertained like all other parts of the homestead, from the use to which it is applied, and that the locality in either case is unimportant only so far as it tends to throw light upon the purposes for which it is used.
To hold that the place of business is exempt as a part of the homestead only where it is at the place of residence is not demanded by the language used in the constitution, and would be manifestly subversive of public policy, by causing other considerations than success to enter into the question of the selection by the head of a family of a suitable locality for business pursuits.

Opinion:
Moore, Chief Justice.
The only question in this case depends for its solution upon the construction which should be given section 51, article XVI, of the constitution, defining an urban homestead. The part of the section of the constitution in question reads as follows: "The homestead in a city, town or village shall consist of lot or lots, not to exceed in value five thousand dollars at the time of their designation as the homestead, without reference to the value of any improvements thereon; provided, that the same shall be used for the purpose of a home, or as a place of exercising the calling or business of the head of a family."
Appellant claims that the proviso quoted neither restricts or enlarges the homestead exemption of the lot or lots previously referred to, but merely requires, to bring them within the exemption, that they must be used as a home or place of business. And that " the exemption is not of a home and place of business, but of a homestead to consist of lot or lots, which may be used for either purpose, and must be used for one or the other." This construction, it seems to us, would involve us in inextricable difficulty, or lead to results which would evidently contravene the object sought to be secured by the constitution, as is manifest when considered in connection with the previous legislation and the decisions of this court.
Whether the policy of our legislation regarding the homestead exemption has been wise or unwise is not for us to say. It is, however, unquestionable, that from its first .introduction there has been a uniform and steady tendency in the popular mind in favor of its liberalization and enlargement.. And if the courts have not at all times responded to the popular sentiment upon the subject, they have been constrained to give way to it by more explicit legislation, or constitutional' enactments. For example, no sooner was it manifest that the courts were inclined to construe the exemption in the constitution of 1845 as referable both to the lot arid its improvements, than it was declared the improvements should not be considered in estimating the value of the exempted lots. And as we think, when it became apparent that this court did not regard the place of business of the head of the family, if entirely distinct and separate from their home, as within the exemption by reason of its use, then there was an enlargement of the homestead exemption as we find it in the present constitution. Iken & Co. v. Olenick, 42 Tex., 195.
In seeking to ascertain the extent or limit of the urban homestead which is exempted from forced sale, it is well to note that while the first clause of the section of the constitution under consideration declares that the homestead in a city, town or village shall consist of a lot or lots, not exceeding in value, etc., the particular lot or lots which shall constitute the homestead are only indicated or designated in the proviso. By it the homestead lot or lots are designated by the use made of them. That is, if the lots not exceeding in value $5,000 are used as a home or place of business, such lots are recognized as the constitutional homestead,- and are exempted from forced sales. The lots exempt include all used in the one way or the other, unless they together exceed the limit of value. The entire sentence as framed, in our opinion, clearly and properly expresses the intention. If the clause in the proviso had been connected by the conjunction and, as appellant seems to insist it should have been, to entitle it to the construction, it would, as we have said, have had an entirely different effect from what we think was intended, or lead to absurd results. In that case there would have been no exemption of an urban homestead, unless there were lots used both for a home and place of business. If there were both, there is nothing in the constitution to enable us to say whether it is the home or place of business intended to be exempted.
[Opinion delivered at January term, 1881.]
Street & Kleberg, for appellant.
Although the opinion of the court would indicate that the construction to be given the clause of the constitution under consideration was circumscribed within the narrow limits of the grammatical relation of the terms used, and that those terms clearly and properly expressed the intention attributed' by the court, yet we venture to say that this decision has been received by the profession with surprise and by the commercial public with consternation.
" If any lots throughout the city, which may have been used for any business purpose by the husband, thereby become part and parcel of the homestead, which cannot be reached by creditors, or alienated by the husband without being joined by the wife, it is needless to say that the security of those so dealing with the husband rests, to a very great extent, on a moral rather than on any legal foundation." Iken v. Olenick, 42 Tex., 195.
The judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.