Case Name: Gould v. Hudson River Railroad Company
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1852-10
Citations: 6 N.Y. 522
Docket Number: 
Parties: Gould v. Hudson River Railroad Company.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 6
Pages: 488–516

Head Matter:
Gould v. Hudson River Railroad Company.
Rivers. — Riparian owners.
The owner of lands on a navigable river has no property in the shore between high and low-water mark; and, therefore, he is not entitled to compensation, on its being taken for the construction of ,a railroad.
Gould v. Hudson River Railroad Co., 12 Barb. 616, affirmed.
Appeal from the general term of the Supreme Court, in the second district, where a judgment entered in favor of the defendant, on demurrer to the complaint, had been affirmed. (Reported below, 12 Barb. 616.)
This was an action to recover damages sustained by the plaintiff, in consequence of the construction of the defendant’s railroad between the plaintiff’s farm and the channel of the Hudson river.
*The complaint alleged that the plaintiff was, -I and for three years past had been, the owner and in the actual occupation and possession of a farm of land, in the town of Stockport, in the county of Columbia, bounded on the west by the Hudson river, and having a front thereon of about 2000 feet. That the Hudson river was a navigable stream, in which the tide ebbs and flows, from the mouth thereof, where it enters into the sea, to a point about forty miles above the plaintiff’s farm; that the plaintiff had a right to use the said river with vessels, boats, floats and other craft, to embark thereon from his said farm, for the purpose of carrying away the produce thereof, and of bringing manure and other materials, to and upon the same; and that for a long time previous to the construction of the defendant’s embankment and railroad track, he had used the said river for such and other lawful purposes.
That in the month of September 1850, the defendants, being a body corporate, and claiming to be authorized to do so, by the acts of 12th May 1846, and 10th February 1848, entered upon the said Hudson river, in front of the plaintiff’s farm, between ordinary high and low-water mark, and with earth and stones, and other materials, raised and constructed a line of solid embankment, in the said river, below the ordinary high-water mark thereof, extending along the front of the whole of the plaintiff’s said farm, from the south to the north line thereof; and which constituted a part of a solid embankment raised and constructed by the defendants, from the city of New York to a point in the town of Greenbush, opposite the city of Albany. That the said embankment in front of his farm, and for a long distance north and south thereof, was about five feet above the ordinary high-water mark of the Hudson river, and formed a complete barrier to the passage of vessels, &c., through the same. That upon said embankment, the defendants had laid a continuous line of iron rails extending from New York to Greenbush, upon which they daily, and several times each day, ran trains of cars, propelled by steam.
That in consequence of the said embankment and railroad track, so constructed by the defendants, the plaintiffs, for more than a year past, had been and was prevented from and obstructed in the passage of vessels, boats, floats and other river-craft, from his said farm to the channel of the Hudson river, and from the said river to his farm; whereby he had been deprived by the defendants of all means of getting from his farm to the said river, with vessels, &c., for the purpose of removing the produce therefrom, and for other lawful purposes.
And the plaintiff averred, that the defendants so entered upon the Hudson river, and constructed the said embankment and railroad track, opposite his farm, and the continuation thereof, north and south, without his permission or consent, and without compensating or offering to compensate him for the damages and injuries thereby sustained, and to be sustained, by him as the owner and occupier of the said farm. By reason whereof, the plaintiff claimed to have sustained damages to the amount of $500, for which he demanded judgment, with costs of suit.
* 524 1 *^e defendants demurred to the complaint, -* and assigned the following causes of demurrer :
I. That it appeared by the complaint, that the Hudson river, wherein the defendants had raised and constructed their said embankment and railroad track, is a public navigable stream, wherein the tide ebbs and flows, and as such belongs, and every part thereof belongs, to the people of the state of New York, and no part belongs to the plaintiff. That said embankment and railroad track being raised and constructed wholly below ordinary high-water mark of said river, no action can be maintained by the plaintiff against the defend-' ants, because:—
(1.) No action will lie in favor of the riparian owner, for merely being obstructed in the passage of vessels and boats from his land to the channel of the river, or from the channel of the- river to his land. That no greater or peculiar right to the use of the river, as a public navigable stream, than that of the common citizen, attaches to the riparian owner ; and, therefore, he cannot complain of any impediment intervening between the channel of the river and his land, so long as it does not prevent his navigating the river as a common citizen.
(2.) Because the convenience of ferry, of fishing, and embarking from his said land upon such river, or of landing therefrom with vessels and boats, are not absolute rights, but merely benefits and advantages, emanating from his riparian ownership; and no action will lie by him, in virtue of his said riparian ownership merely, for a destruction of such benefits or advantages.
(3.) That in the absence of an express grant from the state, or a grant presumed by prescription, the riparian owner cannot complain, as such, of the occupancy of the bed, or the waters, of the river, in front of his land. That the people, being the proprietors of the soil and waters of the river, they alone can object to such occupancy, or remove any obstructions therein.
II. That it appeared, by the complaint, that the said embankment and railroad track was raised and constructed by the defendants, under and by the authority and permission of the people of the state of New York, derived from and given by two acts of the legislature of said state, referred to in said complaint; and the authority and permission derived therefrom, gave to the defendants the right to take, use and occupy the land under the waters of the Hudson river. That such right, so derived, is paramount and superior to any possessed by the plaintiff, either as riparian owner, or as a citizen. That every right of the riparian owner, or the citizen, to the use of a navigable tide-water river, for navigation, fishing, ferrying, or otherwise, is subordinate and subservient to the public use of such river. That such rights of the .riparian owner, or the citizen, reside in him only during the pleasure of the sovereign will, and can, at any time, be taken from him, by the exercise of that will; and that the people, being the proprietors of the river, and the river’s bed, have, in their sovereign capacity, through their legislature, granted to the defendants the right to construct their said railroad in the Hudson river; which grant, though it deprives the riparian owner, and the citizen, of all use, benefit and advantage of the river, for navigation or otherwise, they, the people, as the sovereign power, could ° lawfully and constitutionally make — it being public property thus dedicated to public use.
III. That the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
The cause being brought to a hearing upon the demurrer, at special term, the court (Barculo, J.) gave judgment for the defendants; and this judgment having been affirmed at general term, the plaintiff took this appeal.
Reynolds, for the appellant.
Monell, for the respondents.

Opinion:
* Watson, J.
— After a careful examination of the numerous authorities cited upon the brief of the attorney for the appellant, respect for the able counsel who submitted them, and a belief in his sincerity in the positions which he has assumed, *has alone -* induced me to give any written opinion in this case, so thoroughly am I convinced, that every principle upon which the appellant seeks to recover, has been decided against him in the courts of this state. The great error into which he has fallen is, that, taking " it as conceded, that the common law has been recognised and adopted as the law of this state, and that the rights of a subject of the British crown, and a citizen of the state of New York in navigable waters, are, at common law, the same; that the power of the sovereign, here, in respect to the alienation of these rights, has the same qualifications as is attached to the power of the English crown."
The case of Lansing v. Smith, decided in the supreme court, and reported in 8 Cowen 146, and afterwards affirmed in the court of errors (4 Wend. 9), has laid down an entirely different doctrine. I quote from the opinion of the chancellor, which was adopted by the court of errors, to show that the sovereign power of the people of this state, over these rights, is more extensive than that of the English crown, or the king, as each of these terms is used in the points submitted, though intending to mean, as I suppose, the same thing. " The people of this state, as the successor of its former sovereign, are entitled to all the rights which formerly belonged to the king, by his prerogative. Through the medium of their legislature, they may exercise all the powers, which, previous to the revolution, could have been exercised, either by the Icing alone, or by him, in conjunction with his parliament; subject only to those restrictions which have been imposed by the constitution of this state or of the United States. By the common law, the king, as parens patrise, owned the soil under all the navigable rivers, or arms of the sea, where the tide regularly ebbs and flows, including the shore or bank to high-water mark. (Constable's Case, 5 Co. 106; Davies 152-53; Rex v. Smith, Doug. 425.) He held these rights, not for his own benefit, but for the benefit of his subjects at large; who were entitled to the free use of the sea, and all tide-waters, for the purposes of navigation, fishing, &c., subject to such regulations *and restrictions as the crown, or the parliament, might prescribe. By magna charla, and many *- subsequent statutes, the powers of the king are limited, and he cannot now deprive his subjects of their rights, by granting the public navigable waters to individuals; but there can be no doubt of the right of parliament, in England, or the legislature of this state, to make such grants, when they do not interfere with the vested rights of particular individuals."
Authorities are cited by the appellant's counsel, to show, that the Icing cannot malee any grants in derogation of these rights; and having established, as he supposes, that proposition, he then deduces from it another, viz., that a riparian proprietor enjoys rights in navigable waters that are not common to all the people of the state. Proceeding -upon this errroneous supposition, he then assumes, that the common law of England, and that of this country, are the same (to wit, the power of the king, and the legislature of this state), and from it deduces two propositions:
I. That every citizen has a right of navigation and fishing in navigable waters, to be exercised at their free will, for private gain or pleasure.
II. That this right cannot be destroyed by the sovereign power, unless its destruction is essential to the public welfare.
Having cited sufficient from the opinion of the chancellor to show that the power of the king, in England, and that of the legislature of this state over those rights, are entirely different, I will proceed to show, how widely different principles are deducible from different premises. And here I will allow the chancellor to speak, instead of myself, in the case before cited: " The right to navigate the public waters of the state, and to fish therein, and the right to use the public highways, are all public rights, belonging to the people at large; they are not private inalienable rights of each individual; hence, the legislature, as the representative of the public, may restrict and regulate the exercise of those rights, in such manner as may be deemed most beneficial to the public at large."
If I understand this, it is precisely the reverse of the * K/Li ~t appellant's *first proposition, for that asserts -* that his right is a private one, to be exercised at his free will, for private gain or pleasure; whereas, this case decides, that it is a public right, not private; and that the legislature may restrict and regulate. the exercise of it. But let me proceed with 'the opinion of the chancellor as to the extent of this right, as I have not designed, by any reasoning of mine, to demonstrate what it is, but to show that it has been settled by the adjudications of our courts; he says — " The bank of the Hudson between high and low-water mark, belonged to the people, and he (meaning the riparian proprietor) had no better right to the use of it than any other person. If he built on it, or erected a wharf there, it would be a purpresture, which the legislature might direct to be demolished, or to be seized for the use of the public. (Harg. Law Tr. 85.) Or, the legislature might authorize erections in front thereof, as in the case of Smith's wharf on the Thames." (Rex v. Smith, Doug. 425.) This certainly takes quite a different view of the rights of a riparian owner from that which the appellant's counsel has taken, and seems to me, to take away the whole foundation and substance of his proposition.
I might stop here, with the remark that this denies to the appellant any private right to the waters where the respondents' road was constructed, and if so, he could not have any claim for damages; but as the appellant's counsel has endeavored to satisfy the court, that he has some rights peculiar to himself, for which he is entitled to compensation, I will examine them for a moment. Among them, he enumerates that of the exclusive right to embark from his own land, with all kinds of craft; or to use the natural shore down to high-water mark as a landing place; to draw nets to his shore, &c. These exclusive rights do not belong to the appellant, because his lands adjoin navigable waters, but because no other man can enjoy them, for the reason, that if he enters on the appellant's land, without his permission, whether his object be to draw nets to shore, or any other object in doing so, he becomes a trespasser. The water being in front of his land, does not alter these rights; but every other citizen has as *good right as himself to fish in the water opposite his lands, provided *- he does not draw his nets upon the appellant's premises. So also, may any other citizen navigate the same waters, as well as the appellant, provided he makes no entry upon his land. I can see nothing peculiar in these rights, which are not possessed by any other person living a thousand miles from navigable waters, as, I suppose, he would have the right to the exclusive possession of his land, to come and go to and from it, with teams and produce; and should any other person attempt to exercise the same right, without the permission of the owner, he would be a trespasser.
In the case of Lansing v. Smith, the plaintiff insisted, that he had sustained damages peculiar to himself, in addition to that which he sustained in common with the public; and I will quote from the opinion of the learned . judge in that case: " It must be conceded," he says, " that there is nothing in the plaintiff's case, so far as he complains of the pier and the sloop lock, to distinguish it from that of every other owner of a wharf within the basin; all the proprietors of docks, above the temporary bridges, have sustained an equal injury with the plaintiff, in consequence of their erection. The injury, therefore, for which the plaintiff seeks remuneration, is not peculiar to himself; it has been equally felt by hundreds of others whose property is similarly situated." The court then say, that in' such a case, when the injury sustained is remote and consequential, it is damnum absque injuria, and it is to be borne as a part of the price to be paid for the advantage of the social condition. The same doctrine has been subsequently laid down by the court, in the case of Radcliffe's Executors v. City of Brooklyn (4 N. Y. 195).
The case of Lansing v. Smith was on all fours with this, with the exception, that in some of its features, it was stronger for the plaintiff; to wit, the plaintiff contended, and with some plausibility, that the grant of the land-commissioner to the owners of the wharves admitted their right to the lands under water, and excluded the power of the state to reconvey to others. The facts, in other respects, were exceedingly like those of this case.
The legislature * authorized the construction of * J a pier called the Albany basin, directly in front of docks which had been erected by individuals, under the authority of the commissioners of the land-office, by which the said wharves were rendered nearly valueless, as the communication with them was almost wholly cut off; and still the court held, that such owners could not recover for such consequential damages.
The second proposition virtually concedes that this right of the appellant can be destroyed by the sovereign power, provided its destruction is essential to the public welfare. It seems to me, that this concedes the whole ground, and leaves nothing for the plaintiff to stand upon, in order to sustain his right to recover in this case. Who is to judge of the necessity for such destruction, except the sovereign power, acting through the legislature, which represents it ? It cannot be possible, that such necessity is to be left to be judged of by the circumstances of each particular case. If so, a lawsuit would be the certain consequence of every exercise of this right by the sovereign power. But after all, he concedes no more by this, than was settled in the case of Lansing v. Smith. In that case, the court say, " If the act be unconstitutional, it must be, on the ground, that the plaintiff had, either at common law, as the owner of the adjacent soil, or by virtue of the patent from the state to Quackenboss, for land under water, opposite to the shore, a claim to the natural flow of the river, with which the state had no right to interfere, by any erections in the bed of the river, or in any other manner. This proposition appears to the court too extravagant to be seriously entertained. It denies to the state the power of improving the navigation of the river by dams, or any other erections, which must affect the natural flow of the stream, without the consent of all the proprietors of the adjacent shore, within the remotest limits which may be affected by the operation. Every new dock that is erected, partially diverts the natural course of the stream, and upon the principles contended for by the plaintiff, violates the rights of all the proprietors of * 544 "1 ^0C^S below it. The right of the ^plaintiff to ' navigate to and from the dock is not denied. All that is contended for on the part of the defendants is, that the mode in which that right is to be exercised, is subject to be controlled and regulated by the legislature, as, in their judgment, the interest and convenience of the public may require." "This," the court say, "is founded upon the principle, that the general good is to prevail over partial individual convenience."
I will not pursue this subject further, for it seems to me, if any principle was ever settled, this case settles the principle, that the legislature has the right to regulate and control all navigable waters within the state, as, in their judgment, the interest and convenience of the public may require. It is not upon the ground alone of improving the navigation of such waters, but on the. ground that they possess the power, and can exercise it, for any public improvement, such as is the construction of a railroad, or the laying out of a public highway. The judgment of the supreme court should be affirmed.