Case Name: BALDWIN v. FRANKS
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1887-03-07
Citations: 120 U.S. 678
Docket Number: 
Parties: BALDWIN v. FRANKS.
Judges: 
Reporter: United States Reports
Volume: 120
Pages: 678–707

Head Matter:
BALDWIN v. FRANKS.
ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA.
Submitted April 26, 1886.
—Decided March 7, 1887.
Congress has power, under the .Constitution, to provide for the punishment 'of persons guilty of depriving Chinese subjects of any of the rights, privileges, immunities, or exemptions guaranteed t.o them by the treaty -of November 17, 1880; but Congress has not made such provision in § 5519, Rev. Stat., nor in § 5508, nor in § 5336.
Section 5519, Rev. Stat., is unconstitutional as a provision for the pumish-. ment of a conspiracy, within a state, to deprive an alien "of rights guaranteed to him therein by a treaty of the United States: whether it can be enforced in a territory, against persons conspiring therewith that object, is not now decided.
United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214, affirmed, and applied to the facts in .this case.
To give' effect to the rule that when part of a statute- is constitutional and part is unconstitutional, that which is constitutional will, if possible, be enforced, and that which is unconstitutional will be rejected, the two parts must be capable of separation, so /that each can be read by itself; limitation by construction is not separation Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U. S. Be, :aud Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252, distinguished.
In describing the offence against a citizen of the United States for' which punishment is provided by-Rev. Stat. § 5508, the word “citizen” is used in its political sense; with the same meaning which it.has in the Fourteenth-Amendment to the Constitution; and not as being synonymous . with"“resident,inhabitant,” or “person.”
To constitute the offence described in the first clause, of Rev. Stat. § 5336, it is not enough that a law of the United States is violated, but there must be a forcible resistance to a positive assertion of their authority as a government.
To. constitute an offence under the second clause of Rev. Stat. § 5336 there must be a forcible resistance to the authority of-the United States while they are endeavoring to carry their laws into execution.
Petition for writ of habeas corpus. The .petitioner set forth that he was arrested, by the defendant in error, United States Marshal for the District of California, under a warrant issued by a commissioner of the Circuit Court of the United States charging him with conspiring with others to deprive certain-subjects of the Emperor of China “ of the equal protection of the laws and of equal privileges and immunities under the laws.” The petition set' forth the warrant, describing the alleged illegal acts, and closed with this averment and prayer:
“ And your' petitioher claims and avers that the said commissioner of the said Circuit Court had no jurisdiction or authority to issue the said warrant, or to commit your said petitioner to the custody of the said United States Marshal, for the said offence alleged in the said complaint, nor has the said Marshal any warrant or authority of law to confine your said petitioner or restrain him of his liberty, as aforesaid; that the offence charged in the said complaint, and for which the said warrant'was issued, and for which your said petitioner is now being held in confinement, is one purely of state jurisdiction, and over which the Government of the United States and its tribunals have no jurisdiction whatsoever. That your petitioner is a citizen of the United States and of the state of California, and that said offence is alleged to have been committed in the county of Sutter and within the jurisdiction of said state; Wherefore, to be relieved of said unlawful,detention and imprisonment, your petitioner prays that a writ of habeas corpus, to be directed to the said J. C. Franks, may issue in this behalf, so that your petitioner may be forthwith brought before this court to do, submit to, and receive what the law may require.”
Tiie court below refused the writ. The petitioner then sued out this writ of error.
Mr. A. L. Heart for plaintiff in error.
Mr. Hall McAlUster for defendant in error.

Opinion:
Mr. Chief Justice
Waite delivered the opinion of the court.
This is a writ of error brought by Thomas Baldwin, the plaintiff in error, for the review of a judgment of the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of California refusing his discharge, on a writ of habeas corpus, from the custody of the marshal of the district, and the questions' presented for consideration arise on a certificate of the judges, holding the court, of a division of Opinion between them in the progress of the trial. The record shows that Baldwin was-held in custody by the marshal, under a, warrant issued by a commissioner of the Circuit Court, on a charge of conspiracy with Bird Wilson, William Ilays, and others to deprive Sing Lee and others, belonging to "a- class of Chinese aliens, being . . '. subjects of the Emperor of China, of the equal protection of the laws and of equal privileges and immunities under the laws, for that said . . . .persons so belonging to the class of Chinese aliens did then . . . reside at the town of Nicolaus, in said county of Sutter, in said State of California, and were engaged in legitimate business and labor to earn a living, as they had- a right to do, and they at that time had a right to reside at said town of Nicolaus, . . . and engage in legitimate business and labor to earn a living, under and by virtue of the treaties existing, and which did then exist, between the Government of the United States and the Emperor of China, and the Constitution and laws of the United States; but, nevertheless, while said . • . . persons were . so residing and pursuing their legitimate business and labor for the purpose aforesaid, said conspirators . . . did, . . . having conspired together for that purpose, unlawfully and with force and arms, violently and with intimidation, chive and expel said persons, . . . belonging to said class of Chinese, . . . from their residence at said town of Nicolaus, . . . and did . . . deprive them . . . of the privilege of conducting their legitimate business and of the privilege of laboring to earn a living, and, without any legal process, . . . placed. said Chinese aliens . . . under unlawful restraint and arrest, and so detained them for several hours, and . . by iorce and arms, and with, violence and intimidation, placed them . . . upon a steamboat barge, then plying on the Feather River, and drove them from their residence and labor and from said county."
The questions, certified relate only to the sufficiency of this charge for the detention of the prisoner. There aré nine questions in all, the first six having reference to § 5519 of the Revised statutes, and the others to § 5508 and 5336, as the authority for the prosecution. The fourth fairly presents the whole case as it arises under § 5519, and that is as follows:
"4. Whether a conspiracy of two or more persons in the State .of California, for the purpose of depriving Chinese residents, lawfully residing in California, in pursuance of the provisions of the several treaties between the United States and the Emperot of China, of the right to live and pursue their lawful vocations at the town of Nicolaus in said State, and in pursuance of such conspiracy, actually, forcibly expelling such Chinese from' said town, in the manner shown by the record; is: 1. A violation of and an offence within the meaning of §.5519 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. 2. "Whether said section, so far as it applies to said state of facts and such Chinese residents, and makes theracts stated an offence against the United States, is constitutional and valid ? "
The seventh presents all the points for consideration under § 5508 and 5336, as follows :
" 1. Where two or more persons, with or without disguise, go upon the premises of Chinese subjects, lawfully residing in . the State of California, with intent to prevent and hinder their free exercise or enjoyment of. any right secured to them by the several treaties between the United States and the Emperor of China, and, in pursuance of such conspiracy, forcibly prevent' their exercise and enjoyment of such rights, and expel such Chinese subjects from the town in which they reside:
" Whether (1) such acts so performed constitute an offence within the meaning of the provisions of § 5508 of the Revised Statutes of the' United States ? and,
" (2) If so, whether the provisions of said section, so making said acts an offence, are constitutional and valid ?
" (3) Whether subh acts so performed constitute an offence within the meaning of that clause of § 5336 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, which makes it an offence for two or more persons in any state to conspire, ' by force, to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of the United States,' or within thé meaning of any other clause of said section ? and,
" (4) Whether said section, so far as applicable to the facts stated, is a constitutional and valid law of the United States ? "
The precise, question we have to determine is not whether Congress has the constitutional authority to provide for the punishment of such an offence as that with which Baldwin is charged, but whether it has so done.
That the treaty-making power has been surrendered by the states and given to the United. States, is unquestionable. It is true, also, that the treaties made by the United States and in force are part of the supreme law of the land, and that they are as binding within the territorial hmits of thé states as they are elsewhere throughout the dominion of the United States.
Articles II and III of a treaty between the United States "and the Emperor of China, concluded November 17, 1880, and proclaimed by the President of the United States, -October 5, 1881, are as follows:
" Article II. Chinese subjects, whether proceeding to the United States as teachers, students, merchants, or from curiosity, together with their body and household servants, and Chinese laborers who are now in the United States, shall be allowed to go and come of their own freé will and accord, and shall be accorded all the rights, privileges, immunities and exemptions which are accorded to the citizens and subjects of the most favored nation."
" Article III. If Chinese laborers or Chinese of any other •class, now either permanently or temporarily residing, in the territory of the United States, meet with ill treatment at the hands of any other persons, the' Government of the .United States will exert ah its power to devise measures for their protection and to secure to them the same rights, privileges, immunities, and exemptions as may be enjoyed by the citizens or subjects of the most favored nation, and to which they are entitled by treaty." 22 Stat. 827.
That the United States have power under the Constitution to' provide for the punishment of those who are guilty of depriving Chinese subjects of any of the rights, privileges, im-' munities, or exemptions guaranteed to them by this treaty, we do not doubt; What we have to decide, under the questions certified here from the court below, is, whether this has been done by the sections of the Ee vised Statutes, specially referred to. These sections are as follows:
" Sec. 5519. If two or more persons in any state or territory conspire, or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the puipose of 'preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any state or territory from giving or securing to all persons within such state or territory the equal protection of the laws ; each of such persons shall be punished by a fine of not less than five hundred nor more than five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment, with or without hard labor, not less.than six months nor more than six years, or by both such fine and imprisonment."
"Sec. 5508. If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same; or if two or more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises of another, with intent' to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege so secured, they shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars, and imprisoned not more than ten years; and shall, moreover, be thereafter ineligible to any office, or place of honor, profit, or trust created by the Constitution or laws of the United States."
" Sec. 5336. If two or more persons in any state or territory conspire to overthrow, put down, or to destroy by force the Government of the United States, or to levy war against them, or to oppose by force the authority thereof;, or by force to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of the United States; or by force to seize, take, or possess any property of the United States contrary to the authority thereof; each of them shall be punished by a fine of not less than five hundred dollars and not more than five thousand dollars; or by imprisonment, with or without hard labor, for a period not less than six months, nor more than six years, or by both such fine and imprisonment."
As the charge on which Baldwin is held in custody-was evidently made under § 5519, and that is the section which was most considered in the court below, we will answer the questions based on that first. It provides for the punishment' of those who " in any state or territory conspire . . . for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indireotly, any' person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges or immunities under the laws."
In United States v. Harris, 106 U. S. 629, it was decided that this section was unconstitutional, as a provision for. the punishment of conspiracies of the character therein mentioned, within a state. It is now said, however, that' in that case the conspiracy charged was by persons in a state against a citizen of the United States and of the state, to deprive him of the protection he was entitled to under the laws of that state, no special rights or privileges arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States being involved; and'it is argued that, although the section be invalid so far' as such an offence is concerned, it is good for the punishment of those who conspire to deprive aliens of the rights guaranteed to' them in a state, by the treaties of the United. States. . In support of this argmnent reliance is-had on the well settled rule that a statute may be in part constitutional and in part unconstitutional, and that under some circumstances the part which is constitutional will be enforced, and only that which is unconstitutional rejected. To give effect to this rale, however, the parts • — that which is constitutional and that which is unconstitutional — must be capable of separation, so that each may be read'by itself. This statute, considered as a statute punishing conspiracies in a state, is not of that character, for in that connection it has no parts within the meaning of the rule. Whether it is separable, so that it can be enforced in a territory, though not in a state, is quite another •question, and one we are not now called on to décide. It provides in general terms for the punishment of all who conspire for the purpose of depriving any person, or any class of persons, of the equal' protection of the laws, or of equal privileges or immunities under the laws. A single provision, which makes up the whole section, embraces those who conspire against citizens as well as those who conspire against aliens •— those who conspire to deprive one of his rights under the laws of a state, and those who conspire to deprive him of his rights under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United. States. The limitation which is sought must be. made, if at all, by construction, not by separation. This, it has often been decided, is not enough.
Thus, in United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214, the indictment was against two of the inspectors of a municipal election in Kentucky,, under § 3 and 4 of the act of May 31, 1870, c. 114, 16 Stat. 140, which provided in general terms for the punishment of inspectors who should wrongfully refuse to receive the vote of a citizen when presented imder certain circumstances, and for the punishment of those who by unlawful means hindered or delayed any .citizen from doing any act required to be done to qualify him to vote, or from voting at any election. There was- nothing in either of the sections to limit their operation to a refusal or hindrance " on account of the race, color, or previous, condition of servitude "' of the voter, and it was held that they were unconstitutional because, on their face, they werebroad enough to cover-w'rongful acts without as well as within the constitutional power of Congress. An attempt was made there as here to limit the statute by construction, so as to make it operate only on that which Congress might rightfully .prohibit and punish; but to this the court said, p. 221: " For this purpose we must take these'sections of the statute as they are. We are not able to reject a part which is unconstitutional, and retain the remainder, because it is not pqssibleTo separate that which is unconstitutional, if there be any such, from that which is not. The proposed effect is not to be attained by striking out or disregarding words that are in the section, but- by inserting those that are not now- there. Each of the sections must stand as a whole, or fall altogether. The language is plain. There is no room for construction, unless it be as to the effect of the Constitution. The question then to be determined is, whether we can introduce words of limitation into a penal statute so as to make it specific, when, as expressed, it is general only." This was answered in the negative, the court remarking: " To limit this statute in the manner now asked for would be to make a new law,- not to enforce an old one."
Following this were the Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82, in which there were indictments undqr. § 4 and 5 of the act of August 14, 1876, c. 274, 19 Stat. 141, "to punish the counterfeiting of trade-mark goods and the sale-or dealing in of counterfeit trade-mark goods." Of this act the court' said, speaking through Mr. Justice Miller, p. 98, that its broad purpose "was to establish a universal system of trade-mark registration, for the benefit of all who had already used a trade-mark, or who wished to adopt one in the future, without regard to the character of the trade to which it was to be applied or the residence of the owner, with the solitary exception' that those who resided- in' foreign countries which extended no such privileges to us were excluded from them here." A statute so broad and sweeping was then held not to be within the constitutional grant of legislative power to Congress, but p. 95, " whether the- trademark bears such a relation to commerce in general terms as to bring it within congressional control, when used or applied to the classes of commerce which fall within that control," was properly left undecided. The indictment, however, presented a case in Which the defendant was charged with having in his possession counterfeits and colorable imitations of the trade-marks of foreign manufacturers, and it was suggested that-if Congress had power to regulate trade-marks used in commerce with foreign nations and among the several- States, this statute might be held valid in that class of cases, if no further; but the court decided otherwise, and in so doing said, p. 98: "'While it may be true that when one part of a statute is valid and constitutional, and another part is unconstitutional and void, the court may enforce- the valid part, where they are distinctly separable, so that each can stand alone, it is not' within the judicial province to give to the words used by Congress.^ narrower meaning than they are manifestly intended to bear, in order that crimes may be punished which are not described in language that brings them within the constitutional power of that body." And again, further on, after citing United States v. Reese, and quoting from the opinion in that case, it was said, p. 99: "If we should, in the case before us, undertake to make by judicial- construction a law which Congress did not make, it is quite probable we should do what, if the matter were now before that body, it would be unwilling to donamely, make a trade-mark law which is only partial in its operation, and which would complicate the rights which parties would hold, in some instances under the act of Congress, and in others' under State law."
The same questiop was also considered and the former decisions approved in United States v. Harris, supra ; and in the Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U. S. 269, 305, it was said that " to hold otherwise would be to substitute for the law intended by the legislature one they may never have been willing by itself to enact."
It is suggested, however, that Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U. S. 80, and Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252, are inconsistent with United States v. Reese and the Trade-Mark Cases ; but we do not so understand them. In Packet Co. v. Keokuk, the question arose upon an ordinance of the city of Keokuk establishing a wharf on the Mississippi Eiver and the .rates of wharfage to be paid for its use. In its general scope the ordinance was broad enough to include a part of the shore of the river declared to be a wharf, which was in its natural.condition and unimproved. The city.had, however, actually built, paved, and improved a wharf at a large expense within the limits of the ordinance, and the charges then in question were for the use of the facilities thus provided for receiving and discharging cargoes. An objection was made to the validity of the ordinance, because it provided for charges to be paid for the use of the unimproved bank as well as for the improved whaiwes, but the court said, p. 89: " The ordinance of Keokuk has imposed no charge upon these plaintiffs which it was tfevond the power of the city to impose. To the extent to which they are affected by it there is no valid objection to it. Statutes that are constitutional in part only will be upheld so far as they are not in conflict with the Constitution, provided the allowed and prohibited parts are severable. We think a severance is possible in this case. It may be conceded that the ordinance is too broad, and that some of' its provisions are unwarranted. When those provisions are attempted -to be enforced, a different question may be presented." That was not a penal statute, but only a city ordinance regulating'wharf-age, and the suit was civil in its nature. The only question was whether the packet company was bound to pay for the use of improved wharves when the ordinance, taken in its breadth, fixed the charges and required payment for the use of that part of the established wharf which was unimproved as well as that which was improved. The precise point to be determined was whether, under those circumstances, t3ie vessel owners were excused from paying for the use of that which was improved.
In Presser v. Illinois, the indictment was for a violation of the provisions of one of the sections of the Military Code of Illinois, and it was claimed that the whole code was invalid, because in its- general scope and effect it was in conflict with Title XYI of the Revised .Statutes of the United States upon the subject of " The Militia." But the court held that, even if the first two sections of the code, on which the objection rested, were invalid, they were easily separable from the rest which could be maintained. The objectionable sections related to the enrolment of the militia in the state generally, and the-rest to the organization of eight thousand men as a " volunteer-active militia." This evidently brought that case within the-rule which controls the determination of this class of questions,, that the constitutional part of a statute may be enforced and the unconstitutional part rejected; " where the parts are so distinctly separable that each can stand alone, and where the court is able to see and. to declare that the intention of -the-legislature was that the part pronounced valid should be en-forcible, even though the other part should fail." Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U. S. at p. 305. As was said in Louisiana v. Allen, 103 U. S. 80, 84: " The point to be determined in all such cases is whether the unconstitutional provisions are so-connected with the general scope of the law as to make it impossible, if they are stricken out, to give effect to what, appears to have been the intent of the legislature."
Applying this rule to the present case, it is clear that § 5519 cannot be sustained in whole or in part in its operation .within a state, unless United States v. Harris is overruled, and this we see no. occasion for doing. That case was carefully considered at the time, and subsequent reflection has not changed our opinion .as then expressed. For this reason we answer the second branch of the fourth question, which has been certified, in the negative. This disposes of all the other points included in the first six questions, and no further answer to them is necessary.
We come now to the questions certified, which arise under § 5508. That this section is constitutional was decided in Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651, and United States v. Waddell, 112 U. S. 76. The real question to be determined, therefore, is, whether'what is charged to have been done by Baldwin constitutes an offence within the meaning of its provisions.
The section is found in Title LXX, c. 7, of the Bevised Statutes embracing "Crimes against the Elective Franchise and Civil Bights of Citizens," and it provides for the punishment of those " who conspire to injure, oppress^ threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or- because of his having exercised the same; " and of those-who go in companies of two or more "in disguise on the highway, or on the premises of another, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege so- secured." Tne person on whom the wrong to be punishable must be inflicted is described as a citizen. In .the Constitution and laws of the United States the word ".citizen" is generally, if not always, used in a political sense to designate one who has the rights and privileges of a Citizen of a state or of the United States. It is so used in section 1 of Article XIV of the amendments of the Constitution, which provides that " all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside," and that "no state shall make or enforce' any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." But it is also sometimes used in popular language to indicate the same thing as resident, inhabitant, or person. That it is not so used in § 5508 in the Bevised Statutes is quite clear, if we revert to the original statute from which this section was taken. That statute was the act of May 31, 1870, c. 114, 16 Stat. 140, "to enforce the Eight of Citizens of the United States to. vote in the several States of this Union, and for other purposes." ' It is the statute which was under consideration as to some of its sections in. United States v. Reese, supra, and from its title, as well as its text, if is apparent that the great purpose of Congress in its enactment was to enforce the political j¿ghts of citizens of the United States in the several states. Under these circumstances there cannot be a doubt that originally the word " citizen " was used in its political sense, and as the Eevised Statutes are but a revision and consolidation of the statutes in force December 1,1873, the presumption is that the word has the same meaning there, that it had originally.
This particular section is a substantial re-enactment of § 6 of the original act, which is found among the sections that deal exclusively with the political rights of citizens, especially their right to vote, and wefe evidently intended to prevent discriminations in this particular against voters on account " of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." Sometimes, as in § 3 and 4, the language is broader than this, and therefore, as decided in United States v. Reese, those sections are inoperative, but still it is everywhere apparent that Congress had it in mind to legislate for citizens, as citizens, and not as mere persons, residents or inhabitants.
This section is highly penal in its character, much more so than any others, for it not only provides as a punishment for the offence a fine of not more than five thousand dollars and an imprisonment of not more than ten years, but it declares that any person convicted shall " be thereafter ineligible to any office, or place of honor, profit, or trust created by the, Constitution or laws of the United States." It is, therefore, to be construed strictly; not so strictly as to defeat the legislative will, but doubtful words are not to be extended beyond their natural meaning in the connection in which they are used. Here the doubtful word is " citizen," and it is used in connection with the rights and privileges pertaining to a man as a citizen, and not as a person only or an inhabitant. And, besides, the crime has been classified in the revision among those which relate to the elective franchise and the civil rights of citizens. For these reasons we are satisfied that the word "citizen," as' used in this statute, must be given the same meaning it has in the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, and that to constitute the offence which is there provided for, the wrong must be done to one who is a citizen in that sense..
It is true that the word "citizen" only occurs in the first clause of the section, but in the second clause there is nothing to indicate that any other than a citizen was meant, and the section of the original statute from which this was taken has nothing from which any -different inference can be drawn'. That clearly deals with citizens alone, and the revision differs from it only in a re-arrangement of the original sentences and the exclusion of some superfluous words. Sections 5506 and 5507, which immediately precede this'in the revision, clearly refer to political rights only, for they both relate to the privilege of voting, § 5506 being for the protection of citizens in terms, and § 5507 being for the protection of those to whom . the right of suffrage is guaranteed by the Fifteenth Amendment of the Constitution. It may be that by this construction of the statute some are excluded from the protection it affords who are as much entitled to it as those" who are included ; but that is a defect, if it exists, which can be cured by Congress, but not by the courts. .
We therefore answer the first subdivision of the seventh question certified in the negative. The second subdivision need not be answered otherwise than it has Keen elsewhere in this opinion.
It remains only to consider that part of the questions certified which relates to § 5336. That section provides for the punishment of those who conspire, 1, " to overthrow, put down, or "destroy by force the government of the United States, or to levy war against them, or to oppose by force the authority thereof;" or, 2,;"by force to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of the United States; "or, 3, " by force to seize, take, or possess any property of the United States con trary to the authority thereof." This is a re-enactment of similar provisions in the act of July 31, 1861, c. 33, 12 Stat. 281, "to define and punish certain Conspiracies," and in that of April 20, 1871, c. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13, "to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for other Purposes."
It cannot be claimed that Baldwin has been charged with a conspiracy to overthrow the government or to levy war within the meaning of this section. Nor is he charged with any attempt to seize the property of the United States. " All,-there- fore, 'depends on that part of the section which provides a punishment for "opposing" by force the authority of the United States, or for preventing, hindering, or delaying the " execution " of any law of the United States.
This evidently implies force against the government as a government. To constitute an offence under the first clause, the authority of the government must be opposed; that is to say, force must be brought to resist some positive assertion of authority by the government. A mere violation of law'is not enough; there must be an attempt to prevent the actual exercise of authority. That is not pretended in this case. The force was exerted in opposition to a class of persons who had. the right to look to the government for protection against such wrongs,' not in opposition to the government while actually engaged in an attempt to afford that protection.
So, too, as to the second clause, the offence consists in preventing, hindering, or delaying the government of the United States in the execution of its laws. This, as well as the other, means something more than setting the laws themselves at defiance. There must be a forcible resistance of the author- • ity of the United States while endeavoring to carry the laws into execution. The United States are bound by their treaty with .China to exert their power to devise measures to secure the subjects of that government lawfully residing within the territory of the United States against ill treatment, and if in their efforts to carry the treaty into effect they had been forcibly opposed by persons who had conspired for that purpose, a state of things contemplated by the statute would have arisefi. But that is not what Baldwin has done. His conspiracy is for the ill treatment itself, and not for hindering or delaying the United States in the execution of their measures to prevent it. His force was exerted against the Chinese people,' and not against the government in its efforts to protect them. We are compelled, therefore, to answer the third-subdivision of the seventh question in the negative, and that covers the fourth subdivision.
This disposes of the whole case, and, without answering the questions certified more in detail,
We reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court, omd remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.