Case Name: POMPANO BEACH POLICE AND FIREMEN'S PENSION FUND, Petitioner, v. Orestes J. FRANZA, Respondent
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1981-10-14
Citations: 405 So. 2d 446
Docket Number: Nos. 79-2511, 79-2514
Parties: POMPANO BEACH POLICE AND FIREMEN’S PENSION FUND, Petitioner, v. Orestes J. FRANZA, Respondent.
Judges: DOWNEY, J., and SHARP, G. KENDALL, Associate Judge, concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 405
Pages: 446–449

Head Matter:
POMPANO BEACH POLICE AND FIREMEN’S PENSION FUND, Petitioner, v. Orestes J. FRANZA, Respondent.
Nos. 79-2511, 79-2514.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Oct. 14, 1981.
Rehearing Denied Nov. 23, 1981.
Stephen H. Cypen of Cypen & Nevins, Miami Beach, for petitioner.
Robert J. O’Toole, Fort Lauderdale, for respondent.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
We have for review an order of the circuit court, sitting in its appellate capacity, which reversed the Pompano Beach Police and Firemen's Pension Fund's denial of Orestes J. Franza's application for disability retirement and directed the Fund to pay and process the disability application.
In an abundance of caution the Fund filed both a petition for writ of certiorari (Case No. 79-2511) and a notice of appeal (Case No. 79 — 2514) to review the order of the circuit court. Thereafter the Fund sought to consolidate the cases. By order we granted the motion to consolidate both of said cases and directed that they proceed in accordance with Florida Appellate Rule 9.110(a)(1). However, since the matter was appealed to the circuit court and can only be reviewed here by certiorari, as successive appeals are not available, we treat the matter as a petition for writ of certiorari. We quash the order of the circuit court.
Franza had been a member of the Pension Fund for almost five years when he filed an application with the Fund's Board of Trustees for disability retirement from the position of Police Chief of the City of Pompano Beach on the basis of a back injury and heart condition incurred in the line of duty. Following a hearing, the Board denied Franza's application. On review by the circuit court, the findings of the Board regarding Franza's heart condition were reversed and the court ordered the Board to process Franza's disability application. When its motion for rehearing was denied, the Fund instituted these proceedings to challenge the appellate decision of the circuit court. Our review of this case has convinced us that the circuit court's reversal was not justified by the record before it.
At a hearing before the Board of Trustees of the Pension Fund three doctors testified and the Board had the benefit of a report of a fourth doctor. Three of the medical experts opined that Franza was not able to perform the duties of the job classification. One of those three experts believed Franza could perform most of the duties, but was particularly concerned over his ability to handle the responsibility factor. Thus, even the testimony of these three doctors fails to prove that Franza is totally disabled to perform the duties involved. As the court held in Nuce v. Board of Trustees, 246 So.2d 610 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1971), the disability provision of the retirement system involved does not provide for partial disability and, thus, the appellant was not entitled to retirement for the service connected cardiac disease.
However, even if the medical evidence from the three doctors referred to demonstrated a service connected total disability, the fourth doctor, Dr. Marangoni, testified that Franza was able to perform the duties of the office involved. This doctor is a Fellow of the American College of Cardiologists and American College of Physicians; he is board certified and appears to have excellent medical credentials. His testimony, though in conflict with the other doctors in varying degrees, is neither inherently incredible nor improbable and thus it alone constitutes substantial competent evidence upon which the Board of Trustees could rest their decision. As the court stated in Metropolitan Dade County v. Mingo, 339 So.2d 302 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1976):
The question of the weight and credibility of the evidence is for the administrative agency and not the reviewing court, even though the court may have reached a different conclusion on the same testimony. [Citations omitted] The court should not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative fact finder who heard the testimony and was in a position to evaluate the credibility of witnesses. [Citation omitted] . . .
Neither the circuit court in its appellate capacity, nor this court should reweigh the conflicting evidence. [Citations omitted] — 339 So.2d at 304.
See also Campbell v. Vetter, 392 So.2d 6 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981).
Since we find the record contains substantial competent evidence supporting the agency decision, it was error for the circuit court in its appellate capacity to overturn that decision.
Accordingly, the petition for writ of cer-tiorari is granted; the order of the circuit court is quashed; and the matter is remanded to the circuit court with directions to reinstate the decision of the Board of Trustees.
DOWNEY, J., and SHARP, G. KENDALL, Associate Judge, concur.
HURLEY, J., dissents, with opinion.