Case Name: CLACKAMAS COUNTY, Respondent, v. DUNHAM et ux, Appellants
Court: Oregon Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1977-08-17
Citations: 30 Or. App. 595
Docket Number: No. 91323, CA 6817
Parties: CLACKAMAS COUNTY, Respondent, v. DUNHAM et ux, Appellants.
Judges: Before Schwab, Chief Judge, and Lee and Johnson, Judges.
Reporter: Oregon Reports, Court of Appeals
Volume: 30
Pages: 595–608

Head Matter:
Argued May 25,
reversed August 17, 1977
CLACKAMAS COUNTY, Respondent, v. DUNHAM et ux, Appellants.
(No. 91323, CA 6817)
567 P2d 605
Mark P. O’Donnell, Portland, argued the cause for appellants. With him on the brief were John W. Shonkwiler and O’Donnell, Rhoades & Gerber, Portland.
Scott H. Parker, Clackamas County Counsel, Oregon City, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent.
Before Schwab, Chief Judge, and Lee and Johnson, Judges.
JOHNSON, J.

Opinion:
JOHNSON, J.
Defendants appeal the trial court decree declaring their mobile home a public nuisance and enjoining its use as a residence on defendants' property. On October 1, 1972, defendants erected a "double wide" mobile home on their property which is designated as RR (Recreational Residential) by Clackamas County. The county zoning ordinance provides:

"22.3 Permitted Uses:
"In a recreational residential district, the following uses are allowed as hereinafter provided:
"A. Principal uses
"1. One single-family dwelling unit per lot or parcel of land.
"B. Conditional uses
"1. The following uses may be allowed as a conditional use subject to Section 8 and Section 12.4, procedure for public hearing, of this Ordinance:
c. Mobile home parks, with an allowable maximum density of four (4) mobile homes per acre;
Defendants do not have a conditional use permit. Section 3.2 of the ordinance sets forth the pertinent definitions:

"Dwelling. A building designed for residential occupancy, but not a house trailer.
"Dwelling, Single-Family. A detached building containing one kitchen, designed for and occupied exclusively by one family and the household employees of that family, but not a trailer house. *
"Trailer Houses. Building designed in such a manner that it may be moved from one location to another."
The structure in question has 1,500 square feet and is 65 x 24 feet. It was constructed and transported in two separate units which were subsequently anchored to a preconstructed foundation and bolted together. The house contains a kitchen, living room, dining room, family room, utility room and three bedrooms. The tongue, axles, wheels and springs were removed when the house was erected. The foundation has subsequently been skirted, a front porch added together with a back patio. The surrounding property has been landscaped, fenced, and a circular driveway installed. The structure has the appearances of a conventionally constructed home. The county contends the structure is a "trailer house" and thus a nonpermitted use.
In Clackamas County v. Ague, 27 Or App 515, 556 P2d 1386 (1976), Sup Ct review denied (1977), we held that the subject ordinance was constitutional in that a county could make a reasonable classification between conventionally constructed homes and mobile homes, stating:
"Defendants' most recognizable constitutional argument is an equal protection claim: that it is unconstitutional to distinguish between conventionally constructed homes and mobile homes. Such a distinction may, as most of defendants' argument attempts to show, be unwise. But the equal protection inquiry is only for minimum rationality. The distinction is minimally rational for several reasons; to cite only one, it is widely believed by realtors, tax appraisers, etc. that conventionally constructed homes tend to appreciate in value while mobile homes tend to depreciate in value. This is sufficient to enable zoning ordinances to distinguish between the two forms of housing. [Citing case.]" 27 Or App at 518
A pertinent constitutional question, which was not raised in either Ague or here and which we do not reach, is whether the ordinance definition of "trailer house" is sufficiently certain for purposes of determin ing a non-permitted use. The question points up the underlying problem in applying a vague statute in this injunction proceeding. Conceivably, any building "may be moved from one location to another." The ordinance presumably refers to structures that are readily movable, but there is no standard provided either to those charged with the enforcement or for the courts for making such determination. See Lane County v. Heintz Const. Co., 228 Or 152, 364 P2d 627 (1961).
The additional descriptive phrase in the definition "designed in such manner" adds little to our enlighten ment. The term "design" infers that the structure is constructed with a conscious intent that it may be moved in the future. The requisite design feature must be interpreted to be prospective and not to refer to initial construction. Otherwise the ordinance would be a prohibition on all buildings. Any structure is movable in its initial construction. Materials must be delivered to the site. Even a conventionally constructed home entails some components, such as cabinets, that are prefabricated and assembled before delivery to the site. The modem prefabricated or modular house involves even fewer components that are readily movable to the site. The county's only witness, a planner, testified that in his opinion the ordinance does not prohibit prefabricated modular homes. The definition is not concerned with the portability of materials or components to the construction site, but whether the design of the "building," completed and in place, contains features that make it movable from one location to another.
Defendant contends that the county has not proved that defendants' home was a trailer house as defined in the ordinance. The sole witness for the county was a planner who investigated zoning violations and investigated the alleged violation at issue here. He stated that the only basis for determining whether defendants' home was a trailer house was his visual inspection and "the state insignia" affixed to the building. Presumably the state insignia reference is that which may be required under OES 446.170. Such insignia merely indicates compliance by the manufacturer with certain state requirements "to protect [against] substandard and unsafe plumbing, heating, ilhiminating, cooking and electrical equipment and installations." ORS 446.185(2). The insignia is not evidence of whether the structure may be moved from one location to another.
The county's witness conceded upon cross examination that there was nothing from Ids visual examination from which he could distinguish between defendants' home and conventionally constructed homes as to movability or otherwise. The defendant testified to the construction of the foundation, the bolting together of the two units and anchoring the units to the foundation, removal of the tongue, axles, wheels and springs, the skirting of the foundation and construction of the adjoining porch, patio and fences. The county made no effort to rebut any of this evidence or to show that these steps had not rendered the structure immovable.
The county attempts to rely on defendant's admission that the structure is characterized as a "mobile home" and that the terms "mobile home" and "trailer house" are used interchangeably in the Clackamas County ordinance. In Clackamas County v. Ague, supra, 27 Or App at 515, we acknowledged the interchangeability of these terms in the ordinance. The defect in the county's argument is that the ordinance does not define "mobile home" and thus the definition of "trailer house" is applicable. The fact that defendants' home is called a "mobile home" and that it was originally transported on wheels in two units does not make it a trailer house. The issue is not how the building arrived on the site, but whether in place it retained design features that made it readily movable from its location. The record is devoid of any evidence of movability. Plaintiff has failed to prove that defendants' home is a trailer house.
In Clackamas County v. Ague, supra, the appellant also argued that his mobile home would not constitute a trailer house. Our opinion in that case did not deal with that issue, but merely upheld the statute as to the constitutionality of the classification. The facts in that case are different in that there the mobile home was a single unit stored on the property with its wheels intact. In Yates v. Schumacher, 29 Or App 449, 563 P2d 771 (1977), we affirmed, Per Curiam citing Ague, an injunction abating a mobile home as a nuisance under the Clackamas County ordinance. The mobile home at issue there was practically identical to defendants'. The only distinction is that in Yates the county instituted proceedings before the construction was completed. It is doubtful that the factual differences in either Yates or Ague were of substantive significance. Appellants in both cases made the same assignments of error as made here. However in both those cases, as here, appellant relied primarily on arguments relating to the constitutionality of the classification. In any event we did not address in our opinions in Ague or Yates the assignments of error relating to the county's failure of proof that the mobile homes in question were trailer houses and to that extent we were in error.
Reversed.
With all due respect for the dissenting opinion of Chief Judge Schwab, there is no implication that we would hold the ordinance definition to be unconstitutionally vague. We mention this possible constitutional issue because the case illustrates the difficulty posed by attempting to apply the vague statutory language to concrete facts. The difficulty is compounded by changing technology. In the past the terms "trailer house" or "mobile home" were commonly understood to refer to a type of vehicular equipment. However, because of changing technology the term "mobile home" appears to encompass more than just vehicular equipment. Mobile home construction apparently has become a method of prefabricating and transporting components for residential structures of a stationary nature. The Clackamas County Ordinance may prohibit the latter type of structure if there is proof that the in-place structure is still movable. However, irrespective of any constitutional question presented, there are more precise definitions available such as those quoted in footnote 2 which prohibit this type of structure.
In Columbia County v. Kelly, 25 Or App 1, 548 P2d 163, Sup Ct review denied (1976), we upheld a zoning ordinance which differentiated between mobile and conventional homes. Significantly, the ordinance at issue there, unlike the Clackamas County ordinance, applied not only a portability test in defining a mobile home, but also looked to other physical characteristics. The ordinance defined mobile home to be:
" 'Any vehicle or similar portable structure having no foundation other than wheels, jacks or skirtings and so designed or constructed as to permit occupancy for living or sleeping purposes.' " 25 Or App at 5
2 R. Anderson, American Law of Zoning 2d, § 14.03, points to an even more explicit ordinance of Charlotte, North Carolina, which defines a mobile home as follows:
" 'A movable or portable dwelling over thirty-two (32) feet in length and over eight (8) feet wide, constructed to be transported on its own chassis and designed without a permanent foundation, whether or not a permanent foundation is subsequently provided, which includes one or more components that can be retracted for transporting purposes and subsequently expanded for additional capacity, or two (2) or more units separately transportable but designed to be joined into integral unit, as well as a portable dwelling composed of a single unit.' "
ORS 446.170 provides:
"(1) Trailers and recreational vehicles subject to the provisions of ORS 446.155 to 446.200, and trailers and recreational vehicles upon which alterations of installations of plumbing, heating, illuminating, cooking or electrical equipment are made shall have affixed thereto an insigne of compliance.
"(2) No person shall place an insigne of compliance on a trailer or recreational vehicle except as provided by ORS 446.155 to 446.200 and the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder."