Case Name: Gasz v. Strick
Court: Buffalo Superior Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1890-03-24
Citations: 9 N.Y.S. 408
Docket Number: 
Parties: Gasz v. Strick.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 9
Pages: 408–414

Head Matter:
Gasz v. Strick.
(Superior Court of Buffalo, General Term.
March 24, 1890.)
1. Judgment&emdash;Correction&emdash;Costs&emdash;Ejectment.
A judgment in ejectment for plaintiff, “without costs to either party, ” though plaintiff was, under the statute, entitled to them, may at a subsequent term of the court be amended so as to award the costs to him.
2. Same&emdash;Description of Estate.
A judgment in ejectment for plaintiff may be amended where it fails to specify plaintiff’s estate in the property recovered, as required by Code Civil Proc. 27. Y. § 1519.
8. Same&emdash;Previous Vacation of Judgment.
It is no objection to the amendment of a judgment in ejectment for plaintiff that another judge, at special term, has, on motion of defendant, vacated it, and granted a new trial under Code Civil Proc. 27. Y. § 1525, which requires a new trial to be granted the party against whom the judgment is rendered on payment by him of costs and damages. Such action of the judge being merely ministerial, the rule that one judge at special term shall not overrule the decision of another judge, but leave the party aggrieved to his appeal, does not apply.
Titus, J., dissenting.
Appeal from special term.
Ejectment by Peter Gasz against Michael Strick, in which plaintiff recovered judgment. The cause was tried before the Honorable Edward W. Hatch, Judge, without a jury. His decision, after setting forth his findings of fact and law, contained the direction “ that judgment should be entered accordingly, but without costs to either party.” Judgment thereupon, without costs, was entered September 20, 1888. The decision omitted to state, as required by section 1519 of the Code, “the estate of the plaintiff in the property recov ered.” Pursuant to section 1525 of the Code, on application of the defendant, the court, at special term, by an order dated October 31, 1888, vacated the judgment, and granted a new trial. After service of notice of the application for a new trial, the judgment yet standing, plaintiff, upon an order to show cause, brought on a motion to amend the judgment and decision so as to allow the plaintiff to recover costs by striking out the direction for judgment “without costs.” The court (Hon. Robert C. Titus, J.,) denied the motion “without prejudice to the plaintiff’s right to move before Judge Hatch for such relief if desired.” Subsequently, December 10, 1888, on motion of the plaintiff, defendant opposing, Judge Hatch made an order which, as entered, directed that “the findings,” referring to the court’s decision, be corrected by striking out the words “but without costs to either party,” and that a modified judgment be entered, in accordance with the corrected findings, awarding costs to the plaintiff, and further ordered and directed that “defendant may avail himself of the order made herein, ordering a new trial, after payment of the costs of the action.” Thereupon the modified judgment was entered, December 15, 1888. The defendant afterwards, April 18, 1889, made a motion at special term, held by Judge Hatch, to vacate the modified judgment, and the order directing the amendment of the decision, which motion was denied, and a further order made—not, so far as appears, on motion of either party—that the judgment last entered be further amended by specifying the estate of the plaintiff; and on the 23d day of April, 1889, a new judgment was entered, containing the substance of the two former judgments, and in addition specifying the plaintiff’s estate to be a fee. Code Civil Proc. 25T. T. § 1525, provides that, where judgment is rendered in ejectment, “the court, at any time within three years after such a judgment is rendered, * * * upon the application of the party against whom it was rendered, * * * and upon payment of all costs and all damages, * * * must make an order vacating the judgment, and granting a new trial in the action.” Prom the judgment entered December 15, 1888, and from the order of December 10, 1888, correcting the original judgment, striking out the provision “without costs,” and from the order of April 18, 1889, denying the defendant’s motion to vacate the order amending the decision and judgment entered, and further amending the judgment, defendant appeals.
Argued before Beckwith, C. J., and Titus, J.
D. G. Jackson, for appellant. Day & Parker, for respondent.
Affirming 3 N. Y. Supp. 830.

Opinion:
Beckwith, C. J.
I think the order correcting the decision and judgment was properly granted. Opinion of Hatch, J., 3 N. Y. Supp. 830. The orders were not objectionable on the ground that they overruled the decision of another judge at a special term. The defendant applied at special term, under section 1525 of the Code, for an order setting aside the judgment and granting a new trial. In ejectment, there is no power or discretion vested in the judge or court as to granting a new trial. In ejectment actions, the right to such order, and to a second trial, is vested in the defeated party to the action by statute. In this case the statute was mandatory, and the order was granted by the court, as it were, ministerially. The court was not called upon to make any judicial determination of an issue, or as to an alleged right. Therefore, the reason of the rule that one judge at special term should not overrule the decision of another judge, but leave the aggrieved party to his appeal, does not find applicability here. The reason for the rule failing, the rule itself is not controlling. Moreover, it will be observed that when the plaintiff first applied for an order to correct the decision and judgment, which was before a judge who did not try the case, his application was made upon affidavits showing that a motion was pending to vacate the judgment and for a second trial; and, although the order of the court refused the application, it expressly provided that it was without prejudice to an application before the judge who tried the cause. That order was in force-when the defendant obtained from the same judge the statutory order setting aside the judgment, and for a new trial.
It is contended on behalf of the appellant that it was not competent for the court, although the judge who tried the cause was presiding, to revoke the order made by another judge vacating the judgment, or to make an order-correcting his decision, and directing the re-entry of judgment. Although the order did not, in direct words, vacate the order setting aside the judgment, it, in effect, did so by correcting the decision, authorizing the entry of' anew judgment in conformity with the corrected decision, and providing-that the defendant might avail himself of the order for a new trial by payment of the costs awarded by the new judgment, neither the order correcting the decision and judgment as to costs, nor the order directing an amendment of the judgment so that it should specify the estate of the plaintiff, reviewed or overruled any judicial determination of the issues that the trial court had made, nor did they add anything to the adjudications of the trial judge. The direction in the decision that judgment should be entered, in accordance with the decision, "without costs," was not a "finding," nor an exercise of judicial discretion, so as to require an appeal in order to correct the error. Code, § 1022. It may be conceded for the present purpose that the court, on motion, cannot amend the record when the defect sought to be corrected is one that can be reached only by an appeal, and that an appeal is the remedy where the occasion is an alleged error in the process by which the contested rights of the parties are judicially determined, or in the final determination of these rights. But, beyond such necessity of appeal to review "findings" and adjudications, the power exercised by courts in the way of correcting their judgments seems to have been nearly unlimited. "The administration of justice would be extremely imperfect if this power did not exist." Ice Co. v. Insurance Co., 23 N. Y. 357; Adams v. Ash, 46 Hun, 105; Bank v. Morton, 67 N. Y. 199; Kenney v. Apgar, 93 N. Y. 539; Williams v. Thorn, 81 N. Y. 381; Hunt v. Grant, 19 Wend. 90; Stakes v. Campbell, 7 Cow. 425; Clark v. Hall, 7 Paige, 382.
It appeared on the record and from the findings that the action was ejectment, and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover. It followed as an incident that upon entry of judgment the plaintiff has a right, under the statute, to have the clerk tax and allow his costs. This is so obvious as to make it fairly presumable that the direction found in the decision of the court for judgment "without costs" was inserted from mistake or inadvertence. There are several inadvertences apparent in the language of the orders appealed from, e. g., in referring to the direction without costs in the decision as a "finding," and in the order directing the judgment, instead of the decision, to be amended so as to specify "the estate of the plaintiff." Code Civil Proc. N. Y. § 1519. There was no legal necessity for an appeal by the plaintiff in order to get a proper direction from the trial judge as to costs, or, rather, to get the non-jurisdiclional direction as to costs stricken out. Vandenburgh v. City of New York, 7 N. Y. Supp. 675. There was nothing susceptible of argument on such an appeal. The plaintiff's right to costs arises upon a direction in the statute to the clerk of the court, and was outside the jurisdiction of the court, and called for no exercise of discretion on the part of the court'.
The insertion in the judgment of the specification of the nature of the plaintiff's estate, if not authorized by the decision, should have been reached by a motion to strike out, instead of by appeal. There is no proof as to the occasion for the court to order the judgment so amended, though the respondent's brief says it was done by consent of counsel. But the evidence taken on the trial is not before us, no case having been made for review, and we cannot say that the nature of the plaintiff's estate in the land recovered did not plainly appear to be a fee, as adjudged. The court has inherent power to correct its judgment in the manner it did in this case. Ladd v. Stevenson, 112 N. Y. 325, 19 N. E. Rep. 842; Hatch v. Bank, 78 N. Y. 487; Vanderbilt v. Schreyer, 81 N. Y. 646. The order appealed from should be affirmed; and the judgment appealed from should be affirmed, with costs.