Case Name: Mack A. HAWTHORNE a/k/a Mack Alfred Hawthorne, Appellant, v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee
Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1999-06-29
Citations: 751 So. 2d 1090
Docket Number: No. 96-KA-00959-COA
Parties: Mack A. HAWTHORNE a/k/a Mack Alfred Hawthorne, Appellant, v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
Judges: McMILLIN, C.J., KING, P.J., BRIDGES, COLEMAN, DIAZ AND THOMAS, JJ., CONCUR.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 751
Pages: 1090–1099

Head Matter:
Mack A. HAWTHORNE a/k/a Mack Alfred Hawthorne, Appellant, v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
No. 96-KA-00959-COA.
Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
June 29, 1999.
Leslie C. Gates, Meridian, Attorney for Appellant.
Office of the Attorney General by Pat S. Flynn, Attorney for Appellee.

Opinion:
MODIFIED OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING.
SOUTHWICK, P.J.,
for the Court:
¶ 1. The previous opinion of the court is withdrawn and rehearing is granted. Mack A. Hawthorne was convicted of one count of attempted sexual battery and one count of aggravated assault by a jury in the Circuit Court of Lauderdale County. Hawthorne appeals alleging that the trial court erred in the following respects: (1) in failing to grant his motion to dismiss Count I of the indictment because it failed to allege the lack of consent of the victim and an overt act; (2) in allowing the State to amend Count II of the indictment so that the word "serious" was added as a modifier of "bodily injury"; (3) in amending the indictment to add habitual offender allegations; and (4) in sentencing Hawthorne to serve thirty years on the charge of attempted sexual battery. Finding merit in Hawthorne's first and second assignments of error, we reverse and remand.
FACTS
¶ 2. At approximately 8:30 p.m. on February 5, 1996, Hawthorne forced his way into the home of sixty-seven-year-old Virgie Tucker. Tucker testified at trial that Hawthorne knocked on her door asking for food. She did not know him, but thought that she recognized him as a man who lived on the street behind her house. When she said that she did not have any food, he then asked for a drink of water. Tucker closed the door and went to the kitchen and poured Hawthorne a glass of water. When Tucker came back to the door, Hawthorne forced his way into the house and told Tucker that he was going to kill her.
¶ 3. Tucker began screaming, so Hawthorne shoved his fist down her throat until Tucker could barely breathe. When he removed his fist, she screamed again, and Hawthorne jammed his fist down Tucker's throat twice more. Finally, he said that if she screamed again, he would stab her. Though she did not see a knife, Tucker stopped screaming.
¶ 4. Tucker testified that Hawthorne pushed her onto the bed, holding her with one hand and pulling his coveralls off with the other. She further testified that Hawthorne tried to pull her nightgown up, but she held it down. Hawthorne told her that he was going to rape her and kill her. During the struggle, the police arrived in response to a call from a neighbor whose house Hawthorne had approached before going to Tucker's. The neighbor suspected that Hawthorne was drunk and watched him force his way into Tucker's home. Upon arriving at the scene, the Meridian police officers found Hawthorne with his coveralls down,- pants unzipped, and missing one boot. Tucker was bleeding and her gown was torn.
¶ 5. The Grand Jury returned a two count indictment against Hawthorne. Based on a motion filed several days before trial, the State was allowed to amend the indictment to include habitual offender allegations on the day of trial. The first count charged Hawthorne with attempted sexual battery. The second count charged Hawthorne with aggravated assault. At the close of the State's case, the trial court allowed Count II to be amended to add the word "serious" as a modifier of "bodily injury." The defense then moved to dismiss based on the insufficiency of both counts of the indictment. The trial court overruled the objection and denied the motion to dismiss finding that it was an untimely demurrer to the indictment.
¶ 6. Hawthorne took the witness stand in his own defense. He told the jury that he had been drunk that night. Hawthorne admitted to going to Tucker's house and arguing with her about coming into her house. He stated that he had shoved her and possibly bumped her lip. Also, he recalled that his fist had "sort of stuck in her mouth." Hawthorne denied that he had planned to rape Tucker. He denied that his coveralls were down and his pants unzipped. He also denied that he was missing a boot, although one was discovered on the floor of Tucker's bedroom by the police. He basically told the jury that all of the other witnesses were lying and he was the only person telling the truth.
¶ 7. At the close of the ease, the defense renewed its motion to dismiss. The motion was denied and the case was submitted to the jury. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on both counts.
DISCUSSION
PART I. COUNT I OF INDICTMENT ON ATTEMPTED SEXUAL BATTERY
¶ 8. Hawthorne asserts as error the trial court's submission to the jury the question of whether he was guilty of attempted sexual battery under Count I of the indictment. Hawthorne claims that since the indictment failed to allege the lack of consent of the victim and an overt act, essential elements of the crime of attempted sexual battery, the indictment was insufficient. "The question of whether an indictment is fatally defective is an issue of law and deserves a relatively broad standard of review...." Peterson v. State, 671 So.2d 647, 652 (Miss.1996).
¶ 9. The supreme court has held that "in order to be sufficient, the indictment must contain the essential elements of the crime with which the accused is charged." Hennington v. State, 702 So.2d 403, 407 (Miss.1997). The previous year the court specifically found that the failure to allege the lack of consent in a sexual battery indictment was a fatal error. Peterson, 671 So.2d at 653.
It is fundamental . that an indictment, to be effective as such, must set forth the constituent elements of a criminal offense; if the facts alleged do not constitute such an offense within the terms and meaning of the law or laws on which the accusation is based, or if the facts alleged may all be true and yet constitute no offense, the indictment is insufficient. . Every material fact and essential ingredient of the offense — every essential element of the offense — must be alleged with precision and certainty, or, as has been stated, every fact which is an element in a prima facie case of guilty must be stated in the indictment.
Hennington, 702 So.2d at 408, quoting Peterson, 671 So.2d at 653.
¶ 10. The distinction that can be drawn here is that in Peterson the indictment did not refer to the sexual battery statute at all, but instead to Section 97-3-103. Peterson, 671 So.2d at 652. Thus the defendant could not know which of the sexual battery statute's three subsections would be the basis of proof: (l)(a) without consent, (l)(b) with a mentally or physically handicapped person, or (l)(c) with a child under age 14. Id. at 655; Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-95.
¶ 11. The indictment of Hawthorne was more specific. Count I charged Hawthorne as follows: "did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attempt to engage in sexual penetration as defined by MCA § 97-3-97, with Virgie Tucker (dob: 10/18/28), a female person over the age of eighteen years, in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated Section 97-3-95(l)(a) (1972).... " That subsection (l)(a) specifically requires a lack of consent. Whether that is adequate under Peterson depends in part on whether notice is the question, or whether the point is a more technical requirement that the indictment contain "a plain, concise and definite statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged...." Peterson, 671 So.2d at 655, quoting Unif.Crim. R. Cir. Ct. Prac. 2.05. The Peterson court in discussing one precedent strongly suggested that referring to a specific statutory subsection was inadequate:
This Court has yet to hold that the essential elements of the crime charged are not necessary to be included within the indictment. This Court in Roberson held that an indictment which cited a statute, rather than the specific subsection of the statute, was sufficient to "provide the defendant with notification in fact of the nature of the charge against him and out of what transaction or occurrence it arose." Roberson v. State, 595 So.2d [1310,] 1318 [(1992)]. In Roberson, as with the other cases in which indictments have been upheld, the facts supporting the essential elements of the offense were alleged within the indictment.
Peterson, 671 So.2d at 654. It appears that the court was explaining that despite language in Roberson that a cite to a subsection of a statute provides actual notice, it was still necessary that the indictment contain "the facts supporting the essential elements" of the crime. Id.
¶ 12. This charge against Hawthorne omits the essential element that the crime be without the victim's consent. Notice of that missing element arguably arose from the reference to the specific subsection. For Count I of the indictment it is unnecessary to resolve whether that is adequate under these precedents, as another defect in the indictment has no potential cure.
¶ 13. Besides the absence of words relating to consent, no overt act is alleged indicating the manner in which Hawthorne attempted this crime. See Miss.Code Ann. § 97-1-7 (Rev.1994). When the charge is the attempt to commit a crime, an allegation of an overt act is "mandatory." Watson v. State, 483 So.2d 1326, 1328 (Miss.1986); Maxie v. State, 330 So.2d 277, 277-278 (Miss.1976). The rules of pleading may not be as technical as in previous judicial eras, but there are still basic obligations with which the State must comply regarding the information provided in an indictment. As to an overt act, the State failed to provide any concise and plain statement of the essential facts that would be alleged. Actually, they provided no statement at all.
¶ 14. It is true that Hawthorne did not demur to the indictment, but the omission of an essential element in an indictment is not waived by failure to demur. Durr v. State, 446 So.2d 1016, 1017 (Miss.1984). One and perhaps two of the essential elements of the crime of attempted sexual battery are not contained in the indictment. Consequently, the indictment failed to charge Hawthorne with the crime for which he was convicted.
¶ 15. The conviction under Count I is reversed.
PART II. AMENDMENT TO COUNT II OF INDICTMENT
¶ 16. Hawthorne also contends that the trial court erred in allowing an amendment to the indictment so that the word "serious" was interlined as a modifier of "bodily injury." The second count of the indictment was titled "Aggravated Assault", but defined the crime charged as "wilfully, unlawfully, knowingly, and feloniously and purposely cause or attempt to cause bodily injury to another, Virgie Tucker, with his fist, by striking her in violation of Mississippi Code Ann. § 97-3-7(2) (1972) ." (emphasis added). The State, recognizing what they deemed to be a clerical error, made a motion to amend the indictment. The trial court denied the defense's motion to dismiss, finding that it was in reality an untimely demurrer to the sufficiency of the indictment, and allowed the State to amend the indictment to add the word "serious" as a modifier of "bodily injury."
¶ 17. This issue causes us to take the analysis of the preceding issue one step further. The discussion of Count I of the indictment revolved around the omission of an essential element of the offense, but the indictment's reference to the relevant statute may have provided the missing element. Count II raises the problem of a missing element; again the indictment referred to the controlling statute and at trial the omission was corrected by amendment.
¶ 18. The same case law as for Count I is initially useful. As recently as in Peterson, the court distanced itself from any suggestion in precedents that the failure to assert an essential element of an offense in the indictment could be cured by reference to a code section in which the element appeared. Peterson, 671 So.2d at 654-55. The dissent specifically called the majority to task for reinvigorating older law that in the dissent's view had been substantially modified on this issue. Id. at 660-61 (Pittman, J., dissenting). The result though, not changed by later precedents, is that every element must be alleged.
¶ 19. Serious bodily injury is an element of aggravated assault. Therefore the absence of the word "serious" results in the omission of an essential element of the offense. Here, however, the State was granted the right to amend the indictment. We must decide if that cures the problem.
¶ 20. The propriety of an amendment is generally said to depend upon whether the amendment was one of form or substance. The supreme court has outlined the following test to be used in making such a determination:
whether or not a defense under the indictment or information as it originally stood would be equally available after the amendment is made and whether or not any evidence that the accused might have would be equally applicable to the indictment or information in the one form as in the other; if the answer is in the affirmative, the amendment is one of form and not of substance.
Griffin v. State, 540 So.2d 17, 21 (Miss.1989). The circumstances of Griffin are similar to those here. The charging portion of the indictment also omitted the word "serious" as a modifier of "bodily injury," but included the language "with a deadly weapon, to wit: a pistol, by shooting. ." The indictment was amended to add the phrase "a means likely to produce serious bodily injury" after the word "pistol." The addition of this phrase changed the defense's entire strategy because they had built their case around the theory that the firing of the gun was accidental.
¶ 21. There is no such frustration of a defense strategy in Hawthorne's case. The indictment as amended did not negate a defense that Hawthorne was relying upon in his case. Hawthorne had been informed by the indictment that he was charged with aggravated assault. It was so titled and the aggravated assault statutory section was referenced. Hawthorne's defense concerned absence of intent, such as his hand accidentally falling into her mouth when he was drunk. The amendment completed a matter of statutory form that did not affect Hawthorne's defense. We find, however, that prejudice is not the sole test of whether this kind of amendment is proper.
¶ 22. The inadequacy of an indictment that fails to allege each individual element and the right of the State to amend an indictment for matters of form are concepts that must be reconciled. In one case, the indictment had failed to state that the substance named in the indictment, "preludin," contained the controlled substance "phenmetrazine." Brewer v. State, 351 So.2d 535, 536 (Miss.1977). Pre-ludin was not listed in any statute as a controlled substance. "Therefore, an essential ingredient of the indictment was omitted and the indictment was invalid. Under these circumstances the indictment could not be amended." Id. A later case described Brewer as holding that "a substantive defect in an indictment cannot be cured by extrinsic proof and is not waived by the failure to demur thereto." Copeland v. State 423 So.2d 1333, 1336 (Miss.1982). In Copeland, the controlled substance was said to be " methylenedioxy amphetamine," when the proper name for it also contained the numerals "3, 4" immediately preceding the words. The State argued that the omission was a matter of form and therefore amendable, but the court held that an amendment to add an essential element was improper. Id.
¶ 23. Returning to the ease law discussed under Count I, we find the controlling consideration to be that "every fact which is an element in a prima facie case of guilty must be stated in the indictment." Hennington, 702 So.2d at 408, quoting Peterson, 671 So.2d at 653. Though this can appear formalistic, it is a formula endorsed by the supreme court. To permit an amendment to add what the grand jury cannot leave out, is to undermine the clarity that cases such as Peterson require in the indictment. Amendments can correct other matters if the nature of the defense is not changed, but cannot add a necessary element to the description of the offense.
¶ 24. Notice is not the issue. It would be hard to argue that Hawthorne was unaware that he was charged with aggravated assault. The obligation is on the State to include each statutory element of the offense in the indictment. It is a hurdle, one on which the State occasionally trips as is shown in the various precedents. The hurdle requires careful attention to detail, but that is all.
¶ 25. The State failed to include each element of the offense in this indictment. The defect was therefore substantive and could not be cured by amendment. The conviction is reversed.
PART III. HABITUAL OFFENDER ALLEGATION
¶ 26. Though we are reversing the assault conviction, we address one final question under that part of the indictment. Hawthorne alleges that the trial court erred in allowing the State to amend the indictment to charge him as an habitual offender. Hawthorne cites a case for the proposition that an amendment to an indictment to add habitual offender allegations is only proper when brought by the grand jury that returned the indictment. Akins v. State, 493 So.2d 1321, 1322 (Miss.1986). While correct in his interpretation of Akins, Hawthorne fails to note that the law has changed since that ruling. In 1995, Rule 7.09 of the Uniform Rules of Circuit and County Practice was adopted. Rule 7.09 explicitly allows indictments to be amended to charge a defendant as an habitual offender. There is a requirement that the defendant be afforded a fair opportunity to present a defense and that he not be unfairly surprised. Hawthorne makes no claim of surprise or improper limits on his defense. We find compliance with the rule.
¶ 27. Hawthorne also claims that Rule 7.09 is inconsistent with Rule 11.03 of URCCC. Rule 11.03 states that the indictment must include certain habitual offender information. There is no inconsistency between these rules. Rule 7.09 merely allows the State to comply with Rule 11.03. Accordingly we find no error in that amendment.
¶ 28. PART I: THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LAUDER-DALE COUNTY OF CONVICTION OF ATTEMPTED SEXUAL BATTERY AND SENTENCE TO SERVE THIRTY YEARS IS REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. PARTS II & III: THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION OF AGGRAVATED ASSAULT AND SENTENCE TO SERVE TWENTY YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AS AN HABITUAL OFFENDER IS REVERSED AND REMANDED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE TAXED TO LAUDERDALE COUNTY.
McMILLIN, C.J., KING, P.J., BRIDGES, COLEMAN, DIAZ AND THOMAS, JJ., CONCUR.
PAYNE, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH * SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.
DIAZ, J., JOINS IN CONCURRENCE.
IRVING AND LEE, JJ., NOT PARTICIPATING.