Case Name: PEOPLE v. YOUNG
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1981-02-23
Citations: 410 Mich. 363
Docket Number: Docket Nos. 64444, 64563
Parties: PEOPLE v YOUNG
Judges: Coleman, C.J., and Williams, Fitzgerald, and Blair Moody, Jr., JJ., concurred.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 410
Pages: 363–377

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v YOUNG
Docket Nos. 64444, 64563.
Decided February 23, 1981.
On application by the parties for leave to appeal the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Donald Young was convicted by a jury in Recorder’s Court of Detroit, George W. Crockett, Jr., J., of manslaughter and was sentenced on March 25, 1977. Seven weeks later the defendant was charged in a supplemental information as being a fourth felony habitual offender. The trial court found that one of the prior convictions was invalid for habitual offender purposes, and a jury found the defendant guilty as a third offender. The Court of Appeals, Bashara, P.J., and N. J. Kaufman and Van Valkenhurg, JJ., vacated the habitual offender conviction and reinstated the defendant’s sentence for manslaughter in an unpublished per curiam opinion, relying on a decision of the Supreme Court, announced August 28, 1979, requiring a prosecutor who knows that an accused person has a prior felony record to proceed against the person as an habitual offender before conviction on the current charge (Docket No. 77-5133). The parties apply for leave to appeal. In a per curiam opinion signed by Chief Justice Coleman and Justices Williams, Fitzgerald, and Moody, the Supreme Court held:
The dispositive issue in this case is whether the Supreme Court decision concerning' prompt procedure in habitual offender cases should be given retroactive or prospective application. The three key factors in deciding the issue are: the purpose of the new rule, the general reliance on the old rule, and the effect of retroactive application of the new rule on the administration of justice. The primary purpose of the rule is to provide fair notice to the accused of the supplemental charge so as to avoid the appearance of prosecutorial impropriety. It would not serve that purpose to apply the rule to past conduct. The decision is based on the Court’s supervisory powers over the practices and procedures used in the courts. A new rule of procedure which does not affect the integrity of the fact-finding process should be given prospective effect. Furthermore, the former practice of filing the habitual offender information only after conviction of the current felony was widespread. Retroactive application of the new policy would have an adverse effect on the administration of justice. Therefore, the rule requiring promptness in charging the defendant as an habitual offender is applicable to cases pending on appeal on August 28, 1979, the date of its decision, provided the issue was raised during the pendency of the appeal, and in cases in which the original trial or guilty plea hearing concluded 20 days after August 28, 1979. Because the defendant in this case raised the issue in his appeal, which was pending in the Court of Appeals on that date, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Justice Levin, joined by Justice Kavanagh, concurred in the disposition but he would not limit the application of the rule to cases in which the issue was raised. The rule, rather than innovating a new procedure, reaffirmed a procedure announced by the Court of Appeals in 1968 which the Supreme Court approved in 1970. Although in the interim other panels of the Court of Appeals took the position that the procedure was not mandatory, the directive announced in 1979 was not novel. Prosecutors could have determined that the procedure approved in 1970 might be unequivocally reaffirmed, as it subsequently was, and could have complied with the prescribed procedures at any time without surrendering any legitimate tactical advantage or assuming any burden. Since prosecutors would not have been prejudiced or burdened by compliance with the procedures, and non-compliance may result in prejudice to the accused, the balance favors retroactivity. The Court should not, at the expense of defendants, protect prosecutors from the consequences of their failure to guard against the eventuálity that the procedures might some day be made mandatory. In most cases, the prosecutor will have had notice from his own records or from other sources of the defendant’s prior convictions. Justice Levin would, therefore, establish a policy of vacating the habitual offender charge and reinstating the original unenhanced sentence, or remanding for resentencing, in any case where a defendant with prior felony convictions was not charged as an habitual offender until after conviction of the current felony, subject to the prosecutor’s right to show that he did not know, and should not have been on notice, of the prior convictions.
Justice Ryan concurred in the result. Prosecutors have been on notice since 1970 that the procedure at issue is the approved one for proceeding against alleged habitual offenders.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William L. Cahalan, Prosecuting Attorney, Edward Reilly Wilson, Principal Attorney, Appeals, and Anne B. Wetherholt, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
State Appellate Defender (by Lynn Chard) for defendant.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
Defendant was tried for second-degree murder in Detroit Recorder's Court. On March 18, 1977, the jury found him guilty of manslaughter. The trial judge sentenced defendant to 10 to 15 years in prison on March 25, 1977.
Defendant subsequently filed a claim of appeal. The Court of Appeals granted the prosecutor's motion to affirm on May 11, 1978, and this Court denied defendant's request for review on March 29, 1979. The validity of defendant's manslaughter conviction is not at issue today.
On May 19, 1977, seven weeks subsequent to defendant's sentencing, the prosecutor filed a supplemental information charging defendant as a fourth felony habitual offender pursuant to MCL 769.12; MSA 28.1084.
On October 7, 1977, a jury found defendant's March 18, 1977, manslaughter conviction to be his third felony and found him guilty as a third offender, MCL 769.11; MSA 28.1083. The trial judge sentenced defendant to 20 to 30 years for the habitual offender charge which enhanced the manslaughter sentence of 10 to 15 years.
The Court of Appeals in an unpublished per curiam opinion vacated defendant's habitual offender conviction and reinstated the 10-to-15-year manslaughter sentence. The Court relied upon our holding in People v Fountain, 407 Mich 96, 98-99; 282 NW2d 168 (1979).
In Fountain, we held:
"A prosecutor who knows a person has a prior felony record must promptly proceed, if at all, against the person as an habitual offender. People v Hatt, 384 Mich 302; 181 NW2d 912 (1970); People v Stratton, 13 Mich App 350; 164 NW2d 555 (1968). The prosecutor is not foreclosed from proceeding against a person as an habitual offender after conviction on the current offense provided he is unaware of a prior felony record until after the conviction. MCL 769.13; MSA 28.1085. The only recognized exception to this rule is when the delay is due to the need to verify out-of-state felony convictions based on the 'rap sheet'. People v Hendrick, 398 Mich 410; 247 NW2d 840 (1976)."
The dispositive issue in this case is whether the holding in People v Fountain should be given retroactive or prospective application.
"When the issue of retroactivity arises, the case of Linkletter v Walker, 381 US 618; 85 S Ct 1731; 14 L Ed 2d 601 (1965), is often used to determine a solution." People v Rich, 397 Mich 399, 402-403; 245 NW2d 24 (1976); People v Hampton, 384 Mich 669; 187 NW2d 404 (1971). The three key factors in the Linkletter test are: (a) the purpose of the new rule; (b) the general reliance on the old rule; and (c) the effect of retroactive application of the new rule on the administration of justice.
It is clear that the primary purpose of the rule established in People v Fountain, is to provide fair notice to the accused of the supplemental charge so as to avoid the appearance of prosecutorial impropriety. As noted in the concurring opinion in Fountain, the decision requiring the prosecutor to proceed in this manner is based on this Court's supervisory powers over the practices and procedures used in our courts.
When a decision of this Court involves a rule which concerns the ascertainment of guilt or innocence, retroactive application may be appropriate. People v Hampton, supra. Conversely, a new rule of procedure adopted by this Court which does not affect the integrity of the fact-finding process should be given prospective effect.
We consider the latter two Linkletter factors together because the amount of past reliance will often have a profound effect upon the administration of justice.
The former practice of filing the habitual offender information only after conviction on the current felony was widespread. Retroactive application of the Fountain policy would have an adverse effect on the administration of justice. The rule established in Fountain is procedural in nature, mandating how a prosecutor must proceed when charging a defendant as an habitual offender pursuant to a supplemental information. The guilt or innocence of the accused is not at issue. Since the purpose of the rule is to avoid an appearance of prosecutorial impropriety, it would not serve that purpose to apply the rule to past conduct.
We conclude that People v Fountain is applicable to cases pending on appeal on August 28, 1979, the date of decision in People v Fountain, provided the issue was raised during the pendency of the appeal; and in cases, the original trial or guilty plea hearing of which concluded 20 days after the date of decision in People v Fountain.
In lieu of granting leave to appeal, pursuant to GCR 1963, 853.2(4), we affirm the Court of Appeals decision which vacated defendant's habitual offender conviction and reinstated the conviction and 10-to-15-year sentence for manslaughter.
Coleman, C.J., and Williams, Fitzgerald, and Blair Moody, Jr., JJ., concurred.
Pursuant to defendant's motion, one of the prior convictions was found invalid for habitual offender purposes.
This Court in Fountain noted that the prosecutors must be presumed to have known of the defendants' prior felony records because their offices prosecuted the prior felonies.
In the case at bar, defendant's prior convictions were in Recorder's Court for the City of Detroit. The prosecutors must be presumed to have known of defendant's record since their offices prosecuted the cases.
Defendant Donald Young raised the Fountain issue in his appeal, which was pending in the Court of Appeals when we decided Fountain.
Defendant asserts that reinstatement of the 10-to-15-year sentence for manslaughter is error due to alleged defects in that sentence. He argues that the proper remedy was a remand for resentencing.
The Court of Appeals did not err and, as noted, we affirm their decision. Defendant is directed to Guilty Plea Cases, 395 Mich 96, 137; 235 NW2d 132 (1975), for the proper procedure to follow in challenging the sentence.