Case Name: E. L. Miller v. The State
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1920-11-03
Citations: 88 Tex. Crim. 69
Docket Number: No. 5849
Parties: E. L. Miller v. The State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Criminal Reports
Volume: 88
Pages: 69–77

Head Matter:
NOVEMBER 1920
E. L. Miller v. The State.
No. 5849.
Decided November 3, 1920.
Rehearing denied December 1, 1920.
1.—Embezzlement—Indictment—Corporation—Surplusage.
Where, defendant was indicted under Article 1416, Vernon’s Penal Code, and it was alleged that he was a clerk and employee of a corporation, there was no error in the trial court, in passing upon defendant’s motion to quash, to hold that the use of the word “employee” was surplusage, where it occurred in said indictment.
2.—Indictment—Embezzlement—Capacity of Accused—Fiduciary Relation.
Where, upon trial of embezzlement, under Article 1416, Vernon’s Penal Code, the capacity in which the defendant was acting for his employer was alleged as clerk, in such manner as to bring it within the terms of the statute, and further alleged the fiduciary relations existing, and that it was his duty to receive and care for certain moneys of the corporation, the indictment was sufficient.
3.—Same—Insufficiency of the Evidence—Clerk—Cashier—Variance.
- Where, upon trial of embezzlement under Article 1416, Vernon’s Penal Code, it was alleged that defendant was a clerk and employee of a certain corporation (trial court holding that the word “employee” was surplusage because it is not named in the statute), and the evidence on the trial showed that he was a cashier and not a clerk, and the proof entirely rebutted the proposition that he was ever employed in such capacity, the variance between the proof offered and the allegation in the indictment was fatal and reversible error.
4.—Same—Evidence—Other Transactions—Intent—Rules Stated.
Where, upon trial of embezzlement under Article 1416, Vernon’s Penal Code, there was a vigorous cross-examination of other employees of the alleged corporation, suggesting the appropriation of the alleged embezzled money by such other employees, and other facts in the instant case, there was no error in permitting the State to show other transactions on. the part of defendant of like kind as the one charged in the indictment, to show intent or guilty knowledge, limiting said evidence to its proper sphere. Following Fry v. State, 86 Texas Crim. Rep., 73.
5.—Same—Evidence—Letters.
Where, upon trial of embezzlement, under Article, supra the State introduced the contents of two letters found in defendant’s trunk when arrested, which, although in defendant’s handwriting^ were neither dated, signed, nor addressed, and nothing in either letter referred to any of the facts of any transaction transpiring while defendant was employed by the alleged corporation, etc., the same were inadmissible in evidence.
6.—Same—Circumstantial Evidence—Charge of Court.
Where, on trial of embezzlement under Article 1416, supra, the main fact sought to be proved was a matter of inference, the case was one of circumstantial evidence, and a failure of the court to charge on circumstantial evidence, is reversible error. Following Ward v. State, 10 Texas Crim. App., 513, and other cases.
7.—Same—Rehearing—Indictment—Different Counts.
This court, in its original opinion, should have1 stated that the indictment herein contains seven counts, and that upon defendant’s motion the State elected the seventh count in which defendant was charged as a clerk or employee of a corporate company. This would have been clearer but in no wise affects the decision.
8. —Same—Words and Phrases—Clerk—Employee—Embezzlement—Corporation-
The word “employee” not appearing in the statutory expression of who may commit embezzlement for a corporation, it is evident that the legal terms used in describing defendant’s attitude and relationship in the indictment, being thus narrowed down to the allegations that he was a clerk, there must be evidence which showed him to be a clerk, else the court will be forced to the conclusion of a variance between the indictment and the proof.
9. —Same—Clerk—Employee—Cashier—Legal Definitions.
Where, the motion for rehearing insisted that, while appellant was known and designated by those who employed him, and who were associated with him in business, as a cashier, that he was, notwithstanding, a clerk, and that the question for decision is not, what a man is called, but what he is, held, that there is a clear distinction between a cashier and a clerk, both in view of the lexicographers and the leading definition given in the law books, and under the facts of the instant case.
10. —Same—Evidence—Letters—Case Cited.
Upon motion for rehearing, the court is unable to find any parallel between the case cited by appellant and the facts in the instant case, with regard to the introduction of letters found in appellant’s possession when arrested. Distinguishing Thompson v. State, 35 Texas Crim. Rep., 523.
11.—Same—Circumstantial Evidence—Charge of Court—Rule Stated.
The factum probandum in embezzlement cases is the fraudulent conversion and appropriation of the property in question, and though it he established by positive testimony that said property came into the possession of the defendant, this would not relieve the case of being one of circumstantial evidence, and the court should have submitted, a charge on circumstantial evidence as requested. Following Stewart v. State, 71 Texas Crim. Rep., 480, and other cases.
Appeal from the District Court of Bexar. Tried below before the Honorable W. S. Anderson.
Appeal from a conviction of embezzlement under Article 1416, Vernon’s Penal Code; penalty, two years imprisonment in the penitentiary.
The opinion states the case.
Chambers & Watson, for appellant.
On question that the indictment must allege the capacity and relationship of employment: Johnson v. State, 21 Texas, 775; Clark v. State, 8 Texas Crim. App., 350; Gilliard v. State, 182 S. W. Rep., 1136.
On question of no relationship between clerk and employee made penal by statute: State v. McLane, 43 Texas, 404; Roby v. State, 41 Texas Crim. Rep., 152.
On question of necessity of proving that embezzled money came in defendant’s possession by his employment as clerk: Brady v. State, 21 Texas Crim App., 660; Griffin v. State, 4 id., 414; Gaddy v. State, 8 id., 128; Huntsman v. State, 12 id., 629. Fitch v. State, 58 Texas Crim. Rep., 366. Fleming v. State, 62 id., 653. Gilliard v. State, supra.
On question of court's failure to charge on circumstantial evidence : Hunt v. State, 7 Texas Crim. App., 212; Barr v. State, 10 id., 507; Ward v. State, 10 id., 297; Anderson v. State, 213 S. W. Rep., 639.
On question of other offenses: Denton v. State, 42 Texas Crim. Rep., 429; Clark v. State, 59 id., 246; Davenport v. State, 89 S. W. Rep., 1077; Bowman v. State, 155 S. W. Rep, 940; Harris v. State, 117 id., 839.
On question of introduction of letters: Rix v. State, 33 Texas Crim. Rep., 353; McColloh v. State, 44 id., 152; Cowan v. State, 56 S. W. Rep., 751; Duckworth v. State, 57 id., 665.
Alvin M. Owsley, Assistant Attorney General, and D. A. McAskill, District Attorney, and W. S. Anthony, Assistant District Attorney, for the State.
On question of sufficiency of the indictment: Lamb v. State, 49 Texas Crim. Rep., 443; Sturgis v. Bank, 11 Ohio State, 153; State v. Reubalo, 9 South. Rep., 465; Gantt v. Cox, 48 Alabama, 922; Reg. v. Bailey, 12 Cox C. O., 56; State v. Yeiter, 54 Kan. 277; 20 Corpus Juris, p. 440.
On question of exculpatory statement: McKinney v. State, 48 Texas Crim. Rep., 404; Powdrill v. State, 155 S. W. Rep., 231.

Opinion:
LATTIMORE, Judge.
Appellant was convicted in the 37th District Court, of Bexar County, of the offense of embezzlement of property of the value of more than fifty dollars, and his punishment was fixed at two years confinement in the State penitentiary.
Appellant urged various objections to the indictment in this case, none of which we think are sufficient. Aritele 1416, Vernon's Penal Code, which names those persons who may be held guilty of embezzlement from a corporation, enumerates "any officer, agent, clerk, attorney at law or in fact." The word "employee" is not used in this connection in the statute, and we infer that the trial court, in passing upon this motion to quash, held that the use of the word "employee" was surplusage where it occurred in said indictment. The accused was indicted for embezzlement, it being alleged that he was a clerk and employee of the Brown Cracker and Candy Company, a corporation.
The capacity in which the accused was acting for his employer, when the property came into his possession, in an embezzlement case, must be alleged in such manner as to, bring it within the terms of the statute. In the instant case, the allegation that appellant was the clerk of the Brown Cracker and Candy Company, a corporation, is an allegation of a capacity named, and is, therefore, sufficient under the statute. Likewise, we think the further allegation in the indictment, that the property of said corporation alleged to have been embezzled, "came into the possession, and was then and there under the care of the said E. L. Miller by virtue of his said employment and relation as . . . clerk . as aforesaid," was a sufficient charging that a fiduciary relationship existed, and that it was appellant's duty to receive and care for said money.
There are a great many errors complained of in the able brief filed by appellant's counsel, but in our view of the case, it is only necessary to notice some of the more important ones presented. A careful examination of the statement of facts discloses that the manager of the Brown Cracker and Candy Company, at .San Antonio, under whom appellant worked for a number of years, testified in so many words that appellant never did work for the Brown Cracker and Candy Company in the capacity of clerk. All the witnesses spoke of appellant as the cashier or bookkeeper. While a cashier might be included under the term "agent," and in some instances might be an officer of a corporation, we are unable to find anywhere that he is classed as a "clerk." The designation of appellant in the indictment as an "employee" having been eliminated as surplusage, and the evidence failing to support the allegation of "clerk," there would seem to be a fatal variance between the proof offered and the allegations of the indictment. If one be charged as a "clerk," and the proof entirely rebut the proposition that he was ever employed in such capacity, we have no alternative but to hold that the pleading and the proof do not correspond.
On the trial, much testimony was offered in behalf of the State, showing other transactions on the part of the appellant of like kind as the one charged in the instant case. This was objected to. We think there was no error in admitting proof of those transactions. By vigorous cross-examination of other employees of the said corporation, as to their access to the books, and their opportunity to get the money, the embezzlement of which is charged against appellant; their need of such property; the character and amount of their investments, etc., were brought out by appellant, manifestly to create the impression upon the jury of the improbability of appellant's eonnectioñ with , the appropriation of the property, and suggesting the appropriation thereof by such other employees. We think further that the very nature and character of the employment of the appellant, and of the circumstances surrounding the transaction and necessarily relied on by the State to make its proof of guilt, would make proof of other similar transactions admissible. Said corporation did a large business locally, and in its trade territory. Large sums of money, both cash and checks, came into appellant's hands, and after proper entry, endorsement, etc., should have gone to the bank to the credit 'of said corporation. Appellant kept the books, and had charge of the moneys received, made out the deposit slips, kept the bank books, and except Avhen an auditor came at intervals of some months, and checked the books, no one took actual oversight of the actions of appellant in the performance of his duties. In a business so conducted, one occupying a position such as appellant, might easily mislay a check, or overlook an entry, or erroneously O. K. a miscalculated collection slip turned in by a driver, and thus be guilty of no wrong should an error be discovered, but proof of the continuation of' such happenings might rebut any presumption of innocence as to one independent transaction. Again, when appellant left the employ of said corporation without any notice to them, he seems to have left the State. No charge had been made against him; no suspicion attached to him; no property of said company was found on him when arrested, and practically all the proof offered against him, was the manipulation of the books, cash account, checks, etc., of which he had charge before leaving. In order to sIioav intent or guilty knowledge, we think evidence of such other transactions was admissible, subject to proper instruction in the charge, as to the purpose of such testimony, and that before the jury could consider any of said transactions as evidence, they must believe beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant's guilt in such transactions was shown. See Section 166, Branch's Ann. P. C. pp. 622-623; Vernon's C. C. P. for authorities; Fry v. State, 86 Texas Crim. Rep., 73, 215 S. W. Rep., 560.
The State proved over objection, the contents of two letters found in appellant's trunk when arrested in California. Said letters were shown to be in appellant's handwriting. They were neither dated, signed, nor addressed. Nothing in either referred to any of the facts of any transaction transpiring while appellant was employed by the Brown Cracker and Candy Company. Not a word in either of said letters, so far as we are able to see, related to any transaction under investigation. We think the letters were inadmissible.
An exception was taken to the court's failure to charge on circumstantial evidence. We think such charge should have been given. No one saw this appellant appropriate this money. No confession or admission of his appears in the record to take the case out of the rule of circumstantial evidence. He had the lawful charge of money and property prior to his disappearance, and after he had gone, by the process of checking and auditing, it was discovered that shortages existed. The State claimed that appellant was the party responsible for these shortages. Appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. The issue in the case then became the unlawful conversion by appellant of money belonging to his principal, and to establish this conclusion, the State introduced a number of facts, from which the guilt of the accused might be inferred, but no positive proof thereof. If the main fact sought to be proved is a matter of inference, the case was one of circumstantial evidence under all the authorities. Ward v. State, 10 Texas Crim. App., 513; Lee v. State, 14 Texas Crim. App., 217; Matthews v. State, 17 Texas Crim. App., 475; Fuller v. State, 24 Texas Crim. App., 597; Pace v. State, 41 Texas Crim. Rep., 208; Jones v. State, 54 Texas Crim. App., 37; Stewart v. State, 71 Texas Crim. Rep., 480, 160 S. W. Rep., 381.
This disposes of the material issues raised in this appeal. For the errors mentioned, the judgment will be reversed, and the cause remanded.
Reversed avid remanded.