Case Name: STATE v. GODDARD
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1913-07-08
Citations: 69 Or. 73
Docket Number: 
Parties: STATE v. GODDARD.
Judges: Mr. Chief Justice McBride, Mr. Justice Moore and Mr. Justice Burnett concur.
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 69
Pages: 73–93

Head Matter:
On motion to dismiss appeal, decided July 8, 1913.
On the merits, argued January 15, decided January 27, 1914.
STATE v. GODDARD.
(133 Pac. 90; 138 Pac. 243).
Criminal Law—Appeal—Decisions Reviewable—Effect of Parole.
1. Under Section 1586, L. O. L., providing that when any adult person not previously convicted of a felony shall be convicted of any felony or misdemeanor, the maximum punishment of which does not exceed ten years’ imprisonment, or in the ease of a minor 20 years’ imprisonment, the court may in its discretion parole such person under the supervision of the court or of any prisoners’ aid society, and Section 1589, providing that when any prisoner fails to observe all the conditions and requirements of the parole and order of the court, or shall again be convicted of a felony, the parole shall be revoked, and the prisoner committed to the penitentiary to serve out the original sentence to be counted from the day of his delivery to the warden of the penitentiary, a provision in a judgment of conviction paroling defendant on condition that he would not leave the jurisdiction of the court, violate the laws of the United States, this state, or any municipality, would at all times lead an honorable and upright life and report once a month to the presiding judge his whereabouts, with such other information as might be desired or demanded by the judge, did not defeat such defendant’s right to appeal where he had not requested such parole and had not by any affirmative act accepted the conditions imposed.
Criminal Law—Evidence—Records—Entries in Family Bible.
2. Section 727, Subsection 4, L. O. L., provides that evidence may be given of the declaration of a deceased person as to the relationship, birth, marriage, or death of any person related to the deceased person. Subsection 13 authorizes admission of evidence of entries in family Bibles as evidence of pedigree. Section 715 provides that in the construction of a statute the offiee of a judge is simply to declare its terms, not to insert what is omitted, or omit what has been inserted, and when there are several provisions, such construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all. Section 716 provides that a particular provision or intent controls a general one. Held, in a prosecution for statutory rape, that an entry in the family Bible is admissible to show the age of the prosecutrix, regardless of its authorship, or whether the person who wrote it is dead.
[As to evidence of age, see note in 111 Am. St. Rep. 583. As to admissibility of entry in family Bible to show age where person making entry is dead or unknown, see note in Ann. Cas. 1912A, 1218.]
Criminal Law — Trial—Reception of Evidence — Objections.
3. As a general rule, an objection to evidence as “incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial” is not sufficiently specific to raise any question, and the. objector should indicate the particular point to be raised.
Indictment and Information — Issues and Proofs — General Rule.
4. The defendant, in a criminal action, can be convieted only of the crime charged in the indictment, excepting that, under Sections 1551, 1552, L. O. L., when the crime consists of several degrees the jury may find the defendant guilty of the crime charged, or any inferior degree, or of an attempt, or of any crime included in that charged.
Indictment and Information — Time of Offense.
5. Though the defense includes an alibi, time is not a material ingredient of the offense of statutory rape, within Section 1443, L. O. L., providing that the precise time a crime was committed need not be stated in the indictment, except when time is a material ingredient of the erime.
Indictment and Information — Issues and Proof — Time of Offense.
6. In a prosecution for statutory rape, where the state, at the beginning of the trial, elected to try defendant for an act committed at the Oxford Hotel in the City of Portland, evidence of a single offense at that place on a Wednesday night near the end of April, or beginning of May, was sufficiently definite, though the indictment charged the act to have been committed on May 15th and one of the defenses was an alibi, and evidence of another similar act at a different place was introduced to show the relations between the parties.
Criminal Law — Appeal—Instructions—Sufficiency.
7. In a prosecution for statutory rape where the court elected to try defendant for an act at a particular place, instructions, requiring proof that defendant had sexual intercourse with prosecutrix at the place in question, when she was under the age of 16, near the date stated in the indictment, but not necessarily on the exact date, but the particular transaction being very material, were not ground for reversal under Section 1026, L. O. L., providing that after appeal the court must give judgment without regard to questions in the discretion of the court below, or to technical errors, defects or exceptions whieh do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.
On Motion to Dismiss Appeal.
From Multnomah: James U. Campbell, Judge.
Statement by Mr. Chief Justice McBride.
The defendant, John B. Goddard, was indicted for the crime of rape, and upon trial was convicted by a jury who recommended him to the mercy of the court. The court thereupon sentenced him to the penitentiary for a period of 20 years, and in the same judgment paroled him; the parole condition being as follows: ‘ ‘ The court taking into consideration the recommendation of the jury that the defendant be paroled, it is ordered that the sentence in this cause be suspended, and the defendant is allowed to go at large on parole, on conditions that he will not leave the jurisdiction of this court, and that he will not violate the laws of the United States or of this state or of any municipality in which he may live, and that he will at all times lead an honorable and upright life, and that he shall report in person of writing once a month to the presiding judge of this court his whereabouts with such other and additional information as may be desired or demanded by said judge.”
Section 1589, L. O. L., is as follows: “If any prisoner when required shall fail to give such bail, bond, or security, or shall fail to observe all and every of the conditions and requirements of said parole and order of said court, or shall be again convicted of a felony, then said parole shall be by order of said court revoked with or without notice to such prisoner, and said prisoner shall be committed to the penitentiary to serve out the original sentence imposed in the same manner as though said parole had not been granted. The clerk shall deliver to the sheriff a certified copy of the sentence, together with a certificate that such person had been paroled and his parole has been terminated, and the 'sheriff shall, upon the receipt of such certified copy of sentence, immediately arrest such person and transport and deliver him or her to the warden of the penitentiary, and the time such person shall have been at large upon parole shall not be counted as part of the sentence, but the time of sentence shall be counted from the day of delivery to the warden of the penitentiary.”
Nothing appears to indicate that the defendant requested a parole, nor is any request or acceptance provided for in Section 1586, L. O. L., which is as follows : “When any adult person who has not previously been convicted of a felony shall be convicted in any Circuit Court of this state of any felony or misdemeanor, the maximum punishment of which does not exceed ten years’ imprisonment in the penitentiary, or any minor person who has not previously been convicted of a felony shall be convicted in any Circuit Court of this state of any felony or misdemeanor, the maximum punishment of which does not exceed twenty years’ imprisonment in the penitentiary, and sentence shall have been pronounced, the court before whom the conviction shall have been had, if satisfied that such person, if permitted to go at large, would not again violate the law, may, in its discretion, by order of record, parole such person and permit him or her to go and remain at large under the supervision of the court, or under the supervision of any prisoners’ aid society now organized or hereafter to be organized under the laws of the State of Oregon, subject always, however, to the order of such court as such court may deem best until such parole shall be terminated as hereinafter provided, but such court shall have no power to parole any person after he or she has been delivered to the warden of the penitentiary or where it shall be made to appear to said court before such parole shall have been granted that such person has been before convicted of a felony. ’ ’
The defendant appealed from the judgment, and a motion is now made to dismiss the appeal on the ground that by accepting the parole he has waived his right of appeal.
Motion Denied.
Mr. W. D. Evans, District Attorney, and Mr. George J. Cameron, for the motion.
Messrs. King & Saxton and Mr. Jay Bowerman, contra.

Opinion:
Opinion by
Mr. Chief Justice McBride.
Beyond the fact that the defendant has not attempted to break into the penitentiary vi et armis, there is nothing to indicate that he has accepted the parole. It was made a part of the judgment, and its conditions in themselves constitute a semi-imprisonment. The defendant may not leave the jurisdiction of the court; he must report his whereabouts to the judge every month; he must submit to the judgment of the court as to his conduct; and he must obey strictly every municipal ordinance of any town in which he resides, and all these under penalty of having his parole revoked and being imprisoned for 20 years in case he violates a single one of the conditions. All these conditions constitute a very serious abridgment of the liberty of a citizen; and, until it is shown that he has accepted them affirmatively, we think that he should not be held to have waived his right of appeal. Had he affirmatively accepted the conditions imposed, a different question would arise; but, under the circumstances, he was inter canem et lupum. Had he accepted by matter of record the parole given him, he would probably have been held to have waived his right of appeal. Had he voluntarily insisted that he be received into the penitentiary, his request would probably have been refused, and the fact that he had so insisted might with equal plausibility have been urged as a waiver of his right of appeal.
A parole by the court is not and cannot be a conditional pardon. Under Article Y, Section 14, of the Constitution, the pardoning power is vested in the Governor. It is a power with which courts have nothing to do. This also marks the distinction between the case at bar and the case of Odom v. State, 8 Okl. Cr. 540 (129 Pac. 445), which arose upon parole granted by the Governor, and not upon one constituting a part of the original judgment. To adopt the theory of that state in this case would place it in the power of any judge to prevent an appeal by paroling the prisoner. While in most instances it transpires that only guilty men are convicted by juries, yet, so long as appeals are permitted at all, the right to appeal should be open to anyone who does not waive it by some affirmative act.
The defendant, John B. Goddard, was convicted of statutory rape, and sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term of from 3 to 20 years, and was paroled on the recommendation of the jury, and he appeals.
Aeeirmed.
For appellant there was a brief, with oral arguments by Mr. Will R. King and Mr. Jay Bowerman.
For the State there was a brief over the names of Mr. Walter H. Evans, District Attorney, Mr. Arthur A. Murphy, Deputy District Attorney, and Mr. Andrew M. Crawford, Attorney General, with an oral argument by Mr. Murphy.
The motion to dismiss is overruled.
Motion Overruled.