Case Name: Arthur Charles GALLEGOS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE of Arizona, Defendant-Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2013-02-19
Citations: 509 F. App'x 626
Docket Number: No. 10-15322
Parties: Arthur Charles GALLEGOS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE of Arizona, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: Before: FERNANDEZ, TASHIMA, and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 509
Pages: 626–627

Head Matter:
Arthur Charles GALLEGOS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE of Arizona, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 10-15322.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted Feb. 11, 2013.
Filed Feb. 19, 2013.
Arthur Charles Gallegos Phoenix, AZ, pro se.
Kelley J. Morrissey, Assistant Attorney General, Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix, AZ, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before: FERNANDEZ, TASHIMA, and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Arthur Charles Gallegos appeals pro se from the district court's judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging a Second Amendment claim arising out of the the Arizona Court of Appeals's denial of his request as a convicted felon to restore his right to bear arms. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the dismissal of an action under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir.2003), and for an abuse of discretion the denial of a motion for leave to amend, Chodos v. West Publ'g Co., 292 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir.2002). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Gallegos's action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because it amounted to a forbidden "de facto appeal" of a state court judgment and raised a constitutional claim that was "inextricably intertwined" with that state court judgment. See Noel, 341 F.3d at 1163-65; see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005) (Rooker-Feldman bars "state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced" from asking federal courts to review those judgments).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Gallegos leave to file a second amended complaint because, even if Gallegos could explain how his proposed amended complaint differed from his operative complaint, amendment would have been futile. See Chodos, 292 F.3d at 1003 (dismissal without leave to amend is proper where the complaint cannot be saved by any amendment); see also Thinket Ink Info. Res., Inc. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 368 F.3d 1053, 1061 (9th Cir.2004) (discretion to deny leave to amend is "particularly broad" where plaintiff has previously filed an amended complaint).
Gallegos's contentions regarding the alleged violations of his rights in various state court criminal, habeas, and special actions are unpersuasive.
Gallegos's motion for relief with respect to a pending special action in Arizona state court is denied.
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.