Case Name: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Raymond WILLIAMS, Appellant
Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1982-03-05
Citations: 296 Pa. Super. 97
Docket Number: No. 175
Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Raymond WILLIAMS, Appellant.
Judges: Before WICKERSHAM, WIEAND, and BECK, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports
Volume: 296
Pages: 97–112

Head Matter:
442 A.2d 314
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Raymond WILLIAMS, Appellant.
Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
Argued Aug. 31, 1981.
Filed March 5, 1982.
Paul R. Gettleman, Zelienople, for appellant.
Stella L. Smetanka, Assistant District Attorney, Pittsburgh, for Commonwealth, appellee.
Before WICKERSHAM, WIEAND, and BECK, JJ.

Opinion:
BECK, Judge:
Appellant was arrested and charged on January 30, 1978 with robbery, theft by unlawful taking, violation of The Uniform Firearms Act and criminal conspiracy. After a jury trial, appellant was found guilty on all counts and sentenced to from ten to twenty years incarceration. Post-verdict motions were subsequently denied. This is a direct appeal from the judgment of sentence.
We reverse and remand for a new trial based upon a question by the trial judge about appellant's post-arrest silence. That question was asked immediately after appellant had presented his alibi and had been cross-examined by the prosecutor who judiciously avoided referring to appellant's silence. The trial judge cast doubt upon appellant's alibi by questioning him about the aforementioned silence, thereby attenuating his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent:
Trial Judge:
The only other question I have is, the police testimony seemed to leave me to conclude that they asked you to make a statement, you made no statement to them at all. You didn't tell them anything at all about the man you were with, with Mr. Fuller up in New Kensington?
Appellant: No, I didn't. (N.T. 157.)
Appellee relies upon Commonwealth v. Zellner, 268 Pa.Super. 59, 407 A.2d 436 (1979) which cites the language of Commonwealth v. Maloney, 469 Pa. 342, 365 A.2d 1237 (1976) for the proposition that if the trial judge in his charge adequately cures his earlier indiscretion, the trial judge has not committed reversible error. Those cases are distinguishable from the instant case, however, in that they involve prosecutorial error, rather than judicial. In both cases, a police officer, in answer to the prosecutor's question, referred to defendant's silence after being read his Miranda rights.
While we find a prosecutor's question less prejudicial than a judge's, our appellate courts as well as the United States Supreme Court have reversed even where the prosecutor made that inquiry. See Commonwealth v. Easley, 483 Pa. 337, 396 A.2d 1198 (1979); Commonwealth v. Greco, 465 Pa. 400, 350 A.2d 826 (1976). In Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976), the Supreme Court held such prosecutorial inquiry to constitute a denial of due process:
(W)hile it is true that the Miranda warnings contain no express assurance that silence will carry no penalty, such assurance is implicit to any person who receives the warnings. In such circumstances, it would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person's silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial. Mr. Justice White, concurring in the judgment in United States v. Hale, supra, [422 U.S. 171] at 182-183, 95 S.Ct. 2133 [at 2139] 45 L.Ed.2d 99, put it very well:
"(W)hen a person under arrest is informed, as Miranda requires, that he may remain silent, that anything he says may be used against him, and that he may have an attorney if he wishes, it seems to me that it does not comport with due process to permit the prosecution during the trial to call attention to his silence at the time of arrest and to insist that because he did not speak about the facts of the case at that time, as he was told he need not do, an unfavorable inference might be drawn as to the truth of his trial testimony . Surely Hale was not informed here that his silence, as well as his words, could be used against him at trial. Indeed, anyone would reasonably conclude from Miranda warnings that this would not be the case."
426 U.S. at 618-619, 96 S.Ct. at 2245 (footnotes deleted). The Supreme Court did note an exception to the above rule in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. at 619 n.11, 96 S.Ct. at 2245 n.11, but that exception is inapposite to the instant case. It embodies the situation where the defendant testifies to an exculpatory version of the events and contends that he told the police officers that same version when arrested. In that very narrow case, the fact of earlier silence may be used to impeach this account of what transpired upon arrest.
An accused's Fifth Amendment right to remain silent after arrest is unequivocal. Any mention of the fact that a defendant availed himself of that protection must be scrupulously avoided. The judge's question and its timing could reasonably have led the jurors to conclude that defendant fabricated the alibi after arrest, and that his silence constituted an admission of guilt. We therefore conclude that the question was prejudicial and did not constitute harmless error.
While it is apparent that the trial judge did attempt to cure his indiscretion, the prejudicial effect of the question and its timing outweighed the curative impact of the instruction. See Commonwealth v. Seel, 267 Pa.Super. 490, 406 A.2d 1148 (1980).
We reverse the judgment of sentence and order a new trial.
WICKERSHAM, J., files a dissenting opinion.