Case Name: In Re CLARK
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1916-02-01
Citations: 79 Or. 325
Docket Number: 
Parties: In Re CLARK.
Judges: 
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 79
Pages: 325–332

Head Matter:
Argued January 18,
dismissed February 1,
rehearing denied February 23, 1916.
In Re CLARK.
(154 Pac. 748; 155 Pac. 187.)
Mandamus—Exercise of Judicial Discretion—Dismissal of Indictment —“May.”
1. Section 1704, L. O. L., providing that the court “may” on its own motion, or on an application of the district attorney, and in furtherance of justice, order that an action- after indictment be dismissed, the reasons being stated, vests a judicial discretion in the court; and hence the court cannot, by mandamus, be compelled to sign an order of dismissal on application of the district attorney.
[As to mandamus against judicial officers and tribunals, see note in 98 Am. St. Rep. 890.]
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING.
Mandamus—Ministerial and Judicial Acte.
2. Mandamus lies to compel the performance of ministerial acts or to require subordinate judicial tribunals to exercise their judicial functions, but not to compel them to exercise them in a particular way.
Mandamus—Existence of Other Remedies.
3. Section 613, L. O. L., provides that mandamus may issue to any inferior court, ete., to compel the performance of an act which the law enjoins, but that the writ shall not control judicial discretion, and shall not be issued in any case where there is a plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law. Section 1701 provides that if a defendant indicted for a crime, whose trial has not been postponed upon his application or consent, be not brought to trial, at the next term of the court in which the indictment is triable, after it is found, the court must order the indictment dismissed, unless good cause to the contrary be shown. Section 1606, as amended by Act of February 10, 1915 (Laws 1915, p. 70), authorizes an appeal from an order refusing to dismiss an indictment as provided in Section 1701. Section 1704 provides that the court may either of its own motion or upon the application of the district attorney order an action after indictment to be dismissed. Held, that as a defendant whose trial under an indictment resulted in a mistrial, and who was not again brought to trial, had a plain remedy by his own application for a dismissal of the indictment, coupled with a cumulative remedy by appeal, mandamus would not lie to compel the Circuit Court to grant the request of the district attorney for the dismissal of the indictment.
Original proceedings in Supreme Court.
In Banc.
Statement by’Mb. Justice Benson.
Albin L. Clark commenced a mandamus proceeding in this court to require John P. Kavanaugh, Judge of the Circuit Court of the State of Oregon, for the county of Multnomah, Department No. 1, to sign an order dismissing an indictment. A demurrer to the answer overruled and writ dismissed.
Dismissed.
For the petitioner there was a brief and an oral argument by Mr. Wilson T. Hume.
For defendant there was a brief over the names of Mr. Walter E. Evans, District Attorney, and Mr. George M. Brown, Attorney General, with an oral argument by Mr. Brown.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Benson
delivered the opinion of the court.
On April 29, 1915, the petitioner was indicted for the crime of willfully and fraudulently altering and destroying white ballots cast at an election. There after lie entered a plea of not guilty, and on May 17, 1915, a trial was had in which the jury was discharged for inability to agree upon a verdict. Another trial was begun on May 25th of the same year, which resulted in a conviction, and thereafter the verdict was set aside for the reason that in the interval the official stenographer, who reported the trial, died, and it was therefore impossible to secure a record thereof. About December 10, 1915, the district attorney moved to dismiss the indictment under Section 1704, L. O. L., and tendered a written order reciting the reasons for the signature of Judge Kavanaugh, to whom the motion was presented, and it was by him denied. The record discloses that a like motion had previously been presented to and denied by two other circuit judges of Multnomah County. Thereupon the petitioner applied to this court for a peremptory writ of mandamus requiring Judge Kavanaugh to sign the order of dismissal. In response to the petition an alternative writ was issued by this court, and an answer thereto was duly filed, to which the petitioner demurs. Section 1704, L. O. L., upon which this proceeding is based, reads as follows:
"The court may, either of its own motion or upon the application of the district attorney, and in furtherance of justice, order an action, after indictment, to be dismissed; hut in that case, the reasons of the dismissal must be set forth in the order, which must be entered in the journal."
The petitioner contends that the word "may" in the above section means "must," and that the lower court has' no discretion in the premises, but must sign the order of dismissal when requested by the district attorney. The law above quoted was Section 323 of Deady's Code, and was a part of Chapter 31 thereof, as enacted in 1864. In this chapter there are seven sections, enacted at the same time, all being in relation to the "dismissal of actions after indictment for want of prosecution or otherwise." . In the other sections of the chapter which provide for the dismissal, the word "must" is used. It seems clear that the legislature had the intention of differentiating them when in this section it used the word "may." In fact, the language of the section itself, taken alone, can lead to but one conclusion, and that is that the court is expected to use judicial discretion in furtherance of justice.
"Mandamus will not lie to control the exercise of the discretion of any court when the act complained of is either judicial or quasi judicial, and while mandamus may be invoked to compel the exercise of discretion, it cannot compel such discretion to be exercised in any particular way": 26 Cyc. 158; Croasman v. Kincaid, 31 Or. 445 (49 Pac. 764); Irwin v. Kincaid, 31 Or. 478 (49 Pac. 765).
It follows that the demurrer to the answer must be overruled and the writ dismissed, and it is so ordered.
Demurrer Overruled. Writ Dismissed.