Case Name: GOODEVE v. THOMPSON
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1913-12-02
Citations: 68 Or. 411
Docket Number: 
Parties: GOODEVE v. THOMPSON.
Judges: Mr. Chiee Justice McBride, Mr. Justice Bean and Mr. Justice McNarx concur.
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 68
Pages: 411–419

Head Matter:
Argued October 13,
decided December 2, 1913,
rehearing denied January 6, 1914.
GOODEVE v. THOMPSON.
(136 Pac. 670; 137 Pac. 744.)
Breach of Marriage Promise — Admissions—Determination as to Admissibility.
1. A witness, in an action for breach of promise to marry, testified that defendant said he had been after a' girl for approximately 10 years, and he had finally landed her. Witness could not say that the remark related to plaintiff, but that the girl had come from Tacoma or Vancouver; he did not remember which. The statement was communicated to plaintiif as having reference to her, and she talked it over with defendant in the presence of a third person. Plaintiff had returned from Vancouver about that time, and defendant was associating with her. Held, that the circumstances were sufficient to permit the testimony to go to the jury as to whether defendant had reference to plaintiif.
[As to actions for breach of promise to marry, see notes in 63 Am. Dec. 532; 40 Am. St. Rep. 172. As to exemplary damages in such actions, see note in Ann. Cas. 1914B, 319.]
Trial — Conduct in General — Reproving Witnesses.
2. The reproof of a witness by the judge for including argument in his testimony, and for nodding his head and making demonstrations constantly in the courtroom, is not error in itself.
New Trial — Grounds—Newly Discovered Evidence — Diligence.
3. A motion by defendant for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence is properly denied, where the proposed new witnesses were residents of the city where the trial was held, and one or both were present at the trial to the knowledge of defendant, and their testimony, if material, could have been procured by reasonable diligence.
Appeal and Error — Review—Harmless Error — Misconduct of Juror.
4. The misconduct of plaintiff and a juror in meeting and conversing will not be held harmless, where the jury rendered a verdict for $50,000 for breach of promise of marriage.
New Trial — Grounds—Misconduct of or Affecting Juror.
5. • A surmise of the judge, unsupported by direct evidence, that misconduct of a juror and plaintiff in meeting and conversing was procured by defendant will not prevent a new trial for such misconduct.
Appeal and Error — Rehearing—Questions Reviewable.
6. Where error is assigned on the denial of a motion for new trial, and was the main reliance of the appellant, and the respondent on the original hearing failed to raise the point that the order denying a new trial could not be reviewed on an appeal from tbe judgment, the question cannot be raised on petition for rehearing.
Appeal and Error — Grounds—Misconduct of or Affecting Jury.
7. Where the trial court finds that conduct of plaintiff and a juror in conversing with reference to the ease was improper, an order denying a new trial will be reversed.
From Multnomah: Henry E. McGinn, Judge.
Department 2.
Statement by Mr. Justice Eakin.
This is an action by Helen M. Goodeve against Robert H. Thompson, Jr., for a breach of promise of marriage; the complaint alleging a promise of marriage by the defendant and acceptance by plaintiff, and that on September 30, 1911, the defendant repudiated the said promise and refused to marry the plaintiff, and praying for a judgment for $50,600.
The answer denies that defendant promised to marry the plaintiff, and alleges that she was incapable of contracting marriage at that time, having a husband living. The case was tried before a jury, and a verdict rendered for the plaintiff, assessing her damages at $50,000, and from a judgment thereon the defendant appeals.
Reversed.
For appellant there was a brief over the names of Mr. Samuel White, Messrs. Sheldon & Huntington and Mr. John Manning, with an oral argument by Mr. White.
For respondent there was a brief over the names of Mr. Hall S. Lush and Messrs. Dolph, Mallory, Simon & Gearin, with an oral argument by Mr. Lusk.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Eakin
delivered the opinion of the court.
There are five assignments of error. The first two relate to the admission in evidence of testimony of the witness MacLean to the effect that in September or October, 1911, the defendant said to him that he had been after a girl for approximately 10 years, and that he had finally succeeded in landing her. The witness could not say that the remark related to the plaintiff, but that the girl referred to had come from Tacoma or Vancouver; he did not remember which. This statement was communicated to plaintiff as having reference to her, and she talked it over with the defendant in the presence of Grant. Plaintiff had returned from Vancouver about that time and was in Portland, and defendant was associating with her. The circumstances were sufficient to permit the testimony to go to the jury as to whether or not the defendant had reference to the plaintiff.
The third and fourth assignments of error relate to the action of the court in reproving the witness Terry in the presence of the jury, to which the defendant now excepts. In the absence of proof of what did take place, or of what was the misconduct of the witness, we must accept the statement of the judge as to the circumstances calling for the reproof. The witness was reproved by the judge at least twice, once for including argument in his testimony, and, again, for nodding his head and making demonstrations constantly in the courtroom. Evidently the judge thought he was attempting to exert an influence on the jury or the witnesses, and, if so, it was the court's duty to reprove him and prevent such conduct. There is nothing in the record that discloses error in that regard.
The only other assignment of error relates to the denial of the defendant's motion to set aside the judgment and to grant a new trial. Three grounds are assigned: (1) Newly discovered evidence material to the defense, and which he could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial; (2) improper conduct of a juror; and (3) excessive damages given under the influence of passion and prejudice. The motion was supported by several affidavits, that of Mrs. W. B. Works and Lucille Ayres as to their knowledge of facts alleged to be material, and others relating to the misconduct of the juror. These affidavits were met by affidavits on the part of the plaintiff, and those followed by counter-affidavits especially relating to the misconduct of the juror. Whereupon the court proceeded to hear the oral evidence of many witnesses for and against the motion, all of which is reduced to writing and reported to this court, consisting of 150 pages, and upon consideration of the proofs by the court the motion was denied. It appears in the affidavits of Mrs. Works and Mrs. Ayres that they had certain conversations with the plaintiff with reference to her relations with the defendant. There is testimony tending to show that Mrs. Works and Mrs. Ayres were, at the time of the trial, residents of Portland, with whom defendant was acquainted, and that one or both of them were in the courtroom during the trial within the knowledge of the defendant, and that by the exercise of diligence the testimony, if material, could have been ascertained by the defendant for the trial.
The court tried out the question of the misconduct of the juror at great length. A perusal of the evidence taken on the hearing on the motion to set aside the judgment is convincing that the conduct of the juror Wallis in meeting and conversing with the. plaintiff under the circumstances disclosed was misconduct on the part of both the plaintiff and the juror; and, in view of the extravagant amount of damages awarded to the plaintiff, we cannot ignore this circum stance, nor say that the misconduct was not prejudicial to the defendant's rights.
The trial court found that there was misconduct by both the juror and the plaintiff, but says he was constrained to think it was by procurement of the defendant. There is no doubt but that the misconduct complained of was sufficient ground to set aside the judgment, unless the misconduct was procured by the defendant; but such a conclusion can only be a surmise. There is no direct evidence of fact to that effect, and it is not sufficient to justify the court in ignoring the facts. . It is said in Davidson v. Manlove, 2 Cold. (Tenn.) 346: "Such conduct on the part of a suitor is highly improper and reprehensible, and should call forth the severe censure of the court. Men must not be permitted to tamper with jurors before whom their suits are being tried; and, being seen in close conversation with them during the trial, or while they are considering of their verdict, the circumstance, unexplained, is sufficient to authorize the circuit judge to grant a new trial, and to subject the party to punishment by the court for contempt. The fountains of justice must be kept pure and free from suspicion, or the citizen will lose all respect for the laws, and the rights of person and property will become insecure. Suitors-and jurors must not place themselves in a position where their conduct creates suspicion."
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.
Reversed : Rehearing Denied.
Mr. Chiee Justice McBride, Mr. Justice Bean and Mr. Justice McNarx concur.
Decided January 6, 1914.