Case Name: PEOPLE v. GUY
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1978-07-13
Citations: 84 Mich. App. 610
Docket Number: Docket No. 77-1301
Parties: PEOPLE v GUY
Judges: Before: R. M. Maher, P. J., and M. F. Cavanagh and N. J. Kaufman, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 84
Pages: 610–617

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v GUY
Docket No. 77-1301.
Submitted November 2, 1977, at Grand Rapids.
Decided July 13, 1978.
Larry G. Guy was charged with possession of a gas ejecting device, weapon, cartridge, container or contrivance designed or equipped for or capable of ejecting any gas which will either temporarily or permanently disable, incapacitate, injure or harm any person with whom it comes in contact. The Calhoun County Court, Stanley Everett, J., dismissed the case on the basis that the statute was overbroad. The people appeal. Held:
The statute is unconstitutionally vague and no judicial paring of language can save it.
Affirmed.
M. F. Cavanagh, J., dissented. He would hold that while the statute is unconstitutional, it would not be unconstitutionally vague if it only proscribed gas ejecting weapons and that the unconstitutional parts should be severed and the case remanded for further proceedings.
Opinion of the Court
1. Criminal Law — Constitutional Law — Statutes—Vagueness— Gas Ejecting Devices.
The portion of a statute making it unlawful to possess any gas ejecting device, weapon, cartridge, container or contrivance designed or equipped for or capable of ejecting any gas which will either temporarily or permanently disable, incapacitate, injure or harm any person with whom it comes in contact is unconstitutionally vague, and, while an act should be construed to avoid unconstitutionality and unenforceable provisions severed from the remainder when possible, no severing of portions of this provision can save it (MCL 750.224; MSA 28.421).
References for Points in Headnotes
[1] 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law §§ 181, 552.
[2 — 4] 73 Am Jur 2d, Statutes § 346.
[3, 4] 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law § 552.
Dissent by M. F. Cavanagh, J.
2. Constitutional Law — Statutes—Overbreadth.
A clear and precise enactment may nevertheless be overbroad if in its reach it prohibits constitutionally protected conduct.
3. Constitutional Law — Statutes—Vagueness.
A statute may be challenged for vagueness on three grounds: (1) it does not provide fair notice of the conduct proscribed; (2) it confers on the trier of fact unstructured and unlimited discretion to determine whether an offense has been committed; and (3) its coverage is overbroad and impinges on First Amendment freedoms.
4. Criminal Law — Statutes—Vagueness.
The portion of a statute making it unlawful to possess any gas ejecting device, weapon, cartridge, container or contrivance designed or equipped for or capable of ejecting any gas which will either temporarily or permanently disable, incapacitate, injure or harm any person with whom it comes in contact is unconstitutionally vague in two respects: (a) by leaving it to the police, the prosecution and, ultimately, the trier of fact to determine the difference between legal and illegal devices for ejecting harmful gases, the statute confers an impermissible discretion to determine whether an offense has been committed; and (b) the statute does not provide fair notice of the conduct proscribed; however, if that portion of the statute is pared down to prohibit only possession of gas ejecting weapons, the uncertainty ceases since a weapon is generally understood to be anything used or designed to be used to injure another.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, James Norlander, Prosecuting Attorney, and Theodore P. Hentchel, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Dobbins & Schaeffer, for defendant.
Before: R. M. Maher, P. J., and M. F. Cavanagh and N. J. Kaufman, JJ.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
We agree wholeheartedly with the conclusion reached in Judge Cavanagh's dissenting opinion that MCL 750.224; MSA 28.421 is unconstitutionally vague. We also agree that wherever possible an act should be construed to avoid unconstitutionality, if necessary severing unenforceable provisions.
After much deliberation, however, we cannot see how the statutory provision in question can be saved in this case. For example, if a person buys a can of hairspray or deodorant, we do not believe that the question of whether or not that person is violating the statute should be left to the whim or caprice of law enforcement officials. Rather than have each prosecution effect a common-law construction of the provision, the Legislature, if it so desires, should enact a new law which would include a clearly defined "intent" element.
The trial court's order to dismiss is affirmed.
Affirmed.