Case Name: John Wanamaker, Appellant, v. Simon J. Weaver, Respondent
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1902
Citations: 73 A.D. 60
Docket Number: 
Parties: John Wanamaker, Appellant, v. Simon J. Weaver, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 73
Pages: 60–69

Head Matter:
John Wanamaker, Appellant, v. Simon J. Weaver, Respondent.
Husband and wife — measure of the liability of the husband for goods purchased by the wife — the wife may make herself liable—when the question as to which is liable should be submitted to the jury.
The liability of a husband living with his wife to pay for necessaries purchased by the wife upon credit is not affected by the fact that, at the time such necessaries were purchased the wife was provided with a suitable allowance and that the family were well supplied with goods of like description purchased from other merchants.
McLennan and Davy, JJ., dissented.
A wife living with her husband may, by agreement, make herself personally liable for necessaries purchased by her for the use of the family.
In an action to recover the purchase price of necessaries sold by the plaintiff to the defendant’s wife, evidence was given to the effect that the defendant’s wife called at the plaintiff’s store stating that she desired to purchase goods; that the plaintiff’s credit man inquired her name and was informed that she was the wife of the defendant; that he made an investigation as to the financial responsibility of the defendant and then sold the goods to the defendant’s wife, charging them to her; that the goods were shipped, directed to the defendant’s wife at the defendant’s residence, and that, from time to time, she made payments by her own checks; that she was at this time receiving an allowance from the defendant for the payment of the household expenses.
Held, that the evidence was sufficient to raise a question of fact to be decided by the jury as to whether the credit was given to the husband or to the wife.
Appeal by the plaintiff, John Wanamaker, from a judgment of the County Court of Monroe county in favor of the defendant, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Monroe on the 30th day of October, 1901, upon the verdict of a jury, and also from an order entered in said clerk’s office on the 7th day of November, 1901, denying the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial made upon the minutes.
The action was commenced in the Municipal Court of the city of Rochester, where the plaintiff obtained a verdict for the full amount demanded in the complaint. The defendant appealed to the County Court of Monroe county and demanded a new trial.
Harry Otis Poole, for the appellant.
Charles Van Voorhis, for the respondent.

Opinion:
Spring, J.:
This action was brought by the plaintiff, who carries on an extensive store in the city of Philadelphia, in the State of Pennsylvania, to recover for the purchase price of goods which it is claimed were sold by him to the defendant, the wife of the latter actually making the purchase.
The defendant is a member of a prominent hardware firm in the city of Rochester, and at the time the purchases were made and the credit given, was cohabiting with his wife, and they were apparently in prosperous circumstances and their conjugal relations affectionate. They had no children, but for nine years a little boy had been a member of their family, and while not formally adopted, his clothing was provided, he lived in the family and was treated in every particular like an own son of the defendant.
The articles purchased of the plaintiff were suitable for the station in life in which the defendant and his wife moved. They consisted of towels, hose, shoes, table linen, articles for the little boy, for the wife and for general family use. The trial court in fact stated to the jury that the articles were suitable and within the ordinary definition of necessaries, but submitted to the jury as a question of fact to determine in this particular case whether they were necessaries, not because of the intrinsic character of the articles themselves, but for the reason that a suitable allowance was provided for the wife by the defendant, and that goods of like description had already been purchased of other merchants so that the family were •well supplied. ' The court during the trial thus stated his position succinctly: " But if it appears affirmatively that the lady was abundantly supplied with similar articles purchased elsewhere, and that there was n.ot, in fact, any reasonable necessity for such expenditure, the husband cannot be held responsible unless there is some affirmative proof of actual authority, outside of the authority the law infers from their marital relations." And this position was commented upon -in extenso in his charge to the jury. We have, therefore, this principle enunciated : That if a wife, living with her husband, seeks to purchase goods of a merchant, the latter must make an inquisitorial examination and ascertain whether the family possess an adequate supply of the articles which the wife desires to purchase. If she wishes to buy a pair of hose, a towel, a paper of pins or a pair of shoes for the baby, it is incumbent upon the merchant to be throughly satisfied that the household needs replenishing with the articles which the faithful spouse desires. If this is the rule, the only safe course, inevitably, is for the wife to present to the merchant an inventory of the household goods, and even then he may overstep by selling one towel too many. The marital relation in this country is not so demeaning to the wife as this principle implies.
The respondent, by the fact of his marriage, makes his wife his agent for whatsoever necessaries she may purchase, unless he has expressly forbidden the merchant to sell to her upon his credit. This rule may at times work injustice, but good policy and the pres- , evvation of the home require that the wife be given the fullest latitude in purchasing what is within the compass of her station in life, and the husband must pay therefor. The authorities. to which reference has been made controverting this position are mainly where the wife was living apart from her husband, or where he had expressly forbidden the pledging of his credit.
In our judgment there was no question of fact whether these articles were necessary, as it was conceded that they were intrinsically so, and that they were used in the family in the ordinary way so that the defendant and his family derived the benefit of their use. It seems that during this period the wife had also purchased of merchants in the city of Rochester goods which were also charged to the husband; and on account of these purchases it is claimed that the articles in controversy were not essential. If, however, the position of the defendant is tenable, then none of these purchases are chargeable to the defendant, for during this period he was furnishing his wife with an allowance for her personal expenses and those of his household. We apprehend a secret agreement between the husband and wife cannot absolve the former from liability to those who sell goods to be used in the family and suitable for its use.
With the benefits accruing to the husband from the marital relation inevitably are attached the burdens which follow in its train. Unless we are to take a step backward in our domestic and social economy by holding that a wife is no longer the partner and companion of her husband, but that she is scarcely more than a slave, we must give full force to the doctrine that the husband when living with the wife vests her with the right to purchase whatever may be necessary for the family use, and the only hazard the merchant takes is that the articles must comport with the station in life of the husband, unless the goods are sold after his express prohibition.
The trial court also submitted to the jury the question as to whom credit was given for the purchase of these goods. While the question is not entirely free from doubt, we are inclined to believe that this question was one of fact.
Mrs. Weaver called at the store of the plaintiff, stating that she desired to purchase goods. The credit man of the plaintiff inquired her name and was informed that she was the wife of the defendant, and he examined as to the responsibility of the defendant and then sold the goods, charging them to Mrs. Weaver. The goods were shipped, directed to her at the husband's residence in Rochester, and as the account ran along from time to time she made payments by her own checks. She at this time was receiving the allowance from her husband and must have expected to pay for these goods therefrom, and we think sufficient facts are proved to make this question one of fact. (O' Connell v. Shera, 66 App. Div. 467; Tiemeyer v. Turnquist, 85 N. Y. 516.)
Whatever may have been the character of the articles, under these authorities the wife could make a contract by which she would be personally liable for the payment of these goods, and this is especially so since the passage of chapiter 381 of the Laws of 1884, removing the disability of a married woman to made a contract. If credit was actually given to her instead of to the husband, then she alone is liable. Inasmuch, however, as the first question was submitted to the jury, as we deem erroneously, a reversal of the judgment becomes necessary.
The judgment should be reversed and new trial ordered, with costs to the appellant to abide the event.
Williams and Hiscock, JJ., concurred ; McLennan and Davy, JJ., dissented.