Case Name: John W. MIKOS, etc., Petitioner, v. RINGLING BROS.-BARNUM & BAILEY COMBINED SHOWS, INC., et al., Respondents
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1986-09-25
Citations: 497 So. 2d 630
Docket Number: No. 67766
Parties: John W. MIKOS, etc., Petitioner, v. RINGLING BROS.-BARNUM & BAILEY COMBINED SHOWS, INC., et al., Respondents.
Judges: ADKINS, OVERTON, EHRLICH, SHAW and BARKETT, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 497
Pages: 630–635

Head Matter:
John W. MIKOS, etc., Petitioner, v. RINGLING BROS.-BARNUM & BAILEY COMBINED SHOWS, INC., et al., Respondents.
No. 67766.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Sept. 25, 1986.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 11, 1986.
Beth E. Antrim-Berger of Culverhouse & Dent, Sarasota, for petitioner.
Granville H. Crabtree, Jr. and Michael M. Ingram of Crabtree, Sanchez, Parker & Ingram, P.A., Sarasota, for respondents.
Jeff Kielbasa, Deputy Gen. Counsel, Tallahassee, for Dept, of Revenue, State of Fla., amicus curiae.
Robert A. Ginsburg, Dade Co. Atty., and Daniel A. Weiss, Asst. Co. Atty., Miami, for Franklin B. Bystom, as Property Appraiser of Dade County, Florida, amicus curiae.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
We have for review Mikos v. Ringling Bros.-Bamum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc., 475 So.2d 292 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), which the Second District Court of Appeal has certified as being in direct conflict with Autotote Limited, Inc. v. Bystrom, 454 So.2d 661 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), review denied, 461 So.2d 113 (Fla.1985). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to article Y, section 3(b)(4), Florida Constitution. The issue is whether Ringling's circus tour property is permanently located in Sarasota County for ad valorem tax purposes under subsections 192.032(2) and (5), Florida Statutes (1983). We find that the tangible personal property in question is not permanently located in Sarasota County, and we therefore approve the opinion of the district court.
Ringling is a Delaware corporation in the business of staging circus performances throughout the United States and Canada. Ringling consists of two traveling circuses, the red unit and the blue unit, both of which return to Ringling's permanent facilities in Venice, Florida, each year in order to prepare for the next year's performances and to maintain and refurbish the circuses' property. Both units remain in Venice, a municipality within Sarasota County, for a period of approximately two and one-half months each year, leaving the city sometime in January and returning in November. The controversy in this case centers around Ringling's tour property, including animals and equipment, as well as certain costumes and props which Ringling leases from Hagenbeck-Wallace, Inc. At all times, both while traveling and while in Venice, Ringling's circuses have in their possession all the tour property at issue in this case.
Mikos, as property appraiser for Sarasota County, has assessed Ringling's tour property at 100 percent of its value for ad valorem tax purposes every year since 1972. Ringling and Hagenbeckr-Wallace have challenged the assessments each year, claiming that the circus property is not permanently located in Sarasota County.
In 1979 the Second District Court of Appeal ruled that Ringling's property had in fact acquired situs in Sarasota County and that, therefore, the property could be assessed at 100 percent of its value for ad valorem tax purposes. Mikos v. Ringling Bros.-Bamum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc., 368 So.2d 884 (Fla. 2d DCA), cert, denied, 378 So.2d 348 (Fla.1979), appeal dismissed, 445 U.S. 939, 100 S.Ct. 1334, 63 L.Ed.2d 773 (1980). In its 1979 Mikos the second district reasoned that because no statutory definition of permanence existed, the meaning of the term "permanently located" would have to be determined purely from case law. After an extensive discussion of national case law, the second district determined that the circus property was permanently located in Sarasota County for ad valorem tax purposes.
Shortly after the district court's decision, however, the legislature amended section 192.032, Florida Statutes (1979), which deals with ad valorem taxation. Subsection 192.032(5), Florida Statutes (1983), now provides that with respect to tangible personal property the term "permanently located" means "habitually located or typically present for the 12-month period preceding the date of assessment." In the instant case, the district court relied upon this amendment in concluding that Ringling's tour property was not permanently located within Sarasota County for pur poses of taxation from 1980 through 1988. We agree.
Florida law provides that all real and personal property located within this state is subject to taxation unless expressly exempted. § 196.001, Fla.Stat. (1983). Mi-lcos relies on this statutory provision as well as a historical overview of judicial decisions, in the area of ad valorem taxation to support his claim of taxation. Indeed, were it not for the 1979 amendment to section 192.032, we might well agree. The language currently contained in subsection 192.032(5), however, is unambiguous and specifically defines the term "permanently located." Such a specific statutory definition is controlling and must be followed by the courts of this state. Department of Legal Affairs v. Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club, Inc., 434 So.2d 879 (Fla.1983); Citizens v. Public Service Commission, 425 So.2d 534 (Fla.1982); Tropical Coach Line, Inc. v. Carter, 121 So.2d 779 (Fla.1960). The courts are not taxing authorities and cannot rewrite the statute. Moreover, a taxing statute should always be construed in the light most favorable to the taxpayer. Harbor Ventures, Inc. v. Hutches, 366 So.2d 1173 (Fla.1979); Bayonet Point Hospital v. Department of Labor & Employment Security, Division of Unemployment Compensation, 460 So.2d 473 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). Thus, in the instant case, because the tour property is only present in Sarasota County for approximately ten weeks a year, the property cannot be said to be typically present over a twelve-month period preceding the date of assessment. Therefore, the tour property is not subject to taxation by Sarasota County.
Although Mikos points to Autotote Limited, Inc. v. Bystrom in support of the ad valorem tax on Ringling's tour property, we join the second district in rejecting the Autotote rationale. Autotote dealt with Dade County's attempt to levy an ad valo-rem tax on certain pari-mutuel wagering equipment present in that county. In that case the taxpayer contended that the 1979 statutory definition of "permanently located" imposed as a precondition to taxation a twelve-month presence in the county prior to the January 1 assessment date. In rejecting this argument the court relied on Department of Revenue rule 12D-1.-03(l)(c), which states that an object is "normally and usually permanently located" where it is generally kept for use or storage or where it is consistently returned by its owner for use or storage. Fla.Admin. Code Rule 12D-1.03(l)(c)l. Autotote also concluded that the legislature only intended subsection (5) to apply to multicounty disputes and that, therefore, subsection (5) had no effect on Autotote's property because no such multicounty dispute was involved. In the words of the Autotote court:
To regard the legislative definition of " 'permanently located' " as imposing an additional stricture on taxing tangible personal property located in Florida on January 1 would be incompatible with the patent intent of the Florida Legislature to render taxable under § 192.032(2) property brought into the state after January 1 and before April 1.
454 So.2d at 662-63.
In our view, the Autotote court erred in relying upon rule 12D-1.03(l)(c) as an aid in interpreting subsection 192.032(5). Rule 12D-1.03(l)(c) was adopted three years pri- or to the 1979 amendment. As the district court in the instant case pointed out, rule 12D-1.03(l)(e) was intended to aid in interpreting subsection 192.032(2), which deals with the taxation of property present in more than one Florida county during the taxable year. Because subsection (5) contains entirely different language and makes no reference to multicounty taxation disputes, we neither view the rule as relevant nor read that subsection as applicable solely to multicounty disputes. Therefore, we reject the rationale of Autotote.
We further agree with the second district that, although the second district's interpretation of subsection 192.032(5) appears to create an inconsistency with subsection 192.032(2), which authorizes the taxation of property brought into the state after January 1 and before April 1, subsection 192.- 032(5) is the later enactment and therefore must prevail. Askew v. Scfmster, 331 So.2d 297 (Fla.1976). As noted by the district court, there is a strong presumption that, when the legislature amends a statute, it intends to alter the meaning of the statute. Seddon v. Harpster, 403 So.2d 409 (Fla.1981); Arnold v. Shumpert, 217 So.2d 116 (Fla.1968). Indeed, the plain language of the 1979 amendment to section 192.032 indicates that the legislature intended to restrict the meaning of "permanently located," thus altering the interpretation the courts had previously given to the term. We are bound to acknowledge this change.
Accordingly, we approve the opinion of the district court.
It is so ordered.
ADKINS, OVERTON, EHRLICH, SHAW and BARKETT, JJ., concur.
McDONALD, C.J., dissents with an opinion, in which BOYD, J., concurs.
. Both Ringling's tour property and Hagenbeck-Wallace's costumes and props shall be cumulatively referred to as "tour property" for purposes of this opinion.
. The 1979 amendment originally appeared as § 192.032(7), Fla.Stat. (1979), but has been renumbered as § 192.032(5).