Case Name: Lewis C. DOUGALL, Appellant, v. SPOKANE, PORTLAND AND SEATTLE RAILWAY COMPANY, a corporation, Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1958-06-13
Citations: 256 F.2d 601
Docket Number: No. 15544
Parties: Lewis C. DOUGALL, Appellant, v. SPOKANE, PORTLAND AND SEATTLE RAILWAY COMPANY, a corporation, Appellee.
Judges: 
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 256
Pages: 601–603

Head Matter:
Lewis C. DOUGALL, Appellant, v. SPOKANE, PORTLAND AND SEATTLE RAILWAY COMPANY, a corporation, Appellee.
No. 15544.
United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit.
June 13, 1958.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 5, 1958.
Roth & Tilbury, Roger G. Tilbury, Portland, Or., for appellant.
Hart, Spencer, McCulloch, Rockwood & Davies, Hugh L. Biggs, Cleveland C. Cory, Portland, Or., for appellee.
Before HEALY, POPE, and HAM-LEY, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
HEALY, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal from an order of the United States District Court for Oregon denying appellant's motion, under Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., for correction and relief from a judgment which was entered July 11, 1952.
This judgment dismissed appellant's action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act to recover from appellee damages on account of personal injuries sustained by appellant in January of 1946. The judgment was affirmed on appeal to this court (9 Cir., 207 F.2d 843, Case No. 13,492), and certiorari was denied (347 U.S. 904, 74 S.Ct. 429, 98 L.Ed. 1063). Judgment on this court's mandate was entered below February 23, 1954. The motion under Rule 60, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, was filed November 21, 1956, and the order presently appealed from was entered in January 1957.
As stated in our opinion on the original appeal, a pre-trial order, approved by counsel for both parties, was entered. By stipulation, the order was to supersede all pleadings. The final pre-trial order set out the issues as follows:
"I. Alleged Liability under Federal Employers' Liability Act [45 U.S.C.A. § 51 et seq.]
"A. Right to Maintain Action under Federal Employers' Liability Act.
"B. Alleged Liability for Negligence under Federal Employers' Liability Act and Alleged Violation of Safety Appliance Act [45 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq.]
"1. If plaintiff has a right of action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act against defendant herein, is defendant liable under that Act (a) for negligence or (b) in the active or permissive use of equipment in violation of the Safety Appliance Act ?" [Emphasis supplied.]
It is clear that the action to be tried was framed entirely under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. The trial court agreed to separate issues IA and IB. Witnesses were heard as regards the first of these issues, namely IA, "is there a right of action under FELA?" The trial court found the defendant railroad company Not liable under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, on the ground that Morrison-Knudsen was an independent contractor; therefore, plaintiff was not an employee of the defendant railroad company. This being the case, the court did not reach issue IB, but in accord with its findings of fact it entered judgment dismissing the action.
The district court's order denying appellant's motion for relief must be affirmed. For the purpose of the motion, this court will look at the record in No. 13,492 solely for the purpose of determining whether the judgment of July 11, 1952, was a final judgment, or whether, as appellant contends, it was an unap-pealable interlocutory order. The judgment dismissed and terminated this action in the court below. It was, as already indicated, granted on findings of fact and conclusions of law which determined that appellant was not an employee of appellee and could not maintain an action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act.
The judgment being one of dismissal on the merits of appellant's action for damages under the provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act was obviously a final and appealable judgment.
Affirmed.
. Appellant has also filed with this court a motion for correction and amendment of our mandate in the previous appeal of this case, premised on the assertion that we there lacked jurisdiction because there was no final judgment from which to appeal. The motion is denied for reasons hereinafter appearing.
. The court also suggested from the bench that the plaintiff might desire to amend the pre-trial order or commence a new action on the ground that there was liability independent of the F.E.L.A. for permitting violations of the Safety Appliance Act. Plaintiff did not take advantage of the suggestion.