Case Name: De Edward LESTER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Maurice JUNIOUS, Respondent-Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2014-09-04
Citations: 584 F. App'x 738
Docket Number: No. 12-57035
Parties: De Edward LESTER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Maurice JUNIOUS, Respondent-Appellee.
Judges: Before: O’SCANNLAIN and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges, and RAKOFF, Senior District Judge.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 584
Pages: 738–739

Head Matter:
De Edward LESTER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Maurice JUNIOUS, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 12-57035.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted Aug. 25, 2014.
Filed Sept. 4, 2014.
Tarik S. Adlai, Law Offices of Tarik S. Adlai, Pasadena, CA, Petitioner-Appellant.
De Edward Lester, pro se.
Eric Eugene Reynolds, Deputy Attorney General, Office of the California Attorney General, Los Angeles, CA, for Respondent-Appellee.
Before: O’SCANNLAIN and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges, and RAKOFF, Senior District Judge.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).
The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, Senior District Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
De Edward Lester appeals the district court's order denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Lester contends that he should be granted habeas relief because illicitly-attained incriminating statements were admitted at trial and caused actual prejudice. Lester relies on Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 106 S.Ct. 477, 88 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985), which held that "the Sixth Amendment is violated when the State obtains incriminating statements by knowingly circumventing the accused's right to have counsel present in a confrontation between the accused and a state agent," Id. at 176, 106 S.Ct. 477, and that such "incriminating statements pertaining to pending charges are inadmissible at the trial of those charges." Id. at 180, 106 S.Ct. 477.
Without deciding whether Moulton was violated, we conclude that Lester has failed to show that the introduction of the statements had a "substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 755 (9th Cir.2009) (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 687, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993)). The tainted evidence was merely "in effect, cumulative" of other "weighty" evidence that indubitably influenced the jury. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 639, 113 S.Ct. 1710; see also Moses, 555 F.3d at 755 (holding that, in light of strong evidence of guilt, tainted evidence was harmless under Brecht).
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.