Case Name: PEOPLE v. OTIS
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1910-03-09
Citations: 121 N.Y.S. 810
Docket Number: 
Parties: PEOPLE v. OTIS.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 121
Pages: 810–815

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v. OTIS.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.
March 9, 1910.)
Cemeteries (§ 22 )—Offenses—Injuring Monument—Statutes—“Owner.”
Penal Law (Consol. Laws, c. 40) § 1427, subd. 2, providing that “any person, who not being the owner thereof, and without lawful authority, willfully injures or disfigures * * * a monument * * * in a cemetery * * * is guilty of a misdemeanor,” is not to be construed as though the word “sole” were before the word “owner,” and so does not apply to a joint owner of a monument, who, though without right, removes an inscription therefrom.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Cemeteries, Cent. Dig. § 24; Dec. Dig. § 22.
For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 6, pp. 5134-5151; vol. 8, p. 7744.]
McLennan, P. J., and Spring, J., dissenting.
Appeal from Jefferson County Court.
Charles M. Otis appeals from a judgment imposed on a verdict convicting him of violation of Penal Law, § 1427, subd. 2.
Reversed, and new trial granted.
Argued before McLENNAN, P. J., and SPRING, WILLIAMS,KRUSE, and ROBSON, JJ.
Bloodough & Woolworth, for appellant.
F. B. Pitcher, List. Atty., for respondent.
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r indexes

Opinion:
. WILLIAMS, J.
The judgment should be reversed, and a new trial granted.
All questions of fact have been settled by the verdict of the jury in favor of the people and against the defendant. The only question here is one of law—whether the statute under which the indictment was found and defendant was tried covers this case. The defendant was a joint owner of a lot and monument standing thereon in Brookside Cemetery, in the city of Watertown, N. Y. Other members of the family were joint owners with him of the lot and monument. He was not the sole owner. The statute (Penal Law [Consol. Laws, c. 40] § 1427, subd. 2) provides that:
"Any person who not being the owner thereof, and without lawful authority, willfully injures or disfigures a monument in a cemetery is guilty of a misdemeanor."
The defendant was tried and convicted upon the theory, and instruction to the jury, that the words "not being the owner thereof" mean "not being the sole owner thereof." I think this is not a proper construction of the statute. The question is not whether the defendant had a legal right to remove the Cadwell inscription from the monument, but whether such act was a crime under this statute. It may well be that under the circumstances developed in the evidence the Cadwell inscription was properly placed upon the monument, and the defendant had no legal right to remove it therefrom. For such illegal removal the law would furnish a remedy. That is not the question here involved. When various members of a family are jointly interested in a monm ment, differences are liable to arise as to the rights of parties; that is, where their respective inscriptions shall be placed, and whether the names of their relatives shall be put upon the monument, etc. When these differences arise, the courts will settle them; but, if some one of the parties assumes to settle differences himself without the aid of the court, and is mistaken as to his legal rights, can it be said he is liable under this statute to punishment as for a crime ? Was it the intention by this statute to make the acts of a joint owner criminal, or merely to protect the owners one or many against the acts of outsiders, persons having no interest in the monument whatever? I do not think this statute was designed to cover a case like this, where there are differences between persons jointly interested in a monument as members of a family. It does not at all follow that taking this view of the statute is equivalent to holding that any one of the interested persons may legally remove an inscription from a monument so jointly owned. The act may be illegal, and the Legislature still not have chosen to make it a crime. Criminal statutes should be strictly construed in favor of a defendant. If the Legislature intended this statute to cover all owners except sole owners, it would have been very easy to put the word "sole" in the statute. Having left it out, the construction should not be such as practically to write it into the statute.
I am aware of no decisions bearing upon this question. It is not a matter of sentiment. It is not a question whether a person may lawfully deface a monument, but whether the act if illegal is a trespass or a crime under this statute. There are many illegal acts which the Legislature has not chosen to make crimes. If they are not made crimes, they are not therefore any less illegal, and there is no right to commit such illegal acts. It will not do to say that, if we hold this statute does not cover joint owners, we thereby hold a joint owner may lawfully injure of disfigure monuments. If the statute does not cover joint owners, and it is desirable that it should do so, the Legislature should amend it. The court should not attempt to -make such amendment by a forced judicial construction. To recapitulate, a person who is the sole owner of a monument may do what he pleases to it. He may deface it, remove inscriptions from it, and mutilate it any way he sees fit, and he not only commits no crime, but no illegal act, however much he may shock the community at large. He may do as he pleases with his own. A person having no interest at all in a monument, and who defaces," disfigures, or mutilates it, is not only guilty of an illegal act, but commits a crime under this statute. A joint owner interested with others in a monument who .removes an inscription therefrom under claim of right to do so, but who has no such right in fact, is guilty of an illegal act, but is not guilty of. a crime under this statute.
Judgment reversed and new trial ordered upon questions of law only. All concur, KRUSE, J., with a separate memorandum, except MCLENNAN, P. J., and SPRING, J., who dissent in an opinion by MCLENNAN, P. J. '