Case Name: Richard Lee MORRIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2001-05-29
Citations: 789 So. 2d 1032
Docket Number: No. 1D99-4286
Parties: Richard Lee MORRIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: BARFIELD, C.J., BOOTH, MINER, WOLF, KAHN, WEBSTER, DAVIS, VAN NORTWICK, LEWIS and POLSTON, JJ„ CONCUR; BENTON, J., DISSENTS WITH OPINION IN WHICH BROWNING, J., CONCURS; PADOVANO, J., DISSENTS WITHOUT OPINION; BROWNING, J., DISSENTS WITH OPINION IN WHICH ERVIN, J., CONCURS.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 789
Pages: 1032–1042

Head Matter:
Richard Lee MORRIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 1D99-4286.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
May 29, 2001.
Rehearing Denied July 19, 2001.
Nancy Daniels, Public Defender, and Glen P. Gifford, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Karla D. Ellis, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

Opinion:
EN BANC
ALLEN, J.
The appellant challenges a conviction entered upon a nolo plea reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss. The motion was filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4), and with a contention that § 800.04(4), Fla. Stat. (1997), could not be applied to what the appellant described as a verbal interchange with the victim. Considering the appeal en banc in accordance with Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.331(a), we conclude that the factual allegations are sufficient to bring the appellant's conduct within the statutory proscription against the commission of a lewd or lascivious act.
Section 800.04(4), Florida Statutes (1997), expressly pertains to one who knowingly commits "any lewd or lascivious act" in the presence of a child under the age of sixteen. The appellant was charged with violating this statute by telling a child that he desired to engage her in oral sex, using language which described this in a graphic manner. In his rule 3.190(c)(4) motion the appellant alleged that the child was visiting in his home and lying on his couch when he addressed her with the specified remarks expressing his sexual desire. The appellant further indicated that when the child expressed confusion the appellant explained his intent with specific language which was even more sexually graphic. Noting that he made no motion toward the child and did not hinder her when she got up and left, the appellant asserted that his conduct consisted merely of verbal statements within the privacy of his own home and that these undisputed facts do not establish a prima facie violation of § 800.04(4).
There is no dispute as to whether the language which the appellant used was lewd or lascivious. Instead, the appellant challenges the application of the statute to verbal conduct which is unaccompanied by other physical action. But the statutory reference to a prohibited "act" is commonly understood as encompassing conduct or behavior which involves only verbal statements or speech. See 1A C.J.S. Act 1985. Indeed, this court is one of many which have recognized the concept of a verbal act in the context of a criminal proscription. E.g., L.J.M. v. State, 541 So.2d 1321 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 549 So.2d 1014 (Fla.1989). There is no question but that the appellant understood that he was acting in a lewd or lascivious manner when he uttered his sexually offensive remarks to the child, and the appellant's motion to dismiss was properly denied as his conduct violated the statutory proscription against such a lewd or lascivious act.
The appealed order is affirmed.
BARFIELD, C.J., BOOTH, MINER, WOLF, KAHN, WEBSTER, DAVIS, VAN NORTWICK, LEWIS and POLSTON, JJ" CONCUR; BENTON, J., DISSENTS WITH OPINION IN WHICH BROWNING, J., CONCURS; PADOVANO, J., DISSENTS WITHOUT OPINION; BROWNING, J., DISSENTS WITH OPINION IN WHICH ERVIN, J., CONCURS.