Case Name: Executors of Peter Stevens v. Hartley Hollister
Court: Vermont Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Vermont
Decision Date: 1846-02
Citations: 18 Vt. 294
Docket Number: 
Parties: Executors of Peter Stevens v. Hartley Hollister.
Judges: 
Reporter: Vermont Reports
Volume: 18
Pages: 294–304

Head Matter:
Executors of Peter Stevens v. Hartley Hollister.
If the owner of land, who has been disseized, bring trespass qu. cl.freg., instead of ejectment, against the disseizor, he can only recover damages for the first entry of the defendant upon the land, unless he prove a re-entry by himself before suit brought. In the latter case, — Per Redfield, J.,— he may recover for all the intervening damages, the same as in the action of trespass at common law for mesne profits, after a recovery in ejectment.
The doctrine of constructive possession will not be extended to land in the actual adverse possession of a disseizor.
In this case, which was trespass qu.cl.freg., the plaintiff derived title from original proprietors of the town and produced a survey, on their rights, of fifty acres, embracing the locus in quo. The first deeds in his chain of title, subsequent to the survey, described the lot as a forty acre lot, and omitted one line of the survey, but referred to a survey on record. Subsequent deeds followed these errors in the description, and omitted the reference to. the survey; but it was proved that the plaintiff1 and those under whom he derived title had, for more than thirty years prior to the entry of the defendant, occupied the entire fifty acres, including the locus in quo, claiming title thereto by virtue of the said survey bill and deeds. And it was held, that the county court were correct, in instructing the jury, that, in law, the several deeds conveyed the land described in the original survey.
When there is no controversy as to the facts in the case, itis a mere question of law, what land was intended to be conveyed by a deed.
Trespass qitare clausum fregit. Plea, the general issue, with notice, and also plea of license, and trial by jury, — Williams, Ch. J., presiding.
On trial the plaintiffs gave evidence, proving, that, on the 30th day of September, 1802, one Oliver Hawks surveyed and laid out to John Stark, one of the original proprietors of the town of Pawlet, fifty acres of land, the survey bill of which was recorded in the town records of Pawlet the same day, and that Stark entered immediately into possession of the same land, under the survey, and that the survey covered the land claimed by the-plaintiffs in their declaration. The plaintiffs also -gave in evidence the deeds, subsequent to the survey, under which their testator claimed title, the two first of which, in the chain of title, described the lot as a forty acre lot and omitted one line given in the survey bill, but referred to a survey on record, and the remainder of which continued the same error in the description, but omitted the reference to the survey. The plaintiffs also proved that the testator, and those under whom he claimed, had been in possession of the lot described in the survey bill from the time possession was taken by Stark until the year 1834, when the defendant entered, and cut timber, and cleared about ten acres of the land, — which was the trespass complained of in the declaration, — and had continued the trespass until the commencement of this action.
The defendant gave evidence, tending to prove that he entered into possession of the locus in quo in 1834, and that he had continued in exclusive possession of the same from that time to the time of commencing this suit; he also gave in evidence a survey of the lot to himself, made March 20, 1836, and put on record September 2, 1839, but gave no other evidence of title.
The defendant requested the court to instruct the jury, that, although the original survey to Stark embraced fifty acres, yet that the subsequént deeds restricted the title of the plaintiffs’ testator to' forty acres; but the court instructed the jury, that the subsequent deeds, in law, conveyed the same land described in the survey, although they contained no special reference to the survey. The defendant also requested the court to instruct the jury, that, if he entered upon the locus in quo in 1834 and had ever since continued in the exclusive possession thereof, he would be liable for nominal damages, only, for the first entry, although he showed no title to the land. But the court instructed the jury, that, the plaintiffs’ testator having a title, by deed, to the land in question, if he was in the actual possession of a part of the lot described in the deed, claiming the whole, he had the constructive possession of the whole, and might recover in this action the actual damages for all the trespasses committed by the defendant, while the defendant was in the actual possession of a part of the lot.
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs for the entire damages. Exceptions by defendant.
C. B. Harrington and S. H. Hodges for defendant.
1. The defendant insists, that the deeds, under which the plain tiffs’ testator immediately claimed title to himself, cannot be so construed as to embrace the premises in controversy, but must be restricted, to the forty acres expressly named. If the jury might have found, as matter in pais, that the deeds in fact conveyed the whole lot, including those premises, still the question was within their exclusive province to determine; and the charge, that they, “ in law,” conveyed the land contained in the survey, was therefore erroneous. Hodges v. Strong, 10 Vt. 247.
2. The plaintiff cannot maintain trespass quare clausum fregit, unless he is in possession of the premises at the time the alleged trespasses are committed. Graham v. Peat, 1 East. 244. Harker v. Birkbeck, 3 Burr. 1566. Cary v. Holt, 2 Str. 1238. Lambert v. Stroother, Willes 221. The King v. Watson, 5 East. 485, 487. 1 Chit. PI. 176. 1 Sw. Dig. 513. If he has been dispossessed, he can recover nominal damages, only, for the first act of eviction, and nothing for subsequent injuries, until he has regained the possession. It is so laid down in the books universally; 1 Chit. PL 200, 203; 3 Bl. Com. 210 ; Lyford’s Case, 11 Co. 45 ; 2 Roll. Abr. 553 ; it is settled by the decisions in this country; Allen v. Thayer, 17 Mass. 299; Wheeler v. Hotchkiss, 10 Conn. 225; Holmes v. Seely, 19 Wend. 507; Barr v. Gratz, 4 Wheat. 213; Ellicott v. Pearl, 10 Pet. 412; Morgan v. Varrick, 8 Wend. 587; and the rule has been repeatedly recognized in our own State; Crowell v. Bebee, 10 Vt. 33 ; Hubbard v. Austin, 11 Vt. 129; Ralph v. Bayley, 11 Vt. 521; Ripley v. Yale, 16 Vt. 257. These cases show, at the same time, that the doctrine of constructive possession is never extended to land in the actual occupation of adverse parties. If it were, Holmes v. Seeley, at least, must haye received a different decision. A constructive possession always terminates, when an actual adverse possession commences. Ripley v. Yale, 16 Vt. 257. Crowell v. Bebee, 10 Vt. 33. Hubbard v. Austin, 11 Vt. 129. Ralph v. Bayley, 11 Vt. 521.
If a third person had trespassed upon the premises, while in the possession of the defendant, he alone, and not the plaintiffs’ testator, could have maihtained an action for such trespass. It seems hardly consistent, to treat that possession as a trespass upon the land owner, which the law recognizes as sufficient to defeat his right of action against third persons -and give it to the trespasser. Carey v. Holt, 2 Str. 1238. Catteris v. Cowper, 4 Taunt. 547. Cutís v. Spring, 15. Mass. 137. Reedv. Shepley, 6 Vt. 602. Ralph v. Bayley, 11 Vt. 521. Doolittle v. Linsley, 2 Aik. 155. Sawyer v. New-land, 9 Vt. 383. Graham v. Peat, 1 East 244. 1 Sw. Dig. 513.
The plaintiff’s intestate was so far disseized, that in fifteen years he would have lost his title. His true remedy, 'then, is ejectment; which he could have maintained, beyond any question, upon this eviction. Ejectment will not lie for mere trespasses ; and it seems equally inconsistent, to treat a manifest eviction as merely a trespass.
G. W. Harmon for plaintiff.
1. The true rule applicable to the action of trespass may be found in 5 Bac. Abr. 166, §§ 43, 44; and the question is, whether the facts, as detailed in the bill of exceptions, disclose a case within that rule. The plaintiffs’ testator having had the actual possession of the entire close, described in the declaration, for a long period of time, and the defendant having entered from time to time upon a portion thereof and committed the acts complained of, the possession of the former is to be regarded as continuing through the whole time, during which the latter was committing those acts; and whatever acts the defendant committed must be regarded as trespasses, and not as amounting to a disseisin, — the plaintiffs’ testator having title, and the defendant having none. 4 Kent 120, 482, 487. Bal. ,on Lim. -362, 363. Blood v. Wood, 1 Mete. 528. Beach v. Sutton, 5 Vt. 209. Hull v. Fuller, 7 Vt. 100. Crowell v. Bebee, 10 Vt. 33. Hubbard v. Austin, 11 Vt. 129. It must follow, then, that the plaintiff can recover, not only for the first trespass, but for all subsequent acts of the defendant in clearing the land.
2. The original survey of the lot embraced fifty acres in fact, but was immediately called “ forty acres; ” it was twice conveyed as “ forty acres,” and the quantity made certain by a reference to the survey ; after that it was conveyed as “ forty acres,” without any reference to the survey, but the description was in the same words as in the first deeds. Melvin v. Proprietors, 5 Met. 15. Beach v. Stearns, 1 Aik. 325. Hull v. Fuller, 7 Vt. 100. Hathaway v. Power, 6 Hill 453. Hibbard v. Hurlburt, 10 Vt. 173. Burton v. Lazell, 16 Vt. 158.

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Redfield, J.
The general rule of law, in regard to the right of the disseizee to maintain trespass quare clausum fregit against the disseizor, seems to be well enough settled; and the counsel for the plaintiff has not attempted to unsettle it. It is thus laid down by Blackstone, [3 Bl. Com. 210;] "Though a disseizee might have it [the action of trespass qu. cl. freg.~\ against the disseizor for the injury done by the disseizin itself, at which time the plaintiff was seized of the land, but he cannot have it for any act done after the disseizin, until he gained possession by re-entry, and then he may maintain it for the intermediate damage done; for after his re-entry the law, by a kind of just post liminii, supposes the freehold to have all along continued in him." The rule is laid down in nearly the same terms in 4 Kent 119, and in 5 Bac. Ab. 166. Lord Coke, in his commentary upon Littleton, 257 a, says, " The disseizee shall have an action of trespass against the disseizor, and recover his damages for the first entry, without any regress ; but after regress he may have an action of trespass with a continuando, and recover as well for all the mesne occupation as for the first entry." And the text of Little-ton, Sect. 430, 256 b, is to the same effect.
The only question, then, in the present case seems to be, whether there was any disseizin of the plaintiff. For if there were, it is not claimed, that he made any re-entry upon the premises before bringing the action, and it would therefore be error in the court below to suffer him to recover the intermediate damages between the disseizin and the bringing the action.
There is considerable discussion in the books, how far certain equivocal acts of tenants, and of others in subordinate relations to the owner of the land, may by him be treated, at his election, as a disseizin. This is a concession made to the owner for the sake of the remedy, and to answer the purposes of justice. This part of the subject will be found very elaborately and very learnedly discussed in Taylor d. Atkins v. Horde, 1 Burr. 60, and in 2 Smith's Leading Cases (Am. Ed.) 324, and notes.
In the present case the defendant gave evidence tending to show that he was in actual exclusive occupation of the land, upon which the trespasses were claimed to have been committed, from the year 1834 until the bringing of this suit. And upon this point the court charged the jury, that, if the plaintiff was first in possession of some portion of the land, claiming the whole and having a deed of the whole, he might recover of the defendant for every successive act upon the land, notwithstanding he (defendant) had cleared and actually occupied some portion of the land for a great number of years. We do not see how a clearer, more unequivocal ouster, eviction and disseizin could be described. No one will doubt, I apprehend, that such an actual occupancy of the land from year to year, if continued for the term of fifteen years, would give the possessor a perfect title, which would be absurd, if there had been no actual disseizin committed upon the plaintiff. The occupancy could not give a title by the statute of'limitations, unless it was such an unequivocal disseizin, as the owner1 was not at liberty to elect to treat as subsidiary to his own possession. The case is manifestly one of a positive, actual and notorious disseizin, and the plaintiff was entitled to recover only for the first disseizin, as a trespass, until he had made a re-entry upon the land. It is upon this latter ground, that the recovery was had in Butcher v. Butcher, 14 E. C. L. 59.
The only remaining point in this case is in regard to the construction of deeds in the chain of the plaintiff's title. Such cases are ordinarily of no practical importance to be minutely reported, for every case depends mainly upon its own peculiar circumstances and can only be a precedent for another case precisely identical in all its facts, which never occurs.
In this case it is obvious, that all the deeds were intended to convey the same land, as all use the same terms of description, — which is, indeed, defective by omitting one line; but the earlier deeds referring to the survey of John Stark, which includes the whole fifty acres and does not seem to have been divided, it would, perhaps, be a more natural construction of the deeds, that all the land included in the survey was intended to be conveyed, although it is called " forty acres " instead of. fifty, — which is, indeed, the only thing raising a doubt as to the intention of the parties. We do not well see how the deeds could receive any other construction, unless they weye held void for uncertainty, — which a court will always feel reluctant to do after so long an acquiescence in the validity of the deeds and occupancy under them, as there seems to have been in the present case.
We do not perceive any error in the court below in giving a construction to the deeds, as to the extent of land conveyed, without referring the matter to the jury. There was no controversy in regard to the facts in the case. The matter was, then, a mere question of law as to what land was intended to be conveyed, the same as the construction of a written instrument in any other respect. The trial appears to have been in all respects legal and proper, unless the decision of the court below might have induced the plaintiff to omit giving evidence of a re-entry upon the land. If that is so, the case will be remanded ; otherwise the judgment will be reversed as to all the damages except one cent, and affirmed as to that.
The plaintiff elected to have judgment affirmed for nominal damages, and the entry was accordingly so made.