Case Name: CHANEY v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1994-08-31
Citations: 447 Mich. 145
Docket Number: Docket No. 96282
Parties: CHANEY v DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Judges: Griffin, J., concurred with Riley, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 447
Pages: 145–216

Head Matter:
CHANEY v DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Docket No. 96282.
Argued March 9, 1994
(Calendar No. 9).
Decided August 31, 1994.
Rehearing denied post, 1216.
• Ray Chaney brought an action in the Court of Claims against the Department of Transportation, seeking damages for injuries sustained when his motorcycle left the roadway of a highway entrance ramp and overpass, crossed the shoulder, and struck a bridge railing immediately adjacent to, but beyond,, the shoulder. The court, James R. Giddings, J., denied summary disposition, rejecting the defendant’s claim of governmental immunity and concluding that guardrails are designed to affect the way vehicles travel. The Court of Appeals, Sullivan, P.J., and Mackenzie and I. B. Torres, JJ., citing Scheurman v Transportation Dep’t, 434 Mich 619 (1990), reversed in an opinion per curiam, concluding that because the bridge railing was neither roadbed nor designed for vehicular travel, governmental immunity applied (Docket No. 131092). The plaintiff appeals.
In separate opinions, the Supreme Court held the defendant to be immune from liability, and affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
Justice Brickley, stated that because the bridge railing was not physically located within the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel, and because it did not integrally and directly affect safe vehicular travel on the improved portion of the highway, the highway exception to governmental immunity is inapplicable.
1. The statutory grant of governmental immunity is broad, and its exceptions are narrowly drawn. The legislative purpose underlying the highway exception is fulfilled by requiring certain governmental agencies to repair and maintain the highway so that the improved portion designed for vehicular travel is reasonably safe and convenient for public travel. The highway exception normally does not include installations that are physically separate from the paved or traveled portion of a highway. Rather, the limiting language creating liability under MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102) encompasses installations physically located within the traveled or paved portion of a highway designed for vehicular travel or some installations, even those physically located beyond the traveled or paved portion of a highway, that directly and integrally affect safe vehicular travel on the improved portion.
2. In this case, governmental immunity precludes liability for the bridge railing because it is not physically located within the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel and does not directly and integrally affect vehicular travel along the improved portion of the highway.
Justice Riley, joined by Justice Griffin, concurring in part and dissenting in part, stated that the majority impermissibly expands liability by misconstruing the plain meaning of the statute at issue. The state is not liable for damages arising from installations directly and integrally affecting vehicular safety on the improved portion of the highway unless the highway is unreasonably unsafe because of physical disrepair of the improved portion of the roadbed designed for vehicular travel.
A bridge railing is not an improved portion of a highway designed for vehicular travel. While a bridge railing is designed for vehicular safety, it is not a portion of the highway on which motor vehicles were designed to travel. The governmental statute does not expressly impose liability for bridge railings. To the contrary, bridge railings, separated from the roadbed by a reused curb and a paved shoulder are akin to sidewalks, crosswalks, or any other installation outside the improved portion of the highway. The unambiguous language of the statute excludes injuries involving the bridge railing.
The majority ignores the narrow issue presented and expands the sovereign immunity exception to include all injuries arising from any installation that directly and integrally affects safe vehicular travel on the improved portion of the highway, in contradiction of the clear language of the statute. While the obvious purpose undergirding the section is to compensate injured persons when the highway is unsafe for vehicular travel, it does so only in very limited circumstances. The statute does not provide blanket liability for all injuries that deprive drivers of conditions essential to safety on the highway itself. It only imposes liability if the injuries arise from the failure to repair or maintain the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel.
The judiciary may not amend statutes to conform to its policy preferences. The Legislature, not the Court, is the lawmaking authority within the constitutional order of separate powers. Unless the constitution invalidates a legislative enactment, the propriety and wisdom of an enactment is not for the Supreme Court to question.
Justice Boyle, concurring, stated that the highway exception to governmental immunity does not encompass accidents arising out of any installation that directly and integrally affects safe vehicular travel on the improved portion of a highway designed for vehicular travel.
Under the highway exception, both the state’s duty to maintain and repair the highway and its liability for failure to do so are restricted to the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel. However, the phrase "improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel” draws no obvious line. Including in the highway exception some installations, even those physically located beyond the traveled or paved portion of a highway, that directly and integrally affect safe vehicular traffic on the improved portion, is less helpful than the statute, and is so imprecise that it would foster litigation with no clear benefit. Rather, the state and counties should be liable under the highway exception only when they fail to repair and maintain the paved surface of a roadway, including objects on and structures supporting that surface, or traffic signs or signals necessary for safe vehicular travel.
In this case, the plaintiff’s claim is barred by governmental immunity because he does not allege a failure to repair and maintain the paved surface of the roadway or a traffic sign or signal.
Chief Justice Cavanagh, concurring, stated that while Justices Brickley’s and Boyle’s interpretations of the highway exception to the governmental immunity statute are preferable from a policy standpoint, Justice Riley’s interpretation is in accord with the plain language of the statute and the command of Ross v Consumers Power (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567 (1984), of broad governmental immunity with narrowly drawn exceptions. In addition, her interpretation provides an exact standard, defining not only an injured party’s rights but the government’s potential liability. None of the other separate opinions satisfies each of these components.
Because it is inconceivable that liability under the highway exception should be so severely limited, the Legislature is urged to provide a more exhaustive list of exclusions or revise the statute, illustrating the extent of the highway exception.
Affirmed.
Justice Levin, joined by Justice Mallett, dissenting, stated that the question presented is whether the Michigan Department of Transportation is relieved from liability, under the highway exception to governmental immunity from tort liability, for a defect in design or construction of the concrete wall or guardrail involved in the accident at issue because they were erected immediately beyond, and thus outside, the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel. The Court of Appeals, relying on Scheurman, held that the circuit judge should have granted the department’s motion for summary disposition because the Legislature intended to impose only a duty to keep the traveled roadbed in reasonable repair, and because the concrete wall, while part of the overpass structure, was not designed for vehicular travel, but instead constituted an other installation outside the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel within the meaning of the any-other-installation clause of the highway exception of MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102). It further held that, because the barrier was neither a roadbed nor designed for vehicular travel, governmental immunity applied and the defendant should not be held liable for the plaintiff’s injuries. However Scheurman is not precedentially binding under the doctrine of stare decisis, because no opinion obtained four signatures. In addition, the fundamental issues in this case were not decided in Scheurman. Further, the statement in the plurality opinion in Scheurman that the true intent of the Legislature was to impose a duty only to keep the physical portion of the traveled road in reasonable repair is obiter dictum.
The first two sentences of the highway exception impose a duty to keep the traveled roadbed in reasonable repair and a duty, and liability for failure to discharge that duty, to maintain the highway in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel. Case law has consistently held that the liability for failure to discharge the duty to maintain the highway in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel extends to failures of design or construction, including failures to install guardrails as reasonably necessary to maintain the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel. The view that the only statutory duty imposed by the words "in reasonable repair, and in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel” is to keep roadways in repair was repeatedly rejected. The Legislature, surely aware of the consistent judicial construction, extending for seventy-five years from 1889, nevertheless reenacted in 1964 the same language in the governmental tort liability act. Although the Supreme Court, in the thirty years since the enactment of the governmental tort liability act in 1964, has been true, without dissent, to the well-established precedents holding governmental agencies subject to liability for failures to warn, failures to erect barriers, and failures of design, the Legislature has not changed the statutory standard subjecting governmental agen cies to liability for failure to keep highways in reasonable repair, and in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel.
In providing, in the fourth sentence of the highway exception, that the duty "to repair and maintain highways, and the liability therefor” shall not extend to "any other installation outside of the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel,” the Legislature did not relieve the department of its duty and liability under the first two sentences of the highway exception to repair and maintain the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel, including installation of guardrails reasonably necessary to maintain the improved portion reasonably safe and fit for travel.
The fourth sentence of the highway exception contains two clauses: the repair-and-maintain clause and the any-other-installation clause. Reading the highway exception as a whole, the duty and liability expressly extended in the repair-and-maintain clause to the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel concerns the repair and maintenance of the improved portion. The scope of the obligation is to keep the improved portion in reasonable repair and in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel. That obligation and liability for failure to repair and maintain, under the consistent case law before and after the 1964 reenactment, extends to a failure of design or construction, including a failure to warn or to erect suitable barriers. Although the Legislature clearly did not intend liability for a failure to maintain the unimproved portion of the highway in a condition safe and fit for travel, nothing in the wording of the highway exception suggests an intent to limit the liability of governmental agencies only to certain factors that are necessary to safely maintain the improved portion of the highway.
The Legislature, in providing in the any-other-installation clause that the duty to repair and maintain highways and the liability for failure to do so did not include any other installation outside the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel, relieved the department of the duty and liability to keep the concrete wall in reasonable repair and in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel, not simply because the concrete wall and metal barrier were located immediately beyond and outside the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel, but also because the concrete wall and metal barrier were not designed for vehicular travel. However the plaintiff is not complaining that the concrete wall that was erected was not in reasonable repair or in a condition reasonably safe and fit for travel on the concrete wall. Rather, he asserts that, under the repair-and-maintain clause, the department failed to design and construct the concrete wall and metal barrier as reasonably necessary to maintain the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel.
A literal or "plain” reading of the any-other-installation clause does not relieve the state and counties of their obligation under the repair-and-maintain clause to keep the improved portion designed for vehicular travel not only in reasonable repair, but also in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel. That obligation, as construed by the Supreme Court, subjects the state and counties to liability for failures of design or construction, including a failure to warn or to erect suitable barriers. The any-other-installation clause should be read in harmony with the repair-and-maintain clause. To hold that there is no duty or liability on the part of the state or counties to maintain the improved portion of the highway in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel deprives the words "and maintain” in the repair-and-maintain clause of any meaning.
The majority misreads the legislative purpose in adding the any-other-installation clause in the fourth sentence. That sentence was crafted to avoid state and county responsibility for the repair and maintenance of sidewalks and crosswalks, traditionally the responsibility of townships and cities, and also to eliminate state and county responsibility for the repair and maintenance of installations like bicycle paths, bridges and medians adjacent to, traversing, or running alongside, state and county highways. It was not crafted to eliminate the liability of the state and counties, and by implication cities and townships, for design and construction defects and for all other failures to maintain, as distinguished from repair, highways in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel. Read as the majority reads it, the highway exception is not a meaningful exception to governmental immunity. The new meaning developed by the majority purposefully ignores one hundred years of adjudication by the Supreme Court. In holding that the highway exception requires nothing more than keeping even a hazardous road in reasonable repair, with liability arising only for accidents resulting from failures to fix potholes, the majority indulges in heavy-handed judicial. legislation, rendering the highway exception devoid of any practical meaning.
198 Mich App 728; 499 NW2d 29 (1993) affirmed.
Gittleman, Paskel, Tashman & Blumberg, P.C. (by Clifford Paskel); Bendure & Thomas, of counsel (by Mark R. Bendure and Sidney A. Klingler), for the plaintiff.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, and Brenda E. Turner, Assistant Attorney General, for the defendant.
Amicus Curiae:
Robert A. Koory and Elizabeth A. Givens for Michigan Trial Lawyers Association.

Opinion:
Brickley, J.
This case asks us to decide whether the highway exception to governmental immunity encompasses a concrete bridge abutment and adjoining guardrail adjacent to, but beyond the shoulder of, a state trunk line entrance ramp and overpass. The Court of Appeals relied upon our plurality opinion in Scheurman v Dep't of Transportation, 434 Mich 619; 456 NW2d 66 (1990), to reverse the Court of Claims denial of defendant's motion for summary disposition. While we agree with the result reached by the Court of Appeals, we do not fully endorse its rationale. 198 Mich App 728; 499 NW2d 29 (1993). We hold that because the abutment and guardrail are neither part of "the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel," nor installations integrally and directly affecting safe vehicular travel upon the improved portion, governmental immunity bars the cause of action set forth in plaintiff's complaint.
i
Plaintiff was injured when his motorcycle left the roadway of a highway entrance ramp and overpass, crossed the shoulder, and struck either a metal guardrail or concrete abutment immediately adjacent to, but beyond, the shoulder. Plaintiff was thrown over the bridge railing and landed next to a median barrier on the highway below, incurring a number of injuries.
Plaintiff filed suit in the Court of Claims, alleging that the entrance ramp was owned by the state and under the jurisdiction and control of defendant who, plaintiff maintained, had responsibility for the design, construction, and maintenance of those bridge railings on the entrance ramp. Plaintiff's complaint specifically alleged that defendant had failed to properly design and construct the bridge railing, failed to inspect the entrance ramp for dangerous conditions, and failed to provide adequate warnings of dangers on the entrance ramp. The complaint further alleged that these negligent acts and omissions were the direct and proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries.
Defendant moved for summary disposition and, relying upon our decision in Scheurman, supra, argued that because of governmental immunity it was under no duty to maintain bridge railings "which fall outside the traveled and paved portion of the roadbed actually designed for public vehicular travel." The Court of Claims denied summary disposition, concluding that guardrails are "designed to affect the way vehicles travel down the road." Invoking stare decisis and explaining that it was bound to "follow" our holding in Scheurman, the Court of Appeals reversed in a per curiam opinion. Specifically, the Court of Appeals concluded that because the bridge railing "was neither 'roadbed' nor 'designed for vehicular travel,' governmental immunity applies and defendant should not be held liable for plaintiff's injuries" (citing Scheurman).
ii
A
As a general rule, governmental agencies are immune from tort liability for actions taken in furtherance of a governmental function. MCL 691.1407; MSA 3.996(107). The Legislature has articulated limited exceptions to this general rule, including the highway exception, which mandates that a governmental agency having jurisdiction over any highway
shall maintain the highway in reasonable repair so that it is reasonably safe and convenient for public travel. [MCL 691.1402(1); MSA 3.996(102X1).]
Notably, for activities undertaken to fulfill this mandate, both the government's duty and its liability are limited to that "improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel." It is this limiting language which we interpret and apply in the instant case.
As this Court explained in Ross v Consumers Power (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567; 363 NW2d 641 (1984), the statutory grant of governmental immunity is broad, and its exceptions are narrowly drawn. We are mindful, however, that like all judicial interpretations of statutory provisions, this Court is bound by the well-established rule that our primary goal is to give effect to the controlling intent of the Legislature. Lorencz v Ford Motor Co, 439 Mich 370; 483 NW2d 844 (1992). Accordingly, while we address our efforts in the shadow of a narrowly drawn statutory exception, our analysis inextricably proceeds toward the light of legislative intent.
The legislative purpose for the highway exception is, we believe, a clear one: to enhance the safety of public travel upon state-owned highways. This interpretation of the highway exception was first articulated in Roy v Dep't of Transportation, 428 Mich 330, 341; 408 NW2d 783 (1987), and was most recently reaffirmed in Gregg v Dep't of State Hwys, 435 Mich 307, 316; 458 NW2d 619 (1990). We expressly reiterate and adopt it today.
As was first explained in Roy, the legislative purpose underlying the highway exception is ful filled by requiring certain governmental agencies to "repair and maintain the highway so that the improved portion designed for vehicular travel is reasonably safe and convenient for public travel." Roy, supra at 341. Although this duty to "repair and maintain" is a limited one—extending only to that "improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel"—within this conceptual boundary the statutory goal of maintaining safe highways is clear and unambiguous. Because we are obligated to give effect to the controlling legislative intent of this exception, it. is against the backdrop of this statutory purpose that we today interpret and apply the limiting language of MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102).
B
1. ROY v dep't OF TRANSPORTATION
The highway exception, and its limiting language, was first examined by this Court in Roy. There we held that a bicycle path adjacent to, but separate and detached from, a highway was not part of the improved portion of that highway designed for vehicular travel. Id. at 340. In reaching this conclusion, we focused primarily on the location of the allegedly defective installation. Specifically, we explained that "the [highway exception] does not offer general protection to pedestrians or motorists without regard to location," and that "[t]he criterion used by the Legislature was not based on the class of travelers, but the road on which they travel." Id. at 341 (emphasis added). Because the bicycle path in Roy was located beyond the improved portion designed for vehicular travel, we concluded that governmental immunity from suit was not abrogated by the highway exception.
2. SCHEURMAN v DEP't OF TRANSPORTATION
The location of allegedly defective installations was again emphasized by this Court in Scheurman. There we held that the failure to install lighting along a state trunk line did not subject the government to potential liability because "the physical structure of the lights falls outside the traveled or paved portion of the roadbed actually designed for public vehicular travel." Id. at 633. Notably, while four justices in Scheurman joined in the rationale and result of the lead opinion, only three justices expressly subscribed to its holding that the limiting language of MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102) "refers only to the traveled portion, paved or unpaved, of the roadbed actually designed for vehicular travel." Id. at 623. Con-versely, four justices specifically expressed their desire for an interpretation of the limiting language that would include installations—even those located outside the improved portion of a highway designed for vehicular travel—that integrally affected safe travel on the improved portion.
We interpret Scheurman as reiterating the general rule, first articulated by this Court in Roy, that the highway exception does not normally include installations physically separate and detached from the paved or traveled portion of a highway. As is explained below, this interpretation is consistent with Gregg, supra, this Court's most recent majority interpretation of the highway exception. This interpretation of Scheurman is also consistent with the position we take in the instant case.
3. GREGG v dep't OF STATE HWYS
In Gregg, supra, a majority of this Court again affirmed that location is a key determinant for properly defining and applying the highway exception. There we held that a bicycle path running between the traveled portion of a highway and its paved shoulder comprised part of the improved highway "designed for vehicular travel." In reaching this conclusion, we explained that highway shoulders, while not part of the normally traveled roadbed, were nevertheless intended and designed for vehicular travel. Id. at 314, citing Johnson v Michigan, 32 Mich App 37; 188 NW2d 33 (1971). We held that the highway exception must be tempered by common experience, and that certain installations located beyond the traveled or paved roadway "are essential to a safe modern highway" so as not to be excluded from the highway exception. Id. at 315. This interpretation of the highway exception, we concluded, was more consistent with the exception's express purpose of protecting vehicular travelers by mandating the safe repair and maintenance of highways. Id. at 316.
c
The rule that can be derived from these decisions is clear, and we confirm it today: The limiting language of MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102), creating liability only for "the improved portion of a highway designed for vehicular travel," encompasses (1) installations physically located within that traveled or paved portion of a highway designed for vehicular travel, or (2) some installations, even those physically located beyond the traveled or paved portion of a highway, that directly and integrally affect safe vehicular travel on this improved portion.
This conclusion is consistent with our prior interpretations of the highway exception articulated in Roy and Gregg, supra. Furthermore, this conclusion incorporates the position, advocated by a majority of the justices in Scheurman, that the highway exception should not preclude potential governmental liability in "cases alleging a failure to 'repair and maintain' installations that are integral to, if not part of, the 'improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel,' such as traffic lights and signs." Id. at 637 (opinion of Boyle, J., and dissenting opinion of Brickley, J., joined by Levin and Archer, JJ.).
More importantly, this interpretation of the highway exception is consistent with the overriding legislative intent that guides our inquiry today, namely, the assurance of safe, reliable highways to protect public vehicular travel. As we recognized in Roy and Gregg, this intent is manifestly evident from the plain language of MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102), which commands highway authorities to repair and maintain highways for safe public travel.
Defendant asks us to adopt an interpretation of the highway exception that would limit liability exclusively to alleged defects arising on "part of the physical structure of the roadbed" or "relat[ing] to conditions arising out of the roadbed." While we conclude in this case that a physical installation off the improved portion does not escape immunity, in view of the expressions of a majority of this Court in the above-referenced opinions, we respectfully decline defendant's request for such a limited interpretation of the highway exception. Even the most minimalist assurances of vehicular safety demand more than simply decreeing that potholes be repaired, and proper striping applied, to those state-owned highway's so greatly relied upon by both citizens and guests of this state. We do not interpret the limiting language of MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102) in a manner so clearly inconsistent with, and damaging to, the highway exceptibn's clear and overriding legislative mandate demanding safe highways.
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the scope of liability under the highway exception is not all-encompassing. Indeed, potential liability is expressly limited to that "improved portion of a highway designed for vehicular travel." MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102). This limiting phrase, of course, necessarily defines the scope of duties and liabilities sanctioned by the highway exception. In this respect, the restrictive phrase is a spatial limitation: all duties, and all liabilities, must accomplish the purpose of promoting safe vehicular travel on the improved portion.
To summarize: in light of the clear legislative purpose that we must uphold, we interpret the limiting language of the highway exception as including only installations physically located on, or deemed to integrally affect, those properties comprising "the improved portion of a highway designed for vehicular travel." This interpretation adequately fulfills the legislative goals of the provision, while recognizing that it is also a narrowly defined exception to a broad grant of immunity.
m
Turning now to the facts of this instant case we conclude, albeit for different reasons, that the Court of Appeals did not err in reversing the Court of Claims denial of defendant's motion for summary disposition. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals read our decision in Scheurman as having interpreted the statutory phrase "improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel" to encompass only "the traveled portion of a roadbed actually designed for public vehicular travel." Chaney, supra at 730. We note that this narrow reading does not comport with our interpretation of the limiting language. Rather, and as explained above, we have interpreted this statutory phrase as including installations physically located within that traveled or paved portion of a highway designed for vehicular travel (including that "traveled portion of a roadbed actually designed for public vehicular travel"), as well as, in some narrowly defined circumstances, installations located beyond this improved portion that directly and integrally affect safe vehicular travel on the highway.
Applying this interpretation of the limiting language, we conclude that governmental immunity precludes liability for the bridge railing at issue in this instant case. First, it is clear that this bridge railing—lying outside both the curb and the shoulder of the highway—is not physically located within that improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel. Unlike the bicycle path in Gregg, this bridge railing is not part of the highway shoulder. Rather, like the bike path in Roy, this bridge railing is physically separate and "detached" from the improved portion of this highway.
Second, the bridge railing does not directly and integrally affect vehicular travel along the improved portion of this highway. Neither a guardrail nor a concrete abutment, located beyond the shoulder of a highway, has any effect upon the safe and convenient passage of vehicles while on the improved portion. In this respect, the bridge railing here is markedly different from the traffic lights and signs alluded to by Justice Boyle in Scheurman, supra. Traffic signals and signs are purposely designed to directly affect the flow of vehicular traffic on the improved portion of a highway. If these installations fail, traffic on the improved portion of a highway is directly and integrally affected: the likelihood of accidents increases, as does the related probability of injury to vehicular passengers.
In contrast, a guardrail or concrete abutment permanently located beyond the shoulder of a highway simply cannot cause an accident that originates on the improved portion of a highway. Indeed, the sole purpose and effect of the bridge railing here—i.e., to prevent vehicles from accidentally leaving the highway—is only implicated after a vehicle has left the improved portion. Accordingly, barriers such as guardrails and concrete abutments are not directly and integrally related to safe travel along the highway—the barrier is simply not necessary for safe vehicular travel on and along the improved portion.
iv
Because the bridge railing at issue here was not physically located within the improved portion of a highway designed for vehicular travel, and because it did not directly and integrally affect safe vehicular travel on the improved portion of the highway, we conclude that the highway exception is inapplicable and that governmental immunity is available to defendant. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
MCL 691.1402(1); MSA 3.996(102)(1) provides, in pertinent part, that:
Each governmental agency having jurisdiction over any highway shall maintain the highway in reasonable repair so that it is reasonably safe and convenient for public travel. Any person sustaining bodily injury or damage to his or her property by reason of failure of any governmental agency to keep any highway under its jurisdiction in reasonable repair, and in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel, may recover the damages suffered by him or her from the governmental agency. . . . The duty of the state and the county road commissions to repair and maintain highways, and the liability therefor, shall extend only to the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel and shall not include sidewalks, crosswalks, or any other installation outside of the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel.
Plaintiff does not recall whether he struck the metal guardrail or concrete abutment. Plaintiff's original complaint and the brief filed with this Court describe the guardrail and abutment collectively as a "bridge railing." It appears from a photograph included in both plaintiff's and defendant's appendices that the guardrail merges into the concrete abutment at that point where the entrance ramp becomes a bridge overpass spanning the highway below. Plaintiff has not contested the accuracy of this photograph.
Because any distinction between the guardrail and abutment is irrelevant for purposes of our decision, like the plaintiff, we will, unless otherwise noted, hereinafter refer to this guardrail and abutment collectively as a "bridge railing." Additionally, and unless otherwise noted, we will refer to both the entrance ramp and the overpass as an "entrance ramp."
198 Mich App 728; 499 NW2d 29 (1993), lv gtd 444 Mich 900 (1993).
Similarly, in a companion case decided with Scheurman, this Court held that a hedge growing on private property that obstructed the view of highway travelers "cannot be categorized as a defective condition upon 'the improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel .'" Id. at 635. Accordingly, it concluded that liability could not be imposed, per the highway exception, upon the defendant road commission because of the hedge.
Chief Justice Riley authored, and Justices Griffin and Cavanagh joined, the plurality opinion in Scheurman.
Specifically, three dissenting justices concluded that the plurality opinion, by limiting liability to the traveled or paved portion of a roadbed actually designed for vehicular travel, "negate[d] the fundamental legislative purpose underlying the highway exception to immunity": "a clear legislative purpose and policy to compensate persons injured because of a governmental agency's failure to maintain highways in a condition safe for public travel." Id. at 640 (Brickley, J., dissenting, joined by Justices Levin and Archer); see also id. at 648 (the dissent's argument that the majority holding "seriously undermines the legislative mandate of § 2 to maintain safe high ways"). The dissenting justices would have held that
the "improved portion" language of [MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102)] does not distinguish the surface of the highway as opposed to conditions other than the surface of the highway which may well foreclose the highway from being "reasonably safe." [Id. at 641.]
Additionally, while concurring in both the rationale and result of the lead opinion, Justice Boyle also indicated a preference for interpreting the limiting language to include installations "integral to" safe passage along the improved portion of a highway. Specifically, Justice Boyle expressly concurred in the lead opinion:
[W]ith the understanding that it does not preclude the application of MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102) in cases alleging a failure to "repair and maintain" installations that are integral to, if not part of, the "improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel," such as traffic lights and signs. [Id. at 637.]
Because I stand alone on my position concerning the highway exception to governmental immunity, and thus have contributed to this Court's badly fractured view of what the Legislature has divined in its effort to provide this exception, I wish to offer—for whatever value it might be to the bench and bar—my individual view of where I think the fracture lines are formed.
.There are, in my view, three basic positions represented by the various opinions in this and previous cases. The first viewpoint is that because the state's liability is limited to the "improved portion of the highway designed for vehicular travel," and because the plain meaning of this statutory language can only be interpreted to encompass the roadbed on which vehicles travel, only those accidents that are caused by a condition directly on this roadbed qualify for the exception to immunity. Post at 168, Riley, J. Scheurman v Dep't of Transportation, 434 Mich 619; 456 NW2d 66 (1990).
Another viewpoint, represented by Justice Levin's writings, is that any accident that results from the use of the improved portion of the highway, whether or not it occurs thereon or is caused by a condition thereon, is subject to potential liability. Post at 196-198, Levin, J.
I distinguish my position from the foregoing views in that I read the statute as creating liability for an accident that occurs on the improved portion of the highway caused by a condition that affects that improved portion, regardless of the ultimate location of that cause. Hence, this and my prior decisions allow for recovery when, and only when, the occurrence is on the improved portion and is caused by a condition directly affecting vehicular travel on the improved portion, even though that condition may have been occasioned by an act or an omission outside the improved portion of the highway.
As expressed herein, it is my view that this latter interpretation best captures the essence of a statute that provides liability for mishaps occurring on the improved portion of the highway, but which does so without any direct reference to the location of their causality. This interpretation also protects the stated purpose of the statute to avoid liability for accidents that occur outside the improved portion of the highway, regardless of their cause.