Case Name: Ollie TEMPLE v. STATE of Mississippi
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1996-08-01
Citations: 679 So. 2d 611
Docket Number: No. 92-KA-01308-SCT
Parties: Ollie TEMPLE v. STATE of Mississippi.
Judges: PRATHER, P.J., and PITTMAN, JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., SMITH and MILLS, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 679
Pages: 611–617

Head Matter:
Ollie TEMPLE v. STATE of Mississippi.
No. 92-KA-01308-SCT.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Aug. 1, 1996.
George S. Monroe, II, Newton, for appellant.
Michael C. Moore, Attorney General, Charles W. Maris, Jr., Special Assistant Attorney General, Jackson, for appellee.

Opinion:
BANKS, Justice.
This vehicular homicide case presents an evidentiary issue concerning admissibility of an interim digital display of alcoholic blood level by an intoxylizer when the test is not completed due to the failure of the defendant to blow long enough. We conclude that under the circumstances here presented the trial court cannot be found in error in admitting the evidence. We find no reversible error and affirm.
I.
Temple is charged with vehicular homicide while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The case was tried by a jury which rendered a verdict of guilty on December 10, 1992. Temple appeals raising two issues:
I. Whether testimony relating the digital readout of an intoxilyzer machine was admissible where the test was not completed due to Temple's failure to blow into the machine for a sufficient length of time; and
II. Whether the court erred in failing to grant a continuance where counsel was appointed eight days prior to trial and had two other trials scheduled in the interim.
II.
Issue I presents an evidentiary issue of first impression. The statute under which he was charged requires proof of an injury or death as a result of the negligence of a driver while the driver was acting in violation of Miss.Code Ann. § 63-11-30 (1972). That section proscribes operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor or with a blood alcohol content of .10 percent or greater. Temple was charged with being under the influence, not with a specific blood alcohol content. Nevertheless, testimony was elicited to the effect that the intoxilyzer machine registered .37 during an attempt to administer the test. The testimony from the test administrator and from one who checks the machines was to the effect that a failure to blow for four seconds will prevent the machine from printing out a completed test record. The person administering the test testified that Temple's indicated blood alcohol level continued to rise during the period that he blew into the machine and that meant that, had he continued to blow, he would have registered an even higher level. The machine tester was of the same opinion.
The court ruled that the evidence was admissible as relevant to the question of whether Temple was operating under the influence. That is, it was admissible to show that there was some blood alcohol content in aid of the conclusion that he was driving under the influence as charged. Miss. R. Evid. 401.
Temple relies upon Gibson v. State, 458 So.2d 1046 (Miss.1984) and Johnston v. State, 567 So.2d 237 (Miss.1990). In Gibson this Court reversed a manslaughter conviction because the blood sample kit used to produce blood alcohol evidence appeared to have an expiration date prior to its use in that case. 458 So.2d at 1047. We observed that safeguards to insure the integrity of scientific evidence are generally strictly enforced. Id. It is not clear from the opinion as to how this evidence related to the charge. The statute in effect at the time of the incident created a rebuttable presumption of driving under the influence at a certain blood alcohol level. Miss.Code Ann.1972 § 63-11-30 (Supp.1983). In Johnston this Court reversed a driving under the influence conviction because of the use of test results from a machine not calibrated within the prescribed period. 567 So.2d at 239. Again the opinion leaves it unclear whether Johnston was charged with driving under the influence or driving with a blood alcohol content level in excess of .10%, which by this time was a per se violation of the statute entitled "Driving Under the Influence." Miss.Code Ann. § 63-11-30 (Supp.1987).
The State.responds that the testimony concerning the machine was sufficient to support admitting the evidence and that there was sufficient additional evidence of driving under the influence. It is not clear whether this latter contention is one of harmless error.
The State cites Estes v. State, 605 So.2d 772 (Miss.1992) where, in the course of rejecting an attack on intoxilzyer evidence, this Court observed that there was other evidence of driving under the influence. In Estes, however, we found no deviation from prescribed procedures and the test was completed. One cannot say that the intoxilyzer evidence was harmless on this record. Not only did the prosecutor rely upon it heavily in closing, there is a dispute as to Temple's condition at the time from eyewitnesses.
All officers who dealt with Temple testified that he smelled strongly of alcohol, had slurred speech and walked in a wobbly manner. Temple gave a statement and testified that he had "had a few drinks" although he confined that to sharing a half pint with another and that some whisky remained in the half pint bottle. His ear contained quite a few empty beer cans and one of the officers identified the smell of alcohol as beer related. To counter this testimony Temple showed that there was no indication from an eyewitness who passed him just before the accident that Temple was driving in any improper manner and two ambulance attendants who spoke to him smelled no alcohol and did not observe any slurred speech during their brief encounter. Temple leaned against a car during this encounter and they did not see him walk.
The contention that the evidence here complained of was admissible is based on the testimony of the officer administering the test and the officer who calibrated the machine, that the .37 reading was the minimum level that the printout would have shown had the test been completed. The machine was calibrated on August 3, 1990 and September 14, 1990 and shown to be working properly. Temple was tested on September 2, 1990. The officer who calibrated the machine testified that he was familiar with how they worked and that the failure to blow for four seconds would mean that the deep alveoli lung air was not reached. He opined that had Temple blown for a sufficient time the final reading would have been higher. There was no contradictory evidence. There was no testimony concerning the effect of the failure of the machine to indicate through its printout that it had been cleared of air prior to the test and cleared afterwards. Nor was there testimony concerning the significance of that fact.
The State also brings to our attention a similar case arising in Iowa. State v. Wolfe, 369 N.W.2d 458 (Iowa App.1985), and argues that there are critical faulty differences that distinguish that case. There, as here, the defendant failed to blow for the required time and there was no printout. Additionally, however, an officer also blew into the machine, presumably, in the words of the Iowa court, long enough for it to register, without success. Under those circumstances the admission of the interim digital indication was deemed error. The State distinguishes Wolfe as a ease involving a demonstrably faulty machine.
What was before the court here was the testimony of one purporting to be an expert by training as to how the machine operated. He testified that the digital readout was an accurate measure of the alcohol content of the breath passing into the machine at the time and that continued blowing would have produced a higher result. In other words, while the interim digital reading was not an accurate indication of Temple's blood alcohol level it was in error only on the low side and .37 percent was the blood alcohol level at a minimum. We must acknowledge that, we are dealing with a machine and people trained to calibrate it and administer it whose credentials to verify its accuracy at some interim period may be questioned. It is, therefore, problematic to allow incomplete results where the machine's testing mechanism has not run its full course. Nevertheless, on this record, with ho real attack on the credentials of the witnesses, or their experience in these circumstances, and no objection to their opinion testimony, the decision to admit the evidence will not be reversed.
III.
Temple was not indicted for almost two years. When he was, he retained counsel and sought a continuance for one term, in August of 1992. At the beginning of the next term, the court realizing that retained counsel had become incapacitated, appointed counsel for Temple. Temple demurred at first, but, after a day considering and perhaps seeking retained counsel, acquiesced in appointed counsel on December 1. The trial was scheduled for December 9. Appointed counsel, Mr. Monroe, had two other matters scheduled during the term, in the interim. At the hearing on the motion for continuance, the trial court noted that the incident had occurred more than two years before, that the defendant had contributed to delay by requesting a continuance at the former term, that some of the witnesses were quite elderly and that at least one of the matters that counsel had in the interim had settled, and ordered trial to proceed. Trial did proceed and counsel called a number of witnesses including the ambulance attendants and an accident reconstructionist who had originally been brought in by the State.
Here the State contends that no prejudice was shown. Temple does not suggest how he was prejudiced even though he protests that he had little time to interview the witnesses. He cites Plummer v. State, 472 So.2d 358 (Miss.1985). There, in route to finding that there was no prejudice and affirming, this Court questioned the wisdom and propriety of forcing a trial on a newly appointed lawyer on a Monday following a Thursday appointment in a rape case. While Temple cites the language used there he can take little comfort in the result. Here, as there, the rush to trial does not appear to have hindered an adequate presentation of the evidence. Temple suggests that had he had more time he could have supplied expert testimony refuting the intoxilyzer testimony. The record reflects no post-trial effort to demonstrate that such testimony is available.
Temple raises no issue here concerning the sufficiency of the evidence. Clearly there was enough on the issue of intoxication. He stated that he was driving along on a clear day and all of a sudden he looked up and saw the deceased. An issue of improper lookout arises for jury resolution.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
CONVICTION OF DUI MANSLAUGHTER AND SENTENCE OF NINE (9) YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AFFIRMED.
PRATHER, P.J., and PITTMAN, JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., SMITH and MILLS, JJ., concur.
SULLIVAN, P.J., dissents with separate Written Opinion joined by DAN LEE, C.J., and McRAE, J.
. Stephen M. Brent and Sharon P. Stiller, Handling Drunk Driving Cases, 169 (1985) indicates the verity of the testimony and suggests that an effort to find a contrary opinion would prove fruitless.