Case Name: Kathleen CHANDLER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ARIZONA PARTNERS RETAIL INVESTMENT GROUP LLC, an Arizona Limited Liability Company, Defendant-Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2009-05-18
Citations: 329 F. App'x 724
Docket Number: No. 07-15175
Parties: Kathleen CHANDLER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ARIZONA PARTNERS RETAIL INVESTMENT GROUP LLC, an Arizona Limited Liability Company, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: Before: HUG, REINHARDT, and TASHIMA, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 329
Pages: 724–726

Head Matter:
Kathleen CHANDLER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ARIZONA PARTNERS RETAIL INVESTMENT GROUP LLC, an Arizona Limited Liability Company, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 07-15175.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted Jan. 15, 2009.
Filed May 18, 2009.
James Joseph Lynch, Jr., Sacramento, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Claudia Jane Robinson, Esq., David S. Worthington, Esq., Lewis Brisbois Bis-gaard & Smith LLP, Sacramento, CA, Jesse J. Lad, Meyers, Nave, Riback, Silver & Wilson, Oakland, CA, for Defendants Appellee.
Before: HUG, REINHARDT, and TASHIMA, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Kathleen Chandler appeals the district court's judgment in favor of defendant Arizona Partners Retail Investment Group, LLC, following a jury trial on her negligence claim. Chandler also appeals the pretrial dismissal of her negligence per se claim. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and affirm.
The district court did not err in dismissing Chandler's negligence per se claim. California has codified the common law rule on negligence per se, which allows a defendant's violation of a statuté or regulation to create a presumption of negligence only if, inter alia, the "injury resulted from an occurrence of the nature which the statute . or regulation was designed to prevent-" Cal.Evid.Code § 669(a)(3). Because the requirement set forth in the implementing regulations of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., that "[b]uilt-up curb ramps shall be located so that they do not project into vehicular traffic lanes," 28 C.F.R. § 36, Appendix A, § 4.7.6, was not designed to protect against an occurrence such as the one at issue here, Chandler's negligence per se claim fails as a matter of law.
The district court similarly did not err in refusing to admit testimony about purported ADA violations. Chandler argued that the defendant acted negligently in painting a parking lot ramp in a confusing pattern, causing her to trip. However, because the ADA regulations at issue governed the location of ramps near traffic lanes, evidence of the ramp's supposed non-compliance with those regulations was irrelevant and properly excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 402.
Finally, because, as discussed above, Chandler's negligence per se claim fails as a matter of law, she was not entitled to a jury instruction on negligence per se. See Akins v. County of Sonoma, 67 Cal.2d 185, 60 Cal.Rptr. 499, 430 P.2d 57, 61-62 (1967).
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
. Because the parties are familiar with the factual and procedural background, we recite it here only so far as is necessary to aid in understanding this disposition.