Case Name: THE PEOPLE v. JACOB HARBER
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1905-01
Citations: 19 N.Y. Crim. 45
Docket Number: 
Parties: THE PEOPLE v. JACOB HARBER.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Criminal Reports
Volume: 19
Pages: 45–54

Head Matter:
Supreme Court—Appellate Division—First Department.
January, 1905.
THE PEOPLE v. JACOB HARBER.
(100 App. Div. 317.)
1. Jurisdiction—Discharge Upon Prisoner’s Own Recognizance is Admission to Bail Without Surety. j
Defendant on February 16th, 1901, was arrested and charged with larceny from the person; on the 17th he was arraigned before a city magistrate, pleaded not guilty and was held for trial at a Court of Special Sessions, at which he was arraigned and discharged on his own recognizance. On April 5th the order discharging him was revoked and he was placed on trial before the Childrens’ part of the Court of Special Sessions, pleaded not guilty and was adjudged guilty, from which judgment he appeals. Held, that it must be assumed from the record that defendant was not tried when first arraigned and that no disposition was made of the case and that the court had jurisdiction to subsequently try him.
2. Same.
Assuming that the Court of Special Sessions had no jurisdiction to revoke the order discharging him on his own recognizance the defendant was then before the court charged with the crime, and assuming that the court had no authority to discharge the prisoner upon his own recognizance the effect of that order was not an acquittal.
Appeal by the defendant, Jacob Harber, from a judgment of the Court of Special Sessions of the city of Hew York (Children’s Part), entered on the 6th day of April, 1904, convicting the defendant of the crime of petit larceny; also (as stated in the notice of appeal) from an order denying said defendant’s motion to set aside the judgment appealed from and for a new trial, and also from an order denying a motion in arrest of judgment.
Isidor Cohn, for the appellant.
Edward Sandford, for the respondent.

Opinion:
Ingraham, J.:
The record states that the defendant was, on February 16, 1901, arrested and charged with the crime of larceny from the person; that on February seventeenth he was arraigned before a city magistrate; that he pleaded not guilty and was held for trial at a Court of Special Sessions; that he was arraigned before the Court of Special Sessions and discharged on his own recognizance; that on April 5, 1904, he was tried for.the crime before the Children's Part of the Court of Special Sessions and was convicted, and after a motion to set aside the judgment and for a new trial and for an arrest of judgment and for a trial by a full bench was made he was committed to the house of refuge. When the case came on for trial before the Children's Part of the Court of Special Sessions, counsel for the defendant stated that if the court found when he was first arrested that the defendant was too young to be tried he did not think that the court could reopen the case, whereupon the court stated that the defendant was discharged upon his own recognizance and subsequently brought back for trial. FTo other ruling was made and no1 exception was taken. The defendant then pleaded not guilty. The evidence for the prosecution having been taken, there Was no evidence offered for the defendant. The court found the defendant guilty. By the judgment it appeared that on February 19, 1901, before thie Court of Special Sessions the defendant was discharged on his own recognizance; that on April 5, 1904, the order discharging the defendant was revoked and the defendant was placed on trial, and on the 5th of April, 1904, was convicted and committed to the house of refuge. There is no other record as to the proceeding before the Court of Special Sessions when the defendant was first arrested and arraigned before it. I think we must assume from this record that the defendant was not tried when first arraigned, in 1901, and that no disposition was then made of the charge against him. A discharge upon a prisoner's own recognizance. is nothing more than an- admission to hail without surety. There is nothing to show that there was any investigation as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant or any adjudication that he should not be tried for the crime charged. If, upon Ms being brought before the court for trial, for any reason he was not tried and was then admitted to bail, there was certainly nothing to prevent the court before whom the charge was pending from calling upon the prisoner at any time to appear for trial, and in case of his failure to appear rearresting him and then disposing of the charge against him. When the defendant was brought before the Court of Special Sessions consisting of three judges the order discharging Mm upon his own recognizance was revoked; but assuming that the court had no jurisdiction to revoke that order, the defendant wasi then before- the court charged with the crime, and it seems to- me that the court had jurisdiction to try him and render judgment if his guilt was proved. Assuming that the court had no authority to discharge the prisoner upon his own recognizance, the effect of that order was not an acquittal. There is nothing in the record to show that, when the defendant was discharged upon his own recognizance, the case was not adjourned to a subsequent day; nor did the prisoner make such a claim when he was arraigned for trial.
To reverse this judgment we must assume irregularity which was neither claimed nor proved before the trial court, and as the defendant was proved guilty of the charge, I think the conviction should be affirmed.
Van Brunt, P. J., and Patterson, J., concurred; Laughlin and Hatch, JJ., dissented.