Case Name: L T ELSEY & SON, INC v. AMERICAN ENGINEERING FABRICS, INC
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1991-09-03
Citations: 191 Mich. App. 146
Docket Number: Docket No. 126333
Parties: L T ELSEY & SON, INC v AMERICAN ENGINEERING FABRICS, INC
Judges: Before: Brennan, P.J., and Michael J. Kelly and D. F. Walsh, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 191
Pages: 146–150

Head Matter:
L T ELSEY & SON, INC v AMERICAN ENGINEERING FABRICS, INC
Docket No. 126333.
Submitted March 12, 1991, at Detroit.
Decided September 3, 1991, at 9:20 a.m.
L.T. Eisey & Son, Inc., a Michigan corporation, brought an action in the Wayne Circuit Court against American Engineering Fabrics, Inc., a Massachusetts corporation, alleging breach of contract and breach of warranty regarding materials sold by the defendant to the plaintiff for use in highway construction in Michigan. The court, John H. Gillis, Jr., J., granted summary disposition for the defendant, ruling that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant. The plaintiff appealed.
The Court of Appeals held:
Limited personal jurisdiction over the defendant is proper under the long-arm statute, MCL 600.715; MSA 27A.715. The defendant’s conduct and connection with the State of Michigan were such that it reasonably should have anticipated being brought before a Michigan court. The defendant’s certification of the materials as satisfying the requirements of the Michigan Department of Transportation was a deliberate action calculated to make its product available to Michigan purchasers, and the transaction that gave rise to this action was preceded by other similar transactions involving the plaintiff and the defendant.
Reversed.
D.F. Walsh, J., dissenting, stated that exertion of limited personal jurisdiction over the defendant would result in a violation of the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution because the defendant did not purposefully avail itself of the privilege of conducting business in Michigan to the extent that it reasonably should have anticipated being brought before a Michigan court.
Fitzgerald, Cox & Hodgman (by Barry L. King), for the plaintiff.
Garratt & Evans, P.C. (by C. William Garratt and John G. Coutilish), for the defendant.
Before: Brennan, P.J., and Michael J. Kelly and D. F. Walsh, JJ.
Former Court of Appeals judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
Michael J.
Kelly, J. Plaintiff-appellant contends that the lower court erred in granting defendant-cross-appellant's motion for summary disposition because, under the facts and circumstances of this case, it is clear that "the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum state are such that he [sic] should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." We agree and reverse.
The test is that stated in Burger King Corp v Rudzewicz, 471 US 462; 105 S Ct 2174; 85 L Ed 2d 528 (1985). The trial court simply failed to assess the unrebutted evidence supplied by affidavit that defendant had supplied goods to plaintiff on four prior occasions, three in 1988 and one in 1989, and had been informed by defendant's representative that defendant had conducted "previous business in Michigan with Environmental Protection Inc." During negotiations, Michigan Department of Transportation specifications were sent by plaintiff to defendant with instructions to report "any problems." When shipped, the material was certified by defendant as meeting those specifications and was shipped from defendant's place of business in Massachusetts through a common carrier to the destination specified by plaintiff for a highway project in Monroe County, Michigan. Some of the material was used in the highway construction and some of it, by order of defendant, was picked up by a common carrier at the construction site and returned to Massachusetts.
In the face of these facts, the trial judge stated:
This court does not believe it has jurisdiction over the defendant since the only contact with this state involves a single transaction.
Because it ignored the prior transactions and the certification relating to the mdot specifications, the court necessarily decided defendant's motion in the light most favorable to defendant.
While it is true that the plaintiff has the burden of establishing jurisdictional facts, a motion for summary disposition based on lack of personal jurisdiction must be resolved on the evidential support submitted by both parties. MCR 2.116(C)(1) and (G)(5); Gooley v Jefferson Beach Marina, Inc, 177 Mich App 26; 441 NW2d 21 (1989). Here, the court ignored the evidential support submitted by plaintiff. As a consequence, we have only defendant's assessment of its intentions with regard to its course of dealings with plaintiff and the contemplated future consequences thereof. We believe MCL 600.715; MSA 27A.715 has been facially satisfied, particularly under subsection 5, because defendant entered into a contract for materials to be furnished in this state. We also believe that defendant's conduct was a prime generating cause of the effects resulting in Michigan. Defendant's certification of the material as satisfying Michigan testing requirements was a deliberate action calculated to make its product available to the Michigan market. It is obvious that plaintiff would not have purchased the product had defendant not certified it as meeting mdot requirements. Moreover, defendant must have contemplated being "haled" into a Michigan court in the event that the product failed the testing requirements. Defendant knew that the product was to be used in road construction in Michigan and that it needed to satisfy certain mdot standards. Finally, this was not a singular transaction, but the last of five transactions with plaintiff.
In light of the disposition on the merits of the principal appeal, cross-appellant's claimed error is moot.
Reversed.
Brennan, P.J., concurred.