Case Name: CITY OF ITHACA v. CROZIER
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1911-12-28
Citations: 132 N.Y.S. 863
Docket Number: 
Parties: CITY OF ITHACA v. CROZIER.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 132
Pages: 863–868

Head Matter:
CITY OF ITHACA v. CROZIER.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.
December 28, 1911.)
Judgment (§ 720 ) — Conceusiveness.
A former judgment between the same parties or their privies is only conclusive as to the facts necessarily and actually determined by it.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Judgment, Cent. Dig. § 1251; Dec. Dig. § 720. ]
Smith, P. J., and Houghton, J., dissenting.
Appeal from Trial Term, Tompkins County.
Action by the City of Ithaca against Richard A. Crozier. Rrom a judgment for plaintiff, and an order denying a new trial, defendant appeals. Reversed, and new trial granted.
Argued before SMITH, P. J., and KELLOGG, SEWELL, HOUGHTON, and BETTS, JJ.
David M. Dean, for appellant.
Peter F.. McAllister, for respondent.
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep'r Indexes

Opinion:
JOHN M. KELLOGG, J.
Bridlget Marsh fell upon the snow and ice upon the sidewalk along the defendant's premises, and brought an action against the 'city of Ithaca to recover damages therefor, and recovered judgment for $1,000 damages and $152.50 costs, April 6, 1908, and this action is brought to recover the same from the defendant; he having been notified by the city of the action and required to defend the same. In her complaint against the city she alleged) that the defendant carelessly and negligently suffered, allowed, and permitted water from a defective conductor to collect and freeze, and accumulate ice and snow on the sidewalk—
"and negligently and carelessly allowed, suffered, and permitted said ice and frozen snow to accumulate and remain for a long period of time, on and prior to the 28th day of January, 1907, on the sidewalk at or near the northwest corner of said building owned by said Richard A. Crozier, so :as to become dangerous to persons passing along the same, as they legally might Said ice and snow having been beaten smooth and slippery, which had been there for a long period of time previous, and the said sidewalk •at said place was in an icy, slippery, dangerous, and practically impassible condition, all of which said defendant had due notice and was well "known to the officials, servants, and agents of said defendant city, as plaintiff is informed and verily believes, and of which defendant had or might "have informed itself in time to make said sidewalk safe before the occurrence of the accident hereinafter mentioned."
It does not appear in this case, except from the pleadings and the judgment, what was the actual issue litigated in the Marsh case, and whether the evidence tended to show a ground of liability other than from ice formed by water coming from Crozier's conductor. Upon the trial of this action the plaintiff proved that the conductor from defendant's building discharged its water upon a stone, and then •escaped across the sidewalk at the northeast corner of his building near an alleyway belonging to the city, which furnished the entrance for teams to some buildings next to the defendants, and proved by Bridget Marsh that as she was passing the northwest corner of Crozier's block she slipped and fell on the hard ice and broke her leg. She presented her claim against the city and recovered therefor. It also appeared that where the water came from the conductor onto the sidewalk the ice was frozen for about five feet each side of the conductor pipe, being the thickest immediately in front- of it and gradually sloping. It also appeared that at the time the whole of the walk .along the Crozier building was covered with snow and ice. The charter of the city provided that no person should conduct from any building through any pipe, gutter, or trough any water upon the sidewalk—
•"nor shall such water be conducted across any sidewalk unless the same be made to run in a pipe or groove below the surface of the walk,"
The court denied the defendant's motion for a nonsuit. Thereupon defendant's counsel suggested that he wanted to present to the jury the question whether the injury was the result of ice formed from water coming from the pipe or from causes or neglect of the city, or ice formed independent of acts of the defendant, or by the commingled acts, and stated that he would ask the court to charge the jury upon that subject, particularly if it was the commingled acts of the two, and they could not tell positively which was the exact cause, that the plaintiff cannot recover. He also suggested that they wished to raise a question as to the exact place where the accident took place. The court remarked that after an examination of the judgment roll it was of the opinion that neither of the defenses suggested is available, and that it would have to direct a verdict against the defendant.
"Defendant's Counsel: I offer to show that there was a groove or depression constructed in the sidewalk at the point where the water flowed from this eave trough below the surface of the sidewalk by the stones being formed in a V shape or trough to permit the water to cross the sidewalk, and I offer to show, also, that the complainant, Bridget Marsh, slipped and fell at a point beyond of from four to six feet north of where the eave trough was, and ask to go to the jury as to whether the injury was from the snow and ice from the eave trough, or from the snow and ice or the irregular surface caused by the track across the sidewalk, and ask to go to the jury upon all the issues in the case.
"Plaintiff's Counsel: We object to all the offers, on the ground that the evidence would be incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial, and not admissible in this action, and on the further ground that the judgment roll in the action of Marsh v. City of Ithaca is conclusive upon those questions. (Objection sustained. Exception to defendant's counsel.)"
The court directed a verdict for the plaintiff for $1,502.74, to which the defendant duly excepted, and his motion to set aside the verdict upon the minutes was denied by order duly entered.
The evidence in the Marsh case is not reported, and it is not conclusively shown that the city was held liable solely on account of the ice formed by water from the conductor. Perhaps the general condition of the walk in front of Crozier's premises was taken into consideration and formed a basis for recovery. The allegation of the complaint was sufficient to authorize a recovery, irrespective of the conductor, for a negligent accumulation of ice and snow at the point of the fall. The judgment does not, therefore, conclusively establish that the sole cause of the recovery arose from the condition of the defendant's conductor, and it does not show conclusively that the fall took place within five feet of the conductor, or of a line drawn from it straight across the walk. I think the defendant was entitled to make proof of the facts offered. The former judgment is only conclusive as to the facts necessarily and actually decided by it, and the condition of the walk and the cause and place of the fall are not so clearly shown by the judgment that the defendant is not entitled to have the entire facts presented for the consideration of the jury. The plaintiff can exclude proof of the facts only by showing that the recovery in the Marsh case rested solely upon the condition caused by the defective water pipe.
The judgment and order should therefore be reversed, and a new trial granted, with costs to the appellant to abide the event. All concur, except HOUGHTON, J., dissenting in opinion, in which SMITH, P. J., concurs.