Case Name: E. H. Slead v. Wm. Brannan, adm'r of Crowder
Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1839-05
Citations: 1 Rice 298
Docket Number: 
Parties: E. H. Slead v. Wm. Brannan, adm'r of Crowder.
Judges: Richardson, O’Neall, Butler and Earle, Justices, concurred.
Reporter: South Carolina Law Reports
Volume: 24
Pages: 298–300

Head Matter:
E. H. Slead v. Wm. Brannan, adm'r of Crowder.
The admission of an administrator as to a fact within his own personal knowledge, and which he could be compelled to prove, if he were not a party to the suit, is admissible in evidence in an action against him as administrator, to charge the estate of the intestate.
On a summary process against an administrator, by the plaintiff, to recover the amount of a note signed by himself and the defendant’s intestate, (Crowder,) which the plaintiff had paid, and which he alleged he had signed as security only for Crowder, the declaration of the administrator, “ that he knew the note was given by Crowder at Ingram’s sale, and that Slead, the plaintiff, was security,” was held competent and sufficient evidence of the fact.
Under the 34th rule of court in relation to the process jurisdiction, it seems the administrator (the defendant,) might have been examined to the same point upon interrogatories, and would have been compelled to answer.
Before EVANS, J., at Chester, Spring Term, 1839.
The report of this case, by his honor, the presiding judge, is as follows:
“ This was a summary process, to recover the amount of a note signed by Slead and Crowder. The plaintiff alleged he was security for Crowder, and he had paid the note. A judgment had been recovered against both Crowder and Slead; and Slead had paid the money. The only evidence offered on the question of seeurityship was the statement made by Brannan to the witness; that he knew the note was given for articles bought by Crowder at Mr. Ingram’s sale, and that Slead was security. I did not think this liable to the exception.in Ciples v. adm’r of Alexander, (2 Tread. 767,) that the administrator could not charge the estate by his admissions. It was not the creation of a debt, but it was the statement of a fact within his knowledge, and which he could have been compelled to prove, if he had not been a party to this suit. The defendant’s counsel were not satisfied with my decision; and their notice of appeal is annexed to this report.”
Because the presiding judge erred in receiving the admissions of the administrator to make the estate of his intestate liable.

Opinion:
Cuma, per Evans, J.
I thought at the trial, and still think, that this case bears no resemblance to the case of Ciples v. adm'r of Alexander, (2 Tread. 767.) That case decides that the admission of the administrator, that the account was just, did not dispense with the necessity of the plaintiff's adducing the ordinary proof to establish his demand ; and the reason assigned in the opinion of the court is, that there is no privity between them. The administrator's connexion with the intestate, does not necessarily enable him to know whether the account be just or not. This case depends entirely on a different principle. It is the declaration of the administrator as to a fact within his own knowledge, and which he could be compelled to prove, if he were not a party to the suit. By the rule of court, in the process jurisdiction, the plaintiff may call on the defendant to answer, on oath, to interrogatories. Now, if Slead, the plaintiff, had called on the defendant to answer on oath, whether the demand he had sued for, was not just, then the case would belike that of Ciples v. Alexander and Wright v. Wright, to be found in Rice's Dig., vol. 1, p. 323, and quoted from Brevard's MS. Rep. But if he had called on him to answer, whe ther the note was not given for articles purchased by Crowder ; and whether he did not know that Crowder was the principal, and Slead the security, can there be any doubt that he would have been compelled to answer, and that the answer would have proved the fact ? Or if a bill of discovery had been filed for the same purpose in equity, would not the answer, admitting the fact, be received as evidence ? It strikes me there could be no doubt on these points •, and if the answer would be evidence, I can see no reason why his admission of the truth of the fact is not admissible to be proved. The general rule is clear, that the ' admission of a party on the record is evidence, and the reasons of none of the exceptions apply to this case.
Eaves & Thompson, for the motion.
I think the circuit decision was right, and the motion is dismissed.
Richardson, O'Neall, Butler and Earle, Justices, concurred.