Case Name: McGUIRE v. THE STATE
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1987-12-04
Citations: 185 Ga. App. 233
Docket Number: 74820
Parties: McGUIRE v. THE STATE.
Judges: Birdsong, C. J., Carley, Sognier and Pope, JJ., concur; Deen, P. J., McMurray, P. J., Banke, P. J., Benham and Beasley, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part.
Reporter: Georgia Appeals Reports
Volume: 185
Pages: 233–241

Head Matter:
74820.
McGUIRE v. THE STATE.
(363 SE2d 850)

Opinion:
Per curiam.
Defendant appeals his convictions of two offenses of selling cocaine in violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act. Held:
1. The court erred in refusing to grant defendant's motion for a continuance. The record and the law do not support the conclusion that the refusal of a continuance was not an abuse of discretion in the application of OCGA § 17-8-25 and 17-8-20.
It was charged in indictments of February 2, 1987, that on two occasions, October 2, and November 5, 1986, defendant "did . . . sell . . . cocaine." The defense was that he did not sell it or have any criminal involvement in its sale, but that it was sold by Timmy Kirby.
Defendant secured issuance of a subpoena on February 9, 1987, for Kirby at an address in Summerville, for him to appear at trial on February 28 at the superior court in Summerville. Kirby was a resident of Chattooga County, and the subpoena was served the next day by a deputy sheriff. This is the only subpoena in the record. Defendant's expectation that Kirby would be present explains why onlookers were not subpoenaed: there would be no need for them when the only involved person is available to testify.
When the case was sounded for trial, a Mrs. Kirby answered that Timmy Kirby was in the hospital and "can't get here." Defendant moved for a continuance. He proved via the sheriff that Kirby was in the hospital in Floyd County, having shot himself in the stomach, and was not excused from court attendance. The sheriff did not know the prognosis or the ability of Kirby to attend court at a later date, and defense counsel stated in his place that he had inquired of the hospital as to Kirby's condition and was told that the hospital had no information about Kirby. The sheriff explained the refusal of information by stating that he had written to the hospital at Kirby's mother's request, to be on the lookout for possible problems because of threats against Kirby.
Defendant testified at the motion hearing that it was Kirby who sold the cocaine and that defendant was just a passive onlooker at the sales. Kirby completed the transactions at defendant's girl friend's house so as to make the undercover Agent DeLoch think it was defendant and not Kirby who was selling the cocaine, because Kirby and Agent DeLoch were related and Kirby was afraid DeLoch would tell Kirby's mother that he was selling cocaine. Defendant refused to do the selling, he said, so Kirby did it in an equivocal way so as to still lead Agent DeLoch to believe it was defendant transacting the selling. Defendant further testified that Kirby brought and handled the cocaine and the money throughout the exchange (except on the first occasion when he tried to give it to defendant who handed it back before DeLoch was brought in, and when he made change for DeLoch). Defendant actually refused the money, according to him, telling DeLoch the drugs were not his and therefore he did not want any money. This happened both times, except on the second occasion DeLoch did not try to give the money to defendant.
Four other people were present on the first occasion, except that the girl friend was in the living room rather than in the kitchen throughout. The girl friend Diane Ramey, defendant's sister Pauline Laney, Cynthia Butler or Campbell, and Tommy Hartline were the others. All but Diane were playing cards on the table where the co caine and money were placed.
On the second occasion, the girl friend and sister were present, and the transaction occurred in the kitchen again rather than in the living room where defendant was watching television with his girl friend. Defendant saw that the cocaine and the money were put on the kitchen table, saw DeLoch pick up the cocaine, and later saw Kirby go back into the kitchen for the money. The subject was not discussed. The girl friend did not witness it. Defendant himself bought cocaine from Kirby immediately following that incident, and previously, but never sold or distributed cocaine.
This being defendant's version of the events, the testimony of Kirby was crucial or, if his presence could not be obtained, then that of the other onlookers. Defendant's sister testified but was somewhat impeached by her familial relationship and prior record. No opportunity was given to defendant to secure Kirby at a later time or, if he was to remain unavailable, subpoena any of the other witnesses. Yet he had gone to some lengths to follow the requirements of the two applicable Code sections. The evidence presented to the court in the form of testimony by the sheriff and defendant and the statements in his place by defendant's counsel showed that he had used "due diligence." OCGA § 17-8-25. Yet the court simply denied the motion, ruling without specification that "counsel has not shown all of the proper elements for a continuance."
We look at the requirements. It is beyond dispute that the witness was absent, that he had been subpoenaed, that he did not reside more than 100 miles from the place of trial, that the witness was not absent by permission of the applicant. Defendant laid out the facts expected to be proved by the absent witness, facts which would absolve defendant. Next, considering the direct involvement of Kirby, whom defendant believed to be a confidential informant, it could not be said that his testimony was not material. For example, Agent DeLoch testified at trial that Kirby was not present at the second transaction, whereas defendant at the motion hearing and his sister at the trial unequivocally stated that he was.
Insofar as the applicant showing that he expected he would be able to procure Kirby's testimony at the next term, he showed this to the greatest extent he could, the actions of the sheriff having coincidentally prevented his discovery of Kirby's condition and prognosis. At the least, there was no evidence that Kirby would not have recovered sufficiently within the following weeks in order to appear. If Kirby's unavailability continued to the next term of court, defendant could seek the testimony of the second-best, but in the circumstances of his absence important, onlookers.
Finally, the circumstances also compel the conclusion that the application was not made for the purpose of delay but for procure ment of the testimony of Kirby, whose presence was practically impossible. See Brooks v. State, 3 Ga. App. 458 (60 SE 213) (1907). Compare Cobb v. State, 110 Ga. 314 (1) (35 SE 178) (1900), and Sutton v. State, 70 Ga. App. 499 (28 SE2d 663) (1944). The Sutton case, at Division 3, recognizes that there are some causes of delay which are outside defendant's control. Further evidence of the fact that delay itself was not the purpose but only the result is the indication in the record that defendant was jailed awaiting trial, not having been able to make the $150,000 bond set and there being no action recorded on the application for bond reduction. A delay would not liberate him.
All of the statutory factors were present to entitle defendant to a continuance. The court was obliged to honor the subpoena by granting the continuance. No impediment for doing so appears. See Murphy v. State, 132 Ga. App. 654, 655 (1) (209 SE2d 101) (1974). Where the requirements of the statute are met, the court has no discretion to deny the continuance. Brooks v. State, supra at 463.
We do not even have to reach state or federal constitutional considerations of compulsory process or due process of law, which defendant newly raises at this level, because the statute suffices to protect his right to a fair trial in this instance. It is the statute's application by the court below which was faulty.
Compare Wingfield v. State, 159 Ga. App. 69, 71 (282 SE2d 713) (1981), where as here one of the desired witnesses was the identified confidential informant. There the court rested reversal on violations of federal fifth and sixth amendment rights, having found the statute in those circumstances an inadequate safeguard of defendant's rights. Also in Murphy v. State, supra at 655-656, the statute fell short; the state constitution was employed.
On the other hand, the statute was applied in Tomlin v. State, 170 Ga. App. 123, 125 (5) (316 SE2d 570) (1984), where the absence of an alleged confidential informant, who had been subpoenaed, was the basis for a motion for continuance. The court held there was no error in denying the continuance because defendant had not complied with the statute. But here we have compliance. In Curry v. State, 177 Ga. App. 609 (1) (340 SE2d 250) (1986), the absent witness had not even been subpoenaed. The same is true in Brown v. State, 169 Ga. App. 520, 521 (1) (313 SE2d 777) (1984). In Luttrell v. State, 176 Ga. App. 508 (3) (336 SE2d 369) (1985), defendant did not show that he expected to be able to procure the witness' testimony at the next term, but no explanation for the lack of assurance was given there, unlike the instant case.
OCGA § 17-8-22 and 17-8-25, taken together, attempt to balance a defendant's rights to compulsory process and due process against the State's rights to go forward as planned and to a speedy trial, and these provisions apparently embrace also a recognition of the court's interest in administering its business efficiently. In the present case, the application of these statutes required a continuance, and because defendant was deprived of a material witness as a result of its denial, a new trial should be had.
2. Defendant enumerates as error the trial court's failure to require the State to make a showing of neutral, non-discriminatory reasons for excluding all black jurors by use of peremptory challenges. Defendant, who is white, argues that he was thereby deprived of his right to a fair cross-section in the selection of his jury. "Resolution of this enumeration of error 'properly turns on the application of equal protection principles.' Batson v. Kentucky, [476] U. S. _ [(fn. 4) 106 SC 1712, 90 LE2d 69]." Pope v. State, 256 Ga. 195, 202 (7 (f)) (345 SE2d 831).
"The equal protection clause of the United States Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant that the State will not exclude members of his race from the jury on account of race or on the assumption that members of his race will be unable to impartially consider the State's case. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. _ (106 SC 1712, 90 LE2d 69); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202 (85 SC 824, 13 LE2d 759); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303, 309 (25 LE 664). However, since defendant was not a member of the allegedly excluded class, he lacked standing to make an equal protection claim. See in this regard Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. _, supra, and Ingram v. State, 253 Ga. 622, 627 (fn. 4) (323 SE2d 801)." Heaton v. State, 180 Ga. App. 718, 719 (2) (350 SE2d 480). See also Pope v. State, 256 Ga. 195, 202 (7 (f)), supra.
3. Following the trial in the case sub judice, defendant wrote a letter to the trial court suggesting that his appointed trial counsel provided ineffective assistance at trial. Defendant requested that another lawyer be appointed to appeal his case. Following receipt of the defendant's letter the trial court, sua sponte, convened a hearing at which both defendant and his trial counsel were present. At that time the trial court appointed defendant's trial counsel to represent defendant on appeal. In this connection, the trial court directed that defense counsel was not to file any claim against himself for ineffectiveness and stated for the record that defendant had made no showing of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Defendant enumerates as error the trial court appointing trial counsel, against whom defendant charged ineffective assistance at trial, to represent defendant on appeal. The trial court's direction to defense counsel against raising claims of ineffective counsel against himself is consistent with the ruling in Castell v. Kemp, 254 Ga. 556 (331 SE2d 528), which holds that defense counsel is precluded from presenting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel concerning a trial in which he participated due to the ethical prohibition against a lawyer acting as a witness. In view of the present posture of the case sub judice, the merits of defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel or as to the trial court's finding that defendant has made no sufficient showing in this regard are not properly before us. Moreover, under the particular facts and circumstances of the case sub judice, defendant has not waived his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and same is still viable. As there has been no waiver, any error in the appointment of trial counsel to represent defendant on appeal is harmless. See Nixon v. State, 255 Ga. 656, 657 (fn. 1) (340 SE2d 7).
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Birdsong, C. J., Carley, Sognier and Pope, JJ., concur; Deen, P. J., McMurray, P. J., Banke, P. J., Benham and Beasley, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part.
Thus, the appellate court can review the question, if properly raised, even if the statutory requirements are not met. The particular discretion granted by OCGA § 17-8-22 may be insufficient to protect constitutional rights.