Case Name: Herman F. Eberts, William H. Eberts, Marie Louise Eberts and John Meldrum Eberts by Matilda J. Eberts, his next Friend v. Charles H. Eberts, William Eberts, Nancy Waddell, Henry Eberts, Frances Smith, Aaron C. Fisher, and Aaron C. Fisher and John H. Van Schaick, executors, Joseph M. Eberts, James J. Robertson, Alexander R. Robertson, Elizabeth E. Morrison, Margaret H. Brown and Mary Ellen Robertson
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1880-01-13
Citations: 42 Mich. 404
Docket Number: 
Parties: Herman F. Eberts, William H. Eberts, Marie Louise Eberts and John Meldrum Eberts by Matilda J. Eberts, his next Friend v. Charles H. Eberts, William Eberts, Nancy Waddell, Henry Eberts, Frances Smith, Aaron C. Fisher, and Aaron C. Fisher and John H. Van Schaick, executors, Joseph M. Eberts, James J. Robertson, Alexander R. Robertson, Elizabeth E. Morrison, Margaret H. Brown and Mary Ellen Robertson.
Judges: Marston, C. J., and Campbell, J., concurred.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 42
Pages: 404–412

Head Matter:
Herman F. Eberts, William H. Eberts, Marie Louise Eberts and John Meldrum Eberts by Matilda J. Eberts, his next Friend v. Charles H. Eberts, William Eberts, Nancy Waddell, Henry Eberts, Frances Smith, Aaron C. Fisher, and Aaron C. Fisher and John H. Van Schaick, executors, Joseph M. Eberts, James J. Robertson, Alexander R. Robertson, Elizabeth E. Morrison, Margaret H. Brown and Mary Ellen Robertson.
Wills — Construction.
A testator devised property “to the surviving children of [her] brothers.” Held that she meant those surviving at her death, and not those who were alive when the will was made.
Parol evidence of the circumstances in view of which a will was made, is admissible as tending to show the testator’s intent; but general rules of construction should not be set aside on extrinsic evidence unless it proves that they do not express his intent.
. Appeal from Wayne.
Submitted October 22, 1879.
Decided January 13, 1880.
Bill to obtain a judicial construction of a will. The case is stated in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Graves. Complainants appeal.
Alfred Bussell for complainant.
A will speaks from the death of the testator, and its language must be regarded as used with reference thereto, 1 Redf. Wills, 379, 386; Cresson's Appeal, 76 Penn. St., 19; Kinney v. Kinney, 34 Mich., 255; and when a class of persons is pointed out to receive a legacy, those take who constitute the class when the will takes effect (1 Redf. Wills, 356, n.: 2 id., 10; 1 Jarman on Wills, 306-7; Campbell v. Rawdon, 18 N. Y., 412) unless a contrary intent appears in the language as applied to the subject matter and the circumstances, .1 Redf. Wills, 433; words of survivorship are to be referred to the testator’s death or the period of demise or enjoyment, unless the contrary intent is specially indicated, 2 Redf. Wills, 372; Shoppert v. Gillam, 6 Rich. Eq., 83; Martin v. Kirby, 11 Gratt, 67; Sinton v. Boyd, 19 Ohio St., 30; Shotts v. Poe, 47 Md., 513; Brown v. Bigg, 7 Ves., 279; Long v. Prigg, 8 B. & C., 231; Hansford v. Elliott, 9 Leigh, 79; Whitney v. Whitney, 45 N. H., 311; plain and unambiguous words must govern in construction and are not to be controlled by conjectural constructions growing out of the situation of the testator, his property or family, Chrystie v. Phyfe, 19 N Y., 344; the words used must have their legal meaning unless it is clear that they were used differently, Myers v. Eddy, 47 Barb., 263; Hone v. Van Schaick, 3 N. Y., 538; Roosevelt v. Thurman, 1 Johns. Ch., 220; Grandy v. Sawyer, Phill. Eq. (N. C.), 8; Clark v. Mosely, 1 Rich. Eq. (S. C.), 396; the intention must be gathered from the will, Brownfield v. Wilson, 78 Ill., 467; Asay v. Hoover, 5 Penn. St., 21, and parol evidence is .admissible to prove it, Gilliam v. Brown, 43 Miss., 641.
John H. Bissell and Sidney D. Miller for defendant Joseph M. Eberts, and William E. Baubie and J. Logan Chipman for defendants Robertson, Morrison and Brown.
The words “or the survivor of them,” in naming legatees, have been held overcome by the addition of “their heirs and assigns forever,” the policy of the law being against the jus accrescendi, Branson v. Hill, 31 Md., 181; and the words “in equal proportions” negative the idea of survivorship as between those named, Mowatt v. Carow, 7 Paige, 340; Comp. L., § 4349 provides that children of a devisee related to the testator, and who dies before him, shall take the estate unless the will provides otherwise; this statute is substantially the same as that of Massachusetts, Gen. Stats., ch. 92, § 28, which is construed by Fisher v. Hill, 7 Mass., 86; Ballard v. Ballard, 18 Pick., 41; Prescott v. Prescott, 7 Met., 141; Paine v. Prentiss, 5 Met., 396; Hooper v. Hooper, 9 Cush., 122; Esty v. Clark, 101 Mass., 36; Moore v. Weaver, 16 Gray, 305; Kimball v. Story, 108 Mass., 382; see Moore v. Dimond, 5 R. I., 121; the word “children” will not be converted into a word of limitation except to carry out the testator’s express intent, Murphy v. Harvey, 4 Edw. Ch., 131.

Opinion:
Cooley, J.
It is conceded by counsel for defendant Joseph M. Eberts that the general rule of construction of wills requires the words "surviving children" to be interpreted as intending only those who were surviving at the death of the testatrix. Indeed the cases of Hansford v. Elliott, 9 Leigh, 79, and Martin v. Kirby, 11 Gratt., 67, upon opinions in which some reliance is placed by them, fully recognize this rule, and it is not questioned anywhere.
But it is said that this is merely a general rule, and in any particular case parol evidence of the circumstances under which the will was executed may be received to show that such was not the testatrix's intent. We concede that the surrounding circumstances may be shown, and that sometimes they áre very conclusive that the intent was different from what might be inferred from the language of the will interpreted without the aid of any extrinsic evidence.
But in' this case the parol evidence merely showed that there was a class of persons answering the description of surviving children of her brothers at the time the will was made, and also a class answering the same description, but less .numerous at the time of the testatrix's death. But whether she intended the one or the other, was left on the evidence wholly to conjecture. We may guess that she meant those who answered the description when the will was- made; but the extraneous evidence brings into the, case no element of certainty whatever, and a construction to that effect must be based upon inference and conjecture.
We are not at all inclined to follow arbitrary rules of construction to the overturning of a testator's real intent; but the rule that makes a will speak from the testator's death is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable; and there cannot be the least doubt that in the large majority of cases it corresponds to the actual intent. It thus becomes a rule of property, and should not be set aside on extrinsic evidence in any case* unless the court, on placing itself in the position occupied by the testator at the time he made the will, can clearly see that" such was not his meaning. Wé cannot say that such is the case here.
The statute (Comp. L., § 4349), on which some reliance is placed, cannot help this, defendant. When we find that the will only makes the gift to persons who survived the testatrix, there is nothing to go to the issue of others who died before she did.
The decree must be modified to conform to this view.
Marston, C. J., and Campbell, J., concurred.