Case Name: McGUINN v. UNITED STATES
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1951-06-28
Citations: 191 F.2d 477
Docket Number: No. 10898
Parties: McGUINN v. UNITED STATES.
Judges: Before CLARK, WILBUR K. MILLER, and BAZELON, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 191
Pages: 477–481

Head Matter:
McGUINN v. UNITED STATES.
No. 10898.
United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued May 17, 1951.
Decided June 28, 1951.
Joseph A. McMenamin, Washington, D. C, with whom Robert I. Miller,, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellant. Curtis P. Mitchell, Washington, D. C. , also entered an appearance for appellant.
Joseph A. Sommer, Asst. U.- S. Atty., Washington, D. C., with whom George Morris Fay, U. S. Atty., and Joseph M. Howard, Asst. U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellee.
Before CLARK, WILBUR K. MILLER, and BAZELON, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
CLARK, Circuit Judge.
The appellant was convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia by a jury on a two count indictment which charged rape pursuant to D.C.Code § 22-2801 (1940) and sodomy pursuant to D.C.Code § 22-3502 (1940). He has been sentenced to serve from four .to twelve years in the penitentiary., From that final judgment he takes this appeal.
The appellant has urged numerous errors before this Court. He first contends that there is insufficient corroboration as required by the rule in Kidwell v. United States, 1912, 38 App.D.C. 566, to sustain the conviction for rape. The rule in the Kidwell case, was cited in Ewing v. United States, 1942, 77 U.S.App.D.C. 14, 135 F.2d 633, 635 which is also relied on by the appellant. The rule as stated in these cases requires only that there be circumstantial evidence to corroborate the testimony of the complaining witness in a rape case. As in the Ewing case the only direct testimony here was that of the complaining witness. There is ample corroboration here as in the Ewing case to bring this case within the rule laid down in the Kidwell case. In the Ewing case the complaining witness waited some twenty-four hours before reporting the attack on her. In the instant case the attack was reported to the nearest available person and the police as soon as the complaining witness could free herself from the appellant. She was in a nervous and crying condition at the time she reported the attack to a total stranger. The appellant was found as described by the complaining witness in the front seat with his pants and shorts down. As in the Ewing case the complaining witness had no motive to lie. The statements of the complaining witness were consistent throughout the proceeding while the appellant admitted the intercourse in writing and subsequently at the trial denied it. Similarly the appellant made inconsistent statements when he gave a detailed account of the crime to police and then testified on the stand that he was too drunk to recall what happened. In the Ewing case there was no signed confession as we have here.
The appellant next contends that the trial court erred in failing to give, in substance at least, his prayers No. 2-7, 9 and 9 as amended — 12, and 14-16. Prayers numbered 3, 5, 6 and 7 were adequately covered and the appellant was not prejudiced because his prayers were not adopted as requested.
Prayers 2, 4, 9, 9 as amended, 12, 15 and 16 were properly denied partly because the correct portions of those prayers were given and the remaining portions, as requested, were incorrectly stated. The appellant's second prayer, which seeks to define the amount of force or degree of fear necessary to negative consent, is incorrect for it would require that the fear be mortal. As we held in the Ewing case "fear of death or grave bodily harm" was ail that is required, and the trial court so instructed.
Prayers number four and sixteen demand proof wholly inconsistent with guilt and are consequently incorrect. The only amount of evidence necessary as the court instructed was that which would exclude "the hypothesis of innocence reasonably viewed and reasonably evaluated." Curley v. United States, 1947, 81 U.S.App.D.C. 389, 160 F.2d 229, certiorari denied 331 U.S. 837, 67 S.Ct. 1511, 91 L.Ed. 1850.
Prayers number nine and nine amended dealt with consent. The court properly instructed the jury "there must be an absence of consent unless the consent is induced by putting the woman in fear of grave bodily harm or death or by the exercise of actual force against her person." Prayer number nine and nine as amended assume as a fact that the complaining witness did not offer opposition and should have been denied. Nine as amended further requires that a specific intent be found to exist. Rape is not a crime which requires a specific intent.
Prayer number fifteen is again inconsistent with the Ewing case. The appellant sought 'by this prayer to require resistance to the utmost, and this is not the law in our jurisdiction.
Prayer number ten is wholly irrelevant to the issue of the appellant's guilt or innocence and should not have been granted. Prayer number eleven was properly denied, because there was no evidence to show that the doctor who examined the appellant was more peculiarly available to the Government than to the appellant. Similarly prayer number fourteen was properly denied because there was no evidence to show a mere narration of the attack.
The appellant next contends that the trial court should have declared a mistrial, because the prosecuting attorney in his opening statement commented that only one woman had survived the defense challenge. After an objection the trial court told the jury to disregard that remark as it was improper. Suffice it to say that no request was made for a mistrial. Since the appellant elected to take his chance on a verdict, without motion or exception, there is no foundation for the assignment of error. Yeager v. United States, 1900, 16 App.D.C. 356; Lorenz v. United States, 1904, 24 App.D.C. 337.
The appellant also complains of the fact that the prosecuting attorney commented in his argument on the fact that defense counsel did not make an opening statement because he did not know what the evidence would disclose. The trial court ruled this remark was proper and undoubtedly it was when not taken out of context. This statement was made with reference to the new story which the appellant gave on the stand in contradiction of his written confession. But besides this fact no request was made for a mistrial and there is no foundation for that assignment of error. Yeager v. United States, supra, and Lorenz v. United States, supra.
The appellant has been found guilty by a jury after a full and complete presentation of the evidence. By his assignments of error he, in effect, has asked this court to disregard the conclusions reached by the jury. However the verdict of a jury must be sustained when there is substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to the Government, to support it. Morton v. United States, 1945, 79 U.S.App.D.C. 329, 147 F.2d 28 certiorari denied 324 U.S. 875, 65 S.Ct. 1015, 89 L.Ed. 1428.
Affirmed.
. Prayer is used in the District of Columbia to denote a requested instruction.