Case Name: Kenneth E. FORD, et al. v. MURPHY OIL U.S.A., et al.
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1996-08-28
Citations: 681 So. 2d 401
Docket Number: No. 94-CA-1218
Parties: Kenneth E. FORD, et al. v. MURPHY OIL U.S.A., et al.
Judges: Before SCHOTT, C.J., ARMSTRONG, JONES, WALTZER and MURRAY, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 681
Pages: 401–419

Head Matter:
Kenneth E. FORD, et al. v. MURPHY OIL U.S.A., et al.
No. 94-CA-1218.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
Aug. 28, 1996.
Rehearing Denied Nov. 6, 1996.
Sidney D. Torres, III, Roberta L. Bums, Law Offices of Sidney D. Torres, III, Chal-mette, and Eldon E. Fallon, Gerald E. Meu-nier, Nick F. Nortea, Jr., Andrew A. Lem-mon, Gainsburgh, Benjamin, Fallon, David & Ates, and Jerald N. Andry, Jr., Gilbert V. Andry, III, Andry & Andry, New Orleans, for Plaintiffs/Appellants.
Robert E. Couhig, Jr., Mark S. Embree, Gayle T. Croxton, Adams & Reese, New Orleans, for Defendants/Appellees, Chemcat Corporation, Lloyd Whittington and Frenchy Cheramie.
Sam A LeBlanc, III, Paul G. Pastorek, Glen M. Pilie, Karen L. Lewis, William J. Kelly, III, Adams & Reese, New Orleans, for Defendants/Appellants, Mobil Corporation and R.V. Pisarczyk.
Hal C. Welch, Gerald J. Talbot, Leirile & Kelleher, L.L.P., New Orleans, and George A Frilot, III, James F. Shuey, Kenneth A Mayeaux, Frilot, Partridge, Kohnke & Clements, New Orleans, and James E. Baine, El Dorado, Arkansas, for DefendanVAppellant, Murphy Oil U.S.A, Inc.
Walter C. Thompson, Jr., Mark P. Seyler, Barkley & Thompson, New Orleans, for Defendant/Appellee, Calciner Industries, Inc.
Before SCHOTT, C.J., ARMSTRONG, JONES, WALTZER and MURRAY, JJ.

Opinion:
JiMURRAY, Judge.
Murphy Oil USA, Inc. (Murphy) and Mobil Oil Corporation (Mobil) appeal the trial court's certification of a class action for the claims of residents of St. Bernard and Orleans Parishes who are alleging causes of action against them pursuant to Civil Code articles 667 through 669, 2315 and 2315.1. The twenty-six named class representatives (plaintiffs) appeal the trial court's denial of certification of a class action as to their claims against ChemCat Corporation (Chem-Cat) and Calciner Industries, Inc. (Calciner).
|20n June 25, 1990, plaintiffs filed a "Class Action Petition for Damages" against Mobil, Murphy, Calciner, and ChemCat, as well as various employees of each, alleging that the defendants had breached the duty imposed by the legal servitude of vicinage. The case was removed to federal court by Mobil and Murphy on June 27, 1990, on the basis of diversity and federal question jurisdiction. It was remanded on October 22, 1990. Murphy and its employees filed exceptions of lis pendens, improper cumulation of actions, improper joinder of plaintiffs and defendants, and improper use of class action procedure. The other defendants answered, filing general denials. All defendants objected to the use of the class action procedure.
Defendants filed a Joint Motion for Case Management Order. The district court held a status conference to discuss all aspects of the certification issue. Thereafter, the court held bi-weekly status conferences, which were suspended at some point but later resumed. On December 20, 1990, plaintiffs moved for certification of a class action. In response to discovery motion practice the court entered an order delineating the questions that would be propounded to the proposed class representatives and setting deadlines for plaintiffs to respond to pre-certification discovery. The court subsequently expanded the scope of pre-certification discovery to include interrogatories and depositions, but limited discovery to "the litigants and the experts and any support documents for certification purposes." This order, entered on May 7, 1991, provided that "this discovery process is to focus on the issue of common character, the geographic area question, and to a lesser extent numerosity." The certification motion was ^submitted on briefs and taken under advisement on February 26, 1993. Exhibits introduced in connection with the motion included depositions of the class representatives and experts, affidavits of fact witnesses, various maps, and an air impact study.
On April 19, 1994, the trial court entered Judgment and Reasons for Judgment. The court denied certification of a class against ChemCat and Calciner finding that the requirements of common character and numer-osity had not been met as to these two defendants. The court, however, granted certification of a class action against Mobil and Murphy, finding that all requirements for a class action had been met as to these two defendants. The court also ruled that the class would be divided into two subclasses with the geographic perimeters to be determined later.
Murphy and Mobil appealed the certification of the class as to them, asserting that plaintiffs had not satisfied the "common character" requirement necessary for a class action. They have also assigned as error the trial court's determination that the class should be subdivided without defining the geographic boundaries of the class or subclass. Plaintiffs appealed the denial of certification as to ChemCat and Calciner, contending that the trial court erred when it denied certification as to all defendants, effectively rejecting plaintiffs' theory of tort liability.
CLASS ACTIONS GENERALLY:
Class action procedure is designed to permit the institution and management of litigation involving a right of common character vested in a sufficient number of parties as to render their joinder impracticable in an ordinary proceeding. ^Louisiana class actions are governed by articles 591 through 597 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The purpose and intent of class action procedure is to adjudicate and obtain res judicata effect on all common issues applicable not only to the representatives who bring the action but to all others who are "similarly situated," provided they are given adequate notice of the pending class action and do not timely! exercise the option of exclusion from the class action. La.Code Civ.Proc.Ann. art. 597; Williams v. State, 350 So.2d 131,137-38 (La.1977).
A class action may be instituted when the persons constituting the class are so numerous as to make it impracticable for all of them to join or be joined as parties, and the character of the right sought to be enforced for or against the members of the class is common to all members of the class. La. Code Civ.Proc.Ann. art. 591. Article 591 was adapted from the original federal class action, which recognized "true", "hybrid", and "spurious" class actions. However, the Louisiana legislature rejected the "hybrid" and "spurious" class actions so that Louisiana law recognizes only the "true" class action. Consequently, Louisiana courts have required that there be a relationship between the claims of the purported class members greater than simply a sharing of a common question of law or fact. Stevens v. Board of Trustees of Police Pension Fund, 309 So.2d 144, 150 (La.1975). This has been interpreted to require that questions of law or fact common to the class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that the class action be superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. State ex rel. Guste v. General Motors Corp., 370 So.2d 477, 489 (La.1978). As Justice Tate noted in Stevens, this limits the use of the class action procedural device "to Isoccasions where the class action will be clearly more useful than other available procedures for definitive determination of a common-based right, if such definitive determination in the single proceedings should be afforded in the interests of the parties (including both the class and the opponent(s) to it) and of the efficient operation of the judicial system." Stevens, 309 So.2d at 151.
When the issue of class certification is raised, the court may require some showing beyond the pleadings. The proponents of certification may present appropriate proof of numerosity, common character, and adequate representation. Stevens, 309 So.2d at 152-53.
The sole consideration for the trial court in ruling on certification, and for this court in reviewing that ruling, is whether the case at bar is one in which the procedural device of a class action is appropriate. In determining the propriety of a class action the court is not concerned with whether the plaintiffs have stated a cause of action or the likelihood that they ultimately will prevail on the merits. See Eisen v. Carlisle and Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 94 S.Ct. 2140, 40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1974); Miller v. Mackey International, Inc., 452 F.2d 424 (5th Cir.1971). Article 593.1(A) of the Code of Civil Procedure provides for recall, alteration or amendment of a preliminary order of class certification. Because of this flexibility, trial courts are encouraged to favor class certification in the preliminary stage. McCastle v. Rollins Environmental Services of La., Inc., 456 So.2d 612, 620 (La.1984).
A class action is nothing more than a procedural mechanism designed to efficiently and economically manage large numbers of claims in which common issues predominate over individual issues. Stevens, 309 So.2d at 151. Class certification is not an adjudication on the merits. General Motors Corp., 370 So.2d at 489. Plaintiffs who successfully demonstrate that their claims satisfy the Isstatutory prerequisites for maintaining a class action have done nothing more than establish that they may utilize this procedural device. The road from certification to a favorable judgment is long and arduous, with many pitfalls along the way. If the plaintiffs are unable to surmount the hurdles along that road, the defendants will dispose of a large number of claims at one time. La. Code Civ.Proc.Ann. art. 597.
CLASS CERTIFICATION:
In paragraph 23 of their original petition, plaintiffs have specified eight particular acts by which each of the four corporate defendants, and certain of their respective employees, have caused injury to the petitioners. Additionally, in paragraph 24 it is alleged that "[t]he individual and/or combined activities of the defendants" caused or contributed to a situation by virtue of a "synergistic accumulation or combination of releases, emissions, disbursements, placement, seepage, drainage, migration or otherwise non-consensual placing of pollutants on the exclusive properties or persons of the petitioners" that deprived them of the use of their property in violation of the "vicinage" articles of the Civil Code.
Plaintiffs bore the burden of proving that they satisfied each of the prerequisites of class certification. The basic requirements for a class action are:
1. A class so numerous that joinder is impracticable, and
2. The joinder as parties to the suit one or more persons who are
(a) members of the class, and
(b) so situated as to provide adequate representation for absent members of the class, and
17⅞. A common character among the rights of the representatives of the class and the absent members of the class.
McCastle, 456 So.2d at 616.
In this appeal, which focuses on the requirement of common character, the parties seem to agree on one thing: by certifying a class as to Murphy and Mobil but refusing certification as to ChemCat and Caleiner, the court implicitly rejected the plaintiffs' "synergy" theory of liability.
Of course, each side argues that this implicit rejection supports its position in this appeal. Plaintiffs argue that because they have asserted claims for the "synergistic" effect of the combined activities of the four corporate defendants, the court had to certify a class as to all defendants. On the other hand, the defendants argue that a class action should not be maintained where there may be more than one source for the alleged cause of harm to the plaintiffs.
Following these arguments to their logical extreme highlights the fallacy of each. Adopting plaintiffs' position arguably would allow everyone in Louisiana who claims to be injured by industrial pollution to be joined in a single class action with multiple subclasses, essentially certifying separate class actions as a single class action with subclasses. However, were we to adopt the position advanced by the defendants no class could ever be certified for claims of plaintiffs in a large geographical area who are alleging adverse effects of environmental pollution contributed to by a number of different sources. Neither position is correct. Each, in its own way, is a distortion of the law that undermines the effectiveness of this very important procedural tool.
In this case, people in a certain geographic area encompassing St. Bernard Parish and portions of Orleans Parish have alleged that they were affected ^adversely by pollution emanating from a number of sources. In order for these plaintiffs' claims to be joined in a class action, common issues must 'predominate over individual issues. To satisfy that common character requirement in the context of this case, all of the plaintiffs who sought to be joined in the class would have to have been affected by the activities of at least one of the defendants, although they also may have been affected by emissions from other sources. The trial court found that all plaintiffs had demonstrated a likelihood that they were affected by the activities of Mobil and Murphy, so that there was a common character as to the plaintiffs' claims against those two defendants. The court found, however, that the plaintiffs had not borne their burden of showing that the prerequisites of numerosity and common character had been proven as to ChemCat and Calciner.
DENIAL OF CERTIFICATION AS TO CHEMCAT AND CALCINER:
A trial court is given great discretion in certifying a class action. As this court has noted, "Wide latitude must be given the trial court in considerations involving policy matters and requiring an analysis of the facts under guidelines helpful to a determination of the appropriateness of a class action." Atkins v. Harcross Chemicals, Inc., 93-1904, pp. 6-6 (La.App. 4th Cir. 5/17/94), 638 So.2d 302, 306, writs denied, 94-2158, 94-2161 (La. 11/11/94), 644 So.2d 396. Absent manifest error, a trial court's determination on class certification will not be disturbed. Ellis v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 550 So.2d 1310, 1313 (La.App. 1st Cir.1989), writ denied, 559 So.2d 121 (La.1990).
The trial court denied certification as to ChemCat and Calciner based on its reading of the depositions of the class representatives. Those depositions established that few of these claimants had complaints relating to these defendants. |9In fact, several had no complaints as to ChemCat or Calciner. We cannot say that the court abused its discretion when it found that the plaintiffs had failed to carry their burden to demonstrate that the class action was a superior procedural device as to the-claims against ChemCat and Calciner.
CERTIFICATION AS TO MOBIL AND MURPHY:
In certifying a class against Mobil and Murphy, the district court found that all of the statutory prerequisites for maintaining a class action had been met as to the claims against each, noting that the claims of the class representatives reflected a "correlation to their proximity to Mobil and Murphy." The district court found that the claims against Mobil and Murphy were so numerous that joinder would be impracticable making it judicially efficient to proceed as a class action. The court also found that, in addition to there being common issues of fact and law, the common issues of causation and duty predominated over individual issues of damages so that the common character requirement was satisfied. Finally, the court found that the proposed class representatives would provide adequate representation of the interests of the class.
The claims asserted in this class action include physical and emotional injury, fear of future illness, increased risk of future illness, inconvenience, disruption of personal and professional lives, diminished general quality of life, clean-up costs, property damage, loss of use and enjoyment of property, diminished property values, loss of earnings, loss of profits and business interruption loss. Not every plaintiff is alleging every type of injury, but all | ^plaintiffs claim that Murphy and Mobil conducted activities on their premises that unreasonably inconvenienced and injured members of the class, for which the defendants allegedly are strictly hable.
Murphy and Mobil argue that the trial court was wrong when it determined that common issues of fact and law predominated. We disagree. We find that this case presents a situation similar to that presented in McCastle, supra.
In McCastle the plaintiffs alleged that on numerous occasions over a period of approximately one year, the ongoing operations at a Rollins' waste disposal facility produced nauseating chemical fumes causing illness, discomfort and increased risk of disease. Approximately 400 people who lived in a community near the facility sought monetary damages and injunctive relief, establishing by testimony that the fumes were present on numerous occasions and that the location and density of the fumes sometimes depended on wind conditions. Considering these variables, the court found sufficient common character existed, noting that this requirement restricts the class action to those cases in which it would "achieve economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable results." McCastle, 456 So.2d at 616.
As in McCastle, the single most important issue to be determined in this litigation is whether the defendants' activities at their facilities deprived their neighbors of the liberty of enjoying their own land or caused unreasonable inconvenience or damage. Offering the same facts, all class members will attempt to establish that the activities of Mobil and Murphy emitted hazardous, toxic, | ncorrosive, or noxious odors, fumes, gases or particulate matter that caused them damage. The issue of these defendants' duty predominates over individual questions. The differences noted by the defendants generally concern the proof of damages and causation. The pleadings and evidence presented in connection with certification suggest that with respect to the predominant liability issues, there will be no material deviations because individual defenses such as contributory negligence and assumption of the risk are wholly inapplicable. McCastle, 456 So.2d at 620.
Defendants attempt to distinguish McCas-tle because this case involves separate facilities, whose history of operations span greatly different time frames and involve widely varying materials. That argument was rejected in Atkins, supra, where this court upheld the lower court's certification of a class of individuals living within three blocks of a warehouse that was the site of a pesticide manufacturing plant from 1941 until 1977. Despite this lengthy time span, this court concluded that the common issues predominated over individual ones. Those common issues included whether or not the substances produced and/or stored at the facility were toxic; whether or not such toxins were released or escaped and if so when and in what amounts; whether or not those toxins were of a sufficient concentration to endanger human health within the geographic area of the release; whether the defendants had a legal duty to anticipate and take steps to prevent the risk; and whether or not punitive damages were applicable. Atkins at p. 5, 638 So.2d at 305. We find the issues presented here are virtually identical to those identified in Atkins.
Similarly, the defendants' argument that a class cannot be maintained here because other sources of pollutants may have eontribut- ed to plaintiffs' alleged [^problems has been rejected. In Ellis, 650 So.2d at 1315, a case involving the allegedly unauthorized discharge of phenol into the river by the defendant, the court found that "the claim that others dumped phenol and that different water treatment plants may have aggravated the problem are common defenses asserted by Georgia-Pacific, not defenses against individual plaintiffs." See also Millet v. Rollins Environmental Services of La., Inc., 428 So.2d 1075, 1078 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 433 So.2d 153 (La.1983).
This case, like the McCastle, Atkins, Millet, and Ellis eases, concerns an environmental hazard that allegedly harmed and caused inconvenience to nearby residents. The differences between the claims in this ease are similar to the differences in those cases. We find, as did the court in Ellis, that the fact that individuals may have been injured or unreasonably inconvenienced on varying dates by the defendants' operations does not constitute a material variation in the elements of the class members' claims. The issue of the defendants' duty and possible liability predominate over the individual issues raised by the defendants. Ellis, 550 So.2d at 1317 (citing McCastle, 456 So.2d at 620); accord Saden v. Kirby, 532 So.2d 108 (La.1988) (Supreme Court reversed denial of certification in suit by residents against Parish, Department of Transportation and Development, and Sewerage and Water Board to recover damages caused by severe flooding after construction of a levee where appeal court had upheld denial based on its determination that varied damage claims and multiplicity of available defenses precluded certification).
We recognize that there will be some difficulty in managing this litigation, but we find that this does not outweigh the economies to be derived from a unitary adjudication. As in McCastle virtually all of the witnesses and class members livejisin the same vicinity. This, coupled with the identity of the main issue of liability in all claims, will facilitate a prompt, efficient, relatively inexpensive single trial on the common issues. A class action will allow the court the flexibility to manage this claim in the most efficient manner possible. There can be little doubt that a class action is the superior procedural vehicle to adjudicate these claims. We find that maintaining a class action in this case promotes the implementation of the substantive law in a manner that will provide maximum fairness to all parties with a minimum expenditure of judicial resources, which is the basic goal of any procedural device. Stevens, 309 So.2d at 151. As the First Circuit has noted, "Of what value is a device denominated 'class action' if it is unavailable in the very situation where its peculiar procedural features are so eminently suitable to the expeditious and economical use of the overburdened judicial machinery and to providing a judicial forum to persons to whom such an opportunity might otherwise be denied?" Livingston Parish Police Jury v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R. Co., 432 So.2d 1027, 1034 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 437 So.2d 1137 (La.1983).
In summary, we find no abuse of the trial court's discretion in certifying a class as to the claims against Mobil and Murphy.
THE CLASS DEFINITION:
Although the trial court certified a class action as to Mobil and Murphy, it noted that a division into two subclasses was warranted but did not define the geographical area of the class and each subclass. Mobil and Murphy assert that certifying a class without first determining the geographic perimeters was error because the court could not have determined numerosity, commonality or the Inadequacy of the class representatives without considering the limits of the area involved.
A class definition provides the framework against which the court can apply the statutory requirements in order to determine whether a class action may be maintained. The definition of the class in the petition should provide a sufficient basis upon which to determine the scope of the class and the propriety of permitting plaintiffs to represent all or a part of it. 2 H. Newburg, Class Actions, § 6.14 (3d ed. 1992). The requirement that there be a class capable of definition ensures that the proposed class is not amorphous, vague or indeterminate. See In re Tetracycline Cases, 107 F.R.D. 719 (W.D.Mo.1985). A person should be able to determine readily if he or she is a member of the class. This is essential in order for there to be res judicata effect to any judgment that is rendered. We find, therefore, that the trial court should have defined the geographic perimeters of the class.
Plaintiffs have proposed that the class be defined as:
Residents, property owners, and business owners in the St. Bernard Parish communities of Arabi, Chalmette, and Meraux, extending eastward to the Violet Canal, and that portion of Algiers directly across the Mississippi River bounded to the West by Holiday Drive, to the South by General De Gaulle, and to the East by the Algiers Canal, whose claims are based upon defendants' alleged violation of articles 667-669 and 2315 et. seq., La.C.C., which violations allegedly caused such harm to their neighbors, and who allege personal injury or property damage caused by the emission of hazardous, toxic, corrosive, or noxious odors, fumes, gases, or particulate matter from any or all of the four defendants' facilities, and which emissions cause such damages either in their original form or in combination with each other or other ambient compounds.
_Jii>However, we have found that the trial court correctly refused to certify a class as to the claims against ChemCat and Calcinen Therefore, based on our review of the record, the class is defined as follows:
Those residents, property owners, and business owners in the St. Bernard Parish communities of Arabi, Chalmette, and Meraux, extending eastward to the Violet Canal, and that portion of Algiers directly across the Mississippi River bounded to the west by Holiday Drive, to the south by General deGaulle, and to the east by the Algiers Canal, who allege that they have sustained personal injury or property damage caused by the emission of hazardous, toxic, corrosive, or noxious odors, fumes, gases, or particulate matter as a result of the violation of Articles 667-669, 2315 and 2315.1 of the Louisiana Civil Code by Murphy Oil USA, Inc. and Mobil Oil Corporation.
We leave it to the trial court to determine how the class shall be subdivided as the case develops. Any subdivision(s) may be based upon geographical subgroupings, subgroup-ings by type of injury alleged, exposure, and other factors as may become apparent as a case management order is formulated, and the litigation progresses.
For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the trial court denying certification of a class action against ChemCat and Calciner is affirmed. The judgment maintaining a class action against Mobil and Murphy is amended to include the class definition set forth above. This case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings, with each party to bear its own costs of this appeal.
AMENDED AND AFFIRMED AS AMENDED.
SCHOTT, C.J., dissents.
WALTZER, J., Dissents in Part and Concurs in Part with Reasons.
. The class representatives as of the filing of this appeal are: Kenneth Ford; Gilbert V. Andiy; William Fernandez; James Licciardi, Sr.; James Licciardi, Jr.; Burgess B. Greer, Jr.; Wayne Wescott; Charles W. Borchers III; Myma Fiorel-la; Joyce Clarkin; Felix Giorlando, Sr.; Felix Giorlando, Jr.; Gina Smallwood; Gail Brown; Carol Bodden; Eloise Williams; Carrie Lewis; Joseph Lewis, Jr.; Anna Mae Ruffin; Caesar Ruffin; Frederick Thome, Jr.; Armond Duvio d/b/a Putter's Palace Amusements; Maurice Gilly; Brenda Ciuffi; Clarence Galjour; Bettie Hebert.
. The suit originally named six class representatives, all residents of St. Bernard Parish. Six supplemental and amending petitions were filed in order to name additional plaintiffs, including plaintiffs residing in Orleans Parish, and to withdraw various plaintiffs' names as class representatives.
. Paragraph 23 also alleges that defendants are liable for "[a]ny and all acts of negligence which may be proven."
. Although the petition was amended several times, plaintiffs have maintained the alternative nature of their allegations, i.e., that defendants' "individual and/or combined activities" have injured them.
. There are twenty-six plaintiffs named as class representatives. Plaintiffs' counsel offered a computer printout of clients who, as of December 16, 1993, had signed contracts to be represented in this matter, either as a member of the class or by joinder if a class is not certified. Affidavits provided by plaintiffs established that the number of clients listed on that printout total 4,039.
. The plaintiffs in McCastle, like plaintiffs herein, asserted claims under Civil Code articles 667-669 and 2315. 456 So.2d at 618.
. This proposed class definition was set forth in plaintiffs' response to questions posed by this court when the case was reargued before a five-judge panel. This essentially is the same class definition suggested by plaintiffs to the trial court in their memorandum in support of class certification. The geographic boundaries suggested by plaintiffs in this proposed class definition are based upon the perimeter of the area surrounding the defendants' facilities formed by connecting the outermost points on the geo-coded map of complaints introduced as Plaintiffs' Exhibit 9.