Case Name: DOMSCHKE v. DOMSCHKE
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1910-05-06
Citations: 122 N.Y.S. 892
Docket Number: 
Parties: DOMSCHKE v. DOMSCHKE.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 122
Pages: 892–899

Head Matter:
DOMSCHKE v. DOMSCHKE.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.
May 6, 1910.)
Marriage (§ 58 )—Grounds for Annulment—Fraud.
The false,representation of defendant to plaintiff prior to their marriage that she had been the wife of another, who was the father of her child, when she had been his mistress, being one that can be material to the extent that but for it plaintiff would not have consented to marry her, will sustain an action to annul the marriage on the ground of fraud.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Marriage, Cent. Dig. § 122; Dec. Dig. § 58. ]
Carr and Burr, JJ., dissenting.
Appeal from Special Term, Kings County.
Action by Rudolph P. Domschke against Annie Domschke. From a judgment dismissing the complaint, plaintiff appeals.
Reversed, and new trial granted.
Argued before JENKS, BURR, THOMAS, RICH, and CARR, JJ.
George C. Basch, for appellant.
Isidore Witkind, for respondent.
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep'r Indexes

Opinion:
JENKS, J.
This is an action by a husband to annul his marriage for fraud, in that prior to the marriage his wife represented to him that she had been the wife of a man then deceased, to whom her child was born, when in truth she had been that man's mistress and the child was his bastard. The plaintiff pleaded that since the discovery of the fraud he had not cohabited with the defendant. It was conceded on the record that the parties had cohabited together for six years subsequent to their marriage, and that there was no issue, whereupon the Special Term dismissed the plaintiff because he had not pleaded facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and he appeals. I think that the Special Term erred.
In Reynolds v. Reynolds, 3 Allen (Mass.) 605, Bigelow, C. J., says that it has been contended by some writers, especially the commentators on the civil law, that chastity is a quality that lies at the foundation of the contract of marriage and constitutes one of its essential elements, citing Vcet, 24, 2, 15, which see, and 1 Fraser's Dom. Rel. 231. Montesquieu in his Spirit of the Laws, 23, 21, writes that since the time of Ulpian a freeman was forbidden to marry a woman who had led a disorderly life. See, too, Bishop on Marriage, Divorce and Separation (volume 1, 479 et seq.). But many decisions and many text-writers have pronounced against annulment of marriage subsequentto consummation on the ground of the false representation of the wife previous to her marriage that she was chaste. For examples, see Reynolds v. Reynolds, supra; Carris v. Carris, 24 N. J. Eq. 524; Allen's Appeal, 99 Pa. 196, 44 Am. Rep. 101; Smith v. Smith, 8 Or. 100; Wier v. Still, 31 Iowa, 107; Leavitt v. Leavitt, 13 Mich. 452; Shrady v. Logan, 17 Misc. Rep. 330, 40 N. Y. Supp. 1010; Schouler on Husband and Wife, § 27; Bishop on Marriage, Separation and Divorce, supra.
_ The proposition of the Special Term must be that a false representation of such fact cannot sustain an action brought after the marriage and its consummation for an annulment on the ground of fraud.
Gray, J., writing for a unanimous court in Di Lorenzo v. Di Lorenzo, 174 N. Y. 472, 67 N. E. 64, 63 L. R. A. 92, 95 Am. St. Rep. 609,says:
"While, then, it is true that marriage contracts are based upon considerations peculiar to themselves, and that public policy is concerned with the regulation oí the family relation, nevertheless our law considers marriage in no •other light than as a civil contract. Kujek v. Goldman, 150 N. Y. 176 [44 N. E. 773, 34 L. R. A, 156, 55 Am. St. Rep. 670], The free and full consent which is •of the essence of all ordinary contracts is expressly made by the statute necessary to the validity of the marriage contract. The minds of the parties must meet in one intention. It is a general rule that every misrepresentation of a material fact made with the intention to induce another to enter into an agreement and without which he would not have done so justifies the court in vacating the agreement. It is obvious that no one would obligate himself by a contract if he knew that a material representation, entering into the reason for his consent, was untrue. There is no valid reason for excepting the marriage •contract from the general rule."
And also declares, after quoting from and citing Code Civ. Proc. § 1743, subd. 4, and section 1750:
"This language is broad, and warrants but the one reasonable construction, that the fraud must be material, to that degree that, had it not been practiced, the party deceived would not have consented to the marriage."
I think, then, that under the authority of Di Lorenzo's Case, supra, the soundness of the proposition of the Special Term must be determined by answering the question whether as matter of law such a false representation can be material to that degree that, had it not been practiced, the party deceived would not have consented to the marriage. It can be said that in our civilization a man assumes that his proposed wife is chaste, and that without reason he would not pay her the insult of query as to her virtue. But I can conceive of a case where a man before consenting to a contract of marriage might ask such a question of the woman outright, and rely upon her answer. Or the case at bar is an instance where the circumstances might compel some representation in explanation of them. It is quite true that such a representation is not as to the essentialia of the marriage contract, for previous chastity is not a necessary qualification for cohabitation or for the full discharge of the duties of consortium. But it seems-to me that the question is whether such representation may not be as to a fact material to the consent of the other party to make the contract. Cannot a man regard chastity as an essential qualification of the woman he proposes to marry, and be unwilling to take even an Aspasia to his bed and board? In Di Lorenzo's Case the misrepresentation was that a child was the issue of the illicit relations of the parties. That representation could not strike at the essentialia of marriage, and yet the court pronounced it material, saying:
"In this case the representation of the defendant was as to a fact, except for the truth of which the necessary consent of the plaintiff would not have been obtained to the marriage. It was designed to create a state of mind in the plaintiff, the operation of which would be to yield a consent to marry the defendant, in the belief that he was rectifying a great wrong. The minds of the parties did not meet upon a common basis of operation. The artifice was such as to deceive a reasonably prudent person, and to appeal to his sense of honor and of duty. The plaintiff had a right to rely upon the defendant's statement of a fact, the truth of which was known to her and unknown to him, and he was under no obligation to verify a statement, to the truth of which she had pledged herself. It was a gross fraud, and, upon reason, as upon authority, I think it afforded a sufficient ground for a decree anulling the marriage contract."
Thus we have the principle enunciated that the materiality goes to-the consent to the contract, and need not strike at the capacity to-make the contract and to perform it. A man is not presumed to contract for marriage simply upon the basis of physical ability of the woman for cohabitation; for consortium implies much more. And if a man consent to contract to marry a woman who falsely represents herself as chaste, and yet marries her who has been unchaste, he may thereby be induced to agree to a contract which necessarily requires personal performance by one who is of a different status than he was led to believe. The bad character of the plaintiff or his or her lascivious conduct is a defense to a breach of promise action. Palmer v. Andrews, 7 Wend. 142; 2 Parsons on Contracts (8th Ed.) bottom, paging 69, citing authorities. That author also says:
"It has been said,.also, that if a widow conceals her previous marriage, and betroths herself as a virgin, this would be a fraud, and would avoid the contract. It is going quite far to consider this fact alone as constituting a fraud, but it could seldom occur but under circumstances which would probably de termine the character of the concealment; and, if this were fraudulent, it must, of course, have the usual effect of fraud upon the contract, for if obtained by fraud, whatever that fraud may be, the contract is void."
1 cite this principle as bearing on the question of materiality. Bigelow on Fraud (volume 1, p. 497) says:
"In the next place the representation must have been material; that is, it must not only have induced the" action taken, it must have been adequate to induce it by offering a motive sufficient to influence the conduct of a man of average intelligence and prudence. Still a party who has effected his purpose through a misrepresentation cannot deny its materiality [citing cases]."
2 Parsons on Contracts (8th Ed.) p. 895, writes:
"But, as before, we must say that there is no positive standard by which to. determine whether the fraud be thus material or not. Nor can we give a better rule for deciding the question than this: If the fraud be such that, had it not been practiced, the contract would not have been made, or the transaction completed, then it is material to it; but, if it be shown or made probable that the same thing would have been done by the parties, in the same way, if the fraud had not been practiced, it cannot be deemed material."
See, too, Valton v. National Fund Life Assurance Co., 20 N. Y. 32—37; Canham v. Barry, 15 C. B. 597. If one would go so far as to say that a man would or would not be led- to give or withhold consent to the contract of marriage upon the single consideration whether the woman was chaste or unchaste, the answer is that it is not necessary that the false representation should be the sole inducement. Pomeroy's Equitable Remedies, § 890; Kerr- on Fraud and Mistake, p. 74. _
_ I think, then, that such a misrepresentation can afford ground for the annulment of a marriage for fraud because as matter of law it can be material upon the question of consent, which is essential to the contract of marriage. To reach any other conclusion is to say in effect that the fact that the woman otherwise acceptable is unchaste cannot be sufficient motive for a man of average intelligence and prudence to refuse consent to marriage. This doctrine would put a Cyprian on the marriage plane of a virgin, and makes no distinction in respect to virtue as between a woman who had been a mistress and one who had been a wife.
I cannot perceive that the question is affected by the circumstance that the marriage was consummated, for the sole relation of the false representation, as viewed by the law, is to the consent to contract of marriage, and the sole limitation to the action, as pointed out in Di Lorenzo's Case, supra, is voluntary cohabitation subsequent to the full knowledge of the facts. This court must decide this question upon the law as declared by our statute and as expounded by our highest court. That court has well said in Kujek v. Goldman, 150 N. Y., at page 182, 44 N. E. 775, 34 L. R. A. 156, 55 Am. St. Rep. 670:
"While it is not agreeable to treat a subject of sacred importance upon this narrow basis, it is necessary to do so, for our law considers marriage in no other light than as a civil contract."
My conclusion is that the alleged false misrepresentation can be material in such an action, and therefore may be material in this action. There is nothing more to decide upon the record of this appeal.
I advise that the judgment be reversed and that a new trial be granted.
RICH, J., concurs.
THOMAS, J.
The defendant, it must be assumed, represented that she in the purity of wedlock had given birth to her child, and thereby induced the plaintiff to enter into the contract of marriage. In fact, for eight years she had been the mistress of another, and in such offensive state became the mother of an illegitimate child. Hence the plaintiff became the husband of an unchaste woman, and the stepfather of a bastard, whereby his family life was tainted in its most intimate relations. Presumptively a man would abhor such a marriage, not only on account of the personal society into which it would bring him and his offspring, if such there should be, with the accompanying impairment or destruction of the sacred love and respect that justify marriage, but also on account of the obloquy and social ostracism that the connection upon exposure might entail. I can conceive of no more distressing affront to the sensibilities nor 'more profound injury to the sanctity of the marriage relation; and, where it is effected by actual fraudulent representation that the woman is pure and the child legitimate, the court should not hesitate to relieve the person who has been led into the most inviolable of all personal contracts.