Case Name: William M. Ayres, et al., v. Richard Probasco
Court: Kansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Kansas
Decision Date: 1875-01
Citations: 14 Kan. 175
Docket Number: 
Parties: William M. Ayres, et al., v. Richard Probasco.
Judges: Kingman, C. J., concurring.
Reporter: Kansas Reports
Volume: 14
Pages: 175–201

Head Matter:
William M. Ayres, et al., v. Richard Probasco.
1. Leading Questions — When Allowable. Leading questions may sometimes be put to a party’s own witness; and it is possible that in some cases a court may abuse its discretion by refusing to permit sucll questions to be asked.
2. Principad and Agent; Knowledge of Agent. Where a transaction is carried on and consummated by one person .acting as the agent for another person, whatever comes to the knowledge of the agent pending the transaction, must be presumed to come to the knowledge of the principal.
S. Usurious Note; Construction of Statutes. In an action on a promissory note given in 1871, while $ 4 of the usury law of 1868 was in force, (General Statutes, 526,) said § 4 governs with regard to the forfeiture of interest on usurious contracts, although a subsequent law upon that subject has been passed. (Jenness v. Cutler, 12 Kas., 500.)
4. Mortgage; Execution; Signing a “Blank,” is a Nudity. Where husband and wife sign and acknowledge a blank mortgage, with the understanding and agreement that it shall afterward be filled up so as to make it a mortgage on a certain piece of land owned by the wife, and occupied by herself and husband as their homestead, and so as to make it a mortgage to C. to secure the payment of $1,000,. and also give authority to a third person to so fill up the blank; and the mortgage is afterward filled up in the presence and with the consent of the husband and said third person, but in the absence and without the knowledge of the wife, so as to make it a mortgage on said property, but so as to make it a mortgage to P. instead of O., and to secure the payment of $1,100 instead of $1,000, held, that said .mortgage after it is so filled up is not the mortgage of the wife, and is void as to her.
5. Statute op Frauds; Authority to Agent to he in Writing. Where a party signs and acknowledges a blank mortgage, another person acting as the agent of such party cannot afterward in the absence of his principal fill up the blanks in said mortgage so as to make it the mortgage of his principal, and then deliver the same to the intended mortgagee unless he is authorized so to do by his principal in writing.
6. Estoppel ; Find Mortgage. Where a mortgage was executed in blank as above mentioned, in proposition 4th, to secure a loan of money, and the husband received the money loaned and with it paid ofif a prior mortgage on the land attempted to be mortgaged by such second mortgage, and the mortgagee through his agent was fully cognizant at the time he parted with his money, and received the mortgage, of the manner in which the mortgage was executed, held, that the wife is not estopped from claiming that the mortgage is not her mortgage, ' and that it is void as to her.
7. Homestead ; Mortgage of Husband alone, is Void. And the mortgage being void as to the wife and being on property owned by her and occupied by herself and husband as a homestead, the mortgage is also void as to both the husband and wife. (Morris v. Ward, 5 Kas., 239; Dolman v. Harris, 5 Kas., 597.)
THE CASE ON KE-HEAKING.
8. Delivery op Mortgage ; Mortgagee. Where an instrument or paper is executed or authorized to be executed to a particular person as mortgagee, and without any authority from and without the knowledge of the mortgagor the name of a wholly different party or person is inserted in such paper or instrument as mortgagee, a delivery of such paper or instrument to the person so named, or his agent,' by a person to whom such paper or instrument had been intrusted, without the knowledge or consent of the party named as mortgagor, is not a delivery by such mortgagor, and is wholly void.
9. Estoppel — Not created by Involuntary Benefits. A party who receives an involuntary benefit, (as, where a wife is benefited by the payment by her husband of a mortgage-lien on the homestead, the title to which homestead is in the wife,) which benefit is so received without such party’s knowledge or procurement, is not thereby estopped from denying the validity or legality of a pretended instrument or mortgage used by the party conferring the benefit as the instrument or mortgage of the party so involuntarily benefited, and as a security to' obtain the money employed in conferring the benefit, but of the existence of which instrument such benefited party was wholly ignorant.
10. --The case of Knaggs v. Mastín, 9 Has., 532, cited, considered, and distinguished.
11. Title to Mortgaged Lands, May be Shown. Where neither the pleadings nor the mortgage given by husband and wife show in whom the title to th§ premises is, the presumption, in the absence of proof, is, that the title is in both the mortgagors. But it is competent, to save or determine the rights of either party, to show by proof in whom the title in fact is, whether the husband, the wife, or both.
12. [Equity ; Bien on Homestead, resulting from certain Acts and Benefits. It would seem that, where one person advances money with the consent of the owner of a homestead to extinguish some existing lien upon such homestead, with the understanding of the parties that the person so advancing such money shall acquire a lien upon such homestead, such person will in equity acquire such lien to the extent of the money so advanced and so used to extinguish such first-mentioned lien, notwithstanding the instrument claimed .to create or to evidence such lien in favor of the party so advancing the money may be void. Per Valentine, J.]
13. [Statute oe Frauds; Authority to Agent. The 5th proposition above stated, regarding the authority of agents in certain cases, and the necessity for such authority to be in writing, is again considered by Valentine, J.; and the case of Van Etta v. Evenson, 28 Wis., 33, commented on, and disapproved.]
Error from Doniphan District Court.
Probasco brought suit to recover on two notes of $550 each, ($1,100,) executed by Wm. M. Ayres to hirp, and to foreclose a mortgage given by Ayres and wife to secure said notes. FranJc Sutter, as the holder of a second mortgage, was joined as"a co-defendant. Afterward the court ordered W. L. Challiss made a defendant. Each defendant answered separately. Ayres and wife each pleaded that $100 of the notes was usury, and denied the execution of the mortgage, but specially admitted that they executed a “blank mortgage” for the purpose of procuring a loan of money from said Challiss for $1,000. The blanks in this mortgage were afterward, in the presence of Ayres, but in his wife’s absence, and without her knowledge or consent, filled with Probaseo’s name, and the sum of $1,100, and it then was delivered to Challiss as agent instead of as principal. Mrs. Ayres made her husband’s answer a part of hers, and he the same with her answer, and both asked for affirmative relief, that said supposed mortgage be adjudged and decreed to be null and void, and that the record thereof be canceled. The mortgage does not, nor does either answer show or aver in whom was the title to the mortgaged property. Other facts appear in the opinion, infra. The district court, at the September Term 1873, gave judgment in favor of Probasco for the recovery of the $1,100 and interest, and for the foreclosure of the said mortgage, and also found in favor of Sutter for the amount claimed by him, and decreed a foreclosure of the mortgage held by him as a second lien on the premises, adjudging the same to be subsequent to the lien of Probasco’s mortgage.. From such judgments and decrees Ayres and wife and Sutter appeal, and bring the case here on error.
Everest & Greenwood, A. Perry, and B. O’Briscoll, for plaintiffs in error:
1. The court erred in submitting to the jury the following questions, and receiving their answers thereto, to-wit:
Ques. No. 10. — “Did defendants ¥m. M. Ayres and Melissa T. Ayres obtain' and apply to their use and benefit the proceeds of such loan? — (the loan from Probasco.)” Ans.“■Yes.”
Ques. No. 17.-“ Did Mrs. Ayres after learning the facts of 'such loan consent to the using the proceeds thereof for the benefit of herself and husband?” Ans. — “Yes.”
Question No. 10 was improper and prejudicial to the rights of Mrs. Ayres. If the question was submitted for the purpose of sustaining the execution of the mortgage on the ground of any equitable estoppel as against her, it should have been submitted as to her alone. There was no evidence upon which question No. 17 could have been submitted, as there is no proof that Mrs. Ayres ever knew the facts in reference to this transaction, or that any part of the money passed into her hands, or that she ever used the same.
2. The jury found specifically that the name and place of residence of Probasco were inserted in said mortgage on the 6th of December 1871, at the office of W. W. Guthrie, in the city of Atchison. And the court erred in refusing to submit to the jury for their answer the following' questions of fact, prepared and presented by defendants below, to-wit:
Ques. No. 32.-“ Was the defendant Melissa T. Ayres present at the time the name of Richard Probasco was written in or inserted in said mortgage? and did she have'xuiy knowledge thereof, or consent thereto?
Ques. No. 34.-“ Was the defendant Melissa T. Ayres the owner in her own right of the mortgaged premises mentioned and set forth in plaintiff’s petition, at the time the said mortgage is claimed to have been signed, executed and acknowledged by said Melissa?
Ques. No. 38.-“ What is the value of said notes of Loyd McNamee transferred by defendant Wm. M. Ayres to plaintiff, or to defendant Challiss his agent?
Ques. No. 39.-“Did defendant W. L. Challiss, in making the loan of money to defendant William M. Ayres, in accepting and receiving the notes and mortgage set forth in plaintiff’s petition, and in taking and receiving the notes of said McNamee, and in the receiving the said deed from defendant Wm. M. Ayres, and in the whole transaction between the plaintiff and defendant Wm. M. Ayres act as the agent and attorney of said plaintiff?
Ques. No. 41.-“ What was the consideration paid, for which the said' two notes were executed which are sued upon in this action?
Ques. No. 42.-“ Did the defendant Melissa T. Ayres ever execute or deliver to the plaintiff the mortgage mentioned and set forth in the plaintiff’s petition ?
Ques. No. 43.-“ Was said mortgage ever in any manner by said Melissa delivered to the plaintiff?”
These propositions or questions were proper, and specific answers thereto were necessary to enable the jury or the court to correctly determine the rights of Mrs. Ayres.
3. The court erred in refusing instruction No. 1, asked for by the defendants. The statutes in force at the time the alleged contract was made provided that any person contracting, by promissory note, etc., to receive a greater rate of interest than twelve per centum per annum, “shall forfeit all interest and shall recover no more than the principal.” Gen. Stat., ch. 51, §§ 2, 4. The notes in question bear date December 1st, 1871, and were signed December 6th. The district court erroneously held that the contract in the case at bar was governed as to the usury question by ch. 134, laws of 1872, p. 285; that is, the court held that the law in force at the time of the commencement of the action should govern, 'and not the one at the time the contract was made.
4. It was also error to refuse the following instruction, asked by defendants:
“If the jury find from the evidence that, at the time the defendant Melissa T. Ayres signed said mortgage mentioned and set forth in plaintiffs petition, said mortgage was in blank, and contained no name or person as mortgagee, and thereafter, and without the written authority, direction or consent of the said Melissa, the defendant Challiss, or any other person, in the absence of the said Melissa, and without her knowledge, inserted the name of the plaintiff as mortgagee therein after the same had been signed and acknowledged by her, that the said mortgage is invalid and void as against the said Melissa T. Ayres.”
Under the statutes of this state an agent could not insert the name of the mortgagee in the instrument, much less fill up the entire blank in the absence of Mrs. Ayres, unless he had authority in writing so to do. Statute of Frauds, Gen. Stat., ch. 43, p. 505; 41 Cal., 85; Story on Agency, §49; 2 Johns., 430; 9 Allen, (Mass.) 387; 19 Iowa, 273; 24 N.Y., 230; 14 Geo., 173; 1B. Monroe, 199; 5 How., (Miss.) 71; 4 Kent, 462; 19 Ala., 114; 29 Ill., 306; 33 Texas, 139; 8 Blackf., 413; 14 Wis., 631; 12 Am. Law Reg., (N.S.) 689, and note, 711; 23 Grattan, (Va.) 600.
But if we concede for the purpose of the argument, that parol authority^ alone was sufficient, then, certainly, the court erred in refusing the following instruction asked by defendants below, to-wit:
“If the jury find from the evidence that at the time defendant Melissa T. Ayres signed and acknowledged the said mortgage the same was in blank as to the name of mortgagee, or the amount or consideration thereof, and after the same had passed out of the possession or control of said Melissa, and in her absence, and without her consent or authority, the name of the plaintiff was" inserted therein as the mortgagee, or the amount or consideration thereof was inserted therein, and delivered to the plaintiff or his agent in the absence of the said Melissa, then said mortgage is invalid and void as against her.”
This instruction is undoubted law, and to refuse it was obvious error. The mortgaged premises were the homestead of the parties. Hence it was also error to refuse the instruction asked for —
“That if the instrument, after it passed out of Mrs. Ayres’ possession and control, and in her absence, and without her consent and authority, was filled up, then it constituted no lien on the premises.”
This error affected the material rights of the defendants in the court below. The mortgage was not the act or deed of Mrs. Ayres, and hence there was no “joint consent” to the alienation. 5 Kas., 239, 597.
W. W. Quthrie, for defendant in error:
1. Can a mortgage, when executed in blank, and placed in the hands of an agent on which to negotiate a loan, and thereon he fills it up within the line of his authority, and delivers .it a perfect instrument in a bona fide transaction, be sustained? We assert the affirmative. A mortgage does not convey a title, but only creates a lien: 2 Kas., 391; 6 Kas., 397; 8 Kas., 502; 12 Kas., 223. A mortgage is not an alienation in this state, but is commercial paper as the auxiliary of the note: 8 Kas., 465. Hence the authorities regarding alienations are inapplicable in this case.
2. Instruments take effect upon delivery, and in the condition when delivered: Knaggs v. Mastín, 9 Kas., 550; Simms v. Hervey, 19 Iowa, 296; Basford v. Pearson, 9 Allen, 387; Upton v. Archer, 41 Cal., 87. In these cases it was held that parol authority was not sufficient within the statute of frauds in the absence of the grantor. Why not in' his absence, when performed in strict accordance with his intention ? But in this case Wm. M. Ayres was present, and no issue in the case warranted any finding that Melissa T. Ayres was the owner of the mortgaged premises, and all such evidence was received against our objection. In Chesney v. Arnold, 24 N. Y., 333, and Drwry v. Foster, 2 Wall., 33, parol authority is sustained. In Simms v. Hervey, 19 Iowa, 297, such authority is not denied; and even in case of a deed, in Fletcher v. Manseer, 5 Ind., 269, it is held that the proof may be made aliunde. .The case of Preston v. Hull, 199 of 12 Am. Law Register, is against us, but it fails from the volume of its own weight. A decision of a Virginia court at this day, made by three judges against three judges, will hardly be held to overturn the respectable authorities cited in the editor’s note to that case, or to impair the reasoning of his conclusions. But in Devin v. Heiner, 29 Iowa, 299, the doctrine contended for by plaintiff in error is completely refuted, and ■ the exception stated in Simms v. Hervey, supra, held applicable in a case where the grantee’s name in a deed was filled in after delivery to the grantee, and the deed held valid and complete. But the doctrine as applicable to a mortgage is directly affirmed in Van Etta v. Evenson, 28 Wis., 33. And all the authorities agree that where a party is competent to ratify, and does ratify, that the deed is valid, and such ratification may be proved by parol.
But if a conveyance of title by Mrs. Ayres was claimed, the law of estoppel would apply and defeat her defense, even in case of a homestead: Knaggs v. Mastín, supra; 14 Ohio St., 454; 15 N. Y., 47. But here this very property was under mortgage, and about to be sacrificed at sale on foreclosure, and the money raised on this loan was used to pay off such prior mortgage. Now, Ayres and his wife claim the right, (or more properly the second mortgagee Sutter does,) to say that Probasco has no lien, because when this mortgage was sent out on its mission for their relief, it was not known from whom the relief was to come, and that, although the relief was afforded by Probasco, just as desired, was accepted and used by the Ayres, and the Symns mortgage thereby extinguished, that he shall lose his money in order that Ayres and wife may mortgage the place to Sutter.
3. On the question of usury. The notes were given in December 1871, and payable in one and two years. The amount 'of principal specified in the notes was $1,100, and the rate of interest, 12 per cent. In December 1871, the law of 1868 (ch. 51 of Gen. Stat.,) was in force. On June 20th, 1872, §§ 2, 3, 4 were repealed without any saving clause, and a new rule of recovery established. (Laws of 1872, p. 284.) It was claimed that only $1,000 was in fact loaned, and that the extra $100 was for compensation to Challiss for his services in raising the money. If so, there was no usury: 14 Conn., 594; 30 Conn., 178; 38 N. Y., 281. The repeal in June 1872 was constitutional, and the law of 1872 governed, as held by the district court: Cooley Const! Lim., 374; 28 Conn., 101; 7 Blackf., 474; 18 Ind., 258; 15 N. Y., 151.

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Valentine, J.:
This was an action on two promissory notes and a mortgage. The notes were executed by William M. Ayres alone. The mortgage was executed (as it appears upon its face) 'by both Ayres and his wife, Melissa T. Ayres, and both the notes and the mortgage were executed to Richard Probasco. Probasco was the plaintiff in the court below, and Ayres and wife, Frank Sutter, and W. L. Challiss were the defendants. The defendant. Ayres and wife set up as defenses to the action that the notes were usurious, and the mortgage was void. The transactions connected with the execution and delivery of said notes and mortgage were, so far as they are necessary to be stated, substantially as follows: Mrs. Ayres owned, and she and her husband occupied as a part of their homestead, the W.J of the S.E.J of section 18 in township 4, of range 21 east, in Doniphan county, less ten acres out of the southwest corner of said land. Said land was mortgaged to one A. B. Symns, who was foreclosing his mortgage in the district court of Doniphan county, and the land was about to be sold to satify said Symns' mortgage. B. O'Driscoll was the attorney for Ayres and wife in said foreclosure suit. In order to save their land from being sacrificed, Ayres and wife concluded to try to borrow the money and pay off the mortgage. O'Driscoll acted as their agent in attempting to procure and negotiate the loan. He had an interview with W. L. Challiss, of Atchison, about the matter, and from what transpired they all expected to borrow the money of Challiss. They expected to borrow $1,000, and to pay interest thereon at the z'ate of fifteen per cent, per annum. O'Driscoll furnished an ordinary printed blank mortgage, and Ayres and wife signed and acknowledged the same before E. W. Stratton, a justice of the peace of Doniphan county. O'Driscoll and Ayres then took said blank mortgage to Atchison, and went to the office of said W. L. Challiss. Challiss however was not loaning money for himself, but was loaning money for Richard Probasco, of Maryland. He required a greater rate of interest than fifteen per cent, per annum. O'Driscoll and Ayres finally agreed to the terms proposed by Challiss, and Ayres executed his two promissory notes which read as follows:
"$550.00. Atchison, Kas., Dec. 1,1871.
" One year after date I promise to pay to Richard Probasco, or bearer, five hundred and fifty dollars, value received, payable at Exchange Bank, with interest at 12 per cent, per annum from date until paid, and payable semi-annually.
"William M. Ayres."
The other note is precisely the same as the above, except that it is made payable in "two years after date," instead of in one. The two notes together amounted to $1,100. O'Dris coll and-Challiss then filled up the said blank mortgage so as to make it correspond with said notes, and so as to make it a security for the payment of said notes, O'Driscoll doing the principal part of the writing. They filled up the blank for the description of the land with the same land that hád prior to that time been mortgaged to Symns; and they made Probasco the mortgagee. The notes and the mortgage were then delivered to Challiss, as the agent of Probasco, and in consideration therefor Challiss paid Ayres $1,000, and only $1,000. Ayres, being present all the time, agreed to all that was done/ and ratified and qonfirmed the same. He therefore has no right to raise any question of mere irregularity in the execution of said mortgage. But the question of the execution of said mortgage is one of power, and not a question of mere irregularity, as we shall presently see. After Ayres received said money from Challiss he paid off the mortgage to Symns therewith. The notes and the mortgage to Probasco are the instruments upon which the present suit is brought.
Ayres and wife now claim that said mortgage is void, and that said notes are tainted with usury, and these are the main questions in the case. It is true that a vast number of other questions are raised, but they are mainly technical and frivolous. For instance, the first question raised, , ' (both iu tms court and in the court below,) is# upon the ground that the court below allowed the plaintiff to ask O'Driscoll a leading question. Five such questions are raised in this court, and seven such questions were raised in the court below. Indeed, the defendants even objected to the plaintiff asking the defendant Ayres a leading question, although it was asked in a legitimate cross-examination of said Ayres. We have already stated something of the connection which O'Driscoll had with the transactions out of which this cause of action arose. O'Driscoll was also the attorney for Ayres and wife in this case in the court below. He was called as a witness for the plaintiff below. He did not show himself to be a "fast witness" for the plaintiff, but on the contrary plainly showed himself to be obviously the reverse. Yet notwithstanding all this, seven different questions that were put to him by the plaintiff were objected to-by the defendants on the ground that they were "leading." Some of them were leading; but still there was scarcely the remotest possibility that the witness could be led, either from inclination on his part or from inadvertence, into testifying too favorably for the plaintiff. His evidence abundantly shows this. The court therefore did not err in permitting leading questions to be put to him. Indeed, it possibly would have been an abuse of judicial discretion if the court had refused to permit such questions to be aske^l.
We will now pass from the many immaterial and unsubstantial questions raised by the defendants below to the more material ones. The whole of the transactions out of which this cause of action arose, were oarrie(j on anc[ consummated on the part of Probasco through his agent Challiss. Therefore, whatever came to the knowledge of Challiss, pending the negotiations for said loan, must be presumed to have come to the knowledge of Probaseo. Notice to the agent is notice to the principal, in such a case. Greer v. Higgins, 8 Kas., 519; 1 Parsons on Contracts, 74. And delivery of the notes and mortgage to Challiss, was delivery to Probaseo. Challiss was really standing in the place of Probaseo in every particular.
Were said notes usurious? Certainly they were. Only $1,000 was loaned, although the notes were given for $1,100. And while under our statutes the highest rate of interest allowed to be contracted for is' only twelve per cent, per annum on the amount of the debt or loan, yet in this case interest at the rate of twelve per cent, per annum was contracted for on an amount greater than the amount loaned. Twelve per cent, interest on $1,100 is more than twelve per cent, interest on $1,000. Twelve per cent, interest on $1,100 is equal to thirteen and two-tenths per cent, interest on $1,000. In 1871, when these notes were executed, all interest was forfeited if the parties contracted for more than the highest rate of interest allowed by law. (Gen. Stat., 526, ch. 51, §4.) And the laws in force, when these notes were executed is the law that now governs, although a subsequent law (Laws of 1872, page 284,) has been passed by the legislature. (Jenness v. Cutler, 12 Kas., 500, 510 to 512.)
Is said mortgage void? We are reluctantly compelled to answer this question in the affirmative. Mrs. Ayres never executed said mortgage. She signed and acknowledged a paper, but this paper in legal effect was nothing. It was just such a blank mortgage as mav be purchased at almost any printing office for a few cents. At the time 'she signed and acknowledged the same she had never heard of Richard Probasco. She did not expect the mortgage to be so filled up as to make him the mortgagee. Nor did she expect to have it filled up so as to make it a security for the payment of any sum greater than $1,000. She expected to have the mortgage filled up so as to make W. L. Challiss the mortgagee, and so as to secure the payment of just $1,000. This it may be said she authorized to have done. But even this-authority was given by her only by parol. She never authorized in writing any portion of said mortgage to be filled up. It was therefore not her mortgage, even when filled up. An estate in land is usually transferred by deed. An interest in land less than an estate may probably be transferred by, a simple contract in writing. But no interest in land, if it is to continue for more than one year, whether it be an estate or less than an estate, can be transferred except in writing or by operation of law. (Statute of Frauds, Gen. Stat., 505, ch. 43, § 5.) And if the transfer is to be made through an agent, the agent must be authorized in writing; (Id.) It is true, an owner of real ° ' ' ' estate may by parol authorize an agent to make a simple contract concerning such real estate which will bind the owner personally; (Rottman v. Wasson, 5 Kas., 552;) but in such a case no interest in the land is transferred from the owner to the agent, or from the agent to the person with whom the agent contracts. No interest in the land passes from the owner to any one, and the person with whom the agent contracts gets no interest in the land. If the contract is broken by the owner, the remedy of the other party is an action against the owner personally, either for the specific performance of the contract, or for damages. There is a vast difference between authorizing an agent to transfer an interest in land, and authorizing him to make a contract which will have the effect to compel the owner of the land personally to transfer at some future time such interest. The agent cannot be authorized to do the first by parol: (see said § 5 of the Statute of Frauds.) But he may be authorized to do the second by parol: (Rottman v. Wasson, supra.) Now, a mortgage of real estate, although it may not be technically an estate in land, yet it certainly is an interest in land. It is in form a conveyance, and is in fact, a lien that may be paramount to any subsequent conveyance, lien, or incumbrance. It is an incipient and conditional alienation of the estate that may eventually overturn and destroy the homestead interest of the mortgagor, and may wholly absorb and swallow up every other right or interest which he may have in the mortgaged premises. It is indefinite in its duration. It is coexistent and co-extensive. with the debt which it is made to secure; and nothing but the extinguishment of the debt will destroy it. In the present case, one of the notes which the mortgage was made to secure, was to run two years before it became due. Therefore, as a mortgage of real estate creates an interest in the land of indefinite duration, even if Mrs. Ayres had authorized O'Driscoll or her husband by parol to fill up said blank mortgage, as it afterward was filled up, the authority would have been void. Upon this proposition the authorities in the different states' are conflicting; or at least, the law upon this subject is different in the different states, as shown by the decisions thereof. But the great preponderance of authority, both in this country and in England, lays down the doctrine as we have stated it. See the following authorities: Burnes v. Lynde, 6 Allen, 305; Preston v. Hull, 23 Grattan, 600; People v. Organ, 27 Ill., 27; Ingram v. Little, 14 Geo., 173; Upton v. Archer, 41 Cal., 85; McMurtry v. Frank, 4 Monroe, 435; Cummins v. Casserly, 5 B. Mon., 75; Williams v. Crutcher, 5 How., (Miss.) 71; Mosby v. State of Ark., 4 Sneed, (Tenn.) 324; Graham v. Holt, 3 Iredell (N.C.) Law, 300; Byers v. McClanahan, 6 Gill & J., 250; Blood v. Goodrich, 9 Wend., 68; 12 Wend., 525; Worrell v. Munn, 5 N. Y., 229, 239; Cross v. State Bank, 5 Pike, (Ark.) 525; Ayers v. Horness, 1 Ohio, 368; Perminter v. McDaniel, 1 Hill, (S.C.) 267.
Is Mrs. Ayres estopped from denying that said mortgage is her mortgage? We think not. This case is obviously dissimilar from the case of Knaggs v. Mastin, (9 Kas., 532, 548, et seq.) It may be just as immoral for Ayres and wife to claim that their mortgage is void, as it was for Knaggs and wife to claim that their deed was void; but still there are distinctions between the two cases which render them very dissimilar from each other. The instrument in this case was not filled up as Mrs. Ayres had directed that it should be filled up, while the instrument in the other case was filled up just as Mrs. Knaggs had directed. And the mortgagee in this case, through his agent Challiss, was perfectly cognizant of all the facts connected with the execution of the mortgage at the time the mortgage was delivered to him, and at the time he parted with his money, while the grantee in the other ease was wholly ignorant of all the irregularities in the execution of said deed at the time the deed was delivered to him, and at the time he parted with his money, and for a long time afterward. Both Mrs. Ayres and Mrs. Knaggs enjoyed the benefit of the money, or a portion thereof, procured by means of their respective instruments, and in this respect only (so far as any foundation for equitable estoppel is concerned,) are the two cases similar. But merely enjoying the benefit of money, procured irregularly and wrongfully, is not of itself a sufficient ground upon which to found an equitable estoppel, so as thereby to make what would otherwise be a void deed or mortgage a valid instrument. A party invoking the aid of estoppel must himself show that he has been vigilant and careful in the protection of his own rights and interests. Where a person negligently or knowingly puts it within the power of some other person to swindle and defraud him, and he is thereby swindled and defrauded, he is generally allowed to suffer the consequences of his own negligence and folly. Neither the courts nor the law can undertake to protect men of sound mind from all the consequences of their own negligence and follies. The rule of estoppel in pais will be found stated in the case of Clark v. Coolidge, 8 Kas., 189, 196. Mr. Probasco ought to have said, through his agent Challiss, when O'Driscoll and Ayres desired to borrow said money from him, and offered to deliver said mortgage to him, "I know that mortgage is void, as a mortgage of Mrs. Ayres; I will therefore not receive it. You must furnish me a better' mortgage if you want the money."
If said mortgage had been on the property of Ayres, and on any other property than the homestead of Ayres and wife, it would have been valid as to Ayres, although void as to his wife. But this mortgage was on the property of Mrs. Ayres, and on property occupied as the homestead of herself and husband. Is the mortgage therefor valid as to Ayres, (the husband,) or is it absolutely void? We think it is absolutely void. (Const. of Kas., art. 15, § 9; Morris v. Ward, 5 Kas., 239; Dollman v. Harris, 5 Kas., 597.) A mortgage is a contingent alienation of the mortgaged premises. It is a lien thereon that may finally engulf and swallow up the whole estate. And such alienation ctm only be effected, and the lien created, by the joint consent of the husband and wife. (Const., art. 15, § 9, and cases above cited.) Now as Mrs. Ayres did not give her consent to said mortgage, it is void as to her; and, being void as to her, it must also necessarily be void as to her husband, there being no joint consent of the husband and wife. This virtually leaves Probasco without any security on his notes, so far as the case is now presented to us. It is true, that Challiss received from Ayres, as collateral security, two other notes, given by Lloyd McNamee to Ayres on the purchase by McNamee of another portion of the Ayres homestead, which notes were merely delivered to Challiss without indorsement, (McCrum v. Corby, 11 Kas., 465, 470.) And as Ayres and wife had never made a deed to McNamee for the premises, Ayres made a deed to Challiss therefor, in order to enable Challiss to make a deed to McNamee for the premises, and then to collect the McNamee notes. But as this deed was executed by Ayres alone, and for a portion of his homestead, it was also void. And.as Ayres and wife now refuse to make a good deed to either Challiss or to McNamee, or to any one else on said sale to McNamee, said collateral security may not be worth very much. As McNamee was not made a party to this suit, and as there has not been any sufficient showing as to whether Ayres and wife could.be compelled to make a good deed .for said premises to McNamee, we cannot tell whether Challiss and Probasco may have said premises sold to satisfy the McNamee notes and the proceeds thereof applied in payment or part payment of the notes given by Ayres to Probasco. (Stevens v. Chadwick, 10 Kas., 406.) The only judgment that could be rendered in this case in favor of Probasco, as the case is now presented to us, would be a personal judgment against William M. Ayres for the amount of the first note, without interest. Perhaps however, upon a second trial, with the pleadings amended, and other evidence introduced, and other findings made, other and additional relief may be granted to the plaintiff Probasco.
The judgment of the court below will be reversed, and cause remanded for a new trial.
Kingman, C. J., concurring.