Case Name: Irvine v. Robertson, &c.
Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
Jurisdiction: Virginia
Decision Date: 1825-11-12
Citations: 3 Rand. 549
Docket Number: 
Parties: *Irvine v. Robertson, &c.
Judges: 
Reporter: Virginia Reports
Volume: 24
Pages: 700–702

Head Matter:
*Irvine v. Robertson, &c.
November, 1825.
Accounts — Acquiescence in — Effect. —where Sealings are baa between merchant and planter, for a number of years, accounts rendered from year to year, balances struck. &c., and the planter pays up the balance duefrom him: such accounts, after an acquiescence for an unreasousonable length of time, will be a bar to any future settlement.
This was an appeal from the Chancery Court of Eynchburg; where William Irvine brought a suit against Archibald Robertson, only acting executor of William Brown, deceased, and surviving partner of Brown and Robertson, Boyd Miller, and Samuel Read.
The bill states, that the complainant, in the year 179 — , entered into a verbal agreement with William Brown, as the agent or partner of the mercantile house of William Hart & Co. by which it was stipulated, that the plaintiff should receive his supplies of goods from the said Brown, and deliver, in return, his agricultural products: that the said Brown promised that the plaintiff should be placed on a footing as advantageous as that of the most favorite customer; and that the prices of the goods furnished should be as low, and those of the products received in return, as high, as if they were delivered to, or received from, any other person whatsoever: that under this agreement, the plaintiff received all his supplies from the said Brown, which he could furnish, and delivered all his disposable produce to him, for many years; leaving the accounts of quantities to be kept, and the prices to be fixed, by the said Brown: that in the progress of years, the concern in which the said Brown was interested, underwent various changes in name, of which the plaintiff knew nothing at the time: that these transactions continued, as if no such changes had taken place; the plaintiff regarding the said Brown as the substantial person with whom he dealt: that from the commencement of the dealings, on the terms before stated, until the final termination, no settlement ever took place: that ’-'bills of particulars were furnished from time to time to the plaintiff, which his unbounded confidence induced him to lay aside, without scrutiny; and whether they are correct or not, he does not know: that about the year 18 — , the plaintiff discovered, that in his transactions with other customers of the concern, the said Brown was ill the habit of allowing larger prices for tobacco than had been credited to him, though before that time tobacco sold, not by the quality, but by the inspection: that the plaintiff endeavored in vain to obtain a settlement upon correct principles: that the said Brown, afterwards, formed a connex-ion with a certain Archibald Robertson, who carried on business under the style of Brown and Robertson; and the plaintiff dealt with them to a considerable amount: that when the plaintiff pressed for a settlement, the said Robertson proposed to allow him fifty dollars as a full satisfaction for his whole claim, justly amounting to several thousand dollars: that upon this, the plaintiff withdrew all connexion with the said firm: that the said Brown died, leaving the said Robertson one of his executors, who is now the only acting one: that Robertson, as surviving partner of the firm of Brown and Robertson, instituted a suit for the balance of the account due from the plaintiff to the said firm, and recovered a judgment for upwards of 9001.: that the plaintiff being prevented, at law, from going into the state of the transactions with the preceding partnership, though the said Robertson holds in his hands their funds, being not only executor of Brown, but agent and receiver of Boyd Miller, the surviving partner, as it is said, of William Brown & Co. and who resides in Great Britain: that the changes in the designation of the concerns were but nominal, and there was the same succession of interest, and the same parties were concerned, though not named, when the firm of Brown & Robertson commenced. The bill, therefore, prayed, that the said Robertson might be compelled to exhibit the books of the various concerns in his possession: that an account might be taken before a master, relative to *all the plaintiff’s dealings, and just and proper allowances made for his produce, and for interest-on the balances: and that the said Robertson might be injoined from proceeding on the said judgment, it being in reality for the benefit of William Brown & Co. &c.
An injunction was awarded until the further order of the Coitrt, upon the plaintiff’s releasing errors, &c.
Robertson answered, admitting that the plaintiff commenced dealings, many years before, with a firm of which William Brown was a partner, and continued those dealings with the various successions of firms, which the accounts exhibited indicate; but he denied, that the several changes in the names of those firms, were changes in names only, and not in partners. He admitted, however, that as it regarded the plaintiff’s accounts, all the various firms, from the commencement to the firm of William Brown & Co. might be considered as one, because the accounts of each preceding firm were regularly transferred to the succeeding. In all these firms, the respondent had no interest whatever. The firm of Brown & Robertson was a distinct firm. In that, the respondent had an actual, not a nominal, interest. He had no knowledge of the contract between the plaintiff and Brown, as set forth in the bill, by which the former was to be put on the footing of the most favored customer. The account between the plaintiff and the firm of Wills am Brown & Co. and the preceding firms, were, as the respondent believed, frequently settled between them; as the accounts exhibited by the plaintiff, would shew. No injustice was done to the plaintiff, by allowing him credits for his tobacco, at smaller prices than he was entitled to. The respondent protested against the propriety of opening the account between the plaintiff and William Brown & Co. after this great lapse of time, &c.
The accounts were referred to a commissioner.
The other defendants answered.
*The commissioner reported a balance due to Irvine, and the defendants excepted.
The Court dissolved the injunction; and on a hearing, dismissed the plaintiff’s bill, on the ground that, admitting the allegation of the bill, “no settlement ever took place;” yet as it. is thereby admitted, that the accounts referred to were rendered from time to time, to the plaintiff, and that he held the possession of them, until they were filed as a part of the present bill, without making-any objection, he should not, at this distance of time, be allowed, under all the circumstances of this case, to complain; but should be regarded as having consented to the accounts, as correct.
Heigh, for the appellant,
contested the principle on which the Chancellor decided this cause, and cited Roberts v. Ruffin, 2 Atk. 113; Vernon v. Vowdrey, lb. 119; Brownell v. Brownell, 2 Bro. C. C. 62; Gilb. Equ. Rep. 224, cited 1 Bridg. Lnd. Account, V. pi. 130; Pomfret v. Windsor, 2 Ves. jr. 483, 5; Shearman v. Shearman, 2 Vern. 276; Tickell v. Short, 2 Ves. jr. 239; Willis v. Jernegan, 2 Atk. 252; 4 Bac. Abr. “Limitations,” E. 3, page 478; 2 Wms. Saund. 127, (n) (b.) On a careful examination of these authorities, he insisted that the principle on which the Chancellor decided the case, would be found inapplicable to it.
Johnson, for the appellees,
cited Chap-pedelain v. Deschenaux, 4 Cranch, 306.
The rest of the argument turned on the evidence, and the correctness of the commissioner’s report upon the facts proved.
*November 12.
The principal case is cited in Robertson v. Wright, 17 Gratt. 542; Perry v. Clarke, 77 Va. 409.

Opinion:
The PRESIDENT,
delivered the opinion of the. Court:
This is not the case of mutual accounts kept by the parties, and adjusted and set- tied from .time to time; but the circumstances belonging to it present a case equally strong. The accounts were altogether kept by the several firms with which the plaintiff had dealings; but they were rendered to the plaintiff from year to year, from the year 1793 to the year 1807, the balances ~ struck, and additional credits given for short credits in the price of produce delivered by the plaintiff, interest, &c.; within which period, in 1806, he, in anger, left off his dealings; and in August, 1807, paid $700, which was nearly the balance of the account exhibited; from all which, it is strongly to be inferred, that the parties consented to them. However that might be, it was his duty to examine them; and if he had objections, to make them; the mpre especially, at the times when the firm with- which he dealt was changed, and the balance carried to the books of the new firm, except in the last instance. These accounts, therefore, ought to be considered in the nature of mutual accounts, kept by the parties, and settled; and subject to the settled rule in such cases, that such accounts, after an unreasonable lapse of time, unexplained by circumstances, (which ought to be very strong,) are a bar to any future settlements. To keep them up, some of them for more than twenty years, and all of them for more than ten years, was an acquiescence on the part of the plaintiff, which ought not to be retracted.
Without agreeing, therefore, with the Chancellor, that the rendition of accounts by the merchant, from year to' year, was a settlement of accounts, the Court is of opinion to affirm the decree.