Case Name: J.W. Morris v. State of Indiana
Court: Supreme Court of Indiana
Jurisdiction: Indiana
Decision Date: 1980-01-29
Citations: 272 Ind. 467
Docket Number: No. 779S183
Parties: J.W. Morris v. State of Indiana.
Judges: DeBruler and Prentice, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Indiana Reports
Volume: 272
Pages: 467–477

Head Matter:
J.W. Morris v. State of Indiana.
[No. 779S183.
Filed January 29, 1980.
Rehearing denied April 1, 1980.]
Irma Hampton Nave, of Anderson, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Stephen J. Cuthbert, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.

Opinion:
Hunter, J.
Defendant, J. W. Morris, was convicted by a jury of murder, Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1 (Burns 1979 Repl.), and sentenced to forty years' imprisonment. He now appeals raising several issues. However, because of our disposition of defendant's Fourth Amendment claim, we need consider only that issue.
In the early morning, November 25,1978, David Upton, III, was shot and killed near his home in Muncie, Indiana. Prior to the shooting, a shotgun blast was discharged in the direction of a window to a bedroom of Upton's house in which defendant's father was staying. At approximately 2:00 a.m., Muncie police picked up defendant for questioning. At that time police did not know whether defendant was the perpetrator of the crime or a witness. Deputy Chief LeRoy Hahn testified that defendant
"was one of the subjects we had reason to believe that may or may not have been in the area. And I wanted a statement from him as to where he was at, his actions and so forth."
In fairness to the state, it appears that on this occasion defendant voluntarily accompanied police to the police station for questioning. Another Muncie police officer, Steven Stanley, in response to defense counsel's questioning, testified in the following manner:
Q. "You didn't advise him of his right not to even go with you?"
A. "Who?"
Q. "My client?"
A. "Yes I did ma'am, inside the house. I advised him that he was going of his own free will and he didn't have to go if he didn't want to."
Q. "Did you tell him he didn't have to talk to you?
A. "I didn't ask him any questions. I just ask [sic] the man if [he] would accompany me of his own free will to talk to Detectives.
Although defendant was at the police station for nearly three hours before being questioned and up to seven hours total, he did not give an inculpatory statement. Therefore, any Fourth Amendment violation by Muncie police associated with defendant's first trip to the police station had, in and of itself, no effect on the trial. Besides, defendant's statement indicates he voluntarily accompanied the police.
However, the very next morning police picked up defendant for questioning again. The state, in its brief, states only that "defendant was transported to the police station again." The record does not indicate that this trip was voluntary. The examination of Sergeant Shane McClellan included the following:
Q. "He was picked up by the police department and brought down there?"
A. "He was picked up by 2 investigators, yes."
There is no testimony as to what was said to defendant at the time he was picked up the second time. However, Sergeant McClellan stated:
"And when we met the next morning that's when we decided to pick J.W. and Dana up, John Jones up, [to] reinterview them about the statements that had already been made."
This statement indicates that the decision to bring defendant J.W. Morris in was made by the police and was not a voluntary decision made by defendant. Within three hours of his arrest defendant signed a rights waiver, made inculpatory statements and led police to physical evidence. Defendant was then placed in jail. The next day at approximately 11:00 a.m., defendant asked to talk to another police officer and modified his previous statement, placing more blame on his alleged accomplice.
At no time during the above events did police have an arrest warrant. Prior to defendant's second statement there is no indication that the police had probable cause to obtain an arrest warrant. Indeed the evidence reveals that police used the arrest and detention of defendant as an investigatory tool. Again we quote from the testimony of Sergeant McClellan:
Q. "Was he under arrest at that time?"
A. "He was advised he was a suspect."
Q. "But was he under arrest?"
A. "He hadn't been charged."
Q. "Did you have any grounds for charging him at that time he signed the rights waiver?"
A. "The investigation was still on and going at that time."
Q. "Okay. Did you ask him if he understood that?"
A. "Yes."
Q. "What did he say."
A. "He did. He knowed that he did by signing it."

Q. "I believe you stated . I guess it would be on cross-examination by Mr. Alexander, that you considered J. W. Morris a suspect. I believe those are the words you used."
A. "I think I probably said that. I wasn't happy with the investigation and the statements that had already been taken, that's the reason why and the information that I'd gained, I felt like yes he was a suspect."

Q. "At the time he was arrested did you have an arrest warrant?"
A. "No."
Q. "Did you attempt to get an arrest warrant?"
A. "No."
Q. "Why not?"
A. "Case was still under investigation."
A warrantless arrest not supported by probable cause is unlawful. Morgan v. State, (1926) 197 Ind. 374, 151 N.E. 98.
The evidence is not in dispute regarding the proper advisement of defendant's rights under Miranda v. Arizona, (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, prior to all questioning in this case. However, even if a confession is voluntary under the Fifth Amendment and Miranda and its progeny, that confession must be suppressed if it is the product of an unlawful arrest or detention. Brown v. Illinois, (1975) 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416; Williams v. State, (1976) 264 Ind. 664, 348 N.E.2d 623.
In Brown v. Illinois, supra, the United States Supreme Court was unanimous in the conclusion that the Illinois Supreme Court was incorrect in holdingthat Miranda warnings, per se, rendered the defendant's statements admissible. Rather, when an arrest is unlawful, as in the case at bar, the Supreme Court will look to whether any subsequent statement or production of evidence "was sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint of the unlawful invasion." Wong Sun v. United States, (1963) 371 U.S. 471, 486, 83 S.Ct. 407, 416-7, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 454. Justice Brennan framed the issue in Wong Sun as follows:
"the more apt question in such a case is 'Whether,, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at the exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.' Maguire, Evidence of Guilt, 221, (1959)." 371 U.S. at 488, 83 S.Ct. at 417, 9 L. Ed. 2d at 455.
Justice Blackmun, writing the opinion of the Court in Brown v. Illinois, supra, indicated that in rejecting the Illinois Court's per se rule, the Supreme Court would not adopt a per se or "but for" rule of its own.
"The question whether a confession is the product of a free will under Wong Sun must be answered on the facts of each case. No single fact is dispositive. The workings of the human mind are too complex, and the possibilities of misconduct too diverse, to permit protection of the Fourth Amendment to turn on such a talismanic test. The Miranda warnings are an important factor, to be sure, in determining whether the confession is obtained by exploitation of an illegal arrest. But they are not the only factor to be considered. The temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession, the presence of intervening circumstances, and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct are all relevant." 422 U.S. at 603-4, 95 S. Ct. at 2261-2, 45 L. Ed. 2d at 427. [Citations and footnotes omitted.]
The facts in the Brown case are remarkably similar to those in the case at bar. Brown gave his first statement less than two hours after the unlawful arrest and there were no intervening circumstances of significance. Furthermore, the Court noted:
"The illegality here, moreover, had a quality of purposefulness. The impropriety of the arrest was obvious; awareness of that fact was virtually conceded by the two detectives when they repeatedly acknowledged, in their testimony, that the purpose of their action was 'for investigation' or for 'questioning.'... The arrest, both in design and in execution, was investigatory. The detectives embarked upon this expedition for evidence in the hope that something might turn up. The manner in which Brown's arrest was effected gives the appearance of having been calculated to cause surprise, fright, and confusion. 422 U.S. at 605, 95 S.Ct. at 2262, 45 L.Ed.2d at 428.
In this case, defendant J. W. Morris turned over evidence and gave an inculpatory statement, all within three hours of his arrest on November 26,1978. The arrest was made with neither a warrant nor probable cause. There were no intervening circumstances of significance between the arrest and production of evidence and statement. There was no "quality of opennes" about defendant's detention and defendant had no contact with the outside world as in Fortson v. State, (1979) 270 Ind. 289, 385 N.E.2d 429. We are cognizant
"that a distinction should be made between flagrant violations by the police, on the one hand, and technical, trivial, or inadvertent violations, on the other." Brewer v. Williams, (1977) 430 U.S. 387, 414n, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 1247n, 51 L.Ed.2d 424, 446n. (Justice Marshall concurring.)
But the violations by the police in this case are not technical or trivial, but rather, as in Brown, the violations had a "quality of purposefulness." Concerning the purpose of the interrogation of defendant when he voluntarily accompanied police, Deputy Chief Hahn testified, "Yes, we were pursuing an investigation, that's what we were all there for." Sergeant McClellan indicated that investigation was the purpose of defendant's arrest on November 26.
The burden of showing admissibility of evidence rests with the state. Brown v. Illinois, supra. We find that the state failed to carry that burden in this case.
Defendant has challenged the admissibility of physical evidence, shotgun parts and a bag, as well as the statements. The United States Supreme Court rejected any distinction between physical and verbal evidence under the exclusionary rule in Wong Sun, supra. The rule of Brown v. Illinois, is clearly applicable to physical evidence. See United States v. Watson, (1976) 423 U.S. 411, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 and Gamble v. State of Oklahoma, (10th Cir. 1978) 583 F.2d 1161.
The state claims the shotgun was admissible because "the evidence reveals that defendant, himself, took the officers to his back yard and produced the evidence and gave it to them." The state does not point to the portion of the record which supports this statement. Our search of the record yields only the following evidence of the trip to defendant's residence.
Q. "Okay. Now between the time the rights waiver was signed and the time the statement was taken, was J.W. Morris continuously at police headquarters or was there a time when he left?"
A. "No sir we left with J. W. Morris."
Q. "Okay, who is 'we'?"
A. "[Sergeant] Gene Hayden and myself."
Q. "And where did you go?"
A. "We went to J.W.f's] house.

Q. "Okay and what did you do there?"
A. "We drove down the alley to the rear of the property and we recovered a shotgun which was in a doghouse behind some pile of wood."
Q. "When you say 'we recovered' who physical [sic] went and got it?"
A. "J. W. Morris."
Q. "How did you know to go there in the first place?"
A. "J.W. Morris told us where the gun was."
It appears from this portion of the record and from the custom of the Muncie police in this case that defendant, while in police custody, was driven to his home by the police in a police squad car. Furthermore, the above testimony indicates that the knowledge of the location of the physical evidence was the fruit of verbal communications of defendant made during his unlawful detention. Again the state failed to carry its burden of showing the admissibility of the evidence.
The trial court erred in admitting into evidence state's exhibits 3, 4, 5,6, C, N, O, P and Q, in denying defendant's motion to suppress said exhibits and in overruling defendant's objections with regard thereto. For this reason, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause is remanded with instructions to grant defendant a new trial to be conducted in a manner not inconsistent with this opinion.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
DeBruler and Prentice, JJ., concur.
Givan, C.J., dissents with opinion in which Pivarnik, J., concurs.
. At trial the state was careful not to characterize defendant's detention as an arrest. The United States Supreme Court has addressed this point:
"[T]he detention of petitioner was in important respects indistinguishable from a traditional arrest. Petitioner was not questioned briefly where he was found. Instead, he was taken from a neighbor's home to a police car, transported to a police station, and placed in an interrogation room. He was never informed that he was 'free to go'; indeed, he would have been physically restrained if he had refused to accompany the officers or had tried to escape their custody." Dunaway v. New York, (1979) 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 2256, 60 L. Ed. 2d 824, 835-6.
While there is no evidence here that defendant would have been restrained, neither is there any evidence that he was free to go.
. A three-hour detention was not sufficient to purge the primary taint of the unlawful arrest in United States v. Perez-Esparza, (9th Cir. 1979) 26 Cr.L. 2204.