Case Name: COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY Appellant, v. Lloyd A. PRIDDY Appellee
Court: Supreme Court of Kentucky
Jurisdiction: Kentucky
Decision Date: 2005-12-22
Citations: 184 S.W.3d 501
Docket Number: No. 2003-SC-000041-DG
Parties: COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY Appellant, v. Lloyd A. PRIDDY Appellee.
Judges: GRAVES, JOHNSTONE, ROACH, WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., concur.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Third Series
Volume: 184
Pages: 501–521

Head Matter:
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY Appellant, v. Lloyd A. PRIDDY Appellee.
No. 2003-SC-000041-DG.
Supreme Court of Kentucky.
Dec. 22, 2005.
Rehearing Denied March 23, 2006.
Gregory D. Stumbo, Attorney General, Janine Coy Bowden, Assistant Attorney General, Frankfort, Counsel for Appellant.
Donna Boyce, Appellate Branch Manager, Department of Public Advocacy, Frankfort, Counsel for Appellee.

Opinion:
SCOTT, Justice.
I. INTRODUCTION
Appellee, Lloyd A. Priddy, sought to suppress the fruits of a search of his person by a police officer during the course of a stop of his vehicle. In denying the motion, the trial court made findings — which Appellee argues were contained only in the uniform citation issued by the officer — that the stop, and thus the search, was justified pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). The citation had been filed in the court record and was used and referred to in the hearing by the parties and the court, but it was never formally filed as an exhibit to any record created for the hearing.
Not having been filed of record in the hearing, the Appellee argues the officer's written statement in his citation could not be relied on for the court's findings of facts.
Since the citation was used (and testified to) during the hearing, it was not error for the court to have considered its contents, even though, through fair inference, the officer's actual testimony covered the same information.
Even so, the trial court's ruling was correct since the information (personally given to the officer by a citizen in the area) was sufficient to support an "articulable suspicion" that criminal activity was afoot and thus justified the stop of the Appel-lee's car and the subsequent search of his person. Where a citizen exposes himself to an officer, in a face-to-face meeting, who then has the opportunity to evaluate the citizen's demeanor during the relay of the information, further "predictive evaluation" of the information is not an absolute requirement, as a citizen is not evaluated as a "confidential informant or anonymous tipster."
II. BACKGROUND
In the evening of September 4, 1999, Officer Michael R. Koenig was traveling on the Outer Loop in Louisville en route to a domestic disturbance on Third Street, when he was flagged down by a citizen who told him a six foot tall, 170 pound white male with shoulder-length, black, curly hair, driving a late 1970s model black Ford truck with primer on the hood — was in the K-mart parking lot on 191 Outer Loop and was about to conduct a drug transaction. Officer Koenig then immediately left the citizen and proceeded to the K-mart parking lot, which was only a few minutes away, and observed the vehicle and male driver exactly as described and, as he testified, "confirmed my information from the informant." Appellee however, argues that the actual testimony from Officer Koenig established only that when he arrived the vehicle was exiting the parking lot.
Officer Koenig then followed and stopped the vehicle and noted Appellee's frantic movement in the vehicle and once backup arrived, asked the Appellee to exit his truck. Upon observing and inquiring about a large bulge in Appellee's front pants pocket, the Appellee stated it was a crack pipe, which Officer Koenig then took possession of. After recovering the pipe and noting the residue therein, Appellee was arrested. A subsequent search of Ap-pellee's pockets revealed methamphetamine in a cigarette package.
Appellee pled guilty to First-Degree Possession of a Controlled Substance, Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, and No Motor Vehicle Insurance. He also admitted to being a Second-Degree Persistent Felony Offender and received an enhanced five-year sentence on the Possession of a Controlled Substance charge. The misdemeanor charges, Possession of Drug Paraphernalia and No Motor Vehicle Insurance ran concurrently with the felony charge for a total sentence of five years imprisonment.
Appellee's guilty plea was conditioned on his right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion, in which he had argued that the crack pipe and methamphetamine should be suppressed because the stop violated his Fourth Amendment rights. He contended that the initial corroboration of only his description and location, provided by the "tipster," did not provide Officer Koenig with a "reasonable and articulable suspicion" that criminal activity was afoot.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress as based on clearly erroneous factual findings, finding that in reaching its decision, the trial court relied on statements in the uniform citation, which had not been offered, or admitted, into evidence. The Court of Appeals further reasoned that without reference to the citation, there was insufficient evidence to support a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. We granted discretionary review on the Commonwealth's Petition.
III. ANALYSIS
A. TRIAL COURT'S RELIANCE ON CITATION
When reviewing the outcome of a suppression hearing regarding a warrantless search, this Court employs the standard of review enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996).
[A]s a general matter determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be reviewed de novo on appeal. Having said this, we hasten to point out that a reviewing court should take care both to review findings of historical fact only for clear error and to give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers. Id. at 699, 116 S.Ct. at 1663 (cited with approval in Commonwealth v. Whitmore, 92 S.W.3d 76 (Ky.2002)).
"The Ornelas court recognized that police may draw inferences oí illegal activity from facts that may appear innocent to a lay person and that a reviewing court should give due weight to the assessment by the trial court of the credibility of the officer and the reasonableness of the inference." Commonwealth v. Whitmore, 92 S.W.3d 76, 79 (Ky.2002).
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial judge made oral findings and announced her ruling from the bench. Her findings of fact indicate that she relied upon Officer Koenig's observation of Ap-pellee meeting with another individual in the K-mart parking lot as the determinative "predictive behavior" she felt necessary to support a reasonable suspicion:
'Well, I certainly understand Mr. Conkin why you cited that case and I think it's something that I have to take into consideration. The Florida v. J.L. [529 U.S. 266, 120 S.Ct. 1375, 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000) ] case involved a tip that there would be a black male at a bus stop wearing a plaid shirt and that he had a gun on him. As I read the case that was basically what they were told and the officer went to the bus stop and there was a black male there with a plaid shirt on and he stopped and frisked him and indeed he did have a gun on him.
This case has more detail from the beginning. First, it involves a vehicle that was carefully described as a late 70s black Ford truck, primer on the hood. There was a description of the male as a white male subject six feet tall, I think 150 to 170 pounds is what you said. I didn't get all the poundage written down, but shoulder length hair. That there would be a narcotics transaction at the Kmart parking lot at 191 Outer Loop. So this officer goes and is in the Winn Dixie parking lot and sees a vehicle matching that description and also sees him leaving the location after meeting up with another subject. So, by his own observation, he saw something that could indeed be the narcotics transaction. (Emphasis added).
I think that had he driven to the parking lot and simply seen the truck, even though it's more detailed than it was in the Supreme Court case, Florida v. J.L., I might be inclined to agree with you, Mr. Conkin, if he just saw the truck and followed the truck and stopped. But his testimony was that he observed him leaving the location after he had met up with another person and then he followed him and he stopped him and I think that that was appropriate, and then the frantic behavior was enough to certainly add to the reasonable suspicion that he had for the stop in the first instance .
So, it's a closer call than I see sometimes, because I think somebody gives a description and you find someone at that point and place described that meets the description, I think you are most of the way there. But I think it's this added factor that's reflected in his report and it was in his testimony about meeting up with another subject there that pushes it over the line from what we had in Florida, which was just an individual at a bus stop wearing a plaid shirt. It wasn't a very detailed description and there was nothing to pair with, besides his actual presence. (Emphasis added).
Here we had the presence of a truck, a person driving that truck that fit exactly and then the presence of another subject with whom the narcotics transaction could be conducted. So, accounting for all those factors and the cases that have been decided, I'm going to overrule the motion to suppress." (Emphasis added).
"[T]he police can stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity 'may be afoot,' even if the officer lacks probable cause." United Stated v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989). As such, "[t]he issue is a preliminary question to be decided by the trial judge, KRE 104(a) ." Cf. Talbott v. Commonwealth, 968 S.W.2d 76, 82 (Ky.1998).
All would agree that Officer Koenig's statement in his traffic citation that "officer went to above location and subject matching description was just leaving that location after meeting up with another subject," would be sufficient "predictive behavior" to justify the Terry stop in this case, even under Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 120 S.Ct. 1375, 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000); see also, Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990).
However, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court on the grounds that the "citation" was not made a part of the "record" — thus, concluding, there was no substantial evidence in the record to support the trial court's finding that Officer Koenig "observed Priddy leaving the location after meeting up with another subject . " What this argument overlooks though, is that the citation was used by the parties during the hearing, as well as, having then been reviewed by the court from its record.
In this regard, KRE 104(a) provides "preliminary questions concerning . the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court . In making its determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence, except those with respect to privileges." See also, KRE 1101(d)(1). RCr 8.22 also provides that "pretrial motions raising defenses or objections shall be determined before trial . All other issues of fact shall be determined by the court with, or without, a jury, or on affidavits, or in such other manner as the court may direct." We can assume that the Commonwealth had a copy of the officer's citation at the suppression hearing, but it is known from the video record that the officer, counsel for the Appellee, and the court had a copy and used it.
In fact, Appellee's counsel perused the citation at the hearing in an attempt to impeach Officer Koenig (per KRE 613(a)), as to the time of the arrest and the Miranda warnings.
"Q: Do you have a copy of your citation right handy?
A: Yes I do.
Q: You stated...I assume you wrote the citation, is that correct?
A: That's correct."
Under KRE 613(a), it is necessary to establish that the statement was written by the officer. "Before other evidence can be offered of the witness having made at another time a different statement, he must be inquired of concerning it .; and, if it be in writing, it must be shown to the witness, with opportunity to explain it." Thus, here the Appellee referenced it, confirmed its creation and authenticity, and asked questions from it for purposes of impeachment. A practitioner would expect the court, which had a copy in its record, to review the "citation" in conjunction with its reference and use in the proceedings, especially once it had been authenticated.
Even aside from the applicability of KRE 104, this court has approved the use of interrogatory answers, not filed as exhibits, as a basis for a trial court's judgment, where the trial was by the court. See Mid-Southern Toyota, Ltd. v. Bug's Imports, Inc., 453 S.W.2d 544 (Ky.1970), wherein it stated:
"They refer to Clay, CR 33... and Clay, CR 36.01, ., as authority for the proposition that admissions and answers to the interrogatories must be introduced in evidence. The latter comment states only that admissions 'should be' introduced in evidence, and the former comment states only that answers to interrogatories would not constitute judicial admissions unless introduced in evidence. Clearly, in the case of a jury trial, admissions and answers to interrogatories would not be evidence unless introduced as such, and normally it would seem the same should be true in case of a trial by the court without a jury. However, in the latter case the formal admission in evidence really has no significant purpose so as long as the parties know the court intends to consider the admissions or answers as evidence, and the parties are afforded the opportunity to make objections of inadmissibility." Id. at 550, (emphasis added).
Similarly, although we agree it would be better procedure, we can find no rule that compels the parties, or the court, to create a record of "exhibits" in an RCr 8.22 hearing in front of the court. RCr 8.22 only requires "a verbatim record . of all proceedings . " See also, KRE 104(a). Which it did in this case. Moreover, the trial court twice, in its discussions and oral ruling (in open court with counsel present) referred to the facts as contained in the report and no objection to this incorporation was made at any time, such that the trial court could have clarified whether, in fact, the court was referring to the citation, or a finding from the officer's testimony that he had "confirmed my information from the informant." "It has long been the law of this Commonwealth that an error would not be reviewed on appeal if the trial court has not had an opportunity to rule on the objection. RCr 9.22 and KRE 108(a)(1)." Commonwealth v. Petrey, 945 S.W.2d 417, 419 (Ky.1997).
Thus, aside from the actual testimony of Officer Koenig, the court could have properly considered comments directly from the citation. This is what KRE 104(a) is about, as well as KRE 1101(d)(1) and RCr 8.22. Evidence is what a court is told, knows, sees, or perceives, formally in open court. Exhibits are what are filed in a trial, and by such, become part of the record on appeal. And where there is no objection, as here, in a video proceeding, KRE 104(a) is dispositive. "This means that the judge can bring to bear on those questions evidence that might not be admissible at trial — hearsay without worry about hearsay rules, opinion without concern about opinion rules, documents without concern about the best evidence, etc. There is good reason for this approach . " Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook 4th Ed., § 6(a), p. 62 KRE 104(a) findings, however, must be supported and based upon, "substantive evidence." Cf. Talbott v. Commonwealth, 968 S.W.2d 76, 82 (Ky.1998), subject to the further caveat, that counsel are aware of what evidence the court is relying on. Cf. Mid-Southern Toyota, Ltd at 550.
The dissent cites many cases from Kentucky, and other jurisdictions, which say that documents not introduced into evidence, may not be considered by the court. These cases support that holding, but only at trial, and most often, in a jury setting. Several of the cases refer only to the "appellate record on appeal" in reference to documents absent therefrom, or added later, in briefs. These holdings do not address questions presented in a pre-trial suppression hearing under KRE 104(a).
B. OFFICER KOENIG'S TESTIMONY
Aside from consideration of the citation, Officer Koenig testified that when he entered the parking lot, he observed the suspect vehicle and suspect, "and confirmed my information from the informant." The citizen giving the information had flagged him down on the street near the site and informed him of the "drug deal to go down in the parking lot."
Just prior to this "confirmation testimony," the officer's questions and answers were:
"Q: Is that all the information that you received?
A: I received that they would be in the parking lot of 191 Outer loop selling to an unknown subject out of that vehicle.
Q: Did they give you a time or did they say that they were there right now?
A: That they were there as we spoke."
In his answer to the very next question, he testified "and confirmed my information from the informant." "[W]e hasten to point out that a reviewing court should take care both to review findings of historical fact only for clear error and to give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers just." Ornelas at 699, 116 S.Ct. at 1663. Preliminary questions of fact are to be determined by the trial judge, whose factual findings are conclusive where supported by substantial evidence. Talbott at 82.
Were we disposed to hold, as did the Court of Appeals, that Officer Koenig's observation of "Priddy leaving the location after meeting with another subject," was in fact necessary to meet the "predictive behavior" test required for reliance on a citizen's tip — it is our opinion there was testimony of such properly before the court. It was there for proper consideration from (1) the citation perused and authenticated by the Appellee's counsel in examination at the hearing and available to the court from its own record and (2) through fair inference, Officer Koenig testified to this fact when, having already recited the fact of this observation as given to him from the informant, he testified he "confirmed my information from the informant."
C. .FINDINGS OF "REASONABLE ARTICULABLE SUSPICION"
Even aside from the resolution of the issues in sections A and B, the facts before the trial court supported a "reasonable articulable suspicion" that a drug transaction was about to occur.
In arriving at its conclusion, the Court of Appeals failed to consider the different levels of reliability between tips from a "confidential informant or anonymous tipster" versus that of a citizen, who personally approaches an officer to give information about ongoing criminal activity.
"[T]ips, like all other clues and evidence coming to a policeman on the scene, may vary greatly in their value and reliability. One simple rule will not cover every situation. Some tips, completely lacking in indicia of reliability, would either warrant no police response, or require farther investigation, before a forcible stop of a suspect would be authorized. But in some situations — for example, when a victim of a street crime seeks immediate police aid and gives a description of his assailant, or when a credible informant warns of a specific pending crime—the subtleties of the hearsay rule should not thwart an appropriate police response." Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972).
One who personally comes forward to give information that was immediately verifiable at the scene may carry sufficient indicia of reliability to justify a stop and would be a much stronger case than an anonymous phone tip. Id. at 146, 147, 92 S.Ct. 1921. See also, United States v. Christmas, 222 F.3d 141, 144 (4th Cir.2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1098, 121 S.Ct. 830, 148 L.Ed.2d 712 (2001). (Held that tipster, who failed to give her name, but gave the police her home address, was not an anonymous tipster and that face-to-face informants are generally more rehable than anonymous telephone tipsters).
In its analysis of the trial court's finding that the circumstances related by Officer Koenig in the case at hand did not articulate a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot, the Court of Appeals relied on Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 120 S.Ct., 1375, 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000). In J.L., the tip came through a phone call made from an unknown location by an unknown caller. "Unlike a tip from a known informant whose reputation can be assessed and who can be held responsible if their allegations turn out to be fabricated, an anonymous tip alone seldom demonstrates the informant's basis of knowledge or veracity . " Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990); J.L. at 270, 120 S.Ct. 1375.
However, "[a] face-to-face encounter provides police officers the opportunity to perceive and evaluate personally an informant's mannerisms, expressions, and tone of voice (and thus, to assess the informant's veracity more readily than can be done from a purely anonymous telephone tip). In person communications also tend to be more reliable because, having revealed one's physical appearance and location, the informant knows that she can be tracked down and held accountable, if her assertions prove inaccurate. Finally, a face-to-face encounter often provides a window into an informant's represented basis of knowledge; for example, his physical presence at or near the scene of the reported events can confirm that she acquired her information through first-hand observation." United States v. Romain, 393 F.3d 63, 73-74 (1st Cir.2004)(internal citations omitted). In Romain, the call came into the 911 emergency operator from a woman who explained she was visiting with her friend and that someone had come in with a gun. When the operator inquired whether the woman was placing the call surreptitiously, the woman asked that the call be traced. The police then responded, whereat, the woman again covertly indicated to the officers that another person was inside the apartment and armed. Her identity, however, was unknown until after the search of the person indicated turned up the weapon complained of. In concluding the search was valid, the court stated "[h]ere, the officers had in-person contacts ., and those contacts, although limited, allowed them to gauge her veracity and to make some informed assessment of the reliability of the tip_" Romain at 73-74. "The informant here was not 'anonymous' as the J.L. Court had employed that term and the information was not, as in J.L., a tip that had no diseernable basis." Id. at 74.
In United States v. Sierra-Hernandez, 581 F.2d 760 (9th Cir.1978), a border patrol agent was approached by a man, described in the record only as wearing farmer's overalls and a baseball cap and driving a late-model brown Mercedes Benz. The man then pointed to a black pickup truck proceeding parallel on a road about 100 yards away and told the officer the black pickup truck had just loaded with weed at the canebreak. Without asking the unidentified man for his name, or for any other information, the agent immediately radioed for assistance and followed the black pickup, stopped it and discovered the marijuana. In commenting upon the identity of the person giving the information, the court acknowledged "[mjoreover, although the informant did not identify himself by name, he would have been available for further questioning if the agent had judged the procedure appropriate. Unlike a person who makes an anonymous telephone call, this informant confronted the agent directly. By thus presenting himself to the agent, and doing so while driving a car from which his identity might easily be traced, the informant was in a position to be held accountable for his intervention. The reliability of the information was thus increased." Sierra-Hernandez at 763. The court also noted the timely nature of the information, required the agent to immediately leave the informant's presence, radio for assistance and set off in pursuit. Id.
In United States v. Christmas, 222 F.3d 141 (4th Cir.2000), the intoxicated woman approached officers who were then in her neighborhood, gave them her residence address, but not her name, and told them "you need to come and deal with the drugs and the guns that those guys have on the porch two doors down from me." Id. at 148. Reacting, to the information given, the officers approached the individuals indicated, did a pat-down search and found weapons. After the arrest, a more thorough search revealed a large amount- of crack cocaine and marijuana. In upholding the search, the court noted, "unlike the anonymous tipster, a witness who directly approaches a police officer can also be held accountable for false statements. As the Supreme Court has observed, citizens who personally report crimes to the police thereby make themselves accountable for lodging false complaints." Id. at 144, citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 233-234, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 & n. 2, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972).
In United States v. Heard, 367 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir.2004), the officer responded to a location where a fight was in progress. As the officer responded, he observed a woman yelling at the defendant and demanding fifty dollars. At the officer's suggestion, the defendant paid the woman the fifty dollars. However, just as the woman, whose name and address was unknown, was leaving the scene, she told the officers the defendant was carrying a gun. She then jumped on an arriving train and left the scene anonymously. Nevertheless, to protect his own safety and the safety of the train station patrons, the officer placed the defendant in handcuffs and did a Terry frisk. During the pat-down, a weapon was discovered and the defendant was later indicted for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.
In upholding the reasonableness of the search, the court noted "[a] face-to-face anonymous tip is presumed to be inherently móre rehable than an anonymous telephone tip because the officers receiving the information have an opportunity to observe the demeanor and perceived credibility of the informant." Heard at 1279, citing United States v. Valentine, 232 F.3d 350, 354 (3rd Cir.2000).
In United States v. Hopes, 286 F.3d 788, 789-790 (5th Cir.2002), the court noted "in the instant case the tip was not anonymous but, rather, was given by Robinson, an individual who had operated the halfway house for many years and was well known to the officers who had dealt reliably with her many times. Unlike the unknown, unaccountable tipster in Florida v. J.L., Robinson personally summoned and met the police officers face-to-face, and could be held accountable if the tip proved to be fabricated." Hopes at 789-790.
"Courts are not required to sever the relationships that the citizens and local police forces have forged to protect their communities from crime. [Appellee] argues for a rule that comes close to disqualifying face-to-face discussions with residents as a basis for a Terry stop and frisk. To rule out such conversations as a basis for reasonable suspicion would be a serious step. A community might quickly succumb to a sense of helplessness if police were constitutionally prevented from responding to the face-to-face pleas of neighborhood residents for assistance. Officers are entitled to investigate such reports without jeopardizing their personal safety. Any other constitutional rule would destroy the basis for effective community police work." Christmas at 145.
In this instance, officer Koenig was stopped and flagged down on the street by a citizen and given information that a nar- cotíes transaction was occurring, right then, in the K-Mart parking lot several minutes away. The officer was given an accurate description of the dealer and his vehicle and told they were there as they spoke. The alleged site of the drug transaction being several minutes away, one would have to concede that the failure to get the name and address of the citizen was understandable, given the timely nature of the information along with the common knowledge that it doesn't take long to conduct a drug transaction.
Next, and even viewing the evidence as argued by Appellee, officer Koe-nig arrived on the scene and immediately spotted the person and vehicle described just moments before. As the vehicle was then exiting the K-Mart parking lot, according to Appellee's version (where the transaction was supposed to have taken place), he followed and blue-lighted the Appellee. After activating the blue lights, but before approaching the vehicle, he noticed the apparent frantic activity of the Appellee inside his vehicle indicating concealment activity. Indeed, "a brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity, or to maintain the status quo momentarily, while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time." Williams at 146, 92 S.Ct. 1921. And, "[r]easonable suspicion, while depen-dant upon the 'totality of the circumstances,' including both the content of the information and its reliability, 'can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.'" Heard at 1278. (Internal citations omitted).
Even viewing the evidence as argued by the Appellee, we believe Officer Koenig's stop of the Appellee was based upon "reasonable and articuable suspicions that criminal activity was afoot."
Officer Koenig was flagged down on the street and approached by a citizen who gave him the information, including the necessity of responding quickly. It was under circumstances where Officer Koenig could assess the demeanor of the person giving the information and make his own judgment, as to that person's credibility. Additionally, the person giving the information undertook the risk that the officer, having spoken with her, could recognize her and identify her at a later time thus, subjecting her to various penalties, should the information been proven to be untrue. See KRS 519.040(l)(2nd), "Falsely Reporting an Incident."
Once the response of the officer validated the description of the Appellee and the vehicle, this added credibility to the information, as well as the fact that it was at the location suggested. Thus, even limiting the evidence as argued by the Appellee, he was then leaving the vicinity of the parking lot where it was reported the alleged criminal activity would have occurred. Then, factoring this into an officer's knowledge that it doesn't take a long time to do a drug deal, this had been consistent with the fact that by the time he responded from the location where he was notified of the activity, to its actual location, the deal might have been completed and the Appellee would be leaving the transaction area. Finally, once stopped, the Appellee's vehicle was not approached; nor was the Appellee asked to exit the vehicle, until after Officer Koenig had also witnessed the frantic activity of the Appel-lee in his vehicle, suggesting he was then hiding something. "A court inquiring into the validity of a Terry stop must use a wide lens and survey the totality of the circumstances." Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 8, 109 S.Ct. 1581.
Thus, considering the "totality of the circumstances," we believe Officer Koenig had "reasonable and articuable suspicion of criminal activities afoot," sufficient to justify his search in this instance, even limiting the evidence as argued by Appellee.
For the forgoing reasons, the opinion of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and Ap-pellee's judgment and sentence are reinstated.
GRAVES, JOHNSTONE, ROACH, WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., concur.
COOPER, J., dissents by separate opinion, with LAMBERT,. C.J., joining that dissent.
. KRS 431.015 provides that a citation is issued by an officer only for a misdemeanor or violation committed in the officer's presence; however, KRS 431.450, which provides for the use of a uniform citation by all law enforcement agencies, directs that "[a]ll peace officers in the Commonwealth shall use the uniform citation for all violations of the traffic laws and for all felonies, misdemeanors and violations." KRS 431.450(4). Since the uniform citation is specified as the charging document for traffic offenses, RCr 6.02(2); Skeans v. Commonwealth, 912 S.W.2d 455, 456 (Ky.App.1995) ("Uniform citations, like indictments in felony cases, are charging documents in the prosecution of DUI offenses and are not solely 'investigative reports by police.' "), and Appellee was charged with a traffic offense, i.e., No Motor Vehicle Insurance, the uniform citation was properly filed in the court record for that purpose because of its status as a pleading. RCr 8.12.
. KRS 218A.1415.
. KRS 218A.500.
. KRS 304.39-080; KRS 304.99-060.