Case Name: Mann v. City of Heber Springs
Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 1965-11-15
Citations: 239 Ark. 969
Docket Number: 5141
Parties: Mann v. City of Heber Springs.
Judges: Harris, C. J. dissents.
Reporter: Arkansas Reports
Volume: 239
Pages: 969–979

Head Matter:
Mann v. City of Heber Springs.
5141
395 S. W. 2d 557
Opinion delivered November 15, 1965.
C. E. Blackburn, for appellant.
Bruce Bennett, Atty. General, By: Clyde Calliotte, Asst. Atty. General, for appellee.

Opinion:
Frank Holt, Associate Justice.
Appellant was charged by information with violating the liquor laws. The jury acquitted the appellant of the charge of possessing liquor for sale in a dry county (second offense) in violation of Ark. Stat. Ann. § 48-811.1 (Repl. 1964). He was found guilty of possessing-more'than one gallon of intoxicating liquor in a dry county in violation of Ark. Stat. Ann. § 48-918. The court fixed appellant's punishment at a fine of $200.00, plus costs. For reversal of the judgment upon this verdict the appellant contends that the "court erred in failing to suppress the evidence obtained in the search and.seizure either under an admittedly void search warrant, or the search of an automobile without a warrant." This motion to suppress was seasonably made.
The local police secured a search warrant to search appellant's combination residence and business for contraband liquor. The appellant was present when the officers arrived at his premises. The search warrant was exhibited to him and an unsuccessful search was made. It is admitted that the search warrant was invalidly issued as being in conflict with Ark. Stat. Ann. § 22-753 (Kepi. 1962). Immediately following this fruitless search of his premises, the appellant gave the officers the keys to his car in compliance with their request. The car was parked in the street in front of his premises. Appellant accompanied the officers to his parked car where he assisted in opening the trunk compartment. There a case containing 48 half-pints of illegal liquor was discovered.
It is ably urged by the state that appellant's action in surrendering the keys and participating in the opening of the trunk was a consent to the search and thus constituted a waiver of any constitutional requirements of a search warrant. In support of this contention we are cited to numerous cases including our recent decision in Williams v. State, 237 Ark. 569, 375 S. W. 2d 375. In this case the information that stolen property was stored in a trailer was volunteered by the accused following which the exact location of the trailer was "pointed out" to the officers and assistance rendered in removing the stolen articles. We cannot agree that this case or others cited are controlling under the facts in the case at bar. In our view there was no knowledgeable consent to the search of appellant's parked automobile at his premises. This exploration was merely a continuation of and con teniporaneous with a search made under an admittedly invalid warrant. This invalidity was unknown to appellant at the time of the search. In 79 C. J. S. Searches and Seizures § 62 (b) p. 820-21 it is said: " "* Voluntary consent requires sufficient intelligence to appreciate the act as well as the consequence of the act agreed to. Since the consititutional guaranty is not dependent on any affirmative act of the citizen the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officer's authority by force or waiving his constitutional rights, but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation, thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law."
The state further contends that the search of appellant's automobile Avas reasonable and, therefore, not in violation of constitutional restrictions. It is true that not all searches and seizures Avithout a warrant are prohibited. Only those searches and seizures which are unreasonable are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. 2, § 15, Arkansas Constitution. We recognize the rule that an automobile may be searched AA'ithout a warrant where there is reasonable or probable cause for the belief of the officers that contents of the automobile offend against the laA\r. Burke v. State, 235 Ark. 882, 362 S. W. 2d 695. There AAre said that the total circumstances "all add up to probable cause for the search." These circumstances consisted of the reputation of the defendant, as a bootlegger, his vehicle moving upon the road with the appearance of being heavily loaded, and a strong odor of "wildcat AA'hiskey in the car" thus noticeable to the senses of the officers.
In the case at bar the only evidence in support of the existence of reasonable or probable cause to search appellant's automobile was appellant's reputation as being a bootlegger, a "tip" from a filling station operator to an officer earlier in the day that appellant had purchased gasoline for his car, and that appellant's parked car looked like it was "a little heavy loaded in the hack." It cannot he said that the appearance of the automobile was any different when the officers entered and searched appellant's premises than afterwards. It is undisputed that it was just as practical to secure a search warrant for the stationary vehicle as it was for appellant's house.
As was said in United States v. Roberts, 223 F. Supp. 49: ' ' * # * In the last analysis the question of the validity of a given search and seizure must be determined by reference to whether that particular search and seizure were reasonable or unreasonable, and that determination must be made on a case to case basis in the light of all the surrounding facts and circumstances." In the case at bar there was testimony that the car was searched by the officers because "we didn't find any whiskey inside the building." It can fairly be said from the evidence that the failure to discover contraband whiskey in appellant's dwelling was the compelling basis for extending the exploratory search to appellant's parked automobile.
We hold that it was error to refuse appellant's motion to suppress the evidence. Reversed and remanded.
Harris, C. J. dissents.
Johnson, J., concurs.