Case Name: TEN EYCK v. RECTOR, ETC., OF PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH
Court: New York Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1892-09
Citations: 29 Abb. N. Cas. 150
Docket Number: 
Parties: TEN EYCK v. RECTOR, ETC., OF PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH.
Judges: 
Reporter: Abbott's New Cases
Volume: 29
Pages: 150–171

Head Matter:
TEN EYCK v. RECTOR, ETC., OF PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH.
N. Y. Supreme Court, Third Department; General Term,
September, 1892.
1. Lease; liability to pay paving assessment). Paving with Belgian blocks a street formerly paved with cobblestones, may be-deemed á permanent improvement.
2. The same construction of tax clause.] A lease contained a covenant that during the term the lessee should pay all taxes, and water rents “and also all assessments for paving, flagging or repairing the streets adjoining said premises ; but assessments, if any shall be made, for opening streets, squares, or for other public purposes of an extraordinary character, or for ■ permanent, improvements, shall be paid by ” the lessors. An. ■adjoining- street,which had been paved with cobblestones,, . : was, during the. term, repaved with granite block pavement,, with suitable cross-walks and curbing, at an expense about equivalent to two years’ rent. Held, that the assessment for ' such improvement was for a “ permanent improvement,” and as between the 'parties to the lease, was chargeable to the- ' lessor.
3. The same.) It seems that such improvement was also " of an extraordinary character ” within the exception in the covenant. [Per Putnam, J.]
Submission of controversy between James Ten Eye’: and others, as trustees, etc., lessors, and The Rector and. Inhabitants of the City of Albany in communion with the; Protestant Episcopal Church in the State of New York, lessees, to determine their respective liability to pay an assessment for repaving Maiden lane in the City of Albany in front of the demised premises, which had been imposed thereon by the local authorities, and in default of payment of which the premises had been sold.
The facts are fully stated in the opinion.
Arthur L. Andrews (Stedman, Thompson & Andrews, attorneys), for plaintiffs.
I. The terms of the lease require the defendant to pay the assessment in question (Mayor, etc. of N. Y. v. Cashman, 10 Johns. 96; Matter of Mayor, etc., 11 Id. 77 ; Post v. Kearney, 2 N. Y. 394; Bleecker v. Ballou, 3 Wend. 263).
II. The defendant contracted, with reference to the power of the common council to prder the pavement in question (Gallup v. Albany Ry. Co., 7 Lans. 471 ; affi’d, 65 N. Y. 1).
Abraham Lansing, for defendant.
I. Assessments are for the improvement of the freehold (Matter of Mayor, etc. of N. Y., 11 Johns. 77 ; Sharp v. Speir, 4 Hill, 76; Hassan v. City of Rochester, 67 N. Y. 528 ; Taylor's Landl. and Ten. [5 ed]. § 341), and the covenant of the tenant to pay them will not be unreasonably extended (Hoffman v. Ætna Ins. Co., 32 Id. 405 ; Colt v. Phœnix Fire Ins. Co., 54 Id. 595 ; White v. Hoyt, 73 Id. 505 ; Barlow v. Scott, 24 Id. 40).
II. To pave is properly to do work ; it is: not to provide materials (Matter of Phillips, 60 N. Y. 16, 22).
III. The covenant requires defendant to bear the burden of all assessments for relaying, for keeping the old pavement in repair.
IV. Both covenants stand together (Buckmaster v. Thompson, 36 N. Y. 558 Hoffman v. Aetna Ins. Co., 32 Id. 405).
V. A covenant to pay “ all assessments for paving " is not a covenant to pay all assessments for repaving (L. 1889, c, 114; L. 1875, c. 476; Matter of Grube, 81 N. Y. 139; Matter of Phillips, 60 Id. 16; Matter of Burke, 62 Id. 224 ; Matter of Burmeister, 76 Id. 174; Matter of Garvey, 77 Id. 523).
See note on Tax Clauses at the end of this case. For a note on Covenants to comply with Municipal Ordinances, Hqalth-board orders and the. like, see 27 Abb. N. C. 334,

Opinion:
PUTNAM, J.
Defendants are in possession of premises situated on Maiden lane and Lodge streets, in the city of Albany, under a lease executed" on April 30, 1859, f°r a term of thirty years, at a yearly rent of $500. Said lease contains the following covenant: " During the continuance of said term the said party of the second part shall pay all taxes and water rents which shall be lawfully-assessed or charged upon said premises, and also all assessments for paving, flagging, or repairing the streets adjoining said premises ; but assessments, if any shall be made, .for opening streets, squares, or for other public purposes of an extraordinary character, or for permanent improvements, shall be paid by the said parties of the first part. " On April 25,1889, said lease was renewed for five years, at the annual rent of $400, but with the same conditions and covenants contained in the original lease.
At the time of the execution of said lease the street's known as " Maiden lane " and " Lodge street " had been laid out and graded " under the- laws and ordinances applicable to the city of Albany, and had been and were then paved and curbed, and the expenses thereof had been paid for by the owners of the property adjoining said streets, and by the owners of the property in question, to the extent of their proper portion thereof. . . . The pavement of the roadway, as so paved, was of cobblestone, which pavement, from use and the nature of the soil upon which the same was laid, required frequent, and usually annual, repair: The sidewalks of said streets had been and were at the said date laid with- flagstones. • Cobblestones were the pavement in universal use in the city at that time, and no other kind of pavement was then generally known in cities."
On April 8, 1889, an act was passed by the legislature, amending chapter 298 of the Laws of 1883, entitled "An •act to provide for the government of the city of Albany," under which the common council of said city of Albany in the summer and fall of the year 1891, caused Maiden lane to be repaved with granite block pavement, and suitable cross-walk stones, and recurbed, and the officers of the city assessed the expense of the work, labor, and services and materials for such work upon the property adjoining said street, and in part upon the property described in said lease. The said premises were duly sold for default in the payment of said assessment, which amounted to $799.79; being the amount assessed, with interest and charges.
The plaintiffs claim that the defendants, under the above-quoted clause of the lease, are legally bound to pay the aforesaid assessment. The defendants insist that they are only bound to pay for ordinary repairs to the street, and that, the said assessment being for unusual and extraordinary as well as permanent improvements, the assessment, therefore, under the lease, is for the plaintiffs to pay.
If the covenant of the defendants had ended with their promise to pay " all assessments for paving, flagging, or repairing the streets adjoining said premises," no serious question would arise as to their liability, although the assessment in question was made under the provisions of a statute passed subsequently to the date of the lease (Post v. Kearney, 2 N. Y. [2 Comst.] 394). " Paving" is defined to be the laying of streets with pavement: and assuming that this word in the lease has the same meaning as " repaving, " the covenant above to pay for paving, flagging, or repairing, if unmodified by the subsequent part of the sentence, might be construed as an agreement to pay for all that constitutes paving,—the material of -which a pavement is formed as well as the work of plac ing it.- But that part of the clause above quoted, in-reference to defendants'paying for assessments, is modified by the balance thereof, viz.: But assessments, if any shall be made, for opening streets, squares, or for other-public purposes of .an extraordinary character or for permanent improvements, shall be paid by the said parties, of the first part.'' The covenant of defendants, therefore,, taking the whole sentence together, is an- agreement to-pay all assessments for paving, flagging, or repairing-streets adjoining said premises, except assessments for-opening streets, squares, or for other public purposes of an extraordinary character, or for permanent improvements, which shall be paid for by the parties of the first part.
The assessment for repaving and recurbing Maiden, lane in 1891 was doubtless an assessment for a public: purpose; and the question to be determined is, was it an assessment to pay for work of an extraordinary character,, or in the nature of a permanent improvement ? " Extraordinary" is defined to mean " beyond or out of the. common order or rule; not usual, regular, or of a customary kind; not ordinary; .remarkable; uncommon; rare." It appears that when the lease was made, in 1859, the-streets adjoining such premises, and generally in the city of Albany, were paved with cobblestones ; and I infer from the case that they remained in that condition, with ordinary repairs, until the repaving in question, in 1891, a. period of over thirty years. At this time, in -1891, the whole pavement was removed and replaced with granite.
The question submitted is not free from doubt, and I have had some' hesitation in reaching a conclusion. I think, however, that the covenant contained in the lease on the part of .the defendants was not one to pay assessments for removing a pavement, already existing, and to lay down a new and expensive pavement, with entirely different materials. I think the agreement should be construed to mean that defendants would make the-ordinary repairs, keeping the pavement existing, when the- lease was made in proper condition. The new granite pavement for which the assessment was made was a repavement of the street in the place of the old pavement that had remained over thirty years. ' Hence it was a rare, unusual, infrequent kind of work. It was not ordinary. It was uncommon. The fact that the new pavement was-put down after using the old pavement for over thirty years shows that it was an extraordinary repair. The assessment was also for a public purpose of an extraordinary character, because of its amount. The annual rent reserved in defendants' lease was $400. The assessment was for $800,—twice the amount of the annual rent. - A repair costing that amount cannot be deemed ordinary. The assessment, therefore, was for a public purpose of an extraordinary character. I think this construction of the covenant in question will carry out what may be deemed was the intent of the parties to the contract.
I also am of the opinion that the assessment may properly be considered as one made by the city to pay for permanent improvement. The old cobblestone pavement was taken up and replaced by granite. This pavement is of a permanent character. " Permanent " is defined to mean " not temporary or subject to change ; abiding; remaining ; fixed or enduring in character, state, or place. " I think that the court may take judicial notice that the new granite pavement of the character described in this case is permanent, lasting, and not subject to change. In (Twycross v. Fitchburg Railroad Co., 10 Gray, 293), Justice THOMAS, in delivering the opinion of the court, remarked (page 295), in reference to a new pavement laid in front of the plaintiff's premises, referred to in the opinion : " It is a permanent improvement of the estate, the benefit of which is to be found in the increased value of the estate, and in the increased rent which it would permanently command."
I conclude, therefore, that, under the clause in the lease to which our attention is called, the plaintiffs were liable to pay for the new pavement in question, and that there fore the defendants should have judgment on the case submitted, with costs.
Mayham, P. J.
The questions in this case grow out of the construction to be placed upon the following exception in the lease: "But assessments, if any shall be made, for opening streets, squares, or for other public purposes •of an extraordinary character, or for permanent improvements, shall be paid by the said parties of the first part." If this assessment comes within any of the above exceptions, it must be under that which exempts the lessee from the payment of taxes for permanent improvements. This street was paved with cobble pavement at the time of making and renewing the lease. That kind of pavement necessitated frequent relaying, paving, or repairing, for which the lessee under the lease would be clearly liable. That kind of pavement was in universal use in the city of Albany at that time; and it seems that it required the authority conferred by chapter 298 of the Laws of 1883, to enable the common council to adopt the more permanent but more expensive kind of pavement, known as " Belgian block." It is by no means probable that the parties to this lease, either when it was made or renewed, had in contemplation a repavement of this street with a pavement of this character.
Nor do I think the language of the lease which binds the lessee to pay " all assessments for paving, flagging, or repaving the streets adjoining the premises," necessarily •embraces this kind of repaveme'nt, especially when read in connection with the paragraph relating to " permanent improvements," above quoted. By that paragraph or provision of the lease, the lessee is exempted from taxes imposed for permanent improvements; and it is difficult to conceive of a more substantial or permanent improvement than that •of paving a street with granite block. The lease does not, in express terms, require the lessee to pay for " repaving," but for " paving," which means when pavement is laid for the first time on a dirt road ; repaving is when an old pavement is replaced by a new one. If, by the condition of the streets at the time of making or renewing the lease, there was no " paving " that could be required, the lessee was only the more secure from that burden, and the court cannot import into the agreement any word that could increase the defendants' liability. If, therefore, that provision in the lease is to have any effect, it must be applicable to the permanent improvement of paving this street with granite blocks. If this tax is imposed upon the tenant, it, or the rector, by whom it is represented, would be required to pay for the use of the premises, in 1891, about three times, the amount of the rent stipulated in the lease,—a burden which should not be cast upon the defendants unless, by the clear terms of the lease, they assumed that burden, which I do not think they did.
I therefore concur in the conclusion reached by my Brother Putnam in this case, that the defendants should have judgment, with costs.