Case Name: Howard Monteville NEAL v. STATE of Mississippi
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1987-09-23
Citations: 525 So. 2d 1279
Docket Number: No. DP-36
Parties: Howard Monteville NEAL v. STATE of Mississippi.
Judges: WALKER, C.J., ROY NOBLE LEE, P.J., and GRIFFIN, J., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 525
Pages: 1279–1289

Head Matter:
Howard Monteville NEAL v. STATE of Mississippi.
No. DP-36.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Sept. 23, 1987.
As Modified on Denial of Rehearing June 3, 1988.
Charles R. Bliss, Atlanta, Ga., James L. Sultan, Rankin & Sultan, Boston, Mass., Kenneth J. Rose, Jackson, for appellant.
Edwin Lloyd Pittman, Atty. Gen. by Marvin L. White, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.

Opinion:
DAN M. LEE, Justice,
for the Court:
I.
We have before us this day the familiar application for post-conviction relief by one convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. Prominent among the claims as serted are ineffective assistance of trial counsel and a claim that Petitioner was denied the right to take the witness stand in his own defense. Petitioner also presents a number of already-rejected constitutional challenges to his conviction and sentence — exhaustion of state remedies it is called, although exhaustion of state judges would be a more accurate label.
We have reviewed carefully petitioner's application, his supporting affidavits, and the prior course of proceedings in this case. With respect to the claim that he was denied his right of allocution, petitioner has presented a substantial showing of the denial of a state or federal right. We remand for an evidentiary hearing. All other claims have been previously decided and are precluded from relitigation here, except the claim for ineffective assistance of counsel which we deny for want of a substantial showing of merit.
II.
Prior proceedings in the case of Howard Monteville Neal reflect that on January 24, 1981, Amanda Joy Neal was murdered in Lawrence County, Mississippi. On February 4,1982, following a change of venue to Lamar County, Neal was found guilty by a Circuit Court jury of the capital murder of Amanda Joy. On that same day the jury imposed a sentence of death.
Neal appealed, attacking both his conviction and sentence. On May 23, 1984, this Court affirmed with a written opinion. Neal v. State, 451 So.2d 743 (Miss.1984). On July 11,1984, Neal's petition for rehearing was denied. Thereafter, Neal applied to the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari, which application was denied on December 10,1984. Neal v. Mississippi, 469 U.S. 1098, 105 S.Ct. 607, 83 L.Ed.2d 716 (1984).
The matter is now before the Court upon Neal's application for relief under the Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-1 et seq. (Supp.1986). The Attorney General, of course, denies facial merit to Neal's application.
Our procedural posture is analogous to that when a defendant in a civil action moves to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See Rule 12(b)(6), Miss.R.Civ.P.; Stanton & Associates, Inc. v. Bryant Construction Company, Inc., 464 So.2d 499, 504-06 (Miss.1985). Functionally, Section 99-39-9 is substituted for the pleadings requirements of Rule 8(a) and (e), Miss.R. Civ.P. In relevant part, Section 99-39-9 requires that an application for post-conviction relief contain
(c) A concise statement of the claims or grounds upon which the motion is based.
(d) A separate statement of the specific facts which are within the personal knowledge of the prisoner and which shall be sworn to by the prisoner.
(e) A specific statement of the facts which are not within the prisoner's personal knowledge. The motion shall state how or by whom said facts will be proven. Affidavits of the witnesses who will testify and copies of documents or records that will be offered shall be attached to the motion. The affidavits of other persons and the copies of documents and records may be excused upon a showing, which shall be specifically detailed in the motion, of good cause why they cannot be obtained. This showing shall state what the prisoner has done to attempt to obtain the affidavits, records and documents, the production of which he requests the court to excuse.
Notions of notice pleading have no place in post-conviction applications, the very name of which implies that there has been a final judgment of conviction. Respect for the integrity of the judicial process mandates that we require of such applicants a far more substantial and detailed threshold showing, far in excess of that we deem necessary in the case of a plaintiff in a civil action or, for that matter, in the case of the prosecution in a criminal indictment. In this context we understand Section 99-39-9 suggest a regime of sworn, fact pleadings, based upon personal knowledge. The
Court upon examination of the application has the authority to dismiss it outright,
if it plainly appears from the face of the motion, any annexed exhibits and the prior proceedings in the case that the movant is not entitled to any relief.... Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-11(2).
On the other hand, if the application meets these pleading requirements and presents a claim procedurally alive "substantially] showing denial of a state or federal right," the petitioner is entitled to an in court opportunity to prove his claims. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-27(5) (Supp.1986).
Against this backdrop, we consider the allegations of Neal's application.
III.
A.
Neal's primary charge in the present proceeding is that he was denied effective assistance of counsel at his trial. This is a claim which is not procedurally barred. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-27(5) (Supp.1986); Perkins v. State, 487 So.2d 791, 792-93 (Miss.1986); Leatherwood v. State, 473 So.2d 964 (Miss.1985); Read v. State, 430 So.2d 832, 836-42 (Miss.1983).
An ineffective assistance claim by its very nature refers to the totality of counsel's pre-trial and trial performance. Neal so complains here of his court-appointed attorneys and points to some three specifics. First, he urges that his attorneys failed to conduct an adequate investigation prior to both the guilt phase and sentencing phase of his trial thereby denying him the opportunity to present an adequate defense. Second, he urges that one of his attorneys, Joe Dale Walker, had a conflict of interest in that he had represented one of Neal's alleged murder victims, Bobby Neal, less than two months before the latter was killed. Third, Neal alleges that his attorneys refused to permit him to take the stand in his own defense at his trial.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) furnishes the legal standards by which we consider a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, whether that claim be asserted under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States or under Article III, § 26 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890. Washington mandates a two-fold inquiry: (1) whether counsel's performance was deficient, and, if so, (2) whether the deficient performance was prejudicial to the defendant in the sense that our confidence in the correctness of the outcome is undermined.
We have accepted the Washington standards on a number of occasions. See, e.g., Ferguson v. State, 507 So.2d 94, 95-97 (Miss.1987); Waldrop v. State, 506 So.2d 273, 275-76 (Miss.1987); Alexander v. State, 503 So.2d 235, 240-41 (Miss.1987); King v. State, 503 So.2d 271, 273-76 (Miss.1987); Leatherwood v. State, 473 So.2d 964 (Miss.1985); Stringer v. State, 454 So.2d 468 (Miss.1984). We emphasize that these standards are objective ones. They apply everywhere. As life and liberty are at stake, there is no place for a locality rule in right to counsel jurisprudence. Cf Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So.2d 856 (Miss.1985).
In the present posture of the matter, we are considering whether Neal's showing in his application for post-conviction relief and attached affidavits, coupled with the record made at his trial, render it sufficiently likely that he received ineffective assistance of counsel that we should order an evidentiary hearing regarding the matter. Put otherwise, on the papers and record before us, can we say with confidence that at any evidentiary hearing Neal will not be able to show that he has been denied effective assistance of counsel? If his application fails on either of the two prongs of Washington, we must terminate the proceedings here.
B.
Neal's charges of ineffective assistance of counsel are summarized in his post-conviction application as follows:
Neal charges that his court-appointed counsel failed to conduct an adequate investigation prior to trial and prior to the separate sentencing proceeding, thereby denying him the opportunity to present an adequate defense. Specifically, Neal alleges that his attorneys failed to interview members of the professional staff at the State School at Ellisville and the State Hospital at Whitfield, where he had been institutionalized for a large portion of his life; and that they failed to obtain his Oklahoma prison records or consult with any prison officials or medical professionals in the Oklahoma prison system regarding his mental capabilities and character.
With the exception of Neal's mother, counsel failed to interview any members of his family or any of his former employers or acquaintances. Despite evidence of Neal's mental retardation, counsel failed to obtain a neurological examination. Neal alleges that these investigative steps, had they been undertaken, would have provided important evidence which would have been highly probative, both with respect to determining the voluntariness of his confession and in presenting relevant mitigating circumstances to the jury during the separate sentencing proceeding. Neal charges that counsel's failure to conduct an adequate investigation constituted a denial of reasonably effective assistance of counsel.
Moreover, Neal alleges that co-counsel, Joe Dale Walker, represented him despite the fact that he had represented one of Howard's alleged murder victims, Bobby Neal, less than two months before the latter was killed. Neal argues that this situation was inherently conducive to divided loyalties on the part of counsel. Yet, neither Neal nor the Circuit Court was ever informed of this conflict of interest. Counsel's joint representation of victim and defendant adversely affected his performance, allegedly denying Neal effective assistance of counsel.
Neal alleges that he wanted to take the witness stand in his own defense. He charges that, although he expressed a desire to take the stand in his own defense during his trial, his attorneys refused to permit him to do so. This, Neal claims, denied him his constitutional right to testify in his own defense, and as well is a component of his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Had he been permitted to testify, Neal says he would have presented highly probative evidence concerning the lack of voluntariness of his alleged confession as well as facts concerning his background in mitigation of punishment.
Neal alleges that, but for counsel's deficient performance, as summarized above, there is a reasonable probability that the result of his trial would have been different. Specifically, he charges that it is reasonably likely that the Circuit Court would have concluded that his alleged confession was not based upon a free and voluntary waiver of his constitutional right against self-incrimination and that a properly-instructed jury would have found that the mitigating circumstances outweighed the statutory aggravating circumstances, resulting in the imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment, rather than death. Since the performance of trial counsel presents questions of fact, Neal charges that an evidentiary hearing is required to consider the merits of this claim. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312-13, 83 S.Ct. 745, 757, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963); Rummel v. Estelle, 590 F.2d 103, 104 (5th Cir.1979).
The problem with these charges is that they are substantially redundant or cumulative when compared with the evidence Neal offered at trial. Specifically, Neal now wants to present evidence of his lack of mental capacity, a fact said to go to the voluntariness of his confession and to be in mitigation of sentence. But he went into these same matters at trial. He called Dr. Dana Alexander, a clinical psychologist. He showed that he had been in Ellis-ville State School for retarded youths and that he was later in the retardation unit at Mississippi State Hospital at Whitfield. He further proved that his IQ was 54. See Neal v. State, 451 So.2d at 751-52 for further details of proof at trial. Because it is cumulative, what Neal alleges and purports to show now that counsel should have developed and proved simply does not amount to a substantial showing of denial of a state or federal right. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-27(5).
The same is true of Neal's allegations that competent counsel should have done a better job at sentencing phase of proving the details of Neal's troubled life. In addition to the testimony described above regarding his prior institutionalization, Neal called his mother as a witness who told his life story. Perhaps the details could have been fleshed out more fully through additional witnesses. This may often be said after an unsuccessful trial experience.
There is merit to Neal's demand for an evidentiary hearing on his claim of denial of his right of allocution. For present purposes, and applying the substantive and procedural standards set out above, we hold that Neal has not made a substantial showing of denial of his right to effective assistance of counsel. His prayer for an evidentiary hearing on this issue is denied.
IV.
Neal's claim that he was denied the right to testify in his own behalf is an element of his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. That claim has independent standing as well by virtue of the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and Article 3, § 26 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890. Here, it will be recalled, Neal says that, had his lawyers allowed him to testify, he would have presented highly probative evidence regarding the circumstances of his custodial interrogation as well as the abuse and deprivation he experienced as a child and as a young man, all in mitigation of punishment.
We addressed a similar question in Culberson v. State, 412 So.2d 1184 (Miss.1982). In Culberson we held that an accused has a constitutional right to testify in his own behalf.
The denial of the right of an accused to testify is a violation of his constitutional right regardless of whether the denial stems from the refusal of the court to let a defendant testify as in Warren v. State, 174 Miss. 63,164 So. 234 (1935), or whether the denial stems from the failure of the accused's counsel to permit him to testify.
412 So.2d at 1186.
The State's response does not mention our Culberson decision nor make any attempt to distinguish it. Indeed, we find no basis upon which the case could be distinguished. On this issue, and on the authority of Culberson, Howard Monteville Neal is entitled to an evidentiary hearing and an opportunity thereupon to establish his claim.
V.
A.
Neal argues that he was denied due process of law in that the Circuit Court refused to exclude the in-court identification testimony of Kenneth Hoffman. We considered that point on its merits on direct appeal and resolved it adversely to Neal. Neal v. State, 451 So.2d at 759-60. Under principles of collateral estoppel well established in our law, see Irving v. State, 498 So.2d 305, 308, 313 (Miss.1986); Mann v. State, 490 So.2d 910, 911 (Miss.1986); Evans v. State, 441 So.2d 520, 522-23 (Miss.1983); Sanders v. State, 429 So.2d 245, 248-51 (Miss.1983), Neal is precluded from relitigating the point here. Neal is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on this claim nor to any relief.
B.
Neal next claims that the Circuit Court erred when it denied his motion for a directed verdict based upon insufficient evidence of kidnapping. Here Neal refers to the fact that he was charged with capital murder under Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-19(2)(e) (Supp.1983) and that the indictment more specifically charged that Neal had killed Amanda Joy Neal during the course of kidnapping her. It was necessarily incumbent upon the State in that posture of the matter to prove the kidnapping charge against Neal. We considered that point on its merits on direct appeal and resolved it adversely to Neal. Neal v. State, 451 So.2d at 757-68. Under principles of collateral estoppel well established in our law, Neal is precluded from relitigat-ing the point here. Neal is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on this claim nor to any relief.
C.
Neal next charges that the Circuit Court erred in overruling his motion to exclude evidence of other crimes. Here he refers to the trial evidence of crimes committed against Bobbie Neal and Melanie Sue Lang-ston a/k/a Melanie Sue Polk. We considered that point on its merits on direct appeal and resolved it adversely to Neal. Neal v. State, 451 So.2d at 758-59. Under principles of collateral estoppel well established in our law, Neal is precluded from relitigating the point here. Neal is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on this claim nor to any relief.
D.
Neal alleges that the Circuit Court committed error in failing to suppress his alleged custodial statements. Here he refers to the testimony of Stockton, California Detective Sgt. Wilson Stewart. We considered that point on its merits extensively on direct appeal and resolved it adversely to Neal. Neal v. State, 451 So.2d at 750-57. Under principles of collateral estoppel well established in our law, Neal is precluded from relitigating the point here. Neal is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on this claim nor to any relief.
E.
Neal argues that, during the sentencing phase of the trial proceedings against him, the Circuit Court erred by effectively precluding jury consideration of non-statutory circumstances in mitigation of punishment. We considered that point on its merits on direct appeal and resolved it adversely to Neal. Neal v. State, 451 So.2d at 760-62. Under principles of collateral estoppel well established in our law, Neal is precluded from relitigating the point here. Neal is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on this claim nor to any relief.
F.
Neal next charges that imposition of the death penalty was the result of the prosecuting attorney's improper and inflammatory argument and was based upon passion, prejudice and other impermissible factors. This, he says, constitutes a violation of rights secured to him under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. We considered that point on its merits on direct appeal and resolved it adversely to Neal. Neal v. State, 451 So.2d at 762. Under principles of collateral estoppel well established in our law, Neal is precluded from relitigating the point here. Neal is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on this claim nor to any relief.
G.
Neal argues finally that, under the circumstances of this case, the death sentence is both disproportionate and excessive and, accordingly, is inconsistent with rights secured to him by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. We considered that point on its merits on direct appeal and resolved it adversely to Neal. Neal v. State, 451 So.2d at 762-63. Under principles of collateral estoppel well established in our law, Neal is precluded from relitigating the point here. Neal is not entitled to an evi-dentiary hearing on this claim nor to any relief.
VI.
The only relief to which Neal is entitled at this time, of course, is an evidentiary hearing.
We grant the application of Howard Monteville Neal for an evidentiary hearing on his claim that he was denied the right to take the witness stand and testify in his own behalf. The matter is remanded to the Circuit Court of Lawrence County for purposes of conducting such a hearing. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-23 and -27 (Supp.1986); Tokman v. State, 482 So.2d 241 (Miss.1986); Leatkerwood v. State, 473 So.2d 964 (Miss.1985); Culberson v. State, 412 So.2d 1184,1186 (Miss.1982). On all other issues and claims, Neal's application is denied.
PETITIONER'S MOTION TO VACATE OR SET ASIDE JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE DENIED IN PART, GRANTED IN PART, AND REMANDED TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LAWRENCE COUNTY FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING
WALKER, C.J., ROY NOBLE LEE, P.J., and GRIFFIN, J., concur.
HAWKINS, P.J., and ANDERSON, ROBERTSON, PRATHER and SULLIVAN, JJ., concur in part, dissent in part.
. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 71 L.Ed. 379 (1982).
. Post-conviction actions employ many of the procedural trappings of a civil action. The motion for summary judgment is available. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-19 (Supp.1986); see also Rule 56, Miss.R.Civ.P. As in civil actions, we do not resolve genuine issues of material fact by a process of trial by affidavit.