Case Name: Sherman v. Christy; and Easley v. Christy
Court: Iowa Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Iowa
Decision Date: 1864-10-25
Citations: 17 Iowa 322
Docket Number: 
Parties: Sherman v. Christy and Easley v. Christy.
Judges: 
Reporter: Iowa Reports
Volume: 17
Pages: 322–329

Head Matter:
Sherman v. Christy and Easley v. Christy.
I. Per Lowe, J., Weight, Ch. J., and Dillon, J., concurring.
1. Promissory note: hum: confession of jtosment. C., a member of tho firm of C. & G., executed for the firm promissory notes running as follows : 11 We and each, as principal, jointly and severally promise,” &c., to ■which was signed the name of the firm. Upon these, G. confessed a judgment against the firm, which was held in another proceeding to bind him alone. In an action against 0. upon the notes it was held:
1. That the notes bound 0. severally as wefi as jointly; that they bound G. jointly only as a member of the firm.
2. That the confession of judgment thereon hound G. alone.
3. That the notes, being several as to 0., were not merged in the judgment which bound G. alone; and that an action against 0. severally could be maintained thereon.
II. Per Cole, J., dissenting.
2. -A promissory note executed in the name of a firm, in the transaction of firm business, is a joint and not a several note; notwithstanding it is recited upon the face thereof that it is executed jointly and severally, and a several action against one of the partners cannot be maintained thereon.
Appeal from Polk District Court.
Tuesday, October 25.
The questions presented in these cases are identical. They arc actions upon notes in the following form :
$366t\V Fort Des Moines, Iowa, Dec. 21 si, 1857.
Fifteen days afterdate, we each, as principal, jointly and severally promise to pay to the order of Hoyt Sherman & Go., three hundred and sixty-six xVo dollars, with interest at — per cent, value received, payable at the banking house of Hoyt, Sherman & Co. We agree the holders may enforce, delay, or extend the payment of this note, without affecting our liability thereon.
(Signed) Cheisty & Griffe.
The other note is for $1,404.94, dated 19th December, 1857, and in its form and execution precisely similar to the one just set forth. At the time these notes were given, the makers thereof were partners. They were executed 'by Christy, the party now sued. It farthervappears from the pleadings, and facts reported by the referee, that heretofore the partner Griffe confessed a judgment in vacation on these notes, the other partner not concurring therein. On appeal to this court (see Christy v. Sherman et al., 10 Iowa, 535), it was held that the judgments had no force as against Christy, but that they were valid as to Griffe. In .these actions, the question presented is, were these notes so merged in the judgments by confession that an action cannot be maintained on them against Christy? The court below held affirmatively, and the plaintiffs appeal.
Casady & Polk for the appellants.
S. V. White for the appellee.

Opinion:
Lowe, J.
—In the case of North & Scott v. Mudge & Co., 13 Iowa, 496, the facts were quite different. The party executing the note, which was joint, both upon its face and in its execution, was the one which confessed the judgment: afterwards the other copartner was sued upon the contract. We held that he was not liable, because the note was joint, and not joint and several, and being turned into a judgment, which was a demand of a higher degree, the contract was merged. With this decision we are still content. The cases at bar differ from that, in this: The notes sued are clearly on their face several as well as joint; the party sued is the one who executed them; and whilst^he could not execute such instrument so as to be binding on his copartner in his several capacity, as he could not confess a judgment on a firm note, which would bind his partner, yet, if such a confession would be good and valid against himself, we see no reason why he may not make a several contract in the name of the firm, on which he alone shall be individually responsible. In reason and common sense, the principle involved in the one cannot be essentially different in the other. We all understand that the responsibility of partners is joint, and that one partner has no right or power to bind his copartner in a several contract so that he can be separately sued; but does it follow from this that one partner executing a firm note may not, if he choose, so execute it as to make himself separately liable? Why not? With what principle does it interfere ? It is true an individual creditor may demand that the judgment, when obtained in such case, shall be satisfied out of the firm property, if the enforcement of said judgment is likely to interfere with his rights. And so a firm creditor may insist upon the same thing, if there should be but little individual property and a sufficiency of partnership effects. But whilst the two classes of creditors may thus protect themselves, as they often have to do, through the aid of courts, it does not follow that the defendant can take shelter under their rights and ignore a responsibility which he has voluntarily, yet unnecessarily, if yon please, incurred.
To illustrate once more. On these notes, Griffe, the other partner, confessed a judgment, not against himself alone, but in the name and against the firm. Now, we have made a judicial determination upon the legal effect of this act, and we have said that it was only effectual against the party confessing. If, then, one partner does incur a separate liability in confessing a judgment on a firm note, by mere implication of law, why may not the other partner, by an express covenant to that effect, incur a similar responsibility for himself. If not, the writer of this opinion is unfortunate in not being able to distinguish the difference in principle between the two cases, except that he thinks the liability arising from the express contract is more reasonable, obvious and just than the one fixed upon the party from reason, analogy or mere implication of law.
We conclude, therefore, that it is competent for one partner to execute a firm note in such way as to render himself separately liable thereon; and when he has done so, as in the case at bar, and the other partner confesses a judgment on the same instrument, the contract is not carried into the judgment so confessed, so far as the defendant is concerned, but a separate action may be maintained thereon against him, being the party who signed the firm's name to said note. If, however, the party executing such joint and several note, had confessed a judgment on the same, it would not follow that a separate suit could be maintained on said note against the other partner, for the reason it was not competent to fix upon him, without his consent, a separate liability. The case, in that aspect of it, would fall within the rule laid down in the cáse of North & Scott v. Madge & Co., supra. In support of the principle intended to be settled by this opinion, we refer to the case of Snow v. Howard, 35 Barb. S. C. R., 55, where the same question under a like state of facts arose, and was similarly determined. We also cite tire case of Sheehy v. Mandeville, 6 Cranch, 253, where MARSHALL, Oh. J., substantially held, that the doctrine of merger applies only to a case in which the original declaration or judgment was in a joint covenant. But it may be said that in this case the execution of the note sued is in the name of the firm alone, and not by their individual names, and that this joint execution thereof will conti'ol the body of the note and determine the character of the paper, whether it be joint or several. In this proposition we cannot concur. The note in question was upon its face several as well as joint. "We see no reason why the partner signing such a note may not be held liable, upon the same .principle that he would be liable upon a note joint, both by its terms and signature, but given for a consideration that was personal and outside of the firm business. In the latter case, the partners signing the firm name has been held to be liable on the note, which his copartner would be discharged; for the reason that he will not he allowed to take advantage of his own malfeasance, by claiming that the instrument is void for want of power to execute it for a purpose personal and individual. Livingston v. Hostic, 2 Caines, 246; Laverty and Gantley v. Burr & Baldwin, 1 Wend., 529; Parker v. Jackson, 16 Barb., 33; Doty v. Bates and Handy, 11 Johns., 544; Dob & Dob v. Halsey, 16 Johns., 34.
Judgment below Reversed.