Case Name: Donald Ray BEAN, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1984-09-28
Citations: 469 So. 2d 768
Docket Number: No. 84-153
Parties: Donald Ray BEAN, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: DAUKSCH and COWART, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 469
Pages: 768–771

Head Matter:
Donald Ray BEAN, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 84-153.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Sept. 28, 1984.
On Rehearing and Clarification May 30, 1985.
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Daniel J. Schafer, Asst. Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Gary W. Tinsley, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona ■ Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
COBB, Chief Judge.
The appellant, Donald Ray Bean, was charged with and tried for two counts of felony murder, the first count predicated on robbery and the second on kidnapping, in regard to the homicide of one person. After a jury verdict of guilt as to both counts, the trial judge adjudicated him guilty of each count but sentenced only as to Count I.
On appeal, Bean asserts the second conviction for the same homicide was error based on prior opinions from this court: Goss v. State, 398 So.2d 998 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), and Muszynski v. State, 392 So.2d 63 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). The state concedes error in this regard.
In both Goss and Muszynski we held that one homicide can support only one murder conviction. In neither case did we cite to a state or federal constitutional provision to support our conclusion, apparently on the assumption that the proposition was self-evident. Since those opinions were issued, however, the United States Supreme Court has decided Ohio v. Johnson, — U.S. —, 104 S.Ct. 2536, 81 L.Ed.2d 425 (1984) and concluded that judgments of conviction for both manslaughter and murder for one homicide in one trial setting do not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution. The issue of cumulative punishments for such convictions was determined to be a matter of state legislative intent in footnote 8 of the majority opinion in Ohio.
Ohio seems as incongruous to us as it did to the two dissenting justices therein, Stevens and Marshall. We adhere to the conclusion reached in Goss and Muszynski and now predicate our holding on section 9 of Article I of the Florida Constitution, which states that "no person shall . be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense," thereby precluding more than one homicide conviction (judgment) where there has been but one death, even though the defendant has been charged with multiple homicide counts. Therefore, we reverse the appellant's judgment of guilt under Count II (felony murder — kidnapping) and remand for vacation of that judgment.
We find appellant's remaining points on appeal to be without merit.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; and REMANDED.
DAUKSCH and COWART, JJ., concur.
. See also Thomas v. State, 380 So.2d 1299 (Fla. 4th DCA), review denied, 389 So.2d 1116 (Fla. 1980); Phillips v. State, 289 So.2d 769 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974).