Case Name: Richard TOOMBS, etc., Appellant, v. ALAMO RENT-A-CAR, etc., et al., Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2000-07-28
Citations: 762 So. 2d 1040
Docket Number: No. 5D99-2043
Parties: Richard TOOMBS, etc., Appellant, v. ALAMO RENT-A-CAR, etc., et al., Appellees.
Judges: PETERSON, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 762
Pages: 1040–1044

Head Matter:
Richard TOOMBS, etc., Appellant, v. ALAMO RENT-A-CAR, etc., et al., Appellees.
No. 5D99-2043.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
July 28, 2000.
William 1. Petros, P.A., Miami, and Hicks & Anderson, PA.., Miami, for Appellant.
Walter A. Ketcham, Jr., and David W. Henry of Grower, Ketcham, More, Rutherford, Noecker, Bronson, Siboni & Eide, P.A., Orlando, for Appellee, Alamo Rent-A-Car.

Opinion:
PLEUS, J.
Richard Toombs, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Julia Studdard, appeals a final summary judgment in favor of Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. in a wrongful death action against Alamo and others. Julia Studdard was killed in an automobile that her husband had rented from Alamo. Her husband and two minor children survived. We affirm.
Toombs sought damages on behalf of the two surviving minor children under Florida's Wrongful Death , Act pursuant to section 768.19, Florida Statutes (1997) and brought a claim against Alamo as owner of the rented vehicle that was involved in the accident. Alamo moved for summary judgment on the ground that Julia Stud-dard, a co-bailee of Alamo's vehicle, could not rely 'on the dangerous instrumentality theory where the injury occurred while the vehicle was in her possession. The trial court agreed with Alamo and granted its motion for summary judgment.. In this appeal, Toombs argues that the trial judge erred in failing to follow the recent case of Enterprise Leasing. Co. v. Alley, 728 So.2d 272 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 741 So.2d 1135 (Fla.1999). Alamo asserts this case is controlled by Raydel, Ltd. v. Medcalfe, 178 So.2d 569 (Fla.1965), and that Alley is simply wrong.
Relying on Alley, Toombs argues that even though Julia Studdard's "right of action" was lost because she was a co-bailee, her minor childrens' wrongful death "cause of action" survives. For reasons set forth in this opinion, we find that both the cause of action and the right of action were lost.
The trial judge, relying on Raydel, concluded that because Julia Studdard could not recover against Alamo, her minor children were also barred from recovery. In Raydel, the supreme court held that the dangerous instrumentality doctrine does not apply "where an automobile is entrusted to a husband and wife jointly and while it is in their dominion and control it is negligently operated by one of them, injuring one or both of them." 178 So.2d at 572.
The facts in Alley are virtually identical to those of the instant case. The second district did not find that Raydel barred recovery by the minor children even though it recognized that reconciliation of its decision with Raydel and other pertinent cases was "difficult and challenging." Alley, 728 So.2d at 274.
The second district, in finding a cause of action in favor of the survivors, concluded that only the "right of action," for reasons "personal to the decedent" was lost. Id. at 276. We are unable to reconcile this case with Raydel. A right of action, as explained by the supreme court in Shiver v. Sessions, 80 So.2d 905, 908 (Fla.1955), is "'a remedial right affording redress for the infringement of a legal right belonging to some definite person, whereas a cause of action is the operative facts which give rise to such right of action.' " ' In explaining how the legislature created a right of action in favor of certain beneficiaries under the Wrongful Death Act, the court further noted:
But we think it is unreasonable to imply that the Legislature intended to bar the 'right of action' created by the Act on account of a disability to sue which is personal to a party having an entirely separate and distinct 'right of action' and which does not inhere in the tort— or 'cause of action' — upon which each separate right of action is based.
Id.
We do not believe that an individual's status as a co-bailee of a dangerous instrumentality is a mere disability to sue, but rather, prevents the cause of action from wholly existing in such a circumstance. The dangerous instrumentality doctrine, in short, was never intended to apply to the bailee of that instrumentality during the operation of the bailment. Florida Power & Light Co. v. Price, 170 So.2d 293 (Fla.1964). The co-bailee cannot impute the negligence of the other co-bailee/driver to Alamo. We hold that because no right of action existed at the time of Julia Stud-dard's-death, no wrongful death cause of action survived the decedent. . Variety Children's Hosp. v. Perkins, 445 So.2d 1010 (Fla.1983).
This opinion, of course, does not affect the claims which the minor children may have against other defendants. We affirm' the summary judgment and certify conflict between this case and Alley.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AFFIRMED; CONFLICT CERTIFIED.
PETERSON, J., concurs.
HARRIS, J., concurs specially, with opinion.
. Toombs also sought damages for the personal injuries of one of the minors. The summary judgment ruling did not affect the personal injury claim of the child.
. Toombs also claims summary judgment was improper because there was a factual issue as to whether Julia Studdard was a co-bailee. The facts establishing a bailment, however, are not in dispute. ' Her name and license number were on the rental agreement and she, along with her husband, drove the car.
.While we also disagree with the holding in Alley, the rule of law in that case was nonetheless binding on the trial court. Pardo v. State, 596 So.2d 665, 666 (Fla.1992).