Case Name: Joe Harrold v. The State
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1904-06-08
Citations: 46 Tex. Crim. 568
Docket Number: No. 2812
Parties: Joe Harrold v. The State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Criminal Reports
Volume: 46
Pages: 568–572

Head Matter:
Joe Harrold v. The State.
No. 2812.
Decided June 8, 1904.
1. —Theft—Accomplice—Indictment.
An indictment charging C. with theft of horses which he obtained by virtue of a contract of hire and which he afterwards fraudulently converted to his own use, and which charges H. as an accomplice by fraudulently advising C. to commit the theft, before the commission of said offense, is good and need not allege that H. was a party to the contract of hirei. Davidson, P. J., dissenting.
2. —Charge of the Court—Fraudulent Taking.
Where the court in its main charge instructed the jury that before they could convict the accomplice that they must find the principal guilty of the theft of the horses, it was not error to refuse to give a special charge that if said principal took the horses for the purpose of stealing a ride, to acquit the accomplice who was on trial.
3. —Same—Guilt of Principal May Be Shown.
The statement of the principal to the party from whom he hired the horses alleged to have been afterwards stolen by him were admissible in evidence to show the guilt of the principal, and it was not necessary that the court should so limit this testimony, as it could not be used for any other purpose to affect the accomplice.
4. —Evidence—Circumstantial Conclusive, When.
When circumstantial evidence is of that conclusive character leading on the whole to a satisfactory conclusion and irresistibly points to defendant’s guilt to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis, it is sufiilcient to sustain the conviction.
Appeal from the District Court of Parker. Tried below before Hon. J. W. Patterson.
Appeal from a conviction of theft of horses; penalty, two years im- • prisonment in the penitentiary.
The testimony for the State shows that C. H. McCarty, who was charged as the principal in the indictment, hired a two-horse buggy from Henry Walker, the agent of John Gilbert, who kept a livery stable, saying he wanted to go to take his sister to Granbury, Texas, andi^ would be gone two days. The appellant was not with him at that time, but was seen later riding in the hired buggy with McCarty. They did not return, and after some twelve or fifteen days the team was found at Weatherford, Okla., where defendant and McCarty were arrested. The State’s witnesses testified to several circumstances which pointed to the fact that defendant acted with McCarty in obtaining the team, but there was no direct testimony that he in any way participated in the taking. Appellant’s sister took the stand and testified that McCarty and defendant came to Weatherford, Okla., in the team alleged to have been stolen and said they had hired it, and that they laid no claim to it, nor offered to dispose of it. Defendant was about 22 years old.
Preston Martin, for appellant.
Appellant could not be guilty under this article of the statute unless he was a party to the contract of hiring, or was known in the contract of hiring, or was known in the contract by Walker at the time he parted with his possession of the horses and delivered same to said McCarty. Calkins v. State, 29 S. W. Rep., 1081.
On the question of admitting McCarty’s statement to Henry Walker: Arnold v. State, 9 Texas Crim. App., 435; Sims v. State, 10 Id., 131; Crook v. State, 27 Id., 198.
Howard Martin, Assistant Attorney-General for the State.

Opinion:
BROOKS, Judge.
Appellant's punishment was fixed at two years confinement in the penitentiary, under an indictment charging substantially, as follows: That C. H. McCarty, on September 22, 1903. "having possession of two horses then and there the property of one John Gilbert, by virtue of his contract of hiring made with one Henry Walker, who was thereunto duly authorized by and acting for the said John Gilbert, as the agent and employe of the said John Gilbert, did then and there unlawfully and without the consent of said John Gilbert and Henry Walker, and without the consent of said John Gilbert and Henry Walker, and without the consent of either the said John Gilbert or Henry Walker, fraudulently convert said horses to his, the said C. H. McCarty's own use, and with the intent to deprive the said John Gilbert, the owner, of the value of the same; and the aforesaid grand jurors further state upon théir oaths as aforesaid that on or about the above named day and date, in the county and State aforesaid, one Joe Harrold, before the commission of said offense of theft by said C. H. McCarty, as aforesaid, did then and there fraudulently advise, command and encourage the said C. H. McCarty to do and commit the said offense of theft, as aforesaid, he, the said Joe Harrold not being personally present when said offense was committed .by the said C. H. McCarty," etc. Appellant moved to quash the indictment because it was not alleged therein that appellant was a party to the contract of hiring. We hold that it is not necessary to allege in the indictment that he was a party to the contract of hiring. The indict ment does allege that he advised and encouraged the principal McCarty to commit the offense. We accordingly hold the indictment is good.
Appellant insists that the court committed error in refusing his requested instruction number 3. The substance of this special charge is that if McCarty took the horses for the purposes of stealing a ride with them, but not with intention of appropriating them, appellant would not be guilty. This charge is correct; but the evidence in this case does not raise this issue. Furthermore, the court's charge was sufficient to protect appellant's rights, even conceding that issue is in the case, since the court instructed the jury, among other things, that before they could convict appellant they must find that McCarty was guilty of theft, and that he appropriated the horses in Parker County.
Appellant further insists that the court erred in not instructing the jury that they could not consider the statement of McCarty, made to Henry Walker at the time the contract of hiring was made, since said statements were made in the absence of appellant. It was not necessary to so limit this testimony, since the statement of the principal, McCarty, to the party from whom he hired the horses, was admissible as original evidence to show the guilt of McCarty, and the jury could not appropriate said testimony for any purpose except to show the guilt of McCarty.
Appellant strenuously insists that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. While the evidence is circumstantial, it is of that conclusive character leading on the whole to a satisfactory conclusion and irresistibly leading one to believe in appellant's guilt,, to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis. The judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.