Case Name: Hiram Emerson versus William Thompson et al.
Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
Jurisdiction: Massachusetts
Decision Date: 1824-10
Citations: 2 Pick. 473
Docket Number: 
Parties: Hiram Emerson versus William Thompson et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Massachusetts Reports
Volume: 19
Pages: 504–536

Head Matter:
Hiram Emerson versus William Thompson et al.
The Si. 32 Hen. 8, c. 33, giving a right of entry upon the heir of a disseisor within five years from the disseisin, has been adopted in this commonwealth.
A disseisee recovered judgment against the heirs of the disseisor in a writ of entry ¡ in which they pleaded that they' did not disseise, and re-entered on his writ of seisin within five years from the disseisin by the ancestor. Held, that the heirs were liable in trespass for the mesne profits accruing after the commencement of the writ of entry, (and so, it seems, they would have been, if they had been purchasers,) but not for those accruing between the descent cast and their entry. As to those accruing between their entry and the commencement of the writ of entry, quaere.
Trespass for mesne profits. A trial was had upon the general issue, at March term 1822, before Wilde J., when the following facts appeared in the case.
The plaintiff having recovered a judgment against the administrators de bonis non of the estate of John Harris, deceased, levied his execution on the 30th of March, 1818, upon real estate, consisting of part of a store in Charlestown, then in the possession of J. and J. H. Brown, under a purchase from the same administrators. Before the plaintiff levied his execution, William Thompson, the father of the defendants, had recovered judgment for the premises in a writ of entry sur disseisin against the Browns, and on the 8th of May, 1818, he executed his habere facias seisinam and expelled the Browns, who were then in possession under a lease which the plaintiff had made to them immediately after his levy.
William Thompson, the elder, died on the 16th of November, 1818, and the defendants were his heirs at law. On the 20th of May, 1819, William Thompson, the defendant, in his capacity of administrator upon his father’s estate, leased the premises in question for one year ; and it did not appear that he, or any other of the defendants, had at any time before entered upon the premises, after the death of their ancestor.
On the 21st of May, 1819, the plaintiff brought his action against the defendants, for the premises, in which he declared as follows : — “In a plea of ejectment, wherein the plaintiff demands against the defendants seisin and possession of, &c., into which the said defendants have not entry but by William Thompson &c. deceased, who thereof unjustly disseised the plaintiff, and from whom the same descended to the defendants, and saith that he the said Emerson was seised of, &c., in his demesne as of fee, &c., within thirty years last past, &c., and was unjustly disseised thereof by the said William Thompson deceased, from whom the same descended to the defendants, who still unjustly withhold the same from the plaintiff.” To this the defendants pleaded, “ that they never disseised in manner and form,” &c. Upon this issue, the plaintiff obtained a verdict and judgment, and on the 17th of April, 1821, had his writ of seisin duly executed.
The counsel for the plaintiff, upon this evidence, contended that he was entitled to a judgment for the mesne profits from the levy of his execution, or at least from the death of Thompson the father; but the jury were instructed to compute the damages from the 21st of May, 1819, the time when the plaintiff commenced his suit for the recovery of the premises ; and they found a verdict accordingly, assessing the damages at 200 dollars per annum. It was agreed by the parties, that if the Court should be of opinion that the plaintiff was entitled to damages for any rents and profits previous to the 21st of May, 1819, the verdict should be altered so as t) conform to such opinion.
The cause was first argued at the bar, at October term 1822.
L. M. Parker for the plaintiff.
The plaintiff has a right to recover the mesne profits for some length of time ; the recovery in ejectment is conclusive on this point; Running. Ejectm. 442 ; Bull. N. P. 87 ; Bac. Abi Ejectm. H ; Aslin Parkin, 2 Burr. 667 ; Adams on Ejectm. 334 ; Benson v. Matsdorf, 2 Johns. R. 369 ; and we say the defendants are liable from the time of the disseisin by the ancestor The heirs take the land with all the incidents to which it was liable in the hands of the ancestor. In Jackson v. Stone, 13 Johns. R. 447, it was held, that where, during the pend-ency of an action of ejectment, the defendant gives up the possession to a third person, and afterwards the plaintiff recovers judgment, such third person is liable for the mesne profits. The heirs ought not to be better off than an innocent purchaser. The ancestor would have been liable for the rents and profits from the time of the disseisin. If the plaintiff cannot have a remedy against the heirs, he will have none against any person for the time previous to the ancestor’s death.
The defendants are liable at least for the time since the descent cast. They became seised at that time, as by plead ing the general issue in the action of ejectment they admit, (Higbee v. Rice, 5 Mass. R. 352,) and could be divested by action only, and not by a mere entry. Lit. § 385 ; Co. Lit. 238 a. The legal seisin carries with it the possession, unless there is adverse possession. Prop. of Kennebeck &c. v. Call, 1 Mass. R. 484. If then they were seised from the death of their ancestor, they are liable in trespass for the mesne profits from that time.
Stearns for the defendants.
The recovery in ejectment, as the former action has been called, did not give a right to mesne profits, for the party must show not only a title, but also a right of entry. Cox v. Callender, 6 Mass. R. 533 ; Fletcher v. M'Farlane, 12 Mass. R. 43. Without a right of entry an action of ejectment in the English form cannot be maintained. The plaintiff’s former action however was a writ of entry in the per, rather than an action of ejectment, and the doctrine in the English books in regard to the action of ejectment is therefore not applicable. The position asserted on the part of the plaintiff, that his entry was tolled, forms the basis of our defence. That this right was tolled, appears from 3 Bl. Comm. 176, where it is said, “ descents which take away entries, are when any one, seised by any means whatsoever, &c., dies,” &c. This is more comprehensive and more correct than the definition given by Littleton, § 385, who speaks of a descent from a disseisor only. It is believed that we have not adopted the St. 32 Hen. 8, c. 33, which provides, that except a disseisor has been in possession five years, his dying seised shall not take away an entry. This statute however extends only to the heir of a disseisor. Co. Lit. 237 6, 238 a, and notes, 239 a, note 1. Thompson, the ancestor, was not a disseisor. In Taylor v. Horde, 1 Burr. 114, Lord Mansfield says, “ The true owner cannot even elect to make a person in possession under a judgment in ejectment a disseisor.” “ The entry is not injuste et sine judicio ; but under authority of a court of justice and lawful; therefore not liable to punishment by fine, (as every disseisin was.)” Thompson came in by judgment of law against the Browns, who entered under a deed from the administrator, and who had a seisin sufficient, it is apprehended, to make them tenants to the prcecipe in a common recovery, and if so, it was sufficient in a writ of entry. The finding of the jury, which in form is, that the defendants disseised, is not to govern, when it appears by the case that there was no disseisin.
Admitting that Thompson was a disseisor, it does not follow that the defendants are trespassers. The judgment in the writ of entry is not conclusive as to that fact. It does not appear that they ever entered after the death of their ancestor, and if they did not, the law, by merely casting the descent, does not make them liable as trespassers. Where a descent, is cast, but there is no entry in fact, and one of the heirs, as administrator, leases the land, he does it on the ground that the ancestor had a term for years. The lease made by William Thompson, the son, was made in his capacity of administrator. If he did not enter as heir, there was no entry by the other heirs, and a joint action against them s not sustainable.
At the November term 1823, in Suffolk, Parker C. J. observed, that this case was one in which the Court had great difficulty in coming to a decision, but that the point in regard to which they were most doubtful, had not been much discussed by the counsel. It is alleged by the plaintiff, that the ancestor of the defendants disseised, and that the possession fell to his heirs. On the part of the defendants it was contended that the ancestor, having come in under a judgment, was not a disseisor; that the heirs came lawfully into possession, and the descent cast tolled an entry; and that the St. 32 Hen. 8, c. 33, had not been adopted in this State. We are of opinion that the ancestor did disseise. In Cummings v. Noyes, 10 Mass. R. 433, the defendant entered under a judgment against the plaintiff himself, which was afterwards reversed ; but this case is different ; here the ancestor entered under a judgment which was not against this plaintiff, and which cannot prejudice his rights. As to the statute of Hen. 8, we all know that it has been frequently applied, particularly in the District of Maine, as being in force in this State. Now the question about which we doubted is, whether, as the possession of the defendants was originally lawful, trespass will lie against them' for the mesne profits before actual entry by the plaintiff. It is true that they retained possession after a demand made, but as they came in by a lawful title, the question is, whether they can be made trespassers by relation. This is indeed a mere technical question ; for as the" defendants received the rents for two years after the plaintiff brought his writ to obtain possession, justice seems to require that they should account for them.
In consequence of these suggestions the cause was argued again, in writing.
Stearns, for the defendants,
contended that the action for mesne profits was an action of trespass quare clausum fregit, and in no respect different from the common action of trespass for injuries to real property. The judgment in the former action, that the plaintiff should recover seisin, does not affect the question of his right to mesne profits, except as evidence of his title to the premises. By his entry undei his writ of seisin on the 17th of April, 1821, he is in the same situation that he would have been in, if he had on that day taken possession by his entry only, without having com menced any suit.
A recovery in the English action of ejectment s conclu sive on the question of mesne profits, because the defendant is estopped from denying what he has confessed upon the record, that the plaintiff had entered on the land on the day on which the demise is laid; this puts the plaintiff in the same situation with a demandant in a writ of entry in our practice, who had actually entered on the day of the fictitious demise, and then brought his action and recovered. This distinction between these two modes of proceeding is of no consequence, where the recovery in a writ of entry is against the disseisor himself; but where it is against his heir or grantee it becomes highly important. If the - plaintiff had brought against Thompson the elder a writ of entry (which would have been entry in the quibus) and had recovered, he might then have maintained trespass for the mesne profits from the time when he was disseised. But Thompson the elder died, and the trespass which he had committed died with him. By his death the premises were cast upon the defendants, but they were not trespassers, because the plaintiff was disseised, as he himself affirms, before the descent, and having never re-entered until he executed his writ of seisin, he was never in possession during any part of the time for which he has demanded damages, and he cannot maintain this action. No principle of law is more fully established, than that in order to maintain trespass quare clausum fregit, the plaintiff must have the possession in fact of the premises. 4 Leon. 184 ; Bro. Trespass, pl. 227, pl. 365 ; 3 Bl. Com. 210. Therefore a disseisee, until he has reentered, can maintain trespass for no act done after the disseisin. Com. Dig. Trespass, B, 2, B, 3 ; Taylor v. Townsend, 8 Mass. R. 415.
The liability of the defendants in this action would be nowise different, whether they were heirs, grantees in fee, lessees for life or at will, or even disseisors of the disseisor. In the last case the plaintiff’s remedy to recover the premises would be by writ of entry in the post, but in none of these cases could he recover the mesne profits, unless he had actual possession at the time of the wrong done. If the plaintiff had not actual possession, then in none of these cases would the defendants be either disseisors or trespassers, and the plaintiff’s entry under his writ of seisin cannot relate back, 80 as t0 make them liable as trespassers. Tobey v. Webster, 3 Johns. R. 468 ; Liford’s case, 11 Co. 51 ; Compere v. Hicks, 7 T. R. 723.
If Thompson the elder, by his entry on the 8th of May, committed a trespass, it was not upon the plaintiff, but upon the Browns, his lessees. The plaintiff had parted with the possession voluntarily, and did not re-enter until he executed his writ of seisin against the defendants. He could therefore have maintained no action against Thompson the elder for having entered on the 8th of May, but his tenants should have brought the action.
But according to Taylor v. Horde, 1 Burr. 114, the elder Thompson could not be considered as a disseisor in consequence of his entry under the writ of seisin. As he, then, upon this ground, as well as the one just noticed, was not a disseisor, his heirs, who came into the estate by descent, cannot be made trespassers in the present case.
It was said by the counsel for the plaintiff, in the former argument, that if the recovery had been by the English action of ejectment, instead of a writ of entry, the action for the mesne profits might well be maintained, and therefore the Court ought to uphold the plaintiff’s claim. It is sufficient to reply, that the fiction in that action has never been adopted here ; and it would be absurd and incongruous to attempt to connect it with our practice, and apply it to a real action brought to recover, not a term, but a freehold. The distinction is well settled, that if the party would have the benefit of an entry, he must take care to make it in season; since the law does not allow our courts to compel a party to confess an entry which never was made, nor to decide that a party was in the actual possession when in truth he was out of possession.
Rand and L. M. Parker for the plaintiff.
Our possessory writs do not bear an exact resemblance to the ancient English writs of entry, and there seems to be no reason for arranging them in different classes, and making the same distinctions between them as were made between writs of entry by the ancient lawyers. The reasons which gave rise to those different forms of action have long since ceased to exist. In com mon parlance at least, our writs are called writs of ejectment, and they are brought for the same purposes as the English writ of ejectment. They contain a concise narrative of the facts of the case, and usually conclude by alleging an ejectment or deforcement of the demandant from his land. The plea commonly put in by the tenant is nul disseisin by himself. Our writs treat the tenant as a tortfeasor, and there is now no reason why he should not be so considered, whether he comes in by purchase or descent from a prior disseisor, or by his own tortious act.
But let us suppose the plaintiff’s first writ to be a writ of entry in the per, with all the privileges and disabilities of that ancient writ. Then since it is alleged in the writ, that the entry of Thompson, the ancestor, was tortious, and that the defendants came in under him, as they might have traversed these material facts and have not done it, they have by pleading other matter admitted them. Booth, bk. 3, c. 3; Rast. Ent. 249. In this view of the case, it is true, we must lay aside the concluding clause of the writ, “ who still unjustly withhold the same from the plaintiff,” (which is the peculiar conclusion in a writ in the post, Reg. 228 ; F. N. B. 201, E,) and consider it as alleging no deforcement by the defendants, but simply that they came in as heirs to the original disseisor. But although the writ, by this construction of it, does not declare them to be tortfeasors, the law (St 32 Hen. 8, c. 33) declares them to be so.
In the former action between these parties the defendants pleaded that they never disseised, in manner &c., and the jury found that they did disseise the demandant. They are therefore now estopped from denying that their entry was gained by tort as early at least as the 21st of May, 1819, the date of the writ in that action. If the judgment in ejectment in England is conclusive for the mesne profits between the demise laid and the recovery of possession, á fortiori, a judgment in a writ of entry sur disseisin upon a verdict that the tenants were guilty of a tort, must be conclusive upon the tenants, in an action of trespass, for at least the mesne profits accruing subsequently to the date of such writ. The confession of lease, entry and ouster in the Eng lish action is mere form. An actual entry is not now necessary ; nor was it ever held to be so, except to give validity to the lease which makes a part of the proceedings, by avoiding the technical objection, that no one out of possession could convey a valid title. Adams on Ejectm. 11. A right of entry will support the action ; and this too is necessary only for the purpose before mentioned ; and the demise may be laid back to the time when the title first accrued. Adams on Ejectm. 334 ; Bul. N. P. 87. The plaintiff might have brought his possessory action on the day of the descent cast, and might then have treated the defendants as tortfeasors. If he delayed to bring his suit, still, he had a right to consider them as trespassers from that time. By alleging the disseisin by Thompson the elder, and the descent cast, he has not waived the tort. The defendants, by pleading that they did not disseise, have admitted that they were tenants of the freehold and that they entered into possession claiming as heirs of Thompson the deceased. It is to be presumed therefore, after a verdict and judgment against them, that they tortiously entered and took the rents and profits which accrued subsequently to the death of the original disseisor, until the plaintiff obtained possession under his writ of possession in April 1821. Having obtained possession, what prevents the plaintiff from maintaining his action of trespass for these mesne profits ? His absence from the possession created a temporary suspension of his remedy, but having re-entered, his entry relates back to the time when he formerly was in possession, or when his title first accrued. 1 Chit. Pl. 177 ; 2 Rol. Abr. 554 ; Starr v. Jackson, 11 Mass. R. 520.
The objection that the plaintiff’s entry shall not relate back so as to give a right of action against the defendants, would have more plausibility and apparent equity, if they had come in as innocent purchasers ; whereas they have not only had the benefits of the rents and profits since their father’s death, but have also been gainers by their father’s tortious possession of the premises and taking the rents and profits, inasmuch as his estate was thereby enriched. The doctrine of relation, if applied in its full extent, would work no injury to them, but would only give to the plaintiff that to which in equity he is entitled.
The decision in Taylor v. Townsend seems to have turned upon points not relevant to the present case. Compere v. Hicks was trespass for mesne profits anterior to an entry to avoid a fine with proclamations, and it was decided that the plaintiff could not recover, because his title did not accrue before such entry. He could not lay the demise in his ejectment previous to the entry. So in Berrington v. Parkhurst, Andr. 136, it was held, for the same reason, that ejectment could not be maintained until after entry to avoid the fine ; and Lee C. J. said, “ This case therefore is not parallel to an action brought by a disseisee after entry for the mesne profits, to which it has been compared ; for here if the lessor is entitled to the mesne profits from the time of his demise, he will recover them from a time when he had no title ; whereas, in the other, the profits are recoverable only from the time when the disseisee had a title.” The reason why an entry is necessary, in the case of a fine, in order to give a title, is because the St. 4 Hen. 7, c. 24, has made it so. Adams on Ejectm. 83, 84.
In Liford’s case, 11 Co. 51, there is indeed a dictum of Lord Coke C. J., that the disseisee, after re-entry, cannot recover in an action for mesne profits against the feoffee, lessee, &c., or disseisor of the first disseisor ; and the reasons given are, that 11 this fiction of the law, that the freehold continued always in the disseisee, shall not have relation to make him, who comes in by title, a wrongdoer vi et armis ; ” that “it is to be presumed that the feoffee has given consideration or recompense to the disseisor, and that the lessee has paid rent to him or other consideration, and therefore in reason the disseisor is to be charged with the whole ; ” and in respect to the disseisor of the disseisor, that the “ fiction of law as to action, extends only to the first disseisor, and if the disseisee should punish the second disseisor, he would be twice charged.” Now neither of the two last reasons is applicable to the present case ; and since the plaintiff’s right of entry was not tolled by the descent, and no actual entry was necessary to maintain ejectment, wherein the de mise might be laid back to the time of the descent cast, and since after recovery in ejectment the judgment would be conclusive as to the mesne profits accruing after the time of the demise laid, there should seem to be no solidity in the first reason when applied to our case. The only case worthy of notice which supports any part of Lord Coke’s opinion, is in Keilway, 1 6, where the defendant prevailed, after a verdict for the plaintiff, because it appeared from the record, that the action was brought for the mesne profits against the feoffee of the disseisor, before entry by the plaintiff, the issue joined being held to be immaterial. It is there said, that at common law, before the statute of Gloucester, the disseisee in such case had no remedy except against the disseisor ; and that the remedy given by the statute against the mean occupiers “ is by assize only and not in an action of trespass, for this is as it was before the making of the statute.” The reason here given is very different from, those given by Lord Coke. The same law is laid down arguendo, and the same reason given, in Moore v. Hussey, Hob. 98, where it is said, that trespass vi et armis will not lie, “ for that fits not his case as to them who did no immediate trespass.” If then, as it should seem from these authorities, an assize of novel disseisin would have been maintainable in this, as well as in all the cases before mentioned, (2 Inst. 284,) surely, since this ancient writ is now entirely out of use, the plaintiff ought to be allowed to maintain his action of trespass. By the statute of Gloucester, even the person coming into possession by title, as by feoffment, was made liable, in case the original disseisor had not sufficient property whereof the damages might be levied. Much more ought the heir to be holden for damages done or profits received by himself after the death of his ancestor. For these no claim can be made on the estate of the original disseisor. Indeed none of the reasons given in any of the abovecited cases have any application to such a case. Much less do they apply to the mesne profits accruing between the suing out of the possessory action against the defendants, and the recovery of judgment therein. It would be a reproach to the law, if it furnished no remedy to recover such mesne profits as may have
accrued while the defendants have been resisting the plaintiff’s entry, until the last process of the law has put him in possession.
But the opinions above cited from Liford's case are not laid down by Lord Coke as settled law, and they are against the weight of the authorities. The same points had beef solemnly decided the other way, in the case of Holcomb Rawlyns, reported in Cro. Eliz. 540, Moore, 461, and Owen, 111. See also Hammond’s N. P. 195 ; Rol. Abr. Tresp. per Relation, pl. 7, 8 ; Gilb. Ten. 46, 47 ; Bull. N. P. 87 ; Adams on Ejectm. 334, 185 ; Burne v. Richardson, 4 Taunt. 720.
The lease to the Browns had expired at the time of the descent cast, and they had then no interest in the land and could claim no rents or profits ; and the plaintiff, by his re-entry, must be considered as having been in possession from the period at which the lessees’ interest expired.
Reported in 16 Mass. R. 172. But see Emerson v. Thompson et al., ilia 432.

Opinion:
Wilde J.
delivered the opinion of a majority of the Court. The question raised at the trial related to the extent of the defendants' liability ; but it has been since argued that they are not by law at all liable in this "action, it being trespass against the heirs of the disseisor, who came to the possession by lawful title. And this is the principal question now to be determined.
An action of trespass, being a possessory action, cannot be maintained, unless the plaintiff had the actual or constructive possession of the property trespassed upon, at the time of the trespass. A disseisee, therefore, cannot maintain trespass against the disseisor for an injury done to the land after the disseisin, until he shall have gained possession by re-entry ; after which he may have an action of trespass for the intermediate damages or mesne profits during the time of the tortious dispossession. The law in such cases resorts to a fiction for the attainment of justice ; and supposes the freehold to have been all along in the rightfu. owner by a kind of jus postliminii ; and thus he is considered as having a constructive possession while the actual possession was in the disseisor. Liford's case, 11 Co. 51. If, therefore, A disseise B, and C disseise A, and afterwards B re-enter, he may maintain trespass against both C and A, f°r both are wrongdoers. 2 Rol. Abr. 554.
But it isiaid down in Bro. Tresp. pl. 35, that if a disseis- or makes a lease or feoffment, and afterwards the disseisee re-enters, he cannot, although he thereby reduces the possession to himself from the time of the disseisin, maintain an action of trespass against the lessee or feoffee ; because the lessee or feoffee came in by title. Bac. Abr. Tresp. G, 2. It was however decided in the case of Holcomb v. Rawlyns, Cro. Eliz. 540, that an action of trespass might be maintained in such case against the lessee or feoffee, notwithstanding the plea of title. This was denied to be law, in two subsequent cases, (Liford's case, 11 Co. 51, and Symons v. Symons, 3 Car. 1, Hetley, 66,) and Lord Coke, in Li-ford's case, refers to several ancient cases in support of his opinion, acknowledging at the same time that " there was great variety of opinions in the books," so that it appears that this point was not well settled in Lord Coke's day ; and such has since been the infrequency of real actions in the English courts, that we look in vain for any further light in the modern English cases. But Lord Rolle, in his Abridgment, lays down the law in conformity with the decision of the court in the case of Holcomb v. Rawlyns, noticing Liford's case to the contrary. 2 Rol. Abr. 554, Tresp. per Relation. In like manner the law is laid down by Gilbert and Comyns. Gilb. Ten. 47, 50 ; Com. Dig. Tresp. B, 2. Gilbert says, that the old law was in conformity with the opinion of Lord Coke, and the reason he assigns, why the feoffee's title was formerly allowed though he came in by wrong, (or colorable title,) is because he anciently paid a fine to the lord.
Buller, in his N. P. 87, remarks on the law as laid down by Lord Coke in Liford's case, and says, " It may admit of doubt, for there are cases to the contrary, and the reason of the law seems to be with them." So far, therefore, from feeling myself bound by Liford's case as an authority, I am of opinion that the weight of authority is opposed to the decision in that case. And that this is the opinion also of the English courts may be inferred, I think, from their well- known practice in relation to the action for mesne profits consequent to a recovery in ejectment.
It must be remarked however, that this action may be maintained without overruling Liford's case, or disturbing the doctrine laid down by Lord Coke in relation to the lessees and feoffees of disseisors. The questions now raised for our consideration are, first, whether this doctrine is to be extended to heirs, claiming by descent ; and secondly, if it is, whether it is also to be extended to the heir, feoffee, or lessee of a disseisor, who after action brought for the recovery of possession shall wrongfully withhold it until judgment and execution.
No case has been found in which either of these questions has been decided or considered. They must therefore be determined by those principles and decisions which are most analogous.
Whatever may be the appearance of equity and sound law in the doctrine of Liford's case, it will vanish when applied to an action for mesne profits against heirs claiming the estate by descent. For m the former case, as the lessee or feoffee pays, or may be presumed to have paid, an equivalent for the rents and profits to the disseisor, if he is held responsible for them to the disseisee also, he may be twice charged ; which can by no possibility happen in respect to heirs. In the one case, the disseisee may have a remedy against the disseisor ; in the other, he has no remedy, and the law is defective, unless he can maintain an action against the heirs.
In my judgment there is much weight in these distinctions. They have an important bearing on most of the arguments made use of by Lord Coke in support of his opinion in Liford's case. We do not however think it necessary to take them into consideration in deciding this cause, it being the opinion of the majority of the Court, that the defendants W'ould be liable, if they had come into possession as purchasers. Admitting the plaintiff's right of possession, which has been clearly established, we consider the judgment in the writ of entry conclusive for the plaintiff, as to the mesne profits accruing after the commencement of that action. It ¡g well known, that such is the conclusive effect of a judgment in an action of ejectment. The right to mesne profits is a necessary consequence of a recovery in that form of action. The tenant is concluded by the judgment, and cannot after-wards, in an action for the mesne profits, be permitted to show a better title in bar, or a subsequent recovery by him of the same premises in another action. Adams on Ejectm. 335 ; Aslin v. Parkin, 2 Burr. 667 ; Bac. Abr. Ejectment, H ; Compere v. Hicks, 7 T. R. 723 ; Benson v. Matsdorf, 2 Johns. R. 369.
If then, on the facts appearing in this case, an ejectment could be maintained according to the English practice, it is difficult to assign any good reason why equal justice should not be dispensed in the forms of proceeding practised here. It is true that the demandant may recover in a writ of entry, notwithstanding the tenant's right of possession, which would be a bar to an action of ejectment. The judgment therefore for possession in a writ of entry is not conclusive, indeed it proves nothing at all, as to the right of possession ; and that right must be shown by the plaintiff in his action for the mesne profits. In every other respect, it appears to me that a judgment in a writ of entry is as conclusive in establishing the plaintiff's right to the mesne profits, as a judgment in an action of ejectment. That action is altogether a fictitious remedy introduced for the more convenient administration of justice, and would never have been allowed to change materially the important and essential rights of parties, so as to subject a man to damages for which he was not before liable in any form of action. This would have been an unwarrantable use of a legal fiction, giving new rights instead of a new remedy. Unless such was the effect of the introduction of the fictitious action of ejectment, it seems to me that it is incumbent on the defendants to show that the facts proved in this case would have been a bar to an action of ejectment. Lord Kenyon says, that trespass and ejectment stand on the same footing. 7 T. R. 728. Whatever would be a bar to an action for mesne profits after recovery of possession in a real action, ought to be a bar to an action of ejectment.
Having examined the authorities attentively, I have no hefi ration in saying that ejectment may be maintained against the lessee or feoffee of a disseisor, and against his heirs, unless in case of a descent which tolls the entry. Not a case nor a dictum, I apprehend, can be found to the contrary.
The general rule is, that whatever bars the right of entry is a bar to the plaintiff's title ; as a fine with non-claim, the statute of limitations, a descent cast, &c. Bac. A hr. Ejectment, E ; Adams on Ejectm. 241.
Ejectment being a possessory action, it is sufficient for the plaintiff to prove a possessory title. And generally where there is a right of entry in the plaintiff, no actual entry is required.
But where an entry is necessary to rebut the defendant's title, an actual entry is requisite, because until such actual entry the plaintiff has not the possessory title ; as in case of fine, which Lord Mansfield says is the only case where the plaintiff, having a right to enter, cannot maintain ejectment until after an actual entry. He says it was so settled in 1703, "by the opinion of all the judges, upon deliberation, and consideration of all the cases, and that so the practice had been ever after." " But where the entry is only neces-. sary to complete the landlord's title, (as where a power to reenter is reserved to him in case of non-payment of rent,) there the confession of lease, entry and ouster is sufficient." Goodright v. Cator, 2 Doug. 484 ; Oates v. Brydon, 3 Burr. 1897 ; Compere v. Hicks, 7 T. R. 727 ; Jackson v. Crysler, 1 Johns. Cas. 125 ; Adams on Ejectm. 90. But if a tenant for years levies a fine, that being a case not within the statute of fines, no actual entry is necessary ; the estate must be divested by the fine and by force of the statute, to render an actual entry necessary. Adams on Ejectm. 90. An actual entry is not necessary to avoid a fine without proclamations. Theré have been conflicting decisions on this point, but it seems now well settled. Doe v. Watts, 9 East, 19 ; Adams on Ejectm. 90 ; Doe v. Perkins, 3 Maule & Selw, 271.
From these authorities it seems very clear, that this is a case in which an ejectment, according to the practice in England and elsewhere, would well lie. And it is difficult to believe that courts would allow parties to entitle themselves to recover profits after an ejectment, to which they would not otherwise be entitled ; and that this course of practice should have been so long continued without question.
It is supposed by the defendant's counsel, that the conclusive effect of a judgment in ejectment upon the action for mesne profits is derived from the confession of the tenant, under the common rule, operating by way of estoppel. But this is denied by Lord Mansfield, in the case of Aslin v. Parkin, after a consultation with all the judges, who were unanimously of opinion that there is no distinction between a judgment upon a verdict, and a judgment by default. 2 Burr. 668.
It has also been argued by the defendants' counsel, that the plaintiff's entry was tolled by a descent ca»t, and that the defendants had not only the possession, but the right of possession. If this position can be maintained, I admit that the plaintiff has no case. It is impossible that the defendants can be liable in a possessory action, if they had the right of possession. The case of Taylor v. Townsend, cited by the defendants' counsel, depends on this principle. So also does the case of Cox et al. v. Callender, 9 Mass R. 533, which was argued and decided upon the ground that the plaintiff's right of entry had been barred previous to the commencement of the writ of entry.
But this objection fails, in the case at bar, by the pro visions of the St. 32 Hen. 8, c. 33, which has been adopted and acted upon here from the earliest times of which we have any recollection or knowledge.
It is hardly necessary to remark upon one position of the defendants' counsel, because if they could maintain it, it would not avail them. They deny that Thompson, the ancestor, can be considered as a disseisor; but if so, then the plaintiff was not dispossessed, for there is no pretence for saying that Thompson had a lawful possession. It is now, however, too late for either party to deny that Thompson was a dis seisor. On this point the judgment in the writ oí entry is conclusive.
From this review of the authorities it appears to me, that there is no legal objection to the plaintiff's right to recover; and we may allow ourselves to be guided by a sense of justice in our decision, without any apprehension that we shall in so doing infringe the established rules of law. But this right is limited to the profits after the commencement of the writ of entry. The doctrine of relation before referred to, only operates to make out the plaintiff's possession ; it cannot make the defendants trespassers before their entry. Whether they are liable for the time intervening after entry and before the date of the writ of entry, is in this case so unimportant that it is needless to give an opinion. After the demand of possession, the defendants, by holding on, became wrong-doers. And the plaintiff is not estopped to show this by the writ of entry. He is only estopped to deny that the defendants came into possession by a colorable title, but this is not inconsistent with the allegation that the possession was wrongfully withheld afterwards.
This deforcement or wrongful withholding of the possession is, so far as it respects the present question, equivalent to a disseisin. The plaintiff has been unlawfully deprived of the possession of his land ; and the defendants have received the rents and profits which they have no right to retain. Of this injury the plaintiff complains, and we think both by law and equity he is entitled to an indemnity. The case of Pulteney v. Warren, 6 Ves. 73, was decided on a principle applicable to the present case. In that case the lessor had been delayed from recovering in ejectment by a rule of court and by an injunction, at the instance of the defendant, who ultimately failed both in law and equity. And the court decreed an account of the mesne profits against the defendant's executors, solely on the ground of the delay caused by the defendant. But for this, a court of equity would not have enforced payment against the executors.
Upon the whole, the weight of authority is in favor of the plaintiff. The general rule is, that the disseisee, after re-entry, shall be considered as in possession from the time of the disseisin, by relation. This case does not come within the exception made in LifonPs case. There was no deforcement in that case, and the reason given for the exception is, that it would be hard to make a man a wrong-doer by relation. An exception of such doubtful authority ought not certainly to be extended for the protection of wrong-doers ; and such we consider the defendants, although they came into possession by a colorable title.
See Brown v. Galloway, 1 Peters's C. C. R. 291.
See Stearns on Real Actions (2d ed.) 367 and note; Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1.
Assumpsit will not lie for use and occupation against a bond fide purchaser for a valuable consideration, from the heirs of a disseisor, after a descent cast, and without notice of the disseisin. Wharton v. Fitzgerald, 3 Dallas, 503. See Butler v. Cowles, 4 Ohio R. 203.