Case Name: Roland ANDRY v. The PARISH OF ORLEANS et al.
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1975-03-12
Citations: 309 So. 2d 814
Docket Number: No. 6720
Parties: Roland ANDRY v. The PARISH OF ORLEANS et al.
Judges: Before LEMMON, SCHOTT and BEER, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 309
Pages: 814–816

Head Matter:
Roland ANDRY v. The PARISH OF ORLEANS et al.
No. 6720.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
March 12, 1975.
Byron Magbee, Baton Rouge, for plaintiff-appellant.
Chronvich & Wambsgans, Anthony W. Wambsgans, Richard Michalczyk, Metairie, for defendant-appellee, Louis A. Heyd, Jr.
Blake G. Arata, City Atty., Robert K. Tracy, Asst. City Atty., for defendant-ap-pellee, The Parish of Orleans.
Before LEMMON, SCHOTT and BEER, JJ.

Opinion:
BEER, Judge.
Plaintiff-appellant, Roland Andry, filed suit against Deputy Criminal Sheriff Charles Engles and Criminal Sheriff Louis Hyde, Jr., alleging that Engles severely injured him in the course of an unsuccessful escape attempt. Appellant claims he put up no resistance when he was apprehended and that his alleged injuries were intentionally and unnecessarily inflicted.
The trial court sustained Sheriff Hyde's exception of no cause of action and rendered summary judgment dismissing him from the proceedings. We reverse.
The only question with which we must be concerned is whether an escaping prisoner may have a cause of action against the sheriff if a deputy sheriff uses excessive force to apprehend him.
In order for the sheriff to be required to respond to the allegations that he is responsible for the wrongful action of a deputy, the petition must allege that the deputy's act was committed while he was performing an official duty and must have resulted from the wrongful manner in which such official duty was performed, Gray v. De Bretton, 192 La. 628, 188 So. 722 (1939). In that case the Louisiana Supreme Court said:
"In discussing this point it must be borne in mind that no liability attaches to the defendant sheriff under the doctrine of respondeat superior, or under the doctrines of master and servant and principal and agent. The relation between a sheriff and his deputy is an official and not a private relation. The deputy is not a representative of the sheriff in his individual capacity, but he is a public officer whose authority and duty are regulated by law. As to the public, whose servants these officers are, the acts and omissions of a deputy sheriff are the acts and omissions of the sheriff himself. So far as the responsibilities of the office are concerned, the sheriff is liable for the acts and omissions both of himself and his deputy. Rich v. Graybar Electric Co., 125 Tex. 470, 84 S.W.2d 708, 102 A.L.R. 171, and annotations 102 A.L.R. 182, ix." at 724.
Plaintiff's petition alleges that Charles Engles was, at the time of the injury, acting in the capacity of a deputy sheriff. The answer admits this status. In Polizzi v. Trist, 154 So.2d 84 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1963), a case nearly on all fours with the one at bar, we stated: "If a deputy sheriff strikes a prisoner officially in his charge, when there is no need for it, his conduct in so doing would be a violation of an official duty, and malfeasance, for which the sheriff and his surety would be liable." Accordingly, a deputy allegedly using excessive force in the apprehension of an escaping prisoner could be found to have breached an official duty, thereby rendering the sheriff liable.
Appellee's contentions that appellant was contributorily negligent and that he assumed the risk of his injuries are without merit. Contributory negligence (if the escape could be classified as such) is not a valid defense to an intentional tort, South Texas Lloyds v. Jones, 273 So.2d 853 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 1973).
The trial court improvidently sustained the exception of no cause of action and granted appellee's motion for summary judgment. We must therefore reverse and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Costs are to be paid by ap-pellee.
Reversed and remanded.
LEMMON, J., concurs.
The trial court could have granted a motion to strike that portion of the plaintiff's demand against Sheriff Hyde individually as is proscribed by the application of LSA-R.S. 33:1433 which provides as follows:
"No sheriff of any parish of this state, nor his sureties, shall be liable for any act or tort committed by one of his deputies, or by any person commissioned as deputy sheriff by him, beyond the amount of the bond or limits of liability insurance furnished by said deputy sheriff, unless said deputy sheriff in the commission of the said tort, acts in compliance with a direct order of, and in the personal presence of, the said sheriff, at the time the act or tort is committed."