Case Name: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Ismael Antonio RAMOS, Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1978-02-15
Citations: 572 F.2d 360
Docket Number: No. 204, Docket 77-1271
Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Ismael Antonio RAMOS, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 572
Pages: 360–364

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Ismael Antonio RAMOS, Appellant.
No. 204, Docket 77-1271.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Argued Sept. 29, 1977.
Decided Feb. 15, 1978.
Rehearing En Banc Denied Feb. 15, 1978.
Feinberg, Circuit Judge, concurred in the result and filed an opinion.
Lumbard, Circuit Judge, concurred and filed an opinion.
Timbers, Circuit Judge, dissented from denial of rehearing en banc.
Rhonda C. Fields, Asst. U. S. Atty., for the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, N. Y. (David G. Tragef, U. S. Atty., for the Eastern District of New York and Alvin A. Sehall, Asst. U. S. Atty., Brooklyn, of counsel), for appellee.
Allen Harris, New York City (Perrotta & Harris, New York City, of counsel), for appellant.
Before LUMBARD, MOORE and FEIN-BERG, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
MOORE, Circuit Judge:
The appellant, Ismael Antonio Ramos (Ramos), having waived indictment, pleaded guilty to an information, charging him with possession with intent to distribute 17 ounces of heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). He was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment plus a special parole term of 10 years. From this sentence Ramos appeals. The facts, obtained from the sentencing minutes of May 19, 1977, relating to the imposition of this sentence must be reviewed.
Prior to sentencing, Ramos, at the time of his guilty plea, had been advised by the Court that he was entitled to remain silent; that the maximum sentence is 15 years plus a $25,000 fine and a minimum special parole term of 3 years.
Ramos, then 22 years of age, was told by the Court that he might be entitled to treatment under the Youth Correction Act but that "it is entirely in my discretion and I do not have to give reasons for not giving you that treatment". The Court suggested "if you wish it" Ramos should discuss it with his Probation Officer and that he (the Court) would take it into consideration if Ramos so desired. The advantages and disadvantages of such treatment were outlined. However, neither Ramos nor his counsel seem to have pursued the possibilities of this alternative.
On the day of sentencing, Ramos' counsel referred to the probation report, which so far as a prior criminal record is concerned, referred only to a traffic violation (conditionally discharged) and to letters from Ramos' family. He noted that Ramos was the support of his semi-invalid mother and sisters and then asked for leniency.
The probation report showed that Ramos had traveled to Chicago with some $14,000 supplied by an individual whose name Ramos gave to narcotics agents and who, as a result, was subsequently indicted. Ramos' participation was described "as a 'mule' to transport heroin between Chicago and New York". For this service Ramos, in need of money, was to receive ISOO. Upon his arrest at the time of attempting delivery, Ramos made statements implicating the other individual but as stated in the report "he subsequently refused to testify and is considered to be generally uncooperative". A "period of incarceration" was recommended, although his involvement in criminal activities was recent and he had no prior record except the traffic violation.
Counsel for Ramos told the Court that Ramos feared the consequences to his family if he testified at the trial of the individual for whom he was acting in transporting the heroin. Thereafter, in' colloquy in which Ramos' counsel, the Assistant United States Attorney and the Court participated, it became obvious that the Court placed great stress upon Ramos' cooperation with the Government by testifying. The Court said "[i]f he is anxious to show his cooperation with the Government, his time is now to say to the Government 'I'm willing to assist you in the trial'." (32-A). Counsel for Ramos even "advised him that possibly a more heavier [sic] sentence could possibly result". (34-A). The Court, after stating that he had read the probation report [which contained references to Ramos' refusal to testify] and that he had considered Ramos' indictment waiver and guilty plea, referred to counsel's "statements with respect to his [Ramos'] cooperation [which] are not very helpful to the Court" and thereupon sentenced Ramos to 10 years' imprisonment plus a special parole term of 10 years.
This court cannot be unmindful of the fact that Ramos, on this record, appears to have been only a transporter [i. e., a "mule"] of the heroin, that he had given the name of the individual for whom he was acting, that his testimony had not been shown to be vital to the successful prosecution of that individual, that he was 23 years of age at the time of sentencing, and that he was not a user or distributor [in the sense of being a "middleman"] of narcotics.
In our task of reviewing countless appeals of narcotics convictions we have had to become aware of sentences meted out to convicted traffickers in narcotics. Although we are mindful of an appellate policy of giving the broadest discretion to the sentencing judge, we have read the sentencing minutes and the probation report and are more than somewhat in doubt that the length of the sentence was not influenced by Ramos' refusal to testify for [cooperate with] the Government. This doubt is created because the judge gave no reasons for selecting the particular sentence.
The Proposed Rules on Sentencing of the Judicial Council of the Second Circuit (March 17, 1976) provide in section III(C):
"When sentence is imposed, the court should:
(3) State for the record, in the presence of the defendant, the reasons for the particular sentence imposed and for rejecting available sentencing alternatives; . . . "
Likewise, the American Bar Association Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures (Approved Draft, 1968) state that the court:
"(ii) normally should state for the record in the presence of the defendant the reasons for selecting the particular sentence to be imposed. . . . " § 5.6(ii).
The Third Circuit was faced with a not too dissimilar situation in United States v. Garcia, 544 F.2d 681 (1976). Although Fifth Amendment rights, are not here involved (the question does not arise here because the stated reason for Ramos' failure to testify is fear of harm to his family), nevertheless the sentencing problem was before the Garcia court, which said:
"The appellants were put to a Hobson's choice: remain silent and lose the opportunity to be the objects of leniency, or speak and run the risk of additional prosecution [here violence to his immediate family]. A price tag was thus placed on appellants' expectation of maximum consideration at the bar of justice: they had to waive the protection afforded them by the Fifth Amendment. This price was too high. We, therefore, cannot permit the sentences to stand." (footnote omitted). 544 F.2d 681, at 685.
We believe, since no "reasons for selecting the particular sentence to be imposed" were stated by the Court, that Ramos' refusal to testify may have been an important factor in the sentence. The present sentence should be vacated and Ramos should be re-sentenced after hearings conducted before another judge.
. Ramos told the Probation Officer "that his family was in poor financial condition and he became involved in the offense 'out of desperation'."