Case Name: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. LEON COUNTY, FLORIDA, Appellee
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1982-02-25
Citations: 410 So. 2d 1346
Docket Number: No. 61359
Parties: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. LEON COUNTY, FLORIDA, Appellee.
Judges: SUNDBERG, C. J., and ADKINS, OYER-TON, ALDERMAN and EHRLICH, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 410
Pages: 1346–1349

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. LEON COUNTY, FLORIDA, Appellee.
No. 61359.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Feb. 25, 1982.
Donald S. Modesitt, State Atty., for the Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, for appellant.
F. E. Steinmeyer, III, County Atty., and Hugh M. Taylor and Elise F. Judelle of Bryant, Miller & Olive, Tallahassee, for ap-pellee.

Opinion:
McDONALD, Justice.
The state appeals a trial court order validating the issuance of certain industrial development revenue bonds. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(2), Florida Constitution, and affirm the final judgment.
In June 1981 the Tallahassee City Commission passed a resolution declaring part of Tallahassee to be a blighted area as defined by section 163.340(8), Florida Statutes (1979). In August 1981 the Leon County Commission passed a resolution, pursuant to chapter 159, part II, Florida Statutes (Supp.1980), and chapter 163, part III, Florida Statutes (1979), authorizing the issuance of not more than $10,000,000 of industrial development revenue bonds for the purpose of financing part of the acquisition and construction cost of a privately owned 300-room convention center hotel and related facilities. The proposed site is within the blighted area and is directly across the street from the newly constructed city-county civic center.
The trial court confirmed and validated the bonds, finding, among other things, that the resolution had been properly adopted, that the bonds would not constitute a public debt, that the criteria set out in section 159.29 had been met, and that the project would serve a paramount public purpose. The state raises three issues on appeal: (1) a public lodging facility does not serve a paramount public purpose and is not an industrial or manufacturing plant; (2) a nonjudicial body's determination of whether statutory requirements have been met cannot be final and conclusive; and (3) the failure to allege the interest rate as required by subsection 75.04(1), Florida Statutes (Supp.1980), makes the complaint fatally deficient. We find no merit to any of these points.
The instant project falls within the definition of a "commercial project in a designated slum area or blighted area." § 159.27(19). We agree with the circuit court's conclusion that this project serves a paramount public purpose in the elimination of blight. This is the same public purpose as provided for in chapter 163, part III, which this Court upheld in State v. Miami Beach Redevelopment Agency, 392 So.2d 375 (Fla.1980).
Section 159.29 states that "the determination of the local agency as to compliance with [this section's] criteria and requirements shall be final and conclusive." This Court has acceded to this statement in numerous cases. State v. City of Riviera Beach, 397 So.2d 685 (Fla.1981); State v. Jacksonville Port Authority, 266 So.2d 1 (Fla.1972); State v. County of Dade, 250 So.2d 875 (Fla.1971). We agree with the state that such findings and conclusions are subject to judicial review, but nothing has been presented which requires disturbing the findings of the agency and the circuit court.
The state's third claim is that subsection 75.04(1) requires an agency's complaint seeking bond validation to set out the interest rate the subject bonds are to bear. We find that the trial court correctly concluded that the county's failure to state a finite, specific rate of interest was not fatal to this bond program. We disagree, however, with the trial court's reasoning that section 159.-34 must be read in pari materia with section 215.34, Florida Statutes (Supp.1980), in order to reach this conclusion.
Subsection 215.84(3) sets out a formula for calculating the maximum allowable interest rate which certain governmental bonds may bear. Subsections 215.84(2)(b)2 and (7), on the other hand, specifically exclude bonds issued under part II of chapter 159. The county issued the instant bonds under the authority of chapter 159, part II, and we find section 215.84 inapplicable to the instant case.
Subsection 159.34(1), as amended in 1980, provides that bonds "shall bear interest at such rate or rates, including variable rates, notwithstanding any limitation in other laws relating to the maximum interest rate permitted for bonds . as may be determined or provided for by the local agency." In view of this language, we can find no legislative intent that would mandate reading subsection 75.04(1) to require the complaint to state a finite, specific rate of interest for the issuance of industrial bonds as long as the complaint sets forth the method by which the interest will be determined.
The county resolution authorizing these bonds states that they shall bear a rate of interest "not to exceed the maximum allowed by Florida law, as shall be provided by subsequent resolution of the Issuer at or prior to the sale of the Bonds." Leon County, Fla., Resolution to Finance Constructing a Capital Commercial Project, § 6 (Aug. 11, 1981). The complaint does not set out a specific rate of interest but, rather, follows the resolution and says that the rate will be that rate set by resolution prior to sale of the bonds. The state contends that there is no "maximum allowed by Florida law," and we agree. As discussed above, section 215.84 does not apply to these bonds, and we can find no other statutory maximum applicable to these bonds. Indeed, by its language, subsection 159.34(1) leaves setting the rate to the local agency. We assume that the legislature has so provided in order to take into account the prevailing high and fluctuating interest rates so that local agencies can compete in the bond market. We agree with the trial court that the county's statements in the resolution and complaint are sufficient and that a specific interest rate need not be alleged or proved in this validation.
Affirmed.
It is so ordered.
SUNDBERG, C. J., and ADKINS, OYER-TON, ALDERMAN and EHRLICH, JJ., concur.
BOYD, J., dissents with an opinion.
. Florida Industrial Development Financing Act, § 159.25 — 159.431.
. Community Redevelopment Act of 1969, § 163.330 — 163.450.
. We see this as part of this Court's function in reviewing bond validations to determine whether the issuing agency had the power to act and whether it exercised that power in accordance with law. See State v. Leon County, 400 So.2d 949 (Fla.1981).