Case Name: Commonwealth v. Justice, Appellant
Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1974-09-23
Citations: 230 Pa. Super. 537
Docket Number: Appeal, No. 1922
Parties: Commonwealth v. Justice, Appellant.
Judges: Before Watkins, P. J., Jacobs, Hoffman, Cercone, Price, Yan der Yoort, and Spaeth, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports
Volume: 230
Pages: 537–545

Head Matter:
Commonwealth v. Justice, Appellant.
Argued June 10, 1974.
Before Watkins, P. J., Jacobs, Hoffman, Cercone, Price, Yan der Yoort, and Spaeth, JJ.
Berel Caesar, with him Rubin, Leib and Caesar, for appellant.
James Garrett, Assistant District Attorney, with him David Riehman, Mark Sendrow, and Steven H. Goldblatt, Assistant District Attorneys, Abraham J. Gafni, Deputy District Attorney, Richard A. Sprague, First Assistant District Attorney, and F. Emmett Fitzpatrick, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellee.
September 23, 1974:

Opinion:
Opinion by
Hoffman, J.,
In this appeal, we must decide whether a defendant, the alleged sole participant in the talcing of goods from a department store, may be convicted in a non-jury trial of receiving stolen goods, after being acquitted of larceny.
As in every appeal from a criminal conviction, the evidence must be read in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and the Commonwealth be given the benefit of all reasonable inferences arising therefrom : Commonwealth v. Elam, 221 Pa. Superior Ct. 315, 316, 293 A. 2d 103 (1972). The evidence shows that on April 25, 1973, Detective Elizabeth Buono observed the appellant in the second-floor men's department of the Gimbels Department Store. She watched the appellant as he took a jacket from one of the racks, stuff the price tags in the sleeve of the jacket, put the jacket over his clothes, and walk toward the escalator. She testified that she then followed the appellant as he proceeded toward an exit door on the main floor. When he was approximately fifteen feet from the door, Detective Buono apprehended the appellant and arrested him. He was subsequently charged with larceny and receiving stolen goods.
On July 6,1973, appellant was tried in the Municipal Court where he was found guilty on both charges. He took an immediate appeal de novo to the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, where he was tried by the Honorable G. Fred DiBona, sitting without a jury. Judge DiBona acquitted the appellant on the charge of larceny, but found him guilty of receiving stolen goods. A sentence of two to twenty-three months' imprisonment was imposed. This appeal followed.
In reviewing the evidence, Judge DiBona found incredible the appellant's version of the incident. Appellant had testified that he did take the jacket, but was proceeding to the first floor to arrange for credit terms on the purchase of the merchandise. In its Opinion, the Court reasoned: ". . . [Tjhere can be little doubt that in removing the price tags from view he intended thereby to conceal them, a motive that is further borne out by the fact that he wore the jacket to the first floor instead of carrying it."
By the Act of March 31, 1860, P.L. 427, Section 24, 19 P.S. §411, the joinder in one indictment of a count charging receiving stolen goods with a count charging larceny of the goods is specifically authorized. We have held that a defendant may be found guilty on both counts, provided, however, that sentence is imposed on only one count. Commonwealth v. Phillips, 215 Pa. Superior Ct. 5, 257 A.2d 81 (1969). Furthermore, the Act of 1860 encompasses a situation where indictments are returned against two or more persons: ". . . it shall be lawful for the jury . to find all or any . . . guilty of stealing the property or of receiving it, knowing it to be stolen, or to find one or more of the said persons guilty of stealing the property and the other or others of them guilty of receiving it, knowing it to have been stolen."
We are presented with an anomalous situation in that here the appellant and the Commonwealth witness both testify to the taking of the jacket by the appellant alone. It is the appellant who takes the goods in an apparently furtive manner, and proceeds to leave the store. It is he who is apprehended with the goods. In short, he is the only actor in the drama. Having been acquitted of the charge of larceny, it is difficult for this Court to envision the factual or legal basis for a conviction on the charge of receiving stolen goods. If the goods were stolen (a prerequisite to both larceny and receiving stolen goods), the appellant alone could have been the culprit.
Pennsylvania statutes do not define, but merely proscribe the offense of larceny. 18 P.S. §4807. As such, the cases have held that "larceny", is common law larceny and consists of ". . . the taking and carrying away of the personal property of another with the mind of a thief, that is, with the specific intent to deprive the owner permanently of his property." Commonwealth v. Lyons, 219 Pa. Superior Ct. 18, 22, 280 A.2d 458 (1971).
It is likewise settle that the Commonwealth has the burden of proving three distinct elements of the crime of receiving stolen goods: " (a) that the goods are stolen; (b) that the defendant received such goods; and (c) that he received them knowing, or having reasonable cause to know, that they were stolen." Commonwealth v. Davis, 444 Pa. 11, 15, 280 A.2d 119 (1971).
Where, as here, the defendant is the sole participant in the alleged crime, an acquittal on the charge of larceny necessitates an acquittal on the charge of receiving stolen goods.
Judgment of sentence is reversed, conviction is vacated, and the appellant is ordered discharged.