Case Name: The Franklin Coal Company vs. William McMillan, Kate Coyner and William Coyner, her husband
Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland
Jurisdiction: Maryland
Decision Date: 1878-07-24
Citations: 49 Md. 549
Docket Number: 
Parties: The Franklin Coal Company vs. William McMillan, Kate Coyner and William Coyner, her husband.
Judges: 
Reporter: Maryland Reports
Volume: 49
Pages: 549–569

Head Matter:
The Franklin Coal Company vs. William McMillan, Kate Coyner and William Coyner, her husband.
Admissible evidence—Principal and agent—Inadmissible evidence—Tenant for Life of Goal lands—Rights as such— Measure of Damages in. an Action on the case for Mining and removing Plaintiffs’ Goal.
A witness offered on the part of the plaintiffs stated that he was the boss-miner of the defendant, a coal company, in the year 1855, and considered it was his duty as such boss-miner to know the boundaries and lines of the defendant’s property; that while engaged in superintending the cutting of timber in said year on the defendant’s property for use in its mines, the general superintendent of the defendant in charge of its mines and works, pointed out to the witness the division fence then standing between the plaintiffs’ and defendant's property, and told him not to cut over said line, or allow timber to be cut over it; and that the division fence shown him on said occasion stood on the line of the old fence as located by the plaintiffs. Held :
That such evidence was admissible for the purpose of showing knowledge on the part of the defendant of the lines of its property.
The testimony of an absent witness taken down on a survey by the surveyor, and returned in his book of explanation, is inadmissible where no sufficient evidence has been offered to prove that the absence of such witness is caused by physical inability which rendered him unable to attend.
Prior t.0 the beginning of the life estate in certain coal lands, from an opening at a place where the coal cropped out, coal had been taken and used for domestic purposes, but it never had been mined for market. Under such circumstances the tenant for life would not have the right to open the mine for the purpose of mining coal for sale, but only the right to use the coal for such purposes as it was used when the life estate began.
If in an action on the case to recover damages for mining and removing coal, brought by parties entitled to the reversion in the land upon which the trespass was committed, it be shown that the defendant dug and mined coal from said land, and made excavations thereunder, and removed the coal so mined, and thereby injured the coal left remaining as pillars, or by bad mining or otherwise rendered it difficult or impossible for the plaintiffs to get out such pillars or remaining coal or rendered it of less value to them, they are entitled to recover for such coal as cannot be removed, what it was worth per ton in its native bed, and for so much of such coal as can be removed but with increased expense, damages to the extent that the evidence may show such coal has been thereby diminished in value.
And if the defendant in mining and excavating under said lands, thereby rendered it more difficult and expensive for the plaintiffs to obtain access to the coal under said lands, and depreciated the value of said remaining coal, the plaintiffs would be entitled to such damages as they sustained from the depreciation of said lands and the increased difficulty and expense of obtaining access to the coal remaining therein.
In such action the proper measure of damages for mining coal under the lands of the plaintiffs and removing the same is the value of the coal per ton when first severed from its native bed, and before it is put upon the mine cars, without deducting the expense of the severing; and if the defendant at the time of mining and removing said coal, knew that the lands were not its own, such further damages may be awarded the plaintiffs as the facts and circumstances accompanying such mining and removing of the coal may warrant.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Allegany County.
Lewis B. McMillan being seized in fee simple of certain lands lying in Garrett County, known as “ Joseph’s Farm,” which included military lots Nos. 3836 and 3837, devised the same to Elizabeth McMillan, his wife, for life and after her death to the appellees, William McMillan and Kate. Coyner their only children, in fee. This was an action on the case brought by the appellees to recover damages of the appellant.
The declaration averred that said lands were underlaid with valuable veins and seams of coal and other minerals, but had no mines or openings thereon in the life-time of the said Lewis B. McMillan; and that while said lands were in the possession and occupation of Elizabeth McMillan, the life tenant, the defendant broke and entered into them, tunneled thereunder and made and sunk divers mines, drifts, headings, &c., and raised and conveyed -away large quantities of earth, coal and other minerals, and converted them to its own use ; and further that the defendant mined and excavated said coal and other minerals in such a careless and unskillful way as to render the mining and removing of the remaining minerals more difficult, and expensive, and failed to leave proper supports for the surface; hy all which premises the plaintiffs had been “injured, prejudiced and aggrieved in their said reversionary estate and interest in fee simple” in the said lands.
The plaintiffs, hy a petition stated that they had brought this action for waste committed on the lands described in the declaration, and could not show the extent of the coal dug upon the land by the defendant, and the damages sustained by the plaintiffs, without a warrant of resurvey to lay down on a plat the outlines of their lands, the extent of coal therein, the amount dug and carried away, and the portions of the mines that had fallen in and filled up from the unskillful mining of the defendant; they therefore prayed for a warrant of resurvey which was accordingly issued.
The defendant pleaded not guilt3r and limitations, and issues were joined.
This suit was instituted in Garrett County and at the instance of the plaintiffs was removed to Washington County whence, at the instance of the defendant, it was removed to Allegany County where it was tried.
Under the warrant of resurvey the surveyor of Garrett County proceeded to resurvey and locate the lands of the plaintiffs and the defendant, and such other adjacent lands as were thought necessary, and the locations so made were returned into Court.
It is not deemed necessary to set them out—they were offered in evidence as also copies of certain patents ; other •evidence was also introduced.
First Exception.—The plaintiffs in order to maintain the issue on their part joined offered to prove by one Wm. Gr. McMillan, that he was the boss miner of the defendant in the year 1855, and that he considered "it was his duty as such boss-miner to know the boundaries and lines of the defendant’s property ; and that one Thomas Gr. Kerr was the general superintendent of the defendant, in charge of its mines and works ; and that he, McMillan, was superintending the cutting the timber in said year on defendant’s property, for the use of defendant in its mines ; and that while so engaged, said Kerr pointed out to him, McMillan, the division fence then standing, between the plaintiffs’ and defendant’s property, and told him, McMillan, not to cut over said line, or allow timber to be cut over it; and that the division fence shown him by Kerr on said occasion, stood on the line of the'old fence, as located by the plaintiffs. The defendant objected to the Court allowing said evidence to go to the jury, but the Court overruled said objection, and permitted said evidence to be given to the jury, for the purpose of showing knowledge on the part of the defendant of the lines of its property. To this ruling of the Court the defendant excepted.
Second Exception.—The defendant, in order to maintain the issue on its part joined, offered to read in evidence from the surveyor’s return and book of explanation the testimony of Wm. Warnick, being as follows: “My age is seventy-five years ; I was born in the house which stood upon the ground where I now stand ; that is just where the door of said house stood; I have seen the reference lines run from this spot to the beginning of lot No. 3825.” The testimony of the witness having been taken down on the survey by the surveyor, and returned in his book of explanation. The defendant having first proven by Dr. D. E. Miller, a practitioner, at Westernport, that he had visited said Warnick at his house twice within the past week, and found from the examination there made, that it. would be exceedingly dangerous for him to come to Cumberland as a witness in this cause; that he, Warnick, was about seventy-nine years of age, and that he, Dr. Miller, did not think he ever would be able to appear as a witness in this Court; Warnick’s symptoms, as described by Dr. Miller, were severe pains in the head and back and limbs, and general debility and failure of strength, owing to old age and partial paralysis. On cross-examination, Dr. Miller stated, that he lived about six miles from Warnick’s house ; that W7arnick lived about two miles from Barton, and that there was a railroad from Barton to Cumberland ; that he was not the regular physician of Warnick, and never saw him before the two interviews ; that he had one about ten days, and the other four days, before his evidence was given ; that he went to see him at the instance of the superintendent of the defendant, and was not sent for by Warnick; knew nothing about Warnick, as to his general habits or health before his two visits; that he examined him, and found his pulse light, and complained of dizziness and pain in the head. And then plaintiffs proved, on their own examination of Conrad Eazenbaker, that he is the brother-in-law of Warnick ; that he saw him Tuesday week; he was very feeble, as he has been for several years; sometimes weak and sometimes stronger. Plaintiffs then proved by Norman Jacobs, that he was a neighbor of Warnick’s—acquainted with him all his life ; saw him about four weeks ago going to the mill with a grist, riding on a horse, and carrying a grist with him ; he has to come by way of Barton to get to the mill, and the mill was about one and a-half miles from Barton ; he was as well then as usual, and as smart as men of his age usually are; there are several physicians at Barton, and Dr. Crawford, of Barton, is Warnick’s regular physician, and attends his family when sick ; subsequently the surveyor was being examined in reference to some alleged discrepancies between his statement at the trial and his return, and in explanation he read, in the presence of the jury, the evidence that has been stated above, as that sworn to on the survey by Warnick, without objection on the part of plaintiffs. But the Court refused to allow the said evidence to be read to the jury when offered by the defendant; to this refusal of the Court the defendant excepted.
Third Exception.—The plaintiffs offered fourteen prayers, the second, third and fifth of which the Court rejected, the others it granted. The following it is deemed sufficient to .insert:
11. That if the jury believe from the evidence in the cause, that the defendant dug and mined coal from the tract of land called “Joseph’s Farm,” as located by the plaintiffs, or any part thereof, and made excavations thereunder, and removed the coal so mined, and thereby injured the coal left remaining as pillars, or by bad mining or otherwise rendered it difficult or impossible for the plaintiffs to get out such pillars or remaining coal, or rendered it of less value to them, then the plaintiffs are entitled to recover such sum per ton for such coal as cannot be removed as they shall find from the evidence it was worth in its native bed, and such damages for so much of such coal as can be removed, but with increased expense, as they may find such coal to be diminished in value.
12. That if the jury shall find from the evidence in the cause, that the defendant mined and excavated under the tract of land called “ Joseph’s Farm,” as located by the plaintiffs, if they find said location correct, and thereby rendered it more difficult and expensive for the plaintiffs to obtain access to the coal under said lands, and depreciated the value of said remaining coal, then the jury may allow the plaintiffs such damages as they may find the plaintiffs have sustained from the depreciation of said land, and the increased difficulty and expense of obtaining access to the coal remaining therein.
13. That if the jury shall believe from the evidence in this cause that the defendant mined out coal under the land called “ Joseph’s Farm,” as located by the plaintiffs, and that said location is correct, then the plaintiffs are entitled to recover such sum per ton as the jury may find said coal so mined was worth, when first severed from its native hod, and before it was put upon the mine cars, without deducting the expense of severing said coal from its native bed.
14. That if the jury find from the evidence in the cause, that the defendant at the time of mining out the coal and excavating under said land, knew that said lands were not its own, then the jury are not limited to the actual amount of damages committed, (if they shall find any have been committed,) but may find such further damages as the facts and circumstances accompanying such mining of coal and excavating under said land may warrant.
The defendant submitted ten prayers, the first, fourth and eighth of which the Court granted ; the others it refused, hut substituted an instruction in place of the seventh prayer rejected. The ninth prayer was withdrawn. The following prayers only it is deemed necessary to insert:
2. If the jury find from the evidence in the cause, that the defendant broke and entered into the lands spoken of in the evidence, and dug out and carried away coal therefrom within three years prior to the institution of this suit, and that said lands were within the boundary linos of the property devised by Lewis B. McMillan to Elizabeth McMillan for life, and after her death to the plaintiffs in remainder, and that said life tenant was in possession of said property at the time of said digging and carrying away, and is still alive and in possession thereof, then the plaintiffs cannot recover under the pleadings and evidence in this case.
3. If the jury find from the evidence in the cause, that the defendant broke and entered into the lands spoken of in the evidence, and dug out and carried coal therefrom, and that said lands were within the boundary lines of the property devised by Lewis B. McMillan to Elizabeth McMillan for life, and after her death to the plaintiffs in remainder, but also find that the mine of said plaintiffs was already open as shown on the plat marked “ O. 0.,” and had been so open in the life-time of said Lewis B. McMillan, and that said life tenant was in possession of said property at the time of said digging and carrying away, and is still alive and in possession thereof, then the plaintiffs cannot recover under the pleadings and evidence in this case.
5. If the jury believe from the evidence in the cause, that the defendant broke and entered into the lands of the plaintiffs at the places located on the plats, within three years prior to the institution of this suit, and that the said defendant mined out coal from said lands, but that in so doing the defendant believed itself to be the bona fide owner of the lands so taken and entered, and of the coal so mined out, then the plaintiffs can only recover such sum as the jury may find from the evidence was the value of the said coal so^mined out before it was severed from the mine.
To the action of the Court in granting certain of the plaintiffs’ prayers and in rejecting certain of its prayers, the defendant accepted. The verdict and judgment being for the plaintiffs, the defendant appealed.
The cause was argued before Bartol, C. J., Stewart, Brent and Robinson, J.
Arthur W. Machen and Orville Horwitz, for the appellant.
S. A. Cox, William Walsh and Thomas J. McKaig, for the appellees.

Opinion:
Bartol, C. J.,
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Eor the reasons stated in the opinion of our brother Robinson, we all agree that the instructions given to the jury by the Circuit Court, in regard to the locations made by the plaintiffs and defendant, were correct, and that it was not error to grant the first, fourth, sixth, seventh, eighth and ninth prayers of the plaintiffs, and also that the second and third prayers of the defendant were properly refused.
We are also of opinion that the evidence offered by the plaintiffs, contained in the first bill of exceptions, was properly admitted for the purpose therein stated. But upon the question of the measure of damages, a majority of the Court think there was no error in the rulings of the Circuit Court, and that they ought to be affirmed.
The evidence in the case proves that the defendant's agents, while engaged in mining coal upon its own land, lying contiguous to that of the plaintiffs, extended their mining operations beyond the limits of its own land into that of the plaintiffs, and removed therefrom a quantity of coal, and this suit was brought to recover damages for the trespass. The form of action is in case, brought by parties entitled to the reversion in the land upon which the trespass was committed ; but in our judgment, so far as the question arises in the present case, the rule regulating the measure of damages is the same as if the suit were in trespass by parties owning the fee, and entitled to the immediate possession.
No valid objection can be made to the granting of the eleventh and twelfth prayers of the plaintiffs, and we do not understand the appellants as complaining of them. They are identical with the instructions affirmed by this Court in The Barton Coal Co. vs. Cox, 39 Md., 1.
The objection relied on by the appellant is to the granting of the plaintiffs' thirteenth, and the refusal of the defendant's fifth prayer.
By the former the jury were instructed that the measure of damages was the value of the coal when first severed from its native bed, without deducting the expense of severing it. The defendant's fifth prayer asserts the proposi tion, that if the defendant mined out the coal from the plaintiffs' land, and in so doing believed itself to be the bona fide owner of the land and of the coal so mined, then the measure of damages is the value of the coal in its native bed, before it was severed from the mine.
The question presented by these prayers is not a new one in this Court, it was fully considered and decided, we think, in the case of The Barton Coal Co. before cited.
There the Court below granted the plaintiffs' third prayer, identical with the thirteenth prayer in this case, and refused the second prayer of the defendant, which was in these words :
" If the jury shall find, etc., that the defendant dug out and carried away the coal of the plaintiffs, without knowing that it was trespassing upon the property of the plaintiffs, and believing that it was its own coal, then the measure of damages for such digging and carrying away of coal is the value of the coal in the mine."
The ruling of the Circuit Court upon these prayers was affirmed. After the decision was rendered, an application for a re-hearing was made by appellant's counsel, in which they asked the Court to re-consider its decision upon the question of damages, but the application was refused.
In the opinion then filed, the decided cases were examined, and the question carefully considered, and the Court adopted as the true rule that laid down in Martin vs. Porter, Morgan vs. Powell and Wild vs. Holt.
We have examined all the cases which have been cited in the argument, and have discovered no sufficient reason for departing from the decision so recently made by this Court; nor have we seen an;f good reason to doubt that the rule then announced is upon the whole a sound and salutary one, which, while it awards no more than a just compensation to the party injured, will, as said by Baron Parke, " tend to prevent trespasses of this kind."
We think no real distinction can be drawn between this case and that of the Barton Coal Company.
(Decided 24th July, 1878.)
There this Court held the rule applicable, though the defendant was not a willful trespasser, but "dug the coal without hnowing that it was trespassing upon the property of the plaintiffs, hut believing it was its own coal. ' '
It is said that in that case there was no dispute or question about boundaries, and that it was negligence in the defendant to go beyond its own lines. But the trespass was committed under ground, where the lines were not easily ascertained. Trespasses on the land of another, if not willful, always imply some degree of negligence. In this case the defendant's excuse is, that it claimed to be the owner of the land. But it has been shown by the proof and by the verdict that its claim was not well founded. As said in Maye, et al. vs. Tappan, 23 Cal., 306. " Where a party has the means of ascertaining the dividing line, he is guilty of negligence in not ascertaining its location."
In this respect, therefore, this case is not to be distinguished from that of the Barton Coal Co.
Considering that case as decisive of the present, we have not thought it necessary to make further reference to the authorities, or to discuss the proposition there decided over again.
Upon the second bill of exceptions, we are of opinion that the ruling of the Circuit Court therein stated furnishes no ground for reversal, because we think the evidence offered for the purpose of proving that the absent witness was unable to attend, by reason of physical inability, was not sufficient to establish that fact.
Finding no error in the ruling of the Circuit Court, the judgment will be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.