Case Name: Nusrat BHATTI; Erfan Semuel, individuals, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. GUILD MORTGAGE COMPANY; Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.; Does, 1-10, Defendants-Appellees
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2013-12-24
Citations: 550 F. App'x 514
Docket Number: No. 12-35035
Parties: Nusrat BHATTI; Erfan Semuel, individuals, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. GUILD MORTGAGE COMPANY; Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.; Does, 1-10, Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: Before: TALLMAN and BEA, Circuit Judges, and MURPHY, District Judge.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 550
Pages: 514–515

Head Matter:
Nusrat BHATTI; Erfan Semuel, individuals, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. GUILD MORTGAGE COMPANY; Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.; Does, 1-10, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 12-35035.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted Dec. 2, 2013.
Filed Dec. 24, 2013.
Melissa A. Huelsman, Law Offices of Melissa A. Huelsman, Seattle, WA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Katie Axtell, Ann T. Marshall, Bishop, White, Marshall & Weibel, P.S., Seattle, WA, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before: TALLMAN and BEA, Circuit Judges, and MURPHY, District Judge.
The Honorable Stephen Joseph Murphy, III, District Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation.

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiffs Nusrat Bhatti and Erfan Semuel filed a complaint in Washington state court against Guild Mortgage Co. ("Guild") and Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS") for quiet title, declaratory judgment, and violations of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2601. Defendants removed to federal court based on federal question jurisdiction and filed a Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs then filed a motion for leave to amend their complaint to add Washington state law claims for infliction of emotional distress, wrongful foreclosure under the Washington Deed of Trust Act ("DTA"), and violation of Washington's Consumer Protection Act ("CPA"). Plaintiffs then lodged a proposed amended complaint with the new causes of action. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss, granted defendants' motion to strike plaintiffs' amended complaint, and denied plaintiffs' motion to continue the motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs appealed only the dismissal of their state-law DTA and CPA claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm the district court.
1. The district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling on defendants' 12(b)(6) motion when it did. Defendants filed a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on May 11, 2011, and plaintiffs did not lodge their proposed amended complaint until September 12, 2011. The district court still considered the allegations in the proposed amended complaint, and correctly concluded that they were "conclusory allegations" that could not support a claim for relief.
2. Defendants did not violate the DTA's requirement that a deed of trust's beneficiary hold the note when it appoints a successor trustee. Wash. Rev.Code § 61.24.005(2). MERS had assigned its beneficiary interest back to Guild, the note holder, when Guild appointed Northwest Trustee Services, Inc. as the successor trustee. Defendants therefore complied with the DTA's requirement that only beneficiaries who hold the note may appoint successor trustees.
8. Plaintiffs' CPA claim fails because they did not allege that MERS's temporary status as beneficiary caused them any injury. See Wash. State Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass'n v. Fisons Corp., 122 Wash.2d 299, 858 P.2d 1054, 1061 (1993) (stating that a CPA claim requires "a causal link between the unfair or deceptive act and the injury suffered"). Plaintiffs' foreclosure was not caused by a violation of the DTA because Guild was both the note holder and the beneficiary when it initiated foreclosure proceedings, and therefore the "cause" prong of the CPA is not satisfied.
Accordingly, the district court's judgment is AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.