Case Name: Edward H. Gillilan, surviving partner, &c. agt. James K. Spratt
Court: New York Court of Common Pleas
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1871-03
Citations: 41 How. Pr. 27
Docket Number: 
Parties: Edward H. Gillilan, surviving partner, &c. agt. James K. Spratt.
Judges: 
Reporter: Howard's Practice Reports
Volume: 41
Pages: 27–40

Head Matter:
N. Y. COMMON PLEAS.
Edward H. Gillilan, surviving partner, &c. agt. James K. Spratt.
Where summary proceedings are instituted by the landlord against the tenant, for holding over after the expiration of his term, and a trial is had and the whole case submitted to the justice for his decision, and thereafter the justice, on motion of the landlord discontinues the whole proceedings ; such decision of discontinuance is no bar to an action brought subsequently by the landlord against the tenant for rent and damages for the use and occupation of the premises.
The principles involved as to the effect of nonsuits, discontinuances or withdrawals-of actions, pending before justices of the peace, in cases tried and submitted to them upon the merits, within the time prescribed by statute for decision, have no application to such a case as this. JPer Robinson, tT*.
General Term, March, 1871.
Before Loew, Larremore, and Robinson, JJ.
■Appeal from a judgment rendered1 against plaintiff at special term.

Opinion:
By the court, Larremore, J.
This action was brought to recover the sum of $900, being rent of premises No. 100, Liberty street, for the months of April, May and June, 1868.
By an indenture of lease between the parties, dated' March 6, 1867, the premises in question were demised to the defendant by the plaintiff for the term of one year from' May 1, 1867, at the yearly rent of $3,600, payable monthly on the first day of each succeeding month. The lease, among others, contained the following covenant, that in case the building was required to be removed in consequence of the extension of Church street, then from the time said building was ordered to be removed by the city authorities, said lease should become null and void, and rent joaid to that date. On the 30th day of December, 1807, proceedings were taken and an order duly made and entered by the supreme court at general term, confirming the report of commissioners of estimate and assessment appointed for that purpose, whereby it was ordered, that said premises would be required to be taken for the extension of Church street. On the 2d day of May, 1868, summary proceedings were instituted by the plaintiff, before Justice Quinn, to remove the defendant from said premises, for holding over after the expiration of the term without permission of the plaintiff. Issue was joined therein, and a trial had thereon, on the 7th and 9th days of May, 1868, when the whole case was submitted to said justice, who on the 19th day of May, 1868, on motion of the landlord' in said proceedings, (the said plaintiff,) and without notice to the other party, discontinued the same.
The learned judge, before whom this action was tried, found as questions of fact, in addition to the summary proceedings above stated, the making, delivery and acceptance of said lease, the occupation of the premises therein described by the defendant, from May 1, 1867, to May 1, 1868, the continuance of such occupancy by him through the months of May and June, and until after the 1st of July, 1868, and that the value of the use of said premises from May 1, 1868, to July 1, 1868, was $600, which added to the rent for the month of April 1S6S, is $900, and that .the interest on said several sums up to the day of trial was $58 95, making in all $958 95, no portion of which had been paid by the defendant to the plaintiff. He also found as conclusions of law, that the action of said .Justice Quinn, in said summary proceedings, was an adjudication, and judgment in favor of the tenant therein, .(the defendant in this action,) and was final and conclusive between the parties as to the subject-matter of said action, and was a bar to the plaintiff's alleged right to recover rent or damages for the use and occupation of said premises, and thereupon dismissed the complaint, with costs. From thejudgment entered on this decision, the plaintiff appeals.
It was held by the general term of this court, in December, 1869, in Detmold agt. Drake, et al., (a case similar to the one at bar,) that until the opening of the street, the land appropriated therefor by the public authorities, cannot be employed by them for any other purpose than that contemplated and established by the report of the commissioners. In the meantime, from the date of the confirmation of said report until such opening is actually commenced, the owner of the building, (unless required to remove it,) can retain possession of it, and is entitled to all the benefits of such possession.
The parties hereto evidently contemplated such a contingency in relation to the premises in question, and provided in the lease thereof, that the same should become null and void, from the time the building was ordered to be removed by the city authorities.
There is no evidence before us that any order for such a removal was ever given, and it is fair to conclude that the defendant was not disturbed in his possession during the; continuance of said lease. Besides, it appears aErmatively from the findings of the jury at the trial, that the defendant continued in the occupation of the premises until after July 1, 1868, and that the value of the unpaid rent therefor, up to that time, was $900. It is not pretended that any claim for said rent has been made by any one, except the plaintiff, and I think, his right thereto unquestioned, unless the summary proceedings hereinbefore mentioned, constitute a bar to its recovery.
The proceedings referred to were taken May 2,1868, and after said lease had expired by its own limitation, to dispossess the defendant herein as the tenant of said premises, for holding over after the expiration of the term without permission of the landlord. The defendant, by his counter- affidavit, denied that he thus held over, and also denied that plaintiff was his landlord, on the ground that the title to said premises was, by said order of the supreme court of December .30, 1867, vested in the mayor, aldermen and commonalty of the city of New York.
The question of rent was not raised., or at issue, upon the trial and consequently could hot have been' submitted to the justice for adjudication, The justice did not decide the case as submitted, but on application of the relator discontinued the proceedings.
We are asked to hold such action on his part to be a final and conclusive judgment in favor of the defendant. But what is the nature and effect of such an adjudication?
Is it thereby only established that defendant did not hold -over after expiration of his term, and without permission? i-Or are all the averments in defendant's counter-affidavit, of which proof was offered on the trial, to be deemed res adjudicata? This would compel us to hold that the plaintiff was not entitled to the possession of said premises after the order confirming the report of the commissioners of estim.ate and assessment was made, when, as we have already seen in the case of Detmold agt. Drake, a directly opposite theory was maintained by the general term of this Court,
The cases cited to sustain the position of the respondent (Hess agt. Beekman, 11 Johns., 457; Elwell agt. McQueen, 10 Wend., 521; Peters agt Diossy, 3 E. D. Smith, 115 ; White agt. Coatsworth, 2 Seld., 137; Demarest agt. Darg, 32 N. Y., 284), all proceed upon the theory that the judicial mind had acted upon* the merits of the case as submitted, and giving expression to such action by a judgment or final determination. The defendant in Hess agt. JBeekman " suffered judgment to be entered against himself for costs." In Elwell agt. McQueen the court say, " although he (the justice) may call his judgment a nonsuit, and enter it accordingly, if the record or minutes of the trial show it was rendered after the cause was submitted to him, and after he took time to deliberate, and not at the trial, it will be considered a judgment for the defendant, and will be a bar to any subsequent action."
It might be claimed that as the justice had no authority t'o discontinue said summary proceedings, that the same are still under advisement by him, and his decision thereon might be enforced. Whether this view be correct or not, it is evident that said justice, by allowing such discontinuance, plainly indicated that he had not passed upon the merits of the case, but intended to leave the parties in the •same position as if no such proceeding had been instituted. To construe such action on his part as a final determination is to compel him, by implication, to do that which he never intended, but expressly disavowed. Nor are we to presume -that the justice would have decided contrary to law, and as the whole case turned upon the question of ownership, as decided by this court in the case of Detmold agt. Drake, above referred to, it is fair to assume that if the justice had finally determined the matter, such determination would have been in accordance with the law as thus established. No review could have been had ona discontinuance of said proceedings, and if said action be regarded as final, the party concluded thereby is without remedy.
In the case before us, the question of rent was not raised or litigated, and as it appears that no final adjudication was intended, it would be a severe application of the rule, where the occupation of the premises and the value thereof, are conceded, to deny a recovery on the ground of a former •adjudicationJn which the same merits were not involved, and especially when it appears that the greater • portion of said rent was for a period of time after the expiration of The lease, and was claimed solely on the ground of the use •and occupation by the defendant of the premises in question.
The judgment appealed from should be reversed, and a -new trial granted.