Case Name: ATLANTA COCA COLA BOTTLING COMPANY et al. v. GATES (three cases)
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1969-12-04
Citations: 225 Ga. 824
Docket Number: 25266, 25267, 25268
Parties: ATLANTA COCA COLA BOTTLING COMPANY et al. v. GATES (three cases).
Judges: All the Justices concur, except Grice, Nichols and Felton, JJ., who dissent.
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 225
Pages: 824–843

Head Matter:
25266, 25267, 25268.
ATLANTA COCA COLA BOTTLING COMPANY et al. v. GATES (three cases).
Argued July 15, 1969
Decided December 4, 1969
Rehearing denied December 18, 1969.
Neely, Freeman •& Hawkins, Edgar A. Neely, Jr., for appellants.
Armstrong & Fuller, Ronald J. Armstrong, for appellee.

Opinion:
Frankum, Justice.
These appeals came to this court as the result of litigation concerning an ex parte judgment rendered against the employer and insurance carrier for amounts of weekly instalments of workmen's compensation allegedly unpaid and due under an award of compensation made by the State Board of Workmen's Compensation on account of total incapacity of the employee to work. Only one question of law is presented, to wit: Where an employer is obligated to pay compensation to an employee under the provisions of Code Ann. § 114-404 (that is for total incapacity to work) pursuant to an agreement entered into between the employee and the employer and approved by the board, may the obligation of the employer to continue making such payments be terminated by the filing with and approval by the State Board of Workmen's Compensation of a supplemental agreement duly executed by the employer and the employee, declaring that the employee returned to work on a specified date at the same weekly wage and that liability for temporary disability ceased on that date?
One of the purposes for the passage of the Workmen's Compensation Act was to facilitate and simplify the settlement of disputes arising between employees and employers respecting accidental injuries sustained by employees on the job. " 'The design of the entire Workmen's Compensation Act is a speedy, inexpensive, and final settlement of the claims of injured employees. Its procedure shuns protracted and complicated litigation." Gravitt v. Ga. Gas. Co., 158 Ga. 613, 616 (123 SE 897). To that end the Act provides that settlements are to be encouraged as long as the amount of compensation and the time and manner of payment are in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Code Ann. § 114-106. To further facilitate that purpose and to provide overall supervision by the board, the Act further provides: "If, after 14 days from the date of the injury, or at any time in case of death, the employer and the injured employee or his dependents reach an agreement in regard to compensation under this Title, a memorandum of the agreement in the form prescribed by the State Board of Workmen's Compensation shall be filed with the board for approval as herein provided; otherwise such agreement shall be voidable by the employee or his dependents. If approved by the board, thereupon the memorandum shall for all purposes be enforced by decree or judgment of the superior court, as herein specified." Code § 114-705. Under this Code section it is now well established that the order of the State Board of Workmen's Compensation approving an agreement for the payment of compensation entered into between an employer and an employee has the same force and effect, and is tantamount to, an award made after a full hearing before the board and that the provisions of such an approved agreement providing for the payment of com pensation under the terms of the Workmen's Compensation Act are in the absence of fraud, accident, or mistake, binding on the parties. Rourke v. U. S. Fidel. &c. Co., 187 Ga. 636 (1) (1 SE2d 728); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 199 Ga. 179, 181 (33 SE2d 336); Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Cook, 195 Ga. 397 (24 SE2d 309).
The section of the Workmen's Compensation law immediately following the above referred to section relates to "Hearings Regarding Disagreements." It provides in part: "If the employer and the injured employee or his dependents fail to reach an agreement in regard to compensation under this Title, or if they have reached such an agreement which has been signed and filed with the State Board of Workmen's Compensation, and compensation has been paid, or is due in accordance therewith, and the parties thereto then disagree as to the continuance of any weekly payment under such agreement, either party may make application to the board for a hearing in regard to the matters at issue, and for a ruling thereon." Code Ann. § 114-706. (Emphasis supplied.) It is hardly conceivable what language the legislature could have employed to indicate more clearly an intention that the parties to an agreement for the payment of compensation might thereafter agree as to discontinuance of weekly payments under such prior agreement, formalize such agreement by reducing it to writing, signing the same, and submitting it to the board for the board's approval. It is the position of the appellees, in substance, that the legislature, while providing for the execution, filing and approval of agreements respecting the payment of compensation, and for their binding effect as res judicata, did not intend that agreements terminating weekly payments could ever be binding even though approved by the board. But, it is illogical to say that the legislature would have provided for the execution, approval and binding effect of agreements for the payment of compensation, and provided for the execution and approval of agreements for the discontinuance of the payments of compensation without also intending that such agreements would be equally binding upon the parties. To conclude that the legislature intended to reach such an illogical result as contended for by the appellee here offends the conscience, and we will not, when thus directly presented with the question for the very first time, so construe the Act.
The foregoing construction is not inconsistent with the previous pronouncements of this court touching on this subject matter. It must be borne in mind in this case that the compensation provided for by the original agreement between the parties was compensation for total incapacity to work under the provisions of Code Ann. § 114-404. That section contemplates the payment of weekly compensation to the employee "during such total incapacity." It fixes a limit on the dollar amount of compensation that may be paid per week, a limit on the number of weeks that compensation may be paid, and a limit on the gross amount of compensation which may be paid to an employee on account of total incapacity to work. It is clear that these limitations are intended to apply only in those cases where the total incapacity is permanent, and that the legislature never intended that an employee should continue to be compensated thereunder after his disability has terminated and he has gone back to work. Thus, when the parties enter into an agreement for the payment of compensation at a stated weekly rate, payable from and including a specified date and to continue "until terminated in accordance with the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation law of the State of Georgia," such language necessarily means that such compensation shall not continue beyond the period of "such total incapacity" to work. It may be conceded that the board has no jurisdiction to modify, alter or amend an award resulting from the approval of an agreement except upon a change of condition, but it was not within the contemplation of the legislature that the parties might not thereafter agree between themselves that a change of condition has occurred and submit that agreement to the board and have the board approve the same and thereafter be bound by it as firmly as they were bound by the prior agreement regarding the payment of compensation.
The record shows in this case that the original agreement for the payment of compensation was executed by the parties on October 18, 1966, and approved by the board on October 27, 1966. The injury occurred on September 7, 1966. The em ployee returned to work on September 12, 1966, and again became disabled on September 22, 1966, but returned to work the next day and again became disabled on September 26, 1966. The original agreement provided for the payment of compensation beginning on the 27th day of September, 1966, and it appears that thereafter the employee worked intermittently until January 4, 1967, being paid compensation for all those times when he was out of work on account of disability resulting from the injury. Several supplemental memoranda of agreement as to the payment of compensation, on forms prescribed by the board, were signed by the parties and submitted to the board for approval, the final one reciting that the employee returned to work on the 4th day of January, 1967, at the same weekly wage as before and that liability for temporary total disability ceased on that date. This agreement was signed by the employee and on behalf of the employer and the insurance carrier and was filed with the board. Such agreement, when thus filed, was the equivalent of a joint request by the parties that the board adjudicate that there had been a change in the employee's condition. It was approved by the board on January 12, 1967, as had been all the rest of the supplemental agreements. Under the principles of res judicata this latter agreement is just as binding on the employee, once it received the approval of the board, as any of the preceding agreements providing for the payment of compensation and approved by the board were binding on the employer and insurance carrier. If the employee contended that he suffered further disability on account of the injury he had but to apply to the board at any time within two years for a hearing on account of a change of condition. Code Ann. § 114-709. This he did not do, and he cannot now seek to avoid the effects of the contract which he signed agreeing that he had received all the compensation to which he was entitled under the original award and all subsequent awards.
Nothing contained in any previously decided case in this court requires a different result in this case. The broadest language intimating a contrary view is found in the case of Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Wilson, 215 Ga. 746, 751 (113 SE2d 611). It is sufficient to point out however, that in that case no question was before the court concerning the binding effect of a supplemental agreement terminating the payment of compensation as is here involved, and further, since that case is not a full bench decision (Justice Mobley's opinion, though marked a "special concurrence" is, in effect, a dissent on the very point here involved), it does not require a different result.
It follows that the judge of the trial court erred in rendering the judgment appealed from in each of these cases, and the judgments must therefore be reversed.
Judgments reversed.
All the Justices concur, except Grice, Nichols and Felton, JJ., who dissent.