Case Name: Ex parte Kirt Daylen GARRISON, Relator
Court: Texas Courts of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1993-04-23
Citations: 853 S.W.2d 784
Docket Number: No. 01-92-01255-CV
Parties: Ex parte Kirt Daylen GARRISON, Relator.
Judges: Before SAM BASS, WILSON and DUNN, JJ.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 853
Pages: 784–791

Head Matter:
Ex parte Kirt Daylen GARRISON, Relator.
No. 01-92-01255-CV.
Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (1st Dist.).
April 23, 1993.
Geoffrey W. Hutson, Houston, for appellant.
Phoebe Lester, Gwen H. Slough, Janiece E. Horn, Sahrron K. Wall, Houston, for appellee.
Before SAM BASS, WILSON and DUNN, JJ.

Opinion:
OPINION
SAM BASS, Justice.
This is an original habeas corpus proceeding. Relator, Kirt Daylen Garrison, asks this Court to discharge him from custody because he is destitute and unable to purge himself of the civil contempt.
The issue is not whether relator was able to pay child support as it came due, or at the time of the hearing on contempt. The issue is whether this Court will grant habe-as corpus relief when its original habeas corpus jurisdiction is invoked and the relator, by uncontroverted affidavit, testifies he is presently unable to pay child support arrearage because he has no money or property that can be sold or mortgaged; he is unemployed and has no prospects of obtaining employment; friends, relatives, and financial institutions have refused to loan him money; and he knows of no other source from which he can obtain money to pay the arrearage, and such testimony is corroborated by a period of incarceration.
An original habeas corpus proceeding is a collateral attack on the contempt decree. Ex parte Ramzy, 424 S.W.2d 220, 224 (Tex.1968, orig. proceeding). An order of contempt imposing a coercive restraint is void if the condition for purging the contempt is impossible of performance. Ex parte Dustman, 538 S.W.2d 409, 410 (Tex.1976, orig. proceeding). We agree with the San Antonio Court of Appeals that keeping a person until he performs an act, which is beyond his power to perform, is no more acceptable when the inability arises after he is imprisoned than it would be if the inability existed at the time the imprisonment began. Ex parte Barnes, 730 S.W.2d 46, 47 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1987, orig. proceeding).
Relator filed his petition for writ of habe-as corpus in this Court on December 18, 1992. We were of the tentative opinion that the writ should issue and, on the same date, ordered relator released on bond and scheduled the petition for submission on January 13, 1993. Tex.R.App.P. 120. At the time relator was released on bond, he had served the criminal portion (six months) of the contempt and 18 days of the civil portion.
Relator's petition certified that Debra Joy (Garrison) Ghanem had been served a copy of the petition through her attorney, and a copy of our order was sent to the attorney. Shortly thereafter, a joint motion of relator and Ghanem requested that Ghanem be given an extension of time in which to respond and that the submission date be correspondingly extended. The motion was granted. The Harris County domestic relations office filed an unverified response on behalf of Ghanem, in accordance with the schedule established by our order granting the extension of time. The response does not controvert relator's affidavit.
The July 25, 1985, decree of divorce of relator and Ghanem obligated relator to pay child support of $90 per week for their son. After a hearing, in an agreed judgment of contempt dated March 9, 1990, the trial court (1) found relator in contempt for failing to pay child support, (2) reduced the arrearage to judgment in the amount of $11,343 together with 10 percent legal interest per annum, (3) provided that relator would pay an additional sum of $50 per week towards the arrearage until it was completely liquidated, (4) directed relator to pay the movant's attorney's fees of $300 and court costs, and (5) ordered relator confined to jail for six months and thereafter until he purged himself of the contempt by paying the arrearage in full.
The trial court ordered the commitment be withheld, contingent upon relator purging himself of the contempt by strictly complying with three conditions: (1) paying the additional $50 every Monday; (2) paying the regular support amount of $90 every Monday; and (3) paying attorney's fees in the amount of $300 on or before June 14, 1990, and court costs of $43 on or before September 14, 1990, to the Harris County domestic relations office.
Relator did not comply with the conditions, and on June 3, 1992, after a hearing, the trial court found relator had failed and refused to comply with the terms of the suspension of commitment and had the present ability to pay all of the child support arrearage due. Accordingly, the court revoked the suspension of commitment and ordered relator confined in accordance with the March 9, 1990, agreed judgment of contempt, that is for 180 days (criminal portion) and thereafter (civil portion) until he paid the arrearage, attorney's fees, and court costs.
Relator asserts the judgment of contempt and commitment are void because he is presently destitute and unable to pay the arrearage, and, therefore, cannot purge himself of the contempt. He supports his assertions with the following affidavit:
My name is Kirt Daylen Garrison. I am the respondent in cause no. 8452626, styled In the Matter of the Marriage of Debra Joy Garrison and Kirt Daylen Garrison and in the Interest of Kirt Daylen Garrison, Jr., A Minor, in the 246th District Court, Harris County, Texas, and Relator in this application for writ of habeas corpus. I have no money or property that can be sold or mortgaged in order to obtain the amount necessary for my release. I contacted my friends and relatives, all of them have refused to loan me the $10,527.81, plus attorney's fees in the amount of $300.00, $43.00 court costs and $73.00 commitment fee and stenographer fee that are necessary for my release. I have tried to borrow money from every possible source, including financial institutions, all said attempts have been unsuccessful, I am not employed and at this point in time have no prospects of obtaining gainful employment. I know of no other source from which the $10,527.81, plus attorney's fees and court costs, can be obtained.
I have been incarcerated in the Harris County Jail since June 3, 1992, as a result of this matter.
Relator does not challenge the order of contempt and commitment, except to say he has no 'present ability to purge himself of the contempt. He relies on Dustman and Ex parte Peters, 770 S.W.2d 640 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, orig. proceeding).
Ghanem first argues relator is not entitled to habeas corpus relief because he has not provided a statement of facts from the trial court hearings, citing Ex parte Occhipenti, 796 S.W.2d 805 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, orig. proceeding). In her second point, she argues relator is not entitled to habeas corpus relief because he has failed to establish that the contempt order or commitment order is void, either because the trial court lacked jurisdiction or because the proceeding lacked due process. Finally, she contends relator is not entitled to habeas corpus relief because he has failed to conclusively establish inability to pay child support. According to Ghanem, we should decline to follow Dustman and Peters, and follow the more recent case of Ex parte King, 819 S.W.2d 944 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, orig. proceeding).
Ghanem's first argument is without merit. Relator asserts in his affidavit to this Court that he is presently unable to pay child support arrearage. Ghanem has not contradicted that affidavit. Evidence of relator's inability to pay presented at the contempt hearing more than six months ago shown in a statement of facts may be relevant, but is not necessary to show his present, uncontested inability to pay. There was no issue of inability to pay in Occhipenti. We held in Occhipenti that it was the relator's burden to demonstrate that he did not validly waive his right to counsel, and that he had not sustained his burden because he failed to present us with a statement of facts. 796 S.W.2d at 809.
Ghanem's second point is also without merit. A court of appeals will treat a contempt order as void if the evidence conclusively establishes that it was not within the power of the relator to perform the act or acts that would release him from the punishment authorized by the trial court's judgment, including payment of child support arrearage. See Ramzy, 424 S.W.2d at 224; Ex parte Dean, 517 S.W.2d 365, 367 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, orig. proceeding).
In Peters, 770 S.W.2d at 640-41, and Ex parte Mabry, 792 S.W.2d 588, 589-90 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, orig. proceeding), this Court held an affidavit that accompanied a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the appellate court, similar to the one here, uncontradicted after an opportunity to do so, and corroborated by some period of incarceration, conclusively established that it was not within the relator's power to perform that which would result in his release. We ordered Peters and Mabry discharged.
We recognize the general rule is that evidence given by an interested witness, such as relator here, even though uncontradicted, presents an issue to be determined by the trier of fact. Ragsdale v. Progressive Voters League, 801 S.W.2d 880, 882 (Tex.1990); Voudouris v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 560 S.W.2d 202, 207 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, no writ). However, conclusive effect may be given to the testimony of an interested witness provided that the testimony is clear, direct, and positive and there are no circumstances tending to discredit or impeach the same. Ragsdale, 801 S.W.2d at 882; Voudouris, 560 S.W.2d at 207. There is added reason for recognizing the exception when a party has the means and opportunity of disproving the testimony, if it were not true, and fails to do so. Rags- dale, 801 S.W.2d at 882; Voudouris, 560 S.W.2d at 207.
As in Peters and Mabry, we find relator's uncontradicted affidavit attached to his petition for writ of habeas corpus, corroborated by his 18 days of incarceration under the civil portion of the contempt order and six months of incarceration under the criminal portion, conclusively establishes it is not within his power to presently perform that which would result in his release. We decline to follow King because we can find no law that states a court of appeals, in the exercise of its original habeas corpus jurisdiction, must either abate a proceeding to the trial court for a fact hearing or deny habeas corpus relief in the absence of a current statement of facts, when the fact of relator's current inability to pay is undisputed. See, e.g., King, 819 S.W.2d at 946-47.
We order relator discharged from custody, noting that his discharge does not relieve him of his obligation to pay the child support arrearage, attorney's fees, and court costs.
DUNN, J., dissents.
DUGGAN, J., requested a vote to determine if the cause should be heard en banc, Tex.R.App.P. 79(d), (e), in which DUNN, O'CONNOR and WILSON, JJ., joined.
OLIVER-PARROTT, C.J., and SAM BASS, COHEN, MIRABAL and HEDGES, JJ., voted against en banc consideration.
. Tex.Const. art. V, § 6; Tex.Gov't Code Ann. § 22.221(d) (Vernon Supp.1993).
. We have not been provided with a statement of facts from this hearing or from the one preceding fte March 9, 1990, order.
. We note, as we did in Mabry, 792 S.W.2d at 590, that there are no contested allegations to be resolved. The habeas corpus power of this Court does not extend to the determination of fact issues. See Ramzy, 424 S.W.2d at 227 (Norvell, J., concurring). There are no fact issues to be determined here because the affidavit is un-contradicted.