Case Name: WILLIAM C. WATSON, Respondent, v. ADOLPH SUTRO et al., Appellants
Court: Supreme Court of California
Jurisdiction: California
Decision Date: 1890-11-29
Citations: 86 Cal. 500
Docket Number: No. 12596
Parties: WILLIAM C. WATSON, Respondent, v. ADOLPH SUTRO et al., Appellants.
Judges: 
Reporter: California Reports
Volume: 86
Pages: 500–531

Head Matter:
[No. 12596.
In Bank.
November 29, 1890.]
WILLIAM C. WATSON, Respondent, v. ADOLPH SUTRO et al., Appellants.
Vendor and Purchaser — Notice to Purchaser — Attorney and Client — Agency — Constructive Notice — Unrecorded Deed.—Notice of equities or of an infirmity of title to an attorney, counsel, or agent, acquired during negotiations for a purchase, is constructive notice to the client or principal, and such constructive notice is conclusive and irrebuttable; and if an unrecorded deed under which the client must rely for the title purchased is shown to his attorney, he is chargeable with notice of marks of infirmity appearing upon the face of such deed, and is bound by, its legal effect, regardless of the error of the attorney in misinterpreting the instrument, or of his neglect to inform his client of such infirmity.
Id.—Trust—Substitution of Trustee—Change of Beneficiary—Purchase with Notice. — Where several tenants in common conveyed land to a trustee by a deed absolute on its face, which was duly recorded, and the trustee executed a declaration of trust, reciting the conveyance to him by the parties to facilitate the settlement of the title, and binding himself, his heirs, and assigns to reconvey the proportions conveyed by them after the title is settled, and one of the tenants in common was afterward substituted as trustee in place of the first trustee, upon receiving a conveyance from him, and thereafter executed a declaration of trust to tiie same effect as the first declaration, except that he omitted the name of one of the co-tenants, and agreed to convey the share owned by such co-tenant to another co-tenant, from whom he had obtained it by deed duly recorded, a purchase of such share by the substituted trustee from the one to whom he had agreed to convey it cannot make him an innocent purchaser, as he was hound to know, as a matter of law, that he was trustee for the same parties as the first trustee, and that he could not displace one beneficiary and substitute another in his place by ignoring the right of the former and recognizing another as holding his interest.
Id. — Construction of Deed — Trust — Limitation of Grant—Description of Quantity. — A deed to a trustee of certain lands described as lands the legal and equitable title to which was then in the trustee does not convey to the trustee lands to which he did not then have either the legal or equitable title, but which he had previously conveyed to one of the grantors; such lands are excluded from the grant by implication, and the clear limitation of the grant will not be controlled by a general description of quantity qualified by the words “ more or less ” which represent the trustee as holding in trust land equal in quantity to that owned by him before the previous conveyance to such grantor.
Id.—Estoppel — Deceit — Purchase from Trustee. —Without the element of deceit there can be no estoppel; and if one of the grantors in a deed of trust did not intentionally deceive or do anything to mislead a purchaser from the trustee, who relied upon the representation of the trustee that he had the power to convey certain lands of the grantor, which the trustee did not own, and which the deed gave him no power to convey, the grantor is not estopped from denying the title of such purchaser.
Partition — Equitable Title. — An action for partition may be maintained by the owner of an equitable title. Such a title is real property, and an estate of inheritance, which may descend or be conveyed by the owner; and as legal and equitable remedies may be had in the same case, the owner of the equitable title to an undivided interest in land may sue to establish his right, and to obtain a partition of the common estate.
Id. — Equity — Jurisdiction — Complete Relief. — When a court of equity has once obtained jurisdiction, it will do complete justice by deciding the whole case. Equity will not permit litigation by piecemeal, but will determine the whole controversy, so as to prevent future litigation.
Id.—Tenancy in Common — Adverse Possession — Possession of Trustee— Repudiation of Trust — Statute of Limitations.—Where there is no adverse possession against a tenant in common by any of his co-tenants, and no open repudiation of trust has been made, to his knowledge, by a trustee in possession, the possession of the trustee is as much his possession as that of the other co-tenants, and the statute of limitations cannot run against him, though the trustee had not declared a trust in his favor, but had declared a trust in favor of the other co-tenants, and had purchased his interest from another co-tenant, if such declaration of trust and conveyance were unknown to such tenant in common.
Power of Attorney — Conveyance in Name of Agent. —A power of attorney, though coupled with an interest, and claimed to be irrevocable, cannot be used to justify a conveyance by the agent, when he claimed the property as his own, and conveyed it in his own name, as his own, and not under the power of attorney.
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of the city and county of San Francisco denying a new trial.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Lloyd & Wood, for Appellant.
The plaintiff, having no legal estate, cannot maintain partition. (Harris v. Reynolds, 13 Cal. 518; 73 Am. Dec. 600; Sullivan v. Sullivan, 66 N. Y. 40; Morse v. Morse, 85 N. Y. 57; Warfield v. Gambrill, 1 Gill & J. 503; De Uprey v. De Uprey, 27 Cal. 335; 87 Am. Dec. 81; Morenhout v. Higuera, 32 Cal. 294; Emeric v. Alvarado, 64 Cal. 529, 609.) The possession of Baird was adverse to Watson, the trust being only implied. (Hecht & Slaney, 72 Cal 363, 366; Norris v. Haggin, 28 Fed. Rep. 277; Wilmerding v. Russ, 33 Conn. 77; Beaubien v. Beaubien, 23 How. 207; Wheeler v. Piper, 3 Jones, 249; Philippe v. Philippe, 115 U. S. 157; Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U. S. 140; Robbins v. Hope, 57 Cal. 495.) Proof of notice must be such as to fix upon a subsequent purchaser a charge of mala fides. (Dey v. Dunham, 2 Johns. Ch. 189; Vest v. Michie, 31 Gratt. 151; 31 Am. Rep. 722; Mullen v. Engelen, 12 Bush, 444; Cavin v.Middleton, 63 Iowa, 618; Carrier v. Town of Shawangunk, 10 Fed. Rep. 220; Willson v. Wall, 6 Wall. 90; Hardy v. Harbin, 1 Saw. 202.) After attesting a solemn declaration that Sullivan owns fifteen acres of the Byfield tract, or thereabouts, in an instrument designed expressly for the adjustment of the rights and interests of all parties concerned, and to enable Sullivan to close up the administration thereunder referred to, it does not lie in the mouth of Watson to say that he retains an interest. (Shelly v. Wright, Willes, 12; Salter v. Kidley, 1 Show. 56; Goodtitle v. Bailey, 2 Cowp. 600; Lainson v. Tremere, 1 Ad. & E. 792; Bowman v. Taylor, 2 Ad. & E. 290; Stow v. Wyse, 7 Conn. 219; 18 Am. Dec. 99; Adam v. Lansing, 17 Cal. 629; Pierce v. Whiting, 63 Cal. 540; Freeman v. Auld, 44 N. Y. 50; 3 Smith's Lead. Cas. 690, 707.) The law presumes that the trustees performed their duties, acted according to the rights of the parties, and obeyed the instructions of those authorized to give them. (French v. Edwards, 21 Wall. 150; Perry on Trusts, sec. 349; Lawson on Presumptive Evidence, 405, 410, 413, 424, 426; Code Civ. Proc. sec. 1963, subds. 1, 19, 27, 37.)
Stanly, Stoney & Hayes, for Respondent.
An equitable title is sufficient to sustain a suit for partition. (Hitchcock v. Skinner, 1 Hoff. Ch. 24; Cartwright v. Pultney, 2 Atk. 380.) An action for partition is a suit in equity, and when all who hold legal or equitable rights in the premises are before the court, a partition between them can be had, and all equitable rights determined. (De Uprey v. De Uprey, 27 Cal. 355; 87 Am. Dec. 81; Morenhout v. Higuera, 32 Cal. 294; Pfister v. Dascey, 65 Cal. 405; Emeric v. Alvarado, 64 Cal. 529, 629, 761, 762, 767; Coxe v. Smith, 4 Johns. Ch. 276; Freeman on Cotenancy and Partition, secs. 439, 449, 463, 505, 506; Hosford v. Merwin, 5 Barb. 52; Scott v. Guernsey, 60 Barb. 178; Hunter v. Brown, 7 B. Mon. 234; Williams v. Wiggard, 53 Ill. 233.) Plaintiff's action is not barred by limitation. (Love v. Watkins, 40 Cal. 569; 6 Am. Rep. 624; Warmouth v. Johnson, 38 Cal. 622; Gerdes v. Moody, 41 Cal. 335; Trenouth v. Gilbert, 63 Cal. 407; Freeman on Cotenancy and Partition, secs. 151, 154, 166, 167; Coleman v. Clements, 23 Cal. 245.) Watson had no notice of Baird's declaration of trust, or of his adverse possession. (Carpentier v. Mendenhal, 28 Cal. 484; 87 Am. Dec. 135; Bath v. Valdez, 70 Cal. 350; Vaughan v. Bacon, 15 Me. 457; 33 Am. Dec. 628; Lister v. Pickford, 34 Beav. 580; Foscue v. Foscue, 2 Ired. Eq. 325; Perry on Trusts, secs. 217, 222, 830.) Sutro cannot be protected as a bona fide purchaser. He did' not plead such defense. (Isenhoot v. Chamberlain, 59 Cal. 630; Aurrecoeachea v. Sinclair, 60 Cal. 532; Boone v. Chiles, 10 Pet. 177.) He is charged with knowing whatever came to the knowledge of his attorney, E. J. Moore, who examined the title for him, and upon whose report he purchased the property. (Donald v. Beals, 57 Cal. 399; The Distilled Spirits, 11 Wall. 307.) It was his duty to apply for information to Mr. Watson, whose rights were involved, and who alone was authorized to speak for himself, and is chargeable with notice of what he might have ascertained by reasonable diligence. (Cordova v. Hood, 17 Wall. 8; Mulliken v. Graham, 72 Pa. St. 491; Lawton v. Gordon, 37 Cal. 297; Civ. Code, sec. 19; Barnes v. McClinton, 3 Penr. & W. 67; 23 Am. Dec. 62; Weeks v. Haas, 3 Watts & S. 522; Blaisdell v. Stevens, 16 Vt. 179; Doyle v. Teas, 4 Scam. 202; Chicago, R. I., & P. R. R. Co. v. Kennedy, 70 Ill. 350; Baker v. Bliss, 39 N. Y. 70; Wright v. Ross, 36 Cal. 437; Eversdon v. Mayhew, 65 Cal. 163; Abell v. Howe, 43 Vt. 403; Williamson v. Brown, 15 N. Y. 354; Galland v. Jackman, 26 Cal. 80; 85 Am. Dec. 172.) Watson was not estopped by Sullivan’s representations to Sutro. (Stroughill v. Buck 14 Ad. & E. 784; Bigelow on Estoppel, 2d ed., 269-280.) The recital as to the interest of Sullivan in the Byfield tract was too general and uncertain to create an estoppel upon any of the parties. (Bigelow on Estoppel, 273-277; 1 Greenl. Ev., sec. 26, n. 2; Hall v. Mayhew, 15 Md. 551; Stebbins v. Eddy, 4 Mason, 419; Jones v. Plater, 2 Gill, 128; 41 Am. Dec. 408; Hunt v. Stull, 3 Md. Ch. 26; Smallwood v. Hatton, 4 Md. Ch. 98; Stull v. Hurtt, 9 Gill, 446.)

Opinion:
The Court.
have heard this case the second time, and upon a further examination of the record and the briefs of counsel, we feel constrained to adhere to the reasoning of the former opinion and the conclusion therein reached.
The order appealed from is therefore affirmed.
McFarland, J., and Fox, J., dissented.