Case Name: MIZE v. THE STATE
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1992-10-30
Citations: 262 Ga. 489
Docket Number: S92A0648
Parties: MIZE v. THE STATE.
Judges: Clarke, C. J., Hunt and Benham, JJ., concur; Bell, P. J., and Sears-Collins, J., dissent.
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 262
Pages: 489–493

Head Matter:
S92A0648.
MIZE v. THE STATE.
(422 SE2d 180)

Opinion:
Fletcher, Justice.
On December 19,1989, James Wesley Mize was indicted for murder, felony murder, and armed robbery arising out of an incident that occurred in September of 1989. On February 28, 1990, the last day of the January-February term of court for the Fulton County Superior Court, Mize filed a demand for trial pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-171. On March 22, 1990, the state moved to dismiss Mize's demand for trial, arguing that it had not been timely filed because no jurors had been impaneled on the date the demand was filed. After hearing oral arguments concerning the motion, the trial court granted the motion and struck the demand.
Mize was tried in January of 1991 and, on January 31, 1991, was convicted of felony murder and armed robbery. On February 1, 1991, the trial court filed Mize's sentence. On March 1, 1991, Mize filed a motion for new trial wherein he argued, among other things, that the trial court had erred in March of 1990 when it dismissed his demand for trial.
On September 26, 1991, the trial court granted Mize's motion for new trial and, thereafter, on November 6,1991, Mize filed a motion to bar and dismiss prosecution and indictment. It is from the trial court's denial of such motion that he appeals. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
1. OCGA § 17-7-171 governs demands for trial in capital cases and subsection (a) of that section sets forth the time during which a demand for trial must be entered in a capital case in order to be considered timely. Subsection (a) does not require that jurors be impaneled at the time the demand is entered in order for the demand to be timely; it simply requires that the demand be entered either at the term of court at which the indictment was found or at the next succeeding regular term thereafter.
Mize was indicted during the November/December 1989 term of Fulton County Superior Court and entered his demand for trial at the next succeeding regular term of court thereafter: the January/February term of 1990. That no jurors were impaneled at the time appellant's demand was entered was not relevant to the timeliness of his demand and the trial court erred by striking the demand.
2. OCGA § 17-7-171's guarantee of a speedy trial protects a right that is personal to an individual accused of a capital offense. However, the statutory right to a speedy trial is not jurisdictional in nature and may be waived by an accused's affirmative acts and/or failures to act. The conduct of an accused, both before and after the filing of the speedy trial demand authorized by OCGA § 17-7-171, may result in an accused waiving his or her right to a speedy trial. See 57 ALR2d 302. See also Parker v. State, 135 Ga. App. 620, 621 (218 SE2d 324) (1975); Hogan v. State, 193 Ga. App. 543, 544 (388 SE2d 532) (1989).
Mize did not seek the trial court's permission to file a new demand for trial following dismissal of his first demand. Nor did Mize file a motion seeking dismissal of the indictment prior to proceeding with his trial when it eventually began in January of 1991, despite the fact that five terms of court had passed since that demand was filed. It was not until after he had been tried and convicted that Mize, in his motion for new trial, first asserted error with respect to the timeliness of his trial. As a result of these affirmative acts and failures to act, Mize has long since waived his statutory right to a speedy trial.
3. Mize's motion to bar and dismiss the prosecution and indictment was not filed until after his motion for new trial had been granted. Such motion was not timely and was correctly denied by the trial court.
Judgment affirmed.
Clarke, C. J., Hunt and Benham, JJ., concur; Bell, P. J., and Sears-Collins, J., dissent.
To the extent that dicta in Cleary v. State, 258 Ga. 203 (366 SE2d 677) (1988) may have indicated that a demand for trial will be effective only where jurors are impaneled at the time the demand is entered, that dicta is expressly disapproved.
Fulton County Superior Court has six terms of criminal court each year: January/February, March/April, May/June, July/August, September/October, and November/December.
Whether jurors are impaneled during a term of court is relevant only to whether that term will be counted as one of the two regular terms of court, after the term when the demand for trial is entered, during which subsection (b) of OCGA § 17-7-171 requires the state to give the defendant a trial or an absolute discharge and acquittal after an appropriate demand for such has been filed.
As the term of court at which the indictment was found had passed, along with the next succeeding regular term thereafter, OCGA § 17-7-171 (a) would require the permission of the trial court to file another demand for trial.
Any error by the trial court in striking Mize's demand for trial has also been waived by Mize's actions and his inaction following the striking of the demand.