Case Name: PEOPLE v. JAGOTKA
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1999-10-26
Citations: 461 Mich. 274
Docket Number: Docket No. 113735
Parties: PEOPLE v JAGOTKA
Judges: Taylor, Corrigan, and Young, JJ., concurred.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 461
Pages: 274–284

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v JAGOTKA
Docket No. 113735.
Decided October 26, 1999.
On application by the people for leave to appeal, the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings.
Michael J. Jagotka was charged with driving under the influence of intoxicants. The 52-1 District Court, Brian W. MacKenzie, J., suppressed the results of Mr. Jagotka’s blood-alcohol test after it was revealed that the sample on which the results were based had been destroyed. The circuit court, Jessica R. Cooper, J., reversed the suppression order. The Court of Appeals, McDonald and Cavanagh, JJ. (Makkman, P.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), affirmed, but held that the destruction of the blood sample constituted a violation of MCL 780.655; MSA 28.1259(5), and directed that the defendant receive an adverse inference jury instruction. 232 Mich App 346 (1998) (Docket No. 197753). The people seek leave to appeal.
The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings.
Justices Taylor, Corrigan, and Young, JJ., concurring, stated that there was neither a violation of MCL 780.655; MSA 28.1259(5) nor of the federal or state constitution. Thus, there is no need to consider a proper remedy or to reach the issue whether an “adverse-inference” instruction would be an appropriate remedy or, if so, what the content of such an instruction might be.
Chief Justice Weaver concurred in the result only.
Justice Cavanagh, joined by Justice Kelly, dissenting, stated that the phrase “shall be safely kept” in MCL 780.655; MSA 28.1259(5) is not ambiguous. It requires the police to keep blood samples until trial. Disposal of a blood sample violates this language. Test reports are in no way “property and things so seized.” The only thing seized in this case was the blood itself. State police could keep, destroy, misplace, or ceremonially bum a test report, and whatever effect that might have on what is admitted at trial, it would in no way be governed by the statute. The statute only governs what was “seized.”
Additionally, MCL 780.655; MSA 28.1259(5) does not restrict the police to safely keep the evidence only as long as necessary for production or use by the prosecution. It requires the evidence to be safely kept as long as necessary for production or use at trial, and that includes production or use by the defendant. Because the statute does not require safekeeping only until “produced or used” by the prosecution, the blood sample should have been safely kept.
The contention that the defendant failed to request the sample within a reasonable time, within the statute’s language, is immaterial. Nothing in the statute conditions anything on the defendant’s assertion of any right, or seems to permit the sort of policy of destruction apparent in this case.
Justice Markman took no part in the decision of this case.
Jennifer M. Granholm, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, David G. Gorcyca, Prosecuting Attorney, Daniel L. Lemisch, Chief, Appellate Division, and Joyce F. Todd, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Traver, Lepley & Walsak (by Daniel A. Travef) for the defendant-appellee.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
We reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals and affirm the judgment of the circuit court. We remand this case to the district court for further proceedings. MCR 7.302(F)(1).
Taylor, Corrigan, and Young, JJ., concurred.
Weaver, C.J., concurred in the result only.