Case Name: SUN BANK/MIAMI, N.A., as Personal Representative of the Estate of Toby Saewitz, Appellant, v. Max Paul SAEWITZ, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1991-04-30
Citations: 579 So. 2d 255
Docket Number: No. 88-2185
Parties: SUN BANK/MIAMI, N.A., as Personal Representative of the Estate of Toby Saewitz, Appellant, v. Max Paul SAEWITZ, Appellee.
Judges: Before FERGUSON, COPE and LEVY, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 579
Pages: 255–258

Head Matter:
SUN BANK/MIAMI, N.A., as Personal Representative of the Estate of Toby Saewitz, Appellant, v. Max Paul SAEWITZ, Appellee.
No. 88-2185.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
April 30, 1991.
Fromberg, Fromberg and Lewis and Elsa Alvarez, Miami, for appellant.
Allison Doliner Hockman, Coral Gables, for appellee.
Before FERGUSON, COPE and LEVY, JJ.

Opinion:
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
LEVY, Judge.
Sun Bank/Miami, N.A., as personal representative of the estate of Ms. Toby Saew-itz, appeals from a final judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Max Paul Saewitz, in an action to recover money lent. We affirm.
The plaintiff, who is the son of the decedent Toby Saewitz, brought an action against Sun Bank, personal representative of the decedent mother's estate, to recover money the son allegedly loaned to his mother. Attached to the complaint as an exhibit, was a check for $100,000 payable to the decedent, signed by the plaintiff son's wife, and drawn on their joint account. The word "loan" appeared on the check, and the plaintiff alleged that the check was a loan to his mother, with whom he had a business relationship. Both parties stipulated that the plaintiff and his wife were interested parties.
At trial, and over the defendant's objections, the check and testimony by the plaintiff and his wife, that the cheek was a loan to the decedent, were admitted into evidence. The trial court denied Sun Bank's motion for a directed verdict based on the insufficiency of the evidence, and entered a final judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $100,000.
Sun Bank first argues that the trial court committed reversible error in allowing the check payable to the plaintiff's mother to be introduced into evidence and cites to Stebnow v. Goss, 165 So.2d 251 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964). In Stebnow, the Second District held that cancelled checks drawn by the plaintiff to the order of the decedent, which bore no inscription or other evidence indicating the purpose for which they were given, were insufficient to establish a claim of indebtedness on the part of the decedent. The court indicated that an objection to the introduction of the check should have been sustained stating that:
Checks in short, are used for divers purposes other than the advancement of loans. So reasonable prudence, especially in the case of an unsecured loan, demands a clear evidence of the debt to meet the contingency of the Dead Man's Statute and guard against presumption from circumstances which otherwise might be inconsistent with a claim of indebtedness. An ordinary cancelled check is not per se indicative of a debt of the payee to the drawer.
Stebnow, 165 So.2d at 253-54 (emphasis added). By contrast, in the present case the check to the plaintiff's decedent mother was not "ordinary" because it contained the inscription "loan" on its face and was endorsed without restriction. Under these circumstances, the check did constitute a writing which evidenced an indebtedness, sufficient to overcome the ordinary presumption to the contrary, and to allow its introduction into evidence.
Furthermore, we note that the Stebnow case was decided prior to the 1976 revisions to the Deadman's Statute, which revisions became effective on July 1, 1978. The pri- or statutory language, contained within Section 90.05 of the Florida Statutes, prohibited interested persons from acting as witnesses regarding "transactions" and oral communications between the interested person and the deceased. The post-revision language contained in Section 90.602, Florida Statutes (1984), prohibits such testimony only insofar as it concerns oral communications. It omits the language regarding "transactions". As recognized in Section 90.602 at the Law Revision Council Note — 1976:
This section, commonly known as the "Deadman's Statute," provides protection for the estates of the deceased and the insane by making certain interested persons incompetent to testify in an action against the estate regarding oral communications with the deceased or insane person. Existing Fla.Stat. § 90.05 is substantially restated and the same class of persons are protected. However, the section is applicable only to "oral communications" and not to "transactions" because of problems that have arisen therewith.
We are also not persuaded by Sun Bank's second argument for reversal, that the trial court committed reversible error in admitting the testimony of the interested plaintiff and his wife regarding the transaction. As noted above, Section 90.602 only excludes testimony that refers to conversations between an interested party and a deceased person. It does not exclude testimony by an interested party regarding written transactions or written communications with a deceased person. Hulsh v. Hulsh, 431 So.2d 658 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). Thus it was not error for the trial court to admit testimony by the plaintiff and his wife regarding the terms of the transaction. Questions of the weight, sufficiency, and credibility of the properly submitted testimony and the other evidence were mat ters correctly for the trier-of-fact to determine, and we find that there was substantial competent evidence to support the judgment below.
Accordingly, having found that the trial court was eminently correct in entering the judgment below, we affirm.
Affirmed.