Case Name: MAURER v. GREENING NURSERY CO.
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1917-12-28
Citations: 199 Mich. 522
Docket Number: Docket No. 20
Parties: MAURER v. GREENING NURSERY CO.
Judges: Kuhn, C. J., and Stone, Ostrander, Moore, Steere, Brooke, and Fellows, JJ., concurred.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 199
Pages: 522–532

Head Matter:
MAURER v. GREENING NURSERY CO.
1. Contracts — Statutes—Construction.
A contract in violation of a statute is void, although not expressly declared so, and it is immaterial whether that which is forbidden is malum in se or merely malum prohibitum.
2. Statutes — Partnership Certificates — Assumed Names.
Act No. 101, Pub. Acts 1907 (2 Comp. Laws 1915, § 6349 et seq.), requiring the filing of certificates by persons doing business under assumed names, and Act No. 164, Pub. Acts 1913 (2 Comp. Laws 1915, § 6354 et seq.), requiring the filing of certificates by copartnerships, were intended to inform the public as to whom it was dealing with and'thereby serve its convenience, and to prevent imposition and fraud.
3. Contracts — Payment—Noncompuance with Statute.
Payment under a partnership contract cannot be enforced by the partnership which, although it does not come within the proviso in Act No. 164, Pub. Acts 1913, has not filed the certificate required by such act, and it is immaterial that the debtor actually knew who the members of the copartnership were. Kuhn, Moore, and Brooke, JJ., dissenting.
4. Appeal and Error — Constitutional Law- — Questions Not Raised on Trial.
The question of the constitutionality of a statute will not be considered by the Supreme Court, where such question was not raised in the court below.
Error to Monroe; Gilday, J.
Submitted April 3, 1917.
(Docket No. 20.)
Decided December 28, 1917.
Resubmitted April 19, 1918. Former opinion affirmed July 18, 1918.
Assumpsit by John Maurer and Charles A. Maurer, copartners as Maurer Brothers, against the Greening Nursery Company for an amount due on a building contract. Judgment for defendant on a directed verdict. Plaintiffs bring error.
Affirmed.
Thornton Dixon (Fred A. Baker, of counsel), for appellants.
Oliver J. Golden, for appellee.

Opinion:
Bird, J.
The plaintiffs entered into a contract to construct an office building for defendant in the city of Monroe. When the building was constructed and the final payment was due some controversy arose concerning certain set-offs which defendant claimed. Being unable to adjust their differences amicably this suit was instituted. Among other defenses made by defendant was the failure of plaintiffs to comply with either Act No. 101, Pub. Acts 1907 (2 Comp. Laws 1915, § 6349 et seq.), or Act No. 164, Pub. Acts 1913 (2 Comp. Laws 1915, § 6354 et seq.), requiring certificates to be filed with the county clerk by copartnerships and persons doing business under an assumed name. Nothing was claimed for plaintiffs' failure to comply with Act No. 101, except to show that plaintiffs were not excused from compliance with Act No. 164 by having previously complied with Act No. 101. The case went off on this question, the trial court holding that plaintiffs' failure to comply with Act No. 164 was a bar to any recovery.
It is conceded by plaintiffs that they never complied with either act, and they recognize the fact that this court has held in Cashin v. Pliter, 168 Mich. 386 (134 N. W. 482, Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 1913C, 697), that a failure to comply with Act No. 101 was a bar to any recovery by the person in default, but an effort is made by counsel to distinguish the aims and purposes of this statute from those which gave rise to Act No. 164. Counsel say in their brief:
"The act of 1913 requiring partnerships to register was not enacted to protect the public against fraud and imposition or to safeguard the public health or morals. It has no such object; it is a mere regulation, designed to have record evidence of the membership of partnerships; it is nothing more than a convenience, to enable those who are not aware of the names of partners, composing a firm, to readily ascertain them."
And they argue that where the act prohibited is not malum in se, a contract made in violation thereof will not be declared void. The general rule appears to be that:
"Where a statute expressly declares that certain kinds of contracts shall be void, there is then no doubt of the legislative intention, and an agreement of the kind voided by statute is unlawful. The same is true where the contract is in violation of a statute, although not therein expressly declared to be void. It is immaterial whether the thing forbidden is malum in se or merely malum prohibitum. 9 Cyc. p. 475, and cases."
The obvious purpose of both acts was to inform the public with whom it is dealing, and thereby serve its convenience and to prevent imposition and fraud. Prior to the passage of the acts it was neither wrong for one to do business under an assumed name, nor to trade under a copartnership name without disclosing his identity. It is wrong now only because it is prohibited by statute. It is true that contracts in violation of Act No. 164 are not therein expressly prohibited, but they are impliedly. The statute has imposed a penalty for the failure to file the required certificate, and by so doing it impliedly prohibits the making of any contract during the period of default. Harris v. Runnels, 12 How. (U. S.) 79; Dudley v. Collier, 87 Ala. 431 (6 South. 304, 13 Am. St. Rep. 55); Buxton v. Hamblen, 32 Me. 448; Vanmeter v. Spurrier; 94 Ky. 22 (21 S. W. 337); Levinson v. Boas, 150 Cal. 185 (88 Pac. 825, 12 L. R. A. [N. S.] 575, 11 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 661); Watrous v. Blair, 32 Iowa, 58; Despres, Bridges & Noel v. Zierleyn, 163 Mich. 399 (128 N. W. 769).
Inasmuch as there is nothing, in the language of Act No. 164 indicating that the legislature intended the penalty imposed should be the sole punishment for its violation, we are of the opinion that the general rule implying a prohibition from the imposition of the penalty should be applied and a like construction given to it as has been given to Act No. 101.
The argument is made that defendant was fully informed who constituted the plaintiff firm, and therefore it is estopped from raising this defense. The following cases are cited in support of this contention: Missaukee Farm & Investment Co. v. Ferris, 193 Mich. 286 (159 N. W. 490); Sauer v. Construction Co., 179 Mich. 624 (146 N. W. 422). We think that neither of these cases supports the contention of counsel. In the first one cited it was held that Act No. 101 did not apply to copartnerships doing a banking business, but that such copartnerships were controlled by Act No. 160 of the Laws of 1859, and that what was done under that act was a substantial compliance with its provisions. In the second case cited it was held that the copartnership name was not an assumed name, and therefore did not come within the provisions of the act. The mere fact that a person dealing with a copartnership might know who the members of a co-partnership were would not relieve them from filing a certificate in compliance with Act No. 164. To hold otherwise would be to destroy the usefulness of the act.
The constitutionality of the act is attacked under the "due process" clause of the Constitution, on the specific ground that the penalties imposed by the act are excessive. This question does not appear to have been presented to nor passed upon by the trial court. In view of our rule that trial courts must be given an opportunity to pass upon questions before being raised in this court, we shall not consider it.
Being of the opinion that the trial court reached the right conclusion, the judgment must be affirmed.
Kuhn, C. J., and Stone, Ostrander, Moore, Steere, Brooke, and Fellows, JJ., concurred.