Case Name: J. A. Davis v. The State
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1920-11-24
Citations: 88 Tex. Crim. 183
Docket Number: No. 5777
Parties: J. A. Davis v. The State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Criminal Reports
Volume: 88
Pages: 183–194

Head Matter:
J. A. Davis v. The State.
No. 5777.
Decided November 24, 1920.
1. —Pool Hall—Transcript—Caption—Date—Practice on Appeal.
Where, it is impossible for this court to tell whether the transcript contains the record of the trial during any particular year, as no date appears anywhere in the caption, nor is it there stated when the term of the court began and ended, the appeal must be dismissed; but where on re-hearing it appeared that a proper caption has been affixed, etc., the appeal is reinstated and decided upon its merits.
2. —Same—Constitutional Law—Concurrent Resolutions—Legislative Journals —Corrections.
Where, upon appeal from a conviction of the so-called “pool hall law,” Chapter XIV, Acts of Thirty-sixth Legislature, appellant attacked the constitutionality of said law because a concurrent resolution of the Legislature, containing the Act in question, directed that the same be so corrected as to make it use in a certain place the word “and” instead of the word “or,” which appeared in the original bill as engrossed, held, that the Legislature may make corrections such as these at any time before the bill is signed by . the presiding officers of the several houses.
3. —Same—Legislative Bills—One Subject Expressed in Title—Concurrent Resolution.
Where, appellant attempted to invoke that part of the Constitution which forbids that any bill or Act shall have more than one subject, which must be expressed in its title, and contended that a concurrent resolution to correct the original bill was a bill itself, and should have been referred to a committee, read on three several days, etc., held, that a concurrent resolution is neither a bill nor a joint resolution; besides, the Legislature is not deprived of its power to correct that which manifestly appears to be a clerical error, especially where the bill has not been signed by the presiding officers of the two houses. Distinguishing: Hunt v. State, 22 Texas Crim. App., 396, and other cases.
4. —Same—Caption—Matters not Comprehended in Bill.
Where, appellant complains that the caption of said Act, supra, is not sufficient in that there are matters in the bill not comprehended by the caption, held, that this would not be a good objection to the caption, and that the bill would only be invalid as to matters not so comprehended in the scope of the title, and, where the caption and the act itself are not in conflict, said contention is untenable.
6.—Same—Caption—Terms of Act—Rule Stated.
Where, appellant objected to the above law, supra, in that the purpose oT' the Act, as stated in the caption, was to forbid pool halls, the inclusion of billiards and billiard tables in the definition of a pool hall is not allowable, but it appeared from the Act in question that it did not comprehend legislation incongruous in itself, and its provisions by a fair construction have connection with the subject expressed, the same is valid; besides, Section 35, Article 3, of our State Constitution must be liberally construed; and, if the act be singular in substance and its provisions germane in any degree, it will be upheld. Following Nichols v. State, 32 Texas Crim. Rep., 403, and other cases.
6—Same—Constitutional Law—Rule Stated—Legislative Power.
There is no express limitation in our Constitution upon the power of the Legislature in defining what constitutes a given offense, and, unless the language and terms in such definition be so repugnant, unintelligible, or inadequate as to fail to make clear the meaning and intent of the law-makers, etc., the court will not undertake to create limitations or invade the domain of a coordinate department of the government.
7.—Same—Pool and Billiard Tables—Legislative Power.
Where, the appellant contended that the inclusion of billiards and billiard tables in the definition of a pool hall is not allowable, held, that the court does not know judicially or otherwise any reason why denominating a certain place as a billiard hall or parlor might not mean that pool, as well as billiard tables, were there exhibited, and we do not think the Legislature exceeded its power, or included repugnant or ■ incongruous elements when it defined pool halls as being those places where pool and billiard tables were exhibited. Following Newman v. Williamson, 46 Texas Civil Appeals, 615, and other cases.
8.—Same—Pool Halls—Billiards—Legislative Intent.
We hold without further elaboration that the Legislature had power to include within its definition of a pool hall those places where were exhibited tables or structures at which were played games of pool or billiards of any kind or character.
9.—Same—Words and Phrases—Statutes Construed—Constitutional Law—Surplusage.
■■ Where, appellant attacked the so-called pool-hall law, Chapter XIV, Section 1, of the Act of the Thirty-sixth Legislature, as unconstitutional, in that said act seeks to include within its definition of a pool hall any place where is exhibited any table or structure upon which is played a game similar or 'dissimilar to the game of pool or billiards played with balls, cues, or pins, or any similar device, and contended that the use of the words “or dissimilar” destroyed the whole law, held, that the same is untenable, and that said words may be disregarded as surplusage.
10.—Same—Rule Stated—Statute Construed.
When a liberal reading of a statute leads to an absurdity plainly not intended, the courts will put such construction upon the language used as corresponds with the plain meaning and intent of the Legislature, and to effect that purpose, will strike out words clearly superfluous. Following Gage v. Chicago, 201 Ill., 93.
11. —Same—Words and Phrases—Legislative Intent—Surplusage.
The words “or dissimilar” may be treated as surplusage, and do no violence to the Act, suprra,' and do not take from it that which the Legislature purposely wrote there, and do not affect the frame work of the entire Act. The purpose of the Legislature was to write this law in such broad terms as to make impossible the existence of those places known in common parlance as pool halls, and its intention cannot be misconstrued.
12. —Same—Innocent Game—Pool Tables—Statutes Construed.
There is no condemnation in said Act of innocent games; besides, this has no particular reference to the instant case; it not being contended here that defendant operated any other kind of tables save pool, clearly within the violation of the statute.
Appeal from the County Court of Bell. Tried below before the Honorable M. B. Blair.
Appeal from a conviction of a violation of the pool hall law defined by the terms of Chapter XIV. Section .1, Acts of the Thirty-sixth Legislature; penalty, a fine of twenty-five dollars.
The opinion states the case.
Williams & Williams, and Black and Smedley, for appellant.
On question of unconstitutionality of Section 1, Chapter XIV, Acts of Thirty-sixth Legislature: Augustine v. State, 41 Texas Crim. Rep., 59; Cogdell v. State, 81 id., 66; Griffin v. State, 218 S. W. Rep., 494; Tozer v. U. S., 52 Fed., 919; Hewitt v. State Board of Examination, 84 Pacific, 39; U. S. v. Brewer, 139 U. S. 278; Ry. Company v. Dey, 35 Fed., 865; Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. U. S., 213 Federal, 162; Ry. Co. v. Commonwealth, 35 S. W. Rep., 129; Coe v. Lawrence, 72 English Ruling Cases, 516; Sturgis v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheaton, 202; International Harvester Company v. State of Kentucky, 234 U. S., 222; Ex Parte Roquemore, 131 S. W. Rep., 1101; Ex Parte Muckenfuss, 52 Texas Crim. Rep., 467.
On question of innocent games: Condon v. Forest Park, 278 Ill., 218; Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S., 133; McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S., 539.
On question of caption of act: State v. Cumberland Club, 188 S. W. Rep., 583; Smith v. State, 17 Texas, 191; Squire v. State, 66 Indiana, 317; Rodgers v. State, 26 Alabama, 26; Commonwealth v. Montedenico, 13 Kentucky Opinions, 347; Giddings v. San Antonio, 47 Texas, 556; Joliff v. State, 53 Texas Crim. Rep., 63; Ex Parte Abrams, 120 S. W. Rep., 833; Brown v. State, 122 id., 565.
On question of valid and invalid parts of legislative act: Western Union Tel. Co. v. State, 62 Texas, 630; Ex parte Massey, 92 S. W. Rep., 1083; Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U. S., 678.
On question of words and phrases and incongruous terms: Butts v. Merchants, etc., Transportation Company, 230 U. S., 126; Spain v. Ry. Co., 151 Federal, 522; James v. Bowman, 190 U. S., 127; Ry. Co. v. McKengree, 203 U. S., 514; Trade Mark Cases, 100 U. S., 82. Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U. S., 217.
C. M. Cureton, Attorney General, Alvin M. Owsley, and E. F. Smith, Assistant Attorneys General, for the State.
The enactment of a law raises the presumption that it is valid. All doubts must be resolved in favor of its validity. Lyle v. State, 193 S. W., 680; Altgelt v. Gutzeit, 187 S. W., 220; Hale County v. Lubbock County, 194 S. W. 678; Glass v. Pool, 166 S. W., 375; Railway Company v. Griffin, 171 S. W., 703; Railway Company v. Express Company, 173 S. W., 217; Ex parte Mode, 180 S. W., 798; Harris County v. Stewart, 91 Texas, 133; Ashford v. Goodwin, 131 S. W., 535; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch (U. S.), 87; Cheeney v. Jones, 14 Fla., 587; Whitlock v. Hawkins, 105 Va., 242; Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations, p. 216.
Any practice or business, the tendency of which as shown by experience is to weaken or corrupt the morals of those who follow it, or to encourage idleness instead of habits of industry, is a legitimate subject for regulation or prohibition by the State. Marvin v. Trout 199 U. S., 212; Ah Sin v. U. S., 198 U. S., 500; Western Tuff Assn. v. Greenburg, 204 U. S., 339; Douglas v. Kentucky, 168 U. S., 488; Boothe v. Illinois, 184 U. S. 425; Logan & Bryan v. Postal, etc., Co., 157 Fed., 570; Wallace v. Reno, 27 Nev., 71, 63 L. R. A., 337; Parker v. Otis, 130 Cal., 332, 92 A. S. R., 56; L’Hote v. New Orleans, 51 La. Ann., 93, 44 L. R. A., 90.
Courts, in passing upon the constitutionality of a law passed by both branches of the Legislature, properly signed by the presiding officer of each, approved by the Governor, and promulgated as the law of the land in compliance with all other constitutional requirements, are not required to go behind the enrolled bill, deposited as a record in the office of the Secretary of State, and consult the journals of the Legislature with reference to the antecedent proceedings in the enactment of the law. Usener v. State, 8 Texas App., 177; McLane v. Paschal, 28 S. W., 711; Day Land & Cattle Co. v. State, 68 Texas, 526; Parshall v. State, 138 S. W., 759; H & T. C. Ry. Co. v. Stuart, 48 S. W., 799; El Paso, etc., Ry. Co. v. Foth, 100 S. W., 171; Williams v. Taylor, 83 Texas, 667; In re Tipton, 28 Texas App., 438; H. & T. C. Ry. Co. v. Odum, 53 Texas, 343; Blessing v. Galveston, 42 Texas, 641; Field v. Clark, 143 U. S., 649; Leaper v. Texas, 139 U. S., 462; Lyons v. Woods, 153 U. S., 649.
Titles to acts should receive a liberal construction, especially, criminal acts. Ex parte Segars, 25 S. W., 26; Nicols v. State, 23 S. W., 680; Joliff v. State, 109 S. W., 176; Brown v. State, 122 S. W., 565; Ex parte Walch, 129 S. W., 118; Morris v. Gussett, 62 Texas, 741; Fahey v. State, 27 Texas App., 146.
As an aid in the construction of the law, the caption may be referred to, and it is equally permissible in the construction of the caption to refer to the body of the act. City of Austin v. McCall, 95 Texas, 565; Morris v. State, 62 Texas, 741; Otoe County v. Baldwin, 111 U. S., 16; 2 Sutherland. Statutory Construction, p. 651; Railway Co. v. Riblet, 66 Pa., 164; Hines v. Wilmington, etc., Co., 95 N. C., 434; Nazor v. Merchants, etc., Co., 14 Wis., 295; Dodd v. State, 18 Ind., 56; Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations. 169 et seq.; Commonwealth v. Barney, 24 Ky. L. R., 2352.
The language used in the caption of Senate bill No. 14 is broad and comprehensive enough to include both pool and billiards. Stone v. State, 3 Texas App., 675; Taylor v. State, 95 S. W., 119; Clear Water v. Bowman (Kan.), 82 Pac., 526; Smith v. State, 17 Texas, 191; 7 Century Dictionary, 4618; Webster’s Dictionary. (Unabridged), 1113; Sikes v. State, 67 Ala., 77; State v. Pamprin, 42 Minn., 320.
The presumption is that the Legislature of the State of Texas had before it at the time it passed the “Pool Hall Law” sufficient evidence to justify it in finding that pool and billiard halls are a menace to the health, prosperity, morals, and general welfare of the people of Texas. The courts will not go behind that finding, but will treat the fact as proved without allegation or proof. State v. Layton, 160 Mo., 474, 62 L. R. A., 163; People v. Durston, 119 N. Y., 569, 7 L. R. A., 715; In re Yunquong, 159 Cal., 508; Viemeister v. White, 179 N. Y., 225, 70 L. R. A., 798.

Opinion:
LATTIMORE, Judge.
The caption of the transcript in this case is as follows:
"The State of Texas County of Bell
At the February Term of the County Court, begun and holden at Belton, within and for the county of Bell, before the Honorable M. B. Blair, County Judge, the following ease, among others, came on for trial, to-wit:
The State of Texas
No. 566 vs.
J. A. Davis."
It is impossible for us to tell whether the transcript, of which the foregoing is the caption, contains the record of the trial during any particular year, as no date appears anywhere in the caption; nor is it there stated when the term of the court began and ended. This Court suffers so continually from the carelessness of the¡ officials charged with the duty of preparing transcripts, that its limit of patience is almost reached. It seems that calling attention in opinions, to such matters, has little effect. The rules of practice with regard to these matters are well understood, and there is no excuse for the delay and expense incident to the necessary correction of such errors.
The appeal is dismissed.
Dismissed.