Case Name: STATE, DEFENDANT IN ERROR, v. JOHN H. YOUNG, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR
Court: New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1919-11-17
Citations: 93 N.J.L. 396
Docket Number: 
Parties: STATE, DEFENDANT IN ERROR, v. JOHN H. YOUNG, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Law Reports
Volume: 93
Pages: 396–413

Head Matter:
STATE, DEFENDANT IN ERROR, v. JOHN H. YOUNG, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR.
Argued July 5, 1917
Decided March 4, 1918.
Reargued June 17, 1919
Decided November 17, 1919.
1. It is error to permit a witness for the state, on direct examination, to testify that be was under indictment, jointly with the defendant, for another crime that had no tendency logically to prove the substantive case of the state.
2. A mere charge of crime cannot effect the credibility of a witness,’ since, even if it take the solemn form of an indictment, the accused is presumed innocent.
On error to the Supreme Court.
Por the state, Wilbur A. Mott (J. Henry Harrison on the brief).
.For the plaintiff: in error, Robert II. McCarter.
Alter the original argument in the Court of Errors and Appeals, the following opinion was filed by Mr. Justice Kalisch:
The plaintiff in error, a surgeon, was, convicted of manslaughter, in . the Essex Quarter Sessions, for causing the death of Emma C. Truesdell through malpractice, in the performance of a surgical operation upon her, she having died upon the operating table.
The record of the conviction and judgment of the trial court was removed by the plaintiff in error, by writ of error sued out of the Supreme Court, in which latter tribunal the judgment was affirmed.
That record is now before us for review by writ of error sued out bv the plaintiff in error in this court to the Supreme Court.
The argument, so elaborately and forcefully addressed to us by counsel for plaintiff in error upon, the merits of the case, cannot be properly considered here where we deal exclusively with the legal questions presented by the record.
It may very well be that the testimony tending to establish the guilt, of the plaintiff in error is of such meagre and attenuated character that tested by a ¡dried analysis it is, not clearly convincing of the guilt of the plaintiff in error; and even though it may appear lo us that on a motion for a new trial, in the trial court, such a motion might properly prevail, nevertheless, such a, situation affords no legal ground for disturbing the verdict in this case here, so long as there is some testimony, no matter how slight, tending to support the finding of the jury.
It is only where there is no testimony to support a verdict and a motion is made for a direction of a verdict of not guilty, and such motion is refused, that such refusal may be properly assigned as error, reviewable here. •
AYe come now to consider the legal questions presented by the record and advanced as reasons, by counsel for plaintiff in error, for a reversal of the judgment.
In the trial court one of the points- made in behalf of the accused was that the removal of two parts of the smaller intestine, together with the larger intestine, could not possibly have been accomplished with the instruments- that were alleged to have been'used by-tire defendant in performing the operation. In this aspect of the case counsel for plaintiff in error requested the court to charge the jury as follows: “There was no duty to examine the witness with respect to any other instruments than those which the evidence disclosed were used. No inference can be drawn from the fact that the question was confined to the instruments which the evidence disclosed were used, there -being no evidence whatever to show that any other, instruments were used.”
The court refused to charge this request, and, we think, properly so.
On the one hand, there v/as testimony tending to show that in fact there- was no disturbance of the abdominal tract after death, and that when opened, in the presence of Dr. Washington, its contents were gone; and there was the testimony of every medical expert, except Dr. Washington, that they could not have been removed by the use of the instruments exhibited.
The legitimate inference from all this would be that the contents were removed before death and by some instruments other than those exhibited. ' On the other hand, was the defendant’s claim that in fact the removal of the contents had' occurred after death.
The jury evidently adopted the view that the contents were removed before death and by some instrument or instruments other than those-exhibited. There was evidence on which to -base such, finding, and, hence, it would have been improper for the trial judge to charge, as requested, that there was no evidence whatever to show that any other instruments were used. This clause of the request being unsupported the entire request was vitiated and was properly refused.
In State v. Reilly, 89 N. J. L. 627, this court, speaking through Mr. Justice Parker (on p. 628), said: “Where a party asks for an instruction, which is partly good and partly bad, it is proper to refuse it altogether. Gardner v. State, 55 Id. 17; affirmed, Id. (582; Consolidated Traction Co. v. Chenoweth, 58 Id. 416; affirmed, 61 Id. 554; Dedrick v. Central Railroad Co., 74 Id. 424.”
For the plaintiff in error it is further urged that harm and injustice were done him in permitting the witness Dr. Trues-dell to be asked on his redirect examination by the state: “You are under indictment in this court jointly with Dr. Young for performing a criminal abortion on your wife, are you not?”
The witness was called by the state in rebuttal. The brevity of the testimony justifies its insertion here, and, because, it is to a certain degree explanatory why the question above recited was asked.
Direct examination by Mr. Mott:
“Q. Doctor, were you in your home from the time Dr. Young left until the undertaker an-ived ?
“A. I was.
“Q. What were you doing during that time?
“A. Why, the whole time that my another was with me until she left for supper I was sitting in the front room— sitting in the Morris chair with my mother on the same chair, or in my lap, either of the two.
“Q. Who was in the house during that period?
1. Mr. Ered Wolf and his mother and my mother and iriysel f.
“Q. During that period did you go to the body of your wife and remove any of the organs from it in any way?
“A. Certainly not.
“Q. Do you know of any one doing it during' that period?
“A. I don’t know of any one doing it.”
Cross-examination.
“Q. You are under indictment in this'court?
“A. I am.
“Q. You have been promised, or your counsel has been promised, by the state if you testified in this case you will be relieved from that indictment, haven’t you?
“A. I believe that is the understanding, is it not, Mr. Mott?
“Q. Thatis all.”
•Redirect.
“Q. You are under indictment in this court jointly with Dr. Young for performing a'criminal abortion on your wife, are you not?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Mr. McCarter- — I object as immaterial.
“The Court — That is proper.”
First, it is to be observed that no objection was made to this question until the witness had answered it. The situation here is somewhat analogous to that which was before this court in Clark v. State, 47 N. J. L. 556, and in which case Mr. Justice Reed, speaking for the court (on p. 558), said: “It does not appear that there was not an opportunity afforded to the counsel for the defendant to have made his objection earlier.” In the case cited a motion was made to strike out the testimony, and this was' held properly refused, whereas in the present case no such motion was made. Nor does it appear that the attention of the trial court was called to the circumstance now urged here that the witness had answered the question before counsel had an opportunity to interpose an ■objection. It is a. matter of common experience in .the trial of causes that a witness will occasionally answer a question before counsel, no matter bow alert, can interpose an objection, but, when such is the case, the settled practice is for counsel to move the court at once to strike out the question and answer, and if refused, to take an exception. That course was not pursued in this ease. Furthermore, the record shows that the objection to the question was rested upon, the ground that, it was immaterial and not upon the ground that it was incompetent. It is, therefore, manifest that the ground stated failed to apprise the trial judge of the viewpoint now taken by counsel for plaintiff in error that, the unexpressed ground of his objection was really intended to challenge the competency -of the quéstion.
It is a salutary rule of practice, rigidly adhered to by the courts of this state, that before a party may avail himself, on an appeal, based upon bills of exceptions, of an error committed by a court, in the admission or rejection of testimony, it must appear from the record that the attention of the court was directed to the ground'relied on. Associates of the Jersey Co. v. Davison, 29 N. J. L. 415; Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad Co. v. Dailey, 37 Id. 526; Packard v. Bergen Neck Railway Co., 54 Id. 553.
The record further' shows that there was no exception taken, signed and sealed by the court. Hence, there was no foundation for any assignment of error challenging the propriety of the judge’s ruling in allowing the question.
We have alluded to these matters for the purpose of making it plain to the bar that in criminal causes, brought up for review on strict writ of error, the old practice in relation to hills of exceptions, and assignments of errors remains unchanged.
As this record is also up for review under section 136 of the Criminal Procedure act, and as one of the causes assigned, for reversal is based upon the admission of the testimony which has been above discussed, under the assignment of error, a different legal rule becomes applicable, by virtue of section 136, whereby the competency of the question may he challenged, even though not excepted to in the trial court.
Under that section a twofold proposition presents itself here for decision. Was the question put to the witness, competent, and, if so, was it harmful?
The latter inquiry we need not consider, because we have readied the conclusion that in the light of the evidence the question put to the witness wras competent.
It wras proper for counsel for defendant for the purpose of disclosing the interest of the witness to ask him whether he was not under indictment, and had been promised immunity from prosecution on that indictment, by the state, if he testified in the case on trial.
It is to be observed, however, that the question and answer do not disclose the nature of the indictment, and unexplained might leave the transaction open' to the inference that the testimony of the witness was given tinder the influence of a corrupt motive.. The state was, therefore, strictly within its legal right on redirect examination of the witness to ascertain from him to what extent the indictment referred to was related to the offence for which the defendant was then on trial.
Another ground urged by counsel for plaintiff in. error for reversal of the judgment is that the judge erred in its refusal to permit the defendant to give evidence as to what was sa-id by him when he left the spool of thread with the prosecutor.
The defendant claimed that after the autopsy he sewed up the abdominal incision with cotton thread. This was one of the disputed facts in the case. Several weeks after the operation the defendant handed a spool of cotton thread to the prosecutor of the pleas and made some statement to him at the time regarding the thread.
On the trial counsel for defendant asked the counsel for the state to produce the spool of thread, which was done. Counsel for defendant then offered the spool of thread in evidence.
Counsel for defendant then offered to -prove what the defendant said to the prosecutor of the pleas with reference to the thread when he handed it to him. The court refused to admit such proof and an exception was taken and sealed.
• We think the proffered testimony was properly excluded. It was in the nature of a self-serving declaration.
A different legal rule would have been applicable if the state had offered the spool of thread in evidence for the purpose of incriminating the defendant or as a part of the state’s case. In that situation the defendant would undoubtedly have had the right to state under what circumstances he handed the thread to the counsel for the state and what was said on that occasion, for the purpose of meeting the effect of this part of the state’s evidence. But that is .not the case here. The defendant called for the production of the spool of thread and offered it in evidence in his own behalf, in order, presumably, to establish that the cotton thread with which he sewed up the abdominal incision after the autopsy dime from that spool and thus bearing out his contention that he used no other material. And that was as far as lie could legally make use of that incident.
To adopt any different rule than that applied by the trial judge, in dealing with the proffered testimony, would he most vicious in its tendencies. It would open the door for the admission, not only of self-serving declarations, but to the most objectional kind of hearsay testimony.
We have examined the other specifications of causes argued before us and find them to be without merit.
Judgment will be affirmed.
For affirmance — Parker, Kalisch, White, Heppewtieimer, Williams, JJ. 5. '
For reversal, — The Chakcellor, Svvayze, Bergey, Min-TURN, JJ. 4.
Subsequent to the filing of the above opinion, a reargument of the ease was .ordered, which reargument was had on June 17th, 1919; and on November 17th, 19.19, the following opinion was rendered :

Opinion:
Swayze, J.
The facts in the case and the legal questions presented are set forth in the report in 103 Atl. Rep. 173. We need consider only one point. The defendant testified that he discovered that there was a dead foetus in the womb and operated for its removal. The woman's body was disinterred. and it was found that she. had been eviscerated. The question was by whom, Dr. Young* or the undertaker, or, perhaps, someone else. The husband, who was the chief witness for the state, was called in rebuttal and testified that he did not remove ant of the organs from liis wife's body. He their testified, in response to counsel for the defence, that he was under indictment, and, in effect, that be had been promised by the prosecutor that if he testified in this case for the state, ho would he relieved from the indictment. Thereupon, on re direct examination, counsel for the state asked if he was under indictment jointly with Dr. Young for performing a criminal abortion on his wife, and he answered in the affirmative. A.s the record stands, his answer preceded the objection of defendant's counsel. Whether this is a true report of the order of events or not is questionable, since a stenographer can hardly be held to absolute accuracy in the order where objection and answer may come together, especially in the case of a biased witness. We assume in favor of the state that the answer came first. There is nothing, however, to indicate that counsel for the defendant delayed his objection for the purpose of speculating on the answer. Be that as it may, the trial judge treated the objection as timely and calling for a ruling, and he ruled "that is proper." This was judicial action within the rule of State v. Hummer, 81 N. J. L. 430, and brings the case within the purview of section 136 of the Criminal Procedure act as to the effect- of the erroneous admission or rejection of testimony. That the admission of the testimony was erroneous is clear. The witness was not only permitted to testify to the contents of a public record, but also to the fact that the defendant had been charged with another crime from that for which he was on trial — a crime that had no tendency logically to prove the substantive case of the state. It can hardly be supposed that proof even of the crime of abortion, certainly not proof of an indictment, tends to prove negligence amounting to manslaughter in a surgical operation for a different purpose. It only proves that the state meant to have more than one chance for a conviction. The evidence bore only on the credibility of the defendant. A mere charge of crime cannot affect a witness' credibility, since, even if it take the solemn form of an indictment, the accused is presumed innocent. It has even been questioned whether a plea of nolo contendere to an indictment made the fact admissible as a conviction. State v. Henson, 66 Id. 601. All the argument in that case was washed if the mere indictment was admissible for the same purpose. The matter is regulated by statute. Comp. Stat., p. 2211,. § 1. The statute provides that the conviction of crime may be shown on the cross-examination or by the production of the record thereof. The admission of the testimony was in violation of every branch of the statutory rule. It was not proof of a conviction; it was not shown on cross-examination of the defendant, but on redirect 'examination of the state's own witness, whose credibility the state could not legally impeach; and what was shown was not by the production of the record but by parol testimony.
It is said the evidence was permissible in explanation of the supposed bias of the witness, to show to what extent the indictment was related to the offence for which the defendant was then on trial. But if this consideration justified an inquiry into the charge of the indictment, the inquiry should have been limited to the witness' relation to it. The defendant had asked only as to the indictment of the witness and the promise of immunity to him. It was not competent for the state on redirect examination to ask if the indictment was not jointly with the present defendant and was not for the crime of abortion.. This question was so leading that the prosecutor virtually was the witness. ISTo doubt, the question was so put for the very purpose of getting before the jury a suggestion which, however inadmissible as proof, might influence them in favor of the state.
If: is said that the testimony was. objected to only as immaterial, and that if immaterial it could not be harmful. This, however, overlooks the real question. By making objection, no matter on what ground, judicial action was called for; the judge was hound to rule correctly. " Instead of holding the evidence to be immaterial, he held it to be material, for he said it was proper. If immaterial, it was not proper. The effect, of the ruling was harmful, for it would have been futile for counsel for the defendant, to move to strike out. He was not bound to move to strike out, but might properly acquiesce in the ruling, and rely on redress of the error in the appellate court.
It is, moreover, erroneous to say that immaterial evidence is necessarily harmless. Probably, it was harmless in the cases referred to. But evidence entirely immaterial to the issue, which is what the objection means, may be very harmful. It would hardly be said that a man on trial for larceny could be proved guilty of murder and the error passed over if the objection was put solely on the ground of immateriality. The fact is, objection on the ground of immateriality has a double aspect. It may mean that the evidence is a mere waste of time; it may mean that it is irrelevant. Which is the proper meaning depends on the case. The judge, in the present case, evidently took the objection in the latter sense, since he ruled that it was proper. The ruling was erroneous on the further ground that the question was leading, and a striking instance of the harm that may be done by so objectionable a question. The íuling that the evidence was proper was an approval by the judge of a mere suggestion of guilt by tire state without any proof, and must have been understood by the jury as meaning- that it was of value as bearing on the present indictment, when in fact it was of no value, but was immaterial and irrelevant. That the defendant siiffered manifest wrong and injury is obvious. The jury hoard the judge say the testimony was proper. If the defendant was guilty of abortion, his testimony about a dead foetus, for which he was not responsible, was a lie, and his credibility was injuriously affected, if not destined. That the witness was, if there was in fact an indictment and the charge therein was true, an accomplice, and that he was state-'s' evidence, only emphasizes the error of the court in ruling that the evidence was proper.
Let the judgment be reversed and the record remitted for a now trial.