Case Name: Vincent BROWN, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1999-02-03
Citations: 728 So. 2d 758
Docket Number: No. 97-3045
Parties: Vincent BROWN, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: Before NESBITT, GREEN, and FLETCHER, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 728
Pages: 758–761

Head Matter:
Vincent BROWN, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 97-3045
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Feb. 3, 1999.
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Marti Rothenberg, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Christine E. Zahralban, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Before NESBITT, GREEN, and FLETCHER, JJ.

Opinion:
FLETCHER, Judge.
The defendant appeals his conviction for three counts of armed robbery, arguing that the trial court erred in the jury selection process by denying his challenges for cause of five prospective jurors. While we are not persuaded that the trial court erred as to all five prospective jurors, we conclude that reversal is required based on the denied challenge to prospective juror Mercado.
During the jury selection process the following dialogue took place:
"THE COURT: You are Mr. Mercado?
MR. MERCADO: Yes. Correct. A good friend of mine was involved in an attempted murder where somebody tried to shoot him and that I haven't really been able to deal with that as far as not having a biased opinion on people involved in armed robbery and cases like that. Depending on — I don't know — anything about his case but I have really — I have little patience for these types of crimes.
THE COURT: Okay. Well, I guess we could all say we all have little patience for these types of crimes. The question is whether you would be able to set aside your personal feelings concerning crime or what happened to your friend and whether you could listen to the evidence in this case and deliberate on the case solely based on what you hear or whether you would have a preconceived notion about things because of what happened to your friend?
MR. MERCADO: I am not really positive about that, but I guess that I would just have to go through it. I really couldn't say for sure how I would react.
THE COURT: Well, if I instructed you that you could not take that into consideration, that you had to listen and judge this case solely based on what you hear without being influenced by any of those things, could you follow that instruction?
MR. MERCADO: Yeah, I think so."
T. 21-22.
Based on this dialogue, the defendant unsuccessfully challenged Mercado's competency to sit as a juror.
The test for determining juror competency is whether the prospective juror can set aside any bias or prejudice and render a verdict based solely on the evidence presented and the instructions on the law given by the trial court. Smith v. State, 699 So.2d 629 (Fla.1997), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 1194, 140 L.Ed.2d 323 (1998); Lusk v. State, 446 So.2d 1038 (Fla.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 873, 105 S.Ct. 229, 83 L.Ed.2d 158 (1984). The question of the competency of a challenged juror is one of mixed law and fact to be determined by the trial court in its discretion, and its decision will not be disturbed unless error is manifest. Singer v. State, 109 So.2d 7 (Fla.1959). This broad discretion is granted the trial court because, unlike the reviewing court which is limited to a cold transcript, the trial court directly hears the tone and inflection of the prospect's voice and observes the prospect's facial expressions, "body language" and other physical demeanor, and thus generally has the better ability to assess the individual's candor and the probable certainty of the answers to critical questions. State v. Williams, 465 So.2d 1229 (Fla.1985).
The trial court's discretion is not absolute however. For example, that discretion is abused where the court refuses to excuse for cause a prospective juror who responds with equivocal or conditional answers, thus raising a reasonable doubt as to whether the prospect possesses the state of mind necessary to render an impartial decision. Price v. State, 538 So.2d 486 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). Even a cold transcript can reveal equivocal or conditional responses not reflective of a prospect's final detached determination to serve as a fair and impartial juror. A reviewing court may therefore, from time to time and as to juror equivocations, find itself with a better view than the trial court because of the greater amount of time available to it for rendering decisions. Such is the situation in this case. Prospective juror Mercado's responses, including "Yeah, I think so," when asked whether he would be able to follow the trial court's instructions, are equivocations, and thus raise a reasonable doubt as to whether he could serve as a fair and impartial juror. As a result the trial court abused its discretion when it denied the defendant's challenge of Mercado for cause.
The defendant's conviction and sentence are reversed and the cause is remanded for a new trial.
NESBITT, J., concurs.
. The defendant also argues that the trial court erred in denying a special jury instruction. We conclude, however, that the matter was adequately covered in the standard jury instructions and thus the trial court did not err by rejecting defendant's special instruction. See Brown v. State, 423 So.2d 599 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
. The issue was preserved by the defendant in the fashion set forth in Longshore v. Fronrath Chevrolet, Inc., 527 So.2d 922, 923 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988).
. The trial court, after questioning other prospects, returned to Mercado, but we do not find that additional dialogue to be helpful to our analysis.