Case Name: PEOPLE v. BLACHURA
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1975-03-24
Citations: 59 Mich. App. 664
Docket Number: Docket No. 13627
Parties: PEOPLE v BLACHURA
Judges: Before: Quinn, P. J., and Bashara and N. J. Kaufman, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 59
Pages: 664–669

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v BLACHURA
Opinion op the Court
1. Grand Jury — Witnesses—Right to Counsel — Statutes.
A statute which provides that a witness before a one-man grand jury is entitled to have his attorney present in the grand jury room is inapplicable to proceedings of a citizens’ grand jury (MCLA 767.3).
2. Grand Jury — Witnesses—Right to Counsel.
A witness is not entitled to have his attorney present in the room when being questioned by a citizens’ grand jury where the proceeding is not accusatory but is a general inquiry, it does not focus on the witness in the area of the investigation, and the witness is not in police custody.
3. Grand Jury — Witnesses—Right to Counsel — Equal Protection.
The significant differences between proceedings before a one-man grand jury and a citizens’ grand jury are ample justification for granting a witness before a one-man grand jury the right to have counsel present in the room where the inquiry is held and the denial of that right to a witness before a citizens’ grand jury.
4. Perjury — Defenses—Coercion—Duress—Jury Question.
The defense of coercion and duress to a charge of perjury creates an issue for jury determination.
Concurrence by N. J. Kaufman, J.
5. Grand Jury — Witnesses—Right to Counsel — Prosecutor’s Conduct.
The presence of a witness’s counsel is not constitutionally or statutorily mandated in a general investigatory proceeding before a grand jury, but when the witness is denied counsel the prosecutor must guard against conduct and questioning which may be so coercive as to require dismissal of a subsequent charge of perjury.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1-3, 5] 38 Am Jur 2d, Grand Jury § 35.
[4] 25 Am Jur 2d, Duress and Undue Influence § 34.
60 Am Jur 2d, Perjury § 18.
Appeal from Oakland, Arthur E. Moore, J.
Submitted Division 2 March 6, 1975, at Lansing.
(Docket No. 13627.)
Decided March 24, 1975.
Leave to appeal denied, 394 Mich —.
Leon Blachura was convicted of peijury. New trial granted. The people appeal by leave granted.
Reversed and remanded.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, and Marvin S. Shwedel, Special Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Zemke & Lustig, for defendant.
Before: Quinn, P. J., and Bashara and N. J. Kaufman, JJ.

Opinion:
Quinn, P. J.
Defendant was indicted by a grand jury for perjury. Tried by a jury, he was convicted on five of the six counts contained in the indictment. Defendant moved for a new trial which was granted as to counts 1 and 2; counts 3 through 6 were quashed. On leave granted, the people appeal.
Defendant was called as a witness before a grand jury which was investigating alleged wrongdoing and conflict of interest in the office of the county drain commissioner. Defendant's attorney was present but was not in the grand jury room. Defendant was advised of his right to consult with his attorney.
Although the trial judge found that none of the grounds alleged as basis for a new trial were applicable to counts 1 and 2, he granted a new trial as to them because the reasons for quashing counts 4 through 6 affected the validity of the trial on all counts. We now examine those reasons.
The trial judge held that defendant was entitled to have his attorney present in the grand jury room on the basis of the statute, MCLA 767.3; MSA 28.943, and on Escobedo v Illinois, 378 US 478; 84 S Ct 1758; 12 L Ed 2d 977 (1964), and Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694; 10 ALR3d 974 (1966). Neither basis supports the holding. (Appellee seems to concede this in his brief at page 28.)
The statute relied on relates to proceedings before a one-man grand jury. The grand jury which indicted defendant was a citizens' grand jury and the controlling statute is MCLA 767.19e; MSA 28.959(5). This statute provides right of counsel to a witness granted immunity and requires counsel's presence when the witness is being questioned concerning matters included within the grant of immunity. This specific statute on right to counsel in citizens' grand jury proceedings leads to the conclusion that the statute relied on by the trial judge is inapplicable in this case and applies only to one-man grand jury proceedings.
There is nothing in this record which requires or justifies application of the principles announced in Escobedo and Miranda, supra. The grand jury proceeding was a general inquiry, not accusatory. It never focused on defendant in the area of the investigation and defendant was not in police custody. Defendant's problem arose not from the denial of any of his rights but from his own testimony. Even assuming denial of some of defend ant's rights, this would not grant him a license to commit perjury, People v Ianniello, 21 NY2d 418; 288 NYS2d 462; 235 NE2d 439 (1968).
Defendant contends that the right of a witness before a one-man grand jury to have counsel present in the room where the inquiry is held and the denial of that right to a witness before a citizens' grand jury denied defendant equal protection of the law. The significant differences between proceedings before a one-man grand jury and a citizens' grand jury are ample justification for this disparity in a witness's right to counsel depending on the type of grand jury he is called before.
The record does not support the finding of the trial court that defendant was denied access to his attorney outside the grand jury room. If it did, defendant did not have a license to commit perjury, Ianniello, supra.
The trial judge further held that defendant's testimony before the grand jury was the product of "star chamber coercion and duress". If the record supports this holding, the defense of coercion and duress to a charge of perjury creates an issue for jury determination, People v McClintic, 193 Mich 589, 602; 160 NW 461, 465 (1916).
Reversed. Jury verdicts are reinstated. Remanded for sentencing.
Defendant was acquitted on count 3 and reference to that count in the trial judge's opinion is obviously erroneous.