Case Name: Kenneth M. CLAYTON and Neal McCulloh, etc., Appellants, v. Kevin E. BRYAN and Renee M. Bryan, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2000-02-25
Citations: 753 So. 2d 632
Docket Number: No. 5D99-253
Parties: Kenneth M. CLAYTON and Neal McCulloh, etc., Appellants, v. Kevin E. BRYAN and Renee M. Bryan, Appellees.
Judges: ANTOON, C.J., concurs
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 753
Pages: 632–636

Head Matter:
Kenneth M. CLAYTON and Neal McCulloh, etc., Appellants, v. Kevin E. BRYAN and Renee M. Bryan, Appellees.
No. 5D99-253.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Feb. 25, 2000.
Rehearing Denied April 5, 2000.
Kenneth M. Clayton and James E. Olsen of Clayton & McCulloh, Maitland, for Appellants.
Kenneth L. Mann, P.A., Orlando, for Appellees.

Opinion:
PETERSON, J.
Kenneth M. Clayton and Neal McCulloh and their law firm, Clayton & McCulloh (collectively "C & M"), appeal a supplemental final judgment denying fees and costs to them as prevailing defendants after they made an offer of judgment in a case involving the Federal Fair Debt Collection Protection Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1692. Specifically, this case raises the issue of whether Florida's offer of judgment statute is preempted by FDCPA. In that we agree with the trial court that it is preempted, we do not consider whether the trial court further reasonably concluded that the offer of judgment made by the prevailing defendants was not made in good faith.
Kevin E. Bryan and Renee M. Bryan ("the Bryans"), alleged in their action against C & M that the latter violated the FDCPA. The trial court dismissed the action and this court affirmed that dismissal based on the conclusion that the FDCPA does not apply to condominium maintenance assessments. Bryan v. Clayton, 698 So.2d 1236 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997), rev. denied, 707 So.2d 1123 (Fla.1998), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 933, 118 S.Ct. 2334, 141 L.Ed.2d 706 (1998). C & M thereafter sought an award of its fees in the trial court. Resisting C & M's quest for attorney's fees, the Bryans asserted both that C & M's offer of judgment had not been made in good faith and that Florida's offer of judgment statute is pre-empted by FDCPA's provisions that fees are to be awarded to a prevailing defendant only when the court expressly finds that the plaintiffs case was "brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment...." 15 U.S.C.'§ 1692.k(a)(3).
The Bryans find support for their preemption argument in Moran v. City of Lakeland, 694 So.2d 886 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) and Colorado v. Golden Concrete Co., 962 P.2d 919 (Colo.1998), which explicitly followed Moran.
Moran involved a section 1983 federal civil rights action against the City of Lake-land. The city successfully defended the claim but was not successful in obtaining attorney's fees sought pursuant to an offer of judgment. The .city appealed and the second district found that Florida's offer of judgment statute, section 768.79, was preempted by the federal statute which allowed an award of fees only when the suit was vexatious or brought to harass or embarrass the defendant. 42 U.S.C. § 1988. We conclude that the federal statute involved in the instant case similarly preempts an award of fees under the offer of judgment statute.
C & M attempts to distinguish the Moran case from the instant case by arguing that here, the plaintiffs brought both a federal claim under the FDCPA as well as a state law cause of action under the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act ("Florida Act"). C & M asserts, assuming arguendo that preemption of the offer of judgment with respect to the federal claim applies, that preemption should not also apply to the fees incurred in defense of the state law cause of action. However, the state law cause of action exists only because it is at least as broad, in its protection to the consumer, as the federal act. Section 559.552, Florida Statutes (1997), one of the sections comprising the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act, provides: [Emphasis added]. We conclude that the provision of the federal statute which provides protection to the consumer by limiting the assessment of attorney's fees against the consumer for bringing an action is a provision which is "more protective of the consumer or debtor," than the provision of the Florida Act. If it is more protective, the Florida Act, by its terms, cedes to the federal act. If the Florida Act is more protective of the consumer, the Florida Act controls. Either way, the offer of judgment statute takes the back seat.
Relationship of State and Federal Law. — Nothing in this part shall be construed to limit or restrict the continued applicability of the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act to consumer collection practices in this state. This part is in addition to the requirements and regulations of the federal act. In the event of any inconsistency of any provision of this part and any provision of the federal act, the provision which is more protective of consumer or debtor shall prevail.
We conclude that the trial court correctly denied an award of attorney's fees to C & M based on its finding that the offer of judgment statute is preempted by the FDCPA. Only where the court expressly finds that the plaintiffs case was brought in bad faith or for the purpose of harassment can attorney's fees be awarded against the unsuccessful plaintiff in an FDCPA action.
AFFIRMED.
ANTOON, C.J., concurs
HARRIS, J., dissents, with opinion.