Case Name: GARDNER v. GARDNER
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1994-04-04
Citations: 264 Ga. 138
Docket Number: S94A0222
Parties: GARDNER v. GARDNER.
Judges: All the Justices concur, except Sears-Collins, Hunstein and Thompson, JJ., who dissent.
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 264
Pages: 138–142

Head Matter:
S94A0222.
GARDNER v. GARDNER.
(441 SE2d 666)

Opinion:
Carley, Justice.
The trial court granted appellant-plaintiff Husband a divorce and awarded appellee-defendant Wife permanent custody of the three minor children and child support. The final decree also imposed a requirement that Husband maintain, for the benefit of the children, a policy insuring his life. Husband's application for a discretionary appeal was granted to determine the validity of that provision of the final decree requiring his maintenance of the life insurance policy.
This court has previously held that, in a divorce action, there is no authority to require that a father maintain a policy insuring his life for the benefit of his minor children and that
such provision is enforceable only when it has been agreed to by the father in the first instance. Generally, the duty of a father to support his children ceases upon his death. . . . [Cits.] The law does not require that a father provide for the support of his children after his death. [Cit.] Public policy, of course, favors the support of minor children by the father's estate after his death. [Cits.] However, the fact remains that, despite this strong public policy, a father is not required by law to create an estate for his minor children. The same is true with respect to a divorced father and a child support decree. The decree merely replaces the father's statutory duty of support. [Cit.] Absent some express, voluntary provision in the decree, the decree will not be enforced after the death of the father. [Cits.] Similarly, this court has held that a father is not required to settle an estate on his children in a divorce case. [Cits.] The rationale is that the law places no greater duty of support on a divorced father than on one who is not divorced.
Clavin v. Clavin, 238 Ga. 421, 422-423 (233 SE2d 151) (1977). See also Lane v. Titus, 259 Ga. 264 (379 SE2d 521) (1989). Compare Ritchea v. Ritchea, 244 Ga. 476, 477 (2) (260 SE2d 871) (1979) (spouse made the beneficiary of a life insurance policy).
The rationale of Clavin is not inapplicable in the instant case simply because Husband may have been given the option of having a testamentary executor administer the life insurance proceeds on behalf of the children. Although the life insurance proceeds would not vest directly and permanently in the children, Husband has still been required by the trial court's order to "provide for the support of his children after his death." Clavin v. Clavin, supra at 423. Compare Collins v. Collins, 231 Ga. 683 (3) (203 SE2d 524) (1974) (inter vivos trust). Accordingly, that provision of the final decree requiring Husband's maintenance of the life insurance policy "was beyond the [trial] court's power to impose, [and] we hold it invalid." Clavin v. Clavin, supra at 424. To the extent that Tomlinson v. State of Ga., 193 Ga. App. 123, 124 (1) (387 SE2d 49) (1989) is inconsistent with our instant holding, it is hereby overruled.
Coker v. Coker, 251 Ga. 542, 543 (307 SE2d 921) (1983) is not authority to the contrary. Unlike here, Coker involved a requirement that a life insurance policy be maintained for the benefit of the spouse until the obligation of child support ended. Moreover, this court did not directly uphold the validity of that provision, since Coker was not an appeal taken from the final decree itself. Instead, this court merely held in Coker that the inclusion of such a provision in the divorce decree, if a mistake of law, nevertheless did not constitute a ground for setting aside that decree pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-60 (d).
The provision of the final decree requiring Husband's maintenance of the life insurance policy
can be excised and a new trial is not required because of [it]. [Cit.] . . . Thus, the judgment will be affirmed in part and reversed in part with direction that the trial court modify its final decree to conform to this opinion. [Cit.]
Clavin v. Clavin, supra at 424-425. We note that Wife, the party who would be harmed by any change in the jury's allocation of resources resulting from our holding, has expressly requested that the life insurance provision be stricken and that a new trial not be granted. Compare Stone v. Stone, 258 Ga. 716 (373 SE2d 627) (1988); Marshall v. Marshall, 262 Ga. 443 (421 SE2d 71) (1992).
Judgment affirmed in part; reversed in part with direction.
All the Justices concur, except Sears-Collins, Hunstein and Thompson, JJ., who dissent.