Case Name: Linda Gayle ROYAL and William Ellison, Appellants, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1984-07-19
Citations: 452 So. 2d 1098
Docket Number: Nos. 82-1050, 82-1055
Parties: Linda Gayle ROYAL and William Ellison, Appellants, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: COBB, C.J., and DAUKSCH, ORFINGER, FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr. and SHARP, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 452
Pages: 1098–1104

Head Matter:
Linda Gayle ROYAL and William Ellison, Appellants, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Nos. 82-1050, 82-1055.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
July 19, 1984.
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and James R. Wulchak, Asst. Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for appellant Linda Gayle Royal.
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Larry B. Henderson, Asst. Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for appellant William Ellison.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Richard B. Martell, Asst. Atty. Gen., Day-tona Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
This criminal ease concerns the definition of a "taking" as that term is used in the robbery statutes. Appellants Royal and Ellison were observed in a department store placing clothing in a plastic garbage bag. As appellants proceeded past the cash register and toward the front door a store detective, Ricciardone, attempted to deter them and was pushed aside by Ellison. Appellants left the store and were getting into an automobile outside when the store detective and two other store employees, Morris and Cox, attempted to recover the clothing and to detain appellants. As Morris attempted to grab the ignition key Ellison hit Morris. As Cox was pulling at Ellison in the automobile, Royal produced a pistol and pointed it at Cox's forehead. The three store employees retreated. The ignition key having become bent and useless appellants fled on foot and were apprehended. The pistol was found in the automobile but there was no evidence that it had been carried into the store. Appellants were found guilty of robbery while carrying a deadly weapon and appeal.
Section 812.13(1), Florida Statutes (1981), provides:
"Robbery" means the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another by force, violence, assault or putting in fear.
Appellants urge that the trial court erred in denying a motion for judgment of acquittal because the taking (caption) occurred and the theft of the store merchandise was completed, either (a) when appellants, with intent to steal, first obtained or took the clothing into their actual physical possession, or (b) when appellants, with intent to steal, took the clothing past the cash register or out of the store, and any subsequent force used did not elevate the completed theft into a robbery. Appellants also claim the motion for judgment of acquittal should have been granted because there was no evidence that the appellants, either of them, carried a firearm while in the store or that Ellison ever carried or used a firearm. Therefore, the question presented here is whether the taking was completed without the utilization of any force, assault or fear.
In State v. Douglas, 337 So.2d 407 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), cert. denied, 348 So.2d 946 (Fla.1977), the manager of the food market saw the defendant grab some pieces of meat and drop them into his co-defendant's shoulder bag. The manager intercepted the two as they attempted to leave the store by the front door and while the three were walking to the rear of the store the defendant struck the manager, and his co-defendant began stabbing the manager. The defendants then ran out the front door. On appeal, the court stated the question was "whether a person who finds it necessary to resort to violence in order to escape with the property of another is chargeable with robbery." The court held that where the owner of property takes action to prevent a thief from taking his goods from his premises and the thief uses force in order to get away with the goods, the thief's use of force is concurrent with the taking and constitutes robbery. The court distinguished that situation from one in which force is used to prevent pursuit after the taking is complete.
In Stufflebean v. State, 436 So.2d 244 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), the majority stated that whether the offense is a robbery rather than a larceny cannot turn on the fortuitous circumstance that, owing in part to the victim's quick reaction, the taker is required to use force in order to make good his escape with the property before getting outside the building where the property is located. The court in Stufflebean held that pursuant to the robbery statute, "force or threat of force is considered to be contemporaneous with the taking if that force or threat of force is used to overcome a victim's resistance to an attempted asportation." Id. at 245. The court further held that "where an offender gains possession of property of another without force and with intent to deprive the true owner of its use, but the victim gives instant and uninterrupted protest or pursuit in an effort to thwart a taking, and the offender then assaults the victim in order to complete a taking of the property and make good an escape, the offense is robbery." Id. at 246.
Accordingly, we hold that the pushing aside of the store detective by Ellison was, as in Douglas force involved in the taking of the property and that use of the pistol in the automobile occurred concurrent with the taking because possession of the property was still in continuing dispute, as in Stufflebean.
Appellants' convictions are
AFFIRMED.
COBB, C.J., and DAUKSCH, ORFINGER, FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr. and SHARP, JJ., concur.
COWART, J., dissents with opinion.