Case Name: STATE OF HAWAII v. WILLIAM ROLLIN GOUDY II
Court: Supreme Court of the State of Hawaii
Jurisdiction: Hawaii
Decision Date: 1971-01-13
Citations: 52 Haw. 497
Docket Number: No. 4933
Parties: STATE OF HAWAII v. WILLIAM ROLLIN GOUDY II.
Judges: Richardson, C.J., Marumoto, Abe, Levinson and Kobayashi, JJ.
Reporter: Hawaii Reports
Volume: 52
Pages: 497–517

Head Matter:
STATE OF HAWAII v. WILLIAM ROLLIN GOUDY II.
No. 4933.
January 13, 1971.
Richardson, C.J., Marumoto, Abe, Levinson and Kobayashi, JJ.

Opinion:
OPINION OP THE COURT BY
MARUMOTO, J.
This is an appeal by defendant William Rollin Gondy II from a circuit court judgment convicting Mm of possession of firearms by a person convicted of a crime of violence, in violation of HRS § 134-7(b). Defendant had previously been convicted of burglary, which, under the definition in HRS § 134-1, is a crime of violence.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the circuit court properly denied the defense motion for suppression of evidence. The items of evidence sought to he suppressed were one .22 caliber Marlin rifle, one 9 mm. Luger pistol, and one .32 caliber Walther pistol. The police obtained these items under the circumstances described below.
At 10 o'clock in the morning of June 23,1969, Sergeant Carl Ledward of the Honolulu police department received an anonymous telephone call at the Kaneohe police station informing him that within an hour there would be a transaction in guns, diamond i*ing, and diamond watch, which the informant thought was illegal; that the transaction would take place at 127 Oneawa Street, Kailua; that the buyer would be driving a black Barracuda automobile; and that the passenger in the automobile would be the contact man to obtain the articles.
Upon receiving the telephone call, Ledward went to Kailua to check the address, but there was no house on Oneawa Street with the given number. However, together with Detective Donald Kamakea, whom he met at the Kai-lua police station, he kept a watch for an automobile fitting the informant's description at Andy's Drive-Inn on Oneawa Street.
At 11:10 o'clock, Ledward and Kamakea saw a black Barracuda, with driver and a passenger, proceed on One-awa Street in the Kaneohe direction. The driver was later identified as James Kaaku. Defendant was the passenger.
Ledward and Kamakea followed the Barracuda in Ka-makea's automobile, with Kamakea driving. Kamakea's automobile was used because it had no police insignia.
The Barracuda stopped in front of a house at 728 Oneawa Street. Kamakea drove past the Barracuda for about a block to the intersection of Oneawa Street and Oneawa Place, where he turned his automobile around and backed into Oneawa Place.
Ledward and Kamakea set up a surveillance of the Barracuda behind a growth of pine trees at the intersection. Ledward watched with his naked eyes. Kamakea used binoculars in making his observation.
On the surveillance, both Ledward and Kamakea saw defendant make the following movements: He got off the Barracuda, entered a nearby lane, and returned within a few minutes with a beige-colored case which appeared to contain a rifle. He placed the case in the back of the automobile, then went into the house at 728 Oneawa Street, returned with a brown paper sack, and got back into the automobile.
When defendant got back into the Barracuda, Kaaku turned the automobile around, and drove it back in the direction of Kailua town at a speed of about 20 miles, well within the legal speed limit.
Ledward and Kamakea again followed the Barracuda. Just before reaching the intersection of Oneawa Street with Kailua Koad, Kamakea tooted his horn, and Ledward motioned to Kaaku to pull over. Instead of pulling over, Kaaku made an abrupt stop. The stop took place in front of the City Bank Building at 43 Oneawa Street. Ledward and Kamakea decided to stop the Barracuda at that location lest there might be a getaway if it was permitted to go beyond the intersection.
Up to this point, there was nothing furtive in the actions of Kaaku and defendant, and nothing to arouse any suspicion of criminal activity, except for substantial dovetailing of police observations with the information given in the anonymous telephone call. Neither Ledward nor Kamakea knew defendant. Ledward did not know Kaaku. Kamakea knew Kaaku as a musician, had heard that he was "a member of the criminal world," but was not sure that he was.
When the Bari*acuda stopped, Ledward and Kamakea approached it from different sides with drawn pistols. Ledward approached Kaaku from the left side of that auto mobile, and told Mm to get out. Kaaku did so with his hands np. Kamakea approached defendant from the right side, and opened the door to have him come out.
While making the approaches, both Ledward and Ka-makea saw the butt end of a rifle sticking out from a case on the back seat of the Barracuda. In addition, when he opened the door to have defendant come out, Kamakea noticed the butt end of a pistol exposed from a package on the floor.
Upon seeing the rifle and the pistol in the Barracuda, Kamakea placed Kaaku and defendant under arrest for being offensively armed, and took them to the Kai-lua police station for booking. Defendant was formally charged on the day after the arrest with violation of HRS § 134-7 (b), instead of for being offensively armed, which is a violation of HRS § 727-25.
The rifle Ledward and Kamakea saw on the back seat of the Barracuda was the .22 caliber Marlin rifle. The pistol Kamakea noticed on the floor was the 9 mm. Luger pistol. After the arrest, Kamakea found the .32 caliber Walther pistol between the bucket seats of the automobile. That pistol was fully loaded with one round in the chamber, and cocked.
In deciding the issue raised on this appeal, we must first inquire whether the stopping of the Barracuda by Ledward and Kamakea was a constitutionally permissible action.
On this point, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), is apposite. That was a stop and frisk case. The case at hand involved stop only, and not a frisk. But the discussion there of considerations involved in constitutionally permissible street stops is pertinent.
Terry states that a police officer may "in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest"; that this is warranted by the general governmental interest in effective crime prevention and detection ; and that, given a state of facts, which separately may appear innocent but which taken together would warrant investigation, it would be poor police work to fail to make further investigation. However, it cautions that such an intrusion upon personal liberty must be reasonable and be based on something more substantial than inarticulate hunches, and that reasonableness is to be judged by an objective standard, namely, whether the facts known by the officer would warrant a man of reasonable caution to believe that the action taken was appropriate.
Here, circumstances were appropriate for Ledward and Kamakea to approach Kaaku and defendant to question them about possible criminal conduct.
The anonymous telephone call to Ledward did not justify arrest or search. But the call was a factor in the totality of circumstances which made the decision of Led-ward and Kamakea to stop the Barracuda and approach its occupants for questioning reasonable.
Where, as here, the telephone call related to possible traffic in firearms, it would have been poor police work on the part of Ledward not to have followed up the given information. Dealings in firearms, and possession thereof, are very strictly regulated in HRS c. 134.
Also, it would liave been poor police work on the part of Ledward and Kamakea not to have stopped the Barracuda and questioned its occupants when, upon surveillance, they observed facts which substantially corroborated the information in the telephone call. The observed facts might have been consistent with lawful activity. But they were also consistent with possible criminal activity.
Under such circumstances, a stop for brief inquiry, without more, does not constitute an arrest. It is stated in Wilson v. Porter, 361 F.2d 412, 415 (9th Cir. 1966) :
"We take it as settled that there is nothing ipso facto unconstitutional in the brief detention of citizens under circumstances not justifying an arrest, for purposes of limited inquiry in the course of routine police investigations. A line between reasonable detention for routine investigation and detention which could be characterized as capricious and arbitrary cannot neatly be drawn. But due regard for the practical necessities of effective law enforcement requires that the validity of brief, informal detention be recognized whenever it appears from the totality of the circumstances that the detaining officers could have had reasonable grounds for their action. A founded suspicion is all that is necessary, some basis from which the court can determine that the detention was not arbitrary or harassing."
Also, under similar circumstances, the mere approach with drawn pistols upon persons stopped for questioning is not an arrest. In Wartson v. United States, 400 F.2d 25, 28 (9th Cir. 1968), the court stated, citing Terri/:
"Appellant further argues that the arrest was made in the bathroom when Officer Smith pulled his gun. At that time, according to appellant, Officer Smith only knew that a person fitting appellant's general description had robbed a bank and had come to the general area. Appellant contends that he was actually restrained in the bathroom, and thus was arrested there. Nevertheless, we agree with appellee that appellant was only briefly detained in the bathroom and was not arrested until he was handcuffed outside the house. Such brief, informal detentions for a limited inquiry are not arrests and the peace officer need not possess the probable cause necessary to make an arrest."
There is a cautionary statement in Terry that an investigative action which is reasonable at its inception may violate the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures by virtue of its intolerable intensity and scope. In this connection, questions may possibly be raised as to the reasonableness of the actions of Ledward and Kamakea, first, in ordering Kaaku and defendant out of the Barracuda instead of questioning them while they were seated in the automobile, and, second, in approaching them with drawn pistols.
On the first point, Carpenter v. Sigler, 419 F.2d 169 (8th Cir. 1970), supports the actions of Lédward and Kamakea. In that case, two police officers Stopped a suspicious automobile after a period Of surveillance. After holding that the stop was reasonable under Terry, the court considered the question as to whether under the Terry analysis, "the scope of the 'seizure' was reasonably related to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." The court stated:
"The problem of the scope of the intrusion focuses the analysis on the request by officer Cowan for Hawkins to get out of the car. Officer Cowan testified that he requested Hawkins to get out of the car so he could identify him. This, of course, could have been done by the officer requesting Hawkins to hand him his iden tification through the window. This would seem to indicate that the officer went beyond the scope of the original intrusion. However, when the request for identification is considered with the unusual circumstances justifying the stop plus the darkness and the possibility that Hawkins was holding a gun inside the car beyond the sight of officer Cowan, the request to get out of the car seems reasonable in light of the circumstances."
The stop in this case was made in broad daylight, instead of in darkness as in Carpenter. Nevertheless, we think that the ordering out was justified by the same circumstances which made the stop reasonable.
On the second point also, we think that the same circumstances support the actions taken by Ledward and Kamakea as reasonable self-protective measures. It is stated in Terry:
"Certainly it would be unreasonable to require that police officers take unnecessary risks in the performance of their duties. American criminals have a long tradition of armed violence, and every year in this country many law enforcement officers are killed in the line of duty, and thousands more are wounded. Virtually all of these deaths and a substantial portion of the injuries are inflicted with guns, and knives.
"In view of these facts, we cannot blind ourselves to the need for law enforcement officers to protect themselves and other prospective victims of violence in situations where they may lack probable cause for an arrest."
The stop of the Barracuda being reasonable, and the subsequent actions of Ledward and Kamakea in approaching Kaaku and defendant with drawn pistols and ordering them out of the automobile not being an arrest, State v. Hanawahine, 50 Haw. 461, 443 P.2d 149 (1968), applies.
Thomas P. Huber (Cades Schutte Fleming £ Wright of counsel) for appellant.
Douglas L. Halsted, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney (Barry Chung, Prosecuting Attorney, with him on the brief) for appellee.
We need not decide whether the sighting of the butt end of the Marlin rifle in the back seat of the Barracuda by Ledward and Kamakea while they were approaching Kaaku and defendant provided probable cause for their arrest. When the door of the Barracuda was opened to let defendant out and the butt end of the Luger pistol was seen in open view on the floor, that certainly provided sufficient probable cause for arrest under HRS § 727-25.
The fact that Kamakea opened the door does not matter. He opened the door not to pry into the automobile but to let defendant out. Kamakea arrested Kaaku and defendant only after he saw the butt end of the Luger pistol. Kamakea later found the Walther pistol between the bucket seats of the Barracuda. That discovery was made upon a search incident to lawful arrest.
Affirmed.
Kamakea testified as follows regarding the arrest he made: "When I approached the ear I noticed the butt end of the rifle sticking out of the case which was on the back seat. X also noticed a package on the floor with some papers in it and the butt end of a pistol sticking out. I then placed both occupants of the car under arrest."
HRS § 727-25 reads as follows: "§ 727-25. Carrying deadly weapons ; penalty. Any person not authorized by law, who carries concealed upon his person or within any vehicle used or occupied by him, or who is found armed with any dirk, dagger, blackjack, slug shot, billy, metal knuckles, pistol, or other deadly or dangerous weapon, shall be fined not more than $250, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both. Any such person may be immediately arrested without warrant by any sheriff, policeman, or other officer or person. Any weapon, above enumerated, shall, upon conviction of the one carrying or possessing same under this section, be summarily destroyed by the chief of police or sheriff."