Case Name: Bernard ROGERS, O.D., Appellant, v. TEXAS OPTOMETRY BOARD, Appellee
Court: Texas Courts of Civil Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1980-08-13
Citations: 609 S.W.2d 248
Docket Number: No. 20252
Parties: Bernard ROGERS, O.D., Appellant, v. TEXAS OPTOMETRY BOARD, Appellee.
Judges: Before GUITTARD, C. J., and AKIN and STOREY, JJ.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 609
Pages: 248–254

Head Matter:
Bernard ROGERS, O.D., Appellant, v. TEXAS OPTOMETRY BOARD, Appellee.
No. 20252.
Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, Dallas.
Aug. 13, 1980.
Rehearing Denied Nov. 7, 1980.
Douglas S. Lang, Gardere, Wynne & Jaffe, Dallas, for appellant.
Carla Cox, Asst. Atty. Gen., Austin, for appellee.
Before GUITTARD, C. J., and AKIN and STOREY, JJ.

Opinion:
GUITTARD, Chief Justice.
Bernard Rogers appealed to the district court from an order of the Texas Optometry Board suspending his license to practice optometry on the ground, among others, that he was denied a fair hearing before the Board in that two members of the Board, who did not participate in the decision, personally investigated the case and gave the only testimony against him. We reverse on the ground that this procedure was so fundamentally unfair under the circumstances of this case as to be a denial of procedural due process of law.
The proceeding in the district court was an appeal on the record before the Board under Section 19 of the Administrative Procedure and Texas Register Act, Tex.Rev. Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 6252-13a (Vernon Supp. 1980). The record before the Board shows that the only evidence presented against appellant was the testimony of two members of the Board, Dr. John B. Bowen and Dr. Richard Friedman. Their testimony showed that on November 7,1977, Dr. Bowen, a resident of Lubbock, was in Dallas on business unrelated to his official duties as a member of the Board. During a lunch break, he and Dr. Friedman, who resided in Dallas, decided to make a personal investigation of appellant. Dr. Bowen assumed a disguise and in company with Dr. Friedman, visited appellant's office. Dr. Bowen represented to appellant that his name was Joe Berry and that he was moving to Dallas from Oklahoma. He requested an examination by appellant, who complied and wrote a prescription for corrective lenses. According to Dr. Bowen, appellant failed to perform certain eye-examination steps required by section 5.12 of the Texas Optometry Act, Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 4552-5.-12 (Vernon 1976). Dr. Friedman testified only with respect to the general circumstances of the visit to appellant's office.
As a result of this investigation, Dr. Bowen filed a complaint against appellant on the ground of incompetence. The matter then came on for hearing before the Board, and the only witnesses against appellant were Dr. Bowen and Dr. Friedman. The testimony shows that investigations are normally conducted by investigators employed by the Board rather than by members. Dr. Bowen explained that the reason he and Dr. Friedman undertook the investigation was because the Board had received complaints concerning appellant and this was the "easiest way" to get the investigation done.
Appellant testified in his own defense and denied that he had failed to make a complete examination on the occasion in question. Neither Dr. Bowen nor Dr. Friedman participated in the decision to suspend his license. Another member of the Board was present at the hearing, but refrained from voting because of kinship with appellant. Consequently, only three of the six members remained to decide the case. These three voted to suspend appellant's license for one month on the ground of incompetence. On appeal to the district court, the order of the Board was affirmed.
Appellant contended in the district court, and also here, that he was denied due process of law before the Board because of the intertwining of its investigative, prose-cutorial and judicial functions. In response, the attorney general contends that the Board's order is supported by Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 43 L.Ed.2d 712 (1975). Withrow stands for the rule that the combination of investigative and adjudicative functions in an administrative agency does not, without more, create an unconstitutional risk of bias in an administrative adjudication, but it recognizes that such a risk may be shown in special circumstances. The court had before it a Wisconsin statute empowering a physicians' examining board to make an investigation to determine whether probable cause existed to institute criminal action for revocation of a physician's license and also to suspend the license temporarily upon a determination that the licensee had been guilty of a violation. The court pointed out that a determination of probable cause and determination of guilt were separate functions, and that a finding of probable cause did not necessarily prejudice the Board on a later determination of guilt. The court also observed that the Board had organized itself internally to minimize the risks arising from combining investigation and adjudication. 421 U.S. at 54, n. 20, 95 S.Ct. at 1468, n. 20. Thus, the court held that the facts shown did not meet the test of unconstitutional risk of bias in administrative adjudication, which was stated as follows:
It must overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators; and it must convince that, under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness, conferring investigative and adjudicative powers on the same individuals poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately implemented.
The court was careful to note that its holding did not "preclude a court from determining from the special facts and circumstances present in the case before it that the risk of unfairness is intolerably high."
We hold that to have members of the Board sit in judgment with their fellows one day and appear as investigators and witnesses before them the next creates an intolerable risk of unfairness under the circumstances shown here. This case is not like Withrow, where the Board made an initial determination of probable cause based on a staff investigation and presentation. Here, the only witnesses to the controlling facts were the appellant and two members of the Board, and the remaining members were required to decide the case on the basis of the credibility of the two investigating members.
Although we presume that all members of the Board acted in good faith, "a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness," as required by Withrow, leads to the conclusion that this procedure poses an unreasonable risk of bias. The members of the Board, in order to perform their statutory functions, are required to transact its business in meetings. Article 4552, § 2.05. It is important for them to develop a close working relationship and to give consideration to each other's views. In this context it is obviously difficult for members of the Board to reach a completely objective decision when the principal witnesses are other members of the same body and the issue presented involves their credibility. This unfairness is especially apparent in a case such as this, in which the agency's decision on the facts is reviewable only for the purpose of determining whether its findings are supported by substantial evidence.
The problem is not cured by letting the members take turns as witnesses and as adjudicators. See Wall v. American Opto-metric Ass'n, Inc., 379 F.Supp. 175, 189 (N.D.Ga.1974). Voluntary nonparticipation of the two members who appeared as witnesses did not cure the unfairness, but contributed to it because the number of members remaining to deliberate on the decision was reduced.
Although no case similar to the present has been cited to us or disclosed by our research, a number of federal decisions since Withrow illustrate the kind of "special facts and circumstances" that may present an intolerably high risk of unfair adjudication. In Staton v. Mayes, 552 F.2d 908, 913-14 (10th Cir. 1977), school board members made statements indicating bias before hearing evidence on charges against the superintendent. In Gonzales v. McEwen, 438 F.Supp. 460, 464-65 (C.D.Cal.1977), a student expulsion case, the school board's bias was shown by contacts by members of the board with the superintendent and the relationship of members to a lawyer who presented the case against the students at a hearing and also represented the members individually. In Huber Pontiac, Inc. v. Allphin, 431 F.Supp. 1168, 1171-72 (S.D.Ill.1977), vacated on other grounds, 585 F.2d 817 (7th Cir.1978), the hearing officer in a tax case had responsibility to preside at the hearing, present the state's case, cross-examine witnesses, rule on admissibility of evidence, and make recommendations for the final decision. In National Rifle Ass'n v. United States Postal Service, 107 F.Supp. 88, 92-94 (D.C.), the same official who had initially rejected an application for a special postal classification also had responsibility to reconsider it. In all of these cases due process was found lacking. An earlier case illustrating the same principle is Amos Treat & Co. v. Securities and Exchange Comm'n, 306 F.2d 260, 263-67 (D.C.Cir. 1962), in which a member of the commission was held to be disqualified because before his appointment he had served as a director of the staff which had responsibility to make the investigation which led to the adjudication.
We hold that the risk of unfairness is intolerably high under the special facts and circumstances of this case. Consequently, we reverse the judgment of the district court and vacate the order of the Board.
Reversed and rendered.
. No contention is made that the Board lacked the quorum of four members required by section 2.05(c) of the Texas Optometry Act.
. Appellant also argues that the Administrative Procedure Act denies him equal protection of the laws in failing to afford optometrists the right of trial de novo provided for other professional licensees, but we do not reach that question, since we assume, without deciding, that the substantial evidence rule governs.