Case Name: State, Respondent, v. Luczaj, Appellant
Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Wisconsin
Decision Date: 1960-01-05
Citations: 9 Wis. 2d 199
Docket Number: 
Parties: State, Respondent, v. Luczaj, Appellant.
Judges: Martin, C. J., took no part.
Reporter: Wisconsin Reports Second
Volume: 9
Pages: 199–205

Head Matter:
State, Respondent, v. Luczaj, Appellant.
December 4, 1959
January 5, 1960.
For the appellant there was a brief by Posner & Rubin of Milwaukee, and oral argument by Alexander N. Rubin.
For the respondent the cause was argued by William A. Plats, assistant attorney general, and Hugh R. O’Connell, special assistant district attorney, with whom on the brief were John W. Reynolds, attorney general, and William J. McCauley, district attorney of Milwaukee county.

Opinion:
Brown, J.
Appellant submits that she was not accorded due process of law because the complaint upon which the warrant was issued did not establish that there was probable cause to issue the warrant. Sec. 954.02 (1), Stats., authorizes a complaint made upon information and belief, and sub. (2) "If it appears from the complaint that there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and the accused committed it, . . ." the warrant shall issue. The form of complaint and its foundation, information and belief, was held to be sufficient to support a warrant in State v. Davie (1885), 62 Wis. 305, 22 N. W. 411. That case was cited with approval in Piper v. State (1916), 163 Wis. 604, 158 N. W. 319, and a like result was reached. We conclude that- the complaint and the warrant issued upon it conform to our established precedents and this assignment of error is without merit.
Appellant submits that upon the trial of the general issue she should have been permitted to inquire into the existence of probable cause at the time the complaint was made.
Sec. 955.09 (3), Stats., provides that "Defenses and objections based on defects in the institution of proceedings, . . . or the use of illegal means to secure evidence (except confessions) must be raised before trial by motion or be deemed waived." Sub. (5) provides: "The motion shall be determined before trial of the general issue unless the court orders that it be deferred for determination at such trial.
The alleged defect in the proceedings was raised by the defendant's notice of motion prior to the trial that she would move to suppress the evidence because obtained by illegal means. When the case was called for trial the court ruled that it would hear the motion and determine it before trying the general issue and directed appellant's counsel to proceed with his motion. Counsel was not ready, whereupon, in effect, the court denied the motion and directed the trial of the general issue to be commenced. Thereafter, during trial of the general issue, the court ruled on evidence as though the motion had been heard and determined in respondent's favor. We find no error in the dispositions made by the learned trial court in these matters.
Appellant's counsel submits that he had been misled by an assistant district attorney — not the one who tried the case — that further delay would be granted him in pursuing his motion and that he was "surprised" by being required to proceed at once. Wherefore, counsel says, the court abused its discretion in refusing to defer determination of the motion and merge it into the general issue. There had been ample time to prepare and present the motion. Appellant had filed two affidavits of prejudice and a third judge had now come into the case. There is no written stipulation that the state would agree to further delay and the record is far from clear concerning whatever may have been said in conversation between the state's former attorney and appellant's counsel. The court followed sec. 955.09 (3), Stats., and used the discretion given him by sub. (5). We do not think this was an abuse of discretion. The court might well conclude that under the circumstances further delay was not required in getting to the merits.
Lastly, appellant contends that the state's only evidence is insufficient because all of it was obtained incidental to the arrest. In our view that evidence does not lack persuasive power. The trial court believed the state's witnesses and doubted the appellant's statement of facts and her explanations of obviously incriminating conduct. We conclude the evidence amply supports the judgment and we perceive no reversible error in the course of the trial.
By the Court. — Judgment affirmed.
Martin, C. J., took no part.