Case Name: EDWARD LEE BARKSDALE v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
Court: Court of Appeals of Virginia
Jurisdiction: Virginia
Decision Date: 1993-12-14
Citations: 17 Va. App. 456
Docket Number: No. 1989-90-1
Parties: EDWARD LEE BARKSDALE v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
Judges: 
Reporter: Virginia Court of Appeals Courts
Volume: 17
Pages: 456–468

Head Matter:
Richmond
EDWARD LEE BARKSDALE v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
No. 1989-90-1
Decided December 14, 1993
Counsel
William M. McKee (Zoby & Broccoletti, PC., on brief), for appellant.
Kathleen B. Martin, Assistant Attorney General (Stephen D. Rosenthal, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Opinion:
UPON A REHEARING EN BANC
Opinion
BRAY, J.
Edward Lee Barksdale (defendant) was convicted by a jury for possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute and possession of a firearm while in possession of cocaine. He complains on appeal (1) that the prosecutor unconstitutionally exercised peremptory challenges to remove black veniremen from the jury panel, and (2) that the jury recommended a sentence not authorized by statute. We disagree and affirm the convictions.
Because the assigned errors relate only to procedural aspects of the proceedings below, we recite only those facts material to a review of such issues.
During jury selection, the prosecutor peremptorily struck two black veniremen from the panel, and defendant moved that the prosecutor "be required . to state his grounds" for these challenges. However, before the trial judge ruled on this motion, the prosecutor explained that he was "primarily looking for younger people," "jurors who appeared not to be homeowners or people with not as big [a stake] in the community as other people." In response, defendant acknowledged that these reasons "certainly . . . would appear to be rationally mutual [sic]," adding that "a number of fairly young looking people . . . were not struck" from the panel. Defendant offered no further argument or evidence on the issue, the motion was overruled, and the court proceeded with trial.
The jury convicted defendant of both crimes, recommending sentences of twenty years and a $35,000 fine for the cocaine offense and two years and a $1,000 fine on the firearm charge, and was "excused from the courtroom."
On defendant's motion, sentencing was delayed pending the preparation and consideration of a presentence report. Before the proceedings adjourned, however, the trial judge noted that the recommended sentence on the firearm offense was "not in compliance" with Code § 18.2-308.4, and defendant promptly moved "to set aside the verdict." The court overruled the motion and imposed the prison terms recommended on both offenses but suspended the related fines.
We first address the jury selection issue. In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the long established principle that a "'State's purposeful or deliberate denial [to persons] on account of race of participation as jurors . . . violates the Equal Protection Clause.'" Id. at 84 (quoting Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 203-04 (1965)). The Court recognized, however, that "interpretation" of its decision in Swain had "placed on defendants a crip pling burden" by requiring "proof of repeated striking of blacks [by prosecutors] over a number of cases . to establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause" in the selection of a petit jury. Id. at 92. This "evidentiary formulation," which had rendered "prosecutors' peremptory challenges . . . largely immune from constitutional scrutiny," was expressly rejected by the Batson court "as inconsistent" with the proper "standards . . . for assessing a prima facie case under the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 92-93.
In response, the Court concluded that "a defendant may establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in selection of the petit jury solely on evidence" related to the "prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges at. . . trial" and identified a "combination of factors in the empaneling of the petit jury" which "raises the necessary inference" to defendant's "requisite showing" of such discrimination. Id. at 96. These criteria have been frequently referenced by this Court and need not be repeated here. Once a defendant "makes a prima facie showing" of deliberate discrimination, Batson requires "the State to come forward with a neutral explanation" of its strikes, "related to the particular case," after which the trial court "will have the duty to determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination" vel non. Id. at 97-98.
As a threshold issue, the Commonwealth argues that defendant did not establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination because the prosecutor undertook an explanation of the strikes before the trial judge addressed defendant's motion. However, this circumstance does not preclude our Batson review of the peremptory strikes. In Faison v. Hudson, 243 Va. 397, 417 S.E.2d 305 (1992), the Supreme Court found this procedural defect "was waived and became irrelevant" once the challenged party "undertook to articulate reasons for [a strike] without first raising the procedural issue" before the trial court. Id. at 402, 417 S.E.2d at 308; see also Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359 (1991).
Guided by Batson, we next consider whether the prosecutor articulated a racially neutral explanation for the disputed strikes. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360. "In evaluating the race-neutrality of an attorney's explanation, a court must determine whether, assuming the proffered reasons for the peremptory challenges are true, the challenges violate the Equal Protection Clause as a matter of law." Id. at 359. If not, the "decisive question" before the trial judge in a Batson analysis becomes "whether counsel's race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed," and, "once that has been settled, there seems nothing left to review." Id, at 365, 367.
A "trial court's decision on the ultimate question of discriminatory intent represents a finding of fact of the sort accorded great deference on appeal," id. at 364, which should be disturbed only if "clearly erroneous." Id. at 369; Batson, 416 U.S. at 98 n.21. Such "[d]eference to trial court findings . . . makes particular sense in this context" because "evaluation of the prosecutor's state of mind based on demeanor and credibility lies 'peculiarly within a trial judge's province.'" Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365 (citation omitted).
This view accords with the holding by a panel of this Court in Winfield v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 446, 404 S.E.2d 398 (1991), aff'd en banc, 14 Va. App. 1049, 421 S.E.2d 468 (1992), and with Wright v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 177, 427 S.E.2d 379 (1993). In Winfield, we acknowledged that "Batson places upon the trial courts the burden of weighing the explanations tendered by prosecutors justifying their use of peremptory strikes, assessing their genuineness, and determining whether they bespeak discriminatory motives." Winfield, 12 Va. App, at 453, 404 S.E.2d at 402. In discharging this responsibility, trial judges enjoy the unique "opportunity" of personal observation and familiarity with "the general circumstances of the case." Id. As a consequence, we must be controlled by the "accepted standards of review" and "uphold the trial court's decision if it is supported by credible evidence." Id.
In this instance, the prosecutor's "reasoning" for his peremptory strikes related to the ages of panel members. He explained that he "was primarily looking for younger people," "young jurors or jurors who appeared not to be homeowners or people with not as big as stakes [sic] in the community as other people." Defense counsel acknowledged that this explanation "certainly . . . would appear to be rationally mutual [sic]," commented that a "number of fairly young looking people . . . were not struck" and offered no further argument or evidence on the issue. Implicitly finding the prosecutor's explana tion credible, racially neutral and properly related to the case, the trial court overruled defendant's motion for a mistrial.
The trial judge presided at the proceedings, personally observed the entire jury panel, the challenged jurors and the composition of the trial jury, entertained the assurances and arguments of the prosecutor and was familiar with the case. Obvious human characteristics such as age, sex, race and demeanor are generally discernible and apparent to anyone present in the courtroom, including the trial judge, defendant and his counsel. Though not precisely recited in the record, such facts and circumstances attendant to jury selection presented an array of sensory perceptions to the trial judge which were relevant and appropriate considerations to a disposition of defendant's motion. See Winfield, 12 Va. App. at 449-50, 404 S.E.2d at 400.
The prosecutor's attribution of his peremptory strikes to age, an explanation previously approved by this Court, Chambliss v. Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 267, 269-70, 386 S.E.2d 478, 479 (1989), was easily subject to the scrutiny of the court, as well as all assembled, and unchallenged by defense counsel. The record need not further reflect circumstances apparent in the proceedings and obviously before the court. Clearly, the evidence supported the prosecutor's explanation and, more importantly, the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court.
Defendant's contention that the impermissible sentence recommended by the jury rendered its entire verdict "illegal" is also without merit. Although the verdict incorrectly combined a penitentiary term and a fine, "[a] sentence in excess of one prescribed by law is not void ab initio . . ., but is good insofar as the power of the court extends, and is invalid only as to the excess." Deagle v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 304, 305, 199 S.E.2d 509, 510-11 (1973); see also Bell v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 530, 534, 399 S.E.2d 450, 453 (1991). Under such circumstances, the trial court may, as here, "impose a valid sentence in substitution for one that is void." Deagle, 214 Va. at 305, 199 S.E.2d at 510. Clearly, "the jury, if it had been required to choose between the two punishments it fixed, would have imposed the greater, the penitentiary sentence, and not the lesser, the fine." Id. at 306, 199 S.E.2d at 511. This was precisely the result effected by the trial court, without prejudice to defendant.
Accordingly, the trial court correctly overruled defendant's challenge to the petit jury and imposed a proper sentence on the jury verdict, and its judgments are affirmed.
Affirmed.
Moon, C.J., Baker, X, Barrow, X, Coleman, X, Willis, X, Elder, X, and Fitzpatrick, X, concurred.
While the record suggests that three black veniremen may have been removed by the prosecutor, defendant only "noted. . . two" in argument before the trial court.
On the date of this offense, Code § 18.2-308.4 classified the crime as a Class 6 felony, punishable pursuant to applicable Code § 18.2-10 by a specified "term of imprisonment of not. . . more than five years" or "confinement in jail for not more than twelve months and a fine of not more than $1,000.00, either or both."
Batson notes that the court has "explained the operation of prima facie burden of proof rules" in earlier decisions and cited McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Batson, 476 U.S. at 94 n.18. There, the Court held that a litigant must be "afforded a fair opportunity" to rebut a facially valid explanation for the conduct in issue and "show that [the] stated reason . . . was in fact pretext." McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804.
In Broady v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 281, 284, 429 S.E.2d 468, 470 (1993), the prosecutor cited age as a basis for the challenged strikes. "[D]efense counsel protested" that white jurors "of the same apparent age . . . were not struck," and the ages of those jurors in issue were ascertained for the record. Id. at 285, 429 S.E.2d at 471.