Case Name: ATLANTIC INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT CORPORATION, Appellant, v. John W. TURNER, Jr., Volusia County Property Appraiser, and Robert D. Summers, as Director of the Revenue Division of Volusia County, Florida, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1980-01-09
Citations: 381 So. 2d 719
Docket Number: No. KK-196/NT1-10
Parties: ATLANTIC INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT CORPORATION, Appellant, v. John W. TURNER, Jr., Volusia County Property Appraiser, and Robert D. Summers, as Director of the Revenue Division of Volusia County, Florida, Appellees.
Judges: MELVIN, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 381
Pages: 719–728

Head Matter:
ATLANTIC INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT CORPORATION, Appellant, v. John W. TURNER, Jr., Volusia County Property Appraiser, and Robert D. Summers, as Director of the Revenue Division of Volusia County, Florida, Appellees.
No. KK-196/NT1-10.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Jan. 9, 1980.
As Corrected On Denial of Rehearing March 4, 1980.
Guyte McCord, III, of Spector & Tunni-cliff, Tallahassée, for appellant.
William M. Barr of Raymond, Wilson, Conway, Barr & Burrows, Tallahassee, for appellees.

Opinion:
BOOTH, Judge.
This cause is before us on appeal from the order of the Circuit Court, Volusia County, upholding the 1976 ad valorem tax assessment on acreage owned by appellant.
The facts are that the property was originally purchased in 1967 and 1968, divided on paper into more than 5,000 parcels and registered with the Florida Land Sales Board. By 1971, some 90% of the land had been sold under contracts for deeds, which contracts provided that an extensive system of drainage and graded dirt roads would be constructed by 1973. However, difficulties were encountered following the abolition of the South County Drainage District, which had theretofore been contractually responsi ble for construction of the graded dirt roads and drainage system on the property. In 1971, the Department of Pollution Control was empowered by the Legislature to require permits for construction and operation of water pollution sources. Appellant's project was presented to the Department of Pollution Control in June of 1972, but the Department refused to take any action while litigation concerning the South County Drainage District was pending. In 1973 an agreement was reached between appellant and Volusia County concerning the transfer of functions and responsibilities of the former South County Drainage District, and in September of 1974, appellant filed a formal application for a permit with the Department of Pollution Control. This was required because roads and drainage projects already undertaken by appellant were considered to be "pollution sources" by the Department of Pollution Control. On November 6,1974, the Department of Pollution Control, by letter from the regional engineer of the Orlando office, denied appellant's permit application. Administrative review of the denial of. appellant's permit application was pursued and the matter was eventually settled by stipulation between the parties in June of 1977.
The question presented is whether the tax assessor, in determining the assessment for the year 1976 properly considered the moratorium on development or improvement of the property as required by Florida Statute § 193.011, which provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
"193.011 Factors to consider in deriving just valuation
In arriving at just valuation as required under s. 4, Art. VII of the State Constitution, the property appraiser shall take into consideration the following factors:

(2) The highest and best use to which the property can be expected to be put in the immediate future and the present use of the property, taking into consideration any applicable local or state land use regulation and considering any moratorium imposed by executive order, law, ordinance, regulation, resolution, or proclamation adopted by any governmental body or agency or the Governor when the moratorium prohibits or restricts the development or improvement of property as otherwise authorized by applicable law." (e. s.)
Specifically, the question presented is whether the tax assessor properly interpreted subsection (2) of § 193.011. Under the foregoing statute, the assessor was required to consider the highest and best use to which the property could be put on January 1,1976 and "in the immediate future," taking into consideration any regulations and moratoriums which "prohibit or restrict development or improvements." The highest and best use in the immediate future, refers to a use which is "expected immediately." Lanier v. Overstreet, 175 So.2d 521 (Fla.1965).
The present use of the property on the assessment date was, according to the landowner's evidence, for a hunting and fishing preserve. The land was largely unusable for other purposes due to lack of drainage and access roads. On January 1, 1976, development was at a standstill and there was the poténtial of 5,000 lawsuits from irate purchasers due to the three-year delay of improvements contracted for by appellant, which improvements required permits.
On January 1, 1976, there had been only one resale of the property, a refund by appellant of a purchaser's money in an. effort to avoid a lawsuit. There was no income from the property and permit applications for further development had been rejected by the Department of Pollution Control. The sole existing canal on the land was unconnected to a drainage area and survey and survey markers on the land were directly related to the development which was still awaiting government approval.
Concerning appellee's consideration of § 193.011(2), the testimony of the Volusia County property evaluator supervisor, Frank DeBartolo, is, in pertinent part, as follows:
"Q [B]ut assume that on January 1, 1976 through the refusal of the State to issue necessary permits, a prospective buyer of one of these tracts would have no assurance that he could use this land for anything other than as its being used now in its natural state. Is it your judgment that he would have been willing to pay $700 an acre for that piece of property?.
A You made some assumption that I of course don't make with you.
Number one is that you are not going to get the — can't get the approval. See, I have been — I haven't been able — our department hasn't been able to feel that way yet . .
*♦*#*
Q . The question is simply this: In regard to the 1976 assessments that we're talking about here, did you consider there was or was not a moratorium as of January 1, 1976 as defined by this statute?
A We considered this — this delay problem — whatever you want to — you're calling it a moratorium. . . . But in any event this delay, this problem, which we've talked about been testified to, definitely was considered in the early 76 or as of the date of the assessment .
We did consider it and the only adjustment we made on that overall subdivision was to the other purchasers, your purchasers, not to the corporation because we felt that value was conservative enough that it reflected the problem.
# #
A . [W]e knew it — that you were having problems on a delay. And rest assured you're not the only one with problems of this general nature. I don't know about your specific problems. So we were aware of it and some of your purchasers had notified us that your client had told them they couldn't pursue because of problems with state, local, county and all, I don't know We surely did not feel at that time and don't today that this is a — its done, its finished, its absolutely gone busted, whatever language you want to use; maybe moratorium is the proper name, legally. And therefore everything is collapsed. No. We don't believe that's happened yet. Now I don't know what the future holds for your subdivision . . . " (e. s.)
In the foregoing testimony, the assessor assumes that approval for development will ultimately be obtained, admits he didn't know appellant's specific problem, but states that the development is not "done," "finished," "absolutely gone busted," or collapsed, the moratorium factor results in no reduction in the assessed value.
This property was assessed as "speculation land of A-l property" described as "undeveloped land speculation subdivision," and $700 to $800 per acre with no reduction for the moratorium factor. This assessment admittedly required speculation that appellant would eventually receive the needed permits and that the property could be made useable in something other than its wild state. Subsequent history of the property has revealed how speculative the assessment was on the assessment date, since the permitting problems were only resolved by court settlement some two years later.
The use of private property is increasingly subject to government regulation' in the public interest to protect the environment and guard against thoughtless development. In 1974, the Legislature, in recognition of this increased regulation and its burden, amended § 193.011(2) to specifically require that property appraisers consider government moratoriums affecting development in arriving at a just valuation for tax purposes. Basic concepts of fairness, as well as principles of property appraisal, preclude valuation for tax purposes without due consideration of the governmental restrictions on use of the property to be taxed. Thus, even prior to the 1974 amendment, zoning regulations applicable on the taxable date were required to be considered in determining the highest and best use of the property. Straughn v. Tuck, 354 So.2d 368 (Fla.1977).
The Florida Supreme Court, in Straughn v. Tuck, supra, held the tax assessor must consider each factor in § 193.011, holding:
"[T]he tax assessor in this case failed to consider the 'present use' of appellees' property, in determining the 'highest and best use' to which the property could be expected to be put in the 'immediate future.' Section 193.011(2). Rather,, he valued it by subjective standards, using speculative factors, assuming there would be a zoning change and the land converted to a more intensive use . . . The uses under the statute must be immediate, not speculative, and not predicated on conversion to higher or better uses
In Straughn v. Tuck, the court found that the assessment of unimproved land zoned agricultural based on the assessor's speculation that zoning could be changed to allow a more intensive use was improper and failed to take into account the factor of the statute requiring determination of present use and highest and best use in the "immediate future." In Williams v. Simpson, 209 So.2d 262 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968), this Court set aside an appraisal based on the "ultimate poten-, tial" of the property, citing the rule of the Florida Supreme Court in Lanier v. Overstreet, 175 So.2d 521 (Fla.1965), holding:
"By authorizing tax assessors to consider, as one of the factors '[i]n arriving at a just valuation' of property, the use to which the property 'can be expected to be put in the immediate future' (emphasis added), the Legislature has, under the familiar rule of expressio unius est exclu-sio alterius, prohibited tax assessors from considering potential uses to which the property is reasonably susceptible and to which it might possibly be put in some future tax year or, even, during the current tax year. To be considered, the use must be expected, not merely potential or a 'reasonably susceptible' type of use; it must be expected immediately, not at some vague uncertain time in the future . " (emphasis theirs)
In the instant case the assessor testified that he "considered" the moratorium provision of the statute but his testimony reveals: (1) That he was unaware of the facts concerning the moratorium and (2) That he misconstrued the statutory provision to require that the proposed development be abandoned as of the January 1 date, or as he stated, "absolutely gone busted" in order for the provision to apply and (3) That he considered eventual rather than immediate future uses based on conjecture that the approval would be obtained.
A moratorium is by definition "a delay officially required;" "a suspension of activity;" "a temporary ban on the use of something." In interpretation such as testified to by the assessor here requires a high degree of finality and permanence of restriction and prohibition of development before the moratorium factor can be given effect in making the assessment. This defeats the legislative intent to require consideration in each taxable year of governmental delays enjoined on the development and improvements of private property. Florida Statute 193.011 does not require that there be an abandonment of development or improvement of the property, but rather that there be a delay due to the causes specified. Here there was clearly such a delay, and its effect on the value of the property must be accurately taken into account.
Accordingly, we must remand this cause to the trial court for determination of the value of the property for its highest and best use in accordance herewith. REVERSED and REMANDED.
MELVIN, J., concurs.
LARRY G. SMITH, J" dissents.
. Webster's Third New International, Unabridged, at 1469 (1976).