Case Name: PEOPLE v. SWIRLES
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1994-08-02
Citations: 206 Mich. App. 416
Docket Number: Docket No. 168756
Parties: PEOPLE v SWIRLES
Judges: Before: Michael J. Kelly, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Corrigan, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 206
Pages: 416–420

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v SWIRLES
Docket No. 168756.
Submitted June 8, 1994, at Detroit.
Decided August 2, 1994, at 9:00 a.m.
Thomas R. Swirles pleaded guilty in the Midland Circuit Court, Paul J. Clulo, J., of armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony pursuant to a plea bargain and sentencing agreement, and was sentenced to twenty-five to fifty years’ imprisonment for the armed robbery conviction. The defendant appealed, claiming that the prosecution breached the sentencing agreement by recommending the longest minimum sentence under the sentencing guidelines instead of making a general recommendation that the minimum be within the five-to twenty-five-year range of the guidelines.
The Court of Appeals held:
The record in this case is unclear with respect to whether the prosecution agreed to make a general recommendation that the minimum sentence fall within the guidelines or whether the prosecution agreed to recommend a specific sentence that falls within the guidelines. The case must be remanded for a determination of the actual terms of the agreement and for specific performance of the agreement. If the trial court determines that the prosecution breached the sentencing agreement, the court must resentence the defendant in accordance with People v Shuler, 188 Mich App 548 (1991), and People v Nixten, 183 Mich App 95 (1990).
Remanded.
Michael J. Kelly, P.J., concurring, stated that a prosecutor’s promise to recommend sentencing within the guidelines can mean that the prosecutor intends to recommend a specific sentence that is within the guidelines. A defendant approves such a specific recommendation by not objecting at sentencing.
1. Sentences — Sentencing Agreements.
A sentencing agreement that provides for a general recommenda_tion by the prosecution that the minimum sentence of impris onment be within the range recommended by the sentencing guidelines is breached where the prosecution recommends a specific minimum sentence.
References
Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 481, 485.
See ALR Index under Guilty Plea.
2. Sentences — Sentencing Agreements.
The terms of a sentencing agreement must be fulfilled where a defendant’s plea of guilty is induced by the agreement.
State Appellate Defender (by Daryl D. Mack), for the defendant on appeal.
Before: Michael J. Kelly, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Corrigan, JJ.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
Defendant appeals as of right his plea of guilty of armed robbery, MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2), and his sentence of twenty-five to fifty years of imprisonment for the armed robbery conviction. Defendant pleaded guilty pursuant to the prosecutor's promise to dismiss a charge of conspiracy to commit armed robbery and a charge of being an habitual offender in this case and to dismiss charges in another case of unlawfully driving away an automobile, conspiracy, and of being an habitual offender. The prosecutor and defendant also negotiated a sentencing agreement. We affirm defendant's plea-based conviction but remand for further proceedings regarding the scope of the prosecutor's promise relating to the sentencing recommendation.
Defendant claims that the prosecutor breached the sentencing agreement by recommending a sentence of twenty-five years, a specific top end of the guidelines' sentence, instead of honoring his promise to make a general recommendation of a sentence of five to twenty-five years. Whether the prosecutor breached the agreement depends on the exact terms of the agreement. At the rearraignment, the prosecutor stated:
[T]he People are making a Briggs-Killebrew sentence recommendation that the defendant receive an initial sentence within that recommended by the sentencing guidelines as determined by the court at the time of sentencing.
[W]e believe the minimum range is going to fall between 5 to 25, but I think that's something that ultimately will have to be determined by the court.
At sentencing, the prosecutor argued:
I think that this court should give him the 25 years, the maximum in the guideline range, as the minimum and I have no problem with the 50 years as maximum on the maximum part of the sentence.
Defense counsel never objected to the prosecutor's specific sentence recommendation at sentencing. The record contains no copy of a written plea agreement, and the parties' intent appears somewhat ambiguous. From the record before us, the true nature of the prosecutor's promise is not adequately developed.
A prosecutor who agrees to make a general sentence recommendation pursuant to a sentencing agreement breaches the agreement by recommending a specific number of years. People v Shuler, 188 Mich App 548; 470 NW2d 492 (1991). A sentencing court is, of course, not bound by any sentencing agreement negotiated between a defendant and the prosecution. People v Killebrew, 416 Mich 189, 207; 330 NW2d 834 (1982). Where a defendant's plea of guilty is induced by the prosecutor's promise relating to sentencing, the terms of that agreement must be fulfilled. People v Nixten, 183 Mich App 95; 454 NW2d 160 (1990).
It is not apparent from the record before us whether the prosecutor agreed to recommend, generally, that defendant's minimum sentence fall within the guidelines or whether he agreed to recommend to the court a specific sentence that would fall within the guidelines.
We, therefore, remand to the trial court for a determination of the actual terms of the agreement regarding the prosecutor's intent. If the court on remand concludes that the promise was breached, the court should resentence defendant in accordance with Shuler and Nixten, supra, so that defendant may obtain specific performance of the bargain.
Remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.