Case Name: CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, a Florida municipal corporation, Appellant, v. FORTE TOWERS, INC., a Florida corporation, Appellee
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1974-10-09
Citations: 305 So. 2d 764
Docket Number: No. 44936
Parties: CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, a Florida municipal corporation, Appellant, v. FORTE TOWERS, INC., a Florida corporation, Appellee.
Judges: DEKLE, J., concurring specially with opinion with which OVERTON, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 305
Pages: 764–773

Head Matter:
CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, a Florida municipal corporation, Appellant, v. FORTE TOWERS, INC., a Florida corporation, Appellee.
No. 44936.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Oct. 9, 1974.
Rehearings Denied Jan. 27, 1975.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., J. Robert Olian, Asst. Atty. Gen., Joseph A. Wanick, City Atty., Yale Freeman, Asst. City Atty., Tobias Simon of Tobias Simon and Elizabeth duFresne, Miami, and Jack Sobell, for appellant.
Wm. Snow Frates, Ray H. Pearson, James D. Little and Andrew C. Hall of Frates, Floyd, Pearson, Stewart, Proenza & Richman, Miami, for appellee.
Ralph A. Marsicano, Tampa, and Burton M. Michaels, Tallahassee, for Fla. League of Cities, Inc., as amicus curiae,
Marion E. Sibley of Sibley, Giblin, Lev-enson & Ward, Miami Beach, for amicus curiae.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Jurisdiction of this direct appeal from the Circuit Court of Dade County vests under Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla.Const., the trial court having expressly held unconstitutional F.S. § 166.021 relating to municipal home rule (a portion of Ch. 73-129, Laws of Florida, 1973).
It is the unanimous opinion of this Court that F.S. § 166.021 is constitutionally valid, as more fully set forth in the special concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Dekle. A majority of this Court also concurs in the trial court's holding that insufficient evidence was presented at trial to overcome the city council's finding that an emergency existed (at the time it was passed) to support enactment of the rent control ordinance at that time, although Justices Roberts and Boyd expressly dissent on this point.
However, a majority of this Court holds that this particular rent control ordinance is constitutionally defective in its attempted delegation of the legislative powers of the city to the rent control administrator without prescribing sufficient objective guidelines, as is more fully set forth in Mr. Justice Dekle's specially concurring opinion, with which (on this point) Justices Roberts, Boyd and Overton join.
Accordingly, the opinion of the trial court is reversed insofar as it holds F.S. § 166.021 to be unconstitutional and holds that Ch. 73-129 does not authorize the city to enact a rent control ordinance; to the extent that the trial court found the provisions of the ordinance to be invalid as to guidelines and standards, it is affirmed.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part.
DEKLE, J., concurring specially with opinion with which OVERTON, J., concurs.
OVERTON, J., concurring specially with opinion.
ROBERTS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part with opinion with which BOYD, J., concurs.
ERVIN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part with opinion with which ADKINS, C. J., and McCAIN, J., concur.