Case Name: State, Respondent, v. Haugen, Appellant
Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Wisconsin
Decision Date: 1971-11-05
Citations: 52 Wis. 2d 791
Docket Number: No. State 32
Parties: State, Respondent, v. Haugen, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Wisconsin Reports Second
Volume: 52
Pages: 791–803

Head Matter:
State, Respondent, v. Haugen, Appellant.
No. State 32.
Argued October 7, 1971.
— Decided November 5, 1971.
(Also reported in 191 N. W. 2d 12.)
For the appellant there was a brief and oral argument by John J. Valenti of Milwaukee.
For the respondent the cause was argued by Thomas J. Balistreri, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was Robert W. Warren, attorney general.

Opinion:
Heffernan, J.
While further facts were elicited during the course of trial, they are immaterial to the determination of whether the complaint was sufficient to show probable cause that a crime had been committed and that Haugen had probably committed it.
Evidence adduced at a subsequent trial cannot be used to supply the factual deficiencies of a complaint. As we frequently held, a complaint, including documents that are made a part of it by reference, is a self-contained charge, and it alone may be considered in determining probable cause. State ex rel. Cullen v. Ceci (1970), 45 Wis. 2d 432, 173 N. W. 2d 175. Within the four corners of the document must appear facts that would lead a reasonable man to conclude that probably a crime had been committed and that the defendant named in the complaint was probably the culpable party.
A reasonable summary of the facts alleged in the complaint appear in the attorney general's brief:
"The crime charged is theft of 48 candy bars belonging to the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.
"Gary Melvin Haugen is the person charged.
"The offense is alleged to have occurred on May 6, 1970, at the U.W.M. union located at 2200 East Kenwood in the city of Milwaukee.
"The defendant is charged because an unidentified male broke the door of a storage case and removed a quantity of candy which he handed to the defendant who then consumed some and gave away the balance.
"Linda Nieft, an officer of the union who personally observed the incident, said so.
"It is immaterial that the person who took the candy from the case is unidentified or that his identity is not alleged to be known to the defendant, for mutuality of agreement may be secured without the conspirators knowing each other and without distinct statement of plan. O'Neil v. State, supra, 405.
"The complaint specifically alleges that the unidentified person took property without consent of the owner. Even if it had not, the allegation that a door had to be broken in order to obtain the candy clearly creates that inference.
"The allegation that the unidentified person handed the candy to the defendant after taking it from the case raises a reasonable inference of immediacy which includes inferences that the defendant was present when the candy was taken, that he knew how the candy was taken and that he was or should have been aware that the candy did not belong to the person who broke a door to take it.
"The allegation that the defendant, after receiving the candy from the taker, consumed some and gave away the rest sufficiently establishes the defendant's culpability as a party to the crime of theft in that he aided in the asportation of the stolen goods."
While we agree with the state's reiteration of the facts recited in the complaint, we cannot agree that the inferences that are so readily found by the attorney general are reasonable, nor that the inferences found would cause a reasonable man to conclude that the defendant was probably a party to the crime of theft.
The state's inferences are questionable, since they rest on the assumption that Haugen saw the unidentified male break a door in a storage case, and that he therefore knew that the candy was unlawfully taken.
These inferences are merely the product of speculation as to what conclusions the defendant might have drawn had he seen the actual breaking. There is no allegation that defendant saw the breaking into the storage case, or that he was in such a position that he should have seen the breaking. The complaint is, rather, a recitation of some of the inferences in regard to the criminal nature of the conduct of the unidentified male that reasonably could have been drawn by Linda Nieft, the complainant, who was the president of the student Union, who knew that the unidentified male was an unauthorized person, and who actually saw the breaking and the extraction of two boxes of candy from the storage case. It was reasonable for Linda Nieft to conclude that the crime of theft had been committed — she was aware of the ownership of the personal property and saw the breaking of the locked case and the actual, if partial, asportation.
The question raised, therefore, is whether a reasonable person, from a reading of the complaint, could conclude that Haugen saw the identical incident, had the same background information as to the authority of the person behind the counter, and therefore could conclude that a theft had been committed. In short, it is necessary to reasonably conclude from the four corners of the complaint that Haugen knew a criminal act had been performed and intentionally undertook conduct to further the accomplishment of the act.
The complaint will not support such inference.
While at some point subsequent to the breaking of the lock and the taking of the candy the unidentified thief handed the candy to the defendant, there is nothing to indicate that the defendant was in a position to see what Linda Nieft saw, or in fact saw what she saw. There is no factual allegation that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that probably Haugen knowingly and intentionally engaged in conduct that would further the theft. The fatal lacuna of the complaint is the omission of any facts that would reasonably indicate that Haugen was aware of the felonious conduct of the unidentified thief. The complaint merely puts Haugen at the scene of the crime. Unless the facts indicate he was aware that he was furthering a criminal act, his mere presence and ambivalent conduct at the scene of a crime is insufficient to charge a crime.
In Hampetoss v. State, ante, p. 71, 187 N. W. 2d 823, we said that there are two elements that are requisite to make one a party to a crime — the commission of the crime and the party's awareness of its commission.
Here, there is not even an allegation that defendant was aware that a crime was committed. That conclusion, which the drafter of the complaint neglected to allege, has been left for the conjecture of the reader. This conclusion, if inferentially reached, is not reasonable. Under the facts, the conclusion that the defendant was an innocent bystander is equally reasonable.
In Hawpetoss, at page 78, we said:
"The elements of complicity, or aiding and abetting are that a person (1) undertakes conduct (either verbal or overt action) which as a matter of objective fact aids another person in the execution of a crime, and further (2) he consciously desires or intends that his conduct will yield such assistance."
"Aid or encouragement to another who is actually perpetrating a felony will not make the aider or encourager guilty of the crime if it is rendered without mens rea . . it is the abettor's state of mind rather than the state of mind of the perpetrator which determines the abettor's guilt or innocence . . . ." Perkins, Criminal Lam (2d ed., University Textbook Series), p. 662.
The statute itself, sec. 939.05 (2) (b), Stats., provides for complicity only where the party charged "Intentionally aids and abets the commission of it." (Emphasis supplied.)
The complaint herein alleges the objective act of receiving the candy. It fails to recite any facts that would indicate even inferentially defendant's state of mind was such that he had a conscious desire to assist in the execution of the crime.
At each stage of the proceedings the various assistant district attorneys prosecuting the case, as well as the assistant attorney general representing the state on appeal, admitted the inartfulness of the complaint, but contended that it skeletally complied with the legal requirements. It is unfortunate that these prosecutorial doubts did not deter prosecution on this complaint. It would have been wise at an early stage of the proceedings to have dismissed the complaint and if possible redraft it to supply the necessary factual allegations that showed the defendant's complicity as an aider or abettor or as a conspirator. Alternatively, defendant could probably have been charged simply as a principal under sec. 939.05, Stats. The state by unsuccessfully attempting to allege the defendant's guilt as a common-law accessory showed that the facts alleged would not in themselves sustain the inference that defendant's conduct was motivated by the requisite mens rea. The complaint itself negatived the probability that defendant had the guilty knowledge that a crime had been committed, which state of mind was the sine qua non for prosecution against this defendant.
By the Court. — Order reversed, and cause remanded with directions to dismiss the complaint.
Although the conspiracy theory was urged by the state on appeal and was the foundation of the circuit court's affirmance of the county court, the notes of the Wisconsin Legislative Council committee which revised the statutes make it clear that a conspirator is one who is concerned with a crime prior to its actual commission — a fact not found here. See Judiciary Committee Report on the Criminal Code, Vol. 5 (Feb. 1953), p. 5.