Case Name: W. T. PHY v. WINNIFRED W. PHY
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1925-06-16
Citations: 116 Or. 31
Docket Number: 
Parties: W. T. PHY v. WINNIFRED W. PHY.
Judges: Bean, J., dissents.
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 116
Pages: 31–62

Head Matter:
Submitted on briefs at Pendleton May 4,
reversed June 16,
rehearing denied October 23, 1925.
W. T. PHY v. WINNIFRED W. PHY.
(236 Pac. 751; 240 Pac. 237.)
For appellant there was a brief over the name of Messrs. Cochran & Eberhard.
For respondent there was a brief over the names of Mr. W. F. Ma>gill and Mr. Milton B. Klepper.

Opinion:
BROWN, J.
This case involves the right of a divorced wife who has remarried to continue to collect alimony from her former husband as provided in the decree of divorce.
*'Alimony is an allowance for support, which is made upon considerations of equity and public policy. It is not property of the wife recoverable as debt, damages, or penalty. It is based upon the obligation, growing out of the marriage relation, that the husband must support his wife—an obligation which continues even after a legal separation without her fault." 2 Schouler, Marriage, Divorce, Separation and Domestic Delations (6 ed.), § 1754.
This court has held that maintenance and permanent alimony aré synonymous terms and constitute an allowance in money, to be recovered from the one in fault for the support of the innocent party: Huffman v. Huffman, 47 Or. 610 (86 Pac. 593, 114 Am. St. Rep. 943).
"The remarriage of a divorced wife cuts off her right to alimony from the date of her remarriage, and alimony may be reduced to a nominal sum where the wife has remarried with a man able to support her, or retainéd only at a sum sufficient for support of the minor children." 2 Schouler, Marriage, Divorce, Separation and Domestic Relations (6 ed.), § 1834.
In 19 C. J. 275, 276, the editors announce the doctrine that, while a divorced wife's remarriage to another does not ipso facto release the former husband's obligation to pay alimony, it affords a cogent reason for the court to modify or vacate a decree awarding alimony, "especially where the wife marries a man who is able to afford her a reasonable support; and the rule applies to a decree based upon and incorporating an agreement between the parties, as well as to one founded on testimony. ' '
The effect of remarriage of the wife upon an allowance of alimony is treated as follows in 1 R. C. L., p. 950:
"Aside from its positive unseemliness, it is illogical and unreasonable that she (the divorced wife) should have the equivalent of an obligation for support by way of alimony from a former husband, and an obligation from a present husband for an adequate support at the same time. It is her privilege to abandon the provision made by decree of the court for her support under sanctions of the law, for another provision for maintenance which she would obtain by a second marriage, and when she has done so the law" will require her to abide by her election as there is no reason why she should not do so."
See 30 A. L. R., p. 79, note; 11 Ann. Cas. 523, note; Carlton v. Carlton, 87 Fla. 460 (100 South. 745).
It is a general rule that the remarriage of a divorced wife does not of itself terminate the former husband's obligation to pay the alimony decreed: Brandt v. Brandt, 40 Or. 477 (67 Pac. 508); McGill v. McGill, 101 Kan. 324 (166 Pac. 501); Hartigan v. Hartigan, 142 Minn. 274 (171 N. W. 925); Nelson v. Nelson, 282 Mo. 412 (221 S. W. 1066); 1 R. C. L., p. 950. But, when an application is regularly made to modify the decree awarding alimony and the marriage of the divorced wife is shown, the burden of showing the circumstances to overcome the fact of marriage is placed upon the divorced wife: Brandt v. Brandt, supra; Cohen v. Cohen, 150 Cal. 99 (88 Pac. 267, 11 Ann. Cas. 520); Southworth v. Treadwell, 168 Mass. 511 (47 N. E. 93).
When the allowance for alimony or maintenance arises from a consideration, of the restitution of property brought to the husband by the wife, the decree awarding such maintenance should be regarded as a final adjudication of the matter. But, as said by Mr. Justice Wolverton in speaking for this court in Brandt v. Brandt, 40 Or. 477, 486 (67 Pac. 508, 510):
"Where-it is made as a matter of support and maintenance merely, then the changed condition of the parties, as where the faculties of the husband have diminished, or the divorced wife has acquired other facilities or means of support, will warrant such a revision- or modification, diminishing or cutting off the allowance in toto, as may seem reasonable and proper (citing numerous authorities). The remarriage of the wife is a persuasive circumstance, calling for an exercise of the court's discretion and authority to modify or rebate the allowance." See, also, 19 C. J. 276.
The case of Henderson v. Henderson, 37 Or. 141 (60 Pac. 597, 61 Pac. 136, 82 Am. St. Rep. 741, 48 L. R. A. 766), is relied upon by defendant in support of the ruling of the lower court. But that case is not based upon a like set of facts. The decree of the court required M. W. Henderson, defendant, to support and maintain the minor child of the marriage during his minority, and to pay to the plaintiff during the term of her natural life $150 per month. Thereafter, the defendant, basing his petition upon his inability to pay a greater sum than $75 per month, asked the court to modify the decree so as to reduce the alimony to that amount. The plaintiff, answering, averred that the defendant ought to be estopped because the parties had entered into a postnuptial agreement adjusting their property rights, under the terms of which the defendant had, for himself, his heirs, executors and administrators, in consideration of plaintiff's covenant, agreed to pay to plaintiff the sum of $150 on the fifteenth day of each month during the term of her natural life, and that, as security for such monthly payments, the defendant and plaintiff had joined in deeding to one Byron Z. Holmes, Block 22 in McMillan's Addition to East Portland, Oregon, to be held by him in trust for such purpose. She further asserted that in consideration of the above covenants and agreement's she had relinquished all her right and interest in and to the property of the defendant, both real and personal. She averred that she had carried out the terms of her contract by executing the deed. She further averred and proved that this agreement had been made for a valuable consideration and in order to adjust and settle the property rights between the parties. Mr. Justice Wolverton, in rendering the decision for the court, held that a decree carrying into effect the provisions of an agreement entered into between a husband and wife, by which the , wife, in consideration of releasing all interest in certain real and personal property, is to receive $150 per month for her support during her life after divorce caused by the husband's misconduct, cannot afterward be modified by the court without the consent of both parties thereto.
The case of Southworth v. Treadwell, supra, is in point. In that case the wife was granted a divorce on June 5, 1890, on the ground of desertion. The parties agreed that alimony at the rate of $150 per month should be allowed the wife, and on June 21, 1890, a written agreement to this effect was adopted as the order of the court, to be embodied in the decree absolute when such decree, if any, should be entered. On March 3, 1891, the divorce was made absolute. Upon the hearing of the husband's petition to vacate the decree awarding ali mony, the divorced wife requested a ruling of the court that the alimony constituted a vested right which the court had no power to disturb, and that, before the petition could be maintained it was necessary to show that by her remarriage the financial condition of the wife was so improved that she no longer required the alimony. The court declined to make the requested ruling, and held that the remarriage of the divorced wife was prima facie cause for the reduction of alimony to a nominal sum. The case was appealed to the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, where it was held that the remaniage of the wife brought about a material change in her circumstances, in that it gave her the right to be supported by another man. The court further upheld the decision of the lower court in reducing the alimony to a nominal sum and in ruling that the remarriage constituted a prima facie cause for reduction of the alimony.
There is no contention here that the wife ever brought any property into the estate of her husband, or that the award of alimony or maintenance was based upon the relinquishment of any property rights. She is remarried. It is admitted that her husband is amply able to support her, and that he is supporting her. Under this state of facts, when the divorced wife elected to marry her present husband, she waived her legal right to claim support from -a former husband, and the court was empowered to modify the decree so as to fit the situation: Section 514, Or. L.
The order appealed from is reversed and the decree of divorce, in so far as it relates to alimony, is modified, in this: that the payment of alimony accruing subsequent to the filing of the motion in the court below will be discontinued.
For the petition, Mr. Milton B. Klepper and Mr. W. O. Magill.
No appearance contra.
Neither party shall recover costs in this court.
Reversed and Decree Entered.