Case Name: STATE of Louisiana In the Interest of James L. SIMON
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1974-05-23
Citations: 295 So. 2d 473
Docket Number: No. 4652
Parties: STATE of Louisiana In the Interest of James L. SIMON.
Judges: Before FRUGÉ, HOOD and WATSON, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 295
Pages: 473–482

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana In the Interest of James L. SIMON.
No. 4652.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
May 23, 1974.
Rehearing Denied June 13, 1974.
Louis B. Guidry, Lake Charles, for defendant-appellant.
Bernard Marcantel, Dist. Atty., Jennings, for plaintiff-appellee.
Before FRUGÉ, HOOD and WATSON, JJ.

Opinion:
WATSON, Judge.
This is an appeal from the judgment of a juvenile court, appellate jurisdiction being vested in this court by Article 7, Section 29 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921, as amended.
Following a hearing ¿p the juvenile court, the appellant was committed to the Department of Corrections, State of Louisiana, under a judgment which reads as follows:
"It is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed that James Lynell Simon, a minor born the 23rd day of September, 1959, is adjudged a child who has committed an offense not classified as criminal but who is in need of supervision, care and rehabilitation and is committed to the care of the Department of Corrections, State of Louisiana, for an indefinite period not to exceed his majority." (Tr. 5).
On appeal, counsel for the appellant contends that the juvenile court erred in committing appellant. The specific argument is that, when the state failed to establish that appellant had violated the specific statute with which he was charged, the juvenile court made the commitment on another ground, as stated in the judgment quoted above.
A juvenile proceeding is initiated by the filing of a petition under LSA-R.S. 13:1574. This statute outlines the methods by which juvenile proceedings are commenced and provides for the contents of the petition, including the following requirements :
C. The petition shall set forth with specificity:
1. The facts which bring the child within the provisions of this chapter, together with a statement, wheh delinquency is alleged, that the child is in need of supervision, care, or rehabilitation. If a violation of law is the basis for filing the petition, the petition shall cite the statute or municipal ordinance which the child is alleged to have violated;
In the case before us a petition was filed on March 15, 1974 by the District Attorney of the Thirty-first Judicial District. It is not contended that the petition is defective. Appellant's claim is that the petition sets forth the information required by LSA-R. S. 13 :1574, but that he was committed for some other charge or offense. The portion of the petition which is pertinent to the contention being made by appellant, reads as follows:
". . . said child is within the provisions of Title 13, Sections 1569, et seq., and is a child in need of supervision, care, and rehabilitation for having committed the following delinquent act, to-wit: On or about January 18, 1974, James L. Simon did unlawfully commit the crime of receiving stolen things by receiving one ring, valued at $250.00, property of Mrs. Wade Lormand, under circumstances which indicate that the said James L. Simon knew or had good reason to believe that the said ring was the subject of a theft, in violation of L. R.S. 14:69."
Facts
The facts surrounding the alleged offense, as developed by the hearing in juvenile court, are that the appellant was given a ring to hold by another youth during a physical education class. The appellant, according to the testimony of the other youth, put the ring in his pocket, and later in the day, the appellant was requested to return the ring. The appellant, again according to the other youth, said he did not have the ring so the other youth complained to the school principal. The appellant was summoned from his class and instructed to get the ring from his locker. When appellant returned from the locker area, he told the principal that he had lost the ring coming up the stairs. The youth who gave appellant the ring later searched for it, but, according to his testimony, he was unable to find the ring. On cross-examination, it was developed that the youth had not told appellant that the ring was stolen. He apparently led appellant to believe that he had purchased the ring.
The school principal confirmed that he had called appellant in, that appellant informed him that the ring was in his locker and that appellant was instructed to bring it to the office. The principal testified further that when appellant came back, he reported that he had lost the ring.
Another witness was a thirteen year old youth who testified that appellant had asked him to help look for the ring. He indicated that he did not actually search for it because he was in a hurry.
The only other, witness to testify was a State Juvenile Probation and Parole Officer, Joe Fairfield. This officer testified that he knew appellant and that he had consulted with him about the loss of the ring. He testified that he had also discussed the matter with appellant's parents. Mr. Fairfield also described his search for the ring at the school building, which actually appears to have been an attempt to duplicate the loss of the ring or determine the likelihood of an occurrence such as appellant had described previously -to the probation officer. The substance of Mr. Fair-field's testimony was that the story told to him by appellant as to how the ring was lost was improbable.
Appellant did not testify but invoked his constitutional privilege not to do so. Clearly, a juvenile is not required to testify if he chooses to remain silent and this is not to be construed against him.Amendment V, United States Constitution; LSA-R.S. 13:1579.
Pre-Hearing Report
No mention is made here of certain information which is contained in a document appearing in the record at TR. 6-11, entitled "Confidential Pre-Hearing Investigation Report". First, there is no method of determining whether the juvenile court relied on the information contained in this document in considering appellant's case. From the title of the document an implication arises that this report was submitted to the juvenile court prior to the hearing and determination of appellant's case. Such a procedure has been the practice in some juvenile courts in the past. We omit any reference to the information contained in the report for another reason. We believe it to be reversible error for a juvenile court to receive a report containing hearsay evidence, opinions and recommendations prior to making an adjudication. In re State In the Interest of Elliott, 206 So.2d 802 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1968); Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967). It is interesting to note that our brothers of the Second Circuit reached a similar conclusion in the Elliott case, supra, which involved a charge of neglect, not delinquency. They raised a serious question as to the validity of LSA-R.S. 13:1579.1 which at that time authorized receipt of hearsay evidence:
"The introduction of such testimony is clearly unauthorized under the general rules long and well established and recognized in the jurisprudence of this State, for the reason among many others, that the party against whom the evidence is sought to be used is deprived of the right of cross-examination to test and determine the truth of all such statements." 206 So.2d 804.
On the other hand we see no error, once a juvenile has been adjudicated delinquent or otherwise properly held to be subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, in the receipt of a report or reports from probation officers, social workers, or other persons acting as officers of the court and assisting the court to make a proper disposition of the youth, even though such report or reports contain hearsay evidence or opinions which would not be admissible in the adjudication of the case.
The possible difference in evidentiary standards and procedural requirements dictate, as a practical matter, the necessity of a double hearing in juvenile matters. Many procedural problems can be avoided by dividing the hearing into an adjudicatory phase and a dispositional phase. Not doing this risks commission of reversible error.
Reasons for Judgment
After hearing the witnesses whose testimony is reviewed above, the juvenile court signed a judgment in the terms previously quoted. However, to fully state the decision of the juvenile court it is necessary to also quote the reasons assigned in open court for the judgment rendered and the exchange in court between the juvenile judge and the attorney for appellant. It was as follows:
"THE COURT: The Court is going to rule in the matter that this child is in need of supervision, care, and rehabilitation. • The Court does not feel that he had knowledge of the fact that he was receiving stolen things, but the Court does feel that he was at fault in taking this ring and not returning it.
"The Court does not believe that the ring was lost; the Court does believe that he either still has this ring, or that he has disposed of it at his own — at his own ends. And for this reason, The Court feels that he is in need of supervision, care, and rehabilitation and will assign him to the diagnostic center.
"MR. GUIDRY: Your Honor, we understand the ruling. As I understand, the Defendant was charged specifically with receiving stolen goods and that it is the ruling of the Court that he is not guilty of—
"THE COURT: He's not guilty of this, but he is in need of supervision for the reason that he did know that this ring did not belong to him; he took the ring, he did not return it. It was in his locker; he said he lost' it. Mr. Fairfield has testified that he could not have lost it where he said he lost it. The Court feels that the child did not tell the truth. The child claimed the right against self incrimination; he would not talk to the Court. This is a juvenile hearing and the Court thinks that under these circumstances, he certainly is in need of supervision of the State."
As to the charge of violating LSA-R.S. 14:69, Receiving Stolen Things, the juvenile judge obviously concluded that appellant did not know or have good reason to believe the ring was stolen. He therefore held correctly that appellant had not violated the criminal statute; an essential element was not proved. In re Glassberg, 230 La. 396, 88 So.2d 707 (1956); State v. Melanson, 259 So.2d 609 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1972).
Issues
The issues thus presented for our determination are: (1) whether appellant was committed to the Department of Corrections, State of Louisiana, on a charge other than that specified by the petition filed against him; and (2) if so, is there a violation of his constitutional or statutory rights which would require that the commitment be set aside.
As to the first issue, a mere reading of the quoted portions of the judgment, the reasons for judgment, and the charge in the petition is sufficient to answer the first issue affirmatively. Appellant was found not to have committed the criminal offense alleging in the petition, but he was committed as being in need of supervision.
We have reflected on the question of whether the appellant was charged with being delinquent or merely in need of supervision, care or rehabilitation under the terms of LSA-R.S. 13:1569. We háve concluded that appellant was in fact charged with delinquency even though it is not clear from the wording of the petition. Significant in this connection is the wording of the petition which refers to a "delinquent act" and which referred to a specific criminal law which was alleged to have been violated. Therefore, we determine that appellant was charged with being delinquent.
The second issue is whether in committing appellant, as being a child in need of supervision for having committed some other offense, the statutory and constitutional rights of the child were violated.
Notice of the specific charges against an accused, whether adult or juvenile, is fundamental to the law of the State of Louisiana and that of the United States. The Louisiana Constitution of 1921 requires an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Article 1, Section 10. Louisiana statutory law requires that a juvenile and his parents be informed of a specific charge against the youth. LSA-R.S. 13:1574, 13:1575. This is in accord with the notions of due process of law as provided by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The United States Supreme Court, speaking of due process, has said:
"It does not allow a hearing to be held in which a youth's freedom and his parents' right to his custody are at stake without giving them timely notice, in advance of the hearing, of the specific issues that they must meet." Application of Gault, supra, 87 S.Ct. 1428 at 1447.
This rule has been recognized in Louisiana. Judge Ellis writing for the First Circuit in In re State in Interest of Hampton, 257 So.2d 459 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1972), summarized the requirement as follows:
. . a juvenile may not be adjudged delinquent unless his guilt of the specific charges against him is shown in accordance with the foregoing principles. That is, a judge may not make a finding of delinquency based on misconduct other than that which is set forth in the petition. This would violate the constitutional right of the Jtivenile to be notified of the charges against him." 257 So.2d 459 at 460.
It is important to note that appellant is only fourteen years of age. Under the terms of his commitment he could be held in an institution until age eighteen, a period of almost four years.
Our Louisiana courts have realized the serious consequences of commitment by a juvenile court. In State in Interest of Ogletree, 244 So.2d 288 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1971), it was declared:
"The requirements of proof must be stringent if severe consequences flow from a finding of delinquency based on this proof. A juvenile should not be subjected to possibility of institutional confinement on proof insufficient to convict him if he were an adult. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970)." 244 So.2d 290.
We find that there was a violation of appellant's rights which requires setting aside the commitment.
Before entering an order in this matter, we must dispose of the application for sus-pensive appeal and we desire to comment on other procedural questions raised either directly or incidentally by the present case.
Motion for Suspensive Appeal
In this case, an application for a suspen-sive appeal was filed with this court. LSA-R.S. 13:1591. However, on inquiry, it was determined that the record had been completed or was virtually complete for purposes for appeal. Therefore, this court directed that the record be transmitted to us forthwith and the matter was immediately set down for hearing. In view of the immediate hearing and the disposition of the matter by this court, the application for a suspensive appeal is now moot.
Other Procedural Issues
There is no question that the judge who committed appellant and the district attorney, as well as counsel for appellant, were motivated by a desire to promote the best interests and welfare of the youth involved and to protect society from delinquent conduct. They are mindful, as is this court, of the mandate of our law which says that juvenile statutes shall be:
". . . construed to the end that each child coming within the jurisdiction of the court shall receive such care, guidance and control, preferably in his own home, as will conduce to the child's welfare and best interests of the state . . LSA-R.S. 13:1592.
To facilitate achievement of these goals, we believe care must be taken in juvenile court proceedings, both to protect the rights of the youths involved and to effectively administer the law. Several of the proper procedural steps have been mentioned in this opinion. We find error only in the commitment on a charge not specified in the petition.
We note with approval the filing of a particularized petition, granting ample opportunity to prepare, affording the right of counsel, and a properly conducted hearing which was reported or recorded for purposes of appeal.
We would have suggested, however, to our esteemed brother of the juvenile court that the proceeding be divided into first, an adjudicatory hearing, and second, a dispositional hearing. There is no reason why these may not be held on the same day one after the other, if appropriate and if the parties are prepared. Cf. In re State in Interest of Collins, 288 So.2d 918 at 920 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1973). To take evidence, however, concerning family history, prior arrests, school situation and the like, while attempting to determine delinquency is to chance error. Many of the matters properly considered on disposition are entirely irrelevant and immaterial on the question of whether a certain criminal statute has been violated. The better procedure, we suggest, is not to take up disposition until after an adjudication of delinquency. The adjudication must be on admissible evidence constituting proof beyond a reasonable doubt. LSA-R.S. 13:1579.1; In re State in Interest of Taylor, 255 So.2d 361 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1971). If the youth is found delinquent, or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, disposition can then be considered. An added advantage of the double hearing (sometimes referred to as "split" or "bifurcated" by legal writers) is that, if the juvenile is found not delinquent, time has not been wasted on dispositional considerations.
Order
It is therefore, ordered, adjudged and decreed that the commitment of appellant, James L. Simon, be and it is hereby annulled, and the Department of Corrections is ordered to discharge him.
Any further proceedings concerning this youth, of course, will be left within the discretion of local authorities.
Commitment annulled and set aside; petition dismissed.
HOOD, J., dissents and assigns written reasons.
. § 69. Receiving stolen things
Receiving stolen things is the intentional procuring, receiving, or concealing of anything of value which has been the subject of any robbery or theft, under circumstances which indicate that the offender knew or had good reason to believe that the thing was the subject of one of these offenses.
Whoever commits the crime of receiving stolen things, when the value of the things is five hundred dollars or more, shall be imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not more than ten years, or may be fined not more than three thousand dollars, or both.
When the value of the stolen things amounts to one hundred dollars or more, but less than a value of five hundred dollars, the offender shall be imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not more than two years, or may be fined not more than two thousand dollars, or both.
When the value of the stolen things amounts to less than one hundred dollars, the offender shall be imprisoned for not more than six months, or may be fined not more than five hundred dollars, or both. If the offender in such eases has been convicted of receiving stolen things two or more times previously, upon any subsequent conviction he shall be imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not more than two years, or may be fined not more than one thousand dollars, or both.
When the offender has committed the crime of receiving stolen things by a number of distinct acts, the aggregate of the amount of the things so received shall determine the grade of the offense.
. The practice of receiving social reports prior to hearing was probably more prevalent prior to the amendment of LSA-R.S. 13:1579.1 which prior to amendment read as follows:
In the hearing of all cases under this Part, involving petitions of juvenile delinquency or neglect, all facts connected therewith and all surrounding circumstances, including the environment and history of the child, together with any character of evidence, including hearsay evidence and opinion evidence which the court, in its discretion, may deem proper, may be admissible, and the testimony of the probation officer assigned to the case shall be admissible.
In 1972 the legislature removed the authorization to receive hearsay, opinion evidence, etc., by amending the statute to read as follows:
The rules of evidence prevailing in proceedings governed by the Code of Civil Procedure shall be applicable to a proceeding to declare a child delinquent, neglected or dependent, in need of supervision, in need of the protection of the state or abandoned; provided, however, no child shall be adjudged to be delinquent in the absence of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that such condition exists.
. Taken from page 2 of the Transcript attached to a Motion for Suspensive Appeal filed in this court on April 29, 1974 and certi-tied by Tim West, Official Court Reporter, 31st Judicial District.
. No problem arose in this case concerning appointment of counsel. The right to counsel and to be provided free counsel, if financial circumstances require, can be explained to the juvenile and his parents on their first appear-anee in court; and such explanation should be made part of the record. The same procedure can be followed concerning the right against self-incrimination. See LSA-K.S. 13:1579, subd. A.