Case Name: GOLDMAN v. HART et al.
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1975-03-06
Citations: 134 Ga. App. 422
Docket Number: 49780
Parties: GOLDMAN v. HART et al.
Judges: Pannell, P. J., Been, P. J., Clark and Marshall, JJ., concur. Bed, C. J., Quillian, Stolz and Webb, JJ., dissent.
Reporter: Georgia Appeals Reports
Volume: 134
Pages: 422–429

Head Matter:
49780.
GOLDMAN v. HART et al.

Opinion:
Evans, Judge.
John A. Goldman, as plaintiff, sued George W. Hart and Willa L. Hart, as owners, and Ethel Lilley Company, as real estate agent, because of a defective house alleged to have been sold by defendants to plaintiff. The lower court sustained a motion to dismiss as to Ethel Lilley Company, defendant. Plaintiff appeals. Held:
1. Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that Mrs. Willibel Duckworth, as agent for the Ethel Lilley Company, represented that the house was in excellent condition generally and there were no problems with the roof, following which plaintiff signed a preliminary contract to purchase, which was to be followed later by a final or "closing" contract. Before the closing contract was signed, both plaintiff and his wife saw patched areas in the ceiling of the house, and called same to the attention of Mrs. Duckworth, who in turn advised plaintiff to inquire about the patched areas of the owners at the time of closing which was to be later during the same day. Plaintiffs complaint also alleged that prior to execution of the closing contract, Mrs. Duckworth advised plaintiff "that any answers she gave concerning the condition of the house were based on information given to her by Mr. and Mrs. Hart," and that "Mr. Hart was a very respected attorney whose integrity could be relied on."
2. Thus, it is made quite plain that before the plaintiff became finally bound by executing the last or "closing" contract, he had personal knowledge that the ceiling had been patched; and that Mrs. Duckworth specifically refused to vouch for the prior statements she had made respecting the house, and told plaintiff that same were based on information given to Mrs. Duckworth by Mr. and Mrs. Hart. She did not specify how much of the information was from Mrs. Hart and how much from Mr. Hart. Mrs. Duckworth did not vouch for Mrs. Hart's reliability, but recommended Mr. Hart as a respected attorney whose integrity could be relied on.
3. Plaintiff contends the preliminary contract bound the parties. If this were correct, it would not be necessary to have a final or "closing" contract. Any knowledge that had come to plaintiffs attention before signing the final or closing contract, which tended to show that the previous representations on which he relied were withdrawn or that he could no longer rely on same, would have been ample justification for his refusing to execute the closing contract. His complaint alleges he had personal knowledge of the patched condition of the roof, which should have excited his attention to determine the exact and true condition of the roof. The law is quite plain in this respect. Code § 37-116. "Notice sufficient to excite attention and put a party on inquiry shall be notice of everything to which it is afterwards found such inquiry might have led. Ignorance of a fact, due to negligence, shall be equivalent to knowledge, in fixing the rights of parties." Therefore, as plaintiff had actual knowledge of the patched condition of the ceiling, this was sufficient to put him on inquiry as to the true condition of the ceiling, and he is chargeable with notice of its exact and true condition prior to signing the final or closing contract. As is held in Griffin v. Griffin, 130 Ga. 527 (2) (61 SE 16): "One can not be said to be deceived by an alleged false representation, when he admits that he had knowledge of its falsity." Also see Cline v. Nelson, 46 Ga. App. 600, 606 (168 SE 70), in which the above authority is cited and approved. And in Kidder & Co. v. Clement A. Evans Co., 111 Ga. App. 484, 490 (142 SE2d 269), it is held that one can not recover for false representations, if by the exercise of ordinary diligence he could have discovered the falsity of the representations. Citing Summerour v. Pappa, 119 Ga. 1, 5 (45 SE 713); Scoggins v. Puckett, 219 Ga. 282 (133 SE2d 17). And in Doanes v. Nalley Chevrolet Co., 105 Ga. App. 846, 848 (125 SE2d 717), it is held: "Misrepresentations are not actionable unless the hearer was justified in relying on them in the exercise of common prudence and diligence."
4. How stands the plaintiff in this case in this regard? His complaint first alleges that he was assured the house was in excellent condition, and there were no problems with the roof, and after which, he alleges, with his own eyes he saw that the ceiling was patched. This should have caused him to make a thorough and complete investigation, which he did not do.
5. The essentials of fraud and deceit, where false representations have been made, are: (1) Defendant made the representations. (2) At the time defendant knew they were false. (3) Defendant made them with intent to deceive. (4) Plaintiff relied on such representations. (5) Plaintiff sustained a loss as a result. See McBurney v. Woodward, 84 Ga. App. 807, 814 (67 SE2d 398), and Brown v. Ragsdale Motor Co., 65 Ga. App. 727 (3) (16 SE2d 176).
What false representation did Mrs. Duckworth make? She told plaintiff before he signed the closing contract that she had no personal knowledge of the house, but her information came from Mr. and Mrs. Hart, the owners. What effort did she make to deceive plaintiff? She told him before the closing to inquire of the owner about the patched areas of the ceiling. Does this show intent to defraud on her part? She stated that Mr. Hart was a respected attorney whose integrity could be relied on. Was this true or false? Is there anything in the record to suggest that Mr. Hart was other than a respected attorney? Is there anything in the record to suggest that Mr. Hart's integrity could not be relied on? Let it be remembered that plaintiffs complaint does not allege that Mr. Hart told Mrs. Duckworth the house and the roof were in good condition; but plaintiff alleges she got this information from Mr. and Mrs. Hart, and it is not alleged that Mrs. Duckworth ever vouched for the integrity of Mrs. Hart. But, be that as it may, here was Mrs. Duckworth, before the closing papers had been signed, telling plaintiff that she, Mrs. Duckworth, had no personal knowledge as to the condition of the house, but that her information came from Mr. and Mrs. Hart, and since plaintiff was evincing interest in the patched ceiling, she admonished him to make inquiry of the seller about the ceiling "at the closing."
Did Mrs. Duckworth do anything to prevent plaintiff from examining the property so he could discover its actual condition? No, the complaint alleges she urged him to make inquiry of the owner, and under such circumstances no actionable fraud is alleged against her. In Fenley v. Moody, 104 Ga. 790, 792 (80 SE 1002), it is held:"... where one purchases land from another, and has an opportunity to examine it, the contract will not be rescinded or set aside, unless there has been some fraud or artifice practiced by the vendor to prevent such examination. . ." (Emphasis supplied.) Holding to the same effect, see Thompson v. Boyce, 84 Ga. 497, 503 (11 SE 353); Stone v. Moore, 75 Ga. 565; Castleberry v. Scandrett, 20 Ga. 242.
In Martin v. North Ga. Lbr. Co., 72 Ga. App. 778, 781 (35 SE2d 270), it is held: ". . . she had at least an equal opportunity with the defendant to find out how much merchantable sawmill timber she had. And where she had such opportunity and failed to avail herself of it, she can not now complain and maintain a suit for damages based on fraud and deceit."
In Millender v. Looper, 82 Ga. App. 563, 569 (61 SE2d 573), it is held: "... 'With equal opportunities for knowing the truth, a party grossly failing to inform himself must take the consequence of his neglect.' "
Thus, it appears that Mrs. Duckworth made no false representation prior to closing, but to the contrary, urged the plaintiff to follow up the lead he already had as to the patched ceiling, and make inquiry of the owner "at the closing."
6. The following findings are authorized in this case, to wit: (a) The allegedly false representations made by Mrs. Duckworth were corrected before plaintiff signed the closing papers, (b) Absolutely no fraudulent intent to deceive was alleged against Mrs. Duckworth, (c) Plaintiff learned of the defective condition of the roof prior to signing the closing papers, and was urged by Mrs. Duckworth to make inquiry respecting same, and yet he signed the closing papers without ever having an examination made of the roof.
Argued October 3, 1974
Decided March 6, 1975
Rehearing denied April 4, 1975
Robert O. Bennett, for appellant.
Hodges, Oliver & Buckworth, W. H. Duckworth, Jr., Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, Glover McGhee, for appellees.
7. Complaint here fails to allege facts which would show fraud on the part of Mrs. Duckworth, who acted as agent for the Ethel Lilley Company. The trial judge properly dismissed the complaint as to that defendant.
Judgment affirmed.
Pannell, P. J., Been, P. J., Clark and Marshall, JJ., concur. Bed, C. J., Quillian, Stolz and Webb, JJ., dissent.