Case Name: Angela Nicole BRYANT, Respondent, v. Charles Edward WALKER, Jr., Appellant
Court: Oregon Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 2003-10-22
Citations: 190 Or. App. 253
Docket Number: 02-01548CV; A118386
Parties: Angela Nicole BRYANT, Respondent, v. Charles Edward WALKER, Jr., Appellant.
Judges: Before Edmonds, Presiding Judge, and Deits, Chief Judge, and Schuman, Judge.
Reporter: Oregon Reports, Court of Appeals
Volume: 190
Pages: 253–267

Head Matter:
Argued and submitted May 14,
affirmed October 22, 2003
Angela Nicole BRYANT, Respondent, v. Charles Edward WALKER, Jr., Appellant.
02-01548CV; A118386
78 P3d 148
Karen M. Oakes argued the cause and filed the brief for appellant.
No appearance for Angela Nicole Bryant.
Before Edmonds, Presiding Judge, and Deits, Chief Judge, and Schuman, Judge.
SCHUMAN, J.
Edmonds, P. J., dissenting.
Deits, C. J., vice Kistler, J., resigned.

Opinion:
SCHUMAN, J.
Petitioner obtained a stalking protective order against respondent based on his repeated contacts with her at her workplace. On appeal, respondent raises a plethora of issues, only one of which was adequately raised below: whether sufficient evidence supported issuance of the order. We do not address the unraised issues. Ailes v. Portland Meadows, Inc., 312 Or 376, 380-82, 823 P2d 956 (1991). We affirm.
The facts, viewed (along with all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them) in the light most favorable to petitioner, Delgado v. Souders, 334 Or 122, 134, 46 P3d 729 (2002), are as follows. In 1997, petitioner began work as a cashier at a large department store in Klamath Falls. She worked there for two years before moving. During that time, she noticed that respondent would enter the store, buy small items such as magazines and cigarettes, and pay for them at her check stand. She also noticed that he would stare at her from various parts of the store, but his behavior did not disturb her during that period.
After a year away from Klamath Falls, petitioner returned to work at the store in September 2000. For the next two years, she noticed respondent visiting the store at least three times a week. On one occasion, he parked his car next to hers as she pulled into the store's lot. Petitioner also once observed respondent drive by her house, but, according to her testimony, she lived on a busy street and was not certain that he saw her. Most of the disturbing contacts, therefore, occurred in the store, where respondent would follow petitioner from aisle to aisle and department to department, staring at her in a fashion that she and a coworker regarded as abnormal, ominous, and sexually suggestive. That conduct made petitioner uncomfortable and frightened, and at some point she asked the store's security personnel to monitor respondent when he was in the store. She also once asked respondent, "What are you looking at?" He responded, "Oh you look nice," to which she replied, "You don't need to stare." Thereafter they did not speak, but he continued to stare and to follow her around the store. On at least one occasion, petitioner asked a coworker to stand by her for reassurance and protection when respondent was nearby. The coworker regarded defendant's conduct toward petitioner as so offensive that, as she testified, she glared at him as if to say, "Have some decency." Further, at some point, petitioner learned from a different coworker that, in 1992, respondent's ex-wife had petitioned for a restraining order against him on the ground that he was abusive and violent.
On April 27, 2002, petitioner contacted Klamath Falls police and described the situation and her concerns. An officer issued respondent an Oregon Uniform Stalking Citation. ORS 163.735. Pursuant to the citation, a show cause hearing was held on April 30 and May 9, 2002. Neither party was represented by counsel. The trial court issued a protective order. Respondent appeals.
Under ORS 163.738(2)(a)(B), petitioner may obtain a stalking protective order (SPO) against a person if the trial court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that:
"(i) The person intentionally, knowingly or recklessly engages in repeated and unwanted contact with the other person or a member of that person's immediate family or household thereby alarming or coercing the other person;
"(ii) It is objectively reasonable for a person in the victim's situation to have been alarmed or coerced by the contact; and
"(iii) The repeated and unwanted contact causes the victim reasonable apprehension regarding the personal safety of the victim or a member of the victim's immediate family or household."
At a minimum, then, to obtain an SPO, petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that respondent had two or more contacts with her; that at least two of these contacts alarmed her; that her alarm was objectively reasonable; that respondent was aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that petitioner did not want those contacts and consciously disregarded that risk; and that the contacts, cumulatively, caused her reasonably to fear for her personal safety. Delgado, 334 Or at 134. Respondent argues that the evidence does not permit a reasonable trier of fact to find by a preponderance of the evidence that these requirements have been met. We disagree.
Abundant evidence supports the finding that repeated contacts occurred; a contact is defined to include "[c]oming into the visual or physical presence of the other person" and "[fiollowing the other person." ORS 163.730(3)(a), (b). Further, corroborated testimony establishes that the contacts alarmed petitioner and caused her to fear for her personal safety. And although petitioner's one spoken exchange with respondent, when she told him to stop staring at her, does not conclusively establish that he knew that further contact would be unwanted, the exchange was surely sufficient to make him aware of a substantial risk that further contact was unwanted.
The closer question is whether petitioner's fear and alarm were "objectively reasonable for a person in [her] situation ." ORS 30.866(l)(b). The significant contacts all occurred in a public place where petitioner was not alone. No overt threats occurred. However, respondent did drive by petitioner's house on one occasion, and, although she could not testify with certainty that he did so intentionally or even that he saw her, that one incident could reasonably have led petitioner to suspect that respondent knew personally identifiable information about her. In addition, she had information that, at some point in the past, respondent's then-wife had accused him of violence. Those facts, in light of the fact that petitioner is a 22-year-old woman, suffice to support the conclusion that her alarm and fear were reasonable. We therefore reject respondent's substantive argument.
As the dissent notes, respondent also argues on appeal that he did not have a constitutionally adequate hearing because the trial court did not allow him to be heard or to cross-examine petitioner. However, respondent did not object in any way to the trial court's conduct of the hearing. Therefore, he did not preserve the alleged procedural error. The dissent argues that we should nonetheless consider respondent's argument because the error is "apparent on the face of the record." ORAP 5.45(1). To be apparent on the face of the record, the error
"must be 'apparent,' i.e., the point must be obvious, not reasonably in dispute; and it must appear 'on the face of the record,' i.e., the reviewing court must not need to go outside the record to identify the error or choose between competing inferences, and the facts constituting the error must be irrefutable."
Ailes, 312 Or at 381-82 (citing State v. Brown, 310 Or 347, 355-56, 800 P2d 259 (1990)).
In the present case, the alleged error is not undis-putable or irrefutable. At the hearing that led to the issuance of the permanent SPO, after petitioner had presented her evidence, the trial court asked respondent, "Okay, what's your response to this, Mr. Walker?" Respondent replied that he was upset that petitioner had informed his employer of the proceedings. In response to a question from the court, he reported that he had obeyed the directive to avoid contact with petitioner. At that point, the court recognized petitioner, who stated that she had "some further evidence." She then presented the court with a copy of the request for a restraining order that respondent's ex-wife had filed in 1992, and also repeated all of the evidence she had already presented, this time in more detail.
When she finished, the following dialogue occurred:
"THE COURT: Anything further?
"MS. BRYANT: No.
"THE COURT: Okay, all right, well I think I have essentially heard enough. I am going to find that Mr. Walker has either intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly made repeated unwanted contact with you and an objectively reasonable person in your position would be alarmed by that contact and the contact has caused you reasonable apprehension regarding your personal safety. Therefore I am going to enter a court protective order."
Respondent's argument on appeal is that the trial court announced its decision without permitting him to present his case. One interpretation of the transcript supports that argument: If the court's question, "Anything further?" was directed solely to petitioner, then there could be merit in respondent's contention. Before a permanent SPO can be entered against a respondent, he must have "an opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses, including [the petitioner], and to present his own evidence." Miller v. Leighty, 158 Or App 218, 222, 973 P2d 920 (1999). However, we are unwilling to conclude on the record before us that the court's question was not directed also at respondent. If that was the case, then he was not deprived of his opportunity to present his case and cross-examine petitioner. He had the opportunity and did not take it. That is at least a permissible inference from the record; therefore, we conclude that the alleged error is not apparent on the face of the record. That being the case, we have no discretion to address it on appeal. Ailes, 312 Or at 381-82.
Affirmed.
"[B]ased on the realities of men's and women's lives, reasonable women are likely to experience fear in situations where reasonable men would not. [I]n our culture, men and women are not similarly situated when it comes to being able to defend and protect themselves from others." Caroline A. Forell and Donna M. Matthews, A Law of Her Own: The Reasonable Woman as a Measure of Man 133 (2000).