Case Name: J. Brailey ODHAM, as Chairman and James A. Acree, Wilmer W. Bassett, Jr., Robert G. Carter, Jackson Logan, Alex G. Shaw and Charlotte Tomlinson, as members, together constituting the Florida Milk Commission; and the Florida Milk Commission, Appellants, v. FOREMOST DAIRIES, INC., a corporation, Appellee
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1961-03-22
Citations: 128 So. 2d 586
Docket Number: No. 30803
Parties: J. Brailey ODHAM, as Chairman and James A. Acree, Wilmer W. Bassett, Jr., Robert G. Carter, Jackson Logan, Alex G. Shaw and Charlotte Tomlinson, as members, together constituting the Florida Milk Commission; and the Florida Milk Commission, Appellants, v. FOREMOST DAIRIES, INC., a corporation, Appellee.
Judges: THOMAS, C. J., TERRELL, THOR-NAL and O’CONNELL, JJ., STURGIS, District Court Judge, and SAULS, Circuit Judge, concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 128
Pages: 586–594

Head Matter:
J. Brailey ODHAM, as Chairman and James A. Acree, Wilmer W. Bassett, Jr., Robert G. Carter, Jackson Logan, Alex G. Shaw and Charlotte Tomlinson, as members, together constituting the Florida Milk Commission; and the Florida Milk Commission, Appellants, v. FOREMOST DAIRIES, INC., a corporation, Appellee.
No. 30803.
Supreme Court of Florida.
March 22, 1961.
Rehearing Denied April 26, 1961.
Winston E. Arnow of Clayton, Arnow, Duncan & Johnston, Gainesville, for appellants.
Bedell, Bedell & Dittmar and Milam, LeMaistre, Ramsay & Martin, Jacksonville, for appellee.

Opinion:
DREW, Justice.
This interlocutory appeal was taken from an order of the trial court denying the motion of appellants for a summary final decree and appointing a special master to hear the cause and make findings on the merits and continuing in effect an injunction theretofore issued by the trial court enjoining appellants from holding a hearing on an order to show cause why appellee's license to sell milk and milk products issued to it by the Commission should not be suspended or revoked pursuant to Chapter 501, Florida Statutes, F.S.A. In the discussion which follows we will refer to the appellants as the Commission and to the appellee as the Distributor.
Jurisdiction
The complaint which initiated these proceedings in the trial court among other things prayed for a construction of Chapter 501, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., and particularly Sections 501.13(3), 501.07 and 501.09 and asserted that certain designated provisions of said statutes violated Section 12 of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of Florida, F.S.A. and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States because such provisions were vague, general, ambiguous, indefinite and uncertain; it asserted that to suspend the Distributor's licenses upon the basis thereof would deprive the plaintiff of its property without due process of law. The question of the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain this appeal, under the provision of the Constitution which authorizes a direct review by certiorari of interlocutory orders or decrees passing upon chancery matters which upon a final decree would be directly appealable to this Court must first be disposed of ; in this case the question is a close one; nevertheless, upon consideration of the record and a careful analysis of the allegations of the complaint, we are satisfied that, in the event this cause reached the stage for the entry of a final decree, and if such decree were rendered upon the complaint as framed, it would inevitably require the trial court to pass directly upon a state statute and conceivably construe a controlling provision of both the federal and State Constitutions. In determining our jurisdiction, therefore, we must find in these cases that "there must be no alternative to the proposition that a directly ap-pealable decree will essentially and beyond all question be the final result of. the proceeding." Indulging such assumption in this instance we reach the conclusion that this appeal is properly before us and that we have jurisdiction to determine the issues presented.
Background of Litigation
An understanding of the issues here requires a brief review of the background of this litigation and other litigation between these same parties arising out of. many of the same statutes and regulations involved here which was recently disposed of by this Court.
On July 31, 19S9, this Court handed down three opinions in three separate cases involving this Distributor and other distributors holding licenses from the Florida Milk Commission. It would unduly burden the record to recite in detail the issues presented in those proceedings and the holding of this Court with reference to such issues. Suffice it to say, many of the propositions urged by the Distributor in the complaint involved in this appeal were involved in one or more of those cases. Rehearing was granted on the -original opinions, the causes were reargued and the per curiam opinions on rehearing in each of. the three cases were filed on June 22, 1960. The net result of the rehearing was to modify the original opinions in only one respect and that was a holding that a portion of Order No. 20-7 of the Milk Commission requiring a showing of cause in addition to the ninety days' notice in order to terminate a previously established course of dealings was invalid and unenforceable. In all other respects the first opinions were adhered to on rehearing. Petitions for rehearing of the per curiam opinions on rehearing were denied July 13, 1960 thus bringing to a close those phases of the litigation involved in the three suits above mentioned.
The complaint in this cause was filed February 19, 1960 by the Distributor. At the time of the filing of the complaint which again presents for decision many of the questions which were finally decided in the three cases above mentioned July 13, 1960, (some five months later) the questions raised in the three cases mentioned above were in the breast of this Court for consideration and had not been finally determined.
. Article V, Section 4(2), Constitution of the State of Florida, provides: "The supreme court may directly review by . certiorari interlocutory orders or decrees passing upon chancery matters which upon a final decree would be directly ap-pealable to the supreme court." F.A.R. Rule 4.2, 31 F.S.A., provides that appeals from interlocutory orders or decrees in equity may be prosecuted in accordance with this rule. The propriety of an interlocutory appeal instead of certiorari to review the subject order is not raised in this case.
. Article V, Section 4, Constitution of the State of Florida, provides for appeals from, trial courts directed to this Court from "final judgments or decrees directly passing upon the validity of a state statute or a federal statute or treaty, or construing a controlling provision of the Florida or federal constitution,
. Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction of Orange County, Fla.1960, 118 So.2d 541, 543.
. Borden Company v. Odham et al., Fla.1959, 121 So.2d 625; Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. Odham et al., Fla.1959, 121 So. 2d 636; National Dairy Products Corporation v. Odham et al., Fla.1959, 121 So. 2d 640.