Case Name: STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DAVID E. RAMSTEAD, Defendant and Appellant
Court: Montana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Montana
Decision Date: 1990-05-25
Citations: 243 Mont. 162
Docket Number: No. 89-412
Parties: STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DAVID E. RAMSTEAD, Defendant and Appellant.
Judges: CHIEF JUSTICE TURNAGE and JUSTICES HARRISON, WEBER and McDONOUGH concur.
Reporter: Montana Reports
Volume: 243
Pages: 162–174

Head Matter:
STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DAVID E. RAMSTEAD, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 89-412.
Submitted on Briefs March 22, 1990.
Decided May 25, 1990.
793 P.2d 802.
Antonia P. Marra, Great Falls, for defendant-appellant.
Marc Racicot, Atty. Gen., Elizabeth S. Baker, Asst. Atty. Gen., Helena, Patrick L. Paul, County Atty., and Steven M. Hudspeth, Deputy County Atty., Great Falls, for plaintiff-respondent.

Opinion:
JUSTICE BARZ
delivered the Opinion of the Court.
David Everrett Ramstead, defendant, was charged on November 2, 1988, with one count of felony theft and one count of misdemeanor theft pursuant to sec. 45-6-301(l)(a), MCA. The case proceeded to trial on March 20, 1989. On March 21, 1989, the jury returned a guilty verdict for each offense charged. Defendant was sentenced to a term of three and one-half years' imprisonment, with six months suspended on the condition that he pay restitution in the amount of $32.43 and that he undergo alcohol and drug counseling. Defendant appeals from his conviction and judgment. We affirm.
The following issues were raised on appeal.
1. Whether the District Court erred in denying defendant's motion to dismiss, in which the defendant asserted that the information charging him with two counts of theft was not supported by probable cause.
2. Whether the District Court properly admitted evidence of defendant's prior criminal conduct.
3. Whether defendant's two theft convictions are supported by sufficient evidence.
4. Whether defendant's felony conviction should be reversed on the ground that the State failed to prove that the sundial's value exceeded $300.
On October 11, 1988, upon returning home from a trip to Wyoming, Charles Hill noticed that his sundial was missing from the front yard of his home in Great Falls, Montana. Hill's daughter, who had been checking on the house while her parents were gone, testified that the sundial was in place in the yard on the evening of October 10, 1988. Hill reported the theft on October 12, 1988.
The sundial was subsequently recovered by a Great Falls city police officer at Carl Weissman and Sons' recycling business in Great Falls. It was then discovered that defendant had sold the sundial to Weissman's at approximately 2:00 p.m. on October 11, 1988. The sundial was constructed of aluminum and had been cast at the former Anaconda foundry in Great Falls in 1972. The sundial, originally designed by Hill, was calibrated and built for the longitude and latitude of Great Falls and kept accurate time. Hill, who had evaluated aluminum items during his employment with the Anaconda Company, estimated the value of the sundial to be $2,000 at the time it was built. He further testified that the sundial presently was worth over $1,000. Jim Rowe, an expert witness on behalf of the State, further testified that he would charge approximately $1,500 to reproduce the sundial today.
On the same day that defendant brought in the sundial to Weissman's to sell — October 11, 1988 — defendant also brought in a piece of stainless steel and sold it at the same time as the sundial. After defendant had left, Weissman's scrap yard manager discovered that the stainless steel item had belonged to Weissman's and had previously been sitting within the fenced yard. Defendant had neither purchased nor been given permission' to take the scrap which he later sold back to Weissman's for approximately $8.00.
Defendant was subsequently convicted by a jury of Count One, a felony charge arising out of theft of the sundial from Charles Hill, and of Count Two, a misdemeanor charge arising out of theft of the stainless steel item from Weissman and Sons. Defendant appeals, raising four issues on appeal.
The first issue raised on appeal is whether the District Court erred in denying defendant's motion to dismiss, in which the defendant asserted that the information charging him with two counts of theft was not supported by probable cause.
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on March 6, 1989, premised on the ground that the affidavit in support of the information failed to show probable cause that the defendant had committed the charged offenses of theft. Defense counsel asserted that the affidavit was deficient on both counts because it alleged only that defendant possessed the items, and that it did not demonstrate that defendant had taken either item from the owners.
Leave to file an information will be granted if it appears from the application that probable cause exists to indicate that an offense has been committed by the defendant. Section 46-11 201(1), MCA. In the affidavit, the State need only recite facts sufficient to indicate a probability that the named defendant committed an offense. Contrary to what defendant infers in his argument, the State does not need to demonstrate a prima facie case at this juncture. State v. Buckingham (Mont. 1989), [240 Mont. 252,] 783 P.2d 1331, 1334, 46 St.Rep. 2102, 2105; State v. Bradford (1984), 210 Mont. 130, 139, 683 P.2d 924, 928-29.
In reviewing an affidavit for a determination of probable cause, a district court may use common sense and draw permissible inferences. State v. Riley (1982), 199 Mont. 413, 423, 649 P.2d 1273, 1278. On appeal, this Court's role is merely to determine whether a district court abused its discretion. Buckingham, 783 P.2d at 1334, 46 St.Rep. at 2105; Bradford, 210 Mont, at 139, 683 P.2d at 929.
The affidavit presented to the District Court in this case contained sufficient factual allegations to support a finding of probable cause as to each charge. With respect to Count One, the affidavit demonstrated that (1) a theft had occurred from the property of Charles Hill; (2) the property taken had a value exceeding $300; and (3) defendant had possession of the stolen property and sold it on the same day that the theft was discovered. With respect to Count Two, the affidavit described that (1) defendant possessed a stainless steel item and obtained money for its sale; (2) the item did not belong to defendant when he sold it; and (3) the item was owned by Carl Weissman and Sons and had been in Weissman's own scrap yard prior to its possession by defendant. In light of the above, the District Court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss.
The second issue raised on appeal is whether the District Court properly admitted evidence of defendant's prior criminal conduct.
On December 23, 1988, the State filed notice that they intended to introduce evidence during trial of a prior crime, a misdemeanor theft, in which defendant had pled guilty. Defendant filed a motion in limine on March 10, 1989 requesting that the prior misdemeanor theft not be allowed into evidence. After a hearing, the District Court denied defendant's motion and allowed the State to introduce evidence of defendant's prior crime of misdemeanor theft.
The evidence that the State introduced regarding the prior misdemeanor theft was that on February 13, 1988, defendant and Tony Lopez sold four aluminum gas tanks to Pacific Hide and Fur, a Great Falls recycling business. The tanks were identified later the same day as having been stolen from Vic Brewer's yard. A subsequent investigation revealed that the tanks had been within the fenced yard area of Brewer's property, and tennis shoe tracks were left in the mud showing that someone had climbed the fence to get to the tanks' location. As a result of the investigation, Tony Lopez and defendant were arrested, and both admitted that they had gone over the fence to get to the tanks. Defendant was charged with felony theft and, pursuant to an agreement with the Cascade County Attorney's office, entered a plea of guilty to a charge of misdemeanor theft. Defendant argues that the admission of the evidence outlined above was improper in light of State v. Just (1979), 184 Mont. 262, 602 P.2d 957.
Evidence that a defendant has committed other crimes is not admissible to prove character in order to show that a defendant acted in conformity therewith. Such evidence is admissible only if it is introduced "as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." Rule 404(b), M.R.Evid.
The four substantive factors that the State must demonstrate in order to introduce evidence of other crimes are that the other crimes are (1) similar in nature; (2) not remote in time; (3) tend to establish a common scheme, plan or system; and (4) that the probative value of the other crimes is not substantially outweighed by their prejudice to defendant. State v. Randall (Mont. 1989), [237 Mont. 271,] 772 P.2d 868, 869-70, 46 St.Rep. 794, 796; Just, 184 Mont. at 269, 602 P.2d at 961. After applying the four factors to the facts of this case, we hold that the District Court did not err in allowing the admission of the February 13, 1988 crime.
In satisfying the similarity of crimes factor, the prior crime does not need to be identical to the crime charged, so long as "sufficient similarity" exists in a defendant's actions (on both occasions. Randall, 772 P.2d at 870, 46 St.Rep. at 797. In this case, defendant's prior crime was strikingly similar to the crimes with which he was charged in the present case. Each involved the theft of recyclable metal products from private property; each resulted in the sale of stolen items by defendant to a Great Falls recycling business for scrap value; each was committed while defendant was in the company of Tony Lopez; and on each occasion defendant claimed that he had "found" the stolen property, although he entered a guilty plea as a result of the first incident. The prior crime introduced by the State in this case involved a very specific instance of theft which was nearly identical to the theft charged. In light of the facts in this case, the first factor, that the crimes must be similar in nature, is satisfied.
The second factor that a court must consider is whether the prior crime is remote in time. As a general rule, remoteness of the prior crime affects the credibility of the evidence and not its admissibility. State v. Eiler (Mont. 1988), [234 Mont. 38,] 762 P.2d 210, 217, 45 St.Rep. 1710, 1718; State v. Doll (1985), 214 Mont. 390, 396, 692 P.2d 473, 476. In the present case, approximately eight months elapsed from the time defendant committed the misdemeanor theft in February and the two thefts that occurred in October of the same year. In light of other cases before this Court, eight months between the crimes is not too remote in time. See State v. Hall (Mont. 1988), [234 Mont. 57,] 761 P.2d 1283, 1285, 45 St.Rep. 1726, 1729 (six months); State v. Stroud (1984), 210 Mont. 58, 71, 683 P.2d 459, 466 (three and one-half years); Eiler, 762 P.2d at 216-17, 45 St.Rep. at 1718 (five years).
The third factor that the State must demonstrate is that the prior crime has a "tendency" to establish a common scheme, plan or system. Eiler, 762 P.2d at 217, 45 St.Rep. at 1719. The prior crime introduced in the present case presented a strong showing of a common scheme, plan or system by defendant. In particular, both incidents were thefts; the items taken on both occasions were aluminum materials that were subsequently brought to a recycling business for their scrap value; and the participants in both incidents were identical. Defendant's prior theft of aluminum materials tended to show a common scheme by defendant to procure items of recyclable value on his salvaging trips even if it required him to enter private property. The State successfully demonstrated the third factor.
The final factor the State must demonstrate before a court allows introduction of prior crimes into evidence is that the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the prejudice flowing to the defendant. This Court has held that satisfaction of the first three Just factors, as outlined above, establishes the probative value of the prior crime evidence. State v. Keefe (Mont. 1988), [232 Mont. 258,] 759 P.2d 128, 135, 45 St.Rep. 1034, 1042. This Court in Just then also established three procedural requirements which, if satisfied, indicates that the prejudicial effect the evidence may present for the defendant is less likely to occur. Eiler, 762 P.2d at 218, 45 St.Rep. at 1720. Those requirements are:
"1. notice to the defendant prior to trial that evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts will be introduced;
"2. an admonition by the judge to the jury when the evidence is introduced that it is admitted solely for one or more of the accepted purposes stated in Rule 404(b); and
"3. a cautionary jury instruction to the same effect, providing in unequivocal terms that the evidence is admitted for the purpose earlier stated and not to try and convict the defendant for prior wrongful conduct. ' '
Randall, 772 P.2d at 871, 46 St.Rep. at 789 (quoting Doll, 214 Mont. at 395, 692 P.2d at 475-76).
In accordance with these requirements, the State filed notice on December 23, 1988, nearly three months prior to trial, that it intended to offer evidence of the February 1988 theft and defendant's subsequent plea of guilty. The District Court gave a cautionary instruction to the jury at least three times during trial — immediately prior to the introduction of any evidence regarding the February 13, 1988 theft, and at two other times during the course of the trial. At the end of the trial and in conjunction with the other jury instructions, the court gave the same cautionary instruction one last time. The jury was instructed as follows:
"The State has offered evidence that the defendant at another time engaged in other crimes. That evidence was not admitted to prove the character of the defendant in order to show he acted in conformity therewith. The only purpose of admitting that evidence was to show knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. You may not use that evidence for any other purpose.
' 'The defendant is not being tried for that other crime. He may not be convicted for any other offense than that charged in this case. For the jury to convict the defendant of any other offense than that charged in this case may result in unjust double punishment of the defendant. ' '
This instruction unequivocally apprised the jury that the evidence was to be considered only for the purposes permitted by Rule 404(b).
In addition, the February 13, 1988 crime tended to show, contrary to defendant's assertions, that he "actively and knowingly participated" in the crime with which he was charged. Defendant testified that he found the sundial and that he would not have gone onto private property to retrieve it. Thus, the critical element in dispute was defendant's state of mind at the time he took the property. Evidence that he had entered private property on another occasion for the purpose of taking recyclable materials contradicted defendant's testimony and tended to show that he acted purposely and knowingly when he took the sundial and that it was not by accident or as the result of a mistaken belief that the sundial was abandoned.
Given the rigid adherence to the Just procedures and the satisfaction of the first three Just factors in this case, we hold that the probative value of the February 13, 1988 crime was not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. The admission of the evidence was a proper exercise of the District Court's discretion.
The third issue raised on appeal is whether defendant's two theft convictions are supported by sufficient evidence.
Defendant argues that his conviction on both counts should be reversed because insufficient evidence existed to support a guilty verdict. Defendant argues that the circumstantial evidence was inconsistent with the mental state required to commit the charged offenses.
The direct evidence at trial showed that defendant obtained the sundial from Hill's property and that he sold it a short time later to Weissman's. The sundial had been positioned in its customary location the evening before defendant obtained it. The evidence further showed that defendant obtained a stainless steel item which had earlier been in the scrap yard at Weissman's, and sold that item back to Weissman's at the time he sold the sundial. Both of the items were shown to have been taken from the owners without permission. In addition to this direct evidence, the circumstantial evidence, including defendant's prior acts, tended to show that defendant acted with the requisite mental state when he took the items. In particular, defendant testified that he had "found" the sundial and the stainless steel item, as well as the gas tanks that belonged to Vic Brewer. The evidence, however, demonstrated that the gas tanks were stolen. Defendant himself had previously admitted climbing Brewer's fence to get to the tanks. This evidence cast doubt on the credibility of defendant's story as to the location of the sundial and the stainless steel item. When combining both the direct and circumstantial evidence, the evidence was sufficient far a trier of fact to find all elements of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt.
This Court has recognized that "possession of stolen property, accompanied by other incriminating circumstances, and false or unreasonable explanation by the suspect is sufficient to sustain a conviction ." State v. Cox (1987), 226 Mont. 111, 114, 733 P.2d 1307, 1309. Applying these standards to the present case, and in view of the evidence discussed above, we hold that sufficient evidence exists to support the conclusion that defendant had the purpose and knowledge to commit the two thefts with which he was charged.
The last issue raised on appeal is whether defendant's felony conviction should be reversed on the ground that the State failed to prove that the sundial's value exceeded $300.
When conflicting evidence of value is presented, it is "solely within the province of the jury to weigh these figures and consider the weight to be given to the testimony of each of the experts." State v. Dess (1984), 207 Mont. 468, 473, 674 P.2d 501, 505. Accord State v. Milhoan (1986), 224 Mont. 505, 510, 730 P.2d 1170, 1173. Ample evidence was before the jury from which it could find that the value of the sundial exceeded $300. Hill, who had designed the plans for the sundial and had experience in valuing aluminum products, estimated the value of the sundial at $2,000 when made, and testified that the sundial presently was worth at least $1,000. His testimony was corroborated by Jim Rowe, an expert witness, who testified that the sundial was unique and that he would charge approximately $1,500 to produce it today, although it could be worth even more if sold on a retail basis. The bases for Rowe's conclusion were fully explained to the jury, including the process for creating a similar sundial and the hours required for production. This testimony was contradicted only by defense witness Bill Rogne, who testified that the sundial was worth only $250. Rogne's opinion was called into question during cross-examination, and it appeared that he refused to place a value on the sundial based upon what it would cost to replace it. In view of the evidence presented, it was within the juiy's province to find that the value of the sundial exceeded $300.
This Court will not consider disputed questions of fact on appeal, nor will it weigh the credibility of the witnesses or their testimony. State v. Crumley (1986), 223 Mont. 224, 226, 725 P.2d 214, 216. Further, even if the evidence presented by defendant was consistent with innocent conduct, this Court has held that such factual discrepancies are matters properly resolved by the jury. State v. Cain (1986), 221 Mont. 318, 321, 718 P.2d 654, 657.
Affirmed.
CHIEF JUSTICE TURNAGE and JUSTICES HARRISON, WEBER and McDONOUGH concur.