Case Name: ROSECRANCE v. ROSECRANCE
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1901-07-02
Citations: 127 Mich. 322
Docket Number: 
Parties: ROSECRANCE v. ROSECRANCE.
Judges: The other Justices concurred
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 127
Pages: 322–323

Head Matter:
ROSECRANCE v. ROSECRANCE.
1. Divorce—Evidence—Citing Appearance op Dependant.
Under Circuit Court Rule No. 25, adopted by virtue of 1 Comp. Laws, § 211, the circuit judge has authority to require the defendant in a,proeonfesso divorce caseto appearand testify.
2. Same—Declarations op Parties.
3 Comp. Laws, § 8652, providing that no decree of divorce shall be granted solely on the declarations of the parties, refers to confessions, and not to the testimony of a party as a witness.
3. Chancery Appeal—Review—Credibility op Witnesses.
A certification by the circuit judge of his disbelief in the testimony adduced by a party to a chancery cause, notwithstanding the advantage possessed by such judge in seeing and hearing th^Mfcpesses, will not conclude the Supreme Court from reviewql^he case on the merits.
Appeal from Ingham; Wiest, J.
Submitted April 5, 1901.
Decided July 2, 1901.
Bill by Stella Rosecrance against Scott Rosecrance for a divorce. From a decree dismissing the bill, complainant appeals.
Reversed.
(x. Edward Foerster, for complainant.

Opinion:
Hooker, J.
The complainant has appealed from a decree denying her a divorce in a pro confesso case. The important testimony was given by herself, and her husband, the defendant, was called by order of the court. A decree was denied by the court upon two grounds:
First. That, " considering complainant's testimony, and viewing the manner in which she gave it, I cannot say that it satisfies me clearly, and I decline to make a judicial determination that it proves the cause for divorce alleged in the bill."
Second. " The complainant has not made a case. The statute provides (section 8652, 3 Comp. Laws), that'no decree of divorce shall be made solely on the declarations of the parties, but the court shall require other evidence of the facts alleged in the bill for that purpose; but either party may, if he or she elect, testify in relation to such facts.' If the testimony of the complainant had been clear and satisfactory, I should still hesitate, until it was supported by other evidence of the facts alleged, to grant a decree."
We think the court had authority to require the husband to appear and testify, under the statute (section 211, 1 Comp. Laws).
We think the court's construction of section 8652 erroneous. The declarations there referred to are confessions, as contradistinguished from testimony as a witness.
While the conscience of the court is not to yield to testimony of a witness whom he disbelieves, and while we recognize the advantage of seeing and heajjj^rthe witness, and the presumption arising therefrom, tS^court is not concluded by the certification of disbelief, and by the presumption, from reviewing a case upon the merits. In the present case we are of the opinion that a divorce should have been granted upon the proofs.
The decree is reversed, and a decree of divorce granted, with costs of both courts.
The other Justices concurred