Case Name: Betty J. LaRUE v. Walter F. LaRUE
Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
Jurisdiction: West Virginia
Decision Date: 1983-05-25
Citations: 172 W. Va. 158
Docket Number: No. 15578
Parties: Betty J. LaRUE v. Walter F. LaRUE.
Judges: 
Reporter: West Virginia Supreme Court
Volume: 172
Pages: 158–183

Head Matter:
304 S.E.2d 312
Betty J. LaRUE v. Walter F. LaRUE.
No. 15578.
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
May 25, 1983.
Concurring Opinion May 27, 1983.
Martorella & Martorella and Majorie Martorella, Huntington, Susan P. Moser, Wheeling, for appellant.
Bailey, Byrum & Vieweg and George B. Vieweg, III, Wheeling, for appellee.
Marsha Levick, Judith I. Avner, Anne E. Simon, New York City, for amicus curiae— The National Organization for Women Legal Defense and Education Fund and the National Center on Women and Family Law.

Opinion:
MILLER, Justice:
In this appeal from a final divorce action, we are asked to recognize the doctrine of equitable distribution of marital property. The trial court essentially held that the wife was not entitled to her claim for the equitable distribution of the marital assets. We conclude that the trial court erred.
The parties were married in 1950, and their marriage was a traditional one in the sense that Mr. LaRue exclusively handled the family's financial affairs and Mrs. La-Rue was mainly a homemaker. Their gross income in the last year of marriage, during which Mrs. LaRue did not work, was $43,000. Out of thirty years of marriage, Mrs. LaRue was employed only in the early years of the marriage, and her gross earnings over seven years totaled $51,000. Evidence was presented that Mr. LaRue encouraged his spouse to be a housewife and homemaker, and accordingly she raised two children, cared for the house and the comfort of her family, and entertained her husband's business associates.
A divorce was granted to the parties in March 1980, based on irreconcilable differences, following a period of eight to ten years of problems. The trial court found inequitable conduct on both sides, but concluded that Mr. LaRue's abusive conduct "far outweighed" that of his wife. As the parties' two children were grown, the divorce order awarded Mrs. LaRue only alimony and an allowance for health insurance. The divorce order did not provide for any distribution of the marital assets, and the parties were unable to agree on any division except as to some items of personal property. The appellant petitioned the circuit court to award her a one-half interest in all personal property owned by Mr. LaRue, an undivided one-half interest in all real estate owned by him, a conveyance to her of all real and personal property in the name of and under the control of Mr. La-Rue, and a reservation for Mrs. LaRue of a dower interest in the real property owned by Mr. LaRue. Mrs. LaRue's petition was denied, on the grounds that she had failed to carry the burden of proving either that a contract existed that marital assets were to be equally owned, or that any of her earnings were invested in any property titled in Mr. LaRue's name. The court found no grounds to establish a constructive trust in favor of Mrs. LaRue.
Early in the marriage, the parties had owned a home located on East Cove Avenue in Wheeling. The home, which had been titled in both names jointly, was sold for approximately $15,000 in 1962, and the proceeds were reinvested in another home, located on Elm Crest Drive in Wheeling. Prior to January 1972, that home was owned in the name of Mrs. LaRue only. At that time, Mr. LaRue had Mrs. LaRue sign a deed transferring title to his name only. The appellant did not recall signing the deed, but stated that she frequently signed papers at her husband's request without knowing their nature. The deed was signed at about the time when the marriage began to deteriorate, but was not recorded until November 1979, after the parties separated. Prior to bringing her petition for a division of the marital property, Mrs. LaRue sued to set aside the transfer of the home, but lost because the trial court concluded that she was unable to show fraud or mistake in the transfer.
I.
The concept of equitable distribution of marital property has achieved an almost universal acceptance in the divorce laws of the various states. It originated when courts applied their equitable powers to secure equitable rights for one spouse in property titled or held by the other spouse based on the claim that a resulting or constructive trust should be impressed on the property. The basis for such a claim was that the spouse seeking an interest in the property had made a substantial economic contribution toward the acquisition of the property. Consequently, under the principles of unjust enrichment, it would be unfair to permit the spouse with title or possession to keep the entire interest. This general rule is set out in 27B C.J.S. Divorce § 293:
"Where a wife has made a material contribution to the husband's acquisition of property during coverture, she acquires a special equity in the property so accumulated which equity entitles her, on divorce, to an award in satisfaction thereof; and it is not a necessary prerequisite that the wife show that she has contributed by funds or efforts to the acquiring of the specific property awarded to her, but division may be had even though the wife has not contributed funds or efforts to the acquisition of the specific property awarded to her." (Footnotes omitted)
Judicial decisions involving these equitable principles have more recently been supplemented and enhanced by various forms of legislative enactments. In the eight states having community property statutes, all property acquired after the marriage is deemed to be owned jointly and upon its dissolution or annulment the parties are generally entitled to share equally in it.
A more common statute, which a majority of states have enacted, permits the court upon the dissolution of a marriage to make an equitable distribution of the marital property based upon a detailed list of factors. A third category of statutes, used in a few states is more general and provides that an equitable distribution of property may be made by the court without specifying any guidelines. Finally, in those few jurisdictions that have no specific statute on equitable distribution, the courts have continued to evolve their concepts of equitable distribution with a broad interpretation of traditional equity principles. We, along with Florida, Mississippi, and South Carolina, are in this category.
South Carolina has judicially created a special equity doctrine. Based on earlier cases, the doctrine is defined in Burgess v. Burgess, 277 S.C. 283, 286 S.E.2d 142, 143 (1982), as:
"A wife is entitled to a special equity in the husband's property acquired during coverture where the wife has made a material contribution to the acquisition of the property. Simmons v. Simmons, 275 S.C. 41, 267 S.E.2d 427 (1980); Wilson v. Wilson, 270 S.C. 216, 241 S.E.2d 566 (1978)."
Burgess involved a wife who had worked during a portion of her marriage and had contributed her earnings to the support of the family. In Parrott v. Parrott, 292 S.E.2d 182 (S.C.1982), a homemaker wife was involved and the court enlarged its definition of special equity by stating:
"Also, where a spouse has made 'material contributions' of industry and labor during marriage to acquisition of property, a special equity or equitable interest favoring that party can be found." Id. at 183.
The court further held:
"The showing made in the instant case persuades us that a third exception to the rule of title should be recognized in South Carolina: where, as here, one spouse has foregone career opportunities at the behest of the primary wage-earning spouse, and throughout a long marriage has remained in the home to rear children and provide a suitable environment for the family, the homemaker spouse shall have upon divorce an equitable interest in real property acquired by the wage-earner spouse during the marriage." Id. at 184.
Thus, taken together, Burgess, supra, and Parrott, supra, reflect that through its special equity doctrine, South Carolina's Supreme Court extends to a spouse the right to recover economic contributions and also homemaking contributions.
The South Carolina Court's evolution of its special equity doctrine can be traced to Florida where the Florida Court held that a wife's economic contributions could give rise to a special equity in her husband's property upon divorce. E.g., Heath v. Heath, 103 Fla. 1071, 138 So. 796 (1932); Carlton v. Carlton, 78 Fla. 252, 83 So. 87 (1919). Originally, Florida took the position that a special equity did not arise for homemaker contributions. Eakin v. Ea kin, 99 So.2d 854 (Fla.1958); Heath v. Heath, supra. This result has now been changed in Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197 (Fla.1980), where the court authorized lump-sum alimony, based on the wife's contribution to the marriage as a homemaker, in addition to periodic alimony payments.
Mississippi has also recognized, through the device of a lump-sum alimony award in addition to periodic alimony payments, that a wife may receive an amount of money from her husband's assets to compensate her not only for economic contributions made but also for homemaker services. E.g., Reeves v. Reeves, 410 So.2d 1300 (Miss.1982); Clark v. Clark, 293 So.2d 447 (Miss.1974). In Jenkins v. Jenkins, 278 So.2d 446 (Miss.1973), the court made this statement as to a lump-sum alimony award:
"It appears to us that a lump-sum award in conjunction with an award of monthly alimony would have been proper in this case. As heretofore stated, this couple was married for approximately twenty-four years. At the beginning of the marriage they had no assets and the husband made a salary of $85 per week. At the time of the divorce the appellee admitted assets of $800,000. The appellant's worth was meager by comparison. It seems to us in a case such as this where the wife has contributed to the accumulation of the property of her husband, doing her part as a housewife, it would not be improper that she be allowed a reasonable amount as lump-sum alimony on retrial." 278 So.2d at 449.
Thus, it would appear that in virtually every state either by way of express statute or through court interpretation, some mechanism exists to permit a court in granting a final divorce to provide the wife with some distribution for her homemaker and economic contributions.
Our law in this area has not been static. For example in Dyer v. Tsapis, 162 W.Va. 289, 249 S.E.2d 509 (1978), we recognized the changing view of divorce as manifested by the legislative adoption of no-fault grounds for divorce:
"Now, increasingly, divorces are awarded on no-fault grounds and awards of alimony, like contract damages, increasingly emphasize restitution to the exclusion of punishment. The law which once saw marriage as a sacrament now conceptualizes it as roughly analogous to a business partnership." 162 W.Va. at 291-292, 249 S.E.2d at 511. (Footnotes omitted)
In Patterson v. Patterson, 167 W.Va. 1, 277 S.E.2d 709 (1981), we fashioned a constructive trust theory, which is essentially a special equity doctrine. Our holding secured the wife's interest in property toward which she had made a material economic contribution. In Syllabus Point 1, we stated:
"Under Rule 18, W.Va.R.C.P. an action to impress a constructive trust upon property acquired through joint funds or joint efforts during coverture but titled in the name of one spouse only may be joined as an independent count in a divorce complaint, and where all of the requirements for a court of equity to declare a constructive trust exist, the court may impress a trust upon real property as part of its overall relief in a divorce proceeding."
Patterson traced the historical antecedents of this rule through our earlier cases, most notably Philips v. Philips, 106 W.Va. 105, 144 S.E. 875 (1928), where we said in Syllabus Point 1:
"Where decree of annulment or dissolution of marriage is awarded, or divorce is granted either from bed and board or from the bonds of matrimony, the court has power under section 11, Chapter 64, Code [1923], to decree further concerning the estate of either or both of the parties acquired during marriage, as the court may deem expedient, including an equitable division thereof."
Although this Court in Selvy v. Selvy, 115 W.Va. 338, 177 S.E. 437 (1934), viewed the 1931 revision of W.Va.Code, 48-2-15, to be more restrictive than the predecessor statute discussed in Philips, supra, it did so without taking into account that, in the 1931 Code revision, a new section, W.Va. Code, 48-2-19, was added to compensate for the changes made in W.Va.Code, 48-2-15 (1931). Even the single Syllabus of Selvy v. Selvy, supra, recognized that a divorce court still had its traditional equitable powers over the estate of the parties if such powers were invoked by proper pleadings:
"In a suit for divorce under 48-2-15, Code, a circuit court has no jurisdiction to deal with the estates of the parties, save as it may be necessary to do so in order to make effectual its decree concerning the maintenance of the parties, or either of them, or the care and custody, education, and maintenance of minor children. In order to sustain a decree that plainly exceeds that purpose in dealing with the estates of the parties, the allegations of the bill of complaint must be such as to justify the court in dealing with such estates on some ground invoking the general equity powers of the court, in addition to those allegations justifying its jurisdiction for divorce." (Emphasis added)
Moreover, as Patterson also pointed out, our sanctioning of equitable concepts in divorce actions had extended to the award of the physical possession of a jointly-owned home as an incident to the award of custody of minor children. Murredu v. Murredu, 160 W.Va. 610, 236 S.E.2d 452 (1977). In Marshall v. Marshall, 166 W.Va. 304, 273 S.E.2d 360 (1981), we recognized that a fiduciary relationship existed between husband and wife in regard to their property transactions with each other and inequitable conduct on the part of one in obtaining property from the other would result in an order to reconvey such property. In Pierce v. Pierce, 166 W.Va. 389, 274 S.E.2d 514, 516 (1981), we remanded the case to permit the wife "to petition under W.Va. Code, 48-2-21 for the purpose of establishing an equitable ownership interest in the mobile home."
II.
Patterson, supra, spoke in terms of a constructive trust, and this theory encompasses transfers that are induced by fraud, duress, undue influence, and mistake, which are not necessary elements for the right to equitable distribution on divorce. Moreover, a constructive trust theory can be brought at any time, whereas the right to equitable distribution arises only as an incident to a final divorce. Equitable distribution rests upon concepts of unjust enrichment which was the focal point in Patterson:
"It is apparent from the law of trusts that the purpose of a constructive trust is to redress unjust enrichment resulting from an equitable wrong. The extent of the property subjected to the trust should be equal to the extent of unjust enrichment. That is, a wife should be entitled to a trust in property to the extent that the husband is unjustly enriched by her contribution." 167 W.Va. at 12-13, 277 S.E.2d at 716.
Thus, we believe that Patterson's principles are compatible with the doctrine of equitable distribution, which permits a spouse, who has made a material economic contribution toward the acquisition of property which is titled in the name of or under the control of the other spouse, to claim an equitable interest in such property in a proceeding seeking a divorce. Furthermore, because these are economic contributions, the right to claim such equitable relief is not barred because the party seeking them may be found at fault in the divorce action. We view these tangible economic contributions to be sufficiently akin to a property interest to justify the court's returning the contribution to the claiming party regardless of fault.
In determining an appropriate amount for equitable distribution where there have been economic contributions made (other than homemaker services), it is necessary to consider the respective economic contributions made by both parties during the marriage as weighed against the net assets that are available at the time of the divorce. The term "net assets" does not include assets acquired by a party prior to the marriage, or obtained during the marriage by way of inheritance or gifts from third parties. In computing the value of any net asset, the indebtedness owed against such asset should ordinarily be deducted from its fair market value.
In an appropriate case, the court in calculating the amount of equitable distribution arising from economic contributions may take into account the value of gifts made to the spouse seeking equitable contribution by the other spouse.
Finally, we recognize that economic contributions are similar to property interests. A court may, in an appropriate case, transfer title to both real and personal property to satisfy an award for economic equitable distribution. We believe that such an interest falls within the purview of W.Va.Code, 48-2-21 (1969), which authorizes the transfer of property "in the possession, or under the control, or in the name, of the other . as in other cases of chancery." Where a spouse has retained possession or control of the other spouse's economic contribution, it is only equitable that it be transferred back upon the dissolution of the marriage.
III.
A related area involving equitable distribution is that of homemaker services. Although this point was not at issue in Patterson, supra, the matter was addressed in part of Syllabus Point 3:
"Traditional domestic services such as those as wife, mother, and housekeeper and incidental contributions to a husband's business never alone give rise to grounds for impressing the property of the husband with a trust."
It is possible to distinguish this language by pointing out that it is cast in terms of a constructive trust which is not coextensive with the doctrine of equitable distribution. However, candor compels us to conclude that any attempt to distinguish this language would be at best semantical and not substantive. A more forthright course would be to acknowledge that this language in Patterson, supra, was too broad and absolute. To the extent that it absolutely forbids consideration of homemaker services in the equitable distribution of marital assets upon a divorce, it is overruled.
Homemaker services, however, present a more complex problem than economic contributions. In the traditional view of marriage, the husband's obligation was to support his wife and she in turn rendered domestic or homemaker services. The theory of alimony is based upon the husband's legal obligation to support his wife, and thus upon the dissolution of a marriage where she was not at fault, the wife is entitled to alimony. In State ex rel. Cecil v. Knapp, 143 W.Va. 896, 904, 105 S.E.2d 569, 574 (1958), we said:
"Though the power of courts of equity to award alimony is derived from statute it did not originate in any statute but stems from the legal obligation of the husband, incident to the marriage state, to maintain his wife in a manner suited to his means and social position.... Alimony is a right of the wife which she may forfeit by her misconduct; and when she is the offender she can not have an award of alimony in a decree of divorce in favor of her husband, in the absence of a statute which authorizes such award." (Citations omitted)
See also In Re: Estate of Nicholas, 144 W.Va. 116, 107 S.E.2d 53 (1959); Snyder v. Lane, 135 W.Va. 887, 65 S.E.2d 483 (1951); W.Va.Code, 48-2-28; W.Va.Code, 48-3-24. Thus, to some extent, it may be argued that homemaker services were the consideration for the husband's traditional obligation to support his wife. There is, however, an increasing recognition that homemaker services cannot be viewed as a mere adjunct to the husband's duty of support.
We have previously cited South Carolina's use of the doctrine of equitable distribution in Parrott v. Parrott, supra, where the homemaker wife was given "an equitable interest in real property acquired by the wage-earner spouse during the marriage." 292 S.E.2d at 184. This rule is analogous to the statement made in note 1 of Patterson, supra, where we said:
"To the extent that Murredu limits the authority to grant exclusive possession of the home property to one spouse incident to obtaining custody as suggested in State ex rel. Collins v. Muntzing, 151 W.Va. 843, 157 S.E.2d 16 (1967) and State ex rel. Hammond v. Worrell, 144 W.Va. 83, 106 S.E.2d 521 (1958), we expressly state that a spouse may receive a life estate subject to remarriage in the home property regardless of any custody of children. As we stated in Dyer v. Tsapis, 162 W.Va. 289, 249 S.E.2d 509, (1978) the spouse who is no longer young, who has no occupational skills, and who has devoted time to his or her role as a homemaker has a greater claim to an award of alimony. Therefore, we wish to ensure that a trial court be empowered to award a life estate to a deserving spouse, subject to remarriage."
Several other considerations are relevant to an award based on homemaker services. First, it is not limited to the giving of a possessory interest in real estate. A court may determine that a lump-sum monetary amount should be awarded. Second, the concept of homemaker services is not to be measured by some mechanical formula, but instead rests on a showing that the homemaker has contributed to the economic well-being of the family unit through the performance of the myriad of household and child-rearing tasks which make up the term "homemaker services."
In valuing this service, the length of the marriage is an important factor and consideration should be given to the quality of the services. For example, a homemaker who, over the course of the marriage, has been frugal in the handling of homemaker expenditures and has thereby enhanced the family assets is entitled to a more equitable return than one who has been extravagant. Some consideration should also be given to the age, health, and skills of the homemaker as well as the amount of independent assets possessed.
Finally, we believe that fault is a factor to consider when valuing homemaker services even though it is not a factor where economic contributions have been made. The reason for considering fault is that, historically, homemaker services were the wife's marital contribution upon which rested the husband's countervailing support obligation and his duty to pay alimony if the marriage was dissolved without fault on the wife's part.
We do not suggest that fault on the wife's part is an absolute bar to her receiving some equitable distribution for homemaker services. Where the divorce is granted on a no-fault ground, such as voluntary separation or irreconcilable differences, W.Va.Code, 48-2-4(a)(7) and (10), we have held that fault and inequitable conduct are not a bar to an award of alimony. F.C. v. I.V.C., 171 W.Va. 458, 300 S.E.2d 99 (1982); Haynes v. Haynes, 164 W.Va. 426, 264 S.E.2d 474 (1980). Such holdings are obviously applicable to an equitable distribution for homemaker services. Moreover, we do not foreclose the trial court from giving some equitable distribution for homemaker services even where traditional fault grounds exist, where an otherwise compelling case for equitable distribution for homemaker services can be shown.
Just as in the economic contribution area, a court may consider the value of any gifts given to the homemaker spouse during the marriage by the other spouse. The value of homemaker services must also be considered in relation to the net assets available at the time of the divorce and in light of the alimony award. Finally, we do not consider an award for equitable distribution based on homemaker services to give rise to the right to have transfer made of the legal title to real estate. In this respect, equitable distribution for homemaker services differs from the theory of an equitable distribution award based on economic contributions because in the former we considered the tangible economic contributions to be in the nature of a property interest sufficient to come within W.Va.Code, 48-2-21. When a monetary award for homemaker services is decreed, it has the same characteristics as a judgment. Moreover, since homemaker services have some correlation to the right to alimony, the award is entitled to the lien provisions of W.Va.Code, 48-2-17.
IV.
Several procedural comments are in order. First, a claim for equitable distribution based on either economic contributions or homemaker services must be specifically asserted in the divorce action. In the absence of such a claim, the court need not proceed to consider the issue. We have traditionally required a particular assertion of property claims in a divorce action. Patterson v. Patterson, supra; Murredu v. Murredu, supra; Wood v. Wood, supra.
Second, claims for equitable distribution may be settled and foreclosed by property settlement agreements fairly negotiated by the parties as in the case of other property settlement agreements. See In re Estate of Hereford, 162 W.Va. 477, 250 S.E.2d 45 (1978). Courts in other jurisdictions that recognize a right of equitable distribution have rather uniformly adopted this rule. See In re Marriage of Olsher, 78 Ill.App.3d 627, 34 Ill.Dec. 32, 397 N.E.2d 488 (1979); Carlsen v. Carlsen, 72 N.J. 363, 371 A.2d 8 (1977); Peterson v. Peterson, 313 N.W.2d 743 (N.D.1981); In re McDonnal and McDonnal, 293 Or. 772, 652 P.2d 1247 (1982); Laird v. Laird, 597 P.2d 463 (Wyo.1979).
Third, the rights of equitable distribution do not alter our existing law with regard to alimony and child support.
Finally, we address the applicability of the doctrine of equitable distribution to pending cases. In Bradley v. Appalachian Power Company, 163 W.Va. 332, 256 S.E.2d 879 (1979), we discussed at some length the concept of retroactivity in a civil case and concluded in Syllabus Point 5:
"In determining whether to extend full retroactivity, the following factors are to be considered: First, the nature of the substantive issue overruled must be determined. If the issue involves a traditionally settled area of law, such as contracts or property as distinguished from torts, and the new rule was not clearly foreshadowed, then retroactivity is less justified. Second, where the overruled decision deals with procedural law rather than substantive, retroactivity ordinarily will be more readily accorded. Third, common law decisions, when overruled, may result in the overruling decision being given retroactive effect, since the substantive issue usually has a narrower impact and is likely to involve fewer parties. Fourth, where, on the other hand, substantial public issues are involved, arising from statutory or constitutional interpretations that represent a clear departure from prior precedent, prospective application will ordinarily be favored. Fifth, the more radically the new decision departs from previous substantive law, the greater the need for limiting retroac-tivity. Finally, this Court will also look to the precedent of other courts which have determined the retroactive/prospective question in the same area of the law in their overruling decision."
See also Sitzes v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 169 W.Va. 698, 289 S.E.2d 679 (1982); Bond v. City of Huntington, 166 W.Va. 581, 276 S.E.2d 539 (1981); Ables v. Mooney, 164 W.Va. 19, 264 S.E.2d 424 (1979).
Because equitable distribution based on economic contributions does not involve any substantial departure from our prior law which is contained in Patterson and related cases, it is available in pending cases where the issue is specifically asserted. However, the right to an equitable distribution based on homemaker services is a new rule.
In Bradley, we dealt with the establishment of comparative negligence and overruled the common law concept of contributory negligence, and gave full retroactivity to the doctrine of comparative negligence. We recognized that tort laws are subject to continual judicial and legislative changes. Furthermore, because of the rather short statute of limitation period for filing tort actions, the beneficiaries of the new decision were a rather limited class.
Divorce law, however, is a rather settled area of law, and there was no clear foreshadowing that the right to homemaker services could be recovered other than a general broadening of equitable principles in divorce actions. Pierce v. Pierce, supra, Marshall v. Marshall, supra; McKinney v. Kingdon, 162 W.Va. 319, 251 S.E.2d 216 (1978); Dyer v. Tsapis, supra; Murredu v. Murredu, supra. In fact, in Patterson v. Patterson, supra, we indicated that the value of such services could not be obtained by way of the imposition of a constructive trust. Furthermore, this change is substantive, not procedural, and the class of beneficiaries is more extensive than in a tort case. There is no definite statute of limitations for filing for divorce because divorce actions are equitable and are governed by the doctrine of laches. Kittle v. Kittle, 86 W.Va. 46, 102 S.E. 799 (1920).
Under Bradley, we may also consider the treatment of retroactivity in decisions from other jurisdictions. Although this question has not been considered by Florida, Mississippi, or South Carolina, the issue has been raised in other jurisdictions following the enactment of statutes giving equitable distribution rights. In such cases, the claim is usually made that the statute should not apply to a divorce where the marriage occurred prior to the effective date of the statute, because that application would impair existing contracts and violate due process. These claims have been uniformly denied. E.g., In re Marriage of Bouquet, 16 Cal.3d 583, 546 P.2d 1371, 128 Cal.Rptr. 427 (1976); Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 71 Ill.2d 563, 17 Ill.Dec. 801, 376 N.E.2d 1382 (1978); Corder v. Corder, 546 S.W.2d 798 (Mo.App.1977); Rothman v. Rothman, 65 N.J. 219, 320 A.2d 496 (1974); Valladares v. Valladares, 55 N.Y.2d 388, 449 N.Y.S.2d 687, 434 N.E.2d 1054 (1982); Pollack v. Pollack, 56 N.Y.2d 968, 453 N.Y.S.2d 623, 439 N.E.2d 339 (1982).
Admittedly, the issues in these cases are not identical to the issue here, which is whether the doctrine of equitable distribution for homemaker services is applicable to pending cases. In Valladares, supra, the court addressed the question of whether a suit instituted prior to the date of the new act could be amended or refiled in order to obtain the benefits of the new act. The court concluded that ordinarily relief under the new act was available only for those suits filed subsequent to the new act.
Under the foregoing analysis, we believe that today's holding permitting equitable distribution based on homemaker services should be applied prospectively, that is, only to those cases filed after the date of this opinion. Since we have applied the homemaker principles to the present case, we will extend these principles to those cases presently on appeal to this Court where an equitable distribution claim for homemaker services has actually been presented in the lower court.
V.
Applying these principles of equitable distribution to the facts of the present case, we must reverse this case and remand it for further consideration. The record demonstrates that Mrs. LaRue was given the divorce on the no-fault ground of irreconcilable differences. The trial court found that Mr. LaRue was guilty of abusive conduct and essentially exonerated Mrs. LaRue from any fault. Under these circumstances, Mrs. LaRue was entitled to some equitable distribution on both theories. First, during the early years of her marriage, she had contributed her earnings, totalling $51,000. This economic contribution must be considered, but its value will have to be determined based on a comparison of the contributions made by Mr. LaRue as weighed against the net assets at the time of the divorce. Second, Mrs. LaRue's homemaker services, which were contributed over a considerable period of time, also entitle her to some equitable consideration. Again, her contributions must be calculated against the net marital assets.
Although Mrs. LaRue sought unsuccessfully in a separate suit to obtain legal title to an undivided one-half interest in the home property, res judicata does not foreclose this asset from being valued as a part of the net assets. The same is true of the joint bank accounts whose funds were withdrawn by Mr. LaRue shortly before the divorce action was filed. In St. Clair v. St. Clair, 166 W.Va. 173, 273 S.E.2d 352, 355 (1980), we noted with approval the trial court's action in restoring to the wife one-half of the money in a jointly-owned bank account, all of which had been removed by the husband shortly before the divorce. A more complete discussion is found in Simmons v. Simmons, 171 W.Va.170, 298 S.E.2d 144 (1982), where we referred to W.Va.Code, 31A-4-33, relating to the creation of a joint bank account, and the case of Dorsey v. Short, 157 W.Va. 866, 205 S.E.2d 687 (1974), which permitted a rebut-table presumption of a gift. In Simmons v. Simmons, supra, we concluded that there were not sufficient facts in the record to conclude that the presumption of gift had been rebutted. Earlier in this opinion, we pointed out that where a court determines that an award of equitable distribution is appropriate, it could consider the value of gifts made to the spouse seeking contribution by the other spouse. We also explained in note 14 that the rule was not to be construed to mean that we are weakening the presumption of a gift.
The purpose of permitting a trial court to give some consideration to the value of interspousal gifts on equitable distribution is to provide for the situation where a spouse retains his or her interest in jointly-held property because the presumption of gift has not been rebutted and such retaining spouse is also entitled to some equitable distribution. In the present case, if Mr. LaRue is not able to rebut the presumption of gift arising from the creation of the joint bank accounts, then Mrs. La-Rue would be entitled to one-half of their value. However, if this money constituted a gift, its value could be offset, in the court's discretion, on the amount of the ultimate equitable distribution that she is awarded. Of course, if the presumption of gift is rebutted by Mr. LaRue, his retention of the bank accounts will provide no offset against the amount of equitable distribution found to be due.
Under the foregoing principles, we reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court of Ohio County and remand the case for further consideration.
Reversed and Remanded.
. For a survey of the various states' provisions, see D. Freed and H. Foster, Divorce in the Fifty States: An Overview as of August 1, 1981, 7 Family Law Reporter 4049, 4056-57 (1981). They list thirty-nine states plus the District of Columbia as having some form of equitable distribution statute. Additional articles and comments relating to the right of equitable distribution are contained in the following journals: Foster, Commentary on Equitable Distribution, 26 N.Y.L.Sch.L.Rev. 1 (1981); Greene, Comparison of the Property Aspects of the Community Property and Common-Law Marital Property Systems and Their Relative Compatibility with the Current View of the Marriage Relationship and the Rights of Women, 13 Creighton L.Rev. 71 (1979); Note, Equitable Distribution vs. Fixed Rules: Marital Property Reform and the Uniform Marital Property Act, 23 B.C.L.Rev. 761 (1982). For a disapproving view of equitable distribution, see Mulligan & O'Connor, The Inequity of Equitable Distribution: An Editorial, 5 Seton Hall Legis.J. 21 (1980).
. 41 CJ.S. Husband and Wife § 462; W. Reppy & C. Samuel, Community Property in the United States 1-9 (1982). It appears that in some community property states, the division need not always be equal but equitable factors may be considered. E.g., Comment, Division of Marital Property on Divorce: What Does the Court Deem "Just and Right", 19 Hous.L.Rev. 503 (1982), as to Texas' community property statute.
. Section 767.255 of the Wisconsin statute is rather typical of this category:
"Upon every judgment of annulment, divorce or legal separation, or in rendering a judgment in an action under s. 767.02(l)(h), the court shall divide the property of the parties and divest and transfer the title of any such property accordingly. A certified copy of the portion of the judgment which affects title to real estate shall be recorded in the office of the register of deeds of the county in which the lands so affected are situated. The court may protect and promote the best interests of the children by setting aside a portion of the property of the parties in a separate fund or trust for the support, maintenance, education and general welfare of any minor children of the parties. Any property shown to have been acquired by either party prior to or during the course of the marriage as a gift, bequest, devise or inheritance or to have been paid for by either party with funds so acquired shall remain the property of such party and may not be subjected to a property division under this section except upon a finding that refusal to divide such property will create a hardship on the other party or on the children of the marriage, and in that event the court may divest the party of such property in a fair and equitable manner. The court shall presume that all other property is to be divided equally between the parties, but may alter this distribution without regard to marital misconduct after considering:
"(1) The length of the marriage.
"(2) The property brought to the marriage by each party.
"(2r) Whether one of the parties has substantial assets not subject to division by the court.
"(3) The contribution of each party to the marriage, giving appropriate economic value to each party's contribution in homemaking and child care services.
"(4) The age and physical and emotional health of the parties.
"(5) The contribution by one party to the education, training or increased earning power of the other.
"(6) The earning capacity of each party, including educational background, training, employment skills, work experience, length of absence from the job market, custodial responsibilities for children and the time and expense necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party to become self-supporting at a standard of living reasonably comparable to that enjoyed during the marriage.
"(7) The desirability of awarding the family home or the right to live therein for a reasonable period to the party having custody of any children.
"(8) The amount and duration of an order under s. 767.26 granting maintenance payments to either party, any order for periodic family support payments under s. 767.261 and whether the property division is in lieu of such payments.
"(9) Other economic circumstances of each party, including pension benefits, vested or unvested, and future interests.
"(10) The tax consequences to each party.
"(11) Any written agreement made by the parties before or during the marriage concerning any arrangement for property distribution; such agreements shall be binding upon the court except that no such agreement shall be binding where the terms of the agreement are inequitable as to either party. The court shall presume any such agreement to be equitable as to both parties.
"(12) Such other factors as the court may in each individual case determine to be relevant."
. Section 552.19 of the Michigan statute is representative of this category:
"Upon the annulment of a marriage, a divorce from the bonds of matrimony or a judgment of separate maintenance, the court may make a further judgment for restoring to either party the whole, or such parts as it shall deem just and reasonable, of the real and personal estate that shall have come to either party by reason of the marriage, or for awarding to either party the value thereof, to be paid by either party in money."
. For a more detailed account of South Carolina's law in this area, see Chastain, Henry & Woodside, Determination of Property Rights Upon Divorce in South Carolina: An Exploration and Recommendation, 33 S.C.L.Rev. 227 (1981).
. See note 5, id. at 235-40.
. A more detailed discussion of Florida's law is found in Guthrie, Family Law: The Aftermath of Canakaris, 35 U.Miami L.Rev. 531 (1981).
. Both Reeves and Clark dealt with lump-sum awards for economic contributions, with the court in Reeves stating:
'In Clark v. Clark, 293 So.2d 447 (Miss.1974), we held that where the wife has, without salary or remuneration, worked in her husband's business and contributed to the accumulation of assets, she is entitled to some share therein. This is such a case. Indeed, in this case Mrs. Reeves contributed her personal funds towards her husband's entrepreneurial ventures." 410 So.2d at 1302.
Section 93-5-23 of the Mississippi Code is general, as is ours, in regard to an alimony award. In material part, it provides:
"When a divorce shall be decreed from the bonds of matrimony, the court may, in its discretion, having regard to the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case, as may seem equitable and just, make all orders touching the care, custody and maintenance of the children of the marriage, and also touching the maintenance and alimony of the wife or the husband, or any allowance to be made to her or him."
.For a discussion of West Virginia law in this area, see Note, The Distribution of Marital Real Property Upon Divorce In West Virginia: The Need for Legislative Reform, 82 W.Va.L.Rev. 611 (1980).
. The relevant portion of the 1923 Code, Chapter 64, Section 11, relied on in Philips v. Philips, supra, was:
"Upon decreeing the dissolution of a marriage, and also upon decreeing a divorce, whether from the bond of matrimony or from bed and board, the court may make such further decree as it shall deem expedient, concerning the [estate and] maintenance of the parties, or either of them; and the care, custody and maintenance of the minor children, and may determine with which of the parents the children, or any of them may remain." (Brackets added)
In the 1931 Code, this section became W.Va. Code, 48-2-15 (1931), but the bracketed words "estate and" were dropped. However, there was added in 1931 a new provision, W.Va.Code, 48-2-19, which stated:
"Upon decreeing the annulment of a marriage, or upon decreeing a divorce, whether from the bond of matrimony or from bed and board, the court shall have power to award to either of the parties whatever of his or her property, real or personal, may be in the possession, or under the control, or in the name, of the other, and to compel a transfer or conveyance thereof as in other cases of chancery."
The reviser's notes to W.Va.Code, 48-2-19, clearly indicate the purpose of this new statute: "As there is omitted from § 15 the provision giving the court power to decree 'concerning the estate of the parties, or either of them' . it is deemed advisable to add this section here." The paradox is that as a result of the Court's failure in Selvy to look to these reviser's notes an unwarranted restriction was brought into our divorce law. See Wood v. Wood, 126 W.Va. 189, 28 S.E.2d 423 (1943). This same language is now found in W.Va.Code, 48-2-21.
. Patterson, supra 167 W.Va. at 10, 277 S.E.2d at 715, quoted 5 Scott on Trusts, § 404.2:
"'A constructive trust is imposed where a person holding title to property is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to another on the ground that he would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain it. The duty to convey the property may arise because it was acquired through fraud, duress, undue influence or mistake, or through a breach of fiduciary duty, or through the wrongful disposition of another's property. The basis of the constructive trust is the unjust enrichment which would result if the person having the property were permitted to retain it.'"
. A constructive trust also involves the tracing of funds to some tangible property on which the trust can be impressed. Williams v. McCarty, 82 W.Va. 158, 95 S.E. 638 (1918). However, we have not adhered to a rigid tracing requirement. In Annon v. Lucas, 155 W.Va. 368, 185 S.E.2d 343 (1971), we permitted the plaintiff to recover funds obtained from the sale of a farm promised to the plaintiff. The sale had occurred some fifteen years prior to the institution of the suit. The ability to trace funds is not a requirement for a claim of equitable distribution in a divorce action.
.Patterson, supra 167 W.Va. at 12, 277 S.E.2d at 716, began its discussion of this issue by stating:
"While we have ample authority on unjust enrichment, fraud, duress, undue influence, mistake, or breach of implicit fiduciary duty such as will support the impressing of a constructive trust, the question of what types of services will support a constructive trust between husband and wife appears to be novel."
. By permitting some consideration to be given to the value of gifts, we do not mean to suggest any change in our rule relating to the presumption of gift between husband and wife. W.Va. Code, 48-3-10 (1931). See Davis v. Davis, 137 W.Va. 213, 70 S.E.2d 889 (1952); Wood v. Wood, 126 W.Va. 189, 28 S.E.2d 423 (1943); Boyd v. Boyd, 109 W.Va. 766, 155 S.E. 303 (1930). In an appropriate case, the court is permitted to take the value of such gift into account in determining the wife's equitable distribution claim. A typical example would be where the husband has purchased the home property out of his own assets and placed the legal title in both his name and that of his wife. Upon the divorce, it would be permissible for the court, after determining the amount of equitable distribution due the wife, to consider as an offset the initial value of the one-half interest in the home property given to the wife. Such an offset would not affect the legal title.
. We do not envision that the right to equitable distribution based on economic contribution would entail any drastic shifting of legal title to real property. Ordinarily, satisfaction may be had by requiring the payment through sale or transfer of personal assets. In note 3 of Murredu v. Murredu, 160 W.Va. at 616-617, 236 S.E.2d at 457, we said: "We read W.Va.Code, 48-2-21, as not being applicable to jointly owned property." The note was and is confined to the limited situation where a spouse was authorized to have physical possession of the home property as an incident to receiving custody of the minor children. Nothing in this statute or in today's opinion precludes a circuit court from making an order directing transfer of either real or personal property jointly owned to satisfy an equitable distribution award based on economic contribution. This was recognized in Patterson v. Patterson, supra. See also note 2, Simmons v. Simmons, 171 W.Va. 170, 298 S.E.2d 144, 147 (1982).
. Somewhat similar language is found in Wilcoxon v. Carrier, 132 W.Va. 637, 649, 53 S.E.2d 620, 626 (1949), and it is also disapproved.
. In Oates v. Oates, 127 W.Va. 469, 475, 33 S.E.2d 457, 460 (1945), we said:
"In the absence of statutory authority, an agreement between husband and wife by which the wife agrees to perform the domestic duties imposed by the marital relation for a consideration is contrary to public policy and void." (Citations omitted)
. W.Va.Code, 48-2-17, provides:
"An order for support, maintenance or alimony shall not give rise to a lien on any real estate of the person against whom the order is entered until such order is entered of record in the office of the clerk of the county court where any such real estate is situate. On and after the effective date of this section [April 1, 1969], any such order shall be recorded in the same manner as other judgments are recorded."
. The concept that a property settlement agreement incident to a divorce must be fair and equitable has long been recognized in our law. E.g., Smith v. Smith, 125 W.Va. 489, 24 S.E.2d 902 (1943); Hartigan v. Hartigan, 58 W.Va. 610, 52 S.E. 720 (1906).
.The issue of retroactivity is a confused area of the law. Frequently, the issue is not raised by the parties and therefore not addressed. Compare Coffindaffer v. Coffindaffer, 161 W.Va. 557, 244 S.E.2d 338 (1978), with Sitzes v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 169 W.Va. 698, 289 S.E.2d 679 (1982). Moreover, not every decision setting a new principle of law triggers a question of retroactivity as the issue is generally limited to those cases that make a clear departure from existing law. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971). Commentators are unable to formulate either a suit able test for when a retroactivity problem arises or what factors should he considered in resolving the issue. Beytagh, Ten Years of Non-Re-troactivity: A Critique and a Proposal, 61 Va.L. Rev. 1557 (1975); Currier, Time and Change in Judge-Made Law: Prospective Overruling, 51 Va. L.Rev. 201 (1965); Traynor, Quo Vadis, Prospective Overruling: A Question of Judicial Responsibility, 28 Hastings L.J. 533 (1977); see generally Annot., 10 A.L.R.3d 1371 (1966). At the heart of any retroactivity issue is the attempt to draw some just balance line between two competing issues: the reliance by the parties on the prior law with its settled expectations, as against the need to bring new principles to bear on the changing conditions of society in pending cases.
. Kittle, supra, recognized, as do we, the three-year statute of limitations for adultery. W.Va. Code, 48-2-14.
. Because the facts surrounding the creation of the joint bank accounts are not in the record, we have assumed that the money came from Mr. LaRue's earnings and therefore the presumption of gift arises. We do not foreclose Mrs. LaRue from showing that some portion of the joint bank accounts came from her economic contribution. To the extent that she does, the "gift credit" is not available on equitable distribution.