Case Name: D. L. Bedford v. The State
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1922-02-22
Citations: 91 Tex. Crim. 285
Docket Number: No. 6695
Parties: D. L. Bedford v. The State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Criminal Reports
Volume: 91
Pages: 285–289

Head Matter:
D. L. Bedford v. The State.
No. 6695.
Decided February 22, 1922.
Rehearing Denied March 15, 1922. .
1. —Forgery—Indictment—Deed—Conveyance—Securing Debt.
A written conveyance of land, conveying the interest of the grantor for the purpose of securing a debt, would not prevent its being a deed within the definitions. Following Lockridge v. McCommon, 90 Texas, 234.
2. —Same—Continuance—Want of Diligence—Truth of Testimony.
Where the application for continuance shewed a want of diligence and the absent testimony was probably not true and would not have effected the result different from that obtained, there was no error in overruling the application.
S.—game—Rule Stated—Diligence—Rehearing.
A mere affirmation of diligence is not sufficient, but the facts must be set forth showing such diligence, and the right of compulsory process is guaranteed by the Constitution; and one accused of crime who fails to follow the. statute must abide the consequences.
4.—Same—Rule of Court—Practice in Trial Court.
Reverting to the matter of the existence of a rule of the trial court vefusing the issuance of process till causes have been set for trial, referred to in appellant’s motion, this matter is not properly before this court, as no such facts are authenticated by the trial court. However, the trial court was not authorized to make such rule.
5. —Same—Record—Continuance—Practice on Appeal—Rule Stated.
This court is compelled to adhere to the utterances of the record before it, and is forced to conclude that the same shows such lack of diligence in the matter of obtaining process of alleged absent witness as called for a refusal of continuance, and this in recognizing the' correctness of the proposition that when in doubt as to diligence, the doubt must resolve itself in favor the accused.
6. —Same—Continuance—Practice on Appeal—Precedent.
The correctness of our conclusions, that a reversal should not be granted unless we were impressed with the belief that had the absent testimony been at hand, a verdict more favorable to the appellant would have resulted is affirmed in former decisions. Following Browning v. State, 26 Texas Grim. App., 432, and other cases.
Appeal £rom the Criminal District Court of Harris. Tried' below before the Honorable C. W-. Robinson.
Appeal from a conviction of forgery; penalty, five years imprisonment in the penitentiary.
Green & Boyd, for appellant.
—On question of continuance: Smith v. State, 114 S. W. Rep., 828; Yelton v. State, 170 id., 318; and cases cited in opinion.
R. G. Storey, Assistant Attorney General, and E. T. Branch, District Attorney, for the State.
—Cited cases in opinion.

Opinion:
LATTIMORE, Judge.
—Appellant was convicted in the Criminal District Court of Harris county, and his punishment fixed at five years in the penitentiary.
The conviction was for forgery. In the charging part of the indictment the instrument alleged to have been forged is called a deed. It is set out in the indictment in haec verba, and shows to be a deed of trust. A motion to quash was addressed to this alleged contradictory recital of the indictment. It was properly overruled. That a written conveyance of land conveys the interest of the grantor for the purpose of securing a debt, would not prevent its being a deed within the definitions. 13 Cyc., p. 519; Loekridge v. McCommon, 90 Texas, 234; Words & Phrases, p. 1919.
The only remaining question is the refusal of appellant's request .for a continuance. Two witnesses, Maxie and Blocker, were absent. No diligence is shown. The indictment was returned October 30, 1920, and no subpoenas were issued or applied for until July 1, 1921. This appears to be appellant's first effort to obtain the testimony of said witnesses. Subpoena for Maxie was issued to Harris county, for Blocker to Navarro county. Process for both was returned not served, that for Blocker being returned on July 5th, and that for Maxie on July 8th. No alias process was secured. No reason is stated in the application for failing to further search for Maxie. It is stated that upon the return of said subpoena for Blocker, appellant made diligent inquiry as to his whereabouts. This is but a conclusion. It is further stated that on July 15th appellant located Blocker's mother at Cuney, Texas, and that he expects to learn from her where said witness is. No effort appears to communicate with said mother between July 15th and 18th, the date set for trial. Same might have resulted in locating Blocker and securing his presence. This is clearly not diligence. Vernon's C. C. P., p. 307 for collation of authorities; Yelton v. State, 75 Texas Crim. Rep., 38; 170 S. W. Rep. 318; Brown v. State, 32 Texas Crim. Rep. 119.
The refusal of the continuance was made a ground of the motion for new trial. When so presented there arises the added questions of the likelihood that the absent witness would have testified as stated in the application for continuance, and also the question as to whether such testimony be probably true and, likely to effect a result different from that attained. The testimony expected from Blocker appears so contrary to that given by unimpeached witnesses, and so impossible of truth, if theirs be true, as to seemingly justify the conclusions, if said witness was present on the trial he would not have given the testimony desired, and that if present and so testifying, it would not have been believed.
Finding no error in the record, the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.
Affirmed.