Case Name: John M. Kelly vs. Edmund H. Chadwick
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1900-11
Citations: 104 La. 719
Docket Number: No. 13,505
Parties: John M. Kelly vs. Edmund H. Chadwick.
Judges: The opinion of the Court on motion to dismiss was delivered by Blanchard, J.
Reporter: Louisiana Reports
Volume: 104
Pages: 719–735

Head Matter:
No. 13,505.
John M. Kelly vs. Edmund H. Chadwick.
Syllabus.
Ox Motion to Dismiss Appeal.
1. Where a local assessment, or charge upon property for street improvements is made, or levied, by compulsion of law, without regard to the assent or dissent of the abutting' proprietors, it presents the case of a taw in the sense in which the word is used in the Article of the Constitution conferring jurisdiction upon this court.
Where the answer impeaches the validity of the city ordinance on the ground that it imposes a greater burden on the abutting property than the paving statute authorizes, there is presented the issue of legality, vel non, of the tax sought to be collected, and this court has jurisdiction without regard to the amount involved.
On the Mekits.
1. The city of New Orleans, by Act No. 119 of 1886, as amended by Act No 142 of 1894, was authorized by a two-thirds vote “in its discretion to provide for the paving or banquetting of any street or portion thereof at the expense of the whole city, and to thereupon force, impose, and collect of the front proprietors of lots fronting on said streets a special assessment in proportion to frontage of three-quarters of the cost of said improvement.Under the authority so conferred the city, by a two-thirds vote by ordinance, ordered the paving of Hagan avenue from Canal street to Esplanade avenue, and caused the contract for the construction of the work on certain terms and conditions to be sold at public auction. The ordinance provided that under the provisions of the act recited the cost should be borne by the whole of the city, but that in accordance with the same there was levied on all the front proprietors of lots fronting on said streets three fourths of the cost of said improvement. It was expressly stipulated that the contractor should accept in settlement with the city, in part payment of the cost to the extent of the proportion of cost for which the abutting property was liable, a transfer of the rights of the city to the same with subrogation: this proportion to be fixed by the City Engineer and the Commissioner of Public Works and evidenced by certificates signed by them. The work was executed to the satisfaction of the city, the cost ascertained and certificates given. The present suit is against one of the owners of abutting property for recovery of his proportion of cost. Without questioning the consititu tionality of the law by which the General Assembly conferred the said authority upon the city, or that the work of public improvement was as a whole a work of special local public benefit, or that as a whole the work as executed did not carry out such purpose, the defendant resisted the claim on a number of grounds, livid: That the fact that some particular piece of property along the line of work might not be benefited would not justify Us owner in preventing the execution of the work on the ground of the uncon stitutionality of the ordinance. It is not necessary for the purpose of the legality or the constitutionality of the ordinance as to liability of the abutting property that it should bo benefited in every possible respect, or directly, or immediately, benefited. The work is done for the benefit of the local public, and assessments levied upon the abutting lots, not because of any special benefits that each owner may derive from it, but because the local public good demands it. When the General Assembly has itself fixed in what proportion and by what standard the cost of the work is to be apportioned, the judiciary is not authorized to alter it and substitute for a fixed legislative standard by frontage, a judicial standard based upon actual benefits received, measured by values or enhanced values established by proof.
2. The fact that from some unavoidable cause the work has, not been extended as far as contemplated by the ordinance and contract, does not cause the contractor to lose the entire benefit of the work done, where the general purpose of the work has not failed. The abutting owners can only exact that the amount of the cost be properly reduced. The fact that in the ordinance and contract the contributivo share of the abutting properties for the cost of the work was fixed upon an erroneous basis, does not work a forfeiture of the whole assessment. All that abutting owners can claim is that the proper proportion should be ascertained, and their liability not extended beyond it.
APPEAL from the Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans — ■ Si. Paul, J.
Denegre, Blair & Denegre for Plaintiff, Appellee.
George L. Bright and Edwin N. Whitiemore for Defendant, Appellant.
The opinion of the Court on motion to dismiss was delivered by Blanchard, J.
The opinion of the Court on the merits was delivered by ISTicholls, C. J.
Carried to the Supreme Court of the United States by Writ of Error.

Opinion:
On Motion to Dismiss Appeal.
Blanchard, T.
The ground of the motion, made by plaintiff and appellee, is want of jurisdiction ratione maieriae appearing on the face of the record, the amount involved being $638.80, or a sum below the minimum jurisdictional limit of this court.
The City of New Orleans let a contract to A. J. Christopher to pave Hagan avenue from Canal street to Esplanade avenue.
As far as it was possible to do so the contract was executed. It was not wholly executed for the reason that Hagan avenue, for a small part of its line between the points indicated, had not been opened as a street.
Christopher transferred his rights and claims under the contract to the plaintiff.
Defendant owned certain lots having a frontagé on Hagan avenue along that part of the street paved. An assessment of the amount he was due as front proprietor, under the contract for paving the avenue, was made by the City Engineer and Commissioner of Public Works. He declined to pay and this suit was brought to enforce payment.
The petition alleges the contract with Christopher was made, and the paving done, in accordance with Act No. 73 of 1876 and with Sectiou 37 of Act No. 20, approved June 23, 1882, entitled "An Act to Incorporate the City of New Orleans," etc., as amended by Act No. 119 of 1886, as amended by Act 142 of 1884, and in accordance with City Ordinances Nos. 11,184, 11,349 and 12,136, and other laws and ordinances on the same subject matter.
It is further averred that, prior to the making of the contract, the resolution to pave the -street was passed by the City Council by a two-thirds vote, and that notice of intention to pave the street and enact the ordinance relative thereto was published in the official journal once a week for four weeks.
A lien and right of pledge upon the property and its proceeds is claimed.
The prayer is for judgment against the defendant for the amount sued for, with interest, and with recognition of the lien claimed upon the property, and condemning the property to be sold and the proceeds applied to the payment of the indebtedness.
A supplemental and second supplemental petition were filed, which, in so far as the motion to dismiss the appeal is concerned, need not be further referred to.
Among other defenses set up, it is averred, on behalf of the defendant, that' the city ordinances under which plaintiff claims are unconstitutional and illegal, and the grounds for this charge of unconstitutionality and illegality are set forth in detail and at length.
From the several answers filed by defendant we think it sufficiently and affirmatively charged that the city ordinances, and the contract predicated upon same, transcend the powers and authority granted by the statutes relating to the subject of street paving in the City of New Orleans.
This brings the case, so far as the jurisdictional question raised is concerned, within the rule announced in City of Shreveport vs. Prescott, 51 La. Ann. 1895.
In that case, as in this, the assessment, or charge upon property for street improvement was made, or levied, by compulsion of law without regard to the assent or "dissent of the abutting proprietors. It was purely a forced contribution, the property owners having no voice whatever in the matter.
The law under Vhich the proceeding here was taken (Section 37 of Act 20 of 1882, as amended by Act 119 of 1886, as amended by Act 142 of 1894) authorized the City Council to levy the charge by simple ordinance (a two-thirds vote adopting same), without any precedent application of the owners of property.
The law under which the proceeding in the Prescott ease was taken (Act 10 of 1896) was, in this respect, the same, save that a majority, instead of two-thirds, vote sufficed to pass the paving ordinance and levy the assessment.
We held, in the latter case, that the forced contribution for street improvement purposes, under such circumstances, was a tax in the sense of the constitutional provision conferring appellate jurisdiction upon this court.
So, too, we must hold in the instant case. In the Prescott case the abutting proprietors impeached the validity of the city ordinance on the ground that it imposed a greater burden upon their property than the paving statute, correctly interpreted, permitted. Hence, the illegality of the tax, or forced contribution,- assessed against them.
This court, entertaining the view that the ordinance was not in' keeping with the terms of the statute, and to the extent not in keeping with it injurious to the abutting owners, annulled the same, reserving to the City Council of Shreveport the right to reform the ordinance so as to conform to the law.
Here the like contention is made — that the ordinance exceeds the authority bestowed by the statute, and injuriously affects the property owner.
There is, therefore, presented the issue of illegality, vel non, of the tax sought to be collected, and this court has jurisdiction.
Constitution of 1879, Article 81.
Constitution of 1898, Article 85.
The authority relied upon by appellee's counsel to sustain his motion to dismiss — the Rosetta Gravel, Paving and Improvement Company vs. Adler, 52 La. Ann. 689- — is not in point.
For these reasons it is ordered that the motion to dismiss the appeal be denied.