Case Name: LAURIS TENDRUP, Respondent, v. JOHN STEPHENSON COMPANY (Limited), Appellant
Court: New York Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1889-01
Citations: 58 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 462
Docket Number: 
Parties: LAURIS TENDRUP, Respondent, v. JOHN STEPHENSON COMPANY (Limited), Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Supreme Court Reports (Hun)
Volume: 58
Pages: 462–467

Head Matter:
LAURIS TENDRUP, Respondent, v. JOHN STEPHENSON COMPANY (Limited), Appellant.
Liability of a eoiporationfor its neglect of duties which it is bound to perform, without regard to the position of the agent performing them.
In an action, brought by a carpenter employed in the car factory of the defendant, to recover damages for personal injuries which were alleged to have been sustained by reason of the negligence of the defendant, it appeared that the plaintiff worked on the first floor of the building, and, in the course of his employment, was called upon from time to time to go into the basement. The first floor, which did not wholly cover the basement, was open at one end, and in order to allow the. workmen to go up and down a wooden stairway was made for use between the first floor and the basement, and was placed with the bottom resting on the basement floor and the top resting against the beam which supported the boards of the first floor, the stairs being fastened below by„wooden cleats nailed to the floor, and above by means of nails.
On the day of the accident the plaintiff, who was at work on the first floor, went down this stairway to the basement in order to saw some,boards, and after performing this task started to return by the same stairs. When he had nearly reached the top the entire steps fell under his weight and he was thrown backwards and knocked senseless. On that day the defendant, the president of the corporation, had directed a workman to change the position of the stairs about five feet, and the workman had done so, putting cleats around the bottom and securing it “good and fast.” The stairway was in this position when the plaintiff went down into the basement. Before he went up again another workman, who had been ordered to remove a bulky piece of machinery, changed the position of this flight of steps so as to get them down out of the way, but without any specified direction so to do. He then left them, unscrewed, only long enough to go a short distance for his hammer and nails, during which time the accident occurred.
Held, that as the act of removing the stairway was authorized by the defendant the servant occupied the place of the corporation, and the latter was liable for the manner in which it was performed, and that a judgment, entered upon the verdict of a jury in favor of the plaintiff, should he affirmed. (Bartlett, J., dissenting.)
Pantzar v. Tilly Foster Iron Mining Company (99 N. Y., 368); Berea Stone Company v. Kraft (31 Ohio St. 287) followed; Crispin v. Babbitt (81 N. Y., 516) distinguished.
Appeal from a judgment entered upon the verdict of a jury, for $3,500 damages, rendered at the New York Circuit, and entered in the office of the clerk of the city and county of New York on November 17, 1887, and from an order denying a motion for a new trial, made upon the minutes of the justice presiding at the circuit, and entered in the same office on the 16th day of November, 1887.
The facts in this case are fully stated in the dissenting opinion of Bartlett, J.
William Allen Butler, for the appellant.
J. Edward Swanston, for the respondent.

Opinion:
Brady, J.;
It will be perceived on reading the opinion of Bartlett, J., that the act of removing the stairway was one authorized by the defendants ; the negligence of the so-called fellow-workman being his leaving the stairway without a guard or notice, and without being fastened, while he was seeking the means of finishing his work of removal. This makes a vast difference between this case and that of Crispin v. Babbitt (81 N. Y., 516), to which Justice Bartlett refers; in the latter case the injury was occasioned by an act with which the master had no connection, directly or indirectly, and was one of carelessness. The fellow-workman carelessly let on steam, and the plaintiff, was injured. The true rule, I apprehend, said Church, Oh. J., is to hold the corporation liable for negligence in respect to such acts and duties as it is required to perform as master, without regard to the rank or title of the agent intrusted with their performance. As to such acts, the agent occupies the place of the corporation, and the latter is liable for the manner in which they are performed. Here it appears that Jeblick, the fellow-workman, had been ordered by the defendants' foreman to put a machine in position, to do which it was necessary to remove the stairs. They were removed,' and hence the accident, for the reason that they were not secured, of which the plaintiff was ignorant. The distinctions made by the cases bearing upon the obligations and responsibilities of employers for the carelessness of one fellow-workman resulting in the injury of another in the same common employment, are somewhat shadowy, and, therefore, difficult of application; but where the act causing the injury is an independent one, and done by order of the employer or his alter ego, as in this case, the liability of the employer seems to be settled, particularly when it is within the principle that he owes his servant the duty of furnishing him a safe and proper place to prosecute his work. (Pantzar v. Tilly Foster Iron Minimg Co., 99 N. Y., 368.) In addition to this, it may be said that the case of Berea Stone Company v. Kraft, 31 Ohio St., 287), and quoted by Earl, J., in his dissenting opinion in Crispin v. Babbitt (supra), exactly hits this case. Indeed, that opinion will be found sustained by authorities, the doctrines of which make the defendants here liable for the plaintiff's injuries. I am decidedly in favor of the affirmance of the judgment.
Daniels, J., concurred.