Case Name: Tommy STAFFORD v. ARKMO LUMBER COMPANY
Court: Arkansas Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 1996-07-03
Citations: 54 Ark. App. 286
Docket Number: CA 94-1373
Parties: Tommy STAFFORD v. ARKMO LUMBER COMPANY
Judges: Jennings, C.J., and Griffen, Neal, and Rogers, JJ., agree.
Reporter: Arkansas Appellate Reports
Volume: 54
Pages: 286–298

Head Matter:
Tommy STAFFORD v. ARKMO LUMBER COMPANY
CA 94-1373
925 S.W.2d 170
Court of Appeals of Arkansas En Banc
Opinion delivered July 3, 1996
William F. Sherman, for appellant.
Walter A. Murray, for appellee.
Barber, McCaskill, Amsler, Jones & Hale, FA., by: Robert L. Henry, III and Christopher Gomlicker, for appellee Diamond Constr. Co.

Opinion:
John Mauzy Pittman, Judge.
Tommy Stafford appeals from an order of the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission denying additional temporary total disability benefits and medical benefits arguing lack of support by substantial evidence.
Appellant sustained a compensable injury to his left shoulder on August 2, 1986, while working for Arkmo Lumber Company. He was treated by Dr. Joe W. Crow, an orthopedic surgeon, who performed an acromioplasty on appellant's left shoulder and assigned a 20 percent impairment rating when he released appellant on September 9, 1987, to return to work with lifting restrictions. On December 16, 1988, while working for Diamond Constructing Company, appellant sustained a compensable injury to his neck and back. Appellant stated that before the 1988 injury, his shoulder was "stiff" but he was able to work without problems. However, after the 1988 injury, he began having pain in his left shoulder. Appellant returned to Dr. Crow for treatment, who opined that the 1988 injury was a new injury rather than a recurrence. Appellant became dissatisfied with Dr. Crow's treatment. The administrative law judge appointed Dr. William F. Blankenship to be appellant's treating physician. Dr. Blankenship provided conservative treatment, physical therapy and injections, and conducted numerous diagnostic tests, such as an EMG and nerve conduction studies. On January 8, 1990, Dr. Blankenship released appellant to return to work with restrictions of no sweeping, mopping, lifting in excess of twenty pounds or overhead lifting. Dr. Blankenship thought that appellant could perform some limited work and that no further medical treatment was needed.
Subsequent to being released by Dr. Blankenship, appellant continued to have complaints and in 1990 sought treatment at UAMS. There, appellant was treated by several physicians. Dr. Samuel Agnew performed a second acromioplasty on November 4, 1992, which alleviated appellant's symptoms. Following the surgery, appellant sought additional temporary total disability benefits from January 1, 1990, to April 1993, medical benefits for treatment from UAMS, and a retroactive change of physician to Dr. Agnew.
The Commission found that appellant failed to prove that his treatment from UAMS was causally related to either compensable injury or to the surgery following the 1986 injury. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the fight most favorable to the Commission's findings and will affirm if the Commission's decision is supported by substantial evidence. Wright v. ABC Air, Inc., 44 Ark. App. 5, 864 S.W.2d 871 (1993). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. The issue is not whether we might have reached a different result or whether the evidence would have supported a contrary finding; if reasonable minds could reach the Commission's conclusion, we must affirm its decision. Cagle Fabricating & Steel, Inc. v. Patterson, 42 Ark. App. 168, 856 S.W.2d 30 (1993). Moreover, the Commission has the authority to accept or reject medical opinions, and its resolution of the medical evidence has the force and effect of a jury verdict. McClain v. Texaco, Inc., 29 Ark. App. 218, 780 S.W.2d 34 (1989).
Dr. Agnew's December 9, 1992, report stated: (1) that a May 9, 1991, examination revealed recurrent impingement syndrome of appellant's left shoulder, (2) that a repeat acromioplasty was performed November 4, 1992, and (3) that there was no indication that the acromioplasty performed by Dr: Crow after the 1986 injury was inadequate. He further stated, "It cannot be determined with any degree of reasonable certainty as to what event caused the recurrent or persistent symptoms.... Specifically, one cannot determine whether the accident of August 1986, December 16, 1988, or the surgery of Dr. Crow specifically is the event. One can state with reasonable assurity that all three play in some part to [appellant's] overall complaints." Dr. J. M. Grunwald, a physician at UAMS who treated appellant, stated in a September 19, 1990, report that "there is no way to decide if the orthopedic problem which [appellant] has is related to or caused by his work related injury or if they were caused by Dr. Crow's treatment surgery. I do not feel that Dr. Crow's surgery was inadequate or substandard." He further said, "There is no way to decide which part of the symptoms that [appellant] is presenting with is related to his first and which part is related to his second accident." Lastly, Dr. James Blankenship, a UAMS physician, said in a March 23, 1993, report that appellant has two cysts which are almost certainly congenital and which are believed to be causing some of appellant's complaints.
Appellant argues that Dr. Agnew's opinion should be interpreted to mean that both compensable injuries and the first surgery played a part in his need for the second surgery although Dr. Agnew could not say which one precipitated his condition. He also contends that causation was established because the second surgery in November 1992 alleviated his problems.
The interpretation of medical opinion was for the Commission, and we cannot say that the Commission's finding that a causal connection between his medical treatment and the compensable injuries was not established is not supported by substantial evidence. Therefore, we decline to address appellant's arguments concerning a change of physician to Dr. Agnew.
Appellant also argues that he is entided to temporary total disability benefits from January 1, 1990. The Commission found that appellant failed to prove that he was unable to perform employ ment subsequent to January 1990 and that the medical and lay testimony indicated that appellant had reached a plateau of recovery and was performing some gainful employment.
Temporary total disability is that period within the healing period in which an employee suffers a total incapacity to earn wages. J. A. Riggs Tractor Co. v. Etzkorn, 30 Ark. App. 200, 785 S.W.2d 51 (1990). After Dr. William Blankenship's release to return to work with restrictions on January 8, 1990, appellant testified that he returned to his employer who did not have any work available within the restrictions. Appellant said that had there been a job available, he would have tried to do it. Appellant stated that he has not sought employment anywhere since his second injury in December 1988. However, the record shows that from at least 1990 to 1992, appellant operated a lawn care business. Appellant said that he could do only two or three yards each week, never worked more than four hours a day, only did a dozen yards in 1991 and earned less than $600 a year in the business. Our review indicates that the Commission's findings and decision to deny temporary total disability benefits is supported by substantial evidence.
Affirmed.
Jennings, C.J., and Griffen, Neal, and Rogers, JJ., agree.
Mayfield, J., dissents.