Case Name: Carl BERGERON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MAR-CON, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1997-11-26
Citations: 705 So. 2d 232
Docket Number: No. 97-263
Parties: Carl BERGERON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MAR-CON, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: Before DOUCET, C.J., and THIBODEAUX and DECUIR, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 705
Pages: 232–237

Head Matter:
Carl BERGERON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MAR-CON, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 97-263.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
Nov. 26, 1997.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 25, 1998.
John Powers Wolff, III, Baton Rouge, for Carl Bergeron.
Joseph Michael Stiltner, Baton Rouge, for Mar-Con, Inc.
Before DOUCET, C.J., and THIBODEAUX and DECUIR, JJ.

Opinion:
JiDECUIR, Judge.
Carl Bergeron appeals the judgment of the Office of Workers' Compensation dismissing his claim for benefits against Mar-Con, Inc. and its workers' compensation insurer, Louisiana Workers' Compensation Corporation. Plaintiff contends the workers' compensation judge erred in finding that plaintiff was not in the course and scope of his employment at the time of his accident and in failing to award penalties and attorney's fees. We affirm.
The issue presented is whether Bergeron, who was employed as a rigger and roustabout with Mar-Con, Inc., was in the course and scope of his employment at the time he was injured in an automobile accident in Lafayette while en route in his personal vehicle from his Opelousas home to a heliport at Intracoastal City. Mar-Con's facility is located in Erath. Mar-Con does not dispute that it agreed to provide transportation from its facility in Erath to the work site or point of crew change, in this ease Intracoastal City. Evidence presented at trial reflects that employees had the |2option of traveling in a company van from the defendant's facility in Erath to Intracoastal City or using their own vehicle.
It is well established in our law that generally an employee who is involved in an accident while traveling to and from work is not within the course and scope of his employment and is therefore not entitled to worker's compensation benefits. Kennedy v. Martin Gas Transportation Co., Inc., 96-100 (La.App. 3 Cir. 8/21/96); 680 So.2d 1195, 1197, writ denied 96-2838 (La.1/24/97); 686 So.2d 860. When an employee is required to check in at a certain place and is then dispatched to the work site, he is generally in the course of employment in the travel between the check in place and the work site, but not between home and the check in place. Orgeron on Behalf of Orgeron v. McDonald, 93-1353 (La.7/5/94); 639 So.2d 224, 227.
Bergeron argues that an exception to the general rule that an employee who is involved in an accident while traveling to and from work is not within the course and scope of his employment applies in this case. Relying on Tarver v. Energy Drilling Company, 26,233 (La.App. 2 Cir. 10/26/94); 645 So.2d 796, plaintiff argues that because Mar-Con interested itself in the transportation of the plaintiff, as an incident to employment, either by contractually providing transportation or reimbursing him for travel expenses, the travel of the plaintiff from his home to the work site falls within the course and scope of his employment.
Bergeron first argues that defendant expressly agreed to provide transportation to him, and that by undertaking this express obligation, Mar-Con placed Bergeron within the course and scope of employment at the time of his accident. Plaintiff contends that Mar-Con's express obligation is memorialized in a document entitled "Conditions of Employment," included in plaintiffs personnel file. The document contains the following provision: "Mar-Con, Inc. will be responsible for transportation to and from the work site (or point of crew change)." Bergeron also contends that 13Mar-Con entered into a separate agreement by giving Bergeron a raise allegedly in compensation for obtaining his own transportation to the point of crew change.
We address first the applicable provision of the "Conditions of Employment." We find that by this provision Mar-Con agrees to be responsible for transportation from its facility to the job site, not from plaintiffs home to the job site. La.Civ.Code art.2053 provides:
A doubtful provision must be interpreted in light of the nature of the contract, equity, usages, the conduct of the parties before and after the formation of the contract, and of other contracts of like nature between the same parties.
The custom of industry is a consideration in determining the true intent of the parties to an ambiguous contract provision. See Fontenot's Rice Drier, Inc. v. Farmers Rice Milling Co., Inc., 329 So.2d 494 (La.App. 3 Cir.), writ denied 333 So.2d 239 (La.1976); Gary v. Miami Corp., 546 So.2d318 (La.App. 3 Cir.1989). It is not the industry custom for a company such as defendant's to provide transportation from its roustabout's homes to the job site. In Lambert v. Maryland Casualty Co., 418 So.2d 553 (La.1982), the supreme court stated:
Contracts must be construed in such a way as to lead to logical conclusions and to give effect to the obvious intention of the parties. St. Ann v. American Insurance Companies, 182 So.2d 710 (La.App. 4th Cir.1966). They must be interpreted in a common-sense fashion, according to the words of the contract their common and usual significance. LSA-C.C. Art.1946. A cardinal rule in the construction of contracts is that the contract must be viewed as a whole and, if possible, practical effect given to all its parts, according to each the sense that results from the entire agreement so as to avoid neutralizing or ignoring any of them or treating them as sur-plusage. LSA-C.C. Art.1955; Polozola v. Garlock, Inc., 343 So.2d 1000 (La.1977); Reuter v.. Reuter's Succession,, 206 La. 474, 19 So.2d 209 (1944); Solomon v. Hickman, 219 So.2d 330 (La.App. 1st Cir.1969); Crow v. Southern Natural Gas Company, 210 So.2d 596 (La.App. 2d Cir.1968), writ refused 252 La. 834, 214 So.2d 160 (1968). . . .
Id. at 559-560.
The record contains evidence that plaintiff was not paid any travel expenses, nor was he paid for the use of his vehicle, nor was he "on the clock" at the time of the Uaccident. Nor was any other co-employee who chose to use his personal vehicle paid by Mar-Con for the use of his vehicle or travel expense. Berger-on had the option, as did the other roustabouts, of traveling in a company van to and from Mar-Con's facility in Erath to Intra-coastal City or using his own vehicle. The company vehicle traveled to and from Erath to Intraeoastal City with or without the plaintiff. Mar-Con contends that it never agreed to provide transportation from an employee's home to the heliport, and the testimony adduced at trial reflects the common intent of the parties was that Mar-Con agreed to provide transportation from its facility in Erath to the heliport, not from, the plaintiffs home to the heliport.
Secondly, plaintiff argues that a raise he received actually represented travel expenses. The trial court concluded that Ber-geron's raise was not related to his travel to and from .work, and that Bergeron's decision to use his personal vehicle to go to the heliport was a matter of preference rather than a condition of employment. This finding is supported by evidence presented at trial. Several witnesses testified regarding this issue, but only Bergeron testified at trial that a raise he received was conditioned upon his using his personal vehicle. The record reflects that plaintiffs co-employees received the same raise whether they rode in the company vehicle or not. Furthermore, Ber-geron's testimony that after he received the raise, he could not ride in the company vehicle from Mar-Con's facility to the heliport was impeached at trial. In deposition testimony, Bergeron had testified that he could have continued to ride in the company van after he received the raise.
We find that Mar-Con did not agree to provide transportation from Bergeron's home to the work site. Based upon the jurisprudence, and the facts and circumstances of this case, including industry custom and the custom between Mar-Con and its employees, the contract must be interpreted to provide that Mar-Con agreed to be responsible for transportation only from its facility in Erath to the work site or point |5of crew change. Thus, we find no error in the trial court's finding that Bergeron was not in the course and scope of his employment at the time of his automobile accident, and is therefore not entitled to worker's compensation benefits.
Having affirmed the trial court's ruling that plaintiff was not within the course and scope of his employment at the time of his accident, the issue of penalties and attorney's fees is rendered moot.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs of appeal are assessed to Carl Berger-on.
AFFIRMED.
THIBODEAUX, J., dissents and assigns written reasons.