Case Name: DAVIS v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1925-02-25
Citations: 270 S.W. 165
Docket Number: No. 8665
Parties: DAVIS v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 270
Pages: 165–167

Head Matter:
DAVIS v. STATE.
(No. 8665.)
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Feb. 25, 1925.
Rehearing Denied April 1, 1925.)
1. Criminal law <®=>92l — Exclusion of evidence on motion showing that defendant was under arrest when he made confession as to which evidence had been admitted during trial held error.
Where court admitted evidence as to confession without knowledge that it was made while defendant was under arrest, without being reduced to writing, as required by Code Cr. Proc. 1911’, art. 810, court’s refusal to admit evidence on motion for new trial that defendant was under arrest when confession was made, so as to make evidence as to confession inadmissible, was error.
2. Criminal law <8=5530 — That confession was made before grand jury does not necessarily render it admissible when not in writing as required by statute. , 1
That confession was made before grand jury does not reader it admissible when not in writing as required by Code Cr. Proc. 1911, art. 810.
3. Criminal law <§=>1043(2), 1169(12) — Improper admission of evidence held harmless in view of other evidence proving guilt and sentence imposed.
Admission of evidence as to defendant’s confession made while under arrest, though not reduced to writing, as required by Code Cr. Proc. 1911, art. 810, held not ground for reversal, where no objection on that ground was made, and, there was no affirmative defensive theory, and evidence independent of confession was sufficient to establish guilt, and lowest penalty was assessed.
Appeal from District Court, Potter County; Henry S. Bishop, Judge.
Jack Davis was convicted of burglary, and he appeals.
Affirmed.
W. P. Nix and A. M. Mood, both of Amarillo, for appellant.
Tom Garrard, State’s Atty., and Grover O. Morris, Asst. State’s Atty., both of Austin, for the State.

Opinion:
MORROW, P. J.
The offense is burglary; punishment fixed at confinement in the penitentiary for a period of two years.
Morton, the owner of the premises, testified that his house was entered and certain property removed therefrom. Noel, an accomplice, testified that he received from the appellant certain property belonging to Morton and which was identified by him as having been stolen from the burglarized premises. Appellant, at the time of the arrest, had in. his possession property which was also identified as part of the^ stolen goods. There were other circumstances tending to connect the appellant with the'commission of the offense.
A reversal is sought upon the claimed error of the court in admitting in evidence the confession of the appellant. It appears that appellant while under arrest and in jail was brought in custody of an officer to the grand jury, which was in session, and there admitted the commission of the offense.' His testimony was not reduced to writing, but was verbal and proved by the foreman of the grand jury upon the trial of the case. Objection to the testimony was made and a bill of exceptions reserved to its receipt. Qualifying the bill, however, the trial court said in substance that, at the time the testimony was offered in evidence, he was not informed that the confession had been obtained while the appellant was under arrest, and no objection had been urged against it upon, that ground, that he did not know that the testimony was of that character. On the motion for new trial, appellant sought to prove and offered witnesses who would have testified that he was under arrest, was taken from the jail to the grand jury, and there made the statement showing his guilt. Under the bill of exceptions taken at the time, as qualified, there was no fact within the knowledge of the court or objection addressed to the bill which would render his action in receiving it erroneous. The procedure which the record reflects, that is, the taking of a witness before the grand jury while he is under arrest and obtaining from him a verbal confession not in compliance with the statute, is a practice which this court would not by any means sanction, and in the present case, if there was not other evidence warranting the conviction, or if there was testimony justifying an acquittal, this court would feel called upon to reverse the case because of the error of the trial court in refusing to receive proof upon t"he motion for new trial, which would have demonstrated that the confession which was introduced in evidence against the appellant was illegal, and was not admissible. The fact that the confession.was made before the grand jury does not necessarily render it admissible when it is not-in writing as required by the statute (article 810, C. C. P.). See Oliver v. State, 81 Tex. Cr. R. 529, 197 S. W. 185; Dover v. State, 81 Tex. Cr. R. 545, 197 S. W. 192; Mayzone v. State, 88 Tex. Cr. R. 98, 225 S. W. 55; Williams v. State, 88 Tex. Cr. R. 87, 225 S. W. 177.
Taking note of the fact that in the present case there was no affirmative defensive theory, and the evidence of the state, independent' of the confession, being sufficient to establish the guilt of the appellant, and the lowest penalty having been assessed by the jury, we are constrained to hold that we are not warranted in reversing the judgment because of the receipt in evidence of the testimony improperly admitted.
The judgment is affirmed.
'<g=^For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes