Case Name: Louis A. BELL, Appellant, v. W.T. COX, Jr., Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1994-04-29
Citations: 642 So. 2d 1381
Docket Number: No. 92-1867
Parties: Louis A. BELL, Appellant, v. W.T. COX, Jr., Appellee.
Judges: PETERSON, J., concurs specially, with opinion.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 642
Pages: 1381–1387

Head Matter:
Louis A. BELL, Appellant, v. W.T. COX, Jr., Appellee.
No. 92-1867.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
April 29, 1994.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 13, 1994.
Bruce W. Jacobus, Melbourne, for appellant.
Harold T. Bistline of Stromire, Bistline & Miniclier, Cocoa, for appellee.

Opinion:
THOMPSON, Judge.
Appellant, Louis A. Bell, appeals a final judgment of the trial court granting the ap-pellee, W.T. Cox, Jr., a statutory way of necessity easement pursuant to sections 704.-01(2) and 704.04, Florida Statutes (1991), over a portion of property owned by Bell. We affirm the judgment.
FACTS
This case involves the right to a way of necessity as that common-law concept is recognized in section 704.01(1), Florida Statutes (1991). The property involved consists of four parcels, one owned by Cox, two owned by Bell and one owned by Donald and Beth Messersmith.
Cox purchased a parcel of land in 1971. The parcel is located in Brevard County and is bordered by the Banana River on the east and the Indian River on the west. The parcel encompassed the subject parcel in this lawsuit. Bell owns two parcels north of the subject parcel and the Messersmiths own a third parcel north of the Bell property. In 1986, Cox attempted to purchase an easement from Bell over Bell's property. Bell refused to sell a portion of his property to Cox, but offered to allow the easement in return for one acre of Cox's land on the waterfront. This was ½ of Cox's parcel. Cox refused.
Cox filed a complaint seeking a statutory way of necessity, exclusive of common-law right, pursuant to section 704.01(2), Florida Statutes (1991). Cox alleged the property had no practical ingress and. egress except through Bell's and the Messersmiths' properties, to Randon Lane, a public road. Bell filed an answer and asserted a counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment that sections 704.01 and 704.04, Florida Statutes (1991), are unconstitutional.
After a non-jury trial, the court entered a final judgment granting Cox a statutory way of necessity, finding Cox's property hemmed-in or shut-off by Bell's and the Messersmiths' properties and that the Cox property had no practicable route of ingress or egress to a public road except through Bell's and the Messersmiths' properties. The court granted a statutory way of necessity and entered a summary final judgment against Bell's counterclaim. The court ordered Cox to pay Bell $56,100 as compensation for the use of the easement over his property. This amount was determined by an appraiser hired by Cox. The court also awarded attorney's fees of $10,000 and costs of $6,557.55 to Cox against Bell under section 704.04, Florida Statutes (1991), because Bell unreasonably refused to comply with the statute. Bell timely appeals.
ARGUMENTS
Bell raises six issues on appeal. Four of the issues deal with evidence admitted by the trial judge and the sufficiency of rulings made by the trial court. Bell argues, in essence, that this court should reweigh the evidence presented at the trial. We find that the record supports the findings of fact and the exercise of discretion by the trial judge. The factual determinations of the trial court are clothed with the presumption of correctness. Wales v. Wales, 422 So.2d 1066 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). There was competent substantial evidence to support the trial court's findings and the weight of such evidence is solely in the province of the trial court. See Clegg v. Chipola Aviation, Inc., 458 So.2d 1186 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
There are two remaining issues that require attention. First, Bell argues that sections 704.01 and 704.04, Florida Statutes (1991), are unconstitutional and second, that the evidence does not support the determination that there was no common-law right of way to the property, which determination is essential before a statutory way of necessity can be used.
Section 704.01(2) reads:
(2) STATUTORY WAY OF NECESSITY EXCLUSIVE OF COMMON-LAW RIGHT. — Based on public policy, convenience, and necessity, a statutory way of necessity exclusive of any common-law right exists when any land or portion thereof outside any municipality which is being used or desired to be used for a dwelling or dwellings . shall be shut off or hemmed in by lands, fencing, or other improvements of other persons so that no practicable route of egress or ingress shall be available therefrom to the nearest practicable public or private road. The owner or tenant thereof, or anyone in their behalf, lawfully may use and maintain an easement . over, under, through, and upon the lands which lie between the said shut-off or hemmed-in lands and such public or private road by means of the nearest practical route, considering the use to which said lands are being put; and the use thereof, as aforesaid, shall not constitute a trespass; nor shall the party thus using the same be liable in damages for the use thereof; provided that such ease ment shall be used only in an orderly and proper manner.
Section 704.04, Florida Statutes (1991), reads:
When the owner or owners of such lands across which a statutory way of necessity under s. 704.01(2) is claimed, exclusive of the common-law right, objects or refuses to permit the use of such way under the conditions set forth herein or until he receives compensation therefor, either party or the board of county commissioners of such county may file suit in the circuit court of the county wherein the land is located in order to determine if the claim for said easement exists, and the amount of compensation to which said party is entitled for use of such easement. Where said easement is awarded to the owner of the dominant tenement, it shall be in compliance with s. 704.01(2) and shall exist so long as such easement is reasonably necessary for the purposes stated herein. The court, in its discretion, shall determine all questions, including the type, duration, extent and location of the easement, the amount of compensation, and the attorney's fees and costs to be awarded to either party for unreasonable refusal to comply with the provisions of s. 704.01(2) provided that if either of said parties so requests in [the] original pleadings, the amount of compensation may be determined by a jury trial. The easement shall date from the time the award is paid.
Bell argues that the statutes violate the equal protection guarantees of Article I, Section 2 of the Florida Constitution because the language "outside any municipality" creates an arbitrary class: the class outside a municipality being treated differently than the class inside a municipality.
The statutes create a cause of action for the establishment of an easement, but do not abridge a fundamental right nor does their application to property "outside any municipality" affect adversely upon some suspect class, therefore, the statute should be analyzed under a rational basis standard and not given strict scrutiny. Under a rational basis standard of review, a court should inquire only whether it is conceivable that the regulatory classification bears some rational relationship "to a legitimate state purpose. The Florida High School Activities Ass'n, Inc. v. Thomas ex rel. Thomas, 434 So.2d 306 (Fla.1983). Bell has the burden to show that there is no conceivable factual predicate which would rationally support the classification he seeks to attack, i.e., "outside a municipality." Id. at 308. Bell has not overcome the burden of showing that the statutes violate the equal protection clause of the Florida Constitution. Bell offers no case or statute to support his position. He merely asserts that the application of the statute to property "outside, any municipality" is unreasonable and arbitrary. Bell has failed to show that there is no conceivable factual predicate supporting the classification. His argument, therefore, is without merit.
Bell next argues that the statute is unconstitutional because it is vague. He argues that the term "unreasonable refusal" in section 704.04, Florida Statutes is constitutionally infirm because it authorizes the trial court to award attorney's fees and costs when either party "unreasonably refuses" to comply with section 704.01(2). This argument is also without merit. The statute clearly recognizes the existence of an easement when the dominant estate is shut-off or hemmed-in by the servient estate. The term "unreasonable refusal" is susceptible to be understood by a person of common intelligence when the term is defined in its plain and ordinary sense and applied to this situation. The statute is clear so that persons of common intelligence can understand its meaning. See State v. Hagan, 387 So.2d 943 (Fla.1980). Also, the statute is clear so that it does not invite arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. See McKenney v. State, 388 So.2d 1232 (Fla.1980); State v. Deese, 495 So.2d 286 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1986).
Finally, Bell argues that sections 704.01 and 704.04 are contrary to the public purpose clause of the Florida Constitution. Bell argues that the public policy goal of protecting ecologically sensitive land as shown in section 187.201, Florida Statutes (1991), requires that the statute be stricken as unconstitutional. In essence, he argues that when balancing the goal of protecting the environment versus the goal of ingress and egress from hemmed-in land, the ecological goal must prevail. Bell overlooks the fact that in Deseret Ranches of Fla., Inc. v. Bowman, 349 So.2d 155 (Fla.1977), the Florida Supreme Court held that the statutory way of necessity created by these statutes is constitutional. The court wrote that "sensible utilization of land continues to be one of our most important goals." Id. at 156. The court in Deseret found that the statute was consistent with the state public policy of utilization of land and the policy against loss of the use of landlocked property. Further, the public policy providing access to hemmed-in lands was recognized and applied to state agencies. See South Florida Water Management Dist. v. Layton, 402 So.2d 597 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1981). Bell has presented no statute or case showing that environmental public policy goals have superseded long held public policy goals of full utilization of property. We hold, therefore, this statute is constitutional in spite of the arguments offered by Bell.
Bell's next argument is that, before Cox could obtain a statutory right of way, he had to demonstrate that a common-law right of way did not exist. See Parham v. Reddick, 537 So .2d 132 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). Cox needed to present evidence to establish that his parcel was hemmed-in and that there was no practical route of ingress or egress. Faison v. Smith, 510 So.2d 928 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987). Cox presented evidence and the record supports a finding that no common-law easement existed. There was no unity of title between the dominant and servient estate. The landlocked parcel was originally part of a larger parcel separated by Moon Lake. The record shows that Cox produced ample evidence establishing that the only practical route of ingress and egress was through Bell's property. The trial court made no error.
AFFIRMED.
PETERSON, J., concurs specially, with opinion.
HARRIS, C.J., dissents, with opinion.
. The Messersmiths were defendants below but did not join in this appeal. Cox was ordered to pay the Messersmiths $31,000 for use of the easement, their attorney's fees and their costs because Cox never tendered an offer before trial for their easement. See § 704.04, Fla.Stat. (1991).