Case Name: Jackson S. Schultz and others v. Edson Bradley
Court: New York Court of Common Pleas
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1871-05
Citations: 4 Daly (N.Y.) 29
Docket Number: 
Parties: Jackson S. Schultz and others v. Edson Bradley.
Judges: 
Reporter: Daly's Common Pleas Reports
Volume: 4
Pages: 29–41

Head Matter:
Jackson S. Schultz and others v. Edson Bradley.
Defendant, having agreed to purchase a certain numheriof hides of plaintiffs, at a fixed price, accepted a delivery, but afterwards alleged that a part of them were of an inferior quality to that contracted for, and requested plaintiffs to to take them back. Plaintiffs denied that the hides were inferior to the contract quality, but took them back as requested, and examined them, and having satisfied themselves that they were of the proper quality, tendered them again to the defendant, who refused to receive them.
Held, a sufficient part delivery to take the case out of the statute of frauds.
Held further, that plaintiffs, by taking back the hides, did not rescind the contract, or give an acquiescence to defendant’s rejection of them amounting to a rescission, and that the hides being of the proper quality, they were entitled to recover damages for defendant’s refusal to fulfil his contract.
In such a case, Held, that plaintiffs might sell the goods at private sale, and without notice to defendant; and, provided the sale was a judicious one, could thereafter recover from defendant the difference between that price and the contract price.
Appeal by the defendants from a judgment entered on the verdict of a jury at trial term.
The action was brought to recover damages for a refusal to take and pay for certain goods.
The facts are as follows :
In December, 1864, an agreement was entered into by the parties to this action, for the sale and purchase of 10,000 sides of oak wax leather, memoranda of which agreement were signed and exchanged. By the terms of sale, 3,000 sides were to be delivered at once, and paid for in thirty days, the residue to be ■delivered as fast as finished, from 100 to 150 sides daily, commencing January 15,1865.
After plaintiffs commenced the delivery of the 3,000 sides, defendant requested that 5,000 additional sides should be added to the contract, which was done by plaintiffs’ writing the same on said memoranda of sale, in presence of the defendant.
On February 24th, 1865, the deliveries of leather by the plaintiffs amounted to 6,365 sides.
About this time a misunderstanding arose as to the quality of the leather, and time of delivery. No further deliveries were made until March 29th, 1865, when, from negotiations had, a new arrangement was made between the parties, whereby it was verbally agreed, that the whole number of hides to-be sold and delivered should be reduced from 15,000 to 12,000,. the limitation as to time waived, and additional facilities of" payment offered.
The plaintiffs then resumed the delivery of said leather, and by the 8th of April, 1865, had delivered-5,635 sides, in addition to the 6,365 sides previously delivered, making the 12,000 called for by said new agreement.
. On April 12th, 1865, defendant (by letter of that date) complained of the quality of the leather, and subsequently rejected the whole 5,635 sides, and notified the plaintiffs to take them away. This was done by the plaintiffs, without admitting the-, position of the defendant as to the quality of the articles so-rejected. The said hides were taken to plaintiffs’ store, reexamined, found by them to be good in all respects, and the same were again offered and retendered to the defendant, who-refused to receive them. Shortly after the market fell,.and the leather in question was, on the 5th of September, 1865, sold by the plaintiffs at 20 cents a foot. For the damages caused by such depreciation in value, and defendant’s refusal to take, judgment was rendered for the plaintiffs for $9,649 46, from which this appeal is taken.
Alvin G. Bradley, for appellant.
I. Plaintiffs, by sending for and taking away the rejected hides, waived their right to maintain an . action (Lord v. Kinney, 13 Johns. 219; Healey v. Utley, 1 Cow. 345 ; Coon v. Reed, 1 Hilt. 511; Callins v. Brooks, 20 How. Pr. 327; Mallory v. Lord, 29 Barb. 454; Shindler v. Houston, 1 N. Y. 261; Rogers v. Phillips, 40 Id. 519; Sands v. Taylor, 5 Johns. 395 ; Bement v. Smith, 15 Wend. 493; McEachron v. Randalls, 34 Barb. 301; Pallen v. Le Roy, 30 N. Y. 549).
II. The contract was void by the statute of frauds, and defendant had a right to reject the hides (Champion v. Plummer, 5 Est. 240 ; 4 B. & P. 253, per Mansfield, C. J.; 3 Pars, on Cont. (5th ed.) 13, note (v); 1 Greenl. on Ev. § 268, n. (4); 2 Ph. Ev. ch. 7, p. 84, C. & H. 2d 4 Am. ed.; Bailey v. Ogden, 3 Johns. 399).
William M. Evarts, for respondents.
T. The statute of frauds does not apply to the transaction between the parties. The agreement was for the purchase of an article to be manufactured, and, therefore, not within the-statute of frauds (Mead, v. Cose, 33 Barb. 202; Donovan v. Willson, 26 Id. 138 ; Robertson v. Vaughn, 5 Sand. 1; Sewall v. Fitch, 8 Cow. 215 ; Crookshank v. Burrell, 18 Johns. 58).
II. If the statute of frauds applies, there was a delivery and acceptance of a portion of the hides, which renders the' contract valid (Sale v. Darragh, 2 Hilt. 184; Boutwell v. O’Keefe, 32 Barb. 434; McKnight v. Dunlop, 1 Seld. 537; Sprague v. Blake, 10 Wend. 61).
III. The sending for and taking away of the 5,635 sides,, neither did away with the acceptance of such as the defendant had previously accepted, nor did it amount to a rescission of the contract. It was done with the intent of re-examining the hides, to see if the defects complained of really existed. When it was found that the complaint was unfounded, the plaintiffs did all they could to restore the goods to the custody of the defendant (Smith v. Dynes, 5 N. Y. 41, 45).
IY. When defendant refused to receive the leather, plaintiffs had a right to sell it" (Sands v. Taylor, 5 Johns. 395 ; Dement v. Smith, 15 Wend. 497; Crooks v. Moore, 1 Sandf. 297; 2 Pars, on Cont. 453 ; McLean v. Dunn, 4 Bing. 722 ; Gerard v. Taggart, 5 Serg. & R. 19); and no notice to defendant of time and place of sale was necessary (Pollen v. Le Roy, 30 N. Y. 549).

Opinion:
Larremore, J. (after stating the facts).
—It will hardly be claimed that the contract in question is within the statute of frauds. It calls for the delivery of an article to be manufac tured (Mead v. Case, 33 Barb. 202, and cases there cited; Donovan v. Willson, 26 Barb. 138).
But even if this were not the case, there was a delivery of a portion of the hides, in pursuance of the verbal agreement of March 28th, 1865, on the day it was made, and the residue in a short time thereafter. The jury have found that there was an acceptance by the defendant, and such finding, upon the evidence offered, must be regarded as conclusive. The subsequent delivery and acceptance of the hides by the defendant was sufficient to take the case out of the statute (McKnight v. Dunlop, 5 N. Y. (1 Seld.) 537; Sale v. Darragh, 2 Hilt. 184; Sprague v. Blake, 20 Wend. 61).
The retaking of the property by the plaintiffs, for the purpose of re-examination as to its quality, was not a rescission of the contract, and the jury have found this to be the fact.
There can be no doubt of the plaintiffs' right to sell the property, after a refusal by defendant to receive it (Sands v. Taylor, 5 Johns. Rep. 395 ; Bement v. Smith, 15 Wend. 497; Crooks v. Moore, 1 Sand. 297; 2 Parsons on Cont. 453). There does not appear to have been any unfairness about the transaction. The sale was made on a rising market, in the regular course of business, and for full value, and no notice of the same to defendant was necessary (Pollen v. Le Roy, 30 N. Y. 549).
The case was fairly submitted to the jury, and the judgment entered on their verdict should be affirmed, with costs.
Joseph F. Daly, J.
—It does not seem to me that there was any rescission of the contract of sale between the parties as to the 5,635 sides of leather in question. The defendant had no right to disaffirm the contract and reject the goods, since it appears, that they were not inferior to the quality agreed to be furnished. The jury found this fact under the charge, and the evidence is sufficient to sustain the finding. The question, therefore, is, was there an agreement between the parties to rescind, or an acquiescence by the plaintiffs in defendant's rejection of the goods, amounting to rescission?
The evidence on the point is, that the plaintiffs, had always told the defendant to send back what was not right, to reject inferior leather, and they would take it hack; that while the leather was in course of delivery, and under date of April 12th, the defendant wrote to the plaintiffs : " I have examined some of the wax'leather sent in on the last bills, and I notify you thus early that if this is a sample of the lot, I will not receive the leather, but hold it subject to your order." On April 15th, the defendant again wrote to plaintiffs: " Of the 5,635 sides wax leather sent me, I have examined sufficient to satisfy me that the leather is not of the quality which you agreed to* furnish me. I, therefore, reject the entire lot, and request you to take it away as early as possible." The plaintiff" Schultz, who had been absent from the city, found these letters on his return. He wrote under date of April 21st, on behalf of plaintiffs, to the defendant: " We are in receipt of your two letters of the 12th and 15th. We are, of course, surprised at your statement.' We do not and cannot admit the position you take. But, by your request, we will send and take the leather away. You will, therefore, please deliver the leather, or such portion as you reject, to our cartmen when they call."' The plaintiffs sent to defendant's, got the leather, took it to their store, opened and examined it, found it good, and equal in all respects to the best they had manufactured, and tendered it back to defendant. On April 29th, they wrote to defendant, " We have re-examined the leather referred to in your letters of the 12th and 15th of this month, and are satisfied of the incorrectness of your position,, and we shall insist upon your receiving it according to the agreement. We now offer to return it to you. Please advise us by the bearer, or otherwise, if you will accept it." On May 1st, the defendant wrote to the plaintiffs, • "As to your examination of the leather rejected by me, and taken away by you, I am sure my course is correct, and shall be governed accordingly."
It cannot be claimed that the foregoing shows any agreement to rescind the contract of sale of the 5,635 sides. The essence of such an agreement is the same as of all agreements; the minds of the parties must meet, there must be perfect acquiescence ; they must consent as fully to the canceling of their contract, -as to the making of it originally. It will hardly be argued that the parties concurred when the letter of plaintiffs of the 21st April expressly says : " We do not and cannot admit the position you take and it is certain that there is no evidence that plaintiffs admitted the defendant's rejection to be proper, or agreed to receive the leather back for that reason. What, then, was their object in retaking it? They had stipulated with defendant that he might reject what was of inferior quality, and they would take it back. It is clear that this agreement to take back was conditional upon the goods being of inferior quality. Pursuant to it, the defendant notifies his rejection of the whole 5,635 sides ; pursuant to it the plaintiffs take them back. Under the condition, it is the right of the plaintiffs to be satisfied that the rejection is according to the stipulation; they examine, and find the leather good in all respects. If they have been tricked into taking it back, or if mistake on the part of defendant caused the rejection, are the plaintiffs without remedy ? Clearly not, when the only act which can be construed against them—the taking back the leather—was conditional merely, pursuant to an agreement between them, and usage in their dealings as to rejection of goods. There was no unnecessary delay in the re-examination by plaintiffs; eight days for the examination of 5,635 sides •cannot be deemed unreasonable, and it nowhere appears that the defendant was prejudiced by delay. If the question of intent in the retaking of the goods was a proper one for the jury, it was fully submitted to them, and they found in favor of plaintiffs.
The judgment should be affirmed.