Case Name: Byron De La BECKWITH v. STATE of Mississippi
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1992-12-16
Citations: 615 So. 2d 1134
Docket Number: No. 91-IA-1207
Parties: Byron De La BECKWITH v. STATE of Mississippi.
Judges: SULLIVAN, PITTMAN and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 615
Pages: 1134–1166

Head Matter:
Byron De La BECKWITH v. STATE of Mississippi.
No. 91-IA-1207.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Dec. 16, 1992.
Rehearing Denied April 22, 1993.
Merrida Coxwell, Stanfield Carmody & Coxwell, Jim Kitchens, Kitchens & Ellis, Jackson, for appellant.
Edward J. Peters, Hinds County Dist. Atty., Bobby B. DeLaughter, Asst. Dist. Atty., Jackson, for appellee.

Opinion:
HAWKINS, Presiding Justice, for the Court:
Medgar Evers, a black civil rights activist and leader in the turbulent 1950s-1960s civil rights struggles, was murdered at his home in Jackson June 12, 1963. Byron De La Beckwith, a vocal pro-segregationist and white supremacist in this State, was arrested June 23 and indicted for Evers' murder at the July, 1963, term of the grand jury of Hinds County. He stood trial in February, 1964, and following a hung jury, a mistrial was ordered by the circuit judge February 7. He again stood trial in April, and following another hung jury, the circuit judge declared a mistrial April 17, 1964. Until his second trial, Beckwith had been incarcerated without bail.
Following his second trial Beckwith was released on $10,000 bail. He ran a markedly unsuccessful campaign for Lieutenant Governor in 1967. The district attorney prosecuting the case did not seek re-election, and his successor on March 10, 1969, moved the court to enter a nolle prosequi of the indictment. The three circuit judges of the Seventh Circuit Court District signed the order granting a nolle prosequi. There was no objection by the defense to the entry of the nolle prosequi.
Over the years this case has received considerable public attention by the press, but no further effort was made by the State to initiate criminal proceedings against Beckwith until the December, 1990, term of the Hinds County grand jury when he again was indicted for murder. Beck-with, then living in Tennessee, following an extradition contest in the Tennessee courts, was extradited to Mississippi and incarcerated in a Hinds County jail.
His request for bail was denied by the circuit judge, and affirmed on appeal by this Court's order of March 25, 1992. He has been in jail in this State since October, 1991.
In April 1992, he sought dismissal of the indictment against him on three constitutional grounds. The circuit court on August 4, 1992, denied his motion, and Beck-with then petitioned this Court for an interlocutory appeal, pursuant to our Rule 5, Mississippi Supreme Court Rules. This Court by August 26, 1992, Order granted an interlocutory appeal.
There should be no necessity to emphasize the obvious: This case is not before us from a final conviction. It is before us on an interlocutory appeal in which Beckwith claims a Constitutional right not to even be put to trial, seeking this Court to intervene in circuit court criminal trial proceedings instituted by the State of Mississippi, stop them, and order his discharge.
This Court does not equate the right not to be wrongfully convicted as somehow giving a defendant a right not to be put to trial at all. We adhere to the wisdom stated by the United States Supreme Court in Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 328 at 325, 60 S.Ct. 540 at 541, 84 L.Ed. 783 at 785 (1940):
An accused is entitled to scrupulous observance of constitutional safeguards. But encouragement of delay is fatal to the vindication of the criminal law. Bearing the discomfiture and cost of a prosecution for crime even by an innocent person is one of the painful obligations of citizenship. The correctness of a trial court's rejection even of a constitutional claim made by the accused in the process of prosecution must await his conviction before its reconsideration by an appellate tribunal. (Emphasis added.)
On his appeal Beckwith seeks the dismissal of the indictment and his discharge from custody on three grounds:
(1) Denial of a speedy trial. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed_" Amendment 6, U.S. Constitution. "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have a right to a . speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the county where the offense was com-mitted_" Art. 3, § 26, Mississippi Constitution.
(2) Denial of due process. "No person shall be . deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law_" Amendment 5, U.S. Constitution.
(3)Double jeopardy. "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb_" Amendment 5, U.S. Constitution.
We find much wisdom in the principles enunciated in the Federal Courts on questions such as those raised here, and today hold that in applying Rule 5 to any attempted interlocutory appeal in which a defendant seeks to have all criminal charges against him dismissed and for his final discharge, we will adhere to the same principles and criteria of the Federal Courts.
The interlocutory appeal granted Beckwith in this case was not based upon any Constitutional mandate or statute giving him any such right, but solely upon a rule promulgated by this Court. While Beckwith's indictment, arrest and anticipated trial may raise serious and troubling Constitutional questions, he clearly has no Constitutional or statutory right to an interlocutory appeal.
After mature consideration we have concluded that the first two grounds asserted by Beckwith afford no basis for an interlocutory appeal, and decline to address them. We do address the final ground and find it without merit. Our reasons follow.
I.' FEDERAL DECISIONS
The principles and criteria adhered to in the Federal courts are illustrated in three U.S. Supreme Court decisions: Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 104 S.Ct. 1051, 79 L.Ed.2d 288 (1984); United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 98 S.Ct. 1547, 56 L.Ed.2d 18 (1978); and Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 97 S.Ct. 2034, 52 L.Ed.2d 651 (1977).
In Abney v. United States, the Court granted certiorari to specifically address the question of whether or not an appeal would be permitted from a district court order denying a defense motion to dismiss criminal charges on the basis that the defendant's double jeopardy rights under the Fifth Amendment would be violated by a second trial. The Court first analyzed why no appeals are allowed other than those from a final judgment of conviction as authorized by 28 U.S.C.S. § 1291.
We approach the threshold appealability question with two principles in mind. First, it is. well settled that there is no constitutional right to an appeal. McKane v Durston, 153 US 684, 38 L Ed 867, 14 S Ct 913 (1894). Indeed, for a century after this Court was established, no appeal as of right existed in criminal cases, and, as a result, appellate review of criminal convictions was rarely allowed. As the Court described this period in Reetz v Michigan, 188 US 505, 47 L Ed 563, 23 S Ct 390 (1903):
"[TJrials under the Federal practice for even the gravest offences ended in the trial court, except in cases where two judges were present and certified a question of law to this court." Id., at 508, 47 L Ed 563, 23 S Ct 390 [at 392],
The right of appeal, as we presently know it in criminal cases, is purely a creature of statute; in order to exercise that statutory right of appeal one must come within the terms of the applicable statute — in this case, 28 USC § 1291 [28 USCS § 1291],
Second, since appeals of right have been authorized by Congress in criminal cases, as in civil eases, there has been a firm congressional policy against interlocutory or "piecemeal" appeals and courts have consistently given effect to that policy. Finality of judgment has been required as a predicate for federal appellate jurisdiction.
"The general principle of federal appellate jurisdiction, derived from the common law and enacted by the First Congress, requires that review of nisi prius judgment." DiBella v United States, 369 US 121, 124, 7 L Ed 2d 614, 82 S Ct 654 [656] (1962).
Accord, Cobbledick v United States, 309 US 323, 324-326, 84 L Ed 783, 60 S Ct 540 [541-542] (1940). This principle is currently embodied in 28 USC § 1291 [28 USCS § 1291] which grants the federal courts of appeals jurisdiction to review "all final decisions of the district courts," both civil and criminal. Adherence to this rule of finality has been particularly stringent in criminal prosecutions because "the delays and disruptions attendant upon intermediate appeal," which the rule is designed to avoid, "are especially inimical to the effective and fair administration of the criminal law." DiBella, supra, [369 U.S.] at 126, 7 L Ed 2d 614, 82 S Ct 654 [658]. Accord, Cobbledick, supra, [309 U.S.] at 324-326, 84 L Ed 783, 60 S Ct 540 [541-542], (Footnotes omitted; brackets original.)
Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. at 656-657, 97 S.Ct. at 2038-2039, 52 L.Ed.2d at 657-658.
The Court then distinguished an appeal from an order overruling a motion to dismiss an indictment on the ground of double jeopardy from other interlocutory orders in a district court. A motion to dismiss on the ground of double jeopardy involved a right totally independent and collateral to the issues in the trial, and was a "final decision" as contemplated by § 1291.
The Court noted that while a pretrial denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment on double jeopardy grounds "is obviously not 'final' in the sense that it terminates the criminal proceedings," it nonetheless fell "within the so-called 'collateral order' exception to the final-judgment rule first announced in Gohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan," and was a "final decision" within the meaning of § 1291. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. at 657, 97 S.Ct. at 2039, 52 L.Ed.2d at 658-659. The Court observed that the double jeopardy clause protected an accused beyond that of being twice convicted for the same offense, it protected the accused "against being twice put to trial for the same offense." Abney, 431 U.S. at 661, 97 S.Ct. at 2041, 52 L.Ed.2d at 661 (emphasis added.) "[T]he . State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense.'..." Abney, 431 U.S. at 661, 97 S.Ct. at 2041, 52 L.Ed.2d at 661 (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-188, 78 S.Ct. 221, 223-224, 2 L.Ed.2d 199, 77 Ohio L.Abs. 202, 61 A.L.R.2d 1119 (1957).
The Court then considered the petitioner's appeal on the ground of double jeopardy violation and, finding there was none, affirmed the conviction.
In United States v. MacDonald, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether a court of appeals could hear an appeal from a district court order denying a defense motion to dismiss on the ground that the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial had been violated. United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 98 S.Ct. 1547, 56 L.Ed.2d 18 (1978). The Court found that such claim was not separate from or collateral to the trial itself, and held that courts of appeal lacked jurisdiction to entertain appeals in such instances.
The Court made further observations about speedy trial claims:
This Court frequently has considered the appealability of pretrial orders in criminal cases. [Citations omitted.] Just last Term the Court reiterated that interlocutory or "piecemeal" appeals are disfavored. "Finality of judgment has been required as a predicate for federal appellate jurisdiction." Abney v United States, 431 US, at 656, 52 L Ed 2d 651, 97 S Ct 2034 [2038]. See also DiBella v United States, 369 US, at 124, 7 L Ed 2d 614, 82 S Ct 654 [at 656],
This traditional and basic principle is currently embodied in 28 USC § 1291 [28 USCS § 1291], which grants the federal courts of appeal jurisdiction to review "all final decisions of the district courts," both civil ánd criminal. The rule of finality has particular force in criminal prosecutions because "encouragement of delay is fatal to the vindication of the criminal law." Cobbledick v United States, 309 US, at 325, 84 L Ed 783, 60 S Ct 540 [at 541], See also DiBella v United States, 369 US, at 126, 7 L Ed 2d 614, 82 S Ct 654 [at 657].
The resolution of a speedy trial claim necessitates a careful assessment of the particular facts of the case. As is reflected in the decisions of this Court, most speedy trial claims, therefore, are best considered only after the relevant facts have been developed at trial.
Even if the degree of prejudice could be accurately measured before trial, a speedy trial claim nonetheless would not be sufficiently independent of the out come of the trial to warrant pretrial appellate review. The claim would be largely satisfied by an acquittal resulting from the prosecution's failure to carry its burden of proof.... The essence of a defendant's Sixth Amendment claim in the usual case is that the passage of time has frustrated his ability to establish his innocence of the crime charged. Normally, it is only after trial that that claim may fairly be assessed.
Relatedly, the order sought to be appealed in this case may not accurately be described, in the sense that the description has been employed, as involving "an important right which would be 'lost, probably irreparably,' if review had to await final judgment." [Citations omitted.] . Unlike the protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause, the Speedy Trial Clause does not, either on its face or according to the decisions of this Court, encompass a "right not to be tried" which must be upheld prior to trial if it is to be enjoyed at all. It is the delay before trial, not the trial itself, that offends against the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial. If the factors outlined in Barker v Wingo, supra [407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972)] combine to deprive an accused his right to a speedy trial, that loss, by definition, occurs before trial. Proceeding with the trial does not cause or compound the deprivation already suffered.
Furthermore, in most cases, as noted above, it is difficult to make the careful examination of the constituent elements of the speedy trial claim before trial. Appellate courts would be in no better position than trial courts to vindicate a right that had not yet been shown to have been infringed.
Significantly, this Court has emphasized that one of the principal reasons for its strict adherence to the doctrine of finality in criminal cases is that "[t]he Sixth Amendment guarantees a speedy trial." DiBella v United States, 369 US, at 126, 7 L Ed 2d 614, 82 S Ct 654 [at 658]. Fulfillment of this guarantee would be impossible if every pretrial order were appealable.
In sum, we decline to exacerbate pretrial delay by intruding upon accepted principles of finality to allow a defendant whose speedy trial motion has been denied before trial to obtain interlocutory appellate review. (Footnotes omitted; brackets original.)
MacDonald, 435 U.S. at 853-863, 98 S.Ct. at 1549-1554, 56 L.Ed.2d at 23-29.
The Supreme Court also rejected the notion that an extraordinary speedy trial claim could afford any basis for an interlocutory appeal.
The Court of Appeals' alternative rationale — that it was the "extraordinary nature" of respondent's claim that merited interlocutory appeal, even though not all speedy trial claims would be so meritorious — is also unpersuasive. "Appeal rights cannot depend on the facts of a particular case." Carroll v United States, 354 US 394, 405, 1 L Ed 2d 1442, 77 S Ct 1332 [1339] (1957). The factual circumstances that underlie a speedy trial claim, however "extraordinary," cannot establish its independent appealability prior to trial. Under the controlling jurisdictional statute, 28 USC § 1291 [28 USAC § 1291], the federal courts of appeals have power to review only "final decisions," a concept that Congress defined "in terms of categories." Carroll v United States, 354 US, at 405, 1 L Ed 2d 1442, 77 S Ct 1332 [at 1339].
United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. at 857, n. 6, 98 S.Ct. at 1551, n. 6, 56 L.Ed.2d at 25, n. 5b, 6b, 7b.
In Flanagan v. United States, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether a court of appeals had jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a district court order which, over defense objection, disqualified a law firm from representing four defendants because of a conflict between their defenses. The petitioners asserted a Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel, and of their Fifth Amendment right to due process to present a common defense through joint counsel. Flanagan, 465 U.S. at 262-263, 104 S.Ct. at 1053-1054, 79 L.Ed.2d 288 at 293. The Court held that the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
The observations and holding of the Court in Flanagan merit repeating in full here:
"Finality as a condition of review is an historic characteristic of federal appellate procedure." Cobbledick v United States, 309 US 323, 324, 84 L Ed 783, 60 S Ct 540 [541] (1940). Thus, the jurisdictional statute applicable to this case limits the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals to appeals from "final decisions of the district courts." 28 USC § 1291 [28 USCS § 1291]. This final judgment rule requires that "a party must ordinarily raise all claims of error in a single appeal following final judgment on the merits." Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v Risjord, 449 US [368], at 374, 66 L Ed 2d 571, 101 5 Ct 669 [at 673]. In a criminal case the rule prohibits appellate review until conviction and imposition of sentence. Berman v United States, 302 US 211, 212, 82 L Ed 204, 58 S Ct 164 [166] (1937).
The final judgment rule serves several important interests. It helps preserve the respect due trial judges by minimizing appellate-court interference with the numerous decisions they must make in the prejudgment stages of litigation. It reduces the ability of litigants to harass opponents and to clog the courts through a succession of costly and time-consuming appeals. It is crucial to the efficient administration of justice. Firestone Tire 6 Rubber Co. v Risjord, supra [449 U.S.] at 374, 66 L Ed 2d 571, 101 S Ct 669 [at 673]. For these reasons, "[t]his Court has long held that the policy of Congress embodied in [§ 1291] is inimical to piecemeal appellate review of trial court decisions which do not terminate the litigation." United States v Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 US 263, 265, 73 L Ed 2d 754, 102 S Ct 3081 [3082] (1982).
The Court has also long held that "this policy is at its strongest in the field of criminal law.'' Id. More than 40 years ago the Court noted that the reasons for the final judgment rule are "especially compelling in the administration of criminal justice." Cobbledick v United States, supra [309 U.S.] at 325, 84 L Ed 783, 60 S Ct 540 [at 541]. Promptness in bringing a criminal case to trial has become increasingly important as crime has increased, court dockets have swelled, and detention facilities have become overcrowded.
The importance of the final judgment rule has led the Court to permit departures from the rule "only when observance of it would practically defeat the right to any review at all." Cobbledick v United States, supra, at 324-325, 84 L Ed 783, 60 S Ct 540 [541] (footnote omitted). The Court has allowed a departure only for the "limited category of cases falling with the 'collateral order' exception delineated in Cohen...." United States v Hollywood Motor Car Co., supra [458 U.S.] at 265, 73 L Ed 2d 754, 102 S Ct 3081 [at 3083]. To come within this "narrow exception," Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v Risjord, supra [449 U.S.] at 374, 66 L Ed 2d 571, 101 S Ct 669 [673], a trial court order must, at a minimum, meet three conditions. First, it "must conclusively determine the disputed question"; second, it must "resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action"; third, it must "be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Coopers & Lybrand v Livesay, 437 US 463, 468, 57 L Ed 2d 351, 98 S Ct 2454 [2458] (1978) (footnote omitted).
Because of the compelling interest in prompt trials, the Court has interpreted the requirements of the collateral-order exception to the final judgment rule with the utmost strictness in criminal cases. The Court has found, only three types of pretrial orders in criminal prosecutions to meet the requirements. See United States v Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 US, at 265, 73 L Ed 2d 754, 102 S Ct 3081 [at 3082]. Each type involves " 'an asserted right the legal and practical value of which would be destroyed if it were not vindicated before trial.' " Id., at 266, 73 L Ed 2d 754, 102 S Ct 3081 [3083] (quoting United States v. MacDonald, supra [435 U.S.] at 860, 56 L Ed 2d 18, 98 S Ct 1547 [at 1552]).
An order denying a motion to reduce bail may be reviewed before trial. The issue is finally resolved and is independent of the issues to be tried, and the order becomes moot if review awaits conviction and sentence. Stack v Boyle, 342 US 1, 96 L Ed 3, 72 S Ct 1 (1951). Orders denying motions to dismiss an indictment on double jeopardy or speech or debate grounds are likewise immediately appealable.... Similarly, the right guaranteed by the Speech or Debate Clause is more than the right not to be convicted for certain legislative activities: it is the right not to "be questioned" about them — that is, not to be tried for them. Helstoski v Meanor, 442 US 500, 61 L Ed 2d 30, 99 S Ct 2445 (1979). Refusals to dismiss an indictment for violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause or of the Speech or Debate Clause, like denials of bail reduction, are truly final and collateral, and the asserted rights in all three cases would be irretrievably lost if review were postponed until trial is completed.
An order disqualifying counsel lacks the critical characteristics that make orders denying bail reduction or refusing to dismiss on double jeopardy or speech or debate grounds immediately appeal-able. Unlike a request for bail reduction, a constitutional objection to counsel's disqualification is in no danger of becoming moot upon conviction and sentence. Moreover, it cannot be said that the right petitioners assert, whether based on the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment or on the Assistance of Counsel Clause of the Sixth Amendment, is a right not to be tried. Double jeopardy and speech or debate rights are sui gen-eris in this regard. See United States v. MacDonald, 435 US, at 860, n 7, 56 L Ed 2d 18, 98 S Ct 1547 [at 1552, n. 7], Rather just as the speedy trial right is merely a right not to be convicted at an excessively delayed trial, id., at 860-861, 56 L Ed 2d 18, 98 S Ct 1547 [at 1552-1553], the asserted right not to have joint counsel disqualified is, like virtually all rights of criminal defendants, merely a right not to be convicted in certain circumstances. Unlike a double jeopardy or speech or debate claim, petitioners' claim "would be largely satisfied by an acquittal resulting from the prosecution's failure to carry its burden of proof." Id., at 859, 56 L Ed 2d 18, 98 S Ct 1547 [at 1552], See also United States v Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 US [263], at 268, 75 [73] L Ed 2d 754, 102 S Ct 3081 [3084] (vindictive prosecution right fully protected by postconviction review). "Bearing the discomfiture and cost of a prosecution for crime even by an innocent person is one of the painful obligations of citizenship." Cobbledick v United States, 309 US, at 325, 84 L Ed 783, 60 S Ct 540 [at 541], See also Roche v Evaporated Milk Assn., 319 US 21, 30, 87 L Ed 1185, 63 S Ct 938 [943] (1943). (Brackets original; parenthesis original; emphasis added; footnotes omitted.)
Flanagan, 465 U.S. at 263-267, 104 S.Ct. at 1053-1056, 79 L.Ed.2d at 293-96.
II. MISSISSIPPI HISTORY
Art. Ill, § I of the United States Constitution states that "The Judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." (Emphasis added.) Art. 6, § 144 of the Mississippi Constitution states that "The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a Supreme Court and such other courts as are provided for in this constitution." (Emphasis added.)
Until 1983, Art. 6, § 146 of the Mississippi Constitution read: "The Supreme Court shall have such jurisdiction as properly belongs to a court of appeals." By amendment ratified in November, 1983, § 146 was amended. In pertinent part, it now provides: "The Supreme Court shall have such jurisdiction as properly belongs to a court of appeals and shall exercise no jurisdiction on matters other than those specifi- catty provided by this Constitution or by general law." (Emphasis added.)
Both the United States and the Mississippi Constitutions are silent on rights to appeal. Clearly, neither gives its Supreme Court any specific right to grant appeals of any kind.
Until 1984 this Court adhered to the same principle of Constitutional law under our Mississippi Constitution as the United • States Supreme Court has under the U.S. Constitution, namely: that all rights of appeal, including interlocutory appeals, are purely statutory, that there is no right of appeal in the absence of a statute authorizing it and, as a condition precedent to this Court acquiring jurisdiction, the terms of the appeal statute had to be strictly complied with.
All interlocutory appeals were governed solely by statute. Except as authorized by Miss.Code Ann. § 11-7-213, a statute authorizing an appeal by either party from an order granting a new trial on damages, no interlocutory appeal was ever granted from a circuit court order. Cotton v. Veterans Cab Co., Inc., 344 So.2d 730 (Miss.1977). Interlocutory appeals from chancery court were governed solely by Miss.Code Ann. § 11-51-7 (Supp.1992).
The same rule was assiduously followed by this Court in all criminal cases. The right to appeal to this Court in a criminal case was not a common law right, but "strictly a statutory right," and an appeal had to be perfected within the terms of the applicable appeal statute. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-35-101 (Supp.1992). In the absence of compliance with the statute, we have consistently held that this Court did not have jurisdiction. Cf. Fleming v. State, 553 So.2d 505, 506 (Miss.1989); Mississippi v. Ridinger, 279 So.2d 618, 620 (Miss.1973); Cooper v. State, 175 Miss. 718, 168 So. 53 (1936). We likewise held that there could be no appeal to this Court before a final judgment of conviction, absent which we did not have jurisdiction. Jaquith v. Beckwith, 248 Miss. 491, 157 So.2d 403 (1963); Cooper v. State, 175 Miss. 718, 168 So. 53 (1936); Hayden v. State, 81 Miss. 55, 32 So. 922 (1902); Lemly v. State, 69 Miss. 628, 12 So. 559 (1892). In sum, throughout out State's jurisprudence, we adhered to the same principles governing a right of appeal as the United States Supreme Court, namely: there was no Constitutional or common law right of appeal in either civil or criminal cases and any right thereasto had to be given by Legislative enactment.
This State followed the general rule as to interlocutory appeals. For interlocutory appeals in civil cases, see generally 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error, § 93, et seq.; and in criminal cases, 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law, § 1643, et seq.
Indeed, until State v. Maples, 402 So.2d 350 (Miss.1981), this Court felt it had no jurisdiction to interfere at all in a trial court proceeding. Our jurisdiction was limited solely to review upon an appeal perfected by statute. Wynne v. Railroad, 105 Miss. 784, 66 So. 411 (1914); Planters In surance Co. v. Cramer, 47 Miss. 200 (1872). In Maples the State petitioned this Court for a writ of prohibition directed to a circuit judge to recuse himself from presiding over a number of criminal prosecutions. Because the State would be without remedy in the absence of the writ, we held it proper recourse for the State in that particular case.
The overruling by a circuit judge of a motion to require him to vacate the bench is an interlocutory order, and ordinarily the Supreme Court will not review his action in an original proceeding here, since the petitioner may have the ruling reviewed on appeal. However, in a criminal case the State is without adequate remedy by appeal if the trial judge has erroneously refused to vacate the bench because if there is a verdict of acquittal or a directed verdict, the defendant in the criminal case may not be tried again because of the double jeopardy provisions of the Constitutions of the United States and the State of Mississippi. The inability of the State to have the error corrected on appeal takes the case out of the rule that the Supreme Court is without jurisdiction to review such an order in an original action for writ of prohibition. We hold this is a proper case to review the action of the trial judge in an original action for a writ of prohibition.
The rule announced in this case will not apply to plaintiffs or defendants in civil cases, or defendants in criminal cases, where the judge is requested to recuse himself, because such parties may have the ruling of the trial judge reviewed on appeal. (Emphasis added.)
Maples, 402 So.2d at 353.
In a series of cases, beginning with Southern Farm Bureau Cos. Ins. Co. v. Holland, 469 So.2d 55 (Miss.1984), this Court departed from its previous holdings and held that it had the power, aside from statute, to grant interlocutory appeals.
These cases culminated in our promulgating Rule 5 of the Mississippi Supreme Court Rules. This rule is patterned after Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Two important distinctions need be noted between Federal Rule 5 and this Court's Rule 5, however. The first is that the Federal Rule is specifically authorized by 28 U.S.C.S. § 1292(b); no Mississippi statute authorizes our Rule 5. The second distinction is that the Federal statute § 1292(b) and the Federal Rule only authorize an interlocutory appeal in a civil action. No interlocutory appeal is authorized in a criminal prosecution. Our Rule 5, on the other hand, is not limited to civil cases. "It applies to both civil and criminal cases." Comment to Rule 5.
For better or worse, Rule 5 exists. It has never been challenged by any litigant. In today's decision we cannot escape addressing the breadth and scope of the rule's applications in criminal cases. Having granted this interlocutory appeal, must we prior to trial examine Beckwith's claims of Speedy Trial and Due Process violations? In fairness to Beckwith's contentions, it would not be an illogical extension of our post-Holland decisions to hold that we are obligated to do so, and if we find them prejudicial, terminate the prosecution and order his discharge.
But law is more than logic; it is the embodiment of human experience. To address Beckwith's Speedy Trial and Due Process contentions would be to hold that this Court, without any Legislative enactment permitting it, and based solely upon a rule promulgated by us, has the authority and duty to address his contentions and make a ruling thereon. It would be to hold that this Court somehow has the Constitutional authority to abort a criminal trial in progress and address rights that can and most assuredly would be vindicated on appeal, and if we pre-trial deem them prejudicial, terminate all criminal proceedings and direct the discharge of the defendant. Moreover, it would be to hold that, by our promulgation of Rule 5, this Court intended to stake a Constitutional claim to wield such awesome authority. A matter of more serious gravity cannot be envisioned. If we hold that in this case, however serious or extraordinary it may be, we intended by promulgation of Rule 5 to grant unto ourselves the authority to address pre-trial rights that can be vindicated on appeal from a final judgment to this Court, it will mean that we also have the authority and duty to consider them in deciding whether to grant or deny all attempted interlocutory appeals raising similar questions. We construct a quagmire onto our appellate responsibilities already strained beyond our capacity.
It will mean we ignore the wisdom of Maples in which we held that we would never address .by interlocutory appeal rights that can be vindicated on appeal. It will mean we ignore the wisdom of the United States Supreme Court decisions and the United States Congress, encompassing two centuries of experience, not to address such questions by an interlocutory appeal. For whatever reason the rationale of the Federal Courts came into existence, by court decisions or intent of Congress, or both, it is a most compelling wisdom, and not to be ignored.
Under our Constitution the State of Mississippi and our circuit judges have the authority and solemn responsibility following an indictment to proceed to final judgment in all criminal proceedings without interference. It is simply carrying Rule 5 too far to hold that a majority of this Court has the authority to intervene and interpose ourselves into a circuit court criminal trial, stop all proceedings, and order the discharge of a criminal defendant to protect an alleged violation of a right that can be addressed, and if violated, fully vindicated on appeal.
We today hold that it is not the intent of this Court under Rule 5 to grant unto ourselves such authority or duty. We decline Beckwith's invitation that we do so; all such rights can be fully addressed if there is an appeal to this Court from a final judgment. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-35-101 (1972).
In this holding we are not unmindful of the comment to Rule 5 that it applies to criminal as well as civil cases, nor our decisions in State v. Caldwell, 492 So.2d 575, 576-77 (Miss.1986), and Dantzler v. State, 542 So.2d 906 (Miss.1989). Caldwell can be readily distinguished. There we directed a circuit judge to grant a change of venue to assure the defendant an impartial jury and a fair trial; we did not terminate the prosecution and order the defendant's discharge. In Caldwell we, in effect, issued a writ of mandamus to prevent the circuit judge from committing what otherwise would have been certain reversible error. In Dantzler we granted an interlocutory appeal to determine the Constitutional validity of a statute under which a defendant had been convicted in justice court. We will await a future day to decide whether Rule 5 or Caldwell and Dantzler should indeed authorize granting an interlocutory appeal in any criminal case on issues that can be fully addressed upon an appeal from a final judgment. As Supreme Court Justice Jackson so aptly noted in Cohen, footnote 3, supra, appellate jurisdiction is the power of review, not intervention.
Under Mississippi law, Beckwith must show actual prejudice and intentional delay to gain tactical advantage by the government. Hooker v. State, 516 So.2d 1349, 1351 (Miss.1987). This can be shown, if at all, only after a trial on the merits with a full record for this Court to review.
Mississippi caselaw requires a trial with a result before this Court will review a claim of speedy trial violation. We apply the Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), factors to the facts developed at the trial. All published Mississippi cases on speedy trial flow from a trial, a conviction and an appeal on the merits.
Suffice it for today's decision that we do not read into the rule any intent to grant unto ourselves the authority or duty to abort a criminal trial in progress, and by interlocutory appeal address rights which can be fully vindicated upon appeal from a final judgment of conviction, and order the termination of all criminal prosecution and discharge the defendant.
III. DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Beckwith is presently in jail, awaiting trial without bond. If his double jeopardy claim has merit, then he has two very serious civil rights being violated now: the right to liberty guaranteed him by the Fifth Amendment, and the right not to be prosecuted. These are rights collateral to and totally independent of his guilt or innocence or the conduct of his trial, and are of immediate urgency.
Miss.Code Ann. § 99-35-101 is the only statutory avenue of appeal afforded defendants in criminal cases. "Any person convicted of an offense in a circuit court may appeal to the supreme court ." Clearly this Court does not have jurisdiction under this statute. His double jeopardy claim is not an appeal from a criminal conviction. The manner in which we have interpreted Miss.Code Ann. § 99-35-101, Hayden v. State, 81 Miss. 55, 32 So. 922 (1902); and Lemly v. State, 69 Miss. 628, 12 So. 559 (1892), is precisely as the United States Supreme Court has interpreted 28 U.S.C.S. § 1291 in attempted criminal appeals from a district court; Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 77 S.Ct. 481, 1 L.Ed.2d 393 (1957); Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211, 58 S.Ct. 164, 82 L.Ed. 204 (1937).
As Abney, however, mandates, Beck-with's rights under a double jeopardy claim in this case go beyond his right not to be convicted, and are of immediate urgency, justifying determination now. Because of the unique nature of the denial by a circuit court of a colorable double jeopardy claim, involving as it does the Constitutional right not to be prosecuted for the offense, it is final. This Court is authorized to treat it as a "final judgment" in a civil action under Miss.Code Ann. § 11-51-3 (Supp.1992), which authorizes an appeal from a final judgment, and Miss.Code Ann. § 9-3-9 (Supp.1992), which gives this Court jurisdiction of an appeal from any final judgment in the circuit court. This is again precisely as the United States Supreme Court has interpreted appeals from a "final decision" under 28 U.S.C.S. § 1291. "The words, 'final decision in the district court,' mean the same thing as 'final judgments and decrees,' as used in former acts regulating appellate jurisdictions." In re Tiffany, 252 U.S. 32, 36, 40 S.Ct. 239, 241, 64 L.Ed. 443, 444 (1920). See also Bankers Trust Co. v. Mollis, 435 U.S. 381, 98 S.Ct. 1117, 55 L.Ed.2d 357 (1978), rehearing denied 436 U.S. 915, 98 S.Ct. 2259, 56 L.Ed.2d 416. Indeed, Abney compels us to treat the circuit court denial of Beckwith's double jeopardy claim as a "final judgment."
Moreover, Abney compels us to consider whether we have jurisdiction under Art. I, § 9 of the United States Constitution and Art. 3, § 21 of the Mississippi Constitution, guaranteeing Beckwith the right of habeas corpus. If Beckwith's legal position is correct, his pleading in circuit court entitled him to be released via a writ of habeas corpus. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-43-1; Jaquith v. Beckwith, 248 Miss. 491, 157 So.2d 403 (1963); Rule 81, Miss. R.Civ.Proc. We are authorized to treat his appeal to this Court as an appeal from a denial of a writ of habeas corpus, Miss. Code Ann. § 11-43-53 (Supp.1992); or, alternatively, his pleading is sufficiently specific to treat it as an application to this Court for a writ of habeas corpus, Miss. Code Ann. § 11-43-7, 11-43-9 (Supp. 1992). See also Harden v. State, 460 So.2d 1194, 1200-01 (Miss.1984).
IY. THE MERITS OF THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAIM
At the outset we note that ,the fact we have jurisdiction over Beckwith's double jeopardy claim does not give us pendent jurisdiction over his due process and speedy trial claims. "[A] federal court of appeals is without pendente jurisdiction over otherwise nonappealable claims even though they are joined with a double jeopardy claim over which the appellate court does have interlocutory jurisdiction." United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 857, n. 6, 98 S.Ct. 1547, 1551 n. 6, 56 L.Ed.2d 18 (1978), rev'g 531 F.2d 196 (4th Cir.1976); United States v. Blackwell, 900 F.2d 742, 746 (4th Cir.1990).
We therefore address Beckwith's double jeopardy claim solely, without consideration of, or affected by, his due process or speedy trial claims.
A defendant's double jeopardy right not to be re-prosecuted for the same offense accrues instantly upon the happening of some event in criminal proceedings against him. A double jeopardy right "attaches" when the jury is sworn and empan-elled to hear the case. Jones v. State, 898 So.2d 1312, 1314 (Miss.1981). In order for his double jeopardy right not to be re-prosecuted for the same offense to accrue, however, the original jeopardy must have "terminated." Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984). Thereafter, lapse of time neither strengthens nor diminishes it. No subsequent event affects an accrued double jeopardy right. Beckwith's sole basis of a claim of violation of his double jeopardy right is premised upon the nolle prosequi order of March 10, 1969. If he is correct, the State would have been absolutely prohibited from again seeking his indictment and prosecuting him on March 11, 1969. If the nolle prosequi order did not give him the right not to be again prosecuted for this murder, the State had just as much authority under a double jeopardy claim to proceed in 1990 as it would have in 1970.
Thus, the sole question before us is whether the nolle prosequi entered upon the motion of the district attorney gives him such right under either our Mississippi or the United States Constitution.
Art. 3, § 22 of the Mississippi Constitution states:
Section 22. No person's life or liberty shall be twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense; but there must be an actual acquittal or conviction on the merits to bar another prosecution.
Clearly, if a defendant has pleaded guilty, been convicted, or acquitted by a jury, his double jeopardy right has fully accrued. It is also settled law that a court-directed verdict to the jury to find the defendant not guilty has the same effect as a jury-deliberated verdict of not guilty. See, e.g., State v. Russell, 358 So.2d 409 at 412-13 (Miss. 1978); Agregaard v. Duncan, 252 Miss. 454 at 457, 173 So.2d 416 at 417 (1965); State v. Thornhill, 251 Miss. 718 at 726, 171 So.2d 308 at 312 (1965).
Defendants may be repeatedly retried, however, following mistrials granted because the jury was deadlocked and could not reach a unanimous verdict. Watts v. State, 492 So.2d 1281 (Miss.1986); Wallace v. State, 466 So.2d 900 (Miss.1985); State v. Moor, 1 Walk.Ch. 134, 1 Mor.St.Cas. 13, 12 Am.Dec. 541 (Miss.1823). Federal jurisdictions follow the same rule. Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984); Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 83 S.Ct. 1033, 10 L.Ed.2d 100 (1963).
We have also held that "retiring" or "passing" an indictment to the files is not an acquittal barring further prosecution, following which the case may be reopened upon motion of the State. Walton v. City of Tupelo, 229 Miss. 193 at 196, 90 So.2d 193 at 194 (1956); Gordon v. State, 127 Miss. 396, 90 So. 95 (1921).
Pursuant to § 22 of our Constitution, this Court has held that following a mistrial declared because of a hung jury, a nolle prosequi entered at the request of the State did not terminate the original jeopardy, and the State was not barred thereafter from seeking the re-indictment of and re-prosecuting the defendant from the same offense. Smith v. State, 158 Miss. 355 at 359, 128 So. 891 at 892 (1930). This same principle has been applied in California and Florida. People v. Lucas, 78 Cal.App. 421, 248 P. 691 (1926); Smith v. State, 135 Fla. 835, 186 So. 203 (1939). 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law, § 255, p. 667.
Nor does this rule in and of itself offend the United States Constitution. Bucolo v. Adkins, 424 U.S. 641, 96 S.Ct. 1086, 47 L.Ed.2d 301 (1976), citing Smith v. State, 135 Fla. 835, 186 So. 203 (1939); Chatfield v. Ricketts, 673 F.2d 330, 332 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied 459 U.S. 843, 103 S.Ct. 96, 74 L.Ed.2d 88; Arnold v. McCarthy, 566 F.2d 1377, 1388 (9th Cir.1978). Cf Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23, 97 S.Ct. 2141, 53 L.Ed.2d 80 (1977). The Federal Courts have held that the application of the double jeopardy rule "has never been considered absolute." United States v. McHan, 966 F.2d 134, 139 (9th Cir.1992); Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 151—52, 97 S.Ct. 2207, 2216-17, 53 L.Ed.2d 168 (1977).
In Jones v. State, 398 So.2d 1312, 1314 (Miss. 1981), the circuit judge declared a mistrial when there was no manifest necessity to do so. We held that the double jeopardy clause prohibited the defendant from again being put to trial for the same offense, because once the jury had been empanelled, the defendant had a right to have his trial concluded by the same jury. The distinction between Jones and this case is readily apparent. Beckwith's right to have his case heard by the jury empanelled to hear it was never frustrated. Two juries heard his case, and each was unable to agree upon a verdict, and was hopelessly deadlocked. Clearly there was a manifest necessity to declare a mistrial in each case. Also, see Spann v. State, 557 So.2d 530 (Miss. 1990) (distinguishing Jones).
McNeal v. Hollowell, 481 F.2d 1145 (5th Cir.1973), cited by Beckwith is also distinguishable. In that case, during McNeal's trial, a key state witness asserted his Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate himself, and the district attorney, finding himself unable to offer sufficient evidence to make a jury issue, moved for a nolle prose-qui, which was sustained by the Court over vigorous defense objection. The jury was dismissed, and shortly thereafter McNeal was re-indicted, re-tried and convicted. McNeal sought remedy by habeas corpus in the United States district court, and on appeal the Court of Appeals held that there was no manifest necessity of a mistrial which resulted from the district attorney's taking his chance on an unreliable witness. The Court held that to allow the State to move for a nolle prosequi and have the circuit court declare a mistrial and discharge the jury would lend itself to "prose-cutorial manipulation," or "prosecutorial misconduct." McNeal, 481 F.2d at 1150. In McNeal, however, and contrary to this case, the defendant was denied his right to have the jury empanelled to hear his case proceed to final verdict.
On the record before us, there is nothing to suggest any prosecutorial misconduct or manipulation in moving for a nolle prosequi in 1969. The State had unsuccessfully sought the conviction of Beckwith through two successive trials, both ending when the jury became deadlocked. A hopelessly deadlocked jury is clearly a manifest necessity for a mistrial. Richardson, 468 U.S. 317, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984); Downum, 372 U.S. 734, 83 S.Ct. 1033, 10 L.Ed.2d 100 (1963). There was no objection by Beckwith to the entry of the nolle prosequi
Constitutional rights of an accused must be forever safeguarded. Society as well has the right to a criminal justice system that is not a toothless tiger. It is not at all unusual for jurors to be unable to agree on a verdict because they believe there is insufficient evidence to convict. If, following a mistrial declared in such an instance, the State does what it considers manifestly fair, and moves to dismiss the case, it would be shockingly wrong to hold that it could never have the case re-opened upon discovery of additional evidence.
In sum, the entry of the nolle prosequi in 1969 did not terminate Beckwith's original jeopardy or accrue unto him the right not to be re-indicted and re-prosecuted for the same offense.
V. RIGHT TO BAIL
As we have above noted, this Court has jurisdiction to treat Beckwith's pleading as an application for a writ of habeas corpus directed to the circuit directed to the circuit judge, Miss.Code Ann. § 11-43-7, -9, which we are constrained under the unusual circumstances of this case to do. While Beck-with remains subject to trial under the present indictment, we direct the circuit judge upon remand to reconsider whether he "would constitute a special danger to any other person or the community," Art. 3, § 29, Miss. Const., and make specific findings thereon. Beckwith is over seventy years of age, in failing health, and has been in jail now over a year. Unless the State can satisfy the court that he does indeed constitute a special danger, he should be granted bail in a reasonable amount.
We therefore dismiss Beckwith's interlocutory appeal as to his speedy trial and due process claims without prejudice to assert them at trial and on appeal, and affirm the circuit court's denial of his double jeopardy claim.
DISMISSED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART FOR PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION.
SULLIVAN, PITTMAN and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.
ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., dissents with written opinion joined by DAN M. LEE, P.J., and PRATHER, J.
DAN M. LEE, P.J., dissents with written opinion joined by ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., and PRATHER, J.
BANKS and McRAE, JJ., not participating.
. Rule 5 states in pertinent part:
(a) Petition for Permission to Appeal. An appeal from an interlocutory order may be sought if the order grants or denies certification by the trial court that a substantial basis exists for a difference of opinion on a question of law as to which appellate resolution may:
(1) Materially advance the termination of the litigation and avoid exceptional expense to the parties; or
(2) Protect a party from substantial and irreparable injury; or
(3) Resolve an issue of general importance in the administration of justice.
. 28 U.S.C.S. § 1291 reads in pertinent part: "The courts of appeals . shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States."
28 U.S.C.S. § 1292 authorizes appeals from interlocutory decisions under certain limited circumstances.
. The Court's analysis was based upon Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949), in which the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether an appeal would be allowed from a district court order denying a defendant corporation's motion to require a shareholder plaintiff to post a security bond for court costs and attorney fees as required by a New Jersey statute. The Court found the order to be a "final decision" as contemplated by § 1291 and therefore appealable. The Court first noted: "Appeal gives the upper court a power to review, not one of intervention." "Nor does the statute [28 USCS 1291] permit appeals, even from fully consummated decision, where they are but steps toward final judgment in which they will merge." (Emphasis added) The Court then added:
This decision appears to fall in that small class which finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated. (Emphasis added)
We hold this order appealable because it is a final disposition of a claimed right which is not an ingredient of the cause of action and does not require consideration with it. But we do not mean that every order fixing security is subject to appeal. Here it is the right to security that presents a serious and unsettled question. (Emphasis added)
Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546, 69 S.Ct. at 1225, 93 L.Ed. at 1536.
.Sanford v. Board of Sup'rs, Covington County, 421 So.2d 488, 490-91 (Miss.1982); Miller Transporters Ltd. v. Johnson, 252 Miss. 244, 249, 172 So.2d 542, 544 (1965); Bradley v. Holmes, 242 Miss. 247, 25-53, 134 So.2d 494, 495-96 (1961); McMahon v. Milam Mfg. Co., 237 Miss. 676, 679, 115 So.2d 328, 330 (1959); State, ex rel. Patterson v. Autry, 236 Miss. 316, 320-21, 110 So.2d 377, 378 (1959); J.R. Watkins Co. v. Guess, 196 Miss. 438, 443, 17 So.2d 795, 796 (1944); Jackson v. Gordon, 194 Miss. 268, 273, 11 So.2d 901, 902 (1943); Craig v. Barber Bros. Contracting Co., 190 Miss. 182, 187, 199 So. 270, 272 (1941); Jackson County v. Meaut, 185 Miss. 235, 238, 189 So. 819, 820 (1939); Worley v. Pappas, 161 Miss. 330, 332, 135 So. 348, 349 (1931); Shapleight Hardware Co., Inc. v. Brumfield, 159 Miss. 175, 179, 130 So. 98, 98-99 (1930); McClanahan v. O'Donnell, 148 Miss. 478, 114 So. 336, 338 (1927); Jones v. Cashin, 133 Miss. 585, 590, 98 So. 98, 99 (1923); State v. Poplarville Sawmill Co., 119 Miss. 432, 441, 81 So. 124, 127 (1919); Bridges v. Board of Supervisors of Clay County, 57 Miss. 252, 254 (1879); Dismukes v. Stokes, 41 Miss. 430, 432-33 (1867); Steele v. Shirley, 9 S. & M. 382 (1848).
. Now repealed by Laws, 1991, ch. 573, § 141, effective from and after July 1, 1991.
. Nelson v. Ethridge, 271 So.2d 730 (Miss.1973); Seaney v. Seaney, 218 So.2d 5 (Miss.1969); Calmes v. Weill, 216 So.2d 418 (Miss.1968); West v. Mechanical Services, Inc., 216 So.2d 174 (Miss.1968); Management, Inc. v. Crosby, 186 So.2d 466 (Miss. 1966); Burns v. Arrington, 251 Miss. 247, 169 So.2d 831 (1964); Farrar v. Phares, 232 Miss. 391, 99 So.2d 594 (1958).
. Craig v. Barber, 524 So.2d 974 (Miss. 1988); Sonford Products Corp. v. Freels, 495 So.2d 468 (Miss.1986); Kilgore v. Barnes, 490 So.2d 895 (Miss. 1986).
. Only in the dissent in City of Mound Bayou v. Johnson, 562 So.2d 1212 (Miss.1990) (Hawkins, P.J., dissenting, at 1221) has its constitutional validity been assessed.
. This is not to mention ignoring the wisdom of decisions of this Court covering a period of 125 years prior to our decisions in Holland, none of which have been overruled. See Footnote 4, Lemly v. State, 69 Miss. 628, 12 So. 559 (1892).
. Jones v. State, 250 Miss. 186, 164 So.2d 799 (1964); Bell v. State, 220 So.2d 287 (Miss.1969); Smith v. State, 220 So.2d 313 (Miss.1969); Cummings v. State, 219 So.2d 673 (Miss.1969); Brown v. State, 217 So.2d 521 (Miss.1969); Saucier v. State, 259 So.2d 484 (Miss.1972); Craig v. State, 284 So.2d 57 (Miss.1973); Blackwell v. Sessums, 284 So.2d 38 (Miss.1973); Wells v. State, 288 So.2d 860 (Miss.1974); Macon v. State, 295 So.2d 742 (Miss.1974); Myers v. State, 296 So.2d 695 (Miss.1974); Page v. State, 295 So.2d 279 (Miss.1974); Edmond v. State, 312 So.2d 702 (Miss.1975); Campbell v. State, 309 So.2d 172 (Miss.1975); Harrington v. State, 336 So.2d 721 (Miss.1976); Yates v. State, 342 So.2d 312 (Miss. 1977); Durham v. State, 377 So.2d 909 (Miss.1979); Speagle v. State, 390 So.2d 990 (Miss.1980); Atkinson v. State, 392 So.2d 205 (Miss.1980); Salter v. State, 387 So.2d 81 (Miss. 1980); State v. Davis, 382 So.2d 1095 (Miss. 1980); Turner v. State, 383 So.2d 489 (Miss. 1980); Davis v. State, 406 So.2d 795 (Miss.1981); Diddlemeyer v. State, 398 So.2d 1343 (Miss. 1981); Jones v. State, 398 So.2d 1312 (Miss. 1981); Smith v. State, 394 So.2d 1340 (Miss. 1981); Saxton v. State, 394 So.2d 871 (Miss. 1981); Carlisle v. State, 393 So.2d 1312 (Miss. 1981); Perry v. State, 419 So.2d 194 (Miss.1982); Ransom v. State, 435 So.2d 1169 (Miss.1983); Brady v. State, 425 So.2d 1347 (Miss.1983); Young v. State, 425 So.2d 1022 (Miss.1983); Gray v. State, 481 So.2d 763 (Miss.1985); In re W.R.A, 481 So.2d 280 (Miss.1985); Nations v. State, 481 So.2d 760 (Miss.1985); Darby v. State, 476 So.2d 1192 (Miss.1985); Burgess v. State, 473 So.2d 432 (Miss.1985); Plummer v. State, 472 So.2d 358 (Miss.1985); Bailey v. State, 463 So.2d 1059 (Miss.1985); Kinzey v. State, 498 So.2d 814 (Miss.1986); Beavers v. State, 498 So.2d 788 (Miss.1986); Lightsey v. State, 493 So.2d 375 (Miss.1986); Smith v. State, 489 So.2d 1389 (Miss.1986); Vickery v. State, 535 So.2d 1371 (Miss.1988); Arnett v. State, 532 So.2d 1003 (Miss.1988); Fisher v. State, 532 So.2d 992 (Miss.1988); Livingston v. State, 525 So.2d 1300 (Miss.1988); Dedeaux v. State, 519 So.2d 886 (Miss.1988); Trotter v. State, 554 So.2d 313 (Miss.1989); Smith v. State, 550 So.2d 406 (Miss.1989); Conerly v. State, 544 So.2d 1370 (Miss.1989); Mitchell v. State, 572 So.2d 865 (Miss. 1990); Jaco v. State, 574 So.2d 625 (Miss. 1990); Flores v. State, 574 So.2d 1314 (Miss. 1990); Yarber v. State, 573 So.2d 727 (Miss. 1990); Galloway v. State, 574 So.2d 1 (Miss. 1990); Handley v. State, 574 So.2d 671 (Miss. 1990); Moore v. State, 556 So.2d 1031 (Miss. 1990); Spencer v. State, 592 So.2d 1382 (Miss. 1991); Fordv. State, 589 So.2d 1261 (Miss.1991); Flores v. State, 586 So.2d 811 (Miss.1991); Corley v. State, 584 So.2d 769 (Miss.1991); Adams v. State, 583 So.2d 165 (Miss.1991); Wiley v. State, 582 So.2d 1008 (Miss.1991); Anderson v. State, 577 So.2d 390 (Miss.1991); Barnes v. State, 577 So.2d 840 (Miss.1991); State v. Ferguson, 576 So.2d 1252 (Miss.1991); Folk v. State, 576 So.2d 1243 (Miss.1992); Esparaza v. State, 595 So.2d 418 (Miss.1992); and McGee v. State, 608 So.2d 1129 (Miss.1992).
. Three other cases which came to us as interlocutory appeals involved serious double jeopardy claims: Griffin v. State, 584 So.2d 1274 (Miss.1991); Spann v. State, 557 So.2d 530 (Miss. 1990); Griffin v. State, 545 So.2d 729 (Miss.1989). As fully set forth in Part III, Double Jeopardy, infra, these were in fact appeals from final judgments, although denominated interlocutory appeals.
In re Brown, 478 So.2d 1033 (Miss.1985), involved an independent right of a state's witness not to be required to undergo a blood transfusion, analogous to Jaquith v. Beckwith, 248 Miss. 491, 157 So.2d 403 (1963), infra, as well as a final order contemplated by Abney v. United States. In the Interest of W.R.A., 481 So.2d 280, 283 (Miss.1985), was an appeal from a "final order."
Today's holding does no violence to any of these decisions.
. Jaquith v. Beckwith is a good example of the question. In that case the Hinds County Circuit Court, over the strenuous objection of defense counsel, ordered the defendant committed to the Mississippi State Hospital at Whitfield to determine his competency to stand trial. The evidentiary basis for the commitment order was minimal.
Beckwith applied for a writ of habeas corpus in the Rankin County Circuit Court. In affirming his release from the mental hospital, we noted first that interlocutory orders could not be taken from preliminary orders of the circuit court; also, that a writ of habeas could not perform the functions of a writ of error on appeal. We then noted, however, that the order committing him was beyond the authority of the court, and if Beckwith were denied a remedy to test the order, "a right of appeal after trial and final judgment would be meaningless." We held, "A proceeding to enforce a right of personal liberty by means of a writ of habeas corpus is civil and not criminal." 248 Miss, at 503, 157 So.2d at 409. Jaquith v. Beckwith was decided in this State 14 years before Abney.