Case Name: WARD v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1917-06-29
Citations: 196 S.W. 840
Docket Number: No. 4566
Parties: WARD v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 196
Pages: 840–840

Head Matter:
WARD v. STATE.
(No. 4566.)
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
June 29, 1917.)
1. Witnesses <&wkey;345(4) — Impeachment—Conviction oe Felony.
Testimony that the state’s witness had been convicted in 1887 of assault with intent to murder, and served three years-in the penitentiary, having been released in 1890, was inadmissible to impeach the witness, who had been pardoned by the Governor, supposedly that he might be a witness, the conviction having been too remote.
[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. §§ 1127, 1128.] '
2. Witnesses &wkey;>345(4) — Disqualification-Impeachment — Conviction of Felony.
A conviction of felony may be interposed either as a disqualification of a witness, where there is no pardon, or, in case of pardon, as a matter of impeachment.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. §§ 112.7, 1128.]
Appeal from Austin County Court; G. S. Cumings, Judge.
George Ward was convicted of violating the pistol law, and he appeals.
Affirmed.
C. Douglas Duncan, of Bellville, for appellant. E. B. I-Iendricks, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

Opinion:
DAVIDSON, P. J.
This conviction was for violating the pistol law.
There is but one question in the case. The witness Brown makes out the state's case by showing that appellant had the pistol under circumstances under which he was not justified. It developed on the trial that Brown had been convicted in 1887 of assault with intent to murder, and served three years in the penitentiary, under the said conviction. One or more attempts had been made to induce the Governor of the state some years ago to grant him a pardon. These were not successful. In the early part of the current year application was made by the county attorney for a pardon for Brown that he might be a witness supposedly in this case. The pardon was'granted. All this is made to appear, and appellant seems to have interposed this conviction as a disqualification of Brown. This contention was met with the pardon, and he then offered to prove the conviction as a matter of impeachment. The ruling of the court with reference to this whole proposition is presented for revision.
We are of opinion the court did not err in rejecting the testimony as a matter of impeachment. He had been out of the penitentiary since the year 1890, practically 27 years before the pardon was granted. A conviction for felony may be interposed either as a disqualification where there is no pardon, or, in case of pardon, as a matter of impeachment, but where long time has elapsed, as in this case, such conviction cannot be used for the purpose of impeachment. The conviction was too remote. This has been the subject of a great many decisions. Had the conviction been of recent years and within the rules laid down and followed by this court, it would-have been error to reject the testimony for impeachment, but where such length of time has elapsed as here shown such testimony is not admissible. It is unnecessary to cite the cases. The matter of impeachment does not relate to the time of the pardon; it relates to the time of conviction.
Finding no error in the record, the judgment is ordered to be affirmed.
other oases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes