Case Name: Charley Woodard v. The State
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1923-06-27
Citations: 95 Tex. Crim. 534
Docket Number: No. 7741
Parties: Charley Woodard v. The State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Criminal Reports
Volume: 95
Pages: 534–538

Head Matter:
Charley Woodard v. The State.
No. 7741.
Decided June 27, 1923.
Rehearing denied October 31, 1923.
1. — Selling Intoxicating Liquor — Date of Offense — Condition of State’s Witness.
Where the court restricted the right to convict to a transaction on the fourth day. of November, at -which time the State’s witness named as purchaser was, on the night before, said to have been drunk, testimony as to his drunkenness or sobriety after the date of the sale in question was irrelevant and inadmissible.
2. —Same—Evidence—Impeaching Witness — Reprimanding Counsel.
Where, as a predicate to impeach the State’s main witness, defendant asked him if he had not sold whisky to Ralph Lee on November fourth, which the witness denied, there was no error in rejecting testimony to show that Lee bought whisky from said witness on the date mentioned, and the defendant’s counsel repeating the same question several times was reprimanded by the court. Following Redwine v. State, 87 Texas Crim. Rep., 387.
3. —Same—Motion for Continuance — Discretion of Court.
Where the motion for new trial was not supported by the affidavit of the absent witness nor was the absence of such verification explained, and there was no abuse of discretion of the court, there was no reversible error. Following Hollis v. State, 83 Texas Crim. Rep., 612, and other cases.
4. —Same—Rehearing—C ontinuance.
Application for continuance was correctly refused for the reasons stated in the original opinion, and it may be added that had defendant’s wife been present and testified, as set out in the application, it would not likely have influenced the jury to have returned a different verdict. Following Grayson V. State, 236 S. W. Rep., 1110.
5. —Same—Evidence—State’s Witness.
Manifestly the fact that one was drunk two days or quite a length of time before an occurrence which he attempts to detail, could not have the accuracy of his relation of the events assailed or, his credibility attacked by proof of the fact that he had been drunk at some time sufficiently long before that to enable him to have overcome the effect of such dunkenness, and the testimony rejected was not of such materiality as to call for a reversal.
Appeal from the District Court of Haskell. Tried below before the Honorable W. It. Chapman.
Appeal from a conviction of selling intoxicating liquor; penalty, one year imprisonment in the penitentiary.
The opinion states the case.
C. J. Henson, and A. J. Smith, for appellant.
On question of continuance, Byrd v. State, 231 S. W. Rep., 399; Dixon v. State, 23S id., 227; White v. State, 236 id., 745; Grayson v. State, 236 id., 1110; Barton v. State, 227 id., 317.
R. G. Storey, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.
Cited, cases in the opinion.

Opinion:
MORROW, Presiding Judge.
— The offense is the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor; punishment fixed at confinement in the penitentiary for one year.
The date of the offense is laid on or about the 9th day of November, 1922. Goben is named as the purchaser. He testified that he arrived at the town of Rule on the 2d of November and left there on the 9th of that month; that on various occasions between those dates he went to Townes' blacksmith shop; that on one of his visits there he bought from the appellant a quart of whisky for which he paid him seven dollars. This occurred, he said, about the 4th of November. His business was to buy whisky to entrap the offenders. He made a record of the date of the purchase. Another witness testified that he saw the transaction though he did not remember the date.
In instructing the jury, the court restricted the right to convict to a transaction occurring on the 4th day of November. Several witnesses testified on behalf of the appellant to the effect that Goben was drunk on the night of the 3d of November and also on the following day..
In several bills of exception complaint is made of the refusal of the court to receive evidence that Goben was drunk between the 4th and 9th of November. ¥e perceive no evidence rendering relevant the inquiry touching the drunkenness or sobriety of the witness Goben after the date of the sale in question. His condition at and before that time was properly made an issue as it might have affected his credibility. There was evidence on both sides of that question.
As a predicate to impeach the witness Goben, appellant asked if he had not sold whisky to Ralph Lee on November 4th. This Goben denied. The court rejected testimony to show that Lee bought whisky from Goben on the date mentioned because it was an effort to impeach the witness Goben upon an immaterial issue. We do not understand from the bill how the selling of the whisky by Goben to Lee became pertinent. After the court had ruled that the inquiry was not a proper one, counsel, according to the bill as qualified, repeated the same question several times, and finally the witness answered it in the affirmative. The court reprimanded counsel and told the jury that neither the question nor the answer should be considered. It was not error for the court to exclude the testimony because it was immaterial. While a more appropriate time for the admonition of the counsel might have been chosen, the fact that it was done under the present circumstances does not impress us as being of such a prejudicial nature as would justify a reversal of the judgment. Redwine v. State, 87 Texas Crim. Rep., 387.
To prove an alibi the appellant sought to continue the case because of the absence of his wife. She was expecting to give birth to a child, and according to the motion, would have testified that for six days preceding the ninth of November, appellant was with her at their home about twelve miles distant from the place at which the sale was made. Her sickness at the time of the trial prevented her attendance. The court continued in session about a week after the verdict was rendered. The motion for new trial is not supported by the affidavit or testimony of appellant's wife, nor is the absence of such verification explained. The circumstances do not indicate that in overruling the motion for new trial, there was an abuse of the discretion of the trial judge. Hollis v. State, 83 Texas Crim. Rep., 612, Walker v. State, 91 Texas Crim. Rep., 507, 240 S. W. Rep., 538.
We find nothing in the record requiring a reversal of the judgment. It is therefore affirmed.
Affirmed.