Case Name: PATTY v. SALEM FLOURING MILLS CO.
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1909-07-28
Citations: 53 Or. 350
Docket Number: 
Parties: PATTY v. SALEM FLOURING MILLS CO.
Judges: 
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 53
Pages: 350–364

Head Matter:
Argued June 4,
decided July 28,
modified on rehearing December 22, 1908,
further rehearing denied March 23, 1909.
PATTY v. SALEM FLOURING MILLS CO.
[96 Pac. 1106; 98 Pac. 521: 100 Pac. 298.]
Evidence — Declarations—Conduct oe Parties.
1. Section 718, subd. 8, B. & O. Comp., providing that evidence may be given of a declaration of another in the presence of a party, and of his conduct in relation thereto, recognizes the rule that, when a declaration is made in the presence of a party understanding the import 'therof and at liberty to reply thereto, a failure to deny an assertion adverse to his rights is tantamount to an admission of the truth of the declaration, but does not permit a party to show that the adverse party, in a prior action brought against him by a third person, called a witness who gave evidence against the rights of the adverse party, and that the adverse party did not contradict such witness.
Same — Evidence in Former Action — Parties—Identity.
2. Under Section 718, subd. 8, B. & O. Comp., providing that evidence may be given of the testimony of a witness deceased or out of the State, given in a former action between the same parties relating to the same matter, evidence of the testimony of a witness unable to testify, given in a former action, is not admissible where the parties to the two actions are not the same, though the same issues are involved.
Trial — Questions of Law or Fact — Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence.
3. The degree of proof required of a plaintiff, who, in order to obtain a favorable judgment, must sustain the material issues involved, is generally classed as a probability, and, if, when he rests his case, the facts which were incumbent upon him to establish appear from the evidence as merely possible, the court, upon motion of the adverse party, should grant a judgment of nonsuit for failure to prove a material issue; but, when, however, after the plaintiff rests his case, it appears from his evidence that the facts devolving upon him to make manifest are quite probable, his "cause has passed the danger point of a nonsuit, and, together with the defendant’s evidence, if offered, should be submitted to the jury for them'to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the testimony, by comparing and considering the balancing probabilities.
Trial — Nonsuit—Motions—Admissions.
4. A motion for nonsuit admits the truth of plaintiff’s testimony, and every legitimate inference of fact which may be reasonably deducible therefrom.
Sales — Actions foe Price — Questions for Jury — Evidence—Nonsuit.
5. On an issue as to whether the delivery of wheat to a warehouseman was a sale or bailment, plaintiff’s evidence that it was a sale held sufficient to go to the jury as against a motion for a nonsuit.
Trial — Direction of Verdict — Nonsuit—Waiver of Jury Trial— “Motion for Nonsuit.”
6. A motion for nonsuit at the close of plaintiff’s case is tantamount to a demurrer to the evidence on the ground that it is insufficient to establish one or more of the material issues devolving upon the plaintiff to prove, and that the cause therefore should not be submitted to the jury, and where defendant offers no evidence after the denial of the motion, and the plaintiff moves for a directed verdict, the court may direct the verdict; there being some evidence to sustain plaintiff’s case, as both parties have waived the right to a jury trial by submitting the case to the court.
Appeal and Error — Review—Directed Verdicts —Questions Considered.
7. Where a motion for nonsuit at the close of plaintiff’s case is denied, and exception taken, and defendant introduces no evidence, and plaintiff moves for a directed verdict, which is granted and exception taken, on appeal the denial of the nonsuit is only open for review, and will be sustained if there be any evidence to support the judgment.
Trial — Direction of Verdict on Court’s Motion.
8. The test of the correctness of a direction by the court of its own motion of a verdict for plaintiff on motion for nonsuit being denied, and failure of defendant to introduce evidence, is whether, if, in the absence of a special direction, any other verdict were found, it ought to be set aside.
Trial — Motion for Nonsuit — Waiver. .
9. Defendant’s motion for a nonsuit, when overruled, is not waived by his introducing evidence, unless he thus cures the defect in plaintiff’s evidence.
Trial — Motion for N onsuit — Waiver.
10. Defendant by requesting, after his motion for nonsuit is denied, that the cause be submitted to the jury, does not waive his motion.
Jury — Right to Jury Trial — Waiver.
11. Defendant by moving for nonsuit expressly waives, in the manner prescribed by Section 157, B. <&C. Comp., his right to a jury trial.
Appeal and Error — Decision—Adopting Principles Not Suggested by Parties.
12. A legal principle, though not suggested by either party at the trial, should be adopted in order to finally dispose of a cause on appeal, if this impels the speedy enforcement of a right or redress of a wrong, and, as a correct exposition of the law, is appropriate to the facts involved.
Jury — Waiver of Right to Jury Trial — Revival.
18. When defendant waives his right to a jury trial by moving for a non-suit on the ground that plaintiff’s evidence is insufficient to go to the jury, such express renunciation is binding on him till he changes his position by introducing evidence, after denial of his motion, or by requesting submission to the jury.
From Marion: George IT. Burnett, Judge.
Statement by Mr. Justice Moore.
This is an action by Reuben Patty, as administrator of the estate of J. H. Patty, deceased, to recover the alleged value of wheat delivered to the defendant by the plaintiff’s intestate and by Thomas David, respectively; the latter claim having been assigned to the plaintiff.
The material averments of the complaint, the contradiction thereof, the allegation of facts constituting separate defenses, and the denial of such new matter are substantially the same as set forth in the pleadings in the case of Savage v. Salem Mills Co., 48 Or. 1 (85 Pac. 69), except in certain particulars that differentiate the causes. The case at bar was tried, and the plaintiff secured a judgment, from which the defendant appeals.
Reversed.
For appellant there was a brief over the names of Messrs. Williams, Wood & Linthicum, Mr. George G. Bingham, Messrs. John H. and Charles L. McNary, and Mr. Sanderson Reed, with an oral argument by Mr. Reed.
For respondent there was a brief over the names of Mr. Woodson T. Slater and Mr. William M. Kaiser, with an oral argument by Mr. Kaiser.
Mr. Commissioner Slater, being one of the attorneys for respondent, toolr no part in this decision.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Moore
delivered the opinion of the court.
It is contended by defendants' counsel that the court erred in permitting testimony given at the trial of an action in which the plaintiff herein was not a party to be read in evidence. The bill of exceptions shows that Dr. F. E. Smith testified that as a practicing physician he had visited Mr. Werner Breyman, who at the trial of this cause was too ill to attend as a witness. M. E. Pogue stated upon oath that as a stenographer he reported the case of Savage v. Salem Mills Co., 48 Or. 1 (85 Pac. 69), at the trial of which Mr. Breyman appeared as defendant's witness, whose testimony was not disputed by counsel for the party calling him, though they might have claimed, in argument, that his sworn declarations were erroneous. Pogue was permitted, over objection and exception, to read from his stenographic notes the entire testimony so given, the material parts of which related to an alleged custom of the defendant with respect to receiving wheat from farmers and issuing to them receipts therefor, and detailed the manner in which the mill company, the defendant in both actions, usually disposed of such grain. The plaintiff's counsel maintain that this testimony was admissible under a clause of our statute, to-wit:
"Evidence may be given on the trial, of the following facts: 3. A declaration, or act of another, in the presence and within the observation of a party, and his conduct in relation thereto." Section 718, B. & C. Comp.
This enactment recognizes a well-established rule of evidence, which is to the effect that when a declaration is made in the presence and hearing of' a party, who understands the full import thereof and is at liberty to reply thereto, and the utterance is made by such a person and under such circumstances as naturally to call for an answer, a failure to deny an assertion that is adverse to the known rights or interests of such party is tantamount to an implied admission of the truth of the affirmation: 1 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2 ed.) 672; 16 Cyc. 956; 1 Enc. Ev. 367; Elliott, Ev., § 230; Gillett, Ind. & Col. Ev., § 5; Greenleaf, Ev., § 197; Jones, Ev., § 291. "Declarations or statements," says Mr. Justice Martin, in People v. Koerner, 154 N. Y. 355, 374 (48 N. E. 730, 736), "made in the presence of a party are received in evidence, not as evidence in themselves, but to ascertain what reply the party to be affected makes to them. If he is silent when he ought to have denied, the presumption of acquiescence arises." It is the spontaneity of a party's denial of a declaration made in his presence and hearing, injuriously affecting his interests, that rebuts any inference of acquiescence as to the truth of an accusation or the assertion of an adverse right. A party might be so indignant at the production of adverse testimony which he knew was false, or which he asserted was untrue, as vociferously to declare that the witness was a deliberate liar. The use of the supposed emphatic observations might repel any implication of acquiescence that could arise from the testimony received; but the interruption of the orderly proceedings of a trial by a party would manifest his contempt for the court, and properly subject him to such reasonable punishment. as might be imposed. As the methodical course of procedure cannot be disturbed without incurring liability for the annoyance, a party who is entitled to his day in court ought not to be bound by the undisputed testimony introduced by himself or his adversary at a former trial, so as to render such evidence admissible at another trial, where a different party is interested in the judgment or decree that' may be given.
Thus in Hovey v. Hovey, 9 Mass. 216, a deposition taken to be used in another action in which a different party was plaintiff was, over objection, received in evidence on the ground that, as the defendant had procured the written declaration under oath, he thereby admitted the truth of the facts stated. It was held, however, that such evidence was inadmissible; the court saying: "It cannot be inferred, from the defendant's procuring the deposition, that he is bound to admit the statement contained in it. Besides, consequences of the most mischievous kind might be apprehended from allowing such a precedent to be established." So, too, in Wilkins v. Stidger, 22 Cal. 231 (83 Am. Dec. 64), a similar conclusion was reached. In that case a Dr. McDaniel had assigned to the plaintiff a demand against the defendant upon which the action was based. Mr. Justice Crocker, speaking for the court in rendering the decision, says: "It seems that the professional services sued for were given in attending to injuries sustained by the defendant, caused by the upsetting of a stage-coach of the California Stage Company, in which the defendant was a passenger. The defendant's claim for damages against the stage company was referred to arbitrators, and at the trial before them the defendant introduced McDaniel to prove the amount and correctness of his bill for services, being the same in controversy in this suit, as an item of the damages to which he was entitled against the stage company. The plaintiff in this action offered evidence to prove this fact, of the use of McDaniel and his bill as testimony by the defendant, and it was admitted under the exception of the defendant. To support this ruling of the court it is urged that as McDaniel testified that his bill was correct, and as the defendant was present and did not deny the statement, but used the evidence and bill in the trial before the arbitrators as a true and correct account, it is evidence of an admission by him, and that his silence is to be deemed an acquiescence. It is clear that this evidence is not of such a character as to conclude the defendant, or to estop him from controverting it, for the plaintiff was not influenced thereby to do any act to his injury. His remaining silent and not denying or contradicting his witnesses, when giving this evidence before the arbitrators, cannot be held as estopping him, or deemed an acquiescence. His remaining silent did not injure the plaintiff, or operate as a fraud upon him. It is clear that a party to a suit is not bound by, or held to admit as true, every statement made by his witnesses during the trial of a cause, because he does not deny or contradict them at the time. A denial or contradiction under such circumstances would produce great confusion, and cause continual wrangling between the party and the witnesses. There is a certain regularity, order, and decorum required in such proceedings, which precludes parties from interposing with denials and objections as they could in common conversations. There are circumstances under which statements may be made, which, if not denied by the party at the time, he is deemed to have admitted; but this does not properly come within that rule." To the same effect, see Broyles v. State ex rel. De Long, 47 Ind. 251; Horan v. Byrnes, 72 N. H. 93 (54 Atl. 945: 62 L. R. A. 602: 101 Am. St. Rep. 670).
Our statue regulating the manner of proving certain matters contains this provision, to-wit:
"Evidence may be given on the trial of the following facts: (8) The testimony of a witness, deceased or out of the State, or unable to testify, given in a former action, suit, or proceeding, or trial thereof, between the same parties, relating to the same matter." Section 718, B. & C. Comp.
As the trial herein was not between the same parties as in the Savage case, though the issue there involved related to the same matter as in the case at bar, the testimony so objected to was inadmissible.
For the error committed in permitting Mr. Breyman's testimony to be read in evidence, the judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial.
Reversed.