Case Name: Adm'r. of Forbes vs. Adm'r. of Foot
Court: Constitutional Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1823-01
Citations: 2 McCord 331
Docket Number: 
Parties: Adm’r. of Forbes vs. Adm’r. of Foot.
Judges: Justices Jonnson, Gantt and Huger, concurred.
Reporter: South Carolina Law Reports
Volume: 13
Pages: 331–334

Head Matter:
Adm’r. of Forbes vs. Adm’r. of Foot.
By the saving words in our statute of limitations, “beyond seas,” is meant “out of the state.”
Tried before Mr. Justice Huger, in May Term, 1822.
THIS was an action of assumpsit to recover balances due on several notes ; the first in time dated the 16th of January, 1804, and the last the 11th of June, 1806. The defence set up, was the statute of limitations. The plaintiff proved the hand writing of the defendants intestate to the notes, and gave in evidence an endorsement on each of them, made with the intestates consent, acknowledging the receipt of certain sums of money, in part payment of the notes. These were dated thp 9th of August, 1814. The plaintiff, in order to take the case out of the statute, produced the following testimony : That Asa Foot, the intestate, formerly resided in Boston ; that in 1805, he became very much embarrassed and absconded from that city; that he was brought back by a creditor and absconded a second time ; that he again returned to Boston and kept himself concealed and expressed his intention to do so ; that afterwards, he was absent ten or twelve years ; that witness considered him a transient person. He was in the habit of trading to the West Indies. During the SUIB7 mer in 1810, witness met him in Barbadoes, and they visited in company, several of the West India. Islands. In 1815 or 16, witness met Foot in Charleston.
, On the part of the defendant, it was proved by Mr. O’Hara, one of the plaintiff’s witnesses, that he knew Foot three or four years during his residence in Charleston ; that Foot arrived there in the spring of 1812 or 1813, about the commencement of the war ; that he was a horse dealer and livery stable-keeper, and owned the livery stables in the rear of St. Philip’s church ; that he was generally in Charleston during the spring and winter ; and in the summer traded to the West Indies ; that this mode of life continued from 1812 or 1813, until his death, which occurred in the spring of 1817, and that he was correct in his dealings. It was also proved by the defendant, that John Foot administered on the estate of Jisa Foot, the letter of administration being dated April 27th, 1817; that this was revoked and administration de bonis non granted to G. W. Vankanst, the present defendant, on' the 27th December, 1817. The present action was commenced February 24, 1820.
Verdict was rendered for the plaintiff.
A motion was now made for a new trial on the following grounds, viz :
1st. Because the testimony adduced to take the case out of the statute, by shewing that the intestate was a transient person and concealed himself from his creditors at Boston, referred to a period long antecedent to August 9th, 1814, the date of the several acknowledgments ' on the notes, from which time the statute began to run, and the testimony was, therefore, jrrevelent.
2nd. Because it' was proved that the intestate resided in Charleston from 1812 or 1813,-to, the spring of 1817, when he died, and was a freeholder here ; that ah action might have been commenced in Charleston during all that: time, whereas it was not brought until February 24,; 1820, nine months and fifteen days too late.
3rd. Because the verdict was in other respects contrary to law and evidence.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Colcock
delivered the opinion of the court:
As to the facts of this case, the first enquiry is, when did the statute begin to run ? And it is not disputed by the parties that it commenced its operation on the 9th of August, 1814. It is also conceded that the plaintiff lives in Boston, and has always resided there from the origin of this transaction. {The only question then for the determination of the court is, whether the saving in the statute in favour of persons beyond seas, can apply to the plaintiff? I think we are bound as well by reason as authority to say, that the wor ds beyond seas mean out of the state or out of its jurisdiction. Many places literally beyond seas are nearer to us than the distant parts of the continent, and if four years are given to those who reside in the same place with a defendant to bring suit, it would seem but reasonable to extend the time to those who are at the distance of one thousand miles ; and whether the intervening space was occupied by land or water is certainly immaterial. The idea of the law was, that those who had not ready access to the tribunals of justice should be allowed a longer time to commence their actions. But the point seems to have been well settled both here and in England. In the case of Faw vs. Roberdeau's executors, chief justice Marshall says, 4 4 beyond seas and out of the state are analogous expressions, and are to have the same construction ('3 Cranch, 177;) and in the case of Murry vs. Baker, (3 Wheaton's Reports, 545,) Mr. Justice Johnson says " beyond seas' must be held to be equivalent to 4 without the limits of the state —so in 2 Johnson's Cases, 81. By the act of 1789, commonly called the administrators law, nine months are allowed to the administrator to collect debts and arrange the affairs ofhis intestate's estate, during which he cannot be sued ; and it was decided in the case of Moses vs. Jones, (2 Nott & McCord, 259,) that the creditor was entitled to four years exclusive of the nine months, to bring his action againstthe executor oradministrator. This time then is to be deducted from the ordinary time allowed to the plaintiff to commence suits. In other words, that in the case of administrators, the act of 1789, is for the period of nine months, a suspension of the act of limitations : It follows then that the verdict must stand. From tho 9th of August, 1814, to 24th February, 1820, when this action was commenced, is five years and six months, from which nine months are to be deducted, which leaves four years and nine months, three months less than the five years given in the saving clause. The Inotion is, therefore, refused.
Cross S; Gray, for the motion.
JDunkin, contra.
Justices Jonnson, Gantt and Huger, concurred.