Case Name: Dantzler Shipbuilding & Dry Docks Co. v. Hurley et al.
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1919-03
Citations: 119 Miss. 473
Docket Number: 
Parties: Dantzler Shipbuilding & Dry Docks Co. v. Hurley et al.
Judges: HoldeN, J., concurs in this dissenting opinion.
Reporter: Mississippi Reports
Volume: 119
Pages: 473–500

Head Matter:
Dantzler Shipbuilding & Dry Docks Co. v. Hurley et al.
[81 South. 163,
In Banc.]
1. CaRkíebs. Carriage of passengers by automobile truck. Breach of contract.
An employer who conveyed his employees to and from their homes in an automobile truck for a small stipend, did not breach his contract of carriage by stopping his truck a few yards beyond his employee’s gates instead of directly opposite, where no in-pediments or inconvenience were in the way- of his getting into his home from where the truck was stopped.
2. Same. ,
In such, case the employer was not liable for the death of an employee, who' jumped from the moving truck when the truck driver failed to stop his truck directly opposite the employee’s gate. In such case the efficient and proximate cause of the injury causing death was the voluntary act of the employee in jumping from the truck and not the negligence of the driver.
3. Same.
In such case the fact that the driver of the truck stopped a few yards beyond the employee’s gate was not negligent, although his custom was to stop in front of the gate.
Appeal from the circuit court of Jackson county.
Hon. J. H. Neville, Judge.
Suit by Mrs. J. W. Hurley and others against the Dantzler Shipbuilding & Dry Docks Company. Prom a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.
The facts are fully stated in the opinion of the court.
White & Ford, for appellant.
It will be noted at the outset that liability against appellant'in this case was predicated on the relation of carrier and passenger which it was alleged existed between appellant and deceased Hurley. The declaration did aver that Hurley was employed by appellant, and the relation of master and servant existed between them on the date when deceased was killed, but it was • charged that at the time he was hurt, deceased was a passenger being transported for hire by appellant. If therefore the proof fails to show that the relation of carrier and passenger existed at the time Mr. Hurley was run over, there cannot be a recovery in this case in any view of it.
Legal status of employee while transported to and from places of work by employer without remuneration. See case of Bowles v. Indiana By. Go., 87 Amer. State Eeports, 279; Ionnone v. N. Y. Gen. R. R. Go., 79 Amer. State Eeports, 812; L. & N. R. R. Go. v. Btuber, 54 L. E. A.. (Old Series), page 696; McGuirk v. Shattuck, 30 Amer. State Reports, pag'e 454; Vick v. N. Y. Gen. B. B. Go., 47 Amer. State Reports, page 36; Toledo & W. Baihvay Go. v. Durkin, 76 Ill. 395; Abend v. Terre Haute & I. Bailway Go., Ill Ill. 202; 53 Amer. State Rep. 616; Seaver v. Boston & M. Bailway Go., 14 Gray 466. We do not find that Mississippi courts have decided this point squarely. A multitude of authority from other states might be cited, hut we think the foregoing sufficient.
Under numerous decisions of this court, Hurley was clearly the fellow-servant of the driver, John Seymour. Both were employed by the same master in the general business of building ships. Similar question^ have been before this court heretofore, and many authorities might be cited but we will content ourselves with the following:
See McMaster v. B. B. Go., 65 Miss. 264, holding that a conductor of one train is the fellow-servant of the employees of another train of the same company, and that the railroad company is not liable for the death of a brakesman of a freight train caused by the negligence of the conductor and other employees on a passenger train. See also N. 0., etc., B. B. Go. v. Hughes,. 49 Miss. 258; Memphis, etc., B. B. Go. v. Petty, 67 Miss. 255; Lagrone v. B. B. Go., 67 Miss. 592; Millsaps v. B. B. Go., 69 Miss. 423; 111; Gen. B. B. Go. v. Jones, 16 So. 300; 1. G. B. B. Go. v. Bishop, 76 Miss. 810; Bradford Construction Go. v. Heflin, 88, Miss. 314.
The courts have often had occasion to pass on a carrier’s liability for injuries sustained by a passenger in jumping off and on moving trains. They all hold that the passenger in so doing is negligent. Referring to decisions from our own state, we find the case of Bardivell v: M. & O. B. B. Go., 63 Miss. 574.
In that ease, plaintiff leaped from a train moving from six to twelve miles per hour, the conductor having slowed down the train at plaintiff’s stop, so that he could jump off. The court held there could he no recovery. In this case, the driver, Seymour, did not know that Hurley was going to jump, until lie liad fallen under the wheels. See also case of Collins v. Southern B. Company, 89 Miss. 375. See also M. & 0. R. R. Co. v. Statha, 42 Miss. 607.
So then, we submit, there could be no liability in this case, even if Hurley had been a passenger, which he was not.
We do not see how the driver could have averted this unfortunate accident. He was not running rapidly, nor recklessly and did not know of Hurley’s peril until the wheel struck him. Hurley had evidently jumped clear of the truck, but according to a statement made by witness Brondum, stumbled against some one’s heel as he alighted, causing him to fall backward. We cannot say that Hurley would not have jumped off any how, whether the truck stopped or not. But we have it from the driver, uncontradicted, that he was bringing the truck to a ■ stop when the accident occurred. Probably • Hurley would not have been hurt, if he had not stumbled on the other man’s heel. Certainly appellant was not responsible for that.
Mise & Mise and S. C. Broom, for appellees.
In the threshold of this case lie the following legal propositions: Was Hurley a passenger of appellant; ‘did the relation of passenger and carrier exist between Hurley and appellant at the time he was hurt? .Or did the relation of servant and master exist between Hurley and appellant at the time of the injury?
We submit, emphatically, that the relation of master and servant did not exist while Hurley was being conveyed by said truck to his living place, as we will show hereinafter, and plant ourselves squarely on the first proposition above, to wit: that the relation of passenger and carrier only existed between appellant and said Hurley at said time.
Our analysis of the facts from the evidence is this: That Hurley paid the agent of appellant, the driver of the truck, twenty cents per week for his transportation, which was independent of his contract with appellant to work for sixty-five cents per hour and that this was done at the instance and with full knowledge of the appellant and, under these facts Hurley was a passenger.
Or, if mistaken in this, our contention is that appellant had a general rule to provide its employees with transportation, by means of this truck operated by its own servant and under its control, to and from a fixed place of work in which event he was a passenger.
There can be no dispute but what all the authorities hold that a person who is travelling with another, paying compensation may be, or in whatever amount, for his carriage, is a passenger. Elliot on Railroads, sec. 1578.
In the instant case, Hurley paid the appellant twenty cents per week for his transportation i. e., he paid appellant’s agent and driver of the truck, the twenty cents; hence, he was a passenger of appellant.
But, should we he mistaken in this, then we submit that it cannot he successfully disputed that the company had a general rule, as disclosed by the record, to provide its employees with transportation by means of this truck operated by its servant and under its control, to and from a fixed place of work.
There is Some authority to the contrary, hut the Court will find that they are hopelessly in the minority or are cases in which an analysis will show that a different state of facts exist from those disclosed in the instant case. Without criticising any of the courts holding contrary to our view, will say that most of them have overlooked this point; that is, in cases that state the doctrine contrary to our contention most of them are on facts where the servant is employed concerning duties that call him to different places of business, and, while going to and from these places by transportation furnished by the employer, he is injured, and are not cases where servants are engaged at a fixed place of work and have completed their work for the day, quit this, fixed place of work, and are being transported home by conveyance of the appellant under its rule and custom, as in the instant case, under which facts the servant is no longer in the employment of the master until he actually begins work again.
The great weight of authority is, and we think properly so, that the servant is not a passenger where the facts are such that he has more than one place to work for the master and is being transported free by the master between such places.
The ease of R. R. v. Stuber, 54 L. R. A. (Old Series), 696, cited by appellant, p. 6, of its brief, is a case where a foreman of water supply of a railroad is carried from place to place where some machinery is to be repaired; held by the court to be a fellow servant, and properly so; because he is hurt while riding between his place to work and is on duty and under the authority of the master. The case of McGuirk v. Shaltuck, 30 Am. St. Rep. 454, cited by appellant, and cited by Thompson on Negligence, is a case where a servant was sent for by her master and carried by another servant • to her place of work. The very moment the other servant took charge of her, she became a fellow servant and under the authority of the master, and the .court correctly so held.
The ease of Toledo, etc., By. v. Durkin, 76 Ill. 395, cited by appellant, p. 7, of brief, is a case of a laborer on a gravel train being conveyed home. That case went off on the idea that the crew of the gravel train in case of need would have had authority to requisition his services at any point en route; and that the master’s control was only dormant while he was in transit.
The case of Abend v. Terre Haute B. R., Ill Ill. 202, cited by appellant at p. 7 of brief, is a case where a blacksmith was injured while travelling with a wrecking crew. In this case the blacksmith was on duty at the time he was injured about the business of his master, and it was in the very nature of his business for the master that he was travelling with this wreck crew. He was correctly held to he the servant and not a passenger.
Now, there are several cases cited by appellant that are against our contention, hut we say that they are hopelessly in the minority, and are decisions of courts that have followed on a different state of facts the cases where the facts show that the injured person was actually on duty at the time, though doing nothing-hut travelling between points, and that the master had the right to requisition his services at any time while in transit.
The case of Vick v. N. Y. Gent., 47 Am. St. Rep. 36, cited by appellant at p. 7 of brief, is a case where an employee of a railroad travelling from his home to his post of duty upon the care .of the company free of charge, as stipulated for in the contract of service, is held to be not a passenger.
We may assume that this case is authority against us, though hardly so, because there the contract for carriage is stipulated in the contract of employment, which is not at all the case here. 4 Labatt on Master & Servant, sec. 1555, p. 4669 (2 Ed.), says (Subdivision A): “A servant who, at the time of the accident in suit, was being transported in a railway car or other vehicle furnished for the purpose of facilitating the performance of his work, is deemed to have been injured in the course of his employment, and therefore cannot recover if the injury was the result of a risk known to and appreciated by him.”
The court will see that the vehicle in the case discussed by Labatt under this doctrine was furnished by the employer for the purpose of facilitating the performance of the work, and follows the line of cases we first set out, as where a pump tender is conveyed free by the master from Ms work at one pump to bis work at another pump and is injured while in transit. In such case, the conveyance was for the purpose of facilitating the performance of the work.
Labatt then goes on, under subdivision “b” of said section 1555, as follows: “ . . . Upon this ground it
has been held that no action was maintainable in a case where a laundress was injured by the negligence of the driver of a carriage in which she was being carried to her place of work.” This is the case of McGuirk v. Shattuck, 160 Mass. 45, cited by appellant in his brief.
Now, in the instant case under the contract of employment, there was no provision with reference to his transportation. His contract of employment was to work for sixty-five cents per hour, and that was the end of it. When he checked out for the day at 3.30 there was no further authority of the master over him, dormant or otherwise, until he went back to his work the next time, under his contract by the hour.
Continuing, Labatt says, page 4677: “The train becomes, from this standpoint, one of the instrumen-talities furnished for the more efficient performance of his duties, and in using it he is carrying out his contract just as clearly as when he is using any other piece of machinery for the same purpose.”
But, says Labatt, under subdivision “3” p. 4679: “Both on principle and authority it is clear that the defense of common employment is not available to the master where the injured person was travelling entirely for his own purpose, and the right of the master to exact the performance of services was not merely dormant but wholly suspended.”
Now, we come to our contention which we say Labatt supports under the analysis of the evidence for which we are contending; Labatt, at p. 4680, subdivision “e” sec. 55; Vick v. N. T. C., 47 Am. Rep. 36. Now we will cite some other cases we rely on to support our contention. McNulty v. Pa. R. R. Go., 182 Pa. 479; O’Donnell v. Alleghany Valley R. R., 59 App. 239; Herbert y. Portland R. R. Go., 103 Me. 315; Doyle v. Fitch-burg, 1.66 Mass. 492'; N. Y. etc., R. R. v. Burns, 17 Atl. 630; Enos v. Rhode Island, etc., R. R., 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 244; Dickson v. West End Street R. Go., 177 Mass. 365, 52 L. R. A. (Old Series) 326; Todd v. Old Colony, etc., R. Go., 80 Am. Dec. 49; Doyle v. Fitchburg R. Go., 162 Mass. 66; State to use Abell v. Western Maryland R. Go., 63 Md. 43; Doyle v. Fitsburg, 162 Mass. 66; McNulty v. Pa. R. R., 182 Pa. 479; Carswell v. Macon, etc. R. R. Go., 118 G-a. 826; St. Louis, etc., R. R. v. Waggoner, 90 Ill. App. 556; L. N. R. Go. v. Scott, 108 N. Y. 392; Chattanooga Rapid Transit Co. v. Venable, 51 L. R. A. 886; Pigeon y. Lane, 80 Conn. 237; Ellington y. Beaver Dam Go., 93 Ga. 53; Russell y. Hudson River Go., 17 N. Y. 134; Robertson v. Greenleaf Johnson Lumber Company, 154 N. C. 328, 70 S. E. 630; Hass v. St. Louis R. R., 90 S. W. 115; A Missouri case, Johnson v. Texas Central R. R., 93 S. W. 433; Union Packet Go. v. McGoe, 21 Law Ed. (U. S. Sup. Ct.) 705, approved in the case of Dickinson y. West End Ry. Go., 59 N. E. 60, supra.
As to the general line of authority holding that under the conditions 'under which Hurley was transported, he is a passenger, and the minority line of authority holding that under such conditions, he is not a passenger, we cite 2 Hutchinson on Carriers (3 Ed.), p. 1158, see. 1004.
As we have heretofore argued, the relation of master and servant did not exist, because, for it to exist, the master would have had to have authority and control over Hurley at the time he was injured; to have had this, Hurley would have had to he on duty at the time; and we submit that by no stretch of the imagination can Hurley be considered to be on duty when he was killed in front of his boarding place by the motor truck after lie had completed his day’s work cheeked out, and was practically at home.
Next, the relation of host and guest cannot exist; because Hurley was paying twenty cents per week for his passage; and this relation presupposes gome hospitality, and there is not much hospitality on a crowded truck carrying men from a shipyard to their boarding place. Nor was Hurley a trespasser, because he was riding, if not for hire, under the rule and custom of the company.
We submit from the foregoing authorities cited by us in support of our contention that he was a passenger clearly shown that the relation of passengers and carrier existed, either on the first or second analysis we have made of the facts in the record, to wit: he was either a passenger for hire, because of his paying the twenty cents per week, or he was a passenger under the rule of the company aforesaid.
Was the appellant guilty of negligence toward Hurley at the time of his injury that contributed to his death? In our discussion of this question, we will state to the court at the outset that appellee’s testimony will show that at the time Hurley got off the truck he was in front of his gate at the regular place where he had been in the' habit of getting off, and the proper place; that the truck was going at the rate of from two to four miles an hour and as he got off he was caught under the wheel and dragged about fifteen feet and that the driver made no attempt to stop the truck earlier and did not put on his brakes.
Sec. 2860, 3 Thompson on Negligence (2 Ed.), p. 326, lays down the following: “Duty to afford passenger a reasonable opportunity to alight safely.' The implied contract to carry safely includes the duty of giving the passengers a reasonable opportunity to alight in safety froip. the train, and a violation of this part of the company’s duty is a culpable negligence for which in case of an injury to a passenger pro ceeding from this source, an action will lie. This means a sufficient time for the passenger to alight safely, hy the use of reasonable diligence and care, hawing regard to all the circumstances surrounding him. ’ ’
This doctrine is also recognized in this state in So. By. v. Kundry, 40 Miss. 374, Mississippi Reprint Book 20, p. 375, section 2862, 3 Thompson on Negligence.
From the foregoing authorities, the court will see that the degree of duty with reference to stopping for a passenger to alight hy the party having the passenger under his control, is a high degree of duty. Wooten v. B. B. 79 Miss. 36.
Therefore, we say that though Hurley might have been guilty of negligence in getting off the truck while in motion at the regular stop, if he got off there, yet if the truck did not stop at this place it was guilty of negligence which would render appellant liable; and, were there no question involved hut failure to stop the truck at the proper place the verdict should be affirmed; hut there is a still more important question involved here, in that, after Hurley got caught by the truck, the record shows, or the jury has the right to deduce from the record that the appellant was guilty of the most culpable negligence in going fifteen feet before stopping the truck after the man had hollered, when the brakes were in good condition, and it was not going over two to four miles an hour. If the driver had been paying the slightest attention to his passenger (and the law enjoins on him a high degree of care) he would have learned that the man was under the car and could have stoped the truck almost instantly and before the man was seriously injured. We refer the court to the testimony of Wilson Powell, a disinterested witness and man of standing, superintendent of the waterworks at the time of the injury, who heard Hurley holler although he was two hundred yards away and who testified that he was dragged about fifteen feet by the truck after lie hollered. In this, he is corroborated by other •witnesses for appellees.
The Mississippi authorities cited by appellant are not in point, as they are on a different state of facts. SolUns v. So. Ry., 89 Miss., is a case where the injured party seized the handhold of the coach before the train stopped as it approached a station where it generally stopped, which is not applicable here. The court will see that the Bardwell case, 63 .Miss. \574, cited by appellant, is altogether a different state of facts as well as the other Mississippi case cited.

Opinion:
Cook, P. J.,
delivered the opinion of the court. N
Mrs. J. W. Hurley and her children brought this suit against the appellee for the alleged negligent killing of the husband of Mrs. Hurley and the father of her children. The shipbuilding company was engaged in the business of shipbuilding, and its plant was located at Pascagoula. Numerous workmen were employed by this company,, and Mr. Hurley, the deceased , was one of the number. Mr. Hurley and a number of the other employees made their home in Moss Point, a nearby town. An arrangement was made whereby the company furnished an automible truck and driver to and from their homes.
The plaintiffs alleged, and for the purposes of this opinion we will assume, that the evidence tends to prove that they paid a small stipend to the company for this service; thus assuming that the company thereby became a carrier for hire. It was also alleged that the driver was reckless; but as the facts of this case do not show, or tend to show, that the injury and death of Mr. Hurley was caused by any reckless conduct of the driver, this avermeht of the declaration will not influence our conclusions.
Taking the record as a whole, there is very little conflict in the evidence about the deplorable accident which robbed the wife of a husband and the children of a father. On the date of the injury to Mr. Hurley, Mr. Hurley and a number of other employees were passengers upon the truck, having hoarded the truck at the shipyard to be transported to their several homes in Moss Point. ' When the truck reached the boarding house of Mr. Hurley, and while it was running at a speed of not less than three miles per hour, Mr. Hurley jumped off the truck, and, losing his balance, he fell under the wheels of the machine, receiving injuries which caused his death.
We can find no evidence in the record that the driver was not going to stop at all. At the most, it may he inferred that the driver did not stop in front of the gate, and that he did not intend to stop exactly in front of the gate. It is also shown that the body of Mr. Hurley was dragged about fifteen feet before the truck was stopped and backed off of him. It will never be known why Mr. Hurley jumped from the moving truck. It is, however, assumed by the attorneys for the plaintiff that he jumped because he saw or believed that the truck would not stop just opposite his gate.
We are unable to appreciate the argument that it would be a breach of the contract of carriage for the driver to have passed the gate for a few feet or yards, as it was shown that anywhere near this gate there were no impediments or inconvenienced in the way of his getting into his home. As we read the record, it conclusively appears that the driver had shifted his gear and would probably have brought his car to a stop within a half dozen yards of the gate. Assuming, however, that the driver should have stopped his ear immediately in front of the gate, and that he did not. do so, we must nevertheless reach the conclusion that the 'efficient and proximate cause of the injury was the voluntary act of Mr. Hurley himself. There can be no reasonable doubt that, had Mr. Hurley remained on the truck for a few seconds more, lie would to-day be living, barring other causes of death.
Again, we are unable to appreciate the validity of the argument that the truck was negligently operated. If we assume that it was the custom to stop the car precisely opposite the gate, and that in this instance the driver neglected to toe the mark, but was going fifteen or twenty yards beyond the gate, this could not be classified as negligence. We think the following cases are all authority for the conclusions we have reached, viz.: Bardwell v. M. & O. R. R., 63 Miss. 574, 56 Am. Rep. 842; Collins v. Southern Ry., 89 Miss. 375, 42 So. 167; Natchez, C. & M. R. R. v. Lambert, 99 Miss. 310, 54 So. 836, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 264; N. O., J. & G. N. R. R. v. Statham, 42 Miss. 607, 97 Am. Dec. 478.
The charge of negligence was not sustained. If it could be said that the driver was negligent, the plaintiff is still without remedy, because the alleged negligence was not the efficient or proximate cause of the injury. Taking this view of the case, the judgment _of the trial court will be reversed, and the cause dismissed.
Beversed and dismissed.