Case Name: CHARLSON REALTY COMPANY v. THE UNITED STATES
Court: United States Court of Claims
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1967-10-13
Citations: 181 Ct. Cl. 262
Docket Number: No. 388-62
Parties: CHARLSON REALTY COMPANY v. THE UNITED STATES
Judges: Before CoweN, Chief Judge, JoNes, Senior Judge, Lara-more, Durfee, Davis, Skelton, and Nichols Judges.
Reporter: United States Court of Claims Reports
Volume: 181
Pages: 262–299

Head Matter:
384 F. 2d 434
CHARLSON REALTY COMPANY v. THE UNITED STATES
[No. 388-62.
Decided October 13, 1967.
Defendant’s motion for rehearing denied January 19, 1968]
Lawrence J. Mayes, for plaintiff. Josef h A. Maun, attorney of record. Maim, Hazel, Green, Hayes, Simon and Aretz, of counsel.
Leonard S. Toyman, with whom, was Assistant Attorney General Mitchell Rogovin, for defendant. Philip R. Miller, Josef h Kovner and Norman J. Hoffman, Jr., of counsel.
Before CoweN, Chief Judge, JoNes, Senior Judge, Lara-more, Durfee, Davis, Skelton, and Nichols Judges.

Opinion:
Skelton, Judge,
announced the judgment of the court in an opinion in which Cowen, Chief Judge, and Jones, Senior Judge, joined:
This is an income tax case. The plaintiff, Charlson Realty Company, is a Minnesota corporation which purchased 14.25 acres of unimproved land in Minnesota on April 27, 1953, for the sum of $40,000, for the purpose of constructing a building to be leased to the Charlson-Lynn Company (its grantor had bought the same real estate in 1952 for $10,650). Thereafter, it was determined that this property was not suitable for improvement for rental purposes because of certain zoning restrictions and other reasons. Since the plaintiff was not interested in developing the property for resale or lease to others, it sold the property on February 10, 1955, to Mabelle F. Charlson and Harriet C. Charlson, the mother and sister of Lynn L. Charlson, the president and sole stockholder of the plaintiff company, for the sum of $40,000 evidenced by their demand note in that amount payable to the company. The plaintiff alleges that the fair market value of the property on the date of sale and prior thereto was not in excess of $40,000, and the value of the note which it received for the property was not less than $40,000.
Thereafter, the purchasers constructed a building on 4.5 acres of the land at a cost of $268,323.18 and thereafter sold it for $356,460.63. The balance of 9.5 acres was sold by the purchasers for $103,585.67. The plaintiff alleges that it had no interest of any kind in said property or in the improvements made thereto after it sold the 14.25 acres for $40,000 on February 10, 1955. Furthermore, it was not interested in developing the property for resale or lease, and during the years 1954 and 1955 had no information of any nature that said 14.25 acres of unimproved land had a value in excess of the $40,000 for which it was sold.
On or about July 15, 1955, plaintiff filed its Corporation Income Tax Return for its fiscal taxable year ending April 30, 1955. This return disclosed net taxable income of $10,139.63 with a net tax due of $3,041.89. This tax was duly paid to the District Director of Internal Revenue on or about July 15, 1955. The Internal Revenue Service assessed a deficiency in income tax for 1955 against the plaintiff in the amount of $12,500, together with interest in the sum of $3,453.94, the basis for which was its claim that the 14.25 acres of land had a fair market value of $90,000 on February 10,1955, the date it was sold by the plaintiff for $40,000, and that the sale resulted in a distribution of a taxable dividend to plaintiff's president and sole shareholder, Lynn L. Charlson. It further contended that plaintiff realized a taxable gain of $50,000 by reason of the sale, even though no amount in excess of its cost of $40,000 was ever received or realized by the plaintiff.
The Internal Revenue Service also assessed a deficiency in income tax against plaintiff's president, Lynn L. Charlson and wife, which is now the subject of litigation in the United States Tax Court and is not in any way involved in this suit.
The plaintiff paid the Internal Revenue Service said additional income tax and interest in the sum of $12,500 and $3,453.94, respectively, on February 23, 1960. On March 8, 1960, plaintiff filed a claim for refund of such additional tax and interest which it had been required to pay with the Internal Revenue Service. In such claim the plaintiff assigned as the ground upon which the claim was based the fact that plaintiff had not realized any gain on the sale of the 14.25 acres of land for $40,000, and that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue was wrong in finding that the plaintiff had realized a net gain of $50,000 on the sale.
While the first claim for refund was still pending, and before any action had been taken thereon by the Internal Revenue Service, the plaintiff, on July 25,1960, filed an amended claim for refund of said deficiency assessment for $12,500 and interest in the sum of $3,453.94. This amended claim contained various specific grounds on which such claim was based which were not contained in the first claim, all of which will be discussed in more detail in the following paragraphs.
While both of the claims were pending, the District Director of Internal Revenue for the District of Minnesota notified plaintiff by certified mail, dated September 21, 1960, of the disallowance of the first claim filed March 8,1960. On December 6,1960, the District Director notified plaintiff by certified mail that he had disallowed plaintiff's second claim for refund which it had filed July 25,1980.
The plaintiff filed this suit for said tax and interest in the total sum of $15,953.94, plus interest thereon, based upon plaintiff's second claim for refund and the disallowance thereof by the District Director. The defendant filed an answer to plaintiff's petition generally denying the basic allegations thereof and asserting an affirmative defense that this suit is barred by Section 6532 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, because it was begun after the expiration of two years from the date of mailing of a notice of disallowance of the claim to which the suit related. Thereafter, on December 13, 3963, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that plaintiff's petition was not timely filed. Plaintiff opposed defendant's motion for summary judgment, and, after hearing oral argument, the court, by order entered on May 18,1964, denied said motion "without prejudice" and referred the case back to the trial commissioner with directions to "investigate and report as to the mailing of plaintiff's petition, the handling of the mailed petition by the Post Office Department, and the receipt and filing of the petition in this court." The commissioner has complied with the directions of the court and has made his report only on this one jurisdictional issue raised by the defendant. Defendant renewed its motion for summary judgment in its briefs filed to tire commissioner's report and the case is now before the court on such motion.
The defendant has made a two-pronged attack on plaintiff's case on jurisdictional grounds based on limitations, claiming that plaintiff has not filed its suit within two years from the date its claim for refund was disallowed by the District Director of Internal Revenue Service as required by law. In the first place, the defendant contends that plaintiff's first claim for refund and its second claim for refund were identical and the second claim did not add anything to the first claim but was a mere repetition of it, and, by reason thereof, the filing of the second claim did not extend the period of limitations within which plaintiff could file its suit. On this theory, defendant says that the plaintiff was required to file its suit within two years after September 21, 1960, the date the District Director of Internal Revenue Service disallowed the plaintiff's first claim. Plaintiff's petition was marked filed in this cause on December 7,1962. On this theory, plaintiff's suit would be barred. However, the plaintiff contends that the second claim for refund was an entirely new and different claim from the first claim, and that it filed its suit within two years after the District Director disallowed its second claim for refund on December 6, 1860, notwithstanding the file date marked on the petition. If plaintiff's contention is correct, this court has jurisdiction to determine this suit insofar as this particular jurisdictional ground is concerned. These claims and theories will be further developed in subsequent paragraphs of this opinion.
Tire second jurisdictional ground asserted by the defendant relates to the time when plaintiff's petition was received by this court. The defendant says that the file mark on the petition shows that it was filed on December 7,1962, whereas, it was required to be filed no later than December 6, 1962, if it be conceded that the basis of the plaintiff's suit is the disallowance of plaintiff's second claim for refund by the District Director on December 6, 1960. In other words, defendant contends that the suit was filed one day late, and, accordingly, is barred by the two-year statute of limitations for suits of this kind. Tlie plaintiff counters with, allegations that it mailed the petition from St. Paul, Minnesota, on November 30,1962, in an envelope properly sealed, stamped and addressed to the Clerk of this Court in Washington, D.C., and that in due course of the mails it arrived at the court on December 4th or 5th, 1962, or in any case, by December 6,1962, the last day of the two-year period of limitations within which plaintiff could file the suit.
I
Statute of Limitations
At the outset, it is necessary for us to determine the primary questions presented in this case as to whether or not plaintiff's suit was begun within the applicable period of limitations set forth in Section 6532 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, which, 'as amended by Section 89(b) of the Technical Amendments Act of 1958, P.L. 85-866, 72 Stat. 1606 (26 U.S.C. § 6532(a)(1) (1964)), (hereinafter sometimes referred to as "the statute of limitations"), reads in pertinent part as follows:

(a) Suits by taxpayers for refund.
(1) General rule.
No suit under section 7422(a) for the recovery of any internal revenue tax, penalty, or other sum, shall be begun after the expiration of 2 years from the date of mailing by certified mail by the Secretary or his delegate to the taxpayer of a notice of the disallowance of the part of the claim to which the suit relates.
Rule 1 of the Rules of the United States Court of Claims, as revised December 2,1957, which was in effect at all times material to this case, provided in pertinent part as follows:
Rule 1. COMMENCEMENT of Suit
(a) Filing and Fee: A suit in the United. States Court of Claims shall be commenced by filing with the Clerk a petition conforming to the requirements of this rule and Rule 12 and by paying to him the filing fee required by Rule 84.
The defendant contends that the plaintiff did not file its suit within the two-year limitation period required by the foregoing statute and urges the two jurisdictional grounds based on limitations heretofore mentioned. On the other hand, the plaintiff insists that it has filed its suit in compliance with the statute of limitations and that the jurisdictional grounds alleged by the defendant are not applicable to the facts in this case.
II
The Two Claims for Refund
We will now consider whether plaintiff's first and second claims for refund are identical, or whether the second one is a separate claim containing different facts, grounds and theories for recovery to those contained in the first claim.
Both claims involve the same amounts, namely the tax of $12,500, together with interest thereon in the sum of $3,453.94. Both claims contain the grounds set forth by plaintiff as a basis for refund in the first claim, because such grounds were copied and quoted from the first claim in the second claim. The only ground for recovery alleged by plaintiff in the first claim was that it had sold the 14.25 acres of land for $40,000 on February 10, 1955, which was the exact amount that it had paid for the land, and that it had realized no gain on the sale of this real estate, but that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue had wrongfully determined that the amount realized on the sale was $90,000 and the taxpayer thereby realized a net gain of $50,000 on the sale of the property, thus resulting in the deficiency assessment, together with interest thereon.
The second claim for refund, on the other hand, in addition to setting forth the above grounds contained in the first claim, alleged various other and different grounds and theories 'for recovery. In the second claim, the plaintiff alleged that at no time during 1954 and 1955, nor at the time of the sale of the property in February 1955, did the property have a fair market value in excess of $40,000; and that after February 10, 1955, the date of the sale, the taxpayer had no interest of any kind in the property or in the improvements made thereto. Also, it was alleged that the taxpayer was not interested in developing tlie property for resale or lease, and during the years 1954 and 1955 bad no information of any nature that the property bad a value in excess of $40,000. The second claim further stated that, in any event, if there was any gain to the taxpayer, it should be taken into account as income for the year 1956 and not for the year 1955. Plaintiff also alleged that the Internal Revenue Service had merely assumed that plaintiff had made a gain of $50,000 on the sale, which was erroneous and without support in fact. It was further claimed that the taxpayer did not participate in making the improvements on said land subsequent to its sale, and did not realize anything from the subsequent sale of the property by the purchasers after it had been improved, and that if any gain was realized by the owners of the property when it was sold by them in 1956, such gain is taxable income to them and not to the plaintiff. The second claim also requested a conference on the grounds set forth in the amended claim for refund. None of these grounds or theories of recovery were set forth in the first claim.
It is the view of this court that the two claims are separate and distinct and that the second claim alleges and asserts facts, grounds, and theories for recovery different from those set forth in the first claim. Furthermore, the second claim was filed by the plaintiff while the first claim was pending and before any action had been taken thereon by the District Director and less than six months after plaintiff had paid the additional income tax and interest, the tax and interest having been paid February 23, 1960, and the second claim having been filed July 25,1960.
The second claim was not a mere repetition of the first claim, but is based upon new grounds, and, therefore, constitutes a separate claim which is entitled to independent treatment with reference to the statute of limitations. Accordingly, the limitation period commenced to run from the date the second claim was disallowed, namely, December 6, 1960, and plaintiff was entitled to file this suit up to and including December 6,1962. See First Nat'l Pictures v. United States, 91 Ct. Cl. 83, 32 F. Supp. 138 (1940); Pacific Mills v. Nichols, 72 F. 2d 103 (1st Cir. 1934) ; and Hills v. United States, 73 Ct. Cl. 128, 50 F. 2d 802 (1931). The defendant relies on the cases of B. Altman & Co. v. United States, 69 Ct. Cl. 721, 40 F. 2d 781 (1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 863; and Ragan-Malone Co. v. United States, 93 Ct. Cl. 316, 38 F. Supp. 290 (1941), and cases of like import. It should be pointed out that the cases cited by defendant can be distinguished on the facts from the present case. In the Altman case, when the second claim was filed, the taxpayer's time to sue had already lapsed by limitation. Also, the claims there were identical, and the second was a mere repetition of the first. In Ragan-Malone Co. v. United States, supra, the action asserted by the plaintiff was filed in an amended petition eleven years after payment of the tax, where only five years was permitted, and nine years after rejection of the claim, when only two years was permitted. The suit was clearly barred by limitations.
The fact that both claims ask for the same amount of refund does not make the two claims one and the same. First Nat'l Pictures v. United States, supra.
In the present case the District Director of Internal Revenue did not refuse to allow the second claim to be filed, but received and filed it and thereafter considered the claim and rejected it, all of which indicates that he considered it to be different from the first claim. This was done within a period of less than one year after the plaintiff paid the additional taxes and interest. The case of Pacific Mills v. Nichols, supra, is authority for the proposition that if the District Director entertains the second claim and decides it adversely to the claimant, suit may be brought within two years thereafter in accordance with the statute. We are in accord with this principle, especially under the facts in this case.
Ill
The Filing of Plaintiffs Petition
We will now consider whether the plaintiff's petition was filed in this court on or before December 6, 1962, which was the last day of the two-year limitation period after the District Director of Internal Revenue disallowed the plaintiff's second claim for refund on December 6,1960.
It is a well established rule of law that a petition is considered filed when it is delivered to the court. See Schultz v. United States, 132 Ct. Cl. 618, 132 F. Supp. 953 (1955) ; Central Paper Co. v. Commissioner, 199 F. 2d 902 (6th Cir. 1952); Arkansas Motor Coaches Ltd., Inc. v. Commissioner, 198 F. 2d 189 (8th Cir. 1952); Parissi v. Telechron, Inc. 349 U.S. 46 (1955); Bolduc v. United States, 189 F. Supp. 640 (D. Maine, 1960); Bates Mfg. Co. v. United States, 303 U.S. 567 (1938).
Therefore, it becomes necessary to determine the date plaintiff's petition reached this court, since, according to the authorities, that would be the date on which the petition would be considered filed.
The facts with regard to the mailing and filing of plaintiff's petition are generally as follows:
The plaintiff mailed its petition in a sealed envelope, weighing five and one-half ounces, properly addressed to the Clerk of this Court in Washington, D.C., on which was placed 55 cents of postage stamps, at the post office in St. Paul, Minnesota, at about 3:00 P.M. on Friday, November 30, 1962. There were no markings on the envelope to indicate that it was any particular class of mail. However, the amount of postage placed thereon was more than sufficient for it to be transported as First Class Special Delivery Mail, First Class Air Mail, First Class Certified Mail with return receipt requested, but not enough for it to travel as Registered Mail. Under these facts and circumstances, and, according to the testimony of credible expert postal employees, the letter was presumed to be First Class Mail and handled as such. The testimony of these expert postal employees showed that this First Class letter would arrive in Washington, D.C. on December 1st, 2nd, or 3rd, 1962, and at this court in due course of mails on December 3rd, 4th, or 5th, 1962, whether it traveled as First or Fourth Class Mail. It was proven that there was nothing to interfere with the regular movement of the mails between St. Paul, Minnesota and Washington, D.C. during tbis period, either outside the mails or within the postal facilities.
The evidence shows that this court maintained a guard at the front door of the court twenty-four hours a day, and that the customary habit and procedure of handling mail delivered to the court was for the guard on duty to receive the mail from the postman and to immediately stamp the date received on each letter or parcel of mail by means of either a stamp machine or a hand stamp if the mail did not fit into the stamp machine. At periodic intervals during the day the guard who had received the mail, or his replacement on duty, would take the mail thus stamped to the office of the Clerk of the Court where such clerk or his deputy would open the mail and stamp all petitions filed which he found in the mail, and docket them on the records of the court. The guards testified that they had no independent recollection of receiving the letter containing plaintiff's petition, but that all mail received during this period was stamped in accordance with their usual custom and practice and delivered to the clerk. They further testified that at no time did they find any letter that had been misplaced or that was on the desk of the guard on the day following the date that it had been received, stamped, and that all mail during this period had been received, stamped, and delivered to the clerk on the same day that it was received. They were testifying on the basis of their habit and custom and without any recollection of or reference to the letter containing plaintiff's petition, as they, of course, could not remember receiving it or any other particular letter as it came in.
The Deputy Clerk of this Court opened the envelope containing plaintiff's petition and handed the petition to another Deputy Clerk, who was in the act of docketing the case when he noticed that the date of December 7,1962, which he had stamped on the petition was more than two years after the date of December 6, 1960, when the District Director of Internal Revenue disallowed plaintiff's second refund claim. The deputy clerk, realizing some question might arise as to limitations, retrieved the envelope in which the petition had arrived from the wastebasket where it had been thrown, and found that the envelope had also been stamped December 7,1962, by the guard of the court at the front door. He filed the envelope along with the petition among the papers of the case so that it might be inspected if any questions arose. An inspection of the envelope revealed a post office stamp thereon showing that it was mailed on November 30, 1962, at St. Paul, Minnesota, and that it contained 55 cents in postage, which had been placed thereon by a postage stamp meter by a post office employee in St. Paul by means of two strips of stamps, and that the envelope had been sealed and also properly addressed to the Clerk of this Court in Washington, D.C.
The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, as stated above, on the ground that the petition was filed one day late. The plaintiff says that the petition was timely filed, and, to support this contention, it relies upon the well-established presumption that a letter which is properly sealed, stamped, addressed, and deposited in the United States mails is presumed to reach the addressee and be received by him in due course of the mails. This presumption has been approved by many authorities and has long been recognized by the courts. See Dunlop v. United States, 165 U.S. 486, 495 (1897); Hagner v. United States, 285 U.S. 427, 430 (1932); Rosenthal v. Walker, 111 U.S. 185, 193 (1884); Columbian Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Rodgers, 93 F. 2d 740, 742 (10th Cir. 1937) and cases there cited; Central Paper Co. v. Commissioner, supra; Detroit Automotive Produets Corp. v. Commissioner, 203 F. 2d 785 (6th Cir. 1953); Schultz v. United States, supra; Arkansas Motor Coaches Ltd., Inc. v. Commissioner, supra; The Borden Co. v. United States, 134 F. Supp. 387, 391 (D.N.J. 1955).
Postal employees are presumed to discharge their duties in a proper manner. Boerner v. United States, 117 F. 2d 387 (2d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 587; Henderson v. Carbondale Coal & Coke Co., 140 U.S. 25, 37 (1891). There be ing no evidence to rebut this presumption, it must be assumed that the employees handled plaintiff's letter in accordance with their regular duties and practices from the time it was mailed at St. Paul until it arrived at the court in Washington.
This is not the first time this problem has been considered by this court. It was fully discussed in the case of Schultz v. United States, supra. In that case, as here, the petition was placed in an envelope which was properly sealed, stamped, addressed, and mailed to the court in time to reach the court within the limitation period in due course of the mails, but it was marked filed two days late by the clerk. The plaintiff, as here, relied upon the presumption of arrival of the petition in due course of the mails. Chief Judge Jones, in writing the unanimous opinion of the court, discussed with approval the presumption of arrival of the petition in due course of the mails, citing cases, and holding that the presumption must prevail in the absence of direct testimony that rebuts it. The court held that the date stamped on the petition is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of arrival in due course of the mails and ordered the petition filed in time.
Other cases holding that the date stamp on the petition is not enough to rebut the presumption of arrival of the petition in due course of the mails are: Arkansas Motor Coaches Ltd., Inc. v. Commissioner, supra; Central Paper Co. v. Commissioner, supra; The Borden Co. v. United States, supra; and Detroit Automotive Products Corp. v. Commissioner, supra. Actually the file stamp on the envelope or petition is nothing-more than evidence of the method of procedure, habit and custom followed by the officers of the court in handling papers delivered to them in the proper discharge of their official duties. Such evidence adds nothing to the well-recognized presumption that public officers perform the duties of their office in a proper manner. But the cases hold that such a presumption will not overcome nor rebut the presumption of the arrival of a letter in due course of the mails. See Arhansas Motor Coaches Ltd., Inc. v. Commissioner, supra, and Rosengarten v. United States, infra.
The problem before us was again considered by this court in an opinion also written by Chief Judge Jones in the case of Rosengarten v. United States, 149 Ct. Cl. 287, 181 F. Supp. 275 (1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 822, where the court held that the petition was not timely filed. That case and the Schultz case, supra, are clearly distinguishable on the facts. There the person who was supposed to have mailed the document in question could not remember the details of the mailing, including the affixing of the stamps, the placing of the instrument in the envelope, and when and where he mailed it. The court held that the indefinite character of such evidence was such that a presumption of the arrival in due course of the mails and of receipt did not arise. In other words, there was no presumption at all of arrival in due course of mails. That case actually reaffirms the principles announced in the Schulta case, supra. It was pointed out by the court in that case in upholding the presumption, that the Government was only able to offer negative evidence, which was insufficient.
The case of Modern Engineering Co. v. United States, 126 Ct. Cl. 136, 113 F. Supp. 685 (1953), decided by this court, is distinguishable on the facts, because in that case there was direct and positive evidence when the letter was received at the office where its contents were to be filed.
The defendant seeks to overcome the presumption of the arrival of the petition in due course of the mails by presenting evidence of the habit and custom of the officers and employees of the court, showing in detail their method and procedure of handling mail arriving at the court, including the placing of a date stamp thereon. This is nothing but habit or custom evidence and is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of arrival in due course of mails. Such was the holding of the court in the case of Crude Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 161 F. 2d 809 (10th Cir. 1947). There the defendant proved the detailed method of handling the mail by the officers in the Internal Revenue Office in an attempt to show the late arrival of the document in that case. The court said this was not enough to overcome or rebut the assumption that it had arrived in due course of the mails.
A similar case is Borden Co. v. United States, supra, where the defendant proved the habit and custom of the mail clerk whose duty it was to stamp received mail and route it to the proper office in an attempt to rebut the presumption of receipt. The mail clerk there, as here, could not remember receiving the particular document, but testified from habit and custom that since it was stamped on a particular day "it must have been received that day." The court held that this evidence was insufficient to overcome the presumption of timely receipt.
The evidence as to the habit and custom of the court's officers and employees in handling the mail is negative evidence and has no appreciable value in proving the omission or commission of a specific act at a particular time when there is a presumption to the contrary as in this case. For instance, if many witnesses testified that they had never seen the door guard of the court place a date stamp on letters as they were delivered to the court, such evidence would not prove that he did not, in fact, stamp the date on a given letter. In like manner, if they testified that they had seen him stamp letters day after day for a long period of time, this would not prove he stamped the particular letter containing plaintiff's petition. It is simply negative evidence and is insufficient to prove that something happened or did not happen at a given time in the face of a presumption to the contrary. Such was the holding, in effect, of the court in the case of Jones v. United States, 226 F. 2d 24, 27 (9th Cir., 1955) wherein the court stated:
We regard the concededly proper and timely mailing of the claims in this instance as positive evidence giving rise to a strong presumption of delivery to the Collector. The showing that a search of the pertinent files in the latter's office revealed no record of the claims having been filed is a purely negative circumstance, insufficient, in our opinion, to rebut the presumption of delivery. »i» H»
See also Rosengarten v. United States, supra; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Welch, 345 F. 2d 939, 943 (5th Cir. 1965); Spreitler v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 125 F. 2d 115, 117 (7th Cir. 1941); Trust Co. of Chicago v. Erie R. Co., 165 F. 2d 806, 809 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 845; Gulf, M. & O.R. Co. v. Freund, 183 F. 2d 1005, 1010 (8th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 904.
Negative evidence as to habit, custom and procedure may create a presumption that the ordinary course of business or procedure was followed on a given day. Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co. v. Pendleton, 115 U.S. 339 (1885); Dunlop v. United States, 165 U.S. 486 (1897); and United States v. State of Washington, 233 F. 2d 811, 816 (9th Cir., 1956). However, if such a presumption, was created in this case by the offered testimony as to the custom and procedure in handling the mail at the court when it is received, it is not sufficient to overcome the strong presumption of the arrival of plaintiff's petition in due course of the mails. The cases hold that the presumption of arrival in due course of the mails cannot be overcome by another presumption. Arkansas Motor Coaches, Ltd., Inc. v. Commissioner, supra; Rosengarten v. United States, supra.
A presumption cannot be overturned or rebutted by speculation or suspicion. It can only be destroyed or overcome by convincing and uncontradicted evidence to the contrary which clearly and distinctly establishes a fact so that reasonable minds can draw but one inference. Falstaff Brewing Corp. v. Thompson, 101 F. 2d 301, 304 (8th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 631; Wolfgang v. Burrows, 181 F. 2d 630, 631 (D.C. Cir., 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 826. In addition to the foregoing, to overcome the strong presumption of the arrival of a letter in due course of the mails, the countervailing evidence must show the contrary to be true by direct and positive proof of affirmative facts. The negative evidence offered by the defendant in this case fails to meet these requirements.
The plaintiff did everything that could be reasonably expected of it in the mailing of its petition to this court. See Hetman v. Fruit Growers Express Co., 200 F. Supp. 234 (D.N.J., 1961); Arkansas Motor Coaches Ltd., Inc. v. Commissioner, supra. There is no showing of negligence on its part. The petition was mailed in plenty of time for it to reach the court in due course of the mails within the limitation period. There was no negligence in its failure to send the letter by certified or registered mail. In fact, mail of this type could arrive later than ordinary mail because of the record keeping required of the postal employees. If it had been sent by air mail, that service might have speeded up the time of its arrival, but plaintiff would still have to rely on the presumption of arrival in due course of the mails. Even with air mail, we would still have the same presumption and the same argument if the envelope was stamped December 7, 1962, one day late, by the employees of the court.
The Court of Claims is a national court and receives petitions from all parts of the country. It is the almost universal practice of litigants and lawyers residing outside of the Washington area to send their petitions to the court by United States mail. It is impossible for them to know exactly what day or hour a petition will actually arrive at the court. All that they can do is mail their petitions in time to arrive at the court in due course of the mails, or journey to Washington and deliver them in person to the clerk. The latter course is far too expensive, time-consuming, and inconvenient to be expected of them. Consequently, every reasonable presumption of the arrival of a petition in due course of the mails when sent to the court by mail should be indulged in by this court.
Under all of these facts, and in accordance with the foregoing authorities, we hold that it is presumed that plaintiff's letter containing his petition arrived at this court in due course of the mails on or before December 5,1962, and that this presumption is conclusive, since it has not been rebutted by direct, positive, clear and convincing evidence which is uncontradicted, to the contrary. Plaintiff's petition was timely filed.
Accordingly, defendant's motion for summary judgment is denied, and the case is remanded to the commissioner for proceedings in ordinary course.
We are indebted to Trial Commissioner Franklin M. Stone for Ms exhaustive development of the facts on this phase of the case, although we do not agree with many of his findings and inferences drawn therefrom. All relevant facts are contained in this opinion.
Rule 5(e) (1957 ed.) of the united States Court of Claims recognizes the same principle:
"(c) Additional Time After Service by Mail: Whenever a party has the right or is required to do some act or take some proceeding within a prescribed period after the service of a pleading, motion, or other paper upon him, and the service is made by mail outside the District of Columbia, 3 days shall be added to the prescribed period for points east of the Mississippi River, and 5 days shall be added to the prescribed period for points west of the Mississippi River."