Case Name: Bobby Gene BUTLER, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, State
Court: Texas Courts of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 2005-03-31
Citations: 162 S.W.3d 727
Docket Number: No. 2-04-178-CR
Parties: Bobby Gene BUTLER, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, State.
Judges: PANEL B: DAUPHINOT, HOLMAN, and GARDNER, JJ.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Third Series
Volume: 162
Pages: 727–739

Head Matter:
Bobby Gene BUTLER, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, State.
No. 2-04-178-CR.
Court of Appeals of Texas, Fort Worth.
March 31, 2005.
William Trantham & Associates, William E. Trantham, Denton, for appellant.
Bruce Isaacks, Crim. Dist. Atty., Kathleen Walsh, Charles E. Orbison, Gretchen Choe, Ryan Calvert, Beth Hayes, Asst. Dist. Attys. for Denton County, Denton, for appellee.
PANEL B: DAUPHINOT, HOLMAN, and GARDNER, JJ.

Opinion:
OPINION
ANNE GARDNER, Justice.
Appellant was charged by information with assault-family violence and pleaded not guilty. Appellant was found guilty by a jury and sentenced by the trial court to two-hundred-seventy days' confinement, probated for a term of eighteen months. In a single issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in making a factual finding of family violence rather than submitting this issue to the jury. We affirm.
Because sufficiency of the evidence is not at issue, we need only briefly discuss the facts of this case. The record shows that Appellant and the victim, Janyce Couch, were engaged, had a child together, and had been living together for approximately two and a half years. Couch testified that on the evening of October 20, 2003, she and Appellant got into an argument and she was assaulted by Appellant. She stated they were in the bedroom and that Appellant came to her side of the bed, pushed her down, got on top of her, and pinned her to the bed by placing his knee on her chest. She testified that he began to punch the pillow on either side of her head, striking the side of her head twice. Couch stated that she was able to get away from Appellant and attempted to call for help; however, they began to struggle over the phone, during which time Appellant grabbed her by her arm and pushed her into the wall, causing scratches and bruises to her arm.
Appellant challenged Couch's testimony regarding the events that caused her injuries. Appellant testified that on the night of October 20, 2003, they got into a disagreement, he put his arm on her shoulder, and they fell to the bed. He stated that he did fall on top of her, but that he immediately got up. He testified that he used his hand to push himself up, but did not punch the pillow. Appellant further testified that on October 17, 2003, they had gotten into an argument during which time he tried to leave with their child. He stated that Couch tried to take the child, and he used his hand to "move [her] away from the door."
The jury subsequently found Appellant guilty. At the punishment phase, the trial court made an affirmative finding that Appellant and the victim were members of the same household at the time of the offense. In a single issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in making a factual finding of family violence without submitting the issue to the jury.
Appellant's argument appears twofold: (1) he did not receive "notice that he was being tried for assault with a finding of family violence to be added"; and (2) based on the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey and Blakely v. Washington, the finding of family violence had to be submitted to the jury. See Blakely v. Washington, - U.S. -, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 2536, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 2362-63, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). Our sister court has recently addressed both parts of this issue. See Thomas v. State, 150 S.W.3d 887 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2004, pet. filed). We agree with its reasoning and decision, and thus adopt its opinion as set forth below.
Under the code of criminal procedure, in the trial of an offense against a person, "if the court determines that the offense involved family violence . the court shall make an affirmative finding of that fact and enter the affirmative finding in the judgment of the case." Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.013 (Vernon Supp.2004-05); see also Thomas, 150 S.W.3d at 888. The family code defines family violence as "an act by a member of a family or household against another member of the family or household that is intended to result in physical harm, bodily injury, [or] assault." Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 71.004(1) (Vernon 2002); see Thomas, 150 S.W.3d at 888. The family code's definition of "family" includes individuals who are the parents of the same child, without regard to marriage. Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 71.003. Additionally, the family code's definition of "household" includes persons living together in the same dwelling, without regard to whether they are related to each other. Id. § 71.005.
A finding of family violence "impacts a defendant's sentence only if the defendant has previously committed a family-violence assault." Thomas, 150 S.W.3d at 888. Under the penal code, a misdemeanor assault, such as the one in this case, becomes a third degree felony if it is committed against "a member of the defendant's family or household, if it is shown on the trial of the offense that the defendant has been previously convicted of an offense against a member of the defendant's family or household." Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.01(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 2004-05); see Thomas, 150 S.W.3d at 888. Here, however, the State did not attempt to prove Appellant had previously been convicted of an assault involving family violence. Thomas, 150 S.W.3d at 888. The evidence before the trial court simply showed the single family-violence assault alleged in the information. Id. Thus, the family violence finding could not increase Appellant's sentence in this case.
Nevertheless, the State sufficiently notified Appellant of its intent to seek a finding of family violence. In the information, the caption indicates the charge as "ASSAULT FAMILY VIOLENCE," and the State alleged Appellant had assaulted Janyce Couch. The record clearly reflects Appellant's awareness that Couch was his fiancee and that they had a child together. See id. at 888-89 (finding sufficient notice when record showed victim was defendant's ex-wife and they had a child together). Under the family code, and as found by the trial court, they were not only members of the same household, but they also met the definition of "family." Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 71.003; see also Thomas, 150 S.W.3d at 889. And under the code of criminal procedure, the trial court had no discretion in entering a family violence finding once it determined the offense involved family violence. See Tex.Code Crim. PROC. Ann. art. 42.013; Thomas, 150 S.W.3d at 889. Therefore, we hold that Appellant had all the notice necessary to prepare for the State to seek a family violence finding.
Appellant also argues that the family violence finding should have been presented to the jury for consideration and cites as authority the United States Supreme Court decisions in Blakely v. Washington and Apprendi v. New Jersey. These cases set forth the rule that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2536; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. at 2362-63.
Appellant appears to challenge the constitutionality of article 42.013 under both the United States and Texas Constitutions. However, as Appellant has failed to provide any argument or authority that the Texas Constitution provides him greater protection in this instance and has failed to independently develop this argument, we will address Appellant's constitutional claims together. See Riddle v. State, 888 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Tex.Crim.App.1994) (holding that arguments under the United States and Texas Constitutions must be developed independently of the other), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1068, 115 S.Ct. 1701, 131 L.Ed.2d 563 (1995); Johnson v. State, 853 S.W.2d 527, 533 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) (declining to address appellant's Texas constitutional claims when he failed to provide any argument or authority as to how protection under Texas Constitution was different than protection under United States Constitution), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 852, 114 S.Ct. 154, 126 L.Ed.2d 115 (1993).
There are two types of challenges to the constitutionality of a statute: the statute is unconstitutional as applied to the defendant, or the statute is unconstitutional on its face. Fluellen v. State, 104 S.W.3d 152, 167 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2003, no pet.). An as-applied challenge to a statute cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. See Garcia v. State, 887 S.W.2d 846, 861 (Tex.Crim.App.1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1005, 115 S.Ct. 1317, 131 L.Ed.2d 198 (1995). Because Appellant did not make an as-applied challenge in the trial court, we will assume he is making a facial challenge to the constitutionality of article 42.013. A facial challenge to a statute may be raised for the first time on appeal. Ex parte Flores, 130 S.W.3d 100, 106 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2003, pet. ref'd). A facial challenge to a statute is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully because the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the statute will be valid. Santikos v. State, 836 S.W.2d 631, 633 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 999, 113 S.Ct. 600, 121 L.Ed.2d 537 (1992). Thus, it is incumbent on the challenger to first show that the statute is unconstitutional as to him in his situation. Id. Moreover, even as to a facial challenge, it is not sufficient to show that the statute may be unconstitutional as to others. Id. It is still a prerequisite to a facial challenge that the challenger establish that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to him. Id.; Fluellen, 104 S.W.3d at 167.
Appellant's constitutional challenge is not ripe for review because the statute has not yet been applied to him. The ripeness doctrine examines the timing of a lawsuit and its factual posture at the time of its filing. Ex parte Cross, 69 S.W.3d 810, 814 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2002, no pet.). It also allows courts to avoid premature adjudication and serves constitutional interests in prohibiting advisory opinions. Id. The theory behind the doctrine is straightforward-if the plaintiffs injury is not concrete and depends on contingent, remote, or hypothetical facts, the court does not have jurisdiction to hear the dispute. Id.
A finding of family violence under article 42.013 would only affect Appellant by increasing "the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum" in violation of Apprendi if he were subsequently convicted for an additional assault-family violence. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. at 2362-63. It is not until this hypothetical subsequent conviction occurs that the level of assault would be increased from a Class A misdemeanor to a third degree felony, subjecting Appellant to a higher penalty range. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.01(b)(2).
The application of article 42.013 that would allow a higher penalty range is contingent on Appellant being convicted for a subsequent assault-family violence. Because it is contingent on a remote possibility of a future conviction, the statute has not been unconstitutionally applied to Appellant. See Ex parte Fox, No. 14-02-00446-CR, 2003 WL 21191227, at *4 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (holding that appellant could not make any constitutionality claim as to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 62.02 because it had not been applied to him in any unconstitutional manner). Thus, the proper time to raise this constitutional argument is after a subsequent charge or indictment for assault-family violence, if one arises. See id. (stating that the proper time for appellant to raise his constitutional challenge is after he has been charged or indicted for the future offense). Accordingly, Appellant's constitutional challenge is not ripe for our review.
Furthermore, we agree with the State and our sister court in Thomas that Blakely and Apprendi do not affect the validity of the finding of family violence by the trial court. Thomas, 150 S.W.3d at 889. The family violence finding made here had no effect whatsoever on Appellant's punishment in this case. Id.; see Resendiz v. State, 112 S.W.3d 541, 550 (Tex.Crim.App.2003) (acknowledging that Apprendi applies only to facts that increase the penalty beyond the "prescribed statutory maximum"), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1032, 124 S.Ct. 2098, 158 L.Ed.2d 713 (2004). In the present case there were no facts that would increase Appellant's penalty. Appellant contends that "[t]he finding by the trial court enhances the effect of the conviction by making it a pre-cursor offense to a felony if an assault involving family violence is charged subsequently." However, Appellant provides no authority as to how this statement makes Blakely and Appren-di applicable in this case, and we find that this argument is without merit. Therefore, we agree with our sister court in Thomas and conclude that the holdings in Blakely and Apprendi do not affect Appellant's case. Thomas, 150 S.W.3d at 889.
We conclude that Appellant had sufficient notice that the trial court would be required to make an affirmative finding of family violence, that Appellant's constitutional challenge of article 42.013 is not yet ripe, and that Blakely and Apprendi have no application to the facts of this case. Thus, we overrule Appellant's sole issue and affirm the trial court's decision.
DAUPHINOT, J. filed a dissenting opinion.
. Appellant also states that he had to perform additional requirements, such as attending a Batterer's Intervention Program, as a result of the family violence finding. However, a court may impose any reasonable condition on probation, but that does not constitute an increase in Appellant's sentence.