Case Name: Frederick W. Prior, Appellant, v. Henry M. Flagler, Respondent
Court: New York Court of Common Pleas
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1895-06
Citations: 13 Misc. 115
Docket Number: 
Parties: Frederick W. Prior, Appellant, v. Henry M. Flagler, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Miscellaneous Reports
Volume: 13
Pages: 115–116

Head Matter:
Frederick W. Prior, Appellant, v. Henry M. Flagler, Respondent.
(New York Common Pleas —General Term,
June, 1895.)
An agreement to pay a disabled servant his salary for the remainder of the term of his employment if he will resign is void for want of consideration, as such disablement operates to dissolve the contract of employment, and there is, therefore, no employment to resign.
An erroneous exclusion of evidence, if not prejudicial to the defeated party, is not ground for reversal.
Prior v. Flagler, 10 Misc. Rep. 496, affirmed.
Appeal from a judgment of the General Term of the City Court of New York, which affirmed a judgment rendered at Trial Term directing the dismissal of the complaint for failure of proof.
Action to recover upon an alleged oral contract to pay the plaintiff’s stipulated salary, as an employee of the defendant, in consideration of the former’s resignation of the employment.
Edwin B. Boot, for appellant.
Boudi/not Keith, for respondent.

Opinion:
Bischoff, J.
The judgment directing the dismissal of the complaint was rightfully rendered and should be affirmed.
The plaintiff was employed by the defendant as chef in the kitchen of the hotel "Alcazar," at St. Augustine, Florida, for the season of 1892-1893, at an aggregate salary of $750. A little more, than three weeks after his employment began the plaintiff met with a mishap, through whose fault does not appear, from which he sustained personal injury which disabled him from further service during the term. While at the hospital, he testified, one Tomlinson, another of the defendant's employees, promised in the defendant's behalf that he (the plaintiff) would receive the stipulated salary. if he would resign his employment, to which, the plaintiff further testi fled, he agreed; and it was upon this alleged oral agreement that the plain tiff sought recovery in this action.,
When the plaintiff became disabled the contract of employment was dissolved, each of the parties thereto being released from further performance. Wood Mast. & Serv. (2d ed.) § 122, p. 237; Fisher v. Monroe, 16 Daly, 461. He then had no employment to resign, no right of return to service to yield. Whereof, then, did the consideration for the defendant's alleged promise consist % Obviously, there was none; yet it is elementary that from the nonfulfillment of a mere promise no cause of action can accrue.
But the appellant's counsel urges the judgment' must-be reversed because the trial court committed error in the exclusion of evidence proffered by the plaintiff and which tended to show that Tomlinson had authority from the defendant to, make the promise. Not so. Let us assume that Tomlinson had such authority. How could that have aided the plaintiff in the absence of proof of the constituent of a valid contract, a consideration ? We fail to see.
It is manifest that the exclusion of evidence of Tomlinson's authority, if error it was, did not prejudice the plaintiff, and to sustain his right to a reversal of the judgment it was incumbent upon him to show that he was prejudiced by the rulings of the trial court. Tracey v. Altmyer, 46 N. Y. 598, 604; Appleby v. Erie Co. Sav. Bank, 62 id. 12,18; Carman v. Pultz, 21 id. 547; Briant v. Trimmer, 47 id. 96; Standard Oil Co. v. Triumph Ins. Co., 64 id. 85; Phillip v. Gallant, 62 id. 256, 265. From harmless error no reversal will result. Tenney v. Berger, 93 N. Y. 524; Thorne v. Turck, 94 id. 90; Story v. Williamsburgh M. B. Assn., 95 id. 474; Ellwanger v. Fish, 60 id. 651; Flannagan v. Maddin, 81 id. 623; Downs v. N. Y. Cent. R. R. Co., 56 id. 664.
Judgment affirmed, with costs.
Bookstaver and Pryor, JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed, with costs.