Case Name: John Flickinger vs. Peter Hull
Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland
Jurisdiction: Maryland
Decision Date: 1847-06
Citations: 5 Gill 60
Docket Number: 
Parties: John Flickinger vs. Peter Hull.
Judges: 
Reporter: Reports of cases argued and determined in the Court of Appeals of Maryland
Volume: 5
Pages: 60–84

Head Matter:
John Flickinger vs. Peter Hull.
June, 1847.
In 1821 S. was appointed guardian, and gave bond with F. and H. as his sureties. In 1825 S. died insolvent, and in debt as guardian. H. was appointed his successor, and F. became his surety. The second guardian before he had received any part of his ward’s funds, charged himself with the balance due from his predecessor. In 1845, the infant sued the second guardian’s bond, and recovered judgment against H. and F. when the second guardian paid the ward a greater sum than he had received in fact from the first. The ward then assigned the judgment to F. who was about to sue out execution against H. for the whole judgment, though he had in fact, but paid a part of it. Held,
1. Whether one surety can sue another security to the same instrument, for contribution in a case where the plaintiff by a change of his relation, had only made himself constructively liable for the debt secured. Qr.
2. That the claims between the co-sureties having become complicated by sundry payments and receipts, and on adjusting which, accounts would be necessary to show the true payments, made a case for equity.
3. That a surety who had become constructively liable at law to the principal creditor by charging himself with sums he had not in fact received, would not be concluded in equity as related to his co-surety originally liable for contribution by his admission, where a remedy suitable to the circumstances of the case would be extended.
4. It being admitted that there was a balance due from S. the first guardian, for which H. and F. were both liable, that H. had not received it in fact, and S’s estate insolvent, made a case for contribution, and against equity for F. to endeavour to recover the whole amount of the judgment recovered against him and if.
5. When a party applying for an injunction admits that he owes a balance to the person to he enjoined, the court may require such balance to he brought into court to be paid accordingly.
Where a guardian dies insolvent, and his surety is appointed his successor, and charges himself with the balance due the ward from the first guardian, this makes the second guardian liable to the ward.
Where a person in one character is debtor, and the same person in another character is creditor, the law regards the debt as paid by the debtor capacity to the creditor.
Where a man has several capacities, and is found in possession of property, the law will attach the possession to the capacity in which of right it ought to be held.
So also, where having different capacities, he executes an authority delegated to him in one of those capacities, the law will attribute the act to the proper authority, although the person does not profess to exercise it in virtue of that particular power.
Appeal from the equity side of Carroll County Court, from an order continuing an injunction.
The bill in this cause was filed by the appellee on the 1st October, 1845, and alleged that about the year 1820 Jacob Snyder was appointed by the Orphans court of Frederick county, guardian to Matilda Flickinger an infant, who has since intermarried with one Reuben Rachner, and that your orator and one John Flickinger became the securities in the guardian bond of said Snyder, which bond was executed on the 1st May, 1820; that the said Jacob Snyder died about the year 1825, and that at the time of his death he was indebted as guardian as aforesaid to his said ward, in the sum $2,036 31. That after the death of the said Snyder it was believed and understood by the said Flickinger and your orator, upon consultation between them on the subject, that they would be compelled to lose a considerable amount of the sum so due from said guardian to said ward, as they believed the estate of the said Snyder to be insufficient to pay his debts, and it was thereupon agreed by the said Flickinger and your orator, that he the said Flickinger should become the guardian to the said ward, and that your orator should become his security in the guardian bond, and that they should be equally responsible for the amount of said account settled by said Snyder, and should pay the amount thereof in equal proportions, whenever the same should be demanded by said ward after she had attained majority, and that the said Flickinger should recover from the estate of said Snyder whatever he might be able, which should be applied to the payment of said amount to said wai’d, and that the deficiency which would be the loss to your orator and said Flickinger should be equally borne by them in equal and even proportions; that the said Flickinger and himself went together to Frederick city for the purpose of carrying out the aforesaid agreement, by applying to the said Orphans court for the appointment of Flickinger as guardian as aforesaid, and that after they had reached Frederick the said Flickinger proposed to your orator, that as your orator was more conversant with the business of the kind, he, your orator, should become the guardian, and that he, Flickinger, would become his security, and that the same agreement should exist, that is to say, that he the said Flickinger and your orator, should be equally bound for the amount due to said ward, and should pay the same in equal proportions as aforesaid, and that the amount which might be recovered from the estate of said Snyder should be for the equal benefit and relief of said Flickinger and your orator; and your orator states that it was distinctly understood and agreed between them, that their liability as securities in the bond of said Snyder should be in no degree altered or changed, and that the arrangment aforesaid was with the view, and for the purpose of having for themselves the benefit of the time which would elapse before the coming of age of the said ward, and also for the purpose of recovering whatever they might be able from the estate of said Snyder before they could be called on to pay said money. That in pursuance of the agreement aforesaid, himself and the said Flickinger applied to the said Orphans court for the appointment of your orator as guardian as aforesaid, and that your orator was appointed by said court guardian as aforesaid, sometime in the early part of the year 1826, and on the same day on which his bond as guardian bears date; and that on the 8th February in said year he entered into bond as such guardian with the said John Flickinger as security, and that two securities being required by said Orphans court, one John Daugherty who was present, offered to become the remaining security, and did so become. That afterward, to wit: on the 16th May, 1831, another bond was given by your orator as guardian as aforesaid, in which bond the said John Flickinger and John Slyan became securities, and your orator alleges and states, that at the time the said last mentioned bond was executed the same agreement and understanding aforementioned existed between said Flickinger and your orator, and was distinctly and expressly recognized by said Flickinger; and your orator further shews to your Honors, that he proceeded to recover whatever amount he could from the estate of said Snyder, and that he has at different times, recovered and received from the administrator of said Snyder, in all, the sum of $1688 10. That the estate of said Jacob Snyder the former guardian as aforesaid, was and is insolvent. That in pursuance of the understanding and agreement aforesaid, between said Flickinger and your orator, he proceeded soon after he had been appointed guardian as aforesaid, to settle an account in the Orphans court of Frederick county aforesaid, in which account he charged himself with the knowledge and concurrence of the said Flickinger, with the whole amount due from said Snyder to said ward, although at that time he had not received one cent of said amount, and that he proceeded from time to time to settle accounts in said Orphans court, charging himself with the whole of said amount, and the accumulating interest thereon, until the 26th February, 1835, when he settled a final account in said Orphans court, when the said sum with the interest thereon, amounted to the sum of $3905 67.
And your orator further shews to your Honors, that although he has received and recovered from the estate of said Snyder in all but the sum of $1588 10, he has paid to the said ward since she had attained majority, at various times, from the 2nd February, 1839, to the 21st November, 1842, various sums amounting in the whole, with interest up to the said last mentioned day to the sum of $2779 82, out of the monies which he had so received as aforesaid from the administrator of said Snyder, and out of his own private funds, and that not one cent of said sum has been paid by said Flickinger; that the State of .Maryland, for the use of the said Reuben Rachner and Matilda his wife, the said Matilda being the ward aforesaid, recovered at the April Term of Carroll county court, 1845, a judgment against your orator and the said John Flickinger, for the sum of $3129 75 with interest, &c. of the said amount so due to her as aforesaid, after having allowed all the payments so made to her as aforesaid by your orator, that since the rendition of said judgment he has paid thereon, in all the sum of $1270 00; that on the 9th July, 1845, a writ of fieri facias was issued on said judgment, under which said writ the sheriff of Carroll county seized and levied on the personal and real property of the said John Flickinger and your orator for the satisfaction of said judgment, and that after said seizure and levy, and advertisement of sale of the property levied on, the said writ of fieri facias was countermanded by the order of the said Reuben Rachner, all which will appear from a copy of said writ, and the sheriff’s return thereon endorsed; and that afterwards, to wit, on the 16th August, in the year aforesaid, a pretended assignment of the said judgment was executed by the said Rachner and wife, for whose use the said State sued the said John Flickinger, as will appear from a copy of said pretended assignment herewith filed ; and also a copy of an agreement between said Reuben Rachner and said Flickinger, herewith filed.
And your orator states that a particular statement of the amounts so paid by him as aforesaid, with the interest thereon up to the date of the said judgment, and of the amounts paid by him since said judgment, as well as the amounts so received by him from the estate of the said Snyder, shewing the condition of the account as between the said Flickinger and your orator is herewith filed; that the said Flickinger pretends that by virtue of the aforesaid assignment of said judgment, and the act of assembly of October, session, 1763, chap. 23, sec. 8, he is entitled unto and can have in his own name as assignee, the same execution against your orator as the principal debtor in said judgment, that the plaintiff in said judgment might or ought to have had, if said assignment had not been made. And your orator is informed and verily believes, and therefore states that said Flickinger is about to sue out of Carroll county court, as a court of law, an execution against your orator for the whole amount of said judgment, including interest and costs, after deducting therefrom and giving credit for the said sum of $1270 00, so paid by your orator as aforesaid, since the date of said judgment. Whereas your orator is advised and humbly insists that the said pretended assignment of said judgment not having been made by the legal plaintiff on the record, does not entitle the said Flickinger to sue out an execution as aforesaid and also that the facts, agreements and circumstances hereinbefore set forth in equity and good conscience, debar the said Flickinger from having any execution whatever against your orator on said judgment, and that whatever may be the relative rights of said Flickinger and your orator, as regards principal and security in the aforesaid guardian’s bond on which judgment has been obtained as aforesaid, the simple fact, that your orator as guardian charged himself with the whole amount of money due the said ward from Snyder, the said former guardian, and thereby exonerated as well the said Flickinger as your orator, from great loss and responsibility as securities in said guardian bond as aforesaid, is in equity and good conscience a defence to your orator against all claims by said Flickinger, founded upon his being only a security in the aforesaid guardian bond of your orator, as also the additional fact that after the said Flickinger had refused as aforesaid to become the guardian of said ward, your orator at the instance and request of the said Flickinger assumed the said guardianship, and charged himself in the said Orphans court of Frederick county, with the entire amount of the indebtedness of the said former guardian for the express purpose of relieving said Flickinger, as well as your orator, from loss and responsibility, and immediate accountability as securities of the said former guardian, and upon the express agreement between your orator and said Flickinger, that he would contribute equally with your orator in making up the amount which might be coming to said ward by reason of the insolvency of the estate of said Snyder after said ward should have arrived at age.
And your orator charges that for the said Flickinger to proceed to recover from your orator by execution on said judgment, the money which he may have paid on said judgment, would be to practice a fraud on your orator, which the principles of equity forbid, and would be also in violation of said Flickinger’s agreements solemnly entered into with your orator, but which your orator cannot enforce at law, in case said Flickmger is permitted to sue out execution as he is about to do against your orator on said judgment, unless enjoined.
The complainant filed with his bill various exhibits, viz:
The third account of Jacob Snyder as guardian to M. F., showing a balance due the ward, 4th November, 1822, $2036 31.
The guardian’s bond of 8th February, 1826, executed by complainant and defendant, and one John Daugherty.
The guardian’s bond of 16th May, 1831, executed by complainant and defendant, and John Slyan. Penalty $6000.
The account of John Snyder, administrator of Jacob Snyder, 26th November, 1826, balance $798 29. 2nd account, balance $329 01.
The first account of Peter Hull as guardian, 4th November, 1825, balance $2276 14, due his ward.
The eighth and final account of same, 26th February, 1835, balance due the ward, $3905 67.
Receipts of Matilda Flickinger, 1839, $830. 1842, $63. $155. $1539 50.
Judgment. The State use of Reuben Rachner and Matilda his wife vs. Peter Hull and John Flickinger, on bond of 16th May, 1831, for $3129 75 and costs. Cr.—'Ey Peter Hull, $900, $250. 25th August, 1845, balance due on this judgment assigned to the use of John Flickinger; 9th July, 1845, fi. fa. issued; 26th July, 1845, Peter Hull pays $120 on the fi. fa., and plaintiff countermands the writ.
Assignment of judgment, R. R. fy wife to Peter Hull, 16th August, 1845. It was then agreed that the assignment to John Flickinger, conveyed to him the entire amount of the plaintiff’s claim, as per the judgment, except the sum of $120, now in the sheriff’s hands, and credits entered on the judgment.
Statement of claims paid by complainant as guardian to M. F., and of the receipts by him from the estate of Jacob Snyder. Payments, $4418 80. Receipts, $2791 35.
The answer of John Flickinger admitted, that about the year 1820, Jacob Snyder was appointed guardian to Matilda Flickinger, then an infant, and who has since intermarried with Reuben Rachner; and that the said complainant, and this defendant, became the securities in the guardian bond of said Snyder. He admits that the said Jacob Snyder died about the year 1825, in the State of Pennsylvania, where he resided at the time of his death; and at that time he was indebted to his ward in the sum of $2036 31. But this defendant saith it is not true, that after the death of the said Snyder, it was believed and understood by this defendant and said complainant, upon consultation between them on the subject, that they would be compelled to lose a considerable amount of the sum so due from said guardian; or, that they believed the estate of said Snyder to be insufficient to pay his debts; or that it was thereupon agreed by this defendant and the complainant, that this defendant should become the guardian to the said ward, or that the said complainant should become his security in the guardian bond; or that they should become equally responsible for the amount of the account settled by said Snyder; or should pay the amount thereof, in equal proportions, whenever the same should be demanded by said ward after she had attained majority, or at any other time; or that this defendant should recover from the estate of said Snyder whatever he might be able, to be applied to the payment of said amount to said ward ; or that any deficiency should be equally borne by the said complainant and this defendant, in even and equal proportions. He further denies that ho and the said complainant went together to Frederick city, for the purpose, or with a view of carrying out any agreement whereby this defendant was to become guardian of said ward; or that the said complainant was to become security for this defendant in his bond as such guardian; or that they, the said complainant and this respondent, went together to Frederick city, for the purpose, or with a view of applying to the Orphans court of Frederick county for the appointment of this defendant as guardian to said ward; and this defendant denies and saith, that it is not true that he ever proposed to the said complainant, that he, the said complainant, should become the guardian to said ward; and that this defendant would become his security; or that when this defendant did become security for the said complainant in his guardian bond as guardian of said ward, to wit: on the 8 Feb., 1826, that any agreement existed whereby this defendant and said complainant should be equally bound for the amount due to said ward; or that they should pay the same in equal proportions, as stated in the complainant’s bill; or that the amount which might be recovered from the estate of said Snyder should be for the equal benefit and relief of this defendant and the said complainant; or that there was any understanding or agreement between them, the said complainant, and this defendant, with regard to their liability as securities in the said guardian bond of said Snyder; or that this defendant ever expected any benefit or advantage by becoming security for said complainant in his guardian bond aforesaid. This defendant avers, that during the period which elapsed between the death of said Snyder, and the day on which this defendant accompanied said complainant to Frederick city, for the-purpose of becoming one of his, the said complainant’s securities, in his first guardian bond, this defendant and said complainant had but one conversation on the subject, and that occurred when the said complainant, after said Snyder’s death, called on this defendant, and suggested that he, this defendant, might become the guardian for said ward, and voluntarily offered to become one of this defendant’s securities, if he, this defendant, were disposed to become such guardian; but this defendant said, he was not acquainted with such business, and had no inclination to become the guardian of said ward. Whereupon, said complainant expressed his willingness to become the guardian himself, and requested this defendant to become his security; but this defendant was not disposed to become security for the said complainant as such guardian, and did not consent to do so until said complainant represented to him that if he, the said complainant, did become guardian, he could invest the money in his, the said complainant’s tan-yard, and extend his business, and realize handsome profits, or he would buy land with it; and that he was quite confident, that he, the said complainant, could pay the money whenever it would be required to be paid to the said ward; and that John Daugherty (who then resided in the neighborhood, and was in good circumstances, and a responsible man,) was willing to become one of his, the said complainant’s securities, in the bond which he, the said com plainant, would be required to give as such guardian as aforesaid, if this defendant would consent to become the other security. And that it was upon these representations, and at the solicitation of said complainant, that this defendant consented to become one of the securities in said complainant’s guardian bond as aforesaid; and this defendant saith, that he consented to become security as aforesaid, on the condition that the said John Daugherty should become one of the securities, and that with this understanding, he, this defendant, went to Frederick city with the said complainant; but does not now recollect whether the said Daugherty went in company with them or not; but the said Daugherty was present when the said complainant entered into bond as the guardian of said ward, and became one of his, the said complainant’s, securities, in said bond. This defendant further saith and avers, that he was never apprehensive or fearful of sustaining any loss in consequence of his being security for said Jacob Snyder in his guardian bond; for he was under the impression and belief, that the said Snyder's estate was solvent, and the said complainant, after he became the guardian for said ward, frequently represented to this defendant, that the said Snyder's estate was solvent, or very nearly so; and this defendant, before he became security for the said Jacob Snyder in his said guardian bond, and consideration of his becoming such security, he was indemnified in the sum of $3200, by the joint or joint and several bond of said Jacob, Henry, and John Snyder. But after the death of John Daugherty, who was co-security with this defendant in the guardian bond, to wit: about the year 1831, there being a report, &c.; and the said complainant proposed to this defendant, that he, the said complainant, would give a bond in which one John Slyan, who was then in said city, would become co-security with this defendant—to which proposition this defendant acceded, and the bond was accordingly executed. And this defendant denies that any agreement or understanding existed between said complainant and this defendant, when the bond last aforesaid was executed, whereby they were to be equally liable or responsible for any loss that might be sustained in consequence of the insolvency of the estate of said Jacob Snyder, or otherwise; or that this defendant was other than a security for said complainant in said bond.
And this defendant further answering, saith, that he does not know what amount the said complainant received or recovered from the estate of said Snyder, the former guardian of said ward: but states, that it appears from the account and distribution stated by auditors, duly appointed by the Orphans court of Jldams county, in the State of Pennsylvania, that the said auditors allotted, assigned, or directed to be paid to the said complainant as guardian for said ward, the sum of $2096 57, by John Snyder, the administrator of said Jacob Snyder.
And this defendant has been informed, and believes, and so states, that the said complainant received or recovered the aforesaid sum from the estate of the said Jacob Snyder. That the said complainant also received the sum of $308 44, as guardian for the said ward, from this defendant, as executor of Andrew Flickinger, late of Frederick county, deceased. That he was not advised or informed of the said complainant’s settlement or settlements with the said Orphans court of Frederick county, as guardian of said ward, and denies that it was with the knowledge and concurrence of this defendant that the said complainant charged himself with the whole amount due from said Snyder to said ward; but this defendant believes that he did so, under the impression that said Snyder's estate was perfectly solvent; and this defendant does not know whether the said complainant had then received anything from the said Snyder's estate or not. That he does not know, but believes and admits that the said complainant paid to the said ward since she attained majority, &c.
This defendant further answering-saith, that he admits that the said Reuben Rachner and Matilda his wife, in the name of the State of Maryland, for their use, recovered at the April term of Carroll county court, 1845, a judgment against the said complainant and this defendant for the sum of $3129 75, with interest, and the balance due her from the said complain ant as her guardian as aforesaid, after allowing all the payments which the said complainant had made to her as aforesaid; and this defendant states that the suit in which the aforesaid judgment was obtained, was brought on the aforesaid guardian bond of said complainant, in which this defendant and the aforesaid John Slycm were securities for the said complainant, as this defendant has hereinbefore stated; and this defendant admits that since the rendition of said judgment, the said complainant has paid thereon, in all the sum of $1270 00. And this defendant admits, that on the ninth day of July, 1845, a writ of fieri facias was issued on said judgment, and that under said writ the sheriff of Carroll county seized and levied on the personal and real estate of said complainant and this defendant, and that the said property was advertised by the said sheriff, and that after the said levy and advertisement, the said writ of fieri facias was countermanded by the order of said Reuben Rachner.
And this defendant further answering, saith, he denies that there was any pretended assignment of said judgment to this defendant by the said Reuben Rachner and wife, but this defendant states and avers that inasmuch as his personal and real property was seized and levied upon and advertised for sale by the sheriff of Carroll county as aforesaid, this defendant to save his said property from sacrifice, as said complainant’s security, paid on the whole balance then remaining due on said judgment and writ of fieri facias, to wit: the sum of $2378 75; and in consideration thereof, and of this defendant being only security for said complainant in the bond on which said judgment wras obtained as aforesaid, and by virtue and force of the act of assembly in such case made and provided, the said Reuben Rachner and Matilda Rachner his wife, the said Matilda being the ward aforesaid, executed an assignment of said judgment to this defendant; that inasmuch as the said complainant had paid to the sheriff aforesaid the sum of $120 00 after the aforesaid writ of fieri facias came to the hands of him, the said sheriff, this defendant and the said Reuben Rachner, with a view to avoid any error or mistake, signed an agreement setting forth that the said complainant should have credit for the said $120 00, as well as the several sums which the said complainant had paid on the said judgment before the said writ of fien facias was issued.
And this defendant states that he is advised that he, this defendant, by virtue of the aforesaid assignment and. the act of assembly of 1763, chap. 23, is entitled unto and ought to have in his own name, or in the name of the State of Maryland, for his use, the same execution against the said complainant as the said R. R. and M. R. his wife, or the said R. R. and M. R. his wife in the name of the State of Maryland, for their use, might or ought to have had, the said assignment having been recorded in Carroll county court, it being the same court in which the said judgment was rendered or obtained: and this defendant is advised and humbly insists, that inasmuch as he, this defendant, was security for the said complainant in the bond on which the said judgment was obtained; and inasmuch as he, this defendant, paid the balance, and on the said payment and the plaintiffs in the said judgment has assigned the same to him, this defendant, in consideration of his having so paid them said balance, this defendant is entitled to and ought to have execution for the said balance still remaining unpaid by the principal debtor, who is the said complainant. And this defendant prays that the injunction heretofore granted in this cause may be dissolved.
Various exhibits were filed with this answer.
At the September term, 1846, the cause having been submitted on a motion to dissolve the injunction,
The county court, Dorsey, C. J., and Brewer, A. J., passed the following order:
The bill states that the complainant and defendant became sureties for one Jacob Snyder, as guardian for Matilda Elickinger; that Snyder died indebted to his ward in the sum of $2036 31J, for which sum the complainant and defendant were equally responsible, and which they would eventually have to pay to the extent of the insolvency of the estate of said Snyder. That under these circumstances it was .agreed between the complain ant and defendant, that the complainant should become the guardian for said Matilda Flickinger, with the defendant as his surety, for the purpose of recovering from the estate of said Snyder so much of said debt as it would be able to pay, and appropriating it to the relief of said sureties, each of them undertaking to pay his proportion of the deficiency, and that in pursuance of said agreement, the complainant became such guardian with the defendant, as one of his sureties, passed an account charging himself with the whole of his ward’s estate, as if received. That the complainant afterwards recovered from Snyder's estate, a part of the debt, and paid over divers sums of money to the ward after she became of age, leaving, however, a residue, for which the ward and her husband recovered judgment against the complainant and his sureties in Carroll county court, and upon which judgment, he, the complainant, paid other sums of money, and a ji. fa. having been issued and laid upon the defendant’s property, the defendant paid what remained due upon the judgment, took an assignment of it under the act of 1763, and was proceeding to levy the whole on the complainant, without regard to what was due on his original responsibility as one of the sureties of Jacob Snyder. The answer of the defendant, admits his original responsibility as one of J. Snyder's sureties, that the complainant became the guardian after his death, and received and paid the sums of money stated in the bill, but denies that the complainant became guardian at his instance, or that he agreed to pay his proportion of the deficiency: on the contrary, the defendant professed to have felt no interest in the matter, as he alleges that he had a good bond of indemnity which would have secured him from any eventual loss, or a deficiency of Snyder's estate, which is admitted.
We do not see upon what ground the defendant claims a dissolution of the injunction. His original, co-equal, responsibility, with the complainant as one of the sureties in Snyder's bond, is admitted; and how is he released from that responsibility ? Although he did not agree that the complainant should become guardian and charge himself with the whole debt due from Snyder, that they might by the delay, be enabled to recover from Snyder's estate before they should be compelled to pay, he was equally benefitted by it as if he had so agreed, and can hardly mean to contend, that the complainant by charging himself with the whole amount, assumed the whole responsibility, to his the defendant’s exoneration, in the face of the fact, that he had then received none, and subsequently received only a part. We are not aware of any principle of law or equity that would release him on such grounds. That he has a bond of indemnity, cannot release him. If that could have any effect in the case, it would rather tend to create an equity in favor of the complainant. An undue importance seems to be attached to the alleged agreement of the defendant. His responsibility as a co-security was antecedent to, and entirely independent of it, and has not, so far as we can perceive, ever been discharged. Injunction continued until the final decree or further order.
The defendant appealed to this court.
The cause was argued before Archer, C. J., Chambers, Spence, Magruder and Martin, J.
By Palmer for the appellant, and
By W. P. Maulsby and Reverdy Johnson for the appellee.

Opinion:
Chambers, J.,
delivered the opinion of this court.
The bond of Hull, as guardian, and the fact of bis charging himself with the amount due from Snyder, the former guardian to whom he wras security, made him responsible to the ward for that amount. Where a person in one character is debtor, and the same person in another character is creditor, the law regards the debt as paid by the debtor capacity to the creditor.
This is on the same principle which governs in the case where a man has several capacities, and is found in possession of property, the law will attach the possession to the capacity in which, of right, it ought to be held j so also, where having various capacities, he executes an authority delegated to him in one of those capacities, the law will attribute the act to the proper authority, although the person does not profess to exercise it, in virtue of that particular power. It is said that this being, so far as the ward was concerned, equivalent to an actual payment by Hull, would entitle Hull to claim contribution from Flickinger, if at all, at that time, and by a suit at law. How far a principal in a bond, who had charged himself in the Orphans court with the receipt of a sum of money, could in a court of law, recover against a security on his own bond, upon the ground that the money was not received in fact, but only charged because both the principal and that surety were co-sureties of the former debtor, and therefore equally liable, might be a very questionable matter. Certainly the learned counsel has not produced such a case, and it is believed such an one cannot be produced. The case is very far from being an ordinary case of contribution. If suit at law would not have been entirely defeated by showing that the plaintiff was principal in the new bond, and the defendant his surety, and that the plaintiff had admitted the receipt of the whole sum, yet clearly, the defendant could, under the circumstances of this case, have restrained the plaintiff from enforcing the payment of the one-half of the gross amount, until it was ascertained in a due course of administration, how much Snyder's estate would pay, and of course how much the ultimate loss would be, especially, as in the meantime no actual advance of the capital was required, and no actual loss sustained by the plaintiff.
It is a case now complicated by sundry payments and receipts running over quite a long period of time, and in adjusting which, accounts between the parties will be necessary to ascertain the true merits of their respective claims, if indeed the complainant shall ultimately be found to have a claim.
It is therefore the proper subject for a bill in Chancery, where the technical objection of the admission in the account passed by the complainant will not conclude him, and where a thorough examination of all the accounts can be had, and an opportunity afforded of proving the agreement, and remedy extended to suit all the circumstances of the case. It has been intimated that perhaps in equity, no claim for contribution could have been enforced at any period prior to the actual payment of the money by the appellee, the guardian. In that view of the case, there would be no pretence to allege that the claim was stale, but upon the ground even that a proceeding could have been instituted as soon as the appellee charged himself with the debt, yet the period has not elapsed which is considered as evidence of payment. That period has been fixed at twenty years, and ought not to be shortened, except •under peculiar circumstances; whereas in this case, there are peculiar circumstances to account for the delay, and of course to forbid the making the exception.
The case being before us on bill and answer, on motion to dissolve the injunction, must in reference to that motion be regarded as if there was no such agreement between the parties at the time Hull became guardian; the answer of defendant, having positively denied its existence. It is not however denied that there was a balance due from Snyder, for which both were equally liable; that Hull charged himself with this amount, without in fact receiving it, and that Snyder's estate was partially insolvent. These facts alone, exclusive of any agreement, would entitle Hull to contribution, and therefore would make it inequitable for Flickinger to issue an execution for and recover the whole of the balance paid by him on the ward's judgment. The injunction therefore was properly continued to restrain him from such proceeding.
It is said that by the authority of 7 G. & J. 306, Planters Bank & Hodges, this court have required the injunction to go only for the amount claimed as a deduction, here the appellee claims " nearly the whole," the admission of a balance is in very equivocal terms, and a readiness is alleged to pay what may be found due. So far however as he admits a balance due to Flickinger, the court below should have passed an order directing the amount to be brought into court to be paid accordingly, and doubtless would have done, and will still do so at any time on a petition by the appellants to that effect.
It is not in this case a sufficient ground on which to dissolve the injunction. The answer sets up various matters by way of defence, but they are not responsive to the bill; and cannot of course affect the question of dissolution which is now before the court.
A question has been made in the argument on the conformity of the assignment stated in the proceedings to have been made by Rachner and wife, who were the beneficial plaintiffs in the judgment obtained against these parties on the guardian bond, to the provisions of the act of 1763, ch. 23, but the view taken of the case has rendered an opinion on that question unnecessary.
On the whole, this court is of opinion that the bill does contain matter fit for the jurisdiction of the court, and entitling the complainant to an injunction, and that the answer does not entitle the defendant below, the appellant here, to a dissolution of that injunction.
decree affirmed.