Case Name: PELICAN BAY HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellant, v. Robert SEDITA & Patricia Sedita, His Wife, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1999-01-22
Citations: 724 So. 2d 684
Docket Number: No. 98-1611
Parties: PELICAN BAY HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellant, v. Robert SEDITA & Patricia Sedita, His Wife, Appellees.
Judges: PETERSON, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 724
Pages: 684–687

Head Matter:
PELICAN BAY HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellant, v. Robert SEDITA & Patricia Sedita, His Wife, Appellees.
No. 98-1611.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Jan. 22, 1999.
R. Michael Kennedy of Kennedy & Pyle, P.A., South Daytona, for Appellant.
Bruce A. Hoehstetler, Daytona Beach, for Appellees.

Opinion:
HARRIS, J.
Pelican Bay filed an action against the Seditas to enjoin them from parking their limousines outside their garage in violation of a homeowner restriction that prevents "commercial" vehicles from being openly parked in the development. The trial court granted the injunction but gave the Seditas six months to come into compliance. The trial court refused to grant prevailing party attorney's fees to the homeowner association. It appeals; we reverse.
Neither the fact that ,the issue was close, nor the fact that the Seditas were given time to comply with the injunction, alters the conclusion that the homeowner association was the prevailing party. In Kirou v. Oceanside Plaza Condominium Ass'n, Inc., 425 So.2d 650 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), the court held that the proceeding was one in which the association sought the removal of dogs from the condominium unit, and that, because the trial court ruled that the dogs could not be removed, the unit owner clearly prevailed and was therefore entitled to attorney's fees. Here, the ultimate result was that the limousines were ordered removed, making the homeowner association the prevailing party and entitled to attorney's fees. See also, Moritz v. Hoyt Enterprises, Inc., 604 So.2d 807 (Fla.1992) (prevailing party on significant issues in litigation should be considered prevailing party for attorney's fees).
When the parties by contract determine that the prevailing party in any litigation shall be entitled to attorney's fees, the question before the court is not whether fees should be awarded; the issue is which is the prevailing party. See Imperial Terrace East Homeowner's Association v. Grimes, 649 So.2d 301 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) ("If any provisions of the Declaration are to be enforced, all must be enforced"). A trial court has some discretion in determining which party prevailed when neither party has been vindicated fully, see Prosperi v.Code, Inc., 626 So.2d 1360 (Fla.1993), but here, where the homeowner association prevailed on the only issue in contention, it was the court's duty to enforce the attorney's fees provision in the parties' contract. As the supreme court stated with respect to a mortgage agreement:
It is well established in this state that an acceleration clause or promise in a mortgage confers a contract right upon the note or mortgage holder which he may elect to enforce upon default. Campbell v. Werner, 232 So.2d 252, 255 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970). Safeguarding the validity of such contracts, and assuring the right of enforcement thereof, is an obligation of the courts which has constitutional dimensions. Id. at 256. See also art. I, see. 10, U.S. Const.; Declaration of Rights, art. I, sec. 10, Fla. Const.
David v. Sun Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 461 So.2d 93 (Fla.1984).
Regarding the issues of notice and timeliness, raised for the first time in the dissent, they are waived because they were not raised in the brief, see Martin v. Town of Palm Beach, 643 So.2d 112 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994), or, apparently, below, see Baldwin v. State, 694 So.2d 125 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997).
REVERSED for imposition of attorneys fees in favor of the homeowner association.
PETERSON, J., concurs.
W. SHARP, J., dissents, with opinion.
. Even if we consider the notice and timeliness issues raised by the dissent, the record does not support denying fees. The suit was brought on an instrument providing for prevailing party attorney's fees and the request for fees was predicated on being the prevailing party. The claim for fees was properly made in the pleadings. When a party seeks prevailing party attorney's fees in an action in which the instrument authorizing such fees is either attached to the com plaint or referred to in it, the basis for the attorney's fees should not be a mystery. And although the proof relating to attorney's fees must be presented "within a reasonable time" [Stockman v. Downs, 573 So.2d 835, 838 (Fla.1991)], what is "reasonable" will depend on the circumstances. Here, since the issue was not raised by appellee, there was no showing of any prejudice caused by the three month delay.