Case Name: RALPH P. GAGE, Petitioner, v. FRANK M. JORDAN, as Secretary of State, etc., et al., Respondents; RETIREMENT LIFE PAYMENTS ASSOCIATION, INC. (a Corporation) et al., Interveners
Court: Supreme Court of California
Jurisdiction: California
Decision Date: 1944-03-21
Citations: 23 Cal. 2d 794
Docket Number: L. A. No. 18816
Parties: RALPH P. GAGE, Petitioner, v. FRANK M. JORDAN, as Secretary of State, etc., et al., Respondents; RETIREMENT LIFE PAYMENTS ASSOCIATION, INC. (a Corporation) et al., Interveners.
Judges: 
Reporter: California Reports
Volume: 23
Pages: 794–820

Head Matter:
[L. A. No. 18816.
In Bank.
Mar. 21, 1944.]
RALPH P. GAGE, Petitioner, v. FRANK M. JORDAN, as Secretary of State, etc., et al., Respondents; RETIREMENT LIFE PAYMENTS ASSOCIATION, INC. (a Corporation) et al., Interveners.
O ’Melveny & Myers, Louis W. Myers and Pierce Works for Petitioner.
Robert W. Kenny, Attorney General, Charles W. Johnson, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Arthur McHenry, Deputy Attorney General, J. H. O’Connor, County Counsel (Los Angeles), and A. Curtis Smith, Deputy County Counsel, for Respondent.
Ellis E. Patterson, John J. Taheny, Jack B. Tenney, Paul F. Fratessa, Philip C. Boardman, J. Lamar Butler and Lawrence W. Allen for Interveners.

Opinion:
CARTER, J.
Petitioner, a qualified elector of Los Angeles County, applied to this court for a writ of mandate to compel the Secretary of State and the Registrar of Voters of Los Angeles County to omit from any ballot at any general or special election to be held in the future, the proposed initiative constitutional amendment known as the "Retirement Life Payment Amendment," and entitled by the attorney general, "Gross Income Tax, Warrant Credits." Petitioner also asked that the Secretary of State be compelled to correct certificates of qualification transmitted by him in June, 1943, to the county clerk or registrar of voters of each county in the state by notifying those officials that the certificates should be disregarded, that the measure has never qualified, and that it must be omitted from any future ballot.
An alternative writ issued, in return to which the attorney general filed a demurrer and answer and the sponsors of the measure also intervened and answered. There is no dispute as to the facts. The issues joined present solely the problem of proper construction and application of article IV, section 1, of the Constitution of this state, particularly the provision of the second paragraph of said section which reads as follows:
"The first power reserved to the people shall be known as the" initiative. Upon the presentation to the Secretary of State of a petition certified as herein provided to have been signed by qualified electors, equal in number to eight per cent of all the votes cast for all candidates for Governor at the last preceding general election, at which a Governor was elected, proposing a law or amendment to the Constitution, set forth in full in said petition, the Secretary of State shall submit the said proposed law or amendment to the Constitution to the electors at the next succeeding general election occurring subsequent to 130 days after the presentation aforesaid of said petition, or at any special election called by the Governor in his discretion prior to such general election. . . ." (Italics ours.)
The initiative measure here involved was first promulgated in 1940. On March 5th of that year the sponsors obtained from the attorney general a title and summary preparing the measure for submission to the voters as proposed article XXXII of the Constitution. Petitions for signatures were circulated in various counties and on May 29, 1940, the first certificates were received by the Secretary of State from county clerks. Supplemental certificates were received up to August 16, 1940, when a total of 196,498 signatures of qualified electors had been certified.
The "last preceding" general election for governor had been held in November, 1938, at which 2,651,463 votes were cast. As specified in the above quoted provision, 8 per cent of this number or 212,117 signatures were required to entitle an'initiative measure to a place on the ballot "at the next succeeding general election occurring subsequent to 130 days after the presentation aforesaid of said petition." The circulation of original, as distinguished from supplemental, petitions had been discontinued on June 28th, which was exactly 130 days prior to November 5, 1940, the date of the "next succeeding general election." Therefore, because of lack of sufficient signatures the measure did not qualify for a place on the ballot in November, 1940. A last minute attempt to certify enough additional signatures to qualify the measure was unsuccessful (Thompson v. Kerr (1940), 16 Cal.2d 130 [104 P.2d 1021]), and the certified signatures lay dormant in the office of the Secretary of State through all of 1941 and 1942.
At the general election in November, 1942, however, only 2,234,545 votes were east for governor, 8 per cent of that number being 178,764. Hence if ,the qualification, certification, and presentation of signatures to the Secretary of State in 1940 did not become ineffective and void upon the failure of the measure to qualify for the 1940 ballot, there were by reason of the intervening 1942 election, enough signatures to qualify the measure for the 1944 ballot. Thus the question is directly presented of whether or not an initiative measure, having once failed to qualify for the ballot for want of enough signatures, is automatically revitalized by a sufficient decrease in the number of votes east at a subsequent gubernatorial election to bring the number of signatures secured within the 8 per cent limit based upon the number of votes cast at said subsequent election.
In addition, it appears that in 1943, signatures were sought in Imperial County, where petitions had not previously been circulated, and that in May of that year thirty-nine qualified signatures from that county were certified to the Secretary of State. This made a grand total of 196,537 signatures. But without these additional signatures there had already been certified more than sufficient'to qualify the measure for the 1944 ballot on the basis of 8 per cent of the votes cast in 1942, if that basis could properly be employed upon the theory that the time for "presentation" to the Secretary of State (see above quoted provision) had not lapsed upon the failure of the measure to qualify for the 1940 ballot. Thus the further question is also presented whether an initiative petition received by the Secretary of State and continuing to be circulated is not to be regarded as finally "presented" to or "filed" by him until it has sufficient signatures to qualify for the ballot, regardless of how many years this may take. In this connection, paragraph 13 of section 1, supra, provides that "a petition shall be deemed to be filed with the Secretary of State upon the date of the receipt by him of a certificate or certificates showing said petition to be signed by the requisite number of electors of the State."
Preliminary to a discussion of these questions, it may be noted that the problem is one of first impression upon which no authority directly in point has been found in this or any other jurisdiction of the United States. It must therefore be solved by a proper and reasonable construction of the quoted provision, read in pari materia with the full context of the section and all other pertinent legislation. No similar situation will arise in the future because the Legislature in 1943 incorporated in the Elections Code a statute containing a time limitation provision (see Elec. Code, sec. 1407, Stats. 1943, p. 1127).
The desirability of having initiative measures, particularly those of such importance as the present one, reach the ballot without delay or excessive expenditures of time, money, and effort is a factor of which the courts are ever mindful. All doubt as to the construction of pertinent provisions is to be resolved in favor of the initiative and such legislation is to be given the same liberal construction as that afforded election statutes generally (Ley v. Dominguez (1931), 212 Cal. 587 [299 P. 713]; see, also, California Teachers Assn. v. Collins (1934), 1 Cal.2d 202 [34 P.2d 134]; Willett v. Jordan (1934), 1 Cal.2d 461 [35 P.2d 1025]; Uhl v. Collins (1932), 217 Cal. 1 [17 P.2d 99, 88 A.L.R. 1371]; Hinkley v. Wells (1922), 57 Cal.App. 206 [206 P. 1023]). However, the interpretation adopted must be reasonable and where the language is susceptible of more than one meaning, it is the duty of the courts to accept that intended by the framers of the legislation, so far as its intention can be ascertained. (Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1932), 215 Cal. 461, 464 [11 P.2d 1, 82 A.L.R. 1170]; San Frmcisco v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1920), 183 Cal. 273 [191 P. 26].) The purpose and object sought to be accomplished by the legislation are of prime importance in ascertaining that intention (City and County of San Francisco v. San Mateo County, 17 Cal.2d 814 [112 P.2d 595]; California Drive-in Restaurant Assn. v. Clark, 22 Cal.2d 287 [140 P.2d 657, 147 A.L.R. 1028]; Estate of Ryan, 21 Cal.2d 498-513 [133 P.2d 626]). Furthermore, where the language is fairly susceptible of two constructions, one which, in application will render it reasonable, fair and harmonious with its manifest purpose, and another which would be productive of absurd consequences, the former construction will be adopted. (Jersey Maid Milk Products Co. v. Brock, 13 Cal.2d 620, 648 [91 P.2d 577]; Dept. of Motor Vehicles v. Industrial Acc. Com., 14 Cal.2d 189 [93 P.2d 131]; 23 Cal.Jur. 766.)
Under circumstances such as those here presented, mandamus is the proper remedy (Felt v. Waughop, 193 Cal. 498 [225 P. 862]; Bordwell v. Williams, 173 Cal. 283 [159 P. 869, Ann.Cas. 1918E 358, L.R.A. 1917A, 996]).
Article IV, section 1, of the Constitution, which was adopted in 1911, specifies in detail the manner in which the legislative power reserved to the People may be exercised by means of the initiative and the referendum. It sets forth a complete plan or scheme and when read in its entirety, together with statutes enacted pursuant to it, it clearly connotes an intention that insufficient petitions shall lapse and become functus officio; that is, it imports a time limitation running from the "last preceding general election" to the "next succeeding general election occurring subsequent to 130 days after the presentation aforesaid of said petition." The significance of the term "presentation" will be discussed later.
The steps in the initiative procedure are first, the entitling and summarization of the measure by the attorney general (sec. 1, supra, par. 8; Elec. Code, sees. 1401, 1452), and second, its circulation among the voters (sec. 1, supra, par. 9). The petition for signatures of electors may be circulated in sections, each section containing a full and correct copy of the title and text of the proposed measure (see. 1, supra, par. 9). Each section may be filed with the clerk or registrar of voters of the county in which it was circulated, but all sections circulated in any county are to be filed at the same time (sec. 1, supra, par. 10).
There is, it is true, no prohibition against circulation of sections of petitions in any county indefinitely, and no spe ciñe time provision for completion of the entire process other than the period between general elections prescribed by the second paragraph of section 1, first herein quoted, or, more specifically, between a period commencing. 130 days before a general election and 130 days before the second succeeding election. Obviously, with a then two-year period for registration, it.was necessary that the petition be filed with the county clerk or registrar of voters within such a limited time as would enable him to determine whether the signers were qualified electors. The detailed provisions of section 1, providing an entire plan of procedure, impose meticulous time limitations for completion of various intermediate steps of the process, all of which would be utterly meaningless if petitions could be held over as valid indefinitely, or could be revitalized by any subsequent drop in the gubernatorial vote.
Consider the following provisions, which seem obviously to be directed at insuring that a measure, if it qualifies, shall go upon the ballot at the next succeeding general election occurring 130 days or more after the presentation to the Secretary of State of the initial certified petition, and that if it does not qualify, the entire procedure must be instituted anew:
1. The percentage of vote at the "last preceding general election" determines the qualification standard (sec. 1, par. 2, supra).
2. The proposed law must, if qualified for the ballot, be submitted "at the next succeeding general election occurring subsequent to 130 days after the presentation . . .' of said petition" (see. 1, par. 2, supra).
3. To insure completion of the process within this period, the measure must first be submitted to the attorney general for a title and summary. The submission must be made "prior to circulation of any initiative petition for signatures thereof," (see art. IV, sec. 1, par. 8), and the attorney general must provide a ballot title and return the measure to the Secretary of State within 10 days after it is filed with him (Elec. Code, secs. 1401, 1452). Paragraph 8, supra, of section 1, also states that the persons presenting a measure to the attorney general with a written request for title and summary "shall be known as 'proponents' of said proposed measure," and that "The Attorney General shall preserve said written request until after the next general election." Hence "after the next general election," there is no longer any title and summary, and without a title and summary there can be no "proponents" and no "measure."
4. All sections circulated in a county must be filed with the clerk at the same time, to the end that the signatures may be checked within the short period of 20 days. As stated in paragraph 10 of section 1, supra: "Within twenty days after the filing of such petition in his office the said clerk or registrar of voters, shall determine from the records of registration what number of qualified electors have signed the same. ."
5. Additional help is provided; to wit: "If necessary the board of supervisors shall allow said clerk or registrar of voters additional assistants for the purpose of examining said petition and provide for their compensation." (Sec. 1, supra, par. 10.)
6. The clerk or registrar "upon completion" of the examination is to "forthwith transmit" the petition, together with his certificate to the Secretary of State. (Sec. 1, supra, par. 10.)
7. The time within which the Secretary of State may act is definitely limited. "When the Secretary of State shall have received" the certified petition signed by the requisite number of qualified electors, "he shall forthwith transmit" to the clerk or registrar his certificate showing that fact. (Italics ours.) (See. 1, supra, par. 13.)
8. A limited period for filing supplemental petitions is specified. "Within forty days from the transmission" of the petition and certificate by the clerk to the Secretary of State, a supplemental petition, identical with the original but containing additional names, may be filed with the clerk or registrar. (Italics ours.) (Sec. 1, supra, par. 10.)
9. Ten days are allowed the clerk to certify the result of his examination of the supplemental petition to the Secretary of State (sec. 1, par. 12, supra).
Hence in each respective county where petitions are circulated, the process must be completed within 70 days from the first filing of sections of any petition with the county clerk or registrar, to wit: 20 days to check first sections, 40 days to secure supplemental names, and 10 days to check supplemental names. At the expiration of this period it becomes the ministerial function of the Secretary of State to forthwith certify the measure for the ballot if it has sufficient qualified signatures, measured by the last preceding gubernatorial vote (see. 1, supra, pars. 2, 13).
In view of these express time limits and provisions for "forthwith" action, any construction of the second paragraph of section 1 which would destroy their effectiveness and render them meaningless would be clearly unreasonable and contrary to the intent of the framers of the legislation.
In addition to the evidence of intent supplied by the provisions above discussed, it may be worthy of note that paragraph 7 of section 1 affords protection to measures which have qualified but which, due to negligence or misprision, have not been placed on the ballot. It provides: "If for any reason any initiative . . . proposed by petition as herein provided, be not submitted at the election specified in this section, such failure shall not prevent its submission at a succeeding general election. ." (Italics ours.) This language affords support for the construction urged by petitioner here because it shows that only in the ease of the stated exception may a measure go on the ballot at an election later than the "succeeding general election."
Contemporaneous construction placed upon section 1 by the Legislature of 1911, the same Legislature which drafted the constitutional provision, is also significant. Political Code, section 4058 (Stats. 1911, p. 577), in specifying the procedure for county initiatives, provided that if an initiative petition was fofind to be insufficient, it should be "returned to the person filing the same, without prejudice, however, to the filing of a new petition to the same effect." (Italics ours.) In incorporating this section in the Elections Code as section 1607, the Legislature of 1943 emphasized the point by providing that "the failure to secure sufficient signatures shall not prejudice the filing later of an entirely new petition to the same effect." A similar provision with reference to municipal initiatives was also enacted (Stats. Extra Sess., 1911, chap. 33, p. 131, see. 1).
The most recent direct expression of the legislative intent is that already referred to, the enactment of new section 1407 of the Elections Code (Stats. 1943, p. 1127) providing that no petitions shall be circulated until after the official summary date and that first petitions with signatures must then be filed with the county clerk or registrar "not later than 90 days from the 'Official summary date' . . . and no clerk or registrar of voters shall accept first petitions on such proposed initiative measure thereafter." Is not this a clear recognition that the framers of the Constitution never intended that initiative measures should remain alive for year after year in the hope that they might ultimately qualify at some distant future election?
The detailed provisions of paragraphs 9 and 10 of section 1, prescribing the manner in which signatures are to be afSxed and dated also fortify the conclusion that the life of the petitions is not to be unlimited. The manifest purpose of such provisions, as stated in Chester v. Hall, 55 Cal.App. 611 [204 P. 237], and approved in Boggs v. Jordan, 204 Cal. 207, 216 [267 P. 696], "is to guard against signatures by persons who are not qualified electors at the time of signing," thus making certain that no initiative measure shall appear upon the ballot unless it has been petitioned for by the requisite number of electors who are then qualified to vote upon the measure at the forthcoming election at which it is to be submitted. In other words, it is intended that the signers of the petition shall be qualified electors at the time of signing and that the measure shall be submitted at the next general election, at which they are qualified to vote. As electors change each year, through death, coming of age, removal, neglect to qualify, and the like, any construction of section 1, supra, which would permit the qualified electors of one year to determine largely the measures liable to go on the ballot in a subsequent year would lead to confusion and uncertainty, and would be contrary to public policy.
Illustrative of the impossible situation to which such a construction might lead, consider a measure first circulated prior to 1943, upon which signatures are allowed to cumulate year after year until the measure ultimately qualifies with reference to the last gubernatorial election preceding the last certification to the Secretary of State from any county in the state. Under this theory, as long as there remains one county out of the fifty-eight in the state in which a section of the petition has not been filed, the measure is eligible to qualify at some future gubernatorial election when the accumulative total of signatures of electors, past, present, living, dead, or removed from the state, shall equal the re quired 8 per cent of the vote cast at the then "last preceding election." Such a measure first proposed in 1912 might ultimately (allowing one filing in one county per year) qualify for the ballot circa A. D. 1970, or if there were one filing in one county every other year, it might qualify about A. D. 2028. That the constitutional provision could so operate was obviously never intended by the framers, and such a construction is too unreasonable to contemplate. Present day electors are not interested in initiating legislation to be finally adopted by their children or children's children.
The measure here under consideration was initiated with the intent that it should appear on the 1940 ballot. Since that year, there has been a drastic change in economic conditions, the nation has found itself in an exhaustive war, vast numbers of the people have surged to the western coast and many others have been removed by reason of war conditions. It may safely be assumed that many who signed as sponsors of the measure might refuse to sign were it submitted to them today, and the present electorate should not be burdened with their undertaking. The fact that it is not only reasonable, but desirable to limit the time for the qualification of initiative measure is commented upon as follows in the case of State ex rel. Kiehl v. Howell, 77 Wash. 651 [138 P. 286] :
"It, of course, is necessary that some practical test be provided for determining whether the signers of the petitions are legal voters. It is, of course, but fair that the petitions should, so far as practical, be signed only by those who would be voters at the election. This can be secured with greater certainty by having the petitions signed as near the time of the election as practical. We all know that our electorate is not the same from year to year. We are of the opinion that it is within the power of the Legislature to fix a reasonable limit of time preceding the election within which an initiative measure may be filed with the Secretary of State." See, also, State ex rel. Ilg v. Myers, 127 Ohio St. 171 [187 N.E. 301], where a somewhat similar problem was resolved in accord with the views here expressed.
Much of the argument in the briefs centers upon the meaning of the word "presentation" as used in section 1, and its asserted synonymy with the word "filing" as used in that section. The words in their usual and ordinary sense are not generally defined as synonymous. For example, Webster's New International Dictionary, 2d ed., defines to "present" as, among other things, "to lay before, or submit to, a person or body for consideration or action; as to present a memorial, petition, or indictment," whereas to "file" is defined as: "(a) To deliver (a paper or instrument) to the proper officer so that it is received by him to be kept on file, or among the records of his office, (b) Of the receiving officer, to place (a paper or instrument) on file among the records of his office by receiving, endorsing, entering, or the like." In this state the distinction between the two expressions was early noted in the case of Estate of Giovanni Sbarbor o (1883), 63 Cal. 5. To express the difference precisely it would be proper to say that ordinarily a document is "presented" to an official for "filing," but the filing is subsequent to rather than concurrent with the presentation.
In section 1 the word "presentation," or "presenting," or "presented" appears nine times, while the word "file" or "filing" or "filed" appears eleven times. Although the respective terms appear clearly to have been chosen with understanding of their exact meaning and to have been used with precise discrimination, yet it is argued that the "presentation" under paragraph 2 of section 1, first herein quoted, does not in fact occur until sufficient signatures have been certified to qualify the measure for the ballot; or, in other words, that the "presentation" is synonymous with the "filing" referred to in the provision of paragraph 13 of section 1, which states "a petition shall be deemed to be filed with the Secretary of State upon the date of the receipt by him of a certificate or certificates showing said petition to be signed by the requisite number of electors of the State."
Under this theory it is said that initiative petitions are neither presented nor filed until they are certified to have been signed by a sufficient number of qualified electors, and that this may occur either in the year that the initiative measure is first promulgated and sections from certain counties are presented, or in some later year. To state the process another way then, the time at which the requisite percentage of signatures is obtained, is to determine the time of "presentation" and also which election is the "last preceding general election," and which is the "next succeeding general election ." at which the measure must be submitted to the voters. In the present case it is said that at no time prior to November, 1942, did the petitions bear sufficient signatures; therefore upon the certification in May, 1943, of thirty-nine signatures from Imperial county, it became the duty of the Secretary of State to consider the petition finally "presented" or "filed," under the signature computation based on returns from the then "last preceding general election," the election of 1942, and to certify the measure for the ballot in 1944.
The very statement of this complex proposition is indicative of its weakness. Section 1 clearly provides in express terms for "presentation" to the Secretary of State of a certified petition, which is to qualify the measure for the ballot at the next succeeding general election if sufficient signatures are obtained within the required time. It contemplates that all steps in the initiative proceeding, shall be taken not less than 130 days prior to the general election next following the institution of the proceeding, and that the sufficiency of the petition is to be tested by the last preceding gubernatorial vote. In view of the privilege given of circulating the petition in sections, and of filing supplements to it, it appears that the additional sections and supplements necessarily relate back to the "presentation" date of the first section presented. Thereafter, within the period, the petition is either "deemed to be filed" by reason of the certification of enough signatures, or else it lapses because of its failure to qualify for the subsequent election. This construction is not only reasonable, but it gives effect to all of the pertinent provisions of the section without straining the phraseology, and it appears to accord with the intent of the framers of the legislation. That the presentation precedes the filing of the petition is indicated by the provision in paragraph 9 of section 1 that: "Unless and until it be otherwise proven upon official investigation, it shall be presumed that the petition presented contains the signatures of the requisite number of qualified electors." This must refer to the required 8 per cent as there is no limit on the number of signatures to be obtained in any particular county and the Secretary of State is the official whose duty it is to determine the requisite number of qualified signers to authorize the filing of a petition.
Here the petition was "presented" in May, 1940; the "last preceding general election" was the election of 1938, hence the petition lapsed when it failed to qualify for the November, 1940 ballot.
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue forthwith.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Curtis, J., concurred.