Case Name: In re APPORTIONMENT OF STATE LEGISLATURE-1972
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1972-05-04
Citations: 387 Mich. 442
Docket Number: No. 13; Docket No. 53,919
Parties: In re APPORTIONMENT OF STATE LEGISLATURE—1972
Judges: Adams, Swainson, and Williams, JJ., concurred with T. M. Kavanagh, C. J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 387
Pages: 442–494

Head Matter:
In re APPORTIONMENT OF STATE LEGISLATURE—1972
Opinion op the Court •
1. States — Apportionment op Legislature — Constitutional Law— Commission on Legislative Apportionment — Supreme Court.
Michigan Supreme Court, being convinced that it would be futile to remand a legislative reapportionment cause to the Commission on Legislative Apportionment and having no reasonable alternative, must carry out the constitutional mandate placed upon it by the people of this state to determine “which plan complies most accurately with the constitutional requirements” and direct that it be adopted by the Commission and published as provided in a section of an article of the Constitution (Const 1963, art 4, § 6).
2. Constitutional Law — Words and Phrases — Proposed—States —Apportionment op Legislature.
The word “proposed”, in the phrase “proposed plan” in a section of the Michigan Constitution providing for legislative reapportionment, is a limitation not upon the source of the reapportionment plan; i.e., originating from the Commission on Legislative Apportionment but rather a limitation upon the sponsor of a plan, i.e., the plan must come from one or several of the Commissioners (Const 1963, art 4, § 6).
3. States — Apportionment op Legislature — Commission on Legislative Apportionment — Supreme Court — Constitutional Law.
It was not necessary to submit to the Michigan Supreme Court only plans for legislative reapportionment previously presented to the Commission on Legislative Apportionment (Const 1963, art 4, § 6).
References for Points in Headnotes
1-7, 9-13,17,20, 22, 24-26, 29] 25 Am Jur 2d, Elections § 13 et seq.
8] 25 Am Jur 2d, Elections §§ 44, 45.
14] 25 Am Jur 2d, Elections § 35 et seq.
15,16] 25 Am Jur 2d, Elections § 37.
30 Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 1091.
26 Am Jur 2d, Elections § 211.
25 Am Jur 2d, Elections §§ 2, 5.
25 Am Jur 2d, Elections § S3.
25 Am Jur 2d, Elections § 5.
25 Am Jur 2d, Elections § 117.
4. Constitutional Law — Equal Protection — States—Apportionment op Legislature — Equality op Population.
The controlling criterion for judgment in legislative apportionment controversies, involving bicameral state legislatures, under the equal protection clauses of the Federal and state Constitutions is equality of population as nearly as practicable; a state must make an honest and good faith effort to construct districts, in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal population as is practicable.
5. States — Apportionment op Legislature — Equality op Population.
Mathematical exactitude re equality of population is the primary and controlling standard in reapportionment; as between competing plans with identical “equality of population” factors, attention may then be focused upon other considerations such as compactness, shape, etc.
6. States — Apportionment op Legislature — Equality op Population — Constitutional Law.
Plan filed with the Michigan Supreme Court whereby difference of population between largest and smallest senatorial district is 21, and representative district is 25, purports to be a plan for districting and apportioning of both houses of the Michigan legislature based upon districts containing population as nearly equal as practicable and b^ such plan districts in both the Senate and House of Representatives are composed of territory containing population as equal as the 1970 Federal Decennial Census permits, the districts by such plan are formed as compact, contiguous, and regular in shape, and do follow county, city, and township boundaries as nearly as practicable, and most nearly complies with the constitutional requirement regarding apportionment of the legislature (Const 1963, art 4, §§ 1-6).
7. States — Apportionment op Legislature — Commission on Legislative Apportionment — Elections—Constitutional Law.
The Commission on Legislative Apportionment should be directed to adopt and publish forthwith, as provided by the Michigan Constitution, the reapportionment plan whereby difference of population between the largest and smallest senatorial district is 21, and representative district is 25, which plan shall be placed in effect for the primary and general elections of 1972 irrespective of whether or not the said plan shall he challenged upon the application of an elector (Const 1963, art 4, §6).
Dissenting Opinion
T. E. Brennan, J.
8. States — Apportionment op Legislature — Constitutional Law —Commission on Legislative Apportionment — Supreme Court.
The Michigan Constitution creates a Commission on Legislative Apportionment and provides that if the Commission is unable to agree upon a plan of apportionment its members may submit proposed plans to the Michigan Supreme Court, which shall determino which plan complies most accurately with the constitutional requirements and shall direct that it be adopted by the Commission and published as provided in a section of the constitution (Const 1963, art 4, §6).
9. States — Apportionment op Legislature — Commission on Legislative Apportionment — Supreme Court.
Matter of apportionment of state legislature should be remanded to the Commission on Legislative Apportionment, with instructions to submit sealed proposal for apportionment of the legislature within ten days, the same to be opened by the Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court on a day certain, and with Court in session, the winners to be announced forthwith, based upon the lowest population variance im each Souse, and with ties broken by reference to the number of political units left intact.
Dissenting Opinion
Black, J.
10. Elections — Nominating Petitions — Apportionment op Legislature — Constitutional Law — Statutes.
Circulation of nominating petitions under a new legislative apportionment plan could not validly commence, under a section of the Michigan Constitution and present statute, until after July 4, 1978, and that is far too late for the 1978 legislative election (Const 1963, art 4, §6).
11. States — Apportionment op Legislature — Elections—Constitutional Law.
Michigan’s Constitution as well as the Fourteenth Amendment requires that Michigan’s bicameral legislature be newly ap portioned, newly districted and newly elected at the same time, according to a “final plan” based on the 1970 census and readied for the simultaneous election of the Senate and the Souse in 1974 (VS Const, Am XIV).
12. Constitutional Law — States—Apportionment or Legislature.
Michigan Supreme Court decision of May 4, 1972 regarding apportionment of the legislature rendered wholly impotent a paragraph of a section of the Michigan Constitution providing: “Vpon the application of any elector filed'not later than 60 days after final publication of the plan, the supreme court, in the exercise of original jurisdiction, shall direct the secretary of state or the commission to perform their duties, may review any final plan adopted by the commission, and shall remand such plan to the commission for further action if it fails to comply with the requirements of this constitution” (Gonst 1963, art 4, §6).
13. States — Apportionment op Legislature — Commission on Legislative Apportionment — Supreme Court.
The people of Michigan have a right to have the section Of their Constitution on legislative apportionment administered faithfully; not twisted and tortured or hurried or delayed for partisan advantage, or shamelessly emasculated by arrant omission of a supposedly responsible Michigan Supreme Court to force Michigan’s Commission on Legislative Apportionment to perform its exclusively assigned task of proceeding, within an unexpired 180 day period, to district and apportion the Senate and Hbuse of Representatives according to the provisions of the Constitution (Const 1963, art 4, § 6).
14. States — Apportionment op Legislature — Commission on Legislative Apportionment — Supreme Court — Constitutional Law.
Michigan has an excellent system of constitutional procedure. leading to constitutional reapportionment and redistricti/ng of her legislature every ten years; our weak link is the constitutionally appointed supervisor of the Commission on Legislative Apportionment, a partisan nominated and “nonpartisan” elected Supreme Court which simply hasn’t the innards to order, contrary to the will of whatever political party has nominated a majority of the seated Justices, that the constitutional Commission perform its chore of reapportionment and redistricting of the legislature; a' chore which the Michigan Supreme Court may not lawfully take over, a chore that means so much for years ahead to the people of Michigan (Const 1963, art 4, § 6).
15. Constitutional Law — Apportionment op Legislature — Supreme Court — Commission on Legislative Apportionment.
Petition submitting an apportionment plan for the Michigan Legislature by the Democratic half of the Commission on Legislative Apportionment, filed with the Michigan Supreme Court on February 1, 1972, and that Court’s majority order of February 9, 1972 promulgating procedures for proceedings to be had under a section of the Michigan Constitution for legislative apportionment were and are unconstitutional and, except for partisan advantage, they were and yet are so unnecessary because the Commission on January 28, 1972, when upon allegation of the Democratic Secretary of State the Commission planned no further meetings, it actually had more than four months within which to complete its work (Const 1968, art) 4, §6).
16. Constitutional Law — Apportionment op Legislature — Elections — Senate—House op Eepresentatives.
The ultimate “final plan” called for by a section of the Michigan Constitution on legislative apportionment is a coordinate that should of constitutional intent be applied to simultaneous election of the House and Senate and that cannot be done, validly, until proceedings upon the application of any elector under that section of the constitution have been concluded in time for the concurrent elections of 1974 for the House and Senate (Const 1968, art 4, § 6).
17. Constitutional Law — Equal Protection — Bicameral Legislature — Apportionment op Legislature — Population Basis.
As a basic constitutional standard, the Equal Protection Clause requires that the seats of both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a population basis.
18. Evidence — Circumstantial Evidence — Proofs—Witnesses.
Circumstances, which are things, constitute inflexible proofs; witnesses may be mistaken or careless in their use of words, especially when interested in the judicial result; circumstances can be neither; they cannot lie, once they are established.
19. Judges — Disqualification—Supreme Court — Court op Appeal's —Apportionment op Legislature — Constitutional Law.
The partisan-nominated Michigan Supreme Court should disqualify itself from a case on legislative apportionment in favor of plenary resubmission under a section of the Michigan Constitution and before the nonpartisan nominated and nonpartisan elected Court of Appeals, with that Court sitting en bane by authority of an order entered pursuant to a section of the judicial article of the Michigan Constitution (Const 1963, art 4, §6; art 6, § S3).
20. States — Apportionment of Legislature — Commission on Legislative Apportionment — Secretary of State — Constitutional Law.
Nothing in the Michigan Constitution and nothing whatever in the “rules of procedure” which the Commission on Legislative Apportionment adopted authorized the Secretary of State to write a letter for support of an allegedly commenced judicial proceeding on legislative apportionment; nothing in a section of the article in the Michigan Constitution providing for legislative apportionment or the Commission’s rules authorizes the institution of a judicial proceeding on apportionment in the absence of a “cannot agree” resolution of the Commission itself (Const 1968, art 4, § 6).
21. Constitutional Law — Construction—Common Understanding —Intent.
The primary rule of construction of a constitution is the rule of “common understanding” and the interpretation that should be given it is that which reasonable minds, the great mass of the people themselves, would gime it; as the intent to be arrived at is that of the people who ratified it.
22. States — Apportionment of Legislature — Commission on Legislative Apportionment — Supreme Court — Constitutional Law.
The word “proposed” in the phrase “proposed plan” was put in the article of the Michigan Constitution for submission of proposed plans to the Michigan Supreme Court if a majority of the Commission on Legislative Apportionment cannot agree on a plan for apportionment of the legislature, for the precise purpose of restricting submission to the Court of a plan or plans theretofore proposed to the Commission and turned down there, subject only to the inherent power of the Supreme Court to act decretally should there be some emergency or other equitably justifying reason for delayed filing of a plan not previously proposed to the Commission (Const 1963, art 4, §6).
23. Constitutional Law — Due Process — Pair Trial — Pair Tribunal^-States — Apportionment of Legislature.
A fair trial in a .fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process; but hds been denied patently by the Michigan Su preme Court’s judgment of May 4, 197% on a legislative apportionment ease.
24. States — Apportionment op Legislature — Commission on Legislative Apportionment — Supreme Court — Constitutional Law.
Order should he entered advismg the constitutional commissioners on legislative apportionment that they should receive and consider all plans for legislative apportionment they wish the Michigan Supreme Court to examine according to the test in an article of the Michigan Constitution for that Court to determine which plan complies most accurately with the constitutional requirements; further, if unable to agree then, that they should meet for the making of a due and final record of constitutional disagreement; that record with all plans the Commission has considered and failed to adopt should then be submitted to the Supreme Court as constitutionally directed for proceedings under that article of the Constitution (Const 1963, art 4, §6).
25. States — Apportionment op Legislature — Commission on Legislative Apportionment — Court op Appeals — Supreme Court— Constitutional Law.
Order should be entered directing that the Court of Appeals be assigned en bane to Supreme Court duty under the judicial article of the Michigan Constitution, the specific assignment to be that of hearing and determining all proceedings rightfully instituted under a section of an article of that Constitution for legislative apportionment and arising out of the decennial census of 1970 (Const 1963, art 4, §6; art 6, §23).
Dissenting Opinion
T. G. Kavanagh, J.
26. Constitutional Law — Apportionment op Legislature — Supreme Court.
Michigan Supreme Court has no proper function at all in apportionment of the Michigan Legislature because the provisions of the Michigan Constitution which would place that responsibility on the Court are invalid as in contravention of the United States Constitution (Const 1963, art 4).
27. Constitutional Law — Commission on Legislative Apportionment — Apportionment op Legislature — Nonpopulation Factors.
A section of an article of the Michigan Constitution which established the Commission on Legislative Apportionment had to be held void when the United States Supreme Court struck down nonpopulation factors in apportionment because that section was so dependent upon the continuing validity of the preceding sections of that article of the Constitution by which the Commission’s duties were specified and expressly limited, that it could not survive alone (Const 1968, art 4, §6).
28. Constitutional Law — Commission on Legislative Apportionment — Political Parties — Discrimination.
The provision in the Michigan Constitution requiring a third political party to receive more than 25% of the Gubernatorial vote in order to obtain representation on the Commission on Legislative Apportionment and making no provision for representation for other political parties receiving less than 25% but still representing a significant number of voters, is invidious discrimination offensive to both the First and Fourteenth Amendments because if a class be recognized there may be no legal discrimination in favor of part of that class (TTS Const, Ams I, XIV; Const 1963, art 4, § 6).
29. Constitutional Law — Commission on Legislative Apportionment.
There is no valid Commission on Legislative Apportionment under an article of the Michigan Constitution and hence there is no need to review their work; indeed it is wholly improper (Const 1963, art 4).
Four original petitions by various members of the Commission on Legislative Apportionment, filed under the provision of the Constitution of 1963, submitting proposed apportionment plans for the state legislature, one petition and plan by Edwin P. Hughes, one petition and plan by Paul Gr. Groebel, Sr., Ralph E. Huhtala, Anthony C. Licata, and Kenneth E. Thompson, one petition and plan by Virginia Selin, and one petition and plan by Lillian Hatcher and A. Robert Kleiner.
Submitted March 6, 1972.
(No. 13
March Term 1972,
Docket No. 53,919.)
Decided May 4, 1972.
Commission ordered to adopt the Hatcher-Kleiner plan, publish it forthwith, and put it into effect for the 1972 election. Dissenting opinion by Black, J., filed May 8, 1972, and dissenting opinion by T. Gr. Kavanagh, J., filed May 10,1972. Application filed by petitioners-electors, pursuant to Const 1963, art 4, § 6, ¶ 8, and motion for immediate consideration denied September 11,1972. Black, J., not participating. T. E. Brennan and T. G. Kavanagh, JJ., dissenting.
Foster, Lindemer, Swift <& Collins (Peter F. Mc-Nenly, of counsel), for Commissioners Goebel, Huhtala, Licata and Thompson.
Virginia Selin, in propria persona.
Edwin P. Hughes, in propria persona.
Lillian Hatcher and A. Robert Kleiner, in propriis personis.

Opinion:
T. M. Kavanagh, C. J.
The people, in adopting the 1963 State Constitution, provided the procedure to carry out legislative reapportionment. However, for the second time in eight years the Court has had thrust upon it a proceeding which historically has been a legislative rather than a judicial one.
The activities of the political parties during the 1964 Commission on Legislative Apportionment, and the political shenanigans of both political parties making up the Commission this year, as brought out in oral argument before this Court, convinced a majority of the Court that it would be futile to remand this cause to the Commission for further proceedings.
We, having no reasonable alternative, must carry out the constitutional mandate placed upon us by the people of this state, and that is to determine "which plan complies most accurately with the constitutional requirements" and direct that it be adopted by the Commission and published as provided in Const 1963, art 4, § 6, paragraph 7. In short, it is constitutionally incumbent upon our Court to evalúale, approve and mandate.
There is, however, one procedural problem which is present in the Republican's "Motion to Foreclose" which, as a threshold issue, must be resolved, viz., whether § 6, paragraph 7 requires expressly or impliedly that a "proposed plan" must have been submitted to the Commission as a condition precedent to submission of the proposed plan to our Court.
It is submitted, and we agree, that the word "proposed" is a limitation not upon the source of the plan, i.e., originating from the Commission but rather a limitation upon the sponsor of a plan, i.e., the plan must come from one or several of the Commissioners. The Constitutional Convention debates support this construction. Conversely viewed, the drafters never intended to freeze the plans as submitted to the Commission but, rather, to allow compromise and collaboration between the members of the Commission in coming up with a plan after a member's or party's pet plan has failed to secure a majority but before submission of the compromise "proposed plan" was submitted to our Court. In short, once the Commission failed to agree, a Commissioner — but only a Commissioner — could propose his plan to our Court.
The balance of the arguments, pro and con, upon the motion to foreclose consideration have little merit. As to the "applicable principles of law," the Republicans candidly concede that "the above cases are not dispositive of the present controversy. They all arose in. factual situations radically different from the present case." As to the "public policy consideration," neither party is coming into our Court with clean hands. Both have engaged in partisan maneuvering. Both sides frankly admit they did not pass upon all of the plans submitted to the Commission. This is borne out by the Commission's minutes, which reflect that 19 last hour motions for adoption of plans by the members failed for want of a concurrence of a majority. We hold it was not necessary to submit to our Court only plans previously presented to the Commission. Finding it unnecessary, we do not rule on the question of whether the various plans were in some form or other before the Commission.
In March, 1971, the State Central Committees of the Democratic and Republican parties respectively appointed four members to the Commission on Legislative Apportionment pursuant to Const 1963, art 4, § 6. Upon the advice of Attorney General Kelley, Secretary of State Richard Austin, acting as the constitutionally designated Secretary of the Commission, convened the Commission on April 23, 1971. Chairman and co-chairman of the Commission were elected and rules of procedure were adopted. On September 17,1971, the Commission unanimously established midnight of January 28,1972, as a tentative deadline for completing its work.
Statewide public hearings on reapportionment plans and proposals were conducted. During the 16 formal meetings of the Commission, including the final meeting field on January 28, 1972, some 23 complete or partial Senate plans and 20 complete or partial House plans were submitted by tfie members of tfie Commission. Tfie Commission, despite 19 "last hour" motions for adoption by its members, failed to agree on a plan for want of a "concurrence of a majority of tfie members." Also at tfie January 28, 1972 meeting, four separate motions were made to extend tfie deadline set by tfie September 17, 1971 resolution. All motions failed for want of a majority. Chairman Goebel adjourned tfie meeting, without future date, at 12:05 a.m. on January 29,1972.
Order of tfie Court (Black, J., dissenting) entered February 9; 1972, promulgating procedures for proceeding under, art 4, § 6, paragraph 7, which in essence advised submission of any other proposed plans on or before February 18, 1972, the filing of written objections to any such plan on or before February 25, 1972, and offered opportunity for oral presentation or objections, upon written demand therefor filed on or before the latter date, before tfie specially convened bench on March 6, 1972. Subsequently, four apportionment plans were submitted.
Tfie controlling criterion for judgment in legislative apportionment controversies, involving bicameral state legislatures, under tfie equal protection clauses of tfie Federal and state Constitutions is equality of population as nearly as practicable. As more fully stated by this Court in 373 Mich. 250, 251, adopting the holding of Reynolds v Sims, 377 US 533; 84 S Ct 1362; 12 L Ed 2d 506 (1964):
" 'We hold that, as a basic constitutional standard, the equal protection clause requires that tfie seats in both houses of a bicameral State legislature must be apportioned on a population basis. # # #
" 'By holding that as a Federal constitutional requisite both houses of a State legislature must be ap portioned on a population basis, we mean that the equal protection clause requires that a State make cm honest and good faith effort to construct districts, in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal population as is practicable.' " (Emphasis added.)
Although the Court in Reynolds states that "mathematical nicety is not a constitutional requisite" (pp 569, 577) and suggests other relevant but subordinate state considerations (pp 576-577), subsequent decisions of the United States Supreme Court have largely clarified and confirmed or dispelled and disclaimed this dicta. Thus, in Swann v Adams, 385 US 440, 444; 87 S Ct 569, 572; 17 L Ed 2d 501 (1967), the Court rejected the argument that de minimis population variances were tolerable, without any justification or explanation, under the "as nearly as practicable standard," and consonantly concluded:
"On the contrary, the Reynolds opinion limited the allowable deviations to those minor variations which 'are based on legitimate considerations incident to the effectuation of a rational state policy.' 377 US 533, 579. Thus that opinion went on to indicate that variations from a pure population standard might be justified by such state policy considerations as the integrity of political subdivisions, the maintenance of compactness and contiguity in legislative districts or the recognition of natural or historical boundary lines."
The "equality of population" criterion received an even more stringent construction in Kirkpatrick v Preisler, 394 US 526; 89 S Ct 1225; 22 L Ed 2d 519 (1969), where the Court found that population disparities could not be justified on the ground that the state was attempting to avoid fragmenting political subdivisions or, conversely viewed, at tempting to inhibit partisan gerrymandering. The Court held in Kirkpatrick v Preisler, supra, pp 533-534:
"Similarly, we do not find legally acceptable the argument that variances are justified if they necessarily result from a State's attempt to avoid fragmenting political subdivisions by drawing congressional district lines along existing county, municipal, or other political subdivision boundaries. The State's interest in constructing congressional districts in this manner, it is suggested, is to minimize the opportunities for partisan gerrymandering. But an argument that deviations from equality are justified in order to inhibit legislators from engaging in partisan gerrymandering is no more than a variant of the argument, already rejected, that considerations of practical politics can justify population disparities."
It is true that Kirkpatrick is distinguishable in that it involved a congressional districting statute. However, a close reading of the January 24, 1972 per curiam opinion in Connor v Williams, 404 US 549; 92 S Ct 656; 30 L Ed 2d 704 (1972), discloses that population disparities brought on by state legislative apportionment along boundary lines raise a substantial constitutional question and that the United States Supreme Court only deferred ruling on the applicability of Preisler and Wells until they have an appropriate appellate vehicle. Prudence would counsel avoidance of the problems presented in Preisler and Wells, vis., attempting to justify population disparities on the basis of anti-gerrymandering techniques. In end analysis, mathematical exactitude re equality of population is the primary and controlling standard. As between competing plans with identical "equality of population" factors, attention may then be focused upon other considerations such as compactness, shape, etc.
Analysis of the Senate and House plans proposed by the respective members of the Apportionment Commission discloses the following data on p 457.
This Court after examining each of the plans finds as a fact that all plans to some degree, and of manifest necessity, cross or recross county, city or township lines.
The Court findings that the so-called Hatcher-Kleiner plan filed in our Court on February 18,1972, purports to be a plan for districting and apportion ing of both, houses of the Michigan Legislature based upon districts containing population as nearly equal as practicable. By such plan, districts for both the Senate and House of Representatives are composed of territory containing population as equal as the 1970 Federal Decennial Census permits. Subject to this controlling objective of substantially equal population, and to the extent it would not be subordinated, districts established by such plan are formed as compact, contiguous, and regular in shape, and follow county, city and township boundaries, as nearly as practicable.
SENATE (Ideal District 233,753)
Numerical Disparity Population Average Deviation % Capable of Political
Largest to Smallest Variance from Ideal Size Electing Ma- Units Split
Ratio verity (optimun 52,6316)
Hatcher-Kleiner
21 1.0001:1 2.66 or .0011% 52.6310% 59 [33 Counties
(Dist 17=233,762) j15 Cities
(Dist 23=233,741) [ll Townships
GHLT
92 1.0003:1 18.71 or .0080% 52.628% 32 Counties
(Dist 22=233,789) [1.00039:1] <10 Cities
(Dist 31,233,697) 4 Townships
Selin
194 1.0008:1 43.08 or .0184% 52.6228% 40 Í 25 Counties
(Dist 34=233,844) 10 Cities
(Dist 19=233,650) { 5
Hughes
1799 [1.0077:1] [444.08 or [52.5368%] 30 Counties
(Dist 11=234,709 .1900%1 I 11 Cities
(Dist 14=232,910) 1
total Population 1970 Census = 8,882,619
HOUSE (Ideal District 80,751)
Population Disparity Population Average Deviation % Capable of Political
Largest to Smallest Variance from Ideal Size Electing Ma- Units Split
^ority (optimun 52.6316)
Hatcher-Kleiner
25 0003:1 3.1 or .0038% 50.9072% 118 Counties
(Dist 77=80,765) 33 Cities
(Dist 107=80,740) (36 Townships
GHLT
79 1.0009:1 14.41 or .0178% 50.901% 73 Counties
(Dist 79=80,799) [1.00098:1] [50.9002%] 27 Cities
(Dist 11=80,720) Townships
Selin
124 1.00015:1 24.74 or .0306% 50.8939% 96 Counties
(Dist 107=80,833) 31 Cities
(Dist 32 & 82= 80,709) 1.22 Townships
Hughes
991 [1.01234:1] [94.45 or .1170%] [50.8505%] 78 Counties
(Dist 89=81,313) Cities
(Dist 49=80,322) 14 Townships
Total Population 1970 Census = 8,882,619
While it is not possible to develop detailed constitutional requirements, there can be no question of the overriding requirement of "districts, in both houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal population as is practicable." The Hatcher-Kleiner districting and apportionment plan, filed in this Court on February 18,1972, most nearly complies with said constitutional requirement.
Therefore, it is ordered that the Commission on Legislative Apportionment be, and it hereby is, directed to adopt and publish forthwith, as provided in § 6 of article 4 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963, the aforesaid Hatcher-Kleiner plan, which plan shall be placed in effect for the primary and general elections of 1972, irrespective of whether or not the said plan shall be challenged upon the application of an elector pursuant to the final paragraph of said § 6 of article 4.
Nominating petitions may be filed or the statutory filing fees paid for the office of State Representative at any time after the date of this order up to and including 4 p.m., Eastern Standard Time, on June 20, 1972. See MCLA 168.163; MSA 6.1163, and 1 OAGr, 1955, No 2,403, p 784 (December 30, 1955).
Considering the limited time which remains for the giving of notices of the 1972 legislative elections, no motion or application for a stay of this order will be entertained by this Court. Any person deeming himself aggrieved by this order may, for the purposes and requisites of USSC Rules 18, 50, and 51 proceed to move or apply forthwith for a stay pursuant to said rules, in the same manner &s if he had previously and vainly moved or applied to this Court for such stay.
Adams, Swainson, and Williams, JJ., concurred with T. M. Kavanagh, C. J.
Const 1963, art 4, § 6.
The "liberalizing" intent .of permitting any Commissioner to propose his plan to the Supreme Court and not be bound by the "party" plan which was submitted to the Commission is reflected by Delegate Pollock's comments and amendment which was eventually adopted by the Convention by vote of 70 to 30 (2 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, pp 2023-2025). Por the other side of the coin, i.e., freezing the "party" plan which would be submitted to our Court, see e.g., the comments of Delegate Danhof (2 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, p 2024).
Letter opinion of Attorney General, dated March 2, 1971, summarizes (p 5) :
"In summary, it is my opinion that the secretary of state must issue a call not less than 30 nor more than 45 days after February 10, 1971 but that the apportionment commission will have 180 days after the Bureau of the Census furnishes the state with block and tract data which it will require to complete its work."
It should be noted that in the companion ease of Wells v Rockefeller, 394 US 542, 544; 89 S Ct 1234; 22 L Ed 2d 535 (1969), the Court expressly declined ruling on the constitutionality of partisan gerrymandering. For some expressions by the Justices on our Court see 376 Mich at pp 426-427 (Kelly, J.); p 457 (Adams, J.); pp 477-479 (Smith, J.). It is suggested that, even if the anti-gerrymandering devices of compactness, shape, adherence to existing boundary lines, etc., have some continuing viability, such state standards, at best, serve as a minimal factor in the judicial determination as to the constitutionality of a proposed reapportionment plan. Thus, the judicial selective process should ascertain which of the submitted plans contains the least population disparity. If competing plans are equal in this factor, then, but only then, should judicial attention focus upon the anti-gerrymandering factors. This opinion, of course, presents all of the factors utilized by the members of the Commission rather than only those which we consider to be relevant. As a matter of history, however, see the arguments of petitioners, summarized by Justice Smith in 376 Mich 410, 473, in the context of current constitutional law.
For limited endorsement of the same caveat by at least some of the Democratic members and all of the Republican members, see Hateher-Kleiner brief 16-17, Selin brief 17, GHLT brief 9-10.
On the other hand, these same members endorse and urge the continuing validity of subordinate but legitimate objectives such as compactness, shape, contiguity, etc. It is argued that this was the consensus opinion of our Court in 377 Mich 396 (i.e., excluding the views of Justice Souris and "perhaps" those of Justice Smith). See, e.g., Selin brief 11. The relative merit accorded each of these subordinate but legitimate objectives is concisely stated in GHLT brief 17.
Although not explicitly stated in terms of gradient standards as above, I believe that our Court, as indicated in 373 Mich 250, 253-254, utilized this reasoning process. For a concise but thorough analysis of the constitutional principles and mathematical tests applicable to the apportionment question see Dungan v Sawyer, 253 F Supp 352 (D Nev, 1966).