Case Name: Duane PAGEL, Administrator of the Estate of David Pagel, Deceased, and Duane Pagel, Appellants, v. Elwin NOTBOHM and Elizabeth Notbohm, Appellees
Court: Iowa Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Iowa
Decision Date: 1971-06-17
Citations: 188 N.W.2d 314
Docket Number: No. 54428
Parties: Duane PAGEL, Administrator of the Estate of David Pagel, Deceased, and Duane Pagel, Appellants, v. Elwin NOTBOHM and Elizabeth Notbohm, Appellees.
Judges: All Justices concur except BECKER, J., who dissents and REYNOLDSON, J., who takes no part.
Reporter: North Western Reporter 2d
Volume: 188
Pages: 314–320

Head Matter:
Duane PAGEL, Administrator of the Estate of David Pagel, Deceased, and Duane Pagel, Appellants, v. Elwin NOTBOHM and Elizabeth Notbohm, Appellees.
No. 54428.
Supreme Court of Iowa.
June 17, 1971.
Donohue, Wilkins & Donohue, West Union, for appellants. . ,
Fuerste & Carew, Dubuque, for appel-lees.

Opinion:
MASON, Justice.
Plaintiffs' appeal presents the question whether interest commences on the date of death or date of verdict for wrongful death. Duane Pagel brought this law action to recover for the death of his son David. In one division of the petition he seeks damages as administrator of his son's estate. In the other he makes claim against defendants for loss of his child's services until David would have attained his majority but for his untimely death.
April 10, 1970 the jury returned verdict of $10,360 in favor of plaintiff as administrator and one of $13,401.85 for plaintiff individually.
Since the issue presented is relevant to the claims asserted in both capacities, Mr. Pagel will hereinafter be referred to as plaintiff.
Following return of the verdicts, plaintiff made a motion for additur moving the court to enter an order directing the clerk to include interest at five percent per an-num on each verdict from April 11, 1968, the date of David's death.
The court overruled the motion holding interest commenced on the date of verdict under the instructions. Instructions 13, 14 and 14A are the ones involved in the contentions urged in ¡plaintiff's assignments of error.
The court told the jury as a part of instruction 13, "The measure of damages to his estate for the death of David Pagel will be the present worth or value of the estate which he would reasonably be expected to have saved and accumulated as a result of his own efforts from the date he attained his majority if he had lived out the term of his natural life. This is not the sum which, when placed at interest, would yield an amount equal to the income of the decedent at the time of his death, but as heretofore stated, is that amount which estimated at its present worth, under all the circumstances, as disclosed by the evidence, would have come to his estate from the date he attained his majority to the end of his natural life."
The above portion of the instruction follows closely the Iowa Uniform Jury Instruction 3.10.
Instruction 14 dealt with plaintiff's claim for loss of services. As a part of the instruction the court told the jury, "Such allowance of damages to the father, Duane Pagel, if any damages you find for him, should include the present value of the services of David Pagel and the present value of the probable earnings of David Pagel during the remainder of his minority, less the probable cost of his maintenance, from the date of his death until he attained his legal majority."
We set out instruction 14A in its entirety. "The matter of the payment of court costs under your verdict and the matter of interest on any allowance of damages are matters to be handled by the Court and you will give no consideration thereto."
Plaintiff made no objections nor took any exceptions to these instructions.
In Sisson v. Weathermon, 252 Iowa 786, 799-800, 108 N.W.2d 585, 592 and in Abel v. Dodge, 261 Iowa 1, 10-11, 152 N.W.2d 823, 828, plaintiff's contention on appeal that he was entitled to five percent interest on the amount of the verdict in a wrongful death action from the date of his decedent's death was rejected.
In each case an instruction closely following Iowa Uniform Jury Instruction 3.10 was given.
In neither case did we question prior Iowa decisions that where recovery for wrongful death is computed as of the time of death, rather than time of verdict, interest is allowable from time of death.
In Sisson v. Weathermon this court said:
"The primary question in connection with allowance of interest on the recovery from date of death to date of verdict is whether or not from the instructions it appears the jury have considered interest in arriving at the amount of the verdict."
The court in Sisson v. Weathermon in commenting on the instruction under consideration continued, "It is obvious the present worth of a sum payable in the future becomes greater as the time for payment grows nearer. So the present worth of the pecuniary loss to this estate was greater at the time of the verdict than at the time of decedent's death- — and by approximately the amount of interest on the present worth at time of death, if computed from that time, to time of verdict. So the effect of the instructions, which it is presumed the jury followed, was to give plaintiff the benefit of approximately the amount of interest on the present worth of the pecuniary loss to the estate as of the time of death."
In Abel v. Dodge this court said with reference to the same instruction:
"In the quoted instruction the jury was plainly told in effect to allow, in the event of recovery, the present worth or value of the pecuniary loss to decedent's estate. This fairly means that such worth or value was to be computed as of the time of verdict rather than the earlier time of death."
The opinion then repeats the quote from Sisson v. Weathermon which we have set out, supra.
We point out cross-appellant in Abel v. Dodge unsuccessfully maintained that "present worth" refers to date of death and not date of verdict.
To the extent they deal with the question presented by this appeal, Sisson v. Weathermon and Abel v. Dodge are based on a judicial determination that guided by an instruction patterned after Iowa Uniform Jury Instruction 3.10, which we must assume they followed, the jury had included interest in computing the allowance of damages to the time of verdict rather than the earlier time of death. The quote from Abel v. Dodge set out, supra, sustains this position. It is not inconsistent with the prior Iowa decisions recognized in the two cited opinions where recovery was computed as of the time of death and interest allowed from that date.
I. Plaintiff argues neither Sisson nor Abel govern here in view of instruction 14A wherein the jury was told to give no consideration to the matter of interest on any allowance of damages fixed by their verdict. He maintains it cannot be said from a reading of the instructions it is apparent the jury considered interest in arriving at its -verdict when they were told not to do so and therefore the court should add interest from date of death.
Plaintiff apparently made this argument to the trial court in connection with his motion for additur.
In denying plaintiff's motion the court said:
"What this court intended to tell the jury by Instruction 14A was that they did not need to and should not attempt to insert in their verdict a provision as to the rate of interest on the verdict after rendition, or any specification as to a separate amount of interest that they had included therein. It is felt that the meaning of Instructions 13 and 14 and 14A taken together could readily be and was understood by the jury.
"The jury was told in 14A not to be concerned with the matter of interest on any allowance of damages. The verdict is the allowance of damages. They were told by this instruction not to be concerned about what the amount or rate of the interest would be on whatever verdict they allowed. A different situation would have been presented for determination now had the jury been told, in Instruction 14A, that they were not to be concerned with the matter on interest on any claim (instead of on any allowance of damages) of the plaintiffs." (emphasis in the original)
It is clear the jury was told in instructions 13 and 14 to allow, in the event of recovery, the present worth or value of the pecuniary loss suffered by decedent's death and as stated in Abel v. Dodge, this fairly meant that such worth or value was to be computed as of time of verdict rather than the earlier time of death.
The answer to the question presented by the appeal in the present case is the effect of instruction 14A which was not included as an instruction in either Sisson v. Weathermon or Abel v. Dodge.
Plaintiff's argument would be more persuasive if the jury had been instructed to fix the allowance as of the date of death. But as stated in instructions 13 and 14 the jury was plainly told "present worth" or value means such worth or value was to be computed as of the time of verdict.
In order to sustain plaintiff's position it would be necessary to hold the jury was told in effect in instruction 14A that in arriving at their allowance of damages they were to reduce the present worth or value of the pecuniary loss suffered by decedent's death as determined under the guidelines given in instructions 13 and 14 to the worth or value of such loss at the time of David's death. We decline to make such judicial determination and approve defendant's contention urged in support of the trial court's ruling that "instruction 14A simply told the jury that they were not to consider in their verdict the payment of court costs or interest on any 'allowance of damages' arrived at under the 'present worth' instructions 13 and 14."
Plaintiff's assignment considered in this division is without merit. Under the instructions interest commences on date of verdict.
II. In support of his remaining assignment plaintiff maintains interest upon a verdict for wrongful death should be allowed from date of loss to date of verdict without regard to the instructions given to the jury on present worth. He insists the rule laid down in the Sisson case is invalid, unsound, and fallacious and urges us to overrule that decision.
We are not persuaded to do so. Much of plaintiff's argument ignores the fact that he is entitled to interest from the date of the verdicts.
The case is therefore
Affirmed.
All Justices concur except BECKER, J., who dissents and REYNOLDSON, J., who takes no part.