Case Name: The City of Kennewick, Petitioner, v. Patricia C. Vandergriff, Respondent
Court: Washington Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Washington
Decision Date: 1987-10-01
Citations: 109 Wash. 2d 99
Docket Number: No. 53438-1
Parties: The City of Kennewick, Petitioner, v. Patricia C. Vandergriff, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: Washington Reports
Volume: 109
Pages: 99–107

Head Matter:
[No. 53438-1.
En Banc.
October 1, 1987.]
The City of Kennewick, Petitioner, v. Patricia C. Vandergriff, Respondent.
William L. Cameron, for petitioner.
Armstrong, Klym & Waite, P.S., by Linda M. Waite, for respondent.

Opinion:
Dore, J. —
Patricia Vandergriff obtained a dismissal of drunk driving charges because her trial date was set more than 90 days after her arraignment in violation of the speedy trial rule. The City of Kennewick argues that the recent amendment to this rule makes the dismissal of the charges unwarranted even though the trial date exceeded the 90-day limit.
Facts
Vandergriff was arrested and charged with reckless driving and driving while intoxicated by Kennewick police officers. She was arraigned on January 31, 1985, and her original trial date was scheduled for April 1. On March 22, Vandergriff waived her right to a jury trial, and the court, on March 25, rescheduled her trial for May 14. This date was more than 90 days after Vandergriff's arraignment.
On March 28, 3 days after the trial court reset her tried date, Vandergriff's counsel objected to the new date by letter. The full text of the letter was as follows:
Amy Bell
Benton County District Court P.O. Box 7265 7320 W. Quinault Kennewick, Washington 99336
In Re: City of Kennewick v. Patricia C. Vandergriff, K85-2150
Dear Amy:
Pursuant to JCrR 3.08(f)(1) I object to the trial setting of May 14, 1985 in the above matter. I believe the 90 days will run out on May 6,1985.
Very truly yours,
Terry J. Bloor
Brief of Appellant, at A-l. Vandergriff's counsel did not send a copy of the letter to the prosecutor's office or note the motion on a judge's docket.
The clerk filed this letter without taking any action on it. On May 14, when the case was called for trial, Vandergriff's counsel moved to dismiss. The District Court granted this motion pursuant to JCrR 3.08(i), and the Benton County Superior Court affirmed the dismissal (JCrR was rescinded June 4, 1987 and replaced by CrRLJ). The Court of Appeals granted discretionary review and affirmed the trial court. We then granted the City's petition for review.
Speedy Trial Rule
The speedy trial rule requires that a case be set for trial within 60 days of arraignment if the defendant is in custody or 90 days if the defendant has been released from jail. JCrR 3.08(c)(1). Various extensions of the 60- or 90-day deadline are possible, although none of them are relevant in this case. JCrR 3.08(d). If the trial is set after this time limit expires, and the defendant has not waived his or her right to a speedy trial, then the case against the defendant is dismissed with prejudice. JCrR 3.08(1).
Prior to April 2, 1984, a defendant was under no obligation to inform the court that the trial date it had set violated the speedy trial rule. State v. Williams, 85 Wn.2d 29, 530 P.2d 225 (1975). Furthermore, the time limit has always been interpreted quite strictly, so that " [a] showing of prejudice to the defendant is unnecessary." Williams, at 32. Therefore, a defendant who knew that a technical violation of this rule had occurred could simply wait until the date of trial and then move for a dismissal.
The revision to JCrR 3.08 changed this situation. Now, when a trial court decides to reset a trial date for any reason,
[a] party who objects to the date set on the ground that it is not within the time limits prescribed by this rule must, within 10 days after the notice [of the new trial date] is mailed or otherwise given, move that the court set a trial date within those time limits.
JCrR 3.08(f)(2). Failure to make such a motion is a waiver of the provisions of the speedy trial rule. JCrR 3.08(f)(2). At issue in this case, therefore, is whether counsel's letter to the court clerk constituted a valid motion within the meaning of JCrR 3.08(f)(2).
In order for this letter to constitute a motion, it must state with sufficient particularity the relief Vandergriff sought. As the Court of Appeals noted in this case, "the sufficiency of a motion is determined not by its technical format or language but by its contents ." Kennewick v. Vandergriff, 45 Wn. App. 900, 903, 728 P.2d 1071 (1986); Colorado Nat'l Bank v. Merlino, 35 Wn. App. 610, 614, 668 P.2d 1304 (1983). Here, the letter to the clerk mentioned the case, the file number, and contained a specific reference to the justice court rule at issue. While the letter did not contain the word "motion", and did not ask for any specific relief, it is abundantly clear in this case that the relief sought was an earlier trial date. The letter was sufficiently explicit to constitute a motion.
The City nevertheless contends that an ex parte letter to the clerk was improper, and that Vandergriff should have presented the motion to a trial judge. We disagree. CR 5(e) states that all papers filed with the court should be given to the clerk of the court, and JCR 5(e) provides for the same rule in civil cases before a justice court. We believe the same rule should apply to criminal cases before a justice court, and therefore, sending a letter to the court clerk was proper.
However, we believe that this motion should also have been served on the City. JCrR 10.02 provides that " [reasonable notice shall be given to the opposing party or attorney of record of all motions and applications other than those ex parte." Vandergriff does not dispute that no notice whatsoever was given to the City, and we believe this failure to give notice violated JCrR 10.02 and invalidated the motion.
We cannot accept Vandergriff's contention that this motion could be granted ex parte. While JCrR 10.02 does not list which motions may be granted ex parte, generally a party is entitled to notice if the motion will affect its substantial rights. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Wherley, 34 Wn. App. 344, 347-48, 661 P.2d 155 (1983); State ex rel. McLeod v. Brown, 378 S.C. 281, 294 S.E.2d 781 (1982). While in the narrow sense it is true that a motion to reset a trial date does not affect the prosecution's substantial rights, it is equally true that if the court fails to act on such a motion, there may be a speedy trial rule violation mandating dismissal of this action. JCrR 3.08(i). The dismissal obviously does affect the substantial rights of the prosecution. The possibility that a case might be dismissed mandates that the prosecution be served with the original motion.
Conclusion
Vandergriff's failure to serve the prosecution with her motion to have her trial date reset violated JCrR 10.02. She therefore did not make a proper motion under JCrR 3.08(f)(2) and is deemed to have waived her rights under the speedy trial rule. The subject case is remanded for a trial on the merits.
Brachtenbach, Dolliver, Callow, and Durham, JJ., concur.