Case Name: Williams v. Bradbury
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1853
Citations: 9 Tex. 487
Docket Number: 
Parties: Williams v. Bradbury.
Judges: Lipscomb, J., did not sit in this case.
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 9
Pages: 244–245

Head Matter:
Williams v. Bradbury.
The statute' (Ilart. Dig., art. 1599) prescribing the time within which, after judgment, an injunction maybe obtained to stay execution, manifestly has no application to an injunction sought for causes which have arisen subsequent to the rendition of the judgment. (Note
The statute of limitations is not applicable to payments.
Where an injunction was prayed, on tho ground that an execution had been issued “ for the 1 “amount of the judgment and costs,” whereas certain payments, specifying them, had been made, without a direct averment that the payments bad not been credited on the execution, it was held that a general demurrer was improperly sustained. But, Queref If tho objection had been taken by special exception.
An objection to the misjoinder of parties defendant cannot bo taken by general demurrer.
It seems that tho neglect and refusal of a co-defondant to join as a co-plaintiff for a writ of injunction, is not a good ground for making him a defendant.
That the judgment-debtor placed claims in the hands of the attorneys of the judgment-creditor for collection, to b« applied, when collected, to tho payment of the judgment, and that a sufficient amount has been collected by them to pay the judgment, constitutes no ground for the issue of an injunction to restrain execution upon the judgment.
Error from Brazoria. The plaintiff, Williams, filed his petition in February, 1852, praying an injunction to restrain the execution of the judgment, and for general relief. Tlie judgment sought to be enjoined was rendered against the petitioner and McKinney, in March, 1843; and the petition alleged the payment thereon of two certain sums, one of $042, in April, and oue of $500, in March, 1844. It further sought to charge the plaintiff iu the judgment with sums alleged to have been collected by his attorneys upon claims placed in their hands for that purpose, and to he applied in satisfaction of the judgment. The petition prayed that Bradbury, Reel, tlie sheriff, and McKinney he made defendants, alleging that McKinney neglected and refused to join as plaintiff.
The defendant, Bradbury, (plaintiff in the judgment,) filed a general demurrer to tlie petition, which was sustained, and tlie case dismissed. Tlie judgment upon the demurrer was assigned as error.
J. B. Jones, for plaintiff in error.
Harris fy Bease, for defendants in error.
Lipscomb, J., did not sit in this case.

Opinion:
Wheelbr, J.
It is urged, in support of the demurrer, that the application for an injunction was not in time, and the statute prescribing the time within which an injunction to stay an execution upon a judgment may be granted is relied on. (Hart. Dig., art. 1500.)
The statute manifestly lias no application to an injunction sought for causes which have arisen subsequent to the rendition of the judgment, as payment and satisfaction, release, &c. Kor is the statute of limitations applicable to payments. It cannot, therefore, he objected that the injunction in tiffs case was not applied for in time.
Note 83. — Beardsley v. Hall, ante, 119.
It is further objected to the sufficiency of the petition that it does not aver that tiie several payments were not credited on the execution sought to he enjoined. It is, however, averred that execution has issued " for Hie amount " of said judgment, and a large amount of costs," &c., and that "said execution "has been levied upon nine of the slaves, the property of the petitioner, and "the said slaves are about to be sold'by the sheriff to satisfy said judgment," &c. The plain meaning of this statement is, that the plaintiff is proceeding to collect the amount of the judgment, notwithstanding the alleged payments; and we think the averment sufficiently specific and certain to that effect, especially on general demurrer. Had the objection now urged been taken by an exception to the petition, pointing out the supposed defect, there would be better reason for holding that the petition should have negatived, by averment, the fact of any credit upon the. execution. This, however, would be requiring very great specialty in pleading, and greater, it is believed, than has heretofore been required, except iu dilatory pleas, or pleading either regarded by the law with disfavor, or construed with more th;m ordinary strictness.
There does not appear to have been any good reason for making McKinney a party defendant to the suit for an injunction; but this objection was not well taken by a general demurrer; and, if rightly taken, it might have been obviated by amendment, and did not afford a ground for dismissing the case.
To so much of the petition as sought to charge the plaintiff in the judgment with the amount of claims alleged to have been placed in the hands of his attorney to be collected and applied in sal isfaetiou of the judgment, the demurrer was rightly sustained. The facts alleged did not show payment. But, in respect to the actual payments alleged to have been made, the averments of the petition wore sufficient to entitle the petitioner to relief, and under the. prayer for general-relief the appropriate relief, upon proof of the plaintiff's case, might have been afforded him. There was error, therefore, in dismissing the case, for which the judgment must he reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.
Keversed and remanded.