Case Name: Wayne FILES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1991-08-30
Citations: 586 So. 2d 352
Docket Number: No. 89-1080
Parties: Wayne FILES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: WENTWORTH, Senior Judge, concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 586
Pages: 352–362

Head Matter:
Wayne FILES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 89-1080.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Aug. 30, 1991.
Michael E. Allen, Public Defender, Lawrence M. Korn, Asst. Public Defender, Tallahassee, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Wayne Mitchell, Certified Legal Intern, Bradley R. Bischoff, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Opinion:
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
We deny the state's motion for rehearing, filed June 10, 1991, to strike the certified question in this case. However, the original majority and dissenting opinions are withdrawn and the following opinions are substituted therefor:
MINER, Judge.
Wayne Files appeals his convictions on three counts of dealing in stolen property, contending that the trial court erred in denying his motion to strike the jury panel following the state's allegedly discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. We find that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to strike the jury panel. Accordingly, we affirm appellant's convictions.
During the course of voir dire examination, the prosecutor excused two black prospective jurors. Defense counsel objected to the state's use of peremptory challenges on these prospective jurors suggesting that they were racially motivated. The court then inquired as to the state's reasons for the exercise of these challenges. The prosecutor responded that although his information sheet indicated that the first black prospective juror challenged had been convicted of DUI, that juror had failed to respond when he asked if any prospective juror had been convicted of any offense. His articulated reasons for striking the other prospective juror were that she was divorced, had five children, was unemployed and that he preferred jurors who worked or had other visible means of support. After the state's response, defense counsel, calling the stated reasons "superfluous," moved to strike the jury panel. The trial court denied the motion. A jury was seated and sworn and appellant's trial commenced. He was found guilty as charged, adjudicated and sentenced. This appeal then ensued.
In Reed v. State, 560 So.2d 203, 206 (Fla.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 230, 112 L.Ed.2d 184 (1990), the Florida Supreme Court observed:
Within the limitations imposed by State v. Neil, [457 So.2d 481 (Fla.1990)] the trial judge necessarily is vested with broad discretion in determining whether peremptory challenges are racially intended. State v. Slappy [522 So.2d 18 (Fla.1988) ]. Only one who is present at the trial can discern the nuances of the spoken word and the demeanor of those involved. Given the circumstances . we cannot say that the trial judge abused his discretion in concluding that the defense had failed to make a prima facie showing that there was a strong likelihood that the jurors were challenged because of their race.

In trying to achieve the delicate balance between eliminating racial prejudice and the right to exercise peremptory challenges, we must necessarily rely on the inherent fairness and color blindness of our trial judges who are on the scene and who themselves get a "feel" for what is going on in the jury selection process.
See also Knight v. State, 559 So.2d 327, 328 (Fla. 1st DCA), review dismissed, 574 So.2d 141 (Fla.1990).
In Reynolds v. State, 576 So.2d 1300 (Fla.1991), the court noted:
Reed vests significant discretion in the trial court on Neil issues by requiring appellate courts to show deference to the trial court's conclusions. Specifically, Reed states that the appellate courts must "rely on the inherent fairness and color blindness of our trial judges who are on the scene and who themselves get a 'feel' for what is going on in the jury selection process." However, Reed rested on the assumption that, in the context of that case, some sort of Neil inquiry must have been made in the first instance.
Id. at 1302 (citations omitted).
Case law indicates that appellate review of trial court rulings concerning the alleged discriminatory use of peremptory challenges seems to depend upon how the trial court responded to the initial objec tion. In cases like Reynolds, where the trial court chooses not to conduct a Neil inquiry, the reviewing court is presented with no conclusion to which deference can be shown, and the case may well be reversed. But where a trial court, exercising its broad discretion in considering whether a party has established the required "strong likelihood," asks the noncomplain-ing party to explain its peremptory challenges and determines that those explanations are reasonable, race-neutral and non-pretextual, its findings are entitled to great deference.
The "abuse of discretion" standard has found application in both civil and criminal contexts. Justice Overton explained in Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197, 1202-03 (Fla.1980), that a reviewing court must give great deference to findings of fact in family law matters:
Judicial discretion is defined as: The power exercised by courts to determine questions to which no strict rule of law is applicable but which, from their nature, and the circumstances of the case, are controlled by the personal judgment of the court. 1 Bouvier's Law Dictionary and Concise Encyclopedia 804 (8th ed. 1914). Our trial judges are granted this discretionary power because it is impossible to establish strict rules of law for every conceivable situation which could arise in the course of a domestic relation proceeding. The trial judge can ordinarily best determine what is appropriate and just because only he can personally observe the participants and events of the trial.
We cite with favor the following statement of the test for review of a judge's discretionary power:
Discretion, in this sense, is abused when the judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, which is another way of saying that discretion is abused only where no reasonable man would take the view adopted by the trial court. If reasonable men could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion.
Delno v. Market Street Railway Company, 124 F.2d 965, 967 (9th Cir.1942).
In reviewing a true discretionary act, the appellate court must fully recognize the superior vantage point of the trial judge and should apply the "reasonableness" test to determine whether the trial judge abused his discretion. If reasonable men could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then the action is not unreasonable and there can be no finding of an abuse of discretion. The discretionary ruling of the trial judge should be disturbed only when his decision fails to satisfy this test of reasonableness.
The widely recognized Canakaris standard was applied in Huff v. State, 569 So.2d 1247 (Fla.1990), wherein the trial judge struck a motion for postconviction relief on the ground that the attorney signing the motion was not admitted to practice law in Florida prior to ruling on counsel's motion to admit him pro hac vice. The court held that a denial of the latter motion would have been an abuse of discretion because nothing appeared of record which cast doubt on the standing of the attorney from another jurisdiction, and that striking the rule 3.850 motion prior to a ruling on the motion pro hac vice violated the appellant's due process rights.
Just as the Neil inquiry is designed to ferret out impermissible bias in voir dire selection, the Richardson inquiry is designed to expose procedural prejudice occasioned by a party's discovery violation. In Lucas v. State, 376 So.2d 1149 (Fla.1979), the court held that it is within the "broad discretion" of the trial judge, after an adequate inquiry, to determine whether a defendant has been prejudiced by a discovery violation. In Parce v. Bryd, 533 So.2d 812 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988), review denied, 542 So.2d 988 (Fla.1989), the court applied the Canakaris standard in holding that the trial court improperly granted mistrial for an alleged Richardson violation.
The Canakaris standard was also applied in determining the propriety of a departure sentence in Booker v. State, 514 So.2d 1079 (Fla.1987):
Inquiring into whether the trial court abused its discretion necessarily turns on the specific facts presented in each case. If, based upon the entire set of circumstances presented, the reviewing court finds the sentence so excessive as to shock the judicial conscience, this will likely evidence an abuse of discretion. Reviewing courts which have held that they possess the power to review a sentence on these grounds have articulated a variety of phrases which, in fact, comport to the abuse of discretion standard adopted by this Court in Canakaris.
Id. at 1085 (citations omitted).
The abuse of discretion standard has been applied in Slappy and in other Florida cases reviewing Neil inquiries. Federal courts likewise apply a "great deference" standard of review, under which a trial court's findings in determining whether peremptory challenges were exercised in a discriminatory manner will not be disturbed unless "clearly erroneous." Several states have followed the federal standard. Based upon the foregoing analysis, we hold that the abuse of discretion standard, as discussed in Canakaris, is the appropriate standard by which an appellate court should review lower court Neil inquiries into the " 'Slappworth^mess' " of proffered explanations for peremptory challenges. Here, the judge implicitly concluded that the prosecutor's explanations were race-neutral, reasonable and non-pre-textual by denying the defendant's motion to strike the jury panel. This court must therefore determine whether the trial judge's Neii-inquiry conclusions fell within his vested breadth of discretion as espoused in the Reynolds—Reed paradigm.
It is clear that in conducting a Neil inquiry, the trial judge is engaged primarily in fact finding. This court's review of such a case is therefore limited to determining whether the basis for the judge's findings of fact "appear of record" and whether the complaining party has shown a clear and palpable abuse of discretion by demonstrating the judge's conclusions to be clearly erroneous. This court is not authorized to conduct a de novo review of the voir dire examination. In the instant case, we are presented with the trial court's exercise of discretion in accepting the state's reasons within the confines of a Neil inquiry. Applying the principles in Neil, Slappy, Reed and Reynolds to this trial judge's ruling, we cannot say that the judge abused his discretion.
As to the first prospective black juror challenged, it is apparent from the record that the prosecutor asked not only whether any of the jurors had had dealings with the state attorney's office or contacts with law enforcement officials, but also whether anyone present or any of their relatives had ever been arrested for any type of crime. Although several jurors admitted having previous convictions or experiences with law enforcement officers, this prospective juror said nothing. Although the prosecutor did not produce the information sheet indicating that the juror had actually been convicted of DUI, his representation of a prior felony conviction was a valid reason for exercising a peremptory challenge. Roundtree v. State, 546 So.2d 1042 (Fla.1989); Tillman v. State, 522 So.2d 14 (Fla.1988); Stephens v. State, 559 So.2d 687 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), approved on other grounds, 572 So.2d 1387 (Fla.1991); Knight, 559 So.2d at 327 (Fla. 1st DCA), review dismissed, 574 So.2d 141 (Fla.1990).
As to the second prospective black juror challenged, it is apparent from the record that while two other jurors were divorced and one other juror was unemployed, none of the other jurors selected were both unemployed and divorced with five children. Had the prosecutor offered only unemployment or divorce as an explanation for the exercise of this peremptory challenge, we may have been required to find that the trial judge abused his discretion by accepting the reason as nondiscriminatory. See Slappy v. State, 522 So.2d at 22 (Fla.1988). But, because the combination of unemployment, and divorce may arguably indicate some prospect of a level of detachment from the proceedings not based on race, we cannot say that reasonable persons would not differ as to the propriety of this reason for excusing the juror.
Just as a trial judge has broad discretion, within the limitations imposed by Neil, in factually determining whether a complaining party has met the initial burden of showing a "strong likelihood" that the peremptory challenge was exercised in a discriminatory manner, he also has broad discretion within those same limits in evaluating the state's responsive explanations for the challenges. It is not the function of an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the trial judge on the issue of credibility of the state's reasons unless the record reflects a clear or palpable abuse of discretion.
To reverse the trial judge's conclusions on this record would require us to second guess his evaluation of the prosecutor's credibility as well as the reasons given for challenging the two jurors. In the total context of the record, we find that reasonable persons could arguably agree with the trial court's action. Appellant has therefore shown no clear or palpable abuse of discretion exercised by the trial judge in finding that the state's explanations for exercising the two peremptory challenges against prospective black jurors were reasonable, race-neutral and non-pretextual. See also Hernandez v. New York, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991), and Green v. State, 583 So.2d 647 (Fla.1991).
While we affirm the convictions appealed from, we note that the Florida Supreme Court has not yet clearly defined the standard of review when Neil-Slappy issues are raised on appeal. Since such issues frequently recur, we certify the following question as one of great public importance:
WHAT IS THE STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW OF A TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE STATE'S USE OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES AGAINST PROSPECTIVE BLACK JURORS WAS REASONABLE, RACE-NEUTRAL AND NON-PRETEXTUAL?
AFFIRMED.
WENTWORTH, Senior Judge, concurs.
ERVIN, J., concurs and dissents with written opinion.
. Richardson v. State, 246 So.2d 771 (Fla.1971).
. See also Banda v. State, 536 So.2d 221 (Fla.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1087, 109 S.Ct. 1548, 103 L.Ed.2d 852 (1989); Ross v. State, 474 So.2d 1170 (Fla.1985); Duest v. State, 462 So.2d 446 (Fla.1985); Justus v. State, 438 So.2d 358 (Fla.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1052, 104 S.Ct. 1332, 79 L.Ed.2d 726 (1984); McGee v. State, 435 So.2d 854 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), review denied, 444 So.2d 417 (Fla.1984).
. See abo Albritton v. State, 476 So.2d 158 (Fla.1985); Riggins v. State, 477 So.2d 663 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985); Steiner v. State, 469 So.2d 179 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 479 So.2d 118 (Fla.1985).
. Green v. State, 583 So.2d 647, 652 (Fla. June 6, 1991) ("After reviewing the record, we cannot say the trial judge abused his discretion in finding that the exercise of these peremptory challenges was racially neutral and not a pretext.''). In Slappy, the court observed:
Part of the trial judge's role is to evaluate both the credibility of the person offering the explanation as well as the credibility of the asserted reasons. These must be weighed in light of the circumstances of the case and the total course of the voir dire in question, as reflected in the record.
*
The function of the trial court in determining the existence of reasonableness is not to substitute its judgment for that of the prosecutor, but merely to decide if the state's assertions are such that some reasonable persons would agree.
522 So.2d at 22-23. See abo Mitchell v. State, 548 So.2d 823 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); McCloud v. State, 536 So.2d 1081 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Spillis Candela & Partners, Inc. v. The Association of School Consultants, Inc., 586 So.2d 351 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Bohannon v. State, 557 So.2d 680 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 569 So.2d 1278 (Fla.1990).
. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986); Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985); United States v. Grandison, 885 F.2d 143 (4th Cir.1989), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 2178, 109 L.Ed.2d 507 (1990); United States v. Baker, 855 F.2d 1353 (8th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1069, 109 S.Ct. 2072, 104 L.Ed.2d 636 (1989).
.In State v. Artwine, 743 S.W.2d 51, 66 (Mo.1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017, 108 S.Ct. 1755, 100 L.Ed.2d 217 (1988), the Missouri Supreme Court opined:
A finding of discrimination, or a finding of no discrimination, is a finding of fact. Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1511, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985). In a Batson context, the Supreme Court observed that because the trial judge's findings "largely will turn on evaluation of credibility, a reviewing court ordinarily should give those findings great deference." Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, n. 21, 106 S.Ct. at 1724, n. 21. "[Fjindings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of witnesses." Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573, 105 S.Ct. at 1511, quoting F.R.C.P. 52(a).
"[A] finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed." Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573, 105 S.Ct. at 1511, citing United States v. United States Gypsum, 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 541, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948). Thus, if the trial court's "account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, [an appellate] court may not reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently." Id., 105 S.Ct. at 1512.
In Commonwealth v. Lewis, 523 Pa. 466, 567 A.2d 1376, 1380 (1989), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court opined:
[T]he decision whether to disqualify a juror is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed in the absence of a palpable abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Hardcastle, 519 Pa. 236, 256, 546 A.2d 1101, 1110 (1988); Commonwealth v. Colson, 507 Pa. 440, 490 A.2d 811 (1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140, 106 S.Ct. 2245, 90 L.Ed.2d 692 (1986).
In State v. Young, 569 So.2d 570 (La.Ct.App.1990), a Louisiana court applied the Batson "great deference" standard.
. Quoting term coined by Chief Judge Schwartz in Smith v. State, 574 So.2d 1195, 1196 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991).
. In Tillman v. State, 522 So.2d 14, 17 n. 1 (Fla.1988), the Florida Supreme Court, in reviewing the trial court's acceptance of a prosecutor's reasons, observed:
This is not to say that every assertion made by a prosecutor to support the peremptory striking of a juror must find support within the record. There will be occasions where statements of fact (not conclusions drawn from fact) made by counsel, concerning a juror's background can be accepted by the court without the need to examine the record. For example, if a prosecutor represents to the court that a juror has, in the past, been convicted of a crime, the court may accept this as a reason for striking the juror without requiring the prosecutor to produce a certified copy of the judgment of conviction for the record. Furthermore, a judge is certainly permitted to place in the record his observations to support a prosecutor's reasons for striking a juror. If a prosecutor strikes a juror because the juror has been glaring at or using a hostile tone of voice with the prosecutor, the judge may state for the record that he has observed this behavior from the juror.
. Bryant v. State, 565 So.2d 1298 (Fla.1990); Reed v. State, 560 So.2d 203 (Fla.1990); State v. Williams, 566 So.2d 1348 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Dinkins v. State, 566 So.2d 859 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), City of Miami v. Cornett, 463 So.2d 399 (Fla. 3d DCA), cause dismissed, 469 So.2d 748 (Fla.1985).
. Bohannon v. State, 557 So.2d 680 (Fla. 3d DCA), review denied, 569 So.2d 1278 (Fla.1990). See Huff v. State, 569 So.2d 1247 (Fla.1990) [Where the action of the trial court is discretionary, the order of the lower court will not be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is clearly shown]. See generally Booker v. State, 514 So.2d 1079 (Fla.1987); Albritton v. State, 476 So.2d 158 (Fla.1985); Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197 (Fla.1980).