Case Name: JOHN C. HAM, Plaintiff, v. THE MAYOR, &c., OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, Defendant
Court: New York Superior Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1874-06-01
Citations: 5 Jones & S. 458
Docket Number: 
Parties: JOHN C. HAM, Plaintiff, v. THE MAYOR, &c., OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, Defendant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Reports of cases argued and determined in the Superior Court of the city of New York
Volume: 37
Pages: 458–482

Head Matter:
JOHN C. HAM, Plaintiff, v. THE MAYOR, &c., OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, Defendant.
I. CORPORATION.—MUNICIPAL.
1. Misfeasance of its officebs, when not liable fob.
a. When the misfeasance is in respect to a duty specifically imposed by statute on the officer.
b. When the misfeasance is by officers over whom they hare no control, and whose duties are to be performed as the representatives and for the purposes of the state government.
H. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK.
1. Corporation of the city of New York not liable for the misfeasance ■ of the commissioners of said department.
1. Such department is not in fact a part of the integral government of the municipal corporation; and the duties of the commissioners are specifically imposed by statute on them, and are to be performed by them as the representatives of and for the purposes of the state government.
1. This, although the statute declares in respect of such department that “there shall be in the government of the city of New York an additional department, to be called the department of public instruction” {Laws of 1871, vol. 3, p. 1344), and, although the mayor of said city, pursuant to said act, appointed the commissioners.
3. The legislature has nowhere, in any form, expressed or intimated any intention to make the Mayor, &c., liable for the negligence or omissions of such department.
a. Semble. The legislature would have no power to impose such a liability.
HI. Application of above pbinciples.
The former board of education 'became Qthe lessees of a certain second floor, and caused a large number of water-closets and other water arrangements to be put therein. Upon the organization of the department of public instruction, the commissioners thereof took under its charge the said second floor, and continued its occupancy. Thereafter, through the imperfect, insufficient and defective construction of the water arrangements, water flowed from time to time therefrom into and upon the floor below, occupied by the plaintiff, causing the injury complained of.
Held,
That the mayor, aldermen and commonalty was not liable, neither by reason of original defectiveness in construction, nor by reason of a negligent maintenance.
Before Mohell, Ch. J., Curtis and Speir, JJ.
Decided June 1, 1874.
Exceptions ordered to be heard at general term.
The action was to recover damages for injury to plaintiff’s property by a flow of water.
One Henry Mason was the owner of certain premises on the corner of Fourth-street and Lafayette-place. He leased the first floor and basement of said building to the plaintiff, for a term of five years, from May 1, 1869.
By an act of the legislature (Laws 1854, ch. 101, § 2, Sub. 11), a body was incorporated, known and designated in the act, as the board of education. It was given all the powers and privileges of a corporation, and was authorized to take and hold real and personal estate and property.
Such board, in October, 1870, took a lease from said Mason of the second floor of said building, for a term of two years from the ensuing 1st of May, for the use of the NT or mal College; and at its own expense, and by its direction', caused a large number of water-closets and other water arrangements, to be put into the premises, from which the water from time to time flowed into and upon the- first floor occupied by the plaintiff, oausing the injury complained of.
By another act of the legislature (Laws 1871, ch. 574), which is entitled “An act to amend an act entitled ‘An act to reorganize the local government of the city of New York, passed April 17, 1871,’ ” &c., the said board of education was abolished. The
seventh section of the last-mentioned act is as follows ;—“There shall be in the government of the city •of Hew York an additional department, to be called the department of public instruction, which shall • under that name have the same powers and discharge the same duties, which are now vested in the board of 'education in said city, when such department shall be duly organized under this section.”
By the 2nd subd., the officers composing the board of education are legislated out of office, and commissioners of the department of public instruction aré to be appointed by the mayor, who “shall possess and succeed to all the duties of commissioners of common schools of said city, and shall constitute á board, and as such board be at the head of the said department of public instruction for said city.”
And it is enacted 'that “whenever, in any laws the words board of education or commissioners of common schools shall occur, said words shall be taken to mean and comprehend respectively the department of public instruction and commissioners of said department as herein provided for.”
Upon the organization of this new department, it took under its charge the public schools, including the one in question, and continued the occupancy "of the premises leased to the board of education.
There was evidence to show that the plumbing for the water-closets, &c., had been imperfectly done, and had continued ■ insufficient when the department of public instruction took possession, and down to the time of the injury to the plaintiff’s property.
There was no evidence of any negligence in the use of the water apparatus. The floor leased to the board, of education was occupied and used as a female school^ consisting of a large number of children of various ages, and the closets, &c., were put in for the use .of, and were used by such persons.
The action was commenced against Henry Mason, the department of public instruction of the city of Hew -York, and the mayor, alderman and commonalty of the city of Hew York. It was discontinued as to the department of public instruction ; and at the close of the plaintiff’s case at the trial, the complaint was dismissed as to Henry Mason, and thereafter the trial proceeded as against defendants, the mayor, &c., alone.
The court charged the jury, that the defendants, the mayor, alderman and commonalty of the city of Hew York, were liable for damage done to the plaintiff’s property “resulting from negligence of the employees of the board of public instruction.” To this the defendants excepted.
The defendants’ counsel made the following several requests to the court to charge the jury:—
1. In cases of this description the defendants are not bound to exercise more than ordinary care and caution, and unless a direct omission of such care and caution be affirmatively proved to have been the cause of damage in this case, the plaintiff can not recover.
2. The mere fact of the occurrence of the accident, owing to a defect in the apparatus is not enough to charge the defendants, the mayor, &c. The knowledge" of such defect in such a manner and at such a time as to enable the defendants to prevent or stop the overflow of water must be brought home to them, and some distinct act of negligence causing such overflow must be proved.
3. If the water-works were so constructed that an
overflow could not be caused except by negligence of some person who failed to use it carefully, the defendants would not be liable, unless the negligence is shown to have been by some agent or servant of the defendants. :
4. The defendants are not liable for the defective
construction -of the water works, as they did not erect them.
5. The plaintiff is bound to establish his damages .affirmatively in. such a manner that the jury can ascertain and fix their amount.
,, 6; There is no presumption of negligence on the
part of the defendants, but the burden of proving the .negligence is on the plaintiff.
The judge, after he had charged the jury, refused to charge as requested, except so far as he had already charged them on the subject of the requests, to-which refusal the defendants duly excepted.
The jury gave the- plaintiff a verdict.
The court suspended judgment, and directed the . exceptions to be heard in the first instance at general term.
A. B. Millard, attorney, and A. B. Byett, of counsel for plaintiff, in reference to the points decided, urged :—I.
The judge properly denied the motion for nonsuit as to the appellants.. As to the first ground of nonsuit: .1. The board of education was created by chapter 101 of Laws of 1854, a corporation capable of suing and being sued (§ 2, subd. 11, Const. art. VIII. § 3; Laws of 1869, ch. 437; 17 Abb. Pr. 201, 211; Angell & Ames on Corp. 9 ed. § § 309, 659). It was entirely independent of the appellants. It had sole charge of all public schools, and power to select sites and lease school-houses, and to fit them up and keep them in repair, &c. (§ 2, subds. 1, 4, 8, 9), and it was its duty to do so. Every power entrusted to a public officer' to do an act for the benefit of the public, carries with it a duty to do it, and to do it properly. This is elementary, 'and it was its duty expressly to visit and examine the schools (§ 2, subd. 6). In October, 1870, the board of education leased the normal school premises, in question for two years from May 1, 1871, from Henry Mason. This covered the period during which the injury complained of occurred. The title to the premises was in the appellants (§ 3, subd. 9). By the laws of 1870, passed April 5, 1870, § 30, the several departments of the city government are created, and ' by chap. 574 of laws of 1871, passed April 18, 1871, £ 3, the above section 30 is amended by adding at the end thereof “Department of Public Instruction,” and by § 7 of same chapter (574 of Laws of 1871), page 1344, “Article Fifteen,” the department of public instruction “ shall under that designation have the same powers and discharge the same duties which are now vested in the board of education,” and by subd. 3, the officers composing the board of education are legislated out of office and commissioners of the department of public instruction are to be appointed by the mayor, who “shall possess and succeed to all the power and perform and succeed to all the duties of commissioner's of common schools of said city, and shall constitnte-a board,- and as such board be at the head of the said department of public.instruction for said city.” And it is enacted that “whenever in any laws the words * board of education or commissioners of common schools’ shall occur, said words shall be taken to mean and comprehend respectively the ‘ department of public instruction,’ and commissioners of said department as herein provided for.” We must, therefore, read chap. 101 of laws of 1854, quoted supra, by substituting the department of public instruction, and hence the appellants for the board of education. The department of public instruction being thus an integral part of the corporation, can neither sue nor be sued (17 Abb. Pr. 201 ; 10 Seld. 360). Consequently, the faults, negligences, offenses and official acts of the board of public instruction are those of the appellants, and# uoad hoc, wherever in the above quoted portions of chap. 574 of laws of 1874, the words “ departen--nt of public instruction ” occur, they are synonymous with the- appellants. Indeed, if the appellants are not liable, the plaintiff is absolutely .without remedy. Yet, 'ubi jus, ibi remedia, is a favorite maxim of the law. The judge expressly limited the liability of the appellants to the damages occurring after the passage of this act of 1871. Can any one doubt that the board of education, while a. corporation, was liable for the injury, complained of, which occurred prior to the passage of this act of 1871 \ And that liability arose out of the powers and duties conferred and imposed upon it, as already stated. The powers and duties conferred and imposed on the appellants are expressly declared to be “ the same.” It is a logical necessity that all consequent responsibility and liability must also be “the ■eame.”
B. Delajield Smith, corporation counsel, and A. ./. Vanderpoel, of counsel for defendant, in respect of the points decided, urged :—I.
The department of public instruction was not the agent or servant of this defend: ‘ ant, and the court erred in charging the jury that this defendant was “ responsible for such damages as, between the middle of April, 1871, and April 1, 1873, were occasioned by the negligence of the people employed by this department of public instruction in the •second story of the building.” Also, the defendant was entitled to a dismissal of the complaint for this 'same reason. As airead}7 appears, the board of education leased these premises, and occupied them for school purposes, under the provision of chap. 101, laws of 1854, § 2. By § 7 of chap. 574 of laws of 1871, passed April 18, 1871, it was enacted as follows: “ There shall be in the government of the city of New York an additional depariment to be called the department of public instruction, which shall, under that •designation, have the same powers and discharge the same duties which are now vested in the board of-education.” Said act also provides that the terms of office of the commissioners of common schools shall cease, and that the mayor shall appoint twelve commis-" sioners of said department of public instruction, who shall succeed to all the powers and perform and succeed to all the duties of commissioners of common schools,: and shall constitute a board, and as such board be at the head of the said department of public instruction-for said city and county, and shall hold their offices-until December 81, 1876, and the board shall be known as the board of public instruction (Laws of 1871, 1244). The law is correctly laid down in 2 Dillon on Corp. § 772. Tested by the rule, which Judge Dillon deduces from the adjudged cases on the subject, the defendants clearly are not liable for the negligence of the department of public instruction. That department is managed and controlled by a board of commissioners created by statute; this defendant neither appoints, elects, nor can it control said board; it can -neither continue nor remove said commissioners, nor can it hold them responsible for the manner in which they discharge their trust; nor do the duties of said board of commissioners relate to the exercise of corporate powers of this defendant, nor are such duties for the peculiar benefit of this defendant. Said commissioners are appointed by the mayor, in obedience to the statute, to perform a public service not peculiarly local or corporate, and are independent of this defendant as to the tenure of their office and the manner of discharging their duties. The care and control of the schools of the city is a duty specifically imposed by-statute on the board of commissioners, and not upon this defendant (2 Laws of 1871, 1244). “ A municipal corporation is not liable for the misfeasance or nonfeasance of one of its officers in respect to a duty specifically imposed by statute on the officer” (Martin v. Mayor, 1 Hill, 545; Lorillard v. Town of Monroe, 11 N. Y. 392, 396). Nor are municipal corporations liable for acts of misfeasance of public officers not appointed, by them, although performing certain acts for them under the law for which they are appointed (Bank of Commonwealth v. Mayor, 43 N. Y. 184). Nor liable for the neglect of the board of police commissioners, who are not appointed by or responsible to the corporation (Atwater v. Baltimore, 31 Md. 462). A city is not liable for a personal injury occasioned by the negligence of the members appointed and paid by the city council, of a” fire department established by the city council pursuant to an act of the legislature (Hafford v. City of New Bedford, 82 Mass. [16 Gray] 297). Nor for injuries to the plaintiff caused by the bursting of the hose of one of the engines of the corporation, through the negligence of a member of the fire department (Fisher v. Boston, 104 Mass. 87). A town is not liable for an injury sustained by reason of the negligence of a laborer employed by one of its surveyors to aid him in performing the duties of his office (Walcott v. Inhabitants of Swampscott, 83 Mass. [1 Allen] 101). A city is not liable for an assault and battery committed by its police officers, even though it was done in an attempt to enforce an ordinance of the city (Buttrick v. City of Lowell, 83 Mass. [1 Allen] 172).

Opinion:
By the Court.—Curtis, J.
The defendant, the corporation of New York, claims that it is not liable for the negligence of the department of public instruction, and that the court erred in charging the jury that it was responsible for such damages, as between the middle of April, '1871, and April 1, 1872, were occasioned by the negligence of the persons employed by the department of public instruction.
The board of education whs created and had certain powers conferred on it by acts of the legislature, passed July 3, 1851, June 4, 1853, March 31, 1854, April 15, 1854, April 15, 1863, and April 25, 1864.
The board of education was (among other powers conferred) authorized to establish schools, to take and hold property, both real and personal, devised or transferred to it, for the purposes of public education, in the city of New York, and for the purposes of the legislation, in respect to it; it was enacted that the board should "possess the powers and privileges of a "corporation" (Gildersleeve v. The Board of Education, 17 Abb. Pr. 201).
The board of education was the instrument of the state government, in administering its system of common schools as far as related to the city of New York. It reported to the state superintendent of public instruction, and the amount of public moneys apportioned by the state to the county of New York among other counties, for the support and encouragement of common schools, was applied to its expenditures.
To these powers, duties and privileges of the board of education the department of public instruction succeeded. The statute making the change of name, and of the mode of the appointment of the commissioners enacts, that "there shall be in the government of the city of New York an additional department, to be called the department of public instruction" (Session Laws of 1871, vol. 2. p. 1244). Though this declaration is made, it must be seen whether the act makes the department in fact a part of the integral government of the municipal corporation as it purports. The defendant justly insists, that in reality this department is managed and controlled by a board of commissioners created by statute; that this defendant neither appoints, elects, nor can it control such board ; that it can neither continue nor remove such commissioner, nor can it hold them responsible for the manner in which they discharge their trust; nor do the duties of this board of commissioners relate to the exercise of the corporate powers of this defendant, nor are such duties for the peculiar benefit of this defendant, and that such commissioners are appointed by the mayor, simply in obedience to the statute, to perform a public service not peculiarly local or corporate, and are independant of this defendant as to the tenure of their office, and the manner of discharging their duties, and that the care and control of the schools of the city is a duty specifically imposed by statute on the board" of commissioners and not upon the defendant.
It is apparent that this department is in effect entirely independent of the city government, and that in its creation, and in the exercise of its powers and duties, it is the instrument of the state government. It would be manifestly unjust to subject a municipal corporation to liability for the negligences of the agents of the state government, in the course of the administration of their public duties, on behalf of the state. Especially would this be the-case where such agents are in every respect independent of the corporation.
In the mayor of Lynn v. Turner, Qowp. 86, Lord Mansfield considers, that a corporation may be bound by prescription or by the conditions and terms of their cn-ation or charter. The courts of this state also have held, that a municipal corporation is liable for misfeasance in respect to a duty imposed absolutely upon the corporation as such ; but they have also held, that the corporation is not liable for the misfeasance of one of its officers, in respect to a duty specifically imposed by statute on the officer (Martin v. Mayor, 1 Hill, 545 ; Lorillard v. Town of Monroe, 11 N. Y. 396; Bank of Commonwealth v. Mayor, 43 N. Y. 189 ; Levy v. Mayor, 1 Sandf. 465).
If the legislature had intended to make the defendant- liable for the negligences or omissions of this department of public instruction, which in itself was vested with the powers of a corporation on behalf of the state, it is to be presumed that they would have in some form expressed it. But no such expression or intimation occurs. Even if they had specifically attempted to impose such a liability upon the defendant, the question arises whether the legislature itself had this power. Yo such power is apparently conferred by the state constitution, and the courts have failed to recognize it. The existence of a liabilty on the part of the city for the misfeasance of officers over whom they have no control, and whose duties are to be performed as the representatives and for the purposes of the state government, would greatly add to the hazards and losses of the tax payers of the corporation.
The learned judge, at the trial, expressed his doubt as to whether his instruction to the jury, that the corporation of Yew York was liable for the negligence of the department of public instruction was correct. In the view here taken of the question there was error in that part of the charge.
The defendant being sustained in the exception that he thus took to the ruling of the court, it becomes unnecessary to consider the remaining exceptions, and there should be a judgment rendered for the defendant.
Speir, J., concurred.