Case Name: PEOPLE v. McCULLER
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 2006-06-13
Citations: 475 Mich. 176
Docket Number: Docket No. 128161
Parties: PEOPLE v McCULLER
Judges: Taylor, C.J., and Weaver, Corrigan, Young, and MARKMAN, JJ., concurred.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 475
Pages: 176–214

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v McCULLER
Docket No. 128161.
Decided June 13, 2006.
On application by the defendant for leave to appeal, the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, ordered oral argument on whether to grant the application or take other peremptory action. 474 Mich 925 (2005). Following oral argument, the Supreme Court entered a memorandum opinion affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeals with regard to the sentence imposed on the defendant and denying leave to appeal in all other respects.
Raymond A. McCuller was convicted by a jury in the Oakland Circuit Court, Richard D. Kuhn, J., of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder and was sentenced as a second-offense habitual offender within the guidelines range to two to 15 years in prison. The defendant appealed, alleging that he was entitled to an intermediate sanction because his prior record variable score alone placed him in a recommended minimum guidelines range of zero to 11 months. The defendant contended that the trial court violated Blakely v Washington, 542 US 296 (2004), by engaging in judicial fact-finding to score the offense variables, thereby allegedly increasing his maximum sentence from an intermediate sanction to a prison term. The Court of Appeals, Talbot, EJ., and Griffin and Wilder, JJ., affirmed in an unpublished opinion per curiam, issued January 11, 2005 (Docket No. 250000). The Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, ordered oral argument on whether to grant the defendant’s application for leave to appeal. 474 Mich 925 (2005).
In a memorandum opinion signed by Chief Justice Taylor and Justices Weaver, Corrigan, Young, and Markman, the Supreme Court held:
A sentencing court in an indeterminate sentencing scheme does not violate Blakely by engaging in fact-finding to determine the minimum term of a defendant’s indeterminate sentence unless the fact-finding increases the statutory maximum sentence to which the defendant had a legal right. Under MCL 769.34(4)(a) a defendant is not legally entitled to an intermediate sanction until after the offense variables have been scored and those offense variables, in conjunction with the prior record variables and the offense class, indicate that the upper limit of the defendant’s guidelines range is 18 months or less. A sentencing court does not violate Blakely by engaging in judicial fact-finding to score the offense variables to calculate the minimum recommended sentencing guidelines range, even when the defendant’s prior record variable score alone would have placed the defendant in an intermediate sanction cell. In this case, the defendant’s sentence must be affirmed because the properly scored sentencing guidelines range did not entitle the defendant to an intermediate sanction. In all other respects, the application for leave to appeal must be denied.
Sentence affirmed; leave to appeal denied in all other respects.
Justice Kelly, dissenting, would hold that the sentencing guidelines are unconstitutional as applied in this case and would remand the case to the trial court for resentencing. A defendant is entitled to a sentence based solely on the defendant’s prior convictions and any facts admitted by the defendant or specifically found by the juiy. If a defendant would be entitled to a sentence within an indeterminate sanction cell using only these factors, MCL 769.34(4)(a) sets the maximum sentence as the indeterminate sanction. The sentencing court must impose this maximum sentence. Subsequent judicial fact-finding by a preponderance of the evidence that raises the defendant’s sentence above the maximum, such as the fact-finding necessary to score the offense variables or to state substantial and compelling reasons to depart from the guidelines range, violates the Sixth Amendment and Blakely. Because severance of the offending portions of the guidelines is not possible, a bifurcated hearing system should be implemented that allows the jury to determine beyond a reasonable doubt the additional facts necessary to score the offense variables.
Justice Cavanagh, dissenting, agreed with the rationale and proposed result of Justice Kelly’s dissent concluding that the sentencing guidelines are unconstitutional as applied in this case, but disagreed with her proposed cure for the constitutional violation. A less burdensome approach that would protect defendants’ constitutional rights would be for the prosecution to charge the aggravating factors in the information and request a special jury verdict if the prosecution wants offense variable points assessed.
1. Criminal Law — Sentences.
Any fact, other than the fact of a prior conviction, that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum sentence must he submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt; the statutory maximum is the maximum sen tence a court may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the juiy verdict or admitted by the defendant; a sentencing court under an indeterminate sentencing scheme may engage in judicial fact-finding in order to impose a minimum term within the statutory range.
2. Criminal Law — Sentences.
MCL 777.21 requires a sentencing court to consider the offense variables, the prior record variables, and the offense class to determine a defendant’s recommended minimum guidelines range.
3. Criminal Law — Sentences.
A defendant is not entitled to an intermediate sanction under MCL 769.34(4)(a) until after the offense variables have been scored and those offense variables, in conjunction with the prior record variables and the offense class, indicate that the upper limit of the defendant’s guidelines range is 18 months or less.
Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, David G. Gorcyca, Prosecuting Attorney, Joyce F. Todd, Chief, Appellate Division, and Robert C. Williams, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
State Appellate Defender (by Desiree M. Ferguson) for the defendant.
Amici Curiae:
Kimberly Thomas for Criminal Defense Attorneys of Michigan.
Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Ron Franz, President, Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan, and William E. Molner, Assistant Attorney General, for the Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan.

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM. Defendant was convicted of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, MCL 750.84, following a jury trial. The properly scored recommended minimum sentence guidelines range for defendant's offense provided for a term of five to 28 months' imprisonment, thus placing defendant in a so-called "straddle cell." The trial court sentenced defendant within the guidelines range to two to 15 years of imprisonment. On appeal, defendant argues that because his prior record variable (PRV) score alone placed him in a recommended minimum guidelines range of zero to 11 months, he is entitled to an intermediate sanction. Defendant contends that the trial court violated Blakely v Washington, 542 US 296; 124 S Ct 2531; 159 L Ed 2d 403 (2004), by engaging injudicial fact-finding to score the offense variables (OVs), thereby allegedly increasing his maximum sentence from an intermediate sanction to a prison term. We reject defendant's and the dissent's contention and affirm defendant's sentence.
In Apprendi v New Jersey, 530 US 466, 490; 120 S Ct 2348; 147 L Ed 2d 435 (2000), the United States Supreme Court held that under the Sixth and Fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution, "[ojther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." In Blakely, supra at 303, the Court held that "the 'statutory maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant." (Emphasis deleted.) In regard to indeterminate sentencing schemes such as Michigan's, the Blakely Court reaffirmed that a sentencing court may engage in judicial fact-finding in order to impose a minimum term within the statutory range. See People v Drohan, 475 Mich 140; 715 NW2d 778 (2006). The Blakely Court explained:
Of course indeterminate schemes involve judicial fact-finding, in that a judge (like a parole board) may implicitly rule on those facts he deems important to the exercise of his sentencing discretion. But the facts do not pertain to whether the defendant has a legal right to a lesser sentence —and that makes all the difference insofar as judicial impingement upon the traditional role of the jury is concerned. [Blakely, supra at 309 (emphasis in original).]
Thus, a sentencing court in an indeterminate sentencing scheme does not violate Blakely by engaging in fact-finding to determine the minimum term of a defendant's indeterminate sentence unless the fact-finding increases the statutory maximum sentence to which the defendant had a legal right.
In Michigan, when the high end of the recommended minimum guidelines range is 18 months or less, MCL 769.34(4) (a) requires a sentencing court, absent articulation of substantial and compelling reasons, to impose an intermediate sanction, which may include a jail term of no more than 12 months:
If the upper limit of the recommended minimum sentence range for a defendant determined under the sentencing guidelines set forth in chapter XVII is 18 months or less, the court shall impose an intermediate sanction unless the court states on the record a substantial and compelling reason to sentence the individual to the jurisdiction of the department of corrections. An intermediate sanction may include a jail term that does not exceed the upper limit of the recommended minimum sentence range or 12 months, whichever is less. [Emphasis added.]
MCL 777.21 explicitly requires the court to consider the OVs, the PRVs, and the offense class to determine a defendant's recommended minimum guidelines range. Under our statutory scheme, a defendant has no legal right to have the minimum sentence calculated using only a fraction of the statutorily enumerated factors. Thus, under MCL 769.34(4)(a), a defendant is not legally entitled to an intermediate sanction until after the OVs have been scored and those OVs, in conjunction with the PRVs and the offense class, indicate that the upper limit of the defendant's guidelines range is 18 months or less. In other words, a defendant's legal right to an intermediate sanction arises from properly scored guidelines, including the scoring of the OVs. A sentencing court does not violate Blakely and its progeny by engaging in judicial fact-finding to score the OVs to calculate the minimum recommended sentencing guidelines range, even when the defendant's PRV score alone would have placed the defendant in an intermediate sanction cell.
In this case, properly scored guidelines placed defendant in a recommended minimum sentence range of five to 28 months in prison. This placed defendant in a "straddle cell," in which the trial court was permitted to choose between imposing an intermediate sanction or a prison term. MCL 769.34(4)(c). Thus, defendant faced a statutory maximum sentence of 15 years in prison for his conviction of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder as a second-offense habitual offender, MCL 750.84; MCL 769.10. Because the properly scored guidelines range did not entitle defendant to an intermediate sanction, the trial court did not violate Blakely by scoring the OVs before imposing a prison sentence within the guidelines. Accordingly, we affirm defendant's sentence.
In all other respects, defendant's application for leave to appeal is denied, because we are not persuaded that this Court should review the remaining questions presented.
Taylor, C.J., and Weaver, Corrigan, Young, and MARKMAN, JJ., concurred.
When a defendant is placed in a "straddle cell," the sentencing court has the option of imposing an intermediate sanction or a prison term. MCL 769.34(4)(c) provides:
If the upper limit of the recommended minimum sentence exceeds 18 months and the lower limit of the recommended minimum sentence is 12 months or less, the court shall sentence the offender as follows absent a departure:
(i) To imprisonment with a minimum term within that range.
(ii) To an intermediate sanction that may include a term of imprisonment of not more than 12 months.
When the upper limit of the guidelines range is 18 months or less, the sentencing court must impose an intermediate sanction. MCL 769.34(4)(a). An "intermediate sanction" can mean a number of things, but excludes a prison sentence. People v Stauffer, 465 Mich 633, 635; 640 NW2d 869 (2002); MCL 769.31(b).
MCL 777.21(1) provides:
For an offense enumerated in part 2 of this chapter, determine the recommended minimum sentence range as follows:
(a) Find the offense category for the offense from part 2 of this chapter. From section 22 of this chapter, determine the offense variables to be scored for that offense category and score only those offense variables for the offender as provided in part 4 of this chapter. Total those points to determine the offender's offense variable level.
(b) Score all prior record variables for the offender as provided in part 5 of this chapter. Total those points to determine the offender's prior record variable level.
(c) Find the offense class for the offense from part 2 of this chapter. Using the sentencing grid for that offense class in part 6 of this chapter, determine the recommended minimum sentence range from the intersection of the offender's offense variable level and prior record variable level. The recommended minimum sentence within a sentencing grid is shown as a range of months or life.
Contrary to the dissent's contention, our holding is consistent with Ring v Arizona, 536 US 584; 122 S Ct 2428; 153 L Ed 2d 556 (2002). In Ring the Court held that Arizona's sentencing scheme violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights where the sentencing court increased the defendant's statutory maximum sentence of life imprisonment to a death sentence on the basis of a judicial finding of aggravating factors. This case does not involve an increase of defendant's statutory maximum sentence on the basis of judicial findings. Instead, the trial court merely scored defendant's OVs before imposing a sentence within the statutory range.