Case Name: George J. SATTLER and Arthur H. Rude, Appellants, v. Reubin O'D. ASKEW, etc., et al., Appellees (two cases)
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1974-05-01
Citations: 295 So. 2d 289
Docket Number: Nos. 44110, 44217
Parties: George J. SATTLER and Arthur H. Rude, Appellants, v. Reubin O’D. ASKEW, etc., et al., Appellees (two cases).
Judges: ADKINS, C. J., and ROBERTS, ERVIN and BOYD, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 295
Pages: 289–294

Head Matter:
George J. SATTLER and Arthur H. Rude, Appellants, v. Reubin O’D. ASKEW, etc., et al., Appellees (two cases).
Nos. 44110, 44217.
Supreme Court of Florida.
May 1, 1974.
Rehearing Denied June 20, 1974 in No. 44110.
Charles Lavon Ward, Fort Lauderdale, for appellants.
Geoffrey B. Dobson and Betty Owen Stinson, Tallahassee, for appellees.

Opinion:
CARLTON (Retired), Justice:
This is an appeal from an order of the Circuit Court of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Broward County, which granted a motion to dismiss the class action complaint filed by appellants. This order ruled upon appellants' allegations that Florida Statutes, Sections 206.-41 (4) (a), 335.04, and 339.08, F.S.A. established an unconstitutional system for the statewide distribution of primary road funds and that this system was being unconstitutionally applied to the residents of Broward County; our jurisdiction there fore vests pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b) (1), Florida Constitution.
The complaint alleged that the method, established by the cited statutes and administered by the appellees, of expenditure of State funds for the construction and maintenance of the State's primary road and State Park road system violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 2, of the Florida Constitution, F.S.A. Specifically, the complaint alleged that Broward County residents were unconstitutionally discriminated against because, although the county is the second largest in the State in population and gasoline consumption, it ranks sixty-sixth out of the sixty-seven counties in miles of State highway per registered vehicle, sixty-first in miles of State road per square mile of area, sixty-sixth in miles of State road per person, and fifty-seventh in per capita construction expenditure.
The appellees filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, one ground therefor being that the complaint failed to state a cause of action. In granting the motion to dismiss, the trial court held:
"One needs only to motor throughout the State of Florida to realize that Broward County does not receive an equitable portion of primary road funds. The failure to equitably apportion primary road funds however does not give rise to an attack on the constitutionality of legislation or its application. The legislation under attack in this cause charges the Department of Transportation, among other things, with paying the cost of construction of the primary road and State park roa,d system, including amounts necessary to match federal aid funds for such purposes. All of the statutes look toward construction and maintenance of a highway system throughout the State, open to the use of all people of the State, and to all others having occasion to use the roads. All funds, from whatever source, are incorporated into an integral road system rendering each road more valuable than it would otherwise be if it were to stand alone. The State, through its legislative body, has the power to levy taxes for a recognized public purpose and to expend the monies received from such levy in a manner that will accomplish that purpose. That manner is to be determined by legislative judgment which in the instant case has been properly delegated to the Department of Transportation.
"In order to provide for an integral primary road system serving the whole State of Florida the legislature must have the prerogative to utilize its judgment in the allocation and distribution of funds collected through the State's power to levy taxes. Assuming all of the allegations within the Plaintiffs' Complaint to be true it cannot be said that -the legislative acts involved, or their application, are unconstitutional and viola-tive of the equal protection clause or the due process clause."
We are in agreement with the trial court that, although the expenditure of primary road funds within Broward County may be disproportionate, based upon area, population, number of registered vehicles, road needs, or any other criterion, the complaint, nevertheless, did not state a cause of action. We reach this conclusion because we perceive no constitutional or statutory right to a proportional expenditure of such funds, on any criteria, which is thereby being infringed.
After examining the relevant statutory provisions, we agree with the trial court that the State's primary road system was not designed to create separate road systems within each county for the sole use, enjoyment, and benefit of the county's residents. Rather, it is the intent of the statutes to establish a safe and efficient statewide system of primary roads for the use, benefit, and enjoyment of all of the State's citizens, wherever they reside and wherever they may travel within the State. A greater per capita expenditure of road funds in Florida's northern counties, for example, directly benefits the residents of the southern counties, not only because these roads are equally available to the southern county residents for their use, but also because they are necessary to encourage the tourist industry so vital to South Florida.
Therefore, since we are of the opinion that the expenditure of primary road funds anywhere in the State equally benefits all State residents, wherever they are situated, and since we 'do not believe that counties — or their residents — have any right to have a particular proportion of these funds expended within their borders, we conclude that neither the system itself nor its application violates in any way the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The order of the trial court dismissing the complaint is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
ADKINS, C. J., and ROBERTS, ERVIN and BOYD, JJ., concur.
ERVIN, J., concurring specially with opinion.
BOYD, J., concurring specially with opinion.
McCAIN, J., dissents with opinion.
DEKLE, J., dissents and concurs with McCAIN, J.