Case Name: Richard Francis vs. Mrs. Marie Louise Martin, Widow of Robert Johnson, et al.
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1876-04
Citations: 28 La. Ann. 403
Docket Number: No. 5524
Parties: Richard Francis vs. Mrs. Marie Louise Martin, Widow of Robert Johnson, et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Louisiana Annual Reports
Volume: 28
Pages: 403–412

Head Matter:
No. 5524.
Richard Francis vs. Mrs. Marie Louise Martin, Widow of Robert Johnson, et al.
The judgment appealed from Is one rendered upon confirmation of a default. The judgment was rendered on the twentieth of November, 1871, and was signed tho same day, that being tho last day of court. Notice of judgment was issued on the first of December following, and was served on the seventh. Application for an appeal was mado on the tenth of December, three days after the notice of judgment was served. This was within tho delay granted by the law.
It is contended in support of the motion to dism iss, that it must be governed by the proviso appended to article 575, Code of Practice. But the whole of tho article relied on must be taken together, and from the whole of the article it is apparent that the ten days commence to run from the day the judgment has been notified to the party east.
It is urged that tho article in Question should read, “ whenever no answer has been filed,” instead of “whenever an answer has been filed;” but no reason can bo seen for changing tho whole force of the article.
Tho decision in the ease oí Lazarre vs. Snow, 1 R., p. 60, is authority, it is true, for supporting the position that “ the period after the lapse of which no appeal will lie is to be computed from tho day when the judgment was signed, not from that on which it was notified to the party against whom it was given.” It would control tho court were tho law now what it was when that case was doeidod. But tho law has been changed. This decision was rendered in 1841. The statute changing tho 1 aw was passed in 1843.
A married woman is sued on an obligation due by her alone; judgment is asked against her alone, and her husband is cited to authorize her to appear and defend the suit,and no appearance is made either by the wife or the husband, and, after proper sorvieo of the petition on each, no judgment by default has been taken against the husband, and no authorization from tho judge was given or asked for to enable her to defend the suit. To complete the statement, it must be addod that the wife in this ease was sued as the wife of Ragas, that she was cited . as his wife, that judgment by default was entered up against her as his wife, and that the default was made flnal against her as his wife. The Question whether said judgment is flnal must be answered affirmatively.
Legal notice of a suit against the wifo (said wife being cited) having boon served upon tho husband is sufficient to bring her properly into court. Tho notice of the suit to the husband is sufficient, if he makes no objection, to allow her to stand in judgment. If ho has not come into court and has not authorized.his wife to make defense, it must be considered that he thought there was none to make, and, under these circumstances, to obtain an order from the judge authorizing her to stand in judgment would be a useless formality. She is in court from tho fact that the suit is brought against her. her husband being cited to authorize her. Being in court, proceedings may then be carried on against her in tho same manner as they are against other defendants. If she does not answer, default may bo taken against her. If the default, when taken, is not regularly set aside, it may be confirmed.
The error assigned, that the judgment was rendered against the defendant without a judgment having been rendered at the same time against the widow in community of the surety, is not established. All tho parties to the suit are sought to be made liable in solido. It is as though separate suits had been instituted against them all, and judgment could have been rendered against each of them, or all of them, or one of them alone. With the effect of the judgment against the co-defendants, the plaintiff had nothing to do. If he sues-a number of persons and seeks judgment against each of them in solido, and judgment is rendered only against one and he is satisfied, the defendant who is alone condemned can not complain of the judgment in so far as he is concerned. The defendant’s rights as against his co-obligors are separate and distinct from the plaintiff’s rights against him.
'The third error assigned, that the bond sued on is not conditioned according to law, can not be maintained for the reasons given in the judgment.
The security on the bond was Robert Johnson. He died leaving a widow in community and several children (defendants herein), who were put in possession of his estate. The widow and children wore sued. Pending the suit, tho widow died, and the proceedings were carried on and completed against tho eliildron, the succession of the mother apparently not having been opened.
If the Question was between the original parties to the bond — principal and surety— the conclusion would be that thoy were both bound in solido. But the parties before the court are the heirs of tho surety. .As to them the obligation is joint; they inherit the rights, credits, and obligations of their ancestor, but as the rights and credits of their ancestor are distributed among them, each according to his share, so are the obligations, each being bound for his proportion. The position which they assume, that they were bound for one-half of the obligation, because their mother was put in possession of one-half of the estate of their father, is untenable. The obligation was an obligation of the community. It was duo by the father. There was no succession to divide until the community debt was paid. As heirs of their father, they are responsible for his obligations, they having been put in possession of their share of his estate.
A PPEAL from the Second Judicial District Court, parish of Plaque-mines. Pardee, J.
C. Howard Me Caleb, for plaintiff and appellee.
Sambola & Dacros, for defendants and appellants.

Opinion:
ON Motion to Dismiss.
Moegan, J.
Appellee moves to dismiss this appeal on the grounds—
First — That a suspensive, appeal was illegally granted.
Second — Because the appeal was not applied for within the delays allowed by law.
Third — Because the application for an appeal was granted after the expiration of more than ten days after the adjournment of the court by which the judgment was rendered.
The first ground need not be noticed, as the alleged illegality of the application and order of appeal are contained in the second and third grounds.
The second and third grounds may be considered together.
The judgment appealed from is one rendered upon confirmation of a default.
The judgment was rendered on the twentieth of November, 1874, and was signed the same day, that being the last day of court.
Notice of judgment was issued on the first of December following, and was served on the seventh.
Application for an appeal was made on the tenth of December, three days after the notice of judgment was served.
This was within the delays granted by the law. Taylor vs. Woodward, 25 An. 212. Riley vs. Howell, lately decided.
Counsel for appellee contends that his case is governed by the proviso appended to article 575, O. P., which says that " in the country parishes no execution shall issue in eases where an appeal lies, until ten days after the adjournment of the court by which the judgment was rendered, within which delay a party may take a suspensive appeal on filing petition and appeal bond, as now provided by law." But the whole of the article relied on must be taken together. Now, one part of the article declares that " whenever an answer has been filed in a suit in which the defendant has had personal service made upon him to appear and file his answer, or when a'judgment has been rendered in a ease after answer filed by the defendant, or by his counsel, the party cast in the suit shall be considered duly notified of the judgment by the fact of its being signed by the judge," and this precedes the proviso relied upon. From the whole of the article it is, we think, apparent that the ten days commence to run from the day the judgment has been notified to the party cast.
It is urged upon us that the article in question should read " when ever no answer has been filod," etc., instead of " whenever an answer has been filed," but we see no reason for thus changing the whole force of the article.
It is also pressed upon us that the case of Lazarre vs. Snow, 1 R., p. 60, is authority for supporting the position that " the period after the lapse of which no appeal will lie is to be computed from the day when the judgment was signed, not from that on which it was notified to the party against whom it was given." The decision quoted does decide in that way, and it would probably control us were the law now what it. was when that case was decided. But the law has been changed. This decision was rendered in 1841. The statute changing the law was passed in 1843.
The motion to dismiss is refused.