Case Name: Robert A. WHITE a/k/a Robert A. White, Appellant, v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee
Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1999-08-03
Citations: 751 So. 2d 481
Docket Number: No. 1998-CA-00980-COA
Parties: Robert A. WHITE a/k/a Robert A. White, Appellant, v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
Judges: KING, P.J., AND DIAZ, J„ CONCUR.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 751
Pages: 481–489

Head Matter:
Robert A. WHITE a/k/a Robert A. White, Appellant, v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
No. 1998-CA-00980-COA.
Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
Aug. 3, 1999.
P. Shawn Harris, Lake, Attorney for Appellant.
Office of the Attorney General by Pat S. Flynn, Attorney for Appellee.

Opinion:
IRVING, J.,
for the Court:
¶ 1. Robert White entered a plea of guilty to the charge of "fondling" and was sentenced to a term of ten years and ordered to undergo counseling. White filed a motion for post-conviction relief in the Circuit Court of Lamar County on the basis that his attorneys incorrectly informed him on parole eligibility. The motion was denied. Aggrieved, White now appeals the denial of his motion for post-conviction relief. White presents one issue for review and resolution which is quoted verbatim from his brief:
The court erred by not granting the Appellant an evidentiary hearing on his motion Post Conviction Relief after evidence of mistaken advise [sic] of the Petitioner[']s Counsel was presented regarding false information that the petitioner would be eligible for parole at the time he was sentenced.
FACTS
¶ 2. White was indicted for sexual battery against his stepdaughter on February 28, 1996. The indictment stated that the act was ongoing over a period of years with the most recent incident occurring during the month of September 1995. White agreed to plead guilty, and in exchange for his plea, the district attorney reduced the charge from sexual battery to child molestation (fondling). On October 21, 1996, White entered a plea of guilty to "fondling." On October 30, 1997, White filed a motion for post-conviction relief in the Circuit Court of Lamar County. White alleged that he did not learn until after he was incarcerated that he had received incorrect information from his attorneys. He alleges that he was unaware that Miss.Code Ann. § 47-7-3 (Supp.1998) was amended in July of 1995 and now requires anyone who commits a sex crime to serve the entire sentence without eligibility for parole. White further alleged that his attorneys informed him that he would be eligible for parole after serving 25% of his sentence since some of the acts he pleaded guilty to occurred prior to the amending of the statute. White stated in his motion for post-conviction relief, and argues here, that had he known he would have to serve the entire term of his sentence, he would not have pled guilty.
¶ 3. The trial judge entered an order directing the attorneys who represented White at the plea hearing to submit affidavits in response to White's motion. In their affidavits, the attorneys denied giving any specific information on parole eligibility, but admitted that they did not advise White of parole ineligibility. The circuit court denied White's motion for post-conviction relief -without conducting an eviden-tiary hearing on the merits of the motion. The denial was based on the record, the petition and the affidavits submitted by both White and the attorneys.
DISCUSSION
¶ 4. A petitioner is entitled to an in-court opportunity to prove his claims if the claims are procedurally alive and show a substantial denial of a state or federal right. Washington v. State, 620 So.2d 966, 967 (Miss.1993); see Mississippi Uniform Post Conviction Collateral Relief Act, Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-1 through 99-39-29 (Supp.1998). Accordingly, we must determine whether White was entitled to an evidentiary hearing.
¶ 5. The Mississippi Supreme Court has previously stated that:
[b]efore a person may plead guilty to a felony, he must be informed of his rights, the nature and consequences of the act he contemplates, and any other relevant facts and circumstances, and thereafter, voluntarily enter the plea.
Vittitoe v. State, 556 So.2d 1062, 1063 (Miss.1990).
¶ 6. The quality of advice from counsel has been considered in determining whether a plea has been entered into voluntarily. Washington, 620 So.2d at 967; Vittitoe, 556 So.2d at 1065. Mistaken advice of counsel may also vitiate a guilty plea in some cases. Myers v. State, 583 So.2d 174, 177 (Miss.1991).
¶ 7. White argues that his attorneys provided him with erroneous information on parole eligibility, thereby causing him to involuntarily enter a guilty plea. The Mississippi Supreme Court has acknowledged that parole eligibility is a consequence in which attorneys should advise their clients in order to enter a voluntary plea. See Washington, 620 So.2d at 967; Alexander v. State, 605 So.2d 1170, 1172 (Miss.1992); Coleman v. State, 483 So.2d 680, 683 (Miss.1986). The court in Washington held that the appellant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the basis of his contention that he did not voluntarily enter a guilty plea because of his reliance on his attorneys advice regarding the possibility of parole. Washington, 620 So.2d at 967. Washington was sentenced to a ten-year mandatory period before he would be eligible for parole. Id. at 966. He alleged that his attorney led him to believe that he would be eligible for parole in six years and three months. Id. Washington further alleged that he did not learn of the required mandatory sentence until after incarceration. Washington, 620 So.2d at 967. The State argued that the misinformation regarding parole eligibility could not have induced Washington to enter a guilty plea. Id. at 969. The State further argued that the mandatory ten years to be served was not a "consequence" of which Washington needed to be informed of in order to plead voluntarily. Id. The court held that Washington should have been given a chance to present his claim at a hearing. Id. Additionally, the court stated that the
issue is not whether Washington was sufficiently advised on his parole eligibility, but whether he was apprised of the mandatory sentence without parole consideration.
Id. (emphasis added)
¶ 8. While Washington involved a mandatory sentence issue, we see no reason to make a distinction between it and the case sub judice where the issue is sentencing without the possibility for parole. Just as the court in Washington concluded that the defendant was entitled to an evidentia-ry hearing, we likewise conclude that White is entitled to one. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's dismissal of the post-conviction motion without an eviden-tiary hearing and remand for such a hear ing to determine the merits of White's allegations.
¶ 9. THE JUDGMENT OF THE LAMAR COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT OF DENIAL OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IS REVERSED AND REMANDED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO LAMAR COUNTY.
KING, P.J., AND DIAZ, J" CONCUR.
SOUTHWICK, P.J., CONCURS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY McMILLIN, C.J.
LEE, J. DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY BRIDGES, PAYNE, AND THOMAS, JJ.
MOORE, J" NOT PARTICIPATING.