Case Name: Mary Laughlin v. The Street Railway Company of Grand Rapids
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1886-07-01
Citations: 62 Mich. 220
Docket Number: 
Parties: Mary Laughlin v. The Street Railway Company of Grand Rapids.
Judges: Sherwood, J., concurred. Champlin, J., concurred in the result'.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 62
Pages: 220–235

Head Matter:
Mary Laughlin v. The Street Railway Company of Grand Rapids.
Negligence — Of street railway company — Established by proof that snow falling during the winter was thrown up beside track, and packed down, so as to leave a depression at the track, at a street crossing, of from six to ten inches, with a short slops downward — In suit for injuries sustained by ■ upsetting of cutter at such crossing — Testimony as to condition of road may be confined to the immediate vicinity of the accident — Competent to allow eye-witnesses who are familiar with driving to give their opinion concerning safety of crossing — Deala/ration in such a case — Alleging dislocation of plaintiff’s shoulder and consequent suffering, and other invisible and internal ailments — Should not be held to any technicality of construction — Examination of plaintiff by medical witnesses— Who testify for defendant regarding parrticular ailments described in declaration— Physicians present at such examination on behalf of plaintiff — May testify to the particulars in which, in their opinion, defendant’s witnesses failed to make proper or full examination — No opinion can prevail over facts — Opinions of experts admissible concerning the scientific probability of certain consequences from, particular fads — And scientific probability of their concurrence — Neither science nor witnesses infallible — If facts shown to exist to satisfaction of jury, they must act upon them — Contributory negligence — Party, in proper use of highway, who sought to cross railway at said crossing as directly as seemed practicable — The place being one where an impracticable crossing would be an unlawful obstruction of a public way — And it being habitually crossed, although requiring some care in so doing— Whose cutter was overturned to his personal injury — In absence of proof of carelessness on his part, is a question for the jury.
1. Where, in a suit against a street railway company for personal injuries caused by the upsetting of a cutter while crossing defendant’s track, the testimony for the plaintiff, if believed, showed that the snow which had fallen during the winter had been thrown up beside the track, and trampled or packed down, so as to leave a depression at the track, at a street crossing, of from sis to ten inches or more, with a short slope downward; and that plaintiff’s husband, who was driving, finding it necessary to cross the track at this point, turned the horse so as to cross it as nearly as he could at right angles, but the sleigh, on making the descent, tipped over to the left and threw plaintiff out, her husband being thrown upon her, dislocating belief t arm,—
Heli, that defendant’s negligence was made out, and came within Bowen v. Detroit City By. Co., 54 Mich. 496, and Wallace v. Same, 58 Id. 231.
2. In such a case it is not. error to confine the testimony of both parties,. as to tlie condition of the road, to the immediate vicinity of the accident.
3. In a suit against a street railway company involving the safety of a street crossing, which it was its duty to prevent being made dangerous for travel, it is competent to allow persons familiar with driving to give their opinion, as eye-witnesses, concerning the safety of such-crossing. (Morse, J., dissenting; see page 229 of opinion.)
4. No amount of description can enable a jury to see a place as witnesses saw it, and while they must describe the place as well as they can, it is always competent for those who are familiar with highways, and their use, to give their impressions received at the time concerning the safety or convenience of passage, and other conditions of an analogous nature. They are not strictly scientific questions, and come within familiar principles. Evans v. People, 12 Mich. 27; Beau-Men r. Cicotte, Id. 459; Detroit <9 M. B. B. Co. v. Van Stéinburg, 17 Id. 99; Underwood v. Waldron, 33 Id. 232; Elliott v. Van Burén, Id. 49; Pettibone v. Smith, 37 Id. 579; lluizega v. Cutler <& S. L. Co., 51 Id. 272.
5. A declaration for personal injuries sustained by reason of defendant’s-alleged negligence, consisting of the dislocation of plaintiff’s shoulder, and alleging consequent suffering and other invisible and internal ailments, should not be held to any technicality of construction. The injury which is visible and open to common observation may be described and tested easily, and should be described reasonably. But the internal and invisible ailments, which are only inferred from 'scientific deduction, and on which there is always room for some-difference of opinion, cannot be held to so close a rule, and there i-s-no reason why they should be.
6. Where medical witnesses testify on behalf of a defendant, in a suit for injuries sustained, as alleged, through its negligence, to an examination of the person of plaintiff with reference to the particular-ailments named in the declaration,—
Held, that physicians who were present at such examination, on behalf of plaintiff, should be allowed to testify to the particulars in which, in their opinion, the defendant’s medical witnesses failed to make proper or full examinations.
7. No opinion can prevail over facts. The opinions of experts are admissible concerning the scientific probability of certain consequences from particular facts, and the scientific probability of their concurrence. But neither science nor witnesses can be held infallible; and when facts are shown to the satisfaction of a jury to exist, they must act upon them.
8. Where a street railway company allowed the snow which had fallen during the season to be thrown up beside the track, and packed down, so as to leave a depression at the track, at a street crossing, of from six to ten inches or more, with a sharp slope downward; and a party who was in the proper use of the highway sought to cross the railway track at such crossing as directly as seemed practicable, and the cutter was overturned and the occupant injured; and it further appearing that the place was one where an impracticable crossing would have been an unlawful obstruction of a public way, and that it was being crossed habitually, although requiring some care in so doing:—
Held, that, in the absence of proof that the injured party acted in a careléss manner in making the crossing, the question of his contributory negligence was for the jury.
Error to superior court of Grand Eapids. (Parrish, J.)
Argued June 17, 1886.
Decided July 1, 1886.
Case. Plaintiff brings error.
Eeversed.
The facts are stated in the opinion and head-notes.
Mitchel db McG-arry and Peter Doran, for appellant:
Every person having occasion to use the public streets for the purpose of travel or passage is entitled to feel absolutely safe, while exercising ordinary care, against all accidents arising from obstructions in the street; and no one has the riglit, without special authority, to materially obstruct it or render its ordinary use dangerous. The rights of the railway are subject, not paramount, to the rights of the people : Bowen v. Detroit City Ry. Co., 54 Mich. 496-500; Wallace v. Detroit City Ry. Co., 58 Id. 231; Dixon v. Brooklyn City & N. R. R. Co., 100 N. Y. 170.
Contributory negligence cannot be conclusively established by a state of facts upon which fair-minded men may well differ. The inferences to be drawn from the evidence must be certain and uncontrovertible, or a jury, and not the •court, must decide them : D. & M. R. R. Co. v. Van Steinburg, 17 Mich. 123; Lincoln v. Gillilan, 18 Neb. 114; Leavitt v. C. & N. W. R. R. Co., 64 Wis. 228.
Edward W. Withey, for defendant;
Plaintiff was responsible for the negligence of her husband in driving ; his negligence was her negligence : L. S. & M. S. R. R. Co. v. Miller, 25 Mich. 277; Abernethy v. Van Buren, 52 Id. 383.
Plaintiff must show herself free from contributory negligence to entitle her to recover ; and if the undisputed testimony shows that her carelessness contributed to the accident, there is nothing to submit to a jury, and the court should ■direct a verdict in defendant’s favor as a matter of law: Pzolla v. M. C. R. R. Co., 54 Mich. 273; Hutchins v. Priestly Express Wagon & Sleigh Co., 61 Id. 252.
Even though the defendant obstructed the highway, if the plaintiff saw the danger and might easily have avoided it, but nevertheless drove into it, she cannot recover: Butterfeld v. Forrester, 11 East, 60; City of Centralia v. Krouse, 64 Ill. 23; Lovenguth v. City of Bloomington, 71 Id. 238; Wood v. Village of Andes, 11 Hun, 513; Horton v. Inhabitants of Ipswich, 12 Cush. 188; Wilson v. City of Charlestown, 8 Allen, 137; Durkin v. City of Troy, 61 Barb. 437; Schaefler v. Sandusky, 33 Ohio St. 216; City of Erie v. Magill, 101 Penn. St. 616.
“Where an obstruction is in the street in plain view of the driver of a vehicle, and his attention is in no manner diverted so as to excuse him for not seeing the obstruction, and he drives aginast it or into it, he is clearly guilty of contributing proxvmately to any injury which may result: Yahn v. City of Ottumwa, 60 Iowa, 429; Folsom v. Underhill, 36 Vt. 580; McLaury v. McGregor, 54 Iowa, 717; Parkhill v. Brighton, 61 Id. 103; Bloomington v. Read, 2 Ill. App. 512; Macomb v. Smithers, 6 Id. 170.
There is a fatal variance between the allegations of the declaration and the proofs. If a plaintiff describe with minuteness the injury, and means adopted in effecting it, and the truth substantially vary from. such statement, the variance is fatal: 1 Saunders on PI. & Ev. 739 ; 1 Chitty on PI. 107.
For cases illustrating this rule, see Kroll v. Estate of Ten Eyek, 48 Mich. 230; Batterson v. C. & G. T. Ry. Co., 49 Id. 184; F. & P. M. Ry. Co. v. Stark, 38 Id. 714-19; M. H. & O. R. R. Co. v. Marcott, 41 Id. 433; Macumber v. White River, etc., Co., 52 Id. 195; Williamson v. Haskell, 50 Id. 364; Abernathy v. Van Buren, 52 Id. 386; Bloomington v. Goodrich, 88 Ill. 558; Moss v. Johnson, 22 Id. 633; Lund v. Tyngsboro, 11 Cush. 563; Shaw v. Boston, etc., R. R. Co., 8 Gray, 45.
General words of exemption, when used after a designation of specific exemptions and risks, will be presumed to-include only those of a similar character: Hawkins, v. G. W. R. R. Co., 17 Mich. 57.; In re the Estate of Ticknor, 13 Id. 44; McDade v. People, 29 Id. 50; Brooks v. Cook, 44 Id. 617.
“Words of specification draw into the same- class those general terms which are superadded to attain the end without further prolixity Macumber v. White River Log, etc., Co., 52 Mich. 196.
James H. Hoyt, for defendant.
[Brief discusses substantially the same propositions as that of Mr. Withey. — Reporter.]
The declaration averred that plaintiff was “greatly hurt, cut,bruised, and wounded, and sustained a dislocation of the head .of the humerus-into the left armpit, and an injury of the brachial plexus of nerves, causing a partial paralysis of sensation and motion of the left arm, and became sick, sore, lame, and disordered; and from thence hitherto has-continued to suffer, and does now suffer, great pain, and was, and from thence hitherto has been, and still is, permanently deprived of the use of her said arm,, and has been and is greatly enfeebled in health, body,, and mind, and was by the said premises permanently injured and damaged in body and limb, and greatly injured in health; and by reason, thereof became and is unable to care for her family and superintend her liousehold duties and attend to her ordinary duties in that behalf.”
See “Negligence,” 59 Mich. 679; 60 Id. 694; 61 Id. 693.

Opinion:
Campbell, O. J.
Plaintiff sued for personal injuries caused by the upsetting of a cutter while crossing defendant's track, the cause of the accident alleged being the continued existence of a hard and slippery ridge left by defendant by the side of its track, and making the crossing-dangerous. The court below directed a- verdict for the-defendant on account of contributory negligence. Defendant now insists that, whether or not this defense is clearly made out, there is enough in the record to support the ruling, because no negligence appears in defendant, and because-the injury suffered by plaintiff, if any, was not the same-alleged in the declaration.
Plaintiff alleges a good many errors in- the reception and' rejection of testimony, in addition to- the- vital question whether the case should have been taken from the jury.-. We do not think it worth while to- dwell! on all of these-points, although some of them are nnd'onbtedly well taken. The record indicates, on both sides, an amount of objecting and debating on interlocutory questions much beyond ordinary practice, and prolonging and confusing the trial, and we can hardly suppose such a state of things will be exhibited again. The issues were not complicated, and the debates on small points take up altogether too large a part of the record of the trial for the proper disposition of the controversy.
The claim of plaintiff is that upon the twenty-ninth of February, 1884, not far from 9 o'clock in the morning, she, with her husband, was going in a sleigh down Fulton street, towards the railway station, and, at the junction of Park and Monroe streets, had to cross the track, which there turned upon Monroe street, with a switch at the curve. The horse was a steady one, going previously at a walk. She claims that the snow which had fallen along through the season had been thrown up beside the track, and trampled or packed down, so as to leave a depression at the track of from six to ten inches or more, with a sharp slope downward.
Finding it necessary to cross the track, her husband turned the horse so as to cross as nearly as he could at right angles, but the sleigh, in making the descent, tipped over, to the left, and threw her out, her husband being thrown upon her, and her left arm was dislocated. She claims that in consequence of the- injury the shoulder and arm have been affected painfully-ever since, and more or less weakened.
Defendant claimed that there was no negligent disposition of the snow; that the accident came from careless driving over the track, and that the alleged injuries were fictitious and the proof variant.
If the testimony of the plaintiff and her husband, and several other witnesses, on the subject, was true, the defendant's negligence was made out, and came within Bowen v. Detroit City Ry. Co., 54 Mich. 496, and Wallace v. Same, 58 Id. 231, cited on the argument. The court below did not allow any testimony of the condition of the road away from the immediate vicinity of the accident. As the testimony, if believed, indicated a condition of things of some duration, and not a fall of snow too near the time of the accident to relieve the defendant from fault for not removing it sooner, we do not see that any harm was done by confining the inquiry, if the same rule had been applied to both parties. But it was not.
It, was the duty of defendant to see that nothing was allowed to make crossing dangerous at that point, where otherwise both Fulton and Park streets would have been rendei'ed perilous to persons on lawrful business. There was sufficient proof of fault, and we do not gather from the record that the court below thought otherwise. But we think it was error to refuse to allow persons familiar with driving to give their opinion, as eye-witnesses, concerning the safety of the crossing.
No amount of description can enable a jury to see the place ás the witnesses'saw it; and, while witnesses must describe the place as well as they can, it is always competent for those who are familiar with the highways, and their use, to give their impressions received at the time concerning safety or convenience of passage, and other conditions of an analogous nature. They are not strictly scientific questions, •and come within familiar principles : Evans v. People, 12 Mich. 27; Beaubien v. Cicotte, Id. 459; Detroit & M. R. R. Co. v. Van Steinburg, 17 Id. 99; Underwood v. Waldron, 33 Id. 232; Elliott v. Van Buren, Id. 49, and.note; Pettibone v. Smith, 37 Id. 579; Huizega v. Cutler & S. L. Co., 51 Id. 272.
Ve do not think there is any force in the claim that the testimony of injury and suffering is fatally variant from the declaration. The injury is sufficiently described as a dislocation of the shoulder, caused by the accident, and also consequent suffering. That much, at least, is distinctly enough alleged. The question whether the dislocation threw the head of the bone into the armpit, or under the shoulder-blade or collar-bone, or elsewhere, was in itself of no sort of consequence, and the conflicting testimony of the medical witnesses shows that it could not be determined except by the medical observer before it was set, and he did not re member. The plaintiff herself is the only person who could describe her actual suffering. Every one else must, to some extent, prove it by her appearance and declarations of present sensation.
There was testimony of her physicians corroborating her story by their own observations of her personal appearance, and testimony from all the physicians that observations made with the aid of personal explanations must always be more satisfactory than those made without them, if they are consistent with appearances. There 'was medical testimony, and plaintiff's own testimony, which corresponded sufficiently with the minute statements of the declaration concerning the specific injuries and consequences to authorize the jury to find them established, and the court could not have selected particular medical witnesses as most worthy of credit, had it seen fit to do so, which we do not find it did.
But we do not think a declaration in such a case as this should be held to any technicality of construction. The injury which is visible and open to common observation may be described and tested easily, and should be described reasonably. But the internal and invisible ailments, which are only inferred from scientific deduction, and on which there is always room for some difference of opinion, cannot be held fo so close a rule, and there is no reason why they should be. There is no danger that the defendant in such a case as this will be taken by surprise, for any permanent or temporary mischief likely to arise from injuries such as were originally received can be understood and anticipated on one side as well as on both sides, who seem to have had no hesitation concerning their respective theories, although they were not in harmony.
In our opinion, the plaintiff should have been allowed to show, by her medical witnesses, who were present, the particulars in which, in their opinion, the defendant's medical witnesses failed to make proper or full examinations. This was itself chiefly a medical question, and inferences drawn, from impei'fect examinations must be of inferior value. This was the more important because those witnesses had taken the grave responsibility of assuming that the plaintiff was shamming, and appear to have confined their observations to the-particular ailments named in the declaration. If the plaintiff suffered pain and ineon venienee, she was entitled to> recover for it, whether scientifically described or not; and if the jury believed her statements, and if they were actually true, the-fault would have been in the deductions of the- witnesses-.
No opinion can prevail over actual facts. The opinions of experts are admissible concerning the scientific probability of certain consequences from particular facts, and the scientific probability of their concurrence. But neither science-nor witnesses can be held infallible; and when facts are-shown to the satisfaction of a jury to exist, they must act upon them. It does not follow, because particular physical ailments are not established, that there is no pain, or that it does not indicate something else, known or unknown.
We do not think there was any such proof of contributory negligence as to authorize the court to take the- case from the jury. The parties were in the use of the highway upon a proper errand, and unless the crossing was in such a condition as to make it reckless to attempt to drive over it,, there was no wrong in doing so. It was at a place where an impracticable crossing would have been an unlawful obstruction of a public way, and there is abundant evidence to show that it was crossed habitually, although requiring some care in doing it. Plaintiff's husband is shown, by several eyewitnesses, to have crossed it as directly as seemed practicar ble, and unless he was shown to have done so in a careless way he was not at fault. All of plaintiff's testimony showed at least ordinary care, and the question was therefore one for the jury.
The judgment must be reversed, with costs, and a new trial granted.
Sherwood, J., concurred. Champlin, J., concurred in the result'.