Case Name: Campbell & Son v. William G. Lane & Co.
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1860-10
Citations: 25 Supp. Tex. 93
Docket Number: 
Parties: Campbell & Son v. William G. Lane & Co.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 25 Supp.
Pages: 93–96

Head Matter:
Campbell & Son v. William G. Lane & Co.
A note between merchant and merchant was entitled to three days of grace, under the act of 20th March, 1848, which read, “ Three days of grace shall be allowed on all bills of exchange and promissory notes assignable and negotiable by law; Provided, That the 4th, 5th, and 6th sections of this act shall.extend only to contracts between merchant and merchant, their factors and agents.” (Hart. Dig., Art. 2533; O. & W. Dig., Art. 99; Paschal’s Dig., p. 151, Note 295.)
When a bill is drawn payable so many months after date, the computation is made by the calendar, and (without counting the days of grace) the bill will become due on the day of the month corresponding with the day of grace.
If suit be brought on the day of maturity, no cause of action has accrued, and it will be dismissed.
[Note.—For the different rulings on the subject, see Paschal’s Annotated Dig., Art. 234, Note 295, p. 151.]
■ Error from G-uadaloupe. The case was tried before Hon. A. "W. Terrell, one of the district judges.
The suit was brought upon the 1st of October, 1858, upon a note in these words:
“$1,000. Seguin, Nov. 1, 1857.
“Eleven months after date, we or either of us, the subscribers, of Seguin, State of Texas, promise to pay to the order of Wm. G. Lane & Co. one thousand dollars, value received, at the office of Campbell & Son, with current exchange on Hew York, and all expenses of collection in ease of suit, with ten per cent, interest from date till paid.
“Ho. —, due 4 Oct., 1858.
“ Campbell & Son,
“Andrew Herron, Security.”
The defendants failing to appear, judgment was rendered by default. The plaintiff prosecuted error, and assigned for error a technical objection to the service; and also, that the suit was brought before the cause of action accrued.
The defendant in error suggested delay, which opened all objections apparent upon the record. (Paschal’s Dig., p. 390, Hote 612.)
' J. J. Thornton, for plaintiffs in error.
—“In computing the time when bills and notes, payable a certain number of days, months, or years after date, become due, the rule is, to exclude the day of the date from the calculation, and include the day of payment.” (Edwards on Bills and Promissory Notes, p. 514; Chitty on Bills, p. 264; Hartford Bank v. Barry, 17 Mass. Rep., 94; Henry v. Jones, 8 Mass. Rep., 453; Ripley v. Greenleaf, 2 Vt. Rep., 129.) The note in this case, then, being dated on the 1st day of Hovember, 1857, payable eleven months after date, fell due on the 1st day of October, 1858. The rule, as set•tled in the case of Osborn v. Moncure, 3 Wend., 170, is, that the makers of a promissory note have until the last instant of the day on which it falls due in which to make the payment. (See also Hopping v. Quinn, 12 Wend., 517; Thomas v. Shoemaker, 6 Watts & Serg., 179; also, Edwards on Bills and Promissory Notes, 525 to 527, where the whole question is reviewed.)
This suit having been instituted before expiration of the credit agreed upon in the note, and before any right of action on the note had accrued to the defendants in error, yet, inasmuch as the note was due at and before the time of the rendition of the judgment of the District Court, can that judgment for that reason be held to be valid? I think most clearly not. The defendants in error could only maintain their action upon a breach of the promise contained in the note, and that breach must have been made; and a right of action against the plaintiff in error must have subsisted at the time of the institution of the suit. Nothing which may afterwards happen, and which is not alleged in the petition, can be inquired into by the court; and the rights of the defendants in error to maintain their suit must rest upon the legal cause of complaint as it existed at the time of the institution of the suit. If they had no good cause of action against the plaintiffs in error at that time, then no good cause of action is alleged against the makers of the promissory note, and the judgment of the District Court must be reversed and the cause dismissed. (Barton v. Anderson, 1 Tex., 93.)
John P. White, for defendants in error.

Opinion:
Egberts, J.
—The note sued oh in this case appears, from the recitals in the petition, to have been a contract between merchant and merchant, and assignable and negotiable by law. The makers were entitled to three days of grace under our statute. (O. & W. Dig., Art. 99.) Being dated on the 1st day of November, 1857, and payable " eleven months after date," it was not due, including the three days of grace, until the 4th day of October, 1858; excluding them, it would be due on the 1st day of October. The suit was brought on the 1st day of October, 1858 ; which was certainly before any right of action had accrued.
"When a bill is drawn, payable so many months after date, the computation is made by the calendar, and (without counting the days of grace) the bill will become due on the day of the month corresponding with the day of the date; that is, if it be dated on the 10th day of the month, it will become due on the 10th." (Edwards on .Bills and ¡Notes, 515.) The judgment must be reversed, and the cause
¡Dismissed.