Case Name: Herman Herzog, Respondent, v. Abraham Stern et al., as Executors of David Stern, Deceased, Appellants
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1934-05-23
Citations: 264 N.Y. 379
Docket Number: 
Parties: Herman Herzog, Respondent, v. Abraham Stern et al., as Executors of David Stern, Deceased, Appellants.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 264
Pages: 379–389

Head Matter:
Herman Herzog, Respondent, v. Abraham Stern et al., as Executors of David Stern, Deceased, Appellants.
(Argued March 1, 1934;
decided May 23, 1934.)
William M. Kurtz, James J. Mahoney and George J. Stacy for appellants.
The public policy of this State denies the right to recover damages for personal injuries from the estate of a deceased wrongdoer and forbids enforcement of any cause of action of such a nature purported to be created by the statute of another State. (Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N. Y. 99; People v. Martin, 175 N. Y. 315; Matter of Girard, 2 How. [U. S.] 127; Dammert v. Osborn, 140 N. Y. 30; Cross v. U. S. T. Co., 131 N. Y. 330; Matter of Lampson, 33 App. Div. 49; 161 N. Y. 511; Hollis v. Drew Theological Seminary, 95 N. Y. 166; Hegerich v. Keddie, 99 N. Y. 258; Gorlitzer v. Wolffberg, 208 N. Y. 475; Bernstein v. Queens County Jockey Club, 222 App. Div. 191; Cregin v. Brooklyn Crosstown Ry. Co., 75 N. Y. 192.) . The result of enforcing the Virginia statute in this State would be to make a distribution of the deceased’s property contrary to the laws adopted by this State governing such distribution. (Matter of Killough, 148 Misc. Rep. 73; Clough v. Gardiner, 111 Misc. Rep. 249; Sultan of Turkey v. Tiryakian, 162 App. Div. 613; 213 N. Y. 429; Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41; State ex rel. McClintock v. Guinotte, 275 Mo. 298.)
Sidney J. Feltenstein and Abraham Rosenstein for respondent.
The legal liability of appellants is controlled by the lex loci, and that is not varied by any considerations of local public policy under the lex fori by reason of the failure of the Legislature of the forum to have spoken on the subject. (Hegerich v. Keddie, 99 N. Y. 258; Gorlitzer v. Wolffberg, 208 N. Y. 475; Cons. Laws, ch. 15, § 120; Kursa v. Overseas Shipping Co., 217 App. Div. 775; Watkins v. Comm. Stevedoring Co., 216 App. Div. 234; Lichtenstern v. Augusta-Aiken R. & El. Co., 165 App. Div. 270; Clough v. Gardiner, 111 Misc. Rep. 249; 194 App. Div. 923; Domres v. Storms, 236 App. Div. 630; Matter of Killough, 148 Misc. Rep. 73; Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N. Y. 99; Kerston v. Johnson, 185 Minn. 591; Thuna v. Wolf, 130 Misc. Rep. 306; Benton v. Safe Deposit Bank, 255 N. Y. 260; Veazey v. Allen, 173 N. Y. 359; Wikoff v. Hirschell, 258 N. Y. 28; Gregonis v. P. & R. Coal & Ice Co., 235 N. Y. 152; State of Colorado v. Harbeck, 232 N. Y. 71; Dennick v. Railroad Co., 103 U. S. 11.)
James Marshall as amicus curies.
The person or power which negligently inflicts injury upon another shall be held responsible to the injured party. The mere fact that no statute of identical coverage exists as part of the law of the forum will not prevent the enforcement of a transitory cause of action arising in a foreign jurisdiction under a foreign statute. (Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N. Y. 99; Fitzpatrick v. International Ry. Co., 252 N. Y. 127; Young v. Masci, 289 U. S. 253; Sheldon v. Haxtun, 91 N. Y. 124; Manhattan Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 188 N. Y. 108; Domres v. Storms, 236 App. Div. 630; Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N. Y. 220; Orr v. Ahern, 107 Conn. 174; Chubbuck v. Holloway, 182 Minn. 225; Powell v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 102 Minn. 448.)

Opinion:
' ¿Lehman, J.
Though the cause of action created in Virginia is not penal in its nature and its enforcement does not offend our sense of justice or menace the public welfare, it by no means follows that the cause of action is enforceable against the executors of the wrongdoer. True, the foreign statute provides that such a cause of action shall not abate by the death of the wrongdoer, and the general rule is that " whether a claim for damages for a wrong survives the death of the wrongdoer or of the injured person is determined by the law of the place of wrong." (Proposed Final Draft No. 3 of the Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws by the American Law Institute, § 426.) (Cf. Orr v. Ahern, 107 Conn. 174; Friedman v. Greenberg, 110 N. J. L. 462.) The question, however, is not whether the cause of action created by the laws of the State of Virginia survives the death of the wrongdoer, but whether the law of this State permits the representative of the deceased wrongdoer to be sued on such a claim.
On that question the comment upon the general rule contained in the proposed draft is illuminating. " If a claim for damages for injury survives by the law of the place of wrong, recovery may be had upon it by or against the representative of the deceased party, provided the law of the state of suit permits the representative of the deceased party to sue or be sued on such a claim. Without such power created by the law of the state of suit, no recovery can be had."
This State has undoubted power to determine the devolution of the property of a deceased resident and how such property shall be administered. It determines upon' what claims a suit may be brought against the representatives of the decedent, and payment be enforced out of the assets of the estate. A transitory cause of action may constitute a property right. It may even bé regarded as a vested right against the wrongdoer. There can, however, be no vested right to enforce a claim for damages out of the property of a deceased resident of this State unless there is a law which permits the property of such a decedent to be applied upon the claim. At common law a claim for personal injury did not survive and could not be enforced out of the property or against the personal representatives of the deceased wrongdoer. The common law has in this regard not been changed by the Legislature. Indeed, the Legislature has expressly provided that "For wrongs done to the property rights or interests of another for which an action might be maintained against the wrong-doer, such action may be brought by the person injured, or after his death, by his executors or administrators, against such wrong-doer, and after his death against his executors or administrators, in the same manner and with the like effect in all respects, as actions founded upon contracts. This section shall not extend to an action for personal injuries, as such action is defined in section thirty-seven-a of the General Construction Law, except that nothing herein contained shall affect the right of action now existing to recover damages for injuries resulting in death." (Decedent Estate Law [Cons. Laws, ch. 13], § 120.) It is not without significance that this provision has been inserted in the Decedent Estate Law intended to govern the devolution and administration of property -within this State belonging to residents of this State,"' The Legislature has not merely failed to provide, as many other States have done, that causes of action for personal injury shell survive the death of the wrongdoer, but the Legislature, though it has affirmatively provided for the prosecution of some causes of action against the executors and administrators of a wrongdoer after his death, has expressly refused to sanction causes of action for personal injury against such executors or administrators./^ Where neither common law nor a statute permits the bringing of an action against executors or administrators of a deceased resident, the courts of this State are without jurisdiction to pass upon such a cause of action. There is here no room for speculation as to whether^the cause of action against the representatives of the deceased wrongdoer created by the .laws of the State of Virginia offends our public policyj)j-The rights and obligations of executors and administrators appointed by our courts are defined by our law, and our courts are without jurisdiction to grant a judgment binding on the executors or administrators appointed here unless our law makes provision for such actions against executors and administrators. A Each State may define the rights and obligations of those who come within its territorial bounds, and comity will ordinarily cause the sister States to permit the enforcement of such rights and obligations against their residents by resort to their' courts, but no State has any power to provide that such rights and obligations may be enforced out of the property of a deceased wrongdoer in the possession of executors or administrators appointed by the courts of another State. Here comity does not determine the jurisdiction of the courts of the decedent's domicile. The courts are without jurisdiction, because neither common law nor statutory law provides for the maintenance of any action for personal injury against the executors or administrators of a deceased wrongdoer. •
'The result would not, however, I think, be different if the question were really one of comity, for comity depends upon the public policy of the State, and the Legislature has declared the public policy of this State . when it provided that no action for personal injuries-may be maintained against the executors or administrators 'Of antecedent who resided in this State. A rule that would permit the depletion of the estate of a deceased resident through enforcement of claims for damages for personal injuries sustained outside of the State, where the Legislature has denied such remedy for injuries within the State, seems to me unreasonable and sustained by no authority outside of the Minnesota cases cited by Judge Hubbs. There is nothing said or decided in the case of Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. (224 N. Y. 99) which supports such holding.
The order of the Appellate Division should be reversed and that of the Special Term affirmed, with costs in this court and in the Appellate Division. The second certified question should be answered in the negative and the other questions not answered.