Case Name: Beverly Ann IBN-TAMAS, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee
Court: District of Columbia Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: District of Columbia
Decision Date: 1983-01-17
Citations: 455 A.2d 893
Docket Number: No. 79-1278
Parties: Beverly Ann IBN-TAMAS, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.
Judges: Before NEBEKER and PRYOR, Associate Judges, and GALLAGHER, Associate Judge, Retired.
Reporter: West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 455
Pages: 893–896

Head Matter:
Beverly Ann IBN-TAMAS, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.
No. 79-1278.
District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
Argued Sept. 18, 1980.
Decided Jan. 17, 1983.
William E. McDaniels, Washington, D.C., with whom Ellen S. Huvelle, Washington, D.C., was on the brief, for appellant.
Benjamin B. Sendor, Asst. U.S. Atty., Washington, D.C., with whom Charles F.C. Ruff, U.S. Atty., Washington, D.C., at the time the brief was filed, John A. Terry, Asst. U.S. Atty., Washington, D.C., at the time the brief was filed, Michael W. Farrell, and William J. Bowman, Asst. U.S. Attys., Washington, D.C., were on the brief, for appellee.
Before NEBEKER and PRYOR, Associate Judges, and GALLAGHER, Associate Judge, Retired.
Associate Judge Pryor was selected by random process to replace Associate Judge Harris upon his retirement from the court.
Separate concurring statement of Associate Judge Gallagher at p. 894.

Opinion:
JUDGMENT
This is an appeal from an order entered after remand proceedings. We earlier ordered those proceedings, with discretion whether to hold an evidentiary hearing, for clarification because "we cannot be certain that the record otherwise supports the ruling as a matter of law." Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 640 n. 29 (D.C. 1979). The trial court has stated on remand that it did consider the relevant factors as outlined by this court in its original ruling. It concluded, inter alia, "that defendant failed to establish a general acceptance by the expert's colleagues of the methodology used in the expert's study of 'battered women.'-" Since the expert's testimony could have been excluded "for failure to meet either the second or third elements of the test," id. at 635, and the trial court did exclude that testimony on one such basis, we are left with deciding whether "the evidence, despite our inability to observe the witness, permits but one interpretation." Id. at 636 n. 17. As the court said in its earlier decision in this case, our scope of review on this issue is "narrow" to the point where manifest error must appear for reversal. Id. at 632. We hold that the trial judge was not compelled, as a matter of law, to admit the evidence. He had discretion whether to admit it and "this court should not substitute its judgment in [such] a discretionary ruling . " Id. at 636 n. 17.
Accordingly, the order appealed from is
Affirmed.
. We find no abuse of discretion in proceeding without a hearing and on submission of memo-randa.