Case Name: William MINOR, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. SULLY BUTTES SCHOOL DISTRICT #58-2, Brian Meyer, Tony Todd, Cliff DeSautell, Lillian Wright, Don Burgeson and Superintendent Don Rykhus, Defendants and Appellants
Court: South Dakota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: South Dakota
Decision Date: 1984-02-15
Citations: 345 N.W.2d 48
Docket Number: Nos. 14205, 14211
Parties: William MINOR, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. SULLY BUTTES SCHOOL DISTRICT #58-2, Brian Meyer, Tony Todd, Cliff DeSautell, Lillian Wright, Don Burgeson and Superintendent Don Rykhus, Defendants and Appellants.
Judges: FOSHEIM, C.J., and WOLLMAN, J., concur.
Reporter: North Western Reporter 2d
Volume: 345
Pages: 48–54

Head Matter:
William MINOR, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. SULLY BUTTES SCHOOL DISTRICT #58-2, Brian Meyer, Tony Todd, Cliff DeSautell, Lillian Wright, Don Burgeson and Superintendent Don Rykhus, Defendants and Appellants.
Nos. 14205, 14211.
Supreme Court of South Dakota.
Considered on Briefs Sept. 28, 1983.
Decided Feb. 15, 1984.
Linda Lea M. Yiken of Finch & Viken, Rapid City, for plaintiff and appellee.
Charles M. Thompson of May, Adam, Gerdes & Thompson, Pierre, for defendants and appellants.

Opinion:
DUNN, Justice.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the circuit court in a teacher contract dispute. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
In August of 1982, appellants Sully Buttes School District # 58-2, the members of the Sully Buttes board of education, and Sully Buttes superintendent Don Rykhus (School District) found themselves in the position of losing their band instructor and needing another for the upcoming school year. Appellee William Minor (Minor), a music teacher and resident of Minnesota, saw a bulletin about the job opening and sent an application to School District. On August 27, 1982, at the request of School District, Minor traveled to Onida, South Dakota, for an interview and discussed the job with the superintendent and chairman of the board of education. They informed him that he would undergo a two-week "trial period" of teaching because the board could not meet for another two weeks to approve or disapprove his contract. Minor refused to take the position on a trial basis, so he was told that a contract would be prepared for him to sign. Minor accepted the position on that basis.
Minor returned to Onida on August 30, 1982, to begin teaching and was given the contract document to sign. After signing it, he returned the document to the superintendent, but it was never signed by any officials of School District. During the period before the contract could be approved, Minor had problems with the band. Consequently, School District refused to approve the contract with Minor and terminated him after nine days of teaching. Minor appealed the decision of School District to circuit court, seeking a determination that a contract existed between him and School District. The court concluded that no contract existed, but that Minor had incurred compensable damages because of School District's actions.
School District raises two issues on appeal: 1) Since the trial court found that there was no contract between the parties, was it error for the court to award damages to Minor? 2) Are the damages awarded to Minor excessive? On notice of review, Minor raises two issues: 1) Should School District be estopped from denying that a contract existed between School District and Minor? 2) If a contract existed, did School District properly terminate Minor?
In order to deal with these issues in a logical fashion, we shall first consider the question of whether a contract existed between School District and Minor. Minor contends that strict compliance with SDCL 13-43-4 is not necessary for the existence of a contract between a school district and a teacher, and that by its actions in giving a contract document to Minor and allowing him to teach for nine days School District should be estopped from denying the existence of a contract. We disagree.
SDCL 13-43-4 states: "A teacher shall be employed only upon written contract signed by the teacher and by the president of the school board and business manager of the school district." It is well settled that when by statute the mode and manner in which contracts of a school district may be entered into are limited and any other manner of entering into a contract is expressly or impliedly forbidden, a contract not made in compliance therewith is invalid. Schull Const. Co. v. Webster Ind. School Dist. No. 101, 86 S.D. 475, 198 N.W.2d 512 (1972); Seim v. Independent Dist. of Monroe, 70 S.D. 315, 17 N.W.2d 342 (1945); 68 Am.Jur.2d Schools § 142 (1973).
The precise wording of SDCL ISIS-! ("A teacher shall be employed only ." [emphasis added]) makes clear that any attempt by a school district and a teacher to enter into a contract without following the statutory language is forbidden. Since neither the president of the school board nor the business manager of School District signed the document in question, we must conclude that no contract came into existence. The statutorily mandated method for teachers and school districts to enter into contracts simply has not been met.
Minor is also incorrect in claiming that a contract exists by virtue of estoppel, thus overcoming the strict requirements of SDCL 13-43-4. In Bak v. Jones County, 87 S.D. 468, 210 N.W.2d 65 (1973), a county commission asked a contractor to repair certain roads, but they failed to follow the statutorily mandated requirements in making the contract. The contractor worked for about a month with the full knowledge of the commission. Even under those facts, we held that any contract entered into without complying with the statutes was null and void. We stated that it would be contrary to public policy to allow one to evade contract provisions which have been enacted by law for the protection of the public merely by arguing implied contract theories. Therefore, despite the actions of School District in this case, no contract existed. Only if all the requirements of SDCL 13-43-4 are met is there a contract between a school district and a teacher.
In light of our holding on the question of the existence of a contract, we need not deal with Minor's other contention. The statutory requirements which a school district must fulfill before terminating a teacher apply only to individuals under contract.
We deal next with School District's contention that if there is no contract there can be no breach of contract and, consequently, no damages can be awarded to Minor. The trial court awarded $1,612.98 in damages to Minor despite finding that no contract existed.
Even when there is no valid contract between the parties, a trial court can, applying the doctrine of detrimental reliance, find that an individual was unjustly harmed and is entitled to damages. The doctrine of detrimental reliance (also called promissory estoppel) may be invoked in the following situation: a promise, apparently made in good faith, causes the promisee to alter his position to his detriment in the reasonable belief that the promise would be performed. Murray on Contracts § 91 (2d ed. 1974). This court recognized and applied the doctrine of detrimental reliance in Valley Bank v. Dowdy, 337 N.W.2d 164 (S.D.1983). See also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90 (1981). It has been stated that before the doctrine can be applied, a trial court must find: 1) the detriment suffered in reliance must be substantial in an economic sense; 2) the loss to the prom-isee must have been foreseeable by the promisor; and 3) the promisee must have acted reasonably in justifiable reliance on the promise as made. Simpson on Contracts § 61 (2d ed. 1965).
Here, Minor has proven all the elements of detrimental reliance. School District, by preparing the contract document and giving it to Minor to sign after Minor refused to take the position on a trial basis, implied that Minor would have the teaching position for the entire year. This action, in effect a promise, was apparently made in good faith, since School District would have approved and signed the contract at its next meeting if the problems with Minor's teaching had not arisen. Relying upon this action, Minor acted reasonably in altering his position: he moved from Minnesota to Onida, he obtained an apartment, etc.; such actions were clearly foreseeable by School District. The detriment suffered by Minor in reliance upon School District was substantial in an economic sense, amounting to hundreds of dollars of expense for Minor. Therefore, the trial court properly found that even though there was no contract between the parties, since the strict requirements of SDCL 13-43-4 were not met, Minor relied upon School District's actions to his detriment and is entitled to damages.
Finally, we consider School District's claim that the damages awarded to Minor were excessive. The trial court computed the damages as follows:
We agree with School District's contention that the damages for teaching dues and hearing expenses were excessive and clearly erroneous. First, the South Dakota Education Association (SDEA) is a voluntary association. Minor did not have to join SDEA in order to teach at Sully Buttes, whether the teaching was for a "trial period" or under a teaching contract. Therefore, it cannot be said that Minor's SDEA dues expense was caused by the actions of School District; Minor was free to join or not to join the organization. Second, the hearing expense refers to those costs incurred by Minor in returning to South Dakota to attend the hearing in this action. We note that it was Minor who brought this controversy into the court system of this state; he appealed to the circuit court, seeking relief from alleged wrongs of School District. Since the legal action was initiated by Minor and was totally of his choosing, we hold that it was error to award him damages for the expense of getting to the hearing.
The damage award for apartment expense and moving expense is totally proper, however. Minor simply would not have moved from Minnesota to Onida but for his reliance on School District and the implications that a teaching position would be available to him. If Minor had not taken the position in Onida, he would not have had the apartment expense, since he was living with his parents in Minnesota. Thus, both of these expenses were caused by School District's actions and damages should be awarded to Minor.
The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed, but we reverse on the question of damages and remand for recalculation of damages.
FOSHEIM, C.J., and WOLLMAN, J., concur.
HENDERSON, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.
MORGAN, J., dissents.
. Minor was paid for the nine days he taught for School District.
. SDCL 13-46-1 allows any aggrieved person or any party to the.proceedings to appeal a decision made by a school board to the circuit court.