Case Name: Ronald A. DRAPEAU, an Individual Appellant, v. JOY TECHNOLOGIES, INC., a Delaware Corporation
Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1996-01-17
Citations: 670 A.2d 165
Docket Number: 
Parties: Ronald A. DRAPEAU, an Individual Appellant, v. JOY TECHNOLOGIES, INC., a Delaware Corporation.
Judges: Before CIRILLO, BECK and HUDOCK, JJ.
Reporter: West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 670
Pages: 165–173

Head Matter:
Ronald A. DRAPEAU, an Individual Appellant, v. JOY TECHNOLOGIES, INC., a Delaware Corporation.
Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
Argued Sept. 26, 1995.
Filed Jan. 17, 1996.
William Wyeoff, Pittsburgh, for appellant.
Richard R. Nelson, II, Pittsburgh, for ap-pellee.
Before CIRILLO, BECK and HUDOCK, JJ.

Opinion:
CIRILLO, Judge:
This is an appeal from an order of the Common Pleas Court of Allegheny County. We reverse and remand.
Appellant, Ronald A. Drapeau ("Dra-peau"), owned 54,764 shares of common stock in Appellee-Company, Joy Technologies, Inc. ("Joy"). Drapeau, an employee of Joy, owned the stock pursuant to an amended Employee Stockholders Agreement ("Agreement"). The Agreement provided, in part, that if Drapeau should cease to be employed with Joy, for any reason, he was required to immediately offer to sell back to Joy his shares of company stock.
In February of 1992, Drapeau voluntarily terminated his employment with Joy and immediately offered to sell his shares of stock to the company. However, Joy officers constantly attempted to dissuade Drapeau from enforcing his right to have his stock bought back by Joy. Not until after Drapeau hired counsel did Joy finally agree to enter into a Stock Purchase Agreement ("Purchase Agreement") with Drapeau. The Purchase Agreement contained the condition that Dra-peau retained the right to seek recourse from Joy for additional sums due and owing under the original Agreement.
In October, 1992, Drapeau filed an action against Joy alleging theories of breach of the Agreement, common law fraud and violation of the Pennsylvania State Securities Act of 1972. The court sustained Joy's preliminary objections to Drapeau's second amended complaint and dismissed the fraud and securities act counts. Drapeau and Joy then moved and cross-moved, respectively, for summary judgment on the breach of contract claim. Both motions were denied by orders without an opinion.
Before trial, Drapeau filed a motion in limine to exclude testimony of a former Joy C.E.O., regarding the intent of the parties in drafting the Agreement. This motion was granted by a court of concurrent jurisdiction. Joy then renewed its motion for summary judgment which was also granted in favor of Joy. Drapeau now files this timely appeal.
Appellant raises the following issues for our consideration:
(1) Whether the trial court erred in reconsidering and overruling an interlocutory order issued by a court of concurrent jurisdiction in the same case;
(2) Whether the trial court erred in excluding evidence of the parties' intent in an agreement that had inherently ambiguous terms;
(3) Whether the trial court erred by granting defendant's motion for summary judgment based upon the conclusion that the agreement at issue was clear and unambiguous in favor of the defendant; and
(4) Whether the trial court erred in dismissing Count III of the second amended complaint where Count III accurately set forth all legal and factual averments necessary to sustain claims for common law fraud and violations of the Pennsylvania Securities Act?
Appellant properly appeals from a final order granting summary judgment. See Pa. RAP. 341(c). When we review the grant of a motion for summary judgment made under Pa.R.C.P. 1035, the appellate court's scope of review is well-settled: summary judgment is properly granted where "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Pa.R.C.P. 1035(b). Summary judgment may be granted only where the right is clear and free from doubt. Musser v. Vilsmeier Auction Co. Inc., 522 Pa. 367, 369, 562 A.2d 279, 280 (1989). The moving party has the burden of proving that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Thompson Coal Co. v. Pike Coal Co., 488 Pa. 198, 412 A.2d 466 (1979). The record and any inferences therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and any doubt must be resolved against the moving party. Davis v. Pennzoil, 438 Pa. 194, 264 A.2d 597 (1970). The trial court will be overturned on the entry of summary judgment only if there has been an error of law or a clear abuse of discretion. Hetrick v. Apollo Gas Co., 415 Pa.Super. 189, 608 A.2d 1074 (1992).
Additionally, it is well-settled that summary judgment may not be entered where the moving party relies exclusively upon deposition testimony in order to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Penn Center House, Inc. v. Hoffman, 520 Pa. 171, 553 A.2d 900 (1989), citing Nanty-Glo v. American Surety Co., 309 Pa. 236, 163 A. 523 (1932) (holding that a court may not summarily enter a judgment where the evidence depends upon oral testimony because the testimony is still a matter of credibility for the jury to decide). Because we find that the trial court abused its discretion by granting summary judgment in favor of Joy, we reverse and remand.
Appellant first contends that the trial court improperly overruled the decision of a prior court, at the same level, by reconsidering and subsequently granting Joy's motion for summary judgment. We agree with the Appellant and hold that the trial judge erred as a matter of law in granting the motion.
Where a motion has been presented and decided and where no new facts are presented in the motion which is seeking the same relief, the first order should be followed based on considerations of judicial economy and efficiency. Harrity v. Medical College of Pennsylvania Hospital, 439 Pa.Super. 10, 653 A.2d 5 (1994). This rule prevents forum shopping because without this rule, the same issue could be raised repeatedly before different judges of the same court until a litigant finds a judge sympathetic to his or her position. Id. Additionally, our supreme court has stated that "absent the most compelling circumstances, a judge should follow the decision of a colleague on the same court when based on the same set of facts." Yudacufski v. Commonwealth of Pa. Dep't of Transportation, 499 Pa. 605, 612, 454 A.2d 923, 926 (1982). See also Okkerse v. Howe, 521 Pa. 509, 556 A.2d 827 (1989) (remanding case to the trial court when it was held that it is contrary to jurisprudential policy for a successor judge to rule on a motion when the successor judge had no record basis upon which to sustain the motion); Golden v. Dion & Rosenau 410 Pa.Super. 506, 600 A.2d 568 (1991) (same).
In the case at hand, the judge granting summary judgment was faced with the same set of facts and no new additional evidence in the record than that which was presented to the original judge who ruled on the same motion. The only change in the record, which occurred between the preceding judge's denial of Joy's first motion for summary judgment and the subsequent order granting the renewed motion, was the exclusion of testimonial evidence by Joy's former C.E.O.
Based upon the Nanty-Glo rule, a case should not be summarily decided solely on the basis of a non-party's testimony. Nanty-Glo, supra. As such, the inclusion or exclusion of Joy's former C.E.O.'s testimony should not have been the deciding factor in determining that no genuine issue of fact existed in the case at hand. This is especially true in light of the fact that the same court would not have been able to decide a motion for summary judgment based solely on identical testimony. Nanty-Glo, supra. Accordingly, we find that the trial court acted neither in the interests of jurisprudence nor in a manner promoting judicial economy or efficiency by granting Joy's renewed motion for summary judgment. Okkerse, supra. See also Salerno v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 877 Pa.Super. 83, 546 A.2d 1168 (1988) (affirming order to grant summary judgment that overruled prior judge's denial of preliminary objections because the expense of an unnecessary trial would thwart the very purpose of maintaining judicial economy and efficiency). Cf. Rosenfield v. Pennsylvania Aut. Ins., 431 Pa.Super. 383, 636 A.2d 1138 (1994) (determining that successor trial judge properly granted summary judgment, contrary to preceding trial judge's order to deny same party's preliminary objections, when the trial court did not issue an opinion stating why the preliminary objections were not granted and where the successor judge was provided with a more current and wider array of documents upon which to base her decision than was the original trial judge); Boyle v. Steiman, 429 Pa.Super. 1, 631 A.2d 1025 (1993) (holding that it was only proper for successor judge to overrule prior order of predecessor judge in a case based on additional evidence presented to successor judge); Hutchison by Hutchison v. Luddy, 417 Pa.Super. 93, 110, 611 A.2d 1280, 1289 (1992) (holding that where the record contains new evidence which was not in the record before the preceding judge, it is not improper for the succeeding judge to reach a different result on reconsideration of an order).
The trial court clearly abused its discretion and committed error of law by deciding that there was no genuine issue of material fact and that Joy was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Pa.R.C.P. 1035. Because this case must be remanded for a full hearing on its merits, we need not make a determination of the other issues on appeal.
Order reversed and remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
BECK, J., files a concurring opinion.
. The Agreement fixed the purchase price at the market price of Joy's stock "on the fifth trading day preceding the date of purchase." If Drapeau had sold his shares to Joy, pursuant to the Agreement, immediately following his termination in February 1992, Drapeau would have received $15.75 per share — a total purchase price of $862,533.00 — compared to the actual price received of $616,095.00.
. Drapeau sought to recover damages in the amount of $246,440.00 plus costs — approximately the difference between the value of the stock in February, 1992 (the time of Drapeau's resignation) and the value in April of the same year (the actual date used to determine the market price for Joy's buyback).