Case Name: LENORA MORENUS, Respondent, v. IRA CRAWFORD and NEHEMIAH HOAG, Appellants
Court: New York Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1878-09
Citations: 22 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 45
Docket Number: 
Parties: LENORA MORENUS, Respondent, v. IRA CRAWFORD and NEHEMIAH HOAG, Appellants.
Judges: Present — Learned, P. J., Boardman and Tappan, JJ.
Reporter: Supreme Court Reports (Hun)
Volume: 22
Pages: 45–51

Head Matter:
LENORA MORENUS, Respondent, v. IRA CRAWFORD and NEHEMIAH HOAG, Appellants.
- Civil damage act — action against two defendants jointly — cannot he sustained ; - •• ly proof of. separate sales.'- . ' ■
In this action, brought by a married woman to recover damages under the Civil • • Damage Act, the complaint • alleged, among other things, that the defendant Crawford resided in one village and the defendant Hoag in another; that, on May 15 th, 1875, “the said defendants wi-ongfully, conspiring and intending to injure sa,icl. plaintiff, at their places of residence aforesaid, gave and sold intoxicating liquors to the said J. M., the plaintiff’s said’ husband, * * * which he drankand that, in consequence thereof, he became intoxicated and killed a horse belonging to plaintiff, to'which complaint the defendants separately interposed general denials. . . . > •
Held, that, even if the allegations as to a conspiracy were rejected as surplus-age, the complaint charged a joint'sale, atad that it was not'sustained by proof of separate sales by each defendant, at hiá place of residence, ■ (Tappan, J., dissenting.) . ,. . • . . , ' ■
■. Appeal from a judgment" iii favor of thé plaintiff, entered xipon the report of a referee.
: The action was brought under the Civil Damage Act to recover the value of a horse owned by the plaintiff, a'married woman, 'Which ivas killed by her husband, while intoxicated. ’’ The comqilaint alleged: ■- .
“I. That she is, and for about ten years'last past has been, a married woman; that John Mo.renus.is her husband; that,she, with her said husband, resides'' in "the" tówii 'of''Lisle," 'Broome county, N. Y. . , . ( ...
“II. -That iñ and previous to. the món'th of ’Miiy, 1875, and-to the time of its death, as hereinafter stated., she was the owner of a valuable horse, - which ivas lifer sole And separate 'property.
“III. That, in the month of'May;aforesaid, the' said defendant Crawford resided iii "the village of Berkshire, and thé said defendant Hoag' resided- iii the village' of Richford,' Tioga coxintyj N. Y.; that each kept;a hotel atfhis' 'place' ;-of résidencé and- sold intoxicating liquors at all tithes, aiicL iii quantities to suit the purchaser;' ■ f
• “TV.'- For a' further 'cause bf' action,1 the siti.d plaintiff alleges:, Thakon Of about the'l'Sfhkiay’Of'Máy;’'1875, the 'said’ defendants wrongfully conspiring and intending to injure the said plaintiff, at their places of residence aforesaid, gave and sold intoxicating liquors to the said John Morenus, the plaintiff’s said husband, in small and large quantities, which he drank; and, from the effects of the intoxicating liquor so sold and given to the plaintiff’s said husband as aforesaid by the said defendants, he became and was intoxicated; and, while so intoxicated, caused by drinking the intoxicating liquor sold and given to him by the said defendants, and by reason of said intoxication, he killed plaintiff ’s said horse or mare, which was of the value of one hundred and fifty dollars.” To the complaint, the defendants interposed separately general denials.
The referee found, among other tilings:
“That, on the 15th day of May, 1875, said defendants, each separately, at his place of residence, and without conspiracy or concert between them, by selling intoxicating liquors, caused the intoxication, in whole or in part, of said John Morenus, said plaintiff’s said husband, such selling by each of them contributing to such intoxication; and, in consequence of such intoxication of said John Morenus, the said horse of said plaintiff was then and there killed and became worthless, whereby said plaintiff in this action was injured in her property in consequence of such intoxication in said sum of one hundred and fifty dollars,” and directed judgment for the plaintiff.
Eugene B. Gere and J. W. Hopkins, for the appellants.
A. McDowell, for the respondent.
The action was properly brought against the defendants jointly. Intoxication constitutes the gist °f the action, and was produced by the joint and concurrent effect of the liquor sold by e,ach of the defendants. The liquor sold by either defendant, while it contributed to, might not have produced, intoxication; but, >vhen the liquor sold by each came in contact, its joint effect produced the intoxication complained of, and made it the joint act of the defendants. (Colgrove v. The Harlem and New Haven R. R. Gos., 6 Duer, 402, 403, 404, 407; affd., 20 N Y., 492; Barrett y. Third Avenue R, R. Oo., 45 id., 628; Websterv. Hudson River R.R. Go., 38 id.., 2.60.)

Opinion:
Learned, P. J.:
I agree with much that is said in the opinion of Judge Tap-pan, hut I cannot concur in the result. We may, perhaps, assume that the allegation of conspiracy could be treated as surplusage; but, even then, we have the allegation of a joint act by two defendants, and the proof of -two separate acts, for which there is no joint liability. This is not a mere misjoinder of several causes of action; such a misjoinder arises when a plaintiff has several causes of action against the same defendant, which are such in their nature that they may not be united.
But, if a plaintiff should sue two defendants on an alleged joint note, and on the trial should offer to prove two separate notes — one made by each defendant — he could not be allowed to do this, although the defendants had not set up a misjoinder in their answer; or, if a plaintiff had alleged a joint assault and battery against two defendants, he could not sustain the complaint by proof of two separate assaults, one by each defendant.
Two separate, wrongful acts, or acts giving a cause of action, committed severally by two defendants, do not warrant a joint action or joint recovery.
The complaint must be construed as alleging a joint sale by the defendants. This the plaintiff failed to prove. Two separate sales by the defendants severally do not prove the allegations. Possibly the plaintiff might have been allowed to elect, and to recover against one or the other of the defendants; but we need not decide that. It is enough that he could not recover against both for their several acts. The case of Blossom v. Barrett (37 N. Y., 436,) was one where the two alleged causes of action were against the same party; one for fraud in procuring a marriage, •the other for assault and battery. So the case of Winterson v. Eighth avenue (2 Hilt., 389,) was one for damages, alleging that an accident occurred by a conductor's negligence, and also that it Occurred by his willful .act. These cases do not touch this present .question.
The case of Fosgate v. Herkimer Manufacturing Co. (12 N, Y., 580.) was an action to recover possession of land, brought against one person, and several who held under him, according to the peculiar provisions of the statute. The cause of .action was only for recovery of one piece of land, and the persons having possession of parts of the lahd as tenants under the adverse claim.ant were made parties. This casé is not analogous to the present. • . 1
The judgment should be reversed and a new trial granted, and the reference discharged, costs to abide the event.