Case Name: WELKE v. KUZILLA
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1985-02-06
Citations: 140 Mich. App. 658
Docket Number: Docket No. 75515
Parties: WELKE v KUZILLA
Judges: Before: Hood, P.J., and Bronson and R. L. Tah-VONEN, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 140
Pages: 658–680

Head Matter:
WELKE v KUZILLA
Docket No. 75515.
Submitted November 13,1984, at Detroit. —
Decided February 6, 1985.
On October 13, 1981, plaintiff, Robert J. Welke, personal representative of the estate of Judith L. Welke, deceased, brought a wrongful death action in the Wayne Circuit Court against defendants, Sharlyn M. Kuzilla, also known as Sharlyn M. Lyons, and Bradford G. Capper, D.O. Plaintiff alleged that defendant Kuzilla negligently caused the death of plaintiff’s decedent in an automobile crash. Defendant Dr. Capper owned the automobile driven by defendant Kuzilla. On August 30, 1983, plaintiff filed a motion for leave to amend to add several new tort theories and allegations of damages including a medical malpractice count against Dr. Capper in regard to his prescribing of controlled substances to defendant Kuzilla. Oral argument on plaintiff’s motion was heard on September 9, 1983, before the Honorable Paul S. Teranes, who was sitting as a substitute because the judge who had been assigned to the case for pretrial matters was unavailable. The arguments were limited to adding only the medical malpractice count because the period of limitations on that count was about to run. After determining that the plaintiff could file a separate malpractice action, the trial court found that prejudice would result to the defendant doctor and denied plaintiffs motion to amend the complaint in regard to the malpractice count. In a subsequent order, the trial court granted plaintiffs motion for leave to amend the complaint to add new tort theories and allegations of damages not included in the malpractice count. However, the trial court denied plaintiffs motion to consolidate the separate medical malpractice action, which he had filed on September 9, 1983, with the present action. Plaintiff appeals from the trial court’s order denying his motion for leave to amend his complaint to add the medical malpractice count against Dr. Capper. Held:
References for Points in Headnotes
[I] 61A Am Jur 2d, Pleading § 309 et seq.
62 Am Jur 2d, Pretrial Conference and Procedure § 26.
[2, 5] 5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 878.
61A Am Jur 2d, Pleading §§ 310, 314.
[3, 4, 6] 61A Am Jur 2d, Pleading § 311.
[4] 61A Am Jur 2d, Pleading § 315.
[7] 61A Am Jur 2d, Pleading § 312.
[8, 9] 57 Am Jur 2d, Negligence § 34.
[9] 57 Am Jur 2d, Negligence § 66.
[10,11] 57 Am Jur 2d, Negligence § 37.
[II] 61 Am Jur 2d, Physicians and Surgeons § 228.
[12] 61 Am Jur 2d, Physicians and Surgeons §§ 311, 313.
What constitutes physician-patient relationship for malpractice purposes. 17 ALR4th 132.
[13] 61 Am Jur 2d, Physicians and Surgeons § 205 et seq.
Modern status of "locality rule” in malpractice action against physician who is not a specialist. 99 ALR3d 1133.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for leave to amend to add the medical malpractice count because prejudice to the defendant doctor was possible. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals noted that it reached such a determination only given the special circumstances of this case,
i.e., that the trial court compromised the interests of both parties by denying the motion but facilitated plaintiffs filing of the separate medical malpractice action in a timely manner. By ruling in this manner, the trial court furthered the spirit of GCR 1963, 118.1, not by granting the motion for leave to amend, but by helping plaintiff preserve the cause of action he desired to add to the complaint. Thus, neither plaintiff nor defendant Dr. Capper were ultimately prejudiced.
Affirmed.
Bronson, J., dissented.
1. He noted his belief that the fact that there is little time left for discovery is not sufficient reason in and of itself to deny amendment and that this is particularly true where it is possible to extend discovery. He noted that while the Court of Appeals has upheld the denial of a motion to amend on the ground that there is insufficient opportunity for the opposing party to obtain discovery, it has done so only under the extreme circumstances where trial is imminent and prior discovery completed in the case will contribute nothing to discovery on the claim sought to be added by amendment. It is his belief that such is not true of the case at bar. He would hold that, in the absence of any actual prejudice to defendant, the trial court must allow plaintiff leave to amend his complaint.
2. He would hold that Dr. Capper owed a duty to plaintiff’s decedent, an innocent driver within the scope of foreseeable risk, by virtue of his special relationship with Sharlyn Kuzilla.
3. He would hold that, for reasons of logical consistency and public policy, plaintiffs claim is properly considered as one sounding in medical malpractice.
4. While noting his intent not to make physicians highway accident insurers, he stated that liability is properly imposed where a doctor’s malpractice is the proximate cause of a plaintiffs injuries.
He would reverse the trial court’s denial of plaintiffs motion to amend and instruct the court to extend the time of discovery to accommodate the amendment and eliminate any possible prejudice to Dr. Capper.
Opinion op the Court
1. Pretrial Procedure — Pleading — Amendment op Pleadings —
Court Rules.
A general court rule permits a party to amend his pleading by leave of the court; leave to amend shall be freely given when justice so requires (GCR 1963, 118.1).
2. Pretrial Procedure — Pleading — Amendment of Pleadings.
The decision to grant or deny leave to amend the pleadings is within the discretion of the trial court and the decision will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion; such discretion is not unlimited and the motion should be granted absent undue delay, bad faith, a dilatory motive or when an amendment would be futile; mere lateness in moving to amend is an insufficient reason to deny the motion, absent unfair prejudice to the opposing party.
3. Pretrial Procedure — Pleading — Amendment op Pleadings —
Court Rules.
The language in a court rule regarding the amendment of pleadings that "leave shall be freely given when justice so requires” imposes a limitation on the discretion of the court necessitating a finding that justice would not be served by an amendment to the pleadings; the allowance of an amendment is not an act of grace, but a right of a litigant who can show that amendment will not work an injustice on the opposing party (GCR 1963, 118.1).
Dissent by Bronson, J.
4. Pretrial Procedure — Pleading — Amendment of Pleadings — Court Rules.
Amendment of pleadings should be granted as a matter of right absent some speciñc finding of injustice to the opposing party; the fact that there is little time left for discovery is not sufficient reason in and of itself to deny amendment and this is particularly true where it is possible to extend discovery (GCR 1963.118.1) .
5. Appeal — Pretrial Procedure — Pleading — Amendment op
Pleadings — Discovery.
The Court of Appeals has upheld the denial of a motion to amend on the ground that there is insufficient opportunity for the opposing party to obtain discovery only under the extreme circumstances where trial is imminent and prior discovery completed in the case will contribute nothing to discovery on the claim sought to be added by amendment.
6. Pretrial Procedure — Pleading — Amendment op Pleadings —
Court Rules.
A trial court must allow a plaintiff leave to amend his complaint in the absence of any actual prejudice to the defendant (GCR
1963.118.1) .
7. Pretrial Procedure — Pleading — Amendment op Pleadings —
Futility.
Futility is a recognized reason to deny leave to amend the pleadings only if the complaint is legally insufficient on its face.
8. Negligence — Duty.
The question of whether a duty exists in a negligence action is one of law for the court’s resolution, whether for medical malpractice or any other personal injury action based upon negligence.
9. Negligence — Duty.
"Duty” in an action for negligence comprehends whether the defendant is under any obligation to the plaintiff to avoid negligent conduct; it does not include, where there is an obligation, the nature of the obligation and the standard of care.
10. Negligence — Third Parties — Duty.
There is generally no duty to control the conduct of a third person to prevent him or her from causing harm to another absent a special relationship between the actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person’s conduct.
11. Negligence — Medical Malpractice — Duty — Third Parties.
A defendant doctor may be found to have owed a duty to the plaintiff’s decedent, an innocent driver who was within the scope of foreseeable risk resulting from the doctor’s treatment of a patient, where there is a special relationship between the doctor and patient sufficient to place the case within the exception to the common-law rule that no one has a duty to protect an individual who is endangered by the conduct of another.
12. Negligence — Medical Malpractice — Third Parties.
A plaintiff’s claim may properly be considered as one sounding in medical malpractice where, in order for the plaintiff to prove his claim against the defendant doctor under either a negligence or a malpractice theory, it is necessary for the plaintiff to demonstrate: (1) the existence of a physician-patient relationship between the defendant doctor and the third person who was a cause in fact of the plaintiff’s injury; (2) the breach of the applicable standard of care required by the doctor in the treatment of his or her patient; and (S) that the negligent treatment of the patient was a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury.
13. Negligence — Medical Malpractice — Standard of Care —
Evidence.
The applicable standard of care required by a doctor in the treatment of his or her patient requires the doctor to exercise that degree of skill, care and diligence exercised by members of the same profession, practicing in the same or a similar locality, in light of the present state of medical science; in Michigan, the testimony of experts is required to establish that a doctor has breached the standard of care required.
Chambers, Steiner, Mazur, Ornstein & Amlin, P.C. (by Courtney E. Morgan, Jr., and Angela J. Nicita), for plaintiff.
Highland & Currier, P.C. (by John N. Highland), for Bradford G. Capper, D.O.
Before: Hood, P.J., and Bronson and R. L. Tah-VONEN, JJ.
Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
Hood, P.J.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the trial court's order denying his motion for leave to amend his complaint to add a medical malpractice count against defendant Dr. Bradford G. Capper.
On October 13, 1981, plaintiff filed this wrongful death action against defendant Sharlyn Kuzilla alleging that she negligently caused the death of plaintiff's decedent and wife Judith Welke in an automobile crash occurring September 11, 1981. Defendant Dr. Capper owned the automobile driven by defendant Kuzilla. On August 30, 1983, plaintiff filed a motion for leave to amend to add several new tort theories and allegations of damages including a medical malpractice count against Dr. Capper.
In his proposed amended complaint regarding the medical malpractice count, plaintiff alleged that Dr. Capper was defendant Kuzilla's treating physician prior to the accident. As such, Dr. Cap-per allegedly had a duty to protect the public and, in particular, plaintiff's decedent from any imminent foreseeable danger posed by defendant Kuzilla. Dr. Capper allegedly breached this duty by prescribing many controlled substances to defendant Kuzilla without warning her of the drugs' effects on her driving ability and by allowing her to drive his motor vehicle while she was under the influence of the drugs.
On September 9, 1983, the trial court heard arguments regarding the motion to amend the complaint limited to adding only the medical malpractice count because the period of limitations on that action was about to run. Defendant's argument that amending to add a medical malpractice count a few months short of the discovery cut-off date (WCCR 301.3[c]) and so soon before mediation and trial would prejudice defendant convinced the court to deny the motion. Nevertheless, the trial court did not deny the motion to amend the complaint to add the medical malpractice count until it ascertained that plaintiff could still timely file a separate medical malpractice action against Dr. Capper. The trial court made arrangements for plaintiff to file the complaint on the date of hearing despite the fact that the clerk's office was officially closed. Plaintiff did file the separate action on September 9, 1983.
In a subsequent order, the trial court granted plaintiff's remaining motion for leave to amend the complaint. However, the trial court denied plaintiff's motion to consolidate the medical malpractice action with this case. On March 15, 1984, the trial court ordered defendant's motion for summary judgment in the medical malpractice action granted stating that plaintiff failed to state a claim, GCR 1963, 117.2(1), because this state does not recognize a third-party cause of action based upon a physician-patient relationship. Plaintiff also filed a separate claim of appeal from that order. (Docket No. 77810).
Plaintiff argues in this appeal that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion for leave to amend the complaint to add a medical malpractice count. Plaintiff argues that the little time left for discovery was not a sufficient reason alone to find the necessary prejudice to defendant to deny the motion. Plaintiff argues that defendant was already fully aware of the facts underlying the action.
Defendant argues that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because adding a medical malpractice claim would require Dr. Capper's medical malpractice insurer to become involved and, most certainly, new counsel. Trial would have to be delayed to allow additional discovery, particularly deposition of expert witnesses. The original complaint did not act as notice to Dr. Capper's malpractice carrier that it would need to prepare a defense despite the commonality of underlying facts. Defendant also argues, even though the trial court did not decide the motion for this reason, that plaintiff's amendment would have been futile.
GCR 1963, 118.1 permits a party to amend its pleading by leave of court which "shall be freely given when justice so requires". While the decision to grant or deny leave is within the discretion of the trial court, the decision will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. McCalla v Ellis, 129 Mich App 452, 457; 341 NW2d 525 (1983). This discretion is not unlimited.
" 'This language [that "leave shall be freely given when justice so requires"] imposes a limitation on the discretion of the court necessitating a finding that justice would not be served by an amendment to pleadings. The allowance of an amendment is not an act of grace, but a right of a litigant who can show that an amendment will not work an injustice on the opposing party.' Midura v Lincoln Consolidated Schools, 111 Mich App 558, 563; 314 NW2d 691 (1981)." McCalla, supra, p 457.
Such a motion should be granted absent undue delay, bad faith, a dilatory motive or when an amendment would be futile. Meyer v Hubbell, 117 Mich App 699, 705-706; 324 NW2d 139 (1982). Mere lateness in moving to amend is an insuflicent reason to deny the motion, absent unfair prejudice to the opposing party. Rubino v Sterling Heights, 94 Mich App 494, 499-500; 290 NW2d 43 (1979).
In this case, the trial court was faced with an uncomfortable dilemma. Although plaintiff's motion to amend came late in the proceedings, a few months of discovery time was still available to defendant. However, the trial court recognized that adding a medical malpractice count was adding an entirely different theory of which defendant would not previously have had notice and, therefore, time to prepare. Defendant's medical mal practice insurer would need to be notified and new counsel would probably be retained. Discovery would undoubtedly need to be extended by order. Even though plaintiff stated that he was willing to agree to an extension of discovery, the trial court could not guarantee that the Chief Judge of the Wayne County Circuit Court would grant such an extension. See WCCR 301.3(g)(1).
We find that because prejudice to defendant was possible, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for leave to amend to add the medical malpractice count. Nevertheless, we do so only given the special circumstances of this case, i.e., that the trial court compromised the interests of both parties by denying the motion but facilitated plaintiff's filing of the medical malpractice action in a timely manner. By ruling in this manner, the trial court furthered the spirit of GCR 1963, 118.1, not by granting the motion for leave to amend, but by helping plaintiff preserve the cause of action he desired to add to the complaint. Thus, neither plaintiff nor defendant were ultimately prejudiced.
Because we affirm on the grounds given by the trial court, we need not address defendant's argument that, alternatively, the trial court could have denied plaintiff's motion because his medical malpractice claim would have been futile. We do, however, refer defendant to this Court's recent decision in Duvall v Goldin, 139 Mich App 342; 362 NW2d 275 (1984).
Affirmed.
R. L. Tahvonen, J., concurred.