Case Name: Joseph YASAK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RETIREMENT BOARD OF THE POLICEMEN'S ANNUITY AND BENEFIT FUND OF CHICAGO, Defendant-Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2004-02-04
Citations: 357 F.3d 677
Docket Number: No. 03-1733
Parties: Joseph YASAK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RETIREMENT BOARD OF THE POLICEMEN’S ANNUITY AND BENEFIT FUND OF CHICAGO, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: Before BAUER, RIPPLE, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 3d Series
Volume: 357
Pages: 677–684

Head Matter:
Joseph YASAK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RETIREMENT BOARD OF THE POLICEMEN’S ANNUITY AND BENEFIT FUND OF CHICAGO, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 03-1733.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Argued Sept. 19, 2003.
Decided Feb. 4, 2004.
Thomas J. Pleines (argued), Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
David R. Kugler (argued), Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before BAUER, RIPPLE, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge.
Joseph Yasak was convicted of a federal felony, and his request for pension benefits was denied as a result. Yasak then applied for and received a refund of his pension contributions. Years later, Yasak received a presidential pardon, and attempted to get his pension benefits restored. The pension board denied Yasak's request, and a federal district court agreed that the pension board had no duty to reinstate benefits. Because we find that Yasak forfeited his property interest in his pension when he elected to receive a refund of his pension contributions, we affirm the district court's decision.
I. BACKGROUND
Joseph Yasak served as a Chicago police officer for almost twenty-eight years before retiring in September 1988. During that period, Yasak paid a portion of his salary into a police pension fund controlled by the Retirement Board of the Policemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago (the Board). In December 1988, Yasak was convicted of making false declarations before a grand jury, a federal felony under 18 U.S.C. § 1623. The Board denied Ya-sak's request for pension benefits in April 1991, on the ground that pursuant to 40 III. Comp. Stat. 5/5-227, Yasak had forfeited his entitlement to pension benefits as a result of his felony conviction. Yasak then applied for and received a refund of his contributions to the fund. The Board's 1991 check was lost, so Yasak was issued a replacement check in January 1995, which he cashed.
Yasak received a full and unconditional pardon from former President William Jefferson Clinton in January 2001. In May 2001, Yasak asked the Board to restore his pension benefits both prospectively and retroactively, and provided a copy of the pardon to the Board. During the next six months, Yasak repeatedly asked the Board for various documents, and to calculate how much money he needed to repay to the fund to get benefits reinstated for himself and his wife. He also requested a hearing on his claim. Other than the issuance of two subpoenas that Yasak requested, Yasak received no response from the Board until December 2001, when the Board sent him a letter denying his claim. In the letter, the Board asserted that it lacked jurisdiction to reconsider its 1991 decision, and that even if it had jurisdiction, state law precluded reinstatement of benefits.
Yasak sought a declaratory judgment in federal district court in January 2002. Count I alleged that, as a result of his pardon, he had a property interest in his pension benefits, and the Board had deprived him of his property without substantive and procedural due process in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Yasak also filed a petition for administrative review of the Board's decision in the Circuit Court of Cook County, .and amended his federal complaint in March 2002 to include the administrative review claim; this became Count II.
The Board moved for dismissal under either Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) or (6). After extensive briefing, the district court denied the Board's motion for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) as to Count I, but declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Count II. It then granted the Board's motion to dismiss Count I under Rule 12(b)(6), finding that Yasak's voluntary acceptance of the refund of his pension contributions resulted in the relinquishment of his property interest in his pension, and Yasak's pardon did not reverse the effects of his acceptance. Yasak appeals the dismissal of Count I.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
We review de novo a district court's dismissal of a complaint under Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), "examining a plaintiffs factual allegations and any inferences reasonably drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 648 (7th Cir.2001). Dismissal is warranted "only if the plaintiff could prove no set of facts in support of his claims that would entitle him to relief." Id.
B. The Due Process Claims
The crux of Yasak's argument on appeal is as follows. By denying Yasak his pension benefits, the state punished Yasak for his conviction. Although Yasak then received a refund of his pension contributions, his receipt of the refund was involuntary. Therefore, he never relinquished his property interest in his pension, and the issuance of the presidential pardon necessitates reinstatement of his pension benefits. Failure to reinstate his benefits violates the rule that once an individual receives a pardon, the state can no longer punish the individual for the crime for which he was pardoned. Although we sympathize with Yasak's predicament, we disagree with many of his assertions.
Yasak rightly notes that the forfeiture of his pension benefits following his felony conviction was intended to be a punishment for his conviction. See Devoney v. Ret. Bd. of the Policemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund for the City of Chicago, 199 Ill.2d 414, 264 Ill.Dec. 95, 769 N.E.2d 932, 935 (2002) (explaining that the purpose of 40 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/5-227 is to " 'discourage official malfeasance by denying the public servant convicted of unfaithfulness to his trust the retirement benefits to which he otherwise would have been entitled' ") (quoting Kerner v. State Employees' Ret. Sys., 72 Ill.2d 507, 21 Ill.Dec. 879, 382 N.E.2d 243, 246 (1978)). We further agree that in light of his pardon, the state cannot continue to punish Yasak for his conviction. As we explained in Bjerkan v. United States, 529 F.2d 125, 127-28 (7th Cir.1975), "after a pardon, a state may not take cognizance of the offense pardoned in any way which would constitute a 'punishment.' " See also Carlesi v. New York, 233 U.S. 51, 57, 34 S.Ct. 576, 58 L.Ed. 843 (1914).
However, our analysis diverges from Yasak's when we consider his contention that his acceptance of the refund was involuntary. Notwithstanding Yasak's claim to the contrary, the Board did not force Yasak to accept a refund of his pension contributions. Yasak himself filled out an application and requested a refund. Indeed, Yasak's own complaint states the following: "Plaintiff applied for a refund of his contributions and the Board issued a refund to him in April 1991." (emphasis added). Yasak argues that because we must draw all reasonable inferences in his favor when reviewing the dismissal of his complaint, a finding that he voluntarily initiated the refund process is an impermissible inference. However, under the circumstances, this is not an impermissible inference, but rather a rational conclusion dictated by Yasak's own language. Indeed, based on the pleadings, it would be unreasonable to assume that Yasak's actions were anything but voluntary. See Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399, 407 (7th Cir.2000) ("[WJhile we must draw reasonable inferences in the [plaintiffs'] favor, we should not draw inferences that while theoretically plausible are inconsistent with the pleadings.") (emphasis in original); cf. Mills v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 171 F.3d 450, 459 (7th Cir.1999) (explaining that in the summary judgment context, "while any inferences drawn from the facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, only reasonable inferences need be made").
Once we accept the fact that Yasak voluntarily sought a refund, it becomes clear that the issuance of the pardon does not trigger reinstatement of his pension benefits. In Knote v. United States, the Supreme Court stated that
[a] pardon is an act of grace by which an offender is released from the consequences of his offence, so far as such release is practicable and within control of the pardoning power.... It gives [the offender] a new credit and capacity, and rehabilitates him to that extent in his former position. But it does not make amends for the past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender in his person by imprisonment, forced labor, or otherwise. .
95 U.S. 149, 153, 13 Ct.Cl. 517, 24 L.Ed. 442 (1877). Later cases have made clear that numerous acts committed by the state may be deemed "consequences of [an] of-fence" from which pardons provide relief. See, e.g., Carlesi, 233 U.S. at 57, 34 S.Ct. 576 (stating that the "act of the state in taking into consideration a prior conviction" despite a pardon would be "void" if "it was in any just sense a punishment" for the prior conviction); Bjerkan, 529 F.2d at 128 (explaining that the deprivation of basic civil rights "by a state," such as the right to vote, would constitute punishment in violation of a pardon).
However, the pardon power has its limits. For example, we stated in Grossgold v. Supreme Court of Illinois, 557 F.2d 122, 126 (7th Cir.1977), that "a presidential pardon does not relieve an attorney from discipline," while the Third Circuit held in United States v. Noonan, 906 F.2d 952, 960 (3d Cir.1990), that a pardon does not warrant expunction of all court records relating to an individual's conviction. More recently, the D.C. Circuit determined that a pardon does not entitle an individual who has been indicted, but not convicted, to attorneys' fees incurred as a result of an investigation conducted by independent counsel. See In re North, 62 F.3d 1434, 1438 (D.C.Cir.1994).
Similarly, the case law does not suggest that a pardon prevents an individual from having to deal with the consequences of his own actions taken in response to his conviction. Unlike the forfeiture of Yasak's pension benefits, the provision of the refund was not a punishment meted out by the state on account of Yasak's conviction, but resulted instead from a conscious decision on Yasak's part to regain control of his money. The consequence of this decision is that Yasak triggered the application of 40 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/5 — 163(c), and thus voluntarily relinquished his property interest in his pension. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972) (explaining that property interests are created and defined by sources other than the Constitution, such as state law). A consequence of this nature falls squarely within the "otherwise" umbrella described above in Knote, so Yasak's pardon does not entitle him to relief. Because Yasak has no property interest in his pension, and a cognizable property interest is a prerequisite for Ya-sak's success on his due process claims, his claims necessarily fail. See Brown v. City of Lake Geneva, 919 F.2d 1299, 1301 (7th Cir.1990) ("It is well established that the threshold requirement for any successful due process claim is the deprivation of a liberty or property interest.").
We note that rather than claiming his refund, Yasak could have waited out the pardon process and thus retained his property interest. No law, as far as we can tell, required Yasak to seek his refund within a certain time frame. Cf. Shields v. Judges Ret. Sys. of Ill., 204 Ill.2d 488, 274 Ill.Dec. 424, 791 N.E.2d 516, 517 (2003) (noting that a state court judge who was denied pension benefits in 1992 following numerous felony convictions did not seek a refund until 1999 because he wanted to see how the appeals process and pardon process turned out). After Yasak was pardoned, if the Board still had Yasak's pension contributions and was simply refusing to pay his benefits, the denial of benefits could be deemed punitive and reinstatement might be warranted. See Osborn v. United States, 91 U.S. 474, 477, 23 L.Ed. 388 (1875) (holding that a pardoned individual was entitled to recover from various court officers the proceeds from his previously forfeited property).
Alternatively, if the Board had sent Ya-sak a refund check in the absence of an application and over Yasak's objections, an argument could be made that Yasak was punished by the provision of the refund, and the Board's refusal to take notice of the pardon constitutes further punishment. Reinstatement might well be in order under such circumstances.
Unfortunately for Yasak, he chose to get his money sooner rather than later, and as a result, relinquished his property interest in his pension benefits at his own election. Because Yasak's own actions (as opposed to the state's reaction to his conviction) caused his current dilemma, the Board is not required to "make amends for the past" by way of reinstatement of benefits. Knote, 95 U.S. at 153, 95 U.S. 149. We therefore see no error in the district court's analysis of Yasak's claim.
III. CONCLUSION
Although we recognize that Yasak made a difficult choice, we are unable to alter the consequences of his decision. Accordingly, the district court's decision is Affirmed.
. In his initial appellate brief, Yasak states that "[h]is livelihood of twenty-eight (28) years was over and he had one of two choices to make. He could either accept the refund or he could allow the fund to retain thousands of dollars of his money. [His] acceptance of the fund was compelled by the overwhelming circumstances in which he found himself. [He] truly had no choice but to accept the refund." We understand that the thought of letting the Board retain his money might have been unpalatable to Yasak. However, he fails to cite any support for his argument that he sought the refund under duress. (As an aside, we note that it seems unlikely that financial concerns drove Yasak's decision, as he received a refund check in 1991, but does not complain about the fact that the check was lost and apparently not replaced and cashed until 1995.)
. For the first time in his reply brief, Yasak claims that his acceptance of a refund is of no consequence because under 40 Ill. Comp Stat. 5/5-163(a) & 5/5-227, the Board was required to give him a refund whether he applied for one or not. Not only does this argument come too late, see Wilson v. Giesen, 956 F.2d 738, 741 (7th Cir.1992), but even if we agreed that the statutes impose such a requirement, Yasak offers no evidence that the Board was required to give Yasak his refund in 1991 as opposed to some later date, and thus fails to challenge persuasively the Board's argument that Yasak's actions alone triggered the provision of the refund in this instance.
. Yasak concedes that "certain state laws may be enforced if their operation is not dependent on the fact of a conviction." According to 40 III Comp. Stat. 5/5-163(c), "[a] policeman who withdraws the amount credited to him surrenders and forfeits all rights to any annuity or other benefit from the fund, for himself and for any other person or persons who might otherwise have benefitted through him." Although provisions for reinstatement of benefits following forfeiture are discussed in 40 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/5-164, this option applies to police officers who re-enter the police force, and Yasak has passed the age limit for re-entry. Unlike 40 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/5-227 (which precludes payment of pension benefits to police officers convicted of certain felonies), sections 5/5 — 163(c) and 5/5-164 come into play here not because Yasak was convicted, but rather because he chose to withdraw the money that was credited to him. Because the statutes' relevance is not dependent on Yasak's conviction, these rules may be enforced to Yasak's detriment.
. Ex Parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 71 U.S. 333, 18 L.Ed. 366 (1866), does not compel a contrary result. In that case, an act of Congress was in direct conflict with the terms of a presidential pardon, and the Supreme Court determined (among other things) that the pardon took precedence. Id. at 380-81. Unlike Yasak, beyond committing the offense for which he was pardoned, the Garland petitioner played no role in creating the unfortunate circumstances in which he found himself.
. Yasak asks us to expand the list of "basic civil rights" discussed in Bjerkan v. United States, 529 F.2d 125, 128 (7th Cir.1975) (namely, the right to serve on juries, the right to vote, and the right to work in certain professions) to include the right to "restoration of vested annuity benefits created by state law." As Yasak has not provided a compelling reason for doing so, we decline the invitation.