Case Name: PEOPLE v. MEADOWS
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1973-04-26
Citations: 46 Mich. App. 741
Docket Number: Docket No. 12936
Parties: PEOPLE v MEADOWS
Judges: Before: Lesinski, C. J., and Levin and V. J. Brennan, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 46
Pages: 741–747

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v MEADOWS
Opinion op the Court
1. Criminal Law — Witnesses—Impeachment—Juvenile Records.
The defendant in a criminal trial was entitled to use the juvenile record of a witness against him to impeach the credibility of the witness.
Dissent by Lesinski, C. J.
2. Criminal Law — Witnesses—Juvenile Records.
A witness’s past as a minor may be brought before the court in evidence so long as it is not done by use of a juvenile record, but juvenile records as such are not admissible in evidence; the use of a juvenile record for impeachment purposes is barred (MCLA 712A.23).
3. Criminal Law — Witnesses—Credibility—Juvenile Records.
A trial judge applied the correct rule of law when he prevented the use of the juvenile, record of a witness to impeach him as a witness against a defendant because the material conduct of an individual being examined as a witness can be used to impeach his credibility even though this conduct occurred while he was a minor, so long as it is not the juvenile record made in the probate court that is used to do so.
Appeal from Recorder’s Court of Detroit, Karl F. Zick, J.
Submitted Division 1 June 20, 1972, at Detroit.
(Docket No. 12936.)
Decided April 26, 1973.
Leave to appeal applied for.
Zerious Meadows was convicted of first-degree murder. Defendant appeals.
Reversed and remanded for new trial.
Reference for Points in Headnotes
[1-3] 58 Am Jur, Witnesses § 736.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William L. Cabalan, Prosecuting Attorney, Dominick R. Carnovale, Chief, Appellate Department, and Robert A. Reuther, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Carl Ziemba, for defendant on appeal.
Before: Lesinski, C. J., and Levin and V. J. Brennan, JJ.

Opinion:
Levin, J.
The defendant, Zerious Meadows, was convicted by a jury of first-degree murder. MCLA 750.316; MSA 28.548. The victims lost their lives in a house fire which the people claim and the jury found was started by the defendant. The defense was alibi.
The people's evidence tended to show that, shortly before the fire, the defendant, age 16 at the time, and other young men were on the grounds near the house.
Jeffrey Coleman, age 15 at the time of the trial, was acquainted with the defendant. He was described by the trial judge in his instructions to the jury as the people's "key-witness". Coleman testified that he observed the defendant ignite a rag hanging out of the mouth of a Coke bottle and throw the bottle against the house, and also saw him ignite a cushion which had been stuffed into a broken window of the house. No other witness so directly implicated the defendant as the instigator of the conflagration.
On cross examination Coleman acknowledged that he was then confined at the Wayne County Youth Home because he was AWOL from the Boys' Training School. He acknowledged that he had been to the youth home quite a number of times. He was then asked whether he had been there "for any larcenies, or stealing". He responded, "yes". At this point, the prosecutor objected, and the jury was excused. The judge ruled that the defendant's lawyer could inquire regarding Coleman's record at the Boys' Training School but not with regard to any other contact with the Juvenile Court.
In People v Davies, 34 Mich App 19 (1971), leave den 385 Mich 773, we held that, while a person's history of juvenile offenses may not, under the statute, be used "against" him, it is reversible error to prevent use of a witness's juvenile record to impeach his credibility when he testifies against someone else. Similarly, see People v Basemore, 36 Mich App 256 (1971), and People v Yacks, 38 Mich App 437, 443, where we further held that a defendant on direct appeal was entitled to the benefit of the rule stated in Davies even though the appealing defendant's case was tried before Davies was decided. 3****The defendant Meadows was entitled to use Coleman's juvenile record to impeach his credibility.
The other assignments of error are without merit.
The judge in his instructions merely repeated a concession made by defendant's lawyer. The judge clearly instructed the jurors that they could not find the defendant guilty unless they found all the essential elements of the crime. There was no objection to the instructions given. There was no instructional error.
We likewise find without merit the claim that the instructions were prejudicially disjointed and confusing. Again, there was no objection. No error.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
V. J. Brennan, J., concurred.
MCLA 712A.23; MSA 27.3178(598.23).
Davies was decided May 21, 1971. Meadows' trial commenced September 1,1971.
People v Farrar, 36 Mich App 294 (1971), is distinguishable.
Firstly, there is nothing on this record "which tends to disclose the intent of performing an act of judicial discretion; hence there was no exercise thereof'. Hileman v Indreica, 385 Mich 1, 17 (1971).
Moreover, it was brought out that one of the defendant Meadows' • witnesses had been convicted on two occasions of committing a criminal offense. The judge charged the jury that it could consider such prior convictions of crime as bearing upon the weight and credibility to be given to the witness's testimony. The judge refused to give a like charge regarding juvenile witness Coleman.
Surely, the judge would not have exercised his discretion to allow evidence of prior conviction record to be used to impeach the credibility of a witness for the defendant but excluded evidence of prior conviction record when offered to impeach the credibility of a witness who testified against the defendant.
Secondly, as set forth in Luck v United States, 121 US App DC 151, 156; 348 F2d 763, 768 (1965), the situation of a defendant on trial and of a witness, who is not himself an accused person, are entirely different, insofar as the consequence to the witness of allowing the jury to hear derogatory information affecting the witness's credibility is concerned. A non-party witness does not lose his case if the jury decides on the strength of such information to disbelieve him.