Case Name: OTIS ELEVATOR COMPANY, a Corporation, and Harry E. Hampton, Plaintiffs in Error, v. Goldie MELOTT, Defendant in Error
Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oklahoma
Decision Date: 1954-11-16
Citations: 281 P.2d 408
Docket Number: No. 35892
Parties: OTIS ELEVATOR COMPANY, a Corporation, and Harry E. Hampton, Plaintiffs in Error, v. Goldie MELOTT, Defendant in Error.
Judges: JOHNSON, DAVISON, ARNOLD and BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Pacific Reporter 2d
Volume: 281
Pages: 408–421

Head Matter:
OTIS ELEVATOR COMPANY, a Corporation, and Harry E. Hampton, Plaintiffs in Error, v. Goldie MELOTT, Defendant in Error.
No. 35892.
Supreme Court of Oklahoma.
Nov. 16, 1954.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 15, 1955.
Application for Leave to File Second Petition for Rehearing Denied March 8, 1955.
Mart Brown and Clark Hurd, Oklahoma City, John L. Goode, Shawnee, for plaintiffs in error.
Stevens & Winterringer, Shawnee, for defendant in error.

Opinion:
WELCH, Justice.
Mrs. Goldie Melott sued Otis Elevator Company, a corporation, and Harry E. Hampton for damages for personal injuries which she sustained. Verdict and judgment were for the plaintiff and against the defendants. The defendants contend the trial court was in error in overruling defendants' demurrer to plaintiff's evidence and defendants' motion for a directed verdict.
The circumstances in proof show that the plaintiff was injured when she fell into an elevator shaft in a building belonging to the Masonic Temple Association. The plaintiff was employed by the said Association to operate an elevator in the said building. The building is a six story structure and has an elevator shaft containing two elevators. The shaft extends from a point above the level of the sixth floor to a point below the basement floor. The elevators are about two feet apart when located at the same floor level and will hereinafter be referred to as the East Elevator and the West Elevator. The shaft is equipped with separate sliding doors at each floor level of the building for entrance to the elevators. At each said entrance place and inside the shaft there is a jointed metal arm which is attached at one end to the shaft wall, and at the other end to the shaft door. When the arm is in horizontal position and fully extended, the door is closed and is locked in such position and when the arm is pulled downward at the joint it serves to release the door from a locked position and to slide the door open. There is a small round hole in each shaft door located slightly above the place of the joint in the horizontal arm. A key or metal rod may be inserted through the door from outside the elevator and used to push downward the arm at its joint and release the door from a locked position.
At the time of the plaintiff's fall into the elevator shaft and for some years before, the defendant corporation had been under contract with the building owner to make monthly inspections of the elevators and accessory equipment and to report any defects found. The defendant, Hampton, as the employee of the said corporation had made such periodic inspections.
According to testimony of the plaintiff she had been operating the west elevator for a period of five years during the workdays of each week from 8:30 a. m. to 5 p. m. and a Mrs. Williams had been operating the east elevator for three years during the work-days thereof from 7:15 a. m. to 4:00 p. m. It was the rule of the building owner and the custom and practice for each operator to be off duty one hour each day at lunch time and for a 15 minute rest period at mid-morning and mid-afternoon each day. Mrs. Williams' lunch period was from 11 a. m. to 12 noon each day, and the plaintiff's lunch period was from 12 noon to 1:00 p. m. Their respective rest periods were taken at separate times each morning and afternoon, it being the rule, custom 'and practice to keep one elevator operating at all times during each work-day from 7:15 a. m. to 5 p. m. Each operator was furnished an elevator key and required to keep said key inside the elevator at all times that the elevator was in operation. According to rules, custom and practice, each time an operator left her elevator at rest periods, lunch period, and at the end of the day, the elevator was parked at the street floor level of the building, the lights inside the elevator were turned off, the elevator key was removed from its hook or place inside the elevator and on departure of the operator from the elevator the door was closed. The operator would then place the elevator key on a large mail box that was attached to a wall of the building and near the elevator entrance. On return to work, and to put the elevator in operation the operator would obtain the key from the mail box and insert the key in a hole through the shaft door and thereby move the arm locking device inside the door and slide the door to an opening sufficient for insertion of fingers or hands whereby the door would be further opened to permit entrance into the elevator. The elevators are without windows and are dark inside when the shaft doors are closed unless the lights inside are on. The switches for the lights are inside the elevators.
The plaintiff testified that the defendant Hampton had made inspections of the elevators on an average of once each month for a period of three years prior to the date she sustained her injury, and such inspections were made at various times of the day. On several occasions the defendant Hampton had worked on the doors to the elevators. On one occasion when she came to work at 8:30 o'clock in the morning she found the said-defendant and the building superintendent working on the west elevator; that Hampton had at times inspected and worked on elevators during a rest period or lunch period of the plaintiff, or the rest period or lunch period of Mrs. Williams. On one occasion the plaintiff had closed her elevator and left her key on the mail box and gone to lunch and when she returned no key was on the mail box and she pushed a button for the elevator service and she heard the elevator in movement and that it stopped at the street floor level and doors were opened from the inside and the defendant Hampton and the building superintendent, and her key, were inside the elevator.
The plaintiff testified that on an occasion in the month preceding the date of her injury that the defendant Hampton and the building superintendent had been working on her elevator and were working in the penthouse at the top of the elevator shaft when they rang for the elevator and that they came down on the plaintiff's elevator; •that Mrs. Williams had left her elevator for her 2 o'clock off duty rest period; that Hampton went over to the east elevator door and took something and opened the elevator door and requested the plaintiff to take over the operation of Mrs. Williams' elevator. The plaintiff noticed a key on the mail box and said to Hampton, "Why, you didn't get Mrs. Williams' key off the box. She doesn't know I'm over here running her elevator." Hampton said, "That's right. I'm glad you noticed .it." The plaintiff walked out and got the key from off the box and brought it into the east elevator and began operating the east elevator.
According to the testimony of the plaintiff, on the day of her injury the defendant Hampton and the building superintendent were working on the east elevator, during the regular time for Mrs. Williams' lunch period from 11 a. m. to 12 noon. The plaintiff was operating the west elevator in regular passenger service. At 12 o'clock, and the time when Mrs. Williams was due from lunch, the plaintiff was bringing down a load of passengers when she heard the door to the east elevator open an heard that elevator in movement and heard it stop at the third and fourth floor levels. The plaintiff continued downward to the street floor level where she -unloaded her passengers and turned out the light in the west elevator and removed the elevator key and closed the door thereto. She placed the key on the mail box and went out to lunch. She returned from lunch at 1:0O o'clock and removed the key from the mailbox and un-docked the door to the west elevator. She then pushed on the door to slide it open and while she was pushing and the door was opening she stepped into the opening and fell into the elevator shaft. She fell a distance of about sixteen feet. She landed on her foot and then to a sitting position and then fell over on her back at the bottom of the elevator shaft. From there she looked up and observed the east elevator going up and down the shaft and the west elevator parked near the top of the shaft. She heard Mrs. Williams' voice issue from the east elevator, and Mrs. Williams) said, "Goldie, (the plaintiff), has fallen down the elevator shaft." She then heard the defendant Hampton's voice issuing from the west elevator or from the penthouse above the elevator and he said, "Where is she ?" Immediately she heard the door to the west elevator open and close and saw and heard the elevator descend to the street floor level. She then heard fast steps in rapid succession on the stairway leading from the street floor level to the basement floor level, and immediately thereafter the shaft door at the basement floor level opened and Hampton and the building superintendent jumped from the opening into the bottom of the shaft where the plaintiff lay.
Several witnesses testified that on the day of the plaintiff's injury they had ridden the east elevator during the time from 12 o'clock noon to 1 o'clock p. m., and that at such times the east elevator was being operated by Mrs. Williams.
In an action for damages based on negligence a demurrer to the plaintiff's evidence presented no question as to the plaintiff's negligence. The sole question thereby presented is whether the evidence in any reasonable inference shows the defendant guilty of negligence, a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury. Breno v. Weaver, 208 Okl. 14, 252 P.2d 487. A demurrer to evidence admits the truth of all the evidence and admits the existence of all of the facts which the evidence, together with all inferences that may reasonably and logically be drawn therefrom, in the slightest degree tend to prove. Roy v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 153 Okl. 270, 4 P.2d 1038.
Herein, excluding any negligence on the part of the plaintiff, it is apparent that the removal of the elevator from the street floor level during the absence of the plaintiff was a cause of the plaintiff's injuries. The charge of negligence against the defendants, the' cause of the plaintiff's injury, depends on the ultimate fact that Hampton imprudently removed the elevator.
In the foregoing testimony it is made to appear that Hampton was aware of the custom and practice of the elevator operators to close and park their elevators at the street floor level when they went off duty at lunch time or otherwise, and at such times to leave their elevator key on the mail box, and that a key on the mail box when an operator returned was a signal to the operator that the elevator was in place at the street floor level.
According to testimony above noted, the defendant Hampton was on the premises where the plaintiff was employed on the day that the plaintiff was injured, and Hampton was there for the purpose of inspecting the elevators. Hampton was in the business of his employer, the corporate defendant.
On former occasions in making inspections or servicing the equipment the defendant Hampton had operated and directed the operations of the elevators and had opened the shaft door to the elevator without' use of'the operator's key. On the date of the plaintiff's injury she closed and parked the west elevator at the street floor level and left her key on the mail box and went to lunch. At the time she closed the elevator the east elevator was being operated. In the time of her absence for lunch several persons rode on the east elevator being operated by Mrs. Williams. When the plaintiff returned from her lunch her key was on the mail box, and at the time she used the key to open the shaft door to the west elevator Mrs. Williams was operating the east elevator and the west elevator was parked at or near the top of the elevator shaft and the defendant Hampton was in or about the west elevator.
We find the circumstances in proof suggest, .and reasonably tend to prove, that Hampton removed the elevator from the street floor level in the absence of the plaintiff and at a time when the plaintiff's key .was on the mail box, and that Hampton so acted in the knowledge that the plaintiff might return and act on the assumption that the elevator was at the street floor level and to her possible injury; that plaintiff did so .act and to her injury. Accordingly, we find there was evidence authorizing an inference of negligence of the defendants, a cause of the plaintiff's injury. We conclude that defendants' demurrer and defendants' motion for directed verdict were properly overruled.
The defendants suggest that plaintiff relies entirely on circumstantial evidence to establish her allegations and that there was no direct evidence to establish any of the ultimate facts, but the contrary.
The defendants cite the rule against the piling of inference on inference as the basis of a conclusion. But here we have circumstances in proof tending to establish the ultimate facts from which the inference of negligence may.be drawn. There are evi-dentiary facts to support a conclusion of negligence and resulting injury.
In the consideration of the defendants' motion for a directed verdict, likewise as in consideration of the defendants' demurrer to the plaintiff's evidence, the evidence offered by the defendants and directed against the circumstances shown in the plaintiff's proof may not be considered. The credibility of witnesses is a matter for the exclusive determination of the trier of the facts. The jury, if it so decides, may accept circumstantial evidence on one side and reject positive testimony presented on the same point by the other side, when there is proof of circumstances reasonably tending to establish the facts and support the conclusion reached. Greenland v. Gilliam, 206 Okl. 85, 241 P.2d 384.
It is a settled rule that if there is any evidence, including every reasonable inference the jury could have drawn from the same, reasonably tending to support the verdict this court will not reverse the case for insufficient evidence. Reed v. Scott, 50 Okl. 757, 151 P. 484.
The defendants complain of the instructions and assert there was fundamental error in that the court failed to give any instructions outlining the parties' respective theories with refereiice to the elevator keys.
In the instructions in a statement of all the allegations of the plaintiff's petition there is mentioned an allegation concerning a custom and practice of the elevator operators in their use of elevator keys, and allegations to the effect that the plaintiff on the day of her injury, at 12:05 p. m. parked the west elevator and placed her key on the mail box and went to lunch and returned at 1 p. m. and removed the key from the mail box and used it to open the west elevator door. There follows a statement of the substance of the defendants' answer wherein the defendants generally deny all the allegations of the plaintiff's petition, and plead contributory negligence and unavoidable accident.
In the court's instruction numbered two the jury was advised that the statement of the pleadings defines the issues to be tried, arid the jury was told that the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to establish by a preponderance of the evidence all of the material allegations of the petition, and unless the plaintiff has proved these allegations by a preponderance of the evidence, verdict must be for the defendants.
In the court's instruction numbered five the issue is presented as to whether or not the defendant Hampton moved the west elevator just before the plaintiff's accident, knowing of the existence of certain customs of the manner of operation of the elevators by the plaintiff.
We are of the opinion that the instructions in a general way covered the issues pertaining to the keys and all the decisive issues raised by the pleadings and evidence. It is noted that the defendant made no request for a more detailed instruction in reference to the elevator keys.
In Sanders v. C. P. Carter Const. Co., 206 Okl. 484, 244 P.2d 822, 824, said the Court:
"It is the duty of the trial court in instructing the jury on its own motion to instruct upon the decisive issues raised by the pleadings and evidence in the case; but where the trial court does in a general way in its instruction instruct as to all of such issues and either party desires a more specific instruction as to any of such issues it is his duty to request such an instruction. In the absence of such request the court is not required to do so."
We hold the foregoing rule is here applicable.
The defendants assert-that instruction numbered five given by the court was erroneous and prejudical to the defendants in that same invades the province of the jury.
In instruction numbered five the jury was advised that the plaintiff alleges in her petition certain facts and events. The jury was instructed that if they find these certain facts and events from a preponderance of the evidence in the case, and further find that plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence, then the jury would be warranted in finding a verdict for the plaintiff.
In the instruction it is not assumed that any fact has been proved. The jury is instructed that it is to determine from the evidence in the case if a certain state of facts as alleged has been proved. We find no basis for the charge that the court invaded the province of the jury.
The defendants contend that in instruction numbered five there is set out a material issue not raised by the pleadings and which confused and misled the jury and prejudiced the rights of the defendants.
Arguments rest on an asserted distinction between an allegation that Hampton moved the elevator and a charge that the elevator was moved by Hampton personally, or at his direction.
In the instructions it is set out that plaintiff alleges in her petition that Hampton moved the west elevator at a certain time and that Hampton was possessed of certain knowledge. There follows an instruction upon an hypothesis of the evidence showing that the west elevator was moved by Hampton personally, or at his direction, at the certain time and that Hampton was possessed of certain knowledge.
Obviously, any responsibility of Hampton for moving the elevator under particular circumstances and knowledge would be the same as if he caused the elevator to be moved under the particular circumstances and knowledge, and that an allegation that he moved the elevator under particular circumstances is a sufficient basis for the introduction of evidence tending to prove he either moved the elevator or caused it' to be moved under the said circumstances.
In the instruction we find no departure from the issues raised in the pleadings and evidence, nor any reason to believe that the jury was confused and misled.
The defendants contend the court erred in refusing to give certain requested instructions.
In defendants' requested instructions numbered 8 and 9 the court was requested to instruct the jury on the hypothesis of a finding from the evidence that a third party, the Masonic Building Association, was guilty of negligence, the cause of the plaintiff's injury. We do not find that such an issue was presented by the pleadings and evidence, and accordingly hold that the requested instructions on such issue were properly refused.
In defendants' requested instructions numbered five and ten the court was requested to instruct the jury concerning the plaintiff's duty of exercising care for her safety and concerning the defendants' contentions as to certain conclusions and circumstances in- proof. Upon these bases the court was requested to instruct the jury respecting a finding that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence and that such contributed to her injury.
We find the propositions stated in the requested instructions were substantially covered by the instructions given, wherein the court set forth a full statement of the pleadings of the parties and instructed on the burden of proof and defined the terms, negligence, ordinary care, proximate cause and contributory negligence.
It is not error to refuse to give requested instructions where the propositions therein stated are substantially and correctly covered by other instructions given. Eagle-Picher Mining & Smelting Co. v. Drinkwine, 192 Okl. 662, 141 P.2d 66.
The defendants assert the trial court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial because of improper and prejudicial remarks .to the jury made by the counsel for plaintiff in his closing argument.
During closing argument to the jury counsel for the plaintiff stated: "You cannot commit legal error in returning a verdict for the plaintiff for the amount sued for if you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the allegations of' her petition are true. If this were not so, the court would not have given you this case, but would have taken it away from you."
The remarks of counsel were improper in so far as they might be construed as tending to argue or imply that the judge favored plaintiff's side, however, any such effect of the remarks appears undone in the fact that the court promptly sustained an objection to the remarks. There were no further remarks or argument of similar tenor or tendency, and apparently the trial court was of the view the remarks, in question created no impression on the jury, and would not influence their verdict. Upon an examination of the record we are of the opinion that the jury was not improperly influenced by the argument and hold that the impropriety of the plaintiff's counsel, if any, did not affect the substantial rights of the defendants.
The defendants assert that the judgment in the amount of $67,000 is so excessive as to indicate conclusively that the jury was actuated by bias, prejudice, or passion, and that the trial court committed reversible error in not allowing defendants' motion for new trial.
According to testimony and evidence the plaintiff, from the fall into the elevator pit, sustained a permanently painful and disabling injury to her pelvis, spine and body, and at the time she was injured she was employed at a salary of $100 per month, and had a life expectancy of thirty years.
There is no fixed rule or standard whereby damages for pain and suffering can be measured and the amount to be awarded for pain and suffering must be left to the judgment of the jury, subject only to correction by the courts for abuse and passionate exercise. 15 Am.Jur. Damages, § 71.
Herein there is evidence to show that as a result of her injury the plaintiff suffered detriment in a large amount in loss of earning capacity and that as a consequence of said injury she has suffered great pain, and in reasonable certainty or probability such pain and suffering and loss of earning, capacity will continue for the balance oilier life. We cannot say that the amount assessed as damages by the jury has no reasonable relation to the evidence. We find in the record no evidence of passion or prejudice of the jury toward defendants, and no reason to believe such existed by reason- of the amount of the verdict.
The judgment is affirmed.
JOHNSON, DAVISON, ARNOLD and BLACKBIRD, JJ., concur.
HALLEY, C. J., CORN, O'NEAL and WILLIAMS, JJ., dissent.