Case Name: Billy WHITED, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HOME DEPOT U.S.A., INC., Defendant-Appellee
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1996-04-03
Citations: 712 So. 2d 97
Docket Number: No. 27938-CA
Parties: Billy WHITED, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HOME DEPOT U.S.A., INC., Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: Before HIGHTOWER, BROWN and GASKINS, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 712
Pages: 97–105

Head Matter:
Billy WHITED, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HOME DEPOT U.S.A., INC., Defendant-Appellee.
No. 27938-CA.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
April 3, 1996.
Opinion Accepting Original Dissent on Rehearing Aug. 21,1996.
Writ Denied Nov. 22, 1996.
C. William Gerhardt & Associates by Walter W. Gerhardt, Shreveport, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Lunn, Irion, Johnson, Salley & Carlisle by James A. Mijalis, Shreveport, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before HIGHTOWER, BROWN and GASKINS, JJ.

Opinion:
liHIGHTOWER, Judge.
In this action arising from a slip and fall accident, plaintiff Billy Whited appeals the jury's rejection of his claim for damages. We affirm.
Facts AND Procedural History
On the afternoon of January 13, 1992, Whited entered the Home Depot store in Shreveport to obtain the price of electrical wiring needed for a home project. Upon procuring a written estimate from an employee, plaintiff began to leave the establishment. Looking at the quote as he walked down an aisle, Whited slipped and fell in some liquid, presumably water. Several witnesses concurred that, after plaintiff slid through the accumulation, it measured approximately two feet by two feet and appeared almost dry. They additionally reported no difficulty in seeing the hazard. Soon after the accident, an employee in the electrical department, Roy Jones, discovered the customer lying on the floor and called for assistance. In compliance with company policy, the loss prevention supervisor (another employee) filled out the necessary reports and authorized plaintiff to have his condition evaluated by a physician.
Three months later, Whited filed suit against the store. A jury subsequently decided in defendant's favor. After unsuccessfully moving for new trial as well as judgment notwithstanding the verdict, plaintiff appealed. Home Depot answered, urging other grounds for an affirmance and, in the alternative, asserting plaintiff's comparative negligence.
Discussion
La.R.S. 9:2800.6 requires that a merchant exercise reasonable care to keep floors and aisles free of any hazardous conditions, and a customer in a self-service store may _J¿reasonably assume that duty has been discharged. La.R.S. 9:2800.6 A; Saucier v. Kugler, Inc., 628 So.2d 1309 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1993). Pursuant to this statute, however, an accident-causing condition does not create a presumption of store negligence. Stated another way, though the plaintiff proves he suffered damages due to an accident caused by a hazardous condition on the merchant's premises, the burden of proof does not shift to the merchant to exculpate itself. Saucier, supra. Instead, the plaintiff additionally must prove that the hazardous condition presented an unreasonable risk of harm, that the merchant either created or had actual or constructive notice of the condition, and that the merchant failed to exercise reasonable care. Id.; La.R.S. 9:2800.6 B.
In Whited's designation of errors, he maintains that the trial court in the present case failed to reflect the law accurately in its jury interrogatories, that the jury made clearly wrong factual findings, and that the panel's determinations are inconsistent,
Jury Interrogatories
Initially, we address the assignment concerning an alleged error in the jury interrogatories. Specifically, Whited asserts that the sixth question did not track the language of La.R.S. 9:2800.6, and, thus, is incorrect. That query required the jury to determine if "[o]n January 13, 1992 . Home Depot [took] reasonable protective measures to keep its premises free of substances that might cause a patron to fall." Whited argues that, in listing the third element that a plaintiff must prove, La.R.S. 9:2800.6 B(3) only requires a demonstration that "[t]he merchant failed to exercise reasonable care." In reference to such care, however, Paragraph A of the statute explains that a merchant owes those who use his premises "a duty . to exercise reasonable care to keep his aisles, passageways, and floors in a reasonably safe condition." Thus, reading the enactment as a whole, the sixth jury interrogatory is clearly consistent with the law.
Moreover, Whited did not lodge his objection in the trial court. Although he requested, and defendant agreed, that the question be limited to the day of the accident, |3the record reflects no further complaints about the interrogatories. Failure to make a contemporaneous objection to either jury interrogatories or a verdict form precludes a party from-raising the issue for the first time on appeal. Luman v. Highlands Ins. Co., 25,-445 (La.App. 2d Cir. 02/23/94), 632 So.2d 910; Bell v. Vickers, 568 So.2d 160 (La.App. 2d Cir.1990).
Jury Factual Findings and Inconsistencies
Plaintiff next contends the jury's finding, that Home Depot exercised reasonable care, is manifestly erroneous. That determination, he further argues, is factually inconsistent with the panel's conclusion that defendant possessed actual or constructive knowledge of the unreasonably dangerous condition. Understandably too, if we are indeed confronted with inharmonious answers, a de novo review of the record may be required.
As stated, the jury interrogatories propounded in the instant ease are consistent with the statute. Even so, plaintiffs contentions invite examination of the interplay between the concepts of notice and reasonable care. According to the statute, "constructive notice" means the condition existed for such a period of time that it would have been discovered if the merchant had exercised reasonable care. La.R.S. 9:2800.6 C(l). By definition, then, a finding of constructive notice precludes a conclusion that the merchant exercised reasonable care. On the other hand, if a jury found actual notice, the reasonableness-of-care aspect.would not perforce be resolved against the merchant. See Diez v. Schwegmann Giant Supermarkets, 94 1089 (La.App. 1st Cir. 06/23/95), 657 So.2d 1066, writ denied, 95-1883 (La.11/17/95), 663 So.2d 720.
Of course, the answers to the interrogatories did not specify whether Home Depot possessed actual or constructive notice of the puddle of water. Furthermore, the jury's intent cannot be discerned, even though there is no evidence of actual notice in that the record fails to disclose that any employee created or observed the hazard before the Uaccident. Accordingly, we are constrained to interdict the jury verdict. Cf. Diez, supra. And, as a result, we are confronted with either remanding the case for a new trial or deciding the matter on the record, which is complete with no substantial conflict in the testimony. We will pursue the latter course.
Whited suggests, and Home Depot does not dispute, that the puddle of water constituted an unreasonable risk of harm. Next, in addressing the matter of notice, it should be borne in mind that the only water sources within the store are situated well away from the electrical department. Although one employee reported an occasional leak in the roof, he explained its location to be several aisles away from the accident site. Additionally, customers are discouraged from bringing beverages into the building. Hence, in approaching this aspect of the case, plaintiff relied heavily upon the testimony of a civil engineer, Austin Hagan, Jr., in an effort to establish that the puddle had been present for an extended time. Close examination of the expert's opinion, however, seriously undermines that proposition.
Upon assuming that the wet spot measured two feet by two feet in size, had a depth of one-tenth inch, was indoors, and was left undisturbed, Hagan concluded it would have taken approximately eight hours, certainly more than one hour, to evaporate or become "almost dry" as reported by witnesses at the scene. The expert failed to consider other significant factors, however, in reaching that conclusion. Importantly, and as he eventually acknowledged, if the water had been smeared about to achieve the stated expanse, the puddle would have been thinner and would have dried faster. And, as he further agreed, a two by two spot that had become "almost dry" may have initially been ten feet by ten feet. Conversely, if the liquid had measured two by two when placed on the floor, it possibly would have been that same size twenty seconds later. In sum, if provided with more information, Hagan stated his opinion could change. Thus, ^considered in its totality, we find his testimony to be of little assistance in determining whether Home Depot had constructive knowledge of the hazard.
As discussed below, throughout the day, two Home Depot employees inspect and work within the electrical department. One of these individuals, Jones, had been at the exact accident site approximately ten, but no more than twenty, minutes prior to plaintiffs fall and had seen no liquid on the floor. Very importantly too, a competitor's price checker had been visiting the store at the time of the accident. That individual, David Morton, who worked for Lowe's, testified that he had been on the aisle in question some twenty to thirty seconds prior to the incident, but saw no yvater there. Accordingly, inasmuch as the hazard did not exist only moments before the accident, defendant could not have known about it, and, thus, did not possess constructive knowledge.
Our examination of the record, also reveals that Home Depot exercised reasonable care to maintain its premises in a safe condition. "Whether a merchant's periodic protective measures are reasonable must be determined in light of the circumstances of each ease, taking into consideration the risk involved, the type and volume of business, the floor space utilized for customer service, the time of day, the section of the store, and other such factors. Rudd v. Atlas Processing Refinery, 26,048 (La.App. 2 Cir. 09/21/94), 644 So.2d 402, writ denied, 94-2605 (La.12/16/94), 648 So.2d 392. In this regard, we note that the accident occurred in a hardware store, not a grocery. Thus, the hazards typically presented in such an establishment (food, ice, cooking oil, etc.) are not present here. Nor did plaintiff encounter a puddle of water near a facility's entryway on a rainy day. Instead, the accident transpired well inside the building, in the electrical department, and away from Home Depot's only water hookups in the garden area and the employee break room.
The electrical department consists of two aisles, each approximately fifty-five to sixty feet long, and a fan section. Two employees are placed there, as stated, and are ^responsible for both customer service and general maintenance. Because they are not assigned to a desk or particular site, these individuals are continuously walking the department during their shift. They also, based on the testimony, consistently confine their activities to their assigned area. Furthermore, both the loss prevention supervisor and the store manager constantly traverse the entire store throughout the day, with the latter indicating that he probably passed through the electrical department six times each hour. Jones, the previously mentioned employee, recalled helping a customer with light bulbs prior to Whited's arrival on the day in 'question. He then assisted plaintiff in procuring a price quote on wire and, next, offered service to yet another store patron. In his estimation, he had been at the accident site approximately ten, but no more than twenty, minutes prior to plaintiffs fall.
Considering the nature of this business establishment, to have two employees monitoring a relatively small area, coupled with continual store inspections by two managers, demonstrates reasonable care. In fact, contrary to Whited's arguments, these protective, procedures are far more exhaustive than would be the case with a single person in charge of cheeking such a large facility.
Beyond all of this, and for whatever purpose it may serve, we are convinced that the jury well understood that their answers to the interrogatories would result in a judgment, adverse to plaintiff. Specifically and clearly, the verdict form instructed that deliberations cease with the affirmative answer to interrogatory number six, leaving unanswered all questions concerning the apportionment of fault and the assessment of damages.
Conclusion
Accordingly, having determined that plaintiff failed to sustain his burden of proof under La.R.S. 9:2800.6, we affirm the district court judgment at his costs.
AFFIRMED.
BROWN, J., dissents with reasons.
.The jury responded to special interrogatories as follows:
1. Did Billy Whited fall at the Home Depot on January 13, 1992? YES
2. Was Billy Whited injured by a fall at the Home Depot on January 13, 1992? YES
3. Did the premises of the Home Depot Store present an unreasonable risk of harm to Billy Whited under the circumstances which harm was reasonably foreseeable? YES
4. Did Billy Whited fall and suffer injury as a result of the condition of the premises of Home Depot? YES
5. Did Home Depot have knowledge of the condition of the premises which caused the injury to Billy Whited or had this condition been present for such a period of time that Home Depot should have known of the condition? YES
6. On January 13, 1992 did Home Depot take reasonable protective measures to keep its premises free of substances that might cause a patron to fall? YES
. As noted, the panel answered this question in the affirmative, thus ultimately finding for the defendant on the question of liability.
. Suppose, for example, a customer slips in a puddle of liquid on the merchant's premises at the moment an employee is in the process of mopping the spill.
. Bruce Lewis, the store manager, examined the spot immediately after the accident and, in deposition, commented that it appeared to be almost dry. He explained at trial, however, that he meant that the water had been smeared over the floor, i.e., it was not undisturbed. Moreover, plaintiff indicated that his fall resulted in his clothes soaking up some of the water.
. Although Whited believed it had rained, he conceded that the floors were not particularly wet and observed no indication of people tracking water into the store.