Case Name: Charles Woodrow CHILDERS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1973-05-03
Citations: 277 So. 2d 594
Docket Number: No. 71-1048
Parties: Charles Woodrow CHILDERS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: CROSS, J., concurs with opinion.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 277
Pages: 594–598

Head Matter:
Charles Woodrow CHILDERS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 71-1048.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
May 3, 1973.
Rehearing Denied June 6, 1973.
Ray Sandstrom, of Sandstrom & Hodge, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Andrew I. Friedrich, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
OWEN, Judge.
Appellant was convicted of breaking and entering with intent to commit a felony, to-wit: grand larceny, and sentenced to a term of five years in the state prison. Because the prosecutor, during closing argument to the jury, directly or indirectly commented upon the failure of the defendant to testify, the judgment and sentence must be reversed and this cause remanded for a new trial.
An essential part of the state's case against this defendant depended upon circumstantial evidence of defendant's breaking and entering a specific building, as no one had seen the defendant inside the building. In commenting upon circumstantial evidence, the prosecutor said:
"The Judge will also instruct you, and I will tell you right now, that if a man can offer you a reasonable hypothesis of innocence, then you should look to' that reasonable hypothesis of innocence when you are dealing with circumstantial evidence.
"I submit to you, what reasonable hypothesis has been offered to you, other than the one which indicates
At this point, appellant's counsel immediately objected and moved for a mistrial, which motion was denied. The motion satisfies the requirements of State v. Jones, 204 So.2d 515 (Fla.1967). The court's denial of the motion is the error assigned.
Formerly by statute (F.S., Section 918.09, F.S.A.) and now by rule (Rule 3.-250, RCrP, 33 F.S.A.) a prosecuting attorney is prohibited from commenting before the jury or the court on the failure of the accused to testify in his own behalf. It has been consistently held that the prohibition [against any comments on the failure of the defendant to testify] applies without regard to the character of the comment, or the motive or intent with which it is made, if such comment is subject to an interpretation which would bring it within the statutory prohibition, and regardless of its susceptibility to a different construction. See Trafficante v. State, 92 So.2d 811 (Fla.1957); Tolliver v. State, 133 So.2d 565 (Fla.App.1961); Harper v. State, 151 So. 2d 881 (Fla.App.1963); State v. Jones, supra; Mathis v. State, 267 So.2d 846 (Fla.App.1972).
Referring now to the quoted remarks of the prosecutor, and particularly the emphasized portions thereof, we think it clear that such comment is subject to an interpretation which would bring it within the prohibited area. The prosecutor's statement of the applicable law, followed immediately by his rhetorical question, "What reasonable hypothesis has been offered to you . . . " is fairly susceptible of being interpreted by the jury as a statement to the effect that "an innocent man would attempt to explain the circumstances but the defendant offered no such explanation." The comment as thus interpreted or construed violates the prohibition of the rule. As stated above, it matters not that this was not the interpretation intended by the prosecutor, nor that the comment is also susceptible of a construction which is nonviolative of the rule. Furthermore, the harmless error statute is not applicable to a violation of this rule. Mathis v. State, supra.
The judgment and sentence are severally reversed and this cause remanded for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.
CROSS, J., concurs with opinion.
MAGER, J., dissents with opinion.