Case Name: Vincent C. JOHNSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, Defendant-Appellee, New York City Police Department, Defendant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2016-02-10
Citations: 633 F. App'x 37
Docket Number: No. 14-4718
Parties: Vincent C. JOHNSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, Defendant-Appellee, New York City Police Department, Defendant.
Judges: PRESENT: PIERRE N. LEVAL, DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 633
Pages: 37–38

Head Matter:
Vincent C. JOHNSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, Defendant-Appellee, New York City Police Department, Defendant.
No. 14-4718.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Feb. 10, 2016.
Vincent C. Johnson, pro se, Staten Island, N.Y., for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Scott Shorr, Assistant Corporation Counsel for Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, New York, N.Y., for Defendants-Appellees.
PRESENT: PIERRE N. LEVAL, DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
SUMMARY ORDER
Appellant Vincent C. Johnson, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Appellees on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim that police officers were deliberately indifferent to an ankle injury he sustained by delaying his arrival at a hospital and temporarily depriving him of crutches and forcing him to hop on his uninjured foot for short distances, in violation of his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.
As an initial matter, Johnson has explicitly abandoned his deliberate indifference claim based on the delay in treating his injured ankle by failing to argue that claim in his brief and asserting, in that brief, that it is not an issue in his case. See LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d Cir.1995) (a pro se litigant's failure to raise an issue in his appellate brief results in abandonment of that issue). Accordingly, we do not address that claim.
We review de novo a district court's grant of summary judgment, with the view that "[sjummary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party shows that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir.2003). We are required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all inferences in favor of the non-movant. Nationwide Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Leasing Assoc., Inc., 182 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir.1999). Summary judgment is appropriate "[wjhere the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non- moving party." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Upon review, we have concluded that the district court correctly granted summary judgment to the City of New York on Johnson's claim that police officers were deliberately indifferent to his ankle injury-based on the deprivation of his crutches, for the reasons stated in the magistrate judge's well-reasoned report and recommendation.
We have considered all of Johnson's arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.