Case Name: Charles Ray COMPTON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1979-04-25
Citations: 607 S.W.2d 246
Docket Number: No. 57195
Parties: Charles Ray COMPTON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
Judges: Before ONION, P. J., and PHILLIPS and TOM G. DAVIS, JJ.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 607
Pages: 246–257

Head Matter:
Charles Ray COMPTON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
No. 57195.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, Panel No. 1.
April 25, 1979.
On Rehearing Oct. 8, 1980.
Rehearing Denied Nov. 19, 1980.
Kerry P. Fitzgerald, Dallas, for appellant.
Henry N. Wade, Dist. Atty., W. T. West-moreland, Jr., Richard E. Zadina and Ron Poole, Asst. Dist. Attys., Dallas, Robert Huttash, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.
Before ONION, P. J., and PHILLIPS and TOM G. DAVIS, JJ.

Opinion:
OPINION
ONION, Presiding Judge.
This is an appeal from a conviction of theft over $10,000.00. The jury assessed punishment at twelve (12) years' confinement in the Texas Department of Corrections.
Appellant urges reversal on seven grounds of error, but in view of our disposition of the case, only one ground will be discussed. In that ground of error, appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the judgment because the State failed to prove that J. Howard Coo-nen was the owner of the property in question as alleged in the indictment.
Omitting the formal parts, the indictment reads in pertinent part as follows:
"... CHARLES RAY COMPTON . . did unlawfully, knowingly and intentionally exercise control over property other than real property, to-wit: $400,000.00 current money of the United States of America, of the value of at least $10,-000.00, without the effective consent of J. Howard Coonen, the owner thereof, and with the intent to deprive the said owner of said property . " (Emphasis supplied.)
Without presenting the extremely intricate details of this case, it suffices to say that the record reflects that in late March or early April of 1976, the appellant, doing business as National Trailer Sales, purchased a 1972 Diamond Reo truck from one Dan Thompson. Payment was to be made to Thompson as soon as appellant was able to re-sell the truck to someone else. This re-sale occurred on May 3, 1976, when, after negotiating with George Bushfield and Joe Bennett, two employees of the International Harvester (hereinafter referred to as International), Used Truck Center-Dallas office, appellant agreed to sell the truck to International for $11,650.00. The facts indicate that pursuant to this purchase agreement, International's Dallas office made a request for $11,650.00 from the home office in Atlanta, Georgia in order to purchase the truck. However, because of an error, the Atlanta office forwarded a check in the amount of $411,650.00. The check was signed by two officers of the Atlanta office and sent directly to the appellant, who presented the same to a bank. It appears from the record that J. Howard Coonen represented International in the capacity of manager for the Southwest Region, which included the Dallas office, and was in charge of disbursement of funds from the Dallas area. It is clear, however, that he at no time had any contact with the funds disbursed to the appellant from the Atlanta office. The record further reflects that the two employees of the Atlanta office who signed the check were in control of and jointly responsible for funds paid out of that office. Moreover, although Dallas and Atlanta were in different regions so far as "sales people" were concerned, the Atlanta office was in charge of "accounting" for the "Eastern part of the United States, including the Texas area."
When the property referred to in an indictment is the property of a corporation, it is not only permissible, but also better pleading practice to allege ownership in some natural person acting for the corporation. Article 21.08, V.A.C.C.P.; Commons v. State, 575 S.W.2d 518 (Tex.Cr.App.1978); Eaton v. State, 533 S.W.2d 33 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Roberts v. State, 513 S.W.2d 870 (Tex.Cr.App.1974). However, when specifying this natural person, it is equally important to satisfy the requirement of V.T. C.A., Penal Code, § 1.07(a)(24) and (28), which defines the terms "owner" and "possession" as follows:
" 'Owner' means a person who has title to the property, possession of the property, whether lawful or not, or a greater right to possession of the property than the actor."
" 'Possession' means actual care, custody, control, or management."
In view of these definitions, there are three different ways provided in the statute by which the State may have shown that Coonen, as manager of the Dallas Region, was the owner of the property taken: (1) title, (2) possession, or (3) a greater right to possession than appellant. McGee v. State, 572 S.W.2d 723 (Tex.Cr.App.1978).
The record does not support the State's contention that the property was either owned or possessed by Coonen. To the contrary, the record clearly shows that Coo-nen exercised no control over the check at any time. Although the check was requested by the Dallas office, of which Coonen was in charge the issuance was approved by and the check was drafted by employees of the Atlanta office. In fact, Coonen testified that so far as disbursements of funds were concerned, he was in charge of those disbursed from the Dallas office. Since the funds in question were disbursed from the Atlanta office and sent directly to the appellant, Coonen had no occasion to see the check, much less gain title to or exercise any care, custody, control or management over it. Moreover, to the extent that the check was issued in appellant's name and signed by two employees who neither received nor required Coonen's approval to do so, it cannot be said that Coonen had a greater right to possession than appellant.
We therefore conclude that the evidence was insufficient to convict appellant of the offense alleged in the indictment, or, more particularly, to show that Coonen was the "owner of the property as alleged in the indictment." See, McGee v. State, supra; Commons v. State, supra. We further conclude that no further prosecution may be had in this cause pursuant to the holdings in Burks v. United States, 431 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978), and Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19, 98 S.Ct. 2151, 57 L.Ed.2d 15 (1978). These cases dictate that once this court has found the evidence legally insufficient to sustain a conviction, a second trial is precluded by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution of the United States.
The judgment of conviction is set aside and is reformed to show acquittal. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded accordingly.
Before the court en banc.
. Compare Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 98 S.Ct. 2170, 57 L.Ed.2d 43 (1978).