Case Name: PECOS & N. T. RY. CO. v. HALL
Court: Texas Courts of Civil Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1916-10-18
Citations: 189 S.W. 535
Docket Number: No. 1032
Parties: PECOS & N. T. RY. CO. v. HALL.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 189
Pages: 535–539

Head Matter:
PECOS & N. T. RY. CO. v. HALL.
(No. 1032.)
(Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Amarillo.
Oct. 18, 1916.
On Motion for Rehearing, Nov. 22, 1916.)
1.Commerce ®=>10 — Concurrent Powers oe State.
Where the federal and state governments have concurrent power, and the federal government is inactive, the state’s power may be executed.
[Ed. N<fte. — For other cases, see Commerce, Cent. Dig. § 8; Dec. Dig. <®=^>10.]
2. Commerce <§==>8 — Interstate Shipment-Live Stock.
The federal government’s power as to interstate shipments is paramount, and, when the interstate transportation of live stock is taken under direct federal supervision and a system devised by which diseased stock may be excluded from interstate commerce, any state regulations in respect thereto cease to have any force, and the acts of Congress and the regulations thereunder will alone control.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Commerce, Cent. Dig. § 5; Dec. Dig. <©=>8.]
3. Carriers «^=206 — Interstate Shipment oe Live Stock — Statute—Damages.
Under Act Cong. March 3, 1905, c. 1496, §§ 1, S, 4, 33 Stat. 1264 (U. S. Comp. St. 1913, §§ 870Í, 8703, 8704), and the express provision of a federal quarantine regulation adopted thereunder, cattle which had been exposed to disease, might, without inspection, be shipped as un-inspected exposed cattle for immediate slaughter from quarantined territory to slaughtering centers in another state, where separate pens are provided for yarding exposed cattle, so that a carrier, refusing to accept them for shipment unless they were dipped, was liable in damages for the consequent shrinkage and injury.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. §§ 916, 917; Dec. Dig. <©=5206.]
4. Appeal and Error ¡©=5725(1) — Assignments of Error — Exclusion of Evidence.
Where there was no assignment as to the sustaining of the demurrers to an answer, assignments as to the exclusion of the paragraphs of a contract set up in the answer were wholly abstract and inapplicable.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 3002, 3003, 3005; Dec. Dig. (©=5725(1).]
Appeal from District Court, Potter County ; Hugh L. Umphres, Judge.
Action by J. F. Hall against the Pecos & Northern Texas Railway Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Terry, Cavin & Mills, of Galveston, and Madden, Trulove, Ryburn & Pipkin, of Amarillo, for appellant. R. R. Hazlewood and J. Marvin Jones, both of Amarillo, for appel-lee.
Application for writ ci error pending in Supreme Court.

Opinion:
HENDRICKS, J.
The appellee, Hall, in the fall of 1913, contracted for 498 head of cattle from Warren & Son, to be delivered to him on or before November 1st, at Bovina, Tex.; said station being on the line of the appellant railway, and said cattle to be delivered for the purpose of shipment to the open market. On the 14th day of October he ordered from the chief dispatcher of the appellant in Amarillo, Tex., cars for the purpose of shipping said cattle, who agreed to furnish the cars at Bovina on the 24th of' October. Appellee's trade with Warren & Son, with reference to the purchase and delivery of said cattle, was that the same were to be cut in the pens at their pasture, five miles from Bovina, on the morning of the 24th. The agent (Lucas) of the Pecos & Northern Texas Railway Company at Bovina refused to furnish1 the cars for the* transportation of the cattle until said cattle were dipped and a permit issued. The cattle were exposed to a disease known as "scabies"; but the appellee testified that under his contract he was not to receive any cattle infected with such disease, and did not receive any cattle so infected.
On account of the action of the railway company, in refusing to furnish the cars, and its insistence that the cars would not be furnished or the cattle shipped unless the same were dipped, the cattle were not brought in or tendered for shipment on the 24th of October, but were held on the ranch of Warren & Son, and there dipped in compliance with the railway's demand. The particular cattle were specifically purchased by Hall, for the purpose of shipment to the open markets of Kansas City and St. Joseph, Mo., and were fat cattle, eligible for that purpose. The cattle were dipped twice, with' tobacco dip, and on account of the handling and dipping of the same a resultant shrinkage and injury to said cattle produced damage which the jury assessed at $4,460.69.
It was impracticable for the appellee, after having been informed that this particular railroad would not ship his cattle, except under the conditions as stated, to take the cattle to any other railroad for the purpose of shipment, it being 100 miles to another road over which they could have been shipped to market, which' would have required a week to have driven said cattle to that point. Bailey and Parmer counties, in the state of Texas, in which said cattle were located, were at the time in a quarantined territory, on account of the disease known as "scabies," the quarantine having been effectuated by a regulation and promulgation of the state authorities, as well as the federal Bureau of Animal Industry. The particular shipment was interstate, and hence, as applied to the immediate "transportation," the regulations, .hereafter shown, promulgated by the Bureau of Animal Industry of the Department of Agriculture, if applicable, will control.
It is assigned and argued that neither under the regulations of the Bureau of Animal Industry, nor the state law and the regulations of the Live Stock Sanitary Commission, was the plaintiff entitled to recover. The last act affecting this subject passed by Congress on March 3, 1905, is entitled:
"An act to enable the Secretary of Agriculture to establish and maintain quarantine districts, to permit and regulate the movement of cattle and other live stock therefrom, and for other purposes." 33 Statutes at Large, Í264, United States Compiled Statutes, 1913, § 8701.
Section 1 of this act provides:
"That the .Secretary of Agriculture is authorized and directed to quarantine any state," or portion thereof, "when he shall determine the fact that cattle or other live stock" therein "are affected by any contagious, infectious, or communicable disease," etc.
A railroad company is prohibited from receiving for transportation any live stock from any quarantined state, or quarantined portion of any state, except as provided in the act. Section 3 of the act provides for the promulgation of rules and regulations by the Secretary of Agriculture, permitting a method and manner of inspection, delivery, and shipment of cattle from such quarantined territory, "when the public safety will permit." Section 4 of said act provides:
"That cattle or other live stock may be removed from a quarantined state under and in compliance with the rules and regulations of the Secretary of Agriculture, made and promulgated in pursuance of the provisions of section 3 of this act; but it shall be unlawful to move any cattle or other livestock from an quarantined state or quarantined portion of any state into any other state, in manner or method or under conditions other than those prescribed by the Secretary of Agriculture."
A part of regulation 21 of the federal quarantine regulations is as follows:
"Cattle not visibly diseased, but which may be a part of a diseased herd, may, without inspection, be shipped interstate as 'uninspected exposed cattle' for immediate slaughter from points in the quarantined area to any recognized slaughtering center where separate pens are provided for yarding exposed cattle," etc.
As stated, these cattle were to be shipped to St. Joe and Kansas City, where, according to the testimony, the facilities mentioned were provided for the reception of the character of cattle purchased. We do not think it is necessary to prolong this opinion with a reproduction, and an analysis, of the state-law and the Live Stock Sanitary Commission's regulations urged by appellant as defense to appellee's cause of action.
There is some controversy, in the condition of the testimony, whether any of the particular cattle were actually infected with the disease designated as "scabies." Hall's trade, however, with Warren & Son, was that he was not to accept any diseased cattle. He-had a "10 per cent, cut" on all spayed heifers purchased by him, and if we read the record correctly, on October 23d, there were 695-head of "Mule Shoe" cattle dipped (owned by Warren & Son), and only 6 head of that number, as testified to by appellant's own witness Keeliehor, were affected with the particular disease. Appellee, who saw the cattle prior-to the time of the dipping, and thereafter at the pens preparatory to shipment, testified" that none of his cattle were affected with scabies, though it is uncontradicted that the-same had been exposed to the disease.
It is, of course, the general rule that,, where the federal and state government have-concurrent power, if the federal government is inactive, the state's power may be executed; the corollary to this, however, is that the-government's power is paramount, and it is-the rule that, when the subject of the trans portation of live stock from one state to another is taken under direct national supervision, and a system devised by which diseased stock may he excluded from interstate commerce, any state regulations in respect of such matters will cease to have any force. The acts of Congress and the regulations thereunder will alone control. Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137, 146, 23 Sup. Ct. 92, 47 L. Ed. 108. The veterinary inspector, Jones, testified:
"When I told the agent (meaning Lucas, the local agent at Hereford) that Hall had a right to ship these cattle as exposed cattle, he contended all the time that he would not accept them without a certificate or a permit."
We are clear that the shipper had the right to pen and ship these cattle under the regulations of the Bureau of Animal Industry from Bovina to the open market for immediate slaughter, without the demand and the exaction by the railway company for the dipping (and certificate to that effect) of said cattle; and as applied to shipment for immediate slaughter, regarding the cattle as uninspected exposed cattle, the railroad company had no legal justification to make such a demand and refuse to furnish the cars for transportation, invoking any rule or regulation under the so-called authority of the state government.
Rule 20 of the Live Stock Sanitary Commission of Texas prescribes that cattle held in certain counties (including the two counties where these cattle were situated) shall not he moved from the pastures where cattle were located for any purpose whatsoever without a permit issued by a duly authorized inspector; and said rule further prescribes that:
No cattle shall be tendered for inspection for "interstate" movement situated in the quarantined area, "unless the owner of said cattle is in possession of a certificate, signed by an inspector, stating that the owner of the cattle so tendered has complied with the state laws, rules, and regulations of this commission, and that his range and cattle are free of infection."
We will not attempt to solve the question whether or not, after the Bureau of Animal Industry and the state had interdicted the same territory — the former, however, permitting nondiseased cattle, though exposed, to be shipped — the person moving said cattle (excluding the act of penning and shipping) would be guilty of a violation of the state law. We, however, think that, so far as any preliminary movement of the particular cattle is concerned, even if the state has a right to prohibit the same as between the state and the owner, the railroad, under the national act and the rules and regulations of the Bureau of Animal Industry, would have the right to ship said cattle after same had been penned for transportation; and as an agent of interstate commerce and as a common carrier it would be its duty to do so, because the national act, and the regulations under its authority, authorized it. To that extent, at least, the state law is superseded, and the question of its enforcement in other respects, as to the actual transportation of the cattle, is between the state and the citizen.
We are unable to infer from the' record that Jones advised the agents of the railway company that they had a right to demand that the cattle should be dipped as a prerequisite to an interstate shipment. He said:
"I told him [the agent] that according to the state regulation they could not come from the ranch without dipping, but according to the federal regulations they were entitled to go as uninspected exposed cattle for immediate slaughter. I do not remember just exactly what he said when I told him he had a right to ship these cattle as exposed cattle."
Neither do we infer from the record that the inspector demanded of the purchaser or the vendor of the particular cattle that said cattle had to be dipped as a prerequisite to any movement. The only testimony is that the inspector sent word by certain parties who were going to the ranch where the cattle were situated:
"That the agent would not receive the cattle unless they had a permit. I also stated [to them] that I would not issue a permit unless the cattle were dipped."
All assignments and propositions affecting the question of the sanitary regulations, interposed as a justification for the refusal to furnish the cars, and the consequent dipping of said cattle, are overruled.
The seventh and eighth assignments of error, in the condition of the record, present only abstract questions, and are unnecessary to discuss on the merits. Portions of the live stock contract were pleaded by the defendant railway company, asserting that the written agreement merged all prior understandings concerning the furnishing of cars, facilities for shipment, and the transportation of the stock. It is also pleaded that the contract provided that notice of a claim for damages for injury to the stock occurring during the transportation thereof, or previous to loading the same for shipment, would be given in writing to either of certain designated officers before the stock should be removed from the place of destination. The court sustained exceptions to these pleadings, and at the trial the defendant railway company offered such contracts in evidence, to which it was objected that there were no pleadings to sustain the same, and that they were immaterial and irrelevant.
There is no assignment challenging the action of the court in sustaining the demurrers to the answer, however erroneous that action may be; hence the assignments questioning the court's action in excluding the paragraphs of the contract as evidence are wholly abstract, and inapplicable to the merits of the case. After the court had sustained exceptions to the answer, unless he revoked his action in that respect, lie could not have done otherwise than exclude the testimony.
The judgment is affirmed.
<B=>For other oases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes