Case Name: Andree PITARD v. STILLWATER TRANSFER AND STORAGE COMPANY, et al.
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1991-11-07
Citations: 589 So. 2d 1127
Docket Number: No. 90-CA-1471
Parties: Andree PITARD v. STILLWATER TRANSFER AND STORAGE COMPANY, et al.
Judges: Before SCHOTT, C.J., and KLEES, LOBRANO, WARD and PLOTKIN, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 589
Pages: 1127–1132

Head Matter:
Andree PITARD v. STILLWATER TRANSFER AND STORAGE COMPANY, et al.
No. 90-CA-1471.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
Nov. 7, 1991.
William D. Treeby, Randall A. Smith, Angela J. Crowder, Stone, Pigman, Walther, Wittmann & Hutchinson, New Orleans, for plaintiff-appellant Andree Pitard.
James R. Carter, Robert F. Lakey, Porteous, Hainkel, Johnson & Sarpy, New Orleans, for defendants-appellees Stillwater Transfer & Storage, Inc. and John E. Scott.
Mary Clare Hartman, Hartman & Associates, Metairie, for defendants-appellees Gaylord Wilson, Nat. Enterprises, Inc., and U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co.
Before SCHOTT, C.J., and KLEES, LOBRANO, WARD and PLOTKIN, JJ.

Opinion:
KLEES, Judge.
Plaintiff appeals the trial court's judgment awarding her $285,000 for injuries she received in an automobile accident. Plaintiff claims that the amount of damages determined by the jury is inadequate, and that the trial judge erred in denying her post-trial motions for judgment N.O.V. and additur. After reviewing the record, we increase the plaintiff's award to $400,-000.
On June 4, 1986, plaintiff Andree Pitard was a passenger in a vehicle struck by a tractor trailer on the. 1-10 expressway near LaPlace, Louisiana. Ms. Pitard, a then thirty-six year old attorney, received numerous injuries, including a lacerated lip, a fractured shoulder, a broken rib, a com pression fracture in the lumbar region of her spine, trauma to the previously injured cervical area of her spine, and internal abdominal injuries. She underwent abdominal surgery and was hospitalized for a month. At the time of trial, she was still undergoing physical therapy for her back and shoulder disabilities and was taking several medications on a regular basis. She had ceased working due to her physical problems.
Plaintiff brought suit against Gaylord Wilson, the driver of the vehicle in which she was riding, and John Scott, the driver of the tractor trailer. The case was tried before a jury on November 2, 6, 8 and 9, 1989. The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $285,000, assigning 75% negligence to defendant Wilson and 25% to defendant Scott. Judgment was entered in accordance with the jury verdict against both individual defendants and their respective employers and insurer.
Liability is not contested; the sole issue on appeal is quantum. Following trial, plaintiff filed motions for judgment N.O.V. and additur, which were heard on January 19, 1990. The trial judge denied these motions with written reasons, stating "Although in my mind, a preponderance of the evidence establishes that Ms. Pitard's damages are $600,000.00, primarily because I believe that her injuries from the accident forming the basis of this suit prevent her from practicing law, I just cannot say that reasonable minds could not differ as to the quantum of damages."
Plaintiff now appeals the denial of these motions and the original judgment. At trial, the issue of quantum was complicated by the fact that plaintiff had been involved in three prior automobile accidents, including one in June of 1983 in which she had seriously injured her neck and back. She was still suffering from these injuries when she was re-injured on June 4, 1986, the accident which forms the basis of this appeal. On appeal plaintiff contends that the trial court erred: (1) by allowing the introduction of a privileged communication into evidence, and (2) by refusing to raise the amount awarded by the jury to $600,-000 or grant a new trial.
Plaintiff's first assignment of error has merit. During his cross examination of plaintiff, counsel for defendants introduced into evidence a letter written by Ms. Pitard to her trial counsel Mr. Leonard Radlauer in June of 1987. In the letter, Ms. Pitard lists all of her medical treatment related to the June 27, 1983 accident, for which Mr. Radlauer had filed a separate suit in Jefferson Parish. The letter also states: "I have included Dr. Russo's office visits and Me-tairie Physical Therapy after the June 4, 1986, accident since they are directly related to both the June 27, 1983, accident and the June 4, 1986, accident."
The plaintiff was obviously surprised by the introduction of the letter, calling it "a private letter written to my attorney." She stated that she had never testified that the bills in question were related to any accident other than the 1986 one and that she had never been reimbursed for them. The defendants' counsel used the letter to try to create an impression in the minds of the jury that Ms. Pitard was seeking double recovery for these medical bills.
According to defendants' counsel, the letter was found by him in a large stack of medicals produced by Mr. Radlauer. Mr. Radlauer maintained that his disclosure of the letter was inadvertent.
Communications between a client and his attorney made with the expectation of confidentiality are protected by the attorney-client privilege, and cannot be disclosed without the client's permission. La. R.S. 13:3734.3; Succession of Smith v. Kavanaugh, Pierson & Talley, 513 So.2d 1138 (La.1987). R.S. 13:3734.3 states: "No attorney or counselor at law shall give evidence of anything that has been confided to him by his client, without the consent of the client...." As the client is the holder of the privilege, the power to waive it is his alone. Smith, supra, at 1143.
Although the Louisiana courts have not considered specifically whether the privilege can be waived by the attorney's inadvertent disclosure of a communication, we find that it cannot, because such a disclosure is without the consent of the client and therefore violates R.S. 13:3734.3. In this case, the record clearly reflects that the plaintiff believed the letter was confidential.
The record also reflects that the use of the letter, which was also mentioned in the closing argument of defendants' counsel, had a prejudicial effect upon plaintiff's case. In his reasons for judgment, the trial judge indicated that the most probable reason for the jury having returned a verdict of less than $600,000 was their belief that plaintiff's inability to ever again work as an attorney was a result of the 1983 accident rather than the 1986 accident. The extent to which the 1986 accident aggravated Ms. Pitard's preexisting back condition was a key issue in the case. Under the circumstances, we find that the allowance of the letter into evidence was a consequential error.
Defendants argue strenuously that the introduction of the letter cannot be urged as an error on appeal because it was not objected to by plaintiff's counsel at trial. We disagree. The record shows that there was a bench conference requested by Mr. Radlauer at the moment the letter was first mentioned. Then, at the conclusion of the testimony on that day, Mr. Radlauer stated that he wanted to put his objection to the letter on record. The trial judge then confirmed on the record that Mr. Rad-lauer had objected to the letter during the bench conference, although he had not asked at that time for the objection to be put on the record. Mr. Radlauer then responded that he was used to having the court reporter "sneak up" and record what occurs during a bench conference.
An objection affords the trial court the opportunity to prevent or correct the alleged error. Deville v. Fields, 546 So.2d 332, 334 (La.App. 3d Cir.1989), citing Bertoli v. Flabiano, 116 So.2d 76 (La.App. 1st Cir.1959). In the instant case, the trial judge obviously had that opportunity when the letter was objected to during the bench conference, even though the objection was not recorded in the transcript at that moment. Although the circumstances are unusual, we find that the objection was timely. Deville v. Fields, supra, the case relied upon by defendants to show that the objection was not timely made, is inapposite. In that case, the court held that the plaintiff could not object for the first time on appeal to matters which he had failed to object to during trial. Id. at 334. In the instant case, plaintiff objected at the bench before the letter was introduced, and then placed his objection on the record at the close of testimony that day. We therefore find that a timely objection was made, and the admission of the letter was a consequential error that must be corrected on appeal.
When a trial court makes a consequential error in the admission of evidence, the appellate court is required to make an independent review of the record, giving no weight to the jury verdict, and to decide the case by a preponderance of the evidence without regard to the improper evidence. McLean v. Hunter, 495 So.2d 1298, 1304 (La.1986). Because we find the admission of the privileged letter to be a consequential error, we have reviewed the record to make an independent determination of quantum.
We find that the amount awarded by the jury ($285,000) is insufficient to compensate plaintiff for the fact that she will never be able to engage in a normal practice of law as a result of this accident. The accident caused severe abdominal injuries requiring immediate surgery. Plaintiff suffered a fractured shoulder, which, according to expert testimony is now 75 to 80% abnormal. She is in constant pain and is undergoing physical therapy several times per week. She is also on numerous medications. She has incurred over $65,-000 in medical expenses as a result of this accident. Plaintiff's back, which was causing her problems before the accident, is now so bad that she cannot sit down for even a few minutes without being in what she described as "excruciating" pain. A medical expert testified that plaintiff was totally disabled from working as an attorney. Plaintiff cannot sit, drive, lift anything or bend over without pain.
We recognize that plaintiff did not perform a significant amount of work as an attorney between the 1983 accident and the 1986 accident. Because of this fact, we disagree with the trial judge's opinion that Ms. Pitard's damages amounted to $600,-000. We find this figure to be too high in view of the fact that, just prior to this accident, plaintiff's activity in the legal field mainly consisted of telephone calls. Nevertheless, she was able to do some work, however limited, and the preponderance of the evidence shows that she was improving physically. She was also taking some college classes at that time. Since the June 4, 1986 accident, however, plaintiff has not been able to do anything productive.
In Louisiana, it makes no difference whether an accident has caused or has only aggravated the plaintiff's condition, because the defendant must take him as he finds him. Willie v. Barriere Constr. Co., Inc., 506 So.2d 669, 674 (La.App. 5th Cir.1987), writ denied, 512 So.2d 457 (La.1987). Ms. Pitard's former employer, Mr. DeBois-blanc, testified that he would have paid plaintiff a starting salary of $30,000 to $32,000 annually had she been able to work as an attorney. Therefore, considering all the evidence, including future lost wages, we find plaintiff's damages to be in the amount of $400,000.
Accordingly, we amend the trial court's judgment to award plaintiff total damages in the amount of $400,000. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
AMENDED & AFFIRMED.
SCHOTT, C.J., and WARD, J., dissent.