Case Name: Hiller v. Landis
Court: Iowa Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Iowa
Decision Date: 1876-10-04
Citations: 44 Iowa 223
Docket Number: 
Parties: Hiller v. Landis.
Judges: 
Reporter: Iowa Reports
Volume: 44
Pages: 223–227

Head Matter:
Hiller v. Landis.
1. Attorney: agreement oe: practice. The record of an agreement between attorneys respecting a matter in litigation, based upon testimony or affidavits offered after the agreement is disputed, constitutes no stronger evidence than the testimony or affidavits themselves, and is not conclusive upon the objecting party. Beck, J., dissenting.
2. -: rule applied. An attorney moved that the record be amended by adding to it the statement that, by agreement of counsel, the case was to be heard by the court and a decree rendered in vacation, as of the term at which it was submitted; the motion was supported by affidavits and opposed with counter affidavits denying the existence of the agreement; the court sustaining the motion, it was held that such a record was not sufficient to establish the fact of the. agreement. Beck, J., dissenting.
Appeal from Hardin District Oourt.
Wednesday, October 4.
Action in equity. At the April term, 1874, tlie case was submitted to be beard in vacation on written evidence, and by arguments of counsel in writing. In August, 1874, in vacation, the judge filed bis decision dismissing plaintiff’s petition, and rendering a decree upon defendant’s cross-petition. A decree was drawn up by defendant’s counsel and entered of record as of the April term, 1874.
At tbe April term, 1875, tbe plaintiff made a motion to strike the decree from tbe record, setting up, among other things, as ground for tbe motion, that be bad no knowledge of tbe decree until tbe time for taking an appeal bad expired. About tbe same time the defendant filed a motion to corrrect the record of the agreement of April term, 1874, by making the following additions to it, to-wit: “And that by agreement of counsel for plaintiff and defendant this case shall be heard by tbe court in vacation, tbe decree to be rendered in vacation as of this term of court, and entered upon the record of the court in vacation as of this term.” The motion was supported by affidavits to tbe effect that such was the agreement. Tbe plaintiff’s counsel, E. W. Eastman, filed an affidavit, to tbe effect that he had been the only attorney for the plaintiff and that he did not make such agreement.
Between the April term, 1874, when it is alleged that the agreement was made, and the April term, 1875, when the motion was made to add to the record the official term of the judge presiding at the April term, 1874, expired, and he was succeeded by another person. The motion, therefore, to add to the record, was heard and determined solely upon the affidavits. The court overruled the plaintiff’s motion to strike the decree from the record, and sustained the defendant’s motion to add to the record. From the said rulings the plaintiff appeals.
E. W. Eastman, for appellant.
Huff da Heed and T. Brown, for appellee.

Opinion:
Adams, J.
Section 213 of the Code provides that "an attorney and counselor has power to bind his client to any agreement in respect to any proceeding within the scope of proper duties and powers, but no evidence of any such agreement is receivable, except the statement of the attorney himself, 'his written agreement signed and filed with the clerk, or an entry thereof upon the records of the court."
In this case, there was an entry made upon the records, but not until a year, after the making of the alleged agreement, and not until a dispute had arisen as to whether suoh agreement was in faot made. The question arises, whether an entry so made was sufficient to establish the alleged agreement.
In consideration of the great importance of attorneys' agreements governing niatters of litigation, and the uncertainty of human memory after strife is moved, the legislature saw fit to provide that attorneys' agreements should not be shown by testimony or affidavits. It is claimed, however, in substance, that, while testimony, or affidavits, are not sufficient to justify a court in finding that a disputed agreement was made, they may be sufficient to justify the court in making a record of the agreement, and that the record so made will be sufficient to establish the agreement. But, to our mind, a record of an alleged agreement, made after the agreement is disputed, and wholly upon the strength of testimony or affidavits, does not constitute any stronger evidence than the testimony or affidavits themselves. The reason why a record properly made constitutes better evidence than testimony or affidavits is that, in theory at least, the record is a contemporaneous reduction of the agreement to writing, and is read over in the hearing of, and assented to by, counsel.
Again: Attorneys in full practice do not always find it possible to remember the terms of all the agreements made by them, relative to the conduct of their cases. The law, in its tenderness, does not require them to remember them. It provides that, if they do not remember them, they may rely upon such agreements as are signed and filed, or such as are entered of record by the court. Indeed, without such provision, it is plain to see, the rights of suitors would oftentimes be placed in great jeopardy. Nor is any hardship imposed by precluding a party from establishing an attorney's agreement by a record made after the agreement is disputed, and upon the strength of testimony or affidavits. Whoever intends to rely upon a record to establish an attorney's agreement, should see to it that it is made in such a way as to have the proper force and effect of a record for that purpose.
As the District Court had no power to enter a decree in vacation as of. a previous term, except by agreement of parties, and as no such agreement is properly established, it follows that the plaintiff's motion should have been sustained and the defendant's overruled. -r,
Reversed.