Case Name: FARQUHAR v. OWENS
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1986-02-18
Citations: 149 Mich. App. 208
Docket Number: Docket No. 73148
Parties: FARQUHAR v OWENS
Judges: Before: Shepherd, P.J., and V. J. Brennan and C. Jobes, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 149
Pages: 208–223

Head Matter:
FARQUHAR v OWENS
Docket No. 73148.
Submitted March 13, 1985, at Lansing.
Decided February 18, 1986.
Leave to appeal applied for.
Deborah A. Farquhar was injured when the automobile in which she was riding as a passenger collided with an automobile driven by Kimberly J. Owens. Farquhar sustained a broken arm which prevented her from returning to her home and job in Florida for a period of time, prevented her from taking care of herself for a period of time and caused her a good deal of pain. Deborah Farquhar and her husband, John P. Farquhar, brought a negligence action in Wasthenaw Circuit Court against Kimberly Owens, Eddie Owens and Josephine Owens, alleging that Deborah Farquhar had suffered a serious impairment of body function within the meaning of the automobile no-fault insurance act and that plaintiffs thus were entitled to bring an action for damages for their noneconomic losses. Following proofs on the nature and extent of Deborah Farquhar’s injuries and on damages, defendants’ having admitted negligence, the trial court, William F. Ager, Jr., J., held that, because there was a dispute as to the duration and seriousness of Deborah Farquhar’s impairment, there existed a jury question as to whether she had suffered a serious impairment of a body function within the meaning of the automobile no-fault insurance act. The jury specifically found that Deborah Farquhar had not suffered a serious impairment of a body function. The trial court entered a judgment of no cause of action and subsequently denied Deborah Farquhar’s motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Deborah Farquhar appealed.
V. J. Brennan, J., held:
1. The proofs failed to establish that Deborah Farquhar suffered a serious impairment of a body function within the meaning of the language of the automobile no-fault insurance act. Since there was no real dispute as to the nature of Deborah _Farquhar’s injuries, the trial court should have decided, as a matter of law, that there was no serious impairment of a body function, rather than submitting that question to the jury; however, since the jury reached the same decision as the trial court should have reached on its own, the court’s error in submitting the question to the jury was harmless.
References
Am Jur 2d, Automobile Insurance §§ 348 et seq.
Validity and construction of "no-fault” automobile insurance plans. 42 ALR3d 229.
2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by permitting the defense to question Deborah Farquhar as to her alleged drinking habits.
C. Jobes, J., concurred in the result only.
Affirmed.
Shepherd, P.J., dissented. He would hold that a serious impairment of a body function was shown. He would hold that the trial court erred in submitting the question of whether there was a serious impairment of a body function to the jury. He would reverse and remand for a trial as to damages only.
Opinion of V.J. Brennan, J.
1. Insurance — No-Fault Insurance — Serious Impairment of Body Function.
The question of whether an injury is a serious impairment of body function under the no-fault act so as to give rise to tort liability for noneconomic loss must be decided as a matter of law by the tried court where there is no factual dispute regarding the nature and extent of the plaintiffs injuries; a dispute about the duration or seriousness of the impairment does not render the question one for the jury (MCL 500.3135; MSA 24.13135).
2. Insurance — No-Fault Insurance — Serious Impairment op Body Function — Harmless Error.
It is harmless error for a trial court to send to the jury the question of whether there is serious impairment of body function within the meaning of the no-fault act where, although the question was one for the court, the jury returned a verdict consistent with what the trial court should have found under the proofs presented.
Dissent by Shepherd, P.J.
3. Insurance — No-Fault Insurance — Tort Liability — Serious Impairment of Body Function.
Whether an injury is a serious impairment of body function under the no-fault act so as to give rise to tort liability for noneconomic loss is a question of statutory construction to be decided by the trial court; where there is no factual dispute regarding the nature and extent of a plaintiffs injuries or where a factual dispute is not material to the determination, the court must decide as a matter of law whether the plaintiff has suffered a serious impairment of body function (MCL 500.3135; MSA 24.13135).
4. Insurance — No-Fault Insurance — Serious Impairment of Body Function — Tort Liability.
A broken arm which causes the person to be unable to travel, to return to work, or care for himself for a period of time following the injury is a serious impairment of a body function within the meaning of the no-fault act, since an injury under those circumstances can be said to be objectively manifested, to impair an important body function and to have a severe detrimental effect upon the person’s normal lifestyle; a severe temporary impairment will satisfy the statutory threshold requirement of a serious impairment of a body function which gives rise to tort liability for noneconomic loss under the no-fault act (MCL 500.3135; MSA 24.13135).
5. Insurance — No-Fault Insurance — Tort Liability — Serious Impairment of Body Function.
A person who is seriously impaired in body function may recover damages for pain and suffering and other sequelae of the injury ' after the impairment is no longer serious (MCL 500.3135; MSA 24.13135).
Garris, Garris & Garris, P.C. (by Michael J. Garris), for plaintiff.
Stein & Moran (by Stephen B. Goethel), for defendants.
Before: Shepherd, P.J., and V. J. Brennan and C. Jobes, JJ.
Recorder’s Court judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
V. J. Brennan, J.
We hold that the proofs did not indicate a serious impairment of a body function and we affirm the trial court's entry of judgment of no cause of action and the denial of plaintiff Deborah Farquhar's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict._
In this case, the injury suffered by plaintiff Deborah Farquhar was a broken arm, and, from the reports, that was the only lingering injury. I would hardly classify that as a "catastrophic" injury.
In Wolkow v Eubank, 139 Mich App 1; 360 NW2d 320 (1984), the plaintiff received objectively manifested injuries, i.e., broken bones. The fractures were of the left second rib and the left clavicle. The rib healed without treatment, though the clavical fracture required that plaintiff wear a clavicle strap for SV2 months. During this SV2 month period, the plaintiff complained that the strap was "very distressful" and interfered with her sleep. After the strap was removed, plaintiff was able to do some household tasks but was still unable to raise her left arm over her head or straight out from her shoulder. Dressing and showering were painful. However, after seven months, plaintiff was almost fully recovered. Plaintff was unable to drive for a five-month period. Plaintiffs doctor advised her not to work or drive for at least three months after the accident. At the time of appeal, plaintiff still asserted that she suffered from headaches and neckaches. This Court found no serious impairment of body function.
See also Sherrell v Bugaski, 140 Mich App 708, 711; 364 NW2d 684 (1984), where the Court found no serious impairment of a body function. There, the Court agreed that the plaintiff sustained a back injury that had objective manifestations, noting that the "x-rays show the absence of a normal spinal curvature and that the injury does impair important body functions. Plaintiff cannot sit for long periods and finds running or jogging painful." The Court could not find this "serious" within the meaning of the statute because the injury had not caused a significant impact on the plaintiff's abil ity to have a normal life. She could walk, drive, and work and her doctors had never restricted her social activities or work.
"When considering the seriousness of the injury, the court should be mindful of the other threshold requirements for recovery of noneconomic loss (i.e., death and permanent serious disfigurement), and the legislative reasons for limiting the recovery for noneconomic losses, namely to prevent overcompensation for minor injuries and to reduce litigation in automobile accident cases." Routley v Dault, 140 Mich App 190, 193; 363 NW2d 450 (1984).
In my opinion, the trial court could have concluded as a matter of law that plaintiff did not suffer a serious impairment of an important body function. Although there was a dispute as to the duration and seriousness of the impairment, under Cassidy v McGovern, 415 Mich 483; 330 NW2d 22 (1982), I do not believe that this dispute was material to the determination of serious impairment and whether plaintiff's injury met the statutory threshold question. Although it was error for the court to send the question of serious impairment to the jury, the error here was harmless, because the jury reached the same conclusion as the court should have reached as a matter of law.
We do agree with Judge Shepherd as to his conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the cross-examination of plaintiff covering her alleged drinking problem; however, since retrial is not necessary here, we decline to comment on the manner in which a trial court must weigh the testimony under MRE 403. We also find that counsels' arguments, while irrelevant, do not mandate a new trial.
Affirmed.
C. Jobes, J., concurred in result only.