Case Name: G. A. Chapman, Appellant, vs. St. Stephens Protestant Episcopal, Church, Inc., a corporation not for profit under the laws of the State of Florida, and the Trustees of the Diocese of South Florida, a corporation not for profit, under the laws of Florida, Appellees
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1931-07-21
Citations: 105 Fla. 683
Docket Number: 
Parties: G. A. Chapman, Appellant, vs. St. Stephens Protestant Episcopal, Church, Inc., a corporation not for profit under the laws of the State of Florida, and the Trustees of the Diocese of South Florida, a corporation not for profit, under the laws of Florida, Appellees.
Judges: 
Reporter: Florida Reports
Volume: 105
Pages: 683–719

Head Matter:
G. A. Chapman, Appellant, vs. St. Stephens Protestant Episcopal, Church, Inc., a corporation not for profit under the laws of the State of Florida, and the Trustees of the Diocese of South Florida, a corporation not for profit, under the laws of Florida, Appellees.
136 So. 238.
138 So. 630.
139 So. 188.
En Banc.
Opinion filed July 21, 1931.
Petition for rehearing denied September 14, 1931.
Mandate recalled January 6, 1932.
Order granting rehearing filed January 27, 1932.
Opinion on rehearing filed January 9, 1933.
Blackwell & Gray, for Appellant;
B. A. Johnston, for Appellee.
On motion to recall a mandate for further consideration of a judgment rendered at the present term (See 136 So. 238). Mandate recalled.
B. A. Johnston, of Miami, for the Motion;
Francis B. Wmthrop, of Tallahassee, and Blackwell <& Gray, of Miami, contra.

Opinion:
Davis,
Commissioner.—The appellant filed his bill in the circuit court of Dade County, for the foreclosure of a lien claimed by him for labor performed on and for materials furnished for repairing and enlarging church property used and occupied by St. Stephens Protestant Episcopal Church, Inc., of Coconut Grove, but the legal title to which was in Trustees of the Diocese of South Florida, a corporation.
The latter corporation was created by act of the Legislature under the name of "The Protestant Episcopal Church in the Missionary Jurisdiction of Southern Florida" with full power to acquire property for the use of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the Missionary Jurisdiction of Southern Florida, or o'f any institution controlled by said church.
The act among ether things provides that no property used for parochial purposes shall be alienated or encumbered without the written application or consent of the constituted authorities of the parish and that it shall not be lawful for any parish or the corporate officers or congregation thereof to encumber, sell, transfer or convey any real property without the consent of the corporation. Later the corporate name was duly changed to "The Trustees of the Diocese of South Florida."
In the charter creating the defendant St. Stephens Protestant Episcopal Church Inc., a corporation (which was in 1925) the corporation acknowledged itself to be a member of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese of South Florida, and adopted Constitution, canons, doctrine, discipline and worship of the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America and also the Constitution and canons of the said Church in the Diocese of South Florida. The Charter of the last-named corporation provides that the officers by whom the affairs of the corporation are to be managed are a Rector, and a Vestry composed of not less than five lay baptized male members of the corporation, one of whom shall annually be appointed Senior Warden by the Rector, and one shall be elected Junior Warden. The Vestry shall also' elect annually a secretary and a treasurer. The charter also provides that
"No grant shall be made nor shall any change (charge) be imposed upon any consecrated church or chapel or any church or chapel which has been used solely for divine service belonging to the Parish, except by the consent of a majority of the whole Vestry at any regular or special meeting, nor without the consent of the Bishop acting with the advice and consent of the Standing Committee of the Diocese."
At the time the property in question was acquired by the church, the organization at Coconut Grove was a mission under the Protestant Episcopal Church in the Missionary Division of South Florida. The clergyman then in charge of the mission raised certain money by subscription which, added to money obtained as a result of the sale of property it already had, was paid for the purchase of the property in question, and the title to the property was made to "The Protestant Episcopal Church in the Missionary District of Southern Florida." In his testimony, the said' clergyman states that
"A mission cannot hold property, not being a corporate body, it had to be held by a trustee or Diocese. # 8 The custom was for the diocese of mission -jurisdiction to hold title to all mission property."
"When the Coconut Grove church was1 incorporated, it continued to use the same property.
On June 5, 1923, the Trustees of the Diocese of South Florida at a regular meeting resolved
"That whenever a parish shall incorporate under the standard form of charter which has been prepared by the Chancellor the Bishop shall convey # to the incorporated parish the property held by this corporation for such parish, provided that this resolution shall not apply to any property which is held by this corporation on any express trust."
The church building and rectory belonging to St. Stephens Church were seriously damaged in the hurricane of September, 1926, and it became necessary to do something at once to avert greater loss. Being unable to get together a majority of the vestry, members thereof—less than a majority—authorized certain work to be done on the rectory so that it could be occupied by the rector who was then out of the city, but would return in a few days. On October 8th, following, at a meeting -of the vestry, a majority being present, it was moved
"That a committee be appointed, with 'full power to act, to consider widening the church to the South as far as the present North line of the sidewalk and to extend the back wall to a line with the extreme Eastern Wall of the present church building. The idea being to make no changes in the chancel, pulpit or the position of the organ console, but to arrange for a wall to extend across the new structure in a line with the wall at the right hand side of the sanctuary; this wall having a door from the church to the new space, which will be developed up into rooms for the choir and providing more room in the Vestry."
Upon the motion being carried, Mr. Gray and Mr. Oemler, the latter being an architect, were appointed as a tentative committee to' be approved by the Rector. A motion was then made and carried that the committee be instructed to o.k. all bills for payments and the treasurer w;as authorized to pay all bills so approved. It seems that committeeman Gray was not very active in looking after the repairs that were made, although he stated that he was on the property about every day, and it is not in evidence that he o.k.'d any bills. Committeeman Oemler went ahead and made a verbal contract with the complainant to do the work on a cost-plus basis. No plans or specifications were made other than a 'drawing of the alterations to the church building and this was changed somewhat. During the progress of the work, the vestrymen generally were on the property every Sunday and some of them were there two or three times a week. The Rector returned the latter part of September or the first part of October and was there probably every day where he could, and sometimes did, consult with Mr. Oemler. Checks were drawn periodically to cover payrolls and material until some time in November when $10,850.00 had been paid on the work, while the contractor had paid out the sum of $15,597.47. Thereupon, the complainant was notified to cease work. He then demanded payment of the balance due him which added to the percentage claimed by him amounted to $7,087.09, and payment was refused.
The master reported that complainant was entitled to a lien upon the church property for the payment of said amount together with interest thereon from November 26, 1926, and recommended that a decree be entered in favor of the complainant. The court sustained certain exceptions filed by St. Stephens Protestant Episcopal Church Inc., and dismissed the bill.
We deem it established by the evidence that a contract was made with the complainant to do 'the work for the St. 'Stephens 'Protéstant Episcopal Church Inc.''on'á cost-plus basis; that the complainant in good faith spent upon the work the sum of $15,597.47 of which amount he was paid $10,850.00; that the defendant St. Stephens Protestant Episcopal Church Inc. then had and continued to have possession and enjoyment of the property; that, to use the language of Bishop Mann, whose testimony was taken before a commissioner, "repairs of that sort are made by .the rector and vestry. They don't have to consult the Bishop on the matter," from which we deduce that the Rector and Vestry had general authority under the church law to make such improvements, if it was in the power o'f the trustee to withhold it from them; that certain work was done which was not covered by the quoted resolution of the vestry, but that it was done under the supervision of Oemler, and the cost of this extra work is not apparent from the record; that the defendant, Trustees of the Diocese of South Florida, held the legal title in trust for the use of the Coconut Grove Church, the beneficial owner, and that said church could have obtained the legal title to the property in its o'wn name at any time after it became a corporate entity.
Under the terms of the resolution of the Vestry no limit was placed on the amount that was to be spent in repairing and making additions authorized to the property, nor was any detailed plan adopted by them.
If there was any protest made or dissatisfaction, shown •during the progress of the work on the part of the Rector and Vestry as to the work that was done, the cost of it, or the manner in which it was done, the record does not reveal it.
Under the circumstances disclosed by the record, St. Stephens Protestant Episcopal Church Inc. had the right to make a binding contract for repairs and additions to the church property.
It is not argued here that the Vesthy did not'have the power to appoint a committee to see that the work was done, but it is insisted that one of the committeemen, alone had no right to' make a contract with complainant, and that because the other member of the committee knew nothing of such a contract, it was not binding on St. Stephens Protestant Episcopal Church, Inc.
"Liens prior in dignity to all others accruing thereafter shall exist in favor of the following persons, upon0 the following described real estate, under the, circumstances hereinafter mentioned, to-wit (Sec. 5349 (3495) Compiled General Laws of Florida, 1927)
"In favor of any mechanic, laborer or other person who shall'perform by himself or others any labor upon, or in the construction or repairs of any building or other work or structure, or additions to or upon any fixtures therein or thereon; upon such buildings, work or structure and the land upon which it stands. (Sec. 5350 (3496) Compiled General Laws of Florida, 1927)
"In favor of any person who shall furnish any building material for the construction, repair or use of any building, fence, railroad, canal or telegraph line, wharf, bridge, mill, distillery or other manufacturing work or structure, upon the said buildings, lines or other property, and upon the lands upon which they stand. (Sec. 5353 (3499) Compiled General Laws of Florida, 1927.
"As against the owner, absolute or limited, of the property, real or personal, upon which a lien is claimed, or person deriving through his death, or purchasers or creditors with notice, the lien hereinbefore provided for shall be acquired by any person, in privity with such owner, by the performance of the labor or the furnishing of the materials. Any purchaser or creditor whose title, interest, lien or claim in or to the property shall be created, or shall arise, while the construction or repair of such property as aforesaid is in progress shall be deemed and held to be a purchaser or creditor with notice. " Section 5380 (3517) Compiled General Laws of Florida, 1927.
There is nothing in the statute that excepts church property from the above-quoted provisions though it has been held, in other jurisdictions that a mechanic's lien cannot be acquired on a church building. The weight of authority however sustains the right to a mechanic's lien against such property. 18 R. C. L. 884; 40 C. J. 60; See Notes in 78 Am. Dec. 696; 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 161 and Ann. Cas. 1915D 1145; 20 A. & E. Ency. Law (2d. Ed.) 289.
In the instant case the trustees of the Diocese of South Florida held merely the legal title and the St. Stephens Church was the beneficial or equitable owner of the property.
"In case of a simple or dry trust a mechanic's lien may exist for labor performed or materials furnished under or by virtue of a contract with, or the consent of the equitable owner of the property; but where a trustee has power to manage and control the trust property, a contract with the cestuis que trust alone, not consented to or approved by the trustee, is not sufficient as a basis for a mechanic's lien." 40 C. J. 110.
As a general rule an equitable as well as the legal owner of property may create a mechanic's lien. The wofrd "owner" includes the owner in equity as well as at law. Phillips on Mechanic's Liens (3d Ed.), Secs. 67, 188; 20 A. & E. Ency. Law (2d Ed.) 330; Goldheim v. Clark, 68 Md. 498, 13 Atl. 363; Seitz v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., 16 Kan. 133; Springer v. Kroeschell, 161 Ill. 358, 43 N. E. 1084.
While it has been held here that persons who' desire to avail themselves of mechanics' and laborers' liens should take care to inform themselves with whose estates they are dealing, when they make contracts and perform their labor (National Bank of Jacksonville v. Williams, 38 Fla. 305, 320, 20 So. 931), it is also true that the owner is es-topped to deny the agency where, without repudiating it he stands by and expressly consents to, or silently acquiesces in contracts for improvements entered into with a person who claims to be his agent. Also, the owner may, under the circumstances of the case, be estopped to deny the authority of his agent to enter into the contract, 40 C. J. 97. Furthermore, a corporation, the same as a natural person, may ratify and become bound by an unauthorized contract made on its behalf by its agent, if the contract is within the scope of its corporate powers and might have been previously authorized by it, (14a C. J. 373) and ratification "may be implied from the acquiescence in, or recognition of, the act by the corporation through its proper officer or agent, or from its accepting and retaining the benefits of the act, or from any other acts or conduct which reasonably tends to show an intention to adopt or affirm the act or contract, particularly where it appears that the corporation has repeatedly recognized and approved similar acts done by the officer or agent, and provided that at the time of such acts or conduct it has full knowledge or the material facts; and where the unauthorized act or contract is clearly beneficial to the corporation, a ratification may be implied from slight circumstances. ' ' 14a C. J. 382, 387. See also Atlanta & St. Andrews Bay R. Co. v. Thomas, 60 Fla. 412, 424, 53 So. 510, and Annotation, 7 A. L. R. 1446, et seq.; 2 Jones on Liens (3d Ed.) 451.
Where authority is conferred upon two or more agents to represent their principal in a business transaction, it is the general rule that such an agency will be presumed to be joint, and it can be performed by the agents only jointly unless an intent appears that it may be otherwise executed ; but if it appears from his course of dealing or subsequent approval that the principal has waived the re quirements of joint action on the part of the agents by-allowing a number less than the whole to act for him, the execution of the power by a number less than all will be valid. 1 Mechem on Agency (2d Ed.) Sec. 198; 2 C. J. 668.
Inasmuch as the management of the affairs of St. Stephens Episcopal Church devolved upon the Rector and Vestry, and they, with the "consent of the Bishop, acting with the consent of the standing committee of the Diocese" had the power to impose "changes" (charges) upon the church property, it seems to us that when Bishop Mann testified that "repairs of that sort are made by the Rector and Vestry," this statement, uncontradicted, taken in connection with the evidence in the record relating to the conduct of the Rector and Vestry, authority was clearly shown for making the said improvements. If Oemler was not duly authorized by the Rector and Vestry to make the alleged contract with the appellant, the officers of the church either had actual knowledge of what he did, or they should have kno'wn because it was their duty to know it, and "negligent ignorance has the same effect in law as actual knowledge." Redstone v. Redstone Lumber & Supply Co., 101 Fla. 226, 133 So. 882. By acquiescing therein and accepting the benefits flowing therefrom, they ratified Oemler's acts and now are estopped to deny his authority to bind the St. Stephens Episcopal Church.
It follows that the appellant had, at the least, a lien upon the interests of the St. Stephens Episcopal Church in the property, and since the Rector and Vestry of the said Church had the authority of the defendant, the Trustees of the Diocese of South Florida, to make "repairs of that sort" (to the Chapel and Recto'ry) we hold that the lien is upon the whole of said property and that appellant has a right to have it enforced.
The decree appealed from is reversed and the canse is remanded with directions to enter a decree for the complainant in accordance with the views herein expressed.
Per Curiam.
The record in this canse having been considered by the Court, and the foregoing opinion prepared under Chapter 14553, Acts of 1929, adopted by the Court as its opinion, it is considered, ordered and decreed by the Court that the decree of the court below should be, and the same is hereby reversed, and the cause is remanded with directions to enter a decree for the complainant in accordance with the views herein expressed.
Bufobd, C.J., and 'Wi-iitfield, Ellis, Tbbeell, Beown and Davis, J.J., concur.
Mandate Recalled Januaey 6, 1932.
Per Curiam.
Section 4690 C. G. L., 2961 R. G. S., provides that the Supreme Court shall hold two terms in each year, commencing, respectively, on the second Tuesday in January and June. In accordance with this statute a regular term of the Supreme Court began on June 9, 1931.
On July 21, 1931, judgment was entered in this cause reversing a decree of the Circuit Court of Dade County in a suit for foreclosure of lien and directing that a decree be entered by the Circuit Court for the complainant in the Court below. The original decree was for the defendant and appellee, St. Stephens Protestant Episcopal Church, Inc. On August 15, 1931, a petition, for rehearing was filed by the appellee. This petition was in the form and filed within the time required by the rules of this Court. On September 1, 1931, said petition for a rehearing was denied by a majority of the Court. On September 16, 1931, mandate was issued in accordance with this Court's judgment of reversal. Thereafter said mandate was duly filed in the Circuit Court of Dade County. On November 13, 1931, appellee filed in this Court its motion to recall the mandate heretofore sent to the Cirenit Oonrt of Dade County and that all proceedings thereunder be stayed in order that this Court might give further consideration to the judgment of reversal for the purpose of rehearing and modifying it to accord with the law and justice of the present cause.
Appellee's motion to recall the mandate and reconsider and modify or reverse the judgment of reversal which was entered by this 'Court on July 21,1931, is proposed by the appellant. As grounds for such opposition the appellant contends that after this Court denied the appellee's petition for a rehearing and issued its, mandate thereon and such mandate was duly lodged in the Circuit Court for Dade County that all jurisdiction of this Court absolutely ended at the time the mandate was lodged in the lower Court and that this Court has no jurisdiction to order that such mandate be recalled for the purpose of reinvesting itself with power to have further proceedings with respect to the appeal which was finally determined according to the judgment-of this Court entered July 21, 1931, and the denial of a rehearing on September 14, 1931.
• In support of the contention that this Court has no jurisdiction to recall the mandate under the circumstances, appellant cites and relies upon the eases of Lovett v. State, 29 Fla. 384, 11 So. 176; Brown v. State, 29 Fla. 494, 11 So. 181; and Merchants National Bank v. Grunthal, 39 Fla. 388, 22 So. 685.
But the question now before the Court is whether or not the jurisdiction of this Court ends before the expiration of the term, at the time the mandate is lodged in the lower Court, the time for rehearing having expired, or a rehearing having been applied for and been denied in due course.
It is generally held, in the absence of statute, that the power of an appellate court over its judgments, like that of courts generally, persists to the end of the term at which the judgment is rendered, and then absolutely terminates. See Ott v. Boring 131 Wis. 472, 111 N. E. 833, 11 Ann. Cas. 857) Franklin & Co. vs. Mackey, 158 N. Y. 683, 51 N. E. 178.
For the purposes of the present motion, which is an extraordinary one to recall the mandate and grant a rehearing with regard to a judgment rendered in a case decided at the present term, it has been assumed that the judgment of this Court reversing the decree of the Circuit Court was erroneously entered by this Court, at least to the extent that it directs, a particular decree to be entered in favor of the appellant.
If that proposition be true (which, of course, is not decided but only assumed for the purpose of the present motion), the question which we must determine narrows itself down to the proposition as to whether or not the Supreme Court of Florida has jurisdiction or p&wer to modify or change its own judgment of reversal during the term at which such judgment was rendered, when it is made to appear to this Court that it has committed an error which requires such change of its judgment in order to prevent a miscarriage of justice, even though a mandate has been issued and lodged in the Circuit Court.
To hold in the negative would be to announce the remarkable doctrine that errors committed by the Supreme Court of Florida are the only errors in the entire scheme of government for which no remedy can be found, where relief therefrom is seasonably applied for by an injured party. To hold to such a rule would be to declare that the Supreme Court of Florida has power to correct the errors of all other tribunals and departments of the government, while faithfully adhering to and perpetuating its own.
As late as the ease of Washington vs. State, 92 Fla. 740, 110 So. 259; opinión filed October 12, 1926, this Court said: "It is not necessary for us now to determiné the question as to whether or not the jurisdiction of this Court ends before the expiration of the term, at the time the mandate is lo'dged in the lower court, the time for rehearing having expired." This declaration found in the opinion of MR. JUSTICE BROWN in that case would seem to imply that the Court did not consider that.the case of Merchants National Bank v. Grunthal, supra; Lovett v. State, supra; and Brown v. State, supra, relied upon and cited by the appellant in this case were in point, or controlling, on the proposition as to whether or not the jurisdiction of this Court ends before the expiration of the term, at the time the mandate is lodged in the lower court, merely because such mandate has been issued and filed in the court from which the appeal was taken.
But, be that as it may, a majority of the Court have reached the conclusion that the correct rule, which should be recognized and applied in such situation, is that the jurisdiction of this court, like the jurisdiction of courts generally, persists to the end of the term and then terminates, but that during the term at which a judgment of this Court is rendered, this Court has jurisdiction and power which it may exercise, as the circumstances and justice of the ease may require, to reconsider, revise, reform or modify its own judgments for the purpose of making the same accord with law and justice, and that it has power to recall its own mandate for the purpose of enabling it to exercise such jurisdiction and power in a proper case.
Some members of the Court are of the opinion that the three eases cited and relied upon by appellants hold to' the contrary, and that they are accordingly in point and should be followed here. Other members of the Court are of the opinion that our three previous cases decided a different point and were not intended to hold that this Court lo'ses the power to control its own judgments during the term at which they are rendered inasmuch as such power is a power which is 'universally recognized to reside in courts generally.
But a majority of the Court as at presnet' constituted, are of the opinion that if the three Florida cases previously cited and relied upon by the appellant are to be construed as holding that this Court lo'ses jurisdiction over its own judgment before the expiration of the term, at the time the mandate is lodged in the lower Court, that such holding is contrary to the holdings of the better reasoned cases on the subject, and therefore should be overruled insofar as the same may conflict with the generally recognized law on the subject of jurisdiction of appellate courts. This rule is to the effect that jurisdiction of the appellate court over its own judgments, like that of courts generally, persists to the end of the term at which the judgment is rendered, and then absolutely terminates, in the absence of statute, or rule having the effect of a statute, in fohce to the contrary, and that the appellate court in a proper case may recall its mandate, and reassume jurisdiction over its own judgments during the term at which they were entered. See Franklin Bank Note Co. v. Mackey, 158 N. Y. 683, 51 N. E. 178; 10 R. C. L. Sec. 351, page 563; 15 R. C. L. Sec. 143, page 690.
The motion to recall the mandate will therefore be granted and the cause reinstated on the docket for the purpose of giving further consideration to the judgment rendered at the present term, in order that it may be determined whether or not there is error in such judgment which should be corrected in order to prevent aa miscarriage of justice.
Motion to recall mandate granted.
Buford, C.J., and Whitfield, Terrell, Brown and Davis, J.J., concur.
Ellis, J., dissents.
Lovett v. State, 29 Fla. 384, 11 So. 176; Brown vs. State, 29 Fla. 494, 11 So. 181; Merchants National Bank v. Grunthal, 39 Fla. 388, 22 So. 685.