Case Name: Patrick Darnell HILL v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia
Court: Court of Appeals of Virginia, Norfolk
Jurisdiction: Virginia
Decision Date: 2018-04-24
Citations: 812 S.E.2d 452
Docket Number: Record No. 0482-17-1
Parties: Patrick Darnell HILL
v.
COMMONWEALTH of Virginia
Judges: Present: Judges Humphreys, Decker and O'Brien
Reporter: South Eastern Reporter 2d
Volume: 812
Pages: 452–466

Head Matter:
Patrick Darnell HILL
v.
COMMONWEALTH of Virginia
Record No. 0482-17-1
Court of Appeals of Virginia, Norfolk.
APRIL 24, 2018
Stephanie J. Pough (Eric O. Moody and Associates, P.C., Portsmouth, on brief), for appellant.
Robert H. Anderson, III, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Mark R. Herring, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Present: Judges Humphreys, Decker and O'Brien

Opinion:
OPINION BY JUDGE MARY GRACE O'BRIEN
Patrick Darnell Hill ("appellant") was indicted for possession of a Schedule I or II controlled substance with intent to distribute, third offense, in violation of Code § 18.2-248. Appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence recovered during a search of his vehicle, claiming that police officers improperly seized him and the drugs found in his car in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The court denied his motion, and appellant entered a conditional guilty plea to the lesser-included offense of possession with intent to distribute as a second offense, preserving his right to appeal pursuant to Code § 19.2-254. Finding no error in the court's denial of appellant's suppression motion, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
In an appeal of the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we review the facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, the Commonwealth. Aponte v. Commonwealth, 68 Va. App. 146, 156, 804 S.E.2d 866, 870 (2017). So viewed, the evidence established that on the afternoon of April 5, 2016, Detectives Hunter and Whitson of the Portsmouth Police Department were "investigating some narcotics complaints" in the 600 block of Newport Avenue in the City of Portsmouth. Detective Hunter had been assigned to a unit specializing in narcotics transactions for two-and-a-half years of his seven years on the police force. Detective Whitson, a twenty-one-year employee of the police department, had been with the narcotics unit for four years.
Both detectives identified the 600 block of Newport Avenue as "a high drug, high crime area." Detective Whitson testified that he had previously "made several [drug arrests] in that area, mostly right behind that area." Detective Hunter confirmed that he had also "been [to] several places in that area . about drug sales."
The detectives observed appellant sitting alone in a black Lexus, leaning back in the driver's seat and "[not] moving around." The vehicle was parked in front of a fence that bordered a "shop of some sort." The detectives drove their unmarked police car past the Lexus and executed a U-turn, without activating their lights or siren. As the detectives again approached the Lexus in their car, appellant looked in their direction. The detectives parked approximately twenty-five feet away and watched appellant's car for "a minute or so." During that period, the detectives observed appellant make "a bunch of movement inside of the vehicle" by repeatedly "looking up and down."
Detective Hunter testified that based on the character of the location and his experience with drug dealers waiting for their clients in "a secluded area," he was investigating possible narcotics activity. The detectives, who were wearing police vests and patches, exited their car and started walking toward the Lexus. Appellant again looked in their direction and immediately began to engage in more extensive movement inside the car. The detectives observed appellant place his left hand on the steering wheel, turn his back and head away from them, and use his right hand to "d[i]g down" next to the driver's seat. Neither detective was able to see what, if anything, was in appellant's right hand.
Concerned for their safety, the detectives verbally identified themselves as police officers and demanded that Hill show his hands. Detective Hunter later told appellant "that he thought [appellant] had a firearm [based on] the way he was acting and the way he was pulling away, reaching." Appellant did not obey the detectives' orders, and his right hand remained out of view. After shouting at appellant "at least ten times" to show his hands, the detectives grabbed appellant's left forearm, physically removed him from the vehicle, and placed him in handcuffs.
Once appellant was secured, Detective Hunter looked under the rear portion of the driver's seat where appellant had been reaching. There, he found a plastic bag containing individually wrapped rocks of crack cocaine. Appellant was subsequently charged with drug possession.
Appellant filed a motion to suppress the seized evidence and following a hearing, the court denied the motion. The court ruled that "the officers acted properly and in a constitutional manner and had reasonable articulable suspicion for what they did." On appeal, appellant's sole argument is that the detectives lacked reasonable suspicion for an investigative detention and subsequent search of the vehicle.
DISCUSSION
Upon review of the court's denial of a suppression motion, "the burden is upon [the appellant] to show that the ruling, when the evidence is considered most favorably to the Commonwealth, constituted reversible error." Andrews v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 479, 488, 559 S.E.2d 401, 406 (2002) (quoting McGee v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 193, 197, 487 S.E.2d 259, 261 (1997) (en banc ) ). "[W]e are bound by the trial court's findings of historical fact unless 'plainly wrong' or without evidence to support them[,] and we give due weight to the inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers." McGee, 25 Va. App. at 198 & n.1, 487 S.E.2d at 261 & n.1. We review de novo the application of law to the court's factual findings. Watts v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 206, 213, 562 S.E.2d 699, 703 (2002). Appellant asserts that he was impermissibly seized in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, and as a result, the cocaine found by the police officers should be suppressed. He contends that the evidence, viewed in its entirety, did not support the conclusion that the detectives had a reasonable articulable suspicion sufficient to seize him and search his vehicle.
A. Fourth Amendment Seizures
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, as incorporated in and applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." A person is not seized according to the Fourth Amendment until he submits to a police officer's show of authority. Cochran v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 604, 608, 521 S.E.2d 287, 289 (1999) ; see also California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 625, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 1550, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991) ; McGee, 25 Va. App. at 199, 487 S.E.2d at 262 (stating that no seizure occurs until "an individual is either physically restrained or has submitted to a show of authority"). "[T]here is no seizure without actual submission; otherwise, there is at most an attempted seizure, so far as the Fourth Amendment is concerned." Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 254, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 2405, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007). We addressed the issue of "submission to authority" in Beasley v. Commonwealth, 60 Va. App. 381, 728 S.E.2d 499 (2012). In Beasley, although the defendant and another passenger in a parked vehicle initially complied with an officer's directions to show their hands, they continued to make "furtive movements," and the defendant began reaching to the side of his seat. Id. at 386-88, 728 S.E.2d at 501-02. We held that it was not until the defendant responded to the officer's third command to keep his hands in his lap that he was seized for Fourth Amendment purposes. Id. at 394, 728 S.E.2d at 505. See also Jones v. Commonwealth, 52 Va. App. 548, 665 S.E.2d 261 (2008) (holding that the defendant was not seized until he stepped out of the vehicle because he did not submit to the detectives' authority until then).
Here, appellant did not comply with the detectives' requests to show his hands, and therefore he did not submit to their authority while sitting in the vehicle. The detectives were not required to articulate a suspicion of criminal behavior to explain their observation of appellant and their approach to his vehicle. Although Detectives Hunter and Whitson both testified that appellant was sitting in a parked car in an area known for drug transactions, and they were specifically investigating narcotics sales in that location, those facts were not necessary to justify their decision to approach the Lexus. Their initial interaction with appellant was constitutionally permissible; appellant was not seized at that point. No seizure occurred until the detectives physically removed him from the vehicle and placed him in handcuffs. It was only then that appellant submitted to their authority and was seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
B. Reasonable Articulable Suspicion
Having determined when the seizure of appellant occurred, we turn to whether the detectives had a reasonable articulable suspicion that, at the time of the seizure, appellant may have been involved in criminal activity. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1883, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) ; see also Jones, 52 Va. App. at 559, 665 S.E.2d at 267. The Supreme Court has described an "articulable suspicion" as a "conclusion that can be expressed in words sufficient to persuade a reasonable listener to come to a like conclusion." Mason v. Commonwealth, 291 Va. 362, 369, 786 S.E.2d 148, 152 (2016). However, " '[a]rticulable' does not mean 'articulated.' " Id."A police officer conducting a stop is not required to precisely and individually articulate the facts that added up to suspicion in his mind." Id. (quoting United States v. Brown, 232 F.3d 589, 594 (7th Cir. 2000) ).
The test is not what the officer thought, but rather whether the facts and circumstances apparent to him at the time of the stop were such as to create in the mind of a reasonable officer in the same position a suspicion that a violation of the law was occurring or was about to occur.
Id. at 368, 786 S.E.2d at 151 (citing Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 1723-24, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978) ).
Additionally, "[t]here is no 'litmus test' for reasonable suspicion." Jones, 52 Va. App. at 560, 665 S.E.2d at 267 (alteration in original) (quoting Harmon v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 440, 445, 425 S.E.2d 77, 79 (1992) ). "Whether an officer has a reasonable suspicion to justify . a detention is 'based on an assessment of the totality of the circumstances.' " Branham v. Commonwealth, 283 Va. 273, 280, 720 S.E.2d 74, 78 (2012) (quoting Harris v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 689, 695, 668 S.E.2d 141, 145 (2008) ). Reasonable suspicion "need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct." Raab v. Commonwealth, 50 Va. App. 577, 581, 652 S.E.2d 144, 147 (2007) (en banc ) (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277, 122 S.Ct. 744, 753, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002) ). A "series of acts," which appear innocent when viewed on an individual basis, may "collectively . [be] suspicious enough that a reasonable officer [will] ha[ve] grounds to stop [a defendant] for purposes of investigating the situation further." Id. (quoting Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274, 122 S.Ct. at 751 ). This assessment recognizes "the need [for] split-second decisions" and permits an officer "to view the circumstances confronting him in light of his training and experience." Atkins v. Commonwealth, 57 Va. App. 2, 19, 698 S.E.2d 249, 257 (2010) (quoting Scott v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 725, 727, 460 S.E.2d 610, 612 (1995) ). See also Beasley, 60 Va. App. at 397, 728 S.E.2d at 506-07 (holding that when the defendant ignored three commands to keep his hands in his lap, the "accumulating factors, in their totality, provided a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot").
If an officer has reasonable suspicion "to believe criminal activity may be afoot," thereby justifying a stop, and believes that the person "may be armed and dangerous," the officer may lawfully conduct a pat-down search for weapons. Lowe v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 656, 660-61, 536 S.E.2d 454, 456-57 (2000). An officer is also entitled to conduct a "search [of] the accessible areas of the passenger compartment of the car in which a weapon might be hidden" if the officer has reasonable suspicion that a lawfully detained suspect in a stationary vehicle is armed and dangerous. Stanley v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 873, 875, 433 S.E.2d 512, 514 (1993) (citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049-50, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 3480-81, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983) ).
Further, actions by an individual prior to a seizure "may both crystallize previously unconfirmed suspicions of criminal activity and give rise to legitimate concerns for officer safety," thereby permitting detention and a limited search for weapons. Jones, 52 Va. App. at 562, 665 S.E.2d at 268 (quoting United States v. Davis, 202 F.3d 1060, 1063 (8th Cir. 2002) ). Additionally, under some circumstances, reasonable articulable suspicion that an individual possesses a concealed weapon "ipso facto render[s] him potentially armed and dangerous" for purposes of permitting both a detention and a limited weapons search. Id. at 560-61, 665 S.E.2d at 267. See also Jones v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 692, 701 n.3, 636 S.E.2d 403, 407 n.3 (2006) ("[I]t is reasonable for an officer to believe a person may be armed and dangerous when the person is suspected of being involved in a drug transaction[.]" (quoting United States v. Bustos-Torres, 396 F.3d 935, 943 (8th Cir. 2005) ) ).
In light of these principles, we find that Detectives Hunter and Whitson had reasonable articulable suspicion that appellant possessed a concealed weapon and was armed and dangerous, justifying appellant's seizure and subsequent protective search of his vehicle. While mere presence in a high crime area does not establish a reason to detain a suspect, "it is a relevant contextual consideration in a Terry analysis." Whitaker v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 268, 276, 687 S.E.2d 733, 737 (2010) ; see also Walker v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 782, 791-92, 595 S.E.2d 30, 35 (2004) (finding defendant's behavior and "very nervous" appearance in area known for drug activity, and officer's concern when appellant refused to remove hand from his pocket, justified frisk). Appellant's presence in a "high-drug, high crime area" was one of several contextual considerations supporting the detectives' actions. The experienced detectives were specifically "investigating some narcotics complaints" when they encountered appellant on a "secluded" part of the street "right [in front of the] area" where Detective Whitson previously had made several prior drug arrests. Detective Hunter had also "been [to] several places in that area . about drug sales." Based on his experience, Detective Hunter testified that drug dealers often wait for their clients in secluded locations; adding to his suspicions that appellant was engaged in narcotics activity.
We have held that a defendant's furtive hand gesture in a public place known for narcotics activity is a circumstance which, in and of itself, is insufficient to justify a Terry stop. Smith v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 1100, 407 S.E.2d 49 (1991) ; Riley v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 494, 412 S.E.2d 724 (1992). In Smith, a police officer observed the defendant, who was on foot, at night in a playground known for drug activity. Id. at 1102, 407 S.E.2d at 51. As the officer's marked patrol car approached, the defendant quickly thrust his hand into his pants. Id. The officer stopped, approached the defendant, and tried to search him. Id. As the two men tussled, the officer grabbed at the defendant's pants and pulled them open, finding a bag of cocaine. Id. We held that "[t]he officer's observations, standing alone, were not sufficient to justify an investigatory stop and search." Id. at 1104, 407 S.E.2d at 52. Similarly, in Riley, we held that a police officer's observations of a defendant walking away from his car in a high-crime area at night, and making a motion toward his waistband, did not amount to a reasonable articulable suspicion. Riley, 13 Va. App. at 497-99, 412 S.E.2d at 726-27.
Unlike the defendants in Smith and Riley, appellant did not merely exhibit a single furtive movement in a high crime area. Instead, numerous factors prompted the investigative detention and subsequent search of the area where appellant was reaching. The detectives were responding to specific complaints of narcotics activity and had personal experience making drug arrests in the immediate vicinity. Appellant was sitting motionless when the detectives first observed him, and then changed his behavior significantly when he saw them approach in their unmarked car. He engaged in "a bunch of movements inside of [his] vehicle," looking "up and down" repeatedly. When the detectives parked and walked towards him, appellant immediately turned away and began reaching repeatedly next to his seat, which prompted the detectives to demand that he show both hands. He "dug down into the seats," "tuck[ing] his right hand into the rear bottom of the driver's seat," and he refused to show his hands despite being told to do so "at least ten times."
Our decision in Jones, 52 Va. App. 548, 665 S.E.2d 261, where we affirmed the denial of a suppression motion, is instructive. In Jones, detectives approached the defendant who was in a vehicle parked outside a hotel known for narcotics transactions. Id. at 552-53, 665 S.E.2d at 263. Prior to their approach, the detectives had observed the defendant sitting in his car and looking down toward his lap for about fifteen minutes. Id. at 552, 665 S.E.2d at 263. The detectives believed Jones could be involved in a narcotics transaction, although he was not engaged in any overtly criminal activity. Id. at 552-53, 665 S.E.2d at 263. As the detectives began speaking to him, Jones reached for the floorboard of his vehicle. Id. at 553, 665 S.E.2d at 263. He ignored the detectives' command to put his hands on the steering wheel and persisted in reaching down underneath the seat. Id. The detective on the passenger side of the car noticed a large bowie knife behind the seat. Id. at 553-54, 665 S.E.2d at 264. Jones again ignored the detectives' commands and continued "going down underneath the seat." Id. at 554, 665 S.E.2d at 264. Jones then exited the car, holding a black zippered bag that he tossed onto the driver's seat. Id. The detectives seized Jones and the bag, which contained drugs and a digital scale. Id. One of the detectives testified that as the defendant was reaching to the floorboard and ignoring his commands, "[m]y concern was that I was going to get shot." Id. at 553, 665 S.E.2d at 264.
We held that Jones was not seized until he stepped out of the vehicle because he did not submit to the detectives' authority until then. Id. at 557, 665 S.E.2d at 265-66. We further held that when the detectives seized Jones, they had reasonable articulable suspicion both that he possessed a weapon and that he was armed and dangerous. Id. at 560-64, 665 S.E.2d at 267-69. The Court's analysis focused on Jones's failure to obey the detectives' commands to show his hands and his continual reaching under the seat. We specified that "[t]he potential concealed weapon to which we here refer is not the bowie knife . [but] the black bag, which Jones retrieved from 'underneath' the car seat, despite being thrice told not to reach under that seat." Id. at 561, 665 S.E.2d at 267. We found that Jones' continued disregard of the detectives' commands, coupled with his repeated attempts to reach toward the floorboards, gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that warranted the seizure. Id. at 560-61, 665 S.E.2d at 267 ; see also James v. Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 740, 745-46, 473 S.E.2d 90, 92 (1996) (concluding that a frisk was constitutionally permissible where a passenger exhibited "jittery" behavior and was unresponsive to officers' requests to keep hands in view during a driver's arrest).
Similarly, here, based on their initial observations of appellant, and their knowledge of and personal experience in the area, the detectives suspected that appellant was involved in narcotics activity. As in Jones, the officers did not immediately see appellant engage in any overtly criminal behavior. The detectives initially observed appellant make "a bunch of movement inside of his vehicle" by "looking up and down." Upon their approach, the detectives saw appellant look in their direction and start moving around in his vehicle. The detectives repeatedly told appellant to show them his hands. Despite being instructed at least ten times to put both hands on the steering wheel, appellant continued to "d[i]g down" next to his seat, with his right hand out of view. Detective Hunter testified that he thought appellant had a concealed firearm, based on the way he was acting. This concern was objectively reasonable, given the detectives' familiarity with the prevalence of narcotics transactions in that location, appellant's initial furtive movements, and most significantly, appellant's refusal to respond to the detectives' repeated commands to show his hands, which were based on their concern for their own safety. See Harris v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 146, 149, 400 S.E.2d 191, 193 (1991) (stating that, in determining whether an officer has reasonable articulable suspicion, "due weight must be given . to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience" (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. at 1883 ) ).
The interest in police officer safety was an important consideration in the United States Supreme Court's decision in Terry:
We are now concerned with more than the government interest in investigating crime; in addition, there is the more immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps to assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him. Certainly it would be unreasonable to require that police officers take unnecessary risks in the performance of their duties. American criminals have a long tradition of armed violence, and every year in this country many law enforcement officers are killed in the line of duty, and thousands more are wounded.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 23, 88 S.Ct. at 1881. This justification for an investigative search set forth in 1968 by the United States Supreme Court holds firm today.
By the time appellant was seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, which did not occur until appellant was physically removed from the car, the detectives had reasonable articulable suspicion that appellant was involved in criminal activity. Therefore, the investigatory detention, and the search under the rear portion of appellant's driver's seat, did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we find that the court did not err in denying appellant's motion to suppress.
Affirmed.
Appellant's single assignment of error alleges that "his Fourth Amendment rights against illegal search and seizure were violated [because] the officers lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion that [he] was engaged in criminal activity when he was found in a high crime area and did not respond to the officers' commands to show his hands." He challenges the investigative detention, his removal from the vehicle, and the "recover[y of] the suspected controlled substance" on this ground. He does not challenge the officers' seizure of the drugs from his car on any other basis. See Commonwealth v. Brown, 279 Va. 235, 240-42, 687 S.E.2d 742, 744-45 (2010) (emphasizing that "[o]nly questions presented in the petition for appeal will be noticed by the Court of Appeals" and reversing a holding of the Court of Appeals that itself reversed a ruling of the trial court on a ground on which the defendant did not assign error, despite his preservation of the issue in the trial court (quoting Rule 5A:12(c) ) ). Additionally, appellant did not preserve a separate challenge to the seizure of the drugs in the trial court as required by Rule 5A:18, and he does not ask the Court on appeal to invoke any exceptions to that rule's finality principles. See Edwards v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 752, 760, 589 S.E.2d 444, 448 (2003) (en banc ) (stating that the Court "do[es] not consider" an "exception to the rule sua sponte "), aff'd by unpub'd order, No. 040019 (Va. Oct. 15, 2004), cited with approval in Jones v. Commonwealth, 293 Va. 29, 39 n.5, 795 S.E.2d 705, 710 n.5 (declining to apply sua sponte one of the same exceptions to Rule 5:25, the Supreme Court of Virginia's counterpart to Rule 5A:18), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 138 S.Ct. 81, 199 L.Ed.2d 25 (2017).
We note that the United States Supreme Court's holding in Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 346-47, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 1720-21, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009) concerning the scope of vehicle searches incident to arrest, did not affect the ongoing validity of the Long exception permitting a vehicle search based on officer safety concerns.