Case Name: WATERS, administratrix, v. HURST
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1913-02-11
Citations: 12 Ga. App. 248
Docket Number: 3967
Parties: WATERS, administratrix, v. HURST.
Judges: 
Reporter: Georgia Appeals Reports
Volume: 12
Pages: 248–250

Head Matter:
3967.
WATERS, administratrix, v. HURST.
1. Wliere it appeared from the petition in a suit against an administratrix, that the suit was brought within twelve months from her qualification, and the petition failed to state that she waived the twelve months’ exemption from suit, which the law allows to administrators, the allegations were not sufficient as basis for a recovery. An acknowledgment of service, without an express waiver therein of the twelve months’ exemption from suit, and the fact that she did not appear or file a defense, did not authorize the judge to enter judgment against Her as administratrix.
2. The decisions in Baiter v. Shephard, 30 Ga. 706, and Bill v. Julian, 119 Ga. 607 (46 S. E. 834), are not controlling on this question. In those cases it was held that the twelve months’ exemption was a personal privilege, for the security of the representative of the decedent, and if he allowed a judgment to be rendered against him during that period, a third person could not attack the judgment by setting up the exemption. In the present case the administratrix herself attacked the validity of the judgment, on the ground that the suit was premature.
Decided February 11, 1913.
Complaint; from city court of Sylvania—Judge Boykin. December 9, 1911.
J. W. Overstreet, for plaintiff in error.
E. K. Overstreet, contra.

Opinion:
Russell, J.
In tbe opinion of .a majority of this court, the trial judge erred in overruling the defendant's motion to set aside the judgment, made during the term in which the judgment was rendered. We are led to this view by the fact that, while the twelve months' exemption from suit, which is accorded by law to representatives of estates of deceased persons, is, in a sense, a personal privilege, and may be expressly waived, a waiver can not be implied from a mere acknowledgment of service of a petition which does not contain an averment that there has been 'a waiver of the exemption. In our opinion, in .order to permit the issuance of a valid judgment against an administratrix upon an action brought within the period of twelve months, it must appear from the record that the statutory exemption from suit has been waived. The petition in the present instance was fatally defective as the basis of a judgment against the administratrix, unless she had appeared and pleaded, because it did not contain any reason why the plaintiff could maintain the action in total disregard of the Civil Code, § 4015, which forbids such suits.
If the defendant administratrix had entered upon the petition or incorporated in her waiver of service an express waiver of the twelve months' exemption from suit, the action, under the ruling in the case of Emmett v. Dekle, 132 Ga. 593 (64 S. E. 682), could have proceeded. But by acknowledging service she did not commit herself to the admission that the petition set forth a valid cause of action; and, not having subsequently appeared and pleaded, she is not estopped from contesting that it is a good cause of action. The acknowledgment of service can not be extended beyond its express terms. Certainly waiver of the statutory exemption from suit accorded by law to administrators and executors must be evidenced by some affirmative action on the part of such representative. It can not be implied. Nor is this right, while in a sense a. personal privilege, identical with the personal element involved in the statute of limitations. Generally, the decision as to whether a de-, fendant will plead or decline to plead the bar of the statute of limitations affects only himself, whereas an executor or administrator acts solely in a fiduciary capacity, and his acts in this respect affect not only creditors, but legatees and heirs at law.
Judgment reversed.