Case Name: Kenneth BROWN v. STATE of Mississippi
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2008-06-26
Citations: 986 So. 2d 270
Docket Number: No. 2005-CT-00108-SCT
Parties: Kenneth BROWN v. STATE of Mississippi.
Judges: SMITH, C.J., WALLER, P.J., CARLSON AND LAMAR, JJ., CONCUR. GRAVES AND RANDOLPH, JJ., CONCUR IN RESULT ONLY. DIAZ, P.J., CONCURS IN PART AND IN RESULT AND DISSENTS IN PART WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. EASLEY, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 986
Pages: 270–289

Head Matter:
Kenneth BROWN v. STATE of Mississippi.
No. 2005-CT-00108-SCT.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
June 26, 2008.
Phillip Broadhead, Oxford, attorney for appellant.
Office of the Attorney General by Deirdre McCrory, attorneys for appellee.

Opinion:
DICKINSON, Justice, for the Court.
¶ 1. This is a conviction for aggravated assault and shooting into a dwelling house. During closing argument, the prosecutor repeatedly suggested to the jury that it should return a verdict of guilty for reasons other than that the defendant in this case was actually guilty. On one such occasion, after defense counsel's objection was sustained, the prosecutor argued with the trial judge, falsely representing to her that every decision from this Court allowed him to make "send-a-message" arguments to the jury.
¶ 2. The jury returned a guilty verdict, and the defendant appealed. We referred the matter to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the conviction but ordered the prosecutor to pay the costs of appeal. Brown v. State, 986 So.2d 308, 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 924 (Miss.Ct.App. Dec. 12, 2006). The State filed a petition for writ of certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' decision to assess the costs of the appeal to the prosecutor. We granted the State's petition and, pursuant to our authority to review all issues raised in the Court of Appeals, we now reverse the conviction and the assessment of costs against the prosecutor.
BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
¶ 3. We borrow and restate here the Court of Appeals' excellent statement of the facts in this case:
On May 2, 2003, at approximately 8:00 p.m., Earnest Moore and Latoya Carter were inside their bedroom at 115 West Second Street, in Leland, when they heard noises from outside. Carter went to make sure the front door was locked. Meanwhile, Moore was shot in the left hand as a shot was fired into his bedroom window from outside.
At trial, Carter testified that she looked out the hall window on the night of the shooting and saw that it was Brown standing outside of their bedroom window with something silver in his hand. She said that she told Moore that it was Brown and to get out of the room. In her first statement to the police, there was no mention that she ever looked out of the window and saw the perpetrator at all. It was not until her second police statement that Carter said that she saw Brown. Carter testified that she and Moore both told police that same night that it was Brown.
The jury heard testimony that during the three weeks leading up to the shooting, Brown made threats against the household and was caught prowling outside. Moore's brother-in-law, Richard Chaney testified that Brown bragged that he had shot Moore and gotten away with it. However, Brown denied the crime and gave an alibi. The jury found him guilty.
Brown v. State, — So.2d—, 2006 Miss. App. LEXIS 924 (Miss.Ct.App. Dec. 12, 2006).
¶ 4. During closing argument, Assistant District Attorney Brad McCullouch's serial misconduct began when he urged the jurors to
walk away from our oppression and prejudice and make the types of decisions that make us heroes and rid crime from our streets. You know, we always say something could have been done. I mean, have you heard that? Something could have been done. Something could have been done in the future. And the future is now. We get to do something about the crime in this county. It is [sic] epidemic proportion.
(Emphasis added). Brown's counsel objected. Immediately after the trial judge sustained the objection, McCullouch stated to the jury that
There were small children that was [sic] in that house minutes before that shot. How many children are sleeping on the floor with their momma sleeping on the floor in Greenville and Leland?
(Emphasis added). Again, Brown's counsel objected. Responding to the objection, McCullouch stated to the trial judge:
Judge, every Supreme Court opinion that I have read has said the latitude given to prosecutors in cross-examination, even to use that send a message argument, is proper because it is a broad latitude that we're supposed to have for a free flow of ideas, to make inferences on the — to zealously represent the State and the people of the state. I mean we just have — we have great latitude here. I am not saying anything improper in this argument.
(Emphasis added). Unconvinced by this inaccurate argument, the trial judge admonished McCullouch, instructing him not to use such tactics in her courtroom. Rather than respectfully apologizing, McCullouch stated, "I've done nothing improper. The judge in this — I mean Your honor has said not in my courtroom, but the Supreme Court — " At this point, the trial judge interrupted the prosecutor, telling him that she was not attempting to enforce rules different from those which applied to all courts in the state. McCul-louch continued to argue with the trial judge:
McCULLOUCH: Your Honor, the Supreme Court has said—
COURT: I heard you say that.
McCULLOUCH: — over and over again—
COURT: You don't have to tell me twice. I heard you when you said it.
McCULLOUCH: Then how can it be improper argument if the Supreme Court has said that it is proper?
COURT: I don't agree with you that the Supreme Court has said that.... Let me say this straight up to you. I have ruled. Step back from the bench, continue with your closing, or be seated.
¶ 5. As he continued his closing argument, McCullouch next stated to the jury: "Talk about witnesses he. His [the defendant's] liberty is at stake. What about our liberty to walk the streets.... " (emphasis added). Brown's attorney objected and, after hearing argument, the trial judge stated,
The court is going to sustain it. The court is going to caution you that we're not going to go into the crime in the United States, the FBI statistics, that Greenville is trying to get into the safe crime community. We're not going there.
McCullouch continued:
These people have a right to feel safe in their home and not have to leave, not have to sleep on the floor. We have a right — they have a right. That woman in the next apartment has a right not to have to worry that her child is going to get hit by a bullet in our county. (Emphasis added). Brown's attorney objected, and, again, the trial judge sustained.
¶ 6. In winding down his closing argument, McCullouch told the jurors: "We stand up here trying our best to represent the people, the people of the State of Mississippi, from crime that may happen.... " (emphasis added). Brown's attorney objected, but before the trial judge could sustain the objection, McCullouch "withdrew" the inappropriate comment.
¶ 7. The jury found Brown guilty on both charges, and he was sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment of ten and five years, with one year to serve on each count, and the remainder suspended with five years supervised probation. Brown timely perfected an appeal which we referred to the Court of Appeals. Brown's issues on appeal were (1) that the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, and (2) that McCul-louch engaged in prosecutorial misconduct in his closing argument to the jury.
¶ 8. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions and taxed the costs of the appeal to Washington County. As a sanction for his inappropriate conduct during closing argument, the Court of Appeals ordered McCullouch personally to reimburse Washington County for all costs of the appeal. The State filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which we granted.
ANALYSIS
¶ 9. Because Brown's second assignment of error — that, due to McCullouch's misconduct during closing argument, the trial court should have granted a mistrial — is dispositive of the case, we will not address his first assignment of error. We also will address the Court of Appeals' order that requires McCullouch personally to reimburse Washington County for the costs of appeal.
I.
¶ 10. Justice Armis Hawkins once warned that a "rule which is not enforced is no rule." Box v. State, 437 So.2d 19, 21 (Miss.1983). While we agree with the spirit of Justice Hawkins's statement, we are not so intractable and inflexible that we believe every error and misstatement by a prosecutor during closing argument merits a mistrial. However, we have searched in vain for a case as egregious as the one before us today. McCullouch repeatedly was called down by the trial judge for blatantly violating the rule against making inappropriate statements to the jury, all the while lecturing the trial judge on the appropriateness of his objectionable comments. Furthermore, McCul-louch brazenly misrepresented this Court's precedent to the trial judge.
¶ 11. For two decades, this Court has warned prosecutors not to encourage juries to use their verdict to "send-a-message" to the public or to other potential criminals. While, hopefully, the threat of punishment serves as a deterrent to crime, it is the function of the jury in a particular case to render a verdict based solely on the evidence introduced at the trial of that case. As this Court stated twenty years ago:
The jurors are representatives of the community in one sense, but they are not to vote in a representative capacity. Each juror is to apply the law to the evidence and vote accordingly. The issue which each juror must resolve is not whether or not he or she wishes to "send a message" but whether or not he or she believes that the evidence showed the defendant to be guilty of the crime charged. The jury is an arm of the State but it is not an arm of the prosecution. The State includes both the prosecution and the accused. The function of the jury is to weigh the evidence and determine the facts. When the prosecution wishes to send a message they should employ Western Union. Mississippi jurors are not messenger boys.
Williams v. State 522 So.2d 201, 209 (Miss. 1988).
¶ 12. Depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case, "send-a-message" arguments may — standing alone — constitute reversible error. Payton v. State, 785 So.2d 267, 271 (Miss. 1999). In Payton, this Court found the following "send-a-message" statement to be reversible error:
Send a message to these older, more mature, criminals, "We are not going to let you ruin young people's lives like you have ruined these three people's lives, and all these lives you endangered in the process."
Id. at 270.
¶ 13. We recently addressed this issue in Spicer v. State, 921 So.2d 292 (Miss. 2006), in which we set forth two threshold inquiries, followed by a two-pronged test. The first threshold question is whether defense counsel objected. We noted that, despite the absence of objection, we will not procedurally bar the issue where "the [send-a-message] argument is so 'inflammatory' that the trial judge should have objected on his own motion." Id, at 317 (internal citations omitted).
¶ 14. Spicer's second threshold inquiry is whether it appears, in examining the surrounding circumstances, that defense counsel invited the comment. Id. at 318. If so, of course, the issue may be waived.
¶ 15. Once the two threshold questions are satisfied, Spicer provides that, for a finding of reversible error, "the court must determine (1) whether the remarks were improper, and (2) if so, whether the remarks prejudicially affected the accused's rights." Id. (internal citations omitted). In attempting to clarify the application of the test, we stated that
[i]t must be clear beyond a reasonable doubt, that absent the prosecutor's comments, the jury could have found the defendant guilty. This goes beyond a finding of sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
¶ 16. In analyzing this language in Spi-cer, we find we should have employed the term "would" instead of "could." Thus, to meet the second prong of the test, we hold that it must be clear beyond a reasonable doubt that, absent the prosecutor's inappropriate comments, the jury would have found the defendant guilty. This, of course, amounts to a harmless-error analysis, and is the analysis to be used for the second prong of the Spicer test.
¶ 17. In this case, we find, as did the Court of Appeals, that both threshold questions must be resolved in favor of Brown. His counsel repeatedly objected, and we find nothing whatsoever in the record which indicates that he invited the inappropriate comments.
¶ 18. We also agree with the Court of Appeals that the first prong of the Spicer test is met. McCullouch's remarks were indeed improper. We now address the second prong, using a harmless-error standard.
¶ 19. We first note that this case is far more egregious than Payton, which we reversed. In Payton, 785 So.2d at 268 the prosecutor made the mistake only once, and the evidence of the defendant's guilt included the testimony of three accomplices and several other witnesses.
¶ 20. By contrast, in the case sub judi-ce, McCullouch violated the rules five times and, in the process, attempted to mislead the trial judge as to the prevailing law. Furthermore, the evidence against Brown was hardly overwhelming. He was convicted primarily on the testimony of the victim's girlfriend, Latoya Carter, who claimed she saw someone who looked like Brown outside the window with something shiny in his hand. However, in her handwritten statement to police on the day of the incident, Carter made no mention of Brown, stating only that she saw "someone" outside the window. In a later statement, typed by one of the police officers, Carter stated that Brown was the person she saw. However, she also stated elsewhere in the statement that "a shot went off and Ernest [the victim] fell to the floor I ran to the other room. Ernest told me to go and see who it was and I told him no." This is a curious statement, given that the trial testimony was that both Ernest and Carter identified the person prior to the shot.
¶ 21. There were numerous other contradictions in Carter's testimony, as well as in the testimony of the victim, Ernest Moore. We do not point out these contradictions to say there was insufficient evidence for a jury to convict Brown. Rather, we focus on this testimony to demonstrate that the evidence against Brown was not overwhelming; and certainly not enough so to overcome the prejudice engendered by McCullouch's numerous inappropriate statements to the jury during closing argument. Thus, we hold that McCullouch's numerous inappropriate statements to the jury do not constitute harmless error and, due to prose-cutorial misconduct, Brown's conviction must be reversed.
¶22. We turn now to the Court of Appeals' order requiring McCullouch to reimburse Washington County for its payment of the costs of appeal.
II.
¶ 23. In its Petition For Writ of Certio-rari, the State informs us that the Court of Appeals "issued an opinion affirming Brown's conviction and sentence, but assessing costs of the appeal to Assistant District Attorney Brad McCullouch." We find this statement is not fully supported by the record.
¶ 24. It is true enough that, within its opinion, the Court of Appeals stated: "We hold that the prosecutor Brad McCullouch be personally assessed with the costs of this appeal." However, in the next sentence, the court stated: "As such, we hold that McCullouch is ordered to reimburse Washington County for such costs within thirty days of the issuance of the mandate." Furthermore, in the disposition of the case at the conclusion of the opinion, the Court of Appeals stated:
THE COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO WASHINGTON COUNTY, AND THE COURT ORDERS THAT THE PROSECUTOR BRAD MCCOLLOUCH, INDIVIDUALLY, SHALL REIMBURSE WASHINGTON COUNTY FOR ALL COSTS OF THE APPEAL WITHIN THIRTY DAYS OF THIS MANDATE.
(Emphasis added). Furthermore, the Court of Appeals made it clear that it drew its authority to require McCullouch to reimburse Washington County from our pri- or cases which speak in terms of sanctions. For instance, citing Livingston v. State, 525 So.2d 1300, 1308 (Miss.1988), the Court of Appeals stated that "[f]or approximately twenty years, the appellate courts of this state have warned that prosecutors may be sanctioned for such conduct." Brown, 986 So.2d at 315. Citing Payton v. State, 785 So.2d 267, 271 (Miss.1999), the Court of Appeals stated that such punishment "includes sanctions at the trial court level as well as the appellate level." Id. at 315.
¶ 25. Because of the ambiguity of the question, that is, whether the Court of Appeals intended to tax McCullouch with costs or sanction him; and because the authority for taxing costs is different from the authority to sanction an attorney, we shall address both possibilities.
Taxation of costs
¶ 26. Taxation of costs on appeal is governed by Rule 36 of the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure, which states:
(a) To Whom Allowed. Except as otherwise provided by law, if an appeal is dismissed, costs shall be taxed against the appellant unless otherwise agreed by the parties or ordered by the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals. If a judgment is affirmed, costs shall be taxed against the appellant unless otherwise ordered. If a judgment is reversed, costs shall be taxed against the appellee unless otherwise ordered. If a judgment is affirmed or reversed in part, or is vacated, costs shall be allowed only as ordered by the court which decided the case.
(b) Costs For and Against the State of Mississippi. Costs may be awarded for or against the State of Mississippi or any of its agencies, or officers, or political subdivisions unless otherwise provided by law.
¶27. We agree with the State that, where an appeal is decided by an appellate court, subsection (a) of Rule 36 provides only for the assessment of costs against the appellant or the appellee, "unless otherwise ordered." And we view the "otherwise ordered" language as authority, under appropriate circumstances, to tax part or all of the costs of appeal to the winning party. Subsection (b) simply provides that the State of Mississippi "or any of its agencies, or officers, or political subdivisions" are fair game for costs. But it says nothing of taxing costs to any of these entities outside their official capacities. Furthermore, the provision presupposes that such official entities are parties to the litigation.
¶ 28. We are provided no citation of authority for the proposition that an appellate court's power to assess the costs of appeal pursuant to Rule 36 extends beyond the parties to the litigation. Thus, because McCullouch, in his individual capacity, was not a party to the litigation, Rule 36 provides no authority for taxation of costs against him, personally.
Sanctions
¶ 29. If we read the Court of Appeals' action to be a sanction, then the salient question is whether the Court of Appeals had authority to sanction McCul-louch, individually, for his inappropriate conduct before the Circuit Court of Washington County.
¶ 30. The Court of Appeals' authority to sanction is governed by several of the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure, none of which are applicable here. Rule 2(a) allows the Court of Appeals to dismiss an appeal where certain procedural requirements are not followed. This rule is inapposite to this case, as McCullouch's conduct is unrelated to procedural requirements for prosecuting the appeal. Rule 2(b) allows the Court of Appeals to issue sanctions for failure "to comply with these rules or any order is- ¶ 30. The Court of Appeals' authority to sanction is governed by several of the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure, none of which are applicable here. Rule 2(a) allows the Court of Appeals to dismiss an appeal where certain procedural requirements are not followed. This rule is inapposite to this case, as McCullouch's conduct is unrelated to procedural requirements for prosecuting the appeal. Rule 2(b) allows the Court of Appeals to issue sanctions for failure "to comply with these rules or any order is-
¶ 31. Thus, we find no authority for the Court of Appeals' order of sanctions against MeCullouch personally.
¶ 32. In its majority opinion, the Court of Appeals cited several cases which it felt stood as authority for the direct imposition of sanctions by the Court of Appeals against MeCullouch. See e.g. Payton v. State, 785 So.2d 267, 271 (Miss.1999). To the extent Payton and other cases suggest that sanctions should be assessed against prosecutors personally, we hold that — because the offending conduct occurred in the trial court — the trial judge must assess whether sanctions are appropriate.
¶ 33. We find that Circuit Judge Betty Sanders displayed exceptional judicial restraint and temperment in response to McCullouch's inappropriate behavior which, we emphasize, took place in her courtroom, not here. Thus, we decline to inquire behind her decision not to sanction MeCullouch.
CONCLUSION
¶ 34. Eleven years ago, addressing recalcitrant prosecutors who stubbornly continued to use "send-a-message" arguments, Justice Banks stated that "it is high time that the bench and bar take seriously our admonitions about such improprieties. Harmless error analysis should not be considered as a license to transgress the rules of fair argument that are repeatedly promulgated by this Court." Wells v. State, 698 So.2d 497, 519 (Miss.1997). (Banks, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
¶ 35. We find considerable prejudice resulted from McCullouch's inappropriate statements to the jury, and we are unable to say, beyond a reasonable doubt, that such prejudice was overcome by the evidence. We therefore reverse Brown's conviction and sentence and we remand this case to the trial court for a new trial consistent with this opinion.
¶ 36. We further find that the Court of Appeals was without authority either to assess the costs of appeal to MeCullouch personally, or to sanction him for conduct which took place outside the Court of Appeals. We therefore reverse the Court of Appeals' order requiring MeCullouch to reimburse Washington County for the costs of appeal.
¶ 37. THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS REVERSED. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY IS REVERSED AND REMANDED.
SMITH, C.J., WALLER, P.J., CARLSON AND LAMAR, JJ., CONCUR. GRAVES AND RANDOLPH, JJ., CONCUR IN RESULT ONLY. DIAZ, P.J., CONCURS IN PART AND IN RESULT AND DISSENTS IN PART WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. EASLEY, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.
. "The Supreme Court's review on the grant of certiorari shall be conducted on the record and briefs previously filed in the Court of Appeals, and on any supplemental briefs filed. The Supreme Court may limit the question on review." Miss. R.App. P. 17(h) (emphasis added). See also Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. of Miss. v. Hawkins, 781 So.2d 899, 900-01 (Miss 2001) (Supreme Court not limited to review of issues raised on appeal); McDaniel v. Ritter, 556 So.2d 303, 306-07 (Miss.1989) ("Our appellate jurisdiction extends to cases and not just issues.... Moreover, once a case becomes subject to our appellate jurisdiction, we have authority to address all matters as may appear in the interests of justice and economy....").
. In recalling this incident during the hearing on post-trial motions, Judge Sanders stated, "I believe it is the first time in my career of almost 15 years on the bench that I have had to say to an attorney to step back from the bench."
. We also note that McCullouch made the following inaccurate and misleading statement to the jury: "[T]hink of the consequences of a vote of not guilty. The community says they voted him innocent. I mean, it might be not guilty, but what you're doing is saying he's innocent. That's what it means."
. As quoted from the record later in this opinion, the prosecutor stated to the trial judge that, in "every case" he has read, the "Supreme Court" has said "send-a-message" arguments are proper. Given that every case addressing the subject for the past twenty years states the opposite, it is fair to conclude that the prosecutor either read no cases, or was not telling the trial judge the truth.
. See also Evans v. State, 725 So.2d 613, 675 (Miss. 1997); Wilcherv. State, 697 So.2d 1123, 1139 (Miss.1997); Hunter v. State, 684 So.2d 625, 637 (Miss. 1996); Williams v. State, 522 So.2d 201, 209 (Miss.1988).
.In Spicer, the "send a message" statement made by the prosecutor was: "We can't keep you from doing it, but you will pay the price for doing it. And other people are going to know that you paid the price." Spicer, 921 So.2d, at 317. No objection was made to the comment, and it happened only once.
. In Spicer, we actually intended the State's burden to be difficult. We stated that we have "cautioned against using harmless error analysis to 'transgress the rules of fair argument that are repeatedly promulgated by this Court'." Id. citing Payton, 785 So.2d at 271.
. Also unlike today's case, the defense counsel in Payton failed to object to the prosecutor's "send-a-message" statement to the jury. Pay-ton, 785 So.2d at 270. This Court has stated, however, that "if the argument is so 'inflammatory' that the trial judge should have objected on his own motion the point may be considered." Gray v. State, 487 So.2d 1304, 1312 (Miss.l986)(citing Griffin v. State, 292 So.2d 159, 163 (Miss.1974)).
.We parenthetically point out that Mississippi Constitution article 14, section 261, provides: "The expenses of criminal prosecutions shall be borne by the county in which such prosecution shall be begun; and all fines and forfeitures shall be paid into the treasury of such county. Defendants, in cases of conviction, may be taxed with the costs."
. The Supreme Court has constitutional authority to sanction attorneys which exceeds the authority of the Court of Appeals. See e.g. Broome v. Mississippi Bar, 603 So.2d 349 (Miss. 1992).
. See generally Munford, Mississippi Appellate Practice, Penalties and Sanctions Against Parties, ¶ 19.1-19.4 (October 1, 2006).
. Chief Judge King articulated this position in writing for the Court of Appeals dissent. Judge King also noted that this Court in Northern Electric Company v. Phillips, 673 So.2d 1384, 1385 (Miss.1996), held that the discretion inherent within the rule is limited by a presumption that costs are awarded to the party prevailing on appeal.