Case Name: Aaron Armstrong et al. vs. Vicksburg, Shreveport & Pacific Railroad Company
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1894-12
Citations: 46 La. Ann. 1448
Docket Number: No. 11,572
Parties: Aaron Armstrong et al. vs. Vicksburg, Shreveport & Pacific Railroad Company.
Judges: 
Reporter: Louisiana Annual Reports
Volume: 46
Pages: 1448–1465

Head Matter:
No. 11,572.
Aaron Armstrong et al. vs. Vicksburg, Shreveport & Pacific Railroad Company.
1. Where five persons unite in an action claiming ten thousand dollars damages against another for malicious prosecution and arrest, based on an affidavit charging them together with a violation of the 758th section of the Revised Statules, the defendants against whom the judgment has been rendered properly appealed the case to the Supreme Court.
2. There may be illegal opposition and resistance to the execution of the process or order of court, without the application of actual physical force or the use of words. Any conduct which would place the officer executing the order in bodily fear or terror, would be guilty of the illegal opposition and resistance contemplated by the law. Threats may be communicated by signs, by tones of voice, or by actions as fully as by word of mouth.
3. Whereupon an affidavit against certain parties substantially true as to its facts, and where a District Judge, learned in law, before whom the affidavit is made, affixes a certain legal character to the acts charged therein, and issues a warrant of arrest as for violation of a particular statute — for acts that fall under that statute — but he subsequently discharged the prisoners under the specific charge by reason of a change of opinion by him as to the fallacy thereunder of the facts stated, the warrant and proceedings thereunder do not furnish the basis for a malicious prosecution and arrest.
APPEAL from the Fifth District Court, Parish of Ouachita. Riehardson, J.
Aaron A. Armstrong, J. Van Harper, Isaac J. Brooks, Martin H. Hunnicutt and A. J. Bush join in a petition, in which they pray for a judgment of ten thousand dollars against the defendant company, as damages for a malicious prosecution. The action is founded upon the following allegations:
That on the 28th of August, 1893, they were arrested by the sheriff of the parish of Ouachita, under a warrant issued by the Judge of the Fifth District Court which was based on an affidavit made before him by J. T. Howard and J. A. Mhoon, charging petitioners with being armed and having resisted an officer with force and threats, and thereby preventing with violence said officer, J. A. Mhoon, from executing the order and process of the judge of said court; that said affidavit was false and malicious. That they were compelled thereby to leave their homes and attend court, at Monroe, a distance of twenty miles from their homes, on the 2d of September, for the purpose of standing a preliminary trial under said charge and arrest; that on said day the parties who had instigated and instituted the said prosecution failed to be present, and petitioners were compelled to give bond for their appearance on the 9th September, when they again appeared and were tried before the judge sitting as a committing magistrate, and after full hearing and argument the judge discharged them, decreeing that there was an absolute want of cause to justify the arrest; that said affidavit was written and prepared entirely by F. P. Stubbs, attorney, agent and counsel for the defendant company; that in preparing said affidavit and actively instituting and urging said prosecution against petitiouers, said F. P. Stubbs was representing said company and acting for their benefit and interest, and within the scope of his powers as their attorney and representative; that both Howard and Mhoon were employés of said company, and made said affidavit under the influence, direction and advice of said Stubbs for the benefit of said company, and as a part of said company’s scheme and design to oppress, abuse and coerce petitioners; th&t said prosecution and arrest were malicious and withoutjproper cause. That they had not made any threats against Mhoon, nor used any force and violence against him, and he and Howard and Stubbs were well aware that they had not violated or attempted to violate any law of the State of Louisiana, but to the contrary, without being armed, had peaceably and quietly requested said surveyor to desist from trespassing upon their premises. That said surveyor was in the employment and pay of the railroad company and engaged during the entire 26th of August, as aforesaid, in making a private survey of lands claimed by said railroad company and not included in the ex parte order of survey, as said prosecutor well knew.
That said arrest; and prosecution were made and instituted not for the purpose of vindicating the law, but for the vindictive purpose of coercing petitioners and others to recognize the claims of the railroad to the land claimed by them, and to enforce the surrender of said lands to the agents of said roads.
That said railroad, its attorney and agents have been harassing and worrying the entire community in ward 9 to compel them to deliver possession of lands claimed by said railroad for which they have brought petitory actions, and recognize the defendants’ rights to remain in possession until said actions are decided; that said attorney and said agents, in pursuance of their malevolent and lawless designs to coerce the people of said community, selected petitioners as victims and examples, in order to terrorize and intimidate petitioners and all their neighbors in the interest and for the benefit of said roads and its agents.
That they were damaged by said false and malicious prosecution in the sum of ten thousand dollars in loss"'vof time and the expense of attending court and employing counsel to defend them, in damage to their crops during their absence, in vexation, worry and in physical and mental suffering caused by this illegal, unwarrantable and vindictive and malicious prosecution; that they are peaceable, hard working, law abiding citizens (farmers),. with good characters for sobriety, honesty and fideltyto the duties of good citizens, which the railroad company and its agents well knew; that the false charge that they were law-breakers and criminals was slanderous and injurious to their good names and damaged your petitioners as above set forth.
Defendants denied each and every allegation of plaintiffs’ petition and insisted upon strict legal proof. Further answering, it specially denied that it is legally liable for the acts of any agent outside of the scope and purposes of his employment. Further, it denied the truth of the allegation that the proceeding complained of was without cause and averred that the allegations that said proceedings were malicious are wilfully and maliciously false and were so known to be by the counsel who wrote them.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs for twenty-five hundred dollars damages. Defendants “moved the court to set aside the verdict rendered because the same is contrary to the law as given by the court and to the facts of the case,” alleging “that it was clearly established that the defendant not only believed that there was probable cause, but in fact there was undoubtedly probable cause for the same, whereas the clearest and latest authorities require that to sustain such an action the prosecution ‘must have been instituted without any probable cause.’ Brelet vs. Mullen, 44 An. 194.”
The court overruled the motion and rendered judgment against the defendants in conformity to the verdict and they have appealed. Plaintiffs moved to dismiss the appeal for the reason assigned that this court is without jurisdiction ratione materise.
Gunby & Sholars, Newton & Madison and F. Vaughan Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Appellees:
Where several plaintiffs, having a common cause of action, unite in the same suit, each claiming an amount not exceeding two thousand dollars, but the aggregate of their claims being in excess of two thousand dollars, the Circuit and not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction of the appeals. 30 An. 609.
An action for malicious prosecution or for false imprisonment may be maintained against a corporation. 22 Am. and Eng. R. R. Cases, 366; 26 Am. and Eng. R. R. Cases, 121, 122; 99 Ind. 519; 22 Conn. 530; 1 Am. and Eng. R. R. Cases, 571; 4 Mo. 505.
A corporation is responsible for the acts of an agent performed while engaged in the discharge of duties within the general scope of his agency, although the particular act was wilful and was not directly authorized. 26 Am. and Eng. R. R. Cases, 122; 92 Ind. 371; 13 Am. and Eng. R. R. Oases, 1.
A corporation that entrusts a general duty to an agent is responsible to an injured person for damages flowing from the agent’s wrongful act done in the course of his general authority, although the agent may have disobeyed instructions. 26 Am. and Eng. R. R. Oases; Story on Agency, 73; 46 N. T. 23; 14 Am. and Eng. Ency. of Law, 40.
The principal is liable for the acts of his agent in the course of his employment and for the principal’s benefit, even though he has given no special instructions to do them. 2 Greenleaf on Evidence, 449; Addison on Torts, 31, 32; Cooley on Torts, 536; 40 An. 91; 14 Am. and Eng. Ency. of Law, 25.
Masters and employers are answerable for the damages caused by their servants and overseers in the exercise of the functions in which they are employed. O. C. 2320; 40 An. 88.
A corporation is liable in damages for a malicious prosecution instituted by one of its officers or agents. 14 Am. and Eng. Ency. of Law, 40.
The discharge of the accused by committing magistrate is prima facie evidence of the want of probable cause, sufficient to throw on defendant the burden of proving the contrary. 34 An. 246; 36 An. 104; 24 An. 330; 2 Greenleaf on Evidence, 455.
Malice is inferred from want of probable cause. 4 An. 377; 6 An. 577; 9 An. 219; 15 An. 421; 33 An. 392; 42 An. 955; 41 An. 304.
The wanton and causeless injury of an individual is in itself a malicious act. 4 An. 377; 6 An. 578.
Public order and the highest interest of society require that no violence shall be done to one in peaceable possession of property. 44 An. 816, 818, 819.
Where criminal prosecutions are instituted not to vindicate the law but to coerce payment of debt or restitution of property, malice is conclusively presumed. 14 Am. and Eng. Ency. of Law, 48.
An officer charged with the execution of an order or process of court must give notice to party against whom directed, of its nature and purport and of his official capacity to execute it Wharton’s Orim. Law, Vol. 1, pp. 549, 552.
Stubbs & Bussell, Attorneys for Defendants and Appellants,
cite l 3 R. 17; 12 An. 333; 15 An. 421; 27 An. 339; 33 An. 915; 40 An. 374; 44 An. 194; 2 Greenleaf, 449; 14 Am. and Eng. Ency. of Law, 17.
Probable cause is such a state oí facts and circumstances as would create in the mind of a man of ordinary caution and prudence an honest and reasonable belief of the guilt of the party charged. It does not depend on the actual stage of the case, in point of fact, but upon the reasonable and honest belief of the prosecutor. 8 An. 12; 10 An. 537; 12 An. 333; 13 An. 274; 33 An. 915; 34 An. 1147; 36 An. 441; 38 An. 161; 40 An. 374, 1268; 44 An. 936; 2 Greenleaf, 453; 97 U. S. 645; 24 How. 551; 3 Wash. 37; 1 Me. 135; 2 Den. 617.
Acquittal or discharge not proof of want of probable cause. 3 R. 17; 8 R. 150; 34 An. 1268; 41 An. 511; 98 U. S. 195; 2 Green-leaf, 455.
Advice of counsel, under a full and fair statement of fact, followed in good faith, evidence of probable cause. 9 R. 421; 8 An. 12; 11 An. 290, 418; 15 An. 422; 2 Greenleaf, 459.
If defendant show probable cause, there must be judgment in his favor. 15 La. 298; 8 An. 12; 11 An. 418; 12 An. 333, 714; 28 An. 325; 29 An. 368.
The authority or a qualification of a defacto officer, or the sufficiency of a writ entrusted to him for execution, can not be denied by third parties. 10 An. 524; 28 An. 82; 39 An. 820; 36 Ala. 273; 79 Ala. 39; 82 Ga. 535; 17 Am. and Eng. Ency. of Law, 17.
Threats, with the ability and apparent intention to execute them, may well constitute resistance. 3 Wash. C. O. 335, 169; 43 Md. 490; 1 Dill. 17.
To fix liability on a corporation for unlawful acts of its employé, it must appear that the employer was expressly authorized to do the act, or that it was done in pursuance of a general authority in relation to the subject of it, or that the act was adopted or ratified by the corporation. Ang. and Ames Oorp., Sec. 311; 51 Md. 290; 28 Atl. Rep. 615; O, R. R. vs. Brewer, 33 An. 58; 38 An. 631, 705.
Actions for malicious prosecutions are not encouraged by the law and must be cautiously entertained. From motives of public policy the prosecutor must be protected. 3 R. 20; 3 L. 278; 15 An. 605; 40 An. 374; 41 An. 511; 44 An. 194, 939.

Opinion:
On the Motion to Dismiss.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Nicholls, O. J.
Appellees would place this case before us as if five different individuals having separate and distinct causes of action against a'particular corporation had brought in the same petition five distinct demands against it, and had each obtained against it a separate and distinct judgment in his favor. It is argued that the demand of each of the plaintiffs against the defendants was really for two thousand dollars, and that by the judgment appealed from, the District Court adjudged to each of them the sum of five hundred dollars.
Are appellees justified in this contention?
We think not.' The plaintiffs did not, for reasons of convenience and economy, and because the testimony taken in respect to any one of them would be to a great extent the same testimony as would be taken in respect to the others present themselves in the District Court urging separate demands and asking separate relief though advanced in the same petition. They did more than this — they appeared before the court as plaintiffs, all uniting in taking up certain acts complained of as having given rise to a single cause of action, in favor jointly of the five, and as entitling the five to a joint judgment of ten thousand dollars, and when a judgment was rendered in the case it properly followed the pleadings, and the prayer, as a judgment upon a cause of action declared upon as a single one, and in which the five plaintiffs were jointly interested.
This judgment, was it to go to execution, would have to be executed according to its terms, as a single joint judgment for twenty-five hundred dollars. The plaintiffs having control over their own pleadings, free to urge their rights as they themselves held and determined them to be, thought proper to proceed in the manner they have done. Whether they -were right or wrong in so doing is not a question at present before us.
Having proceeded to judgment in the lower court as joint plaintiffs they can not in this court claim to have, separate and distinct judgments and in separate and distinct causes of action, and to separate and divide the. judgment into five parts of five hundred dollars each. Whatever appellate court would pass upon the judgment in the case would have to pass upon it as rendered — that is, as a single judgment for twenty-five hundred dollars. Appellant would be utterly without authority for the purposes of appeal to split the judgment up into five judgments for specific amounts, even if it thought it to be to its interest and desired to do so. It would have to deal with the judgment as it was made. Appellees claim that if this judgment was paid in full as rendered each of the five plaintiffs would be entitled to receive five hundred dollars and no more. We are not called on to say what each plaintiff would be entitled to receive from the judgment on a settlement inter se, if it was paid in full. The judgment itself determines that the five are to receive two thousand five hundred dollars, and not that each is to receive five hundred dollars, and it is with the judgment as such and prior to payment that we are .dealing. We can say in this as was said in Shields & Thomas, 17 Howard, 3, that so far as the appellant is concerned the entire sum found due by the lower court is in dispute. It-disputes the validity of that decree and denies its obligation to pay any part of the money. If the judgment should stand as rendered defendants will be made liable to pay the whole amount decreed to the plaintiffs. That is the controversy on its part, and the amount exceeding two thousand dollars we have jurisdiction in respect to it. Heirs of Ballio vs. Prudhomme, 8 N. S. 338; Bowman vs. City of New Orleans, 27 An. 501. Motion to dismiss refused.