Case Name: VROOM v. NEW YORK CENT. & H. R. R. CO.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1909-01-06
Citations: 115 N.Y.S. 1063
Docket Number: 
Parties: VROOM v. NEW YORK CENT. & H. R. R. CO.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 115
Pages: 1063–1067

Head Matter:
(129 App. Div. 858.)
VROOM v. NEW YORK CENT. & H. R. R. CO.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.
January 6, 1909.)
1. Master and Servant (§ 205 )—Existence of Relation—Railroad Employé Traveling on Pass—Presumptions.
Where a railroad brakeman on a construction train is employed at some distance from his home, and is given a pass to use in going ‘home on Saturdays and returning to his work on Sundays, it will be presumed that the‘pass was limited to use by him in going home and back to work, and that it was a part of the contract of employment, and that he used it as an employé.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 205.*]
2. Master and Servant (§ ISO*)—Fellow Servants—Constitutionality of Law.
Laws 1906, p. 1682, c. 657, providing that persons engaged in the service of a railroad company with authority to direct or control other employes, or who have as a part of their duty physical control or direction of the employment of a signal, train, or telegraph office, are vice principals, and not fellow servants of an injured employé, and that mo contract, receipt, rule, or regulation between the employé and the railroad corporation shall exempt or limit the liability of the corporation from the provisions of the section, is constitutional.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 180.*]
McLennan, P. J., and Williams, J., dissenting.
Appeal from Trial Term, Erie County.
Action by, Cora C. Vroom, as administratrix of the estate of Benjamin H. Vroom, deceased, against the New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.
Argued before McLENNAN, P. J., and SPRING, WILLIAMS, KRUSE, and ROBSON, JJ.- .
Maurice C. Spratt, Aldred L. Becker, and Hoyt, Spratt & Becker, for appellant.
Charles L. Feldman, for respondent.
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
KRUSE, J.
The plaintiff's intestate, Benjamin H. Vroom, whose death, it is contended on her part, was caused through the negligence of the defendant, was a workman employed by the defendant as a brakeman on a construction train. He lived in the city of Buffalo. The construction train worked on the West Shore Branch near Despatch, just east of Rochester. He had been at work there on this train for some months. It was customary for him to go home Saturdays and return Sundays. He had gone home on the Saturday before the accident, and was on his way back Sunday evening, when a collision occurred between two trains on the defendant's railroad east of Rochester and just before reaching the place where he usually got off the train, resulting in his death. The defendant had furnished the deceased a free pass, which he used in going back and forth from his work to his home. He was riding on the pass at the time he met his death. The pass contained the usual condition exempting the defendant from liability for negligence. While the pass upon its face did not limit its use by the deceased in going back and forth to and from his work, we think the inference is permissible that such was the primary purpose for which it was-issued by the defendant, and that it was a part of the contract of employment made between the defendant and the deceased, and that the further conclusion is warranted from the evidence that at the time of the accident he was an employé of the defendant, .having the right to ride free as a part of the contract between himself and the defendant. It may well be that no question of fact was involved under the evidence, but, if there was, it must be regarded as resolved in favor of the plaintiff, since the only question of fact submitted to the jury was that of damages, and none other was requested to be submitted; it being contended on behalf of the defendant that no legal liability had been established against it as a matter of law.
Chapter 657, p. 1682, Laws 1906, known as the "Barnes Act," provides that it shall be held that persons engaged in certain kinds of service for a railroad company, with certain specific authority named in the act, among other things that of authority to direct or control other employés, or who have as a part of their, duty for the time being physical control or direction of the movement of a signal, train, or telegraph office, are vice principals of the corporation, and not fellow servants of the injured or deceased employé. The act further provides that no contract, receipt, rule, or regulation between the employé and the railroad corporation shall exempt or limit the liability of the corporation from the provisions of the section. The appellant contends that the act is unconstitutional, but we have repeatedly applied the act, and held it to be constitutional. Schradin v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co. (Sup.) 103 N. Y. Supp. 73, and s. c., 124 App. Div. 705, 109 N. Y. Supp. 428; Brown v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 126 App. Div. 240, 110 N. Y. Supp. 514; La Placa v. L. S. & M. S. R. R. Co., 127 App. Div. 843, 111 N. Y. Supp. 797. If, therefore, the deceased was an employé at the time he met his death, then under the facts of this case the defendant's employés, through whose lack of care and attention the collision occurred, were vice principals.
As has been stated, we think the evidence warrants the conclusion that at the time the deceased was injured and met his death he was not a passenger being transported free, but that the relation of master and servant existed between the defendant and him, and, if we are right in that conclusion, it follows that the defendant is liable. Vick v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 95 N. Y. 267, 47 Am. Rep. 36. But, even if that relation did not exist at the time of the accident, we think under the circumstances of this case it could well be found that the pass was not a mere gratuity, but a part of the contract of employment, entitling the deceased to transportation to and from his work.
We therefore conclude that the judgment and order should be affirmed, with costs. All concur, except McLENNAN, P. J., and WILLIAMS, J., who dissent.