Case Name: Alfred GONZALES et ux., Mary Evans Gonzales v. WINN-DIXIE LOUISIANA, INC. and Continental Insurance Companies, Inc.
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1975-02-13
Citations: 309 So. 2d 697
Docket Number: No. 5484
Parties: Alfred GONZALES et ux., Mary Evans Gonzales v. WINN-DIXIE LOUISIANA, INC. and Continental Insurance Companies, Inc.
Judges: Before SAMUEL, REDMANN, LEM-MON, GULOTTA, STOULIG, BOU-TALL, SCHOTT, MORIAL and BEER, JJ-
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 309
Pages: 697–706

Head Matter:
Alfred GONZALES et ux., Mary Evans Gonzales v. WINN-DIXIE LOUISIANA, INC. and Continental Insurance Companies, Inc.
No. 5484.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
Feb. 13, 1975.
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Morial March 4, 1975.
Rehearing Denied March 12, 1975.
Writ Granted April 24, 1975.
Darleen M. Jacobs, New Orleans, for plaintiffs-appellees.
Christovich & Kearney, Robert E. Pey-ton, New Orleans, for defendants-appellants.
Dillon & Williams, C. T. Williams, Jr., New Orleans, for amicus curiae Schweg-mann Bros. Giant Super Markets, Inc.
Before SAMUEL, REDMANN, LEM-MON, GULOTTA, STOULIG, BOU-TALL, SCHOTT, MORIAL and BEER, JJ-

Opinion:
SCHOTT, Judge.
Defendants, Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc. and Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York, its liability insurer (Continental Insurance Companies, Inc., was erroneously named as the liability insurer in the original petition, answer was filed by Fidelity and Casualty and reference to Continental is omitted from the judgment of the trial court) have appealed from a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs for medical expenses and personal injuries resulting from an accident which occurred on November 2, 1968, in which Mrs. Gonzales, plaintiff, was injured while shopping in the defendant's store at 3325 Paris Road in St. Bernard Parish.
The accident happened when Mrs. Gonzales, while pushing a grocery cart in the store, slipped and fell on a spill of olive oil measuring about two feet in diameter and near a broken bottle. She had been moving through the middle of the aisle looking at the displays of wares with her grocery cart about three feet from the shelf where the olive oil was displayed when she slipped down. She did not cause the bottle to fall from the shelf and did not have any olive oil in her cart. After her accident she reported it to a store employee, Mrs. Bonnie Bedford.
The only evidence of cleanup procedures is the testimony of the store manager, Mr. Federico, who testified that he had come on duty that day at approximately 1:00 PM, shortly after Mrs. Bedford got the report of the accident; that cleanup procedures at the store included a complete sweeping and mopping from one end of the store to the other each evening before closing ; that on each morning whichever manager opens the store conducts an inspection to be sure that there are no hazards on the floor; that this inspection, normally made between 8:00 and 8:30 AM, is followed by a second such inspection normally made after a shift change in managers between 12:00 and 1:00 PM, and a third such inspection at approximately 5:00 PM; that at the time of plaintiff's accident at about noon the manager had not yet made his inspection so that the only regular inspection prior to the accident was to have been between 8:00 and 8:30 AM; that he is constantly on the floor looking for hazards; that all of the employees are instructed to keep their eyes open for broken items with further instructions to clean up anything that may be on the floor; and that there is one fulltime man designated to clean up during the day. None of the other store employees, including the morning manager, who were involved in cleanup procedures on the day of the accident were called as witnesses. There is no other evidence which would show the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the inspection and cleanup procedures.
Plaintiffs contend, that to establish liability, it is only necessary that they prove that Mrs. Gonzales slipped and fell through no fault of her own on a foreign substance on defendant's floor and defendants must then exculpate themselves. Defendants contend that plaintiff has the burden of proving either actual knowledge that the spill of olive oil was on the floor that it was there for such a period of time so as to charge defendant with constructive knowledge of the existence of the hazard. They contend that in the absence of such proof the adequacy and reasonableness of their cleanup procedures were not at issue.
In Fontanille v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc., 260 So.2d 71 (La.App.4th Cir. 1972) this Court had occasion to consider the legal principles applicable to the instant case and nothing will be gained by repeating here those principles and the many authorities cited therein.
The Court decided that case in favor of the plaintiff upon a finding that the customer had slipped on a half eaten piece of banana which was inferred to have been on the floor between 30 and 40 minutes based upon the Court's findings that the piece of banana was brown and that such a length of time is required for a banana to turn brown once exposed to the air. Having found for a fact that this hazard had been present for 30 minutes or longer the Court concluded that defendant had constructive knowledge of the hazard and had not exercised reasonable care to maintain aisles and passageways in a reasonably safe condition considering the type and purpose of the premises. A similar result was reached in Lang v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc., 230 So.2d 383 (La.App.1st Cir. 1969) in which the case was decided for the plaintiff on the basis of the fact that since plaintiff slipped on several pieces of thawed out but originally frozen okra and since 30 to 60 minutes is required for frozen okra to thaw the evidence was sufficient to establish a lack of adequate inspection and cleanup procedures on the part of the store owner.
Unfortunately for the plaintiff in the instant case, there is nothing on which we can base a determination that this spill of oil was on the floor for any length of time so as to provide a basis for the theory that the inadequacy of defendant's inspection and cleanup procedure was the' cause of plaintiff's accident. Counsel for plaintiff in brief and in oral argument points to testimony that the olive oil on defendant's floor was green in color and argues from this testimony that it had been there for some time, but this is at best speculation and is not supported by any evidence. The same result must be reached in this case as in Frederic v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc., 227 So.2d 387 (La.App.4th Cir. 1969) in which this Court, reversing judgment in favor of a plaintiff who slipped and fell on a grape, said:
". . . It may have been dropped a few minutes before Mrs. Frederic fell and again it may have remained there for over an hour. It is possible that it was on the floor a sufficient length of time to constitute constructive notice of its presence so that the failure of the storekeeper to remove it was negligence for which the plaintiff might recover, but there is no proof of this and its pres ence on the floor does not cast the burden on the defendants to show how and when it got there. That burden is on the plaintiffs."
We recognize that proof of an inadequate, faulty or improperly functioning inspection system or procedure is always admissible in adjudging the issue of a store owner's negligence. However, it is but one of the aspects or factors that must be considered in the court's determination of liability and standing alone cannot support a finding of negligence in the absence of attendant circumstances that would render its omission as the proximate cause of the accident. The facts of defendant's inspection in this case do not alone support a finding that the defendant store owner was negligent.
Our jurisprudence in this circuit is consistent with that of the Second Circuit as shown in White v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 270 So.2d 632 (La.App.1972) and of the Third Circuit as exemplified in Lofton v. Travelers Insurance Company, 208 So.2d 739 (La.App.1968); Broussard v. National Food Stores of La., Inc., 233 So.2d 599 (La.App.1970); and Brown v. Kroger Company, 252 So.2d 336 (La.App.1971).
However, the First Circuit has taken a different view. In McCauley v. Nicholas, 297 So.2d 914 (La.App.1st Cir. 1974), it was held:
"First, we noted that to avoid liability for injuries to a customer because of negligence in failing to discover an object or substance upon the floor which causes injury the storekeeper must make a preliminary or prima facie showing of a reasonably careful and thorough inspection where there was a potential danger to patrons. While the burden is on the plaintiff to show that such substance remained on the floor for a longer time than that in which it should have been discovered and removed, this burden on the plaintiff is subject to the requirement that the defendant first show in a preliminary way that the foreign substance was not discovered in spite of reasonably careful and frequent inspections."
In Welch v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Inc., 273 So.2d 876 (La.App.1st Cir. (1973)) it was said that the initial burden is on the storekeeper to show reasonably careful and frequent inspection practices and:
. . If he is unable to show such inspection practices, the plaintiff is relieved of the burden of proving actual or constructive knowledge of the hazardous condition. This rule has the effect of shifting the burden of proof in such cases from the plaintiff to the defendant."
The sharp contrast among the Circuits can best be demonstrated by comparing the quoted language from the First Circuit cases with the cited cases from the Third Circuit. In his dissent in the Lofton case Judge Culpepper criticized the majority view of his colleagues and argued that under the circumstances existing in large self-service super markets where a customer slips and falls on an extraneous substance the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should be applied and an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant created by such circumstances. In the Brous-sard case now Justice Tate, then the organ of the Third Circuit, applied the law, but in a separate concurring opinion criticized the principles and lauded Judge Culpep-per's dissent in Lofton. By that time, the Supreme Court had denied a writ application in Lofton at 252 La. 457, 211 So.2d 327, and Judge Culpepper now concurred with the majority in Broussard explaining that he was bound by the action of the Supreme Court in Lofton. Judge Fruge dissented in the Broussard case expressing the opinion that Lofton should be overruled. In the Brown case, Judge Miller dissented, expressing agreement with Judge Culpepper's dissent in Lofton and with the concurring opinion of Judge Tate in Broussard.
The jurisprudence cited and relied upon herein has been repeatedly submitted for the Supreme Court's consideration in writ applications. A writ was refused in Lof-ton on June 21, 1968, with: "On the facts found by the Court of Appeal, the result is correct," 252 La. 457, 211 So.2d 327 (Justices Sanders and Barham were of the same opinion that the writ should be granted). A writ was also refused in Frederic on October 1, 1969, with: "On the facts found by the Court of Appeal, we find no error in the judgment complained of," 254 La. 866, 227 So.2d 598. This action was significantly taken by a unanimous Court. In McCauley a writ was refused with: "On the facts found by the Court of Appeal the result is correct," 302 So.2d 24. But the Court did not address itself to the legal principles under consideration here.
When a writ was granted in Broussard there was created an expectation that the issue would finally be considered by the Supreme Court, but such hopes were dashed when the Court's opinion turned on the lack of proof of a fall on the part of the customer in the first instance and led to the following statement by Chief Justice McCaleb:
"Having concluded that plaintiffs have failed by a preponderance of credible evidence to jprove that Mrs. Broussard slipped and fell in the defendant's store as a result of the presence of a dangerous substance on the floor, we need not consider the issue of where the burden of proof lies to show that the defendant did or did not take sufficient precautions to maintain the premises in a safe condition for the use of its customers." 258 La. 493, 246 So.2d 838.
In considering our own jurisprudence we also take cognizance of Lozier v. Ninth Street Food Store, Inc., 293 So.2d 543 (La.App.1974); Morais v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Supermarket, 290 So.2d 357 (La.App.1974) ; Vosbein v. National Food Store of Louisiana, Inc., 286 So.2d 715 (La.App.1973); and Walters v. Sears Roebuck and Company, 196 So.2d 563 (La.App.1967). In Lozier there was evidence of acutal as well as constructive knowledge of the hazard on the part of the storekeeper. In Vosbein a jury had found the defendant free of negligence and this Court affirmed acknowledging the jurisprudential authority of Fontanille v. Winn-Dixie on the doctrine that plaintiff has the initial burden to prove constructive knowledge of the storekeeper in these cases. Finally, the Moráis case did not involve a hazardous substance on the floor but rather a hazard resulting from the stacking of merchandise on a shelf and the Court found that the cans would not have fallen from the shelf if they had been safely and correctly stacked, a duty performed by the store employees presumably. Significantly in his concurring opinion, Judge Stoulig found that plaintiff had laid the proper predicate to warrant the application of res ipsa lo-quitur by showing that the cans on the shelf were in disarray and messy, i. e., an obvious condition about which the storekeeper should have known. As to certain dicta in the Moráis case, some comments will follow.
In the Walters case this Court apparently concluded that a greasy substance must have been on the floor for 45 minutes because the area had been unattended for that length of time. This case is somewhat inconsistent with the Fontanille case and to that extent must be considered to have been overruled.
Perhaps there should be a reconsideration of the principles which we apply to the instant case. A customer who slips and falls as did Mrs. Gonzales is at a great disadvantage to prove how long an extraneous substance has been on the floor while such information is more properly within the ambit of the storekeeper's knowledge. In the instant case the broken bottle of olive oil might have been there for a minute or perhaps for four hours and yet the injured customer is being told that it is her burden to show how long the hazard has been present before the defendant is required to exonerate itself from negligence.
On the other hand, if constructive knowledge of the hazard on the part of the storekeeper is not a condition precedent to his being required to disprove his negligence it seems that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is to be applied to these cases, as was observed by Judge Culpepper in his dissent in the Lofton case.
In Larkin v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 233 La. 544, 97 So.2d 389, it was said that the doctrine of res ipsa applies when the circumstances of an accident are such as to justify the inference that the accident was due to the negligence of the one having control of the thing which caused the injury and that this inference is drawn from the circumstances of the accident which are such that the only fair and reasonable conclusion is that the accident was due to some omission of defendant's duty unless an explanation can be given. Ordinarily the plaintiff must prove that defendant committed an act of negligence in order to recover in a tort action. The doctrine of res ipsa enables a plaintiff to recover on a showing that there was an injury producing accident caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of defendant. If the doctrine were applicable here, plaintiff need prove only that she sustained an injury when she slipped and fell on an extraneous substance on the floor through no fault of her own and rest her case. Absent an explanation from the storekeeper, for example, that this particular spot was inspected shortly before the accident, plaintiff would be entitled to recover.
In Taylor v. CNA Insurance Group, 300 So.2d 479 (La.1974), there is an extended discussion of the doctrine of res ipsa and its application to the situation where plaintiff was injured when, in the process of removing a carton of soft drinks from a shelf, some of the other bottles fell to the floor with the result that her leg was struck by' flying glass. It was held that the doctrine of res ipsa was not applicable because there was a reasonable inference that the accident might have been caused by the negligence of plaintiff in removing the carton. The following principles were enunciated:
"We are satisfied that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply where the facts are such that one could reasonably infer therefrom that the accident was due to a cause other than the defendant's negligence. It is our opinion that the accident, together with all the attending circumstances, must warrant an inference, not of negligence only, but of defendant's negligence. We might add that the fact that the accident gives rise to several inferences, each one of which suggests a different cause of the accident, does not concern us as long as they all point to the negligence of defendant."
Applying these principles to the instant case, once Mrs. Gonzales established that she fell on the spill of oil through no negligence of her own, one reasonable inference was that the oil had been there for a sufficient length of time to place the duty on Winn-Dixie to know about it and to remedy the situation. But it is just as reasonable to infer that just moments before the accident another customer knocked the bottle off the shelf so that the storekeeper did not violate any duty. Under these circumstanctes res ipsa does not apply and plaintiff's case fails for her failure to prove that defendant was negligent and its negligence caused the accident.
A further point to be considered is that the approach taken by the First Circuit is tantamount to making the storekeeper the insurer of the premises. If the burden of proving reasonable inspection is placed on the storekeeper at the outset this presumes causal connection between unreasonable inspections and the presence of the particular hazard which brought about the acci dent. Even if Winn-Dixie thoroughly inspected that aisle five minutes before the accident it might still be liable if under the circumstances that were not often enough. As a practical matter with the ease at which bottles can be knocked from the shelves and considering that the customer who causes such is inclined to make a quick exit from the scene, the storekeeper could only guard against liability by maintaining constant surveillance over the floors. Thus, he would be cast in the role of an insurer of the safety of his customers, a role which has repeatedly been rejected by our Courts.
In the Moráis case this Court made the following pronouncement:
"This plaintiff who only minutes previously entered the store cannot possibly (and it would be unreasonable to hold otherwise) establish the negligence of the store owner. If she can establish her freedom from causation, the burden then must shift to the storekeeper to rebut the presumption of fault for the reason that he is most cognizant of facts necessary to decide the issue."
We repudiate this language as being inconsistent with the principles and jurisprudence discussed herein.
We therefore conclude that in the instant case plaintiff failed to carry the burden of proof which was hers, to wit, that the spill of olive oil was on the floor for such a period of time that defendant should have known its presence and was thereby negligent in failing to clean it up. Nor was there proof that the inadequacy of defendant's inspection procedure was the cause of her accident.
Accordingly, the judgment appealed from is now reversed and set aside, and there is judgment in favor of Winn-Dixie of Louisiana, Inc. and Fidelity and Casualty Insurance Company of New York, dismissing plaintiffs' petition at their cost.
Reversed and rendered.
REDMANN, LEMMON and GULOT-TA, JJ., dissent with written reasons.
MORIAL, J., dissents with written reasons to follow.