Case Name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Frederick Lee ROBINSON, Jr., also known as Fredrick Lee Robinson, Jr., Defendant-Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2018-03-06
Citations: 713 F. App'x 408
Docket Number: No. 17-10842 Summary Calendar
Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Frederick Lee ROBINSON, Jr., also known as Fredrick Lee Robinson, Jr., Defendant-Appellant
Judges: Before DAVIS, CLEMENT, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 713
Pages: 408–409

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Frederick Lee ROBINSON, Jr., also known as Fredrick Lee Robinson, Jr., Defendant-Appellant
No. 17-10842 Summary Calendar
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Filed March 6, 2018
James Wesley Hendrix, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Peter Michael Fleury, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Northern District of Texas, Fort Worth, TX, for Defendant-Appellant
Before DAVIS, CLEMENT, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM:
Frederick Lee Robinson, Jr., appeals the 57-month sentence imposed following his guilty plea conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm. He first argues that his prior Texas conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon should not have been used to enhance his base offense level, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, because the elements of the Texas offense are not equivalent to the elements of the generic aggravated assault offense. However, he acknowledges that this argument is foreclosed by this court's decision in United States v. Guillen-Alvarez, 489 F.3d 197, 200-01 (5th Cir. 2007), that determined that the Texas aggravated assault offense qualifies as a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2.
Next, Robinson argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), as construed, violates the Constitution in that it regulates conduct that falls outside the Commerce Clause. However, he recognizes- that this court has rejected that argument in United States v. Alcantar, 733 F.3d 143, 145 (5th Cir. 2013), which held that § 922(g)(1) is a valid exercise of Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause.
Last, Robinson contends that there was no allegation in the indictment and no factual basis presented that established that he knew that he possessed a weapon that had traveled in interstate commerce and, therefore, his conviction should be vacated. He concedes that this court has also rejected that argument in United States v. Rose, 587 F.3d 695, 705 (5th Cir. 2009), in which the court determined that it is not necessary to prove that a defendant in possession of a firearm knew that the weapon has an interstate nexus.
Because the issues raised by Robinson on appeal are all foreclosed by this court's precedent, Robinson's unopposed motion for summary disposition is GRANTED, and the district .court's judgment is AFFIRMED. See Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969).
Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.