Case Name: Charles POMPEY, Petitioner, v. Ron COCHRAN, Sheriff of Broward County, and Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services of the State of Florida, Respondents
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1997-01-08
Citations: 685 So. 2d 1007
Docket Number: No. 93-3181
Parties: Charles POMPEY, Petitioner, v. Ron COCHRAN, Sheriff of Broward County, and Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services of the State of Florida, Respondents.
Judges: WARNER, POLEN, KLEIN, PARIENTE and GROSS, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 685
Pages: 1007–1024

Head Matter:
Charles POMPEY, Petitioner, v. Ron COCHRAN, Sheriff of Broward County, and Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services of the State of Florida, Respondents.
No. 93-3181.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Jan. 8, 1997.
Sharon Kung and Walter H. Honaman of Lawyers Collaborative, P.A., Boca Raton, for petitioner.
Linda Jaffee of the Law Offices of Milena Christopher, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for Respondent-Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services of the State of Florida.
No appearance for Respondent-Ron Cochran, Sheriff of Broward County.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
We review this case en banc to consider important issues relating to the incarceration of a former spouse or parent who has failed to pay alimony or child • support after having been found in civil contempt. This has led us to modify or recede from a prior decision of this court. We grant Charles Pompey's petition for a writ of ha-beas corpus, finding that Pompey's incarceration was unlawful because there was no evidence at all to support the trial court's affirmative finding that the petitioner had the ability to pay a purge amount of $22,-100.
This case arises from a 1986 final judgment ordering Pompey to pay $60 per week in child support pursuant to a stipulation he entered with the Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services of the State of Florida (HRS). Pompey failed to make a single payment for nearly seven years. Then, in early May 1993, HRS filed a motion seeking to hold him in contempt for nonpayment of child support. The motion for contempt and notice of hearing stated:
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that Petitioners shall apply for an Order adjudging you to be in contempt of this Court's previous Order by failure to pay support . as ordered. Petitioners will seek to hold you in contempt of Court for all arrears up to the date of the hearing.... You are required to attend this hearing or a writ of attachment may issue for your arrest.
. [Motion also required production of income tax returns, W-2s, and financial affidavit]
FAILURE TO PRODUCE THE DOCUMENTS REQUESTED MAY LEAD THE COURT TO CONCLUDE THAT YOU HAVE FAILED TO REBUT THE PRESUMPTION THAT YOU HAVE THE ABILITY TO PAY YOUR SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS IN FULL. Register v. Pita, 546 So.2d 1162 (1st DCA 1989). THE BURDEN OF PROOF IS YOURS TO ESTABLISH YOUR INABILITY TO PAY.
The motion and notice were personally served on Pompey in Manatee County, where he resided. Pompey failed to attend the scheduled hearing before a hearing officer in Fort Lauderdale and has offered no excuse for his non-appearance.
After the contempt hearing, the hearing officer filled in the blanks of what appears to be a standard form for reporting the results of child support enforcement hearings. The officer found:
2. Respondent failed to comply with the previous orders and/or final judgment of this Court to pay child support and is in arrears of said payments in the sum of $22,100 as of 5/18/93.
3. Respondent was served on 5/7/93 with notice of this hearing.
a. _x_ By his/her non appearance fails to rebut the presumption of his/her ability to comply with the terms of the Court's orders and/or final judgment.
4. Respondent has the present ability or assets to pay the purge amount set forth below.
B. The Hearing Officer recommends the Court enter an Order approving the following:
1. Respondent is in willful contempt of Court based upon his/her failure to comply with the Court's orders and/or final judgment even though he/she had the ability to do so and presently has the ability to comply.
2. The arrears are determined to be $22,100 as of 5/18/93 .
3. Respondent's contempt shall be punished as follows:
a. _Respondent shall be incarcerated in
the Broward County Jail for a period of 179 days commencing 6/10/93.
c. In the event Respondent does not purge of said contempt as provided herein on or before 6/9/93 a Writ of Attachment/Writ of Arrest and Commitment shall issue without further notice to Respondent to be brought before the undersigned after being brought into custody.
4. Respondent shall be released from the above sentence by payment of a purge in the amount of $ 22,100 (including fees) anytime prior or during the sentence....
For reasons unknown to us, the trial court did not enter a contempt order until July 14, over six weeks after the hearing. The trial court's order simply adopted the hearing officer's report by ratifying and approving the hearing officer's recommendations in all aspects. When Pompey failed to comply with the contempt order, another trial judge issued an order of arrest and commitment on August 18. The order of arrest specified that Pompey was to remain incarcerated until either the $22,100 purge amount was paid or the 179 day sentence was served.
Nearly two months after his incarceration, Pompey filed a petition for habeas corpus alleging that his incarceration was illegal because the requirements of Bowen v. Bowen, 471 So.2d 1274 (Fla.1985), were, not met as petitioner did not have the ability to pay the purge amount set by the court. In responding, HRS noted that by failing to appear Pompey had waived any opportunity to be heard on the issue of his present ability to pay, thus running the very risk of the incarceration which was ordered. We ordered the trial court to hold a hearing on petitioner's ability to pay. As a result of the hearing, the purge amount was reduced to $212, the amount of Pompey's last unemployment check, and Pompey has since been released from custody. Because of the significance of the issues regarding the extent of our own jurisdiction on habeas corpus relief in civil contempt proceedings, and the proper interpretation of Bowen in the conduct of civil contempt proceedings, we address the issues even though Pompey is no longer incarcerated. See In Interest of M.C., 567 So.2d 1038 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990).
I.
Article I, section 13 of the Florida Constitution states: "The writ of habeas corpus shall be grantable of right, freely and without cost. It shall be returnable without delay. ." Under Article V, Section 4(b)(3), district courts of appeal may issue writs of habeas corpus returnable before the court or before any circuit judge within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Thus, it is clear and undisputed that we have jurisdiction to entertain petitions for writs of habeas corpus.
Confinement contrary to constitutional principles of due process may be the subject of habeas corpus relief. See Ex parte Senior, 37 Fla. 1, 14-15, 19 So. 652, 653-54 (1896); Ex parte Earman, 85 Fla. 297, 315, 95 So. 755, 761 (1923); Vick v. Navarro, 567 So.2d 495 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). "The writ [of habeas corpus] is venerated by all free and liberty loving people and recognized as a fundamental guaranty and protection of their right of liberty." Allison v. Baker, 152 Fla. 274, 275, 11 So.2d 578, 579 (1943).
As stated in Anglin v. Mayo, 88 So.2d 918 (Fla.1956):
[The writ] is as old as the common law itself and is an integral part of our own democratic process. The procedure for the granting of this particular writ is not to be circumscribed by hard and fast rules or technicalities which often accompany our consideration of other processes. If it appears to a court of competent jurisdiction that a man is being illegally restrained of his liberty, it is the responsibility of the court to brush aside formal technicalities and issue such appropriate orders as will do justice. In habeas corpus the niceties of the procedure are not anywhere near as important as the determination of the ultimate question as to the legality of the restraint.
Id. at 919-20. The court also noted in Sneed v. Mayo, 66 So.2d 865 (Fla.1953):
"Jurisdiction of the person and of the subject matter is not alone conclusive [and] the jurisdiction of the court to make or render the order or judgment" depends upon due observance of the constitutional rights of the accused. 25 Am.Jur., Habeas Corpus, sec. 27, p. 161. See also Palmer v. Ashe, [342 U.S. 134, 72 S.Ct. 191, 96 L.Ed. 154].
Id. at 874. In our opinion, Bowen established constitutional criteria for incarceration for civil contempt, the violation of which can be addressed by petition for writ of habeas corpus. In his petition for writ of habeas corpus, Pompey alleged that his confinement was contrary to the requirements of Boiven in that the trial court ordered the incarceration of Pompey when Pompey lacked the ability to purge himself from the contempt.
This conclusion that habeas corpus is available to review incarceration which violates the requirements of Boiven is not a new pronouncement of the law. We ourselves have frequently reviewed the legality of incareerative civil contempt orders by ha-beas. In Vick, we granted habeas relief to a civil contemnor where the order was not sufficient to support a finding of civil contempt and the record did not show that the contemnor had been given the constitutional protections required for a criminal contempt proceeding. In LeNeve v. Navarro, 565 So.2d 836, 837-38 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990), we granted habeas corpus relief, and discharged the petitioner where we reviewed the evidence presented in the contempt hearing and found that it failed to support the required Bowen finding that petitioner held the "keys to his cell." See also Cook v. Navarro, 611 So.2d 47 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992).
Other districts also review such orders by way of habeas. In Fennell v. Felton, 655 So.2d 1316 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995), the third district entertained a petition for writ of habeas corpus by a jailed civil contemnor who failed to pay his child support. The court reviewed the evidence and found that not only did the master not make a finding that petitioner had the present ability to purge himself of the contempt, but also the record would not support such a finding. In ordering his discharge from incarceration, the court stated:
In this case, the state concedes the allegation of the petition but implores us to reverse and remand the matter to the trial court to reduce the monetary purge and to reconsider the non-incarceration purge option to permit the trial court to consider possible criminal contempt proceedings. We decline to do so. The office and function of a writ of habeas corpus is to make a precise and definitive inquiry as to whether one's liberty is legally restrained. To honor the state's request would be to turn such an extraordinary proceeding into a general inquiry in the nature of appellate review.
Id. at 1318 (emphasis supplied); see also Roundtree v. Felton, 656 So.2d 584 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (granting habeas relief where evidence in civil contempt proceeding failed to show that petitioner had present ability to pay purge amount, relying on Bowen); Smith v. Felton, 654 So.2d 620 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (same); Sarron v. Crawford, 464 So.2d 644, 645 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) ("Where . there is neither an affirmative finding nor evidence in the record that the petitioner, at the time of his incarceration for civil contempt, had the ability to pay the amount ordered and thus obtain his release from incarceration, the incarceration, the aim of which is to coerce future compliance with the court's order, is unlawful, see Bowen ., and the petition for writ of habeas corpus must be granted.")
The first district treated an appeal from an order of contempt and incarceration as a petition for writ of habeas corpus in Ganzel v. Ganzel, 520 So.2d 112 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). There, the trial court recited evidence from a hearing conducted less than a month preceding the order of incarceration to determine that the contemnor had the present ability to pay the purge amount. The appellate court held that the facts concerning those earnings did not satisfy the Bowen requirement that the court make a separate, affirmative finding that the contemnor possess the ability to pay the purge amount. However, unlike Fennell, the court granted the writ with directions to immediately deliver the petitioner to a trial court judge for a hearing on petitioner's ability to pay the purge amount. If a hearing could not be immediately held, the petitioner was entitled to release pending-such hearing.
In Cummins v. Cummins, 615 So.2d 173 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993), the fifth district also granted a petition for habeas corpus relief for a civil contemnor, concluding the petitioner's incarceration was illegal under Bowen where the record did not support a finding of the present ability to pay. In that case the appellate court granted relief even though there was no court reporter present at the contempt heating and the petitioner appealed pro se. As in Ganzel, the- court remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings, including the consideration of other alternative methods to enforce the contempt order.
This review of case law both in our district and other districts convinces us that the district courts not only have jurisdiction, but, in the spirit of Anglin, take seriously their responsibility to strip aside formal technicalities where it appeal's a person is being illegally detained, and that justice requires the court to act. To the extent that our opinion in Goldstein v. Navarro, 590 So.2d 20 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), can be read to indicate that habeas, corpus relief is not available in this court to remedy a civil contempt confinement in violation of due process, we recede from it. Indeed, to construe Goldstein as specifying the sole remedy would interfere with habeas corpus rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution article I, section 9, and by our Florida Constitution article I, section 13.
We acknowledge that language in Driggers v. Pearson, 141 Fla. 256, 192 So. 881 (1940), might cast doubt on the availability of habeas corpus to attack the type of unlawful confinement complained of here. In Driggers, the supreme court determined that habeas corpus was not available to attack the validity of the order citing the petitioner for contempt:
In such collateral attack by habeas corpus proceedings in this type of case, practically the only question which can be raised is the jurisdiction of the committing court over the subject matter and the parties. Errors, if any, committed by the court in the exercise of its jurisdiction, may be remedied by appeal. Richey v. McLeod, Fla., [137 Fla. 281] 188 So. 228.
Id., 192 So. 881 (citations omitted). Drig-gers, decided long before Bowen, did not involve a challenge to the petitioner's imprisonment as being unconstitutional, whereas here, the challenge is that petitioner is being unconstitutionally detained.
Givén the precedent we have reviewed above, we hold that we have jurisdiction to consider Pompey's petition. We turn now to the consideration of the merits of the issue.
II.
Contempt may be either civil or criminal. The distinction is important because the type of contempt determines both the procedures for adjudication and the type of punishment which may be imposed.
" 'Criminal contempt is a crime in the ordinary sense.' " International Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 826, 114 S.Ct. 2552, 2556, 129 L.Ed.2d 642 (1994) (citation omitted). As the Florida Supreme Court has stated:
The purpose of criminal contempt . is to punish. Criminal contempt proceedings are utilized to vindicate the authority of the court or to punish for an intentional violation of an order of the court.
Bowen, 471 So.2d at 1277 (citations omitted). A sentence imposed for criminal contempt is punitive'—to reassert the authority of the court and to "deter other like derelictions." Ex paite Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 111, 46 S.Ct. 332, 334, 69 L.Ed. 527 (1925). Therefore, a court may sentence a criminal con-temnor to imprisonment for a definite term or to pay a punitive fine. Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 827-29,114 S.Ct. at 2557-58. These criminal sanctions may not be imposed unless a contemnor has been afforded the same constitutional due process protections to which criminal defendants are entitled. Bowen, 471 So.2d at 1277; Hicks on Behalf of Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 631-32, 108 S.Ct. 1423, 1429-30, 99 L.Ed.2d 721 (1988). Among these constitutional safeguards are the right to be represented by counsel, the requirement that the offense be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and the privilege against self incrimination. See Bowen, 471 So.2d at 1277; Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 826-27, 114 S.Ct. at 2556-57; Hicks, 485 U.S. at 632, 108 S.Ct. at 1429-30; Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.840.
The purpose of civil contempt is. not to punish, but to obtain .compliance with a court order. Bowen, 471 So.2d at 1277; Parsons v. Wennet, 625 So.2d 945 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). "Because incarceration is utilized solely to obtain compliance, it must be used only when the contemnor has the ability to comply. This ability to comply is the con-temnor's 'key to his cell.' " Bowen, 471 So.2d at 1277. Thus, a parent who is incarcerated for civil contempt for failure to pay child support is not entitled to court-appointed counsel because only those having the ability to pay may be incarcerated for civil contempt, and " 'if the parent is indigent, there is no threat of imprisonment.' " Id. at 1278 (quoting Andrews v. Walton, 428 So.2d 663, 666 (Fla.1983)).
The ability to comply is the linchpin of civil contempt, and this principle underlies all assumptions concerning the protections afforded a civil contemnor. Because civil contempt sanctions are "coercive and avoidable through obedience," they may be imposed in an ordinary civil proceeding upon notice and an opportunity to be heard, without the constitutional protections required in criminal cases. Bagwell, 512 U.S. at —, 114 S.Ct. at 2557; Bowen, 471 So.2d at 1277.
As our Florida Supreme Court emphasized in Andrews,
The sixth amendment guarantees provide the source of the constitutional protections accorded a defendant in a criminal contempt proceeding because of its punitive character; the defendant in a civil contempt proceeding, on the other hand, because he has the ability to control the act which causes release from jail, is guaranteed a proceeding which is "fundamentally fair" under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
428 So.2d at 666 (citation omitted).
Where a civil contemnor is jailed without a purge condition that is within his power to accomplish, the sentence transforms into one for criminal contempt without having been preceded by any of the necessary constitutional safeguards. Bowen, 471 So.2d at 1277-78; Robbins v. Robbins, 429 So.2d 424, 431 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Hicks, 485 U.S. at 635 n. 7, 108 S.Ct. at 1431 n. 7.
With its use of jail as the instrument for enforcing orders, civil contempt is a hybrid proceeding unique in the law. Unlike the criminal law, where the Legislature sets the parameters of a permissible penalty and a jury typically decides the issue of guilt, contempt proceedings leave the judge responsible for adjudicating and sanctioning the contumacious conduct. See Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 830-31, 114 S.Ct. at 2559. The trial judge has broad discretion in imposing, reviewing, and reconsidering a contempt sentence. Because it centralizes so much power in one person, the contempt power is uniquely "liable to abuse." Id.
The consequences of a civil contempt in the area of child support enforcement are potentially greater than those of a criminal contempt. Yet. there are few procedural safeguards. Many individuals are unrepresented and may be unaware of their rights — such as the right to periodic review of the contempt order and the right to request a hearing to demonstrate that they no longer possess the ability to pay. The consequences are even more dire for an indigent individual caught in a "Catch-22" situation: he cannot afford to hire an attorney, yet he has no right to an attorney because the court indulges in the assumption that no incarceration can take place unless the contemnor possesses the present ability to pay. See Boiven, 471 So.2d at 1278. Contempt jurisprudence must attempt to balance the need of a court to enforce its orders with the doctrine that a court's power to obtain compliance should be tempered by safeguards that ensure fundamental fairness.
The central critical holding of Bowen was that incarceration for civil contempt cannot be imposed unless' the trial court finds that the contemnor has the present ability to purge himself of contempt. Bowen, 471 So.2d at 1277-78; see Hicks, 485 U.S. at 635 n. 7, 108 S.Ct. at 1431 n. 7. Bowen established what we interpret to be a two-step procedure for establishing civil contempt in family support cases. It first provided the procedure for determining if there has been a willful violation of a court order:
In these cases, the initial order or judgment directing a party to pay support or alimony is predicated on an affirmative finding that the party has the ability to pay. This initial judicial determination creates, in subsequent proceedings, a presumption that there is an ability to pay. In a civil contempt proceeding for failure to pay child support or alimony, the mov-ant must show that a prior court order directed the party to pay the support or alimony, and that the party in default has failed to make the ordered payments. The burden of producing evidence then shifts to the defaulting party, who must dispel the presumption of ability to pay by demonstrating that, due to circumstances be--yond his control which intervened since the time the order directing him to pay was entered, he no longer has the ability to meet his support obligations. The court must then evaluate the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to justify a finding that the defaulting party has willfully violated the court order.
Boiven, 471 So.2d at 1278-79.
Then, as a second step which is a prerequisite to incarceration, the court went on to state:
Once the court finds that a civil contempt has occurred, it must determine what alternatives are appropriate to obtain compliance with the court order. If incarceration is deemed appropriate, the court must make a separate, affirmative finding that the contemnor possesses the present ability to comply with the purge conditions set forth in the contempt order. In determining whether the contemnor possesses the ability to pay the purge amount, the trial court is not limited to the amount of cash immediately available to the contemnor; rather, the court may look to all assets from which the amount might be obtained.
Id. at 1279 (emphasis added). Thus, the presumption of ability to pay which exists in the first step is not a substitute for the "separate, affirmative finding" of ability to pay required for incarceration. Moreover, the supreme court never discussed burden of proof issues in connection with the trial court's determination to incarcerate as the remedy for civil contempt. We do not read Bowen as compelling the contemnor to disprove a presumption that incarceration is the appropriate method for compliance.
Applying the process to this case, the original final judgment of support in 1986 created the presumption that Pompey had the present ability to pay his support obligation of $60 per week. HRS, as movant, also proved, and petitioner does not contest, that Pompey failed to make the payments, which as of the date of the hearing amounted to $22,100. The burden then shifted to Pompey to dispel the presumption of ability to pay as set forth in Bowen. Because Pompey did not appear at the hearing, he did not dispel the presumption. Therefore, the hearing officer concluded that Pompey had willfully violated the court order. Up until that point, the proceeding's were in full compliance with Bowen.
Boiven then requires the trial court to determine what alternative is appropriate for addressing the civil contempt of failing to pay child support. Incarceration is an option only if the trial court "makes a separate, affirmative finding" that the contemnor possesses the present ability to comply with the purge amount. Id. at 1279. There is nothing in this record to show that the trial court had any evidence that Pompey could pay a purge amount of $22,100 and thus secure his release from incarceration.
The trial court must have some affirmative evidence before it that the obligor has the "keys to his cell" in his pocket. Otherwise, its order of incarceration is more than just coercive, and is thus an order of criminal contempt, without the required due process protections, including representation by an attorney. See Vick. If the contemnor must have the keys to the cell in his pocket, they cannot be made of paper presumptions when cold hard cash ($22,100 in this case) is required to get out of jail.
The supreme court in Boiven did not address the dilemma faced by a trial court when the contemnor does not appear at the contempt hearing, and there is no evidence available to establish a purge amount. It is our understanding and experience that obli-gors routinely fail to appear at hearings on motions for contempt. Trial courts are faced with a difficult task of balancing the real and pressing need to protect the children of this state through the collection of unpaid child support against the constitutional right of the individual not to be "punished" without the full protections guaranteed in the Florida and United States Constitutions. Where the obligor fails to appear and the trial court decides to incarcerate and set a purge amount based on a presumption, there is a very real risk that an individual will be imprisoned on a civil contempt without possessing the "keys to his cell," thus allowing unconstitutional incarceration without the same due process protections afforded to typical criminal defendants. And while we may not be sympathetic to the recalcitrant parent who fails to pay child support, all courts are duty-bound to protect the constitutional rights of the individuals who appear before them.
Some circuits provide for the issuance of a writ of bodily attachment for a non-appearing obligor at a child support enforcement hearing. Then, when the obligor is brought before the court, a hearing can be immediately held as to the party's present ability to pay a purge amount. See, e.g., Fennell. In fact, a Broward County hearing officer's report gives the option for a trial court to issue a writ of bodily attachment, although one was not issued in this case. This procedure "would permit the incarceration for civil contempt without running afoul of constitutional rights.
Standard procedure in Palm Beach County requires that after the court has ordered incarceration of the obligor and set a purge amount, the contemnor must be brought before a trial judge after being arrested in all cases, or appear before the judge within twenty-four hours of arrest, for the judge to determine whether a post-incarceration hearing is necessary as to the present ability to pay the purge amount. At that hearing, a trial court may adjust the purge amount to a sum which the contemnor has the present ability to pay. This also may avoid an unconstitutional incarceration.
However, where, as here, the petitioner was found in contempt, and the trial court determined that incarceration was the appropriate method to coerce compliance, the setting of a purge amount without any record showing that petitioner had the present abili ty to pay the purge amount transformed the civil contempt into a criminal sanction. Thus, petitioner's incarceration without compliance with all of the criminal due process protections was unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
While we conclude that the availability of habeas corpus in cases such as this is consistent with Anglin and Boiven, we do, in light of Driggers, certify the following question of great public importance:
WHERE A DEFENDANT FAILS TO APPEAR AT A HEARING ON A MOTION FOR CIVIL CONTEMPT, AND AS A RESULT OF THE NON-APPEARANCE THE TRIAL COURT ENTERS AN ORDER OF INCARCERATION WITH A PURGE AMOUNT ARRIVED AT WITHOUT ACTUAL EVIDENCE OF ABILITY TO PAY, IS HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF AVAILABLE TO A JAILED CONTEMNOR?
We also consider the issue of our interpretation of Boiven as one of great public importance, and we certify the following question:
IN ORDER TO SUPPORT AN ORDER OF INCARCERATION FOR CIVIL CONTEMPT, DOES THE BOWEN PRESUMPTION OF ABILITY TO PAY, WHEN NOT REBUTTED BY A CIVIL CONTEMNOR WHO FAILS TO APPEAR AT A NOTICED HEARING FOR CONTEMPT, SATISFY THE SECOND BOWEN REQUIREMENT OF A SEPARATE AFFIRMATIVE FINDING OF ABILITY TO PAY THE PURGE AMOUNT SPECIFIED BY THE TRIAL COURT?
WARNER, POLEN, KLEIN, PARIENTE and GROSS, JJ., concur.
GLICKSTEIN, DELL and STEVENSON, JJ., concur specially.
KLEIN, J., concurs specially with opinion in which WARNER, PARIENTE and GROSS, JJ., concur.
GROSS, J., concurs specially with opinion in which WARNER, POLEN, KLEIN and PARIENTE, JJ., concur.
STONE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with opinion in which GUNTHER, C.J., and FARMER and SHAHOOD, JJ., concur.
FARMER, J., dissents with opinion, in which GUNTHER, C.J., and SHAHOOD, J, concur.
. At the hearing ordered by this court, HRS presented no evidence that Pompey had the present ability to pay the purge amount of $22,100 or that he ever had that amount of money. The testimony established that Pompey had been unemployed for at least a year and unemployment checks were his only source of income. He did not own a car, bank account or other assets.
. Criminal contempt sanctions are available for willful noncompliance with a court order, but such proceedings must be instituted by serving an order to show cause and affording a hearing after notice is given to the defendant, at which time the defendant has an opportunity to defend the charge of contempt. The procedure is governed by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.840 on indirect criminal contempt. See Bowen, 471 So.2d at 1279.
. Section 61.14(5), enacted in 1992, attempts to fill the gap that Bowen leaves in determining the purge amount. That statute creates a presumption that an obligor has the "present ability . to purge himself or herself from the contempt" flowing from the entry of the original order of support providing for periodic support payments. Because the original order of support in this case was entered prior to the enactment of section 61.14(5), and the order does not comply with the terms of that section, wc are not called upon to consider its application to this case. Moreover, neither party has argued that the statute applies.