Case Name: Arthur Morgan, Plaintiff in Error, v. John Hays, Defendant in Error
Court: Illinois Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 1825-12
Citations: 1 Breese 126
Docket Number: 
Parties: Arthur Morgan, Plaintiff in Error, v. John Hays, Defendant in Error.
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Reports
Volume: 1
Pages: 126–128

Head Matter:
Arthur Morgan, Plaintiff in Error, v. John Hays, Defendant in Error.
ERROR TO ST. CLAIR.
After a final judgment is entered, the court has no power at a subsequent term to set it aside and direct a nonsuit to be entered; and if the court had power to set aside the judgment it ought to have directed a new trial and not a nonsuit.

Opinion:
Opinion of the Court by
Justice Smith.
In this case it is not deemed necessary to decide more thaii one of the points presented for consideration.
That one is the decision of the court below in setting aside the final judgment entered in the cause, at a term subsequent to the one at which such judgment was entered, and directing a nonsuit. On the trial of the cause, the plaintiff below, who is plaintiff here, offered to give in evidence a record of a cause determined in one of the circuit courts of this state. This the defendant's counsel objected to, but the court overruled the objection and permitted the record to be given to the jury as evidence.
The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff and a final judgment was entered thereon. The court then continued the cause to the next term, when it set aside the final judgment and directed a judgment of nonsuit to be entered. Two questions arise here for consideration: 1. Had the court the power at a term subsequent to the one at which the judgment was regularly entered, to set it aside ? 2. If so, was a judgment of nonsuit warranted ? That courts have not, as a general proposition the right, at a term subsequent to the one at which judgment is entered, to set it aside, we have no doubt.
The power to re-adjudicate causes finally disposed of at one term, where the proceedings are regular, at another and subsequent one, would produce consequences too embarrassing and lead to endless and contradictory decisions. If a judge could review the final opinion given at one term at the next, why may it not be imagined that he might be equally dissatisfied with the second opinion and reverse that, and continue to vacillate as often as the parties might desire to present their case before him. If, on the trial, either party is dissatisfied with the decision of the court, the remedy for a correction is by excepting to this opinion, or by application afterwards for a new trial. Appellate courts are established for the purpose of correcting the errors of inferior tribunals; but if inferior ones possessed the power at all times to review their own decisions, the creation of the appellate jurisdiction was vain and useless. The court was therefore wrong in setting aside the judgment; but as the court, from the confused state of the record, may be supposed to have considered that the case had been reserved for a review at a future term, and as we are by no means satisfied that the plaintiff ought, from the evidence contained in the bill of exceptions, to have recovered, we do not feel disposed to interfere with that part of the decision. On the second point we are clearly of opinion that after the judgment was vacated the court ought to have directed a new trial. On principle and precedent a nonsuit could not be directed.
The judgment must therefore be reversed, a new trial granted, with directions to the court below to award a ve,nire de novo, and that the plaintiff in error recover his costs
Judgment reversed.
Where an attorney enters an appearance of a party without authority, and judgment is rendered against Mm, such judgment will be set aside on motion. Lyon v. Boilvin, 2 Gilm., 635.
At the May Term, 1837, a judgment was rendered against Sloo & McClintock, partners, on a power of attorney executed by McClintock alone. At the next term of the court Sloo entered a motion to set aside the judgment as to him. Held by the supreme court that the motion should have been sustained. Sloo v. State Bank, 1 Scam., 429.
It was also held in Truett v. Wainwright, that a judgment rendered against a person who has not been served with process, nor authorized his appearance to be entered, may be set aside by a bill in chancery, 'or by a motion in the court where the judgment was rendered. 4 Gilm., 418.
After a term has expired, a court has no discretion or authority at a subsequent term to set aside a judgment, but may amend it in mere matter of form, after notice has been given to the opposite party. Cook v. Wood et al., 24 Ill., 295. This decision I apprehend does not conflict with the decisions cited above. Those cases were set aside for the reason that the parties were not properly in court ; while in the last case the defendants had been duly served with process, but it was vacated by the circuit court on equitable grounds, but which decision was reversed in the supreme court for the reason, among others, that the motion came too late.