Case Name: ESTATE OF Frank S. SPICKLER, Deceased, Appellant, v. COUNTY OF LANCASTER BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS
Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1990-07-16
Citations: 395 Pa. Super. 542
Docket Number: No. 1467
Parties: ESTATE OF Frank S. SPICKLER, Deceased, Appellant, v. COUNTY OF LANCASTER BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS.
Judges: Before BROSKY, BECK and HOFFMAN, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports
Volume: 395
Pages: 542–552

Head Matter:
577 A.2d 923
ESTATE OF Frank S. SPICKLER, Deceased, Appellant, v. COUNTY OF LANCASTER BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS.
Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
Submitted Nov. 29, 1989.
Decided July 16, 1990.
Henry F. Gingrich, Elizabethtown, for appellant.
John A. Kenneff, Millerville, for appellee.
Before BROSKY, BECK and HOFFMAN, JJ.

Opinion:
BROSKY, Judge.
This is an appeal from an order dismissing exceptions to a memorandum opinion in a quiet title action. The action was brought to litigate the existence of an easement over property which was formerly a railroad bed. The trial court found that no such easement existed and appellant has appealed raising several allegations of error and arguments in its favor, included among them, that there existed an easement by operation of the Railroad Act of 1849. We reverse.
The facts of relevance are: Appellant, Estate of Spickler, brought this action to quiet title to an easement purportedly running across property that used to be a railroad and is now a recreational walking trail. Appellant asserts, inter alia, that there exists an easement by operation of law under the Railroad Act.
The relevant chain of title indicates that the land in question, plus additional land, was owned by Benjamin Brandt when a strip of Brandt's land was conveyed to C. & L. Railroad in 1881, effectively bisecting the remainder of Brandt's land. This conveyance, for practical purposes, created two separate parcels of land which were later conveyed separately. Appellant's property was the parcel to the north, and there was another to the south. The northern parcel was conveyed to Gibble and then to Groff then to Spickler. The deed from Brandt to Gibble indicates the presence of an easement along the northern boundary of the railroad's strip which was purportedly acquired in 1909. The same language is contained in the deed from Gibble to Groff. However, in the deed from Groff to Spickler there is described an easement across the railroad's land and to a public road accessible from the southern track. In fact, there exists a "farm road" across the railroad/county's land which has been in existence and used since at least 1912. It is the use of this way that is in question. The parcel conveyed to the railroad was used for a railroad until 1976. In 1979 the land was purchased by the county.
Appellant argues that it had an easement by operation of the Railroad Act of 1849. That act states:
Whenever, in the construction of such road or roads [railroads], it shall be necessary to cross or intersect an established road or way, it shall be the duty of the . said company [railroad company], so to construct the said road [railroad] across such established road or way, as not to impede the passage or transportation of persons or property along the same; and that, for the accommodation of all persons owning or possessing land through which the said railroad may pass, it shall be the duty of such company to make or cause to be made a good and sufficient causeway or causeways, whenever the same may be necessary to enable the occupant or occupants of said lands to cross and pass over the same, .
15 P.S. § 4101. The trial court considered this Act but found that it did not support appellant's theory as it applied only to established roads and ways. However, there are essentially two parts to the statute; and, the trial court did not address the second part. This second part refers to the landowner's right to have an access way across the right-of-way/railroad when it divides the portion of land in two. Although the law is rather antiquated it remains valid today, and although the caselaw is equally old, it seems to support appellant's position.
One of the more recent decisions on this act is Sonnen v. Reading Company, 43 D. & C.2d 737 (1967). There the court discussed the railroad's duty to maintain access-ways across the railroad and noted several highly relevant general propositions regarding such rights of way. There it was stated:
Under the plain meaning of the Act of 1849, a property owner whose land was severed by the taking of a right-of-way for railroad purposes was given a vested right to a private crossing on their own lands over the railroad's right-of-way. It is a right as sacred as any other property right. It was granted by the State, and no power but that of the State could deprive them of it: Green v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 245 Pa. 35 [91 A. 248].
The court continued its discussion, later stating:
Defendant's contention is that the existence of an alternate route, township road 640, as a means of access by plaintiffs, compels the conclusion that defendant need not repair and maintain bridge no. 18/22____
We are of the opinion that, once a property owner acquired a private crossing over the right-of-way under the Acts of 1849, he cannot be divested of this right by the subsequent location of a public road across the property which would supply a less convenient alternate crossing route. It is only in those cases where a public route crossing the right-of-way is in existence that a property owner cannot compel a railroad to furnish an additional private causeway crossing.
Nor are we of the opinion that the acquisition by one person of two lots or farms, each of which enjoys the benefit of the Act of 1849 by having private access causeways built theréon and maintained by the railroad, is a sufficient reason at law for the railroad to discontinue maintaining and repairing one of the crossings. As we pointed out previously, this is a vested right for which consideration was given. It is for the accommodation and convenience of the property owner____ If we were to accept defendant's contention in this regard, we would be divesting plaintiffs of a valuable legal right without compensating them for it.
We would note that, although Sonnen is a decision of the Court of Common Pleas, it is founded upon principles mostly asserted by our Supreme Court; and, that although rather old, those decisions remain valid law to this day. For instance, Dubbs v. Philadelphia & Railroad Co. Reading, 148 Pa. 66, 23 A. 883 (1892), held that the object of this section was to compel railroad companies to give the owners of farms divided by a railroad a convenient mode of access from one part to the other. In Shepp v. Reading Belt Railroad, 211 Pa. 425, 60 A. 985 (1905), it was held that where there is no public road crossing the landowner is entitled to a private one.
The error of the trial court appears to lie in the consideration of only part of the referenced Act without consideration of the other, and its defined purpose. The trial court found that the Act was inapplicable because it dealt only with established roads or ways. This is true to a certain extent, however, it is true only to that extent. The duty of the railroad described in the first part of the Act requires them to build the railroad in such a way as to not impede traffic across then established roads. This might require the building of bridges and/or underpasses as was seen in Sonnen. However, there is another portion of the Act which has been unequivocally defined as intending to provide for access across the railroad by a landowner when the railroad shall bisect the landowner's land. The trial court failed to consider this portion of the Act.
Under the principles enunciated in Sonnen it would seem indisputable that at the time the strip of land was conveyed to the railroad and a railroad built upon it, Benjamin Brandt acquired a right to access across the railroad, as the railroad divided his land in two. Further, this right was a vested right as sacred as any other. Sonnen, by implication, further supports the theory that the easement is devisable to another, a theory which logic would further compel, lest there be too great a restraint upon alienation. To hold otherwise could result in many parcels of land so divided from being freely devisable due to lack of access. This would seem contrary to the intent of the Act. As such, it is rather easy to conclude that there was an inherent right of access across the railroad strip at all times relevant to the within controversy, and that it was acquired by all subsequent purchasers of Brandt's land, including Spickler. As such, we conclude, the trial court's decision to the contrary must be reversed and remanded so that an appropriate order quieting title in the easement can be entered.
Order reversed, remanded to trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Jurisdiction is relinquished.
BECK, J. files a dissenting opinion.
. In this regard, we find irrelevant appellee's contention that the Act in question has been repealed. The fact of the matter is that it was in effect at the time of the conveyance to the railroad. Thus, the easement or right of access was established at that point in time and must be construed to run with the land. Absent some indication that the repealing of the Act was further designed to extinguish already existing rights acquired under it, we will not impute such an intent from the mere repealing of the Act.