Case Name: Michael SMITH v. SOUTHERN HOLDING, INC. and Southern Scrap Material Company, L.L.C.
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 2003-01-28
Citations: 839 So. 2d 5
Docket Number: No. 2002-CC-1071
Parties: Michael SMITH v. SOUTHERN HOLDING, INC. and Southern Scrap Material Company, L.L.C.
Judges: CALOGERO, C.J., concurs and assigns reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 839
Pages: 5–13

Head Matter:
Michael SMITH v. SOUTHERN HOLDING, INC. and Southern Scrap Material Company, L.L.C.
No. 2002-CC-1071.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Jan. 28, 2003.
Rehearing Denied March 21, 2003.
Michael D. Meyer, Counsel for Applicant.
Ruben Hernandez, Jr., Robert A. Len-ter, Metairie, Counsel for Respondent.

Opinion:
_JjKNOLL, Justice.
In this workers' compensation case, we are asked to decide whether an employee who submits to surgery and treatment by an employer-referred physician, makes a de facto choice of treating physician within the meaning of La.Rev.Stat. 23:1121(B). There is a split among the First and Third Circuit Courts of Appeal and the Fourth Circuit as to the proper resolution of this question. The First and Third Circuits recognize de facto selection of a physician and the Fourth Circuit finds the statute does not so provide. Finding that the Fourth Circuit's resolution of the issue is correct as a matter of law, we affirm.
FACTS and PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The plaintiff, Michael Smith (Smith), injured his left knee on August 21, 2000. This injury occurred when Smith missed a step with his right foot as he was getting out of his truck while in the course and scope of his employment with Southern Scrap | ¡Material Company, L.L.C. (Southern Scrap). Smith was referred by Southern Scrap to Chalmette Medical Center, where he sought treatment on August 24, 2000. He was treated by Dr. A. Friedri-chsen, who in turn referred him to Dr. Gordon Nutik, an orthopedic surgeon.
Smith first saw Dr. Nutik on September 1, 2000, and returned to him on September 18, 2000. On October 11, 2000, Dr. Nutik recommended arthroscopic surgery. Smith saw Dr. Nutik on October 23, 2000, for the purpose of a pre-operative examination. The surgery was performed by Dr. Nutik on October 31, 2000. Following the surgery, Smith saw Dr. Nutik six more times, the last visit occurring on February 19, 2001.
After the surgery, Smith informed Dr. Nutik that he continued to experience pain. Smith also continuously complained to Dr. Nutik that the therapy was inadequate and that his leg was not improving, leaving him unable to drive a truck with a clutch that requires ninety pounds of pressure. Subsequently Smith learned he had the right to be treated by a physician of his choice. Claiming that he had not chosen Dr. Nutik to treat him, Smith sought to be treated by Dr. John Watermeier, an orthopedic surgeon. Southern Scrap refused Smith's request on the grounds that he made a de facto choice of physician. Smith filed a claim with the Office of Workers' Compensation (OWC) seeking an appointment of a physician of his choice.
Southern Scrap argued that by submitting to medical treatment over a period of almost six months, including surgery, Smith had defacto chosen Dr. Nutik as his treating physician. The hearing officer rejected the employer's argument and ruled that Smith had shown cause why he was dissatisfied with the treatment by Dr. Nu-tik and that Smith had a right to choose an orthopedist under La. R.S. 23:1121(B).
Southern Scrap took a supervisory writ to the court of appeal, which denied the writ. It then applied to this court for a supervisory writ, which we granted, remanding |sthe case to the court of appeal for briefing, argument and opinion. Smith v. Southern Holding, Inc., 2001-2258 (La.9/28/01), 798 So.2d 104. On remand from this court, the court of appeal affirmed the OWC. The court of appeal recognized that the employer relied upon cases from the First and Third Circuits, which have adopted a theory of de facto selection of physicians in workers' compensation cases. However, citing Santacruze v. INA Ins. Co., 614 So.2d 323 (La.App. 4 Cir.1993), the court of appeal noted the Fourth Circuit had never adopted such a theory and held the statute gives an injured employee an absolute right to choose one physician in any field without the approval of the employer. Southern Scrap again sought this Court's review. We granted the employer's writ application to resolve the split among the circuits. Smith v. Southern Holding, Inc., 2002-1071 (La.6/21/02), 819 So.2d 336.
DISCUSSION
Southern Scrap asserts that the failure of the hearing officer and the Fourth Circuit to recognize the defacto selection of a physician under the provisions of La.Rev. Stat. 23:1121(B) is erroneous. It argues that when an employee submits to treatment by an employer-referred physician it constitutes a selection of a physician within the intendment of La.Rev.Stat. 23:1121(B).
La.Rev.Stat. 23:1121(B) provides:
The employee shall have the right to select one treating physician in any field or specialty. The employee shall have a right to the type of summary proceeding provided for in R.S. 23:1124(B), when denied his right to an initial physician of his choice. After his initial choice, the employee shall obtain prior consent from the employer or his workers' compensation carrier for a change of treating physician within that same field or spe cialty. The employee, however, is not required to obtain |4approval for change to a treating physician in another field or specialty.
A review of the jurisprudence shows the Fourth Circuit was the first appellate court to address La.Rev.Stat. 23:1121(B), in Santacruze. In that case the employer had sent Santacruze to Dr. Mímeles. In support of its argument to uphold the hearing officer's finding that Dr. Mímeles was Santacruze's de facto choice of physician, the employer pointed out that Santa-cruze had willingly consulted Dr. Mímeles for years and allowed him to perform surgery. The employer argued Santacruze began claiming Dr. Mímeles was not his physician of choice only when Dr. Mímeles released Santacruze to return to work. Santacruze testified consistently at trial that he never selected Dr. Mimeles's treatment as his orthopedist, but that he submitted to Dr. Mimeles's treatment because the employer had told him to go there. The hearing officer found that Santacruze had defacto selected Dr. Mímeles.
In reversing the OWC, the Fourth Circuit held that La.Rev.Stat. 23:1121(B), "gives an injured employee an absolute right to choose one physician in any field without the approval of the employer." Santacruze, 614 So.2d at 324. The statute does not impose any time limits, nor does it prohibit an employee from choosing a physician in a particular field after he was treated by another physician in that field, unquestionably chosen by the employer. See Santacruze, 614 So.2d at 324.
In the present case, the Fourth Circuit upheld the decision of the hearing officer that Smith has the right to choose a treating physician under La.Rev.Stat. 23:1121(B). Relying upon its Santacruz decision, the court stated that it has not adopted the theory of de facto selection of a treating physician.
The theory of a de facto choice of physician under La.Rev.Stat. 23:1121(B) first appeared in Guillotte v. Dynamic Offshore Contractors, 628 So.2d 234 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1993). There the employer referred the injured employee, Guillotte, to Dr. | ^Comeaux. Dr. Comeaux subsequently referred Guillotte to Dr. Shepherd, an orthopedist. After Dr. Shepherd released Guillotte to return to work, Guillotte complained he was unhappy with Dr. Shepherd and sought authorization to see an orthopedist of his choosing. The hearing officer found that Guillotte had chosen Dr. Shepherd as his treating orthopedist. The hearing officer found that by, (1) failing to specify an orthopedist and, (2) undergoing treatment by Dr. Shepherd, Guillotte had de facto chosen Dr. Shepherd as his treating physician. See Guillotte, 628 So.2d at 236. The Third Circuit concluded that the hearing officer's finding was not manifestly erroneous. Id. See also Comeaux v. Sam Broussard Trucking, 94-1631, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/31/95), 657 So.2d 449, 452-453, which affirmed the hearing officer's finding that the employee had de facto chosen a physician, where the employee clearly submitted to treatment and did not request a change in physicians until the doctor released the employee to return to work.
The First Circuit, relying upon Co-meaux and Guillotte, has also held that an employee can de facto choose a treating physician. Moore v. Sanderson Farms, Inc., 95-2042, p. 10 (La.App. 1 Cir.5/10/96), 674 So.2d 478, 484, unit denied 96-1399 (La.9/13/96), 679 So.2d 106. In that decision the court of appeal overturned the decision of the hearing officer, which had found Moore was deprived of an opportunity to seek treatment from a physician of her choice pursuant to La.Rev. Stat. 23:1121(B). The First Circuit found that even though the physician was chosen by the employer, Moore had de facto chosen him as her treating physician by clearly submitting to treatment and further stating she never had. a problem with him. Id Likewise, in Fenyes v. Highland Park Med. Ctr., 97-0120, p. 4 (La.App. 1 Cir.2/20/98), 708 So.2d 493, 495, the First Circuit overruled the decision of the hearing officer and found the employee had de facto chosen a treating physician. Even though the English language was not the employee's primary language and she testified that she did what the insurance I (¡company told her to do, the court held that she had de facto chosen a treating physician by continuously treating with the physician. Id.
"The [Workers' Compensation] Act was long silent on the matter of the respective rights of employer and employee to select the physician who is to treat the worker." 13 Wex S. Malone & H. Alston Johnson, III, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise, § 287 (4th ed.2002). Before the Legislature addressed this subject, Professors Malone and Johnson adopted the view that the employee should have the right to choose the physician of his choice. At that time, their treatise on this issue stated:
In view of the fact that the success of the treatment may depend upon the patient's confidence in the physician chosen, it is suggested that the primary right of choice should rest with the patient, unless his choice is shown to be unreasonable, or solely for the purpose of tactical advantage at trial. The right of primary choice may be an important one in view of the fact that on trial the opinion of the treating physician is frequently preferred over that of other experts. 13 Wex S. Malone & H. Alston Johnson, III, Louisiana Civil Law Treatise, § 287 (2d ed.1980).
See also Kinsey v. Travelers Ins. Co., Inc., 402 So.2d 226, 228 (La.App. 1 Cir.1981) (citing this passage from Malone & Johnson in an opinion which held the employee is entitled to choose the physician for treatment of his injury). "The trust and confidence needed in a patient-doctor relationship is important to successful treatment which can best be obtained if the injured employee has the choice of a physician for treatment purposes." Kinsey, 402 So.2d at 228.
The history of the legislation on this issue shows that the Legislature added subsection B of La.Rev.Stat. 23:1121 by Acts 1987, No. 492, § 1. Representative Thompson explained that this bill was part of a package that was an attempt to fine-tune the workers' compensation system to address problems that both employer and employee representatives had encountered. Minutes of Meeting, House Committee on Labor and Industrial Relations, June 12, 1987, p. 3. The intent of this law was to provide that the employee shall have the right to select one treating physician in any | ffield or specialty. Testimony before the committee indicated the amendment was needed because the current system allowed the employee to "doctor shop;" this law allows the employee to choose one physician. The same opportunity is given to the employer. Minutes of Meeting, House Committee on Labor and Industrial Relations, June 12, 1987, p. 4 (emphasis ours).
"[T]he amendment! ] [adding subsection B] codified the principle that the employee has the right to select one treating physician in each specialty, but required that he obtain the employer's consent to change specialists after that initial choice." Malone, § 287; see also H. Alston Johnson, Workers' Compensation, 48 La. L.Rev. 519 (1987) (emphasis ours). "[T]he 1987 amendment . was designed to reduce the occurrence of "doctor shopping" by claimants while preserving the employee's right to select the treating physician." Denis Paul Juge, Louisiana Workers' Compensation, § 13:3 (2d ed.1999). "The employee's choice of physician is carefully respected, . if the employer refers the employee to a physician, it might be difficult to establish that this was the employee's choice." Malone, § 287.
It is firmly established that legislation is a solemn expression of legislative will; therefore, interpretation of a law is primarily the search for the Legislature's intent. See La. Civ Code art. 2; O'Reagan v. Preferred Enterprises, Inc., 98-1602, p. 4 (La.3/17/00), 758 So.2d 124, 128; Cat's Meow, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 98-0601, p. 15 (La.10/20/98), 720 So.2d 1186, 1198. When a law is clear and unambiguous, and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the law shall be applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in search of the intent of the legislature. La. Civ.Code art. 9; Cat's Meow, 720 So.2d at 1198. The starting point for the interpretation of any statute is the language of the statute itself. Lenard v. Dilley, 2001-1522, p. 4 (La.1/15/02), 805 So.2d 175, 178; Cat's Meow, 720 So.2d at 1198. The words of a law must be given their generally prevailing meaning. La. CivjCode8 art. 11. Statutes are to be interpreted in ways effectuating their purpose. Wise v. J.E. Merit Constructors, Inc., 97-0684, p. 8 (La.1/21/98), 707 So.2d 1214, 1218.
The language of La.Rev.Stat. 23:1121(B) is clear on its face. La.Rev. Stat. 23:1121(B) grants the employee "the right to select one treating physician in any field or specialty." Words and phrases shall be read with their context and shall be construed according to the common and approved usage of the language. La.Rev.Stat. 1:3. Webster's New Universal Unabridged Dictionary defines select as, "to choose in preference to another or others; pick out." The same dictionary states the synonym for select is "choose" and defines choose as, "to select from or in preference to another or other things or persons." We find the well accepted standards of statutory interpretation require that we find the employee has the right to choose his treating physician, even though he or she submitted to treatment by the employer's physician.
We find the statute clear and unambiguous and thus, no need to search for legislative intent. Notwithstanding, a review of the legislative history corroborates our finding. The legislative history shows that the purpose of adding subsection B was to allow the employee to select one treating physician and after that initial choice, employer consent was required if the employee wanted to change treating physicians. It is clear that the legislation addressed the employers' concern of employees "hopping" from one physician to another. In response to this concern, the Legislature enacted subsection B which limits the employee to his choice of one treating physician in a specialty, unless the employer consents to a change in treating physicians.
Interpreting this statute in a way to effectuate its purpose, results in finding that the employee has a right to select one treating physician. The right to select one treating physician is clearly conferred upon the employee, not the employer. Southern Scrap strongly argues that because Smith submitted to treatment by its physician, he | flmade a de facto choice of a physician. It further contends that Smith did not become unhappy with Dr. Nutik's treatment until Dr. Nutik released Smith for sedentary work. Contrary to this argument, the hearing officer found that Smith showed he was dissatisfied with the treatment by Dr. Nutik, and under La. Rev.Stat. 23:1121(B), Smith had a right to choose a physician of his choice.
Significantly, we note the statute does not make the employee's choice of selection of a physician contingent upon the employee's dissatisfaction with the employer's physician. Nor does the statute limit the employee's right of selection of a physician by submitting to treatment by the employer's physician, even for an appreciable amount of time. The statute is clear and mandatory that the "employee shall have the right to select one treating physician.... " Southern Scrap's argument does not take into view the injured employees who submit to treatment by the employer's physician because the employee did not know he or she could go to a physician of their choice. In the present case, Smith did not know he had a right to choose a physician until sometime after Dr. Nutik performed surgery on him. Southern Scrap's theory would impose a serious infringement on the employee's statutorily created right under these circumstances. To adopt the employer's argument would be changing a clear and statutorily mandated law which we cannot do. Under these circumstances, the employer's argument is more properly addressed before the Legislature, whose function is to make and amend laws if it so chooses.
Accordingly, we find the Fourth Circuit's holding that La.Rev.Stat. 23:1121(B) gives an injured employee an absolute right to select one physician in any field without the approval of the employer, is correct as a matter of law. If the Legislature had intended for theie to be a de facto selection of a physician, it could have so provided.
|inDECREE
For the above and foregoing reasons, the judgments of the OWC and the court of appeal are affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
CALOGERO, C.J., concurs and assigns reasons.
WEIMER, J., dissents and will assign reasons.
TRAYLOR and VICTORY, JJ., dissents and assigns reasons.
. Compare Guillotte v. Dynamic Offshore Contractors, 628 So.2d 234 (La.App. 3 Cir.1993); Comeaux v. Sam Broussard Trucking, 94-1631 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/31/95), 657 So.2d 449; Moore v. Sanderson Farms, Inc., 95-2042 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/10/96), 674 So.2d 478, writ denied, 96-1399 (La.9/13/96), 679 So.2d 106; and Fenyes v. Highland Park Med. Ctr., 97-0120 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/20/98), 708 So.2d 493 to Smith v. Southern Holding, Inc., 2001-1185 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/27/02), 814 So.2d 656 and Santacruze v. INA Ins. Co., 614 So.2d 323 (La.App. 4 Cir.1993).
. The opinion states that '[t]he employer relies upon cases from the Second and Third Circuits...." This is an error, as immediately following this sentence the opinion cites cases from the First and Third Circuits, and there are no cases from the Second Circuit addressing de facto selection of a physician pursuant to La.Rev.Stat. 23:1121(B).