Case Name: Edward ERVIN and Keith Lilley, Appellants, v. Bonnie JAMES, Appellee
Court: Texas Courts of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1994-03-10
Citations: 874 S.W.2d 713
Docket Number: No. B14-93-00983-CV
Parties: Edward ERVIN and Keith Lilley, Appellants, v. Bonnie JAMES, Appellee.
Judges: Before SEARS, LEE and MORSE (Sitting by Designation), JJ.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 874
Pages: 713–719

Head Matter:
Edward ERVIN and Keith Lilley, Appellants, v. Bonnie JAMES, Appellee.
No. B14-93-00983-CV.
Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (14th Dist.).
March 10, 1994.
Rehearing Denied March 31, 1994.
Barbara Baruch, Houston, for appellants.
Logene L. Foster, Sugarland, for appellee.
Before SEARS, LEE and MORSE (Sitting by Designation), JJ.

Opinion:
OPINION
MORSE, Justice.
This is an appeal of the denial of a motion for summary judgment. Bonnie James sued Edward Ervin and Keith Lilley for assault and negligence. Ervin and Lilley, who were deputy constables, moved for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The trial court denied the motion, and they appeal. We reverse.
The facts are derived from the affidavits of Deputies Ervin and Lilley. James' affidavit provided little factual detail from which to reconstruct the events and activities involved in her encounter with the deputies.
Ervin and Lilley were deputy constables on-diity at approximately 1:35 a.m. on September 28, 1992. The deputies were in a Stop-N-Go convenience store, when a man approached them and asked Deputy Lilley for a ride to a friend's car. The man said that Bonnie James had thrown beer on him. James had been to a nightclub behind the Stop-N-Go and seemed to be intoxicated.
In the deputies presence, James called the man a coward and tried to pick a fight with him. Deputy Ervin advised her to calm down or he would take her to jail. James said, "Take me to jail." Deputy Ervin asked Deputy Lilley to take James outside and learn her side of the story. James said, "I'm not going anywhere, I'm staying right here." She then called the man a coward, pushed him onto a canister of iced drinks, and began assaulting him. When Deputy Ervin tried to pull her away from the man, James turned and assaulted Ervin by butting her head into him, holding onto him, clawing his face, and damaging his eyeglasses.
The deputies tried to put James down onto the floor. Deputy Ervin lost his balance and both he and James fell. Ervin fell on his knee. James struck her head on the floor. When the deputies handcuffed her, James complained that the cuffs were too tight and continued fighting and kicking.
James sustained a cut on the head, broken collar bone, and dislocated shoulder. Officer Ervin injured his knee and sustained facial scratches.
On February 18, 1993, James sued Ervin and Lilley, in their individual capacities, for assault and negligence. On September 28, 1993, The trial court denied Ervin and Oil-ley's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. They appeal.
In one point of error, Ervin and Lilley complain that the trial court erred in denying their motion for summary judgment, which was based on qualified immunity.
The denial of a summary judgment may be appealed when a court "denies a motion for summary judgment that is based on an assertion of immunity by an individual who is an officer or employee of the state or a political subdivision of the state_" Tex. Crv.PRAC. & Rem.Code Ann. § 51.014(5) (Vernon Supp.1994).
We apply the same standard of review for the denial of a summary judgment as for the granting of a summary judgment. The movant for summary judgment has the burden to show that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Nixon v. Mr. Property Management, Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex.1985). In deciding whether there is a disputed material fact issue precluding summary judgment, we take evidence favorable to the non-movant as true. Id. We indulge every reasonable inference in favor of the non-movant and resolve any doubts in his favor. Id. If the movant's motion and summary judgment proof facially establishes his right to judgment as a matter of law, then the burden shifts to the non-movant to raise fact issues precluding summary judgment. See City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex.1979). A defendant, to be entitled to summary judgment, is required to disprove at least one essential element of each pleaded cause of action or otherwise show that plaintiff could not succeed on any theory pleaded. Rosas v. Buddies Food Store, 518 S.W.2d 534, 537 (Tex.1975). Ervin and Lilley based their motion for summary judgment on the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. A defendant is entitled to summary judgment on the basis on an affirmative defense if he expressly presents and conclusively proves each essential element of the affirmative defense. Swilley v. Hughes, 488 S.W.2d 64, 67 (Tex.1972).
A government official or employee, who is sued in his individual capacity is immune from personal liability if (1) his status or action can be classified as quasi-judicial, (2) his actions were within the scope of his authority, and (3) he acted in good faith. ' See Chapman v. Gonzales, 824 S.W.2d 685, 687 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied). This immunity is based on the sound public policy which encourages public officers and employees to perform their duties without fear of personal liability for negligent or improper performance. Id.
Ervin and Lilley's summary judgment proof consisted of their personal affidavits and official incident reports. "A summary judgment may be based on uncontroverted testimonial evidence of an interested witness . if the evidence is clear, positive and direct, otherwise credible and free from contradiction and inconsistencies, and could have been readily controverted." Tex.R.Civ.P. 166a(c). We find that Ervin and Lilley's proof meets these criteria.
Quasi-Judicial Function?
The test for determining whether an official or employee acts in a quasi-judicial capacity centers on whether his acts are ministerial (no immunity) or discretionary (immunity). See Esparza v. Diaz, 802 S.W.2d 772, 779 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ). Discretionary actions are those that require personal deliberation, decision and judgment. Ministerial actions require obedience to order or the performance of a duty as to which the actor is left no choice. Wyse v. Department of Pub. Safety, 738 S.W.2d 224, 227 (Tex.App.—Waco 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Ervin and Lilley's proof shows that they were on-duty as deputy constables on the night of their encounter with James. Justice Cornyn, in his concurring opinion in Travis v. City of Mesquite, 830 S.W.2d 94 (Tex.1992), stated:
Nowhere else in public service is official immunity more appropriate or necessary than in police work. In their routine work, police officers must be free to make split-second judgments in good faith based on their experience and training, without fear of personal liability. To hold otherwise "would likely cause other peace officers under similar circumstances to flinch from acting because of fear of liability." [Citation omitted]. "Creating that potential does not serve the public interest." [Citation omitted]. Were there no immunity from personal liability under such circumstances, "the prudent would be reluctant to enter governmental service and even competent persons who entered public life would not be zealous in discharging their duties." [Citation omitted].
City of Houston v. Newsom, 858 S.W.2d 14, 17 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ), quoting Travis, 830 S.W.2d at 103.
We find that Ervin and Lilley's proof establishes as a matter of law that they were charged with quasi-judicial authority as law enforcement officers.
Actions Within Scope of Authority?
The facts set out in Ervin and Lil-ley's affidavits as detailed above establish that Ervin's and Lilley's physical contact with James occurred while attempting to stop an assault-in-progress and while effecting an arrest. We find that these are functions within the range of discretionary authority granted peace officers.
Did Officers Act in Good Faith?
A proper resolution of the good faith element of qualified immunity "requires an inquiry into the permissible intentions of the police officer and the reasonableness of the officer's actions in light of the risk of harm to the public." See Newsom, 858 S.W.2d at 17, quoting Travis, 830 S.W.2d at 104 (Cornyn, J., concurring).
The good faith determination has subjective and objective components. In taking action to maintain the peace, an officer acts in good faith when he (1) believes that the need to immediately subdue or apprehend a suspect is not substantially outweighed by a clear risk of harm to the public, and (2) a reasonably prudent police officer, under the same or similar circumstances, would believe that the need to immediately subdue or apprehend the suspect is not substantially outweighed by a clear risk of harm to the public. See Newsom, 858 S.W.2d at 17-18, quoting Travis, 830 S.W.2d at 104.
Ervin and Lilley's proof establishes that their actions in subduing James were in response to an assault-in-progress, initially on a private citizen, then on Deputy Ervin. James was agitated, appeared intoxicated, and did not respond to the deputies' request to calm down. James' injuries occurred as the deputies attempted to get James onto the floor and under control. Deputy Ervin lost his balance, and he and James fell to the floor hard enough to injure both him and James. They stated that their duty as peace officers was to keep the peace and make arrests when warranted. They stated that they believed there was probable cause to arrest James for assault on the private citizen and Deputy Ervin. The deputies averred that they never intended to injure James, but only intended to stop her assault.
We find that Ervin and Lilley's proof establishes their subjective belief that they acted in good faith. See Newsom, 858 S.W.2d at 18. We further find that each deputy's affidavit and report establishes the objective good faith of the other deputy. See id.
Having found that Ervin and Lilley's summary judgment proof establishes as a matter of law all the elements of their affirmative defense of qualified immunity, we now look to James' response to determine if James raised any fact issues precluding summary judgment.
James' summary judgment proof consisted of her personal affidavit. But her affidavit offered no alternative version of the facts to controvert the facts detailed by Er-vin and Lilley's summary judgment proof. Her affidavit contained conclusory statements such as (1) "I was assaulted . before I offered any resistance_(2) "Defendants . used greater force than was necessary to effect any arrest...."; (8) "They used excessive force_and (4) "There was no need to use the force that they used_". Her affidavit did not even name her alleged assailants or provide any descriptive facts to refute Ervin and Lilley's affirmative defense. James never averred that the deputies intentionally used greater force than was necessary or had any ulterior motive or purpose for doing so. We find that James' responsive summary judgment proof was insufficient to raise a fact issue on Ervin and Lilley's affirmative defense of qualified immunity. See Hidalgo v. Surety Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 487 S.W.2d 702, 703 (Tex.1972) (conclusions are not competent summary judgment evidence).
James relies heavily on Cronen v. Nix, 611 S.W.2d 651 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ ref d n.r.e.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1095, 102 S.Ct. 667, 70 L.Ed.2d 636 (1981). In Cronen, the court reversed a summary judgment in favor of peace officers accused by the plaintiff of false imprisonment. The court held that "in order to entitle themselves to a summary judgment, the appellee officers would need to prove that not only was the arrest and detention lawful, but that the period of time which appellant was detained was reasonable.... These are fact issues which are extremely difficult to prove as a matter of law." Id. at 653-54.
We do not find Cronen persuasive authority in the present case. Cronen did not discuss the substance of the summary judgment proof before it except to say that "in our case, such facts were not proved as a matter of law." Id. at 654. In the instant case, we have the detailed affidavits of two police officers setting out sufficient facts to establish as a matter of law that the arrest of James was justified and that the force used to subdue her was reasonable. James's proof was wholly conclusory and failed to controvert the deputies' version of the facts and so raise a fact issue. Furthermore, Cronen did not employ a qualified immunity analysis in arriving at its conclusion. Finally, Cronen was published before the legislature enacted, in 1989, Tex.Civ.PRAC. & Rem.Code Ann. § 51.-014(5) (Vernon Supp.1994), which provided for the interlocutory appeal of a denial of a motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The enactment of § 51.-014(5) signaled the importance that the legislature places on a deserving government official's ability to extricate himself from litigation at its earliest stages. Cronen seemed to dismiss, out-of-hand, the idea of proving qualified immunity by summary judgment proof. We believe that such an approach would render the qualified immunity defense illusory.
We conclude that Ervin and Lilley established their right to summary judgment as a matter of law on their affirmative defense of qualified official immunity. The trial court erred in denying Ervin and Lille/s summary judgment. We reverse that riding and render judgment for Ervin and Lilley.