Case Name: Mae Wilson v. State of Indiana
Court: Supreme Court of Indiana
Jurisdiction: Indiana
Decision Date: 1972-02-23
Citations: 258 Ind. 3
Docket Number: No. 1070S253
Parties: Mae Wilson v. State of Indiana.
Judges: 
Reporter: Indiana Reports
Volume: 258
Pages: 3–11

Head Matter:
Mae Wilson v. State of Indiana.
[No. 1070S253.
Filed February 23, 1972.
Rehearing denied April 7, 1972.
Certiorari to United States Supreme Court denied June 26, 1972.]
Palmer K. Ward, of Indianapolis, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Martin C. Bosch, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.

Opinion:
Prentice, J.
Defendant (Appellant) was convicted of prostitution under Acts of 1965, ch. 345, § 1, 1967 ch. 23, § 1; Burns Ind. Stat. Ann § 10-4220; I.C. 35-30-1-1, under an affidavit which alleged that she did " unlawfully and feloniously offer to commit an act of sexual intercourse for hire, Her appeal presents two questions, neither having merit. Her first proposition is that the trial court erred in refusing the following instruction:
"An offer to commit an act of sexual intercourse is in essence an 'attempt to commit a crime.' An attempt to commit some crime can only occur when the act or offer of the person charged has gone to the extent of giving that person the power to commit such crime unless interrupted, and nothing- but such interruption prevents the commission of the crime. In order to convict the defendant of the crime charged in the affidavit you must find that she has the present ability to commit the crime charged, by herself, and the only thing that prevented her from committing said act was her arrest by the police. If you find from the evidence that she did not have the present ability to commit the crime charged against her by her acts alone, and without the assistance from some other person, then you must acquit her."
It is the defendant's contention hereunder that the crime charged is in the nature of the offense of attempting to commit a crime, and that since the arrest occurred before she reached the "point of no return," no offense had been committed. We do not agree with the major premise. The crime defined by statute is that of "offering" to commit the act, not that of "attemping" to commit it.
The circumstances leading to the charge are as follows:
On July 10, 1969, a vice squad officer of the Indianapolis Police Department was driving south on Central Avenue. The defendant was standing on the sidewalk, and as he approached, she signaled for him to stop, which he did. She asked him if he wanted a date and wanted to spend $10.00. He said that he did and went with her to her apartment nearby. The officer's testimony continues as follows:
"I went into the apartment. She went to the kitchen and come back with a pan of water and wash rag. I then at that time asked her what the ten dollars was for, and she told me sexual intercourse. At this time I identified myself as a police officer and placed her under arrest." (Tr. p. 65)
From the evidence, we are unable to say with certainty whether the witness welched on a deal or if, as appears more likely, a contract was never culminated. We assume, from the circumstances related by the witness, that his testimony regarding the defendant's explanation of the ten dollar charge was not in the vernacular but rather was the officer's conclusion. However, it was not offered as a literal quotation, and there was no cross examination upon the subject. We, therefore, must conclude that there was a meeting of the minds. This, of course is not determinative of the issue, but is, nevertheless, substantial and probative upon the allegation of an offer. Defendant has cited good authority in support of her contention that an attempt to commit a crime can only occur when the act or offer of the person charged has gone to the extent of giving him the power to commit such crime unless interrupted and that the present ability to com mit the crime must be evident. Defendant has called to our attention that she could not commit an act of sexual intercourse without a partner. She has cited no authority, but we believe that few would dispute that this may be taken by judicial notice. It is the offer, however, with which we are concerned and not the fulfilment or attempted fulfilment thereof. To sum up, we concede that it "takes two to tango," but the bid therefore may be proffered without plural involvement. Williams v. State (1971), 256 Ind. 228, 267 N. E. 2d 840.
The tendered instruction was inapplicable to the matters in issue and was therefore properly refused. Finton v. State (1963), 244 Ind. 396, 193 N. E. 2d 134; Nix v. State (1960), 240 Ind. 392, 166 N. E. 2d 326; Kennedy v. State (1935), 209 Ind. 287, 196 N. E. 2d 316.
Defendant next asked that this Court declare a statute under which she was charged unconstitutional as being violative of Article IV, § 22 of the Constitution of the State of Indiana, the applicable portions thereof being as follows:
"The General Assembly shall not pass local or special laws, in any of the following enumerated cases, that is to say:

[2.] For the punishment of crimes and misdemeanors;
'
It is the defendant's position hereunder that the statute, being applicable to females only is special, inasmuch as the acts proscribed thereby could be committed as well by males.
Defendant presents no authority under this proposition, but it appears that the question has been previously determined in State v. Griffin (1948), 226 Ind. 279, 79 N. E. 2d 537, and we see no significant distinction between that case and the one at bar nor any compelling need to re-examine the position of the court as therein expressed. In State v. Griffin, supra, the defendant charged that the Act of 1905, ch. 169, § 470, Burns Ind. Stat. Ann § 10-4219 was unconstitutional, inasmuch as it was applicable only to male persons. Judge Gilkison speaking for this Court by unanimous opinion said:
"The classification as made is founded on substantial distinctions in the subject matter. It is reasonably designed to protect the morals and welfare of the public. It was deemed sufficient for this purpose when it was enacted. If the morals of the people of the state have changed in the meantime so as to require a more general classification, that matter is for the legislature to consider — not for the courts.
1 (c). § 22, Art. 4 Indiana Constitution, among other things, provides: "The General Assembly shall not pass local or special laws, in any of the following enumerated cases, that is to say: (2) for the punishment of crimes or misdemeanors .'
This section of the Constitution is not violated by the involved act, because it applies to all who come within its provisions, generally and without exceptions, and it rests upon an inherent and substantial basis of classification.
'A law which applies generally to a particular class of cases is not local or special. The Constitution does not require that the operation of a law shall be uniform, other than that its operation shall be the same in all parts of the state under the same circumstances.' " 226 Ind. 279 at 290
Finding no error, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Arterburn, C. J. and Givan and Hunter, JJ., concur. De-Bruler, J., dissents with opinion.