Case Name: BEASON v. BEASON (AFTER REMAND)
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1994-03-21
Citations: 204 Mich. App. 178
Docket Number: Docket No. 136783
Parties: BEASON v BEASON (AFTER REMAND)
Judges: Before: Wahls, P.J., and Mackenzie and Taylor, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 204
Pages: 178–187

Head Matter:
BEASON v BEASON (AFTER REMAND)
Docket No. 136783.
Submitted April 13, 1993, at Detroit.
Decided March 21, 1994, at 9:05 a.m.
Kenneth P. Beason brought an action in the Monroe Circuit Court against Mary L. Beason, seeking to terminate alimony under the terms of the parties’ divorce judgment on the ground that the defendant was residing with an unrelated male, John Robinson. The court, William F. LaVoy, J., granted the plaintiffs motion to terminate alimony. The Court of Appeals, Weaver and G. S. Allen, JJ. (Gillis, P.J., concurring), reversed in an unpublished opinion per curiam, decided March 29, 1988 (Docket No. 98716), concluding that the evidence was insufficient to show that the defendant resided with Robinson. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals decision, finding that it was based on an incorrect standard of review. The Court noted that "it appears the trial court’s findings of fact may have been based on an erroneous view of the law,” and remanded the case to the trial court "for consideration of the meaning of the term 'reside’ in the parties’ divorce judgment.” 435 Mich 791 (1990). On remand, the trial court concluded that "reside” was an ambiguous term undefined by Michigan law, and resorted to a benefit test and the definition set forth in Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed). Applying essentially undisputed facts, the court again concluded that the defendant was residing with Robinson and ruled that the plaintiff was no longer obligated to pay alimony. The defendant appealed.
After remand, the Court of Appeals held:
1. The term "reside” is unambiguous. The definition of “residence” is well settled in this state.
2. "Residence” means the place where one resides; an abode; a dwelling or habitation; especially, a settled or permanent home or domicile. Residence is made up of fact and intention. There must be the fact of abode, and the intention of remaining.
3. The trial court erred in concluding that Robinson resided with the defendant. There was no evidence that either the defendant or Robinson considered the defendant’s home to be Robinson’s settled or permanent home. The evidence indicates a transient relationship in which Robinson was at most a frequent guest at the defendant’s home. There was no evidence that Robinson intended to become a permanent occupant of the defendant’s household. Absent such an intent, Robinson falls outside the definition of "resident” consistently adopted by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court.
4. Because the trial court failed to apply the facts of this case to the well-settled definition of the term "reside,” the order terminating the plaintiffs alimony obligation must be reversed.
Reversed.
Taylor, J., dissenting, stated that the Supreme Court’s instruction to the trial court to consider "the meaning of the term 'reside’ in the parties’ divorce judgment” meant that its meaning in the judgment could be different than its meaning in other judgments and, therefore, it is not a legal term of art, like "residence.” The trial court correctly found the term "reside” to be ambiguous, and should have applied contract analysis principles to determine what the parties meant the term to mean. The majority erroneously relies on the definition of "resident” in deciding that the word "reside” is unambiguous. The matter should be remanded to the trial court for a determination of what the parties agreed, and then resolution of the question concerning the alimony clause as directed by the Supreme Court.
E. J. McCormick, Jr., for Kenneth Beason.
Ready, Sullivan & Ready (by Michael L. Heller), for Mary Beason.
AFTER REMAND
Before: Wahls, P.J., and Mackenzie and Taylor, JJ.

Opinion:
Mackenzie, J.
Defendant appeals as of right from an order terminating plaintiffs obligation to pay alimony. We reverse.
The parties were divorced in 1985. The divorce judgment provided that plaintiffs obligation to pay defendant $320 a month in alimony would terminate "when [defendant] should reside with an unrelated adult male person." One year later, plaintiff filed a motion for the termination of alimony, alleging that defendant was residing with an unrelated male, John Robinson. The trial court granted the motion following an evidentiary hearing. This Court reversed, concluding that the evidence was insufficient to show that defendant resided with Robinson. Beason v Beason, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, decided March 29, 1988 (Docket No. 98716).
The Supreme Court subsequently reversed this Court's decision because it was based on an incorrect standard of appellate review. Beason v Bea-son, 435 Mich 791, 805; 460 NW2d 207 (1990). The Court further noted that "it appears the trial court's findings of fact may have been based on an erroneous view of the law," id., and remanded the case to the trial court "for consideration of the meaning of the term 'reside' in the parties' divorce judgment." Id. at 806.
On remand, the trial court concluded that "reside" was an ambiguous term undefined by Michigan law, and resorted to a benefit test and the definition set forth in Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed). Applying essentially undisputed facts, the court again concluded that defendant was residing with Robinson, and therefore again ruled that plaintiff was no longer obligated to pay alimony. It is this determination that defendant now appeals.
Unlike the trial court, we do not believe that the term "reside" is ambiguous. On the contrary, the definition of "residence" is well settled in this state. In Wright v Genesee Circuit Judge, 117 Mich 244, 245; 75 NW 465 (1898), our Supreme Court defined the ordinary meaning of "residence" as follows:
Residence means the place where one resides; an abode; a dwelling or habitation; especially, a settled or permanent home or domicile. Residence is made up of fact and intention. There must be the fact of abode, and the intention of remaining.
See also Banfield v Banfield, 318 Mich 38, 43; 27 NW2d 336 (1947); Leader v Leader, 73 Mich App 276, 280-281; 251 NW2d 288 (1977); Bingham v American Screw Products Co, 398 Mich 546, 564; 248 NW2d 537 (1976); In re Scheyer's Estate, 336 Mich 645; 59 NW2d 33 (1953); Reaume & Silloway, Inc v Tetzlaff, 315 Mich 95, 99; 23 NW2d 219 (1946); Hartzler v Radeka, 265 Mich 451; 251 NW 554 (1933).
Applying this definition to the undisputed facts, it is apparent that the trial court erred in concluding that John Robinson resided with defendant. There was no evidence that either defendant or Robinson considered defendant's home to be Robinson's settled or permanent home. Rather, the evidence established a transient relationship in which Robinson was at most a frequent guest at defendant's home. Further, there was no evidence that Robinson intended to become a permanent occupant of defendant's household. Absent such an intent, Robinson falls outside the definition of "resident" consistently adopted by this Court and our Supreme Court.
Where a trial court's finding is derived from an erroneous application of law to facts, the appellate court is not limited to review for clear error. Beason, supra, 435 Mich 804-805. Nor is an appellate court so limited where the trial court's factual findings may have been influenced by an incorrect view of the law. Id. at 805. Because the trial court failed to apply the facts of this case to the well-settled definition of the term "reside," we reverse the order terminating plaintiffs alimony obligation.
Reversed.
Wahls, P.J., concurred.