Case Name: Reginald L. SMITH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1996-07-10
Citations: 677 So. 2d 370
Docket Number: No. 95-00822
Parties: Reginald L. SMITH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: FULMER, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 677
Pages: 370–373

Head Matter:
Reginald L. SMITH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 95-00822.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
July 10, 1996.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 7, 1996.
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, Bartow, and Allyn Giambalvo, Assistant Public Defender, Clearwater, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Angela D. MeCravy, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

Opinion:
BLUE, Judge.
Reginald L. Smith appeals his convictions for two counts of battery on a law enforcement officer, two counts of resisting arrest with violence, depriving an officer of communications equipment, and aggravated battery. Because the trial court denied Smith's requests to discharge his attorney and failed to advise Smith of his right to self-representation, we reverse.
At the close of the prosecution's casein-chief, Smith requested the discharge of his court-appointed counsel. Smith raised specific complaints about his attorney's performance. After eliciting a response from defense counsel, the trial judge found no legitimate basis for the discharge of counsel. Smith then raised more general complaints and continued to insist on the discharge of his attorney. This resulted in an extended colloquy between Smith and the trial judge. Several times, the trial judge informed Smith that his court-appointed counsel would not be discharged and that Smith had no choice in the matter. The trial judge gave Smith the option of remaining in the courtroom or returning to his jail cell while his attorney continued the trial in his absence. The trial judge did not inform Smith that he would be exercising his right to represent himself if he persisted in his request to discharge his counsel.
When a defendant requests the discharge of his court-appointed counsel, a trial judge should:
[Fjirst determine whether adequate grounds exist for replacement of the defendant's attorney. If the court finds that the defendant . has no legitimate complaint, it is then required to advise the defendant that if his request to discharge his attorney is granted, the court is not required to appoint substitute counsel and the defendant would be exercising his right to represent himself.
Matthews v. State, 584 So.2d 1105, 1106-07 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (citations omitted). See also Davis v. State, 648 So.2d 228 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). In the present case, the trial judge repeatedly informed Smith that he had "no choice" and had to proceed with his attorney. Because Smith did have a choice, self-representation, the trial judge erred by telling Smith that he could choose only to remain in the courtroom or to wait in his jail cell.
We realize that trial judges may be overburdened by defendants who use their right to counsel or to self-representation in deliberate attempts to disrupt the trial. "[A] trial judge is not compelled to allow a defendant to delay and continually frustrate his trial." State v. Young, 626 So.2d 655, 657 (Fla.1993). See also Amos v. State, 618 So.2d 157 (Fla.1993). With the power to control the proceedings and prevent disruption, the trial judge would have been justified in refusing to grant Smith a continuance or otherwise disrupt a trial that was at least half-way finished. The trial judge was not justified, however, in refusing Smith's request to discharge his attorney and in failing to inform him of his right to self-representation.
Because of our disposition in this matter, we do not find it necessary to address Smith's second issue. Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
FULMER, J., concurs.
CAMPBELL, A.C.J., concurs specially in result only with opinion.