Case Name: Schill, Plaintiff in error, v. State, Defendant in error
Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Wisconsin
Decision Date: 1971-03-30
Citations: 50 Wis. 2d 473
Docket Number: No. State 106
Parties: Schill, Plaintiff in error, v. State, Defendant in error.
Judges: 
Reporter: Wisconsin Reports Second
Volume: 50
Pages: 473–486

Head Matter:
Schill, Plaintiff in error, v. State, Defendant in error.
No. State 106.
Argued February 4, 1971.
Decided March 30, 1971.
(Also reported in 184 N. W. 2d 858.)
For the plaintiff in error there was a brief and oral argument by Herbert S. Bratt of Milwaukee.
For the defendant in error the cause was argued by Michael Skwierawski, assistant district attorney of Milwaukee county, with whom on the brief were Robert W. Warren, attorney general, and E. Michael McCann, district attorney.

Opinion:
Heffernan, J.
The defendant initially asserts that the traffic arrest was invalid because the officer did not have the traffic warrant and capias in his posses sion at the time he came to defendant's apartment and hence all subsequent police conduct that stemmed therefrom was invalid.
Secs. 954.02 (6) (a) and 954.03 (2), Stats. 1967, provide that physical possession of the warrant is not necessary at the time of the arrest. Under sec. 954.02 (6) (a), the defendant's rights are satisfied in that he can, upon arrest, ask to see the warrant and such warrant must be shown to him as soon as possible. No such request was made at the time of the initial arrest and, in fact, the capias and warrant were shown to him within a short time after he was booked at the police station. No defect in the proceedings arises from the fact that Officer Monreal did not have the outstanding warrant in his possession at the time of the arrest.
We are also satisfied that the police officer's unobstructed view of the heroin packets through the open door did not constitute a search. In the recent case of Milburn v. State, ante, p. 53, 183 N. W. 2d 70, we pointed out that a police officer's view of coins and other articles inside a motor vehicle did not constitute a search in the constitutional sense. We quoted therein with approval Edwards v. State (1968), 38 Wis. 2d 332, 338, 339, 156 N. W. 2d 397 :
" 'A search can be conducted by one's eyes alone. However, "A search implies a prying into hidden places for that which is concealed." It is not a search to observe what is in plain view.' "
In Harris v. United States (1968), 390 U. S. 234, 236, 88 Sup. Ct. 992, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1067, the United States Supreme Court pointed out that objects that are in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position from which the view is taken are subject to seizure and may be introduced into evidence.
We followed a similar rationale in State v. Dombrowski (1969), 44 Wis. 2d 486, 171 N. W. 2d 349.
We are thus satisfied, assuming for the moment that Officer Monreal had the right to be in the position to have the view, that no search took place and the articles were subject to seizure.
The crucial and difficult question remains of whether Officer Monreal's positioning himself so that the view could be had was the result of unreasonable police conduct that transgresses the principles of the fourth amendment. If so, the arrest for the possession of narcotics and their seizure was invalid.
The defendant contends that the circumstances of this case were similar to the situations warned against in Ker v. California, (1963), 374 U. S. 23, 83 Sup. Ct. 1623, 10 L. Ed. 2d 726. Ker, however, was primarily concerned with the question of whether the entry by the police into the premises of the defendant was unlawful. The supreme court found the entry therein constitutionally antiseptic because, almost immediately before, Ker had been observed having contact with narcotics suspects and, in light of the short period of time between his exposure to narcotics suspects and the time of the entry, this was substantially equivalent to a hot pursuit. Ker had furtively eluded the police only a short time before, and it was reasonable for the police officers to conclude that any announcement before entering would result in the destruction of the narcotics. Although the language of Ker is significant in demonstrating the penumbra of protection of a citizen's privacy that is afforded by the fourth amendment, the facts are so different that they are not persuasive in the instant case.
In the instant case, it should be noted at the outset that the search, if one there was, was not made after the entry of the room but was a visual search which immediately and without the necessity of further investigation or entry gave rise to the probable cause that the defendant possessed heroin.
In this case, Officer Monreal was lawfully there for the purpose of executing a warrant. When asked who was there, he gave his own first name and he was in fact known to the defendant. It appears, however, that Officer Monreal made no attempt to correct what appeared to be defendant's assumption that the person outside of the door was one "Serencoben." On the other hand, the police officer did not attempt to make an entry and only entered after the door was opened and after he saw the narcotics in plain view. There is no contention that the defendant made any objection to this entry into the premises.
We pointed out in Morales v. State (1969), 44 Wis. 2d 96, 170 N. W. 2d 684, that, before breaking into a private place, a police officer must identify himself and his purpose and, except under special circumstances, must allow time for the door to be opened. In the instant case, there was no entry except one consented to, and there was no forcible breaking. There is absolutely nothing in the record to show that the arrest on the traffic charge was anything but proper police conduct. There is nothing to indicate that Officer Monreal engaged in any trickery or subterfuge for the purpose of securing narcotics evidence. The record, in fact, was to the contrary. He was doing precisely what the obligation of his employment required. Nor can we conclude that, when, as here, an officer in the good faith performance of his duty executes an arrest on one charge, he is required to ignore evidence of other crimes that he may come upon inadvertently in the course of his lawful duty. His obligations as a police officer are to the contrary, and it would appear that Officer Monreal acted reasonably under the circumstances. His position was not unlike that of the officers in Browne v. State (1964), 24 Wis. 2d 491, 129 N. W. 2d 175, 131 N. W. 2d 169, where it was held that the view of the defendant through an open doorway from a point where the officers had a right to be and seeing in defendant's immediate vicinity a hypodermic needle and syringe did not constitute an improper invasion of the defendant's privacy. Similarly, in Edwards v. State (1968), 38 Wis. 2d 332, 156 N. W. 2d 397, and in Jackson v. State (1965), 29 Wis. 2d 225, 138 N. W. 2d 260, we concluded that a view through a window from a location where the police had a right to be was not an unreasonable search as proscribed by either the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution or by art. I, sec. 11, of the Wisconsin Constitution.
In the instant case, once having concluded, as we have, that the officer could, pursuant to the warrant, properly station himself at defendant's doorway even though the warrant was not in his physical possession, we reach the inevitable conclusion it was reasonable for him to make the visual search when the door was opened and that such viewing is not prohibited by the constitution.
Inasmuch as the majority of the court concludes that the police conduct in this case was not unreasonable, we do not reach the question which concurring members of this court believe ought to be decided herein. The question of whether a police officer armed with an arrest warrant, in all or any circumstances, may resort to a ruse or misrepresentation of identity and purpose to facilitate the arrest is reserved for future consideration.
After defendant Schill was arrested on the narcotics charge without a warrant he was taken to the jail and booked, and the following day Officer Monreal swore out a complaint before an assistant district attorney. There is no evidence that a warrant on the narcotics charge was ever issued by an impartial magistrate.
The defendant relies upon State ex rel. White v. Simpson (1965), 28 Wis. 2d 590, 137 N. W. 2d 391. We conclude, however, that defendant's reliance upon State ex rel. White v. Simpson is misplaced in the instant case. That case and the constitutional provisions relied on in the prior federal cases upon which it is based go to the question of probable cause for wrest, and they determine that a warrant for arrest may be issued only by a neutral and detached magistrate. The purpose of this rule is obviously to protect the citizen from unlawful intrusions into his privacy. In the instant case, however, the intrusion into the privacy of Schill was the consequence of a valid and uncontested warrant issued by the court for a traffic violation. When making the arrest pursuant to that warrant, probable cause appeared to the police officer to make an arrest on the additional charge, that of the possession of narcotics. We therefore conclude that the State ex rel. White v. Simpson rule is satisfied for a duality of reasons : The traffic arrest warrant itself and the probable cause for the narcotics arrest that became apparent when the officer could reasonably conclude that an additional crime was committed in his presence. No warrant for the second arrest was required under these circumstances. Moreover, sec. 954.02 (4m), Stats. 1967, provides:
"If the defendant has previously been validly arrested without warrant and is still in custody, no summons or warrant is required and the defendant may be brought before a judge of the county court with a complaint subscribed and sworn to before either the district attorney or a magistrate."
This statute recognizes the superfluity of issuing a warrant when the arrest has already been executed. It is true, of course, that State ex rel. Cullen v. Ceci (1970), 45 Wis. 2d 432, 173 N. W. 2d 175, holds that a complaint must state facts constituting probable cause to hold the defendant. We also stated therein that it is a jurisdictional requirement for holding a preliminary examination. In the instant case this jurisdictional re quirement was satisfied, and there is no basis for alleging and, in fact, defendant at no time alleged that the face of the complaint failed to state facts constituting probable cause. Moreover, probable cause was found in the preliminary hearing by a detached and impartial magistrate. The law does not require that a warrant be issued after a defendant is otherwise lawfully in custody. The complaint may constitutionally be sworn to before a district attorney or his assistants and such complaint, assuming that it is factually sufficient, confers jurisdiction for a preliminary examination. We conclude that the conviction and the subsequent post-conviction order that upheld it are free of constitutional taint.
By the Court. — Judgment and order affirmed.