Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. Kenneth LeCOMPTE, et al.; STATE of Louisiana v. Deborah EWING and Luke Dubaz
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1981-05-18
Citations: 406 So. 2d 1300
Docket Number: Nos. 80-K-2213, 80-KA-2271
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Kenneth LeCOMPTE, et al. STATE of Louisiana v. Deborah EWING and Luke Dubaz.
Judges: WATSON, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, and assigns reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 406
Pages: 1300–1312

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. Kenneth LeCOMPTE, et al. STATE of Louisiana v. Deborah EWING and Luke Dubaz.
Nos. 80-K-2213, 80-KA-2271.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
May 18, 1981.
On Rehearing Nov. 16, 1981.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Harry F. Con-nick, Dist. Atty., Robert Long, Michael Fanning and Louise S. Korns, Asst. Dist. Attys., for plaintiff-appellant.
Sheryl L. Jarvits, Joseph Beeler, James J. Hogan, Miami, Fla., Frank G. DeSalvo, Robert Zibilich, Edward M. Baldwin, New Orleans, William Moran, Miami, Fla., for Kenneth LeCompte et al.
William H. Slaughter, III, Noble, Slaughter, Clayton & Lorenz, New Orleans, for Deborah Ewing and Luke Dubaz.

Opinion:
WATKINS, Associate Justice Ad Hoc .
These are consolidated criminal appeals which involve the constitutionality of Louisiana Act No. 313 of 1979. Defendants in the first consolidated appeal (80-K-2213) are Kenneth LeCompte, John Lagrange, Pedro Rodrigues, G. Vera Martinez, and John M. Hirschler, and in the second consolidated appeal (80-KA-2271) defendants are Deborah Ewing and Luke Dubaz. The former defendants were proceeded against by bill of information for possession of 16,000 lbs. of marijuana, and the latter defendants were proceeded against by indictment for possession of cocaine and "related substances" in the amount of over 400 grams. Motions to quash were filed and granted in each of the two consolidated appeals. The State now appeals these rulings.
The charges against both sets of defendants involve the allegation that they violated Louisiana Act No. 313 of 1979, which is contained in the Revised Statutes of this state as LSA-R.S. 40:967 (E) through (G), which read as follows:
"E. (1) Except as otherwise authorized in this Part, any person who knowingly or intentionally possesses one hundred pounds or more, but less than two thousand pounds of marijuana, tetrahydrocan-nabinol or chemical derivatives thereof, shall be sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment at hard labor of not less than five years, nor more than ten years, and to pay a fine of not less than twenty-five thousand dollars.
(2) Except as otherwise authorized in this Part, any person who knowingly or intentionally possesses two thousand pounds or more, but less than ten thousand pounds, of marijuana, tetrahydro-cannobinol or chemical derivatives thereof, shall be sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment at hard labor of not less than ten years, nor more than fifteen years, and to pay a fine of not less than fifty thousand dollars.
(3) Except as otherwise authorized in this Part, any person who knowingly or intentionally possesses ten thousand pounds or more of marijuana, tetrahydro-cannabinol or chemical derivatives thereof, shall be sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment at hard labor of not less than fifteen years, nor more than twenty years, and to pay a fine of not less than two hundred thousand dollars.
F. (1) Except as otherwise authorized in this Part, any person who knowingly or intentionally possesses twenty-eight grams or more, but less than two hundred grams, of cocaine or related substances as provided in Schedule 11(A)(4) of R.S. 40:964, shall be sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment at hard labor of not less than five years, nor more than thirty years, and to pay a fine of not less than fifty thousand dollars.
(2) Except as otherwise authorized in this Part, any person who knowingly or intentionally possesses two hundred grams or more, but less than four hundred grams, of cocaine or related substances as provided in Schedule 11(A)(4) of R.S. 40:964, shall be sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment at hard labor of not less than ten years, nor more than thirty years, and to pay a fine of not less than one hundred thousand dollars.
(3) Except as otherwise authorized in this Part, any person who knowingly or intentionally possesses four hundred grams or more of cocaine or related substances as provided in Schedule 11(A)(4) of R.S. 40:964, shall be sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment at hard labor of not less than fifteen years, nor more than thirty years, and to pay a fine of not less than two hundred fifty thousand dollars.
G. (1) Except as provided in Paragraph (2) hereof, with respect to any person to whom the provisions of Subsections E and/or F are applicable, the adjudication of guilt or imposition of sentence shall not be suspended, deferred, or withheld, nor shall such person be eligible for probation or parole prior to serving the minimum sentences provided by Subsections E and/or F.
(2) The district attorney may move the sentencing court to reduce or suspend the sentence of any person to whom the provisions of Subsections E and/or F are applicable who provides substantial assistance in the identification, arrest or conviction of other parties or conspirators to the crime for which he was convicted or to related crimes. The arresting agency shall be given an opportunity to be heard in reference to any such motion. The court may reduce or suspend the sentence if it finds that the defendant rendered such substantial assistance."
The motions to quash were founded upon the contention that the subject statute was unconstitutional. The arguments in sup port of this contention, stated briefly, were that: (1) The statute provides for cruel and unusual punishment contrary to the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and "cruel, excessive, or unusual punishment" contrary to the provisions of Article I, Section 20 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 because the penalties provided are unduly harsh and because no maximum is required for the mandatory fine. (2) The statute in permitting a reduction or suspension of sentence by the trial court, on motion of the district attorney, to one "who provides substantial assistance in the identification, arrest, or conviction of other parties or conspirators to the crime for which he was convicted or to related crimes", coerces a waiver of Fifth Amendment rights by giving legislatively sanctioned preference to one who engages in self-incrimination and, further, violates the doctrine of separation of powers by delegating some of the exclusive sentencing powers of the judiciary to the district attorney. (3) Subsection G(2) of the statute is impermis-sibly vague in its use of the term "substantial assistance" without providing any criteria by which it can be determined objectively as to when substantial assistance has been rendered.
By Act 313 of 1979, the Louisiana legislature amended LSA-R.S. 40:967 to provide rather severe mandatory penalties for the possession of large amounts of marijuana, cocaine or related substances. Defendants convicted under the most onerous provisions of this Act (possession of over 10,000 pounds of marijuana and over 400 grams of cocaine) are subject to a minimum term of fifteen years imprisonment without benefit of suspension, probation or parole and a minimum fine of $200,000 for marijuana and $250,000 for cocaine. LSA-R.S. 40:967(E), (F) and (G)(1). However, the district attorney is granted discretion to "move the sentencing court to reduce or suspend the sentence of any person to whom the provisions of Subsections E and/or F are applicable who provides substantial assistance in the identification, arrest or conviction of other parties or conspirators to the crime for which he was convicted or to related crimes." LSA-R.S. 40:967R.S. 40:(G). These provisions were patterned after a virtually identical Florida "trafficking" statute and were intended to halt the dramatic rise in drug smuggling along the Louisiana coast which was believed to have occurred as a result of the earlier Florida clampdown. Section 893.-135, Florida Statutes (1979). Both legislative schemes seek to provide enforcement officials with an additional tool for obtaining the assistance of a defendant in the identification, arrest or conviction of those persons involved in the smuggling operations. The Florida Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of its statute in State of Florida v. Carlos M. Benitez and Esperanza Benitez, Fla., 395 So.2d 514, stating the legislative purpose as follows:
"Section 893.135 was enacted to assist law enforcement authorities in the investigation and prosecution of illegal drug trafficking at all levels of distribution, from the importer-organizer down to the 'pusher' on the street. The harsh mandatory penalties of subsection (1), ameliorated by the prospect of leniency in subsection (3), were clearly calculated to provide a strong incentive for drug violators to cooperate with law enforcement authorities and become informers. No one argues that the elimination of illegal drug traffic is not a beneficial and worthwhile goal, or that the goals of this legislation are not meritorious."
We find the above statement of the Florida Supreme Court clearly sets forth the general'purpose of the Louisiana legislature in enacting Act 313 of 1979, and we have no doubt that legislature was motivated by legitimate, and indeed, wise and proper considerations, in view of the substantial increase in drug smuggling activities along the Louisiana coast.
EXCESSIVE PUNISHMENT
However commendable the legislative purpose, we find the penal portion of the statute (Subsections E and F) unconstitutionally provides for a minimum fine with no maximum, our decision in State v. Goode, 380 So.2d 1361 (La.1980) being almost directly in point. Goode likewise involved a statute (LSA-R.S. 14:50.1) based upon a very commendable policy, the desire to deter crimes against the person of individuals age sixty-five or older. In Goode the statute provided a minimum term of imprisonment but no maximum and was held to provide an excessive punishment, and hence to violate this state's constitutional prohibition of "excessive punishment" as found in Art. 1, Sec. 20, Louisiana Constitution of 1974. The constitutionality of the punishment in Goode was, as in these cases, challenged on motion to quash. Stating that it would be possible for a trial court to impose a term of imprisonment grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime, we were compelled to declare the statute invalid in that case as providing for an "excessive" punishment contrary to the state's Constitution.
In the present case, it takes only a little imagination to think of a fine that would be grossly disproportionate to the offense prohibited, especially in view of the fact that the statute in its various gradations carries with it a term of imprisonment which the court is required to impose on top of the unlimited maximum of the fine. However despicable trafficking in drugs, and however admirable the legislative purpose in seeking to put an end to or even a partial cessation of the practice, we cannot uphold a statute that permits an unlimited fine, especially as we have struck down a somewhat similar statute in State v. Goode, supra on the ground that it violated the excessive punishment clause of this state's Constitution.
Defendants contend that sentences mandated by Subsections (E), (F) and (G) are unduly harsh and, therefore, constitute "cruel and unusual" punishment contrary to the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and "Cruel, excessive or unusual" punishment contrary to Article 1, Section 20 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974. The defendants argue that under the standards set forth in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976), the punishment under the subject statute is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offense. In view of the gross social evil resulting from the increased trafficking in drugs in this state, we cannot find that the punishment provided in this statute is, at least facially, disproportionate to the offense. In State v. Mallery, 364 So.2d 1283 (La.1978) we declared:
"According to the defense a guarantee that the sentence be proportioned to the offense is to be found in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976). Such a proposition is in the first instance a matter which falls squarely within the constitutional prerogative of the Legislature. Except as limited by the constitution its authority is plenary. Its determination is clothed with a presumption of constitutionality which persists until a finding is made, supported by adequate evidence, that the enactment prescribing punishment has transcended the limitation on legislative power set forth in constitutional enactments of equal or superior dignity. La. Const, arts. I, II, III & V; La.Civil Code art. 1."
(364 So.2d 1283, 1284, 1285)
We, therefore, find the statute to be unconstitutional only insofar as it provides no maximum fine, and sever those portions of the statute that provide the minimum fine, thus permitting to remain only that portion providing for a term of imprisonment. With the unconstitutional minimum fine excised, the remainder of the statute still accomplishes the legislative purpose, thus fulfilling the requirements of severability. State v. Johnson, 343 So.2d 705 (La.1977).
SELF-IN CRIMINATION
Defendants contend that conditioning their right to relief from the severe mandatory sentences imposed under LSA— R.S. 40:967 (E) and (F) upon their providing "substantial assistance in the identification, arrest or conviction of other parties" as set forth in Subsection 967 (G) (2), coerces a waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by giving legislatively sanctioned preference to one who engages in self incrimination. While clearly the "substantial assistance" provision of this statute is designed to encourage the convicted defendant to cooperate with the authorities, the statute is not compulsory, and it is reasonable to assume that a defendant could furnish "substantial assistance" in the identification of other parties without incriminating himself in acts other than those for which he already stands convicted. As these cases are before us on Motions to Quash and there has been neither a specific claim of privilege nor a hearing as to the merits of such a claim, the defendants are in effect contending that the "substantial assistance" provisions of this statute necessarily undermine any defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. Stated another way the defendants argue that because non-cooperating defendants are punished more severely, the "substantial assistance" provision clearly poses a threat of coercing waiver of the defendants' privilege. We do not agree as we find that the provisions of Subsection (G) (2) can be met without a defendant having necessarily to relinquish Fifth Amendment rights.
Even in cases where a defendant's claim of privilege is reasonable, the use of the "substantial assistance" provision as a prerequisite to leniency in sentencing need not work to penalize the defendant for asserting his privilege. The benefits of Subsection (G) (2) could be obtained by a cooperating defendant in a manner consistent with constitutional law regarding assertion of the self-incrimination privilege, since a valid claim of the privilege could be overcome with a grant of immunity from further prosecution. See Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 100 S.Ct. 1358, 63 L.Ed.2d 622 (1980).
Accordingly, we hold that the statute as it stands does not offend the defendants' rights against self-incrimination and is, therefore, constitutionally valid.
SEPARATION OF POWERS
Defendants contend that the "substantial assistance" provisions of LSA — R.S. 40:967 (G)(2) strips the judiciary of its traditional sentencing discretion by delegating a portion of this discretion to the district attorney. They claim that this delegation of judicial power to the executive branch constitutes a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers enunciated in Art. 2, Sec. 2 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974.
As stated earlier, the newly-enacted "trafficking" provisions of LSA-R.S. 40:967 impose harsh mandatory minimum prison terms and fines without suspension or reduction for individuals convicted for the possession of large amounts of cocaine or marijuana. Maximum terms of imprisonment are also provided by the statute, thus leaving the sentencing judge free to impose, within the specified range, any term of imprisonment (we find the failure to provide a maximum fine unconstitutional). The limitation in this statute of the court's authority to suspend the sentence does not violate Art. 2, Sec. 2 of our Constitution, since the legislature may constitutionally limit the discretion of the courts to impose sentence. State v. Normand, 285 So.2d 210 (La.1973). The basic sentencing provisions of the statute, absent Subsection (G)(2), do no more than is constitutionally permitted.
Subsequent to conviction, Subsection (GX2) grants the district attorney the discretion to move the sentencing court to reduce or suspend the sentence of any person who provides substantial assistance. Thus, it is argued, that as to defendants who attempt to provide assistance the range of possible sentences lies, at least initially, within the discretion of the district attorney. Once the district attorney has moved for the reduction or suspension, the decision as to whether or not to grant the reduction or suspension is by the statute solely within the court's discretion. The final or ultimate decision, therefore, rests not with the district attorney, but with the courts. While it is true that this provision of the statute does not permit the courts to act on their own motion, the effect of this provision is to broaden the sentencing discretion of the courts under the full statute. As the basic limitation (mandatory minimum sentence without authority to suspend) of the sentencing discretion of the courts is constitutional (State v. Normand, supra), the conditional removal of that limitation cannot be considered unconstitutional.
We have also considered a question not raised by defendants in brief: Does the statute grant to the courts the power to commute sentences, which is a power limited by the Louisiana Constitution to the governor alone?
The governor is granted the power to commute sentences by Art. 4, Sec. 5 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974. The pertinent portion of the cited Article and Section reads as follows:
"(E) Pardon, Commutation, Reprieve, and Remission; Board of Pardons.
(1) The governor may grant reprieves to persons convicted of offenses against the state and, upon recommendation of the Board of Pardons, may commute sentences, pardon those von-cited of offenses against the state, and remit fines and forfeitures imposed for such offenses. However, a first offender never previously convicted of a felony shall be pardoned automatically upon completion of his sentence, with out a recommendation of the Board of Pardons and without action by the governor.
(2) The Board of Pardons shall consist of five electors appointed by the governor, subject to confirmation by the Senate. Each member of the board shall serve a term concurrent with that of the governor appointing him."
Although the language of the comparable provision of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921 differed, the meaning of the comparable provision (Art. V, Sec. 10) was for purposes of our consideration identical: The governor on recommendation of the Board of Pardons (or, under the 1921 Constitution, the lieutenant governor, attorney general, and the trial judge, or any two thereof) may commute sentences. The constitutional grant of the power to commute sentences to the governor (on recommendation of the "Board of Pardons" or any two members thereof) was held by this Court to be an exclusive grant to the governor of the power to commute sentences in State ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 212 La. 143, 31 So.2d 697 (1947), preventing the courts of this state from exercising the power to commute. As the grant of the power to the governor on recommendation of the Board of Pardons to commute sentences is not narrowed under the Constitution of 1974, and as the Convention that drafted that Constitution had ample opportunity to grant a similar power to the judiciary, independent of the governor's power, had it wanted to do so, Resweber is still clearly the law, and the courts of this state are without power to commute sentences as a matter of constitutional doctrine.
We must then address the question of whether or not the restriction of the power to commute sentences to the governor, likewise restricts the power to "reduce" sentences to the governor, using the word employed by the statute under consideration. As used in criminal law, the word "commutation" is defined as follows in Black's Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951):
"The change of a punishment from a greater to a less; as from hanging to imprisonment."
Clearly, a reduction of sentence by the judiciary under LSA-R.S. 40:967 (G)(2) is a commutation of the sentence that runs counter to constitutional limitation of the power to commute to the governor. The courts of this state cannot constitutionally reduce or commute a sentence. Since the statute permits a reduction or commutation of a sentence by the judiciary, it may be violative of this state's constitution, and of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers.
The Code of Criminal Procedure in Art. 881 permits the trial court to "amend or change" a sentence prior to the beginning of its execution. In language in Comment (a) under that article the redactors state that reduction of sentence after the beginning of its execution should be impermissible, as to so permit would virtually constitute the trial judge as a " 'one man pardon board' ". The language of that comment was quoted by this Court with approval in State v. Battaglia, 377 So.2d 264 (La.1979), we thereby indicating that we, as a matter of judicial policy as well as constitutional doctrine and statutory policy, will not permit the judiciary to reduce sentence after its execution has commenced.
The statute under consideration, LSA-R.S. 40:967 (G)(2) permits a reduction of sentence that could be construed to be granted to the courts for a period extending both before and after the commencing of execution of sentence. If the statute is so interpreted, it is clearly unconstitutional, as it infringes upon the exclusive grant to the governor of the power to reduce or commute sentences after the execution of the sentence begins. Thus, if so read, it would violate the doctrine of separation of powers as found in Art. 2, Sec. 2. Louisiana Constitution of 1974.
However, if a statutory provision is susceptible of both a constitutional and an unconstitutional interpretation, it must be interpreted so that its constitutionality will be sustained. The legislature is presumed not to intend to enact an unconstitutional statute. 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law, Sec. 98. Thus, we must interpret LSA-R.S. 40:967 (G)(2) to permit a reduction of sentence only until such time as the execution of sentence has begun. Thus, read, the statute is constitutionally valid.
DUE PROCESS — VAGUENESS
Defendants contend that LSA-R.S. 40:967 (G)(2) is unconstitutionally vague in its use of the term "substantial assistance" in prescribing the prerequisites for a defendant to obtain leniency, since this section does not prescribe any criteria by which it can be determined objectively as to when substantial assistance has been rendered. Defendants argue further that because of the failure of the statute to afford any guidance as to when "substantial assistance" has been provided, it allows for arbitrary enforcement and unreasonable application in violation of their federal and state guarantees of due process of law.
In order to satisfy the constitutional requirements of due process a statute creating or defining an offense and fixing the punishment therefor must be sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conduct or conditions required or forbidden, to prescribe the elements of the offense with reasonable certainty, fix an ascertainable standard of guilt, and make it known to those to whom it is addressed what conduct on their part will render them liable for its penalties, and not be so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law, Sec. 580, State v. Baker, 359 So.2d 110 (1978). There is no claim that the definition of the offense or penalties provided are unclear, but the effect of a defendant providing "substantial assistance" can have a direct bearing on the extent or severity of the punishment imposed. We believe, therefore, that the stated principles regarding due process standards for criminal statutes must be applied.
The phrase "substantial assistance in the identification, arrest or conviction of other parties or conspirators to the crime for which he was convicted or related crimes" is sufficiently definite in the context of the statute taken as a whole. We find the language of the provision sets forth the requirements for leniency with as much exactitude as it is reasonably possible for a statute to do, and that the provision is susceptible of common understanding and can, therefore, be uniformly applied.
We, therefore, find the statute constitutional in all respects except in that part which imposes a minimum fine and no maximum, and strike down that part. We further find that the statute must be so interpreted that a reduction of sentence cannot be granted by the courts of this state after the commencement of execution of sentence.
We vacate the granting of the motions to quash in the two individual cases now before us, and remand the cases for further proceedings in accordance with the views expressed in this opinion.
MOTIONS TO QUASH DENIED.
Judges Frederick S. Ellis, Luther F. Cole and J. Louis Watkins, Jr. of the First Circuit Court of Appeal participated in this decision as Associate Justices Ad Hoc, joined by Chief Justice Dixon and Associate Justices Marcus, Watson, and Lemmon.
. Act 313 of 1979 contained the following sev-erability clause:
"Section 2. If any provision or item of this Act or the application thereof is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect other provisions, items, or applications of this Act which can be given effect without the invalid provisions, items, or applications, and to this end the provisions of this Act are hereby declared severable."
. In State v. Benitez, supra, the Florida Supreme Court cogently answered the contention that a similar provision was in violation of Fifth Amendment rights as follows:
"Finally, the appellees argue that section 893.135 coerces a defendant into relinquishing his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination by denying him sentencing leniency unless he cooperates with the authorities. We reject this argument, primarily because it depends on unwarranted assumptions about the nature of the informer's disclosures. Nothing in the statute suggests that "substantial assistance" must incriminate the defendant of crimes other than those for which he has already been convicted (and for which no fifth amendment privilege is obviously necessary). We acknowledge the risk of prosecution in other jurisdictions. Nonetheless, a defendant need not invoke subsection (3), as nothing in the statute is compulsive. Putting a defendant to a difficult choice is not necessarily forbidden by the fifth amendment. See, e.g., Corbitt v. New Jersey, [439 U.S. 212,] 99 S.Ct. 492, 497, [58 L.Ed.2d 466] (U.S. 1978) ('[N]ot every burden on the exercise of a constitutional right, and not every pressure or encouragement to waive such a right, is invalid.' (footnote omitted)); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, [98 S.Ct. 663, 54 L.Ed.2d 604] (1978); McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, [91 S.Ct. 1454, 28 L.Ed.2d 711] (1971). No constitutional deprivation results if a defendant elects to reap the benefits of subsection (3).
With respect to those cases which say that the trial courts may not enhance a sentence based on a defendant's failure to cooperate with the authorities, see United States v. Garcia, 544 F.2d 681 (3rd Cir. 1976); United States v. Acosta, 501 F.2d 1330 (5th Cir. 1974) (Gee, J., dissenting), adopted en banc, 509 F.2d 539 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 891, [96 S.Ct. 188, 46 L.Ed.2d 122] (1975); United States v. Rogers, 504 F.2d 1079 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042, [95 S.Ct. 2655, 45 L.Ed.2d 693] (1975), we believe that Roberts v. United States, [445 U.S. 552] 100 S.Ct. 1358, [63 L.Ed.2d 622] (U.S.1980), went a long way toward resolving this issue against appellees. The Court in Roberts concluded that the district court properly considered the defendant's refusal to cooperate as one factor in imposing consecutive sentences. Admittedly, a fifth amendment claim was not properly raised in Roberts and 'would have merited serious consideration' if it had been. Id. at 1364. We conclude, however, that for fifth amendment purposes the situation in Roberts is distinguishable from that here. A sentence reduction obtained by a sentenced convict due to his cooperation is not tantamount to the enhancement of a sentence imposed on an unsentenced, but convicted defendant as a result of his lack of cooperation. The former is no different from a gratuitous sentence reduction offered to one already incarcerated who, even without statutory sanction, risks reincrimination in exchange for early release benefits."
. Though the Louisiana statutory scheme is phrased only in terms of affording leniency to a cooperating defendant (rather than punishing a non-cooperating one), the same principles and considerations expressed in Roberts are applicable.