Case Name: PEOPLE v. MALLORY
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1967-01-04
Citations: 378 Mich. 538
Docket Number: Calendar No. 3, Docket No. 51,212
Parties: PEOPLE v. MALLORY.
Judges: Adams, J., concurred with Dethmers, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 378
Pages: 538–611

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v. MALLORY.
Decision of the Court.
1. Criminal Law — Moot Case — Misdemeanor—Service of Sentence —Parole Violation.
Service of misdemeanor jail sentence did not render moot the future appeal of such conviction, where the misdemeanor conviction was held to constitute a parole violation and defendant has been remanded to serve the remainder of a former sentence.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1, 6, 7,13]_ 4 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 273.
When criminal or contempt ease becomes moot so as to preclude review by higher court. 87 L ed 1201.
When criminal ease becomes moot so as to preclude review of or attack on conviction or sentence — Eederal eases. 1 L ed 2d 1876.
[2, 8] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 233, 323.
Right of indigent defendant in criminal ease to aid of State as regards new trial or appeal. 55 ALR2d 1072.
[3, 4] 20 Am Jur 2d, Courts § 68 et seq.
'5] 5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 901 et seq.
'9,10] 21 Am Jur 2d. Criminal Law § 397.
'll] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 18 et seq.
'12] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 313, 314.
'14] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 1.
15] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 318, 319, 322, 326.
16] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 322.
4 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 273.
87 L ed 1201; 1 L ed 2d 1876.
[17] 4 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 159.
16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law § 584.
[18] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 317, 322.
[19] 4 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 159.
16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law § 584.
21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 232, 322.
'20] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 322.
'21-26] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 233, 322.
'27] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 233.
'28] 4 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 159.
5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 867.
2. Same — Misdemeanor—Assistance of Counsel — Transcript.
Defendant who was charged with the crime of receiving and concealing stolen property under the value of $100, a misdemeanor cognizable by a justice of the peace, is entitled as a matter of right to have counsel appointed to appeal his conviction and to a free copy of portions of transcript and record essential to preparation of posteonvietion motions and appeal (Const 1963, art 1, §20; CLS 1961, § 750.535; GGR 1963, 785.4).
3. Judges — Appellate Courts — Freedom of Expression — Predetermination Views.
Views expressed by judges of an appellate court while deliberating upon their decisions ought to remain confidential until they appear in an opinion, if they ever do, over the signature of the author, thereby permitting judges to discuss freely among themselves all issues involved in a ease and advance, tentative views for reactions and criticisms of colleagues.
4. Same — Appellate Courts — Freedom of Expression.
Freedom of expression in camera should be encouraged among justices in an appellate court who have the duty to strive to reach majority accord when that ean be achieved without compromise of legal principles, and such freedom ought not to be inhibited by the threat of public disclosure.
5. Same — Courts of Last Resort — Solidarity of Conclusion.
Judges constituting a court of last resort should use effort and self-restraint to promote solidarity of conclusion and the consequent influence of judicial decision (Canons of Judicial Ethics, No 19).
References for Points in Headnotes
[29] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 233, 322.
[30] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 309, 318.
[31] 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law § 204.
20 Am Jur 2d, Courts § 226.
[32, 33] 20 Am Jur 2d, Courts § 226.
[34, 35] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 233, 322.
[36] 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law §§ 58, 59, 87, 88.
[37] 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law § 87.
[38] 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law §§ 58, 59, 75.
[39] 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law §§ 83, 87.
[40,41] 15 Am Jur 2d, Civil Rights §§ 1-4.
[42, 43] 20 Am Jur 2d, Courts §§ 1, 64.
[44] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 233, 322.
Separate Opinion.
Dethmers and Adams, JJ.
6. Criminal Law — Misdemeanor—Sentence—Moot Case — Parole Violation.
Appeal from a case involving a misdemeanor conviction and sentence of 90 days in jail which was served' by defendant held, not moot, where the misdemeanor conviction was held to constitute a parole violation and defendant was remanded to State prison to serve remainder of an old sentence.
7. Same — Appeal and Error — Moot Case — Sentence.
An appeal from a criminal conviction and sentence is not necessarily moot because the sentence has been served, because although the term has been served, the results of the conviction may persist, and subsequent convictions may carry heavier penalties.
8. Same — Appeal and Error — Eight to Counsel — Misdemeanor Cases.
Constitutional provision and court rule provisions granting right, to appeal and to appellate counsel and trial transcript in criminal cases malee no distinction between felonies and misdemeanors, or types or seriousness of crimes (Const 1963) art 1, § 30; GCM 1963, 785.4).
9. Same — Offense Cognizable by Justice of the Peace — Maximum Penalty.
The determination of whether or not an offense is cognizable by a justice of the peace is dependent upon the permissible maximum penalty, not on whether the statute has denominated the offense a misdemeanor or a felony (CL 1948, §§ 750.7, 750.8, 750.504; CLS 1961, § 774.1).
10. Same — Offenses..Not-Cognizable by Justice of the Peace— Limitation on Powers.
The powers of a justice of the peace with respect to an offense-not cognizable by him are limited to issuance of a warrant, conducting a preliminary examination, and either discharging the accused or binding him over for trial (CL 1948 and CLS 1961, §§ 766.3-766.15). '''
11. Same — Words and Phrases — Circuit Court Misdemeanors.
Circuit court misdemeanors is a term used to describe offenses which are labeled as misdemeanors by the statute but because of the maximum penalty are not cognizable by-a justice of' the peace, and the justice’s power over the offense is. limited ‘ to binding the accused over to circuit court for trial.
12. Same — Circuit Court Misdemeanors — Assistance op Counsel.
A defendant, charged with a circuit court misdemeanor, who is bound over to circuit court by the justice of the peace, must follow a procedure that is the same as for one accused of a felony, and the defendant’s need for assistance of counsel may well be as great as in felony cases.
13. Same — Conviction op Misdemeanor — Right to Appellate Counsel — Transcript.
An indigent misdemeanant in a criminal case is entitled as a matter of right to have counsel appointed to appeal a misdemeanor conviction, and he is entitled as a matter of right to a free copy of portions of transcript and record essential to preparation of postconviction motions and appeal, his liberty being involved and in jeopardy (Const 1963, art 1, § 30; GCB 1963, 785.4).
14. Same — Violations op Ordinances.
The violations of village or city ordinances are not considered criminal offenses, since the term criminal cases, used in the laws, refers to none but prosecutions under the State laws.
Separate Opinion.
T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., and Souris, J.
See headnotes 3 and 4.
15. Criminal Law- — Conviction op Misdemeanor — Right to Appellate Counsel — Transcript.
An indigent misdemeanant in a criminal case cognizable by a justice of the peace is entitled as a matter of right to. have counsel appointed to appeal a conviction of a misdemeanor, and he is entitled .as a matter of right to a free copy of portions of transcript and record essential to preparation of postconviction motions and appeal (Const 1963, art 1, §30; GCB 1963, 785.4).
16. Same — Misdemeanor—Moot Case — Appointment op Counsel— Parole Violation.
Defendant’s service of his misdemeanor jail sentence does not render a future appeal of that conviction moot so as to justify the trial judge’s denial of the defendant’s request, without a finding that he is not indigent, for appointment of appellate counsel and for the trial transcript, where the misdemeanor conviction was held to constitute a parole violation and defendant was remanded to State prison to serve the remainder of a former sentence.
17. Constitutional Law. — Criminal Law — Appeal as a Matter op Eight.
'The clause “to have an appeal as a matter of right” was added to the State Constitution as a guarantee of the right of a defendant to at least one appeal in a criminal case, and the provision was not intended to restrict the legislature in its power to provide by law for additional appeals (Const 1963, art 1, § 30).
18. Criminal Law — Court Eule — Eight to Counsel — Transcript.
New provision of court rule which requires sentencing judge to advise defendant at time of sentencing of his right to appellate review of his conviction, and that he is entitled to assigned counsel and transcript if he is unable to provide them, applies to all criminal cases in which sentence is imposed on or after the effective date of the amendment malcing such addition to the court rule (GGR 1963, 786.4[1], as amended effective August 1, 1964).
19. Constitutional , Law — Criminal Law — Appeal as op Eight— Eight to Counsel — Discrimination Between Eich and Boor.
A State providing for an appeal as of right to defendants convicted of crimes is obliged, by the requirements of the equal protection clause to provide indigent appellants the assistance of counsel on appeal and a trial transcript in order to avoid discrimination between rich and poor (US Const, Am 14).
20. Same — Criminal Law. — Eight to Counsel — Discrimination Between Eich and Poor.
The merits of the one and only appeal an indigent has as of right, made without the benefit of counsel, effects an unconstitutional line of discrimination between rich and poor (US Const, Am 14).
21. Same — Criminal Law — Trial Transcript — Discrimination Between Eich and Poor.
A State which grants an appeal as of right may not discriminate between rich and poor defendants, charged with crime, by denying to an indigent appellant the use of a trial transcript if such transcript may be purchased by an affluent appellant for use in presenting his appeal (US Const, Am 14).
22. Criminal Law — Eight to Transcript — Discrimination Between Eich and Poor.
' It is the duty of the State in all criminal cases to provide an indigent as adequate and effective an appellate review as that given appellants with funds, and the State must provide the indigent defendant with means of presenting his contentions to the appellate court which are as good as those available to a nonindigent defendant with similar contentions (US Const, Am 14).
23. Constitutional Law — Appeal op Right — Appointment op Counsel — Trial Transcript.
Our constitutional guarantee of appellate review as of right, and recent judicial precedent require that State appoint appellate counsel and furnish trial transcripts for indigents in all criminal cases which now in this State may be appealed as a matter of right (Const 1963, art 1, §30; GCB 1963, 785.4 [IV-
24. Criminal Law — Court Rules — Appointment op Counsel.
Court rule provision applicable to criminal cases long since tried to conviction and sentencing, in which application for discretionary review may be filed, requires that upon request by an indigent defendant, our courts shall appoint counsel and shall furnish so much of the trial transoript as counsel requires for postconviction proceedings and preparation of application for leave to take delayed appeal (GCB 1963, 785.4[3]).
25. Same — Court Rules — Discretion of Court — Indigents.
No discretionary power is given to trial judges to refuse appellate counsel or trial transcript, once indigency is determined (GCB 1963, 785.4[3\).
26. Same — Misdemeanant — Appointment op Counsel — Court Rules.
Befusal of trial judge to grant indigent misdemeanant’s request for appellate counsel and trial transcript upon proof of indigency as required by express terms of court rule held, reversible error (GCB 1963, 785.413}).
27. Appeal and Error — Delayed Appeals — Felonies—Court Rules —Appointment of Counsel — Criminal Law.
Contention that court subrule relative to delayed appeals has applied in the past only to felonies, and for that reason does not apply to an indigent misdemeanant held, without merit, where no such restriction appears in the language of the subrule, or in the constitutional guarantee of appellate review “in every criminal prosecution” (Const 1963, art 1, §30; GCB 1963, 785.4[3}).
28. Criminal Law — Judicial Experience — Appellate Review.
Judicial experience suggests that where opportunity exists for effective appellate review of trial court proceedings, such proceedings usually are conducted with greater diligence toward the rights of the accused and greater attention to the adequacy of the record to support what is done in the trial court.
Separate Opinion.
Kelly, J.
29. Constitutional Law — Criminal Law — Appointment op Counsel — Misdemeanors.
Provision of new Constitution awarding defendants “in every criminal prosecution” the right “to have the assistance of counsel for his defense,” and “to have such reasonable assistance as may be necessary to perfect and prosecute an appeal,” and provision of Constitution of United States granting accused “in all criminal prosecutions” the right “to have the assistance of counsel for his defense” permit the petty offense exception made by the Federal criminal justice act, and, therefore, do not require appointment of trial and appellate counsel in every misdemeanor prosecution (US Const, art 6; Mich Const 1963, art 1, § S0; 18 USCA § 3006A).
30. Criminal Law — Receiving Stolen Goods — -Appeal and Error.
Conviction of defendant of crime of receiving and concealing stolen property under the value of $100 held, improper, because defendant has served and is still serving a lengthy prison sentence as parole violator in addition to a 90-day confinement in jail due to the fact that trial court, without a jury and without defendant being represented by counsel, pronounced judgment that defendant was guilty of a petty misdemeanor (CLS 1961, § 750.535).
See headnotes 1 and 6.
Separate Opinion.
T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., and Dethmers, Souris, and Adams, JJ.
See headnotes 3-5.
Dissenting Opinion.
Black, J.
31. Constitutional Law — Construction—Supreme Court op the United States.
Ascertainment of what was and is required by some standing principle or provision appearing in the Constitution of the United States should be left to the Supreme Court of the United States, and it is not the function of the State Supreme Court to anticipate the holding of the Federal Supreme Court.
32. Same — Criminal Law — Appointment op Counsel.
Ascertainment as to whether the amendment of the Constitution of the United States relative to providing assistance of counsel to one accused of crime requires that our State extend such right of assistance of counsel to all criminal cases should be decided by such Federal guidelines as are provided by the cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United States.
33. Courts — States—United States — Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court of this State is, so far as Federal questions are concerned, a subordinate court to the Supreme Court of the United States.
34. Criminal Law — Appointment op Appellate Counsel — Transcript — Indigent Dependants — Petty Cases.
Appointment of appellate counsel and furnishing of trial transcript to defendant who had been found guilty of having received stolen property of the value of less than $100 held, not required by constitutional guarantees, since this offense is “petty” by Federal standards and not entitled to assistance of counsel as provided by the Constitution of the United States (US Const, Ams 6, 14; Mich Const 1963, art 1, § 20; 18 USCA §§ 1, 3006A[a] ; CLS 1961, §750.535)..
35. Same — Appointment op Counsel — Indigent Dependants — Petty Oppenses.
Recent cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United States requiring appointment of counsel for indigent defendants charged with or convicted of felony and other serious offenses, speaking as they do of discrimination against the poor “on account of their poverty" in the context of murder and other serious crimes do not support the proposition that counsel and trial transcript should be provided at public expense for the indigent who has been charged with or convicted of a petty offense (Griffin v. Illinois, 351 US 12; Douglas v. California, 372 US 353; Lane v. Brown, S72 US 477; Draper v. Washington, 372 US 487).
36. Constitutional Law — Construction by Judiciary — Laws and Usage op Time.
A constitutional provision is looked upon and '■construed by the judiciary as the people understood it at the time of debate and vote, having regard for the “laws and usagetf’ of that time.
37. Same — Peculiar, History — Construction by Judiciary.
Every constitution should be interpreted in the light of its own peculiar history so that it is not made to express purposes which were never within the minds of the people in agreeing to it.
38. Same — Construction by Judiciary.
It is the duty of a court in construing a constitution to enforce the law which the people have made, and not some other law which the words of the constitution may possibly be made to express.
39,. Same — Constitutional History — Criminal Prosecution.
The expression “criminal prosecution” in the new Constitution has a history of words, meaning, and public comprehension going baclc to the bill of rights in the Constitution of the United States and carrying through our prior Constitutions, which indicates that the expression has never been understood gen- ■ erally, or by any judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States or by any judgment of this Court, or by “any sense most obvious to the understanding” as including within its compulsive scope all prosecutions for all offenses cognizable in all of our courts (US Const, Am 6; Mich Consts 1835, 1850, 1908, and 1963, art 1, § SO).
40. Criminal Law — Civil Bights — Law-Abiding Citizens.
Courts should consider at great length the “civil rights” of that great unnumbered multitude of law-abiding citizens and that constantly multiplying number of victims of today’s fearsome crime wave.
41. Same — Civil Bights.
Everyone has civil rights; not just those who may be arrested and charged with crime or petty offense.
42. Courts — Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court belongs to the people of the State, and ■ is not owned and possessed by the eight justices.
43. Same — Business oe Supreme Court — People’s Business.
The business of the Supreme Court is the people’s business.
Dissenting Opinion.
O’Hara, J.
See headnotes 1 and 6.
44. Constitutional Law — Appointment op Counsel — Indigent Misdemeanants.
Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States involving felonies do not require a State to furnish indigent misdemeanants counsel at public expense.
Appeal by leave granted from Court of Appeals, Division 1; Lesinski, C. J., and J. H. Gillis and Watts, JJ., order denying leave to appeal from an order of Recorder’s Court for the City of Detroit; Schemanske (Frank G.), J., of October 29, 1964, denying defendant appellate counsel and transcript.
Submitted April 6, 1966.
(Calendar No. 3, Docket No. 51,212.)
Decided January 4, 1967.
Alton Mallory was convicted of receiving and concealing stolen property under the value of $100.
Order reversed and cause remanded for further proceedings.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, and Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, Samuel H. Olsen, Prosecuting Attorney, Samuel J. Torina, Chief Appellate Lawyer, and James E. Lacey, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people. ;
Goodman, Crockett, Eden, Robb & Philo (Holland R. O’Hare and Sheldon M. Meizlish, of'counsel), for defendant.
Amicus Curiae:
Civil Liberties Committee of the State Bar of Michigan, by Irving Tukel. -

Opinion:
Dethmers, J.
This is an appeal, upon leave granted, from Court of Appeals' denial of application for delayed appeal from an order of the recorder's court of the city of Detroit denying defendant's motion for appointment of appellate counsel and free transcript for appeal purposes.
On May 11, 1964, defendant was convicted, by a judge sitting without a jury, in the recorder's court of the city of Detroit, of the misdemeanor of receiving and concealing stolen property under the value of $100. This is an offense cognizable by a justice of the peace. The maximum permissible sentence is 90 days in jail or $100 fine or both. He was sentenced to 90 days in the Detroit house of correction and served the sentence.
It is urged by the people that because defendant completed service of his sentence this appeal should be dismissed on the ground that the case has become moot. For this the following authorities are cited: People v. Leavitt, 41 Mich 470; City of Ishpeming v. Maroney, 49 Mich 226; Pittsburgh Plate Class Co. v. Charles Klein Co., 177 Mich 399; Howe v. Doyle, 187 Mich 655; Thomas v. Montcalm Circuit Judge, 228 Mich 44; Sullivan v. Michigan State Board of Dentistry, 268 Mich 427; Horowitz v. Rott, 235 Mich 369; People v. Pyrros, 323 Mich 329; Johnson v. City of Muskegon Heights, 330 Mich 631; McCarthy v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 294 Mich 368.
At the time of the alleged commission of the misdemeanor and his conviction thereof, defendant was on parole from a previous sentence on a 1962 felony conviction. After the May 11, 1964, misdemeanor conviction, defendant was found guilty by the parole board of parole violation and, after service of his 90-day misdemeanor sentence, was remanded to State prison as a parole violator and is still there as provided by law, serving the remainder of his sentence for the 1962 felony conviction.
There is question as to how the matter of the reasons for his parole revocation, set forth in defendant's appendix, came into the record in this case. However, the people's appendix contains material which equally goes into the matter. Prom all that appears in the appendices it is evident that either defendant's misdemeanor conviction automatically brought about a finding by the parole board of parole violation or that, at least, that conviction was an element and factor in the parole violations charged against defendant and considered by the board in making its finding of parole violation. Accordingly, we consider the above cases cited by the people with respect to mootness inapt. Defendant's present incarceration may well be considered a consequence, in part at least, of this misdemeanor conviction. More to the point is United States v. Morgan, 346 US 502 (74 S Ct 247, 98 L ed 248), in which the United States Supreme Court said (pp 512, 513):
"Although the term has been served, the results of the conviction may persist. Subsequent convictions may carry heavier penalties. As the power to remedy an invalid sentence exists, respondent is entitled to an opportunity to attempt to show that this conviction was invalid."
See, also, Jones v. Cunningham, 371 US 236 (83 S Ct 373, 9 L ed 2d 285); United States, ex rel. Harton, v. Wilkins (CA 2), 342 F2d 529; Williams v. United States (CA 7), 332 F2d 36; United States v. Cariola (CA 3), 323 F2d 180; Williams v. United States (CA 7), 310 F2d 696; United States v. Moore (CA 7), 166 F2d 102; United States v, Steese (CA 3), 144 F2d 439; United States, ex rel. Oddo, v. Fay (DC, NY), 236 F Supp 242; Janiec v. State of New Jersey, 85 NJ Super 68 (203 A2d 727); Bojinoff v. People, 299 NY 145 (85 NE2d 909). Because of the parole revocation and present resultant imprisonment, we cannot hold this case moot.
Defendant was not represented by counsel at the misdemeanor trial. Since trial defendant has said that he did not waive his right to trial by jury and the record does not clearly disclose that he did. Other claims of reversible error with respect to the trial and conviction are suggested. None of these, however, are before us for determination now. Bather, it is the subsequent occurrences which are the subject of this appeal. We turn now to these.
Defendant's brief states the question involved in this appeal as follows:
"Is an indigent misdemeanant entitled as a matter of right to have counsel appointed to appeal a misdemeanor conviction?"
Despite defendant's wording of this question, it will be noted that there is involved not only appointment of appellate counsel but also furnishing to defendant of a free copy of portions of transcript and record essential to preparation of postconviction motions and appeal.
In Griffin v. Illinois, 351 US 12 (76 S Ct 585, 100 L ed 891, 55 ALR2d 1055), indigent defendants were convicted of armed robbery, which was undoubtedly, as in Michigan, a felony. It was held that the due process and equal protection clauses of the 14th Amendment to the Federal Constitution required furnishing defendants, at public expense, with the portions of the transcript of trial necessary for taking and presenting an appeal.
In Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 US 335 (83 S Ct 792, 9 L ed 2d 799, 93 ALR2d 733), an indigent defendant convicted of a noncapital felony was denied appointment of trial counsel. The court held that defendant's trial and conviction without being accorded the fundamental right of assistance of counsel violated the 14th Amendment.
In Douglas v. California, 372 US 353 (83 S Ct 814, 9 L ed 2d 811), indigent defendants were convicted of 13 felonies. Denial of their requests for appointment of counsel to prosecute an appeal was held to amount to discrimination between the rich and the poor, in violation of the 14th Amendment.
In Patterson v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 372 US 776 (83 S Ct 1103, 10 L ed 2d 137), defendant had been denied court-appointed counsel because the Maryland statute provided for this only in capital or "serious" cases and the trial court said this one was neither. He was convicted of carrying concealed weapons and sentenced to two years' imprisonment. The United States Supreme Court vacated judgment and remanded for reconsideration in the light of Gideon v. Wainwright, supra.
Similar are the cases of Lane v. Brown, 372 US 477 (83 S Ct 768, 9 L ed 2d 892), involving a conviction for murder, and Draper v. Washington, 372 US 487 (83 S Ct 774, 9 L ed 2d 899), in which the indigent defendants were convicted of robbery.
These United States Supreme Court decisions, all involving felonies, may not necessarily be controlling of the question in the instant case relating to a misdemeanor.
The Federal criminal justice act, 18 USCA, § 3006A(b), provides that "In every criminal case in which the defendant is charged with a felony or a misdemeanor, other than a petty offense, and appears without counsel" (emphasis supplied) defendant shall be advised by the -commissioner or court that counsel will be appointed to represent him if he is financially unable to obtain counsel.
In the opinions of certain Federal courts of appeal cases language appears indicating that statutory denomination of the offense as a felony or fixing of a serious penalty or the offense being a serious one are not prerequisites to the constitutional right to counsel at public expense and apprisal of defendant of his rights thereto. These do not appear to give heed to the "petty offense" provision of the above Federal statute. For example :
In Evans v. Rives (CA DC), 126 F2d 633, 638, the court of appeals for the District of Columbia said:
"It is further suggested by the District of Columbia that the constitutional guaranty of the right to the assistance of counsel in a criminal case does not apply except in the event of 'serious offenses.' No such differentiation is made in the wording of the guaranty itself, and we are cited to no authority, and know of none, making this distinction. The purpose of the guaranty is to give assurance against deprivation of life or liberty except strictly according to law. The petitioner would be as effectively deprived of his liberty by a sentence to a year in jail for the crime of nonsupport of a minor child as by a sentence to a year in jail for any other crime, however serious. And so far as the right to the assistance of counsel is concerned, the Constitution draws no distinction between loss of liberty for a short period and such loss for a long one."
In Harvey v. Mississippi (CA 5), 340 F2d 263, 271, defendant was convicted, on plea of guilty, of the misdemeanor of possession of whiskey and sentenced to a 90-day jail term and to pay $500 fine. The fifth circuit court of appeals, after quot ing the above quotation from the Evans v. Rives Case, went on to say:
"While the rule as thus stated has never been expressly extended to misdemeanor charges in State tribunals, it has been argued that such a principle is implicit in the Supreme Court's decision in Gideon v. Wainwright (1963), 372 US 335 (83 S Ct 792, 9 L ed 2d 799, 93 ALR2d 733). Be this as it may, the reasoning in Evans along with other recent right-to-counsel decisions persuades us that we should apply that rule in the present case. See Hamilton v. Alabama, supra, White v. State of Maryland, supra. The failure of notice to Harvey of his right to the assistance of counsel invalidated his guilty plea and rendered his conviction and incarceration constitutionally improper. We therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for the entry of judgment ordering the release of the appellant from custody on the present conviction and sentence."
In McDonald v. Moore (CA 5), 353 F2d 106, 110, defendant was convicted, on plea of guilty, of the misdemeanor of possession and sale of intoxicating liquor and sentenced to pay a fine of $250 or serve 6 months in county jail. The court of appeals, fifth circuit, reversed the district court's denial of habeas corpus, and, after again quoting the above language from Evans v. Rives, supra, continued:
"In approving the above quotation this court has, we think, rejected the 'serious offense' rule. We also think that Gideon has repudiated the Betts v. Brady ad hoc special circumstance rule of 'an appraisal of the totality of facts in a given case.' We are without any authority authorizing the announcement of a petty offense rule. We are not, fortunately, precluded from following precedent. In the Harvey Case the facts were so similar to those in the case before ns as to permit, and probably to require that our decision be the same as was there announced. There it was held that the failure to notify the appellant of his right to the assistance of counsel rendered the plea of guilty and the judgment of conviction and sentence constitutionally invalid. We make the same holding as to the appellant here."
Among State court of last resort opinions of similar import are:
State v. Anderson, 96 Ariz 123, 131 (392 P2d 784). In that case defendant was convicted of the misdemeanor of attempting to assist the escape from county jail of a prisoner held on felony charges. Defendant was sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment. He had been denied court-appointed counsel at trial, but was granted appellate counsel. A court rule in that State required appointment of counsel in felony cases. The court said, however, that "Gideon" requires appointment of counsel in cases of "a misdemeanor which falls in the category of a 'serious offense,' " and said, further, that this case was a serious one in which the sentence could be up to 2 years' imprisonment.
Bolkovac v. State, 229 Ind 294 (98 NE2d 250). In Indiana the Constitution provides for the right to counsel for accused and since it makes no distinction between felonies and misdemeanors, the court held that the right must apply also to misdemeanors, saying that otherwise the legislature could defeat the constitutional provisions and right to counsel by merely denominating offenses as misdemeanors. In this case the offense was child neglect and the sentence for 180 days. Defendant was not given counsel at trial. Reversed on that account.
People v. Witenski, 15 NY2d 392 (259 NYS2d 413, 207 NE2d 358). Defendants were convicted of stealing apples of a value of about $2 in an orchard. They received a 30-day jail sentence plus fine of $25 which none could pay. Hence, they were required to serve 55 days in jail. Although there was a statutory involvement not present in Michigan, the court held that there was a right to appointed counsel in every criminal case "large or small." Because the justice of the peace, upon their arraignment, only told defendants that they had a right to be represented by counsel but failed to state that they had a right to have counsel appointed for them if they were unable to procure same, the conviction was reversed on that account for violation of "fundamental rights."
Hunter v. State (Okla), 288 P2d 425. Defendant was convicted of drunk driving, a misdemeanor, and fined $125. The court held 'that defendant had a right to appointed counsel because the State's Constitution, in providing therefor, made no distinction in that regard between felonies and misdemeanors.
State, ex rel. Barth, v. Burke, 24 Wis 2d 82 (128 NW2d 422). Defendant was convicted, on plea of guilty, of 19 counts of issuing worthless checks, all misdemeanors. After defendant told the trial court that he owned certain property, that court. determined that he was not indigent and accepted his guilty plea. He was sentenced to 4 years' probation and, upon violation thereof, to 5 years' imprisonment. The appellate court held that the finding of nonindigency was arbitrary and, hence, for failure to appoint or offer to appoint counsel, reversed the conviction with new trial.
Michigan Constitution of 1963, art 1, § 20, provides that, "In every criminal prosecution, the accused shall have the right to have the assistance of counsel for his defense; to have an appeal as a matter of right; and in courts of record, when the trial court so orders, to have such reasonable assistance as may be necessary to perfect and prosecute an appeal."
GCB 1963, 785.4, provides:
"(1) immediately upon sentencing, the court shall advise the defendant in open court that he is entitled as a matter of constitutional right to appellate review of his conviction and that, if defendant is financially unable to provide counsel to perfect such appeal, the court will appoint counsel for him and will furnish counsel with such portions of the trial transcript counsel requires to prepare postconviction motions and to perfect an appeal.
"(2) Delayed Appeal. In all other criminal cases, application for leave to take delayed appeal may be filed pursuant to the provisions of Mule 806. Upon defendant's request, if defendant is indigent, the trial court in which defendant was convicted shall appoint counsel for him and shall furnish such portions of the trial transcript counsel so appointed requires to prepare delayed motions for postconviction proceedings in the trial court and to prepare an application for leave to take delayed appeal."
No distinction is made between felonies and misdemeanors or types or seriousness of crimes in the above quoted language from the Constitution of Michigan and the Michigan court rule relating to the rights of criminal appeal.
The following definitions appear in the Michigan statutes:
"The term 'felony' when used in this act, shall be construed to mean an offense for which the offender, on conviction, may be punished by death, or by imprisonment in state prison." CL 1948, § 750.7 (Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 28.197).
"When any act or omission, not a felony, is punishable according to law, by a fine, penalty or forfeiture, and imprisonment, or by such fine, penalty or forfeiture, or imprisonment, in the discretion of the court, such act or .omission shall be deemed a misdemeanor." CL 1948, § 750.8 (Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 28.198).
The only distinction between felonies and misdemeanors, insofar as these definitions are concerned, appears to be whether imprisonment is to be in State prison or the county jail.
CL 1948, § 750.504 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.772), provides:
"A person convicted of a crime declared in this or any other act of the state of Michigan to be a misdemeanor, for which no other punishment is specially prescribed by any statute in force at the time of the conviction and sentence, shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than 90 days or by a fine of not more than 100 dollars, or by both such fine and imprisonment."
CLS 1961, § 774.1 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.1192), empowers justices of the peace to try all criminal charges punishable by fine not exceeding $100 or imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding 3 months or both such fine and imprisonment. The justice of the peace is empowered to impose these sentences. These are referred to as criminal offenses cognizable by a justice of the peace. Whether or not thus cognizable is made dependent on the permissible maximum penalty and not on whether the statute has denominated the offense to be a misdemeanor or felony.
CL 1948 and CLS 1961, § 766.2-766.15 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.920-28.933), inclusive, relate to offenses not cognizable by a justice of the peace. In these it is provided that the justice of the peace may issue a warrant, after arrest conduct an examination of the accused and either discharge him or bind him over for trial in circuit court, depending on whether it' shall appear to the justice of the peace that a crime not cognizable by him has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe the defendant has committed it. The subsequent proceedings occur in the circuit court or other court of comparable level having jurisdiction thereof.
There are instances in the Michigan statutory law in which offenses are named misdemeanors and for' which the maximum penalty fixed exceeds $100 fine or 3 months' imprisonment or both. For example : Certain violations of rules and regulations of the public utilities commission are termed "misdemeanors" (CL 1948, § 460.55 [Stat Ann §22.5]) and the penalties fixed at not less then $10 nor more than $1,000 or imprisonment in county jail for not more than 6 months, or both. In People v. Causley, 299 Mich 340, after discussion of the distinction between felonies and misdemeanors, this Court speaks of People v. Lamb, 153 Mich 675, in which, so the Court said, the crime of extortion there involved was a misdemeanor punishable by not more than one year in county jail or $250 fine' or. both. See, also, In re Moynahan, 255 Mich 497, in which this Court refers to the offense therein involved, possession of narcotics, as a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment limited to one year. See, also, in'that connection, In re Spencer, 252 Mich 48. This gives rise to the term, used in criminal' law circles, "circuit court misdemeanors". That is to say, the statute labels the offense a misdemeanor, but,- by fixing the maximum penalty, renders the offense one not cognizable by a justice of the peace and, hence, one in which the limit of his power is to bind over to circuit court. When so bound over the procedure is the same as for felonies. Defendant's need for legal assistance of counsel then may-well be as great as in felony cases. The name "felony" or "misdemeanor" can make small difference as relates to his constitutional right to such assistance. We entertain no doubt that as to such circuit court misdemeanor cases the rule and constitutional requirements are the same as relates to felonies. To hold otherwise would mean, as said in Bolkovac v. State, supra, that the legislature could defeat constitutional rights by the simple device of labelling offenses as misdemeanors.
In the instant case, however, the offense was one cognizable by a justice of the peace. It might be urged that the apparent distinction made in 18 TJSCA, § 3006A(b), supra, between a felony or misdemeanor, on the one hand, and a "petty offense" has application, should be adopted by this Court, and applied here. Scarcely can it be said, however, that a permissible maximum sentence of 3 months' imprisonment or $100 fine or both leaves the offense one to be regarded as so petty as not entitling the indigent accused to the assistance of counsel. His liberty is involved and in jeopardy in such case. For this the constitutional right is designed' to insure equality of treatment and chances for acquittal between the rich who can afford to hire counsel and the poor who cannot.
In behalf of the people it is protested, however, that holding for defendant's contentions in this criminal case would result in a vast wave of pleas of not guilty in cases of clear guilt, with demands for free counsel, in traffic violations of city and village ordinances, of such proportions as to paralyze judicial proceeding's in justice of the peace or magistrate courts. Note may be taken with interest, although not controlling of the case at bar, of the following:
"As before said, the violations of the village ordinances are not considered criminal offenses. Mixer v. Supervisors, 26 Mich 422; People v. Jackson, 8 Mich 110; Jackson v. People, 8 Mich 262." Village of Vicksburg v. Briggs, 85 Mich 502, 508.
"The term 'criminal cases,' used in the laws, refers to none but prosecutions under the State laws. In Jackson v. People, 8 Mich 262, and People v. Jackson, 8 Mich 110, we held that cases under city ordinances could not be brought into this Court by writ of error, or exceptions, but must come up on certiorari. They resemble criminal cases only in being penal proceedings, but no offense is a crime which does not violate the law of the land." Mixer v. Supervisors of Manistee County, 26 Mich 422, 424.
"Violations of village ordinances are not regarded as criminal offenses." 1 Gillespie's Michigan Criminal Law & Procedure, § 2, p 5.
Reversed and remanded to recorder's court for appointment, upon finding of indigency, of appellate counsel for defendant and furnishing of all portions of the transcript and record essential in preparation of postconviction motions and appeal.
Adams, J., concurred with Dethmers, J.
CLS 1961, § 750.535 (Stat Ann 1965 Cum Supp § 28.803).—Be--PORTER.
368 US 52 (82 S Ct 157, 7 L ed 2d 114).
373 US 59 (83 S Ct 1050, 10 L ed 2d 193).
316 US 455 (62 S Ct 1252, 86 L ed 1595).
Sec 373 Mich xvi,—Reporter.