Case Name: AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL LAND CORPORATION, a Florida Corporation, Petitioner, v. Robert J. HANNA, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1975-10-15
Citations: 323 So. 2d 567
Docket Number: No. 45246
Parties: AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL LAND CORPORATION, a Florida Corporation, Petitioner, v. Robert J. HANNA, Respondent.
Judges: BOYD, OVERTON and SUNDBERG, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 323
Pages: 567–571

Head Matter:
AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL LAND CORPORATION, a Florida Corporation, Petitioner, v. Robert J. HANNA, Respondent.
No. 45246.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Oct. 15, 1975.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 16, 1976.
Howard W. Mazloff, of Weithorn & Mazloff, Coral Gables, for petitioner.
Ronald S. Guralnick, of Guralnick & Gellman, Miami, for respondent.

Opinion:
ENGLAND, Justice.
This cause is before us on a petition for writ of certiorari to review a decision of the Second District Court of Appeal reported at 289 So.2d 756. Jurisdiction for our review is established by the direct conflict between the district court's decision and Associated Heavy Equip. Schools, Inc. v. Masiello, 219 So.2d 465 (3rd Dist.Ct. App.Fla.1969). We have concluded that the rule of law articulated in Masiello is correct, and that the district court's decision is in error.
The factual and procedural background of this case is set forth in the opinion below. The sole issue for our review is whether punitive damages can be recovered for a breach of contract or for the conversion of real property. The facts alleged by Hanna to support such a recovery begin after Hanna had paid in full for two lots under an installment land sales contract with petitioner's predecessor (for convenience, "petitioner"). At that time Hanna was entitled to a deed by the terms of his contract. Instead of providing a deed, petitioner offered to exchange Hanna's lots for two others owned by petitioner in the same land subdivision. At the time of the offer Hanna was neither advised nor aware that petitioner had begun the construction of a golf course on his lots. Nonetheless, Hanna refused the exchange offer and demanded a deed to the original lots. When petitioner continued in its refusal to issue Hanna a deed, Hanna discovered the motive for petitioner's exchange offer. Hanna then filed suit seeking specific performance and, if not granted, both compensatory and punitive damages.
During the course of the trial court action, Hanna abandoned his demand for specific performance and agreed to accept monetary relief. The trial court subsequently entered an order limiting recovery to compensatory damages. On appeal of that decision the district court disagreed and reversed, holding that Hanna's complaint not only asserted a bad faith breach of contract but also the independent tort of intentional, willful conversion of the property. Based on the asserted bad faith breach of contract, the district court held that punitive damages would not be foreclosed where the complaint alleges an intentional conversion of property. We disagree.
Both parties agree that real property cannot be the subject of conversion, but Hanna asks that we disregard the district court's language and look to its conclusion that punitive damages are recoverable. Neither approach warrants affirmance, however. Petitioner may have done something on or to Hanna's real property, but the land was not in fact or in law "converted" because it was still available to Hanna through an action for specific performance. Hanna indicated a desire to pursue that remedy when he brought suit on that basis, but he subsequently abandoned that cause of action and agreed to accept compensatory damages for contract breach. His election foreclosed the "penalty" to petitioner of having to convey Hanna's land with petitioner's golf course on it.
Treating the district court's finding of "conversion" as an assertion that the tort of fraud and deceit is spelled out in the complaint, we still find no basis for recovery either in law or in fact. The general rule is that a breach of contract cannot be converted into a tort merely by allegations of malice. Nothing in the facts of this case suggests a reason to depart from that rule.
In an action for fraud and deceit plaintiff must allege (1) that defendant made a representation on which plaintiff was meant to act, (2) that the representation was false and defendant knew that fact, and (3) that plaintiff relied on the representation to his injury. All three elements must appear with reasonable cer tainty in plaintiff's complaint. The only specific acts of deceit which Hanna attributes to respondent are the construction of a golf course on his lots and the offer to exchange those lots for two others. The former was not an affirmative, false representation to Hanna although it affected his property without his knowledge. The latter was not a false representation and, because it was never accepted, obviously was not relied upon to Hanna's detriment. Thus, although Hanna's contract was perhaps flagrantly breached, the legal elements of tortious fraud and deceit are wholly absent from his complaint.
Accordingly, the decision of the district court is reversed, the trial court's order rejecting a recovery of punitive damages is reinstated, and Hanna's claim for punitive damages is dismissed.
BOYD, OVERTON and SUNDBERG, JJ., concur.
ADKINS, C. J., dissents with an opinion, with which CHAPPELL, Circuit Judge, concurs.
. Fla.Const. art. V, § 3(b) (3).
. Hanna v. American Int'l Land Corp., 289 So.2d 756, 758 (2d Dist.Ct.App.Fla.1974).
. Quitman Naval Stores Co. v. Conway, 63 Fla. 253, 58 So. 840 (1912); 7 Fla.Jur. Conversion § 4 (1956).
. There is no dispute that such a tort and recovery are available under the proper sets of facts and allegations. Griffith v. Shamrock Village, Inc., 94 So.2d 854 (Fla.1957).
. Days v. Fla. East Coast Ry., 165 So.2d 434 (3d Dist.Ct.App.Fla.1964). Even a tort action will not support punitive damages where the assertions of willfulness and malice are not supported by specific allegations regarding the malicious conduct. Anderson v. Burwell Motors Co., 73 So.2d 822 (Fla.1954); General Finance Corp. v. Sexton, 155 So.2d 159 (1st Dist.Ct.App.Fla.1963).
. Mizell v. Upchurch, 46 Fla. 443, 35 So. 9 (1903).
. Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.120(b); Nantell v. Lim-Wick Constr. Co., 228 So.2d 634 (4th Dist.Ct.App. Fla. 1970).
. As stated, the remedy for that misconduct would have been specific performance, where Hanna would obtain his land with petitioner's improvements.
. Although respondent's letter offering the exchange did not state the real motive for the proposal — to permit or continue the construction of a golf course on Hanna's lots — "the general rule is that punitive damages are not recoverable for breach of contract, irrespective of the motive of the defendant." Griffith v. Shamrock Village, 94 So.2d 854, 858 (Fla.1957).
.We approve and reiterate the rule enunciated in Associated Heavy Equipment Schools v. Masiello, supra, and in Griffith v. Shamrock Village, Inc., supra, to the effect that punitive damages are not recoverable for breach of contract.