Case Name: MARY MONTAIN v. CITY OF FARGO, a Corporation
Court: North Dakota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: North Dakota
Decision Date: 1917-11-01
Citations: 38 N.D. 432
Docket Number: 
Parties: MARY MONTAIN v. CITY OF FARGO, a Corporation.
Judges: 
Reporter: North Dakota Reports
Volume: 38
Pages: 432–455

Head Matter:
MARY MONTAIN v. CITY OF FARGO, a Corporation.
(L.R.A.1918C, 600, 166 N. W. 416.)
'City — servant of — independent contractor — written contract — to perform services.
1. One who performs services for a city in the matter of removing garbage under a written contract which contains a provision that he is to furnish teams and men or such number thereof as in the judgment of said city may be necessary, and that the entire wor.k is to be done in a good and substantial manner with the approval and acceptance of the city, and under the supervision and direction of the commissioner of health, and that his teams and equipment shall be acceptable and satisfactory to said health commissioner, is held to be an independent contractor, and not a servant of said city.
City health commissioner — city commission — removal of garbage — supervising the work — public and governmental capacity — not private — or corporate capacity.
2. A city health commissioner while supervising the removal of garbage, and a city commission while authorizing and providing for its removal, are held to have been acting in a public governmental, and not in a private or corporate, capacity.
Opinion filed November 1, 1917.
Rehearing denied November 27, 1917.
Appeal from the District Court of Cass County, A. T. Oole, J.
Action to recover for personal injuries.
'Order sustaining demurrer to complaint.
Plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
Statement of facts by Bruce, Oh. J.:
This is an appeal from an order sustaining a demurrer to a complaint which in substance alleged .that the plaintiff’s intestate, one Mons Montain, met his death by being struck by a runaway team drawing a ¡garbage sled, which sled was being used for the purposes and under the conditions intended and detailed in a certain written agreement between the city of Pargo and one Neis Johnson for the collection and disposal of kitchen garbage, and which contained the following provisions :
“Whereas, said Neis Johnson did agree in writing to furnish four “teams and eight men or any number of said teams, at the rate of $147 per month for each team, and two men to haul said garbage, during the «aid year 1915, at the said prices set out in said bid,
“Now, therefore, the said party of the second part covenants and agrees to furnish to said city, at his own cost and expense, not to exceed four teams fully equipped and eight men or any number of said teams _ and men, at the rate of $147 per month for each team, and two men to perform the work necessary under the provisions of the ordinance ■commonly known as the ‘garbage ordinance,’ to the full satisfaction and acceptance of the said city, and to perform not less than ten hours’ work each day.
“The entire work to be done in a good and substantial manner, with the approval and acceptance of the city, and under the supervision and ■direction of the commissioner of health, of such agent or agents as he may appoint for that purpose. Such teams and equipment and men to be acceptable and satisfactory to said health commissioner. The .said city reserving the right to cancel this agreement upon ten days’ notice if the said second party fails to comply in all respects with the terms and conditions of this contract and the provisions of the ordinance heretofore referred to.”
Pfeffer & Pfejfer, for appellant.
The written agreement between the parties created the relationship of master and servant. Comp. Laws 1913, § 6134; Hedge v. Williams,, 131 Oal. 455, 82 Am. St. Pep. 366, 63 Pac. 721, 64 Pac. 106.
The test is that, if the performance of the work is controlled by the employer, the employee is a servant; but if it is controlled by the employee he is an independent contractor. Messmer v. Bell & C. Co. 133 Ky. 19, 117 S. W. 346, 19 Ann. Cas. 1; Madisonville, H. & E. E. Co. v. Owen, 147 Ky. 1, 143 S. W. 421; Mason & H. Co. v. Highland,, — Ky. —, 116 S. W. 320.
Where the owner retains the right to direct the manner of carrying out the details of the work, the contractor is not independent. Majors v. Connor, 162 Cal. 131, 121 Pac. 371; Perkins v. Blauth, 163 Cal. 782, 127 Pac. 50; Madisonville, H. & E. P. Co. v. Owen, 147 Ky. 1, 143 S. W. 421; Quayle v. Sewerage & Water Board, 131 La. 26, 5S So. 1021; Cunningham v. Penn Bridge Co. 131 La. 196, 59 So. 119; McCarthy v. Clark, 115 Md. 454, 81 Atl. 12; Beal v. Champion Fiber Co. 154 N. C. 147, 69 S. E. 834; Harmon v. Ferguson Contracting Co. 159 N. C. 22, 74 S. E. 632; Chas. T. Derr Oonstr. Co. v. Gelruth, 29 Okla. 538, 120 Pac. 253; Moore v. Koplin, — Tex. Civ. App. —, 135 S. W. 1033; James v. Pearson, 64 Wash. 263, 116 Pac. 852; Nelson v. American Cement Plaster Co. 84 Kan. 797, 115 Pac. 578; Johnson v. Carolina, C. & O. E. Co. 157 N. C. 382, 72 S. E. 1057; Swanson v. Schmidt-Gulack Elevator Co. 22 N. D. 563, 135 N. W. 207; Sol-berg v. Sehlosser, 20 N. D. 307, 30 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1111, 127 N. W. 91.
The right to control the work to be done under the contract is the most important test in determining whether the employee is a servant or an independent contractor. Singer Mfg. Co. v. Pahn, 132 H. S. 518,, 33 L. ed. 440, 10 Sup. Ct. Pep. 175; Sacchi v. Bayside Lumber Co. 13 Cal. App. 72, 108 Pac. 885; Atlantic Transport Co. v. Coneys, 28 C. O. A. 388, 51 H. S. App. 570, 82 Fed. 177; Campbell v. Lunsford, 83 Ala. 512, 3 So. 522, 13 Am. Neg. Cas. 164; Giacomini v. Pacific Lumber Co. 5 Cal. App. 218, 89 Pac. 1059; Linnehan v. Pollins, 137 Mass. 123, 50 Am. Pep. 287 ;DePalma v. Weinman, 15 N. M. 68, 24 L.P.A. (N.S.) 423, 103 Pac. 782; Potter v. Seymour, 4 Bosw. 140; Goldman v. Mason, 18 N. Y. S. E. 376, 2 N. Y. Supp. 337; Hawke v. Brown,. 28 App. Div. 37, 50 N. Y. Supp. 1032; Baldwin v. Abraham, 171 N. Y. 677, 64 N. E. 1118; Pickens v. Diecker, 21 Ohio St. 212, 8 Am. Rep. 55; Smith v. Humphreyville, 47 Tex. Civ. App. 140, 104 S. W. 495; Kniceley v. West Virginia Midland R. Oo. 64 W. Va. 278', 17 L.R.A.(N.S.) 370, 61 S. E. 811; Lacour v. New York, 3 Duer, 406; New Orleans M. & O. R. Oo. v. Hanning, 15 Wall. 649, 21 L. ed. 220; Jensen v. Barbour, 15 Mont. 582, 39 Pac. 906.
Where the work is to be done “under the direction of a street commissioner,” the employer retains control and the employee is a mere servant. St. Paul v. Seitz, 3 Minn. 297, Gil. 205, 74 Am. Dec. 753.
Also where the work is directed by a “superintendent” of employees. De Palma v. Weinman, 15 N. M. 68; 24 L.R.A.(N.S.) 423, 103 Pac. 782; Cincinnati v. Stone, 5 Ohio St. 38.
A master is -liable for the negligent act of his servant when the negligent act occurred while the servant was performing services within the scope of his employment and in the line of his duties while engaged in such employment. Scott v. Springfield, 81 Mo. App. 312.
The removal of garbage by a city in this state is a private or corporate function, and not a public or governmental duty. Denver v. Porter, 61 C. C. A. 168, 126 Fed. 288; Barney Dumping-boat Oo. v. New York, 40 Fed. 50; Denver v. Davis, 37 Colo. 370, 6 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1013, 119 Am. St. Rep. 293, 86 Pac. 1027, 11 Ann. Oas. 1013, 20 Am. Neg. Rep. 498; Quill v. New York, 36 App. Div. 476, 55 N. Y. Supp. 889, 5 Am. Neg. Rep. 423; Missano v. New York, 160 N. Y. 123, 54 N. E. 744, 6 Am. Neg. Rep. 652.
Negligence may be inferred from the mere fact that a team of horses runs away; or, in other words, the mere running away of a team of horses implies negligence on the part of the owner, and the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies. Peck v. St. Louis Transit Co. 178 Mo. 617, 77 S. W. 736; Oreutt v. Century Bldg. Oo. 201 Mo. 424, 8 L.R.A. (N.S.)'929, 99 S. W. 1062; Denver v. Davis, 6 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1013, note; 34 Cyc. 1665; 29 Cyc. 591, 595; Kahn v. Burette, 42 Misc. 541, 85 N. Y. Supp. 1047; Griffen v. Manice, 166 N. Y. 188, 52 L.R.A. 922, 82 Am. St. Rep. 630, 59 N. E. 925, 9 Am. Neg. Rep. 336; Maus v. Broderick, 51 La. Ann. 1153, 25 So. 977; Gorsuch v. Swan, 109 Tenn. 36, 97 Am. St. Rep. 836, 69 S. W. 1113, 12 Am. Neg. Rep. 632; Strop v. Edens, 22 Wis. 432; Gannon v. Wilson, 1 Sadler (Pa.) 422, 18 W. N. O. 7, 5 Atl. 381; Kokoll v. Brohm & B. Lumber Oo. 77 N. J". L. 169, 71 Atl. 120; Francois v. Hanff, 77 N. J. L. 36-4, 71 Atl. 1128; Crawford v. Upper, 16 Ont. App. Eep. 440; Unger v. Forty-second Street & G. Street Ferry E. Co. 51 N. Y.- 497; Humniell v. Wester, Brightly (Pa,) 133; Tolhausen v. Davies, 59 L. T. N. S. 436, 57 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 392, 52 J. P. 804; Snee v. Durlde (1904) 6 F. 42, 1 Butterworths’ Dig. 67; Thane v. Donglass, 102 Tenn. 307, 52 S. W. 155; 1 Thomp. Neg. p. 389.
Spalding & Shure, for respondent.
The contract here was to do an act in itself lawful, and, it is to be presumed, in a lawful manner. It did not involve injury to anyone. It was not inherently dangerous. Emmerson v. Fay,' 94 Va. 65, 26 S. E. 386; Hilliard v. Eichardson, 3 Gray, 349, 63 Am. Dec. 743.
A servant is one who is employed to render personal service to his employer otherwise than in pursuit of an independent calling, and who in such service remains entirely under the control and direction of the employer, who is called his master. Comp. Laws 1913, § 6134; Cal. Civ. Code, § 2009.
An independent contractor is one who, carrying on an independent business, contracts to do a piece of work according to his own methods, and without being subject to the control, as to the means by which the result is to be accomplished, of anyone, but only as to the results of the work. 26 Cyc. 1546; Taute v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co. 25 N. D. 102, 141 N. W. 134, 4 N. O. O. A. 365; Harrison v. Collins, 86 Pa. 153, 27 Am. Eep. 699; Smith v. Simmons, 103 Pa. 32, 49 Am. Eep. 113; Eichmond v. Sitterding, 65 L.E.A. 455, note; Bailey v. Troy & B. E. Co. 57 Vt. 252, 52 Am. Eep. 129; Butler v. Townsend, 126 N. Y. 105, 26 N. E. 1017; Humpton v. Unterkircher, 97 Iowa, 509, 66 N. W. 776, 14 Am. Neg. Cas. 595.
If the contract of employment has been reduced to writing, the question whether the person employed was an independent contractor or merely a servant is determined by the court as a matter of law. Linnehan v. Eollins, 137 Mass. 123, 50 Am. Eep. 287; Pioneer Fireproof Constr. Co. v. Hansen, 176 111. 100, 52 N. E. 17; Foster v. Chicago, 197 111. 264, 64 N. E. 322; Eogers v. Florence E. Co. 31 S. C. 378, 9 S. E. 1059; Emmerson v. Fay, 94 Ya. 60, 26 S. E. 386; Central Coal & I. Co. v. Grider, 65 L.E.A. 508, note.
■ The character of the contract is tested by'the existence or absence of a right of control on the employer’s part. Carrico v. West Virginia, C. & P. E. Co. 39 W. Va. 86, 24 L.E.A. 50, 19 S. E. 571; Pioneer Fireproof Constr. Co. y. Hansen, 176 111. 100, 52 N. E. 17; Tkomp. Neg. p. 909; Powell t. Virginia Constr. Co. 88 Tenn. 692, 17 Am. St. Eep. 925, 13 S. W. 691; Morgan v. Smith, 159 Mass. 570, 35 N. E. 101; Carlson v. Stocking, 91 Wis. 432, 65 N. W. 58; Blake v. Ferris, 5 N. Y. 48, 55 Am. Dec. 304; Smith v. Simmons, 103 Pa. 32, 49 Am. Eep. 113; Foster v. Wadsworth-Iiowland Co. 168 111. 514, 48 N. E. 163; Barg v. Bonsfield, 65 Minn. 355, 68 N. W. 45, 16 Am. Neg. Oas. 188; Pickens v. Diecker, 21 Ohio St. 212, 8 Am. Eep. 55; Scammon y. Chicago, 25 111. 424, 79 Am. Dee. 334; Hexamer y. Webb, 101 N. Y. 377, 54 Am. Eep. 703, 4 N. E. 755; Hnghbanks v. Boston Invest. Co. 92 Iowa, 267, 60 N. W. 640; Hardy v. Shedden Co. 37 L.E.A. 33, note; Central Coal & I. Co. v. Grider, 65 L.E.A. 475, note; Hppington v. New York, 165 N. Y. 222, 53 L.E.A. 550, 59 N. E. 91, 9 Am. Neg. Eep. 115 ; Hardaker v. Idle Dist. Council [1896] 1 Q. B. 335, 67 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 335, 74 L. T. N. S. 69, 44 Week. Eep. 323, 60 J. P. 196.
A person who hires a contractor to do certain work, and'has no immediate control over the servants of the contractor, is not liable to persons injured through the negligence of one of such servants. De Forrest v. Wright, 2 Mich. 368; Eiedel v. Moran Fitzsimons Co. 103 Mich. 262, 61 N. W. 509.
Clauses providing that the work shall be done under the direction of the engineer or superintendent, relating to the supervision of the work and other conditions with reference to by-laws and ordinances, do not have the effect of rendering the contractor a servant, nor do they interfere as to any particular method the contractor may employ to do the work, so long as it is done according to the contract. Central Coal & I. Co. v. Grider, 65 L.E.A. 478, note; Larson v. Metropolitan Street E. Co. 110 Mo. 234, 16 L.E.A. 330, 33 Am. St. Eep. 439, 19 S. W. 416; Harrison v. Kiser, 79 Ga. 588, 4 S. E. 320; Vosbeck v. Kellogg, 78 Minn. 176, 80 N. W. 957, 7 Am. Neg. Eep. 86; Callan v. Bull, 113 Cal. 593, 45 Pac. 1017.
“A provision in the contract, that the work is to be done to the satisfaction of the employer’s representative,” is not such a supervision over the work that it destroys its independent nature. Harding v. Boston, 163 Mass. 14, 39 N. E. 411; Foster v. Chicago, 197 111. 264, 64 N. E. 322; Kelly v. New York,'11 N. Y. 432; Erassi v. McDonald, 122 Cal. 400, 55 Pac. 139; Indian Iron Co. v. Cray, 19 Ind. App. 565, 48 N. E. 803; Humpton v. Hnterkircher, 97 Iowa, 509, 66 N. W. 776, 14 Am. Neg. Cas. 595; Poster v. Chicago, 197 111. 264, 64 N. E. 322; Harding v. Boston, 163 Mass. 14, 39 N. E. 411; Saunders v. Toronto, 26 Ont. App. Hep. 265, reversing 29 Ont. Rep. 273; Hppington v. New York, 165 N. Y. 222, 53 L.R.A. 550, 59 N. E. 91, 9 Am. Neg. Rep, 115; Hardaker v. Idle Dist. Council [1896] 1 Q. B. 335, 65 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 363, 74 L. T. N. S. 69, 44 Week. Rep. 323, 60 J. P. 196; Blumb v. Kansas City, 84 Mo. 112, 54 Am. Rep. 87; Cuff v. Newark & N. Y. R. Co. 35 N. J. L. 17, 10 Am. Rep, 205.
“A city is not liable for injuries caused by the board of public works in disposing of the garbage from the city.” Kuehn v. Milwaukee, 92 Wis. 263, 65 N. W. 1030; Ash v. Century Lumber Co. 153 Iowa, 523, 38 L.R.A.(N.S.) 973, 133 N. W. 888, 2 N. O. C. A. 494; Driscoll v. Towle, 181 Mass. 416, 63 N. E. 922; Stewart v. California Improv. Co. 131 Cal. 125, 52 L.R.A. 205, 63 Pac. 177, 724; Frerker v. Nicholson, 41 Colo. 12, 13 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1122, 92 Pac. 224, 14 Ann. Cas. 730; Huff v. Ford, 126 Mass. 24, 30 Am. Rep. 645; Fenner v. Crips Bros. 109 Iowa, 455, 80 N. W. 526, 6 Am. Neg. Rep. 504; Bellatty v. Barrett Mfg. Co. 192 Fed. 229.
It is the duty of cities to keep the streets clean and free of all putrid and other substances which are offensive to the tastes and endanger or imperil the health of the people, and this duty directly devolves upon the health department; and the functions of this department of the city being governmental, and not purely administrative in their nature, it follows that if, in the exercise of such functions, a private citizen is injured by the negligence of one of its servants in and about such work, no right of action arises against the city. Savannah v. Jordon, 142 Ga. 409, L.R.A.1915C, 741, 83 S. E. 109, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 240; Love v. Atlanta, 95 Ga. 129, 21 Am. St. Rep. 64, 22 S. E. 29.
Cleaning the streets and removing ashes and garbage therefrom is a public duty of a city, performed for the protection of the general health, and it is purely a governmental function. Savannah v. Jordon, Ann. Cas. 19160, 243, note; Haley v. Boston, 191 Mass. 291, 5 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1005, 77 N. E. 888; State v. Howard, 72 Me. 459; Re Yandine, 6 Pick. 187, 17 Am. Dec. 351.
While engaged in such public, governmental work, a city cannot be held in damages for injuries to third persons resulting from the negligence of a person who is performing the actual labor under a contract and according to his own method and manner of doing the work, and who is responsible to the city or to its proper representative only to the extent of doing the work as provided by his contract. Kuehn v. Milwaukée, 92 Wis. 263, 65 N. W. 1030; Condict v. Jersey City, 46
N. J. L. 157; Comp. Laws 1913, § 3818, ¶ 9; Nicholson v. Detroit, 129 Mich. 246, 56 L.R.A. 601, 88 N. W. 695; Gillespie v. Lincoln, 35 Neb. 34, 16 L.R.A. 352, 52 N. W. 811; Ogg v. Lansing, 35 Iowa, 495, 14 Am. Rep. 499; Eastman v. Meredith, 36 N. II. 284, 72 Am. Dec. 302; Russell v. Tacoma, 8 Wash. 156, 40 Am. St. Rep. 895, 35 Pac. 605; Kies v. Erie, 135 Pa. 144, 20 Am. St. Rep. 867, 19 Atl'. 942; Evans v. Sheboygan, 153 Wis. 287, 45 L.R.A.(N.S.) 98, 141 N. W. 265; Kempster v. Milwaukee, 103 Wis. 421, 79 N. W. 411; Bruhnke v. LaCrosse, 155 Wis. 485, 50 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1147, 144 N. W. 1100; Gregg v. Hatcher, 94 Ark. 54, 27 L.R.A.(N.S.) 138, 125 S. W. 1007, 21 Ann. Cas. 982; Bolster v. Lawrence, 225 Mass. 387, L.R.A.1917B, 1285, 114 N. E. 722; Tindley v. Salem, 137 Mass. 171, 50 Am. Rep. '289.
The mere fact that a team of horses runs away and injury results, does not raise the presumption of negligence, either as against the owner or the driver. Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Clark, 145 Wis. 181, 37 L.R.A.(N.S.) 717, Í29 N. W. 1065, 3 N. C. O. A. 532; Rowe v. Such, 143 Cal. 573, 66 Pac. 862, 67 Pac. 760; Creamer v. Mcllvain, 89 Md. 343, 45 L.R.A. 531, 73 Am. St. Rep.. 186, 43 Atl. 935, 6 Am. Neg. Rep. 547; McGahie v. McOlennen, 86 App. Div. 263, 83 N. Y. Supp. 692; Gray v. Tompkins, 40 N. Y. S. R. 546, 15 N. Y. Supp. 953; Coller v. Knox, 222 Pa. 362, 23 L.R.A.(N.S.) 171, 71 Atl. 539; O’Brien v. Miller, 60 Conn. 214, 25 Am. St. Rep. 320, 22 Atl. 544; Button v. Prink, 51 Conn. 342, 50 Am. Rep. 24; PattonWorsham Drug Co. v. Drennon, 104 Tex. 62, 133 S. W. 871, 3 N. C. O. A. 859.

Opinion:
Bruce, Ch. J.
(after stating the facts as above). Two propositions are advanced in support of the demurrer to the complaint:
(1) That the garbage collector was an independent contractor, and, being such, the city was not liable for his negligence.
(2) That' even if tbe said collector was not an independent contractor, the city was acting in a public and governmental capacity and was therefore not liable.
And, first, Was the said Neis Johnson an independent contractor? Is or is not the appellant correct in his contention that "one who performs services for a city in the matter of removing garbage under a written contract which contains a provision that he is 'to furnish said teams and men or such number thereof as in the judgment of said city may be necessary for the delivery and disposal of said garbage,' and which contains this further provision, viz.: 'The entire work to be done in a good and substantial manner with the approval and acceptance of the city, and under the supervision and direction of the commissioner of health, or such agent or agents as he may appoint for that purpose; such teams and equipment to be acceptable and satisfactory to said health commissioner,' is a servant of the city, and not an independent contractor."
We are satisfied that the said Neis Johnson was an independent contractor, and not a servant of the defendant city.
According to § 6134 of the Compiled Laws of 1913, "a servant is one who is employed to render personal service to his employer, otherwise than in pursuit of an independent calling, and who in such service remains entirely under the control and direction of the latter, who is called his master."
This definition of a servant, where it is sought to distinguish between a servant and an independent contractor, affords by inference a definition of an independent contractor, an independent contractor being considered a person employed to execute work, who is not within the definition of a servant.
The question whether the employee is an independent contractor,, says the supreme court of Kentucky, may be determined by answering the following questions: Who has the general control of the work? Who has the right to direct what shall be done, who shall do it, and how it shall be done ? See Mason & H. Co. v. Highland, — Ky. —, 116 S. W. 322; Madisonville, H. & E. R Co. v. Owen, 141 Ky. 1, 5, 143 S. W. 421.
"An 'independent contractor' is one who is independent of his employer in the doing of his work, and may work when and how he prefers. A 'servant' is one who is employed by another and is subject to the control of his employer." Messmer v. Bell & C. Co. 133 Ky. 19, 25, 117 S. W. 346, 19 Ann. Cas. 1.
"The right to control the conduct of another implies the power to> discharge him from the service or employment for disobedience; and, accordingly, the power to discharge has been regarded as the test by which to determine whether the relation of master and servant exists."' 1 Thomp. Neg. § 579, 629.
"The relation of master and servant exists whenever the employer retains the right to direct the manner in which the business shall be done, as well as the result to be accomplished; or, in other words, 'not. only what shall be done, but how it shall be done.' " Singer Mfg. Co. v. Rahn, 132 U. S. 518, 33 L. ed. 440, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 175; Huffcut, Agency 9; Taute v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co. 25 N. D. 102, 141 N. W. 134, 4 N. C. C. A. 365; notes in 65 L.R.A. 445 and 17 L.R.A.(N.S.) 371.
"The test is very much this; viz., whether the person charged is under the control and bound to obey the orders of another." Reg. v. Negus, L. R. 2 C. C. 37, 42 L. J. Mag. Cas. N. S. 62, 28 L. T. N. S. 646, 21 Week. Rep. 687, 12 Cox, C. C. 492, 1 Am. Crim. Rep. 150.
There can be no doubt that under these general tests the relation of master and servant did not exist; and the mere fact that the contract states that the collector was "to furnish said teams and men or such number thereof as in the judgment of the health commissioner of said city may he necessary for the delivery and disposal of garbage;" and that the contract further provides that the work shall be done "under the provision of the ordinance known as the 'garbage ordinance' to the full satisfaction and acceptance of the city,' — and under the supervision and direction of the commissioner of health, — and that such teams and equipment and men shall be acceptable and satisfactory to said health commissioner," does not change the situation.
It is true that the men and the teams and the work were required to be satisfactory to the health commissioner, but this was for the purpose of the public health, and the health commissioner would have had a voice in the matter even though the contract and ordinance under which it was let had not so provided.
The health commissioner had no power to discharge men; he had no power to say how hard they should work; he had no power to say what their wages should be; nor did the contract itself dictate in these matters.
His supervision was for the protection of the public health and for that purpose alone.
The city health officer or commissioner, indeed, exercises a public, and not a private or municipal, function. His office is provided for by the statutes, and in cities which, like Fargo, are under the commission form of government, he has all the power and authority which are conferred by the general statutes upon city boards of health. He represents the state and the city in their governmental, and not in their corporate or property owning, capacities. He would have possessed the powers given to him by the contract even if the instrument had been silent upon the subject. See § 3820 and 411 to 433, Compiled Laws of 1913.
We are also satisfied that, in disposing of its garbage and in letting the contract in question, the city of Fargo was acting in its governmental, and not in its private or corporate, capacity.
There is only one purpose for our municipalities entering so largely into this work as they do to-day, and that is the preservation of the public health; and in every enlightened land this aid and protection always has been and always will be considered a primary duty which devolves upon the state in its sovereign power. Savannah v. Jordon, 142 Ga. 409, L.R.A.1915C, 741, 83 S. E. 109, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 240 and note 243; Love v. Atlanta, 95 Ga. 129, 21 Am. St. Rep. 64, 22 S. E. 29; Watson v. Atlanta, 136 Ga. 370, 71 S. E. 664; Haley v. Boston, 191 Mass. 291, 5 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1005, 77 N. E. 888; Re Vandine, 6 Pick. 187, 17 Am. Dec. 351; Kuehn v. Milwaukee, 92 Wis. 263, 65 N. W. 1030; see also Nicholson v. Detroit, 129 Mich. 246, 56 L.R.A. 601, 88 N. W. 695; Ogg v. Lansing, 35 Iowa, 495, 14 Am. Rep. 499; Bolster v. Lawrence, 225 Mass. 387, L.R.A.1917B, 1285, 114 N. E. 722.
If, indeed, as has generally been held, the protection of the lives and property of its citizens from loss by fire is a governmental function, and to such an extent that the city is not liable for the negligence of its firemen either in putting out or failing to put out a fire, or for accidents while the engines and carts are going to and from fires, or of its servants in removing ashes and inflammable material, how much less should the city be held liable for acts done in seeking to protect its citizens from dangers which are much more insidious and extensive ? See 28 Cyc. 1303; State v. Howard, 72 Me. 459; Re Vandine, 6 Pick. 187, 17 Am. Dec. 351; Condict v. Jersey City, 46 N. J. L. 157; Gillespie v. Lincoln, 35 Neb. 34, 16 L.R.A. 352, 52 N. W. 811; Kies v. Erie, 135 Pa. 144, 20 Am. St. Rep. 867, 19 Atl. 942.
We realize that there are some decisions of the courts of New York and Colorado which seem to hold to a contrary view than that expressed by us, but we are not persuaded thereby.
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.