Case Name: THOMPSON v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1916-05-10
Citations: 187 S.W. 204
Docket Number: No. 4068
Parties: THOMPSON v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 187
Pages: 204–207

Head Matter:
THOMPSON v. STATE.
(No. 4068.)
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
May 10, 1916
1916. On Motion, for Rehearing, June 14, 1916.)
1. Homicide <&wkey;21&wkey;EviDENCE — Admissibility.
In a prosecution for murder, a conflict in testimony as to whether deceased was conscious when making alleged dying declarations would not render the statements inadmissible, but would go to the weight to be given them by the jury.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. § 460; Dec. Dig. &wkey;>219.]
2. Witnesses <&wkey;379(l) — Impeachment.
In a prosecution for murder, where defendant’s witness testified that she believed the deceased was unconscious when she made the statement that defendant inflicted the injuries on her head, statements made by the witness to the physician who attended deceased, prior to so testifying, were admissible as tending to impeach her.
[Ed. Note. — For other 'eases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. §§ 1209, 1247; Dec. Dig. &wkey;379(l).]>
3. Criminal Law <&wkey;595(l) — Trial—Continuance.
In a prosecution for murder, the fact that a witness would testify that he knew the deceased was quarrelsome and knew of two men who had made threats, it not being shown that either was in a position to commit the crime, was immaterial and not ground for a continuance.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 1323; Dec. Dig. <§=3595(1).]
4. Criminal Law <&wkey;595(l) — 1Trial—Contin-uance.
In a prosecution for murdei’, where witnesses for the state testified that they had heard defendant make threats against the deceased, testimony of an absent witness that he had never heard such threats would be immaterial and not ground for a continuance, unless the absent witness is shown to have been in a position to have heard the threats testified to.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 1323; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;>595(l).]
5. Criminal Law <&wkey;814(17) — Trial — In-structio ns — Circumstantial Evidence .
In a prosecution for murdex-, where the case depended on direct and positive evidence consisting of dying declarations of deceased, the court properly refused to charge on circumstantial evidence.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1883, 1979; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;> 814(17).]
On Motion for Rehearing.
6. Criminal Law &wkey;366(6) — Homicide &wkey; 202 — Evidence—Admissibility—Res Gest.® —Dying Declarations.
In a prosecution for murder, where the doctor who attended the deceased within 15 minutes after the blows were inflicted believed her about to die and told her so, and, although he gave her morphine to ease her pain, believed her to be thoroughly conscious, his testimony as to her replies by nods to his questions as to who hit her, she not being able to speak plainly because of a fractured jaw, was admissible as res gestae and as dying declarations.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 820; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;366(6); Homicide, Cent. Dig. § 429; Dec. Dig. c&wkey;>202.]
7. Criminal Law <&wkey;366(3) — Homicide &wkey; 207 — Evidence — Dying Declarations — Res Gestas.
Testimony of another witness who arrived before the doctor as to the statements of the deceased in response to the doctor’s questions as to who struck her, although in answer to a question, were admissible as dying declarations and as res gestae, since it is no objection to a dying declaration that it is made in answer to questions, if the questions were not calculated to lead the deceased to make any, particular statement.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §819; Dec. Dig. <@=366(3); Homicide, Cent. Dig. § 439; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;> 207.]
8. Homicide <&wkey;216 — Evidence—Admissibility.
Statements made to the undertaker some time after the statements made to the doctor, while he was preparing to shave the head of deceased, tending to show that deceased was conscious,’-were admissible as dying declarations.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. § 457; Dec. Dig. &wkey;216J
9. Criminal Law <&wkey;1133 — Appeal and Error-Presentations in Lower Court oe Grounds eor Review.
In a prosecution for homicide, an objection that no predicate was laid for impeaching testimony cannot be presented for the first time on motion for rehearing.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 2984; Dec. Dig. <@=31133.]
10. Homicide <&wkey;166(2) — Evidence—Admissibility.
In a prosecution for murder, testimony of a previous quarrel between deceased and defendant, and that he knew another negro was going to the house of the deceased on the night of the crime, was admissible as tending to show motive for the crime.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. §§ 321, 322; Dec. Dig. &wkey;166(2).]
11. Criminal Law <&wkey;1092(ll) — Trial—Objections.
In a prosecution for murder, an objection by defendant to the court’s qualification of one of his bills of exceptions should have been made before filing the bill as qualified.
[Ed. Note. — Eor other . cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2837, 2841; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;> 1092(11).]
12. Criminal Law <&wkey;456 — Evidence — Opinion Evidence.
In a prosecution for murder, where a witness testified that she had seen the deceased moaning and raising her body while the doctor was examining her wounds, and heard what the witnesses said to her, and her answers, her opinion that the deceased was conscious was admissible, although opinion evidence, since it is one of the instances where a witness in language cannot portray what she sees and observes and is permitted to express an opinion.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 1045; Dec. Dig. <@=3456.]
13. Homicide <&wkey;234(6) — Evidence — Sufficiency.
In a prosecution for murder, where several witnesses testified' as to statements made by deceased immediately after the crime accusing the defendant, evidence held sufficient to sustain a verdict of guilty.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. § 487; Dec. Dig. <@=¿5234(6).]
Appeal from District Court, Wichita County; Wm. N. Bonner, Judge.
Charles Thompson was convicted of murder, and he appeals.
Affirmed.
Ralph P. Mathis and Wayne Somerville, both of Wichita Palls, for appellant. C. C. McDonald, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

Opinion:
HARPER, J.
Appellant was convicted of the murder of Pearl Bransford, and his punishment assessed at death.
Dr. MacKechney testified to being called to see the woman, that he had her carried to the sanitarium, and that the wounds she received were the cause of her death. lie testified her face was literally torn all to pieces; that her upper jaw was broken, and all her teeth on the right side were broken loose, her lower jaw was brollen, and there were seven distinct wounds on her head; that he found a hammer there bloody; that there were wounds practically all over her entire scalp, and there were several places where the out.er table of her skull was broken. He says be told Mr. Nelson and his wife that he thought it was useless to attempt to do anything for her, but at their request he treated her; that in his opinion the woman was conscious; and he furthermore testified that he informed the woman she was' going to die and that she wanted to tell the truth. Mrs. Nelson says the woman was informed that she was going to die, and the doctor thought she was dying.
The doctor's testimony and Mrs. Nelson's testimony would be admissible both under the res gestse rule and as dying declarations. While the statements made to the undertaker were some time after the statements were made to the doctor, yet his testimony would tend strongly to show that she was conscious, and his testimony would be admissible as a dying declaration.
There are a number of bills objecting to testimony wherein, when asked who did it, she would answer to "Sharles," to others Charles Thompson, and to others would nod her head in the affirmative when asked the question. It is true that witnesses for appellant testified they did not think she was conscious, but this would not render the testimony inadmissible, but go to the weight to be given it by the jury. When the state's witnesses testified tiiat she was conscious and informed that she was going to die, this made a prima facie case, and rendered the testimony admissible. When the defendant offered testimony that she was not conscious of what she was saying, this rendered it a question of fact to be determined by the jury. None of the bills complaining of the admissibility of this testimony present error.
The testimony of Dr. MacKechney as to what Miss Gossler said to him was admissible. Appellant introduced Miss Gussler and had her testify that in her opinion the woman was unconscious when she made the statement that appellant inflicted the injuries on her head. Any statement she had made to Dr. MacKechney prior to her so testifying would' be admissible as tending to impeach her, and the court in approving the bill says he so limited the testimony.
The testimony of a previous quarrel between deceased and appellant was admissible as tending to show motive for the crime. The witnesses testify that appellant had told the negro woman that "no other man should have her." It was shown another man called on her that evening and was to call again that night, and when he did call he found the negro woman murdered. It is shown that appellant could have and probably did know that Ben Henderson had called that evening and was to call again that night.
The court did not err in overruling the application for a continuance. While it is always permissible to show that another probably committed the crime, or that another had made threats, or had ill will, if the testimony goes further and would place such person in such proximity to the person that he might or could have committed the deed, the fact one absent witness would testify that he "knew the woman was quarrelsome, and knew of two men who had made threats," would be immaterial, unless such other two persons, or one of them, were placed in such position where they had an opportunity to commit the offense. There is no allegation in the motion as to where the two persons were on the night of the homicide, nor is the name of either of them given. The fact that the absent witnesses had never heard appellant make any threats toward deceased would be immaterial, nor would such testimony tend to weaken the testimony of the state's witnesses who heard and testified to the threats. Doubtless any number of men could have been picked up who would have testified, and testified truthfully, they had never heard appellant make a threat. Before the testimony of such witnesses would become material, they would have to place themselves in position to have heard the threats testified to by the witnesses for the state. There is no allegation they were present on such occasion, nor is it so contended in the record before-us. 1 1 -
Three or four witnesses testify to the fact that deceased, in her dying declaration, said appellant committed the offense, and the court did not err in refusing to charge on circumstantial evidence. It was a case depending on direct and positive testimony. If the jury had not believed the woman was conscious when she made the statements charging appellant with having inflicted the wounds which caused her death, they should not and would not have convicted him, much less assess the highest penalty known to the law.
The judgment is affirmed.
<§=jFor other oases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
(g^For other cases see same topic and KEY-N.UMBEK, in all Key-Numbered Digests and indexes