Case Name: STATE of Oregon, Respondent on Review, v. Rodney BANKS, Sr., Petitioner on Review.
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 2019-02-07
Citations: 434 P.3d 361
Docket Number: CC 140130317 (SC S065180)
Parties: STATE of Oregon, Respondent on Review,
v.
Rodney BANKS, Sr., Petitioner on Review.
Judges: 
Reporter: Pacific Reporter 3d
Volume: 434
Pages: 361–379

Head Matter:
STATE of Oregon, Respondent on Review,
v.
Rodney BANKS, Sr., Petitioner on Review.
CC 140130317 (SC S065180)
Supreme Court of Oregon.
Argued and submitted May 4, 2018.
February 7, 2019
Ben Eder, Thuemmel Uhle & Eder, Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for petitioner on review.
Timothy A. Sylwester, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review. Also on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
Before Walters, Chief Justice, and Balmer, Nakamoto, Flynn, Duncan, and Nelson, Justices, and Kistler, Senior Justice pro tempore.
WALTERS, C. J.
Defendant was arrested for driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII) and, when asked, refused to take a breath test, which would have revealed the percentage of alcohol in his blood. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution prohibited the state from using defendant's refusal as evidence when it prosecuted him for that crime. We reverse the contrary decision of the Court of Appeals, State v. Banks , 286 Or. App. 718, 401 P.3d 1234 (2017), and the judgment of the circuit court.
I. BACKGROUND
The facts in this case are undisputed. Defendant drove his vehicle into a fence one night in Portland. Paramedics and law enforcement responded to the scene, evaluated defendant, and determined that he was he was intoxicated. Defendant was arrested and transported to the police station, where Officer Ladd was waiting. Ladd informed defendant that he had been in a crash and was at the police station because he "smelled of an alcoholic beverage pretty strongly." Ladd explained that he was "going to read [defendant] some information" and that he would "like [defendant] to open [his] mouth." When Ladd asked defendant, "Can I look in your mouth," defendant responded, "No." Ladd then explained that, "if you don't [open it], then I can't help you maybe take a breath test." After defendant responded that he would not open his mouth, Ladd read defendant the "rights and consequences" required by law. Ladd explained that defendant was "about to be asked to submit to a breath test *** under the implied consent law," and he provided information on the consequences for refusing or failing the test, including that his refusal to submit to the breath test "may be offered against [him]." After reading the form, Ladd asked defendant, "[W]ill you take a breath test?" Defendant responded that he would not. Ladd did not obtain defendant's blood alcohol content (BAC). Defendant was charged with DUII, reckless driving, and criminal mischief.
Before trial, defendant moved to suppress evidence of his refusal to consent to the breath test. His position was that use of his refusal as substantive evidence of his guilt, as permitted under ORS 813.310, is unconstitutional. Defendant argued that use of his refusal would violate his right against self-incrimination under Article I, section 12, and his right against unreasonable searches and seizures under Article I, section 9. With respect to the latter, defendant argued that the use of his refusal as evidence as of his guilt placed too great a burden on his exercise of his Article I, section 9, right. The trial court denied the motion, the state presented evidence of defendant's refusal to support the inference that defendant knew he was intoxicated, and defendant was convicted of DUII.
Defendant appealed his judgment of conviction, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Banks , 286 Or. App. at 719, 401 P.3d 1234. On the Article I, section 9, issue, the only issue that we address, the Court of Appeals explained that Ladd had a lawful right to conduct a warrantless seizure and search based on a warrant exception-the existence of probable cause and exigent circumstances. Id. at 727, 401 P.3d 1234. As a result, the court reasoned, defendant had no right to refuse to consent to that search, and his right against unreasonable searches and seizures was not violated by the use of his refusal as evidence at trial. Id.
Defendant sought review in this court, which we allowed. In this court, defendant does not argue that Ladd did not have probable cause or that exigent circumstances did not exist to permit a warrantless search of his breath. Instead, he argues, as he did in the proceedings below, that his refusal to take a breath test was an invocation of his right under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution to refuse to give his consent to a warrantless search. That exercise of a constitutional right, he submits, cannot be used as substantive evidence of his guilt and may not be commented on at trial without violating that constitutional provision.
The state does not take issue with that latter proposition. The state acknowledges that, "as a general rule, a person's choice to refuse to consent to a warrantless search and seizure is not admissible as substantive evidence against him." See, e.g. , State v. Smallwood , 277 Or. 503, 505-06, 561 P.2d 600 (1977) (noting that it is "usually reversible error to admit evidence of the exercise by a defendant of the rights which the constitution gives him if it is done in a context whereupon inferences prejudicial to the defendant are likely to be drawn by the jury"); State v. Moller , 217 Or. App. 49, 51, 174 P.3d 1063 (2007) (error to admit evidence of the defendant's refusal to consent to a search of his car); United States v. Moreno , 233 F.3d 937, 941 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting cases indicating that government cannot use refusal to consent to a search of home as evidence that person knew search would produce incriminating evidence); United States v. Thame , 846 F.2d 200, 207 (3rd Cir.), cert. den. , 488 U.S. 928, 109 S.Ct. 314, 102 L.Ed.2d 333 (1988) (error for prosecutor to argue that defendant's refusal to provide consent to search constituted evidence of his guilt); State v. Larson , 788 N.W.2d 25, 32-33 (Minn. 2010) (error to allow the introduction of defendant's refusal to consent to DNA testing as evidence of guilt); State v. Jennings , 333 N.C. 579, 604-05, 430 S.E.2d 188, 201 (1993) (error to allow officers to testify that defendant refused to allow search of hotel room and car); Padgett v. State , 590 P.2d 432, 434 (Alaska 1979) (error to admit evidence of the defendant's refusal to consent to search of car); Curry v. State , 217 Ga. App. 623, 625-26, 458 S.E.2d 385, 386-87 (1995) (evidence of defendant's refusal to consent to surgery erroneously admitted). The state's response, instead, is that that general rule is not implicated here for three reasons. First, the state contends, under the implied-consent statutes, defendant agreed, by driving on a public highway, to submit to a breath test if arrested for DUII and, therefore, did not have a constitutional right at the time of arrest to refuse to provide the consent that Ladd requested. Second, the state argues, defendant's refusal was not an invocation of a constitutional right. When Ladd asked defendant to take to a breath test, he was not asking defendant to waive his Article I, section 9, right; rather, he was seeking defendant's physical cooperation and submission to a breath test that Ladd had lawful authority to conduct. Third, the state asserts, even if defendant's refusal was an invocation of a constitutional right, it can be used against him because Ladd had another lawful basis for obtaining a breath sample from defendant without a warrant and without his consent-probable cause and exigent circumstances. We address each of those arguments in succession.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Defendant had a legal right to refuse to provide consent at the time of arrest.
Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures of "persons" and their "houses, papers, and effects." A search of one's breath is protected under that provision. State v. Newton , 291 Or. 788, 800, 636 P.2d 393 (1981), overruled on other grounds by State v. Spencer , 305 Or. 59, 750 P.2d 147 (1988). Generally, Article I, section 9, requires that law enforcement obtain a warrant before performing a search. See Art I, § 9 ("[N]o warrant shall issue but upon probable cause."); State v. Bridewell , 306 Or. 231, 235, 759 P.2d 1054 (1988) (noting that law enforcement must have a warrant to search unless warrant exception applies). However, in interpreting that constitutional provision, this court has recognized various exceptions to the warrant requirement. See, e.g. , State v. Davis , 295 Or. 227, 237-38, 666 P.2d 802 (1983) (noting some exceptions). One such exception is voluntary consent to search. State v. Paulson , 313 Or. 346, 351-52, 833 P.2d 1278 (1992). That exception is established when the state proves that "someone having the authority to do so voluntarily gave the police consent to search the defendant's person or property," thereby waiving the right to insist that the government obtain a warrant. State v. Weaver , 319 Or. 212, 219, 874 P.2d 1322 (1994).
The state contends that, under ORS 813.100, when an individual drives on a public road, the individual provides that voluntary consent and irrevocably waives the right to insist that the state obtain a warrant to search his or her breath. The state relies on ORS 813.100(1), which provides that,
"[a]ny person who operates a motor vehicle upon premises open to the public or the highways of this state shall be deemed to have given consent, subject to the implied consent law, to a chemical test of the person's breath *** for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of the person's blood if the person is arrested for driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants."
The problem with the state's argument, however, is that the implied-consent statutes also include a provision that permits a person who drives on public roads to later refuse to take a breath test if and when the person is arrested for DUII. As this court recently explained in State v. Swan , 363 Or. 121, 420 P.3d 9 (2018), decided after the state filed its brief in this case, " ORS 813.100(2) expressly recognizes that a person arrested for DUII may decide, at the point of arrest, to refuse to submit to a breath test and that the person's refusal limits the state's ability to determine his or her BAC under the implied-consent statutes." Id. at 139, 420 P.3d 9. Specifically, ORS 813.100(2) provides that, if a person arrested for DUII refuses to submit to a breath test, " '[n]o chemical test of the person's breath *** shall be given' under the implied-consent statutes, although the state can always apply for a warrant to determine a suspect's BAC." Id. Relying on that statutory provision, we rejected the state's argument that an individual who drives on public roads has no legal right to refuse a breath test. Id. at 138-39, 420 P.3d 9. We concluded that, at the time of arrest, "a DUII suspect does have a statutory right to decide whether to submit or refuse to submit to a breath test." Id. at 145, 420 P.3d 9. That interpretation of the implied-consent statutes answers the state's first argument here that, under the implied-consent statutes, defendant did not have a right to refuse Ladd's request that he take a breath test. Because the implied-consent statutes preserve a driver's right to decide, at the point of arrest, whether to consent to a search of his or her breath or blood, it is that point in time that is relevant. Law enforcement officers may conduct a search of a driver's breath at that time, but they must have a constitutional basis to do so. The fact that the driver drove a vehicle on public roads prior to the arrest does not supply such a basis because Oregon law does not make the driver's implied consent irrevocable; rather, it gives the driver the opportunity to make a different choice at the time of arrest. At the time of arrest, the constitutional bases for an officer's search may include the driver's voluntary consent given at that time. See ORS 813.100(5) ("Nothing in this section precludes a police officer from obtaining a chemical test of the person's breath or blood through any lawful means *** including, but not limited to, obtaining a search warrant."); State v. Moore , 354 Or. 493, 495, 318 P.3d 1133 (2013), adh'd to as modified on recons , 354 Or. 835, 322 P.3d 486 (2014) (upholding search of driver's breath based on express voluntary consent at time of arrest). As indicated in ORS 813.140(1), if the basis for the search is the consent of the driver, that consent must be the driver's express consent at the time of arrest. Specifically, ORS 813.140(1) provides that a police officer may obtain a chemical test of a driver's breath "[i]f, when requested by a police officer, the [driver] expressly consents to such a test." We reject the state's argument that, by driving on a public highway, defendant irrevocably gave his consent to a later search of his breath and had no constitutional right to refuse a request to search at the time of arrest. B. The state did not meet its burden to prove that defendant's refusal to consent to a breath test was admissible .
The state's second argument is that, when Ladd asked defendant to take a breath test, Ladd was not asking defendant to provide a constitutional basis for that search; rather, Ladd had a constitutional basis for the search provided by another warrant exception-probable cause and exigent circumstances-and was seeking only defendant's agreement to submit to the requested test. The state argues that defendant's refusal to take the breath test was a refusal to perform a physical act and not an invocation of his constitutional right to insist on a warrant.
The state is correct that, when an officer has probable cause to believe that a driver has been driving under the influence of alcohol, and exigent circumstances exist, the officer may conduct a warrantless search to determine a driver's BAC. See Moore , 354 Or. at 497 n. 5, 318 P.3d 1133 (noting that exigent circumstances may permit warrantless search due to the "evanescent nature" of BAC); Missouri v. McNeely , 569 U.S. 141, 165, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 185 L.Ed.2d 696 (2013) (under Fourth Amendment, whether exigent circumstances exist in DUII context is determined on case-by-case basis). The state also is correct that the implied-consent statutes are premised, at least in part, on the assumption that a police officer who asks a driver to take a breath test will have a constitutional basis for obtaining the driver's breath-the driver's consent implied by statute when the driver operates a motor vehicle on public highways-and will not need the driver's consent to search. See ORS 813.100(1) - (2) (providing that driver is "deemed to have given consent" but precluding test if the driver refuses to "submit" to breath test). This court has explained that the implied-consent statutes are meant " 'to overcome the possibility of physical resistance *** without resort to physical compulsion' by imposing adverse legal consequences on a refusal to submit to the test." Spencer , 305 Or. at 67, 750 P.2d 147 (quoting Newton , 291 Or. at 793, 636 P.2d 393 ); see also State v. Cabanilla , 351 Or. 622, 632, 273 P.3d 125 (2012) (legislative purpose with advice and consequences was to "coerce a driver's submission to take the tests"); Spencer , 305 Or. at 71, 750 P.2d 147 ("[T]he statute's references to a driver's 'refusal' do not evince a legislative concern that the driver make a voluntary and fully informed decision whether to submit to the test.").
At the same time, though, the implied-consent statutes make it clear that an officer who stops a driver for DUII need not rely on a driver's implied consent to provide the constitutional basis for a search of the driver's breath. ORS 813.100(5) permits an officer to obtain chemical tests of a driver's blood or breath "through any lawful means *** including, but not limited to, obtaining a search warrant." And, ORS 813.140(1) specifically describes those lawful means as including obtaining a driver's "express[ ] consent[ ]" to take such a test.
Other statutes also reflect a difference between a request for physical submission and a request for express consent to search. For instance, and specifically relevant here, ORS 813.310 provides that, "[i]f a person refuses to submit to a chemical test under ORS 813.100or refuses to consent to chemical tests under ORS 813.140, evidence of the person's refusal is admissible in any civil or criminal action[.]" (Emphases added.) Other statutes allow the imposition of other consequences only when a driver refuses to submit to a test under ORS 813.100. See ORS 813.100(3) (driver who refuses to submit under ORS 813.100 subject to license suspension); ORS 813.095 ($650 fine for refusing to submit under ORS 813.100 ).
Thus, given the various provisions of the implied-consent statutes, an officer's question to a driver asking whether the driver will take a breath test may be either (1) a request under ORS 813.140 for express consent to search the driver's breath that, if given, will supply a constitutional basis for the test; or (2) a request under ORS 813.100 that the driver "submit" to a breath test that finds its constitutional justification elsewhere. Stated another way, a driver's refusal to answer that question affirmatively may be either an invocation of a constitutional right or a refusal to cooperate without constitutional significance.
As discussed above, the invocation of a constitutional right cannot be admitted at trial as evidence of a defendant's guilt. However, no similar bar applies when an officer seeks only a driver's physical cooperation in conducting a constitutionally-authorized search. Defendant does not take issue with that notion, nor does he argue that the consequence that ORS 813.310 imposes for failure to submit under ORS 813.100 is unlawful. Rather, he contends only that the consequence that ORS 813.310 imposes for failure to give express consent under ORS 813.140 is unconstitutional. And, he argues, he understood Ladd's question as seeking that express consent to search.
When the state seeks admission of a defendant's refusal to take a breath test, the state, as the proponent of the evidence, has the burden to establish its admissibility. See State v. Fish , 321 Or. 48, 59, 893 P.2d 1023 (1995) ("As proponent of the evidence of defendant's refusal [to take field sobriety tests], the state has the burden, after appropriate objection has been raised, of establishing the admissibility of the evidence."). The state must demonstrate that the officer's question could reasonably be understood only as a request to provide physical cooperation and not as a request for constitutionally-significant consent to search. If the state fails to establish that fact, then a driver's refusal cannot be admitted in evidence against the driver.
In this case, the state did not meet its burden. Ladd's question-"[W]ill you take a breath test?"-was ambiguous. Ladd could have been asking defendant to physically submit to a test that was justified by a warrant exception, or Ladd could have been asking defendant for his consent to search, thereby establishing a warrant exception. Ladd told defendant that he would be asked to submit to a breath test "under the implied consent law," but he did not specify the aspect of the implied-consent law to which he was referring. As explained, ORS 813.100 and ORS 813.140 provide that a driver's consent to take a breath test may serve two different functions, one of which has constitutional significance. Here, the state did not meet its burden to establish that Ladd's request was solely a request for physical cooperation and could not reasonably be understood as a request for constitutionally significant consent to search. Consequently, the state did not establish that defendant's refusal to take the test was admissible as evidence of his guilt.
C. The fact that the state had a constitutional basis to search does not make defendant's refusal to provide consent admissible.
As indicated, the state's third and final argument is that, even if (1) an officer's request that a driver take a breath test is a request for constitutionally significant consent to search, and (2) a defendant's refusal to provide consent to search is, as a general rule, not admissible against the defendant, we nevertheless should recognize an exception to that rule when an officer has a constitutional basis to search other than the defendant's consent. That is, the state contends, even if an officer is requesting constitutionally significant consent to search, the existence of an alternative basis for that search permits the admission of the driver's refusal. Applying that proposed exception here, the state argues that defendant's Article I, section 9, rights were not burdened by admitting evidence of his refusal to provide constitutional consent because Ladd had an unstated lawful basis for obtaining a breath sample from defendant without a warrant and without his consent-probable cause and exigent circumstances. The parties have not cited any Oregon Supreme Court case that has addressed that issue, but other courts have done so, albeit outside the drunk driving context.
In United States v. Rapanos , 115 F.3d 367, 369 (6th Cir. 1997), the defendant was suspected of destroying wetlands on his property. Government officials with the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) met with the defendant at his property line, and, after a discussion, the defendant refused to allow them to visually search his property without a search warrant. Id. The defendant later attended a second meeting with the government officials, one that took place away from the defendant's property. Id. He again denied them access to his property without a warrant. Id. The government charged the defendant with discharging pollutants into wetlands, and, during trial, the defendant was questioned about his refusal to allow the government on his property. Id. at 370. The defendant did not object at the time, but, in a motion for a new trial after a guilty verdict was rendered, he argued that the prosecutor's questions impermissibly infringed on his Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 371. The district court agreed and granted the defendant a new trial. Id.
On the government's appeal, the Sixth Circuit explained that, "[u]nless the defendant had a Fourth Amendment right to prevent the DNR representatives from coming onto [his property] for an inspection," the district court erred in granting the defendant's motion for a new trial. Id. at 372. And, the court further explained, the defendant had no such right: The open fields doctrine permitted the DNR officials to conduct a visual inspection of the defendant's property, and, because such a search would therefore be reasonable, the defendant had no Fourth Amendment right to assert. Id. at 374.
Here, the Court of Appeals relied on this court's decision in State v. Meharry , 342 Or. 173, 149 P.3d 1155 (2006), and one of its own opinions to reach a conclusion similar to that reached by the Sixth Circuit in Rapanos . Banks , 286 Or. App. at 725, 401 P.3d 1234. In Meharry , we stated that, under Article I, section 9, "a search conducted without a warrant is deemed unreasonable" unless it falls within one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. Meharry , 342 Or. at 177, 149 P.3d 1155. In this case, the Court of Appeals explained, probable cause and exigent circumstances justified a warrantless search of defendant. Banks , 286 Or. App. at 727, 401 P.3d 1234. Therefore, the court reasoned, Ladd had requested only that defendant submit to a reasonable search, and, in that instance, the court held, there is no Article I, section 9, right to be burdened. Id. at 725-27, 401 P.3d 1234 (citing State v. Gefre , 137 Or. App. 77, 83-84, 903 P.2d 386 (1995), rev. den. , 323 Or. 483, 918 P.2d 848 (1996) ). The state does not cite the Court of Appeals' decision, but its argument is consistent with that court's reasoning. The state contends that, because Ladd had lawful authority to seize a sample of defendant's breath without a warrant, defendant's refusal to comply was not a valid exercise of his rights under Article I, section 9.
The difficulty with the state's argument, however, is that, at the time a suspect is asked to consent to a search, the suspect may not know whether another warrant exception provides an independent basis for the search. After all, when the state relies on exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search, a determination of whether that exception applies will not be made until long after the search has been executed and, in circumstances similar to these, not until long after the individual has been asked to provide consent. See Davis , 295 Or. at 237, 666 P.2d 802 (noting that warrantless searches are "per se unreasonable" and that the state has the burden to prove that an exception applies). Furthermore, a suspect who is asked for consent reasonably could assume that his or her consent would not be necessary if officers already had another legal basis for conducting the search.
Some courts have recognized that an analysis of the admissibility of a suspect's refusal to consent must focus on the right asserted rather than on the ultimate legality of the warrantless search. For instance, in Elson v. State , 659 P.2d 1195, 1198 (Alaska 1983), the Alaska Supreme Court considered whether the principle that makes a defendant's refusal to consent to a warrantless search inadmissible is applicable to a search that was lawfully executed pursuant to another warrant exception. The court explained that the principle precluding admission is based on the notion that the right to insist upon a warrant " 'would be effectively destroyed if, when exercised, it could be used as evidence of guilt.' " Id. (quoting Padgett , 590 P.2d at 434 ). That principle, the court concluded, applies with "equal force to lawful searches": "[T]he crucial question is not whether a search is illegal, but rather whether the admission of a refusal to consent to a search, legal or illegal, will inhibit the exercise of fourth amendment rights." Id . ; see also Commonwealth v. Welch , 401 Pa. Super. 393, 398, 585 A.2d 517, 520 (1991) (stating that focus on the ultimate legality of a search and seizure is "very misguided" and the "point of significance is that one should not be penalized for asserting a constitutional right" (emphasis in original)).
Garrett, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
Defendant challenged the use of his refusal as evidence in a motion to suppress. When this court reviews a denial of a motion to suppress, it is "bound by the trial court's findings of historical fact that are supported by evidence in the record." State v. Holdorf , 355 Or. 812, 814, 333 P.3d 982 (2014). To the extent that the trial court did not make findings of facts, and where "there is evidence from which those facts could be decided more than one way," this court will presume that the facts were decided in a way that is consistent with the trial court's conclusion of law. Id.
Defendant argued before the Court of Appeals, as he did at the trial court, that the use of his refusal as evidence against him violated his right against self-incrimination under Article I, section 12, because it forced him to decide between providing consent or withholding it, both of which, he argued, implicate his constitutional rights. Defendant renews that argument here, but, because we decide the case on the Article I, section 9, issue, we do not address defendant's Article I, section 12, argument.
See State v. Swan , 363 Or. 121, 137, 420 P.3d 9 (2018) (describing breath test as a seizure and search). From this point forward, we will refer in this opinion to the request at issue as a "search" of defendant's breath. We use that single term only for simplicity's sake.
Our construction of the Oregon implied-consent statute is consistent with a decision of the Kansas Supreme Court recognizing that consent implied by statute can be withdrawn. See State v. Ryce , 303 Kan. 899, 944, 368 P.3d 342, 369 (2016) (stating that "Fourth Amendment principles recognize that" the consent implied by statute can be withdrawn because "[i]t would be inconsistent with [those] principles to conclude consent remained voluntary if a suspect clearly and unequivocally revoked consent"); see also Olevik v. State , 302 Ga. 228, 233, 806 S.E.2d 505, 512 (2017) (holding that drivers have a constitutional right to refuse to consent to a breath test).
Although we have not decided the issue under Oregon law, the search incident to arrest exception also might justify a warrantless search of a driver's breath. See Birchfield v. North Dakota , --- U.S. ----, ----, 136 S.Ct. 2160, 2185, 195 L.Ed.2d 560 (2016) (holding that under federal constitution officers may obtain breath sample without a warrant under exception for search incident to arrest).
ORS 813.100(1) -(2) provides:
"(1) Any person who operates a motor vehicle upon premises open to the public or the highways of this state shall be deemed to have given consent, subject to the implied consent law, to a chemical test of the person's breath, or of the person's blood if the person is receiving medical care in a health care facility immediately after a motor vehicle accident, for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of the person's blood if the person is arrested for driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants in violation of ORS 813.010 or a municipal ordinance. A test shall be administered upon the request of a police officer having reasonable grounds to believe the person arrested to have been driving while under the influence of intoxicants in violation of ORS 813.010 or of a municipal ordinance. Before the test is administered the person requested to take the test shall be informed of consequences and rights as described under ORS 813.130.
"(2) No chemical test of the person's breath or blood shall be given, under subsection (1) of this section, to a person under arrest for driving a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicants in violation of ORS 813.010 or of a municipal ordinance, if the person refuses the request of a police officer to submit to the chemical test after the person has been informed of consequences and rights as described under ORS 813.130."
ORS 813.140(1) provides:
"Nothing in ORS 813.100 is intended to preclude the administration of a chemical test described in this section. A police officer may obtain a chemical test of the breath or blood to determine the amount of alcohol in any person's blood or a test of the person's blood or urine, or both, to determine the presence of cannabis, a controlled substance or an inhalant in the person as provided in the following:
"(1) If, when requested by a police officer, the person expressly consents to such a test."
(Emphasis added.)
Moore , 354 Or. at 493, 318 P.3d 1133, is not to the contrary. Although in that case we treated a defendant's affirmative response to a request under ORS 813.100 as consent, defendant in that case had conceded that he had given consent and that his consent was voluntary in fact. Id. at 504 n. 9, 318 P.3d 1133. The defendant's concession in Moore was critical to our analysis in that case, but it does not decide the issue here, where defendant refused to submit to the officer's request.
Both parties cite Moller , 217 Or. App. 49, 174 P.3d 1063, a Court of Appeals opinion that held it improper to admit as evidence against the defendant his decision not to consent to a search of his car. Whether the search was permitted under a different warrant exception was not at issue, or at least not litigated, in Moller .

Opinion:
The Ninth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in United States v. Prescott , 581 F.2d 1343 (9th Cir. 1978). There, federal agents investigating a mail fraud scheme obtained a warrant to search Duvernay's apartment (but not Duvernay himself). Id. at 1346. Authorities executed the search warrant one morning following a controlled delivery of fraudulently purchased packages, but, to their surprise, Duvernay was not home. Id. Instead, he was in the defendant's apartment, which was the next door down from his. Id. When federal agents knocked on the defendant's door, she answered and told them that Duvernay was not there; when asked, she declined to give the agents permission to search her apartment. Id. at 1346-47. After searching the building and again unsuccessfully seeking permission to enter the defendant's apartment, federal agents forcibly entered and immediately found Duvernay, who had the packages from the controlled delivery. Id. at 1347. For her actions, the defendant was charged as an accessory after the fact, and evidence of her refusal to allow federal agents in her apartment was used against her at trial. Id. at 1350.
Before the Ninth Circuit, the defendant contended that her refusal to let police in without a warrant was constitutionally protected conduct that could not be used as evidence against her. Id. The court agreed:
"When a law enforcement officer claims authority to search a home under a warrant, he announces in effect that the occupant has no right to resist the search. When, on the other hand, the officer demands entry but presents no warrant, there is a presumption that the officer has no right to enter, because it is only in certain carefully defined circumstances that lack of a warrant is excused. An occupant can act on that presumption and refuse admission. He need not try to ascertain whether, in a particular case, the absence of a warrant is excused. He is not required to surrender his Fourth Amendment protection on the say so of the officer. The Amendment gives him a constitutional right to refuse to consent to entry and search. His asserting it cannot be a crime. Nor can it be evidence of a crime.
"
"Had [the defendant] forcibly resisted the entry into her apartment, we might have a different case. We express no opinion on that question. We only hold that her passive refusal to consent to a warrantless search is privileged conduct which cannot be considered as evidence of criminal wrongdoing. If the government could use such refusal against the citizen, an unfair and impermissible burden would be placed upon the assertion of a constitutional right and future consents would not be freely and voluntarily given.
"The rule that we announce does not have its raison d'etre the deterrence of unlawful conduct by law enforcement officers, as does the rule excluding evidence discovered and seized in the course of an unlawful search.
Rather, it seeks to protect the exercise of a constitutional right, here the right not to consent to a warrantless entry."
Id. at 1350-51 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Other courts have reasoned similarly. See Welch , 401 Pa. Super. at 398, 585 A.2d at 520 ("[T]he actual entitlement to the right could be thought of as irrelevant to the point we are discussing. We would think that the same reasoning would apply even if the individual asserting the right had a mistaken belief that they were protected by a constitutional provision or were extended a right or protection when, in fact, they were not."); Longshore v. State , 399 Md. 486, 537, 924 A.2d 1129, 1159 (2007) (stating that "[a]n unfair and impermissible burden would be placed upon the assertion of a constitutional right if the State could use a refusal [to consent] to a warrantless search against an individual"); Garcia v. State , 103 N.M. 713, 714, 712 P.2d 1375, 1376 (1986) (holding that the defendant's "refusal to allow the warrantless search cannot be used as proof of his guilt").
For the following reasons, we concur. For one thing, we question the probative value of evidence of a defendant's exercise of a constitutional right to establish the defendant's guilt. See Moreno , 233 F.3d at 940 (questioning the probative value of a refusal to permit warrantless search of home); Welch , 401 Pa. Super. at 398, 585 A.2d at 520 ("We do not think that a refusal to allow police to search one's bedroom without first producing a warrant is probative of the fact the items the police suspect are present are actually present. There are many personal reasons that an individual would not wish to have the police searching through [her] room."). But more importantly, we are convinced that, if a person's verbal refusal to consent to a warrantless search could be admitted as evidence of guilt, it would "impose a prohibitive cost upon an individual's assertion of his [or her] constitutional rights." Elson , 659 P.2d at 1198. An individual should be able to act on the presumption that a warrantless search is unreasonable. Permitting the state to adduce evidence of the exercise of that right would place an impermissible burden on its assertion. We reject the state's argument that because the police had a lawful basis for obtaining a breath sample from defendant without a warrant-probable cause and exigent circumstances-defendant's refusal to provide consent is admissible as evidence of his guilt.
III. CONCLUSION
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
Kistler, S. J., concurred and filed an opinion.
Balmer, J., dissented and filed an opinion, in which Nakamoto, J., joined.
Although a defendant has a right to refuse consent, a defendant may not have the right to physically obstruct law enforcement officers who are executing an otherwise lawful search. In this case, we address only a defendant's verbal exercise of a constitutional right.