Case Name: Rodney K. McINTYRE, Appellant, v. Nance Ruth McINTYRE, n/k/a Nance Ruth Greene, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1984-04-18
Citations: 452 So. 2d 14
Docket Number: No. AN-449
Parties: Rodney K. McINTYRE, Appellant, v. Nance Ruth McINTYRE, n/k/a Nance Ruth Greene, Appellee.
Judges: BOOTH, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 452
Pages: 14–33

Head Matter:
Rodney K. McINTYRE, Appellant, v. Nance Ruth McINTYRE, n/k/a Nance Ruth Greene, Appellee.
No. AN-449.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
April 18, 1984.
Rehearing Denied June 19, 1984.
Gene T. Moss, Moss & Edwards, Jacksonville, for appellant.
Kevin V. Canipelli, Jacksonville, for ap-pellee.

Opinion:
. SMITH, Judge.
Appellant seeks reversal of an order modifying child custody. Under the order, custody of the parties son was changed from appellant to the appellee-mother, and the mother was permitted to take the son and the parties' second child, a daughter, to Japan where they will reside during the two-year tour of duty of the mother's present husband, a naval officer. We affirm.
Appellant cites alleged erroneous rulings on evidentiary matters, and contends that the trial judge also applied an erroneous standard in determining whether the mother's petition and supporting evidence warranted a change of custody. Appellant further argues that the evidence did not support change of custody of the parties' son to the mother, nor did it support denial of appellant's petition for change of custody of the daughter to appellant. He further complains that it was error for the trial court to fail to limit the children's residence outside Florida to the two-year period in Japan, and to require appellant to continue child support payments while the children are in Japan.
The parties were divorced in February, 1980, at which time by agreement of the parties the mother was granted custody of the six year-old daughter, and the father was given custody of the nine year-old son. In September, 1981, the mother married a Lt. Commander in the naval service, a member of the North Carolina Bar serving as a legal officer at Jacksonville Naval Air Station. The present litigation stems from the new husband's impending transfer to Misawa Air Base, Japan, where he will be stationed for a period of two years, if accompanied by dependents, or eighteen months if not so accompanied. The mother petitioned for modification to gain custody of the son, and, as required by the final judgment, requested the court's permission to remove the daughter and the son from the State of Florida. In response, appellant petitioned for a modification, seeking custody of the parties' daughter.
The most critical issue of law is whether the trial court erred in misconstruing the effect of the newly amended Section 61.-13(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1982), by determining that the new law changes the requirements for modification of a custody decree. The long-established rule in this state is that to justify modification, the trial court must find (1) a substantial change in circumstances and (2) that the best welfare and interests of the child will be promoted by the court's action. Sanders v. Sanders, 376 So.2d 880 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), cert. denied, 388 So.2d 1117 (Fla.1980); Avery v. Avery, 314 So.2d 198 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975). The question is whether the 1982 amendments eliminated the requirement of showing a "substantial change in circumstances" in modification proceedings. Before enactment of Chapter 82-96, Laws of Florida (1982), Section 61.-13(2)(b), Florida Statutes, read in part as follows:
The court shall award custody and visitation rights of minor children of the parties as a part of proceedings for dissolution of marriage in accordance with the best interests of the child and in accordance with the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. (emphasis supplied)
By enactment of Chapter 82-96, the above quoted portion was amended to read as follows:
The court shall determine all matters relating to custody of each minor child of the parties as a part of any proceeding under this chapter in accordance with the best interests of the child and in accordance with the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. (emphasis supplied)
As seen from the above, the "best interests of the child" standard, formerly applicable (by the terms of the statute) only to initial custody determinations made in dissolution proceedings, by the 1982 amendment is made applicable to "any proceeding" under Chapter 61, which obviously would include modification proceedings. The problem presented by the statutory amendment is that while the statutes provide (as they have since 1975) specific factors to be considered by the trial courts in determining "best interests of the child," (see Section 61.13(3)(a)-(j), inclusive), the statutes are silent with respect to the "substantial change in circumstances" requirement in modification proceedings.
As contended by appellant, it appears from the transcript of the hearing below that the trial court viewed the amendments as setting forth the criteria applicable to child custody decisions in modification proceedings as well as in initial custody determinations, and there is some indication from the language used by the court in discussing the amendments that he believed a "substantial change in circumstances" was no longer required for modification. Whether the trial court completely disregarded the "change of circusmtances" requirement is open to some question, from a mere reading of the record, but in view of appellee's acceptance of the interpretation advanced by appellant, we are bound to address- this issue.
The trial judge's assumption, if he did so assume, that the new act does away with the requirement of "change in circumstances," is in our view incorrect. As appellant points out, the new amendments retain the requirement that determination of child custody matters be made "in accordance with the best interests of the child," but the same amended section also continues to require that this determination be made "in accordance with the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act." Therefore, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, not merely subparagraphs (3)(a) through (j), setting forth factors "affecting the best welfare and interests of the child," must be considered. It is clear that other provisions, specifically Section 61.1326, relating to the binding force and res judicata effect of a custody decree, must also be considered. That provision reads as follows:
61.1326 Binding force and res judica-ta effect of custody decree —A custody decree rendered by a court of this state which has jurisdiction under s. 61.08 binds all parties who have been served in this state or notified in accordance with s. 61.1312 or who have been given an opportunity to be heard. As to these parties, the custody decree is conclusive as to all issues of law and fact decided and as to the custody determination made unless and until that determination is modified pursuant to law, including the provisions of this act.
We find no indication that the res judicata effect'of custody decisions made prior to the effective date of the amendments may be disregarded. See, Avery v. Avery, supra, 314 So.2d at 200, and Teta v. Teta, 297 So.2d 642, 646 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974). On the other hand, once a change in circumstances sufficient to bring the matter before the court for redetermination has been shown, we agree with the trial court's ruling that the amended statute controls modification proceedings as well as original custody determinations. Thus, we find no error in the trial court's use of the "best interests of the child" standard in this modification proceeding. One of the statutory factors to be considered is the "reasonable preference of the child," Section 61.13, subparagraph (3)(i). Here the trial court specifically found that both children have "indicated to their parents a preference to go to Japan which the court finds to be a reasonable preference," pursuant to the statute.
Appellant urges that the trial court's misinterpretation of the statute requires reversal. This may or may not be the case. As our sister court has recently observed in Damico v. Lundberg, 379 So.2d 964, 965 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1979), the "cardinal principle" of appellate review is that error is reversible only when, considering all the facts peculiar to the particular case, it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appellant would have been reached if the error had not been committed. It has also been stated, as noted by the Fourth District in Anthony v. Douglas, 201 So.2d 917 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967), that errors which do not affect the outcome of the trial are not harmful. See also, 3 Fla.Jur.2d, "Appellate Review," § 360-364.
Under the foregoing principles, whether reversible error is shown by the trial court's erroneous assumption that a change in circumstances is no longer a prerequisite to modification of child custody arrangements must be determined from examination of the facts and circumstances presented by this case. In this connection, we note first that the mother's motion for modification was filed before the effective date of Chapter 82-96, and in conformity, with existing law; that is, the motion specifically alleged "that there have been substantial changes in the conditions and circumstances surrounding the parties" since the original custody judgment was entered, and it alleged that it would be "in the best interests" of both children if custody of the son were transferred from the father to the mother. The motion for modification reveals the mother's remarriage, the fact that her new husband had received orders from the United States Navy to proceed to Misawa, Japan, for a tour of duty, and that she planned to accompany him and desired to take the two children so that they would be together during their absence from the state of Florida. The alternative of allowing the mother to take only the daughter and of having the children change residences during the summer vacation would have meant virtual total separation of the children for the entire two year period.
This court has recently held, in Sanders v. Sanders, 376 So.2d 880 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), that a motion for judgment on the pleadings was properly denied with respect to a supplemental complaint for modification alleging that there had been a substantial change in the mother's circumstances and that it was in the best interests of the child for modification to be ordered. The mother based her complaint for modification upon a change in her financial and employment circumstances, and the evidence disclosed that she had changed jobs, remarried, and that her finances had improved to a degree. By comparison, the mother here also alleged her remarriage, her proposed temporary residency in Japan, and the need for modification to allow both children to accompany her. At the same time, the mother was required to and did seek the court's permission to allow her to leave the state of Florida with the daughter, and she also appropriately requested that provision be made for reasonable visitation with the children by their father. The record reveals no motion attacking the sufficiency of her request for modification. We note also that the father subsequently filed his own motion for modification, seeking custody of the daughter, based upon the wife's proposed temporary residence in Japan.
We conclude that the pleadings before the court adequately presented a material and substantial change in conditions affecting custody of the children. Although no specific finding that a change of conditions justifying modification was made by the trial judge, such a finding is unnecessary. It is enough that the record displays it. Johnson v. Johnson, 422 So.2d 1013 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
The evidence establishing a change in conditions is considerably more impressive than the bare allegations of appellee's motion. For one thing, appellee was pregnant and expected to deliver shortly before her scheduled departure for Japan in October, 1982. This circumstance promised a significant family event, one that could best be shared by having all of the children under one roof. Another development of significance was the strengthening of the bonds of affection between the son and the mother. For a period immediately following the dissolution and particularly after the mother's remarriage, there was a period of estrangement between mother and son, causing the mother to experience considerable difficulty in attempting to enjoy visitation with the son. There is evidence in the record that the father, although a fit and loving parent, was accountable at least to some extent for this period of difficult relations, and it appears that he made and permitted disparaging remarks concerning the mother in the childrens' presence. It is undisputed, however, that in recent months prior to the modification hearing, the son had become reconciled with his mother, and more particularly, had begun to exhibit an appreciation for and to enjoy the experience of living in the family unit consisting of his mother, stepfather, and his sister. The anticipated addition of a new family member was a circumstance that might be expected to further enhance the quality of life the children would share with appellee and their stepfather. Appellee, a teacher, further noted the fact that she had rendered needed assistance to the son in his schoolwork, and since she did not expect to be employed while in Japan, would be available there for further assistance on a regular basis.
Both parties appeared to recognize, to a degree, the benefits the children might be expected to receive from the experience of travel and exposure to a foreign culture. The father understandably argued that these benefits could be more satisfactorily achieved by leaving them with him in Jacksonville during the school year, and by allowing visitation with the mother during their summer vacation from school. The mother's position emphasized the change in her relationship with her son, the beneficial effects of the family unit living together during the school year, and the fact that she would be available as a mother full-time. She also pointed out the potentially devastating effects upon the daughter if separated from her for an extended period of time, which would have been the case if the father's request for custody of the daughter had been granted. She further urged that the childrens' travel to visit with the father during the summer months could readily be arranged, and she further offered full cooperation with the father by assisting in securing housing for him if he should desire to visit Japan.
After hearing all the evidence, which we find no need to summarize in its entirety, the trial judge was persuaded that the alternatives presented by the mother would promote the best interests of the children. Accordingly, he ordered that the primary physical residence of the son should be with the mother, and she would be allowed to take the children to Japan.
We acknowledge the serious impact upon the father's visitation rights created by the children's temporary residence in Japan. In earlier days, before the advent of modern communications and means of travel, a move even to a neighboring state could have meant severe deprivation and in some cases, as a practical matter, virtual destruction of parental access to a child. Even today, restriction of removal may be necessary to preserve parental rights, and there is no doubt that the courts retain the power to restrict the movement of children of divorced parents out of state, or out of the country — or out of a county, for that matter. Brandon v. Faulk, supra, footnote 6; Scheiner v. Scheiner, 336 So.2d 406 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1976); Costa v. Costa, 429 So.2d 1249 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983). On the other hand, there is no restriction on change of residence by a custodial parent unless such a restriction is contained in the final judgment of dissolution, and even if such restriction does appear, the custodial parent is not barred from obtaining a modification — -upon a showing of a substantial change in circumstances and that it would be in the best interests of the child — approving removal of the child from the state or jurisdiction. Scheiner v. Scheiner, 336 So.2d 406 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1976); Viltz v. Viltz, 384 So.2d 1348 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1980); Giachetti v. Giachetti, 416 So.2d 27 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); Costa v. Costa, 429 So.2d 1249, supra; Award of custody to a nonresident parent, or to one who after the dissolution will take up residence in another state, or modification of custody based on a change in parental residence, is not an unusual event. See, annotation 15 A.L.R.2d 432, "Nonresidence as affecting one's right to custody of child," and later case service supplementing the annotation. Unlike the custodial parents in Giachetti, Costa, and Brandon v. Faulk, supra, appellee here in the judgment of the trial court carried the burden of showing grounds for a change in custody and temporary residence outside the United States. Cf. Viltz v. Viltz, supra. We are not at liberty to disturb that ruling absent a showing of abuse of discretion. Dinkel v. Dinkel, 322 So.2d 22 (Fla.1975).
We are reminded of the deference which must be accorded a trial judge's rulings on custody matters by the Dinkel court's quotation (322 So.2d at 24) from Grant v. Corbitt, 95 So.2d 25, 28 (Fla.1957):
[Tjhis court cannot, in any type of case, overturn the decision of a Chancellor made in the exercise of his judicial discretion in the absence of a clear showing of an abuse thereof; and, in a child custody case, the opportunity of the Chancellor to observe the demeanor and personalities of the parties and their witnesses and to feel forces, powers and influences that cannot be discerned by merely reading the record, assumes a new importance because of the many intangibles that must be evaluated in deciding the delicate question of child custody.
In this connection we note that this was not the first appearance of these parties before the trial judge.
Finally, we are inclined to avoid sweeping generalizations concerning whether the 1982 amendments pertaining to child custody reflect a legislative purpose to make it more difficult or less difficult for a parent to change the physical residence of a child to a place far removed from the residence of the other parent. Under what conditions the best interests and welfare of a given child may be served by a court order, aimed at preserving close physical proximity of the child to the noncustodial parent, and to what extent consideration of physical proximity may be allowed to control at the expense of other equally important factors affecting the child, in our opinion depends upon the varying facts and circumstances of each case. It seems obvious that the practical demands of a mobile society in today's shrinking world will at times collide head-on with the twin goals of maintaining a child's close relationships with both parents, and preserving to the maximum extent possible the right of both parents to retain full parental rights and responsibilities for the child. The resolution of this conflict in keeping with the child's best interests will produce one result in one case, a different result in a different case. The best result, of course, is most likely to be the one arrived at by the parents by their own mutual agreement; and that is perhaps the ultimate objective that will be achieved by the 1982 amendments and other efforts to legislatively deal with child custody issues.
Turning briefly to the remaining points raised on appeal, we find no reversible error in the trial court's rulings allowing appellee's husband to testify as to living conditions at Misawa Air Base, nor in allowing appellee to introduce into evidence what purports to be a pamphlet issued by the Department of the Navy and an Air Force newsletter containing further details and particulars concerning the area, including educational, cultural and recreational facilities available. The husband's testimony amounts to nothing more than his considered opinion as to what the family might expect in the way of living conditions at the foreign base. In order to inform himself, having never before been stationed there, he talked to other military personnel who had been, and read reports and pamphlets concerning the base. The basis for his knowledge would obviously bear on the weight and credibility of his testimony. The essential facts, however, are that the children would be residing in a peaceful, civilized, foreign country, as military dependents on a United States military base, in the care and custody of their mother. The reasonably informed opinion of one who would share in the responsibility for the well-being of appellee and the children seems to us well within the range of permissible testimony in a proceeding of this kind. We think it would add nothing to the jurisprudence of this state to expound some technical ground for the admissibility of this evidence. The trial judge has a wide latitude in ruling on admissibility of evidence, and we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's rulings.
Upon review of the entire proceeding, we are of the opinion that the trial court's decision to change custody of the parties' son and to permit removal of the children to Japan for a two-year period of time is supported by evidence adequately demonstrating a change in circumstances and that the change is in the best interests of the children. We also find that it was not improper for the trial court to fail to limit the children's residence outside Florida to the two-year period in Japan, nor was it error to order appellant to continue child support payments while the children are in Japan.
The order appealed from is AFFIRMED.
BOOTH, J., concurs.
ZEHMER, J., dissents With Opinion.
. Paragraph 12 of the final judgment of dissolution provided: "Neither party shall remove or aid, encourage or initiate the removal of the children beyond the boundaries of the State of Florida for any period of time that will conflict with the other party's custodial or visitation privileges and responsibilities without first obtaining written permission of the other party or the court."
. In addition to introducing the new concept of "shared parental • responsibility," the 1982 amendments to Section 61.13 added one additional factor (subsection (3)(a)) to be considered in determining the best interests of the child. In our opinion the amendments are primarily "remedial" in nature, and there would be no prohibition against their retrospective application. See, 30 Fla.Jur., "Statutes," § 152, pp. 321-322. See, also, Ryan v. Ryan, 277 So.2d 266 (Fla.1973), holding that the 1971 "no-fault" dis- solution of marriage law applies retroactively to existing marriages. In addition, Chapter 82-96, § 3, provides that the new provisions shall be applicable to all proceedings under Chapter 61 that are pending on the effective date of the act, July 1, 1982. Cf. Malchiodi v. Malchiodi, 431 So.2d 301 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1983), indicating that the new act has no retroactive application to judgments which became final prior to July 1, 1982, the effective date of the amendments. We would agree that the new act does not in itself create new grounds for modification of existing custody judgments. See, Judge Lewis M. Kap-ner, "Shared parental responsibility: Questions and answers," The Florida Bar Journal, March (1983), p. 163. However, if grounds for modification otherwise exist, it is our conclusion that the new provisions would guide the actions of the trial court in providing a remedy.
. The reasonable preference of the child is but one of the statutory factors. Standing alone, this factor does not warrant a modification of custody. Elkins v. Vanden Bosch, 433 So.2d 1251 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1983).
. Cf. Stricklin v. Stricklin, 383 So.2d 1183, 1184 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980), in which the District Court held that the trial court's error in holding that the law no longer requires a change in circumstances was "a departure from established rules," commanding a reversal.
. We caution that as a general rule the mere fact of remarriage and improved circumstances of the non-custodial parent will not be considered as providing sufficient grounds for modification of custody. See, e.g. Sanders v. Sanders, supra; Wiggins v. Wiggins, 411 So.2d 263 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Stricklin v. Stricklin, supra, footnote 5. Cf. Prevatt v. Penney, 138 So.2d 537 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1962); Brandon v. Faulk, 287 So.2d 714 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974).
. Although we find no necessity to agree or disagree with these opinions and comments in the disposition of the case, see, Judge Glick-stein's thoughtful majority opinion in Costa v. Costa, supra, and Judge Anstead's equally reflective dissenting opinion. Note also the comment in Scheiner v. Scheiner, supra, 336 So.2d at 408, that the Dissolution of Marriage Act of 1971 "substantially increases a father's rights to custody and visitation." The view has also been expressed that the 1982 amendments to Chapter 61 make it more difficult for the primary residential parent to move out of state, sin'ce the new law greatly expands the alternate parent's rights, thus imposing a greater burden of proof upon the moving parent. Kapner, "Shared parental responsibility: Questions and answers," The Florida Bar Journal, March (1983), p. 163.