Case Name: KENNETH ROBINSON, AN INFANT BY HIS PARENT AND GUARDIAN AD LITEM, ERNESTINE ROBINSON, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS, v. WILLIAM T. CAHILL, GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1976-05-13
Citations: 70 N.J. 155
Docket Number: 
Parties: KENNETH ROBINSON, AN INFANT BY HIS PARENT AND GUARDIAN AD LITEM, ERNESTINE ROBINSON, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS, v. WILLIAM T. CAHILL, GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Reports
Volume: 70
Pages: 155–178

Head Matter:
KENNETH ROBINSON, AN INFANT BY HIS PARENT AND GUARDIAN AD LITEM, ERNESTINE ROBINSON, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS, v. WILLIAM T. CAHILL, GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.
Argued March 15, 1976
Decided May 13, 1976.
Mr. Lewis B. Kaden, Special Counsel to the Governor, argued the cause for appellant Governor of the State of New Jersey (Mr. Kaden, of counsel and on the brief; Ms. Judith Nallin, Mr. Arthur Winkler and Mr. Walter Bliss, Jr., Assistant Counsel to the Governor, on the brief).
Mr. Stephen Skillman, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for appellants Treasurer of the State of New Jersey, Commissioner of Education of the State of New Jersey, New Jersey State Board of Education and State of New Jersey (Mr. William F. Hyland, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney; Mr. Skillmam, of counsel and on the brief; Ms. Jane Sommer, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief which was filed only on behalf of the Attorney General) .
Mr. David Goldberg argued the cause for appellants President of the Senate of the State of New Jersey and the Senate of the State of New Jersey (Messrs. Warren, Goldberg and Berman, attorneys.)
Mr. Jack Borrus argued the cause for appellants Speaker of the General Assembly of the State of New Jersey and the General Assembly of the State of New Jersey (Messrs. Borrus, Goldin and Foley, attorneys).
Mr. Harold J. Ruvoldt, Jr. argued the cause for respondents (Messrs. Ruvoldt and Ruvoldt, attorneys and Special Counsel to Mr. Dermis L. McGill, Corporation Counsel of the City of Jersey City, Mr. Frank H. Blatz, Jr., Corporation Counsel of the City of Plainfield, Mr. Joseph LaCava, Corporation Counsel of the City of Paterson and Mr. Julius Fielo, Corporation Counsel of the City of East Orange).
Mr. Paul L. Tractenberg and Mr. David G. Lubell, a member of the New York bar, argued the cause for amid curiae Education Committee, Newark Chapter, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey (Messrs. Tractenberg, Lubell and Frank Askin, attorneys; Mr. Stephen Eisdorfer, on the brief).
Mr. William Zaino argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey School Boards Association (Mr. Zaino, attorney; Mr. David W. Carroll, on the brief).
Mr. Casset B. Buhlman, Jr. argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey Education Association (Messrs. Buhlman and Butrym, attorneys).
Mr. Andrew T. Berry argued the cause on behalf of amici curiae Township of Livingston and the Boards of Education of the School Districts of Montclair, Berkeley Heights, Chatham Township, New Providence, Rumson, Sandyston Walpack, Summit and Millburn; Mr. Berry, of counsel; Mr. Arthur F. Dicker III, on the brief).
Mr. Robert T. Pickett and Mr. David C. Long, a member of the Illinois bar, argued the cause for amicus curiae The Education Reform Project of The Greater Newark Urban Coalition (Messrs. Pickett and Jennings, attorneys; Mr. Pickett, of counsel and on the brief; Mr. Long, on the brief).
Mr. James L. Wilson argued the cause for amici curiae Boards of Education of the Township of Bass River, Town ship of Eagleswood, Township of Long Beach Island, Borough of Tuekerton and Pinelands Regional School District.
Mr. Alfred W. Kiefer argued the cause for amicus curiae Board of Education of the Borough of Hasbrouck Heights (Messrs. Kiefer, Bollermann and Kaplowitz, attorneys).
Mr. William DeLorenzo, Jr. argued the cause for amicus curiae Board of Education of the Borough of Little Perry.
Mr. Arthur J. Sullivan argued the cause for amicus curiae City of Clifton.
Mr. Morton Feldman submitted a brief on behalf of amici curiae Pleasantville Taxpayers Association, Weymouth Taxpayers Association, Association of Concerned Citizens of Vineland and Gilbert Cramer.
Mr. Bertram F. Busch submitted briefs on behalf of amici curiae Boards of Education of the Township of Forth Brunswick and the Township of Monroe (Messrs. Busch and Busch, attorneys).
Mr. Joseph A. Hallock submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Board of Education of Lincoln Park (Messrs. Hoffmann, Fiorello and Hallock, attorneys).
Mr. Jeffrey L. Reiner submitted a letter memorandum on behalf of amicus curiae Morris School District (Messrs. Meyner, Landis and Verdon, attorneys).
Mr. Howard Butensky submitted a letter memorandum on behalf of amicus 'curiae Little Egg Harbor Township (Messrs. Kelly and Butensky, attorneys).
Mr. Henry B. Kessler submitted a memorandum on behalf of amicus curiae Burlington County Special Services School District.
Mr. Joseph A. Maressa submitted a statement on behalf of amicus curiae Board of Education of Lower Camden County Regional High School District Humber One (Messrs. Maressa, Diadone and Wade, attorneys).

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
On January 30, 1976, a majority of this Court sustained the facial validity of the Public School Education Act of 1975 ("the 1975 Act"), L. 1975, c. 212, N. J. S. A. 18A:7A-1 et seq. Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N. J. 449 (Robinson V). The enactment of this statute on September 29, 1975, was the culmination of several years of litigation and of activity by the other branches of government consequent upon the adjudication by this Court of the unconstitutionality of the provisions of previous statutes governing the financing of public schools. Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N. J. 473, 480 (1973) (Robinson I).
Our determination in Robinson Y was reached on the assumption that "complete funding [would] be forthcoming to furnish the necessary means to put [the 1975 Act] into full operation" Robinson V, 69 N. J. at 454, n. 2, absent which funding that statute "could never be considered a constitutional compliance with the 1875 amendment to the New Jersey Constitution — adjuring the legislative establishment of a system of thorough and efficient education." Id. (emphasis supplied).
We retained jurisdiction and stated that if the Legislature did not provide for such funding by April 6, 1976, we would issue an order to show cause why certain specific or other relief, including injunctive relief, should not be mandated. We accelerated the issuance of the order, and briefs were submitted and argument was held. To date there has been no final legislative action funding the financial aid provisions of the 1975 Act.
The continuation of the existing unconstitutional system of financing the schools into yet another school year cannot be tolerated. It is the Legislature's responsibility to create a constitutional system. As we stated in Robinson I, supra, 62 N. J. at 520, "The judiciary cannot unravel the fiscal skein." The Legislature has not yet met this constitutional obligation. Accordingly, we shall enjoin the existing unconstitutional method of public school financing.
We therefore order as follows:
On and after July 1, 1976, every public officer, state, county or municipal, is hereby enjoined from expending any funds for the support of any free public school. This injunctive order shall not apply to:
1. Payment of principal, interest and redemption of existing school bonds, anticipation notes and like obligations.
2. The cost of maintenance and security of school properties.
3. The payment of contractual obligations for capital construction, necessary repairs and like expenses necessary for the protection of school properties.
4. Contributions toward teachers' pensions.
5. Payment of existing obligations for Blue Cross, Blue Shield, social security and similar commitments.
6. Payment of all insurance premiums.
Eurther applications for clarification of this injunctive order may be made to the Court.
This injunction will not become effective if timely legislative action is taken providing for the funding of the 1975 Act for the school year 1976-1977, effective July 1, 1976, or upon any other legislative action effective by that date providing for a system of financing the schools in compliance with the Education Clause of the Constitution.
So ordered.
We recognize full well, along with Justice Mountain, the compelling force of Professor Cox's assertion that an injunctive order is "no answer" to the dilemma created by legislative inaction. See Com, The Role of the Supreme Court in American Government 95 (1976). But Professor Cox hastens to acknowledge that "[n]ot to act would be to recognize judicial futility." Id. He suggests that "[t]he Court will scarcely perform its historical function of protecting the individual in his relation with the State unless substantive constitutional rights and the processes of constitutional adjudication can be adapted so as retain vitality despite the difficulties of the new milieu." Id. at 98.
However our decision today may be characterized — and we pause to observe that injunctive relief, a traditional remedy, can hardly be thought of as the product of unwarranted judicial "activism" in light of the history of this litigation or in contrast to the other remedies alluded to in our February 19, 1976, Order to Show Cause — our reluctance to issue it is far outweighed by the necessities of the situation before us.
It might be noted that Professor Cox delineates four possible remedies (none of which we pass upon presently as to possible constitutionality) which a legislature might adopt to finance public education:
Should public school education be centrally financed out of State revenues? Or should the State adopt the ingenious "district power-equalization" scheme, under which a district with a tax base per pupil above the State-wide average would contribute part of the school revenues it chose to raise to districts whose tax base per pupil was below the State-wide average? A third possibility might be to redraw school district lines to equalize the tax bases. A fourth would be to remove commercial, industrial, and mineral property from the local tax rolls, tax this property State-wide and use the proceeds to equalize inequalities resulting from the disparities in the remaining local tax bases. From a [federal] constitutional standpoint it would not matter what choice was made [so long as the constitutional objective was achieved]. [Cox, supra, n. 1, at 9A-95],