Case Name: Todd ADAMSON, Appellant/Cross-Appellee v. Sandra Lynn CHAVIS, Appellee/Cross-Appellant
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1996-04-26
Citations: 672 So. 2d 624
Docket Number: No. 95-3912
Parties: Todd ADAMSON, Appellant/Cross-Appellee v. Sandra Lynn CHAVIS, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Judges: ERVIN and MINER, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 672
Pages: 624–629

Head Matter:
Todd ADAMSON, Appellant/Cross-Appellee v. Sandra Lynn CHAVIS, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
No. 95-3912.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
April 26, 1996.
Douglas H. Pike, Atlanta, and Sandra J. Mathis of Rogers, Towers, Bailey, Jones & Gay, Jacksonville, for AppellanVCross-Ap-pellee.
Nancy N. Nowlis, and Barry Sinoff, Jacksonville, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
The father in this appeal from a final judgment of paternity challenges the court's adoption of the mother's proposed visitation schedule. We find merit in the father's claim regarding the limited visitation schedule and therefore reverse on that issue. We affirm without further discussion, however, the issue raised on cross-appeal challenging that part of the final order which changes the child's last name to that of appellant.
The mother, who currently resides in Jacksonville, filed a paternity action on March 10, 1995, against appellant, the father of their child bom on October 6, 1994. The suit requested a determination of paternity, establishment of child support and contribution for medical expenses, a determination of shared parental responsibility with the mother's home as primary physical residence of the child, and establishment of a visitation schedule for the father. In his answer, the father, who lives in Ohio, acknowledged paternity, sought joint custody, and requested visitation not only for himself, but also for the child's paternal grandparents, who live in Georgia. The father has always admitted paternity and provided financial support for the child, including paying for part of the child's medical expenses. Both parties submitted proposed visitation schedules.
The court, at the hearing held on September 22, 1995, stated that the final order would not adopt the visitation schedule of either party, but would provide a compromise schedule. The final order, however, adopted the mother's proposed visitation schedule without alteration. In the final judgment, the court stated that no overnight visitation would be permitted to the father for some time because an eleven-month-old child has "certain emotional needs and cognitive limitations" that mitigate against it. The court recognized that the father and paternal grandparents clearly desired to establish a relationship with the little girl as soon as possible, but stated that because they lived so far away this would be difficult while the child is an infant and preschooler.
The visitation schedule initially provides for a few hours of visitation on alternating weekends in Jacksonville until the child is two. The father is permitted a single overnight visit each month when the child is two (from Saturday afternoon to Sunday afternoon). After the child turns three, the father may take the child out of Jacksonville on his two monthly opportunities for an overnight visit.- The father is not permitted a full weekend visit, i.e., Friday afternoon until Monday morning, until the child is in kindergarten, and he is not permitted any extended visitation with the child until the summer before she enters first grade. The visitation schedule makes no provision for visitation by the paternal grandparents.
"[I]t is the responsibility of the trial court . to establish a visitation schedule in compliance with the evidence and in accordance with Florida law." Wattles v. Wattles, 631 So.2d 349, 350 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). Section 61.13(2)(b)l., Florida Statutes (1994), provides that
[t]he court shall determine all matters relating to custody of each minor child of the parties in accordance with the best interests of the child and in accordance with the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. It is the public policy of this state to assure that each minor child has frequent and continuing contact with both parents after the parents separate or the marriage of the parties is dissolved and to encourage parents to share the rights and responsibilities of childrearing. After considering all relevant facts, the father of the child shall be given the same consideration as the mother in determining the primary residence of a child irrespective of the age or sex of the child.
This statute also controls custody disputes between parents who never married. In the Interest of S.M.H., 531 So.2d 228 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Collinsworth v. O'Connell, 508 So.2d 744 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).
The above-cited statute abolished the "tender years doctrine," which gave preference to the mother of a child of tender years in custody issues. Ketola v. Ketola, 636 So.2d 850 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). This and other courts also have rejected the use of the tender years doctrine in determining visitation rights. The trial court in Kerr v. Kerr, 486 So.2d 708 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986), had refused overnight visitation of a child with his father because of the child's youth. The Fifth District reversed and stated that there was no evidence that the father was unable to care for his child overnight and he was certainly willing to do so. Id. This court also has reversed a trial court order that restricted a father's visitation with his son based on the child's youth. Saucier v. Willis, 656 So.2d 252 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). The trial court in the instant case found both parents to be fit and recognized both at hearing and in the final judgment that the distance between Florida and Ohio would be a daunting factor for the father in exercising any visitation at all. The visitation schedule adopted by the court, however, in no way takes this into account. The court's order requires the father to travel from Ohio for sharply limited visitation with his child in Jacksonville. As stated previously, the father cannot have a single overnight visit with his child until she is two years old, and he is only allowed to take her out of Jacksonville for a single night when she is halfway through her kindergarten year. The father under the circumstances and visitation schedule of this case must wait several years until he is permitted visitation that affords him any meaningful opportunity to establish a relationship with his child. The absence of opportunities for overnight and extended visits and for visitation other than in Jacksonville for many years is based expressly on the child's youth and implicitly on the idea that the child is too young to be apart from her mother. This application of the abolished tender years doctrine is error.
The decision to impose limitations on visitation, moreover, must be supported by some evidence in the record showing that the restrictions are necessary. Kent v. Burdick, 591 So.2d 994 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (citing Goodman v. Goodman, 571 So.2d 23 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)). The instant court's determination to limit visitation was based solely on the youth of the child. There was no testimony regarding any need to restrict the father's opportunity for meaningful visitation with his child. The final order in fact states that the father "has admitted paternity and stands ready to meet his responsibilities and obligations as a father toward the parties' minor child."
Accordingly, the visitation schedule is reversed and remanded. The issue raised on cross-appeal is affirmed.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
ERVIN and MINER, JJ., concur.
WEBSTER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with written opinion.
. The mother stipulated at the hearing that because the father is an entry-level assistant college football and track coach in Wooster, Ohio, and cannot visit on weekends during those sport seasons, that visitation could be during the week. This stipulation does not appear in the order.
. We also note that the visitation schedule's silence on visitation for the paternal grandparents apparently means that they may only see their grandchild when their son is able to visit. No provision is made that they may use their son's visitation times when he cannot.