Case Name: In the Interest of Kelsey C.R., a person Under the Age of 17: State of Wisconsin, Petitioner-Respondent, v. Kelsey C.R., Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner
Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Wisconsin
Decision Date: 2001-05-31
Citations: 243 Wis. 2d 422
Docket Number: No. 99-3095
Parties: In the Interest of Kelsey C.R., a person Under the Age of 17: State of Wisconsin, Petitioner-Respondent, v. Kelsey C.R., Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner.
Judges: 
Reporter: Wisconsin Reports Second
Volume: 243
Pages: 422–475

Head Matter:
In the Interest of Kelsey C.R., a person Under the Age of 17: State of Wisconsin, Petitioner-Respondent, v. Kelsey C.R., Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner.
Supreme Court
No. 99-3095.
Oral argument March 1, 2001.
Decided May 31, 2001.
2001 WI 54
(Also reported in 626 N.W.2d 777.)
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner there were briefs and oral argument by Susan E. Alesia, assistant state public defender,
For the petitioner-respondent the cause was argued by Christian R. Larsen, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general.

Opinion:
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.
¶1. This case arises out of a stop and pat-down search of Petitioner Kelsey C.R. (Kelsey). Two police officers came upon Kelsey sitting alone after dark in a high-crime neighborhood. The officers were concerned that she was a runaway so they began asking her questions. After Kelsey had responded to a few questions, the police told her to "stay put." Kelsey then fled from the police. The police chased and eventually caught her. The officers detained Kelsey, and had a pat-down search of her person for weapons conducted. The police found a loaded handgun on Kelsey, and she was charged with possession of a dangerous weapon. Kelsey moved the circuit court to suppress the results of the pat-down — the handgun — as evidence. The circuit court denied her motion and the court of appeals affirmed. We granted Kelsey's petition for review.
¶ 2. To resolve this case, we address three distinct points in the encounter between the police and Kelsey. First, did the police seize Kelsey, thereby invoking her constitutional protection against unreasonable seizures, when they-told her to "stay put" but she ran away? Second, was The detention of Kelsey after she fled and the police caught her reasonable? Third, was the pat-down search of Kelsey reasonable?
¶ 3. We hold that the circuit court properly denied Kelsey's motion to suppress the evidence. The police did not seize Kelsey when they told her to "stay put" but she ran away, because she did not yield to the police officers' show of authority. Even if this initial exchange was considered a seizure, it was justified by the police community caretaker function. We further hold that the investigative detention of Kelsey, after she fled from the police, was reasonable because the officers had reasonable suspicion that Kelsey had committed, was committing, or was about to commit, a crime. Lastly, we hold that the pat-down search, or frisk, of Kelsey was reasonable. We conclude that the frisk was reasonable because the officers had reasonable suspicion that Kelsey may be armed and dangerous. We therefore affirm the court of appeals.
f-H
¶ 4. On March 1, 1999, at about 7:40 p.m., darkness had descended on the high-crime neighborhood of Eighth and Mitchell Streets in the City of Milwaukee, when Police Officers Bernard Gonzalez (Gonzalez) and Rafael Rivera (Rivera) observed a juvenile female who appeared to need their help. The officers observed Kelsey sitting in the middle of the block leaning up agaipst a storefront. It was a commercial area, but most of the stores were closed and few people were around. Gonzalez testified at the suppression hearing that it was not a good area, especially for a young female alone at night. In addition, Kelsey appeared to be withdrawn, sitting in a huddled position with her hood up over her head.
¶ 5. The officers were concerned that Kelsey might be a runaway, so they stopped the police car and rolled down the window to ask her a few questions. The officers were on the opposite side of the street from where Kelsey was located. The police car was unmarked, but both officers were wearing their uniforms. Gonzalez asked Kelsey if she was all right. Kelsey responded that she was. Gonzalez asked Kelsey how old she was. Kelsey told him that she was 15. When Gonzalez inquired as to where she lived, Kelsey pointed in a direction and said that she lived over there. Gonzalez then asked Kelsey what she was doing. Kelsey said that she was waiting for a friend. This answer raised Gonzalez's curiosity, because he thought that most people waiting for a friend would be standing on the corner, rather that sitting in the middle of the block. Gonzalez thought Kelsey's answers were evasive and was still concerned that Kelsey was a runaway, so he told her to "stay put" so-he could make a U-turn with the police car to be on the same side of the street as Kelsey and ask her more questions. Kelsey then fled.
¶ 6. After a 30-40 second chase, the officers caught Kelsey. When asked why she ran, Kelsey told the officers that she was afraid, but could not explain why she was afraid. The officers checked a national computer database which indicated that Kelsey was not a runaway. Kelsey provided the officers with her telephone number. Gonzalez called the number and spoke with Kelsey's mother. She told Gonzalez that Kelsey was not a runaway, and asked Gonzalez to bring Kelsey home. In addition, Kelsey's mother told Gonzalez that she could not understand why Kelsey fled the police. At this time Gonzalez decided to issue Kelsey a citation for resisting or obstructing an investigation.
- ¶ 7. Before the officers placed Kelsey in the police car to take her home, they wanted to perform a pat-down search. Because Kelsey was a female, the officers called for a female officer to conduct the search. The closest female officer was downtown so the officers had to wait about 20 minutes for her to arrive. While they were waiting for the female officer to arrive, Gonzalez described Kelsey as very cooperative. When the female officer arrived, she immediately conducted a pat-down search of Kelsey. During the search, she felt something hard in the front of Kelsey's jeans. When she asked what the object was, Kelsey did not respond. The female officer asked if she could take the object out. Kelsey sighed and said yes. The object was a small, loaded handgun. Kelsey was then taken to the District 2 police station.
¶ 8. The State petitioned for a determination that Kelsey was delinquent based on the possession of a dangerous weapon by a person under 18, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.60 (1997-98). Kelsey moved to suppress the evidence found during the pat-down search, claiming that the officers did not have probable cause to arrest her for resisting or obstructing an investigation, and that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion for the investigative detention.
¶ 9. The circuit court denied Kelsey's motion to suppress. The court concluded that there were two stops, one when the officers began asking Kelsey questions, and a second when the officers caught Kelsey after she fled. The court held that the first stop was justified, because the officers had reasonable suspicion that Kelsey was a runaway. The court held that the second stop was justified, because Kelsey fled from the police. The court then determined that the pat-down search of Kelsey was reasonable, because the officers were doing good police work and were concerned with their safety. After the court denied the motion to suppress, Kelsey admitted to being delinquent based on a violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.60. Kelsey then appealed, claiming that the circuit court erroneously denied her suppression motion.
¶ 10. The court of appeals affirmed. First, the court concluded that the initial investigation, when the officers began asking Kelsey questions, was justified by the police community caretaker function, because the officers were concerned that Kelsey might be a runaway. In addition, the court stated that this initial stop was justified by the authoritjcgranted to police to take runaways into custody. Second, the court held that the stop of Kelsey, after the police chase, was justified by The fact that Kelsey fled from the police. Third, the court held that the pat-down search of Kelsey was reasonable because it was prudent for the officers to frisk Kelsey before placing her inside the police car. The court concluded that the intrusion of a pat-down search was outweighed by the officers concern for their safety. We granted Kelsey's petition for review.
I — I hH
¶ 11. This case presents three issues. One, did the police officers seize Kelsey, thereby invoking her constitutional protection against unreasonable seizures, when Gonzalez told her to "stay put" but she ran away? Two, was the investigative detention after she fled based on a reasonable suspicion that she had committed, was committing, or was about to commit, a crime? Three, was the pat-down search of Kelsey based on a reasonable suspicion that she may be armed and dangerous?
¶ 12. To resolve the issues presented by this case, we must review the circuit court's denial of Kelsey's motion to suppress evidence. The issues in this case involve the constitutional protection against unreason able searches and seizures. The determination of whether there is reasonable suspicion for an investigative detention and a subsequent pat-down search presents a question of constitutional fact. State v. Martwick, 2000 WI 5, ¶ 18, 231 Wis. 2d 801, 604 N.W.2d 552. We apply a two-step standard of review to questions of constitutional fact. Id. First, we review the circuit court's findings of historical fact and uphold them unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. Second, we review the circuit court's determination regarding reasonable suspicion de novo. Id. We benefit from the analyses of the circuit court and the court of appeals, however.
HH I — I
¶ 13. The parties make several arguments with respect to the issues before us. The State contends that the initial exchange between the police and Kelsey, when the officers began asking her questions, told her to "stay put" but she ran away, was not a seizure. The State asserts that not all police-citizen encounters are seizures. For example, when a police officer seeks a citizen's voluntary cooperation through non-coercive questions, and does not restrain the citizen's liberty, then no seizure has occurred. By contrast, the State argues that a seizure occurs when a police officer, by the application of physical force, or by a show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen. The State claims that the initial exchange between Kelsey and the police, before Gonzalez told her to "stay put," was not a seizure because the police were just asking her questions in a non-confrontational manner.
¶ 14. The State also argues that no seizure occurred when Gonzalez told Kelsey to "stay put" but she ran away. According to the State, no seizure occurs when a police officer makes a show of authority to a citizen, but the citizen does not yield to that show of authority. The State claims that Gonzalez made a show of authority by telling Kelsey to "stay put," but Kelsey did not yield to that show of authority, rather, she ran away.
¶ 15. Even if the initial encounter was a seizure, the State contends that it was justified by the police community caretaker function. The State argues, and Kelsey concedes (Resp't-Appellant-Pet'r's Br. at 10), that the police were conducting a bona fide community cáretaker function by checking on Kelsey's welfare. The State also argues that the limited privacy intrusion on Kelsey, asking Kelsey to "stay put" so that the officers could determine if she was a runaway, was outweighed by the public interest in the protection of juveniles.
¶ 16. The State addresses the second issue, the constitutionality of the investigative detention after Kelsey fled, only in a footnote in its brief, stating that Kelsey does not challenge the constitutionality of this seizure. The State suggests that Kelsey makes this concession because flight from the police justifies an investigative detention.
¶ 17. With respect to the third issue, the State contends that the pat-down search of Kelsey was reasonable because the officers had reasonable suspicion that Kelsey was armed and dangerous. According to the State, there are specific facts in the record, when judged in the totality of the circumstances, that lead to a reasonable suspicion that Kelsey was armed and dangerous. First, the State argues that a relevant factor is that the pat-down search took place in a high-crime neighborhood. Second, the State argues that we should consider the fact that the pat-down search occurred at night when few people were around. The State claims that darkness is a factor because most assaults on police occur after dark. Third, the State suggests that Kelsey's flight from the police is perhaps the most important fact supporting the pat-down search, because it indicates that Kelsey had something to hide, like a weapon. In addition to the suspicion Kelsey created by her flight, the State argues that this suspicion was increased, because Kelsey could not adequately explain why she fled.
¶ 18. The State also contends that an additional fact supporting the reasonableness of the pat-down search was the need to place Kelsey in the police car. According to the State, a police officer should be allowed to conduct a pat-down search of a person placed in a police car to guard against an ambush from the back seat. The State argues that the officers had a need to place Kelsey in the police car, due to her mother's request that they bring Kelsey home, and that we should consider this need a factor in the totality of the circumstances justifying the pat-down search.
¶ 19. Kelsey contends that her initial encounter with the police, when Gonzalez told her to "stay put" and she fled, was a seizure and is, therefore, subject to the constitutional requirement of reasonableness. According to Kelsey, none of the justifications offered for this stop render this seizure reasonable.
¶ 20. Kelsey argues that the seizure is not justified, because the officers did not have a reasonable suspicion that some criminal activity was taking, or had taken, place. Kelsey asserts that Gonzalez did not have reasonable suspicion that she was involved in criminal activity, but that he only had a hunch that Kelsey might be a runaway.
¶ 21. Kelsey claims that the officers did not have the statutory authority to take her into custody, because Gonzalez did not have reasonable grounds to suspect that she was a runaway. Kelsey argues that the facts Gonzalez found suspicious were really facts demonstrating innocent conduct. The fact that Kelsey was sitting in the middle of the block could be explained by the fact she that was tired or bored, rather than to indicate that she was lying about waiting for a friend. Kelsey also disputes Gonzalez's claim that her answers to his questions were evasive. Kelsey contends that she gave direct answers to Gonzalez's questions that should have dispelled, rather than increased his suspicion. Kelsey also claims that her presence in a high-crime neighborhood, without additional facts, does not justify an investigative detention.
¶ 22. Kelsey also argues that the initial stop cannot be supported by the police community caretaker function, because the public interest did not outweigh the intrusion on her privacy. Kelsey claims that the public interest in investigating runaways falls on the low end of the scale. Kelsey also argues that there were other alternatives available to the officers besides stopping her, such as asking her more questions or continuing to patrol the neighborhood. In addition, Kelsey contends that the attendant circumstances did not support the stop, because the time of day, and the type of neighborhood, do not lead to a reasonable suspicion that she was a runaway, only to a hunch.
¶ 23. Kelsey claims that this initial stop was illegal, and, therefore, all evidence gathered as result of this stop must be suppressed. If the officers had not illegally stopped her, Kelsey argues that she would not have run, and, therefore, would not have been searched. Consequently, Kelsey argues that evidence of the gun found in her jpans must be suppressed.
¶ 24. Kelsey argues that this court should reaffirm the objective test for when a seizure occurs. According to Kelsey, a seizure occurs when a reasonable person would not feel free to leave. Kelsey urges us to reject the standard offered by the State, because the State's standard replaces the objective test, based on the officer's conduct, with a subjective test based on a citizen's reaction to that conduct. Under the "free to leave" standard, Kelsey claims that she was seized, because a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave when ordered by the police to "stay put."
¶ 25. Even if we conclude that this initial encounter was a legal stop, Kelsey contends that the pat-down search was unreasonable. The pat-down search was unreasonable because the police did not have a warrant, and there is no exception to the warrant requirement that applies. Kelsey cites examples of the exceptions such as consent and search incident to arrest. Kelsey argues that this was not a consent search, because neither Gonzalez and Rivera, nor the female officer who conducted the search, asked Kelsey for her permission. Kelsey also claims that this was not a search incident to arrest, because there was not an actual arrest.
¶ 26. Kelsey also contends that the pat-down search was not a valid frisk for weapons. According to Kelsey, there are no specific facts in the record that would support a reasonable suspicion that she was armed and dangerous. Kelsey points to the fact that Gonzalez testified that he wanted the search con ducted, because he was going to place her in the police car, not because of any suspicion that she was armed and dangerous. In this case, the search was conducted well before curfew on a person, Kelsey, who was not acting nervous, but instead was described as very cooperative. Kelsey also argues that the fact that she was in a high-crime neighborhood, without other specific facts, does not justify a pat-down search.
¶ 27. Kelsey also contends that the pat-down search was not justified by the police community caretaker function. Kelsey claims that Gonzalez's decision to issue Kelsey a citation for resisting or obstructing an investigation removes this case from the community caretaker analysis. According to Kelsey, Gonzalez's role as community caretaker ended when he decided to issue Kelsey the citation.
¶ 28. Kelsey also urges us to reject a blanket-rule pérmitting a pat-down search of every person placed in a police vehicle. Kelsey argues that no state has adopted such a rule, and that this court has explicitly rejected such a rule. Kelsey claims that a blanket-rule would allow the police to circumvent the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth'Amendment by asking a person to sit inside a police car. In addition, Kelsey contends that such a rule would eliminate the Fourth Amendment's requirements for a pat-down search for weapons because an officer would not need reasonable suspicion that a person was armed and dangerous.
IV
¶ 29. We begin our analysis at the point of the first encounter between the police and Kelsey. We consider whether the police seized Kelsey, when the officers told her to "stay put" but she ran away. If this initial exchange was a seizure, then it is subject to the reasonableness requirement of both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution. We ordinarily follow the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment when interpreting Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution. State v. Griffith, 2000 WI 72, ¶ 24, n.10, 236 Wis. 2d 48, 613 N.W.2d 72.
¶ 30. Not all police-citizen encounters are seizures. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991)(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, n.16 (1968)). A seizure occurs "when an officer, by means of physical force or a show of authority, restrains a person's liberty." State v. Harris, 206 Wis. 2d 243, 253, 557 N.W.2d 245 (1996)(citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 19, n.16). Included in this test for a seizure is the requirement that when a police officer makes a show of authority to a citizen, the citizen yields to that show of authority. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991).
¶ 31. In Hodari D., police officers came upon a group of young people huddled around a car. 499 U.S. at 622. The officers were traveling in an unmarked police car, but were wearing jackets with the word "Police" on the front and back. Id. When the group saw the officers approaching, they fled. Id. at 622-23. This flight raised the officers' suspicion, so they chased the fleeing youths. Id. at 623. One of the fleeing youths was Hodari D. Id. As one of the officers was chasing Hodari D., he saw Hodari D. [the juvenile] throw away what appeared to be a small rock. Id. Shortly thereafter, the officer caught Hodari D. and handcuffed him. Id. The "rock" that Hodari D. threw away was later determined to be crack cocaine. Id. In the juvenile proceeding that followed, Hodari D. moved the court to suppress evidence of the cocaine. Id. The trial court denied his motion without stating a reason. Id. The California Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the officer had seized Hodari D. when he saw the officer running after him. Id. The court held that this seizure was unreasonable and, therefore, that the evidence of cocaine had to be suppressed. Id. The California Supreme Court denied the State's petition for review, but the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id.
¶ 32. The United States Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 629. By examining dictionary definitions from the early 19th century to the present, the Court concluded that the word "seizure" requires actual physical control. Id. at 624. The Court then held that a seizure, when attempted by a show of authority rather than by the application of physical force, does not occur unless the citizen actually yields to the show of authority. Id. at 625-26. As an example, the Court stated that a seizure does not occur when an officer yells, "[s]top, in the name of the law," at a fleeing citi zen who continues to flee. Id. at 626. Accordingly, the Court held that the officer did not seize Hodari D. until he caught him after the chase. Id. at 629.
¶ 33. We agree with the State and will follow the Hodari D. standard for when a seizure occurs. In order to effect a seizure, an officer must make a show of authority, and the citizen must actually yield to that show of authority. In the present case, Gonzalez did make a show of authority to Kelsey when he told her to "stay put." An officer telling a citizen to "stay put" is similar to an officer telling a citizen "stop, in the name of the law." Kelsey, like Hodari D., did not weld to the officer, when he made the show of authority. See Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 622-23. When Gonzalez told Kelsey to "stay put," she ran away. We, therefore, conclude that no seizure occurred in the present case, until the officers applied physical force to Kelsey, by catching her after the 30-40 second chase.
¶ 34. Even if we considered this initial exchange between the police and Kelsey to be a seizure, it would be reasonable under the police community caretaker function. The community caretaker function provides that the police may act in certain situations which are " 'totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.'" State v. Anderson, 142 Wis. 2d 162, 166, 417 N.W.2d 411 (Ct. App. 1987)(Anderson IXquoting Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973)). Therefore, the police may seize a citizen without a warrant, when the police are performing a community caretaker function. Anderson I, 142 Wis. 2d at 166 (citing Cady, 413 U.S. at 441). However, a seizure conducted under the community caretaker function still must satisfy the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Anderson I, 142 Wis. 2d at 167-68.
¶ 35. To determine whether a seizure conducted under the community caretaker function is reasonable, this court must balance "the public need and interest furthered by the police conduct against the degree of and nature of the intrusion upon the privacy of the citizen." Id. at 168. In Anderson I, the court of appeals fashioned a three-step test to determine if a seizure based on the community caretaker function is reasonable. Id. at 169. A court must determine: "(1) that a seizure within the meaning of the [F]ourth [A]mendment has occurred; (2) if so, whether the police conduct was bona fide community caretaker activity; and (3) if so, whether the public need and interest outweigh the intrusion upon the privacy of the individual." Id.
¶ 36. We conclude that the three-step Anderson I test for a reasonable seizure under the community caretaker function is satisfied in the present case. For step one, we assume for the purpose of this analysis that a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurred. For. step two, Kelsey appropriately concedes that the police were, at least at some point, performing a bona fide community caretaker activity by checking to see if Kelsey was a runaway. For step three, we must consider the four relevant factors set forth in Anderson I to determine if the public need and interest outweighed the intrusion on Kelsey's privacy. These four factors are:
(I) the degree of the public interest and the exigency of the situation; (2) the attendant circumstances surrounding the seizure, including time, location, the degree of overt authority and force displayed; (3) whether an automobile is involved; and (4) the availability, feasibility and effectiveness of alternatives to the type of intrusion actually accomplished.
Id. at 169-70.
[II]
¶ 37. These four factors lead us to conclude that step three of the Anderson I test is satisfied in the present case. First, the degree of public interest and the exigency of the situation support the reasonableness of the seizure. There is a strong public interest in locating runaway children and juveniles, as evidenced by Wis. Stat. § 48.19(l)(d)4 and 938.19(l)(d)4. In addition, the exigency of the situation supports the reasonableness of the seizure, because given all the circumstances discussed herein, something bad could have happened to Kelsey had the officers not approached her. A juvenile, alone in a dangerous neighborhood, is vulnerable to kidnappers, sexual predators, and other criminals. Second, the attendant circumstances surrounding the seizure support its reasonableness, because Kelsey was alone, after dark, in a dangerous neighborhood. The degree of overt authority and the force displayed also support the reasonableness of the seizure because the intrusion on her was minimal, demonstrated by the fact that Gonzalez told Kelsey to "stay put," and did not apply any physical force. The third factor does not apply because Kelsey was not in an automobile at the time. Fourth, there were not any alternatives to asking Kelsey to stay where she was to answer some questions, that would have been either feasible or effective in dispelling the officers' concern that Kelsey was a runaway. We, therefore, conclude that, if this initial exchange was a seizure, then it was reasonable under the police community caretaker function.
V
¶ 38. We now turn to the second encounter between the police and Kelsey, by addressing the question of whether the investigative detention of Kelsey, after she fled, was based on a reasonable suspicion that she had committed, was committing, or was about to commit, a crime, and therefore was reasonable. Even though this issue is uncontested by the parties, it is important to consider the reasonableness of the investigative detention for an understanding of the entire encounter between the police and Kelsey. Further more, many of the facts that justify the investigative detention of Kelsey also justify the pat-down search.
¶ 39. As stated above, both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution protect against unreasonable seizures. An investigative detention is a seizure that requires constitutional protection. Terry, 392 U.S. at 16. This protection provides that "a police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest." Id. at 22.
¶ 40. Wisconsin law has recognized a Terry investigative detention as constitutional. We have adopted the Terry standard in State v. Chambers, 55 Wis. 2d 289, 294, 198 N.W.2d 377 (1972). In addition, the legislature codified the Terry standard in Wis. Stat. § 968.24. To interpret § 968.24, we look to Terry and the cases following it, such as State v. Waldner, 206 Wis. 2d 51, 55, 556 N.W.2d 681 (1996). In Waldner, we stated that, for a police officer to conduct an investigative detention, the officer must possess "specific and articulable facts which would warrant a reasonable belief that criminal activity was afoot." 206 Wis. 2d at 55. We review the facts in light of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the detention. State v. Jackson, 147 Wis. 2d 824, 833, 434 N.W.2d 386 (1989).
¶ 41. The test for reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot is an objective, common-sense test. Waldner, 206 Wis. 2d at 55-56. The test asks "[w]hat would a reasonable police officer reasonably suspect in light of his or her training and experience?" Id. at 56 (citing State v. Anderson, 155 Wis. 2d 77, 83-84, 454 N.W.2d 763 (1990) (Anderson III). This objective, common-sense approach strikes a balance between society's interest in the police preventing and detecting crime, and the individual's privacy interest. Waldner, 206 Wis. 2d at 56.
¶ 42. As stated above, we review the circuit court's conclusion that the investigative detention was reasonable with a two-step process. First, we will uphold the court's findings of historical fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Martwick, 2000 WI 5, ¶ 18. Second, we review the court's determination of reasonableness de novo. Id. The findings of fact relied on-by the circuit court to conclude that the investigative detention of Kelsey was reasonable are not clearly erroneous. The circuit court relied on the fact that Kelsey was a juvenile female sitting alone in a dangerous neighborhood. The fact that Kelsey was a minor and was sitting alone in a high-crime neighborhood is undisputed. In addition, the circuit court relied on the way Kelsey was sitting. It is undisputed that Kelsey was sitting in a huddled position with her hood up over her head. The circuit court also found that Kelsey's flight from the police heightened the officers' suspicion. The fact that Kelsey fled when Gonzalez told her to "stay put" is verified in the record and is undisputed. Upon de novo review, we conclude that the circuit court's determination that Kelsey's appearance, sitting alone in a high-crime neighborhood, her demeanor, sitting in a huddled position with her hood up over her head, and her flight from the police all justified the stop is a correct application of the law. In Anderson III, we held that flight from the police, in and of itself, creates reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. 155 Wis. 2d at 84.
¶ 43. The totality of the circumstances here supports a finding of reasonable suspicion to detain Kelsey. The fact that Kelsey was leaning against a store-front at a time when most of the stores were closed gave the officers reasonable suspicion that something was amiss. It was dark outside, and there were few people around. Criminal activity is more likely under such conditions. A reasonable person in the officers' position would reasonably suspect, based on the totality of these circumstances, that Kelsey had committed, was committing, or was about to commit, a crime. We therefore conclude that the investigative detention of Kelsey was reasonable.
¶ 44. The other requirement for an investigative detention is that it must last only long enough to fulfill the purpose of the stop. Griffith, 2000 WI 72 at ¶ 54. In the present case, the purpose of the stop was to either confirm or dispel the officers' suspicion that Kelsey was engaged in criminal activity. The officers asked Kelsey why she fled. Kelsey said she was afraid but did not state why she was afraid. This failure to explain adequately her flight increased the officers' suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. The officers then checked the computer and called Kelsey's mother to confirm that she was not a runaway. Knowing that Kelsey did not flee because she was a runaway served to increase the officers' suspicion. The officers then decided to conduct a pat-down search of Kelsey for weapons. Because Kelsey was a female, the officers called for a female officer to conduct the search, which is the preferred policy of the Milwaukee Police Department and a reasonable procedure. See State v. Guy, 172 Wis. 2d 86, 91, 492 N.W.2d 311 (1992). Because the nearest female officer was downtown, the officers and Kelsey had to wait 20 minutes for the female officer to arrive. Considering the totality of these circumstances, we conclude that the detention of Kelsey lasted only long enough to fulfill the purpose of the stop.
¶ 45. The detention could also be justified by the police community caretaker function. The investigative detention of Kelsey satisfies the three-step Anderson I test, set forth above. For step one, there was a seizure of Kelsey. An investigative detention is a seizure. Terry, 392 U.S. at 16. For step two, the officers were conducting a bona fide community caretaker activity. Even after Kelsey fled, the officers were still concerned that Kelsey might be a runaway. In fact, Kelsey's flight heightened the officers' suspicion that she was a runaway.
¶ 46. The four factors to be considered under step three of the Anderson I test also indicate that the public need and interest outweighed the intrusion on Kelsey's privacy. The analysis of these factors to the investigative detention of Kelsey is nearly identical to the analysis applied to the initial encounter. First, the degree of public interest and the exigency of the situation support the reasonableness of the investigative detention. There is a strong public interest in locating runaway children, as evidenced by Wis. Stat. § 48.19(l)(d)4 and 938.19(l)(d)4. In addition, the exigency of the situation supports the reasonableness of the investigative detention because, as stated above, something bad could have happened to Kelsey had the officers not detained her after she fled. Second, the attendant circumstances surrounding the investigative detention support its reasonableness because Kelsey was alone, after dark, in a dangerous neighborhood. The third factor does not apply because Kelsey was not in an automobile at the time. Fourth, there were not any alternatives to detaining Kelsey that would have been either feasible, or as effective, in dispelling the officers' concern that Kelsey was a runaway. We therefore conclude, after applying the Anderson I test, that the investigative detention of Kelsey, following the police chase, was also reasonable under the police community caretaker function.
VI
¶ 47. We now consider the third point of the encounter between the police and Kelsey by examining whether the pat-down search of Kelsey was based on reasonable suspicion that she might be armed and dangerous. A pat-down for weapons conducted by police, commonly known as a "frisk," is a search. State v. Morgan, 197 Wis. 2d 200, 208, 539 N.W.2d 887 (1995). Consequently, a frisk must satisfy the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution. In Terry, the United States Supreme Court balanced a police officer's need for protection from a potentially dangerous citizen, against the citizen's privacy interest in personal security. 392 U.S. at 23-25. The Court concluded that a police officer may conduct a frisk for weapons if the officer "reasonably believes that his safety may be in danger because the suspect he is investigating may be armed." State v. McGill, 2000 WI 38, ¶ 19, 234 Wis. 2d 560, 609 N.W.2d 795 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 24). The legislature codified this standard in Wis. Stat. § 968.25. As is the case with an investigative detention, the reasonable suspicion for a frisk must be based on "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." State v. Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d 128, 139, 456 N.W.2d 830 (1990)(citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21).
¶ 48. The test for reasonable suspicion that a person may be armed and dangerous is an objective test. Morgan, 197 Wis. 2d at 209. As stated in Terry, the test is "whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger." 392 U.S. at 27. In addition, the reasonableness of the officer's actions must be judged by considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding the frisk. Morgan, 197 Wis. 2d at 209.
¶ 49. In the present case, there are specific and articulable facts in the record to support the conclusion that the frisk of Kelsey by the female officer was reasonable. The same facts that justified the investigative detention of Kelsey after the police chase also justify the frisk. These are: Kelsey fled from the police; Kelsey's initial appearance — sitting in the mid- die of the block leaning against a storefront; Kelsey's demeanor in sitting in a huddled position with her hood up over her head; Kelsey's age; it was dark outside and there were few people around. See McGill, 2000 WI 38 at ¶ 32 (stating that this court has "consistently upheld protective frisks that occur in the evening hours, recognizing that at night, an officer's visibility is reduced by darkness and there are fewer people on the street to observe the encounter"). In .addition, the officer's reasonable suspicion is supported by the fact that the frisk occurred in a high-crime neighborhood. See Morgan, 197 Wis. 2d at 211 (holding that "an officer's perception of an area as 'high-crime' can be a factor justifying a search"). We, therefore, conclude that under the totality of the circumstances, the frisk of Kelsey was based on a reasonable suspicion that she was armed and dangerous.
¶ 50. There are two additional facts that support the frisk of Kelsey. First, Kelsey could not adequately explain why she fled from the police. She told the officers that she was afraid, but did not explain why she was afraid. It was reasonable for the officers to believe that Kelsey fled because she might be hiding a weapon. Second, when Gonzalez called Kelsey's mother, she asked him to bring Kelsey home. When this request was made, the officers had a reasonable basis to place Kelsey inside the police car. Courts in other jurisdictions have included placing someone inside a police car as a factor justifying a frisk for weapons. See State v. Varnado, 582 N.W.2d 886, 891 (Minn. 1998)(holding that "when an officer has a valid reasonable basis for placing a lawfully stopped citizen in a squad car, a frisk will often be appropriate without additional individual articulable suspicion"); State v. Evans, 618 N.E.2d 162, 167 (Ohio 1993)(holding that "the driver of a motor vehicle may be subjected to a brief pat-down search for weapons where the detaining officer has a lawful reason to detain said driver in the patrol car"); and People v. Tobin, 269 Cal. Rptr. 81, 85 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990)(holding that "the need to transport a person in a police vehicle in itself is an exigency which justifies a pat-search for weapons"). As in Morgan, this court is not adopting a blanket-rule that a police officer may frisk a person just because the officer is going to place that person inside a police vehicle. 197 Wis. 2d at 215-16. Such a rule might be found to eliminate the constitutional requirement that a search be reasonable. However, we conclude that a reasonable basis to place someone inside a police vehicle is a factor to be considered in the totality of the circumstances, when deciding the reasonableness of a pat-down search.
¶ 51. In summary, we conclude that the circuit court was correct in denying Kelsey's motion to suppress the evidence of the handgun. We conclude that the initial encounter between the police and Kelsey was not a seizure. Even if it was, it was reasonable under the police community caretaker function. We also conclude that the investigative detention of Kelsey was reasonable because the officers had reasonable suspicion that Kelsey had committed, was committing, or was about to commit, a crime. We further conclude that the pat-down search of Kelsey was reasonable, because the officers had reasonable suspicion that she may be armed and dangerous.
By the Court. — The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed.
Four other members of this court, Justices William A. Bablitch, Jon P. Wilcox, David T. Prosser, Jr., and Diane S. Sykes join this conclusion. However, Justices Sykes and Prosser would hold that the pat-down search of Kelsey was reasonable because the police officers had an objectively reasonable need to transport Kelsey in the police car. They, therefore, concur in the result, but not in the conclusion that the officers had reasonable suspicion that Kelsey may be armed and dangerous. Chief Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson and Justice Ann Walsh Bradley, although in disagreement with the mandate, agree with Justices Sykes and Prosser that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion that Kelsey may be armed and dangerous.
Gonzalez testified during the motion to suppress hearing that he could not remember when he issued Kelsey the citation. There is no other evidence in the record that a citation for resisting or obstructing an investigation was ever issued.
Wisconsin Stat. § 948.60 provides in pertinent part:
(1) In this section, "dangerous weapon" means any firearm, loaded or unloaded...
(2) (a) Any person under 18 years of age who possesses or goes armed with a dangerous weapon is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1997 — 98 version unless otherwise indicated.
Kelsey does not challenge the legality of the investigative detention after she fled from the police and they caught her. (Resp't-Appellant-Pet'r's Br. at 7.)
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states:
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution states:
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
State v. Anderson, 142 Wis. 2d 162, 166, 417 N.W.2d 411 (Ct. App. 1987) (Anderson I), after numerous proceedings not relevant to the analysis of the present case, was reversed on other grounds in State v. Anderson, 155 Wis. 2d 77, 454 N.W.2d 763 (1990)(Anderson III).
Wisconsin Stat. § 48.19 provides in pertinent part:
(1) A child may be taken into custody under any of the following:
(d) Circumstances in which a law enforcement officer believes on reasonable grounds that any of the following conditions exists:
4. The child has run away from his or her parents, guardian or legal or physical custodian.
Wisconsin Stat. § 938.19 provides in pertinent part:
(1) A juvenile may be taken into custody under any of the following:
(d) Circumstances in which a law enforcement officer believes on reasonable grounds that any of the following conditions exists:
4. The juvenile has run away from his or her parents, guardian or legal or physical custodian.
Wisconsin Stat. § 968.24 provides:
After having identified himself or herself as a law enforcement officer, a law enforcement officer may stop a person in a public place for a reasonable period of time when the officer reasonably suspects that such person is committing, is about to commit or has committed a crime, and may demand the name and address of the person and an explanation of the person's conduct. Such detention and temporary questioning shall be conducted in the vicinity where the person was stopped.
Wisconsin Stat. § 968.25 provides in pertinent part:
When a law enforcement officer has stopped a person for temporary questioning pursuant to s. 968.24 and reasonably suspects that he or she or another is in danger of physical injury, the law enforcement officer may search such person for weapons or any instrument or article or substance readily capable of causing physical injury and of a sort not ordinarily carried in public places by law abiding persons.
The dissent attempts to analyze the facts in this case separately to justify a conclusion that there is an absence of reasonable suspicion that Kelsey was armed and dangerous. We are satisfied that the facts must be considered together, not in isolation, in order to apply the totality of the circumstances test, properly. If that is done, it is clear that the pat-down search was reasonable. This approach does not result in a blanket rule, but one that depends on consideration of all of the facts in each case, along with the reasonable inferences which can be drawn from those facts.
The circuit court determined that the pat-down was reasonable because the officers were doing good police work and were concerned for their safety. (Mot. Hr'g at 66.) Although the circuit court concluded that "[t]he evidence in this motion doesn't necessarily support the suspicion that [Kelsey] was armed and dangerous," (Mot. Hr'g at 66) we may consider any fact in the record known to the officers at the time of the frisk. State v. McGill, 2000 WI 38, ¶ 24, 234 Wis. 2d 560, 609 N.W.2d 795. The dissent correctly notes the requirement set forth in McGill that the facts we rely on must also be supported by the officer's testimony at the suppression hearing. Dissent at ¶ 80. In this case, Officer Gonzalez's testimony at the suppression hearing does support the facts that we rely on to conclude that there was reasonable suspicion. Moreover, the dissent incorrectly states that our conclusion cannot conflict with Officer Gonzalez's testimony that the only reason he ordered the search was because he was going to place Kelsey inside the police car. Dissent at ¶ 79-80. As noted above, the test for whether there is reasonable suspicion to support a pat-down search is an objective test, not a subjective one, and, therefore, his reason is not controlling.