Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. Glenn A. MACK
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1981-05-18
Citations: 403 So. 2d 8
Docket Number: No. 80-KA-2349
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Glenn A. MACK.
Judges: BLANCHE, J., dissents with reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 403
Pages: 8–13

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. Glenn A. MACK.
No. 80-KA-2349.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
May 18, 1981.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 4, 1981.
Concurring Opinion Sept. 15, 1981.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Harry F. Con-nick, Dist. Atty., Louise S. Korns, and Judith A. Lombardino, Asst. Dist. Attys., for plaintiff-appellee.
John M. Standridge, Supervising Atty., New Orleans, Jack Wright, Jr., Student Practitioner, Loyola Law School Clinic, for defendant-appellant.

Opinion:
DIXON, Chief Justice.
Glenn A. Mack was charged by bill of information with simple burglary, R.S. 14:62, and convicted after a jury trial of attempted simple burglary, R.S. 14:27; 14:62. He was sentenced to twelve years at hard labor under the multiple offender provisions of R.S. 15:529.1. The single assignment of error relied upon in this appeal requires that the conviction and sentence be reversed.
According to the evidence adduced at trial, the instant offense occurred in a parking lot adjacent to a New Orleans hotel. The hotel manager saw the defendant park his own car in the lot, then break into a hotel guest's car. The guest was notified, and when he went out to the lot he found the defendant rummaging through the glove compartment.
Defendant's assignment of error contests the trial judge's jury charge on reasonable doubt. Defendant maintains that the judge did not comply with C.Cr.P. 804, which provides in part:
"A. In all cases the court shall charge the jury that:
,
(2) It is the duty of the jury, in considering the evidence and in applying to that evidence the law as given by the court, to give the defendant the benefit of every reasonable doubt arising out of the evidence or out of the lack of evidence in the case ."
Instead, the jury was instructed:
". . You are prohibited by law and your oath from going beyond the evidence to seek for doubts upon which to acquit the defendant, but must confine yourself strictly to a dispassionate consideration of the testimony given upon the trial. You must not resort to extraneous facts or circumstances in reaching your verdict. That is, you must not go beyond the evidence to find facts or circumstances creating doubts, but must restrict yourselves to the evidence that you heard on the trial of this case.. . . "
This portion of the jury charge is clearly wrong. C.Cr.P. 804(A)(2) states that reasonable doubt may arise from the lack of evidence in the case. In the instant case, the trial judge specifically limited the jurors to the evidence before them to support a reasonable doubt. This jury instruction tracks verbatim a charge criticized by this court in State v. Gibbs, 355 So.2d 1299 (La.1978). We characterized the charge as "patently erroneous," and stated that it "should not be given." Id. at 1301. In Gibbs, however, the defendant did not complain of the erroneous charge until his appeal before this court. Consequently, no reversible error was found. In the instant case, defense counsel lodged his objection to the erroneous charge after the jury had retired for deliberation. As far as the record shows, it was the first opportunity available to defense counsel to object to the charge. Defense counsel stated his objection, specifically pointing out the violation of C.Cr.P. 804 by omitting the instruction that defendant is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt arising out of (not only the evidence but) "the lack of evidence in the case." The judge replied:
"I included all of that in my general charge. Of course, there was no special charge submitted on behalf of the defendant, so, he can't reserve any error in the judge's charge as a result."
The judge then declined to hear any more argument.
The judge was in error. The defendant is not required to submit special charges before he can effectively make an objection and reserve an assignment of error on an adverse ruling.
The state advances two arguments in support of its position that the instant charge presents no reversible error. First, the state contends that defense counsel's objection was untimely because not lodged until after the jury had retired. Second, the state maintains that the judge's instructions on reasonable doubt, when read as a whole, provide substantial compliance with C.Cr.P. 804(A)(2).
Timeliness of the Objection
C.Cr.P. 804 states that "[i]n all cases the court shall charge the jury ." The duty imposed by this article is mandatory, and exists without the necessity of a special request by counsel. If, at the conclusion of the jury charge, the trial judge has not informed the jury that reasonable doubt may arise from the lack of evidence in the case, then the judge has not discharged his statutory duty.
Of course, a defendant may not wait until his appeal before he complains of the trial judge's failure to comply with C.Cr.P. 804. See State v. Gibbs, supra. But see State v. Williamson, 389 So.2d 1328 (La.1980) (exception carved out for jury charge which misdefines the crime with which defendant is charged). Rather, he must bring the error to the attention of the trial judge at a time when the judge can cure the error. State v. Lee, 346 So.2d 682, 685 (La.1977). Otherwise, his objection shall be deemed waived. C.Cr.P. 841.
In the past, this court has held that objections to the judge's general charge are untimely if lodged after the jury has retired for deliberations. See, e. g., State v. Jefferson, 379 So.2d 1389 (La.1980); State v. Williams, 366 So.2d 1365 (La.1978); State v. Beard, 312 So.2d 278 (La.1975). These cases are premised on the belief that, once the jury has retired, it is too late for the trial judge to correct his error.
State v. Jefferson, supra, involved a charge given after the jury returned. Defendant objected, in a general way, after the jury again retired to deliberate. We held, not only that the issue was not before us (because of the lack of a contemporaneous objection), but that there was no merit in the assignment. State v. Williams, supra, and State v. Beard, supra, were cited as authority.
The Code of Criminal Procedure of 1928 provided, in article 391 (later preserved in R.S. 15:391 but omitted from the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1966, see Acts 311, 312 and 313 of 1966) that objections to the charge or to the failure to give a special requested charge "shall be by means of a bill of exceptions reserved before the jury shall have retired to deliberate." The omission was for simplicity, since the matter was covered by Title 38 of the Code of Criminal Procedure dealing with bills of exceptions, arts. 841-845.
C.Cr.P. 841 was amended in 1974 to eliminate bills of exceptions, around which a body of technical jurisprudence had arisen. C.Cr.P. 841 contains the following:
"... It is sufficient that a party, at the time the ruling or order of the court is made or sought, makes known to the court the action which he desires the court to take, or of his objections to the action of the court, and the grounds therefor."
We recognize today that trial judges may, and frequently do, recall the jury for further instructions. See C.Cr.P. 808, providing for additional charges in open court with the defendant and counsel for both sides present. We hold therefore, that an objection to the judge's general charge is properly preserved if made immediately after the jury is retired, particularly if that is the first opportunity to object. Defense counsel is not required to interrupt the judge during the charge and have the jury removed while the point is argued. Careful practice would suggest that C.Cr.P. 801 be followed, and the charge reduced to writing on defendant's request and copy provided to defendant before reading. In busy courts today, however, we recognize that this course would use precious time of judge, jury and counsel.
State v. Jefferson, supra; State v. Williams, supra and State v. Beard, supra, are therefore overruled to the extent that they are in conflict with this opinion.
Whether "Substantial Compliance" Occurred
The state contends that the judge's instructions on reasonable doubt, when read as a whole, substantially comply with the intent of C.Cr.P. 804. Reliance is placed on State v. Henderson, 362 So.2d 1358 (La.1978). In that case, the defense's request that C.Cr.P. 804 be read to the jury was denied on the ground that the matter was covered in the general charge.
This court found that the general charge did not convey the substance of 804 in a straightforward manner. However, the judge had informed the jury that reasonable doubt could be based upon unsatisfactory evidence, and that the jurors were to determine which facts were not proven. Although this charge was found to be less clear and less direct than the statutory language, we held that ". . . the instructions given by the trial court substantially com plied with the legislative intent of Article 804...." Id. at 1366. Our holding was qualified by the following caveat:
"... Our approval of the trial court's formulation, however, is limited to the particular charge given within the context of the particular instant case. It would have been preferable for the trial court to have read the exact language of Article 804 to the jury, and future use of the general charge used in the instant case could easily result in reversible error. See, State v. Gibbs, 355 So.2d 1299 (La.1978)." Id.
The state correctly points out that the instant charge, when read as a whole, includes the same statements reluctantly labeled substantial compliance in Henderson. The trial in the instant case occurred a full seven months after Henderson announced our dissatisfaction with unclear and indirect interpretations of C.Cr.P. 804. Our caveat in Henderson has been unheeded, and we decline to sanction jury instructions which substitute misleading and unclear statements for the direct statutory language of C.Cr.P. 804.
A correct understanding of reasonable doubt is essential in every criminal jury trial. A vital part of that definition is the statutory formulation of C.Cr.P. 804 — reasonable doubt may arise out of the lack of evidence in the case. This concept is best explained by the exact wording of the statute. Its essential ingredients are not supplied by jury instructions which merely hint at the idea embodied in the statute. In Henderson we stated that a reading of the exact language of C.Cr.P. 804 would have been preferable; today we hold such a reading to be mandatory.
For the reasons assigned, the conviction and sentence are reversed, and the cause remanded to the district court for a new trial.
BLANCHE, J., dissents with reasons.
MARCUS, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
WATSON, J., dissents for reasons assigned by MARCUS, J.
. A different situation is presented when the defendant is contesting a special charge. In that case, the burden is on the defendant to timely submit a proposed charge, C.Cr.P. 807, and his failure to do so bars appellate review. Once he has submitted his proposed charge to the judge, he need not thereafter object if the judge rejects his proposed charge and substitutes therefor an erroneous statement of law. State v. Marmillion, 339 So.2d 788 (La.1976).