Case Name: Maurice Meyer, Jr., et al., Appellants, v. Albert M. Whisnant, Jr., Respondent, et al., Defendants
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1954-07-14
Citations: 307 N.Y. 369
Docket Number: 
Parties: Maurice Meyer, Jr., et al., Appellants, v. Albert M. Whisnant, Jr., Respondent, et al., Defendants.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 307
Pages: 369–375

Head Matter:
Maurice Meyer, Jr., et al., Appellants, v. Albert M. Whisnant, Jr., Respondent, et al., Defendants.
Argued April 22, 1954;
decided July 14, 1954.
Simon Brett for Maurice Meyer, Jr., appellant.
I. The Appellate Division improperly exculpated Whisnant upon the alleged existence of an “ emergency ” without considering whether negligence on Whisnant’s part created the “ emergency ” in which he found himself. (Tapley v. Ross Theatre Corp., 275 N. Y. 144.) II. Plaintiffs offered affirmative evidence of negligence on Whisnant’s part in that, at the time of the collision, Whisnant was operating his car at an excessive rate of speed and in a careless and inattentive manner. (Mantione v. Picone, 273 App. Div. 1049; Martin v. Herzog, 228 N. Y. 164; Lee v. City Brewing Corp., 279 N. Y. 380; Weigand v. United Traction Co., 221 N. Y. 39; Sweet v. Perkins, 196 N. Y. 482; Rosenberg v. Schwartz, 260 N. Y. 162.)
Alexander Freiser for Bussell Boyle, appellant.
I. Defendant-respondent was negligent as a matter of law. (People v. Scanlon, 132 App. Div. 528.) II. Defendant-respondent, Whisnant, was negligent in management, operation, and control of his vehicle. III. Verdict of $50,000 for Boyle is not excessive. IV. The charge to the jury was" proper.
John M. Aherne, Casper B. Ughetta and John J. Martin for respondent.
I. The De Soto driven by Bien was an aggressor, which suddenly left its westbound lane, cut across and through the eastbound traffic, and “ looped ” directly back into the path of the Whisnant car, creating a sudden and dangerous emergency for all eastbound traffic, (living plaintiffs the benefit of every inference, there was no substantial evidence that Whisnant failed to act with reasonable care and promptness in the emergency created by Bien’s gross negligence. As to Whisnant it was an inevitable accident. (Duffield v. New York City Omnibus Corp., 259 App. Div. 647; Zwilling v. Harrison, 269 N. Y. 461; Maranta v. Wenzelberg, 241 App. Div. 420, 267 N. Y. 510; Payne v. City of New York, 277 N. Y. 393; Kawacz v. Delaware, L. & W. R. R. Co., 259 N. Y. 166, 287 U. S. 659; Platto v. Stier, 282 App. Div. 242; Woloszynowski v. hiew York Central R. R. Co., 254 N. Y. 206; Kumkumian v. City of New York, 305 N. Y. 167; Marra v. New York Central & H. R. R. R. Co., 139 App. Div. 707; Gross v. Gross, 169 F. 2d 199.) II. The Appellate Division properly ruled that the evidence was wholly insufficient in point of law to sustain a verdict. Whisnant’s motion for a directed verdict should have been granted. The Appellate Division properly dismissed the complaints. (Blum v. Fresh Grown Preserve Corp., 292 N. Y. 241; Matter of Case, 214 N. Y. 199; Berner v. Board of Educ., Union Free School Dist. No. 1, 286 N. Y. 174; Russ v. Russ, 263 N. Y. 625; Iannone v. Weber-McLoughlin Co., 186 App. Div. 594; Love v. Donald, 264 N. Y. 418.) III. The contention that Whisnant was violating paragraph (c) of subdivision 2 of section 56 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law was not presented, litigated or decided at Trial Term. The Appellate Division, accordingly, refused to consider it. It is not open to the plaintiffs in this court. In any event it is without merit. (Carlock v. Westchester Lighting Co., 268 N. Y. 345; Tedla v. Ellman, 280 N. Y. 124; Boronkay v. Robinson & Carpenter, 247 N. Y. 365.)

Opinion:
Desmond, J.
The dismissal of the complaints as against defendant-respondent Whisnant should be affirmed. The sudden, unanticipated and unexplained dash of the Bien car, across the highway and into Whisnant's path, made him the helpless victim of what was, beyond any dispute, an emergency with the creation of which Whisnant had nothing to do. Such violations as Whisnant may have been guilty of were no proof of negligent causation by him, since there was no possible logical connection between any of them, and the accident (see Brown v. Shyne, 242 N. Y. 176, 180; Tedla v. Ellman, 280 N. Y. 124; Hagadorn v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 298 N. Y. 882; Goldblatt v. Tabacco, 299 N. Y. 663; Restatement, Torts, § 286).
The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.