Case Name: James R. Johnston et al., Plaintiffs, v. John Vinton Dahlgren et al., Defendants
Court: New York Court of Common Pleas
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1895-12
Citations: 14 Misc. 623
Docket Number: 
Parties: James R. Johnston et al., Plaintiffs, v. John Vinton Dahlgren et al., Defendants.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Miscellaneous Reports
Volume: 14
Pages: 623–626

Head Matter:
James R. Johnston et al., Plaintiffs, v. John Vinton Dahlgren et al., Defendants.
(New York Common Pleas
Special Term,
December, 1895.)
An inchoate right of dower is not subject to a mechanic's lien although the wife agreéd to pay for the improvement.
Demurrer to complaint in an action to foíeciose a mechanic’s lien.
Pcmiel P. Mahoney, for plaintiffs.
Aim. I. Pllms, for-defendant.

Opinion:
Bookstaver, J.
The defendant Elizabeth. Dahlgren demurs to the complaint for insufficiency.
It is plain that no cause of action is stated against her considered simply as the wife of the owner of the property against which the lien is sought to be foreclosed. That a wife's inchoate right of dower is not made subject to a mechanic's lien is obvious from the language of the act (Chap. 342, Laws of 1885). Section 1 provides for- a lien " to the extent of the right,, title and interest at that time existing of such owner, whether owner in fee or of a less estate, or . whether a lessee for a term of years, or vendee in possession under a contract existing at the time of the filing of said notice of lien, or of the owner of any right, title or interest in such estate which men/ he sold tinder cm e&ecution under the general provisions of the statutes in force in this state relating to liens of judgment and enforcement thereof."
An inchoate right of dower is not, according to the settled theory of the law, an estate or interest in land at all ( Witthaus v. Schack, 105 N. Y. 332, 336), and obviously cannot be sold under an execution. Even a widow's right of dower before assignment is not subject to such sale. Aikman v. Harsell, 98 N. Y. 186, 191; Lawrence v. Miller, 2 id. 245, 254; Moore v. Mayor, 8 id. 110, 113.
This intention of the legislature not to affect an inchoate dower right, so apparent in the first section, is. in some degree inferable from the fact that section 17 requires only prior incumbrancers who are mechanics' lienors to be made parties to the foreclosure proceeding.
In other jurisdictions it has been specially held that a wife's dower is not subject to a mechanic's lien. Bishop v. Boyle, 9 Ind. 169 ; 68 Am. Dec. 615 ; Gove v. Cather, 23 Ill. 634; 76 Am. Dec. 711; Van Vronker v. Eastman, 7 Metc. 162 ; Mark v. Murphy, 76 Ind. 547. The force of these cases as authorities depends chiefly, of course, upon the similarity of the statutes relating to dower and mechanics' liens in those states and in this-; but some of the opinions, notably that in Bishop v. Boyle, point out the reasons independent of statutes why dower should be paramount to mechanics' liens : " A wife's dower is a favorite'of the law, not resting in contract, but resulting from the marriage relation. * Hers is the elder lien. The mechanic bestows his labor - with knowledge of her prior right in the real estate, and he knows the house he is building, as brick is added to brick, and nail after nail is driven, becomes real estate. He can protect himself by security or not venture. She is passive and can do nothing."
But, though no cause of action is stated against the demur-rant as wife simply and in virtue of her inchoate dower right, is there, nevertheless, a cause made out against her by reason of her alleged agreement to pay for the improvements.made upon the property ? In this aspect, too, I think the complaint is defective. Upon that alleged promise, which was, so far as-'appears, made without any mention of a lien, she has a right to a trial by jury and cannot be brought in as a defendant in an equitable action of foreclosure.
From a p^nisal of the complaint, including the prayer for relief, it is fairly apparent'that the.theory of the pleader was to charge the demurrant only to the extent of cutting off her interest in the property kgainst which the lien was filed,, although it is -now urged in support of the complaint that a-cause of action is stated against her upon her independent promise to pay. There is an allegation of the " special instance and request " of the husband, but only of the " knowledge and consent " of the wife. The prayer for personal judgment for deficiency is against the husband only. It is also alleged that the notice of claim and lien specified the wife as well as the-, husband as owner, and the prayer for relief is that the defendants and all claiming under them be forever barred and foreclosed of all equity of redemption.
I think, therefore, that so distinct an intention- to affect thedemurrant only to the extent of her interest in the property is shown that it cannot be held that the allegations that she-agreed to pay for the services and materials, coupled with the general prayer for other and' further relief, state a cause of action against her upon her promise to pay, and which would, result in a personal judgment against her for the full amount. Justice requires that the specific portions of the complaint be-regarded as controlling and giving character to the more general portions.
Had it appeared, by any fair inference, from the face of' the complaint that an attempt-was made to unite an equitable-action to foreclose a lien, affecting all the defendants, jvith an action at law upon a contract, affecting only one of them, thedemurrant would have been put upon her guard by a sufficient notice, and might have raised in her demurrer the question of' misjoinder.
. ITéither do I: ttónh that her* promise' in- her character of1 wife to-pay for the improvement cáii be' regarded as creating1 a mechanic's-lien upon her dower right* To say • nothing-" of '• the strict compliance Which " the law exacts-with respect to' -statutory provisions for barring or extinguishing this right - and the fact that, such a promise1 is. not otte ' of these recognized ^-statutory methods, the intention of the act as evinced in section-above quoted, is too clear to allow any extension of1 thedien, by judicial construction, to-cover dower right.'' It"' may be moré just that a mechanic should, have a lien- wheré his material and labor have,1 at the wife's1 request -and upon • her- promise to- pay, gone- to enhance -the value of the- property ¡ ;in- which she -hás this contingent1 interest, and more in accord- ' ¡anee with the ¡present tendency to give a married'Woman full; •control of-'whatever is hers; and moré1 logical as being in' .analogy with her recognized power to'charge her dower interest by uniting With her husband in a mortgage1;' hut all these1 ¡are-considerations for the legislature :in -view1 of " any amend! -.ments of the act. As it noW reads; the- lien' 'extends only to' •estates or interests in the 'same which may he'sol'd1 under execution, neither of Which'án inchoate dower right is, and that ' restriction binds me. : ' ' " ' . ¡ - ; - ,
"Thé ' -demurrer -is, therefore, sustained,- with" liberty to : • amend the 'Complaint; if so advised; within twenty days npbn - 'payment1 of costs. ' - * " ' .• !:"
.Dcmurrer sustained, with leave to, amend complaint.