Case Name: SUCCESSION of Henry ROSS
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1981-03-11
Citations: 397 So. 2d 830
Docket Number: No. 10896
Parties: SUCCESSION of Henry ROSS.
Judges: Before REDMANN, BOUTALL and CHEHARDY, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 397
Pages: 830–832

Head Matter:
SUCCESSION of Henry ROSS.
No. 10896.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
March 11, 1981.
Lacour & Calloway, Vanue B. Lacour, Baton Rouge, for Zirlee Henderson Nelson, Elizabeth Henderson Ingram and David Henderson, appellees.
Before REDMANN, BOUTALL and CHEHARDY, JJ.

Opinion:
CHEHARDY, Judge.
Henry Ross was married twice, although he had no children from either marriage. After he died on August 11,1971, his widow was placed in possession of all of his property (under LSA-C.C. art. 916) on September 28,1971. Petitioners, alleging that they are the acknowledged illegitimate children of Henry Ross, now ask that that judgment of possession be annulled and that they be declared the heirs of Henry Ross. The district court maintained the exceptors' exception of no cause of action and dismissed the demands of the petitioners.
LSA-C.C. art. 919 prohibits acknowledged natural children from inheriting intestate from their natural father when he has a surviving wife. This article, however, was expressly declared unconstitutional by the Louisiana Supreme Court in the case of Succession of Brown, 388 So.2d 1151 (La.1980), relying on the case of Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 97 S.Ct. 1459, 52 L.Ed.2d 1459 (1977), and agreeing that innocent children should not suffer for the promiscuous adventures of their parents.
In Lovell v. Lovell, 378 So.2d 418 (La.1979), the Supreme Court addressed itself to the issue of when a decision which declares an article of the Louisiana Civil Code-to be unconstitutional should be given retroactive effect and stated at pages 421 — 422:
"In determining whether or not our decision should be given retroactive effect, three factors should be considered: (1) the decision to be applied nonretroac-tively must establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied, or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed; (2) the merits and demerits must be weighed in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective application will further or retard its operation; and (3) the inequity imposed by retroactive application must be weighed. Chevron Oil Company v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971)."
The court in Lovell, upon consideration of these factors, concluded that its decision declaring LSA-C.C. art. 160 (as it read prior to the 1979 amendment making it gender-neutral) unconstitutional should not be applied retroactively. In the present case, the declaration of the unconstitutionality of LSA-C.C. art. 919 in Succession of Brown, supra, certainly establishes a new precedent of law in that an acknowledged illegitimate can now maintain intestate succession rights to his father's estate even if other relatives exist. Furthermore, a prior decision of the United States Supreme Court specifically held that LSA-C.C. art. 919 was constitutional, Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 91 S.Ct. 1017, 28 L.Ed.2d 288 (1971). Certainly in the present case, as in Lovell, substantial inequity would result if all prior judgments of possession which relied on the substantive law of LSA-C.C. art. 919 were declared invalid, and such a holding would engender new litigation in each case where there had been such a justified reliance. As noted in Lovell, where such a decision could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis for avoiding the injustice or hardship by a holding of nonretroactivity. Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 89 S.Ct. 1897, 23 L.Ed.2d 647 (1969).
Accordingly, although the Supreme Court did not address itself to the issue of the retroactive application of its declaration of the unconstitutionality of LSA-C.C. art. 919 in Succession of Brown, supra, we hold that that declaration should only be applied prospectively from the September 3, 1980 decision.
For the reasons assigned, the decision of the district court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
REDMANN, J., dissents with written reasons.