Case Name: PEOPLE v. HALL
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1976-12-31
Citations: 399 Mich. 288
Docket Number: Docket No. 58668
Parties: PEOPLE v HALL
Judges: Williams, Coleman, Fitzgerald, Lindemer, and Ryan, JJ., concurred.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 399
Pages: 288–305

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v HALL
Docket No. 58668.
Decided December 31, 1976.
On application by the people for leave to appeal the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the conviction.
Rehearing denied 400 Mich 952.
Edward D. Hall was convicted on his plea of guilty in Washtenaw Circuit Court, Ross W. Campbell, J., of armed robbery. The defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea on his allegation that the plea was induced by a promise of leniency in sentencing made by the prosecuting attorney was denied by William F. Ager, Jr., J. The Court of Appeals, M. J. Kelly, P. J., and V. J. Brennan, J. (Danhof, J., dissenting), reversed (Docket No. 21348). The people apply for leave to appeal. Held:
The trial court found that no promise of leniency had in fact been made to the defendant by the prosecuting attorney, and thought the record belied a conclusion that leniency had even been suggested to the defendant. The Court of Appeals erred in substituting its judgment for that of the trial court in determining whether the plea was induced by a promise.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the conviction reinstated.
Justice Levin would deny leave to appeal. The record and the memorandum opinion indicate that, measured by any standard, the Court of Appeals correctly reversed the conviction.- If, as the circuit judge found, the prosecutor advised the defendant’s lawyer that he would offer no inducement for the plea, then the lawyer’s advice to the defendant was inaccurate, whether he advised that the prosecutor would recommend a ten-year minimum or would probably so recommend. A plea induced by an inaccurate representation concerning possible leniency should not be permitted to stand. It is enough that the defendant’s lawyer induces a plea of guilty by a statement that a concession was promised by a prosecutor, without proof that the promise was in fact made. The defendant’s failure to claim innocence is not properly a factor; even a guilty defendant is entitled to relief when there is an unfulfilled plea bargain.
Chief Justice Kavanagh concurred with Justice Levin.
68 Mich App 32; 241 NW2d 750 (1976) reversed.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William F. Delhey, Prosecuting Attorney, and John J. Hensel, Senior Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
State Appellate Defender Office (by Barbara R. Levine) for defendant.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
Defendant alleges that his guilty plea was induced by his attorney's representation that the prosecutor had promised to recommend a minimum sentence of ten years. Defendant and his attorney told the circuit judge at the plea proceeding that the plea was not the result of any promises. Defendant was in fact sentenced to a minimum term of 20 years.
A different circuit judge later conducted an evidentiary hearing on his claim. Defense counsel testified that the prosecutor and an assistant prosecutor had said they would probably not recommend more than a ten-year minimum. He relayed this exact information to the defendant. Defendant testified that the attorney did not use the word "probably"; he admitted he lied at the plea, when confronted with his denial at that time of any promise or inducement. Defendant's mother testified that the attorney had told her that the defendant would not get more than a ten-year minimum.
The prosecutor and an assistant denied any promise to defendant's attorney. Both said that only the prosecutor made minimum sentence recommendations, these were disclosed only in writing, and they so informed defense counsel before the plea. The record also discloses that the prosecutor recommended more than a ten-year minimum, that defense counsel was aware of that fact before sentencing but did not advise the defendant to withdraw his plea, and that neither defense counsel nor defendant objected at the sentencing to this recommendation by the prosecutor.
In re Valle, 364 Mich 471; 110 NW2d 673 (1961), involved a defendant who alleged his guilty plea was induced by the prosecutor's promise as to his sentence, stated by defendant's attorney on the record at the plea proceeding. The prosecutor later denied any promise was made. We vacated defendant's conviction:
"If the evidence establishes that the prosecutor or the judge has made a statement which fairly interpreted by the defendant (in our case of foreign extraction and with only an eighth-grade education, presumably in court for the first time) is a promise of leniency, and the assurance is unfulfilled, the plea may be withdrawn and the case proceed to trial." 364 Mich 471, 477-478.
We recently reaffirmed this principle where the record disclosed that the plea was induced by a promise of leniency, later unfulfilled, by the prosecutor of an adjoining county. People v Brooks, 396 Mich 118; 240 NW2d 1 (1976).
The Court of Appeals concluded in this case:
"On the basis of the entire transcript, the affidavits and the inferences drawn from both, it is our opinion that the defendant was told that the prosecutor would recommend a ten-year minimum, that he relied upon that representation; but the recommendation was, in fact, for a 20-year minimum, which recommendation was adopted by the trial court and the defendant sentenced thereon." 68 Mich App 32, 36; 241 NW2d 750 (1976). (Emphasis added.)
The Court of Appeals relied upon Justice Levin's concurring opinion in People v Byrd, 12 Mich App 186, 229-230; 162 NW2d 777 (1968):
"[T]he test should not be whether the defendant establishes the truth of his claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Rather, his claim should be deemed established, and the plea set aside, if the evidence causes the judge to entertain a reasonable doubt whether the plea was 'encouraged' by a false promise of leniency in sentencing. Under a reasonable doubt standard, the court need not wholly adopt the defendant's story, or wholly reject the attorney's story. He may simply conclude that, on the evidence, he is in doubt, and, the defendant being entitled to the benefit of that doubt, he will set aside the plea and allow the defendant to stand trial." 12 Mich App 229-230.
We specially note, however, Justice Levin's language above "if the evidence causes the judge to entertain a reasonable doubt". As Chief Judge Danhof noted in dissent:
"[T]he trial court is in the best position to determine whether or not the plea of guilty was induced by promises of leniency because it can observe the demeanor of the conflicting witnesses in determining their credibility." 68 Mich App 32, 38.
The circuit judge in this case concluded that no promise had in fact been made by the prosecutor or any member of his staff. He thought the sentencing record belied a conclusion that a promise of a ten-year minimum recommendation had even been suggested to defendant. He therefore denied the motion to withdraw the plea.
The Court of Appeals majority erred in substituting its judgment for that of the circuit judge. It was the circuit judge's responsibility to determine whether the plea was induced by a promise of leniency which went unfulfilled. Guilty Plea Cases, 395 Mich 96, 127; 235 NW2d 132 (1975).
In lieu of leave to appeal, pursuant to GCR 1963, 853.2(4), we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the defendant's conviction and sentence. The prosecutor's emergency motion for stay becomes moot thereby and is denied.
Williams, Coleman, Fitzgerald, Lindemer, and Ryan, JJ., concurred.