Case Name: Kevin Wayne EALEY a/k/a Kevin Ealey, Appellant, v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee; Kevin Wayne Ealey a/k/a Kevin Ealey, Appellant, v. State of Mississippi, Appellee
Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2007-10-30
Citations: 967 So. 2d 685
Docket Number: Nos. 2006-CP-00552-COA, 2006-KP-01349-COA
Parties: Kevin Wayne EALEY a/k/a Kevin Ealey, Appellant, v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee. Kevin Wayne Ealey a/k/a Kevin Ealey, Appellant, v. State of Mississippi, Appellee.
Judges: LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE AND ROBERTS, JJ, CONCUR. IRVING, J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY. KING, C.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 967
Pages: 685–695

Head Matter:
Kevin Wayne EALEY a/k/a Kevin Ealey, Appellant, v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee. Kevin Wayne Ealey a/k/a Kevin Ealey, Appellant, v. State of Mississippi, Appellee.
Nos. 2006-CP-00552-COA, 2006-KP-01349-COA.
Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
Oct. 30, 2007.
Kevin Wayne Ealey, appellant, pro se.
Office of the Attorney General by Billy L. Gore, attorney for appellee.

Opinion:
CARLTON, J.,
for the Court.
¶ 1. In March 2003, Kevin Ealey entered a guilty plea in the Circuit Court of Adams County for possession of cocaine. Ealey filed a motion for post-conviction relief which was summarily denied. Ealey appeals pro se and argues (1) that his guilty plea lacked a factual basis, (2) that he was denied effective assistance of counsel, (3) that the search which yielded the cocaine was unlawful, and (4) that he was not in constructive possession of the cocaine. We find no error and affirm.
FACTS
¶ 2. In July 2002, Ealey, a prior convicted felon, was riding in the back seat of a rented vehicle occupied by three other men. The four stopped at Taste of Chicago in Natchez, Mississippi, and two of them went inside the restaurant, leaving the driver, Tramelle Wallace, and Ealey in the vehicle. Narcotics officers from Adams County then pulled alongside the vehicle. The ensuing search yielded the following: (1) $11,000 found on Wallace's person, (2) 540 grams of cocaine and $25,000 found inside the center console between the two front seats, (3) a handgun found behind the driver seat, and (4) a receipt for the purchase of baking soda and "baggies."
¶ 3. On October 29, 2002, Ealey was indicted in the Circuit Court of Adams County for possession of cocaine with intent to sell in a church zone. Ealey filed a motion to suppress and a suppression hearing was held, at which Ealey challenged the legality of the search of the vehicle. At this hearing, Officer Jerry Brown, one of the officers present at the search, testified regarding the search and the evidence derived therefrom including the 540 grams of cocaine, $36,000 in cash, the handgun, and the receipt for the purchase of baking soda and "baggies." He also testified that Ealey and Wallace were from Houston, Texas, and that they claimed they were staying in Vidalia, Louisiana, with some friends and were in Natchez, Mississippi, only to get a hamburger at the Taste of Chicago. Officer Brown also stated that neither Ealey nor the driver were able to name the friends that they were allegedly staying with.
¶ 4. The trial judge denied Ealey's motion to suppress, whereupon a plea bargain agreement was reached between Ealey and the district attorney that Ealey would plead guilty to a reduced charge of simple possession of cocaine. On March 11, 2003, a hearing was held to determine whether the trial court would accept Ealey's plea. During the plea colloquy the following relevant discussion took place.
COURT: Okay, All right. Now, are each of you pleading guilty because you are, in fact, guilty of this charge of possession of cocaine on July 25, 2002? Are you, in fact, guilty of your part in this crime, Mr. Ealey? Mr. Ealey, let me advise you about the nature of the law about this. Of course, I have heard a lot by way of motions and everything, but under the law, regardless of where initially it came from or who bought it or what, you were in the vehicle?
EALEY: Yes.
COURT: If you were aware of its presence in the vehicle in there and that, then under the law, that would be sufficient, but I don't want you pleading guilty to something you are not guilty, but I heard evidence about the search and everything and you being in the vehicle. So are you guilty of knowing that these drugs were in this vehicle? EALEY: I didn't know, but I am guilty. I don't know how to say it or what to say.
COURT: Before I can take a plea, you have to acknowledge your guilt to me, and, again, I don't want to do that if that's not what the situation is, but you have to decide whether or not you are guilty of this offense and you want to plead guilty, or, if you want a trial, [we can go] ahead and proceed with a trial in this case.
EALEY: Guilty.
COURT: Why don't you tell me in your own words what happened Mr. Ealey.
ÉALEY: I don't want to—
COURT: Do what?
EALEY: I don't want to go to trial. I'll lose and then I get all them years. That's why I'll go on and plead now.
EALEY'S ATTORNEY: Your Honor, may I speak with him for a minute?
COURT: Yes. The Court is going to take a short recess.
[Following the recess]
COURT: All right. Now Mr. Ealey and Mr. Wallace, the Court is going to ask you again. Are you pleading guilty to this charge because y'all are, in fact, guilty of this offense? Now, Mr. Ealey, are you pleading guilty because you are guilty?
EALEY: Yes, sir.
¶ 5. The trial court then asked Ealey's attorney if he was "satisfied from the evidence that there is a factual basis for this plea?" He responded that he was. The trial court then asked the State if a factual basis existed "as set out in the hearing and in other matters that have come up before this Court?" The State responded, "It does have such a basis, your honor." After this discussion, whereby the trial judge acknowledged the evidence from the suppression hearing and the defendant, after a recess with his attorney, unequivocally admitted his guilt, the trial court accepted Ealey's plea of guilty. Ealey was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment with five years suspended and five years of post-release supervision and ordered to pay a fine of $10,000 plus all court costs and fees.
¶ 6. On October 19, 2004, Ealey filed a motion for post-conviction relief. In his motion, Ealey argued (1) that he was denied effective assistance of counsel, (2) that his guilty plea lacked a factual basis, and (3) that he was not in constructive possession of the cocaine. The trial court summarily denied his motion. Aggrieved by the trial court's ruling, Ealey appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 7. On appeal from the denial of a motion for post-conviction relief, we will not disturb the trial court's decision unless we find the decision to be clearly erroneous. Felder v. State, 876 So.2d 372, 373(¶ 4) (Miss.2004). However, questions of law are reviewed de novo. Brown v. State, 731 So.2d 595, 598 (Miss.1999).
DISCUSSION
1. Factual Basis for Guilty Plea
¶ 8. Ealey asserts that the trial court's acceptance of his guilty plea was devoid of a factual basis. Specifically, Ea-ley contends that the testimony given at the plea hearing was insufficient to form a factual basis for the acceptance of his guilty plea. The State responds that, in addition to testimony given at the guilty plea hearing, the trial judge had before him facts brought forth at the suppression hearing, which was conducted the day before the plea hearing. The State argues that the facts adduced from these two sources were adequate to provide the factual basis necessary for the tidal judge to accept Ealey's plea.
¶ 9. Prior to accepting a plea of guilty, the trial court is required to determine "that there is a factual basis for the plea." URCCC 8.04(A)(3). The reason for the rule is:
to push the court to delve beyond the admission of guilt lying on the surface and determine for itself whether there is substantial evidence that the petitioner did in fact commit those crimes he is charged with and is not entering the plea for some other reason that the law finds objectionable.
Gaskin v. State, 618 So.2d 103, 106 (Miss.1993).
1110. The trial court must have before it evidence "sufficiently specific to allow the court to determine that the defendant's conduct was within the ambit of that defined as criminal." Lott v. State, 597 So.2d 627, 628 (Miss.1992) (quoting United States v. Oberski, 734 F.2d 1030, 1031 (5th Cir.1984)). The fact that a defendant entered a plea of guilty is not alone sufficient to form a factual basis for the acceptance of the plea. Hannah v. State, 943 So.2d 20, 26-27(¶ 16) (Miss.2006) (citing Lott v. State, 597 So.2d 627, 628 (Miss.1992)). However, our supreme court has explained that a guilty plea coupled with "an independent evidentiary suggestion of guilt" is sufficient to form a factual basis. Hover v. State, 773 So.2d 421, 424(¶ 12) (Miss.2000); see also Corley v. State, 585 So.2d 765, 767 (Miss.1991) ("Fair inference favorable to guilt may facilitate the finding."). "The law does not require that a defendant admit every aspect of a charge against him." Gazzier v. State, 744 So.2d 776, 779(¶ 7) (Miss.1999) (holding that a factual basis existed to support a guilty plea to rape notwithstanding that defendant denied the element of penetration at the plea hearing). The facts required to be shown are determined by the elements of the crime charged. Corley, 585 So.2d at 767.
¶ 11. As Ealey was not in actual possession of the cocaine, the trial judge must have had facts before him that created a fan inference that Ealey was in constructive possession of the cocaine. Constructive possession may be established where the evidence, considered under the totality of the circumstances, shows that the defendant "conscientiously exercised control over the contraband." Dixon v. State, 953 So.2d 1108, 1112(¶ 9) (Miss.2007) (citing Berry v. State, 652 So.2d 745, 750-51 (Miss.1995)). "Constructive possession may be shown by establishing that the drug involved was subject to [the defendant's] dominion or control." Curry v. State, 249 So.2d 414, 416 (Miss.1971). The defendant's close physical proximity to the contraband is usually required, but is not in and of itself sufficient to establish constructive possession unless "other incrimi nating circumstances" are present. Id. at 416.
¶ 12. In the instant case, the testimony given at the plea hearing provided little beyond Ealey's admission to the crime of possession of cocaine. However, this does not render Ealey's plea invalid. Mississippi law recognizes that there are multiple forms from which the required factual basis may be established. Corley, 585 So.2d at 767 (facts adduced from preliminary hearing); Gaskin v. State, 618 So.2d 103, 106 (Miss.1993) (sworn statements from witnesses); Brown v. State, 533 So.2d 1118, 1124 (Miss.1988) (facts adduced from hearing on demurrer to indictment). Thus, in' reviewing whether a factual basis existed for the acceptance of a guilty plea, "this Court is not limited to the transcript of [the] guilty plea hearing, but we are allowed to review the record as a whole." Boddie v. State, 875 So.2d 180, 183(¶ 8) (Miss.2004) (citation omitted).
¶ 13. Accordingly, we now turn to the facts adduced at the suppression hearing to determine if "an independent evidentia-ry suggestion of guilt" accompanied Ea-ley's admission of guilt. Officer Brown's testimony at the suppression hearing, detailed above, showed that Ealey was riding across several states in a rented vehicle containing a large amount of drugs, a large sum of money, a gun, and a receipt for the purchase of products regularly used in the sale of cocaine. From these facts, it is fairly inferable that Ealey was aware of the character and presence of the cocaine and that it was subject to his dominion and control. Thus, these facts provide an evi-dentiary suggestion of guilt independent of Ealey's admission.
¶ 14. Additionally, we note that our supreme court has instructed that "[a] factual showing does not fail merely because it does not flesh out the details which might be brought forth at trial." Corley, 585 So.2d at 767. To this end, it is entirely possible that evidence might have been presented at trial which more affirmatively proved that Ealey was in possession of the cocaine.
¶ 15. Considering the totality of the circumstances, we find that the trial judge's acceptance of Ealey's guilty plea was supported by substantial evidence. Based on the facts in the record, we cannot say that the trial judge's acceptance of Ealey's guilty plea was clearly erroneous. Therefore, we find that a factual basis existed sufficient to undergird the trial judge's acceptance of Ealey's guilty plea to possession of cocaine. This issue is without merit.
£. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
¶ 16. Ealey asserts that the performance of his trial counsel, David Read, was constitutionally inefficient. He claims that Read failed to conduct an independent investigation into his case, failed to intei'-view witnesses favorable to him, and failed to file the proper motions. Ealey also claims that Read coerced him to plead guilty by advising him that if he chose to go to trial he would be convicted and sentenced to sixty years in jail.
¶ 17. We review Ealey's argument under a two-part inquiry to determine whether counsel's performance was deficient, and whether the deficient performance was prejudicial to his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Swington v. State, 742 So.2d 1106, 1114(¶ 22) (Miss.1999). We consider the "totality of the circumstances" in determining if counsel's actions were deficient and prejudicial. Id. at 1114(¶ 22) (citation omitted). In the context of a guilty plea, the focus is whether the defendant has shown that there is a reasonable probabili ty that, but for the errors of his counsel, he would not have entered a guilty plea, would have insisted on going to trial, and that the outcome would have been different. Hannah v. State, 943 So.2d 20, 24(¶ 7) (Miss.2006).
¶ 18. Ealey offers only his bare assertions as proof that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. In his motion for post-conviction relief, he provided no affidavits or proposed testimony of other witnesses to support his contentions. Ealey offers no exculpatory evidence that his attorney would have discovered by more thoroughly investigating the case nor does he identify which motions his attorney should have, but failed to file. It is firmly established that mere allegations are insufficient to entitle a defendant to an evidentiary hearing on a post-conviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Gazzier, 744 So.2d at 778-79(¶ 6) (citing Robertson v. State, 669 So.2d 11 (Miss.1996)). Post-conviction claims of ineffective assistance are properly dismissed where the defendant offers only his affidavit in support of his allegations. Vielee v. State, 653 So.2d 920, 922 (Miss.1995); Brooks v. State, 573 So.2d 1350, 1354 (Miss.1990).
¶ 19. Moreover, the transcript of the guilty plea hearing contradicts Ealey's claim that his attorney coerced him to plead guilty. At the plea hearing, Ealey represented that no one had threatened him to plead guilty. Our supreme court has held that "when the only support offered by a convict is his own affidavit, and his affidavit is contradicted by his own sworn statement, an evidentiary hearing is not required." Young v. State, 731 So.2d 1120, 1123(¶ 12) (Miss.1999).
¶ 20. Here the trial court found that Ealey failed to provide "any substance whatsoever" in support of his motion for post-conviction relief. For the reasons discussed above, we do not find the trial court's decision to be clearly erroneous. The arguments advanced by Ealey fail to meet the required burden that counsel was deficient, and that Ealey was prejudiced by counsel's deficiency. This issue is without merit.
3. Sufficiency of Evidence/Illegal Search
¶ 21. Ealey argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he was in possession of the cocaine. He also asserts that the search of the vehicle was illegal. These claims are procedurally barred.
¶ 22. It is well-settled that a valid plea of guilty waives all non-jurisdictional defects incident to trial. Dennis v. State, 873 So.2d 1045, 1048(¶ 9) (Miss.Ct.App.2004) (citing Anderson v. State, 577 So.2d 390, 391 (Miss.1991)). Our supreme court has squarely held that a guilty plea waives a claim alleging an illegal search or seizure as well as the prosecution's requirement to prove each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. King v. State, 738 So.2d 240, 240(¶¶ 4-5) (Miss.1999); Jefferson v. State, 556 So.2d 1016, 1019 (Miss.1989).
¶ 23. Having already determined that Ealey entered and the trial judge accepted a valid guilty plea, we find that Ealey's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and the legality of the search are waived. This issue is without merit.
¶ 24. THE JUDGMENT OF THE ADAMS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT DENYING POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IN CAUSE NO. 2006-CP-00552 IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO ADAMS COUNTY.
¶ 25. THE APPEAL IN CAUSE NO. 2006-KP-1349 IS DISMISSED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO ADAMS COUNTY.
LEE AND MYERS, P.JJ., CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE AND ROBERTS, JJ, CONCUR. IRVING, J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY. KING, C.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.
. The record reflects that Ealey's attorney filed a motion to suppress evidence found during the search of the vehicle. It is clear from the record that Ealey's attorney aggressively attacked the legality of the search at the suppression hearing and that he was very knowledgeable of the facts and circumstances of the case as evidenced by his cross-examination of Officer Brown.