Case Name: The Woodmont Association vs. The Town of Milford
Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Connecticut
Decision Date: 1912-07-19
Citations: 85 Conn. 517
Docket Number: 
Parties: The Woodmont Association vs. The Town of Milford.
Judges: Prentice, Thayer, Roraback, George W. Wheeler and Ralph Wheeler, Js.
Reporter: Connecticut Reports
Volume: 85
Pages: 517–534

Head Matter:
The Woodmont Association vs. The Town of Milford.
Third Judicial District, Bridgeport,
April Term, 1912.
Prentice, Thayer, Roraback, George W. Wheeler and Ralph Wheeler, Js.
An Act expressly repealing inconsistent Acts or parts of Acts adds nothing to what would result by implication. Such repeals are not favored, and will not be extended beyond the reason therefor, nor presumed where the earlier and later statutes may be reconciled.
The action or non-action of administrative boards may become the subject of judicial review whenever it is claimed, among other things, that it works material damage to individual or corporate rights, or invades or threatens such rights, or is so unreasonable as to justify judicial intervention, or is not consonant with justice, or that a legal duty has not been performed.
When there is doubt as to the jurisdiction of such a board, a motion to dismiss the proceeding before it for want of jurisdiction should be denied.
Where a judge is by statute constituted a special tribunal with definite limited powers, whose jurisdiction of the subject-matter is made dependent upon the existence of certain prescribed conditions, until and unless the existence of such conditions is averred and proven and affirmatively appears of record, he is without authority to act, and any attempted action on his part is coram non judice and void.
No presumption will be made in favor of jurisdiction.
The objection of want of jurisdiction may be made at any time, and the court or tribunal may act on its own motion, and should do so when the lack of jurisdiction is called to its attention.
Where a statute permits an application to a judge to determine the amount of money to be paid by a town to a borough within it for highway construction and improvement, only in the event of a disagreement between the selectmen and burgess representatives upon a joint board, the application must aver such disagreement, since it is a jurisdictional fact.
Such an application, lacking such an averment, may not be made sufficient by amendment, since the allowance of an amendment involves the assumption and exercise of jurisdiction.
Argued April 16th
decided July 19th, 1912.
Application to the Hon. Luden F. Burpee, a judge of the Superior Court, to fix and determine the amount of money that the defendant shall pay to the plaintiff for making and repairing highways, and for maintaining other public works, within the territory of the plaintiff during the year beginning September 1st, 1911, brought pursuant to § 36 of the applicant’s charter (14 Special Laws, p. 464); the defendant’s motion to dismiss the application was granted, and judgment rendered dismissing it, and the plaintiff appealed.
No error.
The section of the charter referred to reads as follows: “Sec. 36. It shall be the duty of the selectmen of the town of Milford and an equal number of the burgesses, annually to determine the amount of money that the town of Milford shall pay over to the association for the making, repairing, and laying out of the highways and sidewalks, for maintaining a fire department and street hydrants, and for lighting the streets within the territory of said association; provided, however, that no money shall be paid to said association for making and repairing sidewalks, for maintaining a fire department, or street hydrants, or for lighting the streets within the territory of said association, or for any of such purposes, unless the town of Milford shall appropriate moneys for the same purposes to be expended within the limits of said town outside the limits of said association; and in case the selectmen and the burgesses aforesaid cannot agree upon the amount of money to be paid by said town, then either the said town of Milford or said association may apply to any judge of the Superior Court to have him fix and determine the amount that shall be paid by said town to said association. Said judge shall cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the parties of the time when and place where he will hear said cause, and said judge is hereby empowered to fully hear said parties and determine the amount that said town shall pay to said association for the current year, and shall file his opinion with the clerk of the Superior Court for New Haven county. The sum thus determined shall be paid by said town into the treasury of said association and said town shall not be liable to make or repair any highways or sidewalks within the limits of said association; but said town shall continue to be liable to make and repair all bridges in the territory included in said association.”
The complaint alleges, in substance, that the applicant is a municipal corporation chartered by the General Assembly, and located within the limits of the defendant town; that the annual tax of said town yielded about $71,000, of which about $24,000 was spent for certain general town purposes; that of this sum of $71,000 about $11,000 was paid by residents of the applicant association; that the entire expense of maintaining highways, sidewalks, a fire department, street hydrants, and street lights within the limits of the association is directly borne by the association, the town of Milford expending nothing directly therefor, or for any other purpose whatsoever; that it was and is necessary for the association to lay out and expend for the current year between $8,000 and $9,000 for the purposes named; that it is in want of money to meet such necessary expenditure; that the selectmen and board of finance of the town and an equal number of burgesses of the association have held several meetings for the purpose of determining the amount of money that the town should pay over to the association for the purposes enumerated in § 36 of the charter from the first day of September, 1911, to the first day of September, 1912, and that said selectmen and the board of finance and said equal number of burgesses cannot agree upon an amount to be so paid for such purposes, or for any other purpose where money is required from said association that is legally to be paid by said town to said association.
The judge was asked to fix and determine the amount to be paid by the town to the applicant conformably to the provisions of the above § 36.
William Kennedy and Spotswood D. Bowers, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Robert C. Stoddard .and Omar W. Platt, for the appellee (defendant).

Opinion:
Prentice, J.
This application was brought under the assumed authority of § 36 of the applicant's charter. 14 Special Laws, p. 464. It was dismissed upon motion upon three jurisdictional grounds, to wit: (1) that said section had been repealed, (2) that its allegations did not show that the prescribed conditions precedent to its presentation existed, and (3) that it did not present a question of judicial cognizance.
The claim of repeal rests upon the enactment in 1911 of an Act creating a department of finance in the town of Milford. 16 Special Laws (1911), p. 91. This Act contains no express repeal of the charter section. The only repeal expressed in it is one of inconsistent Acts and parts of Acts. This provision added nothing to what would have resulted by implication. "Such repeals are not favored, and will not be extended beyond the reason therefor, nor presumed where the old and new may stand together. . If both the earlier and later statute can be reconciled, they must stand and have concurrent operation. . . . The repugnancy between the two statutes must be clear and manifest, to warrant a court in holding that the latter repeals the former. . . . Repeals by implication extend to only so much of the prior statute as is within the reason of the repeal. They are never extended further than the inconsistency compels." Fair Haven & W. R. Co. v. New Haven, 75 Conn. 442, 446, 53 Atl. 960.
Reading the two enactments under consideration together, we discover no good reason why they may not both stand and have concurrent operation. It is true, of course, that, as a result of the passage of the Act of 1911, there can be no allotment or appropriation to the applicant of any sum or sums for any of the several purposes enumerated in § 36, by the action of the joint body specified, until there has first been an appropriation or appropriations by the town for such purpose or purposes, or to some other available fund, pursuant to the method ordained in the Act, and then only within the limits of such appropriation or appropriations. But we discover no inconsistency between that proposition and the further one that, after the requisite appropriations have been made by the town, in the manner prescribed by the Act of 1911, and the funds have thus been put at the service of the town officials, the joint board may proceed, as provided in the charter section, to designate a portion thereof to be paid over to the Woodmont Association, to be expended under its direction for the purposes for which the appropriations were made. Doubtless the Act would thus operate in restraint of the freedom of action of the board, and thus limit the power which it previously enjoyed. But this restraint is not one which is necessarily, or by reasonable implication, destructive of all the powers conferred upon it in the matter of payments directly to the applicant. To the extent suggested the provisions of the two enactments may well be reconciled, and stand together, with the result that a condition of disagreement might arise such as under the terms of § 36 would justify an application to a judge.
The present application was not drawn with the care which might have been bestowed upon it, to the end that it clearly and unmistakably appear that judicial questions were presented. There are, indeed, strong indications that it was within its purpose to have the judge pass upon certain purely administrative ones. But that fact would not justify its dismissal if a judicial question was also presented. Spencer's Appeal, 78 Conn. 301, 303, 61 Atl. 1010. A judicial question may arise out of, or as incidental to, action upon a purely administrative matter. Norwalk Street Ry. Co.'s Appeal, 69 Conn. 576, 599, 37 Atl. 1080, 38 id. 708. The action or non-action of administrative boards may be-j come the subject of judicial inquiry or review whenever '¡it is claimed, among other conditions, that it works j material damage to individual or corporate rights, or invades or threatens such rights, or is so unreasonable as 'to justify judicial intervention, or is not consonant | with justice, or that a legal duty has not been performed. Norton v. Shore Line Electric Ry. Co., 84 Conn. (24, 35, 78 Atl. 587; New York, N. H. & H. R. Co.'s Appeal, 80 Conn. 623, 636, 70 Atl. 26; Spencer's Appeal, 78 Conn. 301, 308, 61 Atl. 1010; Norwalk Street Ry. Co.'s Appeal, 69 Conn. 576, 599, 37 Atl. 1080, 38 id. 708; Fenwick Hall Co. v. Old Saybrook, 69 Conn. 32, 39, 36 Atl. 1068; State ex rel. Morris v. Bulkeley, 61 Conn. 287, 375, 23 Atl. 186. "In a doubtful case the motion [i. e. to dismiss] should be denied. And where the power in controversy is 'so near the border line of judicial power that its definition calls for subtle distinctions and its nature depends to an extent on the purpose and manner of its use,' the question of law may be dependent upon further allegations before the test of the question of power can be applied, or it may have to await the trial." Norton v. Shore Line Electric Ry. Co., 84 Conn. 24, 32, 78 Atl. 587.
There runs' through this application the underlying complaint that a legal duty has not been done; that the rights of the applicant, as representing its taxpayer residents, inherent in the situation disclosed, and recog nized and protected by its charter provision noted, have been ignored; and that the situation which has developed by reason of the action of the town and its authorities is not consonant with justice, and so unreasonable and unfair as to justify judicial interference. This grievance, it is true, has not been as distinctly brought out in the allegations as it might have been. But it is so palpably there that it could not properly be disregarded, upon a motion to dismiss, for the reason that the proceeding was one which presented administrative questions only.
The right of the judge to whom the application was addressed to entertain it rests entirely upon the provisions of the charter (§ 36) already referred to. By force of them the judge whose action should be invoked was constituted a special tribunal with defined limited powers, whose jurisdiction of the subject-matter was made dependent ~upon~~the existence of certain prescribed conditions^ Until and unless sucn conditions had come into existence he would be wholly without authority to act, and any attempted action on his part would be coram non judice and void. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. (37 U. S.) 657, 719; Grumon v. Raymond, 1 Conn. 40, 46; Sears v. Terry, 26 id. 273, 280; Culver's Appeal, 48 id. 165, 173. Any order he might make, or final judgment in form render, would be without effect, if the existence of the prerequisite facts showing jurisdiction did not appear upon the record. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. (37 U. S.) 657, 719; Sears v. Terry, 26 Conn. 273, 281, 285. No presumption would be made in favor of jurisdiction. The facts establishing it must affirmatively appear. They must be averred and proven. Sears v. Terry, 26 Conn. 273, 281. Until the existence of the prerequisites of jurisdiction appears in the papers, and jurisdiction is thus prima facie shown, the judge could not take hold of the proceeding. To do so would be to assume jurisdiction without apparent authority. "The power to hear and determine a cause is jurisdiction; it is coram judice, whenever a case is presented which brings this power into action; if the petitioner states such a case in his petition that on a demurrer the court would render judgment in his favour, it is an undoubted case of jurisdiction, whether on an answer denying and putting in issue the allegations of the petition, the petitioner makes out his case, is the exercise of jurisdiction conferred by the filing of a petition containing all the requisites and in the manner prescribed by law." United States v. Arredondo, 6 Pet. (31 U. S.) 691, 709. The objection of want of jurisdiction may be made at any time. Banks v. Porter, 39 Conn. 307, 308; Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. (37 U. S.) 657, 717. And the court or tribunal may act on its own motion, and should do so when the lack of jurisdiction is called to its attention. State v. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449, 455; State v. Pritchard, 35 Conn. 319, 325. Whenever the absence of jurisdiction is brought to the notice of the court or tribunal, cognizance of it must be taken and the matter passed upon before it "can move one further step in the cause; as any movement is necessarily the exercise of jurisdiction." Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. (37 U. S.) 657, 717; Denton v. Danbury, 48 Conn. 368, 372.
The charter provision permits an application to a judge only in the event of a disagreement of the selectmen and burgess representatives upon the joint board. This disagreement is clearly a jurisdictional fact. Without it action by a judge cannot be invoked. The application does not aver such a disagreement; nor does the allegation that another body of men has vainly tried to agree supply the deficiency. Jurisdiction is predicated upon a prescribed situation, and no other. It is not a sufficient answer to this objection to say that the application might possibly have been amended so that the necessary fact be made to appear, and that an opportunity for such amendment should have been given. Such a course would in itself have involved an assumption of jurisdiction. It would have been the taking of a step in the proceeding, which could not be taken until jurisdiction had first attached by the presentation of an adequate application showing the jurisdictional facts. The judge was therefore right in declining to proceed with the matter, and in dismissing the application for want of jurisdiction. No other course was open to him. Denton v. Danbury, 48 Conn. 368, 372.
There is no error.
In this opinion Thayer, Roraback and Ralph Wheeler, Js., concurred.