Case Name: POPE v. CITY OF ATLANTA et al.; and vice versa
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1977-10-18
Citations: 240 Ga. 177
Docket Number: 32525, 32526
Parties: POPE v. CITY OF ATLANTA et al.; and vice versa.
Judges: All the Justices concur, except Hall, J., who dissents from Division 1.
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 240
Pages: 177–188

Head Matter:
32525, 32526.
POPE v. CITY OF ATLANTA et al.; and vice versa.

Opinion:
Undercofler, Presiding Justice.
Mrs. Pope wishes to build a tennis court on the rear portion of her residence property which borders on the Chattahoochee River. The City of Atlanta issued a stop work order claiming that at least part of the tennis court was within 150 feet of the river and the river's floodplain and that she could not build the court without violating the Metropolitan River Protection Act (River Act), Ga. L. 1973 p. 128, as amended, Ga. L. 1975, p. 837. Mrs. Pope brought suit in the federal district court claiming the statute was unconstitutional on federal grounds. That case was dismissed. She then brought this suit in the state court asserting the state constitutional grounds that the Act violated her state due process and eminent domain rights, 1976 Const., Art. I, Sec. I, Par. I (Code Ann. § 2-101); Art. I, Sec. Ill, Par. I (Code Ann. § 2-301), and was an attempt by the state to exercise zoning powers delegated to local governing authorities, 1976 Const., Art. XI, Sec. IV, Par II (Code Ann. § 2-6102 (15)). The trial court ruled in our case No. 32525 that the state due process and eminent domain grounds were barred by res judicata by the litigation of the federal due process grounds in the federal court. The trial court held also in case No. 32526 that the River Act was an unconstitutional attempt to zone by the state, but that it was validly adopted by the City of Atlanta as a zoning ordinance, which it could enforce. Accordingly, the trial court ordered the city to hold a hearing before the Zoning Board of Adjustments. These appeals followed. We reverse on both grounds.
1. The trial court erred in holding that the federal court litigation was res judicata of the state due process and eminent domain grounds. Questions of the construction of the State Constitution are strictly matters for the highest court of this state. The construction of similar federal constitutional provisions, though persuasive authority, is not binding on this state's construction of its own Constitution. Harris v. Duncan, 208 Ga. 561 (67 SE2d 692) (1951); National Mtg. Corp. v. Sutiles, 194 Ga. 768 (22 SE2d 386) (1942); Kennemer v. State, 154 Ga. 139 (113 SE 551) (1922). See generally, 21 CJS 360, Courts, § 205. We note especially Harris v. Duncan, supra, where this court held that price fixing by a state milk control board violated the state due process clause even though the United States Supreme Court had already ruled that such a scheme was not unconstitutional under the federal due process clause. Therefore, we conclude that Mrs. Pope's state constitutional claims here are separate from her federal constitutional claims.
The doctrine of res judicata involves prior litigation by the same parties on the same subject matter in a court of competent jurisdiction as to all issues which were raised or which could have been raised. Code Ann. § 110-501; Price v. Ga. Industrial Realty Co., 132 Ga. App. 107 (207 SE2d 556) (1974). Where state claims which "could have been raised" in the federal litigation would have been pendent had they beén presented to the federal court, this court, in applying its res judicata statute, will use the same rules that the federal court would have used in determining whether it would exercise pendent jurisdiction. If the federal court would have retained jurisdiction of the pendent state claims had they been raised, then a subsequent suit in state court would be barred by res judicata; if the federal court would have refrained from exercising its pendent jurisdiction over the state claims, then the subsequent suit in the state court would not be barred by res judicata. In so doing, we conclude that the state issues in this case "substantially predominate" and would most likely have been left for state resolution had they been presented to the federal court. United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715 (1966). Therefore, now that these important state issues are before the state courts, we will not apply our res judicata statute to bar this litigation.
We emphasize that che rule announced here applies only to federal pendent jurisdiction, that is, where the federal court would not independently have jurisdiction of the state question but acquires jurisdiction only because a federal question is involved. Also, the court must be convinced that the underlying purposes of the res judicata rule are advanced rather than defeated by not applying the rule. Here the suit attempts to enjoin a public body from acting under a statute alleged to be unconstitutional under the State Constitution. The statute governs a matter of great public importance. The issue had not been decided by the state courts. If the res judicata bar is applied the defendant will likely be sued again on the same issue by another person situated similarly to the plaintiff. In that event both the courts and the defendant must suffer the same procedural requirements and hearings as here, as well as the attendant delay, until the issue is again ripe for decision. A decision now will preclude further litigation. The public interest will be served by an early decision. The defendant will not be harmed. Judicial economy will result.
Because the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the City of Atlanta and the state on the res judicata ground, it did not decide the state due process and eminent domain issues on the merits. Therefore, the judgment in case No. .32525 is reversed and the case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
2. The trial court erred in holding that the River Act constituted an attempt by the state to exercise zoning powers delegated by the Georgia Constitution to the local governing authorities. 1976 Const., Art. XI, Sec. IV, Par. II (Code Ann.§ 2-6102 (15)). The state contends it validly enacted the River Act under its police power. 1976 Const., Art. Ill, Sec. VIII, Par. Ill (Code Ann. § 2-1403).
The zoning power granted to county and municipal governments is defined in the Georgia Constitution, supra, as "the power to provide within their respective jurisdictions for the zoning or districting of such political subdivisions for various uses and other or different uses prohibited in such zones or districts; to regulate the use for which said zones and districts may be set apart; and to regulate the plans for development and improvements on real estate therein." See Anderson, American Law of Zoning, § 1.13; 82 AmJur2d 387, Zoning and Planning, § 2.
The same paragraph of the Constitution also provides: "Except as otherwise provided in this Paragraph as to planning and zoning, nothing contained within this Paragraph shall operate to prohibit the General Assembly from enacting general laws relative to the above subject matters or to prohibit the General Assembly by general law from regulating, restricting or limiting the exercise of the above powers,..." Some of the powers included are "(6) Storm water and sewage collection and disposal systems. (7) Development, storage, treatment and purification and distribution of water." The state is thus not precluded from acting in these areas by general law.
The purposes of the River Act are set out in Section 3, Ga. L. 1973, p. 128 at pp. 130-131. "(a) The General Assembly finds that adequate supplies of clean drinking water constitute the life-blood of the great metropolitan areas of this State and are, therefore, essential to the health, welfare and economic progress of the State; that development adjacent to major streams in certain metropolitan areas requires special regulation to provide adequate protection for jrablic water supplies; that siltation and urban runoff threaten such water supplies; that flood plain development unnecessarily exposes life and property to loss by flooding while increasing flood risks for other area [sic]; that over-intensive development adjacent to major streams increases the frequency and severity of such flooding; that it is in the public interest to avoid future flood damage and possible loss of life, to control erosion and pollution and to protect the water quality of major streams in certain metropolitan areas.
Argued July 12, 1977
Decided October 18, 1977
—Rehearing denied November 9, 1977.
Moretón Rolleston, Jr., Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General, Patricia T. Barmeyer, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.
Ferrin Y. Mathews, Ralph H. Witt, Mary Carole Cooney, Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General, Patricia T. Barmeyer, Assistant Attorney General, for appellees.
Furman Smith, Jr., William R. Bassett, Harvey M. Koenig, amicus curiae.
"(b) The purpose of this Act is to provide a flexible and practical method whereby political subdivisions in certain metropolitan areas may utilize the police power of the State consistently and in accordance with a comprehensive plan to protect the public water supplies of such political subdivisions and of the area and to prevent floods and flood damage, to control erosion, siltation and intensity of development adjacent to major streams in such areas for such purposes, and to provide for comprehensive planning for stream corridors in such areas."
We conclude that the River Act does not constitute zoning within the definition set out in the Georgia Constitution and quoted above, but instead falls within the reserved powers of the state to act, along with the local governing authorities, with regard to the water system, as is set out in the purpose of the River Act. Therefore, the trial court erred in ruling otherwise and the judgment in case No. 32526 is reversed.
Judgments reversed.
All the Justices concur, except Hall, J., who dissents from Division 1.
The Federal Constitution, which is of course binding on the states, thus provides a minimum standard, but the state may be more restrictive under its own constitution. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U. S. 714, 719, n.4 (95 SC 1215) (1975).
Pendent jurisdiction relates to issues of which the federal court would not have jurisdiction if raised independently of a federal claim. "Pendent jurisdiction, in the sense of judicial power, exists whenever there is a claim 'arising under [the] Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority..U. S. Const., Art. Ill, § 2, and the relationship between that claim and the state claim permits the conclusion that the entire action before the court comprises but one constitutional 'case.' The federal claim must have substance sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court. Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U. S. 103. . . The state and federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of operative fact... Needless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed reading of applicable law." United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 725-726 (86 SC 1130, 16 LE2d 218) (1966). (Footnotes deleted.)
"Had the court found a jurisdictional bar to reaching the state claim in Hurn [v. Oursler, 289 U. S. 238 (53 SC 586, 77 LE 1148) (1933)], we assume that the doctrine of res judicata would not have been applicable in any subsequent state suit." United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, supra, p. 724. (Emphasis in original.)