Case Name: HANLON v. THE FIRESTONE TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1972-11-28
Citations: 44 Mich. App. 1
Docket Number: Docket No. 10479
Parties: HANLON v THE FIRESTONE TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY
Judges: Before: Levin, P. J., and V. J. Brennan and Van Valkenburg, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 44
Pages: 1–8

Head Matter:
HANLON v THE FIRESTONE TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY
Opinion op the Court
1. Trial — Evidence—Interrogatories—Admissibility—Court Rules.
The trial court did not err in allowing a defendant to read to the jury a portion of its answers to the plaintiffs’ interrogatories where the answers read to the jury were relevant to another portion of the interrogatory previously introduced by the plaintiffs since such a procedure is specifically sanctioned by the court rules (GCR 1963, 302.4[4], 309.4).
2. Trial — Witnesses—Witness Not Submitted at Pretrial Conference — Admissibility of Testimony — Discretion—Court Rules.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing a defense expert witness to testify even though his name had not been submitted to the plaintiffs within the time limit set by the court at the pretrial conference, where the plaintiffs had an opportunity to depose the witness, since the trial court may modify a pretrial order (GCR 1963, 301.3).
Dissent by Levin, P. J.
3. Trial — Evidence—Interrogatories—Introduction by Interrogated Party — Admissibility—Court Rules.
The introduction into evidence of a defendant’s answers to the plaintiffs’ interrogatories is permissible where the answers introduced by the defendant are "relevant" to another portion of the interrogatories previously introduced by the plaintiffs only where that introduction would be necessary to avoid misimpression or unfairness (GCR 1963, 302.4[4]).
4. Trial — Evidence—Interrogatories—Introduction by Interrogated Party — Admissibility—Hearsay.
The trial court erred in permitting a defendant tire manufacturer to read to the jury in a products liability action a portion of its answers to the plaintiffs’ interrogatories, where the answers read to the jury were not introduced for the purpose of avoiding misimpressions and unfairness arising from the plaintiffs’ previous introduction of another portion of the interrogatories, but as a means of introducing self-serving hearsay evidence, and the error in allowing such hearsay evidence to be read should not be ignored on the assumption that it was harmless.
References for Points in Headnotes
29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 689.
58 Am Jur, Witnesses § 111.
Appeal from Wayne, Benjamin D. Burdick, J.
Submitted Division 1 March 8, 1972, at Detroit.
(Docket No. 10479.)
Decided November 28, 1972.
Leave to appeal granted, 389 Mich 789.
Complaint by Margaret Hanlon and Richard Hanlon against the Firestone Tire & Rubber Company for damages resulting from an automobile accident caused by tire failure. Verdict and judgment for defendant. Plaintiffs appeal.
Affirmed.
Lopatin, Miller, Bindes & Freedman and Norman L. Zemke, P. C, for plaintiffs.
Butzel, Long, Gust, Klein & Van Zile (by James D. Ritchie), for defendant.
Before: Levin, P. J., and V. J. Brennan and Van Valkenburg, JJ.
Former circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment pursuant to Const Í963, art 6, § 23 as amended in 1968.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
Plaintiffs were injured when one of the front tires on their automobile failed, causing their car to go out of control and strike a guardrail. Plaintiffs allege that the tire, a product of the defendant corporation, failed due to a defect in its manufacture. The defendant contends that the tire failed due to a cut sustained by a contact with a sharp object. A jury in the Wayne County Circuit Court returned a verdict of no cause of action; plaintiffs appeal from a judgment entered pursuant to that verdict.
Plaintiffs first allege that the trial court erred in allowing the defendant to read to the jury a portion of its answers to plaintiffs' interrogatories. The portion which the defense was permitted to present to the jury was relevant to another portion of the interrogatory previously introduced by the plaintiffs. Such a procedure is specifically sanctioned by the court rules (GCR 1963, 309.4, 302.4[4]) and accordingly we find no error.
Plaintiffs also allege that the trial court erred in admitting certain objects into evidence due to alleged gaps in the chain of evidence. We feel there was a sufficient identification of the items to permit their introduction into evidence, and to allow the jury to determine what weight they should be given. Witt v Chrysler Corp, 15 Mich App 576, 586 (1969).
Plaintiffs also argue that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing a defense expert to testify since his name had not been submitted to the plaintiffs within the time limits set by the court at the pretrial conference. Plaintiffs, nevertheless, did have the opportunity to depose this witness, and in fact did do so. GCR 1963, 301.3 specifically permits a judge to modify a pretrial order, and we find no abuse of his discretion thereunder.
Plaintiffs' final arguments, that defendant's expert was allowed to express opinions on matters regarding which he was not competent, and that the court improperly interjected itself into the proceedings, are both without merit.
Affirmed.
V. J. Brennan and Van Valkenburg, JJ., concurred.