Case Name: Arkansas Mining Company v. Eaton
Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 1926-12-06
Citations: 172 Ark. 323
Docket Number: 
Parties: Arkansas Mining Company v. Eaton.
Judges: 
Reporter: Arkansas Reports
Volume: 172
Pages: 323–329

Head Matter:
Arkansas Mining Company v. Eaton.
Opinion delivered December 6, 1926.
James B. McDonough, for appellant.
G. 0. Patterson, for appellee.

Opinion:
Hart, J.,
(after stating the facts). It is earnestly insisted by counsel for the defendants that the evidence is not legally sufficient to support the verdict, and in this contention we think counsel is correct. Counsel for the plaintiff asked a recovery upon the theory that the defendants were negligent in failing to notify the plaintiff that one of their servants had placed a defective coal-car in the neck or entry of the room where the plaintiff had been engaged in operating a coal-cutting machine.
In testing the legal sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a verdict in favor of the plaintiff on the ground of the negligent failure of the defendant to notify him that the coal-car had been placed in the entry, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. When this is done, however, we are of the opinion that the plaintiff, by his own testimony, has precluded himself from recovery. It failed to establish the fact that it was a rule or regulation of the company to notify him that a defective or other coal-car had been set in the entry of the room where he had been operating the cutting machine. He says in one place that they generally notified him, but this falls short of establishing a regulation to that effect. We have quoted from his cross-examination upon the question of notice. In this the plaintiff admitted that, under the mining regulations, the driver of the coal-ear had a perfect right to put the coal-car in the neck or entry of the room where he was operating the cutting machine, and that it was his duty to watch and see when cars were put in there. His only excuse is that, if the coal-car had not been defective, Walker would not have put it there. Thus it will be seen that, under the plaintiff's own testimony, there was no duty upon the part of Walker to notify him that the defective car had been placed in the entry.
On the other hand, the plaintiff expressly admitted that it was his duty to watch out for himself and see when coal-cars were placed in the entry. Once more, in his testimony, the plaintiff was asked if it was not the custom to notify him when a car was placed in the entry, and he answered, "Walker does, yes sir." This merely shows that it was the practice of Walker to notify the operators of cutting machines when he- placed coal-cars in the entries of the rooms in which they were working, but it does not establish that there was any rule or regulation to that effect.
Indeed, the testimony of Walker himself shows that, while he generally notified his fellow-servants that he was leaving a car in the entry, he did that to prevent them from getting hurt, and not because of any rule or regulation requiring him to do so. He was expressly asked if there was a rule requiring him to give such notice, and answered that he was not required to give the notice by the company, but he just did it himself in order to keep any one from getting hurt. As he expressed it, he took it for granted, and gave the notice usually by holloing at his fellow-workmen that he had placed a car there. Thus it will be seen that no duty devolved upon Walker to notify Eaton that the defective coal-car had been placed in the entry.
There being no rule or regulation requiring such notice to be given, no recovery could be had against the defendants because of their failure to do something which, under their rules and regulations, they were not required to do.
In this connection it may [be stated that rules are important and necessary where the conduct of the business is' complicated or dangerous, or where it is obvious that the safety and protection of the employees depend upon their adoption and enforcement, the failure to adopt and enforce proper rules or regulations for the proper management of the business in such eases is negligence. Ft. Smith Lbr. Co. v. Shackleford, 115 Ark. 273, 171 S. W. 99; Evans v. B. L. & A. S. R. Co., 147 Ark. 28, 227 S. W. 257; and Arkansas Natural Gas Co. v. Sealy, 167 Ark. 1, 267 S. W. 569.
In snch case, however, the burden of showing an omission of duty in these respects, if they existed, is upon the plaintiff; and, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the presumption is that the defendants adopted and enforced all rules and regulations reasonably necessary to the management of their business. In the case at bar, no proof that the business was so dangerous or complex that a rule requiring notice to be given that defective or other coal-cars had been set in an entry of the mines was necessary for the protection of those operating the coal-cutting machines. On the other hand, the undisputed, testimony shows that no such- rules or regulations are necessary. Two men are engaged in operating a coal-cutting machine, which is run into the room where it is used, on tracks extending into the room from the main entry, and the cutting machine is backed out on the same tracks. The operator of the machine, by looking behind him for an instant, before he backed his machine into the neck or entry of the room, could tell whether or not there was a coal-car on the track. It is true that, for their own convenience and safety, drivers of coal-cars generally told operators of cutting machines when they placed a coal-car in the entry, but this they were not required to do, under the rules and regulations of the company, and such practice was not necessary for the safety of the operators of the cutting machines. Hence negligence could not be predicated upon the failure of the driver of the coal-ear to give notice to the operator of the cutting machine that he had deposited a coal-car in the entry of the room. •
It follows that the court erred in not directing a verdict for the defendants, and, for that error, the judgment will be reversed; and, inasmuch as the case on the facts-seems to have been fully developed, the cause of action will be dismissed.