Case Name: GENERAL TEAMSTERS UNION, LOCAL NO. 406, v. UPTOWN CLEANERS & HATTERS, INC.
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1959-06-05
Citations: 356 Mich. 204
Docket Number: Docket No. 58, Calendar No. 47,430
Parties: GENERAL TEAMSTERS UNION, LOCAL NO. 406, v. UPTOWN CLEANERS & HATTERS, INC.
Judges: Smith, Black, Voelker, and Kavanagh, JJ., concurred with Edwards, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 356
Pages: 204–246

Head Matter:
GENERAL TEAMSTERS UNION, LOCAL NO. 406, v. UPTOWN CLEANERS & HATTERS, INC.
1. Appeal and Error — Chancery Cases — De Novo Hearing.
The Supreme Court hears chancery appeals de novo on the record, but gives great weight to findings of fact of the trial court.
2. Labor Relations — Employer Interference with Self-Organization of Employees — Collective Bargaining.
Bindings of circuit judge that termination of authority of plaintiff union to represent defendant’s 9 driver-salesmen as their, collective-bargaining agent had been obtained as a result of. interference by the defendant in the exercise by the employees of their right of self-organization for the purpose of collective bargaining and was, therefore, ineffective to terminate such authority of plaintiff held, justified under record presented (CL 1948 and CLS 1956, § 423.1 et seq.).
3. Same — Unfair Labor Practices — Defection of Union Members —Collective Bargaining.
An employer cannot justify its refusal to bargain with a union by the defection of union members which had been induced by unfair labor practices, where union representation had been obtained by the free will of the employees (CL 1948 and CLS 1956, § 423.1 et seq.).
4. Same — Collective Bargaining by Employers — Construction of Statute.
The State labor mediation act, while it does not in specific language impose a duty on an employer to engage in collective bargaining, does prohibit the employer from interfering with his employees’ right to organize and bargain collectively and, thereby, prohibits the employer from refusing so to bargain (CL 1948 and CLS 1956, § 423.1 et seq.).
References for Points in Headnotes
[1] 3 Am Jur, Appeal and Error § 912.
[2] 31 Am Jur, Labor § 269.
[3] 31 Am Jur, Labor § 90 et seq.
[4] 31 Am Jur, Labor §§ 123, 263.
[5] 31 Am Jur, Labor § 247.
[9] 31 Am Jur, Labor § 124.
[10] 31 Am Jur, Labor § 92 et seq.
[12] 31 Am Jur, Labor § 123 et seq.
[13] 3 Am Jur, Appeal and Error § 912.
5. Same — Construction of Statutes — Labor Mediation Act — Self-Organization of Employees — Collective Bargaining.
The State labor mediation aet is construed as restating the right of employees to self-organization for the purpose of collective bargaining with their employer and, where lawful bargaining representatives have been chosen in the method provided by statute, it is unlawful for the employer to interfere with his employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization (CL 1948 and CLS 1956, §§ 423.1, 423.8, 423.16)..
6. Same — Labor Mediation Act — Collective Bargaining.
Compulsory collective bargaining is a part of the express provisions of the State labor mediation aet (CL 1948 and CLS 1956, §§423.9, 423.10).
7. Same — Labor Mediation Act — Collective Bargaining.
Labor mediation, as spelled out under the State labor mediation act, is a form of collective bargaining with the influence of a third party added (CL 1948 and CLS 1956, § 423.1 et seq.).
8. Same — Labor Mediation Act — Collective Bargaining.
The purpose of the State labor mediation aet was the prevention or prompt settlement of labor disputes and the preventing of strikes or lockouts and to encourage collective bargaining (CL 1948 and CLS 1956, § 423.1 et seq.).
9. Same — Mediation—Collective Bargaining — Questions Beviewable.
Whether or not the State labor mediation act imposes an enforceable duty to bargain collectively at any point prior to mediation held, not necessary to be decided in suit against employer by union, which had at one time been lawfully selected by the employees as their bargaining agent, to compel defendant employer to cease interference with the emloyees’ rights to self-organization (CL 1948 and CLS 1956, § 423.1 et seq.).
10. Same — Collective Bargaining — Union as Bargaining Agent.
Defendant employer held, bound by its agreement with plaintiff union to bargain collectively with it as bargaining agent of defendant dry cleaner’s driver-salesmen, under record presented, showing it had been selected by the employees as such agent pursuant to an election held under the State labor mediation aet (CL 1948 and CLS 1956, § 423.1 et seq.).
11. Same — Collective Bargaining Agreement — Labor Mediation Act.
Collective bargaining agreement between defendant employer and union, as representative of driver-salesmen of defendant dry cleaner, and which had been selected at an election conducted through machinery provided by the State labor mediation board held, entirely consistent with the language and purposes of the State labor mediation act (CLS 1956, § 423.9c; CL 1948, § 423.9e).
12. Same — Enforcement of Collective Bargaining Agreement— Statutes.
Enforcement of a collective bargaining agreement between defendant employer, a dry cleaner, and plaintiff union, as representative of defendant’s driver-salesmen, by way of bill to enjoin defendant’s unlawful interference with the employee's rights of self-organization within the meaning of the State labor mediation act is specifically authorized by the act (CLS 1956, § 423.22).
13. Appeal and Error — Chancery Cases — Reasons for Result.
The Supreme Court does not reverse a decree in equity when the court below arrived at a correct result for other reasons than those upon which the Supreme Court relies.
14. Same — Questions Reviewable — Constitutional Law — Statutes — Labor Mediation Act.
Whether or not State labor mediation act is unconstitutionally vague and indefinite to the extent that it makes refusal of an employer to bargain collectively with his employees a crime is not determined, where no criminal charges are under consideration and in view of the severability statute (CL 1948 and CLS 1956, §§ 8.5, 423.1 et seq.).
15. Labor Relations — Antidiscrimination—Collective Bargaining —Continuing Power of trial Court.
Plaintiff union’s claim that decree enjoining defendant employer, a dry cleaner, from interfering with, restraining or coercing its employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization or contributing to or forming any labor organization and requiring defendant to bargain collectively in good faith through plaintiff, their freely chosen representative, over the wages, hours and working conditions of defendants’ employees who are driver-salesmen, should also have contained an anti-discrimination provision held, without merit, continuing power being retained by the trial court to restrain discriminatory practices, if need therefor be shown (CL 1948 and CLS 1956, § 423.1 et seq.).
Dethmers, C. J., and Carr and Kelly, JJ., dissenting.
Appeal from Kent; Searl (Fred N.), J.
Submitted April 15, 1958.
(Docket No. 58, Calendar No. 47,430.)
Decided June 5, 1959.
Bill by General Teamsters Union, Local No. 406, against Uptown Cleaners & Hatters, Inc., a Michigan corporation, Michael P. Salhaney and others to enforce upon employer the duty of collective bargaining and to enjoin certain violations of labor mediation act. Decree for plaintiff. Defendants appeal. Plaintiff cross-appeals seeking specific injunction against future discriminatory acts relative to union membership.
Affirmed.
Morse & Kleiner (A. Robert Kleiner, of counsel) and Padway, Goldberg & Previant, for plaintiff.
Warner, Nor cross & Judd (Harold 8. Sawyer, of counsel) and Varnum, Riddering, Wierengo é Christenson (Clifford C. Christenson and Eugene Alhema, of counsel), for defendants.
Amici curiae:
Harold A. Cranefield, Kurt L. Hanslowe, Redmond H. Roche, Jr., and Gordon A. Gregory, for International Union, UAW.
Beaumont, Smith & Harris, Franh E. Cooper and Dwight jEL Vincent, for Michigan Manufacturers’ Association. -

Opinion:
Edwards, J.
We believe tbe issues presented by this record are:
(1) Is plaintiff the representative of a majority of the 9 driver-salesmen employed by defendants?'
(2) Did the chancellor have power, under tho agreement between the parties and the terms of the-labor mediation act (CL 1948 and CLS 1956, § 423.1 et seq. [Stat Ann 1950 Rev § 17.454(1) et seq.]), to require defendants to enter into collective bargaining with plaintiff?
Certain features of this case make our task somewhat easier than it might otherwise be. First, we have here a purely intrastate problem with no question of pre-emption of the field by Federal labor legislation. Second, although we deal with a dispute of some bitterness, the record discloses no strike, stoppage of work, or counterclaim of unlawful labor activity. Third, the parties are in reasonable agreement as to the issues and have filed excellent briefs. And fourth, the circuit judge who heard this chancery action wrote a careful and thorough opinion of which we shall make frequent use.
The employer defendant in this case is a dry cleaning company in the city of Grand Rapids, which employs approximately 75 persons. The business is owned and operated by Michael, Nicholas and James Salhaney, and has been so operated for over 20 years. Included among the defendants' employees are 9 men who are described as driver-salesmen.
Functions of driver-salesmen include soliciting business for the firm and picking up laundry and cleaning throughout the city, and bringing such materials to the plant where the goods are cleaned, pressed and laundered. After delivering the articles to the customers, the drivef-salesmen collect the amount due or allow the customer to charge the amount. Some of the charge accounts are carried directly by the employer. Most accounts, however, are ones of the cash-and-carry variety. In relation to these, where a driver-salesman allows a customer to charge an item where the customer is not a firm charge account, the company rules required the driver-salesman to pay the firm for such charge accounts after 30 days have elapsed. Other than these accounts, driver-salesmen turn in all money at the end of each workday. Testimony indicated that the aforementioned 30-day accounts were in actuality not always brought up to date at the end of 30 days and that the defendant firm allowed driver-salesmen some leeway as to clearing up such accounts.
This record does not disclose any record of union organization at Uptown prior to 1957. On February 5, 1957, a representative of Teamsters Union Local 406, who was a personal friend of at least 1 of the driver-salesmen, met with 6 of the 9 drivers to talk about the union. At this meeting the 6 men present signed cards joining the union, and authorizing Local 406 to represent the men in obtaining a contract with defendant firm.
The following day the 3 other driver-salesmen, upon being informed of what transpired the previous night, also signed similar cards.
Pursuant to such authorizations, representatives of Local 406 approached defendant firm's officers, Nicholas and Michael Salhaney, seeking to set a time for the purpose of negotiating a contract. Nick Salhaney expressed great surprise that his men had joined a union, and asked for time to think about the matter.
The union representatives returned the following, day, at which time Nick Salhaney expressed disbelief that his men had joined a union. Possibilities of a representation election were discussed.
The next day, after consulting with his attorney, Nick made arrangements for a representation election to be held February 15, 1957, under the auspices! of the State labor mediation board: A formal mediation board agreement was executed by the parties calling for a secret ballot among the drivers "to determine the representative, if any, desired by them for the purposes of collective bargaining."
Prior to the election Nick spoke to his drivers, expressing his disappointment that the drivers wanted a union, because, he said, their problems had always been solved amicably. Prior to the election defendant firm also sent letters to the driver-salesmen instructing them as to the manner of the election. In this letter, disappointment over the desire for a union was again expressed. In addition, the letter noted:
(1) Union members pay $60 per year dues.
"What can the union do for you for this $60 or more a year that you cannot do for yourself?";
(2) The possibilities of strikes;
(3) The congressional investigation of the Teamsters Union;
(4) The high driver commission rate paid by Uptown.
The election was held as scheduled, with a resulting vote of 6-3 in favor of Local 406 being exclusive representative for collective bargaining.
On the day of the election after the results were known, Nick Salhaney had all drivers bring their 30-day accounts up to date. There is some dispute in the testimony on this matter, but it appears that the accounts generally were not handled by Nick Salhaney and that the drivers had not generally been required to keep them up to date.
Between February 15 and March 1, 1957, friction mounted between the drivers and the Salhaneys. Mike Salhaney reproached 1 driver over the union, used abusive language to him, and threatened him with violence. Reports were circulated among the drivers that defendant firm was going to go on a cash- and-carry basis, that some drivers would lose their jobs, and that strikes would injure the drivers.
One driver spoke to Nick Salhaney about quitting the union and organizing an independent union. Nick suggested that the way to solve the problem was for the drivers to sign a petition withdrawing from the union. This petition was typed in the defendants' office after suggestions as to its wording by Nick Salhaney, and circulated and signed by all 9 men. The petition was kept in the firm safe at night, to which no driver had independent access.
Testimony also indicated that Mike Salhaney encouraged the drivers to sign the petition "joining the bandwagon." One late signer testified that Salhaney asked him why he had not already signed.
When all signatures were obtained, Local 406 was notified of the drivers' withdrawal from the union, and thereafter defendants refused to recognize the local or bargain with it as representative of its driver-salesmen.
Plaintiff local thereupon brought this action claiming unlawful interference by defendants in the exercise of employees' rights to organize, and that such interference rendered the petition of withdrawal from the union inoperative. Plaintiff also sought in-junctive relief to restrain defendants from interfering with plaintiff's rights to organize and from refusing to bargain.
The circuit judge who heard the matter found in his opinion that the defendants had interfered with the rights of self-organization of the employees, and that the petition dated February 26th was ineffective, because of such interference, to terminate plaintiff's authority as representative of the employees. He thereupon entered a decree containing the following, provisions:
"It.is ordered that the defendants, their officers and agents, shall absolutely cease and desist from:
"(a) Interfering with, restraining or coercing their employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization.
"(b) Initiating, creating, dominating, contributing to, or interfering with the formation or administration of any labor organization.
"It is further ordered that the defendants, and their officers and agents, shall enter into collective bargaining, in good faith, with the plaintiff over the wages, hours and working conditions of the defendants' employees who are driver-salesmen, until the further order of this court." '
Both parties appeal, the plaintiff arguing that the decree should have contained an antidiscrimination provision, and defendants contending that the judge's finding as to interference was in error and that the collective-bargaining order was beyond the power conveyed by the labor mediation act.
We believe that the major issues presented on appeal are as stated at the outset:
(1) Is plaintiff the representative of a majority of the 9 driver-salesmen employed by defendants?
(2) Did the chancellor have power, under the agreement between the parties and the terms of the labor mediation act, to require defendants to enter into collective bargaining with plaintiff?
The chancellor summarized the facts bearing upon the representation question thus in his opinion:
"Prior to the election defendants made known their opposition to the union both at a meeting with the employees and by means of a letter sent out to each employee. In the letter, which was carefully drafted, and standing by itself would appear to have been permitted under both the constitutional and statutory free-speech rule, defendants marshaled the arguments against the union — the monthly dues, the possibility of strikes, the events then taking place before a congressional committee with respect to this particular union, the comparison of the employees' rate of compensation with, that of competing businesses in the city. Defendants emphasized their previous associations with the employees and concluded: 'Therefore, all the union can really do is to present and argue problems and we don't think either you or we need a union to do this for us.
" 'The choice is yours to make and we urge you to give the matter careful thought. Whatever you decide, be sure to vote by the secret ballot provided by the State of Michigan.'
"The result upon the secret ballot was a vote of 6 to 3 in favor of the union.
"In less than 2 weeks the 9 employees who had so voted had all signed the so-called petition terminating the union's authority — this time without a secret ballot and only after a certain amount of persuasion. What caused this apparent change of mind?
"One cannot escape the conclusion that the aggregate of the defendants' acts played an important and controlling effect. The evidence is clear that despite the election and plaintiff's [defendants'] agreement to be bound by the results, they continued to express by various means their hostility to the union. They arranged for a meeting place of the employees to discuss the possibility of an independent union and for the giving of individual notices to each employee of this meeting; they suggested that the drafting of the letter or petition was the 'American' method of terminating the authority of the union; they made changes in the form of the petition and caused it to be typed and placed for safekeeping in the company's safe. An officer of the company took active part in persuading hesitant members to sign. ' *
"Even though we accept defendants' version as to what was said and done with regard to the calling in of the past-due accounts, the possible loss of jobs,, the changing to a cash-and-carry basis and the somewhat violent argument with 1 employee, we cannot disregard wholly its effect as a part of the total picture.
"Nor can we disregard wholly what was said by the employees to the union representative urging prompt negotiations to end the pressure being put upon the employees—not as proving the existence of pressure but as evidence of the state of mind of the employees. The same may be said with reference to the question asked by the employees of the union as to whether signing the petition would have any legal effect upon its authority."
In his consideration of the evidence, the trial judge relied upon the "course of conduct" rule as set forth in National Labor Relations Board v. Kropp Forge Co. (CCA), 178 F2d 822, 828, 829, certiorari denied, 340 US 810 (71 S Ct 36, 95 L ed 595):
"Therefore, in determining whether such statements and expressions constitute, or are evidence of unfair labor practice, they must be considered in connection with the positions of the parties, with the background and circumstances under which they are made, and with the general conduct of the parties. If, when so considered, such statements form a part of a general pattern or course of conduct which constitutes coercion and deprives the employees of their free choice guaranteed by section 7, such statements must still be considered as a basis for a finding of unfair labor practice. To hold otherwise would nullify the guaranty of employees' freedom of action and choice which section 7 of the act expressly provides. Congress, in enacting section 8(c) could not have intended that result."
The circuit judge recorded his conclusion thus :
"When the employer participates in the making of the decision as to the choice or change of choice of a bargaining representative as actively as did defendants here, it may not be heard to complain because the court cannot look into the mind of each employee and determine with mathematical nicety the weight to be given each factor which contributed to the signing of the document which is relied upon to terminate the authority of the union.
"Defendants urge with obvious sincerity that their relations with their employees during the building of this successful business have been good and their treatment of the employees fair.
"This is not determinative of the issue. The act applies equally to good and just employers as well as to bad and unfair employers. The decision as to whether the men wish to bargain through a union is for them to make. Neither the employer nor the union can make it for them. It must be their own free choice.
"I therefore find that the defendant employer interfered in the exercise by the employees of their right of self-organization for the purpose of collective bargaining; that the so-called petition bearing date February 26th was ineffective to terminate the authority of the plaintiff as the representative of the employees."
"While we hear chancery appeals de novo on the record, we have many times stated that we give great weight to findings of fact of the chancellor.
"The trial court is our arena for the test of truth. There the contesting parties and their witnesses appear face to face in flesh and blood with weight and size and demeanor under the eye of the trial judge, tie sees the averted glance, marks the hesitation, detects the note of hysteria in the voice of a witness whose words may be calculated to deceive. The cold words on a printed page show none of these essentials to the search for fact. Donaldson v. Donaldson, 134 Mich 289; Vollrath v. Vollrath, 163 Mich 301; Cooper v. Cooper, 345 Mich 44." Hartka v. Hartka, 346 Mich 453, 455.
On the principal legal issue involved, the circuit judge relied upon Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 321 US 678 (64 S Ct 830, 88 L ed 1007), wherein the United States supreme court said (p 687) :
"Petitioner cannot, as justification for its refusal to bargain with the union, set up the defection of union members which it had induced by unfair labor practices, even though the result was that the union no longer had the support of a majority. It cannot thus, by its own action, disestablish the union as the bargaining representative of the employees, previously designated as such of their own free will. National Labor Relations Board v. Bradford Dyeing Assn., 310 US 318, 339, 340 (60 S Ct 918, 84 L ed 1226); International Assn. of Machinists v. National Labor Relations Board, 311 US 72, 82 (61 S Ct 83, 85 L ed 50); cf., National Licorice Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 309 US 350, 359 (60 S Ct 569, 84 L ed 799). Petitioner's refusal to bargain under those circumstances was but an aggravation of its unfair labor practice in destroying the majority's support of the union, and was a violation of sections 8(1) and (5) of the act."*
We believe the record presented here fully justifies the chancellor's findings of fact and conclusions of law.
We turn now to the second issue pertaining to the validity of the chancellor's order to defendants to enter collective bargaining with plaintiff.
At the outset it should be noted that the Michigan labor mediation act does not contain in the section dealing with unlawful conduct of employers any specific language making it unlawful for an employer to fail to engage in such bargaining. Cf., Labor management relations act, 1947, § 8(a) (5) (29 USCA, § 158[a] [5] ). It is plaintiff's claim (and the learned chancellor agreed) that proper construction of the act resulted in imposition of such a duty as a necessary implication of the express language of the statute and as a correlative duty to the employees' right to organize and bargain collectively.
The title and the specific provisions of the statute (CL 1948 and CLS 1956, § 423.2, 423.8, 423.9, 423.9b, 423.10, 423.16, 423.19, 423.22 [Stat Ann 1950 Rev § 17.454(2), 17.454(8), 17.454(9), 17.454(10.1), 17.454(11), 17.454(17), 17.454(20), 17.454(23)]), to which we will have reason to refer are as follows:
"An act to create a board for the mediation of labor disputes, and to prescribe its powers and duties; to provide for the mediation and arbitration of labor disputes, and the holding of elections thereon; to provide methods for settlement of hospital or public utility labor disputes, including the use of special fact finding commissions, to regulate the conduct of parties to labor disputes and to require the parties to follow certain procedures; to regulate and limit the right to strike and picket; to protect the rights and privileges of employees, including the right to organize and engage in lawful concerted activities; to protect the rights and privileges of employers; to make certain acts unlawful; and to prescribe penalties for violations of the provisions of this act."
"Sec. 2. When used in this act, unless the language or context indicates otherwise:
"(b) The terms 'dispute' and 'labor dispute' shall include but are not restricted to any controversy concerning terms, tenure or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of employees in negotiating, fixing, maintaining or changing terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee.
"(g) The term 'labor organization' means any organization of any kind,, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which em ployees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work."
"Sec. 8. It shall be lawful for employees, to organize together or to form, join or assist in labor organization, to engage in lawful concerted activities for the purpose of collective negotiation or 'bargaining or other mutual aid and protection, or to negotiate or bargain collectively with their employers through representatives of their own free choice."
"Sec. 9. No strike or lockout shall take place or be put into effect until and unless each of the steps have been taken and the requirements complied with as provided in this section.
"1. In the event the parties thereto are unable to settle any labor dispute, the employees or their representatives, in the case of impending strike, or the employer or his agent, in the case of an impending lockout, shall serve notice of such dispute together with a statement of the issues involved upon the board and the other party to the dispute.
"2. Upon receipt of such notice it shall be the duty of the board to exercise the powers herein granted to effect a settlement of such dispute by mediation between the parties. Prior to the calling of an election as provided hereinafter, it shall be the duty of each of the parties to such dispute to actively and in good faith participate in the mediation thereof. At least 1 member of the board, to be designated by the chairman, shall actively participate in the negotiations to mediate any dispute in an industry rendering a hospital or public utility service."
"Sec. 9b. It shall be the duty of both employees and employer to avoid a cessation of employment or a change in the normal operation of the business during the entire period in which the respective steps required by section 9 of this act are being taken or until a strike is authorized by an election held as provided in section 9a."
"Sec. 10. It shall he the duty of the hoard:
"(a) To arrange for, hold, adjourn or reconvene a conference or conferences between the disputants and/or 1 or more of their representatives;
"(b) To invite the disputants and/or their representatives to attend such conference and submit, either orally or in writing, the grievances of and differences between the disputants;
"(c) To discuss such grievances and differences with the disputants or their representatives; and
"(d) To assist in negotiating and drafting agreements for the adjustment or settlement of such grievances and differences and for the termination or avoidance, as the case may be, of the existing or threatened labor dispute."
"Sec. 16. It shall be unlawful for an employer or any officer or agent of an employer (1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, (2) to initiate, create, dominate, contribute to, or interfere with the formation or administration of, any labor organization; (3) to discriminate in regard to hire, terms or other conditions of employment in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization; (4) or encourage membership in, or initiate, create, dominate, or contribute to a company union; or (5) to discriminate against any employee because he has given testimony or instituted a proceeding under this act. Violation of this section shall be a misdemeanor and punishable as such."
"Sec. 19. This act shall be deemed an exercise of the police power of the State of Michigan for the protection of the public welfare, safety, prosperity, health and peace of the people; and all the provisions of this act shall be liberally construed for the accomplishment of said purposes."
"Sec! 22. (a)
"(c) The board, the attorney general, or any prosecuting attorney, on behalf of the people, or any individual or person, may pursue any appropriate legal or equitable remedy or other relief in any circuit court haying jurisdiction with respect to any act or conduct in violation of any of the provisions of this act. The existence of a criminal penalty with respect to any such act or conduct shall not be deemed to preclude appropriate equitable relief."
The chancellor who heard this matter below considered these provisions in his construction of the act as to the question of the employer's duty to bargain:
"The court must choose between these 2 possible constructions of the act. Forceful arguments are made in support of each and it cannot be said that there is an entire freedom from doubt as to the intention of the legislature upon this precise question.
"The language of the statute being susceptible of 2 constructions, the court must adopt that which is most reasonable and best suited to accomplish the objects of the statute.
"In section 1 the legislature declared as the public policy of the State that the best interests of the people are served by 'the prevention or prompt settlement of labor disputes; that strikes and lockouts and other forms of industrial strife, regardless of where the merits of the controversy lie, are forces productive ultimately of economic wastes.'
"In section 19 the legislature expressed its views as to how in cases of doubt the statute should be construed. 'This act shall be deemed an exercise of the police power of the State of Michigan for the protection of the public welfare, safety, prosperity, health and peace of the people; and all the provisions of this act shall be liberally construed for the accomplishment of said purposes.'
"In section 8 the legislature in these words spelled out the right of employees with respect to self-organization: 'It shall be lawful for employees, to organize together or to form, join or assist in labor organization, to engage in lawful concerted activities for the purpose of collective negotiation or bargain ing or other mutual aid and protection, or to negotiate or bargain collectively with their employers through representatives of their own free choice.' In so providing, the legislature did not create a new right. [Citing National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 US 1 (57 S Ct 615, 81 L ed 893, 108 ALR 1352).]
"It can be argued with considerable force that the* recognition by the Michigan legislature of this-'fundamental right' resulted without further legislative action in the correlative obligation on the part of the employer to perform those acts which are required to give effect to that right; that it was the intention of the legislature to not declare merely an academic or paper right, but to effectively secure collective bargaining as a means of curtailing labor disputes and furthering industrial peace.
"Plaintiff further contends that the Michigan legist lature by the provisions of section 16 has in effect made it unlawful for the employer to refuse to bargain collectively and by section 22 provided a remedy in the courts for a violation of section 16.
"By section 16 of the act as originally adopted certain conduct on the part of the employer was prohibited. In 1949 this section was amended by the addition of the following, 'It shall be unlawful for an employer (1) to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization.'
"Plaintiff contends that this language is substantially equivalent to that of section 8(a) (1) of the national labor relations act and that that provision had been construed prior to 1949 by the national labor relations board and by the Federal courts as prohibiting as an unfair labor practice the refusal of the employer to bargain collectively with the representative of the employees. Art Metals Construction Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, (CCA, 1940), 110 F2d 148; Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 321 US 678, 684 (64 S Ct 830; 88 L ed 1007); Franks Bros. Co. v. National Labor Relations Board (1943), 321 US 702 (64 S Ct 817, 88 L ed 1020).
"Section 8(a) (1) of the national act reads, 'It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer (1) to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exr ercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7.' Section 7 is the section relating to self-organization and collective bargaining.
"Defendants urge that there are substantial differences between section 16 of the Michigan act and section 8 of the national act.
"They first point to difference in the language of subdivision 1 of each act, that the Michigan act only makes unlawful interfering with the employees in the exercise of their right 'to self-organization,' while the national act prohibits interference 'in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7 Defendants urge that section 7 of the national act states 3 separate rights — the right to organize, to engage in .concerted activities and to bargain collectively.
"Counsel argue that the failure of the Michigan legislature to expressly prohibit interference with the right of collective bargaining is significant and 'controlling.
"I find it difficult to believe that the legislature in adopting the 1949 amendment was making such a fine distinction between the right of self-organization and the right of collective bargaining.
"In 6 ALR2d 416, 425, the editor states, 'The first phrase of section 7 declares that employees shall have the right of self-organization. The right is not propounded abstractly, however, either in the declaration of policy in section 1, or in the discussions of courts concerning it, but as incidental to the right of employees to choose representatives for collective dealings with their employer.' And at page 432, 'The right of employees to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing is recognized as the central right to which the right of self-organization, and of forming, joining, or assisting labor, unions, is constituent.'
"When, in 1939, the Michigan legislature adopted section 8 of the statute it did not do so for the purpose of enabling the employees to self-organize for social or fraternal purposes. It was endeavoring to avoid strikes and other forms of industria strife and to that end it was recognizing the principle of. collective bargaining and the right to organize for that purpose.
"In 1949, when it amended section 16 to expressly prohibit interference with the right of self-organization, the legislature was talking about the same kind of self-organization."
Appellants on the other hand contend that the chancellor erred in this construction of the act. They claim that Michigan has rejected compulsory collective bargaining by failure of the legislature to enact a specific duty-to-bargain provision. They point out that the unlawful interference section does not in terms forbid an employer's refusal to bargain. This latter fact is certainly accurate. But we decline at this time to explore its significance for reasons which will be noted.
We do believe, however, that enforceable collective bargaining is a part of the express provisions of the labor mediation act although the particular provision is not applicable to our current facts. Thus, section 10, supra, makes it the duty of the board, when mediation has been invoked, to arrange conferences between the parties and to assist in negotiating the settlement of a threatened labor dispute, while section 9 specifically states "it shall be the duty of each of the parties to such dispute to actively and in good faith participate in the mediation thereof."
It may, of course, be pointed out that these provisions are referred to as mediation, rather than collective bargaining, and that the duty thus spelled out does not arise until after mediation is invoked. We believe, however, that the mediation thus spelled out is obviously a form of collective bargaining with the influence of a third party added. No matter what word be chosen, these provisions impose an enforceable duty upon Michigan employers under the circumstances outlined of meeting with and seeking to resolve differences with lawfully-chosen representatives of their employees. Indeed, the labor mediation act can only be read as designed to mitigate strikes and lockouts and to encourage collective bargaining.
We do not find it necessary to decide whether the statute imposes an enforceable duty to bargain at any point prior to mediation under sections 9 and 10 of the act to which we have just referred.
The fourth issue presented by appellee on its appeal is as follows:
"Were appellants bound by their contract with the appellee and the State of Michigan to recognize ap-pellee as the collective bargaining representative of the 9 driver-salesmen?"
On the facts contained in this record and as found by the chancellor we answer this question affirmatively.
The election agreement voluntarily entered into between the parties through machinery provided by the labor mediation board spelled out the purpose of the election. It was "to determine the representative, if any, desired by them [the employees] for purposes of collective bargaining." The agreement was declared by plaintiff and defendants to be "binding upon all parties." Defendants, when they sought the consent election and signed the agreement therefor, in our view undertook to abide by the results of the election and to engage in collective bargaining in the event plaintiff won.
"We find this type of agreement entirely consistent with the language and purposes of the Michigan labor mediation act. (See sections 9c, 9e. )
The method of enforcement sought by the plaintiff and granted by the chancellor is authorized by specific terms of the act. The statute provides in section 22, subd (c) :
"The board, the attorney general, or any prosecuting attorney, on behalf of the people, or any individual or person, may pursue any appropriate legal or equitable remedy or other relief in any circuit court having jurisdiction with respect to any act or conduct in violation of any of the provisions of this act."
Indeed, appellants appear to concede in their brief filed in this Court that if the revocation of the bargaining agent of their employees is not valid, the agreement is binding and enforceable upon them. For they state:
"That agreement does provide that the results of the election shall be final and binding upon the parties. Defendants recognized this and were preparing to negotiate until all of the employees requested them not to do so. It was only after receiving that request that they refused to bargain.
"It is defendants' position that they were bound by that agreement for a reasonable period, unless there would be evidence sufficient to give them a good-faith doubt as to plaintiff's status as the representative of a majority of the employees."
We have previously held that the chancellor was right in determining that plaintiff was the lawfully designated representative of defendants' employees at the times in question. As we view the facts, ap pellants were obligated by voluntary contract to recognize appellee as representative of the employees concerned for purposes of collective bargaining and the chancellor's order required them to do so.
On this point, we found our decision on the plain terms of an agreement and the applicable sections of the labor mediation act authorizing enforcement in equity. Hence, we do not discuss the interesting authorities cited by both parties pertaining to appellee's claim of a statutory implied duty to bargain. Our affirmance thus is based on grounds other than those employed by the learned chancellor, but we do not reverse a decree in equity when the court below arrived at the correct result for other reasons. Langschwager v. Pinney, 351 Mich 473; Ormsby v. Barr, 22 Mich 80; County of Ottawa v. Zwagerman, 229 Mich 501.
No criminal charges are under consideration here. In view of the severability statute (CL 1948, § 8.5 [Stat Ann 1952 Rev § 2.216]), we find no need to pass upon appellants' claim that the act is unconstitutionally vague and indefinite to the extent that it makes refusal to bargain a crime. Nor do we consider that the cross appeal has merit. If need arises for amendment of the injunction in order to restrain discriminatory practices, the circuit judge has clearly indicated a willingness to consider amendment upon proper showing.
The decree is affirmed. Costs to appellee.
Smith, Black, Voelker, and Kavanagh, JJ., concurred with Edwards, J.
See 29 USCA, § 157, 158.—Reporter.
Section 8 originally was divided into numbered subsections. See 49 Stats 452, 453. Upon amendment, 61 Stats 140, 141, section 8 was expanded, alphabetical and numerical subsections being designated. Subsections (1) and (5) became, without change in content, subsections (a)(1) and (a) (5).—Reporter.
CLS 1956, § 423.9c, CL 1948, § 423.9e (Stat Ann 1950 Rev § 17.454[10.2], 17.454[10.4]).—Reporter.
CLS 1956, § 423.22 (Stat Ann 1950 Rev § 17.454[23]).-Reporter.
See Service Drivers & Helpers, Car Washers & Garage Employees Union, Teamsters Local 985, A.F.L., v. Labor Mediation Board, 342 Mich 295; Art Metals Const. Co. v. National Labor Relations Board (CCA, 1940), 110 F2d 148; State v. Stodulski (Mo), 298 SW2d 420; Erie County Water Authority v. Kramer, 208 Misc 292 (143 NYS2d 379); Quill v. Eisenhower, 5 Misc 2d 431 (113 NYS2d 887); Trustees of Wisconsin State Federation of Labor v. Simplex Shoe Manfg. Co., 215 Wis 623 (256 NW 56).