Case Name: LEWIS H. BAUMGARTEL, Respondent, v. THE PROVIDENCE WASHINGTON INSURANCE COMPANY, of Providence, R. I., Appellant
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1891-07
Citations: 68 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 118
Docket Number: 
Parties: LEWIS H. BAUMGARTEL, Respondent, v. THE PROVIDENCE WASHINGTON INSURANCE COMPANY, of Providence, R. I., Appellant.
Judges: Learned, P. J., concurred.
Reporter: Supreme Court Reports (Hun)
Volume: 68
Pages: 118–124

Head Matter:
LEWIS H. BAUMGARTEL, Respondent, v. THE PROVIDENCE WASHINGTON INSURANCE COMPANY, of Providence, R. I., Appellant.
Insurance — conditions in a policy — declarations of agent — when an estoppel — after a loss subsequent proceedings may be regulated by consent, notwithstanding stipulations in the policy.
A policy of insurance provided tliat it should be void if other insurance should be made or procured upon the premises, unless it was otherwise provided by agreement indorsed thereon or added thereto. It further provided that no officer, agent or other representative of the company should have power to waive any provision or condition of the policy, unless such waiver be written upon or attached thereto, nor should any privilege or permission affecting the insurance, under the policy, exist or be claimed by the insured, unless so written or attached. The insured procured other insurance, and thereafter informed the agent of the insurance company of the fact, who replied, “All right, I will attend to it,”but he failed to do so.
In an action upon the policy to recover for a loss thereunder:
Held, that the declaration of the agent was equivalent to a promise made to the insured to indorse the proper consent upon the policy; that, upon such a promise, the insured had a right to rely, and that the insurer was thereby estopped to refuse to perform said promise. (Mayham, J., dissenting.)
Where a loss has occurred under a valid policy, subsequent proceedings, e. g., serving proofs of loss, etc., are mere procedure to ascertain the amount due, and this may be regulated by the consent of the parties, notwithstanding specific provisions in that regard contained in the policy.
Appeal by the defendant, the Providence Washington Insurance Company, from a judgment, entered in the office of the clerk of Fulton county on the 18th day of March, 1890, in favor of the plaintiff for $808.67, after a trial at the Fulton Circuit before the court and a jury; and also from an order, entered in said clerk’s office on the 25th day of Februaiy, 1890, denying the motion of said defendant for a new trial upon the minutes of the court.
The action was brought to recover the amount of a loss sustained under a policy of insurance which contained, among others, the following provisions: “ This entire policy, unless otherwise provided by agreement- indorsed hereon or added hereto, shall be void if the insured now has or shall hereafter make or procure any other contract of insurance, whether valid or not, on property covered in whole or in part by this policy. * * * This policy is made- and accepted, subject to the foregoing stipulations and conditions, together with such other provisions, agreements or conditions as may be indorsed hereon or added hereto, and no officer, agent or other representative of this company shall have power to waive any provision or condition of this policy, except such as, by the terms of this policy, may be the subject of agreement indorsed hereon or added hereto, and as to such provisions and conditions no officer, agent or representative shall have such power or be deemed or held to have waived such provisions or conditions, unless such waiver, if any, shall be -written upon or attached hereto, nor shall any privilege or permission affecting the insurance, under this policy, exist or be claimed by the insured, unless so written or attached.”
I. _N. Avies, for the appellant.
Dudley cé Thorne, for the respondent.

Opinion:
L'andon, J.:
The plaintiff did obtain other insurance upon this property after the date of the policy issued to him by defendant. Such subsequent insurance made this policy void, if the defendant's consent thereto was not indorsed upon this policy, unless the defendant waived the indorsement or so acted as to be equitably bound to make the indorsement, or be estopped from taking advantage of the fact that it was not made.
The plaintiff, after obtaining the subsequent insurance, told the defendant's agent that he had obtained it. The agent, then being upon the street, replied to the plaintiff, " All right, I will attend to it." He failed to attend to it before the fire occurred, and now the defendant claims that that declaration of its agent, under the terms of the policy, has no effect. I think it was equivalent to a promise to indorse the propér consent upon the policy, a promise upon which the plaintiff1 had the right to rely, and did rely, and which the defendant cannot now repudiate to its own gain, and the plaintiff's loss, and which the defendant is estopped to refuse to perform, and could be compelled, specifically, to perform, if necessary; but since no such circuity is necessary, the law will regard as done what the defendant ought to have done, and will declare the rights of the plaintiff accordingly, and hence hold the present policy valid.
Walsh v. Hartford Insurance Company (73 N. Y., 5) is. cited in opposition. But in that case the agent performed all lie promised to perform; the plaintiff's misfortune consisted in relying upon the supposed legal effect of the full performance of the promise, and he was mistaken in that respect.
It is not quite correct to call the transaction between the plaintiff and defendant's agent a waiver,, since that could, under the terms of the policy in respect to further insurance, only be made in writing; but the agent had the power to make the necessary indorsement in writing, and consequently he had the power to make the prelimi-. nary oral executory agreement that he would make it; an agreement which must be enforced, or regarded as enforced, in order to prevent a failure of justice. But as it is the duty of the court to declare the legal effect of the transaction upon the rights of the jiarties, and as it practically amounts to the same result whether called one thing or another, no error to the prejudice of the defendant was committed by the court in speaking of it. as a waiver.
Evidence was given tending to show a waiver of proofs of loss within the time fixed by the policj'.
The policy being valid, and a loss having occurred, subsequent proceedings are mere procedure to ascertain the amount due plaintiff upon the policy, and the consent of the parties may regulate it, notwithstanding specific regulations in the policy. The plaintiff acted as defendant consented he might, and defendant cannot now withdraw that consent to plaintiff's injury.
The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
Learned, P. J., concurred.