Case Name: BEVINS v. ALBRO
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1895-05-29
Citations: 33 N.Y.S. 1079
Docket Number: 
Parties: BEVINS v. ALBRO.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 33
Pages: 1079–1081

Head Matter:
(86 Hun, 590.)
BEVINS v. ALBRO.
(Supreme Court, General Term, Third Department.
May 29, 1895.)
Attorney’s Lien—Judgment for Costs.
Under Code Civ. Proc. § 66, giving an attorney a lien from the commencement of an action, or the service of an answer containing a counterclaim on his client’s cause of action or counterclaim, and providing that the lien shall attach to a verdict, judgment, etc., in his client’s favor, the lien in favor of defendant’s attorney on a judgment rendered in favor of defendant for costs attaches immediately on its rendition, and therefore a judgment against defendant in another action between the same parties cannot be set off against it.
Appeal from special term, Warren county.
Two actions by Stanley H. Bevins against Annie Albro. Both actions were brought for the same cause of action, viz. for the services and disbursements of plaintiff as attorney for said Annie Albro in an action wherein one Sheehy was defendant and said Albro plaintiff. In action No. 1 a judgment for costs was rendered against plaintiff, amounting to §81.80; in the other action, No. 2, judgment was rendered in his favor for $163.55 damages and costs. An order was entered staying all proceedings on an execution heretofore issued by defendant in action No. 1 until the determination of an appeal taken by defendant in action No. 2, and directing that, in case the judgment ,in action No. 2 be affirmed, the judgment in action No. 1 be set off against, and applied towards the satisfaction of, the judgment in action No. 8. From said order, defendant appeals.
Reversed.
Argued before PUTNAM, P. J., and HERRICK, J.
S. M. Richards (C. H. Sturges, of counsel), for appellant.
Lyman Jenkins, for respondent.

Opinion:
HERRICK, J.
We have heretofore held that the costs recovered in an action belong to the attorney, without any assignment; and that the claim of the attorney thereto is superior to the right of the adverse party in the action to set off claims against the successful party. Delaney v. Miller, 84 Hun, 244, 32 N. Y. Supp. 505. A distinction is sought to be made between an attorney for a plaintiff and an attorney for a defendant, where no counterclaim is contained in the answer. And it is claimed that under section 66 of the Code of Procedure attorneys for defendant only have liens for costs, or are entitled thereto, when the answer contains a counterclaim. Section 66 was not intended as a limitation upon liens of attorneys for their costs, but as an extension; it was intended as an additional security to them. By it the lien is made to attach to the cause of action, whether that cause of action is set forth in a complaint or in an answer by way of counterclaim; and it attaches just as soon as it is asserted,—in the case of a plaintiff's attorney, when the summons is served; in the case of a defendant's attorney, when the answer is served, if it contains a counterclaim. The only change in the law effected by the section is to give attorneys liens upon causes of action before they are perfected into judgments. Obviously, an attorney for a defendant who has no cause of action to assert gets no benefit under the section, and therein is the only difference between liens for plaintiffs' and defendants' attorneys; it is a difference that only obtains before judgment.
The cases of Pierson v. Safford, 30 Hun, 521, and Levis v. Burke, 51 Hun, 71, referred to to sustain the claim that attorneys for defendants who have not pleaded counterclaims have no liens for costs, are both cases arising upon settlements made before judgments obtained, without paying the attorneys for their services, and, there being no counterclaims, there was nothing to which the liens could attach; and therefore the court held in each case that it did not come under the provisions of section 66, and the attorney could get no relief at its hands. Here a judgment has been obtained by the defendant for costs. The lien of his attorney attaches upon its rendition. Unlike the cases of Pierson v. Safford and Levis v. Burke, there is here something in existence, upon which, or to obtain which, the attorney has exercised his skill and spent his labor, and upon which the court can act to protect him. "It has long been settled that an attorney has a lien for his costs and compensation upon the judgment recovered by him." Marshall v. Much, 51 N. Y. 140. It makes no difference whether the attorney is attorney for a plaintiff or for a defendant. These views lead to a reversal of the order appealed from. Order reversed, with costs and disbursements.
3 N. Y. Supp. 386.