Case Name: Francis Lindsay v. Mary A. Lindsay
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio
Jurisdiction: Ohio
Decision Date: 1875-12
Citations: 28 Ohio St. 157
Docket Number: 
Parties: Francis Lindsay v. Mary A. Lindsay.
Judges: 
Reporter: Ohio State Reports, New Service
Volume: 28
Pages: 157–175

Head Matter:
Francis Lindsay v. Mary A. Lindsay.
Upon closing his final account in the probate court, an amount being due-his ward, the guardian induces her to sign a receipt for the money as though paid, agreeing to be responsible to her for said amount with interest. Held: An action may be maintained upon such agreement by the ward, and the sum actually due from the guardian recovered,. without in any way opening or reviewing the accounts which had been, settled in the probate court.
Error to the District Court of Harrison county.
Mary A. Lindsay, March 28, 1871, filed in the court of common pleas the following petition :
“ The said plaintiff, Mary A. Lindsay, who is now of full age, complains of the said defendant, Francis Lindsay, for that the said defendant was duly appointed and qualified as the guardian of said plaintiff, by the Probate Court •of said county, on or about the 81st day of October, a. d. 1854, and that, as such guardian, a large amount of money .belonging to said plaintiff came into his possession, to-wit, the sum of $798.39. That on or about the 6th day of April, 1867, said defendant filed in the Probate Court of said Harrison county, Ohio, a paper purporting to be a final settlement of his accounts as guardian of said plaintiff' as aforesaid; that at the date of filing said pretended account there ■was justly due from said defendant as such guardian to said plaintiff' the sum of $741.14; that since the filing of said pretended account the said defendant has {paid the said, plaintiff' at different times small sums of money, amounting in the aggregate to not more than $60.00,. •leaving a balance still due, after deducting said credits, from said defendant to said plaintiff, the sum' of $681.14, :no part of which has ever been, paid, either before or since the filing of said pretended account, and the same now remains due .and unpaid. Said defendant has at different times, at and since filing said pretended account, promised to pay said plaintiff' said sum of money so remaining due to said plaintiff', but now wholly refuses to pay the same, or any part thereof. Wherefore said plaintiff prays a judgment against said defendant for said sum of $681.14, with interest thereon from the 6th day of April, 1867.
This petition was demurred to, and the demurrer was overruled. An aménded answer was filed, setting up the de..fense that the matters in controversy relate to and involve ■the settlement of Francis Lindsay’s account, as the guardian of Mary, in the Probate Court of Harrison county.
That said Francis filed his said account, and on the 6th of July,1867, it was approved and passed by the judgment of the probate court, which judgment is still in full force and effect. A copy of this account is attached to the answer, and the judgment of the probate court approving the same is plead as a bar to the present action, and it is insisted that said account can not be opened, reviewed, or questioned. This account contains a voucher of $291.14, by which Mary A. Lindsay acknowledges receipt of that amount from her guardian.’ As to this voucher the answer states, that the money was not in fact paid, but the guardian borrowed it of her, agreeing to pay her interest. The answer thus avers that a large portion of this sum has been paid, according to an account set forth, and that there is only a small balance of $40.62 remaining unpaid, which the defendant, Francis Lindsay, is ready to pay.
The account attached to the answer shows that the guardian received $798.39. He paid out a few cash items amounting to $53.78, and then ballances the account by two vouchers. One is a charge of $450 for six years’ board, clothing, washing, and schooling, and Mary Lindsay, the ward, acknowledges the receipt of that sum in the bill presented. It is as follows :
“ Voucher, No. 1. — Oct. 31, 1854. Mary A. Lindsay to Francis Lindsay, her guardian, Dr. To six years’ boarding, clothing, washing, and schooling from Oct. 31, 1854, to Oct., 1860, at $75 per year — $450.
“ Received April 1, A. d. 1867, of F. Lindsay, my late guardian, the sum of four hundred and fifty dollars, the amount of the above bill in full.
Mary A. Lindsay.”
The other voucher is the one before spoken of, which was for $291.14 acknowledged to be paid, but not paid.
1. The reply denies that the action relates to the accounts in the probate court, and denies that any attempt is made to open or review the same, averring the purpose to be to recover the amount in defendant’s hands at the time of filing his account, which he retained upon an agreement-that he was to be released as guardian, but remain responsible, personally, to his ward for the amount in his hands.
2. The reply further says that, by the proceedings in the-probate court, it was not intended to release the defendant from responsibility. It also claims that the vouchers were obtained from the plaintiff by misrepresentation, while she was still a minor, and under control of defendant; that she-was prevented from taking action in the probate court by the misrepresentations and concealments of defendant, and his repeated promises that he would pay her what was due her.
3. That she did not receive the money the vouchers called for; that she signed them at her father’s request, he agreeing to become personally responsible for the amount, and agreeing to pay interest; that she did not read the vouchers, and did not know their contents, but relied exclusively on defendant’s promise to pay her the full amount; and that she signed the voucher to enable defendant, as he claimed, to settle with the court.
4. She also denies that defendant made the payments he-claims. The cause was submitted to the court, and judgment rendered for plaintiff below for $705.30.
The bill of exceptions shows that the ward, Mary Lindsay, lived the most of her time with her guardian and father until she was eighteen ; that she was ignorant of the-condition of her own affairs, not knowing what amount of her money her father had until a short time before this suit was brought. As any daughter would, she appears to have confided her interests to her natural protector without particular inquiry as to their management. As to the charge of $450 for board and schooling, etc., several witnesses testify that the girl’s work fully compensated for keeping her during her minority, and that her father had some property, and was fully able to maintain his family decently.
The girl herself testifies that she worked in the cornfield and harvest-field, and shoveled coal, as her father had. a coal-bank. She performed other services indoors and out of doors. When her father was a widower, she kept house-for him. She dressed cheaply, and though she did go to-school, it was never but to a public school. She says that, although she signed these receipts, she did not understand what they were, and no effort appears to have been made-to explain them to her, and she signed them a few days before coming of age.
The father testifies that he agreed to pay her whatever was coming to her when his settlement was made in court; that he had some conversation with her about her business, and after having his account and vouchers prepared by counsel, he handed her these vouchers, and said he wanted her name to them, whereupon she signed them; that he told her the $291.14 was coming to her, and that he had not the money just then, but would keep it, and pay her along from time to time, and pay her as much interest as any one else would. He further states that he had always been ready and willing to pay her whatever balance was-due her. It was agreed that if any judgment was rendered for plaintiff, it should be in amount $705.30.
John S. Pearce, for plaintiff in error:
The demurrer to the petition in the common pleas court should have been sustained :
First. Because if there was no settlement of the guardian’s accounts, the probate court was the proper and only tribunal that had jurisdiction to do so. No other court has the power to control the conduct of the guardian in respect to his accounts and to settle them. Sec. 2 S. & C. 1212.
Second. Because the petition does not allege a refusal of the plaintiff in error to settle his accounts, or that he has settled, and the amount claimed is the balance found due thereon to the defendant in error. Swan’s Manual on Guardians, etc., 1864 Edition, p. 92; 7 Pickering, 47, and authorities there cited.
The accounts of the plaintiff in error as guardian of the defendant in error having been settled by the probate court, the same is final between the parties. 1 S. & C. 677, sec. 31. The judgment of the probate court is final, and can not be collaterally impeached. 9 Ohio, 109; Paine’s Lessees v. Moreland, 15 Ohio, 435; Faran v. Robinson, 17 Ohio St. 242; 2 Phillips on Ev. 3, 4; Freeman on Judgments, 132; Anderson v. Anderson, 8 Ohio, 108; 17 Ohio, 190; Henry v. Vermillion, 1 Ohio St. 233; 9 Ohio, 187.
The plaintiff was barred by the statute of limitation. 1 S. & C. 677, sec. 31; 1 Paine, 61; Angell on Lim., sec. 23 and note 3; Id. 194; 17 Ohio St. 554; 34 Ala. 15; 10 Ohio, 469; Story’s Eq. Jur. sec. 1572.
Cunningham & Hollingsworth, for defendant in error.
As we understand the statute (1 S. & C. 677, sec. 31), the most that can be claimed for it is that it makes “ accounts final between guardian and ward,” so far only as the jurisdiction of the probate court is concerned, leaving the guardian responsible at law for any promise he may have made to his ward, or any benefit that may have accrued to him in consequence of a mistake, or of any fraudulent act of his own. Negley v. Gard and wife, 20 Ohio, 310; Bank of Muskingum v. Carpenter’s Admr’s et al., 7 Ohio, 70, 71; Adm’r of Tracy v. Adm’r of Card, 2 Ohio St. 444, 445; Long v. Mulford et al., 17 Ohio St. 504. If this be the meaning of the statute, then the court did not err in overruling the demurrer to the petition.
The settlement of the probate court was not conclusive. Wright, 200; White v. Parker, 8 Barb. 48; 4 Ohio, 334; Wright, 764.

Opinion:
Wright, J.
With regard to the demurrer to the petition, we remark : The petition alleges that the guardian filed a paper purporting to be a final settlement of his accounts as .guardian; that, at the date of filing of said pretended account, there was due from the defendant to plaintiff a certain sum, a small part of which has been paid, and defendant has promised to pay the balance.
It is alleged that, at the date of the final settlement, a .sum was due. If that settlement had found an amount to he due from the guardian to the ward, an action could he maintained to recover that amount, as was done in Favorite v. Borher's Adm'r, 17 Ohio St. 548.
It is hardly necessary to aver in what particular way this amount was determined. It is averred that a sum is due, and the party promised to pay it. This, we think, is sufficient, and there was no error in overruling the demurrer to the petition.
The second clause of the reply is demurred to. This clause, in effect, avers that the proceedings in the prohate •court were a fraud, and, therefore, the plaintiff should not he barred of his right to recover. This demurrer raises an immaterial issue. As will hereafter appear, it is of no consequence whether the settlement in the probate court was fraudulent or not.
The case does not at all turn upon the merits of that settlement, and may be disposed of without considering whether it is proper or improper, or entering into or reviewing it in any way.
It is very possible that the plaintiff may have thought it necessary to attack the guardian's accounts for fraud, and have them set aside and reviewed, in order to maintain the suit; but we think that the proper results can be obtained without any such action. In the opinion of a majority of the court, neither the jurisdiction of the probate court nor the finality of its action are involved in the decision of the case.
The ground of those demurrers and upon which the action is most strenuously defended is that all matters perT taining thereto belong to the probate court, and jurisdiction thereof can not be entertained elsewhere. The account of the guardian had been closed and settled in that court, and to all appearances he had paid to his ward every cent that was due her, although it stands admitted that such was not the fact.
The 31st section of the act relative to guardian and ward provides that the settlement made in the probate court of the guardian's accounts shall be final between him and his ward, unless appealed from to the common pleas, with a further provision that such settlement may be attacked for fraud within two years. 1 S. & C. 677.
It is therefore claimed by the defendant that this voucher of $450 for board, schooling, and clothing, constitutes a proper charge, which can not now be inquired into, although it might be made to appear in the first place that the father was bound in law to provide these things for his child ; in the second place, that her work and labor had fully compensated therefor; and in the third place, in the matter of schooling, that nothing at all had been paid, as the girl only attended the public schools.
In the view we take of the case, it is not necessary to consider this voucher at all. It is not an element upon which we proceed in our decision, and it may be laid entirely out of view. "We therefore dismiss it as entitled to no further consideration.
As to the item of $291.14, her receipt, it is true, appears in the settlement account as though the ward had received the money. But upon the trial, the father and guardian himself says it never was paid. Although he attaches to-his answer a long account of items furnished her as an offset to the amount due, in his evidence he makes no attempt whatever to prove the truth of that account, but passes it silently by as though it never existed.
To maintain this action, as has been already intimated, it is not necessary at all to interfere with the proceedings of the probate court. Its accounts may remain finally settled, and not now to be disturbed. Considering the case with all the facts before us as set out in the pleadings and bill of exceptions, we may illustrate the views we take by reference to this very voucher of $291.14, the settlement with the probate court shows that it was paid, and the settlement is a final one. The finality, perhaps, is such that it would bar the ward from any proceeding against the' guardian as guardian, or against his sureties. But suppose the money was not paid, as is- admitted to be the case ; suppose the ward consented to such settlement for the purpose of closing up the accounts and releasing the sureties, the guardian agreeing to become responsible in his individual capacity, and agreeing to pay the money, can it be said that an action to enforce that agreement is a reopening the accounts in the probate court ? We think not. The action is based upon the finality of that settlement. It is not against the guardian as such, nor his sureties — it is upon a new and independent contract, the foundation of which is that the accounts are closed, sureties released, and other individual responsibility substituted therefor.
Suppose the guardian, instead of giving himself as the person who should pay the money, had given another who had assumed the obligation, or suppose he had given the note of another in payment of the amount found due, and which the settlement showed was paid, could an action on such note be claimed to be an opening and reviewing of the proceedings in the probate court ?
The case, then, stands thus. It is admitted that the $291.14 was not paid at the time of the settlement. The guardian claims that since,he has paid a large amount, exactly how much is in dispute, but he admits that something is still due, which he is ready to pay. He admits, therefore, that judgment against him must be rendered for some sum. Then comes this agreement in the bill of exceptions :
" It was agreed between the parties, with consent of the court, that if the judgment of the court shall be for the plaintiff in this trial, that for the purposes of this trial only, and to save an inquiry at this time as to the amount paid plaintiff by the defendant, said judgment shall be for $705.30."
What else could the court do than render the judgment it did, which was for $705.30.
Judgment of the district court affirmed.