Case Name: Raul CARRILLO, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2007-08-08
Citations: 962 So. 2d 1013
Docket Number: No. 3D05-975
Parties: Raul CARRILLO, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: Before RAMIREZ, ROTHENBERG, and LAGOA, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 962
Pages: 1013–1020

Head Matter:
Raul CARRILLO, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 3D05-975.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Aug. 8, 2007.
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Robert Kalter, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Valentina M. Tejera, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Before RAMIREZ, ROTHENBERG, and LAGOA, JJ.

Opinion:
LAGOA, Judge.
The Defendant, Raul Carrillo, appeals a conviction and sentence for first-degree murder with a firearm and aggravated stalking with a firearm. We affirm.
I. FACTUAL HISTORY
On August 2, 2000, a grand jury indictment charged Defendant with first-degree murder with a firearm and aggravated stalking with a firearm.
At trial, the State elicited the testimony of various witnesses to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant killed his girlfriend after she ended their relationship. The victim's brother testified that the night before she was murdered he overheard a telephone conversation during which his sister ended her relationship with the Defendant. Two eyewitnesses also testified that they heard gun shots immediately before the victim was found in her car and that a man who looked like Defendant was seen near the crime scene. These same witnesses identified Defendant's green pick-up truck as having been near the crime scene.
The State further presented Defendant's video-taped confession in which he admitted shooting the victim and disposing of the gun, a .32 caliber, in a canal. Defendant's cell mate also testified that Defendant admitted to him that he killed the victim and further told him where he had disposed of the gun.
The State presented testimony from Detective Mike Melgarejo, the lead detective, who testified that the .32 caliber gun was found exactly where Defendant had told his cell mate it was. The State also presented expert testimony from Thomas Fa-dul, supervisor of Miami-Dade Police Department's forensic identification section, that the gun found in the canal was the same gun that fired the casings found near the victim's body.
The jury found Defendant guilty of first-degree murder with a firearm and aggravated stalking with a firearm.
II. JURY SELECTION
On appeal, Defendant claims that the trial court erred in striking a prospective male juror over the objection of the defense without making a finding that the reason proffered by the State was genuine. We find that no new trial is warranted as the State volunteered a gender-neutral reason for the strike, and the trial court implicitly ruled that such reason was genuine. Accordingly, we affirm.
During the jury selection phase, the State challenged eight jurors for cause, four men and four women. The State also sought to exercise nine peremptory challenges against eight men and one woman. Two of the peremptory challenges were used on jurors the State had unsuccessfully sought to remove for cause. This appeal relates to a single prospective juror, Paul Soule, against whom the State sought to use one of its peremptory challenges.
During voir dire, the trial court asked the jury panel whether "yourself, close friend, or family member [has] ever been a victim of crime." Mr. Soule stated that he had been a victim of auto theft and that a close friend had been a victim of armed robbery. Following Mr. Soule's answer, the trial court further inquired whether "any of those incidents [would] affect your ability to be fair and impartial in this case." Mr. Soule responded that he couldn't answer the question, but noted that "I honestly do not believe that those life experiences would affect my ability in this case."
Following this exchange, Mr. Soule informed the trial court that he had a question regarding the death penalty:
MR. SOULE: I do have a question, your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. SOULE: You mention that this is a murder trial and that the death penalty is not on the table. Why is that, sir?
THE COURT: Because it is.
MR. SOULE: We'll never know.
THE COURT: No, you'll never know.
MR. SOULE: I don't mind if you answer the question.
THE COURT: The State of Florida does not seek the death penalty in this case. It's as simple as that....
When the State moved to strike Mr. Soule, the defense objected and the following exchange ensued:
[PROSECUTOR]: Strike No. 3.
THE COURT: Number 3?
[PROSECUTOR]: Yes.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Juror 3. Your Honor, I object. He's a man. She wants to get more women on the jury. And he's been sitting there since we began and there is absolutely no answer he gave that would even hint to be anything other than an excellent juror. He was mature and very experienced.
THE COURT: Yeah. But he's not part of any suspect class for which to raise any Neil/Slappy Melbourne inquiry.
[PROSECUTOR]: Judge, just for the record, he actually affirmatively asked why the death penalty is not on the table, he muttered under his breath in response thereto, which I noted. He also—
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: What was his — I didn't hear his response.
THE COURT: Nobody here did.
[PROSECUTOR]: And about the convicted felon testifying.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I'm sorry, what was the last thing?
[PROSECUTOR]: The court even asked him just for the record.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: What was that about? What was the last one? .
THE COURT: That he muttered under his breath on the response to the death penalty being put on the table. There wasn't any from him.
[PROSECUTOR]: He actually raised it in front of the question of—
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: What's wrong with that? That's a very legitimate question.
[PROSECUTOR]: It's not a legitimate question for someone on this jury, Judge.
THE COURT: That's the State's eighth.
The jury composition ultimately included five males, seven females, and the alternates, a male and a female.
III. ANALYSIS
It is within the trial court's discretion to determine the propriety of the reasons for a strike. "[T]he trial court's decision turns primarily on a determination of credibility and will not be overturned on appeal unless clearly erroneous." State v. Holiday, 682 So.2d 1092, 1094 (Fla.1996)(citing to Melbourne v. State, 679 So.2d 759, 764-65 (Fla.1996)). Based on our review of the entire voir dire record, we find no such error.
At the outset, we reject the State's argument that the defense failed to make a sufficient objection because he failed to ask for a race or gender-neutral reason for the strike. "A simple objection and allegation of racial discrimination is sufficient, e.g., 'I object. The strike is racially motivated.' " Melbourne, 679 So.2d at 764 n. 2. See also Whitby v. State, 933 So.2d 557 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006)(recognizing that a Neil inquiry is required when counsel simply objects to a peremptory challenge, identifies that the juror is a member of a distinct racial or ethnic group, and requests an inquiry). In the instant case, defense counsel stated: "I object. He's a man. She wants to get more women on the jury." Counsel's objection was clearly directed to the State's strike of juror 3 on the basis of his gender and therefore sufficient to mandate an explanation for the strike.
On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court's statement that men are not a protected class constitutes prima fa-cie proof that the court never engaged in a genuineness analysis. We cannot agree. Despite the trial court's off-the-cuff remark, the State offered a gender-neutral reason for the strike, and the trial court engaged in a discussion with counsel regarding the genuineness of the strike. Specifically, the State expressed its concerns with the juror's question about the reason the State did not seek the death penalty, and the juror's comment in response to a voir dire inquiry that a convicted felon is not a very reliable witness. While the trial court in the instant case was incorrect that men are not a suspect class, the State's proffer of a gender-neutral reason for the strike and the ensuing discussion with the Court, affirmatively indicate that the trial court implicitly underwent a genuineness inquiry and found the State's proffered reason to be non-pre-textual.
The Defendant would have us fashion a rule of law that whenever a trial court makes an incorrect statement of law, that misstatement cannot be corrected by fulfilling the court's obligations under Neil, , Slappy, and Melbourne. We decline to so elevate form over substance. This Court has made it clear that "no magic words or incantations are required, and that substance must control over form. The trial court's quest is not to create a perfect script, but to assure that peremptory challenges are not used to exclude persons from jury service for improper reasons." Pringle v. State, 792 So.2d 533, 536 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). See also Davis v. State, 691 So.2d 1180, 1183 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). "A trial court's genuineness inquiry involves consideration of factors which tend to show whether the proffered reason is pre-textual." Scott v. State, 920 So.2d 698, 700 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006). In deciding this issue, courts have considered the following relevant circumstances: the makeup of the venire, prior strikes exercised against the same racial group, a strike based on a reason equally applicable to an unchallenged juror, or the singling out of a juror for special treatment. See Melbourne, 679 So.2d at 764, n. 8. Finally, a trial court's decision on the ultimate issue of pretext tons primarily on an assessment of credibility and will be affirmed on appeal unless clearly erroneous. Id. at 764-65.
Here, the record supports the State's gender-neutral reason for the peremptory strike. The record demonstrates that the State sought to strike both women and men from the panel and that no other juror asked why the Defendant was not facing the death penalty. Because the trial court heard the State's gender-neutral explanation, allowed defense counsel to argue its position, and then granted the peremptory strike, we are satisfied that a genuineness inquiry was indeed conducted. We, therefore, find no error in allowing the State to exercise a peremptory challenge to strike Juror Soule. Accordingly, we affirm Defendant's conviction and sentence for first-degree murder with a firearm and aggravated stalking with a firearm. Affirmed.
LAGOA AND ROTHENBERG, JJ., concur.
. Under Abshire v. State, 642 So.2d 542 (Fla.1994), men are cognizable members of a gender class for the purposes of a Neil inquiry. See Thompson v. State, 648 So.2d 323 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995); Preston v. State, 641 So.2d 169 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994).
. State v. Neil, 457 So.2d 481 (Fla.1984).
. State v. Sloppy, 522 So.2d 18 (Fla.1988).
. Melbourne v. State, 679 So.2d 759 (Fla.1996).