Case Name: Josephine STURIANO, Petitioner, v. Martin BROOKS, as Guardian Ad Litem of the Estate of Vito Sturiano, Deceased, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1988-03-24
Citations: 523 So. 2d 1126
Docket Number: No. 69743
Parties: Josephine STURIANO, Petitioner, v. Martin BROOKS, as Guardian Ad Litem of the Estate of Vito Sturiano, Deceased, Respondent.
Judges: McDonald, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW and BARKETT, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 523
Pages: 1126–1132

Head Matter:
Josephine STURIANO, Petitioner, v. Martin BROOKS, as Guardian Ad Litem of the Estate of Vito Sturiano, Deceased, Respondent.
No. 69743.
Supreme Court of Florida.
March 24, 1988.
Rehearing Denied May 16, 1988.
Leonard Robbins, Joseph J. Huss and Linda Raspolich Pratt of Abrams, Anton, Robbins, Resnick, Schneider & Mager, P.A., Hollywood, for petitioner.
Steven Billing of Billing, Cochran & Heath, and Nancy Little Hoffmann of Nancy Little Hoffmann, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for respondent.

Opinion:
KOGAN, Justice.
This action is before the Court on review of a decision by the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Brooks v. Sturiano, 497 So.2d 976 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). Because that court certified two questions to this Court as being of great public importance, we have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.
The petitioner, Mrs. Sturiano, was injured when the car in which she was a passenger, struck a tree. Her husband, Vito Sturiano, the driver of the car, was killed in the collision, and Mrs. Sturiano brought an action against his estate alleging negligence on the part of Mr. Sturiano. Because Mrs. Sturiano was also the personal representative of her husband's estate, a guardian ad litem was appointed to represent the interests of the estate. Other than Mrs. Sturiano, Vito Sturiano was survived by no heirs or lineal descendents.
Following a jury verdict for Mrs. Sturi-ano and a reduction to the amount of applicable insurance coverage, Brooks, the guardian ad litem, appealed to the fourth district. That court held the doctrine of interspousal immunity did not bar the action, reasoning that the traditional policy reasons for maintaining the doctrine simply did not apply. However, the court reversed the verdict, holding the doctrine of lex loci contractus required that New York law apply because the contract was executed there. Under a New York statute, the action is barred unless the insurance policy specifically includes coverage for claims between spouses. Absent such a provision, no coverage exists. The fourth district then certified questions regarding both issues to this Court.
Both certified questions involve challenges to established common law doctrines followed in Florida. The first question, which we will answer last, involves the conflict of laws doctrine known as lex loci contractus. The other question, which we shall address first, requires this Court to again examine the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity. That question, as phrased by the district court, asks:
DOES THE DOCTRINE OF INTER-SPOUSAL IMMUNITY BAR AN OTHERWISE VALID CLAIM BY AN INJURED PASSENGER WHOSE NEGLIGENT SPOUSE DIED AS A RESULT OF THE ACCIDENT, WHERE THE CLAIM IS LIMITED TO THE AMOUNT OF INSURANCE COVERAGE, THE PLAINTIFF IS THE ONLY PARTY INTERESTED IN THE ESTATE AND A GUARDIAN AD LITEM IS APPOINTED?
497 So.2d at 979. We answer this question in the negative and approve the district court decision regarding the issue of inter-spousal tort immunity.
The doctrine of interspousal tort immunity has a long and established history in Florida law. This common law doctrine has, until this decade, barred actions by one spouse against the other. Recently, however, inroads have been made eroding the traditional basis for upholding the doctrine. The policy reasons for upholding the doctrine in these instances either do not exist or cannot justify immunity from liability.
These policy considerations have been debated strenuously in judicial opinions for many years. The doctrine of inter-spousal tort immunity has its origins in the fiction that the marriage of two people creates a unified entity of one singular person. The reasoning was that a person or entity cannot sue itself. Despite dicta to the contrary in prior opinions of this Court, we believe that this outdated policy consideration can no longer be regarded as a valid reason to bar actions. We no longer live in an age where the wife is subservient to her husband. A married woman now has power to control her separate property and enter into contracts with her husband. With these expansions of individual free dom, legal status, and power, it can no longer be said that a woman becomes part of an entity represented by the husband. Thus "the common law unity concept is no longer a valid justification for the doctrine of interspousal immunity." Several other reasons to bar interspousal actions, however, still exist under certain conditions. Domestic tranquility, peace and harmony in the family unit, and the possibilities of fraud or collusion are the most frequently cited policy reasons for maintaining inter-spousal immunity. In cases where these considerations apply, the doctrine of inter-spousal immunity shall continue to bar actions between spouses.
This Court's most recent pronouncement on this issue, Snowten v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 475 So.2d 1211 (Fla.1985), demonstrates the application of interspousal immunity. In that case, the injured plaintiff and the negligent defendant spouse were both living. Any recovery would be covered by an applicable insurance policy, so there was ample reason to believe collusion was a possibility. Alternatively, the spectre of a lawsuit by one spouse charging negligence against the other spouse would be extremely disruptive to the family, causing significant disharmony within the family unit. This state has long maintained a policy of promoting family harmony. The lawsuit in the Snowten case would have only served to promote marital discord, assuming the couple was not working in collusion to perpetrate a fraud upon the insurance company.
In this case, however, there is no fear of disharmony or collusion. Sadly, Vito Sturi-ano is dead, leaving only Mrs. Sturiano as the sole remaining member of the family. While this tragedy works a great loss on Mrs. Sturiano, it also clears the way for an action against the estate. Because the family unit died with Vito Sturiano, there is no marital harmony to disrupt, no domestic tranquility to destroy. Moreover, we cannot presume any possibility of collusion or fraud when there is nobody with whom she could conspire.
Brooks, the guardian ad litem, argues that the doctrine of interspousal immunity should continue without exception, regardless of the absence of policy reasons for doing so. He contends that Snowten should control and interspousal tort immunity must apply in all cases involving actions between spouses to maintain consistency in law. We disagree. Snowten is clearly distinguishable on the facts. In that case, because both spouses were alive, the policy reasons for barring the action were strong. Here, because the defendant spouse is deceased, the policy reasons for barring the action do not exist. Moreover, in this case, there are no surviving lineal descendants, and thus no one left to be victimized by a disruption of the family unit. We will not blindly adhere to a doctrine that has no application to these facts. To do so would promote injustice for the sake of expediency and consistency.
We note at this point that Snowten and the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity are still good law. Actions between spouses must be barred when the policy reasons for maintaining the doctrine exist, such as the fear of disruption of the family or other marital discord, or the possibility of fraud or collusion. However, under the circumstances of this case, we hold that when no such policy considerations exist, the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity is waived to the extent of applicable liability insurance.
The other question posed by the fourth district requires us to address the doctrine of lex loci contractus. Specifically, we must examine whether the rule requiring that the laws of the jurisdiction where the contract was executed should apply. The fourth district has certified the following question:
DOES THE LEX LOCI CONTRACTUS RULE GOVERN THE RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF THE PARTIES IN DETERMINING THE APPLICABLE LAW ON AN ISSUE OF INSURANCE COVERAGE, PRECLUDING CONSIDERA TION BY THE FLORIDA COURTS OF OTHER RELEVANT FACTORS, SUCH AS THE SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FLORIDA AND THE PARTIES AND/OR THE TRANSACTION?
497 So.2d at 979. We answer the certified question in the affirmative, limiting this answer to contracts for automobile insurance, and approve the decision of the district court.
The Sturianos, lifelong residents of New York, purchased automobile insurance in New York six years prior to the accident which took the life of Vito Sturiano and injured Josephine Sturiano. Subsequently, the couple moved to Florida each year for the winter months. They did not notify the insurance company of this migration, and the insurance company had no way of knowing that such a move had taken place.
Under the doctrine of lex loci contractus, it is clear that New York law must apply. That rule specifies that the law of the jurisdiction where the contract was executed should control. However, in recent years this doctrine has been criticized and, in several jurisdictions, discarded in favor of the more flexible "significant relationships" test.
That test, as stated in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 188 (1971), provides:
§ 188. Law Governing in Absence of Effective Choice by the Parties
(1) The rights and duties of the parties with respect to an issue in contract are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties under the principles stated in § 6.
(2) In the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties (see § 187), the contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place of contracting,
(b) the place of negotiation of the contract,
(c) the place of performance,
(d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and
(e) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue.
Thus, under the Restatement view, and seemingly the trend of courts around the nation, the place the contract is executed is only one of five factors used in determining which jurisdiction's law should control.
Sturiano argues that in this modern, migratory society, choice of law rules must be flexible to allow courts to apply the laws which best accommodate the parties and the host jurisdiction. She contends that the archaic and inflexible rule of lex loci contractus does not address modern issues or problems in the area of conflict of laws. While it is true that lex loci contractus is an inflexible rule, we believe that this inflexibility is necessary to ensure stability in contract arrangements. When parties come to terms in an agreement, they do so with the implied acknowledgment that the laws of that jurisdiction will control absent some provision to the contrary. This benefits both parties, not merely an insurance company. The view espoused in the Restatement fails, in our opinion, to adequately provide security to the parties to a contract.
Although lex loci contractus is old, it is not yet outdated. The very reason Sturi-ano gives as support for discarding lex loci contractus, namely that we live in a migratory, transitory society, provides support for upholding that doctrine. Parties have a right to know what the agreement they have executed provides. To allow one party to modify the contract simply by moving to another state would substantially restrict the power to enter into valid, binding, and stable contracts. There can be no doubt that the parties to insurance contracts bargained and paid for the provisions in the agreement, including those provisions that apply the statutory law of that state.
We recognize that this Court has discarded the analogous doctrine of lex loci delicti with respect to tort actions and limitations of actions. However, we believe that the reasoning controlling those decisions does not apply in the instant case. With tort law, there is no agreement, no foreseen set of rules and statutes which the parties had recognized would control the litigation. In the case of an insurance contract, the parties enter into that contract with the acknowledgment that the laws of that jurisdiction control their actions. In essence, that jurisdiction's laws are incorporated by implication into the agreement. The parties to this contract did not bargain for Florida or any other state's laws to control. We must presume that the parties did bargain for, or at least expected, New York law to apply.
For these reasons, we answer the certified question concerning conflict of laws in the affirmative, limiting that answer to situations involving automobile insurance policies. As stated, we answer the certified question concerning interspousal immunity in the negative and approve the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal.
It is so ordered.
McDonald, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW and BARKETT, JJ., concur.
GRIMES, J., concurs with an opinion, in which OVERTON, J., concurs.
EHRLICH, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion.
. See Corren v. Corren, 47 So.2d 774, (Fla.1950).
. See Dressier v. Tubbs, 435 So.2d 792 (Fla.1983) (Wrongful death action by wife's estate against husband's estate was not barred by the doctrine of interspousal immunity); Ard v. Ard, 414 So.2d 1066 (Fla.1982) (abolishing interfamily (but not interspousal) immunity to the extent of liability insurance).
. Corren v. Corren, 47 So.2d 774 (Fla.1950).
. § 708.08, Fla.Stat. (1977).
. Raisen v. Raisen, 379 So.2d 352, 357 (Fla. 1979) (England, C.J. and Adkins and Sundberg, JJ., dissenting), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 886, 101 S.Ct. 240, 66 L.Ed.2d 111 (1980).
. See, e.g., Wood Bros. Homes, Inc. v. Walker Adjustment Bureau, 198 Colo. 444, 601 P.2d 1369 (1979); Champagnie v. W.E. O'Neil Constr. Co., 77 Ill.App.3d 136, 32 Ill.Dec. 609, 395 N.E.2d 990 (1979); Choate, Hall & Stewart v. SCA Services, Inc., 378 Mass. 535, 392 N.E.2d 1045 (1979); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Simmons's Estate, 84 N.J. 28, 417 A.2d 488 (1980); Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).
. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 181 (1971).
. Bishop v. Florida Specialty Paint Co., 389 So.2d 999 (Fla.1980).
. Bates v. Cook, Inc., 509 So.2d 1112 (Fla. 1987).