Case Name: Bruce Adrian MOUNIER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee; Vernon Russell THOMPSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1965-04-14
Citations: 178 So. 2d 714
Docket Number: Nos. 33521, 33522
Parties: Bruce Adrian MOUNIER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. Vernon Russell THOMPSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: THORNAL, O’CONNELL, CALDWELL and HOBSON (Retired), JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 178
Pages: 714–722

Head Matter:
Bruce Adrian MOUNIER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. Vernon Russell THOMPSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Nos. 33521, 33522.
Supreme Court of Florida.
April 14, 1965.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 13, 1965.
Robert E. Brandt, Miami, for appellants.
Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., and George R. Georgieff, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Opinion:
DREW, Chief Justice.
These two appeals were consolidated and will be disposed of in one opinion inasmuch as the points involved in both appeals are identical.
The defendants in the court below, Thompson and Mounier, were arrested by officers of the Department of Conservation for spearfishing in a prohibited area in Monroe County contrary to the provisions of Section 370.172(2), Florida Statutes 1963, F.S.A. They were tried before the court without a- jury, adjudged guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of $500 each or serve six months in the county jail.
During the course of the trial, a motion was made to quash the information on the ground that the statute, the violation of which was charged therein, was un constitutional and invalid in that "it offends the equal protection of the laws clause of the State and Federal Constitutions; that the Act was a local act passed under the guise of a general law; that the classification upon which the Statute was based is unreasonable, arbitrary and possessed of no unique character; that the Statute was arbitrary and discriminatory and that it discriminated against a class of persons; that the Statute countervenes [sic] and is repugnant to the provisions of the State and Federal Constitutions, guaranteeing to citizens the right to due process of law. It is unconstitutional because it is arbitrary, harsh and discriminatory, and it countervenes [sic] the spirit and the intent of the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Florida. It violates the Declaration of Rights and it violates Section 24 of the Declaration of Rights." The motion to quash was overruled, thereby passing directly upon the validity of this statute. Such ruling in an appeal from the final judgment of conviction entered after trial upon the merits brings this case within our appellate jurisdiction on direct appeal.
These cases must be reversed because the proof of the State clearly established the fact that the offense upon which these defendants were convicted was not committed in Monroe County. Having reached such conclusion, we are not required nor should we pass upon the validity of the subject statute. It is a fundamental principle that courts will not do so where the case before them may be disposed of upon any other ground. This result docs not, however, divest us of jurisdiction under the Constitution. In the Lissenden case, we held that where a trial court directly passes upon the validity of a state statute, this Court has jurisdiction of and should determine the appeal even though in its consideration of the case it is- decided that the action of the trial court in passing upon the jurisdictional issue of statutory validity was unnecessary to the. disposition of the cause.
We now direct .our attention to the basic issue in these cases. Was the offense for which these defendants were, convicted in; Monroe County, Florida, committed within, said county? .
The statute under which the indictment was made provides in its pertinent provisions :
"(2) It is unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to take any fish by means of any spear, gig or other similar device in an area in Monroe coim- ' ty known as the Upper Keys, or to engage in any spearfishing in said area; said area shall include 'all salt waters ' under the jurisdiction of the state board of conservation beginning at the"' county line between Dade and Monroe counties and running south, including all of the keys down to and including Long Key." 370.172(2), F.S" 1963, F.S.A. (Emphasis supplied.)
At a preliminary hearing and during the trial it was conceded by the State that the violation occurred at Davis Reef which is 3j/$ nautical miles off Plantation Key in a southeasterly direction.
Before proceeding to a further discussion of the question, we deem it pertinent to point out that the statute above quoted makes spearfishing unlawful in an area "in Monroe county known as the Upper Keys." The language following the semicolon to the effect that said area shall in- elude all waters under the jurisdiction of the State Board of Conservation, etc. must be construed as relating- only to that area lying within Monroe County. Whether the State Board of Conservation or the State of Florida through any other agency has jurisdiction over the waters or over the conduct of these defendants where the offense was committed or beyond that into the open ocean is a question not presented here and one on which we do not pass. We are proscribed in our disposition of these cases by the limited issue involved.
The boundaries of Florida, as fixed by the Constitution at the time this offense was committed, appear in the footnote. In this area the boundary is three geographical -miles from the Florida coast line, "meaning the line of ordinary low water along that portion of the coast which is in direct contact with the open sea and the line marking the seaward limit of inland waters; " The boundaries of Monroe County are defined as "so much of the State of Florida as is situated south of the county of Collier and west and south of the county of Dade." Section 6.11, F.S.A. defines the coast line as follows:
"6.11 Boundary of Florida, east coast. — Wherever the coast line of the state, both along the east coast of the mainland and along the Florida Keys, is in direct contact with the waters of the Atlantic ocean or the Florida Straits, which latter is an arm of the Atlantic ocean, the seaward boundary of the state is hereby fixed, defined, and interpreted as, and is hereby extended to, a line three geographical miles distant from said coast line. The term 'coast line' means the line of ordinary low water along that portion of the coast which is in direct contact with the open sea and the line marking the seaward limit of inland waters."
Organic law requires that in all criminal prosecutions the accused have the right to a public trial in the county where the crime was committed.
No citation of authority is required •or necessary to support the proposition that the failure of the State to prove that the crime was committed in the county where the trial took place is fatal.
The record of the hearing reveals that both the county solicitor and the trial judge were laboring under the mistaken view that the constitutional boundaries of the State of Florida extended to the edge •of the Gulf Stream. This was the boundary of the State under Article I of the •Constitution , prior to the adoption of Amended Article I at the general election in 1962. In 1962, however, the boundaries •of Florida were changed by the people to include only a distance seaward of three geographic miles in this particular area. It appearing without any question that the offense was committed beyond this line, it follows that the conviction was a nullity and that these defendants should have been discharged.
Reversed and remanded with directions to discharge these defendants and restore to them the personal property which was confiscated by the State.
It is so ordered.
THORNAL, O'CONNELL, CALDWELL and HOBSON (Retired), JJ., concur.
THOMAS, J., dissents with Opinion.
ERVIN, J., dissents with Opinion.
. The quoted language is taken from the transcript of record. The motion was made orally at the hearing held on the motion to quash the information.
. "Appeals from trial courts may be taken directly to the supreme court, ns a matter of right, from judgments directly passing upon the validity of a state statute Article Y, Section 4(2), Florida Constitution., F.S.A.
. P. C. Lissenden v. Board of County Commissioners, Fla.1959, 110 So.2d. 632.
. Cf. Skiriotes v. State, 144 Fla. 220, 197 So. 736, affirmed Skiriotes v. State of Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 61 Sup.Ct. 924, 85 L.Ed. 1193, rehearing denied 313 U.S. 599, 61 Sup.Ct. 1093, 85 L.Ed. 1552.
. "The state boundaries are: Begin at the mouth of the Perdido River, which for the purposes of this description is defined as the point where latitude 30°16'53" north and longitude 87°31'06" west intersect; thence to the point where latitude 30°17/02" north and longitude 87°31'06" west intersect; thence to the point where latitude 30°18'00" north and longitude 87°27'08" west intersect; thence to the point where the center line of the Intra-coastal Canal (as the same existed on June 12, 1953) and longitude 87°27'00" west intersect; the same being in the middle of the Perdido River; thence up the middle of the Perdido River to the point where it intersects the south boundary of the State of Alabama, being also the point of intersection of the middle of the Perdido River with latitude 31°00'00" north; thence east, along the south boundary line of the State of Alabama, the same being latitude 31°00'00", north to the middle of the Chattahoochee River; thence down the middle of said river to its confluence with the Flint River; thence in a straight line to the head of the St. Mary's River; thence down the middle of said river to tbe Atlantic Ocean, and extending therein to a point three (3) geographic miles from the Florida coast line, meaning the line of ordinary low water along that portion of the coast which is in direct contact with the open sea and the line marking the seaward limit of inland waters; thence southeastwardly following a line three (3) geographic miles distant from the Atlantic coast line of the state and three (3) leagues distant from the Gulf of Mexico coast line of the state to and around the Tortugas Islands; thence northeastwardly, three (3) leagues distant from the coast line, to a point three (3) leagues distant from the coast line of the mainland; thence north and north-westwardly, three (3) leagues distant from the coast line, to a point west of the mouth of the Perdido River, three (8) leagues from the coast line, as measured on a line bearing 0°01'00" west from the point of beginning; thence along said line to the point of beginning.
"The legislature may extend the coastal boundaries to such limits as the laws of the United States or international law may permit." Article I, Constitution of the State of Florida.
.Section 7.44, Florida Statutes 1963, F.S.A.
. "§ 11. Rights of accused; speedy trial; etc. — In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury, in the county where the crime was committed, and shall he heard by himself, or counsel, or both, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to meet the witnesses against him face to face, and have compulsory process for the attendance of witnesses in his favor, and shall be furnished with a copy of the indictment against him." Declaration of Rights, Constitution of the State of Florida.
"AMENDMENT YI.
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining Witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.". Constitution of the United States.