Case Name: JOHNSON v. THE STATE
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1996-10-23
Citations: 223 Ga. App. 294
Docket Number: A96A1355
Parties: JOHNSON v. THE STATE.
Judges: Pope, P. J., concurs specially.
Reporter: Georgia Appeals Reports
Volume: 223
Pages: 294–297

Head Matter:
A96A1355.
JOHNSON v. THE STATE.
(477 SE2d 439)

Opinion:
Andrews, Judge.
Bobby Lee Johnson was found guilty by a jury of aggravated assault with a knife and possession of a knife during the commission of the aggravated assault. On appeal, he claims: (1) that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury to return a guilty verdict on the possession charge if they found him guilty of aggravated assault; (2) that the trial court erred by refusing to charge the jury on the' defense of accident; (3) that he was denied due process of law by a delay in the preparation of the trial transcript during the appellate process; and (4) that the trial court should have ordered a retrial. Because instructing the jury to return a guilty verdict on the possession charge was error, the conviction for possession of a knife during the commission of the aggravated assault must be reversed. Finding no other error, the conviction for aggravated assault is affirmed under the standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
The following evidence was produced at trial: The State presented testimony from the victim and two eyewitnesses that Johnson attacked and attempted to stab the victim with a knife in the lobby of the Richmond County courthouse. The victim testified that her hand was cut when she grabbed the blade of the knife to prevent Johnson from stabbing her. Johnson testified and admitted he pulled a knife on the victim and brought it up at her to scare her. But he testified that after doing so he decided not to hurt her and handed the knife to the victim. He testified that, although he intentionally pulled the knife and brandished it to scare the victim, he considered the whole incident to be an accident.
1. At the close of the evidence, the trial court instructed the jury that, if they found Johnson guilty of aggravated assault with a knife (Count 1), "you necessarily have to find him guilty of count 2 because that is whether or not he was in possession of a knife in the commission of a crime, and that's been admitted in the testimony in the case." This instruction was erroneous because it required the jury to find Johnson guilty of the possession charge if they found him guilty of aggravated assault and prevented the jury from independently considering whether or not Johnson was guilty of the possession charge. See Bryant v. State, 163 Ga. App. 872 (296 SE2d 168) (1982).
Apparently, the trial court concluded that, if the jury found Johnson guilty of aggravated assault with the knife, the evidence and law logically demanded that he also be found guilty of possession of the knife in the commission of the aggravated assault. However, under the Georgia Constitution, "the jury shall be the judges of the law and the facts" (Ga. Const. 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XI (a)), and the court cannot direct the jury to return a verdict of guilty in a criminal case no matter what the law or the evidence would require. Id. Although a jury has a duty to convict when the evidence proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, its duty is distinct from its power, and a jury has the power to acquit the defendant even if its verdict is contrary to the law and the evidence. Cargill v. State, 255 Ga. 616, 642 (340 SE2d 891) (1986); Felker v. State, 252 Ga. 351, 378-379 (314 SE2d 621) (1984). Accordingly, the judgment of conviction and sentence on the charge of possession of a knife during the commission of a crime must be reversed.
2. The trial court properly refused to give Johnson's requested charge on misfortune or accident based on OCGA § 16-2-2 because there was no evidence to support it. Moore v. State, 220 Ga. App. 434, 435 (469 SE2d 211) (1996). Johnson's testimony that he intentionally pulled the knife on the victim but considered the whole incident to be an "accident" was not even slight evidence that he acted accidentally, with "no criminal scheme or undertaking, intention, or criminal negligence." OCGA § 16-2-2.'
3. Johnson has failed to demonstrate that delay in the preparation of a transcript of testimony during the appellate process denied him due process of law. Although there was an unexplained delay of over two years between the conviction and the filing of the requested trial transcript, Johnson's only claim of prejudice is that he was incarcerated during the delay. In the absence of any evidence that a delay in preparing the transcript prevented an appellant from presenting an adequate appeal or impaired a defense which would have otherwise been available where a new trial is ordered due to trial error, no prejudice has been shown amounting to a denial of due process. Graham v. State, 171 Ga. App. 242, 250-251 (319 SE2d 484) (1984). "[W]e refuse to hold that post-conviction incarceration, in and of itself, is a violation of due process of law." Id. at 251.
4. Because Johnson's fourth enumeration of error was not supported in his appellate brief by citation of authority or argument, it is deemed abandoned. Court of Appeals Rule 27 (c) (2).
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. Smith, J., concurs.
Pope, P. J., concurs specially.