Case Name: PEOPLE ex rel. DRAKE v. ANDREWS, Supreme Court Justice
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1909-07-06
Citations: 118 N.Y.S. 37
Docket Number: 
Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. DRAKE v. ANDREWS, Supreme Court Justice.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 118
Pages: 37–42

Head Matter:
PEOPLE ex rel. DRAKE v. ANDREWS, Supreme Court Justice.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.
July 6, 1909.)
1. Contempt (§ 67 )—Review—Remedy.
Certiorari is a proper remedy to review an order adjudging relator guilty of a contempt of court.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Contempt, Cent. Dig. §§ 221, 222; Dec. Dig. § 67. ]
2. Witnesses (§ 21 )—Criminal Contempt—Resistance to Lawful “Man- ' date’ ’—Subpoena.
A subpoena duces tecum is not a “mandate,” within Code Civ. Proe. § 8, subds. 3, 4, making punishable as a criminal contempt willful disobedience or resistance to a mandate of the court.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Witnesses, Dec. Dig. § 21.
For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 5, p. 4331; vol. 8, p. 7715. J
3. Witnesses (§ 21 )—Criminal “Contempt”—Disobedience to Subpoena.
An undersheriff, advising or directing a witness upon whom he had served a subpoena duces tecum to disobey it, and hide or destroy the books, and not produce them, is not punishable as for a “contempt” of court, within Code Cr. Proc. § 619, making disobedience to a subpoena punishable as a criminal contempt, especially where the witness, regardless of what the undersheriff said, obeyed the subpoena and produced the books.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Witnesses, Dec. Dig. § 21.
For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 2, pp. 1489-1492; vol. 8, p. 7614.]
McLennan, P. J., dissenting.
Certiorari by the People, on relation of Leonard Drake, against William S. Andrews, Justice of the Supreme Court, to review an order adjudging relator guilty of a contempt of court.
Order reversed, and relator discharged.
Argued before McLENNAN, P. J., and SPRING, WILLIAMS, ICRUSE, and ROBSON, JJ.
Jones, Townsend & Rudd, for relator.
Emerson M. Willis, for respondent.
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
WILLIAMS, J.
The order should be reversed, and the relator discharged from custody. Certiorari is a proper remedy for the review of this order. People ex rel. Taylor v. Forbes, 143 N. Y. 119, 38 N. E. 303. The order states the grounds upon which the conviction was based substantially as follows: A grand jury was in session at that term of court, and the district attorney of the county issued a subpoena for John Cox, a witness, requiring him to produce before such grand jury, as evidence, the books, papers, and writings therein described, and delivered such subpoena to the sheriff's office of the county for service. There was being investigated by the grand jury a charge of felony, and the subpoena was issued in reference to that charge. The subpoena was delivered to the relator, who was under-sheriff, and he served the same on the witness Cox. At the time of such service, and at various times thereafter, the relator told said witness that he must not produce the books called for by the subpoena, but must hide or destroy the same. The court found these facts to be true, and determined that the relator's direction to the witness to hide or destroy the books, and not to obey the directions of the subpoena to produce them before the grand jury, constituted a criminal contempt, and disorderly, contemptuous, and insolent behavior on the part of an officer of the court, intended directly to interfere and interrupt its proceedings and those of the grand jury, and to impair the respect due to the court's authority, and constituted willful disobedience of the lawful mandate of the court and resistance willfully offered thereto, and for this the punishment was inflicted.
We are not inclined to disagree with the trial court in its determination as to the facts. We are only interested in the question as to whether the acts committed constituted a criminal contempt and were punishable as such. Section 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides what acts may be so punishable, and that no others can be. There are six subdivisions in the section, none of which are applicable to this case, unless it may be the third and fourth. The first subdivision has no application, because the acts therein specified must be "committed during its [the court's] sitting in its immediate view and presence," and the acts here complained of were committed some distance away from the court and the grand jury. It is claimed, however, that the acts constituted willful disobedience to the lawful mandate of the court, and resistance willfully offered to such lawful mandate, and so were a criminal contempt under subdivisions 3 and 4, above referred to.
This section, though in the Code of Civil Procedure, relates to all courts of record, in criminal as well as civil cases; but we must read with it section 619 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides that disobedience to a- subpoena, or a refusal to be sworn or to testify, may be punished by the court or magistrate, as for a criminal contempt, in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure. This latter provision refers to subpoenas in criminal cases, and is therefore peculiarly applicable to this case. Taking the two provisions together, it is clear that, whether a subpoena is, strictly speaking, a mandate or not, disobedience to it is punishable as a criminal contempt. Resistance willfully offered to this subpoena could only be so punishable in case it was a mandate, under section 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure. I do not think the subpoena is such a mandate.
Attention is called by counsel to the provisions of section 338, 3307, and 3343 of the Code of Civil Procedure as indicating that a subpoena is covered by the word "mandate" in section 8 above referred to; but I think People ex rel. v. Gilmore, 26 Hun, 1, and Sherwin v. People, 100 N. Y. 351, 3 N. E. 465, are authority to the contrary. They were cases under the provisions of the Revised Statutes and the Code of Procedure; but the reasoning in those cases is to me quite conclusive that these provisions of section 8 were not designed to cover subpoenas, and make disobedience and resistance thereto criminal con-tempts. It would not be well to analyze and discuss those cases and the statutes under which they were decided in this opinion. It would occupy too much space. They must be carefully read and considered themselves.
As I have already suggested, we have still left the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure making disobedience to a criminal subpoena punishable as a criminal contempt. If this had been a proceeding to punish the witness for disobeying the subpoena, or refusing to produce the books, the conviction and punishment would have been proper; but I am unable to see how the relator could be so dealt with. He did not disobey the subpoena. He at most advised or directed the witness to disobey it, and such advice or direction was not followed. The witness, regardless of what the relator said to him, obeyed the subpoena and produced the books before the grand jury.
I am unable to see how advising or directing this witness to disobey the subpoena could be punished as a criminal contempt in this proceeding, especially as disobedience to the subpoena did not result. It was fully obeyed. All concur, except McLENNAN, P. J., who dissents.