Case Name: FRANCES KATTERMANN, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. SALVATORE DI PIAZZA AND ANTONINA DI PIAZZA, DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS
Court: New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1977-06-30
Citations: 151 N.J. Super. 209
Docket Number: 
Parties: FRANCES KATTERMANN, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. SALVATORE DI PIAZZA AND ANTONINA DI PIAZZA, DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Superior Court Reports
Volume: 151
Pages: 209–218

Head Matter:
FRANCES KATTERMANN, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. SALVATORE DI PIAZZA AND ANTONINA DI PIAZZA, DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.
Superior Court oí New Jersey-Appellate Division
Argued June 6, 1977
Decided June 30, 1977.
Morgan, J. A. D., dissented and filed an opinion.
Before Judges Bischoff, Morgan and King.
Mr. Peter J. McDonald argued the cause for appellant (Messrs. Ronca & McDonald, attorneys).
No brief was filed on behalf of the respondents.

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Bischoff, P, J. A. D.
Plaintiff Prances Kattermann appeals from an order denying her visitation rights with her son, who was adopted by her parents. The appeal is unopposed and the facts are undisputed.
Plaintiff is the natural mother of John DiPiazza, who was born out of wedlock on September 27, 1961. Plaintiff continued to live with her parents, Salvator DiPiazza (age 76) and Antonina DiPiazza (age 68), defendants herein. When the infant was approximately two years of age plaintiff, then 20 years old, consented to his adoption by her parents. In June 1964 plaintiff married and left her parental home. Por the periods September 1964 through September 1965 and September 1966 through September 1967, plaintiff had full care and custody of John while both defendants were working. John, now 15 years of age, has known for years that plaintiff is his natural mother and has, in the past, continually enjoyed visitation with her at the home of his adoptive parents. However, defendants have refused to permit John to visit plaintiff's home, except for the two occasions mentioned above. On several recent occasions John has run away from home and sought to live with his natural mother. This caused defendants to charge him in Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court with being incorrigible; the complaints doing so, however, were dis missed. Defendants have indicated that if John continues to xnn away they will continue to file complaints against him in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. Defendants have since refused all visitation between plaintiff and John.
This proceeding was instituted by the filing of a verified complaint and order to show cause in which plaintiff sought a judgment "granting reasonable visitation rights including the right to take the infant John from the home of defendants at reasonable times." Defendants did not answer the complaint and did not appear on the return date of the order to show cause, and plaintiff submitted the matter for decision on the moving papers. The trial judge ordered the Division of Youth and Family Services to investigate the family background of the DiPiazzas and their adopted son, John, and also ordered an investigation into the family background of plaintiff. After receipt of those reports, the judge entered an order denying plaintiff the relief sought, stating the reasons for doing so as follows:
The legal basis for the court's conclusion was that the legislature expressed a clear statement of public policy when it adopted N. J. S. 9:3-17e. The purpose of the statute was to protect an adopted child from interference by his natural parents after he had been established in his adoptive home and to protect the adopting parents from later disturbance of their relationship with the child by the natural parents.
Plaintiff appeals from the order denying her visitation rights contending: (1) she is entitled to a plenary hearing on the merits of her petition, and (2) she is entitled to visitation with her biological son.
We approach the resolution of this appeal with full recognition of the firmly entrenched principle of law that "in matters involving custody and visitation the ultimate concern of our courts is always for the welfare of the infant. This is the controlling element." Mimkon v. Ford, 66 N. J. 426, 430 (1975); see also, concurring opinion of Justice Sullivan at 439.
N. J. S. A. 9 :3-17, upon which the trial judge relied, provides in pertinent part:
This act shall be administered so as to give effect to the public policy of this State to provide for the welfare of children requiring placement for adoption and so as to promote policies and procedures which are socially necessary and desirable for the protection of such children, their natural parents and their adopting parents. To that end, it is necessary and desirable
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(c) to protect the adopting parents from assuming responsibility for a child without sufficient knowledge of the child's heredity and capacity for physical and mental development, and, having accepted a child for adoption, from later disturbance of their relationships to the child by the natural parents.
That statute is primarily concerned with adoption by persons other than relatives of children placed for adoption because parents are unwilling or unable to care for them. Mimkon v. Ford, supra 66 N. J. at 434. In re Adoption of Children by D., 61 N. J. 89, 92 (1972). This case is outside the zone of primary concern of the Legislature in enacting N. J. S. A. 9 :3—17 et seq. Cf. Mimkon v. Ford, supra 66 N. J. at 435.
Here, until recently, the adoptive parents neither needed nor wanted protection from the natural mother. They permitted the child and the natural mother to develop a close relationship over the years. A consideration of the reports of the Division of Youth and Family Services indicates a strong desire on the part of this 15-year-old child to have visitation with his natural mother, and such desire has probative value in the resolution of this dispute. Cf. Sheehan v. Sheehan, 38 N. J. Super. 120 (App. Div. 1955).
We are thus confronted with a situation involving a serious potential for emotional and psychological harm to this child should he be presented with a court order holding that his natural mother has no right to visit him at the home of his adoptive parents, and should his adoptive parents continue to deny him the right to visit his natural mother at her home. "When such a potential for harm ex ists, a hearing to determine "the best interests of the child" is required. Sorentino v. Family & Children's Society, 72 N. J. 127, 132 (1976).
The idea expressed in the dissent, that visitation by the child with his natural mother contrary to the wishes and orders of the adoptive parents is to be anticipated and should not be punished by proceedings in the Juvenile Court, we find unacceptable. The Juvenile Court cannot condone the refusal of a child to follow parental orders if such defiance constitutes incorrigibility.
Considering the highly unusual circumstances existing here, we hold that it was improper to interpose the prohibition of N. J. S. A. 9:3-17(c) to deny the child access to the love and affection of his natural mother in the absence of a determination that it is in the best interests of the child to do so. A determination of that issue can only be made following a plenary hearing.
We reverse the order denying plaintiff visitation rights and remand the matter to the trial court for the conduct of a plenary hearing to determine the best interests of the child with respect to a resumption of visitation with his natural mother.
Reversed and remanded.
While these proceedings have been instituted by the natural mother who-, by consenting to the adoption, has surrendered all rights to the child, N. J. S. A. 9:3-30; N. J. S. A. 9 :3-19.1, we have approached the issue as if the proceedings were instituted by or on behalf of the child. We recognize that the responsibility of the court as parens patriae of all minor children transcends all other considerations when there exists a potential for serious psychological harm to a child. Sorentino v. Family & Children's Society, supra 72 N. J. at 132.