Case Name: Randy Dale MAYO, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1986-04-30
Citations: 708 S.W.2d 854
Docket Number: No. 69462
Parties: Randy Dale MAYO, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
Judges: CLINTON, J., concurs in the result.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 708
Pages: 854–861

Head Matter:
Randy Dale MAYO, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
No. 69462.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, En Banc.
April 30, 1986.
Kirk Hawkins, Stephen R. Lupton, San Angelo, for appellant.
Gerald A. Fohn, Dist. Atty. and Tom McCoppin, Asst. Dist. Atty., San Angelo, Robert Huttash, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

Opinion:
OPINION
WHITE, Judge.
This is an appeal from a conviction for the capital murder of Kimberly Sue Reeves. Appellant pled not guilty. The jury found appellant guilty of capital murder while in the course of committing aggravated sexual assault. See V.T.C.A., Penal Code Sec. 19.03(a)(2). After the jury returned an affirmative answer to the first two special issues in Art. 37.071, V.A.C. C.P., the trial court imposed the sentence of death by lethal injection. This case is before us on direct appeal.
On April 13, 1984, between the hours of 1:30 and 2:30 p.m., the body of the deceased was found next to the concrete supports of a bridge crossing over part of Lake Nasworthy in Tom Green County. Police found Ms. Reeves' automobile and personal belongings approximately 600 yards from the bridge supports. She appeared to have been sunbathing. She was last seen alive at approximately 10:30 a.m. on April 13 by students at Angelo State University in San Angelo. The body of the deceased, identified by her father, was transported to San Antonio for an autopsy. The autopsy revealed that Kimberly Sue Reeves died as a result of a blow to the skull and brain with a blunt instrument. It was further concluded by the medical examiner that neither of two stab wounds, one to the neck and one to the abdomen, would have caused death under ordinary circumstances. Examination of the vaginal cavity of the deceased indicated the presence of spermotazoa.
Appellant was seen driving later that same evening in San Angelo. He pulled his car into the Sonic Drive In and was arrested at approximately 8:45 p.m., pursuant to a warrant from Lubbock County for another crime.
Appellant made two confessions to police, the validity of which are not before us for review. He also led police to an area where he had thrown the jack stand he used to crush the skull of the deceased. Appellant does not question the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction.
In his first ground of error, appellant alleges the trial court erred by overruling his motion for new trial. Appellant's motion for new trial alleged a violation of Art. 40.03(7), V.A.C.C.P. Specifically, after presentation of the evidence in the punishment phase, but before final arguments and deliberations, Dennis Potter, the foreman of the jury, made a telephone call to Raymond Allison, a witness who testified on behalf of the defense in the punishment phase. Appellant claims McMahon v. State, 582 S.W.2d 786 (Tex.Cr.App.1978), cert. den. sub. nom., McCormick v. Texas, 444 U.S. 919, 100 S.Ct. 238, 62 L.Ed.2d 175 (1979), reh. den. 444 U.S. 985, 100 S.Ct. 492, 62 L.Ed.2d 414 (1979), and Williams v. State, 463 S.W.2d 436 (Tex.Cr.App.1971), hold that injury to the accused is presumed when a juror converses with an unauthorized person. However, the State points out, and appellant concedes, this presumption is rebuttable, McMahon, supra.
The trial court held a hearing on appellant's motion for new trial. At the hearing, Allison testified that he was contacted by Dennis Potter on January 30, 1985, at about 5:00 p.m., after the jury had been released for the day. Allison stated that Potter told him he appreciated his [Allison's] testimony because he seemed to be the only witness who said anything good about appellant. Allison asked Potter to be lenient toward appellant because he [Allison] felt that if given a chance, possibly to learn a trade while in prison, appellant could be a benefit to society when he got out. Potter, who also testified at the hearing, corroborated this testimony. Both men stated that everything stated in the phone call had been said at trial. Another juror, John Michael Anderson, testified at this hearing that Potter made no mention, to any member of the jury, of the phone call to Allison during any of the jury's deliberations. Additionally, according to Anderson, no one in the jury room brought up how much time appellant might actually have to spend in prison if he received a life sentence.
Appellant's attorney conceded that Allison's testimony at trial was along the same lines as the testimony brought out at the motion for new trial hearing, but claims that the State has not rebutted the presumption of harm.
We disagree. The testimony at the motion for new trial hearing indicates that the conversation on the telephone was substantially the same in content as Allison's testimony at the punishment phase of appellant's trial. The only statement made in the telephone call that was not said at trial was that Allison expressed his wish to Potter that appellant be given a more lenient sentence than the death penalty. Judging from the sentence received, death by lethal injection, it appears Allison's plea for a life sentence was totally disregarded. We find the State has rebutted the presumption of harm under McMahon, supra.
Ground of error one is overruled.
Appellant's second ground of error is a failure to grant a mistrial because evidence of an extraneous offense was admitted during the guilt/innocence phase of appellant's trial. Jimmy Don Daniel, a witness for the State, testified before the jury that appellant called him on the telephone and told him he had been arrested on a capital murder charge. Appellant contends that Daniel was undoubtedly making reference to an unrelated, extraneous capital murder, because at the time of the phone call appellant had not yet been charged with the capital murder in the present case. The transcription of the relevant testimony reads as follows:
By Mr. McCoppin [prosecuting attorney]:
"Q. Directing your attention to the evening hours of April the 13th, 1984, did you have occasion to have telephone contact with Randy Dale Mayo?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Approximately what time was that?
"A. I'm not sure. I didn't pay any attention to the clock because I was already asleep.
"Q. Okay. Do you have any idea?
"A. Well, I know I went to bed about — I imagine, around 9:30 or 10:00, somewhere around there, I guess, something like that.
"Q. Okay. What, if anything, did he say when he called you on the phone?
"A. He told me that he'd been arrested on a Capital Murder charge and would I please—
"Q. Uhhh . Without—
"MR. HAWKINS [defense attorney]: Your Honor, I'd object to that question and answer. Calls for hearsay, first of all.
"And I'd ask the Jury to disregard the witness' answer.
"THE COURT: All right, what do you say? Do you have any—
"MR. McCOPPIN: No objection, Your Honor.
"THE COURT: I'll sustain the objection. The Jury will not consider the answer.
"MR. LUPTON [defense attorney]: Your Honor, due to the prejudicial nature of the statement, I'd move for a mistrial.
"THE COURT: I can't hear you. You're going to have to speak up, now.
"MR. LUPTON: Due to the prejudicial nature of the statement, I'd move for a mistrial, Your Honor.
"THE COURT: Overruled.
"MR. McCOPPIN: We withdraw that question, Your Honor. Pass the witness.
"MR. LUPTON: No questions, Your Honor."
The record reflects that appellant was actually arrested pursuant to a warrant concerning another, unrelated capital murder. However, the testimony complained of gives no indication that appellant was or was not actually speaking of the case at bar. We cannot find anywhere in the statement of facts where it is stated before the jury that appellant was arrested for anything other than the present case. We note that at the time appellant made the aforementioned telephone call, the investigation had begun to focus on appellant concerning the capital murder in the present case. We do not believe, based on these facts, that the jury could have been misled, or that appellant could have been harmed by the aforementioned testimony.
Appellant's second ground of error is overruled.
Appellant, in his third ground of error, claims the evidence was insufficient to warrant an affirmative finding by the jury to the second special issue in Art. 37.071, supra. In support of his contention, appellant points out that the State presented only one prior final conviction, that of burglary. The State introduced evidence of an unrelated murder, wherein appellant beat a man to death. The State also introduced numerous instances wherein appellant threatened death or serious bodily injury to various individuals. Appellant appears to claim these extraneous offenses, which are unajudicated, are not probative of the sec ond special issue in capital murder cases. See Art. 37.071(b)(2), supra.
We find appellant's ground of error to be without merit. In the punishment phase of a capital murder case, any evidence that the trial court deems relevant to sentencing may be presented. Art. 37.-071(a), supra. Unadjudicated extraneous offenses have been held to be admissible at the punishment phase of the trial. Rumbaugh v. State, 629 S.W.2d 747 (Tex.Cr.App.1982); Williams v. State, 622 S.W.2d 116 (Tex.Cr.App.1981), cert. den. 455 U.S. 1008, 102 S.Ct. 1646, 71 L.Ed.2d 876 (1982). Further, the circumstances surrounding the capital offense itself, if severe enough, can be sufficient to sustain an affirmative finding under the special issues in death penalty punishment determinations. O'Bryan v. State, 591 S.W.2d 464 (Tex.Cr.App.1979).
In the present case, appellant forced Kimberly Sue Reeves, who was sunbathing, to submit to his sexual desires at knife-point. After raping her, he stabbed her twice, neither of the two wounds resulting in injury severe enough to cause her death. Then, as he was leaving the scene, he went to his car and removed the jack stand, came back to where Ms. Reeves was laying face down, and proceeded to literally beat her brains out with the steel jack stand.
We find this type of conduct, and the other evidence brought out at the punishment phase, sufficient to sustain the affirmative finding of the jury to the second special issue.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
CLINTON, J., concurs in the result.
. Article 37.071, V.A.C.C.P., reads in pertinent part:
"(b) On conclusion of the presentation of the evidence, the court shall submit the following three issues to the jury:
"(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased or another would result:
"(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and
"(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased."
The third special issue in Art. 37.071, supra, was not submitted, and it is not contended on appeal that it should have been, because it was not raised by the evidence.
. Article 40.03, V.A.C.C.P., reads in pertinent part:
"Art. 40.03. Grounds for New Trial in Felony
"New trials, in cases of felony, shall be granted the defendant for the following causes, and for no other:
"(7) Where the jury, after having retired to deliberate upon a case, has received other evidence; or where a juror has conversed with any person in regard to the case; . "