Case Name: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Todd D. SAUFLEY, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1991-02-21
Citations: 574 So. 2d 1207
Docket Number: No. 89-1971
Parties: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Todd D. SAUFLEY, Appellee.
Judges: DAUKSCH, COBB, GOSHORN, PETERSON and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 574
Pages: 1207–1211

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Todd D. SAUFLEY, Appellee.
No. 89-1971.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Feb. 21, 1991.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Bonnie Jean Parrish, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellant.
James P. Gibson, Public Defender, and Michael S. Becker, Asst. Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
ON REHEARING EN BANC
HARRIS, Judge.
In response to the State's motion for rehearing we grant the motion, withdraw our previous opinion, and substitute the following.
JURISDICTION
The issue is whether an order granting a motion to suppress, rather than an order suppressing evidence, is an appealable order. In Lawler v. Harris, 418 So.2d 1239 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) this court held that an order granting a motion to dismiss with prejudice was neither a judgment nor a final dismissal and was, therefore, not a final appealable order. This court elected to temporarily relinquish its inchoate jurisdiction rather than enter a dismissal of the cause which would have required more judicial labor at the trial and appellate level. Seven years later, we retreated from the Lawler solution because it failed to persuade attorneys to avoid appellate pitfalls by insuring that they obtain appropriate orders. Arcangeli v. Albertson's, Inc., 550 So.2d 557 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989). See also McPheeters v. Tolbert, 561 So.2d 18 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). Arcangeli involved the granting of defendant's motion for summary judgment. Both Lawler and Arcangeli were civil cases.
The original panel dismissed the appeal because the trial court granted a motion to suppress evidence rather than enter an order suppressing evidence. Although this was a highly technical reason, the original panel felt bound by the en banc opinion in Arcangeli (as well as the opinion in Lawler). That panel saw no reason to distinguish criminal cases from civil cases or to require less from criminal lawyers than from civil lawyers. But the remedy is harsh and, though symmetrical, may be unjustified and unnecessary. Upon reconsideration we note the Supreme Court's admonition that we seek to avoid, not foster, a hypertechnieal application of the law and to avoid placing form over substance. Simpson v. State, 418 So.2d 984, 986 (Fla.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1156, 103 S.Ct. 801, 74 L.Ed.2d 1004 (1983).
Rather than distinguish between civil and criminal cases, it may be more helpful to determine the intended effect (and prac-' tical result) of the order appealed. For example, an order merely granting a motion for summary judgment (as in Arcange-li ) is not intended to be nor does it represent the final action on the subject. If the order granting the motion for summary judgment is for plaintiff, then a summary judgment granting the requested relief must follow; if for defendant, a summary judgment disposing of the matter and assessing costs, if applicable, must enter. Arcangeli is a correct statement of the law when the issue is summary judgment and we adhere to it.
In Lawler the trial court "granted the motion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice." We held that the order was not appealable because the court granted a motion to dismiss rather than dismissing the complaint or action. When one considers form versus substance, this is a close call. Probably a great majority of lawyers and judges would interpret "granting a motion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice" as meaning the complaint was dismissed and could not be amended — thus having the practical effect of dismissing the action. Clearly the judge and the attorneys in Lawler interpreted it that way. It would have been better form in Lawler if the order had said "the motion to dismiss is granted and the action is dismissed with prejudice." Unfortunately, when it comes to drafting orders, all lawyers and trial judges are not perfect. Further, it appears that drafting perfection was not accomplished even by remanding cases by the time Arcangeli came about and this court expressed its resulting frustration in that opinion. But since we are convening en banc it could be argued that the original panel suffers from that same human frailty —imperfection.
In our original opinion we held that the order granting the motion to suppress was not appealable. Certainly it would have been in better form if the order had stated: "motion to suppress is granted and the evidence is suppressed." Then it would have complied technically with Rule 9.140(c)(1)(B), Rules of Appellate Procedure. But the substance of the order was that the evidence was not going to be admitted at trial and the court and the lawyers understood that.
In summary judgment cases there should indeed be a summary judgment. In cases requiring final action there should indeed be final action — but we should not insist on magic words to determine finality. In cases suppressing evidence or dismissing a count of an information — the evidence must be suppressed or the count dismissed, but we should look at the effect of the order, not just its language to determine if it comes within the rule.
It should be substance over form and merit, whenever possible, over procedure.
Upon reconsideration, we hold the order granting a motion to suppress is appeal-able.
ON THE MERITS
Todd Saufley was observed driving in excess of the speed limit. His car was weaving back and forth across the road. Although the pursuing officer followed Saufley with his siren on and lights flashing, Saufley proceeded approximately two miles before stopping in his front yard. Once Saufley exited his vehicle, he appeared to have difficulty in maintaining his balance; he exuded a strong smell of alcohol. His eyes were bloodshot and his skin was flushed. He was arrested for driving under the influence.
As the officer was putting Saufley in his patrol car, he was accosted by Saufley's girlfriend and paused to explain why he was making the arrest. It was 2-3 minutes after the arrest that the officer finally was able to search Saufley's vehicle where cannabis was found in a paper bag inside a green deposit bag. Saufley was then also charged with possession of cannabis.
Although contrary to the officer's testimony, Saufley contends that he was out of his truck and about to enter his house when the officer pulled up. He urges that since he was arrested after he was outside his truck, the search could not have been incident to arrest. The trial judge must have agreed because, although he upheld the arrest as proper, he suppressed the evidence found in the truck. We disagree and reverse.
Saufley relies on this court's opinion in State v. Bennett, 516 So.2d 964 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987), rev. denied, 528 So.2d 1183 (Fla.1988). This reliance is misplaced. In Bennett we held that an arrest which was a pretext to carry out a pre-planned, war-rantless search of a vehicle could not validate the subsequent search. We held that the State could not itself create the exigent circumstances to justify the lack of a proper warrant. These are not the facts in the case before us. Here the court found the arrest proper — not a pretext to justify a warrantless search. The fact that the search occurred after Saufley was placed in the patrol car and approximately 2-3 minutes after the arrest does not affect the validity of the search incident to arrest. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981); State v. McLendon, 490 So.2d 1308 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), rev. denied, 500 So.2d 544 (Fla.1986).
REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings.
DAUKSCH, COBB, GOSHORN, PETERSON and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur.
COWART, J., concurs in result only with opinion with which W. SHARP and DIAMANTIS, JJ., concur.