Case Name: St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Co. v. Gray
Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 1904-04-23
Citations: 72 Ark. 376
Docket Number: 
Parties: St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Co. v. Gray.
Judges: 
Reporter: Arkansas Reports
Volume: 72
Pages: 376–379

Head Matter:
St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Co. v. Gray.
Opinion delivered April 23, 1904.
Venue — stock-killing—jurisdiction—Under Sandels & Hill’s Digest, § 6352, providing that any person having stock killed or wounded by a railroad train may sue for damages in any court having jurisdiction in the county where the killing or wounding occurred, the objection that stock alleged to have been killed was not shown to have been killed in the county where suit was brought goes to the jurisdiction, and may be raised for the first time on appeal.
Appeal from Conway Circuit Court.
William L. Moose, Judge.
Reversed.
Dodge & Johnson, for appellant.
The evidence fails to show jurisdiction. 38 Ark. 205; 55 Ark. 283; 70 Ark. 346. It was error not to make H. L. Buford a party plaintiff upon demand of the defendant. 30 Ark. 401; 32 Ark. 304; 36 Ark. 207; 37 Ark. 593; 39 Ark. 413.
Chas. C. Reid, and R. N. Bruce, for appellee.
The record shows jurisdiction in the trial court. 67 Ark. 512; 70 Ark. 346; 68 S. W. 153; 29 Ark. 293; 53 Ark. 46; 17 Am. & Eng. Enc. 904, 905, 912. The statute of limitations must be pleaded. 19 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.), 332; 13 Am. & Eng. Enc. PI. & Pr. 200, 271. H. L. Buford was not a proper party. Sand. & H. Dig. § 6352; 50 Ark. 169; 57 Ark. 136; 30 Ark. 401; 32 Ark. 297: Sand. & H. Dig. § 5717; 15 Am. & Eng. Enc. PI. & Pr. 567. The evidence sustains the verdict. 36 Ark. 207; 37 Ark. 593; 39 Ark. 413.

Opinion:
Bunn, C. J.
This is a suit for damages in the killing of a horse colt by one of the handcars of the defendant, tried and determined in the Conway circuit court. Judgment by default was rendered, and the company appealed.
Conceding that there is sufficient evidence to sustain the judgment, although the evidence is weak at best, the only remaining question is, whether or not the venue was proved, and this question is raised by the third assignment of errors; that is to say: "The court had no jurisdiction of the case." The jurisdictional facts were alleged in the complaint, but in no very direct way. The failure to show jurisdiction consisted in a failure to prove the venue as required in section 6352, Sandels & Hill's Digest. This section fixes the local jurisdiction of suits for damages in killing live stock in the county where the killing occurred. In the trial of this cause there was no evidence whatever showing the county in which the killing occurred. This case therefore comes under the principle announced in Little Rock & Ft. Smith Ry. Co. v. Jamison, 70 Ark. 346. The same principle is announced in L. R. & Ft. S. Ry. Co. v. Clifton, 38 Ark. 205. In all matters pertaining to real estate, the jurisdiction is confined to courts sitting in the county where the real estate is situated, and this court said in Jacks v. Moore, 33 Ark. 31: "An action for injury to real property must be brought in the county in which the property is situated," and "no consent of parties, express or implied, can give jurisdiction to a court to try a cause."
The question of local or territorial jurisdiction not coming under the head of personal jurisdiction, but of the subject-matter, brings this and similar cases under the rule that consent cannot confer jurisdiction, and the question of jurisdiction can be raised at any time.
The judgment in this case is therefore reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial.