Case Name: Alfred B. CHRISMAN v. Shirley M. CHRISMAN
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1986-04-11
Citations: 487 So. 2d 140
Docket Number: No. CA-4031
Parties: Alfred B. CHRISMAN v. Shirley M. CHRISMAN.
Judges: Before GULOTTA, KLEES, BYRNES, LOBRANO and WARD, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 487
Pages: 140–143

Head Matter:
Alfred B. CHRISMAN v. Shirley M. CHRISMAN.
No. CA-4031.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
April 11, 1986.
Rehearings Denied May 15, 1986.
Harry R. Cabral, Jr., H. Craig Cabral, Cabral & Cabral, Metairie, for Alfred B. Chrisman, plaintiff-appellant.
James E. Shields, Gretna, for Shirley M. Chrisman, defendant-appellee.
Before GULOTTA, KLEES, BYRNES, LOBRANO and WARD, JJ.

Opinion:
BYRNES, Judge.
By this appeal, Alfred B. Chrisman seeks reversal of a judgment ordering him to pay his ex-wife one half of his past, present and future military retirement benefits. We reverse.
Mr. Chrisman joined the Navy in 1946 and married appellee in 1954. He retired from the Navy in August 1976 and obtained a divorce in September. Six months later, in March 1977, the parties entered into a voluntary partition of the community which had formerly existed between them. Four and one half years later in September 1981, Mrs. Chrisman filed a pleading styled "Petition for Partition of Remaining Property". In that petition Mrs. Chrisman alleged that her ex-husband's military retirement benefits were a community asset which had not been included in the earlier partition. Mr. Chrisman argued that his ex-wife had waived her rights to his retirement benefits in the 1977 partition.
Clause H of that agreement provides:
Alfred B. Chrisman hereby waives any and all other rights that she has or may have against the community existing between Shirley Martin Chrisman and Alfred B. Chrisman. (emphasis added)
This clause, which contains an obvious typographical error, is ambiguous and could be read as a waiver of either party's rights. In interpreting this clause of the agreement we are guided by several principles of contract law. The first of these is that an ambiguous contract is generally construed against the party who prepared it. C.C. Art. 2057 (formerly Art.1958), Aguillard's Enterprises Inc. v. Smith, 439 So.2d 1158 (La.App. 4th Cir.1983). The second is that where the intent of the parties to a contract is doubtful, the manner in which it has been executed by them can supply a rule for its interpretation. C.C. Art. 2053 (see former Art. 1956), John Bailey Contractor, Inc. v. State Through Department of Transportation and Development, 439 So.2d 1055 (La.1983). Finally, courts should seek to determine the true intent of the parties, and in doing so should view the contract as a whole and not just the ambiguous clauses. C.C. Art. 2055 (formerly Art. 1955), Wilson Warehouse Co. of Texas Inc. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 269 So.2d 562 (La.App. 1st Cir.1972).
In this case, we are presented with a contract which clearly was intended to be a partition of community property. It is also clear that Clause H was intended to make this partition complete and final by providing for a blanket waiver of "... any and all other rights . against the community. ." Although an error in the preparation of the agreement makes it unclear which party was waiving his or her rights, there is absolutely no doubt that the intent of the parties was that a waiver take place.
The 1977 partition was prepared by an attorney-notary in the law firm which represented Mrs. Chrisman at that time. Thus, the ambiguity in the meaning of Clause H is attributable to Mrs. Chrisman and should be construed against her. We are reinforced in this conclusion by the conduct of the parties, which has been consistent with our belief that Mrs. Chrisman was aware of her right to share in Mr. Chrisman's retirement benefits but chose to waive that right when the community property was partitioned in 1977.
Mr. Chrisman retired in 1976 so both parties were aware of the retirement benefits at the time they negotiated the partition in March 1977. By that time, it was also clear that Louisiana courts would classify military retirement benefits as a community asset. See Swope v. Mitchell, 324 So.2d 461 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1975). The answer and reconventional demand which Mrs. Chrisman filed in response to her husband's suit for divorce shows that she was aware of her right to treat his retirement benefits as community property. This pleading, filed some seven months before the partition, specifically alleged in Paragraph V that:
Community property, including a home at 2176 Guardian Avenue, Gretna, Louisiana, retirement rights, privileges and payments which have been acquired during the marriage, (emphasis added)
The petition went on the request an injunction, restraining Mr. Chrisman from disposing of any of this property.
Thus, by her own pleadings, Mrs. Chris-man has admitted that she knew her ex-husband's retirement benefits were community property before the divorce and subsequent property partition. In spite of this knowledge, Mrs. Chrisman treated her ex-husband's retirement as his separate property to obtain alimony on two separate occasions.
The 1976 judgment of divorce awarded Mrs. Chrisman $500/month in alimony. At that time, Mr. Chrisman's income consisted almost entirely of his retirement benefits. Five years later, Mrs. Chrisman sought an increase in alimony based in part on an increase in Mr. Chrisman's retirement income due to cost of living increases. These two alimony awards, one before the partition and one after, are further evidence that Mrs. Chrisman was willing to treat her ex-husband's retirement benefits as his separate property.
In short, Mrs. Chrisman's conduct before and after the partition leads us to believe that she intended to waive her right to claim the retirement benefits as community property. Having reached this conclusion, we reverse the judgment of the trial court. Costs of this appeal are to be borne by appellee.
REVERSED.
KLEES and LOBRANO, JJ., concur.
GULOTTA, J., dissents with reasons.