Case Name: Helio ESCOBAR-CUELLAR, a.k.a. Helio Balmore Escobar Cuellar, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2016-05-23
Citations: 650 F. App'x 446
Docket Number: No. 12-73317
Parties: Helio ESCOBAR-CUELLAR, a.k.a. Helio Balmore Escobar Cuellar, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent.
Judges: Before: M. SMITH and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges, and GORDON, District Judge.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 650
Pages: 446–448

Head Matter:
Helio ESCOBAR-CUELLAR, a.k.a. Helio Balmore Escobar Cuellar, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent.
No. 12-73317.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted May 6, 2016.
Filed May 23, 2016.
Michael John Selph, Esquire, Law Offices of Michael J. Selph, North Hollywood, CA, for Petitioner.
Janice Kay Redfern, Esquire, OIL, DOJ-U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel Ice, Office of the Chief Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.
Before: M. SMITH and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges, and GORDON, District Judge.
The Honorable Andrew P. Gordon, District Judge for the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada, sitting by designation.

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Helio Escobar-Cuellar petitions for review of a decision by the Board of Immi gration Appeals (BIA) denying his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and cancellation of removal. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), and we deny the petition.
The BIA properly determined that Es-cobar-Cuellar was ineligible for cancellation of removal because he was previously convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude ("CIMT") for which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(l)(C); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(i). Namely, Escobar-Cuellar pled guilty to felony grand theft, a crime punishable under California law by up to three years. CaLPenal Code § 489. Es-cobar-Cuellar argues that his conviction was converted to a misdemeanor by operation of California Penal Code § 17(b)(1), but § 17(b)(1) does not apply where, as here, the imposition of sentence was suspended. See United States v. Robinson, 967 F.2d 287, 293 (9th Cir.1992), recognized as overruled in other part by Ortega-Mendez v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 1010, 1019-20 (9th Cir.2006). Therefore, because the record shows that Escobar-Cu-ellar was convicted of CIMT for which a three-year sentence could have been imposed, the BIA properly found that he was ineligible for cancellation of removal.
Substantial evidence supports the BIA's denial of Escobar-Cuellar's application for withholding of removal. The BIA's determination that any persecution suffered by Escobar-Cuellar was on account of his membership in the army, not his political opinion, is supported by the record. Absent any evidence that the guerillas singled out Escobar-Cuellar for his political opinion, evidence of generalized antagonism toward him as an army member does not constitute persecution on a protected ground. See Cruz-Navarro v. INS, 232 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir.2000) (rejecting the petitioner's argument that the guerillas' had imputed "pro-government, anti-communist political beliefs to him," and instead concluding that the petitioner "fail[ed] to link his persecution to anything other than his status as a police officer").
Finally, we note that Escobar-Cuellar did not challenge on appeal the agency's decision denying his asylum application as untimely.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
. At oral argument, Escobar-Cuellar's counsel for the first time asked the court to take judicial notice of a transcript of a state court oral decision, dated April 22, 2016, granting a motion to reduce his conviction to a misdemeanor under California Penal Code § 17(b)(3). Because our review is limited to the administrative record, this request for judicial notice is denied. Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 964 (9th Cir.1996). To seek consideration of this new evidence, Escobar-Cuellar's proper course of action is to seek to reopen the proceedings below.