Case Name: CONTINENTAL LUMBER & TIE CO. v. WILROY
Court: Texas Courts of Civil Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1912-10-22
Citations: 151 S.W. 840
Docket Number: 
Parties: CONTINENTAL LUMBER & TIE CO. v. WILROY.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 151
Pages: 840–843

Head Matter:
CONTINENTAL LUMBER & TIE CO. v. WILROY.
(Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Galveston.
Oct. 22, 1912.
On Motion for Rehearing, Nov. 21, 1912.)
1. Continuance (§ 20 ) —, Discretion of Court.
Defendant caused depositions to be taken, which were duly returned to the district clerk on November 16, 1910, during the November term of court. About May 8, 1911, defendant’s counsel discovered that the depositions could not be found in the district clerk’s office, and wired to the notary taking them, who informed counsel that the depositions had been mailed to the clerk as instructed, whereupon defendant applied for a continuance for want of such depositions, stating the facts. A previous continuance had been granted for another cause. The depositions were merely cumulative of evidence given somewhat fully at trial. Held, in view of counsel’s delay in not inquiring whether the depositions had been returned, that there was no abuse of discretion in overruling the application for a continuance.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Continuance, Cent.'Dig. §§ 74-93; Dec. Dig. § 26. ]
2. Continuance (§ 51 )' — Second Application.
It is within the sound discretion of the court to grant or refuse a second application for a continuance, which is not strictly a statutory application.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Continuance,Cent. Dig. §§ 69, 79, 85, 87, 88, 118, 128, 130, 132, 135, 141, 147; Dec. Dig. § 51. ]
On Motion for Rehearing.
3. Courts (§ 116 ) — Records—Jurisdiction—• In Vacation.
An order of the judge, made in vacation, after trial and adjournment of court, incorporating certain depositions in the record, was without authority and ineffectual for that purpose.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Courts, Cent. Dig. §§ 369-373; Dec. Dig. § 116. ]
4. Continuance (§ 26 ) — Diligence.
If defendant’s counsel were advised by letter in November, 1910, from the notary public, who took depositions for use at trial, tha't the depositions had been taken and mailed to the clerk of court, counsel could assume that the depositions were on file, and were not guilty of a lack of diligence in not inquiring until the time of trial, in May, 1911, as to whether the depositions were on file, so as to preclude them from moving for a continuance because of their loss, first discovered at the trial.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Continuance, Cent. Dig. §§ 74-93; Dec. Dig. § 26. ]
5. Appeal and Error (§ 671 ) — Presentation Below.
An appellate court is only required to pass upon the action of the trial court as shown by the record, so that, in determining whether an' application for a continuance was properly •overruled, it can only consider the facts stated in the application, as shown by the trial court’s record.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 2867-2872; Dec. Dig. § 671. ]
Appeal from District Court, Angelina-County.
Action by Joe Wilroy against the Continental Lumber & Tie Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Mantooth & Collins, of Lufkin, and Lane, Wolters & Storey, of Houston, for appellant. W. J. Townsend, Jr., of Lufkin, for appellee.
For other oases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
REESE, J.
This suit was instituted in the district court by Joe Wilroy against the Continental Lumber & Tie Company to recover a debt alleged to be owing to plaintiff by defendant, being the contract price for a lot of ties sold by plaintiff to defendant. The defense was that a large portion of the ties were not first-class ties, as were contracted for. A trial with a jury resulted in a judgment for plaintiff for $1,121.97, from which this appeal is prosecuted.
There are three assignments of error in the brief of appellant, all presenting the same question, to wit, the error in overruling appellant's application for continuance. No question is ráised on the facts by the assignments. As appears from the bill of exceptions, the. application for continuance Was the "second application made by appellant. The facts pertinent to the question, as shown by the bill of exceptions and the record, are as follows: The suit was instituted by filing the original petition on the 19th day of February, 1910. It does not appear when service was had on defendant; but it filed its original answer, presenting a valid and meritorious defense, on May 5, 1910. The terms of court in the county began on the first Mondays in May and November, respectively. It does not appear why the case was continued at either the first or second terms; but at one or the other of them the case was continued on the application of the defendant, as shown by the fact that the application for continuance under consideration, made at the May term, 1911, was its second application. In June, 1910, appellant had an inspection made of the ties by William Blair and A. T. Thompson at Clifton, Ariz., to which point they had been shipped, and in June, 1910, at the same time, it had certain photographs taken of some of the ties. About the 12th of November, 1910, appellant filed interrogatories to Blair, Thompson, and Dunlap, and had their depositions taken in answer thereto. The depositions were duly returned to the district clerk on November 16, 1910, which must have been during the November term of the court. About May 8, 1911, counsel for appellant discovered that these depositions could not be found in the district clerk's office, and on that day they wired to the officer to whom the commission had been sent, inquiring whether the depositions had been returned. The telegram states that the case was then on call. In reply to this message the officer wired that the depositions had been mailed as instructed. The case being called for trial, appellant made application in the usual form for continuance for want of these depositions, stating the facts about their taking and return, and attaching to the application, as part thereof, a copy of the answers, which we presume had been procured from' the officer, who stated in his message that he had such copy. The testimony was material to the defense set up in the answer. The photographs were, attached to Dunlap's deposition. The application was made and overruled on May 12, 1911. After the adjournment of the May term of court the depositions were found in a box in the district clerk's office, unopened. After stating the facts with regard to the taking, return, and loss of the depositions, the application states in the usual form that it was not made for delay, and that the testimony could not be procured from any other source. It is shown by the depositions of these witnesses that George A. Wagstaff and George M. Ooale were present when the inspection referred .to in Arizona was made, and participated therein; Ooale being an officer of appellant, and Wag-staff a tie inspector for the railway company to whom the ties had been contracted to be-sold. On'the trial Wagstaff testified by depositions; his testimony being substantially the same as that of Blair and Thompson. Dunlap seems to have testified only as to the photographs taken by him. Co ale appeared in person and testified for appellant on the trial, at considerable length and very fully, and in substance to the same effect as Blair and Thompson.
The above are the material facts to be gathered from the record. The application being the second one, and not strictly a statutory application, it was within the sound discretion of the court to grant or refuse it. We think the record shows such want of diligence on the part of appellant as justifies the action of the court. At least, we cannot say that his action was such an abuse of his discretion as would authorize this court to reverse the judgment, in the circumstances stated. It will be seen that appellant made no inquiry as to the return of the deposition from November 16th, when they were returned and filed, until the case was called for trial on May 8, 1911. They had not even been opened. It seems to us that the most ordinary diligence, in the circumstances, the ease having been once continued on its application, required appellant to learn whether these depositions had been taken and returned, at least after the lapse of a reasonable time for doing so. If such inquiry had been seasonably made, it would have disclosed the loss of the depositions in ample time for appellant to have again filed interrogatories and taken the depositions. If it be urged that the missing photographs could not have 'been again procured, that is no answer, because the continuance, if granted, could not enable appellant to do so. While we cannot agree with appellee that the mere fact that the testimony is merely cumulative of that of Wagstaff and Ooale, and several other witnesses who testified for appellant as to the character of the ties, would of itself justify the overruling of the application, in case proper diligence had been shown, still this fact must also be taken into consideration in determining whether there has been an abuse, or a proper exercise, of discretion on the part of the trial court.
We are of the opinion that the assignments of error present no grounds for reversal, and the judgment is therefore affirmed.