Case Name: County of Pulaski vs. Irvin
Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 1842-07
Citations: 4 Ark. 473
Docket Number: 
Parties: County of Pulaski vs. Irvin.
Judges: 
Reporter: Arkansas Reports
Volume: 4
Pages: 473–506

Head Matter:
County of Pulaski vs. Irvin.
The provision in the constitution of this State, that the county courts shall have juris, diction in all matters relating to county taxes, disbursements of money for county purposes, and in every other purpose that may be necessary to the internal improve, ment and local concerns of their respective counties, does not confer on those tribu, nals the power of taxation and disbursement, without legislative action.
And section 205, of the chapter on Criminal Proceedings, in the Revised Statutes, providing that each county shall pay the costs of criminal proceedings had within it, is imperative on the county courts, and they have no discretion but to obey it.
The county in which a prosecution is commenced, though a change of venue is after-wards obtained, is liable for all the costs.
On certiorari to the county court, the circuit court can only quash or affirm."'
This was a case brought into the Pulaski Circuit Court, by certio-rari, and there determined, in March, 1840, before the Hon. Charles Caldwell, one of the circuit judges. Miller Irvin exhibited, in the county court of the county of Pulaski, a demand for the sum of $450 04, for compensation and fees for services rendered by him, as sheriff of Phillips county, in the case of the State of Arkansas against David F. Douglass, prosecuted for murder, upon an indictment returned into the circuit court of the county of Pulaski, in which the offence was alleged to have been committed, but which was removed for trial, by change of venue, to the circuit court of Phillips county.
The evidence adduced before the county court, in support of the demand, consisted of a duly certitied transcript of the following order of the circuit court of Phillips county:' “This day comes Miller Irvin, sheriff of the county of Phillips, and presents his account for moneys due, as sheriff, in the case of The State vs. David F. Douglass, in which there was a change of venue frorn the county of Pulaski to the county of Phillips, amounting to the sum of four hundred and fifty-nine dollars and four cents; which account, being proven to the satisfaction of the court, is audited, allowed, and ordered to be Certified to the county court of Pulaski county; and the said court is hereby directed to pay the same.”
Upon the hearing of the case, the comity court decided, that the county of Pulaski was under no legal obligation to pay the expenses of that prosecution, accruing after the change of venue; refused any 6r-der for the payment of the demand; and adjudged “that the said Miller Irvin take nothing by his motion, or suit, and that the county of Pulaski have and recover of the said Miller Irvin all the costs herein expended.” To be relieved in the premises, Irvin then caused the proceedings of the county court to be brought before the circuit court of Pulaski county, by writ of certiorari; the return to which exhibited the facts, as above stated. Upon the matter being thus brought before the.circuit court, it was agreed, between the parties, and their agreement, by leave of the court, entered of record, “ that all manner of exception to the writ of certiorari, in this case, be, and the same are hereby, waived, and it is admitted, by both the parties, and ordered to be made a part of the record, that the indictment, in the name of the State vs. David F. Douglass, for the murder of William C. Howell, was found in the county of Pulaski, and removed, by change of venue, to the county of Phillips, for trial, and disposed of, in that court, by nolle prosequi.” The circuit court, on the hearing of 'the case thus presented, decided that the county of Pulaski was le-gaily bound to pay the cost and expenses incident to the prosecution, and adjudged, “ that the county court of the county of Pulaski do allow, and order to be paid, to the said Miller Irvin, sheriff of the county of Phillips, the said sum of four hundred and fifty-nine dollars and four cents, certified by the circuit court of Phillips county to be due him, as sheriff, in the case in which there was a change of venue from the county of Pulaski to the county of Phillips; and that this case be, and it is hereby, remanded to the said county court; and the said county court is hereby'instructed to allow and pay said claim, together with all the costs in and about this claim in this court expended.” To reverse this adjudication, the county of Pulaski brought the matter before this court, by writ of error.
Trapnall & Cocke, for the plaintiff in error.
The original application was made to the county of Pulaski, under the 205th section of the statute of Criminal Proceedings, which provides, that “ in all penal or criminal cases, if the defendant shall be acquitted, (except in cases where the prosecutor shall be adjudged to pay costs), or, if convicted, shall not have property to pay the costs, the same shall be paid by the county;” referring, as may be fairly inferred, from a comparison of the 204th, ’5th, and ’6th, sections, to the county in which the indictment was found.
The paramount objection to this claim, is, that the law, under which it is prosecuted, is in violation of the 9ih section of the 6th article of the constitution, and appropriates, for public purposes, and divests the county, without its consent, of a fund, over which this section and article of the constitution has given it the exclusive control. It provides, bhat “ there shall be established, in each county in the State, a court, to be holden by the justices of the peace, and called the county court, which shall have jurisdiction in all matters relating to county taxes, disbursement of money for county purposes, and in every other case that may be necessary to the internal improvement and local concerns of the respective counties.”
This section constitutes the county court a local legislature, for each county, and gives it sole and exclusive authority to regulate county taxation, and to expend and appropriate the fund, when collected; and, in addition, directs the expenditure of the fund for county, and not for State, purposes; and, therefore, the act, so far'as it invades the exclusive jurisdiction of the county court, and appropriates a fun. the public, that was designed, by the constitution, for unconstitutional and void.
Ashley■ & Watkins, contra.
The question involved in £ has the General Assembly power to prescribe, by law, that spective counties, in which State prosecutions originate, shaLln any event, pay the costs of these prosecutions? This resolves itself imotKe grave and serious question, whether the General Assembly has the power to control, by legislative enactment, the exercise of the jurisdiction vested by the-constitution in county courts, “in all matters relating to county taxes, disbursements of money for county purposes, and in every other case, that may be necessary for the internal improvement and local concerns of the respective counties.” Cons. Ark. Art. 6, Sec. 9.
In considering this question, I lay down the following propositions, as well settled: that the Federal Government can exercise no power, which is not clearly expressed in the constitution, or which is not ne cessarily implied, because it was created by the delegation of certain attributes of sovereignty, belonging to independent States: that, in construing the constitution of a State, a different rule is observed, for the Legislature of a State has the power to pass all laws, unless prohibited expressly, or by necessary implication, by the constitution, because the people possess all sovereign power, which may be expressed through their Legislature, unless restrained by the organic law.
By the constitution of this State, the powers of the government are divided into three distinct departments, each confided to a separate body of magistracy, to wit: those which are legislative, to one; those which are executive, to another; and those which are judicial, to another; and no person, or collection of persons, belonging to any one of these departments, shall exercise the powers belonging to either of the others, except in the instances thereinafter expressly directed, or permitted. Cons. Ark. Art. 3. The only such instance, which the constitution directs or permits, is in regard to impeachments. Under this clause in the constitution, it was held, in the case of the State vs. Hull, on quo warranto, that the same person could not hold the office of State treasurer and justice of the peace, at the same time.
By the 9th sec. of the 6lh art., under the head of the Judicial Department, it is provided, that there shall be established, in each county of the State, a court, to be holden by the justices of the peace, and called the county court; which shall have jurisdiction in all matters relating to county taxes, disbursements of money for county purposes, and in every other case that may be necessary to the internal improvement and local concerns of the respective counties. This confers upon the county court the right to exercise a purely judicial function, and not any legislative power whatever. But if they possess the powers claimed for them in this instance, then are they legislative bodies, capable of passing all laws, general or special, “relating to county taxes, and disbursements of money for county purposes,” independent of the General Assembly, and beyond the control of this court, which is invested by the constitution with a general superintending control over all inferior courts of law and equity. Instead of being judicial tribunals, they would be sovereignties. And what would it avail to sue the county, for any debt, if the county court pos sess the right to determine whether it shall be paid out of the funds of the county? Nothing. All demands against the county, would lay in entreaty, and not in suit, even for their liquidation.
It is believed that the principle involved in this case has already been decided in this court, in the case of Woodruff, adm’r Gunn, ear parte, in which a mandamus was ordered to be issued, to compel the county court to adjudicate a claim which it had once rejected. This court decided, that the only discretion vested in the county court, was, as to the amount to be allowed on the. claim of Gunn, not as to whether the county was responsible for a claim of the character then presented. If a law, passed by the General Assembly, fixed the responsibility of the county, notwithstanding the decision of the county court, in that case, surely it has equal force in this.
If the question be doubtful, a construction ought not to be made of the constitution, which would lead to dangerous and absurd consequences, if not unhinge the operations of the government, while it admits of another safe, uniform, and practical construction.
After advisement, the following opinions were delivered:
Judge Dickrtson held, that the great principle, in reference to which the constitution must be construed, is the separation and division of the powers of the government among the different departments: that the clause giving jurisdiction to the county courts, must be considered by, and in reference to, this leading principle; and the authority given that court must yield to, and be restricted by, this principle, unless its exercise is in accordance with the true object of the convention, and even if the clauses in the constitution were in direct contradiction to each other: that under our system of government, the power of taxation naturally belongs to the legislative department of the State, not to be exerted partially, or in local districts, but through the agency and sovereignty of the State, by uniform and impartial laws: that it is to be presumed that the State has not delegated the power of taxation to any other department than the Legislature, unless the grant in the constitution is so express and imperative as to forbid the idea that she intended to reserve this privilege solely to herself: -that the grant of power to the county courts Í3 not so express as to compel any such conclusion, for upon a proper construction of the grant, even standing alone, the Legislature must first define the objects on which the jurisdiction of the county courts is to be exercised, draw the line of distinction between general and local coucerns, point out the internal improvements of tho county, as contradistinguished from those of the State, and determine for what purposes county taxes may be assessed, the amount, mode, and manner, of taxation, and the purposes for which the moneys raised may bo disbursed.
He held furthei, that the county courts could not act on the subjects of taxation or disbursement, without previous legislativo action, for that it would be an exercise of legislative power : that tho constitution gives them no legislative power, but regards them as courts: that they are political and corporate bodies, to be controlled and regulated in their discretion by llmacts of the General Assembly, and not as independent of, and superior to it.
f. Judge Lacy held, that to the fundamental provision in the constitution, as to the division of power, and its distribution among the departments, all the minor parts of the constitution must yield: that the whole structure of our political fabric was reared upon the principle, and rests upon the foundation, that the power of taxation belongs peculiarly and exclusively to the representatives of the people : that it is, in its essence and character, a legislative and not a judicial power, and cannot, in the nature of things, appertain or be assigned to judicial functions, with reason or justice : that this principle constitutes a governing rule in construing the constitution ; and that, if there is any doubt or difficulty in ascertaining the precise boundaries of the departments, the design and objects of the separate jurisdictions must be inquired into, and the authority assigned to each, which the general scope and design of the system warrants: that a constitution is not to be construed, or its meaning ascertained, like an ordinary grant or deed, but it is a charter of great political rights and powers, and its spirit and meaning to be sought for and found, in the principles it ordains and establishes: that as the power of taxation belongs, as matter of right and principle, to the legislative department, it must remain there, unless the constitution has given a part of it to another department, by express grant or imperative implication : that no part of it could be, or is, conferred on tho county courts,' by mere ambiguous and uncertain terms, nor is conferred by thé constitution: that the county courts are made judicial tribunals by tho constitution, and a part of the judiciary department; and that when the constitution, in regard to them, uses tho word jurisdiction, it must ho restricted to the kind and quantum of jurisdiction that belongs to them as courts. He held, further, that tho meaning of a legal or judicial jurisdiction, appertaining to a particular class of cases, means that the sovereign power of the State may prescribo a rule of action for that jurisdiction, and that the county courts must act in conformity to its authority: that the language of tho constitution is loo loose and vague to be taken as a grant of legislative power, or as conferring any other powers on the county courts than such as they can exercise as judicial tribunals: that construed by this rule, the terms become sufficient- • ly certain, as far as their judicial powers and jurisdiction are concerned, and indicate to the Legislature what powers may be exercised by the county courts, and the necessity that would devolve on the General Assembly, of creating laws and regulations by which that jurisdiction might bo exercised: that all inferior magistrates and corporate bodies, must, as a fundamental axiom in tlm science of government, be subject fo the sovereign will, and subordinate to tho welfare of the whole, whereof they form a part: that there is in the Legislature a necessary and indispensable power to provide for the common defence, the common welfare, and the common benefit and improvement, of the State, as one great whole, and, consequently, to provide for an ample exorcise of public justice throughout the State, in tho exercise of which powers, the constituent parts of the body cannot interfere; and that if its exercise imposes charges on a county, or creates tho necessity for county taxes, this is a mere result that flows from the exercise of an indisputable power: that if the Legislature cannot interfere with county charges, or create county taxes, they cannot legislate for the common good, compel each county to keep and maintain good roads, or erect suitable buildings for purposes of justice.
The Chiei? Justice held, that that clause in the constitution confides to the county courts the direction and control (■/ all matters affecting only, or principally, the interests of those residing ill the county, in regard to which they possess the power of adjudicating every question that may arise : that for this purpose, they are the authorized agents of tho inhabitants of the county, and ihc only organ by or through which their will, upon such subjects, can be legitimately made known, and their common interests provided forand that their powers, in those respects, arc plenary, and only subject to control by the circuit and supremo courts. lie held, furthor, that county taxes could only be collected and disbursed for county purposes: that the county courts alone have the power of appropriating or disbursing the moneys so collected: that the county court, and not the Legislature, has the power to determine whether any particular object, the prosecution of which requires an expenditure of money, belongs to the class of objects which are local to the county : that if the county court has this power, the Legislature cannot have it: that tho county court alone has the power to designate the objects for which county moneys are to be disbursed ; and that there is no repugnancy between the grant of power to them, so construed, and any other part of the constitution. He further held, that the expenses of criminal prosecutions aro not local to any county, or matters of county concern, and therefore, as to paying such expenses, no county court could have any jurisdiction: that the object of tho constitution was, as appears from its language, to confer upon tho officers of one department, in inore than one instance, the exercise of powers, which, by the general distribution of power, would belong to another department: that unless the county courts have some legisla, tive powers, this has not been done, because the only other instance is the power of the Senate to try impeachments: that the constitutional provisions in regard to revenue, apply exclusively to the State revenue, and have no relation or application to the levying of county taxes, or the appropriation or disbursement of money for county purposes: that the word jurisdiction, used in tho constitution in regard to the county courts, has merely its ordinary moaning of a power to determine or decide, and is not confined to judicial jurisdiction. Ho also held, that his construction conferred on the county courts no legislative power, though, if it did, it might be exercised.

Opinion:
By
Dickinson, J.
This is a question w'hich, both in its principle and in its consequences, involves the construction of our constitution, in regard to the powers that belong to the State, in her sovereign capacity ; and,' also, the constitutional jurisdiction of the county courts.
The matter in controversy is not easily determined, because the questions involved in its discussion possess inherent difficulty, in them- , selves; and this is greatly increased by the vagueness and uncertainty of the terms used in the constitution.
In the construction of grants of constitutional power, there is no rule which should be more closely adhered to, than the one laid down by Justice Story, who declares, "thatwe should regard the constitution as a frame of laws, and not as ordinary statutes, and that the great end and object of all just interpretation are, to ascertain and determine the sovereign will of the people who formed the constitution; that the whole instrument must be taken together; and that its true intent and meaning can only be ascertained and defined from the great objects and purposes for which the government was instituted; that anj other construction will abridge grqat fundamental principles, which are supreme, and enlarge those which are restricted, beyond their true and just meaning."
I deem it proper to make this preliminary remark, before entering into a minute examination of the powers that belong to the State, as a sovereign, and those that appertain to the county courts.
The great axiom in the American form of government, is the separation and division of all political power among the three equal and co-ordinate departments of government; and that true and beneficial problem in the'science of government was revealed by our revolution, and worked out and put in harmonious operation by the adoption of our federal and State constitutions. To deny this self-evident proposition, is to impeach the right of self-government, and to destroy the great presdrvative and constitutional principle that runs through our entire system of free states. This axiom is declared inviolate by our constitution, by which it is also declared, that the powers of the government of the State shall be, divided into three distinct departments, each to be confided to a separate body of magistracy. Those which are legislative to one, those which are executive to another, and those which are judicial to a third; and, "that no person, or collection of persons, being of one of these departments, shall exercise any powers belonging to either of the others." It is clear, from this provision, that this was the great and important object that the convention had in view, in the formation of the constitution, and therefore the instrument must be construed in reference to it. They well knew that they could not be separated, or made independent of each other; for the action of the government depends upon the joint agency of them all. But, within the constitutional jurisdiction, each was supreme, exceptin cases expressly permitted or directed. Now, it is perfectly clear, that the clause in the constitution which confers jurisdiction upon the county courts "in all matters relating to county taxes, disbursement of money for county purposes, and in all other cases that might be necessary for their internal improvements or local concerns," must be considered by, and in reference to, the leading and governing principle of the constitution; and that the authority given to the justices of the peace, as a county court, must yield to, and be restricted by, this principle, unless its exercise is in accordance with the true object and design of the convention. Again, it cannot be denied, that, if these clauses in the constitution were in direct contradiction to each other, the latter must give way to the former, because an inferior principle is intended to be engrafted upon the constitution, in opposition to a higher and more commanding provision, and one which constitutes the ingredients of civil liberty, and furnishes the only means and security by which the liberty of the country can be preserved or continued. This is the plain dictate of common sense, founded on experience and the nature of things, and strictly in accordance with all just rules of constitutional interpretation. There is a wide difference between the constitution of the United States and those of the State governments. The one is a delegation and enumeration of powers for national purposes and objects, and hence, its provisions are not to be extended beyond the true construction of the terms used, and their necessary implication with reference to the objects granted and intended to be secured. The constitution of a State government is wholly different. It is true, whatever it forbids, either to the State or to the people, cannot be done; and, thus far, it is like the constitution of the United States. Here the similitude stops; for, whatever is not forbidden by the constitution of the United States, or by the laws of Congress in pursuance of its authority, is retained as a residuary power to the State, as a matter of sovereign right, which she has the unquestionable authority to exercise in any manner she pleases, subject to the restrictions and limitations before stated. This results from the nature and character of civil government.
It would be impossible to make an enumeration of all the political rights that belong to sovereign States, or the natural privileges that belong to the people, or to give a definition that would include the whole extent of their power. Besides, it would be impeaching the will of the sovereign to do whatever she might think proper, within her constitutional orbit; and it would strip her of all her attributes of usefulness .and improvement. The constitution of a State is, therefore, a mere declaration or biff of rights, imposed alike upon the different departments of government, and upon the citizens, and organizing its powers and franchises in such form as the sovereign will of the people, in convention, deemed proper to impose. These premises? being established, will, I think, lend to just and proper conclusions.
The most distinguishing characteristic in the federal and State governments, is the power that belongs to the legislative department to impose taxation upon the people. There is a sensibility and a jealousy upon this subject, that may be regarded as furnishing the most effectual barrier against oppression and injustice. Representation and taxation, in their proper meaning, belong exclusively to the principles of a free, constitutional, and limited government; and this power, checked and controlled by the elective franchise, is not exerted partially or in local districts, but through the agency and sovereignty of the Slates, by uniform and impartial laws, and was the power that the people regarded, above all others, as constituting the shield of their protection. Liberty, they well knew, was in far more danger from attacks upon private property, than from any other cause; and hence, they guarded it upon that side with more solicitude and concern than any other.
These principles being established, it would seem to me to follow, that the State has certainly not entrusted her resources or her powers, on the subject of taxation, to any ether department than the General' Assembly, unless the grant in the constitution is so express and imperative as to forbid the idea that she ever intended to reserve this privilege solely to herself. And if it is doubtful how the power of taxalion is distributed, then, as a governing principle of constitutional freedom, it necessarily belongs to tbe State, and she is authorized to exert it through the agency and instrumentality of her political or corporate communities. By keeping in view these principles, we shall be able to define the- true constitutional jurisdiction of the several departments, and confine each to its appropriate sphere. The power of taxation, as has been justly said, is the greatest power that can be entrusted to a sovereign. In ils exercise, all the great interests of society are involved, and the government is put into operation and supported by its resourced or influence. As a general principle, the right of taxation is given, and belongs exclusively, to the legislative department. And there is great propriety and necessity in thus lodging it; for, as it is to be exercised for the benefit and security ©f the State, so' the whole people of the State, through the means of the elective fran chise, should have the power of regulating and controlling-its action. Is our constitution an exception to this universal rule? How is the power of taxation given, iti the instrument? The county courts " shall have jurisdiction in all matters relating to county taxes, and disbursements of money for county purposes, and in every other case that may be necessary to the internal improvement and local concern of their respective counties." Sec. 9, Art. 6, Cons. These words must be all construed together, keeping in view the great object and purposes of the government. Admit that the term, jurisdiction over all matters relating to taxes for county purposes, if taken disconnected from the other portions of the constitution and the clauses of the sentence that follow it, might convey to the mind the idea (hat the power of taxation was given to that court; but, even then, I should deem that doubtful; for they are certainly neither appropriate nor sufficiently explicit terms to confer such a power. Their meaning is restrained by the latter part of the paragraph, which shows the object for which the jurisdiction was conferred; for that proves that the county court was intrusted with the mere collection and disbursement of the revenues of the county, and in all other cases in which she was concerned, by the appointment and prescription of the Legislature. Such is the extent of their powers. That they are to have and exercise jurisdiction in all cases coming within the provisions from which they derive their authority, is not controverted; and it is the duty of this Court to sustain and protect them in it. But the objects upon which that jurisdiction is to be exercised, must first be defined, and the line of distinction drawn by the General Assembly, between what shall be considered local or general concerns, and the internal improvements of the counties pointed out, as contradistinguished from those of the State; for what purposes county taxes may he assessed; the amount, mode, and manner of taxation; and the purposes for which such moneys may be disbursed. When this shall have been done, and a case is properly presented, in the form prescribed by law, then the jurisdiction attaches.
To assert the broad and naked proposition, that the county courts can act upon the subject either of taxation or disbursement, without any legislative control upon the subject, is, virtually and in effect, to give to the most inferior tribunals in the State, powers expressly belonging to the General Assembly; and that, too, in a class of cases in which they might cause the most serious embarrassment to the State, by cutting off her revenue. As judges, they possess no such right, because it is the exercise of legislative authority. Where, I ask, is the grant giving them legislative power ? Does the constitution regard them as a court, or as d legislature ? or do they partake of a double character compounded of both, possessing the attributes of both judging and legislating. Is it to be presumed that so novel and extraordinary a power would have been conferred on an inferior tribunal of justice, without an express declaration of the constitution to that effect? To say that they, as judges alone, may declare what constitute county purposes, is to make the corporate and political bodies of the State uncontrollable upon the subject of county taxation, as well as disbursements, and all their incidents; for it cannot be contended that this, or any other court, could control them upon a mere question of fact, and that, too, upon a subject of which they have an exclusive, absolute jurisdiction. Suppose the General Assembly had passed no-act whatever upon the subject, could the county court, upon its own mere will, have gone on and imposed burthens upon the property of her citizens? If it can arbitrarily declare the class of cases which shall be deemed local, or upon which the county funds shall be disbursed, regardless of the expression of the legislative will, it may, with equal propriety, levy and collect whatever tax it pleases, and upon such species of property as it may think proper to designate. If it can do all this, by what rule of uniformity are the county courts-governed? for that bench, consisting of numerous judges, continually changing, at the will of the p.eople by whom they are elected, must, then, having no rule for its government, be controlled in its judgment by the many circumstances acting upon the immediate interests of those who preside upon it. With a power undefined, unlimited, and unregulated, that which in one county would be deemed local, in another would be adjudged very differently. If the county court can, independent of the legislative will, levy taxes, and select all objects of expenditure, why can it not, as an incident of these powers, create an assessor, a treasurer, and collector? Such a power, I presume would hardly be claimed for them. Grant, then, these uncontrolled powers of levying taxes, and they can, if they wish it, indirectly exclude the State from coming into the counties for her revenue, or at least so cripple her resources as to render them valueless. What right has a county to purchase property of any kind without the authority of law? If she can do this, she may erect court-houses and jails, and call them county property, and exclude the State from the use or occupation of them, and thereby paralyze the arm of justice. It is no answer to this proposition, to say there can be no motive to do such a thing. A failure to do so may be mere policy, while it can exercise the power at any time, to the great detriment of the general interests of the State and the citizens. I admit that, if the courts were given this power, absolutely and unquestionably, by the constitution, however dangerous such an arbitrary jurisdiction might be, no valid objection could be made to its exercise; but, as there is no such express grant in the instrument, according to my view of it, we are not warranted in clothing them with such unlicensed discretion. Had the convention intended to confer it upon them, would they not have declared, in express terms, that the county court should have authority to levy taxes upon the citizens of their counties, for county purposes, and disburse the same, without being subject to the control of the General Assembly? As they have not done so, is it not fair and reasonable to presume that no such power was ever intended to be conferred? Assume the position that an uncontrolled power is explicitly given to the county courts over eounty disbursements, and it must, of course, extend to the power of taxation. I cannot consider the grant as standing separate and alone, but as in reference only to other and higher objects of government. The question that I am considering, is one of power, and not of policy. Therefore, I am unable to bring my mind to the conviction that the convention ever intended to confer upon the most inferior part of the judiciary system the power of taxation and of disbursement, without reference to any legislative action. Admit the power, and all that the county courts have to do is, to declare any object local, and a fit subject for county taxation, and then they can, of course, (if the position the county court,has assumed be correct), raise the levy to meet the expense; or, they may refuse to make any improvCrfients whatever, to the injury of other parts of the State. If this be trife, how could taxation be uniform throughout the State, or a standard of equal valuation fixed upon the same species of property? And yet, this is one of the main and leading provisions of the constitution, upon the subject of taxation.
The members of the convention who framed the constitution, are supposed to have known the wants of the State, and to have provided adequate and sufficient means for the security and maintenance of the government. They, according to my opinion, proceeded upon the principle that the people were willing to intrust the General Assembly with the power of taxation; and, through the representatives of the whole State, have agreed that their property might be taxed for State purposes and county objects. They have provided the means for these two things, by intrusting the power to the Legislature, in the first instance, and requiring it to lay down a rule upon the subject, that should govern county courts. The constitution regards the county courts as political and corporate bodies, that are to be controlled and regulated in their discretion by the acts of the General Assembly, and not as independent of, and superior to, it. As political and corporate bodies, they are required to conform their action to the rule of the Legislature, and, in the exercise of their jurisdiction, to proceed in the mode and manner prescribed by law. That the State has the right to require them to defray the expenses of criminal prosecutions, originating in their respective districts, I have no doubt. As the sovereign, she may defray them out of any portion of her revenue that she may think proper. Whether the law she has passed in regard to the subject be ill advised or not, it does not belong to this Court to determine. Much rmiy depend upon the vigilance of the police of a county, in preserving peace, good order, and quietness, and in suppressing vice and crime. And while, on the other hand, she is induced to exercise all her energies in preventing the commission of crime, she is warned that unnecessary and unwarrantable prosecutions may cause the expenditure of her public moneys, and increase the burthen of her citizens. The General Assembly having, under any state of case, authority to pass the laws, they must, in my opinion, remain in force until changed or modified by subsequent legislation.
Under the view I have taken of this case, it is not necessary for me to say, that I consider the acts of the General Assembly, regulating the disbursement of county funds, as imperative upon the county courts, and that they have no discretion but to obey them. In the present case, it cannot be contended but that the sheriff of Phillips county has acted in conibrmity with law, and that his account for official services, rendered in the case of the State vs. Douglass,-is properly certified. It is equally clear, in my opinion, that the county of Pulaski, in which the prosecution was instituted, is bound to pay the costs. The judgment of the circuit court, however, must be reversed, as that court, upon certiorari, could take no other action upon the proceedings of the county court, than to quash or affirm them. The case must therefore be remanded, with instructions that the judgment of the county court be quashed.
By