Case Name: In the Matter of Roy Brenner, Appellant, against John F. O'Connell et al., Individually and as Members of the State Liquor Authority, Respondents
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1955-06-09
Citations: 308 N.Y. 636
Docket Number: 
Parties: In the Matter of Roy Brenner, Appellant, against John F. O’Connell et al., Individually and as Members of the State Liquor Authority, Respondents.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 308
Pages: 636–650

Head Matter:
In the Matter of Roy Brenner, Appellant, against John F. O’Connell et al., Individually and as Members of the State Liquor Authority, Respondents.
Argued March 7, 1955;
decided June 9, 1955.
Monroe I. Katcher, II, for appellant.
I. By moving for an order to dismiss the petition upon objections in law, respondents, for the purpose of their motion and this appeal, admit the truth of all of the facts alleged in the petition. (Matter of Nistal v. Hausauer, 308 N. Y. 146; Matter of Schwab v. McElligott, 282 N. Y. 182; Matter of Felice v. Swezey, 278 App. Div. 958.) II. The courts have the power and the duty to make certain that respondents have not acted in excess of the grant of authority given them by statute or in disregard of the criteria or standard prescribed by the Legislature; and where respondents have refused, without legal excuse, to perform a duty imposed by statute, the courts may issue an order in the nature of mandamus to compel the performance of the duty. (Matter of Wilson v. Quinn, 253 App. Div. 403, 277 N. Y. 720; Matter of O’Connor Long Is. Properties Corp. v. Bruckman, 262 App. Div. 1018, 288 N. Y. 23; Matter of Blankfein v. Bruckman, 273 N. Y. 588; Matter of Gifts By Wife, Inc., v. Bruckman, 253 App. Div. 350, 278 N. Y. 499; Fulton Restaurant v. Quinn, 253 App. Div. 740; Reckler v. Quinn, 254 App. Div. 710; Olmstead v. Westchester Co. Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 254 App. Div. 63; Matter of Sesselberg v. Schoeneck, 151 Misc. 267; Matter of Ramey v. Bruckman, 178 Misc. 659; Matter of Colaci v. Bruckman, 172 Misc. 383; Matter of Barry v. O’Connell, 303 N. Y. 46.) III. The performance of a statutory duty on the part of an administrative official will be compelled, where no legal excuse exists for the refusal to perform such duty. (Matter of City of New York v. Schoeck, 294 N. Y. 559; Fulton Restaurant v. Quinn, 253 App. Div. 740; Matter of Wilson v. Quinn, 253 App. Div. 403, 277 N. Y. 720; People ex rel. Carlisle v. Board of Super visors, 217 N. Y. 424; People ex rel. O’Loughlin v. Prendergast, 219 N. Y. 377; People ex rel. Belden Club v. Hilliard, 28 App. Div. 140; People ex rel. United States Grand Lodge v. Payn, 161 N. Y. 229; Matter of Danaher v. Harris, 236 App. Div. 481; People ex rel. Sayville Steamboat Co. v. Kempner, 49 App. Div. 121.) IV. The Special Term erred in ruling that the provisions of subdivision 2 of section 17 of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law, in and of themselves and without a lawful, valid administrative rule by respondents, furnish a legal excuse for the failure of the Nassau County Alcoholic Beverage Control Board to receive petitioner’s application and proceed thereon in accordance with the statute. (Fulton Restaurant v. Quinn, 253 App. Div. 740.) V. That portion of rule 17 upon which respondents acted in determining not to permit the Nassau County Alcoholic Beverage Control Board to accept applications for a retail liquor store license to replace the decrease in the number of stores in Nassau County, was invalid by reason of respondents’ employment of “ need ” as the standard for the acceptance of applications by local boards, instead of employing to that end the statutory standard of ‘ ‘ convenience and advantage ’ ’. (Fulton Restaurant v. Quinn, 253 App. Div. 740; Leader-Observer, Inc., v. State Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 148 Misc. 757, 241 App. Div. 637; Matter of Sesselberg v. Schoeneck, 151 Misc. 267; Matter of Levine v. O’Connell, 275 App. Div. 217, 300 N. Y. 658; Matter of Barry v. O’Connell, 303 N. Y. 46.) VI. The subsequent amendment of rule 17 by respondents cannot operate to defeat petitioner’s application. (Matter of Brenner v. O’Connell, 282 App. Div. 742.) VII. The procedure, policy or rule adopted by respondents of allowing removals of existing package stores licenses to new locations within the same county instead of permitting the acceptance of applications for new licenses, as contemplated by statute and rule 17, is inconsistent with and out of harmony with the substantive and procedural provisions of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law and is, therefore, legally invalid. (People v. Woodruff, 32 N. Y. 355; Matter of Hering, 196 N. Y. 218; Moritz v. United Brethrens Church, 269 N. Y. 125; Lawrence Constr. Corp. v. State of New York, 293 N. Y. 634; Matter of Russo v. Valentine, 294 N. Y. 338.)
Alvm McKinley Sylvester and Robert W. Corcoran for respondents.
I. The issues now presented for adjudication were completely settled in prior proceedings between the same par ties. There are existing orders of a court of competent jurisdiction which have, on two prior occasions, determined the same causé of action between the parties. Those orders were unanimously affirmed by the Appellate Division and no appeal was taken therefrom. (Matter of New York State Labor Relations Bd. v. Holland Laundry, 294 N. Y. 480; Schuylkill Fuel Corp. v. Nieberg Realty Corp., 250 N. Y. 304.) II. The order which petitioner sought below, being in the nature of mandamus, is not available to compel respondents to do an act which is not required by law. (People ex rel. Jones v. Thompson, 147 App. Div. 150; Matter of Hines v. State Bd. of Parole, 181 Misc. 274; Matter of Stewart v. City Court of Binghamton, 183 Misc. 155; Matter of Newbrand v. City of Yonkers, 285 N. Y. 164; Matter of Eiss v. Summers, 205 App. Div. 691, 236 N. Y. 638; Matter of Marburg v. Cole, 286 N. Y. 202; Matter of Pruzan v. Valentine, 282 N. Y. 498.) III. The administrative determination of respondents, now challenged, does not fall within any of the categories of action enumerated in section 121 of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law, and hence is not subject to judicial review. (Matter of Millman v. O’Connell, 300 N. Y. 539; Matter of Roden v. Bruckman, 258 App. Div. 1076; Matter of Guardian Life Ins. Co. v. Bohlinger, 308 N. Y. 174; Reckler v. Quinn, 255 App. Div. 873, 280 N. Y. 768; Matter of Calvary Presbyt. Church v. State Liq. Auth., 249 App. Div. 288, 275 N. Y. 552; Matter of Marks v. Bruckman, 170 Misc. 709.) TV. Subdivision 2 of section 17 of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law specifically empowers the Authority to limit in its discretion the number of licenses of each class to be issued within the State and, in connection therewith, to prohibit the acceptance of applications for such class or classes of licenses which have been so limited. The petition herein, stating as it does that respondents refused to permit the local board to accept his application, does not state a cause of action. (Sherman Plastering Corp. v. R. & R. Co., 281 App. Div. 293; Matter of Buck v. Hurd, 281 App. Div. 115; Matter of Wilson v. Quinn, 253 App. Div. 403, 277 N. Y. 720; Matter of Barry v. O’Connell, 303 N. Y. 46.) Y. The Authority’s policy of permitting the removal of existing package liquor stores within the same county is proper and in keeping with the general spirit and intent of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law.

Opinion:
Conway, Ch. J.
On November 21, 1952, the appellant submitted a written request to the State Liquor Authority to accept an application for a package liquor store license in the village of Massapequa Park in Nassau County. The basis for this request was the allegation that there had been a decrease of one retail liquor store license in the County of Nassau between 1948 and 1952. Shortly thereafter the Authority notified appellant that his request was being held in abeyance pending the completion of a survey of New York City, Nassau, Suffolk and Westchester Counties.
Before the completion of that survey the appellant commenced an article 78 proceeding on December 12, 1952, seeking an order directing the Authority to permit the local board in Nassau County to accept and consider appellant's application for a license. The Authority moved to dismiss the petition, and the motion was granted. The Appellate Division affirmed, pointing-out that since the Authority had as then made no final determination on the application of November 21, 1952, the petition of December 12th was premature. (282 App. Div. 742-743.)
On July 20,1953, after the Authority had completed its survey, it notified appellant that his request of November 21, 1952, was denied. Thereafter, on September 9, 1953, the Authority approved the removal of an existing licensee from Bayville to the section of Massapequa Park in which appellant had sought to open his store. On September 16,1953, appellant commenced the present article 78 proceeding- seeking an order directing the Authority to permit the local board in Nassau County to consider his application. That petition was dismissed by Special Term, and the Appellate Division has affirmed unanimously.
Subdivision 2 of section 17 of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law gives the State Liquor Authority the power, jurisdiction and duty " To limit in its discretion the number of licenses of each class to be issued within the state or any political subdivision thereof, and in connection therewith to prohibit the acceptance of .applications for such class or classes of licenses which have been so limited " (emphasis supplied).
Buie 17 of the Buies of the State Liquor Authority — promulgated pursuant to the authorization of subdivision 2 of section 17 (supra) — stated, in part, that: "in the judgment of the Authority and in the exercise of the discretion vested in it by law, it is determined that public convenience and advantage are now adequately served by the number of premises licensed ' (snbd. 1).
It was therefore determined by that rule (subd. 2), " that the number of licenses issued pursuant to section 63 and section 79 of said law [i.e., the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law] be limited to the number in each political subdivision as set forth on the annexed schedule, and that no application for a license under either of said sections be accepted by any local board while the aforesaid number of said licenses shall be in effect " (1 N. Y. Official Compilation of Codes, Bules & Begulations, p. 757; emphasis supplied).
The schedule of political subdivisions referred to in the last paragraph is a schedule of counties. It is clear, therefore, that the term " political subdivision " refers to a " county ", and not to a " village ", a " town," a " township " or other political subdivision. That this meaning of that term is the correct one to be applied here is further evidenced by the definition of the " local board " under the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law. Section 30 of that law provides for the establishment of an alcoholic beverage control board in every county of the State, and then provides that the boards so constituted " shall be referred to and designated as local alcoholic beverage control boards " (emphasis supplied).
The meaning of " political subdivision " is important, for if that subdivision were the town, the village or the township, then the transfer of the license from Bayville to Massapequa Park might well involve an increase in the number of licenses in that subdivision. If, on the other hand, the term " political subdivision " as it is used in the statute and in the rules herein means " county ", then there was no increase in the number of licenses in Nassau County when the retailer was permitted to move from Bayville to Massapequa Park. Not only is it clear from the statutory scheme of "local" county boards, and from the schedule of "political subdivisions " listed in rule 17, that that term applies to and is intended to mean " county ", but that meaning facilitates and is in complete harmony with the policy of the entire Alcoholic Beverage Control Law. That policy is " to regulate and control the manufacture, sale and distribution within the state of alcoholic beverages for the purpose of fostering and promoting temperance in their consumption and respect for and obedience to law " (Alcoholic Beverage Control Law, § 2).
To hold that, in a county such as Nassau, with its numerous, overlapping villages, towns and other communities, the term ' ' political subdivision ' ' meant other than ' county ' ' would not tend to aid in carrying out the statutory policy, but would result in innumerable administrative difficulties since the number of local boards would be, likewise, innumerable. It is far better to hold that the intended subdivision is the county — for then the local county board can attempt to formulate an over-all plan for the distribution of retail liquor stores which would be exceedingly difficult — if not impossible — to do were the local unit — for example — the village. The desired goal of limiting liquor consumption would likewise be vastly facilitated by considering the county as the " political subdivision " rather than some smaller unit. This is particularly true in our State where our network of roads permits persons to travel easily and quickly from town to town, from village to village, and thus makes the unit for effective administrative control of liquor consumption an area larger than the town or village. The Legislature has chosen to make that subdivision the county in setting up local boards, and there is no sound reason for now adopting some other interpretation.
For these reasons we are unable to agree that it was arbitrary and unreasonable for the Authority to have denied the appellant's request. The survey made by the Authority had only recently revealed that the number of premises licensed to sell liquor in Nassau County was sufficient for the public convenience and advantage in that county. By permitting the transfer of the business of an already-licensed retailer within that county, and by refusing to license new retailers, the number of retailers was kept constant. So far as the appellant is concerned it is immaterial why the retailer was permitted to move from Bay-ville in Nassau County to Massapequa Park in Nassau County, so long as in denying his application the Authority acted within its legal competency. In view of the meaning of the words " political subdivision ", and because the action of the Authority— based upon a recently concluded survey of conditions in that county — does not in fact increase the number of retailers in Nassau County, the action taken by the Authority upon appellant's request cannot be said to have exceeded the limits of a reasonable exercise of the discretion vested in the Authority by the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law (§ 17, subd. 2), in refusing to increase the number of licensed retail liquor stores in Nassau County by permitting the appellant to open another store in that county. Our decision in Matter of Barry v. O'Connell (303 N. Y. 46) in no way diminishes the accuracy of this conclusion, for the precise issue in that case was whether or not the grounds set forth in the notice of disapproval of the appellant's application there were legally sufficient to support the determination reached. We held that they were not.
The order should be affirmed, with costs.