Case Name: J. M. Bedwell v. Burwell J. Thompson
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1860-10
Citations: 25 Supp. Tex. 247
Docket Number: 
Parties: J. M. Bedwell v. Burwell J. Thompson.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 25 Supp.
Pages: 247–252

Head Matter:
J. M. Bedwell v. Burwell J. Thompson.
Where the petition stated a good equity, upon which the ad interim injunc- ■ tion was granted, and the answer did not deny the facts, but only specially objected to the injunction, it was error to dissolve the injunction.
Where an injunction was sued out to restrain the negotiation of notes not due, it was error to dissolve the injunction, and to render a decree for the amount of the notes.
A suit to enjoin the negotiation of notes until the validity of the consideration could be tested at law, is not a suit to enjoin the "payment of money,” within the meaning of the 154th section of the act of 1846, to regulate proceedings in the District Court. (Paschal’s Dig., Art. 3935, Note 927.) And a judgment could not be rendered against the sureties.
Where the petition for an injunction stated a case which conduced to show fraud and failure of consideration, it was wrong to dissolve the injunction on special exceptions.
Where the petition stated facts upon which he averred a conclusion of law, in which the court does not concur, the legal deductions of the complainant will not be treated as the averment of a fact, by which he stated himself out of court.
Error from McLennan.—The case was tried before Hon. H. W. Battle, one of the district judges.
Bedwell sued Thompson, alleging that he purchased of Thompson six hundred and forty acres of land for $6,000, for which he paid $1,250 cash, and gave his notes for the balance in installments, to “B. J. Thompson or bearer;” that Thompson gave his warranty deed; and that there was an understanding that the cash payment of $1,250 was in consideration of the improvements. The purchaser was to take immediate possession. Thompson was to have the survey made to include one hundred acres of cleared land; that, the land being in litigation, Thompson was to prosecute the suit, and if lie lost he was to refund the $1,250, and to return the notes; and that the collection of the notes should be delayed until the final adjudication in the said case of Kelly and Kelly v. Allen, Taylor, and Barrett, and then not to be paid unless Thompson, through said suit, established the title under which he claimed: thus making the whole trade a contingent one, in parol. That Thompson had not surveyed the land; had not put him in possession of one hundred acres of improved land; that the litigation had hot been determined, and would not be for a long time; that he feared that Thompson would negotiate the notes; and therefore he prayed an injunction against the collection of the notes, or the negotiation of them, until the termination of the litigation. The court granted the ad interim injunction. The plaintiff executed his bond for $5,000, as ordered by the court. In an amended petition, the plaintiff stated that Thompson represented, at the time of negotiation, that the title which he sold did not conflict with the Galindo grant; that he had the only title; that Taylor and Barrett had no title under which to claim; and that, relying upon these representations and the parol agreement, he purchased; that these representations were false and fraudulent; that the land purchased does conflict with the Galindo grant; and that Barrett claims under this superior outstanding title; that Barrett had sued him, and he feared eviction; that he went into possession relying upon Thompson’s statements; that in the suit of Barrett against him, he called Thompson in to avouch for the value of his improvements made on the land in good faith; and, on condition, he tendered back the deed, and prayed for a recision of the contract, a restoration of his advanced payment, and perpetually to enjoin the notes. As the case seems to have turned upon the answer, which was intended tó be in the nature of exceptions, it is here given:
“ Defendant now comes only so far as allowed by law for the purposes, and saith: That the matters and things alleged and set out in plaintiff’s original and amended bill in this case are insufficient to allow him to have and maintain his said action in manner and form as pleaded and brought, and prays judgment of the court. And further, he saith, that said original and amended bill of plaintiff, in this cause filed, present, if true, which he denies, upon their face no good reason in equity or law why this court should interfere in his behalf. And specially it is objected that all parts of said bills which set up a contemporaneous, verbal, or parol agreement outside of the writings had in law; because the allegations of a failure to have survey of land made, and to put plaintiff in possession of one hundred acres of cleared land, is shown to be a verbal parol agreement, not included in the writings between parties; and because the allegations are not sufficiently specific; and because no injuries have or are likely to result to him from said failure of survey, or refusal to deliver said cleared land to said plaintiff; because the allegations are mainly fraudulent representations, and too vague and inadequate; and because it is not affirmatively stated in said amended bill, that plaintiff was not fully informed of the truth or untruth of all said representations by said defendant, Thompson, outside of anything Thompson said; or, in other words, it is not affirm atively stated in said -bills, or either of them, that said Bedwell, in said purchase, and at its date, relied solely upon the representations of said Thompson; because it does not affirmatively appear that there was any fraudulent concealment of any facts by Thompson relating to the title 1jp the land sold, and that all the sources of information were not equally open to said J. M. Bedwell at the time of sale as to said Thompson. And of these facts he prays judgment of the court; and upon dismissal of the bills he prays judgment against J. M. Bedwell for the full amount of the $2,000 note due upon the 1st day of January, A. D. 1857, and described in plaintiff’s petition, and his sureties in the said injunction bond, and ten per cent, damages thereon, and all cost of suit.”
The court dissolved the injunction and dismissed the bill, and rendered judgment against the plaintiff, and his sureties on the injunction bond for the amount of the notes enjoined.
Noiolin <f Herring, for plaintiff in error.—
That the court erred in dissolving the injunction and in dismissing the plaintiff’s original and amended petitions. The following authorities are submitted and relied upon:
2 Story’s Eq. Jur., § 906, p. 246, and authorities there cited; also § 901, p. 242; Cooper v. Singleton, 19 Tex., 260; Cook v. Jackson, 20 Tex., 210; Smith v. Nolen, 21 Tex., 497.
F. W. Chandler, for defendant in' error.
—There is no error in dissolving and dismissing the bill and amended bill of injunction, and giving judgment to appellee in the court below. (1 Tex., 158; 2 Tex., 137; 3 Tex., 152, 235; 4 Tex., 431; 7 Tex., 240; 10 Téx., 265, 291; 12 Tex., 195; 19 Tex., 291; 20 Tex., 164, 176, 209, 266.)

Opinion:
Wheeler, C. J.
—There is no foundation laid in the defendant's answer, either by averment, or admission of the plaintiff's allegations, to authorize the rendition of judgment in his favor. He does not admit, but denies the plaintiff's allegations, and does not allege any matter to entitle him to a recovery. Moreover, the cause of. action, if any, does not appear to have matured at the date of the rendition of judgment.
This was not a case in which the collection of money had been enjoined, within the meaning of the statute, (0. & W., Art. 1020;) and if judgment could have been legally rendered against the principal in the injunction bond, there was no authority of law to give judgment against the sureties. But the judgment is erroneous as to both principal and sureties, and must be reversed.
"Whether the court decided rightly in sustaining exceptions to the petition, is not wholly free from doubt. We incline to the opinion, however, that the petition 'is sufficient. It alleges substantially want of title in the defendant, and that there is a valid, subsisting, outstanding title in another, upon which suit has been instituted against the complainant; that, at the time of the purchase, the defendant falsely represented to the plaintiff that the land purchased by him did not conflict with that embraced by the. outstanding title; and that he purchased and went into possession in good faith, relying upon the defendant's representations. The question would have been free from doubt if he had averred a want of acquaintance with the lines of the surveys, or ignorance of the facts respecting which the alleged fraudulent representations were made, and that he was deceived by the representations, and induced thereby to make the purchase. But we incline to 'think the averment, that he relied upon the representations, must be taken to mean that he believed them to be true. If so, he, of course, was ignornt that they were false, and was deceived by them. We think the alleged fraud in the vendor, taken in connection with the other allegations to which we have adverted, sufficient to entitle the complainant to relief; and are therefore of opinion that the court erred in dismissing the petition.
The plaintiff might, perhaps, be deemed to have stated himself out of court by the averment, that the matters set up in his petition had been pleaded in the suit instituted against him upon the outstanding title, and that they can all be adjudicated in that suit, if we were at liberty to consider this as an allegation of fact. But the latter averment is manifestly a conclusion of law, in which we do not concur, and do not, therefore,' think it affords a ground for dismissing this suit.
We are of opinion that the judgment be reversed and the cause
Remanded.