Case Name: PEOPLE v. HARBER
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1905-01-06
Citations: 91 N.Y.S. 571
Docket Number: 
Parties: PEOPLE v. HARBER.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 91
Pages: 571–576

Head Matter:
(100 App. Div. 317)
PEOPLE v. HARBER.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
January 6, 1905.)
1. Criminal Law—Discharge of Prisoner on His Recognizance—Revocation—Trial—Conviction—Jurisdiction.
Where the record on appeal showed that when defendant was arraigned before the Court of Special Sessions he was discharged on his own recognizance, and that thereafter the order was revoked, and trial and conviction had, and it did not appear that before trial there was any investigation of the charge, no irregularity appeared, since, even if there was no authority to discharge, the order had not the effect of an acquittal, and, if the revocation of the order was unauthorized, nevertheless, the defendant being before the court, it had jurisdiction.
Hatch and Laughlin, JJ., dissenting.
Appeal from Court of Special Session».
Jacob Harber was convicted of petit larceny, and he appeals.
Affirmed.
Argued before VAN BRUNT, P. J., and HATCH, PATTERSON, INGRAHAM, and LAUGHEIN, JJ.
Isidore Cohn, for appellant.
Edward Sanford, for the People.

Opinion:
INGRAHAM, J.
The record states that the defendant was, on February 16, 1901, arrested, and' charged with the crime of larceny from the person; that on February 17th he was arraigned before a city magistrate; that he pleaded not guilty, and was held for trial at a Court of Special Sessions; that he was arraigned before the Court of Special Sessions, and discharged on his own recognizance; that on April 5, 1904, he was tried for the crime before the Childrens' Part of the Court of Special Sessions, and was convicted, and, after a motion to set aside the judgment and for a new trial and for an arrest' of judgment and for a trial by a full bench was made, he was committed to the House of Refuge. When the case came on for trial before the Childrens' Part of the Court of Special Sessions, counsel for the defendant stated that if the court found, when he was first arrested, that the defendant was too young to be tried, he did not think that the court could reopen the case, whereupon the court stated that the defendant was discharged upon his own recognizance, and subsequently brought back for trial. No other ruling was made, and no exception was taken. The .defendant then pleaded not guilty. The evidence for the prosecution having been taken, there was no evidence offered for the defendant, and the court found the defendant guilty. By the judgment it appeared that on February 19, 1901, before the Court of-Special Sessions, the defendant was discharged on his dwn recognizance; that on April 5, 1904, the order discharging the defendant was' revoked, and the defendant was placed on trial, and on the 5th of April, 1904, was convicted, and committed to the House of Refuge. There is-no other record as to the proceeding before the Court of Special Sessions when the defendant was first arrested and arraigned before it. I think we must assume from this record that the defendant was not tried when first arraigned in 1901, and that no disposition was then' made of the charge against him. A discharge upon a prisoner's own recognizance is nothing more than an admission to bail without surety. There is nothing tó show that there was any investigation as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, or any adjudication that he should not be tried for the crime charged. If, upon his being brought before the court for trial, for any reason he was not tried, and was then admitted to bail, there was certainly nothing to prevent the court before whom the charge was pending from calling upon the prisoner at any time to appear for trial, and, in case of his failure to appear, rearresting him, and then disposing of the charge against him. When the defendant was brought before the Court of Special Sessions, consisting of three judges, the order discharging him upon his own recognizance was revoked. But, assuming that the court had no jurisdiction to revoke that order, the defendant was then before the court, charged with the crime, and it seems to me that the court had jurisdiction to try -him, and render judgment if his-, guilt was proved. Assuming that the court had no-authority to discharge the prisoner upon his own. recognizance, the effect of that order was not an acquittal. There is nothing in the record to show that when the defendant was discharged upon his own recognizance the case was not adjourned to a subsequent day, nor did the prisoner make such a claim when he was arraigned for trial.
To reverse this judgment we must assume irregularity, which was neither claimed nor proved before the trial court, and, as the defendant was proved guilty of the charge, I think the conviction should be affirmed.
VAN BRUNT, P. J., and PATTERSON, J., concur.