Case Name: Marsh et al. v. Ne-ha-sa-ne Park Ass'n
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1898-01-12
Citations: 49 N.Y.S. 384
Docket Number: 
Parties: MARSH et al. v. NE-HA-SA-NE PARK ASS’N.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 49
Pages: 384–396

Head Matter:
(25 App. Div. 34.)
MARSH et al. v. NE-HA-SA-NE PARK ASS’N.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.
January 12, 1898.)
1. Evidence—Declarations—Title.
Declarations of the owner of land that he had sold it are Inadmissible to defeat his title thereto, or that of his descendants or their grantees, derived through him.
2. Same—Lost Deed—Secondary Evidence.
A lost deed to land cannot be proved by the mere declarations of the deceased owner of the land, contained in letters and memoranda left by him, that he had sold the land; such lost deed not being accounted for.
3. Boundaries—Evidence.
Letters and memoranda left by a deceased owner of land, to the effect that he had sold certain portions of the land, are not competent evidence, as explanatory of the boundary of the land Intended to be conveyed by the several descendants of deceased by quitclaim deeds, in which they conveyed “whatever the deceased owned, or may have owned, on the northeast quarter of township 38 at the time of his death.”
4. Tax Sale—Jurisdictional Defects—Tax Deeds—Curative Acts.
Where a tract of vacant land, assessed as a whole, was sold to the state in 1843 for the taxes of 1836, 1837, 1838, and 1839, and the taxes on a poriion of the land had been paid for 1836 and 1837, and the comptroller’s deed dated, November 4, 1845, was duly recorded in the office of the secretary of state, the irregularity in the tax sale, not being jurisdictional, is erred (unless it has been seasonably attacked) by Laws 1885, c. 448, and Laws 1893, c. 711, providing that all tax deeds theretofore executed, which have been recorded for two years, shall be conclusive evidence that the sale and proceedings prior thereto were regular.
5. Tax Deed—Uncertain Description.
A comptroller’s tax deed to the state, which excepted from the grant “250 acres in the northeast corner of the northeast quarter” of a certain township, is not void on its face, for uncertainty of description.
6. Same—How Construed.
The exception of land in a tax deed should be construed favorably to the owner, and the excepted land should be located, if possible, qnd in a manner as favorable as possible to the owner.
Putnam, J., dissenting.
Appeal from trial term, Fulton county.
Action by Lelia E. Marsh and another against the He-ha-sa-ne Park Association to recover possession of a certain tract of real estate. Judgment for plaintiffs. (42 H. T. 8upp. 996.) Defendant appeals.
Reversed.
Argued before PARKER, P. J., and LAHDOH, HERRICK, PUT-HAM, and MERWIH. JJ.
Charles E. Snyder, for appellant.
Frank E. Smith, for respondents.

Opinion:
LANDON, J.
I agree with Mr. Justice PUTNAM that the plaintiffs proved a paper title to ñve-sixths of the lands described in the complaint, under the patent to Alexander Macomb of 1787. But I think that such title was devested by the comptroller's deed to the state under the tax sale of 1843, for the reason that chapter 448, Laws 1885, and chapter 711, Laws 1893, limited the time in which the presumptive evidence of the validity of the title given by that deed to the state could be controverted, and, that time having expired before this action was commenced, the deed has become conclusive evidence of the validity of the title thereby conveyed to the state. Such, I think, is the effect we must give to the statutes of 1885 and 1893, under the authority of People v. Turner, 145 N. Y. 451, 40 N. E. 400, affirmed by the United States supreme court (Oct. term, 1897) 18 Sup. Ct. 38. The comptroller's deed is dated November 4, 1845, and was recorded in the office of the secretary of state. September 27, 1855, the people of the state, by letters patent, conveyed the premises to the Backet Harbor & Saratoga Railroad Company. The defendant is the grantee of the said railroad company's grantees, by deeds duly recorded more than two years before the commencement of this action. The comptroller's sale was made in 1843, and was irregular, and could have been vacated, if it had been seasonably attacked. Prior to the statute of 1885, the comptroller's deed was only presumptive evidence of the regularity, and consequently of the validity, of the sale. Laws 1855, c. 427, § 65. The return to the comptroller of the unpaid taxes for the years 1836, 1837, 1838, and 1839 shows the assessment to have been upon the entire township No. 38, containing 20,000 acres, except certain designated parts thereof, which either were not embraced in the assessment, or upon which the taxes had been paid. Among the excepted parcels for the years 1836-37 was the N. E. £ (5,000 acres), which quarter embraces the locus in quo, upon which the taxes for 1836-37 were paid before return was made to the comptroller. But the taxes upon the N. E. £ for the years 1838-39 were unpaid, and the comptroller, therefore, had the right to sell the quarter. But as the township was wild forest land, with no visible allotments into the respective parcels of the several owners thereof, the N. E. parcel was taxed as part of the larger parcel, from which it was not visibly separated. This was permissible. Upon other portions of the larger parcel the taxes of 1836-37. were unpaid, and also the taxes for 1838-39. The comptroller sold the larger parcel, embracing the N. E. }, and thus the locus in quo, for all the unpaid taxes for the years 1836, 1837, 1838, and 1839. Under the laws then existing, the owner of the N. E. \ could not have redeemed it by paying the amount properly chargeable upon it, but he would have been obliged to pay the proportion of the unpaid taxes upon all the parcels which his acreage bore to the whole acreage; and, as that amount was increased by the taxes of 1836-37 upon the other parcels, the owner of the land would have been obliged to pay more than he owed. The sale, therefore, was invalid; and, no doubt, it would have been so held, if it had been seasonably attacked. People v. Hagadorn, 104 N. Y. 516, 10 N. E. 891.
Section 12, c. 711, Laws 1893, is as follows:
"Effect of Former Deeds. Every such conveyance heretofore executed by the comptroller, county treasurer or county judge, and all conveyances of the same lands by his grantee or grantees therein named, which have for two years been recorded in the office of the clerk of the county in which the lands conveyed thereby are located, and all outstanding certificates of a tax sale heretofore held by the comptroller, that shall have remained in force for two years after the last day allowed by law for redemption from such sale, shall be conclusive evidence that the sale and proceedings prior thereto, from and including the assessment of the lands, and all notices required by law to. be given previous to the expiration of the time allowed for redemption, were regular and regularly given, published and served according to the provisions of all laws directing and requiring the same or in any manner relating thereto, but all such conveyances and certificates, and the taxes and tax values on which they are based, shall be subject to cancellation on direct application to the comptroller, or in an action brought before a competent court therefor by reason of the payment of such taxes, or by reason of the levying of such taxes by a town or ward having no legal right to assess the land on which they are laid, or by reason of any defect in the proceedings affecting the jurisdiction upon constitutional grounds."
Every objection urged in this case to the validity of the comptroller's sale of 1843 is covered by the terms of this statute. The state was the purchaser at that sale, and, if the comptroller could have canceled the sale, the owner had his opportunity to have his day in court before that officer. The distinction between the case where the state is the purchaser, and where an individual is the purchaser, is stated by the court of appeals in the Turner Case, and referred to as unimportant in the opinion in the supreme court of the United States in the same case. Referring to the case of People v. Roberts, 151 N. Y. 540, 45 N. E. 941, since the owner had his opportunity to seek his remedy in the supreme court, whether he had one before the comptroller or not. The answer to the plaintiffs' contention that it is sought to deprive them of their property without due process of law is that the state gave them, or their grantor, the opportunity to protect their land by due process of law, and they would not resort to it. But can a person, upon whose estate an unlawful charge has been placed, be put to the cost and trouble of a proceeding to remove the charge, under peril of losing his estate? Yes. When danger threatens, we must resort to whatever measures are needful to avert it, or abide its perils. The state must collect its taxes; it may make mistakes in doing so; and it is not unreasonable, especially in respect to unoccupied lands, that the owners of such lands should be charged with the burden of showing the mistake within a reasonable time. In such case the land is taxed, not the owner; the owner knows his land is subject to taxation, and that he must protect it from sale, or lose it. If the owner had been in possession of the lands, then I think it quite probable that a different rule would apply, for the reason that statutes of limitation do not give validity to bad or imperfect' titles, as against a possessor who is not given notice to defend against them until after the limitation has expired. They are shields for the defense of the pos sessor, not weapons for Ms eviction. Joslyn v. Pulver, 59 Hun, 129, 13 N. Y. Supp. 311, affirmed Joslyn v. Rockwell, 128 N. Y. 334, 28 N. E. 604. But, when he is out of possession, non constat but that he is out because he has no right to be in; and hence there is no apparent reason why, when he is absent and silent during all the • time the statute allows him to protect his title against the proceeding of the state to confiscate it, he should not be held to have abandoned it, or to have admitted the right of the state to devest him of it.
There is in tMs case no constitutional question respecting the imposition of the taxes. There is no constitutional provision respecting any particular procedure to be pursued by the comptroller in selling lands upon the nonpayment of taxes thereon. There is none in respect to redemption. TMs sale was not upon account of the taxes wMch had been paid, but for the unpaid taxes. I concede that, if the sale had been upon account of the taxes for 1836-37 wMch had been paid, the sale would have been void, beyond the power of any statute to cure or validate it. The purpose of these "statutes is to collect unpaid taxes, and, if the taxes have been paid, the statutes do not apply. If the comptroller should make a sale, it would not be for unpaid taxes; and he has no jurisdiction to sell, and can be given none to make a tax sale, when there is no tax unpaid. Calling it a tax sale would not make it such. I doubt whether the statute quoted declares that the comptroller's deed is evidence that the tax had not been paid. But, if it does so declare, I tMnk the fact may be shown to be otherwise, upon the same principle that you may attack a judgment by proving that no summons was served, or jurisdiction otherwise acquired. The same rule should apply if the tax was unconstitutionally laid, because a constitutional tax, and its nonpayment, lie at the foundation of the power to sell;' and you cannot, in such cases, by a subsequent statute, give jurisdiction nunc pro tunc, so as to supply the original lack of it, however it may be with a curative statute, that still preserves for a reasonable time, before another forum, ihe party's constitutional rights. Of course, these questions are not before us. I refer to them in the hope that they serve to make my meaning clearer upon the question that is before us. But the taxes for 1838-39 were not paid, and the sale was for such unpaid taxes. The comptroller had jurisdiction to make that sale, and ought to have observed the statutory regulations then in force. He made the sale, and it is now challenged because he did not observe the statutory regulations, but disregarded them, by selling this land in a parcel, wMch embraced other lands upon which the taxes for four years (1836, 1837, 1838, and 1839) were unpaid. Thus, the form and manner of the sale are now attacked. That means that the comptroller, in maMng the sale, abused Ms jurisdiction as to form and manner, or erred in exercising it,—nothing more. The unpaid taxes were like a judgment, and the comptroller's sale is like a sheriff's sale upon execution, which may be vacated, if not made in proper form and manner. But the owner, like the judgment debtor, may waive the irregularities. Neither can get rid of tax or judgment, except by paying it; and it may not be worth his while to take the trouble to move, when the successful result of his motion will still leave tax or judgment unsatisfied. It is obvious that these irregularities are not jurisdictional, in the sense that they lie at the foundation of the comptroller's power to sell, or that they take it away from him altogether, but only in the sense that his power to sell in this form and manner may be challenged, and such sale set aside. Ensign v. Barse, 107 N. Y. 329, 14 N. E. 400, and 15 N. E. 401. This is very different from a sale where there are no taxes unpaid. The one cannot be made at all, and the other ought to be made in due form and manner. The one cannot be cured, the other ought to be; and after a reasonable lapse of time it should be regarded as cured, if the owner, meantime, makes no Objection. It is proper to have evidence of this waiver, and this the comptroller's deed, two years after its record, affords. In this case the time allowed for the owner to complain expired, and the owner did nothing. The statutes declare, in effect, that his day has gone by, and that the comptroller's deed is therefore conclusive evidence of the material facts which the plaintiffs now seek to controvert.
I do not think the comptroller's deed to the state was void on its face for uncertainty of description. The alleged uncertainty is in regard to the land excepted from the grant, namely, "250 acres in the northeast corner of the northeast quarter." Suppose the exception void for uncertainty; then there is no exception from the grant. But the exception in a tax title should be construed most favorably to the owner, since no more land should be sold than is necessary, and the excepted land should be located, if possible, and in a manner as favorable as possible to the owner. The corner is a base point from which two sides of the land excepted can extend an equal distance along the intersecting boundaries, so as to include, by parallel lines, the 250 acres. Jackson v. Vickory, 1 Wend. 407; Dolan v. Trelevan, 31 Wis. 147; Bowers v. Chambers, 53 Miss. 259; Doe v. Clayton, 81 Ala. 391, 2 South. 24. I think this location was intended, and should be adopted.
As to the exception from the comptroller's deed of lots 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, and 9 in Gorton's tract, the deed is not void on its face for lack of certain description. The uncertainty arises from the lack of extrinsic evidence locating the tract and the lots. The defendant did not need to furnish it. The action is ejectment, and plaintiffs must show title to the lots before defendant could be put to its proof. If plaintiffs had shown such title, they would have shown the certainty of the description. I advise a reversal.
All concur, except PUTNAM, J., dissenting.