Case Name: LENA THORP, Appellant, v. GEORGE W. THORP, Respondent
Court: North Dakota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: North Dakota
Decision Date: 1920-11-01
Citations: 46 N.D. 113
Docket Number: 
Parties: LENA THORP, Appellant, v. GEORGE W. THORP, Respondent.
Judges: Birdzell and Grace, JJ., concur.
Reporter: North Dakota Reports
Volume: 46
Pages: 113–125

Head Matter:
LENA THORP, Appellant, v. GEORGE W. THORP, Respondent.
(180 N. W. 26.)
Divorce — order forbidding mother awarded minor child from associating with certain person reversed.
In 1915 there was duly entered in this case a judgment dissolving the mar riage between the plaintiff and the defendant and awarding to the plaintiff a liberal alimony, giving to her the custody of the minor child and making for its future support a special and generous allowance of $500 a year for twenty years.
In 1919 the court made an order forbidding the plaintiff to move from her residence into an apartment house and from permitting the child to go in company with Mrs. Grant, a teacher in the public schools, and a lady of the highest repute. Held, that there is no sufficient reason for the order and it is reversed.
Opinion filed November 1, 1920.
Appeal from an order of the District Court of Stutsman County; Honorable J. A. Coffey, Judge.
Order reversed.
John W. Carr and S. E. Ellsworth, for appellant.
“A defendant in a civil action is not entitled to the provisional remedy by injunction. This remedy is entirely a creature of statute, and is awarded only to the plaintiff in a proper action. Forman v. Healy, 11 N. D. 563, 63 N. W. 866.
“A court of equity will refuse to grant an injunction where circumstances are such that the, injunction cannot be enforced by the court, or where such enforcement will require a continuous supervision on the part of the court.” 22 Cyc. 781.
“A court of equity ought not to attempt to do by injunction anything that will not be possible by enforcement.” McConnell v. Arkansas Brick Mfg. Co. (Ark.) .69 S. W. 559.
“A mandatory injunction will never be granted where its enforcement will require too great an amount of supervision by the court.” McCabe v. Watt (Pa.) 73 Atl. 455; Hawley v. Burk, 134 111. App. "96; Miller v. Edison El. Co. 73 N. T. Supp. 376.
Engerud, Divet, Holt, & Frame, for respondent.
When it appears that the thing done was something that ought to be done we apprehend that technical objections to the procedure will not be permitted to defeat the accomplishment of substantial justice; and if there are any procedural defects they can be easily remedied. Houghton v. Houghton (S. D.) 157 N. W. 316; Arne v. Holland (Minn.) 89 N. W. 3.
The courts have recognized the propriety of safe-guarding children from exposure to influences tending to impair the affection or loyalty of the children to a parent. Albertus v. Albertos (Iowa) 160 N. W. 830; Ladd v. Ladd (Iowa) 176 N. W. 211; Dimmitt v. Dimmitt (Mo.) 150 S. W. 1111; Copeland v. Copeland (Oída.) L.E.A.1917B, 287, 290 and annotations.
The strict principles of res ad judicata do not apply to provisions of a divorce respecting the custody of children. Houghton v. Houghton (S. D.) 157 N. W. 316; People ex rel. v. Allen, 40 Hun, 611, affirmed in 105 N. T. 628; State v. Dist. Court (Mont.) 128 Pac. 590; Stone v. Stone (Ind.) 64 N. E. 86; Oliver v. Oliver (Mass.) 24 N. E. 51; Harlan v. Harlan (Cal.) 98 Pac. 32.
If the child were competent to testify, we were not informed as to what she would testify to, and the exclusion of testimony is never reversible error unless by an offer of proof it is shown to be competent and material and its exclusion prejudicial. Smith v. Barnes Co. 32 N. D. 4; State v. Schonberg, 24 N. D. 532.

Opinion:
Robinson, J.
In 1915 there was duly entered in this case a judgment dissolving the marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant and awarding to the plaintiff a liberal alimony and the custody of her minor child, Margaret Thorp, whose age was then six years. In April, 1919, the court made an order forbidding the plaintiff to remove from her residence to an apartment house over a pool room in Jamestown, and from permitting the child to associate with one Mary Grant, except when in the company of her mother. From that order the plaintiff appeals. The order is made on the judgment roll and on the affidavit of defendant. It avers that the plaintiff continuously and against the best interests of the child permits her to be in the company of Mary Grant, who is imbued with a hatred of the defendant; that the purpose of the plaintiff is to remove the child from her commodious home into a certain building owned by Mary Grant and to place the child in a flat over a pool room frequented by men who stand around the entrance to the room and often use vile language; that in using the flat and passing in and out of it the child would hear bad language; and defendant fears that an association of the child with Mary Grant may estrange it from her father.
Lena Thorp, the plaintiff, makes affidavit that during the life of tbe child she has at all times taken the utmost care of her and has ever been watchful of her mental and physical development; that the welfare of the child has always been her first consideration. The plaintiff also shows good reason for leaving her home and moving into the flat and avers that it is one of the most desirable flats in Jamestown; that it is within three blocks of the public school; that one of the flats in the building is the residence of Mary Grant and her husband and that she, Mrs. Grant, is one of the teachers in the public schools of Jamestown, where she has been teaching for eighteen years; that she is an educated and refined woman whose moral character is above suspicion; that the pool room is a clean, sanitary place and well conducted; and that the plaintiff has never heard Mrs. Grant speak ill of defendant or say a thing of him in the presence of the child. Her affidavit is well corroborated by that of Mrs. Grant.
In the order, as formulated, the learned judge says, in effect, that the order is granted not only on the affidavits but also on his own personal knowledge of the situation and circumstances affecting the relation of the parties, etc. That is in no way proper. If the judge had knowledge of material facts on which to base a decision, he should have stated the same by certificate or affidavit, so that a reviewing court might consider the same.
On the facts, as disclosed by the affidavits, no good reason is shown for interfering with the plaintiff's custody of the child or her right to remove her residence to a desirable flat, nor for any order in regard to the association of the child with Mrs. Grant. Defendant had no reason for thinking or suspecting that a lady of good character and high repute would think of doing the child so great an injury as to say a word to lessen her pride of birth and her love for a father who has made for her ample and generous provisions.
It appears, however, that more than a year has elapsed since the making of the order appealed from, and that portion of the order which restrains the plaintiff from removing to the fiat over the pool room is moot. Judge Birdzell is of the opinion that that portion of the order should be affirmed and hence disagrees to this extent with the opinion of the writer. But he is further of the opinion, in accord with the views of the writer, that upon this record there does not appear to be sufficient reason for prohibiting ordinary communication between, the child and Mrs. Grant. The decision of this court is that the order appealed from is reversed in so far as it relates to Mrs. Grant, with costs to the appellant.
Birdzell and Grace, JJ., concur.