Case Name: Thomas Lee STEPHENS, Appellant, v. Lois Marie STEPHENS, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1981-08-17
Citations: 402 So. 2d 1301
Docket Number: No. PP-405
Parties: Thomas Lee STEPHENS, Appellant, v. Lois Marie STEPHENS, Appellee.
Judges: MILLS, J., and OWEN, WILLIAM C. Jr. (Retired), Associate Judge, concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 402
Pages: 1301–1303

Head Matter:
Thomas Lee STEPHENS, Appellant, v. Lois Marie STEPHENS, Appellee.
No. PP-405.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Aug. 17, 1981.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 29, 1981.
David C. Goodman, Jacksonville, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen. and Bruce D. Barkett, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
The husband appeals the trial court's order, entered in a uniform reciprocal enforcement of support action (URESA), modifying the support payments awarded in the original divorce decree. We reverse.
On January 6, 1975, the Circuit Court for Duval County rendered a final judgment dissolving the marriage between the parties and ordering the husband to pay $25.00 each week in support payments. On April 10, 1975, the trial court entered an order staying the payment of support. On April 7, 1976, the wife, appellee, then living in Maryland, filed a petition under that state's uniform act. The cause was then transferred to the Circuit Court for Duval County where the trial court entered a final order requiring the husband to pay $20.00 each week in support payments. The husband filed a motion to stay and vacate the final order in which he asserted the trial court lacked jurisdiction to establish support payments in the URESA action. The trial court denied the motion and the husband appealed.
In Ray v. Pentlicki, 375 So.2d 875 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979), the court considered a similar case in which two separate proceedings, a post-judgment modification and a URESA action, were pending before different judges of the same circuit. The modification proceeding resulted in a suspension of support payments. The husband then moved to suspend a payment order rendered in the URESA action which the trial court denied. The Second District Court of Appeal reversed the cause holding the URESA action was circumscribed by the order entered in the dissolution of marriage proceeding.
We agree with the result in Ray. Section 88.281, Florida Statutes (1975), provides that "[a]ny order of support issued by a court of this state when acting as a responding state shall not supersede any previous order of support issued in a dissolution of marriage for separate maintenance action . " See also Cochran v. Cochran, 263 So.2d 292 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972). Although the statute is broad enough to permit a responding court in a URESA action to initially determine the duty of support, this is not permitted when there is a previous order establishing support in the underlying dissolution of marriage proceeding. Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying the motion to vacate. Therefore, the case is reversed and the cause remanded with instructions to the trial court to enter an order vacating the final support order rendered on July 26, 1976.
MILLS, J., and OWEN, WILLIAM C. Jr. (Retired), Associate Judge, concur.
WENTWORTH, J., dissents with opinion.
. The fact that the trial court has stayed the support order has no bearing on our analysis of this issue.