Case Name: Moore v. State
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1925-04-06
Citations: 138 Miss. 116
Docket Number: No. 24764
Parties: Moore v. State.
Judges: Holden, J., concurring.
Reporter: Mississippi Reports
Volume: 138
Pages: 116–195

Head Matter:
Moore v. State.
(En Banc.
April 6, 1925.)
[103 So. 483.
No. 24764.]
1. Searches and Seizures. Constitution held to prohibit only unreasonable searches and seizures.
Section 23 of the Mississippi Constitution, which provides that, “The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, and possessions, from unreasonable seizure or search; and no warrant shall be issued without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, specially designating the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized,” does not prohibit all searches and seizures nor require a warrant in all cases 'therefor. It prohibits only unreasonable searches and seizures.
2. Searches and Seizures. Reasonableness of search or seizure is judicial question for court in each case.
The reasonableness of a search or seizure is a judicial question to be determined by the court in each case, talcing into consideration the place searched, the thing seized, the purpose for, and the circumstances under which the search or seizure was made, and the presence or absence of probable cause therefor.
3. Searches and Seizures. Search of automobile or boat for intoxicating liquor without warrant is not unreasonable.
Because of the ease with which vehicles and boats can be moved beyond reach, a search thereof without a warrant, for intoxicating liquor being transported therein, the possession and transportation of which is unlawful, is not unreasonable, provided the search is made on probable cause. Consequently, such a search or seizure is not prohibited by section 23 of the Mississippi Constitution, and section 2, chapter 244, Laws of 1924, which provides therefor, is valid.
4. Intoxicatino Liquors. Belief, based on information by credible person, that intoxicating liquor is being transported in automobile, is sufficient to justify search without warrant.
Belief by a police officer, based on information given him by a credible person, that intoxicating liquor is being transported in an automobile, is sufficient probable cause to justify a search by him of the automobile without a warrant therefor under section 2, chapter 244, Laws of 1924.
Ethridge and Anderson, JJ., dissenting.
Appeal from circuit court of Hinds county.
Hon. W. H. Potter, Judge.
Donovan Moore was convicted of possession of intoxicating liquor, and he appeals.
Affirmed.
G. L. Teat and Geo. S. Hamilton, for appellant.
This case presents squarely to the court for decision two questions: (1) Whether the search and seizure was lawful or unlawful. (2) If unlawful, 'whether the evidence so obtained was admissible or inadmissible.
I. It is appellant’s contention that the search and seizure was in violation of section 23, Constitution of Mississippi, and was, therefore, illegal, because made wthout a search warrant. To determine whether the search and seizure was lawful or unlawful it is necessary to consider the meaning of the word “unreasonable” as used in the Constitution with reference to search and seizure. To fully appreciate what the common law was, it is necessary to consider to some extent the history of its development. There must have been a very definite idea in the minds of the framers of the Constitution when they used the word “unreasonable” for it is found in most of the Constitutions.
“The history of this amendment is given with particularity in the opinion of Mr. Justice Bradley, speaking for the court in Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 29 L. Ed. 746, 6 Sup. Ct. Pep. 524. As was there shown, it took its origin in the determination of the framers of the Amendments to the Federal Constitution to provide for that instrument a bill of rights, securing to the American people, among other things, those safeguards which had grown up in England to protect the people from unreasonable searches and seizures, such as were permitted under .the general warrants issued under authority of the government, by which there had been invasions of the home and privacy of the citizens, and the seizure of their private papers in support of charges, real or imaginary, made against them. Such practices had, also, received sanction under warrants and seizures under the so-called writs of assistance, issued in the American colonies. See 2 Watson, Const. 1414 et seq. Resistance to these practices had established the principle which was enacted into the fundamental law in the Fourth Amendment, that a man’s house was his castle, and not to be invaded by any general authority to search and seize his goods and papers.” See, also, Weeks v. U. S., 56 L. Ed. 652, 232 II. S. 383.
At common law no power existed to make a search without a warrant. People v. Case, 27 A. L. R. 686; State v. Welch, 79 Me. 99, 8 Atl. 348; Be Swan, 150 II. S. 637, 27 L. Ed. 1207, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 225.
It was the determination of the people to confine searches and seizures to special warrants and to prohibit all other searches and seizures. It is the contention of counsel for the state that only unreasonable searches and seizures were prohibited, and that if there is probable cause for search and seizure, then the search and seizure is reasonable. But, how can the existence of “probable cause” alone make the search and seizure reasonable? What becomes of the requirement “supported by oath or affirmation,” and the “warrant,” and “specially designating” etc? A search within the meaning of the Constitution is unreasonable unless all the requirements set forth in the Constitution are complied with. In this case now before this court, the search and seizure was made by policemen without any warrant of any kind whatever. See State v. Kees, 27 A. L. R. 681, 114 S. E. (W. Ya.) 617.
“In order to fully comprehend the full, true import and meaning of the restriction of the provision in the Constitution, it is necessary to follow the course of history with reference to searches and seizures in England and the American colonies, and the evils practised and the efforts made to curb unbridled police action until such efforts crystallized in the provisions in American Constitutions limiting power under warrants, or under legslative authority, or assumed police power, to make searches and seizures.” Wiest, J., dissenting, People v. Case, 27 A. L. R. 686, 220 Mich. 379, 190 N. W. 289; State v. Marcchausen, 3 A. L. R. 1505, 171 (Mich.) N. W. 557; State v. Peterson, 13 A. L. R. 1284, 194 (Wyo.) .Pac. 342.
In this case now before the court the search and seizure cannot be justified on the ground that it was incident to a lawful arrest. None of the grounds for arrest without warrant, set forth in the brief for the state apply here, because this case is not a felony, and not an indictable offense committed, not a breach of the peace threatened in the presence of an officer, within the meaning’ of the law. The officer did not see or smell the liquor or know it was there by the exercise of his senses. It was only by the illegal search that the offense was discovered. This case is a misdemeanor only.
Counsel for the state attempts to justify the search and seizure on the ground that probable cause existed. If probable cause alone is sufficient to justify search and seizure without warrant, no distinction can be made between the search of an automobile and the search of houses. The same probable cause can exist with reference to one as to the other; there can be no-distinction. If automobiles can be searched upon probable cause, without a warrant, then persons and houses can equally be searched. The Constitution makes no distinction. It covers persons, houses and possessions. Falkner v. State, 98 So. 691.
Some of the cases cited by counsel for the state seem to indicate that the word “unreasonable” in search and seizure refers to the manner in which the search is made. If the conduct of the officer is making the search is to determine whether the search is reasonable or unreasonable, then the search of persons and houses as well as automobiles can be made whenever his conduct is considered reasonable.
There is and can be no distinction between the search of automobiles on the one hand and of persons and houses on the other, if by reasonable search is meant either the existence of probable cause or the manner in which the search is made. The Constitution applies to all alike.
What then does “unreasonable” mean as used in our Constitution? “It ought not to be necessary to recall the fact that it is the essence of a free government that the individual shall be secure in his person, his home, and his property from unlawful invasion, from unlawful search, from unlawful seizure. The writing of these provisions into the Federal Constitution, into every Constitution of every state in the Union, was not an idle ceremony. With a clearness of vision our forefathers provided for a lawful search and seizure, one supported by oath or affirmation, describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized, and in the same section safeguarded the rights of the individual by inhibiting unreasonable and unlawful search. They provided an orderly manner for search and seizure, and prohibited all others. ’ ’ State v. Marxhausen, 3 A. L. it. 1507, 171 (Mich.) N. W. 557.
II. Assuming that the search and seizure in this case now before the court was unlawful, the other remaining question presented is whether the evidence so obtained was admissible or inadmissible. This question involves the constitutional provision discussed above, section 23, against unreasonable search and seizure, and in addition section 26 of the Constitution against compelling a person to give evidence against himself. These two provisions must be interpreted together.
In support of the proposition that the evidence secured by unlawful search and seizure is inadmissible, there is a long line of decisions. First and foremost as authority in this state is the decision of this court in the case of Tucker v. State, 128 Miss. 211, 90 So. 845, and the following cases decided by this court subsequently: Hill v. State, 129 Mass. 445, 92 So. 578; Williams v. State, 129 Miss. 469, 92 So. 584; Butler v. State, 129 Miss. 778, 93 So. 3 (Automobile); Taylor v. State, 129 Miss. 815, 93 So. 355;'State v. Patterson, 95 So. 96; Owens v. State, 98 So. 233; Smith v. State, 98 So. 344; Regnall v. State, 98 So. 444; Taylor v. State, 98 So. 459; Falkner v. State, supra; City of Jackson v. Howard, 99 So. 497 ;.Vaughn-y. State, 101 So. 439 (Automobile).
Nest in line of importance are the following cases decided by the supreme court of the United States: Boyd v. U. S., 116 U. S. 616/29 L. Ed. 746; Weeks v. U. S., 232 U. S. 383, 58 L. Ed. 652; Silverthorn Lbr. Co. v. U. S., 251 U. S. 385, 64 L. Ed. 319; Gouled v. U. S., 255 U. SI 298, 65 L. Ed. 649; Amos v. U. S., 255 U. S. 313, 65 L. Ed. 654; Re Jackson, 24 L. Ed. 877.
In addition, there is a long list of authorities on page 1417 in a note in 25 A. L. R. 1408, under the statement that: “There are numerous modern cases holding that evidence obtained by an illegal search and seizure by the government is not admissible against the accused in a criminal case.”
The following are some very late cases on the- subject: Batts v. State (Ind. 1924), 144 N. E. 23; in which an automobile was stopped and searched without warrant and liquor found and the occupant arrested. The court held that unlawful search for liquor does not became lawful because liquor is found, and that the evidence thus se cured is inadmissible. Callender v. Slate (Ind. 1923), 138 N. E. 817; search for liquor under invalid search warrant, evidence inadmissible. Ash v. Commomuealth (Ky. 1922), 236 S. E. 1032; evidence in regard to liquor found by unlawful search inadmissible. Simmons v. Commonwealth (Ky. 1924), 262 S. W. 972; evidence secured by illegal search incompetent. Adhins v. Commonwealth (Ky. 1923), 259 S. W. 32; officer stopped and searched automobile without search warrant and found liquor, evidence incompetent. Hilton v. Commonwealth, 243 S. W. 918; officer had no right to stop and search for liquor without warrant, evidence incompetent. State ex rel. Sadler v. Hist. Court, etc. (Mont. 1924), 225 Pac. 100; liquor found in grip by unlawful arrest, evidence incompetent. Thomas v. State (Oída. 1923), 220 Pac. 976; evidence of liquor obtained by unlawful search inadmissible. State v. Warfield (Wis. 1924), 198 N. W. 854; evidence of liquor found by unlawful arrest inadmissible. See, also, ü. S. Fidelity Guaranty Co. v. State to use of Hardy, 121 Miss. 369, 83 So. 610; in regard to unlawful search of suitcase without warrant.
The finest discussions that I have found by the courts on this subject, outside of the cases of this court and of the United States supreme court, are found in the cases immediately following. I earnestly commend them to this court for its careful consideration. They are State v. Marxhausen, supra; State v. Peterson, supra; Youman v. Commonwealth, 189 Ky. 152, 224 S. W. 860,13 A. L. R. 1303; State v. Wills, 91 W. Va. 659, 114 S. E. 261, 24 A. L. R. 1398; Hoyer v. State (Wis.), 193 N. W. 89, 27 A. L. R. 673; People v. Castree, 311 111. 392, 143 N. E. 112, 32 A. L. R. 357; State v. Owens (Mo.), 259 S. W. 100, 32 A. L. R. 383; State v. Kees, supra; Opinion of Weist, J., dissenting in State v. Case (Mich.), supra.
■ If policemen, constables, marshals and other officers could stop and search automobiles, the harm done would be far greater than the good. Many citizens of this state, perfectly innocent, would be stopped and searched, em barrassed and humiliated. There would be resistance and serious trouble. The people could not know their rights. If they were stopped, often they would not know whether it was an officer or not. If it was he would have no warrant to show, and they could not tell. If they resisted, they would be resisting an officer, though not knowing it. . If in fact it was not an officer, but some one intending to hold them up but pretending to be an officer, they still would not know. If they submitted, they might be robbed, if they resisted they might be injured, for such characters are always armed. It would be a very bad state of affairs and should be avoided.
According to- the traditions of the common-law, it is better for ninety-nine guilty persons to escape punishment than for one innocent man to suffer. Would it not be better for some contraband cars to escape than for many innocent persons to be stopped, searched, humiliated and disgraced? I hope the court does not think that the innocent would not be stopped and searched. They would be reasonably safe where they are known., but away from home, in the little towns and rural districts it would be different.
I submit it would be better by far to cling to the doctrine of the Tucker case and let the rights of the people under the Constitution remain secure, than to try to make an exception where none can be made.
I respectfully submit that this case now before this court should be reversed and the appellant discharged.
F. S. Harmon, Assistant Attorney-General, for the state.
I. The presumption to be accorded a statute solemnly' enacted by a co-ordinate branch of the government — that it be respected unless transgression of the Constitution is shown beyond a rational doubt — sustains this law. American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 Harvard Law Review at 144; State v. Henry (1905), 87 Miss. 143, 40 So. 152; Hart v. State (1905), 87 Miss. 176, 39 So. 523; Natchez R. R. Co. v. Crawford (1911), 55 So. 598; Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations (7 Ed.) pp. 252, 253 and 254; Ex Parte Wren, 63 Miss. 532; State ex rel Attorney-General v. Jones (1914), 64 So. 469; University of Mississippi v. Waugh (1913), 105 Miss. 627, 62 So. 827; Johnson v.Reeves (1916), 112 Miss. 230, 72 So. 925; Hinds County et al. v. Johnson (1923), 133 Miss. 591, 98 So. 95.
So much for the expressions of our own court. Hundreds of cogent statements from the courts of other jurisdictions reaffirm the rule. Mr. Justice Chase in Ware v. Hylton (1796), 3 Dali. 171; Cooper v. Telfair (1800), 4 Dali. 14, per Mr. Justice Patterson ; The Dartmouth College' Case in 1819; per Marshall, C. J.; Ogden v. Saunders (1827), 12 Wheat. 213, per Mr. Justice Washington; Sinking Fund Cases (1878), 99 U. S. 700, per Chief Justice Waite; People v. The Supervisors of Orange (1858), 17 N. Y. 235.
II. Similar statutes in other states have been upheld. The provisions of sections 23 and 26 of the Mississippi Constitution find their counterpart not only in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments but in the Constitutions of practically all the other states of the Union. With constitutional provisions identical or very similar, and with the same problems growing out of the use of highpowered motor cars by violators of the prohibition laws, it is interesting to find that other states of the Union have placed on the statute books laws similar to the act here under attack and the decisions upholding the constitutionality of these statutes are authorities of primary importance in the consideration of this case.
Ohio: G-eneral Code, sec. 6212-43. This act was upheld in Houck v. State (1922), 106 Ohio 112,140 N. E. 112.
Virginia: Ch. 345, Acts 1920, sec. 4. Upheld in Quivers v. Commonwealth (Va.) 1923, 115 S. W. 564. This statute was again considered in McClannan v. Chaplain, et al. (Ya. 1923), 116 S. E. 495. See, also, Hall v. Commonwealth (Ya. 1924), 121 S. E. 154; where the court again upholds the search and seizure act of 1920 and declares that it is not violative of the constitutional provisions against unreasonable search and seizure, or against self-incrimination.
Colorado: Ch. 141, Laws of 1919, sec. 13. This act was favorably passed upon by the supreme court of Colorado in Sullivitch v. People (1922), 206 Pac. 789. See, also, Pasch v. People (1922), 209 Pac. 639, where the court construed section 7 of the same statute, abolishing property interests in intoxicating liquors and admitted liquor, alleged to have been illegally seized, as evidence.
Pennsylvania: The Prohibition Enforcement Act of 1924, Public Laws 34, sec. 9. This statute has not been construed by the supreme court of Pennsylvania, but it was upheld in a well-reasoned opinion by the court of Quarter Sessions of Philadelphia County in Commonwealth v. Street, District and County Reports, (The Legal Intelligencer, Yol. 80, No. 50, p. 783, Dec. 18, 1923).
Vermont: Ch. 204, Acts of 1921, sec. 8, amending see. 6539 of the General Laws. State v. Four Jugs of Intoxicating Liquor, 2 Atl. 586 (1886), sec. 2 of statute No. 43, Acts of 1882 was upheld.
Texas: Ch. 117, Acts 38th Regular Legislative Session, sect. 1. Austin v. State (1924), 261 S. W. 1035.
Maine: Sec. 28, ch. 127, Revised Statutes of Maine, as amended by ch. 167, Public Laws of 1923. The latest decision of the supreme court of Maine with respect to seizing liquor from an automobile without a warrant as provided by this statute ife State v. Choroshy (1923), 122 Me. 238, where liquor was seized by an officer from an automobile which the officer searched without warrant.
New Jersey: Ch. 103, Laws of 1921, known as the Prohibition Enforcement Act of New Jersey, is most elaborate in its provisions, the ninety-three sections of the Act covering every conceivable phase of this difficult and perplexing question. Section 23 subjects liquor and vehicles used in connection with its transportation to seizure, forfeiture and confiscation. Section 25 deals directly with our specific point. The New Jersey statute was upheld in an elaborate opinion rendered by the supreme court of New Jersey in Katz v. Eldridge (1921), 118 Atl. 242. We submit that this decision is a direct authority in favor of the state’s contention here. Nor is the weight of the decision materially lessened by virtue of the fact that the court of errors and appeals reversed the case in 117 Atl. 841, on an entirely different point with respect to another section depriving the defendants the right of trial by jury.
North Carolina: Public Laws of 1923, ch. 1, see. 6. This statute was upheld in the very recent case of State v. Godette (1924), 125 S. E. 25.
Federal Statutes: Statutes in nine different states have been set out and decisions construing them have been discussed. The statutes vary in language, but all achieve thé same purpose sought to be attained by the Mississippi statute here under attack. If the courts of these other states could sustain these various statutes in the light of their constitutional provisions on the subject of search and seizure, it is submitted that the supreme court of Mississippi can do likewise without doing violence to our organic law. In fact it would be difficult to find a statute which holds officers of the law to closer limits than section 2 of this act. The language is such that the officer is never protected unless he acts upon probable cause as determined after'the evemt by the same justice of the peace or circuit judge who is authorized before the event to issue a warrant authorizing the search.
Not a .single statute has been held unconstitutional as far as our information and study goes.
Furthermore, there are a series of Federal Statutes passed by Congress over several decades which are no more drastic in their provisions than this law, and at-, tention is called to these acts of Congress, and decisions construing them.
(1) Revised Statutes, sec. 2140, for the Protection of the Indians in the Indian country. It will be noted that this statute authorizes Indian agents to search boats, wagons, and other vehicles and to seize them and liquor found therein, and this statute has been held constitutional. For a discussion of this legislation see U. 8. v. One Buick Roadster (1917), 244 Fed. 961.
(2) Revised Statutes, sec. 3061, (Com. St., sec. 5763) dealing with the collection of customs duties and the enforcement of the customs laws. This act was passed in 1866 and has been repeatedly upheld. Be it noted that the officers may search and examine these vehicles when they ££ shall suspect there is merchandise subject to duty. ’ ’ See U. 8. v. Rembert (1922), 284 Fed. 1004, and the cases therein cited.
(3) Section 26, Title 2, of the National Prohibition Act of 1919 (The Volstead Act, Comp. St., Ann. Supp. 1923, par. 10,138%mm). It will be noted that the Volstead Act authorizes a seizure of liquor when any officer of the law ££ shall discover any person in the act of transporting.” That phrase ££shall discover” has been variously construed by the different federal courts. Park v. Ü. 8. (1924, C. O. A. 1st Circuit), 294 Fed. 783.
Various cases upholding this provision of the Volstead Act in the various circuit courts of appeal are included in the list of authorities cited and discussed herein. The supreme court of the United States has not yet passed directly upon the constitutionality of this sec-' tion. But the fact that seven of the nine circuit courts of appeal in which cases have been found, have upheld a search and seizure without a warrant on facts similar to the case at bar, affords a strong indication of the course that the supreme court of the United States will follow.
At the threshold of this case, therefore, we find not only a presumption in favor of the constitutionality of this act of a co-ordinate department of the government, but in addition thereto, we find that statutes of similar import varying in language, but similar in requiring the officer to act upon probable cause, have been upheld in at least nine states of the Union, as well as Acts of Congress, relative to enforcement of the customs laws, Indian affairs, and Prohibition.
But aside from the presumption in favor of constitutionality, aside from the legislative action taken in other jurisdictions, it is necessary and proper that our own constitutional provision be closely examined and the straight edge of the Constitution be applied to the particular statute here under attack in the. light of logic and of reason and of legal history. At the outset of the discussion we are met with the statement that only unreasonable searches and seizures are prohibited.
III. Only unreasonable searches and seizures are prohibited. Section 23 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 is very nearly identical with the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution and finds its parallel in a similar constitutional guarantee in the organic law of every state of the Union, save New York.
We are here concerned with the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Federal Constitution only in so far as the history of their adoption throws light on the evils which the patriots of the Revolutionary epoch sought to guard against.
It is well settled that the first Ten Amendments comprising the Federal Bill of Rights, have no application to the states and accordingly no question thereunder is raised on this appeal.- Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U. S. 174, 44 L. Ed. 119; Ensign v. Pennsylvania, 227 U. S. 592, 57 L. Ed. 658; Weeks v. U. 8., 232 U. S. 383.
It is clear, however, that our constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure which has come down through the various constitutional conventions in the history of the state breathes the spirit of the Fourth Amendment. Just as the Fourth Amendment sought to protect the individual against unreasonable search and seizure of his person, his houses, his papers and effects at the hands of Federal officers, so section 23 seeks to protect the citizen of Mississippi against unreasonable search and seizure under authority of the state. While recognizing the inapplicability of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments in the actual decision of this case, counsel on the other hand, recognizes the transcendent importance of a correct understanding of their history and the circumstances resulting in their adoption in order to explain correctly the intent of the framers of our own organic law in incorporating a provision almost identical in our own charter of liberties.
(a) The colonial struggle was against “general writs of assistance.” The student looks in vain for statements that any and all searches and seizures without warrants were in contravention of the liberties of a free people. The abuse was the issuance of the general search warrant or “writ of assistance.” The constitutional prohibition was an effort t'o build up a safeguard against this specific abuse and any other abuse which made the search or seizure unreasonable. The slightest study of the history of this time will reveal the accuracy of the distinction here made and a failure of some courts to catch this distinction is responsible for much of the confusion which has arisen within the past generation.
There are two separate and distinct safeguards in the Fourth Amendment. The first clause then is a general prohibition, the second a specific safeguard, and the conclusion of these courts is neither logically accurate nor historically correct when they say that every search not made pursuant to a warrant such as here provided for, is, an unreasonable search, regardless of the circumstances under which it is made.
(b) The struggle in England was likewise against general warrants. It is insisted, in some quarters that cases decided in England during the same period between the forces of tyranny and of liberalism sustain the contention that all searches and seizures without a warrant are illegal.
It is insisted for the state that the most casual reading of these cases will show that identically the same distinction was drawn by Lord Camden and his confreres, as was drawn in this country, in the struggle against these general search warrants. Money v. Leach, 3 Burrows 1742; the Wilkes Case (1763), 19 How. St. Tr. 982 at 1381; May’s Constitutional History of England, ch. 11; EnticJc v. Carrington (1765), 19 How. St. Tr. 1029.
Here again, therefore, the most important cases of the Revolutionary Epoch in England shows a recognition of-the distinction which counsel now seeks to press upon this court.
(c) The authorities sustain the contention, that a search and seizure is not unreasonable simply because made without a warrant. It is interesting to note that the reasonableness of a search for liquor without warrant in these automobile cases, such as the one at bar, has made a very strong impression on the Federal district and circuit courts of appeal. Milam v. TJ. 8. (1924, C. C. A. 4th Circuit), 296 Fed. 631; TJ. 8. v. McBride (1922, Ala. Dist. Court), 287 Fed. 216, where officers searched McBride’s stable without a search warrant and found a still and liquor; Lambert v. TJ. 8. (1922, C. C. A. 9th Circuit), 2£>2 Fed. 417, a case directly in point.
Another case directly in point is TJ. 8. v. Bateman (1922, Cal. Dist. Court), 278 Fed. 231. Here the specific question was whether a prohibition enforcement officer could stop an automobile on a public highway and search it for intoxicating liquors, without the consent of the driver and without any search warrant. The court re ferred to section 26 of the Volstead Act, authorizing an officer to seize a vehicle when he should discover liquor therein without a warrant, and stated that while Congress could of course, prohibit searches which were reasonable, Congress could not authorize searches that were unreasonable. See, to the same effect, Haywood v. U. 8. (1920, C. C. A. 7th Circuit), 268 Fed. 803; O’Connor v. U. 8. (1922, N. J. Dist. Ct.), 281 Fed. 398; see, also, 3 Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 2264, p. 3126.
(d) The reasonableness of the search and seizure and not the presence or absence of a warrant is the test laid down by the Constitution. In dealing with the great constitutional guarantees such as that against “unreasonable searches and seizures” we need always to keep in mind Chief Justice Marshall's great major premise that “it is a Constitution we are expounding,” and not a detached document inviting scholastic dialectics. Mr. Justice Holmes has emphasized this point of view with the assertion that “the provisions of the Constitution are not mathematical formulas; they are organic, living institutions. ’ ’
Instead of a rule we have here a standard by which the facts of each individual case must be measured. If the facts show that the search and' seizure was reasonable, then the presence or absence of a warrant is immaterial; if the facts show that the search was unreasonable, then the presence of a warrant does not protect the officer in question.
(e) The true test of reasonableness in this case is not the existence of a search warrant, but the existence of probable cause. Wheeler v. Nesbitt, 24 How. (U. S.) 544; Carl v. Ayers, 53 N. T. 14; Munns v. Dupont, 3 Wash. C. C. Reports. Now our contention here-is, that there must be the same degree of probable cause to justify a search without a warrant as would justify the issuance of a warrant. But the mere fact that the justice of the peace or judge ascertains after rather than before the search, that probable cause exists makes no material difference, so long as it is found actually to exist.
In the case at bar, the special bill of exceptions shows affirmatively the existence of facts which enabled the officer to testify under oath that he had reason to believe and did believe, that intoxicating liquor was being transported by this particular defendant in the particular automobile seized; that he was transporting it over a particular road and in a particular direction. All of this is sworn testimony as is also the statement that the search was conducted without violence. From these facts, from this sworn testimony of the officer, the trial judge was just as able to find judicially that probable cause existed, justifying this search, as if this officer had made oath before him prior to the search and secured a warrant under which to act. In admitting the evidence therefore, the trial judge found affirmatively that the search was reasonable; that-probable cause did exist; that no violence or undue force was used and that the evidence was therefore properly admissible. It would be an artificial distinction to hold that all this evidence was to be excluded because probable cause was not judicially found to exist before the search. The rights of the citizen have been equally well protected. The rights of the state have been safeguarded. The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures has not been abused. In the light of the facts of this case — in the light of the history of this section of our bill of rights, it is insisted that the distinction here made is a valid one.
IY. The constitutional prohibition against “unreasonable search and seizure” was not violated in this case, since the liquor seized was- contraband and appellant’s possession of-same was unlawful. Section-5, chapter 189, Laws of 1918; see discussion of forfeiture in 4 Bacon’s Abridgment, pp. 337-352; Chitty on Criminal Law, pp. 727-737. In Goldsmith Grant Co. v. U. 8. (1921), 254 U. S. 505, 65 L. Ed. 376; an Act of Congress passed July 13,1866,14 Stat. L. 151, ch. 184, par. 14, was under attack. In a similar case, TJ'. 8. v. One Hundred Barrels Distilled Spirits (1871), 14 Wal. 44, 81 U. S. 345, distilled spirits upon which the tax had not been paid at the time of a removal to a bonded warehouse and which afterwards came into the hands of a bona-fide purchaser for value without notice, were declared forfeited.
. It is, therefore, of greatest importance to remember that the supreme court of the United States has held in a series of decisions not only that a statute providing for forfeiture'of liquor upon which a tax has not been paid, is constitutional but that the forfeiture relates back to the very instant when the prohibited act was committed and from that moment the title to the contraband property vests in the United States.
The final link in the chain was established by Mr. Justice Story in Taylor v. TJ. 8. (1845), 3 How. 197, at 205, 11 L. Ed. 559, where under the Duty Collection Act of 1799 it was agreed that certain goods were seized by the wrong officer for failure to pay customs duty.
The three cases last cited, therefore, show that the irregularity of the seizure is immaterial; that when contraband is seized the forfeiture relates back to the timo of the commission of the crime; and that the crime is committed the instant the goods come into the hands of the accused in violation of law.
This doctrine, if applicable to the case where a mere tax on liquor has not been paid under the revenue laws is certainly here applicable to a case where, under its far reaching police powers, the government speaking through the legislature has solemnly abolished all property rights in the prohibited liquors and has made the mere possession of such liquor a crime.
Our position is fully sustained by a cloud of authorities, both Federal and state to which the attention of the court is now called. TJ. S. v. Stoivell, 133 U. S. 16, 33 L. Ed. '555; U. S. v. Fenton (1920, Mont. Dist. Ct.), 268 Fed. 221; O’Conner v. Ü. 8. (1922, N. J. Dist. Ct.), 281 Fed. 396; U. 8. v. Bembert (1922, Tex. Dist. Ct.), 282 Fed. 996.
It thus appears that the Federal courts fully recognize the principle that where the goods seized are contraband, the right to their possession is in the government and since the defendant has them in his possession unlawfully, they may be recovered by force without a warrant by the government officers.
Cases in many of the state courts are in accord. Opinion of Judge Sykes in Owens v. State (1923), 133 Miss. 774; Bosansld v. State (1922), 106 Ohio 442; Hall v. Commonwealth (Ya. 1924), 131 S. E. 155; State v. Simmons (N. C. 1922), 110 S. E. 595; Commomuealth v. Dana (Mass. 1841), 2 Met. 337; State v. Chuchóla (Del. 1922), 120 Atl. 214; People v. Kamhout (Mich. 1924), 198 N. W. 836.
The Constitution protects the defendant Donovan Moore in his person, his property, and his possessions against unreasonable search and seizure. Here the stuff seized was contraband liquor to which he had no property right in the eye of the law and no right of lawful possession. His car was likewise, in the eye of the law, forfeited to the state from the moment of the commission of the first illegal act, to-wit: the transportation of the contraband therein.
Granted, therefore, that the strained and narrow construction which appellant seeks to place on the meaning of the words of section 23 be correct, this is not a proper case for the constitutional guarantee, as so construed, to be applied, since no property or lawful possessions of this defendant were either searched for or seized.
Y. The search of defendant’s automobile and the seizure of this contraband liquor was not unreasonable since it did not compel the defendant to give evidence against himself in violation of section 26 of the State Constitution. Baldly stated, the position seems to be here taken that the admission of evidence secured as a result of a search without a warrant is compelling a man to give evidence against himself. With the greatest deference and respect, counsel insists that such a position is absolutely untenable, in the light of legal history.
A careful reading of the elaborate and scholarly exposition of the separate histories of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments by Prof. Wigmore, in his work on Evidence (3 Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 2264), and his article on “The Privilege against Self-Crimination,” in 15 Harvard Law Review, 610, should prove to be absolutely convincing as answer to Mr. Justice Bradley’s statement in Boyd v. TJ. 8.
The doctrines crystallized in the two amendments are quite separate and distinct. They grew up at different times, for different reasons, and under different conditions. They are complementary rather than supplementary.
A classic statement of the separate histories of the prohibitions against unreasonable search and seizure and against self incrimination, is found in the opinion of Judge Baker in Haywood et al.'V. U. S. (1920, C. C. A. 7th Circuit), 268 Fed. 802.
The privilege against self-crimination is a privilege against testimonial compulsion and not' against the use either of documents or of contraband chattels which are obtained from the person’s control, without process to be used against him as a witness.
In the case at bar, when Chief -of Police Simmons stopped this automobile, searched it, and discovered this contraband liquor, the evidence which he gave upon the trial was his evidence and not the evidence of Donovan Moore. There was no testimonial compulsion by virtue of which this appellant was forced to give evidence against himself. The words were the words of Simmons; the information was the information of Simmons; the liquor was the property of the state, forfeited to it from the instant of the doing of the prohibited act.
That we are correct in this contention is seen by another reference to Burdeam v. McDonald (1921), 256 U. S. 475, where the supreme court of the United States, in a case already elaborately discussed herein, held that— “The Fifth Amendment, as its terms import is intended to secure the citizen from compulsory testimony against himself. It protects from extorted confessions or examination in court proceedings by compulsory methods. ’ ’
Donovan Moore, in the case at bar, did not perform a single affirmative act and in the absence of such affirmative action and in the absence of force compelling him to testify or to produce documents at the trial, how can it be said that there is any element of self-incrimination in this case? It seems clear, therefore, that chattels obtained from a person’s control, without the use of process, are not within the scope of the privilege and may be used as evidence; and a cloud of authorities cited in 3 Wigmoré on Evidence, par. 2264, p. 3124, Note 2, sustains our position. Argetakis v. State (Ariz. 1923), 212 Pac. 372; State v. Reynolds (Conn. 1924), 125 Atl. 639; People v. Mayen, (Cal; 1922), 205 Pac. 442; State v. Barela (N. M. 1917), 168 Pac. 547; Holt v. U. S., 281 U. S. 245, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 2, 54 L. Ed. 1031, 20 Ann. Cas. 1138.
We are well satisfied, however, to rest upon the decisions of the supreme court of Mississippi in cases not cited in the argument of Tucker v. State, and not mentioned by the court in that decision. These cases, not having been overruled by a majority of the judges of the full court, remain to this day as thé clear cut pronouncement of the law on this point in this state. Magee v. State (1908), 92 Miss. 865, 46 So. 529; Pringle v. State, (1914), 108 Miss. 802, 67 So. 455.
VI. Section 2 of the statute under attack is not unconstitutional in authorizing the arrest without a war rant of a person whom the officer has reasonable ground to believe has committed or is committing a felony, since the arrest under such circumstances without a warránt was good at common law at the time of the adoption of the constitution; and a search and seizure conducted as an incident to such arrest is not an unreasonable search or seizure. The special bill of exceptions in this case states that after the Chief of Police secured the information as to the approach of appellant’s car, the Chief of Police proceeded to the Pearl Eiver Bridge and that presently the automobile described to the Police Chief and bearing the tag number given him, crossed the bridge and “at that place the witness arrested the defendant Donovan Moore and searched the automobile that he was driving and found several quarts of whiskey.”
It thus appears from the bill of exceptions that this officer arrested the defendant Donovan Moore on the basis of information which he had previously secured that Donovan Moore had committed and was committing a felony, viz: That he had transported and was then continuing to transport intoxicating liquor contrary to law.
It is the state’s position that the officer did no more in this case than he had a clear right to do in England, under the common law, decades prior to the separation of the colonies and the adoption of the various state Constitutions. And it is well settled that constitutional provisions are “to be construed in'conformity with the basic principles of the common law which were familiarly known to the framers of the Constitution. Kansas v. Colorado (1922), 206' TJ. S. 46 at 94-95, 51 L, Ed. 956, 281 Fed.'397; TJ. 8. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 TJ. S. 651, 42 L. Ed. 892; Mr. Story, on the Constitution (5 Ed.), par. 1902, p. 648.
We have had in the various codes of Mississippi for many years a statute which seems to reflect this common-law rule. So far as the writer has been able to ascertain, the constitutionality of this old statute has never been successfully assailed. Section 1204, Heming way’s Code, the same being section 1447, Code of 1906, section 1375, Code of 1892, is entitled: “Arrests — When made without a warrant.”
Furthermore, it can be demonstrated easily that this statute, section 1204, is merely a crystallization in codified form, of the ancient common-law doctrine of arrest. Blackstone in this Commentaries, Book 4, p. 292, states the common-law doctrine. Green v. U. 8. (1923), 289 Fed. 238; Ledwith v. Catchpole, Cald. Cas. at 295; Lawrence v. Hedger, 3 Taunt. 14; Beckwith ,v. Philby, 6 Barn. & Cress. 635; Pritchett et al. v. Sullivan (1910, C. C. A. 8th Circuit), 182 Fed. 480. To the same effect see, Park v. U. 8., 294 Fed. 781; O’Connor v. U. 8. (1922 N. J. Dist. Ct.), 281 Fed. 396; People v. Kamhout (Mich. 1924), 198 N. W. 836; Hughes V. State (Term. 1922), 238 S. W. 588.
The fact of the business is, that in regard to the arrest feature, the law of 1924 now assailed did nothing more than re-enact with specific reference to liquor violations what was already the statute law of this state and the common-law doctrine, with respect to arrests for all threatened violations of law, as set forth in the Code of 1892, in the section herein quoted. In view of the importance of the enforcement of the liquor law this feature was included in this statute specifically, though we are frank to say to the court, on the arrest feature that the law here involved conferred on this Chief of Police no authority to arrest not already possessed by him by virtue of section 1204, Hemingway’s Code, which has come down from 1892.
This feature of the statute finds its exact parallel in section 26 of the Volstead Act which authorized Federal officers to arrest individuals under similar circumstances, search the vehicle which they are driving, and seize the contraband liquor so found. Furthermore, another close analogy is found in our statute authorizing the arrest of gamblers without a warrant, section 12Í2, Hemingway’s Code, the same being section 1455, Code of 1906, sec. 1383, Code of 1892.
Briefly summarizing the state’s position, we find a well-settled presumption favoring the constitutionality of an Act of the legislature; we find similar statutes upheld by the highest courts of other states in this Union; and it is urged that where probable cause is found to exist by justices of the peace or circuit judges for an arrest and a search, and where such arrest and search are conducted in a reasonable manner, that the absence of a warrant does not render said arrest, search, or seizure unreasonable, especially where the chattel searched for and seized and for the possession of which the individual is arrested, has been divested of all characteristics of property, and as contraband became forfeited to the Government from the instant the prohibited act was committed. ,.
VII. No constitutional provision was violated by the legislature in enacting section 3, chapter 244, Laws of 1924, changing the rule of evidence in liquor cases and bringing same into accord with the previously announced doctrine of the Mississippi court and the vast majority of the other common-law jurisdictions to the effect that evidence otherwise relevant and competent shall not be rendered inadmissible because illegally secured. Section 3, to which attention is now called, is much broader than section 2 in one sense, and very much narrower in another. It is broader in that it is not limited in its application to the case of vehicles, such as automobiles, in which liquor is being transported, but is so worded as to render admissible, evidence illegally secured in any and all liquor cases, whether the unauthorized search be a search of the home, premises, or the person. On the other hand, section 3 is much narrower than section 2 in that it affords the officer no protection whatever, leaving him fully and completely liable for a search and seizure not made by virtue of a warrant or not made in the narrow class of cases covered by section 2.
Ill other words, the section now under discussion is simply a rule of evidence and in no wise affects any of the substantive rights of the parties. Any individual claiming to have been injured by an unauthorized act of an officer may still seek redress in the courts and no officer may plead section 3 by way of defense. The only change, therefore, which section 3 will bring about in our law is to render admissible certain evidence in liquor eases which an equally divided court has held inadmissible in such liquor cases but which a unanimous court has held to be admissible in other varieties of criminal actions.
Stated baldly, the situation is this: The supreme court of Mississippi decided Pringle v. State, 108 Miss. 806, 67 So. 455, in 1914. There a constable searched the clothing of the accused, then confined in jail awaiting trial, and seized a damaging letter which was admitted in evidence and constituted one of the strongest links in the chain of circumstances which led to the accused’s conviction. The court" cited with approval the leading-case of State v. Turner, 82 Kan. 787, 109 Pac. 654, 32 L. E. A. (N. S.) 772, 136 Am. St. Eep. 129, and notes thereto.
In 1922, Tucker v. State, 128 Miss. 211, 90 So. 845, was decided by Division A and in the opinion it was announced as a rule of evidence, that evidence illegally secured in a liquor ease was inadmissible. No reference whatever was made to Pringle v. State, nor is there anything to indicate that the attention of the court was called to this decision.
In December, 1923, Owens v. State, 133 Miss. 753, 98 So. 233, was decided by the court en banc, three judges adhering to the rule laid down in Tucker v. State, and three judges expressing views in conflict therewith. Since a majority of the court is required to overrule a decided case and since the court was evenly divided, the rule of evidence announced in Tucker v. State, as applicable to liquor cases, remained in force.
Exactly one month after the decision in Owens v. State, the legislature of Mississippi convened, and the difficulty in. which the'court found itself, with respect to this important rule of evidence, was brought to the attention of the judiciary committees of house and senate. The net result of the discussion was the introduction of Senate Bill No. 431 which was duly enacted and received the approval of the Governor on April 12, as chapter 244 of the Laws of 1924.
Section 3 of this Act is intended to be a solution of the perplexing problem of evidence. It is so worded as to apply only to liquor cases and bring the rule of evidence in these cases into harmony with the previously announced general rule of evidence promulgated by the court in-the Pringle case. If this section is valid, then the legislature has secured uniformity in so far p,s the admission of illegally secured evidence is concerned, regardless of whether it be a whisky case or a murder case, for certainly the Pringle case has never been overruled, since the majority of the judges of this court have never made such a pronouncement. Certainly the Tucker case has not been overruled, since only three judges announced themselves in opposition to that doctrine.
The effort of the legislature was clearly a laudable one and in no sense, constitutes an interference with the activities of a co-ordinate department of the government. For it is well settled that the legislature has full power with respect to the making and alteration of the rules of evidence. The scope of its power in this regard is best pointed out by reference to decided cases. Garothers v. Hurley (1866), 41 Miss. 71; Hopt v. Utah (1884), 110 U. S. 574; Thompson v. Missouri (1897), 171 U. S. 380; Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, ch. 9, p. 272; Mrous v. State (Tex.), 21 S. W. 764; Dunning v. West (La. 1899), 25 So. 306; Burke v. Pittman (Iowa 1901), 84 N. W. 1035.; Katz v. Eldredge (N. J. 1921), 118 Atl. 247; People v. Johnson (N. Y. 1906), 77 N. E. 1164; People v. Braun (111. 1910), 92 N. E. 917.
The state insists, however, that the reasoning set forth in the above decisions is equally applicable here. Let us look at the logic of the matter and see in a commonsense way whether or not the state’s contention is sound.
We have certain great fundamental constitutional guarantees protecting the citizen in the sanctity of his person, the untroubled possession of his property and the complete security of his home. Any person, be he officer or private individual, who lays impious hands upon my person commits a battery; and when my right to personal integrity is violated, the law substitutes for this primary right a secondary or remedial right, commonly called a right of action. When an officer or private individual, without authority, breaks into my home, disturbs my peace and quiet, and seizes chattels rightfully in my possession, my primary right in the security of my property and home has been violated by such unreasonable search and seizure. At the instant this primary right is violated, there springs into being, by operation of law,-a secondary right, to-wit: the recovery by self-help, or court help, of the chattels seized- and carried away, and a right of action against the trespasser, be he officer or private citizen. Nor is this all. When my right of action has been exercised, suit brought and a judgment secured, the law, in its effort to remedy the wrong done to my primary Tight, grants to me still another remedial one, to-wit: A right to have execution issue in satisfaction of the judgment.
So it is, that we find a well-settled and clear-cut distinction between the primary rights and the group of secondary or remedial rights which the law creates in my favor. Not a single one of these remedial rights is touched in any fashion by the statute here under attack. My primary right to the security of my home and person and chattels was destroyed the instant the illegal act was committed. All that the law can do is to furnish a remedy. This the law furnishes in the same full measure that a remedy is furnished for the violation of other primary rights.
"Where is the logic, therefore, of insisting that the exclusion of evidence illegally secured, furnishes an additional remedial right to me1? Such a view is simply erroneous.
Briefly summarized, the state’s position here is that the legislature has full control over rules of evidence; that the legislature may prescribe at what age a little child may be a competent witness; that the legislature may prescribe whether or not a felon may he competent to testify at all, that the legislature may make the wife competent to testify against her husband, and the husband competent to testify against the wife; and that the legislature may declare, as was done in the statute now under attack, that an officer of the law shall be competent to testify as to information secured through an unauthorized search and seizure, without in any wise limiting the right of the injured individual to sue for damages, or removing from the officer’s head any criminal penalty for his unauthorized act. The rule laid down by the legislature is in accord with the previous announcements of this court and in line with the vast weight of authority in England and all other common-law jurisdictions, and meets with approval of all the text writers on evidence whose opinion on the point has been found.
Attention is called to the following summary of authorities favoring the views herein discussed, and a listing of the authorities by jurisdictions which are apparently contrary, with appropriate comments seeking to distinguish the cases contra from the case at bar.
(a) Decisions of thirty-five States are in accord.
1. At,atsama. (1921). Banks v. State, 92 So. 293, 24 A. L. R. 1359.
2. Arizona. (1923). Argetakis y. State, 212 Pac. 372.
3. Arkansas. (1921). Benson v. .State, 233 S. W. 758, 149 Ark. 633; (1923). Venable v. State, 246 S. W. 860.
4. California. (1922). People v. Mayen, 205 Pac. 435.
5. Colorado. (1922). Sullivitch v. People, 206 Pac. 789; (1922) Pasch v. People, 209 Pac. 640.
6. Connecticut. ■ (1924). State v. Reynolds, 125 Atl. 636.
7. Delaware. (1922). State v. Chuchóla, 120 Atl. 212.
8. G-eorgia. (1923). Johnson v. State, 118 S. E. 702.
9. Idaho. (1918). State v. Anderson, 174 Pac. 124; (1922) State v. Myers et al., 211 Pac. 440.
10. Iowa. (1923). State v. Town, 191 N. W. 530.
11. Kansas. (1910). State v. Turner, 109 Pac. 654, 32 L. E. A. (N. S.) 772 (leading case); (1918) State v. Van Wormer, 173 Pac. 1076.
12. Louisiana. (1923). State v. Davis, 97 So. 590.
13. Maine. (1923). State y. Choroshy, 122 Me. 283.
14. Maryland. (1906). Lawrence v. State, 103 Md. 17, 63 Atl. 102.
15. Massachusetts. (1923). Com. v. Wilkins, 138 N. E. 11; (1841). Com v. Dana, 2 Met. 257.
16. Michigan. (1924). People v. Kamhout, 198 N. W. 831.
17. Minnesota. (1923). State v. Pluth, 195 N. W. 789.
18. • Nebraska. (1923). Billings v. State, 191 N. W. 721; (1924). Bush v. State, 199 N. W. 792; (1907): Younger y. State, 114 N. W. 170.
19. New Hampshire. (1919). State v. Agalos, 107 Atl. 314; (1858). State v. Flynn, 36 N. H. 64, (Leading Case.)
20. New Jersey. (1921). Kats v. Eldredge, 118 Atl. 242; (1923). State v. Gould, 122 Atl. 596; (Nov. 1923). State y. Lyons, 122 Atl. 758.
21. New Mexico. (1917). State v. Barela, 168 Pac. 545.
22. New York. (1922). People v. Esposito, 194 N. Y. Supp. 328; (1903). People v. Adams, 68 N. E. 636, 176 N. Y. 351; 63 L. E. A. 406, (Leading Case); Affirmed hy U. S. Supreme Court, (1904) 192 IT. S. 585,'48 L. Ed. 575; (1922). People v. Diamond, 233 N. T. 130.
23. Nevada. (1924). State v. Chin Gim, 224 Pac. 798'.
24. North Carolina. (Oct. 1924). State v. Godette, 125 S. E. 24; (1922). State v. Simmons, 110 S. E. 591.
25. North Dakota. (1924). State v. Dinger, 199 N. W. 196.
26. Ohio'. (1922). Houck v. State, 106 Ohio 195; (1922). Bosanski v. State, 140 N. E. 370, 106 Ohio 444.
27. Oregon. (1924). State v. Goldstein, 224 Pac. -■1087; (1916). State v. Ware, 154 Pac. 907.
28.- Pennsylvania. (1923). Com. v. Street & Street, (Quarter Sessions, Philadelphia County, Legal Intelligencer, Dec. 18, 1923, p. 783); (1922). Com. v. Klein, 81 Pa. Super Ct. 55.
29. South Carolina. (1923). State v. Maes, 120 S. E. 576.
30. South Dakota. (1922). City of Sioux Falls v. Walser, 187 N. W. 821.
31. Texas. (1924). Austin v. State, 261 S. W. 1035; (1924). Delaney v. State, 263 S. W. 1065; (Latest case, though leading case for this doctrine is Bippey v. State, (1920) 219 S. W. 463).
32. Utah. (1923). State v. Aime, 220 Pac. 704.
33. Vermont. (1905). State v. Krinski, 78 Vt. 162, 62 Atl. 37.
34. Virginia.- (1924). Hall v. Com., 121 S. E. 154; (1923). McClannan v. Chaplain, 116 S. E. 495.
35. Washington. (1923). State v. Basil, 217 Pac. 720.
(b) Decisions of U. S. supreme court and circuit courts of appeal are in accord.
U. S. Supreme Court. (1904). Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 575, 48 L. Ed. 585.
C. C. A. 1st Circuit. (1924). Park v. U. S., 294 Fed. 776.
C. C. A. 2d Circuit. (1923). Agnello v. U. S., 290 Fed. 671.
C. C. A.' 4th Circuit. (1924). Ash v. TJ. 8., 299 Fed. 277; (1924). Milan v. U. S., 296 Fed. 629; (1923). Boyd v. TJ. 8., 286 Fed. 930.
C. C. A. 5th Circuit. (1922). Bell v. TJ. 8., 285 Fed. 145. C. C. A. 7th Circuit. (1920). Haywood v. TJ. 8., 268 Fed. 803.
C. C. A. 8th Circuit. (1923). Green v. TJ. 8., 289 Fed. 236.
C. C. A. 9th Circuit. (1922). Lambert v. TJ. 8., 282 Fed. 413.
(c) Typical decisions of federal district courts support state’s contentions.
N. D. California. (1923). TJ. 8. v. Vatune, 292 Fed. 497.
S. D. California. (1922). TJ. 8. v. Bateman, 278 Fed. 231.
Montana District. (1920). TJ. 8. v. Fenton, 268 Fed. 221.
S. D. Alabama. (1922). TJ. 8. v. McBride, 287 Fed. 214. E. D. Michigan. (1923). TJ. 8. v. Dais on, 288 Fed. 199. S. D. Ohio. 1922). TJ. 8. v. Hilsinger, 284 Fed. 585.
(d) England and Canada are in harmony.
(1723). Bishop Atterbury’s Trial, 16 How. St. Tr. 495, 629.
(1740). Jordan v. Lewis, 2 Stra. 1122, 14 East 306 note. ------
(1811). Legatt v. Tollervey, 14 East, 302.
(1826). R. v. Derrington, 2 C. & P. 419.
(1886). R. v. Doyle, 12 Ont. 350.
(e) Text writers all concur.
1 Bishop New Crim. Procedure, p. 148.
Greenleaf on Evidence, sec. 254a.
Y. Jones on Evidence, par. 884.
Taylor on Evidence (9 Ed.), 922.
2 Wharton Crim. Evidence, par. 518g.
3 Wigmore, on Evidence, par. 2183, p. 2955.
(f) Eleven jurisdictions apparently hold contra, though some of decisions are readily distinguishable.
1. Florida. (1921). Haile v. Gardner, 91 So. 376; (1924). Jackson v. State, 99 So. 548.
2. Illinois. (1924). People v. Gastree, 145 N. E. 112.
3. Indiana. (1923). Plum v. State, 141 N. E. 353; (1922). Callender v. State, 136'N. E. 10.
4. Kentucky. (1920). Youman v. Com., 224 S. W. 860; (1923). Davis v. Com., 256 S. W. 429; (1924). Cole v. Com., 257 S. W. 713.
'5. Missouri. (1924). State v. Oivens, 259 S. W. 100.
6. Montana. (1924). State ex rel. King v. District Court, 224 Pae. 862; (1921). State ex rel. Samlin v. District Court, 198 Pac. 362; (1917). State v. Reed, 163 Pac. 477. ' '
7. Oklahoma. (1923). Thomas v. State, 220 Pac. 976.
8. Tennessee. (1922). Hughes v. State, 238 S. W. 588.
9. West Virginia. (1923). State v. Pridemore, 116 S.E. 756.
10. Wisconsin. (1924). State v. Warfield, 198 N. W. 854.
11. Wyoming. (1920). State v. Peterson, 194 Pac. 342.
VIII. Conclusion. This question of searches and seizures is one of the main legal battle grounds of this decade. The automobile and airplane have worked wondrous changes in every branch of human relationship. Properly used, they are boons of inestimable worth to the human race; in the hands of the lawless and the dissolute, they are tools of uncommon advantage and their use in the commission of crime has raised problems of infinite complexity. To no class is the automobile more indispensable than to the rum-runner and the bootlegger. In no instance is it more necessary to the very existence of government that some efficient and ■ constitutional means be found to curb the flagrant and open violations of the Eighteenth Amendment.
That amendment is of the same force and effect as any other integral part of the Federal Constitution. Its full enforcement is a duty and a necessity. The effort of the state in this case is not to weaken the constitutional guarantees of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments as reflected in our own constitutional provisions but to strengthen the Eighteenth Amendment, for as part of "the supreme law of the land” it is equally binding upon us.
In closing this discussion, the court’s attention is called to the fact that when our Revolutionary Ancestors formulated the provisions against unreasonable search and seizure, the Eighteenth Century doctrine of natural rights was uppermost in their minds. Samuel Adams, Patrick Henry, and George Mason were thinking of the individual’s inalienable right to the integrity of his person, the sanctity of his home, and the protection of his possessions when they drew the pertinent provisions of the Massachusetts and Virginia Bill of Rights. These natural rights which were peculiarly the subject of protection against the despotism of organized society and of its official representatives, long antedated the promulgation of these constitutional provisions.
But the right to drive a complicated, highpotvered and dangerous automobile over the highways of this state is not a natural right, on a par with that of the sanctity of the home or the integrity of the person. No man has a right to operate an automobile upon the highways of this state without a preliminary license granted by the state. No one needs such a license to inhabit a home, to walk down the streets with one’s hands in one’s own pockets or to accumulate ordinary chattels in one’s own premises.
But when an individual seeks to embark upon certain callings and to conduct certain lines of busiess, he must secure a privilege license from the state and submit to inspection .and regulation by the state. Similarly, in a crowded city the state steps in and says that one may not keep a foul pig sty within the narrow confines of his own hack yard and in close proximity to a crowded apartment house. In the same way, the state declares that a child of tender years, a drunk man or a person without any experience whatever, may not operate a motor car along its streets imperiling the lives of scores of citizens as well as the safety of property.
A policeman is warranted in stopping my car at any moment and requiring me to show a license to drive same over the highways of this state. Without a license and the tag which stands out as the state’s public permission for my action, I have no right as an individual to operate one of these complicated machines on the highways. In other words, there is a vast distinction between the individual’s interest in his person, his home, and his property, and his right to drive a car along a public road. If the state requires a license to run such a car, it is not unreasonable to allow the officers of the law to see whether the state’s permission is being abused. A car loaded with nitroglycerin is not a safe vehicle to move along a crowded street. A car loaded down with contraband whiskey is in the same class. Surely in the light of these considerations, the state in order to protect its citizens is justified in solemnly enacting a law providing for a reasonable search of these vehicles when the law officer making the search has probable cause to believe that the Prohibition laws are being violated and the state’s permission to operate the vehicle over its highways, is being grossly abused.
All these considerations weighed mightily with the legislature in the passage of this statute. They are submitted for the court’s careful attention as showing the reasonableness of the legislature’s action and the necessity for it.
The affirmance of this cause will not destroy precious constitutional guarantees which this court, as well as counsel,, are quick to defend and safeguard. But this affirmance will strengthen the enforcement of the Eight eenth Amendment, promote law and order, aid in bringing flagrant violators of the law to justice, and enable the state to better protect its people. Its affirmance will deprive this appellant of no constitutional right. It will afford the people of Mississippi, acting in their sovereign capacity, an opportunity to better enforce the law and make of government that “contrivance of human wisdom” which Edmund Burke long ago insisted it should be “in providing for human wants.” May we add in his words that “Men have the right that these wants should be provided for by this wisdom.”
Argued orally by Geo. L. Teat and Geo. 8. Hamilton, for appellant, and Francis Harmon, Assistant Attorney-General, for the state.
Headnotes 1. Searches and Seizures, 35 Cyc., p. 1269; 2. Searches and Seizures, 35 Cyc., p. 1269 (1926 Anno); 3. Searches and Seizures, 35 Cyc., p. 1'269; 4. Intoxicating Liquors, 33 C. J., Section 377.

Opinion:
Smith, C. J.,
delivered the opinion of the court.
This is an appeal from a conviction for having intoxicating liquor in possession. The conviction rests on testimony obtained by a search of the appellant's automobile without a warrant therefor. The bill of exceptions sets forth this testimony and the appellant's objection thereto as follows:
"Said Simmons, being duly sworn, testified as follows: That on the 24th day of April, 1924, he was called over the telephone by an officer of an adjoining county, who stated to him that an automobile containing whisky was making a rapid approach to the city of Jackson, and would pass into the city of Jackson over Pearl River Bridge, giving witness a description of the automobile and the tag number of the same; that Simmons at the time was chief of police of the city of Jackson, and having-reason to believe, and then and there believing, that intoxicating liquor was thus being transported, at once repaired to the western end of said bridge, which is situated in the Fifth supervisors district of Hinds county, and within the corporate limits of the city of Jackson, Miss., and that presently approached over said bridge and into the city of Jackson the automobile described to said witness, and bearing the tag number given to him; that in said city and at that place the witness arrested the defendant, Donovan Moore, and searched the automobile that he was driving, and found several quarts of whisky; that the search was made without violence or the consent of the said Donovan Moore, who was driving and in possession of said car containing said intoxicating liquors; that in the telephone message above mentioned, the party giving him the information stated to him that the automobile contained and there was being transported in said automobile several quarts of intoxicating liquors; that he regarded the officer giving him the information as being a credible person, and that he believed the information given to be true, and acted upon the same in good faith, at the time when he made the search and found the defendant with the whisky. Whereupon the defendant objected to said testimony upon the ground that it involved a search, and that the information given in said testimony was obtained by testimony secured against the will of the defendant without affidavit or searcli warrant, and that the said search was in violation of the Constitution of the state of Mississippi, and that under the decisions of the supreme court of Mississippi said testimony was not competent to be introduced before the jury."
Section 2, chapter 244, Laws of 1924, provides that— "It shall be the duty of any sheriff or constable of a county, or any sheriff, constable, marshal, or policeman in a municipality who has reason to believe and does believe that intoxicating liquor is being transported in violation of law, in any wagon, cart, buggy, automobile, motorcycle, motor truck, water or air craft, or any other vehicle, forthwith to make a reasonable search of such vehicle and to seize any intoxicating liquor so found being transported or being attempted to be transported in violation of law and at once to arrest the person or per sons in possession or control thereof and transporting or attempting* to transport same in violation of law; and such officer or officers proceeding* in good faith shall not be liable either civilly or criminally for such a search and seizure without a warrant, so long* as said search and seizure is conducted in a reasonable manner, it appearing that the officer or officers had reason to believe and did believe that the prohibition laws of the state of Mississippi were being violated at the time such search was instituted. And the officer or officers making* such search shall be a competent witness, or witnesses, to testify as to all facts ascertained, and discoveries made, by means of said reasonable search, and all liquor, and all appliances for its manufacture or transportation, so seized in the reasonable search of any such vehicle shall be admitted as evidence.
"But this section shall not in any event authorize the search of a residence or home or building or room in a building or premises, without a search warrant duly and properly issued."
The question presented for decision is the validity, vel non, of this statute under section 23 of the Mississippi Constitution, which provides that — "The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, and possessions, from unreasonable seizure or search; and no warrant shall be issued without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, specially designating the place to be searched and the person or thing* to be seized."
The possession, transportation, and control of intoxicating liquor is a misdemeanor punishable by fine and imprisonment. Section 5, chapter 189, Laws of 1918, provides that no property rights of any kind shall exist in intoxicating* liquor, and that all such liquor may "be seized by the sheriff or any other lawful officer of the state, and destroyed and rendered useless by him without any formal order of any court."
The section of the Mississippi Constitution here under consideration is practically a rescript of the Fourth Amendment of the federal Constitution, and the supreme court of the United States has recently held that the provision of the National Prohibition Act (U. S. Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1923, section 1038 1/4 ei seq.) permitting vehicles, boats, etc., to be searched for intoxicating liquor without a warrant, on probable cause therefor, is valid. Carroll v. United States, 45 S. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. • — , decided March 2, 1925, and not yet [officially] reported. While it is true that this decision of the supreme court of the United States is not binding on us, it is, to say the least, very persuasive, and, moreover, the enforcement of the amendment to the Federal Constitution prohibiting the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquor will be more effectually enforced in Mississippi if the decisions of the state and Federal courts thereon are in accord.
Section 23 of the Constitution does not prohibit all searches and seizures, nor does it, in express terms, require a warrant therefor. It prohibits: First, unreasonable searches and seizures; and, second, the issuance of warrants "without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, specially designating the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized."
The right of the citizen to be secure from unreasonable searches and seizures was a great constitutional doctrine of the common law (Money v. Leach, 3 Burr. 1742; The Bishop of Atterbury's Case, 16 Howell St. Tr. 490; Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell St. Tr. 103; Story's Constitution, section 1902), and its incorporation into the national and the early state Constitutions was because of the claim of the English and of some of the colonial governments of the right "to issue warrants for the arrest of persons without inserting their names in the warrants, especially authors, printers and publishers of obscene and seditious libels, and to invade the homes and search for private papers of individuals to obtain evidence against them on imaginary charges" (2 Watson on Construction, pp. 1414, 1415; Cooley's Constitutional Limitations [7th Ed.] 426; 4 Wigmore [2d Ed.] 2264). When the Constitution is viewed, as it must be, in the light of this historical fact, it is clear that the reasonableness of a search or seizure must also be viewed and determined in the light of the common-law traditions. People v. Chiagles, 237 N. Y. 193, 142 N. E. 583, 32 A. L. R. 676.
The immunity, it will be observed, covers not only a search and seizure of property, but of persons as well, and the common-law rules and statutes permitting and regulating arrests or seizures of persons are pertinent here, for a seizure of property cannot be said to be unreasonable if made under the same circumstances that justify the arrest or seizure of a person. An arrest at common law. has always been permissible without a warrant if made on probable cause therefor. For a misdemeanor when committed in the presence of the person making the arrest, and for a felony, though not committed in the presence of the person making the arrest on probable cause therefor.
If section 23 of the Constitution prohibits all arrests or seizures of persons without a warrant, the rule of the common law permitting such arrests or seizures is necessarily abrogated thereby; but such has not been the construction placed thereon by this or any other court hi so far as we are aware, and the legislature has uniformly acted on .the theory that arrests without a warrant are not prohibited by the Constitution.
Section 1447, Code of 1906, Hemingway's Code, section 1204, authorizing and regulating arrests without a warrant, enacts practically the common law on the subject and appeared in our statutes at least as early as the Code of 1857, see page 618 thereof.
Section 1448, Code of 1906, Hemingway's Code, section 1205, which also appeared in the Code of 1857, at page 618, authorizes an officer or private person in order to make an arrest without a warrant to enter £ £ any dwelling or house in which he has reason to believe the offender may he found," and in Monette v. Toney, 119 Miss. 846, 81 So. 593, 5 A. L. R. 261, was held not to be in conflict with section 23 of the Constitution and to authorize the entry and search of a dwelling house without a warrant therefor for the purpose of arresting a person charged with the commission of a crime.
It thus appears that the reasonableness of a search or seizure is not determined either at common law or under our statutes by -the presence or absence of a warrant therefor. It is a judicial question to be determined by the court in each case, taking into consideration the place searched, the thing seized, the purpose for, and the circumstances under which the search or seizure was made, and the presence or absence of probable cause therefor. Carroll v. United States, supra; Haywood v. U. S. (C. C. A.), 268 F. 803; United States v. Bateman (D. C.), 278 F. 231; O'Connor v. United States (D. C.), 281 F. 396; Lambert v. United States (C. C. A.), 282 F. 413; Katz v. Eldridge, 96 N. J. Law, 382, 118 A. 242.
As pointed out by the supreme court of the United States in the Carroll case, Congress has always so understood the search and seizure provision of the Federal Constitution, and beginning with its first session in 1789, it has continuously discriminated between dwelling houses and similar places and boats and vehicles, as has our legislature here, by requiring a warrant for the search of the former and permitting a search of the latter without & warrant. The impracticability in most cases of obtaining a warrant for the search of swift moving vehicles and boats before they can be moved beyond reach justifies the distinction made between them and dwelling houses and similar places, and renders a search of vehicles and boats without a warrant reasonable.
The purpose for which the search was here made, and which the statute authorizes, is, of course, reasonable, for it was made in order that a thing which it is unlawful to possess, and which by its very existence offends against +he law, might be seized and destroyed.
The 'search, of an automobile without a warrant for contraband being transported therein is reasonable and is not prohibited by section 23 of the Constitution, provided the officer who made the search had probable cause therefor, to which question we now come.
The statute permits an officer to search any vehicle, boat, etc., in which he has reason to believe and does believe that intoxicating liquor is being transported in violation of law. The officer who made the search here believed that intoxicating liquor was being transported in the automobile searched, the reason for the belief being that he had been advised by another police officer whom he regarded as a credible person that intoxicating liquor was being transported in the automobile. Information and belief has always been considered sufficient probable cause to justify a search and seizure and was so held by this .court in State v. Quintini, 76 Miss. 498, 25 So. 365; Loeb v. State, 133 Miss. 883, 98 So. 449; Bufkin v. State, 134 Miss. 1, 98 So. 452.
If it be said that an arrest for a misdemeanor is authorized at common law only when committed in the presence of the person making the arrest and therefore the seizure of contraband, the possession of which is a misdemeanor and not a felony, should be permitted only when a knowledge of the existence thereof is acquired by the person making the seizure in the same way that he becomes conscious of the commission of a misdemeanor in his presence, that is through his senses, the answer,» as pointed out by the supreme court of the United States in the Carroll case, supra, is that the distinction be tween felonies and misdemeanors is of no consequence in this connection, for the reason that the legislature has full power to classify an offense either as a misdemeanor or as a felony; the classification being determined by the punishment inflicted therefor. Section 1578, Code of 1906; Hemingway's Code, section 1345.
It may not be amiss to say that the difference in the security afforded the citizen by requiring searches and seizures to be made only on a warrant therefor, and that afforded by permitting them to be made without a warrant on probable cause, is more apparent than real. The warrant issues on the affidavit of any credible person that he has reason to believe and does believe that intoxicating liquor is being stored, etc., in a described place, or "is being transported in any" vehicle or boat and protects the officer who makes the search under it. When a search is made without a warrant, the person making it must justify his act in so doing by proving that he had probable cause therefor. In the case at bar the officer could have obtained a warrant to search the automobile, though when the warrant was obtained the automobile might have been beyond reach, by making the same oath before a magistrate that he made on the trial in the court below; that is, that he had good reason to believe and did believe that intoxicating liquor was being transported in the automobile. The penalty for false swearing by the officer and the appellant's remedy therefor would have been the same in either case.
The appellant relies on the line of cases beginning with Tucker v. State, 128 Miss. 211, 90 So. 845, 24 A. L. R. 1377, in which this court held that the evidence obtained by means of a search or seizure without a warrant was not admissible in a criminal trial against the person whose property was searched or seized. The power of the legislature to authorize a search or seizure without a warrant was not involved in any of those cases, and of them only the cases of Butler v. State, 129 Miss. 778, 93 So. 3, Taylor v. State, 129 Miss. 815, 93 So. 355, and Porter v. State, 135 Miss. 789, 100 So. 377, deal with the search of a vehicle in which intoxicating liquor was being transported. They were decided before the statute here under consideration, which permits the search of a vehicle or boat without a warrant, was enacted, and there was no pretense in any of them that the person by whom the search or seizure was made had probable cause therefor ; consequently section 23 of the Constitution was vio lated thereby. In none of those eases was the power of the legislature to authorize a search or seizure of a vehicle or boat without a warrant considered, and they are not here in point.
Section 2, chapter 244, Laws of 1924, is valid, and the judgment of the court below will be affirmed.
Affirmed.
Holden, J., concurring.
Anderson and Ethridge, JJ., dissenting.