Case Name: ENERGO INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, Appellant, v. MODERN INDUSTRIAL HEATING, INC., Appellee
Court: Texas Courts of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1986-10-30
Citations: 722 S.W.2d 149
Docket Number: No. 05-85-01289-CV
Parties: ENERGO INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, Appellant, v. MODERN INDUSTRIAL HEATING, INC., Appellee.
Judges: Before AKIN, SCALES and CARVER JJ.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 722
Pages: 149–154

Head Matter:
ENERGO INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, Appellant, v. MODERN INDUSTRIAL HEATING, INC., Appellee.
No. 05-85-01289-CV.
Court of Appeals of Texas, Dallas.
Oct. 30, 1986.
Richard Parker, Michael C. Prior, Houston, for appellant.
J. Michael Weston, Leonard J. McDonald, Jr., Dallas, for appellee.
Before AKIN, SCALES and CARVER JJ.
. The Honorable Spencer Carver, Justice, retired, Court of Appeals, Fifth District of Texas at Dallas, sitting by assignment.

Opinion:
SCALES, Justice.
Energo International Corporation (Ener-go) appeals from a summary judgment rendered in favor of Modern Industrial Heating, Inc. (Modem). Energo contends that the trial court erred in granting Modern's motion for summary judgment because En-ergo's amended answer with supporting affidavits raised a material fact issue on En-ergo's claim of offset, and because a material fact issue was raised regarding Ener-go's liability to Modem on sales taxes due to the State of Texas on goods Energo purchased from Modern. We affirm.
Modern brought suit against Energo seeking to recover $3,801.99 due on an account and for $12,300 in sales taxes due on goods sold to Energo. After Energo answered generally denying Modem's claim, Modern filed a motion for summary judgment. Energo answered and filed supporting affidavits. In its answer to Modern's motion, Energo denied that it owed Modern $3,801.99, alleged that Modem owed Energo $63,750.00, and alleged that any account which showed that Energo owed Modem $3,801.99 had not taken into account the $63,750.00 that Modem owed Energo. On the day of the hearing on Modern's summary judgment motion, Ener-go filed an amended answer to Modern's petition generally denying Modem's claim and alleging offset of $63,750.00. The trial court subsequently granted Modem's motion and entered judgment in favor of Modem.
In its first point of error, Energo contends that the trial court erred in granting Modern's motion for summary judgment because Energo's amended original answer and supporting affidavit raised a material fact issue concerning offset. Modern argues that the affirmative defense of offset was not properly before the court because Energo's amended answer was not on file at the time of the hearing and Energo did not obtain the trial court's permission to file the amended answer, and because En-ergo's affidavit was insufficient to "raise a contest" to Modem's motion for summary judgment.
Rule 166-A of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, affidavits, stipulations of the parties, and authenticated or certified public records, if any, on file at the time of the hearing, or filed thereafter and before judgment with permission of the court, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issues expressly set out in the motion or in an answer or any other response.
TEX.R.CIV.P. 166-A (emphasis added). Thus, we first determine if Energo's amended answer was "on file at the time of the hearing." Rule 63 provides that no amended pleadings shall be filed within seven days of trial, except on leave of court. See TEX.R.CIV.P. 63. A summary judgment hearing is a "trial" under Rule 63. See Claude Regis Vargo Enterprises, Inc. v. Bacarisse, 578 S.W.2d 524, 529 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The record shows that Ener-go's amended answer was filed on the day of the summary judgment hearing. The parties disagree as to exactly when the answer was filed on that day. However, there is no question that Energo did not obtain leave of court before the summary judgment hearing. Consequently, under Rule 63, even if the answer was filed before the summary judgment hearing as En-ergo contends, it was not properly "on file at the time of the hearing" as required by Rule 166-A.
We next determine whether, under Rule 166-A, the amended answer was filed "with permission of the court" after the summary judgment hearing. Energo argues that the docket sheet entry, which reads, "Pltfs MSJ. Argued, under advisement to 6/30/85 for all pleadings to be amended (trial judge's initials)," indicates that the trial court accepted Energo's amended answer. We disagree.
A docket entry forms no part of the record which may be considered; it is a memorandum made for the trial court and clerk's convenience. Azopardi v. Hollebeke, 428 S.W.2d 167, 168 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1968, no writ); Restelle v. Williford, 364 S.W.2d 444, 445 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Consequently, there is no indication in the record that permission of the court was requested or obtained to file the amended answer and that the amended answer was properly before the court.
Further, even if the docket sheet were considered, we hold that the entry does not indicate that the trial court accepted and considered Energo's amended answer. The consideration of pleadings filed in the interim between hearing and judgment is within the trial court's discretion. Brown v. Prairie View A & M University, 630 S.W.2d 405, 411 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Energo has not attempted to show that the trial court abused its discretion in not considering the amended answer. The trial court is charged with the duty only of considering the record as it properly appears before it when the summary judgment motion is heard. Id. Accordingly, we hold that the amended answer was not properly before the court, that there is no showing of an abuse of discretion by the trial court in not considering the amended answer, and that the affirmative defense of offset was not properly pled, and therefore, was not before the trial court. The point of error is overruled.
Energo next contends the trial court erred in granting Modern's motion for summary judgment because Energo presented evidence which raised a material fact issue concerning Energo's liability on certain sales tax due the State of Texas. We disagree.
The record indicates that Energo agreed with Modern that Energo would assume liability for payment of any tax due on sales of goods from Modern to Energo, if such sales were not exempt from such taxes under Energo's exemption permit. The record further indicates that the Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts determined that such sales between Modern and Ener-go were not exempt, that taxes in the amount of $12,348.50 were due, and that Modern paid the taxes to the State Comptroller of Public Accounts.
Energo contends that its summary-judgment evidence showed that another corporation owed and paid the sales tax in question. The affidavit of Energo's president, attached to Energo's response to Modern's summary judgment motion, states that "[s]uch sales taxes are the liability of Texas Upsetting and Finishing, Inc. and Continental Bank of Illinois and Ferrotherm Corp., not Energo Interogational [sic] Corporation," and that "[t]o the best of my knowledge, Ferrotherm Corp. has paid the sales taxes claimed due." The affidavit of the president of Ferrotherm Corporation states "[t]hat the sales taxes due on material purchased from Energo International Corporation which had been purchased by [Energo] from [Modern] are being paid directly to the State of Texas by Ferrotherm Corporation pursuant to an agreement between the State of Texas and Ferrotherm Corporation."
Even assuming that these conclusory statements are competent summary-judgment proof, they clearly do not raise a fact issue as to Energo's liability for sales taxes under the contract between Energo and Modern. Whether a third party owes Ener-go reimbursement of the taxes paid is irrelevant to Energo's liability under the Ener-go-Modern contract. We hold that the trial court properly granted summary judgment to Modern. Energo's second point of error is overruled.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
AKIN, J., files a dissenting opinion.
. The dissent cites N-S-W Corp. v. Snell, 561 S.W.2d 798 (Tex.1977), as overruling the above-cited cases by holding that "a docket entry may be considered to supply facts in certain situations." N-S-W Corp. involved a side-by-side comparison of a docket sheet entry and a final judicial order. The court held that the docket entry must yield to the final judicial order because a "docket entry may supply facts in certain situations, but it cannot be used to contradict or prevail over a final judicial order." N-S-W Corp., 561 S.W.2d at 799.
The dissent argues that we have one of the "certain situations" before us so that the docket entry may be used to supply the fact that the trial judge gave Energo permission to file an amended pleading after the summary judgment hearing. The dissent apparently interprets the holding in N-S-W Corp. that a docket entry cannot be used to prevail over a final judicial order as applying only where a litigant, in a side-by-side comparison of the docket entry and the final judgment, attempts to defeat or alter the express terms of the judgment. The dissent urges that in other situations, such as in the present case, facts shown by the docket entry may be used, even if the result is to defeat the final judgment, so long as the docket entry, in a side-by-side comparison, does not directly defeat the final judgment.
We disagree with the dissent's reasoning for two reasons. First, we do not believe that this
Is one of the "certain situations" envisioned by the supreme court when it announced in N-S-W Corp. that a "docket entry may supply facts in certain situations." The supreme court was merely recognizing a limited exception to the holding in Azopardi and Restelle —that docket entries may be used to correct clerical errors in judgments or orders. In fact, the cases cited by the dissent for the proposition that a docket entry is part of the record and can be considered on appeal are cases where facts supplied by docket sheet entries were used to correct clerical error in a judgment or to determine the meaning of words used in a judgment. We do not have a case of clerical error before us.
Second, and more importantly, docket entries are inherently unreliable. For purposes of defeating the final summary judgment for Modern under the dissent's analysis, Energo's amended pleading would rest entirely upon a fact supplied from an unclear docket entry. Implicit in the N-S-W Corp. holding is an awareness of the dangers in using an informal docket entry to defeat a formal court order. The dangers of unreliability are equally apparent here; Energo attempts to defeat a final summary judgment by relying on a docket entry which purportedly gave it permission to file untimely amended pleadings, and in light of those pleadings, then argues that summary judgment was improperly granted.