Case Name: Richard Berg, Appellant, v. Arthur Stromme et al., Respondents
Court: Washington Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Washington
Decision Date: 1970-02-04
Citations: 1 Wash. App. 916
Docket Number: No. 26-40331-3
Parties: Richard Berg, Appellant, v. Arthur Stromme et al., Respondents.
Judges: 
Reporter: Washington Appellate Reports
Volume: 1
Pages: 916–926

Head Matter:
[No. 26-40331-3.
Division Three.
February 4, 1970.]
Richard Berg, Appellant, v. Arthur Stromme et al., Respondents.
Horton, Wilkins •& Horton and Hugh B. Horton, for appellant.
Peterson, Taylor ■& Day and Stanley D. Taylor, for respondents.

Opinion:
REVIEW GRANTED BY SUPREME COURT.
Green, J.
Plaintiff, Dr. Richard Berg, brought this action against defendants, d/b/a Stromme Motors, for damages alleging the sale of and. refusal to replace or satisfactorily repair a defective new car. At the close of plaintiff's evidence, the trial court dismissed the action. Plaintiff appeals.
Construing the evidence and the inferences therefrom most favorably to the plaintiff, the following facts become evident. Plaintiff is a medical doctor specializing in psychiatry in Pasco and is also in the business of raising and breeding horses. His professional and business activities require him to travel extensively by automobile and often to tow a horse trailer.
In 1964, Dr. Berg went to Stromme Motors, where he had previously purchased several automobiles and a 3-horse trailer. He informed defendants of his needs, uses and desire to purchase a new automobile. Defendants recom mended a new Pontiac Bonneville Safari station wagon with a large engine and numerous extras. Plaintiff concurred in the recommendation, ordered such vehicle and took delivery on February 8, 1965. At the time of delivery, plaintiff executed a sales order and a conditional sale contract. These documents constitute the only written agreement between the parties.
Shortly after delivery, plaintiff experienced more than the usual minor new car problems, including among others, difficulties in steering, acceleration and shifting; a rough running, overheating and stalling engine; and a malfunctioning air conditioner. It is not necessary to list all of the defects; however, they were so serious as to cause plaintiff to request defendants replace the car. Defendants refused but did attempt to repair the defects. As a result, the car was in the service department for 20 days within the first four months and a total of 45 days between the date of delivery, February 8, 1965 and the end of that year. Meanwhile, on June 10, 1965, plaintiff tendered the car back to the Pontiac Motor Division. This tender was also refused.
Although never satisfied with its performance, plaintiff continued to drive the car. Defendants were unable to placate plaintiff's constant requests for satisfactory repairs. Plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to sell the car on the open market, and ultimately accepted a used car dealer's wholesale price. Thereafter, plaintiff brought this action to recover damages. The trial court construed the allegations of the complaint as an action for breach of implied warranty and granted defendants' motion to dismiss at the close of plaintiff's evidence. The dismissal was based upon the following grounds: (1) There was no implied warranty of fitness because the vehicle was sold by its trade name; and (2) there was a valid disclaimer'of express and implied warranties agreed to by the parties. Since the assignment of error raised on appeal is general in nature, it must be assumed that it is directed only to the two grounds given by the trial court for dismissal. Other argument not supported by ah assignment of error, is not before this court for con sideration, CAROA 43; Boyle v. King County, 46 Wn.2d 428, 433, 282 P.2d 261 (1955).
The trial court correctly applied the existing law of this, state and properly dismissed the complaint. Dr. Berg signed an Automobile Sales Order on February 8, 1965. Immediately preceding his signature is printed:
I have read the matter printed on the back hereof and agree to it as a part of this order the same as if it were printed above my signature. The front and back of this order comprise the entire agreement pertaining to this purchase, and no other agreement of any kind, verbal understanding or promise whatsoever, will be recognized. Receipt of a copy of this order is hereby acknowledged.
On the reverse side of the document is the following provision:
(3) There is no guarantee on the automobile in connection with this agreement. The purchaser has no guarantee whatsoever unless a separate written agreement is obtained at the time of sale. This applies to new cars as well as used cars. The purchaser must have a written guarantee in his possession to secure an adjustment.
The conditional sales contract signed by plaintiff contains the following provision.
2. No warranties, expressed or implied, have been made by the Seller unless endorsed hereon in writing.
No dealer's warranty of any kind was endorsed on the Automobile Sales Order or conditional sales contract.
It seems clear from these provisions that, with respect to the purchased vehicle, defendants by agreement disclaimed all express or implied warranties to plaintiff. Disclaimer provisions of this type are enforceable.
[W]hen a seller and a buyer enter into a contract in which the seller expressly refuses to give any warranty, and the contract is not induced by fraud, no warranty of any kind can be implied by law.
(Italics ours.) McDonald Credit Serv., Inc. v. Church, 49 Wn.2d 400, 301 P.2d 1082 (1956). See also Dimoff v. Ernie Majer, Inc., 55 Wn.2d 385, 347 P.2d 1056 (1960); Mclnnis & Co. v. Western Tractor & Equip. Co., 63 Wn.2d 652, 388 P.2d 562 (1964); Nakanishi v. Foster, 64 Wn.2d 647, 393 P.2d 635 (1964); RCW 63.04.160 and 63.04.720. Cf. Northwest Collectors, Inc. v. Gerritsen, 74 Wn.2d 690, 446 P.2d 197 (1968). There was no fraud alleged or proved in the instant case.
Plaintiff forcefully argues in his brief that such disclaimer should be held invalid as against public policy and that dealers should be held strictly liable for defective products. It is contended by plaintiff that the state of New Jersey did so in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69, 75 A.L.R.2d 1 (1960); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965) adopted the same rule. He also points out that other jurisdictions and legal writers are likewise critical of disclaimer provisions. The position taken by plaintiff and the support for it articulated in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., supra, was alluded to in Norway v. Root, 58 Wn.2d 96, 361 P.2d 162 (1961), where our Supreme Court said at 100:
It is repetitive, but we desire to expressly limit the extent of this decision by again pointing out that this is not an action on an implied warranty, as was the case in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., supra, and we are not here concerned with the validity of the waiver of implied warranties.
Notwithstanding this language, our Supreme Court in the subsequent case of McInnis & Co. v. Western Tractor & Equip. Co., supra, recognized the disclaimer provisions when it said at 656:
The rule is well settled that no warranty, express or implied, will be found where, as here, the seller expressly refuses by merger and disclaimer clauses to give any warranties. [Citing cases.]
Plaintiff cites Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co., 75 Wn.2d 522, 452 P.2d 729 (1969). This case is not factually apposite to the case at bar.
For the foregoing reasons, we must hold the trial court was correct in dismissing plaintiff's complaint relying upon the disclaimer provision of the written agreements. Our Supreme Court has not yet seen fit to change the rule. In view of this holding, it is unnecessary to discuss the remaining error raised by plaintiff.
Judgment affirmed.
Evans, C. J., concurs.