Case Name: In re Martin
Court: United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1952-03-18
Citations: 39 C.C.P.A. 893
Docket Number: No. 5918
Parties: In re Martin
Judges: Before Garrett, Chief Judge, and Jackson, O’Connell, Johnson, and Woeley, Associate Judges
Reporter: Court of Customs and Patent Appeals Reports
Volume: 39
Pages: 893–904

Head Matter:
195 F. (2d) 303; 93 USPQ 173
In re Martin
(No. 5918)
United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,
March 18, 1952
Procter, Smith & Harding (Arthur W. Procter and Raymond J. Mawhinney of counsel) for appellant.
E. L. Reynolds (J. Schimmel of counsel) for the Commissioner of Patents.
[Oral argument January 8, 1952, by Mr. Proctor and Mr. Schimmel]
Before Garrett, Chief Judge, and Jackson, O’Connell, Johnson, and Woeley, Associate Judges

Opinion:
Johnson, Judge,
delivered the opinion of the court:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents denying an application by appellant for an extension of time in the life of Letters Patent No. 2,068,300, covering an improved form of aeroplane and issued to appellant, who is the inventor, on January 19, 1937. The application was made pursuant to Public Law 598, 81st Congress (2nd Session), 35 U. S. C. § 115. The pertinent portions of that law read as follows:
Sec. 1. Any person who served honorably in the military or naval forces of the United States at any time'between December 7, 1941, and September 2, 1945—
(a) who is the inventor or discoverer of an invention or discovery for which a patent was granted to him prior to September 2, 1945, the original term of which had not expired prior to said date and which is still owned by him, or who was prior to said date and continuously thereafter the sole owner of a patent for an invention or discovery which had not expired prior to said date; and
(b) who, between December 7, 1941, and the date of the termination of his service but not later than the date of the enactment of this Act, was not receiving income from said patent or patented invention or discovery; or whose income therefrom was substantially reduced as a result of his said service or because of the war,
may obtain an extension of his patent for the term specified herein, upon application to the Commissioner of Patents within one year after the enactment of this Act and upon complying with the provisions of this Act. The period of extension of such patent shall be a further term from the expiration of the original term thereof equaling twice the length of the portion of his said service between the dates of December 7, 1941, and September 2, 1945, during which his patent was in force. [Italics added.]
Appellant claims, as the basis of his application for extension, that he served in the military and naval forces in the following instances:
(1) between October 31, 1944 and November 24,1944, he served as chief mate of the S. S. Clark Howell in a voyage from Baltimore, Md. to San Pedro, California. The record indicates that appellant left the vessel at that point of his own accord.
(2) from January 8, 1945 to January 18, 1945, he served as first officer on a per diem basis with the Army Transportation Corps at the San Francisco Port of Embarkation, Fort Mason, California. The record indicates that he terminated his service there to accept other employment.
(3) from January 18,1945 to July 23,1945, he served as master of the S. S. Matthew Thornton on two round trips to the Marianas 3 slands, including Guam, Saipan and Tinian. During this period the S. S. Matthew Thornton was owned by the United States, represented by the War Shipping Administration, and was operated under General Agency Operation by the Hammond Steamship Company which employed and paid the crew, including appellant. The vessel was at that time allocated to the United States Navy to carry military cargo and personnel for the account of the Navy.
In support of his claim that the above-enumerated instances constitute service "in the military or naval forces of the United States" within the meaning of the act involved, appellant urges the following facts of record: that he was issued a commission by the United States Maritime Service under regulations prescribed by the War Shipping Administration; that he took an oath of office similar to the oath taken by an officer in the Coast Guard; that, as an officer in the United States Maritime Service, he wore a prescribed uniform protected by statute; that, while in a combat zone under Navy orders, he was subject to disciplinary control of the Navy; that, while master of the S. S. Matthew Thornton, he had under his command a Navy gun crew and was subject to the same combat hazards as the Navy personnel of said crew. All the foregoing facts on which appellant bases his claim appear to be supported by the record and are. not disputed by the Solicitor of the Patent Office.
The Commissioner of Patents characterized the service relied on by appellant as service "in ships of the Merchant Marine operating under control of the United States Navy" and denied appellant's request for extension on the sole ground that it was not service " in the military or naval forces of the United States " within the meaning of Public Law 598, supra.
In his Notice of Appeal from the decision of the commissioner, appellant averred that:
5. The Commissioner of Patents erred in holding that service in ships of the Merchant Marine operating under control of the United States Navy is not or cannot be service in the military or naval forces of the United States within the meaning and intent of Public Law 598, Eighty-first Congress.
It is clear then that the sole question to be determined by us is: Did Congress, in extending the benefits of Public Law 598 to " any person who served in the military or naval forces of the United States intend to include service in ships of the merchant marine, particularly when such ships are operating under control of the Navy?
Where the words of a statute are free from ambiguity and doubt, and the intent or meaning of the Congress is clear, construction of the statute is not only unnecessary but is not justified. However, _f there is ambiguity, as we think there is in the instant case, a statute may be construed by the courts in order to determine the Congressional intent, and recourse may be had to external aids to construction if such is necessary. Such recourse to external aids must be had in the case at bar since there is nothing in the statute itself to resolve the question in issue.
The legislative history of the act yields no information which will adequately explain the language in question. See U. S. Code Congressional Service, 81st Congress, 2nd Session, 1950, pp. 2667-2669.
In construing a statute a court may resort to other enactments in which Congress has defined the language in issue, or otherwise explained its meaning. Such definitions, while not binding on the court, are highly persuasive, particularly when such other enactments are substantially contemporaneous with the statute involved in the case at bar.
Eesort to other Congressional enactments dealing with military and naval matters, and with veterans, sheds considerable light on the meaning usually given by Congress to the term "military or naval forces." Those enactments considered pertinent are discussed below.
The Internal Revenue Code, 26 U. S. C. § 3797, states that the term "military or naval forces of the United States" includes:
the Marine Corps, the Coast Guard, the Army Nurse Corps, Female, the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps, the Navy Nurse Corps, Female, and the Women's Reserve branch of the Naval Reserve.
This definition does not include the merchant marine.
The Soldiers' and Sailors' Relief Act of 1940, 50 U. S. C. App. § 511, in defining persons in the "military service of the United States" states that it includes the following persons, and no others:
All members of the Army of the United States, the United States Navy, the Marine Corps, the Coast Guard, and all officers of the Public Health. Service detailed by proper authority for duty with the Army or Navy.
By subsequent acts tbe members of the women's organizations of the services enumerated were included as such persons. This definition in effect excludes persons who served in the merchant marine.
In 50 U. S. C. App. § 1305, which is part of the National Emergency and War Shipping Acts, the term "veteran" is defined as meaning:
any person in the active military or naval service of the United States or any person who is or has been eligible to receive a certificate for substantially continuous service in the merchant marine .
This court believes the distinct provisions with respect to "military or naval service" and "service in the merchant marine" in this act are highly significant. If Congress regarded the former term as generic to, and inclusive of, the latter, as urged upon us by appellant, why did it recite each of these terms in separate clauses in the above statutory definition ?
We are of the opinion that the above statutory definitions strongly indicate that Congress does not regard the term "service in the military or naval forces" as encompassing service in the merchant marine within its usual and ordinary meaning. Moreover, we agree with the solicitor that the intent of Congress not to include members of the merchant marine as being in the military or naval forces of the United States is manifested also by the fact that it was found necessary to pass special enactments to give members of the merchant marine civilian re-employment rights, 50 U. S. C. App. § 1472, and to establish decorations for service in the merchant marine, 50 U. S. C. App. § 754. We concur with the solicitor's conclusions that those enactments of Congress are inconsistent with the concept or theory that such persons were in the "military or naval forces," for if they had been, separate acts would have been unnecessary since these matters were completely covered by the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 (see 50 U. S. C. App. § 301-318).
In our opinion, all the statutory enactments discussed above compel an interpretation of Public Law 598, supra, which is contrary to that sought by appellant.
There is one statute which appears to lend some support to appellant's contentions that the contested language of Public Law 598, supra, includes service in the merchant marine. That is the Criminal Code, 18 U. S. C. § 2387, which defines the term "military or naval forces of the United States" as including:
tbe Army of the United States, the Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, Naval Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, and Coast Guard Reserve of the United States; and, when any merchant vessel is commissioned in the Navy or is in the service of the Army or the Navy, includes the master, officers and crew of such vessel.
The Supreme Court has often stated that Congress is presumed to have used words in a statute in their usual and ordinary meaning unless there is evidence to the contrary. Old Colony Railroad Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 284 U. S. 552; United States v. Stewart, 311 U. S. 60. Notwithstanding the last-mentioned statute, in view of the numerous above-mentioned enactments in which Congress has treated service in the merchant marine as separate and distinct from service in the military or naval forces of the United States, we are compelled to conclude that Congress does not consider the former to be included within the usual and ordinary meaning of the latter. It is well settled that Congress may expressly give a term a definition which differs from its ordinary meaning. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Lenroot, 323 U. S. 490; Von Weise et al. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 69 F. (2d) 439. In the light of Congress' general usage of the terms in issue, as evidenced by the many other statutes discussed above, it is our belief that in 18 U. S. C. § 2387, supra, Congress exercised its prerogative to give the term "service in the military or naval forces" a special meaning in that particular statute.
Contemporaneous interpretation of the terms in issue by administrative or executive officials in the enforcement or application of other statutes may also shed light on the ordinary and usual meaning of such terms. Regulation 10 of the Veterans Administration, promulgated pursuant to 38 U. S. C. Ch. 12, defines in detail the term "military or naval forces," and such definition does not include service in the Merchant Marine (see 38 U. S. C. A., Ch. 12, Veterans Regulations).
Further, the Office of the Housing Expediter, in issuing regulations pursuant to the veterans' preference provisions of the Housing and Kent Act of 1947 (see 24 CFK, 1950 Supp., 801.2), stated that "veteran" shall mean:
(1) A person who has served in the active military or naval forces of the United States *
(6) A person to whom the War Shipping Administration has issued a certificate of continuous service in the United States Merchant Marine
The treatment of service in the Merchant Marine and service in the military or naval forces in separate sections of this regulation clearly indicates that the Housing Expediter regards the two terms as separate and distinct, the latter not encompassing the former.
It is our belief that these regulations add force to our above-stated conclusion that "service in the military or naval forces of the United States" does not include "service in the merchant marine" within the usual and ordinary meaning.
In the light of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that the Commissioner of Patents properly characterized appellant's service as service in the merchant marine, and that he correctly construed Public Law 598, supra, in holding that appellant's service in the merchant marine was not service " in the military or naval forces of the United States " within the meaning of that statute.
Under the clear terms of the statute, such service in the military or naval forces is a condition sine qua non which must first be satisfied if an applicant is to obtain the benefits of Public Law 598, supra. If an applicant fails to establish such service within the meaning of the act, the commissioner need not determine the existence of the other factors enumerated in Public Law 598 upon which extension of the life of a patent is to be based. Appellant having failed to show such service within the meaning of the act, it was proper for the commissioner to deny his application for extension upon this ground alone.
For the reasons hereinbefore set out, the decision of the Commissioner of Patents is affirmed.
See "Statutory Construction," by Crawford, 1940, section 223.
In Osbourne v. United States et al., 164 F. (2d) 767, It was held that merchant seamen are not in the "military service of the united States" within the meaning of 50 U. S. C. App., § 511, even though subject in some cases to court martial jurisdiction of the military under other statutes.