Case Name: GODWIN v. BANISTER
Court: Texas Courts of Civil Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1922-05-03
Citations: 242 S.W. 1098
Docket Number: No. 6434
Parties: GODWIN v. BANISTER.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 242
Pages: 1098–1099

Head Matter:
GODWIN v. BANISTER.
(No. 6434.)
(Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Austin.
May 3, 1922.
Rehearing Denied June 28, 1922.)
1. Evidence <@=n424 — Allegation that recitals in deed were untrue held not to make petition demurrable.
In an action by a purchaser against the grantor of his vendor for damages, a general demurrer to a petition on the ground that plaintiff had no right to show that recitals in a deed between defendant and plaintiff’s vendor1, to the effect that the vendor had paid a sum of money and had executed notes for the payment of certain additional sums, were not true, and that defendant and his grantee in the deed had entered into a conspiracy to defraud plaintiff, was proper; the rule that when consideration of a deed is contractual neither party may by parol evidence show that it was different than stated in the deed not applying to a person not a party to the deed.
On Motion for Rehearing.
2. Courts <®=>I04 — Where jurisdiction of appellate court is final, it is proper to write a brief opinion.
Where the jurisdiction of an appellate court is final, and it is impossible to write an opinion upon all the questions presented in an appeal, it is proper for the court to write briefly or even not at all when it affirms a case.
Appeal from Coleman County Court; J. B. Dibrell, Jr., Special Judge.
Action by Neill H. Banister against William Godwin. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Balter & Weatherred, of Coleman, for appellant.
Critz & Woodward, of Coleman, for ap-pellee.

Opinion:
KEY, C. J.
This is a county court case, which resulted in a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Banister, and the defendant, God-win, has appealed; and, as the jurisdiction of this court is final, and the questions presented are not deemed to be of such importance as to require extended discussion, this opinion will be brief.
In the first assignment of error, it is contended that the court erred in overruling a general demurrer, to the plaintiff's petition; the contention being that the plaintiff had no right to show that the recitals, in a certain deed, to the effect that the purchaser had paid the sum of $400, and executed certain promissory notes for the payment of certain additional sums, were not in fact true, and that appellant, the defendant in this suit and grantor in the deed referred to, and Mrs. Lelia Collins, the grantee therein, had entered into a conspiracy for the purpose of inducing appellee to purchase from Mrs. Collins one-half of the interest she had acquired from appellant, Godwin, for a consideration equal to that which Mrs. Collins ,was to pay to Godwin, and, in order to accomplish that result, they had agreed between themselves to recite the fact that the (Consideration for the deed from Godwin to Mrs. Collins was twice as much as it really was.
Appellant cites authorities to the effect that when the consideration specified is contractual, neither party has the right, by parol evidence, to show that it was different from what it was stated to be in the written instrument. The rule referred to has no application to this case, as it does not include and bind persons who are not parties to the written instrument. It was so held by our Supreme Court in Johnson v. Portwood, 89 Tex. 235, 34 S. W. 596, 787.
The other questions presented in appellant's brief have been duly considered, and our conclusion is that no ground is shown for a reversal; and therefore the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
(&=»For other oases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes