Case Name: DAVID GILMOUR DOOR CO. v. SHEA, Sheriff, et al.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1912-04-19
Citations: 134 N.Y.S. 919
Docket Number: 
Parties: DAVID GILMOUR DOOR CO. v. SHEA, Sheriff, et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 134
Pages: 919–923

Head Matter:
DAVID GILMOUR DOOR CO. v. SHEA, Sheriff, et al.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
April 19, 1912.)
1. Execution (§ 198 )—Third Party Claims—Sheriff’s Jury—Review.
The action of a sheriff’s jury in determining a claim of title to property seized is not a judicial determination, and is not subject to review by motion or otherwise.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Execution, Cent. Dig. § 578; Dec. Dig. § 198.*]
2. Execution (§ 198*)—Claims by Third Parties—Sheriff’s Jury—Equity.
Since a finding for the claimants by a sheriff's jury procured according to Code Civ. Proc. §§ 1418, 1419, providing for the trial of the claims of third parties to property levied upon and for the procedure if the claimants succeed, is not conclusive upon any one as to the title claimed, and, if induced through fraud of the sheriff, he may be held accountable in an action at law by the creditor, and, if induced by a fraudulent claim of ownership by the claimants, they may be held to account by the remedy under Code Giv. Proc. §§ 2432-2463, providing for general remedies against the judgment debtor and for reaching property held in trust for him, and since upon a finding being made for the claimants the sheriff may demand an indemnity in an amount to be determined as provided by the Code, equity will not interfere to supersede a finding for claimants by a sheriff’s jury, and give a retrial of the claims of ownership and damages.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Execution, Cent. Dig. § 578; Dec. Dig. § 198.*]
3. Equity (§ 43*)—Jurisdiction—Other Remedy.
While equity may relieve against fraud, it will do so only when it" ap- • pears that the plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Equity, Cent. Dig. §§ 121-140, 164^ 166; Dec. Dig. § 43.*]
Laughlin and Miller, JJ., dissenting.
Appeal from Special Term, New York County.
Action by the David Gilmour Door Company against John S. Shea, as sheriff of the county of New York, and others. From a judgment dismissing the complaint, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.
Argued before INGRAHAM, P. J., and LAUGHLIN, CLARKE, SCOTT, and MILLER, JJ.
Eugene M. Bartlett, of Buffalo, for appellant.
Francis A. O’Neill, of New York City, for respondent Shea.
Arleigh Pelham, of New York City, for respondents Shollenberge.r and others.
For other cases see same topic & § number In Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
SCOTT, J.
The plaintiff appeals from a judgment dismissing the complaint. The facts alleged in the complaint and the nature of the relief sought are set forth in the opinion of Mr. Justice LAUGHLIN, and need not be repeated. As the complaint was dismissed before the introduction of any evidence, all the facts well pleaded in the complaint must be accepted as true. This, however, does not justify us in accepting the allegations of bad faith and fraudulent intent on the part of the sheriff, except as such charges are supported by well-pleaded facts. In effect, what the plaintiff seeks is a judgment superseding the finding of a sheriff's jury procured as provided in sections 1418 and 1419 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and a retrial of the claims of ownership and damage made by the defendants Iroquois Door Company, Mary P. Shollenberger, and Shollenberger & Co.
It is well settled that the action of a sheriff's jury" in determining a claim of title to property seized by the sheriff under execution or attachment is not a judicial determination, and is not subject to review by motion or otherwise. Cohen v. Climax Cycle Co., 19 App. Div. 158, 46 N. Y. Supp. 4; Shaw v. Dunn, 122 App. Div. 736, 107 N. Y. Supp. 777. It is not conclusive upon any one as to the title claimed (Minor v. Gurley, 81 App. Div. 586, 81 N. Y. Supp. 367), and its only office is to afford justification to the sheriff for surrendering the property to the claimant, unless indemnified by the plaintiff who had sued out the execution or the attachment. If the sheriff has been guilty of fraud or bad faith in inducing a finding in favor of fictitious claimants, the inquisition will afford him no protection, and he will release the property levied upon at his own peril, and may be called upon in appropriate action by the execution or attachment creditor. If it was the claimants who were guilty of fraud in asserting ownership of the property, the plaintiff has ample remedy under sections 2432 to 2463, Code of Civil Procedure. If the sheriff was free from fraud in bad faith in procuring the inquisition to be returned, he is entitled by law to demand indemnity from the judgment creditor, and this court has no authority to fix the amount of such indemnity. The Code provides how such amount shall be determined. We are unable to see, therefore, any theory upon which this action can be maintained.
It is quite true that a court of equity has general power to relieve against fraud, but, to invoke that power, it must be made to appear, not only that fraud has been committed, but that the law has provided the plaintiff with no other adequate remedy. As already pointed out, the plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law, if fraud was committed, whether the sheriff was or was not a party to the fraud.
The complaint was rightly dismissed, and the judgment must be affirmed, with costs.
INGRAHAM, P. J., and CLARKE, J., concur.