Case Name: BROWNE v. PRATT & LETCHWORTH CO.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1908-07-07
Citations: 111 N.Y.S. 863
Docket Number: 
Parties: BROWNE v. PRATT & LETCHWORTH CO.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 111
Pages: 863–868

Head Matter:
BROWNE v. PRATT & LETCHWORTH CO.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.
July 7, 1908.)
Master and Servant—Injury to Servant—Contributory Negligence—Instructions.
Plaintiff, a man 22 years old, employed in defendant’s factory, which was 300 feet long, at a saw, was injured, on the third night of his employment therein, while putting on the belt which drove his saw, he standing on a crossbeam above his saw, and for the purpose of steadying himself putting his hand on the top of the rail, 6 feet above the crossbeam, on which rail ran a crane, and the crane, coming from behind, running over his hand. There was evidence that there were not more than 10 or 15 minutes at a time when the crane was not moving. Plaintiff, while not denying that the crane passed up and down the room, testified that- he paid no attention to it, that he did not know whether or not it passed over his head, and that he never paid any attention of that kind, looking about the shop. Held, that it was error to deny, with the statement that it must be found that plaintiff knew and appreciated the danger of putting his hand on the rail, or that he had been instructed as to the danger, a requested instruction that if plaintiff had noticed that the crane was frequently passing up and down the track, and placed his hand on the rail with such knowledge, he could not recover.
Spring and Williams, JJ., dissenting.
Appeal from Trial Term, Erie County.
Action by Louis W. Browne against the Pratt & Letchworth Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, and from an order denying a motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial, defendant appeals.
Reversed, and new trial ordered.
Argued before McLENNAN, P. J., and SPRING, WILLIAMS, KRUSE, and ROBSON, JJ.
Evan Hollister, for appellant.
Philip A. Laing, for respondent.

Opinion:
KRUSE, J.
The plaintiff, a workman in defendant's employ, placed his hand on top of the rail upon which a traveling crane was moving, and his hand was injured. He brings the action to recover damages for the personal injuries so sustained, alleging that the defendant was negligent in placing him at work in a dangerous place, made so by the movements of the traveling crane, without instructing or warning him of the danger. The defendant is a manufacturing corporation, making iron castings and the like. It has a machine shop. The shop is 300 feet long and 37 feet wide. In the shop is a traveling crane, about 16 feet above the floor. It runs on two rails, one on each side of- the building. The rails are laid, on and along I-beams. The crane runs backward and forward the entire length of the shop. It is used to distribute castings and other" material. It is operated by a man in a cage at one side of the crane, under directions of some one on the floor. At one side of the shop are located revolving saws. They are operated by power supplied by means of shafting, pulleys, and belts.
The plaintiff'was at work at one of these saws. A crossbeam resting on a standard extends over the saw. The crossbeam is about 10 feet above the floor, and a little over 5 feet below the top of the rail upon which the crane, runs. There is a line shaft along the side of the shop, a little below and a little farther away from the side of the wall than the I-beam. There is a pulley on this shaft, which drives the saw in question by means of a belt. The belt was off, and the plaintiff was directed by the foreman in charge of his branch of the work to get up on the crossbeam and put the belt on the pulley. He got up on the crossbeam, which projected from the side over the saw, and put his left hand on top of the rail to steady himself, with his back towards the crane. The crane came along, passed over his fingers, and crushed them. He could have taken hold of the lower flange of the I-beam, but perhaps not so conveniently, nor hold himself so securely. The shopwork seems to have been carried on night and day. The plaintiff worked nights. He had worked there but a short time when he was injured, being hurt on the third night of his employment. He testified that when he went to work there he received no instructions, that he was not told to look out for the crane, and that he never noticed it. There was a printed notice posted, warning employes to look out for the crane; but plaintiff testified that he never saw it, and that just before he was hurt he was told by the foreman to put on the belt. He told the foreman that he did no: know anything about putting on the belt. The foreman said to get up on the beam, hang on, take hold, and put, it around the pulley. The plaintiff attempted to comply with the directions, and was injured in the manner stated.
While we think the evidence sufficient upon the question of the defendant's negligence to send the case to the jury, the question of the plaintiff's contributory negligence is not so free from doubt. There was a general foreman in charge of the shop, over the one who gave the directions to the plaintiff. He was not in the defendant's employ at the time of the trial, and was called as a witness by the plaintiff. He testified that, while the crane did not move constantly up and down, the shop, it would probably not stand stationary longer than 10 or 15 minutes at a time; that it was used quite a little the night of the accident, before the plaintiff was hurt. The plaintiff himself does not deny that the crane passed up and down; but he says he paid no attention to it, and that he did not know whether it passed over his head or not. As he puts it:
"I never paid any attention of that kind, looking around the shop. I paid attention to my work."
If this crane was used, passing up and down frequently, directly over the plaintiff, during the time he was at work in this shop, as the undisputed evidence shows it. was, it seems incredible that the plaintiff should not have noticed the crane and the manner of its operation; and, if he did, he must have known and appreciated the danger of putting his hand upon the rail over which the crane was moving back and forth.
After the evidence was closed, and before the case was summed up and submitted to the jury, in answer to an inquiry of counsel for the defendant, the presiding judge stated that if the jury should find as a matter of fact that the plaintiff knew of the operation of the crane, and knew that it was liable to run along the rail there at any moment, and put his hand on the rail, he was guilty of contributory negligence; but in charging the jury it seems to have been left uncertain (at least so defendant's counsel claims) whether, if the jury found those facts, the question would still be left open whether the plaintiff knew and appreciated the danger involved in putting his hand upon the rail, and at the close of the charge the court was asked to specifically charge that if the plaintiff had noticed that the crane was frequently passing up and down the track, and placed his hand on the rail with such knowledge, he cannot recover. This request was denied, for the reason, as stated by the judge, that it must be found that he knew and appreciated the danger of putting his hand upon the rail—either that, or that he had been instructed as to the danger; and he refused, to charge as requested, except with this qualification, to which defendant's counsel excepted.
It seems to me that the defendant was entitled to this request without qualification. The plaintiff was a man 22 years of age, and presumably of ordinary intelligence. If he knew that this crane was frequently passing up and down the track, and placed his hand on the rail, he must have appreciated that this heavy crane passing over it would injure his hand. We do not decide that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law; but we think that the request should have been charged without the qualification, and that the error was so prejudicial to the defendant as to require a new trial.
The judgment and order should therefore be reversed, and a new trial ordered, with costs to the appellant to abide the event.
MCLENNAN, P. J., and ROBSON, J., concur.