Case Name: Ronald H. SPRINGER and Terry C. Oltmann v. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., and Armond M. Traylor
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1975-03-12
Citations: 311 So. 2d 36
Docket Number: No. 6586
Parties: Ronald H. SPRINGER and Terry C. Oltmann v. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., and Armond M. Traylor.
Judges: Before REDMANN, GULOTTA, BOU-TALL, SCHOTT and BEER, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 311
Pages: 36–44

Head Matter:
Ronald H. SPRINGER and Terry C. Oltmann v. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., and Armond M. Traylor.
No. 6586.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
March 12, 1975.
Rehearing Denied April 15, 1975.
Writ Refused June 13, 1975.
Thomas L. Giraud, New Orleans, for plainti f f s-appellees.
Hammett, Leake, Hammett, Hayne & Hulse, Michael E. Wanek, New Orleans, for defendants-appellants, Government Employees Ins. Co., Inc. and Armond M. Traylor.
Jones, Walker, Waechter, Poitevent, Car rere & Denegre, R. Henry Sarpy, Jr., New Orleans, for defendants-appellees, The Travelers Ins. Co.
Before REDMANN, GULOTTA, BOU-TALL, SCHOTT and BEER, JJ.

Opinion:
BEER, Judge.
Suit was brought by Ronald H. Springer, the owner-driver of an automobile, and Terry C. Oltmann, passenger therein, for personal injuries and damages as a result of a collision with a vehicle operated by Armond M. Traylor and insured by Government Employees Insurance Company, Inc. Subsequently, Travelers Insurance Company, the carrier of plaintiff's uninsured motorist coverage, was made a party defendant. From a judgment in favor of plaintiffs and against Traylor, and Government Employees Insurance Company, Inc., and a dismissal of plaintiffs' claim against Travelers, several appeals have been taken.
The record discloses a series of events, all taking place at high speeds, which re- suited in a head-on collision between the Springer and Traylor automobiles in Springer's lane of traffic on a divided four-lane highway. The trial judge gave judgment against Traylor. We reverse.
Under these factual circumstances, the trial judge correctly determined that Traylor was burdened with the obligation to exculpate himself from blame by affirmatively showing himself to-be free from fault. In adopting this position the trial court had ample basis for it has been often stated that:
"A motorist who is involved in a collision in the wrong lane must absolve himself from negligence by a clear preponderance of the evidence; that is, inasmuch as he was in the wrong lane of traffic at the time of the accident, he is presumed to have been negligent and bears the burden of establishing that he was without fault or that there were circumstances which justified his conduct."
See: Coleman v. Ross, 232 So.2d 885 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 1970); Wishom v. Ford Motor Company, 256 So.2d 298 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1971); Mistich v. Matthaei, 277 So.2d 239 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1973); Bauer v. Bauer, 211 So.2d 375 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1968); Lewis v. Travelers Insurance Company, 247 So.2d 635 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1971).
However, we conclude that Traylor carried the burden properly thrust upon him. He and the independent eyewitnesses who testified in his behalf give creditable accounts of the incidents which, compressed into the time sequence and the physical factors existent at the critical moment, sufficiently explain the mechanics of the crash.
Traylor was heading east on Highway 90 on his way to work. Traffic was medium to heavy. He was proceeding in the "inside" lane — next to the median — at a speed between 55 and 60 miles per hour.
The median is at this point about 5 feet wide with curbing.
A vehicle passed him on his right at high speed, cut diagonally in front of him at the moment he caught his first glimpse of it in juxtaposition with his automobile and the one just ahead of him and to his right in the "outside" lane.
Confronted with a sudden emergency not caused by his own actions, he braked his automobile and moved close to the curb of the median. His car was then struck by the car that cut diagonally in front of him and that impact was enough to cause his car to strike the median curbing. At the speed previously described, the Traylor car, now verging on being out of control, apparently went up on to the median and either at that moment or in the next moment the front tire or tires blew out. At that point the Traylor car was — for all intents and purposes — out of control. In this status, it crossed the "inside" west-heading lane of Highway 90 and struck the Springer automobile head-on in the "outside" west-heading lane of traffic.
There is little doubt that the hit-and-run vehicle previously described did hit the Traylor automobile. Independent witness Cancienne describes the impact between the vehicles and recalls that a piece of chrome came off the Traylor vehicle at impact. He saw it when it came off and when it hit the ground and testified that "it was still in the roadway after the accident on the opposite side of the road from where the Buick (Traylor) hit the Fairlane (Springer)."
Independent witness Mrs. Phillips saw the hit-and-run vehicle "weaving in and out" of traffic "like rick rack." She saw that car cut in front of Traylor and saw Traylor's car as it apparently went out of control — after being just missed or struck [she did not see the actual striking] by the hit-and-run vehicle.
Independent witness Theriot saw the hit-and-run vehicle cut sharply in front of Traylor but can only say that it either hit him or came very close to doing so.
All witnesses confirm the fact that the sequence of events that let directly to the head-on collision began with the swerving action of the hit-and-run vehicle. There is no contrary testimony. Nor is there any refutation of that portion of the evidence that shows an actual collision between the hit-and-run vehicle and Traylor's automobile.
We believe that the mechanism of this accident went into operation at the moment the hit-and-run vehicle swerved into the path of the Traylor automobile and struck it and ended when Traylor struck Springer in Springer's lane of traffic. All this happened in the few seconds that intervened and in a climate of sudden emergency. There is nothing before us to indicate that Traylor — thus confronted — acted improperly under the circumstances. He fought for control but the physical factors existent after the left tire blew and the left wheel "bursted" could not be overcome.
Starting with the presumption that, under the circumstances, Traylor must be presumed negligent, we believe that he has rebutted the presumption by a preponderance of the evidence and borne the burden of establishing that he was without fault even though his reactions during the sudden emergency may not have been exactly those of a man with unsurpassed experience in coping with unforeseen circumstances calling for immediate action.
Having determined that Traylor was not negligent, we must give consideration to the claims by Springer and Oltmann against Travelers Insurance Company, the uninsured motorist insurer of the Springer automobile.
The facts show that plaintiffs were painfully injured as the result of the negligence of a hit-and-run driver. The physical contact between the hit-and-run vehicle and the Traylor vehicle was the sole, direct and proximate cause of the collision between the Traylor vehicle and the Springer vehicle. Thus, we are confronted with a situation where this court must make a determination with respect to the applicability, under these specific circumstances, of the uninsured motorist coverage provisions of the Travelers Insurance Company policy insuring the Springer vehicle.
The policy of insurance issued by The Travelers Indemnity Company provides as follows:
"Definitions
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" '[H]it-and-run vehicle' means a highway vehicle which causes bodily injury to the insured arising out of physical contact of such vehicle with the insured or with an automobile which the insured is occupying at the time of the accident, provided: (a) there cannot be ascertained the identity of either the operator or the owner of such 'hit-and-run vehicle'; (b) the insured or someone on his behalf shall have reported the accident within 24 hours to a police, peace or judicial officer or to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, and shall have filed with the company within 30 days thereafter a statement under oath that the insured or his legal representative has a cause or causes of action arising out of such accident for damages against a person or persons whose identity is unascer-tainable, and setting forth the facts in support thereof; and (c) at the company's request, the insured or his legal representative makes available for inspection the automobile which the insured was occupying at the time of the accident." (Emphasis added.)
We hold that the "physical contact of such vehicle" includes the physical contact of that vehicle with an intermediate vehicle or other object which, in the same mechanism of the accident, strikes the assured's vehicle. We limit this to the type of factual situation existent here. Specifically, the injury causing impact must have a complete, proximate, direct and timely relationship with the first impact between the hit-and-run vehicle and the intermediate vehicle. In effect, the impact must be the result of an unbroken chain of events with a clearly definable beginning and ending, occurring in a continuous sequence.
As stated by the Michigan Court of Appeals in Lord v. Auto Owners Insurance Company, 22 Mich.App. 669, 177 N.W.2d 653, (1970):
"It is clear that ever since the time of Sir Isaac Newton man has recognized and lived by certain physical laws of impact and motion. Accordingly, we hold, as did the Federal Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (applying Florida law) in the case of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Spinola (CA5, 1967), 374 F.2d 873, that an insured party is covered where the impact of the hit-and-run car was transmitted to his car through an intermediate car. We find, as did Sir Isaac, that this acceptance of a fundamental property of natural phenomena is the more sensible and consistent view as regards transfer of impact through intermediate objects."
In this connection, see also Inter-Insurance Exchange of the Automobile Club of Southern California v. Lopez, 238 Cal. App.2d 441, 47 Cal.Rptr. 834 (1966) and Uninsured Motorist Indorsement: Validity and Construction of Requirement That There Be "Physical Contact" With Unidentified or Hit-And-Run Vehicle, 25 ALR 3rd 1299, particularly Sec. 3 [b] at p. 1304.
The applicable provisions of the policy of insurance issued by Travelers Insurance Company to Springer provide coverage in the basic amount as provided by the statute ($5,000/$10,000). See joint exhibit marked "P-4" which is Policy Number 009651179100 1 of The Travelers Indemnity Company. The claims of Springer and Oltmann against Travelers, Springer's uninsured motorist insurer, were preserved insofar as this proceeding is concerned by the devolutive appeal filed on June 7, 1974.
The judgment appealed from is reversed. The claim by Ronald H. Springer and Terry C. Oltmann against Travelers Insurance Company, the uninsured motorist insurer of the Springer vehicle will be allowed in the amount of $3,000.00 in favor of Terry C. Oltmann and $5,000.00 in favor of Ronald H. Springer, plus interest from date of judicial demand. The costs of this appeal to be paid by Travelers Insurance Company.
Reversed and rendered.