Case Name: PENNSYLVANIA HUMAN RELATIONS COMMISSION, Appellee, v. JONES & LAUGHLIN STEEL CORPORATION, Aliquippa Works Division, Appellant
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1978-11-18
Citations: 483 Pa. 35
Docket Number: No. 195
Parties: PENNSYLVANIA HUMAN RELATIONS COMMISSION, Appellee, v. JONES & LAUGHLIN STEEL CORPORATION, Aliquippa Works Division, Appellant.
Judges: Before EAGEN, C. J., and O’BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX, MANDERINO and LARSEN, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania State Reports
Volume: 483
Pages: 35–40

Head Matter:
394 A.2d 525
PENNSYLVANIA HUMAN RELATIONS COMMISSION, Appellee, v. JONES & LAUGHLIN STEEL CORPORATION, Aliquippa Works Division, Appellant.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Argued Sept. 18, 1978.
Decided Nov. 18, 1978.
Robert W. Hartland, Reed, Smith, Shaw & McClay, Pittsburgh, for appellant.
James D. Keeney, Asst. Gen. Counsel, (AEP) Human Relations Commission, Harrisburg, for appellee.
Before EAGEN, C. J., and O’BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX, MANDERINO and LARSEN, JJ.

Opinion:
OPINION
NIX, Justice.
This appeal is from an order of the Commonwealth Court enforcing a subpoena issued by the appellee, Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (Commission), to the manager of the appellant, Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, Aliquippa Works Division (J & L), to testify concerning a complaint filed with the Commission, charging J & L with employment discrimination on the basis of sex, race and national origin. J & L's sole contention is that section 7(g) of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act only gives the Commission the power to issue subpoenas in connection with hearings before it. The Commission, in addition to disputing this issue on the merits, has moved to quash the appeal on the ground that the order enforcing its subpoena is not a final order, and is hence not appealable. We reserved decision on the motion until this question could be briefed and argued by the parties. We now grant the motion and quash the appeal.
In this jurisdiction the law is clear that a ruling denying a motion to quash a subpoena or an order directing a response to depositions directed to a party to the litigation are interlocutory and therefore not appealable. Kine v. Forman, 412 Pa. 163, 194 A.2d 175 (1963); Young v. Bradford Co. Tel. Co., 346 Pa. 90, 29 A.2d 533 (1943). There was formerly some authority for the view that an order directed to a witness, who was not a party to the litigation, to respond to process of this nature might present a final and appealable decision. See e. g. International Coal Mining Co. v. Penna. R. R., 214 Pa. 469, 63 A. 880 (1906). However, even this exception has been discarded in our more recent decisions. Petition of Specter, 455 Pa. 518, 317 A.2d 286 (1974).
Mr. Justice O'BRIEN, speaking for a majority of this Court, has recently stated the long-standing rule of both this jurisdiction and the federal system with respect to grand jury subpoenas:
"It has long been the law that the denial of a motion to quash a grand jury subpoena is interlocutory and, therefore, not appealable. United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 91 S.Ct. 1580, 29 L.Ed.2d 85 (1971), Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 60 S.Ct. 540, 84 L.Ed. 783 (1939). Instead, the party subpoenaed must either comply with the subpoena or refuse to comply and litigate the propriety of the subpoena in the event that contempt or similar proceedings are brought against him. Forcing the party subpoenaed to make such a choice is justified by the 'necessity for expedition in the administration of the criminal law.' United States v. Ryan, supra, 402 U.S. at 533, 91 S.Ct. 1580."
Petition of Specter, 455 Pa. 518, 519-20, 317 A.2d 286, 287 (1974).
The need for expedition in administrative agency investigations is at least as great as in grand jury investigations. We can perceive of no legitimate legal or policy reason for providing for a different result as to when the matter is ripe for appellate review based solely on the fact that the body issuing the subpoenas is an administrative agency and not an investigating grand jury. We note that in both the Petition of Specter, supra, and in the instant case the right of the body to issue the subpoena was being challenged.
Appeal quashed.
POMEROY, J., filed a concurring opinion.
MANDERINO, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which LARSEN, J., joined.
. Act of Oct. 27, 1955, P.L. 744, § 7(g), as amended, 43 P.S. § 957(g).
. This writer took the position that where there is a substantial question concerning the authority to issue the subpoena, the subpoenaed party should not be forced to risk contempt in order to challenge the subpoena on appeal. Petition of Specter, 455 Pa. 518, 521, 317 A.2d 286, 288 (1974) (Dissenting Opinion of NIX, J., joined by MANDERINO, J.). The majority having clearly rejected this position, however, this Court must apply its rule consistently rather than shifting its application to depend on either the current composition of the Court or whatever view a majority may wish to reach on the merits.
. On the comparability of administrative agency and grand jury investigations, see United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642, 70 S.Ct. 357, 94 L.Ed. 401 (1950).