Case Name: CITY OF ST. PAUL v. ROBERT MORRIS
Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Minnesota
Decision Date: 1960-07-22
Citations: 258 Minn. 467
Docket Number: No. 37,909
Parties: CITY OF ST. PAUL v. ROBERT MORRIS.
Judges: 
Reporter: Minnesota Reports
Volume: 258
Pages: 467–482

Head Matter:
CITY OF ST. PAUL v. ROBERT MORRIS.
104 N. W. (2d) 902.
July 22, 1960
— No. 37,909.
Otis H. Godfrey, Sr., for appellant.
Louis P. Sheahan, Corporation Counsel, and Robert E. Faricy, Assistant Corporation Counsel, for respondent.
Certiorari denied, 365 U. S. 815, 81 S. Ct. 696, —■ L. ed. (2d) —.

Opinion:
Dell, Chief Justice.
Defendant was convicted of disorderly conduct under St. Paul City Ordinance 438.02. He appeals from the judgment of conviction.
On January 10, 1959, at approximately 1:30 a. m., the defendant's half brother, Booker T. Parker, was arrested with two others on a charge of consuming liquor in a restaurant not licensed for such consumption. As the officers left the establishment and were leading the accused to the police car, the defendant walked behind them asking the officers why they were arresting his brother who, defendant claimed, had done nothing to warrant arrest. The defendant then said to the officers two or three times, "You white mother f — kers, what are you picking on us for, why don't you pick on the white people?" He was then placed under arrest. While it appears from the record that other persons were close enough to hear what was said, no claim is made that persons other than the officers did, in fact, hear the defendant's remarks or that, apart from the words referred to, the defendant created any disturbance.
Defendant contends that the use of abusive language toward a police officer does not, in itself, constitute disorderly conduct. In support of his argument he cites numerous authorities, particularly New York cases, holding that since an officer is charged with preserving the peace, offensive language directed solely toward an officer, however abusive or vile it may be, cannot be said to tend to provoke a breach of the peace. This largely fictional reasoning has been vigorously repudiated in other jurisdictions, and not always followed in New York.
Regardless of the merits of these cases they are of little significance since the conduct prohibited by the ordinance here involved is not limited to acts which tend to breach the peace or cause actual disturbance. It is the rule in this state, as it is generally elsewhere, that legislation relating to disorderly conduct also embraces acts which corrupt the public morals or outrage the sense of public decency. Under the circumstances before us the foul, vulgar, and obscene expressions admittedly used by the defendant constituted conduct of such a nature. While it is obvious that not every abusive epithet directed toward police officers would be sufficiently disturbing or provocative to justify arrest for disorderly conduct, there is no sound reason why officers must be subjected to indignities such as present here, indignities that go far beyond what any other citizen might reasonably be expected to endure.
Since this opinion was written a dissent has appeared even though the only issue briefed and argued is the one disposed of by the majority opinion. Ordinance 438.02 is the only one involved. The trial and conviction in the court below as well as the briefs of both parties here were based on that ordinance. No other ordinance was mentioned.
The question of whether the ordinance involved is sufficiently definitive to meet constitutional requirements was not argued by the defendant. Nevertheless it is clear from our discussion in State v. Reynolds, 243 Minn. 196, 66 N. W. (2d) 886, in which we held that the offense of "disorderly conduct," as defined in M. S. A. 615.17, was not too vague or indefinite, that an ordinance of the type here involved is also sufficiently certain to meet objections on constitutional grounds.
Nor can we adopt the suggestion made in the dissenting opinion that the foul and vulgar expletive here used became offensive only because it was addressed by a colored person to a Caucasian officer and referred to the "white" race. While each case must rest upon the probable and natural consequences of the defendant's own conduct, under the particular facts involved, we have no doubt that the expression would be equally provocative and offensive to any citizen, regardless of race.
No racial issue was raised in this appeal, and as pointed out in footnote 17 of the dissent, the record does not even show that the defendant and his companions were of the colored race while the officers were of the Caucasian race. We think it would have been a great deal better, and certainly far more judicial, to have waited until a case was presented to us dealing squarely with this issue than to inject it, as was unfortunately done here, through the dissent.
The defendant's other assignments, dealing with procedural matters only, have not been briefed or argued. In any event they are without merit.
Affirmed.
Ordinance 438.02 provides: "Any person or persons who shall make, aid or countenance, or assist in making any noise, riot, disturbance or improper diversion, to the annoyance or disturbance of the citizens, or other person or persons in said city; or who collect in bodies or crowds in any street or public place in said city, so as to obstruct public travel thereon, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."
See Pavish v. Meyers, 129 Wash. 605, 225 P. 633, 34 A. L. R. 561, and the authorities cited therein.
Compare People v. Lukowsky, 94 Misc. 500, 159 N. Y. S. 599, relied upon by the defendant, with People v. Fenton, 102 Misc. 43, 168 N. Y. S. 725.
State v. Reynolds, 243 Minn. 196, 66 N. W. (2d) 886; 2 Wharton, Criminal Law and Procedure, § 805.
Under M. S. A. 615.17 every person who "engages in brawling or fighting" is guilty of disorderly conduct.