Case Name: John O. MAY v. STATE of Arkansas
Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 1973-04-09
Citations: 254 Ark. 194
Docket Number: 5796
Parties: John O. MAY v. STATE of Arkansas
Judges: Byrd, J., dissents in part.
Reporter: Arkansas Reports
Volume: 254
Pages: 194–199

Head Matter:
John O. MAY v. STATE of Arkansas
5796
492 S.W. 2d 888
Opinion delivered April 9, 1973
[As modified on denial of rehearing April 30, 1973.]
Jack L. Lessenberry, for appellant.
Jim Guy Tucker, Atty. Gen., by: Frank B. Newell, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Opinion:
Lyle Brown, Justice.
J. O. May appeals from a conviction on a charge of inducing an abortion. It was the theory of the State that at the request of Kaye and Allan Kuykendall, Bill McCord, Jr. contacted Teresa Barrett who he had reason to believe could get in touch with someone who would perform an abortion. Teresa was said to have contacted appellant and arranged for the abortion. Kaye Kuykendall testified that the illegal act was committed on October 9, 1970, which happened to be appellant's birthday. Appellant's defense was an alibi. He, along with corroborating witnesses, testified that appellant was in DeValls Bluff celebrating his birthday. Those are about all the facts that are necessary to an understanding of the issues on appeal. Such additional facts as are pertinent to an understanding of any of the issues will be subsequently recited.
We shall first treat appellant's argument that our abortion statutes, Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-303-310 (Supp. 1971) are unconstitutional in light of two recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court. Doe v. Bolton, Attorney General of Georgia, 93 S. Ct. 739, 35 L. Ed. 2d 201 (1973); Roe v. Wade, District Attorney of Dallas County, 93 S. Ct. 705, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1973). In both cases, parts of the abortion laws of the respective states were declared unconstitutional. In Roe, it was determined by the Court that a pregnant single woman had standing to attack the Texas statute; the plaintiffs in Doe were an indigent, married, pregnant Georgia citizen and certain licensed physicians, standing being conferred, so the Court held, on the latter through Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968). The most salient aspect of both cases (Roe and Doe) for the purposes of the appeal in the case at bar is that the decisions in/ both Roe arid Doc contemplate the per for mance-of'abortions only by licensed physicians.. In fact as to laymen, Roe makes the statement, in its summary under XI that a state "may proscribe any abortion by a person who is not a physician". .Our Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-303 in effect prohibits abortions by two classes of people, physicians and laymen. The effect of the Supreme Court holdings was to strike down the prohibition as against physicians during the period preceding approximately the end of the first trimester. The cited section can be left intact as to laymen; that was the effect of our holding in Borchert v. Scott, 248 Ark. 1041, 460 S.W. 2d 28 (1970), where we said: "If a statute attempts to accomplish two or more objects, and is void as to one, it may still be in every respect complete and valid as to the other". An abortion case in point in this respect is Commonwealth v. Brunelle, 277 N.E. 2d 826 (Mass. 1971).
The appellant has no standing to personally attack the constitutionality of § 41-303 because it is not unconstitutional as applied to him. As applied to appellant, § 41-303 simply prohibits a layman from performing or inducing an abortion. As we have pointed out, the United States Supreme Court says in Doe and Roe that the states have a right to prohibit such activity by one other than a physician. In Brunelle, supra, the standing of the accused to attack the statute as unconstitutional was brought into question and his standing to make that attack was denied because Brunelle was not a licensed physician. The court said: "Only persons whose interests are affected by a statute may assert that it is unconstitutional".
We are compelled to reverse and remand for new trial, principally because appellant was denied the right to attack the credibility of some of the State's key witnesses on the grounds of certain acts of moral turpitude. For example, appellant sought to elicit from Mrs. Kuykendall the fact that she had sexual relations with another witness, Bill McCord, Jr., while she was married to Allan Kuykendall. (Mrs. Kuykendall admitted the act in her testimony in chambers). Appellant also sought to elicit on cross-examination of Bill McCord, Jr., a State witness, that McCord had been found in an alley suffering from the effects of drugs. On cross-examination the credibility of a witness may be impeached by showing acts of moral turpitude. Hale v. State, 252 Ark. 1040, 483 S.W. 2d 228 (1972); Heath v. State, 249 Ark. 217, 459 S.W. 2d 420 (1970). Still more in point are such cases as Garrard v. State, 113 Ark. 598, 167 S.W. 485 (1914), intercourse with other men; Rowe v. State, 155 Ark. 419, 244 S.W. 463 (1922), intercourse with others; Schooley v. State, 176 Ark. 895; 2 S.W. 2d 67 (1928) immoral acts.
Several other points for reversal are advanced. Some of those will not arise on retrial; others have no merit; and some present situations in which a timely record was not made.
Reversed and remanded.
Byrd, J., dissents in part.