Case Name: Lionel RUBALCAVA, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Tom FELKER, Warden, Warden, High Desert State Prison, Susanville, California, Respondent-Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2013-08-07
Citations: 537 F. App'x 683
Docket Number: No. 10-15791
Parties: Lionel RUBALCAVA, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Tom FELKER, Warden, Warden, High Desert State Prison, Susanville, California, Respondent-Appellee.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 537
Pages: 683–684

Head Matter:
Lionel RUBALCAVA, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Tom FELKER, Warden, Warden, High Desert State Prison, Susanville, California, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 10-15791.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted June 10, 2013.
Filed Aug. 7, 2013.
Lionel Rubalcava, Soledad, CA, pro se.
Rene Antonio Chacon, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Office of the California Attorney General, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent-Appellee.
Before: O’SCANNLAIN and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges, and PIERSOL, Senior District Judge.
The Honorable Lawrence L. Piersol, Senior District Judge for the U.S. District Court for the District of South Dakota, sitting by designation.

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Petitioner Lionel Rubalcava appeals the district court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus, brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He argues that the California Court of Appeals unreasonably applied Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), by rejecting his challenge to testimony at his trial from the state's expert witness.
The state court did not unreasonably apply Crawford. There, the court squarely stated that "[t]he [Confrontation] Clause [ ] does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n. 9, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Here, the statements recounted by the state's expert were not for the purpose of establishing the truth of the matters asserted but rather were only admitted to explain the basis of the expert's opinions— a fact which was explained to the jury at the time and in the jury instructions. See, e.g., Fed.R.Evid. 703 (permitting experts to disclose otherwise inadmissible facts to explain the basis of their opinion if the probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect). Given his admission that he was a gang member, Rubalcava was not prejudiced to the extent that the witness may have repeated the opinions of others as to his membership. In the highly deferential posture demanded by AEDPA, this was not an unreasonable application of Crawford.
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.