Case Name: William Wallace, Plaintiff in Error, vs. Corry M'Connell, Defendant in Error
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1839-01
Citations: 13 Pet. 136
Docket Number: 
Parties: William Wallace, Plaintiff in Error, vs. Corry M'Connell, Defendant in Error.
Judges: 
Reporter: United States Reports
Volume: 38
Pages: 136–152

Head Matter:
William Wallace, Plaintiff in Error, vs. Corry M'Connell, Defendant in Error.
An action was instituted oh a promissory note against the drawer, by which the drawer promised to.pay at the oiHqe of discount and deposite of the Bank of the United States at Nashville, three years after date, four thousand and eighty dollars. In the declaration which set out the note according to its terms, and alleged the promise to pay-according-to toe tenor of the note,' there was no averment that the note yras presented at the bank, •or demand of payment made there. The defendant pleaded payment and satisfaction of site note, and issue was joined toereóm Afterwards, at toe succeeding term, the defendiht interposed a plea of puis darien continuance, stating, that tour thousand two hundred and four dollars, part of the amount of the note had. been attached by B. and W. in a state Court of Alabama, under the attachment law of the state, and'a judgment had been obtained against him for four thousand two hundred and four dollars and costs, with á stay of proceedings until the further proceedings in the case; which remains pndeternSned. lire plaintiff demurred to this plea, and the Circuit Court sustained the demurrer; and judgment was given for toe plaintiff for six hundred and seventy-nine dollars, the residue of the note beyond the amount attached, and a final judgment for the whole amount of toe note. Held, that there was ho érror in the judgment of the Circuit Court.
The aoceptor of a bill of exchange stands in the same relation to the drawee as the maker of a note does to the payee; and the acceptor is the principal debtor in the case of a bill, precisely like the maker of a note. ■ The liability of toe acceptor grows.out of and is to be governed by the terms of his acceptance; and toe liability of the maker of a note grows out of, and is to be governed by the terms of his note; and toe place of payment can be of no more importance-in the one case than in toe other.
It i^ of toe utmost importance that all rules relating'to commercial'law should.be stable and •uniform. .They are adopted for practical purposes, to regulate the course of commercial transactions. When a note or bill is-made payable at a particular bank, as is generally toe case, it is well known that according to the usual course of business, the note or bill is lodged at the bank for collection; and if the maker or acceptor calls to take it up when it falls due,-.it wilt be delivered to him,tafid toe business is closed. But should he Hot ' find the note or bill at too bank, he can deposite his money to meet the note when presented fand should he be afterwards prosecuted, he will be exonerated-from all costs' and damages, upon, proving such tender and deposite. Or should the note or bill be made payable at some place other toan a bank, and no deposite could be made, or he "should choose to retain his- money in his own possession, an offer to pay the money at the time and place would protect him against interest and costs, on bringing the money into Court;
' In. actions oil promissory notes against the maker, or on bill's of exchange where the suit is - against the maker, in the one case, and toe acceptor in the other, and the note of bill is made payable at a specified time and place; it is not necessary to aver in the declaration or prove on the trial, that a demand of payment was made in order to maintain the actibnl But if-the maker or acceptor was at the place at the time designated, and-was ready and offered to pay the money, it was matter of defence to be pleaded and proved on his part.
The jurisdiction-of toe District Court of the United States for the district of Alabama-, and toe right of a plaintiff to prose.cute his suit, having attached by the commencement oft toe suit in the District Court, that right .cannot be taken away or arrested by any proceedings in another Court. An attachment of toe debt by toe process of a state Court, after toe commencement of the suit in.a Court of the United States, cannot affect the right of .toe plaintiff to recover in the suit.
An attachment commenced, and conducted to a conclusion before the institution of a suit against the debtor in a Court of the United States, may be set up as a defence to the suit; and toe defendant would.be prohibited pro-tan to under a recovery had by virtue of the attachment, and could plead such-recovery in bar. So, too, an attachment pending, in a state Court, prior to toe commencement of a quit in toe Court of the United States, may be pleaded in abatement. The attachment of toe debt in such case in the hands' of toq defendant, would fix ittoere in favour of the attaching creditors; and toe defendant could„ not afterwards pay it over to toe plaintiff The attaching creditor would in such a case; acquir^a lien on the debt binding on the defendant, and which therCourts of all other governments, if they recognise such proceedings at all, would not fail to regard. The rule must be reciprocal; and when the suit in one Court ig commenced prior to proceedings under attachment, in another Court, such proceedings cannot arrest the'suit.
It seems that a plea of puis darien continuance, is considered as a waiver óf all previous pleas; and the cause of action is admitted to the same extent as if- no other defence had been urged than that contained in the plea.
IN error to the District Court of the United States for the southern district of Alabama.
The plaintiff in error, William Wallace,, was sued in. the District Court of Alabama, exercising the powers of a Circuit Court of the United States, on the second day of April, 1836, by a capias issued out of that Court, and returnable on the first Monday of May following. The action was brought on a promissory note, under the seal of the defendant, for four thousand eight hundred and eighty dollars, dated May Í0, i832, and payable to. the plaintiff or to his order, at the office of discount and deposite of the Bank of the United States, at Nashville, three years and two months after date.
At the May term, 1836, of the District Court, the plaintiff filed a declaration oh the note, in debt, alleging the non-payment of the note,' although frequent demands had been made of the drawer. No demand was alleged tó have been made at the office of discount and deposite of the Bank of the United States, at Nashvüle.
The defendant pleaded payment, on which issue was joined, and the case was continued.
At the succeeding term of the District Court, the defendant filed the following plea: That as to the sum of forty-two hundred and four dollars, part and.parcel of the sum by the said plaintiff in said declaration demanded, he, the said plaintiff, ought not further to have and. • maintain his aforesaid action therefore against him; because he Saith,-that after the said last-continuance of this cause, that is to say,, after the term of this-Court held on the first Monday of May last, and before the Decehiber term aforesaid, to wit, on the eighth day of June, in the year. 1836, at Mobile, to wit, in the district aforesaid, one William J. Blocker, John R, Blocker, and Benjamin Horner, merchants, trading'under the name of Horner, Blocker and Co. by Wüliam J. Blocker one of the said firm, in behalf of himself and hia copartner, caused to be sued out a certain writ of original attachment againát the said Corry M‘Connell, for the sum of forty-two hundred and four dollars; and which said writ was issued by Benjamin Wilkins, a justice of the peace of Mobile county, on the said eighth day of June, in the year 1836, and was directed to the sheriff of Mobile county, and was made returnable to the county Court of Mobile county, which was held bn the second Monday in June, 1836, And the said defendant further avers, that the said plaintiffs in tlje said attachment, were at the time of suing out the same, residents of the state of Alabama; that the said Corry M‘Connell was a nonresident, and citizen of the state óf New York, and that the said plaintiffs did comply with the requisites-of the statute, in such cases made and provided,t by giving bond and security, and filed affidavit, whereby it is shown that the said justice'and the said county Court had jurisdiction of the said attachment, and that the said county Court could lawfully hear and determine the same. And the said defendant further saith, that in said original attachment, such proceedings were had; that he, the said William Wallace was on the said eighth day of June, 1836, summoned as a garnishee by the sheriff of Mobile county, and required to appear before the said county Court, and answer, on oath, what he wag. indebted to said Corry M'Connell. And the said William Wallace, defendant, further saith, that, in obedience to the said summons of garnishment, he, the said William, did appear before the said county Court of Mobile, at the said term of the said county Court held on the second Monday in June, 1836, before the judge of said Court then sitting, and was in said suit of attachment between the said Horner, Blocker and Co., plaintiffs, and Corry M'Connell, defendant, examined on oath, touching his indebtedness to the said Corry M'Connell; whereupon he did declare on oath, that he did execute to the said M'Connell, the note for the sum of four thousand eight hundred and eighty dollars, on which' the said plaintiff in this shit hath declared, that he did pay, on the said note to said' M'Connell, on the ’24th day of September, 1833, the sum of three hundred and seventy-two dollars thirty-four' cents, and that the remainder of said note was due by said Wallace to Said M'Connell, &c. And the said defendant further saith, that in the said attachment by said Court, at the said June term thereof, it was ordered that the proceedings against said M'Connell be stayed for six months, arid that notice be given to the said M'Connell of the pendency of said attachment, by letter, directed to New York.; the said M'Connell being shown to be a resident of the stat.e of New York. And the said defendant, Wallace, further saith, that in the said attachment, and upon the said writ of garnishment, the .said Courtat the said June term, then sitting, did make the further' order-following, to wit:
It appearing, to the satisfaction of the Court, that William Wallace has been duly summoned as a garnishee, and he having admitted an indebtedness to said defendant, to an amount greater than the amount sued for in the above entitled cause, it is considered by the Court, that said plaintiffs do recover from said garnishee, the sum of forty-two'hundred and four dollars, the amount sued for in said case, together with the cost thereof, and that all proceedings against said garnishee be stayed until the final disposition of said case; wherefore the said cause was, in said county Court, at said June term, continued by said Court,- as well against the said M'Connell as against the said Wallace, till the next term thereof, to be held in due course of law, that is to say, on the second Monday of February, in the year 1837. All which said pro.céedings in the said county Court, in which the- said plea still remains pending and undetermined, are still in frill force, and not reversed, vacated, or otherwise set aside, as by the record and proceedings in said Court, still remaining of re cord, will more fully and at large appear; and that he, the said defendant, is ready to verify: wherefore, he prays judgment, if the said plaintiffs ought further to have or maintain his said action therefor, against him, this defendant, as to the sum of four thousand two hundred and four dollars, parcel of .the sum by the said plaintiffs above demanded, &c.
The plaintiff at the same term entered a demurrer to this plea of puis darien continuance, and prayed the Court to render judgment against the defendant for six hundred and seventy-six dollars thirty cents, parcel of the debt of four thousand eight hundred and eighty dollars, the amount of the note, which by the plea was wholly undefended; and as to the said-plea of puis, darien continuance, the plaintiff says that the plea of the defehdant is not sufficient to bar him from maintaining his action on the said note, &c.
The Court, on the pleadings, gave judgment as follows: “As to the said sum of four thousand two hundred and five dollars; being argued by counsel,' it seems to the Court that said plea, as to the said sum. of forty-two hundred and five dollars, and the allegations therein contained, are not sufficient in law to bar the said plaintiff from having and maintaining his aforesaid action therefor against the said defendant; whereupon, it is ordered by the court, that the said demurrer be sustained; but as to the sum of six hundred and seventy-five dollars, thirty-nine cents, the residue of said plaintiff’s debt, in his declaration mentioned, this day. came the plaintiff, by his attorney, and the said defendant, being solemnly called, came not, but wholly made default, as to the said last mentioned sum, whereby the said plaintiff, therein against him remains altogether undefended. It is therefore considered by the Court, that the said Corry McConnell, plaintiff, do recover against the said William Wallace, defendant, the said sum of four thousand eight hundred and eighty dollars and thirty-nine cents, his debt aforesaid, and also the further ' sum of three hundred and ninety-four dollars, the inteest thereon, assessed by the clerk of this Court by way of damages, for the detention of the same, together with his cost in this cause; the plaintiff remits to the defendant the sum of three hundred and fifty-one dollars, twenty-eight cents.”
The record of the District Court stated: “In this-cause the Court décided that the plea-of puis da.'ien continuance was a waver of the previous, plea.pleaded by the defendant: there was no default of thé defendant, further than his abandonment, under the decision of the Court, of 'his first plea. In this cause the defendant moved the Court to stay proceedings in the said cause until the final decision. of the County Court of Mobile county, upon the attachment of Horner, Blocker and Co.; which motion was overruled.”
The defendant prosecuted this appeal.
The case was-argued by Mr. Key, for the plaintiff in error; and by Mr. Crittenden, for the defendant.
For the plaintiff, it was contended,
1. That the demurrer should have been overruled, the matters pleaded being sufficient under the attachment laws of Alabama.
2. That the judgment, by nil dicit, as to-the residue of the debt, viz., the $675' 39, not attached, was erroneous ; inasmuch as it was covered, and defended by the first plea of payment to the whole debt, which plea was not waived by the subsequent plea, which only went to part of the debt claimed in the action: parties being allowed by the law and practice in Alabama to plead any number of pleas to the same cause of action.
3. That the declaration on the note does not aver that payment of the note was demanded at the office of discount and deposite of the-Bank of the United States, at -Nashville, where the same was payable.
Upon the first point, Mr. Key contended that the attachment in the State Court of Alabama was a bar to further proceeding in the District Court. If this be not so, the plaintiff in the Court below will twice recover the amount of -his debt from- the defendant: once in the District Court, and again in the State Court; as his debt, to the attaching creditor Will be paid under the judgment of that Court. •
. The plaintiff in error had answered to the attachment* that' he owed to McConnell, the defendant in error, the amount of the debt claimed by the plaintiff in the attachment; and this, by the attachment law of Alabama, fixed his responsibility. But as to the residue of the note, he continued liable to the plaintiff in the District Court, if liable at all. The District Court decided that the plea of the attachment was a waiver of the first plea. This Was not so.; it could operate, only, if it had any operation as to part of it.
■ The case of the defendant in error is put on the ground that the attachment was no bar to the suit in the District Court of Alabama.. This would be so, if in the attachment case the garnishee could plead the existing action in the District Courts . This he could not do. - It was not a. plea to the attachment, that a suit was pending for the débt attached; and this is the law of Alabama, as it is in. all the states in which attachment laws exist. By the customs of London such a plea would be good; but not so here.
By the attachment laws of Alabama, every thing in the shape of goods or credits, whether sued for or not, even judgments and money in the hands of the sheriff, may be attached; and.the garnishee can only defend .himself by showing that he had nothing in his hands, and owed nothing to the defendant in 'the attachment. No-matter how he owed,it, whether sued for or not. Aiken’s Digest, 37, sec. 15, 16, 19.
Nor can the defendant in the attachment suit complain.. He has full notice of this proceeding, and may appear and dissolve - the attachment; and he has sécurity for the restoration of the property in a year and a day, should the plaintiff in the attachment have recovered improperly. .
In the case before the Court, the plea of puis darien continuance is said to have overruled the plea of payment, entered to the plaintiff’s declarations, and thus makes it apply to the whole of the claim of the plaintiff; when, in fact, its application was for a sum less than the amount of the note, leaving the balance, six hundred, and seventy-five dollars thirty-nine cents, undefended. This is founded upon the supposition that such a plea withdraws the whole defence originally pleaded. Rut this is not so; the plea has no operation but to the sum stated in it: and in this case, the attachment had seized upon four thousand two hundred and five dollars,leaving the residue of the note sued upon protected from a judgment of the Court, on the original plea of payment. The cáse in 2 Wendall’s Reports, 300, fully, sustains this position.
• 2. Do not the attachment laws of the states interpose a bar to a suit commenced before the attachment?
It is important that this question should be considered, and the principle settled; and-that the property of absent debtors shall be liable to pay their creditors. Much of the credit which an individual, who is a non-resident, obtains, is' often derived from the debts due to him at the place or in the country in which the credit is given; as they are considered liable, under the attachment laws of the states, to the payment of his debts. Thus the credit operations of the country are made safer, and commercial transactions are beneficially extended.
It seems to be considered.by the District Court of Alabama, that the attachment in the State Court could not operate after the, commencement of the suit on the note. But the only question to the original debtor under the attachment was, do you owe the money? And mo state of things, such as a suit, or surety for the defendant in the attachment, could exempt him from liability for the amount in his hands.
It is said, it is different in England: this is so to some extent'. By the attachment law, under the customs of 'London, a debt in suit cannot be attached. But this is not the law in the states of the United States. The attachment law of England, under the customs of London, is peculiar in many of its features; although in some respects our laws are the same. Customs of London, 265 — .268. By that law, debts in suit, debts on judgments, cannot be attached; our laws give no such exemptions.
It is a settled principle, that the property of absent debtors is liar ble, by legislation, to the payment of their debts. This is. a rule in almost all the states of the Union; and it will not be disturbed by the Courts of.the United States. • Cited, Aiken’s Digest of the Laws of Alabama, 37. Sergeant on Attachment, 161. 2 Dallas, 279. 2 Yeates, 192. 9 John. Rep. 221. 20 John. Rep. 229—231, 239, 268. 4 Cowan, 521. 1 Peters’ C. C. R. 245. 8 Cowan, 311, 315. 1 Harris and M'Henry, 236. 2 Harris and M'Henry, 466. 1 Alabama Rep. 129. 12 Martin’s Rep. 68.
Upon these authorities, it is immaterial.whether the attachment was commenced before or after the suit was instituted.
. 3. It is contended that the plea of puis darien continuance, is a waiver of all preceding pleas.
This may be admitted, so far as the plea goes, but it does not extend beyond the matter of the;plea; nor is it an abandonment of a defence.which is riot affected by the plea. Where it is pleaded to a part of the bill sued on, and not to the whole amount of it¿ the original plea stands for the residue unaffected by the special plea. This must be so, or- the grossest injustice might arise; as the defendant, who should desire to avail himself of a just defence to a part of a debt claimed from him, must give up a defence which would be equally available against another part of it.
The authorities do not sustain the position upon which the decision of the District Court was made. When the plea of puis darien continuance goes to a part only of the claim, it has no extent to any other or further part. 1 Alabama Rep. 129. 2 Wendall, 300.
The last objection is that there is no averment of a demand at the bank of deposit, at Nashville; and no demand is stated- to have been made there.
Can' an action be maintained without proving that the money was noj;'-*it the bank of deposite, in Nashville, to pay it; and that a demand was made there in conformity with the note ? It has been decided that as to the endorser on' a .note of this description, it is necessary to prove such a demand. Smith vs. the Bank of the United States, 11 Wheat. 171. The same principle should apply in an action against the drawer.
Mr. Crittenden, for the defendant, said, there are but twjat questions in the case.
1. Whether the plea puis darien continuance is a good bar to. the action.
2. Whether that plea was a waiver of the first plea of payment.
As to the first question, it is insisted, on the'part of McConnell, that neither the pendency of an attachment, nor condemnation'Under it, if the attachment be issued after the commencement of his suit; can form any legal defence or bar to that. suit. And for authority on this point, reference is made to 3 Wilson, 297—304. Brooks vs. Smith, 1 Salkeld, 280. Savage’s case, 1 Salkeld, 291. 5 Johns. Reps. 101. 5 Taunton, 558. 4 Durnford and East’s Reps. 312. 16 Eng. Com. Law Reps. 78 and 79.
As McConnell’s suit was brought long before the attachment-pleaded in bar of it, it follows, therefore, that the decision of the Court upon the demurrer to that plea was Correct. If the matter of the plea was available at all, it could only have been pleaded in abatement. 1 Chitty, 697.
As to the second question, we' refer to Chitty’s Pleading, vol. i. 697, &c., and the cases cited in thé.note thereto; and also to the case of Kenner and Bussard vs. Marshall, 1 Wheaton, 215. -In the case referred to in Chitty, he says: “ A plea puis darien continuance, is not a departure from, but is a waiver of the first plea, and no ad vantage can afterwards be taken of it; nor can even the plaintiff afterwards proceed thereon.”
Upon the whole matter, therefore, it is confended that the judgment ought to be affirmed.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Thompson
delivered the opinion of the Court.—
This -case comes up on a writ of error irom the District Court of the United States for the southern district of Alabama.
The action in the Court below was founded upon a note, which, although under seal, is considered in Tennessee a promissory note; and is in the words following:
" Three years and two months after date, I promise to pay Corry M'Connell or order, at the office of discount and deposíte of the Bank of the 'United States, at Nashville, four thousand eight hun dred and eighty dollars, ninety-nine, cents, value received." The declaration sets out'this note according to its terms, and alleges the promise. Aa pay at the office ,of discount and deposite of the Bank of the United States, at Nashville; without averring that the note was presented at the bank or demand of payment made there. The defendant pleaded payment and satisfaction of the note; and issue being joined thereupon, the cause was continued until the next term thereafter. At which time the defendant interposed,, a plea puis darien continuance, alleging that the plaintiff, as to the. sum of four thousand two hundred and four dollars, part and parcel of the sum demanded in the declaration, ought not further to have and maintain his action therefor against him, because that sum had been attached by B1 cker and Co., by proceedings commenced by them against the plaintiff in this cause, under the attachment law of Alabama, in which he was summoned as garnishee. And setting out the proceedings against, him according to the-'requirements of that law, and under whicn he was examined on oath; and did declare, that he executed the note to the said McConnell, the plaintiff in this cause, as set out in the declaration; that he had paid on the note three hundred and seventy-two dollars and thirty-four cents, and that the remainder of the said note was due by him to said M'Con-nell. And the plea further sets out, that under the proceedings on the attachment, the Court had given judgment against him for four thousand two hundred and -four dollars and costs; but with a stay of all further proceedings until the further disposition of the case, and which remains yet undetermined.
To this plea -the plaintiff demurred. And the Court sustained the demurrer, and gave judgment for the plaintiff for six hundred and seventy-fivé dollars and thirty-nine cents, the residue of the plaintiff's, debt in his declaration mentioned, by default; and thereupon gave a final judgment for the plaintiff for the full amount of the note, four thousand eight hundred and eighty dollars, the debt aforesaid, and three hundred and ninety-four dollars, the interest assessed by tpe clerk, together with his cost. And the plaintiff remits upon the record the sum of three hundred and fifty-one dollars. and twenty-eight cents; and the questions arising upon this record have been made and argued under the following objections:
1. That the declaration is bad for want of an averment that the note was presented, and payment demánded at the office of discount and deposite'pf the Bank of the United States, at Nashville.
2. That the matters pleaded of the proceedings under the attachment laws of Alabama, were sufficient to bar the action, as to the amount of the sum so attached; and that the demurrer ought therefore to have been overruled.
3. That the judgment by nil dicit, for the six hundred and seventy-five dollars and thirty-nine cent's, was erroneous.
The question raised as to the sufficiency of the declaration in a case where the süit is by the payee against the maker of a promissory note, never has received the direct decision of this Court. In the case of the Bank of the United States vs. Smith, (11 Wheat. 172.) the note upon which the action was founded was made payable at the office of discount and deposite of the Bank of the United States, in the city of Washington; and the suit was against the endorser, and the question turned upon the sufficiency of the averment in the declaration óf a demand of payment of the maker. And the Court said, when in the body of a note, the place of payment is designated} the endorser has a right to presume that the maker has provided funds at such place to pay the note; and has a right to require the holder to apply at such place for payment. In the opinion delivered in that case, the question now presented, in the case before us is stated: and it said, whether where the suit is against the maker of a promissory note, or the acceptor of a bill of exchange, payable at a particular place, it is necessary to aver a demand of payment at Such place, and upon the trial to prove such demand; is a question upon which conflicting opinions have been entertained in the Courts in Westminster Hall. But that the question in such case may, perhaps, be considered at rest in England, b}r the decision of the late case of Rowe vs. Young, (2 Brod. and Bing. 165.) in the House of Lords; where it was held, that if a bill of exchange be accepted, payable at a particular place, the declaration on such bill, against the acceptor, must ave/presentment at that place, and the averment must be proved. But it is there said a contrary opinion has been entertained by Courts iri this country; that a demand on the maker of aunóte, or the acceptor of a bill payable at a specified place, need not be averred in the declaration or proved on the trial; that it is not a condition precedent to the plaintiff's right of recovery. As matter of practice, application will generally be made at the place appointed; if it is believed, that funds have been there placed to meet the note or bill. But if the maker or acceptor has sustained any loss by the omission of the holder to make such application for payment, at the place appointed, it is matter of defence to set up by plea and proof. But it is added, as this question does not necessarily arise in this case, we do not mean to be understood as expressing any decided opinion'upon it, although we are strongly inclined to think, that as against the maker of a note or the acceptor . of a bill, no 'averment or- proof of a demand of payment at the place designated •would be'necessary. The.question now before the Court cannot, certainly, be considered as decided by the case of the Bank of the United States vs. Smith. But it cannot be viewed' as the mere obiter opinion of the judge who delivered the judgment of the Court. The attention of the Court was drawn to the question now before the Court; and the remarks made upon it, and the authorities referred to, show that this Court was fully apprized of the conflicting opinions of the English Courts on the question; and that opinions, contrary to that of the House of Lords, in the casé of Rowe vs. Young, had been entertained by some of the Courts in this country : and under this view of the question, the .Court say they are strongly inclined to adopt the American decisions. As the precise question is now presented by' this recofdj it becomes necessary to dispose of it.
.It is not deemed necessary to go into a critical. examination of the English authorities upon this point.; a reference to the case in the House of Lords, which was decided in the year-. 1820, shows the great diversity of opinion entertained by the English' •judges upop this question. It was, however, decided that if a bill of exchange is accepted, payable at a particular place, the declaration in an action on sach bill against the acceptor, must aver presentment at that place, and the averment must be proved. The' Lord Chancellor, in stating the' question, said this was a very fit question to be- brought before the House of Lords, because the state of the law, as actually.administered in the Courts, is such, that it would be infinitely better, to settle it in any way than to permit' so controversial a state to exist any-longer. That the Court of King's Bench has been of late years in the habit of holding, that such an acceptance as this, is a general acceptance;!and .that it is not necessary to notice it as such in the declaration, or to prove presentment, hut that it must be considered as matter of defence; and that the defendant must state , himself ready Ifco pay at the place, and bring the money into' Court, and so bar the action by proving the truth of that defence. On the contrary, the Court of Common Pleas was in the -habit of holding, that an acceptance like this was a qualified acceptance, and that the contract of the acceptor was to pay at the place; and that as matter of pleading, a presentment at the place stipulated must be averred, and that evidence must be given- to sustain t lat averment; and that the holder of the bill has' no cause of action unless such demand has been made.' In that case the opinion of the twelve 'judges, was taken and laid before the House of Lords, and will be found reported in an appendix to the report of the case of Rowe vs. Young, (2 Brod. and Bing. 180.) In which opinions all the cases are referred to in which the question had been drawn into discussion; and the result appears to have been, that eight judges out of the twelve sustained the doctrine of thé King's Bench on this question; notwithstanding which the judgir nt was reversed
It is fairly to be inferred from an act of parliament passed immediately thereafter, 1 and 2 G-. 4, ch. 78, that this decision was not satisfactory. By that act. it is .declared that "after the 1st of August, 1821., if any person shall accept a bill .of exchange payable at the house- óf a banker or other place, without further expression in his acceptance, such acceptance shall be deemed and taken to be, to all intents and purposes, a general acceptance of such bill. But if the acceptor shall, in his acceptance, express, that he accepts the bill payable at a banker's house or other place only, and not otherwise or elsewhere; such acceptance shall be a qualified acceptance of such bill; and the acceptor-'shall not be liable to pay the bill, except in default of payment, when such payment shall have been first duly demanded at such banker's house or other place." Bayley on Bills, 200, note.
In most of the -eases which -have arisen in the English Courts, the suit has been against the acceptor of the bill; and in some cases a distinction would seem to be made between such a case, and that of a note, when the action is against the maker, and the designated placeis in the body of the note. But there can be no solid grounds upon which such a distinction can rest. The acceptor of a bill stands in- the same relation to the drawee, as the maker of a note does to the payee; and. the acceptor is the principal debtor, in the. case of a bill, precisely like the maker of a note. The liability of the acceptorgrows put of, and is-to be governed by the terms of his acceptance, and the liability of the maker, of a note grows out of, and is to be governed by the terms of his note';and the place of payment can be of no more impórtance- in the one case than in the other. And in some of the cases Where the point was madey the action was against the maker of a promissory note, and the place of payment designated in the body of the note.' The case of Nichols vs. Bowes, 2 Camp. 498, was one of that description, decided in the year 1810; arid it was contended on the trial, that the plaintiff was bound to show that the note was presented at the banking house where it was made payable. But Lórd Ellenborough, before whom the cause was tried, not only decided that na such proof was necessary, but would not suffer such evidence to be given; although the counsel for the plaintiff said' he had a witness in Court to prove the note was presented at the banker's the day it became" due: his Lordship alleging that he was afraid to admit such evidence, lest doubts should arise as to its necessity-. , And in the case of Wild vs. Renwards, 1 Camp. 425, note, Mr. Justice Báyley, in the year 1809, ruled that if a promissory note is made payable at a particular place, in an action against the maker, there is no' necessity for proving that.it was presentpd there for payment. .
The case of Saunderson vs. Bowes, 14 East, 500, decided in the King's Bench in the year. 1811, is sometimes referred to'as containing a different rule of construction of the .same words when used in the body of a -promissory note-,'from that: which is given to them when used in the acceptance of a bill of exchange. But it may b.e Well questioned, whether this use warrants any such conclusion. That was an action on a promissory note by the bearer against the maker. The note, as set out in the declaration, was a'promise to. pay on demand at a-specified place, and there Was no averment that a demand of payment had been made at the place designated. To which declaration the defendant demurred; and the counsel in support of the demurrer referred to cases where the rule had been applied to acceptances on bills of exchange;. hut contended that the rule did not apply to a promissory note, when the place is designated in the body of the note. Lord Ellenborough, in the course of the argument, in answer to some cases referred to by counsel, observed; those are eases where money is to be paid, or something to be done at a particular time as well as place, therefore the party (defendant) may readily make an averment, that he was ready at the time and place to pay, and that, the other party was not ready to. receive it; but here the time of payment depends entirely oti the pleasure of the holder of the note. It is true Lord Ellenborough did not seem to-place his opinion, in the ultimate decision of the cause, upon this ground. But the other judges did not allude to the distinction taken at the bar between that case ahd the acceptance of a bill, in like terms; but placed, their opinions upon the terms of the note itself, being a promise to pay on demand at a particular place. And there is certainly a manifest distinction between a promise to pay on demand, at a given place,-and a promise to pay at a fixed time at such place. And it is hardly .to he presumed that Lord Ellenborough intended to. rest his judgment upon a distinction between a promissory note and a bill of exchange, as both he and Mr. Justice Bayley had a very short time before, in the cases of Nichols vs. Bowes, and Wild vs. Renwards, above referred to, applied-the .same rule of construction to promissory notes where .the promise was contained in the body of the note. Where the promise is to pay on demand at a particular place, there-is no cause of aotion until the demand is made; and the maker of the note cannot discharge himself- by an offer of payment, the note not being due until demanded.
Thus we see that until the late decision in the House of Lords in .the case of Rowe vs. Young, and the act of parliament passed soon thereafter, this question was in a very unsettled state in the English Courts; and without undertaking to decide between those conflicting) opinions, it may be well ' to look at. the, light ip which this question has been viewed in the Courts in this country.
This question came before'the Supreme Court of the state of New York, in the year 1809, in the case of Foden and Slater vs. Sharp, 4 Johns. Rep. 183; and the Court said the holder of a bill of exchange need not show a demand of .paymentiof the acceptor, any more than of the maker of a note. It is the business of the acceptor to show that he was ready at the day and place appointed, hut that no one came to receive the money; and that he was always ready afterwards to pay. This case shows, that the acceptor of a bill, and the maker of a note, were considered as standing on the same footing with re spect to a demand of payment at the place designated. And in the case of Wolcott vs. Van Santvoord, 17 Johns. Rep. 248, which came before the same Court in the year 1819, the same question arose. The action was against the acceptor of a bill,payable five months after date .at the Bankof Utica,andthe declaration contained no averment ofademand at the Bank of Utica; and upon a demurrer to the declaration, the Court gave judgment for the plaintiff. Chief Justice Spencer, in delivering the opinion of the Court, observed' that the question had been already decided in the case of Foden vs. Sharp : but considering the great' diversity of opinion among the judges in the English Courts on the question, he took occasion critically to review the cases which had come before those Courts, and shows very satisfactorily, that the weight of authority is in conformity to that decision, and the demurrer was accordingly overruled; and the law in that state for the last thirty years, has been considered as settled upon this point. And,although the action was against the acceptor of a bill of exchange, it is Very evident that this circumstance had no influence upon the decision; for the Court say that in this respect ' the acceptor stands in the same relation to the payee, as the maker of a note does to the indorsee. He is theprincipal,andnotacollateral debtor.
And in the case of Caldwell vs. Cassady, 8 Cowen, 271, decided in the same Court in. the year 1828, the suit was upon a promissory note payable sixty days after date at the Franklin Bank in New York; and the note had not been presented or payment demanded at the bank: the Court said, this case has been already decided by this Court in 'the case of Wolcott vs. Van Santvoord. And after noticing some of the cases in the English Courts, and alluding to the confusion that seemed to exist there upon ihe question, they add: that whatever be the rale in other Courts, the rule in this Court must be considered settled, that where a promissory note is made payable at a particular place on a day certain, the holder of the note is not bound to make a demand at the time and place by way of a condition precedent to the bringing an action against the maker. But if the maker was ready .to pay at the time and place, he may plead it, as he would plead a tender in'bar of damages and costs, by bringing the money into Court.
It is not deemed necessary to notice very much at length the various cases that have arisen in the American Courts upon this question; but barely to refer to such as have fallen under the observation of the Court, and we briefly state the point and decision thereupon, and the result will show a uniform course of adjudication, that in actions on promissory notes against the maker, or on bills of exchange, where the suit is against the maker in the one case, and acceptor in the other, and the note or bill made payable at a specified time and place, it is not necessary to aver in the declaration, or prove on the trial, that, a demand of payment was made in order to maintain the action. But that if the maker or. acceptor was at the- place at the time designated, and was ready and' offered lo pay the money, it wakjnatter. of defence to be pleaded and proved on his part.
The case of Watkins vs. Crouch and Co., in the Court of Appeals of Virginia, 5 Leigh, 522, was a suit- against the maker and endorser, jointly, as. is the course in that state upon a promissory note like the one in suit.. The note was made, payable at a specified time, at the Farmers' Bank, at Richmond, an.d the Court of Appeals, in the year 1834, decided, that it was nbt necessary to aver and prove a presentation at the bank and demand-pf payment in order to- entitle the plaintiff to recover against the maker; but that it was necessary in order to entitle him to recover against thq endorser: and the President of the Court went into a very elaborate consideration of the decisions of the English. Courts upon the question; and to show, that upon common law principles, applicable to bonds, notes, and other contracts for the payment of money, no previous demand was necessary in order to sustain the action, but that a tender and readiness to pay must come by way of .defence from the defendant; and that looking upon the note as commercial paper, the principles of the common law were clearly against the necessity of such demand and proof, where the time and place were specified, though it would be otherwise where- the.place, but nbt the time, was specified; a. demand in such case ought to be made: and he examined the, case of Sanderson vs. Bowes, to show, that it. turned upon that distinction, the note being payable on demand at a specified place. The same doctrine was held by the Court -of Appeals, of Maryland in .the case of Bowie vs. Duvall, 1 Gill and Johnson, 175; and the New York cases, as well as that of the. Bank of the United States vs. Smith, 11 Wheat. 171, are cited with approbation, and?fully adopted; and the Court put the case upon the broad ground, that when, the suit is against the maker of a .promissory noté,.payable at a specified, time and. place, no demand is necessary, to be averred, upon the principle that the money to-be-paid. i$. a. debt, from the defendant, fhat it is due generally and "Universally, and. will, continue due, though there be a neglect on the part of-, the creditor to. attend at the time and place, to receive or demand it- That it is matter bf defence on the part of the-defendant to show that he was in. attendance to pay,but that the plaintiff was nbtthereto receive it; which defence genérally .will be in bar pf damages only,,and nbt in -bar. of the debt. The case of Ruggles vs. Patton, 8 Mass. Rep. 480, sanctions the same rule, of construction. The action was on a promissory note for the payment of money, at a-day and place specified; and...the defendant pleaded that he whs . present at the time, and place, and ready and willing to pay according to the tenor of his promises, in the second count of the declaration mentioned, and- avers that the plaintiff was not.then ready or present at the bank to receive, payment, and did not demand the same .of the defendant, as the plaintiff in.his declaration-had alleged.; the Court said this was an immaterial issue.and no bar to an action or promise to páy money.
So also in the state of New Jersey the same rule is-adopted. In the case of . Weed vs. Houten, 4 Halst. N. J. Rep. 189, the Chief Justice says: "The question is whether, in an action, by, the payee, of a promissory note payabjs at a particular place and not on demand, but at time, it is necessary to aver a presentment of the note and demand of payment by the holder at that place, at the maturity of the note. And upon this question he says, I have no hesitation in expressing-my entire concurrence in the American decisions, so far as is necessary for the present occasion; that a special averment of presentment at the- place, is not necessary to-the validity of the declaration, nor is proof óf it necessary upon the trial; This rule I. am satisfied, is most conformable to sound reason, most conducive to. public convenience, best supported by the géneral principles and doctrines of the law, and most assimulated to the- decisions, which bear analogy more or less directly to the subject."
The same rule has been fully established by the Supreme Court of Tennessee, in the cases of M'Nairy vs. Bell, and Mulhovin vs. Hannum, 1 Yerger, Rep. 502, and 2 Yerger, Rep. 81, and the rule sustained and enforced upon the same principles and. course of reasoning upon which the other cases referred to have been placed. And no case, in an American Court, has fallen under our noticé, where a contrary doctrine has been asserted and maintained. And it is to be observed, that rtiost of the cases which have arisen in this country, where this question has been drawn info discussion, were upon promissory notes, where the place of payment was, of course, in the body' of the note. After such a uniform course of .decisions for at least thirty years, it would be inexpedient to change the rule, even if the grounds upon which it was originally established might' be questionable'; which, however, we do not mean to intimate. It is of the utmost importance, that all rulés relating to commercial law should be stablé and uniform. They are adopted for practical purposes, to regulate the course of business in commercial transactions ; and the rule here established is well calculated for the convenience and safety of all parties.
The place of payment in a promissory note, or- in an acceptance of a bill of exchange, is always matter of arrangement between the parties for their mutual accommodation, and may be stipulated in any manner that may best suit their convenience. And when a noté or hill is made payable at a bank, as is generally the case, it is well known that, according to the usual course of business, the note or bill is lodged at the bank for collection; and. if the maker or acceptor calls to take it up when' it falls due, it will.be delivered to him, and the business is closed. But should he not find his note or bill at the bank, he can deposit his money to meet the note when, presented, and should he be after-wards prosecuted, hé would be exonerated from all costs and damages, upon proving such tender and deposite. Or should the note or bill be made payable at some place other than a bank, and no deposite could be made, or he should choose to retain his money in his own possession, an offer to pay at the time ánd place, would'protect him against interest and costs, on bringing the money into Court; so that no practical inconvenience or hazard can result from the esta blishment of this rule, to the maker or acceptor. But, on the other hand, if a presentment of the note and den and of payment at the time and place, are indispensable to the right of action, the holder might hazard the entire loss of -his whole debt.
The next point presents the question as to the effect and operation of the proceedings under the attachment law of Alabama, as disclosed by the plea puis' darien continuance. The plea shows that the proceedings on the attachment were instituted after the com? mencement of this suit. The jurisdiction of the District Court of the United States, and the right of the plaintiff to prosecute his suit in that Court, having attached, that right could not be forested or taken away by any proceedings.in another Court. This-would produce a collision in the jurisdiction of Courts, that would extremely embarrass the administration of justice. If the. attachment had been conducted to a conclusion, and the money recovered of the defendant before the commencement of the present stiit, there can be. no doubt that it might have been set up as a payment upon the note in question. And if the defendant wpiild have been protected pro tanto', under a recovery had by virtue of the attachment, and could have pleaded such recovery, in bar, the same principle would support a plea in abatement, of an attachment pending prior to the commencement - of the present suit. The attachment of the debt, in such case, in the hands of the defendant, would fix it there in favour of the attaching creditor, and the defendant could not after- . wards pay it over to the plaintiff. The attaching creditor would, in such case, require a lien upon the debt, binding upon the defendant, ánd which the Courts of all other governments, if they recognise such proceedings at all, could not fail to regard. If this.doctrine be well founded,- the priority of suit will determine the right. The rule must be reciprocal; and where the suit in one Court is commenced prior to the institution of proceedings, under attachment in another Court, such proceedings cannot arrest the suit; and the maxim qui prior est tempore,portior est jure,, must govern the case. This' is the doctrine of this Court in the case of Renner and Bussard vs. Marshall, 1 Wheat. 216, and alsp in the case of Beaston vs. The Farmers' Bank of Maryland, 12 Peters, 102; and is in conformity with the rule that prevails- in; other Courts in this country,, as well as in the English Courts; and. is essential to the protection of the rights of the garnishee; and wifi avbid all collisions in. the proceedings of different Courts, having-the same subject matter before them. 5 John. Rep. 100. 9 John. Rep. 221, and the cases there cited. In the case now before the Court, the.suit was commenced prior to the institution of proceedings under the attachment. The plea was, therefore, bad, and the demurrer properly sustained.
The remaining inquiry is, whether the judgment, by nfi dicit,'for . the @675, was properly given, after overruling the plea puis darien continuance. The argument at the bar was, that as the attachment went only to a part of the debt, the case stood as to the residue upon the original plea of payment. The facts disclosed in the plea, puis darien continuance, do not raise the question intended to he presented; for the defence set up in the plea puis darien continuance goes to the whole cause of action, and leaves no part unanswered. And it may well be questioned, whether such pleading ought to be sanctioned, even if the plea, puis darien continuance, went only to a part of the cause of action. It would introduce great confusion on the record in the state of the pleadings.
It is laid down in Bacon's Abridgment, (6 Bac. Ab. by Gwillim, 377,) that if after a plea in'bar, the defendant pleads a plea puis darien continuance, this - is a waiver of his bar; and no advantage shall be taken of any thing in the. bar. And it is added, that it seems dangerous to plead any matter puis darien continuance unless you be well advised, because, if. that matter' be determined against y.ou, it is a confession of the matter in issue. This rule was adopted in Kimball vs. Huntington, 10 Wendall, 679. The Court say, the plea puis darien continuance waived all previous pleas, and on the record, the cause of action w'as admitted to the same extent as if no other'defence had been urged than that, contained in this plea,.
In/the case now before the Court, the oath of the defendant taken in the proceedings on the attachment, is made a part of the plea phis darien continuance. And he admits that- he executed the note on which this suit is brought, for $48S0. That he had paid on the note $372 34; and that the remainder of--the. note was due by .him to the plaintiff. And If -the, $4204 attached could not -be dedueted, the whole debt, according to'his own admission, was due, except the $372 34, set up by him to have been paid; and the.plaintiff remits upon the record $351 28, and the judgment will stand within a few dollars for the amount admitted by the defendant to be due. And this difference must arise from some error in the mere calculation, and may easily be corrected.
The judgment of the Court below is accordingly affirmed,, with costs.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the District Court,of the United States, for the Southérn District of Alabama, and was argued by counsel. On consideration .whereof, it is ordered and adjudged'by this Court, that the judg-. ment of the said District Court, in this cause be, and the same is hereby, affirmed,-with costs and damages at the rate of six per cent, per annum.