Case Name: SWEENEY v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1911-11-22
Citations: 146 S.W. 883
Docket Number: 
Parties: SWEENEY v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 146
Pages: 883–891

Head Matter:
SWEENEY v. STATE.
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Nov. 22, 1911.
On Motion for Rehearing, March 20, 1912.
Rehearing Denied May 1, 1912.)
On Motion for Rehearing.
1. Criminal Law (§ 1170% ) — Appeal — Harmless Error — Admission of Evidence.
In a prosecution for unlawfully carrying a weapon, accused was asked ou cross-examination whether he was not once convicted for be.ating up a woman, but the question was excluded by the court on objection, and the court instructed the jury not to consider it. Accused was also asked, “You were just married about a year?” which question was also excluded, and the jury instructed not to consider it. Held, that the asking of the unanswered questions was not reversible error.
TEd. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3129-3135; Dec. Dig. § 1170%. ]
2. Criminal Law (§ 1169*) — Appeal—Harmless Error — Admission op Evidence.
While the improper admission of evidence is not always cured by its subsequent withdrawal, as a rule the subsequent withdrawal of incompetent evidence cures error in admitting it, where' the evidence is of such a character that accused would not be deprived of a fair trial thereby.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 754, 3088, 3130, 3137-3143; Dec. Dig. § 1169. ]
3.Criminal Law (§ 1170% ) — Appeal — Harmless Error — Asking Improper Questions.
That the state’s attorney merely asked an improper question, which was not answered, is not reversible error, where no material injury to accused results, ■ even though the improper question was intentionally asked.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3129-3135; Dec. Dig. § 1170%. ]
4.Criminal Law (§ 392 ) — Evidence — Admission.
Evidence is admissible, in a prosecution for unlawfully carrying a weapori,' that a person who was shown to have been with prosecuting witness and others, who testified to accused’s commission of the unlawful act, was out of the state at the time of the trial and might not return, though accused did not attack the state’s good faith in not producing all the evidence available.
[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 852; Dec. Dig. § 392. ]
5. Criminal Law (§ 382 ) — Evidence—Relevancy in General.
Eiither party to a criminal case may introduce any pertinent evidence tending to prove an issue or lessen the adverse effect ot any proper deduction made by evidence introduced against him.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal •Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 847-864; Dec. Dig. § 382. ] <S. Criminal Law (§ 721% ) — Trial—Comment by District Attorney — Failure to Produce Witnesses.
The district attorney may comment on accused’s failure to produce material witnesses.
TEd. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 1673; Dec. Dig. § 721%. ]
7. Criminal Law (§ 543*) — Admission oe Evidence — Evidence on Former Trial.
As preliminary to introducing the evidence of a witness who had testified on a former trial, the state could show that such witness was then outside of the state, and that it was not certain that he would return; the fact that the state did not afterwards introduce such evidence being immaterial, especially where accused did not move to exclude the evidence as to the witnesses being absent from the state from the jury, on the ground that his evidence was not introduced.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1233, 1236; Dec., Dig. § 543. ]
8. Criminal Law (§ 1169 ) — Appeal—Harmless Error.
Any error in admitting evidence, in a prosecution for unlawfully carrying a weapon, that a certain person, who was shown to have been with the prosecuting witness and others, who testified as to the unlawful act by accused, was out of the state at the time of the trial with no certainty of returning, was not reversible.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 754, 3088, 3130, 3137-3143; Dec. Dig. § 1169. ]
Davidson, P. J„ dissenting.
Appeal from Criminal District Court, Harris County; C. W. Robinson, Judge.
George Sweeney was convicted of unlawfully carrying a pistol, and he appeals.
Affirmed.
E. T. Branch, of Houston, for appellant. C. E. Lane,'Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
For other oases see same topie and section NUMBER in Dee. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Rep’r Indexes
For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
DAVIDSON, P. J.
The following brief of appellant's counsel so satisfactorily discussed the issues presented by the record it is adopted as the opinion of the court:
"Appellant was indicted and convicted under a plea of not guilty of the offense of unlawfully carrying a pistol on and about his person, and his punishment assessed at a fine of $200 and a term of 90 days in the county jail.
"1. The bills of exceptions are drawn so as to show the charge, issues and testimony, the contentions of the respective parties, and in themselves contain all that is necessary to manifest the supposed errors. This practice is to be commended, as it saves this court .the labor of going through a statement of facts, and such practice has often been recommended by this court. With bills of exceptions so drawn there is no necessity for a statement of facts, and the exact questions presented are thus squarely presented, and therefore must be squarely met and decided.
"2. Bills Nos. 1 and 2 may be considered together. By these bills it is shown that under the plea of not guilty to the charge of unlawfully carrying a pistol on and about his person, the state's evidence is sufficient to support the verdict, and that appellant's testimony, if- believed, is sufficient to entitle him to an acquittal. In brief, as shown by the bills, the issue was simply whether appellant had the pistol at the time testified to by the state's witnesses. There was a sharp conflict in the testimony, and the lines were closely drawn as to whether appellant was the person who had the pistol at the time testified to by the state's witnesses. It was shown that the pistol was drawn in a house of prostitution, and the question was asked by state's counsel of appellant, while a witness, 'You were just married about a year?' Bill No. 1. State's counsel also asked appellant, 'Wasn't you, arrested once and convicted for beating up a woman?' Bill No. 2. In view of the severe penalty inflicted upon appellant, these questions, although not answered, were calculated to, and in the light of the verdict probably did, prejudice the appellant before the jury, and produce a verdict much higher than the minimum penalty. The jury were apt to conclude, and it is the only natural inference, that the state's counsel would not have asked these questions, especially in the form as asked, unless he had knowlege that such was the case, and thus by inference these illegitimate and extraneous matters were gotten before the jury to the prejudice of appellant, and it is impossible to say that these matters may not have influenced the jury to inflict more than the minimum penalty, if they did not bring about the conviction itself. The issue was simply whether the appellant carried the pistol at the time, and these outside matters, which were only calculated to prejudice the appellant, should not have been thus attempted to be gotten before the jury. In view of the heavy penalty inflicted, these matters, in common fairness, demand a reversal. Campbell [v. State] 138 S. W. 609; Tijerina [v. State] 45 Tex. Cr. R. 182, 74 S. W. 913; Nix [v. State] 74 S. W. 766; Wyatt [v. State] 58 Tex. Cr. R. 115 [124 S. W. 929, 137 Am. St. Rep. 926]; Williford [v. State] 36 Tex. Cr. R. 425 [37 S. W. 761].
"3. Bills Nos. 3 and 4 also show the issues, pleas, and contentions of the parties, and that there was sharp conflict in the testimony as to whether appellant was the person who had the pistol. In this state of the case, the bills, fairly construed, show that state's counsel, for the purpose of accounting for the absence of a state witness, F. R. Schultz, and to account for not putting him on the stand as a witness, proved that said E. R. Schultz, who was shown hy other witnesses to have been present at the house of prostitution, was absent from the state at the time of the trial, as shown by a letter. • In a proper case this testimony is admissible to account for the absence of a witness, but it must not be used to the detriment of a defendant unless the testimony would show that defendant had something to do with keeping the state's witness away. Appellant was not' responsible for the absence of the witness, and the state was not entitled in this way to strengthen by inference the state's case; and, there being a sharp conflict in the testimony, this requires a reversal. Appellant is not required to present this error in the motion for new trial when he preserved it by bill of exceptions. Tubb [v. State] 55 Tex. Cr. R. 621 [117 S. W. 858); Askew [v. State] 59 Tex. Cr. R. 152, 127 S. W. 1037; Id., 54 Tex. Cr. R. 414 [113 S. W. 287]; Clifton [v. State] 46 Tex. Cr. R. 22 [79 S. W. 824, 108 Am. St. Rep. 983]; Hardin [v. State] 55 Tex. Cr. R. 634 [117 S. W. 974].
"Respectfully submitted,
"E. T. Branch,
'Attorney for Appellant."
The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded.