Case Name: Joe W. SMITH, Jr., Joe W. Smith, and Clovis Smith v. Natalie Cash MALOUF, Alex J. Malouf, Jr., and Patricia Malouf
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1998-09-24
Citations: 722 So. 2d 490
Docket Number: No. 92-CA-01177-SCT
Parties: Joe W. SMITH, Jr., Joe W. Smith, and Clovis Smith v. Natalie Cash MALOUF, Alex J. Malouf, Jr., and Patricia Malouf.
Judges: PRATHER, C.J., SULLIVAN, P.J., and McRAE and JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 722
Pages: 490–511

Head Matter:
Joe W. SMITH, Jr., Joe W. Smith, and Clovis Smith v. Natalie Cash MALOUF, Alex J. Malouf, Jr., and Patricia Malouf.
No. 92-CA-01177-SCT.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Sept. 24, 1998.
J. Brad Pigott, Mary Marvel Fyke, Jackson, Attorneys for Appellants.
James W. Burgoon, Jr., James E. Upshaw, F. Ewin Henson, III, Greenwood, Attorneys for Appellees.

Opinion:
BANKS, Justice,
for the Court:
¶ 1. Here we are confronted with a challenge to the propriety of the lower court's dismissal of a suit, which alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress, conspiring to prevent the appellant-father from exercising his parental rights and conspiring to effect an illegal adoption of a child born out of wedlock. Because they have no standing, we affirm the dismissal of the appellant-grandparents' claim. The appellant-father, on the other hand, should have been afforded his day in court on his claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and conspiracy to deprive him of his parental rights. Accordingly, we reverse and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings.
I.
¶2. In May 1989, teenagers Joey Smith and Natalie Malouf began dating, and in August 1991, Natalie discovered that she was pregnant. She told Joey about the pregnancy on August 16. The following day Joey asked Natalie to marry him, and they discussed their options regarding the baby although no decision was made at that time. Joey and Natalie told her parents (hereinafter "the Maloufs") about the pregnancy. The Maloufs told Joey the child would be put up for adoption and the pregnancy would be kept private until then.
¶3. The next day, August 18, Joey returned to the Maloufs' home in an attempt to change their minds about the adoption. Their minds were set. On August 19 Joey confided in his pastor about the pregnancy. Together, they told his parents (hereinafter "the Smiths") that Joey would soon be a father. After finding out about the baby, the Smiths went to the Maloufs and told them that they did not want the child to be placed for adoption and that they were willing to take full responsibility for the child. The Maloufs remained firm in their decision regarding the child's adoption.
¶ 4. The record is not clear, but it would appear that Natalie and Joey's romance went sour soon after she discovered she was pregnant. When he called her on September 7, Natalie asked him not to call again. At some point in that month, Joey consulted an attorney about the situation, but he did not take any formal action at that time. A few months later in December, the Smiths visited Natalie at school in Indiana. According to the Maloufs, the Smiths kidnapped and badgered Natalie regarding the child's adoption.
¶ 5. In January 1992, Joey went to the Maloufs' home and was told that Natalie was gone and that she would not be back until the child was born. On January 14, 1992, Joey initiated legal proceedings against Natalie in the Leflore County Chancery Court, seeking a declaration of paternity, order for custody of the child and injunctive relief to stop adoption proceedings within and outside Mississippi. Because Natalie could not be reached for service of process, she was served by publication on three separate dates — February 21 and 28 and March 6. On March 9, one of Natalie and Joey's mutual friends called Joey and asked him to drop the suit against Natalie, informing him Natalie said she would not put the child up for adoption if he dropped the suit.
¶ 6. Joey applied for a temporary restraining order enjoining the commencement of adoption proceedings on March 12. The TRO was served on Natalie via her father. On March 27, the chancellor issued a permanent injunction in the form of a final judgment, enjoining Natalie and "all who might assist her" from proceeding with an adoption. Joey and his parents mailed the chancellor's order to all Vital Statistics offices in the State of Mississippi. He also hired investigators to trace Natalie's whereabouts. On April 18, Natalie called Joey and told him the birth of their child was imminent and that she was healthy. She asked him to sign the adoption papers, and she also mentioned private adoption.
¶ 7. The baby was born on April 21,1992 in Marietta, Georgia. After discovering her whereabouts, Joey went to Georgia and retained an attorney to assist in getting custody of the child. However, his attempts were too late. Natalie and her parents traveled to California where the baby was adopted to Canadian parents.
¶ 8. Joey and his parents sued Natalie and her parents in circuit court, alleging civil conspiracy and intentional infliction of emotional distress. In September 1992, Natalie and her parents filed motions to dismiss the complaint. The chancellor stayed all proceedings in chancery court and suspended all prior orders except the declaration of Joey's paternity. On October 2, 1992, Joey's California attorney learned that the child had been adopted by parents in Alberta, Canada. The Canadian adoption was put on hold pending the resolution of the Mississippi action. On October 22, the circuit court granted the 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss filed by the Maloufs and Natalie. Joey filed notice of appeal from that order on November 13, 1992.
¶ 9. Joey and the Smiths assign as error the following:
ISS UE I
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT BECAUSE JOEY SMITH IS AN UNWED FATHER (RATHER THAN AN UNWED MOTHER), HE HAS NO PARENTAL RIGHTS TO RECEIVE NOTICE OF ANY ADOPTION OF, OR TO OBJECT TO ANY ADOPTION OF, OR TO SEEK LEGAL CUSTODY UPON THE BIRTH OF, HIS BIOLOGICAL CHILD.
ISSUE II
THE CIRCUIT COURT'S RULING THAT MR. AND MRS. JOE SMITH LACKED STANDING TO CLAIM DAMAGE, FLOWING EITHER FROM THE DEFENDANTS' UNLAWFUL CONSPIRACY OR FROM THE DEFENDANTS' INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS UPON THEM, WAS ERRONEOUS.
ISSUE III
PLAINTIFFS ESTABLISHED ALL ELEMENTS OF THEIR CLAIMS FOR PURPOSES OF RULE 12.
ISSUE IV
THE CHANCERY ORDER ENTERED IN A SEPARATE JUDICIAL PROCEEDING, THAT DEFENDANTS SEEK TO INSERT INTO THE RECORD IN THE INSTANT CAUSE, IN NO WAY ADVERSELY AFFECTS PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS FOR RULE 12 PURPOSES.
ISSUE V
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT JOEY SMITH WAS LIMITED TO SEEKING REDRESS FOR THE TORTIOUS ACTIONS OF THE MALOUFS BY RESORT TO CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS IN THE CHANCERY COURT.
ISSUE VI
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT BECAUSE THE DEFENDANTS WERE EXERCISING UNSPECIFIED "RIGHTS TO TRAVEL FREELY THROUGHOUT THE UNITED STATES AND TO BE LEFT ALONE," THEY WERE SHIELDED FROM LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES CAUSED BY THEIR INTENTIONAL TORTS.
II.
a.
¶ 10. This Court, in adjudicating Rule 12(b)(6) motions, has held that upon a motion for dismissal pursuant to M.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the pleaded allegations of the complaint must be taken as true, and a dismissal should not be granted unless it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which entitles him to relief. Overstreet v. Merlos, 570 So.2d 1196, 1197 (Miss.1990).
¶ 11. "A motion to dismiss under MRCP 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint.... [T]o grant this motion there must appear to a certainty that the plaintiff is entitled to no relief under any set of facts that could be proved in support of the claim." Busching v. Griffin, 465 So.2d 1037, 1039 (Miss.1985). In Carpenter v. Haggard, 538 So.2d 776, 777 (Miss.1989), this Court further explained that "[ujnder the MRCP it is only necessary for the complaint to show that the plaintiff is entitled to some relief in court in order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion." The dismissal of a complaint on a 12(b)(6) motion is reviewed de novo. Tucker v. Hinds County, 558 So.2d 869, 872 (Miss.1990); UHS-Qualicare, Inc. v. Gulf Coast Community Hosp., Inc., 525 So.2d 746, 754 (Miss.1987).
b.
¶ 12. We first examine whether Joey had a right to notice of the adoption of his child or a right to object to that adoption under state or federal law. If under current law Joey was so entitled but was prevented from achieving such by and through the actions of Natalie and her parents, the Maloufs, then he is indeed entitled to a trial on his conspiracy and tort claims. With that issue in mind, we begin by looking at the pertinent Mississippi statutes and case law governing this issue.
¶ 13. Miss.Code Ann. § 93-17-5 (1994) provides in relevant part:
In the case of a child born out of wedlock, the father shall not be deemed to be a parent for the purpose of this chapter, and no reference shall be made to the illegitimacy of such child [during the adoption process].
The effect of this provision is that the putative father of a child does not have to be notified of an adoption proceeding because he is not considered a parent under the statute and parents are the only parties statutorily required to be made parties to the adoption proceeding. Thus, § 93-17-5 expressly indicates that Joey was not entitled to notice of the adoption of his child nor was his consent to the adoption necessary. Thus under the statutory law of this state, Joey has no right to complain about the adoption of the child. See Humphrey v. Pannell, 710 So.2d 392, 395 (Miss.1998).
¶ 14. Despite the conclusiveness of § 93-17-5, several United States Supreme Court decisions demonstrate the unconstitutionality of our statute. In fact, the constitutionally suspect nature of § 93-17-5 was recognized recently by this Court in Humphrey v. Pannell. There we stated that:
Although Miss.Code Ann. § 93-17-5 and applicable decisions of this Court do not require notification of the natural unwed father of an illegitimate child, applicable United States Supreme Court decisions nevertheless make it clear that this Mississippi statute [§ 93-17-5] would be unconstitutional in its application in certain eases, particularly in cases in which the natural unwed father has attempted to establish a substantial relationship with the child.
Id. at 396 (citing N. Shelton Hand, Mississippi Divorce, Alimony, and Child Custody, § 21-5 (3rd. ed.1992)).
¶ 15. Beginning with Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651-63, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972), the United States Supreme Court for the first time stated that under certain circumstances the Constitution protected the parental rights of an unwed father. These circumstances included instances in which the putative father had participated in the "companionship, care, custody, and management" of his child. Under those circumstances, his custodial rights to the child could not be revoked without a hearing to determine his parental fitness.
¶ 16. Since this seminal ease, the Supreme Court has clarified and in many ways expanded the rights of unwed fathers. Six years after Stanley, the Supreme Court in Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 98 S.Ct. 549, 54 L.Ed.2d 511 (1978) rejected a putative father's quest to veto the adoption of his eleven-year-old child. The Court found that the father wholly failed to have or seek custody of the child nor had he ever shouldered any significant responsibility with respect to the daily supervision, education, protection and care of the child. Thus, that case established the requirement of a meaningful relationship with the child and not simply proof of biology.
¶ 17. Then there was Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 99 S.Ct. 1760, 60 L.Ed.2d 297 (1979) where the unwed father had custody of his children for several years. Under the applicable New York law, the putative father was merely entitled to notice of the proposed adoption of his children following the mother's death and an opportunity to present evidence on the children's best interest. A sharply divided Supreme Court struck down the New York statute on equal protection grounds, concluding that the undifferentiated distinction between unwed mothers and unwed fathers did not bear a substantial relationship to the State's asserted interests. The Court further found that the father and children had lived together for many years, thereby having established and maintained a significant, supportive relationship. The Court therefore concluded the father should have the privilege of vetoing the adoption of his children. Once again, the Supreme Court was greatly influenced by the fact that the putative father had initiated and carried out a substantial relationship with the children.
¶ 18. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261-62, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983) dealt with an unwed father's attempt to block the adoption of his child by the stepfather. The Supreme Court noted that putative father had never lived with the child or mom, nor had he provided any type of financial support. In short, the father had never "grasped the opportunity to form a relationship" with his child even though the pertinent statute provided him ample procedural protection to do so. As such, the Supreme Court rejected his equal protection claims, likening the father to Quilloin, who also had never even attempted to establish a substantial relationship with the child.
¶ 19. While the preceding cases provided much needed protection to the rights of those unwed fathers who had "grasped the opportunity" to establish a relationship with their children, they failed to address the issue before us — what, if any, constitutional protections should be given to a putative father whose child was adopted immediately after birth, thereby prohibiting him from establishing any type of substantial relationship with the child. This very situation has been addressed by the New York County Surrogate Court in In re Adoption of Baby Girl S, 141 Misc.2d 905, 535 N.Y.S.2d 676 (1988).
¶ 20. There, the child was born on April 24, 1988. Id. at 677. The adoption proceedings commenced on May 4. On March 2 — fifty-three days before the child was born — the unwed father filed a petition to establish his paternity and obtain custody of the unborn child. Id. After several failed attempts, the mother was served with an order on May 6 to show cause that restrained her "from removing or causing the removal" of the child from the county.
¶ 21. On May 13, counsel for the mother and father appeared in Family Court. The mother's attorney failed to inform the court that she had given birth on April 24 and that the child had been placed for adoption in New York County. The restraining order was continued and the matter was adjourned until June 9. In the interim, the mother appeared in the Surrogate Court to place her consent to the adoption on the record. On June 9, the mother told the trial judge and the putative father that she had given birth. The judge ordered the mother to appear in court with the baby on June 14. On that date, she came to court and informed the judge that she had surrendered the baby for adoption. That same day, the father filed with the Putative Father Registry. The next day his attorney informed the Surrogate Court about the paternity and custody proceedings initiated by the father.
¶22. The Surrogate Court appointed a guardian ad litem for the child, and a trial on the issue of paternity was scheduled for July 18. On the morning of trial, the mother admitted she lied about her husband being the father of the child and that the attorney for the adoptive parents had advised her to give the "mistaken" responses. The putative father was determined to be the father of the child, and a hearing was scheduled to determine his rights in the adoption proceeding.
¶23. At this hearing, the mother announced that she wished to revoke her consent to the adoption and to either take custody of the child or give her to the father. The mother also corroborated the father's testi mony from the paternity hearing. Specifically, she confirmed that he told her upon finding out that she missed her menstrual period, "I love you and want to marry you." The mother further admitted that at one point she told the father she was not pregnant and then terminated their relationship. Also she disclosed that the attorney advised her to say she found out about the adoptive parents via an advertisement in the paper because the attorney was not supposed to be the go-between for an adoption. Id. at 678. When the father learned (from a friend) about the pregnancy, he asked the mother to give the child to him. At one point, he even went to see her and offered her $8,000 to help pay for her expenses. The mother continued to tell him the baby was not his. The mother's testimony established that she and the adoptive parents worked in concert to "mastermind something" to deal with "the latest Gus [the putative father] issue," knowing that the mother's estranged husband — whose consent to the adoption they submitted — was not in fact the child's father.
¶ 24. The Surrogate Court found that the adoptive parents (both attorneys) and their counsel orchestrated the whole proceeding so that the court would not discover the omission of Gustavo from the adoption petition. The petition was, in the Surrogate Court's words, "a blatant attempt to make an end run around the Family Court proceedings." Id. at 680. The Court further concluded that when the mother consented to the adoption in Surrogate Court she violated the lower court's restraining order. In short, the Court determined that the adoption proceeding was "permeated with fraud and misrepresentation" and dismissed it accordingly. Id.
¶ 25. Despite this ruling, the Court went on to state that Gustavo had "grasped the opportunity" to develop a relationship with his daughter and accepted responsibility for her future. Furthermore, the Court noted to hold that no unwed father has. a right to prevent an unwed mother from placing their child for adoption immediately at birth would create an invidious gender-based distinction between the rights of unwed fathers and unwed mothers. Id. at 684.
¶ 26. Baby Girl S was affirmed by the New York Court of Appeals in the consolidated ease of In re Raquel Marie X., 76 N.Y.2d 387, 559 N.Y.S.2d 855, 559 N.E.2d 418 (N.Y.1990). Addressing whether "the full measure of constitutional protection— the right to a continued parental relationship absent a finding of unfitness — [is] ever required where a child is placed for adoption before any real relationship can exist, and if so, what actions on the unwed father's part would demonstrate his willingness to take parental responsibility sufficient to give rise such rights," that court of appeals concluded that such an interest must be recognized in appropriate circumstances as a matter of federal constitutional law. Id. at 861, 559 N.E.2d at 424. In order to fall within this constitutional protection, however, the unwed father must come forward to immediately assume parental responsibilities and he must do so in a prompt and substantial manner, including public acknowledgment of paternity, payment of pregnancy and birth expenses, steps taken to establish legal responsibility for the child, and other factors evincing a commitment to the child. Id. at 865, 559 N.E.2d at 428. Any unfitness, waiver or abandonment on the part of the father works to his detriment. Id. All of these requirements had been met by the father in Baby Girl S, where the evidence indicated the father had sought full custodial responsibility virtually from the time he learned of the mother's pregnancy and that he had done everything possible to manifest and establish his parental responsibility. Id.
¶ 27. The instant matter is very analogous to Baby Girl S. Taking the allegations in the complaint as true, from the moment he learned of her pregnancy Joey asked Natalie to marry him. Upon being rejected, he told her that he wanted to keep the child and that he would provide her with financial and any other type of support necessary. When it was disclosed that Natalie and the Maloufs did not want the child, Joey and the Smiths appealed to them to give the child to Joey on more than one occasion. Their pleas were disregarded. Joey sought legal advice, but did not institute legal proceedings until Natalie and her parents orchestrated a scheme whereby Natalie and her mother traveled across the United States and the continent to avoid Joey until the child was born and adopted.
¶ 28. While they were moving from state to state and country to country, Joey — like the father in Baby Girl S — was "grasping every opportunity" to manifest and establish a relationship with his child. He filed a declaration of paternity, obtained a permanent injunction against Natalie and all others working with her to prohibit an adoption of the child, hired private investigators to locate Natalie and mailed the permanent injunction to every Vital Statistics office in Mississippi as well as other states. In sum, he did all he could have done under the circumstances. Unfortunately as the Court realized in Baby Girl S, the unwed father who attempts to establish a parental relationship can be thwarted by the unwed mother's interference. Such was the case here.
¶ 29. Though our state's common law and statutory law did not vest Joey with any protections regarding his right to receive notice of the adoption of his child or to object or veto said adoption, he was entitled to greater constitutional protections under the federal constitution and the dismissal of his suit was therefore improper. As noted in Humphrey v. Pannell, here we are presented with a situation in which the natural unwed father attempted in every way possible to establish a substantial relationship with the child. He was unable to do so because of the mother and her parents.
¶ 30. As the United States Supreme Court has established, Joey had a constitutional right to be notified of or to withhold his consent to the adoption of his child in light of his substantial and prompt attempts to establish a relationship with his child. Section 93-17-5, as a bar to the instant action, then cannot stand up to constitutional scrutiny. See also Nale v. Robertson, 871 S.W.2d 674 (Tenn.1994) (ruling that a Tennessee statute, which allowed adoption to occur before an unwed father's parental rights had been determined, was unconstitutional).
C.
¶31. Joey — faced with the certainty of never gaining custody of his son — has sued Natalie and her parents for intentional infliction of emotional distress and conspiracy. This state recognizes recovery for both negligently and intentionally inflicted emotional distress:
Where there is something about the defendant's conduct which evokes outrage or revulsion, done intentionally — or even unintentionally yet the results being reasonably foreseeable — Courts can in certain circumstances comfortably assess damages for mental and emotional stress, even though there has been no physical injury. In such instances, it is the nature of the act itself — as opposed to the seriousness of the consequences — which gives impetus to legal redress.
Leaf River Forest Prods., Inc. v. Ferguson, 662 So.2d 648, 658 (Miss.1995) (quoting Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Devers, 405 So.2d 898, 900 (Miss.1981)).
¶ 32. We have, on a number of occasions, considered the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Fuselier, Ott & McKee, P.A. v. Moeller, 507 So.2d 63 (Miss.1987) (firing of attorney, including changing of door locks to office not sufficient conduct); T.G. Blackwell Chevrolet Co. v. Eshee, 261 So.2d 481 (Miss.1972) (forging of car buyer's name on finance contract, sufficient conduct); Lyons v. Zale Jewelry Co., 246 Miss. 139, 150 So.2d 154 (1963) (abusive bill collection tactics amounted to sufficient conduct). The standard is whether the defendant's behavior is malicious, intentional, willful, wanton, grossly careless, indifferent or reckless. Leaf River Forest Prods., Inc. v. Ferguson, 662 So.2d 648, 659 (Miss.1995).
¶ 33. If there is outrageous conduct, no injury is required for recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress or mental anguish. Id. at 658. One who claims emotional distress need only show that the emotional trauma claimed was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the negligent or intentional act of another. First National Bank v. Langley, 314 So.2d 324 (Miss.1975) If the conduct is not malicious, intentional or outrageous, there must be some sort of demonstrative harm, and said harm must have been reasonably foreseeable by the defendant. Strickland v. Rossini, 589 So.2d 1268, 1275 (Miss.1991).
¶ 34. The first aspect we must consider is what type of conduct occurred between Joey and Natalie and the Maloufs. Natalie argues she was entitled to put the child up for adoption, just like she would have been entitled to have an abortion had she been so inclined. Thus it is her position that she cannot be held liable for infringing upon Joey's rights when in fact she was only exercising her own right to place the child for adoption.
¶ 35. Natalie is correct insofar as she acknowledges that this Court is faced with two individuals' diametrically opposed legal rights — her right to place the child for adoption and Joey's constitutional right to establish and maintain a relationship with his child. However her reliance on her constitutionally protected right to an abortion is of no moment since she was not hiding in order to effectuate an abortion. In other words, had Natalie been seeking an abortion there would have been little Joey could have done to prohibit her or to assert an interest that would have outweighed her right to abort the child. See Doe v. Smith, 486 U.S. 1308, 108 S.Ct. 2136, 100 L.Ed.2d 909 (1988) (denying an application for an injunction, seeking to enjoin a mother from aborting the child on grounds that the mother's interests in aborting the child outweighed the father's interests notwithstanding Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 96 S.Ct. 2831, 49 L.Ed.2d 788 (1976)). This is not an abortion ease however. Once Natalie decided to carry the child full-term and place the child for adoption, Joey's constitutionally protected rights became viable.
¶ 36. Hence, the pivotal question here is whether Natalie and her parents owe damages to Joey for interfering with his right to attempt to gain custody of the child by exercising her own right to terminate her relationship with the child. Stated otherwise, the issue is whether Joey has a viable claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, thereby rendering the circuit court judge's dismissal of his claim improper. Taking the well-pled allegations in the complaint as true, we conclude that he does.
¶ 37. It is irrefutable that appellees' behavior was intentional and that the foreseeable result of their actions was that the child would be adopted by strangers, thereby depriving Joey of an opportunity to veto the adoption and vie for custody. It is also axiomatic that any father — especially a father who has gone that "extra mile" to gain custody of his child — would suffer severe emotional distress due to the child he wanted being secretly placed for adoption. Thus, this Court concludes that Joey has presented a viable claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Kessel v. Leavitt, 1998 WL 407096, — S.E.2d - (W.Va.1998) (affirming a verdict for damages in similar circumstances).
III.
¶ 38. Joey also sued Natalie and the Maloufs for effectuating a conspiracy to prevent him from establishing a relationship with his child. A conspiracy is "a combination of persons for the purpose of accomplishing an unlawful purpose or a lawful purpose unlawfully." Shaw v. Burchfield, 481 So.2d 247, 255 (Miss.1985). Civil conspiracy, which results in damage, may give rise to a right of recovery. Id. (citing Bailey v. Richards, 236 Miss. 523, 537-38, 111 So.2d 402, 407-08 (1959)).
¶39. The instant claim is that the defendants conspired to unlawfully violate the outstanding injunction and to deprive Joey of his lawful rights as natural parent of the child. These allegations are sufficient to pass Rule 12(b)(6) muster, and Joey should have been afforded the opportunity to present the merits of this claim.
IV.
¶40. We turn now to the propriety of the suit initiated by the Smiths, Joey's parents, against Natalie and her parents, the Maloufs. In the circuit court proceedings, Natalie and the Maloufs argued that as grandparents the Smiths had no legal standing to assert rights involving a grandchild. The circuit court agreed with this contention and therefore ruled that the Smiths could not maintain an action for unlawful conspiracy to violate the chancery court injunction, prohibiting Natalie and anyone else working with her in going forward with the adoption.
¶ 41. The Smiths presently argue that they did, in fact have standing to assert a claim against Natalie and the Maloufs. In particular, they assert — even though they were not parties to the chancery injunction and their own parental rights were not violated — they have standing because they were damaged by the Maloufs' unlawful conspiracy which deprived their son of his parental rights and which resulted in the illegal adoption of their only grandchild. They further posit that they suffered "mental and emotional distress" and that they have "expended a great deal of resources" because of Natalie and her parents' conduct. In short, they contend these damages provided them with a color-able interest in the subject matter of this litigation and the circuit court's finding of no standing was clearly erroneous.
¶ 42. The Maloufs respond that the Smiths are not parents, nor were they parties to the chancery court injunction. The Smiths therefore cannot complain that the injunction was violated. Natalie likewise counters that only she and Joey were parties to the injunction, thereby making it impossible for the Smiths to sue her or her parents (who were not parties to the injunction).
¶ 43. We conclude that in order to prevail on these claims it must be established that the plaintiffs had some legal interest at stake. We find no such legal interest on the part of the Smiths. We therefore affirm so much of the judgment as dismisses their claim for failure to state a cause of action upon which relief could be granted.
Y.
¶ 44. Finally, it is asserted that Joey's only remedy is to institute contempt proceedings in the chancery court. We reject that contention. Conduct may be at once tortious and violative of a court order. The victim is not thereby deprived of a tort remedy simply because the conduct complained of also violated a court order. See Mitchell v. Stevenson, 677 N.E.2d 551, 563 (Ind.Ct.App.1997) (holding that defendant's actions constituted contempt and evidence supported finding of intentional infliction of emotional distress). It is also asserted that to hold Natalie liable violates her constitutional right to travel. We also reject that claim. Parties may exercise constitutional rights in a manner which unlawfully damages others. When they do so, they can be held accountable. See Kathleen K v. Robert B., 150 Cal.App.3d 992, 198 Cal.Rptr. 273 (Cal.Ct.App.1984) (constitutional right to privacy did not protect respondent from a suit for damages based upon severe injury to the appellant's body resulting from the contraction of genital herpes after respondent misrepresented that he was disease-free); see also Doe v. Roe, 218 Cal.App.3d 1538, 267 Cal.Rptr. 564 (Cal.Ct.App.1990) (holding same).
¶ 45. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is hereby reversed, except as herein provided, and this matter is remanded to that court for further proceedings.
¶ 46. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
PRATHER, C.J., SULLIVAN, P.J., and McRAE and JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., JJ., concur.
PITTMAN, P.J., concurs with separate written opinion joined by McRAE and JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., JJ.
SMITH, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with separate written opinion joined by MILLS, J.
MILLS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with separate written opinion joined by SMITH, J.
WALLER, J., not participating.
. The Mississippi Legislature amended § 93-17-5 during the 1998 legislative session. Subsection (3) was rewritten to allow the father to have a right to object to an adoption if he has demonstrated a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood within 30 days after the birth of the child. The amendment was effective beginning July 1, 1998 and is effective until July 1999. From and after July 1999, subsection 3 of 93-17-5 reverts to the language existing before the amendment.