Case Name: Perry M. SEGURA, d/b/a Perry Segura and Associates v. LOUISIANA ARCHITECTS SELECTION BOARD et al.
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1978-09-05
Citations: 362 So. 2d 498
Docket Number: No. 61390
Parties: Perry M. SEGURA, d/b/a Perry Segura and Associates v. LOUISIANA ARCHITECTS SELECTION BOARD et al.
Judges: SANDERS, C. J., dissents and assigns reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 362
Pages: 498–501

Head Matter:
Perry M. SEGURA, d/b/a Perry Segura and Associates v. LOUISIANA ARCHITECTS SELECTION BOARD et al.
No. 61390.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Sept. 5, 1978.
Max N. Tobias, Jr., New Orleans, J. Burton Willis, St. Martinsville, William P. Brumfield, Brumfield & Brumfield, Baton Rouge, for plaintiff-appellant.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Kenneth C. DeJean, Thomas S. Halligan, Asst. Attys. Gen., for defendants-respondents.

Opinion:
SUMMERS, Justice.
Plaintiff Perry M. Segura, doing business as Perry Segura and Associates, sued the Louisiana Architects Selection Board and its members; the Louisiana Engineers Selection Board, and its members; the Louisiana Landscape Architects Selection Board, and its members; the State of Louisiana, Division of Administration; the Governor; the Capitol Outlay Budget Board; the Lieutenant Governor; the State Treasurer; Kevin P. Reilly; B. B. Rayburn; and Nichols State University.
Plaintiff sought a judgment declaring that he had a valid and binding contract to furnish architectural services for the construction of a building to be known as the Ellender Memorial Library at Nichols State University. Judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff and against the defendants, the Governor and the State of Louisiana, Division of Administration, through the Commissioner, jointly and in solido, declaring the contract in question to be valid and binding on the State, the Governor and the Commissioner of Administration. It was also ordered that costs be paid by defendants "to the extent provided by law."
On appeal to the First Circuit the trial court judgment was affirmed. That court also decreed: "The State shall pay whatever costs it may be responsible for under the law." 340 So.2d 369 (La.App.1976). Defendants' application for writs to this Court was denied. 342 So.2d 676 (1977).
Thereafter plaintiff Segura brought a rule against defendants, in accordance with Article 1920 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to show cause why they should not be condemned to pay costs in this matter, or, alternatively, why costs should not be reimbursed and refunded to plaintiff by the clerks of court and sheriffs to whom plaintiff had advanced or paid costs in the course of this litigation. After a hearing, plaintiff's rule was dismissed in the trial court and this dismissal was affirmed on appeal to the First Circuit. 353 So.2d 330 (1977). On application of the plaintiff in rule writs were granted by this Court to review the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 354 So.2d 1051 (La.1978).
By Act 135 of 1936, later amended by Act 509 of 1964, Section 4521 of Title 13 of the Revised Statutes was enacted declaring that,
"Except as hereinafter provided, neither the state, nor any parish, municipality, or other political subdivision, public board or commission shall be required to pay court costs in any judicial proceeding instituted or prosecuted by or against the state or any such parish, municipality or other political subdivision, board or commission, in any court of this state or any municipality of this state, including particularly, but not exclusively, those courts in the Parish of Orleans and the City of New Orleans. This Section shall have no application to stenographers' costs for taking testimony."
Thereafter, in 1974, Louisiana's new constitution was adopted wherein it was provided that "Neither the state, a state agency, nor a political subdivision shall be immune from suit and liability in contract or for injury to person or property." La. Const, art. XII, § 10(A).
The narrow question presented by this case is whether the exemption from payment of costs granted to the State in judicial proceedings by Section 4521 of Title 13 of the Revised Statutes was superseded by Section 10(A) of Article XII of the Constitution of 1974 declaring that the State shall not be "immune from suit and liability in contract." And, if the Constitution did supersede Section 4521 in this regard, is the State required to pay costs in this case?
If the State has no immunity from suit or liability in contract under the Constitution, it is not immune from payment of costs of court incurred by the party who prevails in such a suit against the State, and any statutory enactment to the contrary must succumb to this constitutional proposition.
Costs of court are part of the "liability" to which a party cast in litigation is subject. As plaintiff in this suit Segura was required to advance costs to the clerks of the courts through which this litigation progressed. These advances, insofar as they have been incurred, and other costs paid by plaintiff and properly chargeable to this suit, would reduce the value of the award in Segura's favor if he could not be reimbursed to that extent. The consequence would be that the State was relieved of part of its liability. The Constitution makes no such concession.
Even before the constitution declared the State was not immune from suit and liability in contract and tort, the State was required by statute to pay the stenographer's costs for taking testimony if cast in judgment. In light of the clear constitutional declaration that the State is not immune from suit and liability in this suit in contract, there is no reason why the State should not now be cast in judgment for all other costs. Under the facts of this case this can be accomplished by a judgment in favor of Segura in the amounts advanced or incurred by him for costs. If other costs not advanced or incurred by Segura are involved, the question whether clerks of courts, sheriffs and others can collect these costs from the State is not before us. Our concern is Segura's claim against the State for costs incurred and advanced by him through all phases of this litigation. He is entitled to a judgment against the State in that amount.
Segura's claim for attorney's fees cannot be allowed. There was no stipulation to pay attorney's fees in the contested contract, and no statute allows recovery of attorney's fees in such cases. Recovery of attorneys' fees in this State is allowed only when required by contract or statute. Nassau Realty Co. v. Brown, 332 So.2d 206 (La.1976); Hughes v. Burguieres, 276 So.2d 267 (La.1973).
For the reasons assigned, the case is remanded to the trial court for a hearing and a determination of the costs advanced and incurred by Segura and for judgment in his favor in that amount.
SANDERS, C. J., dissents and assigns reasons.
DIXON, J., dissents.