Case Name: Donna S. MICHAUD-BERGER, etc., et al., Petitioners, v. Honorable Daniel T.K. HURLEY, Respondent
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1992-09-18
Citations: 607 So. 2d 441
Docket Number: No. 92-2216
Parties: Donna S. MICHAUD-BERGER, etc., et al., Petitioners, v. Honorable Daniel T.K. HURLEY, Respondent.
Judges: LETTS, J., concurs specially with opinion.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 607
Pages: 441–454

Head Matter:
Donna S. MICHAUD-BERGER, etc., et al., Petitioners, v. Honorable Daniel T.K. HURLEY, Respondent.
No. 92-2216.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Sept. 18, 1992.
Motions for Rehearing, Rehearing en banc and Certification Denied Oct. 13, 1992.
Jack Scarola of Searcy, Denney, Scarola, Barnhart & Shipley, P.A., and Edna L. Caruso of Edna L. Caruso, P.A., West Palm Beach, for petitioners.
Marjorie Gadarian Graham of Marjorie Gadarian Graham, P.A., West Palm Beach, and George H. Moss of Moss, Henderson, Van Gaasbeck, Blanton & Koval, P.A., Vero Beach, for North American Van Lines; James M. Walker of Fowler, White, Burnett, Hurley, Banick & Strickroot, P.A., Miami, for Effort Enterprises, Inc. and Alvin Youngblood, parties in interest.
No appearance for respondent.

Opinion:
DELL, Judge.
Petitioner Donna S. Michaud-Berger filed suit to recover damages for the wrongful death of her husband and three children and for personal injuries. She has filed a petition for writ of prohibition to disqualify the Honorable Daniel T.K. Hurley from presiding in the trial of this matter. We grant the petition.
The trial of this case began on July 20, 1992. On July 22, 1992, respondent declared a mistrial as a result of problems that occurred during jury selection. The trial began again. Late in the afternoon of July 23, respondent issued a 45-page memorandum opinion and final judgment in the case of Scheller v. American Medical International, Inc., No. 80-5519 AF (Fla. 15th Cir.Ct. July 23, 1992). The final judgment in that case denied the law firm of Searcy, Denney, Scarola, Barnhart & Ship-ley, P.A.'s claim for a charging lien and contained numerous findings of fact concerning Attorney John Scarola. John Sca-rola and Christian D. Searcy, partners in the foregoing law firm, represent petitioner in the proceedings before the trial court in the case sub judice.
In the Scheller final judgment, respondent made the following statements in regard to Mr. Scarola's representation:
The concepts of material breach and an attorney' [sic] duty of loyalty to the client are ingrained in the law. A lawyer has no greater duty than to serve the client within the law. The claim in this case that the Code of Professional Responsibility somehow justified an eleventh-hour demand that the client execute a written contract in "Scheller VI" is pure sophistry. It masked greed, overreaching and attempted extortion. Nothing in this scenario justifies a departure from traditional contract law.
The next morning, when the trial resumed in this case, the following colloquy occurred between Mr. Scarola and respondent:
MR. SCAROLA: Your Honor, with regard to the Court's order, the Court has entered an order finding that I have engaged in what—
THE COURT: May I stop you for a moment, Mr. Scarola?
MR. SCAROLA: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: You have a motion that you are filing?
MR. SCAROLA: I do not have a written motion.
THE COURT: You do not have a written motion?
MR. SCAROLA: No, sir, I DID not have an opportunity to prepare a written motion and this is more in the nature of an inquiry at this point than it is in a motion.
THE COURT: Can you tell me the subject of the matter of the inquiry without going into detail?
MR. SCAROLA: Yes, sir, I can. I need to inquire whether it's possible for me to continue to participate in this proceeding without prejudicing my client?
THE COURT: I really think that's a decision you need to make.
MR. SCAROLA: Well, sir, I don't think that it's a decision that I can, that I can make without some input from the Court, and if the Court is not inclined to give me any input, then I don't think that I would have any alternative but to withdraw.
In the absence of some assurance from the Court that the Court's findings with regard to my past conduct would have no potential bearing whatsoever upon any aspect of this litigation, if I cannot receive that assurance from the Court I don't have any alternative but in the interest of my client to withdraw from further participation.
I think that my client deserves that reassurance. If I can't give it—
THE COURT: Let me stop you for a second, Mr. Scarola. I want you to know that if that were not the case the Court on its own would have alerted you to that fact. But my inquiry is as to whether you need to file any kind of a motion?
MR. SCAROLA: No, sir, I think that I am satisfied that if that's the Court's response I can give my client the reassurance that she needs that my continued participation will not be of any prejudice to her....
THE COURT: I want to assure you, Mr. Scarola, without question, without reservation that your presence in this case would in no way affect the manner in which the Court would discharge its responsibilities and I am well satisfied with that.
MR. SCAROLA: Thank you, sir.
Mr. Searcy then began his opening statement which apparently consumed most of the morning. Shortly before the court recessed for lunch, Mr. Searcy stated:
And the evidence in this case will show that inadequate [sic] measure of damages for Donna, and you need to listen to the evidence and make sure it does in fact show the preview that I discussed with you. But I think the evidence will show that the verdict to measure the damages of Donna Michaud should be no less than ten million dollars.
The trial court sustained defendants' objection on the ground that the foregoing statement constituted argument because Mr. Se-arcy mentioned a specific amount of damages. After the noon recess, defense counsel moved for a mistrial arguing that Mr. Searcy had violated the court's ruling by writing the words "ten mil" on a handwritten jury verdict form after the objection was sustained. The trial court had authorized Mr. Searcy's use of the handwritten jury verdict form to aid him in the discussion of the elements of damages during opening argument. At this point, another exchange occurred between the court, Mr. Searcy and defense counsel:
MR. SEARCY: .
I certainly in all instances am going to abide with the Court's rules. I would like to tell the Court that I have in many, many instances in opening statement have talked with the jury about the amount that I believe the evidence will show the damages should be, and I can give the Court transcripts of opening statements in many, many instances where I have done that.
So I'd like to assure the Court that in doing that I believe and do believe that I was perfectly appropriate in doing that. I think you have great discretion in your ruling and once you ruled that I immediately left that subject and did not return to it.
MR. BURNETT: My objection was made — commenced prior to any dollar figure being put on that or spoken. I can't say put on because I didn't know he put it on.
MR. SEARCY: That's not true, Your Honor. I was writing that and saying there is ten million and writing it while I said it, and you'll notice from the record that I didn't even get to finish writing "million" because when Mr. Burnett objected I interrupted right where I was in mid-stream.
MR. BURNETT: If that's not a final argument, Judge.
THE COURT: Thank you very much.
Mr. Searcy, you pride yourself on being an excellent lawyer and you know and I know that what you did is wrong. You know it.
MR. SEARCY: No, sir, I do not. I take exception to that, sir.
THE COURT: It is wrong and that would be my ruling. I get the impression you're going to push as far as you can go and I can't let you do that. I want to have a fair trial.
Now that is wrong in opening statement. I'm going to grant the motion for mistrial. Bring in the jury panel.
Mr. Searcy then stated that he wished to file a motion. The court recessed the trial until Monday, July 27, and asked that the motion be filed as soon as possible. On Sunday, July 26, petitioner delivered a copy of the motion for disqualification to respondent. On Monday, petitioners filed a verified motion for disqualification together with a certificate of good faith.
Petitioner alleged in her verified motion for disqualification that she had read the memorandum opinion and final judgment in Scheller, a headline and article from the Palm Beach Post dated July 24, excerpts of the transcripts from the court proceedings on July 24 and the affidavits of Christian D. Searcy and John Scarola. She stated in part that:
7. From my reading of the attached documents I fear I will not receive a fair trial in the Court where my suit is pending on account of the prejudice of Judge Hurley against my attorneys, Christian D. Searcy and John Scarola. I fear that what I perceive to be a demonstrated prejudice on the part of Judge Hurley towards Mr. Searcy and Mr. Scarola has and will continue to extend to me as their client.
8. From reading Judge Hurley's 45 page Order, I don't see how Judge Hurley could possibly have the respect for Mr. Scarola's integrity that I believe a
Court must [have] for a lawyer to be an effective advocate before the Court.
12. From my reading of the excerpts from my own trial, I am afraid that Judge Hurley is prejudiced against my attorney Chris Searcy. I understand that Judges make rulings all of the time in trials and I do not complain that Judge Hurley ruled against me. However, it inescapably appears that Judge Hurley has impliedly accused my attorney of being less than truthful with him. After my attorney explained to the Judge that he acted in good faith and on the belief that he was right, but would certainly abide with the Judge's ruling, Judge Hurley stated "Mr. Searcy, you pride yourself on being an excellent lawyer and you know and I know that what you did is wrong. You know it", [sic] From my reading of this excerpt, this statement implying a lack of veracity on the part of my attorney was not in any way necessary for the court's ruling. It appears to me to be an expression of prejudice against my attorney unrelated to a ruling of the Court.
18. The Court's accusation against Mr. Searcy of intentional misconduct (repeated twice by the Court) causes me to be afraid that Judge Hurley is not capable of placing any reliance whatsoever on Mr. Searcy's honesty and integrity. I do not share Judge Hurley's opinion of Mr. Searcy and I want to continue to entrust my representation to him.
14. I am of the belief that the rulings of Judge Hurley demonstrate the effect of some unknown influence other than the law and evidence presented to him. The only reasonable conclusion I can draw and have drawn is that Judge Hurley dislikes and distrusts my lawyers to such an extent that I could not possibly get a fair trial in front of Judge Hurley while my lawyers continue to represent me.
For the reasons I have stated above, I sincerely fear that I will not receive a fair trial in my case on account of the prejudice of Judge Hurley against my attorneys.
Respondent entered written orders denying petitioner's original motion and renewed motion for disqualification in which he stated:
ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the motion is denied. See Jackson v. State, 599 So.2d 103 (Fla.1992) (adverse rulings not adequate ground for recusal); Fischer v. Knuck, 497 So.2d 240 (Fla.1986) (subjective fears insufficient to require disqualification); People Against Tax Revenue Mismanagement, Inc. v. Reynolds, 571 So.ed [sic] 493 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (motion for disqualification must be timely); United States v. Grinnel Corp., 384 U.S. 563[, 86 S.Ct. 1698, 16 L.Ed.2d 778] (1966) (prejudice must stem for [sic] extrajudicial source); In re J.I., 47 Fla. Supp.2d 206 (Fla. 15th Cir.Ct.1991) (Where alleged prejudice is against counsel as opposed to a party, there must be allegations of intense personal antipathy between the trial judge and counsel.); see also J. Shaman, S. Lubet and J. Alfini, Judicial Conduct & Ethics 112 (1990).
Counsel for defendants argue in their response that the motion for disqualification was untimely and legally insufficient. We disagree. In Fischer v. Knuck, 497 So.2d 240 (Fla.1986), the court held that a motion to disqualify must be timely filed. In Fischer, the motion for disqualification was not filed until eleven days after all testimony had been completed and five days after the judge had announced his ruling on the merits. The court in Fischer stated:
A motion for recusal is considered untimely when delayed until after the moving party has suffered an adverse ruling unless good cause for delay is shown. Data Lease Financial Corp. v. Black-
hawk Heating & Plumbing Co., 325 So.2d 475 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975).
Id. at 243. Here, the events leading to petitioners' motion for disqualification essentially occurred during a period of less than twenty-four hours. Although trial began on Monday, July 20, it proceeded without incident until July 23, when respondent issued the memorandum opinion and final judgment in Scheller. The next morning, counsel asked the trial court if his appearance on behalf of petitioner would prejudice his client's case and received assurances from the trial judge that his continued appearance in the trial would not affect the trial judge's impartiality. The record does not clearly establish whether petitioner, on the morning of July 24, had had the opportunity to review the 45-page memorandum opinion and to reflect upon its contents. The law is well-established that under most circumstances if petitioner had full knowledge of the contents of the Scheller final judgment and failed to make a prompt motion for disqualification, she would have waived the findings in the final judgment as a basis for disqualification. However, here the trial judge furnished petitioner with reassurance that Mr. Scaro-la's representation would not prejudice her case. Her counsels' reliance on respondent's comments should not now be used as a basis to conclude that she waived the right to assert the Scheller final judgment as a ground for disqualification.
Furthermore, it appears that after the exchange between respondent and Mr. Se-arcy concerning the use of the verdict form and respondent's order granting a mistrial, Mr. Searcy stated that he intended to file a motion. The trial court accommodated Mr. Searcy and asked that it be filed as soon as possible. This occurred on Friday afternoon and by Sunday, petitioner delivered a copy of the motion for disqualification to respondent. We agree with the Fifth District Court of Appeal's holding in Deren v. Williams, 521 So.2d 150 (Fla. 5th DCA), rev. denied, 531 So.2d 169 (Fla.1988), in which the court concluded that a motion to disqualify the trial judge on multiple grounds discovered during the course of two trials but not filed until after the conclusion of the second trial was not untimely. The court stated:
[W]e think a motion to disqualify should be denied for untimeliness only when its allowance will delay the orderly progress of the case or it is being used as a disruptive or delaying tactic. None of these factors appears to be present in this instance so the legal sufficiency of the motion will be considered.
Id. at 152. We find nothing in the record furnished suggesting that petitioner filed her motion as a delaying tactic or as any other disruptive tactic. In our view, the circumstances giving rise to this petition furnish good cause for the delay, if any, in petitioner's filing of her motion.
With regard to the legal sufficiency of the motion for disqualification, Hayslip v. Douglas, 400 So.2d 553, 555-56 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) and Fischer, 497 So.2d at 242, establish that the standard is whether the party has a "well-founded fear" of prejudice on the part of the trial judge. The facts must be viewed from the perspective of the petitioner. Here, petitioner was confronted with a memorandum opinion in which respondent found that one of her attorney's actions in an unrelated case involved "sophistry," "greed, overreaching and attempted extortion." Although her attorneys had received assurance from the trial judge that he would remain impartial, within a matter of hours, the same trial judge had concluded that her other attorney had intentionally acted improperly in his use of a jury verdict form. We conclude that the cumulative effect of the foregoing events, as reasonably perceived by the petitioner,' constituted a legally sufficient basis for her motion for disqualification and amounted to more than a mere subjective fear that she would not receive a fair trial.
We reject respondent's reliance upon In Re: J.I., 47 Fla.Supp.2d 206 (Fla. 15th Cir.Ct.1991). Defense counsel have not cited a Florida case in support of the circuit court's holding in In Re: J.I. cited by respondent for the premise that "intense personal antipathy" must exist between the trial judge and counsel to support a motion for disqualification. In Re: J.I. clearly conflicts with this court's opinion in Hayslip v. Douglas, wherein this court stated:
We agree with the court's observation in Brewton v. Kelly, supra [166 So.2d 834,] at 836, that "[i]t is not always possible with exact particularity in a matter of this kind to set forth facts as to the process of the human mind_" Nonetheless, we feel certain that under the facts as alleged in Dr. Hay slip's motion, his fear was reasonable and not frivolous nor fanciful. Though a client and his counsel are separate entities, they share a common bond forged by the attorney-client relationship and tempered in the rigors of litigation. Most clients find the courtroom to be an unfamiliar and, in some instances, uncomfortable atmosphere and so it is not unusual that they entrust themselves into their counsel's care and view their interests as one. Thus, it is understandable that a client would become concerned and fearful upon learning that the trial judge has an antipathy toward his lawyer and has expressed the opinion that the client's counsel "should not be in this case."
400 So.2d at 557 (emphasis added).
In summary, this petition causes us great concern. We wish to make it clear that we have the utmost confidence in Judge Hurley's commitment to be fair and impartial and we have no doubt that petitioner would receive a fair trial from him. However, the law requires us to consider this petition from petitioner's perspective. She is entitled to enter the courtroom with confidence that she will receive a fair trial. For the reasons stated above, we hold that the cumulative effect of the foregoing events occurring within a short space of time caused petitioner to have a well-founded fear that she would not receive a fair trial.
We grant the petition, but withhold issuance of the writ since we are confident that respondent will act in a manner consistent with this opinion.
LETTS, J., concurs specially with opinion.
GUNTHER, J., dissents with opinion.
. Defendants in their response argue that the verified motion for disqualification of the judge was technically deficient because it did not contain a certificate of good faith. Petitioners' appendix contains a copy of a docket sheet which indicates that the certificate of good faith was, in fact, filed on July 27th, bearing an earlier docket number than the verified motion for disqualification.
. We find petitioners' allegations concerning Judge Hurley's request that she leave the courtroom and those allegations concerning his facial expressions legally insufficient and therefore have not included them in this excerpt.