Case Name: Gary Paul SMITH v. STATE of Mississippi
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1994-12-01
Citations: 646 So. 2d 538
Docket Number: No. 92-KA-00813
Parties: Gary Paul SMITH v. STATE of Mississippi.
Judges: HAWKINS, C.J., PRATHER, P.J., and BANKS and JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 646
Pages: 538–550

Head Matter:
Gary Paul SMITH v. STATE of Mississippi.
No. 92-KA-00813.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Dec. 1, 1994.
Rex K. Jones, Hattiesburg, for appellant.
Michael C. Moore, Atty. Gen. and DeWitt T. Allred, III, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.

Opinion:
SMITH, Justice,
for the Court:
This case involves one Gary P. Smith, who, under cover of darkness, participated in what citizens concerned about wildlife conservation consider absolutely detestable, a "headlight-er." Headlighters most often are those individuals who jeopardize the safety of wildlife conservation law enforcement officers in the line of duty afield.
The headlighter, like a thief in the night, would shoot deer by blinding them with a powerful spotlight, rather than face this magnificent creature on its home range, during legal hours, using legal means; even if it means waiting for hours, rain, shine, sleet or snow; and even if it means only enjoying the view provided by nature, and not necessarily the harvesting of game. It matters not to the headlighter whether he shoots a buck, doe or fawn. What does it matter that it's dark and the headlighter cannot see too well or that he might be shooting from a public road. It would be too bad if he hit something else, like a farmer's livestock, another vehicle, or worse yet, a human being.
Gary Paul Smith and his brother, Dale, were arrested on November 27, 1991, by Officer Jim Carver of the Department of Wildlife, Fisheries and Parks. Smith was charged with headlighting deer, hunting on a public road, and hunting from a motorized vehicle, all in violation of the hunting and game laws of the State of Mississippi.
Smith was convicted on January 28, 1992, in the Justice Court of Pearl River County, Mississippi, on all three charges. Smith appealed his conviction to the Pearl River County Circuit Court for a trial de novo, and on June 18, 1992, a jury convicted Smith on all charges. Smith was sentenced to fifteen days in jail and a $1,000.00 fine for headlight- ing deer; six months in jañ and a $500.00 fine for hunting from a public road; and a $100.00 fine for hunting from a motorized vehicle.
Smith, aggrieved by his conviction, appeals to this Court and raises the following issues on appeal:
I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FAILING TO SUSTAIN THE APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT FOR FAILURE OF THE STATE TO PROVE VENUE
II. THE VERDICT OF THE IURY (WAS) AGAINST THE OVERWHELMING WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AS TO THE CRIME OF HUNTING FROM A PUBLIC ROAD
Only issue I of Smith's claims warrants discussion. The evidence against Smith was more than sufficient to support the jury's verdict. The State proved venue on rebuttal and Smith failed to counter the evidence in surrebuttal. After a complete review of the parties' briefs and the record in this case, we find no merit to Smith's claims and must affirm the trial court.
FACTS
Officer Carver testified at Smith's trial identifying Smith as one of two brothers that he arrested on the night of November 27, 1991. Carver testified that he observed a vehicle pull off Sones Chapel Road at Amacker cemetery and cut its headlights off. Carver then testified that the car pulled back onto Sones Chapel Road with its headlights shining over a rye field. He also observed a bright light, coming from the passenger side of the car, scanning the rye field. After shining the spotlight on the field, the Smiths left the area and headed towards State Highway 26. Carver radioed for backup, dropped back a distance, and followed the car.
Officer Carver pulled the Smiths over at the intersection of Sones Chapel Road and Highway 26. Carver approached the passenger's side of the car and observed Gary Paul Smith trying to open the bolt and eject two shells from a .243 caliber rifle. Officer Carver took the gun from Smith, examined it, and found two shells in the clip. Officer Carver also observed a quartz spotlight plugged into the cigarette lighter on the passenger's side of the car. Officer Carver testified that Smith stated: "[Y]ou caught us red-handed." "We're not going to try to deny anything. You caught us fair and square."
Throughout Officer Carver's entire testimony, he never stated that he arrested Smith in Pearl River County, Mississippi, or that the crime took place in Pearl River County, Mississippi.
Troy Stockstill, the State's next witness, testified that he was the county road manager and that he maintained the county roads throughout the district and that he was familiar with Sones Chapel Road. Stockstill stated that Sones Chapel Road was a public road and that it was maintained by public funds. However, Stockstill did not testify that he was the county road manager for Pearl River County, Mississippi, or that Sones Chapel Road was in Pearl River County, Mississippi.
After the State rested, Smith moved the court to peremptorily instruct the jury to find him not guilty and sought the court's dismissal of the charges for failure of the State to prove venue. The judge overruled Smith's motions finding that he did not think that the State had proved venue, but that he would let the record speak for itself. Smith's attorney informed the court that he would proceed with his case but that he did not want to waive the question of the State's failure to prove venue. The trial judge incorrectly ruled that Smith was proceeding with his case, but that he was not waiving the issue of venue.
Smith testified that he and his brother Dale were traveling from Dale's house at Carriere to his house along Sones Chapel Road on the night of November 27,1991, and pulled into Amaeker cemetery to use the restroom. Smith testified that neither he nor his brother shined a headlight or any kind of light across any rye field on Sones Chapel Road.
The defense next called Gary Smith's brother Dale to the stand. Dale Smith's testimony was for all practical purposes identical to that of his brother. Dale Smith denied that he or his brother spotlighted the rye field across from Amacker cemetery. Dale Smith testified that he was using his sister's Thunderbird and that he kept the spotlight in the ear because the ear had vacuum headlights and the lights sometime leaked down and he would have to get under the hood with the spotlight to repair the headlights. Dale Smith testified that he kept the rifle in the car for his own protection.
At the close of his case, Smith renewed his motion for a peremptory instruction of not guilty and again sought dismissal because of the state's failure to prove venue. The motion was denied.
The State called Officer Carver as a rebuttal witness. The officer was called to the stand to rebut testimony that he, Carver, could not have observed the Smith's car from where he was parked. On rebuttal Officer Carver testified that the whole incident took place in Pearl River County, Mississippi. The State rested and the defense did not call any further witnesses.
The jury was instructed as to the law and was excused to begin its deliberations. After completing its deliberations, the jury found Smith guilty of all three charges.
DISCUSSION
Smith claims the State failed to prove venue in Pearl River County and that the court erred in its failure to grant his motion for a directed verdict.
The local jurisdiction of all offenses, unless otherwise provided by law, shall be in the county where committed. Jones v. State, 606 So.2d 1051 (Miss.1992). Smith attacks the sufficiency of the proof of venue and argues that the State failed to prove that the alleged crimes took place in Pearl River County, Mississippi.
The State called two witnesses during their ease-in-chief, Carver and Stockstill. Neither of them testified that the crime occurred in Pearl River County. Stockstill, the county road manager, testified that Sones Chapel Road was a public road and that it was maintained by county funds. However, he did not testify that he was the county road manager for Pearl River County, Mississippi, or that Sones Chapel Road was located in Pearl River County, Mississippi.
Proof of venue is indispensable to a criminal trial and it may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence. Jones v. State, 606 So.2d 1051, 1055 (Miss.1992); Griffin v. State, 381 So.2d 155, 158 (Miss.1980); Jackson v. State, 246 So.2d 553, 555 (Miss.1971). In this ease, none of the witnesses testified during the State's case-in-chief that the crimes took place in Pearl River County, Mississippi.
The only place in the record during the State's case-in-chief where testimony was elicited concerning the county of proper venue occurred on cross-examination of Officer Carver, who was asked:
Q. Okay. Of course, there's nothing unusual about people in Pearl River County or any other Country [sic] carrying rifles in their vehicles; is it?
A. Nothing so unusual about it.
This question by Smith's attorney appears to have been an attempt to establish that it was commonplace in Pearl River County for people to carry loaded rifles in their car. It is certainly logical that the jury could have inferred that the entire incident occurred in and that Gary was arrested in Pearl River County, Mississippi, or alternatively, the jury could have found that it was common practice for people to carry guns in their cars in Pearl River County and not necessarily be guilty of headlighting and hunting from a public road in a motorized vehicle. Sanders v. State, 286 So.2d 825, 827 (Miss.1973).
Additionally, the jury heard from Troy Stockstill, the county road manager of Pearl River County, who testified that Sones Chapel Road was a public road maintained by county funds. The jury, composed of Pearl River County residents, could have possibly inferred that venue was established in Pearl River County, considering Stockstill's testimony, coupled with Officer Carver's testimony that the incident occurred on Sones Chap el Road. Although this is a close question indeed, we find that there was insufficient evidence for establishing venue in the State's case-in-chief.
Smith moved for a directed verdict or peremptory instruction at the end of the State's case-in-chief. In considering a motion for a directed verdict, this Court on review must consider the evidence introduced in the light most favorable to the State, accepting all evidence introduced by the State as true, together with all reasonable inferences therefrom. If there is sufficient evidence to support a guilty verdict, the motion for a directed verdict must be overruled. Barnwell v. State, 567 So.2d 215, 217 (Miss.1990); Davis v. State, 530 So.2d 694, 703 (Miss.1988); Thompson v. State, 457 So.2d 953, 955 (Miss.1984). Conversely, if there is insufficient evidence to support a guilty verdict, the motion for directed verdict must be sustained.
The standard of review used in determining the sufficiency of the evidence after the denial of a directed verdict motion or motion for a peremptory instruction is found in Wetz v. State, 503 So.2d 803 (Miss.1987). In Wetz, the State challenged the defendant's ability to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence after the trial judge overruled the defendant's motion for a directed verdict. Id. at 807-08. This Court in an often quoted footnote stated:
[I]n his brief before the court, the Attorney General argues that we should not consider the propriety of the Circuit Court's denial of the motion for a directed verdict made at the end of the prosecution's evidence, on the premise that Wetz waived any rights he might have in that regard by offering evidence in his own behalf. We have, of course, stated this waiver rule on numerous occasions, generally without bothering to explain its limited procedural meaning. See, e.g., Weeks v. State, 493 So.2d 1280, 1282 (Miss.1986); Ruffin v. State, 481 So.2d 312, 316 (Miss.1986); (further citations omitted) Because the point is often misunderstood an explanation may be helpful.
By offering evidence of his own, the defendant in no way waives the right to challenge the sufficiency or weight of the evidence in the event of an adverse jury verdict. What the waiver rule means is that the defendant must proceed on the basis of the evidence before the court at the time the challenge is made and not in the limited state of the record which may have existed back when the motion for a directed verdict was originally made.
Put otherwise, all of these motions — the motion for directed verdict made at the end of the case for the prosecution, the request for a peremptory instruction at the end of all of the evidence or the motion for a directed verdict at that point, or, finally, a motion for judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict — are procedural vehicles for challenging the sufficiency of the case for the prosecution. Each requires that the court considers all of the evidence before it at the time the motion is considered. When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on appeal, this Court properly should review the Circuit Court's ruling on the last occasion when the sufficiency of the evidence was challenged before the trial court. Here, of course, that was when the Circuit Court overruled the motion for a new trial which contained at least two paragraphs challenging the legal sufficiency of the evidence. Cf. Clements v. Young, 481 So.2d 263, 268 (Miss.1985). See also Griffin v. State, 495 So.2d 1352, 1353 (Miss.1986).
Wetz, 503 So.2d at 807-08, n. 3. (emphasis added).
In the case sub judice, Smith moved for a directed verdict based upon the sufficiency of the evidence establishing venue. The trial judge denied Smith's motion and Smith put on evidence in his defense. Smith, at the end of his case, sought a peremptory instruction from the judge instructing the jury to find that the State had not established venue. Smith once again challenged the weight and sufficiency of the State's proof of venue in his motion for a JNOV, or in the alternative, for a new trial. Since each requires consideration based on the evidence before the court when made, this Court properly reviews the ruling on the last occasion the challenge was made in the circuit court. McClain v. State, 625 So.2d 774, 778 (Miss.1993). Smith may appeal the alleged inadequacy of the State's evidence establishing venue, but he must do so based upon the entire record, not just on the State's case. Jordan v. State, 513 So.2d 574, 578 (Miss.1987). See also Hall v. State, 546 So.2d 673 (Miss.1989) (defendant challenged sufficiency of State's evidence establishing identity of defendant).
The State argues that the district attorney's oversight was corrected during the defendant's case or during the State's rebuttal case and therefore, venue was established. To support this argument the State points to the footnote found in Wetz v. State, 503 So.2d 803, 807 (Miss.1987). On review, the State argues, we must look to the entire body of evidence before the trial court at the last time the sufficiency of the evidence was challenged. In the case sub judice, the last time the sufficiency of the evidence establishing venue was challenged was in Smith's Motion for a Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, or in the Alternative, A New Trial. Thus, the State argues, venue was conclusively established and Smith's conviction should be upheld. Again we find the claim made by Smith prior to rebuttal by the State to be a very close issue, but Smith should prevail at that point because of his reliance upon the erroneous ruling of the trial judge who allowed Smith to put on evidence in defense while supposedly not waiving his claim under the venue issue. ^
On rebuttal, however, the State called Officer Carver, who testified that the entire headlighting incident occurred in Pearl River County, Mississippi. Smith put on no evidence to the contrary. Clearly at this point, there can be no doubt that venue was being sufficiently proven to be in Pearl River County, Mississippi. This. Court, when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, must review the entire record. Wetz; Jordan; Hall.
Because of this rebuttal testimony by the State, which went unchallenged due to the lack of surrebuttal by Smith, we find review of the entire record shows that the State proved venue conclusively in the case sub judice.
We liken rebuttal testimony that is unchallenged with no surrebuttal testimony by the opposite party as somewhat similar to a motion to reopen a case. This Court has a long line of precedent cases concerning rebuttal and motions to reopen a case.
In Roney v. State, 167 Miss. 827, 150 So. 774 (1933), the appellant contended that the children at issue were not his. After the State rested its case in chief and appellant had introduced his evidence in defense, the State was permitted to introduce a witness in rebuttal that the appellant admitted the children were his and not someone else's. The appellant argued the evidence should have been introduced by the State before it closed its case in chief. The Court held:
It is the general rule that the party with the burden of proof and the duty to open the case, must in his opening, and before he rests in his proof, introduce all the substantial evidence upon which he relies to establish his demand, and the extent of his demand. There is an exception to the rule, however.
The Court noted a more liberal rule as to admitting testimony in rebuttal, "although not strictly rebuttal in its nature, and this has been done even after the testimony has been closed on both sides." Roney, 167 Miss, at 831, 150 So. at 775.
The Court in Riley v. State, 248 Miss 177, 186, 157 So.2d 381, 385 (1963) further noted that circumstances in trials always change "where justice requires its relaxation...." The Court stated:
"The rule is that when the question is not free from doubt whether' the evidence offered in rebuttal is that which belongs to the evidence in chief, or whether it is rebuttal evidence proper, the court should resolve the doubt in favor of the reception in rebuttal where (1) its reception will not consume so much additional time as to give an undue weight in practical probative force to the evidence so received in rebuttal, and (2) the opposite party would be substantially as well prepared to meet it by surrebuttal as if the testimony had been offered in chief, and (3) the opposite party upon request therefor is given the opportunity to reply by surrebuttal."
Id. at 186, 157 So.2d at 385.
Clark v. State, 181 Miss. 455, 180 So. 602 (1938) followed the analysis of Roney and Riley stating "[i]t is not reversible error for the court to allow testimony in rebuttal which should have been introduced as substantive evidence in chief, unless it is shown that no opportunity is afforded the defense to reply by surrebuttal testimony." 181 Miss. at 462, 180 So. at 603 (emphasis added).
In Coburn v. State, 250 Miss. 684, 168 So.2d 123 (1964), the Court stated it is not error for the trial judge to permit the state to reopen its case after it had rested for the purpose of putting on additional evidence. Again, it is at the sound discretion of the trial judge. The Court stated that "nothing whatever had intervened between the time the district attorney announced the state had rested and the time that he asked for permission to reopen and introduce further testimony. 250 Miss. at 692, 168 So.2d at 127.
Hunter v. State, 183 Miss. 779, 787,184 So. 835, 837 (1938) stated "Moreover, even if it were true that this testimony should have been offered in chief, it was not reversible error to permit the State to introduce the same in rebuttal, where the defendant was not denied the opportunity to offer further testimony in surrebuttal." citing Roney v. State, Clark v. State. The Riley Court noted that both Lee v. State, 201 Miss. 423, 433, 29 So.2d 211, 212 (1947), and Summerville v. State, 207 Miss. 54, 63, 41 So.2d 377, 379 (1949), "the State was permitted to reopen for the purpose of proving an element of the offense itself."
In a more recent case, Meeks v. State, 604 So.2d 748, 755 (Miss.1992), Meeks was convicted of capital murder, kidnapping, burglary, and assault. He argued that the Circuit Court erred when it refused to allow him to reopen his case after both the prosecution and defense rested its case. The defense failed to cross-examine one of the witnesses on a particular point claiming an "inadvertent oversight" and asked the court to reopen. The court denied the request but allowed Meeks to proffer for the record. The Court affirmed that a trial court has "considerable discretion" to consider reopening. The Court held no abuse of discretion existed because Meeks testified on direct examination. The court would not have erred if it allowed reopening, but here it did not add to the testimony to add serious doubt of his guilt.
In Wakefield v. Puckett, 584 So.2d 1266 (Miss.1991), Justice Prather cited a Connecticut Supreme Court discussing this issue:
In any ordinary situation, if a trial [judge] feels that, by inadvertence or mistake, there has been a failure to introduce available evidence upon a material issue in the case of such a nature that in its absence . a miscarriage of justice [would result, the judge] may properly permit evidence to be introduced at any time before the case has been decided.
Id. at 1268 citing Wood v. City of Bridgeport, 216 Conn. 604, 583 A.2d 124, 125 (1990).
The Wakefield Court referenced another Mississippi case which held:
"As a general rule . the reopening of a case for the purpose of showing facts vital to the issue involved, is liberally allowed . and a failure to do so may be considered an abuse of judicial discretion." Wells-Lamont Corp. v. Watkins, 247 Miss. 379, 151 So.2d 600, 604 (1963) (emphasis added by Wells-Lamont Court)
Id. at 1268.
The Court noted the liberal application of the rule because judges are encouraged to "see that all of the necessary [evidence is introduced] so as to properly [and fairly] dispose of a case." Meeks, 604 So.2d at 755 (citing Anderson v. Anderson, 249 Miss. 1, 162 So.2d 853, 855 (1964)).
Wakefield was a prisoner who was placed in special confinement for bad behavior. His personal belongings were confiscated by prison guards and he filed suit to recover the value thereof. He mistakenly believed that because he enumerated the items in the complaint, the jury would be privy to the information. Representing himself, Wakefield failed to produce a list of personal belongings and the relevant associated costs associated to the jury. The trial court denied Wakefield the opportunity to produce the list for the jury. This Court reversed, holding that Wakefield should have been permitted to introduce the list of missing items. The Court stated that the judge in determining whether to accept additional evidence should consider:
(1) whether the cause of the omission is excusable? (e.g., (omission due to inadvertence, mistake, etc.?)), (2) whether the evidence is relevant to a material issue? (3) whether the absence of the evidence will result in a miscarriage of justice? and (4) whether another party will be significantly or unduly prejudiced if the case were reopened?
Wakefield, 584 So.2d at 1268-69.
CONCLUSION
There will likely be those who might question the Court's taking such valuable time on a case such as this. Some will consider this trivial. Rest assured that the issue of "head-lighting" is important to Gary P. Smith, law enforcement officers and a large segment of an interested public.
It is the Gary P. Smiths of this State who steal beautiful game animals such as deer, under cover of darkness by "headlighting", thereby blackening the image of respectable consumers of our wildlife resources. These headlighters have no respect whatsoever for the State of Mississippi's sovereign ownership of such magnificent God given creatures of the wild, entrusted to mankind for his consumption and/or enjoyment. They fail to recognize that such animals are for the benefit of all mankind, nor do they heed the State's laws regulating the taking, possession, or prohibition against certain acts regarding wildlife. To say that headlighters fail to understand the principles of good conservation management and stewardship of our abundant wildlife resources in order to secure the survival of the species for future citizens, is an understatement.
On the opposite side of the fence and the law are the average citizens, men, women and children, who enjoy the great outdoors of Mississippi, utilizing the vast game and fish resources she has to offer and who are keenly aware of their respective obligations and responsibilities to conserve and protect wildlife resources in order that future Mississippians may experience these same benefits afforded us today. Our abundant wildlife resources, so often taken for granted, are the result of the sacrifice and hard work of our elders and more so that of officials of the Department of Wildlife Conservation. The officers of the Department of Wildlife Conservation have labored long, hard years establishing the successful conservation programs and enforcing the laws necessary to produce and conserve the abundant supply of wildlife now available for all of our citizens. Both are owed a tremendous debt of gratitude by the public. We need only remind ourselves that when most of us were youngsters there were very few deer in this State, yet now there are literally thousands. We also need not forget that the funds for these conservation programs which produced such abundant wildlife have primarily been supplied by hunters, fishermen, hikers, campers, bird watchers, and other consumers or observers of nature and its wildlife resources.
This Court must continue to adhere to its long established precedent of a more liberal rule admitting testimony in rebuttal that was not strictly rebuttal in nature. The Roney Court noted this exception in 1933 and the same analysis was adhered to in Clark, where the Court held that no reversible error existed where the trial court allowed in rebuttal, evidence which should have been introduced as substantive evidence in chief, unless it was shown that no opportunity was afforded the defense to reply by surrebuttal testimony. In the ease sub judice, Smith had surrebuttal opportunity but, did not avail himself to it. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in allowing the State's rebuttal testimony to establish venue. Error, if any, was cured by the rebuttal testimony of Officer Carver which clearly established venue of the offenses charged as being in Pearl River County, Mississippi. There is no merit to Smith's claims and we must affirm the trial judge.
COUNT I: CONVICTION OF HUNTING FROM A PUBLIC ROAD AND SENTENCE OF SIX MONTHS IN THE CUSTODY OF MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, PAY A FINE OF $500.00 AND PAY ALL COURT COSTS AFFIRMED.
COUNT II: CONVICTION OF HEAD-LIGHTING AND SENTENCE OF FIFTEEN DAYS IN THE PEARL RIVER COUNTY JAIL, PAY A FINE OF $1,000.00 AND FORFEIT OF ALL HUNTING PRIVILEGES AFFIRMED.
COUNT III: CONVICTION OF HUNTING FROM A MOTORIZED VEHICLE AND ORDERED TO PAY A FINE OF $100.00 AFFIRMED.
HAWKINS, C.J., PRATHER, P.J., and BANKS and JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., JJ., concur.
PITTMAN, J., concurs in result only.
DAN M. LEE, P.J., dissents with separate written opinion joined by SULLIVAN, J., and McRAE, J., joins in part.
McRAE, J., dissents with separate written opinion joined by DAN M. LEE, P.J., and SULLIVAN, J.