Case Name: Henry Presley, alias Tom Presley, v. The State
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1910-05-25
Citations: 60 Tex. Crim. 102
Docket Number: No 590
Parties: Henry Presley, alias Tom Presley, v. The State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Criminal Reports
Volume: 60
Pages: 102–107

Head Matter:
Henry Presley, alias Tom Presley, v. The State.
No 590.
Decided May 25, 1910.
Rehearing Granted October 19, 1910.
1. —Theft of Horse — Statement of Facts — Extension—Filing—Practice on Appeal.
Where the court adjourned and entered an order allowing thirty days in which to file statement of facts and bills of exception, and afterwards, after the expiration of thirty days, filed an order extending the time for the filing of statement of facts, etc., and after which the same was filed, the same can not be considered on appeal; but it being shown on motion for rehearing that there was no want of diligence on the part of appellant’s counsel in securing the statement of facts within the time of the original order, the same will be considered.
2. —Same—Charge of Court — Explanation of Possession — Words and Phrases.
Where, upon trial of theft of a horse, the court submitted a charge on the issue of explanation of the possession of the alleged stolen property by the defendant, which was identical with the charge in the case of Wheeler v. State, 34 Texas Crim. Rep., 350, there was no reversible error, although the court used the expression “and contradictory” after the word “reasonable;” however, this additional expression should have been omitted. See opinion as to individual views of Davidson, Presiding Judge.
3. —Same—Indictment—Motion to Quash — Time Alleged.
Where, upon trial of theft of a house, the indictment alleged the time as “on or before the 21st day of July,” this expression was not too indefinite viewed from the standpoint of limitation; however, such pleading is not commended.
4. —Same—Continuance—Purchase.
Where, upon trial of theft of a horse, the defendant claimed to have purchased the same, the court should have granted a continuance to secure ;the attendance of an absent witness whom he alleged was present when the purchase was made by defendant, the application being sufficient in other respects.
Appeal from the District Court of Austin. Tried below before the Hon. L. W. Moore.
Appeal from a conviction of theft of a horse; penalty,- two years imprisonment in the penitentiary.
The opinion states the case.
Carothers & Brown, for appellant.
On question of reinstatement of statement of facts: Article 1382, Rev. Civ. Stats.; Pace v. State, 58 Texas Crim. Rep., 90, 124 S. W. Rep., 950; Dobbs v. State, 54 Texas Crim. Rep., 579, 113 S. W. Rep., 921; Howard v. State, 53 Texas Crim. Rep., 378, 111 S. W. Rep., 1038; Campbell v. State, 57 Texas Crim. Rep., 301, 123 S. W. Rep., 583; Wright v. State, 44 S. W. Rep., 151,
On question of explanation of possession of alleged stolen property: Johnson v. State, 36 Texas Crim. Rep., 394, 37 S. W. Rep., 424.
On the question of continuance and materiality of testimony: Hyden v. State, 31 Texas Crim. Rep., 401, 20 S. W. Rep., 764; Ferguson v. State, 31 Texas Crim. Rep., 93, 19 S. W. Rep., 901; Walker v. State, 32 Texas Crim. Rep., 175, 22 S. W. Rep., 685; Clark v. State, 38 Texas Crim. Rep., 30, 40 S. W. Rep., 992; Miller v. State, 18 Texas Crim. App., 232.
On the question of insufficiency of indictment and insufficient allegation of time when offense was committed: Coleman v. State, 62 S. W. Rep., 753; Harwell v. State, 65 S. W. Rep., 520; Vallegas v. State, 66 S. W. Rep., 769; Barnes v State, 59 S. W. Rep., 882; Reed v. State, 13. S. W. Rep., 865; State v. Eubanks, 41 Texas, 291.
Where State does not controvert defendant’s explanation jury should acquit: Coleman v. State, 22 S. W. Rep., 41.
John A. Mobley, Assistant Attorney-General, for the State.

Opinion:
DAVIDSON, Presiding Judge.
Appellant was convicted of horse theft, his punishment being assessed at two years confinement in the penitentiary.
The Assistant Attorney-General moves to strike from the record the statement' of facts because the same was not filed within the time and under the terms prescribed by law. Court adjourned on the 22d day of Januarj^ after entering an order allowing thirty days in which to file statement of facts. On the 2d day of March the following order was filed: "It is ordered in the above styled and numbered cause that twenty-five additional days be granted to the parties for making out their statement of facts and bills of exception and said time is extended to the twenty-eighth day of February, 1910." This order is signed by the judge. The statement of facts was filed on the 2d of March. The thirty day order expired on the night of the 21st of February. The order was not filed until the 2d of March. The statement of facts was filed on the 2d of March. To make the order extending the time legal and available it should have been entered before the expiration of the thirty days allowed by.the court. In other words, the latest day upon which this order could have been made extending the time was the 21st of February. As the matter is presented, we are of opinion the motion is well taken, and the statement of facts will not be considered. In the absence of statement of facts the alleged error in overruling application for continuance can not be revised.
The charge of the court with reference to explanation of the possession of the alleged stolen property by the defendant is criticised. The objection to the charge is that the court informed the jury that if defendant's statement when first questioned was unreasonable and contradictory and did not account for his possession in a -manner consistent with his innocence, they would find him guilty, appellant contending there was no evidence that his explanation when his possession was first challenged was unreasonable or contradictory, and because there was no evidence that said explanation did not account for his possession in a manner consistent with his innocence. The charge is identical with that in the case of Wheeler v. State, 34 Texas Crim. Rep., 350, except that after the word "unreasonable" the expression occurs "and contradictory." The reason assigned for' the criticism of the charge is that there is no evidence that* his statement was unreasonable or contradictory, and there is no evidence that his explanation failed to account for his possession consistent with his innocence. These criticisms or exceptions to the charge can not be considered in the absence of statement of facts. The evidence may have shown that his explanation was both unreasonable and contradictory. It being a question of faot, the court can not review these exceptions without the evidence. The point is not made that it was. on the weight of testimony, and we are only required to treat the objections urged.
Motion to quash the indictment was presented and overruled. The particular portion criticised is in alleging the time. The indictment avers that it was "on or before the 21st day of July." It is contended that by the use of the expression "or before" that it does not preclude the question of limitation; that it may have been far back in the past, beyond the question of limitation. We are- of opinion that this is not sufficient reason to quash the indictment. Such loose pleading, however, as this should not be indulged. It is well enough in setting out the date to be specific, but under the decisions in this State we are of opinion 'that this expression, is not too indefinite, viewed from the standpoint of limitation. The date of the offense must be alleged so that it does not show on the face of the pleading to be barred by limitation. This seems to be the criterion of our decisions with reference to this matter. Quite a number'of decisions are to the effect "on or about" a certain date is sufficient allegation of time. "On or before" may be perhaps a little broader as to time than the expression "on or about," but under all the decisions the setting out of the date in the indictment as to the commission of the offense is to show that at the time of the presentment of the indictment the offense was not barred by limitation. Of course,' under the allegation in this indictment the evidence for the State would have to show the offense was within the period of limitation, counting back from the time the indictment was presented in the court by the grand jury. Viewing it from these standpoints* we are of opinion that the indictment is not so deficient as to require this court to hold good a motion to quash.
As the record is before us we are of opinion that the judgment ought to be affirmed, and it is accordingly so ordered.
Affirmed.