Case Name: Phila., Appellant, v. Masonic Home of Penna.
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1894-04-02
Citations: 160 Pa. 572
Docket Number: Appeal, No. 61
Parties: Phila., Appellant, v. Masonic Home of Penna.
Judges: Before Sterrett, O. J., Green, Williams, McCollum, Mitchell, Dean and Fell, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania State Reports
Volume: 160
Pages: 572–589

Head Matter:
Phila., Appellant, v. Masonic Home of Penna.
Taxation — Exemption—Masonic Home — Charily.
A charity is a gift to promote the welfare of others.
A charity is not a “ purely public charity” which excludes from its benefits any person because he has not a particular relation to some society, church or other organization.
It seems that so long as the classification is determined by some distinction which involuntarily affects or may affect any of the whole people, although only a small number may be benefited, it is public.
Ahorne limited to indigent, afflicted and aged Freemasons, although supported by voluntary contributions, without charge to the beneficiaries, and with no profit cither to the corporation or its officers, is not a “ purely public charity,” exempt from taxation within the meaning of the constitution, sec. 1, art. 9, and the act of May 14, 1874, P. L. 158.
Tax exemptions — Statutes—Repeal—Act of May 14, 1874.
The act of May 14, 1874, P. L. 158, in connection with the constitution of 1874, repeals all tax exemptions enacted after the constitutional amendment of 1857
Argued Jan. 19, 1893; reargued Jan. 2, 1894.
Appeal, No. 61, July T., 1892, by plaintiff, from judgment of C. P. No. 4, Pliila. Co., Sept. T., 1889, No. 923, M. L. D., on verdict for defendant.
Before Sterrett, O. J., Green, Williams, McCollum, Mitchell, Dean and Fell, JJ.
Reversed.
Sci. fa. sur municipal claim for taxes.
At the trial, it appeared that the Masonic Home was incorporated under the act of May 6, 1871, P. L. 615. On April 14, 1884, the Home of Free and Accepted Masons of Pennsylvania was incorporated by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia county. On Sept. 6, 1887, the two corporations were merged by a decree of court. The act of May 6, 1871, P. L. 615, exempted the property of the Masonic Home from taxation.
Defendant’s charter under act of May 6,1871, P. L. 615, was as follows:
“ Section 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, in General Assembly met, and it is hereby enacted, by the authority of the same, that Robert A. Lamberton, Christian F. Knapp, Henry B. McKean, Michael Nisbet, John A. Wright, D. W. C. Carroll, Jeremiah L. Hutchinson, Samuel B. Dick, James M. Porter and James H. Hopkins, their associates and successors, be and they are hereby created a body corporate and politic, with perpetual succession, by the name and style of ‘ The Masonic Home of Pennsylvania,’ and by that name are made capable in law and equity to sue and be sued, plead and be impleaded, contract and be contracted with, and to make, have and use a common seal and the same to break, alter, renew at- pleasure, ordain' by-laws, and shall have the right to take and hold by purchase, gift or devise, real and personal estate, free from all taxation, for the purposes hereinafter named, and to sell, convey or exchange the same at pleasure.
“ Sec. 2. The object of said institution shall be to provide and sustain in the state of Pennsylvania one or more houses for destitute widows and orphans of deceased Freemasons of the state of Pennsylvania, and an infirmary or infirmaries for the reception and care of sick and afflicted Freemasons in indigent circumstances, and all such as may be placed under its charge by its managers.
“ Sec. 3. The membership of said institution shall consist of life members, active members and representatives of masonic bodies, under such regulations as the committee of management may prescribe — all of whom shall be Freemasons.
“ Sec. 4. There shall be a meeting of the members of the institution called within three months after the passage of this act, for the purpose of electing members of the committee of management, prescribing its constitution and general rules and regulations for the government of the institution.” . . .
The by-laws applicable to the question at issue were as follows :
“OBJECT OE THE HOME.
“Section 1. The Masonic Home shall have for its object, to provide and maintain a home for indigent, afflicted or aged Freemasons, and for the destitute widows and orphans of Freemasons in the state of Pennsylvania, and for such others as may be placed under its charge.
“ CORPORATION.
“ Sec. 2. This corporation shall be composed of individuals as representatives of such masonic bodies as are recognized by the Grand Lodge of Free and Accepted Masons of Pennsylvania, and of such Master Masons as may become members thereof by complying with the by-laws.
“ADMISSION OF INMATES AND FEES.
“ Sec. 41. Every nomination for admission into the home as an inmate shall be made in writing, at a stated meeting of the board of managers, setting forth the name, age (not less than fifty-five years), residence, social condition, and masonic membership of the nominee, with such other information as the board of managers may require.
“ All nominations shall be recorded in a book kept for that purpose, in the order in which they are presented, and shall be referred by the board of managers to the committee on admissions.
“ Sec. 42. Inmates shall be admitted into the home after report of the committee on admissions; those under sixty years of age requiring a two thirds, and others a majority, vote of the board of managers.
“ Sec. 43. Each representative shall be entitled to make as many nominations for admission into the home as inmates as he may deem advisable, at the request of the masonic body represented by him; but not more than one nominee of a representative , shall be admitted as an inmate while other nominees are upon the list from bodies which have at the time no inmate, and whose admission is approved by the board of managers.
“ Individual members may also make nominations, subject to the same restrictions as to inmates as hereinbefore stated.
“ In the event of an inmate withdrawing from the home, for* any cause whatever, within three months after admission, so much of the fee paid into the funds of this corporation as shall remain after deducting five dollars (§5.00) per week for his board during his residence in the home, and, in addition, such other expenses as may be incurred in his behalf, shall be returned to the masonic body or individual member that paid the same.
“ The preference for admission shall always be given in the following order, viz.:
“1. To such nominees as are members of masonic bodies represented in the corporation, and nominated at their instance.
“ 2. To such nominees as may be placed in nomination by a representative of one masonic body, where the nominee is a member of some other masonic body which is also represented.
“ 8. To Master Masons nominated by individual members.
“ 4. To Master Masons belonging to masonic bodies located within the commonwealth of Pennsylvania, but not represented in this corporation, who may have been nominated as aforesaid.
“ 5. To Master Masons of other jurisdictions upon such nomination.
“ Sec. 44. There shall be paid into the funds of this corporation, as the admission fee of an inmate, the sum hereinafter named, according to the age of the brother so admitted, as follows :
“ If the applicant be 55 years of age, and not exceeding 60 years, ..... $250 00
If the applicant be 60 years of age, and not exceeding 65 years, .... 200 00
If the applicant be 65 years of age, and not exceeding 70 years, . . • . . 150 00
If the applicant be over 70 years of age, . 100 00
“ Sec. 45.. Any Master Mason wishing to secure a home for himself in his declining years shall, upon becoming a member of this corporation and the payment of four hundred ($400.00) dollars in addition to his membership fee, be at once nominated by a majority vote of the board of managers for admission into the home, in accordance with section 41 of these by-laws. He .shall be exempt from the payment of annual dues, and, upon reaching the age of sixty (60) years or upwards, shall have precedence, according to date of nomination, of all other Master Masons nominated by either representatives or by individual members, subject, however, to the restrictions of section 43 of these by-laws; Provided, That any member of this corporation, becoming an inmate of the home, shall thereby forfeit and terminate his membership in the corporation.
“ PERMANENT FUND.
“ Sec. 46. The permanent fund shall consist of the fees for life membership and admission of inmates, and of all donations and bequests, when not otherwise designated by the donor or legatee, and such other amounts as may be voted to the fund by the board of managers.
“ All investments in the permanent fund shall be made under the supervision and direction of the committee on finance, who shall make a report of the investments in the fund annually, or whenever required, to the board of managers and the corporation.
“The interest from such-investments shall be paid to the treasurer for the general uses of the corporation.”
It was admitted that defendant institute was supported as a charity.
Binding instructions for defendant were given.
Verdict and judgment for defendant. Plaintiff appealed.
Error assigned was above instruction, quoting it.
James Alcorn, assistant city solicitor, Isaac U. Shields, assistant city solicitor, and Charles F. Warwick, city solicitor, with him, for appellant. —
The exemption clause of the act of May 6, 1871, was repealed by the act of 1874: Wagner Free Institute v. Phila., 132 Pa. 612; Phila. v. Penna. Hospital, 134 Pa. 171; Allegheny Co. v. Gibson, 90 Pa. 397; Perkins v. Slack, 86 Pa. 270 ; Lehigh Iron Co. v. Lower Macungie Township, 81 Pa. 484.
The constitution of 1874 does not exempt any property from taxation, but authorizes the legislature by general laws to exempt the property mentioned in § 1, art. 9. It thereby limited the power of the legislature. In pursuance of that authority, the act of May 14, 1874, P. L. 168, was passed. There is now no exemption except as mentioned in § 1, art. 9, as enforced by the act of May 14, 1874. Unless appellee is within the class referred to in said section and act, it is not exempt from taxation.
Appellee is not a purely public charity, and therefore exempt from taxation by § 1, art. 9, of the constitution, and tbe act of May 14, 1874, P. L. 158 : Donohugh’s Ap., 86 Pa. 306 ; Burd Orphan Asylum v. School District, 90 Pa. 21; Delaware County Inst. v. Delaware Co., 94 Pa. 163; Phila. v. Women’s Christian Assn., 125 Pa. 572 ; Northampton Co. v. Lafayette College, 128 Pa. 132; Episcopal Academy v. Phila., 150 Pa. 565.
Robert H. Hinckley, for appellee. —
By the terms of the act of May 6, 1871, defendant’s property was to be held by it free from all taxation, and it is contended that this act is still in force. The act of May 14,1874, P. L. 158, does not, by any of its terms, repeal this previous statute of 1871: Bell v. Allegheny Co., 149 Pa. 381; Williamsport v. Brown, 84 Pa. 438; Coatesville Gas Co. v. Chester Co., 97 Pa. 476; Erie Co. v. Erie, 113 Pa. 367 ; Allegheny County v. Gibson, 90 Pa. 411; Evans v. Phillipi, 117 Pa. 237.
In Phila. v. Penna. Hospital, 134 Pa. 171, the power of the constitutional provisions to repeal exceptions was not before the court. There the decision was limited to subsequent legislation.
The home is a public charit3: Burd Orphan Asylum v. School District, 90 Pa. 21; Phila. v. Women’s Christian Association, 125 Pa. 572.
April 2, 1894:

Opinion:
Opinion by
Mr. Justice Dean,
There is nothing of doubt in this case, except the question as to whether the appellee is an "institution of purely public charity," within the meaning of section 10, article 16, of the constitution of 1874. If it be not, nothing in its charter or the statutes can avail to exempt it from liability to taxation.
The contention turns on the constitutional meaning of the words " purely public charity." "Words in a constitution that do not of themselves denote that they are used in a technical sense, are to have their plain, proper, natural and obvious meaning:" Nav. Co. v. Coons, 6 W. & S. 114. The legal definition of the word " charity " has been the subject of much discussion in the courts, especially in those of England, but its meaning here, discarding all technical sense, is, " a gift to promote the welfare of others." The appellee clearly is a charity. It provides for and maintains in the " Masonic Home " indigent, afflicted and aged Freemasons. This too from voluntary contributions, without charge to the beneficiaries, and with no profit either to the corporation, or to its officers. Not one of the corporate officers receives a cent of compensation for administering its affairs; such unselfishness excites the admiration and approval of all friends of humanity. General Wagner, president of the home, testifies: " The number of inmates at present is thirty; their average age is 72 jears; all are decrepit; if they could support themselves, they would not be admitted; the money to support them is contributed by different masonic lodges, individuals, Masons, men and women: the receipts are always less than the expenses, and a deficit has to be made up at the end of each year; no one is benefited except the inmates ; they are fed, clothed, and lodged during life, and buried at death at the expense of the home." Of course, if this be not purely charity, nothing is.
But, is it a public charity? Tlie word "public " relates to or affects the whole people of. a nation or state. General Wagner further testifies: " The home is open only to those who are Masons; a man to be admitted must be a Mason." When the eligibility of those admitted is thus determined, it seems to us the institution is withdrawn from public and put in the class of private charities.
A charity may restrict its admissions to a class of humanity, and still be public; it may be for the blind, the mute, those suffering under special diseases ; for the aged, for infants, for women, for men, for different callings or trades by which humanity earns its bread, and as long as the classification is determined by some distinction which involuntarily affects or may affect any of the whole people, although only a small number may be directly benefited, it is public. But when the right to admission depends on the fact of voluntary association with some particular society then a distinction is made which concerns not the public at large. The public is interested in the relief of its members, because they are men, women and children, not because they are Masons. A home without charge, exclusively for Presbyterians, Episcopalians, Catholics or Methodists, would not be a public charity. But then to exclude every other idea of public, as distinguished from private, the word " purely " is prefixed by the constitution; this is to in tensify the word " public," not " charity." It must be purely public; that is, there must be no admixture of any qualification for admission, heterogeneous, and not solely relating to the public. That the appellee is wholly without profit or gain only shows that it is purely a charity, and not that it is a purely public charity.
Nor does the argument that, to the extent it benefits Masons, it necessarily relieves the public burden, affect the question; there is no public burden for the relief of aged and indigent Masons; there is the public burden of caring for and relieving aged and indigent men, whether they be Masons or anti-Masons; but age and indigence concern the public no further than the fact of them; it makes no inquiry into the social relations of the subjects of them. Burd Orphan Asylum v. School District, 90 Pa. 21, is cited as sustaining a different view. The test there, as to whether the defendant was a purely public charity, was, whether there was any gain or profit to any class of persons or corporations who could assert a right to be beneficiaries. As there was not, and as the administrators of the charity could, in their discretion, select those who should be the recipients of the benefits, giving only a preference, the court held it to be a purely public charity. While concurring in the judgment in that case, because the facts showed it was administered as a purely public charity, I do not concur in the reason given for distinguishing a quasi-public from a purely public charity. I would put the distinction on firmer as well as on what seems to me more clearly defined ground: Is any member of humanity, that greater public of whom the commonwealth is constructively the parent or trustee, excluded because he has not a particular relation to some sociéty, church or other organization, which relation is dependent on his wholly voluntary act? If so, if he be excluded in fact, because ,1m is not a Presbyterian, Freemason, or a member of some one of the innumerable religious, social, or beneficial organizations of the commonwealth, then, however pure may be the charity, however commendable its purpose, it is not "purely public," and its property must, under the constitution, be taxed; not because this court says so, but because the people have said so in their fundamental law.
Here, while the charter and by-laws of the institution do not show that it is not " purely public," the undisputed facts, as to the administration of the charity, show that none were admitted except Freemasons, of course excluding all other aged and indigent men, because they had not chosen to become members of a particular society. This made admission depend on an artificial badge of distinction, and not on one incident to humanity, and therefore it is not " purely public." If this be purely public, then what is not purely public?
This is not a question to be decided on sentiment; if it were, our inclinations would prompt to a different conclusion. But there is not much sentiment in the constitution. It is a barrier erected by the whole people against encroachments on the rights of the people as a whole; they have forbidden an annual appropriation of their money in a sum equal to the amount of taxes here imposed, for the benefit of a favored few; the duty of a court, when called upon to decide such a question, is so plain that he who runs may read.
As to the argument that the act of 1871 exempted the home from taxation, the act of 1874, when read in connection with the constitution of 1874, repealed all such exemptions enacted after the constitutional amendment of 1857. It is so decided in Wagner Institute v. Philadelphia, 132 Pa. 612, and Philadelphia v. Penna. Hospital, 134 Pa. 171.
The judgment is reversed at costs of appellee, and a new trial is awarded.