Case Name: Ronald JEFFERSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1996-06-27
Citations: 677 So. 2d 29
Docket Number: No. 95-4588
Parties: Ronald JEFFERSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: WEBSTER, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 677
Pages: 29–32

Head Matter:
Ronald JEFFERSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 95-4588.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
June 27, 1996.
Rehearing Denied July 25, 1996.
Ronald Jefferson, pro se.
No appearance for Appellee.

Opinion:
LAWRENCE, Judge.
Ronald Jefferson (Jefferson) appeals from an order denying his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800. He was sentenced for the offenses of possession of cocaine and carrying a concealed firearm. We affirm.
The record in this case does not contain a copy of the judgment and sentence, but consists solely of Jefferson's motion and the order of the trial court denying the motion. We consider only the allegations contained in the motion in determining whether it is facially sufficient.
Jefferson's motion is rather cryptic, but we interpret it as alleging that he was originally sentenced to eighteen months in prison, which term was suspended with probation imposed in lieu thereof. He later violated his probation and was resentenced to thirty months in prison. Jefferson argues that his sentence is illegal because he could not be lawfully sentenced to more than the original suspended sentence of eighteen months in prison.
We find it unnecessary to consider whether Jefferson has a viable claim pursuant to Poore v. State, 531 So.2d 161 (Fla.1988), because the sentence of thirty months does not exceed the maximum statutory penalty for the offenses of possession of cocaine and carrying a concealed firearm. Our supreme court recently addressed the issue and said:
[A]n illegal sentence is one that exceeds the maximum period set forth by law for a particular offense without regard to the guidelines.
Davis v. State, 661 So.2d 1193, 1196 (Fla.1995).
We interpret Davis to mean that Jefferson's sentence does not qualify as an illegal sentence. We reach this conclusion because under the plain language of Davis, Jefferson's sentence would have had to exceed the maximum sentence provided by law for third-degree felonies in order to entitle him to relief. We therefore affirm the order of the trial court denying Jefferson's rule 3.800 motion.
We consider the issue in this case to be one of great public importance and therefore certify the following question to the supreme court:
WHERE A DEFENDANT IS SENTENCED TO A TRUE SPLIT SENTENCE, AS DEFINED IN POORE v. STATE, 531 So.2d 161 (Fla.1988), AND UPON VIOLATION OF PROBATION, RESENTENCED TO A PERIOD OF INCARCERATION WHICH EXCEEDS THE ORIGINAL SENTENCE IMPOSED, BUT DOES NOT EXCEED THE STATUTORY MAXIMUM FOR THAT OFFENSE, IS THE NEW SENTENCE "ILLEGAL" WITHIN THE MEANING OF DAVIS v. STATE, 661 So.2d 1193 (Fla.1995), FOR THE PURPOSES OF FLORIDA RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 3.800(a)?
WEBSTER, J., concurs.
ALLEN, J., dissents with opinion.
. It is apparent however, that the motion, un-sworn and filed more than two years after sentencing, cannot be treated as having been filed pursuant to rule 3.850.
. Credit for time served in prison under the original sentence is not an issue.