Case Name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Terrance Lee JONES, Defendant-Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2010-03-09
Citations: 370 F. App'x 792
Docket Number: No. 09-30161
Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Terrance Lee JONES, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: Before: TASHIMA, FISHER and BERZON, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 370
Pages: 792–793

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Terrance Lee JONES, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 09-30161.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted March 5, 2010.
Filed March 9, 2010.
Kimberly R. Sayers-Fay, Assistant U.S., Office of the U.S. Attorney, Anchorage, AK, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
John C. Pharr, Esquire, Law Offices of John C. Pharr, Anchorage, AK, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before: TASHIMA, FISHER and BERZON, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Defendant Terrance Jones appeals the sentence imposed by the district court. We affirm.
The district court correctly held that Jones's 1989 Colorado conviction for second-degree robbery is a predicate conviction for sentencing purposes under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). •
Federal law forbids a person "who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . to . possess . any firearm." 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). If convicted under this statute, an offender who has three violent felony convictions faces an enhanced sentence of at least fifteen years. § 924(e)(1). A violent felony is defined in relevant part as "any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year." § 924(e)(2)(B). A conviction is not a "crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" if "a person . has had civil rights restored . unless . restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person may not . possess . firearms." § 921(a)(20).
Colorado restores civil rights automatically when a person has "served out his full term of imprisonment." Colo. Const, art. VII, § 10. Where restoration is automatic, "[o]ne must 'look to the whole of state law' " of the state of conviction for any provisions limiting the right to possess firearms. United States v. Herron, 45 F.3d 340, 342 (9th Cir.1995). Colo.Rev. Stat. § 18-12-108 now provides that "[a] person commits the crime of possession of a weapon by a previous offender if the person knowingly possesses . a firearm . subsequent to the person's conviction for a felony . under Colorado or any other state's law - or under federal law." The statute prohibits a felon from possessing a firearm after his civil rights have otherwise been restored.
Section 18-12-108 was amended to its present form in 1994, after Jones's guilty plea to second-degree robbery in March 1989 but before his release and the restoration of his civil rights in October 2001. The state law in effect "at the time of the restoration [of civil rights]" controls. United States v. Huss, 7 F.3d 1444, 1446 (9th Cir.1993), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Sanchez-Rodriguez, 161 F.3d 556 (9th Cir.1998). Thus, the district court did not err in counting the Colorado conviction as a predicate conviction for sentencing purposes under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.