Case Name: Beulah V. JOHNSON, Petitioner, v. W. Richard EVERY, as Ancillary Administrator of the Estate of James Nelson Johnson, Deceased, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1957-02-06
Citations: 93 So. 2d 390
Docket Number: 
Parties: Beulah V. JOHNSON, Petitioner, v. W. Richard EVERY, as Ancillary Administrator of the Estate of James Nelson Johnson, Deceased, Respondent.
Judges: TERRELL,.'C. J., and THOMAS'and O’CONNELL, 7J., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 93
Pages: 390–397

Head Matter:
Beulah V. JOHNSON, Petitioner, v. W. Richard EVERY, as Ancillary Administrator of the Estate of James Nelson Johnson, Deceased, Respondent.
Supreme Court of Florida, En Banc.
Feb. 6, 1957.
Rehearing Denied March 20, 1957.
Turner, Hendrick & Fascell, Miami, for petitioner.
Paul & Sams, Miami, for respondent.

Opinion:
THORNAL, Justice.
Appellant seeks reversal of an order of the Chancellor denying her petition to compel payment of alimony and quashing a writ of scire facias issued on the basis of her petition.
The principal point for determination is whether under the fads shown by this record a former wife can assert a claim for unmatured alimony against the estate of her deceased former husband.
, On May 20, 1939, the Circuit Court of Dade County entered a decree of divorce in favor of Beulah V. Johnson and against James Nelson Johnson. By the decree Beulah V. Johnson was awarded the sum of $25 per week for support and maintenance, it being provided that the payment of such sum "shall cease, upon the death of the plaintiff [Beulah V. Johnson] or upon her remarriage to any person other than the defendant [James Nelson Johnson]." The court expressly retained jurisdiction to enforce the decree.
Prior to the divorce proceeding the parties had entered into a property settlement agreement whereby, among other things, James- Nelson Johnson agreed to pay to Beulah V. Johnson the sum of $25 per week and the contract further stipulated that the payments would be made while the contract remained in force and "shall only be terminated by the death of the party of the second part [Beulah V. Johnson] or a remarriage of the party of the second part to a person other than the party of the first part [James Nelson Johnson]."
James Nelson Johnson died on June 23, 1954, and an ancillary administration proceeding was opened in Volusia County, Florida. Thereupon, on June 8, 1955, appellant filed in the original divorce proceeding, which was had in Dade County, Florida, a petition to compel the payment of alimony in accordance with the final decree of divorce. The petition also sought modification of the decree by increasing the amount of the award, both retrospectively and prospectively, and further sought the issuance of the writ of scire facias directed to the appellee, Every, as Ancillary Administrator of the Estate of James Nelson Johnson, seeking to make him a party to the divorce proceeding in order that the James Nelson Johnson Estate might be subjected to the claim of the petitioner.
The Administrator moved to quash the writ and dismiss the petition on the ground that the petition "fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." The Chancellor thereupon quashed the writ and dismissed the petition with prejudice. Reversal of this order is sought by this appeal.
Appellant contends that the final decree of divorce as well as the property settlement agreement provided that the payments should be made to her during her lifetime and so long as she remained unmarried and that such a decree and agreement can be enforced against the estate.
Appellee contends that the responsibility for the payment of alimony died with the husband and a claim therefor is not enforceable against his estate.
Although the property settlement agreement was not incorporated in the final decree, the essential aspects thereof were for all practical purposes made a part of the decree. In addition to the provisions recited above, the agreement provided that the wife and husband mutually released the interest of each other in the respective estates of each other. In other words, in exchange for the weekly payments for support and maintenance and other considerations, the appellant-wife surrendered any and all claim she might have against her husband's estate. It should be noted that the property settlement agreement was executed two years before the divorce decree. Both by the agreement and by the decree, it was expressly provided that the weekly payments would be terminated only by the death of the wife or her remarriage to someone other than her former husband.
We subscribe to the proposition that in the absence of an express contract or a provision in a decree such as the one before us, a divorced husband's liability for alimony terminates with his death. On the other hand, where the decree or property settlement agreement expressly provides for the continuance of the payments "until the death of the wife" then the husband's estate remains liable for the obligation in the same manner as it is liable for any other legitímate obligation outstanding at the time of his death. Here there was a provision in the final decree as well as in the property settlement arrangement to the effect that the payments would be made during the life of the wife or until she remarried. She is still living and she has not remarried, and consequently, the conditions for the termination of the weekly payments have not occurred.
This was in effect a part of our holding in Underwood v. Underwood, Fla.1953, 64 So.2d 281; and Allen v. Allen, 111 Fla. 733, 150 So. 237, 238. In the case last cited, we held:
" As a general rule the obligation to pay alimony dies with the person, but agreements of the husband to bind his representatives to do this have been upheld, and there is no prohibition against them in this state."
The rule stated appears to be applicable to the situation in the case at bar.
Several incidental questions appear in the record. Appellee contends that the claim should be adjudicated in a separate proceeding against the estate rather than by bringing the ancillary administrator into the original divorce proceeding. In Guinta v. Lo Re, 159 Fla. 448, 31 So.2d 704, we recognized by implication the propriety of asserting a claim for support of a minor child by substituting the Executor of the estate of the deceased husband in the place and stead of the husband in the original divorce proceeding although in that case, admittedly, a separate complaint in equity was filed. In the ultimate, it appears to be a problem for equity to resolve and we can see no reason why a husband's estate should not be substituted as a party in his place and stead in a case such as the one before us.
While we concur in the view of the Chancellor that the alimony payments cannot be increased either retrospectively or prospectively after the death of the husband, we cannot concur in the view that as a matter of law his estate is not liable for the amount fixed by the final decree in a situation such as the one presently before us. See Jennings v. First National Bank, 116 W.Va. 409, 180 S.E. 772, 100 A.L.R. 494, 500; and 17 Am.Jur., Divorce and Separation, Sec. 733, p. 550.
The motion to dismiss was sustained on the general ground that it failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. The reasons for the ruling are not specified. We are compelled to concur in the order of the Chancellor granting the motion to dismiss for the reason that the petition fails to show' that the claim had previously been filed' against the estate of the husband and rejected by the personal representative. To this extent, the order of the Chancellor must be affirmed.
We are of the view, however, that the motion to dismiss should have been granted with the privilege to the appellant to amend her petition, if she is able to do so, to show that her claim against the es-' tate of her deceased former husband was filed in accordance with the requirements of the Probate Act and rejected by the Administrator thereby compelling the institution of this proceeding. See Sec. 733.16, Florida Statutes, F.S.A. '
We agree with app'ellee ' that this was a post-decretal order that was subject to review by certiorari rather than appeal. However, under Sec. 59.45, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., the notice of appeal will be treated as "petition for certiorari." As so construed, the petition is granted as to that portion of the order dismissing the petition below "with prejudice", and the cause is remanded for fqrther proceedings in accordance with ' this opinion. In all other respects, the petition is denied.
TERRELL,.'C. J., and THOMAS'and O'CONNELL, 7J., concur.
HOBSON, ROBERTS and DREW, JJ., dissent. ' '