Case Name: GILMORE, Respondent, v. GILMORE et al, Appellants
Court: South Dakota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: South Dakota
Decision Date: 1919-08-15
Citations: 42 S.D. 236
Docket Number: File No. 4210
Parties: GILMORE, Respondent, v. GILMORE et al, Appellants.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Dakota Reports
Volume: 42
Pages: 236–251

Head Matter:
GILMORE, Respondent, v. GILMORE et al, Appellants.
(173 N. W. 865).
(File No. 4210.
Opinion filed August 15, 1919.)
1. Evidence — 'Alienation of Affections — Husband’s Letter to Wife, Why He Had Wi'itten It, Competency.
In a suit by "wife against husband’s parents for damages for alienation of husband’s affections, held, that a question put to plaintiff as to what her husband said to her as to why he had written the letter and “why he done as he did,” was incompetent as calling for hearsay testimony; that the contention that the declaration was in nature of a verbal act indicative of his feelings at time of his subsequent abandonment of her .was untenable.
Gates, L, and Whiting, j., concurring specially. McCoy, L, dissenting.
2. Same — Showing Defendant’s Declarations Concerning Letter to Wife, by Third 'Party re State of Mind, Competency — Rule Stated — Res Gestae Defiiied.
The rule¡ is well settled that statements and declarations of a person may he shown by a third party, when th© feelings or state of mind -of the declarant are material 'to issues; and whenever bodily or mental feelings are material, the usual expressions thereof are original and competent evidence. Such declarations are regarded as verbal acts, and, when relevant, are competent, but, to he admissable, they must be in nature of res gestae. They must accompany the act they are supposed to characterize and have been calculated to unfold the nature and quality of the facts they were intended, to explain, and so to harmonize therewith as obviously to constitute one transaction; surrounding circumstances to be given in evidence with the principal fact, and the declaration rhust grow out of the principal transaction. It must he contemporaneous with the conduct, or must accompany the act. Under this ruling, said evidence was pure hearsay. So held, concerning a letter from husband to wife prior to the conversation referred to, but not written until after the husband had had the alleged conversation with defendants in which they were claimed to have as sailed plaintiffs character; the letter not indicating loss of husband’s affection, the intention to abandon her having been formed at a subsequent time and for some .other cause than that' assigned by her.
Gates, J., and Whiting, J., concurring specially. McCoy, J., and Smith, P. J., dissenting.
S. Samei- — Disparaging Remarks re Plaintiff to Third Parties, Not Communicated to Husband, Incompetency.
In a suit for damages against defendant’s parents for alienation of plaintiff’s husband’s affections, held, that evidence of disparaging remarks concerning plaintiff’s character to parties other than her husband, it not being shown that they were -brought to husband’s knowledge, is incompetent.
-4. Evidence — Directing Verdict — -Sufficiency of Evidence.
Where, at close of plaintiff’s case, there was no competent evidence- to support either of plaintiff’s causes of action, defendant’s motion for directed verdict should have been granted.
Appeal from Circuit Court, Corson County. Hon. Raymond 3b. Dirrman, Judge.
Action by Emma Gilmore, against Silas A. and Stella Gilmore, to recover damages for alienation of affections of plaintiff’s 'husband. From a judgment for plaintiff, and from an order denying a new trial, -defendant’s appeal.
Reversed.
Clay Carpenter, and Hozvard G. Fuller, for Appellants.
. Frank McNulty, and Robert Pearson, for Respondent.
(1) To point one of opinion, Appellants cited:
3 Elliott on Evidence, Section 1648; White v. Ross, 47 Mich. 172, 10 N. W. 188; Leucht v. Leucht,. 129 Ky. 700, 112 S. W. 845, 130 Am. St. Rep. 486.
Respondent cited:
Respondent cited:
Hillers v. Taylor, (-Md.) 81 Atl. 286.
(2) To point two, Appellants cited:
Cochran v. Cochran, 196 N. Y. 86, 89 N. E. 470, 24 I,. R. A. (N S.) 160.
Respondent cited:
Lockwood v. Lock-wood, 67 Minn., 476, .70 N. W. 784; White v. White, 140 Wis. 538, 122 N. W. 1051; Perry v. Lovejoy, 49 Mich. 529, 14 N. W. 486; Sweikhart v. Hanrahan, 184 Mich. 201, i’5o N. W. 833; Sec. 1649, Vol. 3, Elliott on Evidence.

Opinion:
POLLRY, J.
This action is brought for the recovery of damages alleged to have been sustained -by plaintiff because of the alienation of the affections of her husband.' by the defendant. Plaintiff and one W. C. Gilmore were married in 1910, and defendants are the father and mother of said W. C. Gilmore. The complaint alleges that in 1915 the defendants circulated certain false reports reflecting upon the virtue and chastity of the plaintiff, andi that, as a result of such reports, plaintiff's said husband-deserted and abandoned her, and that she was thereby deprived of his support, comfort, and affection. Verdict and judgment tv ere for plaintiff, and from such judgment, and an. order overruling their motion for a new trial, defendants appeal.
While the 'respondent was on the witness stand the following question'was put to her by her counsel:
. "You may state what your husband said to you in regard to w'hy he had written this letter and why he done as he did."
This was objected to on the ground, among others, that it called for hearsay testimony. The objection was overruled, and the witness answered thqt.her husband told her that his parents had told him that he (plaintiff's husband) was not the father of plaintiff's little boy, then only a few months old. Appellants then-moved to strike out the answer on the same ground as urged- in. the objection. This motion w^as' denied, and this ruling is assigned as error. The facts disclosed by this testimony are regarded of vital importance to respondent's case, and it is contended by respondent that such testimony was admissible for the purpose of showing the reason for certain conduct on the part of respondent's husband; rvhile, on the other hand, it is contended. by appellant that such testimonyis pure hearsay and should have -been excluded 'by the court. :
Respondent contends that this declaration- of her husband was in the nature of a verbal act' indicative of the state of h'is féelings at the time of his abandonment of her, and in support of her contention cites the following cases: Hardwick v. Hardwick, 130 Iowa, 230, 106 N. W. 639; Sessions v. Little, 9 N. H. 271; Sexton v. Sexton, 129 Iowa 487, 105 N. W. 314, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 708; Baker v. Baker, 16 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 293, Williams v. Williams, 20 Colo. 51, 37 Pac. 614; Nevins v. Nevins, 68 Kan. 410, 75 Pac. 492; Horner v. Yance, 93 Wis. 352, 67 N. W. 720; Perry v. Lovejoy, 49 Mich. 529, 14 N. W. 485; McKenzie v. Lautenschlager, 113 Mich. 171, 71 N. W. 489. The rule is well settled that statements and declarations of a person may be shown by a third party when the feelings or state of mind of the person making such statements are material to the issues. "Wherever the bodily or mental feelings of an individual are material to be proved, the usual expressions of such feelings are original and competent evidence. Those expressions are the natural reflexes of what it might be impossible to show by other testimony. If there be such .other testimony, this may be necessary to set the facts thus developed in their true light, and to give them their proper effect. As independent, explanatory, or corroborative evidence, it is often indispensable to the due administration of justice. Such declarations are regarded as verbal acts, and are as competent as. any other testimony, when relevant to the issue. Their truth or falsity is an inquiry for the jury." Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Mosley, 8 Wall. 397, 19 L. Ed. 437. But such declarations, to be admissible, must be in the nature of res gestae. They "must have been made at the time of the act done, which they are supposed to characterize, and must have been well calculated to unfold the nature and quality of the facts they wire intended' to explain, and so to harmonize with them as obviously to constitute one transaction." Meek et al. v. Perry et al., 36 Miss. 261. "Such declaration derives credit and importance as forming a part of the transaction itself, and is included in the surrounding circumstances, which may always -be given in eviden. e to the jury with the principal fact. There must be a main or principal fact or transaction, and only such declarations are admissible as grow out of the principal transaction, illustrate its character, and contemporary with it and derive some degree of credit from it." Lund et al. v. Tyngsborough, 9 Cush. (Mass.) 36. "According to the authorities, if such declaration was made at the time the act was done', and is calculated to explain the character, nature, or quality of the facts constituting the act and its effects, so as to unfold and harmonize them as parts of the same transaction, then such a declaration must be regarded as a part of the res gestae, and may always be shown to the jury along with the principal facts." Frink & Co. v. Coe, 4 G. Greene (Iowa) 555, 61 Am. Dec. 141. To form a part of the res gestae, such declarations "must have been made at the time of the act done, which they are supposed to characterize, and have been well calculated to unfold the nature and quality of the facts they were intended to explain, and so to harmonize with them as obviously to constitute , one transaction." Enos v. Tuttle, 3 Conn. 247. This subject is treated at length by Prof. Wigmore, and, at section 1776, that author says:
"Since the words are used only as parts of the whole act,, filling out and giving significance to the conduct, it is obvious that the words must be contemporaneous with the conduct, or, in the usual phrase, must accompany the act."
Tested by these rules, the evidence in question was pure hearsay.
The letter referred to in the question had been written by the husband and' received by the plaintiff' some two weeks prior to-the conversation referred to in the question, 'but had not been written until after the husband had had the alleged conversation with defendants in which defendants are claimed to have assailed plaintiff's chastity and virtue. There is nothing in the letter, however, that shows any loss of affection on the part of the husband, nor was there anything said or done by him during said conversation to indicate that he had lost confidence in her, or intended to abandon or desert her. So far as anything said to the plaintiff by her husband is concerned, the intention to abandon her' was formed-at some subsequent time, and for some cause other than that assigned by her. This being the case, the words attributed to him by plaintiff in answer to the question complained of did not accompany the act of abandoning her, nor constitute any part thereof, nor was it contemporaneous with that act.
There was some evidence introduced' tending to show that one or both of the defendants had made disparaging remarks relative to plaintiff's character to parties other than her husband, but it was not shown, nor even intimated by any evidence in the case, that the making of such remarks was eve'r brought to the knowledge of her husband. 'Such remarks, therefore, could have had no effect upon his affection for plaintiff, and could not have influenced him in abandoning her; and, for that reason, such evidence was wholly incompetent for any purpose.
. At the close of plaintiff's case, there was no competent evidence before the jury to support either of her causes of ac tion, and defendant's motion for a directed verdict should have been granted.
The judgment and order appealed from are- reversed.