Case Name: STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Lonnie FARR and Tanya Farr, Respondents
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1990-02-14
Citations: 558 So. 2d 437
Docket Number: No. 89-1276
Parties: STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Lonnie FARR and Tanya Farr, Respondents.
Judges: ANSTEAD, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 558
Pages: 437–439

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Lonnie FARR and Tanya Farr, Respondents.
No. 89-1276.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Feb. 14, 1990.
On Rehearing April 11, 1990.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee and Joan Fowler, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for petitioner.
Douglas N. Duncan of Wagner, Nugent, Johnson, Roth, Romano, Eriksen and Kup-fer, P.A., West Palm Beach, for respondents.

Opinion:
POLEN, Judge.
The state seeks to prohibit a second, compelled gynecological examination of an eight-year-old child who, it is alleged, was the victim of sexual battery perpetrated by respondents Lonnie and Tanya Farr.
The child was examined in July 1987 by a Dr. Levitón. The medical findings showed no evidence of fissure or trauma to the anus. But an obliterated hymen and an opening approximately six millimeters across and twelve millimeters vertically suggested probable sexual intercourse. Respondents' expert has expressed an opinion to the contrary.
Based on this contrary opinion, respondents moved the trial court for an order to permit reexamination of the child by respondents' expert. The trial court granted respondents' motion and this petition followed.
Respondents argue that since Dr. Levi-tón contends that anal intercourse could occur without scarring, their expert should be allowed to examine the child. Furthermore, respondents challenge the professional capabilities of Dr. Levitón, a seventy-five year old physician. Petitioner responds that there is no compelling reason to order the additional gynecological examination of this child. We agree.
We addressed a similar situation in State v. Drab, 546 So.2d 54 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). In Drab, the trial court ordered a second gynecological examination of an eight year old victim in a sexual abuse case. This court held that no "extreme and compelling circumstances" existed such that unless the complaining witness was compelled to undergo an intimate physical examination a manifest injustice would result in the denial of due process. This court went on to find that:
Respondent has not alleged that there was anything improper or unprofessional about the voluntary physical examination of the complaining witness. He does not urge that the scientific observations that were made are in any way suspect. He faults only the conclusion that these findings lend support to the allegations of sexual abuse. His concern is mainly the relative weight that might be given by a jury to testimony from one expert who has made a physical examination and another who has not. In our view, this falls far short of justification for a compelled physical examination. The trial court's order therefore constitutes a substantial departure from the essential requirements of the law.
Drab at 56.
A review of the record and motion filed by respondents indicates that they are challenging the results of the examination rather than the methodology. Respondents merely challenge Dr. Leviton's value as a witness. Respondents are pursuing their own gynecological examination of the child in order to have their own expert's opinion bolstered by a physical examination that he made himself.
If anything, we find this case even more egregious than Drab because the findings of the doctor, which respondents dispute, are partially favorable to their case. The results of this examination at this late date would be of little probative value. Moreover, the examination is not in the best interest of the child.
The trial court's order therefore constitutes a substantial departure from the essential requirements of the law. We grant the petition for writ of certiorari, quash the order under review, and remand for further proceedings.
ANSTEAD, J., concurs.
WARNER, J., concurs specially with opinion.