Case Name: Jimmy BROWN, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1983-04-14
Citations: 430 So. 2d 446
Docket Number: No. 62198
Parties: Jimmy BROWN, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
Judges: ALDERMAN, C.J., and ADKINS, OYER-TON and EHRLICH, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 430
Pages: 446–447

Head Matter:
Jimmy BROWN, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
No. 62198.
Supreme Court of Florida.
April 14, 1983.
Nancy A. Daniels and Gwendolyn Spivey, Asst. Public Defenders, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, for petitioner.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Barbara Ann Butler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jacksonville, for respondent.

Opinion:
McDONALD, Justice.
We granted the petition for review of the decision below, Brown v. State, 413 So.2d 1273 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), based upon apparent conflict with Hill v. State, 293 So.2d 79 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974). We approve.
Brown entered a Family Dollar Store, approached one cashier, displayed a firearm, and directed her to empty the money from her register into a paper bag. Failing to find the manager, Brown returned to the first cashier and ordered her to open a second cash register. The cashier did not have a key to the second register and so summoned her only fellow employee who had a key to the second register. The second employee refused to believe that a robbery was actually in progress and would not open the register until Brown displayed his firearm to her. She then opened the register for which she was solely responsible and placed its contents in the paper bag with the money from the first register. Brown was convicted of two counts of robbery and the district court of appeal affirmed his convictions.
In Hill the defendant entered a grocery store, brandishing a gun, and ordered both the cashier and manager to give him money belonging to the store chain from a drawer and a safe. Because all the money which was the subject of the robbery was taken at the same time and place, under the same circumstances and with the same intent, the district court ruled that separate counts charging robbery of both the manager and the cashier charged but a single offense.
The Hill court cited Hearn v. State, 55 So.2d 559 (Fla.1951), wherein this Court held that only one larceny was committed where the property, consisting of eleven cattle belonging to different owners, was taken at the same time from the same place under the same circumstances and with the same intent. In Green v. State, 134 Fla. 216, 183 So. 728 (1938), we noted that where property is stolen from the same owner from the same place by a series of acts, if each taking is a result of a separate independent impulse, it is a separate crime. Hence, in larceny cases it is not the fact that the same owner's property is involved that controls, but rather whether there were separate events, each with a separate intent. In Hall v. State, 66 So.2d 863 (Fla.1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 931, 74 S.Ct. 321, 98 L.Ed. 422 (1954), we affirmed separate convictions where the taking of cattle on the same day involved the invasion of separate pastures even though the same motor truck was used.
In this case the money taken by the defendant belonged to a single owner, but it was taken by force, violence, assault, or putting in fear from two separate employees. The taking was from separate cash registers, over the second of which the first employee had no control. The two events were separated in time and each required separate criminal intent. Actual ownership of the money obtained is not dispositive of the question of whether multiple robberies have been committed. What is dispositive is whether there have been successive and distinct forceful takings with a separate and independent intent for each transaction.
Hill may be factually different from this case, since only one transaction was found, but, we disapprove Hill to the extent that it implies that there cannot be two robberies when the property taken belongs to the same entity. We approve the First District Court's opinion in this cause.
It is so ordered.
ALDERMAN, C.J., and ADKINS, OYER-TON and EHRLICH, JJ., concur.
BOYD, J., dissents with an opinion.