Case Name: Raul Barreto, Appellant, et al., Plaintiff, v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority et al., Respondents. (And Third-Party Actions.)
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 2015-05-07
Citations: 25 N.Y.3d 426
Docket Number: 
Parties: Raul Barreto, Appellant, et al., Plaintiff, v Metropolitan Transportation Authority et al., Respondents. (And Third-Party Actions.)
Judges: Chief Judge Lippman and Judges Rivera and Fahey concur; Judge Stein dissents in part in an opinion in which Judge Abdus-Salaam concurs; Judge Read dissents and votes to affirm in an opinion.
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 25
Pages: 426–447

Head Matter:
[34 NE3d 815, 13 NYS3d 305]
Raul Barreto, Appellant, et al., Plaintiff, v Metropolitan Transportation Authority et al., Respondents. (And Third-Party Actions.)
Argued February 11, 2015;
decided May 7, 2015
POINTS OF COUNSEL
Gorayeb & Associates, P.C., New York City (John M. Shaw of counsel), for appellant.
I. Plaintiff should have been awarded partial summary judgment against defendants on plaintiff’s Labor Law § 240 (1) cause of action and the motions to dismiss that claim should have been denied. (Gordon v Eastern Ry. Supply, 82 NY2d 555; Koenig v Patrick Constr. Corp., 298 NY 313; Zimmer v Chemung County Performing Arts, 65 NY2d 513, 65 NY2d 1054; Quigley v Thatcher, 207 NY 66; Rocovich v Consolidated Edison Co., 78 NY2d 509; Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d 494; Ortega v City of New York, 95 AD3d 125; Klapa v O&Y Liberty Plaza Co., 218 AD2d 635; Runner v New York Stock Exch., Inc., 13 NY3d 599; McCann v Central Synagogue, 280 AD2d 298.) II. In its decision, the Appellate Division misconstrued the facts, ignored other facts and misapplied well settled law regarding sole proximate cause/ recalcitrance. (O’Connor v Enright Marble & Tile Corp., 22 AD3d 548; Orellana v American Airlines, 300 AD2d 638; Cahill v Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth., 4 NY3d 35; Singh v Barrett, 192 AD2d 378; Bland v Manocherian, 66 NY2d 452; Mac-Nair v Salamon, 199 AD2d 170; Yu Xiu Deng v A.J. Contr. Co., 255 AD2d 202; Morales v Spring Scaffolding, Inc., 24 AD3d 42; Harris v Rodriguez, 281 AD2d 158; Weininger v Hagedorn & Co., 91 NY2d 958.) III. Plaintiff has maintained a viable Labor Law § 241 (6) claim in that plaintiff has cited to specific and relevant Industrial Code sections and was not the sole proximate cause of the accident. (Caddy v Interborough R.T. Co., 195 NY 415; Lewis-Moors v Contel of N.Y., 78 NY2d 942; Joblon v Solow, 91 NY2d 457; Nagel v D & R Realty Corp., 99 NY2d 98; Copertino v Ward, 100 AD2d 565; Maher v Atlas Tr. Mix Corp., 104 AD2d 591; Celestine v City of New York, 86 AD2d 592, 59 NY2d 938; Olsen v James Miller Mar. Serv., Inc., 16 AD3d 169; O’Connor v Lincoln Metrocenter Partners, 266 AD2d 60; Messina v City of New York, 300 AD2d 121.) IV. Plaintiffs Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence claims have merit and should not have been dismissed. (Allen v Cloutier Constr. Corp., 44 NY2d 290; Russin v Louis N. Picciano & Son, 54 NY2d 311; DaBolt v Bethlehem Steel Corp., 92 AD2d 70, 60 NY2d 701; Giuffrida v Metro N. Commuter R.R. Co., 279 AD2d 403; Negri v Stop & Shop, 65 NY2d 625; Giambrone v New York Yankees, 181 AD2d 547; Forde v Columbus McKinnon Corp., 274 AD2d 446; Landry v General Motors Corp., Cent. Foundry Div., 210 AD2d 898; Barzaghi v Maislin Transp., 115 AD2d 679, 67 NY2d 852; Murdoch v Niagara Falls Bridge Commn., 81 AD3d 1456.)
Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP, New York City (Patrick J. Lawless of counsel), for Metropolitan Transportation Authority and another, respondents.
I. The plaintiff’s Labor Law § 240 (1) claim was properly dismissed as the evidence clearly shows that he was the sole proximate cause of the accident. (Cahill v Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth., 4 NY3d 35; Blake v Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of N.Y. City, 1 NY3d 280; Robinson v East Med. Ctr., LP, 6 NY3d 550; Montgomery v Federal Express Corp., 4 NY3d 805; Hunt v Meyers, 63 AD3d 685; Hughes-Berg v Mueller, 50 AD3d 856; Burke v Hilton Resorts Corp., 85 AD3d 419; Kosavick v Tishman Constr. Corp. of N.Y., 50 AD3d 287; Morales v Spring Scaffolding, Inc., 24 AD3d 42.) II. The plaintiff’s Labor Law § 241 (6) claim was properly dismissed. (Parker v 205-209 E. 57th St. Assoc., LLC, 100 AD3d 607.) III. The plaintiff’s Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence claims were properly dismissed. (Ortega v Puccia, 57 AD3d 54; Azad v 270 5th Realty Corp., 46 AD3d 728; Kerins v Vassar Coll., 15 AD3d 623; Dennis v City of New York, 304 AD2d 611; Comes v New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 82 NY2d 876; Rizzuto v L.A. Wenger Contr. Co., 91 NY2d 343; Russin v Louis N. Picciano & Son, 54 NY2d 311; O’Sullivan v IDI Constr. Co., Inc., 7 NY3d 805; Cahill v Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth., 31 AD3d 347; Dalanna v City of New York, 308 AD2d 400.)
Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York City (Susan Paulson and Francis F. Caputo of counsel), for City of New York, respondent.
Plaintiffs claims were correctly dismissed because his own failure to observe the safety requirements of his employment was the sole proximate cause of his accident. (Blake v Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of N.Y. City, 1 NY3d 280; Hagins v State of New York, 81 NY2d 921; Cahill v Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth., 4 NY3d 35; Robinson v East Med. Ctr., LP, 6 NY3d 550; Ares v State of New York, 80 NY2d 959.)
Jones Morrison, LLP, Scarsdale (Clifford I. Bass of counsel), for IMS Safety Inc., respondent.
I. The plaintiffs claims under Labor Law §§ 240 (1) and 241 (6) were properly dismissed against IMS Safety Inc. (Russin v Louis N. Picciano & Son, 54 NY2d 311; Nascimento v Bridgehampton Constr. Corp., 86 AD3d 189; Doherty v City of New York, 16 AD3d 124; Smith v McClier Corp., 22 AD3d 369; Lamia v City of New York, 2008 NY Slip Op 32136[U]; Lazarou v Turner Constr. Co., 18 AD3d 398; Loiacono v Lehrer McGovern Bovis, 270 AD2d 464; Generoso v New York City Hous. Auth., 2008 NY Slip Op 33596[U]; Cappabianca v Skanska USA Bldg. Inc., 99 AD3d 139; Pope v Safety & Quality Plus, Inc., 111 AD3d 911.) II. The plaintiffs Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence claims were properly dismissed against IMS Safety Inc. (Jock v Fien, 80 NY2d 965; Buckley v Columbia Grammar & Preparatory, 44 AD3d 263; Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 NY2d 494; Comes v New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 82 NY2d 876; Russin v Louis N. Picciano & Son, 54 NY2d 311; Rizzuto v L.A. Wenger Contr. Co., 91 NY2d 343; Reilly v Newireen Assoc., 303 AD2d 214; Cappabianca v Skanska USA Bldg. Inc., 99 AD3d 139; Hughes v Tishman Constr. Corp., 40 AD3d 305; Jones v New York City Hous. Auth., 2010 NY Slip Op 31209[U].) III. The Metropolitan Transportation Authority defendants and the City of New York have no viable cross claims against IMS Safety Inc. (North Star Reins. Corp. v Continental Ins. Co., 82 NY2d 281; Adams v Boston Props. Ltd. Partnership, 41 AD3d 112; Bussanich v 310 E. 55th St. Tenants, 282 AD2d 243; Goncalves v 515 Park Ave. Condominium, 39 AD3d 262.)

Opinion:
OPINION OF THE COURT
Pigott, J.
Plaintiff Raul Barreto, an asbestos handler employed by asbestos removal contractor P.A.L. Environmental Safety Corp. (PAL), allegedly sustained on-the-job injuries after falling through an uncovered manhole in Manhattan at a location owned by the City of New York (City), which had been leased by the City to the New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA). NYCTA, on behalf of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), retained PAL to perform asbestos removal from electrical cables underneath city streets. PAL directly contracted with IMS Safety Inc. to serve as site safety consultant.
Prior to the commencement of the work, PAL employees constructed a three-sided wooden containment enclosure around the manhole. Plastic sheets were placed on the ceiling and the floor of the enclosure. The plastic sheet on the ceiling was stapled and glued to two two-by-fours, forming an "X" over, and framing, the enclosure. Two sets of double plastic sheets were hung in the open side of the enclosure approximately four feet apart. A circle was cut out of the plastic floor to account for the three-to-four-foot in diameter manhole. Two lights illuminated the enclosure.
Before the manhole cover was removed, an MTA foreman conducted an inspection to ensure that the electrical cables were not live. Due to the weight of the manhole cover, two PAL workers were required to remove the cover and place it outside the enclosure. IMS thereafter checked the underground air quality inside the open manhole and apprised PAL workers that it was safe to begin work. PAL workers descended approximately 10 feet by way of a ladder and began the asbestos removal work. At the conclusion of their shift, plaintiff and his coworkers were required to bring up the asbestos-filled bags, remove their protective equipment and the ladder, and replace the manhole cover before disassembling the containment enclosure.
PAL workers, including plaintiff, finished their shift at approximately 4:00 a.m. on the day of the accident. After plaintiff and his coworkers exited the manhole, they proceeded to break down the containment area "right away." Plaintiff did not notice that the manhole remained uncovered, and, during the breakdown, the manhole cover remained outside the enclosure. According to plaintiff, the lights inside the enclosure had been turned off. As plaintiff walked toward the rear of the enclosure to disassemble the two-by-fours from the ceiling, he fell into the open manhole.
L
Plaintiff commenced this action against defendants IMS, City, NYCTA and MTA alleging violations of Labor Law § 200, 240 (1) and 241 (6) and common-law negligence. At the conclusion of discovery, all defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss plaintiff's complaint and any relevant cross claims asserted against them. Plaintiff cross-moved for partial summary judgment against all defendants on his section 240 (1) and 241 (6) claims, and for partial summary judgment against IMS, NYCTA and MTA on his common-law negligence and section 200 claims.
Supreme Court dismissed plaintiff's complaint against all defendants on the ground that plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of his injuries because he disregarded his supervisor's instructions by dismantling the containment enclosure before the manhole cover was replaced (2012 NY Slip Op 30858 [U] [Sup Ct, NY County 2012]). The court reasoned that had plaintiff waited for the manhole to be covered before commencing the deconstruction of the enclosure, he would not have fallen through the open manhole.
A divided Appellate Division affirmed, holding, as an initial matter, that IMS was not a statutory agent subject to liability under any of plaintiff's theories because it lacked the authority to supervise plaintiff or his work (110 AD3d 630, 632 [1st Dept 2013]). The Court also dismissed plaintiff's section 240 (1) claims against the remaining defendants, noting that plaintiff was provided with a "nearby and readily available" safety device, i.e., the manhole cover, and plaintiff's own actions were the sole proximate cause of his injuries because he disregarded his supervisor's instruction to replace the manhole cover before dismantling the containment enclosure (id.). It also dismissed the section 241 (6) claims because, in its view, none of the alleged Industrial Code violations proximately caused the accident (id. at 633). The common-law negligence and section 200 claims against NYCTA and MTA were dismissed because they neither had notice of the defect nor supervised plaintiff's work (id. at 632-633).
The dissenting Justice agreed with the majority that IMS was not a statutory agent, but would have reinstated plaintiff's Labor Law § 240 (1) claims against the City (as owner) and NYCTA and MTA because plaintiff was not the sole proximate cause of his injuries in light of the record evidence that it took at least two workers to move the manhole cover and because the lights may have been turned off before the deconstruction work had begun (id. at 634 [Feinman, J., dissenting in part]).
The Appellate Division certified to this Court the question whether its order affirming the order of Supreme Court was properly made (2014 NY Slip Op 63475[U] [1st Dept 2014]).
IL
Plaintiff is entitled to partial summary judgment against the City, NYCTA and MTA on his Labor Law § 240 (1) claims. Section 240 (1) provides, in relevant part:
"All contractors and owners and their agents . . . in the erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of a building or structure shall furnish or erect, or cause to be furnished or erected for the performance of such labor, [certain enumerated] and other devices which shall be so constructed, placed and operated as to give proper protection to a person so employed."
The statute imposes upon owners, contractors and their agents a nondelegable duty that renders them liable regardless of whether they supervise or control the work (see Cahill v Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth., 4 NY3d 35, 39 [2004]). "[W]here an accident is caused by a violation of the statute, the plaintiff's own negligence does not furnish a defense"; however, "where a plaintiff's own actions are the sole proximate cause of the accident, there can be no liability" (id.). Thus, in order to recover under section 240 (1), the plaintiff must establish that the statute was violated and that such violation was a proximate cause of his injury (see Zimmer v Chemung County Performing Arts, 65 NY2d 513, 524 [1985]).
The City, NYCTA and MTA do not contend on this appeal that the work plaintiff was engaged in at the time of the accident did not involve an elevation-related hazard, nor did IMS initially move for summary judgment on that ground. Therefore, we assume, for purposes of this appeal only, that plaintiff was engaged in work that posed an elevation-related risk.
On his motion for summary judgment, plaintiff met his burden of establishing the absence of an adequate safety device through the submission of the deposition testimony of IMS's president, Joseph Mazzurco, who testified that there should have been a guardrail system around three sides of the open manhole while the containment enclosure was being dismantled. Plaintiff also established that the absence of guardrails was a proximate cause of the accident because had they been in place he would not have fallen.
The Appellate Division erred in holding that plaintiff's conduct was the sole proximate cause of his injuries in light of the undisputed fact that it took at least two PAL workers to move the manhole cover (given its weight), and plaintiff's testimony that the lights had been turned off prior to disassembly of the containment enclosure. Therefore, plaintiff's conduct could not have been the sole proximate cause of his injuries, and plaintiff is entitled to partial summary judgment against the City, NYCTA and MTA on his section 240 (1) claims.
Supreme Court and the Appellate Division, having erroneously concluded that plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of his injuries, did not reach the merits of plaintiff's Labor Law § 241 (6) claims against the City, NYCTA and MTA. Therefore, plaintiff's section 241 (6) claims should be reinstated, and we remit the matter to Supreme Court so it may consider the summary judgment motions that were brought relative to those claims.
m.
The Appellate Division also erred in holding that IMS was not a "statutory agent" as a matter of law. Given Mazzurco's testimony that it was part of IMS's responsibility to ensure that a guardrail system was in place and the manhole cover was replaced once the system was removed, there is a question of fact concerning whether IMS was a "statutory agent" subject to liability under Labor Law § 240 (1) (see Walls v Turner Constr. Co., 4 NY3d 861, 863-864 [2005]; Blake v Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of N.Y. City, 1 NY3d 280, 292-293 [2003] [no agency liability under section 240 (1) where responsibility for the activity that surrounded the injury was not delegated to a third party]). Moreover, MTA and NYCTA submitted the affidavit of a PAL supervisor who averred that one of IMS's duties at the site was to ensure that the manhole was covered before PAL workers disassembled the containment enclosure, and that IMS had the authority to stop plaintiff from working in the area near the missing manhole cover. On this record, a jury could reasonably find that IMS "had the ability to control the activity which brought about the injury" (Walls, 4 NY3d at 863-864, citing Russin v Louis N. Picciano & Son, 54 NY2d 311, 317-318 [1981]).
For a similar reason, plaintiff's common-law negligence and Labor Law § 200 and 241 (6) claims should be reinstated against IMS, as plaintiff raised triable issues of fact as to whether IMS, as a potential statutory agent, had the authority to supervise that portion of the work that brought about plaintiff's injury (see Rizzuto v L.A. Wenger Contr. Co., 91 NY2d 343, 353 [1998] [common-law negligence and Labor Law § 200 claims]; Harris v Hueber-Breuer Constr. Co., Inc., 67 AD3d 1351, 1353 [2009] [Labor Law § 241 (6) claim]).
IV.
Finally, NYCTA and MTA met their respective burdens of establishing that they did not supervise or control plaintiffs work, or that neither of them had notice of the alleged dangerous condition or defect (see Comes v New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 82 NY2d 876, 877-878 [1993]). Plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact in that regard. Therefore, the Appellate Division properly dismissed plaintiffs common-law negligence and section 200 claims brought against NYCTA and MTA.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be modified, with costs to plaintiff Raul Barreto, in accordance with this opinion and, as so modified, affirmed, and the certified question not answered as unnecessary.
Plaintiff discontinued his common-law negligence and section 200 claims against the City.