Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. John E. SMITH
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1982-01-25
Citations: 415 So. 2d 930
Docket Number: No. 81-KA-0876
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. John E. SMITH.
Judges: DIXON, C. J., dissents with reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 415
Pages: 930–935

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. John E. SMITH.
No. 81-KA-0876.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Jan. 25, 1982.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Harry F. Con-nick, Dist. Atty., Louise S. Korns, Joseph Meyer, John Craft, Asst. Dist. Attys., for plaintiff-appellee.
Dwight Doskey, Orleans Indigent Defender Program, New Orleans, for defendant-appellant.

Opinion:
MARCUS, Justice.
John E. Smith was charged in the same information with two counts of theft in violation of La.R.S. 14:67, one count of receiving stolen things in violation of La.R.S. 14:69, and one count of simple burglary in violation of La.R.S. 14:62. Defendant pled not guilty to these charges. Subsequently, the state nolle pressed the theft charges and defendant withdrew his former pleas of not guilty to receiving stolen things and simple burglary and entered pleas of guilty to these charges. After waiving the legal delay, defendant was sentenced to serve three years in the parish prison on each of the two counts with credit for time served. The court expressly directed that the sentences be served concurrently.
Thereafter, the district attorney filed an information pursuant to La.R.S. 15:529.1 (Habitual Offender Law) accusing defendant of a prior conviction under the laws of the State of Florida which, if committed in this state, would be a felony. Said conviction was based on a plea of guilty. After a hearing, the trial judge found defendant to be a second felony offender. He vacated the sentences previously imposed and sentenced defendant to serve four years in the parish prison on each count with credit for time served. The court expressly directed that the sentences be served concurrently. On appeal, defendant relies on two assignments of error, both of which relate to the finding by the trial judge that he was an habitual offender.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NOS. 1 AND 2
Defendant contends the trial judge erred in finding him to be an habitual offender. He argues that he was restricted in showing that his prior out-of-state conviction by guilty plea, used to enhance his sentences, was not taken in compliance with Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). He further argues that his testimony at the habitual offender hearing was sufficient to bar the state's use of the prior out-of-state conviction.
At the habitual offender hearing, after defendant denied the allegations of the information, the state introduced, without objection, a certified copy of the minutes of defendant's prior conviction in the Circuit Court of Escambia County, Florida. These minutes reflect the following:
On this September 21, 1976, came in person and by counsel, Gregg Hall, the defendant, John Elbert Smith, into open court. Whereupon, said defendant requested permission to withdraw his plea of not guilty entered July 6, 1976. Said permission was granted by the Court, and said defendant having waived arraignment on July 6, 1976, entered his plea of guilty to Burglary of Auto as charged under the first count and Grand Larceny as charged under the second count of the information filed herein against him. The Court accepted defendant's plea after first determining through interrogation of defendant that the plea was made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charges and after inquiring and determining that there was a factual basis for same .
Defense counsel stipulated that the present accused and the defendant in the Florida proceedings are one and the same person. Defendant also affirmed this fact in his testimony. He further testified that he could not remember whether or not the Florida trial judge informed him of his right to trial by jury, his right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him, and his privilege against self-incrimination. He did recall that on the morning of trial his lawyer told him that, if he agreed to plead guilty, he could get credit for time served and go home that day. On the other hand, he stated that he was told that, if he did not agree to plead guilty, he would be sentenced to a few years in jail. He testified that he agreed to the plea bargain. At the completion of defendant's testimony, defense counsel introduced in evidence a letter from the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Escambia County stating that a certified copy of the minutes of September 21, 1976 of the Florida proceedings was enclosed but that a transcript of said proceedings was only available through the circuit court reporters. Defense counsel also introduced in evidence a letter from the Office of the Public Defender of Escambia County indicating that the requested transcript of the Florida proceedings was missing and had probably been destroyed by water damage. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial judge found defendant to be a second felony offender and sentenced him as aforesaid.
In State v. Holden, 375 So.2d 1372 (La.1979), we held that when the state intends to use a federal or non-Louisiana plea of guilty as a prior conviction in order to enhance punishment under La.R.S. 15:529.1 (Habitual Offender Law):
the state is required only to prove the conviction by a plea of guilty with representation by counsel. The defendant has the burden of proving that he did not waive his constitutional rights in making the plea, if the plea was taken subsequent to Boykin's requirement in this regard. Unless the colloquy at the time of the plea of guilty affirmatively shows substantial defect in this regard, the defendant will not be permitted to make any other collateral attack beyond the colloquy upon these otherwise-valid guilty pleas in the enhanced-punishment proceedings.
See also State v. Jefferson, 386 So.2d 77 (La.1980); State v. Bolton, 379 So.2d 722 (La.1979). For any other collateral attack upon the prior plea of guilty, the defendant is relegated to any remedy he has in the court which took his plea. State v. Bolton, supra.
In the instant case, a certified copy of the minutes as well as the testimony of defendant unequivocally establish that defendant was represented by counsel at the time he entered his guilty plea on September 21, 1976 in the Circuit Court of Escambia County, Florida. Hence, the state fulfilled its requirement under Holden. At this point, the burden of proof shifted to defendant. Defendant testified that he did not recall being advised of his Boykin rights; however, he failed to support his testimony with a transcript of the colloquy at the time of the plea of guilty indicating substantial Boykin defects. Hence, defendant did not meet the burden of proof required by Holden. We do not believe that the possible destruction of the transcript of the colloquy warrants an exception to the rule regarding collateral attacks on federal and non-Louisiana pleas of guilty announced in Holden and followed in Bolton and Jefferson. Defendant, of course, retains his remedies in the court which took his plea.
Accordingly, the trial judge did not err in finding defendant to be an habitual offender. Assignments of Error Nos. 1 and 2 are without merit.
DECREE
For the reasons assigned, defendant's convictions and sentences are affirmed.
DIXON, C. J., dissents with reasons.
LEMMON, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
LEAR, J. ad hoc, dissents.
Judges Remy Chiasson, Wallace A. Edwards and Elmo E. Lear of the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, participated in this decision as associate justices ad hoc, joined by Chief Justice Dixon and Associate Justices Marcus, Blanche and Lemmon.