Case Name: PEOPLE v. ORA JONES
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1975-12-18
Citations: 395 Mich. 379
Docket Number: Docket No. 54801
Parties: PEOPLE v ORA JONES
Judges: Williams, Levin, and Fitzgerald, JJ., concurred with T. G. Kavanagh, C. J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 395
Pages: 379–407

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v ORA JONES
Docket No. 54801.
Argued June 6, 1974
(Calendar No. 20). —
Decided December 18, 1975.
Rehearing denied 396 Mich 976.
Ora T. Jones was charged with second-degree murder and convicted by a jury in the Recorder’s Court of Detroit, Samuel H. Olsen, J. The Court specifically instructed the jury on the elements of second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter. The Court of Appeals, Lesinski, C. J., and T. M. Burns and O’Hara, JJ., affirmed (Docket No. 13881). The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether the judge erred in not instructing the jury on other offenses. Held:
1. There are two classes of included offenses: (a) "necessarily” included lesser offenses which are such that it is impossible to commit the greater crime without first having committed the lesser; and (b) "cognate” lesser offenses which are related to the greater offense in the sense that they share several elements, and are of the same class or category, but which may contain some elements not found in the greater offense. If the lesser offense is of the same class or category, or closely related to the originally charged offense, so as to provide fair notice to the defendant that he will be required to defend against it, the lesser offense is or may be included within the greater.
2. The evidence will always support conviction of a necessarily included offense if it supports conviction of the greater offense. In the case of cognate offenses, the evidence adduced at the particular trial must be examined to determine whether it would support a conviction of the lesser offense. If evidence has been presented which would support conviction of a lesser included offense, refusal to give a requested instruction on the offense is reversible error.
References for Points in Headnotes
[I] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 326, 327.
[2-6, 9, 10, 12] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 185-187, 189, 494-496.
Conviction of lesser offense as bar to prosecution for greater on new trial. 61 ALR2d 1141.
[7] 40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide §§ 525, 528-530, 533-535.
[8, 15] 40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide § 514.
[II] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 152,153.
[13,14] 40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide §§ 44, 53, 55.
3. On the evidence presented, the trial court erred in refusing to give the requested instruction on the statutory offense of careless discharge of a firearm (MCL 752.861; MSA 28.436[21]).
4. The trial court erred reversibly in giving on its own motion a misleading instruction on common-law manslaughter which recognized only the prosecution’s theory of the case and omitted an instruction on involuntary manslaughter based on the defendant’s theory.
5. The evidence would have supported an instruction on the statutory crime of manslaughter resulting from aiming or pointing a firearm intentionally but without malice (MCL 750.329; MSA 28.561), but failure to give it was not reversible error absent a request by defendant.
6. The trial court erred in failing to instruct adequately that an accidental homicide is not murder or manslaughter.
Reversed and remanded for new trial.
Williams, J., concurred but wrote separately to point out a question not present in this case: the information must give notice of a cognate offense either in the original form or, if amendment is possible, in the amended information. If amendment is allowed, there might be such surprise that the defendant should be entitled to an adjournment, or in the extreme the complexion of the case might be so changed that the defendant is denied a fair trial.
Coleman, J., dissented and would affirm the conviction. The interim rule of instructing on offenses "cognate”, "related”, or "allied” to the crime charge if requested invites increased confusion and should not be adopted because it will only serve to further blur the lines of responsibility in the criminal justice process. The prosecutor determines the initial offense to be charged and not every offense possibly committed during a crime is open to consideration by the jury as an inferior degree of the crime charged. The charge of careless, reckless or negligent use of firearms (MCL 752.861; MSA 28.436[21]) is not a degree of the murder charged within the meaning of the statute allowing the jury to find the defendant guilty of an inferior degree of the crime charged. The defendant was not prejudiced by the failure to instruct on involuntary manslaughter; he did not request the instruction and did not offer argument or proofs on the issue. The jury was adequately instructed on the defendant’s theory that the shooting was accidental and the defendant did not request additional instructions.
45 Mich App 373; 206 NW2d 453 (1974) reversed.
Opinion op the Court
1. Criminal Law — Constitutional Law — Pleading—Indictment and Information.
It is elementary that a defendant may not be convicted of a crime with which he was not charged because the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments give a defendant the right to know the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
2. Criminal Law — Lesser Included Offenses — Pleading—Due Process.
One guide to the minimal notice requirements for a lesser included offense in the crime charged is that due process is met if the greater charged crime and the lesser offense are of the same or of an overlapping nature.
3. Criminal Law — Lesser Included Offenses — Pleading—Due ■ Process — Fair Notice.
A lesser offense is or may be included within a greater offense if the lesser offense is of the same class or category or closely related to the originally charged offense so as to provide fair notice to the defendant that he will be required to defend against it; the fact that a lesser offense within the same category as the greater charged offense has an element not included in the greater does not preclude the lesser from being included in the greater.
4. Criminal Law — Lesser Included Offenses — Instructions to Jury.
The duty of the trial judge to instruct on lesser included offenses is determined by the evidence; if evidence is presented which would support a conviction of a lesser included offense, refusal to give a requested instruction is reversible error.
5. Criminal Law — Lesser Included Offenses — Cognate Offenses.
A lesser offense within the same category as a greater charged offense, which has an element not included within the greater, is a cognate offense if analysis of the offenses demonstrates an overlapping of elements and a common statutory purpose and a cognate offense may be a lesser included offense where the evidence adduced at trial would support a conviction of the lesser offense.
6. Homicide — Lesser Included Offenses — Cognate Offenses — Second-Degree Murder — Careless Discharge of Firearms.
The offenses of careless, reckless or negligent discharge of firearms causing death and second-degree murder have certain overlapping elements and common statutory purpose: the purpose is protection against killing or injury to the person and the elements relate to a "reckless” state of mind concerning damage to human life and an activity or intended activity to kill or injure a person; the offenses are cognate and the first is a lesser included offense of the second where the evidence adduced would support a verdict of guilt of the lesser offense (MCL 750.317, 752.861; MSA 28.549, 28.436[21]).
7. Homicide — Manslaughter—Instructions to Jury.
Giving an unrequested instruction to the jury on voluntary manslaughter, in a trial for second-degree murder, which recognized only the prosecution’s theory of the case but ignored the defendant’s theory that the killing was accidental was misleading and reversible error.
8. Homicide — Accident—Instructions to Jury.
An instruction to the jury in a trial for second-degree murder which mentioned accident in only two places in passing did not fairly and fully present the case to the jury in an understandable manner where the defense theory was that the victim was shot accidentally and whether the shooting was intentional or accidental was the central issue in the case (MCL 750.317; MSA 28.549). •
Concurring Opinion
Williams, J.
9. Criminal Law — Lesser Included Offenses — Cognate Offenses— Notice.
An information must give notice of a cognate offense either in the original form or, if amendment is possible, in the amended information if the cognate offense is to be considered as a lesser included offense of the offense charged on the evidence presented.
10. Criminal Law — Lesser Included Offenses — Cognate Offenses —Information—Amendment.
Amendment of an information to include a lesser cognate offense may be allowed by the trial court, but the court should consider whether there is such surprise that a defendant should be entitled to an adjournment or, in an extreme situation, whether the additional charge so changed the complexion of the case that the defendant would not be permitted to fairly develop his case and defend himself and thus would be denied a fair trial.
Dissenting Opinion
Coleman, J.
11. District and Prosecuting Attorneys — Criminal Law — Decision to Charge.
The decision to charge a person with a certain crime is the prosecutor’s responsibility; the prosecutor determines the initial charge and the courts may not interfere with the process.
12. Criminal Law — Instructions to Jury — Lesser Offenses.
A trial judge is responsible for instructing the jury on the elements of the offense charged and on those lesser offenses which are properly for the jury’s consideration under the statute permitting conviction of lesser degrees or attempt of the offense charged as determined by the offense charged and the evidence presented; not every offense possibly committed during the crime is covered by the statute (MCL 768.32; MSA 28.1055).
13. Homicide — Second-Degree Murder — Degrees—Careless Use of Firearm.
A charge of careless, reckless or negligent use of firearms is not a lesser degree of second-degree murder which the jury may consider under the statute permitting conviction of lesser degrees or an attempt of the offense charged (MCL 750.317, 752.861, 768.32; MSA 28.549, 28.436[21], 28.1055).
14. Homicide — Second-Degree Murder — Involuntary Manslaughter — Degrees.
A defendant was not prejudiced by failure to instruct on involuntary manslaughter in the absence of a request for the instruction where the elements of involuntary manslaughter are inconsistent with and even opposite to those of the second-degree murder charged and the proofs presented (MCL 750.317, 768.32; MSA 28.549, 28.1055).
15. Homicide — Instructions to Jury — Sufficiency—Accident.
An instruction to the jury, in a trial for second-degree murder, in which the defendant maintained that the shooting of the victim was an accident and in which the only two theories advanced were as to "accident” and '!intentional killing”, in which the judge listed the four classiñcations of homicide (felonious, justiñable, excusable, and accidental) and speciñcally said that only felonious homicides were punishable, instructed on the elements of the crimes charged and the applicable law, and told the jury that in determining whether the defendant intended to kill the victim they were to examine all of the circumstances and facts of the case as disclosed by the testimony and evidence was a sufficient instruction, and no additional instructions were needed.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William L. Cahalan, Prosecuting Attorney, Dominick R. Carnovale, Chief, Appellate Department, and Robert A. Reuther, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
State Appellate Defender Office (by Joseph B. Szeremet) for defendant on appeal.

Opinion:
T. G. Kavanagh, C. J.
Defendant's initial conviction of first-degree murder was reversed by the Michigan Court of Appeals. Upon retrial, defendant was charged with second degree murder and convicted by a jury of that offense. That conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. People v Jones, 45 Mich App 373; 206 NW2d 453 (1973). We granted leave to consider the failure to instruct on lesser included offenses.
Testimony indicated that defendant was sitting in the living room of an apartment he shared with the decedent, Phyllis Grace. A female friend of the decedent came to visit her and, on the decedent's invitation, the two women left the living room and entered the kitchen where they carried on a conversation. After a few minutes, while they were standing in the kitchen, defendant rose from the couch, went to a closet, and removed a shotgun he had stored there. He then proceeded to the kitchen door where he aimed the weapon at the decedent and the gun discharged, fatally wounding the decedent.
Two police officers called to the scene testified that upon their entering the apartment the defendant made a statement to the effect that 'T [have] just done something I should have done a long time ago". This statement was ruled admissible by the trial judge subsequent to a Walker-type hearing held during the course of the trial. The defendant denied making such a statement.
The defendant testified that he took the shotgun from a closet and approached the kitchen with the intention of frightening the female companion from the apartment.
He testified that he did not aim the weapon intentionally, that he did not know the weapon was loaded, and that the weapon accidentally discharged when he was bumped by the fleeing female companion.
During both his opening statement and closing argument, defense counsel asserted the shooting was accidental. During his closing argument he also alluded to the fact that the jury might find the defendant guilty of manslaughter rather than murder in the second degree.
The court instructed the jury on murder in the second degree and voluntary manslaughter. Defendant did not object to these instructions.
Subsequent to the giving of these instructions and before the jury retired to consider its verdict, defense counsel requested the trial judge to instruct the jury on the statutory offense of killing or injuring a person by careless, reckless or negligent discharge of a firearm, claiming this was a lesser included offense of second-degree murder. The trial judge ruled defendant was not entitled to such a charge and refused the request.
Our disposition of this appeal requires only consideration of the claimed errors in instructing the jury.
We conclude that the trial court erred in the following respects:
1. In refusing to give the requested instruction on the statutory offense of careless discharge of a firearm. MCLA 752.861; MSA 28.436(21).
2. In giving a misleading instruction on manslaughter.
3. In failing to instruct adequately that an accidental homicide is not murder or manslaughter.
We conclude that the trial court did not commit reversible error in failing to instruct on a statutory manslaughter offense, MCLA 750.329; MSA 28.561, not requested by defendant.
I
In People v Henry, 395 Mich 367; 236 NW2d 489 (1975), we held that a trial court is not ordinarily required to instruct on lesser included offenses unless request for those instructions is properly made.
In the case at bar, defense counsel requested instructions on the offense of reckless use of firearms causing death. The trial judge refused the request, stating that reckless use of firearms was not a lesser included offense of second degree murder.
The law of lesser included offenses in Michigan has not been clear or consistent:
"The case law is not in agreement as to either the elements of the various crimes or the lesser offenses, and there tends to be a stratification of law along the lines of individual crimes, so that in one instance, instructions on lesser offenses are routinely given sua sponte, whereas in other crimes they are rarely if ever given sua sponte, although both crimes are equally susceptible to lesser offenses." Koenig, The Many-Headed Hydra Of Lesser Included Offenses: A Herculean Task for the Michigan Courts, 1 DCL Rev 41, 42 fns 3, 4 (1975).
The common-law definition of lesser included offenses is that the lesser must be such that it is impossible to commit the greater without, first having committed the lesser. 4 Wharton, Criminal Law and Procedure, § 1799. This definition includes only necessarily included lesser offenses. This definition, however, is generally conceded to be unduly restrictive, and thus most jurisdictions, including Michigan, have statutes that are broadly construed to permit conviction of "cognate" or allied offenses of the same nature, under a sufficient charge. These lesser offenses are related and hence "cognate" in the sense that they share several elements, and are of the same class or category, but may contain some elements not found in the higher offense.
"The practical differences become evident when one considers an indictment containing allegations of facts which are extraneous to the basic offense on which defendant is to be tried, but which are essential elements of some lesser 'cognate' offense." Comment, Jury Instructions On Lesser Included Offenses, 57 Nw U L Rev 62, 63 (1962).
It is elementary that a defendant may not be convicted of a crime with which he was not charged. DeJonge v Oregon, 299 US 353; 57 S Ct 255; 81 L Ed 278 (1937). The reason is apparent: The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments give a defendant the right to know the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Thus, while there is comparatively little difficulty with the necessarily included lesser offenses, the cognate lesser included offenses are somewhat more difficult to ascertain, conceptually as well as practically. One guide to the minimal due process notice requirements in this area was set out in Paterno v Lyons, 334 US 314; 68 S Ct 1044; 92 L Ed 1409 (1948), wherein the Court said that due process notice requirements are met if the greater charged crime and the lesser included offense are of the same or of an overlapping nature.
While the distinction between cognate and necessarily included lesser offenses is helpful in analyzing the subject of lesser included offenses, the distinction has largely disappeared.
If the lesser offense is of the same class or category, or closely related to the originally charged offense, so as to provide fair notice to the defendant that he will be required to defend against it, the lesser offense is or may be included within the greater.
The failure to advert to the nature of the "cognate" lesser included offense has caused confusion. The fact that a lesser offense, within the same category as the greater charged offense, has an element not included within the greater does not preclude the lesser from being included within the greater. This rule was enunciated in Michigan in 1861 in People v McDonald, 9 Mich 150 (1861), where the Court stated that a defendant indicted for assault with intent to commit murder could be convicted of "an assault, or assault and battery only. Upon a charge for felonious assault, the lesser offense of an assault, or an assault and battery is, under our statutes, included". 9 Mich at 153. Of course under a strict "necessarily included" test, an assault and battery offense would not be included, as battery is an element not required for the higher assault with intent to murder offense. Thus, although we recognized the broader definition in 1861, we have not followed it with consistency, with the result that different theoretical definitions have been followed which have led to different results.
While it is true that reckless discharge of a firearm causing death is not always a lesser included offense of second-degree murder, e.g., if the killing were done by stabbing, it may be such a lesser included offense, as it was in the case at bar.
Analysis of the offense charged (second-degree murder), and the lesser offense on which instruction was requested (careless, reckless, or negligent discharge of a firearm causing death), demonstrates the overlapping of certain elements and common statutory purpose. The common purpose is the protection against killing or injury to the person. The overlapping elements relate first to a "reckless" state of mind concerning damage to human life and secondly to an activity or intended activity to kill or injure a person. Both of these overlapping elements relate to the common purpose of the statutes, i.e., to protect against killing or injury to the person. The offenses are cognate; the elements shared by the two offenses coincide in the harm to the societal interest to be protected.
The duty of the trial judge to instruct on lesser included offenses is determined by the evidence. People v Phillips, 385 Mich 30; 187 NW2d 211 (1971). If evidence has been presented which would support a conviction of a lesser included offense, refusal to give a requested instruction is reversible error. Id. at 36. People v Hamilton, 76 Mich 212; 42 NW 1131 (1889).
If the lesser offense is one that is necessarily included within the greater, the evidence will always support the lesser if it supports the greater.
In the area of "cognate" lesser offenses, the evidence in each case adduced at the particular trial must be examined to determine whether that evidence would support a conviction of the lesser offense. In the case at bar, the evidence was undisputed that the killing resulted from a shotgun blast. The defendant claimed that the blast was accidental.
Because the evidence adduced at trial would have supported a guilty verdict on the offense of careless, reckless or negligent discharge of firearms causing death, the trial court was required to accede to defendant's request to instruct the jury that such offense was a lesser included offense of the charge of second-degree murder.
II
There were no requests by counsel for instruc tions on manslaughter. The court, nevertheless, instructed the jury that they could find defendant guilty of manslaughter, though the language used covered only voluntary manslaughter. The judge instructed as follows:
"Voluntary manslaughter is the unlawful, intentional killing of another without malice, but where the killing is done under some great provocation before the passions have had time to subside, and the blood to cool.
"Whether or not there is a legally sufficient provocation in this case is a question of fact for you to determine from a consideration of all the testimony and the evidence in this case.
"Before you can find the defendant guilty of manslaughter, you must find that the people have established each and every one of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
"First, that the defendant unlawfully, intentionally killed Phyllis Grace.
"Second, that this was a killing without malice either express or implied, but the defendant was acting under a great provocation, as the court has defined that term.
"Third, that the defendant committed the crime on July 24, of 1969.
"And fourth, that the crime was committed by the defendant in the City of Detroit, Wayne County, State of Michigan.
"If you find that the people have established each and every one of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant guilty of manslaughter.
"On the other hand, if the people have failed to establish all of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt as I have defined that term, you must find the defendant not guilty of manslaughter."
Defendant alleges that the above quoted instruction was erroneous and prevented the jury from considering either involuntary manslaughter or the statutory offense of manslaughter resulting from a firearm pointed intentionally but without malice.
In People v Townes, 391 Mich 578, 590-591; 218 NW2d 136 (1974), this Court discussed the necessary elements of voluntary and involuntary manslaughter:
"A defendant properly convicted of voluntary manslaughter is a person who has acted out of a temporary excitement induced by an adequate provocation and not from the deliberation and reflection that marks the crime of murder. People v Younger, [380 Mich 678; 158 NW2d 493 (1968)] supra, 681-682; People v Droste, 160 Mich 66, 79; 125 NW 87 (1910); People v Bucsko, 241 Mich 1, 3; 216 NW 372(1927).
"The elements of involuntary manslaughter, although not completely exclusive of those found in voluntary manslaughter are distinguishable in several respects. They define a crime that originates out of circumstances often quite different from those found in voluntary manslaughter and apply to a defendant who did not proceed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury. In the leading case of People v Ryczek, 224 Mich 106, 110; 194 NW 609 (1923), the Court approved the following definition of involuntary manslaughter:
"' "Involuntary manslaughter is the killing of another without malice and unintentionally, but in doing some unlawful act not amounting to a felony nor naturally tending to cause death or great bodily harm, or in negligently doing some act lawful in itself, or by the negligent omission to perform a legal duty." '
"The usual situations in which involuntary manslaughter arise are either when death results from a direct act not intended to produce serious bodily harm, People v Carter, 387 Mich 397, 419; 197 NW2d 57 (1972), People v Austin, 221 Mich 635, 643-645; 192 NW 590 (1923), or when death results from criminal negligence. People v Stubenvoll, 62 Mich 329; 28 NW 883 (1886); People v Townsend, 214 Mich 267; 183 NW 177; 16 ALR 902 (1921)."
Appellant contends that confronted with a manslaughter instruction expressly limited to only the voluntary type the jury was precluded from finding manslaughter based on defendant's theory of the facts.
We agree.
The prosecutor claimed intentional shooting, the defendant maintained it was accidental. The jury was not obliged to accept either theory but could have concluded that the killing was the result of criminal negligence, e.g., involuntary manslaughter. Had the judge not instructed at all on manslaughter, there would be no reversible error, because no request for instruction on manslaughter was made. See People v Henry, 395 Mich 367; 236 NW2d 489 (1975).
Having undertaken to do so, however, it was reversible error to give a misleading instruction which recognized only the prosecution's theory but not the defendant's.
Michigan has a statutory definition of manslaughter which defendant alleges fits the facts of this case and on which an instruction should have been given. MCLA 750.329; MSA 28.561 provides:
"Any person who shall wound, maim or injure any other person by the discharge of any firearm, pointed or aimed, intentionally but without malice, at any such person, shall, if death ensue from such wounding, maiming or injury, be deemed guilty of the crime of manslaughter."
We agree that on the evidence presented in this case the trial court would have been required if requested to instruct on this offense.
Since no such instruction was requested, there was no reversible error in failing to give it. People v Henry, 395 Mich 367; 236 NW2d 489 (1975).
III
The defense theory was accidental shooting. The trial court's instruction did not adequately present this to the jury. The only places in the instruction which touched directly upon the theory of accident were two: In defining homicide the court said:
"Members of the jury, the word homicide means the killing of one human being by another human being.
"Homicides in turn are divided into a number of classifications or degrees: felonious homicides, excusable homicides, justifiable homicides, or accidental homicides.
"It is only felonious homicides, members of the jury, that are punishable by statute in Michigan."
and in defining "wilfully" the court said:
"It means a wrongful criminal act done intentionally as opposed to an act done accidentally."
The court did not instruct the jury that if the jury found the shooting was accidental it should find the defendant not guilty. While a logician or one skilled in the law could have gleaned such a rule from the instructions given, we are not satisfied that the instructions fairly and fully presented the case to the jury in an understandable manner. Whether the shooting was intentional or accidental was the central issue in the case and read as a whole these instructions did not direct the jury's attention to this issue.
Reversed and remanded for new trial.
Williams, Levin, and Fitzgerald, JJ., concurred with T. G. Kavanagh, C. J.
Lindemer and Ryan, JJ., took no part in the decision of this case.
MCLA 752.861; MSA 28.436(21).
Indeed, the Federal rule concerning lesser included offenses specifically limits the requirement to charge to "necessarily included" lesser offenses. FR Crim P, 31 (c). Nevertheless, as the Ninth Circuit recognized in Olais-Castro v United States, 416 F2d 1155 (CA 9, 1969): "There is a difference between an offense 'necessarily-included' and a Tesser-included' offense, but the terms are used interchangeably by the courts: It seems to be recognized that Rule 31 (c) covers lesser-included offenses as well as necessarily-included offenses."
See People v Chamblis, 395 Mich 408; 236 NW2d 473 (1975).
In Paterno, a plea-based conviction for attempted larceny, upon an original charge of receiving stolen property, was held not to be a denial of due process.
The McDonald case itself dealt with a jury verdict of guilty of assault and battery upon an information charging assault with intent to rape, but the language of the information also alleged a "beat-ting]". 9 Mich 150 (1861).
MCLA 750.329; MSA 28.561.