Case Name: In the Matter of the ESTATE of John Larson GLOMSET, Sr., Deceased. Margie V. GLOMSET, Executrix of the Estate of John Larson Glomset, Sr., Deceased, Appellant, v. Carolyn Gay GHAN, Appellee
Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oklahoma
Decision Date: 1976-03-16
Citations: 547 P.2d 951
Docket Number: No. 47321
Parties: In the Matter of the ESTATE of John Larson GLOMSET, Sr., Deceased. Margie V. GLOMSET, Executrix of the Estate of John Larson Glomset, Sr., Deceased, Appellant, v. Carolyn Gay GHAN, Appellee.
Judges: WILLIAMS, C. J., and BERRY, SIMMS and DOOLIN, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Pacific Reporter 2d
Volume: 547
Pages: 951–955

Head Matter:
In the Matter of the ESTATE of John Larson GLOMSET, Sr., Deceased. Margie V. GLOMSET, Executrix of the Estate of John Larson Glomset, Sr., Deceased, Appellant, v. Carolyn Gay GHAN, Appellee.
No. 47321.
Supreme Court of Oklahoma.
March 16, 1976.
John N. Goodman, Leslie L. Conner, Jr., of Conner, Little & Conner, Oklahoma City, for appellant.
Douglas Loudenback, Oklahoma City, for appellee.

Opinion:
BARNES, Justice.
On the 16th day of October, 1972, the deceased, John Larson Glomset, Sr., and the Appellant, Margie V. Glomset, made and signed joint and reciprocal wills leaving each other all of the other's property in case of death of the other, except in the case of a common disaster, in which instance the whole of the estate was to go to John Larson Glomset, Jr., the son of the deceased.
The deceased's 40-year-old daughter, Carolyn Gay Ghan, was not named in the will. On the 15th day of October, 1973, John Larson Glomset, Sr., died, and on the 17th day of October, 1973, his will was filed for probate. On the 9th day of November the will was admitted to probate, but the question of whether Appellee, Carolyn Gay Ghan, was a pretermitted heir was reserved. On February 7, 1974, a hearing was held, in which Appellee's motion for a declaratory judgment that Ap-pellee was a pretermitted heir, as defined by Title 84 O.S. § 132, and entitled to share in her father's estate, was sustained. The Trial Court found:
"The Court finds, from a complete reading of the will, that the Contestant was omitted therefrom,' and that said will provides for her in no manner whatsoever. The Court finds that a complete reading of the will discloses no intent to intentionally not provide for said Contestant. No intention to disinherit Contestant affirmatively appears from the four corners of the will. The Court, therefore, finds that Contestant was unintentionally omitted from deceased's said will, and is, therefore, entitled to have the same share in the estate of the decedent as if decedent had died intestate, all as provided in 84 O.S. § 132."
Appellant questions whether this issue can be determined in a summary judgment proceeding, and, if so, Appellant further disputes the Trial Court's finding that Ap-pellee is a pretermitted heir under the provisions of 84 O.S. § 132.
Title 84 O.S. § 132 provides as follows:
"When any testator omits to provide in his will for any of his children, or for the issue of any deceased child unless it appears that such omission was intentional, such child, or the issue of such child, must have the same share in the estate of the testator, as if he had died intestate, and succeeds thereto as provided for in preceding section." (Emphasis added)
There was no dispute concerning the fact that Appellee was a dáughter of the deceased. The only question for our determination is whether or not deceased's omission of Appellee appears to have been intentional.
We must first determine if the intent of the deceased must be determined from the will itself, or if extrinsic evidence is admissible. If extrinsic evidence is not admissible, then there is no question of fact still to be determined, and in that event, since there is only a question of law to be determined, a summary judgment by the Trial Court was proper. In deciding if extrinsic evidence is admissible, we must determine whether or not an intention to disinherit Appellee affirmatively appeared from the four corners of the will. We have previously held that if there are no uncertainties appearing on the face of the will, extrinsic evidence is not admissible. See O'Neill v. Cox, 270 P.2d 663 (Okl.1954), and Dilks v. Carson, 197 Okl. 128, 168 P.2d 1020 (1946).
There are no uncertainties on the face of the will in this case. The testator admittedly failed to mention his daughter, Appellee Carolyn Gay Ghan, and also failed to indicate any reason for his failure to mention her.
Thus, if we are to follow previous decisions of this Court interpreting 84 O.S. § 132, such as In re Daniels' Estate, 401 P.2d 493 (Okl.1965), then we must find that Appellee is a pretermitted heir and entitled to inherit her proportionate share of her deceased father's estate.
Appellant has failed to set forth a compelling reason why the interpretation of 84 O.S. § 132 should be changed at this time to permit introduction of extrinsic evidence to show intent of the testator where no ambiguity appears on the face of the will.
The writ of certiorari petitioned for is granted, the decision of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the judgment of the Trial Court is affirmed.
WILLIAMS, C. J., and BERRY, SIMMS and DOOLIN, JJ., concur.
HODGES, V. C. J., DAVISON and IRWIN, JJ., and BLISS, Special Justice, dissent.
The Honorable C. F. BLISS, Jr., was assigned to act as a Special Justice in this case instead of the Honorable ROBERT E. LAVENDER, who disqualified.