Case Name: E. Dennis BROD and G.M. Brod & Co., Inc., a Florida Corporation, Appellants, v. Ira L. ADLER, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1990-02-20
Citations: 570 So. 2d 1312
Docket Number: Nos. 88-2947, 88-3010
Parties: E. Dennis BROD and G.M. Brod & Co., Inc., a Florida Corporation, Appellants, v. Ira L. ADLER, Appellee.
Judges: Before NESBITT, COPE and GERSTEN, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 570
Pages: 1312–1315

Head Matter:
E. Dennis BROD and G.M. Brod & Co., Inc., a Florida Corporation, Appellants, v. Ira L. ADLER, Appellee.
Nos. 88-2947, 88-3010.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Feb. 20, 1990.
On Motion for Rehearing, Clarification and Certification Oct. 16, 1990.
On Motion for Rehearing En Banc Oct. 16, 1990.
Hickey & Jones, and John H. Hickey, Miami, for appellants.
Joe N. Unger, Miami, and Ullman & Ull-man, and Michael W. Ullman, North Miami Beach, for appellee.
Before NESBITT, COPE and GERSTEN, JJ.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Affirmed.
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING, CLARIFICATION, AND CERTIFICATION
PER CURIAM.
Appellants E. Dennis Brod (Brod) and G.M. Brod & Company, Inc. (G.M. Brod) (appellants) move for rehearing, clarification, and certification of this court's decision affirming the judgment of the trial court in favor of appellee Ira L. Adler (appellee). Brod v. Adler, Nos. 88-2947, 88-3010 (Fla. 3d DCA Feb. 20, 1990). Appellants argue on rehearing that the trial court judgment fails to conform to the verdict because the jury found damages against Brod for $85,625, but the trial court entered a judgment against Brod for $344,709.22. Based on the evidence presented and case law applied to that evidence, we deny appellants' motion for rehearing, clarification, and certification.
The relevant facts directed solely to the rehearing motion are as follows. Appellee brought suit against appellants for breach of a written contract, breach of partnership, and breach of fiduciary duty. The case proceeded to trial on appellee's theory that he was in partnership with Brod and G.M. Brod; and that based on various agreements appellee had made with appellants, appellee was entitled to 50% of the net proceeds Brod and G.M. Brod had re covered in G.M. Brod's action against U.S. Home Corporation. G.M. Brod & Company, Inc. v. U.S. Home Corporation, 759 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir.1985). The total amount appellee sought as his 50% share was $363,484.22.
The jury found in favor of appellee against G.M. Brod on appellee's breach of contract claim, awarding damages in the amount of $173,459.22. The jury also found in favor of appellee against G.M. Brod for breach of partnership, awarding damages in the amount of $85,625. On appellee's claim against Brod for breach of partnership, the jury found in favor of ap-pellee, awarding him $85,625, in damages. Subsequently, the trial court entered a final judgment on the jury verdict. In the final judgment the trial court aggregated all the amounts the jury had awarded as damages on appellee's claims against Brod and G.M. Brod, and entered a joint and several judgment against both Brod and G.M. Brod in that aggregate amount. The aggregated amount totalled $344,709.22.
The trial court's action in aggregating the amounts the jury had awarded was proper. Appellee sought damages of $363,-484.22, which was derived from the total amount paid by U.S. Home Corporation to G.M. Brod in the federal action. Appellee arrived at this figure by subtracting the total amount received by G.M. Brod from U.S. Home Corporation ($1,337,301.78), from the legal fees and costs incurred, leaving a net recovery of $726,968.44. Ap-pellee was claiming one-half of that amount, that is, $363,484.22. The total amount awarded by the jury totalled $344,-709.22. In denying appellants' post-trial motions, the trial court stated, the total amount awarded by the jury "may well reflect the jury's intent to award Plaintiff [appellee] one-half of $726,968.44 reduced by the monies Defendants [appellants] claimed were removed by Plaintiff [appel-lee] during his employ."
The rule is well-settled that courts should construe verdicts to carry out the jury's intention. Phillips v. Ostrer, 481 So.2d 1241 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), review denied, 492 So.2d 1334 (Fla.1986); Advance Company, Inc. v. Albert, 216 So.2d 474 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968), cert. denied, 225 So.2d 526 (Fla. 1969); Dicosola v. Heitel, 138 So.2d 804 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962). Here, the jury's intention was clear, as the trial court so found — to award appellee 50% of the net proceeds recovered by G.M. Brod from U.S. Home Corporation. Therefore, the trial court's action in aggregating the amounts awarded by the jury was proper in order to carry out the jury's intention.
The trial court's action in entering a joint and several judgment against Brod and G.M. Brod was also proper. The evidence adduced at trial established that ap-pellee agreed to go into partnership with Brod with respect to various real estate dealings. The name for the venture "G.M. Brod & Company, Inc." was used because it was an existing "shell corporation" of which Brod owned 100% of the stock.
Appellee's expert testified that a partnership agreement existed between appellee, Brod, and G.M. Brod. The jury was instructed to determine whether appellee, Brod, and G.M. Brod had formed a partnership, and if so, whether Brod and G.M. Brod had breached any duty to appellee as a partner. The jury determined that Brod and G.M. Brod had breached the partnership agreement with appellee. The damages for that breach were 50% of the net proceeds from the U.S. Home Corporation judgment paid to G.M. Brod.
Since both Brod and G.M. Brod were determined to be partners of appellee, and both were found in breach of the partnership agreement, the trial court properly entered a joint and several judgment against Brod and G.M. Brod. See generally, § 620.595(1), .645, .685, Fla.Stat. (1989).
The eases appellants rely on in their motion for rehearing are inapposite. In Teltec Saving Communications Company v. Telsave Leasing Group, 488 So.2d 576 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), review denied, 500 So.2d 546 (Fla.1986), cited by appellants, the parties agreed that if an agreement in dispute had not been ratified by the parties, then no contract existed. If there was no contract, then a judgment would be entered ordering Teltec to repay money it had been given in an aborted effort to form the contract.
The jury found that the agreement had not been ratified and therefore there was no contract. Nevertheless, the court entered a judgment finding that a contract existed by virtue of a prior agreement.
This court reversed the final judgment because it conflicted with the jury verdict and was based on a contract which had not been pled or tried below. In this case, as previously explained, the final judgment carried out the intention of the jury. It did not conflict with the jury verdict.
In Lafferty v. Tennant, 528 So.2d 1307 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988), also relied on by appellants, plaintiff brought suit against a husband and wife. In the interrogatory form of verdict submitted to the jury, only questions relating to the husband's conduct were posed. No questions were asked of the jury about the wife's alleged tortious conduct. The trial court entered a judgment against the wife apportioning damages between her and the husband.
This court reversed the final judgment insofar as it awarded damages against the wife because no findings had been made by the jury as to the wife. In this case, there have been findings made by the jury as to both Brod and G.M. Brod, for breach of the partnership agreement.
Finally, in Leatherby Insurance Company v. Eckerson, 362 So.2d 320 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), cited by appellants in support of their motion for rehearing, the jury returned two separate verdict forms against joint-tortfeasors. The trial court voided the verdict forms and instructed the jury to assess amounts against both defendants in one form. The jury returned unable to agree. The trial court then declared a mistrial and discharged the jury. Subsequently, the trial court used the "voided" verdicts and entered a judgment, which assessed and apportioned the amount of damages.
This court reversed and remanded for a new trial because there had been no proper jury verdict. Here, there has been a proper jury verdict.
Accordingly, appellants' motion for rehearing, clarification, and certification of this court's decision is denied.
NESBITT and GERSTEN, JJ., concur.