Case Name: WEST END FURNITURE COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellant, v. M. NORMAN, Respondent
Court: North Dakota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: North Dakota
Decision Date: 1919-12-27
Citations: 44 N.D. 45
Docket Number: 
Parties: WEST END FURNITURE COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellant, v. M. NORMAN, Respondent.
Judges: Birdzell, J., concurs.
Reporter: North Dakota Reports
Volume: 44
Pages: 45–51

Head Matter:
WEST END FURNITURE COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellant, v. M. NORMAN, Respondent.
(176 N. W. 5.)
Contracts — action for goods sold and delivered — it was error to dismiss on the ground that complaint stated a cause of action on implied contract only.
In an action to recover for goods sold and delivered to the defendant, where the answer, by way of admission, defense, and counterclaim, admits a contract, and pleads a breach of warranty, and where the proof discloses a sale and delivery of such goods upon an agreed price, it is error to direct a verdict dismissal upon the gound that the complaint states a cause of action upon implied contract.
Opinion filed December 27, 1919.
Action to recover for goods sold and delivered, in District Court, Grand Forks County, Cooley, J.
From judgment entered upon a directed verdict of dismissal the plaintiff has appealed.
Reversed and new trial granted.
W. J. Mayer, for appellant.
“In no case can the plaintiff recover on the general counts where the special agreement (executory) continues in force.” Lindingdale v. Livingston, 10 Johns. 37.
“When the terms of a special contract have been so far performed that nothing remains but a mere debt or duty to pay money, the amount due may be recovered under a general count.” See note in 2 Ene. PL & Pr. p. 991, under title “Special Contract Executed” also authorities from the United States courts, and a most convincing array of authorities from numerous states.
Plaintiff has employed in this action a pleading substantially, if not literally, in the form of one of the common counts in indebitatus as-sumpsit. Such plea states a cause of action in this state. Weber v. Lewis, 19 N. D. 473, 126 N. W. 105.
O’Connor & Johnson, for respondent.
“Under the Code System of Pleading as contra-distinguished from that of the common-law system, it is neither necessary nor proper to> allege a promise on defendant’s part, in actions to recover upon implied contract.” Pom. Code Rem. 4th ed. § 540; Weber v. Lewis, 19 N. D.. 437, 126 N. W. 105.
“Plaintiff cannot try his case on one theory and then, after finding himself unable to prove it, shift to another.” 31 Cyc. 85 ; Robinson v.. Rice, 20 Mo. 229; Newell v. Nicholson, 17 Mont. 389, 43 Pac. 180.
“It is well established that under an allegation of an expressed contract no recovery can be had on a quantum meruit. It is not a cause of immaterial variance alone, but it is a failure of proof.” Lowe v. Jensen, 22 N. D. 148, 132 N. W. 661.
“Where the complaint alleges an express contract and a proof shows an implied contract and vice versa, no recovery can be had.” Other cases sustaining this view are: Buell v. Brown, 131 Cal. 158, 63 Pac. 167; Morrow v. Board of Education, 7 S. D. 553, 64 N. W. 1126; Creamer v. Miller, 56 Minn. 62, 57 N. W. 318; Winchester v. Joslyn, (Col.) 72 Pac. 1070; Columbus, H. Y. & T. K. Co. v. Gaffney, 65 Ohio St. 104, 61 N. E. 152; Yansey v. Yoyce, 28 N. D. 187, 148 N. W. 539; Comtograph Co. v. Citizens Bank, 32 N. D. 59, 155 N. W. 680; Beers v. Shallern, 36 N. D. 45, 161 N. W. 557; Louva v. Worden, 30 N. D. 401, 152 N. W. 689.

Opinion:
Robinson, J.
On the evidence in this case it appears that plaintiff is entitled to recover $581.71 and interest on an account for goods sold and delivered. The appeal is from a directed verdict against plaintiff. The complaint avers that the plaintiff sold and delivered to the defendant certain furniture, on which there was due a balance of $506.95. The answer admits the purchase of certain furniture from the plaintiff, but denies that the amount due and owing the plaintiff is the amount stated in the complaint. On the trial plaintiff's attorney testified that the claim against defendant consisted of three promissory notes, and the account amounting to $581.75; that credits had been given on the account for $42.70 and $56.25, and that at the request of the plaintiff the credits were'put on the promissory notes, and that he then paid the balance due on the notes, leaving the account wholly unpaid; that the account and the notes amounted to $1,063. He testified that he gave Mr. Norman the statement of the account as received from the company for comparison with the invoices (ex. J) ; that Mr. Norman returned the statement and said it was correct as to the goods purchased and the price. The statement was put in evidence as exhibit J. The plaintiff rested and defendant moved for a directed verdict on the ground that the complaint shows an implied contract, and the testimony establishes conclusively an express contract; that the price of the articles was agreed upon between the parties. The motion was granted and the action dismissed, with costs. That is a rare specimen of tweedledum and tweedle-dee; it is practice which reflects no credit on the court or on the counsel. When the plaintiff rested he had put in evidence the account (exhibit J.), with proof that defendant had examined it and said it was correct. That made a good strong prima facie case, and the question as to whether the contract price was express or implied became wholly immaterial. In a complaint for goods sold and delivered, the plaintiff has a perfect right to aver an express contract to pay the price charged and also that the goods were reasonably worth the prices charged.
It is true that the complaint is a slipshod document, and, before a new trial, it should be amended; but when the account was put in evidence, with proof showing that defendant had examined it and admitted that it was correct, it virtually became a part of the complaint, and, if necessary, the complaint should have been amended to conform to the fact. This principle is too clear for any discussion.
Judgment reversed and case remanded forthwith.