Case Name: VALLE et al. v. PRESSMAN et al.
Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland
Jurisdiction: Maryland
Decision Date: 1962-09-11
Citations: 229 Md. 591
Docket Number: No. 201
Parties: VALLE et al. v. PRESSMAN et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Maryland Reports
Volume: 229
Pages: 591–606

Head Matter:
VALLE et al. v. PRESSMAN et al.
[No. 201,
September Term, 1962.]
(Three Appeals In One Record)
Decided per curiam September 11, 1962.
Opinion filed November 5, 1962.
The cause was argued before Bruñe, C. J., and Henderson, Hammond, Prescott, HornEy, Marbury and Sybert, JJ.
W. Lee Harrison, with whom were Michael Paul Smith and Richard C. Murray, and Norman Polovoy, on the brief, for Francis J. Valle, one of appellants.
Patrick A. O’Doherty, with whom were William A. Hegarty and Richard T. Moxley on the brief, for Democratic State Central Committee of Baltimore City, other appellant.
Hyman A. Pressman, in proper person, Jack M. Pox, in proper person, and Mark D. Coplin and Robert P. Skutch, Jr., with whom were Weinberg & Green on the brief, for Lawrence Stevenson, appellee.
Thomas B. Finan, Attorney General, with whom was Robert P. Sweeney, Assistant Attorney General, on the brief, for Board of Supervisors of Elections of Baltimore City, appellee.

Opinion:
Hammond, J.,
delivered the opinion of the Court.
On the day after argument we affirmed by per curiam order a decree of the Circuit Court of Baltimore City which held that the purported nomination of Francis J. Valle as Democratic candidate for State's Attorney of Baltimore by the State Central Committee of Baltimore City (the "City Committee") was invalid and that paper writings submitted to the Board of Supervisors of Elections of Baltimore City, purporting to certify Valle's nomination by the Committee, were null and void. The reasons for the affirmance follow.
Saul A. Harris, who had been nominated as the Democratic candidate for State's Attorney of Baltimore in the May, 1962 primary election, died on August 11. While his funeral was in progress on August 13, a meeting of the City Committee, convened by three of its members who had sent telegrams to the other members just before midnight of the day before, was held at a restaurant in Baltimore. Ten of the eighteen members of the Committee, including Anthony E. Gallagher (who had been convicted of grand larceny in 1953 by the Criminal Court of Baltimore) and Domenick DiPietro (who had been convicted of conspiracy to violate the naturalization laws in 1940 by the United States District Court for the District of Maryland) were present. The ten members in attendance signed a paper certifying that Francis J. Valle was the nominee of the Committee to be the Democratic candidate for the office of State's Attorney of Baltimore. The certificate was delivered the same day to the Board of Supervisors of Elections of Baltimore.
The Attorney General had written the Supervisors on July 5, 1962, that Gallagher was ineligible to vote because of his conviction. On July 10 the Board of Supervisors of Elections wrote Gallagher that unless he challenged the conviction within two weeks, his registration as a voter would be cancelled. He did not reply, and on July 25 his name was removed from the list of voters. On August 14 the Attorney General, apparently on his own initiative, wrote the Board that Gallagher was not registered as a member of a political party and, therefore, was ineligible to be a member of the Democratic State Central Committee, that a vacancy existed "nunc pro tunc" on the Committee from the Third District of Baltimore City and that Gallagher's name should be deleted from the list of members of the Committee. The Board immediately deleted his name, and on August 15 wrote the Acting Chairman of the Democratic State Central Committee for the State of Maryland (the "State Committee") that it had done so and that a vacancy existed on the City Committee "nunc pro tunc." A copy was sent to the Secretary of State of Maryland and the Clerk of the Superior Court of Baltimore (with whom the Board had filed Valle's certificate of nomination).
On August 15, again just before midnight, four members of the City Committee sent telegrams to the other members calling a meeting of the Committee for eleven a. m. the next day, Again ten members were present, including Gallagher. DiPietro did not attend; but Franklin L. Waldt, who was not at the first meeting, came to the second. The nomination of Valle was ratified and confirmed, and a certificate that he was the Democratic nominee was signed by each of the ten members and left that day with the Supervisors.
There was testimony the custom and usage of the City Committee was that ten members constituted a quorum and each member had one vote.
Three bills of complaint seeking to invalidate the Valle nomination soon were filed in the Circuit Court of Baltimore City. One, later supplemented, by Hyman Pressman, suing as a citizen, taxpayer, resident of Baltimore, and member and voter of the Democratic Party, and alleging irreparable harm, impairment of civil rights and waste of taxpayers' funds in printing illegal ballots and holding an illegal election, was against the Supervisors and Valle. It claimed that the City Committee meetings were invalid because Gallagher and DiPietro were disqualified so that a quorum was not present, that unit voting was required, that reasonable notice was not given, and that the power and authority to fill the vacancy was in the State Committee and not in the City Committee.
Another was by Jack M. Fox, suing as a resident, a taxpayer and a registered voter of the Democratic Party, against Valle, the Supervisors and the eighteen members of the City Committee as "members of and constituting the Democratic State Central Committee of Baltimore City." He relied for relief on the contention that the State Committee and not the City Committee was empowered under the applicable statutes to fill the vacancy in the nomination for State's Attorney. The third, by Lawrence J. Stevenson, suing as a member of the City Committee (who had not attended either meeting), a resident and a voter affiliated with the Democratic Party, and alleging irreparable harm to him as a citizen, taxpayer, voter and member of the Party and its Committee, was against the other members of the City Committee, as members, and the Board of Supervisors. Its reliance was on improper and inadequate notice, lack of a quorum (because of the disqualification of Gallagher and DiPietro) and the failure to vote by the unit vote.
The cases were consolidated. Each of the defendants demurred on the grounds that a court of equity had no power or right either to determine an election or political contest or to try title to office, lack of necessary parties and lack of standing of the complainants to sue.
We think the demurrers were overruled properly. The general rule that a court of equity may not decide election contests or interfere in political controversies is not inflexible and lately has been considerably relaxed. See Maryland Committee for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 228 Md. 412, following Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663. Soper v. Jones, 171 Md. 643, held that a court of equity had jurisdiction of a taxpayer's suit to enjoin the Secretary of State from certifying the name of a candidate because of his failure to comply with statutory requirements as to signature. Chief Judge Bond referred to the general rule that equity will not decide election cases and said for the Court: "But a contention that no controversy that affects elections may be heard and decided by the Court would be at odds with other decisions," and cited cases in equity in which jurisdiction had been entertained, such as Carr v. Hyattsville, 115 Md. 545 (a bill to invalidate a referendum election on a local act); Graf v. Hiser, 144 Md. 418 (a bill to declare a referendum election invalid as improperly held); and Sun Cab Co. v. Cloud, 162 Md. 419 (a bill to restrain the holding of a referendum election because the signatures seeking it did not meet constitutional requirements). Judge Bond went on to point out that in the Sun Cab case a distinction was drawn between "interferences by the courts with the political conduct of elections, and taking jurisdiction of a question whether persons assuming to avail themselves of the election machinery set up for private initiative are persons entitled under the law to do so."
In Hammond v. Love, 187 Md. 138, a mandamus case, this Court said that administrative or official decisions and actions in regard to the elective process which are arbitrary or contrary to law are subject to review by the courts. In Mayor & Town Council of handover Hills v. Brandt, 199 Md. 105, 107, Judge Henderson for the Court restated earlier holdings that the statute which says the judges of the circuit courts and of the Superior Court of Baltimore City should decide contested elections in certain cases (now Code (1957), Art. 33, Sec. 145) does not confer jurisdiction in equity, and said: "Nor would equity have inherent jurisdiction in the absence of fraud, or arbitrary or illegal action." The Court affirmed the chancellor's action in recounting the ballots because the case could have been removed from equity to law and heard before the same judge. Other cases involving matters pertaining to elections in which equity has acted and in which no question of its right to do so was raised include Wilkinson v. McGill, 192 Md. 387; Nutwell v. Supervisors of Election, 205 Md. 338 (bill to nullify action of a State Central Committee in certifying a nominee); Lexington Park, etc. v. Robidoux, 218 Md. 195.
The bills in the case before us charged illegal action in the nomination by the City Committee which, they alleged, had no power to nominate since the statutes confided that duty to the State Committee. We think they stated a cause of action of which equity had jurisdiction at the suit of the taxpayers, party members and voters who brought the actions, and that all parties necessary to a determination of the question raised were joined.
In passing on the merits of the case, Judge Niles, invoking Maryland Rule 501 ("The Court in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice may order a separate trial of any separate issue or issues"), determined from the pleadings, stipulation of the parties and opening statements that the decisive issues were: (a) whether the State Central Committee for Baltimore City or the Committee for the entire State had the power under the statutes to make the nomination; and (b) whether, assuming it was the City Committee, a quorum of that Committee had properly and effectively acted at either the first or second meeting. He took testimony on these issues in a trial conducted with exemplary judicial fairness, objectivity, and expedition and, pursuant to Maryland Rule 502, of his own motion, found it convenient, before going further, to decide the questions of law which had been raised in the manner he had found expedient. Judge Niles held: (a) that the State Committee and not the City Committee had the power to nominate a candidate for State's Attorney of Baltimore in case of a vacancy, and the purported actions of the City Committee in nominating Valle were of no effect; and (b) Gallagher and DiPietro were not eligible to be members of the State Central Committee and therefore there had not been a quorum at either the first or second meeting.
We agree with Judge Niles' ruling on the first question and, accordingly, do not reach the second question or any subsidiary ones, such as the need vel non of the City Committee to vote by the unit rule or the adequacy of notice of the meetings.
Section 74 (b) of Ch. 739 of the Laws of 1957 (Code (1957), Art. 33, Sec. 74 (b)) under the general heading "Vacancies in Nominations" and under the subtitle "Filling Vacancies," reads:
"(b) State, Judicial, Congressional Vacancies. In the event of any vacancy occurring because of the death or resignation of any person nominated for any State or Judicial office, or as a candidate for member of the Congress of the United States or for United States Senator, under provisions of the preceding sections of this Article, such vacancy shall be filled by the State Central Committee, or governing body for the State, of the political party to which said nominee belongs."
Section 75 under the general heading "Local Vacancies" reads:
"Local vacancies shall be filled by the State or local central committee, of the political party to which said nominee belongs. In the event of any vacancy occurring because of the resignation or death of any person so nominated or because of a tie vote in any primary election for any office in any county of this State or legislative district of Baltimore City, such vacancy shall be filled by the State or local central committee or governing body of the party to which said nominee belongs of the county or legislative district in which any such vacancy occurs, provided that where the vacancy results from a tie vote, the nominee selected to fill the vacancy as aforesaid shall be one of the candidates receiving the tie vote."
Local vacancies are in effect defined in Section 75 as those existing in a nomination for any office in any county or legislative district of Baltimore; and any such vacancy, the statute directs, is to be filled by "the State or local central committee or governing body of the party to which said nominee belongs of the county or legislative district in which such vacancy occurs." Clearly a vacancy in Baltimore is not within the definition of a local vacancy because it is not one in a legislative district (which for the purposes of the Section, at least, is equated to a county) but rather one for a political subdivision comprised of six legislative districts.
Appellants urge that the words "State Vacancies" in Sec. 74 (b) is intended to mean vacancies in "State-wide Offices." Before the general and sweeping revision of the election laws, proposed by the Wheatley Committee and enacted by the Legislature at the 1957 Session, "State Office" was defined, Code (1951), Art. 33, Sec. 64 (a) (which dealt with nominations by Party Conventions), as "an office filled by the vote of all the registered voters of the State of Maryland," and "State-wide Office" was not defined. See Vaughan v. Boone, 191 Md. 515, 519.
The 1957 revision eliminated the definition in Sec. 64 (a) •and substituted in Sec. 79 (b) under the general heading "Party Conventions" the following:
"(b) Nominations of United States Senator, Governor, Attorney General, Comptroller.
The candidates of such political parties for United States Senator, Governor, Attorney General and Comptroller shall be nominated in the manner prescribed in this Article by State Conventions."
The 1957 revision also defined "State-wide Offices" in Sec. 55 as those "to be filled by the voters of the entire State or (with the exception of Judges) of any division of a greater extent than one county." In Sec. 57 (b) Candidates for "State-wide Offices" are said to be those for Governor, the United States Senate, Comptroller, and Attorney General. "State Office" was not defined in the 1957 Act.
We said in Board v. Weiss, 217 Md. 133, 138, that the Wheatley Committee had studied the election laws for five years and their revision of those laws, adopted by the Legislature, was "no mere casual rearrangement of Sections," and that " it would be unreasonable for us to hold that any changes in the law resulting from so detailed a study were inadvertent and not intended."
We think the term "State Office" was used in Sec. 74 (b) not as meaning "State-wide Office" but in contrast and distinction to a local office dealt with in Sec. 75. If "State Office" in Sec. 74 (b) had been intended to mean "State-wide Office," there would have been no purpose in referring therein in terms to a "candidate for United States Senator" because "State-wide Office," which is defined in the 1957 Act as being one filled by all the voters of the State, would necessarily include the office of United States Senator.
The language of Sec. 56 (c) of Ch. 739 of the Laws of 1957 (Code (1957), Art. 33, Sec. 56 (c)) adds support to the conclusion we have reached. It provides that if there is a vacancy for any office by reason of there being no candidate of a political party to file for the same in a primary election "such vacancy shall be filled by the State Central Committee, or governing body, of the political party for the State for any officer elected by the voters of more than one County or Baltimore City; in all other instances the vacancy shall be filled by the State Central Committee of the political subdivision." On their face the quoted words say that a vacancy in Baltimore City, in case no candidate files in a primary, shall be filled by the State Committee. Code (1957), Art. 1, Sec. 14, states that, "The word county shall be construed to include the City of Baltimore unless such construction would be unreasonable." The words "or Baltimore City" would not have to have been used if it had been intended that the State Committee was to act only if two or more counties or one or more counties and Baltimore City were involved. We think the reference to Baltimore City must be given effect and read to mean that a vacancy in an office which is voted on by the voters of all six districts of the City is to be filled by the State Committee.
Section 56 (c), which deals with vacancies for lack of candidates, and Sec. 74 (b), which deals with vacancies by reason of death or resignation, relate to the same subject matter and should be harmonized in meaning and effect, if possible. We read them both as saying that a lack of a candidate for the office of State's Attorney in Baltimore City is to be supplied by the State Committee and not the City Committee.
Appellants, while arguing that a State's Attorney is not a State-wide Officer within the meaning of the election statutes, do not challenge Judge Niles' holding that a State's Attorney is a State rather than a local officer. We find it plain that they could not successfully do so. The office is created by the Constitution which in Art. 5, Sec. 7, provides (in parts here pertinent) : "There shall be an Attorney for the State in each county, and the City of Baltimore, to be styled 'The State's Attorney,' who shall be elected by the voters thereof and be subject to removal by a vote of two-thirds of the Senate, on the recommendation of the Attorney General." Removal is thus a State and not a local function. The naming of a successor to a State's Attorney who dies or resigns during his term is confided to the Judges of the political subdivision in which he was serving, and Maryland Judges are Officers of the State. Attorney General Armstrong ruled in 6 Op. of the Attorney General 427 that a State's Attorney was a State Officer; and the Supreme Court, in Spielman Motor Co. v. Dodge, 295 U. S. 89, 93, 79 L. Ed. 1322, 1324, quoted the Court of Appeals of New York in Fellows v. New York (1876), 8 Hun. 484, 485, as follows: " 'It is conceded that the district attorney is a State officer. It could not well be questioned.' " and held a District Attorney to be in a true sense an officer of the State.
As the per curiam order heretofore filed affirming the decree of the trial court did not direct the payment of costs, it is ordered that the appellants pay them.
. Judge Niles held that Waldt, who represented the Second District on the Committee although he lived in the Third, was an eligible member of the Committee.