Case Name: Mark COLLINS, Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, Appellee
Court: Supreme Court of Kentucky
Jurisdiction: Kentucky
Decision Date: 2004-08-26
Citations: 142 S.W.3d 113
Docket Number: No. 2002-SC-0926-DG
Parties: Mark COLLINS, Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, Appellee.
Judges: LAMBERT, C.J.; COOPER, KELLER, and STUMBO, JJ., concur.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Third Series
Volume: 142
Pages: 113–123

Head Matter:
Mark COLLINS, Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, Appellee.
No. 2002-SC-0926-DG.
Supreme Court of Kentucky.
Aug. 26, 2004.
Steven N. Howe, Dry Ridge, Counsel for Appellant.
Gregory D. Stumbo, Attorney General of Kentucky, James Havey, Matthew D. Nelson, Assistant Attorneys General, Frankfort, Counsel for Appellee.
Wilbur M. Zevely, Florence, Tasha K. Scott, Covington, Counsel for Amicus Curiae, Kentucky Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.

Opinion:
Opinion of the Court by
Justice JOHNSTONE.
The Appellant, Mark Collins, appeals from an order of the Grant Circuit Court denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a vehicular stop. The Court of Appeals affirmed. This Court granted discretionary review. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse and remand.
The material facts of this case are not disputed. An unidentified person called 911 around 8:00 p.m. from a gas station located in Grant County. The caller complained that the white, male driver of a white Chevrolet Blazer was seen throwing liquid from a bottle toward another vehicle at the Ezy-Stop gas station in Williams-town. The caller did not see the male throw the actual bottle, but identified the liquid as alcohol. Further, the caller indicated that he or she perceived that there was- a dispute between the two drivers. The driver of the Blazer then pulled out of the gas station, proceeding southbound on 1-75. The caller was able to give the license plate number of the Blazer.
This information was then passed on to Kentucky State Trooper Oliver, who thereafter located the vehicle approximately two to three miles from the Williamstown exit heading south. Because traffic along that portion of 1-75 was slowed due to construction, Trooper Oliver was able to verify the description and the license plate number of the vehicle. While following the vehicle for about two miles, Trooper Oliver did not observe any unusual behavior or erratic driving. Upon stopping the vehicle, Trooper Oliver detected a smell of alcohol on the driver and, consequently, performed a field sobriety test. Thereafter, Appellant was arrested and taken to the Grant County Detention Facility where a blood alcohol test revealed an alcohol concentration level of .186.
Appellant moved to suppress the results of the blood alcohol test, arguing that the investigatory stop of Appellant's vehicle was not based upon reasonable and articu-lable suspicion. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. Appellant thereafter entered a conditional guilty plea to DUI third offense and operating a vehicle on a suspended license, but appealed the trial court's ruling as to his motion to suppress. The Court of Appeals affirmed, determining that the anonymous tip provided a reasonable basis to perform the investigatory stop. This Court granted discretionary review.
In order to perform an investigatory stop of an automobile, there must exist a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a violation of the law is occurring. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 668, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1401, 59 L.Ed.2d 660, 673 (1979). Complications arise when, as here, the information serving as the sole basis of the officer's suspicion is provided by an anonymous informant, whose veracity, reputation, and basis of knowledge cannot be readily assessed. In situations such as these, we are required to examine the totality of the circumstances, and to determine whether the tip, once suitably corroborated, provides sufficient indicia of reliability to justify an investigatory stop. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 2417, 110 L.Ed.2d 301, 310 (1990).
In White, the police received an anonymous telephone tip stating that a woman would leave a specified apartment in a certain vehicle at a particular time. The tipster further indicated that the woman would be carrying cocaine, and would be going to a designated motel. The police proceeded to the apartment complex and observed the described woman leaving the apartment building, getting into the vehicle, and heading toward the motel. The police stopped the vehicle and performed a consensual search, which revealed marijuana and cocaine in the woman's purse. The Supreme Court concluded that the anonymous tip had been sufficiently corroborated to provide reasonable and artic-ulable suspicion to stop the woman's vehicle. The Court relied heavily on the fact that the anonymous tip not only provided information readily available to a third party, but also predicted the future behavior of the woman. White, 496 U.S. at 332, 110 S.Ct. at 2417, 110 L.Ed.2d at 310. That is, the caller not only accurately described the woman and her car, but also that she would leave the apartment at a certain time and drive to a specified location. These predictions, corroborated by the investigating officers, demonstrated the informant's intimate knowledge of the woman's conduct and lent credence to the incriminating portion of the tip — that she would be carrying illegal narcotics.
More recently, in Florida v. J.L., the U.S. Supreme Court again addressed the issue of whether an anonymous tip can be the basis for reasonable and articulable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop. 529 U.S. 266, 120 S.Ct. 1375, 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000). Florida officers received an anonymous tip stating that a young, black male wearing a plaid shirt and standing with two other males at a particular bus stop was carrying a gun. Minutes later, two officers arrived at the named bus stop and found J.L., wearing a plaid shirt and standing with two other males. Besides the information provided in the tip, the police had no independent reason to suspect that J.L. was engaged in any illegal conduct. The officers performed a frisk on J.L., which revealed a gun. The U.S. Supreme Court determined that the search was unlawful, as the anonymous tip lacked sufficient indicia of reliability upon which to base reasonable suspicion. J.L., 529 U.S. at 274, 120 S.Ct. at 1380, 146 L.Ed.2d at 262.
Returning to the factual scenario in the case before us, we conclude that the information supplied by the anonymous tipster lacked sufficient indicia of reliability to justify the investigatory stop performed on Appellant. Both White and J.L. emphasize that predictive components are especially important to the reliability of an anonymous tip because they provide the police with a means by which to test the knowledge of the tipster. White, 496 U.S. at 332, 110 S.Ct. at 2417, 110 L.Ed.2d at 310; J.L., 529 U.S. at 274, 120 S.Ct. at 1379, 146 L.Ed.2d at 260. As in J.L., the tip provided in this matter contained no predictive information; rather, it consisted almost entirely of information readily available to a casual bystander, such as Appellant's license plate number, his direction of travel, and the make and model of his vehicle. Thus, Trooper Oliver was left with no predictive information to corroborate, or other means by which to verify that the tipster had intimate knowledge of any illegal behavior.
The reliability of this tip is further diminished because the investigating officer did not independently observe any illegal activity, or any other indication that illegal conduct was afoot. Anonymous descriptions of a person in a certain vehicle or location, though accurate, do not carry sufficient indicia of reliability to justify an investigative stop; however, when coupled with independent observations by police of suspicious conduct, such tips do carry the requisite reliability. See Raglin v. Commonwealth, Ky., 812 S.W.2d 494, 495 (1991) (determining that an anonymous tip accurately identifying the appellant's car and location did not in and of itself provide reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop; an adequate basis for the stop was, however, created once police also independently observed suspicious behavior). Here, though, Trooper Oliver testified at the suppression hearing that he did not observe anything suspicious about Appellant, his vehicle, or his driving. In fact, he candidly admitted that the sole basis for his suspicion was the tip. Like the officers in J.L., Trooper Oliver merely located Appellant in the location designated by the tipster but observed nothing unusual or criminal. Prior to stopping Appellant and detecting the odor of alcohol, there was no outward indication that Appellant was violating the law.
The Commonwealth argues that the tip nonetheless was reliable because nearly every piece of information given was corroborated by Trooper Oliver's observations. The accuracy of the tipster's description certainly aided Trooper Oliver in locating Appellant on 1-75. However, the accuracy of the tipster's description did not make it any more reliable because it did not reveal that the tipster was privy to any illegal conduct. Nothing in the con tent of the tip indicates that the tipster either had witnessed or could predict any illegal activity. The pouring of an unidentified liquid from a bottle toward another person may signal a dispute, but it is neither criminal conduct nor a reliable indication that criminal conduct is about to occur.
Therefore, we conclude that the tip here lacked the moderate indicia of reliability required by J.L. and White. Though accurate in its substance, the tip consisted entirely of information available to any casual observer on the street, giving the police no method of verifying that the tipster could be relied upon. The tip neither recounted nor predicted any specific illegal conduct. Moreover, the investigating officer did not independently observe any illegal activity or suspicious behavior. We do not believe that reasonable suspicion can be predicated upon an unidentified person's accurate description of another vehicle and driver, coupled with the bare assertion that the driver had engaged in what might be considered offensive — though not criminal — conduct.
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed and this matter is remanded to the Grant Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
LAMBERT, C.J.; COOPER, KELLER, and STUMBO, JJ., concur.
GRAVES, J., dissents by separate opinion, with WINTERSHEIMER, J., joining.
WINTERSHEIMER, J., dissents by separate opinion, with GRAVES, J., joining.