Case Name: Carl M. DUNHAM, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Roger S. DUNHAM and Belinda F. Dunham, husband and wife, Defendants-Respondents
Court: Idaho Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Idaho
Decision Date: 1994-11-29
Citations: 128 Idaho 55
Docket Number: No. 20837
Parties: Carl M. DUNHAM, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Roger S. DUNHAM and Belinda F. Dunham, husband and wife, Defendants-Respondents.
Judges: PERRY, J., concurs.
Reporter: Idaho Reports
Volume: 128
Pages: 55–60

Head Matter:
910 P.2d 169
Carl M. DUNHAM, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Roger S. DUNHAM and Belinda F. Dunham, husband and wife, Defendants-Respondents.
No. 20837.
Court of Appeals of Idaho.
Nov. 29, 1994.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 8, 1995.
David A. Frazier, Coeur d’Alene, argued, for appellant.
Prohaska Law Firm, Coeur d’Alene, for respondents. Thomas F. Prohaska, argued.

Opinion:
WALTERS, Chief Judge.
Carl Dunham appeals from a district court's judgment which held that a fraudulent transfer of real property did not occur between spouses. I.C. § 55-913 and 55-914. The court held that on the date the real property was purchased and the quitclaim deed was executed, the spouse executing the quitclaim deed had no interest in the property. Consequently, no "transfer" under the Idaho Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act took place. For the reasons explained below, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Carl Dunham (Carl), of Connecticut, and Roger Dunham (Roger), of Idaho, are brothers who have been involved in litigation between themselves in the State of Connecticut since 1982. Roger and his wife, Belinda Dunham (Belinda), have been married since 1983. It appears that the litigation between these brothers in Connecticut is ongoing and, as of the date of the Idaho district court's memorandum opinion, had not resulted in any final determination. We first explain Carl's actions against Roger, then, the chronology of events between Roger and Belinda upon which Carl bases his claim.
On September 9, 1991, Carl filed a complaint in Idaho in which he alleged that Roger was indebted to him by reason of a judgment entered by a Superior Court of the State of Connecticut on February 26, 1990. He stated that the amount of indebtedness was $59,895.70, and that there had accrued on the principal, interest amounting to $10,-585.39 as of the filing date of the complaint. He further claimed that additional interest continues to accrue at the rate of $21.77 per day. Additionally, Carl filed an "Affidavit for Filing of Foreign Judgment" on February 19, 1991, which set forth that he is a "judgment creditor" of Roger's as a result of the February 26, 1990, judgment entered by the Connecticut judge.
In August 1989, Roger received an inheritance of approximately $27,000. Shortly thereafter, he gifted the majority of this money to his wife. In September 1989, Belinda purchased a piece of real property solely in her name for approximately $95,000. She used $25,071.31 of the gifted inheritance money for the down payment, and entered into a promissory note with Mountain West Savings Bank which was secured by a deed of trust, for the remaining balance. Belinda alone signed both the promissory note and the deed of trust on September 6, and made the down payment on September 11. The property's title was transferred by the seller to Belinda through a warranty deed dated September 11,1989. On the same date, Roger executed a quitclaim deed to her on the property. Belinda gave no consideration in return for either the quitclaim deed or the gifted inheritance money.
At the time of Belinda's property purchase, Carl contends that Roger owned real property in Connecticut worth approximately $500,000. However, outstanding claims against it allegedly totalled over $850,000. Carl states that these claims include claims from Roger's own attorneys, Carl himself, the property's mortgage, and an outstanding judgment Ken. He further contends that Roger owned personal property in 1989 but that the value was never determined. All of this property was either disposed of or titled in Belinda's name.
On September 9, 1991, Carl filed a complaint against Roger and Belinda alleging that Roger made the transfer of real property to Belinda through the quitclaim deed with the actual intent to hinder, delay, and defraud him as a creditor; and that Roger did not receive a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer at a time when he beKeved or should have beKeved that he was indebted beyond his abiKty to pay that indebtedness. Carl requested that the court declare the transfer fraudulent and, thus, void so Roger's interest in the property would be subject to Carl's foreign judgment Ken.
The trial court held that a fraudulent transfer of real property did not occur between Roger and Belinda. The court found that Roger did not have an interest in the asset being transferred and, therefore, could not have transferred an interest in the property by way of the quitclaim deed. Carl then brought this appeal.
ANALYSIS
In his appeUate argument, Carl contends that the issue before this Court is whether the trial court erred in failing to set aside the transfer of real property from Roger to Belinda by way of the quitclaim deed. In the trial proceedings, Carl did not seek review of the gift of money from Roger to Belinda or whether Roger possessed a community property interest either in the loan proceeds reflected by the promissory note or in the real property when it was purchased by Belinda. Accordingly, we wiK not address those possi-biKties on this appeal. Matter of Estate of Reinwald, 122 Idaho 401, 834 P.2d 1317 (1992); Whitehawk v. State, 119 Idaho 168, 170, 804 P.2d 341, 343 (Ct.App.1991).
Carl contends that the trial court's decision should be set aside because: (1) a debtor's transfer of an asset for no consideration is presumed fraudulent when he reasonably should have beKeved he would incur debts beyond his abiKty to pay them when they became due, I.C. § 55-913(l)(b)2; (2) a debt- or's transfer of an asset to an insider for an antecedent debt when the debtor was insolvent is presumed fraudulent, I.C. § 55-914(2); and (3) a person becomes the owner of an equitable interest in the property when part or aU of the property's purchase price is paid by this individual, Erb v. Kohnke, 121 Idaho 328, 824 P.2d 903 (Ct.App.1992).
Roger counters stating that the analytical framework for evaluating the district court's ruling is the Idaho Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act set out at I.C. § 55-901 through 55-921. He also claims that Carl mistakenly reKes upon Erb for the proposition that an equitable interest in the property exists. Roger aKeges that the court's reference to this idea in Erb was merely dictum and not central to the disposition of the case.
We agree with the trial court that the statutory analysis for the issue raised before this Court is set forth in the Idaho Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. I.C. § 55-913 and 55-914 address the abiKty of present and future creditors to have a transfer deemed fraudulent. Both statutes apply to a creditor whose "claim arose before the transfer was made." I.C. § 55-913(1) and 55-914(1). Therefore, we must first determine whether a claim existed at the time of the transfer.
A "claim" is defined as "a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, Kquidated, unKquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured." I.C. § 55-910(3). The trial court found that Carl had a claim which arose out of contempt of a court-ordered injunction against Roger regarding property in Connecticut. Carl filed a motion for contempt on August 18, 1989; the quitclaim deed was executed by Roger on September 11, 1989; and a Superior Court of the State of Connecticut issued an order on February 25, 1990, requiring Roger to pay Carl in accordance with the motion for contempt. Given the foregoing facts, we agree with the trial court that Carl was a creditor whose claim, even though not yet reduced to a judgment, arose before the quitclaim deed was executed.
Next, we must determine when a "transfer" occurs. A transfer is defined as "every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset, and includes payment of money, release, lease, and creation of a lien or other encumbrance." I.C. § 55-910(12). A transfer of real property, including the interest of the seller, is made "when the transfer is so far perfected that a good-faith purchaser of the asset from the debtor against whom applicable law permits the transfer to be perfected cannot acquire an interest in the asset that is superior to the interest of the transferee." I.C. § 55-915(l)(a). However, a transfer is not made until the debtor has acquired rights in the asset transferred. I.C. § 55-915(4).
Given the above-described definition of a transfer, this case turns on whether or not Roger had an asset or an interest in an asset to transfer. In other words, did Roger have an interest in the real property purchased by Belinda on the date he executed the quitclaim deed? A quitclaim deed is a deed of conveyance operating by way of release. BlaCK's Law Dictionary 1251 (6th ed. 1990). It is intended to pass any title, interest, or claim which the grantor may have in the premises. Id. In essence, it is a mode of disposing of an asset or an interest in an asset. An "asset" is "property of a debtor." I.C. § 55-910(2). The term, however, does not include property "to the extent it is encumbered by a valid lien" or property "to the extent that it is generally exempt under non-bankruptcy law." Id. Property, in turn, is defined as "anything that may be the subject of ownership." I.C. § 55-910(10).
The evidence presented at trial indicates that Roger gifted most, if not all, of his inherited money to Belinda in August of 1989. As noted above, the appellant did not challenge this gift or transfer. On September 11, 1989, Belinda used a portion of the gifted money, which at this time was considered her separate, personal property, as the down payment on the real property. The warranty deed, dated September 11, 1989, lists the grantee solely as Belinda, and she alone signed both the promissory note and deed of trust on September 6, 1989. When Roger executed the quitclaim deed to Belinda on September 11,1989, he had no interest in the real property to convey. Therefore, without an asset or an interest in an asset, a transfer could not have occurred as a matter of law.
ATTORNEY FEES
Roger and Belinda seek attorney fees on appeal pursuant to I.C. § 12-121. This section, as limited by I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1), allows for an award of attorney fees when an action has been "brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation." I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1). This section and rule are a proper basis for awarding fees on appeal. Troche v. Gier, 118 Idaho 740, 742, 800 P.2d 136, 138 (Ct.App.1990). However, we conclude that the appeal in this case was not brought unreasonably and without foundation.
CONCLUSION
The district court correctly found that Roger was not an owner of an interest in the real property purchased by Belinda. Without an interest in the property, no transfer could have taken place when the quitclaim deed was executed.
Accordingly, the judgment entered below is affirmed. Costs, but not attorney fees, on appeal are awarded to the respondents.
PERRY, J., concurs.