Case Name: UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION, Appellant, v. Marie GILLEN, Individually, et al., Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1973-07-06
Citations: 280 So. 2d 52
Docket Number: No. 71-1096
Parties: UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION, Appellant, v. Marie GILLEN, Individually, et al., Appellees.
Judges: WALDEM, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 280
Pages: 52–57

Head Matter:
UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION, Appellant, v. Marie GILLEN, Individually, et al., Appellees.
No. 71-1096.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
July 6, 1973.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 2, 1973.
W. Marvin Hardy, III, of Gurney, Gurney & Handley, P. A., Orlando, for appellant.
Terrell Griffin, of the Law Offices of Russell Troutman, P. A., Winter Park, for appellees.

Opinion:
OWEN, Judge.
Appellant insurer appeals from a declaratory judgment holding that the "other insurance" clause of the uninsured motorist coverage of its policy (delivered to its insured in New Hampshire while a resident of that state) is void as against the public policy of Florida.
On December 16, 1969, appellant delivered to Mr. and Mrs. Gillen, residents of the State of New Hampshire, two automobile liability insurance policies, No. 29 describing a Karmann Ghia and No. 28 a Volkswagen bus. Both policies provided for uninsured motorist coverage of $10,000 per person and $20,000 per accident, with a separate premium paid for this coverage on each policy. The policy period was for one year.
In July, 1970, the Gillens moved to Florida, notifying appellant. In August, 1970, Mr. Gillen sold the Volkswagen bus on which Policy No. 28 was written and bought a 1969 Volkswagen Squareback. He notified appellant, which issued Policy No. 31 covering the Volkswagen Square-back, and cancelled Policy No. 28. On September 7, 1970, the Gillens, while riding in the Volkswagen Squareback, were involved in a serious accident in Orange County, Florida, in which Mr. Gillen was killed and Mrs. Gillen seriously injured. The automobile collision was due solely to the negligence of an uninsured motorist.
Mrs. Gillen and the personal representative of her husband's estate joined in bringing this suit for declaratory judgment against the insurer after the latter took the position that the "other insurance" clause of Policy No. 29 (insuring the Karmann Ghia) was applicable because similar insurance coverage was available to the insureds under Policy No. 31 (insuring the Volkswagen Squareback). The trial court held that because at the time of the accident the Gillens were residents of Florida, and the cars were licensed and garaged in Florida, all of which was known to the insurer, the uninsured motorist coverage of Policy No. 29 was subject to the law of Florida (which holds such "other insurance" clauses in uninsured motorist coverage are void as contrary to public policy ) rather than to the law of New Hampshire (which recognizes the "other insurance" clauses as valid and enforceable ). The final judgment determined the plaintiffs entitled to the benefits of the uninsured motorists coverage on both policies. It also awarded attorney's fees.
The question is whether Policy No. 29 is to be governed by the law of Florida, where the accident occurred and where the insureds resided at the time of the accident, or whether it is to be governed by the law of New Hampshire where the policy was delivered and where the insured resided at the time of issuance of the policy.
Both parties to this appeal refer to the "center of gravity" or "grouping of contacts" test of choosing the state law that should be applied, and both cite and rely upon Section 188, Restatement of the Law, Second, Conflicts of Law (1969). They disagree, however, as to whether the contacts which are to be taken into account are those which existed at the time of entering in the contract, or those which existed at the time of the accident. If the former, New Hampshire has the more significant relationship to the transaction and the parties. If the latter, Florida has the more significant relationship to the transaction and the parties.
We think that the contract should be governed by the laws of the state in which the policy was delivered and in which the insured resided at the time of delivery. This would be the State of New Hampshire. The rights and obligations of the respective parties under the contract, once entered into, should not vary or fluctuate from state to state depending upon fortuitous circumstances of where an accident might occur, or the arbitrary decision of where the insured might elect to thereafter reside. In the case of Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Enright, Fla.App.1972, 258 So.2d 472, the Third District Court of Appeal, in a somewhat similar factual situation reached a similar conclusion, and the opinion by Judge Pearson sets forth the general principles of law which would be applicable and which we need not repeat here. While the insured in the Enright case had not become a Florida resident, as distinguished from the insureds in the instant case, we feel that this fact alone should not cause us to reach a conclusion contrary to that reached in the Enright case.
Appellant also complains of the award of attorney's fees to the insureds' attorneys. The evidence shows and the court found that it was necessary for the insureds to bring this suit to obtain the benefits under Policy No. 31, and thus it was proper to award an attorney's fee to plaintiffs' counsel. However, in determining the amount to be awarded, the court may have taken into consideration a successful recovery under Policy No. 29. Upon remand the court is directed to reconsider the award of attorney's fees in light of our decision as to Policy No. 29, and award to plaintiffs reasonable attorney's fees as the circumstances of the case may require.
The judgment is reversed and this cause remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.
Reversed and remanded.
WALDEM, J., concurs.
MAGER, J., dissents with opinion.
. "Other Insurance: With respect to bodily injury to an insured while occupying an automobile not owned by the named insured, the insurance under Part IV shall apply only as excess insurance over any other similar insurance available to such insured and applicable to such automobile as primary insurance, and this insurance shall then apply only in the amount by which the limit of liability for this coverage exceeds the applicable limit of liability of such other insurance.
"Except as provided in the foregoing paragraph, if the insured has other similar insurance available to him and applicable to the accident, the damages shall be deemed not to exceed the higher of the applicable limits of liability of this insurance and such other insurance, and the company shall not be liable for a greater proportion of any loss to which this Coverage applies than the limit of liability hereunder bears to the sum of the applicable limits of liability of this insurance and such other insurance."
. Sellers v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., Fla.1966, 185 So.2d 689.
. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Howe, 1965, 106 N.H. 422, 213 A.2d 420.
.This appeal involves only Policy No. 29.