Case Name: Edward Roberts et al. v. John L. Lovejoy
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1860-10
Citations: 25 Supp. Tex. 437
Docket Number: 
Parties: Edward Roberts et al. v. John L. Lovejoy.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 25 Supp.
Pages: 437–441

Head Matter:
Edward Roberts et al. v. John L. Lovejoy.
Nothing can be more clearly settled, than that a court of equity will not decree the specific performance of a contract in favor of a party who refuses performance in whole or in part.
Where the plaintiff has refused to pay a portion of the purchase-money, it makes no difference that Ms refusal was sanctioned by the judgment of the justice; it was none the less a disaffirmance of the contract on his part, and released the other party from his obligation to perform.
A party cannot disaffirm a contract in part, and at the same time hold the other party to the whole of his undertaking.
Error from Collin. The case was tried before Hon. Hat. M. Burford, one of the district judges.
Lovejoy sued William Davis, alleging that the defendant executed to Edward Roberts his certain title bond for land; that Roberts assigned the bond to the plaintiff; that a patent had long since been issued for the land; and that the defendant had refused to convey, as he had covenanted to do; wherefore he prayed a specific performance.
The bond recited the sale of the land, and covenanted to “ convey the above-described tract of land so soon as a patent shall be obtained from the State of Texas for the same.” There was the usual penalty of $700, but nothing about the purchase-money. The assignment to Lovejoy was regular.
The defendant plead specially, the existence of another bond; that one was to be cancelled; some verbal understandings ; and that he was ready to make his title to the rightful owner; biit that Roberts still claimed the land, &c. Roberts intervened, and claimed that he sold the land to Lovejoy; that there was a balance of $84 25 due on the purchase-money; that he sued Lovejoy for this balance before a justice of the peace; that Lovejoy plead the statute of frauds, (that the contract was not in writing,) and thereby disaffirmed the contract. He averred that one Watts had purchased of Lovejoy, and was in possession; and he made Lovejoy, Watts, and Davis parties; and he prayed for the land or the balance of the purchase-money.
Watts put in a general demurrer and general denial.
The title bond and transfers were proved; also the proceedings before the justice of the peace, wherein Lovejoy refused to pay the balance of the purchase-money. The assignment to Lovejoy was proved to have been made in answer to his plea before the justice. Under the instructions of the judge, the jury returned a verdict “for Love-joy,” whereupon the court entered a judgment against Davis and Roberts for specific performance, to inure to the immediate benefit of Watts, who purchased from Love-joy, but gave no judgment for the balance due Roberts on the purchase from him by Lovejoy. So that the real question was, whether Lovejoy was entitled to the land without paying the balance of the purchase-money?
John C. Easton, for appellants.
—The proof in the case clearly shows that Lovejoy sought to defeat the claim of Roberts for the purchase-money, by disavowing the contract and pleading the statute of frauds, and would not accept the transfer of the bond except on the advice of his counsel, and did not even do so then, for the purpose of perfecting his title to the land, hut solely as an indemnity for the money he had already paid. I think this is a positive disaffirmance of the contract, and is such a case as will entitle Roberts to the title and possession of the land, and comes clearly within the rule laid down in Estes v. Browning, 3 Tex., 463.
Brown Breedlove, for defendant in error.
—The points we deem it necessary to discuss are these: 1st, The effect of the delivery of the bond with the assignment to Lovejoy; 2d, The non-payment of the purchase-money by Lovejoy to Roberts; 3d, The judgment of the justice of the peace rendered upon the claim.
The argument was upon the facts, but upon a different view than that on which the case turned.
The second proposition laid down by us seems so clear as to demand neither argument nor authority. "When property is sold absolutely without condition, and upon credit, and possession is given, the vendee acquires a complete title, and the vendor must resort to his action to enforce the payment of the purchase-money, and has no right to the property sold and delivered." It is useless, however, to consume time in the discussion of propositions which are unsupported by the evidence in the cause, and we think the interpleader has no reason to complain of the errors in the charge, if any; they being, as ,we conceive, in his favor and against Lovejoy.
It is doubtless evident to the court, that there has not been sufficient ground shown by the evidence introduced on the trial below for the setting aside of the assignment by Roberts to Lovejoy.
There was, indeed, an entire failure to prove the conditional delivery, as alleged in the bill of interpleader; and upon this we might rest the decision of this cause.
It further appears, that the parties went to trial upon that issue, and the judgment was in favor of Lovejoy.
We will only insist, that the judgment was conclusive between the parties so long as it remained umAversed by a superior tribunal.
Eoberts, having elected to sue for the purchase-money, was bound by the result of his suit, as regards all matters proper to be litigated, and if he ever had a right to disaffirm the contract and treat it as void, his election and choice of one of the two remedies bound him to that alone.
In other words, if A sell to B a horse, and deliver him, the sale to be void, however, if the purchase-money is not paid at a stipulated- time, and B fail to pay the purchase-money, then A may either sue for the purchase-money or for the property; but is bound by his election of a remedy. He cannot, having tried one, resort to the other. (Vide Bouvier, Election C, § 2; 1 Chitty on Plead., 212; 11 Johns, 241.) We deem it unnecessary to refer the court to authorities upon the conclusive force of judgments, nor -will we argue that point.

Opinion:
Wheeler, 0. J.
—Hothing can be more clearly settled, than that a court of equity will not decree the specific performance of a contract in favor of a party who refuses performance in the whole or in part. The plaintiff had refused to pay a portion of the purchase-money. It makes no difference that his refusal was sanctioned by the judgment of the justice; it was none the less a disaffirmance of the contract on his part, and released the other party from his obligation to perform. A party who seeks the specific performance of a contract must have performed, or must show a readiness to perform, the very contract in terms of which he seeks performance. He cannot disaffirm it in part, and at the same time hold the other party to the whole of his undertaking. The court will not aid him to have performance of the contract when he.rejects any part of it. That would be to make for the parties a new contract, to which they had not given their assent. Courts of equity do not modify or change the contracts of parties to suit their own sense of what would be equitable and just in the premises, but leave them to make their own contracts. It may be that the defendant would never have entered into the contract which the plaintiff now seeks to enforce against him; that is, a contract to convey his right to the land in question for a sum considerably less than that for which he stipulated as the consideration for the transfer. Whether he would or not the court cannot know, and cannot undertake to make for him a contract, which he has not made, without his consent. Courts never make contracts for parties; they will only compel performance of the contract which the parties have actually made, and only in favor of the party who has performed, or is ready and willing to perform, his undertaking, according to its terms, and who is without fault.
To entitle the plaintiff to maintain his action, he must show himself entitled to a specific performance as against his immediate vendor. This he has failed to do; and the judgment therefore cannot be maintained.
As the plaintiff has failed to make out his case upon the merits, it is unnecessary to revise the rulings of the court upon incidental questions.
The judgment is reversed, and the cause
Eemanded.