Case Name: Brown v. Mississippi Cent. R. Co. et al.
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1926-09-27
Citations: 144 Miss. 326
Docket Number: No. 25527
Parties: Brown v. Mississippi Cent. R. Co. et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Mississippi Reports
Volume: 144
Pages: 326–342

Head Matter:
Brown v. Mississippi Cent. R. Co. et al.
(Division B.
Sept. 27, 1926.
Suggestion of Error Overruled Oct. 25, 1926.)
[109 So. 796.
No. 25527.]
Currie <& Currie, for appellant.
Hannah é Simrall, for appellee, Mississippi Central Railroad Company.
Stevens d Heidelberg, for appellee, Bonhomie & Hattiesburg Southern Railroad Company.
Green, Green $ Potter and Paid B. Johnson, also, for appellee, Bonhomie & Hattiesburg Southern Railroad Company.
Argued orally by Neil Currie, for appellant, and Garner W. Green, for appellees.
Corpus Juris-Cyc. References; Actions, 1CJ, p. 1056, n. 68, 69; p. 1063, n. 49. Carriers, 10CJ, p. 883, n. 97; p. 1001, n. 21. Pleading, 31 Cyc, p. 79, n. 4; p. 83, n. 16; p. 102., n. 98.

Opinion:
Holden, P. J.-,
delivered the opinion of the court.
The appellant, O. H. Brown, sued the appellees Mississippi Central Railroad Company and Bonhomie & Hattiesburg Southern Railroad Company for damages for personal injury and for the wrongful failure to safely transport him, without unnecessary delay, from Hattiesburg, Miss., to Mobile, Ala., as a passenger on a train of the Mississippi Central Railroad Company. From a judgment of the lower court sustaining demurrers to the declaration Brown appeals to this court.
The question presented for our decision is whether or not the declaration sufficiently charges a cause of action against the two railroad corporations, or against either one of them. The declaration is very inartistically drawn, and too lengthy to set out in full; and, in order to ascertain whether it sufficiently charges a cause of action, it is necessary to consider all parts of it together and determine whether, as a whole, under our liberal statute on pleading, the defendants in the case should be required to plead to the action.
Very briefly stated, the declaration, in substance, charges that Brown purchased a ticket from the Mississippi Central Railroad, and embarked at Hattiesburg for transportation on one of its passenger trains for Mobile. In order to reach his point of destination, this passenger train had to go over a connecting junction track from the main line of the Mississippi Central Railroad to the main line of the Bonhomie & Hattiesburg Southern Railroad.
The passenger train of the Mississippi Central, with Brown as a passenger on it, proceeded over the connecting track, but this track at the point where it conjoins with the Bonhomie & Hattiesburg Southern Railroad was spiked down. A car seems to have been wrecked on the Bonhomie & Southern Railroad track at a point near the switch where the connecting track joins to the Bonhomie & Hattiesburg Southern main line.
There were at the time serious contentions and pending litigation between the two railroads as to which one had the right to use the Bonhomie & Hattiesburg Southern track; and'the spiking of the switch on the connecting track and the wrecking of the car at that point were inferentially done by the Bonhomie & Hattiesburg Southern Railroad Company as a result of these contentions between the two railroads, which seem to have been accompanied by violence and force on the part of the employees of the two railroads at that particular point.
When the Mississippi Central train upon which Brown was a passenger reached the spiked switch of the connecting track where it joined, the Bonhomie & Hattiesburg Southern track, it was derailed on account of the condition of the track, presumably due to -the conduct of the Bonhomie & Hattiesburg Southern Railroad em ployees, who threw axes and tools under the Mississippi Central passenger train, and the result was that this passenger train was. derailed, and Brown, a passenger, was personally injured thereby. He was compelled to abandon the train and pursue another railroad route, by way of the Coast, to Mobile, which resulted in delaying him in reaching Mobile, and caused him financial loss on account of this delay.
The declaration charges many other wrongful acts against the two railroads at the point where they connect, which, by reasonable inference, may be said to have been done by both railroads, which caused or contributed to the derailment of the passenger train upon which Brown was riding, resulting in his personal injury and unnecessary delay in reaching Mobile; but we deem it unnecessary to set out in detail all of the different wrongful acts charged to have caused the obstruction of the passenger train and the injury to Brown, but we have considered all of them together to test the point as to whether the declaration as a whole reasonably states a case against the two railroads.
The demurrer seems to have been sustained by the lower court- on the ground that the declaration did not attempt to say which one of the railroads was at fault from a legal standpoint with reference to which one had the right to use the Bonhomie & Hattiesburg Southern track from Hattiesburg to Beaumont, a station on the Bonhomie & Hattiesburg Southern Railroad ¡between Hattiesburg and Mobile.
It is contended by the Bonhomie & Hattiesburg Southern 'Railroad 'Company that the declaration fails to charge that its conduct was wrongful and caused the injury to Brown. To put it in different words, the Bonhomie & Hattiesburg Southern Railroad Company contends that no cause of action is stated against it on account of its conduct, and that therefore the demurrer was properly sustained as to it.
The Mississippi Central Railroad Company urges the correctness of the judgment sustaining the demurrer as to it because the declaration does not sufficiently charge it with a tort, but that, if tort is sufficiently charged, then the demurrer should have been sustained, because the suit is in one count, and also charg.es a breach of the contract in failing to transport the passenger upon his ticket, and that the two causes of action are inconsistent, and cannot be pleaded in the same count.
It is our opinion that the lower court erred in sustaining the demurrers of the two railroad companies. We think the declaration is sufficient to charge joint liability on the part of the two railroads, for the reason that the acts and conduct of both jointly contributed to the injury of the passenger, Brown.
It was certainly the duty of the Mississippi Central to safely transport, without unnecessary delay, the passenger, Brown, from Hattiesburg to Mobile; and, when he purchased a ticket and embarked on one of its passenger trains, he was not charged with the knowledge of any dispute or violent contentions between the two railroads as to the use of the connecting track or the main line of the Bonhomie & Hattiesburg Southern Railroad Company. And when the Bonhomie & HattiesburgSouthern by its conduct obstructed the connecting track at the point where it joined with its main line, and thereby obstructed the Mississippi Central train, and caused it to be derailed, resulting in the injury to the passenger, Brown, it was guilty of a. wrong, a joint wrong- with the Mississippi Central Railroad Company, in that its conduct at the point where the connecting track joins with its main track endangered the safety of passengers on passenger trains entitled to use the connecting track under the laws of this state.
The latter railroad company was guilty of a wrong, for which it was liable to Brown, when it proceeded over the connecting track and ran into the spiked switch and otfier wreckage there, causing the derailment :of its train, and resulting1; in the personal injury to Brown. It should not have proceeded into this obstruction and thus endangered the passengers on its train.
So the declaration charges the fact to be that the wrongful and unlawful conduct of both of the railroad companies at that point caused Brown's injury and unnecessary delay; therefore we think the declaration sufficiently charges a cause of action against both railroads. It does not so far appear as to which railroad had the legal right to use the tracks; and neither the passenger, Brown, nor this court is concerned with this question at this time.
We do not think the declaration charges two inconsistent causes of action in one count, as contended by counsel for the Mississippi Central Railroad Company. The one cause of action grows out of the breach of duty on the part of the Mississippi Central in not safely transporting its passenger, Brown, from Hattiesburg to Mobile, and by proceeding into the spiked switch, and the Bonhomie & Hattiesburg Southern contributed to this wrong by its conduct at the point where the connecting track joins its main line by obstructing the Mississippi Central train. The different kinds of damages flowing from file one cause of action may be ascertained and recovery had therefor under the declaration in the case.
The judgment of the lower court is reversed and the case remanded.
Reversed and remanded.
On Suggestion of Error.
Ethiridge, J.
Each of the defendants filed a suggestion of error to the former opinion in this case. Each insisted that the declaration did not state a cause of action against the Bonhomie & Hattiesburg Southern Railroad Company. As stated in the former opinion, the declaration is crudely and inartistically drawn, but we think that it does state a cause of action against each of the railroads involved. It is alleged in the declaration that the Mississippi Central Railroad had operated its trains'over this line of road from Hattiesburg" to Mobile under some arrangement with the G-ulf, Mobile .& Northern Railroad which owned the track in question under some arrangement between that Road and the Mississippi Central Road. It alleges that litigation was pending over the right of the Mississippi Central to so use it at the time of the injury alleged in the declaration. It is further alleged that the line of the Mississippi Central was connected with this other line by a connecting, track. It must be taken to be true that the arrangement was approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission, or that it was lawful for it to so use it, and that either expressly or tacitly the Interstate Commerce Commission had approved the arrangement.
It is further alleged that this track was nailed or spiked down so as to prevent this connection, and that both roads, that is, both defendants, were undertaking, in violation of law and the rights of the complainant, to operate their trains over this line, in opposite directions, in a manner calculated to inflict injury.
The case of A. & V. R. R. Co. v. Jackson & Eastern R. R. Co., 136 Miss. 726, 101 So. 553, referred to in the suggestion of error, is not applicable here, because :in that .case no physical connection had been made theretofore, and no trains had been operated from one line onto the- other, whereas in this case the declaration shows that the Mississippi Central had operated its trains over this line under an arrangement so to do, and that litigation was pending in the courts to settle whether or not it had the right so to do. When rights are being litigated-in the courts, it is not proper, but is unlawful and grossly improper, to undertake to resort tó physical force to assert rights.
It is error to assume that a railroad which is affected with the public interest stands in the same situation as a private individual or private corporation unaffected by public interest to do as it pleases with its property. It certainly would be a novel doctrine to hold that, where two railroads had contracted, and had litigation to determine the effect of their contract, one could sever the connection of connecting tracks, and use force to prevent their being used by the other who claimed rights under the contract and was seeking to enforce those rights in court.
If the facts of their respective intendments as1 set forth in the declaration are true, it is manifest that the plaintiff had a right of action against each .of the roads. Section 512, Hemingway's Code '(section 72-91, Code of 1906) provides:
"The declaration shall contain a statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, in-ordinary and concise language, without repetition; and if it contain sufficient matter of substance for the court to proceed upon the merits of the cause, it shall be sufficient; and it shall not be an objection to maintaining any action that the form thereof should have been different. "
It is true that, where a pleading is doubtful, or where it is susceptible of two constructions, the court will construe it most strongly against the pleader, and it is also true that attorneys drafting- pleadings should be careful and painstaking in getting the facts before the court in appropriate legal language, but the section above referred to imposes upon the court the duty of proceeding with the cause and giving appropriate relief, if the facts state a cause of action, and this whether the declaration be skillfully drawn or not. We must give effect to the pleading where it contains sufficient matter to state a cause of action, and we think the declaration here states the cause of action as against each of the defendants.
Suggestion of error overruled.