Case Name: Edward D. Talberth vs. Guy Gannett Publishing Company
Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court
Jurisdiction: Maine
Decision Date: 1953-11-04
Citations: 149 Me. 286
Docket Number: 
Parties: Edward D. Talberth vs. Guy Gannett Publishing Company
Judges: Sitting: Merrill, C. J., Fellows, Williamson, Tirrell, JJ. Murray, A. R. J., dissenting, Thaxter, J., dissenting in concurrence with MURRAY, A. R. J.
Reporter: Maine Reports
Volume: 149
Pages: 286–297

Head Matter:
Edward D. Talberth vs. Guy Gannett Publishing Company
Kennebec.
Opinion, November 4, 1953.
Dub or d & Dub or d, for Plaintiff.
Goodspeed & Goodspeed, for Defendant.
Sitting: Merrill, C. J., Fellows, Williamson, Tirrell, JJ. Murray, A. R. J., dissenting, Thaxter, J., dissenting in concurrence with MURRAY, A. R. J.

Opinion:
Merrill, C. J.
On report. This was an action of assumpsit brought by the plaintiff to recover from the defendant so-called severance pay in the amount of $3,135.00. The plaintiff was an employee of the defendant and a member of the Portland Newspaper Guild, Local 128, with which the defendant had an operating agreement or contract. This contract was entered into by the Guild, as bargaining agent, in behalf of itself and certain employees of the defendant who were engaged in the publication of certain of the defendant's newspapers. The plaintiff was among the employees of the defendant in whose behalf said contract was entered into and was entitled to the benefit of the terms and provisions thereof.
It has been stipulated that if the plaintiff is entitled to recover, the amount of his recovery shall be $3,135.00. Nor is there any controversy relative to the fact that plaintiff's employment by the defendant terminated on May 27, 1952, that he had completed more than twenty years' service at that time and was a member of said newspaper guild at the time his employment was terminated.
Among the provisions of the guild contract were the following which are pertinent to the facts in this case:—
"ARTICLE VII
(Severance Pay)
1. Upon dismissal, an employe, upon his request, shall receive a written notice from the Publisher, or his agent, stating the cause for his dismissal.
2. Upon dismissal, other than for gross neglect of duty, or gross misconduct while on duty, not provoked by management, an employe shall receive a cash severance payment equal to his salary for one week, at the highest rate received during his employment, for each six months or major fraction thereof that he has been employed by the Publisher. In no event shall this exceed thirty (30) weeks.
3. In the event of the death of an employee, the Publisher shall pay his beneficiary, designated by the employe in writing in advance or his executor or administrator, an amount equal to the amount of severance pay to which the employe would have been entitled upon dismissal.
4. Upon completion of 20 years' service or because of illness or having reached the age of 65, an employee may terminate his employment and, upon written application to the Publisher, shall receive a cash lump sum based on length of service as computed under Section 2 of this article. Payments under this section shall be in lieu of any other terminal benefits provided for elsewhere."
The plaintiff seeks to recover severance pay under the provisions of the foregoing contract. The issues in this case are, (1) whether or not the plaintiff was dismissed for "gross misconduct while on duty, not provoked by management," and if so, whether or not he would be entitled to severance pay under the provisions of Section 2 of Article VII of the contract supra; or (2) whether or not the plaintiff himself "terminated his employment" within the meaning of Section 4 of said Article VII under such circumstances that he would be entitled to severance pay "as computed under Section 2" of Article VII.
By agreement of the parties the case was reported to this court for final determination upon the admissible evidence.
The plaintiff was the staff political writer for the Gannett newspapers, so-called, published by the defendant company. Just prior to the severance of his relations with the defendant company he became actively involved in a serious and disgraceful political scandal. A recital of the details of this scandal and of the part played by the plaintiff therein would serve no useful purpose if set forth at length in this opinion and perpetuated in our reports. Suffice it to say, they were of such a nature and character that if and when they became known, the plaintiff's usefulness as a political writer was sure to come to an end, and his retention by the defendant as a political writer would reflect discredit upon itself and its publications.
On the eve of the certain disclosure of the facts with relation to the scandal and the plaintiff's participation therein before a legislative investigating committee, the plaintiff, by his counsel and in person, made known to the defendant the existence of the facts and that the same were to be immediately made public.
The plaintiff's involvement and active participation in this scandal constituted gross misconduct on his part while on duty, not provoked by the defendant company or the management thereof and afforded sufficient ground for his immediate dismissal within the meaning of Section 2 of Article VII supra.
The defendant claims that it dismissed the plaintiff on account of gross misconduct within the meaning of Section 2 of Article VII of the contract, supra, and that the plaintiff because of the provisions thereof is not entitled to severance pay.
The plaintiff, on the other hand, claims that he terminated his employment after the completion of twenty years' service within the meaning of Section 4 of said Article VII, supra, and is entitled to severance pay thereunder in the sum of $3,135.00.
The facts are undisputed and it is upon the inferences from undisputed facts that we are to decide whether or not the plaintiff was dismissed under Section 2 or terminated his employment within the meaning of Section 4.
The difference arises because after the facts became known to the defendant, and after the defendant's Vice President had notified the plaintiff that he was already through, the plaintiff was allowed to write a resignation which was published in the defendant's newspapers.
Upon the undisputed evidence we conclude that the defendant dismissed the plaintiff for "gross misconduct while on duty, not provoked by management." The essential nature of the termination of the plaintiff's employment was not changed by the fact that the plaintiff wrote and the defendant received, after it had dismissed the plaintiff, a statement by him in the form of a resignation which it used in connection with its publication of the facts respecting the termination of the plaintiff's employment.
As we said in Lord, Berry & Walker v. Mass. Ins. Co., 133 Me. 335 at 336
"A discussion of the details of the evidence upon which these conclusions are based might be of interest to the parties to the litigation but would be of no value to students of the decisions of this Court, and we deem it unnecessary to encumber our reports with such a discussion. Suffice it to say that the evidence submitted by defendant fully sustains its contentions,".
See also Robinson v. Clark, 76 Me. 493.
The testimony with respect to the dismissal was given not only in the presence of the plaintiff but also in that of his counsel. Both of them had been present when the representative of the defendant informed the plaintiff of his dismissal. They both heard the entire conversations respecting the same which were testified to by this official and the other representatives of the defendant who were present when the conversations took place. Their testimony stands undisputed and undenied upon the record. Neither the plaintiff nor his counsel took the witness stand, as witnesses, to deny, explain, or to attempt to modify the same in any particular.
In our opinion Article VII must be interpreted as a whole. We hold that Section 4 thereof, which refers to Section 2, must be interpreted in connection therewith, and that the right to severance pay under Section 4 is subject to the same limitation as that contained in Section 2.
It is the intent of the contract that if the employee be dismissed for "gross misconduct while on duty, not provoked by management," he shall not receive the severance pay to which he would otherwise be entitled under either Section 2 or Section 4 of Article VII of the contract.
The right to severance pay, although enforcible, is but a contingent right which does not become absolute unless the terms of the contract making provision therefor are complied with. It is never due and payable until the termination of the contract of employment, and then only if the contract be terminated under such conditions that it is payable according to the terms thereof.
Nor is the employee at the mercy of management with respect to his right to severance pay. His right to such pay depends upon his own conduct and upon that alone. The right to severance pay is not lost by mere dismissal for cause, but only when the dismissal is "for gross misconduct while on duty, not provoked by management."
The plaintiff was guilty of "gross misconduct while on duty, not provoked by management," and was dismissed therefor. The defendant is entitled to judgment. In accordance with the stipulation the entry will be
Remanded for entry of Judgment for the defendant.