Case Name: PEOPLE v. LUKE
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1982-04-08
Citations: 115 Mich. App. 223
Docket Number: Docket No. 57581
Parties: PEOPLE v LUKE
Judges: Before: Mackenzie, P.J., and Bronson and Beasley, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 115
Pages: 223–227

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v LUKE
Docket No. 57581.
Submitted October 12, 1981, at Detroit.
Decided April 8, 1982.
Leave to appeal applied for.
Rodney M. Luke pled guilty in Detroit Recorder’s Court to a charge of armed robbery. He was sentenced to a prison term of from six months to four years, Justin C. Ravitz, J. The people appeal by leave granted, contending the armed robbery statute requires a minimum sentence of at least a year and a day. Held:
The statute specifies that armed robbery is a felony punishable by imprisonment in the state prison "for life or for any term of years”. The language "any term of years” does not establish a mandatory minimum sentence.
Affirmed.
Bronson, J., dissented for reasons stated in a concurring opinion in an earlier case. It would appear that the Legislature intended the phrase "life or any term of years” in a penal statute to impose a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment for one year and that, with respect to armed robbery, there must be some mandatory minimum period of detention since armed robbery is a nonprobationable offense. He would find defendant’s sentence invalid and modify it to provide for a term of imprisonment for a year and a day.
Opinion of the Court
1. Robbery — Armed Robbery — Minimum Sentences.
The phrase "life or any term of years” as used in the armed robbery statute does not establish a mandatory minimum sentence upon conviction (MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797).
Dissent by Bronson, J.
2. Robbery — Armed Robbery — Minimum Sentences.
The phrase "life or any term of years” as used in the armed robbery statute establishes a mandatory minimum sentence of one year and one day upon conviction (MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797).
Reference for Points in Headnotes
67 Am Jur 2d, Robbery § 76.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Louis J. Caruso, Solicitor General, William L. Cahalan, Prosecuting Attorney, Edward Reilly Wilson, Principal Attorney, Appeals, and Carolyn Schmidt, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Irving Tukel, for defendant on appeal.
Before: Mackenzie, P.J., and Bronson and Beasley, JJ.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
Defendant pled guilty to armed robbery, MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797. The statute defining armed robbery specifies that the crime is a felony punishable by imprisonment in the state prison "for life or for any term of years". Defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of six months to four years. The people appeal by leave granted and argue that the statutory language "any term of years" requires a minimum sentence of at least a year and a day.
The weight of authority in this Court indicates that the language "any term of years" does not establish a mandatory minimum sentence. See People v McKnight, 72 Mich App 282; 249 NW2d 392 (1976), lv den 399 Mich 848 (1977), People v Freeman, 73 Mich App 568; 252 NW2d 518 (1977), People v Landis, 91 Mich App 345; 283 NW2d 647 (1979), People v Earl Jones, 94 Mich App 232; 288 NW2d 385 (1979), lv den 409 Mich 854 (1980), and People v Eberly, 110 Mich App 349; 313 NW2d 123 (1981). We adhere to this view, although we note that some authority exists for construing the language to establish a minimum sentence of a year or a year and a day. See the dissent of Judge Corkin in Jones, supra, 236, the opinion of Judge Kelly in People v Harper, 83 Mich App 390; 269 NW2d 470 (1978), lv den 406 Mich 1021 (1979), and the opinion of Judge Bronson in People v West, 113 Mich App 1; 317 NW2d 261 (1982).
Our belief that the language "any term of years" establishes no mandatory minimum sentence is reinforced by a recent decision of our Supreme Court. In People v Urynowicz, 412 Mich 137, 144; 312 NW2d 625 (1981), defendant pled guilty to first-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b; MSA 28.788(2). On appeal, defendant argued for reversal because the circuit judge did not inform him of the mandatory minimum five-year sentence required by MCL 750.520f; MSA 28.788(6) for second or subsequent offenders. The Court said:
"This defendant was not charged under § 520f. Consequently, there was no mandatory minimum of which advice under GCR 1963, 785.7(l)(d) was required."
The penalty for first-degree criminal sexual conduct is imprisonment "for life or for any term of years", MCL 750.520b(2); MSA 28.788(2)(2).
Affirmed.