Case Name: Daniel Dolan et al., Respondents, v. The Newburgh, Dutchess and Connecticut Railroad Company, Appellant
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1890-06-17
Citations: 120 N.Y. 571
Docket Number: 
Parties: Daniel Dolan et al., Respondents, v. The Newburgh, Dutchess and Connecticut Railroad Company, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 120
Pages: 571–583

Head Matter:
Daniel Dolan et al., Respondents, v. The Newburgh, Dutchess and Connecticut Railroad Company, Appellant.
The provisions of the General Railroad Act (Chap. 140, Laws of 1850, as amended by § 8, chap. 282, Laws of 1854) requiring railroad corporations to construct and maintain fences on the sides of their roads, and mailing them, in case of failure so to do, liable for damages to any cattle, horses, etc., thereon, does not require such a corporation to indemnify the owner of a team, who has voluntarily driven it on the lands of the corporation and has negligently permitted it to escape onto the track, in front of a moving train.
Defendants road, at a point where it runs east and west, was constructed on a strip of land in front of a grist-mill on the south side of the track, which strip was conveyed to it by the then owners of the mill property for a right of way. The platform of the mill was four feet ten inches south of the south line of the strip. The only approach to the mill was. by a lane leading from a highway north of the track, which lane crossed the track and terminated at the mill. Teams, in approaching the mill, and while standing at the platform, occupy part of the strip. East and west of the mill and on the north side of the road, except where the lane-crosses it, it is fenced. The conveyance to defendant contained a covenant, on defendant’s part, to leave the land opposite the mill unfenced, so as to permit free passage to and from it. Plaintiffs’ agent drove their team to the mill and left it standing unattended at the platform and partly on the strip. The horses escaped, ran upon-the railroad tracks, and were killed by a passing train. In an action, under said statutory provision, to recover the damages, held (Vann. Bradley and Brown, JJ., dissenting), that the court erred in refusing to hold that, under the exception contained in said provision, which declares that “no railroad corporation shall be required to fence the sides of its roads except when such fence is necessary to protect horses, cattle, sheep and hogs from going onto the track of the railroad from the lands adjoining the same,” defendant was not required to fence its-road at the point in question.
All trains permitted by a railroad corporation to run upon its road, while it is in full possession, are to be treated as its trains for the purpose of enforcing the statutory penalty for operating the road before it is properly fenced.
Accordingly, held, that the fact that defendant had granted to another railroad company the right to run trains upon its road and that the engine which did the injury belonged to such other company, was no defense..
Ditchett v. S. D. & P. M. R. R. Co. (67 N. Y. 425); Knight v. N. Y., L. E.. & W. R. R. Co. (99 N. Y. 25), distinguished.
(Argued April 28, 1890;
decided June 17, 1890.)
Appeal from judgment of the General Term of'the Supreme ■Court in the second judicial department, entered upon an order made December 13, 1887, which affirmed a judgment in favor ■of the plaintiffs entered upon a verdict directed hy the court.
This action was brought to recover damages from the ■defendant on account of its failure to fence its track as required by law, whereby, as it is alleged, two horses belonging to the plaintiffs were run over and killed by a train of cars, operated by the New York and New England Railroad Company, while running upon said track pursuant to a contract for the joint use of the same by the two companies.
At the point where the accident happened, near Brinlcerhoffville, Dutchess county, the general direction of the defendant’s track is east and west. There was a grist-mill directly south ■of the track, between fifty and sixty feet therefrom, at the locality in question. The only way of reaching the mill, except by crossing private property, was by a lane leading from a highway at the north and terminating at the mill after crossing the track a little to the east thereof: On the 25th of
'September, 1886, said horses, hitched to a wagon loaded with grain in bags, were driven by plaintiffs’ agent across the track to the door of the mill fronting the railroad, which was fenced on the north and partially on the south, but there was no fence between the mill and the track. After the wagon was unloaded, as the miller was busy, the agent of the plaintiffs stepped across the threshold of the mill to get the empty bags, leaving the team loose. At that instant a west-bound freight train belonging to the New York and New England road came suddenly from behind another train standing upon a side track and frightened the horses, which ran west, and, turning •to the north, went upon the track in front of the moving engine and were killed. If there had been a fence upon the •south side of the railroad in front of the mill they could not have gone upon the track. In 1868 the former owner of the mill property conveyed a strip of land in front thereof to the defendant for a right of way, and its railroad was subsequently built thereon. The deed contained a covenant on the part of the railroad company that the land so conveyed, or so much thereof as the grantors should elect, should “ forever remain unenclosed so that the parties of the first part, their heirs and assigns, and all persons whom they may desire to have to' do so, may pass and repass over said railroad and lands of said company to and from their mill and other buildings of parties-of the first part, their heirs and assigns.”
"Further facts appear in the opinions.
Milton A. Fowler for appellant.
The liability, if any, is purely statutory. The statute is penal, cuts off the defense of contributory negligence, and, like all penal statutes, is to be strictly construed. (Knight v. N. Y., L. E. & W. R. R. Co., 99 N. Y. 25, 28.) The railroad was fenced within the terms of the statute. It does not provide for a literal fence or a fence in all places, but only at those places where it is necessary to prevent stock from getting on the track from the adjoining lands. (Ditchett v. S. D. & P. M. R. R. Co., 67 N. Y. 425, 428.) The principle is well established that liability under the statute only arises when stock stray on the track of their own volition. (Corwin v. N. Y. & E. R. R., Co., 13 N. Y. 42, 49, 54; Shepard v. B., N. Y. & E. R. R. Co., 35 id. 641, 645 ; Welts v. I. & V. R. R. Co., 2 West. Rep. 651.) The owner of the land who has covenanted that no fence shall be built is estopped from claiming damages. (Duffy v. N. Y & H. R. R. Co., 2 Hilt. 496, 499.)
0. P. M. Baker for respondent.
Defendant is liable for the "value of the horses by reason of its deliberate neglect and refusal to comply with, and its evasion of, the statute as to fencing its road at this place. (Laws of 1854, chap. 282, § 8; Laws of 1850, chap. 140; 3 Edm. Stat. 644; 3 R. S. [8th ed.] 1778.) The engine was upon the track with defendant’s consent, and not as a. trespasser. Defendant was receiving a pecuniary benefit for its being there, and is liable to plaintiffs for the damages resulting from such use. (Bissell v. N. S & N. I. R. R. Co., 22 N. Y. 306.) For the purposes of this action the engine was an “ agent ” of the defendant, and defendant is liable for injuries of the character complained of here, caused by it. (Knight v. N. Y., L. E. & W. R. R. Co., 99 N. Y. 29 ; Parker v. R. & S. R. R. Co., 16 Barb. 315 ; Corwin v. N. Y. & E. R. R. Co., 13 N. Y. 49.) There must be a fence or a substitute for one between the track and “the lands adjoining the same.” (Shepard v. B., N. Y. & E. R. R. Co., 35 N. Y. 646.) There was no contributory negligence. (Brady v. R. & S. R. R. Co., 1 Hun, 378; Ivory v. Town of Deerpark, 115 N. Y. 476.) The statute does not make the liability of the company conditional or dependent Upon absence of negligence by the animal owner. (Waldron v. R. & S. R. R. Co., 8 Barb. 390; Corwin v. N. Y. & E. R. R. Co., 13 N. Y. 54; Bradley v. N. Y. & E R. R. Co., 34 id. 427; Shepard v. N. Y. & E. R. R. Co., 35 id. 641; Tracy v. T. & E. R. R. Co., 38 id. 433; Brady v. R. & S. R. R. Co., 1 Hun, 378; Rhodes v. U. 1. & E. R. R. Co., 5 id. 344; Spemier v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 6 id. 600; 67 N. Y. 153 ; White v. U. & H. R. R. R. Co., 15 Hun, 333; Corwin Case, 13 N. Y. 51; Spencer v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 2 Hun, 421; Thurber v. H. B. & E. R. R. Co., 60 N. Y. 30; Stackus v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 79 id. 466.) The corporation owning the road and neglecting to fence was liable, although.the horses were killed by the engine of a lessee or licensee. (Fontaine v. S. P. R. R. Co., 54 Cal. 645 ; 24 Kan. 619; S. & N. A. R. R. Co. v. Pilgreen, 62 Ala. 305; I. C. R. R. Co. v. Kanouse, 39 Ill. 272; T. P. & W. R. Co. v. Rumbold, 40 id. 143; E. S. L. & C. R. Co. v. Gerber, 82 id. 632.)

Opinion:
Follett, Ch. J.
The mill stands fifty-nine feet, four and •one-half inches south of the center line of the railroad. Five feet of the space between the mill and the land of the railroad is occupied by a platform in front of the mill, which is ten feet long and about as high as the top of a wagon. The ' boundary line between the mill property and the railroad land is but four feet and ten inches north of the north edge of the platform. Teams, in approaching the mill and while standing at it, occupy a part of the right of way of the railroad. East and west.of the mill and on the south side of the railroad it is fenced, and it is fenced on its north side, except where the lane which leads to the mill crosses the track. When the right of way was granted from the mill property its owner bound the railroad to leave its land opposite his mill unfenced so as to permit free passage to and from it. This mill was about 150 feet west of the freight depot and the railroad land in front of it may be said to form an extension of the station grounds. This being the situation, the agent of the owners of the team drove it on this strip of land, stopped in front of the mill and there left it standing, partly on the land -belonging to the owners of the mill and partfy on that of the railroad corporation, for the purpose of delivering a load of wheat. The driver left the team so standing unattended and it escaped upon the railroad tracks and the horses were killed. The railroad corporation permitted its land to be used as a way for the owner of the mill and his patrons to go to and from it, of which privilege the plaintiffs were in the act of availing themselves when their team was killed. To hold that the fencing statute was designed to prevent the owners of a team from voluntarily driving it onto the lands of the corporation, or being so on, to compel the corporation to indemnify its owners for the loss occasioned by the negligence of their agent in permitting the team to escape onto the track in front of a moving train, is to give the statute an effect not contemplated by its authors and not thought of, I think, heretofore.
Many places adjacent to railroad stations, which are not highways nor strictly station grounds, are necessarily left unfenced for the accommodation of the adjoining owners and the public; and to hold that, in all such cases, a railroad is absolutely liable for an injury sustained by teams which enter on the track while in the care of their drivers, without regard to the question of the negligence of their owners or drivers, is to impose an unreasonable liability on the roads, and one altogether foreign to the purposes of the statute.
The court erred in refusing to hold that the railroad was not required to fence its road at this point within .section 8-of chapter 282 of the Laws of 1854, which provides: " But
no railroad corporation shall be required to fence the sides of its roads except when such fence is necessary to protect horses, cattle, sheep and hogs from going onto the track of the railroad from the lands adjoining the same."
I am unable to concur in the reasoning that the escape of this team onto the railroad land proves that a fence was necessary to protect horses from getting on the track from lands adjoining the same. If this conclusion follows from the facts in this case it is. difficult to see why the injury of a team by a collision with a moving train at points other than at highway or farm crossings will not always amount to jproof that a fence was required by the statute.
The judgment should be reversed and a new trial granted, with costs to abide the event.