Case Name: SUNSHINE YACHT SALES, INC., a Florida Corporation, Appellant, v. BOB ANSLOW YACHT SALES, INC., a Florida Corporation; Robert Anslow, Individually; Maria Detzer, Individually and Henry Viau, Individually, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1996-03-13
Citations: 669 So. 2d 342
Docket Number: No. 95-1790
Parties: SUNSHINE YACHT SALES, INC., a Florida Corporation, Appellant, v. BOB ANSLOW YACHT SALES, INC., a Florida Corporation; Robert Anslow, Individually; Maria Detzer, Individually and Henry Viau, Individually, Appellees.
Judges: Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and COPE and GREEN, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 669
Pages: 342–347

Head Matter:
SUNSHINE YACHT SALES, INC., a Florida Corporation, Appellant, v. BOB ANSLOW YACHT SALES, INC., a Florida Corporation; Robert Anslow, Individually; Maria Detzer, Individually and Henry Viau, Individually, Appellees.
No. 95-1790.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
March 13, 1996.
Gustavo Gutierrez, Miami, for appellant.
Moriarty & Grunor and Sylvia A. Grunor, Orlando; Henry T. Swann, III, St. Augustine, for appellees.
Robert Anslow, in proper person.
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and COPE and GREEN, JJ.

Opinion:
COPE, Judge.
Sunshine Yacht Sales, Inc. appeals an order transferring venue on the ground that venue is improper in Dade County. We reverse.
I.
Sunshine Yacht filed suit against appellee Maria Detzer alleging in Count III that Det-zer had breached an exclusive listing agreement for the sale of her yacht. The other counts of the complaint alleged that the other appellees, Bob Anslow Yacht Sales, Inc., Robert Anslow, and Henry Viau, had tor-tiously interfered with Sunshine's yacht brokerage contract, and defrauded Sunshine Yacht of part of its commission.
The parties moved to dismiss or transfer venue, contending that there was no basis for jurisdiction in Dade County. The trial court granted the motion and this appeal follows.
It is well settled that where a complaint contains multiple causes of action, venue is proper where any one of the causes of action arose. § 47.041, Fla.Stat. (1993); Maurice Gelina and Associates, Inc. v. Modular Computer Systems, Inc., 639 So.2d 1060 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994).
In this case there are four counts. Count III is for breach of contract against Detzer individually. Sunshine Yacht alleges that it fully performed its obligations under a yacht brokerage contract, and that "Defendant, Detzer, breached the contract by failing to pay Plaintiff, Sunshine Yachts, the full commission due under their contract." Plaintiff demands compensatory damages, namely, the sum due under the contract.
Writing in the context of a brokerage agreement, this court has said:
The principles of venue law are well settled.... In an action on a contract for the payment of money, where the contract debtor has defaulted on payments thereunder, the action accrues in the county where payment was agreed to be made. Further, as stated in Davis v. Dempsey, 343 So.2d 950, 952 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) and relied upon by appellants, "If no place of payment has been expressly agreed upon, it will be implied that payment was to be made in the county where the contract creditor resides." Id. See Croker v. Powell, 115 Fla. 733, 156 So. 146 (1934).
Maurice Gelina and Associates, Inc. v. Modular Computer Systems, Inc., 639 So.2d at 1060-61 (emphasis added); see also Frankel Group, Inc. v. BA Mortgage and International Realty, Inc., 480 So.2d 230, 231 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (brokerage agreement); Carter Realty Company v. Roper Bros. Land Co., 461 So.2d 1029, 1030-31 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985) (brokerage agreement); First International Realty Investment Corporation, 314 So.2d 214, 215 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975) (brokerage agreement), cert. denied, 330 So.2d 15 (Fla.1976).
As explained by Judge Frank in Ryan v. Mobile Communications Enterprises, Inc., 594 So.2d 845 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992):
Although [appellee] MCE is correct to characterize the underlying contract as one for services; the important consideration for venue purposes is the behavior or events causing the breach of the contract and thus accrual of the cause of action. MCE allegedly performed as agreed; Ryan, however, repudiated the contract and did not pay money owed. Thus, the breach was not of MCE's covenant to perform services but of Ryan's covenant to pay for those services. The following language from Windsor v. Migliaccio, 399 So.2d 65, 66 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), is helpful:
A cause of action for venue purposes accrues in the county where the contract is breached. Speedling, Inc. v. Krig, 378 So.2d 57 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). If a plaintiff alleges breach of a covenant to pay money due or already earned under a contract, the cause of action accrues where performance of the act of payment was to occur. Croker v. Powell, 115 Fla. 733, 156 So. 146 (1934); M.A. Kite Co. v. A.C. Samford, Inc., 130 So.2d 99 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961). If the action is for breach of some other covenant, venue is proper in the county where that covenant was to be performed. American International Food Corp. v. Lesko, 358 So.2d 250 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
Because the complaint alleges that Ryan breached his covenant to pay money due, the cause of action would accrue where the act of payment was to occur.... [T]he rule is that when a written contract fails to specify the place where payments are to be made, a cause of action for failure to pay is properly brought in the county where the. plaintiff has its principal place of business.
594 So.2d at 846 (citations omitted).
Here, Count III of the complaint alleges that defendant Detzer breached the contract by failing to pay plaintiff the amount it was owed. Since the contract did not provide for a place of payment, the money was to be paid to plaintiff at its office in Dade County. Maurice Gelina and Associates, Inc. v. Modular Computer Systems, Inc., 639 So.2d at 1060-61. Venue is therefore proper in Dade County.
The cases relied on by appellees are inap-posite. In Brodesser v. Seven Joy Investments, Ltd., 606 So.2d 1274 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992), the plaintiff was the buyer, and the defendant the seller, of a yacht in Palm Beach County, Florida. The buyer sued the seller for breach of the seller's obligations under the contract; it was not a suit by a seller, or a broker, to collect a sum due. In Goodwin v. Figueroa, 407 So.2d 1055 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), a Dee County seller refused to return a deposit on a boat paid by a Dade County buyer. This court concluded that on the facts and legal theory there presented, venue was proper in Lee County, where the deposit was held. Id. at 1056 & n. 2; see also Earl W. Shomber & Co. v. Florida Casino Associates, Inc., 469 So.2d 936, 937 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (in suit for disbursement of escrow funds, venue is proper where escrow funds are located). The present case does not involve suit for return of a deposit or an escrow, but instead is a suit for money due under a contract. The Goodwin ease expressly acknowledges that where, as here, the suit is for money due under a contract, venue is proper where payment was due, Dade County. See Goodwin, 407 So.2d at 1056 n. 2.
II.
We must respectfully disagree with the factual analysis of the dissent. In this case Detzer signed an exclusive listing agreement with plaintiff Sunshine Yacht in which she agreed to pay it a 10% commission for procuring a buyer. The complaint then states:
9. Between the dates of the CONTRACT and September 17, 1994, SUNSHINE YACHTS undertook to advertise the vessel and to promote its sale pursuant to the terms of the CONTRACT.
10. Between the date of the CONTRACT and September 17, 1994, SUNSHINE YACHTS presented the vessel for sale to Defendant VIAU. Defendant VIAU indicated a strong desire to purchase the vessel.
11. On or about September 17, 1994, Defendant BOB ANSLOW YACHT SALES, INC. through Defendant AN-SLOW individually, contacted Plaintiff and informed Plaintiff that Defendant BOB ANSLOW YACHT SALES, INC., had an interested party for the purchase of the YACHT. Defendants BOB ANSLOW YACHT SALES, INC. and ANSLOW misrepresented the true identity of the proposed purchaser in the following manner:
a. by deleting the name of the purchaser from the purchase and sale contract so that Plaintiff would not recognize the name of Defendant VIAU, (a copy of the purchase and sale contract is attached hereto as Exhibit "B" to the complaint).
b. by providing a copy of a check from an individual known as Evelyn Miller purporting to be the purchaser of the YACHT.
e. by having the purchaser sign his name in such a way as to be totally illegible and thereby preventing Plaintiff from ascertaining the true identity of the purchaser being VIAU.
12. At all times material hereto, Plaintiff was the procuring cause of the sale and had acted as the listing and procuring broker. Defendants VIAU, BOB ANSLOW YACHT SALES, INC. and ANSLOW conspired to defeat Plaintiffs entitlement to the full commission pursuant to the terms of the CONTRACT by misrepresenting and hiding the true identity of the purchaser until after the contract for sale and purchase had been executed by both Buyer and Seller.
13. On or about September 27, 1994, Plaintiff learned that the true identity of the purchaser was VIAU and immediately contacted ANSLOW, DETZER, and BOB ANSLOW YACHT SALES, INC. to advise all the parties that "Plaintiff was claiming its entitlement to the full commission.
14. Notwithstanding the fact that all the parties were informed of Plaintiffs entitlement to the full commission, the closing on the purchase of the YACHT took place on October 18,1991,.
15. Rather than receiving the full commission, Plaintiff only received the sum of $8,500.00 representing 80% of the commission at the time of closing.
16. Upon information and belief, Defendant BOB ANSLOW YACHT SALES, INC. rebated all or a portion of its commission to Defendant VLAU.
17. SUNSHINE YACHTS as brokers, were responsible for procuring VIAU as the purchaser of the YACHT and despite being excluded from the negotiations, acted as broker for arranging the sale of THE YACHT and was in all material respects the procuring cause of VIAU's purchase of THE YACHT.
(Emphasis added).
As alleged, plaintiff Sunshine advised Det-zer of its claim to the full commission prior to closing. Notwithstanding that notification, at closing Detzer only paid Sunshine Yacht 30% of the contract amount. Sunshine has pled a proper cause of action for breach of the contract by Detzer's failure to pay the full contract amount. As a matter of law, the payment was required to be made in Dade County, under the controlling and indistinguishable brokerage cases cited in part I. Venue is proper in Dade County.
The order under review is reversed.