Case Name: Henry F. Capozzella v. Harriet A. Capozzella
Court: Supreme Court of Virginia
Jurisdiction: Virginia
Decision Date: 1973-04-23
Citations: 213 Va. 820
Docket Number: Record No. 8071
Parties: Henry F. Capozzella v. Harriet A. Capozzella.
Judges: 
Reporter: Virginia Reports
Volume: 213
Pages: 820–830

Head Matter:
Richmond
Henry F. Capozzella v. Harriet A. Capozzella.
April 23, 1973.
Record No. 8071.
Present, All the Justices.
Blair D. Howard (Howard, Stevens, Lynch, Cake & Howard, on brief), for appellant.
Roy A. Swayze, for appellee.

Opinion:
Poff, J.,
delivered the opinion of the court.
This is an appeal from a final decree entered on December 20, 1971 granting the prayer of a bill of complaint filed by Harriet A. Capozzella against Lytton H. Gibson and Henry F. Capozzella for a mandatory injunction directing Gibson, as stakeholder, to deliver to the clerk for recordation a deed from Donald K. Graham and Rothwell J. Lillard, Trustees, to Henry F. Capozzella and Harriet A. Capozzella, his wife, as tenants by the entirety, conveying 51 acres of land with residence in Fairfax County. The deed was duly delivered and recorded, and we granted Henry F. Capozzella an appeal.
Pursuant to a separation agreement dated March 20, 1968, and for the purpose of waiving inchoate dower rights, Henry F. Capozzella and his first wife, Bette, executed a deed dated May 3, 1968 conveying the property to Capozzella's attorneys, Donald K. Graham and Rothwell J. Lillard, as trustees, with the understanding that upon payment of a sum of mon'ey to Bette the trustees would be empowered to convey title according to Capozzella's instructions. Payment was made in due course.
Harriet Capozzella testified that some time prior to their marriage, Henry F. Capozzella took her to the office of attorney Lytton Gibson and told Gibson, "I want to get my property out of the names of the trustees and put in this little girl's name, because if it weren't for her, I would be dead today." She explained that Capozzella was referring to help she had given him in obtaining employment as chief anesthetist at a large hospital. On June 19, 1970, four days after their marriage, the couple visited Gibson again, and Capozzella told the attorney that "[tjhere is no reason not to take the trustees' names off, and have my wife's put on".
From Gibson's testimony concerning that meeting, it appears that Capozzella was eager to do whatever was necessary to prevent his first wife from attacking his will, and through their minor daughter, acquiring control over his property. Capozzella told Gibson that he trusted his new wife, and Gibson advised him that they should execute mutual wills and have the trustees convey the property to him and his new wife as tenants by the entirety with right of survivorship as at common law. Gibson explained the nature and effect of the tenancy "in detail".
By letter dated June 22, 1970 Gibson wrote to Lillard inquiring if the trustees were prepared to execute a deed. By letter dated June 25, 1970 Lillard advised Gibson in the affirmative, asked for written instructions from Capozzella and suggested a fee of $25.00 for each of the trustees.
On June 30, 1970 Gibson wrote to Capozzella telling him that the trustees had agreed to execute a deed, that the trustees' fe'es would be $25.00 each and that Capozzella should advise him the balance due on the trust note secured by the property in order that he could make appropriate provision in the deed he was preparing and properly calculate the recording fees.
Harriet testified that Capozzella telephoned her while she was in Massachusetts packing her effects to move to Virginia and asked her to call Gibson and give him the information requested in the letter, which, as Gibson confirmed, she did.
In late August 1970, she and her husband visited Gibson again and signed some document which she could not identify but which Gibson said he would send along with the deed to the trustees. Lillard testified that he never received written instruction signed by Capozzella but felt that Gibson had full authority to speak for him. Gibson testified that he estimated the costs of recordation of the deed would be about $1300.00 and "suggested that the parties just wait and see if the property was sold" and that Capozzella "agreed the deed was not to be recorded on account of the cost."
Dr. Alexander, Harriet's father, testified that at breakfast on the. morning following the August meeting Capozzella told him and Mrs. Alexander "that they went and saw Mr. Gibson, and that he had the names of the trustees on the deed taken off, Lillard and Graham, and asked Mr. Gibson to have Harriet's name on the deed, and he was very happy to do that because that was the best gift he could give to her." Mrs. Alexander testified that Capozzella said, "Dr. Alexander, I want you to know that after we went in to see Mr. Gibson, and we signed the papers for the deed, I gave Harriet one-half of my property as a gift to her."
In a letter dated October 7, 1970 to Lillard, Gibson enclosed two $25.00 checks and a general warranty deed of tenancy by the entirety. At Lillard's request, Gibson re-drafted the deed to provide special warranty of title, dated it October 15, 1970 and sent it to Lillard.
By letter dated November 6, 1970 Gibson advised Capozzella that he had prepared the wills and received the executed deed from the trustees. He asked Capozzella to make an appointment to inspect the wills and "determine just what we want to do about recording the deed". Five days later the Capozzellas separated, the appointment was never made, and the wills were never signed. On account of the domestic dispute, Gibson retained the deed pending a court order. By letter dated December 11, 1970 Gibson submitted and Capozzella paid a bill of $350.00 for legal services rendered from April 13, 1970 to November 6, 1970 and "advanced costs" of $50.00.
Capozzella argues that the deed was void because he had given Gibson no instructions as to disposition of the deed and there was, therefore, no completed delivery of the deed; that the deed was void because Gibson, acting without his authority under seal, had no power to bind him to a deed under seal; and that the deed was void because the trustees, acting without his written authorization, violated their fiduciary duty in executing the deed.
For a deed to pass title, there must be delivery. For delivery to be operative, physical deposit with the named grantee is not essential.
"The delivery may be actual, as by manual tradition to the grantee, or to another for his use, or it may be constructive . It may be proved by direct evidence or be inferred from circumstances." Enright v. Bannister, 195 Va. 76, 79, 77 S.E.2d 377, 379 (1953).
See also Schreckhise v. Wiseman, 102 Va. 9, 45 S.E. 745 (1903), approving the rule that delivery may be effective when a deed is deposited with a third person for transmittal to the grantee.
If delivery is made, recordation is not necessary to pass title. Even if the deed is lost or purposely destroyed by the grantor, delivery passes title. Brewer v. Brewer, 199 Va. 753, 102 S.E.2d 303 (1958); Garrett v. Andis, 159 Va. 150, 165 S.E. 657 (1932). And where the deed is made by one spouse to another in voluntary settlement of an antecedent promise, the formalities of delivery required of deeds of bargain and sale are not necessary. Garrett v. Andis, supra, 18 C. J. Deeds § 96, at 201 (1919); 23 Am. Jur.2d Deeds § 111, at 160 (1965); 26 C. J. S. Deeds § 7 (c), at 592 (1956).
What makes delivery operative is the grantor's intent.
"There was a delivery if there was the intention to deliver which is effectuated by words or acts, and this is a question of fact to be gathered from all of the circumstances of the particular case." Payne v. Payne, 128 Va. 33, 44, 104 S.E. 712, 716 (1920).
Capozzella contends that he did not intend to deliver and delivery was incomplete because he had not given Gibson "specific instructions as to the disposition of the deed". As a corollary, relying upon Forrest v. Hawkins, 169 Va. 470, 194 S.E. 721 (1938), he argues that authority of an agent to bind his principal to a sealed instrument must be under seal. We consider the latter argument first.
In Forrest, the attorney executed a sealed instrument intended to bind his client. Here, Gibson was merely a conduit through which Capozzella's wishes were transported. The sealed instrument was ex ecuted by the trustees under sealed authority given them in the deed of May 3, 1968, signed and sealed by Capozzella.
As to the former argument, we believe delivery was complete.
On the question of intent, the evidence is uncontradicted that Capozzella intended to remove title from the names of the trustees. If he intended the deed to be operative for one purpose, he must be taken to have intended it to be operative for all purposes apparent on its face.
Not once, until separated from his new wife, did he deny that he intended her to share ownership of his home. Prior to the marriage, he told Gibson that he wanted to put the property in her name. Only a few days after the marriage, he reaffirmed that purpose, and when Gibson advised how the deed should be drawn, his words and conduct justified Gibson in believing that he had full authority to pursue the course he recommended. A scant two weeks later, after receiving Gibson's letter telling him that the trustees were ready to execute the deed, Capozzella called his wife and asked her to supply the information necessary for Gibson to draft it, something he would not have done had he objected to its purpose.
When the couple returned to Gibson's office in August, Capozzella had another opportunity to protest what he knew Gibson was doing. Not only did he fail to challenge Gibson's authority, he accepted Gibson's further suggestion that he hold the deed and save recording costs until a decision had been reached about a possible sale. The following morning at breakfast, Capozzella told his wife's father that Gibson had made arrangements to effectuate the gift he was making her.
Even after receipt of Gibson's letter telling him that the executed deed was in his hands, Capozzella did not question Gibson's authority or repudiate what he had done. Rather, he paid Gibson for legal services rendered and reimbursed him for trustees' fees advanced.
When the deed, drafted and executed as Capozzella intended, was delivered to Gibson as Capozzella intended, there was an "intention to deliver . effectuated by words or acts" and therefore a "delivery" within the meaning of the rule in Payne. From the circumstances of this case, the chancellor decided the question of fact and found that delivery was complete. The evidence supports his finding. Upon delivery, title passed from the trustees to the Capozzellas. The fact that Henry F. Capozzella gave Gibson no instructions as to what he should do with the deed after delivery does not negate his intention to transfer title by such delivery.
We find no merit in Capozzella's argument that the trustees violated their fiduciary duty by acting without his written authority. Both trustees were Capozzella's attorneys in his first divorce case. Their authority to execute their deed was written into the deed Capozzella and his first wife made to them pursuant to the separation agreement. Both of these documents were signed by Capozzella. Neither required the trustees to await written instructions. Oral instructions, transmitted through Gibson by the sole beneficiary of the trust, were sufficient to justify the exercise of their fiduciary responsibility.
Finding no error, we affirm the chancellor's decree.
Affirmed.