Case Name: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Shawn SHERMAN, Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2003-05-16
Citations: 63 F. App'x 279
Docket Number: No. 02-3563
Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Shawn SHERMAN, Appellant.
Judges: Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, BOWMAN, and WOLLMAN, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 63
Pages: 279–280

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Shawn SHERMAN, Appellant.
No. 02-3563.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted May 1, 2003.
Decided May 16, 2003.
Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, BOWMAN, and WOLLMAN, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Shawn Sherman appeals from the final judgment entered in the District Court after a jury found him guilty of possessing with intent to distribute over five grams of a mixture or substance containing cocaine base. On appeal, counsel has moved to withdraw and filed a brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), arguing that the District Court erred in faffing to instruct the jury that it must find that Sherman intended to distribute at least five grams of cocaine base as required by Apprendi v. New Jersey, 630 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). We reject this argument and affirm.
The indictment charged a specific drug quantity, and the jury found Sherman guilty pursuant to instructions that referenced that quantity. As such, we find no abuse of discretion. See United States v. Beckman, 222 F.3d 512, 520-21 (8th Cir.2000) (using abuse-of-discretion standard of review to determine "whether the instructions, taken as a whole and viewed in light of the evidence and applicable law, fairly and adequately submitted the issues in the case to the jury," and finding no abuse of discretion where district court's instructions accurately and thoroughly provided elements and definition of crimes charged) (internal citations omitted). Even if the drug quantity had not been established in the jury instructions, Sherman's ninety-month sentence is not subject to an Apprendi challenge because it does not exceed the twenty-year statutory maximum under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) (2000) that is applicable to drug-trafficking offenses without regard to drug quantity. See United States v. Aguayo-Delgado, 220 F.3d 926, 932 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1026, 121 S.Ct. 600, 148 L.Ed.2d 513 (2000). Sherman also cannot rely on Ap-prendi to challenge the five-year statutory minimum under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B). See Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 557, 122 S.Ct. 2406, 153 L.Ed.2d 524 (2002) (explaining that Apprendi does not prohibit judges from deciding facts that increase mandatory minimum sentence).
Having reviewed the record independently under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), including the sufficiency of the evidence, we find no nonfrivolous issues. Accordingly, we affirm, and we grant counsel's motion to withdraw.
. The Honorable Stephen N. Limbaugh, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri.