Case Name: THE FLORIDA BAR, Complainant, v. Daniel Neal HELLER, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1985-06-13
Citations: 473 So. 2d 1250
Docket Number: No. 66841
Parties: THE FLORIDA BAR, Complainant, v. Daniel Neal HELLER, Respondent.
Judges: ADKINS, OVERTON, ALDERMAN, MCDONALD and EHRLICH, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 473
Pages: 1250–1253

Head Matter:
THE FLORIDA BAR, Complainant, v. Daniel Neal HELLER, Respondent.
No. 66841.
Supreme Court of Florida.
June 13, 1985.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 5, 1985.
John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, John T. Berry, Staff Counsel, Tallahassee, and Patricia S. Etkin, Asst. Staff Counsel, Miami, for complainant.
Alan C. Sundberg and George N. Meros, Jr., of Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cutler, Tallahassee, for respondent.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Having been convicted of three counts of income tax evasion and three counts of falsely subscribing to an income tax return, Daniel Neal Heller has filed a petition to avoid his immediate suspension from the practice of law. Under the Integration Rule of The Florida Bar, article XI, rule 11.07, the filing of a notice of a felony conviction, properly documented, causes an automatic suspension unless a petition such as that filed by Heller is granted by this Court.
Heller's petition to withhold suspension from The Florida Bar is based in part on the argument that the federal criminal convictions were obtained by means of a prosecution and trial that did not conform to basic minimum standards of fairness required under the Florida Constitution. He also complains of religious bias. In The Florida Bar v. Prior, 330 So.2d 697 (Fla.1976), in which this Court suspended a lawyer based on federal convictions, a special concurring opinion by two members of the Court said:
[A] trial-level determination of guilt [is] "conclusive proof" of the underlying facts for the obvious purpose of preventing suspension proceedings in this Court from becoming factual retrials. There is neither an adequate record nor an inherent capability in this Court to pass upon the validity of the attorney's conviction or the merits of his appeal. Attempts to assess the likelihood of reversal from the arguments of counsel invite a form of speculation with which this Court should have no part. A majority of other states interpreting rules or statutes similar to our rule have held that suspension may be ordered where a conviction is being appealed, even though (as our rule provides) it may be lifted if the appeal results in a reversal.
Id. at 699-700 (Overton, C.J., and England, J., concurring specially) (footnotes omitted). The approach suggested by the above-quoted words has been predominant in this Court's disposition of petitions to withhold suspension sought on the ground of felony conviction. Thus the legal correctness of the judgment of conviction, as it is likely to be perceived by the court with jurisdiction of the appeal, is ordinarily beyond the scope of this Court's consideration of a petition such as that before us in this case. In general, the judgment of conviction of a felony is conclusive proof of the commission of the felony and, on the basis of the wrongdoing thus shown, immediate suspension is considered appropriate.
On the other hand, the rule as written expressly gives this Court the discretion to defer suspension for good cause. The rule clearly does not contemplate that the Court "must pro forma disapprove of every petition of a convicted attorney to defer suspension of him pending appeal." The Florida Bar v. Smith, 301 So.2d 768, 771 (Fla.1974).
We note that in his order denying post-conviction relief, the trial judge recited findings which clearly show a misuse of trust funds and an abuse of Heller's trust account. This factor, coupled with the convictions and the trial judge's other factual findings, cause us to conclude that Heller's motion should be denied and he should be suspended pending his federal court appeal. This suspension shall be effective July 15, 1985, thereby giving respondent thirty days to close out his practice and take the necessary steps to protect his clients. Respondent shall accept no new business.
It is so ordered.
ADKINS, OVERTON, ALDERMAN, MCDONALD and EHRLICH, JJ., concur.
BOYD, C.J., concurs specially with an opinion with which SHAW, J., concurs.
The trial judge found monies were transferred from the trust account when the regular account bank balance was low or when Heller directed a transfer for other reasons. The trust fund monies were also used by Heller to purchase personal items and Heller took out "loans" from the trust account without the clients' knowledge or permission.