Case Name: PRESIDENTIAL TOWERS, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. CITY OF PASSAIC, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT
Court: New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1985-02-04
Citations: 7 N.J. Tax 655
Docket Number: 
Parties: PRESIDENTIAL TOWERS, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. CITY OF PASSAIC, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Tax Court Reports
Volume: 7
Pages: 655–657

Head Matter:
PRESIDENTIAL TOWERS, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. CITY OF PASSAIC, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.
Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division
Argued January 7, 1985
Decided February 4, 1985.
Before Judges MORTON I. GREENBERG, O’BRIEN and GAYNOR.
Jonathan N. Harris argued the cause for appellant (Andora, Palmisano, DeCotiis & Harris, attorneys; Jonathan N. Harris on the brief; Anthony D. Andora of counsel and on the brief).
John J. McKniff argued the cause for respondent.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
The owners of 63 condominium units located in a high-rise complex known as Presidential Towers appeal from the decision of the Tax Court affirming the 1982 assessments on their units as fixed by judgments of the Passaic County Board of Taxation. It is contended that the court erred in utilizing the "rounded up" average ratio of assessed to true value, as promulgated by the Director, Division of Taxation, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 54:1-35.1, rather than the "actual" average ratio, in determining whether any appellant was entitled to discrimination relief. A further contention is that there was no evidentiary support for the court's use of a 13% mortgage interest rate for purposes of its cash equivalency analyses.
We have carefully reviewed the record and are in accord with the conclusions of Judge Crabtree as set forth in his published opinion reported in 6 N.J.Tax 406 (Tax Ct.1984) and his letter opinion dated May 4, 1984.
We are satisfied that there was sufficient credible evidence justifying the judge's utilization of a mortgage interest rate of 13% for purposes of the cash-equivalency market value analyses. Also, that the "rounded up" school aid ratio as originally promulgated by the Director, Division of Taxation, was properly relied upon by the court inasmuch as such figure had been used by the parties during the trial and the validity of such rounding up had not been preserved as an issue in the pretrial order. R. 4:25-1; Rothman Realty Corp. v. Berick, 73 N.J. 590, 598, 376 A.2d 902 (1977).
Affirmed.