Case Name: BENJAMIN L. SIMPSON v. WITTE IRON WORKS COMPANY, Appellant
Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1913-04-08
Citations: 249 Mo. 376
Docket Number: 
Parties: BENJAMIN L. SIMPSON v. WITTE IRON WORKS COMPANY, Appellant.
Judges: Graves, Faris and Walker, JJ., concur in this opinion; Lamm, G. J., Woodson and Brown, JJ., dissent in opinion by Lamm, C. J.
Reporter: Missouri Reports
Volume: 249
Pages: 376–409

Head Matter:
BENJAMIN L. SIMPSON v. WITTE IRON WORKS COMPANY, Appellant.
In Banc,
April 8, 1913.
1. FACTORY ACT: Constitutionality: Notice. The court in holding in the case of Williams v. Railroad, 233 Mo. 1. c. 680, that section 20 of the Eactory Act, Laws 1891, p. 162, now Sec. 7844, R. S. 1909, pertaining to railroad platforms, passageways and other structures in railroad yards, was unconstitutional in that the subject-matter of that section was not clearly expressed in the title of the act, did not hold that Sec. 7828, R. S. 1909, was invalid, nor was its validity held in judgment in that case; and the observations of the court in that case to the effect that no civil action could be brought under that section even if valid, unless the prior notice required by section 16 of said act, now Sec. 7844, R. S. 1909, had been given by the factory inspector of the unsafe condition of the platform, passageways, etc., to those in charge of the place, were obiter dicta and therefore in no sense res adjudieata.
2. -: Violation Negligence Per Se. Section 7828, R. S. 1909, declaring that “the belting, shafting, machines, machinery, gearing and drums, in all manufacturing, mechanical and other establishments in this State, when so placed as to be dangerous to persons employed therein or thereabouts while engaged in their ordinary duties, shall be safely and securely guarded when possible; if not possible, then notice of its danger shall be conspicuously posted in such establishment,” imposes a positive duty upon the employer to do two things: first, to provide safe and secure guards when possible for motion and power machines “when so placed as to be dangerous to employees;” and, second, if that is not possible, to conspicuously post a danger signal as a warning to employees. If these duties are obeyed, the employer is not liable for injuries occasioned by such agencies to his employees; if they are not obeyed, then the employer’s disobedience is an act of negligence per se, and he is responsible for all injuries directly caused by such failure, except such as are due to the employer’s contributory negligence; and the employer’s negligence exists prior to and independently of any notice to him by the factory inspector to make alterations necessary for the health and safety of the employees.
3. -: -: Prior Notice from Factory Inspector. The liability of the factory employer to his injured employee for failure to guard his machinery or to post a conspicuous notice of danger, is not dependent upon a prior inspection by the factory inspector and a notice from him to the employer to make alterations necessary to the safety and health of the employees, as required hy Sec. 7842, R. S. 1909. The employer’s failure to comply with the requirements of the inspector would he a new and independent violation of the Factory Act, hut that section is merely an additional safeguard provided for the employee, and does not affect his right to recover for damages for injuries due to the employer’s failure to comply with the duties imposed by Sec. 7828.
4. -: Purpose of Statute: Idle Belt in Aisle. The Statute (Sec. 7828, R. S. 1909) requiring the belting, gearing, etc., of machinery and machines in factories to he safely and securely guarded, conditioned that duty upon the words “when so placed as to he dangerous to persons employed therein or thereabouts while engaged in their ordinary duties,” and means that the belting should be guarded when its normal operation would injure an employee who should approach near enough to be caught hy its force. It does not apply where the employer placed partly across an aisle ten feet wide an electric motor carrying a belt, but leaving a space of about three feet of aisle not occupied by the motor or belt, and an employee, upon entering the factory and proceeding to the place of register, tripped over the unguarded belt, which was not in motion and was eighteen or twenty inches above the floor, and was injured by the fall.
Held, by LAMM, O. J., dissenting, with whom WOODSON and BROWN, JJ., concur, that the scope of the statute should not be narrowed to dangerous and unguarded machinery and belting while in motion, since the statute says nothing about motion and the courts have no right to read such an exception into it.
Held, also, that the danger of an unguarded belt, stretched in the uncertain light of a winter’s morning across the pathway customarily used, with the employer’s knowledge, by the employees as they went to the register clock to register-in, its presence there being unknown to them, comes within the purview of the statute, since the act of registering-in was one of their ordinary duties, and the fact that the belt was not in motion at the instant was a mere incident of its use, and no device more cunningly calculated to trip and injure a footman could be well imagined than a flexible belt stretched close to the floor.
Held, also, that the proposition that an employer would have no reasonable ground to anticipate that an employee would come in contact with a belt stretched in that way, does not commend itself.
Held, also, that the jury were as capable as this court of deciding whether the presence of the belt was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury.
5. -: Constitutionality: Void in One Section: Valid as to Others. The holding in Williams v. Railroad, 233 Mo. 1. c. 680, that the section of the Factory Act relating to railroads was unconstitutional because that section was not embraced in the title to the act, did not affect the validity of the independent section relating to guarding machinery in factories. Where one section of a statute can subsist in unimpaired vigor after the destruction of another, they are not interdependent, but independent, and the unconstitutionality of the one does not affect the validity of the other. The section relating to the duty to guard belting, gearing, etc., of machines and machinery . in factories is embraced in the title of the act, and is consti- . tutional.
Appeal from Jackson Circuit Court. — Hon. Thomas J. Seehorn, Judge.
REVERSED.
Pierre B. Porter for appellant.
(1) There can be no violation of the belt guarding statute until after notice by the factory inspector. R. S. 1899, sec. 6446; Williams v. Railroad, 233 Mo. 682; Foley v. Machine Works, 149 Mass. 297; Borck v. Bolt & Nut Co., Ill Mich. 133; Kerr v. Brass Mfg. Co., 155 Mich. 191. (2) Even before the Williams decision the Missouri courts held that in order to prove statutory negligence in failing to guard a belt, it must be affirmatively shown that the defendant had reasonable ground to anticipate injury to employees, either in the course of its regular movements or by an irregular movement due to bad repair or bad handling. Strode v. Box Co., 124 Mo. App. 523. (3) The guarding statute has no application to this accident because: (a) The belt was stationary. The cause of the accident was plaintiff’s act of stumbling over the belt. The belt produced the fall not in its capacity as an unguarded belt, but as an inanimate object, for which there is a common law remedy, (b) There was no reasonable ground to anticipate that plaintiff would come in contact with it while in the performance of his ordinary duties, (c) Plaintiff’s own testimony showed that the belt was not so located as to be dangerous to him in his ordinary duty because he was not required to pass over the space occupied by it, but could have gone safely through the three-foot passageway to the east of the belt, or down the main aisle. Under such a state of facts there was no duty to guard. Lang v. Bolt & Nut Co., 131 Mo. App. 146; Strode v. Box Co., 124 Mo. App. 511; Powalske v. Brick Co., 110 Wis. 461; Wynkoop v. Mfg. Co., 30 L. B. A. (N. S.) 40, 196 N. Y. 324; Stodden v. Anderson & Winter Mfg. Co., 16 L. B. A. (N. S.) 614; Meifert v. Sand Co., 124 Mo. App. 491; Cement Co. v. Ins. Co., 162 N. Y. 403; Bobbins v. Port Wayne Co., 41 Ind. App. 557. (4) The failure to guard did not in any way contribute to the cause of the accident, (a) In determining whether an act is the proximate cause of the injury, the legal test is: Was the injury of such a character that it might have been foreseen or expected as a natural result of the act complained of? Words and Phrases — Proximate Cause, 5764; Neuman v. Bailroad, 20 Iowa, 672; Bailroad v. Bowland, 38 S. W. (Tex.) 756; Holwerson v. Bailroad, 157 Mo. 216; 2 Labatt, Master & Servant, p. 2243. (b) It could not be reasonably expected that he would stumble over this belt in broad day light. Therefore there was no duty to guard against the occurrence of such an accident in broad day light, (c) Nor was there any duty to guard in an unusual condition of darkness, (d) The sole contributory cause of the accident (eliminating his own carelessness) was the darkness and not the failure to guard. He would have stumbled over a guard and received the same injury, while but for this alleged darkness he would not have received any injury at all if he had been in the exercise of due care. (5) Plaintiff did not bring his case within the statute. He failed to prove that it was “possible” or “reasonably practicable” to guard the belt. E. S. 1899, sec. 6433; E. S. 1909, sec. 7828; Huss v. Bakery Co., 210 Mo. 44; Henschell v. Eailroad, 78 Kan. 415; Carriage Co. v. Sullender, 165 Ind. 303.
James G. Smart and Charles 11. Pence for respondent.
(1) See. 7828, E. S. 1909, does not require notice by the inspector to the factory owner and a failure by the owner to construct guards after such notice. It is complete within and of itself and prescribes the duty which the defendant failed to perform. This is not a criminal prosecution to recover the penalty prescribed in section 7846. Eose v. King, 15 L. E. A. 160; Willy v. Mulledy, 78 N. Y. 313; Lore v. American Mfg. Co., 160 Mo. 608; Collins v. Paper Co., 143 Mo. App. 333. The Supreme Court did not intend in its dictum expressed in Williams v. Eailroad, 233 Mo. 666, to overrule the cases cited below in which it was held that the factory owner was guilty of negligence per se if he fails to construct the guard as required by section 7828. In none of these cases was notice by the inspector to the owner either pleaded or proven. Lore v. American Mfg. Co., 160 Mo. 608; Millsop v. Biggs, 122 Mo. App. 6; Stafford v. Adams, 113 Mo. App. 721; Collins v. Paper Co., 143 Mo. App. 333; Bair v. Heibel, 103 Mo. App. 634; Colliott v. American Mfg. Co., 71' Mo. App. 171. Section 20 of Act of 1891, in reference to railroads, was held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Williams v. Eailroad, and the comments in reference to the construction of this unconstitutional law are mere dictum and do not have the force of an adjudication. The comments are applicable alone to section 20 and not to section 3. The petition was not faulty for failure to allege directly either actual or constructive knowledge by defendant of the danger from the belt. Its allegations were equivalent to an allegation of such knowledge. Young v. Schickle, 103 Mo. 328; Hall v. Eailroad, 74 Mo. 322; Crane v. Eailroad, 87 Mo. 594; Tateman v. Bailroad, 96 Mo. App. 448. (2) Counsel for defendant complains that the court erred in overruling defendant’s demurrer to the evidence for the reason that the statute is not applicable to machinery not in motion. The statute does not say so. Its words are general, simply to the effect that the belting, etc., if so placed as to be dangerous shall be guarded. Some machinery may be as dangerous at rest as in motion; other machinery because of its slow motion is not made more dangerous thereby. The Legislature did not see fit to limit the meaning which it could have done by the mere words “while in motion.” Nor is it the province of the court to interpolate these words. Henderson v. Kansas City, 177 Mo. 493; Bair v. Hei-bel, 103 Mo. App. 634; Lore v. Mfg. Co., 160 Mo. 608; Strode v. Box Co., 124 Mo. App. 516; Colliott v. Mfg. Co., 71 Mo. App. 171. (3) Another reason assigned by counsel was that there was no reasonable ground to anticipate that plaintiff would come in contact with it in the performance of his ordinary duties. , This exact question was submitted to the jury by the defendant’s instructions. There was abundant evidence to support the verdict in this respect. (4) Another reason assigned by counsel for defendant is that plaintiff was not required to pass over the space occupied by the belt, but could have gone in another way. The evidence overwhelmingly shows that the- way plaintiff went was customarily or ordinarily used by the employees. Surely no fault can be attributed to plaintiff for not using some other way. (5) Counsel for defendant complains that the failure t<5 guard was not the proximate cause. If the belt had been safely and securely guarded he would not have fallen. It was not guarded and he did fall. Lore v. Mfg. Co., 160 Mo. 608. The evidence is that the place was dark and the -employees were required to begin their work at 7 o’clock in the morning before the sun was up. The defendant knew this. A reasonably prudent person would anticipate just such an injury as plaintiff received.
STATEMENT BY THE COURT.
This suit is for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff while in the employment of defendant, a manufacturer of gas and gasoline engines in Kansas City, Missouri. For his cause of action, plaintiff alleges that he arrived at the factory to begin his day’s work about seven o’clock on November 16, 1909; that while passing through an aisle on his way to a clock where the workmen were required to register, he was tripped by a. belt which was lying in the aisle and was thrown to the floor and permanently injured; that his injuries were caused from the failure of defendant to comply with the provisions of the statutes of Missouri requiring the guarding of machinery when so placed as to be dangerous to employees. He asks judgment for $7500 damages.
The defendant’s answer contained a general denial, a plea of contributory negligence, and assumption of risk.
There was evidence tending to show that the plaintiff was an experienced pattern-maker; that it was his duty to pass through a room adjoining the one in which his work was done, for the purpose of registering at a time clock provided by defendant to be used by its employees to record the time of beginning and ceasing their work; that this clock had been recently moved from its former location about sixty-five feet south-wardly and on the day in question stood on the east side of an aisle or passageway about ten feet wide, partly across which defendant placed an electric motor carrying a belt but leaving a space of about three feet of aisle not occupied by the motor or belt; that on the morning on which plaintiff was injured he was late on reaching the factory, getting there a little after seven o’clock, at wMeli hour all of defendant’s employees were required to be at their work; that lie first entered a store room provided for the clothing of employees, and walked through the aisle wherein the motor stood to the clock and register; that there was another aisle west of the one nsed by plaintiff and known as the main aisle, leading to the clock, which was nsed by employees in going to register and which presented a safe passageway. The one chosen by plaintiff was shorter. There was evidence tending to show that the room was ill lighted at that honr of the morning; that the belt over which plaintiff tripped was unguarded and not in use at the'time; that the upper rim of the belt stood about eighteen or twenty inches above the floor. Plaintiff testified that he did not see the belt until he fell over it. He admitted on cross-examination that he was not looking for the belt but had his head turned in a direction to see the clock; that after he fell he looked behind and saw that he had been tripped by the belt, that he could have seen it if he had been looking for it. Defendant adduced evidence tending to show that the injuries to plaintiff were caused by his failure to use the other or main aisle leading from the locker to the clock, and by his negligent failure to look out for the belt on the aisle which he did use.
Plaintiff had judgment for $3750, from which defendant appealed to the Kansas City Court of Appeals. That court transferred the ease to this court upon the theory that a question as to the constitutionality of the statute upon which this action is based is involved under the ruling of this court in Williams v. Bailroad, 233 Mo. 666. When the case came here it was assigned to Division One. The judges of that division being equally divided in opinion, the cause was sent to Banc.
The errors assigned are, that the petition states no cause of action, the refusal of the court to sustain a demurrer to the evidence, and its exclusion of the certificate of the factory inspector, dated November 17, 1909, and also his oral testimony relating to his inspection.

Opinion:
OPINION.
BOND, J.
(after stating the facts as above).—One section of the Factory Act was reviewed and held to be void because its subject-matter was not clearly expressed in the title of the act as prescribed by the Constitution. [Constitution of Missouri, art, 4, sec. 28; Williams v. Railroad, 233 Mo. l. c. 680.] The particular section of the Factory Act then in judgment was the one referring exclusively to the railroad platforms, passageways and other structures on their yards and grounds. It was known as section 20 of the Laws of 1891, p. 162, and is now found in the Revised Statutes of 1909, section 7844.
The body and substance of the original Factory Act, with slight alterations, is contained in the present revision [R. S. 1909, secs. 7827 to 7852 inclusive.] This court in the Williams case, supra, after disposing of the matter then in judgment by deciding that the plaintiff who had grounded her action upon the aforesaid section of the Factory Act, could not recover because "an unconstitutional act is no law at all," proceeded to make some observations as to the applicability of another section of the Factory Act defining the duties of the Factory Inspector (Laws 1891, p. 161, sec. 16; R. S. 1909, sec. 7842) to the one held in judgment (Laws 1891, p. 162, sec. 20; R. S. 1909, sec. 7844), and intimated that no civil action could be brought for injuries under the section sued upon even if valid, unless a prior notice had been given by the inspector of the unsafe condition of the platforms, passageways and other' structures in and about the railroad yard to the persons in charge of the place. These remarks of the court were abstract from the matter in judgment, for that had been completely disposed of by the previous correct decision annulling the statute upon which plaintiff 's cause of action'rested. They appertained to a snpposable case and are not authoritative nor binding on us. The point not then before the court has now arisen and demands judgment in the case at bar. It grows out of the existence of the section of the statute making it the duty of the factory inspector or his assistant to ascertain all matters of danger to the "health or safety" of employees and to notify the person in charge of the factory or .place to make necessary "alterations or additions" to obviate the reported dangers. That section concludes, to-wit: "The factory inspector or assistant inspector shall at once notify the person or persons in charge of such establishment or place to make the alterations or additions necessary within thirty days; and if such alterations or additions be not made within thirty days from the date of such notice, or within such time as said alterations could be made with proper diligence, then such failure to make such, alterations shall be deemed a violation of this article." [R. S. 1909, sec. 7842; Laws 1891, p. 161, sec. 16.] The section on which plaintiff's suit is founded is, to-wit: "The belting, shafting, machines, machinery, gearing and drums, in all manufacturing, mechanical and other establishments in this State, when so placed as to be dangerous to persons employed therein or thereabout while engaged in their ordinary duties, shall be safely and securely guarded when possible; if not possible, then notice of its danger shall be conspicuously posted in such establishments." [R. S. 1909, see. 7828.] To determine the relation of these two provisions, regard must be had to their respective terms and purposes and also to the language, and general intent of the Legislature in the enactment of the entire Factory Act. The particular section in judgment in this case imposes a positive duty on the part of the employer to do two things: (1) To provide safe and secure guards when possible for certain agencies of motion and power '"when so placed as to be dangerous" to employees; (2) If that is not possible, then to post a danger signal as a warning to employees. [Huss v. Bakery Co., 210 Mo. l. c. 51, 52.] If these statutory directions are obeyed, then the employer is not liable for injuries occasioned by such agencies to such employees. If they are not obeyed, then the employer's disobedience is an act of negligence, and he is responsible for any and all injuries directly caused by such failure, saving the defense of contributory negligence. [Lore v. American Manufacturing Co., 160 Mo. 608; Millsap v. Beggs, 122 Mo. App. l. c. 5 and 6.] The responsibility of the employer arises in such cases not only to the injured employee but to the State, for other sections of the act make his disobedience of any of its provisions (including the one under review) a misdemeanor punishable to the extent provided in such sections. [R. S. 1909, secs. 7846 to 7851 inclusive.] This double liability is imposed by the general tenor of the act and relates to every requirement contained in any provision of any valid section of the Factory Act. [R. S. 1909, secs. 7846 and 7847.]
If the employer is guilty of negligence per se' in violating the statute imposing personal duties on him, as is the law, then his negligence exists prior and independently of the report thereof by the inspector. The report of the inspector, if it should relate to the peculiar duties imposed by the statute under review, would only serve to call to the attention of the employer his own disobedience of the mandate of that section and require him to do the very things previously demanded and which he had neglected to perform, thereby violating a specific duty and committing a misdemeanor under other sections of the statute. [R. S. 1909, secs. 7846 and 7847.] And while it is true that his failure to comply with the requirements of the inspector would be a new and independent violation of the Factory Act, yet this second offense could not in reason relieve him from the consequences of the former. To rule otherwise would exempt the employer from liability, unless his omission to conform to the specific requirements of the section under review — although directly causing injury to one of his employees — is subsequently ascertained and reported to him by the factory inspector. Such a construction cannot be maintained on any logical ground and if adopted would not only emasculate the beneficent purposes of the section under review to afford greater security to the employee, but would leave him in a worse condition than at common law. For under that- rule the employer would be liable to an employee injured by being put to work at a place not reasonably safe, while under the statute requiring specific precautions he would not be liable for omitting these, unless informed of his negligence by a third party. The independence of these two sections is a necessary conclusion from the consideration of their respective language and terms. It is apparent on the face of the section relating to the duties of inspectors (R. S. 1909, sec. 7842), that its object was not to affect the obligation of the employer to comply with any other provisions of the Factory Act, but that it was solely designed to empower the inspector therein named to ascertain whether the "health or safety" of the employees was imperiled, either by the failure of the employer to comply with specific duties imposed on him in other sections of the act, or by any of the other matters referred to in the inspection section. After he has made the investigation prescribed, it is the duty of the factory inspector (in case he finds a condition existing deleterious to the employees) to require the employer to make "alterations and additions" necessary and remedy such condition within thirty days or by "reasonable diligence," and the failure of the employer to comply with these requirements is a separate and distinct "violation of this article." The evident purpose of this section was to enlarge the protection of employees afforded by other sections of the Factory Act, by making the continued neglect of his statutory duties by the employer an additional violation of the Factory Act affording in proper cases a basis for civil or criminal liability. It is, therefore, simply supplementary to other sections of the act, including the one on which plaintiff's suit is based, and is in furtherance of the general purposes and scope of the Factory Act. The only relation of the inspection section to the one under review is to give it greater efficiency by adding to the previous duty of the employer the secondary duty of remedying his neglect under penalty as of a second violation of the statute. We, therefore, hold that the inspection section of the act is merely an additional safeguard provided for the employee, and that it does not either in letter or spirit affect his right to redress for the failure of the employer to provide for other safeguards provided by other sections of the Factory Act. And we further hold, that an injury to an employee caused by failure to guard machinery as prescribed in the section under review in this case is negligence per se and actionable independent of any notice of the factory inspector in the performance of his duties under the section relating thereto.
II. The decisive question in this case is, under what circumstances does the duty of the employer to guard the b.elting, shafting, etc., referred to in the section, supra, arise? Obviously, this must be determined by the language of the section as affected by the scope and object of the entire act, of which it is a subsidiary part. An inspection of the language of the section, supra, shows that the duties 'imposed by it upon employers with reference to the use of certain machinery are predicated upon the following language: "When so placed as to be dangerous to persons employed therein or thereabout while engaged in their ordinary duties." This phrase indicates that the Legislature had the rational motive of warding off the danger likely to occur from the location of certain agencies of power and motion, whose operation is necessary to the business of the employer, by requiring him to guard against the danger arising from their use to employees working about the place where they are situated. The Legislature comprehended that such engines would only be placed in a factory for the purpose for which they are made and designed, and that when so used they would, unless securely guarded, injure any employee who might come into contact with them. The Legislature also knew that the belting, shafting, etc., mentioned in this section have no intrinsic power to injure, such as is had by machinery containing on its outside spikes, saws or other things likely to hurt any one who should fall upon and against them, and thei'efore had no greater potentiality to inflict injury than any other furniture unless they are put to their proper uses as the originators or conduits of motion and power. We think, therefore, that the lawmakers in conditioning the duty to guard upon the phrase above quoted meant thereby that it should attach when the "belting," etc., should be so placed in a factory that its normal operation would injure any employee who should approach near enough to be caught by its force or subjected to its activity. Such accidents are likely to happen to employees who are engrossed in work near such machines unless they are protected from the workings of the machinery by safe and secure guards. This thought is expressed with clearness, force and completeness by Woodson, J., in the dissenting opinion of Huss v. Bakery Co., 210 Mo. l. c. 67 and 68, to-wit: "The Legislature knew that the human mind and conduct were such that a servant when in the performance of his duties to his master, surrounded by dangerous machinery, in motion, with his mind concentrated upon his work, oblivious to his surroundings, is liable to slip or take a misstep and fall into the revolving machinery, or thoughtlessly thrust his hand or other portion of his body into the gearing or other portion of the machinery; and if not 'safely and securely guarded' he would .in consequence thereof receive injuries of a serious character."
In the case at bar the belting over which plaintiff: stumbled occupied two-thirds of the width of the passageway. It was in a state of absolute inertia and had no greater power to inflict injury on him than would have happened if he had stumbled over or against a guard rail of equal height — eighteen or twenty inches. These facts demonstrate that a railing around it would have been no less injurious to a man walking across it with his head turned in another direction— as the proof shows was the case — than the idle belt.
We do not think that the section under review imposed any duty upon defendant to surround this belt with a railing or other guard under the circumstances attending its presence in the aisle at the time plaintiff was injured, and that no cause of action arose in plaintiff's favor under the section of the statute, supra, upon which his suit is based.
In view of this conclusion, it is unnecessary for us to pass upon the assignment of error as to the alleged contributory negligence of plaintiff.
III. The only point that need be further noticed in this case is whether or not the correct ad judication in Williams v. Railroad, snpra, that the provision relating to railroad structures was unconstitutional and void, affected the section of the article under review in this case. The rule on that subject is-this: If one section of a statute can subsist in unimpaired vigor and efficiency after the destruction of another, then they are not interdependent but are independent .provisions, and the unconstitutionality of the one does not affect the constitutionality of another. [Cooley, Const. Lim. (7 Ed.), p. 247; State ex rel. v. St. Louis, 241 Mo. l. c. 246; State ex rel. v. Cordon, 236 Mo. l. c. 170.] The very reason which induced the court to hold that the section of the Factory Act referring to platforms and railroad structures was unconstitutional, was that it was distinct and foreign to the other sections of the act and not pointed out in the title. If it was so dissimilar and unrelated to the remaining provisions as to warrant its exclusion on the ground that it referred to matters foreign to the subject of the bill, then its elimination does not affect the completeness or the enforceability of the section upon which plaintiff's right of action is based. Besides the independence of these two sections is shown by the language of each. We hold the section under which plaintiff's suit is brought to be constitutional and enforceable in all cases justly falling within its provisions.
Plaintiff in this case has not brought «himself within the scope and purview of that section. His action is solely based on it. Whatever may have been his rights at common law, he is not entitled to' recover in the present action; and the judgment in this case is reversed.
Graves, Faris and Walker, JJ., concur in this opinion; Lamm, G. J., Woodson and Brown, JJ., dissent in opinion by Lamm, C. J.