Case Name: LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA, Appellant, v. Ewa A. CICHOWLAS, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1995-09-06
Citations: 659 So. 2d 1333
Docket Number: No. 93-1892
Parties: LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA, Appellant, v. Ewa A. CICHOWLAS, Appellee.
Judges: GLICKSTEIN, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 659
Pages: 1333–1342

Head Matter:
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA, Appellant, v. Ewa A. CICHOWLAS, Appellee.
No. 93-1892.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Sept. 6, 1995.
Robert D. McIntosh and Kimberly W. Co-cahs of Fleming, 0Bryan & Fleming, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.
Laurie S. Moss of Esler, Petrie & Saltón, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.

Opinion:
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
PER CURIAM.
We withdraw our previous opinion and substitute the following in its place.
Life Insurance Company of North America (LINA) appeals from a summary judgment awarding benefits to its insured's widow. We reverse because the insured did not satisfy the requirement, explicitly stated in the application, that he be still insurable on the effective date of the policy.
The one-page insurance application at issue asked five questions and required the applicant to sign under a statement reading in pertinent part,
To the best of my knowledge and belief, the information on this application . is true and complete. I understand that the information is being relied on to issue insurance and that my insurance can be voided if any of the information I provide is not true....
I further understand that, if my application is accepted, coverage will go into effect on the effective date shown on my certificate of insurance provided I am still insurable on that date and provided LINA receives my first premium payment during my lifetime.
It is undisputed that Mr. Waldemar Cichow-las answered all five questions truthfully "no" as of the application date, including one which asked if he had been hospitalized during the past five years and one which asked if he had ever had or been treated for several enumerated ailments including lung disease. It is also undisputed that Mr. Cichowlas was hospitalized for chest pains three days after filling out the application, some three weeks before the policy took effect. He had been having pains prior to his filling out the insurance application. As a result of his hospitalization, Mr. Cichowlas was diagnosed as suffering from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. Mr. Cichowlas did not inform the insurance company of his hospitalization. The uncontradicted testimony on behalf of LINA established that Mr. Cichowlas was not insurable on the effective date of the policy because of the diagnosis. Mr. Cichow-las died three months later of other causes.
Mr. Cichowlas' policy contained a clause requiring that he be "still insurable" on the effective date of the policy. Clauses requiring that an applicant remain insurable between the filing of the application and the delivery of the policy have traditionally been approved by Florida courts. They are generally in the form of statements that the policy shall not take effect unless it is delivered during the continued insurability or sound health of the applicant. E.g., Mathews v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 89 So.2d 641 (Fla.1956); Gulf Life Ins. Co. v. Green, 80 So.2d 321 (Fla.1955); Wolk v. Lamar Life Ins. Co., 202 So.2d 617 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967). Thus, as the evidence was uncontradicted that Mr. Cichowlas was not insurable on the effective date of the policy, the "still insurable" clause precluded recovery for appellee pursuant to its terms.
Reversed and remanded for judgment in favor of appellant.
GLICKSTEIN, J., concurs.
WARNER, J., concurs specially with opinion.
ALVAREZ, RONALD V., Associate Judge, dissents with opinion.