Case Name: Harvey GORDON, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, et al., Respondents
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1992-11-12
Citations: 608 So. 2d 800
Docket Number: No. 78638
Parties: Harvey GORDON, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, et al., Respondents.
Judges: BARKETT, C.J., and OVERTON, MCDONALD, GRIMES, KOGAN and HARDING, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 608
Pages: 800–804

Head Matter:
Harvey GORDON, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, et al., Respondents.
No. 78638.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Nov. 12, 1992.
Bernard B. Weksler of the Law Offices of Bernard B. Weksler, Coral Gables, John Beranek of Aurell, Radey, Hinkle & Thomas, Tallahassee, Florida; and Walter G. Campbell of Krupnick, Campbell, Malone & Roselli, Fort Lauderdale, for petitioner.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Craig B. Willis, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Yvette Rhodes Prescott of Peters, Pickle, Niemoeller, Robertson, Lax & Parsons, Miami, for respondents.
Roy D. Wasson, Miami, amicus curiae, for The Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers.
Jack W. Shaw, Jr. of Osborne, McNatt, Shaw, O’Hara, Brown & Obringer, Jacksonville, amicus curiae, for Florida Defense Lawyers Ass’n.
Edward T. O’Donnell of Herzfeld and Rubin, Miami, amicus curiae, for Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
We review a question certified to be of great public importance: whether subsection 768.73(2)(b), Florida Statutes (Supplement 1986), is constitutional. Gordon v. State, 585 So.2d 1033, 1038 n. 13 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.
Harvey Gordon was falsely imprisoned and battered by employees of K-Mart Corporation in an incident in one of its stores on February 16, 1987. Gordon recovered a jury verdict against K-Mart for $72,500 in compensatory damages and $512,600 in punitive damages, which was affirmed on appeal. K-Mart Corp. v. Gordon, 565 So.2d 834 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). After the mandate was issued, K-Mart, on September 20, 1990, moved to amend the final judgment pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540, and the State moved to intervene to assert its interest in sixty percent of the punitive damages award pursuant to subsection 768.73(2)(b), Florida Statutes (Supplement 1986), which provides:
If the cause of action was based on personal injury or wrongful death, 60 percent of the award shall be payable to the Public Medical Assistance Trust Fund created in s. 409.2662; otherwise, 60 percent of the award shall be payable to the General Revenue Fund.
This provision became effective on July 1, 1986, as part of the Tort Reform and Insurance Act of 1986. Ch. 86-160, § 52, 70, Laws of Fla. The district court upheld the trial court's award to the State. Gordon v. State, 585 So.2d 1033 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). Gordon contends that subsection (2) is unconstitutional. Gordon's attorneys contend that subsection 768.73(4), Florida Statutes (Supplement 1986), also is unconstitutional. We disagree and approve the decision below.
As the district court noted:
[Gordon] has no cognizable, protectable right to the recovery of punitive damages at all. Unlike the right to compensatory damages, the allowance of punitive damages is based entirely upon considerations of public policy. Accordingly, it is clear that the very existence of an inchoate claim for punitive damages is subject to the plenary authority of the ultimate policy-maker under our system, the legislature. In the exercise of that discretion, it may place conditions upon such a recovery or even abolish it altogether.
Gordon, 585 So.2d at 1035-36 (citations omitted). This Court said in Ross v. Gore, 48 So.2d 412, 414 (Fla.1950):
The right to have punitive damages assessed is not property; and it is the general rule that, until a judgment is rendered, there is no vested right in a claim for punitive damages. It cannot, then, be said that the denial of punitive damages has unconstitutionally impaired any property rights of appellant.
(Citations omitted.) The incident here occurred subsequent to the effective date of the statute and thus the award clearly is governed by the statute.
We agree with the trial court that no substantive due- process violation occurred. The statute under attack here bears a rational relationship to legitimate legislative objectives: to allot to the public weal a portion of damages designed to deter future harm to the public and to discourage punitive damage claims by making them less remunerative to the claimant and the claimant's attorney.
We also have considered the other constitutional claims raised and suffice it to say that the statute does not violate the right to trial by jury, does not constitute a tax on judgments, does not deny equal protection and is not a special law.
We further agree that the trial court's amendment to the initial judgment was proper because Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b) authorizes relief from judgment based on "mistake" or "inadvertence," if the motion is made "not more than one year after the judgment." We approve Pruitt v. Brock, 437 So.2d 768 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (holding that the one-year limit of rule 1.540(b) runs from the disposition of a timely-filed motion for rehearing). Although judgment in this case was entered on July 27, 1989, posttrial motions were not denied until October 5, 1989. The rule 1.540 motion was filed on September 20, 1990.
We moreover find no merit to counsel's claim that subsection 768.73(4), providing that attorney's fees, "if payable from the judgment, shall, to the extent that they are based on the punitive damages, be calculated based only on the portion of the judgment payable to the claimant." Valid laws in effect at the time a contract is made enter into and become part of the contract as if expressly incorporated into the contract. State ex rel. Select Tenures, Inc. v. Raulerson, 129 Fla. 346, 176 So. 270 (1937). Gordon's cause of action accrued after the effective date of section 768.73 and the contingent fee contract was entered into after the statute went into effect; hence the statute did not impair any preexisting contractual rights of Gordon's attorney.
Accordingly we answer the question certified in the affirmative and approve the decision of the district court.
It is so ordered.
BARKETT, C.J., and OVERTON, MCDONALD, GRIMES, KOGAN and HARDING, JJ., concur.
SHAW, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion.