Case Name: IN RE GUARDIANSHIP OF ANGELA McMENAMY; R. EMMET KANE, Guardian, Appellant, v. JOHN McMENAMY, Co-guardian
Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1925-03-12
Citations: 307 Mo. 98
Docket Number: 
Parties: IN RE GUARDIANSHIP OF ANGELA McMENAMY; R. EMMET KANE, Guardian, Appellant, v. JOHN McMENAMY, Co-guardian.
Judges: All concur.
Reporter: Missouri Reports
Volume: 307
Pages: 98–137

Head Matter:
IN RE GUARDIANSHIP OF ANGELA McMENAMY; R. EMMET KANE, Guardian, Appellant, v. JOHN McMENAMY, Co-guardian.
In Banc,
March 12, 1925.
1. APPELLATE JURISDICTION": Constitutional Question. In a case in which the circuit court has found facts for an instruction covering constitutional questions and has given instructions covering those questions, and the Court of Appeals has said a constitutional question is involved and transfers the case to this court on that ground, this court should treat the case with respect to the facts found by the trial court, and should not, without reviewing the facts, rule that no constitutional question is involved.
2. -: Amount in Dispute: Excess of $7,500: Gift by Insane Wife: Inventory of Estate. A motion to remove the husband as guardian of the estate of his insane wife, on the ground that he had" not inventoried notes and checks amounting to $24,000 belonging to her estate, was filed in the prohate court, and upon appeal to the circuit court the case was tried ele novo, upon the issues, framed by the parties for1 themselves without seriouis objection, (1) that the wife gave the husband $24,000 and (2) that she was sane when she made the gift. These issues being at law, the court, sitting as a jury, found that the $24,000 was a gift*to the husband and that the wife was sane at the time she made the gift, and that the husband therefore had filed a true inventory and was not subject to removal. The movent appeals. Held, that the parties are bound on appeal by their adopted trial theory, and the amount in dispute exceeds $7,500 and this court has appellate jurisdiction, and instructions based on the trial theory were not error, and the judgment, being supported by substantial evidence, is affirmed.
3. APPELLATE THEORY: Same as Trial Theory. A case cannot be tried upon one theory in the trial court and decided on a totally different theoiy in the appellate court. The theory adopted by the parties in the trial court is the theory upon which the case must be heard, considered and decided in the appellate court.
4. -: Instructions: Inapplicable to Correct Theory. Appellant cannot on appeal complain of instructions on the ground that the parties joined issues in the trial on the wrong theory. If without ohjection-the parties make issues and submit their case upon them, by proper declarations of law applicable to those issues, to the trial court sitting as a jury in a law case, they cannot on appeal complain of the giving of those declarations.
5. ESTOPPEL: By Judgment: Gift of Estate Assets. There being substantial evidence to sustain the findings of the trial court on issues at law, estoppel by judgment applies, which means an absolute bar on the issues framed, whether they were framed on the correct theory or not. Where a motion was filed in the probate court to remove a husband as guardian of his insane wife’s estate on the ground that 'he had failed and refused to inventory and account for $2)4,000'of it, and on appeal to the circuit court the parties, by their pleadings, framed the issues to be (1) whether the wife had given that sum to her husband and (2) whether she was sane at the time, the judgment of the circuit court in favor of the husband on both issues precludes any subsequent judgment against the husband for the money so given him, whether he he removed or not.
6. -: —--: Res Adjudicata. Adjudication of any fact at issue between adversary parties will estop the litigation of that fact in all future litigation. Where a motion to remove a guardian of an estate on the ground that he had not inventoried or accounted for $24,000 belonging to the estate, and on appeal to the circuit court, upon issues framed and accepted by adversary parties, the court, upon substantial evidence, found and adjudged that the guardian did not owe said estate said sum or any part of it and refused to remove him, that judgment, affirmed on appeal by this court, which clearly has appellate jurisdiction, is a complete bar to any future suit for said sum, whether he be hereafter removed or not, and whether or not the issues were framed on the right theory.
7. APPELLATE PRACTICE: Rejected Opinion. A divisional opinion rejected by Court in Banc is' thereafter no opinion. Likewise an opinion of the Court of Appeals is rejected by granting a motion for rehearing, for thereafter the case stands as if it had not been determined — although, upon the transfer of the case to this court, it may be printed in brief as part of counsel’s argument, but it cannot be considered as an opinion.
8. -: Instructions. If no objections are made and no exceptions are saved to the giving of declarations of law, in an action at law, tried by the court sitting as a jury, they are not for consideration on appeal.
9. -: —--: Due Process: Removal of Guardian without Citation. Where the given declaration of law declared that if the guardian of an estate was not previously cited to show cause why he had not filed an inventory, and thus given a day in icourt, his summary removal would be a violation of the constitutional provision relating to due process of law, a failure to except to the declaration may properly be said to be an acquiescence by appellant in the court’s view of this constitutional question.
10. APPEAL: From Probate to Circuit Court. The statutes authorize an appeal from an order of the probate court removing the guardian of the estate of an insane person, to the circuit court; they authorise an appeal from all judgments and orders of the probate court affecting the estates of insane persons, and a trial ele novo in the circuit court. Section 2436, Revised Statutes 1919, giving to circuit courts “appellate jurisdiction from the judgments and orders of . . . probate courts ... in all cases not expressly prohibited by law, and ... a superintending control over them, and a general control over . . . guardians, curators, . . . and persons of unsound minds,” authorizes an appeal from a judgment or order removing a guardian of the estate of an insane person for the alleged ground of failure to inventory assets belonging to the estate, and when such appeal is taken the circuit •court has jurisdiction to try the question of removal cLe novo. Article 18 of Chapter 1, Revised Statutes 1919, which pertains to guardians and curators of insane persons and their estates, is not a law unto itself, and, although it does not mention appeals, is not to be considered as denying an appeal, tout is to be read in connection with said Section 2436, which grants an appeal in all cases from the judgments and orders of the probate court, to the circuit court, except where such appeals are “expressly prohibited by law.”
11. WITNESS: Guardian of Insane Wife: Incompetency: Insufficient Objection. In the trial of a motion to remove, the husband as the guardian of the estate of his insane wife, on. the ground that he has failed to inventory and account for certain estate assets, which he claims were given to him by her before she became insane, he is a competent witness for many purposes and cannot be excluded altogether; and if he was permitted to testify at length without objection, and no objection was made that he was not competent to testify to a gift from his insane wife until he was re-called and ashed if at the hearing in the probate court he testified concerning the gift, and upon his affirmative answer the only objection made was, “It is not competent,” which is no objection at all, unless some reason is suggested why it was not competent, it will not be held on appeal that he was an incompetent witness.
12. -: -: -: Waiver. Appellant waived his right to object to the competency of the guardian to testify in the circuit court to a gift to him from his insane wife, by having previously called him to testify concerning the gift in the probate court.
13. GIFT TO HUSBAND: Parole: Pleading. An objection that the gift of checks and notes by the wife to her husband was not in writing should be pleaded; and if it was not pleaded, particularly if there was no objection at the trial to oral testimony to establish the gift and none to instructions upon the question of the gift, appellant will not be heard to contend on appeal that the gift was not in writing.
1'4. -: Statutory Bight. The statute (Sec. 7323, R. S. 1919) vesting a married woman with the powers of a femme sole, which includes the right to contract with and sue her husband, authorizes her to make a parole gift of her personal property to him. Said Section 7323 is a later enactment than Section 7328, which declares that the husband shall not be deemed to have reduced the wife’s separate property to his possession unless she assents thereto in writing, and may he said, impiiedly at least, to remove the restrictions of said Section 7328 upon her power to make contracts.
Citations to Headnotes: 1, Courts, 15 C. J. 512; 2, Appeal and Error, 3 O. J. par. 618, and Courts, 15 Cl J. 514; 3, Appeal and Error, 3 G. J. 618; 4, Appeal and Error, 4 C. J. 2609, 2621; 5 and 6, Judgments, 34 C. J. 1282, 128i3i, 1312; 7, Appeal and Error, 4 C. J. 2529, 2530, and Courts, 15 C. J. 372; 8 and 9, Appeal and Error, 3 C..J. 766, 818-; 10, Courts, 15 C. J. 443; 11 and 12, Witnesses, 40 Cyc. 2351, 2352, 2344; 13, Appeal and Error, 3 C. J. 593, 623; 14, Husband and Wife, 30 C. J. 303.
Appeal from St. Louis City, Circuit Court. — Eon. Karl Kimmel, Judge.
Affirmed.
Leahy, Saunders & Walther for appellant.
(1) This case should he remanded to the St. Louis Court of Appeals, because this court has no jurisdiction, either because of the amount involved, which is less than $7,500, or because of any constitutional question. (2) The pleadings are ample to apprise respondent of the grounds upon which his removal was sought, and the answer specifically avers the alleged gift by the insane wife to her husband, and, therefore, he was a proper person to act as her co-guardian, and could not be required to account for her separate estate, alleged by him to have been given by her to him, but not in writing. The amended reply specifically denied the,fact of such alleged gift and jts validity, and the mental capacity of Angela McMenamy to make the same. The doctrine of aider by answer has been fully and firmly established in this State. Lee v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 195' Mo. 400.; • Powell v. Sherwood, 162 Moi 605'; Allen v. Chouteau, 102 Mo. 309 ; Stivers v. Horne, 62 Mo. 475; Henry v. Sneed, 90 Mo. 424; Dorrell v. Sparks, 142 Mo. App. 464. (3) No appeal lies from an order of the probate court removing the guardian of an insane person. Morris v. Morris, 128 Mo. App. 623. The right of appeal did not exist at common law; it is purely statutory. It does not exist except where expressly given, and cannot be extended to cases not within the statute. Snoddy v. Pettis Co., 45 Mo. 361; Greeley v. Railroad, 123 Mo. 157; Schwoener v. Christopher, 64 Mo. App. 83; Crossland v. Admire, 118 Mo. 91; Kidder v. Wright, 72 Mo. App-. 389; Breed v. Hobart, 187 Mo. 140; State ex rel. v. Fowler, 108 Mo. 465; Looney v. Browning, 112 Mo. App. 195; State ex rel. v. Guinotte, 113 Mo. App. 3991; Bussiere v. Sayman, 257 Mo. 303. (4) The probate court has power to remove a guardian at any time for neglect of duty, misconduct or mismanagement, or disobedience to any lawful order and to appoint others. Sec. 492, R. S. 1919; King v. King, 73 Mo. App. 78. (a) The statutory term “misconduct” in a removal statute has been construed in the following-cases, and assertion of an interest adverse to the ward’s estate is “misconduct.” In Matter of Gleason, 17 Misc. (N. Y.) 570*; In Matter of Petition of Cohn, 78 N. Y. 249; 2 Perry on Trusts, secs. 817, 818; In Matter of West, 40 Hun, 291, affirmed 111 N. Y. 687; Lichtenberg v. Herdffelder, 103 N. Y. 306; In re Wallace, 74 N. Y. Supp. 33; In re Kirchner, 153 N. Y. Supp. 1091. (b) It does not matter whether the application is presented by a party interested or not. The court can act of its own motion. In re Estate of Padgett, 114 Mo. App. 307; In re Ford, 157 Mo. App. 141. (5) Failure of a guardian to file an inventory and account for thei assets is sufficient ground for removal. King v. King, 73 Mo. 78; In re Estate of Padgett, 114 Mo. App. 307. If the curator asserts some claim to property claimed by his. ward, he should be removed. In re Estate of Padgett, 114 Mo. App. 307; In Matter of Gleason, 17 Misc. (N. Y.) 570; In Matter of Petition of Cohn, 78 N. Y. 249; 2 Perry on Trusts, secs. 817, 818; Manser v. Baker, 60 Ore. 240'; In re Mills’ E'state, 22 Ore. 210; Marks v. Coats, 37 Ore. 609; Kelberg’s Appeal, 86 Pa. St. 129; Putney v. Fletcher, 148 Mass. 247; Winship v. Bass, 12 Mass. 198; State ex rel. Miller’s Admr. v. Bidlingmaier, 26 Mo. 483. (6) A gift by a wife to a husband of her separate estate is void unless evidenced in writing. Sec. 7328, R. S. 1919; McGuire v. Allen, 108 Mo. 403; Jones v. Elkins, 143 Mo. 647; Alkire Grocer Co. v. Ballenger, 137 Mo. 369; Bank v. Winn, 132 Mo. 80'; Hoffman v. Hoffman’s Exr., 126 Mo. 486; Gilliland v. Gilliland, 96 Mo. 522; Broughten v. Brand, 94 Mo. 169; Winn v. Riley, 151 Mo. 161; Conqueror Trust Co. v. Craig, 204 Mo. App- 650:; Hurt v. Cook, 151 Mo. 416; Orr, Executor, v. Union Trust Co., 291 Mo. 383. . (7) John McMenamy, co-guardian and respondent herein, was an incompetent witness to testify to the alleged facts in regard to the alleged gift of his insane wife to himself, she admittedly being insane and having been so for a great many years prior to the trial. Sec. 5410, R. S. 191.9; Orr v. Union Trust Co., 291 Mo. 383; Scott v. Riley, 49 Mo. App. 251; Dunn v. German-American Bank, 109' Mo. 90'; McClure v. Clement, 161 Mo. App. 23; Edwards v. Scharff, 279 Mo. 78. (8) The evidence to- establish a gift inter vivos, asserted by the donee after the death," or insanity of the donor, must be conclusive. Hunter v. Wabash, 149 Mo. App. 243; Lohnes v. Baker, 156 Mo. A,pp. 397; In re Estate of Soulard, 141 Mo. 642; Albrecht v. Slater, 233 S, W. 11; Foley v. Harrison, 233 Mo. 460; Rosenwald v. Middlebrook, 188 Mo. 58. (9) Erroneous declarations of law, declaring the theory upon which the trial court proceeded to enter judgment, are reversible error. Blount v. Spratt, • 113 Mo. 48; Land Company v. Bretz, 125 Mo. 418; Steele v. Johnson, 96 Mo. App. 156.
W. W. Henderson and Chas. G. Revelle for respondent.
(1) An appeal lies from an order of the probate court removing the guardian of an insane person and revoking his appointment. Sec. 2436, R. S. 1919; Coleman v. Farrar, 112 Mo. 72; Hall v. County Court, 27 Mo. 329'; Stanton v. Johnson’s Est., 177 M.o. App. 56; Brockman v. Webb, 189 Mo. App. 475; Sheridan v. Fleming, 93 Mo. 321; Estate of Rooney, 163 Mo. App. 393; Hanley v. Holton, 120' Mo. App. 393; Finney v. State, 9 Mo. 227,; McCrary y. Menteer, 58 Mo. 446; Cuendet v. Henderson, 166 Mo. 657. (2) Upon, an appeal from the probate court to the circuit court the latter becomes fully possessed of the facts and is required to hear-and determine the same anew. Sec. 289, R. S. 1919'; Coleman v. Farrar, 112 Mo. 72. (3) A guardian can be removed only for the causes enumerated in the statute, and then only upon a petition and citation containing distinct allegations on the grounds for removal, and a citation for removal upon one ground does not confer jurisdiction to remove him upon that ground. 21 Cyc. 58; State ex rel. v. Bird, 253 Mo. 569; Richal .v. Riichal, 10' La. 454; Wacherle v. People, 168 111. 250; Calvin v. State, 127 Ind. 403; Edwards v. Maura, 12 La. A,nn. 887; Phillips v. Williams, 26 Ky. L. R. 654; Speight v. Knight, 11 Ala. 461; McCloskey v. P'lantz, 76 Mjinn., 3>23; Weldon i ¡v. Keen, 37 N. Y. Eq. 251; Scott’s Estate, 10' Pa. Dist. 213; Maura v. Ritchie, 16 Fed. Cas. No. 9312. (4) Respondent’s failure to file an earlier1 inventory was due to such causes and occurred under such circumstances as to not warrant his removal. It particularly was not sufficient to make it the mandatory duty of the trial court to remove him. Smith v. Young, 160! S. W. 822; State ex rel. v. Bird, 253 Mo. 569. (5) The petition for removal does not allege as grounds therefor any alleged conflict" of interest, and the record fails to disclose such a conflict and situation as to make necessary respondent’s removal on that ground. Smith v. Young, 169 S. W. 822; State ex rel. v. Bird, 253 Mo. 569 ; Mitchell v. Mitchell, Montreal L. R., 4 Q. B. 191; Gray’s Estate, 4 Kulp. (Pa.) 157; Murray v. Angel, 16 R. I. 602; Maloney’s Estate, 1 Phila. (Pa.) 294, 9 Leg. Int. (Pa.) 14, 5 Clark, (Pa.) 139. (6) A wife can make a valid gift of personal property to her husband without evidencing the same in writing. She can do so by making a delivery thereof. Sec. 7323, R. S. 1919 ; 0'’Day v. Meadows, 194 Mo. 614; RiceStix Co. v. Sally, 176 Mo. 107; 12 Ruling Case Law, p. 823; Westerman v. Lodge, 196 Mo. 710; State ex rel. v. Swanger, 190 Mo. 576; Blandy v. Asher, 72 Mo. 31; Haguewood v. Miller, 273 Mo. 89; Corn v. Ligón, 71 Ga. 692. (7) The witness McMenamy was competent to testify to the matters brought ‘out during his first examination. iElsea v. Smith, 273 Mo. 407; Eaton v. Cates, 175 S. W. 953; Burns v. Polar Wave Co., 187 S. W. 147; First National Bank v. Payne, 111 Mo. 298; Kille v. Gooch, 184 S. W. 1158. (a) No sufficient objection was made to the testimony of this witness, and all objections thereto were thereby waived. Pope v. Mo. Pacific, 175 S. W. 955. (b) The witness having been subjected to a thorough examination by appellant and'his counsel in a proceeding ’in the probate court relating to the same matter, all objections to his competency as a witness were waived. In re Trautmann Estate, 254 S. W. 286; Imbodens v. Trust Co., Ill Mo. App. 220. (8) Instruction 3 given by the court is correct. State ex rel. v. Bird, 253 Mo. 569. (9) Appellant’s motion to remand this case to the Court of Appeals should be overruled, because upon the record this court is the only court having jurisdiction to determine all the issues of law directly involved.

Opinion:
GrRAVES, C. J.
This case reaches this court from Division Two, it having been certified to such court by a full vote of the St. Louis Court of Appeals, and upon two grounds (1) that there was a constitutional question involved, and (2) that the amount involved exceeded $'7,500. The opinion in Division Two having been rejected the case has fallen to me.
Ajngela McMenamy is the unfortunate insane wife of respondent John McMenamy. The wife inherited some property. The husband had not at first been officially in charge of the estate, and after she became insane he placed her in St. Vincent's Hospital, where during all the years he had-cared for her. Delphine McMenamy Seabold was the instrument through which her father, John McMenamy, and Dr. Kane were appointed joint guardians by the probate court (by agreement) August 6, 1917. McMenamy in the fall of 1906 had placed the wife at St. Vincents, where she has been ever since. Shortly after Dir. Kane became co-guardian he began proceedings to have McMenamy ousted. There were negotiations between the parties upon the theory that if John McMenamy filed in the estate a satisfactory inventory, Dr. Kane was to get out and Mr. McMenamy continue with the estate. Hie did file his statement, or inventory, and the court expressly found that the delay was due to negotiations between the parties.
There has never been any difference between this inventory and the one claimed by D'r. Kane (who seemingly represents the daughter) except the sum of $24,000. This Mr. McMenamy claimed to have been a gift from his wife to him on a Christmas- day, several years before there was an estate of Angela McMenamy, Insane. In other words, he claimed that this was his property by gift long prior to there being an estate, and long prior to the date of insanity. The case reached the circuit court, after adverse judgment in the probate -court. No formal pleading in behalf of defendant was filed in the probate court. McMenamy who, as- stated by his then counsel, was precluded below, filed (as he claimed) in the circuit court a full and complete answer, setting out all that Dr. Kane claims to be in this estate, except this $24,000. As to that McMenamy pleaded that it was his, and has never been a part of the estate. He claimed it was- a gift, and Kane by reply put in issue (1) that it was not a gift, and (2) that a gift could only be evidenced by writing, and this was not so evidenced, although the evidence hardly bears out this theory, and (3) that if it was a gift the wife was insane and could not make it. There was a three days' trial upon these issues -(joined in by both parties) and at its conclusion the finding was in favor of McMenamy upon each' and every claim. Kane then appealed to the St. Louis Court of Appeals, where at first the probate -court which had ousted McMenamy was sustained, but upon a rehearing the Court of Appeals held (1) that a constitutional question was in the case and (2) that the amount involved was over $7,500: Thus the case reached us, but/some further detail will be necessary for a complete understanding of the full issues. This is only partial. The amounts transferred (largely in excess of $7,500') were in notes and a check. The check was for $7,500' and signed by Angela Mc-Menamy. Notes to a large amount had to be assigned by her, and all this in the presence of a Christmas party of respectable and well known people and neighbors and kinsmen of these persons. One had served as Lieutenant- Governor of this State at one time and later as Adjutant-General. So the court sitting as a jury upon issues at law could not well question the character of the witnesses, and the court so sitting found a gift in the sum of $24,000;. The same would apply to. mental capacity. The court found that also. The issues as finally made were issues at law, and not issues in equity.
I. This cause assumes several peculiar angles. The constitutional question was submitted upon and by an instruction given by the trial court (circuit), presumably upon evidence upon which to found it. .We do not have a case where a party has sought to inject a constitutional question and then the same party seek to have the reversal upon a failure to consider such a question, but we have a case where a trial court has given an instruction covering constitutional questions, and one wherein the whole appellate branch says there is a constitutional question in the case, and for one of its grounds of certification sends the case here. In other words, the trial court finds the facts for an instruction and this court without reviewing the facts, says, there is no constitutional question, even after the Court of Appeals says there is. It is not the usual case of constitutional question and should at least be treated with respect to the facts found by the trial court, which court (upon such facts) gave the instruction. This is not the most material question upon this appeal.
II. The Court of Appeals was also of opinion that more than $7,500 was involved. For this there may be two good and sufficient reasons assigned. The case was tried de novo in the circuit court. The parties without serious objections framed their own issues. They were issues of fact at law, and not in equity. Among these issues were (1) that the wife gave the husband $24,000, and (2) that she was. sane when she did it. The latter was injected by the reply of the appellant. Not only were issues framed, but three days' time taken up in trying these issues, and instructions were asked and given. Whether or not this money belonged to the husband personally or to the wife's estate was the .trial theory below. No doctrine is better settled than that' the trial theory below must be followed in this court. A case cannot be tried upon one theory below, and upon a totally different theory in the appellate court. "It is axiomatic that in an appellate court the cause should be heard upon the same theory it was heard nisi." [Kilpatrick v. Wiley, 197 Mo. l. c. 171; State ex inf. v. Light & Power Co., 246 Mo. l. c. 664; Benton Land Co. v. Zeitler, 182 Mo. l. c. 265; Crecelius v. Ry. Co., 284 Mo. l. c. 37; White v. Railroad, 202 Mo. l. c. 561.]
The court, sitting as a jury found for McMenamy upon both of these vital questions (1) that the $24,000 was his, and (2) that the wife was sane at the .time. The case, as tried, not only involved more than $7,500, on the theory above discussed, but demonstrates that he had filed a true account and was not subject to removal. In other words, there was no failure to give a true account. They chose to try out all the issues and are bound by them. The only ground of removal was his alleged refusal to account for this $24,000. The circuit court found that he should not be removed, thus finding the issues of fact for McMenamy. The question of our jurisdiction is seriously argued here.
III. No serious complaint is made as to the instructions upon which the case issues were submitted. The only complaint is that the parties joined upon issues upon one theory, when they think now they should have made and joined upon other issues. If parties, without objections, make issues and submit their case upon them to the trial court, it is too late to complain here, as we have above stated. There'was ample and substantial evidence to sustain the finding of the court, and absent error, as here, estoppel as to judgment applies. This means absolute bar by judgment upon the framed issues.
By this we mean that this present judgment would bar a recovery, absent error upon the framed issues, and no judgment could be procured by Kane in view of the present judgment, in any suit which he might bring, if McMenamy should be ousted. The facts, however, did riot prove a right to ouster. McMenamy made a complete inventory, and proved that $24,000 was his property.
But, we have a further thought in mind. Res adjudicata is of two hinds -in the trial of law suits: (1) res adjudicaba as to the judgment and (2) res adjudicaba as to some particular fact litigated between the parties. Of the latter for a moment. The circuit court record in this case, so far as pleadings are concerned, shows as we shall quote from .appellant's abstract of record. 'When the case reached the circuit court, the record recites :
"The answer of respondent John McMenamy (caption, signature and affidavit omitted) filed in the circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, Missouri, February 25, 1919', was as follows."
The substance of this answer was as we have indicated. To this answer or the filing thereof, there was no serious objection. It is long and we need not quote. Suffice it to say that it accounted for all the estate, except the alleged gift. The reply was to this effect:
"Now comes R. Emmet Kane, guardian of Angela McMenamy, non compos mentis; and by leave of court first had and obtained, files his amended reply to the answer and return of John McMenamy to the petition for his removal, and for reply denies each and every allegation in said answer contained.
/. "Further replying, he specifically denies that on or about the 25th day of December, 1894, his said non compos ward, said Angela McMenamy, made a gift to the said John McMenamy of the sum of twenty-four thousand dollars out of her estate, or any other sum.
"Further replying, he states that on the said 25 th day of December, 1894, and prior to said time, and since said time, the said Angela McMenamy was a person of unsound mind, and did not have at any of said times sufficient mental capacity to make a gift or other disposition of her property.
"Further replying*, he specifically denies each and every allegation in said answer contained.
"Wherefore, having fully replied, he prays as in his petition, for removal."
The record entries in the abstract of record further shows:
"February Term, 1919 — 'February 25, 1919'. Cause called for hearing, parties appear and trial progressed. Answer and return of John McMenamy filed by leave. Reply of R. Emmet Kane to answer and return of John McMenamy filed. Further hearings laid over until tomorrow at 10 a. m.
"February Term, 1919 — February 26, 1919. Trial progressed and further hearings laid over until tomorrow at 10 a. m.
"February Term, 1919 — February 27, 1919. Trial progressed and finished and cause taken under advisement.
"April Term, 1919 — April 7, 1919. Motion of R. 'Emmet Kane, co-guardian, to have John McMenamy, co-guardian of Angela McMenamy, removed, overruled. Declarations of law filed.
"April Term, 1919 — April 10, 1919. Motion of R. Emmet Kane, guardian of Angela McMenamy, for a new trial filed.
"April Term,-1919! — April 11, 1919. Amended motion of R. Eimmet Kane, guardian of Angela McMenamy, for a new trial filed.
"June Term, 1919' — June 16, 1919. Motion and amended motion of R. Emmet Kane, guardian of Angela McMenamy, for a new trial overruled.
"June Term, 1919 — June 19, 1919. Affidavit for appeal filed.
"June Term, 1919! — June 20', 1919'. Appeal allowed R. Einmet Kane, guardian of Angela McMenamy, to St. Louis Court, of Appeals.
"October Term, 1921 — October 3, 1921. Bill of exceptions of R. Emmet Kane, co-guardian, allowed, signed, filed and made part of tbe record.
"Appellant's bill of exceptions, filed October 3, 1921, was properly entitled of the court and cause and with the testimony abstracted, read as follows."
Throughout the whole record there never' was a serious objection to the issues made as to the compass and course of trial. The remainder of the record entries in the circuit court read:
"Now comes R Emmet Kane, heretofore appointed one of the guardians of said Angela McMenamy, n. c. m., and states to the court that after his appointment he ascertained that John McMenamy, his co-guardian, had been in charge of the properties of the said Angela Mc-Menamy, n. c. m., since 1896, and that the said Angela McMenamy received from the estate of her father, the late Joseph O'Neil, in 1895', the sum of $36,798.62; that this money has been in the possession of the said John McMenamy since 1896; that the said McMenamy has stated that at some time in 1805 he invested $15^000' of the money he held belonging to the said Angela McMenamy, n. c. m., in a certain piece of property at Twenty-second and Morgan streets; and the said McMenamy has further stated that he has received as rentals of said property $87,478.07 and disbursed $48,858.43, and that there is still a balance due said estate from the rents collected from said Twenty-second and Morgan streets of $38,619.84; and that the said McMenamy has further stated that the said Angela McMenamy inherited from her father a certain piece of real estate on Wash Street, and that he has collected rents therefrom amounting to $12,576 and disbursed $5,652.81, and that he still has a credit from the rents collected from said Wash Street due the said Angela McMenamy, n. c. m., of $6i,923.19!; that when an endeavor was made to have the said John McMenamy account for the $22,000' received by the said Angela McMenamy in addition to the above amounts from the estate of her father, he declined to make any statement except to say that the matter was of no concern to the representative of your petitioner ; that other attempts have been made to secure an accounting from the said McMenamy, but in vain.
"Wherefore, your petitioner prays that the said John McMenamy be cited to appear before your Honor and to show cause why he should not be removed as guardian of the said Angela. McMenamy, n. c. m.,"
This was the original pleading before the case reached the circuit court, where the issues were broadened, as shown.
When the case reached the circuit court and was to be tried there, it would seem that there was a question as to the right of McMenamy to file an answer or return: We quote in full:
"Thereupon, the following proceedings were had in the case at bar, to wit:
"Mr. Marshall: I will ask your,Honor to sign this term bill of exceptions.
"Mr. Leahy: Are you asking me to file that, Judge?
. ' ' Mr. Marshall : Not yet.
"Mr. Leahy: We desire to object, if he does ask.
' ' The Court : You have O1 K'd it.
"Mr. Marshall: He is talking about another matter.
"The Court: This is a term bill of exceptions to the ruling of the court in striking out—
"Mr. Leahy: Yes.
"Mr. Marshall: Now, if your Honor please, I ask leave to file a return or answer to the application of Dr. Kane to the citation that was issued in the probate court. I understand Mr. Leahy wants to make an objection.
"Mr. Leahy: We desire to object to that. This is a mere self-serving statement; it is an argument; it might be proper in a brief, perhaps, but, otherwise, I say that there are no pleadings here.
"The Court: Isn't the test this: Suppose this is a trial de novo here?
"Mr. Leai-iy: Yes.
"The Court: Suppose that McMenamy had been cited to appear to show cause why he should not be removed in the probate court, would he then have had an opportunity of filing an answer to that order to show cause ?
"Mr. Leahy: I think so.
"The Court: That is what he is doing here.
"Mr. Leahy: This is m,ere. argument.
"The Court: Of course, T don't know—
"Mr. Leahy: It won't do any harm to file it.
' ' The Court : In other words, if he had a rig*ht to do it down there, he has a right to do- it here.
"Mr. Marshall.: I didn't get a chance to do it down there.
"Mr. Leahy: Well, we desire to object on the ground it is not proper at this time.
"The Court1: Well, of course, an objection wouldn't reach it. If you demur to it, then I would have to pass upon the sufficiency of it from a legal standpoint. If you are simply going to object to it, I will have to overrule it.
"Mr. Leahy: Very well, your Honor. We will except to the ruling of the court. We will be able to use this, perhaps, to expedite the hearing.
"Mr. Marshall: That is one of the purposes of it."
It will be noted that even Mr. Leahy said "it would do no harm to file it. "
The court offered to pass upon the disputed questions if Mr. Leahy would demur to it or strike at it in some way, but Leahy declined so to do, filed a reply to it, and proceeded to trial on all issues made by the pleadings. The foregoing shows a full trial upon a matter of fact, and one by the tacit consent by all parties. Prom Ibis standpoint we desire to discuss our second point of res adjudicata. It also applies, however, to the first point, i. e. res adjudicata as by judgment.
IV. Suppose McMenamy were removed, and Dr. Kane proceeded to sue for the $24,00.0, what would be the situation1? First, McMenamy, has by the concerted action of the other parties had a court sitting as a jury to say that he owed the estate nothing, and therefore there is no adverse interest for which they claimed that he could be removed. This, on the well founded theory that he had a right to deny adverse interest on the very charge preferred by Dr. Kane. The court by its verdict says that there was no adverse interest. Secondly, the parties framed pleadings upon the question of a gift of $24,000 to the husband by the wife, and thirdly that she had the mental capacity to make the gift. The court sitting as a jury in this circuit court, found by its general finding that this gift of $24,000 was at a time when the wife was sane. These finding's show no adverse interest, because he had accounted for every other cent of the estate. Having joined in these two issues the parties appellant are now estopped. Stating it otherwise they cannot change in this court the course of trial in the circuit court.
Even the adjudication of a single fact as between the two adverse parties, will estop the litigation of that fact in any future litigation. In Herman on Estoppel & Res Judicata, sec. 407, p. 477, it is said: "When a fact has been directly tried and settled by a court of competent jurisdiction, it cannot be contested again between the same parties or their privies, in the same or any other court. ' ' In this case, under accepted issues, it was determined' by the circuit court that John McMenamy owned this $24,000. This, was a determination of a fact, which determination cannot be disturbed except by the Supreme Court, because it is the. only court having appellate jurisdiction over such sum. We discuss all these matters, because they clearly show jurisdiction in the Supreme Court, and. that our own judgment setting aside such judgment by re-transferring to the Court of Appeals would violate every principle of due process of law. If McMenamy were removed (without adjudication of the alleged sum due) and Dr. Kane sued for the $24,000, the appeal would lie in this court and not otherwise. Yet it is said that MeMenamy failed to report on $24,000',. and the matter of his removal (concededly based on such sum) went to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals was right in certifying this case to our court, and here the judgment of the circuit court must be affirmed because the most that can be said is, that it is one on •conflicting' evidence. Under the issues the instructions were proper, and under the evidence these findings of the circuit court bind this court.
The judgment of the circuit court should be affirmed. It is so ordered.
All concur.