Case Name: Ryan C. CHIPMAN, a minor, by his parents and guardians, Kimberle A. CHIPMAN and William E. Chipman, Jr., Appellants v. AVON GROVE SCHOOL DISTRICT
Court: Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 2004-02-06
Citations: 841 A.2d 1098
Docket Number: 
Parties: Ryan C. CHIPMAN, a minor, by his parents and guardians, Kimberle A. CHIPMAN and William E. Chipman, Jr., Appellants v. AVON GROVE SCHOOL DISTRICT.
Judges: BEFORE: LEADBETTER, Judge, SIMPSON, Judge, and FLAHERTY, Senior Judge.
Reporter: West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 841
Pages: 1098–1108

Head Matter:
Ryan C. CHIPMAN, a minor, by his parents and guardians, Kimberle A. CHIPMAN and William E. Chipman, Jr., Appellants v. AVON GROVE SCHOOL DISTRICT.
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.
Argued Nov. 3, 2003.
Decided Feb. 6, 2004.
William E. Chipman,- Jr., Wilmington, DE, for appellants.
Robert L. Boston, West Chester, for appellee.
Sean A. Fields, New Cumberland, for amicus curiae, PA School Boards Assoc.
BEFORE: LEADBETTER, Judge, SIMPSON, Judge, and FLAHERTY, Senior Judge.

Opinion:
OPINION BY
JUDGE SIMPSON.
In this appeal from the denial of an injunction, we are asked what must be provided under the "identical provision" requirement for non-public school transportation under Section 1361 of the Public School Code of 1949 (School Code). Ryan C. Chipman (Student) and friend of the Court, Pennsylvania Catholic Conference, assert it means an identical transportation experience, including bus rides of identical duration with identical provision of transfer stations as those enjoyed by public school students. The Avon Grove School District (District) and another friend of the Court, the Pennsylvania School Boards Association, rely on Section 1362 of the School Code, and argue a school district providing free transportation for its public school students must employ the same policy to provide free transportation for its non-public school students.
Six-year-old non-public school Student filed a complaint requesting a preliminary and permanent injunction in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County (trial court). Student attends the Bethany Christian School in Oxford, 6 miles from his home and outside the District. Repro duced Record (R.R.) at 42. Student requested the trial court direct the District to change its private school bus routes and eliminate its bus transfer stations for nonpublic school students. Student asserted his bus service was not identical to that provided to the public school students in the District primarily because he must use the transfer station and his bus ride is longer.
The trial court determined neither Student's longer ride nor his use of transfer stations violates the "identical provision" of Section 1361(1). The trial court denied the preliminary injunction, and apparently denied a permanent injunction as well. Student appeals to this Court.
I.
We first raise an issue not addressed by the parties or the trial court: whether appeal from the denial of a permanent injunction is properly before us. After hearing, the trial court issued an opinion and order. The opinion discussed the facts relating to Student's transportation, and it discussed the legal analysis for a preliminary injunction. However, the last sentence of the opinion states, "Given [Student's] failure to show a clear right to relief, the request for a preliminary and permanent injunction is hereby denied." Opinion of April 10, 2003 at 5 (emphasis added). The accompanying Order states in pertinent part, "[Student's] request for this Court to issue an injunction (1) changing the private school bus routes, and (2) eliminating the transfer station, is hereby DENIED."
Eschewing post-trial practice, Student filed an immediate appeal to this Court. For the following reasons, we conclude the denial of a permanent injunction is not properly before us. We therefore vacate the trial court's order insofar as it relates to a permanent injunction.
A preliminary injunction is to put and keep matters in the position in which they were before the improper conduct of the defendant commenced. Little Britain Township Appeal, 651 A.2d 606 (Pa.Cmwlth.1994). The sole object of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the subject of the controversy in the condition in which it is when the order is made, it is not to subvert, but to maintain the existing status until the merits of the controversy can be fully heard and determined. Id. In the hearing upon a preliminary injunction, it is neither necessary nor proper to decide the case as though on final hearing. Id., citing Crestwood Sch. Dist. v. Topito, 76 Pa.Cmwlth. 321, 463 A.2d 1247 (1983). A preliminary injunction cannot serve as a judgment on the merits since by definition it is a temporary remedy granted until that time when the party's dispute can be completely resolved. Little Britain Township Appeal.
Moreover, to the extent the order here addresses a permanent injunction, it is not appealable. Pa. R.A.P. 311(a)(4) permits an appeal as of right from an order regarding a preliminary injunction. Nunemacher v. Borough of Middletown, 759 A.2d 57 (Pa.Cmwlth.2000). However, an appeal may not be taken from a decree nisi granting or denying a permanent injunction unless the decree has the immediate effect of changing the status quo. G. Ronald Darlington, et al., 1 Pennsylvania Appellate Practice, § 311:46 (2d Ed. 2002).
Here, the denial of an injunction did not change the status quo. Moreover, no post-trial relief was sought, and the order of the trial court as to a permanent injunction never progressed beyond the decree nisi. Therefore, issues relating to the request for permanent injunction are not yet ap-pealable. See also Chalkey v. Roush, 569 Pa. 462, 805 A.2d 491 (2002) (party re quired to file post-trial motions following a trial court's order in both actions at law and in equity in order to preserve issues it wishes to raise on appeal).
II.
As to the denial of the preliminary injunction, our review is to determine whether or not reasonable grounds appear for the granting of the preliminary injunction, and not to pass on the merits of the dispute. McMullan v. Wohlgemuth, 444 Pa. 563, 281 A.2d 836 (1971). In order to sustain a preliminary injunction, the plaintiffs right to relief must be clear, the need for relief must be immediate, and the injury must be irreparable if the injunction is not granted. Crowe v. Sch. Dist. of Pittsburgh, 805 A.2d 691 (Pa.Cmwlth.2002), petition for allowance of appeal granted, 572 Pa. 744, 815 A.2d 1043 (2003) (later withdrawn after settlement). Additionally, we often consider whether greater injury will occur from refusing the injunction than granting it and whether the injunction returns the parties to the status quo as it existed before the alleged wrongful conduct. Id.' A mandatory injunction which commands the performance of some positive act requires a much stronger case. Id.
Because the thrust of Student's argument is that his transportation arrangements violate the "identical provision" requirement of the School Code, we first examine the statutory language. Student relies on Section 1361(1), 24 P.S. § 13-1361(1), titled, When provided, which states in relevant part (with emphasis added):
The board of school directors in any school district may, out of the funds of the district, provide for the-free transportation of any resident pupil to and from the kindergarten, elementary school, or secondary school in which he is lawfully enrolled, provided that such school is not operated for profit and is located within the district boundaries or outside the district boundaries at a distance not exceeding ten miles by the nearest public highway, except that such ten mile limit shall not apply to area vocational technical schools which regularly serve eligible district pupils.... When provision is made by a board of school directors for the transportation of public school pupils to and from such schools . the board of school directors shall also make identical provision for the-free transportation of pupils who regularly attend nonpublic [schools].
The District relies on Section 1362, 24 P.S. § 13-1362, titled Kinds of transportation, liability insurance, which provides in pertinent part (with emphasis added):
The free transportation of pupils, as required or authorized by this act, or any other act, may be furnished by using either school conveyances, private conveyances, or electric railways or other common carriers when the total distance which any pupil must travel by the public highway to or from school, in addition to such transportation, does not exceed one and one-half (Ph) miles, and when stations or other proper shelters are provided for the use of such pupils where needed, and when the highway, road, or traffic conditions are not such that walking constitutes a hazard to the safety of the child, as so certified by [PennDOT]. [PennDOT] shall take into account the presence of sidewalks along the highway, but such presence of lack thereof shall not be controlling and [PennDOT] shall consider all relevant safety factors in making its determination as to whether or not walking constitutes a hazard to pupils.
Section 1361(1) requires "identical provision for the free transportation of pupils" to and from non-public schools where the school board "provide[s] for the free transportation of any resident pupil to and from the [public] school in which he is lawfully enrolled." 24 P.S. § 13-1361(1). Under the provision, the trigger is provision of free transportation to and from public schools. When that occurs, there must be identical provision of free transportation "of pupils who regularly attend non-public [schools]." The section offers no further description of the quality of required transportation beyond "to and from" school.
Moreover, Section 1361 is significant in its use of the plural, "pupils," when describing the beneficiary of the "identical provision" of transportation. Thus, the identical provision of free transportation is required for the class of non-public school pupils; the section does not address the provision of transportation for an individual non-public school pupil.
Section 1362 addresses "Kinds of transportation." Among other things, this statutory provision addresses how students travel to their pickup and from their drop-off points, including "the total distance which any pupil must travel by public highway to or from school," provision of "stations or other proper shelters," assessment that "the highway, road or traffic conditions are not such that walking constitutes a hazard to the safety of the child," and consideration of "all relevant safety factors . as to whether or not walking constitutes a hazard to pupils." 24 P.S. § 13-1362. This section identifies safety concerns and speaks to individual pupils as well as to the class of transported students. Considering the section's language, the free transportation of pupils includes attention to the health, safety and welfare of individual pupils.
Reading the sections together, the School Code contemplates free transportation of pupils to and from schools. The only qualitative requirements for an individual student relate to health, safety and welfare.
This Court recently addressed the "identical provision" language of Section 1361 of the School Code in Crowe. In that case we vacated a preliminary injunction requiring continuation of mid-day busing of non-public school students. In our analysis, we considered the "identical provision" language of Section 1361(1) and the "regular school hours" provision of Section 1361(2). We concluded:
To accord meaning to all provisions of Section 13-1361, we hold that if the District provides one round trip each day to its kindergartners, it must provide one round trip to private school kindergartners. If a non-public school has regular hours . busing to and from that school must be in accordance with its schedule.
Crowe, 805 A.2d at 696. Thus, our analysis focused on the provision of transportation to a class of non-public school students. Also, our analysis focused on the scheduling of transportation "to and from" non-public schools, rather than the quality of the transportation experience.
Neither the language of the School Code nor appellate court decisions interpreting the School Code requires identity of the quality of transportation for each student. Moreover, it is unwise to attempt a quali tative comparison for individual pupils in the absence of statutory guidance, for several reasons. First, as here, there are innumerable variables. Second, the standard for comparison is unclear. In other words, to what should an individual student's transportation be identical? Unless the .provision of transportation implicates health, safety or welfare, we decline a qualitative comparison for an individual student not clearly mandated by the statute.
A.
Considering the foregoing, we conclude the School Code does not address the quality of individual transportation arrangements in any aspect other than health, safety and welfare. Thus, no error is evident in the trial court's denial of a preliminary injunction on the basis of the duration of Student's ride and his use of a transfer station.
B.
As to health,. safety and welfare concerns for Student, he claims that the presence of older students at the transfer station and on his bus is a risk, particularly for a six-year old. He highlights a particular incident as proof. On March 4, while at the transfer station, Student accepted a dare from an older student to step in front of an oncoming school bus. The transfer station's supervising aide in charge of nonpublic students did not see Student step off the curb. The school bus driver, 15 feet away and driving slowly, did. The driver stopped and waved Student back before continuing. Student's parents were not told. This was not the first time Student was observed stepping off the curb in front of a bus. Student offered no specific proof regarding risks arising from the presence of older students on his bus.
In addition to the foregoing, the trial court found the District employs two adult aides to supervise non-public school students who use the transfer station. The District also employs a security officer to direct traffic and make sure unauthorized vehicles do not enter the transfer station. The trial court specifically found that "[t]he Transfer Station does not pose an immediate and irreparable harm." Opinion of April 10, 2003 at 5. In the absence of probable proof of safety problems, the trial court was not compelled to conclude that a statutory violation occurred based on the quality of transportation arrangements for Student.
III.
Although the School Code does not address the quality of an individual non-public student's transportation beyond safety, there can be no reasonable dispute that the School Code contemplates identical policies for transportation of public and non-public students. Thus, while evaluation of an individual student's arrangements is limited, evaluation of arrangements for transportation of the class is appropriate.
The bulk of Student's proof and argument was devoted to his individual situation. However, Student, also claims the District has a transportation policy for young non-public school students that is not identical to the transportation policy of like-aged public school students. In particular, Student contends non-public school students use the transfer station and may ride with older students. In contrast, public kindergarten and elementary students do not use the transfer station and do not ride with middle school or high school students. Student references testimony from the District's business manager and from a former member of the District's Board of Education, which address trans portation of kindergarten and elementary students.
The District submitted a written transportation policy. Ex. A of Certified Record 12. The written policy does not on its face distinguish between public and nonpublic students except to require non-public students to register.
Proof that non-public school students as a class are provided free transportation that is not identical to public school students could be a violation of the School Code. A violation of a statute is per se irreparable harm for purposes of a preliminary injunction. Crowe. However, it was the trial court's function to determine whether the sparse evidence on this point was believable. No error is committed when the trial court declines to accept oral testimony regarding transportation arrangements for some students as proof of disparate policy.
IV.
As to the other considerations for granting a preliminary injunction, the trial court found it would cost $824,688 to abolish use of a transfer station and transport non-public school students directly from their home to school. Opinion of April 10, 2003 at 1. The trial court concluded a greater injury would result in granting the injunction than by refusing it. Id. at 5. However, we do not agree that violation of a statute can be excused on the basis of cost. When considering the requested permanent injunction, the trial court may not deny relief because compliance with the School Code is expensive.
Also, the trial court concluded that the District did not commit any wrongful conduct, and that, therefore, there is no prior status to which to return the parties. Given the trial court's findings as previously discussed and the trial court's decision not to change the status of the parties, this conclusion is not in error. Id.
In sum, we affirm the trial court's order as to a preliminary injunction, and vacate the trial court's order as to a permanent injunction. The case is remanded for consideration of a permanent injunction consistent with this opinion.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 6th day of February, 2004, the Order of April 10, 2003 is hereby AFFIRMED as to the denial of a preliminary injunction, and VACATED as to the denial of a permanent injunction. The case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
Senior Judge FLAHERTY files a concurring and dissenting opinion.
. Act of March 10, 1949, P.L. 30, as amended, 24 P.S. § 13-1361.
. 24 P.S. § 13-1362.
. Student relies on a trial court case which discusses the "identical provision" requirement. Persi v. Aliquippa Borough School Dist., 15 Pa. D & C 3rd 52 (Com.Pl. Beaver County 1979) (non-public school students required to walk, public school students picked up at their homes; different transportation policy for public and non-public students' transportation violates "identical provision" requirement of School Code).