Case Name: Waters's Representatives vs. Riley's Adm'r.
Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland
Jurisdiction: Maryland
Decision Date: 1828-06
Citations: 2 H. & G. 305
Docket Number: 
Parties: Waters’s Representatives vs. Riley’s Adm’r.
Judges: The cause was argued at June term 1827, before Buchanan, Ch. J. and Earle, Martin, Stephen, and Archer, J.
Reporter: Harris and Gill
Volume: 2
Pages: 305–316

Head Matter:
Waters’s Representatives vs. Riley’s Adm’r.
June, 1828.
SB as administrator de bonis non, with R and W as his sureties, by order of the orphans court in 1806, entered into a joint administration bond. W died in 1810, and R in 1814. After the death of W, judgments were obtained on this bond against 15, and R the surviving surety, on account of which large payments were made by R, the principal being insolvent. The real estate of W, after bis death, being sold by decree of a court of equity, for the payment of his debts — on the petition of the representatives of R, claiming to recover contribution, for the payments made by him, out of such proceeds — Held, that they were not entitled to recover.
In the case of a joint bond, the remedy at law survives against the surviving obligor, and is lost, as against the representatives of him who first dies.
Where the remedy at law is gone, chancery will not revive it, in the absence of fraud, accident, or mistake.
The case of a bond where all are principals, has been held to be an exception to the above rule, each being equally benefited, and under an equal original moral obligation to pay the debt, independent of the bond, to which equity relates back, when the remedy at law on the bond is gone.
fn the case of a surety, who is bound only by the bond itself, and is not under the same moral obligation to pay, equity will not interfere, to charge him beyond his legal liability.
it is a general principle, that a surety who has paid the debt, may compel his co-security to make contribution, or may by substitution take the place of the creditor, and acquire all his rights against the principal debtors but he can acquire no rights, that the creditor had not, and cannot, therefore, compel a contribution by the representatives of his deceased co-seeurity, against whom the creditor had no remedy.
Where the legislature prescribes the substance of a bond, and it is so drawn as to include every obligation imposed by the law, arid to afford every defence given by it, it will be sufficient, notwithstanding it may b© slightly variant from the literal form set out. Per Archer, J»
Appeal from an order of Montgomery County Court, sitting as a Court of Equity. The petition of the appellee to . that court stated, that on the 23d of November 1818, a decree was passed by the court for the sale of the real estate of Richard Waters, deceased, (the ancestor of the appellants,) and a trustee appointed to make such sale; who, in pursuance of the said decree, sold the said real estate for @4000, which sale was duly reported and ratified by the court at November term 1819, when the auditor was directed to state an account of the said sale, and the claims of all the creditors of the said Waters, which was accordingly done on the 25th of July 1820, in which the claim of the petitioner is stated, but the amount is not ascertained. At March term 1821, the said report of the auditor was ratified by the court. Prayer, that the auditor may be ordered to make a further report of the petitioner’s claim, and ascertain and report to the court the amount thereof; and for this purpose a commission may issue to the auditor, authorising and directing him to take testimony touching the said claim, &e. And for further relief, &c. On the 25th of November 1823, the auditor was directed to proceed to state the claim of the petitioner; and that a commission issue to him to take tes-, timony, &c.
The parties afterwards, on the 16th of November 1824, entered into the following agreement: It is agreed in this case that the petitioner’s intestate, and Richard Waters, entered into bond on the 17th of September 1806, as securities for Meshecjc Browning, administrator de bonis non of John Holmes, in the words following, to wit: “Know all men by these presents, that we, Meshach Browning, George Riley and Richard Waters, of Montgomery county, are held and firmly bound to the State of Maryland in the sum of four thousand dollars, to be paid to the state aforesaid, or its certain attorney; to which payment well and truly to be made, we bind ourselves, our heirs, executors and administrators, firmly by these presents. Sealed with our seals, and dated this seventeenth day of September, one thousand eight hundred and six. The condition of the above obligation is such, that if the above bounded Meshach Browning shall well and truly perform the office of administrator de bonis non of John Holmes, late of Montgo* mery county, deceased, according to law, and shall in all respects discharge the duty of him required by law as administrator de bonis non aforesaid, without any injury or damage to any person interested in the faithful performance of the said office, then the above obligation shall he void; it is otherwise to be in full force and virtue in law.” Signed and sealed by the above mentioned obligors. The executiop of which bond was admitted. It was also admitted that the said bond was drawn, by the order of the orphans court, in the form in which it now appears, as a joint, and not as a joint and several bond. Also that Richard Waters died in the year 1810, and that George Riley survived him, and died in 1814 or 1815, and that the petitioner administered on his estate; that after the death of Waters, judgments were obtained on the said administration bond, against Meshach Browning, (who also survived Bichará Waters,) and the said George Riley; and that in the year 1815, and afterwards, payments were made by the said Riley on account of the said judgments, amounting to $1000. That the said Meshach Browning was insolvent at the time the said judgments were obtained, and has so continued always since. That since the death of the said Waters his real estate hath been sold by a proceeding in this court against his administrator and heirs at law, for the payment of his debts, under the aet of 1785, eh. 72; and that there is now in the hands of the trustee upwards of $1000. The petitioner claims to be allowed out of the fund one half of the sums paid by his intestate and himself, on account of those judgments. Which is objected to on the part of the representatives of the said Waters. The Court, [Kilgour and Wilkinson, A. J.] (November term 1824.) It seeming just, and according to equity, that the petitioner should receive from the proceeds of the sale of the real estate of Richard Waters, heretofore sold under a decree of this court for the payment of the debts of the said Waters, by ¡Cadok Magruder the trustee appointed for that purpose, the sum reported by the auditor appointed by this court, to be due to the petitioner as administrator of George Riley-Ordered, that the trustee aforesaid pay over to the petitioner the sum oí $1314 59, from and out of the proceeds of the said sale, remaining jn - the hands of the said trustcei From this order the representa tives of Richard Waters appealed to this court; and it was agreed between the parties, that if upon the final decision of this case in this court, this court should be of opinion that the petitioner’s claim ought to be allowed, or that he is entitled to any relief out of the fund in the hands of the trustee, on account of the joint suretyship of George Riley and Richard Waters, or of any payments made by George Riley, or the petitioner'therefor, or any liability therefor, that then the case shall be sent down to the county court, with such opinion of this court, and that then in the county court the parties may by a reference to the auditor exhibit any claims or off-sets on either side, so that the order may pass for the payment of such sum as shall be then due, and the court shall think just and proper. ■
The cause was argued at June term 1827, before Buchanan, Ch. J. and Earle, Martin, Stephen, and Archer, J.
F. 8. Key, arid Z. Magruder, for the Appellants,
contended, 1. That the bond was void, being á statutory bond, and not according to the form prescribed by the act of 1798, ch. 101, sub ch. 3, s. 11, sub ch. 5, s. 6, not having the words “not already administered,” inserted in the condition as required. 2. If the bond was not void, all remedy at law against Waters, ceased at his death,’and equity, (he being only a surety,) will not enlarge the legal liability.
On the first point, they insisted that the form of the bond, as prescribed by the act of 1798, ch. 101, sub ch. 3, s. 11, tci be given by an executor or administrator; and by the 5 sub ch. of that act, s. 6, to be given by an administrator de bonis non, had not been pursued in the bond in this case; nor were there any words used which were substantially the same as required by the act.to be inserted — “not already administered.” The bond also is a joint one,' when it is contended it should have been joint and several. The bond is considered void, not having the words “not already administered;” and it is insisted that the words de bonis non do not supply the defect or omission, even although Latin maybe used instead of English. They referred to 3 Am. Dig. 72, which cites Rhodes v Vaughan, 2 Hawk’s N. C. Rep. 167. Morgan v Blackiston, 5 Harr. & Johns. 61. Shivers v Wilson, Ib. 130. They also referred to the act of 1798, ch. 101, sub ch. 14, s. 11, to show that a representative of a security in an administration or testamentary bond, could not call for counter security.
On the second point, they cited Ludlow v Simonds, 2 Caine’s Cas. 57. Harrison v Field, 2 Wash. Rep. 138. Thomas v Frazer, 3 Ves. 399. Simpson v Vaughan, 2 Atk. 31. Bishop v Church, 2 Ves. 101. 1 Poth. 245. Williams v Hodgson, 2 Harr. & Johns. 480, (note.) King v Baldwin, 2 Johns. Ch. Rep. 560. Riggs v Murray, Ib. 567. Simpson v Field, 2 Cas. in Chan. 22; and the Act of Assembly of 1811, ch. 161.
No Counsel argued for the Appellee.
Curia adv. vult.

Opinion:
Buchanan, Ch. J,
at this term delivered the opinion of theeourt. It appears from the admissions in the cause, that on the 17th of September 1806, George Riley and Richard Waters, as sureties, entered into a joint administration bond, with Meshach Browning, administrator debonis non of John Holmes, that Richard Waters died in the year 1810, and George Riley in 1814 or 1815, on whose estate the appellee administered; that after the death of Waters, judgment to a considerable amount were obtained on the administration bond, against Browning, and Riley, the surviving surety, on account of which large payments were made by Riley, Browning being insolvent; that the bond was drawn and executed by order of the orphans court of Montgomery county, in the form in which it appears, by which tribunal it was intentionally required to be "joint," and not "joint and several;" and that since the death of Waters, his real estate has been sold for the payment of his debts, under proceedings regularly instituted for that purpose.
The proceeds of which, in the hands of the trustee, are sought to be subjected to the payment of half the amount so paid by George Riley, on account of the judgments rendered against him and Browning on the administration bond, which is resisted on the part of the heirs and representatives of Waters. In the case of a joint bond, the remedy at law survives against the Surviving obligor, and is lost as against the representatives of him who first dies.
If then, this was a suit at law, on the bond, by those interest» éd in the estate of Holmes, against the representatives of Waters, it clearly could not be sustained, the remedy, by the death of Waters, having been lost as against his representatives. Nor could chancery, in proceedings between the same parties, fix the representatives of Waters, with a liability which did not exist at law. The general rule being, that where the remedy at law is gone, chancery will not revive it, in the absence of any accident, fraud or mistake; to which the case of a - bond, where all are principals, has been held to be an exception, each being equally benefited, and under an equal original moral obligation to pay the debt, independent of the bond, to which equity relates back, when the remedy at law on the bond is gone. But in the case .of a surety, who is bound only by the bond itself, and is not under the same moral obligation to pay, equity will not interfere to charge him beyond his legal liability.
And surely there is no evidence here of either mistake or fraud. The act of assembly, under which the bond was taken, does not require that such bonds shall be "joint and several," but is silent on that subject; and the admission stated in the record is, that it was intentionally ordered by the orphans court,' to be drawn and executed as a joint bond. Mistake then, there was none, since, it is admitted, that what was done, whether judiciously or injudiciously, was intentionally done. And there is as little evidence of- fraud of any kind. On whom could fraud have been committed? Not by the parties, or cither of them, upon'the orphans court, because they executed the bond, under, and in pursuance of the directions of the. court; and certainly not by the court itself, of which it may be proper .to remark, there has not been the slightest insinuation. And Waters, not having been a principal in the bond, but only a surety, the exception in relation to principals, who are under the same moral obligation to pay the debt, being equally benefited, would not reach the case. Is there, then, in this case, any thing to enable a court of chancery to extend to the appellee any relief, to which those interested in the estate of Holmes would not have been entitled? If there is, we have not been able to perceive it. There is no doubt (as a general principle,) that a surety, who has paid the debt, may compel his. co-security to make contribution; or he may, by substitution, take the place of the creditor, and acquire all his rights against the principal debtor. But he can acquire no rights that the creditor had not, and cannot, therefore, compel a contribution by the representatives of his deceased co-security, against whom the credit tor had no remedy. So long as the securities in a joint bond are living, the creditor has his remedy against both, and one may recover against the other a just proportion of what he is made to pay, both being under the same obligation to pay. But if one dies, the remedy, as to him, is gone, and the duty, and the remedy both survive against the survivor; and there being .nothing due from the representatives of the other, to the creditor, a payment by the survivor cannot be for, or on their account, nor can it create any liability in them that did not before exist. In such a case the surviving surety pays only his own debt, in which the representatives of the other have no concern, and his only remedy is against the principal debtor. This is just that case; on the death of Richard Waters, the-remedy on the administration bond of those interested in the estate of Holmes, survived against George Riley, the surviving eo-security, and Browning, the administrator and principal in the bond, with no liability resting on the representatives of Waters. The payments, therefore, by George Riley, on the. judgments obtained against him and Browning, could create no charge against the representatives of Waters, on account of debts, for which they were in no way responsible; and which could not by the creditors harm been enforced against them either in law or equity. In this view of the case, we think that the proceeds of the real estate of Waters, in the hands of the trustee, cannot be charged with any proportion of the sums, paid by George Riley on account of those judgments; and that the decree ought to be reversed.