Case Name: ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILROAD COMPANY, Plaintiff in Error, v. JOAQUIN MARTIN, Defendant in Error; JOAQUIN MARTIN, Appellee, v. ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant
Court: Supreme Court of New Mexico
Jurisdiction: New Mexico
Decision Date: 1893-08-16
Citations: 7 N.M. 158
Docket Number: No. 543; No. 535
Parties: ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILROAD COMPANY, Plaintiff in Error, v. JOAQUIN MARTIN, Defendant in Error. JOAQUIN MARTIN, Appellee, v. ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant.
Judges: O’Brien, C. J., and Seeds and Freeman, JJ.,, concur.
Reporter: New Mexico Reports
Volume: 7
Pages: 158–183

Head Matter:
[No. 543.
August 16, 1893.]
ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILROAD COMPANY, Plaintiff in Error, v. JOAQUIN MARTIN, Defendant in Error. JOAQUIN MARTIN, Appellee, v. ATCHISON, TOPEKA & SANTA FE RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant.
[No. 535.
August 16, 1893.]
[Considered and Disposed of Together.]
Writ of Error, or Appeal, Which — Practice Act, 1891, Validity of-By the practice act of 1891, it was clearly the intention of the territorial legislature that common law causes should be reviewed by writ of error, and not by appeal; and this act is not in conflict with either the organic act or subsequent acts of congress.
Id. — Supersedeas—Filing and Approval of Bond, Sufficiency of. Where a bond was filed in the court below within the proper time, and approved by the judge of that court, but not indorsed “approved” by the clerk of the supreme eourt until ninety-two days after the judgment, it was a substantial compliance with the statute, though the correct practice would be to file the bond, and have it approved, and writ of supersedeas issued, within ninety days after judgment.
Id. — Trespass on Case — Liability of Railroad for -Negligence of Fellow Servants — Vice-Principals—Evidence.—In an action of trespass on the case, by a section hand against a railroad company to recover damages for personal injuries caused him by its negligence, where it appeared from the evidence that the plaintiff with the foreman of the section gang and another laborer were going to their work earlier than usual, on a hand car, of their own volition, to aid in repairing the railway; that plaintiff took his position upon the hand car in such way as to have his face looking south, but was ordered by the foreman to turn and look north, who said, on a remark of the third man on the car, that a train was coming out of Albuquerque, that he would look out for trains; that there was upon the line of the defendant's road, at the time of the accident, a work train engaged in repairing the road, under the management and control of a conductor and engineer, upon which, was a road master, who had control of the line of the road where the accident occurred; that the work train, shortly after the hand car left the station, also left Albuquerque for the north, and overtook the hand ear, running into it, knocking it from the track, and seriously injuring the plaintiff; that the work train was running on telegraphic orders that “every man at work on the track must bear in mind that, in operating the road under telegraph orders, a train may pass at any moment,” as to which there was no intimation of negligence, and of which the foreman on the hand car knew, if not the plaintiff; that the foreman hired the section men, directed when they ought to be discharged, and where they should work upon the section, and that he worked in the same way as did the men, and had nothing to do with paying them, — Held: That the plaintiff, and foreman of the section men, and the conductor, and engineer of the work train, were fellow servants, for whose negligence the defendant was not responsible, and could not be held, the evidence not showing any negligence of a superior servant controlling their operations upon the work train and hand ear, or either.
Error, from a judgment for plaintiff, to the Second Judicial District Court, Bernalillo County. Motion to dismiss the appeal, sustained. Motion to quash writ of error and set aside the supersedeas, denied, and judgment reversed. O’Brien, C. J., dissenting.
The facts are stated in the opinions of the court.
W. B. Childers for plaintiff in error.
The plaintiff was a fellow servant with the other servants in charge of the work train. Railroad Co. v. Rider, 62 Tex. 267; Glormley v. Railroad Co., 72 Ind. 31; Collins v. Railroad Co., 30 Minn., 14 N. W. Rep. 60; • Clifford v. Railroad Co., 141 Mass. 564, 6 N. E. Rep. 751; Keyes v. Railroad Co., 3 Atl. Rep. (Pa.) 15; Whalen v. Railroad Co., 8 Ohio St. 249; Coppen v. Railroad Co., 2 N. E. Rep. 749, and note; Buckley v. Grould & Curry Silver M. Co., 14 Fed. Rep. 833; Devinney v. Railroad Co., 17 Ohio St. 198; Railway Co. v. .Welch, 72 Tex., 10 S. W. Rep. 529; Elliott v. Railroad Co., 41 N. W. Rep. 758; Fagundes v. Railroad Co., 21 Pac. Rep. 437; Knahtla v. Railroad Co., 27 Id. 91; McMasters v. Railroad Co., 4 So. Rep. 59; Connelly v. Railroad Co., 35 N. W. Rep. 582; Hervard v. Railroad Co., 26 Fed. Rep. 837; Naylor v. Railroad Co., 33 Id. 801; Easton v. Railroad Co., 32 Id. 893; Yan Wickle v. Railroad Co., 32 Id. 278; Randall v. Railroad Co., 109 U. S. 478; Steamship Co. v. Meribunt, 133 Id. 375; 10 Cushing, 228; 5 N. Y. 492; 18 N. Y. 432; 70 Maine, 63; 14 Minn. 363; 38 Am. and Eng. R. R. Cases, 62; 15 Id. 188; 24 Id. 448; 8 Id. 150; 35 N. W. Rep. 866; Parker v. Railroad Co., 50 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cases, 521.
A section boss is a fellow servant with those constituting his gang. The superior servant doctrine is not recognized except in a limited number of states of the Union. C., B. & O. Railroad Co. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 915; O’Brien v. Dredging Co., 21 Atl. Rep. 324; Knahtla v. Railroad Co., 27 Pac. Rep. (Oregon) 91; Lindvall v. Woods, 42 N. W. Rep. 1020; Hussey v. Coger, 20 N. E. Rep. (N. Y.) 556; Copper v. Railroad Co., 2 N. E. Rep. (Ind.) 749; Yates v. Iron Co., 16 Atl. Rep. (Md.) 286; McGovern ,v. Mary Co., 50 S. E. Rep. (Ga.) 492; Anderson v. Winston, 31 Fed. Rep. 528; Webb v. Railroad Co., 2 S. E. Rep. (N. 0.) 440; Crispen v. B. & B. Bitt., 81 N. Y. 516; Ely v. Railroad Co., 48 N. W. Rep. 222.
“Prima facie all who enter into the employment of a single master are engaged in a common service and are fellow servants, and some other line of demarcation than that of control must exist to destroy thé relation of fellow servant. All enter into the service of the same master to further his interest in the one enterprise; each knows when entering that service that there is some risk of injury through the negligence of other employees, and that risk which he knows exists he assumes in entering the employment.” B. & O. Railroad Co. v. Baugh, supra; Randall v. B. & O. Railroad Co., supra; Merchant v. Steamship Co., supra.
Neill B. Field for defendant in error.

Opinion:
OPINION ON MOTIONS.
Fall, J,
The motions filed in these causes, and argued, will be considered and disposed of together By the motion in 543, appellee seeks to have appeal dismissed and supersedeas set aside. By that in 535, defendant in error (also appellee) seeks to quash writ of error. There is but one record; in fact, but one cause. In the court below the defendant in error, or appellee, recovered judgment for $8,000, against the plaintiff in error, or appellant, from which judgment an appeal was asked and granted, bond for supersedeas being fixed at $16,000, which was executed and filed on the thirteenth of February, 1893, judgment having been rendered on the twenty-first of December, 1892. Argument has been quite exhaustive, and two opinions of the lower court upon the points in question have been filed. We are now called upon to decide upon these motions, as fixing a matter of practice under the acts of the territory, and particularly the act of 1891, commonly known as the practice act, By this act, clearly, the legislature intended that common law causes should be reviewed here by writ of error, and not by appeal. The provision is in express terms, and binding unless in conflict with the organic act or subsequent acts of congress, and we can find no such conflict. The legislature possessed the power to provide the method by which causes should be reviewed here, and exercised that power in clear and unmistakable terms. The appeal should be dismissed for the reason that writ of error is the proper method, and the motion to dismiss is sustained upon the first ground of the motion, as well as upon the second, fourth, and fifth grounds.
We find that the bond filed in the court below was filed on the thirteenth day of February, 1893, and was approved by the judge of that court, also being indorsed "approved" by the 0£ jjjjjg court; 0n the twenty-third of March, 1893. The conditions of this bond show that it was intended to secure a supersedeas upon writ of error from this court, and the point made in the motion is that, being approved by the clerk here on March 23, 1893, ninety-two days after rendition of judgment, it was filed too late, under the statute fixing ninety days as the period within which bond shall be filed to secure stay of execution. Complaint is also made that the bond was treated by the court below as given in appeal, and fieri facias quashed upon this ground. The statute provides that a writ of error must be sued out within twelve months from date of judgment, and bond given within ninety days to secure supersedeas. In Ex parte French, 100 U. S. 4, the supreme court of the United States decides that a supersedeas and writ of error are two different writs. Clearly, it was the intention of the legislature to so provide, and this has been the practice here. In a pause where the writ of error was sued out, or supersedeas bond given, within ninety days, it has been the practice for the clerk of this court, unless an execution has issued below, simply to notify the clerk of the lower court, informally, that such bond has been filed, which was considered sufficient to prevent issuing of an execution. Where execution had issued then a writ" went to the sheriff below, in addition to the writ of error. This practice has doubtless been lax, and, together with the repeated changes in the law and rules of this court, standing under the territorial act as law, has caused confusion. In this case the defendant below, evidently confused as to the proper method of review, first sought it by appeal, and then by writ of error, finally adopting both, and filing a bond in the requisite sum, had either or both been proper, with the intention that the bond should be sufficient in either. The bond, as before said, states that it is for supersedeas in writ of error, and the only question is whether a substantial compliance was had with the statute; such compliance as would secure justice to both parties. Under the law, as it stood prior to 1891, the bond should have been filed in the court below as was first done. Under the latter act, it is to be approved by the clerk of this court, and impliedly filed with him, within ninety days. If this court held, having dismissed the appeal, that no substantial compliance with the statute had been made, and that there was no supersedeas, then the plaintiff below could collect his money, while the case upon review might be reversed, the writ of error pending, and the defendant below be without recourse in event of final success. In case the defendant in error has his judgment affirmed, and the plaintiff is unable to pay the judgment, could the sureties on his bond plead that the same was no bond in this cause, and defeat the collection of the judgment? We think not. The filing of the bond below, conditioned that the plaintiff in error was "about to sue out a writ of error," and its approval by the court, was an act of which the clerk there was compelled to take notice, and was certainly as binding upon him as would have been an informal letter from the clerk here. Further, there is nothing to show, except the approval of the clerk here, that the bond was not filed with him prior to the twenty-third day of March, although we presume that it was so filed on that date. However, we are not prepared to say that the approval of this bond by the clerk of this court was an absolute condition precedent to the issuing of a supersedeas. The citation issued, with writ of error, on the twenty-third, only two days after the ninety days had expired, while the supersedeas bond had been given, and was among the papers below, more than a month before. W& hold that upon the filing of this bond, in pursuance of the express intention of suing out a writ of error, a stay of execution should have been had; that the supersedeas should be considered as such in the writ of error cause, and not on the appeal; that the bond is security to defendant in error; and that while the correct practice is and should be to file the bond, and have same approved, and writ of supersedeas issued by the clerk of this court, within ninety days after judgment, still there has been a substantial compliance-with the statute, the provisions of which are sufficiently obscure to cause some confusion. The motion to quash the writ of error and set aside the supersedeas is denied.
O'Brien, C. J., and Seeds and Freeman, JJ.,, concur.