Case Name: Scarlet Christine ADAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TEMPLE INLAND, LA, Defendant-Appellee
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 2003-11-05
Citations: 858 So. 2d 855
Docket Number: No. 03-187
Parties: Scarlet Christine ADAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TEMPLE INLAND, LA, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: Court composed of NED E. DOUCET, JR., Chief Judge, BILLIE COLOMBARO WOODARD and JIMMIE C. PETERS, Judges.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 858
Pages: 855–869

Head Matter:
Scarlet Christine ADAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TEMPLE INLAND, LA, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 03-187.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
Nov. 5, 2003.
R. Scott lies, Lafayette, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellant, Scarlet Christine Adams.
Mark L. Riley, Onebane Law Firm, Lafayette, LA, for Defendant/Appellee, Temple Inland, LA.
Court composed of NED E. DOUCET, JR., Chief Judge, BILLIE COLOMBARO WOODARD and JIMMIE C. PETERS, Judges.

Opinion:
LDOUCET, Chief Judge.
In this workers' compensation case, Claimant, Scarlet Christine Adams, appeals a judgment denying her claim for benefits in connection with her mental injury caused by mental stress due to sexual harassment in the course of her employment. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Workers' Compensation Judge (WCJ).
DISCUSSION OF THE RECORD
At the beginning of trial, the parties stipulated that there were no facts in dispute and that the matter presented only a legal issue.
The undisputed facts establish that Ms. Adams began working for Temple Inland, LA (Temple Inland) in late 2000 or early 2001 as a utility hand. Almost immediately after she began her employment, her supervisor, David James "Red" Harper, and a co-worker, Kevin St. Romain, began sexually harassing her. Initially, the harassment took the form of "little comments in front of all the . guys in the break room." For example, when Ms. Adams would bend over, Harper and St. Romain would talk about "what they would like to do." Another co-worker, Syrina Silas, also began making comments to Ms. Adams's male co-workers that Ms. Adams was not married and "needed to be laid." Harper carried the harassment even further by requiring Ms. Adams to leave her workstation at times and spend time in his office. There, he would describe to her the various ways in which he wanted to have sex with his wife and would complain about his wife's unwillingness to engage in these sexual activities.
It did not take long for Harper's and St. Romain's harassment to escalate beyond vulgar comments to propositions and threats. When Ms. Adams began refusing to enter Harper's office with him, he warned her that he could make her job 12easy or difficult. He also began propositioning Ms. Adams to have sex with him, which she refused to do. Despite her re jection of his advances, Harper continued to press Ms. Adams for sexual favors, explaining to her that her job would be in jeopardy if she did not submit. Additionally, in the presence of Ms. Adams's coworkers, Harper "offered to get a hotel room so the guys could get [her] out of their system." On at least one occasion, Harper required Ms. Adams, who worked the night shift, to stay late for clean-up duties and threatened to take her to a place where no one would be able to hear her screams and then rape her. Ms. Adams's fears in this regard were exacerbated by a rumor that Harper had sexually exploited another female employee by having sex with her in the sleeper cab of a truck at work and then requiring her to give sexual favors to other men at work, under the threat of job loss. St. Romain also threatened to rape her and to burn her house down.
Moreover, the sexual harassment by Harper and St. Romain turned physical as well. Harper confined Ms. Adams to "areas where he could just get to [her]," and "he would pin [her] in a corner, and [she] would get felt up." Additionally, Harper "would grab himself and ask [her] if [she] wanted some." St. Romain also groped Ms. Adams.
In June of 2001, Ms. Adams reported the harassment to Temple Inland's human resources department. To its credit, shortly thereafter, Temple Inland terminated Harper's employment and suspended and then transferred St. Romain and Ms. Silas.
The sexual harassment resulted in Ms. Adams developing psychological problems. Prior to the harassment, Ms. Adams had not had such problems nor had she ever seen a counselor or mental health professional. In July of 2001, Ms. Adams saw Dr. Charlotte M. Fowler, a family practitioner, at the DeRidder Family Health | .¡¡Clinic. Dr. Fowler diagnosed anxiety and prescribed medication. Additionally, Dr. Fowler reported that Ms. Adams "must find counseling [for] this tremendous amount of stress and trauma that she is handling."
On July 24, 2001, and August 22, 2001, Ms. Adams saw Dr. David S. Post, a clinical psychologist, for evaluation of psychological problems arising from the harassment at Temple Inland. Following psychological evaluation and testing, Dr. Post determined that Ms. Adams was "suffering from severe traumatic anxiety as a result of her harassment on the job" and diagnosed her as having acute stress disorder with agoraphobia and depressive disorder. Dr. Post cautioned that Ms. Adams was "at high risk for developing major depressive disorder if her conditions [did] not improve." He recommended that Ms. Adams leave her employment with Temple as soon as possible and that she be evaluated for a trial of anxiolytic and antidepressant medication should her anxiety disorder continue. Thereafter, by letter dated September 5, 2001, Dr. Post advised Temple Inland of Ms. Adams's condition "due to unusual treatment in her work environment." Dr. Post also informed Temple Inland that he had advised Ms. Adams "that she must take an immediate medical leave of absence from work in order to prevent serious deterioration of her mental and physical health."
Ms. Adams discontinued working and filed a claim for compensation benefits for mental injury from the sexual harassment as well as for an unrelated elbow injury. The parties stipulated at the hearing that there was an injury to Ms. Adams's elbow for which Temple Inland was continuing to provide medical treatment. At the hearing on the claim, the sole issue before the WCJ was the compensability of the claim for benefits arising out of the sexual harassment.
| ¿The WCJ rendered judgment in favor of Temple Inland and dismissed Ms. Adams's claim, finding as follows:
The court found that the claimant failed to prove her injury was caused by a sudden, unexpected and extraordinary situation; in fact, it was due to events that occurred over an extended period of time, not by a sudden, unexpected or extraordinary event. Claimant testified that the various events and occurrences of sexual harassment stretched from January 2001 to June 2001. Based on the testimony presented, the court is unable to identify a "sudden, unexpected and extraordinary" occurrence. This court by no means condones the behavior of the defendants' employees; however, this claim does not meet the conditions established under the Workers' Compensation Act to be a compensable claim.
Ms. Adams has appealed this judgment, contending that the WCJ erred in concluding that, because the sexual harassment occurred over an extended period of time, her mental injury is not compensable.
DISCUSSION OF THE LAW
Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1021(7)(b) (Emphasis added) provides as follows concerning a "mental/mental" claim:
Mental injury caused by mental stress. Mental injury or illness resulting from work-related stress shall not be considered a personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment and is not compensable pursuant to this Chapter, unless the mental injury was the result of a sudden, unexpected, and extraordinary stress related to the employment and is demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence.
In Pham v. Contico Int'l, Inc., 99-945, pp. 5-6 (La.App. 5 Cir.3/22/00), 759 So.2d 880, 882-83 (footnotes omitted)(emphasis added), our brethren of the fifth circuit pointed out the following:
We note that the exclusive remedy provisions of R.S. 23:1032 do not grant an employer immunity from all tort suits by an employee simply by virtue of the employment relationship between the two. This State recognizes an employee's cause of action against an employer for the torts of wrongful or retaliatory discharge, sexual harassment, and false accusation, false imprisonment, and defamation. Therefore, the statutory immunity granted to an employer by LSA-R.S. 23:1032 is not an immunity from all tort suits by an employee, but only those on | ^account of an injury or disease com-pensable under the workers' compensation statutory scheme.
Additionally, we note the case of Sidwell v. Horseshoe Entm't Ltd. P'ship, 35,718 (La.App. 2 Cir.2/27/02), 811 So.2d 229. In Sidwell the Claimant alleged that she was sexually harassed by being subjected to repeated sexual comments by a co-worker who also showed her a nude picture of himself. The court, in Sidwell, noted the following:
Mental injuries caused by mental stress have become commonly known in Louisiana workers' compensation jurisprudence as "mental/mental" injuries and are addressed by La. R.S. 23:1021(7)(b), which states as follows:
Mental injury or illness resulting from work-related stress shall not be considered a personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment and is not compensable pursuant to this Chapter, unless the mental injury was the result of a sudden, unexpected, and extraordinary stress related to the employment and is demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence. (Emphasis added).
The mental injury must be precipitated by an accident, an unexpected and unforeseen event that occurs suddenly or violently. Edwards v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 31,371 (La.App.2d Cir.12/09/98), 722 So.2d 344, citing Sparks v. Tulane Medical Center Hosp. and Clinic, 546 So.2d 138 (La.1989). The mere showing that a mental injury was related to general conditions of employment, or to incidents occurring over an extended period of time, is not enough to justify compensation. Sparks, supra; Edwards, supra. Absent an identifiable accident, general allegations of inability to work due to stress or tension caused by working conditions would not give rise to a compen-sable claim. Id.
Id. at 231.
In the recent case of Partin v. Merchants & Farmers Bank, 01-1560 (La.3/11/02), 810 So.2d 1118, the claimant alleged that she suffered a compensable mental injury when her employer (a bank) demoted her after eighteen years of employment on the basis that she lacked managerial skills. The OWC awarded | (¡benefits and this court affirmed. The supreme court noted that, while the claimant personally found the demotion to be extraordinary and unexpected because she did not know that her employer was displeased with her and because she was quite settled in her career, "by its nature, a demotion for failing to satisfactorily perform one's job creates stress that is neither unexpected nor extraordinary in the usual course of employment at a bank." Id. at 1126. The court explained that "[a] personnel action is not necessarily extraordinary because it is unfair from the employee's point of view." Id. The supreme court went into great detail in analyzing the LAW applicable to "mental/mental" claims stating as follows:
Prior to 1989, Louisiana courts were split on whether mental injuries caused solely by mental stress (known as "mental/mental" claims) were compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act. At that time, the term "injury" was defined in subsection 1021(7) of the Act, which stated:
"Injury" and "personal injuries" include only injuries by violence to the physical structure of the body and such disease or infections as naturally result therefrom. These terms shall in no case be construed to include any other form of disease or derangement, however caused or contracted.
La. R.S. 23:1021(7) (1989). To remedy this split in the courts, a bill was proposed in the state legislature that eliminated the compensability of mental/mental claims. Minutes of Meeting, House Committee on Labor and Industrial Relations 15 16, May 26, 1989, Reg. Sess.1989. It retained the text of subsection 1021(7) but redesignated it as 1021(7)(a), and then added subsection 1021(7)(b), which stated:
(b) Mental injury caused by mental stress. Mental injury or illness resulting from work-related stress shall not be considered a personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment and is not compensable pursuant to this Chapter.
H.B. No. 1431, Reg. Sess.1989 (original version). This amendment was proposed along with many other amendments to the Workers' Compensation Act, which were presented together as House Bill No. 1431. The stated purpose of HB 1431 was to address the |7problem of employers' increased liability in many areas, including mental inju ry claims. House Minutes, supra at 15. The bill's author explained that the bill addressed the "crisis" in Louisiana regarding workers' compensation insurance: Louisiana had the sixth highest workers' compensation insurance rate in the United States, which prevented new businesses from being able to obtain the insurance. Minutes of Meeting, Senate Committee on Labor and Industrial Relations 4, June 7, 1989, Reg. Sess.1989 A proponent of the bill explained that the bill addressed the fact that Louisiana courts had been ignoring much of the language in the Workers' Compensation Act, and that if the laws had been interpreted as they were written, constant changes would not be necessary. House Minutes, supra at 18. He stated that the bill was meant to statutorily override cases that had liberalized the workers' compensation law regarding mental stress and heart attacks, and to impose more difficult tests in order to recover. Senate Minutes, supra at 5.
The proposed language in subsection 1021(7)(b) regarding mental/mental claims passed the house on June 1,1989. Official Journal of the House of Representatives of the State of Louisiana, Twenty-Ninth Day's Proceedings 80, Reg. Sess.1989, June 1, 1989. Twelve days later, however, the Senate adopted an amendment which added a clause to subsection 1021(7)(b) that made mental/mental claims compensable in certain circumstances. Official Journal of the Senate of the State of Louisiana, Twenty Ninth Day's Proceedings 14, Reg. Sess. 1989, June 18, 1989. The added clause is indicated below with underlined text:
(b) Mental injury caused by mental stress. Mental injury or illness resulting from work-related stress shall not be considered a personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment and is not compensable pursuant to this Chapter, unless the mental injury was the result of a sudden, unexpected, and extraordinary stress related to the employment and is demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence.
Id. This amendment was adopted by the house on June 21, 1989, and the bill passed the legislature with the added language that mental/mental claims were not compensable except under those limited circumstances. House Journal, supra, Forty-Third Day's Proceedings at 30, June 21, 1989. The governor signed HB 1431 on June 30, 1989, and it became effective as Act 454 of 1989 on January 1, 1990. 1989 La. Acts 434.
During the window of time between the enactment of HB 1431 and its effective date, this court held that a mental/mental claim was compensable as an "injury" under the pre-amendment version of La. R.S.23:1021(7) in Sparks v. Tulane Med. Center Hosp. & Clinic, 546 8So.2d 138 (La.1989) (decided on September 11, 1989). Our decision today, though, is governed by the new, amended version of the law governing mental/mental claims found at La. R.S. 23:1021(7)(b), as quoted above. Subsection 1021(7)(a) (which was previously designated as subsection 1021(7)) is no longer at issue because the new law specifically provides for mental/mental claims in subsection 1021(7)(b).
In a mental/mental claim, a claimant must not only satisfy subsection 1021(7)(b), but also the general requirements for recovery under the Workers' Compensation Act, found in La. R.S. 23:1031. Section 1031 limits recovery under the Act to situations where "an employee not otherwise eliminated from the benefits of this Chapter receives personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment." La. R.S. 23:1031 (emphasis added). We note that subsection 1021(7)(b) incorporates this entire emphasized phrase into its definition of mental injury, stating that a mental injury or illness resulting from work-related stress shall not be considered a "personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment " and is not compensable unless the mental injury resulted from a sudden, unexpected, and extraordinary stress related to the employment. In contrast, subsection 1021(7)(a) does not contain this language, but simply defines "injury" and "personal injuries" as injuries by violence to the physical structure of the body and their naturally-resulting diseases or infections. La. R.S. 23:1021(7)(a). Yet, by incorporating the language from section 1031 into subsection 1021(7)(b), we do not think that the legislature intended the requirement of "sudden, unexpected, and extraordinary stress related to the employment" to satisfy the whole of "personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment." Our conclusion is supported by the legislative history of subsection 1021(7)(b). As discussed above, the house originally intended for subsection 1021(7)(b) to preclude the compens-ability of all mental/mental claims. It accomplished this by referring to the basic requirements of compensability under section 1031 in a peremptory statement that "a mental injury or illness resulting from work-related stress shall not be considered a personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment and is not com-pensable pursuant to this Chapter." H.B. No. 1431, Reg. Sess.1989 (original version) (emphasis added). However, when the senate later chose to amend that subsection and make mental/mental claims compensable in certain limited circumstances, it merely tacked on an "unless" clause to the end of the original language, rather than redrafting the entire subsection. Senate Journal, supra, Twenty-Ninth Day's Proceedings at 14, June 13, 1989. The logical deduction is that the legislature did not intend to displace the basic requirements of accident, arising out of employment, and in the course of employment in mental/mental claims. Rather, the legislature intended to provide narrow circumstances under which mentai/mental claims would be compensable, assuming that the requirements of accident, arising out of employment, and in the course 1 flof employment were also satisfied. Therefore, a mental/mental claimant must fulfill both the requirements in section 1031 and those in subsection 1021(7)(b) in order to recover.
For the reasons below, we conclude that Claimant's injury fails to meet the requirements of subsection 1021(7)(b). Because her failure to meet the requirements of subsection 1021 (7)(b) precludes Claimant's recovery for her mental/mental claim, it is not necessary to also discuss whether the requirements of section 1031 are met.
In analyzing Claimant's injury under subsection 1021(7)(b), we first note that this subsection states in part that a mental injury or illness resulting from work-related stress shall not be considered a personal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment and is not compensable unless the mental injury was the result of a sudden, unexpected, and extraordinary stress related to the employment and is demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence. Claimant contends that the stress brought on by her demotion was unexpected and extraordinary because Claimant's career at the bank was well-established and successful, Claimant was close to reaching retirement, and the demotion was not a known, scheduled event. Claimant testified that she in no way expected this demotion because she assumed the bank was satisfied with her written explanation of the incident involving the five dollars, and because she had no prior indications that the bank was dissatisfied with her performance as a manager. Nevertheless, we find that, even under the facts as presented by Claimant, this demotion does not fit the meaning of unexpected and extraordinary stress under subsection (7)(b).
Although subsection (7)(b) falls under the "definitions" subpart of the Workers' Compensation Act, it reads more like a declaration of the conditions under which a mental injury will be compensa-ble. In this way, it is not so much a definition of mental injury as it is a definition of compensable mental injury. Under the statute, a mental injury is compensable depending upon the type of stress which triggers that injury. The legislative history of subsection (7)(b), outlined above, reveals an active decision on the part of the legislature to so condition compensability in order to tighten the reigns of recovery for mental/mental claims. The desire for more difficult tests and restricted recovery indicates that the legislature intended that the nature of the stress itself be evaluated, rather than the stress being evaluated from the employee's perspective. This of course differs from the determination of whether an "event" was unexpected or unforseen under the accident requirement of subsection 1021(1), which is made by viewing the event from the employee's perspective. See Williams, 546 So.2d at 156; Parks v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 340 So.2d 276, 281 (La.1976); Ferguson v. HDE, Inc., 270 So.2d 867, 870 (La.1972). Yet we find that this different evaluation of the "stress" under subsection 1021(7)(b) is mandated by the legislative intent. If the stress were evaluated from the | ^employee's perspective, much wider recovery would result under subsection (7)(b) because nearly every employee would consider extraordinary a stress that caused him mental injury. Although Louisiana courts have construed the terms of the Workers' Compensation Act liberally in light of its "beneficient purpose of relieving workmen of the economic burden of work-connected injuries by diffusing the costs in channels of commerce," there is a legislative intent to the contrary in subsection (7)(b). Sparks, 546 So.2d at 146 (quoting Parks v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 340 So.2d 276, 281 (La.1976)). The most likely inference is that the legislature intended to restrict recovery under subsection (7)(b) to those mental injuries that result from stresses which, by their nature, are sudden, unexpected, and extraordinary in the usual course of employment in that working environment.
Given its proper and necessary interpretation, it is evident that the new law under subsection 1021(7)(b) addresses the concerns previously expressed by this and other Louisiana courts. Before subsection 1021(7)(b) took effect and provided an express statutory basis for mental/mental claims, courts struggled to find a place for such claims under what was then subsection 1021(7), which basically restricted "injuries" to those caused by violence to the physical structure of the body. See, e.g., Sparks v. Tulane Med. Center Hosp. & Clinic, 546 So.2d 138 (La.1989); Jones v. City of New Orleans, 514 So.2d 611 (La.App. 4 Cir.1987); Guillot v. Sentry Ins. Co., 472 So.2d 197 (La.App. 5 Cir.1985); To- quino v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 438 So.2d 625 (La.App. 4 Cir.1983). Sparks reasoned that mental/mental claims were compensable under the old law because there was violence in the form of a harmful effect on the physical structure of the body, which includes the complex of integrated and interdependent bones, tissues and organs that function together by means of electrical, chemical and mechanical processes. Sparks, 546 So.2d at 145-46 (quoting Bailey v. American Gen. Ins. Co., 154 Tex. 430, 279 S.W.2d 315, 318 (1955)). In doing so, the Sparks court was also aware of the potential problems that could result if every claim of mental injury were compensable. While the strict language in subsection 1021(7) did not appear to lend itself to a limitation on the com-pensability of mental/mental claims, the "accident" requirement did. The court stated:
[A] mere showing that a mental injury was related to the general conditions of employment, or to incidents occurring over an extended period of time, is not enough to entitle the claimant to compensation. The mental injury must be precipitated by an accident, i.e., an unexpected and unforeseen event that occurs suddenly or violently.
Sparks, 546 So.2d at 147 (emphasis in original). Under the new law, it is not necessary to limit mental/mental claims through the Inaccident requirement as was appropriately done under the old law in Sparks. The new law provided in subsection 1021(7)(b) supplies its own limitation by disallowing compensation for mental injuries unless they result from stress that, by its nature, is sudden, unexpected, and extraordinary in the usual course of employment in that working environment. Although the accident requirement must still be fulfilled as explained above, the limitation on claims should now be found in subsection 1021(7)(b).
Partin, 810 So.2d at 1122-26 (Underlining ours).
In the instant case, the WCJ determined that, because there was not a single, unexpected, and extraordinary "event" that caused Ms. Adams's mental injury but rather "various events and occurrences of sexual harassment" that had "occurred over an extended period of time," Ms. Adams failed to prove that her mental injury was compensable.
The most recent case we have found addressing alleged sexual harassment is Morris and Dickson Co. Ltd. v. Killingworth, 36,117 (La.App. 2 Cir. 10/4/02), 830 So.2d 332, writ denied, 03-71 (La.3/28/03), 840 So.2d 571. In Morris and Dickson, their employee, Deborah KMngworth, resigned stating she was unable to work due to depression, anxiety attacks and other health problems which resulted from an incident on April 14, 2000, when she was sexually harassed by a male co-worker. Following her resignation she sued Morris and Dickson in federal court alleging sexual harassment and retaliation, both violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In response to her suit, Morris and Dickson "filed a disputed claim form with the Office of Workers' Compensation ("OWC"), alleging a bonafide dispute with regard to Killingworth's injuries." Id. at 333. Killingworth answered the workers' compensation action with an exception of lack of subject matter jurisdiction which was denied by the OWC. On review of Ms. Killingworth's •writ application, the second circuit reversed the judgment of the OWC stating:
| ^.Killingworth contends the OWC does not have jurisdiction over her sexual harassment claim because it is outside of the scope of the Louisiana Workers' Compensation Act, ("WCA"), i.e., LSA-R.S. 28:1021 et seq.... M & D asserts that the judgment simply allows the employer the statutory right to proceed with a bonafide dispute of an on-the-job mental injury and the ability to conduct discovery to defend such a claim in the only arena at their disposal. We disagree. The weakness of M & D's argument lies in the failure to recognize the distinction drawn in Louisiana law between claims that arise under the state workers' compensation law and claims that arise under other statutes and authorities.
[A] state law basis for refuting M & D' s claim is provided by LSA-R.S. 23:1032(B), which states:
Nothing in the Chapter shall affect the Lability of the employer, or any officer, director, stockholder, partner, or employee of such employer or principal to a fíne or penalty under any other statute or the liability, civil or criminal, resulting from an intentional act. (Emphasis added.)
Under the applicable statutory authority, Killingworth's sexual harassment claim is not within the scope of this state's workers' compensation law. Therefore, we find that the OWC does not have jurisdiction over this claim.
While we deplore the conduct of Ms. Adams' co-workers, we do note that as soon as she reported their offending actions to management, her chief protagonist was fired and the other two, lesser offenders, were first suspended, then transferred. Our review of the statutory scheme and the jurisprudence convinces us that, while Ms. Adams may have a legal remedy for the mental injury she sustained, that remedy does not lie under the Workers' Compensation Act.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the judgment of the OWC is affirmed. Inasmuch as Claimant is before us as a pauper, we pretermit the assessment of costs.
AFFIRMED.
WOODARD, J., concurs and assigns written reasons.
PETERS, J., dissents and assigns written reasons.