Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. David BANKS
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1975-01-20
Citations: 307 So. 2d 594
Docket Number: No. 55224
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. David BANKS.
Judges: TATE, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 307
Pages: 594–604

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. David BANKS.
No. 55224.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Jan. 20, 1975.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 21, 1975.
Joel B. Dickinson, Joel B. Dickinson & Associates, Baton Rouge, for defendant-appellant.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ossie Brown, Dist. Atty., Richard E. Chaffin, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Opinion:
DIXON, Justice.
David Banks and Willie J. Banks were charged in a bill of information filed on April 30, 1973 with distribution of heroin (R.S. 40:966, subd. A(l)) to Charles Spill-ers on October 18, 1972; the time of the sale was fixed in a bill of particulars at about 6:45 p. m. The case of Willie J. Banks was severed, and David Banks was found guilty by a jury on January 7, 1974, and subsequently sentenced to twenty-one years at hard labor.
Nine bills of exceptions are urged, all related, directly or indirectly, to the use by the prosecution of evidence of other offenses in the trial of the case.
Defense counsel disclosed to the jury that David Banks had been tried (about three months before the instant trial) on another drug offense (distribution of heroin on December 20, 1972) ; that jury had failed to agree on a verdict. In that case, counsel argues in brief, he was served with a notice that the State would attempt to use evidence of other offenses in the prosecution. But in the instant case, states counsel, he never received notice prior to trial that the State intended to use evidence of other offenses. This alleged failure, and the subsequent use of other offense evidence in the State's case in chief, is the basis of the first three bills of exceptions.
Except for two witnesses who identified the contraband drug, undercover agent Spillers was the only prosecution witness who testified on the case in chief. He not only testified that he purchased heroin from Banks at about 6:45 p. m., but that he also purchased heroin from the defendant at 8:30 p. m. the same day, which was the time specified in the notice of intention to use other offenses filed by the State.
The first and third bills of exceptions were based on counsel's failure to receive the notice of intention to use other offenses. The bills are without merit. The notice is in the record, filed on June 5, 1973, having been served on the lawyer who was then counsel of record on June 4, 1973. Defendant employed present counsel in October, 1973. He is charged with knowledge of the pleadings in the record. His contention that service of the notice six months before trial violated the requirement of "reasonable" notice of State v. Prieur, 277 So.2d 126 (La.1973), is insubstantial.
The record does not disclose the reasons for the second bill of exceptions; defendant argues in brief that evidence of the second offense was not relevant to show "knowledge and intent," since, under R.S. 15:444, no further proof of intent is required than that "accused voluntarily did the act." Nor were reasons stated by counsel for his objection at the trial to the evidence of the second sale, which objection forms the basis for Bill of Exceptions No. 3.
In spite of the words in R.S. 40:966 that "it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally ." to do the prohibited acts, the statute requires no more than general criminal intent. (See R.S. 14:11: ". . .in the absence of qualifying provisions, the terms 'intent' and 'intentional' have reference to 'general criminal intent.' "). Knowledge and intent did not become an issue in this case. (State v. Medlock, 297 So.2d 190 (La.1974), is distinguishable: Medlock involved a conviction for possession with the intent to distribute, while the instant charge is distribution of heroin). The notice filed by the prosecution on June 5, 1973 stated, in an attempt to comply with the second procedural requirement of Prieur, that the extraneous offense would be used to prove intent. The rules of Prieur were not meant to be used as additional, technical procedures sacramental to a valid conviction. Substantial compliance with this procedure designed to insure a fair trial when "other offenses" are involved will not be penalized.
We might have said, in Prieur, .instead of requiring the State to "specify the exception to the general exclusionary rule upon which it relies for the admissibility of the evidence of other acts or offenses", that the State would be required to show the relevance of the other offenses, because relevant evidence is admissible unless specifically excluded. See Jones, "Other Crimes Evidence," 33 La.L.Rev. 614 (1973). It is sometimes difficult, at a time long before the trial begins, to articulate the reasons that will make certain evidence relevant. In the absence of prejudice to the defendant, we hold that the failure of the State to include the correct reason for the admissibility of other offense evidence will not invalidate a conviction.
The specific issue in the case before us was one of identity. The defendant contended that there was another David Banks in the vicinity; that he, the defendant, had never sold any narcotics to any person, including Spillers; and that on the evening of the offense he was at home building a dog run in his back yard. Even if the evidence was not admissible to prove "intent," it was relevant and admissible to prove the identity of the accused.
The probative value of the second offense — so close in time to the first, involving the same parties at the same place in an almost identical transaction — was significant. There was no undue prejudice to the defendant in the use of such evidence, and no merit in Bills of Exceptions Nos. 1, 2 and 3.
Bill of Exceptions No. 4 was reserved to the court's refusal to permit the defendant to impeach a State's witness before she was called to testify. The de--fense anticipated that Annette Kelly would be called as a rebuttal witness, and placed Jo Jo Williams on the witness stand for the announced purpose of impeaching the witness Kelly's testimony. The trial judge permitted the defendant, out of the presence of the jury, to adduce from Williams the "impeaching" testimony. That testimony was that Jo Jo Williams, a black man, had, in times past, "dated" Annette Kelly, had "lived at her house," and had seen her use marijuana.
The trial judge properly excluded this testimony from the jury. The general rule, of course, is contained in R.S. 15:484:
"Before a witness has been sworn he can be neither corroborated nor impeached, nor is testimony to establish the credibility of a witness admissible until that credibility has been attacked."
In this case, however, aware that the defendant would not ordinarily be given the opportunity to put on testimony tending to impeach rebuttal witnesses (but see C.Cr.P. 765(5), the judge was correct in allowing the defendant to adduce his "impeaching" evidence out of the presence of the jury. The evidence which the defendant intended to use to attack the antic ipated testimony of Annette Kelly inquired into "particular acts, vices or conduct" of the witness Kelly. It was not admissible impeaching testimony. State v. Burch, 261 La. 3, 258 So.2d 851 (1972). R.S. 15:490 and 15:491 provide:
"The credibility of a witness may be attacked generally, by showing that his general reputation for truth or for moral character is bad, or it may be attacked only in so far as his credibility in the case on trial is concerned."
"When the general credibility is attacked, the inquiry must be limited to general reputation, and can not go into particular acts, vices or courses of conduct."
There is no merit to Bill of Exceptions No. 4.
Bill of Exceptions No. 5 was reserved during the cross-examination of Jesse Williams, a character witness called by the defendant. When the defendant had taken the stand he was questioned by his counsel about his work and family life. He was at the time of the trial thirty-one years old. He testified that he had been convicted of misdemeanor theft at age seventeen and again at age twenty-three. He testified that he had been "picked up" when the authorities "had me for the wrong man." He denied knowing Spillers in October of 1972; denied seeing him at the time; testified that Spillers had approached him in 1973 to attempt to buy heroin. He testified that, since his birthday was on October 17, 1972 he remembered that the following day, the day on which the offense was alleged to have occurred, he was occupied building a run for his dog. He denied that he had ever dealt in narcotics and denied having ever used narcotics in any form.
When Jesse Williams, the last defense witness, was called he testified that the defendant had a good reputation in the community and that he had never heard "anybody discuss anything bad about him." On cross-examination, the character witness was asked whether he knew the defendant had been twice convicted of theft. The witness Williams did not. When asked whether that knowledge would have changed Williams' opinion about the defendant's reputation, the witness answered that it would have made no difference.
At this point, the district attorney asked Williams whether he knew that the defendant had been arrested for simple burglary in 1968. Bill of Exceptions No. 5 was reserved when the trial judge overruled defense objections to this question.
The defendant argues that evidence of previous arrests of the defendant was inadmissible. This much is true. Evidence of prior arrests is not admissible for the purpose of impeaching the credibility of witnesses. R.S. 15:495 provides:
"Evidence of conviction of crime, but not of arrest, indictment or prosecution, is admissible for the purpose of impeaching the credibility of the witness, but before evidence of such former conviction can be adduced from any other source than the witness whose credibility is to be impeached, he must have been questioned on cross-examination as to such conviction, and have failed distinctly to admit the same; and no witness, whether he be defendant or not, can be asked on cross-examination whether or not he has ever been indicted or arrested, and can only be questioned as to conviction, and as provided herein."
But the provisions of R.S. 15:495 do not precisely fit the case before us. To be precise, evidence of prior arrests was not offered. It is no real answer to the problem, however, merely to point out that a character witness was being cross-examined about his knowledge of facts from which a reputation is made. Although the State was not actually offering evidence of convictions, when the prosecutor asked, "Did you know . he was arrested for simple burglary?" and "if I tell you . he was arrested on two counts of burglary and two counts of forgery and felony theft . . . he was in effect conveying information to the jury, almost as surely as if he was producing evidence of prior arrests.
Nevertheless, in spite of the prohibition in R.S. 15 :495, when the question has arisen in this court, we have held that it is not reversible error for the prosecution to ask a character witness for the defendant about his knowledge of prior arrests. State v. Daniels, 262 La. 475, 263 So.2d 859 (1972); State v. Simpson, 247 La. 883, 175 So.2d 255 (1965).
The ruling in the Daniels case has been criticized (34 La.L.Rev. 447 (1974)) for the reason that no distinction was made between a question which inquires solely whether the witness had heard of prior arrests, and a question which inquires whether the witness had knowledge of the fact that the defendant had been previously arrested. The law concerning character witnesses and cross-examination of character witnesses is full of anomalies. See Michelson v. U. S., 335 U.S. 469, 69 S.Ct. 213, 93 L.Ed. 168 (1948).
"It is a merciful dispensation to the accused of hitherto blameless life to allow him to open this door of character. To those with spotted records, however, it is a far more dangerous move to open this door than might at first glance be assumed." (McCormick on Evidence, § 191, 456 (Cleary Ed. 1972).
McCormick further states: "Logically, the courts hold that the witness may not be asked 'if he knows' that the accused has committed such other crimes. As to indictments or other official charges, verdicts, convictions, or repeated arrests, or sentences for crime, it would seem allowable to ask the witness if he 'knows' of these, but some decisions require the 'have you heard' form of inquiry as to these matters also." (Page 457).
We do not have before us the problem of a bad faith inquiry about prior arrests. The real problem is whether the State should be relatively helpless in cross-examining witnesses who testify to the good reputation and good character of an accused in order to determine whether the witnesses are aware of facts which form a reputation, or, as in the case before us, whether the character witness' concept of a good reputation deviates so far from the standard that the witness' opinion would not be affected by knowledge of prior criminal activity.
Although the position is not without danger of abuse, and may be illogical in view of the prohibition against the introduction of evidence of prior arrests, we conclude that neither law nor justice permits a defendant to foist a spurious reputation upon a jury because the State is so limited in its cross-examination of the character witnesses that it may not inquire about knowledge of prior arrests. State v. Ghoram, 290 So.2d 850 (La.1974), cited by the defendant is not applicable. In Ghoram, the defendant himself was, on cross-examination, repeatedly asked about prior arrests.
There is no merit to Bill of Exceptions No. 5.
Bills of Exceptions Nos. 6 and 7 were reserved to the rebuttal testimony of Spill-ers and Early. In order to rebut the defendant's testimony that he had never dealt in drugs, the State adduced evidence from Spillers that Spillers also purchased illicit drugs from the defendant on October 27, 1972, and assisted Early, a federal agent, in making two purchases of illicit drugs from the defendant on January 19, 1973. Defendant argues that Ghoram, as well as Prieur, prohibited the introduction of this evidence.
There can be no doubt of the relevance of the evidence of the other offenses described in the testimony of Spill-ers and Early on rebuttal. Not only was it relevant to the defense of mistaken identity, but it directly contradicted the conten tion of the defendant that he had never dealt in dope and had never sold any to Spillers. Contradiction is one means of rebutting testimony of a witness. State v. Garrison, 260 La. 141, 255 So.2d 719 (1971); State v. Poe, 214 La. 606, 38 So.2d 359 (1948).
The rebuttal evidence adduced from Spillers and Early was evidence of past acts of misconduct, which were, like the 8:30 p. m. sale on October 18, 1972, so similar in nature, so close in time and so nearly identical in parties, that the probative value of the evidence was great. It did not merely show the bad character of defendant. There is no complaint by the defendant that he was unfairly surprised by the use of such evidence.
Defendant's principal argument is that he was not furnished in advance of trial with the written notice required in Prieur that the State intended to introduce evidence of the offenses which occurred on October 27, 1972 and January 19, 1973.
The State in this case did not attempt to avoid the use of the notice required in Prieur. Notice was given concerning the second sale of October 18. It is, however, impossible for the State to anticipate every defense which might be raised on the trial of a case. When, as here, evidence of other acts of misconduct become relevant after defendant's case, and would be admissible on rebuttal except for the fact that advance notice of intention to adduce evidence of other offenses had not been given to the defendant, we will not reverse for the failure, under such circumstances, to comply with the requirements of Prieur.
There is no merit to Bills of Exceptions Nos. 6 and 7.
Bills of Exceptions Nos. 8 and 9 were reserved as a result of Annette Kelly's testimony. Bill 8 was reserved when the trial court overruled the defense objection to the calling of this witness as a rebuttal witness. Defendant argued that the witness Kelly should have been called on direct examination since she was present with Spillers when the two purchases of October 18 were made from the defendant.
We find no abuse of discretion in the trial judge's allowing the witness Kelly to testify on rebuttal. While her evidence would have been properly admissible on the case in chief, it was also proper rebuttal testimony. She contradicted defendant's testimony that he had never sold narcotics to anyone, including Spillers. Her testimony was relevant to rebut defendant's contention that this was a case of mistaken identity. She contradicted defendant's assertion that he was at his home at the time of the sale on October 18. "Rebutting evidence is that which is offered to explain, repel, counteract or disprove facts given in evidence by the adverse party." State v. Monroe, 205 La. 285, 17 So.2d 331, 332 (1944).
There is no merit in Bill of Exceptions No. 8.
Bill of Exceptions No. 9 merely repeated the objection to the testimony by the witness Kelly about the sale from the defendant to Spillers at 8:30 p. m. on October 18. For the reasons found in the discussion of Bills of Exceptions Nos. 1 and 3, there is no merit to Bill of Exceptions No. 9.
The conviction and sentence are affirmed.
TATE, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
BARHAM, J., dissents with reasons.
. "(2) In the written statement the State shall specify the exception to the general exclusionary rule upon which it relies for the admissibility of the evidence of other acts or offenses." (State v. Prieur, supra, 277 So.2d at page 130).