Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. Billy J. TAYLOR
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1973-01-15
Citations: 282 So. 2d 491
Docket Number: No. 52844
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Billy J. TAYLOR.
Judges: DIXON, J., dissents as to Bill #9.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 282
Pages: 491–503

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. Billy J. TAYLOR.
No. 52844.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Jan. 15, 1973.
On Rehearing Aug. 20, 1973.
William McM. King, Covington, for defendant-appellant.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., LeRoy A. Hartley, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Woodrow W. Erwin, Dist. Atty., Max Mercer, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Opinion:
HAMLIN, Chief Justice:
Defendant appeals from his conviction and sentence to death for the crime of aggravated kidnapping, LSA-R.S. 14:44.
During the course of the proceedings a number of hills of exceptions were reserved, some of which are not now urged for our consideration. Defense counsel sets forth in his brief a specification of errors; the bills of exceptions which we shall consider fall under the following errors assigned:
"1
"The trial judge erred in upholding the prosecutor's challenges for cause of prospective jurors who expressed scruples against capital punishment.
"2
"The trial judge erred in overruling the objections of the defendant to the prosecutor's questioning of prospective jurors regarding their reaction to evidence of aggravated rape and armed robbery which he anticipated proving during the trial.
"3
"The trial judge erred in denying defendant's challenge for cause of prospective juror who had been for at least ten years a close friend and immediate neighbor to the persons injured by the alleged crime and their family.
"4
"The trial judge erred in upholding the prosecutor's objection to the introduction by defendant of the certified records of the Charity Hospital in New Orleans and East Louisiana Hospital in Jackson pertaining to defendant.
"5
"The trial judge erred in denying defendant's motion to quash the petit jury venire on the grounds that it systematically excluded women therefrom.
"6
"The trial judge erred in denying defendant's motions in arrest of judgment and for a new trial on the grounds that the imposition and carrying out of the sentence of death constitutes cruel and unusual punishment."
BILL OF EXCEPTIONS NO. 1
This bill of exceptions has been abandoned.
BILL OF EXCEPTIONS NO. 2
This bill of exceptions has been abandoned.
BILL OF EXCEPTIONS NO. 3
Bill of Exceptions No. 3 was reserved to the ' ruling of the trial judge which upheld the State's challenges for cause, over the objection of defense counsel, of certain enumerated jurors who expressed their opposition to capital punishment.
The issue raised in this bill is now moot because of the ruling of the United Stated Supreme Court with respect to the death sentence in the case of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346.
BILLS OF EXCEPTIONS NOS. 4 AND 5
Bills of Exceptions Nos. 4 and 5 were reserved when the trial judge overruled defense counsel's objections to the following questions propounded by the State to prospective jurors Camille H. Ze-ringue and Kenneth T. Erickson:
"In other words, let me pose a hypothetical situation. If you were sitting on a jury and the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt to your satisfaction that a de fendant, whose guilt or innocence you must decide, had kidnapped a lady, two ladies and a child, and during the course of that kidnapping had robbed them of their money at the point of a knife, and during the course of that kidnapping had in fact at the point of a knife committed the crime of aggravated rape, if you are satisfied with the evidence and the circumstances surrounding it in that factual situation, could you render an opinion of guilty as charged?" (The above question was propounded to prospective juror Zeringue.)
"Then if you are satisfied in the trial of the situation where the State presented it to you a kidnapping case which involves not only kidnapping but the facts and circumstances showed, during the course of the trial, that during the kidnapping the Defendant committed the crime of aggravated rape upon one of the victims and at the same time robbed them of their money before they were liberated, then you could return a verdict of guilty in that possible situation?" (The above question was propounded to prospective juror Erickson.)
Defense counsel contends that in effect the district attorney by means of the above questioning was trying to commit the prospective jurors' vote in advance. He argues that such questioning does not advance the legitimate goal of testing possible bias, and it is clearly improper.
An examination of the record reveals that neither Camille H. Zeringue nor Kenneth T. Erickson served as jurors in this prosecution. Although the trial court overruled defense counsel's objections to the above propounded questions, he excused both prospective jurors from service. Under such circumstances, we find that the defendant suffered no prejudice, and there is no need for us to pass on his counsel's contentions.
Bills of Exceptions Nos. 4 and 5 are without merit.
BILL OF EXCEPTIONS NO. 6
This bill of exceptions has been abandoned.
BILL OF EXCEPTIONS NO. 7
This bill of exceptions has been abandoned.
BILL OF EXCEPTIONS NO. 8
Bill of Exceptions No. 8 was reserved to the ruling of the trial judge which denied defense counsel's challenge for cause of prospective juror Warren Martin on the ground that he had been for the ten years preceding trial a close friend of the victims of the crime and their family, and for that length of time lived across the street from them.
Defense counsel contends that the trial judge committed gross error in denying his challenge for cause, Art. 797, LSA-C.Cr. P., and that it is impossible to imagine that Martin would have been uninfluenced by his relationship.
An examination of the record reveals that prospective juror Warren Martin did not serve as a juror in this prosecution. Although defense counsel challenged the prospective juror for cause, he has not shown that defendant suffered any prejudice from an exhaustion of peremptory challenges. The record discloses that after defense counsel reserved a bill of exceptions to the instant ruling, the trial court immediately excused prospective juror Martin. Under such circumstances, defendant suffered no prejudice, and there is no need for us to pass upon his counsel's contentions.
Bill of Exceptions No. 8 is without merit.
BILL OF EXCEPTIONS NO. 9
Bill of Exceptions No. 9 was reserved when the trial judge refused to allow the introduction and filing in evidence in globo of the certified records of Charity Hospital in New Orleans and East Louisiana Hospital in Jackson, said records pertaining to the condition of the defendant.
Defense counsel contends that the trial judge clearly erred in not following the plain provisions of LSA-R.S. 13:3714 and not considering that the statute was an exception to the hearsay rule. He urges that the error substantially affected defendant inasmuch as defendant pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity, and the records sought to be admitted related to that defense.
LSA-R.S. 13 :3714 provides:
"Whenever a certified copy of the chart or record of any hospital in this state, signed by the director, assistant director, superintendent or secretary-treasurer of the board of administrators of the hospital in question, is offered in evidence in any court of competent jurisdiction, it shall be received in evidence by such court as prima facie proof of its contents, provided that the party against whom the record is sought to be used may summon and examine those making the original of said record as witnesses under cross-examination."
Defendant pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity at the time of the commission of the offense and present incapacity. A lunacy commission was appointed, and a lunacy hearing was held on defendant's plea of present incapacity to proceed. The plea was denied, the trial judge stating: "I realize you have medical records out, but for the record you can complete the record, the Court at this time is going to rule the man is really sane and able to assist. I have no evidence that would change my mind."
The plea of not guilty by reason of insanity at the time of the commission of the offense was a matter for the jury to decide. Defense counsel attempted to offer the hospital records for the purpose of substantiating the plea. The State argued:
"Your Honor, first of all, the medical records in a criminal case themselves constitute an opinion or medical testimony as general, and opinion of a medical except general, a doctor, as to the condition of a person's mind.
"Second of all, the best evidence is the doctor himself.
"In the third place, with regard to the records themselves, they are run through with hearsay evidence. They are run through with evidence that is self-serving in that many times the statements of the patient, many times letters, writings, or many kinds of documents are contained, and it is absolutely improper for all totally hearsay records to be introduced in a criminal case.
"If the doctor accepts the medical record as valid and forms an opinion based upon it, without telling where he got his information, if that is satisfied, then he can give his opinion. But certainly the jury nor the Court should be burdened with all the hearsay that is introduced into the record, and it is not admissible."
As stated supra, the trial judge refused to admit defendant's hospital records in evidence in globo; the following colloquy took place between him and defense counsel:
"BY THE COURT:
"Mr. King, I am inclined to agree with the State on this. We have reams of records out there, and you could have a doctor examine this man and have a possible diagnosis such as this doctor has done which could possibly be changed at a later date by another doctor or by this doctor himself.
"BY MR. KING:
"I realize that.
"BY THE COURT:
"And I am just reluctant to let all this come in and burden this jury, should they decide to look at all the documents in this case and go into that record.
"I'm sure the only one competent to testify out of that record is the doctor that is on the stand now or possibly other doctors that you might have.
"BY MR. KING:
"I realize that, and I realize sincerely what Mr. Mercer said.
"BY THE COURT:
"I will do this. I am not going to allow you to introduce that whole record. You can let this doctor or any other doctors examine the record and testify as to their opinion, as to what's contained therein, and they can use that as a basis for their opinions.
"BY MR. KING:
"Your Honor, if I did that, I would have to subpoena one hundred different people, and I can't do that.
"BY THE COURT:
"But what I am telling you, Mr. King, is I believe you could do this: that this doctor has testified already that he has examined this record and has gone over this record with the Defendant.
"Now, if you have any questions that you would like to ask this doctor based on the facts brought out in that record, then I am willing to let you examine him about that.
"BY MR. KING:
"Very well.
"BY THE COURT:
"As long as he testifies in this Court that, based on the information he has obtained from the Defendant himself or from the record that he can give his opinion.
"BY MR. KING:
"I have finished with Doctor DeVillier, as far as his questioning, but I do believe that the law is very clear on my being able to introduce this, since there is no objection to its proper certification, and I will reserve, of course, a Bill to that."
We have read the forensic letters and reports concerning the defendant which were submitted on the question of present insanity. They are complicated and involved; we agree with the trial judge that any hospital records concerning the defendant would be detailed and voluminous. We also agree with the trial judge that a person's condition is subject to change, and a record reflecting a condition at one time would not necessarily reflect a condition at a later date.
In the case of State v. O'Brien, 255 La. 704, 232 So.2d 484, we held that the right conferred under LSA-R.S. 13:3714 was to be regarded as an exception to the hearsay rule, and that the statute did not violate a person's right of confrontation. However, under the facts and circumstances of this case, we do not think that hearsay is our concern. Three doctors testified as to their evaluations of the defendant; they also testified as to the dates of such evaluations; they were allowed to refer to hospital records if they chose to do so. This testimony was heard by the jury; it considered this expert testimony in considering the plea of not guilty by reason of insanity at the time of the commission of the offense. We therefore conclude that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion or commit prejudicial reversible error in not allowing defense counsel to introduce in evidence in globo voluminous hospital records covering a great number of confinements of defendant in the State's hospitals. Under the instant facts and cir cumstances, the medical testimony was the best evidence. LSA-R.S. 15:436.
Bill of Exceptions No. 9 is without merit.
BILL OF EXCEPTIONS NO. 10
Bill of Exceptions No. 10 was reserved to the trial judge's denial of defense counsel's motion to quash the petit jury venire, such motion being grounded on the fact that women were systematically excluded from the petit jury venire.
Counsel urges that the absolute exemption provided by Louisiana is(present in no other state^ He says that it is not reasonable to expect volunteers for jury service, and jury selection cannot be constitutionally grounded upon a voluntary procedure for one sex.
The matter urged in this bill has been considered by this Court many times, and each time that we have considered the contention, we have held that our law, which permits the calling for jury service only those women who have filed with the clerk of court a written declaration of their desire to be subject to jury service is neither irrational nor discriminatory. See, State v. Daniels, 262 La. 475, 263 So.2d 859 (1972); State v. Curry, 262 La. 280, 263 So.2d 36 (1972); State v. Millsap, 258 La. 883, 248 So.2d 324 (1971); State v. Pratt, 255 La. 919, 233 So.2d 883 (1970); State v. Comeaux, 252 La. 481, 211 So.2d 620 (1968).
The contentions urged by defense counsel have been considered by the United States Supreme Court in the case of Hoyt v. State of Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 82 S.Ct. 159, 7 L.Ed.2d 118 (1961) and determined adversely to defendant. The Court stated at pp. 162 and 163 of 82 S.Ct. that:
"In neither respect can we conclude that Florida's statute is not 'based ,on some reasonable classification,' and that is thus infected with unconstitutionality. Despite the enlightened emancipation of women from the restrictions and protections of bygone years, and their entry into many parts of community life formerly considered to be reserved to men, woman is still regarded as the center of home and family life. We cannot say that it is constitutionally impermissible for a State, acting in pursuit of the general welfare, to conclude that a woman should be relieved from the civic duty of jury service unless she herself determines that such service is consistent with her own special responsibilities.
"Florida is not alone in so concluding. Women are now eligible for jury service in all but three States of the Union. Of the forty-seven States where women are eligible, seventeen besides Florida, as well as the District of Columbia, have accorded women an absolute exemption based solely on their sex, exercisable in one form or another. In two of these States, as in Florida, the exemption is automatic, unless a woman volunteers for such service. " Cf. Eslinger v. Thomas, D.C., 340 F.Supp. 886 (1972).
We conclude that under the jurisprudence of this Court and the above ruling of the United States Supreme Court, Art. VII, Sec. 41, La.Const. of 1921, and Art. 402, LSA-C.Cr.P. are constitutional.
Defendant has shown no prejudice. He has offered no evidence of purposeful exclusion of women from the instant grand jury and petit jury; he has made no showing that the present law was not followed. Under such circumstances, we find no error in the ruling of the trial judge.
BILL OF EXCEPTIONS NO. 11
Bill of Exceptions No. 11 was reserved when the trial judge denied defense counsel's motions in arrest of judgment and for a new trial.
The motion for a new trial presents nothing new for our consideration. Matters urged were considered in our determi nation of the bills of exceptions presented supra.
The motion in arrest of judgment attacks the imposition of the death penalty as cruel and unusual punishment.
At the present time, the mandate of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), requires the imposition of a sentence other than death. The motion in arrest of judgment is therefore with merit insofar as it attacks the death penalty imposed upon defendant.
For the reasons assigned, the conviction is affirmed; the death sentence imposed upon defendant is annulled and set aside, and the case is remanded to the Twenty-Second Judicial District Court with instructions to the trial judge to sentence the defendant to life imprisonment.
DIXON, J., dissents as to Bill #9.
. "Aggravated kidnapping is the doing of any of the following acts with the intent thereby to force the victim, or some other person, to give up anything of apparent present or prospective value, or to grant any advantage or immunity, in order to secure a release of the person under the offender's actual or apparent control:
"(1) The forcible seizing and carrying of any person from one place to another; or
"(2) The enticing or persuading of any person to go from one place to another; or
"(3) The imprisoning or forcible secreting of any person.
"Whoever commits the crime of aggravated kidnapping shall be punished by death; provided that if the kidnapped person is liberated unharmed before sentence is imposed then the sentence of death shall not be given but the offender shall be sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor."
LSA-R.S. 14:44.
. In brief, counsel for the defendant avers:
"ARGUMENT
"BILL OF EXCEPTION NO. 1
"This bill was reserved to the ruling of the trial judge denying defendant's j)lea of present incapacity to proceed.
"However, in view of the unanimous opinion of sanity expressed by the members of the sanity commission in their report and under examination and the Supreme Court's great reluctance to disturb such determinations of the trial judge, no useful purpose would be served in presenting argument on this hill."