Case Name: PEOPLE v. ANITA HARRIS; PEOPLE v. JOSEPH HARRIS
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1976-09-07
Citations: 71 Mich. App. 82
Docket Number: Docket Nos. 23948, 23949
Parties: PEOPLE v ANITA HARRIS PEOPLE v JOSEPH HARRIS
Judges: Before: D. F. Walsh, P. J., and J. H. Gillis and R. M. Maher, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 71
Pages: 82–94

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v ANITA HARRIS PEOPLE v JOSEPH HARRIS
Opinion op the Court
1. Witnesses — Criminal Law — Confessions—Coerced Confessions —Impeachment.
A coerced confession can never be used for impeachment purposes.
2. Witnesses — Criminal Law- — Coerced Confessions — Credibility of Witnesses.
It is error to allow the use of a coerced confession for the limited purpose of testing the credibility of a witness.
3. Witnesses — Criminal Law — Coerced Confessions — Harmless Error — Walker Hearings — Appeal and Error.
Error in the admission of a coerced confession for impeachment purposes is rendered harmless in a bench trial: (1) where the trial judge is the same judge who conducted the Walker hearing and ruled the confession inadmissible, and (2) where the defense chose to have the trial court conduct the trial even though the trial court had complete knowledge of all aspects of the coerced confession, and (3) where the judge stated that he would not consider the confession as substantive proof of the defendant’s guilt, and (4) where the transcript clearly shows that there was sufficient evidence to convict the defendant.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1-3, 10] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 222.
29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence §§ 529, 531, 537, 542-554, 582.
29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence §§ 1, 249, 251-257, 267.
[5, 6, 9, 11] 29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence §§ 529, 531, 537, 542-554, 582.
5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error §§ 776-819.
5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 737.
30 Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 612.
5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 614.
29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence §§ 415, 531.
40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide § 425 et seq.
40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide § 15.
Dissent by R. M. Maher, J.
4. Criminal Law — Evidence—Inadmissible Evidence — Miranda Guidelines — Impeachment of Defendant — Standards of Trustworthiness.
Statements held inadmissible under the Miranda guidelines may be used to impeach a defendant where the trustworthiness of the evidence satisfies legal standards; legal standards of trustworthiness are not satisfied where the trial court finds such evidence patently liable to untrustworthiness.
5. Criminal Law — Evidence—Impeachment—Involuntary Confessions.
Impeachment by an involuntary confession is improper.
6. Criminal Law — Evidence—Involuntary Confessions — Impeachment.
An involuntary confession is just as untrustworthy when used for impeachment purposes as when used to prove guilt.
7. Appeal and Error — Harmless Error.
The Court of Appeals cannot hold an error harmless unless it first determines that the error is not so offensive to the maintenance of a sound judicial process that it never can be regarded as harmless.
8. Criminal Law — Evidence—Improper Evidence — Prosecutors— Harmless Error.
The deliberate interjection of improper evidence by a prosecutor precludes a holding that such an error is harmless.
9. Criminal Law — Evidence—Involuntary Statements — Exclusions.
The deterrence of unlawful police conduct and our system’s respect for individual dignity are interests to be considered in determining whether the exclusion of involuntary statements of defendants is required; trustworthiness of the statements is not the only interest that should be considered.
10. Criminal Law — Evidence—Coerced Statements — Police Involvement.
The admission of coerced statements, even when the police have not been involved in the coercion, diminishes the respect an individual should be accorded by our judicial system; gross coercion in order to extract a statement is repugnant in any instance.
11. Criminal Law — Evidence—Appeal and Error — Codependants— Impeachment op Witnesses — Joint Trials.
Reversal of the convictions of both codefendants is required where statements referring to one of the codefendants were improperly admitted to impeach the testimony of the other at their joint trial.
12. Appeal and Error — Criminal Law — Disqualification of Judges — Walker Hearings — Court Rules.
Objection to trial by the same judge who conducted the Walker hearing to determine the admissibility of a confession at the trial should be raised in the trial court by a motion to disqualify, and such objection should not be raised for the ñrst time on appeal (GCR 1963, 405.3).
13. Criminal Law — Evidence—Exclusion—Fruit of Poisonous Tree Doctrine — Police Misconduct.
The "fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine extends the exclusionary rule to evidence obtained from exploitation of an initial government illegality, and such doctrine does not apply where police misconduct has not occurred.
14. Homicide — Second-Degree Murder — Evidence—Sufficiency of Evidence — Statutes.
There is sufficient evidence presented to support a verdict of second-degree murder where the record supports the court’s finding that both of the defendants participated in vicious torturing of their victim and where there was evidence that that torturing and the injuries therefrom contributed to the death of the victim.
15. Homicide — Liability—Contributory Causes.
Liability for homicide does not depend upon the fact that death is the immediate consequence of the injury inflicted by the accused; one is guilty of homicide if the injury he infficts contributes, mediately or immediately, to the death of another.
16. Homicide — Liability—Contributory Causes.
The responsibility for a homicide rests on both actors if at the moment of death the injuries caused by both actors are contributing thereto; the law does not measure the effects of the several injuries in order to determine which is more serious, and which contributes in the greater measure to bring about the death.
Appeal from Oakland, John N. O’Brien, J.
Sub mitted March 3, 1976, at Lansing.
(Docket Nos. 23948, 23949.)
Decided September 7, 1976.
Anita Harris and Joseph Harris were convicted of second-degree murder. Defendants appeal.
Affirmed.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, L. Brooks Patterson, Prosecuting Attorney, Robert C. Williams, Chief Appellate Counsel, and Thomas S. Richards, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
John D. Lazar, for defendants.
Before: D. F. Walsh, P. J., and J. H. Gillis and R. M. Maher, JJ.

Opinion:
J. H. Gillis, J.
Defendants Joseph Harris and Anita Harris, husband and wife, were tried without a jury on a charge of first-degree murder, MCLA 750.316; MSA 28.548. Both were convicted of second-degree murder, MCLA 750.317; MSA 28.549. The court sentenced each to 7-1/2 to 20 years imprisonment. Defendants appeal.
On January 4, 1974, the partially clothed body of a young woman was found in the snow outside a Pontiac grocery store. Clothesline was around her neck, hands and feet. Burns, bruises and cuts on various parts of the body indicated vicious torture. An autopsy revealed strangulation by ligature and substantial internal hemorrhaging.
A "citizens' group" composed of the victim's brother and some friends conducted a private investigation. They obtained statements by physical coercion and threats against the defendants, Joseph Harris and Anita Harris. Additionally, two other suspects, Willie Scott and Rosemary Tipton, were coerced by the citizens group into making statements. Mrs. Harris, who carried her baby with her, was not struck but was forced to confess at gunpoint along with the others.
This citizens' group then entrusted the suspects to the custody of the Pontiac police. After the citizens' group departed from the police station, the suspects were read their Miranda rights and all gave statements concerning the incident to the police. On the basis of the statements given to the police, the district court issued arrest warrants for Joseph and Anita Harris and Rosemary Tipton. A search warrant for the premises where the murder was alleged to have taken place was also issued at this time.
From May 1, 1974 to May 15, 1974 the circuit judge, who later served as the trial judge, conducted a Walker hearing, which resulted in the suppression of all statements made to the citizens' group. The circuit judge declined to suppress the statements made to the police after determining that the Miranda warnings had been given to each of the suspects.
At trial defendant Joseph Harris testified, and the prosecutor attempted to use the statements made by Joseph Harris to the citizens' group for impeachment purposes. The prosecution, in attempting to introduce portions of the coerced confession, relied expressly on the exception of Harris v New York, 401 US 222; 91 S Ct 643; 28 L Ed 2d 1 (1971). The court allowed this coerced confession in for the limited purpose of testing the credibility of the witness. This was clearly erroneous in that a coerced confession can never be used for impeachment purposes. Inasmuch as Joseph and Anita Harris were jointly tried in a nonjury trial and are here on a consolidated appeal, it is important to note at this juncture that the coerced confession was not used against Anita Harris. It is also important to note at this juncture that defense lawyers were well aware of the fact that the same judge who conducted the Walker hearing and ruled the confessions inadmissible, because they were coerced, conducted this nonjury trial. Counsel had every opportunity to request that the trial be conducted by a different judge, and in fact the record clearly denotes that the prosecutor pointed out this dilemma in the presence of defense counsel prior to trial.
We can only conclude that the defendants and their counsel chose to have the trial court conduct the trial even though the trial court had complete knowledge of all aspects of the coerced confession.
In light of the aforementioned facts, we do not believe that there was reversible error committed here. The error was harmless inasmuch as the trial court was not prejudiced by the admission of this attempt to improperly impeach defendant Joseph Harris. It, of course, did not affect Anita Harris' trial since no attempt was made to impeach her testimony.
The trial judge is an able experienced jurist who stated on the record in a rather lengthy dissertation that he would not consider the statement made to the citizens' group as substantive proof of the defendants' guilt. A reading of the 478-page transcript clearly shows that there was sufficient evidence to convict each of the defendants of second-degree murder. Another fact finder might well have found each of the defendants guilty of first-degree murder. There is ample evidence in the record to support a finding that the killing was premeditated and such premeditation extended over a matter of hours.
The trial court, after hearing all of the evidence, reduced the original charge of first-degree murder to second-degree murder, which is some evidence of the fact that he was not prejudiced by the utilization of this coerced confession in the trial of Joseph Harris.
There were other issues presented on appeal, which we have considered. We find no reversible error in each of these other issues.
For the reasons hereinbefore stated we affirm each of the convictions.
D. F. Walsh, P. J., concurred.