Case Name: TEXAS CO. v. VELOZ
Court: Texas Courts of Civil Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1913-05-29
Citations: 162 S.W. 377
Docket Number: 
Parties: TEXAS CO. v. VELOZ.
Judges: McKENZIE, J„ did not sit in this case.
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 162
Pages: 377–379

Head Matter:
TEXAS CO. v. VELOZ.
(Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. El Paso.
May 29, 1913.
On Rehearing, Dec. 18, 1913.)
On Rehearing.
1. Appeal and Error (§ 743 ) — Assignments of Error — Requisites.
It is the duty of the Court of Civil Appeals to pass upon assignments of error, though they do not refer to that portion of the motion for a new trial where the error was complained of.
[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 2999, 3011; Dec. Dig. ' 743. ]
2. Highways (§ 169 ) — Negligent Use of Highways — Dangerous Instrumentalities.
Assuming that an automobile which is out of repair is not, per se, a dangerous instrumentality; rendering its owner liable for damages for injuries to third persons, sustained while it is being driven by a person who is not his servant, an automobile, which was in such a bad state of repair that it was impossible to lessen or regulate its speed making it necessary to run it at full speed all the time, was a dangerous instrumentality when driven on a public highway.
fEd. Note. — Eor other cases, see Highways, Cent. Dig. § 458; Dec, Dig. § 169. ]
3. Master and Servant (§ 300 ) — Use of Automobile by Servant — Liability.
Where an automobile, which was in such a bad. state of repair that it could run only at full speed, was intrusted by the owner’s agent to a third person, the owner was liable for injuries caused by it while being driven by such third person, if the agent was negligent in permitting it to be driven on the highway in such condition, since it is the duty of the owner of an inherently dangerous instrumentality to exercise ordinary care to prevent it from inflicting injury, and, where it is committed to a servant, to exercise reasonable care, through the servant, to prevent it from inflicting injuries.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. § 1209; Dec. Dig. § 300. ]
4. Appeal and Error (§ 742 ) — Assignments of Error — Propositions.
An assignment that the court erred in its general charge for the reason that undue prominence was given to appellee’s theory of the case, and a proposition thereunder that a charge, imparting undue prominence to any one theory of the case, was • improper, were too general for consideration, since they should have specifically pointed out the particular in which undue prominence was given and the portion of the charge subject to such objection.
[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. § 3000; Dec. Dig. § 742. ]
Appeal from El Paso County Court; A. S. Eylar, Judge.
Action by Guadalupe Veloz against the Texas Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Peyton E. Edwards and O. L. Bowen, both of El Paso, for appellant. John T. Hill, of El Paso, for appellee.
For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes

Opinion:
HIGGINS, J.
Appellee, while driving upon the public road, had a collision with an automobile owned by appellant and driven by one Francisco Marcias. The automobile was in a bad state of repair, and Wells Lit-tlefield, agent of appellant, had delivered the automobile to Marcias, who was driving the same to the city of El Paso, where it was to be repaired.
The issue is raised as to whether or not Marcias was the employé of appellant in so driving the car, or the employé and agent of one Stafford, with whom 'Littlefield, acting for appellant, had contracted for the repair of the machine. In the first count in the petition it is alleged that in driving the car Marcias was acting as the employé of appellant; and in the second count it is averred that, if he was not the employé of appellant, then that appellant, acting through its agent, Littlefield, had delivered the automobile to Marcias or Stafford with full knowledge of the fact that the same was in had repair, in that the tires had been punctured, and because the same was unmanageable due to a defect in the carbureter and steering gear. That appellant knew of the danger to the traveling public incident to the operation of said machine in its defective condition upon the public road, and that it was negligence upon the part of appellant to permit Marcias to drive said machine upon the road.
The first assignment of error complains of the action of the trial court in overruling a general demurrer to the second count, and in support of the assignment two propositions are urged: First,* that an automobile out of repair is not, per se, a dangerous instrumentality, and second, the owner is not liable in damages for injuries to third persons, when the agency causing the damage is not, per se, dangerous, and is being operated by one not the servant of the owner. As abstract propositions of law we may assume both these contentions to be correct. The mere fact that an automobile is in a bad state of repair certainly does not render it a dangerous instrumentality, but this was not the case made by the petition. The petition, in addition to stating that the ear was in a bad state of repair, averred that this condition rendered it unmanageable and uncontrollable, and caused the same to rud at a rapid and excessive rate of speed, and it occurs to us that a car in such a condition that its speed cannot be regulated and its course controlled is one of the most dangerous instru-mentalities that could be placed upon the public highway. This being the case made by the second count in the petition, we overrule the first assignment.
. The remaining assignments cannot be considered. They do not comply with that provision of rule 25 which requires that they refer to that portion of the motion for new trial in which the error is complained of. Railway Co. v. Ledbetter, 153 S. W. 646; Nunn v. Veale, 149 S. W. 758; Murphy v. Earl, 150 S. W. 486; Tiefel v. Maxwell, 154 S. W. 319; Railway Co. v. Gray, 154 S. W. 229; Imperial Irrigation Co. v. McKenzie, 157 S. W. 751; and Konz v. Henson, 156 S. W. 593; the last two cited cases recently decided by this court and not yet reported.
Affirmed.
McKENZIE, J" did not sit in this case.