Case Name: Norman Cline MEADE, Piaintiff-in-Error, v. STATE of Tennessee, Defendant-in-Error
Court: Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Tennessee
Decision Date: 1972-06-14
Citations: 484 S.W.2d 366
Docket Number: 
Parties: Norman Cline MEADE, Piaintiff-in-Error, v. STATE of Tennessee, Defendant-in-Error.
Judges: GALBREATH, J., concurs.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 484
Pages: 366–373

Head Matter:
Norman Cline MEADE, Piaintiff-in-Error, v. STATE of Tennessee, Defendant-in-Error.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee.
June 14, 1972.
Certiorari Denied by Supreme Court Aug. 21, 1972.
B. C. Mclnturff, Kingsport, for plaintiff-in-error.
David M. Pack, Atty. Gen., J. B. Hagler, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Nashville, Carl K. Kirkpatrick, Dist. Atty. Gen., Kingsport, for defendant-in-error.

Opinion:
OPINION
RUSSELL, J.
Meade was caught in the act of burglarizing a business house in Kingsport. He was indicted for the offense, and charged in a second count with being an habitual criminal. Upon the first part of the bifurcated trial he entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity at the time of the crime. There was absolutely no question but that he committed it. About the only evidence of insanity at that time was the testimony of a clinical psychologist who opined that he was insane, based upon one session with Meade that lasted about an hour and was conducted many months after the crime. The jury was certainly justified in rejecting this expert testimony as incredible.
Meade was caught inside an automobile garage, in the perpetration of a burglary. He had broken into the building, into the cash drawer and filing cabinets in the office, collected valuables, and had his collection on a mechanic's cover cloth to bundle up and facilitate their transportation when the officers arrived. Then, very rationally, he went upstairs and hid and stayed there until found. When caught he was rational and reasonable, declined to make a statement, and asked for a lawyer.
He was a man who held a job in a hospital around medical people immediately before and after the crime, has a long history of criminality, and there is absolutely no evidence that he has ever been insane. Meade's theory is that he had an onset of temporary insanity that came upon him suddenly and kept him from knowing what he was doing when he broke into the business house, or that it was wrong; but did not cause him to be insane after he was returned to reality by arrest. Now, Meade didn't so testify; but he presented a clinical psychologist who interviewed him for one hour one time one year after the fact and theorized that probably he was temporarily insane. We have carefully reviewed this testimony and can understand why the jury and trial judge rejected it. We find it to be totally incredible. We are reminded of the language of our Supreme Court in the case of Mullendore v. State, 183 Tenn. S3, 191 S.W.2d 149 (1945) :
" A psychiatrist was introduced on behalf of defendant, [sic] testified that defendant was insane. He had made an examination of defendant for about thirty minutes some two weeks before the trial. He kept no record of the examination and could not even be exact about the date of its making. His admissions on cross-examination showed that the examination was casual and incomplete. He showed himself an advocate rather than a dispassionate expert, and the jury was justified (when they weighed his testimony, as they had a right to do, Haskins v. Howard, 159 Tenn. 86, 16 S.W.2d 20) in concluding that he was employed rather than called for the defense. The attitude of obvious partisanship displayed by this nominally expert witness, furnishes convincing evidence of the wisdom of the rule laid down by this Court, that expert testimony is to be received 'with great caution;' (citing cases) and that the weight to be given it is a question for the jury under careful instruction of the trial judge. Haskins v. State, supra. The actions and words of defendant before, at, and immediately after the commission of the crime, were as convincing evidence of his sanity as they were of his sobriety, so we feel the jury had material evi dence on which to disregard the opinion of the expert witness."
The language of Mr. Justice Gailor in Mullendore is appropriate to this case. Unquestionably the verdict of guilty of third degree burglary is well supported by legally sufficient evidence.
We attach no controlling importance to the fact that the charge as to insanity appears to have been incomplete. No error has been assigned upon the charge. No question was raised about it below. See Rules 14(4) and 14(5) which provide that no such question could even have been raised here for the first time. Certainly we should not raise it; most especially in view of the fact that to do so we are assuming that the record has not been abridged to deliberately leave out portions that have no relevancy to the errors assigned, as is positively required by Rules 1 and 2. And the most that can be said about the charge is that it was incomplete, rather than erroneous; and nothing appears to indicate that further instruction was requested. Mere meagerness of the charge, if correct as far as it goes, is not reversible error where there is no special request for additional instructions. Lunn v. Ealy, 176 Tenn. 374, 141 S.W.2d 893; McClard v. Reid, 190 Tenn. 337, 229 S.W.2d 505; Bluff City Buick Co. v. Davis, 204 Tenn. 593, 323 S.W.2d 1. In the last named case, we find:
" This Court has held for more than 100 years that we would not reverse a case for meagerness, inadequacy, etc., or failure to give a charge unless a special request is asked which correctly sets forth the points to be charged. McClard v. Reid, 190 Tenn. 337, 229 S.W.2d 505. This has been followed invariably in criminal cases for reasons set forth in various and sundry opinions which may be found by reference to either the case last cited or that of Gentry v. State, 184 Tenn. 299, 198 S.W.2d 643. "
In the second phase of the trial habitual criminality was well established by proof of five or more prior convictions. Unquestionably the convicting proof is legally sufficient on that count, also.
We note that a punishment for the burglary of three (3) to nine (9) years was set by the jury upon trial of the first count, and that life imprisonment was assessed upon the finding of habitual criminality; and that the trial judge pronounced judgment setting both punishments. We believe the law to be that habitual criminality is a status, not an offense; and its finding calls for an enhancement of the punishment for the new offense (burglary) to life imprisonment. T.C.A. § 40-2801, 40-2802, 40-2805, 40-2806; Canupp v. State, Tenn.Cr.App., 460 S.W.2d 382. Life imprisonment is, therefore, the enhanced punishment for the burglary in this case; and that part of the judgment setting a separate punishment of three (3) to nine (9) years for burglary is declared to be null and void.
Evidence was introduced upon the first phase of the trial that Meade had kidnapped and robbed a nurse of her car, money and credit card; and subsequently used them to carry a female companion on a two-day round-trip "flight" to Florida. It is vigorously argued that the State introduced this evidence to get the fact of the other later crimes before the jury, and not to show guilt by flight.
We do not deem it necessary to decide the admissibility of this evidence. Assuming that proof of the other crimes was erroneously before the jury, such error has to be harmless in the context of this case. Meade admits the burglary (having been caught in the act) and defends upon his alleged insanity. (Argument could be made that the evidence of other later crimes was relevant to the sanity issue, especially in view of the testimony of his psychologist tending to tie his criminality strictly to insanity. Where ones' state of mine is an is sue, all conduct at relevant times is probative.) Since his guilt is clear, and his ultimate punishment set by law, we hold that any error committed in allowing proof of later crimes on the theory that they demonstrated guilt through flight to have been harmless, and in our opinion did not affect the result of the trial. T.C.A. § 27-117. (Further corroboration of the flight theory is reflected in the record, by the fact that Meade failed to appear in Court later, and both preliminary and final forfeitures were taken upon his bond.)
Jury argument of the prosecuting attorney is assigned as error. We would observe that this was a bitterly contested trial, with the State's attorney and Meade's retained counsel demonstrating much zeal. We have carefully examined all of the complained-of argument and find no reversible error. The general test to be applied is whether improper argument could have affected the verdict to the prejudice of the defendant. Harrington v. State, 215 Tenn. 338, 385 S.W.2d 758 (1964).
The assignment complaining that the trial court erred in overruling defendant's motion to quash the habitual criminal count on the grounds that it did not show the time and place where the crime occurred or who the prosecutor was is without merit. See T.C.A. § 40-2803, which provides a readily available procedure for obtaining such information.
Error is assigned upon the alleged refusal of the trial judge to allow the introduction of evidence attacking the validity of the root convictions supporting habitual criminality. We do not find that this happened. What the trial judge did hold was that evidence as to the disposition of a co-defendant's case was incompetent. We noted no tender of proof that Meade's prior guilty pleas were coerced, or that he was denied effective assistance of counsel.
Meade is clearly guilty of this burglary, and his defense that he was momentarily insane has no credible support in the evidence and has been resolved against him by the jury. His status as an habitual criminal is clearly demonstrated, with convictions to spare.
Affirmed.
GALBREATH, J., concurs.