Case Name: VALLEREE L. OWENS, Plaintiff v. W. K. DEAL PRINTING, INC., Defendant
Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: North Carolina
Decision Date: 1994-01-18
Citations: 113 N.C. App. 324
Docket Number: No. 9227SC845
Parties: VALLEREE L. OWENS, Plaintiff v. W. K. DEAL PRINTING, INC., Defendant
Judges: Judge JOHN concurs.
Reporter: North Carolina Court of Appeals Reports
Volume: 113
Pages: 324–332

Head Matter:
VALLEREE L. OWENS, Plaintiff v. W. K. DEAL PRINTING, INC., Defendant
No. 9227SC845
(Filed 18 January 1994)
Master and Servant § 87 (NCI3d) — workers’ compensation — compensable accident —employer’s showing of accidental injury —burden on injured employee to show tortious conduct
If defendant uses its pleadings and supporting materials to negate an essential element of a Woodson claim, i.e., to show that the injury was solely accidental, then the burden shifts to plaintiff and plaintiff will be required to produce a forecast of evidence to show that the injury is also due to the tortious conduct of the employer. In this case, plaintiff failed to produce supporting affidavits or any supporting materials as evidence to support her claim that her injury resulted from tortious conduct by defendant employer, and summary judgment was therefore properly entered for defendant.
Am Jur 2d, Workers’ Compensation §§ 566, 569, 593, 709.
Judge WYNN dissenting.
Appeal by plaintiff from judgment entered 13 May 1992 by Judge Loto Caviness in Gaston County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 17 June 1993.
Frederick R. Stann for plaintiff-appellant.
Alala, Mullen, Holland & Cooper, P. A., by H. Randolph Sumner and Jesse V. Bone, Jr., for defendant-appellee.

Opinion:
JOHNSON, Judge.
This court filed its decision in Owens v. W. K. Deal Printing, Inc., 111 N.C. App. 900, 433 S.E.2d 793 (1993) on 7 September 1993. Plaintiff timely petitioned for rehearing on the matter and we granted this petition.
We now revisit the pertinent facts: On 15 December 1988, plaintiff Valleree L. Owens, suffered an injury when her hand was crushed in a hydraulic press at her place of employment, W. K. Deal Printing, Inc. Plaintiff suffered 60% permanent disability to the right hand. As a result, plaintiff filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits with the North Carolina Industrial Commission (hereafter Industrial Commission) and on 20 August 1991, plaintiff signed an agreement for "final compromise settlement and release," a clincher agreement.
Plaintiff submitted the clincher agreement to the Industrial Commission who approved the agreement on 26 August 1991. After plaintiff had entered into an agreement with the Industrial Commission, plaintiff filed a claim for personal injury against defendant employer on 13 December 1991 pursuant to a case decided by the Supreme Court of North Carolina on 14 August 1991, Woodson v. Rowland, 329 N.C. 330, 407 S.E.2d 222 (1991).
Defendant filed an answer 21 January 1992 pleading the clincher agreement as a bar to plaintiffs cause of action. The motion was heard on 11 May 1992 by Judge Caviness who granted defendant's motion for summary judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiff gave timely notice of appeal.
The dispositive issue before this Court is whether the trial judge erred by granting summary judgment as a matter of law against plaintiff.
Summary judgment is appropriately granted only where no disputed issues of genuine fact have been presented and the undisputed facts show that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Minor v. Minor, 70 N.C. App. 76, 318 S.E.2d 865, disc. review denied, 312 N.C. 495, 322 S.E.2d 558 (1984). A defending party is entitled to summary judgment if the defendant can show that the claimant cannot prove the existence of an essential element of the claim or cannot surmount an affirmative defense which would bar the claim. Little v. National Service Industries, Inc., 79 N.C. App. 688, 340 S.E.2d 510 (1986).
Here, the trial judge made findings of fact in this case and concluded as a matter of law that the release agreement signed by plaintiff barred an additional monetary recovery from defendant. "A trial judge is not required to make findings of fact and conclusions of law in determining a motion for summary judgment, and if he does make some, they are disregarded on appeal." Mosley v. Finance Co., 36 N.C. App. 109, 111, 243 S.E.2d 145, 147, disc. review denied, 295 N.C. 467, 246 S.E.2d 9 (1979). Therefore, upon review of this case, we will consider only the pleadings, affidavits and supporting materials of the parties in our determination of whether a genuine issue of fact has been presented by plaintiff.
Plaintiff in this action filed a complaint alleging rights as set out in Woodson, 329 N.C. 330, 407 S.E.2d 222. In order to fully understand plaintiff's allegations, we consider the Woodson holding.
Woodson, 329 N.C. 330, 407 S.E.2d 222, involved a wrongful death action arising from a work-related cave-in which killed Thomas Alfred Sprouse. The plaintiff in the case was the administrator of Sprouse's estate. The plaintiff in Woodson filed a workers' compensation claim with the North Carolina Industrial Commission and civil claims against the employer and general contractor, simultaneously. The defendants filed a summary judgment motion on the theory that the Workers' Compensation Act shielded the employer from civil liability for intentional tort. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court opined that:
[i]f Sprouse's death can only be considered accidental, defendants' summary judgment motions were properly allowed because Sprouse's death would fall within the Act's exclusive coverage, and no other remedies than those provided in the Act are available to plaintiff either against his employer or a co-worker. On the other hand, if the forecast of evidence is sufficient to show that Sprouse's death was the result of an intentional tort committed by his employer, then summary judgment was improperly allowed on the ground stated, because the employer's intentional tort will support a civil action. (Citations omitted.)
Woodson, 329 N.C. at 337, 407 S.E.2d at 226.
From the outset we note that plaintiff's injury occurred before Woodson was filed; however, Woodson is to be applied retroactively. Dunleavy v. Yates Construction Co., 106 N.C. App. 146, 416 S.E.2d 193, disc. review denied, 332 N.C. 343, 421 S.E.2d 146 (1992). Therefore, we will consider this case according to the standard as set out in Woodson.
The Court in Woodson reasoned that:
[f]rom the standpoint of the injured party, . an injury caused by the same conduct... [may be] both the result of an accident, giving rise to the remedies provided by the [Workers' Compensation] Act, and an intentional tort, making the exclusivity provision of the Act unavailable to bar a civil action. (Citations omitted.)
Woodson, 329 N.C. at 349, 407 S.E.2d at 233.
In the instant case, defendant, through his pleadings and supporting materials, showed that the injury to plaintiff was solely accidental. On 21 January 1992, defendant moved for dismissal of the case and supported his motion with his answer and a release agreement. Defendant stated in his answer that "plaintiff was operating the machine [sic] that she was not operating the machine pursuant to the instructions that were given her, or that she was not operating the machine in a safe and prudent manner; . . . and that plaintiff was operating the machine under the influence of prescription medication, and that these acts constitute a bar to recovery." In addition, the agreement stated that plaintiff suffered an injury by accident when she accidently applied a hydraulic weight before removing her hand. Based on defendant's answer and the clincher agreement which stated that the injury was accidental, the burden'then shifted to plaintiff to present a forecast of evidence to support her claim that the injury was also the result of an intentional tort committed by defendant employer. Plaintiff failed to produce supporting affidavits or any supporting materials as evidence to support her claim that her injury resulted from tortious conduct by defendant employer. If the defendant moving for summary judgment successfully carries his/her burden of proof, the plaintiff may not rely upon the bare allegations of his/her complaint to establish a triable issue of fact. Haithcock v. Chimney Rock Co., 10 N.C. App. 696, 179 S.E.2d 865 (1971). Considering the materials submitted to the court, we find that plaintiff has failed to present a genuine issue of fact sufficient to support a civil action against the employer for an intentional tort.
We note at this point that this case does not stand for the proposition that once a plaintiff signs a release agreement to settle a workers' compensation claim that plaintiff is automatically precluded from recovering pursuant to Woodson or that plaintiff is automatically admitting the injury was solely accidental to the exclusion of a claim against an employer for tortious conduct. Instead, we hold that if defendant uses his/her pleadings and supporting materials to negate an essential element of a Woodson claim, i.e., that the injury was solely accidental, Id., 329 N.C. at 337, 407 S.E.2d at 226, then the burden shifts to plaintiff and plaintiff will be required to produce a forecast of evidence to show that the injury is also due to the tortious conduct of the employer. Dunleavy v. Yates, 106 N.C. App. 146, 416 S.E.2d 193. These principles are basic principles of law pursuant to North Carolina General Statutes § 1A-1, Rule 56 (1991).
Since plaintiff's injury, based upon defendant's pleadings and supporting materials, can only be considered accidental, defendant's summary judgment motion was properly allowed and no other remedies other than those provided in the Act are available to plaintiff against her employer. Woodson, 329 N.C. at 337, 407 S.E.2d at 226. Consequently, plaintiff is limited to the amount received pursuant to the release agreement.
Accordingly, the decision of the trial court is affirmed.
Judge JOHN concurs.
Judge WYNN dissents.