Case Name: STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation, Appellant, v. Barbara REIS and Joseph Reis, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2006-03-14
Citations: 926 So. 2d 415
Docket Number: No. 1D05-576
Parties: STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation, Appellant, v. Barbara REIS and Joseph Reis, Appellees.
Judges: VAN NORTWICK, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 926
Pages: 415–425

Head Matter:
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation, Appellant, v. Barbara REIS and Joseph Reis, Appellees.
No. 1D05-576.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
March 14, 2006.
Rehearing Denied April 19, 2006.
J. Wiley Horton and Leslie G. Street of Pennington, Moore, Wilkinson, Bell & Dunbar, P.A., Tallahassee, for appellant.
David H. Burns and Talley Kaleko of Cox & Burns, P.A., Tallahassee, for appel-lees.

Opinion:
ALLEN, J.
The appellant, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, the insurer under an automobile insurance policy providing coverage to Robert, Barbara, and Joseph Reis, challenges a final judgment by which damages were awarded to appel-lees Barbara Reis and Joseph Reis pursuant to the policy's uninsured/under-insured motorist provisions for their pain and suffering as a consequence of witnessing the death of Robert Reis in an Alabama automobile accident.- Robert Reis, whose death was caused by the negligence of an under-insured driver, was the husband of Barbara Reis and the father of Joseph Reis. State Farm does not challenge the trial court's determination that the appel-lees' damages were independently recoverable by the appellees under the applicable tort law of Alabama as part of their own bodily injuries arising from the accident. State Farm argues instead that the insurance proceeds available for these damages under the policy's coverage provisions were exhausted when State Farm paid Robert Reis's estate the policy limits for bodily injury for "Each Person." Because the ambiguous coverage provisions of the policy may reasonably be read to provide coverage to the extent of the greater "Each Accident" coverage limit, we construe the coverage provisions as providing this greater amount of coverage and affirm the final judgment.
State Farm properly argues that the insurance policy should be construed under Florida contract law, and it also properly offers no argument that Florida tort law need be considered. See, e.g., Langston v. Personal Service Ins. Co., 377 So.2d 993 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
The standard of review in construing this insurance contract is de novo. Management Computer Controls, Inc. v. Charles Perry Constr., Inc., 743 So.2d 627 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). Insurance contracts are construed according to their plain meaning. But when the relevant language of an insurance policy is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, one providing coverage and the other limiting coverage, the policy is considered ambiguous. An ambiguous provision is construed in favor of the insured and strictly against the drafter. Swire Pacific Holdings, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 845 So.2d 161 (Fla.2003); Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 756 So.2d 29 (Fla.2000).
The material contract provisions relating to uninsured/under-insured motorist coverages for bodily injury are set forth in the policy as follows:
Bodily Injury — means bodily injury to a person and sickness, disease or death which results from it.
We will pay damages for bodily injury an insured is legally entitled to collect from the owner or driver of an uninsured motor vehicle. The bodily injury must be sustained by an insured and must be caused by accident arising out of the operation, maintenance or use of an uninsured motor vehicle.
The amount of coverage is shown on the declarations page under "Limits of Liability — U—Each Person, Each Accident". Under "Each Person" is the amount of coverage for all damages due to bodily injury to one person. "Bodily injury to one person " includes all injury and damages to others resulting from this bodily injury. Under "Each Accident" is the total amount of coverage, subject to the amount shown under "Each Person", for all damages due to bodily injury to two or more persons in the same accident.
State Farm argues that this policy language means that when one insured seeks damages for bodily injuries suffered in an automobile accident and a second insured seeks damages for bodily injuries suffered in the same accident, but with the bodily injuries to the second insured having causally resulted from the bodily injuries to the first insured, the total amount payable under the policy to these two insureds is the amount of coverage specified for "Each Person." State Farm therefore sees the words "resulting from" as relating exclusively to causation and argues that when bodily injuries to a second insured would not have occurred "but for" the bodily injuries to the first insured, both insureds are subject to a single "Each Person" coverage limit.
State Farm relies upon the Eighth Circuit's opinion in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Wolff, 926 F.2d 755 (8th Cir.1991), as support for its construction of the policy language. In that case, Ms. Wolff was rendered a quadriplegic in a North Dakota automobile accident due to the negligence of a driver insured by State Farm. The "Limits of Liability" language in the liability coverage portion of the driver's policy was identical to the above-quoted "Limits of Liability" language in the appellees' policy in the present case. Ms. Wolff sought damages for her injuries and her husband sought damages for his resulting loss of consortium. After State Farm paid out the "Each Person" limit to Ms. Wolff, it took the position that no further coverage was available to cover Mr. Wolffs consortium claim. But Mr. Wolff argued that the "resulting from" language was intended to refer to derivative claims and that since his consortium claim was not a derivative claim under North Dakota law, he was entitled to recovery for his loss of consortium up to the "Each Accident" limit. The Wolff court wrote:
Wolff contends that his loss of consortium claim is not derivative, but a wholly independent cause of action. This is apparently meant to get around the "resulting from" language in the "Each Person" section. This argument, however, is irrelevant, because Wolff is arguing the legal attributes of a loss of consortium claim, and ignoring the nature of the injury. He cannot deny that without his wife's injuries, he would not have the cause of action. Therefore, his injury results from his wife's injuries, and the "Each Person" limit of liability applies.
Wolff argues that the "Each Accident" limit applies because his loss of consortium claim includes a claim for bodily injury because of his emotional distress and psychological injury. State Farm responds that the "Each Accident" limit is inapplicable because under the plain language of the policy Wolff would have to have sustained a separate bodily injury in the same accident. Both parties have extensively argued the issue of whether a loss of consortium claim would be considered a separate bodily injury under North Dakota law. We need not decide this issue, however, because Wolffs claim fails the second requirement for "Each Accident" coverage, namely that the injury occur in the same accident. Under North Dakota law, the injury giving rise to a loss of consortium claim occurs after the accident.
In sum, the plain language of the policy does not require State Farm to cover Wolffs loss of consortium claim. The claim is subject to the "Each Person" limit of liability as an injury resulting from the bodily injury of another. The claim does not fall under the "Each Accident" limit of liability, however, because Wolffs injury occurred after the accident.
926 F.2d at 757 (citations omitted). The first paragraph of this excerpt from Wolff would seem to indicate that those injuries to Mr. Wolff which would not have occurred except for the injuries to Ms. Wolff were subject to the same "Each Person" coverage limit applicable to Ms. Wolffs injuries, and that Mr. Wolff therefore was not entitled to recover for these injuries up to the "Each Accident" coverage limit. Although this language seems to support State Farm's argument in the present case, the Wolff court did not end its analysis at this point. Somewhat confusingly, the court instead proceeded to address arguments relating to whether the "Each Accident" coverage limit might nevertheless apply to the loss of consortium claim, with the court concluding that the "Each Accident" coverage limit was inapplicable, not because the consortium claim resulted from the wife's injuries but because Mr. Wolffs injury "occurred after the accident."
Although Wolff appears to be of dubious value in supporting the construction urged by State Farm in the present case, State Farm's suggested interpretation of the insurance contract is nevertheless one possible reading of the policy language. Significantly, however, other constructions of the policy language would support the trial court's ruling in this case.
As suggested by the husband's argument in Wolff some courts have construed the "resulting from" language in the State Farm policy as referring to injuries and damages to additional persons which derive from the bodily injuries to the first injured person. In reading the policy language in this way, these courts limit the additional injured persons to the "Each Person" coverage amount only if their claims are "derivative" rather than "independent" in nature.
The unanimous decision of the Supreme Court of Montana in Treichel v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 280 Mont. 443, 930 P.2d 661 (1997), typifies decisions construing the State Farm policy language in this way. In that case, Mr. Treichel was seriously injured and later died due to the negligence of a driver insured by State Farm. Ms. Treichel witnessed the accident and observed the severe head injuries her husband suffered as a consequence of the collision. The "Limits of Liability" language in the liability coverage portion of the driver's policy was identical to the "Limits of Liability" language in the appellees' policy in the present case. After State Farm paid Mr. TreichePs estate the amount of the "Each Person" coverage under the driver's policy, Ms. Treichel brought an action against State Farm and the driver claiming that she was entitled to an additional recovery under the "Each Accident" coverage on her independent and non-derivative claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress. Because the court agreed with Ms. Treichel that her claim was independent and non-derivative under Montana law, it held that the "Each Accident" coverage limit applied.
In the present case, State Farm has not challenged the trial court's determination that the appellees' claims are independent and non-derivative claims. The trial court's ruling here therefore accords with the Treichel construction of the policy language.
Yet another approach is revealed by the unanimous decision of the Supreme Court of Louisiana in Crabtree v. State Farm Insurance Co., 632 So.2d 736 (La.1994). In that case, Mr. Crabtree was seriously injured due to the negligence of a driver insured by State Farm. Ms. Crabtree witnessed the accident and observed the severe injuries her husband suffered as a consequence of the collision. The "Limits of Liability" language in the liability coverage portion of the driver's policy was identical to the "Limits of Liability" language in the appellees' policy in the present case. Mr. and Ms. Crabtree brought an action against State Farm, seeking damages for Mr. Crabtree's injuries and for Ms. Crab-tree's mental anguish as a consequence of witnessing the accident and her husband's injuries. The court referred to Ms. Crab-tree's cause of action as a "Lejeune " claim. Although State Farm agreed that its driver's negligence was the sole cause of the accident, that Mr. Crabtree's damages exceeded the $25,000 "Each Person" coverage amount under the policy, and that Ms. Crabtree's mental anguish claim was also worth or exceeded $25,000, State Farm argued that its total liability was limited to the $25,000 "Each Person" coverage amount rather than the $50,000 "Each Accident" coverage amount because Ms. Crabtree's Lejeune claim was a derivative claim. Reading the policy language as a whole, the court concluded that the "Each Accident" coverage limit applied even if the Lejeune claim was derivative in nature. The court reasoned as follows:
The "resulting from" clause must be construed together with the policy language explaining the coverage for "Each Accident," which provides as follows:
Under "Each Accident" is the total amount of coverage, subject to the amount shown under "Each Person", for all damages due to bodily injury to two or more persons in the same accident.
The policy language explaining the coverage for "Each Person," which includes the "resulting from" clause, provides:
Under "Each Person" is the amount of coverage for all damages due to bodily injury to one person. "Bodily injury to one person" includes all injury and damages to others resulting from this bodily injury.
In arguing Mrs. Crabtree's Lejeune claim "resulted from" Mr. Crabtree's bodily injuries and therefore falls within the per person policy limits even if Mrs. Crabtree's mental anguish constitutes "bodily injury," State Farm in effect construes the definition of "bodily injury to one person" to include "all injury, including bodily injury, and damages to others resulting from this bodily injury." Under State Farm's construction, all injuries including bodily injuries which "result from" another's bodily injury would be subject to the single per person limit while all other bodily injuries would be covered under the aggregate per accident limit. Thus, if an oncoming car hit Mr. Crabtree while he was driving with Mrs. Crabtree, and the injury to him caused him to drive off the road and hit a tree resulting in external, physical injury to Mrs. Crabtree, the latter's injury, under State Farm's interpretation, would "result from" the former's injury and therefore fall under the single bodily injury limit. Likewise, if, as a result of the impact, Mr. Crabtree was propelled off his motorcycle and into a pedestrian, the pedestrian's external, physical injuries would "result from" Mr. Crabtree's injuries and therefore fall under the single person bodily injury limits.
As illustrated by the foregoing hypo-theticals, State Farm's construction of the policy language defining "bodily injury to one person" strains the meaning of the policy language, respectively enlarges and restricts the separate policy provisions beyond what is reasonably contemplated by the terms, and achieves an absurd result. If State Farm had intended "bodily injury to one person" to include "all injury, including bodily injury, and damages to others resulting from this bodily injury," the policy could have so provided. Moreover, State Farm's interpretation construes the "resulting from" clause in isolation at the expense of disregarding the clear and explicit language defining the aggregate coverage for "Each Accident" as "all damages due to bodily injury to two or more persons in the same accident."
Construing the policy provisions in light of each other so that each is given the meaning suggested by the policy as a whole, we conclude the policy language defining "bodily injury to one person" to include "all injury and damages to others resulting from this bodily injury" does not reasonably encompass bodily injury to others under the single person limit. We interpret the policy to mean instead that where one person suffers bodily injury, or where one person suffers bodily injury and one or more other persons suffer injury and damages other than bodily injury as a result of the former's bodily injury, the amount of coverage for bodily injury to one person applies ($25,000). This interpretation is consistent with State Farm's contractual obligation to "pay damages which an insured becomes legally entitled to pay because of . bodily injury to others." On the other hand, where two or more persons suffer bodily injury in the same accident, the aggregate amount of coverage for each accident applies ($50,000) even if one or more persons' bodily injury "results from" another's bodily injury. Additionally, the coverage for each accident is "subject to the amount shown under 'Each Person'," referring to "the amount of coverage for all damages due to bodily injury to one person" ($25,000), up to the aggregate per accident limit ($50,000) for two or more persons.
In sum, because we conclude, for reasons which follow, that Mrs. Crabtree's mental anguish constitutes "bodily inju ry" within the meaning of the policy, it follows under the clear and explicit terms of the policy construed as a whole that "bodily injury to one person" as defined therein does not encompass Mrs. Crabtree's Lejeune claim. Mrs. Crab-tree's Lejeune claim therefore is not subject to the single person policy limit applicable to her husband's claim regardless of whether her mental anguish "results from" or "derives from" Mr. Crabtree's bodily injuries.
632 So.2d at 742-43.
In the present case, State Farm does not challenge the trial court's determination that the appellees' damages were recoverable as part of their own bodily injuries arising out of the accident. The trial court's ruling here therefore accords with the Crabtree construction of the policy language.
Because the ambiguous coverage provisions may reasonably be read to provide coverage to the appellees to the extent of the "Each Accident" coverage limit, the contract is properly construed as providing coverage in this amount. Swire Pacific Holdings, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 845 So.2d 161 (Fla.2003); Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 756 So.2d 29 (Fla.2000). The final judgment is accordingly affirmed.
VAN NORTWICK, J., concurs.
POLSTON, J., dissents with written opinion.
. Two intermediate appellate court decisions from Wisconsin not relied upon by State Farm in the present case, Estate of Gocha v. Shimon, 215 Wis.2d 586, 573 N.W.2d 218 (1997), and Mullen v. Walczak, 257 Wis.2d 928, 653 N.W.2d 529 (2002), provide superficial support for State Farm's argument, but the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has explained that these cases actually construe the policy provisions as distinguishing between "independent claims" and "derivative claims," and only preclude overall recovery in excess of the "Each Person" coverage in the situation in which the claims of multiple insureds are based upon a single bodily injury. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Langridge, 275 Wis.2d 35, 683 N.W.2d 75 (2004). These decisions have no application in the present case because State Farm does not challenge the trial court's determination that the appellees' damages were independently recoverable as part of their own bodily injuries arising out of the accident.