Case Name: Commonwealth ex rel. Wright, Appellant, v. Hendrick
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1973-12-04
Citations: 455 Pa. 36
Docket Number: Appeal, No. 161
Parties: Commonwealth ex rel. Wright, Appellant, v. Hendrick.
Judges: Before Eagen, O’Brien, Roberts, Pomeroy, Nix and Mandehino, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania State Reports
Volume: 455
Pages: 36–43

Head Matter:
Commonwealth ex rel. Wright, Appellant, v. Hendrick.
Argued May 1, 1973.
Before Eagen, O’Brien, Roberts, Pomeroy, Nix and Mandehino, JJ.
Dennis T. Kelly, Acting First Assistant Defender, with him Vincent J. Ziccwdi, Defender, for appellant.
Benjamin H. Levintow, Assistant District Attorney, with him Milton M. Stein, Assistant District Attorney, Richard A. Sprague, First Assistant District Attorney, and Arlen Specter, District Attorney, for appellee.
December 4, 1973:

Opinion:
Opinion by
Mr. Justice Eagen,
By his own admission Fred Wright, the appellant, is the father of three children born out-of-wedlock to one Beverly Thomas, a resident of Philadelphia. On February 5, 1964, in proceedings instituted under the provisions of the Pennsylvania Civil Procedural Support Law, in the County Court of Philadelphia (now the Family Court Division of the Court of Common Pleas), Wright was ordered to pay $5 weekly towards the support of one of these children. On September 20, 1965, in a separate proceeding under the same statute, he was ordered to pay $5 weekly towards the support of the second of these children. On April 15, 1968, in a third and separate proceeding under the same statute, he was ordered to pay $5 weekly towards the support of the third such child.
On May 28, 1971, Wright was brought before the Family Court Division of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia via a writ of attachment for failure to comply with the aforesaid support orders. After a hearing during which Wright was without counsel, the court found that the total amount accrued under said orders was $4195; that Wright was credited with payments of only $213 since entry of the first order, and, hence, was in arrears in the amount of $3982. The court then entered the following order: "$1000 or six months in the House of Correction." The one thousand dollars was not paid and Wright was committed.
On July 13, 1971, habeas corpus proceedings were instituted on Wright's behalf contesting the validity of the commitment order. After a counseled evidentiary hearing on August 4th, habeas corpus was denied. An appeal was filed in the Superior Court, and that court on August 12th issued a writ of supersedeas staying the order of commitment pending appeal. Subse quently, the Superior Court unanimously affirmed the trial court's order denying habeas corpus by a "Per Curiam" order, without an opinion. See 221 Pa Superior Ct. 756, 289 A.2d 176 (1972). We granted allocatur.
Inter alia, it is argued Wright's failure to comply with the support orders was due to indigency, and that imprisoning an indigent for failure to pay a support order violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. In view of the conclusions that follow, it is unnecessary to reach this constitutional issue in this case.
As noted before, the support proceedings, here involved, were instituted and prosecuted under the Act of 1953, supra, 62 P.S. 2043.39(b), which provides as follows: "Any wilful failure to comply with any order of the court may be deemed a contempt of court and except in counties of the first class may be punishable by the court by commitment to the county jail or house of correction. In counties of the first class, any person who is found, after hearing, to have wilfully failed to comply with any order of the court may be adjudged in contempt of court and may be punished by the court by commitment to the county jail or house of correction until compliance with said order, but in no case for a period exceeding six (6) months, and the court in its order shall state the condition upon which fulfillment will result in the release of such person." [Emphasis added.]
Thus, the act explicitly states that in counties of the first class [Philadelphia is a county of the first class], a wilful noncompliance of a support order, entered pursuant to the provisions of the Act of 1953, is necessary before there may be a finding of contempt and imposition of a jail sentence.
In the habeas corpus hearing in the trial court, Wright testified: that he was without funds and unable to pay any sum towards the arrearage due on the sup port orders; that he was in prison from June, 1968 to June 11, 1970, under a sentence imposed following his conviction for an unrelated criminal offense; that he was able and .willing to work, but had been continuously unemployed since November, 1970, despite efforts to gain employment; and, that he was currently being supported by his mother. There was no testimony from any source to discredit or disprove this testimony.
Wright's request that he be released from imprisonment to further his attempt to find employment was denied by the court.
While the term "wilful" is a word of many meanings, depending on the context in which it is used, it seems clear to us that, as used in the statute instantly involved, "wilful" means an intentional, designed act and one without justifiable excuse. As noted before, the only testimony in the tidal court was that Wright was then penniless and unable, through no fault of his own, to pay any sum on the delinquencies. Such a record does not support a finding of wilful noncompliance, required by the Act of 1953. Compare, Commonwealth v. Pewatts, 200 Pa. Superior Ct. 22, 186 A. 2d 408 (1962).
The trial court reasoned that since Wright was young and in good health, his continued unemployment, coupled with his chronic failure to make contributions towards the support of the children, constituted a wilful disregard of the court's orders. To this, we cannot subscribe. If the record warranted the conclusion that Wright refused to work, and, thus through his own fault was rendered incapable of making payments on the outstanding support orders, this might well constitute a wilful noncompliance under the Act of 1953. However, this is not such a case, and whether criminal sanctions may constitutionally be imposed, under the circumstances, need not be resolved here. The determination of that complex issue must await a proper case.
In view of the foregoing, the remaining assignments of error need not now concern us.
The orders of the Superior Court and the trial court are reversed.
Mr. Chief Justice Jones took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Act of July 13, 1953, P. L. 431, as amended, 62 P.S. §2043.31 et seq.
The validity of these orders is not now questioned.
While the record is silent as to this, the Commonwealth's brief states Wright has been at liberty since August 12, 1971.