Case Name: Larry BLAND, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1990-06-21
Citations: 563 So. 2d 794
Docket Number: No. 89-2693
Parties: Larry BLAND, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: THOMPSON, FORD L. (Ret.), Associate Judge, concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 563
Pages: 794–797

Head Matter:
Larry BLAND, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 89-2693.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
June 21, 1990.
James A. Johnston, Pensacola, for appellant,
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Edward C. Hill, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Opinion:
NIMMONS, Judge.
Bland appeals from an order denying his Rule 3.850 motion. No evidentiary hearing was held. However, it is apparent from the record herein that the trial court, in denying the motion, took into consideration the transcript of the trial testimony. Such transcript is a part of the record herein and is relied upon by both the appellant and appellee. Under the circumstances, the trial court's failure to attach to its order the portions of the record relied upon for denial is not reversible error. See Raulerson v. State, 420 So.2d 567, 571 (Pla. 1982).
Appellant, who went to trial on the dual charges of burglary and attempted sexual battery, claims that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because defense counsel failed to defend on the basis of voluntary intoxication. Although the evidence concerning the defendant's sobriety may well have been sufficient to entitle him — had he requested it — to an instruction on the defense of voluntary intoxication, the trial transcript, beginning with the opening statements all the way through the closing arguments, clearly shows that the theory of Bland's defense was that his entry into the subject home was at the victim's invitation, that although a fight ensued, she initiated the fight, and that there was no attempted sexual battery. This defense was at least partially successful because, although the jury returned a guilty verdict on the burglary charge, Bland was found not guilty on the attempted sexual battery count.
Even more significant though is the fact that only one of the felonies for which the appellant was being tried — burglary — is amenable to a voluntary intoxication defense. While burglary is a specific intent crime in which a defense of voluntary intoxication may be interposed, attempted sexual battery is a general intent crime because, as held in Gentry v. State, 422 So.2d 1072 (Pla. 2nd DCA 1982), approved, 437 So.2d 1097 (Fla.1983), the intent required to attempt to commit a crime is no greater than the intent necessary to commit the crime itself, and sexual battery requires only a general intent.
So, for us to call into question the competency of trial counsel's performance in failing to defend on the basis of voluntary intoxication — a defense applicable to only one of the charged offenses — would constitute Monday morning quarterbacking of the first order.
Were we to reverse in this case, we would, in effect, be suggesting that defense counsel in a situation such as this must, in order to avoid the stigma of an incompetency of counsel claim, defend on the basis of both consent and voluntary intoxication. We decline to promote such incongruity.
We have examined the two other ineffective assistance claims and find them to be without merit.
AFFIRMED.
THOMPSON, FORD L. (Ret.), Associate Judge, concurs.
ERVIN, J., concurs and dissents with opinion.
. Bland's appellate counsel herein was not trial counsel.
. Pope v. State, 458 So.2d 327 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).