Case Name: Regis C. MURPHY, Appellant, v. Linda MURPHY, Appellee
Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1998-08-04
Citations: 715 A.2d 477
Docket Number: No. 1096 Pittsburgh 1996
Parties: Regis C. MURPHY, Appellant, v. Linda MURPHY, Appellee.
Judges: Before DEL SOLE, HUDOCK and ORIE MELVIN, JJ.
Reporter: West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 715
Pages: 477–479

Head Matter:
Regis C. MURPHY, Appellant, v. Linda MURPHY, Appellee.
Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
Argued Jan. 27, 1998.
Filed Aug. 4, 1998.
Jesse L. Katz, Pittsburgh, for appellant.
Arnold H. Cantor (submitted), Pittsburgh, for appellee.
Before DEL SOLE, HUDOCK and ORIE MELVIN, JJ.

Opinion:
DEL SOLE, Judge:
This appeal is from an order dismissing Husband's exceptions and entering the Master's Report and Recommendation as a final order in a divorce action. We vacate the order and remand for further proceedings.
Appellant (Husband) filed a complaint in divorce which requested equitable distribution of marital property and related economic relief. The court appointed a master and hearings were held before the master on the economic issues. The master's report and recommendation was filed on May 3, 1995, and Husband filed timely exceptions on May 15, 1995. The transcript was filed on November 1, 1995. On May 15, 1996, Wife presented a motion to dismiss exceptions and the court entered the order presently under review.
On appeal, Husband raises three issues:
1. The trial court erred in dismissing Husband's exceptions when Husband was in the midst of a bankruptcy proceeding.
2. The trial court should have determined if Wife was prejudiced by the delay or if Husband had good cause for the delay before dismissing the exceptions.
3. The court erred in dismissing the exceptions without providing Husband an opportunity to brief and argue the merits of his exceptions.
Husband first argues that the order, and Wife's motion to dismiss, were in violation of the automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, that Wife's actions put her in contempt of the Bankruptcy Court, and that both Wife and the trial court had knowledge of Husband's filing of a bankruptcy petition. Husband has not, however, seen fit to place this fact on the record or provide either this court or the trial court with any record notice that he had filed a bankruptcy petition. Husband was served with a copy of the motion before it was presented and had both the opportunity and obligation to serve the trial court with notice of his bankruptcy petition and automatic stay. He did not do so and cannot now expect relief based on a "fact" which is not of record. Commonwealth v. Rini, 285 Pa.Super. 475, 427 A.2d 1385 (1981).
Husband next contends that the court's reliance on Allegheny County Administrative Order of Court, No. 201 of 1995, was improper as that order is in conflict with Pa.R.Civ.P. 239. We are constrained to agree with Husband on this point and therefore must vacate the order and remand the ease for further proceedings.
Rule 239 provides that no proceeding may be dismissed for failure to comply with a local rule other than one promulgated under Rule of Judicial Administration 1901, which requires at least 30 days written notice of opportunity for a hearing on termination. The administrative order relied on here provides that "Failure to comply with this Administrative Order will result in the automatic termination of exceptions..."
In Everhardt v. Akerley, 445 Pa.Super. 600, 665 A.2d 1283 (1995), the appellant's exceptions to a support order were dismissed based on his failure to file a brief pursuant to Lebanon County Rule 7. We found that rule to be in direct conflict with Rule 239 and reversed the dismissal order. Similarly, in Murphy v. Armstrong, 424 Pa.Super. 424, 622 A.2d 992 (1993), we reversed an order dismissing a complaint because the plaintiff failed to file a brief in response to preliminary objections. We held that dismissal for noncompliance with Montgomery County Rule of Civil Procedure *302(f) was unauthorized by Pa.R.Civ.P. 239 and could not be upheld.
The Administrative Order relied on here is similarly invalid as it conflicts with Rule 239. We must therefore vacate the order dismissing Appellant's exceptions and remand so the trial court can hear argument on the exceptions in accordance with Pa.R.Civ.P.1920.55-2(c).
Order vacated. Case remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction relinquished.
ORIE MELVIN, J., files a Dissenting Opinion.