Case Name: WALLY WITHERSPOON, Adm'r, Appellant, v. SPOTTS AND COMPANY, SHARPE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY and DONALD HUNTER, Respondents
Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1955-05-17
Citations: 227 S.C. 209
Docket Number: 17004
Parties: WALLY WITHERSPOON, Adm’r, Appellant, v. SPOTTS AND COMPANY, SHARPE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY and DONALD HUNTER, Respondents
Judges: Baker, C. ]., and Oxner and Legge, JJ., concur.
Reporter: South Carolina Reports
Volume: 227
Pages: 209–216

Head Matter:
17004
WALLY WITHERSPOON, Adm’r, Appellant, v. SPOTTS AND COMPANY, SHARPE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY and DONALD HUNTER, Respondents
(87 S. E. (2d) 477)
James Hugh McFaddin, Esq., of Manning, for Appellants,
Messrs. Shuler & Harrell, of Kingstree, John G. Dinkins, of Manning, and Williams & Parler, of Lancaster, for Respondent,
May 17, 1955.

Opinion:
Taylor, Justice.
This appeal arises out of an action brought in the Court of Common Pleas for Clarendon County by appellant for the wrongful death of one Bertha Witherspoon.
The defendants by their separate answers plead generally to the complaint and the case was docketed for trial at the March, 1954, Term of said Court. Upon call of the calendar for said term of Court March 2, 1954, motion for a change of venue was made by the defendant Donald Hunter, upon the grounds of the convenience of witnesses and that the Sharpe Construction Company is a sham and immaterial defendant. After considering the pleadings and affidavits submitted, the case was ordered transferred from Clarendon County to Lancaster County. The pertinent portions of said Order are:
"This matter comes before me on motion of the defendant, Donald Hunter, -for a change of venue from the County of Clarendon to the County of Lancaster upon two grounds, to wit: Subsection (1) and Subsection (3) of Section 10-310 of the Code of Laws of South Carolina for the year 1952. =¡=
"It is undisputed that the defendant, Donald Hunter, is a resident of Lancaster, South Carolina, and I am satisfied from the facts presented that Donald Hunter is the real Defendant and that Sharpe Construction Company, the Clarendon County resident defendant, is an immaterial defendant, and I so find and hold."
Plaintiff appeals contending:
"I. His Honor erred in not holding that each of the defendants had waived the right to raise the objection to the Court of Common Pleas for Clarendon County by answering to the merits the question of jurisdiction relating to the person of the defendant and not to subject matter.
"II. His Honor erred in holding as a matter of law that Sharpe Construction Company was an immaterial defendant and that Donald Hunter was the real defendant, the error being that the action is joint and several and the plaintiff may elect to bring the action in any county in which one or more of the defendants reside."
The first question must be resolved against the contention of appellant upon authority of the recent case of Brown v. Palmetto Baking Co., 220 S. C. 38, 66 S. E. (2d) 417, 419, wherein it is held that answer in an action does not constitute a waiver of the right to move to transfer a case to the proper county for trial, stating:
"The Nixon & Danforth decision is very clearly authoritative of the rule that answer in an action does not constitute waiver of the right to move to transfer the case to the proper county for trial. The subsequent cases in point that have been cited in the argument of this appeal are not in conflict with that rule, which will be demonstrated by brief review of them. Before that, it may be said that issues are not joined, necessitating trial, until answer or demurrer, so motion to change the place of trial cannot logically be required in advance of answer or demurrer." Nixon & Dan-forth v. Piedmont Mutual Insurance Co., 74 S. C. 438, '54 S. E. 657. See also Willoughby v. Northeastern R. Co., 46 S. C. 317, 24 S. E. 308; Hunter v. D. W. Alderman & Sons Co., 79 S. C. 555, 61 S. E. 202; Rosamond v. Lucas-Kidd Motor Co., Inc., 182 S. C. 331, 189 S. E. 641.
The second question must also be resolved against appellant's contention under authority of Brown v. Palmetto Baking Co., supra, wherein this Court stated in dealing with a similar matter:
"The court made relevant factual findings which are practically undisputed on appeal, and, supported by the evidence, they are binding anyway." And cites Morris v. Peoples Baking Co., 191 S. C. 501, 5 S. E. (2d) 286, 287, wherein this Court said: "The Circuit Judge has found as a fact that appellant has an agent and conducts its corporate business in Williamsburg County. In a law case, this Court has no power to review such finding of fact unless wholly unsupported by evidence or manifestly influenced or controlled by error of law."
The affidavit of Donald Hunter is to the effect that on April 9, 1953., the date of the collision, the Sharpe Construe tion Company and its crew and equipment were approximately three miles from the scene of the collision and that the work of the Sharpe Construction Company required no materials from or the use of the barrow pit on State Highway 527; and that the driver of the defendant's truck, one Leslie C. Kersey, was not its employee but was employed by and controlled exclusively by Donald Hunter.
The affidavit of C. A. Sharpe, secretary and treasurer of the defendant Sharpe Construction Company, states that prior to the date of the collision, Spotts and Company made and entered into a written contract with the defendant Donald Hunter and M. C. Steele; said contract being dated April 1, 1953, provided for the hauling of earth and other materials by Hunter and Steele and that this contract superseded the previous oral contract which was in effect up to April 1. That Sharpe Construction Company had no occasion to use the barrow pit on Highway 527 or haul materials therefrom; that the Sharpe Construction Company neither owned, rented, had any interest in, or control over the truck involved in the collision and that the driver of said truck was the employee solely of Donald Hunter ; that at the time of the collision the Sharpe Construction Company was engaged in sub-grading road No. 47, approximately three miles away.
To like effect is the affidavit of Vernor F. Epting, superintendent of Spotts and Company.
We are therefore unable to say that the finding of the circuit Judge that the defendant Donald Hunter is the real defendant and the Sharpe Construction Company an immaterial one is wholly unsupported by the evidence or manifestly influenced or controlled by error of law.
For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion that the exceptions should be dismissed and the Order appealed from affirmed, and It Is So Ordered.
Baker, C. ]., and Oxner and Legge, JJ., concur.
Stukes, J., dissents.