Case Name: COLWELL v. TOMPKINS
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1896-06-02
Citations: 39 N.Y.S. 478
Docket Number: 
Parties: COLWELL v. TOMPKINS.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 39
Pages: 478–482

Head Matter:
(6 App. Div. 93.)
COLWELL v. TOMPKINS.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.
June 2, 1896.)
Real-Estate Agents—Commissions—Pkocuring Cause op Sale.
In an action for commissions on the sale of real estate, it appeared that the property was about to be sold under a mortgage. An attorney interested in the foreclosure of the mortgage testified that the purchaser came to see him, and said that he would give a certain price if he could not get it for less. Plaintiff did not call the purchaser’s attention to the property, and up to that time had had no communication with him in reference to the matter, but he had the property on his books for sale at the instance of the owner, and had told the attorney that the owner’s agent had the property in charge; and the attorney communicated this information to the purchaser, who subsequently bought the premises directly from the owner’s agent. Held, that plaintiff was not the procuring cause of the sale. Hatch, J., dissenting.
Appeal from circuit court, Westchester county.
Action by Harry E. Colwell against Maria Melissa Tompkins to recover broker’s commissions on the sale of real estate. A nonsuit was granted at the close of the entire case, on the ground that plaintiff failed to prove that he was the procuring cause of the sale, and plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
Argued before BROWN, P. J., and PRATT, BARTLETT, and HATCH, JJ.
Charles T. Terry, for appellant.
Cornelius E. Kene, for respondent.

Opinion:
BARTLETT, J.
This action was brought to recover commissions which were claimed by the plaintiff, as a real-estate broker, for effecting the sale to one Frank W. Molloy of certain property at New Rochelle, N. Y., belonging to the defendant, for the sum of $20,000. The learned judge who presided at the trial dismissed the complaint, on the ground that the plaintiff's efforts did not constitute the moving cause which secured the purchaser. I am satisfied that he was clearly right in this view. To demonstrate its, correctness, we need not go beyond the testimony of the first witness called in behalf of the plaintiff, who was Mr. J. Addison Young, one of the attorneys interested in the foreclosure of a mortgage upon the premises which were the subject of the sale. This gentleman testifies that, when Mr. Molloy came to see him, at the very outset of the negotiations, he said, in substance, that he would give $20,000 for the property, if he could not get it for $18,000. The plaintiff did not call Mr. Molloy's attention to the property, and up to that time he had never had any communication whatever with Mr. Molloy in reference to the matter, either directly or indirectly. It is apparent, therefore, that nothing subsequently done by the plaintiff could have induced Mr. Molloy to buy, as he did buy, at $20,000; for, before seeing or hearing from the plaintiff at all, Mr. Molloy had evidently made up his mind to purchase at that figure, if he could not do better. The plaintiff can claim to-recover in this action only upon the theory that he has rendered service to the defendant. To earn a commission upon the sale of real estate, the broker must prove that he was an efficient agent in bringing about the sale. McClave v. Paine, 49 N. Y. 561; Lloyd v. Matthews, 51 N. Y. 124. But in the case at bar, without any action whatever on the part of the plaintiff, of which Mr. Molloy had any knowledge, the latter was willing to pay the price for which the defendant was willing to sell. Nothing done by the plaintiff could have had any effect to change the purchaser's attitude for the beilefit of the owner, because that attitude .was as-favorable, at the beginning of the negotiations, for the purchase,, as it was when the purchase was agreed upon.
It is argued, however, that the plaintiff may be regarded as the procuring cause of the sale because, having the property on his books for sale at the instance of the owner, he had told Mr. Young that Miss Marsh, the authorized agent of the owner, had the property in charge, and Mr. Young communicated this information to-Mr. Molloy, who subsequently bought the premises directly from Miss Marsh herself. In other words, the contention is that a broker employed to sell real estate earns his commission if he simply tells a friend or acquaintance who the owner is, and that friend or acquaintance in turn gives the owner's name to an intending purchaser, who thereupon goes directly to the owner and buys, without ever seeing or communicating with the broker.. There may be language in some of the decided cases broad enough to afford an apparent support to this proposition, but I have found1 no instance in which a recovery has been sustained where the broker had done so little to bring about a sale as was done by Mr.. Colwell.
It should also be observed that Mr. Young was by no means certain that Mr. Colwell was the source of the information which he had, and which he communicated to Mr. Molloy, concerning Miss Marsh and her relation to the property. On cross-examination, Mr. Young admitted that a Mr. Underhill, about the time of Mr. Molloy's first call, had informed him that Miss Marsh had a power of attorney from the owner, and he would not swear that this was not before he saw Mr. Molloy at all in reference to the matter. When the witness for the plaintiff whose testimony is essential to supply the connecting link to take the case to the jury is no more positive than this, I think the complaint should be dismissed, unless vague possibility is to fulfill the office of proof.
In my opinion, the judgment and order appealed from should be affirmed.
BROWN, P. J., and PRATT, J., concur.