Case Name: WOODWARD v. NEW YORK RYS. CO.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1914-11-20
Citations: 149 N.Y.S. 1003
Docket Number: No. 6364
Parties: WOODWARD v. NEW YORK RYS. CO.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 149
Pages: 1003–1006

Head Matter:
WOODWARD v. NEW YORK RYS. CO.
(No. 6364.)
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
November 20, 1914.)
1. Street Railroads (§ 99 ) — Injuries to Persons on Tracks — Contributory Negligence.
A traveler, crossing street car tracks, who saw a car about a block aiway, and, thinking that she had a chance to pass ahead of it, drove on without again looking at the car, is guilty of contributory negligence, which bars recovery, on collision with the ear; it being her duty to look out, as well as that of the motorman.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Street Railroads, Cent. Dig. §§ 209-216;
Dec. Dig. § 99.*]
2. Street Railroads (§ 99*) — Injuries to Persons on Tracks — Care.
While a’ traveler on a highway is not hound to stop, look, and listen for street cars, ho is bound to exercise reasonable precautions for his own safety, and may not rely solely on the motorman to avoid accidents.
[Ed. Note.' — For other cases, see Street Railroads, Cent. Dig. §§ 209-216; Dec. Dig. § 99.*]
Ingraham, P. J., and Baughlin, J., dissenting.
Appeal from Trial Term, New York County.
Action by Anna W. Woodward against the New York Railways Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, and an order denying a new trial, defendant appeals.
Reversed, and complaint dismissed.
Argued before INGRAHAM, P. J., and McLAUGHLIN, LAUGH-LIN, CLARKE, and SCOTT, JJ.
Frederick J. Moses, of New York City, for appellant.
Frank V. Johnson, of New York City, for respondent.
FOr other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to Sate, & Rep’r Indexes_

Opinion:
SCOTT, J.
The action is for damages received by plaintiff as the result of a collision between an electric car owned by defendant and a light wagon which plaintiff was driving. That the motorman of the car was negligent is not denied, but it is claimed by defendant that the plaintiff was herself guilty of contributory negligence, and for this reason should not recover.
On July 6, 1912, plaintiff, who says that she is an experienced horsewoman, was driving a single horse attached to a light wagon westwardly through 130th street in the city of New York. As she approached Eighth avenue, when her horse's head had just reached the crossing on the easterly side of the avenue, she looked uptown and saw a car approaching about one block away. Asked whether she formed an impression whether the car was going fast or slow, she replied: "I did not give it a thought." She admitted that after she had seen the car she proceeded to drive across the avenue, and never paid any more attention to the car until she had nearly crossed the tracks, when she became conscious that the car was right upon her. In fact, it struck the after part of her rear wheel, which indicates very clearly that, if she had looked a second time, she could easily have cleared the car, even if the motorman was negligent, as he undoubtedly was. Her mental attitude is shown by her own testimony, which was that when she first saw the car^ and before she had started to cross the avenue she thought: "Well, it's going pretty good; I have a good show to get across."
In my opinion, on the plaintiff's own evidence, and I have quoted only from that, she was clearly guilty of contributory negligence. It has frequently been so held in many similar cases. In Tully v. N. Y. City Railway Co., 127 App. Div. 688, 111 N. Y. Supp. 919, the circumstances were much the same as in the present case except that the plaintiff was a pedestrian. This court said:
"The truth is the plaintiff, according to her testimony, paid no attention to her own safety after she left the corner, and therefore her conduct does not sustain a legal inference that she exercised the degree of care which the law imposed upon her, and a finding of the jury to the contrary is based solely upon speculation and nothing else. Plaintiff, as already suggested, was as much bound to look out for herself as the motorman was. She could not, having observed a car approaching, heedlessly cross the street and pay no attention to it, because the motorman had as much right to assume that she would keep out of the way of the car as she had to assume that the motorman would so control the car that it would not injure her."
To the same effect are Bernstein v. N. Y. City Ry. Co., 92 N. Y. Supp. 228; Lynch v. 3rd Ave. R. R., 88 App. Div. 604, 85 N. Y. Supp. 180; Litzour v. Interurban Street Ry.' Co., 116 App. Div. 477, 101 N. Y. Supp. 990; Baxter v. Auburn & Syracuse E. R. R. Co., 190 N. Y. 439-443, 83 N. E. 469.
It is true that a traveler on the highway is not subject to the same obligation to "stop, look, and listen" for street cars as for steam cars; but he is under some obligation to use reasonable precaution for his own safety, and may not, without imputation of negligence, rely solely upon the driver or motorman of a street car to avoid collision. What especially convicts the plaintiff of negligence is that she actually saw the car coming, and speculated, as she says herself, whether or not she had time to cross in front of it. If the situation when she first saw the car was such as to raise a question in her own mind as to the probability of a safe crossing in case she attempted to drive in front of the car, it was sheer negligence, and nothing else, to drive blindly on without taking a second look before she placed herself in a position of danger.
The verdict of the jury was directly contrary to the law .of the case as charged by the court, and was also contrary to the evidence.
The judgment and order appealed from should be reversed, and this complaint dismissed, with costs to the appellant.
McLAUGHLIN and CLARKE, JJ., concur.