Case Name: Joseph J. Bond et al., Petitioners, v. Independent Order of Foresters et al., Respondents
Court: Washington Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Washington
Decision Date: 1966-12-08
Citations: 69 Wash. 2d 879
Docket Number: No. 37952
Parties: Joseph J. Bond et al., Petitioners, v. Independent Order of Foresters et al., Respondents.
Judges: 
Reporter: Washington Reports
Volume: 69
Pages: 879–886

Head Matter:
[No. 37952.
En Banc.
December 8, 1966.]
Joseph J. Bond et al., Petitioners, v. Independent Order of Foresters et al., Respondents.
Hennings, Maltman & Weber and John R. Weber, for petitioners.
Williams, Lanza, Kastner & Gibbs, Joseph J. Lanza, and Hugh R. McGough, for respondents.
Reported in 421 P.2d 351.

Opinion:
Ott, J.
Joseph J. Bond and Lorraine Bond, his wife, commenced an action against the Independent Order of Foresters (her employer), and Raymond W. Scheetz and Elizabeth Scheetz, his wife (owners and managers of the building), to recover damages for personal injuries suffered by Lorraine Bond when a window pane fell on her during the course of her employment as a clerk-typist.
Lorraine Bond's pretrial deposition disclosed the names and addresses of two doctors who had treated her for her injuries. Thereafter, the defendant sought a pretrial deposition from Dr. John H. Aberle, one of the two doctors. The doctor was permitted by plaintiffs' counsel to answer the question, "Is Mrs. Bond now a patient?", to which he replied "Yes." When questions were propounded to him regarding the conversation between the patient and the doctor relating to her injury, attorneys for the plaintiffs objected upon the ground that such inquiry was barred by the physician-patient privileged communications statute, RCW 5.60.060(4).
Upon plaintiffs' refusal to permit Dr. Aberle to answer the questions, defendants adjourned the taking of his deposition, and presented a motion to the trial court to compel the doctor to "make available for examination by defendants his records concerning examination of, consultation with, and treatment of plaintiff herein, and answer oral questions put to him concerning such subjects."
The motion was heard and, after argument of counsel, the court ordered the doctor to answer the questions and furnish the requested information, holding that "By commencement of this suit for personal injuries to herself, plaintiff has waived the patient-physician privilege . . . . Such waiver continues in effect so long as plaintiff continues with this suit." (Italics ours.)
This court granted plaintiffs' application for a writ of certiorari in order to review the propriety of the order.
The sole question presented is whether the physician-patient privilege afforded by RCW 5.60.060(4) is waived by the institution of an action for personal injuries. We answer the query in the negative.
The legislature, prior to Laws of 1965, in the proper exercise of its function, enacted RCW 5.60.060(4), which provides:
The following persons shall not be examined as witnesses:
(4) A regular physician or surgeon shall not, without the consent of his patient, be examined in a civil action as to any information acquired in attending such patient, which was necessary to enable him to prescribe or act for the patient.
The bringing of an action for personal injuries does not constitute a waiver of the statute. The legislature expressly provided that a regular physician or surgeon shall not be examined in a civil action as to any information acquired in attending a patient, without such patient's consent. This legislative enactment is a clear and positive mandate.
The respondents rely upon Kime v. Niemann, 64 Wn.2d 394, 391 P.2d 955 (1964), Randa v. Bear, 50 Wn.2d 415, 312 P.2d 640 (1957), and McUne v. Fuqua, 42 Wn.2d 65, 253 P.2d 632 (1953). None of these cases supports respondents' contention that the bringing of an action for personal injuries constitutes a waiver of the statutory physician-patient privilege.
In Randa v. Baer, supra, we said at 416: "The principal question in this case is the proper interpretation of RCW 5.60.060 (4) as applied to an insured under a medical service contract " (Italics ours.) The contract which Ann Bear signed expressly waived the statute as follows:
"I hereby expressly authorize any physician or hospital to disclose to Grays Harbor County Medical Service Corp. any information obtained by having attended me or hereafter attending or examining me, and I understand that Grays Harbor County Medical Service Corp. will not disclose any information so obtained. Signed Mrs. Ann Bear."
In the cited case, we held there had been a waiver of the privilege for the following reason:
We hold that respondent, by bringing a suit upon the medical service contract to which she was a party, and thus placing in issue her physical condition and the ailment for which she was treated, waived the privilege afforded her by the statute. (Italics ours.)
In Kime v. Niemann, supra, we held that the mere bringing of an action does not constitute a waiver of the privilege, stating at 396:
In Randa v. Bear, supra, we pointed out that the majority rule has been that the bringing of an action, in which an essential issue is the existence of a physical ailment, does not constitute a waiver. We then said:
". . . In recent years, this rule has been modified in several states by statutes providing that the bringing of an action for personal injuries constitutes a waiver of the privilege as to those injuries. See Annotation, 25 A.L.R. (2d) 1429. (p. 423)
No such statutes have been enacted in this state.
In McUne v. Fuqua, supra, the plaintiff had testified at the trial and called three doctors as witnesses, who testified to the nature and extent of his injuries. The plaintiff also stated that, prior to the accident, "he had not consulted a doctor 'for years.' " We there said at 76:
It seems to us that, under these circumstances, appellant must be deemed to have waived the privilege as to any medical testimony which tends to contradict or impeach medical testimony which he has himself offered.
Finally, respondents contend that, since petitioner Lorraine Bond, in her pretrial deposition, testified to the nature and extent of her injuries, she thereby waived the privilege.
When a plaintiff responds to a defendant's pretrial subpoena, he appears as an adverse witness and, as such, does not waive the physician-patient privilege. Randa v. Bear, supra, at 421, and case cited.
Under our rules of court, the plaintiff must submit to a medical examination by a doctor of defendant's choice. Rule of Pleading, Practice and Procedure 35, RCW vol. O. The plaintiff may be examined by the defendant as an adverse witness, under the discovery rules of court (RPPP 26, RCW vol. 0), and is required to testify to the nature and extent of his alleged injury.
We are aware that in several jurisdictions the physician-patient privilege statutes specifically provide that the privilege is waived when a civil action for personal injuries is instituted. Whether RCW 5.60.060 (4) should be so amended is a legislative function which rests within the sole discretion of the legislature.
The order of the trial court is vacated.
Rosellini, C. J., Hill, Hunter, and Hale, JJ., concur.