Case Name: John C. Willis, Appellant, v. Frank H. McKinnon and Others, Respondents
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1898
Citations: 35 A.D. 131
Docket Number: 
Parties: John C. Willis, Appellant, v. Frank H. McKinnon and Others, Respondents.
Judges: 
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 35
Pages: 131–136

Head Matter:
John C. Willis, Appellant, v. Frank H. McKinnon and Others, Respondents.
Lease of premises from one tenant in common of the demised premises — the lessee not estopped from setting up the title of the other tenant in common purchased by him while retaining the possession acquired under the lease.
A party, taking a lease of premises from one of two tenants in common, with the assent of the other, who did not, however, sign the lease, applied for and was refused a renewal thereof, hut thereafter continued in possession of the premises and finally purchased, with the knowledge and apparent assent of his lessor, the interests in the property not covered by the lease nor owned by the lessor
In an action of ejectment brought by the grantee of the lessor to recover possession of the property, it was
Held, that the party so entering into possession was not estopped from asserting his rights as a tenant in common, with the plaintiff in the action, of the premises. Parker, P. J., and Landon, J., dissented.
Appeal by the plaintiff, John C. Willis, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the defendants, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Delaware on the 2d day of November, 1896, upon the decision of the court rendered after a trial before the court without a jury at the Delaware Trial Term, dismissing the complaint upon the merits.
The appeal was taken on behalf of the original plaintiff, Warren Gr. Willis, but he having died pending the appeal, John C. Willis,, the present plaintiff, was duly substituted.
The action was in ejectment to recover the possession of certain premises in the village of Masonville in the county of Delaware. At the tidal a jury was waived and the case was submitted to the court. The court found that, at the commencement of the action, the plaintiff was the owner of an undivided seven-eighths of the main store and lot, and an undivided three-fourths of the wing part, and that the defendant McKinnon was the owner of the remaining undivided portions ; that the defendants did not actually oust the plaintiff or do-any act amounting to a total denial of his right; that the plaintiff and defendant McKinnon being tenants in common, this action will not lie unless the defendant McKinnon is estopped from asserting his-title and from disputing the title of the plaintiff. The court then in effect decided that such estoppel did not exist, and, therefore, dismissed the complaint.
C. L. Andrus, for the appellant.
James R. Baumes. for the respondents.

Opinion:
Mebwin, J.:
Practically the only question presented by the appellant is that the court erred in declining to hold that the defendant McKinnon was estopped by the lease of April 15, 1886, from denying thatWarrén Gr. Willis, the original plaintiff, was the owner of the entire title.
The lease is from Prentice W. Willis, as surviving partner of the late firm of Travis & Willis, to Frank H. McKinnon of a portion only of the property. It was then understood by all parties, according to the evidence on the part of the defendants, that Mrs. Travis, as executrix of the estate of Mr. Travis, the deceased partner, had an interest in the property. Prentice said that she would have to consent to the renting of it. She refused to sign the lease, saying that she wanted to sell. • She finally agreed to give McKinnon three months' notice in case she sold, and also the option of buying at the same price she could sell for to another party, and then McKinnon took the lease from Prentice. The lease provides that in case of sale McKinnon should have first privilege of buying, and at least two months' notice to vacate. It might be found from the evidence that the lease in the form it was, and in view of the negotiations with Mrs. Travis, was not intended to be hostile to the rights of Mrs. 'Travis.
The lease was for one year, with privilege of renewal if the premises were not sold. At the end of the one year Prentice and McKinnon settled. McKinnon wanted a renewal; Prentice refused to give it; said he couldn't; that his uncle was going to foreclose and take the title, and McKinnon would have to make arrangements with him.
After repudiating the lease and disclaiming any right to control the possession, Prentice or his subsequent grantee, Warren G. Willis, the original plaintiff, ought not to be permitted to say that McKinnon is estopped from asserting any right he subsequently obtained.
It is to be observed that on this question of estoppel the plaintiff has no greater rights than Prentice himself had.
McKinnon obtained a deed from Mrs. Travis on June 1, 1887. The deed was recorded June 15, 1887. The foreclosure of the two mortgages was, as it may be inferred, commenced soon after. Prentice deeded to W. G. Willis May 1, 1888. It is stated in the case as to both foreclosures that they did not in any way affect the interest or title of McKinnon if he had any.
Prentice knew of the desire of Mrs. Travis to sell and of the option she gave McKinnon. Under the circumstances here appearing he should be deemed to have assented to the purchase by McKinnon of the interest of Mrs. Travis. If so, he or his grantee, the predecessor of plaintiff, has no right to say now that McKinnon shall not have the benefit of his purchase.
I think the conclusion of the trial court was right, and the judgment should be affirmed.
Hebbick and Putnam, JJ., concurred; Landon, J., dissented in opinion concurred in by Pabkeb, P.' J.