Case Name: MISSISSIPPI ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE AGENTS, INC. v. DEPENDENTS of Clant M. SEAY, Deceased
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1969-01-06
Citations: 218 So. 2d 413
Docket Number: No. 45056
Parties: MISSISSIPPI ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE AGENTS, INC. v. DEPENDENTS of Clant M. SEAY, Deceased.
Judges: ETHRIDGE, C. J., and JONES, PATTERSON and INZER, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 218
Pages: 413–424

Head Matter:
MISSISSIPPI ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE AGENTS, INC. v. DEPENDENTS of Clant M. SEAY, Deceased.
No. 45056.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Jan. 6, 1969.
Rehearings Denied Feb. 17, 1969.
Cox, Dunn & Clark, William H. Cox, Jr., Jackson, for appellant.
Heidelberg, Woodliff & Franks, Sam E. Scott, Jackson, for appellee.

Opinion:
RODGERS, Justice.
This is a workmen's compensation case appealed to this Court from a judgment of the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County, Mississippi, affirming an order allowing the dependents of Clant M. Seay, deceased, compensation for death benefits of $17.50 per week for 450 weeks, or until the sum of $12,500 has been paid.
The Mississippi Association of Insurance Agents, Inc. appealed to the Circuit Court, and the dependents of Clant M. Seay (hereafter called Claimants) cross-appealed that part of the Workmen's Compensation Commission's order wherein the Commission found and determined that the deceased suffered from a preexisting disease which contributed 50% to his death, for which an apportionment was allowed in the weekly benefits.
The Mississippi Association of Insurance Agents, Inc. (hereafter called Appellant) contends that:
(1) The Workmen's Compensation Commission erroneously determined that the claimants were entitled to death benefits because
(a) the award was based upon the erroneous conclusion that the death of Clant M. Seay arose out of and in the course of his employment contrary to law, and
(b) the award was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence; and
(2) The Commission was in error in requiring the payment of $17.50 weekly for a period of 450 weeks, based upon 50% apportionment, because the Commission did not apportion the total benefits of $12,500 as well as the amount payable each week.
The employer, appellant here, contends on appeal that the facts in this case do not show causal connection between Mr. Seay's work and his heart attack, and that the order of the Workmen's Compensation Commission is contrary to any substantial evidence introduced before the attorney referee.
The record shows that Mr. Seay, fifty-three years of age, was employed as secretary-manager of the Mississippi Association of Insurance Agents, and that he died of a heart attack while attending an insurance convention in Chicago, Illinois.
In addition to his regular position of employment, Mr. Seay was, in 1965, secretary to the Southern Agents Conference, such conference consisting of insurance agents from thirteen southern states. The conference met once a year, rotating from state to state. In 1965 it was held in Mississippi. Being secretary to the conference, Seay coordinated the convention which was held in April of that year. He prepared the convention's agenda, made all necessary arrangements with the hotel in which it was held, and generally handled all necessary details. In March, just prior to the Southern Agents convention, Seay appeared to be in an exhausted condition. He looked flushed, occasionally slept at work, perspired heavily, coughed frequently, and often had trouble breathing.
After the Southern Agents convention, Seay's doctor advised him to go to bed or to a hospital. Seay went home to bed and stayed out of his office for two weeks, but he continued to transact the business of, his employer by telephone from his home. After this two week period of convalescence, Seay returned to work. He found a heavier work load than usual, because many things had been put off due to the planning and coordinating of the Southern Agents Conference. Nevertheless, Seay continued his work, his main duty at that time being the planning of the convention, in June, of the Mississippi Association of Insurance Agents, to be held on the Mississippi Gulf Coast. At one point between the Southern Agents convention in April and the Mississippi convention in June, Seay worked twenty-six straight days without taking off. He made all the arrangements for the Mississippi convention.
After the convention in June, Mr. Seay remained at work regularly until he left to go to the Chicago convention on July 16. He had no supervisory duties at that convention. However, he did participate in all the meetings, and at the last meeting of the convention, less than twenty-four hours before his death, Mr. Seay participated in a heated debate over an issue at the convention, and he was observed pounding the table in front of him in an effort to make his point. After the convention ended that afternoon, he met his son who had accompanied him to the convention, whereupon the son noticed Mr. Seay's voice to be weaker than usual; he appeared nervous, haggard, and anxious. That night Mr. Seay and his son went to dinner, attended the theater, and returned to the hotel, where Mr. Seay retired for the night. The next morning he was found dead in his bed.
Mr. Seay was a perfectionist, easily upset, high strung and nervous. He was a dedicated employee, taking his job very seriously. He worked late at the office many nights, and did not take a vacation in the four years prior to his death. He planned, in detail, attended and supervised the two conventions within a short time before his death. He dealt with the tedious arrangements in coordinating these conventions. He was under constant physical and emotional strain and was always in a hurry. He was constantly trying to meet "deadline appointments." Were these facts sufficient to establish causal connection with the workman's employment?
The Commission and the Circuit Court Judge were of the opinion that the claim was compensable.
The employer, appellant, relies strongly upon the opinion in Union Producing Company v. Dependents of Simpson, 251 Miss. 183, 168 So.2d 808 (1964), to sustain its argument under the "ordinary wear and tear of life" doctrine. In the Union Producing Company case the employee died of myocardial infarction following a coronary occlusion. He worked as a clerk in an office, and his work required no lifting, stooping or physical work. He had been suffering from high blood pressure and was hypertensive and nervous. He experienced his attack while sitting at his desk working. He remained at his work for about an hour and a half before going to the hospital, where he died very soon after he arrived. In that case the Court pointed out that: "The proof showed without dispute that Employee had no supervisory duties, and he had ample time to do his work, and was not crowded or rushed for time."
The opinion in that case was based largely upon the fact that the employee was not under any physical or mental strain. On the other hand there is' substantial evidence, in the case at bar, that the strain of Mr. Seay's employment was greater than the ordinary wear and tear of life to which everyone is subjected.
We affirmed the trial court and the Commissioner's holding that there was no showing of physical or emotional strain in the case of Moore v. Hederman Brothers, 240 Miss. 358, 127 So.2d 647 (1961), which is also a case where an employee died in bed. In Moore, supra, we affirmed the judgment of the trial court and the order of the Workmen's Compensation Commission denying compensation, because there was no showing that the employee was doing extreme physical exertion, nor was he subject to an emotional strain at the time of or just before his death.
We pointed out in the case of Insurance Department of Mississippi v. Dinsmore, 233 Miss. 569, 102 So.2d 691 (1958), suggestion of error overruled, 233 Miss. 581, 104 So.2d 296 (1958), that a disability proximately resulting from mental and emotional exertion may' be causative and therefore com-pensable. On suggestion of error, we held that an injury does not have to develop instantaneously, but may accrue gradually over a period of time not too remote. See also W. G. Avery Body Company v. Hall, 224 Miss. 51, 79 So.2d 453, 80 So.2d 53 (1955).
The medical testimony in this case is in conflict as to whether or not the work activity of Mr. Seay accelerated his heart attack. Drs. Melvin and Ward testified, based on reasonable medical certainty, that the activity of Mr. Seay did accelerate his fatal accident. This testimony clearly shows that without the stress and strain of his work Mr. Seay would not have died when he did.
There is other testimony to the contrary by Drs. Hudson, Van Landingham, Fyke and Rosenblatt. We are, however, of the opinion that the expert testimony of Drs. Melvin and Ward, coupled with factual evidence, was sufficient, substantial evidence on which the trier of the facts could reasonably conclude that the death of Mr. Seay was causally connected with his work and was brought on by his physical and emotional stress in the performance of his duties.
It is pointed out by Dunn, Mississippi Workmen's Compensation section 97 (2d ed. 1967) that:
"Apparently there are two schools of medical thought as to whether or not usual and normal physical exertion has any causal connection with a heart attack. There is, also, an element of emotional strain which is sometimes considered as a factor and the varying degrees of physical effort or strain, with or without the emotional factor, may play a part in producing medical opinion on one theory or the other, as will be noted from the summaries of the proof adduced in the several cases cited throughout this article. In fact, conflict in the medical testimony has followed such a characteristic pattern as to be referred to in one case as being typical.
"The result of the typical conflict in medical opinion is that the issue of causal connection in such cases is said to be one for the medical experts and the Commission as triers of the facts, and where there is a conflict of qualified and substantial medical testimony, the decision of the Commission, for or against an award, is final and must be affirmed on review. This result is repeatedly evidenced by the several decisions cited throughout this article and the rule is now said to be well settled."
See also Southern Engineering & Electric Company v. Chester, 226 Miss. 136, 83 So. 2d 811, 84 So.2d 535 (1955).
In passing it must be pointed out that the appellant seriously contends that this Court should adopt the report of a committee of the American Heart Association as the rule in cases of heart failure. This report is in effect that: "Heart failure shall be considered related to physical or emotional exertion only if the heart failure occurs during the actual period of stress clearly unusual for the individual involved."
It is argued that this Court has already adopted the foregoing rule in substance in Union Producing Company v. Dependents of Simpson, 251. Miss. 183, 168 So.2d 808 (1964). We decline to adopt this medical rule as a legal doctrine in this jurisdiction, because we have previously held that an employee's heart attack may be causally connected with his work although his coronary attack occurs after he has completed his daily work and sometimes while he is in bed resting.
Professor Larson has this to say on this subject in his work on Workmen's Compensation Law section 38.83 (1967) :
"When the actual heart attack occurs outside of working hours, or otherwise at some distance in time from the exertion to which it is attributed, the burden of proving a connection between the work exertion and the attack and of negating 'normal progression of the disease' is in the nature of things heavier. As observed in other connections such as the going and coming rule, there is something about the occurrence of an injury within the time and space boundaries of the employment that gives a substantial head start toward compensability. The occurrence of the attack outside these boundaries increases the importance of expert medical testimony, but there is nothing rare about this type of award; examples are sprinkled throughout the cases cited in this section. "
Mississippi Shipping Co. Inc. v. Henderson, 231 F.2d 457 (5th Cir. 1956). See also Mississippi Products, Inc. v. Gordy, 224 Miss. 690, 80 So.2d 793 (1955); Pearson v. Dixie Elec. Power Ass'n, 219 Miss. 884, 70 So.2d 6 (1954); Schilling v. Mississippi State Forestry Comm'n, 226 Miss. 858, 85 So.2d 562 (1956) ; McBride v. Wetmore & Parman, Inc., 241 Miss. 743, 133 So.2d 261 (1961).
Each case must be tested by the evidence introduced in that particular case under the substantial evidence rule, and this Court cannot lay down a specific rule that will apply to all cases by saying that a heart attack is causally connected with the employee's work only when the attack occurs during an actual period of stress. See Dunn, Mississippi Workmen's Compensation § 92 (2d ed. 1967).
The appellant next contends that the weekly compensation and also the maximum recovery allowable under the Workmen's Compensation Law for death benefits due the workman's dependents under Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated section 6998-13, as amended by the 1966 Supplement, should be reduced by apportionment, because the employee's death is shown to have resulted in part from an infirmity which preexisted his death from heart attack. Miss.Code 1942 Ann. § 6998-04 (Supp.1966).
This Court has agreed with this contention in Cockrell Banana Company v. Harris, 212 So.2d 581 (Miss.1968), and although this writer dissented, the Legislature has now confirmed this opinion by House Bill No. 671, General Acts of the Regular Legislative Session 1968, Advance Sheet No. 15, p. 4, amending Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated sections 6998-04 and 6998-13 (Supp.1966), and therefore, weekly compensation benefits and maximum recovery for death benefits except as to the widow's allowance and funeral expenses shall be apportioned, where there is shown to be a preexisting physical handicap, disease or lesion, which is a material contributing factor in results following injury.
We are constrained to hold, therefore, that the 50% contribution due because of preexisting disease applied by the Commission to the weekly benefits must also be applied to the maximum of $12,500.
The judgment of the Circuit Court and the order of the Commission are hereby affirmed as to the finding of the Commission that the death of Clant M. Seay was compensable, and its application of the 50% apportionment to the $35 weekly benefits, but we hold that the 50% apportionment should have been applied also to the maximum benefit of $12,500 payable under section 6998 — 13(f), Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated (Supp.1966).
This case is therefore affirmed as to com-pensability, but is remanded to the Workmen's Compensation Commission for further proceedings as to apportionment, in compliance with the foregoing opinion.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
ETHRIDGE, C. J., and JONES, PATTERSON and INZER, JJ., concur.