Case Name: Leonard ARABIA, Appellant, v. Robert J. SIEDLECKI, Cynthia H. Siedlecki, Robert M. Siedlecki, Heidi I. Siedlecki, American National Corporation, a Florida corporation, Biscayne Insurance Company, Inc., a Florida corporation, Transportation Industry Association, Inc., a Florida corporation, and Florida Specialty Underwriters, Inc., a Florida corporation, and Charging Lien Claimant/Lavalle, Brown, Ronan & Soff, P.A., Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2001-03-28
Citations: 789 So. 2d 380
Docket Number: No. 4D99-185
Parties: Leonard ARABIA, Appellant, v. Robert J. SIEDLECKI, Cynthia H. Siedlecki, Robert M. Siedlecki, Heidi I. Siedlecki, American National Corporation, a Florida corporation, Biscayne Insurance Company, Inc., a Florida corporation, Transportation Industry Association, Inc., a Florida corporation, and Florida Specialty Underwriters, Inc., a Florida corporation, and Charging Lien Claimant/Lavalle, Brown, Ronan & Soff, P.A., Appellees.
Judges: WARNER, C.J., DELL, POLEN, STEVENSON, SHAHOOD, GROSS, TAYLOR and HAZOURI, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 789
Pages: 380–392

Head Matter:
Leonard ARABIA, Appellant, v. Robert J. SIEDLECKI, Cynthia H. Siedlecki, Robert M. Siedlecki, Heidi I. Siedlecki, American National Corporation, a Florida corporation, Biscayne Insurance Company, Inc., a Florida corporation, Transportation Industry Association, Inc., a Florida corporation, and Florida Specialty Underwriters, Inc., a Florida corporation, and Charging Lien Claimant/Lavalle, Brown, Ronan & Soff, P.A., Appellees.
No. 4D99-185.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
March 28, 2001.
Rehearing Denied July 13, 2001.
Jane Kreusler-Walsh of Jane Kreusler-Walsh, P.A., West Palm Beach, and Sidney A. Stubbs, Jr. of Jones, Foster, Johnson & Stubbs, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Mindy L. Pallott and Mark F. Raymond of Tew, Cardenas, Rebak, Kellogg, Lehman, DeMaria & Tague, L.L.P., Miami, for Appellee-Charging Lien Claimant/Lavalle, Brown, Ronan & Soff, P.A.

Opinion:
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
WARNER, C.J.
Appellant's motion for rehearing is granted. We withdraw our previously issued opinion and substitute the following in its place.
This case arises from a dispute over attorney's fees. The trial court awarded a $1,000,000 fee to the law firm that represented the appellant Leonard Arabia on a contingent fee basis in the trial court proceedings, which resulted in a judgment in appellant's favor. Appellant claims that the award is in error because the court (1) failed to limit the award to the maximum contract amount; (2) failed to reduce the award by the amount of reasonable appellate fees incurred by the client in defending the judgment on appeal where the contract provided that the lawyer would represent appellant in "court proceedings;" and (3) miscalculated the interest due on the attorney's fees because of a previous tender of a portion of those fees. We agree and reverse on all three issues raised.
Arabia was involved in a business dispute with several companies and individuals. Stuart Soff, an attorney, agreed to represent Arabia in the suit on a partial contingency fee arrangement. Arabia provided Soff with a retainer of $10,000, with the remainder of the fee to be based upon Arabia's recovery in the suit. The contingency fee contract between Arabia and Soff provided that Soff would be paid 25% "of whatever is recovered, either in settlement or court proceedings." Soff later joined the Lavalle Brown firm, the appel-lees in this case.
After proceeding to trial in the action, a jury awarded Arabia $2,048,000 in damages. However, the trial judge reduced the damages to approximately $1,570,752. The defendants in the underlying original action appealed, and Arabia cross-appealed to challenge the reduction of damages. Arabia retained Holland & Knight to conduct the appeal, after Soff advised Arabia that he did not handle appeals and that Arabia should hire appellate counsel. During the appeal process, Soff died, and Arabia later discharged Soffs firm, La-valle Brown, without cause. The appeal resulted in a reversal of the trial court's judgment with directions to reinstate the original amount of judgment. With the addition of interest, that sum amounted to $4,000,000, on which Lavalle Brown demanded á $1,000,000 fee, based on the 25% fee stated in the contingency fee contract.
After remand, Arabia settled the case with the tortfeasor for $3,750,000. Finding that the contingency had occurred, the trial court awarded the entire fee to Lavalle Brown. Based upon the evidence presented at the hearing, the trial court also found that the quantum meruit value of Soffs services was $1,000,000, refusing to reduce the maximum contract price to 25% of the actual settlement reached with the tortfeasor or for the appellate fees Arabia had to pay to Holland & Knight.
Until Arabia actually recovered something from the judgment debtor, the contingency contemplated in the fee agreement did not occur. See Restivo v. Anderson & Anderson, P.A., 453 So.2d 1167, 1169 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (where agreement provided for a contingent fee based upon the amount recovered, fee must be based on amount actually recov ered and not on verdict entered or judgment obtained). Under the rule of Rosenberg v. Levin, 409 So.2d 1016, 1021 (Fla.1982), "[a]n attorney employed under a valid contract who is discharged without cause before the contingency has occurred or before the client's matters have concluded can recover only the reasonable value of his services rendered prior to discharge, limited by the maximum contract fee." Therefore, Lavalle Brown was entitled to the quantum meruit fee, limited by the maximum amount stated in the contract, which according to our decision in Doremus v. Florida Energy Sys. of South Florida, Inc., 676 So.2d 444, 446 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), would be the percentage applied to the client's final recovery after appeal rather than on the original reduced judgment.
However, in this case the client settled his case for $3,750,000, and not the $4,000,000 to which he was entitled under the appellate court ruling. Without provisions in the fee contract limiting the right to settle, and absent bad faith, a client is free to settle the claim after discharge of the attorney, and the lawyer is entitled only to the percentage of the settlement and not the verdict or judgment. See Restivo, 453 So.2d at 1169-70. The trial court did not find that the settlement was in bad faith. It simply determined, contrary to Restivo, that the client could not settle without Lavalle Brown's permission and thus prejudiced its right to a fee on the full $4,000,000. The trial court cited Milton Kelner, P.A. v. 610 Lincoln Road, Inc., 328 So.2d 193 (Fla.1976) and Forman v. Kennedy, 156 Fla. 219, 22 So.2d 890 (1945), for the proposition that a client cannot settle a case without the consent of an attorney and thus compromise the attorney's full fee. However, in both cases the contingency had occurred, and as the Restivo court pointed out with respect to the For-man decision, the occurrence of the contingency distinguishes it from a case such as this where the contingency has not occurred. Thus, the trial court's ruling that the reasonable value of Soffs quantum meruit recovery is $1,000,000, exceeds the maximum contract price of 25% of the actual settlement of $3,750,000.
Lavalle Brown's fee should also be reduced by the reasonable value of securing appellate representation, which Soff had declined to provide himself. Pursuant to the contract, he obligated himself to represent Arabia in the matter, including "court proceedings." As Lavalle Brown's expert conceded, to a lay person the term "court proceedings" would indicate that all court proceedings were included, including those on appeal. Furthermore, even though the expert testified that he felt that the contract was only for trial work, he admitted that appellate fees might be one of the items that would have to be subtracted from Lavalle Brown's recovery. The trial court made no finding that the contract did not include appellate presentation.
An attorney must be clear and precise in explaining the terms of a fee agreement. To the extent the contract is unclear, the agreement should be construed against the attorney. See Jaye v. Royal Saxon, Inc., 687 So.2d 978, 982 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied, Small & Small, P.A., v. Jaye, 699 So.2d 1375 (Fla.1997); May v. Sessums & Mason, P.A., 700 So.2d 22, 25 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997), rev. denied, 705 So.2d 571 (Fla.1998). Here the fee agreement was based upon Soffs representation of Arabia in the entire dispute, and his fee was to be based upon the recovery in all proceedings. Indeed, if "court proceedings" encompassed only the trial proceedings, then what was gained in those proceedings was only a $1,500,000 judgment. Lavalle Brown cannot claim that it is entitled to what was finally recovered after appeal on the one hand, but on the other hand reject its responsibility to perform the legal work necessary to complete those court proceedings which led to the larger recovery.
Other jurisdictions have followed the rule that where the fee agreement calls for the law firm to represent the client in the entire suit, the law firm should absorb the cost of any additional legal services incurred in obtaining the final disposition. See, e.g., A. Stanley Proner, P.C. v. Julien & Schlesinger, P.C., 134 A.D.2d 182, 520 N.Y.S.2d 771, 773 (1987); Sweeney v. Athens Reg'l Med. Ctr., 917 F.2d 1560 (11th Cir.1990). We agree with this rule to the extent that such additional fees and costs are both reasonable and necessary. Certainly, incurring appellate representation to carry on an appeal in this case fits those criteria.
Finally, Arabia actually tendered a check for $223,835.59 when the first payment was made to him on the judgment. "When a court makes a determination which triggers a party's entitlement to an award of attorney's fees, the date of this determination fixes the date for awarding prejudgment interest on previously incurred attorney's fees, even though the actual amount of the award has not yet been determined." Bremshey v. Morrison, 621 So.2d 717, 718 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993). "[I]nterest accrues from the date the entitlement to attorney fees is fixed through agreement, arbitration award, or court determination." Quality Engineered Installation, Inc. v. Higley South, Inc., 670 So.2d 929, 931 (Fla.1996). By tendering payment, however, an owing party can protect itself against owing great amounts of interest caused by delay in determining the amount of fees owed. In other words, "interest ceases to accrue on amounts of attorney fees up to the amount for which an actual tender of payment is made." Id. Because Arabia tendered a check to the law firm, interest ceased to accrue on that amount from the date of the tender.
We therefore reverse to limit the amount of the fee to the maximum contract price based upon a total recovery to Arabia of $3,750,000, to calculate and reduce the fee by the reasonable value of appellate attorney's fees incurred by Arabia, and to recalculate the prejudgnent interest owed thereon in accordance with this opinion.
WARNER, C.J., DELL, POLEN, STEVENSON, SHAHOOD, GROSS, TAYLOR and HAZOURI, JJ., concur.
GUNTHER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with opinion in which FARMER, J., concurs.
FARMER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with opinion in which GUNTHER, J., concurs and STONE, J., concurs in part.
STONE, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with opinion.
. The client and the judgment debtor entered into a settlement agreement whereby the debtor agreed to make several payments constituting $3,750,000 and to pay a penalty of $250,000 if the final payment was not made timely, which it was not. The client still recovered only $3,750,000 and not $4,000,000.
. This rule is simple contract law. Where a party contracts to perform and fails to render full performance, the damaged party may recover his reasonable cost to complete performance of the work.