Case Name: Juan Antonio FALCON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. M. R. PHILLIPS, Correctional Lieutenant at KVSP, Defendant-Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2017-04-21
Citations: 689 F. App'x 529
Docket Number: No. 16-16177
Parties: Juan Antonio FALCON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. M. R. PHILLIPS, Correctional Lieutenant at KVSP, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 689
Pages: 529–530

Head Matter:
Juan Antonio FALCON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. M. R. PHILLIPS, Correctional Lieutenant at KVSP, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 16-16177
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted April 11, 2017
Filed April 21, 2017
Juan Antonio Falcon, Pro Se
Before: GOULD, CLIFTON, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
California state prisoner Juan Antonio Falcon appeals pro se from the district court's judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging a due process claim arising from a disciplinary hearing. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Falcon's action because Falcon failed to allege facts implicating a liberty or property interest protected by the Due Process Clause. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (protected liberty or property interest arises under due process clause when a restraint imposes an "atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life"); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (plaintiff must allege facts that "allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged").
We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
We reject as meritless Falcon's contention that the district court improperly restricted his ability to plead his claim. '
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.