Case Name: Linda J. Heath TUMA, Claimant-Respondent, v. William J. KOSTERMAN, Fantasy Thoroughbred Farms, Employer, Defendant-Appellant
Court: Idaho Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Idaho
Decision Date: 1984-06-14
Citations: 106 Idaho 728
Docket Number: No. 14516
Parties: Linda J. Heath TUMA, Claimant-Respondent, v. William J. KOSTERMAN, Fantasy Thoroughbred Farms, Employer, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: BISTLINE and HUNTLEY, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Idaho Reports
Volume: 106
Pages: 728–735

Head Matter:
682 P.2d 1275
Linda J. Heath TUMA, Claimant-Respondent, v. William J. KOSTERMAN, Fantasy Thoroughbred Farms, Employer, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 14516.
Supreme Court of Idaho.
June 14, 1984.
Robert J. Insinger, of Risch, Goss, In-singer & Salladay, Boise, for defendant-appellant.
Ronald M. Morris, and Charles B. Bauer, of Lyons, Bohner, Chasan & Walton, Boise, for claimant-respondent.

Opinion:
DONALDSON, Chief Justice.
This case is an appeal from a ruling of the Idaho Industrial Commission on the sole issue of whether appellant (employer) may claim an exemption from liability under the Idaho Workmen's Compensation Act. Respondent (employee) was injured while on appellant's premises on September 29, 1980, and subsequently petitioned the Idaho Industrial Commission for compensation pursuant to the Workmen's Compensation Act. Appellant contended that he was exempted from liability on the following theories: (1) appellant's thoroughbred horse business was an exempt activity under I.C. § 72-212(8), as an agricultural pursuit; (2) respondent was an independent contractor as defined by I.C. § 72-102(13); and (3) respondent's employment was casual pursuant to I.C. § 72-212(2). Appellant appeals from the Industrial Commission's finding that he was not exempt from liability under the Workmen's Compensation Act, and thus was required to pay compensation to respondent. We affirm the order of the Industrial Commission.
Appellant owns and operates Fantasy Thoroughbred Farms. At the time of the hearing, thirty acres of the 110-acre farm were used to conduct a thoroughbred horse operation, with the remainder leased to third parties. Appellant had approximately sixty thoroughbred horses at his farm including stallions, brood mares, yearlings, and twenty to twenty-five horses used specifically for racing. He had been raising horses for approximately thirty years. Appellant testified that approximately 50% of the farm revenue stemmed from winning races with his horses, and the other 50% from the sale of horses that were not to be used in the racing operation. In addition to owning and conducting the thoroughbred business, appellant was employed full time at an outside venture.
To train horses for the racing circuit, it is first necessary to gallop them on a regular basis for several months before training begins. Before the time of the alleged accident, appellant had always sent his horses to professional trainers where the galloping service was performed. Appellant later decided he would begin galloping his horses on the farm. He contacted respondent to see if she would gallop his horses. It was decided that respondent would begin on September 29, 1980. Respondent would be paid $2 or $3 per gallop. Appellant apparently felt that respondent would initially be working on a trial basis. Respondent assumed that she would be working for a period of sixty days, the galloping time necessary before the horses' training would begin. She did assume, however, that appellant would terminate her if he was at any time dissatisfied with her work.
On September 29, 1980, respondent met appellant at the farm to begin galloping the horses. Appellant provided the equipment which was to be used, and then indicated what he knew about each horse respondent was to ride and gave her instructions on the use of the reins, the tightness of the reins, and the distance to be covered. Respondent then galloped each horse while appellant observed. While respondent was attempting to take the third horse to the oval track where it was to be galloped, the horse became skittish and fell over on respondent. She was injured during this incident, and it is for these injuries that she claimed compensation.
I.
We will first examine whether appellant's business was exempt from Workmen's Compensation Laws, under I.C. § 72-212(8), as an agricultural pursuit. An agricultural pursuit is specifically defined by the statute as "the raising or harvesting of any agricultural or horticultural commodity including the raising, pelting, shearing, feeding, caring for, training and management of livestock, bees, poultry and fur-bearing animals and wildlife raised in captivity, on inclosed lands and public ranges." Appellant is involved in the "raising, . feeding, caring for, training and management of" horses, which have been defined by this Court as livestock. While these activities arguably fall within the statutory definition of an "agricultural pursuit," our analysis does not end here.
In the recent case of Lesperance v. Cooper, 104 Idaho 792, 663 P.2d 1094 (1983), we summarized the principles that we have relied upon previously in determining whether an employer is engaged in an agricultural pursuit. We concluded that the trier of fact must look at the following factors: (1) "the general nature of the employer's business;" (2) "the traditional meaning of agriculture as the term is commonly understood;" and, (3) "that each business will be judged on its own unique characteristics." Id. at 794-95, 663 P.2d at 1096-97.
In Lesperance, we relied upon both the statutory definition of an agricultural pursuit, and the application of the three factors stated above, in reaching our decision that a cattle feed operation was an agricultural pursuit. Id. at 795, 663 P.2d at 1097. In conjunction with the statutory definition, we believe these three factors provide the necessary framework within which to completely analyze whether a specific business falls within the exemption.
In applying the first factor to the case at bar, we view the general nature of the employer's [appellant's] business to be both the sale and racing of thoroughbred horses. Indeed, appellant testified that approximately 50% of the farm revenue stemmed from winning races with his horses and the other 50% from the sale of horses. Thus, we cannot say that the "general nature" of appellant's business was primarily horse breeding. Rather, it appears that appellant's business was split equally between horse breeding and horse racing.
As to the second factor, the traditional meaning of agriculture may arguably include horse breeding, but, it can hardly include the training and racing of racehorses. We do not view horse racing as typical of an ordinary farmer, or in any way related to an agricultural purpose. Manning v. Win Her Stables, Inc., 91 Idaho 549, 428 P.2d 55 (1967).
In examining the third factor, the unique characteristics of the appellant's business, it is apparent that appellant is involved in two business activities, horse breeding and horse racing. Even assuming that horse breeding is an exempt activity, we do not view horseracing as an exempt activity. Rather, horse racing is a covered occupation. We have stated that "where the employer is engaged in both a covered occupation and an exempt occupation, a special employee employed to work exclusively in the covered occupation is covered." Hubble v. Perrault, 78 Idaho 448, 453, 304 P.2d 1092, 1094-95 (1956), quoted in Manning v. Win Her Stables, Inc., 91 Idaho 549, 553, 428 P.2d 55, 59 (1967); see also Kuhn v. Box Canyon Livestock, Inc., 102 Idaho 658, 660, 637 P.2d 1154, 1156 (1981); Goodson v. L.W. Hult Produce Co., 97 Idaho 264, 267, 543 P.2d 167, 170 (1975). Although horseracing may be related to horse breeding, it fairly can be said to constitute a separate enterprise. Because we have stated that horseracmg is a covered occupation, respondent who was employed to work exclusively in this enterprise, is also covered for purposes of workmen's compensation.
If the Court undertook a strict interpretation of the statutory language of I.C. § 72-212(8), we could conclude the challenged activity would be exempt from Workmen's Compensation coverage. However, in view of the factors enunciated in Lesperance, which necessarily guide our analysis, and their application to the present case, we cannot support a decision to grant an exemption. Furthermore, a discussion of the agricultural pursuit exemption is necessarily predicated upon the policies and purposes of Workmen's Compensation law.
"This court repeatedly has recognized the policy that 'there should be accorded to the Workmen's Compensation Act a broad and liberal construction, that doubtful cases should be resolved in favor of compensation, and that the humane purposes which these acts seek to serve leave no room for narrow technical construction.' . A necessary corollary to the realization of the humane purposes and promotion of justice within the workmen's compensation scheme is that all exemptions from coverage, including the one for agricultural pursuits, be construed narrowly."
Goodson, supra, at 266, 543 P.2d at 169 (citations omitted). In accordance with these policies, we are persuaded to affirm the decision of the Industrial Commission in denying an agricultural pursuit exemption to the appellant herein.
It appears that the Industrial Commission relied entirely upon Manning v. Win Her Stables, Inc., 91 Idaho 549, 428 P.2d 55 (1967), in reaching its decision to deny an exemption to appellant. While our holding therein is of assistance to us today, we do not rely solely upon Manning in reaching our decision. Although the Manning court acknowledged the legislature's definition of an agricultural pursuit, it appears that the court focused primarily upon the character of the claimant's specialized employment in reaching their decision. The Manning court stated that "only the character of respondent's [claimant's] specialized employment need be considered in determining whether he was engaged in an 'agricultural pursuit.' " Id. at 553, 428 P.2d at 59. We hold today that in order to reach a well-reasoned conclusion, the statutory language must be consulted in conjunction with the three factors set out in Lesperance, supra.
Nevertheless, our holding in Manning is conclusive as to a critical factor of the Lesperance framework — the traditional meaning of agriculture as the term is commonly understood. In Manning, we stated that the training of racehorses was "special work, not ordinarily done by farmers, that partook of a commercial character entirely separate and apart from an agricultural pursuit." 91 Idaho at 553, 428 P.2d at 59. Although it may be noted that the employer in the present case raised and trained his own horses exclusively, whereas the employer in Manning performed these services for others, a critical similarity exists between these cases. Both employers were involved in the same character of work — the care and training of racehorses, regardless of who owned them. Moreover, the Manning court did not specifically rely upon the fact that the employer therein was training horses for others in reaching its decision to deny the exemption. We rely in part upon the reasoning of Manning as discussed above. However, to the extent that Manning or earlier decisions of this Court are inconsistent with the views or approach as expressed herein, they are overruled.
II.
Appellant further urges this Court to find that respondent was an independent contractor as defined by I.C. § 72-102(13), and thus, exempt from Workmen's Compensation coverage.
The Industrial Commission correctly identified the test to determine whether or not a claimant was an independent contractor as the "right to control" test. See Ledesma v. Bergeson, 99 Idaho 555, 585 P.2d 965 (1978); Merrill v. Duffy Reed Construction Co., 82 Idaho 410, 353 P.2d 657 (1960); Pinson v. Minidoka Highway Dist., 61 Idaho 731, 106 P.2d 1020 (1940). Furthermore, the question of whether a particular person is an employee or an independent contractor is a question of fact. Larsen v. State, 106 Idaho 382, 679 P.2d 659 (1984); Taylor v. Blackwell Lumber Co., 37 Idaho 707, 218 P. 356 (1923). If the determinations of fact made by the Commission are supported by substantial competent evidence, those findings will not be disturbed on appeal. Larsen v. State, supra; Ford v. Bonner County School Dist., 101 Idaho 320, 612 P.2d 557 (1980); Sutherlin v. Grant, 99 Idaho 864, 590 P.2d 1010 (1979). We have reviewed the record, and the decision of the Industrial Commission is supported by substantial and competent evidence, and thus, we must affirm the Commission on this issue.
III.
Lastly, appellant contends that I.C. § 72-212(2) provides an exemption from coverage under Workmen's Compensation to all individuals engaged in casual employment, such as the respondent herein. The Industrial Commission correctly stated that casual employment includes only that employment which "arises occasionally or incidentally or which comes at uncertain times or at irregular intervals." Manning v. Win Her Stables, Inc., 91 Idaho 549, 554, 428 P.2d 55, 60 (1967) (quoting Wachtler v. Calnon, 90 Idaho 468, 471-72, 413 P.2d 449, 450 (1966)). On the issue of whether the employment in this case was casual, the Commission again determined the facts, and facts which are supported by substantial competent evidence, will not be disturbed on appeal. Larsen v. State, supra; Ford v. Bonner County School Dish, supra; Sutherlin v. Grant, supra. We have reviewed the record, and the decision of the Industrial Commission is supported by substantial and competent evidence, and thus, we must affirm the Commission on this issue.
On the undisputed facts of this case, we conclude that appellant should be denied an exemption on any of the three theories herein discussed. The decision of the Industrial Commission is affirmed.
Costs on appeal to respondent.
No attorney fees on appeal.
BISTLINE and HUNTLEY, JJ., concur.
. Meader v. Unemployment Compensation Div., 64 Idaho 716, 722, 136 P.2d 984, 990 (1943) ("livestock" includes more common forms of domesticated animals, "such as cattle, sheep, hogs and horses").
. The definition of an agricultural pursuit was then codified at I.C. § 72-105A. This codification essentially contains the precise language we are construing today.