Case Name: Tabor v. Sullivan et al.
Court: Colorado Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Colorado
Decision Date: 1888-12
Citations: 12 Colo. 136
Docket Number: 
Parties: Tabor v. Sullivan et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Colorado Reports
Volume: 12
Pages: 136–152

Head Matter:
Tabor v. Sullivan et al.
1. Uncompleted Contract by Tenants in Common to Convey a Definite Parcel of Land — Legal ' Effect of a Verdict of a Jury on Equitable Issues in Ejectment.— The eight locators of a mining claim, all owning undivided interests, agreed to convey a parcel thereof by metes and bounds to the owners of an adjoining location. Five of the grantors executed a deed, which had been prepared and left with a notary public, when a dispute arose about an alleged attempt of the grantees to stake off more ground than was embraced in the agreement. The remaining three owners declined to execute the deed, and nothing further was done under the contract, nor was the partially-executed deed delivered, but the same was allowed to remain uncalled for in the possession of the notary. About a year afterwards, being six months after the decease of the notary, the deed was searched for and found among the papers of the deceased notary by an attorney of one of the then owners of the adjoining location, and by his advice filed for record. Prior to its discovery the owners of the first-mentioned location, including those who had executed the unfinished deed, conveyed the entire lode as located to one F., who, a few days after said deed had been filed for record, conveyed the entire lode to the appellant, who went into possession, applied for and obtained a patent in his own name without opposition, and has ■ever since his entry conducted extensive mining operations upon the property. About a year after issue of the patent the appellees, claiming under the partially-executed deed, entered upon the parcel therein described, asserting title to seven-tenths thereof, when appellant brought the present action to eject them. Appellees set up in defense their equitable title by a cross-complaint. F., appellant’s immediate grantor, appeared and testified for the appellees, his testimony being that one of his grantors told him at the time of his purchase that a part of the ground (pointing it out) had been deeded away; that he had made an effort to find out who had signed the deed, and where it was, but could find no trace of it, and having ascertained that the title of record to the whole lode was in the names of the locators, he completed his purchase from them. No other tangible facts were shown to have been communicated to him concerning the matter; and, on cross-examination, he admitted that he was interested with the defendants (appellees) in the event of the suit, and that he had given the plaintiff no intimation of the former conveyance when selling to him. Further testimony showed that said deed was filed for record a few days prior to appellant’s purchase, although he had no actual knowledge of it, and never heard of the transaction until after his purchase. The whole case was submitted to the jury and a verdict returned for the appellees, and judgment rendered thereon. Held, that under the present practice, permitting a purely equitable defense to be set up to an action of ejectment, if such a cause be submitted to a jury, and a verdict, based on facts pertaining to the equitable issues involved, be returned for the defendant, such verdict is not absolutely binding on the court, but advisory only; and the chancellor may exercise great latitude in the consideration of the evidence received in support of such equitable issues.
2. Interested Witness Attempting to Defeat His Deed to Grantee—How Regarded.—The conduct of plaintiff’s immediate grantor, whose testimony was mainly relied on to defeat the plaintiff’s title, and who was interested with the defendants in the event of the suit, in attempting by his testimony to destroy the title he had conveyed to the plaintiff, justly subjects his testimony to suspicion, and greatly lessens its value as evidence for the defendants.
3. Unrecorded Deed — A Purchaser, Having, without Avail, Made Due Inquiries Concerning, Protected in Purchasing Recorded Title.— Conceding that the witness had sufficient information about the partially-executed deed at the time of his purchase to put him upon inquiry, having testified that he “made an effort to find out w»ho signed the deed and where it was, but found no trace of it,” the court will assume, under the circumstances, that he made the requisite investigation before completing his purchase. This inference is supported by the record as to the facts which an exhaustive investigation must have disclosed, viz., an agreement by all the owners of the parcel in controversy, and not a several agreement by each owner, to convey the entire parcel, and not undivided interests thereto; that the contract was never completed, nor the partially-executed deed ever delivered, nor its delivery ever requested by the grantees named therein; and that it is doubtful if there was a legal consideration to support the contract to convey. Such information would, in law, have justified the purchaser in assuming that the contract to convey had been abandoned, and he would have been warranted in purchasing from the owners of the recorded title.
4. The Title of Land Having Vested in an Innocent Purchaser Cannot be Subsequently Divested as to Him or His Grantees. F., being an innocent purchaser, and the legal title to the whole premises having vested in him, it could not be divested, as to the parcel in controversy, by the subsequent discovery and recording of an earlier conveyance thereof, and his grantee would be equally protected, although the earlier deed was on file at the time of the latter’s purchase.
Appeal from the District Court of Lahe County.
The appellant, Horace A. W. Tabor, brought suit in the district court of Lake county in July, 1881 against Dennis Sullivan, Peter Finnerty and Charles L. Hall, for the recovery of a small parcel of ground constituting the south end of the Matchless lode, situated in said county. The complaint was in form ejectment, alleging title in fee-simple and possession in the plaintiff to the whole lode as located and patented, and an illegal entry upon the parcel in controversy, and ouster of the plaintiff therefrom by the defendants. To the complaint was added a prayer for equitable relief, based on allegations that defendants were mining and carrying away valuable minerals, which acts the court was asked to. restrain by a temporary injunction.
The defendants answered the complaint, denying the alleged illegal entry and ouster, and filed a cross-complaint in which they admitted that plaintiff held the legal title to the entire lode by patent from the United States, setting up, however, an equitable title in themselves to seven-tenths of the parcel in controversy, as tenants in common with the plaintiff, and praying that plaintiff be decreed to convey said interest to the defendants.
The record in this case discloses that the Matchless lode claim was located on June 18, 1878, by the following-named persons, and that they severally claimed the undivided interests in the location attached to their respective names, to wit: Henry Smith one-sixth, Peter Starr one-sixth, John Brashear one-sixth, John Anderson one-tenth, Peter Owens one-tenth, John Garney one-tenth, William Malay one-tenth, and Peter Hughes one-tenth. A relocation certificate was filed July 8, 1878, by and in the names of the same parties, which claimed for them respectively the same undivided interests in the property as the original.
The foundation of appellees’ claim to the parcel of the lode in controversy was an agreement by the locators of the Matchless with the locators of the Dolphin lode claim (which latter claim adjoined the Matchless at its southern extremity) to convey to the Dolphin parties the .south fifty feet of the Matchless location. It was not a several agreement with the respective locators of the Matchless, wherein each one contracted to convey his undivided interest in the parcel to the Dolphin parties, but an entire contract whereby the owners of the Matchless location agreed to convey the parcel by metes and bounds to the owners of the Dolphin. A deed, bearing date August 21, 1878, was prepared and left with a notary public in Lead-ville to be executed by the Matchless owners, but it did 'not appear to correspond with the agreement, either as to the quantity of ground to be conveyed or as to the names of the grantees. Charles Davers and Jacob Hanseth were the locators of the Dolphin, but the deed as drawn named Nelson Hallock, Galatia Sprague and Peter Finnerty as the grantees, who, it appears, were negotiating to purchase the Dolphin. Five of the Matchless locators, however, had called at the office of the notary and executed it before any dispute concerning the matter arose, when some one reported that the stakes of the parcel were being placed so as to take more than fifty feet of ground. Thereupon the remaining three refused to sign the deed, and the agreement to convey was never completed. The names of those who had executed the deed were Brashear, Smith, Starr, Malay and Hughes, the aggregate of whose interests in the Matchless lode and in the parcel mentioned was the undivided seven-tenths.
In this unfinished condition the deed was allowed to remain in the possession of the notary. About six months thereafter he died. Other parties became interested in the Dolphin, among them Lewis Tappan, who, about one year after the making of the agreement mentioned, employed an attorney to examine the title of the Dolphin. He reported a slight conflict between the two locations, and in seeking for evidence to reconcile it learned of the existence of this deed, but no one knew what had become of it. He succeeded in finding it among the papers of the deceased notary, in an old safe owned and used by him in his life-time, and delivered it to Tappan, who by the attorney’s advice placed it on record, the date of its record being August 24, 1879, or one year and three days after its date. Prior to its being filed for record, Brashear, one of the persons who had executed it, conveyed his one-sixth interest in the entire Matchless lode as located to two persons by separate deeds, one-twelfth to each. The grantees were Peter Hughes, one of the original locators of the Matchless lode, and the other was one Edward Fitzgerald.
These deeds bear date March 8, 1879. Subsequently the remaining locators of the Matchless, together with Fitzgerald, conveyed the entire lode to one Tim Foley, their several deeds being recorded prior to the filing of the partially-executed deed above mentioned. On August 30, 1879, a few days after said deed was filed for record, Foley conveyed the entire lode claim to the appellant, Tabor. The appellant filed his deed for record on the same day, went into possession of the whole property, and commenced mining operations thereon. On January 19, 1880, he applied for a patent, and, no adverse claim being filed, he received a patent for the entire lode on June 30th following.
Afterwards, in May, 1881, Hallock and Sprague, two of the grantees of the parcel in controversy, conveyed all their interest therein to the appellee, Dennis Sullivan, and soon after Sullivan and Finnerty entered upon the parcel, claiming to own the undivided seven-tenths thereof, and commenced to work and mine the same, whereupon the appellant instituted the present action to eject them.
The material facts of this case will be found in the opinion of the court and in the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Elliott, but for convenience of reference the history of the case down to the commencement of suit has been arranged in the order of the occurrence of the principal facts.
Messrs. L. 0. Rockwell and J. D. Ward, for appellant.
Messrs. 0. Reed, J. B. Bedford, P. Wykoff and Patterson & Thomas, for appellees.

Opinion:
By the Court.
The first inquiry we deem it important to make relates to Eoley's knowledge of the unrecorded deed at the time of his purchase; but, in examining the evidence upon this subject, we must bear in mind two propositions, viz.: First. That though the action in its inception was ejectment, yet the pleadings admit the legal title to be in plaintiff. Defendants, by their cross-complaint, present a defense purely equitable in its nature, and the evidence in question was admissible only in connection with this equitable defense. Therefore, while the entire case was, against plaintiff's objection, submitted to the jury, and while the form of the verdict is that usually adopted in ejectment, yet in truth it is based upon findings of fact pertaining exclusively to equitable issues. Such findings are, under the present practice, not absolutely binding upon the court. They were in the case at bar merely advisory to the chancellor below, and this court is free to exercise great latitude in considering evidence received in support of the equitable issues involved, even though it may have been submitted to the jury. Second. That Eoley, whose testimony is mainly relied on to establish his knowledge of the unrecorded deed, is clearly shown by his own admission and other evidence to be interested on the side of defendants in the event of the suit. He was put upon the stand by them for the express purpose of attacking the title which he himself had previously conveyed to plaintiff. The latter's title to seven-tenths of the fifty feet in controversy is sought to be undermined and destroyed by showing that Foley had notice of the existence of the unrecorded deed, and therefore did not himself take an indefeasible title under the statute. Foley's position in the case, interested as he is with defendants, who are seeking to destroy the. title of his grantee, conveyed, as he himself acknowledges, without a word of notice or warning to such grantee, justly subjects his testimony to the suspicion of bias, warrants the most searching scrutiny, and greatly lessens its value as evidence for the defendants.
But what does Foley say as to his knowledge of the unrecorded deed at the time he purchased ? We quote a portion of his testimony: "Well, about the only thing that was said was that a piece of this ground had been deeded away,— pointed out the ground. Hughes was the man that did it. I don't think I understood as to whether it was stated that all or only a part [of the locators] had signed the deed. At that time I don't think there was anything said about it. I received a deed for the whole of the Matchless from the same parties after I had been told some portion of it had been deeded away. I took the deed for the entire ground, finding it all in their names. I never learned where this deed was. As to who signed it I have no knowledge at the present time. Whether that was mentioned or not I could not say. I have no recollection of Mr. Hughes saying anything about the deed being good or bad. I could not swear as to the circumstances under which it was made, either. I made an effort to find out who signed the deed, and where it was, but I did not find any trace of it."
Besides Foley's testimony the record contains the following (given by Starr, one of the Matchless locators, and also an interested witness, called by defendants): "Question. Well, give the substance of what you told him [Foley] as to whether you had given any of it away or not. Answer. I don't recollect. I could not say; hut I know I told him something with regard to that portion of the ground. I may have told him about having deeded it. I don't remember. I told him something about that portion we agreed to let Davers have. I didn't tell him about the circumstances under which we conveyed it."
It thus appears that Foley's information as to the existence of a prior valid conveyance covering fifty feet of the Matchless lode, and as to the character of such conveyance, if made, was extremely slender and unsatisfactory. But, conceding that it was • sufficient to put him upon inquiry, we must assume, for the purposes of the present controversy, that he made the requisite investigation. He says: "I made an effort to find out who signed the deed, and where it was, but I did not find any trace of it." The duty of showing the character of this "effort," and its sufficiency, if a doubt thereof existed, did not, in our judgment, devolve upon plaintiff. Under the circumstances, he might safely accept Foley's declaration in this regard. Moreover, were Foley the plaintiff, and undertaking to defend his own title, we are not prepared to say that this evidence would have been insufficient, especially coupled, as it should be, with matters we shall presently mention. But, considering the nature of the proceeding and attitude of the parties, it is clear that we should hold defendants' endeavor to destroy plaintiff's title by showing a want of good faith in Foley's purchase a failure.
The foregoing conclusion is rendered impregnable by a reference to the disclosures that must have followed the most exhaustive investigation by Foley. He would have learned that the agreement was an arrangement with all of the Matchless owners for the entire title to the strip of ground, not a several or individual agreement with them for their undivided interests therein; that three of the parties who were to have been grantors had positively refused to execute the deed, and that all effort to procure their signatures had been abandoned; that the grantees named in the instrument, had he succeeded in discovering who they were, never obtained or even requested its possession; that it had been lying for nearly a year in the safe of a notary public, who in the meantime had deceased, and that its whereabouts were forgotten by all the parties, except possibly Hallock. He would also have found strong evidence tending to show that there was no legal consideration for the instrument, and that there had been no legal delivery thereof by the five grantors who had signed it. With such information Foley would have been justified in -law in assuming that the agreement in pursuance of which the conveyance was attempted had been wholly canceled or abandoned by the parties.
But if Foley's title was good, plaintiff's title cannot be successfully challenged. It was immaterial to plaintiff that the deed under which defendants claim title had been recorded prior to his purchase. Foley being protected under the recording act at the time of his purchase, his title is not vitiated by the subsequent filing of the earlier conveyance, and his grantee is as fully protected as himself. Page v. Waring, 76 N. Y. 463, and cases cited; Wade, Notice, § 241.
It follows from the foregoing conclusions that plaintiff and defendants are not, and never have been, co-tenants as to the ground in controversy. For this reason it is unnecessary to discuss or determine the question whether joint tenants or tenants in common should adverse the proceedings for patent instituted by one co-tenant in his own name alone.
The deed on which defendants rely is further challenged upon the theory that it is wholly lacking in the two essential elements of consideration and delivery. In view of certain facts bearing upon these subjects that were established by uncontroverted testimony, and certain other facts shown by a strong preponderance of evidence, it may be that this challenge is well taken, especially in so far as it relates to the subject of delivery; but, having decided the case on another ground, we shall not prolong the opinion by passing upon the questions thus raised.
Judgment reversed.