Case Name: Sydney Leider, Appellant, v. Beth Israel Hospital Association, Respondent
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1962-04-05
Citations: 11 N.Y.2d 205
Docket Number: 
Parties: Sydney Leider, Appellant, v. Beth Israel Hospital Association, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 11
Pages: 205–210

Head Matter:
Sydney Leider, Appellant, v. Beth Israel Hospital Association, Respondent.
Argued February 19, 1962;
decided April 5, 1962.
Paul O’Dwyer, Howard N. Meyer and Francis X. Murtagh for appellant.
I. A binding agreement resulted when plaintiff accepted its offer of appointment pursuant to the terms of defendant’s offer set forth in the document defendant handed to him. (Hotchkiss v. National City Bank, 200 F. 287, 201 F. 664, 231 U. S. 50.) II. Defendant, having availed itself of the benefits of full performance on the part of Dr. Leider, cannot at this time repudiate or deny him its promised reward. (Rubin v. Dairymen’s League Co-op. Assn., 284 N. Y. 32; Grossman v. Schenker, 206 N. Y. 466; Willetts v. Sun Mut. Ins. Co., 45 N. Y. 45; Chard v. Ryan-Parker Constr. Co., 182 App. Div. 455; Miller v. McKenzie, 95 N. Y. 575; Van Campen v. Olean Gen. Hosp., 210 App. Div. 204, 239 N. Y. 615.) III. There is no basis in the facts or the law for summary judgment in favor of defendant. The undisputed facts dictate judgment in favor of plaintiff. (Matter of Marburg v. Cole, 286 N. Y. 202; Matter of Hecht v. Monaghan, 307 N. Y. 461; Matter of Wignall v. Fletcher, 303 N. Y. 435; Matter of Perpente v. Moss, 293 N. Y. 325; Matter of Fink v. Cole, 286 App. Div. 73; Findlay v. Board of Supervisors, 72 Ariz. 58; Bryant v. City of Lakeland, 158 Fla. 151; Jolmson v. City of Ripon, 259 Wis. 84; Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F. 2d 150; Matter of Barry v. O’Connell, 303 N. Y. 46; Matter of Alpert v. Board of Governors of City Hosp., 286 App. Div. 542.)
Robert Zicklin, Irving D. Liphowitz and I. Robert Harris for respondent.
I. In the ease of private institutions, in the absence of any contractual relationship or agreement to the contrary, the exclusion of a physician from staff privileges rests entirely in the discretion of the managing authorities. (Matter of Trapasso Oldsmobile [Italian Soc. of M. S. Cristoforo Colombo], 4 N Y 2d 133; Van Campen v. Olean Gen. Hosp., 210 App. Div. 204, 239 N. Y. 615; Matter of Alpert v. Board of Governors of City Hosp., 286 App. Div. 542; Johnson v. City of Ripon, 259 Wis. 84.) II. Assuming, arguendo, that defendant’s constitution and the by-laws of its medical board constituted a contract between the parties, it was either a contract at will and duly terminated by defendant, or a contract not to be completed before- the end of plaintiff’s lifetime and thus void under the Statute of Frauds. (Tyler v. Windels, 186 App. Div. 698, 227 N. Y. 589; Matter of Douglas v. Irving Trust Co., 169 Misc. 716, 256 App. Div. 1070.) III. Assuming, arguendo, that defendant’s board of trustees had approved plaintiff’s alleged contract, such contract would nevertheless be void, for the board of trustees of defendant, a membership corporation, does not have the power to bind defendant to such a contract. (Clifford v. Firemen’s Mut. Benefit Assn, of City of N. Y., 232 App. Div. 260, 259 N. Y. 547; Heaman v. Rowell Co., 261 N. Y. 229; Greaves v. American Inst, for Scientific Research, 114 Misc. 413.)

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
Consideration of the papers before us leaves no doubt as to the correctness of the decision, rendered below, granting summary judgment to the defendant dismissing the complaint and, in view of the comprehensive opinion at Special Term, we may be very brief.
The defendant hospital's constitution and the by-laws of its medical board, when road in context, indisputably establish that the plaintiff, a surgeon, has no vested right to the use of the hospital's facilities for the care and treatment of his private patients. More specifically, his successive annual appointments effected no contractual relationship with the defendant which prevented its board of trustees from terminating his member ship on its medical staff. His exclusion from the staff and the " off-service " privileges, incident to staff membership, including the privileges to care for private patients in the hospital, rested entirely in the discretion of the board of trustees. As the court at Special Term aptly noted, the by-law provision granting such " off-service " privileges to doctors " of the Hospital Staff " " cannot derogate from the right of the board of trustees to make annual appointments only, and can refer only to those physicians and surgeons whom the board * " * determines annually to reappoint to the hospital's medical staff ' off service ' after they have reached the age limits ' ' provided for by the hospital's constitution. Consequently, the denial to the plaintiff of future courtesy privileges following the termination of his annual employment constituted no legal wrong.
The judgment appealed from should be affirmed, with costs.