Case Name: Fuchs, Appellant, v. St. Louis et al.
Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1896-03-03
Citations: 133 Mo. 168
Docket Number: 
Parties: Fuchs, Appellant, v. St. Louis et al.
Judges: Bka.ce, O. J., and Robinson, J., concur. Macafblane, J., concurs in the result.
Reporter: Missouri Reports
Volume: 133
Pages: 168–205

Head Matter:
Fuchs, Appellant, v. St. Louis et al.
In Banc,
March 3, 1896.
1. Municipal Corporation: public sewer: negligence. A public sewer of the city of St. Louis exploded and killed the husband of plaintiff, who was in a building under which the sewer ran. The explosion occurred on the fourth day after a large fire at certain oil works. During the fire, a quantity of coal oil escaped from the works and was allowed to run into the sewer through improvised drains, made under directions of the chief of the city fire department. The time was summer. The outlet of the sewer was obstructed by a high stage of water in the river into which the sewer emptied. The coverings of direct openings into the open air from the sewer near the point of the explosion were not removed after the fire, nor were any other measures taken by the city to avoid the catastrophe. It might be inferred that the explosion was caused by gas generated in the sewer after the fire. In an action against the city and the company owning the oil works, it was held, in the circumstances stated in the opinion, that there was evidence of negligence on the part of the city, but none as to the oil company.
2. -: -: -. A city is liable for damage resulting from' the negligent management of its public sewers.
3. -: -: -. An explosion of a sewer underneath residence property is itself entitled to be considered as warranting an inference of some negligence. Res ipsa loquitur.
4. -: -: -: notice. Notice of facts may be inferred from lapse of time when they are of such a nature as to attract general public attention.
5. Ordinary Care. Ordinary care depends on the facts and cireum- . stances of each case. It is often an essential part of that care to guard against such occurrences as persons of ordinary prudence would reasonably anticipate in a given situation.
6. Negligence, Question of Fact, When. Where evidence fairly warrants an inference of negligence, it is for the triers of fact to find whether or not there was such negligence.
7. Scientific Facts: judicial notice. Courts take judicial notice of the scientific fact that gases form from volatile oils, upon subjection of the latter to heat.
Per Sherwood, J., Dissenting.
1. Municipal Corporation: license to construct sewer: duty TO KEEP SEWER IN GOOD ORDER: CONTRACT: EXPLOSION: DAMAGES. Where there is no evidence that a city, in consideration of a license to construct a sewer under a lot, Contracted with the owner of the lot and his assigns that it would keep the sewer in good order, so that the lot and any improvements that might be put thereon would be free from danger of injury on account of the sewer and the use thereof, no right arises out of contract that would render the city liable for injury to person or property by an explosion of gases in the sewer. (Per Sherwood, J.; Burgess and Kobinson, JJ., concurring.)
2. -: -: -: pleading: negligence. A petition in an action against a city for the death .of plaintiff’s husband, caused by the explosion of noxious gases in a sewer of the city, which fails to allege that it was the duty of the city to- keep the sewer free from noxious or dangerous gases or from fluids and substances that would generate such gases, states no negligence and no cause of action. IT).
3. Practice: pleading: appeal. The failure of a petition to state a cause of action may be taken advantage of in the trial court by objecting to the introduction of evidence, or the point may be raised for the first time in the appellate court. Ib.
4. Municipal Corporation: sewer: explosion: practice: demurrer. Where an explosion in a sewer causing the damage complained of is alleged to have been caused by gases produced from oils allowed to flow into the sewer, which gases were not permitted to escape, and the evidence showed that the oils escaping into the sewer did not produce gas at ordinary temperature, and the temperature of the sewer was not shown, a demurrer to the evidence was properly sustained. I b.
5. Pleading: practice: variance. Where gases are alleged as the cause of an explosion it can not be shown that it was caused by vapors. I b.
6. Damages: practice: evidence. Where an action is brought for damages which are caused by one of two things, for one of which defendant is responsible and for the other he is not, the plaintiff can not recover where he fails to show that the damages were produced by the former, or where it appears from the evidence that the probabilities are equally strong that the damages were caused by the one as by the other. I b.
7. City: explosion in sewer: pleading: practice. Where, in an action for damages alleged to have been caused by the explosion of gas in a sewer, it being charged that the gas was formed from oil that flowed into the sewer, the evidence showed that the conditions in the sewer were favorable to the formation of marsh gas by the decomposition of vegetable matter under water, or of sulphuretted hydrogen from the putrefaction of both animal and vegetable matter, and it is not shown whether the explosion was caused by the former or by either of the last two or a mixture of them, the plaintiff can not recover. Ib.
8. Negligence: pleading: practice: evidence. Where a particular act of negligence is specified as a cause of action, evidence will not be received to support a general allegation of negligence, but the plaintiff will be confined to the act of negligence specifically assigned. I b.
9. -: burden of proof. In an action for damages caused by negligence, the burden is on the plaintiff to establish by the evidence circumstances from which it may fairly be inferred that there is a reasonable probability that the damage resulted from the want of some precaution to which the defendant might and ought to have resorted, and, where there is no attempt to make such proof, the plaintiff can not recover. Ib.
10. -. It is not negligence to omit a precaution which, if taken, would have prevented an injury, when the injury could not reasonably have been anticipated, and would not, unless in exceptional circumstances, have happened. I b.
11. Municipal Corporation: public duty: sewer: negligence: damages. A city is, in the construction and maintenance of a sewer, engaged in the performance of a public sanitary duty for the public good, and not for its own private advantage or emolument, and, in such case, is not liable in damages for the wrongful or negligent acts of its officers and servants, unless made so by positive law or by inevitable implication. Ib.
12. Negligence: damages. An oil company can not be held liable for damages resulting from the turning of oils, running from its premises at the time of a fire, into a sewer, because it did not forbid the oils which ran into the streets and on the railroad tracks from being turned, by means of trenches, into the sewer, nor use force to prevent it from being done. Ib.
Appeal from St. Louis City Circuit Court. — Hon. D. D. Fisher, Judge.
Affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in PART.
LubJce & Muench for appellant.
(3 ) The Waters-Pierce Oil Company was properly joined as a defendant with the city under section 9, of article 15, of the scheme and charter (R. S. 1889, p. 2143). It is there provided that whenever the city is jointly liable for. a tortious act with another party who resides in this state that then such other party shall be made a codefendant.. And it is provided, further, that if ‘ ‘it is made to appear that any person or corporation ought to be joined as a defendant in the suit according to the provisions of this section,” and has not been so joined then “the plaintiff shall be nonsuited.” This charter provision is valid. Donoho v. Iron Works, 75 Mo. 401. (2) The state has recognized the business of handling petroleum and its products to be dangerous to human life and has put it under regulation by providing for the appointment of inspectors, commonly known as coal oil inspectors. These officials are required to give bond. The act declares certain things in connection with the business if done to be criminal and also declares penalties against the offenders. And for a neglect of duty by an inspector any party aggrieved is entitled to sue upon the inspector’s official bond. R. S. 1889, chap. 87, p. 1323; County Court to use v. Fassett, 65 Mo. 418. (3) When the safety of human life is in question a high degree of care is required in conducting a business in itself lawful. And when in that business pipes are used to carry oil, there is a constant duty of inspection so that the pipes may be kept in proper condition. Lee v. Oil Co., 54 Hun, 157. (4.) The chief of the fire department is an officer of the city designated by the charter and is the agent of the city in all matters connected with his department including the inspection of all buildings which are in the course of construction. He was bound to take notice of the dangerous character of petroleum and its products. The statute of the state regulating its sale alone gave him warning because he was bound to take notice of the public statutes of the state. Art. 11 of scheme and charter, R. S. 1889, p. 2134. (5) The evidence showed, that the sewer in question was maintained by the city in part for private purposes of its own, — that of draining the city hall, the Four Courts, and the jail. The case at bar, therefore, falls within the rule that the municipality is liable like any individual for the negligent use of its property. The city is liable for injuries inflicted by the fall of a market house if it was not built strong enough to withstand ordinary storms. Fieri v. City, 3 Mo. App. 231; 69 Mo. 341. Where a person was injured at a trap door in the sidewalk of a police station the city was held liable on the ground that it was bound to keep its sidewalk in a reasonably safe condition and also on the ground that the police station was its own property. Carrington v. City, 89 Mo. 212. (6) The duty of a city to keep its sewers in proper condition is a ministerial one and for its breach an action will lie at the instance of the injured party. 2 Dillon on Municipal Corporations [3 Ed.], sec. 1049, and cases cited. (7) If the sewer is negligently permitted to become obstructed or filled up so that it causes the water to back flow and fill up cellars connected with it the city will be liable to the parties injured. 2 Dillon Municipal Corporations [2 Ed.], sec. 1049. (8) A city is liable to the injured party for a back flow of water from a sewer which the city' has failed to keep unobstructed. Its duty in this regard is ministerial. Thurston v. St. Joseph, 51 Mo. 510. (9) There was sufficient evidence to connect the ■Waters-Pierce Oil Company as a principal with the wrong here complained of. That company owned the dangerous article and knew it was being carried off into the sewer for the better protection and preservation of the company’s other property. It received directly the benefit of the wrong done and is a joint tortfeasor with the city. Cooley on Torts [1 Ed.], p. 127,136; Canifexv. Chapman, 7 Mo. 175; Pagev. Freeman, 19 Mo. 421; Allred v. Bray, 41 Mo. 484; McManus v. Lee, 43 Mo. 20Q-,' Murphy v. Wilson, 44 Mo. 313.
W. C. Marshall for the city of St. Louis, respondent.
(1) Under the pleadings and evidence the plaintiff was properly nonsuited. The evidence fails to show any act of commissive or omissive negligence on the part of the city. (2) “The rule of law is well settled that .a municipal corporation is not liable in damages for the wrongful or negligent acts of its police or other officers in the execution of powers conferred upon the corporation or officers for the public good, and not for private corporate advantage, unless made liable by statute law, expressly or by implication. Armstrong v. Brunswick, IQ Mo. 319; Kiley v. City of Kansas, 87 Mo. 103; Dill. Mun. Corp. [3 Ed.], sec. 975; Murtaughv. St. Louis, 44 Mo. 479.” Carrington v. St. Louis, 89 Mo. 212. A sewer is constructed for the sanitary benefit of the whole people, and not for private corporate advantage, and the acts of the officers of, the city in charge of the construction or maintenance of a sewer can not cast a liability on the city. If such was the result of the establishment and maintenance of sewers, no city could afford sanitary protection to its inhabitants at such a price. (3) The case at bar comes rather within the doctrines announced by this court in jHeller v. Sedalia, 53 Mo. 159, and by the court of appeals, in McKenna v. St. Louis, 6 Mo. App. 320. (4) The establishment of sewers is exclusively for the promotion of the sanitary condition and health of the inhabitants, and is as much a governmental function as the establishment of a police force for the protection of life and property or the establishment of a fire department for the protection of property.
C. P. (& J. T>. Johnson for Waters-Pierce Oil Company, respondent.
(1) The instruction fora nonsuit in favor of the Waters-Pierce Oil Company was correct, because: First. There was no evidence that it was guilty of the negligence charged in the petition. Hudson v. Railroad, 115 Mo. 127; Sira v. Railroad, 85 Pa. St. 293; s. c., 27 Am. Rep. 653, and cases cited; Railroad v. Lock, 112 Ind. 404; Cooley on Torts [2 Ed.], p. 73. Second. It does not appear that the oil which was run into the sewer occasioned the explosion. (2) Section 9, of article 15, of the charter of the city of St. Louis, does not change the practice act with respect to non-suits, in cases brought against the city and another thereunder, as contended for by appellant.

Opinion:
DIVISION ONE.
Barclay, J.
This action was brought under the damage act (R. S. 1889, chap. 49, secs. 4426, 4427) to recover for the death of Mr. Carl E. Euchs. Plaintiff is his widow and charges that his death was occasioned by the wrongful act or neglect of the defendants, which charge the defendants deny. The defendants are the city of St. Louis and the Waters-Pierce Oil Company.
The case came to trial in the circuit court, in St. Louis. At the close of the testimony instructions were given to the effect that plaintiff could not recover against either defendant. Plaintiff took a nonsuit with leave, etc., and, having, without result, duly moved to set it aside, brought the case here by appeal, after the customary exceptions preserving her case for review.
The plaintiff's husband was killed by the explosion of a public sewer which was in the possession and control of the city. The question presented by this appeal is whether the facts tend to show a liability for that misfortune, as to either' one of the defendants.
Mr. Euchs had for many years owned a building on the east , side of Fourth street between Chouteau avenue and Convent street. In July, 1892, he occupied the lower floor and cellar of this building as a place of business, where he conducted a saloon. The house stood over a public sewer, built by tbe city, before he acquired the property in 1884. The house was built in that year.
The sewer was called the "Mill Creek Sewer." It was a large one, maintained by the city.' It was used to drain an extensive territory, as well as to carry off the surface water and sewage from the public buildings in the central part of the city, including the City Hall, the'"Four Courts," and the jail. The sewer extended from the west beneath and across Broadway (or Fifth street) and Fourth street, underneath and across Mr. Fuchs' lot, and thence eastwardly, a distance of about four blocks, to the Mississippi river, its outlet. The sewer was provided with several closely covered openings or manholes, which were available for ventilating it. Several of these manholes were located along the line of the sewer near the saloon property, one of them a short distance west of it. The sewer was about fourteen feet in diameter, had an arched top, and was built chiefly of masonry.
July 22nd, 1892, about noon, a fire broke out on the premises of the Waters-Pierce Oil Company, located some ten blocks west, and two or three blocks north, of the saloon. While the fire was in progress, and the city fire engines were throwing streams of water on the burning buildings, large quantities of oil and water ran from the premises of the Oil Company, and spread out among the railroad tracks adjoining. Then a gang of laborers, under direction of the Chief of the St. Louis Fire Department, dug a trench among the railroad tracks and by that means conducted the oil and water into a drain leading to the Mill Creek sewer. This oil was not burning at the time. The men who did this were not on the premises of the Oil Company, and no officer of that company present was seen or heard to give them any directions concerning the prosecution of the work, nor was it shown that the workmen were in the employ of the Oil Company. Nor was the sewer inlet, into which this oil was conducted, on the premises of the Oil Company. How much oil ran into the sewer does not clearly appear. But the amount was, at least, three or four hundred gallons.
Four days after the fire the explosion occurred, shortly after 4 p. m. The immediate cause was the act of an employe of a shop (not far from the saloon) who' went into a cellar in the course of his business, taking a lighted candle. As he approached the drain or sewer inlet, there was a puff of flame and an explosion which knocked him off his feet, stunned him and set fire to his clothes. He remembered nothing more for sometime thereafter; but another man near him took up the story at that point and testified that the big explosion (which demolished part of the saloon) occurred before you could count ten, after the mishap to the man with the candle. The final explosion made a noise like a cannon, as one witness described it. It tore open the top of the sewer for a long distance, blew out part of the saloon building, and killed the plaintiff's husband.
The drain opening into the cellar where the explosion originated connected with the Mill Creek sewer.
The presence of a large body of oil in the sewer at the time and place of the catastrophe was established by the testimony of a witness who was sitting at a table in the saloon with Mr. Fuchs when the explosion took place. This witness, an old riverman, was thrown into the sewer and struggled and swam in it a distance of several hundred feet, but was fortunate enough to escape alive. His positive evidence showed the presence of much coal oil gas in the sewer while he was in it.
There was evidence that the conflagration at the oil works was large and attracted general public attention.
A "gas engineer," of many years' experience in manufacturing gases from petroleum and its products, testified for plaintiff that crude petroleum, exposed to a temperature of sixty degrees Fahrenheit, in a confined space, gives off inflammable vapors or gases which will explode when brought into contact with flame; that naphtha is one of the first products of the distillation of crude petroleum and is lighter, and the like vapors will form from it speedier than from crude oil in the same temperature; that these vapors or gases are lighter than the air and rise, and, although not combustible spontaneously, will explode so soon as a flame comes in contact at any point with the gas.
The evidence also indicated that the outlet of the sewer at the river was stopped up, by reason of the high stage of water.
There was evidence to show that some of the large manholes or inlets to this sewer in the vicinity of the saloon were not opened after the oil ran into the sewer; and that the cover of a manhole in the street west of the saloon was thrown into the air by the explosion, and broken in pieces.
The death of the plaintiff's husband occurred, July 26th, 1892, the day of the disaster, and this suit was instituted on September 16th following.
The first question is whether the case should have gone to the jury on the issue of negligence on the part of the city.
Irrespective of any inquiry as to the capacity or construction of the sewer, it is settled law in Missouri that a city is liable for any omission of reasonable or ordinary care in the management of such a property.. What is ordinary care depends very greatly on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. In determining what care of property is reasonable, its situation and the objects of its use should be considered.
Here was a large sewer which ran under business buildings in a populous part of the city, and the sewer exploded in the circumstances described.
There is not, by the way, the slightest claim or suggestion of any negligence on the part of the deceased.
That a large body of inflammable oil had entered the sewer, because of the ñre át the oil works, was a fact which the jury might naturally have inferred the city had notice of, after a lapse of four days, as also of the high water in the Mississippi river at that time, preventing a free discharge of the contents of the sewer in that direction.
The fact that gases form from such oils, upon subjection of the latter to heat, is a matter of ordinary scientific knowledge, of which courts will take judicial notice. It was moreover testified to as a fact in the case before us.
In view of the conditions existing at the time of the disaster, what was the duty of the city; or, rather, what fair inferences may be drawn (from the fact of the explosion and its circumstances) as to the performance or nonperformance by the city of the duty of ordinary care toward its citizens living along the line of the sewer?
It is in evidence that the large vent or manhole in the street, just west of the saloon, was tightly covered during the four days from the fire to the explosion, and that when the latter occurred the iron cover of that opening, about three feet in diameter, was thrown a great distance by the force of the shock.
The time was summer — the latter part of July. Yet nothing whatever appears to have been done by the city authorities, so far as this evidence indicates, toward averting the effects likely to follow the escape of such a large body of volatile oils into a sewer whose natural outlet was obstructed by the high water in the river, as stated.
All the facts which made the sewer dangerous-might fairly have been found to be within the knowledge of the city officials, after the lapse of time following the fire. Vanderslice v. Philadelphia (1883) 103 Pa. St. 102.
Carefully managed sewers do not, according t'o-the common experience of men, usually blow up and scatter destruction and death. Such a performance is-of itself entitled to consideration, on the issue of care in respect of such property; or as some jurists have-said, "The thing itself speaks." Byrne v. Boadle (1863) 2 H. & C. 722; Koelsch v. Phila. Co. (1893) 152 Pa. St. 355 (25 Atl. Rep. 522); Judson v. Giant Powder Co. (1895) 107 Calif. 549 (29 L. R. A. 718, 40 Pac. Rep. 1020); Sheridan v. Foley (1895) (N. J. L.) 33 Atl. Rep. 484.
Had the cover of the large opening west of the saloon been removed, so as to allow the direct escape of the gas at that point, it may be that the disaster-would have been avoided. It was not removed; nor' do any steps appear to have been taken in regard te the care of the sewer by the city authorities after the flow of the oil into it on the 22d of July.
It is not always consistent with common prudence to await a catastrophe before taking precautions-against it. Nor is it conclusive of careful management, that a particular disaster has never before occurred. It is often an essential part of reasonable care to guard against those- performances which men of ordinary prudence would naturally and reasonably anticipate in dealing with such dangerous agencies as science has contributed to our complex civilization. To what extent such foresight is demanded by the duty to use ordinary care it would be very difficult to say. We shall not attempt to generalize on that topic now. And as the cause at bar should be brought to another -trial, we do not propose to go into any further comment on the facts than seems needful to indicate our general view as to their probative force and tendency.
It appears to us, on the testimony submitted, that it can not be declared as a conclusion of law that the city fully performed the full measure of its duty in respect of the sewer property; and hence that the learned trial judge erred in giving the instruction which denied plaintiff the right to go to the jury for a finding of fact as to the alleged negligence of the city. Lee v. Vacuum Oil Co. (1889) 54 Hun 156.
Touching the charge against the Oil Company, there is no evidence as to the origin of the fire at the works, nor any evidence of any want of care on the part of the company in regard to the flow of oil into the sewer. That flow was caused by the direction of the chief of the city fire department for the purpose of averting the danger of spreading the conflagration. The Oil Company was not responsible for that action on the facts shown, nor was it responsible for the care of the public sewer which exploded four days later.
We conclude that the ruling and finding as to the Oil Company should be affirmed; but as to the city the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.
Bka.ce, O. J., and Robinson, J., concur. Macafblane, J., concurs in the result.
IN BANC.
Per Curiam. — The foregoing opinion of Barclay, J., handed down in Division No. 1, is adopted as the opinion of the Court in Banc.
Brace, C. J., G-antt, and Macfarlane, JJ., concurring therein with him, Sherwood, Burgess, and Robinson, JJ., dissenting.
Accordingly the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed as to the Waters-Pierce Oil Company, and is reversed and remanded for new trial as to the city of St. Louis.