Case Name: Angelia K. MIEGER, Donald Mieger, and Angelia Mieger as Next Friend of Her Children, Arielle Mieger and Andrew Mieger, Appellants v. PEARL RIVER COUNTY, Mississippi, Appellee
Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2008-01-08
Citations: 986 So. 2d 1025
Docket Number: No. 2006-CA-01379-COA
Parties: Angelia K. MIEGER, Donald Mieger, and Angelia Mieger as Next Friend of Her Children, Arielle Mieger and Andrew Mieger, Appellants v. PEARL RIVER COUNTY, Mississippi, Appellee.
Judges: Before LEE, P.J., GRIFFIS and ISHEE, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 986
Pages: 1025–1031

Head Matter:
Angelia K. MIEGER, Donald Mieger, and Angelia Mieger as Next Friend of Her Children, Arielle Mieger and Andrew Mieger, Appellants v. PEARL RIVER COUNTY, Mississippi, Appellee.
No. 2006-CA-01379-COA.
Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
Jan. 8, 2008.
Rehearing Denied April 22, 2008.
Margaret Williams Holmes, Michael Clayton Barefield, Long Beach, for appellants.
James Lawrence Wilson, IV, for appel-lee.
Before LEE, P.J., GRIFFIS and ISHEE, JJ.

Opinion:
LEE, P.J.,
for the Court.
FACTS
¶ 1. On October 10, 2004, Angelia Mieger, a paramedic, responded to a call from the Pearl River County Sheriffs Department. The sheriffs department told her that they needed an ambulance nearby because of a standoff with a gunman. Mieger waited several blocks away until she was told the premises were secured. When she arrived at the scene, she attempted to help the suspect but noticed a strong smell and began to have trouble breathing. She noticed that the deputies were wearing gas masks to protect themselves from fumes released from what appeared to be tear gas cans. Mieger also alleges that she was beaten by the suspect while she was giving him medical attention.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2. Pursuant to the Mississippi Tort Claims Act Section (MTCA), Mississippi Code Annotated Section 11-46-11(1) (Rev. 2002), Mieger first sent a notice of claim to the president and clerk of the Pearl River County board of supervisors on November 80, 2004. On September 28, 2005, Mieger, along with her husband, Donald, and as next of Mend of her two minor children, filed a complaint in the Pearl River County Circuit Court against the Pearl River County Sheriffs Department and Jane/ John Does 1-20. The complaint alleged that Mieger suffered severe and permanent respiratory injuries as well as post-traumatic stress disorder and depression from the events on October 10, 2004. On March 15, 2006, the sheriffs department filed a motion to dismiss for failure to name a political subdivision as a party. Mieger filed a motion for leave , to amend the complaint on March 28, 2006, to correct the oversight of not naming Pearl River County as a defendant. Mieger asserted that the amended complaint, even though not timely filed, related back to the initial filing date and should be allowed. Mieger argues that appropriate representatives of the county were put on notice of the lawsuit when the notice of claim was sent and, thus, the county would not be prejudiced by the amendment. Finally, Mieger asserted that she should be allowed to substitute Pearl River County in the place of one of the fictitious parties named in the original complaint as John/ Jane Does 1-20. Following a hearing on the motion, the circuit court granted the sheriffs department's motion to dismiss on July 17, 2006.
¶ 8. Mieger now appeals asserting the following issues: (1) is a sheriffs department a governmental entity or political subdivision as defined in Mississippi Code Annotated Section 11 — 46—l(i), and (2) in the alternative, should Mieger have been given reasonable opportunity to amend her complaint to add Pearl River County as a defendant.
¶ 4. Finding that the trial court erred as to Issue II, we reverse and remand.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 5. A motion to dismiss under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) challenges the legal sufficiency of the complaint and raises an issue of law. T.M. v. Noblitt, 650 So.2d 1340, 1842 (Miss.1995); Taylor v. S. Farm Bureau Cas. Co., 954 So.2d 1045, 1047(¶ 3) (Miss.Ct.App.2007). This Court conducts de novo review on questions of law. Noblitt, 650 So.2d at 1342. When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the trial judge must accept the allegations in the complaint as true and the motion should not be granted unless it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the plaintiff will be unable to prove any set of facts in support of his claim. Id. The decision to grant or deny a motion to dismiss is in the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed on appeal unless that discretion is abused. State Indus., Inc. v. Hodges, 919 So.2d 943, 945(¶ 2) (Miss.2006).
DISCUSSION
I. IS A SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT A GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY OR POLITICAL SUBDIVISION AS DEFINED IN MISSISSIPPI CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 11-46-1®?
¶ 6. The trial court dismissed Mieger's complaint for failure to name a proper defendant under the MTCA as defined in Brown v. Thompson, 927 So.2d 733, 737(¶ 12) (Miss.2006). The supreme court held in Brown that a sheriffs department is not a political subdivision within the meaning of the MTCA and, thus, does not enjoy a separate legal existence under which it can be sued. Id. Therefore, the proper governmental entity to name as defendant in this suit was Pearl River County, not the Pearl River County Sheriffs Department, as the trial judge correctly found. Mieger concedes that the trial court's ruling was proper under Brown but urges this Court to reconsider the law on whether a sheriffs department is a political subdivision of the state.
¶ 7. Mieger argues that a sheriffs department is an instrumentality of the state, as contemplated in Section ll-46-l(i), and thus enjoys a separate legal existence. Mieger does not offer any specific argument as to why a sheriffs department is a separate governmental entity but simply states that "a sheriffs department is an integral part, an organ, of a county governmental system" and "must, respectfully, be considered an 'instrumentality thereof.' "
¶ 8. The supreme court in Brown reviewed the structural relationship between counties and sheriffs departments and concluded that a sheriffs department is not a separate instrumentality of the state. Brown, 927 So.2d at 737(¶ 12). As it is our duty to follow the precedent set by the supreme court, we find no need to discuss this issue any further.
¶ 9. We find Issue I to be without merit.
II. SHOULD MIEGER HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO AMEND HER COMPLAINT TO ADD PEARL RIVER COUNTY AS A DEFENDANT?
¶ 10. Mieger filed a motion for leave to amend her complaint to add Pearl River County as a defendant on March 27, 2006, well outside the 120 day period after the filing of the original complaint allowed in Rule 4(h) and after the expiration of the statute of limitations. Regardless of the time bar, Mieger argues that she should have been allowed to amend her complaint under the relation back doctrine in Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c). Pearl River County argues that relation back was unavailable under Rule 15 because the motion for leave to amend was not timely filed.
1f 11. Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) states:
Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading. An amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted relates back if the foregoing provision is satisfied and, within the period provided by Rule 4(h) for service of the summons and complaint, the party to be brought in by amendment:
(1) has received such notice of the institution of the action that the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining the party's defense on the merits, and
(2) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against the party. An amendment pursuant to Rule 9(h) is not an amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted and such amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading.
The parties do not dispute whether the amended claim arose from the same "conduct, transaction, or occurrence" as the original complaint. The remaining elements of Rule 15(c) ask whether the new party to be added by the amendment is served or put on notice before the expiration period provided for in Rule 4(h). M.R.C.P. 15(c) cmt.; Brown v. Winn-Dixie Montgomery, 669 So.2d 92, 96 (Miss.1996). Mieger argues that her motion to amend should be allowed because Pearl River County was put on notice of the claim when the president and board of supervisors were served with the notice of claim letter.
¶ 12. Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(6) states that service shall be made upon a county "by delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to the president or clerk of the board of supervisors." Mieger served the clerk of the board of supervisors with a notice of claim letter on November 30, 2004 — well before the expiration of the statute of limitations on February 7, 2006. We find that the notice of claim letter put the proper county official on notice that, except for the mistake of naming the wrong party, the action would have been brought against the county.
¶ 13. We find that the decision of the circuit court denying Mieger's motion for leave to amend her complaint was in error. The decision of the Pearl River County Circuit Court is reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶ 14. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PEARL RIVER COUNTY IS AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART FOR PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED EQUALLY TO THE APPELLANTS AND THE APPELLEE.
KING, C.J., MYERS, P.J., GRIFFIS, BARNES, ISHEE AND ROBERTS, JJ., CONCUR. CARLTON, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY IRVING AND CHANDLER, JJ.