Case Name: KAUFMAN ADVERTISING AGENCY v. SNELLENBURGH et al.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1904-04-13
Citations: 88 N.Y.S. 199
Docket Number: 
Parties: KAUFMAN ADVERTISING AGENCY v. SNELLENBURGH et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 88
Pages: 199–205

Head Matter:
(43 Misc. Rep. 317.)
KAUFMAN ADVERTISING AGENCY v. SNELLENBURGH et al.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Term.
April 13, 1904.)
1. Work and Labor—Quantum Meruit—Gratuitous Services.
Where plaintiff agreed to procure the publication of certain “write-ups” concerning defendants’ business in consideration of the defendants agreeing to place their subsequent advertising for a particular period through plaintiff’s agency, for which plaintiff was to .receive ho compensation other than prestige in his business, and defendants breached the contract by placing their advertising through others, plaintiff was not entitled to recover the reasonable value of his services in preparing and publishing the “write-ups” on a quantum meruit, in the absence of an allegation and proof that plaintiff would have gained prestige in his business, or that such prestige, if obtained, would have been valuable to plaintiff.
2. Same—Instructions.
In an action on a quantum meruit for services performed, an instruction that plaintiff is entitled to recover for any services performed for defendants’ benefit, but that, before plaintiff could recover anything for services, he must show that such services would have been a benefit to defendants, was erroneous, as withdrawing from the jury every question except that of benefit to the defendants.
3. Same.
An instruction, in a suit on a quantum meruit, that, if the jury believed plaintiff was entitled to recover for any services he performed which were of value to the defendants, the jury might give him any sum which they considered fair and reasonable, not exceeding the amount sued for, was erroneous in failing to limit the recovery to the reasonable value of the services.
Appeal from City Court of New York. Trial Term.
Action by the Kaufman Advertising Agency against Nathan Snellenburgh and others. From a City Court judgment in tavor of plaintiff, and from an order denying defendants’ motion for a new trial, they appeal. Reversed.
Argued before FREEDMAN, P. J., and GIEGERICH and McCALL, JJ.
Wellman & Gooch, for appellants.
Jacoby & Dalberg, for respondent.

Opinion:
McCALL, J.
The complaint in this action sets forth, in substance, engage the plaintiff and the defendants entered into an agreement by the terms of which the plaintiff agreed to prepare and cause to be inserted in several of the newspapers of this city notices of the defendants' business enterprise, which notices are known as "write-ups"; that it was also agreed between the parties that, in consideration of the plaintiff preparing and procuring the publication of said "write-ups" the defendants would place all the advertisements that they might thereafter decide to insert in any newspapers published in this city .through the medium of the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff would place such advertisements in said newspapers at the exact cost charged by said newspapers therefor, the consideration of so placing the advertisements was to be "the prestige that the plaintiff would obtain" by reason of the placing of the advertisements as aforesaid. In the opening of plaintiff's counsel to the jury in stating the claim of the plaintiff he said:
"In other words, the benefit which the plaintiff was to receive for the labor of preparing and securing the insertion of the 'write-ups' was not to be money, but was to be the placing of the important advertising business of the defendants. The benefit to the plaintiff from this would be obvious. It would6 be the prestige of handling the important advertising business of the defendants for a period of six months. The plaintiff would get no money out of this transaction, but simply the benefit of its business on account of the prestige of handling this vast amount of advertising."
The breach of this contract was alleged to be the refusal of the defendants; after the plaintiff had prepared and obtained the insertion of the "write-ups," to allow the plaintiff to place its subsequent advertising. Plaintiff claimed that by defendants' refusal as aforesaid it was entitled to recover the value of the services in "writing up" the defendants' business. The theory of the plaintiff is that, notwithstanding the agreement upon its part that its services to defendants should be rendered gratuitously, and that it was to receive no compensation "other than prestige" if it had been allowed to fully perform its contract, the defendants having been guilty of a breach of the contract, the plaintiff can recover for the work actually done before such breach; and this not upon the contract itself, but upon a quantum meruit for the reasonable value of the services actually rendered. The plaintiff has furnished us with no authority in support of such a proposition. The cases relied upon and cited, by the plaintiff simply hold that when a person renders services to another, to be paid for, not in money, but in goods or some other thing, and the person for whom the services are rendered refuses to fulfill the contract, an action can be maintained for the services rendered. Those cases do not apply. The alleged contract on the part of the plaintiff herein was simply an agreement on plaintiff's part to do certain work for the defendants for nothing in consideration of being allowed to do certain other work for nothing. A right of action upon a quantum meruit presupposes an express or implied promise to pay for the services rendered; but the plaintiff's action cannot be maintained upon that theory, for not only has he not set up a quantum meruit, but the agreement which he does set forth expressly precludes the theory that there was any promise to pay for the services, and alleges that such services were to be rendered gratuitously. There is neither allegation nor proof that plaintiff would have gained prestige in his business, or that such prestige, if obtained, would have been valuable to it had it been allowed to place the defendants' advertisements. The agreement on the part of the plaintiff to perform all the services called for by the contract without compensation extended to every portion of such work, and the only consideration for the contract was the prestige derived from the performing of such services; and, in the absence of allegation and proof that such prestige would have been gained, and was of value, the plaintiff cannot recover.
Judgment and order reversed, and new trial ordered, with costs to the appellants to abide the event.