Case Name: STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Lauri A. ELLIS, Respondent
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1997-05-22
Citations: 722 So. 2d 824
Docket Number: No. 96-3143
Parties: STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Lauri A. ELLIS, Respondent.
Judges: MICKLE, J. concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 722
Pages: 824–830

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Lauri A. ELLIS, Respondent.
No. 96-3143.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
May 22, 1997.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Stephen R. White, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Petitioner.
James T. Miller of Corse, Bell & Miller, P.A., Jacksonville, for Respondent.

Opinion:
ALLEN, J.
The petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari, challenging the trial court's determination that section 837.011(3), Florida Statutes, is unconstitutional in describing the issue of materiality in a perjury prosecution as a "question of law" so as to remove the issue from the jury. We conclude that this determination was based on a proper application of United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 115 S.Ct. 2310, 132 L.Ed.2d 444 (1995).
In Gaudin the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of materiality under a federal statute involving false statements, and ruled that because materiality was an element of the crime the defendant was entitled to have the issue submitted to the jury. Gaudin was predicated on the defendant's Fifth Amendment right to due process, and Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, under the United States Constitution. These protections are applicable to the states, see Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993), and the constitutionality of section 837.011(3) therefore must be assessed in light of Gau-din.
The petitioner asserts that materiality is not an element of the perjury prosecution in the present case, which was pursued under section 837.02, Florida Statutes. However, Florida eases have acknowledged that materiality is an element of the crime of perjury, e.g., Hirsch v. State, 279 So.2d 866 (Fla.1973), and section 837.02(1) expressly provides that:
Whoever makes a false statement, which he does not believe to be true, under oath in an official proceeding in regard to any material matter shall be guilty of a felony....
It is clear that materiality is an element of the crime in this case, and Gaudin thus supersedes decisions such as Kline v. State, 444 So.2d 1102 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 451 So.2d 849 (Fla.1984), which permitted the issue to be withdrawn from the jury. Although section 837.011(3) provides a definition of materiality in such prosecutions, and states that whether a matter is "material in a given factual situation is a question of law," this recitation cannot serve to remove the issue from the jury in light of the ruling in Gaudin. The trial court correctly determined that section 837.011(3) is unconstitutional in this respect, and properly indicated that the issue of materiality in this case would be submitted to the jury.
The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.
MICKLE, J. concurs.
MINER, J., dissents with written opinion.