Case Name: Epifanio LOPEZ, Jr., Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
Court: Texas Courts of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1990-08-31
Citations: 797 S.W.2d 272
Docket Number: No. 13-89-447-CV
Parties: Epifanio LOPEZ, Jr., Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
Judges: Before NYE, C.J., and BENAVIDES and KENNEDY, JJ.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 797
Pages: 272–275

Head Matter:
Epifanio LOPEZ, Jr., Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
No. 13-89-447-CV.
Court of Appeals of Texas, Corpus Christi.
Aug. 31, 1990.
Rehearing Overruled Oct. 4, 1990.
Fred Turner, Port Lavaca, for appellant.
Mark R. Kelly, Crim. Dist. Atty., Port Lavaca, for appellee.
Before NYE, C.J., and BENAVIDES and KENNEDY, JJ.

Opinion:
OPINION
BENAVIDES, Justice.
The trial court ordered $11,000 cash which had been seized from appellant forfeited to the Calhoun County Sheriff's Dept, under the Texas Controlled Substances Act, Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann.- art. 4476-15 § 5.07 (Vernon 1976) . Appellant raises two points, the first asserting that the State failed to set a hearing within thirty days, and the second challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment. We reverse the trial court's judgment.
By point one, appellant complains that the State did not secure a setting for the forfeiture hearing within thirty days of the defendant's answer, claiming that § 5.07(a) requires it. The State contests appellant's standing and, alternatively, argues that the language in that section is directory rather than mandatory.
The State's Original Notice of Seizure and Intention to Forfeit alleged that appellant "may claim a right to ownership or possession of the property the subject of this suit." It alleged that D.P.S. Officer Bryon K. Prall seized the $11,000 after discovering it during a consent search of a vehicle appellant operated. The only theory alleged to support the forfeiture was that the money was used in violation of art. 4476-15.
Appellant filed a general denial on May 30,1989. On July 5,1989, appellant filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to § 5.07(a) of art. 4476-15 and requested a return of the money. Thereafter, the State immediately had the case set for July 6, 1989. Thus, no setting had been obtained within the thirty days after appellant filed his answer. Section 5.07(a) instructs, "If an answer is filed, a time for hearing on forfeiture shall be set within 30 days of filing the an-swer_" (emphasis added).
Although older authorities are split on whether the shall is directory or mandatory , we are persuaded by the action of our Supreme Court in denying writ in State v. $4097 in U.S. Currency, 773 S.W.2d 674, 676 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1989, writ denied). That case squarely held the thirty-day limitation for obtaining a setting mandatory (even though the State had requested a setting before the thirty days elapsed). The record in this case does not show any attempt by the State to have the case set until after the thirty days had elapsed and the defendant had filed his motion to dismiss. We are also mindful of the due process rights of property owners. We hold that the shall as used in § 5.07(a) is mandatory, and conclude that since the time had expired, the hearing was illegally set and held. In the most recent case found, the El Paso Court of Appeals has also followed the reasoning of $4097 in U.S. Currency, holding the provision that the State must obtain a setting within 30 days of the answer date is mandatory. State v. One 1986 Nissan, No. 08-89-3241-CV (Tex.App.—El Paso, June 27,1990) (not yet reported). The date selected is left to the court. There is no requirement that the hearing be held, but it must be set within 30 days of the answer date.
At the hearing and although the State had never pleaded entitlement to the money under a claim of abandonment, the State presented evidence in support of the position that appellant had abandoned the seized money. On appeal, the State contends that appellant lacked standing to contest the forfeiture based on the alleged abandonment. However, the State did not raise the issue of abandonment until the hearing, at which point it was too late.
Under Texas law, abandonment is a fact question. City of Anson v. Arnett, 250 S.W.2d 450, 454 (Tex.Civ.App.— Eastland 1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Abandonment is an owner's relinquishment of a right with the intention to forsake and desert it. Texas Water Rights Comm'n v. Wright, 464 S.W.2d 642, 646 (Tex.1971). One who relies on abandonment has the burden of establishing it. Huffington v. Upchurch, 532 S.W.2d 576, 579 (Tex.1976). The evidence of abandonment developed during the illegal hearing will not support a judgment which should not have been rendered. We overrule point one.
Because we have determined that the hearing was improper, we need not review the evidence and will not address point two. Tex.R.App.P. 90(a). We REVERSE the trial court's judgment and RENDER that the money be returned to appellant.
NYE, C.J., files a dissenting opinion.
. The Texas Controlled Substances Act is now partly repealed and partly recodified at Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.151 et seq. (Vernon Pamph.1990). However, Acts 1989, 71st Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 12, § 6, eff. Oct. 18, 1989, repealed § 481.157(a)-(d), the old forfeiture hearing provisions. The new forfeiture provisions effective Oct. 18, 1989 are contained in Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 59.01 et seq. (Vernon Supp.1990), and do not now contain the 30-day hearing provision. The old provisions are applicable to this case.
. See Clark v. State, 693 S.W.2d 23, 24 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1985, no writ) (§ 5.07(a) mandated matter be set, but not actually heard); State v. Boren, 654 S.W.2d 547, 549 (Tex.App.—Waco 1983, no writ) (§ 5.07(a) directed a hearing to be held, not just set); State v. Cherry, 387 S.W.2d 149, 152 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1965, no writ) (provisions for immediate filing and for hearing within thirty days of answer are directory); McKee v. State, 318 S.W.2d 113, 117 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1958, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (provision for hearing forfeiture within thirty days of answer directory); State v. One 1977 Oldsmobile, 700 S.W.2d 33, 36 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 715 S.W.2d 641 (Tex.1986) (shall is mandatory in § 5.07(d)); State v. Three Thousand Five Hundred Dollars (S3,500.00) Lawful Currency, 693 S.W.2d 574, 575 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1985, no writ) (filing limitation is mandatory under § 5.05(a)).
. This view favors a strict construction of the forfeiture statute and also comports with our interpretation of shall in § 5.05(a) in State v. Garza, 760 S.W.2d 734, 734-35 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 783 S.W.2d 198 (Tex.1989). Garza held that failure to institute proceedings within thirty days of the seizure barred the State's forfeiture action. The Supreme Court reversed because Garza counted the thirty days from the time the DEA agents seized the property rather than from the time the State took possession of it.