Case Name: Before State Industrial Commission, Respondent. In the Matter of the Claim of Angelina Solomone, Respondent, for Compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Law, for the Death of Her Husband, Leonardo Solomone, v. Degnon Contracting Company, Employer and Self-Insurer
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1920-11-18
Citations: 194 A.D. 50
Docket Number: 
Parties: Before State Industrial Commission, Respondent. In the Matter of the Claim of Angelina Solomone, Respondent, for Compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Law, for the Death of Her Husband, Leonardo Solomone, v. Degnon Contracting Company, Employer and Self-Insurer.
Judges: 
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 194
Pages: 50–57

Head Matter:
Before State Industrial Commission, Respondent. In the Matter of the Claim of Angelina Solomone, Respondent, for Compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Law, for the Death of Her Husband, Leonardo Solomone, v. Degnon Contracting Company, Employer and Self-Insurer.
Third Department,
November 18, 1920.
Workmen’s Compensation Law — settlement by injured employee without consent of employer with third person liable for injury — effect on right of dependents — dependents chargeable with any money actually coming to their possession from settlement.
The settlement by an injured employee with a third person whose negligence was responsible for the injury without the consent of his employer does not destroy the claim of his dependents after his death for compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Law.
Section 29 of the statute bestows upon the dependents of a deceased employee a cause of action independent of any cause of action which existed at common law or by any other statute. Such cause of action is not derived from any right or benefit which existed in favor of the injured employee, but springs into existence as an original right at his death under conditions making the statute applicable and the employer liable.
Accordingly dependents are not chargeable with any money which was paid to the deceased by a third person and which they have not received.
The claimant, the widow of deceased, should be charged with the amount actually received by her from the settlement between her husband and the third person and the employer given credit therefor.
Kilby, J., dissents in part, with opinion.
Appeal by the defendant, Degnon Contracting Company, from an award and order of the State Industrial Commission, entered in the New York office of said Commission on the 10th day of December, 1919.
Frederick J. Flynn [R. A. Mansfield Hobbs of counsel], for the appellant.
Charles D. Newton, Attorney-General [E. C. Aiken, Deputy Attorney-General, and Bernard L. Shientag, counsel to State Industrial Commission, of counsel], for the -respondents.

Opinion:
Cochrane, J.:
The husband of the claimant while in the course of his employment was injured on May 7, 1918, through the negligence of a third party. He recovered a judgment against that party for $30,000 which he settled for $7,500 without the consent of his employer, which consent was required by section 29 of the Workmen's Compensation Law (as amd. by Laws of 1917, chap. 705). Thereafter, and on January 22, 1919, he died, admittedly in consequence of his said injury. His widow makes a claim herein in behalf of herself and her children which claim has been recognized by the Commission and an award made in their behalf against the employer who appeals therefrom.
The settlement of the judgment by the employee did not affect his claim against his employer except as to the amount received on such settlement. (Matter of Woodward v. Conklin & Son, Inc., 171 App. Div. 736.) A settlement by the claimant herself with the third party would not affect her claim against the employer, except as to the amount received by her on such settlement. (Matter of Malta v. Dennings Point Brick Works, 224 N. Y. 596.) It necessarily follows that the settlement by the employee in his lifetime did not'destroy the claim of his dependents after his death.
It remains to be considered whether the amount received by the employee on such settlement should be applied against the claim of his dependents. Said section 29 bestows upon them- a cause of action independent of any cause of action which existed at common law or by any other statute. Such cause of action is not derived from any right or benefit which existed in favor of the injured employee, but springs into existence as an original right at his death under conditions making the statute applicable and the employer hable. That was substantially held in Travelers Insurance Co. v. Padula Co. (224 N. Y. 397). It follows that the dependents are not chargeable with what they have not received.
It appears, however, that some of the money paid on the settlement of the judgment is now in the possession of the claimant. Such portion as may have been used or expended by her husband is not to any extent chargeable against her but she should be charged to the extent of the money paid on the judgment and which she has actually received. This is on the principle of " subrogation to remedies of employees " given by said section 29. The statute makes the employer liable for " the deficiency, if any, between the amount of the recovery against such other person actually collected, and the compensation provided or estimated by this chapter for such case." As applied to the widow and children the question is not how much has been actually collected by the employee but how much has been actually collected by them. This principle was applied by this court in Dietz v. Solomonwitz (179 App. Div. 560) and counsel for the Commission concedes that the amount received by the widow herein should be credited to the employer. That has not been done. There is some uncertainty in the record as to the correct amount which the claimant has received, and the proceeding must, therefore, be remitted to the Commission to determine that amount and to make the proper application thereof in favor of the employer.
The award should, therefore, be reversed and the matter remitted to the Commission.
All concur, Kiley, J., with separate opinion.