Case Name: PEOPLE v. PAYNE
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1969-06-25
Citations: 18 Mich. App. 42
Docket Number: Docket No. 4,719
Parties: PEOPLE v. PAYNE
Judges: Before: Quinn, P. J. and Holbrook and T. M. Burns, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 18
Pages: 42–58

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v. PAYNE
Opinion of the Court
1. Criminal Law — Sentence—Increased Sentence — Constitutional Law.
Imposition of an increased sentence upon conviction after a new trial, where the circumstances are the same as in the prior proceeding and the record does not show grounds supporting the increase, infringes on the constitutional right of appeal.
2. Criminal Law — Sentence—Increased Sentence.
Judgment of trial court sentencing defendant to 25 to 50 years’ imprisonment on conviction of assault with intent to commit murder, when previously defendant had pled guilty before a different judge to the same charge and received a shorter sentence, held, proper, where the trial court heard details of the crime, was able to observe and judge the defendant and increased his sentence, not as a punitive measure against defendant for appealing, but because of the nature of the offense and the court’s impression of the defendant (CL 1948, § 750.83).
3. Appeal and Error — Punishment—Statute.
The Court of Appeals does not have supervisory control over punishment imposed for crime which is within the provisions of the statute providing for punishment.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1, 2, 4-6] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 570, 572.
21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 536, 538.
5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 938.
21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 533, 545.
Dissenting Opinion
T. M. Burns, J.
4. Criminal Law — Sentence—Increased Sentence.
Increasing the sentence of a criminal defendant, convicted on his plea of guilty to assault with intent to commit murder, from a term of 19 to 40 years to a term of 25 to 50 years after he had successfully appealed and was granted a new trial, where the record does not show anything that could he legitimately taken into consideration in sentencing which was not known to the judge at the original proceeding, and after the defendant had already served almost five years, results in cm erroneous denial of credit for time served and infringes upon the constitutional right of appeal (CL 1948, § 750.88; CLS 1961, § 769.11a).
5. Criminal Law — Sentence—Increased Sentence.
After appeal or post-conviction proceeding has resulted in retrial for errors other than erroneous sentence and defendant has heen reconvicted, no harsher sentence may he given than that originally imposed and defendant, if the sentence is incarceration, may not he sentenced to a term longer than the time to he served upon Ms initial sentence.
6. Criminal Law — Sentence—Increased Sentence.
Imposition of a greater sentence without practical credit for time served, on retrial of a criminal defendant who has vindicated his constitutional rights by exercising the right of appeal forces defendant, whose constitutional rights had been violated in a way which resulted in an invalid conviction, to suffer this violation for fear that on retrial he would receive an even greater penalty, a price which cannot be exacted for invocation of a right.
Appeal from Berrien, Chester J. Byrns, J.
Submitted Division 3 April 10, 1969, at Grand Rapids.
(Docket No. 4,719.)
Decided June 25, 1969.
Leave to appeal granted January 21, 1970.
See 383 Mich 760.
Leroy Payne was sentenced to 19 to 40 years’ imprisonment on his plea of guilty to a charge of assault with intent to commit murder. Upon new trial, defendant was again convicted of the offense and sentenced to 25 to 50 years’ imprison ment with credit for time already served. Defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, and John T. Hammond, Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Philip A. Brown, for defendant.
Before: Quinn, P. J. and Holbrook and T. M. Burns, JJ.

Opinion:
Quinn, P. J.
December 14,1962, defendant, represented by counsel, pleaded guilty to a charge of assault with intent to commit murder, CL 1948, § 750-.83 (Stat Ann 1962 Kev § 28.278). Thereafter, defendant was sentenced to prison for a term of 19 to 40 years. Judge Hadsell presided at the plea and sentence. Judge Hadsell's term of office expired January 1, 1967 and he was replaced by Judge Byrns. 378 Mich (v).
Following a remand from the Court of Appeals for that purpose, a hearing was held June 15, 1967 to determine the voluntariness of confessions, admissions and statements against interest made by defendant prior to his plea. As a result of the hearing, the trial court suppressed all confessions, admissions and statements against interest, set aside the plea, vacated sentence and remanded the ease for preliminary examination.
At the conclusion of the examination, defendant was bound over for trial. His motion for change of venue was granted, and he was tried before Judge Byrns and a jury in Kent county. August 24, 1967, the jury returned a verdict of guilty as charged. Thereafter defendant was sentenced to prison for a term of 25 to 50 years, with credit for time already served. His appeal raises 5 issues, 4 of which do not merit discussion.
Defendant contends it was reversible error for Judge Byrns to impose a more severe sentence than did Judge Hadsell. In People v. Poole (1967), 7 Mich App 237, this Court held such action was not error. In People v. Mulier (1968), 12 Mich App 28, this Court held such action was reversible error. The eases are not in conflict, however; factual differences permit each pronouncement to stand without encroaching on the other. In Poole, a different judge imposed the harsher sentence and reason for such action appeared in the record. In Mulier, the same judge imposed the harsher sentence for no reason apparent on the record. The distinction is noted in Mulier at page 33:
"To allow the imposition of a harsher sentence after a rehearing, where the offense, the plea, and the sentencing judge are the same as in the prior proceeding and the record is barren of any grounds tending to support the harsher sentence, unduly infringes upon the constitutional right of appeal."
This case of Payne is stronger than Poole, supra. In Poole, both convictions were by plea. In Payne, the first conviction was by plea and the second was by jury verdict. A trial affords more opportunity to hear all details, to observe and judge a defendant than does a summary plea proceeding, a fact noted by Judge Byrns. The trial judge noted the right of every citizen to seek appellate relief and the fact that obtaining such relief should in no way affect a subsequent sentence. The trial judge then stated that the sentence he was about to impose was not because defendant had appealed but by reason of the nature of the crime and impressions formed of defendant during 3 days of trial. The trial judge noted that the statute under which de fendant was convicted authorized a life sentence or any term of years, and except for defendant's past history (poor family background, good school, service and prison records), a life sentence would have been imposed.
On this record, we conclude that we do not have supervisory control over punishment within the provisions of the statute, Poole, supra, and that Mulier, supra, is inapplicable.
Affirmed.
Holbrook, J., concurred.
Addendum July 10, 1969:
Since the majority opinion and the dissent were written, the United States Supreme Court has decided North Carolina v. Pearce and Simpson v. Rice (1969), 395 US 711 (89 S Ct 2072, 23 L Ed 2d 656). A revised dissent has been filed citing these decisions as supporting the position expressed in the dissent. These same authorities are incorporated by reference in the majority opinion as supporting authority.