Case Name: George E. Crow, Appellant, v. W. H. Brown et al., Appellees
Court: Iowa Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Iowa
Decision Date: 1890-10-24
Citations: 81 Iowa 344
Docket Number: 
Parties: George E. Crow, Appellant, v. W. H. Brown et al., Appellees.
Judges: 
Reporter: Iowa Reports
Volume: 81
Pages: 344–354

Head Matter:
George E. Crow, Appellant, v. W. H. Brown et al., Appellees.
Pension Money: property purchased therewith : execution : exemption. Real estate purchased by a pensioner with, pension money, received from the federal government, is exempt from levy and sale under execution, under the provisions of section 4747 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. ( Overruling prior decisions.) [Robinson, J., dissenting.}
Appeal from Adams District Court. — Hou. R. C. IIeNry, Judge.
Friday, October 24, 1890.
This is an action in equity by which the plaintiff seeks to enjoin the sale of certain real estate upon an execution against him, and in favor of the defendant Brown, upon the ground that the said real estate is exempt from execution and sale. There was a demurrer to the petition, which was sustained. The plaintiff appeals.
Dams & Wells, for appellants:
To exempt future acquisitions is recognized as a state’s right in all the cases. Edwards t>. Kearzey, 94 U. S. 595; Gunn v. Barry, 15 Wall. 610. The pension law (Statutes, U. S., sec. 4747), enacted in 1866, protects pension money from seizure for debts until it is paid into the hands of the pensioner, and then provides that such pension money “ shall inure wholly to the benefit of such pensioner.” In Goble v. Stevenson, 68 Iowa, 270, this court held, that after chapter 23, Acts of 1884, took effect, “ any pensioner might make a gift of his pension money, and the donee might hold the same, or property purchased therewith, as against the donor’s creditors.” The majority opinion in Foster v. Byrne, 76 la. 295, is in conflict with that case ; for, if the exemption act is unconstitutional, then a donation of pension money could be followed into tlie donee’s hands. The lexicon definition of the noun “benefit” is “profit,” “advantage,” “whatever promotes personal happiness. ” “ Wholly for the benefit of such pensioner, ” means “for his own personal happiness.” To “pay a debt” means to confer a benefit upon another fin discharge of an obligation. To pay always means sacrifice to the debtor and benefits to the creditor. Hissem v. Johnson, 27 West Virginia, 644, expressly holds that the “benefits” of pensions are carefully guarded by federal statutes for the use of the pensioner and his family, not only by section 4747, United States laws, but that said section is made plain by sections 4703, 4745, 4746, 4785 and 4786, to be construed therewith. Eckert v. McKee is still authority, unless overruled by Bohion v. Walker, 82 Ky. 60. If the statute, section 4747, had no other purpose than to exempt the pension money while in transmission from the officers and agents of the government to the pensioner, no such statute was needed. Buchanan «. Alexander, 4 How. 20 ; Elwin’s Appeal, 67 Pa. St. 367: Hey wood v. Clarke, 50 Vt. 617. The right to enforce payment of a pre-existing debt out of pension money, subsequently received, does not enter into the obligation of a contract creating such pre-exist-ing debt. Hissem v. Johnson, 27 W. Va. 652; Kellogg v. Waite, 12 Allen, 530; United States r. Hall, 98 U. S. 349. This court held, in Babcock v. Curney, 42 Iowa, 154, that the legislature could change the remedy and remedial proceedings as to existing judgments, and in Kossuth County v. Wallace, 60 Iowa, 508, it held that if existing remedies are not destroyed a pre-existing contract is not affected. And in Malthy v. Coopér, Morris, 59, it is held, that the legislature may completely bar a particular action as to existing contracts, if a substantial remedy is left. Congress did not intend to appropriate money to pay off creditors of the pensioners. The act of 1884 prevents the diversion of, the pension fund exactly as congress intended. We rely upon Hey wood v. Clarke, SO Vermont, 613; His-sem v. Johnson, 27 W. Va. 644; Folschow v. Werner, .61 Wis. 85 ; Far mum v. Turner, 64 Iowa, 690 ; Goble v. Stevenson, 68 Iowa, 270; United States v. Hall, 98 U. S. 343 ; Eckert v. McKee, 9 Bush, 355.
• Dale & Brown, for appellees:
Is chapter 23, Twentieth General Assembly, 1884, unconstitutional and void as to pre-existing debts ? The question was determined by this court after full argument and reargument on rehearing in Foster v. Byrne, 76 Iowa, 295. The principle of “stare decisis et non quieta movere,” has Ibeen recognized and followed by this court since its foundation, and it is in cases determined by a ■divided court that it is particularly necessary to invoke and be governed by this principle. Stout v. Insurance Go., 12 Iowa, 386-7 ; Longlmrst v. Insurance Co., 19 Iowa, 370-2; Moingona Goal Go. v. Blair .51 Iowa, 447; Lewis v. Soule, 52 Iowa, 11-14; Zent v. Pideen, 54 Iowa, 538 ; Bullís v. Marsh, 56 Iowa, 751 ; Monlc v. Corbin, 58 Iowa, 505; Ex'r of Griffith, •64 Iowa, 197; Maxwell v. Hunter, 65 Iowa, 124; Adams v. Griffin, 66 Iowa, 127. The dissenting opinion in Foster v. Byrne shows that the dissenting judges ■do not attempt to sustain the constitutionality of ■chapter 23, Twentieth General Assembly, but rest their decision on their construction of Revised Statutes, United States, section 4747. Does chapter 23, Laws, 1884, violate these constitutional provisions ? The determination of that question involves another: Is a law exempting from execution property that was liable ■at the time the contract was executed an impairment ofsthe contract? That it is, see Triplet v. Graham, 58 Iowa, 135 ; Goble v. Stephenson, 68 Iowa, 270 ; Edwards ■v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. (6 Otto) 595; Gunn v. Barry, 82 U. S. (15 Wall.) 610-625; Walker v. Whitehead, 83 U. S. (16 Wall.) 314-318; Wilson v. Brown, 58 Ala. •62. “Even as to property acquired by the debtor ;after the act was passed.” Johnson v. Fletcher, 54 Miss. 628; The Homestead Gases, 22 Gratt. 266. Also, .that laws are void which substantially impair the remedy, see Jones v. Brandon, 48 G-a. 593 ; Lessley v. PMpps, 49 Miss. 790; Purvey v. Widcham, 23 Mo. 112; Kibby v. Jones, 7 Bush, 243; Berry v. Phoing, 3 S. W. Rep. 877; State of Louisiana ex ret. Fislc v. Police Jury of Jefferson, 116 U. S. 135-137. A law reducing the limit of taxation of a municipal body is void as to the pre-existing contracts of such, municipal corporation. State of Louisiana v. Police Jury, St. Martin’s Parish, 311 U. S. 716-722. The following cases announce the same doctrine: Van Hoffman v. Quincy, 71 U. S. (4 Wall.) 535; State of Louisiana v. New Orleans, 102 U. S. (12 Otto) 203-7; Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U. S. (12 Wheat.) 213, and several cases collated and cited in 47 U. S. (6 How.) 328. A stay law enacted after the contract is made is unconstitutional, Webster v. Pose, 6 Heisk. 93. Extending time of redemption on foreclosure of a mortgage is held unconstitutional as to prior contracts. Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U. S. (1 How.) 311 ; Maloney v. Fortune, 14 Iowa, 417; Cagill v. Bower, 1 Mich. 369. Laws requiring property to be appraised, and sold at not less than two-thirds the appraisement, held void as to pre-existing contracts. Bronson r>. Kinzie, 42 U. S. (1 How.) 311; McOraclcen v. Hayward, 42 U. S. (2 How.) 608; Witard v. Longstreet, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 172; Rosier v. Hale, 10 Iowa, 470. Every debt, then, created by contract prior to the passage of any homestead or exemption law, is privileged from the operation of such law. Thompson on “Homesteads and Exemptions,” sec. 291. Is real estate purchased solely with pension money exempt from execution under Revised Statutes, United States, section 4747 % This section was first construed by this court in June, 1882, in the case of Webb v. Holt, 57 Iowa, 712. The rule established upon the authority of that decision has been followed in the following cases : Triplett V: Graham, 58 Iowa, 135; Goble & Co. v. Stephenson, 68 Iowa, 270; Baugh v. Barrett, 68 Iowa, 495; Foster v. Byrne, 76 Iowa, 295. In the latter case Justices Rothrock and Beck dissent, as to the construction of section 4747. During this period. Judges Day, Adams, Servers, Need and Robiwsow have concurred in the majority opinion, at different times. This question has been determined in accordance with the holding of the majority in Webb v. Holt, supra, by the following state supreme courts. Kellogg v. Waite, 12 Allen (Mass.) 529; Spelmanv. Eldridge, 126 Mass. 113; Robin v. Walker, 82 Ky. 69; 56 Am. Rep. 878; Eckert ®. McKee, 9 Bush (Ky.) 355; Sirus ®. Walsham, 7 S. W. Rep. (Ky.) 557; Jardain ¶. Eairton, S. F. A. 44 N. J. Law, 376 ; Cavanaugh v. Smith, 84 Ind. 380; Cram v. White, 27 Kan. 319; Friend v. Garcelon, 77 Me. 25; .Rissem v. Johnson, 27 W. Va. 644; Rozelle v. Rhodes, 9 Atl. Rep. (Penn.) 160. The. case of Eckert v. McKee, 9 Bush, 355, has been overruled by the supreme court of Kentucky, in the cases of Robin v. Walker, 82 Ky. 60, and Sirus v. Walsham, 7 S. W. Rep. 557. The state supreme court of Wisconsin, in Folschow v. Weiner, 51 Wis. 85; 7 N. W. Rep. 911, decided in 1881, maintains the doctrine contended for by appellant; this is the only state so construing this statute. The only United States supreme court case bearing on this question is the case of United States v. Hall, 98 U. S. 343-358. The proceeds or investments of exempt property are not exempt. The rule in this state is that money or property, the proceeds of personal property exempt from execution, voluntarily sold by the owner, are not exempt from execution. Friedlander v. Mahoney, 31 Iowa, 311; Harrier v. Fassett, 56 Iowa, 264. That exemptions are purely the creation of statute, which only exist under explicit provisions, see Van Dorn v. Mar-den, 48 Iowa, 188; Rogers v. Raiser, Sheriff, 60 Iowa, 355. Congress has no power to exempt pension money after payment to the pensioner. Webb v. Holt, supra; Cram v. White, 27 Kan. 319; Friend v. Garcelon, 77 Me. 25; Hissem v. Johnson, 27 W. Va. 644; Fink v. O’ Neil, 106 U. S. (16 Otto) 272; Bowman v. Railway Co., 125 U. S. 465; Spindle v. Shreve, 111 U. S. 542. Appellant refers to legislation of congress granting public lands on various conditions. The whole subject-matter of the public lands is, by constitution United States, article 4, section 3, placed under the control and disposal of congress. United States v. Gratiot, 39 U. S. (14Pet.) 537. The words “publiclands” describe ■such lands subject as are to sale or other disposal under general laws. Mewhall ». Sanger, 92 U. S. 761. As to ■other lands or property owned by the United States within a state the United States has only the right of an ordinary proprietor. Ft. Leavenworth Ry. Go. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525; Miner's Bank v. State of Iowa, .53 U. S. (12 How.) 4.

Opinion:
Rotiirock, C. J.
I. In the month of October, 1875, the defendant Brown recovered a judgment against the plaintiff for the sum of four hundred dollars and •costs. At that time the plaintiff was insolvent. The plaintiff was a soldier in the war of the rebellion, and in the month of October, 1886, he received a pension from the United States on account of physical disability incurred while in the military service. He was allowed .and paid the sum of fourteen hundred and'forty dollars •as arrears of pension. Upon receiving the said sum of money he bought one hundred and twenty acres of land, for which he paid out of said pension money the sum of five dollars an acre. He built a house on said land into which he moved his wife and family, and has since occupied the premises as a homestead. On the eighteenth day of May, 1889, the defendant Brown •caused an execution to be issued on said judgment, and levied on the land, and by this action the plaintiff seeks to restrain the defendant Pomroy, who is sheriff, from celling the land in satisfaction of the judgment.
In the case of Webb v. Holt, 57 Iowa, 712, it was held that pension money was exempt from the payment •of the debts of the pensioner while it was in course of transmission to him, but not after it came into his possession. This construction of section 4747 of the Revised Statutes of the United States was adopted by a majority •of this court. The same principle has since been adhered to in the cases of Triplett v. Graham, 58 Iowa, 135; Baugh v. Barrett, 69 Iowa, 495; Farmer v. Turner, 64 Iowa, 690, and in Foster v. Byrne, 76 Iowa, 295. In the first and last of the cited cases Mr. Justice Beck and the writer hereof dissented from the opinion of the majority. No formal dissent was entered in the other cases. Since the final opinion was filed on rehearing in the case of Foster v. Byrne the personnel of this court has been changed, and upon a full examination of the question a majority of the court are of the opinion that the property purchased with pension money is exempt from execution or attachment under the act of congress above cited. The reasons for such holding are fully set out in the dissenting opinions above referred to, and need not be repeated here. It is sufficient to say that if force and effect is to be given to that clause of the act of congress which provides that pension money "shall inure wholly to the benefit of the pensioner," to the exclusion of his creditors, there appears to us to be no escape from the conclusion that the property purchased with pension money is exempt. Any other construction of the law would permit creditors to subject the money as soon as it reaches the hands of the pensioner.
It is correct as claimed by counsel for appellees that the weight of authority is contrary to our present holding. But courts are not always controlled by the weight of authority. If they were, the duties of courts of last resort would be simply to ascertain the number of cases involving the question, and follow the majority. There is the other important consideration that the weight of authority should commend itself to the judgment and conscience of the court having before it the question for determinati on.
If the rule adopted by this court heretofore were such as that rights may have accrued by reason of the rule, whereby the law as declared has become what is known in the law as a rule of property, we might well hesitate to overrule the cases above cited. But no such a result will follow our present holding. The relation of the creditor of the veteran pensioned soldier has •been in no sense changed by the decisions of this court. The defendant in this action has not extended credit to the plaintiff by reason of the former decisions of this eourt.
The decree of the district court is reversed.