Case Name: F. P. HOLDEN, Respondent, v. JONATHAN ANDREWS, Appellant
Court: Supreme Court of California
Jurisdiction: California
Decision Date: 1869
Citations: 38 Cal. 119
Docket Number: 
Parties: F. P. HOLDEN, Respondent, v. JONATHAN ANDREWS, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: California Reports
Volume: 38
Pages: 119–132

Head Matter:
F. P. HOLDEN, Respondent, v. JONATHAN ANDREWS, Appellant.
Estoppel. — One who obtains the possession of public land of the United States from a prior possessor, under a contract of purchase, with which he has not complied, is not estopped from setting up a subsequently acquired title from the United States, in an action brought by the vendor to recover the possession. Cbockett, J., and Spbague, J., dissenting.
Idem.—A person who has acquired the possession of lands under a contract of purchase, is precluded, while he continues in possession, from disputing the title of his vendor; but he is not estopped to show that his vendor’s title has expired. Per Rhodes, J.; Sandeeson, J., concurring.
Idem.—As between the vendor and vendee an estoppel has its origin in the contract, its operation is limited to the title in reference to which the contract was made, and does not extend to the question of the right of possession. (Ibid.)
Idem.—In an action for the possession, the vendor’s right of recovery depends upon his title; when his title expires, his right to the possession also expires. (Ibid.)
Idem.—The rule that the purchaser, remaining in possession after a breach of the contract, is estopped from setting up title from any other source, has reference only to title adverse to the vendor. It has no application when the subsequently acquired title is consistent with the vendor’s, and when the contract was made with full recognition of such title as the permanent title. (Ibid.)
Reason fob Pebmitting the Vendee to Show that the Vendob’s Title has Ceased. —In the cases in which it is permitted to the vendee, entering under a contract of purchase, to show that the vendor’s title has ceased, the defense is allowed on the ground that, without fault or fraud on the part of the vendee, the vendor’s title has expired. Per Cbockett, J. —Spbagde, J., concurring.
Has no Application to the Sale of a Possessoby Claim.—But tills reason has no application to the sale of a possessory claim, of which alone the possession is sold, and to which the vendee knew the vendor had no other title than the possession. (Ibid.)
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth District, San Joaquin County.
The case is fully stated in the opinions delivered.
W. E. Greene and J. H. Budd, for Appellant.
The defendant should have been allowed to have shown his entry under the United States Homestead Laws, on the ground that a tenant has always been allowed to show in defense of an action of ejectment brought by his landlord, that the title of the landlord had terminated. (Jackson v. Davis, 5 Cow. 135.)
The only title of plaintiff to the land was prior possession. This title terminated so soon as the United States had surveyed the land and disposed of it. This, the evidence offered by the defendant showed the United States had done,
Byers & Elliott, for Respondent.
The defendant went into possession under agreement to purchase. Equity and honesty require that he should place plaintiff in his original position before pleading subsequent acquired title. Defendant should have gone out of possession and then brought his action, if he had superior title to plaintiff.
Where one enters on land under contract to purchase, the vendor and those coming under him are estopped in the action of ejectment by the vendor, to show title in himself or to set up an outstanding title in another. (Jackson v. Walker, 7 Cow. 637; Jackson v. Smith, 7 Cow. 717.)
A party in possession of land, recognizing the title of claimant and agreeing to purchase, may subsequently deny such title, and show that he was imposed upon in admitting the title ; but a party entering into possession under agreement to purchase, cannot dispute the title of him under whom he enters until after he first surrenders possession. (Jackson v. Spear, 7 Wend. 401, and cases cited therein.)
A defendant in ejectment cannot question the title under which he enters. He must first restore possession to the party from whom he received possession, and then he may attack the title under which his possession was commenced.
A party who enters into possession under agreement to purchase, and the property is taxed to him, and sold for taxes, and by him bought in, cannot set up title so acquired in his own name or in that of a third person, against the rights of the vendor. (Voris v. Thomas, 12 Ill. 442.)
A parent dies and leaves co-heirs. It is not competent for one or two, having exclusive possession of the land, to defeat an action by co-heirs to obtain proportional share, by setting up title from the owner of the land. They must first surrender.
This case contains the broad general principle that a party entering under and recognizing title of another, cannot set up adverse title. (Phelan v. Kelly, 25 Wend. 389.)
A defendant in ejectment, who became possessor under contract to purchase, which has been rescinded and the purchase money refunded, cannot object to his vendor’s want of title nor set up an outstanding title. (Walker v. Williams, 30 Miss. 1 Geo. 165.)
Where plaintiff relies on the prior possession of public lands, the defendant cannot show anterior possession in a stranger. (10 Cal. 22.)

Opinion:
Sawyer, C. J., delivered the following opinion, in which Sanderson, J., concurred:
Plaintiff, Holden, being in possession of a tract of unsurveyed public land, sold and delivered the possession to Andrews for a sum specified to be paid at a future day. Defendant, Andrews, having failed to make payment according to the terms of the sale, plaintiff brought this action to recover possession of the land, and recovered judgment. The defendant, on the trial, offered to prove that at the time of the purchase the land was unsurveyed public land; that it had since been surveyed; that defendant was a person qualified and competent to enter said land, under the homestead laws of the United States ; that he did enter said lands under the homestead laws of the United States, and that he now holds the same under said laws. Plaintiff objected on the ground that defendant entered under a contract of purchase, and that he is estopped from setting up a subsequently acquired title from the United States, without first surrendering the possession acquired by his purchase from the plaintiff. We think this is not a case that falls within the rule. The plaintiff did not pretend to have any title other than by naked possession. It was well known to both parties that the lands were public lands, and it was doubtless contemplated at the time of the sale that the defendant should purchase, or be in a position to purchase, the land of the Government so soon as it should be open to entry. It was not a case of doubtful title, in which possession is important with reference to a contemplated litigation. It may be unjust for the defendant to make use of the possession thus acquired, to enable him to acquire the title of the Government, without paying for the possession according to the terms of the contract with plaintiff. But the case does not appear to us to be within the rule of estoppel invoked by'plaintiff; and we think defendant should have been allowed to show that he had purchased the land of the United States.
Judgment and order denying a new trial reversed, and a new trial granted.