Case Name: Elias KAGGEN and Rio A. Sferrazza, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE and United States of America, Defendants-Appellees
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1995-06-06
Citations: 57 F.3d 163
Docket Number: Nos. 1152, 1613, Dockets 94-6183, 94-6185
Parties: Elias KAGGEN and Rio A. Sferrazza, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE and United States of America, Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: Before: McLAUGHLIN and JACOBS, Circuit Judges, and KAUFMAN, District Judge.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 3d Series
Volume: 57
Pages: 163–167

Head Matter:
Elias KAGGEN and Rio A. Sferrazza, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE and United States of America, Defendants-Appellees.
Nos. 1152, 1613, Dockets 94-6183, 94-6185.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Argued March 20, 1995.
Decided June 6, 1995.
David H. Singer, New York City, Thomas A. Lopresti, Smithtown, NY, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Eugene J. Rossi, Gary R. Allen, Washington, DC, (U.S. Dept, of Justice) Zachary W. Carter, Brooklyn, NY, for defendants-appel-lees.
Before: McLAUGHLIN and JACOBS, Circuit Judges, and KAUFMAN, District Judge.
Honorable Frank A. Kaufman, of the United States District Court of the District of Maryland, sitting by designation.

Opinion:
FRANK A. KAUFMAN, District Judge:
Taxpayers (plaintiffs-appellants) appeal from the judgment below, denying to them, in the summary judgment context of this case, the return, which they seek, of certain monies seized by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm.
The facts in this case are undisputed. On or about April 12, 1982, the IRS assessed $132,327.06 against each of the two taxpayers for nonpayment of federal employment taxes. Seemingly, taxpayers disputed that assessment and did not voluntarily pay to the IRS any portion of the monies allegedly due.
On or about September 5, 1985, taxpayers agreed in writing to extend the then applicable statute of limitations of six years, see 26 U.S.C. § 6502(a)(1), to December 31, 1991, thus changing the limitations expiration date from April 12, 1988, ie., six years after April 12, 1982. On November 5, 1990, Congress amended § 6502(a)(1) to provide for a 10 year limitations period in the place of the earlier six year period. Accordingly, in this case, the IRS takes the position that that Congressional amendment extended the limitations date until April 12, 1992.
The earlier agreed extension to December 31, 1991, took place pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6502(a)(2). Taxpayers assert in this Court, as they did in the court below, that the 10 year amendment, enacted into law by the Congress on November 5,1990, is not applicable in this case, contending that that amendment applies only with regard to 26 U.S.C. § 6502(a)(1) and not to 26 U.S.C. § 6502(a)(2).
26 U.S.C. § 6502(a) provides in relevant part:
"Where the assessment of any tax imposed by this title has been made within the period of limitation properly applicable thereto, such tax may be collected by levy or by a proceeding in court, but only if the levy is made or the proceeding begun—
(1) within 6 years after the assessment of the tax or,
(2) prior to the expiration of any period for collection agreed upon in writing by the Secretary and the taxpayer before the expiration of such 6-year period
(26 U.S.C. § 6502[a]).
The November, 1990, amendment by Congress specifically refers to "the period specified in § 6502," and not simply to § 6502(a)(1) to the exclusion of § 6502(a)(2):
"The amendments made by this section . shall apply to . taxes assessed on or before . [November 5, 1990] if the period specified in Section 6502 . for collection of such taxes has not expired as of such date."
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub.L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388, § 11317(c) (1990).
Accordingly, the above set forth contention by taxpayers concerning the coverage of the November, 1990, Congressional action was correctly rejected by the court below. See Florsheim Bros. Drygoods Co. v. U.S., 280 U.S. 453, 465-66, 50 S.Ct. 215, 219, 74 L.Ed. 542 (1930). However, in this Court, taxpayers additionally argue that the IRS did not fully effect collection within the applicable limitations period, even assuming that that limitations period did not expire prior to April 12, 1992. The IRS, in response, takes the position that that issue should not be reached in this appeal, because the question was not properly raised by taxpayers in the court below. However, certain aspects of what is referred to infra in this opinion as the "notice of seizure" issue, were in fact presented and argued in the court below. Accordingly, we deem that issue to be appropriately before us at this time.
26 U.S.C. § 6335(a) refers to "notice of seizure" and provides that such notice be given "after" seizure of the "property." Section 6502, which sets forth the applicable limitation period, relates to the period after assessment. Taxpayers contend that § 6335(a) requires that notice of seizure be given after seizure of the property. The IRS contends that that reference in § 6335(a) to property applies only to tangible property, and not to intangible property such as a bank account. See G.M. Leasing Corp. v. U.S., 429 U.S. 338, 350, 97 S.Ct. 619, 627, 50 L.Ed.2d 530 (1977); U.S. v. Donahue Indus., Inc., 905 F.2d 1325, 1329-30 (9th Cir.1990); State Bank of Fraser v. U.S., 861 F.2d 954, 965-67 (6th Cir.1988). Without reaching that issue upon this appeal, we note that the record in this case does not suggest that taxpayers in fact failed to receive notice of the levy by the IRS which took place upon the bank accounts well before April 12, 1992. There were two levies upon two of taxpayers' accounts in three different banks. Those levies occurred on January 2,1992, insofar as one of the three banks is concerned, and on January 9, 1992, insofar as the second and third banks were concerned. In the normal course of events all of us know that depositors are sent monthly bank statements by banks. Thus, it is only reasonable for this Court to proceed in this appeal upon the understanding that taxpayers did receive from the two banks notices of the levies in question and that the levies had been honored, prior to April 12, 1992, by all three of the said banks. Accordingly, while notices of the levies upon the three bank accounts and notices of the honoring of those levies were apparently, insofar as the record in this cases discloses, not directly given by the IRS to taxpayers, taxpayers did in fact and effect learn from the banks of the levies and of the honoring of each of the same; thus, taxpayers were informed by the banks that their funds at the said banks had been seized. Under those circumstances, the statutory requirements and the regulations implementing the same, pursuant to which taxpayers contend the IRS was required to give to them explicit notices of the seizures prior to the expiration of the limitations period, namely April 12, 1992, were in fact and in common sense met. While it would seemingly have been better practice for the IRS itself to have given such notices directly to taxpayers, taxpayers in this instance were in no way prejudiced by any such failure of the IRS so to do.
AFFIRMED.