Case Name: CHARLES REDI-MIX, INC., Appellant/Cross Appellee, v. Edward PHILLIPS and Rose Phillips, his wife, Appellees/Cross Appellants
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1991-02-27
Citations: 580 So. 2d 166
Docket Number: Nos. 90-1517, 90-1518 and 90-1519
Parties: CHARLES REDI-MIX, INC., Appellant/Cross Appellee, v. Edward PHILLIPS and Rose Phillips, his wife, Appellees/Cross Appellants.
Judges: GLICKSTEIN and GARRETT, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 580
Pages: 166–169

Head Matter:
CHARLES REDI-MIX, INC., Appellant/Cross Appellee, v. Edward PHILLIPS and Rose Phillips, his wife, Appellees/Cross Appellants.
Nos. 90-1517, 90-1518 and 90-1519.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Feb. 27, 1991.
Motion for Rehearing June 12, 1991.
Robert L. Kilbride, Stuart, for appellant/ cross appellee.
Joseph Negron, Jr., of Steger & Steger, P.A., Stuart, for appellees/cross appellants.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Appellant sought to foreclose mechanics liens against the appellee owners on September 26, 1989. Appellees had filed notices, contesting the claims of lien; and the court clerk certified the mailing of copies of these notices on July 27, 1989, to appellant, which received them the following day.
Appellees raised the affirmative defense of untimeliness because of section 713.-22(2), Florida Statutes (1989), then moved for summary judgment on this ground and also on the ground that appellant failed to serve the Notice to Owner properly as required by section 713.06(2)(a). The trial court entered summary final judgment in favor of appellees. In its order on rehearing, the trial court found for appellees on the question of untimeliness, but that appellant had complied with the notice to owner requirement.
Appellant claims its actions were not barred under section 713.22(2) and appel-lees cross-appeal the finding that appellant had met the Notice to Owner provisions of section 713.06(2)(a). We agree with the trial court on both points and affirm.
We are not unsympathetic to appellant's two arguments, its first and major being that it was entitled to an additional five days in which to file its lawsuits, the Notices of Contest of Lien having been served upon it by mail — because of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.090(e), which states:
(e) Additional Time After Service by Mail. When a party has the right or is required to do some act or take some proceeding within a prescribed period after the service of a notice or paper is served upon him by mail, five days shall be added to the prescribed period.
Nevertheless, the two cases upon which appellant relies do not apply to the subject area of this appeal, Florida's Mechanic's Lien Law. Appellant contends Greer v. Estate of Smith, 342 So.2d 1007 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), is analogous because no practical differences exist between the objectives of the probate code and the mechanic's lien law with respect to time limits. In Greer, a creditor was given the extra time allowed under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.090(e), as it was then, to file its claim after the estate served written objection to its claim by mail. However, Florida Rules of Probate and Guardianship Procedure, as it existed in January 1975, specifically adopted Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.090 in rule 5.050(h), as this court noted in Greer. Id. at 1008. This factor significantly distinguishes Greer from the instant case.
Similarly, appellant's reliance on Investment & Income Realty, Inc. v. Bentley, 480 So.2d 219 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985), is misplaced. In Bentley, a landlord chose to mail a notice to pay rent or vacate rather than to hand deliver the notice or to leave a copy of it at the residence. The fifth district held that when a party to a civil action conducts service by mail, an additional five days must be added to the period of time designated for response or compliance. Notably the time frame was extremely short; the tenant had but three days to respond; and as appellees point out, Bentley is distinguishable from the instant case in that the instant case does not involve mailing by a party to the action. Service was performed by the clerk of the court who signed sworn notices as to the date of service of the Notices of Contest of Lien.
As the trial court stated in its order on rehearing, the Notice of Contest acts by operation of law to discharge a lien on the sixtieth day, without intervention of the court. Dykema v. Trans State Indus., Inc., 303 So.2d 52, 53 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974). In addition, the mechanic's lien law is to be strictly construed in every particular; and strict compliance is an indispensable prerequisite for a person seeking affirmative relief. Home Elec. of Dade County, Inc. v. Gonas, 547 So.2d 109, 111 (Fla.1989).
Appellant's second argument is that actual receipt of the notices is required, thereby giving it one more day in which to file. It contends that the statement in the notice, "That the time within which you may file suit to enforce your lien is limited to sixty (60) days from the date of service of this Notice," leads a reasonable person to believe the time started running when the notice actually was received. However, the last sentence of section 713.22(2) unambiguously states that "service shall be deemed complete upon mailing." Hence, appellant's second argument also fails.
We see no need to address the cross appeal, finding no merit in appellees' contention that the Notices to Owner were inadequate.
GLICKSTEIN and GARRETT, JJ., concur.
WARNER, J., dissents with opinion.