Case Name: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROY BROWN, Defendant-Appellee
Court: Illinois Appellate Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 1982-11-05
Citations: 110 Ill. App. 3d 443
Docket Number: No. 81-655
Parties: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v ROY BROWN, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Appellate Court Reports, Third Series
Volume: 110
Pages: 443–449

Head Matter:
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v ROY BROWN, Defendant-Appellee.
Third District
No. 81-655
Opinion filed November 5, 1982.
BARRY, P.J., dissenting.
Samuel Naylor, VI, State’s Attorney, of Carthage (John X. Breslin and Kenneth A. Wilhelm, both of State’s Attorneys Appellate Service Commission, of counsel), for the People.
R. P. O’Connell, of Richard P. O’Connell, Ltd., and Chet W. Vahle, both of Quincy, for appellee.

Opinion:
JUSTICE HEIPLE
delivered the opinion of the court:
This case involves the dismissal of all charges against a criminal defendant for failure of the People to comply with the 160-day speedy trial statute. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par. 103 — 5(b).) The People appeal.
Defendant was originally charged with aggravated battery on July 10, 1980. He was arrested, posted bail and was released. On July 31, 1980, he pleaded not guilty and demanded a speedy jury trial.
On September 29, 1980, a pretrial conference was held and, by agreement of counsel, the cause was continued to December for trial.
At the December 8, 1980, trial call, defendant said he was unprepared to defend on a newly added rape count. Defendant did not object, however, to the amendment of the information which added this count.
The following colloquy then took place between the prosecutor, the court, and defense counsel:
"MR. NAYLOR: Your Honor, I simply want to observe that the parties have agreed that the jury trial scheduled for this date on aggravated battery is continued by agreement of the parties due to the addition of the Count on rape, and that it is contemplated it will be continued from the day — today to the next jury calendar on both Counts.
THE COURT: Mr. Vierling?
MR. VIERLING [defense counsel]: That's correct.
THE COURT: I'll show that the matter is continued by agreement on both Counts to the next jury calendar, which you gentlemen are aware is in February.
MR. NAYLOR: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you. Anything further, Mr. Vierling, in this case?
MR. VIERLING: Nothing, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you. That'll be all."
The matter was thus continued twice by agreement of the parties. Both sides agreed to placing the case on the December jury calendar and the February jury calendar. It is well settled that the statutory speedy trial term is tolled where a defendant requests, stipulates to, or consents to a continuance. (People v. Tillman (1963), 26 Ill. 2d 552, 554; People v. Canada (1967), 81 Ill. App. 2d 220, 227-29.) Unmistakably, defendant acquiesced in the trial scheduling. Accordingly, the delay from September 29, 1980, to February 9, 1981, is attributable to the defendant.
On February 9, 1981, when the case was called for trial, the People answered ready. Defendant again requested a continuance. He wanted to hire a new lawyer. Up to that point, Mr. Brown had been represented by the public defender, Mr. Vierling. During this hearing, Mr. Vierling stated that the trial of the case "*** was originally docketed for September. I took a continuance then. * I just wasn't ready *." He also stated he agreed to the December 8 continuance. Five minutes before jury selection commenced, Mr. Brown entered a negotiated plea of guilty to aggravated battery in exchange for a nolle prosequi on the rape charge, and a recommendation of a five-year prison term. After a hearing, the plea was accepted. Defendant was sentenced to five years' imprisonment. At that point, the defendant's speedy-trial rights were tolled. It is the law of this State that a guilty plea negatives the right to a speedy trial. People v. De Cola (1959), 15 Ill. 2d 527, 531; and see People v. Hickman (1971), 3 Ill. App. 3d 919, 930, aff'd as modified (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 175.
Then, on February 13, 1981, defendant was back in court with a new attorney, Mr. O'Connell, on a motion to vacate his guilty plea. This motion was unopposed by the People and was scheduled for a hearing. During such hearing, the following colloquy occurred:
"MR. NAYLOR: I would also like to stipulate that by actions of the defendant he has tolled the 160 days speedy trial period because I don't think that the state should be caused to suffer a dismissal of charges under the speedy trial act.
MR. O'CONNELL: I have no problem with that.
THE COURT: All right, that is shown that there is no question about the 160 days on the part of the defendant's attorney. I will set it again *."
The assertion of defendant's counsel is clear. The 160-day speedy-trial period was tolled. The period began anew on February 13,1981.
Defense counsel subsequently filed a motion for supplemental discovery on March 17, a motion to suppress on March 19, and a motion to dismiss for want of speedy trial on April 21.
On April 27, 1981, a hearing was held on defendant's motion to dismiss. However, Judge Evans terminated the hearing after it had begun and recused himself when it became apparent to him that defendant's evidence was different from what the judge recalled. The cause was referred to the chief judge for assignment of a different judge to hear this motion. The motion was subsequently set for hearing before a different judge on May 28, 1981. The delay from April 27, 1981, to May 28, 1981, is directly related to defendant's speedy-trial motion and is thus chargeable to the defendant.
Further delays were caused by the defendant. Defense counsel could not appear on May 28 due to a scheduling conflict which caused a continuance until June 29,1981.
On June 29, the court continued the hearing on its own motion to July 10. On July 10, the motion hearing was again continued on defendant's motion to July 17. On July 17, the hearing was continued on the People's motion and the motion was finally heard on August 21,1981.
A total of 189 days elapsed between February 13, when the defendant withdrew his guilty plea and August 21 when the court held its final hearing on defendant's ill-founded speedy-trial motion. Subtracting the 63 days chargeable to the defendant leaves 126 days chargeable to the People. It is thus seen that on the day of the final hearing on defendant's speedy-trial motion, there were 34 days still remaining within the 160-day period during which the defendant could have been tried without violating his right to a speedy trial under the statute. The trial judge was in error in granting the defendant's speedy-trial motion and in dismissing the charges against him.
For the reasons stated, the dismissal order of the Hancock County Circuit Court is reversed. The cause is reinstated and remanded to that court for trial within 160 days from the issuance of the mandate.
Reversed and remanded.
ALLOY, J., concurs.