Case Name: FIRESTONE TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY, et al., Petitioners, v. Maria ACOSTA, etc., Respondent; Margaret E. WALKER, etc., Petitioner, v. MILLER ELECTRIC MANUFACTURING COMPANY, etc., et al., Respondents
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1992-10-22
Citations: 612 So. 2d 1361
Docket Number: Nos. 78255, 78506
Parties: FIRESTONE TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY, et al., Petitioners, v. Maria ACOSTA, etc., Respondent. Margaret E. WALKER, etc., Petitioner, v. MILLER ELECTRIC MANUFACTURING COMPANY, etc., et al., Respondents.
Judges: MCDONALD, GRIMES and HARDING, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 612
Pages: 1361–1366

Head Matter:
FIRESTONE TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY, et al., Petitioners, v. Maria ACOSTA, etc., Respondent. Margaret E. WALKER, etc., Petitioner, v. MILLER ELECTRIC MANUFACTURING COMPANY, etc., et al., Respondents.
Nos. 78255, 78506.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Oct. 22, 1992.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 24, 1993.
G. William Bissett of Preddy, Kutner, Hardy, Rubinoff, Thompson, Bissett & Bush, Miami, for petitioner Firestone.
Clifford B. Selwood, Jr. of Clifford B. Selwood, Jr., P.A., and Nancy Little Hoff-mann of Nancy Little Hoffmann, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for petitioner Kelsey-Hayes.
Grevior & Jordan, Fort Lauderdale, and Larry Klein of Klein & Walsh, P.A., West Palm Beach, for petitioner Walker.
Ricki Lewis Tannen and Norman S. Klein of Klein & Tannen, P.A., Hollywood, for respondent Acosta.
Love Phipps of Corlett, Killian, Ober & Levi, P.A., Miami, for respondent Miller Electric.
Richard B. Doyle, Jr. of Loughren & Doyle, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for respondent Air Products and Chemicals, Inc.
Edward T. O’Donnell of Herzfeld and Rubin, Miami, amicus curiae for Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc.
David W. Henry of McDonough, O’Neal & O’Dell, Orlando, amicus curiae for Florida Defense Lawyer’s Ass’n.
Clifford M. Miller of Clifford M. Miller, Chartered, Vero Beach, amicus curiae for Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers.

Opinion:
OVERTON, Justice.
We have for review Acosta v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 592 So.2d 1102 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991), and Walker v. Miller Electric Manufacturing Co., 591 So.2d 242 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), in which the Third and Fourth Districts took opposing views of the applicability of the statute of repose set forth in section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1975), and repealed by the legislature in 1986. In Acosta, the Third District Court of Appeal held that a cause of action for an injury caused by a manufacturer's product could be maintained even though the repose period had expired for that product while the statute was in effect. On the other hand, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Walker, held that the manufacturer's right not to be sued under the statute of repose vested when the time period under the statute had expired for the product in issue prior to the statute's repeal in 1986.
The Walker court certified the following question as being of great public importance:
DID THE REPEALED STATUTE OF REPOSE, SECTION 95.031(2), FLORIDA STATUTES ([1975]), GIVE A MANUFACTURER OR A DELIVERER OF THE COMPLETED PRODUCT A VESTED RIGHT NOT TO BE SUED FOR AN ACCIDENT THAT OCCURRED AFTER THE DATE OF REPEAL?
Walker, 591 So.2d at 246. The Acosta court subsequently acknowledged conflict with Walker and certified the following question as being of great public importance:
DOES THE NOW REPEALED STATUTE OF REPOSE, SECTION 95.031(2), FLORIDA STATUTES (1975), BAR A PLAINTIFF'S CAUSE OF ACTION WHERE THE LAW IN EFFECT AT THE TIME THE DECEDENT'S CAUSE OF ACTION ACCRUED WOULD HAVE PERMITTED HIM TO MAINTAIN A PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTION IF HE WERE ALIVE[?]
Acosta, 592 So.2d at 1105. For the reasons expressed, we quash the decision of the Third District in Acosta, approve the decision of the Fourth District in Walker, and answer both certified questions in the affirmative.
Acosta
This cause of action began when, in August, 1987, Louis Acosta was killed when a multi-piece rim and wheel assembly exploded, causing part of the assembly to separate and strike him. In December, 1987, Maria Acosta, as personal representative of the estate, filed a wrongful death action against Firestone Tire & Rubber Company (Firestone) and Kelsey-Hayes Company (Kelsey), the manufacturers of the components of the rim assembly.
Firestone'and Kelsey moved for a summary judgment,- asserting that Acosta's claim was time-barred under the 1975 statute of repose, section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1975). In response, Acosta argued that her cause of action could be maintained because the statute of repose in product liability actions had been repealed in 1986.
The parties stipulated to certain facts, which the trial court stated in its findings:
(1) that the latest date of delivery to the initial purchaser was December 31, 1966; (2) that the effective date of Florida's product liability twelve-year statute of repose was January 1, 1975; (3) that the twelve-year statute of repose elapsed on December 31, 1978; (4) that the statute of repose was repealed by the Florida legislature on July 1, 1986; and (5) that the incident which gave rise to this litigation did not occur until August 18, 1987, twenty-one years after the product was delivered to the initial purchaser and seven and one-half years after the twelve-year repose period had expired.
Acosta, 592 So.2d at 1103.
The trial court granted Firestone's and Kelsey's motion for summary judgment, finding that the statute of repose was in effect when the repose period expired and, consequently, Acosta's cause of action was extinguished before it ever accrued. The trial court also held that, in 1978, when the repose period expired, the defendants had a vested right which prevented this cause of action and that this right could not constitutionally be affected by the subsequent repeal of the statute of repose.
The Third District Court of Appeal reversed. The district court acknowledged that this Court, in Melendez v. Dreis & Krump Manufacturing Co., 515 So.2d 735 (Fla.1987), held that the legislative amendment abolishing the statute of repose in products liability actions did not apply retrospectively to an action that arose before the effective date of the amendment. However, it concluded that the repealed statute of repose was not applicable under any circumstances after its repeal and that this products liability action could be maintained. The district court reasoned that depriving the appellant of her cause of action in this case would have the effect of applying the repealed statute of repose prospectively. The district court rejected Firestone's contention that the statute conferred on them a vested right and, in so holding, acknowledged that its decision was in conflict with the decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Walker.
Walker
In Walker, a machine that was manufactured by Miller Electric Manufacturing Company (Miller) and delivered by Air Products and Chemicals, Inc., in 1971 accidentally caused the death of Julian Walker in July of 1988. Walker was killed seventeen years after the delivery of the product, five years after the statute of repose period had expired, and two years after the statute of repose had been repealed. The manufacturers moved for a summary judgment on the grounds that the 1975 statute of repose barred the action. The trial court granted the summary judgment and the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed. In so holding, the Fourth District adopted the reasoning of the trial court in Acosta. The Fourth District explained that the important point is the fact that the statute of repose period expired while the statute of repose was still in force and effect and constitutional. It noted our decisions that explained that the purpose of the statute of repose is to cut off the right of action after a specified time measured from the delivery of a product or the completion of work, regardless of the time of the accrual of the cause of action or the notice of the invasion of a legal right. See Bauld v. J.A. Jones Construction Co., 357 So.2d 401 (Fla.1978). The district court in Walker concluded that the repeal of the statute of repose could not affect the defendants' vested right not to be sued. The district court explained its holding by analogizing our decision in Walter Denson & Son v. Nelson, 88 So.2d 120 (Fla.1956); the application of section 11.-2425, Florida Statutes (1987); and our answer to the first certified question in Melendez v. Dreis & Krump Manufacturing Co., 515 So.2d 735 (Fla.1987). The district court also rejected the application of Cathey v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 776 F.2d 1565 (6th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1021, 106 S.Ct. 3335, 92 L.Ed.2d 740 (1986).
The real issue for our determination is whether the repeal of the statute of repose can have the effect of reestablishing a cause of action that had been previously extinguished by operation of law. We find there is no authority or intent by the legislature to do so. We agree with Walker and approve its reasoning. This holding is consistent with the view and policy that this Court has already established in this difficult and sensitive area.
In Melendez, this Court held that the 1986 amendment to section 95.031(2) that repealed the product liability statute of repose could not be "construed to operate retrospectively as to a cause of action that accrued before the effective date of the amendment." 515 So.2d at 735. In that case, the plaintiff was injured on May 10, 1982, by a machine delivered on October 28, 1963. The statute of repose became effective on January 1, 1975, and lapsed as to the product on October 28, 1975. Melendez filed suit on May 17, 1983, over eight years after the repose period had expired. Melendez, as do Acosta and Walker in the instant eases, argued that the repeal of the statute would apply retrospectively and thus breathe life into his cause of action. We held that absent the legislature's "clear manifestation of retroactive effect, the sub sequent elimination of the statute of repose [could not] save the plaintiffs suit." Id. at 736. We hold that Acosta's cause of action was extinguished on December 31, 1978, and Walker's was extinguished on November 18, 1983, when the statute of repose lapsed as to the products that caused the respective injuries, regardless of the fact that the actions accrued after the statute of repose was repealed. See Bauld v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 357 So.2d 401 (Fla.1978). This holding is consistent with this Court's statement in Walter Denson & Sons v. Nelson, 88 So.2d 120, 122 (Fla.1956), in which we considered a statute of limitations and stated that "[t]he Legislature has the power to increase a prescribed period of limitation and to make it applicable to existing causes of action provided the change in the law is effective before the cause of action is extinguished by the force of a preexisting statute." (Emphasis added.) Inherent in this reasoning is a party's right to have the statute of limitations period become vested once it has "completely run and barred [the] action." Mazda Motors of America, Inc. v. S.C. Henderson & Sons, Inc., 364 So.2d 107, 108 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), cert. denied, 378 So.2d 348 (Fla.1979).
We find that the same principle applies to the repeal of a statute of repose and the rights of these defendants. We believe that the legislature fully understood this principle when it stated, in section 11.2425, Florida Statutes (1987), that "[t]he repeal of any statute by the adoption and enactment of Florida Statutes 1987 . shall not affect any right accrued before such repeal." (Emphasis added.)
We emphasize that our holding in these cases is controlled by the fact that the statute of repose periods in issue had expired prior to the statute's repeal. We also emphasize that this decision does not affect causes of action brought against manufacturers of products where the statute of repose period had not expired at the time the statute was repealed.
Accordingly, we answer both certified questions in the affirmative, quash the decision of the Third District in Acosta, approve the decision of the Fourth District in Walker, and remand Acosta with directions to affirm the decision of the circuit court.
It is so ordered.
MCDONALD, GRIMES and HARDING, JJ., concur.
BARKETT, C.J., dissents with an opinion, in which SHAW and KOGAN, JJ., concur.
. Section 95.031(2), Florida Statutes (1975), read as follows:
Actions for products liability and fraud under subsection 95.11(3) must be begun within the period prescribed in this chapter, with the period running from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence, instead of running from any date prescribed elsewhere in subsection 95.-11(3) but in any event within 12 years after the date of delivery of the completed product to its original purchaser or the date of the commission of the alleged fraud, regardless of the date the defect in the product or the fraud was or should have been discovered.
. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.