Case Name: The EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ASSURANCE CORPORATION, Limited, Garnishee, Appellant, v. H. W. OWENS, Plaintiff-Appellee, E. L. Cooksey, Defendant-Appellee
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1955-02-04
Citations: 78 So. 2d 104
Docket Number: 
Parties: The EMPLOYERS’ LIABILITY ASSURANCE CORPORATION, Limited, Garnishee, Appellant, v. H. W. OWENS, Plaintiff-Appellee, E. L. Cooksey, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: MATHEWS, C. J., and TERRELL, THOMAS, SEBRING and HOBSON, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 78
Pages: 104–109

Head Matter:
The EMPLOYERS’ LIABILITY ASSURANCE CORPORATION, Limited, Garnishee, Appellant, v. H. W. OWENS, Plaintiff-Appellee, E. L. Cooksey, Defendant-Appellee.
Supreme Court of Florida. En Banc.
Feb. 4, 1955.
Rehearing Denied March 10, 1955.
Marks, Gray, Yates & 'Conroy and Francis P. Conroy, Jacksonville, for appellant.
Dunham & Dunham, St. Augustine, for appellees.
Richard W. Ervin, Atty. Gen., James L. Graham, Jr., and Howard S. Bailey, Asst. Attys. Gen., amici curiae.

Opinion:
DREW, Justice.
Appellee J. W. Owens recovered a judgment in the St. Johns County Circuit Court against E. L. Cooksey, also an appellee herein, for injuries sustained by Owens as employee of Cooksey while engaged in that employment and while riding in the employer Cooksey's truck. Owens was not covered, nor required to be covered, by Workmen's Compensation insurance. In an effort to collect on this judgment, Owens garnisheed The Employers' Liability Assurance Corporation, Limited, which had insured Cooksey under a standard automobile liability insurance policy. The lower court entered a summary judgment in favor of Owens against the insurer and the insurer brought this appeal.
The provisions of the policy of insurance involved in this appeal which are pertinent to the discussion of this case are the following :
"The Employers' Liability Assurance Corporation Limited Agrees with the Insured, named in the declarations made a part hereof, in consideration of the payment of the pre mium and in reliance upon the statements in the declarations and subj ect to the limits of liability, exclusions, conditions and other terms of this policy:
" — Insuring Agreements—
"1. Coverage A — Bodily Injury Liability
"To pay on behalf of the Insured all sums which the Insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death at any time resulting therefrom, sustained by any person, caused by accident and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the automobile.
"Coverage B — Property Damage Liability
"To pay on behalf of the Insured all sums which the Insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of injury to or destruction of property, including the loss of use thereof, caused by accident and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the automobile.
"Coverage C — 'Medical payments
"To pay all reasonable expenses incurred within one year from the date of accident for necessary medical, surgical, ambulance, hospital, professional nursing and funeral services, to or for each person who sustains bodily injury, sickness or disease, caused by accident, while in or upon, entering or alighting from the automobile if the automobile is being used by the named Insured or with his permission."

" — Exclusions—"
"This policy does not apply:
"(a) Under any of the coverages, while the automobile is used as a public or livery conveyance, unless such use is specifically declared and described in this policy and premium charged therefor;
"(b) under any of' the coverages, to liability assumed by the. Insured under any contract or agreement;
"(c) under coverages A and B, while the automobile is used for the towing of any trailer owned or hired by the Insured and not covered by like insurance in the Company; or while any trailer covered by this policy is used with any automobile owned or hired by the Insured and not covered by like insurance in the Company;
"(d) under coverages A and C, to bodily injury to or sickness, disease or death of any employee of the Insured while engaged in the employment, other than domestic, of the Insured or in domestic employment if benefits therefor are either payable or required to be provided under any workmen's compensation law;
"(e) under coverage A, to any obligation for which the Insured or any company as his insurer may be held liable under any workmen's compensation law;
"(f) under coverage B, to injury to or destruction of property owned by, rented to, in charge of or transported by the Insured;
"(g) under coverage C, to bodily injury to'or sickness, disease or death of any person if benefits therefor are payable under any workmen's compensation law."
It is the basic contention of the appellant insurer that all employees of the-insured, except domestic employees (and these if benefits are payable or required to be provided under any workmen's compensation law), are excluded from coverage under paragraph (d) of the exclusions and that, therefore, it is not liable as garnishee or otherwise for the amount of the judgment recovered by the employee of the insured.
On the other hand, the appellee Owens argues that clause (d) under exclusions must be limited to employees protected by or required to be protected by the provi sions of the Florida Workmen's Compensation Law, F.S.A. § 440.01 et seq., with the exceptions of domestics as noted above. He further argues that if clause (d) is ambiguous, it should be construed in favor of the assured.
In the case of Webb v. American Fire & Casualty Co., 148 Fla. 714, 5 So.2d 252, an exclusion clause in a similar policy was before us. While the exclusion provision in that policy was not in the identical language as that in the policy now under consideration, we think the language of the two clauses are so substantially the same that the decision in the Webb case is controlling here. The pertinent language in the policy involved in the Webb case was,, " 'This policy does not apply to bodily injury or to death of the Insured; or to bodily injury or to death of any employee of the Insured while engaged in the business of the Insured (other than domestic employment in the home), or in the operation, maintenance or repair of the automobile; or to any obligation for which the Insured may be held liable under the Workmen's Compensation Law . The ruling of the lower court which we approved was that, "the Garnishee is not liable upon the policy, because the policy does not apply if the interest of the insured is other than is stated on the policy, and because the policy does not apply to bodily injury of an employee of the insured •while engaged in the business of the insured." (Italics added.)
An exclusion clause identical to that in the main case has been construed by the New York Supreme Court and there held to exclude from coverage the employees of the named insured. Jewtraw v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 280 App. Div. 150, 112 N.Y.S.2d 727; Id., 284 App. Div. 312, 131 N.Y.S.2d 745. The court with reference to this particular clause, at 112 N.Y.S.2d 727, 730, said:
" 'Coverage A' refers to bodily injuries and is common to both clauses (d) and (e). Reading the two clauses together it is quite clear (d), so far as claims for personal injuries are concerned, excludes all employees, other than domestics not covered by workmen's compensation, irrespective of compensation benefits. If this is not so' then clause (e) is superfluous. In our opinion the language of (d) if read alone is -clear enough, but certainly when the two clauses are read together no ambiguity appears in either."
Clauses (e) and (d), referred to in the foregoing quotation, are in language identical to that of clauses (e) and (d) in the instant case.
In Security Ins. Co. v. Jay, D.C., 109 F.Supp. 87, the liability insurance policy before the court contained a clause (d) with language identical to that of clause (d) in the instant case. This language was held to exclude from coverage liability for injury to a person who was serving the insured as an employee when the accident occurred.
In the case of National Surety Corporation v. Windham, Fla., 1954, 74 So.2d 549, the language of the exclusion clause was before this Court: The appellant contended that the claimant, who was injured by its insured, was not within the terms of the policy because he was an employee of the named insured engaged in employment at the time of injury and, therefore, excluded by reason of the clause (d). This contention was rejected by this Court because we found that the complainant Wind-ham was an independent contractor instead of an employee of the insured. Implicit in this decision is the holding that an employee of a named insured, other than domestic, is not within the terms of the policy by reason of the exclusion clause.
There are obvious reasons for differentiating between the public as a class and one's own employees. Upon the authority of the foregoing cases it is clear that the appellee Owens was not within the coverage of the liability policy issued by the appellant to appellee Cooksey. Finding no merit to other contentions of the ap-pellees the summary judgment against the appellant is reversed.
MATHEWS, C. J., and TERRELL, THOMAS, SEBRING and HOBSON, JJ., concur.
HOLT, Associate Justice, dissents.