Case Name: Raul PINTADO, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2007-11-14
Citations: 970 So. 2d 857
Docket Number: No. 3D06-561
Parties: Raul PINTADO, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: Before SHEPHERD, SUAREZ, and ROTHENBERG, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 970
Pages: 857–861

Head Matter:
Raul PINTADO, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 3D06-561.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Nov. 14, 2007.
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Gwendolyn Powell Braswell, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Lucretia A. Pitts, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Before SHEPHERD, SUAREZ, and ROTHENBERG, JJ.

Opinion:
SUAREZ, J.
The defendant appeals the order revoking his probation. We affirm.
The defendant contends that the trial court violated his due process rights by excluding defense witnesses whom he listed on the day of the probation violation hearing. The State asserts that the trial court properly excluded the witnesses after conducting a Richardson hearing, and that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The defendant was serving probation for lewd and lascivious acts on a child when the State alleged that he violated probation by, among other things, stabbing his girlfriend and driving a stolen truck. The case had been pending for two years and had been continued at least two times at the request of the defendant. The defense provided a list of witnesses on the day of the probation violation hearing. The State objected and the trial court conducted a Richardson hearing. The defense proffered that the witnesses would impeach the victim's deposition on matters such as her prior drug use, her children, and history of hitting the defendant, and would testify about the victim's reputation for truthfulness in the community. The State objected on the grounds that these witnesses included the defendant's relatives who could have been listed during the two years the case was pending. The State claimed that it was prejudiced because it had not received a copy of the victim's deposition which was allegedly going to be challenged, and was unable to conduct background investigations on the new witnesses or otherwise refute their testimony. The trial court found that a discovery violation occurred, that it was substantial and not trivial, and excluded the witnesses. The court revoked the defendant's probation and sentenced him to fifteen years imprisonment with credit for time served. The defendant seeks a new probation violation hearing. We review the trial court's decision to exclude evidence for abuse of discretion. Alexander v. State, 931 So.2d 946, 949 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).
A defendant in a criminal case has a right under the Sixth Amendment and the due process clause to present witnesses in defense of a charge. Delgado v. State, 890 So.2d 1269, 1271 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005); see also Cuciak v. State, 410 So.2d 916, 918 (Fla.1982) ("Fair play and justice require that a defendant in a probation revocation hearing be entitled to reasonable discovery pursuant to rule 3.220."). Under Richardson v. State, 246 So.2d 771 (Fla.1971), if there is a discovery violation, the trial judge must first decide whether the violation prevented the aggrieved party from properly preparing for trial. If a court determines that a discovery violation has indeed occurred, "it must then fashion the appropriate sanction to be invoked." Delgado, 890 So.2d at 1271. "[Ejxcluding a defense witness for failure of timely disclosure is a 'severe sanction,' that 'should be a last resort reserved for extreme or aggravated circumstances.'" Delgado, 890 So.2d at 1271 (quoting Livigni v. State, 725 So.2d 1150, 1151 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)).
The trial court conducted a Richardson hearing after the State objected to the defendant's new witnesses. It appears that the trial judge immediately concluded that a discovery violation occurred. The defense proffered that the witnesses would testify regarding the victim's specific bad acts regarding her prior drug use, history of domestic violence with the defendant, and issues regarding her children. Defense counsel explained that the witnesses' testimony would contradict the victim's deposition statements denying these bad acts, and therefore demonstrate that she lies. Character testimony regarding a victim's reputation for truthfulness is admissible. § 90.404(1)(b), 90.609, Fla. Stat. (2006). A witness may also be impeached with statements that are inconsistent with the witness' trial testimony. § 90.608, Fla. Stat. (2006). Here, the defense sought to call witnesses to impeach the victim on collateral matters such as drug use. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by prohibiting this improper impeachment. Ruland v. State, 614 So.2d 537 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (trial court did not err by excluding evidence of victim's drug use and possession of drug paraphernalia; the evidence was not offered to impeach the victim, but attacked the victim's character by suggesting that the victim was a drug dealer or user).
Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion by excluding evidence that the victim previously hit the defendant. Such evidence is not relevant and would not be admissible. The issue at the hearing was whether the defendant had stabbed his girlfriend or she injured herself by falling on the knife. Whether or not she had hit him on prior occasions was collateral and not relevant to the issue. This testimony was being introduced only to show bad character and would not be admissible as, generally, evidence regarding a victim's character is inadmissible unless relevant to the issue being tried. § 90.404(1), Fla. Stat. (2006). However, paragraph 90.404(l)(b) does provide an exception for evidence of a pertinent character trait of the victim. "Under this exception, a defendant may use character evidence to show that the victim of a crime was the aggressor in support of his defense of self-defense." Grace v. State, 832 So.2d 224, 226 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). "While reputation evidence may be offered to corroborate the defendant's testimony by showing the victim's propensity toward violence, specific act evidence is only admissible to prove the reasonableness of the defendant's apprehension." Grace, 832 So.2d at 226. Again, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding evidence regarding the victim's reputation for violence, and specific acts of violence, to be inadmissible. The defendant did not allege that he stabbed the victim in self defense. Instead, he claimed that he did not stab her at all-that she fell on her own knife and the injury was accidentally inflicted. Furthermore, it is clear from defense counsel's proffer that the defense did not intend to use this information for a permissible purpose. Counsel sought to attack the victim's character by presenting evidence that she lied in her deposition when she testified that she had never hit the defendant in the past. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding this testimony.
Next, the court determined that testimony regarding the victim's reputation in the community for truthfulness was admissible and relevant. The court should have attempted to fashion another, less severe, sanction such as continuing the hearing for the State to obtain the needed information, before deciding to exclude the witnesses. Comer v. State, 730 So.2d 769, 774 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (reversing where the trial court precluded a late-listed defense witness from testifying without conducting a Richardson hearing or considering less severe sanctions). However, we conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because there is no "reasonable possibility that the lack of the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.... " Comer, 730 So.2d at 775.
Affirmed.
ROTHENBERG, J., concurs.
. Richardson v. State, 246 So.2d 771 (Fla.1971).