Case Name: Kelly v. Ruble, et al.
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1883-03
Citations: 11 Or. 75
Docket Number: 
Parties: Kelly v. Ruble, et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 11
Pages: 75–118

Head Matter:
Kelly v. Ruble, et al.
Vendob’s Lien.—A vendor’s lien on real restate oanDot be set up'by an apparent stranger to tbe transaction of sale, who claims to have had parol contracts for sale with the grantors, and that the conveyances to the defendant were made through the instrumentality of the plaintiff as the virtual owner.
Semble.—That in this state the vendor of real estate by an absolute deed, has no lien thereon for the unpaid purchase money.
Appeal from Jackson County.
Geo. H. Williams, for appellant.
P. P. Prim, and Bonham da Ramsey, for respondent.
This is an appeal from a decree establishing a vendor’s lien in favor of respondent against certain mining claims on Coyote creek, Jackson county, Oregon, the title to which is in appellants.
The issues are contained in an amended complaint, answer and reply. There were quite a number of defendants, but none of them answered except the appellants, the decree as to the others being for want of answer.
The case stated in the amended complaint is in substance as follows:
That on and prior to April 1, 1878, plaintiff and O. Jacobs owned in fee as tenants in common, certain mining land on Coyote creek, and that at the same time Ash & McWilliams, O’Shea, John Robertson, D. R. Matthews, and Davis & Rathburn owned respectively certain other mining claims adjacent thereto, all of which claims are particularly described by metes and bounds, in the complaint.
That prior to said date all of said claims not owned by plaintiff were “bonded” to him by written agreements with the owners thereof, except the Ash & McWilliam’s claims as to which there was a verbal agreement, whereby he had the refusal and option to purchase said claims, with the water rights, ditches and other appurtenances, from said owners thereof within an agreed period of time. That while said agreements were in full forcé, plaintiff entered into a written contract for the sale thereof, to one Muncy, of which the following is a copy:
Know all men by these presents, that H. Kelly of the county of Jackson, in the state of Oregon, party of the first part, and I. N. Muncy of the county of Douglas, of the above state, party of the second part, agree as follows, to-wit: “That the said Kelly binds himself, his heirs and assigns to make and deliver to the said Muncy or his assigns, a good and sufficient warranty deed of all the mineral ground situated on Coyote creek in the said county of Jackson, that is now patented to 0. Jacobs and Kelly; also a good and sufficient deed for the right of possession of all the mining claims on said creek, commencing from the lower end of the mining claim owned by F. A. Davis, and extending to the upper end of the claims now owned by McWilliams & Co., and all houses, ditches, water rights, flumes and hydraulics belonging thereto. The conditions of the above bond are that if said Muncy or his heirs or assigns, shall pay or tender to the said Kelly, his heirs or assigns, the sum of $30,000 in gold coin of the IT. S., or notes accepted by the said Kelly as follows: Ten thousand dollars ($10,000) in three weeks; ten thousand dollars in two months, and ten thousand dollars in four months from the date of this bond, then the above .bond to remain in full force and effect, otherwise to be void.
Dated at Oanyonville, Oregon, this first day of July, 1878.
H. KELLY, [seal].”
That the mining claims referred to in this bond are the same as those described by metes and bounds in the com-plaint, and other claims known as the Marshall claims.
That about August 15, 1878, ¥m. Ruble assumed said contract evidenced by said bond, and undertook jointly with Muncy and severally for himself to cany it out and to take said property and pay plaintiff therefor according to its terms.
That this contract was subsequently and prior to August 27, 1878, so modified by mutual consent of plaintiff, Muncy and Ruble, as to exclude the Marshall claim, and to reduce the purchase price to $27,000.
That prior to August 27, 1878, Muncy, in pursuance of said contract, and for the purpose of raising said $27,000, procured the following paper writing to be drawn and subscribed by the persons whose names appear thereto:
“Know all men by these presents, that we the undersigned subscribers to stock in a certain gravel mine, situated on Coyote creek in the counties of Jackson and Josephine, in the state of Oregon, agree to pay to I. N. Muncy, fifty per cent, of the capital value for each and every share set opposite our names, as follows: Twenty-five per cent, in hand, and twenty-five per cent, when taken out of the mine over and above expenses.
That said mine is to be divided into two hundred thous- and shares, of the par value of one dollar each, in gold coin of the United States.
It being understood and agreed that each and every subscriber is to have one-half of the net proceeds of the mine pro rata, to the whole amount of the' capital stock, until his stock shall be paid in full in said coin as above mentioned, then he is to receive the amount of stock for which he has subscribed, free from all incumbrances, and full divdends thereafter upon said stock:. It being further agreed and understood that the said Muncy is to, at its own expense, extend the ditch known as the McWilliam & Co. ditch, down the said creek to a point on the hill above a claim known as the Eobertson claim, and to purchase and place upon said mine another pipe fifteen inches in diameter, and of sufficient length for the successful working of said mine, together with a giant and flume corresponding to the same.
Names oe Subscribers. Amount oe Stock.
Paid in full $1,000, H. Kelly.....................1000
Paid D. Stump...........................5000
Paid $20, E. A. Chase...........................1000
Paid $1,500, J. L.sMurphy, first payment full.......7500
Paid $25, xl. Cloak............................. 100
Paid $500, J. E. Bewley, first payment full.........2000
Paid 50 cents, Eddie Eaulconer, first payment full,... 2
Paid 25 cents, Prank Lucas, first payment full....... 1
Paid 50 cents, Ered Lucas, first payment full........ 2
Paid $1.25, Elizabeth Hoper, first payment full...... 5
Paid 25 cents, Curtis M. Hooper, first payment full.. 1
Paid $25, D. M. Oalbreath, first payment full........ 100
Paid by note $10, S. W. Sloper, first payment full.... 40
Paid $25, W. F. Lemon......................... 100
Paid $250, Eeuben Doty........................2000
Paid $150, J. H. Eay...........................1000
Geo. Dyer.....................................2000
B. F. Dyer....................................2000
T. S. Eodabough...............................5000
Paid $9,550, as per arrangement, ¥m. Euble......50,000
That it was understood by and between said subscribers, that Muncy, as their representative, and, representing a com pany to be formed, would secure to them through said contract between himself, plaintiff and Nuble, the said mining grounds and claims and appurtenances, which was the pur.pose of those executing said writing, it being agreed among them that each share should represent a 1-200,000 undivided interest in said mines.
That to carry out said scheme, Nuble, Muncy, Stump, and Murphy, on August 27,1878, incorporated the “Coyote Gold and Silver Mining Company,” which was done at the instance and advice of Nuble by articles, a copy of which is made “Exhibit O” to the complaint.
That Nuble, on August 27, 1878, purchased the shares subscribed by him, 50,000 of Muncy, agreeing to pay $10,-000, seven thousand cash, three thousand on or before November 1, 1878, and $12,500 when realized out of one-half of the net proceeds of his one-fourth interest in said mine.
That it was agreed between Nuble, Stump, Murphy, and Muncy acting for himself and said other subscribers, that Nuble should, in pursuance of said contract between him, Muncy and plaintiff, purchase said mining property and take the title in the name of said company or in his, Nuble’s name, in trust and for the use of said company, and it was known to said incorporators and subscribers at the time of said incorporation, and at all times thereafter, that plaintiff had not been paid in full for said property and had a vendor’s lien thereon for said unpaid balance of the purchase price.
That in pursuance of said contract and arrangement, plaintiff on September 2, 1878, caused and procured Davis and Nathburn to convey their mining ground to Nuble who paid $2,000 therefor, and on September 4, 1878, plaintiff caused and procured O’Shea to convey to Nuble his mining ground, and Nuble paid $2,550, and conveyed to plaintiff a half interest in the Murphy farm valued, at $750, and on the same day plaintiff caused and procured Robertson to convey his claim to Ruble who paid $1,000, and on the same day paid plaintiff $500 and conveyed to him the other half of the Murphy farm, all of which conveyances were made in pursuance of said contract between Kelly and Muncy and Ruble, and with the understanding that Ruble was taking the title thereto in trust and for the use and benefit of said company.
That defendant, ¥m. Ruble, as the agent of said company, did on the 4th day of September, 1878, further promise and agree to pay Ash and McWilliams for plaintiff, on account of said contract of said Muncy with plaintiff, the further sum of $4,000, and the balance of said $27,000 so to be paid on said contract, and the plaintiff therefor, and in consideration thereof, caused the said Ash and McWilliams to make out their deed to the said Ruble for their said property, which was bonded to Kelly as above mentioned, and relying upon Ruble’s promise to pay said balance of $11,664 25 within a short time thereafter, plaintiff, on December 6, 1878, caused to be conveyed to said company the balance of said mining claims, and surrender to it the whole thereof. That the $1,000 subscribed by plaintiff has been credited as part payment of said $27,000. That there is due plaintiff said balance of $11,664 25 with interest at 10 per cent, from December 6, 1.878, on which day an accounting was had between him and defendants, and said balance found due him. That after the corporation of said company, various other persons (whose names are given,) subscribed for shares in said mine, agreeing to pay therefor as set forth in the complaint, all with Ruble’s knowledge and consent, and upon the understanding that he was holding the title to the lands so conveyed to him in trust for said company.
That about November 27, 1878, Wm. Nuble, without consideration, and with intent to defraud said company and said subscribers, and to defraud plaintiff out of said unpaid balance of purchase money due him, conveyed the Davis and Nathbone and Nobertson claims to defendant Walter Nuble, who had, at the time he accepted said conveyance, full knowledge of all the above facts, and that for like fraudulent purposes Walter Nuble on May 20, 1880, without consideration conveyed the same to defendant, Nuth Nuble, who well knew the above facts when she took said deed. That by the acts of Wm. Nuble, in taking possession of and claiming to own the portion of said mining ground conveyed to said company as above stated, the same is rendered almost valueless and will not sell for enough to pay said balance of purchase money due plaintiff.
Wherefore plaintiff prays that said deeds to Walter and Nuth Nuble be decreed to be fraudulent and void and be canceled, and that his vendor’s lien for said unpaid balance of purchase money due him, with interest as aforesaid, be foreclosed, and said property sold to satisfy the same, etc.
A large portion of the answer, consisting of some 22 so-called separate answers, was stricken out on motion. As left standing, that pleading in substance is as follows:
Specific denials of a large majority of the allegations of the complaint, but admitting that the contract between plaintiff and Muncy is correctly copied as above set forth; denying, however, that Wm. Nuble assumed or became a party thereto. Also admitting that the copy of subscription agreement is correctly set forth, but denying the legal effeet claimed for it in the complaint, or that it was executed upon the understanding, or for the purposes claimed by plaintiff, and alleging that tbe words “Paid $9,550” connected with Ruble’s signature and subscription thereto, were placed there long after he signed, and without his knowledge or consent, and denying that he ever paid one cent to Muncy or any one else on said stibscription. Denies that it was understood by or among said subscribers that each share should represent a 1-200,000 part or any interest in said mining ground. Denies that ¥m. Kuble took said conveyances of said mining claims or any of them to himself in trust or for the use or benefit of said subscribers or of said company, or in pursuance of said contract between plaintiff and Muncy, or of said subscription agreement, or upon any understanding or agreement that said deeds were made to him as agent or representative of said company or of said subscribers.
Admits the conveyance to ¥m. Kuble of the Davis and Kathbone, O’Shea and Kobertson claims by the respective owners thereof, and the payment of the amounts of money specified in the complaint therefor, at the times alleged by the plaintiff, and also the conveyance by Ash and McWilliams of tlieir claims to said company, and the payment of $1,000 by Kuble therefor, but denies that said conveyances to Ruble, or any of them, were in trust for said company, and alleges that all of said money paid for said claims was Ruble’s own money, and denies that Ruble agreed to pay plaintiff any balance of $27,000. Admits the payment by Muncy to plaintiff of the $2,285 75, and the payment by Stump to plaintiff of $500, but denies that either payment was made upon, or on account of, or because of said contract between Muncy and plaintiff, or of said subscription agreement, and denies that Wm. Kuble promised or agreed to carry out said contract between Muncy and plaintiff, or became a party thereto, or that plaintiff relied on any such promise, agreement or understanding. It is denied that plaintiff caused and procured said conveyances to be executed to Wm. Nuble and to said company in pursuance of any such contract, agreement or understanding as alleged in the complaint, but it is not denied that plaintiff did cause and procure said deeds to be executed to Nuble and the company, and is admitted that the sums of money alleged in the complaint to have been paid to plaintiff therefor at the delivery of said deeds were so paid. Admits the incorporation of said company by articles copied as exhibit to complaint, and that "Win. Nuble was one of the incorporators thereof. Denies the surrender of possession of said mining claims by plaintiff to said company. Admits that Nuble received $500 from Stump and paid it to Mathews, but denies that any other subscriber to said agreement furnished any money to pay for any property described in the complaint. Denies that any accounting was ever had between plaintiff and defendants, .or that $11,661 25 or any part thereof was found due to plaintiff, or is now due to him, and denies any promise or agreement on the part of Nuble or the company to pay the same or any part thereof. Denies knowledge on the part of said incorporators or subscribers that any balance was or is due plaintiff, or that he had or has any vendor’s lien therefor upon any of said property. Admits the subscription subsequent to incorporation by the various persons named in the complaint for the amounts there stated, but denies they were made or paid with the understanding that the company owned said mines. Denies knowledge, etc., as to whether plaintiff paid the $1,000 subscribed by him, or credited same on purchase price of any of said mining claims. Denies that "Wm. Nuble wrongfully or fraudulently took or holds possession of any of said property, or wrongfully or fraudulently, or without consideration, conveyed the property to Walter Nuble. Denies that Walter Nuble knew that said property belonged to said company when he received said conveyance from Win. Nuble. Denies that the deed from Walter to Nuth Nuble was wrongful, fraudulent, or without consideration, or that she knew the property thereby conveyed belonged to said company. Denies that Wm. Nuble’s possession of said property conveyed to the company has depreciated the value thereof. Admits the conveyance by plaintiff on December 6, 1878, of the 0. Jacobs, Kelly and Mathews claims to the company, and that said corporation paid plaintiff in cash, notes and property about $6,000, and that prior to the commencement of this suit, said corporation paid plaintiff 90,000 shares of its stock, marked paid in full, which was received by plaintiff in full satisfaction of all demands against said company.
The reply denies all of the affirmative allegations of the answer.

Opinion:
By the Court,
Waldo, J.:
The complaint alleges that on the first day of July, 1878, the respondent bound himself by an agreement in writing to convey to I. N. Muncy, for $30,000, to be paid in installments of $10,000 in two weeks, two months and four months, seven mining claims in Jackson county, Oregon.
The respondent owned but one of these claims, but contracts to convey to him are alleged to have existed between him and the owners. Some of these contracts are shown to have been verbal, and in the others the writings have not been produced. They must, therefore, all be held to stand on the same footing of verbal contracts, void under the statute of frauds. The complaint, as stated in respondent's brief, goes on to allege that Nuble in conjunction, with Muncy and severally for himself—what that may mean no one has tried to explain—assumed said contract and undertook to carry it out, and to take said property from respondent. Now there was no contract on Muncy's part to be assumed. The contract was unilateral. (Hawralty v. Warren, 17 N. J. Eq., 124.) Muncy had an option to purchase and if he turned that option over to Nuble, Nuble would have an option and nothing more. If Nuble became bound he became so wholly by subsequent transactions. Then, after Nuble had assumed, as is alleged, the so-called Muncy contract, it is next alleged that the contract was afterward modified so as to exclude the Marshal claim and reduce the purchase price to $27,000. This modification was oral and, therefore, void. (Dana v. Hancock, 30 Vt., 616; Abell v. Munson, 18 Mich., 306.)
The next allegation is that Muncy and Nuble undertook to raise the $27,000, for which the contract called, and we are introduced to the subscription paper, by which it appears that Muncy—not Muncy and Nuble—undertook to figure in the character of vendor of these claims and to sell them to third parties for $100,000. The method adopted was to endeavor to form a company and issue stock, out of the proceeds of the sale of which Muncy was to be paid $100,000, and to make over the property to the company. In furtherance of this project, it is alleged that on the 27th day of August, 1878, Nuble, Muncy, Stump and Murphy incorporated the Coyote Gold and Silver Mining Company; and Nuble is alleged then and there, although the articles of incorporation had not yet been filed and were not filed in J ackson county until the 6th of September, to have purchased of Muncy, acting as agent for the company, 50,000 shares of stock, and to have agreed to pay Muncy therefor the sum of $25,000; $7,000 in hand and the balance in in stallments. What authority Muncy had to act as agent for the corporation and sell its stock to Nuble is one of the mysteries of this remarkable complaint. At this time there was neither stock nor company in existence. (See Mokelumne Hill M. & C. Co. v. Woodbury, 14 Cal., 424.) So far as the complaint affirmatively shows, Nuble rests under the burden of this debt to this day. There is not a word more about the indebtedness to Muncy.
The corporation which is alleged to have'been organized for the purpose of taking and holding the property for the benefit of the subscribers to the Muncy subscription paper, seems to have forgotten the purpose of its creation. But it is alleged that the incorporators agreed among themselves that Nuble should "proceed to Coyote creek, in Jackson county, and make payments on account of said Muncy and Nuble contract with the plaintiff for the purchase of said mining claims and take the title for the same in the name of the company or in his own name, but it was agreed between said parties as aforesaid that if taken in his own name the said title should be held by said Nuble in trust for the use and benefit of the company." The transaction thus alleged has much the appearance of having been a transaction between third parties—res inter alios aeta.
It is then alleged that Nuble went to Jackson county in pursuance of said agreement, and for the purpose of purchasing said mines for said company, and represented to respondent that he was the agent for said company and authorized to make payments for said company to respondent and to take title in his own name for the use and benefit of said company, and that respondent, relying on said representations, did, on the 2d day of September, 1878, cause the Davis & Nathburn claim to be conveyed to Nuble, followed, on the 4th of September, by conveyances of the O'Shea and Rathburn claims.
How does the case, as thus far stated, stand? The claim is, that Ruble acted as agent and purchased these claims for the Coyote Gold and Silver Mining Company, and holds them in trust for that corporation. This cannot possibly be true as matter of law. The respondent was bound to take notice that the articles of incorporation had not been filed. "When Ruble purchased, the corporation had no legal existence. Ruble could not have been an agent, for there was no principal. He could not have been a trustee, for there was no cestue que trust. If the promise was made to Muncy, Stump and Murphy for the benefit of the corporation, it was void, not only under the statute of frauds, but for •want of consideration. As a contract, it would have been one to which the respondent was a stranger. But suppose the corporation to have been in existence and that the promise was made directly to the corporation, Ruble paid his own money and his promise to buy and hold in trust for the corporation would have been directly in the teeth of the statute of frauds. (2 Sugden on Vendors, 8 Am. Ed., 438.) Hence, even if Ruble had been actually the agent of the corporation and had undertaken to purchase the property for the corporation, no title would have vested in the corporation on account of the pm-chases made on the 2d and 4th of September. Some other ground must be found, then, on which to assert a title to this property in the corporation. This ground is supposed to be found in the representations Ruble is alleged to have made to the respondent, that he was purchasing for the corporation. In other words, Ruble is estopped by those alleged representations to deny the title of the corporation. But the corporation was a stranger to the alleged representations, and can neither take advantage of, nor be bound by them. (Averill v. Wilson, 4 Barb., 180; Wood v. Bennell, 51 Me., 52; 32 Pa. St., 49.) No trust can arise in favor of the corporation because of those alleged representations to the respondent. (Blyholder v. Gilson, 18 Pa. St., 135.)
Nuble is not charged to have purchased for himself. There is an insurmountable difficulty in so charging him, because the contract is alleged to have been entire and Nuble purchased only a part. An end, then, would seem to have been reached in the attempt to establish a vendor's lien on the property held by Nuble. But this apparently irremediable defect at the threshold of the respondent's case, has been supplied in the following extraordinary manner: Nuble and the corporation are both defendants in the suit and between them they own the whole of the property. They can not be charged severally, because the contract was entire. There was but one vendee and one sale. This sale was made to the corporation and a portion of the property conveyed to Nuble as trustee. But, unfortunately, the corporation can assert no title to the property held by Nuble. The equitable as well as legal title is wholly in Nuble. How, then, is the trust to be established? The respondent solves the difficulty as follows: Nuble, as he alleges, represented to the respondent that he was purchasing the property for the corporation, and the respondent believed those representations and sold to Nuble believing that he was selling to the corporation. It must be admitted that those alleged representations gave the company no title to the property so purchased. But the respondent is entitled to consider that those representations were true, and that while Nuble is not estopped to deny, as against the corporation, that the property he holds is equitably its property, he is, nevertheless, estopped to deny this as against the respondent. That while the property does not belong to the corporation, within any legal definition of the word property, the respondent has such peculiar relations to it that he may levy on and sell it at execution sale to satisfy a debt against the corporation. The result is most extraordinary. Ruble and the corporation are consolidated into a centaur-like figure—half man—half corporation. Ruble's existence as a natural person is so far destroyed by merger in the corporation that a sale to him instantly vests the title in the corporation. There is, according to the respondent's views, no distinction, in legal effect, between Ruble and the Coyote Gold and Silver Mining Company. They are the same. But Ruble claims to be a private person entitled to the benefit of the laws of private property. The property of one person cannot by the laws of this country be taken to pay the debt of another. Yet this is precisely what the respondent is attempting to do. The corporation, which is sued directly as the purchaser of the property and debtor to the respondent for the purchase money, has not a shadow of title to the property held by Ruble. Hence, had the corporation made defense, the debt which the suit is brought to enforce would have been shown to have no existence, and, consequently, the respondent's suit would have failed. But the corporation makes default. This, however, cannot affect Ruble. Ruble can attack- the respondent's case as the corporation could have attacked it, and show that the corporation has no title to the property, and, consequently, that he cannot .be a trustee. In any other view, the cticum stance of making default or making defense on the part of the corporation would determine the question of Ruble's liability. But Ruble claims adversely and his rights cannot depend on any such principle. The alleged representations to respondent had no effect on the title of the corporation, and there' is no other title in controversy. The respondent asserts rights against Knble not independently of, but through the corporation, and his case fails when he fails to make out title in the corporation.
Next, when we come to the transfer of the Ash & McWilliams claim, we find facts impossible to reconcile witli the transaction of an entire sale set up by the respondent. The Davis & Kathburn claim was conveyed on the 2d of September, anÜ, since the contract was entire, the contract for the sale of. the whole of the property should have been made by that time. Now, it cannot be denied that the respondent's contract with Ash & McWilliams was void under the statute of frauds. Hence, the respondent had not, equitably, sold that claim on the 2d of September when the Davis & Kathburn claim was conveyed. Ash & McWilliams were the absolute owners after that time and could have sold to any one with full notice of the void contract and conveyed a perfect title. There were neither legal nor equitable rights in respondent of which to take notice. On what ground, then, can the respondent claim to have been the vendor of that claim on an entire contract? Suppose that Kuble, after his purchase of the Davis & Kathburn claim on the 2d of September, had conveyed that claim to one with full notice of the void oral agreement. Would not the purchaser have acquired a good title to the claim? This shows that when the Davis & Kathburn claim was conveyed, no sale of the Ash & McWilliams claim had taken place. In what condition was the alleged vendor's lien on the Davis & Kathburn claim prior to the subsequent conveyances? If the other claims were sold under the same contract with the Davis & Kathburn claim, they must have been sold by the 2d of September. If they were sold after that time, it severs the entirety of the contract and is fatal to the respondent's case.
But how can. the respondent avoid the statute of frauds which stares him in the face in every one of these transactions. There cannot be a case in the books entitled to a moment's consideration that will sanction such an inroad on the statute of frauds as is attempted in this case. There is not a single act or circumstance in connection with the alleged part performance to stand as a safeguard against perjury. The oral agreement was as invalid in equity as at law. Earl, J., Wheeler v. Reynolds, 66 N. Y., 236. Where the agreement has been partly performed,c equity interferes to prevent fraud. Id., 236; Playmale v. Comstock, 9 Or., 321. The act of part performance must be clearly proved, and to do this it is essential that the act itself must be such that it cannot be consistently explained except on the supposition of an agreement. Brewer v. Wilson, 17 N. Y. Eq., 180; Bunton v. Smith, 40 N. H., 353; Charpiat v. Sigeron, 25 Mo., 63; Knoll v. Harvey, 19 Wis., 99; Wheeler v. Reynolds, 66 N. Y., 231; Peckham v. Barker, 8 R. I., 22; Purcell v. Minor, 4 Wall., 513.
What presumption can be raised from the fact that Ash & McWilliams deeded their claim to Nuble, that there was an agreement for its sale between respondent and Nuble; it appears on its face to have been a sale made by Ash & McWilliams to Nuble, and when it is shown that Nuble paid the purchase price to them out of his own money, and, as he swears, for his own beneñt, parol testimony cannot be heard to the contrary. The act which is set up to establish part performance must itself furnish some evidence of the alleged agreement without the aid of parol testimony. Such testimony alone cannot establish part performance. Samms v. Worthington, 38 Md., 326-7, cited in Waterman on Specific Performance, § 261; Harris v. Knickerbocker, 5 Wen., 645; Armstrong v. Katterhorn, 11 Ohio, 264; Danforth v. Lancy, 28 Ala., 274; Wilson v. Wilson, 6 Mich., 9; German v. Mackin, 6 Pa., 293; Ham v. Goodrich, 33 N. H., 32; Jones v. Peterman, 3 S. & R., 543; S. C. 8 Am. Dec., 672. If the proposition advanced by the respondent was true, no sale of real estate could take place against which a vendor's lien could not be established wholly by parol testimony by collusion between the grantor and alleged vendor.
It follows that, admit the facts to be as alleged, and they fail as matter of law to show that the respondent was the vendor of these claims. They show, on the contrary, that he was not.
As the respondent has failed to make out a sale, it becomes unnecessary to consider the case further. We have thus far impliedly admitted the existence of the equitable lien of a vendor of real estate for the unpaid purchase price. But we doubt the actual existence of the lien in this state. Ahrend v. Odiorne, 118 Mass., 261; Kauffert v. Bower, 7 S. & R., 64, 76. It is not believed the existence of such lien was decided in Pease v. Kelly, 3 Or.
Judgment reversed and restitution of the property ordered.