Case Name: F. L. W. REED, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Mitchell MELNICK, Defendant-Appellee
Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico
Jurisdiction: New Mexico
Decision Date: 1969-10-31
Citations: 81 N.M. 14
Docket Number: No. 327
Parties: F. L. W. REED, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Mitchell MELNICK, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: HENDLEY, J., concurs.
Reporter: New Mexico Reports
Volume: 81
Pages: 14–17

Head Matter:
462 P.2d 148
F. L. W. REED, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Mitchell MELNICK, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 327.
Court of Appeals of New Mexico.
Oct. 31, 1969.
Writ of Certiorari Issued Dec. 3, 1969.
Sterling F. Black, Los Alamos, for plaintiff-appellant.
Joseph G. Lawler, Sommer & Lawler, Santa Fe, for defendant-appellee.

Opinion:
OPINION
SPIESS, Chief Judge.
Plaintiff (Reed) sued defendant (Mel-nick) for damages based upon an alleged libelous publication. The complaint was dismissed by the trial court for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Appeal is from this order. The basis of the order of dismissal is "that the matter complained of does not constitute libel per se" and "that plaintiff failed to plead special damages."
The sole question presented here is whether the language of the alleged publication is libelous per se. It is alleged that defendant published a false and defamatory statement about plaintiff in a letter to an insurance company "for whom plaintiff was then an agent and with whom plaintiff had extensive business dealings." The letter is in the following language:
"Please cancel the attached PN 46 HO 210678 for insureds Earl R. Buss and Lillian Buss. They have sold the property and wish refund. Please send refund to this office as we must finish disbursements of the closing.
"Cancellation should be effective 12-8-67, date of sale. We have just received the original policy back from lienholder. Under no circumstances send the refund to F. L. W. Reed (agent of record) as in this community people cannot get money out of him.
"I don't even want to rely on getting his return commission back from him, as he is threatening backruptcy [sic] and my client wants his full refund since he no longer owns property.
Thank you."
In Ramsey v. Zeigner, 79 N.M. 457, 444 P.2d 968 (1968) the Supreme Court said:
"Defamatory words are either actionable per se or per quod. Those which are injurious upon their face and without extrinsic aid are defamatory per se; but if insinuations, innuendo, colloquium or explanatory circumstances are necessary either to explain the person intended or the defamatory character, they are only .actionable per quod and require pleading .and proof of special damage to the complaining party. Chase v. New Mexico Pub. Co., 53 N.M. 145, 203 P.2d 594. We further said in Chase that:
"In determining whether the article is libelous per se, the article alone must be construed, stripped of all insinuations, innuendo, colloquium, and explanatory circumstances. The article must be defamatory on its face 'within the four corners thereof.' "
See also Thomas v. Frost, 79 N.M. 125, 440 P.2d 800 (Ct.App.1968).
It is generally held that words falsely written of a party, which prejudice such party in his occupation or trade are actionable per se. Prosser, Law of Torts, § 107 at 780-782 (3rd ed. 1964); Gardella v. Log Cabin Products Co., 89 F.2d 891 (2nd Cir.1937); Southland Publishing Co. v. Sewell, 111 Ga.App. 803, 143 S.E.2d 428 (1965); Pollitt v. Brush-Moore Newspapers, Inc., 214 Md. 570, 136 A.2d 573, (1957); Coursey v. Greater Niles Township Publishing Co., 82 Ill.App.2d 76, 227 N.E.2d 164 (1967); Whitby v. Associates Discount Corp., 59 Ill.App.2d 337, 207 N.E.2d 482 (1965); Jamison v. Rebenson, 21 Ill.App.2d 364, 158 N.E.2d 82 (1959) ; Bonham v. Dotson et al., 216 Ky. 660, 288 S.W. 297 (Ct.App.1926).
A case involving slander but which merits consideration in this connection is Dillard v. Shattuck, 36 N.M. 202, 11 P.2d 543 (1942), in which the court said:
"It is true that slanderous statements which would not be actionable per se when spoken of a person as an individual may become so when spoken of the same person in relation to his trade, profession, or business. When so spoken it is unnecessary to allege or prove special damage."
The following statement is contained in I Harper & James, The Law of Torts, § 5.12 at 381 — (1956):
"The law of defamation has always stressed the pecuniary aspects of-injury to reputation. It is to be expected, therefore, that special emphasis was placed -on those defamatory charges the tendency- of which was to interfere with one's livelihood."
See also Prosser, Law of Torts, § 107 at 782 (3rd ed. 1964); Newell, Slander & Libel, § 150, 152 (4th ed. 1924). The rule stated has generally been applied to statements imputing insolvency, or want of credit to a businessman. Altoona Clay Products, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 367 F.2d 625 (3rd Cir. 1966); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Robinson, 233 Ark. 168, 345 S.W.2d 34 (1961); Tucker v. Kilgore, 388 S.W.2d 112, (Ky.Ct.App.1964), rehearing denied 1965; Goudy v. Dayton Newspapers, Inc., 14 Ohio App.2d 207, 43 Ohio Op.2d 444, 237 N.E.2d 909 (1967).
Tested by these rules it seems clear to us that the letter contains matter defamatory and of a prejudicial nature against plaintiff in relation to his business. The language, without innuendo, casts doubt upon plaintiff's solvency and suggests that he is in financial difficulty; that his credit is poor and he is unable or unwilling to meet his obligations as they accrue.
Defendant places reliance upon the Single Instance Rule (Cinquanta v. Burdett, 154 Colo. 37, 388 P.2d 779, 1 A.L.R.3rd 840 (1964). This rule, however, is inapplicable here since the words relate to a general condition (insolvency) as distinguished from a single act or occurrence. See November v. Time, Inc., 13 N.Y.2d 175, 244 N.Y.S.2d 309, 194 N.E.2d 126 (1963).
The judgment appealed from is reversed with directions to the district court to reinstate the cause on the docket and proceed in a manner consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
HENDLEY, J., concurs.
OMAN, J., dissents.