Case Name: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Walter JOHNSON, a/k/a Walter O'Neal, Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1992-10-26
Citations: 977 F.2d 1297
Docket Number: No. 92-1140
Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Walter JOHNSON, a/k/a Walter O’Neal, Appellant.
Judges: Before JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge, HEANEY, Senior Circuit Judge, and BEAM, Circuit Judge.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 977
Pages: 1297–1300

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Walter JOHNSON, a/k/a Walter O’Neal, Appellant.
No. 92-1140.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted June 8, 1992.
Decided Oct. 26, 1992.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 8, 1992.
John Cullom, Kansas City, Mo., for appellant.
Peter Ossorio, Asst. U.S. Atty., Kansas City, Mo., for appellee.
Before JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge, HEANEY, Senior Circuit Judge, and BEAM, Circuit Judge.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Walter Johnson, also known as Walter O'Neal, III, appeals the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. We affirm.
Johnson was indicted on one count of knowingly and intentionally possessing with intent to distribute fifty (50) grams or more of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A). The indictment was based upon an arrest at the Greyhound Bus Station in Kansas City, Missouri, at which time Johnson was in possession of 793.1 grams of a substance containing cocaine base.
At a hearing on June 29, 1989, conducted pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 11, Johnson offered his plea of guilty which plea was accepted but only after very thorough questioning by the district judge on the issue of voluntariness. Johnson testified that, among other things, he was a high school graduate with "about a year of college," Appendix at 15; he was satisfied with the services of his lawyer, id. at 16; he was paid $1,000 to transport crack cocaine in his suitcase to Kansas City, Missouri; id. at 23; he brought the cocaine to Kansas City from Los Angeles by Greyhound bus to distribute it, id. at 24; and that he knew this was against the law. Id.
After acceptance of the plea, he was incarcerated at the Vernon County Jail in Nevada, Missouri, while a presentence report was being prepared. On July 27, 1989, he escaped from jail and was a fugitive until August 1, 1991.
After his August 1991 arrest, he filed a motion to withdraw the plea alleging ineffective assistance of his counsel, a federal public defender described by the district court at the plea change hearing as "probably the most experienced . [djefender we have in this part of Missouri." Appendix at 16. Johnson alleged that (1) his lawyer failed to locate an exculpatory witness; (2) the suitcase was not his and a woman passenger witness who would have helped him pursue this defense was not located by his lawyer; (3) he was not aware he could go to trial rather than plead guilty; (4) he was not informed by his lawyer that "no fingerprints were obtained off of the bag" with the cocaine; and (5) he was not in formed of the punishment range that could be imposed. Appendix at 40-41.
The motion was denied by the court in a carefully reasoned memorandum and order. Johnson renewed his motion at the time of the sentencing hearing. The district court reconsidered the motion and permitted him to proffer facts in support of his claims. The court also heard argument from counsel. The written plea agreement originally offered at the Rule 11 hearing was received in evidence. It clearly contradicted part of Johnson's claims and allegations as did other parts of the record from the Rule 11 hearing. The court then discussed the sentencing hearing proffer and found that Johnson's statements and his various allegations were incredible. The court again denied the motion.
We agree with Johnson that the test for determining the appropriateness for withdrawal of a plea is set forth in United States v. Boone, 869 F.2d 1089 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 822, 110 S.Ct. 81, 107 L.Ed.2d 47 (1989). The factors to consider are:
(1) whether defendant established a fair and just reason to withdraw his plea;
(2) whether defendant asserts his legal innocence of the charge;
(3) the length of time between the guilty plea and the motion to withdraw; and
(4) if the defendant established a fair and just reason for withdrawal, whether the government will be prejudiced.
Id. at 1091-92 (footnote omitted).
It is also established that "a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
On the record we have, it is clear that Johnson fails to pass the Boone test. His claims, coming after his testimony under oath at the Rule 11 hearing and after an escape period of over two years, are simply not believable. The district judge was correct in his denial of the motion to withdraw the plea.
The sentencing guideline calculation was carefully reviewed by the district court and was determined to be within a range of 235 to 293 months. The sentence actually imposed was the minimum period permitted by the guidelines absent grounds for a downward departure, which grounds did not exist in this case. We note, however, that Johnson had a criminal history rating of zero. This means that he will be incarcerated for the better part of 235 months (19 years, 7 months) for being a $1,000 drug "mule" on the drug-trade route between Los Angeles and Kansas City. In the absence of prior significant criminal conduct, this sentence seems excessive, but it is required by law.
Accordingly, the district court is affirmed.