Case Name: The State ex relatione Fanning & Lord vs. The Mayor of Charleston
Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1860-01
Citations: 12 Rich. 480
Docket Number: 
Parties: The State ex relatione Fanning & Lord vs. The Mayor of Charleston.
Judges: Johnston and Wardlaw, JJ., concurred.
Reporter: South Carolina Law Reports
Volume: 46
Pages: 480–482

Head Matter:
The State ex relatione Fanning & Lord vs. The Mayor of Charleston.
City Ordinances — Court—Free Persons of Color.
An ordinance providing a Court for the trial of free persons of color, for violations of city ordinances, is not unlawful.
BEFORE GLOVER, J., AT CHARLESTON, OCTOBER TERM, 1859.
The report of his Honor, the presiding Judge, is as follows:
“ The relators, who are free persons of color, represent, by the petition, that they were arrested by the police of Charleston and brought before the Mayor on an alleged charge of gambling; that they were adjudged to be guilty, and were sentenced each to pay a fine of fifty dollars, -or to receive twenty lashes, and they pray that a writ of prohibition may issue, restraining the said mayor from any further action touching or concerning the premises, and from executing the sentence or any part thereof.
“ By a city ordinance, passed in 1819, it is ordained, “ that it shall not be lawful for any colored person or negro, whether free or slave, to play at any place whatever within the city of Charleston, at any game or games with cards, dice, &c., &c., under the penalty of receiving any number of lashes, not exceeding twenty, to be adjudged by two or more wardens of the city. Provided, that the wardens shall be authorized to commute the corporal punishment for a fine not exceeding fifty dollars.
“In August, 1836, it was ordained that the intendent (mayor) should ‘ hold a police court daily, at 9 o’clock, A.M., for the examination of all slaves or other persons committed to the guard house, or otherwise lawfully brought before him, and for the trial of such cases as may be liable to be tried by the intendent (mayor) or any of the wardens,’ &e., and directing that the morning reports now required of the commanding officer of the city guard, shall be made daily to the intendent, (mayor,) &c. The ground on which' the relators claim the interposition of this Court, and pray that the execution of the sentence shall be restrained is, that by Act of Assembly the trial of free persons of color is directed to be before a Court consisting of magistrates and freeholders, and that the city ordinance, providing a different tribunal, is unlawful and void.
“All ordinances or by-laws adopted by a municipal or other corporation, contrary to the laws of the land, are void; and the inquiry suggested by the relators is whether the offences created by such ordinances can be heard, adjudged and punished by the corporation or by such police court as the corporation shall appoint. There are many offences dangerous to the peace and good order of a city, especially those committed by slaves and free persons of color, which are not punished by Acts of Assembly, and are declared to be offences only by the ordinances of the corporation. If, therefore, such offences cannot be adjudged and punished by the corporation, there is no jurisdiction which could adjudge them. The Act of 1839, providing that all offences committed by a slave or free persons of color, shall be tried before a magistrate and five freeholders, embraces offences against the laws of the State, and a Magistrate’s Court is not a proper tribunal to hear and determine alleged violations of ordinances adopted by municipal corporations, for the punishment and suppression of practices dangerous to the peace and well-being of the community. It is not perceived that the city ordinance, prohibiting slaves or free persons of color from gambling or playing at cards, &c., is contrary to the law of the land. Unless a city corporation shall have the power to hear, adjudge, and. punish in a summary way those offences committed by slaves or free persons of color, either by fine or corporal punishment, one great and leading object of an Act of incorporation would be defeated.
“I decline, therefore, to interpose and restrain the execution of the sentence, and the petition of the relators is dismissed.”
The relators appealed on the ground:
That the ordinance of 1819 is contrary to the laws of the State, providing an appropriate forum and mode of trial for free negroes and slaves for all offences.
Simons, for appellants,
cited Ordinance Aug. 16,1819, City Ordinances, 82; Ordinance Aug. 16, 1836, City Ordinances, 165; A. A. 1836, City Ordinances, 348; A. A. 1740, 7 Stat. 405; A. A. 1839, Acts, p. 13 ; A. A. 1827, Acts, p. 63 ; A. A. 1820, Acts, p. 30 ; A. A. 1830, Acts,' p. 26; A. A. 1832, Acts, p. 59; O’Neall’s Negro Law, 33; and Observations, § 31, p. 35 ; Smith vs. Hutchinson, 8 Eich. 260.
Porter, City-Attorney, contra.

Opinion:
Curta, per O'Neall, C. J.
It is sufficient in this case to say, that the relators, inhabitants of the city, are amenable to the city authorities for offences against the city ordinances.
They have been tried in conformity thereto, and we cannot interfere.
For offences against the 'laws of the State, they are to be tried according to the Acts of the General Assembly.
The motion to reverse the decision below is dismissed.
Johnston and Wardlaw, JJ., concurred.
Motion dismissed.