Case Name: NAPORA v. NAPORA
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1986-10-29
Citations: 159 Mich. App. 241
Docket Number: Docket No. 89977
Parties: NAPORA v NAPORA
Judges: Before: Sullivan, P.J., and Allen and J. T. Kallman, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 159
Pages: 241–250

Head Matter:
NAPORA v NAPORA
Docket No. 89977.
Submitted July 28, 1986, at Detroit.
Decided October 29, 1986.
Plaintiff, Norman Napora, and defendant, Janet Napora, were divorced by order of the Oakland Circuit Court. Custody of the parties’ three minor children was originally granted to defendant. Defendant was subsequently granted permission by the court to remove the children to Texas. Plaintiff moved for modification of the divorce judgment and requested that he be awarded custody of the two youngest children. The parties thereafter entered into a stipulation providing that plaintiff would gain custody of one of the children, Andrew. The Oakland Circuit Court, James S. Thorburn, J., incorporated the stipulation in an order transferring custody of Andrew to plaintiff. Defendant objected to entry of the modified order, claiming that she had entered into the stipulation only as an interim solution to the parties’ dispute because she could not afford to travel from Texas to respond to defendant’s motion for a change in custody, that a change in custody was not in Andrew’s best interests, and that Texas was the proper forum for resolution of the parties’ dispute. The court disregarded defendant’s objections without hearing them and concluded the stipulation involved no fraud or coercion, that defendant’s financial situation did not amount to duress, and that the stipulation was therefore binding. Defendant appealed.
The Court of Appeals held:
1. The trial court erred in believing that it was required to uphold the stipulation of the parties. Despite any agreement which the parties may reach in regard to the custody of their child, physical custody should not be changed where a custodial environment is found to exist absent clear and convincing evidence that the change is in the best interests of the child. It is necessary to remand to the trial court for consideration of whether an established custodial environment exists and, if so, whether changing custody would be in Andrew’s best interests as that term is defined in the Child Custody Act.
References
Am Jur 2d, Divorce and Separation §§ 1003, 1011, 1016.
Am Jur 2d, Infants §§ 42-44.
Am Jur 2d, Parent and Child §§ 25, 28, 31-33, 37.
See the annotations in the Index to Annotations under Custody and Support of Children.
2. The trial court did not err in refusing to consider, until the prior order was complied with and custody of Andrew was transferred to plaintiff, defendant’s motion requesting that the court decline jurisdiction.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.
J. T. Kallman, J., dissented from the majority’s holding that the trial court erred in concluding that it was required to uphold the stipulation of the parties. No specific findings are necessary where factual issues are uncontested, and the Child Custody Act mandates hearing and consideration of the best interest factors only when the court is presented with a custody dispute. There was no dispute in this case and thus no concomitant need for determination of each of the best interest factors. Due to circumstances in part the responsibility of defendant, the trial court never held an evidentiary hearing on her allegation that she was compelled to agree to the custody change because of inadequate finances. Judge Kallman would hold that, at most, defendant is entitled to a hearing on that issue. He would remand to the trial court for a determination of whether the stipulation should be set aside due to fraud, mistake or duress.
1. Parent and Child — Child Custody — Change of Custody.
A court may not modify or amend an order so as to change a child’s established custodial environment unless the court is presented with clear and convincing evidence that such a change is in the best interests of the child (MCL 722.27[c]; MSA 25.312[7][c]).
2. Parent and Child — Child Custody — Best Interests of Child.
The best interest of the child is the controlling factor in any custody dispute (MCL 722.25; MSA 25.312[5]).
3. Appeal — Child Custody — Parent and Child.
The Court of Appeals will affirm a child custody disposition unless the trial court makes findings of fact against the great weight of the evidence, commits a palpable abuse of discretion, or commits a clear legal error on a major issue (MCL 722.28; MSA 25.312[8]).
4. Parent and Child — Divorce — Rights of Children.
A parent may not bargain away a child’s rights by agreement with a former spouse.
5. Parent and Child — Child Custody — Change of Custody.
Physical custody of a child should not be changed where a custodial environment is found to exist absent clear and convincing evidence that the change is in the best interests of the child.
Judith Dennehy Doran, for plaintiff.
Langs, Schatzberg, Patterson & Langs (by E. Philip Adamaszek), for defendant.
Before: Sullivan, P.J., and Allen and J. T. Kallman, JJ.
Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
On January 8, 1986, the Oakland Circuit Court modified the parties' divorce judgment with respect to custody of their eleven-year-old son, Andrew. Custody was transferred to plaintiff. The order changing custody embodied a stipulation of the parties made in open court on November 8, 1985. Defendant Janet Napora objected to entry of the modified custody order, claiming: (1) that she had entered into the stipulation only as an interim solution to the parties' dispute because she could not afford to travel from Texas to respond to defendant's motion for a change in custody; (2) that a change in custody was not in Andrew's best interests; and (3) that Texas was the proper forum for resolution of the parties' dispute. The trial judge disregarded her objections without hearing them and concluded that the stipulation involved no fraud or coercion, that her financial situation did not amount to duress, and that the stipulation was therefore binding. Defendant appeals from the order as a matter of right. We reverse and remand to the circuit court for further proceedings.
The parties' divorce judgment, dated February 12, 1980, granted defendant Janet Napora custody of the parties' three children. Following a hearing on August 19, 1981, the court granted defendant's motion to remove the children from the State of Michigan to Texas. Plaintiff was granted liberal visitation in Texas, as well as visitation in Michigan for all but four weeks of the children's summer vacations. The summer visitations apparently took place without incident until the summer of 1985. Although the parties' oldest child, sixteen-year-old Jennifer, did not visit during the summer of 1984 or 1985, her absence was apparently not the subject of any legal controversy. However, when Christine, the parties' ten-year-old, did not accompany Andrew in the summer of 1985, an order to show cause was issued to defendant. It is unclear whether Christine ultimately came to visit as a result of this order or because she changed her mind and decided she wanted to visit her father.
In any event, on August 5, 1985, pláintiff Norman Napora moved for modification of the divorce judgment and requested that he be awarded custody of Andrew and Christine. Defendant filed a written response on August 10, 1985, which contained allegations that, if true, would call into question the propriety of changing the custody arrangement. In other words, the response indicated that a change in custody might not be in the children's best interests.
An evidentiary hearing was scheduled for September 10, 1985, where proofs on the allegations in the plaintiffs motion and defendant's response were to be presented. Prior to this date, the court ordered that Christine and Andrew be returned to Texas. Although somewhat unclear, it appears that the September 10 hearing never took place. However, on November 8, 1985, the parties en tered into the subject stipulation. This agreement provided that plaintiff would gain custody of Andrew, but did not contain an agreement as to any facts which might shed light on what disposition would be in Andrew's best interests. A stipulation may serve this purpose where such facts are set out on its face and where the court has previously considered the issue of custody as well as having reports from the Friend of the Court. The subsequent order, incorporating the stipulation, was based solely on the stipulation. It was not based on any evidence or on any consideration of Andrew's best interests.
The term "best interests of the child" is defined by MCL 722.23; MSA 25.312(3), as the sum total of the following factors to be considered, evaluated and determined by the court:
(a) The love, affection and other emotional ties existing between the parties involved and the child.
(b) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to give the child love, affection and guidance and continuation of the educating and raising of the child in its religion or creed, if any.
(c) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to provide the child with food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care recognized and permitted under the laws of this state in place of medical care, and other material needs.
(d) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity.
(e) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial home or homes.
(f) The moral fitness of the parties involved.
(g) The mental and physical health of the parties involved.
(h) The home, school and community record of the child.
(i) The reasonable preference of the child if the court deems the child to be of sufficient age to express preference.
(j) The willingness and ability of each of the parents to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent.
(k) Any other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a particular child custody dispute.
A court may not modify or amend an order so as to change a child's established custodial environment unless the court is presented with clear and convincing evidence that such a change is in the best interests of the child. MCL 722.27(c); MSA 25.312(7)(c). The best interest of the child is the controlling factor in any custody dispute. MCL 722.25; MSA 25.312(5). This Court will affirm a child custody disposition unless the trial court makes findings of fact against the great weight of the evidence, commits a palpable abuse of discretion, or commits a clear legal error on a major issue. MCL 722.28; MSA 25.312(8); Theroux v Doerr, 137 Mich App 147, 149; 357 NW2d 327 (1984).
In the present case, we find that the trial court erred by believing that it was required to uphold the stipulation of the parties. Although stipulations are favored by the judicial system and are generally upheld, Meyer v Rosenbaum, 71 Mich App 388, 393; 248 NW2d 558 (1976), a parent may not bargain away a child's right by agreement with a former spouse. Sayre v Sayre, 129 Mich App 249, 252; 341 NW2d 491 (1983) (pertaining to child support as opposed to child custody). Despite any agreement which the parties may reach in regard to the custody of their child, where a custodial environment is found to exist physical custody should not be changed absent clear and convincing evidence that the change is in the best interests of the child. Moser v Moser, 130 Mich App 97; 343 NW2d 246 (1983). Accordingly, we find it necessary to remand to the trial court for consideration of whether an established custodial environment exists and, if so, whether changing custody would be in the best interest of Andrew as that term is defined by MCL 722.23; MSA 25.312(3).
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in its disposition of her motion requesting that the court decline jurisdiction. The court refused to consider the matter until the prior order was complied with and custody of Andrew was transferred to plaintiff. Seconds later, the court indicated it was denying the motion. Although the basis for denial is unclear, based on Anderson v Anderson, 142 Mich App 837, 840; 371 NW2d 435 (1985), we find no error.
We reverse the decision of the trial court with respect to the change of Andrew's custody and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.