Case Name: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. David Allen HAUGEE, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1981-07-22
Citations: 402 So. 2d 1216
Docket Number: No. 80-201
Parties: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. David Allen HAUGEE, Appellee.
Judges: SHARP and COWART, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 402
Pages: 1216–1220

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. David Allen HAUGEE, Appellee.
No. 80-201.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
July 22, 1981.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 2, 1981.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Evelyn D. Golden, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dayto-na Beach, for appellant.
Joseph A. Rosier, Altamonte Springs, for appellee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
An undercover agent, while making a drug buy from Sam Andrews at a single family dwelling occupied by Sam Andrews and Janice Peeler, was asked by Sam if the agent was interested in buying a large quantity of drugs. When the agent indicated affirmatively, he was told to come back any time after midnight as Sam was expecting another 20,000 Quaaludes then. Based on this as probable cause, a search warrant was issued authorizing search of the private dwelling
. . . together with the yard and curtilage thereof, any and all outbuildings and vehicles thereon .
When, after midnight, the warrant was executed appellee Haugee was present in the house and his truck was in the yard. Appellee was searched, the keys to his truck were obtained from him and the truck was searched. Contraband was found within a briefcase in the truck. Citing Dunn v. State, 292 So.2d 435 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. dismissed, 296 So.2d 47 (Fla.1974), the trial court suppressed the contraband found in the briefcase in the truck. We reverse.
In Alexander v. State, 108 So.2d 308 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959), where a search warrant did not specifically authorize the search of vehicles, the search of an automobile parked in the yard of the dwelling was upheld and Judge Wigginton, specially concurring, observed: *'
it has been uniformly held that where a search warrant authorizes officers to search a described building, together with the yard or curtilage on which the building is located, parked automobiles or other vehicles found in the yard or within the curtilage are proper subjects of search under the warrant. It has accordingly been held that evidence obtained by the search of automobiles or vehicles under such circumstances is admissible to prove the offense with which the defendant is charged.
Id. at 309.
In Joyner v. State, 303 So.2d 60 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974), cert. dismissed, 325 So.2d 404 (Fla.1976), it was held that information that contraband was "at" a certain described dwelling authorized the search warrant for the dwelling and the curtilage thereof. Neither the affidavit nor the warrant referred to any automobile and the dwelling was an apartment in a multi-unit complex. The court held the warrant authorized a search of an automobile located in a common parkway serving the entire complex where the automobile was identified as connected with the searched apartment merely because keys to it were obtained from the occupant of the specifically described apartment.
In Stipp v. State, 355 So.2d 1217 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. denied, 364 So.2d 893 (Fla.1978), the affidavit referred to certain vehicles but the warrant expressly authorized search only of a described house and the curtilage thereof. Again keys to vehicles were obtained from the house and the vehicle searched. The court held:
We think the search of these vehicles was authorized under the warrant since they were in the curtilage described and under the control of the suspects in the house. 355 So.2d at 1218.
In Dunn v. State, 292 So.2d 435 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. dismissed, 296 So.2d 47 (Fla. 1974), the search warrant described a single dwelling. In suppressing evidence resulting from a search of a van owned by the occupant of the dwelling and parked in the driveway, the Fourth District Court of Appeal in a two-one decision attempted to distinguish Alexander primarily because in Alexander the vehicle keys were obtained from the house and the Dunn majority believed "some such evidence necessary in order to authorize the search of a vehicle parked even within the 'curtilage.' " Id. at 436. Dunn is merely referred to in Stipp and appears to be out of step with Alexander, Joyner, and Stipp. However, in requiring some evidence of a connection between the premises and the vehicle, Dunn recognizes that the obtaining of keys to the vehicle from the house described in the warrant is sufficient. Where, as in Joyner, the vehicle is in the common area of a multi-unit complex only one unit of which is described in the warrant, some connection of the vehicle to the dwelling unit is reasonable and necessary in order to extend to the vehicle the authority given by the warrant to search the dwelling unit.
In this case a probable cause for the warrant was the reasonable belief that contraband drugs were going to be somewhere in or around this single family dwelling after midnight. As there were no details as to how the contraband drugs were going to arrive there or where the drugs going to be located after they arrived, the search warrant was not overbroad in permitting a search of all places where the contraband could be hidden in the dwelling and its curtilage, including all buildings and vehicles thereon.
Taking arguments from two cases from other jurisdictions cited in Dunn, appellee Haugee argues that he and his vehicle were not named or described in the warrant and were not the "target" of the search but were "strangers to the process." While this colorful language is designed to attract supporters, it actually is not in point. An arrest warrant is directed at people. Search warrants are directed at things which are believed to be at places. The reference to ownership or to persons in a search warrant is material only as a part of a description of a place or when the object to be seized may be located on, or in possession of, a person. In a search warrant authorizing the seizure of contraband, the reference to ownership is immaterial and the reference to persons is material only as the description, or part of the description, of a place where the contraband is or may be located. The object or "target" of the search and seizure here and in other drug cases is the contraband and the place where the affidavit reasonably indicates the contraband is, or will be, located without regard to ownership.
If courts exempt unknown and hence unnamed persons' property from a valid warrant for a premises location, then most contraband can be kept secure from discovery by being kept on the premises but within vehicles, suitcases or other opaque containers owned by persons other than the regular known occupants of the premises. It is in the nature of such things that drug dealers are not specific when disclosing information that may be hazardous to their activities, such as exactly where on a premises contraband is kept or will in the future be kept. Even when an unwary drug abuser slips and discloses an exact location he does not guarantee that he will not relocate it if circumstances dictate. Law enforcement did the best it could do in this case. It should be sufficient.
Since the warrant did not exceed the probable cause upon which it was based and the warrant expressly authorized the search of vehicles on the curtilage to the described single family dwelling, we uphold the search. The suppression order of the trial court is
REVERSED.
SHARP and COWART, JJ., concur.
ORFINGER, J., dissents with opinion.
. Sec. 933.18(5), Fia.Stat. (1979), authorizes a search warrant for an occupied private dwelling when the law relating to narcotics or drug abuse is being violated therein.
. Section 933.05, Florida Statutes (1979), requires the warrant to name or describe "the person, place or thing to be searched...." Section 933.07, Florida Statutes (1979), provides the warrant is "to search the property described in the warrant or the person named.... "