Case Name: James Millard LIGHT et al. v. CROWSON WELL SERVICE, INC., et al., and Sallie H. Sentell, et al.
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1975-04-24
Citations: 313 So. 2d 803
Docket Number: No. 55383
Parties: James Millard LIGHT et al. v. CROWSON WELL SERVICE, INC., et al., and Sallie H. Sentell, et al.
Judges: SANDERS, C. J., and SUMMERS, J., dissent and will assign written reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 313
Pages: 803–812

Head Matter:
James Millard LIGHT et al. v. CROWSON WELL SERVICE, INC., et al., and Sallie H. Sentell, et al.
No. 55383.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
April 24, 1975.
Rehearing Denied May 30, 1975.
Dissenting Opinions June 5, 1975.
David Klotz, Bodenheimer, Jones, Klotz & Simmons, Shreveport, H. Alston Johnson, III, The Law School, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Curator ad Hoc, J. Philip Goode, Goode, Goode & Overdyke, Shreveport, for defendants-applicants.
Neil Dixon, Shreveport, for plaintiffs-respondents.
James Fleet Howell, Feist, Schober & Howell, Shreveport, for defendants-respondents.

Opinion:
CALOGERO, Justice.
This law suit involves the construction of two documents which were executed by Mrs. Etta May Baxley conveying undivided mineral and royalty interests in certain property to Dr. C. E. Sentell.
Plaintiffs, who brought this declaratory action in the First Judicial District Court (and defendants Crowson Well Service, Inc. and B. C. McKeever) contend that in eách of the conveyances a predecessor in title, Mrs. Baxley (deceased) conveyed unto Dr. Sentell, also now deceased, by mineral deeds dated June 10, 1963 and November 15, 1963 respectively, an undivided Yiñth mineral interest in certain properties in Sections 22, 23, 24, 25 and 26 Township 19 North, Range 14 West, Caddo Parish, Louisiana (located in the Sentell field). The remaining defendants (the principal defendant being Dr. C. E. Sentell, and following his death during the pendency of this litigation, his surviving spouse and heirs, hereinafter referred to as Sentells), contend that the conveyance in each instrument was of designated numbers of mineral acres respectively, which amount to an undivided Yiath mineral interest in each conveyance,
The first document declares that Mrs. Baxley conveys to Dr. Sentell Jieth of %ths of the oil, gas and other minerals in certain described lands approximating 366 acres and situated in the Parish of Caddo, Louisiana. The .document then states that "it is the intention of vendor to convey and vendee to purchase 61 mineral acres in and under the above described lands." There follows a paragraph indicating that the sale was made subject to an oil and gas lease and "covers and includes 61 mineral acres (Vieth of %ths)" of all the oil royalties and gas rentals or royalties due and to become due under the terms of the lease.
The second document contains similar language except that the description of the real estate differs and the involved tract consists of approximately 940 acres.
The fraction "Vieth of %ths" of the oil, gas and other minerals is found in each instrument where the property conveyed (the mineral servitude) is normally described. It is, however, inconsistent with the recitation of the amount of mineral acres later described in each deed, because the mineral acres recited in each instance amounts to approximately an undivided %th mineral interest rather than an undivided )Í6th mineral interest.
At the time of each conveyance Mrs. Baxley owned an undivided % interest in the respective tracts.
Each tract was also subject to prior mineral leases providing for the standard V&th royalty and an additional %eth overriding royalty to the three lessors. Mrs. Baxley therefore owned a royalty interest of %cths as to her undivided % interest in the property or approximately a Vi&th royalty interest in the entire acreage.
The trial court determined that the interest conveyed in each sale was %eth of the minerals under the tracts involved and judgment was rendered defining the mineral ownership of the various parties affected by these mineral sales in accord with this finding.
The trial judge found the conveyance by an undivided fractional interest (Hsth) irreconcilable with the reference to "mineral acres," and determined that the clear concise and definite fractional interest description should prevail over the other clause referring to mineral acres (which he determined was 'of uncertain meaning). He further determined that ambiguity in the instrument should be construed under Article 1958 of the Civil Code against the vendee whose agent had prepared the ambiguous instruments.
The Sentells appealed from that judgment to the Second Circuit Court of Appeal which affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
The Court of Appeal stated that considering the most favorable evidence for Dr. Sentell he had not sustained the burden of showing there was an intent on the part of the vendors as well as the vendee to buy and sell under the formula of mineral acres rather than the fractional proportion first expressed in the conveyance. They acknowledged that the term mineral acres has usage in the oil industry but does not have a simple definite meaning which is easily understood by a person who has little or no experience in the field of minerals. They found an irreconcilable conflict between the respective provisions in each conveyance and concluded that the trial judge was correct in applying Civil Code Article 1958 so as to construe the doubt and ambiguity against Dr. Sen-tell whose agent prepared the instruments, rather than Article 2474, which dictates the construction of ambiguous clauses against the seller.
Wq... granted writs, 302 So.2d 305 (1975) on application of the Sentells.
The facts surrounding the execution of these two, instruments is as follows:
Dr. Sentell hired Mr. John H. Gilbert to prepare and then procure on his behalf, the two controverted mineral deeds. Mr. Gilbert had for a number of years been engaged as a land man and/or lease broker in the oil business and more specifically as an independent broker. He prepared the instruments at the direction of his principal,' Dr. Sentell. He was the one who had the specific terms and provisions placed in these two mineral deeds. He did so on two Bath Louisiana Sale of Mineral Rights forms brought by him to Houston, Texas. The vendor, Mrs. Etta May Baxley, an elderly lady at the time of the execution of these mineral deeds, and an aunt of Dr. Sentell's, was confined to an old folks' home. She had nothing to do with the preparation of the two mineral deeds. She died shortly after the execution of the two mineral deeds, and before the two tracts involved began producing oil.
Both Dr. Sentell and Mr. Gilbert testified at the trial in the district court in connection with an offer of proof after the trial judge ruled parol evidence inadmissible. The Court of Appeal expressed the view that parol should have been admitted and therefore reviewed the entire offer of proof, but did not find the evidence sufficient to change the conclusions reached by the trial judge.
The sale instruments are indeed ambiguous if the words "mineral acres" are to be given the meaning ascribed to them by defendants (See Footnote 1 supra, and the common law text cited by defendants, Williams and Meyers, Oil and Gas Law (1971), Manual of Oil and Gas Terms, Page 262), namely, all of the minerals on and/or beneath one acre of land.
They are uncertain and ambiguous because of the irreconcilable conflict between the fractional interest conveyed (Via) and the reference to mineral acres intended to be conveyed (which equates to an undivided %).
Accordingly, it was proper for the Court of Appeal to consider the parol evidence introduced by the Sentells. That evidence, testimony by Dr. Sentell and his agent, Gilbert, was generally to the effect that they were intending to purchase 61 and 156.67 mineral acres, respectively, or Vz of Mrs. Baxley's minerals at a price of $20.00 per acre in each instance. They did not contend that the "Jieth" entry at the paragraph on the form describing the mineral servitude conveyed was mistaken, and should have read %th, but rather that this was their means of expressing their entitlement to Mrs. Baxley's royalty interest under the lease. We find it difficult to believe that Dr. Sentell and his experienced agent would use the mineral servitude portion of the form to describe the royalty interest intended to be conveyed, or allow such patently erroneous use of the form. In any event that portion of the form unambiguously conveys a Yietii servitude and not a royalty interest.
Their parol proof was additionally inconsistent, for Dr. Sentell testified, in response to a question as to "what royalty and what mineral interest" he had specified should be inserted in the mineral deed, that he "agreed to take the Yieth of %ths, and that's what they had to put in there."
While the foregoing answer by Dr. Sentell would support plaintiffs rather than the Sentell interests, we do not rest our result in this case on that perhaps unintended response. Rather we conclude that ambiguity in the instruments persists even after considering defendant's evidence, an ambiguity caused by clear but conflicting descriptions of the mineral servitude conveyed.
Against whose interest must this ambiguity be resolved, the seller, Mrs. Baxley, under C.C. Article 2474 or the purchaser, Dr. Sentell, who confected the instrument, under C.C. Articles 1957 and 1958?
The Court of Appeal asserted that Article 2474 has no application to this case, noting that the Article has only been applied when the vendor has prepared or been responsible for preparing a written sales agreement.
While we are not willing to say that Article 2474 has application only when the vendor has prepared the sales agreement, we are nonetheless in agreement with the Court of Appeal that Article 2474 should not be applied in this case in preference to Articles 1957 and 1958. The underlying facts and circumstances simply run counter to the legal premise at the heart of Article 2474, (that the vendor is in a better position than the buyer to impose his will, does not part with his thing unless he wishes—"Who sells the pot says the word" is the ancient adage). Those facts show that Dr. Sentell gnd his agent-lease broker, Gilbert, were significantly more experienced in the preparation and execution of mineral deeds, that the instruments were fully prepared by them, (including the conflicting descriptions of the minerals conveyed) and that the ambiguity arose because they employed an exceptional stipulation (the "mineral acres" clause) at variance with the clearly unambiguous fractional interest description of the mineral servitude being conveyed.
Under these circumstances where the purchaser has prepared a sale with conflicting provisions describing extent of the mineral interest conveyed we believe that the provisions of Articles 1957 and 1958 are and should be applicable and that the amibiguities in the instrument should be resolved against the party who con-fected same.
For the foregoing reasons we conclude that there is no error in the judgment of the Court of Appeal, the writ is recalled and the judgment of the Court of Appeal affirmed at relator's cost.
SANDERS, C. J., and SUMMERS, J., dissent and will assign written reasons.
DIXON, J., is recused.
. The following is the first of the two documents, a sale dated 10 June 1963:
. Wé deem it unnecessary to duplicate the second document for purposes of this opinion.
. Defendants contend that mineral acres should be transformed into an undivided fractional interest in the mineral servitude by using the number of mineral acres provided, as the numerator (in the two deeds 61 and 156.67 respectively), and the total acreage of the tract as the denominator (366 and 940 respectively), to arrive at the fractional interest conveyed 6%66 and 1S6-6%4o respectively). Accordingly conveyance is of an undivided mineral interest, defendants contend.
. Subject to a %2 mineral servitude granted by a predecessor in title to one James New-borne in 1949.
. Articles 1957 and 1958 provide:
Article 1957: In a doubtful ease the agreement is interpreted against him who has contracted the obligation.
Article 1958: But if the doubt or obscurity arise for the want of necessary explanation which one of the parties ought to have given, or from any other negligence or fault of his, the construction most favorable to the other party shall be adopted, whether he be obligor or obligee.
. Article 2474: The seller is bound to explain himself clearly respecting the extent of his obligations: any obscure or ambiguous clause is construed against him.
. As the Court of Appeal noted only two Louisiana cases have been cited that have used the term. Smith v. Anisman, 85 So. 2d 351 (La.App.2nd Cir. 1956) and Melancon v. Cheramie, 138 So.2d 138 (La.App.1st Cir. 1962).
.As the Court of Appeal noted the strongest evidence in the Sentell's favor was a bank draft in payment of the consideration of the sale on Tract 1 on which was written "For 61 undivided mineral acres located . . . ." On this premise, Dr. Sentell, while paying $20.00 for each mineral acre, would have been paying nothing for Mrs. Baxley's conveyance for royalty interest under the leases.
. We consider worth noting in this regard a passage from Planiol wherein he notes that Article 1602, the French counterpart to C.C. Article 2474, "should be entirely discarded and the general rule of Article 1162 should he applied in all cases where the doubt bears not on a clause which is naturally part of the contract of sale but oh an exceptional stipulation which the buyer has inserted for his own benefit." 2 Planiol Traite Elementaire de Dorit Civil 1357 (11 e ed. 1939, La.Stat. Law Inst.1959).