Case Name: Kevin BELLARD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LOUISIANA CORRECTIONAL AND INDUSTRIAL SCHOOL, State of Louisiana, and Steve Rader, Defendants-Appellees
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1994-12-14
Citations: 647 So. 2d 1237
Docket Number: No. 93-545
Parties: Kevin BELLARD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LOUISIANA CORRECTIONAL AND INDUSTRIAL SCHOOL, State of Louisiana, and Steve Rader, Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: Before KNOLL, SAUNDERS, COOKS, WOODARD, and DECUIR, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 647
Pages: 1237–1244

Head Matter:
Kevin BELLARD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LOUISIANA CORRECTIONAL AND INDUSTRIAL SCHOOL, State of Louisiana, and Steve Rader, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 93-545.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
Dec. 14, 1994.
Stacey Williams Moreau, Erie Miller, Lake Charles, for Kevin Bellard.
Michael Glenn Hodgkins, Lake Charles, for Louisiana Correctional & Indus. School, et al.
Before KNOLL, SAUNDERS, COOKS, WOODARD, and DECUIR, JJ.

Opinion:
liWOODARD, Judge.
This is an appeal from a judgment dismissing an inmate's personal injury claim against the State for failure to comply with the prescribed administrative procedures.
FACTS
Kevin Bellard injured his leg on March 20, 1992, while he was an inmate at the Louisiana Correctional School. He filed suit against the School, its warden, and the State on April 15, 1992, on the grounds that they had negligently failed to protect him from injury. The defendants responded with exceptions of no cause of action and abandonment, arguing that Bellard was barred from instituting judicial proceedings against them without first exhausting his administrative remedies, and that he had abandoned his claim by failing to do so in a timely manner. The district court granted the defendants' exceptions and dismissed Bellard's lawsuit with prejudice. Bellard now appeals, asserting that he was not required to pursue any administrative remedies prior to filing suit.
LAW
|2The Department of Public Safety and Corrections (DPSC) promulgated the Corrections Administrative Remedy Procedure (ARP) pursuant to federal and state statutes authorizing the implementation of an exclusive administrative remedy for inmate complaints against the State. 42 U.S.C. § 1997 et seq.; La.R.S. § 15:1171 et seq. An inmate must exhaust his administrative remedies under the ARP prior to instituting judicial proceedings. See Daily Advertiser v. Trans-La, Etc., 612 So.2d 7, 27 (La.1993). Administrative review under ARP must be initiated within 30 days of the event of which the inmate is complaining. ARP, § G.
Bellard was given a manual describing the ARP when he was admitted into prison in May 1991. He was given the 1986 edition, however, which had been issued prior to a 1989 amendment to La.R.S. § 15:1171 explicitly providing the DPSC with authority to award monetary damages for personal injury claims. Prior to the amendment, an inmate seeking such relief was not required to pursue administrative remedies before filing suit, because the DPSC did not possess authority to grant monetary relief. Mack v. State, 529 So.2d 446, 448 (La.App. 1 Cir.), writ denied, 533 So.2d 359 (La.1988). The ARP was revised in 1990 to reflect the DPSC's additional authority.
Bellard argues that the new ARP was not properly implemented at the time of his injury, and thus was not in effect, because it was not distributed to the inmates. He also argues that his lack of notice of the revised ARP renders its application to him impermissible. Instead, according to Bellard, he remains subject to the 1986 version, under which he was not required to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to instituting judicial proceedings.
Initially, we note a recent, seemingly similar case, Bumgarden v. Wackenhut Corrections Corp., et al., 645 So.2d 655 (La.App. 3 Cir.1994), decided by this circuit. The issues, however, were different. The dispute in Bumgarden involved the threshold issue of whether the ARP applies to a plaintiff whose cause of action arises when he is imprisoned, but who is subsequently released and brings suit within the statutory period afforded un-incarcerated persons. Id. We did not reach the issues of whether the ARP was properly implemented or whether it may be applied to plaintiffs who were incarcerated when they filed suit. Thus, Bumgarden does not apply to the case sub judice.
|3I. IMPLEMENTATION
An administrative rule, such as the ARP, becomes effective upon publication in the Louisiana Register, subsequent to adoption by the promulgating agency. La.R.S. § 49:954. Additionally, with respect to the ARP, the DPSC was required to obtain the approval of a federal court. La.R.S. § 15:1172(A). The revised ARP was approved by federal district judge Frank Polo-zola on August 17,1990, and published in the Louisiana Register on January 20, 1991. Thus, the revised ARP became effective on January 20, 1991 without further action on the part of the DPSC.
The ARP itself provides that "new employees and incoming offenders must be made aware of the system in writing and by oral explanation." ARP, § E(3). However, as noted by the district court, the procedure for redress of grievances did not change when the rules were changed; the only difference was that damages for personal injury were explicitly provided. Thus, the inmates were made aware of the system. We therefore hold that the DPSC implemented the revised ARP properly.
II. NOTICE
The manual given to Bellard clearly states that inmates have 30 days to request the Warden to provide a solution to any concern they may have, and that "offenders may request administrative remedies for situations arising from policies, conditions, or events within the institution that affect them personally." This procedure is called a "grievance procedure," where a "grievance" is defined as "a written complaint by an offender on the offender's own behalf regarding . an incident occurring within an institution." The manual also states that "Inmates are required to use the procedure before they can proceed with a suit in Federal and State Courts."
It is difficult to believe Bellard's argument that this language did not provide him with notice that he should seek satisfaction initially from the DPSC. He had previously instituted administrative review of other com plaints, and he clearly understood the system. Further, even if he did not understand the rules, the manual would have prompted a reasonable inmate to inquire as to how to proceed. His position is greatly weakened because he was represented by counsel at the time he filed suit, when the 30-day period for initiation of administrative procedures had not yet expired. See Beazor-Williams v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 598 So.2d 1249, 1250 (La.App. 4 Cir.1992). Finally, as noted above, the 'procedure for redress of grievances did not change when thejjrules were changed to authorize monetary relief. Thus, Bellard's claim that the old manual misled him as to how to proceed is without merit.
Moreover, even if the 1986 manual did not provide Bellard with sufficient notice of the course of action he was required to pursue, his lack of knowledge is of no consequence. Prescription does not run against one who is ignorant of his rights, provided that the party pleading prescription has engaged in activity that contributes to the plaintiff's want of knowledge. Martin v. Mud Supply Co., 239 La. 616, 119 So.2d 484, 492 (1960). However, mere ignorance of one's rights will not toll prescription or per-emption. Id. "It is not and has never been the law that one must receive notice of a law before it can affect him." West v. State, 356 So.2d 1015, 1016 (La.App. 1 Cir.1977). Ignorance of the law is no excuse for noncompliance. La.C.C. art. 5; Soileau v. La. Paving Co., Inc., 498 So.2d 1166, 1168 (La.App. 3 Cir.1986).
It does not appear that the DPSC tricked Bellard into filing his claim in state court rather than with the DPSC, or that Bellard was precluded from investigating the current regulations affecting his claim. Bellard was made aware of the system when he was incarcerated, regardless of whether the exact nature of the remedies available was made clear to him. There is no reason, therefore, to depart from the established rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse for noncompliance.
III. DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE
Section 1172 does not discuss whether dismissal for failure to comply with the ARP should be with or without prejudice. Peremptory exceptions properly lead to dismissal with prejudice, however, because they are granted when suit for the relevant claim can not be brought. See Ubosi v. Sowela Technical Institute, 584 So.2d 340, 342 (La. App. 3 Cir.), writ denied, 589 So.2d 1075 (La.1991). A peremptory exception of no cause of action is used to determine whether the law affords plaintiff any remedy under the allegations of his petition. Weber v. State, 635 So.2d 188, 191 (La.1994). The State's peremptory exception of no cause of action was properly granted because the law no longer affords Bellard any remedy for his injury, as a result of the expiration of the 30-day limitation period. Bellard's claim is therefore ended and incapable of revival through amendment. See Day v. Day, 563 So.2d 441, 443-44 (La.App. 1 Cir.), writ denied, 567 So.2d 109 (La.1990). Consequently, his suit was properly dismissed with prejudice.
CONCLUSION
IgFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court in favor of the appellees. Costs of this appeal are assessed against appellant.
AFFIRMED.
KNOLL, J., concurs with reasons.
SAUNDERS, J., dissents.
COOKS, J., dissents with reasons.
. The author of this opinion dissented from the majority opinion in Bumgarden.