Case Name: LAFONTAINE v. THE STATE
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1998-03-16
Citations: 269 Ga. 251
Docket Number: S97A1814
Parties: LAFONTAINE v. THE STATE.
Judges: All the Justices concur, except Benham, C. J, Fletcher, P. J., and Sears, J, who dissent.
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 269
Pages: 251–258

Head Matter:
S97A1814.
LAFONTAINE v. THE STATE.
(497 SE2d 367)

Opinion:
Hunstein, Justice.
Stephen LaFontaine was convicted of violating OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (5), the per se offense of operating a moving vehicle while having an unlawful blood alcohol level. On appeal, LaFontaine claims the roadblock which led to his arrest violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, that OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (5) is unconstitutional, and that his challenge to the traffic citation should have been sustained. We conclude that no error occurred and affirm.
1. LaFontaine's challenge to the constitutionality of OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (5) is of no avail as this Court has recently upheld the con stitutionality of that statute against the challenges raised in his appeal. See Bohannon v. State, 269 Ga. 130 (497 SE2d 552) (1998).
2. LaFontaine's challenge to the admissibility of the blood test results on the ground that the testing procedures have not been properly approved under the Administrative Procedures Act is without merit as that issue was decided adversely to him in Price v. State, 269 Ga. 222 (498 SE2d 262) (1998).
3. T. J. Jackson, a Georgia State Patrol trooper, testified that on the morning of October 22, 1996, he and a fellow officer conducted a roadblock on Old Atlanta Road in Forsyth County for the purpose of examining the driver's licenses and proof of insurance of all vehicles traveling on that roadway as well as to check for other violations of Georgia law. The decision to implement the roadblock was made by a State Patrol supervisor, although the determination as to the location of the roadblock was made by the field officers. Trooper Jackson testified that the determination as to the location of a roadblock is often based on factors such as a high number of complaints about traffic violations on a particular road. Without exception and pursuant to standard operating procedure, on the day in question the troopers checked the insurance and licenses of every driver that approached the roadblock. When LaFontaine arrived at the roadblock, Trooper Jackson detected a strong odor of alcohol and observed that LaFontaine's face was flushed and his eyes bloodshot. When questioned about his use of alcohol, LaFontaine informed the trooper that he had been drinking until about 4:00 a.m., but had not had anything to drink since that time. After failing field sobriety tests, LaFontaine was taken to a hospital for a blood test; the test yielded a blood-alcohol content of 0.11 grams and LaFontaine was issued a Uniform Traffic Citation.
In examining the propriety of roadblock stops, the issue for resolution is not whether there was probable cause to stop the vehicle, but whether the roadblock stop was otherwise implemented and conducted in a manner as to demonstrate that the stop of the vehicle was "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment. Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U. S. 444, 450 (110 SC 2481, 110 LE2d 412) (1990). See Christopher v. State, 202 Ga. App. 40 (1) (413 SE2d 236) (1991).
"It has been held that police officials may set up highway roadblocks for the purpose of requiring motorists to display their driver's license, and that such a practice does not invade their right to use the public ways free from unreasonable and unwarranted interception. Nor does such a practice constitute an unlawful arrest or restraint or an illegal search contrary to the United States Constitution." [Cit.] "The [S]tate can practice preventative therapy by reason able road checks to ascertain whether man and machine meet the legislative determination of fitness . . . ." [Cits.]
State v. Swift, 232 Ga. 535-536 (1) (207 SE2d 459) (1974). Although a roadblock cannot be used as a subterfuge to detain citizens for the purpose of searching their automobiles, a momentary stop of a traveling citizen to perform the license checks or to check the present fitness of a car or driver for further driving is permissible. Id.; Brisbane v. State, 233 Ga. 339, 343-344 (211 SE2d 294) (1974). Roadblock stops have appreciably less intrusion on the part of travelers and do not create the fear and surprise engendered in motorists by roving patrol stops because the motorist is not singled out; the traveler is reassured when all vehicles are stopped. Sitz, supra at 452-453.
We conclude under the circumstances of this case that the roadblock set up primarily as a means to perform routine traffic checks was valid. State v. Golden, 171 Ga. App. 27 (318 SE2d 693) (1984), articulates specific factors to determine when a roadblock is satisfactory. A roadblock is satisfactory where the decision to implement the roadblock was made by supervisory personnel rather than the officers in the field; all vehicles are stopped as opposed to random vehicle stops; the delay to motorists is minimal; the roadblock operation is well identified as a police checkpoint; and the "screening" officer's training and experience is sufficient to qualify him to make an initial determination as to which motorists should be given field tests for intoxication. Id. at 29-30. Applying Golden to the facts of this case it is clear that the roadblock was satisfactory. The roadblock was established and implemented by supervisory personnel and although field troopers were given limited decision making authority where to place the roadblock, their discretion was clearly minimal.
We therefore conclude that the trial court properly denied LaFontaine's motion to suppress because there is no evidence of unfettered discretion by the field troopers and LaFontaine made no showing that the roadblock was arbitrary or oppressive to motorists. LaFontaine's arrest was not the result of a State trooper's whimsical decision to stop only his vehicle or an arbitrary scheme to single him out. See Christopher, supra at (1); Mims v. State, 201 Ga. App. 277 (2) (410 SE2d 824) (1991). The stop was made within the constitutional confines of a routine motorist roadblock on Old Atlanta Road and LaFontaine's ensuing arrest was the result of his personal decision to operate a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated state.
4. Prior to his non-jury trial, LaFontaine filed a general demurrer to the sufficiency of the traffic citation on the ground that it failed to inform him of the specific conduct and statutory provisions allegedly violated by him. The citation alleged the crime committed was a violation of OCGA § 40-6-391. LaFontaine was found guilty by the trial judge of a violation of OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (5) (existence of alcohol concentration per se violation) and not guilty of any violation of OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (1) (under the influence to the extent it is less safe to drive). The trial transcript shows that although LaFontaine filed his demurrer prior to trial, he failed to obtain a ruling on it until after the trial had commenced. As a result, the trial court correctly held that LaFontaine had waived his right to challenge the citation. Andrew v. State, 216 Ga. App. 819, 820 (456 SE2d 227) (1995); Dean v. State, 214 Ga. App. 768, 770 (449 SE2d 158) (1994). See generally OCGA § 17-7-111.
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur, except Benham, C. J, Fletcher, P. J., and Sears, J, who dissent.