Case Name: Hooks v. DuBois, Appellant
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1966-01-04
Citations: 420 Pa. 65
Docket Number: Appeal, No. 245
Parties: Hooks v. DuBois, Appellant.
Judges: Before Bell, C. J., Musmanno, Jones, Cohen, Eagen, O’Brien and Roberts, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania State Reports
Volume: 420
Pages: 65–72

Head Matter:
Hooks v. DuBois, Appellant.
January 4, 1966:
Argued September 29, 1965.
Before Bell, C. J., Musmanno, Jones, Cohen, Eagen, O’Brien and Roberts, JJ.
Kim Darragh, with him Meyer, Darragh, Buckler, Bebenek & Eck, for appellant.
Hyman Schlesinger, for appellee.

Opinion:
Opinion by
Mr. Justice Eagen,
On August 16, 1962, the plaintiffs, residents of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, were occupants of an automobile involved in a collision in Fulton County, Penn sylvania, with an automobile operated by Earl Wike, a resident of Schuylkill County, Pennsylvania. Wike was killed in the accident.
On August 12, 1964, James DuBois, a resident of Allegheny County, was named administrator of the estate of Earl Wike, deceased, in letters issued by the register of wills of Schuylkill County.
On August 14, 1964, the plaintiffs instituted the im stant action in Allegheny County against the estate of Wike to recover for personal injuries suffered in the accident. Service of the complaint was made the same day in Allegheny County upon DuBois, the then administrator of Wike's estate. Preliminary objections to the complaint were filed raising questions of jurisdiction and capacity to sue. From an order in the court below dismissing these objections, this appeal was filed pursuant to the provisions of the Act of March 5, 1925, P. L. 23, §1, 12 P.S. §672.
The jurisdictional objection raised by the pleadings is that the Allegheny County Court cannot entertain jurisdiction of an action against a decedent's estate being administered in Schuylkill County. In other words, it is urged that the fiduciary is not subject to suit in a county other than that in which the letters were granted.
The appeal presents an nnusnal question, but our research compels the conclusion that the lower court resolved it correctly.
The Fiduciaries Act of April 18, 1949, P. L. 512, §621, 20 P.S. §320.621, provides that any action may be instituted against the personal representative of a decedent's estate or his surety in the county wherein the letters were granted, and also provides for the method of service in the event the personal representative or the surety are not residents of that county. In construing substantially similar provisions in the Acts of March 27, 1854, P. L. 214, and June 7, 1917, P. L. 447, §37, 20 P.S. §784, lower courts of this Commonwealth have ruled that the legislature did not intend thereby to vest exclusive jurisdiction of actions against an estate in the county wherein the letters were issued. (See, Harris v. Blatt, 35 Lanc. 361 (1918).) These courts concluded that this section merely provided the means of securing service of process upon nonresident fiduciaries in actions instituted against the estate in the county issuing the letters. Additionally, this Court has held that a foreign fiduciary (i.e., one whose letters were issued in another state) is subject to an action in our courts if he is personally served with process in Pennsylvania. See, Laughlin & McManus v. Solomon, 180 Pa. 177, 36 A. 704 (1897). We see no logical reason why a different rule should prevail in the present situation.
Nor can we find a contrary legislative intent in §601 of the Fiduciaries Act of 1949, P. L. 512, §601, 20 P.S. §320.601, or The Vehicle Code of April 29, 1959, supra note 3, as contended for by the appellant.
'Section 601 of the Act of 1949, merely provides that all causes of action, except slander and libel, shall survive the death of either the plaintiff or defendant. ( Contra to the common law rule that all causes of action terminated and abated upon a person's death.) It does not say that exclusive jurisdiction of causes of action against an estate shall be in the courts of the county wherein the estate is administered. Nor does it indicate that the personal representative of an estate is in a different category than the deceased himself would be if he had survived. It is, of course, established beyond argument as to the latter situation, that a personal action for tort is transitory in nature and any court may entertain jurisdiction if the defendant is personally served with process within the county of the instituted action. See, Gossard v. Gossard, 319 Pa. 129, 178 A. 837 (1935).
We are likewise unable to read in The Vehicle Code of 1959, supra note 3, any intent that would limit jurisdiction in this case to either Schuylkill or Fulton Counties. This act in pertinent part merely established an additional right in the plaintiff to bring his action for damages suffered in an automobile accident in the county where the damages were sustained, even though personal service may not be effected upon the defendant in that county. See, Hartman v. Donahue, 142 Pa. Superior Ct. 382, 16 A. 2d 691 (1940). The act does not specifically state that claims involving a decedent's estate are in a different category, but refers only to 'all civil actions for damages". See and compare, Wiesheier v. Kessler, 311 Pa. 380, 165 A. 854 (1933).
Order affirmed.
Wike was survived by bis wife. The letters of administration were issued without her knowledge or consent. On October 15, 1064, upon her petition, the Orphans' Court of Schuylkill County revoked the appointment of DuBois as administrator, and eo die letters were issued to' Verna M. Krammes as executrix of the estate following the probate of the will of the decedent.
We are not here concerned with the question of collusion or fraud between a "straw" administrator and a plaintiff. This is not a motion to set aside service of the complaint, nor do the preliminary objections specifically raise the question of fraud or collusion.
Subject to the exception created by the Act of April 29, 1959, P. L. 58, §1303, 75 P.S. §1303, as amended, Act of July 12, 1961, P. L. 578, §1.
This is subject to exceptions not pertinent here. If the action -would trench unduly upon the jurisdiction of another court already attached, or would expose the parties subject to such jurisdiction with inequitable burdens, jurisdiction will not be sustained.