Case Name: In re Banfield's Estate BANFIELD v. SCHULDERMAN et al.
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1931-05-19
Citations: 137 Or. 256
Docket Number: 
Parties: In re Banfield's Estate BANFIELD v. SCHULDERMAN et al.
Judges: Bean, C. J., Band and Bossman, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 137
Pages: 256–286

Head Matter:
Argued and submitted on motion to dismiss appeal and on the merits April 14;
motion denied and decree affirmed May 19;
rehearing denied September 15, 1931
In re Banfield's Estate BANFIELD v. SCHULDERMAN et al.
(299 P. 323, 3 P. (2d) 116)
Albert L. Gordon, of Portland, for appellant.
A. C. Shaw and J. 0. Bailey, both of Portland, for respondents.

Opinion:
On Motion to Dismiss Appeal
This is an appeal of Charles C. Banfield, individually, from an order of the department of probate of the circuit court of Multnomah county, Oregon, denying an amended petition filed September 5, 1929, by Charles C. Banfield, executor of the estate of Marie Banfield, deceased, for an order to sell real property belonging to the estate. The order from which this appeal is sought also requires said Charles C. Banfield, individually, to account for certain moneys to the executor of the estate, he, the said Charles C. Banfield himself being such executor.
A motion to dismiss the appeal was duly interposed by respondents. An order was heretofore made overruling said motion with the privilege of renewing it upon argument of the case upon the merits. Respondents in their brief and argument, upon the merits, renewed their motion to dismiss the appeal.
Four grounds are relied upon by the respondents in support of this motion:
First: That no notice, as provided by law, has been served upon respondents.
Second: That no notice of appeal was ever served upon the executor of the estate.
Third: That the appeal was prematurely taken in so far as the same concerns respondents.
Fourth: That the certificate of the court reporter to the transcript of testimony is insufficient in that it fails to state that the witnesses were sworn to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
The first and third grounds urged for dismissal of the appeal must be considered together for the reason that the first ground, namely, that no notice of appeal, as required by law, was served upon respondents is tenable or untenable, dependent upon whether the service of the notice of appeal which actually was served was premature or not.
As to the second ground, that no notice was served upon the executor, we hold that where, as in this case, the appellant is the executor and throughout the litigation in the circuit court and this court the same attorney represents the appellant as an individual and as the executor, and the order from which this appeal is prosecuted, among other things, requires appellant as executor to account for assets becoming such because of a claim due the estate from him as an individual, the service of the notice of appeal by the individual upon himself as executor would be a vain and idle gesture; hence, the failure in this case to make such service constitutes no ground for dismissal of the appeal.
As to the fourth ground for dismissal, namely, insufficiency of the certificate of the reporter, the respondents fail to distinguish between this case, wherein the certificate was made by a duly appointed official court reporter, and the case of Johnson v. Johnson, 131 Or. 235, 240 (274 P. 918, 282 P. 1082), wherein a private stenographer, who had not taken the oath prescribed by statute, reported the testimony. In the case at bar the certificate of the official reporter is substantially the same as that which was approved in Sanborn v. Fitzpatrick, 51 Or. 457, 460 (91 P. 540). The certificate of the clerk of the court also accompanies the transcript. This furnished sufficient authentication of the record under rule 2 of this court.
Subdivision 1 of section 7-503, Oregon Code 1930, provides:
" (1) A party to a judgment, decree or final order or any order from which an appeal may be taken in any action, suit or proceeding, desiring to appeal therefrom, or some specified part thereof, may by himself or attorney give notice in open court, or before the judge if the order, judgment or decree be rendered or made at chambers, at the time said judgment, decree or order is made, that he appeals from such decision, order, judgment or decree, or from some specified part thereof, to the court to which the appeal is sought to be taken; and such notice shall thereupon, by order of the court or judge thereof, be entered in the journal of the court. If the appeal is not taken at the time the decision, order, judgment or decree is rendered or given, then the party desiring to appeal may cause a notice, signed by himself or attorney, to be served on such adverse party or parties as have appeared in the action or suit, or upon his or their attorney, at any place where he or they may be found, and file the original with proof of service endorsed thereon, with the clerk of the court in which the judgment, decree or order is entered. Such notice shall be sufficient if it contains the title of the cause, the names of the parties and notifies the adverse party or his attorney that an appeal is taken to the Supreme or circuit court, as the case may be, from the judgment, order or decree, or some specified part thereof."
Subdivision 5 thereof provides:
" (5) An appeal to the Supreme court, if not taken at the time of the rendition of the judgment or decree appealed from, or at the time of making the interlocutory order appealed from, shall be taken by serving and filing the notice of appeal within sixty (60) days from the entry of the judgment, order or decree appealed from, or to the circuit court within thirty (30) days after such entry, and not otherwise; provided, that in all cases where the right to an appeal to the Supreme Court shall exist at the time this act shall come into force, the time for taking snch appeal is hereby extended for the period of sixty (60) days thereafter. ' '
In onr examination of the cases tending to support respondents' position, we find none based upon such statutory provisions. In 1893, the legislature of the state of Washington enacted a statute with similar provisions: Chapter LXI, 1893 Session Laws of Washington, pp.119,121, § 3 and 4.
In 1895, the Supreme Court of the state of Washington passed upon the question we have to decide in the case at bar. The holding of the Washington court thereupon, in an opinion rendered by Mr. Chief Justice Hoyt, is as follows:
"Bespondents move to dismiss this appeal for the reason that it was taken before the judgment had been made, signed and entered. That it was taken after the announcement by the court of the terms of the judgment is conceded, and, such being the fact, we think the motion must be denied. The statute governing appeals should be liberally construed to the end that parties may have a review by this court of the rulings of the superior courts when they so desire. The appeal statute when thus construed will require us to give force to a notice of appeal given after the court had announced its decision, although it was before the signing and entering of the formal judgment. For some purposes the judgment may not be complete until thus signed and entered, but after such announcement it was so far complete as to sustain a notice of appeal": Hays v. Dennis, 11 Wash. 360 (39 P. 658).
The statute of Oregon, which was enacted in 1899, unquestionably was taken from the Washington statute of 1893: 1899 Session Laws, p. 227. The language of the Oregon statute is not exactly the same as that of the Washington statute and in the Washington case the statute is not quoted, and hence we would not be justified in holding that the enactment of the Oregon statute carried with it the adoption of the construction thereof'theretofore given by the Supreme Court of the state of Washington, but the pronouncement of the Washington court, being based upon a statute so similar to ours, is strongly persuasive.
Many courts have held that service of notice of appeal before entry of judgment is premature: McLaughlin v. Doherty, 54 Cal. 519; In re More's Estate, 143 Cal. 493 (77 P. 407); In re Dunphy, 158 Cal. 1 (109 P. 627); In re Sheid, 122 Cal. 528 (55 P. 328); Estate of Pearsons, 119 Cal. 27 (50 P. 929); Home of Inebriates v. Kaplan, 84 Cal. 486 (24 P. 119); Coon v. United Order of Honor, 76 Cal. 354 (18 P. 384); Matter of Fifteenth Ave. Extension, 54 Cal. 179; Onderdonk v. San Francisco, 75 Cal. 534 (17 P. 678); In re Rose, 72 Cal. 577 (14 P. 369); Schroder v. Schmidt, 71 Cal. 399 (12 P. 304); Kimple v. Conway, 69 Cal. 71 (10 P. 189); Los Angeles County Bank v. Raynor, 61 Cal. 145; Thomas v. Anderson, 55 Cal. 43; Stebbins v. Larson, 4 Cal. App. 482 (88 P. 505); Robinson v. Salt Lake City, 37 Utah 520 (109 P. 817); Watson v. Odell, 53 Utah 96 (176 P. 619); Martin v. Smith, 11 S. D. 437 (78 N. W. 1001); Greenly v. Hopkins, 7 S. D. 561 (64 N. W. 1128); Nepper v. Wordehoff, 42 S. D. 170 (173 N. W. 644); Hahn v. Bank, 25 Wyo. 467 (171 P. 889); Culbertson v. Ainsworth, 26 Wyo. 314 (181 P. 418); Thompson v. Great Western Accident Association, 136 Iowa 557 (114 N. W. 31); Hodgins v. Heaney, 15 Minn. 185 (Gil. 142); McTavish v. Great Northern Railway Co., 8 N. D. 333 (79 N. W. 443); Wolff v. Wilson, 25 Pa. Super. Ct. 266.
The distinction between the statute of Oregon and the statutes of the states from which the cases last above cited are taken is that in Oregon the right to an immediate appeal is expressly given, and in the other jurisdictions the only means of appeal is by notice after the rendition or entry of the judgment, which leads this court to the conclusion that it was not intended by the legislature of Oregon that any interval should intervene between the time when by oral notice an appeal could be instituted and the time that the judgment might be spread upon the records of the court, during which no notice of appeal could be served. Moreover, in the case of Hull v. Thoms, 82 Conn. 386 (73 Atl. 793), under a statute, requiring notice of appeal to be filed within one week after the rendition of the judgment, it was held that a notice of appeal was not premature when filed within the specified time after the acceptance by the court of the certificate but before entry of judgment thereupon.
The motion to dismiss the appeal is overruled.