Case Name: Sam GIANCANA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Marlin W. JOHNSON, Agent in Charge, Chicago Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Defendant-Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1964-06-30
Citations: 335 F.2d 366
Docket Number: No. 14272
Parties: Sam GIANCANA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Marlin W. JOHNSON, Agent in Charge, Chicago Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 335
Pages: 366–371

Head Matter:
Sam GIANCANA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Marlin W. JOHNSON, Agent in Charge, Chicago Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 14272.
United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.
June 30, 1964.
Swygert, Circuit Judge, dissented.
Edward V. Hanrahan, U. S. Atty., John Peter Lulinski, Asst. U. S. Atty., Chicago, Ill., Frank E. McDonald, Asst. U. S. Atty., James P. O’Brien, U. S. Atty., John Peter Lulinski, Thomas W. James, Asst. U. S. Attys., of counsel, for appellant.
George N. Leighton, Chicago, Ill., for appellee.
Before SCHNACKENBERG, KILEY and SWYGERT, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
KILEY, Circuit Judge.
The question is whether the district court had jurisdiction to entertain this action to procure and protect the civil rights of plaintiff," growing out of alleged surveillance of plaintiff, his home and his recreation, by FBI agents under defendant's supervision and direction. We think the record shows the court did not have jurisdiction. tt
The Complaint, as amended, was based upon claim of a "federal question," 28 U.S.C. § 1331, arising under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution; and a civil rights violation under § 1343(4). The district court denied defendant's motion to dismiss which challenged the complaint on jurisdictional grounds.
The district court, on the "sworn amended complaint, affidavits and evidence of the plaintiff," found that plaintiff's constitutional rights to privacy, personal liberty and freedom were violated by the surveillance; and that unless defendant was restrained plaintiff would suffer irreparable injury. The court granted a preliminary injunction. We stayed the effect of the injunction, pending appeal. Giancana v. Hoover, 322 F. 2d 789 (7th Cir. 1963).
District courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, possessing only the jurisdiction that Congress has conferred upon them by statute. Klein v. Lee, 254 F.2d 188, 190 (7th Cir. 1958), citing Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 63 S. Ct. 1019, 87 L.Ed. 1339 (1943). And the jurisdiction conferred upon federal courts to entertain suits arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States has been "narrowly limited." Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496, 507, 59 S.Ct. 954, 83 L.Ed. 1423 (1939). Furthermore, this court has the duty to satisfy itself of the jurisdiction of the district court. Jackson v. Kuhn, 254 F.2d 555, 560 (8th Cir. 1958).
The vital question depends on whether the record shows that "the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,-000 " so as to give the district court jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
In Jackson v. Kuhn, 254 F.2d 555, 556, 560 (8th Cir. 1958), the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of a diversity suit to restrain United States Army officers "from policing, occupying or interfering with the property or the students of Little Rock Central High School " because there was "no allegation in the complaint that the value of the matter in controversy exceeds $3,000," and no facts stated from which the requisite pecuniary value could be inferred. And the Fifth Circuit in Walton v. City of Atlanta, 180 F. 2d 143, 144 (5th Cir. 1950), on its own motion in a "federal question" suit found federal jurisdiction lacking because "[f]rom the allegations of the complaint, it does not appear that the amount in controversy exceeds three thousand dollars" so as to confer jurisdiction under § 1331.
Courts may not treat as a mere technicality the jurisdictional amount essential to the "federal question" jurisdiction, even in this ease where there is an allegedly unwarranted invasion of plaintiff's privacy. The showing of that essential is not a mere matter of form, but is a necessary element. Congress in § 1331 expressed the "federal question" jurisdiction in plain words. The district courts and suitors are bound by the words expressed. Congress could have withheld the jurisdiction entirely, as it did from 1789 to 1875. Or it could have given jurisdiction over suits arising "under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States" simply. But it limited the jurisdiction by including the element of the sum or value of the matter in controversy, and the Congressional will is that unless that sum or value is shown there is no "federal question" presented and no jurisdiction.
Neither may a party invoke the district court's jurisdiction by treating that element as though not essential; nor choose not to amend his complaint or otherwise show, as plaintiff did here, that the jurisdictional sum or value is in controversy, thus opposing his will to the Congressional will.
Plaintiff concedes that Jackson v. Kuhn, 254 F.2d 555 (8th Cir. 1958), and Van Buskirk v. Wilkinson, 216 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1954), support defendant's contention that the district court did not have jurisdiction because the jurisdictional amount is not expressly alleged in the complaint. Here the complaint makes no express allegation of the essential jurisdictional sum or value. Plaintiff argues, however, that the jurisdictional sum or value should be inferred from the allegations, supported by unimpeached affidavits. But there are no facts from which that necessary element can be inferred. If, as plaintiff contends, the sum or value cannot be alleged because of the priceless rights involved, how can this court infer that essential element? And there is no finding of the essential sum or value and no evidence on which to base a finding.
Congress had a reason for setting the minimum jurisdictional sum or value in limiting the jurisdiction of the district court.6 (It surely knew of the priceless nature of liberty and privacy when it required a showing of that element.) And placing the burden of estimating the value of one's claim upon him who sues is not unusual. If, for instance, plaintiff had chosen to sue for damages under § 1331, as plaintiff did in Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 66 S.Ct. 773, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946), for alleged violation of his Fourth and Fifth Amendment right of privacy — the basic claim here — he would have had to estimate the value of his claim. "Plaintiff is master of his claim," and it is no answer to failure to bring his claim within the 'jurisdictional prerequisite that the value is inestimable.
Finally plaintiff contends that the subject matter "in controversy" — the use of his home, his personal liberty and freedom, the tortious conduct of defendant and invasion of plaintiff's private rights — is admitted by defendant's motion to dismiss, and that the substantive issue of the amount of damage awaits ultimate resolution in the trial court upon hearing of the cause on the merits. We disagree. The validity of the court's ruling must be determined as of the time it was made.
To support his argument about deferring resolution of the jurisdictional question plaintiff relies upon McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 56 S.Ct. 780, 80 L.Ed. 1135 (1936). That ease does not require, in the circumstances before us, that determination of the jurisdictional issue be deferred until plaintiff has an opportunity to furnish proof of his charges. We read McNutt, involving Indiana law regulating purchase of installment sales contracts, so far as pertinent here, to decide that if the requisite jurisdictional facts are alleged, and challenged, the plaintiff must support them by competent proof, and that in such a case an inquiry might be necessary to determine whether the facts support the allegations of jurisdiction; but that if the plaintiff fails to allege the facts prerequisite to show jurisdiction he has no standing. 298 U.S. at 189, 56 S.Ct. 780.
The district court erred in entertaining the suit before us because, having only the jurisdiction conferred by Congress, its jurisdiction was limited, so far as it is based upon § 1331, to controversies involving a sum or value in excess of $10,000, and plaintiff failed to allege, or otherwise show, his damage accordingly, or to allege, or otherwise show facts from which that essential jurisdictional element may be inferred.
The court had no jurisdiction either, of the claims under § 1343(4), the "Civil rights and elective franchises" section: "To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights Plaintiff does not allege nor show us otherwise "any Act of Congress" of whose violation he complains.
There is no merit in the contention that defendant cannot raise the question of lack of jurisdiction because he did not comply with 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). That section does not apply because the order is "otherwise appealable" under § 1292 (a) (l), and this court can itself note a jurisdictional defect. McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 187, 56 S.Ct. 780 (1936). '
Since there was no jurisdiction, we do mot reach the other points raised.
Judgment vacated and the cause remanded for proceeding not inconsistent with this opinion.
. The original complaint's caption included § 1346(a) (2) and (b), but this reference was omitted from the amended complaint.
. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 provides in pertinent part:
"(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000 and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."
. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part:
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law
. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 provides in pertinent part:
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person:
*
"(4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under any Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote."
. The jurisdictional amount was increased to $10,000 in 1958. 72 Stat. 415.
. The purpose for setting the jurisdictional amount at $10,000 in 1958 was ex plained in the Senate Report accompanying the bill:
"The recommendations of the Judicial Conference regarding the amount in controversy, which this committee approves, is based on the premise that the amount should be fixed at a sum of money that will make jurisdiction available in all substantial controversies where other elements of Federal jurisdiction are present. The jurisdictional amount should not be so high as to convert the Federal courts into courts of big business nor so low as to fritter away their time in the trial of petty controversies."
S.Rep. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), 1958 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News,. pp. 3099, 3101.
. Wright, Federal Courts 98 (1963).
. Although no Act of Congress is sot forth in the complaint to show jurisdiction under § 1343(4), plaintiff refers us, in his brief, to 28 U.S.C. § 1361 and 42 U.S.C. § 1985. We think plaintiff's references; are insubstantial and warrant dismissal for want of jurisdiction. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-683, 66 S.Ct. 773 (1946).
. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) provides in pertinent part:
"(b) When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not othenoise appealable under this section, shall .be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question of law as -to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals may thereupon, in its diseretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order (Emphasis added.)
. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) provides in pertinent part*
"(a) The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from:
"(1) Interlocutory orders of the district courts of the United States granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court "