Case Name: Kevin KELLEHER v. CITY OF RUSSELLVILLE
Court: Arkansas Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 1994-12-21
Citations: 48 Ark. App. 58
Docket Number: CA CR 94-72
Parties: Kevin KELLEHER v. CITY OF RUSSELLVILLE
Judges: Cooper and Mayfield, JJ., dissent.
Reporter: Arkansas Appellate Reports
Volume: 48
Pages: 58–63

Head Matter:
Kevin KELLEHER v. CITY OF RUSSELLVILLE
CA CR 94-72
891 S.W.2d 802
Court of Appeals of Arkansas En Banc
Opinion delivered December 21, 1994
[Rehearing denied January 18, 1995. ]
Jonathan P. Shermer Jr., for appellant.
Winston Bryant, Att’y Gen., by: J. Brent Standridge, Asst. Att’y Gen., for appellee.
Cooper and Mayfield, JJ., would grant rehearing.

Opinion:
John B. Robbins, Judge.
On June 8, 1993, appellant Kevin Kelleher was convicted of resisting arrest and driving on a suspended driver's license. He was sentenced to two weeks and two days, respectively, in the Pope County Jail. Appellant contends on appeal that the trial court erred in bifurcating the guilt and punishment stages of the trial proceedings on these charges. We find no error and affirm.
Appellant was tried before a jury on the charges of DWI second offense, resisting arrest, and driving on a suspended driver's license. During discussions with counsel concerning the jury instructions, the court made it known that the jury deliberations would be bifurcated, i.e., the jury would first be instructed to determine guilt or innocence on each of the three charges, and after the jury rendered a verdict on guilt or innocence the court would further instruct them to decide upon a sentence on each offense for which the jury had returned a guilty verdict. Appellant's counsel argued against the court bifurcating the proceedings. Appellant argued that the trial court should allow the jury to decide the guilt and sentence on the charges of resisting arrest and driving on a suspended driver's license at the same time the jury decided guilt or innocence on the DWI. Consequently, appellant's previous DWI conviction would not be disclosed to the jury until only sentencing for the DWI conviction remained. Counsel's argument was stated as follows:
Defense Counsel: I think it would be prejudicial because if they found him guilty of the DWI and then came back they might increase the punishment on the other two offenses whereas if they go out now then they might find him guilty or they might find him not guilty of the DWI as an option and go ahead and find him guilty of resisting arrest and on the other charge.

I think that will be prejudicial, Your Honor, because I think it puts the Jury — it — if they find him guilty of the DWI, then they are going to increase the punishment on the other two. . . .
4=
They might just because they want to throw the book at him. I think they ought to be able to find guilty or not guilty of the DWI on the first and then go ahead and decide the sentence and the guilt on the other two.
The trial court rejected appellant's argument and bifurcated the proceedings on all of the charges, reserving sentencing on all charges for the second phase of the proceedings. The jury dead-locked on the charge of DWI, which resulted in a mistrial on this charge, but found him guilty on the charges of resisting arrest and driving on a suspended license.
Appellant's concern revolved around the possibility that he could be prejudiced during the sentencing phase for DWI 2nd because the jury might sentence him to more time on the other two misdemeanor charges after the jury learned of appellant's prior DWI conviction. This simply did not occur. Therefore, appellant's specific argument before the trial court became moot at that point. The argument appellant raises now on appeal is not the same specific argument he raised before the trial court. He now argues that bifurcation was error because there is simply no authority for a circuit judge to bifurcate misdemeanor charges.
The supreme court in Peters v. State, 286 Ark. 421, 692 S.W.2d 243 (1985), held that in felony DWI cases the proceeding should be bifurcated, separating the guilt or innocence stage from the sentencing stage. The supreme court held that this procedure protects the defendant from prejudice by preventing the jury from considering the prior convictions during their initial determination of guilt or innocence. See also, Heard v. State, 272 Ark. 140, 612 S.W.2d 312 (1981). We believe the same rationale would apply to protect a defendant from possible prejudice in a DWI 2nd trial.
Appellant alleges that he was somehow prejudiced by the court bifurcating the two misdemeanor charges along with the DWI 2nd charge. However, appellant fails to support his con tention with any convincing argument or authority. We do not consider assignments of error which are unsupported by convincing argument or citation to proper authority. Womack v. State, 36 Ark. App. 133, 819 S.W.2d 306 (1991). Appellant is simply speculating that he was prejudiced somehow by the bifurcated proceedings. When error is alleged, prejudice must be shown because we do not reverse for harmless error. Tallant v. State, 42 Ark. App. 150, 856 S.W.2d 24 (1993). We cannot presume some impropriety on the bare allegation that the procedure was unusual. See Hines v. State, 289 Ark. 50, 709 S.W.2d 65 (1986). Because the appellant was not found guilty of DWI in the first stage, and therefore the fact of his earlier DWI was not made known to the jury during the sentencing phase on the other two misdemeanors, there could have been no prejudice to appellant.
Appellant also alleges that the city attorney was allowed to make an additional argument between the two phases. However, appellant failed to abstract any such argument, and failure to abstract precludes review of any such error. Rules of Supreme Court and Court of Appeals 4-2(6). Appellant was sentenced to only a minimal time in jail for the two violations. Because the appellant was not found guilty of DWI, we conclude that appellant was not prejudiced in any way as a result of the bifurcated proceeding.
Affirmed.
Cooper and Mayfield, JJ., dissent.