Case Name: Morace C. DUNCAN, Petitioner, v. John D. FLYNN, M.D., et al., Respondents
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1978-03-09
Citations: 358 So. 2d 178
Docket Number: No. 51299
Parties: Morace C. DUNCAN, Petitioner, v. John D. FLYNN, M.D., et al., Respondents.
Judges: OVERTON, C. J., and BOYD and SUND-BERG, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 358
Pages: 178–180

Head Matter:
Morace C. DUNCAN, Petitioner, v. John D. FLYNN, M.D., et al., Respondents.
No. 51299.
Supreme Court of Florida.
March 9, 1978.
Rehearing Denied May 24, 1978.
Robert Orseck of Podhurst, Orseck & Parks, Susan Goldman, Miami, and Wagner, Cunningham, Vaughan & Genders, Tampa, for petitioner.
John I. Van Voris and Charles P. Schropp of Schackleford, Farrior, Stallings & Evans and T. Paine Kelly, Jr. and Claude H. Tison, Jr. of MacFarlane, Ferguson, Allison & Kelly, Tampa, for respondents.

Opinion:
ENGLAND, Justice.
Morace Duncan has brought to us for review a decision of the Second District Court of Appeal holding (1) that an unborn fetus is not a "person" within the meaning of Florida's former Wrongful Death Act, and (2) that a child is not "born alive", for purposes of the wrongful death statute, until he or she acquires an existence separate and independent from the mother. The district court's ruling on the first point is entirely consistent with our recent decision in Stern v. Miller, 348 So.2d 303 (Fla.1977), which resolved the question by holding that an unborn viable fetus is not a "person" within the meaning of Florida's Wrongful Death Act. We adhere to our holding in Stern, and regard that decision as dispositive of the first issue.
As to the second point, Judge Scheb's opinion below has carefully and thoroughly evaluated the case law and poli cy considerations applicable to the determination of when a child is considered to be "born alive" for purposes of the wrongful death statute. We agree with his decision, adding only that his interpretation of this statute is generally consistent with the legislature's definition of "live birth" for record-keeping purposes under the vital statistics law.
We adopt as our own the opinion of the Second District Court of Appeal as to when life commences for purposes of the wrongful death statute, and accordingly discharge the writ of certiorari.
It is so ordered.
OVERTON, C. J., and BOYD and SUND-BERG, JJ., concur.
KARL, J., dissents with an opinion, with which ADKINS and HATCHETT, JJ., concur.
. Duncan v. Flynn, 342 So.2d 123 (Fla.2d DCA 1977).
. § 768.01-.03, Fla.Stat. (1971).
. Although in Stem the issue was presented in the context of our current Wrongful Death Act, § 768.16-.27, Fla.Stat. (1975), we expressly recognized that "[s]ince the legislature did not materially change the language of the prior section, it must be presumed that the legislature intended to carry forward into the new section the terms 'person' and 'minor child' as previously construed." 348 So.2d at 307. Thus, it is clear that our decision in Stem interpreting the scope of the term "person" as used in the new Wrongful Death Act applies with equal force to the identical term as it appeared in the old Wrongful Death Act.
. § 382.071(1), Fla.Stat. (1975), defining "fetal death", which is the converse of "live birth".