Case Name: In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings against Nail S. MACKAY, an Attorney at Law
Court: Alaska Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Alaska
Decision Date: 1964-10-26
Citations: 416 P.2d 823
Docket Number: No. ABA 8
Parties: In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings against Nail S. MACKAY, an Attorney at Law.
Judges: Before NESBETT, C. J., and DIMOND and AREND, JJ.
Reporter: Pacific Reporter 2d
Volume: 416
Pages: 823–852

Head Matter:
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings against Nail S. MACKAY, an Attorney at Law.
No. ABA 8.
Supreme Court of Alaska.
Oct 26, 1964.
On Rehearing Jan. 30, 1965.
Petition for Reconsideration Denied May 13, 1966.
Certiorari Denied, June 20, 1966.
See 86 S.CL 1907.
Petition for Rehearing of Denial of Certiorari Piled July 15, 1966.
Wendell P. Kay and Arthur D. Talbot, Anchorage, for respondent.
No appearance for Alaska Bar Ass’n.
Before NESBETT, C. J., and DIMOND and AREND, JJ.

Opinion:
AREND, Justice.
The Alaska Bar Association commenced this disciplinary proceeding in 1961 by filing a complaint against the respondent, Neil S. Maclcay, charging him with misconduct in his office as an attorney and counselor at law and with violating his oath as an attorney and counselor by cheating or over-reaching a client. The complaint was later amended by the addition of two more charges, namely, purchase by the respondent of an interest in a suit of his client and lack of candor be fore the court. All charges were denied by the respondent.
The matter came on for hearing in September 1961 before a trial committee composed of three attorney members of' the Alaska Bar Association, both parties being represented by counsel. After the hearing, which required several days for the taking of testimony and the argument of counsel, the majority, that is, two members, of the trial committee made written report "that there were many elements brought out in the hearing which indicated deficiency in conduct on the part of the accused as over-reaching of the client." It was their recommendation that the respondent should be suspended "from the right to practice law in the state of Alaska for not more than six months as the Board of Governors feels appropriate." The third member of the committee wrote a dissenting report in which he stated that he found nothing in the respondent's conduct toward his client which called for any disciplinary action.
Tlie minutes of the Board meeting of November 30 and December 1, 1961, deserve particular consideration and comment. As one of the last items of business on November 30, 1961, the Board unanimously voted to hear counsel for Mr. Mackay "informally as a courtesy extended by the Board."
The minutes reveal that the Board was called to order by the president at 9:30 a. m., Friday, December 1, 1961. Roll call showed eight members present, including the president. Counsel for Mr. Mackay appeared and spoke with respect to the grievance matter. Following the departure of counsel it was moved and seconded that the Board "sustain or concur in the dissenting opinion of the Trial Committee." The motion was declared carried. The recorded vote named four members who voted "yes" and two who voted "no." Unexplained in the minutes is the failure of the president to vote on the motion although he was present and chairman of the meeting. Also unexplained in the minutes is the fact that a member was permitted to abstain from voting on the motion.
A statute in effect at the time the trial committee and the Board acted in this matter provided in part:
"Upon finally determining any cause involving the discipline, disbarment, suspension or reinstatement of a member of the Alaska Bar, the Board of Governors shall certify its findings and recommendations thereon to the Su~ preme Court of Alaska. Upon receiving the findings and recommendations, thc Court shall, within thirty dáys thereafter, issue an order of disbarment, suspension, reinstatement, dismissal or otherwise, in full accordance with the recommendations of the Board ." [Emphasis supplied.]
The certification to the supreme court of the Board's findings and recommendations, as required by the above quoted statute, was never made. If this court had not had occasion only recently to remove the Board of Governors for refusal to comply with the court's rules and take temporary custody of the Association's records, it is doubtful if the court would ever have learned of this case.
We pause at this point to express disapproval of the failure of the president and another member of the Board to vote on the motion when it was their duty to do so. Only the most compelling of reasons could justify abstention under the circumstances and in such case the minutes should reflect the reason. Before abstaining the consent of a majority of the members present should have been obtained by a request and a formal vote on the request.
We are seriously concerned over the failure of the president and the members of the Board to certify or cause to be certified to the supreme court their findings and recommendation. Instead of certification as required by law, the Board apparently entered an order dismissing the complaint and destroyed all of the records of the case including the transcript of the trial proceedings.
We turn our attention next to that portion of the above quoted statute which states:
"Upon receiving the findings and recommendations, the Court shall, within thirty days thereafter, issue an order of disbarment, suspension, reinstatement, dismissal, or otherwise, in full accordance with the recommendations of the Board [Emphasis ours.]
As of December 1961, when the Board should have certified its findings and recommendation to this court, the above statute was in force. We hold, however, that insofar as it attempted to impose upon the court the mandatory duty of issuing an order in full accordance with the recommendation of the Board, it was unconstitutional for being an invasion of the inherent power of the court to discipline and disbar members of the Alaska Bar Association.
The above statute has been superseded by Rule 9, sections 13 and 14 of the Alaska Bar Rules, promulgated by this court effective June 1, 1964, which state:
"Section 13. Review. All reviews shall be on the record unless the Court, in its discretion, grants a hearing de novo, in whole or in part. Following review, the Court shall enter a final order disposing of the matter as it sees fit.
"Section 14. Procedure When Uncontested. If no petition for review is made within the time limited, the Court may issue an order of dismissal, reprimand, disbarment, suspension, or order review on its own motion, as it sees fit."
The case was not processed and moved along by the Board with the promptness it deserved as a disciplinary proceeding. This is evidenced in the following paragraphs contained in a letter written in connection with this case by the chairman of the trial committee to the president of the Board:
"I would be less than honorable in this situation if I did not at this time call to your attention several points of concern that have rather plagued the writer as a committee member throughout the course of this proceeding.
" The delay in bringing this matter to hearing is almost unconscionable and while some of it may be the fault of the chairman of the committee, certainly the hearing was long delayed by virtue of failure to constitute a trial committee. This matter should have been gotten out of the way during the year of 1960 and accordingly is at least one year late of what it should have been. This I think is inexcusable regardless of whose fault it is.

"It appears to me further that the filing of the pleadings in this case was most haphazard. I would call your attention to the fact that we do not have all of the original pleadings. The original complaint is not in the file and we used a copy thereof. The items in the file when we received it, were not date stamped as to receipt and the whole aspect of filing seemed most casual.
"It appears to me that after the trial committee was appointed that there was no follow-up on the part of the Board of Governors. I would appreciate the fact that the Board of Governors did not find fit to concern themselves or to inquire as to the timing of the proceedings, leaving it entirely in the hands of the chairman of the trial committee, if such was intended as an expression of confidence.
"I am reasonably certain that there was no expression of confidence by this failure to inquire or to follow the pleadings and I can assure the Board that if the same procedure is followed in the future you will have continued bad results. If we know anything we know there is an occupational disease of lawyers that distasteful matters are placed to one side, put off to another day and that is exactly what you can expect in situations of this kind. It would be my recommendation that the secretary upon the receipt of a file of this kind, set up a regular schedule to be followed by the trial committee and that a report be regularly made to the President so that the President of the Board will at all times know the timing and the stages of the proceedings of any disciplinary matter and a rule should be established that each and every one of them must be completed within a given time unless leave is granted for an enlargement of time from the Board."
Though not required to do so because of this court's inherent power to discipline members of the bar, we may have felt constrained to adopt the recommendations of the Board if the trial committee had reached a unanimous conclusion that disciplinary action was not called for and the Board had then unanimously affirmed that decision. Instead, there was no unanimity in the recommendation of the six members of the Board who voted and the decision they affirmed was not even that reached by the majority of the trial committee. In such a situation we feel it incumbent upon us to most carefully examine the law and the facts pertaining to the complaint against the respondent and to exercise our independent judgment in the matter. To do this we are in no less favorable position than was the Board of Governors, since it reviewed the case solely on the record as we shall likewise do.
Before proceeding with our review on the merits, we need to rule upon two motions filed in this court by the respondent. The first motion was filed on September 24, 1964, the same day on which the respondent and his attorney appeared personally before the court and the attorney made oral argument on behalf of the respondent. The motion was to dismiss the pending review of the disciplinary proceeding involving the respondent and was made on grounds of res adjudicata, double jeopardy and absence of a complete record upon which to base a fair and adequate review.
The second motion, designated "Supplemental Motion to Dismiss" was filed on October 9, 1964. It is based on claims of res adjudicata, laches or "stale mate," failure to bring the matter properly before this court and to advise the respondent of the charges against him and of the basis upon which, the court is proceeding, lack of jurisdiction in the court, no right in this court to review anything but the limited record upon which the minority of the trial committee found that the proceeding should be dismissed, and denial to the defendant of due process of law as prescribed in the state and federal constitutions.
The respondent was granted time until October 19, 1964, to file a memorandum or brief in support of his motions. The memorandum has been received and considered. We find no merit in the motions or in the reasons given in support thereof. Both motions are therefore denied and it is so ordered.
The facts leading up to the filing of the complaint against the respondent were as follows:
After completing law school in 1951 in California the respondent came to Anchorage, Alaska, where he went to work in the First National Bank and became a vice president in charge of loans. By virtue of his office he had numerous business contacts with one Mary Hill who with her husband, John Hill, had substantial cash deposits in the bank. It is to be noted that Mary Hill was a Finnish woman, sixty-eight years of age in 1957, who had no schooling, a very limited knowledge and use of the English language and not much business intelligence. The respondent described her as a spendthrift in the most exaggerated sense of the word and ventured to say that she would have signed anything he asked her to sign and that, if a Finn or anyone whom she knew quite well needed some money, she would give it to him.
Mary often co-signcd promissory notes for persons borrowing money from the bank. On occasions when the bank notified her that payments on a note were delinquent and she volunteered to pay off the note, the respondent would assist her to force payment from the principal debtor. Eventually he persuaded her to stop cosigning notes. During the first several years of his acquaintanceship with Mary, the respondent observed that she and her husband, John Hill, completely dissipated a cash fund of $80,000.
The respondent was admitted to the practice of law in Alaska in March of 1955, after passing the bar examination here. In the meantime he had terminated his employment at the bank and gone into the undertaking business, combining this with some law practice after his admission to the bar. It appears that the respondent as a mortician conducted the funeral arrangements for Mr. Hill and thereafter acted as Mary's attorney until some time in 1960.
Among Mary's assets after the death of John Hill were two city lots with the improvements thereon located at Fifth Avenue and Gambell Street, adjacent to the Westward Inn and other business properties. The improvements consisted of several substandard rental units occupied for the most part by Mary's Finnish friends, some of whom were not paying their rent.
To digress for a moment, in 1956, after John Hill's death, Mary and another Finn, Herman Keno, whom she had known since 1940, obtained a license at Seward to marry; however, the marriage did not materialize until March of the following year. The respondent regarded this man as a very unpredictable person from about the first time he met him. Seven or eight times he had to bail Herman out of jail and pay his fine.
It seems to have become apparent to Mary quite soon after Mr. Hill's death that the operation of the Gambell Street property was not a profitable business for her because she was having trouble in collecting rent from the tenants and in paying the utility bills, taxes and costs of maintenance and repairs. Besides, she and Herman wanted to leave Anchorage and reside at Anchor Point. So Mary asked the respondent to sell the Gambell Street property for her. This he tried to do but without success. After Mary and Herman had made many calls at the respondent's office to inquire whether a buyer had been found, it was finally arranged that the respondent and his wife would purchase the property from Mary for $1,000 plus payments of $150 per month, during the remainder of her natural life. The respondent testified that the idea for the sale and its terms originated with Mary. There is no clear evidence to the contrary in the testimony of either Mary or Herman. In fact they both testified that they understood the deal and considered it a good one for Mary.
In regard to the value of the property, Mary and Herman felt that it was worth -$40,000, but the respondent stated that he was unable to find a buyer at that price or at any price. Exactly what efforts were made by the respondent to push the sale of the property we are unable to determine from the record other than that he discussed the property with certain individuals who, he thought, might be interested in buying it, and he also listed it with a real estate firm. The respondent testified that he figured the property to be worth about $15,000; however, he did bind himself to pay for it some $31,000 in the event Mary lived out her life expectancy, according to the calculations given to the trial committee by his attorney. In 1958 the City of Anchorage gave the property an assessment value of $29,400, of which amount $17,450 was assigned to the land and the balance to the improvements. The respondent considered the evaluation placed on the improvements as being too high but he did not make any formal protest to the City,
The transaction was embodied in a formal written contract, along with deeds from Mary and Herman to the respondent and his wife, under date of January 9, 1957. The conveyance from Herman was in the form of a quitclaim deed and was obtained by the respondent to safeguard against any marital claims that Herman might have to the property. The respondent took Mary and Herman to the office of another attorney, Albert Maffei, before whom the subject documents were executed and acknowledged.
The respondent testified that Maffei was brought into the picture as independent legal counsel for Mary and Herman. Maf-fei testified that he was not hired or paid by the Kenos (Mary and Herman) to act as their attorney on this occasion. His function, as he understood it:
"was merely to act as a person that would — an independent person that would explain to these individuals the nature of these — not the nature of these documents, but the substance of them. In other words, I was to read it over with them so that they would know what they were signing. I think mainly I was to act as the notary."
The record does not establish that Maffei acted as independent legal counsel for Mary in this transaction.
The written agreement between Mary and the Mackays contained two patent irregularities. It bore no legal description of the property to be transferred, referring to it merely as "one full lot and one-half lot" in the Anchorage Recording Precinct, and it had this unusual penultimate paragraph:
"That should the parties of the first part [the Mackays] predecease the party of the second part [Mary Hill Keno], said heirs or assigns of the parties of the first part shall have the right to fulfill and carry out this agreement pursuant to the terms hereinabove set forth." [Emphasis supplied.]
If Mr. Maffei had been acting as counsel for Mary, it is reasonable to assume that he would have raised some question about these irregularities present in the document. Instead, he testified quite definitely that he did not advise her regarding either of these matters; nor did he discuss mortality tables with her or ascertain the wisdom of having her sign the agreement. This seems to us to be consistent with his statement that he was not her attorney.
After the transfer of the property, Mary received her payments of $150 per month regularly from the respondent, frequently drawing them in advance herself or by Herman. In June of 1958 without any apparent effort on his part, the respondent sold the property to the Alaska National Bank for $25,000 cash, with a net sales return of $23,000 or $24,000.
At this point we note that Mackay was acting as attorney for Mary in foreclosing a real mortgage given by Arne Murto to Mary and her former husband, John Hill, to secure a note in the principal sum of $3,400. The full principal was in arrears, plus accrued interest. The First National Bank, by whom the respondent had earlier been employed, also had a mortgage on the property described in the mortgage held by the Hills. The bank's mortgage, though prior in time, had not been recorded in the recording office until after Hills had recorded their mortgage. There was some sort of understanding between the respondent and counsel for the bank that the bank would try to satisfy its claims against Murto first out of some other Murto property as to which it was the mortgagee, failing this, any losses sustained would be shared by Mary and the bank in proportion to the amount of principal and interest owed to each.
By 1959 it appears that Herman was exerting considerable force and effect upon the affairs of Mary. According to Mary's testimony, Herman wanted to cash out with the Mackays the agreement of January 9, 1957, so that he and Mary could go to Finland to live. Mary was opposed to the idea. The respondent corroborates Mary to the extent of saying that it was Herman who actually wanted a cash settlement of the agreement, but he insisted that he tried to dissuade Mary from surrendering her agreement. Finally, one day Mary and Herman came together to the respondent's office, so he testified, and said they wanted the cash settlement and that for $10,000 they would surrender the agreement of 1957 and throw in the Murto mortgage to boot.
Some time prior to these negotiations for a cash settlement, the respondent began having "problems with the Grievance Committee," as he put it, because someone had filed a complaint against him concerning the transaction of January 9, 1957. Just what effect that had upon the respondent's next move is uncertain but he did testify:
"Mary to this date, denies that she signed the complaint [with the grievance committee]. And of course, she probably signed a complaint, so therefore, I was rather dubious about the - whole transaction, relative to who was doing what to whom. So when both of them came into my office and wanted $10,000 I went out and borrowed the money and gave it to them."
To formalize this cash settlement, the respondent followed practically the same procedure as in .the 1957 transaction. He executed or caused to be executed a "Release of All Claims" by Mary and Herman of the 1957 annuity agreement for a lump sum settlement of $10,000 and an assignment by Mary to himself of the Murto note and mortgage. He then took Mary again before Mr. Maffei, ostensibly for the purpose of providing her with independent counsel in the matter. By this time he seems to have been associated with Mr. Maffei in real estate transactions and by some unexplained coincidence the release and the assignment appear on Maffei's stationery as an attorney at law. Maffei stated that the documents could have been prepared either in his office "or they could possibly have been dictated to someone in Neil's office." He maintained, however, that he acted in the same capacity on this occasion as he had in 1957 — as a notary public in ascertaining that Mary and Herman knew what they were signing and then taking their acknowledgements. He received no compensation for his services either from Mary or the respondent.
It is the testimony of the respondent that he did not suggest that the Murto note and mortgage be made a part of the consideration for the $10,000 cash payment to Mary; nevertheless, the note and mortgage were incorporated in the release transaction. The respondent subsequently assigned his interest in the note and mortgage to one Martin, a very good friend and client of his for $2,000. Martin testified that the respondent stated to him at the time that he, Martin, would be able to double his money "over an extended period of time, if everything went as it looked like it should."
At this point we have a situation in which the respondent, if we use his own figures, has made a net gain of $5,500 from his dealings with his client Mary Hill Keno over her Gambell Street property. In addition to that he has received $2,000 from his assignment of the Murto note and mortgage, which he told the assignee might well be worth $4,000 in time. Thus, from all of his dealings with Mary and her property, the respondent has enriched himself in the amount of at least $7,500 over a period of less than three years, not to mention the legal fees he had received for services performed as an attorney at law for Mary and Herman.
Considering the evidence in this case as a whole and viewing in their entirety all of the acts of the respondent in relation to his client Mary Hill Keno, we are persuaded to agree with the majority of the trial committee that Mary had been over-reached, to use the milder expression, by the man on whom she relied for guidance and direction.
The respondent stated himself that Mary came to him because she relied upon him. Yet when Herman came to him with the offer to sell Mary's lifetime security for $10,000, and Mary later joined in the offer, the respondent took no firm stand against separating his client from "the protective devices he claimed to have initiated for her benefit," to use some of the language employed in the majority report of the trial committee. Even if wc were to believe his testimony, as against that of Mr. Maffei, that he sent her to Maffei for independent legal advice, it could have been only a token gesture, for neither he nor Mr. Maffei informed Mary that the respondent would be netting $5,500 for himself through this 1959 deal by virtue of his 1958 sale of the Gambell Street property to the Alaska National Bank. We cannot understand why under the circumstances he did not at least say to Mary: "You don't have to throw in the Murto note and mortgage, and I won't take them, because you have been more than generous in making it possible for me to already clear $5,500 on this deal," or words to that effect.
In strange contrast to the respondent's statement on the witness stand that he "felt very bad about the way she [Mary] broke down here the other day" and that he "would be more than happy to continue that $150 a month," is the fact that he has done nothing to make things right with Mary and apparently feels that he has done nothing unbecoming an attorney and one standing in the highly fiduciary relationship in which he stood with respect to his client.
We are of the firm opinion that the respondent, Neil S. Mackay, has manifested by his conduct in his dealings with his client, Mary Hill Keno, complete lack of comprehension or appreciation of the duties and responsibilities resting upon one in his position and as a member of the legal profession. We find him unfit to continue as a member of the profession and as an officer of the courts of Alaska. The facts being as they were in this case, we feel that the six-month suspension recommended by the trial committee is entirely inadequate and that the misconduct of the respondent calls for his disbarment. We, therefore, order that he be disbarred and that his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys of the State of Alaska, effective thirty days after the filing of this opinion.
So ordered.
. With respect to the filing of complaints and the functions of the trial committee in disciplinary proceedings against attorneys at law, the Rules of Procedure Relative to Disbarment, promulgated by tlie Board of Governors pursuant to authority vested in it by section 8, chapter 196, SLA 1955 [Section 35-2-77h ACLA Cum.Supp. (1957)1 provide as follows:
"Rule 7. PREPARATION AND PILING OP COMPLAINTS. If it shall appear to the President or other officer of the Board designated by the President, from report of the local grievance committee or otherwise, that grounds for reprimand, suspension or disbarment exist against any member or other attorney, such officer shall cause to be prepared and filed with tlie Secretary a complaint against the accused in the name of the Alaska Bar, and proceedings shall then be had thereon as hereafter provided. Such complaint shall be signed by the Secretary and shall set forth the acts or omissions of the accused so as to enable him to know the nature of the charges against him. Where more than one act or transaction is relied upon, the allegations shall be separately stated and numbered. The complaint need not be verified. Within the discretion of the Board, reprimand may be made by it without the filing of a formal complaint.
"Rule 8. TRIAL COMMITTEES. A trial committee, to be composed of three or more active members of the Alaska Bar, may be appointed by the President or other officer of the Board designated by the President for each city and vicinity mentioned. All eases of misconduct in which complaints are filed with the Secretary shall be tried by three or more members of the trial committee to be designated by the President or other officer of the Alaska Bar as may be designated by the President from time to time, one of wbom sliall be designated by the President to act as chairman of tlie particular trial committee so selected, provided that by resolution the Board may assign any such ca-o to a special trial committee appointed by the Board. Members of the trial committee shall be selected for each case, and. whether chosen therefor by the President or the Board, such selection shall be made for the sole purpose of giving the accused a fair and impartial trial and to insure justice to the public. A trial committee shall be appointed for each specific case. By vote of tiie Board, they or any of them, may be removed at any time and their successors appointed to serve. Members of the local grievance committee shall not sit as members of any trial committee concerning any case as to which such member or members may have made any investigation.
"Rule 9. DUTIES OP TRTAL COMMITTEES. It shall be the duty of trial committees to whom complaints have been referred promptly to settle the necessary pleadings in each case and try the same in the manner hereinafter provided. They shall pass on all questions of procedure and admission of evidence, and, in case of disagreement, the majority of the members of the trial committee shall decide each point or objection. They shall keep a record of all proceedings, including a transcript of the evidence and exhibits offered and received, and shall promptly transmit such record to the Board with their recommendations by forwarding the same to the Secretary. The recommendations to be made by the trial committee shall be by majority vote."
The Rules of Procedure from which the foregoing excerpts were taken were superseded on June 1, 1964, by "Rules of the Alaska Bar Association" promulgated by this court.
.Buie 37 of the Buies of Procedure mentioned in note 1 above provided that
"The findings of a trial committee shall be reviewed by the Board [of Governors] upon (1) the record made and transmitted to the Secretary, (2) the statement, if any, in support of, or in opposition to, the recommendations of the trial committee, and (3) such additional evidence as may be received by the Board. Prompt decision upon such review shall be made by the Board and the Board's decision and recommendation shall be reported to the District Court for the District of Alaska and a copy thereof, as required by Section 14 of the Alaska Bar Act, notice thereof, shall be given to the accused."
. Section 35-2-77n ACLA Cum.Supp. (1957) as amended by SLA 1960, ch. 178, § 6.
. In response to verbal inquiry as to why certification was not made in this case, the former executive secretary advised that the- entire record in this case was in the possession of the Board and that it was their obligation to certify, not his. Inquiry of the then president elicited the comment that he believed that, since the case was disposed of in favor of the accused, the records were all destroyed. The court succeeded in obtaining copies of the pleadings from a member of the trial committee and a transcript of the testimony from the court reporter.
. See In re Sullivan, 64 Ariz. 337, 170 P.2d 614, 615 (1946); In re Accusation by Walker, 32 Cal.2d 488, 196 P.2d 882 (1948); Martin v. Davis, 187 Kan. 473, 357 P.2d 782, 787-788 (1960), appeal on other point dismissed sub nom. Martin v. Walton, 368 U.S. 25, 82 S.Ct. 1, 7 L.Ed.2d 5 (1961); In re Parris, 229 Or. 209, 367 P.2d 387, 397 (1961); Ruckenbrod v. Mullins, 102 Utah 548, 133 P.2d 325, 330, 144 A.D.R. 839 (1943).
. See In re Paul, 17 Alaska 360, 366—368 (D.Alaska 1957); In re Tribble, 94 Ariz. 129, 382 P.2d 237 (1963); In re Hollinan, 43 Cal.2d 243, 272 P.2d 768, 774-775 (1954); In re Cox, 164 Kan. 160, 188 P.2d 652, 655 (1948); In re Platz, 60 Nev. 296, 108 P.2d 858, 861 (1940); In re Farris, 229 Or. 209, 367 P.2d 387, 392, 397 (1961); In re Olson, 116 Wash. 186, 198 P. 742 (1921), holding that the supreme court may, at its own option, examine into charges against an attorney proceeded against by the state board of bar examiners, even though the board has not recommended that his license be revoked or annulled, the court having inherent power to admit, suspend or disbar attorneys at law and notwithstanding statutory provision giving an attorney whose license has been revoked the right to petition the supreme court to review the board's findings.
. From the sale price of $25,000 which the respondent received for the Gambell Street property, he credits himself for the following deductions: $1,000 paid to Mary in cash on January 9, 1957; $4,-950 paid to Mary in thirty-three monthly sums of $150 between January 9, 1957, and November 3, 1959; $10,000 paid to Mary in cash on November 3, 1959; $1,-500 as net loss from operation of the property by the Mackays between January 9, 1957, and the date of the sale of the property to the Alaska National Bank in 1958; and $2,000 for expenses of the sale; ora total of $19,450. The difference between the deductions claimed, roughly $19,500, and the $25,000 received from the sale is $5,500.
. It is difficult to determine from the respondent's testimony whether he sent Mary to Mr. Maffei for independent legal advice. At one time in his testimony ho said that was his intention and at another time, when asked how ho could justify taking away from her the agreement by which she was receiving $150 per month, he answered: "Because that is what she wanted, and I talked her out of it, I don't know how many times. >'
. See In re Park, 45 Washed 383, 274 P.2d 1000 (1954), in which the court ordered disbarment of an attorney in spite of the fact that the Board of Governors, Washington State Bar Association. had recommended only a ninety-day suspension from the practice of law. The court answered in the negative the test question taken from an earlier Washington case: "Can I, in view of what has been clearly shown as to this man's conduct, conscientiously participate in continuing to hold him out to the public as worthy of that confidence which a client is compelled to repose in his attorney?"