Case Name: PEOPLE v. MAZZULLA
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1976-09-28
Citations: 71 Mich. App. 418
Docket Number: Docket No. 26505
Parties: PEOPLE v MAZZULLA
Judges: Before: R. M. Maher, P. J., and M. F. Cavanagh and Beasley, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 71
Pages: 418–427

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v MAZZULLA
Opinion op R. M. Maher, J.
1. Searches and Seizures — Consent—Search Without Warrant.
Consent to a search allows the search to be made without a warrant and yet not violate the Fourth Amendment prohibitions against unreasonable searches.
2. Searches and Seizure — Automobiles—Consent—Search Without Warrant — Common Authority.
Consent by the owner of an automobile to a search of the automobile permitted a search without a warrant of the vehicle, but did not authorize the search of a box, found inside the car, which belonged to another person where the person consenting to the search did not possess common authority over the box or other sufficient relationship to it.
3. Searches and Seizures — Consent—Search Without Warrant— Possessions of Third Party — Common Authority.
Proof of voluntary consent to a search without a warrant is not limited to proof that consent was given by a defendant but may show that permission to the search was obtained from a third party who possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected.
Concurrence in Result by M. F. Cavanagh, J.
4. Searches and Seizures — Automobile—Owner of Automobile— Consent — Items Within Automobile.
The owner of an automobile could give a valid consent to a search of an unidentiffed box found in the automobile.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1-5, 7, 8] 68 Am Jur 2d, Searches and Seizures § 46 et seq.
Validity, under Federal constitution, of warrantless search of automobile — Supreme Court cases. 26 L Ed 2d 893.
Authority to consent for another to search or seizure. 31 ALR2d 1078.
75 Am Jur 2d, Trial § 1032.
5. Evidence — Insufficient Evidence — Automobiles—Items Within Automobile — Ownership.
There was insufficient evidence to connect a defendant with a box found in a car being driven by the defendant but belonging to another person where the only evidence linking the defendant to the box, apart from the fact that the box was found in the car when the defendant and his passenger were stopped, was a vial which bore the name of the defendant’s wife and which was found within the box.
6. Drugs and Narcotics — Appeal and Error — Jury—Controlled Substances.
It was reversible error to allow a jury in a trial for possession of a controlled substance to have during its deliberations the entire contents of a box, allegedly belonging to the defendant in the matter, where the contents included a substantial number of pills the possession of which was not in violation of statute and on which there were no charges.
Dissent by Beasley, J.
7. Searches and Seizures — Trial—Assertion of Ownership — Evidence.
A defendant in a criminal action cannot at trial assert ownership on the one hand for purposes of a claim that there was an unconstitutional search and seizure and on the other hand assert that there is no evidence to show his ownership.
8. Searches and Seizures — Automobiles—Consent—Search Without Warrant — Contents of Automobile.
Consent to a search of an automobile, given by the owner and by the principal user, is also a consent to a search of the contents of the automobile.
9. Drugs and Narcotics — Evidence—Jury Deliberations — Discretion of Trial Court — Appeal and Error — Controlled Substances Act.
It was entirely within the discretion of a trial court to permit any pills and tablets which had been admitted into evidence in a trial for a violation of the Controlled Substances Act to go into the jury room during jury deliberations; therefore, it was harmless error to allow all of the pills found in a defendant’s tackle box to be taken into the jury room where a substantial quantity of the pills had been admitted into evidence (MCLA 335.301 et seq.; MSA 18.1070[1] et seq.).
Appeal from Oakland, Richard D. Kuhn, J.
Submitted April 12, 1976, at Lansing.
(Docket No. 26505.)
Decided September 28, 1976.
Joseph Mazzulla was convicted on two counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Defendant appeals.
Reversed.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, L. Brooks Patterson, Prosecuting Attorney, Robert C. Williams, Chief Appellate Counsel, and Keith Corbett, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Robert E. Kostin (Phillip M. Stevens, of counsel), for defendant.
Before: R. M. Maher, P. J., and M. F. Cavanagh and Beasley, JJ.

Opinion:
R. M. Maher, P. J.
A jury found defendant guilty on two counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. MCLA 335.341(1)(a), (b); MSA 18.1070(41)(a), (b). The court imposed concurrent sentences of 10 to 20 years and 4-1/2 to 7 years. Defendant appeals of right. We reverse his convictions.
Defendant raises several issues but disposition of his appeal only requires consideration of his claim that the controlled substances introduced at trial were obtained by an illegal search.
During the early morning hours of June 1, 1974, a police officer, observing defendant's erratic driving, stopped him. Defendant could not produce a driver's license, but did produce the automobile's registration showing the automobile registered to a person named Jewel. The officer arrested defendant for drunken driving, and transported him to jail for Breathalyzer testing. The test indicated no alcohol in defendant's blood, and the charge was changed to driving under the influence of narcotics. When the arresting officer returned to his police car he found a hypodermic needle in the backseat, the arresting officer then had the car defendant had been driving transported to the county jail.
Later in the day, the detective in charge of the case spoke with defendant's mother-in-law, Mrs. Jewel. The automobile's registration was in the name of Mrs. Jewel and her husband. Mrs. Jewel informed the officer that her daughter, defendant's sister-in-law, had been given the automobile for her use. The officer requested that Mrs. Jewel and her daughter go to the jail and consent to a search of the automobile. Both women went to the jail and signed consent to search forms authorizing a search of the automobile.
The detective then proceeded to search the automobile in the presence of the two women and a deputy. He pointed out a gray metal box on the floor of the back seat and asked them who owned it. Each said it was not hers. The detective then opened the box and found a large quantity of tablets and pills inside. Lab tests showed some of them to be controlled substances and they were introduced in evidence at defendant's trial.
The prosecution's brief offers the consent of the owner and of the principal user of the automobile as justification for the warrantless search that produced evidence against defendant. Consent allows searches to be made without a warrant and yet not violate Fourth Amendment prohibitions. Schneckloth v Bustamonte, 412 US 218; 93 S Ct 2041; 36 L Ed 2d 854 (1973), People v Reed, 393 Mich 342; 224 NW2d 867 (1975). The consent given permitted the warrantless search of the automobile, but did not authorize the police to open the box and examine its contents.
It is not always required that the person against whom evidence is introduced give his consent to the search producing the evidence. Indeed, in many cases he will have no interest in the premises searched nor any standing to later complain that the search was not conducted pursuant to a warrant. It is "clear that when the prosecution seeks to justify a warrantless search by proof of voluntary consent, it is not limited to proof that consent was given by the defendant, but may show that permission to search was obtained from a third party who possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected." United States v Matlock, 415 US 164, 171; 94 S Ct 988, 993; 39 L Ed 2d 242, 249-250 (1974). In Matlock, the woman who shared a bedroom with defendant gave police permission to search the room. Police found evidence, later introduced at defendant's trial, in a diaper bag in the only closet in the room. The court refused to hold the search illegal.
But the situation presented in Matlock, like that in Frazier v Cupp, 394 US 731; 89 S Ct 1420; 22 L Ed 2d 684 (1969), and in People v Chism, 390 Mich 104; 211 NW2d 193 (1973), is not found here. In People v Flowers, 23 Mich App 523; 179 NW2d 56 (1970), the Court found invalid the search of defendant's room in his father's house, even though his father had consented to the search. In an earlier case, People v Overall, 7 Mich App 153; 151 NW2d 225 (1967), this Court held that a grandmother could not authorize the search of her grandson's room. The situation now before the Court is analogous to that found in both Flowers and Overall, and, in fact, presents an even more compelling case for finding the evidence to be a product of an illegal search. Neither Mrs. Jewel nor her daughter had any interest in the box. Both prior to the search and at trial they denied any connection with it. The prosecution's case was premised on defendant's exclusive control of the box. Consent obtained from someone who does not "possess common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the effects sought to be inspected" cannot validate a warrantless search.
No other possible basis for the warrantless search is apparent from the record. Defendant's convictions are therefore reversed.