Case Name: Paula J. COCHRAN, a minor, By and Through her father and next friend, R. P. Cochran, and R. P. Cochran, Individually, Appellants, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1974-07-19
Citations: 298 So. 2d 173
Docket Number: No. 72-1163
Parties: Paula J. COCHRAN, a minor, By and Through her father and next friend, R. P. Cochran, and R. P. Cochran, Individually, Appellants, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation, Appellee.
Judges: MAGER, J., concurs in conclusion only.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 298
Pages: 173–177

Head Matter:
Paula J. COCHRAN, a minor, By and Through her father and next friend, R. P. Cochran, and R. P. Cochran, Individually, Appellants, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation, Appellee.
No. 72-1163.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
July 19, 1974.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 20, 1974.
Robert B. Alford and Karl O. Koepke of Whitaker & Koepke & Assoc., Orlando, for appellants.
James O. Driscoll of Driscoll & Conrad, Orlando, for appellee.

Opinion:
CROSS, Judge.
Appellants-plaintiffs, Paula J. Cochran, a minor, by and through her father and next friend, R. P. Cochran, and R. P. Cochran, individually, appeal a final judgment entered on a directed verdict in favor of the defendant-appellee, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, in a cause of action seeking damages resulting from negligent maintenance of an automobile. We reverse.
On July 12, 1970, the plaintiff, Paula J. Cochran, was operating a motor vehicle with the consent of the owner, Martha H. Swindell. At the time of the accident Martha H. Swindell had in force and effect an insurance policy with State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. While Miss Cochran was driving the vehicle, a rear tire blew out, the vehicle went out of control, left the highway and hit a power pole, causing Miss Cochran various injuries.
Subsequently, suit was filed by plaintiffs against the defendants, Martha H. Swin-dell and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, alleging negligent maintenance of an automobile. After various preliminary motions, State Farm answered the complaint, and in essence, denied that the policy afforded coverage to the plaintiffs.
State Farm then sought judgment on the pleadings. The trial court granted State Farm's motion for judgment on the pleadings, and appeal was taken to this court. Cochran v. Swindell, 263 So.2d 638 (Fla.App.1972). This court reversed. After remand to the trial court, the cause came to trial on November 6, 1972, the parties stipulating that the issue of insurance coverage would be tried first. It was further stipulated that the policy of insurance issued to Martha H. Swindell by State Farm was in force and effect at the time of the accident, and that Paula Cochran was operating the motor vehicle with the consent of the owner, Martha H. Swindell. At the conclusion of the plaintiffs' case, on the issue of insurance coverage, the trial judge directed the jury to enter a verdict in favor of the defendant, State Farm. Final judgment was entered pursuant to the jury verdict. It is from this final judgment that the plaintiffs now appeal.
The only controversy on this appeal is whether the loss incurred by the plaintiffs is covered and embraced within the terms of the policy of insurance issued to Martha H. Swindell by State Farm. The pertinent coverage of the policy is:
1. The Insuring Agreement in which the insurance company agreed "To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of (A) bodily injury sustained by other persons . . . caused by accident arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the owned automobile."
2. Definitions — "Insured—under coverages A, B, C and M the unqualified word 'insured' includes . (4) any other person while using the owned automobile . . . " (Emphasis added)
3. Exclusions, which provide "This insurance does not apply under : . (i) coverage A, to bodily injury to the insured or any member of the family of the insured residing in the same household as the insured . " (Emphasis added)
The trial court determined that the minor plaintiff, Paula J. Cochran, came within the definition of "insured" as defined in (2) "Definitions" of the policy issued by State Farm, and also within the exclusionary provisions of the policy as provided in (3) "Exclusions."
To cull from an opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes, words are not crystal, transparent and unchanged, they are the skin of a living thought, and may vary greatly in color and context according to the circumstances in which they are used. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 38 S.Ct. 158, 62 L.Ed. 372.
Do the words "the insured" used in the exclusionary provisions of the policy mean the same as the word "insured" in the definition provisions of the policy P The answer to this question is found in a general principle that when one interprets an insurance policy, grants of coverage must be interpreted broadly in favor of the existence of insurance while limitations thereon, or exclusions, must be interpreted narrowly against the insurance company. Johnson v. Life Insurance Co. of Georgia, 52 So.2d 813 (Fla.1951); 18 Fla.Jur., Insurance § 409. The result is that the context of a word or words used in the grant provisions of the policy are not necessarily used in the same context under the limiting or exclusionary provisions of the policy.
The word "the" qualifies the word "insured" and means the person specifically named in the policy, rather than someone who might become an additional insured by reason of his use of a vehicle owned by the insured with the latter's permission. This conclusion is strengthened by State Farm's own policy. Under "Mutual Conditions" the following paragraph is found:
"1. Membership. The membership fees set out in this policy, which are in addition to the premiums, are not returnable but entitle the first insured named in the declarations to insure one automobile for any applicable coverage, and to insurance for any other coverage for which said fees were paid so long as this company continues to write such coverages and the insured remains a risk desirable to the company." (Emphasis added)
It is obvious from the above paragraph of State Farm's policy that State Farm considered the words "the insured" to mean the same as the first insured named in the declarations.
We see no reason to give the words "the insured" any different color or context than that given by State Farm in its policy. Feldman v. Central National Insurance Co. of Omaha, 279 So.2d 897 (Fla.App.1973).
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court was in error in interpreting the word "insured" in the definition provisions of the policy to mean the same as the words "the insured" in the exclusionary provisions of the policy. Therefore, coverage was afforded to the minor plaintiff, Paula J. Cochran, within the terms of State Farm's insurance policy.
Reversed and remanded.
MAGER, J., concurs in conclusion only.
OWEN, C. J., dissents with opinion.