Case Name: SHI HUI GUAN, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, United States Attorney General, Respondent
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2016-05-10
Citations: 648 F. App'x 129
Docket Number: No. 12-1772
Parties: SHI HUI GUAN, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, United States Attorney General, Respondent.
Judges: PRESENT: ROBERT D. SACK, GERARD E. LYNCH, and CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 648
Pages: 129–130

Head Matter:
SHI HUI GUAN, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, United States Attorney General, Respondent.
No. 12-1772.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
May 10, 2016.
Ning Ye, Flushing, NY, for Petitioner.
Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant Attorney General; Blair T. O’Connor, Assistant Director; Jane T. Schaffner, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
PRESENT: ROBERT D. SACK, GERARD E. LYNCH, and CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
SUMMARY ORDER
Petitioner Shi Hui Guan, a native and citizen of the People's Republic of China, seeks review of a March 30, 2012, decision of the BIA, denying his motion to reopen. In re Shi Hui Guan, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Mar. 30, 2012). We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.
Our review is limited to the BIA's denial of Guan's motion to reopen, and we do not consider his challenges to the agency's underlying adverse credibility determination. See Ke Zhen Zhao v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 265 F.3d 83, 89-90 (2d Cir.2001). The applicable standards of review are well established. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 168-69 (2d Cir.2008).
The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Guan's motion to reopen because he failed to demonstrate his prima facie eligibility for relief. See INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104, 108 S.Ct. 904, 99 L.Ed.2d 90 (1988). In light of the agency's underlying adverse credibility determination, the BIA reasonably declined to credit Guan's affidavit, see Qin Wen Zheng v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 143, 147 (2d Cir.2007), which was the only evidence provided to support his assertion that he has practiced Falun Gong in the United States since 1998 even though he claimed that he meets weekly with other practitioners (who could have corroborated his claims). Furthermore, the BIA did not err in finding that Guan failed to establish his prima facie eligibility for relief because he did not submit any evidence showing that the Chinese government was aware of or likely to become aware of his purported practice of Falun Gong. See Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 143 (2d Cir.2008).
Accordingly, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Guan's motion to reopen. See Abudu, 485 U.S. at 104-05, 108 S.Ct. 904; see also Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 168. We do not consider Guan's remaining arguments as he did not exhaust them before the BIA. See Lin Zhong v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 480 F.3d 104, 119-22 (2d Cir.2007).
For -the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, the stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED.