Case Name: FLOYD FORSBERG, Appellant, v. Manfred (Fred) MAASS, Respondent
Court: Oregon Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1991-12-11
Citations: 110 Or. App. 300
Docket Number: 87-C-10544; CA A65398
Parties: FLOYD FORSBERG, Appellant, v. Manfred (Fred) MAASS, Respondent.
Judges: Before Richardson, Presiding Judge, and Joseph, Chief Judge, and Deits, Judge.
Reporter: Oregon Reports, Court of Appeals
Volume: 110
Pages: 300–301

Head Matter:
Argued and submitted April 15,
affirmed December 11, 1991,
reconsideration denied March 4,
petition for review denied April 28, 1992 (313 Or 210)
FLOYD FORSBERG, Appellant, v. Manfred (Fred) MAASS, Respondent.
(87-C-10544; CA A65398)
821 P2d 446
Steven H. Gorham, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for appellant.
Richard D. Wasserman, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Dave Frohnmayer, Attorney General, and Virginia L. Linder, Solicitor General, Salem.
Before Richardson, Presiding Judge, and Joseph, Chief Judge, and Deits, Judge.
PER CURIAM
Joseph, C. J., vice Newman, J., deceased.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM
Petitioner appeals from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief after the trial court granted summary judgment for defendant.
This is petitioner's third petition for post-conviction relief. His first, which raised the same grounds asserted in the present petition, was dismissed with prejudice on his own motion. His second petition was also dismissed with prejudice because of the dismissal of the first. Petitioner then filed the present petition, raising the same grounds raised in the other two petitions. ¡Defendant moved for summary judgment, because ORS 138.550(3) bars successive petitions for post-conviction relief, unless the later petition raises grounds for relief that could not have been asserted in the original petition.
Petitioner acknowledges that the grounds for relief in the present petition are essentially the same as those raised in the first petition. He argues, essentially, that summary judgment was improper, because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the original dismissal with prejudice was obtained through unlawful coercion and is, therefore, void. The original dismissal with prejudice was not appealed and may not now be collaterally attacked.
Affirmed.