Case Name: LEISY v. HARDIN
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1890-04-28
Citations: 135 U.S. 100
Docket Number: No. 1459
Parties: LEISY v. HARDIN.
Judges: 
Reporter: United States Reports
Volume: 135
Pages: 100–160

Head Matter:
LEISY v. HARDIN.
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IOWA.
No. 1459.
Submitted January 6, 1890.
Decided April 28, 1890.
A statute of a State, prohibiting the sale of any intoxicating liquors, except for pharmaceutical, medicinal, chemical or sacramental purposes, and > under a license from a county court of the State, is, as applied to a sale by the importer, and in the original packages or kegs, unbroken and unopened, of such liquors manufactured in and brought from another State, unconstitutional and void, as repugnant to the clause of the Constitution granting to Congress the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States.
Peirce v. New Hampshire, 5 How. 504, overruled.
Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, on behalf of the court, stated the case as follows:
Christine Leisy, Edward Leisy, Lena and Albert Leisy, composing the firm of Cas. Leisy & Co., citizens of Illinois, brought their action of replevin against A. J. Hardin, the duly elected and qualified marshal of the city of Keokuk, Iowa, and ex officio constable of Jackson township, Lee County, Iowa, in .the Superior Court of Keokuk, in said county, to recover 122 one-quarter barrels of beer, 171 one-eighth barrels of beer, and 11. sealed cases of beer, which had been seized by him in a proceeding on behalf of the State of Iowa against said defendants, under certain provisions of the code of the State of Iowa; and upon issue joined, á jury having been duly waived by the parties, the case was submitted to the court for trial, and, hairing been tried, the court, after having taken the case under advisement, finally “ rendered and filed in said cause its findings of fact and conclusions of law in words and figures following, to wit:
. “1st. That plaintiffs, Gus. Leisy & Co., are a firm .of that name and style, residing in the State of Illinois, with principal place of business at Peoria, Illinois ; that said firm is composed wholly of citizens of Illinois; that said firm is engaged as brewers in the manufacture of beer in the said city of Peoria, Illinois, selling same in the States of Illinois and Iowa.
“ 2d. That the property in question, to wit, 122 one-quarter barrels of beer, of the value of $300, 171 one-éighth barrels of beer, value $215, and 11 sealed cases of beer, value of $25, was all manufactured by said Leisy & Co. in the city of Peoria, Illinois, and put up in said kegs and cases by the manufacturers, viz., Gus. Leisy & Co., at Peoria, Illinois; that each of said kegs was sealed and had placed iipon it, over' the plug in the opening of each keg, a United States internal revenue stamp of the district in which Peoria is situated; that said cases were substantially made of wood, each one- of them containing 24 quart bottles of beer, each bottle of beer corked' and the cork fastened.in with a metallic cap, sealed and covered with tin-foil, and each case was sealed with a metallic seal; that ■ said beer in all of said kegs and cases was manufactured and put up into said kegs and cases as aforesaid by the manufacturers, to wit, Gus. Leisy & Co., plaintiffs in this suit, and to open said cases the metallic seals had to be broken.
“ 3d.x That the property herein described was transported by said Gus. Leisy & Co. from Peoria, Illinois, by means of railways to Keokuk, Iowa, in said sealed kegs and cases, as same was manufactured and put up by them in the city of Peoria, Illinois.
“ 4th. That said property was sold and offered for sale in Keokuk, Iowa, by John Leisy, a resident of Keokuk, Iowa, who is agent for said Gus". Leisy & Co.; that the only sales arid offers to sell of said beer w,as in the original keg and sealed case as manufactured and put up by said Gus. Leisy & Co: and. irriported by them into the State of Iowa; that no kegs or cases sold or- offered for sale were broken or opened on the premises; that as soon as same was purchased it was removed from the premises occupied by Gus. Leisy & Co., which said premises are owned by Christiana Leisy, a member of the firm of Gus: Leisy & Co., residing in and being a citizen of Peoria, Illinois; that none,of such sales or offers to sell were made to minors or persons in the habit of becoming intoxicated.
“5th. That on the 30th day of June, 1888, the defendant, as constable of Jackson township, Lee County, Iowa,'by:virtue of a search warrant issued by J. G. Garréttson, an acting justice of the peace of said Jackson township, upon an information filed charging that in premises occupied by said John Leisy there were certain intoxicating liquors, etc., seized the property, therein described and took same into his custody.
“ 6th. And the court finds that said intoxicating liquors tfius seized by the defendant in his official capacity as constable were kept for sale in the premises described in’ the search warrant in Keokuk, Lee County, Iowa, and occupied by Gus. Leisy & Co. for the purpose of being sold, in violation of the provisions of the laws of Iowa, but which laws, the court holds, are unconstitutional and void, as herein stated.
“ 7th. That on the 2d day of July,. 1888, plaintiffs filed in this court their petition,, alleging, among other things, that they were the owners and entitled to the possession of said property, and that the law under which said warrant Was issued was unconstitutional and void, being in violation of section 8 of article I of the Constitution of the United States, and having filed a proper bond, a writ of replevin issued and the possession of said property was given to plaintiffs.
“ From the foregoing facts the court finds the following conclusions:
“ That plaintiffs are the sole and unqualified owners of said property-and entitled to the possession of same and judgment for one dollar .damages for their detention and costs of suit; that so.much of chapter 6, title XI, of the Code of 1873, and the amendments thereto, as prohibits such sales by plaintiffs as were made by plaintiffs, -is unconstitutional, being in contravention of section 8 of article I of the Constitution of the United States; that- said law has been held unconstitutional; ip a like case heretofore tried and determined by this.court,. involving the same question,' in the case of Collins v. Hills, decided prior to the commencement of this suit and prior to:' the seizure of said property by defendant.; to all of which the defendant at the time excepted.”
Judgment was thereupon rendered as follows :
“ This cause coming on for hearing, plaintiffs appearing by Anderson & Davis, their attorneys; and the defendant. by H. Scott Howell & Son and Vm. B,' Collins, his attorneys, and the cause coming on for final hearing on th'e pleadings on file' and thé evidence introduced, the court, makes the special finding of facts and law herewith ordered to be made of record and finds that plaintiffs are the sole and unqualified owners and entitled to possession of the following-described personal; property, to wit: 122 one-quarter (|)_barrels of beer of the value of $300; 171 one-eighth (J) barrels of beer of. the'value of $215, and 11 sealed cases of beer of the value of $25.
“ That, plaintiffs- being in possession of said property by virtue of a bond heretofore given, said possession, in plaintiffs is confirmed. The court further finds that the writ issued by J. G. Garrettson, a justice of the peace, under which defendant held possession of said property and seized same, is void, same having been issued under sections of the law of Iowa that are unconstitutional and "void.
“ That plaintiff is entitled to one dollar damages for the wrongful detention of said property.
“ It is. therefore Qrdered and considered by the court, that the plaintiffs have and recover of defendant the sum of one dollar damages, and.costs of this action, taxéd. at $—
■ “ To which findings, order and judgment of court the defendant at the time excepts and asks until the 31st'day-of October.,'1888, to prepare and file his bill of exceptions,-which' request is granted and order hereby made.”
. A motion for new trial was made and overruled, and the cause taken to the. Supreme Court of fbwa by appeal, and errors therein assigned as follows:
“ L The. court erred' in finding that the plaintiffs weré the sole and unqualified owners and were entitled to the p'ossession of the intoxicating liquors seized and held by appellant.
“II. In finding that the plaintiffs were entitled to one dollar damages, for their detention, and for costs .of suit.
■ “ III.. The court erred in holding that the sales of beer ;in ‘ original páckagés/ by the keg and case, as made by John Leisy, agent of plaintiffs, were lawful,
.“ IV. The court erred in .its conclusions and finding 'that so much of the law of .the State of Iowa embraced in chapter 6, title XI, Code-of 1873, and the amendments thereto, as prohibits such sales of beer in the State of Iowa was unconstitutional, being in contravention of section 8, article I,, of- the Constitution of the United States.
“ Y. The court erred in rendering a judgment for plaintiffs and awarding them the intoxicating liquors in question and damages and costs against defendant.
. .“ YI. The court erred in overruling the defendant’s motion for a new trial.”
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Superior Court, and entered judgment against the plaintiffs and their sureties on the replevin bond in the amount of the value of the property, with costs. The judgment thus concluded: “ And it is further certified' by this court, and hereby made a part of the record, that in the decision of this suit there is drawn.in question the validity of certain statutes of the State of Iowa, namely, chap. 6 of title XI of the Code of Iowa of 1873 and the amendments- thereto, on the ground of their being repugnant to and in' contravention of section 8 of article I of the Constitution of the United States, said appellees, Gus. Leisy & Co., claiming such statutes of the State of Iowa are .invalid, and the decision in this cause is in favor of the validity of said statutes of the State of Iowa.”
To review this judgment, a writ of error was sued out from this court.'
The opinion of the Supreme Court, not yet .reported in the official series, will be found in 43 N. W. Rep. 188.
/The seizure of the. beer in question by the constable was made under the provisions of chapter 6, title XI, of the Code of 1873 and amendments thereto. (Code 1873, p. 279; Laws 1884, c. 8, p. 8, c. 143, p. 146; Laws 1888, c. 71, p. 91; 1 McClain’s Ann. Code, §§ 2359 to 2431, p. 603.)
.Section 1523 of the Code is as follows:
“ No person shall manufacture or sell, by himself, his clerk, steward or agent, directly or indirectly, any intoxicating liquors except , as hereinafter provided. And the-keeping of intoxicating liquor, wffh the intent on the part of the owner thereof, or any person acting under his authority, or by his permission, to sell the same within this state contrary to the provisions of this chapter, is hereby prohibited, and the intoxicating liquor so kept, together with the-vessels in which it is contained, is declared a nuisance, and shall be forfeited and dealt with-as hereinafter provided.”
Chapter 71 of the Laws of the 22d General Assembly is an act approved April 12, 1888 (Laws Iowa, 1888, p. 91), of which the first section is as follows :
“ That after this act takes - effect no person shall manufacture for sale, sell, keep for sale, give away, exchange, barter or dispense any intoxicating liquor, for any purpose whatever, otherwise than as provided in this act. Persons holding permits as herein provided shall be authorized to sell and dispense intoxicating liquors for pharmaceutical and medicinal purposes and alcohol for specified chemical purposes, and wine for sacramental purposes, but for no other purposes whatever; and all permits must be procured as hereinafter provided from the district court of the proper county at- any term thereof after this act takes effect, and a permit to buy and sell intoxicating liquors when so procured shall continue in force for one year from date of its issue unless revoked according to law or until application for renewal is disposed of, if such application is made before the year expires. Provided, tha1- renewals of permits may be annually granted upon written application by permit holders who show to the satisfaction of the court or judge that they have during the preceding year complied with the provisions of this act and execute' a new bond as in this act required to be originally given, but parties may appear and resist renewals the same as in applications for permits.” Section 2 provides for- notice of application for permit, and section 3 reads thus:
“ Applications for permits shall be made by petition signed and. sworn to by the applicant and filed in the office of the clerk of the-district court-of the proper county at least ten ¿ays before the first day of the term, which petition shall state the .applicant’s name; place of residence; in what business he is then'engaged, and in what business he has been engaged for two'years.previous to filing petition; the place, particularly describing it, where the business of buying and selling liquor is to. be conducted; that he is a citizen of the United States and of the State of Iowa; that he is a registered pharmacist and now is, and for the last, six months has been lawfully conduptipg a pharmacy iti the township or town wherein he proposes to sell intoxicating liquors under the permit applied for, 'and as the proprietor of such pharmacy, that he has not been adjudged guilty of violating the law relating to intoxicating liquors within the last two years next preceding his application ; and is not the keeper, of a hotel, eating-house,, saloon, restaurant or place of public amusement; that he is not addicted to the use of intoxicating liquors as a beverage, and- has not within the last two' years next preceding his application been directly or indirectly engaged, employed or interested in the unlawful manufacture, sale or keeping for sale of intoxicating liquors;.and that he desires a permit to purchase, keep and sell such liquors for lawful purposes only.”
Yarious sections follow, relating to giving bond; petition as . to the good moral character Of applicant; hearing on the application; oath upon the issuing of permit; keeping of record ; -punishment by fine, imprisonment, etc.
By section 20, sections 1524, 1526, and other section’s of the Code were, in terms, repealed.
The Code provided for the seizure of intoxicating liquors unlawfully offered for sale, and no question in reference to that arises here, if the law in controversy be valid.
By section 1 of chapter 8 of .the Laws of 1884, p. 8, ale, beer, wine, spirituous, vinous and malt liquors are defined to be intoxicating liquors.-
Section 1524 of the Code of 1873, p. 279, was as follows:
. “Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to forbid’ the, .sale, by the importer'thereof, of foreign intoxicating liquor imported under the authority of the laws of the United States regarding the importation of such liquors and in accordance with such .laws: Provided, That the said liquor, at the time of said sale- by said importer, remains in the original casks or-packages in which it was by him-imported, and in quantities not less than the quantities' in which the laws of the United States require such liquors to be imported,- and is sold by him in said original casks or packages and in said quantities only; and nothing contained in this law shall prevent any persons from manufacturing in this State liquors for the purpose of being sold according to the provisions of this chapter, to be used for mechanical, medicinal, culinary or sacramental, purposes.”
This section is substantially identical with section 2 of chapter 45 of the acts of the fifth general assembly of Iowa, approved January 22, 1855 (Laws Iowa, 1854-1855, p. 58); and it was carried into the revision of 1860 as section 1560 (Revision 1860, Chap. 64, p. 259). It was repealed by section 20 of the act of April 12, 1888, as before stated.
Section 1553 of the Code, as amended by the act of April 5, 1886 (Laws Iowa, 1886, p. 83, c. 66, § 10), forbade any common carrier to bring within the State of Iowa, for any person or persons, or corporation, any intoxicating liquors from any other State or Territory of the. United States, without first having been furnished with a certificate-, under the seal of the county auditor of the county to which said liquor was to be transported, or was consigned for transportation, certifying that the consignee, or person to whom such liquor was to be transported, conveyed or delivered, was authorized to- sell intoxicating liquors in such county. This was held to be in contravention of. the federal constitutión, in Bowman v. Chicago & North Western Railway Co., 125 U. S. 465.
Mr. James G. Davis for plaintiffs in error.
Mr. H. Scott Howell and Mr. W. B. GolUns for defendant in error. •
Mr. John Y. Stone,.- Attorney General for the State of Iowa, for that State.

Opinion:
Mr. Chief Justice Fuller,
after stating the case, delivered' . the opinion of the court.
The power vested in Congress " to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes," is the power to prescribe the rule by which that commerce is to be governed, and is a power complete in itself, acknowledging no limitations other tb.an those prescribed in the Constitution. It is co-extensive with the subject on- which it acts and cannot be stopped at the external boundary of a State, but must enter its interior and must be capable of authorizing the disposition of those articles which it introduces, so that they may become mingled with the common mass of property within the. territory entered. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 W heat. 1; Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419.
And while, by virtue of. its jurisdiction over persons and property within its limits, a State may provide for the security of the lives, limbs, health and comfort of persons and the protection of property so situated, yet a subject matter which has been confided exclusively to Congress by the Constitution is not within the jurisdiction of the police power of the State, unless placed there by congressional action. Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U. S. 259; Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465; Walling v. Michigan, 116 U. S. 466; Robbins v. Shelby Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489. The power to regulate' commerce among the States is a unit, but if particular subjects within its operation do not require the application of a general or uniform system, the States may legislate in regard to them with a view to local needs and circumstances, until Congress otherwise directs; but the power thus exercised by the States is not identical in its extent with the power to regulate commerce among the States. The power to pass laws in respect to internal commerce, inspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws and laws in relation to bridges, ferries and highways, belongs to the class óf powers pertaining to locality, essential to local intercommunication, to the progress and development of . local prosperity and to the protection, the safety and the welfare of society, originally necessarily belonging to, and upon the adoption of the Constitution reserved by, the States, except so far as falling within the scope of a power confided to the general government. Where the sub ject matter requires a uniform system as between the States, the power controlling it is vested exclusively in Corigress, and cannot'be encroached upon by the States.; but where, in relation to the subject matter, different rules may be suitable for different localities, the States may exercise powers which, though they may' be said to partake of the nature of the power granted to the general government, are strictly not such, but are simply local powers, which have full operation until or unless circumscribed by the action of Congress *in effectuation of the general power. Cooley v. Port Wardens of Philadelphia, 12 How. 299.
It. was stated in the 32d number pf' the Federalist that the States .might exercise concurrent and independent power • in all. cases but three: First, where the power was lodged exclusively in the federal constitution; second, where it was given to the United States and prohibited to the States;, third, where, from the nature and subjects of the power, it must be necessarily exercised by the national government .exclusively. But it is easy to see that Congress may assert • an authority under on¿ of the granted powers, which would , exclude the exercise by the States upon the same subject of '• a different but similar power, between which and .that, posf sessed by the general government no inherent repugnancy existed.
Whenever, however, a particular power of the general government is one which must necessarily be exercised by it, and Congress remains silent, this is not only not a concession that' the powers reserved by the States may be exerted as if the specific power had not been elsewhere reposed, but, on the contrary, the only legitimate conclusion is that the general government intended that power should not be affirmatively . exercised, and the action of. the States cannot be permitted to. effect that which would be incompatible with such intention.'. Hence, inasmuch as interstate commerce, consisting in-, the transportation, purchase, sale and exchange of commodities, is national in its character, and must be governed by a uniform system,' so long as Congress does not pass any law to regulate it, .'or allowing the States so to do, it thereby indicates its will, - ,tnat such commerce shall be free and untrammelled. County of Mobile Kimball, 102 U. S. 691; Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622, 631; Wabash, St. Louis &c. Railway v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557; Robbins v. Shelby Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489, 493.
That ardent spirits, distilled liquors, ale and beer are sublets of exchange, barter and traffic, like any other commodity in which a right of traffic exists, and are so recognized by the usages of the commercial world, the laws of Congress and the decisions of courts, is not denied. Being thus articles of commerce, can a.State, in the absence of legislation on the part of Congress,1 prohibit their importation from abroad or from a sister State ? or when imported prohibit their sale- by the importer? If-the importation. cannot be prohibited 'without ,-the consent of Congress, when does property imported from !abroad, or from a sister State, so'become part of- the common mass of property within-' State as to be subject to its .unimpeded control ?
In Brown v. Maryland (supra) the act of the state legislature drawn in question was held invalid as repugnant to the prohibition of the Consk'íátjon upon the States- to lay any impost or duty upon imports - or exports, and to the clause granting fthe power to regulate commerce; and it.- was laid down by the great magistrate who presided over this court 'for more than a third of' a century, that the point of time when the prohibition ceases and the power of the State to tax commences, is not the instant when 'the article enters the country, but when the importer has so acted upon it that it has become incorporated and mixed up with the mass of property in the country, which happens when the original package is no' longer such in his hands; that the distinction is obvious between a tax which intercepts the import as an import on its way to become incorporated with the general mass of property, and a tax which finds the article already incorporated with that mass by the act of the importer; that as to-the power to regulate commerce, none of the evils which proceeded from the feebleness of the federal -government contributed more" to-the great revolution which introduced the present, system,' than the deep and general conviction that commerce ought to be regulated by Congress; that the grant should- be as extensive' as the mischief, and should comprehend all foreign commerce and all commerce among the States; that that power was complete in itself, acknowledged no limitations other than those prescribed by the Constitution,'was co-extensive with 'the subject on which it acts and not to be stopped at the external boundary of a State, but must be capable of entering its interior.; that the right to sell any article imported was an inseparable incident to the right to import it; and that the principles expounded in the case applied equally to importations from a sister State. Manifestly this must be so, for the same public polT icy applied to commerce among the States as to foreign commerce, and not a reason could be assigned for confiding the power oyer the one which did not conduce to establish the propriety of confiding the power over the other. Story, Constitution, § 1066. And although the precise question before us was not ruled in Gibbon's v. Ogden and Brown v. Maryland, yet we think it was virtually involved and answered, and that this is demonstrated, among other cases, in Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co., 125 U. S. 465. In the latter case, section 1553 of the Code of the State of Iowa as ainended by c. 143 of the acts of the twentieth General Assembly in 1886, forbidding common carriers to bring intoxicating liquors into the State from, any other State or. Territory, without'first being furnished with a certificate as prescribed, was declared invalid, because essentially a regulation of commerce among the States, and not sanctioned by the authority, express or implied, qí Congress. The opinion of the court, delivered by Mr. Justice Matthews, the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Field, and the dissenting opinion. by Mr. Justice Harlan, on behalf of Mr. Chief Justice Waite, Mr. Justice Gray, and himself, discussed the question involved in .all its phases; and while the determination of whether the right of transportation pf an article of commerce from one State to another includes by necessary implication the right of the consignee to sell it. in unbroken packages at the place where the transportation terminates was in terms reserved, yet the argument of the majority conducts irresistibly to that conclusion, and we think we cannot do better than repeat the grounds upon which the decision was made' to rest. It is there shown that the transportation of freight or of the subjects of commerce, for the' purpose- of exchange or sale, is beyond all question a constituent of commerce itself; that this was the prominent idea in the minds of the framers of the Constitution, when to Congress was committed the power to regulate commerce among the several States; that the power to prevent embarrassing restrictibns by any State ivas the end .desired; that the power was given by the same words and in the same clause by which was conferred power to regulate co,mmerce¡ with foreign nations; and fhat it would be absurd ,to suppbse that the transmission of the subjects of trade from the State of the buyer, or from the place .o^f production to the market, was not contemplated, for without' that there could be no consummated trade, either with foreign nations or among the States. It is explained that where State laws alleged to be regulations of commerce among the States have been sustained, they were laws which related to bridges or dams across streams, wholly within the State,, or police or health laws, or to subjects of -a kindred nature, not strictly of' commercial regulation. But. the transportation of passfengers. or of merchandise from one State to- another is in its nature' national, admitting of but one regulating power; and it was to guard against the possibility of commercial embarrassments which would result if one State could directly or indirectly tax persons or property, passing through it, or •prohibit particular property from entrance into the State, th.at the power of regulating commerce among the States was conferred upon the federal government.
" If in the present case," said Mr. Justice Matthews, " the law of Iowa operated upon'all merchandise -sought to be brought from another State into its- limits, there could be no doubt that it would be a regulation of commerce among the States," and he concludes that this must be so,' though it applied only to one class of articles of a particular kind. The legislation of Congress on the subject of interstate commerce by means of railroads, designed to remove trammels upon transportation between different States, and upon the subject of the transportation of passengers and merchandise, (Revised Statutes, sections 4252 to 4289, inclusive,) including the transportation of nitro-glycerine and other similar explosive substances, with the proviso that, as- to them, " any State, territory, district, city or town within the United States" should not be prevented by the languagé used " from regulating or from, prohibiting the traffic in or' transportation of those substances between persons or places lying or being within their respective territorial limits, or from prohibiting the introduction thereof into such limits for sale, use or consumption therein," is referred to as indicative' of the intention of Congress that the transportation of commodities between the States shall be free, except where it' is positively restricted by Congress itself, or by States in particular cases by- the express permission of Congress. It is. said that the law in question was not an inspection law, the object of which "is to improve the quality of articles produced by the labor of a country, to fit them for exportation; or, it may be, for domestic- use; " Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 203; Turner v. Maryland, 107 U. S. 38, 55.; nor could'it be regarded as a-regulation of quarantine or a sanitary provision for the purpose of protecting the physical health of the community; nor- a law to prevent the introduction into the State of diseases, contagious, infectious, or otherwise. Articles in- such a condition as tend to spread disease are not merchantable, are not legitimate subjects of trade and commerce, and the self-protecting power of eách State, therefore, may be-rightfully exerted against their' introduction, and such exercise of power cannot be considered a regulation of commerce, prohibited by the ' Constitution; and the Observations of Mr. Justice Catron, in The License Cases, 5 How. 504, 599, are quoted to the effect that what does-not belong to commerce is within the jurisdiction of .the police power of the State, but that which does belong -to commérce is within the jurisdiction of the United States; that to extend the police power over subjects of commerce would be to make commerce subordinate to that power, and would enable the State to bring within the police power "any article. of consumption thsi.t a State might wish, to exclude, whether it; belonged to that which was drunk* or to food and clothing; and with nearly eqnal claims to propriety, as malt liquors and -the' products of fruits other than grapes stand on no higher ground than the li&ht wines of this and- other countries, excluded in effect by tfhe law as- it now stands. And it \Vould b.e only another step to regulate real or supposed extravagance in food and clothing." And Mr. Justice Matthews thus proceeds, p. 493: "For.the purpose of protecting -its people against the evils of intemperance, it has the -right to prohibit the manufapture within its. limits of intoxicating liquors; it may also, prbhibit all domestic commerce in them between its own inhabitants, whether the articles are introduced from, other States or from foreign countries; it may punish those who sell them in violation of its laws; it may adopt any measures tending, even indirectly and remotely, tó make the policy effective until it passes the line'of power delegated to Congress under, the Constitution.» It cannot, without the consent of Congress, express or implied, regulate commerce be-. tween its. people and those of the other States of the Union in order, to effect its end, however desirable such a regulation might be. . . .' Can it be supposed that by omitting any . express declaration on the subject, Congress has intended to submit to the several States the decision of the question in each locality of what shall and what shall not be articles of traffic' in the interstate commerce of the country ? If. so, it Fas left to each State, according to its own caprice and arbitrary will, to discriminate for or against every- article grown, produced, manufactured or sold in any State and sought to be introduced as an article of commerce,into any other. If the State of Iowa may prohibit' the importation of intoxicating liquors from all other 'States, it may also include tobacco, or ány othér article, the use. or abuse of which it may deem deleterious. . It may not choose, even, to be governed by. considerations growing out of the health, comfort or peace of the community. Its policy, may be directed to other ends. It may choose to establish a system .directed to the promotion arid benefit of its own1 agriculture, manufactures or arts of any description, and prevent the introduction and sale within its limits of any or of all articles that it may select as coming into competition with those which it seeks to protect. The police power of the State would extend to such cases, as well as to those in which it Avas sought to legislate in behalf of the health, peace and morals of the people. In vieAV of the commercial anarchy and confusion that would result from the. diverse exertions of poAver by the several States of the Union, it cannot be supposed that the Constitution or Congress have intended to limit the freedom, of commercial intercourse among the people of the several States."
Many of the cases bearing upon the subject are cited and considered in these opinions, and among others The License Cases, 5 How. 504, wherein laws passed by Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Rhode Island, in reference to the sale of spirituous liquors, came under review and Avere sustained, although the members of the court Avho participated in the decisions did not concur in any. common ground upon which to rest them. That of Peiree et al. v. New Hampshire is perhaps the most important to be referred to here. In that case the defendants had been fined for selling a barrel of gin in New Hampshire which they had bought in Boston and brought coastwise to Portsmouth, and there sold in the same barrel and in the same condition in which it was purchased in Massachusetts, but contrary to the law of New Hampshire in that behalf. The conclusion of the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Taney is in these words, p. 586 : " Upon the whole, therefore, the law of New Hampshire is in my judgment a valid one. For, although the gin sold was an import from another State, and Congress have clearly the power to regulate such importations, under the grant of power to regulate commerce among the several States, yet, as Congress has made no regulation on the subject, the traffic in the article may be lawfully regulated by the State as soon as it is landed in its territory, and a tax imposed upon it, or a license required, or the sale altogether prohibited, according to the policy which the State may suppose to be its interest or duty to pursue."
Referring to the cases of Massachusetts and Rhode Island, the Chief Justice, after saying that if the laws of those States came in.collision with the laws of Congress authorizing the importation of 'spirits and distilled liquors, it would be the duty of the court to declare them void, thus continues, p. 57b: " It has, indeed, been suggested, that, if a State deems the' traffic, in ardent spirits to be injurious to its citizens, and calculated to introduce immorality, vice and pauperism into the State, it may .constitutionally refuse to permit its importation,, .notwithstanding the laws of Congress; and that a State may 'do this upon the same principles that it may resist and prevent the introduction of disease, pestilence or pauperism from abroad, ¿ut -it must be remembered that disease, pestilence and pauperism are not subjects of commerce, although sométimes among its attendant evils. They are not things to be regulated' and trafficked in,' but to be. prevented, as far as human foresight or human means can guard against them. •But spirits and distilled liquors are universally admitted to be subjects of ownership and property, and are therefore subjects of exchange, barter and traffic, like any other commodity in which a right of property exists. And Congress, under its general power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, may prescribe what article of merchandise shall be admitted and what excluded;, and may therefore admit, or not, as it shall deem best, the importation of ardent spirits. And . inasmuch as the laws of Congress authorize their importation, no State has a right to prohibit their introduction. . . . These state laws act altogether upon the retail or domestic traffic within their respective borders. They act upon the article after it hasr passed the line of foreign commerce, and. become a part of the general mass, of property in the, State. These, laws may, indeed, discourage imports, and diminish the price which ardent spirits would otherwise bring. But although a State is bound to receive and to permit the sale by the importer of any article of .'merchandise which Congress authorizes to be imported, it is hot bound to furnish a market for it, nor to abstain from the passage of any law which it may deem necessary or advisable to' guard .the health or morals of its citizens, although such law may discourage importation, or diminish the profits of thé importer, or lessen the revenue of the general government. And if any State deems the retail and internal traffic in ardent spirits injurious to its citizens, and calculated to produce idleness, vice or debauchery, I sée nothing in the Constitution of the United States to prevent it from regulating and restraining the traffic, or from prohibiting it altogether, if it thinks proper."
' The New Hampshire case, the chief justice observed, differs from Brown v. Maryland, in that the latter was a case arising out of commerce with foreign nations, which Congress had regulated by law; whereas the casein hand was one of commerce between two States, in relation to which Congress had not exeróised its.power. "But the law of New Hampshire, acts directly upon an import from one State to another, while in the hands of the importer for sale, and is therefore a regulation of commerce, acting upon the article while it is within the admitted jurisdiction of the general government, and subject to its control and regulation. The question, therefore, brought up for decision is, whether a State is prohibited by the Constitution of the United States from making any regulations of foreign commerce, or of commerce with another State, although such regulation is confined to its own territory, and made for its own convenience or interest, and does not come in conflict with any law of Congress. In other words, whether the grant of power to Congress is of itself a prohibir tion to the States, and renders all state laws upon the subject null and void." p. 578. He declares it to appear to him very clear, p. 579, " that the mere grant of power to the general government cannot, upon any just principles of construction, be construed to be an absolute prohibition to the exercise of my power over the same subject by the States. The controlling and supreme power over commerce with foreign nations and the several States is undoubtedly conferred upon Congress. Yet, in my judgment, the State may, nevertheless, for the safety or convenience of trade, or for the protection .of • the health of its citizens, make regulations of commerce for its own ports and harbors, and for its own territory; and such regulations are valid unless they come in conflict with a law of Congress." He comments on the omission of any prohibition in terms, and concludes that if, as he thinks, " the framers of' the Constitution (knowing that a multitude of minor regulations must be necessary, which Congress amid its great concerns could never find time to consider and provide) intended merely to make the power of the federal government supreme upon this subject over 'that of the States, then the omission of. any prohibition is accounted for, and is' consistent with the whole instrument. The supremacy of the laws of Congress, in cases of collision with state laws, is secured in the article which declares that the laws of Congress, passed in pursuance of the powers granted, shall be the supreme law; and' it is only where both governments may legislate on the same subject that this article can operate." And he considers that the legislation of Congress and the States has conformed to this construction from the foundation of the government, as exemplified in state laws in relation to pilots and pilotage and health and quarantine laws.
But conceding the weight properly to be ascribed to the judicial utterances of this eminent jurist, we are constrained to say that the distinction between subjects in respect of which there can be of necessity only one system or plan of regulation for the whole country, and subjects local in their nature, and, so far as relating to commerce, mere aids rather than regulations, does not appear to us to have been sufficiently recognized by him in arriving at the conclusions announced. That distinction has been settled by repeated decisions of this court, and can no longer be regarded as open to re-examination. After all, it amounts to no more than drawing the line between the éxercise of power over commerce with foreign nations and among the States and the exercise of power over purely local commerce and local concerns.
The authority of Peirce v. New Hampshire, in so far as it rests on the view that the law of New Hampshire was valid because Congress had made no regulation on the subject, must be regarded as having been distinctly overthrown by the numerous cases hereinafter referred to.
The doctrine how firmly established is, as stated by Mr. Justice Field, in Bowman v. Chicago &c. Railway Co., 125; U. S. 507, " that where the subject upon which Congress can act under its commercial power is local in its nature or sphere of operation, such as harbor pilotage, the improvement 'of harbors, the establishment of beacons and buoys to guide ves--' seis in and out of port, the construction of bridges over navigable rivers, the erection of wharves, piers and docks, and the like, which can be properly regulated only by special provisions adapted to their localities, the State can act until Congress interferes and supersedes its authority; but where the subject is. national in its character, and admits and requires uniformity of regulation, affecting alike all the States, such as transportar tion between the States, including the importation of goods from one State into another, Congress can alone act upon it and provide the needed regulations. The' absence of any law of Congress on the subject is equivalent to its declaration that commerce in that matter shall be free. Thus the absence of. regulations as to interstate commerce with reference to any particular subject is taken as a declaration that the importation of that article into the States shall be unrestricted. It is only after the importation is completed, and the property imported has mingled with and become a part of the general property of the State, that its regulations can act upon it, except so far as may be necessary to insure safety in the dis-. position of the import until thus mingled."
The conclusion follows that, as the grant of the power to regulate commerce among the States, so far as one system is required, is exclusive, the States cannot exercise that power without the assent of Congress, and,- in the absence of legislation, it is left for the courts to determine'when state action does or does not amount to such exercise, or, in other words, what is or is not a regulation of such commerce. When that is determined, controversy is at an end. Illustrations exemplifying the general rule are numerous. Thus we have held the following to be regulations of interstate commerce: A tax upon freight transported from State to State, Case of the State Freight Tax, 15 Wall. 232; a statute imposing a burdensome condi tion on shipmasters as a prerequisite to the landing of passengers, Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U. S. 259; a statute prohibiting the driving or conveying of any Texas, Mexican or Indian cattle, whether sound or diseased, into the State between the first day of March and the first day of November in each year, Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465 ; a statute requiring every auctioneer to collect and pay into the state treasury a tax on his sales, when applied to imported goods in the original packages by him sold- for the importer, Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U. S. 566; a statute intended to regulate or tax, or to impose any other restriction upon, the transmission of persons or property, or telegraphic messages, from one State to another, Wabash, St. Louis &c. Railway v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557; a statute levying a tax upon nonresident drummers offering for sale or selling goods, wares or merchandise by sample, manufactured or belonging to citizens of other States, Robbins v. Shelby Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489.
On the other hand, we have decided, in County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691, .that a state statute providing for the improvement of the river, bay and harbor of Mobile, since what was authorized to be done was only as a mere aid to commerce, was, in the absence of action by Congress, not in conflict with the Constitution; in Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 678, that the State Of Illinois could lawfully authorize the city of Chicago to deepen, widen and change the channel of, and construct bridges over, the Chicago River; in Transportation Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U. S. 691, that the jurisdiction and control of wharves properly belong to the States in which they are situated unless otherwise provided ; in Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622, that a general state tax laid alike upon all property is not unconstitutional, because it happens to fall upon goods which, though not then intended for exportation, are subsequently exported; in Morgan Steamship Co. v. Louisiana Board of Health, 118 U. S. 455, that a state law, requiring each vessel passing a quarantine station to pay a fee for examination as to her sanitary condition and the ports from which she came, was a rightful exer cise of police power; in Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465 and in Nashville &c. Railway Co. v. Alabama, 128 U. S. 96, that a state statute requiring locomotive engineers to bexexámined and . obtain a license was not in its nature a regulation of commerce; and in Kimmish v. Ball, 129 U. S. 217, that a statute providing that a person having in his possession Texas cattle, which had not been wintered north of the southern boundary of Missouri at least one winter, shall be liable for any damages' which may accrue from allowing them to run at large, and. thereby spread 'the disease known as the Texas fever, was constitutional.
We held also in Welton v. The State of Missouri, 91 U. S. 275, that a, state statute requiring the payment of a license tax from persons dealing in goods, wares and merchandise, which are not the growth, produce or manufacture of the State, by going from place to place to sell the'same in the State, and requiring no' such, license tax from persons selling in a similar way goods which are the growth, produce or manufacture of the State, is an unconstitutional regulation; and to the same effect in Walling v. Michigan, 116 U. S. 446, in relation to a tax. upon non-resident sellers of intoxicating liquors to be shipped into a State from places without it. But it was held in Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U. S. 501, and in Webber v. Virginia, 103 U. S. 344, that the right conferred by the patent laws of the United States did not remove the tangible property in which an invention might take form from the operation of the laws of the State, nor restrict the power of the latter to protect the community from direct danger inherent in particular articles.
In Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, it was adjudged that "state legislation which prohibits the manufacture of spirituous, malt, vinous, fermented or other intoxicating liquors within the limits of the State, to be there sold or bartered for general use as a beverage, does not necessarily infringe any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States, or by the amendments thereto." And this was in accordance with our decisions in Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. 129 ; Beer Company v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25; and Foster v. Kansas, 112 U. S. 201. So in Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1, it was held that a state statute which provided (1) that foreign, intoxicating liquors may be imported' into the State, and there kept for sale by the importer, in the original packages, or for transportation in such packages and sale beyond the limits of the State; and (2) Nhat intoxicating liquors may be manufactured and sold within the State for mechanical, medicinal, culinary and sacramental purposes, but for'no other, not even for the purpose of transportation beyond the limits of the State, was not an undertaking to regulate commerce among the States. And in Eilenbecker v. District Court of Plymouth County, 134 U. S. 31, 40, we affirmed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Iowa, .sustaining the sentence of the district court of Plymouth in that State, imposing a fine of $500 and costs, and imprisonment in jail for three months, if the fine was not paid within thirty days, as a punishment for contempt in refusing to obey a writ of injunction issued by that court, enjoining and restraining the .defendant from selling or keeping for sale any intoxicating liquors, including ale, wine and beer, in Plymouth County. Mr. Justice Miller there remarked: " If the objection to the statute is that it authorizes a proceeding in the nature of a suit in equity to suppress the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors which are by law prohibited, and to abate the nuisance which the statute declares such acts to be, wherever carried on,, we respopd that, so far as at present advised, it appears to us that all the'powers of a court, whether at common law or in chan-* eery, may be called into operation by a legislative body for the purpose of.suppressing this objectionable traffic; and we know of no hindrance in the Constitution offlhe United States to the form of proceedings, or to the court in which this remedy shall be had. Certainly, it seems to us to be quite as wisp to use the processes of the law and the powers of a court to prevent the evil, as to punish the offence as a crime after-it. has been committed."
, These- decisions rest upon the undoubted right of the States of the Union to control their purely internal affairs, in doing which they exercise powers not surrendered to the. national government; but whenever" the law of the State amounts essentially to a regulation of commerce, with foreign nations or among the States, as it does when it inhibits, directly or indirectly, the receipt of an imported commodity or its disposition before it has ceased to' become an article of trade between one State and another, or another country and this, it comes in conflict with a power which, in this particular, has been exclusively vested in the general government, and is therefore void.
In Mugler v. Kansas, supra, the court said (p. 662) that it could not " shut out of view the fact, within the knowledge of all, that the public health, the.public morals and the public safety may be endangered by the general use of intoxicating drinks; nor the fact, established by statistics accessible to every one, that the idleness, disorder, pauperism and crime existing in the .country are, in s< me degree at least, traceable to this evil." And that " if in the judgment of the legislature [of a State] the manufacture of intoxicating liquors for the maker's own use, as a beverage., would tend to cripple, if it did not defeat, the effort to guard the community against the evils attending the excessive use of such liquors, it is not for the courts, upon their views as to what is best and safest for the community, to disregard the legislative determination of-that question. . . . Nor can it be said that government interferes with or impairs any one's constitutional rights of liberty or of property, when it determines that the manufacture and sale of intoxicating drinks, for general-or individual use, as a beverage, are, or may become, hurtful to society, and constitute^ therefore, a business in which no one may. lawfully engage." Undoubtedly, it is for the legislative branch of the state governments to determine whether the manufacture of particular articles of traffic, or the sale of such articles, will injuriously affect the public, and it is not for Congress to determine what measures a State may properly adopt as appropriate or needful for the protection of the public morals, the public health or the public safety ; but notwithstanding it is not vested with supervisory power over matters of local administration. †-he responsibility is upon Congress, so far as the regulation of interstate commerce is concerned, to remove the restriction upon the State in dealing with imported articles of trade within its limits, which have not been mingled with the common mass of property therein, if in its judgment the end to be secured justifies and requires such action.
. Prior to 1888 the statutes of Iowa permitted the sale of foreign liquors imported under the laws of the United States, provided the' sale was by the importer in the original casks or packages, and in quantities not less than those in which they were required to be imported ; and the provisions of the statute to this effect were declared by the Supreme Court of Iowa, in Pearson v. 'Piternational Distillery, 72 Iowa, 348, 354, to be "intended to conform the statute to the doctrine of the United States Supreme Court, announced in Brown v. Maryland, 12 "Wheat. 419, and License Cases, 5 How. 504, so that the statute should not conflict with the laws and authority of the United States." But that provision of the statute was repealed in 1888, and'the law so far amended that we understand it now to provide that, whether imported or not, wine cannot be sold in Iowa except for sacramental purposes, nor alcohol except for specified chemical purposes, nor intoxicating .liquors, including ale and beer, except for pharmaceutical and medicinal purposes, and not at all except by citizens of the State of Iowa, who are registered pharmacists and have permits-obtained as prescribed by the statute, a permit being also grantáble to one discreet person in any township where a pharmacist does not obtain it.
The plaintiffs in error are citizens of Illinois, are not pharmacists, and have no permit, but import Into Iowa beer, which they sell in original packages, as described. Under 'our . decision in Bowman v. Chicago &c. Railway Co., supra, they had the right to import this beer into that' State, and in the view which we have expressed they had the right to sell it, by which act alone it would become mingled in the common mass of property within'the State. Up to that point of time, we hold that in the absence of congressional permission to do. so, the State had no power to interfere by seizure, or any other action, in prohibition of importation and sale by the for eign or non-resident importer. Whatever our individual .views may be as to the deleterious or dangerous qualities of particular, articles, we cannot hold that any articles which Congress recognizes as subjects of interstate'commerce are not such, or that whatever are thus recognized can be controlled by state laws amounting to regulations, while they retain that character; although, at the same time; if directly dangerous in themselves, the State may take appropriate measures to guard against injury before it obtains complete jurisdiction-.over them. To concede to a State the power to exclude, directly or indirectly, articles so situated, without congressional permission, is to concede to a majority of the people of a State, represented in .the state legislature, the power to regulate commercial intercourse, between the States, by determining what shall be its subjects, when that power was distinctly granted to be exercised by th¿ people of the United States, represented in Congress, and its possession by the latter was considered essential to that more perfect Union which the Constitution was adopted to create. Undoubtedly, there is difficulty in drawing the line between the municipal powers of .the one government and the commercial powers of the other, but when that line is determined, in the particular instance, accommodation to it, without serious inconvenience, may readily be. found, to use the language of Mr. Justice Johnson, in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 238, in "a frank and candid cooperation for the general good."
The legislation in question is to the extent indicated repugnant to the third clause of section 8' of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States, and therefore the judgment of the Supreme Court of Iowa is
Reversed a/nd the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent, with this opinion.