Case Name: COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. NORTH AMERICAN BOND TRUST
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1941-08-14
Citations: 122 F.2d 545
Docket Number: No. 237
Parties: COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. NORTH AMERICAN BOND TRUST.
Judges: 
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 122
Pages: 545–550

Head Matter:
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. NORTH AMERICAN BOND TRUST.
No. 237.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Aug. 14, 1941.
CHASE, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
Samuel O. Clark, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen. (Sewall Key and Michael H. Cardozo, IV, Sp. Assts. to Atty Gen., of counsel), for petitioner.
Claude A. Hope, of New York City (Delafield, Marsh, Porter & Hope and James C. Mulligan, all of New York City, of counsel), for respondent.
Before L. HAND, AUGUSTUS N. HAND, and CHASE, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
L. HAND, Circuit Judge.
I distinguish the case at bar from Commissioner v. Chase National Bank, 122 F.2d 540 handed down at the same time, because here the "Depositor" had it in his power in effect to change the investment of certificate holders at his discretion, as I shall try to show. In Commissioner v. Chase National Bank, supra, each "Unit" consisted of sixteen shares in each of thirty specified companies; and each later "Unit" had to be made up of exactly that number of shares in each of those companies. Therefore, no matter how many "Units" were added, the investment of each certificate holder remained the same; the "Depositor" had no power to change them, they were "frozen," so to speak, for the duration of the trust. It is true that the "Supplemental Agreements" gave larger powers to the "Depositor" than he originally had had to "eliminate" a company, and, so far, it can be said that he had "managerial" powers; but they were far less than those of most trustees stricti juris. True, it was possible, and it always is possible in trusts of this kind, for a beneficiary to sell out and substitute another in his place; and that certainly does make them in some sense "associations." But it does not alone bring them within the statute, else the whole discussion in Morrisey v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 344, 56 S.Ct. 289, 80 L.Ed. 263, was unnecessary. In Lewis & Co. v. Commissioner, 301 U.S. 385, 57 S.Ct. 799, 81 L.Ed. 1174, the court spoke of "the introduction of new participants" into the trust (301 U.S. at page 388, 57 S.Ct. at page 801, 81 L.Ed. 1174) as an important consideration, and it certainly is, since without it the chief resemblance to a corporation disappears; but that feature alone is not in my judgment enough. Article 801-3 of Regulations 86 itself concludes by saying that it is "the purpose and activity" of the enterprise that determines whether it is a trust.
The reason why I think that in the case at bar the taxpayer is liable is because as I have said the "Depositor" really had power to vary the investments. This arose for the following reasons. He was to select the bonds which should make up a given unit — in this instance called an "Interest" —and when he did so he could not change its composition except for reasons which arguendo I shall assume did not give him "managerial" powers. So far the venture was not unlike that in Commissioner v. Chase National Bank, and could not be said to give an opportunity to take advantage of variations in the market; but the important difference was that in making up another unit the "Depositor" was not confined to the same bonds that he had selected for the first; and so on, for as long as new money came in. Even so, possibly the scheme might have been a "trust" if each unit had remained water-tight, so to speak; that is, if a certificate holder had been confined to the securities of his own unit. But that was not the case; on the contrary the bonds of all units constituted a single pool in which each certificate holder shared according to his proportion of all the certificates issued. Thus, every time the "Depositor" made up a new unit, composed of different bonds from the preceding units, he reduced the interest of existing certificate holders in the bonds which they had up till then owned, and substituted in the place of the interest so taken an interest in new bonds. That meant that the "Depositor" had power, though a limited power, to vary the existing investments of all certificate holders at will, for as long as any new money came in; and in this way to take advantage of market variations to improve the investments even of the first investors. It is true that this was far from the full powers of the manager of an investment trust, but it was a broad enough power when coupled with the free "introduction of new participants" and with the power to "eliminate" bonds which had become undesirable, to turn the venture into a "business," i. e. a method of profiting by the rise and fall of securities.
Reversed.
AUGUSTUS N. HAND, Circuit Judge.
What I have said on the appeal from the orders in Commissioner v. Chase National Bank, 2 Cir., 122 F.2d 540 applies a fortiori to the above appeal which ought, therefore, to be reversed. I should concur unreservedly in the opinion of Judge LEARNED HAND in the present proceeding were it not for the fact that he distinguishes Commissioner v. Chase National Bank from the case at bar. While there are factors here which give added weight to the classification of the arrangement as an association, I think the arrangement in Commissioner v. Chase National Bank also created an association for income tax purposes. Reversed.