Case Name: Emory R. PARRISH, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2006-09-25
Citations: 937 So. 2d 1231
Docket Number: No. 1D05-2162
Parties: Emory R. PARRISH, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: HAWKES and THOMAS, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 937
Pages: 1231–1235

Head Matter:
Emory R. PARRISH, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 1D05-2162.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Sept. 25, 2006.
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Archie F. Gardner, Jr., Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, Attorneys for Appellants.
Charlie Crist, Attorney General, and Bryan Jordan, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Attorneys for Appellee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Appellant, Emory R. Parrish, Jr. appeals his conviction for possession of cannabis, possession of a controlled substance without a prescription, and resisting arrest without violence. Because we find that the trial court did not err in denying Appellant's motion to suppress, we affirm.
Appellant was detained and ultimately arrested in a Wal-Mart parking lot by an Okaloosa County sheriffs deputy who was working as a security guard for the store. The deputy testified at the suppression hearing that Appellant came to his attention after the deputy saw a ear lurch forward. Believing a minor collision had occurred in front of the store, the deputy investigated. As he approached the two vehicles involved, the deputy noticed a male leaning into the driver's window of the front vehicle. The driver of the vehicle, a female, and the man, Appellant, were arguing. The deputy saw that the bumper of the rear vehicle was touching the bumper of the front vehicle, although there did not appear to be any damage. The deputy testified that he asked the two if everything was "okay," and he was told that everything was in fact okay. In addition, the deputy testified that he saw no physical contact between the two and that the argument was not loud.
Nevertheless, the deputy was unwilling to accept this representation and separated the two; the deputy explained that victims of domestic violence often say that no problem exists when the situation is in fact problematic. The deputy testified that he acted the way he did because "there is always two stories. There is the person that we're talking to and the truth, and I wanted to get to the truth." On cross-examination, the deputy testified that he detained Appellant because of the possibility of domestic violence rather than to investigate a minor crash.
The deputy testified that he proceeded to question the female first. She told the deputy her name and produced identification. She explained that she and Appellant "were just arguing," but the deputy remained concerned. The deputy then asked Appellant for identification, which Appellant could not produce. Appellant provided a name to the deputy, which the deputy was unable to verify. The deputy then arrested Appellant and conducted a search incident to the arrest, where contraband was found.
Appellant moved to suppress all the evidence seized, arguing that the deputy had no legal justification to detain him, or once detained, the deputy had no legal justification to continue to detain Appellant. The trial court denied Appellant's motion to suppress, explaining that it was reasonable for the deputy to require each party to produce identification before being released. When Appellant failed to produce any identification and lied about his name, the deputy was authorized to arrest Appellant and to conduct a search incident to the arrest. After the denial of his motion to suppress, Appellant pled no contest to two counts of possession of a controlled substance and one count of resisting arrest without violence, and preserved his right to appeal the trial court's denial of his dispositive motion to suppress.
"As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred." Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810-11, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1774, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979)). To determine whether a police officer had probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred requires application of an objective test which "asks only whether any probable cause for the stop existed." Holland v. State, 696 So.2d 757, 759 (Fla.1997). Therefore, as long as the officer has sufficient probable cause for the stop, the officer's subjective motivation for the stop does not render the stop unconstitutional and require suppression of evidence seized during a search incident to the arrest. Whren, 517 U.S. at 819, 116 S.Ct. 1769.
Here, the deputy had probable cause to believe that a traffic violation had occurred. Under Chapter 316, Florida Statutes, local police authorities are authorized to investigate an accident which has occurred in a shopping center irrespective of any injury or death to a person. Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 72-383 (1972). The deputy testified that he saw the female's car lurch forward, and when he walked over to investigate, he saw that Appellant's bumper was touching her bumper. Because the deputy had probable cause to detain Appellant, it is irrelevant that his primary concern during his investigation was the prevention of domestic violence.
Accordingly, the trial court's denial of Appellant's motion to suppress is AFFIRMED.
HAWKES and THOMAS, JJ., concur.
VAN NORTWICK, J" dissents with written opinion.