Case Name: Claiborne v. Parrish
Court: Court of Appeals of Virginia
Jurisdiction: Virginia
Decision Date: 1795-10
Citations: 2 Wash. 146
Docket Number: 
Parties: *Claiborne v. Parrish.
Judges: 
Reporter: Virginia Reports
Volume: 2
Pages: 669–687

Head Matter:
*Claiborne v. Parrish.
October Term, 1795.
Hearsay Evidence — Admissibility—Exceptions to Rule. —The general rule is, that hearsay evidence is inadmissible; but to this rule there are exceptions. If it be admitted and excepted to, such a case should be stated upon the record as to show that it came within some of the exceptions; otherwise, the general rule will be against the admission.
Evidence-Admissibility — Fraud. —The testimony of a witness tending to fix a fraud upon himself, ought not to be regarded.
This was an ejectment brought in the County Court of New-Kent for 200 acres of land. Verdict, that the defendant was guilty as to 155 acres of the land. The judgment was entered for the 150 acres of land in the declaration mentioned. At the trial, the defendant tendered a bill of exceptions which was sealed, stating, ‘‘that the plaintiff offered I. H. as a witness, one of the persons said to be a juryman on the execution of the writ of ad quod damnum, who was questioned by the plaintiff as to-what he had heard William Parrish, one of the chain carriers on the survey made pursuant to the said writ of ad quod dam-num say, with respect to his the said Parrish’s misconduct in carrying the said chain in measuring unfairly the lands mentioned in the declaration; which enquiry was objected to by the defendant as improper, but the court permitted the witness to answer the question as it related to what he had heard the said Parrish say. The District Court of Williamsburg affirmed the judgment for the 155 acres, from which the defendant below appealed.
Wickham for the appellant.
The principle point in this cause is, whether the evidence excepted to was admissible or not?
The hearsay evidence of any person, unless it be of one of the parties (if against him) is inadmissible in a case of this sort. It does not appear that the chain carrier was upon oath at the time he made the declaration, or that he was cross examined.
I will barely mention what may perhaps be a good objection though I do not much rely upon it. The declaration is for 200 acres, the verdict finds for the plaintiff 155 acres, and the judgment is for the 150 acres in the declaration mentioned. The difference in the number of acres between the verdict and judgment may be merely a clerical mistake, but it would seem that the jury ought to have identified the 155 acres to which the plaintiff had a title, so as that it might be distinguished from the residue.
Marshall for the appellee.
If hearsay evidence aided by other testimony could be proper, then this court, presuming that *the judgment below is right until the contrary appears, will suppose that there was other testimony which rendered the hearsay evidence admissible, since the party who has excepted to the opinion of the court, has not stated the contrary. It is the business of the person who would impeach the judgment of a court to state all the facts necessary for this purpose upon the record, and this is most properly done by a demurrer to the evidence.
Now in many cases hearsay evidence is proper. As for instance, if the chain carrier was examined at the trial, evidence of what he had said on a former occasion might be proved so as to impeach his credibility. It does not appear in this case, but that Parrish was examined at the trial, and that the examination of I. H. was intended to destroy the effect of his testimony.
Wickham in reply.
I had always supposed, that tho’ a demurrer to evidence must state the whole testimony, yet that a bill of exceptions was to some point, or part of the evidence, and need not set forth what was not proved.
The general rule is, that hearsay evidence is inadmissible, the bill of exceptions states that hearsay evidence was received and the legal conclusion is, that the court did wrong.' But Mr. Marshall contends that there are some exceptions from the rule; I grant it. But if this case came within any of the exceptions, the party who tries to support the judgment upon that ground, ought to have spread enough upon the record to shew that the case was within the exceptions.
At present, it stands upon the record as a general proposition, that hearsay evidence may be admitted, without any thing to shew that this particular case is within any exception from the rule.
But if the chain carrier had been called upon to give testimony, it would have been improper for two reasons. 1st, That it tended to accuse himself of a fraud, if no worse; and 2dly, That a writ of ad quod damnum continues in force till quashed, and cannot be destroyed by a side wind in an ejectment.
For monographic note on Witnesses, see end of case.
The principal case is cited in Taylor v. Beck, 3 Rand. 346.

Opinion:
ROANE, J.
It is very true, that by the general rules of law, hearsay evidence is inadmissible. The reason of the rule is so well founded and so generally known, that it is unnecessary to state it. But from this rule there are exceptions, warranted by reasons as sound as those which induced the rule itself. As in the case of proving pedigrees, and in other ancient transactions, in which it is the best evidence which the nature of such cases *admit of. But these cases which form exceptions from the general rule, are regulated by another, and that is, that it should appear there is no better evidence behind, and in the power of the party to produce; for otherwise, the omitting to produce such better proof, creates a presumption against the admission of inferior testimony. In this case, the objection made by the appellant is confined to the general rule, and the part}' who relied upon the evidence ought certainly to have stated such a case, as to shew, that tho' the general rule was against him, yet, he was within some of the exceptions: as that the transaction was ancient, his witnesses dead, and that their attendance could not be procured, or the like. But this he has not done, and therefore the general rule is against him.
But I am of opinion that if Parrish had been present and sworn, his testimony ought not to have been credited on account of the turpitude of his own conduct, and which his evidence was to have established ; the court ought to have instructed the jury to disregard it. Most clearly then, it was improper to admit as evidence his declarations made when not on oath.
I am therefore of opinion that both judgments are erroneous.