Case Name: Wm. Ellison, Guardian v. Francis J. Keese, et al.
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1860-10
Citations: 25 Supp. Tex. 83
Docket Number: 
Parties: Wm. Ellison, Guardian v. Francis J. Keese, et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 25 Supp.
Pages: 83–91

Head Matter:
Wm. Ellison, Guardian v. Francis J. Keese, et al.
By the 13th, 14th, and 15th sections of the act concerning wills, approved 28th January, 1840, which sections were repealed by the act of 24th January, 1856, it was enacted as follows:
“No father or mother shall, by last will and testament, disinherit his or her child or children, for any cause, except for personal violence committed by such child or children on the testator or testatrix, at any time after such child or children shall have arrived at the age of sixteen years, or for the attempt of such child or children, at any time after arriving at said age, to slander or defame the said testator or testatrix, by imputing to, them, or either of them, offenses punishable by law, or ascribing to them, or either of them, acts calculated to bring them, or either of them, into disrepute and disgrace in the community; and if any father or mother shall, by last will and testament, disinherit his or her child or children, for either of said causes, such cause shall be assigned in said last will and testament as the reason for such disinherison; and if said child or children should afterward, and within four years after said will is admitted to probate, contend for his, her, or their rights to the estate, by denying the existence of said cause, it shall be incumbent upon the person or-persons taking said estate, to the exclusion of such child or children, to prove that such cause did exist during the lifetime of said testator or testatrix; otherwise, said last will and testament shall be declared void, as to such child or children, and they shall be as capable of inheriting as though no such will and testament had been made.
“ Under the name of children, are included descendants of whatever degree they be, it being understood they are only counted for the child they represent,
"This act shall not he so construed as to prevent any parent from the free disposition of one-fourth of his or her property, by last will and testament, or by donation in last sickness.” (Paschal's Dig., Arts. 3263, 3264, 3265.) Although deeds dated 13 January, 1856, were inoperative because not made to take effect until after the donor’s death, and were invalid as a will to dispose of more than the fourth part of the donor’s or testator’s property, nevertheless they were valid as a testamentary disposition to the extent of the one-fourth of his estate.
A judgment to annul gifts made mortis causa was erroneous as to one-fourth of the disposable portion.
The question of how much of an estate is community property seems not to be a proper one for an auditor, under the following section of the act of May 13, 1846, to regulate proceedings in the District Court:
“ Whenever, in any suit, it shall appear to the court that an investigation of accounts, or examination of vouchers is necessary, for the purpose of justice between the parties, the court shall appoint an auditor or auditors, to state the accounts between the parties, and to make report thereof to the court as soon as may be; and the reports so made shall, under the direction of the court, be given in evidence to the jury, subject, however, to be impeached by evidence from either party.” (Paschal’s Dig., Art. 3760.)
[For a full review of the decisions upon the laws of forced heirship and donations mortis causa, see Paschal’s Annotated Digest, Note 897, pp. 644 to 646, and for the decisions upon an auditor, see the same book, Note 858, p. 615.]
1 Appeal from Q-uadaloupe. The ease was tried before the Honorable A. W. Teeeell, one of the district judges.
Keese and wife and other children of Thomas Hubbard, deceased, sued Thomas H. Hubbard and Mary W. Hubbard, the younger children of the said Thomas Hubbard, to set aside certain conveyances of the said Thomas Hubbard to the defendants and some of the plaintiffs, which were alleged to be deeds mortis causa, and to avoid the statute of forced, heirship then in force, and to give the greater portion of'his property to certain of his children, to the exclusion of others. In an amendment, it is distinctly charged that the deeds were made while the intestate was non compos mentis, which was, in substance, charged in the original petition.
It is charged, that the widow of Thomas Hubbard was not entitled to dower or life-estate in any part of the property, because she, in her lifetime, had abandoned him and gone to reside in the State of Mississippi, and she had also abandoned his children. The plaintiffs also charge, that the property in controversy was the separate property of their deceased mother in her lifetime, and not the property of their father, Thomas Hubbard.
The defendants, Thomas H. and Mary Hubbard, answered by their guardian, Ellison, the general issue, and also asserted the soundness of mind of Thomas Hubbard. He also denied that the testator had violated the statute of forced heirship.
Susan Hubbard, the widow of Thomas Hubbard, set up her right; denied the abandonment of her husband; alleged her absence was to look after her estate in Alabama, with the intention to return; that the most friendly correspondence continued; that a large portion of property was community between herself and the said Thomas Hubbard, and the residue was his separate property. She also attacked the deeds, as having been made mortis causa. An auditor .was appointed, who reported upon the condition of the estate. There are various papers contesting the auditor’s report.
There was an exception to the evidence, showing facts to prove the nullity of the deeds of gift. The cause was submitted to the court without a jury. The court found the deeds null and void; that certain of the property was the community property of Thomas Hubbard and of Susan Hubbard, (Eerguson,) his widow; and that she was entitled to one-half of the community property, and to one-third life-interest in the slaves, with the remainder over to the children. There was a decree of partition of the residue of the property among the children of Thomas Hubbard, in equal proportions.
As, in the opinion of the court, the statement of facts warranted the finding of the judge, a full recapitulation is unnecessary. The soundness of mind was proved, but the purpose to make the will, in view of death, was fully estab lished. The difference between a will and gifts was fully explained, according to the understanding of the witnesses. It was apparent that the parson, who acted as legal adviser, was not aware of the difference between a gift made in view of death and a will, which should declare the same thing. ¡Nor was the holy man, when delivering his lecture upon our peculiar laws of community property, marital rights, forced heirship, descents and distributions, aware that the worldly man was so near his dissolution.
The proof seemed to establish, that nearly all the property was brought into, the family by the first marriage, in the State of Georgia, where that good wife had died. Thomas Hubbard and Susan, his wife, who survived him, married in Mississippi, in 1850; they emigrated to Texas in 1853. She returned to Mississippi about the 1st of January, 1855; she remained there to settle her interest in her father’s estate, always keeping up a friendly correspondence. And it was complained, by the children of Thomas, that she consoled herself in the embraces of Mr. Eerguson too soon. Indeed, in the original petition, they charged that she might have married Eerguson before Hubbard had gone. But she returned to confront this charge, and no point was made against her second marriage. It was proved on the trial that Hubbard inherited his first wife’s property.
[This was not true under the laws of Georgia, the wife having children.—Reporter.]
The defendant’s deeds were made on the same day of the death of Hubbard, grantor, and the witnesses fully proved the real purpose to be a will. Indeed, the clerical witness was so clear in his statement about the'reasons for selecting deeds instead of a will, as to the form of conveyance, and the certainty of the grantor that he should soon die, that the plaintiffs did not read all the evidence. The defendants used it to prove their case of deeds made mortis causa.
For farther necessary facts, see the briefs.of counsel; particularly the points of Mr. Ford.
Hancock £ West, for infant appellants.
—The plaintiff claims adversely to the widow of the deceased (Hubbard) and his minor children, so far as they assert a claim to his estate, under certain deeds executed by him immediately before his death.
. The minors set up a claim adverse to the plaintiff’s, who are also children of the deceased, under the said deeds, and generally, as alleged in the petition, against the widow of the deceased.
On the part of the minors, who are, by their guardian, appellants in this court, we insist that there was error in the verdict and judgment.
1. In this, that it was shown that the deeds made by Thomas Hubbard were inefficacious testaments, and by their operation are to be held valid to the extent of conveying to them the one-fourth of the estate of the devisor. (Crain v. Crain, 21 Tex., 790; Rhodes v. Rhodes, 10 La. R., 90; 13 La. R., 387; 5 La. Ann. R., 433.) If the deeds can be held as in fraud of the law, the utmost right of the other heirs is a reduction. (3 Rob. La. R., 38; Ib., 99; Ballot v. Morrison, 12 Robston, 652.)
The residue of the argument applied to the auditor’s report.
Spencer Ford, for the widow.
—On the 13th day of January, "1856, .and just a few hours before his death, Thomas Hubbard, deceased, executed to his children four deeds of gift to certain negroes. On 20th August, 1856, Keese and wife, Hester and wife, and Jane Hubbard, as heirs of the deceased, brought suit, declaring that the said deeds disposed of nearly all his property, and were made to avoid the statute concerning wills, and were therefore void, and praying that they be so declared; also, praying for distribution of the property, and a decree legally adjusting the respective rights of all the parties.
The petition also alleged, that nearly all the negro prop erty of deceased was the separate property of their mother, his first wife; and that his second wife, now Susan Ferguson, had abandoned him, and was entitled to nothing.
The defendant, Susan Ferguson, denied the abandonment; also alleged, that all the property deceased died possessed of was either his separate property or their community properly.
The other defendants asserted the validity of the deeds; also the abandonment of Mrs. Ferguson.
A jury was waived, and the cause submitted to the court, who held the deeds to have been executed in fraud of the statute of wills; found all the property, except the negroes, to be community property; and ordered that the deeds be set aside, and that Mrs. Ferguson have half of the community property after payment of the debts, and a life-interest of one-third in the negroes; and that each of the three parties pay one-third of the costs. Ellison, the guardian of the minor defendants, appealed, and excepts—■
1. To the ruling of the court, in admitting evidence to show that the deeds of gift were void; the auditor’s, report having pointed out the property specified in the deeds as disposed of by Hubbard, and no objection was taken to the report in that respect.
It will be seen, then, that the auditor was required to report upon the amount and character of the property disposed of by the deeds of gift, but not upon the validity of the deeds themselves; and he made no report whatever as to the validity of the deeds. That was a question the court reserved for its own consideration.
2. The court did not err in declaring said deeds void. Because, 1st, they were made with the avowed design of evading the statute regulating wills; 2d, they were made in apprehension of immediate death.
3. The court did not err in finding all the property of the estate was community property except the negroes.
4. If the property were community property, Mrs. Fer guson is eEititled. to half of it; and this is our answer to the fourth ground of error assigned.
5. The court did not err in decreeing a one-third interest for life in the negroes to Mrs. Ferguson. 1st. There was e no abandonment on her part; she was absent for twelve or thirteen months, and was detained on important business, expressed great anxiety to return home to Texas, but was advised to remain till her business was settled, as she would be under the necessity of returning if she left.
2d. The negroes were Thomas Hubbard’s separate property. To 'prove that the negroes belonged to the children, and not to Hubbard, deceased, the appellants rely on the testimony of E. S. Binns, who says, he “frequently heard Hubbard say he had no right to sell any of the negroes in his possession, except Jo; that all the others came by his first wife, and belonged to Ms children.”
Chandler g Turner, for the appellees,
argued, 1, the facts of the auditor’s report; 2, our statute m reference to community property, which is as follows: “All the effects which both the husband and wife reciprocally possess at the time the marriage may be dissolved shall be regarded as common effects or gains, unless the contrary be satisfactorily proved.” (Paschal’s Dig., Art. 4638.)
It will he seen, by reference to the auditor’s report, that he reported all this property as common property, but he did not report the proof, if any, taken upon the point; and we have a right to conclude that he reported upon the legal presumption. This part of the report, and this alone, is excepted to. And, on the trial of the cause, proof was introduced by the parties to show that all the property was the separate property of the deceased, Thomas Hubbard.
The testimony of Binns stands upon the record unaffected by any other to conflict in the least therewith; and, if true, and we are bound to so regard it, then it is reason ably shown that the said property was not common, but separate property.
The exception done away with any effect to be given to „ the report; and when the exception was taken, and proof introduced upon that point, the report goes for naught, so far forth. This we understand to be the true practice and the law of the case, as stated in Whitehead v. Perie, 15 Tex., 7.
And we submit, that the testimony reasonably and satisfactorily shows that the property was separate; and for this reason the decree is erroneous.

Opinion:
Wheeler, C. J.
—The several deeds of the 13th of January, 1856, though inoperative as deeds, because not made to take effect until after the donor's death, and invalid as a will to dispose of more than the fourth part of the donor's or testator's property, were nevertheless valid as a testamentary disposition to the extent of the one-fourth of his estate. This was expressly so decided in the case of Crain v. Crain, 21 Tex., 790. The judgment of the court, annulling the disposition in toio, was therefore erroneous, and will require a reversal of the judgment. According to the case of Hagerty v. Hagerty, 12 Tex., 456, the minor children, whom it is evident the donor intended to favor, by giving to them the greater portion of his property, are entitled to the disposable one-fourth part of his estate, in addition to their distributive share.
If this were the only question in the case, we might proceed to render the proper judgment. But there was a question of some importance, respecting the amount of community property, on which the evidence upon another trial might be more satisfactory. The reference of the question to an auditor appears to have embarrassed its decision. This appears to have been done at the instance of the parties; but it is not perceived why they should have sought such a reference. It does not appear to be a case in which the statute contemplates the appointment of an auditor. (0. & W.'s Dig., Art. 565.) We think the justice of the case may he better attained by remanding it for a new trial. Whether those having the reversionary interest, after the determination of the life-estate, should have security for the preservation of that interest, may be determined by the court upon the case which shall then be presented. I apprehend the party having the life-estate should not be permitted to remove the property beyond the limits of the State, without giving such security.
The judgment is reversed, and the cause
Remanded.