Case Name: SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body corporate and politic of the State of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Teresa Jean RAMOSELLI, Defendant and Respondent
Court: Utah Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Utah
Decision Date: 1977-07-22
Citations: 567 P.2d 182
Docket Number: No. 14726
Parties: SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body corporate and politic of the State of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Teresa Jean RAMOSELLI, Defendant and Respondent.
Judges: MAUGHAN and WILKINS, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Pacific Reporter 2d
Volume: 567
Pages: 182–186

Head Matter:
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body corporate and politic of the State of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Teresa Jean RAMOSELLI, Defendant and Respondent.
No. 14726.
Supreme Court of Utah.
July 22, 1977.
R. Paul Van Dam, Salt Lake County Atty., Quentin L. R. Alston, Deputy Salt Lake County Atty., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant.
Robert S. Campbell, Jr., of Watkiss & Campbell, Salt Lake City, for defendant and respondent.

Opinion:
HALL, Justice:
Plaintiff appeals from an adverse ruling of the district court as to its need for condemnation of some 11 acres of land to be used as a park and recreation area. The gravamen of the appeal is that the trial court exceeded its authority of judicial review despite the fact that at the time of trial it readily recognized the court's authority to determine the issue of necessity of the proposed acquisition. In fact, the parties stipulated and agreed at the time to bifurcate the trial, separating the issue of entitlement to condemn from that of just compensation for the taking and reserving the latter issue for a subsequent proceeding.
The power of eminent domain is not to be exercised thoughtlessly or arbitrarily and the courts possess full authority to determine the proper limits of the power to prevent abuses in its exercise, and litigants should, and do have great latitude in conferring dispositive functions upon the court as they clearly did in this instance.
The question of necessity of the taking is the functional prerogative of the judicial system and that principle of law is stated in Nichols on Eminent Domain as follows:
"In every case, therefore, there is a judicial question whether the taking is of such a nature that it is or may be founded on public necessity."
The trial court clearly recognized its duty to determine the issue of necessity and pro ceeded to take evidence on that sole issue pursuant to the stipulation of the parties.
Briefly stated, the evidence at trial was that no defined plans had been adopted or approved, that no time frame of use within the reasonably foreseeable future had been determined, despite the fact that a voluntary acquisition of nearby property for public use some six years prior had not as yet been placed to its intended purpose, and that no funds had been requested, budgeted, appropriated or were presently in existence to place the property in question to use.
At the conclusion of the trial, the court made its findings, which, generally stated, were that any use of the premises was uncertain, indefinite, speculative, and not within the reasonably foreseeable future. Based thereon, it concluded that plaintiff had failed in its burden of proving need or public necessity and that the attempted condemnation was clear abuse of discretion.
Plaintiffs challenge to the judgment fails since the parties sought and stipulated for the decision and there is an abundance of admissible, competent, substantial evidence to support the same.
In accord with the numerous pronouncements of this court, no attempt should be made to substitute our judgment for that of the trial court.
Affirmed. Costs to defendant.
MAUGHAN and WILKINS, JJ., concur.
. 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 87.
. 1 Nichols on Eminent Domain, Sec. 4.11(2) p. 4-157.
. Sections 78-34-4 and 78-34-8, U.C.A., 1953, emphasize the judicial authority in this area.