Case Name: Stanley MORGAN a/k/a Frank Holidaye, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1985-06-25
Citations: 471 So. 2d 1336
Docket Number: No. 82-2381
Parties: Stanley MORGAN a/k/a Frank Holidaye, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: Before NESBITT and DANIEL S. PEARSON, JJ. and DELL, JOHN W., Associate Judge.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 471
Pages: 1336–1341

Head Matter:
Stanley MORGAN a/k/a Frank Holidaye, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 82-2381.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
June 25, 1985.
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Bruce A. Rosenthal, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Michael J. Neimand, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Before NESBITT and DANIEL S. PEARSON, JJ. and DELL, JOHN W., Associate Judge.

Opinion:
NESBITT, Judge.
Morgan appeals the denial of his motion for relief from conviction for first-degree murder made pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850.
In Morgan v. State, 414 So.2d 233 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), this court reversed a summary denial of Morgan's 3.850 motion and remanded for a hearing. The appellant misconstrues that mandate in arguing that it established Morgan's right to a new trial by law of the case. All that was decided in the previous appeal was that Morgan was entitled to an evidentiary hearing. It was for the trial court to decide, after hearing, whether Morgan had a right to a new trial. That question was decided adversely to appellant. We affirm.
During deliberations in this case, the jury sent out two requests. Counsel for the state and the defendant were consulted before any response was made. The first request, that all the physical evidence be sent to the jury, was made orally and was granted. The second request was a written one indicating the need for "an interpretation of the law as to what constitutes the difference between first degree and second degree murder." The trial judge, with the concurrence of both counsel, responded in writing that "the jury should rely on the instructions already furnished."
Appellant claims that the trial court erred by responding to the jury's request for evidentiary material and reinstruction outside of his presence. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.400(d) controls situations in which the jury is provided with items previously introduced into evidence. The rule does not require the presence of either counsel or the defendants Fla.R. Crim.P. 3.400(d); Turner v. State, 431 So.2d 328 (Fla. 3d DC A), review denied, 438 So.2d 834 (Fla.1983). Since only previously admitted evidence was provided to the jury, there was clearly no error.
The second question for consideration is whether the defendant's presence is required when the court, with the agreement of both counsel, in effect, denies a request for additional instructions. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.410 addresses the issue and requires, before a response is made to the jury, that both the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel be notified. The literal terms of the rule were complied with in this case. However, in Ivory v. State, 351 So.2d 26 (Fla.1977), the supreme court appeared to add the additional requirement that the defendant be present when any response is made by the court to the jury. The court also apparently established a per se reversible error rule for violations of the requirements. In cases subsequent to Ivory, however, the supreme court has receded from the per se standard, finding reversible error only when the defendant is prejudiced. In Francis v. State, 413 So.2d 1175 (Fla.1982), a portion of the voir dire was conducted outside the defendant's presence. While the case involved a violation of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.180(a)(4), that rule, like Ivory, requires the defendant's presence. It is unquestionably more important that a defendant be present during voir dire than during a conference on the jury's request for additional instructions. A defendant can be of much greater assistance to himself, and his counsel, in selecting a jury than in discussing jury instructions. Yet, in Francis, the supreme court conducted a harmless error inquiry; The court decided it could not assess the extent of prejudice to Francis and, therefore, found the error was not harmless. The fact that a harmless error inquiry was made, however, is instructive.
In Rose v. State, 425 So.2d 521 (Fla.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 909, 103 S.Ct. 1883, 76 L.Ed.2d 812 (1983), the trial judge decided, sua sponte, to give an additional jury instruction. He gave the instruction without prior notice to the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel. The supreme court, in an opinion which glaringly fails to mention Ivory, found the error to be harmless. Rose may be explained by the fact that the communication between judge and jury, which is the focus of Ivory, occurred in everyone's presence. Consequently, there was an opportunity for objection at the time of the instruction, if not before. Still, reading Francis and Rose together, we conclude that violations of rule 3.410 are subject to the harmless error rule. Other district court opinions have recognized the supreme court's retreat from the per se rule in Ivory. Williams v. State, 468 So.2d 335 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Curtis v. State, 455 So.2d 1090 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984); Villavicencio v. State, 449 So.2d 966 (Fla. 5th DCA), review denied, 456 So.2d 1182 (Fla.1984); State v. Prieto, 439 So.2d 288, 290 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (Judge Ferguson concurring), review denied, 450 So.2d 488 (Fla.1984).
In this case, the trial court, with the agreement of both counsel, denied the jury's request for additional instructions by telling them to rely on the written instructions already provided. If this response outside the defendant's presence was error at all, it was harmless.
Finding no prejudice, we affirm.
DELL, JOHN W., Associate Judge, concurs.
. Rule 3.400. Materials to the Jury Room
The court may permit the jury, upon retiring for deliberation, to take to the jury room:
(d) all things received in evidence other than depositions. If the thing received in evidence is a public record or a private document which, in the opinion of the court, ought not to be taken from the person having it in custody, a copy shall be taken or sent instead of the original.
. Rule 3.410 Jury Request to Review Evidence or for Additional Instructions
After the jurors have retired to consider their verdict, if they request additional instructions or to have any testimony read to them they shall be conducted into the courtroom by the officer who has them in charge and the court may give them such additional instructions or may order such testimony read to them. Such instructions shall be given and such testimony read only after notice to the prosecuting attorney and to counsel for the defendant.
. The supreme court relied heavily on the fourth district case of Slinsky v. State, 232 So.2d 451 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970). In that case, the fourth district, by defining message communications between the court and jury as "proceedings before the court when the jury is present," triggered the application of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.180(a)(5) which requires the defendant's presence at all such proceedings. While the supreme court did not cite rule 3.180, its reliance on Slinsky may explain the requirement that the defendant be present when any response is made to the jury. However, reading rules 3.410, 3.420 and 3.180(a)(5) together arguably leads to the conclusion that the defendant's presence is required only when the jury is actually recalled for additional instructions or the reading of testimony and not when a request is denied, as here.
. While the opinion in Rose does not so state, such an action violates Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.420. That rule allows a court, on its own, to give additional and corrective instructions, but, like rule 3.410, "only after notice to the prosecuting attorney and to counsel for the defendant."
. We find that Hitchcock v. State, 413 So.2d 741 (Fla.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 960, 103 S.Ct. 274, 74 L.Ed.2d 213 (1982) is adequately distinguished in both Judge Pearson's concurrence here and in Judge Sharp's dissent in Curtis v. State, 455 So.2d 1090, 1092 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984).
. Because we find the question presented to be one of great public importance, we certify it to the Supreme Court of Florida, in accordance with article V, section 4 of the Florida Constitution, as follows:
Is a violation of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.410, by responding to a jury's request without the defendant being present, subject to the harmless error rule?