Case Name: Paul J. BOUDREAUX, Plaintiff-Appellant-Relator, v. LOUISIANA BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, State of Louisiana, Administrator of the Department of Employment Security, State of Louisiana and Vinson Guard Service, Defendants-Appellees-Respondents
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1979-09-04
Citations: 374 So. 2d 1182
Docket Number: No. 63632
Parties: Paul J. BOUDREAUX, Plaintiff-Appellant-Relator, v. LOUISIANA BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, State of Louisiana, Administrator of the Department of Employment Security, State of Louisiana and Vinson Guard Service, Defendants-Appellees-Respondents.
Judges: SUMMERS, C. J., dissents for the reasons assigned.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 374
Pages: 1182–1186

Head Matter:
Paul J. BOUDREAUX, Plaintiff-Appellant-Relator, v. LOUISIANA BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, State of Louisiana, Administrator of the Department of Employment Security, State of Louisiana and Vinson Guard Service, Defendants-Appellees-Respondents.
No. 63632.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Sept. 4, 1979.
Robert H. Fray, White, Fray & White, Gretna, for plaintiff-appellant-relator.
James McGraw, Marion Weimer and James A. Piper, Baton Rouge, for defendants-appellees-respondents.

Opinion:
TATE, Justice.
The administrative board held that the plaintiff employee was disqualified from receiving benefits because he "left his employment without good cause connected with his employment." La.R.S. 23:1601(1). The court of appeal affirmed the district court's rejection of his application for judicial review of this determination, one judge dissenting. 363 So.2d 1258 (La.1978).
On the plaintiff's application, we granted certiorari, 366 So.2d 560 (La.1979), because we entertained doubt that, as a matter of law, the board of review of the agency was correct in finding that the employee's reason for leaving his employment was not "good cause connected with his employment."
Facts
The agency record and the evidence taken at the agency hearing show:
The plaintiff had initially become unemployed through no fault of his own. On March 4, 1976, he accepted employment at $2.36 per hour with the Vinson Guard Service. Until March 28, he was employed at Avondale, near his home. On that date, he was transferred to serve as guard at Good Hope, which required a round trip of 48 miles daily to commute from his home. His automobile was "in bad shape", and this daily round trip proved to be too expensive in relation to the pay earned.
After nearly two months, on May 20 he asked his supervisor for a transfer to a work area he could reach without this unduly great expense. His supervisor told him to keep working until the supervisor could find him a new position. The employee did so until June 9, when he ceased his employment because no nearer position had been found and because he could not afford to continue commuting to the Good Hope work area.
The plaintiff's application for unemployment compensation was denied. The appeals referee found the above facts and the further fact: "The employer did not promise to furnish transportation." The referee concluded: "The claimant left the employment as his car was not operating properly and he felt it was too far to the job site. This was a personal reason, as the employer did not violate the hiring agreement. It is concluded that the claimant left the employment without good cause connected with the employment."
Legal Principles Applicable
In Bateman v. Howard Johnson Co., 292 So.2d 228 (La.1974), a short-order cook had been administratively disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation because she quit work due to lack of available economical transportation — employed for five hours daily at $1.93 per hour, she was forced to take a taxi home nightly at a cost of $3.80, about 40% of her wages. Rejecting contentions similar to the present, this court held that this reason for quitting employment was "good cause connected with" employment, so as to justify the payment of unemployment compensation to an employee who terminated his job for such reason.
We held that, under the circumstances there reflected, the reason for quitting work was not merely a personal (and thus disqualifying) one.
In reaching this conclusion, we relied upon a provision in the same unemployment compensation statute which provides that an employee should not be disqualified for refusing to accept employment offered which is not "suitable" because of "the distance of the available work from his residence." La.R.S. 23:1601(3)(a). In substance, we held that it is good cause connected with employment for an employee to quit his job when the work becomes un suitable within the meaning of the statute due to unanticipated working conditions. See also, to same effect, Haskett v. Brown, 165 So.2d 25 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1964), when the change in transportation availability after initial hiring made the employment unsuitable and, therefore, a good cause connected with the employment for resigning from the work.
Where transportation is unavailable or available only at prohibitive cost, it may render the employment unsuitable. Johnson v. Administrator, Division of Employment of Security, 166 So.2d 366 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1964); Immel v. Brown, 143 So.2d 156 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1962).
Conclusion
In the absence of a finding that the initial employment agreement specifically contemplated that the employee provide transportation for himself to a work-site 48-miles round-trip from his home, we find that, under the circumstance, the plaintiff-employee left his job for good cause connected with his employment. The circumstances we rely upon are: the plaintiff's employment at $2.36 per hour; his transfer to a post 48-miles round-trip from his home after his initial employment; and the unavailability at reasonable cost of adequate available transportation to his changed and far more distant work-site. As stated by the dissenting judge in the court of appeal, "under these circumstances, . . . [the] plaintiff's employment was unsuitable, and . he had left his employment for good cause." 363 So.2d 1261.
The plaintiff is thus entitled to unemployment compensation benefits.
Decree
For the reasons assigned, the judgments of the district and intermediate courts dismissing the plaintiff's suit are reversed, and the case is remanded to the defendant board of review for it to enter an order in accordance with the ruling of this court. La.R.S. 23:1634.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
SUMMERS, C. J., dissents for the reasons assigned.
. We note that the Administrator of the Division of Employment Security, charged with administering the provisions of the unemployment compensation act, answered the employee's petition for judicial review by joining in his demand that the board's determination be reversed as erroneous.
. We note that the referee did not rely on the employee's affirmative response ("Yes") to a general question which indicated that, at the time of his application for employment, he realized he could have been offered work at the Good Hope site. We thus do not reach the issue of whether it is nevertheless good cause connected with his employment for an employee to quit work from a $2.36 per hour job when transportation expenses become inordinate because of a transfer, even if the possibility of a transfer was realistically contemplated as an aspect of the employment at the time of the initial hiring.