Case Name: Luis Ramon DELEON, Petitioner-Appellant v. William STEPHENS, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent-Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2013-10-15
Citations: 541 F. App'x 492
Docket Number: No. 11-20500
Parties: Luis Ramon DELEON, Petitioner-Appellant v. William STEPHENS, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent-Appellee.
Judges: Before REAVLEY, JONES, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 541
Pages: 492–493

Head Matter:
Luis Ramon DELEON, Petitioner-Appellant v. William STEPHENS, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 11-20500
Summary Calendar.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Oct. 15, 2013.
Luis Ramon Deleon, Rosharon, TX, pro se.
Joseph Peter Corcoran, Assistant Attorney General, Greg Abbott, Office of the Attorney General, Austin, TX, for Respondent-Appellee.
Before REAVLEY, JONES, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM:
Luis Ramon Deleon, Texas prisoner # 1204504, was convicted of capital murder in 2003 and sentenced to life in prison. His probation for an unrelated drug case was also revoked, and he was sentenced to ten years. In May 2011, after the state court denied habeas relief, Deleon filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition challenging the murder conviction, although he also referenced the drug conviction. Before the state was served and filed an answer, the district court sua sponte dismissed the petition as time-barred, reasoning that both convictions became final long before Deleon filed for either state or federal relief. Deleon appeals.
Our appellate jurisdiction is limited to the issue upon which a certificate of appealability ("COA") was granted, see Lewis v. Thaler, 701 F.3d 783, 787 (5th Cir.2012), which in this case is "whether the district court erred in sua sponte dismissing the application as time barred without giving Deleon notice or an opportunity to respond." Deleon does not address the propriety of the district court's sua sponte action nor his opportunity to respond, and the issue is therefore abandoned. See Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir.1993); Brinkmann v. Dallas County Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir.1987). Instead, virtually all of Deleon's appellate brief is devoted to arguing the merits of his claim that his capital murder conviction was obtained in violation of the constitution due to, inter alia, ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct. We do not consider these arguments. See Carty v. Thaler, 583 F.3d 244, 266 (5th Cir.2009) ("Because neither we nor the district court granted Carty a COA on this issue, we lack jurisdiction to consider this claim.").
Deleon makes only passing references to the district court's application of the statute of limitations. To the extent these preserved appellate review, we note that although the district court did not give Deleon explicit notice of the limitations issue prior to dismissal, see Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 210, 126 S.Ct. 1675, 1684, 164 L.Ed.2d 376 (2006), Deleon acknowledged in his § 2254 petition that his habeas claims were filed more than one year after his conviction became final, and he set forth his arguments against application of limitations. Cf. Dillard v. Quarterman, 237 Fed.Appx. 940, 941 (5th Cir.2007). The district court addressed those arguments, the state has not waived application of the time bar, and we perceive no error in the district court's conclusions.
The district court's judgment is therefore AFFIRMED.
Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.