Case Name: FOX v. OGEMAW COUNTY
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1995-02-21
Citations: 208 Mich. App. 697
Docket Number: Docket No. 156257
Parties: FOX v OGEMAW COUNTY
Judges: Before: Mackenzie, P.J., and Griffin and M. J. Talbot, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 208
Pages: 697–706

Head Matter:
FOX v OGEMAW COUNTY
Docket No. 156257.
Submitted September 9, 1994, at Grand Rapids.
Decided February 21, 1995, at 9:45 a.m.
Leave to appeal sought.
Mary K. Fox and others brought an action in the Ogemaw Circuit Court against Ogemaw County and the Ogemaw County Drain Commissioner, seeking, along with other relief, damages for impairment of the value of the plaintiffs’ property when a dam that the defendants were required to’ maintain burst and allowed Flowage Lake to drain. The defendants raised the affirmative defense of governmental immunity. The plaintiffs responded that the defense of governmental immunity was not available because the failure to keep the dam in good repair and to rebuild the dam immediately constituted the creation of a nuisance by the defendants. The trial court, Carl L. Horn, J., denied the defendants’ motion for summary disposition and, following a bench trial, entered a judgment for Mary Fox, the only remaining plaintiff, of $36,950. The defendants appealed.
The Court of Appeals held:
1. The loss of the lake water from the plaintiff’s real estate, by definition, was not an invasion of her property and, therefore, did not constitute a trespass such as would establish the trespass-nuisance exception to governmental immunity. Neither the exposure of tree stumps nor the reversion of the lake bottom to its natural lakeless state, with the consequent restoration of an insect habitat, constituted a trespass-nuisance.
2. Assuming that there is a nuisance per se exception to governmental immunity, the return of the plaintiffs property to its original lakeless state is neither intrinsically unreasonable nor a condition that is dangerous at all times and under all circumstances and, thus, would not constitute a nuisance per se.
Reversed.
Griffin, J., dissenting, stated that the condition created by the collapse of the dam unreasonably interfered with the plaintiffs use and enjoyment of her property and constituted a nuisance that is not subject to the defense of governmental immunity. The nuisance constituted an unconstitutional governmental taking of the property without compensation.
References
Am Jur 2d, Municipal, County, School, and State Tort Liability §160.
Comment Note. — Municipal immunity from liability for torts. 60 ALR2d 1198.
Nuisance — Governmental Immunity — Trespass-Nuisance — Nuisance Per Se — Dams.
The draining of an artificial lake as the result of the failure of a governmental body to maintain the dam that created the lake and thereby to allow the area where the lake had been to return to its original natural state does not constitute either a trespass-nuisance or nuisance per se such as will defeat a claim of governmental immunity by the governmental body in an action by adjoining property owners for diminution of property values because of the absence of the lake (MCL 691.1407[1]; MSA 3.996[107][1]).
Jensen, Smith & Gilbert, P.C. (by Jill K. Smith), for the plaintiff.
Richard L. Alger, Jr., for the defendants.
Before: Mackenzie, P.J., and Griffin and M. J. Talbot, JJ.
Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
Mackenzie, P.J.
Defendants appeal as of right from a judgment that found them liable to plaintiff Mary K. Fox (hereinafter plaintiff) in the amount of $36,950 for creating a nuisance. We reverse.
In order to establish a claim that falls within the nuisance exception to governmental immunity, plaintiff had to prove the existence of a trespass-nuisance or (although a majority of the Supreme Court has yet to decide the question) a nuisance per se. Hadfield v Oakland Co Drain Comm'r, 430 Mich 139; 422 NW2d 205 (1988); Li v Feldt (After Second Remand), 439 Mich 457; 487 NW2d 127 (1992).
Plaintiffs trial testimony established that she was the developer of several lakefront lots on an inland lake known as Flowage Lake. Flowage Lake was an artificial lake created by damming a section of the Rifle River. In 1985, the dam, which was maintained by defendants, gave way, and Flowage Lake was completely drained. Drainage of the lake exposed tree stumps and allowed mosquitoes and flies to breed. As a result of this lawsuit, defendants agreed to rebuild the dam. However, while the lake was drained, the value of plaintiffs lots was diminished. Plaintiff testified that she sold several lots at reduced prices because the lake had been drained.
On these facts, the trial court clearly erred in finding defendants liable for creating a nuisance. The Supreme Court has defined a trespass-nuisance as "a direct trespass upon, or the interference with the use or enjoyment of, land that results from a physical intrusion caused by, or under the control of, a governmental entity." Hadfield, supra, p 145. The loss of the lake water from plaintiffs real estate, by definition, was not an invasion of her property and, therefore, did not constitute a trespass. Peterman v Dep't of Natural Resources, 446 Mich 177, 207; 521 NW2d 499 (1994). Similarly, the exposure of existing tree stumps was not an invasion of the property and thus not a trespass. Plaintiff argues that the presence of insects constitutes a trespass, citing Trowbridge v Lansing, 237 Mich 402; 212 NW 73 (1927). However, a close reading of that case confirms that the Supreme Court's most recent characterization of that case was as a case primarily involving the production of pervasive sickening odors. See Peterman, supra, p 206. Here, there was no evidence of such pervasive, sickening odors. Furthermore, we decline to hold that the reversion of the property to its naturally lakeless state, and the consequent restoration of insect habitat, constituted a trespass-nuisance.
Assuming the existence of a nuisance per se exception to governmental immunity, see Li, supra, we also conclude that the trial court's finding of a nuisance was clearly erroneous. A nuisance per se is "an activity or condition which constitutes a nuisance at all times and under all circumstances, without regard to the care with which it is conducted or maintained." Li, supra, pp 476-477 (opinion of Cavanagh, C.J.). "[U]nlike the nuisance in fact, nuisance per se is not predicated on the want of care, but is unreasonable by its very nature." Hadfield, supra, p 208 (opinion of Boyle, J.). The return of plaintiffs property to its natural state, lacking an artificial lake, is not intrinsically "unreasonable," nor does it constitute a condition that is dangerous at all times and under all circumstances.
From a review of the trial transcript, it is apparent that the "nuisance" proven by plaintiff was that, until the dam was repaired and the area once again artificially flooded, her real estate could not be marketed and sold as lakefront property. Because plaintiff failed to establish either a trespass-nuisance or a nuisance per se, the trial court clearly erred in finding defendants liable to her for damages; they were immune from liability under § 7(1) of the governmental tort liability act, MCL 691.1407(1); MSA 3.996(107)(1).
Reversed.
M. J. Talbot, J., concurred.