Case Name: ROSENTHAL v. EMPIRE BRICK & SUPPLY CO.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1908-01-17
Citations: 108 N.Y.S. 347
Docket Number: 
Parties: ROSENTHAL v. EMPIRE BRICK & SUPPLY CO.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 108
Pages: 347–350

Head Matter:
ROSENTHAL v. EMPIRE BRICK & SUPPLY CO.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
January 17, 1908.)
X. Sales—Contract—Construction—Performance.
Defendant proposed to furnish plaintiff all the brick required for certain specified houses at the market price guaranteed not to exceed $9.50 per 1,000, it being understood that defendant would require about 3,000,-000 brick to complete the operation, all the brick to be received by plaintiff before December 1, 1905. Held, that such proposal, being accepted, constituted a mutual contract between the parties, binding defendant to deliver all the brick required by the date specified.
LEd. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 43, Sales, §§ 39-43.]
2. Same—Breach of Contract—Measure of Damages.
Where defendant breached a contract requiring delivery of brick necessary to complete certain specified operations by December 1,1905, the measure of damages was the difference between the contract price and the market price of such brick as defendant failed to deliver at the time and place of delivery, and it was therefore error to permit plaintiff to wait a reasonable time after the contract date for the completion of deliveries, •defendant having previously refused to make further deliveries under the ■contract, before buying the additional brick required, and recover the difference between the contract price and the price plaintiff was then re•quired to pay.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 43, Sales, §§ 1174-1179.]
Appeal from Appellate Term.
Action by Joseph Rosenthal against the Empire Brick & Supply Company. From a determination of the Appellate Term (104 N. Y. Supp. 769), affirming a judgment of the New York City Court in favor of plaintiff, in an action for breach,of contract of sale, defendant appeals. Modified, and affirmed on condition.
Argued before PATTERSON, P. J., and INGRAHAM, LAUGH-FIN, CLARKE, and SCOTT, JJ.
Benjamin H. Edsall (Wm. C. Beecher, of counsel), for appellant.
Walter J. Rosenstein, for respondent.

Opinion:
CLARKE, J.
The question involved arises out of an alleged breach of contract for the sale and delivery of brick. The contract was in writing, and the material part thereof is as follows:
"We propose to furnish you all the masons' materials required for the construction of seven houses on the S. S. of 134th street, 100 feet west of Amsterdam avenue, this city, all to be delivered at the following prices and conditions: Hard brick at the market price, guaranteed not to exceed $9.50 per M. It being understood that you will require about three million brick to complete the operation, and that all the hard brick will be received by you before December 1st, 1905."
As we interpret this contract, it required performance before December 1, 1905. The contract was in the shape of a proposal by the defendant "that all the hard brick will be received by you before December 1st, 1905," accepted by the plaintiff. If, then, before December 1st the defendant had tendered and the plaintiff had refused to receive the brick, it is clear that the plaintiff would have breached the contract, and the defendant would have had a cause of action to recover damages therefor. The premises under this contract were mutual. If the plaintiff was bound to receive, the defendant was bound to deliver. By the middle of 'November a large amount of the brick required had been delivered. The plaintiff some days prior to December 1st demanded the brick necessary to complete the construction of the seven houses he was erecting. The defendant failed to deliver. The plaintiff wrote that, if for any reason the defendant could not deliver before said' date, he would take the brick thereafter at the price agreed on. The defendant not only failed to deliver before December 1st, but refused to deliver thereafter unless the plaintiff would enter into a new written contract at an advanced price. This the plaintiff refused to do. The breach, then, occurred on December 1st, the date the plaintiff was required to receive and the defendant was required to deliver. Upon breach of a contract for the sale of merchandise at a fixed price, the general rule is that the measure of damages is the difference between the contract price and the market value at the time and place of delivery. Stecker v. Coal Co., 116 App. Div. 772, 102 N. Y. Supp. 89; Atlas Portland Cement Co. v. Hopper, 116 App. Div. 445, 101 N. Y. Supp. 948; Todd v. Gamble, 148 N. Y. 382, 42 N. E. 982. There was a market value for brick on December 1, 1905. It was $11 a 1,000, and so continued until the 20th of the month. Indeed, the defendant offered to deliver all the brick that plaintiff required at this price. The value subsequently rose, and when the plaintiff bought 243,000 brick at the end of December and the 1st of January the price was $13.50 per-1,000. The recovery was upon that basis, namely, the difference between $13.50 and $9.50 per 1,000, amounting to $850.50. The learned court applied the rule which obtains in actions for conversion of stock. It charged •.
"If the defendant was then chargeable with a breach of its contract, and you find that fact, then the plaintiff was required within a reasonable time after the breach of contract to go into the "open market and buy the brick at the best price he could." ,
And it submitted to the jury what was a reasonable titne. It seems to us that the wrong measure of damage was applied, and that the true rule was, as stated supra, the difference between the contract price and the market value at the time and place of delivery.
The determination will therefore be reversed and a new trial ordered, with costs to the appellant to abide the event, unless the plaintiff stipulates to reduce the judgment to $425.25, with interest and costs. If so stipulated, the judgment will be modified accordingly, and affirmed, without costs in this court to either party. All concur.