Case Name: Rosalino GIAMANCO v. Elizabeth Funderburk GIAMANCO
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1961-05-22
Citations: 131 So. 2d 159
Docket Number: No. 262
Parties: Rosalino GIAMANCO v. Elizabeth Funderburk GIAMANCO.
Judges: Before TATE, FRUGE and SAVOY, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 131
Pages: 159–168

Head Matter:
Rosalino GIAMANCO v. Elizabeth Funderburk GIAMANCO.
No. 262.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Third Circuit.
May 22, 1961.
Applications for Rehearing Dismissed June 19, 1961.
Downs & Gremillion, by Field V. Gre-million, Alexandria, John R. Hunter, Jr., Alexandria, for plaintiff-appellant-appellee.
Lloyd G. Teekell, Alexandria, for defendant-appellee-appellant.
Before TATE, FRUGE and SAVOY, JJ.

Opinion:
SAVOY, Judge.
Plaintiff filed suit for a separation against his wife, defendant herein, on the grounds of abandonment. He prayed for the dissolution of the community, asked the court to fix alimony, and asked that the minor child born of the union be given to the wife and allowing him the right to visit said child. Plaintiff then filed a supplemental petition stating that one year had elapsed since he and his wife lived together and prayed for a separation on that ground.
Defendant filed an answer to the suit generally denying all the allegations of plaintiff's petition, and then assuming the position of plaintiff-in-reconvention, alleged certain cruel treatment on the part of plaintiff husband, asked for a separation on that ground, and also prayed that she be granted alimony at the rate of $350 per month and attorney's fees in the sum of $1,000. She prayed further that the community of ac-quets and gains existing between the parties be dissolved and that she be decreed the owner of an undivided one-half of said community property, and the separate es tate of plaintiff be decreed to owe the community the sum of $125,000.
The district court granted plaintiff a judgment of separation on the grounds that the parties had lived separate and apart for one year, allowed defendant $225 per month for alimony for herself and for said minor child, allowed her $1,000 as attorney's fees, and fixed the amount which the separate estate of plaintiff owed to the community of acquets and gains existing between plaintiff and defendant at the sum of $50,006.09.
From the judgment of the district court both plaintiff and defendant appealed to the Supreme Court of Louisiana. The Supreme Court transferred the case to this court under authority of Article 7, Section 30, of the Constitution of the State of Louisiana, LSA.
On Motion to Remand
Plaintiff has filed in this court a motion to remand this case to the trial court for the following reasons:
(1) That prior to the time this case was filed in district court, plaintiff had granted an option to one E. Leroy Chandler, wherein Chandler was granted a lease on the separate property belonging to plaintiff with an option to purchase said property. At the time the trial judge rendered his written opinion, the option had not been exercised. The trial judge pointed out in his opinion that if the option were exercised subsequent to the trial, that it might affect the amount found by him to be owing by the separate estate of plaintiff and his wife, for the reason that the option contained a provision that if Chandler exercised his option and purchased the property, he would be allowed to deduct from the purchase price the amount of lease money paid to plaintiff for the first twelve month period.
Rather than remand the case for the reasons assigned by plaintiff herein, this Court is of the opinion that it would be better practice to reserve to plaintiff and defendant the right to file a separate suit in district court in order to adjudicate their differences because of the sale from plaintiff to Chandler dated July 9, 1960, after the judgment of the district court had been rendered and signed, said suit to be limited to the following subj ect matter:
(A) Allowing plaintiff to show, if he is able to do so, that the amount of the lease on the property sold July 9, 1960, was applied to reduce the purchase price, as stated in said option dated January 9, 1959, to determine whether there is a credit due by the community property to the separate estate of plaintiff.
(B) To allow defendant to show the value of the improvements placed on the property during the term of the lease by Chandler, in order to determine whether said improvements fall within the community of acquets and gains existing between plaintiff and defendant, or whether the improvements are the separate property of plaintiff.
(C) Reserving the right of defendant to sue for one-half of the value of the movable community property on the premises sold by plaintiff to Chandler on July 9, 1960.
The district judge in his opinion had placed a value of $4990 on the movable effects in the restaurant and tourist courts and deducted this sum which the separate property owed the community and recognized plaintiff and defendant as owners of an undivided one-half interest therein. However, when Chandler exercised his option to buy the restaurant and tourist courts, the movables were transferred to him, and plaintiff then became religated to one-half of the value of the movable community property located in the restaurant and tourist courts at the time of the sale.
(2) Another ground urged by counsel for plaintiff as a reason for remanding this case to the district court is that certain checks, statements and documents attached to the motion to remand, which counsel was unable to secure prior to the trial, all dating no later than the year 1951, are material for the proper adjudication of the matter, and the case should be remanded in order to introduce this additional evidence in the record.
Counsel for plaintiff had approximately nine months to prepare for this suit from the time it was filed in the district court, and the evidence sought to be used in the motion was available at the time of the trial in the district court and is not newly discovered evidence. An examination of the evidence in this case reveals that the items contained in the motion to remand do not indicate that they represent credits due by the community to the separate estate of plaintiff which were not taken in consideration by the trial court.
For the foregoing reasons, the motion to remand is disallowed.