Case Name: Prentice E. SCOTT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNION TANK CAR CO., Defendant-Appellee
Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana
Jurisdiction: Indiana
Decision Date: 1980-04-01
Citations: 402 N.E.2d 992
Docket Number: No. 3-877A203
Parties: Prentice E. SCOTT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNION TANK CAR CO., Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: GARRARD, P. J., concurs.
Reporter: North Eastern Reporter 2d
Volume: 402
Pages: 992–997

Head Matter:
Prentice E. SCOTT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNION TANK CAR CO., Defendant-Appellee.
No. 3-877A203.
Court of Appeals of Indiana, Third District.
April 1, 1980.
Thomas J. Scully, Munster, for plaintiff-appellant.
G. Edward McHie, McHie, Enslen & Moran, Hammond, Joel H. Kaplan, Robert B. Watson, Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, Chicago, Ill., for defendant-ap-pellee.

Opinion:
HOFFMAN, Judge.
Prentice Scott was an employee at will of Union Tank Car Company for a period of approximately five years ending on August 26, 1974, the date of Scott's dismissal. On October 6, 1976, over two years later, Scott filed suit against Union, alleging that he had been discharged in retaliation for filing á Workmen's Compensation claim. However, Union's motion to dismiss the suit on the ground that it was barred by the statute of limitations (IC 1971, 34-1-2-2 (Burns Códe Ed.)) was granted by the court below.
Scott argues on appeal that his claim sounded in contract, not in tort, and that the six-year statute of limitations (IC 1971, 34-1-2-1 (Burns Code Ed.)) was therefore applicable. He maintains that the court erred in concluding otherwise because his claim arose out of a contractual relationship, i. e., the relationship created by his unwritten contract of employment.
In Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co. (1973), 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425, the Supreme Court held that an employee who alleges that he or she was discharged in retaliation for filing a claim pursuant to the Workmen's Compensation Act or the Workmen's Occupational Diseases Act has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plainly, that decision recognized that an employee who files such a claim has an interest in continuing in his or her employment which is protected from invasion by the employer's retaliatory actions. It follows that the act of an employer who discharges such an employee is one "which is intended to cause an invasion of an interest legally protected from intentional invasion," and is, therefore, a tortious act. Restatement of the Law, Torts 2d, § 6, Comment a. The fact that the right invaded is one which the law has created "in consequence of a relation which a contract has established between the parties" in no way undermines, but in fact supports, that con-elusion. See: Peru Heating Co. v. Lenhart (1911), 48 Ind.App. 319, at 326, 95 N.E. 680, at 683.
Consequently, the trial court correctly denominated Scott's claim as one sounding in tort and properly applied IC 1971, 34-1-2-2 (Burns Code Ed.) in dismissing the complaint.
Accordingly, the judgment below must be affirmed.
Affirmed.
GARRARD, P. J., concurs.
STATON, J., dissents with opinion.
. IC 1971, 22-3-2-1 et seq. (Bums Code Ed.).
. IC 1971, 22-3-7-1 et seq. (Bums Code Ed.).