Case Name: VAUGHN v. THE STATE
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 2000-12-01
Citations: 247 Ga. App. 368
Docket Number: A00A1069
Parties: VAUGHN v. THE STATE.
Judges: Johnson, C. J., Pope, P. J., Andrews, P. J., and Mikell, J, concur. Miller, J., concurs in the judgment only. Phipps, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.
Reporter: Georgia Appeals Reports
Volume: 247
Pages: 368–373

Head Matter:
A00A1069.
VAUGHN v. THE STATE.
(543 SE2d 429)

Opinion:
Smith, Presiding Judge.
Jackie Vaughn appeals his convictions for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and obstruction of a law enforcement officer. He challenges the trial court's denials of his motion to suppress and his motion to recuse the trial judge. We find no error in the trial court's rulings on these issues, and we affirm.
1. We first address Vaughn's contention that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress. When reviewing a trial court's decision on a motion to suppress, we construe the evidence most favorably to uphold the findings and judgment of the trial court, and we will not disturb the trial court's findings on disputed facts and credibility unless those findings are clearly erroneous. Dickson v. State, 241 Ga. App. 575 (527 SE2d 246) (1999). So viewing the evidence presented to the trial court, the record shows that on the night of February 1, 1998, Officers Chris Webster and Brad White of the Lamar County Sheriff's Department patrolled the area of Tenth Street in Bamesville because the sheriff had received complaints about drug activity in the area. Tenth Street is a short, narrow, heavily traveled, dimly lit, dead-end street. When the officers turned onto the street, they saw a small car parked in the middle of the street with its lights off. As the officers drove toward the car, they saw a man walk from an alleyway between two houses and approach the car. From a distance of approximately 200 yards, they saw the man lean against the car, place his arm on the windowsill, and put his right hand inside the car. According to Webster, while the patrol car was traveling slowly down the street, the man "looked up and [saw] the patrol car and immediately stood up, turned around and stuck his hand in his pocket and started walking away."
After stopping the patrol car, White went to speak with the driver of the vehicle, and Webster "confronted" Vaughn, whom he had recognized when Vaughn turned away from the parked car. Webster called out, "Jackie, let me talk to you for a minute." According to Webster, Vaughn did not want to talk to him, "ignored everything [Webster] asked him," kept walking, and asked only, " 'Chris, why are you messing with me?' " Webster told Vaughn to stop and turn around and explain what he had been doing at the car. When Vaughn turned around, he had his hand in his pocket. At least twice, Webster asked Vaughn to remove his hand from his pocket. Each time, Vaughn complied with the order, but only briefly. He would say, "I ain't got nothing in my hand," and put it back in his pocket. It appeared to Webster that Vaughn was putting his hand in his pocket "to gain control of something."
Webster told Vaughn that he was going to pat him down to make sure that he did not have any weapons. He called White over to assist him because Vaughn had demonstrated that he did not wish to cooperate with the order to keep his hands visible. When the officers attempted to frisk Vaughn, he pushed and shoved and fought with them. After a lengthy struggle in which Vaughn was pepper-sprayed twice, Vaughn was subdued and arrested for obstruction. In a search incident to the arrest, Webster found in Vaughn's right pocket a crack pipe and a Newport cigarette packet containing nine individual bags of cocaine.
The trial court denied Vaughn's motion to suppress because it determined that "Webster had a reasonable, articulable suspicion for stopping [Vaughn], had a right to pat him down because of his conduct and that thereafter, [Vaughn] committed a criminal offense upon [Webster], which subjected him to arrest and search."
Vaughn contends this ruling was erroneous, arguing that Webster and White had no objective and particularized basis for suspecting that he was involved in any criminal activity. We do not agree. The sheriff's office had received a number of calls concerning suspected drug activity in the area, and Webster and White saw a car stopped in the middle of a heavily traveled, dimly lit, dead-end street, with Vaughn leaning into the car and reaching his hand into it. Then, after Vaughn saw the police, but before the patrol car even stopped, he immediately placed his hand into his pocket and began walking away. Under the totality of the circumstances here, we conclude that "[tjhis constituted the observation of suspicious activity . in an area known for drug transactions. Taken together, these observations constituted a founded suspicion sufficient to justify a brief investigatory stop. [Cits.]" Jackson v. State, 191 Ga. App. 439, 440 (382 SE2d 177) (1989). See also Foster v. State, 208 Ga. App. 699 (431 SE2d 400) (1993). The State showed that Webster's suspicion of criminal activity was justified by specific articulable facts, id., and the trial court did not err in denying his motion to suppress.
2. Vaughn moved to recuse the trial judge based upon rulings and actions taken by the same trial judge in a 1994-1995 case, in which Vaughn and numerous relatives were charged with drug offenses. Vaughn contends that in the previous case the judge demonstrated bias against him in the following ways: (1) by not sanctioning a defense attorney who had released confidential wiretap documents to the press; (2) by not reporting the attorney to the State Bar; (3) by not taking additional measures to prevent violation of the court's confidentiality order; (4) by not disclosing prior to a hearing on a motion to suppress the documents that he had been informed that the attorney was the source of the leak to the press; (5) by not limiting the media's access to the hearings; (6) by not passing a motion for recusal to another judge for decision; (7) by denying Vaughn's brother's motion to admit a custodial statement at a Jackson-Denno hearing without tendering it; and (8) by allowing 39 days to pass before granting Vaughn's motion to be discharged and acquitted for failure to provide him a speedy trial.
Alleged bias requiring recusal "must stem from an extra-judicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Birt v. State, 256 Ga. 483, 485 (4) (350 SE2d 241) (1986). Furthermore, any alleged bias "must be of such a nature and intensity to prevent the defendant from obtaining a trial uninfluenced by the court's prejudgment." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 486. After consideration of Vaughn's claim, we find no evidence of a bias that would prevent him from receiving a fair trial in this case, a trial uninfluenced by prejudgment of the court. We therefore find no abuse of discretion in the denial of Vaughn's motion to recuse. See Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Lightsey, 198 Ga. App. 59, 60 (1) (400 SE2d 652) (1990) (abuse of discretion standard).
Judgment affirmed.
Johnson, C. J., Pope, P. J., Andrews, P. J., and Mikell, J, concur. Miller, J., concurs in the judgment only. Phipps, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.