Case Name: Jean P. GUERRA v. Theresa G. WHITE, et al.
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1999-06-16
Citations: 755 So. 2d 894
Docket Number: No. 97-CA-2391
Parties: Jean P. GUERRA v. Theresa G. WHITE, et al.
Judges: Court composed of Judge ROBERT J. KLEES, Judge STEVEN R. PLOTKIN, Judge CHARLES R. JONES, Judge JAMES F. McKAY, III, and Judge DENNIS R. BAGNERIS, Sr.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 755
Pages: 894–901

Head Matter:
Jean P. GUERRA v. Theresa G. WHITE, et al.
No. 97-CA-2391.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
June 16, 1999.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 30, 1999.
Gregory S. Duhy, Chalmetta, LA, Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee.
Richard P. Ieyoub, Attorney General, Gregory G. De’Angelo, Metairie, LA, Counsel for Defendant/Appellant.
Court composed of Judge ROBERT J. KLEES, Judge STEVEN R. PLOTKIN, Judge CHARLES R. JONES, Judge JAMES F. McKAY, III, and Judge DENNIS R. BAGNERIS, Sr.

Opinion:
_[iBAGNERIS, Judge.
Jean P. Guerra was injured when an automobile driven by Theresa G. White struck her while she was walking down Louisiana Highway 624 in Ysclosky, Louisiana, in St. Bernard Parish. Guerra filed suit for damages against Theresa P. White, the driver of tíie automobile that struck her, Edward Cureau and his insurer, State Farm, the owner of the Boat Shed which she alleged encroached onto the highway, and the State of Louisiana, through the Department of Transportation and Development (hereinafter referred to as DOTD)..
DOTD filed a Motion for Summary Judgment requesting the trial court to dismiss the plaintiffs case against DOTD as a matter of law, the motion was denied. DOTD reasserted its grounds for summary judgment in its Motion for Judgment of Involuntary Dismissal, which was denied. During the bench trial, the plaintiff dismissed the Parish of St. Bernard, Theresa P.White, and Edward Cureau and his insurer, State Farm. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and apportioned fault for the | ^plaintiffs damages as follows: DOTD-25%, Guerra-25%, White-30% and Cureau-10%. The plaintiff was awarded $400,000, for physical, mental pain and suffering; $60,000 for past medical costs and future medical expenses; and $10,000 for lost wages and earning capacity.
On appeal, DOTD specifies as error: (1) the trial erred in the denial of the Motion for Summary Judgment and its Motion for Involuntary Dismissal; (2) the trial court erred in its factual findings as it relates to DOTD's liability for the plaintiffs injury; (3) the trial court erred in its application of the law as it relates to DOTD's liability for the plaintiffs injury; (4) the trial court erred in its award of damages.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1
DOTD contends that the trial court erred in its denial of DOTD's Motion for Summary Judgment-and Motion for Involuntary Dismissal. We disagree.
Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo, using the same criteria applied by trial courts to determine whether summary judgment is appropriate. Osborne v. Vulcan Foundry, Inc., 699 So.2d 492 (La.App. 4 Cir.1997); Schroeder v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University, 591 So.2d 342, 345 (La.1991).
A summary judgment shall be granted if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any show that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. LSA-C.C. P. Art. 966(B).
laA fact is material if it is essential to a plaintiffs cause of action under the applicable theory of recovery and without which plaintiff could not prevail. Generally, material facts are those that potentially insure or preclude recovery, affect the litigant's ultimate success, or determine the outcome of a legal dispute. Osborne, supra. Despite the presence of undisputed facts, summary judgment will be granted as a matter of law, if the contested facts present no legal issues. Davenport v. Amax Nickel, Inc., 569 So.2d 23, 27 (La.App. 4 Cir.1990), writ denied, 572 So.2d 68 (La.1991)
In Dibos v. Bill Watson Ford, Inc., 622 So.2d 677, 680 (La.App. 4 Cir.1993), this court held:
To satisfy his burden, the party moving for the summary judgment must meet a strict standard by showing that it is quite clear as to what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of material fact. Vermillion[Vermilion] Corp. v. Vaughn, 397 So.2d 490 (La.1981).
All evidence and inferences drawn from the evidence must be construed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Carr v. City of New Orleans, 622 So.2d 819, 822 (La.App. 4 Cir.1993) writ denied, 629 So.2d 404 (La.1993).
In the instant case, the pleadings, depositions, and answers to interrogatories show that there were genuine issues of material fact. Therefore, we find this assignment of error is without merit.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NO. 2 AND NO. 3
In DOTD's second assignment of error it contends that the trial court erred in its factual finding as it related to DOTD's liability for plaintiffs injury. DOTD's third assignment of error is its contention that the trial court pin its application of the law as it relates to DOTD's liability for the plaintiffs damages. We agree.
In the instant case, the trial court made the following factual findings and conclusions; (1) the plaintiff was forced to walk on the wrong side of the road because of the presence of unleashed dogs; (2) the presence of erosion holes on the shoulder of highway; (3) the erosion holes were within DOTD's right of way; (4) the erosion holes posed an imminent danger to the plaintiff and was a cause in fact of the accident; (5) the presence of the boat shed encroached onto the shoulder of the highway and was a cause in fact of the accident; (6) Ms. White's car did not run off of the road, nor did the plaintiff walk in to the path of the automobile. For the following reasons we conclude that the trial judge erred in these factual findings and conclusions and reverse the allocation of fault to DOTD.
DOTD and the EROSION HOLES
Jean Guerra contends that DOTD's fault is premised on the erosion holes on the shoulder of the highway and DOTD's failure to maintain the shoulder and repair the shoulder. The trial court's reasons indicate that DOTD's fault is predicated on the fact that the erosion holes were in close proximity to the highway and were within an implied right of way in favor of DOTD. Further, the trial court concluded that the erosion holes narrowed the walking area forcing the plaintiff to walk nearer the highway. The trial court reasoned that DOTD contributed to the accident by its failure to repair the erosion holes on the shoulder of the highway, which created an imminent danger to the pedestrian plaintiff.
|fiIn order to determine DOTD's responsibility or liability requires the application of the duty risk analysis set forth in Dixie Drive It Yourself System v. American Beverage Co., 242 La. 471, 137 So.2d 298 (1962), and Hill v. Lundin & Associates, 260 La. 542, 256 So.2d 620 (1972).
The "cause in fact" analysis is primarily a "but for" inquiry. "If the victim probably would not have encountered the harm but for the defendant's conduct, the conduct can be considered a "cause in fact"." Boteler v. Rivera, 700 So.2d 913 (La.App. 4 Cir.1997). A counter-factual hypothesis is recommended as a step in determining cause in fact. Robertson, The Common Sense of Cause in Fact, 75 Tex. L.Rev. (1997). That is, assuming that the conduct of the defendant was "corrected", it is probable that the plaintiff would still have sustained the damages complained of. If so then the defendant's substandard conduct was not a cause in fact. Boteler, supra.
In the instant case, after our review of the record we find that the erosion holes were not proved to be a cause in fact of the accident in which the plaintiff sustained her injuries. Plaintiffs expert, Robert Roth, Superintendent of Highway Maintenance for DOTD, testified that the state inspected, maintained and repaired La. Highway 624. Further, he testified that the highway is inspected on a biweekly basis and his office prepared a yearly report. Also, if there were any erosion holes on the shoulder of the highway, the maintenance crew would repair them immediately. He testified that he had no knowledge of erosion holes being a problem in the area of the accident. Roth never concluded or opined that neither the erosion I «holes existed on the date of the accident nor did he testify regarding the condition of the highway at the time of the accident.
Edward Cureau, the owner of the boat shed, testified that he never experienced any problems with erosion holes around his boat shed. He testified that once there was a hole against the bulkhead of the shed, but the hole did not obstruct anyone from walking perpendicular to the highway. Cureau's testimony was corroborated by Loyce Alonzo, the plaintiffs walking companion on the date of the accident, she testified that nothing obstructed the plaintiff from moving to the right as White's vehicle approached or caused the plaintiff to walk close to the highway.
Although, the plaintiff testified that the erosion holes were present at the time of the accident, we find that the plaintiff failed to prove that erosion holes were a cause in fact of the accident. Also, the plaintiff failed to prove that White's vehicle striking the plaintiff was caused by the erosion holes, or that the erosion holes created an imminent danger. Therefore, we find the allocation of fault as to DOTD is erroneous.
DOTD and the BOAT SHED
The same cause in fact test can be applied to the location of the boat shed. The inquiry is whether with respect to DOTD, the location of the boat shed was a legal cause of the accident. The answer to that inquiry requires a determination of whether the boat shed posed an unreasonable risk of harm, and if so, whether DOTD had a duty to protect against that risk.
The trial court imposed a duty on DOTD, vis a vis the boat shed, and by making a factual and legal conclusion that it was located within DOTD's implied right of way. Further, DOTD had a duty to remove the boat shed or |7to have the owner remove the boat shed that encroached on the shoulder of the highway. These factual and legal conclusions were predicated on the testimony of Jean Guerra, the plaintiff, and Loyce Alonzo, the plaintiffs walking companion on the date of the accident, and Robert Roth, DOTD's engineer. For the following reason we conclude that the trial judge erred in his factual and legal conclusions.
In the instant case, after our review of the record we find the boat shed was not a cause in fact of the accident. Further, the plaintiff failed to prove the boat shed was a cause in fact of the accident. Furthermore, no evidence was presented that proved the boat shed caused White's vehicle to strike the plaintiff, or created an imminent danger.
Robert Roth, plaintiffs expert witness testified that the boat shed was not within the shoulder of La. Highway 624. Roth testified that the boat shed was approximately four feet from the edge of the highway. Also, he defined the term "shoulder" as the aggregate surface area immediately adjacent to the paved, roadway, which is just next to the travel portion of the road. Roth, testified that the area between the boat shed and the edge of the highway was not all of the shoulder. He described that the area where the roadway kind of breaks (sic)over towards the boathouse as the shoulder. He testified that DOTD would not maintain the area between the boat shed and the roadway because the equipment would damage the bulkhead. However, he did testify that if a hole were observed during one of the biweekly inspections, DOTD would have repaired the hole whether it was on the shoulder or not. Roth, testified that these repairs would be made because it was so close to the shoulder that if they grated the shoulder and moored the | shole, the shoulder would sloughs off into the hole or would cause a problem with the continuity of the area adjacent to the highway. Therefore, we find that the trial judge manifestly erred in allocating fault to DOTD on the basis of the location of the boat shed.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 4
The Trial Court erred in its award of damages. We pretermit discussion of this assignment because of our dispositions in assignments of error numbers 2 and 3.
DOTD argues that the sole cause of this accident was either the negligence on the part of the driver, Theresa White, or the negligence on the part of Jean Guerra by stepping into the path of White's vehicle. The trial court allocated fault; Jean Guerra-25%; Theresa White-40%; Edward Cureau-10%; and DOTD-25%.
This argument raises the issue of reallocation of fault and requires consideration of the factors set forth in Watson v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Ins. Co., 469 So.2d 967 (La.1985).
Watson provided the following guidelines for the allocation of fault by an appellate court where the trial court's findings are manifestly erroneous in that regard.
The Watson Factors are, (1) Whether the conduct resulted from inadvertence or involved an awareness of the danger, (2) How great a risk was created by the conduct, (3)The significance of what was sought by the conduct, (4) The capacities of the actor, whether superior or inferior, and (5) Any extenuating circumstance which might require the actor to proceed in haste, without proper thought. Id. at 974.
|9In the instant case, Jean Guerra and Loyce Alonzo gave inconsistent testimony regarding events surrounding the accident. Jean Guerra, testified that she was familiar with the area and she knew of the holes and the location of the boat shed prior to the accident. She testified that they had sufficient room to walk along the highway and had not encountered a hole at the time of the accident. Further, she testified that nothing prevented them from walking on the correct side of the highway. She testified that she did not wander into the highway and White's vehicle did not leave the highway to strike her.
Loyce Alonzo testified that there were no holes or obstacles that caused her or the plaintiff to walk closer to the highway or prevented the two of them from stepping to the right to avoid the vehicle. She testified that she and the plaintiff walked along the highway opposite the boat shed until they reached the Yscloskey Bridge. Upon reaching the bridge they walked along the same side as the boat shed, as they had done on numerous occasions pri- or to the accident. She testified that they were able to see any obstacles in front of them and nothing in the area surprised them.
Applying the Watson Factors and reviewing the evidence presented, we conclude that the majority of fault is that of the driver of the car, Theresa White. The inattentiveness of both Theresa White and Jean Guerra contributed to this accident. Therefore, we re-apportion the fault previously assigned to DOTD to the driver, Theresa White. Also the fault previously apportioned to Edward Cureau is reapportion to the plaintiff, Jean Guerra. Fault is allocated 65% to Theresa White and 35% to Jean Guerra.
\kREVERSED IN PART; AMENDED AND AFFIRMED IN PART.
PLOTKIN, J" CONCURS.
JONES, J., CONCURS IN THE RESULT.
McKAY, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART.
KLEES, C.J., DISSENTS.