Case Name: First National Bank of Madison, Appellant, vs. Geeenwood and others, Respondents
Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Wisconsin
Decision Date: 1891-03-17
Citations: 79 Wis. 269
Docket Number: 
Parties: First National Bank of Madison, Appellant, vs. Geeenwood and others, Respondents.
Judges: 
Reporter: Wisconsin Reports
Volume: 79
Pages: 269–284

Head Matter:
First National Bank of Madison, Appellant, vs. Geeenwood and others, Respondents.
April 11 — May 20, 1890.
February 28
March 17, 1891.
Attachment: Execution: Waiver: Costs.
1. The right to controvert the existence of the grounds for attachment alleged in the affidavits therefor is given by statute to the attachment debtor only. A judgment creditor seeking to secure to himself the proceeds of the sale of the attached property in the attachment suit has no such right.
2. In the absence of fraud, attachments issued in favor of real creditors, though first instigated by the debtors themselves, are valid when the proceedings are ratified by such creditors. Debtors have a right to prefer creditors by such means.
3. The lien of an attachment is not waived by the issuing of an execution in the ordinary form upon the judgment in the attachment suit, without any special reference therein to the personal property which has been attached in the suit or to the time when the attachment lien accrued.
4. A compliance with the requirement of sec. 2736a, S. & B. Ann. Stats., that the officer serving two or more attachments against the same defendant, and on the same property, shall make an inventory and appraisal in only one of the actions, and shall indorse on the copies of the writs served on the defendant in the other actions a notice that the property seized therein is the same property seized in the action wherein such inventory and appraisal are made, is jurisdictional, and a failure to make such indorsement is fatal to the continuance of the lien of such subsequent attachments, unless the defect is waived; but if the attachment defendant traverses the affidavits for attachment in those cases, he does thereby waive such defect, that being a general appearance in the actions.
5. Where the defect in the service and return of such subsequent attachments upon the same property has been so waived by the defendants, the lien of such attachments will continue and be held paramount to that of a creditor who has levied an execution on the property subsequent to the attachments.
6. A petition presented by a judgment creditor to a circuit court, attacking the validity of attachments in actions in that court, and claiming to be entitled to the proceeds of the sale of the attached property, is, in substance and legal effect, the commencement of an equitable action or proceeding in that court, and not an intervention in the several attachment suits, and though the court treats it as an intervention without objection, the successful party is entitled to costs.
APPEAL from, tbe Circuit Court for Jefferson County.
Tbis is a contest between creditors of tbe firm of A. Armstrong & Co., for moneys collected by tbe sheriff of Dane county on several executions against tbe partners in such firm, issued on judgments recovered against them by tbe several parties to tbis proceeding. Tbe firm is insolvent. Tbe facts are substantially as follows:
In January, 1889, five actions were commenced in tbe circuit court of Dane county against the partners constituting said firm, by the respondents, respectively. The aggregate amount of their demands was over $8,000. A writ of attachment was issued in each action, and levied upon certain personal property of the debtors in the order in which the attachments were issued. These levies were all made in January, 1889.
The debtors traversed the affidavits annexed to such writs of attachment, and thereupon the place of trial of all the actions was duly changed to the circuit court of Jefferson county. After depositions had been taken on the issues made by the traverses, the same were withdrawn by the debtors, and on June 20, 1889, judgment was recovered in each action by the plaintiff therein. These judgments aggregated nearly $9,000. An execution was thereupon issued on each judgment to the sheriff of Jefferson county, and transcripts of all the judgments were filed in the Dane county circuit court. Alias executions were thereupon issued on all the judgments to the sheriff of the latter county, who advertised and sold the attached property under two of the executions, for about $2,600. These two executions were in the actions in which the attachments were first levied, and were' not fully satisfied by the proceeds of the sale.
In February, 1889, the appellant, the First National Banh of Madison, recovered judgment for over $1,500 against the same firm in the Dane county circuit court, issued execution thereon, and caused it to be levied upon the same personal property upon which the above-mentioned five attachments had theretofore been levied. In May following, the appellant recovered another judgment in the same court, against the same firm, for about the same amount, issued an execution thereon, and caused it to be levied upon the same property.
The appellant bank thereupon presented its petition, and later its supplemental petition, to the circuit court of Dane county, attacking the validity of all the attachments above mentioned, and claiming to be entitled to the moneys realized by the sheriff on the sale of the property in question. Afterwards the bank presented a similar petition to the circuit court of Jefferson county, incorporating therein its petitions to the circuit court of Dane county. The petition was answered by affidavits on the part of the attaching creditors, and was summarily heard by the court. The court thereupon made an order dismissing the petition on the merits, with costs, and allowed costs, as in an action, at $96.15.
The bank appeals from the order dismissing its petition, and from the award of costs against it.
For the appellant the cause was submitted on briefs of B. J. Stevens.
Among other things, he argued that this mode of procedure by petition is the only one by which the appellants can obtain adequate relief. It is in the nature of a proceeding in rem, to secure a fund in the hands of an officer of the court, and also of an application for leave to sue and have issues tried. The attachments, under which the sales creating the fund arose, were invalid because no legal grounds existed therefor, and the judgments in the actions were also invalid because entered by collusion, in order to give preferences. The right of attachment depends upon the statute, and cannot be conferred by consent. Waples, Attach. 105, 546; Witte v. Meyer, 11 Wis. 295; Whit/ney v. Brunette, 15 id. 81, 82; Robertson v. JZinhhead, 26 id. 571; Drake, Attach, secs. 194, 263; Hop-7ems v. Zangton, 30 Wis. 379. There were numerous other defects in the attachment proceedings which were fatal to the jurisdiction. The attaching creditors have waived their liens by taking judgments and issuing executions in the ordinary form, instead of that prescribed by statute. Waples, Attach. 581, note e; Lowry v. McGee, 75 Ind. 508; Smith v. Seoti, 86 id. 346; U. 8. Mortgage Go. v. Henderson, 111 id. 24. Actions upon claims not yet due, like some of these* can be brought only by attachment, and in order to confer jurisdiction of the actions in those cases it was necessary to allege in the complaints the commencement of attachment proceedings. Gowan v. Hcmson, 55 Wis. 341; Dmid-son v. Haekett, 49 id. 186. And in order to bind the attached property, the judgments should also give a lien. Waples on Attachment, pp. 460, 506-610, 586. The executions were also irregular in that they required the property to be sold as of the date of docketing the judgments, the effect of which was to remit the lien between the date of the attachment and that of the seizure on execution. The appearance of the defendants did not waive the defect, where the writ was served before the summons was issued. Goodyear JR. Go. v. Knapp, 61 Wis. 103; Oximmirngs v. Tabor, 61 Wis. 185; Bell v. Olmsted, 18 id. 69; Blossom v. Estes, 22 Hun,, 472; 84 N. Y. 614. In this proceeding only $10 motion costs are taxable under seo. 2927, R. S. It was a mere order denying a motion.
For the respondents the cause was submitted on the brief of Bashford <& O’Gonnor.
They contended that intervening creditors had no right to traverse the affidavits for the attachments, nor any standing in a court of equity t.o attack the proceedings. Ilowiit v. Blodgett, 61 Wis. 376; Rioe v. Wolf, 65 id. 1; Meissner v. Meissner, 68 id. 336; EspenJicdn v. Meyer, 74 id. 379. If there was real indebtedness to the attaching creditors, it was not a fraud upon other creditors for the debtors to instigate attachments for the purpose of giving preferences to them. Londoner v. Victor, 69 Wis. 434; Bayley v. Bryant, 24 Pick. 198; Ingram v. Osborn, 70 Wis. 184; Greene db Button Go. v. Remington, 72 id. 654. The attachment liens were not waived by taking judgments and issuing executions in the ordinary form, since sec. .2749, R. S., prescribes that the judg ments shall be satisfied out of the property attached, and sec. 2969 how executions shall issue. The lien of the attachments is merged in the judgments and their priority preserved thereby. Drake, Attach, sec. 224a; Waples, Attach, secs. 510, 511; Liebman v. Ashbaclcer, 36 Ohio St. 94. Such lien continues until a reasonable time has elapsed after judgment for the issue and levy of an execution. Avery v. Stephens, 48 Mich. 246; Brown v. Williams, 31 Me. 403; Hannahs v. Felt, 15 Iowa, 141; BaArd v. Trice, 51 Tex. 556; Am. Fx. Banlc v. Morris Canal dk B. Co. 6 Hill, 362; Swift v. Agnes, 33 Wis. 228.

Opinion:
The following opinion was filed May 20, 1890:
Lyon, J.
The circuit court of Dane county had no jurisdiction to grant the relief prayed in the petitions of the appellant, the First National Bank of Madison. Cardinal v. Eau Claire L. Co. 15 Wis. 404, and other cases in this court, there cited. Those petitions are only significant because they are incorporated in the petition of the bank to the circuit court of Jefferson county. We may, therefore, dismiss from further consideration the proceedings in the former court.
In substance and legal effect the petition of the bank to the circuit court of Jefferson county was the commencement of an equitable action or proceeding to obtain a fund in the hands of the sheriff of Dane county, which the respondents also claimed. The bank might have intervened in the several attachment suits, and prayed the same relief. Perhaps this would have been the better practice,— possibly the only correct practice,— but it was not resorted to. Yet the circuit court seems to have treated the petition of the bank as such an intervention, and instead of requiring the procedure incident to the commencement of an original action, such as the issuing and service of a summons, formal pleadings, and a regular trial, disposed of the petition sum- márily on affidavits and tbe records in the different actions, thus treating it, so far as the procedure is concerned, as a mere intervention by the bank in the five actions of the respondents, the attaching creditors of the insolvent firm. No objection having been taken to such procedure, we will not determine the question of the regularity thereof, but will dispose of the order appealed from upon its merits.
It should be observed preliminarily, that the rights of the respective parties in the fund in controversy must be determined on equitable principles, and that mere irregularities or defects in the proceedings in the attachment suits, not going to the jurisdiction of the court or the merits of the controversies, are of no importance, and will not be considered. Many such are claimed to exist, and in his argument the learned counsel for the bank has pressed them upon our attention with much earnestness, and at considerable length. We must be excused from considering them in detail, or even stating them, but will proceed directly to the consideration of the questions which go to the merits.
1. We have carefully examined the record in each of the five attachment suits, but fail to' find in any of them any irregularity or defect affecting the jurisdiction of the court to issue the writs of attachment, or the sheriff to serve them. The affidavit annexed to each writ states sufficient grounds for executing the same, and .is a substantial compliance with the requirements of the statute in that behalf. Neither do we discover any inconsistent averments in either affidavit, or any substantial defects in the service or return of the several writs. The existence of the alleged grounds for the attachments cannot be controverted by the bank. The right to do so is given to the attachment debtors alone, and it is entirely competent for them to abstain from interposing traverses, or to waive the same after they have been interposed, as was done in all of the attachment suits. Landauer v. Vietor, 69 Wis. 434, and cases there cited. Hence, in the attachment suits it is a verity that sufficient grounds existed for executing tbe attachments. Moreover, it satisfactorily appears that the claim of each attaching creditor against the debtor firm is an honest one, upon which a writ of attachment may lawfully issue.
2. The two oldest attachments were issued at the instance of the debtors. Both of the creditors in whose behalf they were issued ratified the proceedings in their behalf,-— one of them before the attachment was executed, and the other before any other attachment had been levied upon the property in question. In the absence of fraud (and we do not think any fraud was shown) it was competent for the debtors to prefer those creditors in that manner, and the fact that they thus instigated the attachments does not necessarily render them invalid. Landauer v. Victor, supra.
Moreover, there are three other attachments, aggregating more than the fund in controversy, which the debtors did not instigate, and to the validity of which there seems to be no valid objection. ' These would defeat the petition of the bank, even were the other two held invalid.
3. It is claimed that the attachment creditors waived the lien of their attachments by issuing executions in the ordinary form on their judgments. The executions are in accordance with the requirements of S. & B. Ann. Stats, sec. 2969, subd. 1; that is to say, they command the sheriff to satisfy the judgment out of the personal property of the debtors, and, if sufficient personal property cannot be found, out of the real property belonging to them on the day when the judgment was docketed in the county, or at any time thereafter. Subdivision 2 of the same section provides that, if real estate shall have been attached, the execution may direct a sale of all the interest which the debtor had therein at the time it was so attached, or at any time thereafter. It will be observed that but one form of execution is provided as to personal property, and that form does not specify the time when the lien of the plaintiff accrued. No such process as a special execution against attached personal property is known to our statute. The executions in these cases were in the only form authorized by law. Clearly they covered all the rights in the attached property which the creditors obtained by their attachments, and the execution sale necessarily cut off all liens accruing subsequently to such attachments. We conclude, therefore, that there was no waiver by the respondents of their attachment'liens upon the property in controversy.
4. Costs are given as in an action. This was correct. It has already been said that this proceeding is substantially an original action in equity, commenced by petition, and not a mere intervening motion in each of the attachment suits. Although the court treated the petition as an inter-' vention in each attachment suit, that fact does not change the essential character of the proceeding.
5. In its petition the bank prayed that issues might be formed and tried as to the legality of such attachments and executions of the respondents. This was unnecessary. The material and controlling facts in the case are established by uncontroverted evidence, and no formal issues were necessary.
By the Court.—The order appealed from is affirmed.