Case Name: THE STATE v. THE PATERSON AND HAMBURG TURNPIKE COMPANY
Court: New Jersey Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1847-01
Citations: 21 N.J.L. 9
Docket Number: 
Parties: THE STATE v. THE PATERSON AND HAMBURG TURNPIKE COMPANY.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Law Reports
Volume: 21
Pages: 9–12

Head Matter:
THE STATE v. THE PATERSON AND HAMBURG TURNPIKE COMPANY.
1. Application in behalf of relators for leave to file an information in the nature of a quo warranto against a corporation (turnpike company) for an alleged violation of its charter: — Held, that such application is not within the statute {Rev. D. 206), and that the court has no authority to direct such information.
2. Such proceeding to dissolve a corporation can only be instituted by the Attorney General on the part of the State, either merely ex officio, or under special direction from the proper authority.
Application for leave to file an information in the nature of a quo warranto in the name of the Attorney General, against the company on the relation of Sydney Ford and others, for an alleged violation of its charier and for the purpose of seizing its privileges into the hands of the State. A rule to shew cause had been granted at the previous term, which now came on to be heard, before Whitehead, Carpenter and Randolph, J. J.
The Company, incorporated 3d of March, 1806, was authorized to make a turnpike road from the town of Paterson to Hamburg in the County of Sussex. The charter prescribed the mode in which the road should be built, the grade, width of bridges, &c. and authorized the company to take toll after commissioners to be appointed by the Governor should report, that the road, or certain portions of it, had been duly completed. A subsequent act (26th Nov. 1806), modified the mode of forming the road over some of the more difficult parts of the route. Much feeling having been excited against the company for its alleged fail ure properly to erect and maintain the road, it resulted in this proceeding. Many affidavits taken under the rule were read to prove the alleged dilapidated and neglected state of the road; that it had not been built, or if built not maintained according to the mode, and in the condition prescribed by the charter. It was urged by the counsel of the relators, that it was a continuing duty, and that the charter was granted not only on the condition of making, but of maintaining this road. Barkalow and W. Pennington for the relators, cited Rev. L. 206; 23 Wend. 194; 23 Ib. 222.
P. D. Vroom, contra,
cited R. v. Passmore, 3 T. R. 244; Angell and Ames 611, 664 (2d Ed.); 5 Mass. 230; 4 Cow. 100 n; 2 Green 84; 1 T. R. 2; 2 John. 184.

Opinion:
Carpenter, J.
delivered the opinion of the court.
This is a private application in behalf of relators, and not a proceeding instituted by the Attorney General. Private individuals ask the permission of the court to use the name of the State and the process of the law. If the Attorney General on behalf of the State was about to institute this proceeding, he need not ask the permission of this court for that purpose. The institution of proceedings of this character at the instance of relators, under the leave of the court, is authorized by statute, and only by statute. No instance, said Lord Mansfield, in R. v. Marsden (1 W. Bl. 580), has been produced of informations in nature of quo warranto before the statute of 9 Anne, unless filed by the Attorney General. The courts at common law and in cases not within the statute, have no authority to direct such information and leave the matter to the discretion of the Attorney General. Ibbotson's Case, cas. temp. Hardw. 261; Sir Wm. Lowther's Case, 2 Lord Raym. 1409.
Our act (Rev. L. 206) is copied substantially from the statute of 9 Anne c. 20. The English statute provides for the case when any persons shall usurp &c. any corporate office or franchise; the language of our statute is more extensive, and applies to the intrusion into, or unlawful holding of any office or franchise within this state. In regard to the present question, we apprehend the same construction applies to both statutes. An information for the purpose of dissolving a corporation, or seizing its franchises, cannot be prosecuted in the name of the State, at the relation of private persons, though leave be asked of the Court. Such proceeding can be instituted only by the Attorney General on the part of the State, either merely ex officio, or under special direction from the proper authority. The statute of 9 Anne extends only to individuals usurping offices or franchises in a corporation, and not to the corporation as a body. Com. v. Union Ins. Co. 5 Mass. 230; Com. v. Fowler, 10 Ib. 295; R. v. Carmarthen, 2 Bur. 869, 1 W. Bl. 187; R. v. Ogden 10 B. and C. 230; R. v. White 5 Ad. & Ell. 613; Bac. Abr. tit. " Information." (D.)
This distinction is well settled, and is a safe and proper rule. The State, said C. J. Parsons in a case cited, may waive any breaches of any condition express or implied, on which the corporation was created; and the court cannot (or ought not) to give judgment for the seizin of the franchises of any corporation unless the State itself be a party in interest in the suit,Kind thus assents to the judgment.
An examination of the affidavits produced is unnecessary, as this rule is not moved for by the authority of the State.