Case Name: Darrell Albert GOMEZ, Petitioner, v. The Honorable Harry G. HINCKLEY, Jr., as Circuit Judge of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, and Nick Navarro, as Sheriff of Broward County, Florida, Respondents
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1985-08-08
Citations: 473 So. 2d 809
Docket Number: No. 85-1706
Parties: Darrell Albert GOMEZ, Petitioner, v. The Honorable Harry G. HINCKLEY, Jr., as Circuit Judge of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, and Nick Navarro, as Sheriff of Broward County, Florida, Respondents.
Judges: WALDEN, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 473
Pages: 809–812

Head Matter:
Darrell Albert GOMEZ, Petitioner, v. The Honorable Harry G. HINCKLEY, Jr., as Circuit Judge of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, and Nick Navarro, as Sheriff of Broward County, Florida, Respondents.
No. 85-1706.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Aug. 8, 1985.
Alan H. Schreiber, Public Defender, Robert R. Wills, Chief Asst. Public Defender, and Robert David Malove, Asst. Public Defender, Fort Lauderdale, for petitioner.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Georgina Jimenez-Orosa, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for respondents.

Opinion:
BARKETT, Judge.
Petitioner, Darrell Albert Gomez, seeks habeas corpus relief from an order denying him pretrial bail. We vacate the order, and direct the trial court to set a reasonable bail.
Gomez was arrested and charged with homicide. Subsequently, a grand jury indicted Gomez for third degree murder and for manslaughter. Neither of these crimes is a capital offense, and neither is punishable by life imprisonment.
At a subsequent hearing upon Gomez's motion to set bail, the court denied bail. In the order denying bail, the court stated:
Defendant's motion to set bond is hereby denied. The presumption is great and the guilt is evident based on the probable cause sheet, the testimony, and the statements. It is the finding of this court that the defendant represents a threat to the community.
The right of an accused to be released on bond is governed by Article I, section 14, of the Florida Constitution. Prior to January 1, 1983, that section read as follows:
14. Bail
Until adjudged guilty, every person charged with a crime or violation of municipal or county ordinance shall be entitled to release on reasonable bail with sufficient surety unless charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by life imprisonment and the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption is great.
Thus, prior to January 1, 1983, this section provided that, with rare exception, only persons charged with capital offenses or offenses punishable by life imprisonment could be denied release on bail. See Gardner v. Murphy, 402 So.2d 525 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Taylor v. State, 388 So.2d 576 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); Cheatham v. Novell, 382 So.2d 361 (Fla. 4th DCA), review denied, 389 So.2d 1113 (Fla.1980). Persons accused of all other crimes "enjoy[ed] the right to release on reasonable bail until the moment of adjudication." Cheatham v. Novell, 382 So.2d at 361.
Article I, section 14, however, was amended at the November 2, 1982, general election. See In Re Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.130 (Bail Bond), 436 So.2d 60 (Fla.1983); § 907.041, Fla.Stat. (1983). That section was amended, effective January 1, 1983, to read as follows:
14. Pretrial release and detention
Unless charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by life imprisonment and the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption is great, every person charged with a crime or violation of municipal or county ordinance shall be entitled to pretrial release on reasonable conditions. If no conditions of release can reasonably protect the community from risk of physical harm to persons, assure the presence of the accused at trial, or assure the integrity of the judicial process, the accused may be detained.
The effect of the amendment, which was proposed by the legislature, was to allow courts to deny bail, in certain situations, to persons accused of offenses other than capital offenses or offenses punishable by life imprisonment. Section 907.041, Florida Statutes (1983), provides an elaborate statutory scheme to implement Article I, section 14, as amended. The legislative intent of this statute, and the intent of the amendment to Article I, section 14, is expressed in section 907.041(1), Florida Statutes:
907.041. Pretrial detention and release
(1) Legislative intent. — It is the policy of the state that persons committing serious criminal offenses, posing a threat to the safety of the community or the integrity of the judicial process, or failing to appear at trial be detained upon arrest. However, persons found to meet specified criteria shall be released under certain conditions until proceedings are concluded and adjudication has been determined. The Legislature finds that this policy of pretrial detention and release will assure the detention of those persons posing a threat to society while reducing the costs for incarceration by releasing, until trial, those persons not considered a danger to the community who meet certain criteria. It is the intent of the Legislature that the primary consideration be the protection of the community from risk of physical harm to persons.
Under section 907.041(4)(b) of the statute, a person accused of committing a "dangerous crime" may be held if any of four enumerated conditions is met. The first three are inapplicable in this case, but the fourth, section 907.041(4)(b)4, allows pretrial detention if the court finds a substantial probability that "the defendant poses the threat of harm to the community." This subsection further requires, however, that the defendant meet at least one of the following criteria: (1) the defendant has previously been convicted of a crime punishable by death or life imprisonment; (2) the defendant has been convicted of a "dangerous crime" within the last ten years; or (3) the defendant is on probation, parole, pretrial release for a dangerous crime, or any other release pending completion of sentence. § 907.041(4)(b)4, Fla.Stat. (1983).
The record is barren of evidence of any of these three requirements as well as any evidence that the defendant poses a present threat of harm to the community at large. Because section 907.041(4)(h) requires that the pretrial detention order, if any, "shall be based solely upon evidence produced at the hearing," we find that the court lacked statutory and constitutional authority to withhold bail in this case.
Consequently, we grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus, and direct Nicholas G. Navarro, Sheriff of Broward County, to deliver forthwith Darrell Albert Gomez before Circuit Judge Harry G. Hinckley, or his alternate, Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, to set reasonable bail. See Flores v. Cocalis, 453 So.2d 1198 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Harp v. Hinckley, 410 So.2d 619 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Good v. Wille, 382 So.2d 408 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). At the bail hearing, Gomez shall be given the opportunity to present evidence, and to otherwise be heard as on a motion for bond reduction. See, e.g., King v. Norvell, 411 So.2d 344 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Forsythe v. Wille, 396 So.2d 195 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).
WRIT ISSUED.
WALDEN, J., concurs.
GLICKSTEIN, J., concurs specially with opinion.
. The provisions of this section appear verbatim in rule 3.131(a), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure.
. "Dangerous crimes" are defined in section 907.041(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1983). Gomez has been indicted for committing a "dangerous crime."