Case Name: ROSA PRENDERGAST v. J. S. PRENDERGAST
Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
Jurisdiction: North Carolina
Decision Date: 1907-12-04
Citations: 146 N.C. 225
Docket Number: 
Parties: ROSA PRENDERGAST v. J. S. PRENDERGAST.
Judges: 
Reporter: North Carolina Reports
Volume: 146
Pages: 225–229

Head Matter:
ROSA PRENDERGAST v. J. S. PRENDERGAST.
(Filed 4 December, 1907).
1. Divorce, Absolute, from Husband — “Fornication and Adultery.”
Under Tbe Code of 1S8S, sec. 1285, as amended by chapter 499, Laws of 1905, an absolute divorce shall only be granted to the wife when the husband commits fornication and adultery, or when such misconduct of the husband has been habitual. •
2. Same — Statute — Interpretation — “Fornication and Adultery”— “Adultery.”
The legislative intent of chapter 499, Laws of 1905, amending The Code of 1883, sec. 1285, was to draw a distinction between the grounds of absolute divorce given for acts of the husband and those of the wife — i. e., (a) if the husband shall commit fornication and adultery, and (Z>) if the wife shall commit adultery, making only one act sufficient as to the wife.
AcjtioN for divorce a vinculo, tried before Councill, J., and a jury, at September Term, 1907, of tbe Superior Court of AlamaNCe County.
Plaintiff alleged and offered evidence tending to prove one act of illicit intercourse on tbe part of tbe husband, defendant. Without evidence ultra-, tbe trial Judge thereupon intimated that be would charge tbe jury that in no aspect of the evidence was tbe plaintiff entitled to tbe relief prayed for, in that tbe laws of North Carolina did not allow a dissolution of tbe bonds of matrimony for one act of adultery on tbe part of tbe husband. Thereupon, plaintiff, having excepted, submitted to a nonsuit and appealed.
Parker & Parker for plaintiff.
Defendant not represented in tbis Court.

Opinion:
Hoke, J.,
after stating the case: Under Tbe Code of 1883, sec. 1285, .and for years prior thereto, the causes for absolute divorce in this State were as follows: (1) If either party shall separate from the other and live in adultery. (2) If the wife shall commit adultery. (3) If either party, at the time of the marriage, was and still is naturally impotent. (4) If the wife, at the time of the marriage, be pregnant and the husband be ignorant of the fact of such pregnancy and be not the father of the child with which the wife was pregnant at the time of the marriage. By chapter 499, Laws of 1905, the first clause of the foregoing section was stricken out and there were substituted the words "If the husband shall commit fornication and adultery," making that part of the law, in effect, as follows: That an absolute divorce shall be granted, (a) if the husband shall commit fornication and adultery, and (b) if the wife shall commit adultery.
To adopt the position contended for by the plaintiff would require that these terms should have one and the same meaning, whereas the marked difference in the two clauses, standing as they do in such close juxtaposition, gives clear indication that the Legislature intended to make a distinction between the man and the woman in this feature of our laws of divorce, and we are of opinion that, in allowing a divorce when the man shall "commit fornication and adultery," it was intended to give those terms the distinctive meaning acquired by the words when associated together and as contained in section 3350 of the Revisal, defining the crime of "fornication and adultery." The uniform construction put upon this statute has established that, to constitute fornication and adultery, the misconduct must be habitual, and the General Assembly was no doubt advertent to this construction in making the amendment referred to.
There are grave reasons for the distinction made by this legislation, wbicb the General Assembly .evidently regarded as controlling, but, being matters more properly for legislative consideration, they are not specified or dwelt upon here, and are only referred to in a general way in support of the construction we have given the statute. It is argued that this interpretation would leave the amendment without any force or effect on the law as it formerly stood, but a reference to the statute will readily indicate the change that was made and intended. Formerly, in order to obtain a divorce for such misconduct on the part of the husband, it was required that he should withdraw from his household and live in adultery, or force the wife to leave him, while this is now no longer required.
We think his Honor correctly interpreted the amendment, and there is no error in his decision.
Affirmed.