Case Name: JAY et al. v. WILSON
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1895-12-18
Citations: 36 N.Y.S. 186
Docket Number: 
Parties: JAY et al. v. WILSON.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 36
Pages: 186–191

Head Matter:
JAY et al. v. WILSON.
(Supreme Court, General Term, First Department.
December 18, 1895.)
1. Vendor and Purchaser—Obligation to Accept Title.
One who agrees to accept the title to real estate if “satisfactory” is bound to accept it if a marketable title is shown.
2. Same—Marketable Title.
The title of a bona fide purchaser of real estate, who buys from the holder of the record title, and records his deed, is not rendered unmarketable by the mere fact that a deed from the same grantor to another person, purporting to have been executed on a prior date, is subsequently placed on record. O’Brien, J., dissenting.
Appeal from special term, New York county.
Action by William Jay and others against William G. Wilson. There was a judgment in favor of plaintiffs, and defendant appeals.
Reversed.
The facts are stated by Mr. Justice O’BRIEN, as follows:
This action was brought to recover a fee for searching defendant’s title, under an agreement evidenced by a memorandum signed by the defendant, as follows: 1
“48 Wall Street, New York, Nov. 26tb, 1894.
“Messrs. Jay & Candler, Attorney and Counsel for Egerton L. Winthrop— Dear Sir: Your client being willing to loan me $20,000 for 5 years at 5 per cent, per annum on my bond, secured by a first mortgage on the premises known as No. 314 West Eighty-Sixth street, New York City, and now owned by me, which mortgage is to be executed by me and my wife, and which said bond and mortgage are to be drawn by, and to be in form satisfactory to, you, the said loan to be made in case my title to said premises is satisfactory to you, I hereby agree to pay you, for your services for examining such title, one per cent, on the amount of the proposed loan, and, in addition, all cash which you may disburse for searches and for recording such deeds and mortgages and other papers as shall be desirable, and for notary’s fees and such other disbursements as shall be necessary.
“Yours, respectfully, William G. Wilson.”
Frederick Van Tine was the owner of the premises under examination prior to June 29, 1889. On November 6, 1889, Van Tine executed a deed to Mary F. Hopkins for the consideration, as shown in the deed, of $40,000. The deed was recorded November 13, 1889. By a deed dated June 29, 1889, Frederick Van Tine purported to convey the same premises to Nelson M. Whipple. This deed was recorded May 14, 1890. By deed dated July 17, 1891, and recorded July 22, 1891, Mary F. Hopkins conveyed the title to William G. Wilson, the defendant in this case. Upon discovery of the Van Tine-Whipple deed, plaintiff wrote to Bose & Putzel, who were attorneys for the defendant at the time of the purchase by him of the premises, of the condition of the record, and requested them to call and explain the matter. Although such attorneys disclaimed being the representatives of the defendant, they nevertheless wrote, in reply, saying that if plaintiffs or whoever had the matter in charge would call at their office “we would be happy to give such further explanations as we possibly can.” These letters do not seem to have brought the attorneys together, but resulted in further communications, one of which was a letter from the plaintiffs directly to the defendant stating, among other things, that “after carefully examining the returns made upon the search, and considering the questions presented, we have reached the conclusion with great reluctance that we cannot approve the title, or advise our client to make the loan.” Thereafter Rose & Putzel wrote the plaintiffs that the defendant had handed plaintiffs’ communication to them, and demanded back the abstract and searches. Then plaintiffs wrote to Rose & Putzel as follows: “When the difficulty in the title was manifest to us, we endeavored to obtain the presence of one of your firm here to explain matters, but without success. We then went to the Lawyer's’ Title Company and stated the condition of the title, as disclosed by our official searches, to one of the counsel in the law department, and we were informed by him that, under the state oil facts as they were disclosed by those searches, the company would not be willing to insure the title,”—and advising them that they should commence a suit for their fee.
Argued before VAN BRUNT, P. J., and O’BRIEN and PARKER, JJ.
Gibson Putzel, for appellant.
Flamen B. Candler, for respondents.

Opinion:
VAN BRUNT, P. J.
I concur in the conclusion arrived at by Mr. Justice O'BRIEN that the contract under consideration in this action did not confer upon the plaintiffs the right arbitrarily and capriciously to refuse to be satisfied with the title which was tendered, but that there must be some reason upon which dissatisfaction is founded; but I do not concur in the conclusion that there was any difficulty with the title which was offered under the contract referred to. I think that, in arriving at this conclusion, the learned justice has misconceived the rule applicable to the question of marketable titles. • It is undoubtedly the law, as stated in Irving v. Campbell, 321 N. Y. 353, 24 N. E. 821, and cited by him, that a purchaser is not bound to take a title which he can defend only by a resort to parol evidence, which time, death, or some other casualty may place beyond his reach; and that a purchaser will not, generally, be compelled to take a title when there is a defect in the record title which can be cured only by á resort to parol evidence. But in the case at bar there is no defect in the record title. It is complete. The purchaser would not be compelled to resort to parol evidence for the purpose of defending his title. The sole ground upon which it is claimed that the title is not marketable is the fact that, subsequent to the record of the deed of a purchaser in good faith, there appears from his grantor a deed of a previous date upon the record. This subsequent deed casts no cloud upon the title of the purchaser. His record title is superior, and there is not a tittle of evidence impeaching that record title.
But it is claimed upon the part of the respondents that, if the grantee of the subsequent deed should show that the purchaser, who paid his money for the property, knew of the existence of this deed, or was in possession of the property, the title would be impeached. There is not the slightest attempt to prove that the grantee in that deed ever was in possession, or that the first purchaser had any reason to suspect the existence of any such deed. If such a procedure is to place a cloud upon title, then no purchaser is secure, because his grantor, after he has conveyed, and his grantee's deed is placed on record, may sign and acknowledge a new deed, dated back of the deed by which he has conveyed the property, and record it, and there is a cloud upon the title. The validity of titles cannot be subject to any such schemes or devices. The record title in the case at bar was good. It required no parol evidence to sustain it, and hence, according to the authority cited, the title was a marketable one.
The judgment appealed from should be reversed, and a new trial ordered, with costs to the appellant to abide the event.
PARKER, J., concurs.