Case Name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ruby Jane GAYLOR, Defendant-Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2011-07-01
Citations: 441 F. App'x 478
Docket Number: No. 09-56967
Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ruby Jane GAYLOR, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: Before: CANBY, O’SCANNLAIN, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 441
Pages: 478–479

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ruby Jane GAYLOR, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 09-56967.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted June 15, 2011.
Filed July 1, 2011.
Daniel W. Layton, Esquire, Office of the U.S. Attorney, Los Angeles, CA, Michael J. Haungs, Christine Durney Mason, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Ruby Jane Gaylor, Simi Valley, CA, pro se.
Before: CANBY, O’SCANNLAIN, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Ruby Jane Gaylor appeals pro se from the district court's order permanently enjoining her from filing false tax documents or providing false tax documents to any persons or entities. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion the issuance of a permanent injunction. United States v. Kapp, 564 F.3d 1103, 1109 (9th Cir.2009). We affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by entering a permanent injunction preventing Gaylor from filing false tax documents or providing false tax documents to other persons or entities. See 26 U.S.C. § 7402(a) ("The district courts of the United States at the instance of the United States shall have such jurisdiction to make and issue . orders of injunction . as may be necessary or appropriate for the enforcement of the internal revenue laws."); California ex rel. Lockyer v. U.S. Dep't of Agrie., 575 F.3d 999, 1019 (9th Cir.2009) (listing traditional permanent injunction factors).
Contrary to Gaylor's contentions, the government's service of process was not defective under Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(c)(2), nor was the government required to enter into a settlement agreement with her.
Gaylor's remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.