Case Name: Dave Coffey v. The State
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1910-10-12
Citations: 60 Tex. Crim. 73
Docket Number: No. 605
Parties: Dave Coffey v. The State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Criminal Reports
Volume: 60
Pages: 73–81

Head Matter:
Dave Coffey v. The State.
No. 605.
Decided October 12, 1910.
1. —Murder—Statement of Facts — Order of Extension — Term of Court.
Where the term of the District Court lasted more than eight weeks the statement of facts and bill of exceptions must be filed within thirty days after final judgment, and an extension of the time of filing such statement of facts, etc., can not be made after the expiration of the said thirty days.
2. —Same—Statement of Facts — Filing—Extension—Docket.
Where the district judge, on overruling the motion for new trial entered an order on his docket allowing the filing of a statement of facts and bills of exception twenty days after the adjournment of court, and it appeared of record that said statements, etc., were filed before the adjournment of said term of the court, the same was filed in time.
3. —Same—Continuance—Want of Diligence.
Where it appeared from the face of the application for a continuance that the defendant had not used proper diligence to secure the attendance of the alleged absent witnesses, etc., there was no error in overruling the application.
4. —Same—Evidence—Bill of Exceptions — Expert Opinion.
Where, upon appeal from a conviction of murder, it appeared from the record that the defendant objected to the questions propounded to witness as to the defendant’s intelligence, because the witness had not qualified himself as an expert to give an expert opinion, but the bill of exceptions did not state what the answer of the witness would have been, there was no error. Following White v. State, 32 Texas Grim. Rep., 625, and other cases.
5. —Same—Bills of Exception — Practice on Appeal — Insanity.
Parties asserting the availability of supposed errors by the court below in admitting testimony, must make their bills of exception so full and satisfactory-in their statements that in and of themselves such bills will disclose all that is necessary to manifest a supposed error; and where the bill of exceptions does not give the answer to the objected questions with reference to the defendant’s sa'nitv, the same can not be considered on appeal. Following Davis v. State, 14 Texas Grim. App., 645, and other, cases.
6. —Same—Evidence—Husband and Wife — Tendering Witness.
Upon trial of murder, where the district attorney in cross-examination of the defendant asked him whether his wife desired to live with the defendant which the latter answered affirmatively and that he could prove it by her, whereupon State’s counsel informed him of' his wife’s attendance on the court and tendered her to defendant as a witness, there was no reversible error. Distinguishing Moore v. State, 45 Texas Grim. Rep., 234,
7. —Same—Charge of Court — Provoking Difficulty — Bill of Exceptions.
Where, upon appeal from a conviction of murder, the bill of exceptions was insufficient as a complaint to the charge itself, but was sufficient, however, to raise the issue as to whether the court was justified in giving a charge on provoking the difficulty, the Appellate Court will nevertheless look to the evidence, and finding same sufficient to raise said issue, there was no reversible error; especially as the court submitted requested charges on this issue which were more favorable than the law required.
8. —Same—Charge of Court — Insanity.
Where, upon trial of murder, the evidence did not raise the issue of insanity, there was no error in the court’s failure to charge the jury on the law of insanity.
Appeal from the District Court of Wichita. Tried below before the Honorable A. H. Carrigan.
Appeal from a conviction of murder in the second degree; penalty, imprisonment for life in the penitentiary.
The opinion states the case.
Fred, W. Householder, and Geo. A. Smoot and S. M. Foster, for appellant.
Hpon question of filing statement of facts and bills of exception, and as to the Appellate Court’s right to ascertain this, fact by affidavits and perfecting the record: Const., Art. 5, Sec. 6; Craddock v. State, 15 Texas Crim. App., 641; McCorquodale v. State, 98 S. W. Rep., 879; Castleman v. State, 44 S. W. Rep., 828; Poyner v. State, 48 S. W. Rep., 516; Western Union Tel. Co. v. O’Keefe, 28 S. W. Rep., 945; Ry. Co. v. Peery, 30 S. W. Rep., 435; Ry. Co. v. Cannon, 31 S. W. Rep., 498; Rice v. Reese, 110 S. W. 502; Ry. Co. v. Felts, 128 S. W. Rep., 155.
On question of opinion of witness on insanity: McClackey v. State, 5 Texas Crim. App., 320; Thomas v. State, 40 Texas, 60; Williams v. State, 37 Texas Crim. Rep., 348; Holcomb v. State, 41 Texas, 125; Penal Code, Art. 39; Code Crim. Procedure, 574.
On' question of the court’s charge on provoking the difficulty: Cartwright v. State, 14 Texas Crim. App., 486; Dent v. State, 46 Texas Crim. Rep., 166; McCandless v. State, 42 Texas Crim. Rep., 58; Morgan v. State, 34 Texas Crim. Rep., 222.
On the. question of the court’s refusal to charge on insanity: Scott v. State, 10 Texas Crim. App., 112; Davis v. State, 28 Texas Crim. App., 542; White’s Code Crim. Procedure, Sec. 801, and authorities there cited.
On question of the remarks of State’s counsel in tendering 'defendant’s wife as witness and failure of latter to testify: Moore v. State, 75 S. W. Rep., 497; Knowles v. People, 15 Mich., 408; Penny v. State, 42 S. W. Rep., 297; Bluman v. State, 26 S. W. Rep., 75; Stein v. Bowman, 13 Peters, 209; McKelvey on Ev., p. 380, 2nd ed.; Code Crim. Procedure, Art. 775; Hare v. State, 56 Texas Crim. Rep., 6; 118 S. W. Rep., 544; Miller v. State, 45 Texas Crim. Rep. 517; 78 S. W. Rep., 511.
John A. Mobley, Assistant Attorney-General, for the State. — Cited eases in opinion.

Opinion:
RAMSEY, Judge.
The appeal in this ease is from a judgment Convicting appellant of murder in the second degree and assessing his punishment at confinement in the penitentiary for life.
It appears from the record that the District Court began in Wichita County upon the 31st day of May, 1909, and adjourned on the 3rd day of September of -the same year, the term including considerable time beyond eight weeks. It further appears that the appellant's motion for new trial was overruled on July 13th of last year and he was by the court on the same day duly sentenced. The statement of facts in the ease was filed in the court below on October 1, 1909. On August 13th the court made and entered an order as follows: "Upon request defendant is granted sixty days extension of time from this day in which to file statement of facts 'and bills of exception." From July 13th to August 13th, excluding both days, full thirty days intervened, and with the close of August 12, 1909, the time allowed by law within which to file a statement of facts, in view of the fact that the term of court lasted more than eight weeks, had elapsed. It was not competent for the court thereafter, by order, to extend the time for filing such statement of facts. Section 7 of the Act of the Thirty-first Legislature, p. 376, is as follows :
"When an appeal is taken from the judgment rendered in any cause in any District Court or County Court, the parties to the suit shall be entitled to and they are hereby granted thirty days after the day of adjournment of court in which to prepare and file a statement of facts and bills of exception; and upon good cause shown the judge trying the cause may extend the time in which to file a statement of facts and bills of exception. Provided, that the court trying such cause shall have power in term time or in vacation, upon the application of either party, for good cause, to extend the several times as hereinbefore' provided for the preparation and filing of the statement of facts and bills of exception, but the same shall not be so extended so as to delay the filing of the statement of facts, together with the transcript of record, in the Appellate Court within the time prescribed by law, and when the parties fail to agree upon a statement of facts, and that duty devolves upon the court the court shall have such time in which to do so, after the expiration of the thirty days as herein-before provided, as the court may deem necessary, but the court in such case, shall not postpone the preparation and filing of such statement of facts and bills of exception so as to delay the filing of same, together with a transcript of the record in -the Appellate Court within the time prescribed by law. Provided, if the term of said court may by law continue more than eight weeks, said statement of fácts and bills of exception shall be filed within thirty days after final judgment shall be rendered unless the court shall by order entered of record in said cause extend the time for filing such statement 'and hills of exception." We have heretofore held that when once the time allowed by law within which to file the statement of facts and bills of exception has passed it is not competent for the court by order to extend the time. This seems to be the clear meaning of the statute. We are not, therefore, authorized to consider either the statement of facts or bills of exception in the record. Without a statement of facts or bills of exception, there is no issue or question which, under the law, we are authorized to consider and it follows that the judgment of conviction must be and it is hereby affirmed.
Affirmed.