Case Name: David Gaston MARSHALL v. STATE of Mississippi; Michael Angelo PATTON v. STATE of Mississippi
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1995-09-28
Citations: 662 So. 2d 566
Docket Number: Nos. 92-KA-00606-SCT, 92-KA-00909-SCT, and 92-KA-01294-SCT
Parties: David Gaston MARSHALL v. STATE of Mississippi. Michael Angelo PATTON v. STATE of Mississippi.
Judges: HAWKINS, C.J., DAN M. LEE and PRATHER, P.JJ., and SULLIVAN, PITTMAN, BANKS and JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 662
Pages: 566–581

Head Matter:
David Gaston MARSHALL v. STATE of Mississippi. Michael Angelo PATTON v. STATE of Mississippi.
Nos. 92-KA-00606-SCT, 92-KA-00909-SCT, and 92-KA-01294-SCT.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Sept. 28, 1995.
Jim Davis, Gulfport, for petitioners.
Michael C. Moore, Attorney General, W. Glenn Watts, Special Ass’t Attorney General, Jeffrey Klingfuss, Special Ass’t Attorney General, Jackson, for respondents.

Opinion:
OBJECTION AND/OR MOTION THAT THE CASES NOT BE REMANDED OR ASSIGNED TO THE COURT OF APPEALS
SMITH, Justice,
for the Court:
This is a case of first impression by two defendants, David G. Marshall and Michael Angelo Patton, considering Miss.Code Ann. § 9-4H to -17 (Supp.1994), challenging the constitutionality of the Court of Appeals of the State of Mississippi as enacted by the Legislature during the regular 1994 session.
Marshall was convicted in the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Harrison County of two counts of sexual battery and one count of kidnaping. He received two thirty-year sentences for the sexual battery counts, to run concurrently with each other; and twenty-five years on the kidnaping count. Patton was convicted in the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Harrison County of manslaughter and was sentenced to serve a term of sixteen years with the Mississippi Department of Corrections.
Both Marshall and Patton have appealed their convictions to this Court. Both cases were fully briefed and initially deflected to the Court of Appeals per the screening process established under this Court's rules.
On January 12, 1995, Jim Davis, attorney for both Marshall and Patton, filed in both eases an Objection and/or Motion that the cases not be remanded or assigned to the Court of Appeals. Marshall and Patton claim that the new appellate court is unconstitutional and that the Legislature, in creating the Court of Appeals, usurped this Court's authority in the area of rulemaking and court procedure. As a result of this objection/motion both cases were by order of this Court returned from the Court of Appeals.
The State argues that Miss.Code Ann. § 9-4r-l to -17 (Supp.1994) are constitutional, that Marshall and Patton lack standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute as enacted and that this Court's authority in rulemaking and court procedure has not been usurped by the Legislature.
A thorough analysis of the issues raised by Marshall and Patton reveal both to be without merit. However, the State is incorrect in its argument that the defendants lack standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statutes as enacted, because both cases were in fact initially deflected to the Court of Appeals by a valid internal process in accordance with the rules of this Court.
This Court has stated its authority to promulgate rules of court practice, procedure and evidence in Newell v. State, 308 So.2d 71 (Miss.1975), and Hall v. State, 539 So.2d 1338 (Miss.1989). However, neither decision may be interpreted as prohibiting the Legislature from establishing the Court of Appeals.
This Court and its predecessor, the High Court of Errors and Appeals, has for one hundred fifty-five years interpreted Article 6, Section 172 of the Mississippi Constitution as authorizing the Legislature to create inferior courts. In Thomas v. State, 6 Miss. (5 Howard) 20 (1840), this Court's predecessor considered the question of whether the Legislature could, under a constitutional provision similar to current § 172 establish an inferior criminal court. The High Court of Errors and Appeals answered that question affirmatively. The Court of Appeals is clearly an inferior court and the Legislature had full constitutional authority to establish such inferior court.
DISCUSSION OF LAW
We begin our analysis considering Article 6, Section 144 of the Mississippi Constitution which provides that: "[t]he judicial power of the state shall be vested in a Supreme Court and such other courts as are provided for in this constitution."
Additionally, Article 6, Section 146 of the Mississippi Constitution states:
The Supreme Court shall have such jurisdiction as properly belongs to a court of appeals and shall exercise no jurisdiction on matters other than those specifically provided by this Constitution or by general law. The Legislature may by general law provide for the Supreme Court to have original and appellate jurisdiction as to any appeal directly from an administrative agency charged by law with the responsibility for approval or disapproval of rates sought to be charged the public by any public utility. The Supreme Court shall consider cases and proceedings for modification of public utility rates in an expeditious manner regardless of their position on the court docket.
Finally Article 6, Section 172 of the Mississippi Constitution states: "The legislature shall, from time to time, establish such other inferior courts as may be necessary, and abolish the same whenever deemed expedient."
Pursuant to this authority, the Legislature established the Court of Appeals under Miss. Code Ann. § 9 — 4—1 to -17 (Supp.1994). Marshall and Patton now allege that the Court of Appeals is unconstitutional, for the following reasons.
First, Marshall and Patton cite Miss.Code Ann. § 99-35-101 (Supp.1994), which states:
Any person convicted of an offense in a circuit court may appeal to the supreme court, provided, however, an appeal from the circuit court to the supreme court shall not be allowed in any case where the defendant enters a plea of guilty.
Marshall and Patton further rely on Harden v. State, 460 So.2d 1194 (Miss.1984), where this Court, when speaking of the strongest imperatives under which an appellate court may operate, stated that the first was the prohibition against double jeopardy, and
[t]he other is the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with trial proceedings. Again, experience has taught us that our function is to decide eases which have been concluded in the trial court, and on lawful appeal here. Any person who feels aggrieved at a lower court decision has an absolute right of appeal to this Court, at which time all his grievances can be addressed by us.
Harden, 460 So.2d at 1200.
Marshall and Patton seize on this last sentence and claim that they have an absolute right of appeal to the Supreme Court, not the Court of Appeals. Obviously, the right to appeal is not absolute, there are requirements attached. Though a person convicted of a crime in circuit court could until now take an appeal to the Supreme Court and have it heard by this Court, the right to have the appeal heard could be infringed upon if certain procedures were not followed. The right of appeal is not absolute where the notice of appeal is not timely filed; where the filing fee and appeal costs are not paid in the case of a non-indigent defendant; where in forma pauperis status is not sought, in the case of an indigent defendant; or where a brief is not timely filed. More importantly, the "absolute right" referred to in Harden is statutory, not constitutional, and thus subject to legislative change. The new statutory scheme is not inconsistent with the original and retained statutory right in that appeals are taken to this court and ultimately, in some manner, if only by denial of certiorari, finally resolved by this court.
Second, Marshall and Patton apparently claim that under the unamended version of Article 6, Section 146 of the Mississippi Constitution, the Supreme Court is the one and only appellate court of the state. They further claim that an "inferior court," as provided in Miss. Const, art. 6, § 172, cannot be an appellate court. The authority cited by Marshall and Patton shows that the term inferior court generally has two meanings: one is in the purely descriptive sense, as in any state court in Mississippi besides the Supreme Court is necessarily an inferior court in relation to the Supreme Court, as it would be subordinate in the state's judicial system. The other definition is a technical one, meaning that an inferior court is one with certain specific characteristics, including, according to Marshall's and Patton's authorities, the following:
All courts from which an appeal lies are inferior courts in relation to the appellate court before which their judgment may be carried; but they are not therefore inferior courts in the technical sense of those words. They apply to courts of a special and limited jurisdiction, which are erected on such principles that their judgments, taken alone, are entirely disregarded, and the proceedings must show their jurisdiction. The courts of the United States are all of limited jurisdiction, and their proceedings are erroneous, if the jurisdiction be not shown upon them. Judgments rendered in such cases may certainly be reversed, but this court is not prepared to say that they are absolute nullities, which may be totally disregarded.
Kempe's Lessee v. Kennedy, 9 U.S. (5 Craneh) 173, 185, 3 L.Ed. 70 (1809).
The High Court of Errors and Appeals, early on declared the meaning of the term "inferior courts" as it appears in § 172. In Thomas v. State, 6 Miss. (5 Howard) 20 (1840), that Court considered the question of whether the Legislature could, under a constitutional provision similar to § 172, establish an inferior criminal court. In finding the criminal court constitutional, the Court found:
[i]t is not essential in order to sustain the authority of the legislature to create this court, to consider it inferior in relation to the circuit courts, or to any other court created by the constitution save that of the court of errors and appeals.
Thomas, 6 Miss. (5 Howard) at 28.
The Court revisited the "inferior court" concept in Houston v. Royston, 8 Miss. (7 Howard) 543 (1843). The appellants argued that since the Constitution of 1832 specifically established the superior court of chancery giving it full jurisdiction in all matters of equity, any "inferior" court created by statute having "equity" jurisdiction was unconstitutional. The Court took a somewhat different approach in finding an inferior chancery court constitutional. The Court stated:
What is meant by an inferior court, in the sense in which that term is used in the 24th section? The article alluded to enumerates all the courts of the state, beginning with the High Court of Errors and Appeals, and ending with the courts of justices of the peace. Now does the article mean by inferior courts, such courts only as are inferior or below all of those mentioned, even down to a justice's court? I do not so understand it; but I understand it to mean that when the legislature created a court and gave it jurisdiction, that it must be inferior to the court created by the constitution, whose jurisdiction was of the same character as that given to the new court by the legislature. Thus, if the legislature wished to create a court which should exercise a part of the jurisdiction now exercised by the circuit courts, they could only do so by creating a court inferi- or to the circuit court. For instance: the criminal court exercised jurisdiction given by the constitution to the circuit court, but it was inferior to the circuit court, and on this ground was held to be constitutional; still in the ordinary acceptation of the term, it was superior to other courts, or might have been so in dignity and extent of jurisdiction.
Houston, 8 Miss. (7 Howard) at 549-50.
The Court judicially established that the legislative power to create "inferior courts" is plenary in Thomas, and that those courts may have the same jurisdiction as a constitutionally created court in Houston. Regardless, whether we apply Thomas or Houston, either case would sanction the legislative scheme creating the Court of Appeals. In Ex parte Tucker, 164 Miss. 20, 143 So. 700 (1932), the Court explained exactly why a legislatively created court is "inferior." Tucker filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his felony indictment had been transferred from the circuit court to the county court pursuant to § 694, Miss. Code (1930), with an order of nolle prosequi subsequently entered. The sheriff declined to honor the order and had Tucker jailed. Tucker's petition was denied, and he appealed. Citing Article 6, Section 172 of the Mississippi Constitution, this Court found:
It is well settled . that the [LJegislature may create inferior courts which shall exercise a jurisdiction far beyond that of a petty court. In fact, it is settled that as respects its constitutional validity all that is required of a court created by legislative act under the quoted constitutional section is that when a new court is created which shall exercise a part of the jurisdiction vested by the Constitution in another court, the said new court must be inferior in ultimate authority to the constitutional court whose jurisdiction is of the same character as that given to the new court. See State v. Speakes, 144 Miss. 125, 159, 109 So. 129. It is competent, therefore, to create a court which may be permitted to exercise in full measure the same jurisdiction as the circuit court, so long as the circuit court shall be superior thereto and this attribute of superiority is accomplished by giving the circuit court the controlling authority of reversal, revisal, correction, and direction over the new court, as by certiorari, appeal, etc.
Looking then at the Constitution as an instrument ordained to stand for all time or for many generations, and keeping in mind that there is an incidental constitutional grant of those powers which are necessary and proper to carry into practical effect the express grants of power, we are now prepared to hold that, in the establishment of the county court, it was within the constitutional authority of the Legislature to authorize the circuit courts to transfer for trial to the county courts, all or such part of the indictments originating in the circuit court as the Legislature should deem expedient, leaving to the discretion of the circuit court the determination of the question whether, and how many of, these indictments so authorized to be transferred should, at any given time or on a particular occasion, be in fact transferred.
Tucker, 164 Miss, at 29-30, 143 So. at 701-02; see also State ex rel. Knox v. Speakes, 144 Miss. 125, 109 So. 129 (1926) (holding that law conferring appellate jurisdiction upon circuit court as to appeals from county court on equity matters is constitutional). Tucker, Thomas and Houston give this Court clear precedent for holding that the Court of Appeals is constitutional.
It is clearly established that what constitutes an "inferior court" as created by legislative act pursuant to constitutional authority is based upon its relation to the constitutionally created court from which the inferior court's jurisdiction is carved.
It appears then that this Court, or its predecessor, has defined an inferior court in the following manner: when the legislature creates a court and bestows jurisdiction upon it, that court must be inferior in ultimate authority to the constitutionally created court which exercises the same jurisdiction. This superiority is shown by giving the constitutional court controlling authority over the legislative court, by appeal or certiorari, for example. Finally, the Legislature has plenary power over appeals where the Mississippi Constitution has not limited this pow er. It thus appears that the Court of Appeals comes well within the term "inferior court" as it has been construed in this jurisdiction; that inferior courts can be appellate courts; and that the Legislature has the authority to create "inferior" appellate courts.
Reviewing other jurisdictions' considerations of this issue we note the South Carolina Supreme Court addressed the issue of the constitutionality of its legislatively-created Court of Appeals in State ex rel. Riley v. Martin, 274 S.C. 106, 262 S.E.2d 404 (1980). Article 5, Section 1 of that state's constitution stated:
The judicial power shall be vested in a unified judicial system, which shall include a Supreme Court, a Circuit Court, and such other courts of uniform jurisdiction as may be provided for by general law.
The argument was made that Article 5, Section 1 of the South Carolina Constitution limited the plenary legislative power to create such a court in that the Court of Appeals was not of uniform jurisdiction. The South Carolina court rejected the argument, stating:
The argument is soundly made that the clear sense of the phrase is that the Supreme Court and the Circuit Court are themselves courts of uniform jurisdiction. If this was not so, the phrase "such other" would be unnecessary and meaningless. Uniform jurisdiction, therefore, clearly means that other courts may be created by the General Assembly, if they possess the jurisdictional characteristics of either the Supreme Court or the Circuit Court.
The Court of Appeals possesses the same uniform jurisdictional characteristics as held by the Supreme Court and Circuit Court. The Act gives to the Court of Appeals exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all criminal proceedings in the circuit court, and all post conviction proceedings in any court, with the exception of death penalty cases which are appealable directly to the Supreme Court. Decisions of the Court of Appeals are reviewable in the Supreme Court by means of judicial writ. The subject-matter jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, within the area of its judicial authority, just as with the Supreme Court and Circuit Court, is the same throughout the State. Since the subject-matter jurisdiction is the same throughout the State, it is a Court of "uniform jurisdiction" within the meaning of Article 5, Section 1. We find no language in our prior decisions, when taken in context, that would justify a contrary conclusion.
Riley, 262 S.E.2d at 406. These states found, when reviewing constitutional provisions analogous to those in the Mississippi Constitution, that their legislatures could create a Court of Appeals separate from the Supreme Court, as long as the Supreme Court has the final power of review over a case decided by the Court of Appeals.
Finally, Marshall and Patton argue that under Newell v. State, 308 So.2d 71 (Miss.1975), and Hall v. State, 539 So.2d 1338 (Miss.1989), the Legislature, in creating the Court of Appeals, usurped this Court's authority in the area of rulemaking and court procedure. Even the broadest interpretation of Hall provides that only this Court may promulgate rules of court practice, procedure and evidence. Hall does not say that the Legislature may not, under § 172, create inferior courts. In this case the Legislature has created the Court of Appeals and this Court has promulgated the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure, all within the context of Hall v. State and the Mississippi Constitution. In fact, the very legislative act that created the Court of Appeals specified that the Supreme Court will be responsible for prescribing rules governing the administration, practice and procedure within the Court of Appeals. Miss.Code Ann. § 9-4-7 (Supp. 1994). In fact the harmony of two separate but equal constitutional branches of government working together to create a constitutional Court of Appeals is commendable. This Court has in fact already acknowledged its inherent rule-making authority with regards to the Court of Appeals. See Order Adopting the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure No. 89-R-99027-SCT at 3 (Miss. Dec. 15, 1994).
This Court, In the Interest of T.L.C., 566 So.2d 691 (Miss.1990), discussed its standard of review in considering the constitutionality of a statute:
Without doubt, our constitutional scheme contemplates the power of judicial review of legislative enactments; however, that power may be exercised affirmatively only where the legislation under review be found
[i]n the palpable conflict with some plain provision of the . constitution.
Statutes such as the Youth Court Act come before us clothed with a heavy presumption of constitutional validity. The party challenging the constitutionality of a statute is burdened with carrying his case beyond all reasonable doubt before this Court has authority to hold the statute, in whole or in part, of no force or effect. When a party invokes our power of judicial review, it behooves us to recall that the challenged act has been passed by legislators and approved by a governor sworn the uphold the selfsame constitution as are we.
T.L.C., 566 So.2d at 696 (quoting Hart v. State, 87 Miss. 171, 176, 39 So. 523, 524 (Miss.1905)) (citations omitted).
Examination of the language of Miss.Code Ann. § 9-4-3 (Supp.1994) clearly indicates that the Court of Appeals is of the same character as the Supreme Court as both are appellate courts. Legislatively creating a court of the same type and character as a constitutionally created court is permissible. See, Houston v. Royston, 8 Miss. (7 Howard) 543 (1843). The language of the statute makes clear that the Court of Appeals is not co-equal to the Supreme Court. It does not share the same subject matter jurisdiction. Miss.Code Ann. § 9-4-3(l) reserves unto the Supreme Court absolute subject matter jurisdiction over certain cases. It is also noteworthy that the Court of Appeals does not have original jurisdiction as all cases received by that court are assigned to it by the Supreme Court. Additionally, at any time prior to a final decision by the Court of Appeals, cases are certainly subject to removal and return to the Supreme Court. More importantly, the decisions of the Court of Appeals are subject to limited certiorari by the Supreme Court. It is thus clear that a court is an "inferior court" when subject to the controlling authority or review of a constitutionally created court. See, Ex Parte Tucker, 164 Miss. 20, 143 So. 700 (1932).
This Court holds that Miss.Code Ann. § 9-4-1 to -17 (Supp.1994) are constitutional. Marshall's and Patton's arguments are without merit as clearly shown by controlling constitutional authority and this Court's long history of precedential case law holdings interpreting accordingly the Legislature's authority to create "inferior courts."
CONCLUSION
Although Marshall and Patton have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statutes as enacted, they have failed to meet their burden of showing beyond a reasonable doubt, that the statutes are unconstitutional. In recalling these cases from the Court of Appeals, following the filing of motions of the appellants and after assignments had been made, we are not unaware of the following provisions of M.R.A.P. 16(e):
After entry of an order assigning a case to the Court of Appeals, neither the Court of Appeals nor any party may file any pleading or certification seeking reassignment. Any reassignment may take place only on the motion of the Supreme Court.
However, the Court of Appeals is in its infancy and before today there has been no judicial consideration of its constitutional foundation. In the exercise of our authority and responsibility to suspend the rules under M.R.A.P. 2(c), we have found that the expeditious administration of justice required this action in order to provide litigants, the Mississippi State Bar, and the Court of Appeals with a consideration of this important question. In doing so we have not abrogated M.R.A.P. 16(e), nor should our action lead future litigants to mistakenly believe that we have created a mechanism or tactic to effectuate a recall of cases in the future.
The cases of Thomas, Houston, and Tucker consistently since 1840 have held that the Legislature may create "inferior courts." The Legislature acted within its constitutionally vested power in creating the Court of Appeals. There is no violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. We hold that Miss.Code Ann. § 9 — 4—1 to -17 (Supp.1994), as enacted by the Legislature, are constitutional. There is no violation of the Mississippi Constitution or statutes in the Court of Appeals considering Marshall's and Patton's eases on the merits. Their cases will be assigned to the Court of Appeals for consideration on the merits.
OBJECTION AND/OR MOTION THAT THE CASES NOT BE REMANDED OR ASSIGNED TO THE COURT OF APPEALS DENIED.
HAWKINS, C.J., DAN M. LEE and PRATHER, P.JJ., and SULLIVAN, PITTMAN, BANKS and JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., JJ., concur.
HAWKINS, C.J., concurs with separate written opinion.
McRAE, J., dissents with separate written opinion.