Case Name: Robert P. Russell, App'lt, v. Nelson Randall, Resp't
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1890-04-11
Citations: 30 N.Y. St. Rep. 452
Docket Number: 
Parties: Robert P. Russell, App’lt, v. Nelson Randall, Resp’t.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 30
Pages: 452–455

Head Matter:
Robert P. Russell, App’lt, v. Nelson Randall, Resp’t.
(Supreme Court, General Term, Fifth Department,
Filed April 11, 1890.)
1. New trial—Newly discovered evidence.
A motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence can only be made on a case showing the evidence given on the first trial.
2. Same—Copt affidavit.
A copy of an extra judicial affidavit can be taken neither as proof of the facts stated therein, nor that the proposed witness would testify to such facts on another trial of the action.
3. Same.
An action of libel was brought against a paper which published such affidavit, in which action the defense consisted of a justification, and that, the alleged libel was published by the procurement and consent of the plaintiff. A general verdict was rendered. Held, that this did not establish the truth of the statements in the affidavit, as it was impossible to say whether the jury found the justification established.
(Corlett, J. dissents.)
Appeal from an order of the Erie special term granting a new trial.
F. W. Stevens, for app’lt; F. 0. Fandall, for resp’t.

Opinion:
Dwight, P. J.
The motion upon which the order was made was treated by the learned judge at special term as a motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, and such it was to all intents and purposes; but it was heard without a case to show what evidence was given on the trial already had. In the opinion at special term it is said: "It is not cumulative evidence which is proposed to be added to the case, as that has been described by the authorities, but the proposal is to prove distinct, and independent matters in no manner brought before to the attention of the court and jury." The difficulty with this statement is that this court has no means of verifying it. If the judge-at special term, being the same who presided at the circuit, relied upon his own recollection of the evidence given at the trial, that, means of information is not available to the court sitting in review of the order; it is not found in the record and is not subject to correction or review. It is true it sufficiently appears that the evidence of the particular witness named in the moving papers, was not given on the former trial, but how much other evidence of the same general purport and effect was given does not appear.
The rule is imperative that a motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence can only be made on a case which presents the evidence given on the first trial, and so enables the court, both in the first instance and on review, to say whether the newly propounded evidence is cumulative or not, and whether it is relatively of such weight and importance as probably to change the result of the trial. The rule seems to be without exception in practice, and it is embodied in the positive enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure, § 997.
The action was for assault and battery and the question chiefly litigated, as we may infer from the papers used on the motion, was of the extent of the plaintiff's injuries. The newly discovered evidence on that question, which is proposed to be added to the defendant's case, is that of one Jeanette Stevens, a sister of the plaintiff, to the effect that the latter, with the aid of a physician, before and at the time of the trial, feigned serious injuries, which did not exist. This evidence is propounded by the petition of the defendant used on this motion, to which is attached a copy of an alleged affidavit of Mrs. Stevens. That affidavit, if made as alleged, seems to have been extra judicial; it was not made or entitled in this action, and a copy only is attached as an exhibit to the moving papers. In this form it could be taken neither as proof of the facts stated therein, nor that the proposed witness would testify to such facts on another trial of the action.
There is another feature of the case presented by the moving papers to which importance seems to be attached in the opinion at special term.
It seems that some time after the affidavit of Mrs. Stevens was made, a copy of it was published in a newspaper of the vicinity, and that, the plaintiff having brought an action of libel against the defendant for such publication, the defendant pleaded in justification the truth of the alleged libel, and had a verdict in the action. Of this result the opinion at special term remarks that it apparently establishes the truth of the statements made by Mrs. Stevens. But the pleadings in that action, which are attached to the moving papers in this record, show that the defendant, both by general and specific denial, put in issue the fact of publication by him, and averred that the alleged libel was published by the procurement and consent of the plaintiff himself. The verdict was general, and it is, therefore, impossible to say whether the jury found the justification established or that the defendant was not chargeable with the publication of the libel.
We think the granting of the motion for a new trial, on the papers contained in the records before us, was error, for which the order must be reversed, but without prejudice to the defendant's renewal of his motion, on the ground of newly discovered evidence, on a case made and settled for that purpose.
Macombes, J., concurs.