Case Name: Whatcom County, Appellant, v. Steve Brisbane, Respondent
Court: Washington Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Washington
Decision Date: 1994-12-08
Citations: 125 Wash. 2d 345
Docket Number: No. 60655-2
Parties: Whatcom County, Appellant, v. Steve Brisbane, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: Washington Reports
Volume: 125
Pages: 345–363

Head Matter:
[No. 60655-2.
En Banc.
December 8, 1994.]
Whatcom County, Appellant, v. Steve Brisbane, Respondent.
David S. McEachran, Prosecuting Attorney, and Randall J. Watts, Chief Civil Deputy, for appellant.
John M. Groen (Ronald A. Zumbrun and Robin L. Rivett, of counsel) of Pacific Legal Foundation, for respondent.
Catherine W. Smith on behalf of The Washington Environmental Council, North Cascades Audubon Society, Greater Ecosystem Alliance, Point Roberts Heron Preservation Committee, Watershed Defense Fund, and Friends of Chuckanut, amici curiae for appellant.

Opinion:
Smith, J.
This court granted the motion of Respondent Steve Brisbane to transfer from the Court of Appeals, Division One, to the Supreme Court review of a decision by the Whatcom County Superior Court dismissing on summary judgment a challenge by Whatcom County to a referendum petition to amend portions of a critical areas ordinance adopted by the Whatcom County Council pursuant to the Growth Management Act. We reverse.
Statement op Facts
On June 23, 1992, the Whatcom County Council adopted the Temporary Critical Areas Ordinance, ordinance 92-032. Respondent Brisbane (Respondent) conducted a successful referendum campaign to eliminate portions of the ordinance. The referendum was certified by the County Auditor in January 1993 for placement on the November 1993 ballot.
On January 12, 1993, Whatcom County (County) filed a declaratory judgment action in the Whatcom County Superior Court asking the court to declare that the critical areas ordinance was not subject to local referendum. On May 14, 1993, the Whatcom County Superior Court, the Honorable Michael F. Moynihan, granted summary judgment in favor of Respondent Brisbane and dismissed the complaint. The trial court held the critical areas ordinance is subject to local referendum. Whatcom County appealed to the Court of Appeals, Division One. On July 16, 1993, Respondent Brisbane moved to transfer the appeal to this court. The County did not oppose the motion. We granted it on April 6, 1994.
Question Presented
The sole question presented is whether a critical areas ordinance adopted by the Whatcom County Council pursuant to the Growth Management Act is subject to amendment by referendum under the home rule charter of the County.
Discussion
Growth Management Act
The Growth Management Act, RCW 36.70A, was enacted in 1990 to prevent "uncoordinated and unplanned growth" and to encourage "comprehensive land use planning" among the "citizens, communities, local governments, and the private sector . . ,." Two years later, in 1992, WAC 365-195 was promulgated which, when read in conjunction with the Growth Management Act, similarly operates to "accomplish[ ] the planning and development regulation requirements of the act."
Under former RCW 36.70A.040(1) any county with "a population of fifty thousand or more and has had its population increase by more than ten percent in the previous ten years . . . shall adopt comprehensive land use plans and development regulations". The statute further provides that "[a]ny county . . . required to adopt a comprehensive land use plan under subsection (1). . . shall adopt the plan on or before September 1,1993."
Whatcom County adopted the Temporary Critical Areas Ordinance on June 23, 1992 to "carry out the goals of the Whatcom County Comprehensive Land Use Plan" mandated by RCW 36.70A.040(1) and (3), .050, .060, .170, and .210.
Pursuant to Const, art. 11, § 4 (amend. 21), Whatcom County enacted the most recent version of its home rule charter (Charter) in 1993. Included among the rights of self-governance under the Charter was the right of citizens to reject ordinances passed by the County Council. "[L]o-cal governance is generally the province of home rule counties. . . . However, this principle does not entirely negate the State's ability to successfully challenge home rule county charter rights. "[ ] This court observed in Snohomish Cy. v. Anderson, supra:
The Washington State Constitution expressly relegates home rule charters to an inferior position vis-a-vis "the Constitution and laws of this state". Const, art. 11, § 4, para. 2. The Henry court . . . recognized bounds on charter rights, noting that county home rule was intended to further self-governance in "purely local affairs . so long as [those exercising their rights to self-governance] abided by the provisions of the constitution and did not run counter to considerations of public policy of broad concern, expressed in general laws."[ ]
Under the Growth Management Act, RCW 36.70A, the Legislature used the words "county" or "city" interchangeably with the words "legislative body" of the county or city. Thus, the power to act under the Growth Management Act was delegated to the "county legislative body". This raises a conflict between the language of the Growth Management Act and the language of the Whatcom County Home Rule Charter (1993).
"Referendum rights do not exist when power has been statutorily delegated to the 'legislative authority'." "In the context of statutory interpretation, [this court has] previously held that a city's 'corporate authority', also referred to as a 'legislative authority', means exclusively the mayor and city council. Therefore, a statutory grant of power to a legislative authority does not generally permit delegation to the voters through an initiative or referendum."
Our most recent case involving legislative authority and the right of referendum is Snohomish Cy. v. Anderson. In that case, we considered whether a section of the Growth Management Act, RCW 36.70A.2UX2), was subject to referendum and whether the mandatory language of the Growth Management Act conflicted with referendum rights under the Snohomish County Home Rule Charter. The Snohomish County Charter has a provision identical to that of the Whatcom County Charter granting referendum rights to the people. In that case, the people of Snohomish County argued that the words "legislative authority" included their right to exercise referendum powers. This court rejected that argument, stating:
"|L]egislative authority" cannot be carried out by initiative or referendum. For example, the statute directs the "legislative authority" to convene meetings and establish processes. These responsibilities cannot be performed by the exercise of a "yes / no" vote.
Furthermore, the Legislature is presumed to be familiar with judicial decisions of the Supreme Court construing existing statutes and the state constitution. At the time the Legislature enacted RCW 36.70A, case law defined "legislative authority" and comparable terms in statutory contexts to mean the council and/or mayor only, and not to permit referendum rights.[ ]
(Citation omitted. Italics ours.)
The purpose of the Growth Management Act, RCW 36.70A, would be frustrated if the people of Whatcom County were permitted by referendum to amend an ordinance adopted to implement the goals of a comprehensive land use plan. Under Anderson, "[permitting the referendum would jeopardize [the] entire state plan [as intended by the Growth Management Act] and thus would extend beyond a matter of local concern." One consequence of such a broad interpretation of the referendum power includes the potential repeal of ordinances required by the Legislature to be enacted for statewide growth management. Also, it would be difficult to balance the various interests contemplated by the Legislature.
Referendum rights are generally matters of local governance and are not mentioned in the Growth Management Act. "Where a statute specifically designates the things or classes of things upon which it operates, an inference arises in law that all things or classes of things omitted from it were intentionally omitted by the legislature. . . The absence of any mention of referenda indicates the statute's rejection of referendum, rights" But the Growth Management Act does provide a process for public participation in growth management legislation at the county or city level. The people of Whatcom County had a participatory opportunity to voice their concerns prior to adoption of the Temporary Critical Areas Ordinance, ordinance 92-032. RCW 36.70A.140 provides:
Each county and city that is required or chooses to plan under RCW 36.70A.040 shall establish procedures providing for early and continuous public participation in the development and amendment of comprehensive land use plans and development regulations implementing such plans. The procedures shall provide for broad dissemination of proposals and alternatives, opportunity for written comments, public meetings after effective notice, provision for open discussion, communication programs, information services, and consideration of and response to public comments. Errors in exact compliance with the established procedures shall not render the comprehensive land use plan or development regulations invalid if the spirit of the procedures is observed.
(Italics ours.)
Ordinance 92-032 was adopted to satisfy the Whatcom County comprehensive land use plan mandated by the Growth Management Act. The County is correct in its assertion that adoption of the ordinance did not create new policy, but merely pursued a plan already adopted by its legislative body, the County Council. The ordinance is merely execution of a policy already in existence. It specifically provided that it was created to comply with the mandate of the Growth Management Act.
Whatcom County Code art. 2, § 2.20 provides in relevant part:
The County Council shall exercise its legislative power by adoption and enactment of ordinances or resolutions. It shall have the power:
(d) To adopt by ordinance comprehensive plans, including improvement plans for the present and future development of the county.
(Italics ours.)
Under the Whatcom County Code, enactment of ordinances is clearly a legislative act. However, the critical areas ordinance in this case is still not subject to referendum. Art. 2, § 2.30 of the Whatcom County Code provides that "[ejvery legislative act shall be by ordinance" and that "[n]o ordinance shall be amended unless the new ordinance sets forth each amended section or subsection at full length". Although legislative acts must be by ordinance, which would normally be subject to referendum, the Temporary Critical Areas Ordinance additionally falls within the public health and safety exception to referendum under article 5, section 5.50 of the Whatcom County Code:
The second power reserved by the people is the referendum. It may be ordered on any act, or bill, or ordinance, or any part thereof passed by the County Council except such ordinances as may be necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety or support of the county government and its existing public institutions.
(Italics ours.)
The Whatcom County Council somewhat routinely declared that "enactment of the Temporary Critical Areas Ordinance w[ould] promote the public health, safety and general welfare." But this nevertheless met the requirements for the exception. In addition, the Critical Areas Ordinance was enacted to satisfy the goals required by the Growth Management Act. The immediacy was established by the September 1, 1993 statutory deadline, which preceded the November 3, 1993 referendum election.
Even if the people of Whatcom County did have the power to amend the Critical Areas Ordinance, the amended ordinance would have to be consistent with state law as expressed by the Legislature. This court has determined that the power of referendum is "applicable only where . . . [the] procedures do not conflict with the expressed legislative intent." If there are inconsistencies, "the intent of the legislature must govern, and . . . conflicting charter provisions must yield to that intent."
Planning Enabling Act
The Planning Enabling Act, RCW 36.70, was enacted "to provide the authority for, and the procedures to be followed in, guiding and regulating the physical development of a county. . . through correlating both public and private projects and coordinating their execution with respect to . . . assuring the highest standards of environment for living, . . . and conserving the highest degree of public health, safety, morals and welfare." The Act provides for creation of departments, commissions and planning agencies, and further describes the procedural functions of each.
The Planning Enabling Act and the Growth Management Act are two related statutes which should be "'. . . read together to determine legislative purpose to achieve a "harmonious total statutory scheme . . . which maintains the integrity of the respective statutes." ' " Both statutes can be read consistently and harmoniously to carry out their intended legislative purpose.
The Whatcom County Temporary Critical Areas Ordinance, ordinance 92-032, having been enacted pursuant to legislative mandate under the Growth Management Act, RCW 36.70A, is not subject to referendum.
Summary and Conclusions
There is a conflict between the language of the Growth Management Act and provisions of the Whatcom County Home Rule Charter giving the right of referendum to the people of Whatcom County. This court has stated that when there is a conflict between the language of a state statute and the language of a home rule charter, the language of the state statute prevails.
The Whatcom County Home Rule Charter may grant the people the right of referendum over ordinances enacted by the County. However, allowing exercise of that right over ordinances enacted pursuant to the Growth Management Act would run counter to and frustrate the declared purposes of the Act to prevent uncoordinated and unplanned growth and to encourage conservation and wise use of land.
We reverse the Whatcom County Superior Court which granted summary judgment in favor of Respondent Steve Brisbane upholding a referendum amending portions of Whatcom County Ordinance 92-032, the Temporary Critical Areas Ordinance, enacted by the Whatcom County Council pursuant to the Growth Management Act, RCW 36.70A.
Andersen, C.J., and Utter, Brachtenbach, Dolliver, Durham, Guy, and Johnson, JJ., concur.
In an affidavit Respondent signed his name "Stephen W. Brisbane". Clerk's Papers, at 155.
Clerk's Papers, at 22-25.
Clerk's Papers, at 16.
Clerk's Papers, at 16. Whatcom County voters approved the referendum at the November 3,1993 election.
Clerk's Papers, at 15-18.
Clerk's Papers, at 7-8.
Clerk's Papers, at 8.
RCW 36.70A.010.
WAC 365-190-020.
RCW 36.70A.040(1) was amended in 1993 and provides in relevant part:
"Each county that has both a population of fifty thousand or more . . . shall conform with all of the requirements of this chapter." (Italics ours.)
RCW 36.7OA.O4O0) was amended in 1993 and provides in relevant part:
"Any county . . . required to conform with all of the requirements of this chapter under subsection (1) of this section shall take actions under this chapter as follows: (a) The county legislative authority shall adopt a county-wide planning policy under RCW 36.70A.210; (b) the county . . . shall designate critical areas, . . . and adopt development regulations . . . protecting these designated critical areas, under RCW 36.70A.170 and 36.70A.060; (c) the county shall designate and take other actions related to urban growth areas under RCW 36.70A.110; (d) if the county has a population of fifty thousand or more, the county . . . shall adopt a comprehensive plan under this chapter and development regulations that are consistent with and implement the comprehensive plan on or before July 1, 1994 . . ." (Italics ours.)
The text of the ordinance consists of approximately 128 pages. The amendments under the referendum struck words almost indiscriminately throughout the ordinance. See Clerk's Papers, at 27-145.
Clerk's Papers, at 27.
"Any county may frame a 'Home Rule' charter for its own government subject to the Constitution and laws of this state . . ."
The Whatcom County Code art. 5, § 5.10 (1993) provides in relevant part:
"The people of Whatcom County reserve to themselves the power to make certain proposals, at their option, and to enact or reject them all at the polls, independent of the County Council."
The Whatcom County Code art. 5, § 5.50 (1993) specifically provides for referendum:
"The second power reserved by the people is the referendum. It may be ordered on any act, or bÜl, or ordinance, or any part thereof passed by the County Council except such ordinances as may be necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety or support of the county government and its existing public institutions. Upon registration and validation of a referendum petition, the measure will be ineffective pending the outcome of the referendum procedure. . . ."
This language closely parallels the language of Const, art. 2, § 1(b) (amend. 72) providing for referendum applicable to state laws.
Snohomish Cy. v. Anderson, 123 Wn.2d 151, 158, 868 P.2d 116 (1994).
Anderson, at 158 (quoting Henry v. Thorne, 92 Wn.2d 878, 881, 602 P.2d 354 (1979)).
For example, former RCW 36.70A.040(3) provides:
"Any county or city that is required to adopt a comprehensive land use plan under subsection (1) of this section shall adopt the plan on or before July 1, 1993. Any county or city that is required to adopt a comprehensive land use plan under subsection (2) of this section shall adopt the plan not later than three years from the date the county legislative body takes action as required by subsection (2) of this section." (Italics ours.)
Anderson, at 156.
(Citations omitted.) Citizens for Financially Responsible Gov't v. Spokane, 99 Wn.2d 339, 344-45, 662 P.2d 845 (1983).
123 Wn.2d 151, 868 P.2d 116 (1994).
Anderson, at 155.
Anderson, at 155.
Anderson, at 156 (citing, e.g., State ex rel. Bowen v. Kruegel, 67 Wn.2d 673, 409 P.2d 458 (1965); State ex rel. Haas v. Pomeroy, 50 Wn.2d 23, 308 P.2d 684 (1957); Neils v. Seattle, 185 Wash. 269, 53 P.2d 848 (1936)). See also Paget v. Logan, 78 Wn.2d 349, 474 P.2d 247 (1970) (court distinguished situation where authority is delegated to electorate from that where authority is delegated to "legislative authority". Referendum rights are not permitted in the latter.).
Anderson, at 159.
In RCW 36.70A.010, the Legislature considered and balanced the interests of the "citizens, communities, local governments, and the private sector" in developing the Growth Management Act.
Anderson, at 158-59.
(Italics ours.) Anderson, at 157. One commentator has noted that some "statutes scattered throughout the code authorize the initiative and referendum for particular subjects". Philip A. Trautman, Initiative and Referendum in Washington: A Survey, 49 Wash. L. Rev. 55, 77 (1973).
Clerk's Papers, at 22.
(Italics ours.) Clerk's Papers, at 24.
State ex rel. Guthrie v. Richland, 80 Wn.2d 382, 387, 494 P.2d 990 (1972).
Guthrie, at 385. See also Seattle Bldg. & Constr. Trades Coun. v. Seattle, 94 Wn.2d 740, 747, 620 P.2d 82 (1980); State ex rel. Bowen v. Kruegel, 67 Wn.2d 673, 679, 409 P.2d 458 (1965).
RCW 36.70.010.
RCW 36.70.030; 36.70.040; 36.70.320.
Ellensburg v. State, 118 Wn.2d 709, 713, 826 P.2d 1081 (1992) (quoting Employco Personnel Servs., Inc. v. Seattle, 117 Wn.2d 606, 614, 817 P.2d 1373 (1991)).