Case Name: STATE of Louisiana, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Steven L. ANDERSON, Defendant-Appellant
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1998-08-19
Citations: 720 So. 2d 355
Docket Number: No. 30901-KA
Parties: STATE of Louisiana, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Steven L. ANDERSON, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: Before NORRIS, BROWN and WILLIAMS, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 720
Pages: 355–359

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Steven L. ANDERSON, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 30901-KA.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
Aug. 19, 1998.
Opinion on Rehearing En Banc Oct. 29, 1998.
Louisiana Appellate Project by J. Wilson Rambo, Monroe, for Defendant-Appellant.
Richard Ieyoub, Attorney General, Paul J. Carmouehe, District Attorney, Donald A. Hyatt and Tommy J. Johnson, Assistant District Attorneys, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before NORRIS, BROWN and WILLIAMS, JJ.

Opinion:
| iNORRIS, Judge.
The defendant, Steven L. Anderson, entered a Crosby plea of guilty to DWI-3rd offense, La. R.S. 14:98. By his sole assignment of error Anderson urges the District Court erred in denying his motion to quash a prior guilty plea. Finding merit in his argument, we reverse and vacate the conviction, enter a conviction of DWI-2nd offense, and remand the case for resentencing.
Prior to the instant charge, Anderson pled guilty to unrelated charges of DWI on January 5, 1995 and December 14, 1995. He was represented by counsel at both misdemeanor pleas. The instant offense occurred in August 1996, resulting in a bill for DWI-3rd offense. Anderson's attorney filed a motion to quash the January 5, 1995 guilty plea on grounds that the court accepting the plea "never ascertained if the defendant understood the nature and consequences of the charge before the court[.]" In support he cited State v. Jones, 404 So.2d 1192 (La.1981). The District Court denied the motion to quash, and in October 1997 Anderson entered his Crosby plea. The court sentenced him to one year at hard labor, including six months without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence, and the remainder on active, supervised probation.
The law applicable to this case is set forth in State v. Jones, supra:
[Wjhenever a misdemeanor guilty plea will be used as a basis for actual imprisonment, enhancement of actual imprisonment or conversion of a subsequent misdemean- or into a felony, it is incumbent upon the trial judge to inform the defendant that by pleading guilty he waives (a) his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination; (b) his right to trial and jury trial where it is applicable; (c) his right to confront his accusers, [Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) ] and to make sure that the accused has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequences.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Lemmon explained that "consequences" of |2the plea include knowledge of the possible penalty. Id., at 1201. This follows federal and State jurisprudence. See Boykin v. Alabama, supra at fn. 7; State ex rel. LaFleur v. Donnelly, 416 So.2d 82 (La.1982); State v. Watts, 550 So.2d 711 (La.App. 2 Cir.1989); State v. Hill, 30,552 (La.App. 2 Cir. 6/26/98), 714 So.2d 814, and citations therein.
In 1997, the legislature enacted La.C.Cr.P. art. 556.1, which provides in pertinent part:
A. In any criminal ease, the court shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, without first addressing the defendant personally in open court and informing him of, and determining that he understands, all of the following:
(1) The nature of the charge to which the plea is offered, the mandatory minimum penalty provided by law, if any, and the maximum possible penalty provided by law.
This article, which took effect on August 15,1997, was intended to clarify existing law. State v. Hill, supra.
Moreover, the State bears the burden of showing that the defendant expressly and knowingly waived his rights at the time of the plea. State v. Santiago, 416 So.2d 524 (La.1982); State v. Deroche, 95 0376 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/10/96), 674 So.2d 291.
The transcript of the January 5, 1995 guilty plea discloses a minimalist or "bare-bones" recital of the basie Boykin rights, with no discussion of any possible consequences or connotations of the plea. In short, this plea colloquy fails to show that Anderson was advised or aware of the sentencing range, an essential consequence of his plea. By contrast, we would note that the Boykin colloquy of December 14, 1995 was thorough and advised Anderson of all relevant consequences of the plea.
|3We therefore hold that the State has failed to meet its burden of proving that the January 5, 1995 guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered. It cannot be used as a predicate for the instant offense. We therefore reverse and vacate the conviction of DWI-3rd offense and enter a conviction of DWI-2nd offense. State v. Mobley, 592 So.2d 1282 (La.1992). We remand the case for resentencing in accord with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
BROWN, J., dissents with reasons.
. State v. Crosby, 338 So.2d 584 (La.1976). Anderson specifically reserved his right to appeal the denial of the motion to quash.
. In view of State v. Jones, supra, we are somewhat perplexed by the result in State v. Newman, 97-797 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/28/98), 707 So.2d 122, and decline to follow it.