Case Name: Jeanie MELBOURNE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1995-04-21
Citations: 655 So. 2d 126
Docket Number: No. 93-1092
Parties: Jeanie MELBOURNE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: PETERSON and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 655
Pages: 126–132

Head Matter:
Jeanie MELBOURNE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 93-1092.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
April 21, 1995.
Rehearing Denied June 1, 1995.
Terrence E. Kehoe, of Law Offices of Terrence E. Kehoe, Orlando, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Barbara Arlene Fink, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dayton Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Jeanie Melbourne was driving under the influence when she turned in front of an oncoming vehicle, killing two people and seriously injuring another. She was convicted of two counts of DUI manslaughter and one count of DUI with serious bodily injury. Although we affirm, appellant has raised three issues that deserve discussion.
Appellant contends that the court violated the rule of Neil , by not conducting a proper inquiry after she objected to the state's peremptory challenge of a black juror. This is the sum total of the record inquiry concerning this matter:
MR. MASON [Trial Defense Attorney]: Does anyone have alcoholism in their family or any friends who are alcoholics, or anything along those lines?
MR. WELLS: My wife. She died of alcohol.
MR. MASON: What do you do for W.E.S.H. T.V.?
MR. WELLS: I work in programming. Whatever you see is whatever I do.
MR. MASON: Do you work nights or do you work days?
MR.' WELLS: I work days.
MR) MASON: Would you like to serve again?
MR. WELLS: I will do what I have to do.
⅜ * ⅜
MR..BRESSLER [Prosecutor]: We'd also like to strike number 19, your honor.
MR. MASON: Mr. Dewey Wells, the black mam I would raise a Baxter Johans Challenge . Johans. He's a black man. Number 19.
MS. MUNYON: The state has not stricken any black jurors at all. The defense has stricken juror number ten, Tillman, as well as juror number 13, which are black. The state accepted both of these jurors.
MR. BRESSLER: Kevin McCall was a blaclj: juror that the defense struck.
MR.[ MASON: I have nothing else to say.
THE COURT: Well, I don't see anything in this record to indicate that there's any— that'the state in exercising this challenge to a black person is in any way acting in a discriminatory fashion, or singling out Mr. Wells because of his race in its exercise of peremptory challenge.
Appellant urges that the process used by the court in upholding the challenge to Mr. Wells violated the bright-line rule set out in State v. Johans, 613 So.2d 1319, 1322 (Fla.1993):
Under our decision today, the presumption of validity of peremptory strikes established in Neil is still the law in Florida. Furthermore, a peremptory strike will be deemed valid unless an objection is made that the challenge is being used in a racially discriminatory manner. However, upon such objections, the trial judge must conduct a Neil inquiry.... Thus, we hold that the proper remedy in all cases where the trial court errs in failing to hold a Neil inquiry is to reverse and remand for a new trial.
In Johans, no Neil inquiry was conducted because the trial judge ruled that the defense had failed to establish the Neil threshold to require the inquiry. The supreme court in Johans eliminated the threshold burden previously carried by the one challenging the strike. Here, however, the court did conduct a Neil inquiry. It is true that the prosecutor anticipated the question by the judge and, without the judge actually asking the question, proceeded into the state's explanation that its peremptory strike was not racially motivated. While somewhat free-form, inquiry was nevertheless conducted, as evidenced by the court's ruling.
Although not raised below, appellant now contends that the reason offered by the prosecution was insufficient to meet its burden of showing a non-racial reason for the challenge. Appellant points out that the state's response merely asserts its non-racial motivation and does not go forward with a race-neutral reason for the strike. Nevertheless, because the trial court can consider all that it has seen and heard, in addition to the explanation that comes directly from the mouth of the lawyer who has announced the peremptory challenge, reversal is not required. The record, as brief as it is in relation to the Wells strike, clearly shows the non-racial motivation. This is a case in which a woman, allegedly driving under the influence, caused the death of two persons and seriously injured another. Mr. Wells informed the court that his wife had died as a result of alcoholism. This revelation was not pursued by either attorney. It is possible, of course, that Mr. Wells might have been unaffected by his previous misfortune. It is more likely, however, that he would either have been sympathetic to appellant because of her weakness or hostile to her because of her conduct. In the event of either sympathy or hostility, a race-neutral reason for this strike was apparent on the record. Moreover, though not alone dispositive, the jury selection proceedings to that point demonstrated that the state's challenge was not a ploy to prevent African Americans from serving on the jury.
Appellant's second issue also involves jury selection. The defense raised challenges to two jurors for cause which were rejected. The court erred in not striking Mr. Csandli for cause because his responses clearly showed that Mr. Csandli's personal experiences might affect his ability to be impartial. The court did not err, however, in failing to excuse Mr. Jilani for cause. Mr. Jilani responded to a defense inquiry concerning driving and drinking as follows:
MR. JILANI: The [law] says don't drink and drive, no drinking.
MR. MASON: If you drink alcohol, or whatever your tolerance is, I have no idea, but if you drink alcohol and get in your car and drive, there's no crime that's ever been committed.
If you drink alcohol and you get in your car and you drive and you are impaired, that's the crime. You agree with the law or disagree with the law, Mr.Jilano [sic]?
MR. JILANI: It's a crime.
MR. MASON: It's a crime?
MR. JILANI: Uh-huh.
The difficulty with a compound question is that it often draws a confused answer. The final part of the question asked indicated that it was a crime to drive while impaired. He then asked if Mr. Jilani agreed. Mr. Jilani agreed that such would be a crime. He did not directly respond to Mr. Mason's first statement that driving after drinking, so long as there is no impairment, would be legal. Mr. Jilani never indicated that he could not or would not follow the law as instructed by the judge. The competency of a juror challenged for cause presents a mixed question of law and fact to be determined by the trial court. Manifest error must be shown to overturn the trial court's finding. Mills v. State, 462 So.2d 1075 (Fla.), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 911, 105 S.Ct. 3538, 87 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985). The defense has simply failed to meet this standard. Since the trial court awarded the defense one additional peremptory challenge, the court's ruling on Mr. Csandli was harmless error.
Finally, we reject appellant's argument that appellant could not be convicted for each of the two homicides and the DUI with serious injuries under section 316.193, Florida Statutes (1991). Appellant's reliance on Boutwell v. State, 631 So.2d 1094 (Fla. 1994) is misplaced. There the court had under consideration whether injury to several persons in one accident where the offender was driving with a suspended license would support multiple convictions for the offense of driving while license suspended causing serious injury. The court answered the question in the negative, reasoning that the offense was driving with a suspended license with the penalty enhanced by the fact of injury; and that the number of persons injured was fortuitous. Id. at 1095.
It is important to note that the case approved by the Boutwell court was Wright v. State, 592 So.2d 1123 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991), quashed on other grounds, 600 So.2d 457 (Fla.1992). The Wright court had expressly upheld four convictions for DUI causing serious injury while reversing the four convictions for driving with a suspended license causing serious injury. The Wright court explained simply that driving with a suspended license was a single offense whereas the injuries to four persons warranted the multiple DUI with injuries convictions. Although this analysis isn't very instructive, the Wright court reached a common-sense result. Unfortunately, as the dissent of Judge Harris shows, given the similarity in the structure of the two statutes, the supreme court, in explaining its reasoning in Boutwell, has placed the existing law construing the DUI statute in some doubt. If "injury" in one of two similarly constructed statutes is merely a penalty enhancement to the underlying offense, the logical conclusion to reach is that the other statute should be treated the same. This would mean that death or injury merely enhances the penalty for the single DUI offense. The fact is, however, that these two offenses have never been treated the same, as Wright vividly demonstrates.
In our view, this issue was decided by the Florida Supreme Court in Houser v. State, 474 So.2d 1193 (Fla.1985), where the court had under consideration whether a single death would support conviction of both DUI manslaughter and vehicular homicide. In Houser, the court made note of the fact that the structure of the DUI statute suggested that death was no more than an enhancement; however, the court found that the legislature had, indeed, intended that "DUI manslaughter" be a homicide statute, not an enhancement to DUI. In essence, although similarly constructed by the legislature, the two offenses of "DUI manslaughter" and "driving with license suspended causing death" are fundamentally distinct. To treat them identically merely based on their structure in reliance on Boutwell would place the holding in Houser in doubt, and the supreme court has repeatedly and recently reiterated its satisfaction with Houser. State v. Cooper, 634 So.2d 1074 (Fla.1994); Goodwin v. State, 634 So.2d 157 (Fla.1994); State v. Chapman, 625 So.2d 838 (Fla.1993); State v. Thompson, 607 So.2d 422 (Fla.1992). Ms.. Melbourne did not improperly receive multiple convictions for one incident of driving under the influence. There were three offenses: two homicide crimes and one driving under the influence resulting in serious bodily injury.
AFFIRMED.
PETERSON and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur.
HARRIS, C.J., concurs in part; dissents in part, with opinion.
. The remaining issues on appeal do not warrant discussion.
. State v. Neil, 457 So.2d 481 (Fla. 1984).
. Defense's challenge to a third juror was withdrawn during oral argument.
. See Cooper v. State, 621 So.2d 729, 732 n. 7 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993), approved, 634 So.2d 1074 (Fla.1994).