Case Name: UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI, Petitioner, v. Lisa WILSON, etc., et al., Respondents
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2006-06-21
Citations: 948 So. 2d 774
Docket Number: No. 3D04-2939
Parties: UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI, Petitioner, v. Lisa WILSON, etc., et al., Respondents.
Judges: Before WELLS, SHEPHERD, and ROTHENBERG, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 948
Pages: 774–792

Head Matter:
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI, Petitioner, v. Lisa WILSON, etc., et al., Respondents.
No. 3D04-2939.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
June 21, 2006.
Order Denying Rehearing En Banc Feb. 28, 2007.
Fowler White Burnett and Marc J. Schleier and June Galkoski Hoffman, Miami; George Hartz, Lundeen, Fulmer, Johnstone, King & Stevens, and Arthur Lundeen, South Miami, for petitioner.
Hersch & Talisman and Patrice A. Talisman, Miami, for respondents.
Before WELLS, SHEPHERD, and ROTHENBERG, JJ.

Opinion:
ROTHENBERG, Judge.
In this petition for writ of certiorari, the University of Miami ("University") is seeking to quash the trial court's order denying its motion to dismiss a wrongful death action filed against it by the decedent's daughters, Lisa Wilson and Keisha Salmon, based upon their failure to comply with the medical malpractice presuit notice requirements.
On October 11, 2002, Marjorie Salmon-Graham died intestate as a result of breast cancer. On September 11, 2003, her daughters, Lisa Wilson and Keisha Salmon, served the University and others with a presuit notice of intent to initiate litigation for medical malpractice. The daughters subsequently filed a wrongful death action against the University and other defendants, alleging that their failure to diagnose Ms. Salmon-Graham's breast cancer resulted in her death. The caption of the wrongful death complaint described the plaintiffs as "LISA WILSON and KEISHA SALMON as nominated Co-Personal Representatives and/or any duly appointed Personal Representative(s) of the ESTATE OF MARJORIE SALMON-GRAHAM, deceased."
The University moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that because the notice of intent to initiate litigation was not served by a duly appointed personal representative of the decedent's estate, it failed to satisfy the medical malpractice presuit notice requirement of Chapter 766, Florida Statutes (2002), a condition precedent to maintaining an action for medical malpractice, and was, therefore, a nullity. At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, Ms. Wilson and Ms. Salmon's attorney informed the court that the daughters, who had already initiated the process to be appointed as the personal representatives of their mother's estate, were expected to be appointed "within a week or two." The trial court denied the University's motion to dismiss, and Ms. Wilson and Ms. Salmon were subsequently appointed as co-personal representatives of their mother's estate.
In its petition for writ of certiorari, the University claims that the trial court's denial of its motion to dismiss was a departure from the essential requirements of the law. The University asserts that the plaintiffs did not comply with the medical malpractice presuit notice requirement because the notice must be filed by a claimant who received negligent medical care or by the personal representative of the person who received the negligent medical care. The University alleges that this requirement was not met in the instant case because Ms. Wilson and Ms. Salmon were not "claimants" pursuant to sections 766.106(2) and 766.202(1) of Florida's Medical Malpractice Act ("Act"), and had not been appointed as personal representatives at the time they served their notice. Ms. Wilson and Ms. Salmon argue that (1) their notice, which placed the University on notice of the alleged malpractice and provided the University with the opportunity to investigate the allegations, satisfied the purpose and intent of the statute, and (2) as named personal representatives, they should not be precluded from pursuing a claim on behalf of the estate, as their appointment relates back in time, validating the actions that they took prior to their appointment.
Our review of the trial court's disposition of the motion to dismiss is de novo. Apostolico v. Orlando Reg'l Health Care Sys., Inc., 871 So.2d 283, 286 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004). The question we must answer in this petition is whether, as a matter of law, a medical malpractice presuit notice is invalid when it is served by persons who were not personal representatives when the notice was served, but are subsequently appointed.
The medical malpractice presuit notice requirement is found in section 766.106(2), Florida Statutes (2002), which provides, in pertinent part:
prior to filing a claim for medical negligence, a claimant shall notify each prospective defendant by certified mail, return receipt requested, of intent to initiate litigation for medical malpractice.
"Timely written notice of intent to initiate litigation is a condition precedent to maintaining a medical malpractice action." Patry v. Capps, 633 So.2d 9, 11 (Fla.1994).
On September 11, 2003, Ms. Wilson and Ms. Salmon, the decedent's surviving daughters, noticed the University regarding their intent to pursue a wrongful death medical malpractice claim against it for the death of their mother, by sending the University a Notice of Intent to Initiate Litigation, as required pursuant to section 766.106(2), Florida Statutes (2002). The notice informed the University that they were the survivors of the deceased and of the basis for their negligence claim.
There are certain requirements which must be met before issuing a notification of intent to initiate medical malpractice litigation. Prior to filing a complaint, the plaintiff must conduct an investigation to determine if a named defendant was in fact negligent and that such negligence resulted in the claimed injury, and obtain corroboration by a medical expert, along with a verified written opinion from the medical expert, supporting the claim of medical negligence. Apparently, these requirements were satisfied, as the University has made no claim that they were not. Additionally, the Act requires that, upon receiving the notice, the medical provider must conduct an investigation to determine the reasonableness of the plaintiffs claim and obtain corroboration prior to rejecting the claim. While the record and briefs are silent as to whether the University satisfied its obligations and whether it rejected the claim, we must assume it did, as the plaintiffs filed suit and these issues have not been raised by either party.
Despite the fact that Ms. Wilson and Ms. Salmon conducted the requisite investigation, obtained the necessary corroborating verified medical expert opinion, and gave the University notice of their intent to file a medical malpractice claim; despite the fact the University conducted its own investigation and rejected the reasonableness of the claim; and despite the fact that Ms. Wilson and Ms. Salmon timely filed their complaint and were ultimately ap pointed as personal representatives of the estate; the University and the dissent argue that the complaint should be dismissed, now that the statute of limitations has run, because the daughters were not "claimants" or personal representatives at the time they noticed the University. We disagree.
The policy underlying the medical malpractice statutory scheme is to require the parties to engage in meaningful presuit investigation, discovery, and negotiations, thereby screening out frivolous lawsuits and defenses and encouraging the early determination and prompt resolution of claims. Kukral v. Mekras, 679 So.2d 278, 284 (Fla.1996). The presuit notice provides notice to the medical provider and requires an investigation of the matter, in an effort to encourage presuit settlements. Otto v. Rodriguez, 710 So.2d 1, 2 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Fort Walton Beach Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Dingier, 697 So.2d 575, 579 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); Chandler v. Novak, 596 So.2d 749, 750 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). The University argues that, because the legislative purpose of the Act is to promote presuit settlement, we must interpret section 766.106(2) to require that the notice of intent to initiate litigation be served by a person who had already been appointed as a personal representative because only a personal representative has the power to settle an action for wrongful death. See Saia Motor Freight Line, Inc. v. Reid, 888 So.2d 102, 103 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004)(stating that only personal representatives have the authority to settle a wrongful death action); Thompson v. Hodson, 825 So.2d 941, 949 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)(explaining that, by statute, a wrongful death claim is brought by only one plaintiff — the personal representative of the estate of the deceased). The University argues that, because Ms. Wilson and Ms. Salmon were not personal representatives at the time they served the notice, the University could not settle the claim with them.
Both the Florida Supreme Court and this court have held that when interpreting section 766.106(2) regarding presuit notice, we must not unduly restrict the access to the courts guaranteed by the Florida constitution in carrying out the legislative purpose of the Act. Kukral, 679 So.2d at 284; see also Patry, 633 So.2d at 13 ("[W]hen possible, the pre-suit notice and screening statute should be construed in a manner that favors access to courts."); Garay v. Colony Springs Med. Ctr., Inc., 731 So.2d 849 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)(declin-ing to adopt a hyper-technical view of section 766.106, which would impermissibly infringe upon the constitutional right of access to the courts).
Ms. Wilson and Ms. Salmon argue that, because they were ultimately appointed personal representatives, their powers as personal representatives should relate back, thereby validating the actions they took prior to their appointment. We agree as there is both statutory and case law support for such a finding. Chapter 733 of the Florida Statutes is the Probate Code and deals with the administration of estates. Section 733.601, Florida Statutes (2002), specifically provides that
The duties and powers of a personal representative commence upon appointment. The powers of a personal representative relate back in time to give acts by the person appointed, occurring before appointment and beneficial to the estate, the same effect as those occurring after appointment. A personal representative may ratify and accept acts on behalf of the estate done by others when the acts would have been proper for a personal representative.
(Emphasis added).
Even early Florida jurisprudence recognized that acts of a personal representative prior to his/her appointment may be validated upon appointment. See Griffin v. Workman, 73 So.2d 844 (Fla.1954)(ac-knowledging the "ancient doctrine" which validates the acts of a personal representative prior to his appointment and noting that "a wide variety of acts and conduct" have been validated by subsequent qualification of an administrator, including an advancement to a distributee, the sale of estate property, the execution of a deed, and the institution of a wrongful death action); see also Talan v. Murphy, 443 So.2d 207, 208 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)(holding that, although Talan brought a wrongful death action without having been appointed as personal representative, his subsequent appointment related back and his acts were thereby validated insofar as they were acts he could have performed had he been qualified as a personal representative, and finding that it was not necessary for him to allege in his original complaint that he was the personal representative).
In Bermudez v. Florida Power & Light Co., 433 So.2d 565 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), the decedent's mother filed a wrongful death complaint against Florida Power & Light (FP & L) and the City of Coral Gables ("City") on June 11, 1981, nearly three years after her son was electrocuted when a power line touched a pole he was holding. At the time she filed the complaint, she had not yet been appointed as the personal representative of her son's estate. She was appointed on July 23, 1981, after the statute of limitations had run. The trial court granted FP & L's and the City's motions to dismiss, finding that since the personal representative was not appointed until after the statute of limitations had run, the complaint was untimely. On appeal, FP & L and the City argued that since the Wrongful Death Act, § 768.16-7, Fla. Stat. (1981), makes it mandatory that an action for wrongful death be filed by the personal representative, the action initiated prior to the appointment of the personal representative was a nullity. We disagreed and reversed, concluding that, "It is well established, however, that whether 'shall' is mandatory or discretionary will depend upon the context in which it is used and the legislative intent expressed in the statute." Id. at 566-67. In reaching this conclusion, we found controlling the Florida Supreme Court's holding in Griffin.
We find that the case of Griffin v. Workman, 73 So.2d 844 (Fla.1954) controls the disposition of the action sub judice. On facts nearly identical to those in the case at bar, the Florida Supreme Court said:
We have the opinion that the circuit court committed reversible error in not allowing the cause to proceed after letters of administration had been issued in the probate proceedings, and in refusing to relate the issuance of the letters back to the time of the beginning of the suit . No fraud or inequity is involved, and no new cause of action would have been presented by allowing the father to prosecute the action to a conclusion. We think, therefore, that the issue is ruled by the ancient doctrine "that whenever letters of administration are granted they relate back to the intestate's or testator's death".
Bermudez, 433 So.2d at 566 (quoting Griffin, 73 So.2d at 846).
The purpose of the presuit requirement is to allow a potential defendant to investigate a claim and to encourage settlement prior to costly and time-consuming litigation. Because the notice sent to the University by Ms. Wilson and Ms. Salmon described their claim-with sufficient detail to enable the University to investigate the claim, they satisfied their statutory duty and should not be denied access to the courts. See Chandler, 596 So.2d at 750-51.
The University and the dissent, however, argue that because the legislative purpose of the presuit notice requirement is also to promote early settlement of claims, and since only the personal representative has the authority to settle a claim, the University was precluded from exercising its option to settle, thereby, frustrating the legislative purpose. We find this argument unpersuasive and in conflict with Berges v. Infinity Insurance Co., 896 So.2d 665 (Fla.2004).
The argument is unpersuasive as the University rejected the plaintiffs' claim of negligence, determining after its investigation, that the claim was unfounded. At no time did it express any intent to enter into settlement negotiations. The Florida Supreme Court in Berges has also rejected this argument, specifically holding that the "relation back doctrine" includes settlement negotiations performed by a personal representative prior to his/her appointment. A review of Berges follows.
Berges was the defendant in a wrongful death action. After receiving an adverse jury verdict that substantially exceeded his policy limits, Berges sued his insurance company claiming it had acted in bad faith by failing to settle or to advise him of a settlement offer made by the decedent's husband. The jury agreed with Berges, finding that the insurance company acted in bad faith, and the trial court entered an amended final judgment in favor of Berg-es, which the insurance company appealed. On appeal, the Second District reversed, finding that, since the decedent's husband had not been appointed as personal representative when he offered to settle the case, he was without the authority to make a valid settlement offer. The Second District found that the insurance company, therefore, as a matter of law, could not have acted in bad faith in faffing to advise Berges of the offer. Id. at 671-72. The Florida Supreme Court, however, reversed the Second District, rejecting its conclusion that a settlement offer for a wrongful death claim is not valid if the person who made the offer has not yet been appointed as a personal representative. Id. at 675. The court explained that:
[T]he statutory scheme governing estates . anticipates valid negotiations prior to court involvement. Specifically, the legal acts of a personal representative relate back after court appointment, thereby validating the previous acts of the personal representative on behalf of the estate. Thus, the statutory scheme[ ] governing . estate claims contemplated] the completion of settlement negotiations prior to court approval. This scheme is consistent with the purposes of settlement, which are to simplify and shorten litigation, save costs to parties, and ease the burden on the courts by obviating the necessity of trial.
Id. at 674-75 (citations omitted). The Florida Supreme Court, therefore, concluded that the Second District erred in determining that the decedent's husband did not make a valid offer to settle the case. Id. at 675.
As the Florida Supreme Court has held that the relation back doctrine applies to settlement offers made by individuals prior to their appointments as personal representatives, we reject the University and the dissent's argument that the University could not settle the claim with Ms. Wilson and Ms. Salmon because when they sub mitted their presuit notice, they had not yet been appointed personal representatives of the estate. Under Berges, an agreement to settle between the University and Ms. Wilson and Ms. Salmon could have been held in abeyance and could have been validated upon their subsequent appointment as personal representatives. Thus, we conclude that the purpose of promoting settlement, which underlies the presuit notice requirement, was served by the notice filed in the instant case.
The dissent spends a great deal of time, and ink, discussing why it believes it is important for a claim to be brought by a true claimant (i.e. a duly appointed representative): (1) because only a claimant has the authority to settle a wrongful death action during the presuit notice period; (2) relaxing the requirement "inhibits the goal of promoting pre-suit settlement [of] claims"; (3) it assures that potentially responsible parties can readily assess their exposure; and (4) it lessens the risk of disagreement among putative claimants or personal representatives. While these arguments are meritorious, they are irrelevant to the issue before us, as the University rejected Ms. Wilson and Ms. Salmon's claim after doing its own independent investigation. Therefore, the University was not "inhibited" in negotiating a settlement nor was it frustrated by attempting to settle with parties who lacked the authority to do so. More importantly, the case law, as has already been discussed, permits the parties to negotiate a settlement and to ratify the settlement after they are duly appointed as personal representatives of the estate.
In attempting to avoid the application of the "relation back" doctrine, which specifically permits the powers of a personal representative in an estate action to relate back to acts taken prior to appointment as the personal representative, the dissent cites to cases issued by the Florida Supreme Court in 1931, Livingston v. Malever, 103 Fla. 200, 137 So. 113 (1931), and in 1912, La Floridienne, J. Buttgenbach & Co., Societe Anonyme v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., 63 Fla. 213, 58 So. 186 (1912), which held that the relation back of amendments should not be applied when it operates to cut off a substantial right or defense. The dissent, however, fails to apply the holdings in these cases to the issue before us or to articulate what substantial right or defense was forfeited by the University which rejected the daughters' claim as unfounded. In fact, were we to rule otherwise, the only substantial right forfeited would be that of the decedent's family, which would be denied its constitutional right to access our courts. We are not dealing with an amendment or new law. Griffin was decided in 1954 and concluded that the trial court erred in refusing to relate the issuance of the letters of administration back to the time of the beginning of the lawsuit. Griffin, 73 So.2d at 846. Bermudez, decided by this court in 1983, likewise found that a wrongful death lawsuit filed prior to the appointment of the personal representative would relate back to the date of the timely filed complaint. We see no reason to treat wrongful death actions based upon medical malpractice differently than wrongful death actions in general.
Lastly, we disagree with the recitation of the facts provided in the dissent and the conclusions made therefrom, which cast Ms. Wilson and Ms. Salmon's delay in obtaining their appointment as personal representatives of their mother's estate in a rather dim light. The dissent states that: "It is not a far leap to conclude that their delay in consummating this most routine of tasks incident to the prosecution of a wrongful death case was inspired by their own strategic and tactical interests"; "Although the daughters apparently elect ed to delay the performance of this most routine of probate procedures for reasons of their own, the majority nevertheless redeems them from any legal consequence of their decision on the ground that when interpreting section 766.106(2) . not unduly restrict the access to the courts guaranteed by the Florida constitution . "; and "The daughters elected not to prosecute their interests." With all due respect for the author of the dissent, there is nothing in the record or briefs to even remotely suggest that Ms. Wilson and Ms. Salmon purposely delayed their appointments as personal representatives. In fact, to the contrary, the only record evidence as to the reason for their late appointment was offered during oral argument before this court, where we learned the delay was due to the fact that the decedent's husband, as next of kin and the person most eligible to assume the responsibility of personal representative of his wife's estate, had not lived in the marital home for several years prior to his wife's death and his whereabouts was unknown. After attempting in vain to locate him, the decedent's two daughters took provident action to protect the estate by sending presuit notice to the University before the statute of limitations ran. As soon as they were able to locate the decedent's husband, who signed a disclaimer waiving his statutory preference to be appointed as the personal representative of his deceased wife's estate and consented to the daughters' appointment as co-personal representatives, Ms. Wilson and Ms. Salmon obtained the necessary letters of administration and immediately amended the complaint. Section 733.601, Florida Statutes, regarding the administration of estates, specifically permits the actions of a personal representative, taken before being appointed, to be ratified on behalf of the estate, and if those actions benefit the estate, they are given the same effect as those occurring after appointment. As Ms. Wilson and Ms. Salmon were appointed as the personal representatives of the estate, and the actions they took prior to their appointment were clearly beneficial to the estate, the law permits their powers to relate back to the presuit notice and the filing of the complaint once the University rejected their claim. We, therefore, deny the petition for writ of certiorari.
Petition denied.
WELLS and ROTHENBERG, JJ" concur.