Case Name: Steve Anton DAVIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1990-04-05
Citations: 560 So. 2d 1231
Docket Number: No. 89-1064
Parties: Steve Anton DAVIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: PETERSON, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 560
Pages: 1231–1239

Head Matter:
Steve Anton DAVIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 89-1064.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
April 5, 1990.
Rehearing Denied May 15, 1990.
Michael J. Snure and David A. Henson of Muller, Kirkconnell, Lindsey and Snure, P.A., Winter Park, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and David S. Morgan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
HARRIS, Judge.
Pursuant to a negotiated drug purchase appellant, at one time and one place on August 25, 1988, handed an undercover agent one piece of crack cocaine. As a result he was charged, convicted of, and sentenced for two statutory offenses: possession of a controlled substance (a third degree felony under section 893.13(l)(f), Florida Statutes (1987)), and delivery of a controlled substance (a second degree felony under section 893.13(l)(a)l, Florida Statutes (1987)).
Appellant argues that his separate convictions and sentences for the crime of possession of one rock of cocaine and for the crime of delivery of that same rock of cocaine violate his right to protection from double jeopardy provided by Article I, § 9, Florida Constitution and the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution in that both crimes are in substance and in legal and constitutional contemplation "the same offense" for which multiple trials, convictions and punishments are constitutionally proscribed. Such reliance on the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution has been rejected by the holding of United States Supreme Court in Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 103 S.Ct. 673, 74 L.Ed.2d 535 (1983) which was recognized by the Florida Supreme Court in State v. Smith, 547 So.2d 613 (Fla.1989):
[wjith respect to cumulative sentences in a single trial, the double jeopardy clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended.
The dissenting opinion recognizes that Missouri v. Hunter forecloses relief to appellant based on the United States Constitution but urges that the Florida Supreme Court construe Article I, § 9, Florida Constitution as granting greater protection.
The Florida Supreme Court specifically rejected this construction in State v. Cantrell, 417 So.2d 260 (Fla.1982) in which it was asked by certified question whether Article I, § 9 of the Florida Constitution should have the same construction as the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution or a more restrictive construction by holding:
[W]e apply and construe article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution in the same manner that the United States Supreme Court applied the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution in Albernaz v. United States [450 U.S. 333, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981)] .
The Supreme Court did not recede from the holding, even though urged to do so, in either Carawan v. State, 515 So.2d 161 (Fla.1987) or State v. Smith, 547 So.2d 613 (Fla.1989).
What would be the basis for a more restrictive construction of the Florida Constitution? Since the language of the two provisions is almost identical, such interpretation would have to be based on a public policy argument. On the one occasion in recent years in which the citizens of this state had an opportunity to be heard on the construction of the constitution, they overwhelmingly determined that no greater rights should be granted under Article I, § 12 of the Florida Constitution than under the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States. There appears no reason to so liberally construe the Florida Constitution in this case.
Although not specifically raised on appeal, the dissent also urges that the conviction and sentence for possession should be reversed based on legislative intent as expressed in section 775.021(4)(b). To reach this conclusion, however, it must be accepted that one cannot have a sale without a delivery or a delivery without possession; otherwise the lesser offense is not subsumed by the greater offense. The dissenting opinion sets out a "mental game" to construct a hypothetical in which a sale can occur without a delivery or a delivery without possession and concludes "... the point is that if one cannot theorize that A is in possession then one cannot conceptualize how A can accomplish a delivery of possession or a sale".
But consider an actual case, Daudt v. State, 368 So.2d 52 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1979) cert. denied, 376 So.2d 76 (Fla.1979) in which the court found that a sale was accomplished without possession. In Daudt the defendant was convicted of sale and possession of marijuana. The defendant had, at the request of a prospective buyer (an undercover police officer), made a phone call to his "source" to obtain marijuana. Defendant and the undercover officer then drove to another location where they met "Mike". The defendant assured "Mike" that the money was right and, at Mike's insistence, remained as a lookout while Mike took the officer to the location of the marijuana. The sale went down and the arrest was made.
The Daudt court held:
There is no evidence whatsoever that appellant ever had actual possession or control of the marijuana. Nor was constructive possession established. Although appellant knew of the presence of the marijuana, there is no evidence that it belonged to or was under the control of the appellant. At best, the evidence establishes that appellant brought the parties to the transaction together and expected to be paid for such service.
Appellant aided and abetted [Mike] in selling the marijuana, but not in possessing it. [Mike] already possessed the marijuana; there is no showing that appellant was of any help to [Mike] in either acquiring it or retaining possession of it. On the contrary, appellant aided [Mike] in divesting himself of it.
Daudt at 53-54.
It appears, therefore, that possession of cocaine is not a category three offense as set out in Brown v. State, 206 So.2d 377 (Fla.1968) to the charged offense of sale or delivery of cocaine because possession is not "an essential ingredient" of the sale or delivery of cocaine. Sale or delivery of cocaine can occur without possession.
In analyzing whether possession is an "essential ingredient" of a sale of cocaine, why does it matter if appellant was charged as an aider or abettor or as the one who actually sold the contraband? In either event he is guilty of the sale, not aiding or abetting in the sale; therefore, one can be guilty of sale whether or not one has had possession. Thus possession, while present in almost all sales, is not an essential ingredient to the crime of sale of contraband. In considering whether something is an essential ingredient of the charge, the true relationships between the concepts of sale, delivery and possession is unimportant — the issue is can a sale be completed without having possession of the thing sold? If a sale can occur without delivering possession (Gregg Maxey, Inc. v. Bateman, 126 Fla. 747, 171 So. 811, (Fla.1937) why cannot a sale occur without having possession?. Sales are conducted by brokers without possession of the thing sold on a daily basis. Since a sale can occur without possession — through brokers, agents, whatever — then possession cannot be an essential element of sale. We do not agree that the test is whether possession was an "element" under the facts of the case before us (as apparently did the court in Gordon v. State, 528 So.2d 910 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)) but whether it is a necessary element under the statute. This is consistent with State v. Burton, 555 So.2d 1210 (Fla.1989) in which the Florida Supreme Court indicates approval of the legislative intent to treat sale and possession of the same substance as separate offenses subject to separate convictions and punishment.
We next must look to the information to see if possession would be a category four offense as defined by Brown. An offense is included within this category when the information charging the greater offense alleges a finding of the commission of the lesser offense. The count of the information charging sale or delivery of cocaine makes no reference to possession. See Portee v. State, 392 So.2d 314 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981) approved, 447 So.2d 219 (Fla.1984). It appears, therefore, under the present law of this state, that section 775.021(4)(b) is inapplicable because possession is not a lesser included offense of sale or delivery of cocaine.
We acknowledge conflict with V.A.A. v. State, 561 So.2d 314 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)
AFFIRMED.
PETERSON, J., concurs.
COWART, J., dissents with opinion.
. Neither Roberts v. State, 557 So.2d 685 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) nor McKinney v. State, 559 So.2d 621 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) are applicable to this case because those offenses occurred prior to the effective date of the amendment to section 775.021(4) Florida Statutes.
. Fifth Amendment, United States Constitution: "... nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy"; Article I, § 9, Florida Constitution: "... or be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense ."
.1982 amendment to Article I, § 12 of the Florida Constitution. This appears to have been in response to Odom v. State, 403 So.2d 936 (Fla.1981) in which the Supreme Court suppressed evidence obtained in violation of Article I, § 12 even though it would have been admissible under the United States Supreme Court interpretation of the fourth amendment.
. Dissenting opinion n. 3.
. Just as clearly it is not a category one offense (crime divisible into degrees) nor a catagory two offense (attempt to commit offenses) under Brown.