Case Name: Jeffrey L. SUTTON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2004-09-29
Citations: 909 So. 2d 292
Docket Number: No. 3D03-1503
Parties: Jeffrey L. SUTTON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: Before COPE, GERSTEN and GREEN, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 909
Pages: 292–296

Head Matter:
Jeffrey L. SUTTON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 3D03-1503.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Sept. 29, 2004.
Opinion Denying Rehearing Aug. 10, 2005.
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Robert Godfrey, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Jill K. Traína, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Before COPE, GERSTEN and GREEN, JJ.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Jeffrey L. Sutton appeals his conviction for second degree murder. We affirm.
In the first point on appeal, the State concedes that the trial court erred by overruling a defense objection to certain hearsay testimony giving a description of defendant-appellant Sutton shortly after the date of the crime. See Puryear v. State, 810 So.2d 901, 903-04 (Fla.2002). We are convinced, however, that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129 (Fla.1986).
Second, the defendant requested a jury instruction "that the testimony of an addict is to be scrutinized with great caution." TR. 519. The eyewitness to the murder testified that she had consumed one or two rocks of cocaine on Friday night, and then drank alcoholic beverages throughout the weekend. The shooting was on Sunday. The trial court denied the request for the special instruction.
We find no error. The Florida Supreme Court has said that "the judge should not invade the province of the jury by commenting on the evidence or indicating what inferences may be drawn from it." Fenelon v. State, 594 So.2d 292, 294 (Fla.1992). The instruction requested by the defense would have been contrary to that mandate, as it would have directed the jury how to weigh the testimony of the eyewitness.
In this case the eyewitness was questioned about her drug and alcohol consumption and her ability to perceive and report what she had seen. The same issue was explored in questions put to the police officers who interviewed this eyewitness right after the shooting. The issue was within the common understanding and common sense of lay jurors and the standard jury instruction on weighing the evidence was adequate. See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 2.04.
The defense argues, however, that in the federal Eleventh Circuit there is a pattern jury instruction along the lines requested by the defendant in this case. See Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal Cases) § 1.3 (2003), available at www.call.uscourts.gov/docu-ments/jury/crimjury.pdf. That may be so, but under Fenelon, the trial court correctly rejected the request for the special jury instruction.
Affirmed.