Case Name: Ephraim Peck v. John Glover
Court: Constitutional Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1819-05
Citations: 1 Nott & McC. 582
Docket Number: 
Parties: *Ephraim Peck v. John Glover.
Judges: Nott and Richardson, JJ., concurred!
Reporter: South Carolina Law Reports
Volume: 10
Pages: 351–352

Head Matter:
*Ephraim Peck v. John Glover.
A plaintiff declared as assignee of a bond given to the sheriff under the Prison Bounds Act, to which the defendant put in a general demurrer; demurrer sustained.
A bond taken under the Prison Bounds Act is not assignable.
Michael J. Budulph had been arrested at the suit of the plaintiff, on mesne process, and the defendant became his security, and entered into a bond to the sheriff', that he should keep the prison bounds, under the AcPof 1788, usually called the Prison Bounds Act. P. L. 55C. 2. Brev. Big. 158.
The sheriff assigned the bond to the plaintiff, and an action was commenced in his name, to which the defendant demurred generally. The demurrer was overruled in the Court below, and the plaintiff' had judgment, and a motion was now made to reverse that decision, and for leave to enter up judgment for the plaintiff in demurrer.

Opinion:
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
JonNSON, J.
The only question presented for the consideration of the Court, is whether the plaintiff could maintain an action in his own name, as assignee of the bond ? It cannot be doubted that this bond was not assignable at common law, and I think it is equally clear that it was not so under the Statute of Ann, or under the Act of 1798, and no such power is expressly given by the Prison Bound Act, under the authority of which it was taken. But it is said, that by construing the 7th clause of the Act which authorizes the sheriff to assign the bond given by a pri soner committed on execution, who shall not give in a schedule agreeable to the terms of his bond, together with the 2d clause, which authorizes the taking of the present bond, that power is impliedly given. I concur fully in the principle, that the intention of the Legislature ought always to prevail, and that to come at this intention, we are to look not only through -the whole Act, but through *all others which relate to the same subject; and from them, thus collectively viewed, the conclusion is to be drawn. But upon looking into the 7th clause of the Act, and the one immediately preceding it, and with which it is connected, and to which it refers, it will be found that they have relation to another subject, not indeed wholly of a different character, but to a different system of the same subject. These clauses are expressly intended to lessen the severity, and obtund the asperities of the insolvent debtor's law, which is different in the mode of application, and in the remedy and its effects, from the Prison Bounds Act, and cannot, therefore, be construed in part materia with other clauses of the Act.
Gregg and Willisson, for the motion. Blanding and Be Saussure contra.
I am, therefore, of opinion, that the motion ought to prevail.
Nott and Richardson, JJ., concurred!
Gantt, J., dissented.
2 Stat. 544; 5 Stat. 330; 5 Stat. 78.
Chev. 246 ; 2 Hill, 433; Harp. 390.
2 MoM. 58; 1 Hill, 375 ; 3 McC. 218; 11 Rich. 436; 4 Strob. 284 ; 4 McC. 19; 1 McC. 373, 300; 2 McC. 137, 267; Harp. 105.