Case Name: George Hamilton BLACK, Appellant, v. The STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee
Court: Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Oklahoma
Decision Date: 1973-01-31
Citations: 509 P.2d 941
Docket Number: No. A-17217
Parties: George Hamilton BLACK, Appellant, v. The STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee.
Judges: BLISS, P. J., concurs.
Reporter: Pacific Reporter 2d
Volume: 509
Pages: 941–944

Head Matter:
George Hamilton BLACK, Appellant, v. The STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee.
No. A-17217.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma.
Jan. 31, 1973.
Rehearing Denied May 23, 1973.
James C. Langley, Tulsa County Public Defender, Tulsa, for appellant.
Larry Derryberry, Atty. Gen., Raymond Naif eh, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Opinion:
OPINION
BUSSEY, Judge:
Appellant, George Hamilton Black, hereinafter referred to as defendant, entered a plea of guilty in the District Court of Tulsa County, Case No. CRF 71-1812, of Unlawful Delivery of Marijuana; his punishment was fixed at two (2) years imprisonment and from said judgment and sentence, a timely Writ of Certiorari has been perfected to this Court.
The defendant asserts four propositions of error, all of which concern the constitutionality of 63 O.S.1971, § 2-401(B)(2), which provides as follows:
"B. Any person who violates this section with respect to:
2. Any other controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule I, II, III, or IV is guilty of a felony and shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for not less than two (2) years nor more than ten (10) years and a fine of not more than Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00). Such sentence shall not be subject to statutory provisions for suspended sentences, deferred sentences or probation."
The defendant argues that the section is unconstitutional and that Legislature has exceeded its constitutionally limited powers by invading the judicial domain, that the denial of the possibility of probation constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and violates due process and equal protection of the laws. We are of the opinion that the Legislature properly exercised its power to prohibit suspension of-a sentence in a given case as an inherent part of its power to prescribe punishment for the acts which it has prohibited as criminal.
In Chatman v. Page, Okl.Cr., 484 P.2d 537 (1971) and Curry v. Page, Okl.Cr., 484 P.2d 887 (1971), we held that a trial court has the inherent power and authority to suspend a judgment and sentence, either in whole or in part, absent legislative authorization. In Curry and Chatman, supra, the trial court suspended a portion of the sentence without statutory authority to do so, wherein the instant case there is an expressed statutory prohibition against a suspended sentence. In dealing with a similar question in the case of Lathem v. United States, 5 Cir., 259 F.2d 393 (1958) the court stated:
"Probation and parole are a matter of legislative grace. There is no substance to appellant's contention that the power to grant probation and parole invades the power of the judiciary and violates the doctrine of separation of powers. Ex parte United States, 1916, 242 U.S. 27, 37 S.Ct. 72, 61 L.Ed. 129; Affronti v. United States, 1955, 350 U.S. 79, 76 S.Ct. 171, 100 L.Ed. 62. There is also no merit to the contention that denial of probation for a first offense is cruel and unusual punishment. The punishment, imprisonment, is usual. Ginsberg v. United States, 5 Cir., 1938, 96 F.2d 433."
The Court further stated in Lathem, supra :
"Appellant seems to think that a first offender is entitled to special consideration. He is right, but it is not the consideration he has in mind. The legislative history of the statute shows that the first offender is given special consideration — when it comes to trafficking in narcotics. He is denied probation and parole and sentenced to a minimum of five years imprisonment. The House and Conference Report on the bill that became the Narcotic Control Act of 1956, points out that eighty per cent of violators of the narcotics laws are first offenders. 'Therefore it is the view of your committee that the first-offender-peddler problem will become progressively worse and eventually lead to the large scale recruiting of our youth by the upper echelon of traffickers unless immediate action is taken to prohibit parole, probation, or suspension of sentence in case of all persons convicted in narcotic and marihuana drugs."
In conclusion, we observe that the provision of 63 O.S.1971, § 2^-01, which prohibits the suspension of a sentence upon con viction of the sale of the enumerated items is constitutional. We further observe that such prohibition does not represent an encroachment upon the Judicial Branch by the Legislature, nor does the same violate the Fifth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. The judgment and sentence is affirmed.
BLISS, P. J., concurs.
BRETT, J., dissents.