Case Name: Commonwealth versus John Francis Knapp
Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
Jurisdiction: Massachusetts
Decision Date: 1830-07
Citations: 9 Pick. 496
Docket Number: 
Parties: Commonwealth versus John Francis Knapp.
Judges: 
Reporter: Massachusetts Reports
Volume: 26
Pages: 505–528

Head Matter:
Commonwealth versus John Francis Knapp.
This Court will not assign as counsel for a prisoner, one who is only an attorney of the Court of Common Pleas.
In a capital case the Court directed that the party indicted should be furnished by the counsel for the government, with a list of the witnesses examined as to his case before the grand jury.
In a capital trial, if a juror, being put upon his voir dire by the prisoner, makes such answers as that he cannot be challenged for cause, the prisoner may still challenge him peremptorily.
A juror having said, upon the voir dire, that from what he had read in the newspapers, his prejudices were against the prisoner, but that he had no definite opinion, and that he should be governed by the evidence, the prisoner was allowed to challenge him for cause.
A juror having said, on the voir dire, that he had formed an opinion from what he had heard, was asked if he had formed such an opinion as incapacitated him from giving an impartial verdict;, he replied, that he did not know how much he might be influenced by his preconceived opinion. This was allowed as a cause for challenge.
If a juror, having been sworn in chief, is under the impression that he was sworn only upon the voir dire, he should be again sworn in chief.
In a capital trial, the Court, upon motion, will exclude from the court-room all the witnesses except the one under examination.
Two brothers, F. and J., being indicted for a murder, avd F. being put upon his trial» a witness testified, that P., a third brother, said to F., * J. has determined to make a confession, and we want your consent.” F. said he thought it hard that J. should have the advantage of making a confession, since the thing was done for his benefit. p. said> « If j. is convicted, there will be no chance for him, but if you are convicted, you may have some chance for procuring a pardon;” and P. then asked the witness if he did not think so. The witness said he did not know; he was unwilling to hold out any improper encouragement. Held, by Wilde J. and Morton J. (Putnam J. dissenting), that the assent would be evidence of F.’s guilt; that a hope of favor was held out, to induce him to give his assent; and that all subsequent confessions at the same interview should be excluded, as being made under he «ame influence.
But it appearing afterwards, that the proposition had no influence on F., inasmuch as he neither assented nor refused his assent, his confessions were allowed to be proved.
In a criminal trial, no more than two counsel will be allowed to manage the prosecution on the part of the government.
Where a fact has been ascertained in consequence of a prisoner’s confession improperly obtained, the government may prove that it was ascertained by means of the confession. Thus, where the confessions were excluded, the witness was nevertheless permitted to testily, that a weapon used in the commission of a murder, was found by him in a particular place, and that he was directed to the place by the prisoner.
The record of a witness’s having been convicted in another State for an infamous crime, is admissible in evidence to affect his credibility.
The St, 1784, c. 65, providing that “if any person shall aid, assist, abet, counsel, hire, command or procure any person to commit the crime of murder, he shall be considered as an accessory before the fact,” refers to a person not present aiding, &c.; and does not mean to abolish the distinction between principals in the second degree and accessories.
Upon a motion for a continuance of a capital cause on account of the absence of a material witness, the affidavit of the prisoner himself will be received in support of the motion.
On a trial for murder, the jury, upon their own request, seconded by the wish of the counsel on both sides, and the consent of the prisoner, were permitted to view the place where the murder was committed, and to take with them plans which had been exhibited and explained in court, but no person was allowed to speak to them while taking the view.
To be present, aiding and abetting the commission of a felony, the abettor must be in a situation where he may actually aid the perpetrator; it is not enough that he is at a place appointed, where the perpetrator erroneously supposes he might render aid.
Proof that a person conspired to commit a murder subsequently perpetrated, is not in itself to be taken as a legal presumption of his having aided, but it is to be weighed as evidence tending to prove that fact.
But if it is proved that there was a conspiracy, and that one of the conspirators was in a situation in which he might have given aid to the perpetrator at the time of the murder, it is a legal presumption that lie was there to carry into effect the preconcerted crime, and it is for him to rebut the presumption by showing that he was there for a purpose unconnected with the conspiracy.
John Francis Knapp was indicted as principal, together with Joseph Jenkins Knapp and George Crowninshield as ac cessories, in the murder of Joseph White of Salem, which was perpetrated on the 6th of April, 1830. The indictment alleged, that Richard Crowninshield also was a principal, and that he had committed suicide. The parties indicted were tried separately.
On the arraignment of J. Francis Knapp on the 23d of July, he desired that R. Rantoul, who had recently been admitted an attorney of the Court of Common Pleas, might be assigned as one of his counsel ; but the Court refused his request, observ mg that they had no control over Rantoul as an officer of this Court. They added, that it was proper that a person of more legal experience should be assigned, who might render aid to the Court as well as to the prisoner.
On the first day of the term, F. Dextet, on behalf of the persons accused of the murder, stated it to be the English practice, to indorse on the indictment the names of the witnesses exam ined in the case by the grand jury, and he requested that this might be done, should any bills be found. The Solicitor-General said that by our practice the grand jury return a list of all the witnesses examined by them, without naming the cases, but that if it was desired in the present instance, the witnesses examined upon each case should be specified. Dexter requested that this course might be pursued. Now, after indictments had been found, Dexter and W. H. Gardiner, of counsel for the prisoner, stated that they had not been furnished with a list of the witnesses.
Morton (Attorney-General) said it was not a matter of right, except under the statute of treason.

Opinion:
Putnam J.
The solicitor-general promised to furnish a list, and I think it is right that it should be done. If an indictment is found upon improper evidence, it ought to be known.
Wilde J.
A list of the witnesses has never been refused in a case of this kind.
Per Curiam.
We are of opinion that the list shall be furnished to the counsel for the prisoner.
In impannelling the jury, a juror was asked by the prisoner's counsel, whether he had formed or expressed an opinion as to the guilt of the prisoner, or was sensible of any bias or prejudice against him ; and upon his answering in the negative, the prisoner challenged him.
Webster,
of counsel for the government, objected that after such an answer it was too late to challenge.
Per Curiam. We are strongly of opinion that the prisoner has a right to challenge under such circumstances. A juror may answer in such manner as to place himself above any legal exception, and yet excite distrust in the mind of the prisoner. The challenge will be peremptory.
Another juror, being questioned, said he did not know whether he had expressed an opinion or not; that from what he had read in the newspapers, he had received an impression unfavorable to the prisoner, but that he had no fixed and definite opinion on the subject; he should be governed by the evidence. The prisoner objected to the juror for cause. The counsel for the government denied that there was cause. The Court then asked the juror, if, in his opinion, he had made up his mind so that he could not give the case an impartial hear ing. The juror replied, " that he must say that his prejudices were against the prisoner." The challenge for cause was thereupon allowed.
Another juror, having stated that he had formed an opinion in the case from what he had heard, was asked by the counsel for the government whether he had formed such an opinion as incapacitated him from giving an impartial verdict; he replied that he did not know how much he might be influenced by his preconceived opinion ; whereupon he was challenged for cause by the counsel for the government.
Another juror, who was noted by the clerk to have been sworn in chief, stated, when the panel was called over, that he had been sworn only upon the voir dire. The prisoner's counsel contended that the minute of the clerk was conclusive, but the Court said if the juror was under the impression that he had been sworn only to answer questions, he ought to be re- . sworn in chiet.
An inquiry was made in regard to excluding from the courtroom, all the witnesses except the one who might be under examination. The Court said that where a motion has been made for that purpose, it has generally been granted. The counsel for the prisoner then requested that the witnesses in the present case might be directed to withdraw, and the Court passed an order accordingly.
The Rev. Henry Colman testified as follows : — " On the afternoon of May 28th, I went to the prisoner's cell with his brother N. Phippen Knapp. Phippen said, ' Well, Frank, Joseph has determined to make a confession, and we want your consent.' The prisoner said, in effect, he thought it hard, or not fair, that Joseph should have the advantage of making the confession, since the thing was done for his benefit. ' I told Joseph, when he proposed it, that it was a silly business, and would only get us into difficulty.' Phippen, as I supposed to reconcile Frank to Joseph's confessing, told him, that if Joseph was convicted, there wotxld be no chance for him (Joseph), but if he (Frank) was convicted, he might have some chance lor procuring a pardon. Phippen then appealed to me and asked me if I did not think so. I told him, 6 I did not know , I was unwilling to hold out any improper encouragement.' "
The counsel for the prisoner objected to the witness's stating any further confessions, it appearing that a hope of pardon was held out to the prisoner if he would make a confession.
Webster, for the Commonwealth, said that as a general principle, confessions are evidence. To exclude them, the prisoner must show that they were not voluntary. In the course of the conversation referred to by the witness, the prisoner made important admissions, which the government are entitled to prove, unless they come within the exception. There is no evidence that they were obtained by encouragement or menace. No confession was asked of the prisoner, but he was merely requested to assent to his brother's making a confession. He is not told that it will be better for him to assent ; but just the reverse ; that making such a confession will save his brother an(j be better on the whole, but that it will be worse for the prisoner. If there was any encouragement, the object, of it was, not to procure the prisoner's confession, but to induce him to consent that another person should make a confession. What he uttered besides, was not upon such encouragement.
Dexter and Gardiner, contra,
observed that evidence of the slightest improper influence upon the prisoner, would exclude his confessions. It is said that nothing was asked, except an assent that Joseph should confess ; but such assent is itself a confession, and the prisoner was encouraged to assent, by the chance of pardon which was held out to him. That the language of Phippen was understood as encouragement, is proved by the remark of Colman, that he was unwilling to hold out improper encouragement. The natural import of the words is, if Joseph is convicted, he will have no chance ; if you confess and are convicted, there may be a hope for pardon. If the encouragement applied only to the assent, yet all that was said by the prisoner afterwards was under the same influence, and therefore cannot be received in evidence. As to the nature of this species of evidence, they cited Foster, 243 ; Phil. Ev. (1st Am. ed.) 86, 81, and note ; 2 Stark. Ev. 48 ; Rex v. Thompson, 1 Leach, 325.
Wilde J. and Morton J. expressed the e opinions, that the assent of the prisoner that Joseph should confess, would imply that the prisoner was guilty ; that the assent was given under the influence of a hope of pardon which was held out to him ; and that the subsequent admissions at the same interview must be considered to have been made under the same influence.
See Commonwealth v. Locke, 4 Pick. 485. But the prisoner is not entitled to a list of the witnesses, whom the counsel for the government propose to examine at the trial. Commonwealth v. Walton, 17 Pick. 403.
See People v. Mather, 4 Wendell, 229 ; Ex parte Vermilyea, 6 Cowen, 555 People v. Jewett 3 Wendell, 314; Mice v. State, 1 Yerger, 432; Brown v. Com monwealthy 2 Leigh, 769; JYoble v. People, 1 Breese, 29.
See 1 Chitty on Crim. Law, (3d Am. ed.) 617, 618 and cases cited in notes; Roscoe's Dig. Crim. Ev. 123; Revised Stat. c. 135, § 14.