Case Name: COLGAN v. FARMERS' & MECHANICS' BANK
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1910-01-18
Citations: 59 Or. 469
Docket Number: 
Parties: COLGAN v. FARMERS’ & MECHANICS’ BANK.
Judges: Mr. Justice Burnett took no part in the trial or consideration of this cause on appeal.
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 59
Pages: 469–483

Head Matter:
On Motion to Dismiss, decided January 18, 1910.
Argued March 2,
decided March 21,
rehearing denied June 13, 1911.
Further rehearing denied September 19, 1911.
COLGAN v. FARMERS’ & MECHANICS’ BANK.
[106 Pac. 1134: 114 Pac. 460: 117 Pac. 807.]
Appeal and Error — Decisions Reviewable — Denial op New Trial.
1. Refusal to set aside a judgment and to grant a new trial for abuse of judicial discretion is subject to review on appeal, notwithstanding Laws 1907, p. 313, § 6, now incorporated in Section 548, L. O. L., providing that an order setting aside a judgment and granting a new trial for the purpose of being reviewed shall be deemed a judgment or decree.
Trial — Objections.
2. A party having a suitable occasion to object and except to anything considered detrimental to his interests must take advantage of it when it occurs, if he has knowledge thereof, as he will not be permitted to speculate on a favorable verdict and, if disappointed, seek to question the proceedings by a new trial.
New Trial — Scope of Remedy.
3. A defeated party by moving for a new trial may present for re-examination alleged errors to which exceptions have been duly taken, in order that the court by granting a new trial may correct any mistakes that may have been made, and thus avoid the necessity of taking an appeal.
New Trial — Scope of Remedy.
4. A motion for a new trial, when interposed by a defeated party, may make reviewable an exercise of the court’s discretion respecting any matter that has arisen from the impaneling of the jury until verdict, of which such party had no knowledge.
New Trials — -Bill of Exceptions.
5. In such case evidence of' the prejudicial act or conduct must be submitted by affidavits or in some other substantial form, so that a memoranda thereof may be incorporated in the bill of exceptions.
Appeal and error — Motion for New Trial.
6. A motion of a defeated party for a new trial, so far as any action by the court thereon can constitute a final judgment and form the basis of an appeal, is limited to the question of discretion, for, since an appeal from the judgment will bring up all errors assigned, except as to matters occurring without the knowledge of such party until after the verdict is returned, a motion for a new trial is unnecessary in all other instances; for if errors occurred at the trial, and were excepted to by defendant, such matters can be considered on appeal from the judgment.
Appeal and Error — Review.
7. The sufficiency of a complaint can be challenged for the first time on appeal.
Appeal and Error — Scope of Review.
8. The sufficiency of a complaint may be examined on an appeal from the judgment.
Exceptions, Bill of — Preparation.
9. Section 170, L. O. L., provides that, if an objection is made to any ruling of the court and the truth of the statement thereof is not agreed on between counsel and court, the counsel may verify his statement thereof by his own oath and that of two disinterested persons, or by his own oath and that of the stenographer, and file the same as an exception to the ruling objected to. Held that, where the trial judge refused to adopt the formal written statement prepared, and an amended bill was prepared and certified to which was attached the rejected manuscript, the written statement of the objections and exceptions certified by the judge was controlling; no attempt having been made to secure a bill of exceptions in the manner prescribed by the statute.
Contracts — Breach of Action — Pleading.
10. A complaint stated that plaintiff, being the owner of certain land and indebted to a specified amount in consideration of the cancellation of the debt, executed to defendant a deed to the property under a contract, whereby it was provided that, if he procured a purchaser to buy the land for the amount of the debt, defendant, on receipt thereof, would execute a deed to the purchaser and permit plaintiff to keep the remainder of the consideration; that plaintiff obtained one who was willing to buy the land for more than the debt, and notified defendant that he had secured such purchaser, and offered to pay to defendant on the execution of the deed to the purchaser the amount of the debt, but that defendant refused to accept the payment or execute the deed, and stated that it had conveyed the property to another person in exchange for other lands, whereby plaintiff was damaged. Held, that the complaint was not insufficient, because it did not allege that defendant owned the property and was capable of conveying the title.
Sales — Nature of Contract.
11. A sale is generally understood to mean the transfer of property for money.
Exchange of Property — What Constitutes.
12. A “trade” is synonymous with an “exchange,” which signifies a transfer of one or more pieces of property for other property.
Mortgages — Nature—Equitable Mortgages.
13. Where a debtor transferred land to his creditor under a contract providing that if the creditor sold it for more than the debt, or if the debtor secured a purchaser who would pay more, the creditor would transfer it to the purchaser, and give the debtor any surplus, the conveyance and contemporaneous agreement constituted an equitable mortgage, and, in an action by the debtor for a breach, the creditor might set oif the taxes and expenses in maintaining the property.
Mortgages — Nature—Equitable Mortgages — Contract
14. Such agreement was not a necessary incident of the mortgage, but was a separate and independent contract; and an action at law would lie for its breach.
Mortgages — Nature—Equitable Mortgages — Contract—Breach.
15. The creditor’s transfer of the land by way of exchange was a breach of the contract, and. when the debtor produced a purchaser able and willing to buy, his right of action was complete, and could not be defeated by the creditor’s subsequent repurchase of the land and tender of a deed.
Contracts — Demand—Time for Performance.
16. The rule that a party to a contract is entitled to a reasonable time after demand in which to perform, does not apply where by his own act he has made performance impossible.
From Marion: George H. Burnett, Judge.
This is an action by George H. Colgan against the Farmers’ & Mechanics’ Bank of Woodburn. Plaintiff-respondent files motion to dismiss defendant’s appeal from an order denying a new trial.
Denied.
Mr. Frank Holmes for the motion.
Mr. Thomas O’Day and Mr. E. P. Moreom, contra.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice King
delivered the opinion of the court.
Plaintiff, by his counsel, moves to dismiss defendant's appeal from the order denying a new trial, and to strike from the files defendant's proposed bill of exceptions, containing Exhibit A. In support of the motion it is argued that the order denying a new trial is not "a final order affecting a substantial right," as used in Section 547, c. 162, p. 313, of the Session Laws of 1907, and that the proposed bill of exceptions, Exhibit A, is an incumbrance of the record, in that the bill of exceptions, as allowed by the court, contains all the record, from which it appears no objections nor exceptions were taken.
Statement by Mr. Justice Moore.
This is an action to recover money. The complaint states in effect that defendant is a domestic corporation; that on January 27, 1909, plaintiff was the owner of 50 acres of land in Marion County, describing the premises, and being then indebted in the sum of $2,669.40 he on that day, in consideration of the cancellation of such debts and the surrender of the evidence thereof, executed to defendant a deed to the real property, pursuant to a contract which, among other things, provided that if he could procure a purchaser who was ready, able, and willing to buy the land and pay the sum of $2,669.40 and interest thereon at the rate of 8 per cent per annum from January 27, 1909, to the time of such payment, the defendant, upon the receipt thereof, would execute a deed of the real property to the purchaser and permit the plaintiff to keep the remainder of the consideration, if any; that plaintiff obtained James. Stewart who, on May 15, 1909, then was, ever since has been, and is, ready, able, and willing to buy the land and to pay therefor $4,000, which sum is the reasonable value thereof; that on the day last named plaintiff notified defendant that he had secured such purchaser, and then offered to pay to it, upon the execution of a deed to Stewart, the sum of $2,669.40, with interest as stated, amounting to $2,734.66; that in violation of the terms of the agreement, defendant refused to accept the payment or execute a deed, and then stated that it had conveyed the premises to - Young in exchange for other lands, thereby causing plaintiff to lose the difference between the sum so offered by Stewart and the amount of the debt, or $1,265.34, for which judgment is demanded.
While the questions thus presented may be raised by motion, the points being new, involving the construction of an act which, in some respects, changes the rules of practice on appeal, it is of such vast importance to the trial courts, and bar generally, throughout the State, that we deem it best to defer action thereon until the cause may be presented on its merits, when we may receive the benefit of an oral discussion of the subject; and it is so ordered. Denied.