Case Name: PEOPLE v. HACKER
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1983-08-02
Citations: 127 Mich. App. 796
Docket Number: Docket No. 65933
Parties: PEOPLE v HACKER
Judges: Before: T. M. Burns, P.J., and R. M. Maher and Hood, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 127
Pages: 796–803

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v HACKER
Docket No. 65933.
Submitted January 21, 1983, at Detroit.
Decided August 2, 1983.
Leave to appeal applied for.
Russell Hacker was convicted on his plea of guilty of breaking and entering with intent to commit larceny, Presque Isle Circuit Court, Robert R. Ferguson, J. The trial court delayed sentencing on that charge for one year. Within that one year period, defendant was charged with and pled guilty to another breaking and entering and reckless driving. Subsequent to the acts giving rise to the second breaking and entering and reckless driving charges defendant was sentenced to one year in the county jail on the first breaking and entering conviction. Thereafter, defendant was placed on three years probation with the first 280 days to be served in the county jail on the second breaking and entering and was sentenced to 90 days in jail on the reckless driving conviction. The court ordered that, because the two subsequent charges arose out of acts committed while disposition was pending on the first charge, the sentence on the subsequent felony should run consecutively to the sentence on the first charge. Defendant appeals. Held:
The first charge was still pending within the meaning of the consecutive sentencing act at the time the acts giving rise to the subsequent charges were committed, since the delaying of sentencing as to the first charge in no way terminated those proceedings. The provisions of the consecutive sentencing act therefore were applicable.
Affirmed.
R. M. Maher, J., dissented. He would hold that the consecutive sentencing statute is not applicable as to any subsequent felony committed after the trial judge has delayed sentencing pursuant to statute. He would hold that the trial judge could not order that the sentence as to the second breaking and entering be consecutive to the sentence for the first breaking and entering and would remand for resentencing.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1, 2, 4, 5] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 526, 551 et seq.
21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 552.
Opinion op the Court
1. Criminal Law — Sentencing — Delayed Sentences — Consecutive Sentencing Act.
A criminal charge is deemed to be pending for the purpose of the consecutive sentence act until the defendant is sentenced; a defendant is deemed to have been sentenced when placed on probation, deferred sentencing is not equivalent to being placed on probation, and any felony committed during the period that sentencing on the first charge is deferred is deemed to have been committed while the first felony charge is still pending and thus subjects the defendant to the provisions of the consecutive sentence act (MCL 768.7b; MSA 28.1030[2]).
2. Criminal Law — Sentencing — Consecutive Sentencing Act.
The purpose of the statutory provision allowing consecutive sentences where a second felony is committed during the pendency of a prior felony charge is to deter such crimes by removing the security which the defendant might feel knowing that the sentence on the second felony would run concurrently with the sentence on the first felony; such deterrent effect would be abrogated by holding that the statutory provision for consecutive sentences does not apply where there has been a delayed sentence (MCL 768.7b; MSA 28.1030[2]).
Dissent by R. M. Maher, J.
3. Criminal Law — Sentencing — Concurrent Sentences — Consecutive Sentencing Act.
Concurrent sentences are the norm and consecutive sentencing is not to be used except when speciñcally authorized by statute; the consecutive sentencing act is a speciñc statutory exception to the general rule and allows a trial court to impose consecutive sentences in appropriate circumstances (MCL 768.7b; MSA 28.1030[2]).
4. Criminal Law — Sentencing — Consecutive Sentencing Act.
The purpose of the consecutive sentencing act is to deter persons accused of one felony from committing other felonies by removing the security of concurrent sentences should conviction result on any or all of the felonies committed (MCL 768.7b; MSA 28.1030[2]).
5. Criminal Law — Sentencing — Consecutive Sentencing Act.
The consecutive sentencing act is designed to replace the deterrent against committing any further felony removed by Michigan’s concurrent sentencing policy; where the deterrent against committing a subsequent felony is otherwise provided, however, the consecutive sentencing act should not be applied to provide an additional deterrent (MCL 768.7b; MSA 28.1030[2]).
6. Criminal Law — Sentencing — Delayed Sentences — Consecutive Sentencing Act.
The provisions of the consecutive sentencing act do not apply where the second felony is committed while under a delayed sentence for the ñrst felony (MCL 768.7b; MSA 28.1030[2]).
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Louis J. Caruso, Solicitor General, Donald J. McLennan, Prosecuting Attorney, and Mary C. Smith, Assistant Attorney General, for the people.
State Appellate Defender (by Sheila N. Robertson), for defendant.
Before: T. M. Burns, P.J., and R. M. Maher and Hood, JJ.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
The pertinent facts are set forth in Judge Maher's dissent and will not be repeated here.
Defendant's argument on appeal is that his delayed sentencing pursuant to MCL 771.1(2); MSA 28.1131(2) was tantamount to being placed on probation. Therefore, defendant asserts, his first breaking and entering conviction was no longer pending within. the meaning of the consecutive sentencing proviso, MCL 768.7b; MSA 28.1030(2), when he committed the second breaking and entering.
In People v Mayes, 78 Mich App 618, 621; 261 NW2d 22 (1977), this Court held that a charge is deemed pending within the meaning of MCL 768.7b; MSA 28.1030(2) until a defendant is sentenced. In People v Leal, 71 Mich App 319, 321; 248 NW2d 252 (1976), lv den 399 Mich 821 (1977), this Court held that a defendant is sentenced when placed on probation. Once placed on probation, the disposition of that case is no longer pending.
Deferred sentencing pursuant to MCL 771.1; MSA 28.1131 is not equivalent to being placed on probation. In People v Saylor, 88 Mich App 270, 275; 276 NW2d 885 (1979), this Court said that a delayed sentence means no sentence is initially imposed even though the trial court may impose conditions upon the defendant. See also People v Clyne, 36 Mich App 152, 155; 193 NW2d 399 (1971). The imposition of those conditions is not construed as tantamount to placing the defendant on probation. Clyne, supra. Therefore, defendant was not yet sentenced for his first breaking and entering conviction when he committed the second offense; disposition of his first case was pending.
Because defendant's first B & E charge was still pending, the consecutive sentencing proviso clearly applies. The language of the statute is mandatory; once a defendant commits a subsequent felony offense when a felony charge is pending, the consecutive sentencing option "shall" apply. Whether that option is imposed as a condition of the sentence for the second or subsequent felony conviction is discretionary with the trial court.
Not only is the language of MCL 768.7b; MSA 28.1030(2) clear and mandatory, but, unlike Judge Maher, we find that § 7b does not impose additional deterrents in this case. While a defendant given delayed sentencing has an incentive to stay on the right side of the law, that incentive cannot be equated with the deterrence intended by § 7b. The purposes of the two statutes at issue, as indicated in the dissenting opinion, are not the same. A defendant given a delayed sentence still faces a possible maximum term for his or her conviction dependent upon many conditions, only one of which is that of avoiding a subsequent felony charge.
Should the dissent's rationale be applied to defendants given delayed sentences, this Court would be interpreting § 7b in a manner that would abrogate the statute's intended deterrent effect rather than liberally construing it. See Mayes, supra, p 621. The defendant would again have the security of knowing that, if convicted of the second felony, the sentence on the second conviction would run concurrently with the first sentence. See People v Henry, 107 Mich App 632; 309 NW2d 922 (1981).
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.