Case Name: Dorothy YOUNG, Respondent v. MEETING STREET PIGGLY WIGGLY, Appellant
Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1986-04-14
Citations: 288 S.C. 508
Docket Number: 0677
Parties: Dorothy YOUNG, Respondent v. MEETING STREET PIGGLY WIGGLY, Appellant.
Judges: Shaw, J., concurs.
Reporter: South Carolina Reports
Volume: 288
Pages: 508–516

Head Matter:
0677
Dorothy YOUNG, Respondent v. MEETING STREET PIGGLY WIGGLY, Appellant.
(343 S. E. (2d) 636)
Court of Appeals
Stephen E. Darling, of Sinkler, Gibbs & Simons, Charleston, for appellant.
Francis X. McCann, Charleston, for respondent.
Heard Jan. 29, 1986.
Decided April 14, 1986.

Opinion:
Goolsby, Judge:
The respondent Dorothy Young brought this slip and fall case against the appellant Meeting Street Piggly Wiggly. The jury awarded her $11,000 in actual damages. The dis-positive question is whether the trial court properly denied Piggly Wiggly's motions for involuntary nonsuit, directed verdict, and judgment notwithstanding the verdict. We reverse.
We are aware that, in determining whether the trial court committed error in denying Piggly Wiggly's motions for involuntary nonsuit, directed verdict, and judgment notwithstanding the verdict, we must view the evidence and all inferences reasonably deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to Young, the nonmoving party. Vacation Time of Hilton Head v. Lighthouse Realty, 286 S. C. 261, 332 S. E. (2d) 781 (Ct. App. 1985). We are also aware that we are required to affirm if there is any evidence to sustain the factual findings implicit in the jury's verdict. Id. Here, however, the evidence yields only one reasonable inference and that inference does not favor Young.
Young slipped on some water and fell "by the entrance" to Piggly Wiggly's Meeting Street store in Charleston. It had been raining heavily all day long.
Because of the tracking in of rain onto its floor by customers and others, Piggly Wiggly's employees had been mopping the floor about every five or ten minutes.
In addition to mopping the floor, the employees of the store had brought two mop buckets "to the front." They had placed one bucket at the store entrance near a check-out and had put the other in a corner. Each bucket stood two feet tall and was painted a bright yellow. The words "WET FLOOR" written on each bucket's side in dark, bold letters warned customers and others of the floor's condition.
Piggly Wiggly used two mats to absorb the water tracked in on its floor by customers and others. One mat was situated outside its electronically-operated entrance door. The second mat, described as a "sponge mat," lay just inside the entrance in a "T" configuration with the electronic door's grooved, rubber floor.
Young, who is overweight and blind in her left eye, entered the store after walking across the parking lot in the rain. She wore no rain gear. She did have on, however, a pair of worn-out leather shoes.
Young fell after taking a few steps inside the store. Although she knew "it was wet" when she went to the Piggly Wiggly, Young did not look at the floor as she entered the store. Nothing, however, blocked her vision and she had a clear view of the floor and of the store.
No other falls occurred at the store prior to Young's fall, even though it had rained throughout the day. Piggly Wiggly received no customer complaints before this accident. The floor where Young fell had been mopped between two and ten minutes before her arrival.
The duty owed a customer by a merchant in South Carolina is well established. A merchant is not the insurer of his customer's safety; rather, a merchant owes his customer the duty to exercise ordinary care to keep his premises in a reasonably safe condition. Milligan v. Winn-Dixie Raleigh, Inc., 273 S. C. 118, 254 S. E. (2d) 798 (1979); Bagwell v. McLellan Stores Co., 216 S. C. 207, 57 S. E. (2d) 257 (1949).
In our view, Piggly Wiggly took reasonable steps to remove excess water from the entrance way to its store.
Since it is impossible to keep commercial premises entirely free of tracked-in rain during bad weather, a merchant's liability may not be based solely on the presence of moisture. See Annot., 20 A. L. R. 4th 438, 448 (1983).
In S. S. Kresge Co. v. Fader, 116 Ohio St. 718, 158 N. E. 174 (1927), a case not unlike the one here, the plaintiff sued a store as a result of a fall occurring in the store's entrance. The floor was made slippery by water tracked in by customers coming in from the rain. The court observed as it reversed the trial court and entered judgment for the store:
Everybody knows that, when people are entering any building when it is raining, they will carry some moisture on their feet, which will render the floor near the door on the inside damp to some extent, and every one knows that a damp floor is likely to be a little more slippery than a dry floor____
. It is not the duty of persons in control of such buildings to keep a large force of moppers to mop up the rain as fast as it falls or blows in, or is carried in by wet feet or clothing or umbrellas, for several very good reasons, all so obvious that it is wholly unnecessary to mention them here in detail.
Not every accident that occurs gives rise to a cause of action upon which the party injured may recover damages from some one. Thousands of accidents occur every day for which no one is liable in damages, and often no one is to blame, not even the ones who are injured____
158 N. E. at 175-76.
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that, considering bad weather conditions, a store had exercised reasonable care in keeping the entrance to its store safe when it mopped up tracked-in water every hour or two. Weidenhaft v. Shoppers Fair of Des Moines, Inc., 165 N. W. (2d) 756 (Iowa 1969). In support of its holding, the court stated:
The record here shows only the wet, dirty floor normally encountered in Iowa under these weather conditions. We do not believe the possessor would as a reasonable prudent person anticipate the condition would present an unreasonable risk to a person using due care. Precautions taken here were sufficient to discharge his duty to exercise due care for plaintiffs safety.
There is no proof in the record the condition which faced plaintiff here contained an unreasonable hazard which possessor should have anticipated she as an ordinary reasonable prudent person would fail to appreciate. The condition complained of here was a temporary one caused by weather conditions.
165 N. W. (2d) at 761.
Here, mats were added at the entrance, the floor at the front was mopped about every five or ten minutes, and at least one warning of wet floors was posted near where Young fell. These steps were reasonable, considering the weather conditions and given that an ordinary reasonable person would know that there would inevitably be moisture on the floor as a result of rain-soaked people coming into the store. See Smith v. Winn-Dixie Stores of Louisiana, Inc., 389 So. (2d) 900 (La. App. 1980); Key v. J. C. Penney Co., 165 Ga. App. 176, 299 S. E. (2d) 895 (1983); Stafford v. Food World, Inc., 31 N. C. App. 213, 228 S. E. (2d) 756 (1976), cert. denied, 291 N. C. 324, 230 S. E. (2d) 677 (1976).
As the Georgia Court of Appeals said in a recent case whose facts mirror those involved in this case,
The risk of harm imposed by some accumulation of water on the floor of business premises during rainy days is not unusual or unreasonable in itself, but is one to which all who go out on a rainy day may be exposed and which all may expect or anticipate.
Colbert v. Piggly Wiggly Southern, 175 Ga. App. 44, 332 S. E. (2d) 304, 306 (1985).
The trial court committed reversible error, therefore, in allowing Young to go to the jury on the question of negligence merely by showing that there was some water on the floor of Piggly Wiggly's store.
Finding no need to do so, we do not reach the other issues Piggly Wiggly raises on appeal.
Reversed.
Shaw, J., concurs.
Cureton, J., dissents in separate opinion.