Case Name: Mrs. A. R. Smith vs. City of New Orleans et al.
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1891-05
Citations: 43 La. Ann. 726
Docket Number: No. 10,495
Parties: Mrs. A. R. Smith vs. City of New Orleans et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Louisiana Annual Reports
Volume: 43
Pages: 726–735

Head Matter:
No. 10,495.
Mrs. A. R. Smith vs. City of New Orleans et al.
ON MOTION TO DISMISS.
Suit having been brought against a State tax-collector for the revocation of a tax title he had made to the State, and judgment having been rendered annulling it, he is competent, quoad /¿oc, to prosecute an appeal for the State, and stand in judgment here.
Personating the State, as such a suit concedes him to be, the State tax-collector was under no obligation to furnish an appeal bond, and the judge a quo properly dispensed him from it.
ON TUB MBRITR.
1. Notwithstanding a sale to the State was made in the enforced collection of State taxes of 1881, yet, being made in January, 1885, it was authorized by the terms of Sections 52 and 59 of Act 95 of 1882, and theproperty was correctly adjudicated to the State.
2. The properly was adjudicated to the State, as the last and highest bidder, at public auction. A forfeiture for the non-payment of taxes is, ordinarily accomplished by the registry of a delinquent list, in the office of the recorder of mortgages or auditor of public accounts, whereby the title of alt properties lliereon listed passes to the sovereign by a statutory condemnation .
3. Section 5 of Act 105 of 1874 is a recognized tax statute of prescription, which limits the time within which the original owner of property alienated for taxes shall be allowed a right ol' action against a purchaser, to invalidate his title. This prescription is sui generis.
APPEAL from the Oivil District Court for the Parish of Orleans. Ellis, J. .
B. B. Forman for Plaintiff and Appellee:
1. A tax sale or other sale of one lot, with one description, can not be made to cover and extended to another lot with a different description. Bell vs. Taylor, 37 An. 56.
Insufficient or incorrect description in an assessment or advertisement or deed is fatal to a tax sale, whereby a citizen’s property is sought to be taken from him without notice. Ileugliey vs. Barrow, 4 An. 248; Jacques vs. Kupman, 6 An. 542; Wills vs. Audi, 8 An. IS); Wilson vs. Marshall, 10 An. 327; Sutton vs. Calhoun, 14 An. 209; Tliibodaux vs. Kellar,'29 An. 508; Marin vs. Orleans, 30 An. 293; Bank vs. Lanes, 30 An. 871; ltapp vs. Lowry, 30 An. 1272; Person vs. O’Neal, 32 An. 228; Stafford vs. Twitchell, .S3 An. 520; Carter vs. New Orleans, 33 An. 816.
2. Since the Constitution prohibits the forfeiture of property to the State fornonpayment of taxes, that which is prohibited directly can not he accomplished indirectly by the form of a sale to herself. Article 210.
3. If the deed does not recite a compliance with Article210, it is void.
4. -A tax sale without notice or demand, other than by publication, is void. Article 210.
5. Property, in possession of the City of New Orleans, used for public school purposes, is exempt from taxation and its for taxes is void. Article 207.
6. Possession is the first essential for the beginning of all prescription acquirendi causa.
7. Ifiach specific piece of property is only affected by the privilege for taxes on it, and for no other taxes; and if the inscription docs not identify the property, there is no privilege, and it should be cancelled. All taxes and tax privileges are prescribed in three years. Act 13, 1870, p. 11; Act 96,1877, p. 132, Sec. 36; Act 77, 1880, p. 95, Sec. 24; Act 96, 1S82, p. 130, Sec. 34; Act 98, 1886, p. 145, See. 34; Act 85, 1888, p. 124, Sec. 33.
S. The judgment for the drainage assessments, rendered in January, 1875, in 27 An.. 20, is prescribed by ten years (C. C. 3547), and the inscription thereof should he cancelled in the absence of proof of revival and re-inscription.
9. This drainage assessment can no longer he collected, and should ho erased as an illegal incumbrance on property. Davidson vs. New Orleans, 34 An. 170; Succession Patrick Irwin, 33 An. 64.
Bayne, Denegre & Bayne on the same side.
W. H. Rogers, Attorney General; Wynne Rogers, Attorney for Tax-. Collector, and T. MeC. Hyman, Assistant City Attorney, for Defendants and Appellants:
When a Tax-Collector's deed of sale of property sold for taxes describes the same as situated in a certain square, the number of the square and the streets hounding same being correctly given, and fronting on a certain street correctly named, with certain measurements within a few inches of being correct, and assessed in the name of a person.who at that time was the owner of the prop- - erty, such a description is sufficient, because by it llio owner would not he misled and the property sold he identified.
Especially would this be the ease where it is shown that the ownerjpossessed no other property in that square
The description is sufficient if it does not mislead or deceive one.
Errors of description can not be taken advantage of when no application has been made to the Board of Review for correction of the same.
Act 80 of 1888 is a remedial and healing statute, intended to cure irregularities in prior tax proceedings by making the tax titles acquired by the State good and perfect, and tlic assessments under which sales wore made legal and valid.
The burden of proof is on the defendant to prove the defects complained of.^
The deed of sale is prima facie valid in all respects.
All actions to annul tax sales for any irregularities or informalities, of whatever nature, are prescribed by two years from the day the Tax-Collector’s deed is recorded.
Ender Section 66 of Act 88 of 1886, and Section 65 of Act 85 of 1888, the State is entitled to take possession of the property bought by her at a tax sale.
The provisions of Sections 51 of Act of 1877, p. 116, and 52 of Act of 1882, p. 186, authorize property sold for taxes to be adjudicated to the State.

Opinion:
On Motion to Dismiss.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Watkins, J.
The grounds assigned for the dismissal of the city's appeal are, (1st) that the matter in dispute is, as to her, less than §2000; (2d) that she is without interest to maintain an alleged sale to the State.
Evidently she is without interest as. to the title of the State to the property in suit; and her taxes are less than §2000 in amount. To this extent, the appellee's motion must prevail, and the appeal be dismissed. But the matter is different in respect to the appeal of the State Tax Collector. As to him, the grounds of the motion are, (1st) that he is without interest to prosecute an appeal from the judgment rendered; (2d) that no law authorizes him to appeal in behalf of the State; (3d) that if he can legally thus appeal, he can so do only on furnishing bond; (4th) the order of appeal was void, because it dispensed the Tax Collector from furnishing bond; (5th) that the matter in dispute does not exceed §2000, exclusive of interest.
This is a suit to test the adjudication of a piece of improved real estate, in the city of New Orleans, to the State, and for that purpose the State Tax Collector was made a defendant.
We think it self-evident that, if the law authorized the Tax Collector to stand in judgment, for the purposes stated in the plaintiff's1 petition, and the judgment rendered in' her favor, it also authorized him to prosecute an appeal from that judgment, and stand in judg ment on appeal. The theory of plaintiff's case certainly is that, as the Tax Collector passed to the State, he was the proper person with whom to litigate its validity. .Whether she was correct in that assumption we-need not decide, because she is completely estopped, by her judicial admission of his competency, from now gainsaying it for her own advantage, and to the detriment df the State.
Personating the State, as he is conceded to be, the State Tax Collector was under no obligation to furnish security, and the order of appeal is valid. In the Tax Collector's answer the value of the property is stated to be $4000, and claim is made for over $2000 of revenues. We think this part of the motion is not well grounded, and must be overruled. Merchants Mutual Insurance Company vs. Board, 40 An. 371.