Case Name: Anthony TOUPS v. KOCH GATEWAY PIPELINE, INC., Kenneth Autin, and ABC Insurance Company; Kenneth Autin v. Koch Gateway Pipeline, Inc., Anthony Toups, and ABC Insurance Company
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 2005-04-27
Citations: 915 So. 2d 811
Docket Number: No. 2004 CA 0223, 2004 CA 0224
Parties: Anthony TOUPS v. KOCH GATEWAY PIPELINE, INC., Kenneth Autin, and ABC Insurance Company. Kenneth Autin v. Koch Gateway Pipeline, Inc., Anthony Toups, and ABC Insurance Company.
Judges: Before: WHIPPLE, DOWNING, McClendon, hughes and welch, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 915
Pages: 811–816

Head Matter:
Anthony TOUPS v. KOCH GATEWAY PIPELINE, INC., Kenneth Autin, and ABC Insurance Company. Kenneth Autin v. Koch Gateway Pipeline, Inc., Anthony Toups, and ABC Insurance Company.
No. 2004 CA 0223, 2004 CA 0224.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
April 27, 2005.
David B. Allen, Houma, Counsel for Plaintiff'Appellee Anthony Toups.
Joseph J. Weigand, Jr., Houma, Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee Kenneth Autin.
Robert J. Daigre, New Orleans, Counsel for Defendant/Appellant Koch Gateway.
Michael E. Mathieu, Houma, Interve-nor/Appellee.
Before: WHIPPLE, DOWNING, McClendon, hughes and welch, JJ.

Opinion:
I .DOWNING, j.
This appeal addresses whether Koch Gateway Pipeline Inc. (Koch) is legally entitled to contribution from these plaintiffs under general maritime principles.
Koch appeals a judgment containing two decrees, each of which resolves individual lawsuits that were consolidated. First, the judgment decrees that Koch is jointly and severally liable, together with Kenneth Autin, for damages from personal injury suffered by Anthony Toups. Second, the judgment decrees that Koch is liable, in solido with Anthony Toups, for damages from personal injury suffered by Kenneth Autin. Both decrees declare that Koch is not entitled to contribution. The judgment on appeal deals only with issues involving the payment of damages. The trial had been bifurcated, and the prior judgment on the issue of liability and apportionment of fault was not appealed.
Koch asserted two assignments of error on appeal:
1. In light of a specific finding that plaintiffs were engaged in a joint venture at the time of the accident at issue, the trial court erred in holding Koch jointly and severally liable for damages attributable to the fault of the members of the joint venture;
2. The trial court erred in ruling that Koch is not entitled to contribution from each plaintiff for the damages awarded to the other plaintiff.
At oral argument on appeal, Koch abandoned the first assignment of error, leaving only the second for our review. For the following reasons, we vacate portions of the judgment, amend the judgment, and as amended we affirm.
^CONTRIBUTION
In the assignment of error that we do review, Koch alleges that the trial court erred in ruling that it is not entitled to contribution from Toups and Autin. We agree.
The trial court ruled that Koch was not entitled to contribution because contribution was not specially pled as an affirmative defense. The trial court erred in so holding. Contribution need not be specially pled. See Scarbrough v. O.K. Guard Dogs, 03-1243, p. 12 (LaApp. 1 Cir. 5/14/04), 879 So.2d 239, 248, writ denied, 04-1440 (La.9/24/04), 882 So.2d 1127. In McIntyre v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 413 So.2d 174, 177 (La.App. 4 Cir.1982), the court observed that, "[cjontribution may be asserted in answer and reconvention, by way of third party demand or by a subsequent action." The McIntyre court also recognized that the issue of contribution could be raised by appeal or answer to appeal. See Id.
The right to contribution is established in the general maritime law. See Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106, 111-15, 94 S.Ct. 2174, 2177-78, 40 L.Ed.2d 694 (1974). In their briefs, all parties concur that this is a general maritime case.
Even so, we decline Koch's request that we determine the shares and amounts of contribution to which it may be entitled. Koch argues that we should limit the payment of damages among the parties to the amount attributable to their proportionate fault, citing Edmonds v. Compagnie Generate Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 271 n. 30, 99 S.Ct. 2753, 2762 |4n. 30, 61 L.Ed.2d 521 (1979), which, Koch argues, suggests such procedure in federal maritime cases.
Maritime law, however, does not provide such remedy, and the very footnote in Edmonds that Koch argues disputes this. The court said: "But we did not upset the rule that the plaintiff may recover from one of the colliding vessels the damage concurrently caused by the negligence of both." Id.
Under federal maritime law, the right to contribution accrues from the date payment is made. See United States Lines, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 487, 489 (5th Cir.1972) and Hercules, Inc. v. Stevens Shipping Co. Inc., 698 F.2d 726, 734 (5th Cir.1983). See also Thomas J. Schoembaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law, § 4-15, p. 154, which states, "the right to contribution arises and limitation begins to run from the time payment in excess of the tortfeasor's proportionate share." As the court in Kantlehner v. United States, 279 F.Supp. 122, 128 (E.D.N.Y.1967) explained: "[A] party's right to either indemnity or contribution [is] derivative, and remains inchoate until the settlement or resolution of the primary action. The cause of action . does not accrue until the payment has been made."
Louisiana law and procedure control the enforcement of contribution rights in this matter. While state courts are bound to apply substantive federal maritime law and jurisprudence, they are free to adopt such remedies as they see fit, so long as they do not attempt to change substantive maritime law. See Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 222-23, 106 LS.Ct. 2485, 2494, 91 L.Ed.2d 174 (1986). See also Lavergne v. Western Co. of North America, Inc., 371 So.2d 807, 810 (La.1979). Enforcement of contribution rights is established in Louisiana by La. C.C. art. 1805 and as described below.
In Louisiana, the right to contribution "arises out of the payment of the obligation of a solidary co-debtor." Constans v. Choctaw Transport, Inc., 97-0863, p. 6 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/23/97), 712 So.2d 885, 890. "Contribution permits a tortfeasor who has paid more than his share of a solidary obligation to seek reimbursement from the other tortfeasors for their respective shares of the judgment, which shares are proportionate to the fault of each other." Hamway v. Braud, 01-2364, p. 5 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/8/02), 838 So.2d 803, 807. "The right to enforce contribution is not complete until payment of the common obligation[J" Thomas v. W & W Clarklift, Inc., 375 So.2d 375, 378 (La.1979).
Accordingly, either under general maritime law or under Louisiana law, Koch's right to enforce contribution does not arise until it actually pays its obligations. And nothing in the record demonstrates that Koch seeks reimbursement for obligations it has already paid.
Koch's second assignment of error has merit in that the trial court erroneously ruled it did not have a right to seek contribution. We vacate the portion of the decrees denying Koch the right to seek contribution. For the above reasons, however, we decline to reassess damages between the parties.
DECREE
We vacate the portions of the judgment that deny Koch the right to seek contribution against Toups and Autin in the separate decrees. We amend the judgment accordingly. In all other respects, we affirm the | ¿judgment of the trial court. Costs are assessed one-half to Koch Gateway Pipeline Company, one-fourth to Anthony Toups, and one-fourth to Kenneth Autin.
VACATED IN PART; AMENDED; AFFIRMED AS AMENDED.
HUGHES, J., dissents with reasons.
. In McIntyre, the court concluded that it could not consider the issue of contribution on appeal because the defendants did not raise contribution in the answer, make a re-conventional demand, make a third-party demand, file a subsequent action, appeal, answer the appeal, or in any way raise the matter for consideration by the court. Id. McIntyre specifically recognizes that the issue of contribution can be raised by third-party demand, appeal or answer to appeal. Id. Therefore, Toups' and Autin's reliance on McIntyre for the proposition that contribution needs to be specially pled, and cannot be raised on appeal, is misplaced.
. The Edmonds language cited by Koch relies on United Sates v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 411, 95 S.Ct. 1708, 1715-16, 44 L.Ed.2d 251 (1975). There, the Supreme Court held:
We hold that when two or more parties have contributed to their fault to cause property damage in a maritime collision or stranding, liability for such damage is to be allocated among the parties proportionately to the comparative degree of their fault, and that liability for such damages is to be allocated equally only when the parties are equally at fault or when it is not possible fairly to measure the comparative degree of their fault.
. While solidary liability has been limited by Acts 1996, 1st Ex.Sess., No. 3, § 1, which amended La. C.C. art. 2324 to apply only in cases where tortfeasors conspire to commit an intentional act, nothing in this amendment alters the law and procedures for seeking contribution where applicable.