Case Name: The State of Delaware, upon the relation of James Frank Allee, et al., vs. Thomas McCoy, et al., Inspectors of Election in the several Election Districts of County of Kent, in the State of Delaware
Court: Delaware Superior Court
Jurisdiction: Delaware
Decision Date: 1896-11
Citations: 2 Marv. 465
Docket Number: 
Parties: The State of Delaware, upon the relation of James Frank Allee, et al., vs. Thomas McCoy, et al., Inspectors of Election in the several Election Districts of County of Kent, in the State of Delaware.
Judges: 
Reporter: Delaware Reports
Volume: 16
Pages: 465–542

Head Matter:
The State of Delaware, upon the relation of James Frank Allee, et al., vs. Thomas McCoy, et al., Inspectors of Election in the several Election Districts of County of Kent, in the State of Delaware.
Kent County, Special Term,
November 1896.
Mandamus. Election. Board of Canvass.—Elections were held in fourteen out of sixteen election districts of the county, and certificates of the result thereof, duly signed by the election judges, were delivered to the Board of Canvass, and in one of the other two districts an election was held but no certificate signed or returned, while no election was held in the other of said two districts; the inspectors with the Sheriff met and organized as a Board of Canvass at the time and place prescribed by law ; the ten Democratic members of the Board calculated the votes of only eight of the fourteen districts for which returns had been made and refused to calculate the vote of the remaining six districts, whereby the vote of the county was ascertained to be about 3948, or about 2962 less than the total vote returned, and by this means pluralities were ascertained for the Democratic candidates for the offices to be filled by the election, and certificates of the result were signed by the said ten inspectors; the six Republican inspectors with the Sheriff, as presiding officer, calculated the votes of all the said fourteen districts, for which certificates had been returned, and thereby ascertained the total vote so returned, by which there were pluralities in favor of the Republican candidates, and of this result certificates were made and signed by the said six inspectors and the Sheriff: Held, that a peremptory mandamus would issue, upon petition of the candidates declared by the last-mentioned certificates to have been elected, to compel the inspectors of the County to assemble at the Court House of the County at a time named by the Court, and publicly perform their duty as a Board of Canvass, by ascertaining the state of the election, by calculating the aggregate amount of all the votes given in all the election districts of the County.
Same.—The duty of the Board of Canvass of the County is a public duty, which if not fully performed will be enforced by mandamus, and the duty is a demand and the omission to perform it a refusal.
Same.—The ascertainment and certification of the results of a general election by the Board of Canvass, is a specific duty, upon the performance of which the candidates, shown to have been elected by the votes actually certified have a right to insist, and in such case mandamus is the only adequate legal remedy.
Election. Board of Canvass. Ministerial Bnty. Judicial Power.—The duties of a Board of Canvass are purely ministerial; it has power only to ascertain and certify the vote actually cast at the election, and has no right to determine whether they were legal or illegal votes, or whether the election was regularly held or not; it has no right to go behind the certificates of the returns of the judges of election.
Same.—An attempt by a Board of Canvass to exercise judicial power with respect to the election and to do more than ascertain the result shown by the certificates returned, is a gross usurpation of the powers vested by the Constitution and laws of the State, in the Legislature, where it relates to the election of its members, and in the Courts, where it relates to the election of other officers.
Election.—If fraud, violence, corruption or any other illegality enter into an election so that the will of the people is thereby defeated, the defeated candidates have ample remedy under the law, in the legislature, with respect to members of that body, and in the Courts, as to other officers.
Mandamus. Amendment. Parties.—After a rule to show cause has been issued and returned and a motion to quash the same refused, an amendment of the petition, by the joinder of a new party respondent, may be allowed.
Mandamus. Practice.—The respondent in mandamus may decline to answer to the rule to show cause and insist upon the issuing of the alternative mandamus.
Mandamus. Service Of Process.—Though the respondents in mandamus have appeared in response to the rule to show cause, where the alternative writ is insisted upon and issued, it must be served as other process unless service is waived.
Same.—Where the Sheriff, being a respondent in mandamus, made and returned service upon other respondents who had previously appeared by counsel at the return of the rule to show cause, the notice is sufficient and a motion to quash the return will be denied.
This was an application for a writ of mandamus to be directed to the inspectors of election of the several hundreds and election districts of Kent County, constituting the Board of Canvass of that County, to require them to reassemble and ascertain and certify the true state of the vote for officers voted for in the several hundreds and election districts of the County at the general election on the third day of November, A. D., 1896.
The petition was filed in vacation, on November 11, 1896, and a special term of the Superior Court was called, pursuant to the statute, to meet at Dover on November 19, 1896, all of which will appear in detail from the order made on the petition which is stated at large, infra.
The petitioners were the candidates for the offices of Senator and Representatives in the General Assembly, Sheriff, Coroner, County Treasurer, Levy Court Commissioners and Delegates to the Constitutional Convention.
The allegations of the petition (or of such paragraphs of it as were material) were in substance as follows:
1. The names of the petitioners and their respective qualifications under the Constitution and Laws of Delaware for the offices to which they claimed to have been severally elected.
2. The names of all the candidates nominated by the different political partios to be voted for at the said election for the several offices then to be filled; all of which names were duly placed on the official ballot and voted for, for said several offices, respectively, at the election.
3. The County had been duly divided into sixteen voting precincts, the names and location of which were set out in detail.
4. The General Election was held on the third day of November, A. D., 1896, at the usual and legal voting places and the respondents were by election or appointment duly and legally constituted inspectors thereof.-
5. The number of votes received by the petitioners and by each of the other persons nominated for the several county offices in fourteen of the sixteen specified voting precincts of the County were set out in detail, being summed up as, for example, for the office of State Senator the petitioner, James F. Allee, received a total of votes returned to the Board of Canvass of 3358 votes, Samuel ft. Meredith a total of 3259 votes, John Heitshu a total of 168 votes, and John Heyd a total of 125 votes, showing a plurality in favor of the petitioner, James F. Allee, of 99 votes for said office of State Senator.
It was further averred that in the Eastern Election District of Duck Creek Hundred no election was held on the third day of November, A. D., 1896, and that in the Hundred of West Dover an election was held but no return of the votes cast was made to' the Board of Canvass, but that if a return of the votes cast had been duly made, it would have disclosed a plurality for the petitioner, James F. Allee, of ten or under.
The petition then stated in the same manner the number of votes received by each of all of said candidates for the respective offices for which they had been severally nominated as aforesaid, in each of the said several election districts, except the Eastern Election District of Duck Creek Hundred and the West Dover Hundred Election District, as to which last mentioned districts it was averred, in the same manner, that in the former no election had been held, and that in the latter it was also averred, as above, that if a proper canvass had been made of the votes cast therein, each of the said relators would have had a plurality of at least ten votes.
6. The functions of the several officers charged with official duties in connection with the ascertainment and certification of the result of the election were described and set forth at large, viz: that of the inspectors to meet at the Court House in Dover on the Thursday next succeeding the general election; that of the Sheriff, or, in case of his death or absence, the Coroner, to attend as the presiding officer of the Board of Canvass; that of each inspector to deliver to the Sheriff or other presiding officer of the Board, the certificate of election, or in case it could not be produced then the ballot box for the Hundred might be opened and the certificate therein contained might be taken and used and again deposited in the box; that of the Board of Canvass publicly to ascertain the state of the election throughout the County and to make certificates thereof as required by law with respect to each office for which the election was held.
9. It was further averred that the inspectors of the several Hundreds and Elections Districts of the County, did meet at the time and place so provided by law, and that the Sheriff did attend and remain continuously until the adjournment, he and the inspectors constituting the Board of Canvass of which the Sheriff was the legal presiding officer. At the said time and place each of the inspectors of the Hundreds and Election Districts where elections were held, with the exception of the inspector for West Dover Hundred, did deliver to the Sheriff, as such presiding officer, the certificate of election for his Hundred or Election District.
11. And the Board of Canvass did not open the ballot box for West Dover Hundred and take out and use the certificate therein contained, as under the law it was their duty to do.
12. It was further averred that the Board of Canvass did not publicly ascertain the state of the election throughout the County by calculating the aggregate amount of all the votes for each office that had been given in all the Hundreds and Election Districts of the County for every person voted for for such office, but, on the contrary, though assembled for that purpose,refused so to ascertain the state of the election, although requested to do so.
13. It was expressly averred that the Board of Canvass refused to calculate the number of votes for every person voted for for each office in Election Districts Nos. 1 and 2 of East Dover Hundred, No. 2 of South Murderkill Hundred, and the Western Election District of Milford Hundred.
14. And that the Board of Canvass did not, before any adjournment or separation, make any legal and proper certificates of election as prescribed by law.
15. 16. It was further averred that certain of the defendants, to wit, Thomas McCoy, the inspector for Eastern Election District of Duck Creek Hundred, Abel S. Fames, the inspector for Western Election District of Duck Creek Hundred, William H. Green-well, the inspector for Kenton Hundred, John L. Scotten, the inspector for Little Creek Hundred, Thomas H. Baxter, the inspector for West Dover Hundred, William H. Walker, the inspector for Election District No. 2 of East Dover Hundred, Alexander J. Draper, the inspector for West Election District of North Murder-kill Hundred, Samuel C. Hughes, the inspector for Election District No. 1 of South Murderkill Hundred, John W. Sheldrake, the inspector for Election District No. 1 of Mispillion Hundred, Frank Tumlin, the inspector for Election District No. 2 of Mispillion Hundred, did at the time and place prescribed by law pretend to ascertain the state of the election throughout the County, but calculated the number of the votes for each office, that had'been given only in the following Hundreds and Election Districts, to wit: The Western Election District of Duck Creek Hundred Little Creek Hundred, Kenton Hundred, Third Election District of East Dover Hundred, West Election District of North Murder-kill Hundred, Election District No. 1 of South Murderkill Hundred, Election District No. 1 of Mispillion Hundred, and Election District No. 2 of Mispillion Hundred, and did refuse to calculate the number of the votes for such officers in all the remaining h undreds and election districts for said County, and did, as a result of said ascertainment, knowingly, illegally and wrongfully make, sign, and deliver, false, incorrect, misleading, and illegal certificates of said election to certain candidates for the offices voted for in said County who had not received a majority or plurality of the votes cast in said County for each of said offices respectively.
17. This action it was charged was an attempt to deprive each of the petitioners of the office to which he was justly and legally entitled and worked an injury and detriment to each of the petitioners.
18. And in each and every of the Hundreds and Election Districts of which the last mentioned members of the Board of Canvass refused to calculate the votes, a large plurality of the votes cast were for each of the petitioners.
19. It was further averred that certain of said inspectors constituting a portion of said Board of Canvass, to wit, Erasmus D. Burton, inspector for Election District No. 1 of East Dover Hundred, John S. Bowan, Inspector for Third Election District of East Dover Hundred, Levi G. Sterner, Inspector for Eastern Election District of North Murderkill Hundred, Benjamin T. Conwell, Inspector for Election District No. 2 of South Murderkill Hundred, Clarence Mason, Inspector for Eastern Election District of Milford Hundred, and Charles Macklin, Inspector for Western Election District of Milford Hundred, did, on the day and year aforesaid, meet with the other of said Inspectors at the County Court House of said County, and constituting a portion of said Board of Canvass, did publicly, in the presence of such electors of the County as thought proper to be present, ascertain the state of the election throughout the County by calculating the aggregate amount of all the votes for each office that had been given in all the hundreds and election districts of said County where an election had been held except West Dover Hundred, the certificate of which was withheld as aforesaid, and did, after the state of the election had been ascertained by calculating the votes as aforesaid, together with the Sheriff, who was the presiding officer of said Board of Canvass, and before any adjournment or separating of said Board, make under their hands the certificates of election prescribed by the statutes of the State of Delaware in such case.
20. And the calculation of the aggregate amount of all the votes for each office that had been given in all of the Hundreds of the County for every person voted for for such office made by the inspectors last above enumerated, did show that each of your petitioners had received a substantial plurality of all the votes cast for said offices at said election in the County aforesaid.
21. After the calculation last mentioned, and the preparation of the certificates based thereon, the Sheriff, as presiding officer, re quested each and every inspector constituting the Board to sign the same, but all refused except those last specifically named.
22. And this refusal and failure of the Board of Canvass to ascertain the state of the election in accordance with the statute, and to make proper and legal certificates of the election of each of the petitioners, worked great detriment, wrong and injustice to each of them by depriving him of the office for which he received a legal plurality in the county and to which he was legally elected and entitled.
The prayer of the petition was as follows:
Wherefore, there being no other adequate remedy in the premises, your petitioners pray this Honorable Court to issue a peremptory writ of mandamus of the State of Delaware directed to the said defendants, Thomas McCoy, Abel S. Farries, William H. Green well, John L. Scotten, Thomas H. Baxter, Erasmus D. Burton, William H. Walker, John S. Rowan, Levi G. Sterner, Alexander J. Draper, Benjamin T. Con well, Samuel C. Hughes, John W. Sheldrake, Frank Tumlin, Clarence Mason and Charles GMacklin, inspectors of election in the several Hundreds and Election Districts in and for Kent County, commanding them and each of them, as follows, to wit:
To assemble at the Court House of their County in the town of Dover on a day and at an hour to be named by this Honorable Court, and then and there publicly, in the presence of such electors of the County as shall think proper to be present, ascertain the state of the election throughout the County by calculating the aggregate amount of all the votes for each office that shall have been given in all of the Hundreds and Election Districts of the County for every person voted for for such offices, and after the state of the election shall have been so ascertained, by calculating the votes as aforesaid, before any adjournment or separating of said Board of Canvass, to make, together with the Sheriff, or other presiding officer of the Board of Canvass, under their hands the proper and legal certificates of election in the manner prescribed by the statutes of the State of Delaware for certifying the election of the sev eral officers voted for at said general election on the third day of November, A. D,, 1896, and in this petition enumerated and described, and that said certificates shall thereupon be delivered and disposed of as required under the laws of the State of Delaware.
And your petitioners further pray that such other and further relief shall be granted, as the nature of the case may require, and as shall to this Court seem meet and proper.
And your petitioners will ever pray &c„
The petition was under oath or affirmation, of all the petitioners, that the facts set forth in the above and foregoing petition, so far as concerns each of said petitioners^ acts and deeds, were true of his own knowledge, and that what relates to the act and deed of any other person he believed to be true.
The petition, having been filed with Prothonotary as before stated, was immediately transmitted by the Prothonotary to the Chief Justice under the provisions of Section 3, Chapter 775, Volume 19 Laws oí Delaware. Whereupon a majority of the members of the Court deeming it expedient to call a special session thereof, to convene at the County Court House of said Kent County, in the town of Dover, on Thursday the 19th day of November A. D. 1896, a special session of said Court was called to meet as aforesaid, and the Chief Justice of said Court awarded the following rule to show cause.
Whereas, the petition of the complainants in the above stated cause, against the defendants in the said cause, for a peremptory writ of mandamus of the State of Delaware, to be directed to the said defendants, has been filed in the office of the Prothonotary of the Superior Court of the State of Delaware, in and for Kent County, and such petition has been immediately transmitted by the said Prothonotary to the Honorable Charles B. Lore, the Chief Justice of the State of Delaware;
And Whereas, it appears to the said Honorable Charles B. Lore, Chief Justice as aforesaid, that the matters contained in said petition and affidavits accompanying the same ought to be heard and determined before the time of the next regular session of said Court;
And Whereas, by virtue of the statues of the State of Delaware in that behalf, the said Honorable Charles B. Lore, Chief Justice as aforesaid, the Honorable Ignatius C. Grubb and the Honorable Charles M. Cullen, Associate Judges of the Superior Court of the State of Delaware in and for the County of Kent, have deemed it expedient to call a special session of said Court to be convened at the County Court House for said County, in the town of Dover, on Thursday, the nineteenth day of November, 1896, at half past ten o’clock in the forenoon.
Now therefore, the said petition for said mandamus having been read and maturely considered by the said Honorable Charles B. Lore, Chief Justice of the State of Delaware, the said Chief Justice upon the motion of the counsel for said petitioners, hereby awards a rule to show cause why, upon the petition of the said complainants as aforesaid, a mandamus shall not be issued to Thomas McCoy, Abel S. Farries, William H. Green well, John L. Scotten, Thomas H. Baxter, Erasmus D. Burton, William H. Walker, John S. Bowan, Levi G. Sterner Alexander J. Draper, Benjamin T. Conwell, Samuel C. Hughes, John W. Sheldrake, Frank Tumlin, Clarence Mason and Charles G. Macklin, defendants in the above stated cause, Inspectors of Election in the sesreral Hundreds and Election Districts in and for Kent County, commanding them and each of them to assemble at the Court House of the County of Kent, in the town of Dover, on a day and at an hour to be named by this Honorable Court, and then and there, publicly, in the presence of such electors of the County as shall think proper to be present, ascertain the state of the election mentioned in said petition throughout the County by calculating the aggregate amount of all the votes for each office that shall have been given at said election in all of the Hundreds and Election Districts of the County for every person voted for for such offices, and after the state of the said election shall have been so ascertained by calculating the votes as aforesaid, before any adjournment or separating of said Board of Canvass, to make, together with the Sheriff, or other Presiding Officer of the Board of Canvass, under their hands, the proper and legal certificates of election in the manner prescribed by the statutes of the State of Delaware for certifying the election of the several officers voted for at said general election on the third day of November, A. D. 1896, and in said petition enumerated and described.
And further, to show cause why the relief prayed for in said petition for said mandamus and such other and further relief as the nature of the case may require, and as shall, to the said Court, seem meet and proper, should not be granted.
And it is further ordered that this rule shall be returnable to and be heard at the said special session of said Superior Court of the State of Delaware, in and for the County of Kent, to be held at the County Court House for said County, in the town of Dover, on Thursday, the nineteenth day of November, 1896, at half past ten o’clock in the forenoon.
Charles B. Lore,
Chief Justice.
The call issued for said special session was as follows:
Whereas, for certain causes which appear to the Judges of the Superior Court of the State of Delaware, in and for Kent County, to be sufficient, a majority of the members of the said Court, to wit, Charles B. Lore, tbe Chief Justice of said Court, the Honorable Charles M. Cullen, and the Honorable Ignatius C. Grubb, Associate Justices for said Court, deem it expedient to call a special session of the said Superior Court in and for Kent County.
Now, therefore, I, the said Charles B. Lore, Chief Justice of the State of Delaware, do hereby call a special session of said Superior Court, in said County of Kent, to convene at the County Court House in the Town of Dover, in said County of Kent, on Thursday the nineteenth day of November, 1896, at half past ten •o’clock in the forenoon, and hereby designate the business of which ■the said Court shall have cognizance at such special session, to be the hearing and determining of a certain petition of the State of Delaware, upon the relation of James Frank Allee and others, against Thomas McCoy and others, Inspectors of election in the -several election districts in the County of Kent, in the State of Delaware, for a peremptory writ of mandamus of the State of Delaware, to be directed to-the said Thomas McCoy and others, defendants in said petition. And I, the said Charles B. Lore, Chief •Justice as aforesaid, further prescribe and direct that a true copy of this call for a special session of said Superior Court shall be -straightway posted upon the outside door of the County Court House, for said County of Kent, and that the said posting of said call shall be legal and sufficient notice of the calling of said special -session of said Superior Court. And it is further ordered and directed that this call for a special session of said Superior Court -shall be, by the Prothonotary of the said County of Kent, entered upon the records of the said Court, and a copy thereof by him immediately transmitted to each of the Judges of said Court.
Charles B. Lore,
Chief Justice.
The Court having convened in special session at Dover on November 19, 1896, the Sheriff’s return was read as follows :
“ Served personally by copy being placed in the hands of the following named persons, this thirteenth day of November, A. D. 1896:—Thomas McCoy, Abel S. Farries, William H. Green well, John L. Scotten, Thomas H. Baxter, Erasmus D. Burton, William H. Walker, John S. Rowan, Levi G. Sterner, Alexander J. Draper, Benjamin T. Conwell, Samuel C. Hughes, John W. Sheldrake, Frank Tumlin, Clarence Mason, Charles C. Macklin.”
“And I, Samuel L. Shaw, Sheriff of said County, do further return upon the within rule to show cause, that I have personally und officially taken notice thereof, and hereby waive service of said rule, and the joinder of myself as co-respondent in the petition for mandamus in said cause, and submit myself to the orders and writs of the Court, as fully, to the same extent, and in the same manner as if I had been made a party respondent therein.
So says Samuel L. Shaw, Sheriff.”
George M. Jones entered an appearance for Samuel L. Shaw, Sheriff, and for Erasmus D. Burton, Inspector of Election District No. 1, East Dover Hundred j John S. Rowan, Inspector for Third Election District of East Dover Hundred; Levi G. Sterner, Inspector for Eastern Election District of North Murderkill Hundred ; Benjamin T. Conwell, Inspector for Election District No. 2 of South Murderkill Hundred; Clarence Mason, Inspector Eastern Election District of Milford Hundred, and Charles Macklin, Inspector for Western Election District of Milford Hundred, and he presented and read the answer of the six last-named defendants, admitting as substantially true all the averments in said petition for mandamus contained, and further .submitting the said defendants-to the orders and any writs of said Court which it may deem it advisable to make or issue in the above stated cause.
James L. Wolcott, for the remaining ten respondents.
There being no statute in this State, the procedure in mandamus is to be-regulated by Common Law rule and practice.
As I Understand, the initial step has already been taken for the purpose of procuring a peremptory writ of mandamus in this matter. The next step, as I understand it, is to hear a rule to show cause as to whether an alternative writ of mandamus will issue, and to that the respondents will make their return. And upon argument after that return is made, the peremptory writ will issue,, or not, as the Court may deem proper in the matter.
I know of no principle or rule of law in respect to making answer to the petition upon which a rule is grounded, or by which a proceeding is initiated, and an answer is something that is entirely foreign to the law, and the course, as I have already intimated, is- that established by Common Law, by which we must be governed, inasmuch as there is no statute in this State regulating the matter.
It is true that the statute by which this Court is convened in special session provides for the application for a writ of mandamus and issuance of a rule to show cause why mandamus shall not issue, but that is no more nor less than an affirmation of the Common Law principle. It does not change, vary or modify in any ■respect the Common Law principle, being a mere affirmation of it. As I understand it, and I think it is laid down in all the authorities upon that subject, the first step is to make the application, which may be by petition, or affidavit, or both, and then a rule issues to ■show cause why a writ of mandamus shall not issue; and upon the return of that rule, and the hearing of the application for a mandamus, the alternative writ is framed and issues; that is to say, ■commanding the respondents to do the thing they are required to do or to show cause why they did not do it.
No injury can result from such careful and deliberate considér.ation of this case as its importance demands. The Constitutional Convention and the General Assembly have full power to deal with the questions involved so far as they effect membership of either body. We are not seeking mere delay, with which to have the ■case postponed, but we do ask for sufficient time to enable us to ■place these respondents before the Court in the position to which they are entitled.
Under the circumstances of this case, it was impossible for these respondents to obtain the information required for the preparation of their answer or return. The returns of the election ■officers are legally in possession of the Sheriff who may not deliver ■them to any one except upon an order of the Court, to obtain which this is the first opportunity. We therefore apply for an order upon the Sheriff to permit the examination of these returns .and for a postponement of the case to a day fixed for filing our •answer or return.
Lore, C, J. Representing these defendants, do you insist upon the issue of the alternative writ ?
Mr. Wolcott. We do not insist now.
Lore, C. J. Your are bound either to insist upon the alternative writ, or answer now. The practice is well settled in this State. Which will you do?
H. H. Ward, for the petitioners. This is a case of emergency and should be speedily heard and decided. The purpose of the act of 1893, Rev. Code 696, was to secure the speedy decision both in this Court and in the Court of Errors and Appeals of just such cases. A fair consideration of the statute would seem to indicate that it contemplated a rule to show cause and that the mandamus to be issued at the return of the rule should be peremptory. Nothing is said of an alternative writ, and the practice in this State is to dispense with the alternative writ and that a peremptory writ shall issue upon a hearing of the rule to show cause.
With respect to the contention that the returns are in the hands of the Sheriff and no access may be had to them, it is not alleged that any demand had been made upon and refused by the Sherifi in connection with the returns.
Until this is shown it would not appear that an order is necessary to secure inspection of the returns.
Wolcott, for the respondents, replied. The idea has never been entertained by any one in this State that the ballot boxes after being deposited in the custody of the Sheriff should be examined or looked into without an order directed by a superior tribunal or court. Either house of the General Assembly can demand it or this Court may do so, and doubtless the Constitutional Convention could demand an inspection for their own information respecting the election of members of that body.
It is contended that the Board of Canvass acted illegally, and it is but just to state on the other side that it is claimed as a matter of general information that the result of the election in this County was obtained by glaring fraud and corruption.

Opinion:
Lore, C. J.
The Court are a unit upon the practice as we conceive it to be now settled, and certainly in this case, in respect to mandamus.
The practice indeed has been passed upon in New Castle County and in Sussex; and what ever fluctuations may have heretofore existed in respect to the practice in these writs, we consider as now ended.
Upon the return of a rule granted on petition to show cause why a writ of mandamus shall not issue, objection may be made to the sufficiency of the record,—that on the face of the record, from the plaintiff's own showing, he is not entitled to the issuance of a rule. No such objection has been made here, and it is not before us. On return of the rule, the respondents then have the right to come in if they see proper and to answer the rule and thus make up an issue upon which the Court can go into the hearing; or to decline to show cause and instead to insist on the alternative writ of mandamus. That has been ruled in three or four cases in the last three years. The alternative writ of mandamus is made returnable, in the discretion of the Court, to meet the exigencies of the public good and.the rights of parties interested. When the alternative writ is returned, then the respondents must file their answer.
That makes up, as you will see, logically and properly an issue, and the petition and answer to the petition give us something to hear and try; and when the issue is thus made up upon the return and answer to the alternative writ, we hear the case.
So that, under the proceedings as they now stand, we deem the petitioners entitled to the alternative writ, and the only question is, when shall that writ be returnable. Upon that question we will hear you if you have anything to say.
After some discussion as to the time for further hearing of the case the Court adjourned, until 2.30 P. M., having announced that they would in the meanwhile determine the question of time.
On the reassembling of the Court, J. B. Penington, for the respondents who did not answer, called the attention of the Court to the fact that the Sheriff after making his return had withdrawn it from the office of the Prothonotary and added the paragraph in which he undertook without authority or direction of the Court to make himself a party.
This second paragraph of the return Mr. Penington moved to strike out, contending that the alternative writ must follow the petition.
Ward, for the petitioners. This is not an application by the Sheriff. His return is conclusive.
Wolcott, for the respondents. That is true, but the application is made on behalf of other respondents in the case. The Sheriff seeks without leave of the Court by his return to correct a mistake which was made originally. This cannot be done; the only course open was an application on behalf of the Sheriff to permit the petitioners to amend their writ and petition and to make the Sheriff a party.
Grubb, J.
It will all come up again on the alternative writ, whether he can be properly included in the alternative writ as a respondent when he was not included in the rule to show cause or in the prayer in the petition. Therefore if he could not be put in the alternative writ, that part of his return would have to be disregarded, whether it is stricken out of his return or not. That question, of course, will have to come up on the alternative writ, and it- is a question which we should not now consider.
Mr. Ward. The question would come up, I suppose, in a motion to quash the writ ?
Mr. Wolcott. We do not waive the right to make the objection.
Lore, C. J.
It is the Sheriff's return, and as such we are bound to treat it. What the effect of it may be will be a matter hereafter.
Mr. Ward. Then we will leave it.
Lore, C. J.
That is proper, we think. It is the Sheriff's return; the effect of it you may discuss hereafter.
Mr. Wolcott. That is all right; but we have not waived it.
W. H. Hayes, for the petitioners. It has been suggested, and we have considered it, that in the fixing of the time of the return of this alternative writ there is another thing to be considered. That is the time at which the command shall be to the Board of Canvass, by the alternative writ, to meet. Then the day of the return or answer can be fixed with reference to that. There are two days to be fixed: the time at which the Board shall meet and the time at which the alternative writ shall be returned.
Lore, C. J.
The alternative writ commands them to meet and do a certain thing, or else to appear here on another day and show cause why they have not done it. The Court have considered this matter.
It is a grave question ; one that requires very careful and considerate treatment by both sides, and the most thorough opportunity for the respondents to answer. But it is also a writ of remedy ; and if the statements in the petition be true, this is a public exigency and demands prompt action.
We therefore make the order that this alternative writ be returnable on Tuesday morning next, November 24, at 10.30 o'clock; and that in the alternative writ the Board of Canvass be directed to perform their duty on Monday, the twenty-third day of November, at 12 o'clock M.
This Board is to meet on Monday and discharge its duty, or to appear, in obedience to the alternative writ, on Tuesday next, and show cause why they have not done so.
H. H. Ward, for the petitioners, in the presence of the other counsel, asked advice of the Court as to service,—the method of service,—for the instruction of the Sheriff.
Grubb, J.
My recollection of the law of mandamus is that the alternative writ must be served. It is a command. If it is not served they of course could give that as a reason for not obeying it. .
Mr. Ward. Yes, but they are in Court now.
Cullen, J.
It is an additional process.
Lore, C. J.
They are entitled to service, if they insist upon it.
Mr. Ward. Would the proper method of serving the writ be by leaving a certified copy with each respondent ?
Cullen, J.
The rule as to service of process is well settled. In this case you may serve a copy, or state the subject matter; it is sufficient.
Grubb, J.
High on mandamus lays it down, and in some States it is held, that you must serve the original on one of them, the first, for instance, and serve a copy on the others. In other States it is different. We have never ruled on that matter, so far as I have ever discovered.
Cullen, J.
When you serve by copy, you must make a copy. In other words, the service is by stating the substance of the writ in notifying the party. The common law practice prevails in this case.
Mr. Jones. • Will you allow me to accept service for the gentlemen for whom I appeared this morning ?
Cullen, J.
Certainly.
Lore, C. J.
You had better file of record a statement that you appear for those parties. Put it in writing that you waive the issue and service of the writs so far as each of them is concerned and appear for these respective defendants.
The special term was then adjourned until November 24,1896, at 10.30 A. M.
On November 24, 1896, the Court having reassembled in Special Session, Jones, for the respondents who had answered the rule to show cause, presented the retúrn of the Sheriff as follows:
" Served personally by copies hereof being, left with the following :—Thomas H. Baxter, John W. Sheldrake, John L. Scot-ten, William H. Walker, William H. Greenwell, Samuel C,. Hughes, and Frank Tumlin, on the nineteenth day of November, A. D. 1896, and with Alexander J. Draper, Abel S. Faries and Thomas McCoy on the twentieth day of November, A. D. 1896, the service being accepted in writing by George M. Jones, attorney, for Erasmus D. Burton, John F. Bowen, Levi G. Sterner, Benjamin T. Conwell, Clarence Mason and Charles G. Macklin, and Samuel L. Shaw, Sheriff, on the nineteenth day of November, A. D. 1896. So says
Samuel L. Shaw,
Sheriff.
Penington and Wolcott, for the other respondents, moved to quash the return upon the ground that the Sheriff was an interested party and could not serve the writ.
Ward, for the petitioners, contended that there was no legal exception to the Sheriff. It is not like a writ of summons, but it is one which only requires notice to the respondents to do a certain thing or show cause why it was not done. If in any manner they receive notice it is sufficient and they must obey the order.
But if, for the sake of argument, the service were irregular, the objection cannot now be interposed, as, on the day when the writ was ordered, service was waived and appearance entered for the Sheriff and five other respondents, and there could be no reason why the Sheriff could not serve it upon the others. It further appears that others of the respondents have appeared by counsel. There is no denial that every one of them had full notice of the writ.
Lore, C. J.
We do not see just now, at the present stage of the case, any legal exception to this return. You must bear in mind, gentlemen, that you are all in Court. It appears from the return of this writ for every one of these parties. This is a proceeding taken after you have come into Court.
It is not urged that you have not had notice, being in Court. We think the notice, so far as now appears, sufficient, and the motion to quash the return is denied.
Penington, for some of the respondents, then moved to quash the alternative writ of mandamus for the following reasons:
1. The writ of mandamus was not directed to the proper persons in that it was directed to the persons alleged to be inspectors of the several Hundreds and election districts of Kent County and the Sheriff of Kent County; whereas it should have been to the Sheriff and other alleged members of the alleged Board of Canvass, commanding it, as such Board, to reconvene to perform the mandates of said writ.
2. The alternative writ of mandamus does not follow the petition and the order of the Court in that a new party is made, to wit.: Samuel L. Shaw, Sheriff of Kent County, is joined as a corespondent without any authority therefor.
3. It does not appear from the petition or writ of mandamus that the certificates of election which were produced to the Sheriff and inspectors of the several Hundreds and election districts throughout the County, sitting as an alleged Board of Canvass on Thursday, the fifth day of November, A. D. 1896, as stated in said petition and writ of mandamus, were signed and properly authenticated by the inspectors and judges of the respective Hundreds or election districts, or by a majority thereof; nor that the said cer-. tificates had the votes received by each and every candidate voted for set out in words at length.
4. The averment that the certificate" of election for each hundred or election district was presented to the sheriff at the session of the alleged Board of Canvass did not set forth with sufficient particularity the papers purporting to be certificates of election in the several hundreds and election districts to show that they were such certificates from which the alleged Board of Canvass was bound to ascertain and to calculate the state of the election throughout the county.
5. It is alleged that the respondents had been legally elected or appointed inspectors of election for Kent County, whereas they could not have been so elected, becatise there is no law of this State authorizing the election of inspectors, and if they were appointed, it should have been set forth clearly and distinctly when and by whom they were respectively appointed.
6. George H. Murray is made a party relator, when it does not appear that he signed the petition for a rule or writ of mandamus, or has ever been made a party relator in any proper manner. Neither has he become a party by any proceedings before this Court.
7. The petition and writ of mandamus set forth and show that there was an election held in West Dover Hundred on Novem ber 3d, A. D. 1896, but it does not show that the relators have resorted to the proper remedy to have the result of said election presented to the said alleged Board of Canvass, so that it could calculate and ascertain the state of the election in that Hundred in in said County.
8. It appears by the petition and said writ of mandamus that the papers purporting to be certificates of election were delivered to the Sheriff of Kent County, and that being so delivered, are no longer subject to the control of your respondents, and that said certificates being thus out of the possession of your respondents, and no order being made in the writ of mandamus commanding the Sheriff to deliver them to your respondents, they could have no certificate from which to ascertain the state of the election throughout the county and issue certificates of election as required by law and the- mandate of the said writ in that behalf.
Upon the point that the petition was defective, referring particularly to the third and fourth grounds on which the motion was based, he contended that "it is a fundamental principle in the law of mandamus, that the act sought to be enforced must not only be lawful and proper in itself, but it also must be one that the defendant may properly do." People, ex rel. Besse vs. The Village of Crotty, 93 Ill. 180.
Ward, for the relators, contended that the Sheriff was not an essential party to the proceeding, though he might not be an improper party. Nevertheless, it was deemed proper, at the time of the return of the rule to show cause, to take certain steps in order to make him a pro forma party. The Sheriff is not an essential part of the Board. The law provides that he shall attend but it is within the contemplation of the statute that he may fail to do so and in his absence the Coroner is the presiding officer and he and the inspectors constitute the Board. But neither the Sheriff nor the Coroner nor the Prothonotary, who is made the presiding officer n the absence of the others, need attend if they do not choose to do so and in such case the Board of Inspectors may from their own number choose a presiding officer. Hence, in contemplation of law the only absolutely essential parties to this proceeding are the inspectors of the county, the very members of the Board of Canvass who were originally made parties. And with this view every part of the statute is consistent. As well might it be insisted that the Coroner and the Prothonotary should be parties as that the Sheriff is necessarily one.
Again this writ runs against these parties in their official capacity and at the election in question a Sheriff was chosen who must be commissioned by the Governor and until such commission is issued there was uncertainty whether the old Sheriff would be out of office and if so who would be commissioned as the new one. Such was the condition of affairs at the time the petition was granted, and it would be a serious question whether the new Sheriff, ex officio, would not be the presiding officer of the Board. State vs. County Judge of Marshall County, 7 Ia. 199.
Though we all concurred in this view that the Sheriff was not a necessary party, as he had actually presided in the Board of Canvass, it was deemed proper that he should be joined here, in order to prevent any possible contention, such as was made in the case of Knight et al. vs. Ferris, 6 Houst. 322, that the Sheriff might not be willing and could not be compelled to perform his duty unless made a party. This was done, it is conceived, in such manner as to bring us within the reasoning of the Court of Errors and Appeals in the case last cited.
Who is to object when a person considered by the Court to be a proper party comes into Court and makes himself such. It does not lie in the mouths of the respondents to object unless they can show injury and this could only be by establishing the fact that they have done their duty. Otherwise we are entitled to the remedy and they have not been injured by the Sheriff's return.
In answer to the criticisms made upon the frame of the allegations in the petition it is sufficient in averring the performance of a duty to follow the words of the statutes directing that duty and that is precisely what is done here. There is no denial that the certificates were in due form but only that there is no sufficient averment that they were. But in the absence of any averment that they did not do their duty there is a presumption of law, upon which the relators had a right to rest, that these officers did do their duty. Another principle to be remembered is that official acts cannot be questioned in a collateral proceeding where persons who have joined in doing those acts are not parties. Here we have certificates to be signed by three persons of whom one only, the inspector was a party.
Wolcott, in support of the motion, replied.
Lore, C. J.,
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The majority of the Court think that at this stage of the case? this motion to quash ought not to prevail. By that we do not mean to preclude you from bringing up any question when you come to the merits of the case that may be proper, so as to have the whole case fully and fairly before us.