Case Name: STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. BRIAN SEYLER, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT
Court: New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1999-06-30
Citations: 323 N.J. Super. 360
Docket Number: 
Parties: STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. BRIAN SEYLER, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Superior Court Reports
Volume: 323
Pages: 360–391

Head Matter:
733 A.2d 497
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. BRIAN SEYLER, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.
Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division
Submitted December 14, 1998
Decided June 30, 1999.
Lesemann, J., temporarily assigned, dissented and filed opin-' ion.
Before Judges SKILLMAN, PAUL G. LEVY and LESEMANN.
Jeffrey S. Blitz, Atlantic County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (James F. Smith, Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief).
Mark E. Roddy, attorney for respondent.

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SKILLMAN, J.A.D.
The State appeals from an order of the Law Division, directing defendant's admission into the Atlantic County Pretrial Intervention Program (PTI) over the prosecutor's objection.
Defendant was indicted for third degree theft, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:20-4, and six counts of fourth degree unsworn falsification to authorities, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:28-3a. During the period of time covered by the indictment, defendant, a former police officer, was attending the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey. The indictment alleged that defendant fraudulently obtained welfare benefits, food stamps and Medicaid over the entire period he attended medical school by filing a series of applications for benefits which failed to disclose that he was receiving a substantial amount of money from the University for his living expenses.
The evidence which forms the basis of the indictment is set forth in an investigatory report which not only describes the alleged acts of welfare fraud which defendant committed while attending medical school but also indicates that defendant probably committed additional acts of welfare fraud while an undergraduate at Stockton State College. This report states in pertinent part:
Brian Seyler failed to disclose to his ease worker loans, grants, scholarships, and other forms of financial resources when he was student at Stockton State College and at the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey. From the Fall of 1994 to the Fall of 1997, Brian Seyler received various forms of student financial aid. After tuition was paid, he was given additional funds for "living expenses" amounting to $53,358.57 for that three year period, averaging $17,786.19 a year for each of those years. None of this money was reported to his case worker when he completed the standard form PA 1J, a 16 page, "Application & Affidavit for Public Assistance", a document he completed six (6) separate times during the period from 1994 to 1997.
Seyler was issued an insurance settlement check for $132,207.43 on July 12,1990. Although he voluntarily withdrew from Public assistance at that time, he failed to report any portion of that resource when he re-applied for Public Assistance in 1992, and on subsequent PA lJ's.
When Seyler re-applied for Public Assistance on 1-13-92, he stated that he had been receiving a disability check for personal injury in the amount of $318.92 per month, but stated that he no longer received the money as it had run out on January 8, 1992. When [the county welfare board investigator] checked with Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, who paid Seyler, she discovered that the payments were in full force, that a balance of $6,000 existed, and that Seyler would be paid the monthly amount until that $6,000 was exhausted.
Subpoenaed Collective Bank records for SeyleFs account reveal that he deposited $4,248.53 into checking on January 12, 1990. This amount was not reported to his case worker and, according to [the welfare board investigator], this amount alone would have precluded Seyler from receiving APDC and Food Stamp Assistance.
Each time Brian Seyler completed a PA 1J form (eleven times since the inception of his case in 1989) he was asked specific questions regarding financial resources, such as loans and grants, and each time he stated that he had no such resources except for a $1,200 PELL Grant in 1992. The record reflects otherwise in fact, he received $30,064 in Financial Aid during the 1996-97 academic year.
Additionally, Brian Seyler failed to disclose that he had received his $132,207.43 settlement check even after he signed [the] Form PA-10D, Agreement to Repay, on May 31,1989.
FINANCIAL AID SUMMARY
Brian Seyler
Program AY 94-95 AY 95-96 AY96-97 AY97-98
Total Budget $27,473.00 $32,767.00 $30,137.00 $28,654.00
Loans:
Federal Stafford Loan 4.461.00 8,500.00 6.526.00 7,554.00
Unsubsidized Federal Stafford Loan 2,972.00
Federal Perkins Loan 3.267.00 2,600.00 3.719.00 2,700.00
Scholarships:
Martin Luther King
Physician/Dentist Scholarship . 12,795.00 13,295.00 14,492.00 12,500.00
Atlantic County Medical Society Auxiliary Sch. 500.00
Atlantic County Medical Society Scholarship 1.250.00 1,250.00 1.250.00 1,250.00
Grants:
Educational Opportunity Fund Grant 4,000.00 4,150.00 4.150.00 4,150.00'
Total Awarded $26,273.00 $32,767.00 $30,137.00 $28,654.00
The prosecutor gave a clear and persuasive explanation of his reasons for denying defendant's PTI application:
The reasons for rejection include the nature of the offense, the facts of the case and the conclusion that the possibility of a collateral detriment as it relates to this defendant's ability to practice medicine in the state of New Jersey is outweighed by the need to deter this defendant and others.
It is charged that this defendant committed welfare fraud over a three year period from 1994 through 1997. It is charged that, in furtherance of this welfare fraud, he committed six separate acts of unsworn falsification for failing to disclose substantial living expense awards which would have resulted in his ineligibility for the benefits he stole. The dollar amount involved in the theft exceeds $22,000.00.
In assessing the nature of the offenses charged, the State concludes that, pursuant to Guideline 3®(2) the defendant's conduct was "part of a continuing criminal . enterprise." As such, there is a presumption that such an application should generally be rejected. The alleged criminal misconduct was of a continuing nature spread over a three year period and included six separate acts of failure to disclose relevant information to the welfare board. Such continuing criminal misconduct resulted in the diversion of scarce welfare benefits, in excess of $22,000.00, from availability for those whose financial situation rendered them lawfully eligible for such funds. Under circumstances where the criminal enterprise is so continuous, and the dollar amount so high, the presumption against diversion is evident.
In assessing the continuous nature of this defendant's criminal enterprise with respect to his unlawful acquisition of welfare, the State also considered uncharged conduct reflected in the welfare investigation. This conduct consisted of the failure to disclose the proceeds of a civil settlement in excess of $130,000.00 and a failure to disclose accurately the remaining amount of disability to which the defendant was entitled. Additionally, there is an apparent failure to disclose a deposit in excess of $4,000.00, all of which is reflected in additional discovery material prepared by an investigator from this Office____ This additional misconduct is considered as bearing upon the conclusion that the thefts actually charged in the indictment were intentional.
Essentially, what this defendant did was to make a conscious decision to "take" the public's money to finance his private life while pursuing his private vocational goals. Absent a formal criminal prosecution and conviction, such conduct would be viewed as no more burdensome than an interest free loan. Specific and general deterrence requires more, and it is the State's conclusion that a formal criminal prosecution is warranted.
It should also be noted that the case arose as a result of information supplied to the welfare board by another. There is no evidence that this defendant would have, on his own, disclosed his continuous receipt of benefits to which he was not legally entitled. But for the investigation, welfare's money would be gone.
The State has reviewed the substantial "compelling reasons" information supplied by defense counsel. The information packet includes an explanation of the extent to which the defendant's life was affected by a motor vehicle collision and attempts to explain the choices the defendant made. The materials also disclose prior involvement by this defendant with law enforcement and the military along with a positive record in college and medical school. It is the State's conclusion, however, that this information does not overcome the presumption against diversion for a crime of this nature and that, additionally, the need for strong specific and general deterrence warrants formal criminal prosecution. The fact remains that this defendant failed to disclose receiving over $53,000.00, over a three year period, in reportable living expenses. This willful failure to disclose resulted in the diversion of more than $22,000.00 in welfare benefits from persons whose financial situation rendered them legally appropriate. The State does not seek to punish the defendant for the choices that he made. As a practical matter, however, he was not entitled to make those choices by requiring that the public's money be used to finance the life he wanted to have and a career he wanted to pursue.
The State is aware that the decision not to divert could possibly interfere with the defendant's ability to practice medicine in the state of New Jersey. Though the material submitted by defense counsel concludes that such a bar will occur, your report indicates that the decision will be made by the State Board of Medical Examiners on an individualized basis and that there is no automatic bar to practice. Formal criminal prosecution will not prevent this defendant from attempting to demonstrate to the Board that, under the facts and circumstances of this case, he is nonetheless a qualified individual to be licensed to practice medicine. This defendant's success or failure in that regard can not be permitted to control the State's judgement in favor of formal criminal prosecution, as expressed above. The objects of the criminal justice system and the medical board system are different and then- respective considerations are distinct from each other.
After a further review of the matter, the prosecutor gave the following supplemental reasons for denying defendant's application:
This defendant could have chosen to forgo medical school until he had earned enough money to pay for it. Given the willingness of relatives to now loan him the money to make restitution, it may well be that this defendant could have chosen to ask for such a loan to help finance his medical school training. While neither of these choices may have been appealing ones, this does not justify the conscious decision to take the public's money when not entitled to do so for private gain with the expectation of never having to pay a price for that theft if he were caught. It is the State's conclusion that the price for choosing to steal the public's money for private gain should be formal criminal prosecution.
Before ordering a defendant to be admitted into PTI over the prosecutor's objection, a trial court must find that defendant "clearly and convincingly established] that the prosecutor's refusal to sanction admission into the program was based on a patent and gross abuse of . discretion." State v. Wallace, 146 N.J. 576, 582, 684 A.2d 1355 (1996) (quoting State v. Leonardis, 73 N.J. 360, 382, 375 A.2d 607 (1977)). "A 'patent and gross abuse of discretion' is more than just an abuse of discretion as traditionally conceived; it is a prosecutorial decision that 'has gone so wide of the mark sought to be accomplished by PTI that fundamental fairness and justice require judicial intervention.' " Id. at 582-83, 684 A.2d 1355 (quoting State v. Ridgway, 208 N.J.Super. 118, 130, 504 A.2d 1241 (Law Div.1985)). The Supreme Court has characterized this as a "highly deferential standard of review." Id. at 589, 684 A.2d 1355. Under this standard, we are unable to conclude that the prosecutor's rejection of defendant's PTI application constituted a patent and gross abuse of discretion.
The prosecutor correctly concluded that the pending charges against defendant fall under PTI Guideline 3(i)(2). This Guideline states that if a defendant is charged with a crime which is "part of a continuing criminal business or enterprise ., [his PTI application] should generally be rejected." If the charges against defendant can be proven at a trial, there would be no doubt he engaged in a long-term, calculated scheme to defraud the State of welfare funds by repeatedly lying about his financial circumstances. Our courts have previously recognized that such fraudulent conduct constitutes a "continuing criminal business or enterprise" within the intent of PTI Guideline 3(i)(2). State v. Sutton, 80 N.J. 110, 117-18, 402 A.2d 230 (1979); State v. Burger, 222 N.J.Super. 336, 341, 536 A.2d 1295 (App.Div.1988).
Sutton involved the denial of a PTI application by a welfare recipient who failed to report approximately $50 per week she received from work as a part-time school bus driver. Although the Court remanded the case for a hearing on defendant's claim that the denial of her application constituted a patent and gross abuse of discretion because the prosecutor regularly consented to PTI applications of other persons charged with similar offenses, the Court indicated that the denial of defendant's application would be sustainable if she had been treated the same as other identically situated defendants:
Defendant did not merely fail to report one or a few sporadic accessions to her income. Rather, over a four and one half year period, she regularly received compensation deriving from her employment as a part-time school bus driver----
The prosecutor thus properly characterized defendant's crime as falling within the ambit of Guideline 3(i)(2) and thus "generally" to result in rejection from PTI. We are cognizant that defendant's misconduct was precipitated in large part by her desire to adequately feed and clothe her children, and that she has never had any other confrontations with the law. However, . in the absence of evidence clearly demonstrating the contrary, we must presume that the prosecutor took these factors into account before arriving at his decision. Notwithstanding our sympathy for defendant's plight, were this defendant's only assignment of prosecutorial error, we would be constrained to hold that the decision to reject defendant was not so arbitrary as to constitute a patent and gross abuse of discretion.
[80 N.J. at 118, 402 A.2d 230 (citations omitted).]
Because defendant is charged with offenses which fall within PTI Guideline 3(i)(2) and thus is presumptively ineligible for admission into PTI, he was required to present facts or materials "demonstrating [his] amenability to the rehabilitative process" and "showing compelling reasons justifying [his] admission and establishing that a decision against enrollment would be arbitrary and unreasonable." PTI Guidelines 2, 3(i); see State v. Caliguiri, 158 N.J. 28, 36, 726 A.2d 912 (1999). In determining whether the reasons defendant relied upon to justify his admission into PTI are "compelling," the prosecutor and any reviewing court are required to consider the criteria set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12. See Caliguiri, supra, 158 N.J. at 35, 726 A.2d 912. These criteria include "[t]he nature of the offense," N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e)(1), "[t]he facts of the case," N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e)(2), "[t]he needs and interests of . society," N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e)(7), and "[wjhether or not the crime is of such a nature that the value of supervisory treatment would be outweighed by the public need for prosecution." N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e)(14). See Wallace, supra, 146 N.J. at 585-86, 684 A.2d 1355; State v. Imbriani, 291 N.J.Super. 171, 178-82, 677 A.2d 211 (App.Div.1996); State v. Rosario, 237 N.J.Super. 63, 70, 566 A.2d 1173 (App.Div.1989), certif. denied, 122 N.J. 139, 584 A.2d 212 (1990). Under these criteria, the interests of society may justify the denial of an application for admission into PTI even though a defendant has led an exemplary life except for the conduct which forms the basis of the pending criminal charges. See Nwobu, supra, 139 N.J. at 259-60, 652 A.2d 1209; Imbriani, supra, 291 N.J.Super. at 179-80, 677 A.2d 211.
The dissent concludes that the primary "compelling reason" for defendant's admission into PTI is that denial of his application will prevent him from becoming a doctor. However, it is not the judiciary's responsibility to determine whether a person who has been charged with serious criminal offenses has the moral character to practice medicine; the Legislature has conferred that responsibility upon the Board of Medical Examiners (the Board). N.J.S.A. 45:9-1 to -27.9. One of the qualifications which the Board must consider in reviewing an application for a medical license is "good moral character." N.J.S.A. 45:9-6. In addition, the Board is authorized to deny an application by a person who "has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude," N.J.S.A. 45:9-16(c), or "relating adversely to the activity regulated by the board." N.J.S.A. 45:1-21(f). To perform its responsibilities under these statutory provisions, the Board has established a "Credentials Committee." Defendant submitted a letter by Dr. Grossman, a former chairman of this committee, which describes how the committee would review defendant's application for licensure if he were convicted of welfare fraud:
[H]is application for licensure would be separated out from other applications and directed to the Credentials Committee. The Credentials Committee would review the application and almost without fail would certainly insist on a personal interview with this young man. During the personal interview, they would attempt to understand what circumstances prevailed that caused him to be convicted of a crime____ The Credentials Committee would then make a recommendation to the full board which would have to discuss this matter and vote on it before granting or denying a license.
We are firmly convinced that, despite the impressiveness of defendant's educational achievements, the charge that he engaged in a long-term scheme of welfare fraud while attending medical school warrants careful scrutiny by the Credentials Committee to determine whether he is morally fit to practice medicine. A hearing before the Credentials Committee would afford defendant an opportunity to present the materials which he has relied upon in support of his PTI application to the agency which the Legislature has entrusted with the responsibility to determine whether a medical school graduate has the moral character to practice medicine. It also would afford the Credentials Committee an opportunity to evaluate all aspects of defendant's record, including not only the conduct upon which his indictment is based and the exemplary aspects of his life described at great length in the dissenting opinion, but also the circumstances underlying the shoplifting charges against defendant as well as the other apparent fraudulent conduct described in the prosecutor's statement of reasons for the denial of his PTI application. In our view, defendant should not be allowed to use PTI as a means to circumvent this statutorily mandated process for review of the qualifications of an applicant for a medical license.
The dissent heavily relies upon State v. Mickens, supra, in which a panel of this court overturned a prosecutor's refusal to consent to a PTI application by a welfare recipient charged with welfare fraud based on her failure to report income from a job paying four to five dollars an hour. The panel emphasized that when defendant committed this fraud, she and her three children were living in an "undesirable" welfare hotel, 236 N.J.Super. at 274, 565 A.2d 720, and that defendant suffered from "the employment limitations of a high school education obtained in an urban ghetto." Id. at 278, 565 A.2d 720. Under these circumstances, the panel concluded that "defendant's crime is forgivable, and not to forgive it by her PTI admission makes a mockery of the rehabilitative purpose of PTI." Id. at 279, 565 A.2d 720.
When defendant committed welfare fraud, he was not in similar financial straits. He owned a home which he had bought in an all cash transaction with a portion of the proceeds from a $132,207.43 recovery in a personal injury action. As a result, he was able to provide housing for himself, his fiancée and child without any obligation to make monthly mortgage payments. In addition, he was receiving an average of $17,786.19 per year for his other living expenses in the form of grants, scholarships, and loans from the federal government and various private sources. Furthermore, his fiancée, who is a physician's assistant, was contributing to the support of the household. Although the money available to defendant was significantly less than would be required to maintain an affluent lifestyle, it was substantially more than was available to Sutton, Mickens or the typical welfare recipient.
Although the dissent places great emphasis upon defendant's employment history, educational attainments and economic prospects as a doctor in concluding that he deserves "a second chance" (dissenting op. at 390, 733 A.2d at 515), the prosecutor justifiably relied upon many of these same circumstances in concluding that "the need for strong specific and general deterrence warrants criminal prosecution." Defendant was not driven to commit welfare fraud by extreme economic circumstances. He was a college graduate with a substantial employment history who undoubtedly could have obtained employment to support himself and his family but instead elected to attend medical school. Consequently, there is adequate support for the prosecutor's conclusion that "what this defendant did was to make a conscious decision to 'take' the public's money to finance his private life while pursuing his private vocational goals." Moreover, the medical school's administrators undoubtedly conducted a comprehensive evaluation of defendant's economic needs in determining to award him more than $53,000 in scholarships, grants and loans for his living expenses while attending medical school. Additionally, as a former police officer, defendant was presumably aware of the seriousness of his fraudulent conduct and the consequences he would face if he were caught. Therefore, we conclude that the prosecutor's determination that defendant should be excluded from the PTI program in order to deter systematic welfare fraud by persons with ample means of available support did not constitute a patent and gross abuse of discretion.
Accordingly, the order directing defendant's admission into PTI is reversed, and the case is remanded for trial.
Although the dissent states that the PTI Manager recommended that defendant be admitted into PTI (dissenting op. at 378, 733 A.2d at 508), we note that her report concludes with the following statement: "Based upon the potential substantial injury that Seyler may suffer if rejected from PTI, deference is being given to the prosecutor to determine the appropriate disposition in this matter."
The dissent suggests that defendant undertook to make such a showing in this case (dissenting op. at 379, 733 A.2d at 508). However, defendant did not present any evidence regarding the Atlantic County Prosecutor's policy or practice in consenting to PTI applications by defendants charged with welfare fraud. Defendant's only reference to this subject was the following statement during his attorney's oral argument:
Your Honor is aware that welfare cases are routinely put into PTI; and, in fact, there's an Appellate Division case where Judge Pressler said that these types of cases were ready-made for a PTI disposition.
Clearly, this statement does not focus upon the policies of the Atlantic County Prosecutor's Office. Instead, it seems to assume that our opinion in State v. Mickens, 236 N.J.Super. 272, 565 A.2d 720 (App.Div.1989) established some kind of presumption in favor of admission into PTI of persons charged with welfare fraud.
In any event, Sutton imposes an extremely heavy burden upon a defendant who undertakes to demonstrate that rejection of a PTI application constituted a patent and gross abuse of discretion because the prosecutor accorded him or her less favorable treatment than other identically situated defendants:
[I]n order for a defendant to prevail on such a theory, he will truly be required to carry a heavy burden____ [Pjrosecutorial decisions in PTI matters are primarily individualistic in nature. In making any determination, the prosecutor must assess a particular applicant's "amenability to correction'' and potential "responsiveness to rehabilitation" — assessments which are dependent upon such factors as a defendant's age, past criminal record, education, family ties, standing in the community, and employment performance. Also relevant are "subjective" evaluations, such as the prosecutor's assessment of a particular defendant's sincerity, the motive underlying the commission of the crime, and the degree of local public anxiety attaching to certain forms of misconduct. Different results may therefore be reached in superficially similar cases.
Ordinarily, therefore, a defendant will not prevail merely because he can demonstrate that, unlike himself, others who have been charged with similar offenses have been diverted into PTI. Rather, he is required to demonstrate through independent evidence that the prosecutor's refusal to sanction his admission was in fact premised upon the consideration of an irrelevant or inappropriate factor.
[80 NJ. at 119-20, 402 A.2d 230 (citations omitted).]
Therefore, even if defendant's broad general representations concerning the disposition of PTI applications by other defendants charged with welfare fraud were supported by the record, this would not establish that the prosecutor's rejection of his application was "premised upon the consideration of an irrelevant or inappropriate factor.'' - Id. at 120, 402 A.2d 230.
N.J.S.A. 44:10-4(a) then required a person receiving AFDC benefits to execute a written agreement to repay benefits from any recovery in a personal injury action and imposed a lien to enforce this obligation. The prosecutor's investigatory report quoted on p. 364, 733 A.2d at 499 of this opinion indicates that defendant executed a repayment agreement in connection with his personal injury action but failed to report the settlement to the county welfare board.
In addition, as the prosecutor noted in his statement of reasons for the denial of defendant's PTI application, the administrative regulations governing the AFDC program require an applicant for assistance to make broad disclosure of both income and assets. The prosecutor's investigatoiy report indicates that defendant may have failed to comply with these obligations when he reapplied for assistance in 1992.
Although the record before us is insufficient to determine whether defendant committed violations of the statutes and regulations governing the AFDC program in 1990 and 1992, the Credentials Committee may consider this to be an appropriate subject of inquiry in determining the period of time during which defendant engaged in welfare fraud.