Case Name: Raymond Arnold BEASLEY, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1987-03-11
Citations: 728 S.W.2d 353
Docket Number: No. 68964
Parties: Raymond Arnold BEASLEY, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
Judges: WHITE, J., joins in this opinion.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 728
Pages: 353–359

Head Matter:
Raymond Arnold BEASLEY, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
No. 68964.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, En Banc.
March 11, 1987.
Abel Toscano, Jr., Harlingen, Larry Warner, Port Isabel, for appellant.
Rene Guerra, Dist. Atty., and Theodore C. Hake, Asst. Dist. Atty., Edinburg, Robert Huttash, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

Opinion:
OPINION
W.C. DAVIS, Judge.
Appellant was convicted of capital murder. Upon the jury's return of affirmative answers to the punishment issues, punishment was assessed at death.
Appellant now contends the court erred in admitting into evidence his written confession. Although the wording of the ground of error and the greater part of appellant's argument go to the voluntariness of the confession, we find that part of appellant's argument raises the question of the legality of his arrest and its effect upon the confession's admissibility, which appellant urged below by pre-trial motion to suppress:
Evidence obtained during an unlawful detention is not admissible. A confession taken as a result of a violation of of the Fourth Amendment is not admissible. Morales v. New York, 396 U.S. 102, 90 S.Ct. 291, 24 L.Ed.2d 299 (1969). The mere giving of Miranda warnings does not dissipate the taint of an illegal arrest, so as to make the statement made during detention admissible. There is really no per se rule. The burden is on the prosecution. There is no "but for" rule. Miranda warnings are merely a factor along with the passage of time and intervening circumstances and the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975).
At the hearing on pre-trial motions, appellant and the prosecuting attorney agreed to present evidence on the motion to suppress the confession and physical evidence, brought on the grounds of illegal arrest and unlawful search and seizure, together with evidence on the voluntariness of the confession. At that hearing it was developed that the victim, a police officer investigating a report that a burglar alarm had been triggered, had been shot to death by a single shot fired after what appeared to have been a struggle. Officers investigating the killing had found a tire tool and a pair of glasses nearby, and an eyewitness had given a description of a person seen there immediately after the killing.
The commander of the uniformed division of the police department recognized that the description could be that of his son-in-law, and recognized the eyeglasses as similar or identical to those worn by him. Appellant's father-in-law, accompanied by a deputy chief and at least three other officers, then proceeded to appellant's apartment. When appellant answered the door, clad only in blue jeans, the officers noticed that he had what appeared to be fresh cuts and scrapes on his torso and arms. When asked where he had acquired the wounds, appellant answered that he did not know. Deputy Chief Williams testified that, after appellant said, "I don't know":
I asked Mr. Beasley — correction; I told Mr. Beasley that he was going to have to come down to the Police Department and would he mind us coming in and looking around his apartment, while he got dressed.
Williams' testimony was the only evidence describing the arrest of appellant.
The burden is on the State to show that a warrantless arrest comes within an exception to the general rule that such arrests are unreasonable. Wilson v. State, 621 S.W.2d 799, 803-804 (Tex.Cr.App.1981). In the instant case, the State, upon appeal, argues that the evidence shows that strong suspicion of appellant ripened into probable cause upon the viewing of appellant's scratches by the officer, and that the decision not to wait for a warrant before arresting appellant was justified by the likelihood that appellant would escape.
Assuming, arguendo, that appellant's father-in-law's identification of appellant's glasses, combined with appellant's resemblance to the eyewitness' description, were not in themselves sufficient to establish probable cause to arrest appellant, it is nonetheless certain that the police knew of a way to confirm whether the glasses were indeed appellant's — which could clearly establish probable cause — without confronting appellant or alerting him to their interest in him. Shortly after appellant's arrest, the glasses — as well as a tire iron appellant used in the burglary to which the victim had responded — were identified by appellant's estranged wife as belonging to appellant. The officers, one of whom was the father of appellant's wife, were certainly aware that such an identification might be made before they confronted appellant.
The confrontation in the instant case is of the sort we suggest in West v. State, 720 S.W.2d 511 (Tex.Cr.App.1986, decided September 17, 1986) would not satisfy the rule of that case that, where probable cause is established in a suspect's presence, and the confrontations with the suspect is not contrived in order to permit an otherwise improper warrantless arrest, under circumstances which make it likely the suspect will flee, a warrantless arrest is permissible.
West's arrest occurred in a motel room; the instant arrest was at appellant's apartment, his permanent residence. No testimony was offered in the instant case to establish circumstances (other than the crime itself — see West, supra, tending to indicate that appellant would flee. Most important, the officers in the instant case, in addition to possessing what was in fact probable cause to obtain an arrest warrant, possessed knowledge of how further to strengthen their case without confronting appellant. We are constrained to hold the arrest to have been unlawful.
The illegality of the arrest does not stop our inquiry, however. As the State points out, the taint of the unlawful arrest may be removed by circumstances which intervene between the arrest and the giving of the confession. Green v. State, 615 S.W.2d 700, 707-708 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). In Green we stated:
As identified in Brown v. Illinois, [422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975)], and reiterated in Dunaway v. New York, [442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979) ] the factors to be considered in determining whether the confession has been obtained by exploitation of the illegal arrest, are
(1) whether Miranda warnings were given;
(2) the temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession;
(3) the presence of intervening circumstances; and,
(4) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.
In the instant case, officers testified that the Miranda warnings were given. The reasons for the improper arrest appear to have encompassed both the continued investigation of the crime and the isolation of a known suspect against whom evidence had been gathered which was sufficient to establish probable cause. Although the action of removing a person from his residence without a warrant or exigent circumstances sufficient to authorize an arrest under Chapter 14, V.A.C.C.P., cannot be said to be entirely without flagrancy, the instant arrest was not so flagrant as, for example, an arrest made without probable cause.
The temporal proximity of the arrest to the confession in the instant case was close — a matter of some seven hours. It is therefore upon the question of intervening circumstances that the validity of the confession must turn.
Appellant was not brought before a magistrate prior to or during the questioning process. The State relies upon the strong evidence held by the police as an attenuating factor:
In any event, the record conclusively established that Appellant's decision to open up and give his statement was not caused by the illegal arrest or any public misconduct but rather was motivated by the realization that the police had overwhelming evidence against him (the State's view) or, if one considers trial testimony also, desire to make the police realize the killing was a mistake or an unfortunate accident and not an intentional killing (Appellant's view).
The State confounds motive with intervention. The Supreme Court of the United States recognized in Brown, supra, that "It is entirely possible . that persons arrested illegally frequently may decide to confess, as an act of free will unaffected by the initial illegality." 422 U.S. at 603, 95 S.Ct. at 2261. But that Court nonetheless required an analysis along the lines set out ante to determine whether the State has met its burden of showing that the taint did not affect the confession. We cannot accept evidence of guilt (which, if very strong, should obviate the need to offer the confession at trial) or a desire to partially exculpate oneself as intervening circumstances. Given the lack of attenuating factors, the court erred in overruling the motion to suppress insofar as it related to the confession and fruits of interrogation and in admitting the confession into evidence. Cf. Self v. State, 709 S.W.2d 662 (Tex.Cr.App.1986) and Bell v. State, 724 S.W.2d 780 (Tex.Cr.App.1986).
Appellant also contends that insufficient evidence was adduced to show that he knew that the victim was a police officer. Appellant's confession leads us to wonder why this ground of error was presented:
I got out and I heard a police car braking at the front. I ran directly across the street thru (sic) somebody's yard and hid in a bush. I then left there and ran easterly between some apartments on a walkway. The officer called me to halt and to lay on the ground. I think the first sentence was 'hands high and hit the ground.['] I did lay on the ground. I then got back up and he kept telling me to stop don't move. I don't remember him pulling his gun but I told him don't shoot, don't shoot. I don't know if I then threw something at him or not but I had a .22 magnum deringer in my back pocket. Me and the officer were facing each other and he had his light shining in my face and I had my hand strected (sic) out in front toward the officer, he kept telling me to get back on the ground. I ran and slipped and fell twice, the second time I fell in some bushes. All this time I hadn't pulled my gun but I had lost my glasses and couldn't see. He tried to hold me and cuff me and we fought and I struggled with him.
The officer never drew his gun but I drew mine. I tried to persuade him to back off but he didn't, he was very brave and the gun I guess didn't scare him. I kept telling him I got a gun, I got a gun and to back away. He grabbed my wrist that I had the gun in. He still had (sic) pulled his gun. We struggled and bounced off the fence and the gun I had went off and it missed. We were in such a battle him trying to take my gun away. I was worn out and we both were gasping for breath. He said 'you know if you shoot me' I don't remember what else he said. All I get in my mind is gas chamber. He told me to put the gun down and he wouldn't say I had shot at him. I regained my breath and struggled harder. (sic) We struggled and the gun hand I then could move, (sic) He went into a crouch position to draw his gun and the gun I had went off into the back of his head.
Although the references to "the officer" and "a police car" could have been made from knowledge acquired after the act, the actions and words described were clearly those of a police officer. Who else, for instance, would go into a crouch position to draw his gun after having attempted to handcuff appellant? Furthermore, the detailed descriptions of the officer's actions render incredible appellant's contention that he could not see well enough to distinguish a police uniform from more than one foot away. The ground of error is clearly without merit.
Because of the erroneous admission of appellant's confession, the judgment is reversed and remanded.
. See Art. 37.071(b)(1), (b)(2), V.A.C.C.P.
. Our disposition of this case makes it unnecessary to abate the appeal for the entry of findings of fact upon the issue of voluntariness, which do not appear in the record.
.Art. 40.09, Sec. 9, V.A.C.C.P.. See also Ben-Schoter v. State, 638 S.W.2d 902 (Tex.Cr.App. 1982).
. In determining the sufficiency of evidence, all the evidence is considered, whether or not properly admitted. Collins v. State, 602 S.W.2d 537 (Tex.Cr.App.1980).
. Because we have held the confession to be inadmissible, we need not admonish the assistant district attorney that it would be highly improper for him to serve again as witness to the confession, then to resume conducting the State's case, then to argue to the jury (in effect to testify) that his version of events was more credible than was appellant's.