Case Name: John J. Henry, Warden of the Penitentiary, et al., v. State of Mississippi
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1905-11
Citations: 87 Miss. 1
Docket Number: 
Parties: John J. Henry, Warden of the Penitentiary, et al., v. State of Mississippi.
Judges: 
Reporter: Mississippi Reports
Volume: 87
Pages: 1–125

Head Matter:
John J. Henry, Warden of the Penitentiary, et al., v. State of Mississippi.
[39 South. Rep., 856.]
State. Suits by. Governor. Potver to bring. Constitution 1890, seos. 116-143. Oocle 1892, § 2156.
The powers of the governor are defined by Constitution 1890, sees. 116-143, and Code 1892, § 2156, and he is not empowered thereby to institute a suit for and in the name of the state. Such power is not deducible from:
(а) Constitution 1890, sec. 116, providing that the chief executive power of the state shall be vested in the governor; nor
(б)' Constitution 1890, sec. 119, providing that the governor shall be the commander in chief of the army and navy of the state and of the militia, except when they shall be called into the service of the United States; nor
(c) Constitution 1890, sec. 123, providing that the-governor shall see that the laws are faithfully executed; nor
(<?) Any other constitutional or statutory provision.
From the chancery court of, first district, Hinds county.
Hon. Eobert B. Mayes, Chancellor.
This suit was begun in the name of the state of Mississippi, the appellee, by James K. Vardaman, governor of the state, as complainant, against Henry, warden of the penitentiary, and others, including the members of the board of control of the penitentiary, and Horace J. McLaurin, the appellants, as defendants. From a decree overruling a motion to dissolve a preliminary injunction which had been issued in the cause the defendants appealed to the supreme court'. The facts are fully stated in the opinions.
Opinion op ti-ie Chancellor.
“Attempting no review of the facts in this case, any further than is necessary to set forth my opinion,_ I proceed at once to a discussion of the questions involved.
“First — 'In the arguments of the case before me, counsel representing the defendants in the bill concede that the governor has the lawful authority to institute the proceedings in behalf of the state, and for that reason there need be no discussion of this point.
“Second — The main question in the case presented for my determination, according to my view of it, is as to the validity of the order of the board of control and the contract made thereunder. In order to discuss this question it is necessary to set out in full the order of the board and to give certain portions of the contract which I will discuss. The order of the board is:
“ ‘Resolved, That the board of control work with the convicts for the year 1906 Sandy Bayou plantation, owned by II. J. McLaurin, and shall receive for their share of the crop and for the labor of the convicts $25,000.00 (twenty-five thousand dollars), which sum the said McLaurin guarantees to the state certain and in all events for said year; the number of convicts to be employed on same to average seventy, if so many be necessary to the proper cultivation and harvesting of the crop thereon.’
“It will be noted that the resolution of the board itself recites that the state is to receive for its ‘share of the crop’ and ‘for the labor of the convicts’ $25,000, ‘which sum the said McLaurin guarantees to the state certain and in all events for said year.’ Pursuant to this resolution of the board, it entered into the following contract with McLaurin, after reciting that it was entered into on December 5, 1905, between the state of Mississippi, acting by and through its board of control, and H. J. McLaurin — viz.:
“ ‘First — That the board of control has agreed to work the plantation in Sharkey county, state of Mississippi, owned by the said McLaurin, and known as “Sandy Bayou,” for the year 1906.
“ ‘Second — That the said board of control shall pay to the said McLaurin, for the use of said plantation for said year, all the crops grown, raised, and gathered on said premises for said year, after the sum of $25,000 shall have been reserved therefrom, and the said McLaurin guarantees that the crop raised on said premises shall amount to $25,000, and binds himself to the said board of control in that sum, promising to make up whatever the crops grown on the said premises may fall short of that amount. **
“ ‘Third — That the said board of control shall have'■"absolute authority over the labor employed in working said land, and that said labor shall be under the direction of said board and of the persons appointed by the board.
“ ‘Fourth — That the said McLaurin, in addition to the land leased and furnished by him, shall also furnish the necessary mules and teams for working of said plantation, and. feed for same, and shall also furnish all wagons and farming implements and planting seed.
“ ‘Fifth — That the said board of control shall have said crops made, harvested, and gathered. This act executed in duplicate.’
“The resolution of the board provides that the state of Mississippi shall receive ‘for its share of the crops and for labor of the convicts $25,000,’ and when the contract itself is stripped of all its verbiage and made to reveal just what it is, it is a contract between the board of control 'of the state of Mississippi to lease to IT. J. McLaurin, for the consideration of $25,000, paid to the-state by McLaurin, seventy convicts for the year 1906, to be worked under state supervision on the private plantation of McLaurin, known as ‘Sandy Bayou.’ This contract is this, and no mere phraseology or adroit use of language can make it anything else, when viewed in the light of its plain stipulations and the thing agreed to be done by the state and McLaurin. McLaurin is the owner of the land, and the contract and the resolution recite that the state has leased it; and yet the lessor, McLaurin, the owner of the land, is the only one who agrees to pay rent. What is he paying the $25,000 to the state for ? He is certainly not paying this sum to the state for the use of his own land. Then if he is not paying this sum to the state for the use of his own land, but is still paying this sum to the state for the use of something, what is it, if it is not for the use of seventy convicts to work this land ‘under state supervision ?’
“But this is not the only objection to this contract. Conceding that this ,is a lease of the plantation, and not a lease of the convicts, as above stated, it is still violative of both the spirit and the letter of the constitution. The resolution provides, and the contract stipulates in express terms, that McLaurin shall have all that the labor of the convicts produces on the plantation, over and above $25,000 reserved to the state for the use of convicts, thereby giving to McLaurin, a private individual, a direct interest in the labor of the convicts, a thing that is expressly prohibited by the constitution. If there is one thing in the constitution that is plain, it is that no individual citizen shall have any interest of gain or loss,’ individually, in the labor of the convicts. If there was one thing that the constitution aimed at, it was'the humane treatment of its convicts, and the taking away from each and every individual of the commonwealth any private interest in the labor of convicts, thereby taking away the inducement that any one might ever have to work them excessively and, for purposes of gain to themselves, grow rich upon the sweat and blood of these unfortunates. Let us examine the sections of the constitution bearing upon this subject, and it will be seen that this conclusion is inescapable. Section 223 of the constitution provides that -no penitentiary convict shall ever be leased or hired to any person or persons, or corporation, private or public, or quasi public, or board, after December 31, 1894, save' as authorized in the next section.’ Section 224, which is the next section, expressly referred to in section 223, says ‘the legislature may authorize the employment, under state supervision and proper officers and employes of the state, of convicts on public roads, or other public works, or by any levee board of any public levees,’ etc. It will thus be seen by those two sections that leasing the convicts to any private person is expressly prohibited by section 223, and when not worked according to the scheme outlined by this section they can only be worked according to section 224, which provides that they can then only be worked on public works, and this under state supervision; and, as if to emphasize the fact that there can be no private interest in the convicts by any individual of the commonwealth, the same section of the constitution, a little further down, says, ‘but said convicts shall not be let or hired to any contractors under said board,’ speaking with reference to any levee board working on public levees. It will thus be seen that, even though the convicts may be worked on public works, so careful was the constitution to guard against any individual of the commonwealth having any interest of gain in the labor of the convicts that it prohibits the letting or hiring of convicts to any contractor working for the board even on public works.
“But it was argued to me, and the contract and the order of the board of control recite, that the board of control shall have absolute authority over the labor employed in working the said land. The constitution plainly says that there shall be no leasing or hiring to any private individual, with or without the board of control retaining authority over the convicts, and, even though the order of the board retains this, it is none the less prohibited by the constitution. There shall not be created in any individual of the state even the inducement to coerce convict labor. There are just four of these sections of the constitution on penitentiary and prisons, the manifest purpose and object of all of them looking to a more humane treatment of the convicts than had existed in the state when private letting was permissible. So cruel and inhumane had been the treatment of the convicts.in many instances when private individuals were permitted to lease them, and thereby, become interested in convict labor, that the constitutional convention placed it in the fundamental law of the state that n'ever again should private individuals become' in any way interested personally in the labor of the convicts, because this interest of personal gain led to all the cruelties that had theretofore existed. To this end the state reserved to itself the dominion and authority over the convicts. It was the policy of the state to work them under guards hired and paid by itself, the pay of whom was in no way dependent upon the production of the convict. When it authorized them to be worked in any other way than upon the farms of the state, it was upon public works, where no element of personal gain entered into the powers by whom they were to be worked and controlled, and even prohibiting them to be worked under any contractor of any board engaged in public works, thus all the time guarding against the element of personal gain to any private person, that which had proven to be the curse of the convict and a disgrace to humanity, if history correctly records the cruelties growing out of the private leasing system. The constitution aimed at prohibiting the wrong, and, by preventing private individuals becoming inter ested directly in the labor of the convicts as a matter of personal gain to themselves, undertook to tear up and destroy any inducement that might exist in any member of the body politic to excessive labor. Every individual in the commonwealth is alike interested in the labor of the convicts, but no individual of the commonwealth can contract lawfully under the constitution of the state, separate himself from the body politic, and obtain a special interest in the convict labor, over and above the interest of every other person, and if he does, the contract is void.
“Let us apply this to the contract of Mr. McLaurin. All the interest in the labor of these convicts, by virtue of this contract, is transferred from the state to McLaurin. If Sandy Bayou makes one bale of cotton, the state gets its $25,000; if Sandy Bayou makes 2,000 bales of cotton, the state gets the same. McLaurin is the only individual in the state that is interested in the production of these convicts, and their labor is a matter of gain or loss to him. The inducement to coercion is created by the contract, and an interest given in the labor of the convicts. McLaurin has a common interest with all the public in the $25,000 paid and an additional interest in the labor of the convicts, not shared in by the general public, in that his profit on the lands must arise from their labor. If a contract can be made that gives to the private individual an interest in convict labor, it thwarts and defeats the plain intent and letter of the constitution. It is my judgment that any contract made which leaves to the party from whom the land is leased any interest in the convict labor, is void as coming in conflict with sections 228 and 224 of the constitution of the state. If this contract had been a contract to lease on shares, giving to McLaurin one-half the produce of the place, or if it had given him one-twentieth of that produced by the convicts, or if it had given him any interest in the smallest degree in the labor of these convicts, it is void. Even if the laws providing that a lease of the lands may be made are constitutional, the board must pay a stipulated sum for the lands — in other words, lease the lands straight out, not giving to tbe lessor any interest whatever in anything produced by the convicts — or the lease is void because in conflict with sections 223 and 224 of the constitution of the state of Mississippi.
“Third — Counsel for complainant in their argument urge that any law of the state authorizing the lease of lands by the board of control, upon which the convicts of the state are to be worked, is void because in conflict with section 225 of the constitution, and press upon the court a decision of this question. The contract made by the board with McLaurin is not a lease of land, but a lease of convicts. The question which is presented to me to decide is not a question arising by virtue of any action taken by the board of control under the statutes and laws in question authorizing the lease of land, and, this being the case, I shall follow the principle so often declared by our supreme court —that courts should never decide constitutional questions except when necessary to a disposition of the cause. HendricJcs v. State, 79 Miss., 368 (30 South. Bep., 708).
“Fourth — 'Counsel for the defense argue that this is but an effort on the part of the minority of the board to control the action of the majority, and again, if they are mistaken as to this, it is an effort on the part of the complainant, by resort to the court, to control the ‘discretion’ of the board. If either of these propositions were correct as shown by the record in this case, the mere statement of them would furnish unanswerable argument. There is a universality of authority that this cannot be done by an appeal to the courts. But does the record present any such case? By section 123 of the constitution of the state, reannounced in Code 1892, § 2156, subdivision' ‘c,’ it is made the duty of the governor ‘to see that the laws are faithfully executed.’ The board of control is of itself a creature of the law, and must act in subservience to the constitution and laws of the state. When it acts in violation of either, or both, it acts without authority. What is it that the board is sought to be enjoined from doing ? Is it a matter about which they have either discretion or authority to act ? I think not. If the board of control had the authority under the statutes to lease a farm for the purpose of working the state convicts, or, in the alternative, place the convicts on lands already belonging to the state, as in their judgment would best subserve the interests of the state, and a majority of the board had decided in favor of the lease, no one would contend that the minority could control the majority by a resort to the courts, and the courts would not entertain such a suit. But the case stated above is not the case which confronts the court.' The board of control have exercised an authority for which there is no warrant, either by statute or by constitution, but which is expressly prohibited by the constitution — to wit: They have leased seventy convicts for the year 1906 for a consideration of $25,000 to a private individual, said convicts to be worked under state supervision, which is expressly prohibited by the fundamental law of the state. Oan it be argued that the authority charged by both the constitution and the laws of the state with the duty of seeing that the laws are faithfully executed, after protesting as a member of the board that the law is being violated, and without effect, shall remain supine and see the unlawful contract carried into execution ? It is not a matter of discretion which is sought to be controlled. It is not a minority trying to control a majority, but it is the chief.executive of the state trying to prevent the board of control from acting without authority and in violation of the law. State of Mississippi v. Johnson, 4 Wall., 493 (18 L. ed., 437), has no application in this case. The law as announced above is clearly recognized in the very authorities cited by counsel for the defense and relied on by them, and I use their authorities, showing that it is only .in matters where there is to be an exercise of lawful discretion that the courts decline to act. Gaines v. Thompson, 7 Wall., 347 (19 L. ed., 62) ; United States v. Seaman, 17 How., 225 (15 L. ed., 226) ; United States v. Guthrie, 17 How., 284 (15 L. ed., 102) ; United States v. Commissioner, 5 Wall., 563 (18 L. ed., 692) ; Litchfield v. Register', 9 Wall., 575 (19 L. ed., 681) ; City of New Orleans v. Paine, 147 IT. S., 261 (13 Sup. Ot., 303 ; 37 L. ed., 162) ; Simpson Oounty v. Buckley, 85 Miss., 713 (38 South. Kep., 104).
■ “Again, it is claimed that the board of control is a part of the executive department, and that a writ of injunction will not lie; that this court has no jurisdiction, because no property rights are involved. In the case which is found in 180 U. S., 236 (21 Sup. Ct., 331; 45 L. ed., 497) — Missouri v. Illinois — reannouncing what has been decided In re Debs, 158 U. S., 564 (15 Sup. Ct., 900; 39 L. ed., 1092), it is expressly decided that in matters of public concern it is unnecessary that there should be involved any pecuniary interest of the state. Many cases are cited by counsel for the defense, all of them holding that the governor of the state cannot be enjoined and that a writ of mandamus will not lie against him. I have examined all the cases and the manner in which the question has arisen. Nothing held in any of the cases cited conflicts in any way with my holding in this case. No injunction is sought against the governor; but the governor himself, in obedience to that command made on him by the constitution and the statutes of the state requiring him to see to the faithful execution of the law, seeks the injunction to prevent the trustees of the convicts of the commonwealth from dealing with the convicts in violation of the law and in disregard of the trust.' By virtue of this contract the finances of the state are involved, public right is violated, and seventy of the state’s convicts are to be contracted away in violation of the law. To argue that under these circumstances the .governor cannot act and the courts have not the power to prevent is to argue impotency in the state’s powers and to assume to the board of control an absolutism that is repugnant to every idea of the law. Can the board of control, in disregard of the constitution, make a contract prohibited by the express terms of that instrument, and, when assailed by the power charged with seeing ‘to the faithful execution of the law,’ answer that power and the courts by saying that they are a part of the executive department of the government, and therefore not amenable to the courts, or that there are no property rights involved, and that therefore the courts are powerless to assume jurisdiction ? No case has been cited to me, and I safely say that no case will be cited to me, holding so monstrous a proposition, or that the governor, under the circumstances presented by this case, cannot institute the action, and that under the case as made by the record the courts are powerless to act in the matter. The right to do so is amply sustained by authorities. State v. Lord (Ore.), 43 Pac., 471 (31 L. P.'A., 473); Simpson County v. Buckley, 85 Miss., 713 (38 South. Pep., 104) ; Wisconsin v. Cunningham (Wis.), 51 N. W., 724 (15 L. P. A., 561) ; State v. Saline County, 51 Mo., 350 (11 Am. St. Pep., 454) ; State v. McLaughlin, 15 Kan., in part of opinion to be found on page 233 (22 Am. St. Pep., 264).
“Por the reasons given above, I order that the motion to dissolve the injunction be overruled and the injunction retained.”
McWillie & Thompson, for appellants.
There must be some limit to the powers and duties of the governor; his powers and duties ought to be distinctly executive in character, although in practice the legislature sometimes requires of him the performance of mere ministerial acts. His functions are never judicial. He is never, and never can be, required to exercise those powers or perform those duties which are expressly or by necessary implication given to or imposed upon other officers.
The general rule on the subject is this: The state can be recognized by the court as a suitor in legal proceedings only through the agents or representatives appointed by law to speak and act in its name, and unless a proper agent or representative is present, in legal contemplation the state is not present ; and this presence of the agent or representative can be made known and attested only by the record. 20 Ency. PI. & Pr., 589.
It must necessarily follow from the general rule that officers are not authorized to bring suits in the name of the state unless their warrant of attorney for so doing can be produced. Legis lative authority for the power must be pointed out. Such authority in the governor cannot be pointed out; it does not exist.
Before calling attention to the state of our express constitutional and statutory law on the subject, we will be excused for calling the court’s attention to two classes of cases which, upon a superficial view, are calculated to mislead:
(a) Federal cases based upon rules of the supreme court of the United States for the regulation of procedure in suits brought under the clause of the constitution of the United States giving that court original jurisdiction in suits by one state against another, and which rules have been acted upon and applied by way of analogy in other cases, and in inferior federal courts in cases wherein a state was a party.
(b) Oases in which states of the union have brought suits in the courts of another state. In such cases the courts of the state in which the suit is brought will not, at the instance of'the defendant, inquire into the law of the plaintiff state, but will assume that the officers of that state have correctly determined the question and that the suit was begun in pursuance of such a determination.
Coming now to our express constitutional and statutory provisions, we find:
(1) That the governor is vested with the chief executive power of the state (const., sec. 116), but he is not vested with all executive power. He is (const., sec. 119) commander in chief of the army and navy of the state and of the militia, except when they shall be called into the service of the United States. The exception is especially to be noted, as will be seen further on. He is to see (const., sec. 123) that the laws are faithfully executed.
These are the only sections of the constitution relative to the governor which -can be conceived to be applicable to the question under discussion.
The constitution then provides (sec. 133), in article 5, entitled “Executive,” for a secretary of state, (sec. 134) for a state treasurer, etc., empowering each to perform certain executive duties. The governor is not the secretary of state, any more than the secretary of state is the governor, and the same can be said of the governor and the treasurer and of the governor and every other officer provided for by the constitution, whether in the article entitled “Executive” or in any other article. The powers given and duties imposed upon one are denied to the others.
In article 6, entitled “Judiciary,” we find that the judges of this court, the circuit judges and chancellors and justices of the peace, are provided for, and section 173 of the same article reads as follows:
“There shall be an attorney-general elected at the same time and in the same manner as the governor is elected, whose term of office shall be four years and ydiose compensation shall be fixed by law. The qualifications for the attorney-general shall be the same as herein prescribed for judges of the circuit and chancery courts.”
A district attorney is also (sec. 174) provided for in the article on “Judiciary.”
It will be observed that the powers and duties of neither the attorney-general nor the district attorney are prescribed by the constitution, but are left to be inferred from the nature of the offices and for legislative determination.
The governor is nowhere expressly authorized by statute to institute suits in the name of the state except in one state of case, Code 1892, § 2167, and this exception but proves the general rule that he is without such authority. We shall inquire presently whether he is empowered to do so by necessary implication. The attorney-general is expressly authorized to begin suits in the name of the state by the following statutes — viz.: Code 1892, § § 178, 180, 185, 190, 192, 2846, 3521.
Has the governor implied authority to institute this suit? Can such authority be predicated, by necessary implication, of any express authority given him? -We think not. It cannot arise from the fact that he is chief executive officer of the state, because we find that he does not possess all executive power, and it cannot be inferred from the fact that he is commander in chief of the army and navy of the state and the militia, except when they shall be called into the service of the United States. The exception to the section creating him the commander in chief shows that he (is not commander in chief when the militia is in the service of the United States. The governor is an inferior officer to the president of the United States. Certainly it could not be contended with reason that the president of the United States, when in command of the state militia, has authority to institute and to prosecute this suit. The governor is not always the man on horseback.
The governor has no implied power to institute this suit arising from the fact that he is charged with the 'duty of seeing that theTaws are faithfully executed.
The trouble about any argument seeking to establish the governor’s power, predicated of the clauses of the constitution mentioned, is this: it proves too much. While the governor is charged with the duty of seeing that the laws are faithfully executed, he has not the power to perform the duties charged by law on every other officer of the state; he has no right by injunction to compel a justice of the peace to perform the law or to refrain from its violation; he has no right to interfere with any judicial officer, nor has he a right to control the sheriff or any other ministerial officer.
The truth of the business is, the institution of a suit, in the name of and for the state, is not an executive function. The discretion involved in the exercise of such rights is rather judicial in its nature than ministerial. We said in the beginning that the governor’s duties are never judicial in their nature.
We must draw a distinction between the attorney-general of the state and the attorney-general of the nation. At common law in England the attorney-general was the creature of the crown, and so the attorney-general of the United States is the aid or assistant to the president; but the attorney-general of Missis sippi is a constitutional officer. He is provided for in the article of the constitution entitled “Judiciary;” his qualifications have to be the same as those of the judges. District attorneys, are also provided for in the constitution in the article on the “Judiciary,” and their qualifications are likewise defined. The legislature in its wisdom has provided that the district attorneys and attorney-general may, and shall, exercise the discretion and judgment required in determining when and what suits shall be brought by the state. It was never contemplated by the constitution makers or the legislature of the state that purely executive officers should be empowered to bring suits in the name and on behalf of the state.
Suppose the governor occupied the position of the attorney-general on this record, and this suit had been brought by! the attorney-general, would the governor be empowered to dismiss the suit? Most assuredly not. And why? Because he has not power to control the discretion and judgment of the attorney-general in the matter of bringing suits. The attorney-general is the chief officer of the state and is invested with exclusive authority as to what suits shall be brought. If the governor has the right to institute suits for and on behalf of the state, then he would have the right to dismi-ss one brought by the district attorney or the attorney-general, and could do so in spite of the constitutional officer who had instituted it.
When the constitution provided for the attorney-general, it contemplated that he should perform the duties usually incident to the position and involved in the very name. It would be beyond the power of the legislature even to deprive him of that power. See Tonella v. State, 70 Miss., 701 (s.c., II South. Rep., 17), á ease wherein this court held that the legislature even cannot empower a state officer to collect back taxes without an assessment, because the constitution has created the office of assessor, and the case is approved in the case of Mangum v. Hawkins, 78 Miss., 97; and we find in the case of French v. State, 52 Miss., 759, ample authority for the statement that the constitu tion makers, in creating an office, by implication gave the officer all the powers implied in the name conferred. That the governor is not the state was recently decided by this court in the case of Colbert v. State, 86 Miss., 769, wherein it was held that the governor has no power to exercise an option reserved by the state in its act authorizing issuance of bonds to call in the bonds and have them paid. This power could not be inferred from the fact that the governor was chief executive of the state, nor from the fact that he was commander in chief of the army and navy of the state, nor from the fact that he was charged with the duty of seeing that the laws were duly executed.
“The powers and duties connected with the office of the attorney-general are so numerous and varied that it has not been the policy of the various legislatures to attempt the difficult task of enumerating them exhaustively, and they have ordinarily been content, after expressly defining such as are deemed most important, to leave the residue as they exist at common law, so far as applicable to our jurisprudence and system of government.”
In People v. Miner, 2 Lans. (N. Y.), 397, the court, by Mullen, J., said: “Most, if not all, of the colonies appointed attorneys-general, and they were understood to be clothed with nearly all of the powers of the attorneys-general of England, and as these powers have never been defined, we must go back to the common law in order to ascertain them. The attorney-general had the power, and it was his duty, (1) to prosecute all actions necessary for the protection and defense of the property and revenues of the crown; (2) by information, to bring certain classes of persons accused of crimes and misdemeanors to trial; (3) by scire facias, to revoke and annul grants made by the crown improperly, or when forfeited by the grantee thereof; (I) by information, to recover money or other chattels, or damages for wrongs committed on the land or other possessions of the crown; (5) by writ of quo warranto, to determine the right of him who claims or usurps any office, franchise, or liberty, and to vacate the charter or annul the existence of a corporation for violations of its charter or for omitting to exercise its corporate powers; (6) by writ of mandamus, to compel the admission of an officer duly chosen to his office and to compel his restoration when illegally ousted; (7) by information to chancery, to enforce trusts, and to prevent public nuisances and the abuse of trust powers; (8) by proceedings in rem, to recover the property to which the crown may be entitled by forfeiture for treason, and property for which there is no other legal owner, such as wrecks, treasure-trove, etc.; (9) and in certain cases, by information-in chancery, for the protection of the rights of the lunatics and others who are under the protection of the crown.” 3 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d ed.), 479.
“An attorney-general, in the exercise of the functions incident to his office, is endowed with large discretion over matters of public concern, and generally the exercise of such discretion is in its nature a judicial act, over which the courts have no control.
“Courts will not review discretion. State v. Gleason, 12 Ela., 190; People v. Bosendale, 76 Hun. (N. Y.), 103, affirmed in 142 N. Y., 126; People v. Fairchild, 67 N. Y, 334, affirming 8 Hun. (N. Y), 334; People v. Ally. Gen., 22 Barb. (N. Y.), 114; People v. Central Cross ToiunB. Co., 21 Hun. (N. Y.), 476; Thompson v. Watson, 48 Ohio St. .Bep., 552; State v. Taylor, 50 Ohio St. Bep., 120.” 3 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d ed.), 484.
A. J. McLawrin, on the same side.
There is no such thing as inherent power in a governor. The executive department is only equal to the judiciary department, and it is held that there is no inherent power in a court. Austin <& Northwestern B. B. Co. v. Cluck (Texas), 64 L. B. A., 497; Messner v. Giddings, 65 Texas, 309.
The right to bring the suit as brought must have existed at the time the suit was brought, and nothing occurring afterwards could avail if such right did not at the beginning exist. P. W. & B. B. B. Oo. v. Quigley, 21 How. (U. S.), 202 (16 L. ed., 77); Martin v. Kelly, 69 Miss., 652.
The facts showing the right to bring the suit as it was brought —that is, that the attorney-general brought it — must have been averred in the declaration. Gould’s Pleading, ch. 4, secs. 13,14.
The governor is an officer just like any other officer, and therefore dei'ives his power from the law, and is governed by law and amenable to law, and must perform his legal functions, and has no power except that derived from law, just like any other officer. Shelby v. Alcorn, 36 Miss., 292.
The laws that he shall see faithfully executed are the laws that pertain to the duties and functions of his office. It was never understood that he should go out and see whether or not the road overseers properly posted and worked their roads.
Nominatio unius est exclusio alterius. The officers he can superintend are.shown in Code 1892, § 2158 — the land commissioner, treasurer, and auditor of public accounts. Those whom he can suspend are named in secs. 2158, 2170, and 2176.
The suits that he can require to be brought in foreign jurisdictions are named in sec. 2167.
Those that he can require to be brought in this state, and the manner in which they are to be brought, are named in sec. 2177.
It would be a sad day for Mississippi if it were held that there is any officer who is not governed by law, or whose duties are not defined and restricted by law.
Williamson, Wells & Peyton, also on the same side.
The state can be recognized by the court as a suitor in legal proceedings only through agents and representatives appointed and authorized by law to speak and act in its name. Unless the proper agent or representative is present, in legal contemplation the state is not present in the court, and the presence of the proper agent and representative can be attested only by the record in the case. This doctrine is clearly maintained in the cases of The People v. Navarre, 22 Mich., 1, and Benallech v. The People, 31 Mich., 200, in which it is distinctly held that, in the absence of a statute, no' action can be brought on behalf of the state except by the proper public agent.
Unless the governor is authorized by the constitution and laws to institute suits for the state this suit has been improperly brought and the state is not in court. ' There is no clause in the constitution which authorizes the governor to bring suits. The only clause under which it can even plausibly be contended that he had the right to bring the suit .is found in sec. 123, which provides that the governor shall see that the laws are faithfully executed. This section is found in the article defining the powers of the executive departments of the government, and authorizes the governor to execute the laws where they'have been ascertained by the courts, and does not undertake to confer the power to bring a suit. Randall v. State, 16 Wis., 341.
Section 173 of the constitution provides that there shall be an attorney-general, who is made the chief law officer of the state, - and by whom all suits for the state must be brought, and all suits against the state must be defended by him unless there is some provision in the legislation of the state authorizing other persons to represent the state. Code 1892, ch. 56, confers on the governor all the powers he has additional to those conferred by the constitution. These additional powers and his powers generally are defined in Code 1892, § 2156. The powers given in the constitution are there enumerated, and paragraph (g) provides that whenever any suit or legal proceeding is pending which affects the title of the state to any property, and which may result in any claim-against the state, he (the governor) may direct the attorney-general to appear on behalf of the state and protect its interests. Paragraph (h) gives him authority to require, the attorney-general or district attorney to inquire into the affairs and management of corporations under the laws. Paragraph (i) gives him authority to require the attorney-general to' aid any district attorney in the discharge of his duties.
Under these enumerations of the powers of the governor he is required to act through the attorney-general in all litigation where the state is interested.
By Code 1892, § 2166, the governor is authorized to engage counsel to- assist the attorney-general in a case to which the state is a party when in his opinion the interests of the state require it, the compensation of the attorney thus employed being subject to the action of the legislature; and by sec. 2167 the governor may order and direct suits to be brought, for and in the name of the state, in any other state or foreign jurisdiction for the recovery of money or property due the state, and for the prosecution of such suits may employ counsel and pay the fees and costs out of money provided for that purpose. .By sec. 2177 the governor may require proceedings in court to be instituted where there is a treasurer, either state or county, or any tax collector shown tó be a defaulter, and in that section it is the duty of the governor to notify the attorney-general in case the state treasurer is the defaulter.
These statutes alone authorize the governor to bring suits for the state, and the court will observe that in all of them the state must be represented by the attorney-general, except cases in a foreign jurisdiction, where the governor may employ attorneys independently of the attorney-general.
A careful study of this legislation defining the duties of the attorney-general and conferring powers upon the governor makes it clear that the only, agent or representative authorized by law to appear for the state and the only officer by whom the suit can be brought in the name of the state is the attorney-general. If .it be true that a legal proceeding in the name of the state can only be begun by and through the agents or representatives appointed by law to speak and act in its name, the. instant case is one in which the governor has undertaken to act independently and without the consent of the attorney-general.. The bill is not signed by the attorney-general.
We cite the court to the following authorities: Fray v. Mar chie, 68 Mich., 323; Babcock v. Uanselman, 56 Mich., 27; Pitts v. McGee, 172 TJ. S., 516; People v. Navarre, 22 Mich., 1; Vrooman v. Michie,, 69 Mich., 42; Benalle'ck v. People, 31 Mich., 200; Spencer v. Knight, 116 Col., 108; McOauley v. Kellogg, 2 Woods (U. S.), 13; Randall v. State, 16 Wis., 941; Oregon v. Lord, 31 L. it. A., 473 ; Notes to 55 L. R. A., 495 ; 20 Ency. PL & Pr., 589.
Frank Johnston, J. A. P. Campbell, Alexander & Alexander, and George B. Power, for appellee.
The governor has the authority to maintain this suit under two provisions of the constitution of 1890. “The chief executive power of the state shall be vested in a governor.” Section 116. “The governor shall see that the laws are faithfully executed.” Section 123.
IIow can the governor “see that the laws are faithfully executed” unless he is allowed to invoke the judicial power of the state ? If the laws of the state are being violated before his eyes, what power has he to prevent their violation, if he is to be denied the aid of the courts of the state ? Can he use the military power that is vested in him by the constitution to prevent a violation of the laws of the state ? There are but two ways of executing the laws; one is through the intervention of the courts, and the other is by the executive force and arms, which would be taking the law. literally into his own hands.
The spectacle presented by this case now before the court on the contention of the appellant; McLaurin, is extraordinary. Here is a contract made in plain violation of the constitution and laws of the state by a majority of the board of control, leasing a lot of-the state convicts, to a private individual. This court stands armed with the plenary judicial power to cancel the contract and to order the convicts to be placed on the state lands, where they belong. The governor is anxious to vindicate the law and prevent this plain violation of the constitution, with the attorney-general standing in >a position of neutrality. In this condition of things, it is contended that the board of control, and the appellants, are beyond the power of the court, not because this court lacks the constitutional authority to prevent this violation of the .constitution, but'because there is no official to invoke the power of the court.
The logical effect of this contention is that the convicts will be kept on the plantation of a private individual under a convict-leasing contract during the whole period covered by the contract. The same thing may be done next year, and the next, and indefinitely, according to the will and pleasure of three members of the board of control.
The board stands, according to appellants’ argument, practically and in fact above the governor and above the courts of the state; by this strange and extraordinary absence of a remedy, the board becomes, in fact and in effect, the final and exclusive arbiter of the constitution and the final judge of its own powers. It is impossible that a premise can be correct that leads to such an unprecedented and astounding result and that ends in such ■ an extravagant conclusion.
It is argued by counsel for appellants that it is the exclusive prerogative of the attorney-general to bring this suit. The con- • stitution nowhere confers upon this official the authority for initiating litigation for the state. The constitution confers no express powers or authority upon the attorney-general whatever. It creates the office, but is silent in respect to the duties and powers of the official. Nor is there any authority given to the attorney-general by statute to initiate litigation on his own motion, except in a single class of cases, and that is, he may file bills in equity to set aside fraudulent conveyances made by judgment debtors of the state. Code 1892, § 179.
The attorney-general may defend and prosecute cases in the supreme court. Code 1892, § 185. All other suits are to be directed to be brought by the governor or by a state officer. Code 1892, § 185. Suits on the bonds of state officials are to be brought upon the direction of the governor.' Code 1892, § 192. If, therefore, the attorney-general has the authority to bring this suit in the name of the state, the power or authority arises from implication, for it is nowhere expressly given. If we are to search for implications to invest the attorney-general with this authority, how can the necessary and unavoidable authority in the governor, springing out of the nature of his constitutional duties and powers, be denied or questioned ? The governor, according to the very nature of things, can control the litigation of the state in the matter of instituting and dismissing suits.
We do not deny, in this argument, that the attorney-general may institute a suit of this character, but his authority to do this cannot deprive the governor of his executive prerogative of initiating litigation in the name of the state. The governor “is to supervise the official conduct of all executive and ministerial officers.” Code 1892, § 2156 (d). “He is to see that all offices are filled and the duties thereof performed.” Code 1892, to■ (e).
If the authority exists in the attorney-general to bring this suit, it cannot well be denied that the governor could direct him to bring it. The governor must see that all officers perform their duties. Code 1892, § 215.6 (e). And upon his failure to do so it clearly and logically follows that the governor could initiate this proceeding. If this is correct, the governor can institute the suit directly.
In the case of The State v. D-ubuelet, 25 La. Ann., 178, the attorney-general of the state had taken an appeal from the lower court to the supreme court of the state, and had failed to file a transcript of the record and perfect the appeal. In the meantime the governor took an appeal. There was a motion made to dismiss the latter appeal upon the ground that there was no authority in the governor for taking it. Upon this the court held that the governor “clearly has the right to appeal on behalf of the state, and this right cannot be taken away from him, simply because another officer has been before him, when he takes the appeal within the delays required by law.” That case was not decided on any statutory provisions. The Louisiana constitution of 1868, then in force, is as follows: “The supreme executive power of the state shall be vested in a chief magistrate, who shall be styled the governor of the state of Louisiana.” “He shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”
The case of Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. (U. S.), 66, was a proceeding’ by the state of Kentucky, acting through the governor, against the governor of Ohio to compel him to surrender a fugitive from justice from Kentucky.
The question arose as to whether this was a suit by a state against a state, within the meaning of the federal constitution and the judiciary act. The court said:. “Where the chief magistrate of a state is sued, not by his name as one individual, but by his style of office, and the claim made upon him is entirely in his official character, the state itself may be considered a party on the record. This was the case where the state was the defendant ; the practice where it is plaintiff has been frequently adopted of suing in the name of the governor in behalf of the state, and this was the form originally used, and always recognized as the suit of the state.”
The court then referred to the first suit brought by a state in that court, which was entitled in the bill as the suit of The State of Georgia, by Edward Teltfair, governor of said state, complavnant, v. Samuel Brailsford and others. The second .suit, as set forth in the pleadings, was, “His Excellency Edward Tell-fair, Esquire, governor and commander in chief in and over the state of Georgia, in behalf of the state, complainant, against Samuel Brailsford and others, defendants.” The court said further in its opinion: “Where the state is a party plaintiff or defendant the governor represents the state, and the suit may be, in form, a suit by him as governor in behalf of the state.”
So it was held, in the case of Governor of Georgia v. Madrazo, that the proceedings instituted by Madrazo, in the United States district court in Georgia, against the governor of that state in his official capacity as governor, was a suit against the state, and as such could not be brought by a private citizen against a state under the federal constitution. 1 Pet. (U. S.), 110.
In Texas v. White, 7 Wall., the court qxpressly recognized the authority of the governor of Texas to have the suit brought by the state against White and others in that court.
The supreme court of Tennessee, in the case of The Governor v. Allen et al., recognized the authority of the governor to bring suits in his own name on bonds of a public character which were made payable to him. - There was no statute authorizing such suits, but the court said that this power belonged to the office inherently according to the constitutional structure of the state government. The Governor v. Allen, 8 Hum., 176.
The supreme court of Georgia, in the case of Alexander v. State of Georgia, 56 Ga., 475, held that the governor had the authority to bring suits in the name of the state, under a statute giving him the authority to supervise the property of the state and to make proper regulations for its preservation. The statute did not in terms authorize the bringing of suits, but it was an implied power according to the decision of the court.
Even if the governor did not have the general power to bring suits, it cannot be denied that he must have the authority in this particular case according to its own peculiar facts.
Argued orally by T. A. McWillie, Ben H. Wells, C. II. Williamson, and B. U. Thompson, for appellants; and by O. II. Alexander, J. A. P. Campbell, and Franlc Johnston, for appellee.
While not determined by the court in this case, both Chief Justice Whitfield and Justice Truly discussed in their opinions the questions afterwards decided in State ex rel. Greaves v. Henry, Warden, etc. (the Sandy Bayou mandamus case),í?o$¿ p. 125; the Chief Justice in the latter case adhering to and more fully treating the views expressed by him in this case, and Justice Truly concurring in the opposing views there expressed by Justice Calhoon.

Opinion:
Oalhoon, J.,
delivered the opinion of the court.
A question sleeps on the doorsill of this case of much graver importance to the state and her people than anything involved in the controversy. That question is whether a governor may, officially or in the name of the state, originate this litigation in our domestic tribunals, unauthorized by statute, without the serious disturbance and threatened destruction of the autonomy and coequal independent rights of three separate departments of government under the constitution and laws of this republic as organized by the people in convention and in their legislature. It is essential to present the history of the proceeding and then the results of a careful examination by the rules -of right reason in the light of authority.
The board of control of the state penitentiary is the creation of legislative enactment, and is composed of the three railroad commissioners and the governor and the attorney-general, five in all, and to this board the people have intrusted the management of the convicts and the affairs of the state penitentiary. The board passed the following — viz.: "Resolved, That the board of control work with the convicts for the year 1906 Sandy Bayou plantation, owned by BE. J. McLaurin, and shall receive for their share of the crop and for the labor of the convicts $25,000.00 (twenty-five thousand dollar's), which sum the said McLaurin guarantees to the state certain and in all events for said pear; the number of convicts to be employed on same to average seventy (70), if so many be necessary to the proper cultivation and harvesting of the crop thereon." According to it the contract was made as follows — viz.: "First — That the board of control has agreed to work the plantation in Sharkey county, state of Mississippi, owned by said McLaurin, and known as 'Sandy Bayou,' for the year 1906. Second — That the said board of control shall pay to the said McLaurin, for the use of said plantation for said year, all the crops grown, raised, and gathered on said premises for said year, after the sum of $25,000.00 shall have been reserved therefrom, and the said McLaurin guarantees that the said crop raised on the said premises shall amount to $25,000.00, and binds himself to the said board of control in that sum, promising to make up whatever the crops grown on the said premises may fall short of that amount. Third— That the said board of control shall have absolute authority over the labor employed in working said land, and that said labor shall be under the direction of said board and of the persons appointed by the board. Fourth — That the said McLaurin, in addition to the land leased and furnished by him, shall also furnish the necessary mules and teams for working of said plantation, and feed for same, and shall also furnish all wagons and farming-implements and planting seed. Fifth — The said board of control shall have said crops made, harvested, and gathered. This act executed.in duplicate."
Thereupon a bill in equity was presented, beginning thus: "The state of Mississippi, acting at the instance of the governor of the state, and by its solicitors specially employed to assist in bringing and prosecuting this suit; files this bill of complaint," etc. Accompanying this bill is a letter, addressed to the law firm appearing as solicitors to the bill, as follows: "I wish, in behalf of the state of Mississippi and .in its name, to have suit brought to enjoin the execution of any order of the board of control looking to leasing any farms for the corning year; and, believing that the interests of the state require it, I hereby retain your firm to assist in the case or cases to be brought for that purpose. Yours respectfully, (Signed) Jas. 3L Vardaman, Governor." The bill is sworn to by "Jas. K. Vardaman, Governor of Mississippi," and on it a fiat for injunction was granted, resulting in a writ restraining three members of the board of control, the warden of the state penitentiary, and H. J. Mc-Laurin, a party to the contract, "from making or executing a léase of the Sandy Bayou place from H. J.. McLaurin, or using or working any convicts thereon-during 1906, or from carrying out the order of the board for said leasing." The bill avers that the board "voted to lease" the place, "over the protest and against the vote of the governor," -by a vote of three for and two against, and that this action of the board is "violative of the constitution and statutes of this state," states the reasons for this view, and prays for the injunction; and in the bill are these words: "The governor, acting under the powers given him by the constitution and laws, and especially the power conferred by Code 1892, § 2156, has directed this suit to be brought."
This section 2156 of the code of 1892 is in the following-words :
"Section 2156. Powers Generally. — In addition to the powers conferred and duties imposed on the governor by the constitution and by the laws as elsewhere provided, he shall have the powers and perform the duties following — viz.: (a) He is the supreme executive officer of the state, (b) He is the commander in chief of the militia of the state, and may call out the militia to execute the laws, to suppress insurrections or riots, and to repel invasions. (c) He shall see that the laws are faithfully executed. (d) He is to supervise the official conduct of all executive and ministerial officers, (e) He is to see that all offices ar¿ filled and the duties thereof performed, or, in default thereof, ajsply such remedy as the law allows; and if the remedy be imperfect, he shall acquaint the legislature therewith at its next session, (f) He shall make appointments and fill vacancies as prescribed by law. (g) Whenever any suit or legal proceeding-is pending which affects the title of the state to any property, or which may result in any claim against the state, he may direct the attorney-general to appear on behalf of the state and protect its interest, (h) He may require the attorney-general or district attorney of any district to inquire into the affairs or management of any corporation existing- under the laws of this state or doing- business in this state under the laws thereof, (i) He may require the attorney-general to aid any district attorney in the discharge of his duties, (j) He may offer rewards, not exceeding two hundred dollars, for escaped insane persons who are dangerous, and such other rewards as are authorized by law. (k) He may require any officer or board to make special reports to him upon demand in writing. (1) He shall transact all necessary business with state officers, shall require them to be present at their respective offices ¿t all reasonable business hours, and may require information, in writing, from any such officer relating to the duties of his office, (m) When deemed advisable, upon proceedings for the arrest of fugitives from justice in this state from other states or countries, he may commission a special officer to arrest such fugitives in any part of the state." ;
An amended bill, not sworn to, makes exhibits of the order and the pursuant contract, as hereinbefore set out, and also a further resolution of the board accepting the signed contract, and sets up that the contract was in fact a hiring of the labor of the convicts, and that it is void, .whether a leasing of the lands or the labor. The two bills were demurred to. The defendants below, appellants here, made a motion to dissolve the injunction, which was overruled, and they appeal to' this court.
The attorney-general is not made a party to the bill, either officially or in any other capacity. As stated, the governor's right to use the name of the state in suits in her own courts is based, in the bill, on the constitution generally, and specifically on Code 1892, § 2156. This section is in part a rehearsal of the constitution, and we find nowhere in either any such power expressly granted. It surely cannot be gravely urged, since the people in solemn convention ordained the organic law; that any of the servants they there provide for and assume to instruct can exercise powers not derived from that instrument by express grant or by necessary implication from the grant.- It is undeniable that the attorney-general is the officer provided by° the people as the legal adviser of the state, and it is agreed on all hands that he has the express statutory power to sue in its name, just as district attorneys have in the matters which the legislature has committed to them. ' But it is said the governor may also sue, because of necessary implication from the constitutional and statutory provisions that he is the "chief executive," that he is the "commander in chief of the militia to execute the laws," etc.-, and that "he shall see that the laws are faithfully executed," etc. In other words, the position seems to be that the attorney-general may sue by express warrant of law; but the governor is to "see that the laws are faithfully executed," etc., and therefore the governor may sue, which sequitur is not plainly to be seen in construing powers under constitutions and statutes. If either may sue, it is interesting to examine results. May each bring a separate suit? If the attorney-general or a district attorney, in his proper sphere, sues first, may the governor appear and dismiss the suit because he is "chief executive ?"' It is idle to say the power would not probably be exercised. The people knew that powers given will be, or might be, exercised, in real or supposed emergencies, and they designed to confer power only where they have expressed the purpose or where it is necessarily implied from its expression. If the governor may sue because he is "chief executive," is it to be his opinion or that of the chosen legal adviser which is to control in determining when suit shall be brought ? If he may sue because it is his duty to see that "the laws are faithfully executed," may he not, in any and every county, sue, in the home courts, on his own construction of the constitutionality of any contract made by any board of supervisors to work the roads or build a bridge, and this over and against the opinion of the district attorney, who is the statutory law adviser? The affirmative could not be denied in the argument, and this carries us irresistibly to an absurdity. It is idle to say that the legislature would resent by impeachment any such use of power. This body meets only once in two years, and no impeachment would lie against an officer for doing what he was empowered to do. Neither the courts nor the legislature can attack the conscience.
Certain it is that it would not be done by the present distinguished executive. But who can speak for all who may follow him ? Great publicists all agree that populations are happiest in absolute despotisms where the despots are wise and good. The difficulty is in the tenure. The successor may be bad, and there must, therefore, be stability of rights or the opportunity of ruin and slavery. We can imagine governors who would cheerfully lend themselves, for political ends, to influential factions who wanted to annoy with no chance of incurring costs. This would be practically impossible to elected law officers, with reputation for law learning, with the oath as attorneys upon them, and the responsibility they are under to the world in the books of reports. To say the most, it would be but remotely possible. Private persons are jealously guarded against the use of their names in lawsuits where they have given no authority for the use. How much more important to a state! When men vote for a governor, they have no thought that they are voting for a law adviser. In the eighty-eight years that we have been a state, this is the first instance of a suit by a governor, unless in the early days on bonds and obligations made payable to him. This in itself is conclusive of the public and executive construction of the scope of powers, and the courts yield to such public construction from such lapse of time. The position of appellee logically forces to the conclusion that the chief executive may dismiss a prosecution for crime in any court of the state in defiance of the district attorney, elected by the people to look after their law matters. The constitution of the United States also has a clause that the president "shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed." Yet who ever heard of a suit by that officer? In the case of United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U. S., 61 (25 L. ed. 93), the decision of the court (supreme court of the United States) is in the following words, so far as pertains to this question : "The allegation in the opening of the bill already cited implies that Mr. Van Dyke, the district attorney, is plaintiff; but if, construing it liberally, we hold that the United States is plaintiff, the statement is clear that it is brought by the district attorney, and not by the attorney-general. Leaving out of consideration all mere questions of form, there arises no presumption from the act of congress, which gives the department of justice a general supervision over the district attorneys, that the suit was brought by his direction; for the district attorneys bring innumerable suits, indictments, and proseutions, in- which the United States is plaintiff, without consulting the attorney-gen eral, and they do this in the strict line of their duty. In the class of cases to which this belongs, however, the practice of the English" courts, and of the American courts also^ has been to require the name of the attorney-general, as indorsing the suit, before it will be entertained. The reason of this is obvious — namely: that, in so important a matter as impeaching the grants of the government under its seal, its highest law officer should be consulted, and should give the support of his name and authority to the suit. He should also have control of it in every stage, so that if, at any time during its progress, he should become convinced that the proceeding is not well founded or is oppressive, he may dismiss the bill."
May the attorney-general dismiss the bill now before us ? It is said he cannot, because the governor is commander in chief and required to "see that the laws are faithfully executed." In other words, the governor can do in this state what the president cannot do in the courts of the United States. If the governor can so 'act under his powers as commander in chief, and under the duty to see that the laws are faithfully executed, why may he not nullify the decrees of the courts because he thinks they do not comport with the constitution? Alexander v. Georgia, 56 Ga., 479, cited by appellee, has no pertinency, exeept that by implication it is an authority in favor of the appellants, in that the governor's right to sue is based only on an express statute making it his duty, which statute is to be found on p; 483 of the volume, and confines the duty to particular specified property. The same may be said of the case of State v. Dubuclet, 25 La. Ann., 161, cited by appellee. On p. 162 it is shown that the governor's right to appeal a case, already brought and lost by the attorney-general below, is sustained in these words: "The letter as well as the spirit of the law gives us the required jurisdiction." That it was on the letter, see 27 La. Ann., 30, citing the statute. And see hereafter in this opinion. The case of Governor v. Allen, 8 Hum. (Tenn.), 176, is also produced. That merely holds that a governor may sue, as governor, on bonds made pay able to his predecessor, officially; and there could be no interregnum in the office of governor. There is no need to go out of Mississippi for that; it has been so held here in the early days, when official bonds, were made payable expressly to the then governor by name. Parmilee v. McNutt, 1 Smed. & M., 179. Even there the court was unnecessarily cautious enough, on p. 184, to note that no objection was made to the right of the governor to -sue as "A. G. McNutt, governor of the state of Mississippi." There could seem to be no question that the head of a corporation, private or political, has the right to sue on an obligation made payable directly to him or his predecessor in office. But this has no even remote bearing on the question now before us. The case of Compton v. State, 38 Ark., 601, is referred to for appellee. There it was held that the governor, while he might have properly employed additional counsel in that case under the statute law, "yet he did not, and, without authority from the legislature, could not, make such a contract with the solicitor as would give him a lien upon the fruits of the litigation" — that is,on the amount he recovered. In that case "the legislature had previously authorized the governor to take such steps as he might deem proper to recover possession of the bonds."
It seems plain that the general words of the constitution, which always and everywhere must be construed strictly against powers, cannot carry by any sort of implication the power claimed here. We are warned against drawing such far-fetched conclusions by elementary law Writers. It is "thumb-paper" law. It is drilled into the youth of the republic. In Walker's American Law, p. 104, we find this wise clause: "Power of General Supervision.— It is a duty enjoined upon the federal and state executives To see that the laws be faithfully executed.' It would be dangerous, however, to treat this clause as conferring any specific power which they would not otherwise possess. It is rather to be regarded as a comprehensive description of the duty of the execu tive to watch with vigilance over all the public interests." This is all that the constitution meant. No authority can be found in any of the reports of any of the states sustaining the forced and unnatural construction urged for appellee. It is not probable that one vote could be had in a constitutional convention to empower the executive to sue at discretion in the home courts. It is certain that, under the federal government and under the government of any of the several states, no instance occurs, except that at bar, where the president or any governor has contended for the power set up here, and yet all the constitutions have the same or equivalent clauses. The power has been claimed and recognized in suits in foreign jurisdictions, such as federal and other state courts, and so our legislature has wisely conferred express power upon the governor to sue in foreign jurisdictions. There can be no political complications or clash of prerogatives there, as at home; and so, in giving the power there, the legislature tacitly excluded the idea of its exercise at home.
It is not easy to understand the pertinency of the many references to federal decisions as to how states may sue and be sued in the United States courts, the service of process on them, etc. The United States constitution and laws provide for such suits, but fail to provide how they should be brought, in whose name, etc., and how process should be served on them as defendants. And so the supreme court of the United States, having the jurisdiction conferred on it, properly determined that it was not to remain |>owerless, and adopted rules to apply in such cases. Among them is this: "1. Ordered, that when process at common law or in equity shall issue against a state, the same shall be served upon the governor, or chief executive magistrate, and the attorney-general, of such state." Grayson v. Virginia, 3 Dall., 320 (1 L. ed., 619). This was in 1796. As late as 1860, in Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How., 66 (16 L. ed., 171), these rules are referred to as in force, and that case shows that service on the governor and attorney-general is enough to make the state a party, and that in these foreign jurisdictions the governor may sue in behalf of the state. So in Texas v. White, 7 Wall., 700 (19 L. ed.,227),in 1869, cognizance was taken of a case brought by Texas, under the sanction of the governor elected and the governor appointed by the president, in that court — a jurisdiction foreign to the state of Texas. It is clear that the governor may. sue in the name of the state in the courts of the United States, and a suit so brought would be recognized. This state has given him the express power to do so. It is also true that this state may be sued in foreign courts on process served on the governor and the attorney-general. It might be the only way to reach it, if its legislature was silent as to the mode of service upon it. In such case it could be made aware of- the suit most properly by service on its political head. But all this is far away from the internal policy of a state in reference to invoking the action of its own courts.
Under the laws of Mississippi the governor may sue in foreign jurisdictions. Code 1892, § 2167. Under other laws the revenue agent may sue in'matters pertaining to his province. May the governor sue, regardless of him ? So as to the land commissioner in matters pertaining to his functions. May the governor sue, regardless of himi ? He ought to be able to do so, under the argument of appellee, as chief executive, with the duty to see that the laws are executed. In People v. Navarre, 22 Mich., 1, the court says (p. 4) : "The state can only be recognized by the courts as a suitor in legal proceedings through the agents or representatives appointed by law to speak and act in its name." This is reiterated in Benalleck v. People, 31 Mich., 200, and in Babcock v. Hanselman, 56 Mich., 27 (22 N. W., 99), holding the attorney-general to be the proper representative of the state in legal proceedings. So in People v. Pacheco, 29 Cal., 210, holding that the attorney general is the only person authorized. So in State v. Railroad Co., 22 Neb., 313 (35 N. W., 118). The case of Succession of D'Aquin, 9 La. Ann., 402, after hoMing the same, uses this language: "The power for appearing for another in judicial proceedings is a very grave power, and one which the law carefully scrutinizes in the case of individuals; and the importance of such a power is obviously not to be less appreciated in the case of the state. The consequence of a power to appear for another in a court of justice is the irrevocably binding force of The thing adjudged' upon the party for whom the appearance is made; and where the interests of the state, which are the interests of all its citizens, are involved, courts of justice should not pass upon these interests unless the state is properly before it through the officers recognized as its representatives by the constitution of law." We refer, also, to Parker v. May, 5 Cush. (Mass.), 336, in which the proceeding was begun "by Samuel D. Parker, Esq., attorney of .the commonwealth for the county of Suffolk, acting in this behalf by the requirement of the governor, pursuant to statute;" and its purpose was to enforce a trust for general charity. The court said, through Shaw, C. J., that the power to institute a suit "in order to establish and carry into effect an important branch of the public interest is understood to be a common-law power, incident to the office of attorney-general;" and further, on p. 338, this celebrated judge expressed "great doubts" whether the governor's requirement would authorize the suit, but finally holds that,- the power being existent in the attorney-general alone, it was not vitiated by the fact that the governor directed it.
Recurring to State v. Dubuclet, 25 La. Ann., 161, to which we have referred and which was cited for appellee, we now refer to State v. Dubuclet, 27 La. Ann., 30, wherein the court says, through the same judge: "Looking to act No. 21 of the acts of 1872 (p. 61), the statute under which the governor acted in this case, we find that he has the right in case of the absence, death, resignation, or inability to act in any particular case of the attorney-general or proper district attorney, or where either of then! may be directly interested, to designate an attorney for such case to act in behalf of the state, for the protection of the public interest. Was the governor authorized under this statute to consent to the transfer of the case and the trial thereof at this term, notwithstanding the opposition of the attorney-general who tried the case in the court below ? We think not. The attorney-general is the proper officer to represent the state in all her lawsuits, and the statute in question was not intended to deprive him of the control and management of his cases. In order to protect the public interest in any particular* case where the attorney-general was-interested or was unable to act from death, resignation, -absence, or from any other cause, this statute authorizes the governor to appoint an attorney for such case. It does not authorize him to give consent for the transfer of any particular case and for the trial thereof before the return-day at a different term of court. The act gives him no personal control of the case whatever. When the condition happens upon which he has authority to supply counsel for the state, the attorney designated by him takes control of such case. The attorney designated by the governor in this ease does not consent to its trial here. But, under the statute, the governor was utterly without authority to appoint an attorney to act in this ease, because the attorney-general is not personally interested; he has not resigned, nor is he dead, or absent, or unable to attend to the duties of his office."
On the functions of the attorney-general and their exclusive character, we refer to Commonwealth v. Burrell, 7 Pa., 39; State v. Baker, 38 Wis., 71-80. In State v. Lord, 28 Ore., 529 (43 Pac., 479; 31 L. R. A., 473), we find this: "But do we find here what may be termed an information or bill by the law officer of the state ? As such an officer is the only person competent to institute a proceeding of the nature under consideration, the information should show upon its face in no uncertain manner that he is the officer instituting and prosecuting the suit, and the sole person responsible for its inception and maintenance. The most common form of instituting like proceedings, it seems, has been in the name of of the attorney-general. Coosaw Mining Company v. South Carolina, 144 U. S., 565 (12 Sup. Ct., 689; 36 L. ed., 537). less frequently they are brought in the name of the crown, or the state, upon the relation of the attorney-general. State, ex rel., v. Hibernian Saving Association, 8 Ore., 396. And, if permissible at all to bring the suit in the name of the state alone, the complaint or information should show upon its face that the appropriate law officer brings the same for or in behalf of the state. The proceeding in either form would fix the responsibility for the maintenance thereof upon that officer, and it' is not believed that the mere affixing of his signature in his official capacity to a complaint of bill shown to be the bill of a private relator is sufficient to impress it with the functions and capacity of an information competent to put in motion the machinery of the courts, whereby they will take cognizance of questions pertaining to the high prerogative powers of the state, or affecting the whole people in their sovereign capacity. See State v. Saline County Court, 51 Mo., 350 (11 Am. St. Rep., 454); Bigelow v. Hartford Bridge Co., 14 Conn., 578 (36 Am. Dec., 502); State v. Anderson, 5 Kan., 115; Buck Mountain Coal Co. v. Lehigh Coal Co., 50 Pa., 100 (88 Am. Dec., 534); Iroquois County Supervisors v. Keady, 34 Ill., 296; People v. Pacheco, 29 Cal., 213; Attorney-General v. East India Company, 11 Sim., 380; Bobbett v. State, 10 Kan., 15; United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U. S., 70 (25 L. ed., 93). Having reached these conclusions, the decree of the court below will be' reversed and the complaint dismissed."
In the case of In re Fire, etc., Commissioners, 19 Col., on p. 503 (36 Pac., 241), it is said: "In.this provision of the constitution, the phrase, To execute the laws/ contemplates the enforcement of a judicial process — that is, the enforcement of a right or fem'edy provided by the law and judicially determined and ordered to be enforced, and not an arbitrary enforcement by the executive of what he may consider the law to be." People v. Martin, 19 Col., 573, et seq. (36 Pac., 543; 24 L. R. A., 201). That a governor cannot employ counsel without express legislative authority, see Randall v. State, 16 Wis., 362, and Cahill v. Board, 127 Mich., 487 (86 N. W., 950; 55 L. R. A., 493). The latter case, after so holding, refers to State v. Dubuclet, 25 La. Ann., 161, supra, and supposes that that case, cited here by counsel for appellee, must base its decision, that the governor could authorize an appeal in a case where the state was interested, on the constitutional clause that he should "see that the laws are faithfully executed," and thinks this because it found no Louisiana statute. We have found it in the acts of 1872, as quoted in 27 La. Ann., supra. The case in 127 Mich. (86 N. W., 55 L. R. A.), supra, also says the decision in Alexander v. State, 56 Ga., supra, cited for appellee, was based on express statute, as it undoubtedly was. That the attorney-general, "even with the approbation of the governor," could not employ an attorney to assist in the prosecution of a claim of the state for land, see Julian v. State, 122 Ind., 68 (23 N. E., 690), and same case, 140 Ind., 584 (39 N. E., 923). These cases require express statutes, although they have in Indiana the same constitutional provision, which, if it gave the governor the light to sue, would necessarily imply the right to employ counsel. See note 55, L. R. A., 493. The attorney-general has complete control and may dismiss a case at pleasure. People v. Tobacco Mfg. Co., 42 How. Prac., 162; Attorney-General v. Barstow, 4 Wis., 567.
In view of the authorities and of the fact that we have a written constitution undertaking to define powers, and in view of the spirit and genius of the government of these states of the American union, we utterly repudiate any suggestion of any power in the governor or any other officer over and above the constitution. We say, too, that if the power sought to be exercised here could be thought a matter of doubt even, it must be decided that it does not exist. No court has ever deviated from the position of rejecting powers claimed which are doubtful. The constitutional or statutory grant must be plain. The whole people are vitally concerned in this principle, as much so as in that very mudsill of the republic that the three departments must be kept inviolably coequal and independent- each of the other. No argument can be based on the evils which might result if tiré! attorney-general refuses to proceed. " If this be a hiatus in the law, so be it until the legislature shall see fit to act. Better the hiatus than the destruction of a great and essential principle, from which it is an easy leap to the crunching of the bones of the constitution. But there is no trouble. It is a simple matter to bring this question here right. Until it is so brought before the people, sitting as this tribunal, it should not be considered any more than if it were between individuals. N o court ever considered the merits of any cause after holding there was no right to sue. Judges do not sit as moot courts to hear academic disputation, in the decision of which their conclusions would be- mere obiter dicta, and without force. Nor must they yield and decide because the public may want a speedy decision. These walls are imperviously padded to public clamor, the howls of mobs, and the storms of political factions.
If there could be any foundation for the argument that the power to sue is inherent in the mere office of governor at common law, as in the case, possibly, of the attorney-general, which we deny, still a new order of things clearly appears in the constitution of Mississippi, which devotes many sections in article 5 to defining executive powers. There is no break in the authorities that where there is an undertaking to set forth powers,' all must be presumed to be included, and that the charter only can be looked to, with its necessary implications, for the limit of authority. There can be no inherent power to sue, unless in the attorney-general; even if in him, without statute. On careful examination it will be found that not one of the cases cited by the counsel or in the dissent of the chief justice sustains, even remotely, the contention of appellee. The only thing they find looking that way is the dissenting opinion of a judge in a Louisiana case, and he cites no authority and shows no investigation of the question, but makes merely a tentative suggestion. No constitution of any of the forty-five states gives the executive the power to ignore the attorney-general, the common-law adviser, and sue at his own will in the state courts; none ever-will. No state legislature has ever done it; none ever will. There is no squint, or pretense, in this record that the attorney-general was ever applied to ajid refused to inaugurate this litigation. If there was, it would make no difference. In two or three states the legislatures have provided that the governor may sue where the attorney-general refuses his demand to sue; but there is no such statute in Mississippi, and courts are not organized to make laws, but to construe them when made. There is here what purports to be a request from certain individuals that the court decide as soon as may be, but what this has to do with the case cannot be explained. It will be an evil day when the courts cease to watch jealously to preserve the independence of the executive, and of the legislative, and of the judiciary departments, or when either becomes indifferent to the slightest encroachment of the other, as all great writers agree. We bow only to the acts of the legislature, speaking for the people, within constitutional limits. Requests do not make law. They are less than the idle winds.
There is no decree of the court below overruling the demurrer to the bill. The appeal is from a decree overruling a motion to dissolve the injunction. The attorney-general was not made a party defendant in the suit, if this could affect the matter. On the contrary, his right to sue is recognized in the bill, and he is expressly omitted as a defendant. My views, condensed as much as possible for me, are submitted with the utmost confidence to an unbiased profession, and yet it pains me to differ radically from the conclusion of the superior powers of one of my distinguished associates. Proceeding by the light before me, I should regard myself as betraying the people if I considered as a judge any case where the name of their state is used by any bne unauthorized by their constitution or by the enactments of their legislature. None but the elect may tread this holy ground. I have an opinion, of course, as a citizen — a very distinct opinion — on the merits; but I represent the people, not as a citizen, but as their officer, and should not speak officially about matters where their state is not present as a litigant in court.
Reversed, injunction dissolved, and bill dismissed.