Case Name: AMERISEAL OF NORTH EAST FLORIDA, INC., Appellant, v. Harold R. LEIFFER, et al., Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1996-03-29
Citations: 673 So. 2d 68
Docket Number: No. 95-565
Parties: AMERISEAL OF NORTH EAST FLORIDA, INC., Appellant, v. Harold R. LEIFFER, et al., Appellee.
Judges: GOSHORN, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 673
Pages: 68–72

Head Matter:
AMERISEAL OF NORTH EAST FLORIDA, INC., Appellant, v. Harold R. LEIFFER, et al., Appellee.
No. 95-565.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
March 29, 1996.
Rehearing Denied May 7, 1996.
Matt G. Firestone of Matt G. Firestone, P.A., Orlando, for Appellant.
Donald L. O’Dell of McDonough, O’Dell, Wieland & Williams, Orlando, for Appellee Hadley, Gardner & Ornstein, P.A., Wa Owen & Hadley, P.A.
Elmo R. Hoffman of Brownlee, Hoffman & Jacobs, P.A., Orlando, for Appellee Kathleen A. Ellis.
No Appearance for Appellee, Harold R. Leiffer.

Opinion:
HARRIS, Judge.
The issue in this case is whether a notary, and the law firm that employs her, may be held liable for damages resulting from an improper notarization.
Section 117.05(5) provides:
A notary public may not notarize a signature on a document unless he or she personally knows, or has satisfactory evidence, that the person whose signature is to be notarized is the individual who is described in and who is executing the instrument. A notary public shall certify in the certificate of acknowledgement or jurat the type of identification, either based on personal knowledge or other form of identification, upon which the notary public is relying.
Kathleen Ellis, a notary, was an employee of the law firm of Hadley, Gardner and Orn-stein, P.A. It is not disputed that upon the request of Harold Leiffer, she notarized the signatures of Mark Paradiso and Ronald Prupis on documents reflecting that Paradiso and Prupis were agents of Indiana Lumberman's Mutual Insurance Company (Lumberman's). There were two problems with these documents. One, Paradiso and Prupis were not the agents of Lumberman's; two, neither Paradiso nor Prupis were known to Ellis nor did they appear before her and swear to the truth of the information contained in the documents.
Ameriseal of North East Florida, Inc. paid $70,000 in premiums to Leiffer to secure the bonds represented by these improperly notarized and unauthorized documents, but when Lumberman's subsequently denied having issued or authorized the bonds, Ameriseal lost its contract with the State of Florida when substitute bonds could not be obtained within the limited time schedule.
Ameriseal sued Harold Leiffer as well as Ellis and the law firm. It obtained a default judgment against Leiffer because of his fraud, but a summary judgment was entered on behalf of Ellis and the law firm apparently because the court found that the improper notarization was not the proximate cause of Ameriseal's losses.
We agree that before the improper notarization is actionable, it must constitute or be part of the proximate cause of the injury. But Ameriseal would not have been injured (at least according to its affidavit) by Leiffer's fraud alone. "But for" the notary's action in affirming that Paradiso and Prupis identified themselves and represented, under oath, that they were the agents of Lumberman's, the bonds would not have been purchased. Indeed, being able to rely on documents is the purpose of having them notarized.
Appellees assert that even if Paradiso and Prupis had appeared before Ellis and sworn as to their authority, still the bonds would have been invalid because the affiants lacked actual authority. First, Paradiso and Prupis might have been unwilling to swear falsely, thereby exposing themselves to criminal responsibility and second, had they signed, they, and not the notary, would be civilly liable for any loss.
Appellees further justify no liability because Ameriseal purchased other invalid bonds not bearing Ellis' notary. Certainly neither she nor her employer are liable for the damages resulting from those bonds— but some other notary and some other employer might be. The misconduct of others does not immunize Ellis and her employer from damages resulting from her misconduct.
This is an appeal from a summary judgment. Carter's affidavit alleged:
3. That he is the individual that made the decision, on behalf of Ameriseal of Northeast Florida, Inc., to accept the bonds delivered by Harold Leiffer and Mid-South Insurance Consultants, Inc., which bonds are the subject of this lawsuit.
4. That Harold Leiffer told him that Ronald Prupis, one of the individuals that had signed these bonds, was the agent for and power of attorney for Indiana Lumberman's Mutual Insurance Company.
5. That he relied upon the notarization of Ronald Prupis' signature as confirmation that Mr. Prupis actually signed the bonds.
6. That he was never told anything regarding Mark Paradiso's affiliation with Indiana Lumberman's Mutual Insurance Company but relied upon the statements in the bond indicating that Mark Paradiso was the "Florida Resident Agent" for this company.
7. That he relied upon the notarization of Mark Paradiso's signature as confirmation that Mr. Paradiso actually signed the bonds.
8. That he believed that Harold Leiffer did not have the authority to bind Indiana Lumberman's Mutual Insurance Company to any bonds by his signature alone.
9.That had these bonds been executed only by Harold Leiffer, he would not have believed these bonds to be authentic, would not have paid premiums for these bonds and would not have submitted these bonds to third parties as authentic bonds.
At least for the purpose of considering whether summary judgment is appropriate, this affidavit properly raises an issue of fact as to whether Ameriseal suffered damages by relying on Ellis' notarization. And the fact that Paradiso and Prupis might have appeared before Ellis and lied about their connection with Lumberman's is irrelevant because they did not so appear and they did not lie. Equally irrelevant is the fact that other notaries may have violated their statutory duties. Here, we are concerned with Ellis' statutory duty. And liability in this ease does not depend on Ellis being an "insurer or guarantor" of the documents. Ellis' obligation as a notary is quite simple: she must either know or have properly identified the affiants that appear before her and she must administer the proper oath. If business cannot depend on notaries doing this simple task, then there is no place for notaries in the world of commerce.
REVERSED for further action consistent with this opinion.
GOSHORN, J., concurs.
W. SHARP, J., dissents, with opinion.
. Section 117.05(7):
The employer of a notary public shall be liable to the persons involved for all damages proximately caused by the notary's official misconduct, if the notaiy public was acting within the scope of his employment at the time he engaged in the official misconduct.