Case Name: STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Movant, v. Norman L. RAINS, Respondent; and Kathleen J. SMITH; Matthew E. Smith, an infant, by his next friend, Kathleen J. Smith; and James T. Marshall, Movants, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondent
Court: Supreme Court of Kentucky
Jurisdiction: Kentucky
Decision Date: 1986-08-07
Citations: 715 S.W.2d 232
Docket Number: 
Parties: STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Movant, v. Norman L. RAINS, Respondent. and Kathleen J. SMITH; Matthew E. Smith, an infant, by his next friend, Kathleen J. Smith; and James T. Marshall, Movants, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondent.
Judges: STEPHENS, C.J., and WHITE, GANT, STEPHENSON, VANCE and WINTER-SHEIMER, JJ., concur.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 715
Pages: 232–237

Head Matter:
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Movant, v. Norman L. RAINS, Respondent. and Kathleen J. SMITH; Matthew E. Smith, an infant, by his next friend, Kathleen J. Smith; and James T. Marshall, Movants, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondent.
Supreme Court of Kentucky.
Aug. 7, 1986.
As Corrected Aug. 7, 1986.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 25, 1986.
Henry A. Triplett, Robert R. deGolian, Bennett, Bowman, Triplett & Vittitow, Louisville, for State Farm.
Terry Fox, Gilbert Hale Nutt, Louisville, for Rains.
David A. McCullough, Louisville, for Smith and Marshall.

Opinion:
VANCE, Justice.
We granted discretionary review in each of the captioned cases and consolidated them for argument. The question in each case is whether there must be some causal relationship between the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle and an injury sustained while using a motor vehicle to entitle the injured person to basic reparation benefits as a result of the injury. K.R.S. 304.-39-020, 304.39-030, and K.R.S. 304.39-040.
Norman Rains, as he approached his parked automobile around midnight, observed two or more individuals on, or partially on, the hood of his car who were apparently engaged in a fight. He asked them to get off of his car and was struck by one of the participants. He then joined in the fray, subdued his attacker, and was hit in the back of the head with a baseball bat, by a person unknown to him, as he proceeded to enter his motor vehicle. His claim for basic reparation benefits on account of his injuries was denied by his insurance carrier on the ground that his injury did not arise out of the use of a motor vehicle. The trial court granted summary judgment to the insurance carrier, and the Court of Appeals reversed. We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Charles Smith was operating his motor vehicle on a public highway, and James Marshall was a passenger in the vehicle. Orville Smith, a deranged brother of Charles Smith, fired several shots through the rear window and instantly killed Charles Smith.
The vehicle turned over and came to rest. James Marshall crawled on his hands and knees away from the vehicle. He was shot and injured by Orville Smith as he crawled away.
The claims for basic reparation benefits resulting from injuries caused by the gunshot wounds to Charles Smith and to James Marshall were denied on the ground that the injuries did not arise out of the use of a motor vehicle. The trial judge granted summary judgment to the insurance carrier. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Basic reparation benefits are provided by the Motor Vehicle Reparations Act. K.R.S. 304.39-010-040. Among the purposes of the act are these:
"To provide prompt payment to victims of motor vehicle accidents without regard to whose negligence caused the accident .; and
"To encourage prompt medical treatment and rehabilitation of the motor vehicle accident victim by providing for prompt payment of needed medical care and rehabilitation;" (Emphasis ours.)
K.R.S. 304.39-010(2) and (3).
K.R.S. 304.39-030(1) provides:
"If the accident causing injury occurs in this Commonwealth every person suffering loss from injury arising out of maintenance or use of a motor vehicle has a right to basic reparation benefits, unless he has rejected the limitation upon his tort rights as provided in KRS 304.-39-060(4)." (Emphasis ours.)
K.R.S. 304.39-040(2) provides:
"Basic reparation obligors and the assigned claims plan shall pay basic reparation benefits, under the terms and conditions stated in this subtitle, for loss from injury arising out of maintenance or use of a motor vehicle. This obligation exists without regard to immunity from liability or suit which might otherwise be applicable." (Emphasis ours.)
The plain language of the statutes provides for the payment of basic reparation benefits to the victims of motor vehicle accidents for injuries arising out of the use of a motor vehicle.
The questions in each of the captioned cases are (1) whether the injured persons were motor vehicle accident victims, and (2) whether their injuries arose out of the use of a motor vehicle.
Although the injuries to each of the persons involved were caused by intentional acts, they contend that, as to them, the injuries were accidents because they were wholly unexpected and unforeseeable. Conceding for the purposes of argument, but not deciding, that the injured persons were the victims of an accident, they fail to establish that they were victims of a motor vehicle accident. The accident claimed by Rains was the deliberate, but unexpected, blow from a baseball bat. The accident claimed by Smith and Marshall was the intentional shooting by a third party, albeit unexpected and unforeseen by them. In both cases the only connection between the victims and a motor vehicle was incidental. No motor vehicle accident contributed to their injuries. It follows that they were not victims of a. motor vehicle accident.
It seems equally clear that the injuries did not arise out of the use of a motor vehicle. The contention is made that each of the injured persons was using a motor vehicle because the term "use" is defined in K.R.S. 804.39-020(6) as "any utilization of the motor vehicle as a vehicle, including occupying, entering into, and alighting from it." Even if it be conceded, however, that the injured were using a motor vehicle at the time they were injured, it remains their burden to demonstrate that the injuries arose out of the use of the vehicle.
They interpret the statutes involved to mean that reparation benefits are payable to one who is injured while using a motor vehicle without regard to whether the use of the motor vehicle had any causal connection with the injury.
K.R.S. 304.39-030(1) and 040(2) do not provide for the payment of benefits to persons injured while using a motor vehicle. They provide for payment of benefits, not to all persons who are injured while making use of a motor vehicle, but only to those persons injured while making use of a motor vehicle whose injuries arose out of the use of the motor vehicle.
The term "arising out of the use of" implies a causal connection. We so decided in United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company v. Western Fire Insurance Co., Ky., 450 S.W.2d 491 (1970). In that case, a passenger in a motor vehicle was injured when a pistol was accidentally discharged in the car. It was stipulated that the movement or operation of the car had nothing to do with the accidental discharge of the pistol. The question presented was the proper interpretation to be placed upon an insurance policy which provided for coverage for bodily injury arising out of the use of the automobile.
We held that the injury did not arise out of the use of the vehicle because there was not a causal connection between the use of the vehicle and the injury. While it is true that this case construed the phrase "arising out of the use of an automobile" as that term was used in an insurance policy rather than a statute, we see no reason why a different interpretation should apply here. We hold that basic reparation benefits are payable pursuant to K.R.S. 304.39-030(1) and 040(2) only when there is a causal connection between the injuries and the maintenance or use of the motor vehicle.
As to the respondent Rains, no such causal connection exists. The only contention made by Rains is that he was injured while using his automobile. The only causal connection suggested by Rains' brief is that he would not have been injured except for the fact that his vehicle was parked at the place it was and that he returned to that place to make use of his vehicle. This fails to suffice as a showing that his use of his vehicle caused his injury.
Likewise, Smith and Marshall were shot by a deranged brother of Smith, but there is nothing to suggest that the shooting was causally related to the use of the vehicle.
The decision of the Court of Appeals in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Rains, NO. 86-SC-19-DG, is reversed.
The decision of the Court of Appeals in Smith and Marshall v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, NO. 85-SC-1013-DG, is affirmed.
STEPHENS, C.J., and WHITE, GANT, STEPHENSON, VANCE and WINTER-SHEIMER, JJ., concur.
LEIBSON, J., dissents as to 86-SC-1P-DG and dissents in part/concurs in part as to 85-SC-1013-DG in a separate attached opinion.