Case Name: EDGE v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1925-05-13
Citations: 275 S.W. 1010
Docket Number: No. 9062
Parties: EDGE v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 275
Pages: 1010–1012

Head Matter:
EDGE v. STATE.
(No. 9062.)
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
May 13, 1925.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 14, 1925.)
Seb E. Caldwell, of Mt. Pleasant, for appellant.
Tom Garrard, State’s Atty., and Grover C. Morris, Asst. State’s Atty., both of Austin, for the State.

Opinion:
HAWKINS, J.
The indictment contained three counts. The first charged possession of mash for the purpose of manufacturing intoxicating liquor, the second, the manufacture of such liquor, the third, possession of a still, equipment, supplies, etc., for the purpose of manufacture. The first count only was submitted. Defendant was donvicted, his punishment being assessed at one year in the penitentiary.
The verdict was general. The first count only being submitted, the verdict will be referred to that count. Parks v. State, 29 Tex. App. 597, 16 S. W. 532; Copello v. State, 95 Tex. Cr. R. 306, 254 S. W. 973; Wright v. State, 98 Tex. Cr. R. 513, 266 S. W. 783. The sentence followed the verdict, but the judgment recited that defendant was adjudged guilty of the "offense of possessing mash and making liquor, etc." The judgment is reformed to condemn defendant to be guilty of possessing mash for the purpose of manufacturing intoxicating liquor.
The officers went to defendant's premises, and some two or three hundred yards from his house found some barrels of mash and a number of other articles of equipment suitable for the manufacture of whisky. It showed signs of having been used. The mash had reached that stage where it was about ready to be "cooked off." A path was found leading from the point where the equipment was discovered to defendant's house. We think it unnecessary to further state in detail the evidence. It was sufficient to support the verdict.
The special charges requested and refused cannot be considered. We find no notation on them advising this court at what time they were presented to the trial judge, neither are there formal bills of exception giving information upon this point. Clark v. State, 90 Tex. Cr. R. 613, 237 S. W. 260, and cases therein cited.
There are three bills of exception in the record, all of which complain of the reception in evidence of certain testimony. We regret that the bills are not sufficiently full to authorize their consideration. No facts are stated showing the connection in which the evidence came into the case, and the things complained of are stated as grounds of objection only. This is not a certificate of the truth of the matters upon which the objections appear to be based. See section 209, Branch's Ann. P. O. for collated authorities.
Defendant attacks the validity of the entire group of prohibitory laws relative to intoxicating liquor based upon the wording of Acts 36th Leg. (1919) 2d Galled Sess. c. 78, § 2b, as added by chapter. 61, § B, 1st Galled Sess. 37th Leg. (Vernon's Ann. Pen. Code Supp. 1922, art. 588%a2), which reads as follows:
"The manufacture,' sale, barter, exchange, transportation, exporting, soliciting, taking orders for, furnishing, and possessing of any of the liquors mentioned in this chapter, if done for medicinal, mechanical, scientific, or sacramental purposes, <md after a permit has been duly authorized and granted hy the proper authorities, shall not be punishable under the terms of thjs chapter."
We have italicized that portion of the section just quoted upon which defendant's contention appears to be based. Defendant urges that because the Legislature inserted in section 2b, the words, "and after a permit has been duly authorized and granted by the proper authorities," it sought to place an undue restriction upon the constitutional provision under which these laws were enacted, and-that such act of the Legislature rendered inoperative all of the laws relative to the subject. We are not in accord with defendant's position upon this point. It has been held in a number of cases that if a party is manufacturing, selling, transporting, or otherwise dealing with intoxicating liquor, for one of the purposes excepted by the Oonstitution (to wit, medicinal, mechanical, scientific, or sacramental), he would not be guilty of a violation of the law, even though he had no permit authorizing his act. Burciago v. State, 88 Tex. Cr. R. 576, 228 S. W. 562; Horak v. State, 95 Tex. Cr. R. 474, 255 S. W. 191; Treglude v. State, 96 Tex. Cr. R. 128, 256 S. W. 276, and cases therein cited.
We find no error in the record which would authorize a reversal of the judgment, and as reformed,- as heretofore indicated, the judgment is ordered affirmed.