Case Name: Ivory Jones v. The State
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1907-12-18
Citations: 52 Tex. Crim. 303
Docket Number: No. 3818
Parties: Ivory Jones v. The State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Criminal Reports
Volume: 52
Pages: 303–307

Head Matter:
Ivory Jones v. The State.
No. 3818.
Decided December 18, 1907.
1. —Murder—Sufficiency of the Evidence.
See opinion for facts held sufficient to support a conviction for murder in the first degree. ®
2. —Same—Res Gestae—Evidence.
Where upon trial for murder the evidence showed that the wife of deceased was in bed in the house at the time her' husband was shot on the gallery and did not see the shooting; that on account of conditions she lay there about an hour after the shooting, and not hearing from her husband, went to him and brought him into the room, asking him who shot him, and he replied the defendant ; that in about fifteen minutes thereafter deceased remarked that he was going to die, and that he did die during the night, such testimony was admissible as res gestae.
3. —Same—Circumstantial Evidence—Charge of Court—Statement of Deceased.
Where upon trial for murder the court’s charge on circumstantial evidence was more favorable than the facts justified, and the statement of deceased possibly placed the case beyond the scope of circumstantial evidence, there was no error.
4. —Same—Constitutional law—Jury and Jury law.
Under the Constitution, article 5, section 13; article 1, section 10 id., and Bill of rights, section 15, as well as under articles 10, 21 and 22, Code Criminal Procedure, the right of trial by twelve jurors in a felony case is placed beyond the reach of the accused even waiving such right; and where in a trial for murder the jury was originally composed of twelve men. but one was excused by agreement of the parties and a verdict was rendered by eleven of the remaining jurors, who all signed the verdict, the same was a nullity, and reversible error.
Appeal from the District Court of San Augustine. Tried below before the Hon. W. B. Powell.
Appeal from a conviction of murder in the first degree; penalty, life imprisonment in the penitentiary.
The opinion states the case.
Davis & Davis, for appellant.
—On question of circumstantial evidence: Hunt v. State, 7 Texas Crim. App., 212; Nolen v. State, 8 Texas Crim. App., 585. On question of res gestre: Foster v. State, 8 Texas Crim. App., 248. On question of charge on circumstantial evidence: Williams v. State, 10 Texas Crim. App., 8; Bennett v. State, 9 Texas Crim. App., 649.
F. J. McCord, Assistant Attorney-General, for the State.
—On question of res gestee: Badberry v. State, 22 Texas Crim. App., 273; Miller v. State, 31 Texas Crim. Rep., 609; Darter v. State, 39 Texas Crim. App., 40.

Opinion:
DAVIDSON, Presiding Judge.
Appellant was convicted of murder and given a life sentence.
The evidence of this case is not as cogent as some cases of this character passed upon on appeal, yet,-there is in our opinion, enough to warrant us in concluding that the jury were correct in their finding.
Appellant was in the neighborhood of the homicide, had made threats against the deceased; deceased was a witness against him in a hog-stealing case. Appellant was seen the night of the homicide, and after the killing should have occurred, with a shotgun at what the witnesses term an "infair." This gun was handed to a named party to be kept until after the festive occasion had terminated. The deceased came to his death by means of a shotgun, both barrels of which was discharged into his body. About an hour after he was shot, his wife, who was in bed, managed to reach him and in answer to a question by her, appellant stated that deceased had shot him. This is the substance of the State's case. The defendant introduced evidence to the effect that he was in that neighborhood and accounted for his presence there, by showing that he was securing the signatures of certain parties to some appearance bonds that he was required by the sheriff to give under some criminal charges. He denied having a shotgun and the party to whom the State's witness stated that appellant handed the gun at the "infair" denied receiving it. Appellant showed by some of his counsel, perhaps all of them, defending him in the hog-stealing case, that the deceased was sufficiently favorable to appellant in that case, for the district attorney to continue said case in order to secure other testimony. They also attack the widow of deceased by showing she had on the day after the homicide, stated that deceased said nothing in regard to who killed him and that she further so testified before the grand jury. They also introduced the constable, who stated that he saw tracks in a certain corner of the fence near the residence of the deceased made by a party who wore a larger size shoe than appellant. This was practically appellant's side of the case. . Without going into a discussion of this testimony, we are of opinion that it was sufficient, if the jury believed the State's side of the case, and this they did.
A bill of exceptions was reserved to the action of the court in permitting the widow of the deceased to detail before the jury the statement of the deceased that appellant was the party who shot him, on the grounds, first, that it was not res gestae and was too remote; and, second, that it was not brought within the rule of dying declarations. The facts show in this connection, as set out in the bill, that the wife was in bed at the time the shots were fired, having three days previously given birth to a child; that appellant ivas on the gallery with an older child at the time the shots were fired; that she lay there in bed about an hour, fearing to get up on account of her condition from childbirth; that her husband said nothing; that at about the expiration of an hour, she went out to see what was the matter, succeeded in getting him in the room and then asked him who it was shot him. He said Boy -Polk; she asked again and he said Ivory Jones. It is further stated that Boy Polk was a name" that Ivory Jones, appellant, was also known by, or called. One of the loads of shot took effect in the head, the other in the body. In about fifteen minutes, or such a matter, after he made the above statement, he remarked, "I allow to die," and during the night did die. Under the conditions above stated, we are of opinion that the evidence was admissible. See Lewis v. State, 29 Texas Crim. App., 201. Here there was about an hour intervening between the shot and the statement. His suffering was rather acute from the wound in the head, as well as that in the body, and evidently his mind was not in such condition as to manufacture and narrate a story. He had no opportunity to make a statement to anybody else, unless he had talked with his wife in another portion of the house. In Lewis' case, supra, the time extended over possibly an hour and a half, and the deceased in that case was not in position to make a statement earlier and her mind was also in a condition not to have manufactured the statement, at least, such was the theory upon which the testimony was held admissible. Under the Lewis case, we are of opinion that the alleged statement of the deceased was admissible.
Appellant attacked the _ charge on circumstantial .evidence. We do not think there is any merit in that (see Smith v. State, 35 Texas Crim. Rep., 618), and besides, the giving of the charge on circumstantial evidence was more favorable to appellant's rights than the facts justify. The statement of the deceased places the case possibly beyond the pale of circumstantial evidence into one of positive testimony.
We think the charge in every way is free from such criticism as requires a reversal of the judgment. It is therefore affirmed.
Affirmed.
Henderson, Judge, absent.