Case Name: MANIMAL LAND COMPANY, Appellant, v. RANDALL E. STOFFT ARCHITECTS, P.A., Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2004-12-22
Citations: 889 So. 2d 974
Docket Number: Nos. 4D03-4906, 4D04-289, 4D04-1596
Parties: MANIMAL LAND COMPANY, Appellant, v. RANDALL E. STOFFT ARCHITECTS, P.A., Appellee.
Judges: FARMER, C.J., and STEVENSON, J., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 889
Pages: 974–976

Head Matter:
MANIMAL LAND COMPANY, Appellant, v. RANDALL E. STOFFT ARCHITECTS, P.A., Appellee.
Nos. 4D03-4906, 4D04-289, 4D04-1596.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Dec. 22, 2004.
Thomas D. Lardin of Thomas D. Lardin, P.A., Delray Beach, for appellant.
Jack R. Reiter, Peter M. Feaman & Joelle C. Sharman of Adorno & Ross, P.A., Miami, for appellee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
We affirm the trial court's finding that the defendant did not breach its duty to design a building for appellant plaintiff, as it is supported by competent substantial evidence. We address only the defendant's cross-appeal of the denial of his motion to award attorney's fees, which was filed more than thirty days after the filing of the final judgment.
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.525 provides:
Any party seeking a judgment taxing costs, attorneys' fees, or both shall serve a motion within 30 days after filing of the judgment, including a judgment of dismissal, or the service of a notice of voluntary dismissal.
Defendant, who did not file his motion for attorney's fees within thirty days of the filing of the judgment with the clerk, argues that we should construe "filing" to mean the date the judgment becomes final, which was when plaintiffs motion for rehearing was denied. Defendant argues that filing is not defined in our rules of civil procedure; however, he provides us with no definition of filing which would include denial of rehearing. Under our appellate rules an order or judgment is rendered when filed with the clerk. Fla. R.App. P. 9.020(h). We conclude that his motion was, under rule 1.525, required to be filed within thirty days of the filing of the judgment with the clerk.
Defendant also argues that his motion was timely because the judgment reserved jurisdiction to award attorney's fees, citing Fisher v. John Carter & Associates, 864 So.2d 493 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). We held in Fisher that a motion for attorney's fees filed more than three months after the final judgment was timely under rule 1.525, because the judgment had reserved jurisdiction to award attorney's fees. Defendant did not, however, raise that argument in the trial court, and we are unwilling to entertain it for the first time on appeal. We accordingly affirm.
FARMER, C.J., and STEVENSON, J., concur.
KLEIN, J., concurs specially with opinion.