Case Name: B & L SERVICES, INC., d/b/a Gray Line of Orlando and Claims Control, Inc., Employer/Carrier # 1, Appellants/Cross-Appellees, v. COACH USA f/k/a Gray Line of Orlando and Cigna, Employer/Carrier # 2, Appellee, and Rafael Guzman, Claimant, Appellee/Cross-Appellant
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2001-06-18
Citations: 791 So. 2d 1138
Docket Number: No. 1D00-1570
Parties: B & L SERVICES, INC., d/b/a Gray Line of Orlando and Claims Control, Inc., Employer/Carrier # 1, Appellants/Cross-Appellees, v. COACH USA f/k/a Gray Line of Orlando and Cigna, Employer/Carrier # 2, Appellee, and Rafael Guzman, Claimant, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Judges: VAN NORTWICK, J., CONCURS; BENTON, J., CONCURS in part and DISSENTS in part with opinion.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 791
Pages: 1138–1148

Head Matter:
B & L SERVICES, INC., d/b/a Gray Line of Orlando and Claims Control, Inc., Employer/Carrier # 1, Appellants/Cross-Appellees, v. COACH USA f/k/a Gray Line of Orlando and Cigna, Employer/Carrier # 2, Appellee, and Rafael Guzman, Claimant, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
No. 1D00-1570.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
June 18, 2001.
Rehearing Denied July 18, 2001.
Robert L. Dietz and C. Douglas Green of Zimmerman, Shuffield, Kiser & Sut-cliffe, P.A., Orlando, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
Jamey S. Rodgers of McDonald and Rodgers, P.A., Altamonte Springs for Ap-pellee/Cross-Appellee.
Neal P. Pitts and Matthew D. Valdes of Neal P. Pitts, P.A., Orlando, for Appel-lee/Cross-Appellant.

Opinion:
LEWIS, J.
B & L Services, Inc., employer # 1, appeals an order from the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) attributing 100% responsibility to it for Rafael Guzman's carpal tunnel condition. Rafael Guzman, the claimant, cross-appeals the JCC's assignment of an overall 2% impairment rating and its failure to award penalties for the temporary benefits due but unpaid. We affirm the JCC's finding that employer # l's work activities were the major contributing cause to the claimant's disability and need for treatment. Competent, substantial evidence exists in the record to support this finding. We also affirm the JCC's assignment of an overall 2% impairment rating. However, we reverse on the issue of reimbursemeni/contribution and attorney's fees because the JCC misapplied the law on this issue. Furthermore, the JCC erred in failing to make any findings of fact regarding when the obligation to pay temporary benefits became due. Therefore, we remand with directions for the JCC to make the appropriate findings and to determine whether statutory penalties should be assessed.
Background
In February 1994, Rafael Guzman, the claimant, began working for employer # 1 in its auto body repair shop. During his three years with employer # 1, he used various vibrating tools such as sanders, drills and grinders. In April 1996, the claimant began to experience numbness in his hands and wrists, particularly his right hand. He did not report his numbness and pain to employer # 1 until May 14, 1997. The day after, on May 15, 1997, employer # 1 sold the company to Coach USA, employer # 2.
On May 21,1997, Dr. Barnard examined the claimant and diagnosed the claimant with bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome related to his work as an auto body repairman. On July 25, 1997, Dr. Barnard placed the claimant at MMI with a zero percent impairment rating because the claimant stated that he was not having any appreciable numbness.
After reporting his numbness on May 14, 1997, the claimant voluntarily began performing light duty work. He still dropped items and was never able to lift a gallon of milk with either hand; but he was not experiencing the same degree of numbness as before. Around July 1997, the claimant's two co-workers who assisted him in the body shop quit. As employer #2 did not hire anyone to replace the assistants, the claimant was required to perform all the repair duties.
The claimant continued to work by himself in the body shop until October 28, 1997. He testified that he had to quit because he could no longer handle the numbness and pain in his hands and wrists. After he quit, the claimant testified that within three to four months the numbness and pain lessened. The claimant claimed October 28, 1997, as the date of his second injury.
On November 10,1997, Dr. Barnard recommended carpal tunnel release surgery. Employer/carrier # 1 (E/C # 1) initially denied the surgery. It filed a Notice of Denial for medical treatment and surgery, on September 21, 1999, stating that the need for treatment and surgery was attributed to the work activities of employer # 2. The claimant went to Dr. Gupta, on January 26,1998, for an independent medical examination arranged by E/C # 1. Dr. Gupta also diagnosed the claimant with bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and recommended surgery. In his deposition, Dr. Gupta opined that the claimant's condition developed under his first employment and it was aggravated further by the heavy workload under his second employment.
On October 1, 1998, E/C # 1 voluntarily authorized the surgery with Dr. Barnard. Dr. Barnard performed the surgery and released the claimant to light duty employment on November 3, 1998. He placed the claimant at MMI on December 8, 1998 and gave the claimant an overall whole body impairment rating of 11%. On April 22, 1999, Dr. Shure conducted an independent medical examination of the claimant for E/C # 2. Dr. Shure stated that the claimant developed carpal tunnel syndrome over the three-year period with employer # 1. He attributed approximately 90% of the responsibility to employer # 1 and 10% to employer # 2 based on the length of time the claimant was employed with each employer. Dr. Shure gave the claimant a 2% impairment rating.
The JCC held a merits hearing on the claimant's petition for benefits on May 18, 1999. The issues presented to the JCC were determining responsibility between the employers for the claimant's unpaid temporary total disability benefits from October 28, 1997 through November 3, 1998 and determining whether E/C # 2 should reimburse E/C # 1 or contribute for the surgery, medical treatment, and indemnity benefits. E/C # 1 has paid impairment benefits to the claimant since October 1, 1998. E/C # 1 argued that the major contributing cause of the claimant's injury was the additional employment with employer #2, and that E/C #2 should contribute its portion for the claimant's benefits. In addition, the claimant sought a determination of his impairment rating and requested penalties, interest and attorney's fees and costs.
The JCC continued the hearing to allow an Expert Medical Advisor (EMA) to determine the relative responsibility of each employer. Dr. White was appointed and examined the claimant on September 9, 1999. In his deposition, Dr. White stated that the claimant would have eventually required surgery whether he continued doing auto body repair work or not. He further testified that the major contributing cause of the claimant's surgery, disability and need for treatment was the work performed for employer # 1. He opined that the responsibility should be allocated 90% to employer # 1 and 10% to employer #2 based on the length of employment with each employer. He also gave the claimant a 2% impairment rating.
On February 14, 2000, the JCC conducted the second merits hearing. The JCC found that the claimant continued to suffer symptoms throughout the entire period, despite Dr. Barnard's zero percent impairment rating. The JCC attributed 100% responsibility to E/C # 1 because the evidence did not support the finding that the claimant's second employment was the major contributing cause of the need for surgery. E/C # 1 was ordered to pay temporary total disability benefits and temporary partial disability benefits. E/C # 1 also was responsible for the claimant's medical compensation and rehabilitative benefits. The JCC also found the claim ant's overall impairment rating was 2% based on Drs. Shure's and White's testimonies. The JCC also awarded reasonable attorney's fees to the claimant.
Major Contributing Cause
Competent, substantial evidence exists in the record to support the JCC's finding that employer # l's employment was the major contributing cause of the claimant's carpal tunnel condition. Therefore, the claimant's condition is compensa-ble. Accordingly, we affirm on this issue.
Reimbursement/Contribution
While employment with employer # 1 was the major contributing cause, we hold that the JCC erred in using a major contributing cause standard for determining whether employer # 1 was entitled to contribution from employer # 2. The JCC found that "the employment with Employer/Carrier # 2 did result in an acceleration of claimant's need for surgery, but that the need for surgery was inevitable and that the acceleration did not rise to the level of major contributing cause so as to place a percentage of responsibility for the need for treatment and disability on Employer/Carrier # 2." The JCC appears to have confused the standard for determining compensability with the standard for determining responsibility.
Section 440.42(3), Florida Statutes (1995), provides the procedure for resolving disputes between carriers regarding responsibility for compensation. It provides in pertinent part: 'When there is any controversy as to which of two or more carriers is liable for the discharge of the obligations and duties of one or more employers with respect to a claim for compensation, remedial treatment, or other benefits under this chapter, the judge of compensation claims shall have jurisdiction to adjudicate such controversy." Prior to 1994, this Court held that the JCC must consider the actual extent to which each accident has contributed to a compensable disability in determining contribution between multiple carriers under section 440.42. See Copeland Steel Erectors v. McCollom, 587 So.2d 658 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. U-Haul Co., 551 So.2d 580 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Sauer Indus. Contracting, Inc. v. Ditch, 547 So.2d 276 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).
In 1994, the Florida legislature substantially amended the workers' compensation laws. One of these amendments included a new burden of proof standard for a claimant to prove compensability: major contributing cause. See § 440.09, Fla. Stat. (1995). However, the legislature did not include section 440.42 in its amendments. See Ch. 93-415, Laws of Fla. The question on appeal in this case is whether the 1994 amendments changed the standard for determining contribution under section 440.42(3) to a major contributing cause standard.
Where the legislature fails to make substantive changes to the pertinent statutory language, it is assumed that the legislature accepted the prior judicial construction of the statute. See State v. Hall, 641 So.2d 403, 405 (Fla.1994); White v. Johnson, 59 So.2d 532, 533 (Fla.1952) (legislative inaction indication of its acceptance of prior construction of statute). As the legislature did not substantially change section 440.42 in its 1994 amendments, we assume that it approved this Court's previ ous construction of the applicable standard for reimbursement and contribution between multiple carriers. Furthermore, the major contributing cause language in section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (1995) applies only to determining whether an injury is covered under workers' compensation. See Closet Maid v. Sykes, 763 So.2d 377, 381 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000); see also Myers v. Williams, 770 So.2d 1246 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000); Consultants & Designers v. Brawn, 697 So.2d 1228 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (to establish coverage after 1994 under major contributing cause, a claimant has a higher burden of proof). Thus, the first step is determining whether the injury is compensable under the major contributing cause standard in section 440.09(1). The next step is determining liability between multiple employers/carriers under section 440.42(3).
As we conclude that the legislature did not intend to apply the major contributing cause standard to section 440.42(3), the JCC must evaluate any reimbursement or contribution claim under the pre-existing standard. "The determinative factor in placing liability under Section 440.42(3) is whether the second compensa-ble accident causes injury which is independent from or an exacerbation of the first compensable accident. Section 440.42(3) thereafter allows the deputy [JCC] to divide liability according to each carrier's responsibility." See U.S. Elec. Co. v. Sisk Elec. Service, Inc., 417 So.2d 738 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). A causal connection must exist between the claimant's employment and second industrial injury in order to justify apportionment of liability among carriers. See Custom Architectural Metals v. Bradshaw, 623 So.2d 804, 806 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). Here, the JCC found that employment with employer # 2 aggravated the claimant's carpal tunnel condition. Therefore, the JCC found some evidence that his work environment at employer # 2 contributed to his injuries. As there is a causal connection between the claimant's injuries and his employment with employer #2, employer #2 is liable for a portion of the claimant's disability. See Roz Fischer's Beauty Unlimited v. Mathis, 644 So.2d 127 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Custom Architectural Metals, 623 So.2d at 806; CNA Ins. Co. v. Kemper Ins. Co., 596 So.2d 81 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). Employer # 1 is entitled, as a matter of law, to contribution from employer # 2.
Accordingly, we reverse on this issue and remand for further findings and rulings on the issue of contribution between the two employers/carriers and the extent of employer # 2's aggravation of the claimant's condition which are consistent with this opinion.
Attorney's Fees
As the JCC did not err in finding that the claimant prevailed on his compensation claims, the JCC properly awarded the claimant an entitlement to attorney's fees. See § 440.34, Fla. Stat. (1995). However, as with the compensation benefits, the JCC erred in failing to apportion the attorney's fees between the two carriers. Based on the reimbursement/contribution discussion, we reverse and remand on this issue also.
Impairment Rating
The claimant argues that, under section 440.1925(1), employer # 1 could not dispute Dr. Barnard's 11% impairment rating by selecting an IME or using employer #2's IME. However, this section merely prohibits the carrier from obtaining an IME to render an opinion on permanent impairment when the carrier selects the treating physician. Section 440.1925(5), Florida Statutes (1995), directs the JCC to determine the claimant's permanent impairment rating based on the estimates in evidence. Both Drs. Shure and White tes tified that the claimant's impairment rating was 2%. As Dr. White was the Expert Medical Advisor requested by the JCC, his testimony was admissible in the proceedings pursuant to section 440.1925(4), Florida Statutes (1995). Competent, substantial evidence, in the form of Dr. White's testimony, exists to support the JCC's assignment of a 2% impairment rating.
The JCC specifically rejected Dr. Barnard's testimony that the impairment rating should be 11%. Dr. Barnard indicated that he calculated his impairment rating shortly after the claimant's surgery and that the claimant could continue improving in the future. As Drs. Shure and White's examinations occurred later, they had a better opportunity to rate the claimant's impairment. Thus, the JCC did not err in accepting Drs. Shure's and White's testimonies over Dr. Barnard's. We affirm the JCC's assignment of an overall 2% impairment rating.
Penalties
The claimant argues that the JCC erred in failing to award penalties on the temporary benefits awarded. Section 440.20, Florida Statutes (1995), provides in pertinent part:
(1)(a) Unless it denies compensability or entitlement to benefits, the carrier shall pay compensation directly to the employee .
(2) The carrier must pay the first installment of compensation or deny com-pensability no later than the 14th day after the employer receives notice of the injury....
(4) If the carrier is uncertain of its obligation to provide benefits or compensation, it may initiate payment without prejudice and without admitting liability. The carrier shall immediately and in good faith commence investigation of the employee's entitlement to benefits under this chapter and shall admit or deny compensability within 120 days after the initial provision of compensation or benefits.
(6) If any installment of compensation for death or dependency benefits, disability, permanent impairment, or wage loss payable without an award is not paid within 7 days after it becomes due . there shall be added to such unpaid installment a punitive penalty . unless notice is filed under subsection (4) or unless such nonpayment results from conditions over which the employer or carrier had no control.
That is, unless a notice is filed under section 440.20(4) or nonpayment occurs from circumstances out of the employer/carrier's control, a penalty applies when the employer/carrier refuses to pay benefits at the time facts then known to the employer/carrier would support an obligation to pay. Eastern Indus., Inc. v. Burnham, 750 So.2d 748 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000).
The JCC stated that the claimant raised the issue of statutory penalties. However, the JCC failed to make findings of fact concerning when the obligation to pay benefits became due. Without these findings of fact, it is difficult to determine if a Statutory penalty applies in this case. Therefore, we remand this issue to the JCC to make the appropriate findings of fact and to determine based on those findings whether penalties should be awarded under section 440.20.
Conclusion
Because competent, substantial evidence exists to support the JCC's determination that employment with employer # 1 was the major contributing cause of the claimant's carpal tunnel condition, we affirm on this issue. We also affirm the JCC's assignment of a 2% impairment rating. However, we reverse the JCC's finding that employer # 1 is 100% responsible for the claimant's temporary total disability, temporary partial disability, impairment, medical and rehabilitation benefits, and attorney's fees. On remand, the JCC should conduct proceedings to determine the correct apportionment of liability between the two employers/carriers. Furthermore, we remand for the JCC to make the appropriate findings of fact on the issue of statutory penalties.
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; REMANDED with directions.
VAN NORTWICK, J., CONCURS; BENTON, J., CONCURS in part and DISSENTS in part with opinion.
. This Court, in a footnote, has stated that apportionment is the correct term to use in dividing liability for permanent benefits. Forklifts of Central Fla. v. Beringer, 560 So.2d 1362, 1362 n. 1 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). Contribution, or reimbursement, is the appropriate term when dividing responsibility under section 440.42(3). Id. However, many interchange the terms.