Case Name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Anthony SWABY, Defendant-Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2017-08-29
Citations: 697 F. App'x 619
Docket Number: No. 16-17780 Non-Argument Calendar
Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Anthony SWABY, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: Before TJOFLAT, WILSON, and WILLIAM PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 697
Pages: 619–620

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Anthony SWABY, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 16-17780 Non-Argument Calendar
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
(August 29, 2017)
Jodi Leigh Anton, Wifredo A. Ferrer, Emily M. Smachetti, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Miami, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Michael Caruso, Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Miami, FL, Robin Cindy Rosen-Evans, Federal Public Defender’s Office, West Palm Beach, FL, for Defendant-Appellant
Before TJOFLAT, WILSON, and WILLIAM PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM:
Anthony Swaby appeals his 120-month, below-the-guideline-range sentence, after pleading guilty to two counts of bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). On appeal, Swaby argues that he was incorrectly classified and sentenced as a career offender. Swaby argues that his previous conviction under Fla. Stat. § 893.13(1), does not qualify as a controlled substance offense under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b) because the statute does not contain a mens rea element. Although he acknowledges that in United States v. Smith, 775 F.3d 1262, 1268 (11th Cir. 2014), we held that § 893.13 qualifies as a controlled substance offense, he argues that Smith conflicts with several Supreme Court decisions.
We review constitutional sentencing challenges de novo, which includes the question of whether a defendant's prior convictions qualify as controlled substance offenses for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b). See Smith, 775 F.3d at 1265. And "[w]e are bound by [our] prior panel decisions unless and until we overrule them while sitting en banc, or they are overruled by the Supreme Court." United States v. Jordan, 635 F.3d 1181, 1189 (11th Cir. 2011). In other words, "[w]e are authorized to depart from a prior panel decision based upon an intervening Supreme Court decision only if that decision actually overruled or conflicted with it." United States v. Marte, 356 F.3d 1336, 1344 (11th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Swaby relies on Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 128 S.Ct. 1581, 170 L.Ed.2d 490 (2008), Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 2001, 192 L.Ed.2d 1 (2015), and McFadden v. United States, 576 U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 2298, 192 L.Ed.2d 260 (2015) for the proposition that Smith has been overruled. However we are not convinced that those cases overrule or conflict with Smith. Therefore, because no Supreme Court or en banc decision has overruled the holding from Smith, the pri- or panel precedent rule bounds us to that holding. See Marte, 356 F.3d at 1344. We affirm Swaby's sentence.
AFFIRMED.