Case Name: Darryl Sean FEDOR, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1986-01-10
Citations: 483 So. 2d 42
Docket Number: No. 84-1041
Parties: Darryl Sean FEDOR, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: GRIMES, A.C.J., and CAMPBELL, J., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 483
Pages: 42–46

Head Matter:
Darryl Sean FEDOR, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 84-1041.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Jan. 10, 1986.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 18, 1986.
Robert H. Dillinger of Dillinger & Swisher, P.A., St. Petersburg, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Theda James Davis, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals his convictions resulting from a jury trial for multiple drug charges. We affirm, and discuss only the conviction for possession of marijuana.
The charges against defendant arose out of a drug purchase by an undercover police officer which took place inside a house. Defendant and another man arrived at the house in defendant's car which was left parked in front of the house shortly before the arrests occurred. After the drug purchase occurred and defendant and others were arrested, police officers searched the car and found two marijuana roaches in the ashtray located in the center portion of the dashboard, and also a small amount of marijuana in a World Atlas on the floorboard between the two front seats. The evidence showed that the car was registered to defendant and that defendant had been driving when the car arrived at the house. Defendant testified that he had no knowledge of the marijuana.
Defendant contends on appeal that the trial court erred in not dismissing the possession of marijuana charge because there was insufficient evidence to show possession of the contraband by defendant. We disagree. As this court explained in Spataro v. State, 179 So.2d 873, 877 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965):
The accused has "constructive possession" of a chattel where he has knowledge of its presence coupled with the ability to maintain control over it or reduce it to his physical possession, even though he does not have actual personal dominion.... It should be noted that possession need not be "exclusive," but may be joint with one or more persons.
In Hively v. State, 336 So.2d 127 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976), our sister court reversed a conviction for possession of marijuana where the evidence showed that the defendant was not in exclusive possession or control of the automobile in which the marijuana was found. In this case, the evidence showed that defendant was the owner and driver of the vehicle, thereby exercising possession and control. He relies upon the fact that the evidence also shows that he had a passenger. He tends to ignore the fact that the ashtray in the center of the dashboard contained two marijuana roaches that had been partially consumed. Even if it might be assumed that the passenger had smoked both, it is certainly a reasonable inference that it was done in the presence of, and with the permission of, defendant. Even though the Hively court reversed on the basis of the evidence in that case, it did acknowledge the controlling law on the subject of constructive possession by stating:
[Ajctual possession exists where the accused has physical possession of the controlled substance and knowledge of such physical possession. Constructive possession exists where the accused without physical possession of the controlled substance knows of its presence on or about his premises and has the ability to maintain control over said controlled substance. Willis v. State, 320 So.2d 823 (Fla.App.1975). See also Medlin v. State, 279 So.2d 41 (Fla.App.1973); Griffin v. State, 276 So.2d 191 (Fla.App.1973).
If the premises on which the controlled substance is found is in the exclusive possession and control of the accused, knowledge of the presence of said controlled substance on the premises, coupled with accused's ability to maintain control over it, may be inferred. If the premises on which the controlled substance is found is not in the exclusive but only in the joint possession of the accused, knowledge of the presence of said controlled substance on the premises and the accused's ability to maintain control over it will not be inferred but must be established by proof. Such proof may consist either of evidence establishing that the accused had actual knowledge of the presence of the controlled substance on the premises, or evidence of incriminating statements and circumstances from which a jury might lawfully infer knowledge by the accused of the presence of the controlled substance on the premises. Willis v. State, supra; Smith v. State, 279 So.2d 27 (Fla.1973); Frank v. State, 199 So.2d 117 (Fla.App.1967).
We conclude, under the circumstances of this case, that the jury could have reasonably inferred that defendant knew of the presence of the marijuana and had control of it.
The cases relied on by defendant, or supportive in any way of his position, are, in our opinion, all distinguishable. In most of those cases in which the possession is alleged to have taken place in a motor vehicle, the defendants were not, or could not be shown to be, the owners of the vehicle in which the contraband was found, or it was found in a location in which the knowledge of the owner or driver should not necessarily be inferred.
The other points raised on appeal by defendant all concern the conduct of the trial, including exclusion of certain testimony, alleged prosecutorial misconduct, and the denial of a motion for mistrial. As to these points, we conclude that either there was no error or that any error was harmless.
The convictions are all affirmed.
GRIMES, A.C.J., and CAMPBELL, J., concur.
LEHAN, J., dissents with opinion.