Case Name: CATHERINE HINNEMAN and JACOB HINNEMAN, Administrators of THEODORE HINNEMAN, Deceased, v. SAMUEL ROSENBACK
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1868-03
Citations: 6 Trans. App. 257
Docket Number: 
Parties: CATHERINE HINNEMAN and JACOB HINNEMAN, Administrators of THEODORE HINNEMAN, Deceased, v. SAMUEL ROSENBACK.
Judges: 
Reporter: Transcript Appeals
Volume: 6
Pages: 257–265

Head Matter:
CATHERINE HINNEMAN and JACOB HINNEMAN, Administrators of THEODORE HINNEMAN, Deceased, v. SAMUEL ROSENBACK.
Contract — Parol evidence — Explanation.
When, according to the terms of a -written contract between the parties, a part of the payment to be made consisted in an order for five hundred dollars, to be given on Messrs. W. & T.—
Held, that parol evidence was admissible to show whether the order was to be for the payment of money, or for the payment of five hundred dollars in sash and blinds, manufactured by said W. & T.
On the 16th of January, 1861, the Defendant and Theodore Hinneman made a -written contract, by which the latter agreed to build a house for the Defendant, which said contract was in the words and figures following:
“ This' agreement, made and entered into this 21st day of January, 1861, by and between Samuel Rosenback, of the city of Syracuse, county of Onondaga, and State of New Torlc, of the first part, and Theodore Hinneman, of the above-named city, county,, and State, of the second part, witnesseth : That the said Theodore Hinneman, party of the second part, for the consideration hereinafter mentioned, doth covenant and agree to and with the party of the first part, to make and build and finish, in a good, substantial, and workman-like manner, on the lot of the said party of the first part, on Jefferson Street in the city of Syracuse, a dwelling-house, agreeably to the plans and specifications, of good substantial materials; and the said Theodore Hinneman, party of the second part, doth further covenant and agree to finish and deliver the same into the hands of the party of the first part on or before the first day of July next.
“ And the said party of the first part covenants and agrees to pay unto the party of the second part, for the faithful performance of the same, the sum of one thousand seven hundred dollars, lawful money of the United States, and five hundred dollars in an order on Messrs. Woodruff & Taylor, of Oswego; also a house and lot on the north-east corner of Jackson and Mulberry Streets, in the city of Syracuse, and the house now on the lot on which the party of the first part designs to build. The money to be paid as follows: Five hundred dollars the first day of May next, five hundred dollars the first day of June - next, and the balance when finished. The house and lot on the corner of Mulberry and Jackson to be deeded to said Hinneman upon the signing of this agreement ;■ also the house now on the lot on Jefferson Street.
“ In witness whereof the parties to these presents have hereunto set their hands and seals, the day and year first above written.
(Signed) “ Samuel Rosenback. [l. s.]
“ THEODORE HliTNEMAn. [l. s.]
'u Signed and delivered in the presence of
“ L. E. Jot.”
The Plaintiff performed the whole work according to the terms of his contract, and the Defendant paid him the price fixed by the - contract, and fully performed, on his part, except the $500 payable in the order on Woodruff & Taylor — the Plaintiff claiming and insisting that the contract entitled him to an order payable in money, and the Defendant insisting on the right to give him an order which, by its terms, was payable in sash, blinds, and other joiner-work; Woodruff & Taylor being manufacturers of such articles at Oswego.
Upon the trial of the cause the referee allowed the Defendant to give certain parol evidence, for the purpose of showing that this expression in the contract meant an order payable in the building materials manufactured by Woodruff & Taylor, and not in cash; and the real question in the case is whether this evidence was properly received; and, secondly, whether the referee was right in holding that the true intent and meaning of the contract was, ■that this order on Woodruff & Taylor should be drawn payable in sash, blinds, &c.
The referee found that such was the true construction of the contract; and as the Defendant had offered the Plaintiff such an order, the referee gave judgment for the Defendant, which was affirmed on appeal to the General Term, and from which judgment the Plaintiff has appealed to this Court.
W. V. Bruyn for Plaintiff.
Wm. G. Huger for Defendant.

Opinion:
Mason, J.
I am satisfied, after a careful examination of 'this case, that the referee committed no error, in admitting the parol evidence to aid in the interpretation of this contract, which can prejudice the Plaintiff, and that he gave the correct construction to this agreement.
The language of the contract itself favors the construction put upon it by the referee. By the terms of the contract, the Defendant was to pay Hinneman, for the construction of his dwelling-house, the sum of one thousand seven hundred dollars, lawful money of the United States, and to convey to him the house and lot on the corner of Mulberry and Jackson Streets, and to deed to said Hinneman, upon the signing, of the agreement, the house on the lot on Jefferson Street, and to pay him "five hmi-dred dollars vn a/n order on Messrs. Woodruff c& Taylor, of Osioego." It is not a reasonable construction of the contract itself to hold that these parties meant a cash draft on Woodruff & Taylor. He was to pay $1,100 in cash, and $500 in an order on Woodruff & Taylor, of Oswego.
The legal deffnition of an order does not ordinarily mean a cash draft. Bouvier says that " an informal bill of exchange, or a paper which requires one person to pay or deliver to another goods on account of the maker to a third party, is called an order " (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, title " order," 2d vol., p. 257); while a draft or bill of exchange is defined to be " an open letter of request from, and order by, one person on another to pay a sum of money therein mentioned to a third person, on demand, or at a future time therein specified " (1 Bouv. Law Dictionary, 189). A draft, at the present day, is " the common term fora bill of exchange " (1 Burrill's Law Dictionary, 520, title " draft "); and a draft and bill of exchange are used indiscriminately. Edwards says : " The bill of exchange, properly termed a draft, is written in the form of an open letter, directing the person to whom it is addressed to pay the sum of money therein specified to a third person named in the instrument, on account of the writer or person by whom it is drawn " (Edwards on Bills and Promissory Notes, 41; Chitty on Bills, 130, 154).
It must be payable in money (Thompson v. Sloan, 23 W. R. 73; Cook v. Satterlee, 6 Cow. R. 108; 5th ed., 186). Not so with an order; the moi'e common definition is that given by Bouvier, as an order to pay goods on account of the maker to a third person. It was only necessary in this case to prove that "Woodruff & Taylor were -manufacturers of these articles, necessarily used in house-building, to raise a reasonable presumption that it was the intention of these parties that this order should be for such articles, especially as it was proved that these parties knew that such was the business of Woodruff & Taylor.
We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that the Plaintiff was, in this agreement, entering into a contract to build a dwelling-house for the Defendant; where these very materials would be required in its construction ; and when we add to this the fact that the Defendant, in the contract, agreed to pay $1,700 in cash, and an order on Woodruff & Taylor for $500, the presumption is very strong that this order did not mean a cash draft on them.
To my mind it is clear. Be this as it may, if the matter was left in doubt, it was certainly competent to remove it by the parol evidence in the case. The rule is a common one, to receive evidence external to the contract in aid of the interpretation of its language. Such evidence, however, cannot be received to contradict or vary the terms of a written contract; and where the instrument has a settled legal meaning, its construction is not open to parol evidence (2 Parsons on Contracts, 63). But where, as in this case, the order may mean a money order, or an order payable in those kind of building materials, there can be no doubt that the interpretation of the language of the contract may be aided by extrinsic evidence showing the intention of the parties in tRe use of the language in the particular instrument (2 Parsons on Contracts, 76).
I am quite inclined to the opinion that it was not competent for the Defendant to prove that he held a note or due-hill, made by "Woodruff & Co., payable in these materials.
Its admission, however, affords no ground for granting a new trial; for the case is too clear for the Defendant, without this evidence, to he doubted. If this evidence were out of the case, the finding must have been the same; and were the finding otherwise, it would be erroneous.
The judgment of the Supi-eme Court must be affirmed.