Case Name: Ronald F. LALIME v. Adelaide T. LALIME
Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court
Jurisdiction: Maine
Decision Date: 1993-08-19
Citations: 629 A.2d 59
Docket Number: 
Parties: Ronald F. LALIME v. Adelaide T. LALIME.
Judges: Before WATHEN, C.J., and ROBERTS, GLASSMAN, CLIFFORD, COLLINS, RUDMAN and DANA, JJ.
Reporter: West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 629
Pages: 59–62

Head Matter:
Ronald F. LALIME v. Adelaide T. LALIME.
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.
Argued May 10, 1993.
Decided Aug. 19, 1993.
M. Michaela Murphy (orally), Robert J. Daviau, Daviau, Jabar & Batten, Water-ville, for plaintiff.
Peter B. Bickerman (orally), Lipman & Katz, P.A., Augusta, for defendant.
Before WATHEN, C.J., and ROBERTS, GLASSMAN, CLIFFORD, COLLINS, RUDMAN and DANA, JJ.

Opinion:
DANA, Justice.
Adelaide Lalime appeals from a judgment entered in the Superior Court (Kenne-bec County, Kravchuk, J.) affirming a divorce judgment entered in the District Court (Waterville, Mills, J.). Because we conclude that the District Court's finding that Ronald's transfer of real estate to himself and Adelaide as joint tenants did not constitute a gift to the marital estate is clearly erroneous, we vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with the opinion herein.
The District Court's determination in a divorce action of which property is marital and which is nonmarital is reviewed for clear error and will not be disturbed on appeal if there is competent evidence in the record to support it. See Gray v. Gray, 609 A.2d 694, 697 (Me.1992). In Carter v. Carter, 419 A.2d 1018 (Me.1980), we held that a transfer during marriage from one spouse to both spouses jointly, "in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, must be understood as evidencing an intention to transfer the property to the marital estate," rather than to the donee separately. Id. at 1022. This presumption in favor of the marital estate "permits the court to make a more equitable division of the property" and "is consistent with the fundamental conception of marriage . as a partnership or shared enterprise." Id. at 1022-23. The parties are agreed that in 1979 Ronald transferred ownership of a cottage on Long Pond and a house in Vassalboro from his sole ownership to himself and Adelaide jointly, thereby creating the presumption of a gift to the marital estate. The issue, therefore, is whether Ronald's later assertion that he conveyed the property to Adelaide for the sole purpose of securing a loan constitutes evidence that he did not intend to transfer the property to joint ownership, thereby rebutting the presumption of a gift to the marital estate. We hold that it does not.
In Carter we held that property that had been acquired by the husband before marriage and conveyed by joint tenancy deed to both husband and wife after marriage was marital property despite the husband's assertion that the joint tenancy was created for the purpose of avoiding probate and inheritance taxes. In so holding we noted that "[m]otivation for the gift is irrelevant." Id. at 1021 n. 3 (citing In re Marriage of Montcrief, 36 Colo.App. 140, 535 P.2d 1137, 1138 (1975)). Indeed, the donor spouse's explanation of why title was placed in joint tenancy is not a denial of title transfer, but rather a statement of the reason for the gift. Id.; see also Holton v. Holton, 189 So.2d 214, 216 (Fla.App.1966); Whiting v. Whiting, 183 W.Va. 451, 396 S.E.2d 413, 421 (1990). Indeed, agreements to co-sign a loan have been construed as evidence that confirms the presumption of a gift, rather than as evidence that rebuts it. See e.g., In re Marriage of Cullman, 185 Ill.App.3d 1029, 133 Ill.Dec. 836, 839, 541 N.E.2d 1274, 1277 (1989). We conclude that the District Court's finding that Ronald's transfer was made for the purpose of securing a loan does not constitute evidence that he did not intend to transfer the property to joint ownership, and thus does not rebut the presumption of a gift to the marital estate. It is precisely because a donor spouse can easily find a plausible reason to explain why a seeming conveyance to his spouse is not in fact a conveyance that we have held that such "retrospective statements of intention offered at the time of divorce to defeat the other spouse's interest are highly suspect." Carter, 419 A.2d at 1022 n. 3.
Because our disposition of this case requires the District Court to divide the marital estate, including the Long Pond cottage and the Vassalboro residence, we need not address Adelaide's additional contention that the court inequitably divided the marital property.
The entry is:
Judgment vacated. Remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion herein.
WATHEN, C.J., and ROBERTS, and GLASSMAN, JJ., concurring.
. We do not mean to suggest that the presumption of a gift to the marital estate is an irrebutta-ble one. The presumption may be overcome by clear and convincing evidence "that the transferring spouse did not intend to transfer the property to joint ownership or was induced to do so by fraud, coercion, duress, or deception." Whiting v. Whiting, 183 W.Va. 451, 396 S.E.2d 413, 421 (1990).