Case Name: WEINSTEIN v. INTERURBAN ST. RY. CO.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1907-02-04
Citations: 102 N.Y.S. 512
Docket Number: 
Parties: WEINSTEIN v. INTERURBAN ST. RY. CO.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 102
Pages: 512–516

Head Matter:
(52 Misc. Rep. 468)
WEINSTEIN v. INTERURBAN ST. RY. CO.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Term.
February 4, 1907.)
1, Evidence—Declarations of Employés—Res Gestus.
Subsequent to the alleged happening of a street car accident, the street car company’s employés could not make declarations that might constitute admissions tending to establish defendant’s liability for injuries sustained therein.
[Ed. Note.—For eases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 20, Evidence, §§ 910, 912, 913, 931-933.]
2. Same—Hearsay.
Subsequent to the alleged happening of a street car accident, the street railway company’s claim agent made a requisition on the superintendent of the division on which the accident was alleged to have occurred, reciting that the claim agent was advised that an accident had occurred on November 17, 1903, at a certain point, and that the person was injured while getting off, caused by a sudden start, resulting from the conductor’s ringing the bell too quickly, and called for a report. Held, that the declaration “getting off, sudden start, conductor rang bell too quickly,” was hearsay, and that such requisition was inadmissible as res gestae, as against the defendant.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 20, Evidence, § 354.]
3. Appeau-Prejudice.
In an action against a street car company for injuries to a passenger, the erroneous admission of a requisition for information made by defendant’s claim agent on the superintendent of the division on which the accident was alleged to have occurred was prejudicial; the court having charged that while defendant was not bound, so far as the manner in which the accident occurred was concerned, by such requisition, the jury were entitled to say, from the surrounding circumstances, whether it was a statement which came to defendant by reason of information derived from plaintiff, or from the conductor or motorman of the car, etc.
Dayton, J., dissenting.
Appeal from City Court of New York.
Action by Ray Weinstein against the Interurban Street Railway Company. From a judgment of the New York City Court in favor of plaintiff, and from an order denying defendant’s motion for a new trial, it appeals. Reversed, and new trial granted.
Argued before GILDERSLEEVE, BLANCHARD, and DAYTON, JJ.
Bayard H. Ames, for appellant.
M. P. O’Connor (J. Brownson Ker, of counsel), for respondent.

Opinion:
GILDERSLEEVE, J.
This is the usual action to recover damages for injuries alleged to have been sustained through the careless operation of one of defendant's cars, upon which the plaintiff was a passenger. The jury in the court below rendered a verdict in favor of plaintiff, and from the judgment entered thereon, and the order denying defendant's motion for a new trial, defendant appeals.
The principal act of negligence charged by the plaintiff was the starting of the car while the plaintiff was in the act of alighting therefrom, and before she had been given a reasonable opportunity to get safely to the street. It appears that the car in question was being operated upon the Avenue C Division of the defendant. The alleged accident occurred on November 17, 1903, at which time one Avery Sickles was the accident clerk in the employ of defendant. Having been called as a witness for defendant, he stated that he had charge of the records of the company, which contained all reports from all conductors and motormen who had accidents on cars, and that he was unable to find any record of any accident whatever occurring to plaintiff, or any one else, at the time and place alleged in the complaint. To refresh the witness' memory as- to a date, a written requisition of the claim agent to the superintendent of the Avenue C. Division for information in regard to the alleged accident in question was placed by defendant's counsel in the hands of the witness, whereupon plaintiff's counsel offered said requisition in evidence. Defendant's counsel objected, upon the ground that it was incompetent, irrelevant,, and immaterial. The' court overruled the objection, to which ruling an exception was duly taken, and the paper was admitted in evidence and marked "Plaintiff's Exhibit A." The said paper bears date of December 28, 1903, and reads in substance as follows:
"Metropolitan Street Railroad Company. To the Superintendent of the Avenue C Division—Dear Sir: I am advised that an accident has occurred on Nov. 17, 1903, as follows: Mrs. Weinstein; location, Bowery and Prince; car No. 7; about 6 p. m.; getting off, sudden start, conductor rang bell too quickly. Please forward report and oblige. W. A. Dibbs, Claim Agent."
The judge below in his charge to the jury directed attention to this exhibit and said:
"You have a right to say, from the complaint in this action and from all the surrounding circumstances, whether that was a statement which came to the defendant by reason of information derived from the plaintiff, or by reason of information received from the conductor or motorman of the car. The defendant is not absolutely bound, so far as the manner in which this accident occurred, by this statement in writing; but you have a right to adduce whatever just inferences you can from the .evidence in consideration, taking into consideration ail the facts in the case at the time."
If any admission of fact contained in the requisition is to be considered as a declaration of some employé of defendant, it would not be binding on defendant. Subsequent to the happening of the accident, the employés of defendant were without authority to make declarations that might constitute admissions tending to establish defendant's liability. Such declarations cannot be said to be res gestae, and would not be binding on defendant. Kay v. Met. St. Ry. Co., 163 N. Y. ,447, 57 N. E. 751; Goetz v. Same, 54 App. Div. 365, 66 N. Y. Supp. 666. Moreover, it appears on the face of the requisition (Exhibit A) that the declaration, if one, "getting off, sudden start, conductor rang bell too quickly," was hearsay. The exhibit in question, for the reasons above stated, was improperly received in evidence. It was clearly of a nature calculated to prejudice the jury against defendant, especially in view of the portion of the charge to the jury above quoted, and its admission constitutes an error that demands a reversal of the judgment.
Judgment reversed, and new trial granted, w.ith costs to appellant to abide the event.
BLANCHARD, J., concurs.