Case Name: Herman PRASHAD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF HARTFORD, Defendant-Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2017-02-16
Citations: 681 F. App'x 42
Docket Number: No. 16-1289
Parties: Herman PRASHAD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF HARTFORD, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: PRESENT: Pierre N. Leval, Guido Calabresi, Susan L. Carney, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 681
Pages: 42–43

Head Matter:
Herman PRASHAD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF HARTFORD, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 16-1289
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
February 16, 2017
FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: John R. Williams, New Haven, CT.
FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: Melinda B. Kaufmann, Pullman & Comley, LLC, Hartford, CT.
PRESENT: Pierre N. Leval, Guido Calabresi, Susan L. Carney, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
SUMMARY ORDER
Plaintiff-appellant Herman Prashad alleges that between 2011 and 2013, he suffered workplace harassment on the basis of his ancestry and national origin while employed as a certified science teacher in the Hartford public school system. He complained about the harassment and was ultimately terminated from his teaching position on December 20, 2013. Proceeding pro se, Prashad filed a lawsuit in Connecticut Superior Court against defendant "Hartford Public Schools/City of Hartford" ("the City"), alleging that the City discriminated and retaliated against him. The case was removed to federal court, and Prashad retained counsel. Summary judgment was entered in the City's favor on April 18, 2016. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts and the procedural history of the case, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm.
Prashad's sole argument on appeal is that the District Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over his case. He argues that, because his complaint, brought in state court, explicitly cited a Connecticut statute and never mentioned federal anti-discrimination law, it did not present a federal question and did not come within the jurisdiction of the federal courts over federal questions under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
We reject Prashad's jurisdictional argument. His complaint was ambiguous as to the law invoked, notwithstanding its reference to a Connecticut statute, and it recited facts sufficient to support a claim under federal antidiscrimination laws. Prashad never objected to federal jurisdiction until this appeal. Even when counselled, he never told the District Court that it was his intention to plead only a state claim, nor did he ever move for remand to the state court. What is more, he repeatedly argued to the District Court that he should prevail under the pertinent federal statute. Prash-ad is correct that the parties may not, by mere consent, create federal jurisdiction where it is otherwise lacking. But his complaint was ambiguous as to the source of law, and his conduct in the District Court constituted acquiescence in resolving that ambiguity in favor of federal jurisdiction. See Vitarroz Corp. v. Borden, Inc,, 644 F.2d 960, 964-65 (2d Cir. 1981).
The District Court therefore properly exercised jurisdiction over the case.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court.
. During oral argument, Prashad expressly abandoned any challenge to the merits of the District Court's grant of summary judgment. We therefore have no occasion to address whether the District Court's reasons for granting summary judgment were sound.