Case Name: Thomas Rupprecht, Appellant, v. Brighton Mills, Respondent
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1898
Citations: 27 A.D. 77
Docket Number: 
Parties: Thomas Rupprecht, Appellant, v. Brighton Mills, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 27
Pages: 77–80

Head Matter:
Thomas Rupprecht, Appellant, v. Brighton Mills, Respondent.
Negligence — sufficiency of a complaint not alleging knowledge by the master, or ignorance by the servant, of a dangerous condition— when the principle of obvious risks is not involved.
In an action brought by a father to recover damages alleged to have been sustained by him in the loss of the services of his minor son, a complaint which alleges that “ owing to the gross carelessness and negligence of the defendant and without any fault or negligence on the part of said minor or this plaintiff in any wise contributing thereto,” the said minor, while performing his duties as a- servant of the defendant, sustained certain injuries by “ falling into and through ah unguarded and improperly constructed elevator shaft on the premises of the said defendant,” is not demurrable. ■
Where, in such an action, a party seeks to recover for inj uries not alleged to have been sustained by him in connection with any machinery or appliance with Which he was furnished by the employer, or in connection with the place, where he was working, a complaint containing the usual allegations of the employer’s negligence, and the absence of contributory negligence on the part of the servant, is sufficient.
It is not necessary to allege therein that the employer did, or that the servant did not, know of the dangerous condition resulting in the accident, as the principle of obvious risks is not directly involved, although it is possible that it may arise on the trial of the action.
Appeal by the plaintiff, Thomas Rupprecht, from an interlocutory judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the defendant, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 26th day of October,-1897, upon the decision of the court rendered after a trial at the New York Special Term sustaining the defendant’s demurrer to the complaint.
The action was brought to recover pecuniary damages alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff in the loss of the services of his minor son through the negligence of the defendant. The complaint alleges that “ owing to the gross carelessness apd negligence of the defendant, and without any fault or negligence on the part of the said minor or this plaintiff in any wise contributing thereto,” the said minor, while performing his duties as a servant of the defendant, sustained certain injuries. “ by falling into and through an unguarded and improperly constructed elevator shaft on the premises of the said defendant.” The demurrer is on the ground that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
The demurrer was sustained for the reasón'stated in the opinion of the court that “ There is no allegation in the complaint that defendant knew of .the defective condition of the shaft, or that the servant was ignorant thereof. * * * The gist' of the cause of action is the negligence of the master and absence of contributory negligence on -part of the servant. The master’s negligence cannot result if he was ignorant of the defects, and .want of like knowledge must exist on part of the servant to hold him free from negligence contributing to his injury. Averments covering these foundations for liability must be contained in the complaint. . If absent therefrom, no cause of action can be stated.” An interlocutory judgment was accordingly directed for the defendant from which the plaintiff appeals.
Thomas C. T. Crain, for the appellant.
Austen G. Fox, for the respondent.

Opinion:
O'Brien, J.:
Were this an action of negligence for injuries to a person other than a servant, there would be no ground for questioning the sufficiency of the complaint, because in the general form which has long been sanctioned as a sufficient pleading, the plaintiff states that the damages which he seeks were due to the negligence of the defendant, and that neither the plaintiff's negligence nor that of his minor son, for the loss of whose services the action is brought, in any way contributed to the injuries; and this is followed by a statement of the cause of the injury, namely, an unguarded and improperly constructed elevator shaft on the premises of the defendant.
It is not alleged that the employee worked on the elevator shaft, or had anything to do with it. But, on the contrary, the fair inference is that he was engaged at other work in some other part of the . premises, and through the negligence of the defendant, and without fault on his own part, was injured. The averment that he was employed by the defendant was proper as showing that he was not a trespasser, but was rightfully on the premises. The principle of obvious risks is not, therefore, directly involved in the complaint, though it is possible it may arise upon the trial. The confusion, therefore, between the necessary averments of a complaint and evidentiary facts led the learned judge into the error of adjudging this complaint insufficient. Where, however, a plaintiff, be he servant or third person,.seeks to recover for injuries sustained, not in connection with the machinery or appliances with which he is furnished, or in connection with the place where he is working, and where the doctrine of obvious risks would be applicable, his complaint is sufficient if it has the usual allegations of the defendant's negligence and the absence of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff.
Here, although the plaintiff counts on negligence, the defendant succeeded below in his contention that he made a mistake in so doing, and that lie should have alleged facts which would have sustained. an action upon the doctrine of obvious risks; and that, as upon such a theory, there were absent certain necessary averments, the complaint was defective. It was the plaintiff's right to formulate his own theory, and the allegations in the complaint in support thereof being the usual and proper ones, and sufficient, it was error to sustain the demurrer thereto., and the interlocutory judgment should be reversed, with costs, hut with leave to the defendant to withdraw demurrer and answer over on payment of costs.
Van Brunt, P. J., Patterson, Ingraham and McLaughlin, JJ., concurred.
Judgment reversed, with costs, with leave to defendant to withdraw demurrer and answer on payment.of costs in this Court and in the court below.