Case Name: Sondra O. CLARK v. DIRECTOR, Employment Security Department, and Northwest Arkansas Radiation Therapy Institute, Inc.
Court: Arkansas Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 1997-06-04
Citations: 58 Ark. App. 1
Docket Number: E 95-193
Parties: Sondra O. CLARK v. DIRECTOR, Employment Security Department, and Northwest Arkansas Radiation Therapy Institute, Inc.
Judges: Pittman, Arey, Bird, and Meads, JJ., agree.
Reporter: Arkansas Appellate Reports
Volume: 58
Pages: 1–7

Head Matter:
Sondra O. CLARK v. DIRECTOR, Employment Security Department, and Northwest Arkansas Radiation Therapy Institute, Inc.
E 95-193
944 S.W.2d 862
Court of Appeals of Arkansas Divisions I and II
Opinion delivered June 4, 1997
Stephen Lee Wood, P.A., by: Stephen Lee Wood, for appellant.
Phyllis Edwards, for appellee Phil Price.
Cypert, Crouch, Clark & Harwell, by: Charles L. Harwell, for separate appellee Robert Reyerson.

Opinion:
John F. Stroud, Jr., Judge.
This is an employment security case in which appellant, Sondra Clark, was denied unemployment benefits because she was discharged for misconduct in connection with her work. The Appeals Tribunal denied appellant benefits for a period of eight weeks. The Board of Review denied benefits for a period of ten weeks, finding that the misconduct involved dishonesty. We affirm the Board of Review.
Appellant had been employed by appellee, Northwest Arkansas Radiation Therapy Institute, for more than nine years when she was discharged in February 1995. Her duties as a senior staff radiation therapist and clinical supervisor included taking and logging daily equipment readings on six machines. The readings numbered between 150 to 200 each day.
One of the machines monitored by appellant was used to deliver high energy radiation in the treatment of cancer patients. Appellant took twenty-one readings each day on this machine, including one with respect to the machine's water pressure. It was important that the readings not vary from day to day because any deviation from the normal operation of the equipment could affect the delivery of the radiation treatment, conceivably altering the treatment outcome. Appellant had performed this task since October 1985.
On January 11, 1995, the water-pressure gauge on this machine was replaced by an engineer employed by NARTI. Prior to replacement, the old gauge had consistently read 60 p.s.i. The engineer performed a preventive maintenance inspection on the machine between January 23, 1995, and February 4, 1995. The inspection included a review of the logbook. In making the inspection, he noticed a discrepancy between the actual reading on the newly installed water-pressure gauge and the readings that were recorded in the log book. The new gauge measured 75-76 p.s.i., rather than the 60 p.s.i. that registered on the old gauge. However, appellant continued to record the readings at 60 p.s.i. She was terminated on February 14, 1995, for "falsifying records," an offense calling for immediate termination under NARTI's progressive discipline policy.
Appellant filed a claim for unemployment benefits. The Appeals Tribunal denied her benefits for a period of eight weeks, and the Board of Review denied her benefits for a period of ten weeks, finding that her misconduct involved dishonesty. On appeal to this court, appellant argues that the Board of Review's finding that she engaged in misconduct by intentionally falsifying company records was not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree.
On appeal, the Board of Review's findings of fact are conclusive if they are supported by substantial evidence. Rucker v. Director, 52 Ark. App. 126, 915 S.W.2d 315 (1996). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. We review the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Board's findings. Id. Our review is limited to a determination of whether the Board could reasonably reach its decision upon the evidence before it. Id.
Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-10-514 (Repl. 1996) provides in pertinent part:
(a)(1) If so found by the Director of the Arkansas Employment Security Department, an individual shall be disqualified for benefits if he is discharged from his last work for misconduct in connection with the work.
(3) Except as otherwise provided in this section, disqualification for misconduct shall be for eight (8) weeks of unemployment as defined in § 11-10-512.
(b) If he is discharged from his last work for misconduct in connection with the work on account of dishonesty, . or willful violation of the rules or customs of the employer pertaining to the safety of fellow employees or company property, he shall be disqualified from the date of fifing his claim until he shall have ten (10) weeks of employment in each of which he shall have earned wages equal to at least his weekly benefit amount.
As we pointed out in Perry v. Gaddy, 48 Ark. App. 128, 891 S.W.2d 73 (1995):
Mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure of good performance as a result of inability or incapacity, inadvertence, and ordinary negligence or good-faith errors in judgment or discretion are not considered misconduct for unemployment insurance purposes unless they are of such degree or recurrence as to manifest culpability, wrongful intent, evil design, or an intentional or substantial disregard of an employer's interests or of an employee's duties and obligations.
(Emphasis added.)
Here, the Board of Review could reasonably reach the decision it did based upon the evidence that was before it. There was substantial evidence to support the Board's finding that appellant was discharged for misconduct connected with the work on account of dishonesty. After the gauge was replaced and the new gauge consistently registered 75-76 p.s.i., appellant continued to chart the gauge readings at 60 p.s.i. Once the problem was brought to the employer's attention, the gauges and logs were monitored on a daily basis and compared to appellant's readings. The discrepancies between the actual readings and appellant's log entries constituted substantial evidence that appellant's actions surpassed those of mere misreadings to those of not reading the gauges at all and logging false numbers. Such misconduct demon strates an intentional or substantial disregard of an employer's interests or of an employee's duties and obligations.
Affirmed.
Pittman, Arey, Bird, and Meads, JJ., agree.
Neal, J., dissents.