Case Name: VLX PROPERTIES, INC., Appellant, v. SOUTHERN STATES UTILITIES, INC., et al., Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2001-05-21
Citations: 792 So. 2d 504
Docket Number: No. 5D99-3314
Parties: VLX PROPERTIES, INC., Appellant, v. SOUTHERN STATES UTILITIES, INC., et al., Appellees.
Judges: THOMPSON, C.J., GRIFFIN, PALMER and ORFINGER, R.B., JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 792
Pages: 504–518

Head Matter:
VLX PROPERTIES, INC., Appellant, v. SOUTHERN STATES UTILITIES, INC., et al., Appellees.
No. 5D99-3314.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
May 21, 2001.
Bruce A. Hanna and C. Allen Watts of Cobb Cole & Bell, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
Gordon H. Harris, Tracy A. Marshall and Kent Hipp of, Gray, Harris & Robinson, P.A., Orlando, for Appellees.

Opinion:
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING EN BANC
HARRIS, J.
We grant en banc review of a panel opinion which reversed the trial court's decision that inverse condemnation had not been established because the trial court, the panel determined, had applied the wrong standard. The panel decision was based on our previous decision in this case, VLX Properties, Inc. v. Southern States Utilities, Inc., 701 So.2d 391 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997), hereinafter referred to as "VLX1." Because we find that this court erred in VLX1 and that to adhere to that decision would work "a manifest injustice," we recede from VLX1 and thereby affirm the decision on appeal. See Strazzulla v. Hendrick, 177 So.2d 1 (Fla.1965).
VLX is currently the owner of certain property which includes a portion of James Pond, the "property" at issue in this case. VLX obtained its interest from Lawyers Title Investment Fund (hereinafter "Lawyers") after the alleged acts relied on for inverse condemnation. James Pond is partially on property previously conveyed to Glen Abbey Golf Course, Inc. (hereinafter "Glen Abbey") for use in its golf course operation. The ownership of that portion of the pond not included in the sale to Glen Abbey remained under the ownership of Lawyers or other adjacent land owners.
Glen Abbey had for years irrigated its golf course from wells. However, when reclaimed water became available in the area, Glen Abbey was administratively prohibited from continuing to draw down ground water and was required to use reclaimed water to irrigate its golf course. It contracted with Southern States Utilities, Inc. (Southern States) to provide the irrigation services.
The agreement between Glen Abbey and Southern States contemplated that since reclaimed water would be placed into various ponds, including James Pond, Lawyers, still the owner of a portion of the pond after the sale to Glen Abbey, would have to join in the agreement confirming that it had no objection to reclaimed water being put into James Pond. Another requirement of the Glen Abbey/Southern States agreement was that flowage easements over the bottom of the pond would be obtained from all the other owners of James Pond who were not involved in the Lawyer's Title/Glen Abbey sales agreement. Lawyers joined in the agreement, which described the affected property as including all of the bottom of James Pond owned by it, and this agreement was recorded in the public records. Flowage easements were then obtained from all the owners who did not join in the agreement.
Events then proceeded as intended and reclaimed water was placed into James Pond. Sometime thereafter, Lawyers conveyed its interest to VLX. VLX now claims that since the reclaimed water flowed not only over the property conveyed by Lawyers to Glen Abbey but also onto that portion of the pond retained by Lawyers after the sale to Glen Abbey, the actions of Southern States in putting reclaimed water into James Pond exceeded the authority granted by the Lawyers joinder. This is because, contends VLX, Southern States did not obtain a separate flowage easement from Lawyers. VLX claims that it is now entitled to compensation by way of inverse condemnation because the water was permitted to flow over that portion of the pond subsequently acquired by it. In effect, VLX contends that the water's flow should have been restricted by a metes and bounds "dam."
In VLX1, we interpreted the description of the property relating to the joinder to exclude property outside the sales agreement because of "scrivener's error." Scrivener's error, however, requires a mutual mistake. There is certainly no evidence that Glen Abbey or Southern States intended that the consent evidenced by the joinder was limited to only a portion of James Pond. We now believe that we erred in VLX1 by amending the legal description contained in the agreement.
After Lawyers executed the joinder agreement consenting to the water being put into ponds, including James Pond, "on and/or adjacent" to the property being conveyed by it to Glen Abbey, a separate flowage easement from Lawyers would have been redundant. Otherwise, its join-der would have been a mere sham, certainly not intended by any party. It is simply too fanciful to imagine that Lawyers intended that water be placed into the pond yet not flow beyond the golf course's invisible boundary. Further, had Lawyers expected to also sell a flowage easement over its adjacent portion of the pond, surely it would have said so in the joinder.
Indeed, as pointed out in the dissent in VLX1, the corporate officer of Lawyers confirmed that by joining in the reclaimed water agreement, it was intended that flowage throughout the pond would occur. Lawyers wanted the pond completely filled so that it could sell waterfront lots.
In VLX1, the majority held that because the reclaimed water agreement drafted by Southern States conditioned the agreement on Southern States being able to get flowage easements from the other owners of the bottom of the holding ponds (including James Pond), this shows that the parties understood that a flowage easement would be required from Lawyers. This proves just the opposite. The fact that Southern States obtained a flowage easement from all other owners of the bottom of the pond and yet did not seek one from Lawyers and then operated the reclaimed water service for a long period of time without objection from Lawyers, convincingly shows that Lawyers consented to the water flowing throughout the pond without expecting additional compensation. Again, this is demonstrated by the reclaimed water agreement in which Lawyers joined which described the ponds to be used as storage as being "on and/or adjacent" to the property subject to the agreement.
Precedent (stare decisis), and law of the case for that matter, is like tradition in that it provides a valuable connection to the past. It assists in providing consistency and predictability, both valuable qualities in law. But neither precedent (nor law of the case) should be used to institutionalize or justify error. We are no more perfect as judges than we are as individuals. We make mistakes. Neither the public nor the Bar expect us to always be right; they do expect us, however, to always be forthcoming. If it appears that we have made a mistake, we should not hesitate to correct it and, if it is still within our power to do so, we should mitigate any damage we have caused. Neither this court nor the law is served by our adhering to a previous position which we now believe to be wrong.
We recede from VLX1 and, on the basis of the tipsy coachmen rule, withdraw the current panel opinion and affirm the decision below.
AFFIRMED.
THOMPSON, C.J., GRIFFIN, PALMER and ORFINGER, R.B., JJ., concur.
COBB, J., concurs and concurs specially with opinion.
SHARP, W., dissents, with opinion in which PETERSON, SAWAYA and PLEUS, J., concur.
PETERSON, J., dissents, with opinion with which SHARP, W., SAWAYA, and PLEUS, JJ., concur.
. Perhaps the reader should now again read VLX1. The dissent's current justification for ruling for VLX has no resemblance to the former opinion. It is that former opinion that we are required to address in this majority. The issues that the dissent now claims we have ignored do not appear to have been raised by the parties and do not appear to have been considered by VLX1. The dissent has amended the facts of VLX1 (the parties to the basic agreement and the joinder in that agreement) in order to accommodate its new reasoning, perhaps hoping that the tipsy coachman rule will be applied to the original panel decision.
The author of VLX1 asserts that because the description in the "Delivery Agreement" included property not then owned by or contracted for by Glen Abbey, an easement could not have been granted over the additional property. Even though Glen Abbey could not grant an easement over property it did not own, it could agree by contract to provide storage over unowned contiguous lands if the owners of the contiguous lands agreed. There is no dispute that LTIF and the other owners who signed consents did own the property at issue and never objected to SSU's actions. The Delivery Agreement was merely a contract by which SSU agreed to provide irrigation services to properties owned by or to be acquired by Glen Abbey. By its terms, the Delivery Agreement contemplated that ponds contiguous to the golf course would be utilized to provide storage for the water to be used in the irrigation. All the owners of the contiguous property consented. Whether we refer to this consent as an easement or license, it is in any event a written, recorded agreement permitting SSU to use LTIF's and the other owner's land as it did. It does not matter that James Pond was not referred to by name in the agreement or joinder because the facts show, and everyone agrees, that James Pond was one of the contiguous ponds intended for storage. For that reason, LTIF, the contract vendor of additional golf course land (at least according to VLX1) to Glen Abby, was required to join in the Delivery Agreement, not merely the easement, and did so, subjecting not only the property subject to the anticipated sale but also contiguous lands over which it had an interest to storage of reclaimed water. The additional land was described, LTIF had an interest in the additional land sufficient to make the grant, and LTIF received consideration for doing so. This was the testimony of LTIF which was consistent with all the facts, testimony that the dissent now finds unworthy of belief because LTIF was not friendly with VLX. The dissent makes the irrelevant point that Glen Abbey never owned the property subsequently conveyed to VLX. We are not here concerned with whether Glen Abbey owned the contiguous property, we are concerned with whether LTIF owned a sufficient interest in it to subject it to storage of reclaimed water. If it did, as we find it did, then LTIF's subsequent conveyance to VLX was subject to such previous grant. The dissent now suggests that perhaps VLX was not bound by the recorded agreement because of some deficiency which would prevent constructive notice. Clearly neither VLX1 nor the parties hereto suggest any problem with notice. Perhaps that is because VLX either saw the agreement, was advised of the agreement by the former agent of LTIF who became employed by VLX or because it actually saw the irrigation process in operation in natural color. In any event, VLX never denied notice.
The admission herein that judges sometimes err is not an apology, "flowery, patronizing, retaliatory" or otherwise; it is merely, as all lawyers know and as so clearly demonstrated, one way or the other, by this case, a statement of unfortunate fact. The rules recognize judicial imperfection by permitting a rehearing, an appeal, an en banc review, and a petition for certiorari. Precedent recognizes it by decisions receding from previous decisions and, as in this case, changing the law of the case. The majority herein suggests that when it appears that we have made an error we admit it, correct the damage if we can, and move on rather than seek new reasons, not considered by the original panel or argued by the parties, to support the initial result.
The dissent urges that VLX should be bound only by the easement granted by Glen Abbey and not by the specific, recorded agreement executed by its predecessor in title permitting the storage of water on specifically described property owned by such predecessor and ultimately conveyed to VLX. Although the dissent now questions the name of the party entering into the joinder agreement, the issue was not raised below and in fact VLX1 assumed the joinder was binding on both LTIF and VLX or there would have been no need for the majority therein to redraft the description.
The dissent's "unreasonable co-use" point is also irrelevant. This defense would apply only if LTIF had not granted the right to use the property for storage. It clearly did.
Finally, the dissent challenges whether the manifest injustice of the case warrants receding from the law of the case. Manifest injustice is apparent when one enters into a contract permitting the performance of certain services, receives the consent of all applicable parties to perform the services, performs only the services contemplated by the agreement and the consents, and is sued for performing the contemplated services by the successor in interest of one of the consenting parties.
It is difficult to determine whether those concurring with the dissent do so because they agree with the original opinion (now apparently abandoned by its author), or the modified reasons (neither pled nor argued by either party), or simply believe (and this is apparently Judge Sharp's position) that the adherence to the "law of the case" is important enough to require a party who, on reflection, totally complied with its contract to pay damages and large attorney's fees. What has happened to the sanctity of contract?