Case Name: STATE, Respondent, v. VICENTE BILBOA, Appellant
Court: Idaho Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Idaho
Decision Date: 1923-03-31
Citations: 38 Idaho 92
Docket Number: 
Parties: STATE, Respondent, v. VICENTE BILBOA, Appellant.
Judges: Dunn and Wm. E. Lee, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Idaho Reports
Volume: 38
Pages: 92–118

Head Matter:
(March 31, 1923.)
STATE, Respondent, v. VICENTE BILBOA, Appellant.
[213 Pac. 1025; 222 Pac. 785.]
Indictment and Information — ■ Besubmission — Appeal and Error — ■ Statute op Limitations.
1. When a demurrer is sustained to an information and the court, at the time of sustaining the demurrer, directs that a new information he filed, as provided hy O. S., see. 8874, and a new information is thereafter filed in obedience to such direction of the court, charging the same offense, the prosecution is continuous and relates back to the filing of the defective information.
2. Where an information is quashed or the proceedings on the same are set aside or reversed on appeal, the time during which such appeal was pending shall not be included within the time limited by the provisions of O. S., sec. 8703, so as to bar any new information thereafter filed for the same offense, as directed by the court.
Publisher’s Note.
Burden on state to show that crime committed within limitation period, see note in 13 A. L. E. 1446.
Exelusion of time of pendeney of prior indictment in computation of limitation of actions, see note in 3 A. I>. E. 1330.
Eelation back of new pleadings to statute of limitations, see notes in 3 It. E. A., N. S., 295; 33 I». E. A., N. S„ 196; 47 L. E. A., N. S., 932.
APPEAL from the District Court of tbe Third Judicial District, for Ada County. Hon. Charles P. McCarthy, Judge.
Appeal from judgment of conviction for having possession of intoxicating liquor.
Affirmed.
Frawley & Koelsch, for Appellant.
Appellant contends that his prosecution upon this charge is barred by the statutes. The charge against the defendant contained in this information is a misdemeanor, and under the provisions of C. S., sec. 8073, is barred within one year after its commission. The time of the commission of such a.n offense is a jurisdictional fact upon a prosecution therefor. (State v. Steensland, 33 Ida. 529, 13 A. L. R. 1442, 195 Pac. 1080.)
“The United States, Illinois, Missouri, Nebraska, New York and some other jurisdictions have statutes requiring that the indictment be filed within a specified period after the commission of the offense. Under such statutes, it is generally held that failure to lodge a valid indictment or information, as the case may be, within the specified period, bars prosecution.” (Davenport v. State (Okl. Cr.), 202 Pac. 18.)
The Iowa statute is almost verbatim with that in Idaho. (State v. Disbrow•, 130 Iowa, 19, 8 Ann. Cas. 190, 106 N. W. 263.)
Though a complaint be filed before a magistrate, who at the request of the accused continued the hearing from time to time until the year had expired, such pendency of a prosecution does not toll the bar of statute of limitations. (People v. Ayhens, 85 Cal. 86, 24 Pac. 635.)
Idaho has no statute authorizing an amendment to an information, and this information purports to be and is a new information, filed in pursuance of the order of the court to that effect and by authority of C. S., sec. 8874. (People v. Clayberg, 26 Cab App. 614, 147 Pac. 994; Ex parte Chambers, 32 Cal. App. 476, 163 Pae. 223.)
A. H. Conner, Attorney General, and Jas. It. Boone, Assistant, for Respondent.
It is not necessary in order to toll the time provided in sec. 8703, C. S., that a “valid” information be filed.
An information satisfies the provisions of sec. 8703, C. S., which informs the accused that an offense has been committed and thereby enables him to build up his defense. This section is to be given a reasonable construction. (State v. Disbrow, 130 Iowa, 19, 8 Ann. Cas. 190, 106 N. W. 263.)
Any statute should be followed which expressly or impliedly tolls the running of the stalute of limitations. Sec. 8874, C. S., impliedly tolls the running of the statute of limitations in this ease.
The pendency of an appeal in the appellate court effectively tolls the running of the statute of limitations. (People, v. Oiesea, 63 Cal. 345; People v. Lundin, 120 Cal. 308, 52 Pae. 807; In re Bergerow, ‘133 Cal. 349, 85 Am. St. 178, 201, 65 Pac. 828, 56 L. R. A. 513.)
Keeping in mind that “the statute of limitations is not founded upon mere delay in the prosecution, but rather upon delay in commencing the prosecution” (People v. Buchner, 281 Ill. 340, 3 A. L. R. 1327, 117 N. E. 1023). C. S., sec. 9191, is applicable in this case.

Opinion:
BUDGE, C. J.
— This cause was before this court upon a prior appeal, the opinion being reported in 33 Ida. 129, 190 Pae. 248, where a complete statement of the facts will be found. The judgment of the trial court was reversed, and the cause remanded, with instructions that further proceedings be had in accordance with the views expressed in the opinion. The basis of reversal was for error committed by the court in refusing to sustain appellant's demurrer and in not requiring the state to elect upon which particular offense it would rely for a conviction. However, this court held that the failure to sustain the demurrer might have been cured had the court required the state to elect. Upon the going down of the remittitur, appellant's demurrer to the information was sustained. The court did not require the state to elect and the cause was not dismissed. The. trial court under the provisions of C. S., sec. 8874, directed the county attorney to file another information, which was done. The charge in this information was within the scope of the magistrate's commitment upon which appellant was formerly held to answer, being one of the identical offenses charged in the prior information. Appellant filed a motion to quash the latter information upon the grounds that the demurrer to the former information charging the same offense had been sustained and that a further prosecution could not be had for the reason that the same was barred by the provisions of C. S., sec. 8703. This motion was denied. Upon a trial thereafter had, appellant was found guilty as charged in the information and judgment entered thereon, from which judgment this appeal is prosecuted.
Two errors are specified in appellant's brief. The only one relied upon is that the court erred in holding that the prosecution of appellant upon the charge contained in the last information was not barred by the provisions of C. S., sec. 8703.
Appellant contends that the information filed on January 29, 1917, was invalid and therefore there was no information, and that before a valid information was filed, under the direction of the court, on September 20, 1920, the statute of limitations barred the prosecution.
C. S,, sec. 8703, provides that: "An indictment for any misdemeanor must be found within one year after its commission."
It is further contended that it appears affirmatively from the record that appellant was during all of the times an inhabitant of or usually a resident within the state, and therefore the prosecution would not fall within the exception recognized by the provisions of C. S., sec. 8704.
Unless the filing of the information upon which appellant was first convicted tolled the running of the statute of limitations, the prosecution was barred and appellant's contention must be sustained.
The information passed upon in the former appeal was not invalid but held to be irregular, in that it charged more than a single offense, and that the court below committed reversible error in refusing to require the state to elect. The prosecution was a continuing one. It was for the same offense and against the same offender, the state having at all times charged appellant with the crime of transporting intoxicating liquor for beverage purposes in violation of law. Had the state elected to try defendant upon this particular charge, as contained in the former information it would have sustained the conviction. (State v. Brown and Christopherson, 36 Ida. 272, 211 Pac. 60.) The court retained jurisdiction over appellant at all times. The fact th'at the court sustained the demurrer was not a final judgment upon* the information and was not a bar to a prosecution for the same offense for the reason that under the provisions of C. S., sec. 8874, the court directed the county attorney to file another information in order to avoid the irregularities appearing in the former information. (In re Pierce, 8 Ida. 183, 67 Pac. 316.) C. S., sec. 8874, expressly provides that upon the setting aside of a defective information it is within the power of the court to direct that a new information be filed. Such action on the part of the court and the prosecuting attorney suspends the running of the statute of limitations, provided the first information is filed within one year of the date of the commission of the offense. During the pendency of an appeal the time is not to be computed as a part of the statutory time within which a prosecution may be commenced. (Davenport v. State (Okl. Or.), 202 Pac. 18.)
It is expressly provided by statute in many jurisdictions that the time during which a prior indictment or information which has been quashed or set aside is pending on appeal shall be deducted from the period of limitations applicable to prosecutions. If we have such a statute in this state, our attention has not been called to it. Plowever, it has been held in numerous jurisdictions that, independently of statute, the pendency on appeal of a prior information for the same offense tolls the statute of limitations, provided the disposition of the first information and the filing of the second are such as to constitute one continuing prosecution. Thus, in the case of Berkley v. Commonwealth, 164 Ky. 191, 176 S. W. 364, the indictment under which the defendant was tried was returned after the expiration of the statutory period therefor. On appeal the commonwealth proved a prior indictment found within the period of limitations which had been dismissed for insufficiency with leave to resubmit. The court held that there had been a continuous prosecution and that the operation of the statute as to the latter indictment had been suspended. In the ease of Tully v. Commonwealth, 13 Bush (Ky.), 142, the indictment upon which the defendant was tried was returned after the period of limitations had expired, but on motion in arrest of judgment the prosecution was able to prove the return of a prior indictment within the period, which indictment had, however, been found fatally defective. The court decided that although the first indictment was defective, yet it was a commencement of prosecution which had since been continuous, and so the statute would not raise a bar to conviction. To the same effect, see People v. Buckner, 281 Ill. 340, 3 A. L. R. 1327 (note p. 1330), 117 N. E. 1023; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 4 Ky. Law Rep. 627; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 7 Ky. Law Rep. 836; State v. Williams, 151 N. C. 660, 65 S. E. 908; State v. Cox, 28 N. C. 440; Foster v. State, 38 Ala. 425; Weston v. State, 63 Ala 155; State ex rel. Graves v. Primm, 61 Mo. 166; Hickey v. State, 131 Tenn. 112, 174 S. W. 269; People v. Giesea, 63 Cal. 345; People v. Lundin, 120 Cal. 308, 52 Pac. 807; State v. Hansen, 10 Wash. 235, 38 Pac. 1023.
In the case of Hickey v. State, supra, it was held that in the absence of an express statute the period between the return of an original defective indictment and a subsequent valid one should not be computed as part of the time limited by statute, within which prosecution could be brought. In the course of that opinion that court said:
"The question now arises whether in this state, in the absence of any statute on the subject, the prosecution under this second indictment may be considered such a continuation of the original prosecution that the statute of limitation cannot apply. We think there is no doubt but that it was the same prosecution under both indictments. While the first indictment was defective and invalid because it did not contain the name of the person upon whom the assault was committed, yet it was a prosecution for the same offense as that embraced in the second indictment. ' '
While the authorities are not in harmony on this point we think the better reasoned cases support the position taken. Counsel -cites and relies upon the case of State v. Disbrow, 130 Iowa, 19, 8 Ann. Cas. 190, 106 N. W. 263. This case is not in point, for the reason that the indictment was found to be void and not merely irregular or defective.
(December 8, 1923.)
Criminal Practice Act — Applicable to Prosecutions by Information— Demurrer — New Information — Plea of not Guilty— Raises Statute of Limitations — Jurisdictional Question.
1. Procedure under the "Criminal Procedure Act" is by C. S., see. 8812, expressly made applicable to prosecutions by information, as well as by indictment.
2. Where a demurrer to an information charging a misdemeanor is sustained upon the ground of duplieity, and a new information is thereafter filed, it is not an amended information or a continuation of the prosecution had under the original information.
When the legislature enacted C. S., sec. 8703, it was clearly not its intention to provide in all cases where an information was, upon demurrer, held to he defective, that pending the determination of the demurrer the statute of limitations was not suspended. The legislature has also made provision by statute for appeals in criminal cases. It would be both unreasonable and inconsistent for this court to say that a defendant might take advantage of such statutes by appeal in order to delay the prosecution and then invoke the aid of the statute of limitations as a bar to such prosecution.
We think that the same principle was applied in the. case of People v. Giesea, supra, and affirmed in People v. Lundin, supra, and the same is adverse to appellant's contention. To the same effect see note to In re Bergerow, 85 Am. St. 201.
From what has been said it follows that the judgment should be affirmed and it is so ordered.
Dunn and Wm. E. Lee, JJ., concur.