Case Name: Beverly PATTERSON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Clifford L. LINN, individually, and as Mayor of the City of Sturgis, South Dakota; and, City of Sturgis, South Dakota, a Municipal Corporation, Defendants and Appellees,
Court: South Dakota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: South Dakota
Decision Date: 2001-11-07
Citations: 636 N.W.2d 467
Docket Number: No. 21745
Parties: Beverly PATTERSON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Clifford L. LINN, individually, and as Mayor of the City of Sturgis, South Dakota; and, City of Sturgis, South Dakota, a Municipal Corporation, Defendants and Appellees,
Judges: [¶ 13.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and MILLER, Retired Chief Justice, concur.
Reporter: North Western Reporter 2d
Volume: 636
Pages: 467–472

Head Matter:
2001 SD 135
Beverly PATTERSON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Clifford L. LINN, individually, and as Mayor of the City of Sturgis, South Dakota; and, City of Sturgis, South Dakota, a Municipal Corporation, Defendants and Appellees,
No. 21745.
Supreme Court of South Dakota.
Considered on Briefs May 29, 2001.
Reassigned Sept. 10, 2001.
Decided Nov. 7, 2001.
Richard A. Pluimer, Belle Fourehe, for plaintiff and appellant.
Sarah Hirsch Wittmuss and James S. Nelson of Gunderson, Palmer, Goodsell & Nelson, Rapid City, for defendants and appellees.

Opinion:
KONENKAMP, Justice (on reassignment).
[¶ 1.] By statute, the mayor in an alder-manic-governed municipality has the authority to remove officers the mayor appointed. Clifford L. Linn, the mayor of Sturgis, summarily fired the city finance officer during her one-year term. The city has a personnel policy outlining legal procedures for discharging employees, but it was not followed. The finance officer brought suit. In granting summary judgment for the mayor and the city, the circuit court concluded that even if the personnel policy applied, it could not override the statute empowering the mayor to remove an officer. We. affirm.
Background
[¶ 2.] Beverly Patterson served as the finance officer for Sturgis, South Dakota. She had worked for the city since April 1980, first as auditor and later as finance officer. On May 3, 1999, she was reappointed to the position, when the mayor executed a warrant of appointment "for the term of one year from and after May 3, 1999, and until your successor is appointed or elected and has qualified." The Sturgis City Council approved the appointment "for the year 1999-2000."
[¶ 3.] On the day before Patterson's termination, the mayor and city council consulted with the city attorney. The attorney advised that Patterson "serves at the pleasure of the mayor, and that the mayor can terminate the finance officer." This advice was based on counsel's interpretation of SDCL 9-14-13 and our decision in Finch v. City of Tea, 443 N.W.2d 632 (S.D.1989). The attorney's opinion did not take into account the city's personnel policy handbook. This handbook, applicable to "all appointed city officials, management employees, contract employees and part-time employees," granted employees certain pretermination rights. Its procedures included the right to a hearing and notice.
[¶ 4.] The mayor terminated Patterson's employment on August 3, 1999. He gave no notice of intended termination, no written statement of charges, no explanation of evidence against her, and no hearing. Later the mayor explained why he gave no reason for his decision: "I felt I didn't need to. She worked at my pleasure."
[¶ 5.] Patterson sued under a multiple count complaint. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the may- or and the city, reasoning that Patterson was an at-will employee. One count was settled by the parties, and Patterson now appeals, asserting that the court erred in holding that she did not have an express contract for a one-year term and in ruling that the city's personnel handbook was inapplicable to her case.
Analysis and Decision
[¶ 6.] Our standard of review for summary judgments has been recited in nu merous cases and need not be repeated here. See Kobbeman v. Oleson, 1998 SD 20, ¶ 4, 574 N.W.2d 633, 635. The circuit court ruled, as a matter of law, that Patterson did not have an enforceable one-year contract. As authority for its decision, the court relied on SDCL 9-14-13, granting the mayor power to dismiss an appointed officer at any time without cause.
[¶ 7.] To address Patterson's claims, we construe SDCL 9-14-13. It specifies the mayoral power to remove officers the mayor appointed:
In an aldermanic-governed first and second class municipality the mayor shall have power except as otherwise provided to remove from office any officer appointed by him, whenever he shall be of the opinion that the interest of the municipality demand such removal, but he shall report the reasons for his removal to the council at its next regular meeting.
SDCL 9-14-13. We discern legislative intent by reading the statute as a whole, along with enactments relating to the same subject. State v. Barton, 2001 SD 52, ¶ 8, 625 N.W.2d 275, 278 (citations omitted). We presume the Legislature intended no absurd or unreasonable purpose. Id. Where a grant of power appears to be delimited by statute, we will strictly resolve against a municipality power taken in excess of that grant. Sioux Falls v. Peterson, 71 S.D. 446, 448, 25 N.W.2d 556, 557 (1946)(interpreting a grant of municipal police power).
[¶ 8.] Patterson hinges her argument on the "except as otherwise provided" language in the statute to assert that the mayor's removal power was modified by the city employment policy. Statutory removal power of officers is one of the "great" powers afforded municipalities. See Finck v. City of Tea, 443 N.W.2d 632, 634 (S.D.1989). To interpret the phrase "except as otherwise provided" as meaning to permit a city to grant tenure to a city officer makes the statute self-contradictory and contravenes the pattern of municipal governance defined in our statutory scheme. The phrase "except as otherwise provided" can logically apply only to the Legislature's authority to grant exceptions by statute, not to a city's authority to make an exception for itself.
[¶ 9.] The power to remove appointed officers is necessary to the exigencies of administrating local government. 12 McQuillan, Municipal Corporations, § 12.233 at 380 (3d ed. 2000). This design is evinced in the plain language of SDCL 9-14-13. It provides that the mayor may remove an officer when, in the mayor's sole opinion, removal is in the best interest of the municipality. See Finck, 443 N.W.2d at 634. The interpretation Patterson advances clashes with the principles of municipal law upheld in Ruple v. Weinaug:
[The] power given by the constitution or statute to remove an officer from office without notice or hearing may be exercised notwithstanding that by ordinance, by law, or order of appointment, an attempt has been made to fix a definite term of office for the officer, or provide for notice and hearing in removal proceedings.
328 N.W.2d 857, 859 (S.D.1983) (emphases added). City policies, like city ordinances, must stay -within "reasonably strict" adherence to their statutory ambit. City of Marion v. Schoenwald, 2001 SD 95 ¶ 6, 631 N.W.2d 213, 216.
[¶ 10.] Interpreting SDCL 9-14-13 as Patterson advocates would entitle a common council effectively to annul the Legislature's express grant of removal power and allow an outgoing regime to install officers for an incoming regime. A city council could, at the end of a mayor's term, grant extended terms of office to existing officers, thus pre-selecting officers to serve under the incoming mayor. As the circuit court recognized, in an aldermanic form of government, such an ordinance could be passed by a majority vote of the aldermen. SDCL 9-8-10. Even a mayoral veto could be overridden by a two-thirds vote of the council. SDCL 9-8-3; SDCL 9-19-11. On Patterson's theory, what would preclude a city council from granting appointed officials consecutive, extended, or even life terms? This interpretation runs counter to the general management structure of municipalities.
[¶ 11.] With few exceptions, a city council cannot bind future councils: municipalities are prohibited, for example, from incurring indebtedness in excess of that appropriated for a fiscal year. See SDCL 9-21-8 (identifying limited exceptions); SDCL 9-21-15; see also 15 McQuillan, supra § 41.10 at 375. Under SDCL 9-14-13, Patterson's appointed position was terminable when the mayor decided it was in the city's best interests. A contrary reading of this statute leads to the inconsonant result that a city can override the powers conferred upon it by the Legislature.
[¶ 12.] Affirmed.
[¶ 13.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and MILLER, Retired Chief Justice, concur.
[¶ 14.] SABERS and AMUNDSON, Justices, dissent.
. In interpreting SDCL 9-14-13, we wrote in Finck that this statute confers on the mayor "full and absolute power to remove appointed officers whenever, in his opinion, the interests of the city require it[.]" Finck, 443 N.W.2d at 634.
. It is noteworthy that SDCL 9-14-13 is not the only method for removing local appointed officials. Another method for removal is provided in SDCL 3-17-6 and 3-17-7. Furthermore, a municipal officer may be removed by the court for "palpable omission of duty . oppression, misconduct, or malfeasance in the discharge of the duties of his office." SDCL 9-14-37.