Case Name: UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION, GARY WORKS, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Otha Williams, Appellee)
Court: Illinois Appellate Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 1987-06-16
Citations: 161 Ill. App. 3d 437
Docket Number: No. 3—86—0276WC
Parties: UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION, GARY WORKS, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Otha Williams, Appellee).
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Appellate Court Reports, Third Series
Volume: 161
Pages: 437–447

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION, GARY WORKS, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Otha Williams, Appellee).
Third District (Industrial Commission Division)
No. 3—86—0276WC
Opinion filed June 16, 1987.
Rehearing denied August 5, 1987.
BARRY, P.J., dissenting.
Storrs W. Downey, of Rooks, Pitts & Poust, of Chicago, for appellant.
Kenneth R. Given and James E. Murray, both of Krol, Bongiorno & Given, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellee.

Opinion:
JUSTICE McCULLOUGH
delivered the opinion of the court:
The parties, the petitioner Otha Williams and his former employer, the respondent U.S. Steel Corporation, stipulated that the petitioner incurred 100% loss of use of his right hand in an industrial accident on September 11, 1978. On that date, the petitioner's hand was traumatically amputated as he was working for the respondent at its Gary, Indiana, plant. The arbitrator awarded temporary total and permanent partial benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act (Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, par. 138.1 et seq.). That award was affirmed by the Industrial Commission (Commission) and confirmed by the circuit court.
The respondent brought the instant appeal. On appeal, it challenges, as it has throughout the proceedings, whether the instant accident was covered under the Act.
The record facts are without controversy. At all relevant times, the petitioner has been a Joliet, Illinois, resident. On February 10, 1947, the petitioner applied for work at the respondent's plant at Joliet. He filled out an application, had a physical examination, and was hired to begin work on the following day. He completed an initial probationary period before he became a union member, and he worked at the Joliet plant as a laborer until July of 1954. Then he was transferred to the respondent's Gary, Indiana, plant pursuant to cuts in his Joliet department's operations and his election of his resulting option to transfer.
In December of 1954, when appropriate jobs reopened at the Joliet plant, the petitioner exercised his option and was returned to work there. He retained his prior Joliet employee number and his seniority at Joliet.
In February of 1958, the respondent's Joliet coke plant, the petitioner's jobsite, ceased operation. Other sections of the Joliet plant remained open, but their identity is not of record. With his notice of the coke plant's closing, the petitioner was presented options, including to retire if he qualified, to accept severance pay, or to apply for a plant transfer to another of respondent's plants.
The respondent's general supervisor of personnel at the Gary plant, Keith Kolb, testified to the respondent's standard procedure in and around February of 1958. According to Mr. Kolb, upon the petitioner's election to seek a transfer to the Gary plant, the petitioner would have completed an application for transfer; the Joliet plant would have forwarded the application to Gary; and if it had an opening for which the petitioner passed screening, the Gary plant would recontact Joliet to notify the petitioner to report for an interview and physical examination. Petitioner had no guarantee that he would be hired. Gary would have the option to reject the petitioner based upon an interview and/or a physical examination.
The petitioner testified that in March of 1958, after his last day of work at Joliet and two weeks of earned vacation, he took company papers to the Gary plant which he believed showed his personnel record. That record had been provided to him by the Joliet plant. He was hired at the Gary plant after completing two interviews, a physical examination, and a form similar to that he had completed upon his 1954 move to the Gary plant. He received an employee number different from his number at Joliet, lost department and unit seniority, joined the Gary union local without a probation period, and entered a laborer position of a lower classification than his most recent job at Joliet. He worked at the Gary plant from March of 1958 until the instant accident.
Employees covered under the Act include "persons whose employment is outside of the State of Illinois where the contract of hire is made within the State of Illinois." (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, par. 138.1(b)(2).) The principal relevant cases interpreting that definition are Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Industrial Com. (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 425, 404 N.E.2d 253, and United Airlines, Inc. v. Industrial Com. (1983), 96 Ill. 2d 126, 449 N.E.2d 119.
In Youngstown, the court focused on the fact that the employer's Chicago plant was permanently closed. After three months of unemployment, petitioner was informed by the employer that he had the opportunity to report for a job interview in Indiana. Petitioner had no guarantee that he would be hired for the Indiana job. The court found that he had no rights beyond those granted in the union contract. Petitioner was hired in Indiana and was subsequently injured 12 years later. The court found that Illinois had no jurisdiction in that case. Virtually identical facts exist in the present case, and thus the holding in Youngstown should control our decision here.
In United Airlines, the court found that Illinois had jurisdiction although the injury occurred while petitioner was working in California. The facts in United Airlines, however, are strikingly dissimilar from the facts presented here. There, the petitioner asked his Illinois employer for a voluntary transfer to San Francisco. Upon transferring to California, petitioner did not undergo the extensive process for hiring which was conducted when he was originally hired in Illinois, but rather was required only to get a new photograph and a new union local membership card. Petitioner's employee identification number remained the same, as did his seniority status. Moreover, if the petitioner in United Airlines failed to successfully complete a 90-day probation period in California, he was entitled to resume his former duties in Illinois.
None of these facts are present here. Petitioner's move to the Indiana job was not the result of a voluntary request. It is difficult to infer that an employee would voluntarily request a job which was of a lower classification, which caused him to lose all seniority rights, and which required him to commute to another State every day. In addition, petitioner underwent application and interview processing and was not merely required to pose for a new photograph. Although the interview process may not have been extensive due to the fact that petitioner had previously worked at the Indiana plant, and thus his work skills and other information were already known, his reemployment with respondent in Indiana was neither guaranteed nor a foregone conclusion. Moreover, petitioner did not retain the same identification number or seniority status. Most significantly, petitioner had no right or opportunity to resume his former duties in Illinois under any circumstances.
The United Airlines court distinguished the facts in Youngstown, pointing out that in Youngstown the employee was permanently deprived of his position in Illinois, underwent comprehensive hiring procedures in Indiana, and worked in Indiana for 12 years before suffering the injury for which he sought Illinois benefits. The facts which our supreme court relied upon to distinguish Youngstown from United Airlines are also present here.
It is not significant that petitioner retained his pension and vacation benefits after he began working in Indiana in 1958. These benefits were retained as a result of a union contract. A union's contract represents an agreement as to terms for hiring, work and pay. It does not constitute an employment contract for each individual employee hired thereunder. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Industrial Com. (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 425, 404 N.E.2d 253.
With respect to petitioner's carrying personnel papers to Indiana, our supreme court has held that merely traveling to a jobsite in Indiana with, e.g., a letter of introduction for employment from Illinois, does not prove that an Illinois contract of employment exists. The contract of employment is not entered into until the petitioner is "put to work by the employer's supervisor in Indiana." Morris v. Industrial Com. (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 563, 565, 304 N.E.2d 606.
The Commission has no jurisdiction where the injury is sustained outside of Illinois, unless the evidence establishes that an employment contract was entered into in Illinois. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, par. 138.1(b)(2); Morris v. Industrial Com. (1973), 55 Ill. 2d 563, 304 N.E.2d 606, citing Severin v. Industrial Com. (1936), 363 Ill. 217, 2 N.E.2d 65.) The place where the last act necessary to give validity to the contract occurs is the place where the contract was made. (Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Industrial Com. (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 425, 404 N.E.2d 253.) The last act necessary to give validity to the contract occurred in Indiana, where petitioner accepted the job and began working.
It is not necessary, however, to rely solely on a technical determination of the last act necessary to give validity to the contract. Where the injury occurred in Indiana and the totality of the arrangements for reemployment occurred in Indiana, Illinois has no jurisdiction. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Industrial Com. (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 425, 404 N.E.2d 253.
In this case, in 1958, respondent's Illinois plant experienced a permanent shutdown. From an objective viewpoint, as a result of the permanent shutdown petitioner was permanently barred from holding any expectation of eventually returning to the Illinois job. In fact, he continued working in Indiana for 20 years before he was injured.
There was a cessation of employment in Illinois and then a reemployment in Indiana with certain carry-over benefits derived from a union contract. (See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Industrial Com. (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 425, 404 N.E.2d 253.) As the court did in Youngstown, a finding of no Illinois jurisdiction is particularly appropriate in a case such as this, where at the time of his injury petitioner had not worked in Illinois for 20 years.
Furthermore, in Youngstown the court articulated numerous other factors which a court may rely upon to find that the totality of the arrangements for reemployment took place outside Illinois. All of those factors are present here.
Petitioner executed the necessary documents for employment, including a job application, in Indiana. The arbitrator's finding that petitioner did not fill out any forms in Indiana is contrary to the testimony he heard. In addition, petitioner rendered employment services in Indiana for 20 years prior to his injury; petitioner accepted the offer of employment in Indiana; and petitioner received benefits, such as worker's compensation benefits, in Indiana. Furthermore, petitioner was required to participate in an interview procedure in Indiana; petitioner underwent a preemployment physical examination in Indiana; and petitioner was given a new employee identification in Indiana. Moreover, petitioner joined a different union local in Indiana and completed some Indiana tax documents; petitioner was placed in a position which was not comparable to that he enjoyed in Illinois; and petitioner lost all seniority rights when he began working in Indiana. Respondent also filed notice of the accident in Indiana.
The fact that petitioner found an available job for which he was qualified sooner than the petitioner in Youngstown was merely a result of good fortune. It does not indicate an uninterrupted employment relationship, or establish that petitioner was guaranteed a job in Indiana. Where an Illinois employer recommends or gives an employee notice of a possible job in another State, the contract of employment is not entered into in Illinois where there is not certainty of any work in the other State. Severin v. Industrial Com. (1936), 363 Ill. 217, 2 N.E.2d 65.
The decision of the Industrial Commission is against the manifest weight of the evidence, and the Commission lacked jurisdiction to enter an award under the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act.
Judgment reversed.
McNAMARA and WOODWARD, JJ., concur.