Case Name: Irene C. BRAILSFORD, Appellant, v. George O. CAMPBELL, sometimes as known Gerry Ora Campbell, Appellee
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1956-03-07
Citations: 89 So. 2d 241
Docket Number: 
Parties: Irene C. BRAILSFORD, Appellant, v. George O. CAMPBELL, sometimes as known Gerry Ora Campbell, Appellee.
Judges: TERRELL, Acting Chief Justice, and HOBSON and BUFORD, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 89
Pages: 241–246

Head Matter:
Irene C. BRAILSFORD, Appellant, v. George O. CAMPBELL, sometimes as known Gerry Ora Campbell, Appellee.
Supreme Court of Florida. En Banc.
March 7, 1956.
Rehearing Denied May 8, 1956.
Burns, Middleton, Rogers & Farrell, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Earnest, Lewis, Smith & Jones, West .Palm Beach, and Mabry, Reaves, Carlton, Fields & Ward, Tampa, for appellee.

Opinion:
ROBERTS, Justice.
This is an appeal by plaintiff from an adverse verdict and judgment entered in a wrongful death action instituted by her to recover damages, under Section 768.03, Fla. Stat. 1953, F.S.A., for the death of her minor son, aged 18. The boy was killed when the car in which he was riding as a guest passenger, and being driven by the defendant, aged 22, ran off the road and crashed into a tree. The plaintiff brought her complaint in two counts: one for simple negligence and one for gross negligence. The trial judge, upon the motion of defendant, dismissed the count for simple negligence on the ground that the so-called Guest Statute, Section 320.59, Fla.Stat.1953, F.S.A., was applicable to her suit, thus barring a claim based on simple negligence. The cause was tried on the charge of gross negligence and the defense of contributory negligence and, as noted, the jury found in favor of the defendant. Motion for new trial was denied, judgment was entered for defendant, and this appeal by plaintiff followed.
The principal point for determination here is whether the Guest Statute is applicable to an action by a parent under Section 768.03 for the wrongful death of his or her minor child. This point has not heretofore been decided by this court.
Historically, our Wrongful Death Acts, Sections 768.01-768.03, Fla.Stat.1953, F.S.A., antedate by many years our Guest Statute. Our first Wrongful Death Act was enacted by Chapter 3439, Acts of 1883, and now appears as Sections 768.01 and 768.02 of our statutes. It created in the named beneficiaries, in the order named, a right of action for the wrongful death of their decedent and specifically provided as a condition of suit that the wrongful act or negligence resulting in death must be such "as would, if the death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured thereby to maintain an action and to recover damages in respect thereof Under this first Wrongful Death Act, a parent had no right of action for the wrongful death of a child unless he or she was dependent upon such child for support; and, if not dependent, the parents could recover only indirectly as the heirs or devisees of the deceased minor child in a suit for wrongful death brought by the administrator of the child's estate. Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Moseley, 60 Fla. 186, 53 So. 718. The second Wrongful Death Act was enacted in 1899, by Chapter 4722, and gave the parent a right to sue directly for the loss of the child's services during his minority and for damages for the pain and suffering of the parents caused by the child's death. This Act, as amended in 1913, now appears as Section 768.03, Fla.Stat.1953, F.S.A., and is the Act under which the instant suit was brought. It did not contain the proviso of the earlier Act, quoted above (hereinafter referred to as "the proviso"), requiring that the wrongful act must be such as would have given the injured person, had he lived, a right to recover damages from the tortfeasor.
Our Guest Statute, Section 320.59, was not enacted until 1937, by Chapter 18033, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1937. This statute says that "No person transported by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle as his • guest or passenger, without payment for such transportation, shall have a cause of action for damages against such owner or operator for injury, death or loss, in case of accident, unless such accident shall have been caused by the gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct of the owner or operator of such motor vehicle provided that nothing in this section shall apply to school children or other students being-transported to or from schools or places of learning in this state."
Plaintiff concedes that the Guest Statute is applicable to a wrongful death action brought under Sections 768.01-768.02 for the death of a guest passenger — and this would presumably be true in a suit by a dependent parent for the death of his minor child while a guest passenger, brought under such sections. It is contended, however, that this is true only because of the proviso of Section 768.01, quoted above. It is further contended that the Guest Statute applies only to actions by the injured guest or to actions after death that are derivative from that held by the injured guest during his life; and that since Section 768.03 does not contain the proviso appearing in Section 768.01 and since wrongful death actions are not derivative actions, the Guest Statute cannot be applied to an action brought under Section 768.03. This contention cannot be sustained.
It is true that wrongful death actions are not "derivative" in the sense used by plaintiff. Such actions are "an entirely new right, for the recovery of damages suffered by [the named beneficiaries], not the decedent, as a consequence of the wrongful invasion of their legal right by the tort-feasor." Ake v. Birnbaum, 156 Fla. 735, 25 So.2d 213, 221. But we do not construe the Guest Statute as applying only to actions by the injured guest or to "derivative" actions such as those brought by the personal representative of a deceased person under Section 45.11, Fla.Stat.1953, F.S.A., the so-called Survival Statute. The Guest Statute in express terms applies to "a cause of action for damages for injury, death or loss (Emphasis added.) A suit by the personal representative under Section 45.11, supra, is not a cause of action for death — it is a suit to recover on behalf of the decedent's estate the damages sustained by the deceased during his lifetime because of his injuries. Ake v. Birnbaum, supra, 25 So.2d 213; Ellis v. Brown, Fla.1955, 77 So.2d 845. Guest statutes were designed to relieve owners and operators of automobiles of the consequences of ordinary negligence to guest passengers. Nelson v. McMillan, 151 Fla. 847, 10 So.2d 565. And while the Legislature ineptly referred to the "person transported" in the opening phrase of the Statute, it expressly referred to "a cause of action for death" in the body of the Statute; and when construed as a whole, in the light of the legislative intent, we have no doubt that it was intended to apply to actions for wrongful death as well as to actions by the injured guest, or his personal representative, for the injuries suffered by the guest himself. It was also clearly intended to apply to actions for "injury, death or loss" involving a minor child who is a guest passenger, since it specifically excepted from its provisions "school children being transported to or from schools " and thus, by implication, includes within its terms all other minor children.
Our conclusion in this respect is supported by the fact that the interpretation here contended for by plaintiff would lead to the unjust result that a dependent parent, suing under Section 768.01 for the death of his minor child, would be required to prove gross negligence against the defendant, whereas this same dependent parent, suing under Section 768.03, would be required to prove only simple negligence. Other anamolous situations could be hypothesized under plaintiff's interpretation of the Statute. In the absence of a clear legislative mandate, we will not construe a statute to lead to such a manifestly unjust result.
It might also be noted that, even though Section 768.03 did not contain the proviso relating to the quality of the conduct of the tortfeasor specifically expressed in Section 768.01, quoted above, the courts of other jurisdictions have generally held that actions for wrongful death are subject to this limitation, even though not expressly imposed by the statute. 16 Am Jur., Death, Section 82, p. 61, and the many cases cited in the footnote. This court has impliedly so held, if not expressly. In Rehe v. Airport U-Drive, Inc., Fla.1953, 63 So.2d 66, involving an action by the father, as parent, under Section 768.03 and another action by him, as administrator of his minor child's estate, under Section 768.01, it was held, in effect, that both suits depended upon the existence of a primary right of recovery in the decedent, so that a verdict and judgment for the defendant in the suit brought by the father, as parent, estopped the father from proceeding against the defendant in his suit, as administrator.
The other questions presented here by plaintiff have been considered, and no reversible error has been found.
For the reasons stated, the judgment appealed from should be and it is hereby
Affirmed.
TERRELL, Acting Chief Justice, and HOBSON and BUFORD, JJ., concur.
THOMAS, J., dissents and adhers to his original opinion. (See dissenting opinion post.)
THORNAL, J., dissents and concurs in original opinion of THOMAS, J. (See dissenting opinion post.)