Case Name: The State v. Barton, Appellant
Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1879-10
Citations: 71 Mo. 288
Docket Number: 
Parties: The State v. Barton, Appellant.
Judges: Henry and Hough, JJ., dissent.
Reporter: Missouri Reports
Volume: 71
Pages: 288–303

Head Matter:
The State v. Barton, Appellant.
1. Competency of Juror who has formed an Opinion. One of the persons summoned as jurors, on his examination on the roir dire, said: “I have heard the case talked about a good deal. I have read the publications in the St. Charles papers with reference to the case, and from what I have heard about the matter, I have formed and still retain an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant. I have not talked with any of the witnesses or any one who pretended to know the facts in the case. I formed my opinion from what I read in the newspapers and conversations I’ve had with others about the case. I can hear the evidence and render a fair and impartial verdict in the case regardless of such opinion. I have at this time no bias or prejudice against the prisoner, from what I have read or heard, which would prevent my giving Mm a fair and impartial trial after having heard the evidence.” He further said that “ It would take evidence to remove the opinion thus formed.” Held, that he had not such a fixed opinion as disqualified him to serve as a juror on the trial of the case. (Following State v. Core, 70 Mo. 491, and o.ther cases.) Henry and Hough, JJ., dissenting. ■
2. Criminal Law: punishment op youth under sixteen. Section 15, article 9 of the statute concerning crimes and punishments, pro* vides: “ Whenever any person under the age of sixteen years shall be convicted of any felony, he shall be sentenced to imprisonment in a county jail, not exceeding one year, instead of imprisonment in the penitentiary, as prescribed by the preceding provisions of this law.” Held, that this section makes imprisonment in the county jail a substitute for imprisonment in the penitentiary only, not for the death penalty.
Appeal from St. Louis Court of Appeals.
Affirmed.
T. Q. Johns and C. W. Wilson for appellant.
J. L. Smith, Attorney-General, for the State
in argument cited as to the competency of the jurors, State v. Baldwin, 12 Mo. 223; State v. Davis, 29 Mo. 391; State v. Bose, 32 Mo. 346 ; State v. Lawrence, 38 Iowa 51; State v. Bryan, 40 Iowa 379; State v. Williams, 3 Stew. (Ala.) 454, 465; Bice v. State, 7 Ind. 332; State v. Sater, 8 Iowa 420; Sanchez v. People, 4 Park. Grim. R. 535, 553; People v. Brown, 48 Cal. 253 ; O'Connor v. State, 9 Ela. 215.

Opinion:
Napton, J.
The defendant in this case was convicted of murder in the first degree. The evidence and instructions are not preserved in the record, and the only points presented for our consideration are two :
First. The admission by the court on the panel of jurors of two persons, who, on their voir dire, admitted that they had formed an opinion from rumor, but stated that they could give a fair and impartial verdict in the case, regardless of such opinion; that they had no prejudice or bias against the prisoner, and would be governed by the testimony. One of the jurors further said that it would take evidence to remove the opinion thus formed. The court overruled the objections, and the defendant's counsel excepted. This point has been considered and decided at the present term in the case of the State v. Core, 70 Mo. 491, and the previous cases referred to and reviewed. I may add that, in the State v. Davis, 29 Mo. 392, the precise words used by one of the jurors in this case, " that it would require evidence to remove the opinions they had entertained," were also used by the jurors in that case, who were pronounced by this court competent. We regard these decisions as settling the law in this State.
The second ground upon which we are asked to reverse the judgment is the refusal of the court, after conviction, sentence the defendant to imprisonment *n the county jail, it having been found by the court that he was, at the time of committing the murder, under sixteen years old. The statute on which this, motion is founded is as follows: " Whenever any person under the age of sixteen years shall be convicted of any felony, he shall be sentenced to imprisonment in a county jail, not exceeding one year, instead of imprisonment in the penitentiary, as prescribed by the preceding provisions of this law." This section seems capable of but one construction, and that is to require imprisonment in a county jail as a substitute for imprisonment in the penitentiary, where sucb offenses as were punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary have been committed by a youth under sixteen. A felony punishable by death is not within tbe letter or meaning of the statute. The judgment must be affirmed. A majority of the court concur.
Henry and Hough, JJ., dissent.