Case Name: JONES v. TRONEX CHEMICAL CORPORATION
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1983-09-27
Citations: 129 Mich. App. 188
Docket Number: Docket No. 62580
Parties: JONES v TRONEX CHEMICAL CORPORATION
Judges: Before: Cynar, P.J., and Hood and R. J. Jason, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 129
Pages: 188–197

Head Matter:
JONES v TRONEX CHEMICAL CORPORATION
Docket No. 62580.
Submitted June 28, 1983, at Detroit.
Decided September 27, 1983.
Pledge Jones was injured when a City of Detroit bus drove through a puddle of slush, water, and ice, splashing some of the mixture in Jones’s eye. Lye was also mixed with the slush, water, and ice as the result of a chemical spill which had occurred when a tanker trailer was being used at Tronex Chemical Corporation to mix a load of sodium hydroxide and other chemicals into lye. The link-up between the tanker trailer and the Tronex plant broke down, spilling lye into the Tronex parking lot. The trailer was removed and the lye was flushed from the parking lot by spraying it with water. The lye solution flowed from the Tronex parking lot, down various alleys and streets, and puddled in front of the bus stop where Jones was standing when injured. Jones and his wife, Kathleen Jones, filed suit against Tronex Chemical Corporation; the City of Detroit, Department of Transportation, a self-insurer; and Carriers Insurance Company, the insurer of the tanker trailer, in Wayne Circuit Court, seeking recovery of no-fault insurance benefits. Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment against Detroit, and Carriers moved for summary judgment in its favor against plaintiffs. The court, Charles S. Farmer, J., granted summary judgment in favor of both plaintiffs and Carriers and against Detroit. Detroit appeals. Held:
1. Detroit’s contention that the eye injury did not arise out of its use of the bus as a motor vehicle is rejected. The eye injury arose out of Detroit’s use of a bus as a motor vehicle, and it is eminently foreseeable that a bus, upon encountering a pool of water, may propel that water and whatever may be mixed with it in the direction of nearby pedestrians. The likelihood that the puddle of water contains a caustic chemical is simply not relevant. It is the manner in which the injury occurs that must be foreseeably identifiable with the normal use of the vehicle, not the quality of the injury. A causal nexus between the use of the bus and the injury existed. Pledge Jones’s injury directly resulted from the force of the bus as it was being operated in a normal fashion as a motor vehicle. Summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs and against Detroit is affirmed.
References for Points in Headnotes
7 Am Jur 2d, Automobile Insurance §§ 194, 351.
7 Am Jur 2d, Automobile Insurance § 198.
7 Am Jur 2d, Automobile Insurance §§ 114, 353.
What constitutes "trailer” within coverage or exclusion provision of automobile liability policy. 65 ALR3d 804.
2. Summary judgment was properly granted to defendant Carriers Insurance Company. In order to have a valid claim against Carriers, plaintiff would have to show not only that Pledge Jones was injured somehow during the loading or unloading process, but also that the tanker was at the time a parked motor vehicle operated, maintained or used as a motor vehicle. The tanker was certainly a motor vehicle but Pledge Jones was not injured during the loading or unloading process. The insured vehicle had completed its operation and had left the scene prior to Pledge Jones’s injury.
Affirmed.
1. Insurance — No-Fault Insurance — Personal Injury Protection.
The phrase "arising out of’ the use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle, as the phrase is used in the personal injury protection provision of the no-fault automobile insurance statute, does not necessitate a finding that an injury was directly and proximately caused by the use of a vehicle; conversely, it cannot be extended to something distinctly remote (MCL 500.3105; MSA 24.13105).
2. Insurance — Automobiles — Personal Injury — No-Fault Insurance.
There must be a causal connection between the injury sustained and the ownership, maintenance or use of the automobile to sustain a claim under the terms of an automobile insurance policy which provides coverage for injuries arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of an automobile, the causal connection must be more than incidental, fortuitous or "but for”, and the injury must be foreseeably identifiable with the normal use, maintenance or ownership of the vehicle.
3. Insurance — Automobiles — Personal Injury — Use of Motor Vehicle.
A person injured when a bus drove through a pool of water, slush, ice and lye, splashing some of the caustic solution into his eye, was entitled to recover no-fault insurance benefits from the self-insured owner of the bus where the injury arose out of the use of the bus as a motor vehicle; the fact that the bus, upon encountering a pool of water, could propel the water and whatever might be mixed with it in the direction of pedestrians was eminently foreseeable and there was a causal nexus between the use of the bus and the injury.
4. Insurance — No-Fault Insurance — Semi-Trailers.
A truck semi-trailer, whether attached to a cab or freestanding, is a motor vehicle within the meaning of the provisions of the automobile no-fault insurance act, unless it can be shown that the semi-trailer is no longer designed for use on a public highway (MCL 500.3101[2][c]; MSA 24.13101[2][c]).
Coticchio, Zotter & Sullivan, P.C. (by Gary W. Parker), for plaintiff.
Maureen Smith, Assistant Corporation Counsel, City of Detroit, for City of Detroit, Department of Transportation, appellant.
Romain, Donofrio & Kuck, P.C. (by Pat M. Donofrio), for Carriers Insurance Company, appellee.
Before: Cynar, P.J., and Hood and R. J. Jason, JJ.
Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
Defendant City of Detroit (Detroit) appeals from two circuit court orders of summary judgment entered against it. The orders relieved codefendant Carriers Insurance Company (Carriers) of liability to plaintiffs and entered judgment in plaintiffs' favor against Detroit.
On December 4, 1979, a tanker trailer connected to a truck owned by Michigan Transportation Company, Carriers' insured, was in the parking lot of Tronex Chemical Company in Detroit. Tronex is in the business of compounding liquid detergents. The truck which Carriers insured had brought 4,000 gallons of sodium hydroxide. A hose was connected between the truck and the Tronex plant. Two hundred and twenty gallons of sodium hydroxide were pumped out, 220 gallons of sodium gluconate and liquid detergents were pumped in, and the whole concoction was mixed by circulation through the hoses between the chemical plant and the tanker. Lye was the intended product of this process.
Unfortunately, the link-up broke down and a good deal of the lye spilled out onto the Tronex parking lot. The system was shut down and the tanker was driven away. Tronex employees began to flush the lye from the parking lot into an alley by spraying the lot with water. The lye flowed through the alley to Linwood Street, along Linwood to Fenkell Avenue, then along Fenkell into a pool by a bus stop. Pledge Jones was standing at the bus stop when a City of Detroit bus pulled up. It splashed slush, water, ice and lye onto him, and into his eye, causing significant damage. Plaintiffs, Pledge Jones and his wife, Kathleen Jones, sued and brought a motion for summary judgment against Detroit. Carriers also sought summary judgment.
On the original presentation of the motions, the court determined that summary judgment should be granted against both defendants in plaintiffs' favor. However, the trial court granted a motion for rehearing before any order had been entered. It then issued a new opinion, in which summary judgment was approved in favor of both plaintiffs and defendant Carriers and against Detroit.
Liability for no-fault personal protection benefits is governed by MCL 500.3105; MSA 24.13105:
"Sec. 3105. (1) Under personal protection insurance an insurer is liable to pay benefits for accidental bodily injury arising out of the ownership, operation, mainte nance or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle, subject to the provisions of this chapter."
Detroit contends that the eye injury did not arise out of its use of the bus as a motor vehicle. We believe that it clearly did.
"The term 'arising out of does not necessitate a finding that the injury was directly and proximately caused by the use of the vehicle. On the other hand, it cannot be extended to something distinctly remote. Each case depends on its own facts. Williams v Citizens Mutual Ins Co of America, 94 Mich App 762, 764-765; 290 NW2d 76 (1980)." Smith v Community Service Ins Co, 114 Mich App 431, 433; 319 NW2d 358 (1982).
A frequently quoted statement of the standard for determining whether an injury arose out of the use of a motor vehicle is found in DAIIE v Higginbotham, 95 Mich App 213, 222; 290 NW2d 414 (1980), lv den 409 Mich 919 (1980):
"Cases construing the phrase 'arising out of the use of a motor vehicle' uniformly require that the injured person establish a causal connection between the use of the motor vehicle and the injury. See Anno: Automobile liability insurance: what are accidents or injuries 'arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use' of insured vehicle, 89 ALR2d 150. Such causal connection must be more than incidental, fortuitous or but for. The injury must be foreseeably identifiable with the normal use of the vehicle. Kangas v Aetna Casualty & Surety Co, 64 Mich App 1, 17; 235 NW2d 42 (1975)."
Detroit's argument focuses on the foreseeability of an eye injury arising out of the use of the bus as a motor vehicle.
We find it eminently foreseeable that a bus, upon encountering a pool of water, may propel that water and whatever may be mixed with it in the direction of nearby pedestrians. The likelihood that the puddle of water would contain a caustic chemical is simply not relevant to this inquiry. It is the manner in which injury occurs that must be "foreseeably identifiable with the normal use of the vehicle", not the quality of the injury.
In this regard, Gajewski v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 112 Mich App 59; 314 NW2d 799 (1981), rev'd 414 Mich 968 (1982), is analytically helpful. Gajewski was injured when a dynamite bomb connected to the ignition of his car exploded as he turned the key. The Court of Appeals ruled that the injury was not covered by the no-fault act, holding that the fact that Gajewski was injured in his car was a "mere fortuity". It was not Gajewski's act of trying to start the car that injured him, but the connection of the explosive device. The Court held that injury by explosive device is not "foreseeably identifiable with the normal use, maintenance, and ownership of the vehicle". Gajewski, supra, p 62.
The Supreme Court reversed Gajewski in an order adopting the dissent of Judge Cynar. That opinion reads in full as follows: