Case Name: Clarence Johnson GAINS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
Court: Texas Courts of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1998-04-09
Citations: 966 S.W.2d 838
Docket Number: No. 14-96-00408-CR
Parties: Clarence Johnson GAINS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
Judges: Before AMIDEI, ANDERSON and SEARS, JJ.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 966
Pages: 838–843

Head Matter:
Clarence Johnson GAINS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
No. 14-96-00408-CR.
Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (14th Dist.).
April 9, 1998.
Kirk J. Oncken, Houston, for appellant.
Carol M. Cameron, Houston, for appellee.
Before AMIDEI, ANDERSON and SEARS, JJ.

Opinion:
OPINION
AMIDEI, Justice.
Clarence Johnson Gains appeals his conviction by a jury for aggravated robbery. The jury assessed his punishment at 75 years imprisonment and a $10,000.00 fine. In two points of error, appellant contends (1) the trial court abused its discretion in allowing jurors to question appellant, and (2) the trial court erred in overruling appellant's objections to the State's reference to the range of punishment for aggravated robbery as opposed to robbery at the guilt-innocence stage of the trial. We reverse and remand for new trial.
On September 13, 1995, Christopher Lane was walking home from school when appellant pointed a gun at him and demanded his jewelry. Lane knew appellant only as "Bayou" and thought appellant was joking. Appellant told Lane he was not joking and would shoot Lane. Lane turned around to walk away and appellant came up behind him, put the gun to Lane's head, then tore two neck chains and one medallion from Lane's neck. Lane then walked across the street to call the police, turned and looked toward appellant, and appellant then ran away. Appellant testified that he used a toy gun to rob Lane.
In point of error one, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in allowing jurors to question appellant at the guilt-innocence stage. At the conclusion of appellant's testimony, the trial judge asked the jury:
THE COURT: Let me — before we let this witness go, is there any of the testimony that you could not understand because you'll have a real problem after you are in the jury room and you want us to repeat or have the court reporter read back? Is there anything that you didn't understand him to say?
JUROR: Yes, your Honor, where he said that he had the pis — he—his—I didn't understand the difference because it's hard to understand where he had the gun in his hand with his friends versus they were passing it around. He said — I didn't understand what was said about the gun with his friends.
THE COURT: Was this on the examination by his attorney or by the State? JUROR: I believe it was the defense attorney.
THE COURT: All right. Do you want to clear that up?
MR. ONCKEN [appellant's trial counsel]: Well, I don't know that that's proper for me to do; but we can certainly find it on the record, Judge, that—
THE COURT: Well, that's what I'm fay-ing to resolve because this is an almost impossible job for a court reporter to take down. It doesn't show up when it's a written record that she wasn't able to understand. But I can tell from what I've listened to it's hard to understand him. And it's obvious watching the faces of some of the jurors they're having a hard time understanding him and I can tell from the court reporter's expression and I just want to be sure before we break his testi mony that we don't have everything clear as far as the jury is concerned.
At the conclusion of appellant's further redirect and cross-examination, the trial judge then stated:
THE COURT: The whole purpose is that we understand that we're seeking justice. We can't do that if we don't know what's been said. And what did you want to ask?
[UNKNOWN] JUROR: I want to know is there a park across from the school? He keeps saying "park."
THE DEFENDANT [appellant]: It was in the park. That's across the street from the school.
[UNKNOWN] JUROR: A park that you play in or—
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. A park, like, a dome. Like, a dome over it with a basketball goal up, got a big old field over here with swings.
THE COURT: Yes, ma'am?
[UNKNOWN] JUROR: The first time he testified I had the impression that he took the toy gun from a child. The second time I had the impression he took it from one of his buddies.
Following other brief exchanges between a juror and the court, there was an off-record bench conference between the attorneys and the trial judge. Thereafter, the following comments and questions occurred in the presence of the jury:
THE COURT: I've been doing this for a hundred years, and by the same token they're going to ask about these very same questions. And if it's impossible from the notes that the court reporter has to read back to them, they just don't have the benefit of it. I'm going to allow it whether it's proper or right or not. They're entitled to have a clear picture of what's being said (emphasis added).
MR. ONCKEN: Is it because the Court thinks that what actually was said is not understandable?
THE COURT: I haven't — I haven't been able to understand it.. The court reporter hasn't been able to understand it. It's obvious that some of—
[UNKNOWN] JUROR: The lingo. Judge, I can interpret if you like.
THE COURT: But you can see that some of us might have a problem.
[UNKNOWN] JUROR: Yeah.
MR. ONCKEN: I'm just going to object to — to the additional questions and the wondering about what should properly be discussed dining deliberation. And we can find in the record, Judge, the answer to the question and have it interpreted.
Thereafter, the trial judge asked the court reporter if she took down all appellant's testimony. The court reporter stated she did not understand some parts of it and the trial judge again explained:
THE COURT: Well, that's — that's my whole problem. I think the jury is entitled to understand what the witness has said if he was talking in a foreign language have a right to have that interpreted for their benefit.
Who had another question? Yes.
[UNKNOWN] JUROR: He's using terminology "homeboy, partners, dudes" as if he was a leader of all these folks; and I can't determine whether he's the leader or he is—
THE COURT: Well, that's a — that's just a decision you're going to have to make. Anything else? All right. Let's have a seat.
Are you through, both of you?
When the trial judge first announced he was having trouble understanding appellant and asked appellant's counsel if he wanted to clear it up, appellant's counsel stated: 'Well, I don't know that that's proper for me to do; but we can certainly find it out on the record, Judge, that — ." On appeal, appellant contends the trial judge interrupted appellant's counsel and cut him off before he could completely explain his objection. The trial court then stated to the jury that appellant's testimony was hard to understand and appellant's counsel proceeded with the redirect examination with interruptions by jurors and the trial court as set out above.
Appellant cites Morrison v. State, 845 S.W.2d 882 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) as authority for the proposition that jurors will not be permitted to question witnesses. Id. at 889.
The State argues that the trial court did not abuse its discretion because the appellant's testimony was incoherent, unintelligible, and incomprehensible, citing the dissent in Morñson as appropriate to this case. Id. at 900. The State further argues appellant did not object to the procedure and therefore has waived error.
Appellant started to object to the procedure but was cut off by the trial judge. In Morrison, the appellant objected "to the process" on the grounds that it is "not authorized by law." Id. at 883 n. 1. In that case, appellant's objection was overruled, but appellant obtained a running objection to "the whole process." Id. No complaint was made by the State in Morrison that appellant had failed to object or the objection was not specific under rule 52(a), Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. In this case, the State contends that appellant waived error under rule 52(a), Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, because he failed to timely and specifically object when the trial judge first asked the jury if they understood appellant's testimony. Appellant's counsel stated he did not think the procedure was proper and was then interrupted by the trial judge who continued addressing the jury about the necessity of clearing up appellant's testimony. We hold the objection was sufficient to tell the court he objected to the whole procedure as improper. Furthermore, the court knew or should have known that it was improper for the jury to ask questions of a witness. Where the correct ground of exclusion was obvious to the judge and opposing counsel, no waiver results from a general or imprecise objection. Zillender v. State, 557 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex.Crim.App.1977) (opinion on reh'g). Appellant's objection, which was interrupted by the trial court, was sufficient to apprise the court and opposing counsel that appellant objected to the procedure being utilized by the court. We hold that appellant did not waive his objection and has preserved error for review. As stated in Morrison, "[w]e know of no authority establishing or authorizing jurors to ask questions of witnesses in the criminal jurisprudence of this state and therefore find the same to be error." Id. at 889. Appellant's point of error one is sustained.
The Morrison court further found the practice of permitting jurors to become active participants in the solicitation of evidence by questioning witnesses is not subject to a harm analysis. Id. at 889. Having sustained appellant's first point, we find it unnecessary to rule on appellant's second point of error concerning the prosecutor's reference to punishment during cross-examination of appellant at the guilt-innocence stage and again during the prosecutor's jury argument at the guilt-innocence stage. The judgment of the trial court is reversed and this ease is remanded for a new trial.