Case Name: Dewey Deraid GULLICK, Petitioner-Appellant, v. BOCK, Deputy Warden; State of Arizona Attorney General, Respondents-Appellees
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2011-03-24
Citations: 423 F. App'x 762
Docket Number: No. 10-15409
Parties: Dewey Deraid GULLICK, Petitioner-Appellant, v. BOCK, Deputy Warden; State of Arizona Attorney General, Respondents-Appellees.
Judges: Before: FARRIS, LEAVY, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 423
Pages: 762–763

Head Matter:
Dewey Deraid GULLICK, Petitioner-Appellant, v. BOCK, Deputy Warden; State of Arizona Attorney General, Respondents-Appellees.
No. 10-15409.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted March 8, 2011.
Filed March 24, 2011.
Dewey Deraid Gullick, Tucson, AZ, pro se.
Kent Ernest Cattani, Chief Counsel, Robert Anthony Walsh, Assistant Attorney General, Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix, AZ, for Respondents-Appel-lees.
Before: FARRIS, LEAVY, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Arizona state prisoner Dewey Deraid Gullick appeals pro se from the district court's dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition as untimely. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm.
Gullick contends that the district court erred by denying equitable tolling of AED-PA's one-year statute of limitations. In light of Gulliek's ability to file other petitions, represent himself at a hearing, and the reports on his mental condition during the relevant time period, Gullick has failed to demonstrate that his mental condition caused his untimely filing. See Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034-35 (9th Cir. 2005), modified on other grounds, 447 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir.2006). Further, any inadequate assistance Gullick received from other inmates is not an extraordinary circumstance that warrants equitable tolling. See Chaffer v. Prosper, 592 F.3d 1046, 1049 (9th Cir.2010) (per curiam).
Finally, Gullick contends that, because the state courts incorrectly denied his state petitions as untimely, statutory tolling renders his federal petition timely. When a post-conviction petition is untimely under state law, that is the end of the matter for statutory tolling purposes. See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414, 417, 125 S.Ct. 1807, 161 L.Ed.2d 669 (2005).
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.