Case Name: Wickham and Goshorn v. Lewis Martin & Co.
Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
Jurisdiction: Virginia
Decision Date: 1856-07
Citations: 13 Gratt. 427
Docket Number: 
Parties: *Wickham and Goshorn v. Lewis Martin & Co.
Judges: MONCOREJ, J., concurred in the opinion of Daniel, J.
Reporter: Virginia Reports
Volume: 54
Pages: 177–186

Head Matter:
*Wickham and Goshorn v. Lewis Martin & Co.
July Term, 1856,
Lewisburg.
' i. Deeds of Assignment — To Secure Creditors — Trustee a Purchaser for Value. — An insolvent merchant purchases goods not Intending to pay for them, and after getting possession of them he conveys them and all his other estate in trust for the payment of his debts, the trustee haying no notice of the fraud. The trastee is a purchaser for value without notice.
2. Same -Same — Conflict of Laws — Case at Bar. — In such a case the grantor and trustee live in Virginia, the goods were sold In Baltimore, and were sent by the purchaser to Ohio apparently for the purpose of concealing them; and the seller of the goods there gets possession of them after the trustee had taken possession; and trustee sues the seller in Virginia for the goods. The deed is to be construed according to the law of Virginia.
3. Same — Same—Case at Bar. -The deed after conveying the debtor’s property, describing it by its location, which does notinclude the goods in controversy, and after stating the trusts upon which it is conveyed; in the conclusion of the deeds says. “And it is further expressly understood, that if through accident or forgetfulness or inadvertence the said M G (the grantor) may have omitted to mention any claim or property that the same shall be understood as being conveyed hereby to the said trustees, to all intents and purposes as fully as if specifically mentioned.” The goods in Ohio passed by the deed.
4. Fraud of Purchaser — Quiere.—Qtjíbrb: What fraud in the purchaser of goods will authorize the seller to reclaim them whilst in the possession of the purchaser.
5. Case Submitted to Court — Form of Bill of Exceptions —Quaere. —Quaere : What should he the form of a bill of exceptions to the refusal of the court to grant a new trial, where the whole case has "been submitted to the court.
This was an action of trover in the Circuit court of Ohio county by Wickham and Goshorn against Lewis Martin & Co. The parties agreed, and entered of record, to waive a trial of the issue in the cause by a jury, and to submit the same to the court, who was to determine all matters of law and fact, and to give judgment accordingly.
Upon the trial, beside the documentary evidence, * there was a large mass of parol evidence submitted in the form of depositions on the part both of the plaintiffs and the defendants, but no witnesses were examined before the court. The plaintiffs claimed under a deed bearing date the 19th of November 1851, executed by Marx Graff, late a merchant in Wheeling, by which, reciting that he is largely indebted to various firms and individuals, and is desirous to provide a fund for the payment of his said liabilities, and for this purpose to devote all'the property of every kind he possesses or is entitled to possess to the creation of such fund, he conveys to William S. Wickham and William S. Gos-horn all the Tstock of dry goods, fixtures and store furniture now in and about his store on the east side of Main street in the city of Wheeling; also all the bonds, notes, accounts, books of account, evidences of debt, and choses in action of every description, due or coming due to the said Marx Graff from any and all persons or corporations whatsoever; also all the household goods and. furniture in and about his dwelling-house, and the unexpired lease of his store and dwelling-house: Upon trust to take immediate possession, and sell the goods either at public or private sale, for cash or on credit, as they shall deem it expedient and proper. To collect the debts and also to compromise or compound disputed or doubtful claims. That the said Graff wa’s to be allowed to occupy the dwelling-house and use the household and kitchen furniture until the 1st of the next April, when he was to surrender it to the trustees, and they were to sell it for cash or on credit, as the3' should think best. That out of the proceeds of sale, after pa3* ***ving the expenses of executing the trust, including a commission of seven per cent, to themselves, the trustees should disburse the residue in the payment pro rata of all the just debts due or coming due from the said Graff to any creditor who should within six months from the date of the *deed assent to the terms thereof, by subscribing a release of all further claim against Graff or his representatives on account of said debt.
In the conclusion of the deed followed the following provision: ‘ ‘And it is further expressly understood, that if through accident or forgetfulness or inadvertence, the said Marx Graff may have omitted to mention any claim or property, that the same shall be understood as being conveyed hereby to the said trustees, to all intents and purposes as fully as if specifically mentioned.”
This deed was admitted to record on the day of its date, in the clerk’s office of the County court of Ohio county, upon the acknowledgment of the grantor.
The subject in controversy in this cause was seven boxes of goods, which had been sold in August 1851 by the defendants, who-were merchants in Baltimore, to Graff, and forwarded to him to Wheeling. It was proved by both parties that these boxes of goods, with others, were sent by Graff to a commission merchant in Steubenville in the state of Ohio; who gave a receipt for them, and that they remained in his possession until the execution of the deed to Wickham and Goshorn. That on the next dajr "Wickham went to Steubenville, and producing and delivering to the commission merchant his receipt, he had obtained possession of the goods, and they were in the act of being transported to the boat which was to carry them to Wheeling, when the sheriff of the county in which Steubenville is located, took possession by virtue of an attachment which issued at the' suit of the defendants, and the goods were returned to the possession of the commission merchant, who, upon being indemnified by the defendants, delivered to them the seven boxes of goods which they had sold to Graff. These goods the defendants took back to Baltimore, where they were *sold, after having been opened, examined and valued by merchants called in for the purpose; and the valuation amounted to three thousand two hundred and ninety-four dollars and twenty-two cents. The other facts in the cause which are of any importance will be found stated in the opinion of Judge Daniel; except the fact that all but two of the creditors of Graff executed the release required by the deed.
The court below rendered a judgment for the defendants ; and the plaintiffs excepted; but instead of stating the facts proved on the trial, the bill of exceptions gave all the evidence introduced by both parties. Erom this judgment the plaintiffs applied to this court for a supersedeas, which was allowed.
Russell and Ery, for the appellants.
Deeds of Assignment — To Secure Creditors — Trustee a Purchaser for Value. — For the proposition that, a trustee in a deed of trust is a purchaser for value, the principal case is cited and approved in the following cases: Gordon v. Bixey, 76 Va. 698: Williams v. Lord, 75 Va. 404; Cammack v. Soran, 30 Gratt. 295, and note; Old Dominion Steamship Co. v. Burckhardt, 31 Gratt. 680, and note; Antoni v. Wright, 22 Gratt. 873; Exchange Bk. v. Knox, 19 Gratt. 747, and note, Evans v. Greenhow, 15 Gratt. 157; Fidelity, etc., Co. v. Shenandoah Val. R. R. Co., 32 W. Va. 259, 9 S. E. Rep. 185; Weinberg v. Rempe, 15 W. Va. 858: Duncan v. Custard, 24 W. Va. 737; Lamb v. Pannell. 28 W. Va. 667; Farmers Bk. v. Willis, 7 W. Va. 47; W. M. & M. Co. v. Peytona, etc., Co., 8 W. Va. 441; Kimmins v. Wilson, 8 W. Va. 591, and cases cited; 2 Va. Law Reg. 716; Hurst v. Leckie, 97 Va. 550, 34 S. E. Rep. 464, and cases cited; Lewis v. Glenn, 84 Va. 965, 6 S. E. Rep. 866, and cases cited; Long v. Meriden, etc., Co., 94 Va. 596. 27 S. E. Rep. 499; Oberdorter v. Meyer. 88 Va. 387, 13 S. E. Rep. 756; Chapman v. Chapman, 91 Va. 400, 21 S. E. Rep. 813; Peters v. Bain, 133 U. S. 670, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 363.
See, on the subject of assignments for benefit of creditors, Paul v. Baugh, 85 Va. 955, 9 S. E. Rep. 329; Siter v. McClanachan, 2 Gratt. 280; Tale v. Liggat, 2 Leigh 84; Lewis v. Caperton, 8 Gratt. 148; Phippen v. Durham, 8 Gratt. 457; Skipwith v. Cunningham, 8 Leigh 271; McCullough v. Sommerville, 8 Leigh 415; Jones v. Christian, 86 Va. 1017. 11 S. E. Rep. 984. See Gordon v. Cannon, 18 Gratt. 387, and note.
Same — Same—Conflict of Laws. — For the proposition that, a transfer of movable property, good by the laws of the owner’s domicil, is valid wherever else the property may be located, and should prevail, the principal case is cited and approved in Bockover v. Life Ass’n, 77 Va. 90. See, in accord. Kirkland v. Brune, 31 Gratt. 126, and note.
Same — Same.—In Lewis v. Glenn, 84 Va. 965, 6 S. E. Rep. 866, it is said: “The language employed in the deed is apt and sufficient to pass everything the company owned, and clearly embraced the uncalled and unpaid subscriptions in the hands of its stockholders. See Maitland v. Newton, 3 Leigh 714, citing Comegy v. Vasse, 1 Peters 193; Mundy v. Vawter, 3 Gratt. 518; Griffin v. MaCanley, 7 Gratt. 477; Wickham v. Lewis Martin & Co., is Gratt, 427; Milner v. Metz, 16 Peters 221.” See also, the principal case cited In Chapman v. Railroad Co.. 26 W. Va. 331.
Case Submitted to Court — Form of Bill of Exceptions. —In Nutter v. Sydenstricker, 11 W. Va. 541, it is said; “In this case, the law and the facts were both submitted to the court. There was a judgment for the plaintiff and the defendant moved for a new trial, which was overruled. The evidence is certi-' fled to this court. There has been much doubt and controversy upon the powers and duties of the appellate court in such cases: Pryor v. Kuhn, 12 Gratt. 615; Wickham v. Lewis Martin & Co., 13 Graft. 427, 444; Rep. Rev. 816. But, finally, in Mitchell v. Baratta, 17 Gratt. 445, the court settled the practice, and announced the law as follows: “1st. That in such gases the evidence, and not the facts proved, should be certified.
“2d. That the case should not be reversed by the appellate court, unless it Is plainly erroneous, particularly If the evidence, or a part of it, be oral, especially if it be conflicting.
“3d. That the whole case, being before the appellate court, it would not remand the case for a new trial, but enter final judgment upon the law and the evidence. Harrison v. Farmers’ Bank, 6 W. Va. 1.
“Under these decisions, this court will not consider objections to the admissibility of evidence; but It will simply inauire whether or not there is sufficient competent evidence in the record, treating the appellant as a demurrant to the evidence, to sustain the judgment of the court helow; and unless the judgment is plainly erroneous, it will affirm it: Claflin v. Steenbock, 18 Gratt. 842; Wright v. Rambo, 21 Gratt. 158; Newlin v. Beard, 6 W. Va. 110.”
The principal case is also cited in Ramsburg v. Erb, 16 W. Va. 783; Mitchell v. Barrata, 17 Gratt. 463, and note; Baltimore, etc., R. R. Co. v. Faulkner, 4 W. Va. 183; Griffie v. McCoy, 8 W. Va. 208. And in Joslyn v. State Bk. of Hartford, 86 Va. 289, 10 S. E. Rep. 166. it is said: “Properly speaking the appeal is always from the judgment of the court and not from the verdict of the jury. Wickham & Goshorn v. Lewis Martin & Co., 13 Gratt. 446. In each case there must be a bill of exceptions pointing out the alleged error, and a certificate of evidence showing what testimony was before the court or jury. Paul v. Paul, 2 H. & M. 525; Lee v. Boak, 11 Gratt. 182; Bart. Chy. 857 et sea.”
As to whether the evidence or the facts proved should he set out in the bill of exceptions, where a jury has been waived and the cause heard by the court, see a review of the Virginia decisions in Western Union, etc., Co., v. Powell, 94 Va. 275, 26 S. E. Rep. 828, where the principal case is cited. See also, monographic note on "Bills of Exception” appended to Stoneman v. Com., 25 Gratt. 887.

Opinion:
SAMUELS, J.
I am of opinion that it is not necessary for the decision of this case, to determine what manner of fraud practiced by a vendee in obtaining goods on credit, will justify the vendor in retaining the goods and annulling the sale thereof. Whether a purchase bv an insolvent vendee without intention to pay will justify reclamation by the vendor, or whether the vendor must have industriously used artifice and stratagem in the purchase to warrant such reclamation, are questions which become immaterial in this case from the fact that the goods were subsequently sold by the vendee Graff to Wickham and Goshorn, purchasers for value without notice. If therefore, whether Graff had been guilty of no fraud in buying the goods, or had bought them, knowing his own insolvency, and without the purpose of paying for them, or had industriously used devices to deceive the sellers, still Wickham and Goshorn, subsequent purchasers for *value without notice, have a title better than that of Martin Lewis & Co. the original sellers. See Williams v. Given, 6 Gratt. 268.
I am further of opinion that the case of Pryor v. Kuhn, 12 Gratt. 615, was correctly decided, and should be followed in all cases in which it applies. That the rule of Bennett v. Hardaway, 6 Munf. 125, as modified by Ewing v. Ewing, 2 Leigh 337, Green v. Ashby, 6 Leigh 135, Rohr v. Davis, 9 Leigh 30, and Pasley v. English, 5 Gratt. 141, should give the rule in cases wherein the courts perform the functions of a jury, as well as in those wherein juries are impanelled. Ascertaining the facts of this case by the rule prescribed by these cases, I am of opinion that the deed of trust given in evidence by the plaintiffs, the making of which is not questioned, and the proof offered by the defendants admitting it to be all true, fully establish the plaintiffs' right to recover. I therefore concur in the judgment to be rendered.