Case Name: Kimberly S. SULT, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2005-06-23
Citations: 906 So. 2d 1013
Docket Number: No. SC03-542
Parties: Kimberly S. SULT, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
Judges: PARIENTE, C.J., and ANSTEAD, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 906
Pages: 1013–1037

Head Matter:
Kimberly S. SULT, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
No. SC03-542.
Supreme Court of Florida.
June 23, 2005.
John H. Trevena, Largo, FL, Patrick B. Calcutt and Kathleen M. Calcutt of Calcutt and Calcutt, St. Petersburg, FL, for Petitioner.
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, Robert J. Krauss, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Bureau Chief, Tampa Criminal Appeals and John M. Klawikofsky, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, FL, for Respondent.

Opinion:
WELLS, J.
We have for review a decision of a district court of appeal on the following question, which the court certified to be of great public importance:
IS SECTION 843.085, FLORIDA STATUTES (2001), UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS OVERBROAD, VAGUE, OR A VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT TO SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS?
Sult v. State, 839 So.2d 798, 806 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. For the following reasons, we answer the certified question in the affirmative and hold that section 843.085 is unconstitutionally over-broad, vague, and violates substantive due process.
FACTS
On. June 14, 2001, petitioner Kimberly Suit entered a convenience store in St. Petersburg wearing a black T-shirt on which was printed a large star and five-inch letters spelling the word "SHERIFF." The star was the official sheriffs five-point star and contained the official sheriffs seal and the words "Pinellas County Sheriffs Office." Suit was also wearing denim shorts and sandals. At trial, Detective Frank Davis identified the T-shirt Suit had been wearing as an official shirt of the Pinellas County Sheriffs Office and testified that the shirt was used in emergency response situations.
Corporal Jerry Davis and Deputy Jeff McConaughey of the Pinellas County Sheriffs Office noticed Suit enter the store. The officers approached Suit and asked, "Do you work for us?" Suit replied,' "Yes," and opened her wallet. In Suit's wallet, the officers saw a Pinellas County Sheriffs Office identification card clipped to her wallet. Corporal Davis believed that Suit was in violation of their office policy by wearing only part of a uniform. Several minutes later, the officers discovered that Suit was not an employee of the sheriffs office. She had previously been employed by the Pinellas County Sheriffs Office as a criminal justice specialist and as a detention deputy recruit. When she left her - employment with the sheriffs office in October 2000, she did not return her identification card. Suit purchased the T-shirt at Americana Uniforms, a store open to the public. Suit testified that when she purchased the T-shirt, she was not in uniform and was not asked for identification. It was further demonstrated at trial that other indicia of law enforcement authority are commercially sold to the public. Suit was charged and ultimately convicted of violating section 843.085(1), Florida Statutes (2001). During the trial, Suit challenged the constitutionality of section 843.085, asserting that the statute was vague or overbroad and that the statute violated substantive due process and equal protection. The trial court rejected Suit's arguments. The trial court first found that the statute did not violate substantive due process. The court also applied a rational basis test and found that the statute was rationally related to the Legislature's legitimate interest in protecting the citizenry. State v. Sult, No. CTC 01-17048 MMANO DIV: E (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. amended order filed Oct. 29, 2001). The trial court further found that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. The court reasoned that the statute was not vague because it gives adequate notice of what conduct is prohibited and persons of common intelligence would not have to guess at its meaning or differ as to its application. The statute was not overbroad because no constitutionally protected guarantees of free speech or free association were affected. Id.
Finally, the court found that the statute did not violate equal protection of the law based on a claim of selective prosecution, reasoning that the statute was no more vulnerable to selective prosecution than any other and that there was no particular class of people who stand to be more affected by its enactment or enforcement. However, the court certified the following question to the district court:
IS CHAPTER 843.085 VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA IN THAT IT CRIMINALIZES WHAT COULD BE INNOCENT CONDUCT, SPECIFICALLY THE WEARING OF PARA PHERNALIA THAT CAN BE PURCHASED THROUGH COMMERCIAL CHANNELS BY THE PUBLIC AND COULD BE MISCONSTRUED AS IN-DICIA OF AUTHORITY?
The Second District Court of Appeal held that the statute was not overbroad or vague and did not violate substantive due process. The district court considered these challenges in light of the Legislature's purpose in enacting the statute to prevent individuals from committing crimes while posing as police officers.
With respect to the overbreadth analysis, the court recognized that wearing a T-shirt that bears a political message is protected speech but that "the right to dress as one pleases, vis-a-vis style and fashion, has little or no First Amendment implications." Suit, 839 So.2d at 803 (quoting City of Daytona Beach v. Del Percio, 476 So.2d 197, 202 (Fla.1985)). The court stated that section 843.085 does not prohibit an expression of support for law enforcement but only prohibits the wearing or displaying of any indicia of authority. The statute thus implicates only an incidental amount of expressive conduct because a shirt that says "Pinellas County Sheriffs Office" at best expresses an ambiguous message. Based on this analysis, the district court held that "[i]ndividuals who wear, without authorization, full law enforcement uniforms or display law enforcement badges are not entitled to First Amendment protection for their conduct." Suit, 839 So.2d at 804. The court held that section 843.085 was therefore not overbroad. Id. at 802-04.
The Second District also held that the statute was not vague. "By flashing the sheriffs identification card, Suit showed that she was trying to deceive the officers, and the officers believed that she was an employee of the sheriffs office who had committed a uniform violation." Id. at 804.The court further noted that because the statute did involve some incidental First Amendment interests, the statute was not vague even under a facial analysis because the statute required a finding that a "reasonable person" could be deceived into believing that such item was authorized by a law enforcement agency. In so holding, the court relied on two cases from this Court that upheld statutes employing a reasonable person standard. See L.B. v. State, 700 So.2d 370 (Fla.1997) (upholding "common pocketknife" exception to the definition of a weapon); Bouters v. State, 659 So.2d 235 (Fla.1995) (upholding aggravated stalking statute).
Finally, the Second District held that the statute did not violate substantive due process. The court stated that "the incidental effect the statute may have on First Amendment rights does not justify application of the strict scrutiny level of review. Rather, we agree with the trial court's use of the rational basis test in its substantive due process analysis." Sult, 839 So.2d at 805. The court concluded that the State had a legitimate and even compelling interest in preventing robberies and kidnappings by individuals posing as law enforcement officers and that the statute was rationally related to that goal. Id. at 806.
Based on the foregoing, the Second District held that section 843.085 was not overbroad or vague and did not violate substantive due process. In so holding, the court certified the previously stated question to this Court. Sult, 839 So.2d at 806. This Court accepted review of the certified question.
The Third District Court of Appeal has also considered the constitutionality of this statute but reached a conflicting result. In Rodriguez v. State, 906 So.2d 1082, 2004 WL 93942 (Fla. 3d DCA Jan. 21, 2004), the Third District held that section 843.085 was unconstitutionally overbroad. In that case, police observed the appellant, Alber to Rodriguez, driving recklessly and erratically on a motorcycle in traffic. The officer in pursuit of Rodriguez attempted to stop him and noticed that Rodriguez was wearing a black shirt with the word "POLICE" written on the front and the back. Once the officer activated his siren and lights, Rodriguez looked back at the officer, pointed at his shirt, mouthed the word "police," and kept driving. When the officer attempted to pass Rodriguez, Rodriguez again mouthed the word "police" and pointed to his shirt. Rodriguez later admitted that he thought the officer would not pull him over if he convinced the officer that he was a member of the police department.
After an extended chase, Rodriguez was ultimately apprehended and charged with, among other things, violating section 843.085. The jury convicted Rodriguez of violating the statute. On appeál, Rodriguez argued that section 843.085 was unconstitutional because the statute was im-permissibly content-based and overbroad and proscribed conduct protected by the Florida and Federal Constitutions.
The Third District held that section 843.085 was overbroad, first noting that the First Amendment afforded protection to symbolic conduct or expressive conduct as well as to actual speech. The court found that section 843.085(1) was content-based "in that it focuses only on the content of the speech or expression and the direct impact that it has on a viewer." Rodriguez, 906 So.2d at 1088. Because the statute was content-based, the Third District stated that it was subject to strict judicial scrutiny and must be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling governmental interest.
The Third District concluded that section 843.085(1) was unconstitutionally over-broad because it banned the wearing of any 'indicia of law enforcement authority regardless of the intent of the wearer and because it may be applied to conduct that is protected by the First Amendment. The court reasoned that without a specific intent requirement, the statute did not distinguish between the innocent wearing or displaying of law enforcement indicia from that designed to deceive the public into believing that such display was official. Thus, there was the potential of penalizing purely innocent conduct. "While there is certainly a legitimate interest in ensuring that the public not be deceived by law enforcement impersonators, we conclude that this statute must be narrowly tailored with an intent requirement so as not to run afoul of the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment." Rodriguez, 906 So.2d at 1089-90. The Third District's decision did not consider the constitutionality of section 843.085 under a vagueness or substantive due process analysis.
ANALYSIS
We agree with the Third District that section 843.085(1) is unconstitutional. We answer the Second District's certified question in the affirmative, quash the Second District's decision, and remand for further proceedings in accord with this opinion.
We conclude that the defects in section 843.085(1) are similar to the defects we considered in respect to the City of Tampa's loitering ordinance in Wyche v. State, 619 So.2d 231 (Fla.1993). Our decision in Wyche controls the answer to the certified question in this case. In Wyche, we held that the ordinance was "unconstitutional because it unnecessarily infringes on constitutional rights; it is too vague because a violation of the law is determined based on law enforcement officers' discretion; [and] it violates substantive due process by punishing innocent activities." Id. at 234.
In answer to the certified question in Wyche, we explained in respect to the overbreadth challenge to the statute:
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 4 of the Florida Constitution protect the rights of individuals to express themselves in a variety of ways. The constitutions protect not only speech and the written word, but also conduct intended to communicate. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397[, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 105 L.Ed.2d 342] (1982); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131[, 86 S.Ct. 719, 15 L.Ed.2d 637](1966). Further, the First Amendment and article I, section 5 of the Florida Constitution protect the rights of individuals to associate with whom they please and to assemble with others for political or for social purposes. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1[, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659] (1976); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479[, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510] (1965); State v. Dodd, 561 So.2d 263 (Fla.1990).
When lawmakers attempt to restrict or burden fundamental and basic rights such as these, the laws must not only be directed toward a legitimate public purpose, but they must be drawn as narrowly as possible. See Firestone v. News-Press Publishing Co., 538 So.2d 457 (Fla.1989). As the United States Supreme Court has noted, "[b]ecause First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, government may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity." NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433[, 83 S.Ct. 328, 9 L.Ed.2d 405] (1963). Put another way, statutes cannot be so broad that they prohibit constitutionally protected conduct as well as unprotected conduct. News-Press Publishing Co., 538 So.2d at 459.
When legislation is drafted so that it may be applied to conduct that is protected by the First Amendment, it is said to be unconstitutionally overbroad. See Southeastern Fisheries Ass'n, Inc. v. Department of Natural Resources, 453 So.2d 1351, 1353 (Fla.1984). This overbreadth doctrine permits an individual whose own speech or conduct may be prohibited to challenge an enactment facially "because it also threatens others not before the court — those who desire to engage in legally protected expression but who may refrain from doing so rather than risk prosecution or undertake to have the law declared partially invalid." Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491[, 503, 105 S.Ct. 2794, 86 L.Ed.2d 394] (1985). The doctrine contemplates the pragmatic judicial assumption that an overbroad statute will have a chilling effect on protected expression. City of Daytona Beach v. Del Percio, 476 So.2d 197, 202 (Fla.1985).
The Tampa ordinance, by potentially applying to such conduct as talking and waving to other people, clearly implicates protected freedoms. The ordinance limits the rights of those who have been previously convicted of prostitution to engage in noncriminal routine activities. The ordinance suggests that it is incriminating when a "known prostitute" "repeatedly beckons to, stops or attempts to stop, or engages passers-by in conversation, or repeatedly stops, or attempts to stop motor vehicle operators by hailing, waving of arms, or any bodily gesture." Hailing a cab or a friend, chatting on a public street, and simply strolling aimlessly are time-honored pastimes in our society and are clearly protected under Florida as well as federal law. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156[, 92 S.Ct. 839, 31 L.Ed.2d 110] (1972). All Florida citizens enjoy the inherent right to window Shop, saunter down a sidewalk, and wave to friends-and passersby with no fear of arrest. A formerly convicted prostitute engaging in these activities, however, risks prosecution under the ordinance for loitering, and the risk of arrest certainly would deter the exercise of these rights. See Johnson v. Carson, 569 F.Supp. 974, 979 (M.D.Fla.1983).
Wyche correctly asserts that the ordinance, which prohibits loitering "in a manner and under circumstances manifesting the purpose of' engaging in acts of prostitution, does not require proof of unlawful intent as an element of the offense, Indeed, the ordinance allows arrest and conviction for loitering under circumstances merely indicating the possibility of such intent, such as beckoning to passersby and waving to motorists, which could be occurring without any intent to engage in criminal activity. Thus, the ordinance affects and chills constitutionally protected activity.
We find that it is impossible to preserve the constitutionality of the Tampa ordinance without effectively rewriting it, and we decline to "legislate" in that fashion. Courts may not go so far in their narrowing constructions so as to effectively rewrite legislative enactments. News-Press Publishing Co., 538 So.2d at 460; Brown v. State, 358 So.2d 16, 20 (Fla.1978). Even if we were to find that the ordinance could be preserved facially by writing in requirements of specific intent to engage in prohibited activity and sufficient overt activity to clearly manifest that intent, the ordinance still would be subject to unconstitutional application; A series of adjudications limiting the application of the ordinance would be unacceptable because it would result in a chilling effect on protected speech during the pen-dency of judicial proceedings delineating the contours of the ordinance. Board of Airport Commissioners v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 576[, 107 S.Ct. 2568, 96 L.Ed.2d 500] (1987).
Wyche, 619 So.2d at 234-36 (footnotes omitted).
In respect to the statute's vagueness, we explained:
Moreover, we also find merit in Wyche's argument that the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague. The principles of the vagueness doctrine address compliance with the concept of due process. Southeastern Fisheries, 453 So.2d at 1353; see also State v. Wershow, 343 So.2d 605, 608 (Fla.1977) (noting that vague statutes violate article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution). A statute or ordinance is void for vagueness when, because of its imprecision, it fails to give adequate notice of what conduct is prohibited. Thus, it invites arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Art. I, § 9, Fla. Const.; Southeastern Fisheries. As the United States Supreme Court has noted:
Vague laws offend several important values. First, because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application. Third, but related, where a vague statute "abut[s] upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms," it "operates to inhibit the exercise of [those] freedoms." Uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to " 'steer far wider of the unlawful zone' . than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked."
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104[, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222] (1972) (citations omitted); see also Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358[, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903] (1983) ("the more important aspect of the vagueness doctrine 'is not actual notice, but the other principal element of the doctrine— the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement' ") (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574[, 94 S.Ct. 1242, 39 L.Ed.2d 605] (1974)); Wershow, 343 So.2d at 609 ("To force one to act at one's peril is against the very foundation of our American system of jurisprudence").
Wyche, 619 at 236-37.
In respect to substantive due process, we stated:
The ordinance also violates substantive due process because, as we have discussed, it may be used to punish entirely innocent activities. Art. I, § 9; State v. Saiez, 489 So.2d 1125, 1129 (Fla. 1986). As drafted, the ordinance without question "unjustifiably transgresses the fundamental restrictions on the power of government to intrude upon individual rights and liberties." State v. Walker, 444 So.2d 1137, 1138 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984), adopted, 461 So.2d 108 (Fla. 1984). Thus, it is impossible to say that the ordinance bears a reasonable relation to a permissible legislative objective and is not discriminatory, arbitrary, or oppressive. Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So.2d 9 (Fla.1974).
Wyche, 619 So.2d at 237.
Section 843.085(1), Florida Statutes, makes it a crime for an individual to exhibit, wear, or display any indicia of authority, or any colorable imitation thereof, of any federal, state, county, or municipal law enforcement agency or to display in any manner or combinations the word or words "police," "patrolman," "agent," "sheriff," "deputy," "trooper," "highway patrol," "Wildlife Officer," "Marine Patrol Officer," "state attorney," "public defender," "marshal," "constable," or "bailiff," which could deceive a reasonable person into believing that such item is authorized by any of the agencies described. The statute has no intent-to-deceive element but, rather, requires only a general intent. Thus, an individual wearing a shirt containing one of the specified words, even in combination with other words, is subject to prosecution under the statute.
In the decision below, the Second District held that the section did not prohibit expressions of support or disdain for law enforcement and thus only limited incidental amounts of protected expression. Suit, 839 So.2d at 803. The court held that the message conveyed by wearing a shirt might be conveying one's support for the police department or might be identifying oneself as belonging to the police department. Id. However, this analysis demonstrates the problem with the broad reach of the statute.
The word "police" on a shirt could mean support for the police, as has been widely seen on clothing in support of the New York Police Department following September 11, 2001. The word "police" on a shirt also could be used to express a negative opinion about police conduct if used in combination with a depiction of police committing a wrong in a traffic arrest. The word "sheriff' could have a political meaning when worn at a political rally involving a campaign for sheriff. The words could be on costumes and have a frivolous meaning, as pointed out by the Third District. Rodriguez, 906 So.2d at 1089 n. 3.
With no specific intent-to-deceive element, the section extends its prohibitions to innocent wearing and displaying of specified words. The reach of the statute is not tailored toward the legitimate public purpose of prohibiting conduct intended to deceive the public into believing law enforcement impersonators. The "could deceive a reasonable person" element of section 843.085(1), in conjunction with the prohibition of .a display in any manner or combination of the words listed in the statute, results in a virtually boundless and uncertain restriction on expression. Thus, similar to the Tampa ordinance that was the subject of the Wyche decision, section 843.085(1) is overbroad because it reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct. See Southeastern Fisheries Ass'n, Inc. v. Dep't of Natural Res., 453 So.2d 1351, 1353 (Fla.1984).
We agree with the following statement of the Third District:
Likewise, we conclude in the instant case that in the absence of an intent or scienter requirement, section 843.085(1) is constitutionally infirm because it makes no distinction between the innocent wearing or display of law enforcement indicia from that designed to deceive the reasonable public into believing that such display is official. While there is certainly a legitimate interest in ensuring that the public not be deceived by law enforcement impersonators, we conclude that this statute must be narrowly tailored with an intent requirement so as not to run afoul of the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment.
Rodriguez, 906 So.2d at 1089-90.
Nonetheless, because application of the overbreadth doctrine is "strong medicine," it should be employed sparingly by courts. Facial overbreadth has not been invoked when a limiting construction has been or could be placed on the challenged statute. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973). We conclude, however, that the overbreadth underlying this statute is substantial and incapable of a narrower construction because there is no logical way to read a specific intent element into the statute as it is currently written. The plain language of the statute indicates that any individual who wears or displays any indicia of authority which could deceive a reasonable person into believing that such item is authorized has committed a misdemeanor in the first degree. As written, the statute plainly requires the individual to merely possess the general intent to wear or display the item. As with the ordinance in Wyche, we could not construe section 843.085(1) otherwise "without effectively rewriting it, and we decline to 'legislate' in that fashion." Wyche, 619 So.2d at 236. Thus, section 843.085(1) is unconstitutionally overbroad. See also Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 123 S.Ct. 1536, 155 L.Ed.2d 535 (2003) (holding cross-burning statute unconstitutional because the statute did not require that the cross burning be done with the intent to intimidate, which was the purpose underlying the statute); Robinson v. State, 393 So.2d 1076 (Fla.1980) (holding statute that made it an offense to wear a mask or hood that concealed identity unconstitutionally over-broad because law was susceptible of being applied to entirely innocent activities).
We also find section 843.085(1) to be vague and in violation of substantive due process. Section 843.085(1), because of its imprecision, again as with the ordinance that was the subject of the Wyche decision, fails to give fair notice of what conduct is prohibited. The statute fails to delineate when the displaying or wearing of the prohibited words will subject the person to prosecution, thus inviting arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement and making entirely innocent activities subject to prosecution. Wyche, 619 So.2d at 237.
We do not agree with the Second District's reliance on our decisions in Reynolds v. State, 842 So.2d 46 (Fla.2002); L.B. v. State, 700 So.2d 370 (Fla.1997); or Bouters v. State, 659 So.2d 235 (Fla.1995). Section 784.048, Florida Statutes (Supp.1992), Florida's stalking statute, which was the subject of Bouters, did not have the flaw we find in section 843.085(1). The stalking statute had a narrow focus upon "any person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly harasses another person." As we found in Bouters, "stalking, whether by word or deed, falls outside the First Amendment's purview." Bouters, 659 So.2d at 237. Even though the statute did not define "harass," we found that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague because it contained the requisite "willful, malicious, and repeated" element. Section 843.085(1) does not have a similar intent element.
In L.B., section 790.001(13), Florida Statutes (1995), was the subject of constitutional attack. This attack was based upon the statute's lack of a definition of "common pocketknife." We upheld the constitutionality of the statute, finding that the statute would be construed giving the words their plain and ordinary meaning. L.B., 700 So.2d at 372. We conclude that this is plainly different from the issue of vagueness in respect to section 843.085(1) because section 843.085(1) potentially reaches constitutionally protected expression and has no specific intent-to-deceive element. These factors were not involved in L.B.
In Reynolds, section 828.12, Florida Statutes (1997), prohibiting cruelty to animals, was upheld against a substantive due process attack. We found the cruelty to animals statute contained a requirement of general intent. However, we also found that the "general intent to commit an act . is obviously reasonably related to the harm sought to be avoided." Reynolds, 842 So.2d at 51. We do not find such a reasonable relationship to be obvious in section 843.085(1).
We point out that there is a Florida statute criminalizing the false impersonation of an officer, section 843.08, Florida Statutes (2004), which is not implicated in this case.
For the foregoing reasons, we answer the certified question in the affirmative, quash Suit, and approve Rodriguez. We remand this case to the district court for further consideration consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
PARIENTE, C.J., and ANSTEAD, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
CANTERO, J., dissents with an opinion, in which BELL, J., concurs.
. Section 843.085, Florida Statutes (2001), provides in pertinent part:
843.085. Unlawful use of police badges or other indicia of authority. — It is unlawful for any person:
(1) Unless appointed by the Governor pursuant to chapter 354, authorized by the appropriate agency, or displayed in a closed or mounted case as a collection or exhibit, to wear or display any authorized indicia of authority, including any badge, insignia, emblem, identification card, or uniform, or any colorable imitation thereof, of any federal, state, county, or municipal law enforcement agency, or other criminal justice agency as now or hereafter defined in s. 943.045, which could deceive a reasonable person into believing that such item is au thorized by any of the agencies described above for use by the person displaying or wearing it, or which displays in any manner or combination the word or words "police," "patrolman," "agent," "sheriff," "deputy," "trooper," "highway patrol," "Wildlife Officer," "Marine Patrol Officer," "state attorney," "public defender," "marshal," "constable," or "bailiff," which could deceive a reasonable person into believing that such item is authorized by any of the agencies described above for use by the person displaying or wearing it.
(3)To sell, transfer, or give away the authorized badge, or colorable imitation thereof, including miniatures, of any criminal justice agency as now or hereafter defined in s. 943.045, or bearing in any manner or combination the word or words "police," "patrolman," "sheriff," "deputy," "trooper," "highway patrol," "Wildlife Officer," "Marine Patrol Officer," "marshal," "constable," "agent," "state attorney," "public defender," or "bailiff," which could deceive a reasonable person into believing that such item is authorized by any of the agencies described above, except for agency purchases or upon the presentation and recordation of both a driver's license and other identification showing any transferee to actually be a member of such criminal justice agency or unless the person is appointed by the Governor pursuant to chapter 354. A transferor of an item covered by this subsection is required to maintain for 2 years a written record of such transaction, -including records showing compliance with this subsection, and if such transferor is a business, it shall make such records available during normal business hours for inspection by any law enforcement agency having jurisdiction in the area where the business is located.
(4) Nothing in this section shall prohibit a fraternal, benevolent, or labor organization or association, or their chapters or subsidiaries, from using the following words, in any manner or in any combination, if those words appear in the official name of the organization or association: "police," "patrolman," "sheriff," "deputy," "trooper," "highway patrol," "Wildlife Officer," "Marine Patrol Officer," "marshal," "constable," or "bailiff."
(5) Violation of any provision of this section is a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. This section-is cumulative to any law now in force in the state.
. The court gave the following example to illustrate its point:
For example, an individual who wears or displays unauthorized law enforcement apparel or indicia merely in observance of Halloween or as an actor in a play or film is in violation of this statute if a reasonable person could be deceived as to its authenticity. Moreover, in the aftermath of the "September 11th" tragedy, it has now become commonplace for many Americans to wear authentic-looking law enforcement t-shirts, caps and other paraphernalia merely out of reverence for the tragedy's heroes. All such persons would nevertheless be in violation of section 843.085(1). We believe that Floridians do enjoy the right to innocently wear or display such paraphernalia under both the Florida and U.S. Constitutions as long as they are not intentionally attempting to pass themselves off as law enforcement officials.
Rodriguez, 906 So.2d at 1089-90 n. 3.
. Section 24-61(A)(10) of the City of Tampa Code (1987) provided that it was unlawful for any person to:
Loiter, while a pedestrian or in a motor-vehicle, in or near any thoroughfare or place open to the public in a manner and under circumstances manifesting the purpose of inducing, enticing, soliciting, or procuring another to commit an act of prostitution, sodomy, fellatio, cunnilingus, masturbation for hire, pandering-, or other lewd or indecent act. Among the circumstances which may be considered in determining whether this purpose is manifested are: that such person is a known prostitute, pimp, sodomist, performer of fellatio, performer of cunnilingus, masturbator for hire or panderer and repeatedly beckons to, stops or attempts to stop, or engages passers-by in conversation, or repeatedly stops, or attempts to stop motor vehicle operators by hailing, waving of arms or any bodily gesture for the purpose of inducing, enticing, soliciting or procuring another to commit an act of prostitution, sodomy, fellatio, cunnilingus, masturbation for hire, pandering, or other lewd or indecent act. No arrest shall be made for a violation of this subsection unless the arresting officer first affords such person the opportunity to explain this conduct, and no one shall be convicted of violating this subsection if it appears at trial that the explanation given was true and disclosed a lawful purpose.
Wyche, 619 So.2d at 233-34 n. 2 (emphasis omitted).
. Section 843.08 prohibits a person from
falsely assuming] or pretending] to be a sheriff, officer of the Florida Highway Patrol, officer of the Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission, officer of the Department of Environmental Protection, officer of the Department of Transportation, officer of the Department of Corrections, correctional probation officer, deputy sheriff, state attorney or assistant state attorney, statewide prosecutor or assistant statewide prosecutor, state attorney investigator, coroner, police officer, lottery special agent or lottery investigator, beverage enforcement agent, or watchman, or any member of the Parole Commission and any administrative aide or supervisor employed by the commission, or any personnel or representative of the Department of Law Enforcement, and takfing] upon himself or herself to act as such, or to require any other person to aid or assist him or her in a matter pertaining to the duty of any such officer....