Case Name: Omar Sharrieff GAY, Petitioner, v. Mike EVANS; J. Woodford, Respondents-Appellees
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2010-08-02
Citations: 390 F. App'x 723
Docket Number: No. 08-16315
Parties: Omar Sharrieff GAY, Petitioner, v. Mike EVANS; J. Woodford, Respondents-Appellees.
Judges: Before: B. FLETCHER, REINHARDT, and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 390
Pages: 723–724

Head Matter:
Omar Sharrieff GAY, Petitioner, v. Mike EVANS; J. Woodford, Respondents-Appellees.
No. 08-16315.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted July 19, 2010.
Filed Aug. 2, 2010.
Miranda Kane, Law Office of Miranda Kane, San Francisco, CA, for Petitioner.
Omar Sharrieff Gay, Soledad, CA, pro se.
Amber N. Wipfler, Esquire, AGCA-Of-fice of the California Attorney General, San Francisco, CA, for Respondents-Ap-pellees.
Before: B. FLETCHER, REINHARDT, and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Omar Sharrieff Gay appeals from the district court's judgment denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we affirm.
Gay contends that the California Board of Prison Terms ("Board") violated his due process rights by considering evidence other than his commitment offense at his parole hearing. Specifically, he contends that California Penal Code section 3041(b) precluded the Board from considering any evidence apart from his commitment offense in determining whether he presented a threat to public safety, and that Title 15, section 2402 of the California Code of Regulations, which specifies that the Board must consider a number of factors, including factors other than the commitment offense, in assessing suitability for parole, contravenes Section 3041(b). However, California courts interpret Section 3041(b) and Section 2402 of the regulations to be consistent with each other and to permit the consideration of certain factors other than the commitment offense. See, e.g., In re Shaputis, 44 Cal.4th 1241, 82 Cal. Rptr.3d 213, 190 P.3d 573, 582 (2008) ("Title 15, section 2402 of the California Code of Regulations sets forth the factors to be considered by the Board in carrying out the mandate of [Section 3041]."); In re Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th 1181, 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 169, 190 P.3d 585, 554 (2008) ("[E]vidence in the record corresponding to both suitability and unsuitability factors — including the facts of the commitment offense, the specific efforts of the inmate toward rehabilitation, and, importantly, the inmate's attitude concerning his or her commission of the crime, as well as the psychological assessments contained in the record— must, by statute, be considered and relied upon by both the Board and the Governor.]"). Because we are bound by a state court's interpretation of its own law, see Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691 & n. 11, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975), Gay's due process claim fails. See Hayward v. Marshall, 603 F.3d 546, 561-62 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc).
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.