Case Name: Richard Gilbert Wall against The Court of Wardens
Court: South Carolina Court of Common Pleas
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1795
Citations: 1 Bay 434
Docket Number: 
Parties: Richard Gilbert Wall against The Court of Wardens.
Judges: Chief Justice, Waties and Bay, Judges, present, who ordered that a prohibition should issue.
Reporter: South Carolina Law Reports
Volume: 1
Pages: 434–437

Head Matter:
Richard Gilbert Wall against The Court of Wardens.
An jnsolvent debtor, who fairly and ho-up^ail hifes-fects ato hís creditors, and takes the benefit of the insolventdebt- or’s act, is for ever after-wards dis-Ws'Iún/crS tw’ accept dend°^ of ^his property.
UPON a motion for a prohibition. The plaintiff had 1 1 been convicted, in the court of wardens for the city of Charleston, of selling spirituous liquors, and fined SOI. for tbe offence, under the terms of the act for regulating tavern licenses, &c.
He was afterwards taken on a ca. sa. and sent to gaol 5 but being unable, by losses and misfortunes, to pay the fine, he applied for and obtained the benefit of the insolvent debtors’ act, and delivered up what property he had, agreeable to the directions of that law.
After the expiration of the year and a day from the time 0f his discharge under the insolvent debtor’s act, a writ of scire facias was issued against him by the court of wardens, in order to renew the judgment on the conviction, and charge him a second time in execution for the above 50/. The present was, therefore, a motion for a prohibition to that court, to restrain it from proceeding further in the case, on the ground that a person once taking the benefit of the insolvent debtor’s act, and giving up all his effects, was for ever discharged from every demand for which he was sued or imprisoned.
On behalf of the court of wardens, it was contended, that the insolvent debtors’ act never intended to discharge the debtor entirely from the demand, only to give him indulgence to raise the money for which he was sued; and therefore it prevented any person from suing such debtor for one year and a day after the discharge ; but it did not follow that every creditor was obliged to sue at the expiration of that time: some might indulge him to a much longer period, and still recover; though every one might sue after that time if he chose.
For the plaintiff, Wall,
it was urged, that such a construction as the corporation insisted on, would be so far from giving relief to an unfortunate man, who had parted with every shilling he had in the world, on his coming out of gaol, and who was about to begin the world anew, would in fact be tantalizing with misfortune, and making him the sport of every rigorous creditor who chose to renew his suit at the expiration of every year and day during his life. That it would damp all enterprise and industry which an active man was still capable of exerting at any future period ; and would prevent the aid and interposition of friends who might afterwards be disposed to serve him by giving him a credit, lending money, or otherwise assisting him, which, it was said, was contrary to the spirit and meaning of the insolvent debtor’s act.
This case ought to have come in among those of 1792, but by some accident or* other it was omitted to be inserted in its proper place.

Opinion:
The Court
took time to consider of this case, and, after mature deliberation, was of opinion, that a man who, without fraud or concealment of any part of his estate and effects, gives- up his all, and comes out of gaol under the insolvent debtor's act, is for ever discharged from the demands of his suing creditors, or those accepting of dividends of his estate and effects.
Those creditors who nave neither sued the insolvent debtor, nor dividendof his Sained are from suing lum until a year ami a day from the time of such dis-ollal"e'
They may, however, prove their gainst which art shau^ñoi atbarVardS be
That the intention of the act was to give effectual relief to poor unfortunate debtors ; and jiot a temporary one, that would again, in( so short a time as a year and day, put them in the powfer of rigorous creditors. That the act contemplated three different classes of creditors — to wit: 1. Suitors or suing creditors. 2. Those coming in and accepting of a dividend of the insolvent debtor's estate and effects. 3. Those who had neither sued nor chose to . accept of a dividend.
That the clause of release and discharge in the act, re- ° lated only to the two first classes ; but the third class, who , , had neitner sued nor accepted or a dividend, was prevent-ed from suing until twelve months and a day next after such discharge.^
That this was the intent and meaning of the act, is mani-t fest from the 10th and 11th clauses of it, which will fully . . . , confirm and explain this construction, ihe 10th clause enacts, that the act of limitations shall not run against such creditors as had not sued., or accepted of dividends. And 0 . the llth clause gives such creditors a power to prove their demands in the court where the insolvent debtor should ap-Pfr f°r discharge ; and enacts, that a certificate of the clerk court; should always be conclusive evidence of the debt, against which the statute of limitations should not be a bar. There is not one syllable said in either of these two last clauses about the suing or accepting creditors. And if in any part of the act, subsequent to the discharge, it had considered their demands as still in existence, they would have been mentioned in the clause which says the limitation act should not be a bar to the other creditors ; and to prove which, this kind of ex parte testimony was to be conclusive. It is evident, therefore, from the silence of the act in those two clauses, respecting the two first classes of creditors, as well as from the general scope and design of jt, the first enacting clause of discharge took leave of them for ever, and considered their demands as totally extinguished.
Harper, for the motion.
Lee and Marshall, against it,
Chief Justice, Waties and Bay, Judges, present, who ordered that a prohibition should issue.
Mr. Justice Groike was present at part of the argument, and at first doubted, but afterwards concurred with the three other judges.
Mr. Justice Burke was absent at New-York when this argument came on; but has since agreed in opinion with the Chief Justice and other judges: so that this may now be considered as the unanimous opinion of the whole court.