Case Name: Leonard GREEN v. ALASKA NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Rowan Companies, Inc. and Universal Services
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 2000-03-29
Citations: 759 So. 2d 165
Docket Number: No. 99-C-2844
Parties: Leonard GREEN v. ALASKA NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Rowan Companies, Inc. and Universal Services.
Judges: (Court composed of Judge JOAN BERNARD ARMSTRONG, Judge MOON LANDRIEU, Judge JAMES F. MeKAY, III, Judge MICHAEL E. KIRBY and Judge ROBERT A. KATZ).
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 759
Pages: 165–173

Head Matter:
Leonard GREEN v. ALASKA NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Rowan Companies, Inc. and Universal Services.
No. 99-C-2844.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
March 29, 2000.
Writ Denied June 2, 2000.
John H. Denenea, Jr., Jonathan M. Walsh, Wiedemann & Wiedemann, New Orleans, Louisiana, Counsel for Plain-tiffiRelator.
Grady S. Hurley, L. Etienne Balart, Jones, Walker, Waechter, Poitevent, Car-rere & Denegre, L.L.P., New Orleans, LA, Counsel for Defendant/Respondents.
(Court composed of Judge JOAN BERNARD ARMSTRONG, Judge MOON LANDRIEU, Judge JAMES F. MeKAY, III, Judge MICHAEL E. KIRBY and Judge ROBERT A. KATZ).

Opinion:
11 ARMSTRONG, Judge.
We agree with the trial court's determination that venue is not proper in Orleans Parish and, therefore, we will affirm that part of the judgment. However, we feel that dismissal with prejudice is not warranted in this case and that an order of transfer to a parish of proper venue is more appropriate. Thus, we will vacate that portion of the judgment dismissing this case with prejudice, and remand with instructions that the trial court conduct such proceedings as are necessary or convenient to determine a correct venue for this case and then transfer the case to such a correct venue.
This is a maritime personal injury action. The plaintiff, allegedly a seaman, was seen by a physician of his choosing, Dr. John Watermeier, for his alleged injuries. Dr. Watermeier recommended back and neck surgery. The plaintiff also was seen by Dr. Edmund Landry who was a physician chosen by Alaska National Insurance Company ("Alaska National") which was the insurer of the alleged ^employer of the plaintiff. Dr. Landry initially concurred in the 'recommendation for back surgery but not in the recommendation for neck surgery.
At that point, according to the allegations of the petition, Alaska National sent "several documents and records" to Dr Watermeier. The plaintiffs writ application states that these documents and records were copies of medical records from the Veterans Administration. . Also, according to the allegations of the petition as elaborated upon in the plaintiffs writ application, Alaska National sent the same Veterans Administration medical records, plus a surveillance videotape of the plaintiff, to Dr. Landry. According to the plaintiffs writ application, after receiving these materials, Dr. Landry withdrew his recommendation for surgery. The petition and writ application do not state whether Dr. Watermeier changed his opinion in any way.
There is no allegation that Alaska National obtained the medical records in any improper way, no allegation that the medical records were false, incomplete or misleading, no allegation that the medical records contained any unusually private information or were anything other than routine medical records and no allegation that the medical records or any information from them was disclosed to any persons other than the two physicians who were examining and evaluating the plaintiff. There is no allegation that the videotape was obtained in any improper way, no allegation that the videotape was false, incomplete or misleading and no allegation that the videotape or any information from it was disclosed to any person other than the physician engaged by Alaska National to examine and ^evaluate the plaintiff. The petition and the writ application make no mention of any invasion of privacy. The plaintiff alleges only that Alaska National sent ordinary medical records to two physicians who already had examined and evaluated the plaintiff, and who thus already had substantial knowledge of the plaintiffs medical condition, and that the physician who had been engaged by Alaska National also received a surveillance videotape.
The plaintiff filed this suit in Orleans Parish. He allegedly is a resident of Winnfield, Louisiana. Alaska National allegedly is a foreign insurer. The other defendants allegedly are a foreign corporation with its principal place of business in Louisiana in St. Mary Parish and a foreign partnership with its primary place of business in Jefferson Parish. There is no allegation that the plaintiffs injury (which occurred aboard a vessel) occurred in Orleans Parish.
Most of the allegations of the plaintiffs petition relate to his accident aboard a vessel of one of the defendants, his resulting injury and his rights to receive compensation for that injury. Because his accident and injury did not occur in Orleans Parish, the plaintiff does not rely upon his allegations as to the accident as establishing venue in Orleans Parish. However, the plaintiff alleges that Alaska National's sending the Veterans Administration medical records to Dr. Watermeier and sending the Veterans Administration medical records plus the surveillance videotape to Dr. Landry constitutes a tort of "interference with medical treatment" and that, because Dr. Watermeier and Dr. Landry are located in Orleans Parish, |4that tort occurred in Orleans Parish. Thus, the plaintiff argues that venue is proper in Orleans Parish based solely upon the occurrence there of "medical interference".
The defendants responded by filing a number of exceptions. Following a hearing, the trial court held that the plaintiff had not alleged any tort occurring in Orleans Parish, maintained the exception of improper venue and dismissed the case with prejudice.
We agree with the trial court. The plaintiff has developed a creative theory of a possible new tort. However, we preter-mit any discussion or decision as to whether there is a tort of "interference with medical treatment" because, even if there is such a tort, facts sufficient to constitute such a tort have not been alleged in this case.
There is no allegation that the copies of the Veterans Administration medical records sent by Alaska National to Dr. Watermeier and Dr. Landry were anything other than genuine, complete photocopies. In other words, nothing false or misleading was sent by Alaska National. The worst that the plaintiff alleges or asserts about these Veterans Administration medical records is that they were useless and irrelevant to the plaintiffs present medical issues. But, whether the medical records were useless or irrelevant to Dr. Watermeier and Dr. Landry was a determination to be made by those physicians themselves and Alaska National did not act wrongfully. by giving the two physicians the opportunity to make that decision. So long as an insurer does not knowingly submit to a physician false or ^misleading information, we will not hold that the insurer has acted tortiously by submitting information that turned out to be of no value.
As to the surveillance videotape submitted by Alaska National to Dr. Landry, we believe that an analysis similar to that which we applied to the medical records applies here as well. So long as the surveillance videotape actually showed the plaintiff at a time subsequent to the alleged injury, and had not been altered or tampered with to make it false or misleading, we cannot say that the insurer acted tortiously by submitting it to one of the doctors. The plaintiff has not denied that the videotape shows him at a time subsequent to his alleged injury and has not alleged or asserted that the videotape was altered or tampered with to make it false or misleading.
The plaintiff puts considerable emphasis on Alaska National's motive in sending the Veterans Administration medical records to Dr. Watermeier and Dr. Landry and in sending the surveillance videotape to Dr. Landry. The plaintiffs alleged employer has an alleged legal obligation to pay for maintenance and cure, which includes necessary medical treatment, because the plaintiff is allegedly a seaman. Alaska National, as the alleged employer's insurer, was asked by Dr. Watermeier to authorize (i.e. agree to pay for) surgery for the plaintiff. It was in that connection that Alaska National engaged Dr. Landry to examine the plaintiff. Thus, Alaska National, as the party being asked to pay for the surgery, had a legitimate interest in submitting information to the two doctors.
| fiLastly, the plaintiff cites a Louisiana criminal statute, La. R.S. 14:332, which statute forbids "the intentional and willful interference with a physician... in the performance of their duties relating to the care and treatment of patients." Alaska National argues that this statute encompasses only physical interference with a physician's care of patients and does not, in any case, create any tort liability or remedy. We need not decide whether to accept Alaska National's arguments because, whatever exactly is meant by the statute, we do not believe that the statute could have been violated under the facts as alleged and asserted by the plaintiff in this case. As we have explained in detail above, Alaska National is not alleged or asserted to have sent false or misleading information to the doctors. Thus, we do not believe that the conduct of Alaska National, which is described in detail above, can constitute willful and intentional interference with a physician.
The only basis for venue in Orleans Parish argued for by the plaintiff is the asserted claim of interference with the plaintiffs medical treatment by doctors located in Orleans Parish. As the plaintiffs petition, even read liberally, does not allege any such tort, there is no basis for venue in Orleans Parish. In particular, the plaintiff is not from Orleans Parish, the defendants are not located in Orleans Parish and the plaintiffs injury did not occur in Orleans Parish. Thus, the trial court was correct in maintaining the exception of improper venue.
However, dismissal with prejudice due to improper venue is neither legally required nor appropriate in this casé. A case filed in an improper venue may be transferred to a proper venue, rather than dismissed, "in the interest of justice." La. Code Civ. Proc. arts. 121, 932. The jurisprudential rule that has evolved is that, unless the plaintiff has knowingly filed suit in the wrong venue, then the case should be transferred rather than dismissed. Marler v. Petty, 94-1851 (La.4/10/95), 653 So.2d 1167; Habig v. Popeye's Inc., 553 So.2d 963 (La.App. 4 th Cir.1989). In the present case, the plaintiff chose to file suit in Orleans Parish based upon a novel theory of the tort purportedly occurring in Orleans Parish. However, while the plaintiffs theory was novel it was not frivolous. Thus, it cannot be said that the plaintiff "knowingly" filed suit in the wrong venue. Consequently, the case should be transferred to a proper venue rather than dismissed. Marler, supra; Habig, supra. On remand the trial court should conduct such proceedings as are necessary or convenient to determine the proper venue or venues and then transfer the case to a proper venue.
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the judgment of the trial court only insofar as it dismisses the case with prejudice, and remand for a transfer to a proper venue.
VACATED IN PART AND REMANDED.
KATZ, J., concurs in part, dissents in part.
. The only one of the defendant's exceptions that we address in this decision is the exception of improper venue. However, in order to resolve that venue exception, we have had to consider the merits of the petition to a very limited extent solely in order to determine whether any tort allegedly occurred in Orleans Parish.
. Our decision in the present case is not inconsistent with our decision in Favorite v. Ochsner, 537 So.2d 722 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988). In Favorite, we held that an exception of venue should be decided before an exception of no cause of action is addressed. In the present case, we have addressed only an exception of venue. We have considered the merits of plaintiff's petition only to the extent necessary to determine whether any tort allegedly occurred in Orleans Parish. Because venue in Orleans Parish is predicated solely upon a tort having occurred there, it is appropriate to examine at least the face of the petition in order to determine whether facts are alleged that, if true, could constitute a tort occurring in Orleans Parish.
. Because the judgment of the trial court dismissed this entire case, with prejudice, the judgment was a final judgment reviewable by appeal rather than on supervisory writs. La. Code Civ. Proc. arts. 1841, 2083. In order to preserve the substantial rights of the parties, we have considered this writ application as an appeal.