Case Name: Gail OLDHAM, Appellant, v. Stephen L. OLDHAM, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1996-11-13
Citations: 683 So. 2d 579
Docket Number: No. 95-1436
Parties: Gail OLDHAM, Appellant, v. Stephen L. OLDHAM, Appellee.
Judges: GLICKSTEIN and SHAHOOD, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 683
Pages: 579–582

Head Matter:
Gail OLDHAM, Appellant, v. Stephen L. OLDHAM, Appellee.
No. 95-1436.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Nov. 13, 1996.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 17, 1996.
Denise Apter and Joel M. Weissman of Weissman & Manoff, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Neil B. Jagolinzer of Christiansen and Jacknin, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
In this dissolution action, the former wife claims error in the trial court's characterization of the appreciation in the land upon which the parties' home was built as non-marital. We agree, and reverse.
The subject property was owned by the husband prior to the marriage, and was valued at $225,000 on the date of the marriage. During the early years of the marriage, the lot remained vacant, but the former husband maintained the land and paid the property taxes. In preparation for the building of the marital home on the property, the parties expended money on various site improvements to the land. Later, they built a home on the site,, which the husband partially financed by mortgaging the property.
At the time of the filing of the petition for dissolution of marriage, the property alone was valued at $375,000. The agreed-upon property appraiser opined that the appreciation in the land was attributed only to the passage of time and market conditions. As a result, the trial court included the proceeds from the sale of the marital home in the equitable distribution, but determined that the enhancement in the value of the land was non-marital.
The trial court's findings with respect to property settlement issues in non-jury dissolution proceedings are presumed correct, Bowen v. Bowen, 347 So.2d 675 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977), and will not be set aside on review unless totally unsupported by competent and substantial evidence. Lee v. Lee, 563 So.2d 754 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)(citing Laufer v. Norma Fashions, Inc., 418 So.2d 437 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)).
Section 61.075(5)(a), Florida Statutes (1993) defines a marital asset as:
(1) Assets acquired and liabilities incurred during the marriage, individually by either spouse or jointly by them;
(2) The enhancement in value and appreciation of nonmarital assets resulting either from the efforts of either party during the marriage or from the contribution to or expenditure thereon of marital funds or other forms of marital assets, or both.
Absent a showing that either marital funds, assets, or the work efforts of one or both spouses contributed to the enhanced value of the asset, the appreciated value of one spouse's nonmarital asset occurring during the marriage is not subject to equitable distribution. Cole v. Roberts, 661 So.2d 370 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Hanks v. Hanks, 553 So.2d 340 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). If the non-marital property is encumbered by a mortgage, however, and marital funds are expended to service the mortgage or to pay taxes, the property then becomes marital even if the enhanced value is due solely to market forces. See Stevens v. Stevens, 651 So.2d 1306 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).
In the instant case, the record shows that the former husband maintained the land, paid the property taxes, and made considerable other site improvements to the property during the term of the marriage; therefore, we hold that the appreciation should be equitably distributed between the parties. On remand, the trial court should distribute one half of the enhanced value of the land, i.e. one-half of $150,000, to the former wife.
After careful consideration of the trial court's award of rehabilitative alimony we find no error and affirm that part of the award.
In that we have changed the scheme of equitable distribution by our reversal on the former wife's first point, we must of necessity reverse the partial award of attorney's fees to the wife, for the trial court to reconsider in light of the changes in the parties' relative financial circumstances following remand.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.
GLICKSTEIN and SHAHOOD, JJ., concur.
POLEN, J., concurs specially with opinion.