Case Name: Thomas BERES, Petitioner, v. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD (LAWSON'S CONVENIENCE STORE), Respondent
Court: Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1991-06-21
Citations: 140 Pa. Commw. 497
Docket Number: No. 1761 C.D. 1990
Parties: Thomas BERES, Petitioner, v. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD (LAWSON’S CONVENIENCE STORE), Respondent.
Judges: Before COLINS and KELLEY, JJ., and BLATT, Senior Judge.
Reporter: Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court Reports
Volume: 140
Pages: 497–504

Head Matter:
593 A.2d 939
Thomas BERES, Petitioner, v. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD (LAWSON’S CONVENIENCE STORE), Respondent.
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.
Submitted on Briefs Feb. 22, 1991.
Decided June 21, 1991.
Petition for Allowance of Appeal Denied Nov. 12, 1991.
Alexander J. Pentecost and Amiel B. Caramanna, for petitioner.
Roy F. Walters Jr. and James A. Mazzotta, for respondent.
Before COLINS and KELLEY, JJ., and BLATT, Senior Judge.

Opinion:
COLINS, Judge.
Thomas Beres (Beres) appeals an order of the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Board) affirming the decision of the referee granting the modification petition of Lawson's Convenience Store (employer). We affirm.
On July 26,1982, Beres suffered a work-related myocardial infarction in the course of his employment with employer and, as a result, he received payments at the total disability rate of $142.00, based on an average weekly wage of $179.93. Employer and its insurance carrier, Aetna Life & Casualty Company, have filed a petition for modification of compensation alleging that as of June 14, 1984, Beres has become partially disabled and that suitable job opportunities have been made available to him within his physical restrictions and geographical area of residence.
The issue in this case pertains to whether the Board properly affirmed the referee's grant of modification. Our scope of review is limited to determining whether findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, whether errors of law were committed, or constitutional rights were violated. Cashmark v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Great A & P Tea Co.), 135 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 464, 580 A.2d 1189 (1990). The referee is the ultimate factfinder in cases such as this where the Board has not taken additional evidence. Investors Diversified Services v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Ho-war), 103 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 562, 520 A.2d 958 (1987). Questions of credibility remain within the exclusive province of the referee who may, in the exercise of discretion, accept or reject a witness' testimony, in whole or in part. Mardee Sportswear v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Franglo, Inc.), 98 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 327, 511 A.2d 905 (1986).
The Supreme Court in Kachinski v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Vepco Construction Co.), 516 Pa. 240, 532 A.2d 374 (1987), articulated four criteria to determine whether a modification petition allowing a claimant to return to work should be granted. These criteria are:
(1) The employer who seeks to modify a claimant's benefits on the basis that he has recovered some or all of his ability must first produce medical evidence of a change in condition.
(2) The employer must then produce evidence of a referral (or referrals) to a then open job (or jobs), which fits in the occupational category for which the claimant has been given medical clearance, e.g., light work, sedentary work, etc.
(3) The claimant must then demonstrate that he has in good faith followed through on the job referral(s).
(4) If the referral fails to result in a job then claimant's benefits should continue.
Id., 516 Pa. at 252, 532 A.2d at 380. Most importantly, the Supreme Court explicitly stated, "the refusal of the employee to pursue a valid job referral can provide a reason for altering benefits." Id.
The record in this case supports the fact that at the time modification was sought, Beres was only partially, not totally disabled. The referee accepted as substantial, competent, and credible the testimony of Dr. Kitsko who opined that Beres was no longer disabled as a result of the cardiac problem related to the episode at work, and that Beres was physically able to perform certain kinds of sedentary work with a limited amount of lifting, bending, squatting, and walking.
Also, evidence in the record indicates that Beres was presented with three job referrals which were analyzed by Melanie Russell, a vocational consultant, and found to be within Beres' physical capabilities and available to him. The referee's findings of fact show that Ms. Russell identified three positions. First, she referred Beres to a position with Enrico's Bakery as a driver/salesperson. Secondly, she identified a position as salesperson with D & L Van Conversions Co., and she referred Beres to an opening with Things Remembered as a salesperson.
Beres argues that the referee's findings of fact are inadequate for appellate review, because the referee failed to answer the question of whether Beres demonstrated that he applied in good faith to the job referrals. We disagree. In findings of fact Nos. 8 through 11, the referee found:
8. Based upon review of the relevant testimony and medical evidence, your Referee accepts as substantial, competent and credible the testimony of Dr. Kitsko that claimant is able to perform within his physical limitations, the three jobs, either as a driver/salesperson with Enrico's Bakery, salesperson with D & L Van Conversions, and [sic] salesperson with Things Remembered.
9. Based upon review of all the relevant testimony and medical evidence, your Referee accepts as substantial, competent and credible the testimony of Ms. Melanie Russell that three positions are available to the claimant, namely, driver/salesperson with Enrico's Bakery, salesperson with D & L Van Conversions, and salesperson with Things Remembered, he is capable of performing within his physical limitations.
10. Based upon review of the relevant testimony and medical evidence, your Referee assigns no probative weight to claimant's testimony regarding his desire and capability of working in the job positions made available to him.
11. Based upon a review of all the testimony and evidence, your Referee finds as a fact that claimant is capable of performing the three job positions made available to him.
Significantly, the referee discredited Beres' testimony regarding his sincerity in applying for the jobs in finding of fact No. 10.
Moreover, deposition testimony of record indicates that Beres failed to apply for the job with Enrico's Bakery. While Beres argues that he applied for the job with Enrico's Bakery, the referee exercised his power to reject this testimony regarding the job application, accepting the testimony of Melanie Russell as to Beres' failure to apply for the job. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has clearly established that the failure to apply for all valid job referrals constitutes grounds for modification of benefits. Kachinski at 252, 532 A.2d at 380. See also Cashmark. We hold that Beres' failure to apply for the job with Enrico's Bakery constitutes bad faith which justifies a modification of benefits.
The above-stated discussion indicates that the referee's findings of fact are adequate for appellate review. The referee is required to find the critical facts upon which to base his conclusions. Furthermore, a referee's findings need only be sufficient "to demonstrate that the fact-finding function was performed and to permit the reviewing court to determine whether substantial evidence supports the conclusions reached." Marcks v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, 65 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 107, 111, 442 A.2d 9, 11 (1982). See also Investors Diversified Services. Findings of fact Nos. 8 through 11 clearly indicate that the referee found the facts which were critical to his decision to modify benefits. Furthermore, the referee's conclusions, regarding the availability of jobs which Beres was capable of performing and related to employer's entitlement to a modification of benefits, are supported by substantial evidence.
Therefore, we affirm the order of the Board granting employer's modification petition.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 21st day of June, 1991, the order of the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board in the above-captioned matter is affirmed.