Case Name: Martin STENSON, Appellant, v. The STATE Of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2000-02-02
Citations: 756 So. 2d 118
Docket Number: No. 3D98-2186
Parties: Martin STENSON, Appellant, v. The STATE Of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and LEVY, and FLETCHER, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 756
Pages: 118–120

Head Matter:
Martin STENSON, Appellant, v. The STATE Of Florida, Appellee.
No. 3D98-2186.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Feb. 2, 2000.
Opinion Granting Rehearing Feb. 28, 2000.
Charles G. White, Miami, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Alison B. Cutler, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and LEVY, and FLETCHER, JJ.

Opinion:
FLETCHER, Judge.
Martin Stenson appeals from a conviction and sentence of one count of burglary of an occupied dwelling with an assault therein, in violation of section 810.02, Florida Statutes (1997), and one count of simple battery, in violation of section 784.03, Florida Statutes (1997). Although appellant raises a number of issues on appeal, we write to address only one — whether there was sufficient evidence of a burglary.
A burglary is defined in section 810.02(1) as "entering or remaining in a dwelling . with the intent to commit an offense therein, unless . the defendant is licensed or invited to enter or remain." Therefore, courts have construed consent to enter and remain to be an affirmative defense to the crime of burglary. See, e.g., State v. Hicks, 421 So.2d 510 (Fla.1982). As explained in Ray v. State, 522 So.2d 963, 965 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988), "once consensual entry is complete, a consensual 'remaining in' begins" and to transform this into a burglary, there must be "proof that consent to 'remaining in' has been withdrawn." Although the victim in this case admitted that she invited the defendant into her home to talk, she also testified that she repeatedly asked the defendant to leave when he began beating her. This constituted sufficient proof that consent to remain was withdrawn.
The cases upon which appellant relies, Marquez v. State, 721 So.2d 1206 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) and McCoy v. State, 723 So.2d 869 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998), are not controlling, In neither case was there any evidence that the initial consent was withdrawn.
Finding no merit in the defendant's remaining contentions, we affirm the judgment entered below in all respects.
Affirmed.
LEVY, J., concurs.
. We agree with the State that Miller v. State, 733 So.2d 955 (Fla.1998) did not overrule Ray v. State. As expressly stated in the revised opinion, Miller v. State, 733 So.2d 955, 957 n. 1 (Fla.1999), that case did not involve the licensee or invitee affirmative defenses.