Case Name: BERGER MANUFACTURING COMPANY, Respondent, v. LLOYD et al., Appellants
Court: St. Louis Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1905-05-16
Citations: 113 Mo. App. 205
Docket Number: 
Parties: BERGER MANUFACTURING COMPANY, Respondent, v. LLOYD et al., Appellants.
Judges: 
Reporter: Missouri Appeal Reports
Volume: 113
Pages: 205–216

Head Matter:
BERGER MANUFACTURING COMPANY, Respondent, v. LLOYD et al., Appellants.
St. Louis Court of Appeals,
May 16, 1905.
(Opinion by Goode, J.)
1. BUILDING CONTRACT: Bond: Construction. Where a contractor under a contract with a Board of Education for the erection of a school building, gave bond for the faithful performance of his contract, which contract provided that he should pay the wages “of artisans and laborers and all those employed by or furnishing material to the said party of the second part” (the contractor), one who furnished to a subcontractor material which the latter manufactured and used in the erection of the building, was not protected by the terms of the contract and could not recover on the bond.
(Dissenting opinion by Bland, P. J.)
2. -: -: -. Where a contractor, under a contract with a Board of Education to build a school building, gave bond for the performance of his contract, which bond provided that he should make payments “for all materials used in the work pro- . vided for in the contract and specifications,” this provision was intended to protect all those who would have been entitled to mechanic’s liens against it, had it been a private building, and one furnishing to a subcontractor material which was manufactured and used in the building, was entitled to sue and recover on the bond for such material in case he was not paid.
3. PRACTICE: Argument. Where counsel by misunderstanding was denied the right to argue his case to the jury, it was error.
4. -: -: Harmless Error. But where the-.question was purely one of law and a different verdict would have had to he set aside, the error in refusing to allow the counsel to ' argue the case was harmless.
Appeal from St. Louis City Circuit Court. — Hon. Warioich Hough, Judge.
Reversed.
Henry A. Hamilton for appellants.
(1) A contract between two parties upon a valid consideration may be enforced by a third party, when entered into for tbe benefit of such third party, even though he may not be mentioned in the contract, and though he was not privy to the consideration. Rogers v. Gosnell, 58 Mo. 590; State ex rel. v. Gaslight Co., 102 Mo. 482, 14 S. W. 974, 15 S. W. 383; Ellis v. Harrison, 104 Mo. 270, 16 S. W. 198; City to use v. Von Phul, 133 Mo. 561, 34 S. W. 843; Devers v. Howard, 144 Mo. 671, 46 S. W. 625; School District v. Livers, 147 Mo. 580, 49 S. W. 507; Bethany v. Howard, 149 Mo. 504, 51 S. W. 94; Lime & Cement Co. v. Wind, '86 Mo. App. 163. (2) No one has a right of action on an agreement except those who are in the minds of the parties as beneficiaries of its provisions, and it must be determined from the language employed in the instrument what parties were intended as beneficiaries by the parties to the agreement. State ex rel. v. Loomis, 88 Mo. App. 500; Howsman v. Water Co., 119 Mo. 304, 25 S. W. 200; State v. Railroad, 125 Mo. 596, 28 S. W. 1074; Porter v. Woods, 138 Mo. 539, 39 S. W. 794; Ins. Co. v. Water Co., 42 Mo. App. 118. (3) The contract and bond involved in the case at bar must be construed together, and the obligation of the sureties on the bond should not be enlarged beyond what is warranted by a fair and reasonable construction of its terms. Sexton y. Anderson, 95 Mo. 373, 8 S. W. 564; Houck v. Frisbee, 66 Mo. App. 16; Bauer v. Cabanne, 105 Mo. 110, 16 S. W. 531; Cochrane v. Stewart, 63 Mo. 424; Earth y. Allen, 55 Mo. App. 107; Bricken y. Stone, 47 Mo<. App. 530. (4) The privilege of argument by counsel is established by precedent and guaranteed by constitutional law. Counsel is recognized as constituting an element in judicial investigations; his right of argument to the jury cannot be denied. Proffat on Jury Trials, sec. 248, (Ed. 1877) ; Weeks on Attorney at Law, (2 Ed.), 240.; Reagan v. Transit Co., 180 M'o. 117, 79 S. W. 435.
B. M. Nichols for respondent,
(1) Plaintiff, materialman of the subcontractor the Quernheim Company, is embraced with the meaning of the bond, both in its literal interpretation and under repeated decision. The clause of the bond under interpretation follows: “Shall make payment to the parties furnishing same for all material used in the work, . . . and for all labor performed on such work, whether by sub-contract or otherwise.” Lime & Cement Có. v. Wind, 86 Mo. App. 163; State ex rel. v. Loomis, 88 Mo. App, 500; Forge'Co. v. Cullen & Stock, 105 Mo. App. 484, 79 S. W. 1024; City of St. Louis, etc., v. Von Phul, 133 Mo. 565, 34 S. W. 843; Devers y. Howard, 144 Mo. 671, 46 S. W. 625; School District y. Livers, 147 Mo. 581, 49 S. W. 507; Bethany y. Howard, 149 Mo. 504, 51 S. W. 94; Crone v. Stinde, 156 Mo. 263, 55 S. W. 863, 56 S. W. 907; Lime & Cement Co y. Citizens Bank, 158 Mo. 273, 59 S. W. 109. (2) The testimony of the defendant in the case under the pleadings was sufficient to warrant a verdict for the plaintiff. There was no disputed fact to go to the jury for discussion, and the court was right in directing counsel that there was nothing to argue. 1 Thompson on Trials, 703, 721; Neidig v. Cole, 13 Neb. 39; 2 Encyclopedia of P. & P., 700; Houck y. One, 80 Neb. 113; Douglas v. Hill, 29 Kan. 528; Dixon y. Burke, 25 Ga. 226; Dunkard v. Railroad, 34 Md. 197; Trice y. Railroad, 35 Mo. 416.

Opinion:
GOODE, J.
— The Berger Manufacturing Company (plaintiff) sold to Quernheim Sheet Metal Works Company some galvanized iron and solder out of which the Quernheim Company manufactured the guttering, spouting and other sheet metal articles which were needed in the construction of the Ralph Waldo Emerson School Building in the city of St. Louis. Hiram Lloyd had the contract with the St. Louis Board of Education to erect that schoolhouse. He made a contract with the Quernheim Company to furnish him the guttering and other sheet metal articles he would need in constructing the house according to the contract. The testimony of William H. Quernheim, President of the Quernheim Company was that said company purchased from the plaintiff (Berger Manufacturing Co.) 12,430 pounds of galvanized .iron at $3.99 a hundred pounds and 105 pounds of solder at 17 cents a pound, making a total of $513. 81. These materials were delivered by the Berger Company at the Quernheim Company's 'shops and made by the latter company into gutters, spouts and hot-air pipes. The manufactured articles were delivered by the Quernheim Company to Hiram Lloyd at the Ralph Waldo Emerson School Building and were accepted and fully paid for by Lloyd. It seems the Quernheim Company put the spouting on the building. The contract between Lloyd and the board of education for the erection of the schoolhouse, after setting out the nature of the work to be done and the other details of the contract, and providing how Lloyd should be paid in different installments and that he should be paid the last installment four months after the.acceptance of the building by the boar! of education, contains this clause;
"Provided that the wages of artisans and laborers, and all those employed by or furnishing materials to the said party of the second part, shall have been paid and satisfied; and in case the said party of the second part shall fail so to pay and satisfy all and every claim and demand against said building as aforesaid, the said party of the first part may, if it deems proper so to do, retain from the moneys due and coming to said party of the second part enough to pay and satisfy such claims and demands, and therewith pay such claims, it being, however, understood that nothing herein contained shall in any way be construed as impairing the right of said party of the first part to hold the said party of the second part, or his sureties liable on their bond for any breach of the conditions of the same."
The bond in suit was given by Lloyd for the faithful performance of his contract. The paragraph we have quoted from the contract shows the intention of the board of education was to require Lloyd to pay the wages of artisans and laborers who worked on the building and all persons employed by or furnishing material "to the party of the second part;" that is, to Lloyd. Lloyd had nothing to do with the Berger Manufacturing Company and it furnished him no material. He made a contract with the Quernheim Company to furnish guttering and spouting for the building and paid said company for those articles when they were delivered or after-wards. The Quernheim Company bought but never paid for the materials out of which it manufactured said articles. In my judgment the Berger Company did not furnish any material to Lloyd within the meaning of the contract and, hence, has no right of action on the bond given to secure faithful performance of the contract. I therefore favor a reversal of the judgment. Judge Wortoni concurs in this opinion and the judgment of the court below is accordingly reversed.