Case Name: The City of Spokane Falls, Appellant, v. J. J. Browne and Anna W. Browne, Respondents
Court: Washington Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Washington
Decision Date: 1891-11-12
Citations: 3 Wash. 84
Docket Number: No. 313
Parties: The City of Spokane Falls, Appellant, v. J. J. Browne and Anna W. Browne, Respondents.
Judges: 
Reporter: Washington Reports
Volume: 3
Pages: 84–92

Head Matter:
[No. 313.
Decided November 12, 1891.]
The City of Spokane Falls, Appellant, v. J. J. Browne and Anna W. Browne, Respondents.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — ASSESSMENTS POR LOCAL IMPROVEMENTS— VALIDITY — APPEAL—NOTICE—TIME.
A party is not estopped by giving a premature and ineffectual notice of appeal, on the supposition that judgment had been rendered in the cause, from thereafter, upon the actual rendition of judgment, giving another notice and pi\ secuting his appeal.
Under the provision of law requiring notice of appeal to he served within six months from date of judgment, where the last day of such period of limitation falls upon Sunday, notice given upon the following day is sufficient.
In the assessment of property for taxation, the omission of the assessor to prefix the usual dollar mark to the amount of the valuation of the property, or of the taxes thereon, is not sufficient to render the assessment roll nugatory.
The provision of the organic act (Rev. St. U. S., fj 1924), declaring that “all taxes shall he equal and uniform, and no distinction shall he made in the assessment between different kinds of property,” etc., has reference to general taxation only, and not to special assessments for local municipal improvements. Sec. 7 of the charter of Spokane Falls (Laws 1885-6, p. 302), providing that “real estate only shall be assessed ” for local improvements is, therefore, not unconstitutional.
Ordinance No. S3 of the -city of Spokane Falls, providing for including both the land and all the improvements thereon in all assessments for the grading of streets, is void as being in contravention of § 7 of the charter of said city, authorizing assessments upon ■“real estate only,” and assessments made under such ordinance cannot he sustained.
Where property has been assessed 'which should not have been placed upon the assessment roll, a court has no power to disregard it and let the assessment stand for the amount justly chargeable.
. In an action by a city to collect an assessment for the expenses of a street improvement, it can only recover by showing a strict compliance with the provisions of its charter.
Appeal from Superior Court, Spokane County.
The facts in this case are stated in the opinion.
H. E. Houghton, and Jones, Belt & Quinn, for appellant.
Jones & Voorhees, for respondents.

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Andeks, O. J.
Respondents move the court to dismiss this appeal for the alleged reasons that the notice of appeal was not given within the time prescribed by law; that the statement of facts is not certified, as required by law; that the notice, or pretended notice, of appeal was never legally served; and that no transcript has been prepared and filed in this' court, as required by law. The argument of counsel for respondents upon the motion was mainly directed to the objection that the notice of appeal was not filed or served in time. It is claimed by counsel that the appeal was taken by giving notice thereof in open court on the 5th day of January, 1891, and that, having abandoned that appeal, appellant could not appeal again by subsequently giving written notice. It appears from an examination of the record that on the day above mentioned the judge who tried the cause announced in open court that he found for the defendant, whereupon counsel for plaintiff, no doubt thinking that judgment in the cause had been rendered by the court, gave notice of appeal to the supreme court. The fact is, however, that the court did not render judgment on said day, but on the 2d day of February, 1891, at which time the court filed its findings of fact and conclusions of law, and ordered the action dismissed at the cost of plaintiff. There being no judgment to appeal from, the first notice of appeal was treated by appellant as a nullity; and we do not think that by so doing appellant should be deprived of the right to appeal from the judgment by which it claims to have been injured. To hold that a party is estopped, by giving a premature and ineffectual notice, from thereafter prosecuting his appeal, would be to deprive him of a legal right upon a mere technicality, unsupported by reason, and contrary to the spirit and policy of the law. We cannot assent to such a doctrine, and therefore hold that the written notice of appeal was properly given, if not barred by lapse of time. This second notice was served on July 25,1891, but was not filed in the office of the clerk until August 3, 1891. As the six months' limitation expired on the 2d day of August, counsel for respondents insists that the filing of the notice was one day too late. That would be true under ordinary circumstances, but in this instance the last day of the time limited fell upon Sunday, and, according to the rule of computation prescribed by the legislature, that day must be excluded. See Code Wash. § 743. The notice was therefore served and filed intime. The remaining objections to the statement of facts are not well taken. The certificate to the statement of facts is sufficient, and the amended proof of service of the notice of appeal shows that it was not served on Sunday, as claimed by respondents. The motion to strike the statement is denied.