Case Name: Clarence Jamison v. Leontine J. McWhorter
Court: Delaware Court of Errors and Appeals
Jurisdiction: Delaware
Decision Date: 1885-06-03
Citations: 7 Houst. 242
Docket Number: 
Parties: Clarence Jamison v. Leontine J. McWhorter.
Judges: 
Reporter: Delaware Reports
Volume: 12
Pages: 242–261

Head Matter:
Clarence Jamison v. Leontine J. McWhorter.
Devise—Trust Estate—Limitation to Children—Life Estate— Dower to Mortgage.
A trust estate cannqt be supported where no active duty is to be performed by the trustee, and the whole management of the property is in the hands of the cestui que trust.
The testator devised a certain farm to his executor in trust for certain uses, etc., and then directs as follows:
“To permit and suffer my son Clarence to use, occupy, and rent, and to receive the rents, issues, and profits of the said Capelle farm during the term of his natural life, for his proper use and benefit, and in case of the death of the said Clarence, leaving a child or children, or the issue of such, remainder to such child or children or the issue of such, their heirs and assigns, free and discharged from the aforesaid trust.” “In case of the death of any of my said sons * * * without leaving child or children, or the issue of such, the share of the one so dying shall go to the survivor or survivors, or the issue of such, as may be deceased, subject to the same conditions, etc., as their own property.”
The rule in Shelly’s Case has no application. The limitation to the child or children of Clarence, who had none at the time, and to the issue of such of them as should be dead at the time of his death, leaving issue, is to the children as a class in remainder; and Clarence takes an estate for life and hot an estate tail.
The will of the testator containing no authority to mortgage the premises to raise money for the maintenance of the sons, the Court of Chancery has no power to authorize the same, and no title can be acquired by the sale by the sheriff in execution of the m rtgage upon the said premises.
Houston, J., dissents.
(June 3, 1885.)
Case Stated on questions reserved by the Superior Court for New Castle County.
John H. Rodney, for plaintiff:
The case originates upon an agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant for the sale of land, and non-performance of that agreement by the defendant upon the ground of insufficiency of title in the plaintiff.
The plaintiff’s title arises under the will of his father, Thomas Jamison (hereafter set forth), and involves the construction of that will presenting two principal questions:
1st. Whether the plaintiff took a life estate in the premises (“ inter alia”) in question.
2d. Whether, if so, that life estate has been enlarged by the subsequent devise.
The will of Thomas Jamison devises as follows:
“ I give and devise unto my executor and the guardian hereinafter named and appointed for my minor children all my estate, real and personal, not herein otherwise disposed of, to have and to hold the same unto them or the survivor or survivors of them, in trust. nevertheless for the uses, intents, and purposes hereinafter set torth and declared.” Then as follows:—“ To have and to hold the farm known as the Capelle Farm, containing about two hundred and twelve acres, situate in Red Lion hundred, in trust, to rent the same to good and careful tenants, at the best cash or share rents attainable, as in their judgments shall be most advantageous, and to collect, expend, and invest the same as hereinafter provided, until the majority of my youngest son who shall live to attain the age of twenty-one years.” Then follows a provision to raise a charge upon the premises for the purpose of equalizing the estate among his children, and following that direction, then “ To permit and suffer my son Clarence to use, occupy, and rent, and to receive the rents, issues, and profits of the said Capelle Farm during the term of his natural life, for his proper use and benefit, and in case of the death of the said Clarence, leaving a child or children, or the issue of such, remainder to such child or .children or the issue of such, their heirs and assigns, free and discharged from the aforesaid trust.” Then follows,—“ In case of the death of any of my said sons” (naming them), “ without leaving child or children, or the issue of such, the share of the one so dying shall go (to) the survivor or survivors, or the issue of such, as may be deceased, subject to the same conditions, etc., as their own property.”
It is admitted that the trustee has performed the duties specifically enjoined upon him, and that no guardian who in the will was named with the executor as trustee was ever appointed by the testator, but afterwards was by the Orphans’ Court.
This therefore is a devise first to trustees for certain defined and specific purposes, whose duties and interest in the estate are limited.
It is a conceded principle of law that the estate of trustees continues only so long as the purposes of the trust require it. When the object and aim of the trust has been served, then the legal estate in the trustees ceases, and the person entitled to the beneficial interest takes it, even where there are words of inheritance in the devise to trustees.
In this case the trustees took the estate to manage until the majority of the youngest child, then to raise a charge upon the same for the purpose of equalizing the property, and after that to permit and suffer each son named to take the rents, issues, and profits, and use, occupy, and rent the same for his proper use and benefit,—these terms being stronger than many of the cases supporting the principle. It is admitted that the youngest child came of age May, A. D. 1878.
1 Powell Dev., 223; 1 Barn. & Cres., 360 (341); 2 Exch., 58 (593); 4 Exchequer, 550 (569); 21 Penna. St., 81; 7 Term. Rep., 433, 652; Hawkins on Wills, 143; 6 Ad. & Ellis, 860.
In this case, therefore, it is confidently assumed that when the youngest child arrived at majority, and the duties of the trustees had been performed, and the “ cestui que use” directed to have the property, the legal estate vested in him, the devisee of the beneficial use, and vested in him as a legal estate for life. This reaches, thérefore, the second point:
How did the estate for life vest in Clarence Jamison, the “ cestui que use ?”
The provision in the will directing the trustees “ to permit and suffer Clarence Jamison to take the rents and profits,” etc., during his natural life, gives him an estate for life.
The property in question, which is mentioned in the agreement sued upon, is part of the Capelle Farm, and as such included in the above demise. This principle is intimately connected with and flows from the rule as laid down above as to the estate of the ,trustees.
In short, the duties of the trustee ceasing, and the direction being to permit and suffer the “ cestui que use” to take the rents and profits, he takes the legal estate.
1 Powell Dev., 221; 12 East, 455; 4 Taunton, 822; 2 Taunton, 109; 2 Salkeld, 679; 2 Jarman Wills, 202 ; 4 B. & Ad., 33 ; 6 Ad. & Ellis, 860.
Upon these authorities and the language of the will, by implication of law, Clarence Jamison took an estate for life, as full and perfect as if specifically devised to him.
The next question is the principal one in the case, and upon it the determination of it depends. Undoubtedly the rule in Shelly’s case prevails in this State. Griffith v. Derringer, 5 Harr., 484.
That rule is to the effect that if in any instrument an estate of freehold is given to one (say for life), and by the same instrument either mediately or immediately is given to his heirs either in fee or in tail, the second estate, whether fee or tail, vests in the first taker. In such cases those words are words of limitation, showing a continuance of the estate of the first taker; but where it is construed that the second taker takes not through or because of the ancestor, but directly from the testator, there the words are words of purchase and the rule does not attach.
The two estates must be of like character^ i. e. both legal or both equitable; but it is submitted that the estate of Clarence Jami-son is a legal estate, arising from implication of law.
The rule in Shelly’s case applies equally where the ancestor takes a freehold by express limitation, by resulting trust, or by implication of law. 2 Kent Com., 215.
The question therefore now is, Does the rule in Shelly’s case apply ? and, considering the devise after the death of Clarence Jamison (he having a legal estate for life), are the words there used words of limitation or of purchase ?
It is not denied that ordinarily the word “ children” in a will is used as a word of purchase and not of limitation. Still, as courts have sometimes construed the word “ heirs” and even “ heirs of the body” to be words of purchase, so have the words “ child” or “ children” been construed as words of limitation, in order to effectuate the intention of the testator. The rule of construction is not so binding and absolute but that it may admit of variation.
Price v. Taylor, 4 Casey (Penna.), 95, Lowrie, J.
It will be remembered that at the time this will was made and went into operation there were no children “ in esse.” That, however, is only mentioned as a means to arrive at the intention of the testator,—showing that the words were not used as “ descriptio personarum,” and as such have no application.
The intention of the testator is that after the life estate and through the life tenant his descendents, children, issue, or heirs shall take, using the words therefore as “nomen collectivim,” and intending to convey the whole interest in the direction of Clarence Jami-son and his heirs. If this be so, then the estate in fee limited to the general heirs of the ancester (Clarence Jamison) by the operation of the rule (Shelly’s case), becomes in him a fee simple, or fee tail,—in 1 Powell Dev., 334, “It is immaterial whether ‘the heirs’ are described under that or any other denomination, as ‘issues’ or ‘ son,’ which cases create an estate tail in the first taker.
Doe Dem., Jones v. Davis, 4 Barn. & Ad., 43; Mellish v. Mellish, 2 Barn. & Cres., 520.
If this be true, therefore, that the testator uses the words “ child, etc.,” as the denomination of a class, that class being the descendants of the ancestor, then the words should be read as if they were “ heirs,”—and to this effect is a very strong case in point, M’Kee v. McKinley, 9 Casey, 92. So in the present case the intention of the testator is that the estate should go in fee to those who could be the heirs of Clarence Jamison. The estate given is not distributive, i. e., in shares, bnfc generally to children and issue and their heirs; giving the whole estate to those who would take as heirs, and therefore indicating the intention of the testator that the heirs shall take. If this intention as to the second estate is plain, the fact that he intended a life estate to the ancestor, and no more, can make no difference. While he might have intended a life estate to the first taker, if he intended the second devise to be equivalent to a devise to the heirs of Clarence Jamison, there the rule applies,—the word “ child ” or “ children ” becoming words of limitation.
Steacy v. Rice, 3 Casey, 75 (cited in 9 Casey, 92.)
In this connection the word issue as used is still further indicative that the testator was merely pointing out the line of transmission, and not indicating the persons with particularity. He was expressing his intention that the heirs of the first taker should take the fee. Therefore, although his intention might have been plain that Clarence Jamison should have only an interest for his life, if his intention was also that the children and their issue generally of Clarence Jamison—using those words as descriptive of his heirs— should take the remaining fee, then, by the rule in Shelly’s case, Clarence Jamison takes a fee simple or fee tail. The devise over to the other sons has no effect, for the evident intention of the testator was that the heirs of Clarence Jamison should take, and if that is so, the devise falls under the preceding principle.
The intention of the testator can be gathered from the first devise to Albert Jamison, where in express terms he says, “if he should die without issue,” showing that he uses the word “children” as general heirs.
As to the last point, namely, the sale under the mortgage given by direction of the Chancellor. At the time that mortgage was given, the legal estate was in the trustee, the youngest son not having arrived at the age of twenty-one years. If the mortgage was properly given under the order of the Chancellor, then the condition under which the estate was to go out of the trustee never arose.
In Perry on Trusts, 717, it is laid down, that while trustees cannot sell trust proper, yet courts of equity, upon cause shown, may decree a sale; and if a sale, a mortgage, which is a conditional sale. Perry on Trusts, 719. It is true that the devise is to the guardian, to expend the rents and profits for maintenance of the minors. These rents and profits were to come through the hands of the trustee, and the trustee, by his petition to the Chancellor? represented that those funds were not sufficient for the purpose designated. While therefore the trustee could not, considering the devise of the rents and profits for a specific purpose to be to him, sell the property, yet the authority of the Chancellor was properly exercised, and the limitation in the order of the court to pay the mortgage out of the rents and profits in three years was directory only to the trustee, and cannot affect the security of the mortgage; for if he did not, which he did not, the mortgagee alone could look to the premises mortgaged as security for his debt. It was for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the will that the order of the Chancellor was made.
The plaintiff therefore insists that he can give a good fee simple title to the lands and premises mentioned in the said agreement,
1st, Under the sale on the mortgage ordered by the Chancellor;
2d, Under the construction of the will of Thomas Jamison.
Alexander B. Cooper, for defendant:
What estate has Clarence Jamison under the will of his father in the farm known as the “ Capelle Farm,” a part of which he has agreed to sell? or presuming he had no legal estate, under the will.
What title (if any) did he obtain to the farm by virtue of his being the purchaser at the sheriff’s sale, upon the mortgage ?
I admit,
1st, That the trustee under the first provision of the will took the legal estate,—subject of course to the trusts imposed upon him, and to be determined when they were executed or performed; but that the active purposes of the trust ended “ at the majority of the testator’s youngest son, who lived to attain the age of twenty-one,” and at that time the legal estate was transferred to the “ cestui que trust”
When real estate is devised to trustees, although with words of inheritance, prima facie, the trustees only take so much of the legal estate as the active purposes of the trust require.
Hawkins on Wills, 143, and cases cited.
This being true, what is the legal force and effect of the subsequent trust in the will ?—“ in trust, to permit and suffer my son Clarence to use, occupy, and rent, and to receive the rents, issues, and profits of the said ' Capelle farm’ during the term of his natural life, for his proper use and benefit, and in case of the death of the said Clarence leaving a child or children, or the issue of such, remainder to such (child) or children.”
I also admit that, under this provision, Clarence took the legal estate; for although a devise of real estate to a trustee, in trust to pay the rents and profits to A, vests the legal estate in the trustee, yet when the devise to the trustee is a trust, to permit and suffer A to receive them vests ths legal estate in A.
Hawkins on Wills, 140, and cases cited; 2 Jarman on Wills, 294, &c.
The language of the testator is even stronger than the principle of the law requires. He says not only “ to permit and suffer” his son Clarence to receive rents, issues, and profits, but to use, occupy, and rent the land itself.
The principal question therefore is, What is the extent of Clarence’s legal estate? Is it within the purview and operation of the rule in Shelly’s case ? that is, is the word “ child” or “ children” a word of purchase or limitation ? Is it a starting of a new stock, or do they take through their ancestors by descent ?
I respectfully submit that the interest of Clarence Jamison (the plaintiff) in the land in question, is a life estate in terms,—“ for the term of his natural life,” and that the rule in Shelly’s case does not apply to the words “ child” or “ children” as used in the will The word "child” or “ children” is always presumed to be a word of purchase, and the onus or burden is on the objector (the defendant in this case) to show that the testator has used them in the sense of “ heirs,”—that such was his intention, and the intention must be manifest and plain.
And the court will observe in this connection that the devise to the “ children” is not immediate,—that is, to Clarence and his “ children,”—for in that case, under the resolution in Wild’s case he having no children in esse at the time of the devise, he would take an estate tail. But here it is by way of a remainder, after an estate for life, to the child or children who shall survive him,—or such as he shall leave at his death; making it an entirely different case, so that the fact that Clarence had no “ children” at the time of the devise, can and does not affect the case in the least; the rule of law being that when words of purchase are used, such as a devise to “ A and his children” the children must be in esse, at the time of the devise, so as to take immediately, jointly, concurrently with the parent. If they are not in esse, of course they cannot so take, and in such case the word “ children,” to have any meaning, must be construed as “ heirs.” But where they take in remainder, after a life estate, it is only necessary for them to be in existence when the particular estate determines, for they do not take until then.
Wild’s Case, 3 Coke Report (part 6, 16 b.) 288; Guthrie’s Appeal, 37 Penna. St., 9 ; 2 Powell on Devises, 299, 495; Clew’s Appeal, 37 Penna. St., 23.
When an express limitation to a particular class of issue by an appropriate term of designation, as “ children,” “ sons,” “daughters,” etc., is followed by the words “ in default of issue,” or similar words introducing an ulterior devise, these words are referable to the objects of that limitation, and do not enlarge the preceding gift.
Hayes on Dispositions of R. E., 32, 107 (7 Law Library, 16 and 58); Hawkins on Wills, 191-255.
The only remaining question is as to the title conferred (if any) by the sale under the mortgage given by the trustee in pursuance of the order of the Chancellor.
It is conceded that the will gives no authority to the trustee to make such a mortgage.
Also, that the order of the Chancellor confers no such power, but restricts the trustee to the rents and profits as security for the sum borrowed.
The trustee exceeded his authority, and therefore no title could be given by the sheriff’s deed.
The plaintiff’s title is derived solely from the will of his father, which I submit is only an estate for life, with the remainder to his children in tail.

Opinion:
Comegys, C. J. :
The questions submitted by the foregoing case, are, in effect—
1st. What estate did Clarence Jamison take under the will of his father, the testator ?
2d. Was the mortgage made, of the " Capelle Farm," by virtue of lawful authority?
There are two conclusions which may be drawn from the language employed by the testator in settling his estate. That language —or rather so much of it as concerns the question of title is in these words—bringing the several expressions together :
" I give, devise and bequeath unto my said executor and the guardian hereinafter named and appointed for my minor children all my estate, real and personal, not herein otherwise disposed of, to have and to hold the same unto them, or the survivor of them, the survivor's heirs and assigns. In trust nevertheless for the uses, intents and purposes hereinafter set forth and declared." " To have and to hold the farm known as the 1 Capelle Farm,' containing about two hundred' and twelve acres, situated in Red Lion hundred, and the farm known as the ' Homestead Farm,' containing about two hundred and thirty acres, situated in St. Georges hundred aforesaid. In trust to rent the same to good and careful tenants at the best cash on share rents attainable as in their judgments shall be most advantageous, and to collect, expend and invest the same as hereinafter provided until the majority of my youngest son who shall live to attain the age of twenty-one years, then to raise out of or charge upon the said farms respectively such sum or sums as shall be necessary to make equal the shares of my sons Edgar, Clarence and Oliver, as hereinafter provided, and subject to such charge and condition. To permit and suffer my son Clarence to use, occupy and rent, and to receive the rents, issues and profits of the said ' Capelle Farm ' during the term of his natural life for his proper use and benefit, and in case of the death of the said Clarence leaving a child or children, or the issue of such, remainder to such child or children or the issue of such, their heirs and assigns free and discharged from the aforesaid trust."
" In case of the death of any of my said sons Edgar, Clarence and Oliver, without leaving any child or children or the issue of such, the share of the one so dying shall go (to) the survivors, or survivor and the issue of such as may be deceased subject to the same conditions and limitations as their own shares respectively hereinbefore designated."
It was the obvious purpose of the testator to keep the lands in the hands of his trustees during the life of his sons respectively; but he was not aware of the rule of law that a trust estate cannot be supported where no active duty is to be performed by the trustee, and the whole management of the property is in the hands of the cestui que trust. When, therefore, the testator provided, as he did, with respect to the " Capelle Farm" and the " Homestead Farm," he in effect gave his sons respectively legal estates in them.
We are then to consider the devise, with respect to the " Capelle Farm " as a disposition of a legal estate: the question is what legal estate ? The plaintiff contends that the devise to him is of an estate of inheritance in fee-simple, or fee-tail which can be turned into a fee; the defendant that a life estate only is given him. They both cite authorities in support of their respective contentions. The testator's sons were unmarried and ^without issue at his death.
It may be considered settled law that where lands are devised to a person and his children, it is to them equally as tenants in common where there are any living at the date of the will; but that where there are none at that time, the words are held to be those of limitation, and the same as heirs of the body or issue. There could not well be a different construction. Adopting the reasoning of Wild's ease, 6 Coke, 17, the children cannot take as immediate devisees, not being in rerum natura; nor in remainder, for the devise is immediate. But this is not a will of that kind, and Wild's case does not govern it. Here the testator devises to Clarence, his son, a legal estate, for life expressly, and in case of his death leaving a child or children or the issue of such remainder to such child or children or the issue of such, their heirs and assigns, etc., and in case of his death without leaving child or children or the issue of such, his share shall go to Oliver and Edgar, or the survivor of them, and the issue of such one of them as may be then dead leaving issue, subject, ect. This is the effect of the language used by the testator.
The rule in Shelly's case has no application to the devise to to the testator's sons. Neither in the construction of a deed or will, where the words " child" or " children" are used, and not heirs or heirs of the body, has the rule any place. 3 Greenleaf Cruise, Tit. 38, Chap. 14, Sec. 39; Tit. 32, Chap. 23, Sec. 28. There is, therefore, no embarassment of decision on account of that rule.
It seems impossible to distinguish this case, in principle, from that of Loddington v. Kime, 3 Lev., 431; 1 Salk., 224; 1 Ld. Raym., 203. There the devise was to A for life without impeach ment of waste, and in case he should have any issue male to such issue male and his heirs forever, and if A died without issue male, etc., A was held to be tenant for life, with a contingent remainder to his issue in fee, and a concurrent contingent remainder to the ulterior devisee. See Hayes on Estates Tail (7 Law Lib.), 29 and 30, and Table IV. And in Wild's case it is said to have been resolved (the reference is to Moor, 220) " that if a man, as in the case at bar, devises land to husband and wife and after their decease to their children, in this case although they have not any child at the time, yet every child which they shall have after, may take by way of remainder according to the rule of law." The reason given is " for his intent appears that their children should riot take immediately but after the decease of Rowland (the husband) and wife."
Further. Where there is a limitation to children in remainder as a class, it will vest in them as they come in esse, and will open and let in each successive member of the class until the determination of the particular estate. Doe v. Penrhyn, 3 T. R., 484, cited in 3d Greenl, Cruise, 213, note 1. In this case there is a limitation to the child or children of Clarence, who had none at the time. It is to them as a class, and to the issue of such of them as should be dead, at the time of his death, leaving issue. This shows that they were to take together, and not in succession one after the other, and precludes the idea of an estate tail. It would add nothing to the import of the language used, to have provided that they should take as tenants in common. A.nd, then, the children and grand children were to take in remainder; which they could not do if Clarence had an estate tail. Issue in tail do not take in remainder, but by descent per formam doni.
From these authorities it seems clear that Clarence Jamison took only an estate for life under his father's will in the Capelle Farm.
With respect to the question of title acquired by Clarence Jamison under the sale by the sheriff in execution of the mortgage made by the Trustee under the order of the Court of Chancery of New Castle county—there does not appear to be in the will of the testator any authority to make a mortgage of the premises to raise money for the maintenance and education of the testator's sons; nor was there any, as it appears to me, in the said Court to make such order. The whole proceedings for sale of the Capelle Farm, therefore, appear to have been without authority.