Case Name: Louis K. JOHNSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1990-02-22
Citations: 557 So. 2d 203
Docket Number: No. 89-43
Parties: Louis K. JOHNSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: DANIEL, C.J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 557
Pages: 203–207

Head Matter:
Louis K. JOHNSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 89-43.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Feb. 22, 1990.
James B. Gibson, Public Defender and Daniel J. Schafer, Asst. Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee and Fleming Lee, Assistant Atty. Gen., and Robin A. Compton, Certified Legal Intern, Daytona Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
GOSHORN, Judge.
Louis K. Johnson appeals his sentence imposed following a revocation of probation. Because he was given an illegal sentence, we reverse and remand for resen-tencing.
In 1985, Johnson plead guilty to shooting into an occupied conveyance and was given a true split sentence of 5½ years in the Department of Corrections with the provision that after serving 2¾⅛ years in prison, the balance of his sentence would be suspended and he would be placed on 3 years' probation.
In 1988 Johnson plead no contest to violating his probation. The recommended guideline range was 12 to 30 months in the Department of Corrections or Community Control. The one cell increase, allowed for the violation of probation, placed the recommended range at 2lk to 3V2 years' incarceration. The trial court departed without written reasons and recommitted Johnson to 15 years in the Department of Corrections with the provision that he serve 10 years, after which he would be placed on probation for 5 years.
Upon revocation of probation after incarceration pursuant to a true split sentence, the trial court is limited to recommitting a defendant
to any period of time not exceeding the remaining balance of the withheld or suspended portion of the original sentence, provided that the total period of incarceration, including time already served, may not exceed the one-cell upward increase permitted by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.701(d)14. Any further departure for violation of probation is not allowed. Lambert v. State, 545 So.2d 838, 841-842 (Fla.1989).
Franklin v. State, 545 So.2d 851, 852 (Fla.1989). See also Poore v. State, 531 So.2d 161 (Fla.1988).
Accordingly, this cause is remanded for defendant's recommitment in accordance with Poore and Franklin, supra. Upon recommitting defendant, the court must give Johnson earned gain time when computing his time served to be credited against this recommitment. State v. Green, 547 So.2d 925 (Fla.1989).
Pursuant to the request of the author of the concurring opinion, we certify the following question to the Supreme Court as being one of great public importance:
WHETHER LAMBERT V STATE, 545 S0.2D 838 (FLA.1989) OVERRULED STATE V. PENTAUDE, 500 S0.2D 526 (FLA.1987) OR MERELY RECEDED TO THE EXTENT THAT NEW CRIMINAL CONDUCT, WHETHER A CONVICTION IS OBTAINED OR NOT, MAY NOT BE USED FOR DEPARTURE?
REVERSED and REMANDED.
DANIEL, C.J., concurs.
HARRIS, J., concurs specially with opinion.
.Although the legislature recently amended sections 944.28 and 948.06, Florida Statutes, to add revocation of probation to the list of circumstances justifying forfeiture of gain-time, these amendments did not become effective until September 1, 1990 and thus are inapplicable to this case. See Ch. 89-526, § 6, 8, 52, Laws of Florida.