Case Name: HUNTER v. McCAMMON
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1907-05-17
Citations: 104 N.Y.S. 402
Docket Number: 
Parties: HUNTER v. McCAMMON.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 104
Pages: 402–405

Head Matter:
HUNTER v. McCAMMON.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
May 17, 1907.)
1. Cancellation of Instruments—Deeds—Undue Influence—Evidence.
• In an action to set aside a conveyance by a mother to her daughter as procured by fraud, duress, and undue influence, evidence helé sufficient to uphold a judgment for plaintiff.
2. Same—Laches.
A mother, in seeking to set aside a conveyance to her daughter as procured by fraud, duress, and undue influence, is not bound to take such prompt action as would be required against a stranger.
McLaughlin and Scott, JJ., dissenting.
Appeal from Special Term, New York County.
Action by Carrie Hunter against Sophie G. McCammon to set aside a conveyance as procured by fraud, duress, and undue influence. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Argued before PATTERSON, P. J., and McRAUGHEIN, HOUGHTON, SCOTT, and LAMBERT, JJ.
Nathaniel Cohen, for appellant.
Herbert D. Cohen, for respondent.

Opinion:
HOUGHTON, J.
By her industry and economy the plaintiff had acquired real property of the value of about $20,000, besides some additional money with which she had made unfortunate investments. On the 5th day of April, 1900, without any money being paid therefor, she conveyed this real estate to the defendant, her daughter and only child; the conveyance containing a clause that the defendant should execute to the plaintiff a life lease of the premises, and further, as part consideration for the conveyance, that in case the plaintiff should become destitute or unable to support or care for herself the defendant would provide such care and support. The lease was executed and delivered, and in 1905 this action was brought to set aside the conveyance on the ground that it was procured by fraud, duress, and undue influence, and that plaintiff was in' such state of mind that she did not comprehend the nature of her act. A decree setting aside the conveyance has been granted, from which the defendant appeals.
While the evidence is meager, we think it is sufficient to uphold the judgment. The plaintiff was old and in feeble health, and disturbed in mind, and had gone to Ithaca, N. Y., respecting some money which she had loaned, and the defendant followed her there and demanded that she be given a deed of the real property, threatening, if this was not done, to have nothing further to do with the plaintiff. According to her own statement the plaintiff did not understand the full purport of the transaction. She says that the defendant procured an attorney to draw the papers, which was done without the title deed, so that any specific description of the property could be given, notwithstanding she pleaded to postpone the execütion of the paper until she could consult her own attorney. In addition, the defendant proceeded to acquire whatever else of value the plaintiff had by way of money and jewelry. The plaintiff was ill from time to time, and a patient in several hospitals, and frequently called upon the defend ant to care for her and to give her money upon which to live. Both of .these things the defendant refused to do, and for long periods the mother did not know where the defendant was, and was in possession of no address at which she could communicate with her. In reply to the plaintiff's importunities for care and assistance, the defendant said that it was better for the plaintiff to work, and that she never intended to keep her agreement to take care of her and furnish her money.
From the testimony it is apparent that the plaintiff's mind at the time she executed the conveyance was greatly weakened from illness and anxiety, and that the daughter, by threats of abandonment and promises of comfort and care which she never intended to bestow, persuaded the plaintiff to divest herself of all the property which she possessed. While it may be impossible to say that any specific testimony meets the legal definition of actual fraud, or duress, or undue influence, yet the evidence, taken as a whole, shows the existence of confidential relations between the mother and daughter, weakened and impaired intellect on the part of the mother, and a strong and overmastering will on the part of the defendant. This situation imposed upon the defendant the burden of showing that the transaction was fair, open, voluntary, and well understood. Where the relationship between the parties is that of parent and child, principal and agent, or where one party is situated so as to exercise a controlling influence over the will and conduct of another, transactions between them are scrutinized with extreme vigilance, and clear evidence is required that the transaction was understood, and that there was no fraud, mistake, or undue influence. Where those relations exist there must be clear proof of the integrity and fairness of the transaction, or any instrument thus obtained will be set aside or held as invalid between the parties. Ten Eyck v. Whitbeck, 156 N. Y. 341, 50 N. E. 963; Green v. Roworth, 113 N. Y. 462, 21 N. E. 165; Rosevear v. Sullivan, 47 App. Div. 421, 62 N. Y. Supp. 447.
The defendant failed to meet this requirement of law, and to show that the mother fully understood the transaction and that the deed was procured without any deception or unfair advantage being taken. The defendant confessed that her promise of support was not given in good faith, and all of her Subsequent conduct goes to show that her only object was to' get possession of her mother's property by preying upon her fears and deceiving her as to the necessity of the transfer.
The plaintiff's right is not barred by her delay in bringing the action. The defendant had promised to reconvey on more than one occasion. In view of the relations between the parties, such prompt action as would be required against a stranger was not a necessity.
We are of the opinion that the judgment is right, and that it should be affirmed, with costs.
PATTERSON, P. J., and LAMBERT, J., concur.