Case Name: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Edward Albert RYDER, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1984-05-02
Citations: 449 So. 2d 398
Docket Number: No. 83-1010
Parties: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Edward Albert RYDER, Appellee.
Judges: GRIMES, A.C.J., concurs specially.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 449
Pages: 398–399

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Edward Albert RYDER, Appellee.
No. 83-1010.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
May 2, 1984.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Diane Barrs, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellant.
Jerry Hill, Public Defender, and Michael E. Raiden, Asst. Public Defender, Bartow, for appellee.

Opinion:
LEHAN, Judge.
The state appeals from an order discharging defendant on speedy trial grounds. We reverse. We hold that defendant's pretrial waiver of speedy trial rights also applied to the ninety day period for retrial after a mistrial.
On September 8, 1981 defendant was charged with sale of marijuana. He was arrested on that charge two days later. On February 16, 1982, defendant obtained a continuance, explicitly waiving speedy trial rights. Defendant received a further continuance on July 7, 1982, reiterating his previous waiver of "all right to a speedy trial."
The trial began on September 29, 1982, but defendant was granted a mistrial on the second day of trial. Thereafter, on March 29, 1983, defendant filed a motion for discharge, alleging that more than ninety days had elapsed from the date of the mistrial and that discharge was appropriate under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(g). The trial court discharged defendant, and the state brought this appeal.
The state contends that defendant's waiver of speedy trial rights applied not only to defendant's right to be brought to trial initially within a certain period but also to the right provided in Rule 3.191(g) to be brought to trial within ninety days after declaration of a mistrial. Defendant argues that, despite a pretrial waiver, the running of the speedy trial time is recommenced by a mistrial just as by a demand for speedy trial under rule 3.191(a)(2) or a denial of a motion to discharge under rule 3.191(d)(3).
We have not found a Florida case that addresses the precise issue presented here. However, we believe that the defendant's pretrial waiver of his right to speedy trial applied through the trial phase of the proceedings, including a retrial after mistrial. See Butterworth v. Fluellen, 389 So.2d 968 (Fla.1980). Cf State v. Corlew, 382 So.2d 787 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980) (waiver of speedy trial applicable where state files amended information charging a crime arising out of same criminal episode that formed basis of original information); State v. Trimel, 387 So.2d 528 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980) (waiver of speedy trial applies where state refiles information after nolle prosequi).
REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT HEREWITH.
GRIMES, A.C.J., concurs specially.
SCHOONOVER, J., dissents with opinion.