Case Name: SAMUEL DICKSON, by LeRoy S. Gilford, His Guardian ad Litem, Appellant, v. L. S. SALISBURY, Respondent
Court: North Dakota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: North Dakota
Decision Date: 1919-12-05
Citations: 45 N.D. 26
Docket Number: 
Parties: SAMUEL DICKSON, by LeRoy S. Gilford, His Guardian ad Litem, Appellant, v. L. S. SALISBURY, Respondent.
Judges: Christianson, Oh. J., and Birdzell, T., concur.
Reporter: North Dakota Reports
Volume: 45
Pages: 26–33

Head Matter:
SAMUEL DICKSON, by LeRoy S. Gilford, His Guardian ad Litem, Appellant, v. L. S. SALISBURY, Respondent.
(177 N. W. 377.)
Judgment — entry of two judgments in same case —first judgment final — second judgment in same cause void.
A verdict was directed for defendant. The trial court made an order for judgment, reciting the direction of the verdict, and ordering judgment for costs in favor of defendant. On November 21, 1918, judgment was entered in conformity with the order, and notice of entry thereof served. On May 7, 1919, a second order for judgment was signed and judgment entered thereon. The second order and judgment are like the first, except that they recite that the action is dismissed.
It is held that the first judgment was a final determination of the rights of the parties; that the entry of the second judgment was of no consequence, and that no rights were affected thereby.
Opinion filed December 5, 1919.
Appeal from the District Court of LaMoure County; Honorable J. A. Coffey, Judge.
Judgment reversed and canceled.
James Manahcm and Thomas & Sullivan, for appellant.
An appeal lies only from a judgment duly entered. An appeal does not lie from a verdict of a jury. Clark v. Van Loon (Iowa) 79 N. W. 88.
Where no judgment was entered on the verdict of the jury, an appeal will not lie. Seven Valleys Book v. Smith (Neb.) 61 N. W. 603.
Unless allowed by express statutory provision, a writ of error or appeal will not lie from the verdict of a jury without an entry of judgment thereon. 3 C. J. 600.
This court has held that there can be no effective judgment in this state until it is entered in the judgment book. McTavish v. G. N. B. Co. 8 N. D. 337; 4 N. D. 119; 20 N. D. 195; 23 N. D. 457; 26 N. D. 283.
A final judgment does not become such until entered by the clerk in the judgment book. Be Weber, 4 N. D. 119; Dibble v. Hanson, 17 N. D. 21.
The judgment entered November 20, 1918, being a judgment for costs only, was not a final appealable judgment. Barnhouse v. Adams (Iowa) 66 N. W. 826; Little v. Gamble (Neb.) 66 N. W. 849; Smith v. Johnson (Neb.) 56 N. W. 323; 3 C. J. 600; 137 Cal. 363.
Defendant’s daughter was acting within the scope of her employment and within the course of her employment as her father’s agent in driving the ear. Dennison v. McNorton, 228 Bed. 401.
The presumption is that the party operating the machine is the agent of the owner. The burden of disproving this presumption is upon him. Lynde v. Browning, 2 Tenn. C. C. A. 262; Birch v. Abercrombie, 50 L.B.A. 67; Stowe v. Marrie, 147 Ky. 386; Daily v. Maxwell, 152 Mo. App. 415; McNeal v. Mcliain (Okla.) 126 Pac. 1742; Collinson v. Cutter (Iowa) 170 N. W. 421, 422; Bloetz v. Holt, 124 Minn. 173; Lenn v. Carlson, 120 Minn. 286; Kayser v. Van Nest, 125 Minn. 277; Uphill v. McCormick (Minn.) 166 N. W. 788; Johnson v. Evens (Minn.) 170 N. W. 220; Johnson v. Smith, 173 Minn. 676.
Maxine Salisbury was using the car with the implied consent of her father. Ferris v. Sterling, 214 N. T. 249; Erlich v. Heis (Ala.) 69 So. 530; Birch v. Abercrombie, 74 Wash. 486, 33 Pac. 1020; Dennison v. McNorton, 228 Fed. 401.
Knowledge and consent may be implied as well as expressed. Lynde v. Browning, 2 Tenn. C. C. A. 262.
The question of whether or not Miss Salisbury received express permission to use the car was for the jury. Specifications of Error XXIII. of insufficiency XI. and XII. Birch v. Abercrombie, 74 Wash. 486, 50 L.R.A.(N.S.) 59; Long v. Bute, 123 Mo. App. 204; Rott y. Boston Ry. 138 Mass. 420; Taylor v. Modern Woodmen, 72 Kan. 453; Whalen y. Harrison, 26 Mont. 326; Wilson v. Royal Neighbors, 139 Mich. 425; Burleson y. Tinnin (Tex.) 100 S. W. 350.
Doane & Porter and Lawrence & Murphy, for respondent.
The chauffeur or agent is not acting within the scope of his employment when he is using the machine for his own pleasure or business. Slater v. Advance-Rumley Thresher Co. 97 Minn. 305, 107 N. W. 133; Stewart v. Barauch, 108 App. Div. 577, 93 N. T. Supp. 161; Quigley y. Thompson, 211 Pa. 107, 60 Atl. 506; Jones v. ILoge (Wash.) 92 Pac. 432.
The owner of an automobile establishment in which his son is employed as a clerk is not liable for the negligent operation of one of the machines by the son while using it for his own personal pleasure. Reynolds y. Buck, 127 Iowa, 601, 103 N. W. 946; Lotz v. Hanlon, 10 Ann. Cas. 732; Maher v. Benedict, 123 App. Div. 579, 108 N. T. Supp. 228; Mattei y. Gillies, 12 Ann. Cas. 973; Lembke v. Ady (Iowa) 159 N. W. 1012.
A father is never liable for the wrongful acts of his minor son unless the acts were committed with the father’s consent or in connection with the father’s business. Smith y. Davenport (Kan.) 11 L.R.A. 492;. Doran v. Thompson (N. J.) 19 L.R.A.(N.S.) 337; Reynolds v. Buck (Iowa) 103 N. W. 946; Conestoga Traction Co. v. Haldy (1912) 22 Pa. Dist. R. 124.
A parent is not liable for the torts of his minor children, when such acts are done without bis authority, knowledge, or consent, and have no connection with his business and are not ratified by him, and are of no benefit to him. Thibodeau v. Cheff, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 585, note; Miriek v. Suehy, 74 Kan. 715, 87 Pac. 1141, 11 Ann. Cas. 366; John son v. Glidden, 11 S. D. 237, 74 Am. St. Eep. 795, 76 N. W. 933, 5 Am. Neg. Eep. 97; Dick v. Swenson, 137 111. App. 68; Pauley v. Draine, 9 Ky. L. Eep. 693, 6 S. W. 329; Bassett v. Eiley, 131 Mo. App. 676, 111 S. W. 596.
A father is not liable for an injury inflicted by his automobile while being driven by his son, merely because of the relationship. Linville v. Nissen, 162' N. O. 95, 77 S. E. 1096; Loehr v. Abell, 174 Mich. •590, 140 N. W. 926; Eoberts v. Schanz, 83 Misc. 139, 144 N. Y. Supp. 824; Notes to McNral v. McKain, 41 L.E.A.(N.S.) 775; Birch v. Abercrombie, 50 L.E.A.(N.S.) 59; White Oak Coal Co. v. Eivoux, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 1091.
An automobile is not per se a. dangerous agency. Lewis v. Amorous, 3 Ga. App. 50, 59 S. E. 338; Shinkle v. McCullough, 116 Ky. 960, 105 Am. St. Eep. 249, 77 S. W. 196; Christy v. Elliott, 216 111. 31, 1 L.E.A.(N.S.) 215, 108 Am. St. Eep. 196, 74 N. E. 1035, 3 Ann. Oas. 487; Chicago v. Banker, 112 111. App. 94; McIntyre v. Orner, 166 Ind. 57, 4 L.E.A.(N.S.) 1130, 117 Am. St. Eep. 359; Indiana Springs Co. v. Brown, 165 Ind. 465, 1 L.E.A.(N.S.) 238; Smith v. •Jordan, 211 Mass. 269, 97 N. E. 761; Hartley v. Miller, 165 Mich. 115, 33 L.E.A.(N.S.) 81; Slater v. Advance Thresher Co. 97 Minn. 305, 5 L.E.A.(N.S.) 598; Dailey v. Maxwell, 152 Mo. App. 675, 108 S. W. 1122; Danforth v. Eisher, 75 N. H. Ill, 21 L.E.A.(N.S.) 93; Vincent v. Crandall, 131 App. Div. 200, 74 N. Y. Supp. 999; Steffen v. McNaughton, 142 Wis. 49, 26 L.E.A.(N.S.) 382, 124 N. W. 1016; Jones v. Hoge, 47 Wash. 663, 14 L.E.A.(N.S.) 216, 125 Am. St. Eep. 915, 92 Pac. 433; McNeal v. McKain, 41 L.E.A.(N.S.) 778, 779; 6 Labatt, Mast. & S. 6644, 6843.
No presumption arises from the fact that at the time of an accident a son was driving his father’s automobile, that he was acting within the scope of his authority, which will cast upon the father the burden of showing the contrary. Hays v. Hogan, L.K.A.1918C, 715; Mc-Farlane v. Winters (Utah) 155 Pac. 437; Zeer v. Bahnmaier (Kan.) 176 Pac. 326; 6 Labatt, Mast. & S. 6644; 46 L.E.A.(N.S.) 199.

Opinion:
Eobinson, J.
This is an action to recover damages by reason of a personal injury sustained by collision with an automobile. The court directed a verdict for the defendant and on that verdict two judgments have been entered. On November 21, 1918, pursuant to an order of the court reciting the trial and verdict, a judgment was entered that the defendant do have and recover from the plaintiff the costs and disbursements of the action, taxed at $237.50.
Now a judgment is a final determination of the rights of the parties in the action. Comp. Laws, § 7599. The first judgment showed such a final determination. It recites the verdict of the jury in favor of the defendant and the order for judgment on the same and the amount allowed as costs, but it seems counsel thought the first judgment not good enough, because it did not declare the action dismissed. Hence, on May 7, 1919, a second judgment was entered which is that the defendant have and recover judgment against the plaintiff dismissing the action and for $237.50, his costs. Plainly the second judgment is no better than the first and it is in the form of an order for judgment.
This is an appeal from the second judgment. It was taken October 15, 1919, and after the first judgment had become final. The second judgment was not authorized and it must be reversed and canceled. After one judgment has been entered on a verdict, if it is in any way technically defective, it may be corrected on motion, but the court may not enter a succession of judgments and in that way extend the time for an appeal from the first judgment. The defendant erroneously moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the second judgment is wholly unauthorized and without jurisdiction. But that is cause for canceling and reversing the judgment, and not for dismissing the appeal.
The record is from beginning to end a very bunglesome affair. Hence, without reviewing the merits of the case, the second judgment must be reversed and canceled, and that will leave the first judgment in full force and effect.
Reversed and canceled.
Christianson, Oh. J., and Birdzell, T., concur.