Case Name: State of Nebraska ex rel. Paul L. Douglas et al., appellees, v. Faith Baptist Church of Louisville, Nebraska, a corporation, et al., appellants
Court: Nebraska Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Nebraska
Decision Date: 1981-01-30
Citations: 207 Neb. 802
Docket Number: No. 43029
Parties: State of Nebraska ex rel. Paul L. Douglas et al., appellees, v. Faith Baptist Church of Louisville, Nebraska, a corporation, et al., appellants.
Judges: Heard before Krivosha, C.J., Boslaugh, McCown, Brodkey, White, and Hastings, JJ., and Colwell, District Judge.
Reporter: Nebraska Reports
Volume: 207
Pages: 802–827

Head Matter:
State of Nebraska ex rel. Paul L. Douglas et al., appellees, v. Faith Baptist Church of Louisville, Nebraska, a corporation, et al., appellants.
301 N.W.2d 571
Filed January 30, 1981.
No. 43029.
David C. Gibbs, Jr., and Charles E. Craze of Gibbs & Craze and Meyer Coren of Viren, Epstein, Leahy & Coren for appellants.
Paul L. Douglas, Attorney General, and Harold Mosher for appellees.
Heard before Krivosha, C.J., Boslaugh, McCown, Brodkey, White, and Hastings, JJ., and Colwell, District Judge.

Opinion:
Hastings, J.
This was an action brought by the State of Nebraska on the relation of the Attorney General against Faith Baptist Church of Louisville, Nebraska, and certain individuals being officers and employees of the principal defendant. It sought to enjoin the operation of an elementary and secondary school by the defendants because there had been no compliance with the school laws of the State of Nebraska. From a judgment granting such relief, the defendants have appealed to this court. Upon consideration de novo on the record, we affirm.
The defendants claim that the trial court erred in granting the injunction because: (1) Criminal sanctions are the remedy prescribed by the applicable statutes rather than equitable relief; (2) The State of Nebraska through the State Department of Education has failed to abide by the same statutes and rules that it asks to be enforced against the defendants; (3) Enforcement of the school laws violates the defendants' ninth amendment rights to bear, raise, and educate their children as they see fit; and (4) Enforcement of the school laws violates the defendants' first amendment rights as to freedom of religion.
As a part of the factual background, it should be helpful to set out certain basic statutory provisions. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 79-201 (Reissue 1976) requires that every person having charge or control of any child between the ages of 7 and 16 "shall cause such child to attend regularly the public, private, denominational, or parochial day schools each day that such schools are open and in session . . .•Among other things, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 79-328 (Reissue 1976) requires that the State Board of Education shall have the power and duty to provide "supervision of the state school system"; to "establish . procedures for classifying, approving, and accrediting schools . for the continued legal operation of all schools"; and to "cause to be published laws and regulations governing the schools." In addition, the State Board of Education has caused to be promulgated and published Rule 14, which contains regulations and procedures for approving the continued legal operation of all schools. That rule provides: "Only school systems approved for continued legal operation by the State Board of Education are considered to be providing a program of instruction which is in compliance with the compulsory attendance laws." It goes on to set forth what the curriculum shall consist of, and prescribes for the use of necessary materials and equipment, the length of the school day and year, and requirements relating to health and safety. Additionally, it requires the filing of a "Fall Approval Report" and an "Annual Term Summary Report," and, in order for a school to become approved and remain so, it mandates that each professional staff member employed by the school must "hold a valid Nebraska certificate or permit issued by the State Board of Education legalizing him or her to teach the grades or subjects to which elected." Rule 21, also adopted by the State Board of Education, provides rules for the issuance of certificates and permits to teach in Nebraska schools. Generally speaking, in order to qualify for a regular certificate, it is necessary that the applicant have obtained a baccalaureate degree.
On August 29, 1977, the defendants began operating the Faith Christian School in Louisville, Nebraska. The curriculum employed by this school is that sup plied by Accelerated Christian Education (A.C.E.), and consists of a series of booklets called Packet of Accelerated Christian Education (PACE), which contain instructional information and self-test questions in various subjects and at different instructional levels. Each student works at his or her own speed, and, after completing each PACE and attaining a grade of at least 80 percent on the self test and the PACE test given under the supervision of the supervisor, moves on to the next sequentially numbered PACE. The teachers as such are supervisors who administer the tests and are available for helping a particular student who may be having difficulty. Their function is not to teach, but to monitor or supervise. The instruction is Bible-oriented. For example, PACE 25 in social studies is devoted to the first chapter of Genesis, and its outline topics include The Creation of the Heavens and the Earth, The Seven Days of Creation, and the Garden of Eden. PACE 7 in mathematics consists of problems in simple addition and subtraction, interspersed with biblical sayings and citations. One gets the impression that the method of instruction is not unlike a correspondence course, with the addition of helping supervisors.
In spite of requests from the various local and state school officials, the defendants have refused to furnish "third-day reports" containing the names and addresses of all students enrolled in their school, as required by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 79-207 (Reissue 1976). This is necessary so as to check parents' compliance with compulsory attendance laws. They have stated that they have not and will not request approval of their A.C.E. program, even though they have been told that it would be approved, and they have neglected and refused to employ accredited teachers and to seek approval from the State of Nebraska to operate their school. It is their position that the operation of the school is simply an extension of the ministry of the church, over which the State of Nebraska has no authority to approve or accredit.
According to the defendants, as expressed by defendant Everett Sileven, pastor of the defendant church, a Christian education is mandated by the Bible. He cites Deuteronomy 6:6,7, which, according to Today's English Version, states: "Never forget these commands that I am giving you today. Teach them to your children. Repeat them when you are at home and when you are away, when you are resting and when you are working." Proverbs 22:6 says: "Teach a child how he should live, and he will remember it all his life." And, although the record indicates a citation to Ephesians 5:4, undoubtedly the reference is to Chapter 6: "Parents, do not treat your children in such a way as to make them angry. Instead, raise them with Christian discipline and instruction." Their belief is that teaching is a way of life and not simply a 5-hours-a-day, 5-days-a-week proposition. It is the defendants' belief that the public schools of today are overrun with an increase in crime, drug and alcohol addiction, teacher assaults, vandalism, and disrespect for authority and property. Additionally, and basically, according to Mr. Sileven, secular humanism is the basic philosophy of the public educational system, which is in direct opposition to the defendants' belief in biblical Christianity. It is because of these beliefs that the Faith Christian School was organized. Defendants further maintain that, because their philosophy is Christian and that of the State Department of Education is not, the latter is not capable of judging the philosophy of the defendants' school. Finally, because the state school laws require inspection of the schools by the county superintendent, the defendants cannot submit to such control because the State has no right to inspect God's property.
According to the testimony of Stephen W. Sturtevant, a certified teacher currently employed by the Fletcher Christian Academy at Axtell, and a teacher for a total of 8% years, he had examined the achievement tests administered to the Faith Christian School students. Although there is no underlying basis in the record for any such conclusion, he stated as his opinion that the students at the defendant school were accomplishing the average amount of progress that most students probably were in Nebraska schools. Other witnesses, who qualified as experts in the field of education, ventured the opinion that the mere fact that a person held a baccalaureate degree did not mean that he or she would be a good teacher. Additional facts will be set forth throughout this opinion as may be required in discussing the various assignments of error.
Defendants' first assignment of error requires little comment. It is true that Neb. Rev. Stat. § 79-216 and 79-1707 (Reissue 1976) provide for penal sanctions in the event of violations of the various statutory provisions relating to compulsory education and operation of private, denominational, and parochial schools. However, that does not foreclose the possibility of injunctive relief. "[A] court of equity may properly afford injunctive relief where there has been a continuing and flagrant course of violations of the . . . law even though these acts may be subject to criminal prosecution." State ex rel. Meyer v. Weiner, 190 Neb. 30, 34, 205 N.W.2d 649, 651 (1973).
Defendants complain that the State of Nebraska has failed to abide by the same statutes and rules that it asks to be enforced against these defendants. Specifically, it alleges that the State Department of Education has neglected to supply county superintendents with a course of study as prescribed by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 79-312(6) (Reissue 1976), and has continued to increase the standards for teacher certification, contrary to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 79-1247.03 (Reissue 1976). Section 79-312 does provide, in part, that "The county superintendent shall: . (6) furnish to each district in the county a copy of the course of study for public schools, as prescribed by the State Department of Education . . . ." By Rule 14, the State Department of Education has set forth in detail the subjects re quired to be taught in both elementary and secondary schools, together with an explanation of the aims sought to be accomplished by each individual program. Implementation of the instructional program is left to the local school authorities to develop in order to meet the unique goals of the particular school community. The action of the state department seems to comply with the statutory mandate.
The standardized tests which the defendants complain have not been made available to all Nebraska students are actually the responsibility of the county superintendent to furnish, but are not mandatory. "The county superintendent shall: . . . furnish to each district . . . such written or printed questions for reviews based upon such course of study as in his judgment are necessary or expedient." § 79-312(6) (emphasis supplied). The tests which the defendants complain have not been made available, contrary to law, are the responsibility of the county superintendent, to be guided by "as in his judgment are necessary or expedient."
As to teacher certification, the defendants point to § 79-1247.03, which states that the purpose of the so-called teacher certification law is "to provide more flexibility in the certification of qualified teachers . and not to increase any requirements for certificates to teach." Neb. Rev. Stat. § 1247.05 (Reissue 1976) then grants broad powers to the State Board of Education to adopt rules and regulations governing the issuance of teaching certificates to be based upon "earned college credit" as well as other factors deemed to be important to a determination of fitness to teach. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 79-1247.06 (Reissue 1976) mandates that the maximum educational requirement which the board may require for the first issuance of a teaching certificate shall be a baccalaureate degree. Interestingly enough, that section as originally enacted in 1963, along with the other sections pertaining to teacher certification, allowed as a maximum to teach elementary grades in Class I and Class II schools the completion of 2 years of a 4-year program of college preparation. The section as it presently exists was enacted in 1976, which eliminated the reference to the 2-year requirement. To read the teacher certification law, as the defendants would have us do, would mean that the State Board of Education could never increase requirements for certification beyond that which it imposed in 1963. We reject that argument as wholly without foundation. The language in § 79-1247.03 was merely declarative of the Legislature's purpose in enacting the series of statutes. It has been modified by deletion of a portion of § 79-1247.06 as set out above. The state board, by enacting minimum requirements equal to, but not in excess of, the maximum provided by law has not violated that particular statute.
Defendants' contention as to violation of their first and ninth amendment rights will be considered together, because the question involved in both is the extent to which the State can, if at all, restrict these rights in the interest of assuring all children a quality basic education.
At first blush, it would appear that the case of Meyerkorth v. State, 173 Neb. 889, 115 N.W.2d 585 (1962), is squarely in point and dispositive of the case, to the prejudice of the defendants. There the issue involved was the constitutionality of various statutes of the State of Nebraska concerning compulsory school attendance, certification of teachers, and supervision of nonpublic schools, the forerunners of the statutes involved here. The plaintiffs there, seeking a declaration that those laws were unconstitutional as a violation of their first amendment rights, raised arguments similar to those with which we are here faced: "The plaintiffs argue that the certification of teachers . . . and the minimal school standards provided for . . . above set forth, and the regulations promulgated by the Nebraska Department of Education, have no relevance to the interests of the state in children not edu cated in public, tax-supported schools; that none of these . . . have any materiality to testing children educated in parochial schools to ascertain if they know the language of their country, understand its government, and are able to participate in the democratic process; and that the above-mentioned sections and regulations infringe upon the rights of the parent and the constitutional right guaranteed to the citizens of the State of Nebraska." Meyerkorth at 898, 115 N.W.2d at 590.
This court reviewed the holding of the U.S. Supreme Court in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S. Ct. 625, 67 L. Ed. 1042 (1923), and cited the following language: "'The power of the State to compel attendance at some school and to make reasonable regulations. for all schools, including a requirement that they shall give instructions in English, is not questioned.'" Meyerkorth at 900, 115 N.W.2d at 591. What the court, in Meyer, did hold was that the State of Nebraska could not prevent the teaching of the German language as an additional elective subject.
In Meyerkorth, we also cited Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S. Ct. 571, 69 L. Ed. 1070 (1925), which struck down an Oregon law requiring all children to attend a public school. We referred generally to certain language from that case which we now set forth verbatim directly from Pierce: "No question is raised concerning the power of the State reasonably to regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise, and examine them, their teachers and pupils; to require that all children of proper age attend some school, that teachers shall be of good moral character and patriotic disposition, that certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be taught, and that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public welfare." 268 U.S at 534.
This court concluded by saying: "As we view the statutes here involved, there is nothing arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconstitutional relating to the qualifications of teachers to teach in the parochial, denominational, private, or public schools of this state or with the requirements of compulsory education and attendance at such schools." Meyerkorth at 904, 115 N.W.2d at 593.
However, it is the defendants' position that the test of reasonableness as declared in Meyerkorth must give way to one of compelling state interest, which, they allege, is the rule announced in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S. Ct. 1526, 32 L. Ed. 2d 15 (1972). In that case, the defendants were members of the Old Order Amish religion, and, as such, did not believe in conventional education for their children beyond the eighth grade. It was their contention that because the children would return to the isolated agrarian community of their families, additional formal education was to be supplanted by vocational instruction received "on the job." As a result, they were prosecuted for failure to comply with Wisconsin's compulsory school-attendance law, which required attendance by children until they reached the age of 16. The trial court, although finding that the law "'does interfere with the freedom of the Defendants to act in accordance with their sincere religious belief' it also concluded that the requirement of high school attendance until age 16 was a 'reasonable and constitutional' exercise of government power . . . ." 406 U.S. at 213. However, the convictions were reversed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, which latter judgment was affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Nevertheless, the Yoder court did recognize the principle upon which our decision in Meyerkorth was based. "There is no doubt as to the power of a State, having a high responsibility for education of its citizens, to impose reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic education." 406 U.S. at 213. However, it went on to say: "It follows that in order for Wisconsin to compel school attendance beyond the eighth grade against a claim that such attendance interferes with the practice of a legitimate religious belief, it must appear either that the State does not deny the free exercise of religious belief by its requirement, or that there is a state interest of sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming protection under the Free Exercise Clause." 406 U.S. at 214.
In dealing with the question of the sincerity of the religious beliefs of the Amish, the Yoder court pointed out that "A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not be interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation of education if it is based on purely secular considerations . . . ." 406 U.S. at 215. Although it is always difficult and perhaps inappropriate to challenge what others say their religious beliefs may be (in the case under consideration the defendants simply state that they believe they are biblically mandated to teach their children themselves), the Yoder court then encountered no such problem. "In sum, the unchallenged testimony of acknowledged experts in education and religious history, almost 300 years of consistent practice, and strong evidence of a sustained faith pervading and regulating respondents' entire mode of life support the claim that enforcement of the State's requirement of compulsory formal education after the eighth grade would gravely endanger if not destroy the free exercise of respondents' religious beliefs." 406 U.S. at 219 (emphasis supplied). Although the record in the case before us demonstrates an educational practice of less than 2 years' duration, for the sake of this decision we assume the sincerity of their religious beliefs.
The Yoder court then introduced the "compelling interest" standard. "We turn, then, to the State's broader contention that its interest in its system of compulsory education is so compelling that even the established religious practices of the Amish must give way. . . .
"The State advances two primary arguments in support of its system of compulsory education. It notes . . . that some degree of education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political system if we are to preserve freedom and independence. Further, education prepares individuals to be self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in society. We accept these propositions." 406 U.S. at 221. But then the court reached the heart of the basis for its decision: "However, the evidence adduced by the Amish in this case is persuasively to the effect that an additional one or two years of formal high school for Amish children in place of their long-established program of informal vocational education would do little to serve those interests . It is one thing to say that compulsory education for a year or two beyond the eighth grade may be necessary when its goal is the preparation of the child for life in modern society as the majority live, but it is quite another if the goal of education be viewed as the preparation of the child for life in the separated agrarian community that is the keystone of the Amish faith." 406 U.S. at 222.
The majority opinion in Yoder, then, although employing a "compelling interest" rule, nevertheless was greatly, if not completely, influenced by the process of balancing the specific interest of the state in 1 or 2 years of education beyond the eighth grade for students not expected to enter the mainstream of modern-day life against competing religious principles and practices nearly 3 centuries old. It is somewhat difficult to develop a generalized rule from the court's specific holding. The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice White, with whom, however, Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Stewart joined, is more illuminating of the rule in its general application. "This would be a very different case for me if respondents' claim were that their religion forbade their children from attending any school at any time and from complying in any way with the educational standards set by the State." 406 U.S. at 238 (emphasis sup plied). And continuing: "As recently as last Term, the Court re-emphasized the legitimacy of the State's concern for enforcing minimal educational standards, Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971)." (In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613, 91 S. Ct. 2105, 29 L. Ed. 2d 745 (1971), the court said: "A State always has a legitimate concern for maintaining minimum standards in all schools it allows to operate.") Mr. Justice White goes on to say in Yoder: "Pierce v. Society of Sisters [citations omitted] lends no support to the contention that parents may replace state educational requirements with their own idiosyncratic views of what knowledge a child needs to be a productive and happy member of society; in Pierce, both the parochial and military schools were in compliance with all the educational standards that the State had set, and the Court held simply that while a State may posit such standards, it may not pre-empt the educational process by requiring children to attend public schools." 406 U.S. at 239.
Defendants cite State v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2nd 181, 351 N.E.2d 750 (1976), as supporting their position, an opinion by Celebrezze, J., who relies in no little measure upon the writings of Thoreau: "Tf a man does not keep pace with his companions, Perhaps it is because he hears a different drummer. Let him step to the music which he hears, However measured or far away.'" Id. at 216, 351 N.E.2d at 771. Of course, it was just such philosophical prose which the Yoder court rejected as the basis for its judicial pronouncements: "Thus, if the Amish asserted their claims because of their subjective evaluation and rejection of the contemporary secular values accepted by the majority, much as Thoreau rejected the social values of his time and isolated himself at Walden Pond, their claims would not rest on a religious basis. Thoreau's choice was philosophical and personal rather than religious, and such belief does not rise to the demands of the Religion Clauses." 406 U.S. at 216. Also, the Ohio court set forth phrase after phrase wherein it pointed out that the Board of Education recited how the inspections shall be conducted; not only how long the instructional day should be but what percentage shall be devoted to each particularized course, leaving no time for biblical and spiritual training; required a minimum number of pupils; required that "all activities shall conform to policies adopted by the board of education" (emphasis supplied); that there shall be cooperation and interaction between the school and the community; that each school shall give evidence of "cooperative assessment of community needs to determine the purposes . for future educational improvement"; that child study information shall not be released to the parents; and that organized group life shall act in accordance with established rules of social controls. We would be inclined to agree with the Ohio court's statement that "these standards are so pervasive and all-encompassing that total compliance with each and every standard by a non-public school would effectively eradicate the distinction between public and nonpublic education, and thereby deprive these appellants of their traditional interest as parents to direct the upbringing and education of their children." 47 Ohio St. 2d at 211-12, 351 N.E.2d at 768. However, such requirements are not found among the statutory mandates of our laws.
Finally, defendants refer us to Kentucky State Bd., Etc. v. Rudasill, 589 S.W.2d 877 (Ky. 1979), in which the author of that opinion, testing school certification statutes against a constitutional provision which provided that "nor shall any man be compelled to send his child to any school to which he may be conscientiously opposed," wrote the following: "Certainly, the receipt of 'a bachelor's degree from a standard college or university' is an indicator of the level of achievement, but it is not a sine qua non the absence of which establishes that private and parochial school teachers are unable to teach their students to intelli gently exercise the elective franchise." 589 S.W.2d at 884. However, to the contrary is an opinion from the Supreme Court of Alaska which held that a requirement that an applicant must have graduated from a law school accredited by the American Bar Association as a prerequisite for admission to the bar of Alaska did not deprive the applicant of his constitutional rights. "While there is some risk that a person could be deprived of the opportunity to practice law by reason of the bar rule, even though he is competent to practice law, we believe that such a risk is outweighed by the difficulty which would be presented by making a case-by-case determination of whether the education afforded by an unaccredited law school was comparable to that given by an accredited school. We have already noted the difficulty of employing such an alternative procedure.
"The ABA system of accreditation is sophisticated and time-consuming. We can think of no effective substitute which could be developed at the state level without diverting impractical amounts of manpower and money into such an inquiry! Given the strong state interest in assuring that those entering the practice of law have had suitable training in adequate institutions, and considering the precedent from other jurisdictions, we are of the opinion that the Alaska bar rule requirement is valid and does not violate the due process clause of either the Alaska Constitution or the United States Constitution." Application of Urie, 617 P.2d 505, 508 (Alaska 1980).
We are not suggesting as an absolute that every person who has earned a baccalaureate degree in teaching is going to become a good teacher, any more than one who has obtained the appropriate training and education will become a good engineer, lawyer, beauty operator, welder, or pipefitter. However, we think it cannot fairly be disputed that such a requirement is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable; additionally, we believe it is also a reliable indicator of the probability of success in that particular field. We believe that it goes without saying that the State has a compelling interest in the quality and ability of those who are to teach its young people.
The cases we have cited from the Supreme Court of the United States should leave no doubt as to the critical interest which the State has in the quality of the education provided its youth. Although parents have a right to send their children to schools other than public institutions, they do not have the right to be completely unfettered by reasonable government regulations as to the quality of the education furnished. Defendants insist that this can be accomplished by annual comparative tests. The problem with testing is that it sometimes comes too late. If the deficiency of the education being afforded is not discovered until the end of the year, the child has wasted that year. The requirements as to curriculum as imposed by the state board appear to be very minimal in nature. All that is required is that certain subjects be taught. There is no effort to dictate in what manner that knowledge shall be imparted. As a matter of fact, the defendants have complained, in part, because no course of study has been prescribed by the State. This is not the type of regulation which the Whisner court found objectionable. The defendants concede, and the State confirms, that the curriculum utilized by the defendants, the A.C.E. program, is acceptable and approved and being used by other schools within the state. The refusal of the defendants to comply with the compulsory education laws of the State of Nebraska as applied in this case is an arbitrary and unreasonable attempt to thwart the legitimate, reasonable, and compelling interests of the State in carrying out its educational obligations, under a claim of religious freedom.
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
Affirmed.