Case Name: Lawrence D. WOODHAMS, SSA [ XXX XX XXXX ], Claimant-Appellant, v. ORE-IDA FOODS, INC., Employer, and State of Idaho, Department of Employment, Defendants-Respondents
Court: Idaho Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Idaho
Decision Date: 1980-07-01
Citations: 101 Idaho 369
Docket Number: No. 13149
Parties: Lawrence D. WOODHAMS, SSA [ XXX XX XXXX ], Claimant-Appellant, v. ORE-IDA FOODS, INC., Employer, and State of Idaho, Department of Employment, Defendants-Respondents.
Judges: 
Reporter: Idaho Reports
Volume: 101
Pages: 369–372

Head Matter:
613 P.2d 380
Lawrence D. WOODHAMS, SSA [ XXX XX XXXX ], Claimant-Appellant, v. ORE-IDA FOODS, INC., Employer, and State of Idaho, Department of Employment, Defendants-Respondents.
No. 13149.
Supreme Court of Idaho.
July 1, 1980.
Louis Garbrecht, III, of Bennett, Powers & Garbrecht, Twin Falls, for claimant-appellant.
David H. Leroy, Atty. Gen., R. LaVar Marsh, Roger B. Madsen, Deputy Attys. Gen., for Dept, of Employment.
Larry C. Hunter of Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett & Blanton, Boise, for Ore-Ida Foods, Inc.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Lawrence Woodhams was employed by Ore-Ida Foods, Inc. in September of 1976, working satisfactorily and without incident until summarily discharged some twenty months later. His application for unemployment benefits, though not initially opposed by Ore-Ida, was turned down by the Department of Employment.
Woodhams for all of his life has suffered epilepsy seizures. In applying for benefits, he stated that Ore-Ida grounded his discharge on his failure, in applying for work at its plant, to enter a checkmark to indicate that he had had "epilepsy or fits." The evidence supports the Commission's findings that Woodhams' fellow employees at the plant were aware of his affliction, and that he made no attempt to conceal it. It equally appears that when he applied for work he had been seizure-free for over six years.
He had no seizures while on the job, and the seizure which precipitated his discharge — for having given false information as to his physical condition — occurred at his home, with fellow employees passing the news of this reason for his absence on to his supervisors.
A factual issue resolved against Wood-hams by the Commission, and hence binding on us, is his contention that at the time he was employed he orally advised his interviewer of his condition, and was advised, in light of his six problem-free years, to answer on the application as he did.
In Wroble v. Bonners Ferry Ranger Station, 97 Idaho 900, 556 P.2d 859 (1976), the issue was similar. There Wroble was discharged and unemployment benefits denied because of misconduct in not giving full and accurate information as to previous employment, where the giving of such information on an application was the employer's rule. Here, the application form signed by Wood-hams clearly stated that the giving of false information was grounds for termination. In Wroble we noted a Commission finding that Wroble "had inadvertently omitted from his application a temporary two-week employment with the post office in 1969." We reversed the Commission's decision, saying:
"We do not perceive the legislative intent in enacting I.C. § 72-1366(e) nor do we construe our opinion in Oliver v. Creamer Heating & Appliance Co., supra, to require that any violation of any rule of an employer will, per se, constitute misconduct such as will result in the denial of unemployment compensation benefits upon discharge. While an employer may make almost any kind of a rule for the conduct of his employees and under some circumstances may be able to discharge an employee for violation of any rule, such does not, per se, amount to 'misconduct' constituting a bar to unemployment compensation benefits.
"Here, if misconduct there was, it came from the claimant's nonconformance with the letter of the rule enunciated by the employer. Here, there appears to be no deliberate violation of the spirit of the rule.
"Given all of the above facts as found by the Commission the record simply does not support any deceitful intent on the part of the claimant in concealing previous employment history for the purpose of obtaining employment. All inferences are to the contrary. Therefore we hold that there is not shown any deliberate violation of the spirit of the employer's rules."
97 Idaho at 902-903, 556 P.2d 859, 861-62. In Wroble the Commission did not express itself on Wroble's "deceitful intent."
Woodhams, on the other hand, runs head-on into a Commission finding that he was possessed of a "deceitful intent" in not truthfully answering the questions on his application, thus effectively shutting the door on Woodhams' chances for another Wroble decision by this Court.
Woodhams has also raised the issue that the employer failed to comply with the requirements of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 793(a). Since Woodhams was discharged because of the falsification of an application form, rather than because of his handicap, we find it unnecessary to consider what implications, if any, an affirmative action program might have on an employer's discharge of a handicapped employee.
The decision of the Commission is affirmed. Jenkins v. Agri-lines Corp., 100 Idaho 549, 602 P.2d 47 (1979); Oliver v. Creamer Heating & Appliance Co., 91 Idaho 312, 420 P.2d 317 (1966); Johns v. S. H. Kress & Company, 78 Idaho 544, 307 P.2d 217 (1957).