Case Name: Kenneth Dean ELDRIDGE, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
Court: Texas Courts of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1984-02-13
Citations: 666 S.W.2d 357
Docket Number: No. 05-83-00172-CR
Parties: Kenneth Dean ELDRIDGE, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
Judges: Before STOREY, SPARLING and GUIL-LOT, JJ.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 666
Pages: 357–360

Head Matter:
Kenneth Dean ELDRIDGE, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
No. 05-83-00172-CR.
Court of Appeals of Texas, Dallas.
Feb. 13, 1984.
William A. Bratton, Dallas, for appellant.
Henry Wade, Dist. Atty., Kathi Alyce Drew, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee.
Before STOREY, SPARLING and GUIL-LOT, JJ.

Opinion:
STOREY, Justice.
This is an appeal from a conviction of driving while intoxicated. Appellant contends the trial judge erred in denying appellant an opportunity to have the jury panel shuffled pursuant to TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 35.11 (Vernon 1966). We agree and, thus, reverse and remand for a new trial.
On the day of trial, appellant filed a written Motion to Shuffle Jurors. Before the jury panel was brought into the courtroom, the following dialogue took place between the trial judge and appellant's counsel:
THE COURT: Mr. Bratton, at this time the Court will ask you if at this time, that is, the time that the Court is about to order a jury in this case, if you desire to shuffle the jurors? At this time?
MR. BRATTON: I can't answer that question at this time. I don't refuse to shuffle them now.
THE COURT: All right. That is what I want in the record. You have been given that opportunity and you have declined at this point to exercise that option.
I understand you and I have been through this before. Let me explain to you what is going to happen. You will be given a list of the jurors. It will not have any other information on it except their names.
They will be standing in the rear of the courtroom in a random manner and you will not be allowed to determine any of the pertinent information pertaining to any of the particular jurors until after the jury selection has been initiated and some of the questions have been asked on the prospective jurors.
Now, at any time that you desire to, if you want to, make a motion to shuffle, then we will indicate in the record at that point that you are making that motion. But your motion will be denied....
MR. BRATTON: . [A]t this point, I have not seen any list of the jurors in any order whatsoever. It's my understanding that I cannot intelligently exercise a motion to shuffle until I do see the order of jurors, and I would request the Court to allow me the opportunity to see what order the jurors sit in and allow me then to properly, according to Code of Criminal Procedure and law of the State of Texas, to exercise my right to motion to shuffle. I am asking the Court at this time....
THE COURT: Your motion is at this time denied and will be for all times denied.
By this time, the jury panel had entered the rear of the courtroom and was standing in a random manner. The trial judge immediately swore the jury and asked voir dire questions of two members of the panel, thereby terminating appellant's right to shuffle. Roberson v. State, 582 S.W.2d 422, 423 (Tex.Cr.App.1979).
The only opportunity to shuffle the jury panel afforded appellant was before the jury panel entered the courtroom. A party has the right to see the jury panel seated before it demands a shuffle. Stark v. State, 657 S.W.2d 115, 116 (Tex.Cr.App.1983); Thomas v. State, 624 S.W.2d 383, 385 (Tex.App. — Fort Worth 1981, no pet.).
In Stark, the Court of Criminal Appeals quoted from defense counsel's argument to the trial court as follows:
Well, my understanding of the statute is that I get a chance to look at how they're seated here before I file my Motion to Shuffle. And I'm not asking that that be filed. In fact, I'll withdraw that at this time, Your Honor, until I've had a chance to look at the panel. I think I have an opportunity to look at the panel we have here in the courtroom for this trial, and then if I want to file my Motion to Shuffle, I'm automatically entitled.
657 S.W.2d at 116. The court then stated: "Appellant's interpretation of the statute is correct." Id. The court did not go so far as to hold that the panel should be seated in any particular order. Similarly, our holding here is not to be understood as requiring that the panel be seated in any particular order.
Appellant's refusal to agree to a shuffle outside the courtroom does not constitute waiver. Latham & Winston v. State, 656 S.W.2d 478 (Tex.Cr.App.1983). It is apparent from our record that the only opportunity afforded appellant to shuffle the jury panel was before the panel entered the courtroom — a practice condemned in Stark, 657 S.W.2d at 116.
We hold that the conduct of the trial judge in this case constitutes error. Because the statute grants each party an absolute right to shuffle, appellant need not show that he was harmed or had to take an unacceptable juror. Smith v. State, 648 S.W.2d 695, 696 (Tex.Cr.App.1983).
Reversed and remanded.