Case Name: Bert Kirkman, as President of Local Union No. 3 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Respondent, v. Westchester Newspapers, Inc., et al., Appellants; Bert Kirkman et al., Appellants, v. Westchester Newspapers, Inc., et al., Respondents
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1942-01-22
Citations: 287 N.Y. 373
Docket Number: 
Parties: Bert Kirkman, as President of Local Union No. 3 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Respondent, v. Westchester Newspapers, Inc., et al., Appellants. Bert Kirkman et al., Appellants, v. Westchester Newspapers, Inc., et al., Respondents.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 287
Pages: 373–389

Head Matter:
Bert Kirkman, as President of Local Union No. 3 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Respondent, v. Westchester Newspapers, Inc., et al., Appellants. Bert Kirkman et al., Appellants, v. Westchester Newspapers, Inc., et al., Respondents.
Argued November 19, 1941;
decided January 22, 1942.
Harold Stern and George Rosling for plaintiffs, appellants and respondents.
An unincorporated association may maintain an action for libel. (N. Y. Society v. Macfadden Publications, 260 N. Y. 167; Philipp v. New. Yorker Staats-Zeitung, 165 App. Div. 377; Stone v. Textile Examiners Employers’ Assn., 137 App. Div. 655; Bradley v. Conners, 169 Misc. Rep. 442.) The complaint states a cause of action for libel as to the union. (More v. Bennett, 48 N. Y. 472; Klaw v. N. Y. Press Co., 137 App. Div. 686; Hall v. Binghamton Press Co., 29 N. Y. Supp. [2d] 760; Townes v. N. Y. Evening Journal Pub. Co., 109 App. Div. 852; Sweet v. Ken, Inc., 169 Misc. Rep. 407; 256 App. Div. 1063; Kraft v. Araujo, 238 App. Div. 324; Jackson v. Consumer Pub., Inc., 256 App. Div. 708.) The innuendo was properly pleaded. It does not in any event affect the sufficiency of the complaint. (Klaw v. N. Y. Press Co., 137 App. Div. 686; Barnard v. Press Pub. Co., 63 Hun, 626; Hall v. Binghamton Press Co., 29 N. Y. Supp. [2d] 760; Cafferty v. Southern Tier Pub. Co., 226 N. Y. 87; Morrison v. Smith, 177 N. Y. 366; Shubert v. Variety, 128 Misc. Rep. 428; 221 App. Div. 856.) The complaint states a cause of action for libel as to each of the individual plaintiffs. (Dall v. Time, Inc., 252 App. Div. 636; Birnham v. Hornaday, 130 Misc. Rep. 207; 223 App. Div. 218; Thomas v. Moore, [1918] 1 K. B. 555.)
Joseph Reeback and Charles S. Cunningham for Westchester Newspapers, Inc., et al., respondents and appellants.
Each of the causes of action of the sixteen union officials is insufficient because it app'ears from its face that the publication does not refer to an ascertained or ascertainable person who is the plaintiff. (Hays v. American Defense Society, 252 N. Y. 266; Feely v. Vitagraph Co., 184 App. Div. 527; Service Parking Corp. v. Washington Times Co., 92 Fed. Rep. [2d] 502; Stroud v. Harris, 5 Fed. Rep. [2d] 25; Owens v. Clarke, 154 Okla. 108; Harvey v. Coffin, 5 Blackf. [Ind.] 566; Gross v. Cantor, 270 N. Y. 93; Van Heusen v. Argenteau, 194 N. Y. 309; Fleischmann v. Bennett, 87 N. Y. 231; Corr v. Sun Printing & Pub. Assn., 177 N. Y. 131.) The publication is not libelous per se of the local union and, therefore, the complaint of its president should have been dismissed. (Kloor v. N. Y. Herald Co., 200 App. Div. 90; Tanzer v. Crowley Publishing Corp., 240 App. Div. 203; Baumann v. Baumann, 250 N. Y. 382; Labouisse v. Evening Post Pub. Co., 10 App. Div. 30; Rossiter v. New York Press Co., 141 App. Div. 339; Smid v. Bernard, 31 Misc. Rep. 35; Morrison v. Smith, 177 N. Y. 366; Crashley v. Press Pub. Co., 179 N. Y. 27; N. Y. Bureau of Information v. Ridgway-Thayer Co., 193 N. Y. 666.) The complaint of Kirkman, as president of the local union, an unincorporated association, is insufficient since it appears therefrom that the members of the union do not have any joint or common interest in the cause of action as required by section 12 of the General Associations Law and since the criticism of the association constitutes an impersonal reproach of an indeterminate class. (Ostrom v. Greene, 161 N. Y. 353; Bossert v. Dhuy, 166 App. Div. 251; 221 N. Y. 342; Picket v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572; Hanley v. American Ry. Express Co., 244 Mass. 248; Lloyd v. Sloan, 259 App. Div. 615; McMahon v. Rauhr, 47 N. Y. 67; Mandell v. Cole, 244 N. Y. 221; Giraud v. Beach, 3 E. D. Smith, 337; McCabe v. Goodfellow, 133 N. Y. 89; Schouten v. Alpine, 215 N. Y. 225; Mercantile Marine Service Assn. v. Toms, [1916] 2 K. B. 243; Hardie v. Chiltern, [1928] 1 K. B. 663; Gatley on Libel & Slander [3d ed.], 464, 465; Markt & Co. v. Knight Steamship Co., [1910] 2 K. B. 1021; Gross v. Cantor, 270 N. Y. 93; People v. Eastman, 188 N. Y. 478; Weston v. Commercial Advertiser Assn., 184 N. Y. 479.) The General Associations Law does not permit an unincorporated association to sue and be sued as a legal entity, but, on the contrary, merely authorizes a representative suit or defense on behalf of the associates. (McCabe v. Goodfellow, 133 N. Y. 89; Schein v. Erasmus Realty Co., 194 App. Div. 38; Bossert v. Dhuy, 166 App. Div. 251; 221 N. Y. 342; Hagan v. Bricklayers Union, 143 Misc. Rep. 591; Andrews v. Local Union No, 13, 133 Misc. Rep. 899; Meinhart v. Contresta, 194 N. Y. Supp. 593; Bobe v. Lloyds, 10 Fed. Rep. [2d] 730; People ex rel. Solomon v. Brotherhood of Painters, 218 N. Y. 115; Schouten v. Alpine, 215 N. Y. 225; Havens v. King, 221 App. Div. 475.) The publication does not warrant, as a matter of law, the innuendo pleaded. (Fleischmann v. Bennett, 87 N. Y. 231; Hays v. American Defense Society, 252 N. Y. 266; Hoeppner v. Dunkirk Printing Co., 254 N. Y. 95; Fry v. Bennett, 7 N. Y. Super. Ct. [5 Sanf.] 54; Stevens v. Whelan, 234 App. Div. 118; Cook v. Mirsky, 249 App. Div. 394; Morrison v. Smith, 177 N. Y. 366.)
Isaac W. Digges and Gilbert H. Weil for McClure Newspaper Syndicate, Inc., et al., respondents and appellants.
The Appellate Division erred in affirming the order of the lower court which denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the first cause of action as insufficient in law upon its face. (O’Connell v. Press Pub. Co., 214 N. Y. 352; Crashley v. Press Pub. Co., 179 N. Y. 27; Hays v. American Defense Society, 252 N. Y. 266; Fleischmann v. Bennett, 87 N. Y. 231; Ben-Oliel v. Press Pub. Co., 251 N. Y. 250; Moore v. Francis, 121 N. Y. 199; Labouisse v. Evening Post Pub. Co., 10 App. Div. 30; Foot v. Pitt, 83 App. Div. 76; Cafferty v. Southern Tier Pub. Co., 226 N. Y. 87.) The order of the Appellate Division dismissing the sixteen causes of action of the union officials on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action in libel as to any of the officials, and the judgment against the individual plaintiffs, should be affirmed. (Hays v. American Defense Society, Inc., 252 N. Y. 266; Corr v. Sun Printing & Pub. Assn., 177 N. Y. 131; Fleischmann v. Bennett, 87 N. Y. 231; Feely v. Vitagraph Co., 184 App. Div. 527; Hauptner v. White, 81 App. Div. 153; Knickerbocker v. Press Pub. Co., 143 App. Div. 138; Fagan v. New York Evening Journal Pub. Co., 129 App. Div. 28.)
Allan S. Locke for James McMullin, respondent and appellant.
The intendment of the newspaper article of which the plaintiff labor union and officials complain is not directed at the plaintiff union, nor is it libelous per se. (Willis v. Eclipse Mfg. Co., 81 App. Div. 591; N. Y. Bureau of Information v. Ridgway-Thayer Co., 119 App. Div. 339; 193 N. Y. 666; Adirondack Record, Inc., v. Lawrence, 202 App. Div. 251; Baker v. Warner, 231 U. S. 588; Hays v. American Defense Society, 252 N. Y. 266; National Variety Artists, Inc., v. Masconi, 169 Misc. Rep. 982; Corr v. Sun Printing & Pub. Assn., 177 N. Y. 131; Van Heusen v. Argenteau, 194 N. Y. 309; Kuhn v. Veloz, 252 App. Div. 515; Hoeppner v. Dunkirk Printing Co., 227 App. Div. 130; Kimmerle v. N. Y. Evening Journal, Inc., 262 N. Y. 99.) In the absence of an enabling statute, an unincorporated association may not sue or be sued in the association’s name. Actions permitted by the president or treasurer of such an association under section 12 of the General Associations Law being specifically limited to causes of action where each of the members of the association has a joint or common interest with all of the other members in the cause of action, no action for defamation by the plaintiff union lies. {Mein hart v. Contresta, 194 N. Y. Supp. 593; Rodier v. Fay, 7 N. Y. Supp. [2d] 744; McCabe v. Goodfellow, 133 N. Y. 89; Edwards v. Warren L. & G. Works, 168 Mass. 564; United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344; Mercantile Marine v. Toms, [1916] 2 K. B. 243; Hardie v. Chiltern, [1928] 1 K. B. 663; Markt v. Knight, [1910] 2 K. B. 1040; U. S. & Cuban Allied Works Engineering Corp. v. Lloyds, 291 Fed. Rep. 889; N. Y. Society v. Macfadden Publications, 260 N. Y. 167; Bradley v. Conners, 169 Misc. Rep. 442; Peacock v. Tata Sons, Ltd., 206 App. Div. 145; Wright v. Afro-American Co., 152 Md. 587; Giraud v. Beach, 3 E. D. Smith, 337.)

Opinion:
Desmond, J.
This opinion deals only with the first cause of action in the complaint. All of the judges concur in Judge Conway's opinion in so far as it treats of the second to seventeenth causes of action, as to which causes of action Judge Conway's opinion, is, therefore, the opinion of the whole court.
As to the first cause of action asserted by Kirkman, as president of the local union, the principal argument advanced against its sufficiency is that " a plurality of persons never has a joint or common interest in a cause of action for' libel." Therefore, we are told, a cause of action for libel is not one of those on which the president of an unincorporated association may sue, on behalf of the association, under the terms of section 12 of the General Associations Law (Cons. Laws, ch. 29). The unincorporated association which plaintiff Kirkman represents in this action was formed for definite purposes and is engaged in activities intended to carry out those purposes for the benefit of all the members of the association. The article charges wrongdoing by officers of this association in performance of the work of the association. It does not reflect upon, or tend to injure the reputation of the individual members but it does tend to discredit the work in which they have a common interest. The injury is thus a common injury and the members have a common interest in the consequent damages. The com- - plaint asserts that this local union of which Kirkman is president, has a " high and enviable reputation " because of its success in collective bargaining and because it has provided for its members educational advantages, sick and death benefits, etc. Is not that reputation the common property of its members as such? This court in New York Society for the Suppression of Vice v. Macfadden Publications, Inc. (260 N. Y. 167, 170), said as to a membership corporation not operated for pecuniary gain, that " to decide that such corporations have no reputation acquired in the management of their affairs and property which can be injured or destroyed by a malicious libel, unless special damage .is proved, would constitute a reflection upon the administration of justice." So as to an unincorporated association with similar objects and purposes. The courts have no less a duty in this case than in a suit brought by a corporation or an individual, to protect good name, reputation and credit from slanderous or libelous attacks.
The history of the law of libel in this State as to partnerships and corporations has led us by successive steps to the rule that we now announce as to unincorporated associations. As early as 1853, in Taylor v. Church (8 N. Y. 452), this court held that mercantile partners might sue for libel and recover for the injury done to the character, standing and credit of their firm. In 1862, in Shoe & Leather Bank v. Thompson (23 How. Pr. 253, 255), there was a similar holding in favor of a libeled banking corporation. There the court, applying the principle that there is no wrong without a remedy, said of the corporation plaintiff: " It is recognized by the law as being engaged in business, and as being possessed of property. This recognition, as to its rights in these respects, is as effectual and complete as in the case of private individuals." Coming down to more recent times, this court said in 1906 of another corporate plaintiff in an action for libel that it was as much entitled to the protection of the law as a natural person, that its right to be protected against false and malicious statements affecting its property or credit was beyond question, and that a corporation need not allege or prove specific damage, when the language complained of " is of so defamatory a nature as to directly affect credit and to occasion pecuniary injury." (Reporters' Assn. v. Sun Printing & Pub. Assn., 186 N. Y. 437, 440, 441. See, also, Mutual Reserve Fund Assn. v. Spectator Co., 50 N. Y. Super. Ct. Rep. 460, decided in 1884, and Philipp Co. v. New Yorker Staats-Zeitung, 165 App. Div. 377, 392, decided in 1914.) And in New York Society for the Suppression of Vice v. Macfadden Publications, Inc. (supra), we said, further, that this rule was just as applicable to non-profit, or benevolent corporations, as to business corporations. We now hold that it is equally applicable to unincorporated associations, also, and that such associations are to be regarded as entities to the extent necessary to permit suits for libel to be brought in their behalf, by their officers.
Labor unions play a large and important role in modern life. The " growth and necessities of these great labor organizations have brought affirmative legal recognition of their existence and usefulness and provisions for their protection, which their members have found necessary." (United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344, 385.) We know that they are rarely incorporated. We should not require them to assume the form of corporations, in order to be recognized as possessing reputations which the law will protect. The courts which recognize a labor union's existence and its traditional form of organization, will not refuse to redress a wrong done to it in its group or unified character. Such a wrong is alleged in the first cause of action here, which complains of a libelous attack not on the reputation of the individual members but on the reputation of the association as such. The newspaper article, read as a whole and reasonably interpreted, would justify a jury's finding that it charged the local union with unfairness and overcharging, if not extortion. The first certified question, therefore, is to be answered in the affirmative.
Besides a question as to the sufficiency of the first cause of action, the Appellate Division has certified to us another question concerning the correctness of an order.made at Special Term and affirmed by the Appellate Division, which denied defendants' motion to strike out certain matter from the first cause of action. This matter was pleaded by way of innuendo. Without discussing this innuendo at length, we conclude that the quoted words of the article are capable of the meaning ascribed to them by the innuendo and that it will be for the jury to say whether they were in fact so understood. Indeed, it may here be said that the innuendo which Special Term refused 'to strike out is practically a paraphrase of the quoted language of the article itself, and that, therefore, its retention in the complaint does not harm defendants.
Upon plaintiffs-appellants' appeal the judgment of the Appellate Division, dismissing the second to seventeenth causes of action, should be reversed, and the motion to dismiss such causes of action denied, with costs in this court and in the Appellate Division; upon the appeal of defendants-appellants the order of the Appellate Division, in so far as it affirms the orders of Special Term, should be affirmed, with costs. The questions certified should be answered in the affirmative.