Case Name: Amanda BRADSHAW, Petitioner, v. Barney Samuel BRADSHAW, Respondent
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 2018-06-29
Citations: 555 S.W.3d 539
Docket Number: No. 16–0328
Parties: Amanda BRADSHAW, Petitioner,
v.
Barney Samuel BRADSHAW, Respondent
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter Third Series
Volume: 555
Pages: 539–562

Head Matter:
Amanda BRADSHAW, Petitioner,
v.
Barney Samuel BRADSHAW, Respondent
No. 16-0328
Supreme Court of Texas.
Argued February 28, 2018
Opinion delivered: June 29, 2018
Nicholas B. Bacarisse, Rachel A. Ekery, for Barney Samuel Bradshaw.
Barney Samuel Bradshaw, pro se.
Ebb B. Mobley III, for Amanda Bradshaw.
Chief Justice Hecht announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion in which Justice Brown and Justice Blacklock joined.
While married to Amanda Bradshaw, Barney Samuel Bradshaw was convicted and sentenced to 60 years in prison for the continuous sexual abuse of Amanda's daughter, who was younger than 14 years old at the time of the offense. In the couple's divorce, the trial court divided their community home 80% to Amanda and 20% to Barney. The court of appeals affirmed. Amanda contends that the division was not just and right and that she should have been awarded 100% of the home because of his criminal abuse of the family. We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the case to the trial court to reconsider the division of the community estate.
I
Amanda and Barney married in November 2010 and lived together in a home Amanda owned before the marriage, together with Amanda's 2 young daughters, S.S. and A.G., and A.G.'s sister, K.M. In February 2012, the home was destroyed by fire. Using insurance proceeds, Amanda paid off the mortgage, sold the property, and bought a new home for the family in June 2012.
That summer, Barney, then 34, began sexually abusing Amanda's 13-year-old daughter, S.S. Barney was accused of requiring S.S. to perform various sex acts with him for more than a year, often daily, sometimes weekly, stopping for a while, then resuming. Barney had also sexually abused A.G., then 15, who knew he was abusing S.S. When K.M., then 16 or 17, told A.G. that Barney had abused her, A.G. said that she and S.S. had both had "sexual problems" with Barney. In August 2013, S.S., A.G., and K.M. were visiting their aunt for a few days when they began to talk with each other about their shared nightmare. "[I]n the midst of great angst and emotion", with the girls "crying hysterically," A.G. told the aunt, "[Bradshaw has] been messing with us, and we can't take anymore, and [S.S.] has been getting the brunt of it." "[We want] 'this to stop.' " The aunt called the police.
Barney was charged with continuous sexual abuse of a young child, S.S., who was at the time of the offense younger than 14 years old. The 3 girls all testified at the trial, as well as a friend of theirs, B.P., whom Barney had also sexually assaulted. All the abuse occurred in the Bradshaw home, the yard, the bathroom, and Barney's bedroom. Barney was convicted and sentenced to 60 years in prison without parole.
Meanwhile, Amanda had filed for divorce. At the hearing, she testified only very briefly, and Barney, in jail awaiting trial, was not allowed to testify. The court awarded Amanda all of the community estate and the home as her separate property. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the evidence did not support either the award of all the community property to Amanda or the characterization of the home as her separate property.
On remand, Amanda presented additional evidence. She testified that Barney had physically abused her on multiple occasions, and S.S. and A.G. testified that Barney had sexually abused them repeatedly. Barney testified by telephone from prison. He claimed an interest in the fire insurance proceeds and in the home, asserting that he had made extensive repairs to it. He denied all the allegations of abuse, contending that they had been concocted to deprive him of an interest in the home. While the case was pending in the trial court, Barney's conviction was affirmed on appeal.
Between the divorce case and the criminal case, 5 different women testified under oath to Barney's physical and sexual abuse. For some, the abuse continued for more than a year. Nearly all of the abuse occurred at the Bradshaw home during Barney and Amanda's 3-year marriage. The trial court found that the home was community property and awarded 80% of it to Amanda and 20% to Barney, based on "fault in the breakup of the marriage". The court awarded the rest of the community property to the party in possession.
Amanda appealed, arguing that she should have been awarded 100% of the home and that anything less was not "just and right". The court of appeals affirmed the property division, noting that "although fault may be considered in making a disproportionate distribution of community property, '[t]he division should not be a punishment for the spouse at fault.' "
We granted Amanda's petition for review.
II
The division of a community estate in divorce must be "just and right, having due regard for the rights of each party and any children of the marriage." "Just" and "right" are broad terms. Black's Law Dictionary defines "just" as "[l]egally right; lawful; equitable", and "right" as "[t]hat which is proper under law, morality, or ethics". And "due regard" simply means the "[a]ttention, care, or consideration" that is "[j]ust, proper, regular, and reasonable". A trial court should consider many factors, including "the spouses' capacities and abilities ... and the nature of the property." The court may consider the "fault in breaking up the marriage", though the community-property division "should not be a punishment for the spouse at fault." In the end, "the court is to do complete equity as between the husband and wife and the children, having due regard to all obligations of the spouses and to the probable future necessities of all concerned."
Because the standards for dividing a community estate involve the exercise of sound judgment, a trial court must be accorded much discretion in its decision. The division "should be corrected on appeal only where an abuse of discretion is shown in that the disposition made of some property is manifestly unjust and unfair." The appellate court cannot merely reweigh the evidence. Rather, "[a] determination of whether the property division decreed in a divorce constitutes an abuse of discretion presents a legal rather than a factual question for appellate review." And in deciding that legal question, the trial court is entitled to no deference. "[A] trial court has no discretion in determining what the law is or applying the law to the facts, even when the law is unsettled."
Thus, the issue before us is this: In the circumstances presented, can it be just and right, as a matter of law, in dividing a community estate in divorce, to award an interest in the family home to a spouse convicted of using the home to sexually abuse his stepdaughter? The issue is not whether Barney's conviction for sexual abuse of his stepdaughter contributed to the breakup of his marriage and for that reason could be considered in dividing the community estate. The trial court appears to have done just that. Nor is the issue whether awarding Amanda 100% of the home "could operate to punish Barney for his fault in the dissolution of the marriage,"
as the court of appeals worried. It can certainly be argued that Barney's punishment was his 60-year prison sentence, not the unequal division of the home (though as JUSTICE BOYD observes, "[a] sixty-year prison sentence hardly seems sufficient"). Wholly apart from whether Barney's crime contributed to the breakup of the marriage, the question is whether it can be just and right to award him an interest in the home he repeatedly used to sexually abuse multiple victims, including his stepdaughters.
We have little difficulty answering no. As broad as the terms "just" and "right" are, they are not meaningless. They express values fundamental to our society, values we hold precious. Our society is diverse, and perceptions of what is "just" and "right" can differ with perspective. But we think it virtually beyond argument that awarding Barney an interest in the very home he used to sexually abuse his stepdaughter, for which he was convicted, and others is unjust and wrong, not as a matter of fact, but as a matter of law. Such an award was thus an abuse of discretion.
Barney argues that the award is justified because Amanda took $5,000 from his disability benefits account after filing for divorce, he worked on the home and helped furnish it, Amanda offered no evidence that his criminal conviction affected her financially, and awarding her 100% of the home could be considered punitive. These arguments might be relevant to whether this is an appropriate uneven distribution for fault in the breakup of the marriage. But they miss the point: Barney should not be awarded an interest in the home he was convicted of using to sexually assault his stepdaughter. Barney insists that the allegations against him are untrue, and that the award of 20% of the home was "a hedge against any residual doubt" the trial court may have had that he is guilty as charged. But the evidence against him in the criminal trial was overwhelming, the sentence was severe, and his conviction has been affirmed on appeal. Barney argues that awarding Amanda 100% of the home would be unjust because she was given other community property in her possession that was his. But the case is being remanded for reconsideration of the division of the community estate, and those arguments are best addressed on remand.
For JUSTICE BOYD , "Barney's cruelty and the harm he inflicted on Amanda and her daughters are indisputably abhorrent and intolerable in any civilized society", but he argues that the Court has "found an abuse of discretion only when the trial court ignores a governing legal standard." JUSTICE BOYD contends that while he "might"-not would , but might -personally agree that Barney should have no interest in the home, that cannot override the trial court's exercise of discretion. If awarding Barney an interest in the home could be just and right, we would agree. But it cannot be-as a matter of law. JUSTICE BOYD opines that "this Court's view of what is 'just and right' is irrelevant to the issue before us." In finally interpreting a statute, this Court's view is all that is relevant. "Maybe", JUSTICE BOYD muses, "Texas law should require those who abuse their spouses or children or step-children to forfeit all interests in any property they use to commit those crimes. But the State's right, in the exercise of its police power, to 'declare a forfeiture of the property of private individuals' involves policy decisions best exercised by the Legislature, not by this Court." In the circumstances of this case, we disagree. The Legislature has already made the policy decision: a division of a community estate must be just and right. As JUSTICE BOYD notes, "we must 'take statutes as we find them.' " As a matter of law, the trial court's division of the home in this case is neither just nor right.
JUSTICE BOYD states that "when a statute authorizes the trial court to make a discretionary determination by applying equitable standards like 'just and right,' appellate courts cannot restrict that discretion by declaring that a particular application is or is not just and right." But that is precisely what appellate courts do, as we have done, for example, in holding that using a community division to punish a spouse for fault in the breakup of the marriage is not just and right. JUSTICE BOYD argues that even if we spoke for the Court, our decision would not be retroactive. Rarely are our decisions not retroactive, and JUSTICE BOYD does not argue why a legal interpretation of "just and right" would be an exception.
To be clear, we limit our opinion today to narrow circumstances where the behavior involves the use of community property, is as egregious as Barney's, and results in a criminal conviction. Family violence is, deplorably, all too common. We do not hold that its occurrence alone deprives the guilty spouse of an interest in all or even a specific part of the community estate. The elements that compel our decision are that Barney sexually abused his stepdaughters and others repeatedly over a protracted period, that he used the family home to commit the abuse, and that he was convicted and severely sentenced for the continuous sexual abuse of a child under the age of 14. One can hypothesize a harder case than this one-a single incident, weak evidence, an enormous home, no criminal conviction. A division of community property can be just and right despite violence directed against the family. The award of an interest in the home to Barney cannot be. JUSTICE BOYD complains that this is "unworkable as a legal principle." We fail to see why it is more unworkable than reasonableness, a standard that pervades the law.
See Tex. Penal Code § 21.02(b) ("A person commits an offense if: (1) during a period that is 30 or more days in duration, the person commits two or more acts of sexual abuse, regardless of whether the acts of sexual abuse are committed against one or more victims; and (2) at the time of the commission of each of the acts of sexual abuse, the actor is 17 years of age or older and the victim is a child younger than 14 years of age, regardless of whether the actor knows the age of the victim at the time of the offense.").
Bradshaw v. State , 466 S.W.3d 875, 877 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2015, pet. ref'd).
487 S.W.3d 306, 312 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2016).
See Tex. Fam. Code § 7.001 ("In a decree of divorce or annulment, the court shall order a division of the estate of the parties in a manner that the court deems just and right, having due regard for the rights of each party and any children of the marriage.").
Bradshaw , 466 S.W.3d at 883.
Id. (alterations in original).
Id.
Id.
See Tex. Penal Code § 21.02(b).
The court awarded Amanda the community property in her possession and awarded the same to Barney. But because Barney was incarcerated, this essentially amounted to an award of the community estate to Amanda.
In re Marriage of Bradshaw , No. 12-14-00056-CV, 2014 WL 3940092, at *2-4 (Tex. App.-Tyler Aug. 13, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Bradshaw , 466 S.W.3d at 884.
487 S.W.3d 306, 312 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2016) (quoting Young v. Young , 609 S.W.2d 758, 762 (Tex. 1980) (alteration in original) ).
61 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 254 (Jan. 19, 2018). Because Barney was without counsel, the Court referred the case to the Supreme Court of Texas Pro Bono Program available through the State Bar of Texas Appellate Section. Barney has been very ably represented in this Court by counsel obtained through the Program.
Tex. Fam. Code § 7.001.
Just , Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
Right , id.
Regard , id.
Due , id.
Murff v. Murff , 615 S.W.2d 696, 699 (Tex. 1981).
Young v. Young , 609 S.W.2d 758, 761-762 (Tex. 1980).
Hedtke v. Hedtke , 112 Tex. 404, 248 S.W. 21, 22 (1923).
Murff , 615 S.W.2d at 698.
Hedtke , 248 S.W. at 23.
Mann v. Mann , 607 S.W.2d 243, 244 (Tex. 1980).
In re State Farm Lloyds , 520 S.W.3d 595, 604 (Tex. 2017) (internal quotations omitted); accord In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. , 148 S.W.3d 124, 135 (Tex. 2004) ; Huie v. DeShazo , 922 S.W.2d 920, 927-928 (Tex. 1996) ; Walker v. Packer , 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992).
487 S.W.3d 306, 312 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2016).
Post at 554.
Post at 554.
Post at 552.
Post at 552.
Post at 555 (quoting State v. Richards , 157 Tex. 166, 301 S.W.2d 597, 600 (1957) ).
Tex. Fam. Code § 7.001.
Post at 555 (quoting Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. Summers , 282 S.W.3d 433, 443 (Tex. 2009) ).
Post at 553.
Young v. Young , 609 S.W.2d 758, 762 (Tex. 1980).
Post at ----.
Post at 553.

Opinion:
"Amanda presents a forceful argument", JUSTICE BOYD begrudges. We agree.

The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
Justice Devine filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Guzman joined.
Justice Lehrmann filed a dissenting opinion.
Justice Boyd filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Green, Justice Johnson, and Justice Lehrmann joined.
Justice Devine, joined by Justice Guzman, concurring.
A trial court must have some understanding of the extent and value of the community estate before it can make an equitable division. When the underlying record fails to provide this basic information, any division of property must lack a reasonable basis and be perceived as arbitrary. Because the record here does not provide sufficient information about the community estate for the trial court to make an equitable division, I agree that the case must be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
I
"In a decree of divorce or annulment, the court shall order a division of the estate of the parties in a manner that the court deems just and right, having due regard for the rights of each party and any children of the marriage." TEX. FAM. CODE § 7.001. A number of factors may be relevant to the determination of a "just and right" division. Murff v. Murff , 615 S.W.2d 696, 699 (Tex. 1981). A non-exclusive list includes such factors as the parties' disparity in income or earning capacity, the parties' capacities and abilities, the parties' relative needs and financial condition, the parties' relative fault in ending the marriage, the benefits the party without fault would have received had the marriage continued, as well as the parties' relative physical conditions, future business prospects, disparity in age, separate estates, education, and the nature of the property to be divided. Murff , 615 S.W.2d at 699 ; Young v. Young , 609 S.W.2d 758, 762 (Tex. 1980).
The trial court has wide discretion in balancing these factors and determining the proper division. Murff , 615 S.W.2d at 698. Although the marital estate need not be divided equally, the division must be equitable. Chafino v. Chafino , 228 S.W.3d 467, 473 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2007, no pet.). If the trial court makes an unequal division, it must have a reasonable basis for doing so. Id.
An appellate court should reverse the trial court's division only when the trial court abuses its discretion. Murff , 615 S.W.2d at 698. Additionally, when the trial court does not file its findings and conclusions, its distribution of the estate must be affirmed if there is any basis in the record to support its decision. Rosemond v. Al-Lahiq , 331 S.W.3d 764, 766 (Tex. 2011) ; Worford v. Stamper , 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990).
In reviewing the division of a marital estate, the appellate court may not substitute its own discretion for that of the trial court. See McKnight v. McKnight, 543 S.W.2d 863, 866 (Tex. 1976). An abuse of discretion requires something more than that the trial court should have reached a different result. Nath v. Texas Children's Hosp. , 446 S.W.3d 355, 371 (Tex. 2014). Instead, an abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court "acts in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner without reference to any guiding rules or principles." Walker v. Gutierrez , 111 S.W.3d 56, 62 (Tex. 2003).
A trial court can act arbitrarily and thus abuse its discretion in several ways. For example, a trial court abuses its discretion when it exercises discretion it does not legally possess or fails to exercise discretion when it must. Landon v. Jean-Paul Budinger, Inc. , 724 S.W.2d 931, 937-38 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, no writ). A court also acts in an arbitrary manner when it attempts to exercise its discretion without sufficient information to make a rational decision. Id. at 938. Finally, a court abuses it discretion when it exercises its discretion in a manner that lacks any support in the record. Id. at 938-39 ; See also In re Marriage of Brown , 187 S.W.3d 143, 148 (Tex. App.-Waco 2006, no pet.)
II
The court of appeals' conclusion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion is not grounded in the evidence but on our admonition that a fair-and-just division "should not be a punishment." 487 S.W.3d 306, 312 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2016) (quoting Young , 609 S.W.2d at 762 ). The court reasoned that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by giving Amanda 80 percent of the Florey Lake property because awarding her any more than that could be viewed as punishing Barney. Id. at 312. The court thus dismissed Amanda's argument that the trial court abused its discretion in dividing the Florey Lake property by assuming that awarding more than 80 percent to Amanda was outside the range of choices permitted by law.
I disagree with this premise. Neither the Family Code nor our decision in Young establishes a threshold beyond which an award must be deemed a punishment as a matter of law. In Young , we merely stated that a trial court may not punish the spouse at fault when dividing marital property. Young , 609 S.W.2d at 762. Thus, a trial court that seeks to punish a spouse when dividing property has "arrived at its determination in violation of [a] general rule[ ] of law" and, hence, abused its discretion. Landon , 724 S.W.2d at 939. But Young does not establish a range of choices permitted by law or a presumption that an award outside that range is a punishment. See Young, 609 S.W.2d at 762. Although relatively rare, other courts of appeal have affirmed divisions where one spouse received more than 80 percent of the property. See, e.g., Ohendalski v. Ohendalski , 203 S.W.3d 910, 912 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2006, no pet.) (affirming award of 81 percent of the community estate to wife); Wright v. Wright , 65 S.W.3d 715, 716 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2001, no pet.) (affirming award of 88 percent of the community estate to wife). Neither does the Family Code create a range of acceptable awards; it simply instructs that the property division be just and right. TEX. FAM. CODE § 7.001. If the evidence supports a disproportionate division of the marital estate, a trial court must order a division that is just and right, guided by that evidence.
The record here supports a disproportionate, fault-based award of property to Amanda. Even so, Amanda complains that the disproportionate award does not go far enough because no evidence supports Barney's award of a 20 percent interest in the Florey Lake property. In short, Amanda argues that the property division, though disproportionately in her favor, still is not "just and right." Id. The argument requires us to examine the entire record to determine whether the trial court had sufficient information on which to exercise its discretion and whether evidence exists to support the trial court's decision.
Although the home where Amanda and Barney began their marriage was Amanda's separate property and an insurance settlement for its loss was used to purchase the Florey Lake property, the court of appeals nevertheless determined that Amanda failed to adequately trace these funds or rebut the community-property presumption that attaches to property purchased during the marriage. 487 S.W.3d at 310-11. The record reflects that Amanda's insurance company settled her claim by paying approximately $166,000 for the house, $60,000 for its contents, and another $13,000 for the family's additional living expenses following the loss. About $40,000 of the settlement was used to pay off the mortgage company's lien, and Amanda sold the property after that. Amanda used $125,000 of the insurance settlement to buy the Florey Lake property outright. The sale closed in June 2012, about nineteen months after the marriage. Amanda took title to the property solely in her name. The rest of the insurance money was used to furnish the new home and pay other expenses.
Barney claims to have a community interest in both the insurance proceeds and the Florey Lake property. He testified about contributing a mattress, some furniture he did not identify, and a remarkable five televisions to the house that burned. Moreover, Amanda testified that during the marriage she paid the home's mortgage of $450 a month from her earnings. The couple lived in the house for about a year and so approximately $5400 of community funds were expended on the mortgage during this period. During the marriage, Barney received social security disability payments, but did not testify about any other earnings. He did, however, testify about making plumbing repairs to Amanda's first house and to providing assistance with the construction of an addition to the Florey Lake property. It was also undisputed that the insurance-settlement check was made payable to Amanda and Barney even though the insured home was Amanda's separate property.
The last known value of the Florey Lake property was its sales price of $125,000. Barney's awarded interest in the property is thus worth perhaps $25,000. Assuming the addition to the Florey Lake property added to the home's value, Barney's interest is worth even more. Given the community contribution, this seems to be an exceedingly generous award to Barney even before considering his fault or other factors supporting a disproportionate award.
When Barney's fault is factored into the analysis of a just-and-right division, what seems at first blush to be a generous valuation of Barney's community interest becomes even more untenable. In Young , we noted a concern that the trial court not delve into every "bicker, nag, and pout" between the parties when examining fault as a relevant consideration. Young , 609 S.W.2d at 762. Fault implicates reprehensible conduct, not a disagreeable personality. For example, James Young deserted his wife and left her with the sole responsibility of raising their son. Id. at 759. We concluded that this reprehensible act was certainly worthy of consideration when dividing the marital estate. Id. at 762. In retrospect, Amanda and her daughters would, in all probability, have considered it a blessing had Barney merely abandoned the family. Instead, he stayed, causing his family and others unspeakable physical and emotional harm. It is difficult to imagine a situation where considering fault in the division would be more appropriate.
Apart from Barney's fault, other relevant factors such as the nature of the property and the parties' relative needs support a disproportionate award to Amanda. Murff , 615 S.W.2d at 699. Ironically, Barney has been awarded an interest in the very asset that facilitated his criminal activity. Moreover, the parties' financial obligations and, hence, their needs, are vastly different. Amanda has two daughters to shelter and support and needs the home. Barney, on the other hand, is incarcerated for sixty years; the state has made arrangements for his room, board, and other necessities for his foreseeable future. Bradshaw v. State , 466 S.W.3d 875, 877 (Tex. Crim. App.-Texarkana 2015, pet. ref'd). He has no need of the Florey Lake property and has stated that he would prefer to have his community interest paid in a lump sum. But the interest awarded to him in the Florey Lake property has no apparent relationship to his community interest, particularly if the trial court's intent was to factor in Barney's fault.
Another significant factor is the value of Amanda's separate property that was either contributed to or commingled with the community estate. Courts may consider the amount of separate property consumed or contributed during the marriage when dividing the marital estate. See, e.g., Monroe v. Monroe , 358 S.W.3d 711, 717 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2011, pet. denied) (concluding that community estate would have been minimal but for husband's contribution of separate property during the marriage); Dickson v. Dickson , 544 S.W.2d 200, 204 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, writ dism'd w.o.j.) (giving a disproportionate award to the wife because "much of [the wife's] separate property was consumed in supporting the family," and "the community estate profited greatly from transactions funded entirely by [the wife's] separate property").
Barney, however, argues that his interest in the Florey Lake property may be justified by the substantial work he put into repairing and improving both houses. His argument is in the nature of a reimbursement claim, but the record contains no evidence of the values involved. Barney merely testified that he repaired some plumbing at Amanda's first house and that he helped to make an addition to the second house. He provides no more detail than that. Nor does he offer any evidence of either the cost of those repairs or any enhancement to the underlying property value.
The standard of review is for abuse of discretion, which in family law cases "overlaps with the traditional sufficiency-of-evidence standards of review." Roberts v. Roberts , 531 S.W.3d 224, 231 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2017, pet. denied). Because of this, our courts of appeals have generally "engage[d] in a two pronged inquiry: (1) Did the trial court have sufficient information upon which to exercise its discretion; and (2) Did the trial court err in its application of discretion?" Lindsey v. Lindsey , 965 S.W.2d 589, 592 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1998, no pet.) ; accord Roberts , 531 S.W.3d at 231, Beshears v. Beshears , 423 S.W.3d 493, 499 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2014, no pet.) ; Iliff v. Iliff , 339 S.W.3d 126, 134 (Tex. App.-Austin 2009), aff'd, 339 S.W.3d 74 (Tex. 2011) ; Swaab v. Swaab , 282 S.W.3d 519, 525 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) ; Boyd v. Boyd , 131 S.W.3d 605, 611 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.).
For the first prong, a trial court abuses its discretion in dividing the community estate without knowledge of its extent and proof of its value. See, e.g. , In re Marriage of Brown , 187 S.W.3d at 147-48 ; Barnard v. Barnard , 133 S.W.3d 782, 789 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied) ; Sandone v. Miller-Sandone , 116 S.W.3d 204, 207-08 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2003, no pet.). "Without the ability to determine the size of the community pie, [a court] can make no determination that the slices awarded to each spouse were just and right." Sandone , 116 S.W.3d at 207-08. Although the trial court held four hearings over the course of the proceedings below, only the middle two included any evidence about the parties' property interests. And even then, those hearings primarily concerned tracing insurance proceeds from the destruction of Amanda's separate property into the Florey Lake property to determine its proper characterization. The parties here have fought over the Florey Lake property's characterization and the community's interest therein to the exclusion of other assets. Along the way, the parties have alluded to other community assets, such as vehicles, tools, televisions, accounts, and furnishings, without ever providing an inventory. Apparently, Florey Lake is the parties' primary asset but the community's interest is not developed in the record. The circumstances are reminiscent of those in Marriage of Brown wherein the court of appeals held the trial court did not have adequate information on which to divide the estate and thus no reasonable basis for its award. In re Marriage of Brown , 187 S.W.3d at 148. There, "a sketchy listing of community assets" and "no discussion of the net value" did not provide the trial court with any reasonable basis on which to divide the community estate. Id. As in this case, the husband was in prison for child molestation, and fault played a role in the trial court's decision to award 100 percent of the community estate to the wife. Id. at 146-47. The court of appeals concluded that the trial court's division might be just and right but that the record was inadequate to make that determination. Id. at 148.
Here, the information available to the trial court was even more limited. Not even a sketchy inventory exists in the record. Clearly, the lion's share of Florey Lake's value is attributable to the destruction of Amanda's separate property, but some undefined part of the insurance proceeds used to purchase and furnish that property was burdened by the community. Moreover, Barney claims that his community efforts added value to the Florey Lake property, although no evidence exists in this record as to what that additional value might be. A trial court cannot divide the marital estate equitably without evidence of the extent of the community estate or its value. Gonzalez v. Gonzalez , 331 S.W.3d 864, 869 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2011, no pet.).
III
JUSTICE BOYD complains that I read too much into Amanda's abuse-of-discretion argument because she "has never once complained about the sufficiency of the evidence." Post at 555. I respectfully disagree. Amanda submits in her briefing that sufficiency of the evidence is not an independent ground of reversible error. Instead, she claims it is a factor relevant to assessing whether the trial court abused its discretion, that is, whether the trial court had sufficient evidence on which to exercise its discretion. JUSTICE BOYD further exclaims that it "is simply not true" to suggest that Amanda's argument includes a no-evidence complaint because "she never argues that 'no evidence supports' the award of some interest to Barney." Post at 556. Again I disagree. Amanda expressly argues that "the record is totally silent as to any rationale" for awarding Barney any interest in the Florey Lake property. Moreover, JUSTICE BOYD reads Amanda's statement that the record "contains sufficient evidence upon which the trial court could determine the division of property" out of context to suggest an inconsistency with her abuse-of-discretion contention. Post at 555. In context, Amanda's statement about the evidence refers to the testimony of her daughters, herself, and Barney regarding Barney's fault, which Amanda interprets as an overriding factor, sufficient by itself to sustain an award of the entire Florey Lake property to her. While I disagree that this factor is controlling to the exclusion of all others, I likewise disagree with JUSTICE BOYD 's characterization of the statement as Amanda abandoning the evidentiary concerns that are otherwise apparent in her abuse-of-discretion complaint.
A just-and-right division of community property does not have to be equal, but it does have to be informed. Thus, a court abuses its discretion when it purports to make an equitable division of the community estate without "sufficient information upon which to exercise its discretion."
Lindsey , 965 S.W.2d at 592. The court of appeals nevertheless affirmed the trial court's division, assuming that the division was equitable rather than arbitrary and assuming further that a more disproportionate award could have amounted to a penalty. I disagree with both assumptions and join the Court's judgment here remanding the cause to the trial court for further proceedings.
Post at 552.