Case Name: James DUNN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1974-04-05
Citations: 292 So. 2d 435
Docket Number: No. 73-356
Parties: James DUNN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: WALDEN, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 292
Pages: 435–437

Head Matter:
James DUNN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 73-356.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
April 5, 1974.
Robert J. Buonauro and James N. Powers, Law Offices of James N. Powers, Orlando, for appellant.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and C. Marie Bernard, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
POULTON, TIMOTHY P., Associate Judge.
The sole point on appeal concerns the sufficiency of a search warrant to allow the search of a vehicle found upon premises described in the warrant.
The warrant in question provided for the search of:
"A certain single story wood frame dwelling being white in color and being the second structure North of the intersection of Clay Avenue and Miller Street and being on the west side of Clay Avenue and having affixed to the front of the house the numerals 1007 and being black numerals with a gold background and haying the address 1007 Clay Avenue, Orlando, Orange County, State of Florida, being the premises occupied by or under the control of Bob Braun."
In executing the warrant, agents searched the appellant's van which was parked in the driveway at the address in question. They found contraband inside the van. The agents testified that there were "two or more vehicles on the curti-lage" and that they had no idea to whom the vehicle in question belonged.
The State relies upon the case of Alexander v. State, 108 So.2d 308 (1st DCA Fla.1959). There are significant differences between Alexander and the case at hand, we believe. In Alexander, like the case here, the warrant referred to the premises and the automobile was located on the premises, but Alexander does not make it clear how many vehicles were on the premises. Also, in Alexander, the arresting officers were in the process of making their search when they rocked the car in question from side to side. As they did so, a gurgling sound emitted from the trunk. (This was a moonshine case.) The officers procured a set of automobile keys from the kitchen table inside the house, opened the trunk of the car and found the contraband in question. In the case at hand, there was no such evidence to connect the vehicle in question with the premises and we believe some such evidence necessary in order to authorize the search of a vehicle parked even within "the curti-lage".
Alexander v. State relies at note two of that opinion, upon 79 C.J.S. Searches and Seizures § 83. We note that the cases annotated there represent a difference of opinion. Cases cited thereunder which seem to support the point of view here expressed include, State v. Sircy, 215 Tenn. 1, 383 S.W.2d 37 (1964), holding that vehicles upon the premises may be searched only when shown to be under the control of persons named in the warrant and Haley v. State, 7 Md.App. 18, 253 A.2d 424 (1969), holding that a warrant to search the premises did not authorize the search of a vehicle "even if it was parked on the property on which the premises were located". 253 A.2d at 432. We feel this approach is the more enlightened.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial in accordance with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
WALDEN, J., concurs.
CROSS, J., dissents, with opinion.