Case Name: Harold Wayne JOHNSON v. STATE of Mississippi
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1972-03-27
Citations: 260 So. 2d 436
Docket Number: No. 46727
Parties: Harold Wayne JOHNSON v. STATE of Mississippi.
Judges: All Justices concur except SUGG, J., who dissents only as to part regarding punishment.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 260
Pages: 436–442

Head Matter:
Harold Wayne JOHNSON v. STATE of Mississippi.
No. 46727.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
March 27, 1972.
Louie Bishop, Waynesboro, for appellant.
A. F. Summer, Atty. Gen. by Guy N. Rogers, Asst. Atty. Gen. and Karen Gilfoy, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.

Opinion:
JONES, Justice:
This case comes from the Circuit Court of Wayne County, where the appellant, an eighteen-year-old boy, was convicted of possession of lysergic acid diethylamide, commonly referred to as LSD. He was sentenced to serve a term of two years in the penitentiary. We are affirming as to guilt but reversing and remanding to the Circuit Court of Wayne County for the infliction of a penalty for a misdemeanor.
A young boy reported to the officers and made affidavit that the appellant had delivered to him some of this drug. Subsequently, appellant was indicted for the possession of LSD and, as aforesaid, was convicted thereof.
It is argued that the appellant was arrested without a warrant for arrest, and that the State failed to prove probable cause.
The facts relative to the arrest were that the sheriff was present at the mayor's office with the chief of police, the mayor, and the young boy who made the affidavit. (The sheriff personally observed the making of the affidavit and the issuance of the warrant.) The chief of police took the warrant and departed in one direction, and the sheriff went in another direction. The sheriff arrested the appellant where his father worked and informed him of the cause of his arrest. As appellant and the sheriff were walking down the aisle and came near appellant's father, the appellant whirled and ran to his father, transferring a bottle from his pocket to his father's pocket. This was seen by the sheriff who took from the father's pocket an Excedrin bottle in which the LSD had been kept by the appellant.
We consider this question answered by Section 2470 Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated (Supp.1971), which obviates proof of probable cause, and reads, in part, as follows :
Any law enforcement officer may arrest any person on a misdemeanor charge without having a warrant in his possession when a warrant is in fact outstanding for that person's arrest and the officer has knowledge through official channels that the warrant is outstanding for that person's arrest. In all such cases, the officer making the arrest must inform such person at the time of the arrest the object and cause therefor. If the person arrested so requests, the warrant shall be shown to him as soon as practicable.
It is alleged that there were no jurors within the age group of appellant (18-20) on either the grand jury or the petit jury. It is argued that because this age group has been permitted by amendment to the United States Constitution to register and vote, they should be on the jury lists. Our Legislature has prescribed qualifications for jurors in Section 1762 Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated (Supp. 1971); and as a part thereof is the requirement that jurors be twenty-one years of age or older. The fact that the Constitution of the United States was amended by Amendment XXVI does not qualify persons under twenty-one years of age as jurors under State laws.
Appellant says that he was prejudiced and that it was reversible error for the district attorney to ask of one of the witnesses the following question: "Mayor Joiner, I ask you, sir, if you know the general reputation of the defendant, Harold Wayne Johnson, in the community in which he resides, as a law abiding citizen and a dealer in drugs?" Objection was made and sustained to this question, and the jury admonished to disregard it. We do not think that this was such an error as would require reversal. We do not believe a miscarriage of justice was caused thereby, and Rule 11 of this Court states:
No judgment shall be reversed on the ground of misdirection to the jury, or the improper admission or exclusion of evidence, or for error as to the matter of pleading or procedure, unless it shall affirmatively appear, from the whole record, that such judgment has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.
Appellant also urges that a statement by the sheriff on cross-examination by appellant's attorney constituted reversible error. Appellant's attorney was cross-examining the sheriff as to whether he had previously arrested the appellant. The answer was that appellant had been arrested on one occasion for driving recklessly. Then followed the following questions and answers:
Q. Is that the only occasion ?
A. The only time that I actually stopped him, Mr. Bishop, yes, sir.
Q. And you say he has a bad reputation because he was speeding?
A. No, I didn't say that.
Q. To your knowledge, do you remember telling me the other day, Mr. Sheriff, to your knowledge that this boy had never been into anything other than on this one occasion?
A. That's right, but do you remember me telling you, Mr. Bishop, he had been accused of fooling with drugs on other—
We think this answer, while improper, was elicited by appellant's attorney and appellant cannot complain thereof.
It is argued that the court did not permit the appellant to present his defense. This is said because the appellant claimed he was holding the LSD for another man and he wanted to go into details about this other man's life and conduct. Objection was sustained, and we think rightfully so.
It is argued that the appellant should have been sentenced as for a misdemeanor, and with this contention we agree.
Mississippi's Act on Controlled Drugs (Section 6831-70 Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated (Supp.1971) ) provides, relative to penalties, as follows:
(a) Except as authorized by this act, it is unlawful for any person to manufacture, deliver, or possess a controlled substance.
Any person who violates this subsection with respect to : .
(2) Any other controlled substance classified in Schedule I, II, or III, as set out in Sections 7, 8, and 9 [§§ 6831-57 through 6831-59] of this act, is guilty of a felony and upon conviction may be imprisoned for not more than four (4) years, or fined not more than Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00), or both;
(c) It is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled substance unless the substance was obtained directly from, or pursuant to, a valid prescription or order of a practitioner while acting in the course of his professional practice, or except as otherwise authorized by this act. Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction, may be confined for not more than six (6) months, or fined not more than Five Hundred Dollars ($500.00), or both. . . . (Emphasis added).
LSD is included in Schedule I. Therefore, the above sections are in direct conflict as to the penalty to be inflicted. One section says possession of LSD is a felony; the other provides that possession of LSD is a misdemeanor. In this situation, we can only invoke the rule used in Grillis v. State, 196 Miss. 576, 17 So.2d 525 (1944), where Grillis was indicted for an attempt to violate either of two sections of the Mississippi Code. The punishment under one section was as for a felony and under the other as for a misdemeanor. Judge Griffith, in deciding this issue, said:
We have examined the other assignments and find no reversible error ex cept that we are of the opinion that appellant's point that he was sentenced under the wrong statute is well taken and must be sustained. (196 Miss. at 585, 17 So.2d at 527).
The case, then, is one for the application of the rule that when the facts which constitute a criminal offense may fall under either of two statutes, or when there is substantial doubt as to which of the two is to be applied, the case will be referred to the statute which imposes the lesser punishment. See cases cited 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1979, p. 1193, under Note 75. And under the attempt statute Section 793, Code 1930, Section 2017, Code 1942, no greater punishment may be administered than that prescribed for the actual commission of the offense attempted. (196 Miss. at 586, 17 So.2d at 527).
We apply the rule as stated in the Grillis case, affirm the conviction, vacate the sentence, and remand to the circuit court for re-sentencing under Section (c) heretofore quoted.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for proper sentence.
All Justices concur except SUGG, J., who dissents only as to part regarding punishment.