Case Name: Jerry Lynn MORGAN et al v. Reba GREEN
Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 1978-03-20
Citations: 263 Ark. 125
Docket Number: 77-315
Parties: Jerry Lynn MORGAN et al v. Reba GREEN
Judges: Fogleman and Howard, JJ., dissent.
Reporter: Arkansas Reports
Volume: 263
Pages: 125–137

Head Matter:
Jerry Lynn MORGAN et al v. Reba GREEN
77-315
562 S.W. 2d 612
Opinion delivered March 20, 1978
(In Banc)
Eldridge & Eldridge, for appellants.
Lightle, Tedder, Hannah & Beebe, for appellee.

Opinion:
Darrell Hickman, Justice.
This appeal questions whether a clause in a will granted a mere life estate, or gave the life tenant an absolute power of alienation. The chancellor, after careful consideration, decided on summary judgment the will of Eva Morgan did not grant her son, Jeff Morgan, the power to sell sixty acres — it only gave Morgan a life estate. We disagree with the chancellor and reverse his decision.
The relevant portions of Morgan's will provided:
Section III: I give, devise and bequeath to my beloved son, Jeff Morgan, a life interest in the real estate described herein with the right to mortgage, sell or in any manner to alienate the said property during his lifetime with remainder over
Section IV: At the death of Jeff Morgan, the remainder over is vested in the following persons or their heirs and assigns as tenants in common . . .
(Emphasis added.)
Eva Morgan died in 1959 and her son took possession of sixty acres of land devised to him. In 1963, Jeff Morgan sold the land by warranty deed. He died in 1973, and appellee, Reba Green, who stood to have an interest in the sixty acres if it had remained unsold, filed suit to set aside the deed.
The case was decided on summary judgment for Green. The present owner brings this appeal.
It is our duty in interpreting documents to apply our best judgment consistent with certain rules of construction. We seek to find the intent of the testator. This intention is gathered from a consideration of the entire instrument. Jackson v. Robinson, 195 Ark. 431, 112 S.W. 2d 417 (1938); Lawrence v. Lawrence, 225 Ark. 500, 283 S.W. 2d 697 (1955). Words and sentences used in a will are to be construed in their ordinary sense so as to arrive at the real intention of the testator. Morris v. Dosch, 194 Ark. 153, 106 S.W. 2d 159 (1937). We do not consider, as a controlling factor, whether a power of sale is in the same clause as the grant of a life estate or in a separate clause. Union & Mercantile Trust Co. v. Hudson, 143 Ark. 519, 220 S.W. 820 (1920). Applying these rules of construction to Morgan's will we merely have to examine her words. Her son Jeff was granted a life estate "with the right to mortgage, sell, or in any manner to alienate the said property during his lifetime ." This simply means that he was given the right to sell, the real estate — not just his interest in the property. We pointed out in a similar case that such words would be meaningless if they did not grant the life tenant the power to sell the property. He already has the right to sell his interest. Pearrow v. Vaden, 201 Ark. 1146, 148 S.W. 2d 320 (1941).
We do not find the words "remainder over" in the will granted to Green a vested remainder interest in the property. The words simply provided for the disposition of the property if Morgan did not dispose of it during his lifetime.
It is not necessary for us to reach the other argument raised by the appellants since the decree is reversed and remanded with directions to enter a decree for the appellants.
Reversed.
Fogleman and Howard, JJ., dissent.