Case Name: CHARLOTTE CONSOLIDATED CONSTRUCTION COMPANY v. ADA W. BROCKENBROUGH et als.
Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
Jurisdiction: North Carolina
Decision Date: 1924-01-22
Citations: 187 N.C. 65
Docket Number: 
Parties: CHARLOTTE CONSOLIDATED CONSTRUCTION COMPANY v. ADA W. BROCKENBROUGH et als.
Judges: 
Reporter: North Carolina Reports
Volume: 187
Pages: 65–77

Head Matter:
CHARLOTTE CONSOLIDATED CONSTRUCTION COMPANY v. ADA W. BROCKENBROUGH et als.
(Filed 22 January, 1924.)
Constitutional Law — Statutes—Due Process — Valid Rights — Estates — Contingent Interests — Wills—Devises—Debts Due by the Testator.
A contingent remainderman in lands acquires his interest therein subject to the payment of testator’s debts, and in that respect can acquire no vested interest therein, and a sale thereof in good faith and at a fair price by the executrix, for the payment of decedent’s debts, as authorized by statute, when by proper proceedings the land could have been sold for the purpose, though the executrix has mistaken therein the authority given her under the will, cannot be held as contrary to the Federal Constitution, Art. I, sec. 10, prohibiting the enactment by any . State of a law impairing tlie obligation of a contract; or to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, sec. 1, as to depriving a citizen of his property without due process of law; or contrary to the provisions of our State Constitution, Art. I, sec. 17, prohibiting that a person be disseized of his freehold, etc., except by the law of the land.
Appeal by defendants from Harding, J., at October Term, 1923, of Mecklenburg.
Civil action. Tbe facts material for the decision of the case are as follows:
This was an action brought by the Charlotte Consolidated Construction Company, plaintiff, against Ada W. Brockenbrough and others, to remove cloud from title to land, under the provisions of chapter 70, Public Laws 1923. This act provides that where an executor under a will, for the purpose of securing assets with which to pay off valid indebtedness, in good faith, and under the mistaken belief that the will authorized him to do so, sells real estate of said estate for a fair price and applies the proceeds of such sale to the payment of such indebtedness, and these facts are established in an action to remove cloud from title brought by the purchaser or his grantor, in which action all persons who might claim any interest in said property are properly brought into court as parties defendant, then such sale so made by said executor will be declared valid and binding upon all contingent remaindermen, executory devisees, and all persons who might in any contingency claim an interest in said property.
The late Miles L. Wriston died in 1876, seized and possessed of a large amount of property in Mecklenburg County, leaving a will which was duly probated and recorded in the office of the clerk of the Superior Court for said county. In said will he appointed his widow, Mary E. Wriston, his executrix, instructing her to pay all his just debts, and, to make assets for this purpose, empowering her to sell four tracts of land specified in said will. All the residue of his property he devised and bequeathed to said Mary E. Wriston during her natural life or widowhood, with remainder upon her death or remarriage to such of his children as should be then living, and to the issue of such as might be then dead, share and share alike, for the term of their natural lives, with remainder in fee to their children; but in the event of the death of any of the testator’s said children without issue, the share of such child to go to his surviving brothers and sisters, or to the issue of such as might be dead; and in the event of the death of all of testator’s children without leaving issue, then said property should go to and be equally divided among the testator’s brother, William Wriston, his sister, E. Jane Byerly, and the children of his deceased brother, Samuel T. Wriston.
Said Miles L. Wriston died leaving a large indebtedness. His executrix sold all tbe personal property of said estate and all tbe four tracts of real property wbicb sbe was specifically empowered under tbe will to sell, and apply tbe proceeds to.tbe payment of said indebtedness. After exhausting sucb proceeds-there still remained debts owed by said estate amounting to about $10,000. To secure assets to pay these debts, said executrix, in good faith and under tbe mistaken belief that tbe will authorized her to do so, sold and conveyed to E. D. Latta, tbe grantor of tbe plaintiff in this action, a tract of some 87% acres for a purchase price of $7,416.25, and applied all tbe proceeds of said sale to tbe payment of tbe debts of tbe estate. It appears that this was a fair price for said property at that time.
Thereafter Latta conveyed this property to this plaintiff. Eatta and tbe plaintiff together have been in sole, exclusive, continuous and peaceable possession of said land since 1890, without any adverse claim thereto having been advanced by any one claiming under said will. Tbe executrix would have been entitled, in a proper proceeding for tbe sale of land to make assets, to .an order of court authorizing tbe sale of said property.
Mary E. Wriston, widow of tbe testator and bis executrix, died in 1913, without having remarried. Five children of tbe said Mary E. Wriston and her deceased husband, Miles L. Wriston, survived her and are still living, to wit: Ada W. Brockenbrough, Bessie W. Durham, Lucie W. Eyder, Minnie W. Smith, and Ella W. Lee. But for tbe conveyance of this property by said Mary E. Wriston, bis executrix, to E. D. Latta, these five daughters of tbe testator would have been entitled to -a life estate in said property. Three of them, Ada W. Broeken-brougb, Bessie W. Durham, and Lucie W. Eyder, have children, all of whom are of age and who would have been entitled to a remainder in fee in said property, subject to defeasance upon tbe contingency named in tbe will. Two of these grandchildren of tbe testator, to wit, Camille D. Hunter and Sarah B. Payne, have two children each, all of whom are minors, and who would have been entitled to a remainder in said property, contingent upon the death of their respective parents prior to the death of the present life tenants, and subject to defeasance upon the contingency named in the will. Consequently title to this property would not have vested absolutely until the death of either Ada W. Brockenbrough or Béssie W. Durham or Lucie W. Eyder, leaving a child or grandchildren surviving her. In such event title would have vested absolutely in the grandchildren of the testator. Or, in the remote contingency of the death of all of the testator’s five daughters without any of them leaving issue, title would have vested in the descendants of the testator’s brothers and sisters.
Prior to the commencement of tbis action all of tbe children and grandchildren of the testator had executed quit-claim deeds releasing to said E. L>. Latta, his heirs and assigns, all their right, title, and interest in said property. The only direct descendants of the testator who have not executed such deeds are his four minor great-grandchildren, contingent remaindermen.
This action is brought for the purpose of having the conveyance by said Mary E. Wriston, executrix, to E. D. Latta, aforesaid, declared valid and binding upon these contingent remaindermen and upon the other contingent remaindermen, descendants of the deceased brother and sister of the testator.
George H. Brockenbrough testified:
“I am one of the defendants in this action. Mrs. Mary E. Wriston, who was the executrix- of the last will and testament of her husband, the late Miles L. Wriston, was my mother-in-law. I assisted her in the management and closing up of the estate. Mr. Wriston’s estate was subject to rather heavy indebtedness at his death. Mrs. Wriston, the executrix, had to sell all the personal property of the estate, and, following that, all of the real estate which she was empowered by item 1 of the will to sell, in order to secure assets to pay these debts. After she had exhausted these resources there still remained an indebtedness in the neighborhood of $10,000. She then sold to Mr. E. D. Latta the property described in paragraph 1 of the complaint which you show me, which was part of a farm. I made the sale for her. It was sold for a purchase price of about $85 per acre. I don’t remember the total amount, but the consideration stated in the deed was the correct amount of the purchase price. At the time that sale was made Mrs. Wriston, as executrix, and I, as her adviser, both understood she had power to make that sale. She made it in good faith and for the sole purpose of acquiring assets with which to x>ay debts of the estate. All the proceeds of that sale were applied to the payment of the debts of the estate. I was familiar with that property, having lived in Charlotte since 1874. I was more or less familiar with real estate values in and around Charlotte. I tried the market, and the price Mr. Latta paid was the best price I could get for this property. It was considered a fair price at that time. I have been more or less familiar with that property since it was sold to Mr. Latta. I am related by marriage to all the defendants in this action, and I can state that no adverse claim to said property has ever been made by any of the persons who might claim under this will. Since the property was sold to Mr. Latta, so far as I know, Mr. Latta and the plaintiff have been in peaceable possession of this property ever since Mr. Latta bought it. I can state that I was sufficiently familiar with the affairs of this estate to know that all of the personal property bad been sold and that it was necessary to sell this real estate to pay the valid debts then outstanding against the estate. I can swear to that.”
E. D. Latta, Jr., testified:
“I am a son of E. D. Latta, who purchased the property involved in this action from Mrs. Wriston. I am vice-president of the Charlotte Consolidated Construction Company, the plaintiff in this action, which bought this property from Mr. Latta. I have been familiar with this property ever since I have been connected with the plaintiff company, which has been 21 years. No claim whatsoever has been made to any title or interest in this property by any one claiming under the last will and testament of Miles L. Wriston during that time.”
Plaintiff offered in evidence deed dated 1 September, 1890, recorded in the office of the register of deeds for Mecklenburg County, in Book 74, page 177, as follows:
State oe Noetii Caeolina,
MECKLENBURG COUNTY.
This deed, made this the 1st day of September, 1890, by M. E. Wris-ton, executrix of M. L. Wriston, deceased, of Mecklenburg County, and State of North Carolina, of the first part, to Edward D. Latta, of Meek-, lenburg County, and State of North Carolina, of the second part, witnesseth:
That the said M. E. Wriston, executrix of M. L. Wriston, deceased, in consideration of the sum of $7,416.25 to me paid by Edward D. Latta, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, has bargained and sold, and by these presents does bargain, sell and convey to the said Edward D. Latta and his heirs all that piece or tract of land in Charlotte Township, Mecklenburg County, State of North Carolina, adjoining the lands of W. N. Failing and others, and bounded as follows:
Beginning at a red oak, Wm. Johnston’s corner, and runs with his line N. 37% W. 55 poles to a pile of stone, W. N. Failing’s corner; thence with his line S. 48% W. 81 poles to a stake and pointers in line of the Smith land (now 4 C’s) ; thence with the line of said land S. 47% E. 59 poles to a white oak, corner of Mrs. Orr’s land; thence with two lines of the same, first, S. 62 poles to a pile of stone (where a dogwood stood) ; second, S. 74 E. 27 poles to a pile of stone in the road known as logtown road; thence with said road, first, N. 36% E. 26% poles; second, N. 1% W. 131 poles to a point in the road N. 41% E. 26 links from a white oak; thence with Wm. Johnston’s line S. 41% W. 72 poles to the beginning, containing 87% acres, the said land being sold by the acre at $85 per acre.
To have and to hold the aforesaid tract or piece of land, and all privileges and appurtenances thereto belonging, to the said Edward D. Latta and bis beirs and assigns, to tbem and tbeir only use and beboof forever. And tbe said M. E. Wriston, executrix as aforesaid, covenants tbat sbe is seized of said premises in fee and bas a right to convey tbe same in fee simple, and tbe same are free and clear from all encumbrances, and tbat sbe will warrant and defend tbe said title to tbe same against tbe claims of all persons whatsoever.
In testimony whereof, tbe said M. E. Wriston, executrix, as aforesaid, bas hereunto set her band and seal, this tbe day and year above written. M. E. Wriston, Executrix. (Seal.)
Attest:
GEO. H. BROCKENBROUGH.
State of North Carolina,
Mecklenburg County.
Tbe foregoing deed was duly proven by oath of tbe subscribing witness.
Let it with this certificate be registered, this 3d day of September, 1890. J. M. Morrow, C. S. C.
Filed 12 September, 1890; registered 18 September, 1890.
Tbe plaintiff offered in evidence deed dated 5 June, 1914, recorded in tbe office of tbe register of deeds of Mecklenburg County, in Book 325, page 549, as follows:
State of North Carolina,
Mecklenburg County.
This deed, made this tbe 5th day of June, 1914, by George H. Broek-enbrough and wife, Ada W. Brockenbrougb, George H. Brockenbrougb, Jr., Mary G. and Sarah M. Brockenbrougb, J. A. Durham and wife, Bessie W. Durham, Mary W. Durham, Dr. W. Myers Hunter and wife, Camille D. Hunter, B. Rush Lee and wife, Ella W. Lee, Mrs. Minnie W. Smith (widow), Mrs. Lucy W. Ryder (widow), all of tbe county and State aforesaid, parties of tbe first part, and Edward D. Latta, of said county and State, party of tbe second part, witnessetb:
Tbat, whereas, Mrs. M. E'. Wriston, executrix of tbe last will and testament of M. L. Wriston, deceased, for tbe purpose of making assets with which to pay tbe indebtedness of her testator, did, on tbe 1st day of September, 1890, for tbe consideration of $7,416.25, by deed duly executed, sell and convey to tbe said Edward D. Latta all tbat tract of land hereinafter described; and
Whereas tbe purchase price paid for said land was a full and fair one and was used by said executrix in tbe payment of tbe indebtedness of tbe estate of her testator; and whereas certain doubts have arisen as to whether the will of the said M. L. Wriston, deceased, conferred upon his executrix plenary power to sell said .land for the purpose of making assets with which to pay the indebtedness .of said estate without obtaining an order of court to that end;..and whereas .those of the parties of the first part who are-devisees under said will are desirous of ratifying and confirming the act of the said M. E. Wriston, executrix aforesaid, in selling the lands herein referred to and hereinafter described, for the purpose of making assets with which to pay the debts of said estate:.
Now, therefore, in consideration of the premises and the sum of one dollar, to them in hand paid by the party of the second part, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, the parties of the first part' have hereby granted, remised, released and quit-claimed, and by these presents do grant, remise, release and quit-claim unto the said Edward D. Latta, his heirs and assigns, all their right, title and interest of every nature and description in and to that tract of- land, lying and being in the city of Charlotte, county and State aforesaid, and described by metes and bounds in the deed of the said M. E. Wriston, executrix, etc., to the said Edward D. Latta, datéd September one, one thousand eight hundred and ninety, and duly recorded in the .register’s office for said county and State, in Book 174, page 177, reference to which is therein made for a full description to said land. And for the consideration aforesaid, the said parties of the first part do hereby ftilly ratify and confirm the said deed made by the said M. E. Wriston, executrix, etc., to the said Edward D. Latta, on the said first day 'of September, one thousand eight hundred and ninety, for the land therein described, to all intents and purposes as if she had been fully authorized and empowered by the will of her testator to execute the same' for the purposes therein set forth.
The said deed was duly signed by the grantors therein named, and duly acknowledged, with privy examination of the married women before proper officials, and recorded, in accordance with law.
The plaintiff offered in evidence a deed dated 4 November, 1922, recorded in the office of the register of deeds for Mecklenburg County, in Book 485, p. 54. . The said deed is in all respects similar to the before mentioned deed made by Geo. H. Brockenbrough and others. Said deed is made by Virginia L. Eyder, Jno. F. Durham, Bessie Durham Scott and husband, Bryon C. Scott, to Edward D. Latta, and was duly acknowledged with privy examination of the married women before proper officials, and recorded, in accordance with law.
Issues were duly submitted to the jury and the answers thereto set out in the judgment. ■
The judgment is as follows:
“This cause coming on to be heard before his Honor, ¥m. F. Harding, judge holding courts of the Fourteenth Judicial District, and a jury, and it appearing to the court from the returns of summons herein and from the affidavit of E. D. Latta, Jr., that service of summons herein has been duly accepted, or has been had personally upon all the defendants who could after due diligence be found in this State, and that service of summons by publication has been duly made upon all-nonresident defendants and upon all persons whose names and residences are unknown who may in any contingency claim any interest in the subject of this action; that proper discreet guardians ad litem have been duly appointed by the court for the infant defendants and for all persons whose names and residences are unknown, and for any persons not in being who may in any contingency claim an interest in the subject of this action; that said guardians ad litem have duly accepted service of summons and filed answers in behalf of their respective wards to the complaint of the plaintiff, and that the time fixed by law within which the other defendants were required to appear and answer or demur to the complaint of the plaintiff has long since expired, and none of such other defendants having appeared and either answered or demurred to said complaint; and the jury having for their verdict answered all the issues submitted to them by the court in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants, as follows:
“1. Did the late Mary E. Wriston, executrix of the last will and testament of Miles L. Wriston, deceased, sell the personal property of the estate of her testator and all the real estate specified in item 1 of the will of said Miles L. Wriston, and apply the proceeds thereof to the payment of the debts of said estate as alleged in the complaint ? Answer: ‘Yes.’
“2. If so, did there remain, after exhausting the proceeds from the sale of such property, an indebtedness in the sum of about $10,000 owing by said estate, as alleged in the complaint? Answer: Wes.’
“3. If so, did said Mary E. Wriston, executrix, on or about 12 September, 1890, in good faith, and under the mistaken belief that she was authorized under said will to do so, convey the property described in the complaint of E. D. Latta at and for a purchase price of $7,-416.25, in order to secure assets with which to pay said indebtedness, as alleged in the complaint? Answer: ‘Yes.’
“4. If so, was said sum of $7,416.25 a fair price for said property, as alleged in the complaint ? Answer: ‘Yes.’
“5. If so, have said E. D. Latta and his grantee, this plaintiff, and its grantees, been in the'sole, exclusive, continuous and peaceable possession of said property for more than 20 years without any adverse claim to said property Laving been asserted by any person claiming under the last will and testament of the said Miles L. "Wriston, as alleged in the complaint? Answer: Wes.’
“6. If so, did said Mary E. Wriston, executrix, apply said sum of $7,416.25 paid by said E. D. Latta as purchase price for said property, and every part thereof, to the payment of the indebtedness of said estate, as alleged in the complaint? Answer: ‘Yes.’
“And it appearing to the court from the foregoing verdict of the jury that Mary E. Wriston, executrix of the last will and testament of the late Miles L. Wriston, would have been entitled, in a proper proceeding-brought for that purpose, to an order for the sale of the property described in the complaint for the purpose of making assets to pay the debts of her testator:
“Now, therefore, upon motion of plaintiff, it is hereby ordered adjudged, and decreed that the sale and conveyance of the land described in the complaint by said Mary E. Wriston, executrix of the last will and testament of Miles L. Wriston, deceased, to E. D. Latta, the grantor of the plaintiff herein, be and the same is hereby declared valid and binding upon all of the defendants to this action, and upon all other persons, descendants of the late Miles L. Wriston, or of the late Wm. Wriston, or of the late Samuel T. Wriston, or of the late E. Jane Byerly, whatever may be their names and wherever may be their residences, and likewise upon all persons who may be born hereafter, descendants of the late Miles L. Wriston, of the late William Wriston, or of the late Samuel T. Wriston, or of the late T. Jane Byerly.”
Defendants C. H. Gover and H. C. Dockery, guardians ad litem, in apt time demur ore tenus to the complaint of the plaintiff upon the ground that upon the facts set forth in the complaint the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief prayed for and that chapter 70, Public Laws 1923, relied upon by plaintiff in support of its position, is invalid for the reason that it undertakes to validate a transaction which was void in its inception. Demurrer overruled, and defendants except. Case was then heard upon the evidence of the plaintiff, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants. Judgment signed. Defendants except to the judgment of the court, and assign as error:
“1. That his Honor erred in refusing to sustain the defendants’ demurrer .to the complaint, which is the defendants’ first exception.
“2. That his Honor erred in overruling the defendants’ objection to the judgment tendered by the plaintiff and in signing the judgment appearing in the record, which is the defendants’ second exception.”
The exceptions were overruled, and the defendants appealed to the Supreme Court.
Gansler & Gansler for plaintiff.
O. H. Gover and H. G. Dockery for defendants.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
There is only one question involved in this appeal — the validity of .chapter 70, Public Laws 1923. This act is in substance as follows: It provides that where an executor under a will, for the purpose of securing assets with which to pay off valid indebtedness, in good faith, and under the mistaken belief that the will authorized him to do so, sells real estate of said estate for a fair price and applies the proceeds of such sale to the payment of such indebtedness, and these facts are established in an action to remove cloud from title brought by the purchaser or his grantor, in which action all persons who might claim any interest in said property are properly brought into court as parties defendant, then such sale so made by said executor will be declared valid and binding upon all contingent remaindermen, execu-tory devisees, and all' persons who might in any contingency claim an interest in said property."
Constitution of U. S., Art. I, sec. 10, in part is as follows: "No State shall . . . pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts."
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, in part, is as follows: "Section 1. . No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United Statés; nor shall any State deprive' any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
Constitution of N. C., Art. I, sec. 17, is as follows: "No person ought to be taken, imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties, or privileges, or outlawed or exiled, or in any manner deprived of life, liberty, or property but by the law of the land. Const., 1868; Const., 1776; Decl. Rights, s. 12; Magna Carta (1215), ch. 39 (1225,), ch. 29."
Black's Constitutional Law (3 ed.), p. 596, says: "Tested rights are to be secured and protected by the law and a- statute which divests or destroys such rights, unless it be by due process of law, is unconstitutional and void."
Black, supra, at p. 752, says: "Retroactive (or retrospective) laws are not unconstitutional unless they . . . impair the obligation of contracts, or divest vested rights, or unless they are specifically forbidden by the constitution of the particular State."
This matter is clearly stated by the late Associate Justice Walker, who was always painstaking and careful, in Anderson v. Wilkins, 142 N. C., 157: "The general rule, therefore, is that the Legislature may validate retrospectively any proceeding which might have been author ized in advance, even though, its act, it has been said, may operate to divest a right of action existing in favor of an individual, or subject him to a loss he would otherwise have' not incurred. 6 A. & E. Enc. (2 ed.), 940. There are, of course, exceptions to this rule, but this case is not within any of them. In regard to the validity of retroactive legislation, so far as it may affect only expectant or contingent interests, we think the law is well settled that the power thus to deal with such interests resides in the Legislature. Justice Woodbury stated the rule with great clearness, and what he said has been accepted by the courts and law-writers as an authoritative utterance and as declaring the true doctrine upon the subject. Laws enacted for the betterment of judicial procedure and the unfettering of estates so as to bring them into the market for sale, cannot be regarded as opposed to fundamental maxims, 'unless (as he says) they impair rights which are vested; because most civil rights are derived from public laws; and if, before the rights become vested in particular individuals, the convenience of the State necessitates amendments or repeal of such laws, those individuals have no cause of complaint. The power that authorizes or proposes to give, may always revoke before an interest is perfected in the donee.' Merrill v. Sherburne, 1 N. H., 213; Cooley (7 ed.), 511. Chancellor Kent, in speaking of retroactive statutes, says substantially that, while such statutes affecting and changing vested rights are very generally considered in this country as founded on unconstitutional principles, and consequently inoperative and void, yet that this doctrine is not understood to apply to remedial statutes, which may be of a retroactive nature, provided they do not impair contracts, or disturb absolutely vested rights, and only go to confirm rights already existing, and proceed in furtherance of the remedy by curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations. Such statutes have been held valid when clearly just and reasonable, and conducive to the general welfare, even though they might operate in a degree upon existing rights. 1 Kent Com., 445."
The Constitution óf North Carolina, annotated by Connor and Cheshire, p. 69, treating of Article I, section. 17, under subdivision K, says: "The Legislature has no power to destroy or interfere with vested rights; but a bare expectancy is not such a vested right as will be protected by the constitutional provision." See Bullock v. Oil Co., 165 N. C., 67; Pendleton v. Williams, 175 N. C., 252; Dawson v. Wood, 177 N. C., 163; Edwards v. Comrs., 183 N. C., 60; Board of Education v. Comrs., 183 N. C., 302; Burney v. Comrs., 184 N. C., 277; Brown v. Hillsboro, 185 N. C., 368. The same authors, under subdivision IX, p. 72, says: "The general rule, subject to some exceptions, is that the Legislature may validate retrospectively any proceeding which might bare been authorized in advance, even though its act may operate to divest a right o£ action existing in favor of an individual, or subject him to a loss he would not otherwise have incurred."
As a guide it is always well to go back to our fundamental and constitutional law. These at all times should be held sacred. They are the reason and wisdom of ages. No law "impairing the obligation of contracts," "due process of law," "law of the land," "vested rights." The question in the instant case: Is chapter 70, Public Laws 1923, such a retroactive statute as to destroy or interfere with vested rights? ¥e do not think so. Miles L. Wriston died in 1876, leaving a large estate and considerable indebtedness. He willed that all his just debts be paid. He appointed his wife, Mary E. Wriston, executrix, and gave her power to sell four tracts of land specified in the will to pay the debts. After the payment of all the debts he devised and bequeathed all the residue of his property to his wife, Mary E. Wriston, during her natural life or widowhood. On her death or marriage, the remainder over to certain vested, contingent remaindermen and executory devisees. The executrix sold the four tracts of land, which she was given authority to sell under the will, and all the personal property belonging to the estate, and applied the amounts received to the debts of Miles L. Wriston. There was left unpaid debts to the amount of about $10,000. To secure assets to pay these debts, in good faith as executrix, she sold the land in controversy, 87^4 acres, to Edward D. Latta for $7,416.25, which was a fair price for the land at the time, and made a deed to him thinking she had a right to do- so. Thereafter Latta conveyed the property in dispute to plaintiff in this case. The deed to Latta was made by Mary E. Wriston, executrix of M. L. Wris-ton, deceased, on 1 September, 1890, and Latta and his assignee, the plaintiff, have been in the uninterrupted possession of the land ever since the conveyance some 33 years ago. Mary E. Wriston is dead and all of the children and grandchildren of Miles L. Wriston, who are of age, have executed quit-claim deeds releasing to said Edward D. Latta and his heirs and assigns all their right, title and interest in the before mentioned land. The only direct descendants of Miles L. Wriston who have not executed quit-claim deeds are his four minor grandchildren, contingent remaindermen.
The executrix, Maiy E. Wriston, would have been entitled, under the law existing at the time she sold the land to Edward D. Latta, to have brought a proceeding for the sale of the 87^ acres of land to make assets to pay the debts of Miles L. Wriston. The court in such proceedings would necessarily have made' all parties who had any interest, vested or contingent, under the will, parties to the action as provided by law.
If tbis bad been done, all parties wbo bad any. interest, vested or contingent, would bave been bound, and Latta would bave gotten a good fee-simple title. Tbe parties wbo were entitled under tbe will took subject to debts. Tbeir interest, wbetber vested or contingent, was cum onore. Tbe money tbat tbe land brought went to pay tbe debt wbicb tbe land was charged with paying. In good conscience, morals and equity, tbe parties under tbe will, wbetber vested or contingent re-maindermen or executory devisees, bad nothing in tbe land — no vested interest. Tbe land was subject to tbe debts of Miles L. Wriston.' Tbe sale left tbe remaining property discharged to tbe amount of tbe purchase price paid for tbe land in controversy free from debt.
Tbe present statute, when all these facts appear, is curative and retrospective, and is nunc, pro tunc, constitutional, legal, and does not interfere with or destroy vested rights. As was said in Board of Education v. Comrs., supra: "Subject to certain exceptions, tbe general rule is tbat tbe Legislature may validate retrospectively any proceeding it might bave authorized in advance."
In Edwards v. Comrs., supra, tbe Court held a retroactive act of tbe Legislature validating' an invalid attempt of municipal authorities to levy a special road tax after tbe expiration of tbe period fixed in tbe prior act. In tbis connection tbe Court said: "Tbis conclusion rests upon tbe recognized and accepted doctrine tbat a retrospective law, curing defects in acts tbat bave been done, or authorizing or confirming tbe exercise of powers, is valid in those cases in wbicb tbe Legislature originally bad authority to confer tbe power or to authorize tbe act. Tbe General Assembly unquestionably bad original authority to confer tbe right to levy a tax for tbe year 1921, in like manner as it bad done for tbe two preceding years."
Tbe property was sold to Edward D. Latta in good faith by Mary E. Wriston, executrix, through her son-in-law and adviser, George H. Brockenbrough. He witnessed tbe deed almost a third of a century ago. From bis testimony be has done all be could to keep faith, "tbe whiteness of bis soul," by bis conduct, and it may not be amiss to quote from bis testimony tbe conduct of tbe others: "I am related by marriage to all of tbe defendants in tbis action, and I can state tbat no adverse claim to said property has ever been made by any of the persons wbo might claim under tbis will."
From a careful examination of tbe record we can find no error, and tbe judgment appealed from was in accordance with law.
No error.