Case Name: BRUCE v. BROOKLYN HEIGHTS R. CO.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1902-01-17
Citations: 74 N.Y.S. 324
Docket Number: 
Parties: BRUCE v. BROOKLYN HEIGHTS R. CO.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 74
Pages: 324–336

Head Matter:
(68 App. Div. 242.)
BRUCE v. BROOKLYN HEIGHTS R. CO.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.
January 17, 1902.)
1. Contributory Negligence—Burden of Proof.
In an action for personal injuries the burden is on the plaintiff to show affirmatively that his own negligence did not contribute to the accident complained of.
2. Street Cars—Injury to Passenger—Negligence—Sufficiency of Evidence.
Plaintiff’s intestate, who was a passenger on defendant’s street car, left his seat as the car was about to enter a 33° curve, and went out on the front platform, from which he fell. One witness stated that the car was running 20 miles per hour, and, when it struck the curve, deceased was lifted from his feet, and thrown over a chain 3% feet high across the entrance to the platform. Witness was about 1,400 feet distant. The evidence was overwhelming that there was no chain on the car. The motorman stated that his first knowledge of deceased’s presence on the platform was when the car was entering the curve, when he saw him lift his hand as if for a signal; that about this time witness threw off the power, and deceased at the same moment opened the gate across the entrance, and stepped down on the car step; that witness warned him, but he did not stop, and stepped down into the street. This witness said the car was running about 15 miles per hour, and others, who were passengers, placed it at from 10 to 15 miles per hour, and none of them seemed to think the car was going too fast. Reid, that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a verdict based upon any negligence of defendant.
Hirsehberg, J., dissenting.
Appeal from trial term.
Action by Helen Bruce, administratrix, against the Brooklyn-Heights Railroad Company. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff,- defendant appeals. '
Reversed.
Argued before GOODRICH, P. J., and BARTLETT, JENKS, WOODWARD, and HIRSCHBERG, JJ.
John L. Wells, for appellant.
Gilbert D. Lamb, for respondent.

Opinion:
WOODWARD, J.
This action was brought to recover damages for personal injuries resulting in the death of plaintiff's intestate through the alleged negligence of the defendant. We apprehend that it is not the law of this state that a street surface railway must be built upon a straight line, after the manner said to have been directed by the czar of Russia in the construction of a transcontinental railroad, or that in the practical operation of the cars they shall be so handled as never to sway or vibrate. We shall assume that such corporations may construct their lines upon approved engineering plans, with such grades and curves as shall be necessary in the practical accomplishment of the purpose for which they are created; and that in the operation of the cars they may, subject to the liability for the negligent injuring of passengers or persons lawfully upon the highways with their property, run them in such a manner as to meet the requirements of transportation. In other words, it is not required that in the operation of street railway cars there shall be no swaying of the cars, no jars or jolts. These are reasonably to be expected in the practical discharge of the duties which are assumed by the corporation in accepting its franchise, and it is the duty of passengers to take notice of the obvious fact that a car weighing from 4 to 10 tons, running at a practical rate of speed, will be subject to the laws of applied mechanics, and will be swayed with greater or less violence in passing around curves, and will be jolted to some extent in passing over other tracks at street intersections. This does not give the street railway company a license to operate its cars without regard to the safety of passengers. It owes them the duty of carrying them in safety over its lines, provided, always, that the passenger has been guilty of no" neglect contributing to the accident. For instance, if a passenger is occupying a seat in a car, and voluntarily leaves that seat, and steps down upon the running board of an open car, and, without taking hold of anything, relies upon his being able to keep his balance, and the car, in passing around a curve, should throw him off, the company would not be liable, even if it were negligent in the operation of the car; and the burden of proving lack of contributory negligence is upon the plaintiff at all times. It is true, of course, if the injury happened to the passenger while occupying a seat provided by the company, the presumption of lack of contributory negligence would at once arise; but it is none the less proved by the plaintiff by establishing the facts which made it impossible for the passenger to contribute to the accident, as in the case of a collision or the derailing of a car. There are no presumptions that a man has been free from contributory negligence. The plaintiff must affirmatively show, either by direct proof or by facts and circumstances from which the inference may be properly drawn, that the plaintiff has been guilty of no act directly contributing to the accident (Chisholm v. State, 141 N. Y. 246, 249, 36 N. E. 184, and authorities there cited); and this court, in the case of Brainard v. Railroad Co., 44 App. Div. 613, 61 N. Y. Supp. 74, recognized no new rule of law. It was there said: "It is fair to assume, we think, that the deceased, as he stood upon the running board of the car, was using such means as were furnished for security to a person standing thereon;" but the court did not assert that this assumption would be justified in all cases, for it continued: "He had ridden some distance, and maintained his position, and the language of one of the witnesses who saw him is that, as 'the jerk came, Mr. Brainard was knocked off.' The language of the other witnesses, and the fact that a person must use a support to remain upon the running board while a car is in motion, justify the inference that it was the sudden jerk which caused the fall, and not any lack of making use of the supports. The car was crowded with passengers, and riding upon the running board was not per se negligence." It thus appears that the facts as they were established by the evidence were the basis for the assumption that the deceased had made use of the opportunities for holding on while in a position of danger, and not any presumption which arises that a man has been free from contributory negligence. It simply stands at the commencement of the trial at zero, and the plaintiff is called upon to establish affirmatively that the deceased was not guilty o acts contributing approximately to the accident. This may be done by showing facts from which the inference may be fairly drawn, as well as by direct proof. Thomas, Neg. 359, and authorities cited.
Having these fundamental principles of the law of negligence in mind, we will look at the facts developed by the evidence in the case now before us. The accident producing the injuries complained of occurred at what is known as "Rapalyea's Curve" in Grand street, Brooklyn. This is approximately a 33° curve, with a radius of from 185 to 200 feet, and is described by one of the witnesses as a "wide curve," as distinguished from a right-angle curve along ordinary highways; and while it is not to be doubted that a car approaching this curve at a high rate of speed would be swayed sufficiently to disturb the equilibrium of persons standing up without support, there is nothing in the evidence to indicate that the car in use at the time of this accident was swayed enough to cause more than a momentary disturbance of the equilibrium of the passengers seated in the car, or that it would have been remembered by any of them, except for the accident which occurred at about the same time. The plaintiff's, intestate was a policeman, and two of his brother officers, who were in the car at the time of the accident, and who were called by the plaintiff, testify that there was nothing in the movement of the car on this occasion of which they complained. One of them says, "I was perfectly satisfied to have the car going as it was;" and the other says: "None of us made any complaint concerning the speed that the car was going. There was nothing in the way that the car was going that appealed to us as police officers that seemed to demand our interference, so that none of us spoke to either the motor man or conductor. So that, for all practical purposes, I and my brother officers were satisfied with the way the car was going. We were not making any complaint." The evidence is uncontradicted that Mr. Bruce, plaintiff's intestate, entered the car of the defendant about half a mile from the scene of the accident, and occupied a seat inside of the closed car; that he was in the habit of riding in the cars of the defendant in coming home from his beat, and that he usually left the car about 300 feet beyond the curve where this accident occurred, the car running out from Brooklyn toward Newton; that when about 500 or 600 feet from the curve Mr. Bruce left his seat inside of the car, and went out upon the front platform at the left of and behind the motorman, and stood with his back against the front of the car. Only two persons claim to have been eyewitnesses of the accident. One of these was a boy, about 17 years old at the time, who testifies that he saw Mr. Bruce upon the front platform, and that when the car struck the curve it was running at the rate of about 20 miles per hour, and that Mr. Bruce was thrown over the chain which was placed across the entrance to the front platform on the left-hand side, striking upon his head, producing the injuries resulting in his death. This witness testifies that this chain was about 3% feet high; that he saw this chain at a distance of about 1,400 feet, though at the time he was where he would have to look over the gate upon the right-hand side of the car, past the motorman and the plaintiff's intestate, in order to see this chain. The evidence is overwhelming that there was no chain in use upon this car, the entrance on the left-hand side being guarded by an accordeon or folding gate. The evidence is that Mr. Bruce was not a tall man,—a little taller than counsel for the plaintiff,—and that he weighed about 165 to 170 pounds. He was standing, or had been standing, the last time he was seen alive by plaintiff's witnesses inside of the car, upon the front platform, back of the motorman, with his back against the front of the car, and to the left of the motorman, so that he must have been within two feet of the alleged chain, if there was a chain, which the witness says was three and one-half feet high; and this witness testifies, "I seen, just as the car came around the curve and hit the curve, Bruce was lifted off his feet, and thrown over the chain," and that his head struck the pavement first. Assuming that Bruce was six feet tall (and the evidence would not support such an assumption), and that.the chain was 3^ feet high (and this is the evidence,—"about three foot and a half"), and that Bruce was 2 feet from the chain, does any one believe that a man weighing 165 pounds could be thrown over this chain in the manner described by the witness, particularly if we take this evidence in connection with the evidence that the passengers within the car were not seriously disturbed by the lurching of the car as it reached the curve? If this is not a physical impossibility, it is certainly highly improbable; and when we remember that it rests wholly upon the testimony of this boy, who swears that he saw this chain at a distance of about 1,400 feet, when the evidence is overwhelming that there was no chain upon the car, and that he did not, after witnessing the accident, remain to see whether the man was killed or not, and that he did not re port the accident at home, or tell any one of the fact that he had seen the accident up to within a few weeks of the trial, the whole case seems so unworthy of credence that, if the testimony was wholly undisputed, we should feel that injustice would result from an affirmance of the judgment. This boy, Benjamin Coordes, is the only witness who places the speed of the car at 20 miles per hour, the others ranging from 9 to 15 miles per hour; and it is the defendant's witness, the motorman who was running the car, who mentions this speed as having been attained before reaching the curve, though he says the car was running up a slight grade, and that the power was turned off, so that the, speed was somewhat reduced at the moment of the accident. This witness, who appears singularly frank and straightforward, and who was the only other eyewitness of the accident who was produced upon the trial, says that he had been running the car at the rate of about 15 miles per hour; that he does not know when Mr. Bruce came out on the platform; that the first intimation of his presence was when he was just about to enter the curve; that at that time deceased "raised his right hand partly at my side. He did not touch me, nor did he speak. He raised the hand, so I took that as a signal that he wanted to get off. And whether I had thrown off my power before that or not I don't know, but I threw off the power about that time anyhow, as I would have done whether there was a person getting off there or not, in order to round the curve. So 1 proceeded to stop the car, and just simultaneously with his signaling me he caught the bolt of the gate, drew it up, pushed the gate toward the dashboard, and stepped down on the step of the car. I shouted to him to hold on, or some words to that effect, but he didn't. He stepped right down in the street, and, although I won't state positively, I believe he didn't have hold of anything when he did step." There is no evidence to dispute the statement of the motorman that he did not know that Bruce was upon the platform until the latter signaled. The evidence is overwhelming that the car was equipped with the kind of a gate which the motorman describes as being opened by plaintiff's intestate, and the boy who tells the story on which the plaintiff relies not only contradicts himself, refusing to answer pertinent questions, but not one of the witnesses who were concededly on the ground was able to say that they had any recollection of seeing him anywhere in the vicinity. The boy himself makes no mention of any one with the exception of 'the motorman and Mr. Bruce, and he says upon cross-examination: "All I seen was Mr. Bruce. That was all. I saw Mr. Bruce. He was lying right between the two tracks straight up and down. The car had come to a stop by that time. I did not see people get out of the car. I did not see any officers get out of the car at all. I didn't see any officers there at all." Yet the evidence is undisputed that the two officers were there; that they got out of the car as soon as it stopped, and ran to the man who had been injured; and it is also undisputed that the conductor and motoneer were there, and ran to the assistance of Mr. Bruce, while two or three other passengers disappeared in the excitement. This all occurred in a thinly-settled district, where it would be very strange if seven or eight people could congregate around a man who had been thrown from a street car and seriously injured without their being seen by the person who witnessed the accident; and the car stopped, as appears from the evidence, within 30 feet of where Mr. Bruce was lying, and at least three or four persons must have been near Mr. Bruce within a few seconds of the time that he received the injury.
But, assuming that this witness, Benjamin Coordes, was not discredited, and that the jury was bound to believe that Mr. Bruce was thrown over the alleged chain, there is no evidence that plaintiff's intestate was free from negligence contributing to the accident. Coordes does not mention any act on the part of Mr. Bruce, or anything from which such an inference may be drawn; and no one else, with the exception of the motorman, pretends to have seen him at the time of the accident. All that is established by the evidence is that Mr. Bruce left the interior of the car, where it is not to be doubted he was perfectly safe, and took a place upon the platform of the car. Conceding that it was not negligence per se to occupy a place upon the front platform of a car, it is equally certain that it is not evidence of lack of contributory negligence. No legitimate inference may be drawn from the fact that a man leaves Ihe interior of the car where he is not crowded, and where the defendant has afforded accommodations for its passengers, and goes out on the front platform, that he is free from contributory negligence at a time when he reaches the platform. It is undisputed that he gave no sign to the motorman that he was present upon the platform until just at the moment of entering upon the curve; and, if it be held that it was negligent upon the part of the defendant not to operate its cars in such a manner as not to injure one who had quietly taken a place upon the platform without the knowledge of the defendant's servants, it cannot be said that it is evidence of a lack of contributory negligence on the part of plaintiff's intestate, and without such evidence the plaintiff cannot recover. It should be remembered that the defendant is not called upon to prove that the plaintiff's intestate is guilty of contributory negligence. The burden is upon the plaintiff to show that the deceased did no act approximately contributing to the accident (Riordan v. Steamship Co., 124 N. Y. 655, 26 N. E. 1027), and we search the record of this case in vain for such evidence. The defendant had erected gates or a chain for the purpose of guarding the entrance to the front platform. There was no invitation, express or implied, for passengers to occupy a place upon this platform, which, it may be assumed (for it.is in accord with public policy and the safety of passengers and those occupying the highways), was reserved for the use of the motorman, whose duty it is to keep a lookout ahead, and to get his instructions from the signals given by the conductor as to matters which are not within the scope of his vision; and if plaintiff's intestate went out there, and stood up, when there was no occasion for his leaving the interior of the car, without giving the motorman any intimation of his presence, it may be that the de fendant owed him no higher duty than it owed to passengers who' were inside of the car, and occupying the seats provided for them. It is not, however, necessary to determine this point. The plaintiff' has failed to establish by evidence that her intestate was free from contributory negligence, or to bring forward any facts from which such an inference may be legitimately drawn; and the weight of evidence is clearly with the defendant, not only that the accident was not due to the negligence of the defendant, but that the injury resulted solely from the negligence of the plaintiff's intestate.
Under such circumstances it only remains to say that .the judgment should be reversed, and a new trial granted, with costs to abide the event.
GOODRICH, P. J., concurs.