Case Name: JACOB BARRETT, Appellant, v. Brian BELLEQUE, Superintendent, Oregon State Penitentiary, Respondent
Court: Oregon Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 2006-11-15
Citations: 209 Or. App. 295
Docket Number: 05C-11516; A127929
Parties: JACOB BARRETT, Appellant, v. Brian BELLEQUE, Superintendent, Oregon State Penitentiary, Respondent.
Judges: Before Edmonds, Presiding Judge, and Linder and Wollheim, Judges.
Reporter: Oregon Reports, Court of Appeals
Volume: 209
Pages: 295–306

Head Matter:
Submitted on record and briefs December 2, 2005,
affirmed November 15,2006
JACOB BARRETT, Appellant, v. Brian BELLEQUE, Superintendent, Oregon State Penitentiary, Respondent.
05C-11516; A127929
150 P3d 1064
Jacob Barrett filed the briefpro se.
Hardy Myers, Attorney General, Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General, and Kathleen Cegla, Assistant Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent.
Before Edmonds, Presiding Judge, and Linder and Wollheim, Judges.
LINDER, J.
Edmonds, P. J., concurring.

Opinion:
LINDER, J.
Plaintiff appeals a judgment denying, sua sponte, his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See ORS 34.370(6) (providing that court may, on its own motion, enter a judgment denying a meritless petition). On appeal, he raises four assignments of error; we write to address only one of his arguments, rejecting the others without discussion. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
We recite the facts relevant to the issues raised on appeal in a manner consistent with the allegations in plaintiffs 46-page handwritten petition. Plaintiff alleged that, in September 2004, Department of Corrections staff accused him of engaging in a "mutual fight" with another inmate and of striking a corrections officer who attempted to intervene. Plaintiff "declined to attend" the subsequent hearing at which a hearings officer found the accusations to be true. As a result of the fight, the Department of Corrections imposed sanctions, including placement in the Disciplinary Segregation Unit. Plaintiff alleged that he later was transferred to the Intensive Management Unit (IMU) at Snake River Correctional Institution as additional punishment for the fight and assault on the corrections officer. Plaintiff sought administrative review of his IMU placement and, according to plaintiff, the placement was upheld.
In his petition, plaintiff asserted that he was entitled to a hearing before being placed in the IMU; that the placement was a second punishment for acts for which he already had been sanctioned; and that his IMU placement violated various state and federal constitutional provisions "because it is based on false charges and false evidence." Plaintiff s theory was, as we understand it (and as is relevant to his arguments on appeal), that placement in the IMU constitutes punishment (that is, a deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty interest) and that he was entitled to a hearing before being assigned to that unit. The trial court denied the petition, stating that there is no constitutional right to placement outside the IMU and citing Troxel v. Maass, 120 Or App 397, 400, 853 P2d 294 (1993).
In Troxel, this court considered and rejected an inmate's habeas corpus challenge to the conditions of confinement in the IMU, stating:
"Petitioner's remaining claims do not state a claim for relief. He argues that, because he served a six-month sanction in disciplinary segregation, his subsequent placement in IMU constitutes double jeopardy. However, placement in IMU is not punitive, so double jeopardy does not apply. There is not, as petitioner argues, a constitutional right to reformation or rehabilitation. Kent v. Cupp, 26 Or App 799, 802, 554 P2d 196 (1976). Finally, petitioner has no constitutional right to placement outside of IMU. Therefore, his argument that he has a right to hearing concerning his placement in IMU fails. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 US 460, 103 S Ct 864, 74 L Ed 2d 675 (1983)."
120 Or App at 400.
On appeal, plaintiff asserts that the trial court erred in relying on Troxel, because conditions have changed in the IMU to such an extent that placement there constitutes punishment. He argues that he alleged facts in his petition sufficient to show that he was being placed in the IMU for punitive purposes and that he was entitled to challenge the placement "by presentation of evidence." He asserts that he "has a constitutional right to Due Process in placement in" the IMU.
We do not reach the merits of plaintiffs constitutional argument because we conclude that he was not entitled to raise his challenge in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We emphasize that plaintiff explicitly disavows any intention of challenging the conditions of confinement in the IMU, stating, "Nowhere did plaintiff challenge the IMU conditions in his claims for relief." Rather, he is challenging a denial of procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in the housing classification decision. That, however, is a claim that can be raised in a manner other than by petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
"Habeas corpus is an appropriate remedy when a petitioner has 'no other timely remedy available,' and there is a 'need for immediate judicial scrutiny of the claim." Haskins v. Palmateer, 186 Or App 159, 163, 63 P3d 31, rev den, 335 Or 510 (2003) (quoting Gage v. Maass, 306 Or 196, 204, 759 P2d 1049 (1988)). As the Supreme Court explained in Penrod/Brown v. Cupp, 283 Or 21, 28, 581 P2d 934 (1978),
"we emphasize the two essential elements that must coincide to make the writ of habeas corpus a proper instrument of judicial inquiry: The need for immediate attention, if this appears from the urgency of the harm to which the prisoner claims to be exposed or if it is found to be required as a matter of constitutional law, and the practical inadequacy of an alternative remedy to meet this need."
This court and the Supreme Court consistently have, in a number of different contexts, concluded that habeas corpus plaintiffs had other adequate remedies.
For example, in Keenan v. Peterson, 307 Or 323, 325, 767 P2d 441 (1989), in the context of a challenge to random monitoring of telephone calls in prison, the court said, "An injunction proceeding, an action for declaratory judgment or a mandamus proceeding all would be sufficiently timely to adjudicate petitioner's claims." In Gage, the inmate challenged the failure to credit him for time served. The court said, "Want of a timely remedy alone is not sufficient. That want must be coupled with a need for immediate judicial scrutiny in order for the rule of Penrod/Brown to apply. Plaintiff has not shown a need for that immediate scrutiny." 306 Or at 204. The court also stated, "[W]e note that injunction, declaratory judgment or mandamus proceedings might be vehicles for plaintiff to cause the sheriff to perform the duty mandated by ORS 137.320(1) if the sheriff has not already done so." Id.; see also Weidner v. Zenon, 124 Or App 314, 317, 862 P2d 550 (1993) ("Petitioner's second petition alleges that he has been denied handicapped access to a food slot, outside recreation and a safety seat, and that he has been harassed for using his wheelchair and denied access to it. Those allegations do not state a claim for habeas corpus relief. Petitioner has alternative civil remedies available to him for denial of handicapped access. In addition, enjoining defendant from harassing petitioner or denying him access to his wheelchair would provide him with an adequate remedy for the last two allegations.").
Cases in which this court or the Supreme Court have concluded that habeas corpus was the only appropriate remedy, in contrast, generally have involved ongoing concerns about health or safety. See, e.g., Bedell v. Schiedler, 307 Or 562, 770 P2d 909 (1989) (alleged failure to provide adequate ventilation and circulation of clean air caused the petitioner to suffer clogged sinuses, severe headaches, dry and irritated skin, and a sore throat); Fox v. Zenon, 106 Or App 37, 41, 806 P2d 166 (1991) (prisoner's allegations that he was suffering from a mental illness and severe depression that had led to numerous suicide attempts and that he was being denied psychological care stated a cognizable claim because there was no other timely remedy available); Moore v. Peterson, 91 Or App 616, 618, 756 P2d 1261 (1988) (allegations regarding heart disease and chest pain).
Here, as noted, plaintiff neither challenges the conditions of confinement in the IMU as violating his constitutional rights, nor does he assert that he is suffering from dangerous or unhealthy conditions. He challenges only the procedure followed in assigning him to the IMU. Such a challenge can be brought as an action under 42 USC section 1983. Indeed, in Keenan v. Hall, 83 F3d 1083 (9th Cir 1996), as amended, 135 F3d 1318 (1998), an Oregon inmate did just that, raising in a section 1983 action the same IMU due process claim that plaintiff raises here. And, in Armstrong v. Cupp, 67 Or App 295, 300-01, 677 P2d 721, rev den, 297 Or 340 (1984), in which the habeas corpus plaintiffs challenged prison overcrowding, this court explained that "an injunction can be a timely and successful remedy for unconstitutional prison conditions," and noted — but did not resolve — the assertion that an action under 42 USC section 1983 also would be adequate. Because plaintiff has another adequate remedy, he was, as a matter of law, not entitled to habeas corpus relief on his due process claim.
"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia."
Affirmed.
ORS 34.370(7) provides that a "meritless petition" for purposes of dismissal under ORS 34.370(6) "means one which, when liberally construed, fails to state a claim upon which habeas corpus relief may be granted." In reviewing a dismissal under ORS 34.370(6), we construe the petition liberally and assume the truth of all well-pleaded allegations and all reasonable inferences that follow from them. Riley v. Baldwin, 143 Or App 404, 407, 923 P2d 687 (1996).
Although the trial court denied the petition — at least in part — on the ground that it was governed by the holding in Troxel, we may affirm on any ground supported by the record. See Williams v. Freightliner, LLC, 196 Or App 83, 89 n 4,100 P3d 1117 (2004) (describing "right for the wrong reason" doctrine); Frady v. Morrow, 169 Or App 250, 254, 9 P3d 141 (2000) (applying doctrine in context of sua sponte denial of habeas corpus petition). On appeal, defendant superintendent raises the unavailability of habeas corpus relief as an alternative basis for affirmance.
42 USC section 1983 provides: