Case Name: Philip K. Russell, Defendant in Error, v. George S. Cochran, Plaintiff in Error
Court: Illinois Appellate Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 1917-03-20
Citations: 204 Ill. App. 418
Docket Number: Gen. No. 22,087
Parties: Philip K. Russell, Defendant in Error, v. George S. Cochran, Plaintiff in Error.
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Appellate Court Reports
Volume: 204
Pages: 418–419

Head Matter:
Philip K. Russell, Defendant in Error, v. George S. Cochran, Plaintiff in Error.
Gen. No. 22,087.
(Not to be reported in full.)
Abstract of the Decision.
1. Municipal Court of Chicago, § 8 —what is jurisdiction of in cases of fourth class. In cases of the fourth class, the Municipal Court of Chicago has jurisdiction in actions in debt as well as in contract.
2. Municipal Court of Chicago, § 29*—when presumed that trial court acted in accordance with rules of in entering judgment. In the absence of the rules of the Municipal Court of Chicago properly before the Appellate Court, it will be presumed that the trial court acted regularly and in accordance with its rules in entering judgment upon the claim before it.
Error to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. John Courtney, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1916.
Affirmed.
Opinion filed March 20, 1917.
Rehearing denied March 30, 1917.
Statement of the Case.
Action by Philip K. Bussell, plaintiff, against George S. Cochran, defendant, upon a foreign judgment for the recovery of money. From a judgment by-default for plaintiff for $962.33, and denial of a motion to vacate the judgment and for leave to defend, defendant brings error.
Carl W. Kellman, for plaintiff in error.
Albert H. Meads and Victor B. Scott, for defendant in error.
See Illinois Notes Digest, Vols. XI to XV, and Cumulative Quarterly, same topic and section number.
See Illinois Notes Digest, Vols. XI to XV, and Cumulative Quarterly, same topic and section number.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice McGoorty
delivered the opinion of the court.
3. Judgment, § 132 —when trial court does not abuse its discretion in refusing to set aside default and vacate judgment. Where an affidavit filed in support of a motion to vacate a default judgment failed to show any diligence or any reason why the party did not appear in court when summoned, held that the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to set aside the default and vacate the judgment, even though such party may have had a meritorious defense.