Case Name: WILLIAM JONES and Others v. HENRY JONES and Others
Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Minnesota
Decision Date: 1898-12-21
Citations: 75 Minn. 53
Docket Number: Nos. 11,264—(158)
Parties: WILLIAM JONES and Others v. HENRY JONES and Others.
Judges: 
Reporter: Minnesota Reports
Volume: 75
Pages: 53–59

Head Matter:
WILLIAM JONES and Others v. HENRY JONES and Others.
December 21, 1898.
Nos. 11,264—(158).
Surviving Spouse — Election to Take under Will — Gr. S. 1894, § 4472— Homestead.
Where the six-months period fixed in G. S. 1894, § 4472, has expired, in a case in which the provisions of that section are applicable, and a surviving husband or wife has not exercised his or her right to renounce and refuse to accept the terms and conditions of the will, an election has been made by such survivor to take under the will, and the right of renunciation and refusal no longer exists. A failure to exercise this right within six months after the will has been probated has the same legal effect upon the estate, including the statutory homestead, if there be one, as the written assent of the survivor to the will itself, provided for and required by the terms of section 4470, would have.
Same — Devise of Homestead to One Child — Children Surviving Both Parents.
In a case where the testator held a statutory homestead at the time of his decease, and the surviving wife, for whom provision was made in the will, lived for more than two years after the expiration of the six-months period, heretofore mentioned, without exercising her option as to such will, children who survive both parents have no interest in the homestead, devised to another person.
Four children of John P. Jones, deceased, petitioned the probate court for the county of Blue Earth to set apart to them, and to Henry Jones, certain lands as the homestead of said deceased. The petition was granted, Torrey, J., and Henry Jones appealed to the district court for that county from the order granting the petition. In the district court the matter was tried, upon stipulated facts, before Severance, J., who reversed the order of the probate court. From an order of the district court denying a new trial, petitioners appealed.
Affirmed.
Lorin Gray, for appellants.
A surviving wife entitled to hold the homestead cannot be allowed to waive a claim to the homestead fixed by law, and take a part thereof, to the injury of other parties interested in the distribution of the decedent’s estate. Mintzer v. St. Paul Trust Co., 45 Minn, 323. The state, which confers the right and prescribes the rule of descent or distribution, may annex to the privilege which it confers such reasonable conditions to its enjoyment, as it may deem expedient. In re Sherman’s Estate, 153 N. Y. 1. The power to dispose of the homestead by will must be subject to the homestead tenure of the survivor. Eaton v. Robbins, 29 Minn. 327. See to the same effect Brettun v. Fox, 100 Mass. 234; Burroughs v. Nutting, 105 Mass. 228. The homestead is to be set apart in pursuance of the statute in force at the time the order is made, and the interest therein which the widow and surviving child will take is to be determined by the same statute. Sulzberger v. Sulzberger, 50 Cal. 385; In re Lahiff, 86 Cal. 151; In re Davis, 69 Cal. 458; Brettun v. Fox, supra. A will speaks from the date of the death of the testator. Graves v. Mitchell, 90 Wis. 306; Langley v. Langley, 18 R. I. 618; Cushing v. Aylwin, 53 Mass. 169; Shute v. Sargent, 67 N. H. 305; Bishop v. Bishop, 4 Hill, 138; Annable v. Patch, 20 Mass. 360; Pray v. Waterston, 53 Mass. 262; Schouler, Wills (2d Ed.) § 11. See also Desesbats v. Berquier, 1 Binney, 336; Desnoyer v. Jordan, 27 Minn. 295; McCune v. House, 8 Ohio, 144.
Wm. F. Hughes, for respondent.
There may be circumstances permitting a will to speak from the day of its execution. See In re Swenson’s Estate, 55,Minn. 300. Statutes will not be construed retrospectively, unless, by their express terms or otherwise, such appears to be the manifest intent of the legislature. Taylor v. Mitchell, 57 Pa. St. 209; Appeal of Lane, 57 Conn. 182; Brewster v. McCall, 15 Conn. 274; In re Tuller, 79 Ill. 99. A will is construed according to the law in force at the time of its execution. Packer v. Packer, 179 Pa. St. 580; Gable v. Daub, 40 Pa. St. 217.

Opinion:
COLLINS, J.
We are again called upon to construe the provisions of G. S. 1894, § 4470. John P. Jones died testate, in 1889, the owner of a farm of 160 acres, of which 80 acres was his statutory homestead. His wife survived him, as did five children. The latter had attained their majority long prior to their father's decease. The will was duly probated in 1890, and, in accordance with its terms, one-half of all of the decedent's property was assigned and decreed unto the widow for the term of her natural life, with the remainder over to a son, Henry Jones; while the other half, except the sum of $600, reserved for certain specified legacies to the other children, was assigned and set over to said son Henry absolutely. Another' son (Hugh) was nominated in said will as executor, and he was duly appointed as such in 1890, and thereafter duly qualified, and has ever since been acting in that capacity.
The widow died in 1893. The estate has never been settled, and in 1894 the children, other than Henry, petitioned the probate court for the setting apart of the 80 acres, as the homestead of-the deceased, to the five children before mentioned, and for their use. The petition was granted in the probate court, but on appeal the order was reversed by the district court.
On the facts this case does not materially differ from that of Radl v. Radl, 72 Minn. 81, 75 N. W. 111, and is governed by it. In each case there was the last will and testament of a husband, in which provision was made for the wife, if she should survive the testator, in lieu of the statutory rights; and there were also children. In neither case did the wife assent to the provisions of the will during the lifetime of the husband. In each case the will was duly probated while the widow was living, and presumably she accepted its terms. In the Radi case the homestead was devised to a son in fee, free from all claims of the widow, and when the will was probated she executed, acknowledged and filed in the probate court her written assent to all of its terms and conditions, relinquishing all claims and rights in and to the estate, except as to the part devised to her. One or two years after this she brought an action against the son to eject him from the homestead, claiming that she could not lawfully assent to the terms of the will after her husband's decease.
In the present case an undivided half of all property, less the amount of certain legacies, and including the homestead, was bequeathed and devised to the son Henry, while the other half was bequeathed and devised to the widow during her natural life, with remainder over to Henry. The widow did not assent in writing to 'the terms and conditions of the will, but it was probated February 1, 1890. She lived until January 31, 1893, or for more than two years after the expiration of the six-months period fixed in section 4472, within which she was required by a written instrument, filed in the probate court, to renounce and refuse to accept the provisions of the will, or be deemed to have elected to take thereunder, and in accordance with its terms and conditions. She failed to file the instrument, and upon her death all of the children save Henry filed the petition just mentioned, claiming that it should be granted because their mother never formally assented to the testamentary disposition of the estate made by her husband.
What was said in the opinion filed in the Radi case in reference to a proper construction of sections 4470-4472, is pertinent here, and need not be repeated; and, changing the language a trifle, so that it may fit slightly different facts, the remainder of that opinion is'in point. We have here the two essentials there mentioned: First, á testamentary disposition of the homestead; and, second, a failure on the part of the surviving wife to renounce, and a refusal to accept, the terms and conditions of the will within the statutory period. This failure was an election on the widow's part to take under the will, and to accept its terms and conditions in lieu of the provisions made for her by statute. When the six months had expired, she having omitted to renounce and to refuse to accept under the will, her right of election terminated. It had gone; and certainly the children who survived her can have no greater rights than she had. They cannot revive this right.
> We have the same argument here as in the Radi case, — that with this construction of the statute it is optional with the surviving husband or wife to deprive the children of their remainder in the homestead, — and the same reply can be made to it. The survivor has the power to deprive the children of this remainder by assenting to the will in writing, and it is of no importance to them how it is done, if this power absolutely exists. It is the act which affects them, and it is therefore immaterial whether it is performed by some affirmative action, like written assent, or is negatively brought about by reason of a failure to renounce and a refusal to accept under the will. The petitioners had no interest in the homestead to be set apart.
Order affirmed.