Case Name: Leroy WELLS v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1990-12-18
Citations: 573 So. 2d 223
Docket Number: No. 89/CA/0712
Parties: Leroy WELLS v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY.
Judges: Before COVINGTON, C.J., LOTTINGER, WATKINS, SHORTESS, CARTER, SAVOIE, LANIER, CRAIN and FOIL, JJ., and VIAL LEMMON , J. Pro Tern.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 573
Pages: 223–237

Head Matter:
Leroy WELLS v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY.
No. 89/CA/0712.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
Dec. 18, 1990.
Richard Thalheim, Jr., Atty., Thibodaux, for plain tiff-appellant Leroy Wells.
Robert B. Butler, III, Schwab & Butler, Houma, for defendant-appellee State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
Before COVINGTON, C.J., LOTTINGER, WATKINS, SHORTESS, CARTER, SAVOIE, LANIER, CRAIN and FOIL, JJ., and VIAL LEMMON , J. Pro Tern.
Judge Mary Ann Vial Lemmon of the 29th Judicial District Court is serving as Judge pro tem-pore by special appointment of the Louisiana Supreme Court to fill the vacancy created by the illness and subsequent death of Judge Steve A. Alford, Jr.
Judge Wallace A. Edwards has recused himself from hearing this case and Judge Daniel W. LeBlanc did not participate in the hearing of this case.

Opinion:
SAVOIE, Judge.
Plaintiff, Leroy Wells, filed suit to recover damages he sustained in a vehicular collision on March 28, 1986. Named as defendants were C.J. and Martha Billiot and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, owner, driver, and insurer of the other vehicle involved in the collision. After trial on the merits, the judge rendered judgment for the defendants. From this judgment, Wells appeals.
FACTS
On March 28, 1986 at about 2:30 p.m. on a clear, dry day, Wells was proceeding south in his 1976 Dodge Monaco on Louisiana Highway 316 (Bayou Blue Road) in Bayou Blue, Louisiana. Martha Billiot, in a 1978 Ford F-100 pickup truck owned by C.J. Billiot, accompanied by her friend Betty Jo Strickland, was heading north on the same highway. The two vehicles collided near the center line of the two-lane roadway, with the Billiot vehicle coming to rest mostly in the southbound lane and the Wells vehicle coming to rest across both lanes.
TRIAL TESTIMONY
At trial, Wells and Billiot gave different explanations for the collision. Wells testified that he was proceeding south in his lane when he saw Billiot coming toward him and into his lane; when he realized Billiot was actually coming into his lane, he veered over into the northbound lane, but he could not avoid the collision.
Billiot and Strickland both gave basically the same testimony as to the cause of the accident. Billiot testified that as she was proceeding north in her lane, she saw Wells pull out of his lane to pass the vehicle in front of him; she took some evasive action, but Wells did not pass the vehicle and went back into his lane. Wells then pulled out to pass the other vehicle again, and again he did not complete the passing maneuver. Because Wells was in her lane, Billiot went to the right onto the shoulder. Because Wells seemed to follow her, after the car preceding Wells passed her, Billiot drove towards the other lane (which Wells had formerly occupied). As Billiot tried to move into the other lane, Wells also moved back to his lane and the vehicles collided near the center line.
Dana Harrison, a Louisiana state trooper who investigated the collision, testified that he accepted the Billiot version of the accident. The remainder of the trial testimony concerned Wells' damages, the blood aleo-hoi testing, and Wells' alcohol consumption. We will discuss the testimony concerning these latter two topics under Assignment of Error No. 2.
TRIAL JUDGE'S REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
After reviewing the testimony and evidence, the trial judge stated that in order to decide the case he must either accept or reject Wells' version of the accident. The judge then reasoned as follows:
The facts and evidence indicate that Wells is the only person who accepts his version of the accident and the attendant circumstances. He offered no corroborating evidence or testimony, either as to accident itself or his supposed intoxication. This Court, like Trooper Harrison, accepts the Billiot/Strickland version as being the more reasonable and probable. It is unlikely that Wells could have seen the defendant's truck, almost a half-mile away, as he was passing the other vehicle. He then claims to have watched her progress for over 800 feet before the collision. That account, together with the expert testimony and test results of his alcohol consumption, lead this Court to the conclusion that Ms. Billiot's version of the accident is not only more probable than Wells', but is likely the actual events of that day. Further, the fact that the vehicles came to rest after the collision more in the Wells' lane than the other does not indicate to this Court in which lane the accident happened. While plaintiff went to great length at the trial to emphasize this point, the Court cannot draw this conclusion without expert reconstruction testimony.
Plaintiff did not call any witness who was with him at the crawfish boil to rebut the inference that he was intoxicated at the time of the accident. Further, his plea of guilty to reckless operation of a motor vehicle creates a rebuttable presumption that he did, in fact, operate his vehicle in such a manner on that day. LA.R.S. 13:3739
In addition to the plaintiff failing to prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence, the preponderance of the evidence is to the other extreme, that he was at fau]t ⅛ causing the collision.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
On appeal, Wells raises the following assignments of error:
1. It was manifest error for the trial court to fail to presume fault against the left-turning motorist and to ignore the physical evidence, improperly consider number of witnesses, improperly be influenced by trooper credibility perspective and erroneously fail to find liability against defendant.
2. The trial court erroneously allowed introduction of blood test results of alcohol consumption without proper foundation and the testing procedure itself was inaccurate; the trial court was in error to rely upon such results in its decision.
We will discuss Assignment of Error No. 2 first.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2: ADMISSIBILITY OF BLOOD ALCOHOL TEST RESULTS
Harrison, the Louisiana state trooper who investigated the collision, testified that when he arrived at the scene, he noticed the odor of alcohol on Wells' breath and in his car, that what appeared to be a mixed drink was spilled in Wells' car, and that Wells' eyes were glassy. After Wells was taken to the hospital for treatment of his injuries, Harrison questioned him; Wells said that he had a prescription for muscle relaxants, but had not taken any, and that he had a beer with lunch before the accident. According to the affidavit of Harrison for Wells' arrest for driving while intoxicated, "Leroy Wells said he was driving and had been drinking prior to the accident." In the affidavit, Harrison also stated that he observed that Wells had glassy eyes, moderate alcoholic breath odor and slurred speech.
Based on his observations, Harrison ordered a blood test to determine Wells' blood alcohol content (BAC). Harrison advised Wells of his rights relating to the blood test; Harrison testified that Wells said he understood his rights, but refused to sign the form indicating that he had been advised of them. This form was introduced into evidence as Exhibit D-2. According to Exhibit D-2 and Harrison's testimony, Jana Dover, the nurse who took Wells' blood, witnessed that Wells had been advised of his rights, but refused to sign the form. Harrison also signed the form.
Harrison then witnessed the nurse draw blood from Wells. He testified that he took the vials of blood, sealed and initialed them, and placed them in a styrofoam box. Harrison testified that after he put the seals on the vials, he did not tamper with them. The styrofoam box was then sealed, initialed, and marked with Wells' name and pertinent information. Harrison testified that although he could not recall his procedure in this case, he usually takes the styrofoam box to Troop "C" in Gray, where it is placed in a locked box. Harrison testified that in this case, after he brought the styrofoam box containing the vials of blood to Troop "C", he had no further dealings with it.
The defendants introduced D-7, an exhibit which was a xerox copy of the two vials of blood and the label on the outside of the styrofoam container in which the vials were kept. The label showed that the subject was Leroy Wells, that the police officer was T.F.C. D. Harrison, and that blood was drawn on March 28, 1986 at 4:25 p.m. at Terrebonne General Houma by Jana Dover, R.N. The label also contained a section called "Chain of Possession." This section showed that Harrison received the blood from Jana Dover, R.N. on March 28, 1986 at 4:27 p.m. and that S/T G.A. Whitney received it from Harrison on March 31, 1986, at 8:00 a.m. The label was filled out by Harrison, with the exception of the March 31 entry and the Crime Lab's notations; Harrison and Dover initialed the label.
When Harrison was asked whether he brought the blood to Troop "C" on the same day he received it, or on March 31, he testified that he was not sure. Harrison could not say where the vials of blood were from March 28 through March 31.
According to Harrison, also in the styro-foam box containing the vials of blood were Exhibit D-8, a request for scientific analysis, and Exhibit D-9, a consent form and blood collection report. Exhibit D-8 shows that Harrison submitted two vials of blood from Leroy Wells for blood alcohol testing to the State Police Crime Laboratory in Baton Rouge. The document bears the signature of Libby Guillory, the criminalist receiving the evidence, showing that the blood was received by mail on April 2, 1986 at 3:30 p.m. Exhibit D-9 shows that Wells refused to give permission for blood samples to be taken on March 28, 1986 at 1623 p.m. The exhibit also shows that the blood was taken from Wells at 4:25 p.m. on March 28, 1986 at Terrebonne General Hospital. J. Dover, R.N. signed the form certifying that she drew the blood and Harrison signed the form stating that he witnessed the blood being drawn from Wells by Dover.
Paul L. Cobb, Jr., a forensic scientist with and director of the Crime Lab Toxicology Unit who was accepted by the court as an expert in blood alcohol analysis and forensic toxicology, testified that on April 4, 1986, he examined the blood and found that BAC was .14 percent. Cobb testified that Exhibit D-7 shows that the Crime Lab's evidence technician assigned a number, SP1507-86, to the blood, added the date and time, April 2, 1986 and 3:30 p.m., and signed her initials. When Cobb opened the kit to analyze the blood, he wrote "SP1507-86 PC sealed" and initialed it. He testified that when he received the blood, the vials were sealed and that he did not see anything to indicate that the vials had been improperly sealed or handled. Cobb wrote "SP1507-86" on both vials of blood and his initials are visible on one vial. He analyzed the blood using gas chromatographic head space analysis.
On cross-examination, Cobb testified that the "only way that blood will manufacture alcohol to my knowledge is upon fermentation if the blood is putrefied . he said the blood alcohol kits furnished by the state police have preservatives in the vials; he said that he did not find preservatives in Wells' blood and that he did not know whether the vials containing Wells' blood had the preservatives. Cobb testified that when he analyzed the blood, it was in good condition.
Cobb testified that he was not present when Wells' blood was drawn; he testified that every registered nurse is qualified to withdraw samples for blood alcohol analysis, based on the statutes dealing with blood alcohol testing. When asked if there was a wrong way to extract blood for a blood alcohol test, Cobb responded: "I do not draw blood myself. I know, I feel as long as they get the blood." When asked whether it made a difference if the area from which the blood was drawn was sanitized, Cobb said that the blood alcohol kits contain a non-alcoholic swab for the person drawing the blood to swab the arm if desired. Cobb testified that if the arm were swabbed with rubbing alcohol, it would not make a difference in the blood test results.
The law regarding introduction of blood test results into evidence was set forth in our recent opinion, Allemand v. Zip's Trucking Co., 552 So.2d 1023, 1026 (La. App. 1st Cir.1989), writ denied, 558 So.2d 569 (La.1990).
The requirements for the introduction of a blood test analysis are very stringent; the party seeking to introduce such evidence must first lay a proper foundation for its admission. Pearce v. Gunter, 238 So.2d 534 (La.App. 3d Cir.), application not considered, 256 La.. 888, 239 So.2d 543 (La.1970). This predicate must connect the specimen with its source, show that it was properly taken by an authorized person, properly labeled and preserved, properly transported for analysis and properly tested. Pearce v. Gunter, 238 So.2d at 537.
"The purpose of the chain of custody rule [as a proper foundation for admission of the blood test results] is to assure the integrity of the evidence, i.e., to prevent the evidence from being tampered with or from being lost." Bufkin v. Mid-American Indemnity Co., 528 So.2d 589, 592 (La.App. 2d Cir.1988). (Citation omitted).
Applying these requirements to the case sub judice, we find that the defendants did not lay a proper foundation for admission of the test results. The defendants did not show that the blood was properly taken, properly preserved, and properly transported for analysis. We find it particularly disturbing that the nurse who actually drew the blood did not testify at the trial, to show that the blood was properly taken; furthermore, no one could testify as to the whereabouts or security of the vials between March 28 and March 31 or between March 31 and April 2. "Unless proof is made of the proper preservation of the blood sample between the time it is taken and its testing, the subsequent results are unreliable evidence and properly excluded." Allemand, 552 So.2d at 1027. (Citations omitted). Therefore, we find that the trial judge erred in considering the results of the blood alcohol test because the defendants did not lay a proper foundation for the introduction of the evidence; because of this finding, we pretermit any discussion of whether the trial judge erred in considering the blood test results based on Wells' contention that the testing procedure was inaccurate.
While we find that the trial judge improperly considered Wells' blood alcohol test results, we find that such error was harmless because there was other evidence on which the trial judge could base his finding that Wells was intoxicated at the time of the accident. According to Trooper Harrison's testimony and his affidavit, at the scene of the accident, he noticed the odor of alcohol on Wells' breath and in his car, that what appeared to be a mixed drink was spilled in Wells' car, and that Wells' eyes were glassy and his speech was slurred. Furthermore, Wells told Harrison he had been drinking prior to the accident. Wells testified at trial that he had two beers before the accident at a crawfish boil. Finally, Wells pled guilty to reckless operation of a motor vehicle in connection with the accident.
Additionally, the blood test results showing that Wells was legally intoxicated were only one factor which led the trial court to reject Wells' version of the accident. Other factors which led the trial court to reject Wells' testimony were that Wells offered no corroborating evidence to support his testimony and that Wells' version of the accident was unlikely (i.e., he claimed to have seen the Billiot vehicle almost a half-mile away as he was passing another vehicle).
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1: TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO FIND DEFENDANTS AT FAULT
After reviewing the testimony and evidence, we cannot say that the trial court erred in accepting the Billiot version of the accident and finding Wells at fault. Recently, the supreme court set out our standard of review in the case of Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840, 844-845 (La.1989)
It is well settled that a court of appeal may not set aside a trial court's or a jury's finding of fact in the absence of 'manifest error' or unless it is 'clearly wrong,' and where there is conflict in the testimony, reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon review, even though the appellate court may feel that its own evaluations and inferences are as reasonable.... Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong....
When findings are based on determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses, the manifest error — clearly wrong standard demands great deference to the trier of fact's findings; for only the fact-finder can be aware of the variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on the listener's understanding and belief in what is said. Where documents or objective evidence so contradict the witness's story, or the story itself is so internally inconsistent or implausible on its face, that a reasonable fact finder [sic] would not credit the witness's story, the court of appeal may well find manifest error or clear wrongness even in a finding purportedly based upon a credibility determination. But where such factors are not present, and a factfinder's finding is based on its decision to credit the testimony of one of two or more witnesses, that finding can virtually never be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong.
(Citations omitted).
Wells contends in brief that the trial judge erred in failing to presume negligence on the part of Billiot since he claims that she was turning left in front of his oncoming vehicle; in his reply brief, Wells contends that the trial judge erred in failing to presume negligence on Billiot's part because she was in his lane when the collision occurred. These contentions have no merit since the evidence shows that Billiot was in the lane Wells had occupied because she was attempting to avoid a collision with him since he was in her lane. Assignment of Error No. 1 has no merit.
For the above reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs of this appeal to be paid by Wells.
AFFIRMED.
FOIL, J., concurs.
LANIER and LOTTINGER, JJ., concur and assign reasons.
COVINGTON, C.J., and VIAL LEMMON, J. Pro Tern., concur for reasons assigned by LANIER, J.
. For cases where blood alcohol test results were held inadmissible due to inadequate chain of custody, see the following: Allemand v. Zip's Trucking Co., Inc., 552 So.2d 1023 (La.App. 1st Cir.1989), writ denied, 558 So.2d 569 (La.1990); Bufkin v. Mid-American Indemnity Co., 528 So.2d 589 (La.App. 2d Cir.1988); Richardson v. Continental Insurance Co., 468 So.2d 675 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 474 So.2d 1304 (La.1985); Holmes v. Christopher, 435 So.2d 1022 (La.App. 4th Cir.), writs denied, 440 So.2d 723, 724, 765 (La.1983); Swanson v. Estate of Augusta, 403 So.2d 118 (La.App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 407 So.2d 732 (La.1981); Lapoint v. Breaux, 395 So.2d 1377 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 399 So.2d 611 (La.1981).
For cases where blood alcohol test results were held admissible, see the following: Harris v. Browning-Ferris Industries Chemical Services, Inc., 635 F.Supp. 1202 (M.D.La.), aff'd, 806 F.2d 259 (5th Cir.1986); Lawless v. New Orleans Police Department, 550 So.2d 252 (La.App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 551 So.2d 1344 (La. 1989); Hutson v. Madison Parish Police Jury, 496 So.2d 360 (La.App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 498 So.2d 758 (La.1986); Ryan v. State of Louisiana, 477 So.2d 110 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 478 So.2d 136 (La.1985); Young v. All American Assurance Co., 243 So.2d 894 (La.App. 3d Cir.), writ refused, 258 La. 349, 246 So.2d 197 (1971).
. We note that State v. Flood, 301 So.2d 637 (La.1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 916, 95 S.Ct. 1577, 43 L.Ed.2d 782 (1975) and State v. Honeyman, 560 So.2d 825 (La.1990), may allow the introduction of blood alcohol test results in criminal cases where it is more probable than not that the blood sample was taken from the defendant, allowing the defects in the chain of possession to go to the weight of the evidence. However, this rationale does not apply as to the initial taking of the sample or later testing procedure. In Honeyman, the court stated that blood alcohol results may be excluded where there is no evidence of careful adherence to strict procedures in administering intoxication tests. Honeyman, 560 So.2d at 829.
. Wells cites State v. Rowell, 517 So.2d 799 (La.1988) to support his contention that the testing procedures were inadequate.