Case Name: Gloria DAVIS, Petitioner, v. Rosman Charles DIEUJUSTE, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1986-10-16
Citations: 496 So. 2d 806
Docket Number: No. 61044
Parties: Gloria DAVIS, Petitioner, v. Rosman Charles DIEUJUSTE, Respondent.
Judges: McDonald, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW and BARKETT, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 496
Pages: 806–813

Head Matter:
Gloria DAVIS, Petitioner, v. Rosman Charles DIEUJUSTE, Respondent.
No. 61044.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Oct. 16, 1986.
Richard K. Inglis, Fort Lauderdale, for petitioner.
John D. Kruse and Robert S. Schlorff, III of the Law Offices of Kruse and Livoti, Fort Lauderdale, for respondent.

Opinion:
EHRLICH, Justice.
We have for review a decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Dieujuste v. Davis, 400 So.2d 981 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), which expressly and directly conflicts with a decision of another district court of appeal, Vandervoort v. Vandervoort, 277 So.2d 43 (Fla. 3rd DCA), cert. denied, 287 So.2d 682 (Fla.1973). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.
This case involves a post-dissolution final judgment awarding the former wife, petitioner herein, sole ownership of certain real property which, during the marriage, had been held by the parties as a tenancy by the entireties. The property rights of the parties were not raised in the former husband's petition for dissolution; nor were they addressed in the April, 1977 final judgment of dissolution. The trial court did not reserve jurisdiction over the proceeding.
In June of 1978 the former wife filed a "petition for additional relief after dissolution of marriage" which was dismissed by the trial court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Then in August of that year, she filed a "complaint for additional relief after dissolution of marriage," claiming a special equity in the real property which is the subject of the instant dispute. The trial court found that it had jurisdiction of the cause and of the parties, that the former wife was the sole owner of the real property in question, and that the former husband had an equitable lien on the property of $950. The husband was ordered to convey by quit-claim deed all his interest in the property; and the wife was ordered to satisfy the lien. The husband appealed the final judgment.
On appeal, the district court noted that the property at issue held by the parties as a tenancy by the entireties, upon dissolution, automatically converted to a tenancy in common. § 689.15, Fla.Stat. (1977). The district court correctly recognized the dispositive issue presented is "whether property rights as between the marital partners and evolving during a marriage are finally settled by a judgment of dissolution of marriage under any and all circumstances." 400 So.2d at 982.
Relying on this Court's decisions in Finston v. Finston, 160 Fla. 935, 37 So.2d 423 (Fla.1948) and Cooper v. Cooper, 69 So.2d 881 (Fla.1954), the district court below concluded that such rights are finally settled upon dissolution. The district court held "res judicata constitutes a complete defense to the claim of [the former wife] embodied in the complaint on which the judgment on appeal is based." 400 So.2d at 983. In Finston we announced that where property rights were before the court "a final [divorce] decree . settles all property rights of the parties and bars any action thereafter brought by either party to determine the question of property rights." 160 Fla. at 937, 37 So.2d 423. This rule was expanded in Cooper where, discussing Finston, we noted: "the [trial] court had before it the question of property rights.... Here the property rights were not introduced in the litigation but they could and should have been so the [doctrine of res judicata] applies." 69 So.2d at 883. (Emphasis added).
The rule set forth in Cooper has been generally followed in this state. See Estabrook v. Wise, 348 So.2d 355 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 354 So.2d 980 (Fla.1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 971, 98 S.Ct. 1612, 56 L.Ed.2d 63 (1978); Boswell v. Boswell, 352 So.2d 91 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); Simon v. Simon, 293 So.2d 780 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974); Thompson v. Thompson, 223 So.2d 95 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969). However, the Cooper decision was completely overlooked in Vandervoort v. Vandervoort, 277 So.2d 43 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973). In Vandervoort, contrary to this Court's decision in Cooper, the Third District Court of Appeal held that matters involving property rights of the parties to a dissolution action which were not dealt with before the trial court or were not adjudicated in the final judgment of dissolution may be litigated in "other separate proceedings." 277 So.2d at 45.
Turning to the case at bar, first we note, implicit in the reasoning of the district court is the assumption that the trial court's jurisdiction was predicated on personal service, giving the trial court jurisdiction to adjudicate the property rights of the parties. If this assumption is correct and the trial court in the original dissolution proceeding had in personam jurisdiction over the wife or in rem jurisdiction to adjudicate the respective rights in the real property in question, the doctrine of res judica-ta as adopted in Cooper was properly applied in this case. However, in raising a due process challenge to the district court's ruling, the petitioner contends that service of process was by publication and that the notice of action made no mention of the real property at issue as required by section 49.08(4), Florida Statutes (1977). If that was indeed the nature of the service of process in the original dissolution proceeding, the trial court was without jurisdiction to adjudicate the property rights of the parties. See, e.g., Wright v. Wright, 411 So.2d 1334 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Lahr v. Lahr, 337 So.2d 837 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976); Nethery v. Nethery, 212 So.2d 10 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968); Hennig v. Hennig, 162 So.2d 288 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 166 So.2d 754 (Fla.1964); Webb v. Webb, 156 So.2d 698 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963).
The rule of Cooper that a party to a dissolution proceeding is barred from raising matters in a subsequent proceeding which "could and should have" been raised in the dissolution proceeding is not applicable where the court lacked jurisdiction to address the matter in the original proceeding. In Pawley v. Pawley, 46 So.2d 464 (Fla.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 866, 71 S.Ct. 90, 95 L.Ed. 632 (1950), which involved a post-dissolution action for alimony, where the foreign final judgment of dissolution was predicated on constructive service, we recognized that "[i]t is only in those cases wherein all parties litigant were personally (actually or by legally sufficient personal service of process) before the court that all justiciable controversies may be said to have been conclusively determined." 46 So.2d at 473. We based our decision in Pawley "upon the just and equitable recognition of the fact that the defendant wife under such circumstances has not had her day in court, or an opportunity in truth and in fact to be heard, upon the subject of her right to alimony_" 46 So.2d at 472 (emphasis omitted). The concept of "divisible divorce" as adopted in Pawley recognizes that a dissolution proceeding has two separable aspects, that which relates to the marital res and that which relates to the property rights and obligations of the parties. While constructive service is sufficient for an adjudication of the former, personal jurisdiction is generally required for a determination of the latter. See Orlowitz v. Orlowitz, 208 So.2d 849 (Fla. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 207 So.2d 453 (Fla.1967). However, as noted previously, a court may obtain in rem jurisdiction to distribute real property located within the state pursuant to section 49.08(4). Therefore, if in the instant case service of process was by publication, with no description of the real property contained in the notice of action, as petitioner alleges, she would not be barred from now bringing an action placing in issue property rights which came into existence prior to the final judgment of dissolution. These rights could properly be raised in an action for partition pursuant to section 64.041, Florida Statutes (1977), or in a dissolution-related action, such as the one brought in the instant case, seeking to establish a special equity, Landay v. Landay, 429 So.2d 1197 (Fla.1983), or requesting an award of the husband's interest in the property in lieu of lump sum alimony. See Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197 (Fla.1980).
Under our holding in Cooper, where a trial court has acquired jurisdiction to adjudicate the respective rights and obligations of the parties, a final judgment of dissolution settles all such matters and bars all subsequent litigation by either party to determine rights and obligations evolving during the marriage. The petitioner argues that such a rule would force the parties to forever hold the property at issue as a tenancy in common, with a fifty percent ownership interest in each. The parties are not forever bound as co-tenants. They may voluntarily partition through mutual agreement or either may seek statutory partition pursuant to chapter 64, Florida Statutes. However, the ownership interest of each was settled once and for all at the time the judgment of dissolution became final.
Upon dissolution of marriage, property held by the spouses as an estate by the entireties converts to a tenancy in common. Cummings v. Cummings, 330 So.2d 134 (Fla.1976); § 689.15, Fla.Stat. (1977). In the absence of a showing that one spouse should be awarded more than an equal share of entireties property, either as an award in lieu of lump sum alimony or because of a special equity in the property, the ownership interest of each is presumed equal. Landay v. Landay, 429 So.2d 1197; Ball v. Ball, 335 So.2d 5 (Fla.1976); Collazo v. Collazo, 318 So.2d 164 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975). As we noted in Ball, "[i]f property is to be divided equally, . no judicial action is required because the law will convert that entireties tenancy to a tenancy in common as soon as the marriage is dissolved." 335 So.2d at 7. Thus, if the trial court had jurisdiction to dispose of the en-tireties property, subsequent proceedings, including dissolution-related proceedings, such as the one brought in the instant case, and statutory partition proceedings, in which the petitioner seeks to establish that she is entitled to an ownership interest greater than fifty percent, are barred.
It is true, as petitioner points out, that section 64.041, Florida Statutes, contemplates that a co-tenant seeking statutory partition may attempt to establish a greater ownership interest. However, in a case such as this where the circumstances giving rise to the petitioner's claim to a greater than equal interest occurred prior to the dissolution, this claim could have and should have been raised during the dissolution proceeding. By operation of law the respective ownership interest of each spouse was determined upon entry of the final judgment of dissolution. The doctrine of res judicata thus precludes other than an equal partition of the property. Therefore, the only property rights which may be raised in an action for partition are those which arose subsequent to the final judgment of dissolution. See, e.g., Mossel v. Mossel, 424 So.2d 979 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983).
In conclusion, we hold that where a trial court has acquired jurisdiction to adjudicate the respective rights and obligations of the parties, a final judgment of dissolution settles all such matters as between the spouses evolving during the marriage, whether or not these matters were introduced in the dissolution proceeding, and acts as a bar to any action thereafter to determine such rights and obligations. Any language to the contrary in Vander-voort is disapproved. If however, the trial court lacks jurisdiction to determine the respective rights and obligations of the parties, the doctrine of res judicata, as adopted in Cooper, would not preclude a post-dissolution action seeking adjudication of these matters.
Accordingly, we remand for a determination as to whether the trial court in the dissolution proceeding had jurisdiction to dispose of the real property at issue and for further proceedings, if they are found to be appropriate, in accordance with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
McDonald, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW and BARKETT, JJ., concur.
ADKINS and BOYD, JJ., dissent with opinions.
. The record is devoid of any information concerning the type of service had in the dissolution action.
. § 49.08(4), Fla.Stat. (1977) requires that a notice of action set forth "[t]he description of real property, if any, proceeded against."
. We note that there is language in Pawley which conflicts with our holding in Cooper. We noted in Pawley that even when the trial court has jurisdiction over the person or property of the defendant, "authority exists for the position that only those matters actually litigated are settled with finality." 46 So.2d at 473 (citing Blanchard v. Stribling, 157 Fla. 10, 24 So.2d 713 (Fla.1946). We recede from those portions of the Pawley and Blanchard opinions which conflict with our holding in Cooper.
. § 64.041, Fla.Stat. (1977) provides in part:
Partition of property; complaint.
The complaint shall allege a description of the lands of which partition is demanded, the names and places of residence of the owners, joint tenants, tenants in common, co-parcen-ers, or other persons interested in the lands according to the best knowledge and belief of plaintiff, the quantity held by each, and such other matters, if any, as are necessary to enable the court to adjudicate the rights and interests of the party.
(Emphasis added.)