Case Name: RAPID CREDIT CORP., Luis De Villiers, and Remberto Cabrera, Appellants, v. SUNSET PARK CENTRE, LTD., Heriberto Sardina, and Loumar Developers, Inc., Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1990-07-17
Citations: 566 So. 2d 810
Docket Number: No. 90-626
Parties: RAPID CREDIT CORP., Luis De Villiers, and Remberto Cabrera, Appellants, v. SUNSET PARK CENTRE, LTD., Heriberto Sardina, and Loumar Developers, Inc., Appellees.
Judges: Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and LEVY and GERSTEN, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 566
Pages: 810–812

Head Matter:
RAPID CREDIT CORP., Luis De Villiers, and Remberto Cabrera, Appellants, v. SUNSET PARK CENTRE, LTD., Heriberto Sardina, and Loumar Developers, Inc., Appellees.
No. 90-626.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
July 17, 1990.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 8, 1990.
Arthur J. Morburger, and Stephen M. Zukoff, for appellants.
Mishan, Sloto, Hoffman & Greenberg, and Barry N. Greenberg, and Carol L. Cox, for appellee Sunset Park Centre, Ltd.
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and LEVY and GERSTEN, JJ.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
This is an interlocutory appeal from the denial of motions to set aside clerk's orders of defaults, entered by the clerk without notice. We reverse and remand.
Appellee, Sunset Park Centre, Ltd. (Sunset), and appellant, Rapid Credit Corp., and their respective general partners, disputed a real estate transaction. As part of litigation between Sunset and Rapid, Rapid sought specific performance of that real estate contract.
During the pendency of the specific performance action, Sunset lost its interest in the property due to foreclosure. Sunset then filed a separate action against Rapid and its officers (Rapid), from which this appeal is taken. In this action, Sunset sought to recover money damages for the loss of its interest in the property (which Sunset claimed was a result of Rapid's dilatory tactics in the specific performance action).
Due to Rapid's failure to file any papers in this case, the clerk entered orders of default without notice. However, prior to the entry of the defaults, Rapid had filed a motion to transfer and consolidate this case with the older pending specific performance case. The motion to transfer and consolidate was filed in error in the specific performance case and was denied by the administrative judge.
Unaware of the default in this case, Rapid continued to defend the case. For example, Rapid filed a motion to dismiss and a motion for a protective order. Rapid and Sunset attended both hearings on the motions. At no time did Sunset's attorney advise the court of Rapid's motion to transfer and consolidate filed in the specific performance case, or advise opposing counsel of the defaults entered in this money damages case.
Two months later, a new attorney was added to Rapid's defense team. While examining the court file, counsel first learned of the defaults. Rapid's motions to set aside the defaults were denied and this appeal followed.
Simply stated, the issue before this court involves an attorney's affirmative duty to disclose information regarding the procedural status of a case, both to the court and opposing counsel, prior to a default being entered. The rules and case law are clear on this issue.
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.5.00(b) provides that if a party has filed or served any paper, the party shall be served with notice of the application for default. See J.A.R., Inc. v. Universal American Realty Corporation, 485 So.2d 467 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (a letter asserting an informal defense sent to plaintiff was enough to preclude any entry of default without notice).
Rapid's motion to transfer and consolidate the case, though erroneously filed, should have put Sunset's attorney "on notice" that Rapid intended to contest the action. This notice, under rule 1.500(b), required Sunset's attorney to notify Rapid before seeking a default. Further, rule 1.500(b) requires that the court, rather than the clerk, enter a default when any paper has been filed or served. Gulf Maintenance & Supply, Inc. v. Barnett Bank of Tallahassee, 543 So.2d 813 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).
Here, once Rapid filed its motion to consolidate, Sunset's attorney clearly should have known that Rapid intended to defend this action. Sunset's attorney should have realized the confusion with the case numbers and that Rapid's attorney intended to defend on the merits. In Gulf Maintenance, the court held, "[a] default is a procedural matter within the control of the attorney, so plaintiff's counsel should contact the attorney known to be representing a defendant to determine whether the latter intends to proceed in the matter before causing a default to be entered." 543 So.2d at 816.
Because we agree that the defaults were improperly entered where Rapid had filed a motion and Sunset was aware of Rapid's intention to defend, we find no need to address Rapid's other contentions. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for vacation of the defaults and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
LEVY and GERSTEN, JJ., concur.
. Sunset sued other parties, however, they are not involved in this appeal.