Case Name: HUGHES v. WESTERN UNION TEL. CO.
Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1905-10-31
Citations: 72 S.C. 516
Docket Number: 
Parties: HUGHES v. WESTERN UNION TEL. CO.
Judges: Mr. Justice Woods concurs in the result.
Reporter: South Carolina Reports
Volume: 72
Pages: 516–531

Head Matter:
HUGHES v. WESTERN UNION TEL. CO.
1. Damages — Telegraph Companies. — Where a telegram announcing the death of a near relative is not promptly delivered, but too late for addressee to attend the funeral, that he was deprived of the consolation of seeing the face of the dead, of being with the family and of attending the burial, does not confer on him a cause of action; but if he would have gone, and it appears on the face of the telegram that there was a probability for him to arrive in time, if message had been promptly delivered, the company is liable for anxiety and pain caused by the thought of being deprived of this privilege. The fact that the funeral may have been fixed for a time at which he could not have arrived, does not affect it unless he had notice of the time fixed.
Hughes v. Telegraph Co.
2. Ibid. — Ibid.—Tort.—An action based on tort for failure to deliver a telegram to addressee in this State, is not governed by the laws of a foreign State from which it is sent as to the measure of damages-
Before Watts, J., Lancaster, October term, 1904.
Affirmed.
Action by W. Alonzo Hughes against the Western Union Telegraph Co. The 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th paragraphs of the complaint are as follows:
“6. That if said message had been promptly transmitted and delivered to plaintiff by defendant, as it was its duty to do, plaintiff could have wired to his family at Coleman when he would arrive there and could have left on an afternoon train on December 18, 1903, and arrived at Coleman at 2.45 p. m.; on December 19, 1903, in plenty of time to have attended the funeral of his said dead brother, which consolation said delay in delivering said telegram deprived him. of. That on receipt of said telegram, as before stated, ■plaintiff immediately sent a telegram to his said sister, at Coleman, but same was not received by her until after plaintiff’s brother had been buried.
“7. That after receiving said delayed message by him, as aforesaid, plaintiff left on the earliest train for Coleman, Fla., leaving Heath Springs, which was not until about 11 a. m. on Sunday, 20th December, 1903, and by traveling the quickest and shortest route he did not reach Coleman, Fla., until the afternoon of December 21, 1903, two days after the plaintiff’s brother had been buried, to his great mental pain, distress and anguish.
“8. That by reason of defendant’s wilful, wanton and gross negligence in not transmitting and delivering promptly said message, plaintiff on arriving at the nearest railroad station to the place where his dead brother’s family resided, was not met with a conveyance by any member of his said brother’s family and his own family, as would have been the case had said message been promptly delivered, and in consequence thereof had to walk a distance of one mile and one-half through deep sand, which very much fatigued and discommoded plaintiff, especially after his long and tedious trip' by rail from1 Heath Springs to said railroad station.
‘‘9. That by reason of this wanton, wilful and gross negligence of defendant in' failing to promptly transmit and deliver the said message, as aforesaid, the plaintiff was not only fatigued and jaded by his said walk through the deep sand, as stated above, but he was caused great mental anguish, pain and suffering not to have had the privilege of seeing his dead brother’s face for the last time and of being with the family before the burial and of attending the burial, all to this damage in the sum of $1,990.”
The fourth request of the defendant and modification is:
“ ‘4. The Court charges you that if it appears from the testimony in this case that even if the messag-e in question had been promptly delivered to> the plaintiff and the plaintiff by going the shortest and quickest route and using all possible diligence could not have reached and have been with his family before the burial, could not have seen his brother’s face before the burial, and could not have arrived in time to have attended the burial, then the plaintiff cannot recover compensatory damages for any mental anguish caused by his not being able to attend the funeral, etc.’ I charge you that in this connection, if you believe that w'as the facts of the case, or if you, believe that the plaintiff here didn’t intend to telegraph or didn’t telegraph, and if he had telegraphed, if you believe they wouldn’t have waited, then I charge you that as good law.”
From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals on the following exceptions:
“1. Because his Honor, the Circuit Judge, erred in refusing to charge the defendant’s third request to charge, the same being as follows, to wit: ‘Sections eight and nine of the complaint set out the injury and damage plaintiff claims to have suffered as follows: (Here read the eighth and ninth sections of the complaint.) ‘The Court charges you- that before the plaintiff is entitled to recover for mental anguish, he must show: (1) not only that the defendant telegraph company did not exercise reasonable diligence, or ordinary care, in delivering the message, but (2) that had it been delivered, without the unreasonable delay alleged, the plaintiff, after receiving it, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, could have seen his dead brother’s face, and have been with the family before the burial, and could have attended the burial of his deceased brother, and .that he not only could have done so, but that he would have done so.’ Error consisting in that the said request contained a correct statement of the law applicable to the facts in issue.
“2. Because his Honor, the Circuit Judge, erred in refusing to charge the jury defendant’s sixth request to charg'e, the same being as follows, to wit: ‘The Court further charges you, as a matter of law1, that the plaintiff can only recover as compensatory damages for such consequences as were within the contemplation of the parties to the contract at the time of the sending of the telegram; that is to> say, for such consequences as naturally and reasonably flow from a breach of the contract or from, negligence in performing any duty imposed by the contract. The Court, therefore, charg-es you that the telegram constituting the written contract out of which this action arose is not sufficient to put within the contemplation of the defendant telegraph company the possibility of a postponement of a funeral or burial. The telegram is the simple announcement of death. .The plaintiff, therefore, is not entitled to> recover damages in the way of compensation for mental anguish on account of not being able to see his dead brother and attend his burial, as alleged, on the ground alone that if he had received the said message promptly he could have had the funeral postponed.’ Error consisting in that the said request embodied a correct statement of the law applicable to> the facts in issue in said cause.
“3. Because his Honor, the Circuit Judge, erred in refusing toi charge defendant’s seventh request to charge, the same being as follows, to' wit: ‘That the question of what compensatory damages, if any, plaintiff is entitled h> recover, that is to say, the measure of damages, is governed in this case by the law of the State of Florida, where the contract for sending the message involved was made. Under the law of Florida, any mental anguish which does not accompany or proceed from a physical injury, as a consequence of such physical injury, is not an element of damage, and cannot be recovered on account .of a breach of contract or negligence. I, therefore, charge you that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover compensatory damages in this case for the mental anguish he claims to have suffered in not seeing his dead brother and attending the funeral, as alleged, due to any breach of contract by the telegraph company, or negligence in transmitting and delivering the telegram involved.’ Error consisting- in that the said request embodied a correct statement of the law applicable h> the facts in issue.”
Messrs. Geo. H. Pegrons, Willcox & Willcox and /. H. Marion, for appellant.
Mr. Marion cites : It 7ms encumbent on plaintiff to'show that he could and would have attended the funeral: 27 S. W., 760; 55 S'. W., 155. No recovery for mental suffermg for not attending the funeral: 27 S. W., Ill; 26 S, W., 190; 27 S. W., 52; 53 & W., 156; 78 S. W., 191. If lam of foreign State is not in controversy, Court should instruct jury what it is: Con., art. V., sec. 25; Code 1902, 2890; 25 S'. C., 31; 27 S'. C., 162. Lam of contract is that of place it is made: 171 Mass., 158; 129 U. S., 397. The governing lam of a contract is a matter of intention: 171 Mass., 158; 129 U. S., 397; 82 Fed., 681; 15 Conn., 516; 91 111., 268; 112 Mo., 622; 158 N. Y., 688; 65 Tex., 13; 83 Pa., 316; 176 Pa., 15. In interstate transportation the law of the contract is that of the place where performance begins: 2 Woods, 211; 13 E. R. A., 210 ; 21 la., 112; 91 111., 268; 15 la., 170; 22 E. R. A., 335; 1 Inter. Com. R., 191; 55 C. C. A., 115; 174 111., 13; 92 la., 231; 160' Mass., 356; 171 Pa., 158; 25 R. R. A., 81; 33 R. ,R. A., 654; 23 Fed., 49; 60 Fed., 625; 82 la., 477; 12 R. R. A., 799; 34 R. R. A., 635; 59 S. W., 945. As to the measure of damages: 57 N. Y., 489 ; 41 R. R. A., 614; 83 Ky., 174; 63 Miss., 291; 22 So>., 53; 1 N. & McC., 67; 37 S. C., 417; 142 U. S., 101; 61 S. W., 501; 34 R. R. A., 492; 69 S. W., 427; 74 S. W., 751; 56 R. R. A., 486; 45 S. E., 938; 37 S. W., 904; 63 R. R. A., 513; 70 111., 275; 100 Ky., 591; 46 S. C., 104. Contract of sending must be referred to the established relations of the parties: 65 S. C., 103; 62 S. C., 230; Thomp'. on Raw: of Elec., sec. 435; 13 Allen, 237; 5 S. C., 370 ; 56 R. R. A., 489; 45 N. Y, 113.
Mr. ,R. F. Wyliecontra,
cites: Action is in tort and not ex contract% and the damages include compensation for all injuries residting: 43 R. R. A., 214; 91 Tex., 206; 18 S. W., 701. If damages for mental anguish are given here it does not matter what the rule m Florida is: 27 Ency., 2 ed., 1079, and authorities cited.
October 31, 1905.

Opinion:
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Mr. Justice Gary.
This is an action for damages arising out of the alleged negligence and wilfulness of the defendant in failing to deliver a telegram addressed to the plaintiff, announcing the death of his brother. At 12.30 p. m., on the 18th of December, 1903, the sister of the plaintiff filed with the defendant at Coleman, Florida, the following message, addressed to Alonzo Hughes, Heath Springs, S. C.:
"John killed at Panasoffkee at mill this morning.
"(Signed) Dora Hughes."
It is alleged that the message was not delivered to the plaintiff until 2 o'clock p. m. on the 19th of December, 1903, although it was received by the defendant at its office in Heath Springs at 8 o'clock a. m. on the 19th of December, 1903. Some time during the afternoon of the 19th of December the plaintiff sent the following telegram to his sister, at Coleman, Florida:
"Telegram received at 2 p. m. Will come if possible.
"(Signed) Alonzo."
The sixth, seventh, eighth and ninth paragraphs of the complaint will be set out in the report of the case; also, the defendant's fourth request to charge, together with the modification therof by his Honor, the presiding Judge; also the appellant's exceptions.
The jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $700.
In considering the exceptions, we will refer to them by their numbers.
First end second exceptions: Section 2223 of the Code of Laws is as follows: "All telegraph companies doing business in this State shall be liable in damages for mental anguish or suffering even in the absence of bodily injury, for negligence in receiving, transmitting or delivering messages. Nothing in this section shall abridge the rights or remedies now provided by law against telegraph companies, and the rights and remedies provided for by this section shall be in addition to those now existing. In all actions under this section the jury may award such damages as they conclude resulted from negligence of said telegraph companies."
It will be well to bear in mind at the outset, that it was not the object of the statute, in a case where a telegraph company negligently fails to deliver a telegram announcing the death of a person, to confer upon the addressee of the message a right of action based upon the fact that he was thereby deprived of the consolation of seeing the face of the dead, being present with the family in the trying hours of sorrow, or taking part in the funeral ceremonies. These facts may be introduced in evidence, in a proper case, for the purpose of showing mental suffering, but they form no part of the cause of action, and are merely evidentiary.' Harrison v. Tel. Co., 71 S. C., 386. The intention of the statute was to give a right of action for mental anguish suffered by the addressee as a direct and proximate result of the negligent delay in delivering the message. If, when such telegram is received by the addressee, he knows that he could not have arrived in time, then there is no legal foundation for mental anguish arising from the failure to deliver promptly. . But, on the contrary, if he would have gone, and it appears upon the face of the telegram that there was a probability for him to have arrived in time, in case it had been promptly delivered, then the thought of being deprived of this privilege would naturally and reasonably be expected to produce anxiety and pain, and may fairly be said to have been in contemplation of the contracting parties. The fact that the parties in charge of the funeral rites may have seen proper to fix a time when it would not have been possible for him to have attended, even if the message had been delivered in time, does not prevent the suffering of mental pain before he had knowledge of such fact, when the telegram showed that there was a probability he would have been able to go in time, if it had been promptly delivered. This interpretation of the statute is just and fair both to the telegraph company and the addressee, as it makes the liability dependent upon facts existing at the time of delivery and which can be made certain, instead of being based upon circumstances that are uncertain, and subject to the caprice of others not parties to the contract. Furthermore, the request set out in the first exception was substantially the same as the request herein-before mentioned, which the presiding Judge charged, except as modified and the modification was too favorable to the appellant.
Third exception: The question presented by this exception has been adjudicated in the recent cases of Hellams v. Tel. Co., 70 S. C., 63, and Harrison v. Tel. Co., 71 S. C., 386.
It is the judgment of this Court, that the judgment of the Circuit Court be affirmed.
Mr. Justice Woods concurs in the result.