Case Name: STATE v. WALTON
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1909-02-02
Citations: 53 Or. 557
Docket Number: 
Parties: STATE v. WALTON.
Judges: 
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 53
Pages: 557–573

Head Matter:
Argued January 9,
decided February 2,
rehearing denied April 30, 1909.
STATE v. WALTON.
[99 Pac. 431; 101 Pac. 389.]
Indictment and Information — Motion to Quash— Time for Making.
1. A motion to quash au information, made after demurrer thereto has been overruled, is too late.
District and Prosecuting Attorneys — Power of Legislature.
2. Since the office of prosecuting attorney is provided for and its duties defined, in part, by Section 17, Article VII, Constitution of Oregon, the legislature cannot abolish it nor abridge its constitutional duties.
■ District and Prosecuting Attorneys — Deputies — Power of Legislature.
8. The legislature can provide for deputies to act in a prosecuting attorney’s name and stead.
Indictment and Infomation — Signing—Deputies—Acts—Validity.
4. The act of a deputy prosecuting attorney, whose appointment was authorized by Gen. Laws 1903 (Sp. Sess. p. 32), in signing and filing au information, was the act of the district attorney, and hence satisfies the requirement of Section 9, Article I, Constitution of Oregon, that a warrant
lihall issue only upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation.
Criminal Law — Plea of Former Jeopardy — Sufficiency.
5. A plea that accused had already been tried and convicted of the crime charged, that he had been thereby put in jeopardy, and could not be legally tried, was insufficient both as a plea of former conviction or former jeopardy under the common law and under Section 1367, B. & O. Comp., prescribing the form of a plea of former conviction.
Criminal Law —Right to Confront Witnesses —Testimony of Decedent.
6. The Constitution of Oregon, Section 11, Article I, guaranteeing to accused persons the right to confront the witnesses, secures the right of cross-examination, and, if that has been once enjoyed, the provision is not infringed by admitting testimony given on a former trial by one who has since died or is absent from the State.
Criminal Law — Testimony on Former Trial — Admissibility.
7. Section 1402, B. & O. Comp., requiring in criminal trials that testimony be given in the presence óf the court and jury, except where taken by deposition under Sections 1879-1385, does not prevent testimony given on a former trial by one who has since died or is absent from the State from being read on a subsequent trial on the same charge; the section relating to the manner in which the testimony is to be given or taken in the first instance, and not to the use to be made of it after it is once given, and being intended to make the general rule concerning the taking of depositions inapplicable to criminal trials.
Criminal Law — Instructions—Province of Jury.
8. In a criminal case it was proper to refuse to instruct that the jury could and should pass upon the law as well as the facts, for while the verdict necessarily includes both law and fact, and hence it is within the jury’s power to determine the law as well as the facts, the jury under the express terms of Section 16, Article I, Constitution of Oregon, and Section 1410, B. & O. Comp., must find the law and the facts under the court’s direction as to the law and should receive and accept the law as given by the court.
Witnesses — Oontbadicjtion—Evidence—Admissibility.
9. Where a state’s witness denied on cross-examination that he had made statements to a particular person, and that person, being called as accused’s witness, denied that such statements had been made, and that he stated to S. that they had been made, accused could not show by S. that the second witness had made the last-mentioned statement to her.
Obiminal Law — Appeal—Habmless Ebbob — Admission op Evidence.
10. Any error in receiving testimony as to accused’s age was harmless where he admitted that he had reached an age of discretion.
Pebjttby — 'Validity op Pbooeeding in Which False Sweabing- was Committed.
11. While perjury cannot be based on false testimony in proceedings void for want of jurisdiction, reversible error does not prevent the offense, and that defendant had not pleaded to an indictment did not render the trial so far void but that false testimony was perjury.
Obiminal Law — Appeal—Habmless Ebbob — Admission op Evidence.
12. The admission of an entry in a school register as evidence of defendant’s age, showing that he was older than he claimed when he committed the offense, was harmless error; it appearing from his testimony that he was at the age of discretion.
Obiminal Law — Appeal—Habmless Ebbob — Admission op Evidence.
13. The erroneous admission of an entry in a school register to prove defendant’s age was not prejudicial as contradicting and discrediting him; it not appearing that he knew of the entry, or caused it to be made, or furnished the information therefor.
From Multnomah: John B. Cleland, Judge.
Statement by Me. Justice Bean.
On September 12, 1904, an information was filed in the circuit court for Multnomah County, signed “John Manning, District Attorney, by G. C. Moser, Deputy,” charging the defendant, Charles W. Walton, with the crime of assault with a dangerous weapon. On the next day he was duly arraigned and took time to plead. On the 16th he demurred to the information, which demurrer was overruled on the 5th of October. On the 21st of October he was put on trial, wthout havng pleaded to the. indictment, and was convicted and sentenced to the penitentiary. From this judgment he appealed, and in August, 1907, it was reversed, because no plea to the information had been entered by defendant, and the cause was remanded to the court below for a new trial. 50 Or. 142 (91 Pac. 490: 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 811). The mandate was entered in the lower court on January 6, 1908, and on the 11th of April defendant moved to quash the information because: (1) It was not indorsed, signed, presented, or filed by the district attorney, but by G. C. Moser, assuming to act as deputy district attorney, and Moser was not the duly or regularly appointed deputy and had no power or authority under the constitution to indorse, sign, present, or file the information; (2) that the effect of the reversal of the former judgment was to place defendant in the situation he was in before the information was filed, and that he could not be further arraigned and required to plead to or be tried thereunder. This motion was overruled, and defendant pleaded:
“That he has already been tried and convicted of the alleged crime charged in the information in this case by the verdict of a jury impaneled and sworn therein, returned, filed, and entered in this court on the 24th day of October, 1904; that he was thereby put in jeopardy for the alleged offense charged in said information; and that under the Constitution and laws of this State he cannot be legally retried for said alleged offense, and pleads the same in bar of further trial thereunder.”
This plea was overruled and decided by the court without the interposition of a jury, and defendant entered a plea of not guilty.
The cause was subsequently tried before a jury, and the court permitted Clara M. Badgley, the official reporter, to read the testimony of Emanuel Johnson and Stephen Hogeboom, witnesses for the State on the former trial; the State having shown that Hogeboom was dead and Johnson beyond the jurisdiction of the court. On cross-examination, Nelson, a witness for the prosecution, was asked, among other things, whether he had not made certain statements, inconsistent with his present testimony, to one Slover, at a certain time and place, and replied that he had not. Slover was afterwards called by defendant and asked whether Nelson had made the statements imputed to him, and denied that he had. Defendant thereupon asked him if he had not so stated to Mrs. C. K. Smith, and he replied that he had not. Defendant called Mrs. Smith and sought to prove by her that Slover had made such a statement, but the court, upon objection of the State, rejected such testimony. During the examination of defendant, he stated that he was 17 years of age at the time the crime with which he was charged was alleged to have been committed. The State subsequently called Miss Butler, who testified she was a teacher in the Couch school of Portland; that she had in her hand the register of attendance and deportment of the pupils of such school, which was in the handwriting of Miss McKenzie; that the register was made from certain census forms, which were sent out to be filled in by parents or guardians of the pupils, and, when returned, copied into the register. There was no proof as to who furnished the data for such census returns, or that they were correctly copied. Defendant objected to the admission of the testimony on the ground that it was hearsay and immaterial; but the objection was overruled, and the witness permitted to answer that the school register contained a statement that on the 7th of February, 1900, defendant was 15 years, 3 months of age. At the close of the testimony defendant requested the court to instruct the jury: That the crimes of assault and battery and simple assault are included within that charged in the information, and that defendant could be found guilty of either of such offenses if the evidence warrants; that
“You are the judges of, and have a right to determine, under the Constitution of this State, the law as well as the facts of this case, and it is your constitutional province and duty to do so in arriving at your verdict, and you are to determine whether under the law and the facts in evidence the defendant should be convicted or acquitted of the charges laid in the information.”
The court gave the first of these instructions, in substance, but refused the second.
The defendant v/as convicted, and, in answer to the question whether he had anything to say as to why the sentence of the court should not be pronounced upon him, replied that he objected for the reason that the information, under which he had been tried and convicted, was invalid because not signed by the district attorney, and that the plea in bar was tried by the court without intervention of the jury. These objections were overruled, and defendant sentenced to the penitentiary, from which judgment he appeals.
Affirmed.
For appellant there was a brief with oral arguments by Mr. Henry St. Rayner and Mr. Dan R. Murphy.
For the State there was a brief over the names of Mr. Andrew M. Crawford, Attorney-General, Mr. George J. Cameron, District Attorney, and Mr. Thad W. Vreeland, Deputy District Attorney, with oral arguments by Mr. Cameron and Mr. Vreeland.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Bean
delivered the opinion of the court.
The motion to set aside the information was properly overruled. It was not made until after a demurrer had been interposed and overruled,' and therefore came too late. State v. Smith, 33 Or. 483 (55 Pac. 534); State v. McElvain, 35 Or. 365 (58 Pac. 525). And, moreover, it was without merit.
The office of prosecuting attorney is provided for, and its duties defined, in part, by Section 17, Article VII, of the Constitution of Oregon. The office therefore cannot be abolished or the constitutional duties thereof abridged by the legislature.
There is nothing, however, in the constitution which restricts the legislature or lawmaking power from providing that such officer may have deputies to act in his name and stead. Nesbit v. People, 19 Colo. 441 (36 Pac. 221).
The legislature made such a provision by the laws of 1903 (Gen. Laws 1903, Sp. Sess. p. 32), and the act of the deputy in signing and filing the information was the act of his principal, and therefore satisfies the requirements of Section 9, Article I, of the Constitution, which declares that no warrant, shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation. State v. Guglielmo, 46 Or. 261 (79 Pac. 577: 80 Pac. 103: 69 L. R. A. 466).
Upon the former appeal the judgment was reversed, and a new trial ordered. From the entry of judgment of the record in the court below, the action was pending in that court for trial, notwithstanding the former verdict and judgment. Section 1489, B. & C. Comp. The plea of a former conviction was not in form or substance as required by the statute (Section 1367) and was not sufficient to constitute such a plea at common law. Mr. Bishop says the substantial allegations at common law are:
"That heretofore, at a court which is mentioned, an indictment whose terms are fully recited was found against the defendant under a name stated, which may be that in the present indictfiient or not according to the fact; that he pleaded thereto, and was convicted or acquitted as the fact was; and the sentence thereon is set out. The plea then avers that the defendant in the former indictment was the same person as in the present one, and the two offenses a,re the same." 1 Bishop, N. Crim. Proc. § 810.
The plea in this case contains none of the averments which Mr. Bishop says are essential, but only that defendant had been found guilty by the verdict of a jury, without any allegation that he had been indicted or informed against, or that he pleaded thereto, or that a trial had been had in any court of competent jurisdiction, and a judgment of conviction rendered therein. The plea was therefore bad on its face, either as a plea of former conviction or former jeopardy, and was properly stricken out. State v. Salge, 2 Nev. 321; Shubert v. State, 21 Tex. App. 551 (2 S. W. 883); Wortham v. Commonwealth, 5 Randolph, 569.
The Constitution (Section 11, Article I) provides that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right "to meet the witnesses face to face," and it is contended that the admission of the testimony of the witnesses Johnson and Hogeboom, given on the former trial of the accused, was an infringement, of this right. The Constitution of the United States, and of most states of the Union, contains similar provisions, and the general, if not the universal, holding- of the courts is that their essential purpose is to secure to an accused the right of cross-examination, and if he has once enjoyed that right no constitutional privilege is violated, by the admission of the testimony of such a witness, who is dead or absent from a state, at a subsequent trial. Underhill, Crim. Ev. § 255; 2 Wigmore, Ev. § 1397; State v. Nelson, 68 Kan. 566 (75 Pac. 505); People v. Dowdigan, 67 Mich. 95 (38 N. W. 920); State v. Byers, 16 Mont. 565 (41 Pac. 708); Territory v. Evans, 2 Idaho (Hasb.) 651 (23 Pac. 232: 7 L. R. A. 646); Marler v. State, 67 Ala. 55 (42 Am. Dec. 95); State v. McO'Blenis, 24 Mo. 402 (69 Am. Dec. 435); State v. King, 24 Utah, 482 (68 Pac. 418: 91 Am. St. Rep. 808: note, 61 Am. St. Rep. 886). The question was thoroughly examined by the Supreme Court of the United States in Mattox v. United States, 156 U. S. 237 (15 Sup. Ct. 337: 39 L. Ed. 409), and Mr. Justice Brown, after referring-to the rule in England, and saying "we know • of none of the states (in this country) in which such testimony is now held to be inadmissible," proceeds: "The question was carefully considered in its constitutional aspect by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Commonwealth v. Richards, 18 Pick. 434 (29 Am. Dec. 608), in which it was said that: 'That provision was made to exclude any evidence by deposition, which would be given orally in the presence of the accused, but was not intended to affect the question as to what was or was not competent evidence to be given' face to face according to the settled rules of common law.' The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to prevent depositions' or ex parte affidavits, such as were sometimes admitted in civil cases, being-used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting, the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief. There is doubtless reason for saying that the accused should never lose the benefit of any of these safeguards even by the death of the witness'; and that, if notes of his testimony are permitted to be read, he is deprived of the advantage of that personal presence of the witness before the jury which the law has designed for his protection. But the general rules of law of this kind, however beneficent in their operation and valuable to the accused, must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case. To say that a criminal, after having once been convicted by the testimony of a certain witness, should go scot free simply because death has closed the mouth of that witness, would be carrying his constitutional protection to an unwarrantable extent. The law in its wisdom declares that the rights of the public shall not be wholly sacrificed in order that an incidental benefit may be preserved to the accused."
The testimony of a witness, deceased or out of the State, or unable' to testify, given on a former action, civil or criminal, between the same parties,, relating to the same matter, is, by statute, made competent on a subsequent trial (Sections 718, 1399), unless prohibited by Section 1402, which declares that in a criminal action the testimony of a witness must be given orally in the presence of the court and jury, except in the case of a witness whose testimony is taken by deposition, by order of the court in pursuance of the consent of the parties, as provided in Sections 1379 to 1385, inclusive, relating to continuances; but we think this section should not be construed to prevent the testimony of a witness, in a criminal action, given orally in the presence of the court and jury, who has since died or is out of the jurisdiction of the court, from being read on a subsequent trial of the same defendant on the same criminal charge. It relates to the manner in which the testimony is to be given or taken in the first instance, and not to the use which may be made of it after it is once given. The statute was intended to make the general rule, concerning the taking of depositions, inapplicable to criminal trials; but we cannot think it was designed to abrogate a doctrine so firmly established and generally -applied as that of permitting the testimony of a witness given in the manner required by statute to be used by either the State or defense on a subsequent trial, when he has since died or is absent from the State. A strict construction of the language of the section would, perhaps, exclude such testimony; but it would also exclude the dying declarations of the deceased, which are everywhere admitted, on the ground of necessity. It is for the same reason that the testimony of a deceased or absent witness is admissible, and the technical language of the statute must give way to public policy and necessity. It is just as important for a defendant that the testimony of a witness in his behalf, given on a former trial, should be competent at a second trial, where the witness is dead or is without the reach of process, as it is for the State, and the statute should, we think, be so interpreted as to protect and preserve the rights of both.
There was no error in refusing the instruction requested, to the effect that the jury had a right, and it was their duty, to pass upon the law as well as the facts. The verdict of a jury in a criminal case necessarily includes both law and fact, and it is therefore within its power to determine the law as well as the facts; but it has no legal right to do so. The jury are required to find the law and the facts "under the direction of the court, as to the law" (Section 16, Article I, Constitution of Oregon; Section 410, B. & C. Comp.; State v. Reinhart, 26 Or. 466: 38 Pac. 822; State v. Reed, 52 Or. 377: 97 Pac. 627; Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156 U. S. 51: 15 Sup. Ct. 273: 39 L. Ed. 343), and should receive and accept the law as given by the court, and not assume to decide it for themselves.
The other assignments of error do not require particular notice. The testimony of Mrs. Smith was clearly incompetent, and the testimony in relation to the age of defendant immaterial.
Any error that may have been committed in permitting the witness to testify to the- age of defendant, as shown by the school register, could not have injured him. According to his own testimony, he had reached an age of discretion- at the time the alleged crime was committed, and whether he was 17 or 19 years of age could have had no material bearing on his guilt or innocence.
Judgment affirmed. Affirmed.