Case Name: LESTER v. GREAT CENTRAL INSURANCE COMPANY
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1976-04-07
Citations: 138 Ga. App. 353
Docket Number: 51812
Parties: LESTER v. GREAT CENTRAL INSURANCE COMPANY.
Judges: Bell, C. J., Pannell, P. J., Deen, P. J., Quillian, Clark, Stolz and Webb, JJ., concur. Evans, J., dissents.
Reporter: Georgia Appeals Reports
Volume: 138
Pages: 353–358

Head Matter:
51812.
LESTER v. GREAT CENTRAL INSURANCE COMPANY.

Opinion:
Marshall, Judge.
This is an appeal from the grant of a motion for summary judgment in favor of the defendant insurance company on the sole question of coverage of a theft loss away from the insured's business premises.
The record reflects that appellant was the owner and operator of two liquor stores in Macon. His normal business operations caused him to pick up the cash receipts of each store at the close of the business day and carry the cash to a Jones County motel jointly owned by himself and another. The cash was placed in a safe at the motel overnight or over the weekends, as the case might be, and deposited in the bank on the workday next following. There was a nightwatchman regularly employed as caretaker-watchman of the motel who slept in the room next to where the safe and money were stored. Sometime during the night of December 14-15, 1974, the motel was robbed or burglarized and the safe and contents taken, to appellant's loss.
The appellee-insurance company had issued two insurance policies, one on each liquor store. These policies agreed "To pay for loss of money . by holdup or robbery from the assured or an employee of the assured outside of the business premises anywhere in the world." (Emphasis supplied.) An employee of the assured was defined as follows: "The word 'employee' shall mean all natural persons in the regular service of the assured, at the business premises designated in the declaration, in the ordinary course of assured's business, [who are compensated by the assured], and who, in the performance of such service are at all times governed and directed by the assured from the business premises and are working at or out of the business premises."
Since the loss occurred while the money was in the custody of an "employee" of the appellant, demand was made for recovery under the terms of the policy. Appellee refused payment contending that the definition of the term "employee" in each policy did not include this particular employee. This suit followed. Held:
"Insurance is a matter of contract, and the language used is to be accorded its general ordinary meaning, bearing in mind that the contract is to be construed in accordance with the intention and understanding of the parties, and in construing it the court cannot go further than a fair construction of the language used will permit. North British &c. Ins. Co. v. Tye, 1 Ga. App. 380, 389 (58 SE 110) . . Where the contract is unambiguous, it must be construed to mean what it says. This rule applies to language limiting coverage. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Sewell, 223 Ga. 31 (153 SE2d 432)." Cherokee Credit Life Ins. Co. v. Baker, 119 Ga. App. 579, 582 (168 SE2d 171). Of course if the contract is ambiguous the ambiguity is to be resolved against the insurer. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Padgett, 49 Ga. App. 666 (176 SE 702). But ambiguity is not to be created by lifting a clause or portion of the contract out of context. Midland Nat. Ins. Co. v. Wright, 117 Ga. App. 208 (1) (160 SE2d 262). The natural, obvious meaning is to be preferred over any curious, hidden meaning which nothing but the exigency of a hard case and the ingenuity of a trained and acute mind would discover. Maddox v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 79 Ga. App. 164, 174 (53 SE2d 235).
Ga. L. 1960, pp. 289, 667 (Code Ann. § 56-2419) provides that "Every insurance contract shall be construed according to the entirety of its terms and conditions as set forth in the policy and as amplified, extended or modified. . ."
Within the context of the above rules of construction, did the word "employee" as defined in the policies include the nightwatchman at the motel in Jones County? There is general agreement between the parties that the nightwatchman was a salaried employee of appellant; that he was regularly employed as a caretaker of the motel and regularly safeguarded the receipts of the two liquor stores. It was also agreed that the employee was not engaged in the liquor store activities but was employed solely at the motel.
Looking to the ordinary meaning of the language in the insurance policy and giving it a fair construction, the definition of "employee" may be paraphrased to read: The word "employee" includes any person in the regular employment of the assured at either of the assured's two liquor stores who is engaged in the ordinary course of the business of retailing liquor; who is paid by the insured; who while in the performance of the business of retailing liquor is at all times governed and directed by the assured from the liquor stores; and who is working at or out of the liquor stores.
A simple application of the facts to the requirement of the policy's definition of "employee" discloses the nighwatchman was not employed in the liquor retailing business at either store in Macon, was not, while engaged in the liquor retailing business at either store in Macon, governed by the assured from the Macon sites, nor was the employee working at or out of the Macon liquor store sites. This reading of the terms of coverage of the policies as amplified by its internal definitions compels the conclusion that the motel employee cannot be one of the employees protected against robbery loss occurring away from the protected premises.
Submitted February 3, 1976
Decided April 7, 1976.
Mullís, Reynolds, Marshall & Horne, Gerald S. Mullís, for appellant.
Anderson, Walker & Reichert, Thomas W. Talbot, for appellee.
The parties do not dispute the applicable law. There can be but one logical reading of the policy. The insurer has pierced the pleadings of the insured. Though the pleadings may have raised an issue, appellee has shown that the truth of the matter is that there was no genuine issue of material fact. Scales v. Peevy, 103 Ga. App. 42 (118 SE2d 193). Appellee-movant having met its burden, there was no error in the grant of the motion for summary judgment. Raven v. Dodd's Auto Sales & Service, 117 Ga. App. 416 (160 SE2d 633).
Judgment affirmed.
Bell, C. J., Pannell, P. J., Deen, P. J., Quillian, Clark, Stolz and Webb, JJ., concur. Evans, J., dissents.