Case Name: Trinity Church vs. City of Boston
Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
Jurisdiction: Massachusetts
Decision Date: 1875-08-31
Citations: 118 Mass. 164
Docket Number: 
Parties: Trinity Church vs. City of Boston.
Judges: 
Reporter: Massachusetts Reports
Volume: 118
Pages: 164–168

Head Matter:
Trinity Church vs. City of Boston.
Suffolk.
March 5.
August 31, 1875.
Gray, C. J., did not sit Morton, J., absent.
A religious society purchased a lot of land in a city for the purpose of building a house of worship. The lot was the only one so held, was not moie than sufficient for its reasonable requirements in this respect, and was devoted by the society in good faith to the erection of a church edifice. The work was begun by driving piles for the foundation of the building, and, although reasonable diligence had been used, no further progress had been made, when a tax was assessed by the city on the land. Held, that the land was exempt from taxation under the Gen. Sts. c. 11, § 5, cl. 7. Wells, J., dissenting.
Contract to recover the amount of a tax paid under protest. The case was submitted to the judgment of the Superior Court, and, after judgment for the defendant, to this court, on appeal, on an agreed statement of facts in substance as follows :
On and before May 1,1873, the plaintiff, a religious corporation, duly established under the laws of this Commonwealth, owned a lot of land on St. James Avenue, in the city of Boston. On May 1,1873, the defendant caused certain taxes to be assessed upon the said lot, which taxes, amounting to $2,313.27, were paid, under protest, to the treasurer of the city on December 31, 1873. The work of building a new house of worship on St. James Avenue, to replace the plaintiff’s church on Summer Street, destroyed by the fire of November 9, 1872, was begun on the lot before the assessment was laid, by driving a part of the piles for the foundation of the edifice, but no further progress had been made in the erection of the building, that being as far as the work could reasonably be advanced during the winter after the fire, and the work has been continued with all reasonable diligence ever since. It was then, and is now, the intention of the proprietors of the plaintiff corporation to use the lot on St. James Avenue for purposes of religious worship only ; and they have caused the work of building the new church to be carried on with all reasonable diligence. All the land included in the assessment is necessary for the use of the church and is intended for no other purpose. A tax was assessed for the year 1873, on the lot on Summer Street, on which the" church stood previously to the fire, and it was paid, as that lot had been abandoned as a site for a house of religious worship.
The lot on St. James Avenue was purchased before the fire of November 9, 1872, and if the church on Summer Street had not been destroyed by that fire the society would have worshipped in that edifice until the new one was completed, in which case the lot on Summer Street would not have been subject to taxation for the year 1873. The St. James Avenue lot is the only, propperty, belonging to the plaintiff, claimed to be exempt from taxa tian under the Gen. Sts. c. 11, § 5, cl. 7.
R. M. Thompson, for the plaintiff.
J. L. Stackpole, for the defendant.

Opinion:
Colt, J.
The statutes, by which "houses of religious worship " " when owned by a religious society, or held in trust for the use of religious organizations " are exempted from taxation, have been uniformly assumed or construed to exempt the land upon which such houses are erected. Gen. Sts. e. 11, § 5. St. 1865, c. 206. Lowell Meeting-house v. Lowell, 1 Met. 538. The purpose of the statute is to relieve such organizations from the burden of taxation upon property devoted to public uses. And as the land upon which the building stands is essential to the existence of the structure, it is fairly to be presumed that it was the intention of the Legislature to include it in the provisions of the statute by the phrase "houses of religious worship."
It is not essential that the property thus exempt should be actually used, or should be in a condition to be actually used, for purposes of religious worship. Such a construction would exclude from the benefits of the statute all unfinished houses of worship, and all which by accident or want of repair had become temporarily unfit for use, or the use of which had for any reason been temporarily suspended. The occupation for religious purposes, which the statute contemplates, does not require the actual completion of the structure. And such occupation continues, notwithstanding temporary interruptions in its use.
By a clause in the statute, which is part of the same sentence which secures this exemption, it is provided that " portions of such houses, appropriated for purposes other than religious worship, shall be taxed at the value thereof to the owners of the houses." And this would seem to imply that it is the appropriation of the property or any part of it to the sacred uses contera» p'Lted which secures the exemption.
It has been recently held in New England Hospital v. Boston, 113 Mass. 518, that land purchased by a charitable institution where measures had been taken preliminary to commencing the erection of a hospital thereon, was occupied by the society for the purposes for which it was incorporated, and so was exempt from taxation under a clause which exempts such property when so occupied.
It is not necessary in this case to define at what stage in the erection of a building the property becomes a house of religious worship, or to say that land only may, under some circumstances, be exempt from taxation, although no building has been actually begun upon it. For a majority of. the court are of opinion that real estate held by a religious society, not more than sufficient in extent to meet its reasonable requirements in this respect, and devoted by such society in good faith to the erection of a church edifice; upon which the work of erection already commenced is prosecuted without unreasonable delay; and being all the real estate which is so held, is entitled to the exemption given by the statute. And this upon the facts agreed disposes of this case.