Case Name: Edward BALL, Petitioner, v. CITY OF TALLAHASSEE, a municipal corporation created and existing under the laws of the State of Florida, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1973-07-18
Citations: 281 So. 2d 333
Docket Number: No. 43297
Parties: Edward BALL, Petitioner, v. CITY OF TALLAHASSEE, a municipal corporation created and existing under the laws of the State of Florida, Respondent.
Judges: CARLTON, C. J., McCAIN, J., and GALE, Circuit Judge, concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 281
Pages: 333–341

Head Matter:
Edward BALL, Petitioner, v. CITY OF TALLAHASSEE, a municipal corporation created and existing under the laws of the State of Florida, Respondent.
No. 43297.
Supreme Court of Florida.
July 18, 1973.
Edgar C. Booth, of Booth & Booth, P. A., and J. Lewis Hall, Jr., of Hall, Hartwell & Hall, Tallahassee, for petitioner.
Roy T. Rhodes and W. Ralph Durrance, Jr., of Rhodes, Stephens, Bryant & Durrance, Tallahassee, for respondent.

Opinion:
DEKLE, Justice.
We have for certiorari review a decision of the First District Court of Appeal reported at 269 So.2d 750 involving the taking of a perpetual easement by eminent domain. The decision is in direct conflict with the law of this state as previously announced in Canal Authority v. Miller, 243 So.2d 131 (Fla.1970); Canal Authority v. Litzel, 243 So.2d 135 (Fla.1970); and Wilton v. St. Johns County, 98 Fla. 26, 123 So. 527 (1929), and other cases, which gives us jurisdiction pursuant to Fla.Const. art. V, § 3(b)(3) (1973), F.S.A. Nielsen v. City of Sarasota, 117 So.2d 731 (Fla.1960).
At the outset, the Tallahassee City Commission adopted a resolution authorizing the condemnation for a perpetual easement, of certain lands for purposes of constructing, operating and maintaining electric transmission lines and appurtenances. As a result thereof, the City of Tallahassee, respondent herein, instituted eminent domain proceedings in the Leon County Circuit Court by filing a petition and declaration of taking which sought to acquire a perpetual easement along the proposed route for the transmission lines. This proposed taking involved land owned by various persons including petitioner.
The landowner answered the petition, denying that the property sought was necessary for the purposes described and denying the city's allegation that it had a present intent to use the property sought to be condemned, affirmatively alleging that the proposed taking constituted a gross abuse of discretion.
At the initial hearing, which was held prior to service of process on petitioner, some of the landowners were represented. Subsequently, a second hearing was held and limited to the propriety of acquiring parcel 18, owned by petitioner herein. At that second hearing, no new evidence was presented. The city chose to rely entirely on the evidence presented at the first or initial hearing and the parties stipulated to its admission into evidence. That evidence consisted of the city's resolution, a map, a survey and the testimony of the city electrician taken at the initial hearing and his earlier deposition.
The diagram from the city's route map in evidence best depicts the areas sought for the proposed power line in question:
The proposed route approaches the petitioner's land from the east, through parcel 17-A and then continues at a right angle to the north in petitioner's parcel 18. The width of the perpetual easement is 200 ft. except in the northernmost portion of petitioner's land which is 100 ft., which matches the continuing 100 ft. easement beyond. The "FUTURE" proposed easement to the left (bottom) which is 200 ft. simply goes off into an open area with no connection shown in the record as to its ultimate future purpose.
The transcript of the testimony of Mr. Dykes, Superintendent Electrician of the City of Tallahassee, generally dealt with the necessity of lines to be constructed as a part of the line loop of the city system to inter-tie with Florida Power Corporation. The purpose of the inter-tie was to make the city system more reliable.
Mr. Dykes' transcript did not deal with the last mentioned southern extension of parcel 18, upon which the record shows no lines or construction, and the city chose not to introduce additional testimony from him at the hearing of August 11, 1972.
A careful study of the record fails to reveal any evidence relating to the southern extension of parcel 18 which is totally outside the presently proposed power line in question and no evidence has been introduced to show any necessity for its taking. In addition, there is no evidence indicating the necessity for two different widths of easement on any of petitioner's land. One easement is 200' wide and the other continuing easement is 100' wide, along the assumed route of the proposed power line angling to the north.
Following the second hearing, the trial judge entered an order granting the requested perpetual easement over the entire land sought from petitioner. Certiorari in the First District Court of Appeal followed. In denying certiorari and approving the order of taking, the district court quoted from its earlier pronouncement in the case of Jones v. City of Tallahassee, 266 So.2d 382, 383-384 (Fla.App.1st 1972), where it had said:
"The 'law is well established in this state that a public body vested by law with the power of eminent domain possesses a broad discretion in determining the necessity for acquiring property needed in order to serve a public purpose. Decisions reached in the exercise of such discretion should not be disturbed in the absence of proof that the acquiring authority acted in bad faith or was guilty of oppression and a gross abuse of power. It has been held that the findings by a city on the question of necessity in an eminent domain proceeding may not be easily or casually overthrown by the courts, but strong and convincing evidence of the most conclusive character is required to upset the findings of the elected officials charged with responsibility in such matters." (Emphasis ours.)
This statement of the law is erroneous in two respects. First, it provides that the condemning authority's exercise of its eminent domain power based upon its own findings will ipso facto stand as sufficient without regard to necessity and will not be disturbed unless the landowner presents strong and convincing evidence of the most conclusive character to the contrary. In essence, this rule does not require the condemning authority to present any evidence indicating a reasonable necessity for the proposed taking.
Preliminary sufficient evidence of necessity of taking is initially required of the condemning authority before any burden shifts to the landowner. To hold otherwise would be contrary to the proof required in all other cases. Any plaintiff must initially prove the several essential elements of his case.
Miller supports the position that a condemning authority's "findings"' by its resolution or otherwise as to necessity, do not constitute proof of necessity, where the landowner has filed, as here, an answer denying necessity as to his particular parcel. The condemning authority must come forward with an initial showing of need before the landowner is called upon to present any evidence.
The rule stated by the First District in the instant case conflicts with this Court's opinion in Canal Authority v. Miller, supra, in allowing "findings" of a condemning authority to substitute for an initial showing of need required by Miller. By adopting the rule which it did in this respect, the district court departed from our legal principles set forth in Canal Authority v. Miller, 243 So.2d 131 (Fla.1970), and Canal Authority v. Litzel, 243 So.2d 135 (Fla.1970). In those Canal Authority cases, we expressly stated that the acquiring authority must come forward initially with some evidence showing a reasonable necessity for the proposed taking. If the condemning authority does not present any evidence, the petition for condemnation fails even though the landowner has offered no evidence supporting his position. In other words, the landowner in these circumstances is not required to prove anything.
Secondly, the district opinion increased the landowner's burden of proof by requiring evidence of bad faith or oppression and abuse of power. Stated another way, the court said abuse of discretion cannot be the sole basis for contesting the act or acts of a condemning authority (which Canal said was alone sufficient); that there must also be, said the DCA, evidence in addition to the proof of abuse of power, further evidence demonstrating bad faith or oppression as well. Such a dual requirement of proofs differs from this. Court's decisions in Wilton v. St. Johns County, 98 Fla. 26, 123 So. 527 (1929); Sibley v. Volusia County, 147 Fla. 256, 2 So.2d 578 (1941); and the Canal Authority cases, holding that abuse of discretion, standing alone, can override the condemning authority's exercise of its eminent domain power, without respect to "bad faith" or oppression (another independent basis of sufficient proof to refute a prima facie case of necessity).
Upon due reflection, we conclude that we are not in accord with the district court's newly espoused rule; we hereby disapprove this extension of required proofs and adhere to our own rule appearing in Wilton, Sibley, and the Canal Authority cases.
Having resolved the conflict created by the district court, we now turn to an application of our relevant legal principles to the factual situation before us. The trial court and the district court of appeal agree that the city presented evidence (as required by the Canal Authority cases) showing a reasonable necessity for a taking of an easement. Our reading of the record, however, does not disclose any evidence indicating a reasonable necessity for the taking of a perpetual easement over petitioner's parcel 18. It is true that the city electrician in his testimony opined that the entire route shown by the maps and plats in evidence were necessary to provide for the construction, maintenance and operation of the distribution system. This statement related not only to the city's present plans but to the city's future plans for the total electric distribution system throughout the city and county, but there was a complete void in the city's proof of necessity, initially required, to support this vaguely asserted "future need." Next year? Twenty years into the future? To where? For what?
Moreover, the evidence which was offered purportedly involved the necessity for the entire project; it did not deal sufficiently with regard to the particular parcel of land involved here, i.e., parcel 18, to show the required reasonable necessity. The city must present evidence pinpointing the need for the particular property, i.e., parcel 18, sought to be condemned. No such evidence being submitted by the city, its petition for eminent domain, as in Miller, cannot be approved even though petitioner did not offer any evidence to refute the condemnation proposal.
Accordingly, certiorari is granted; the decision of the First District Court of Appeal is quashed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
CARLTON, C. J., McCAIN, J., and GALE, Circuit Judge, concur.
ERVIN, J., dissents with opinion.