Case Name: Quinton DRYDEN, et al., Petitioners, v. MADISON COUNTY, Florida, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1999-01-21
Citations: 727 So. 2d 245
Docket Number: No. 87,594
Parties: Quinton DRYDEN, et al., Petitioners, v. MADISON COUNTY, Florida, Respondent.
Judges: HARDING, C.J., ANSTEAD, J., and KOGAN, Senior Justice, concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 727
Pages: 245–251

Head Matter:
Quinton DRYDEN, et al., Petitioners, v. MADISON COUNTY, Florida, Respondent.
No. 87,594.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Jan. 21, 1999.
Larry E. Levy and Loren E. Levy of The Levy Law Firm, Tallahassee, for Petitioner.
George T. Reeves and Edwin B. Browning, Jr. of Davis, Browning & Schnitker, P.A, Madison, and Ken Van Assenderp, Tallahassee, for Respondent.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Joseph C. Mellichamp, III, and Eric J. Taylor, Assistant Attorneys General, Tallahassee, for Florida Department of Revenue, Amicus Curiae.
Robert L. Nabors, Virginia Saunders Dele-gal and Heather J. Melom of Nabors, Giblin & Nickerson, P.A, Tallahassee, and Susan H. Churuti, Clearwater, for Florida Association of Counties and Florida Association of County Attorneys, Amici Curiae.

Opinion:
SHAW, J.
This ease is before the Court on remand from the United States Supreme Court for reconsideration of our decision in Dryden v. Madison County, 696 So.2d 728 (Fla.1997), vacated — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 1162, 140 L.Ed.2d 173 (1998). We reaffirm our decision in Dryden.
1. Facts
The facts are set out fully in this Court's initial opinion on review. See Dryden v. Madison County, 696 So.2d 728 (Fla.1997). Madison County in 1989 adopted several ordinances levying special assessments on property located in the county to pay for garbage services, landfill closure, ambulance service, and fire protection. Several years later, the assessments were declared invalid, and Dryden and other residents sought refunds. The trial court found that the county had acted in good faith in levying the 1989 and 1990 assessments and that Dryden was unentitled to a refund for those years. The district court affirmed. We approved the district court decision:
Where an invalid tax scheme discriminates among citizens without a legal basis and bestows no commensurate benefit, a refund may be in order. Department of Revenue v. Kuhnlein, 646 So.2d 717 (Fla.1994). Otherwise, the tax could constitute an unlawful taking of property in violation of state and federal rights. McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18[, 110 S.Ct. 2238, 110 L.Ed.2d 17] (1990). Where an invalid tax scheme applies across the board and confers a commensurate benefit, on'the other hand, "equitable considerations" may preclude a refund. Gulesian v. Dade County School Board, 281 So.2d 325 (Fla.1973).
In the present case, the 1989 and 1990 assessments fall in the latter category. The assessments were non-discriminatory (i.e., they applied across the board to all property owners in the county) and they conferred a commensurate benefit (i.e., they provided for garbage collection and disposal, landfill closure, ambulance service, and fire protection). Further, the county acted in good faith in imposing these assessments. Competent substantial evidence supports the denial of refunds for 1989 and 1990.
Dryden, 696 So.2d at 729-30 (footnotes omitted).
The United States Supreme Court subsequently vacated our decision in Dryden in light of its just-released opinion in Newsweek, Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 522 U.S. 442, 118 S.Ct. 904, 139 L.Ed.2d 888 (1998). The decision vacating Dryden was brief and without analysis:
On petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Florida. Petition for writ of certiorari granted. Judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the Supreme Court of Florida for further consideration in light of Newsiveek, Inc. v. Florida Department of Revenue, 522 U.S. 442, 118 S.Ct. 904, 139 L.Ed.2d 888 (1998).
Dryden v. Madison County, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 1162, 140 L.Ed.2d 173 (1998). This Court ordered briefing by the parties concerning the effect of Newsweek on our decision in Dryden, and Dryden now contends that Newsweek mandates a refund. We disagree.
2. Newsweek v. Florida Dep't of Revenue
Newsweek is a tax "remedy" case. This Court in Department of Revenue v. Magazine Publishers of America, Inc., 565 So.2d 1304 (1990), declared unconstitutional a statutory scheme that imposed a sales tax on magazines but not newspapers. Relying on this ruling, Newsweek, a magazine, sought a tax refund, claiming that it had been compelled to pay taxes pursuant to the unconstitutional scheme. The trial court did not reach the merits of the claim but rather granted summary judgment against Newsweek. The district court of appeal affirmed. Newsweek, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 689 So.2d 361 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). The district court reasoned that Newsweek should have availed itself of the prepayment remedy under section 72.011, Florida Statutes (1987), which allowed a taxpayer to file suit and pay the contested amount into the court registry rather than to the government. 689 So.2d at 363-64
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated the district court decision, pointing out that a different statutory provision, section 215.26, Florida Statutes (1987), authorized a postpayment remedy wherein the taxpayer could pay the tax first and file suit later. The federal Court reasoned:
The effect of the District Court of Appeal's decision below, however, was to cut off Newsweek's recourse to § 215.26. While Florida may be free to require taxpayers to litigate first and pay later, due process prevents it from applying this requirement •to taxpayers, like Newsweek, who reasonably relied on the apparent availability of a postpayment refund when paying the tax.
Newsweek, 118 S.Ct. at 905. The federal Court concluded that Newsweek was entitled to proceed via the postpayment route and obtain an adjudication on the merits of its refund claim: "Newsweek is entitled to a clear and certain remedy and thus it can use the refund procedures [in section 215.26] to adjudicate the merits of its claim." Id. at 905.
3. Application to Present Case
Newsweek is inapplicable to the present case. The United States Supreme Court in Newsiueek never reached the merits of the refund issue but rather focused only on the remedy that must be made available to a taxpayer seeking an adjudication on the merits of a refund claim. Specifically, the federal Court held that a taxpayer cannot be cut off from a remedy, or avenue of redress, upon which the taxpayer has reasonably relied. The taxpayer is entitled to proceed upon that avenue and at some point obtain an adjudication — either yea or nay — on the, merits of his or her-refund claim.
Until the United States Supreme Court stepped in, Newsweek had never obtained an adjudication on the merits of its refund claim. (As noted above, the trial court had granted summary judgment against Newsweek, and the district court had said that Newsweek was not entitled to seek a refund because Newsweek had failed to comply with the statutory prepayment requirements.) The United States Supreme Court vacated the district court judgment and held that Newsweek was entitled to proceed via the postpayment route and obtain an adjudication on the merits.
The present refund ease could not be more different — it is not a tax "remedy" case. In fact, the remedy that Dryden has chosen has never been in issue in these proceedings. Dryden has proceeded via the postpayment route (i.e., he paid the assessments first and then filed suit), and — unlike the situation in Newsiueek — the government has not asserted and the courts have not held that he is unentitled to do so. Rather, the parties and courts have viewed the availability of the postpayment remedy as a "given" in this ease and have focused exclusively on the merits of Dryden's refund claim (i.e., on whether Dryden and other taxpayers are in fact due a refund). This case thus begins precisely where Newsweek left off.
Dryden has pursued his claim to completion at every level. He has obtained an adjudication on the merits from three separate tribunals — the trial court, the district court (twice), and this Court. He ultimately lost at each stage — fair and square. The analysis in Newsweek, which focuses on a taxpayer's remedy for seeking a refund, is inapplicable to this "merits" case. Simply put: The remedy here is not in issue and never has been.
Based on the foregoing we reaffirm our decision in Dryden v. Madison County, 696 So.2d 728 (Fla.1997), in its entirety.
It is so ordered.
HARDING, C.J., ANSTEAD, J., and KOGAN, Senior Justice, concur.
WELLS, J., dissents with an opinion, in which PARIENTE, J., and OVERTON, Senior Justice, concur.
. This decision was subsequently vacated and remanded and then reaffirmed. See Department of Revenue v. Magazine Publishers of America, Inc., 565 So.2d 1304 (1990), vacated sub nom., Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Department of Revenue, 499 U.S. 972, 111 S.Ct. 1614, 113 L.Ed.2d 712 (1991), reaffirmed, 604 So.2d 459 (Fla.1992).
. As noted above, this Court in Dryden held that although the special assessments were levied pursuant to a technically invalid ordinance, Dryden was not entitled to a refund for good reason: (1) the assessments were nondiscriminatory, i.e., they applied across the board to all property owners; (2) the assessments conferred a com-mensúrate benefit on the taxpayers, i.e., in return for the assessments, the taxpayers were provided with garbage collection and disposal, landfill closure, ambulance service, and fire protection; and (3) the assessments were enacted in good faith.