Case Name: Deno Joseph BOUDREAUX, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Constance Diane Carpenter BOUDREAUX, Defendant-Appellant
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1999-06-02
Citations: 745 So. 2d 61
Docket Number: No. 98-791
Parties: Deno Joseph BOUDREAUX, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. Constance Diane Carpenter BOUDREAUX, Defendant—Appellant.
Judges: BEFORE: YELVERTON, COOKS, PETERS, SAUNDERS, and GREMILLION, Judges.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 745
Pages: 61–66

Head Matter:
Deno Joseph BOUDREAUX, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. Constance Diane Carpenter BOUDREAUX, Defendant—Appellant.
No. 98-791.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
June 2, 1999.
Writ Denied Oct. 29, 1999.
Keith Edward Thibodeaux, St. Martin-ville, for Deno Joseph Boudreaux.
Paul Albert Landry, Lafayette, for Constance D. Carpenter Boudreaux.
BEFORE: YELVERTON, COOKS, PETERS, SAUNDERS, and GREMILLION, Judges.

Opinion:
JjCOOKS, J.
Constance Diane Carpenter Boudreaux appeals the judgment of the trial court finding a Post-Nuptial Agreement she and her husband executed invalid. For the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTS
On June 2, 1993, Constance Boudreaux filed for divorce from her husband, Deno Boudreaux. They had been married eight years. After the filing, they met to talk about some type of agreement they could reach. During the course of this meeting, Deno agreed to meet with Constance and her attorney, Kathleen Hite, for the purpose of entering into some type of written agreement between them.
The meeting at Constance's attorney's office took place. According to Deno, he signed this agreement under the pressure of a divorce, in order to save his \ ¿marriage:
I signed the contract by pressure, and I call that threatened. That Connie, Constance Boudreaux and Kathleen Hite told me, if I may say. She says, "If you don't sign this agreement, I will divorce you." I said, "No. That's not what I want. I don't want a divorce. T want us to try to work out things and keep our home." That's what I said.
The agreement is entitled "Post Nuptial Agreement Between Constance Dianne Carpenter Boudreaux And Deno Bou-dreaux" and is dated June 24, 1993. In that contract, Deno agreed if he filed for divorce for any reason, including adultery, he would pay to Constance $1,500.00 per month alimony for support and maintenance. This was qualified by the following sentence: "This amount will be base [sic] on each of the parties present comparable salaries." Further, Deno agreed to keep Constance on his present group hospitalization plan, and in the event of cancellation or change, he would seek other insurance.
The parties further agreed that Constance could live in the family home as long as she remained single. In the event Constance remarried, the home would be sold and the proceeds split equally. The same provision existed in the event Constance filed for divorce from Deno with the further stipulation that if she remarried, Deno could live in the home upon reimbursing Constance for one-half the value of the house.
Deno was also required to continue to deposit any and all payroll, bonuses, or expense checks, or any other employment checks, or cash into Constance's and Deno's bank account for the purpose of paying the bills for their home. The remainder of the money deposited was to be used for the living expenses of Constance.
After the contract was signed, Constance dismissed her suit for divorce. Deno followed the terms of the contract, depositing monies into the designated bank account monthly. Then on April 22, 1997, approximately four years later, Deno | ¡filed for divorce. In his petition he asked the trial court to nullify the Post-Nuptial Agreement.
The trial court granted the divorce and invalidated the Posh-Nuptial Agreement. In brief oral reasons for judgment, the court found the contract void as against public policy, finding Deno could not divest himself of all of his income and resources. Further, the trial court found Deno executed the PosN-Nuptial Agreement under duress. Finally, the trial court said the contract was not in compliance with the legal requirement that spouses seek court approval of any agreement which terminates or modifies the matrimonial regime. Constance appealed the trial court's judgment, asserting three assignments of error:
1. The District Court erred in its conclusion that the Post-Nuptial Agreement was against public policy.
2. The District Court erred in its conclusion that the PosNNuptial Agreement was invalid due to the failure of the parties to get judicial approval prior to entering into the agreement.
3. The District Court erred in its conclusion that Deno entered into the Post-Nuptial Agreement under duress.
ANALYSIS
1. Did the Post-Nuptial Agreement violate public policy?
"Parties are free to contract for any object that is lawful, possible, and determined or determinable." La.Civ. Code art.1971. Further, spouses are free to contract with one another before or during marriage as to all matters that are not prohibited by public policy. La.Civ. Code art. 2329; Tolar v. Tolar, 25,935 (La.App. 2 Cir. 6/22/94), 639 So.2d 399.
The Civil Code guides us in the interpretation of contracts. La.Civ.Code art.1983 provides:
Contracts have the effect of law for the parties and may be dissolved only through the consent of the parties or on grounds Uprovided by law. Contracts must be performed in good faith.
The interpretation of a contract is determined by the common intent of the parties. La.Civ.Code art.2045. When the words of a contract are clear, explicit, and do not lead to absurd consequences, no further interpretation may be made as to the parties' intent. La.Civ.Code art.2046. Further, each provision in a contract must be interpreted in light of the other provisions so that each provision is given the meaning suggested by the contract as a whole. La. Civ.Code art.2050. We keep these principles at the forefront in considering the Post-Nuptial Agreement.
Constance argues the Posh-Nuptial Agreement is "in essence, . a contractual alimony agreement," and thus may be enforced. We have reviewed the cases that hold a promise to pay alimony after divorce can be the subject of a contract. See, Cunningham v. Cunningham, 448 So.2d 910 (La.App. 3 Cir.1984); Klein v. Klein, 485 So.2d 970 (La.App. 5 Cir.1986), writ denied, 489 So.2d 921 (La.1986); Jones v. Jones, 459 So.2d 1200 (La.App. 5 Cir.), writ denied, 462 So.2d 649 (La.1984). However, these cases deal with contractual alimony and consent decrees after the parties have separated. All the noted contracts were confected during the pendency of a divorce action which ended the marriage. Thus, the circumstances surrounding perfection of these contracts are distinguishable from the present case.
The agreement to pay alimony, regardless of fault — even adultery, is in our view against public policy, and renders the agreement void. Such a contract would undermine the sanctity of marriage, and would encourage the parties to approve adulterous conduct for a price. La.Civ. Code art. 98 provides "[m]arried persons owe each other fidelity, support and assistance." The fourth circuit in Favrot v. Barnes, 332 So.2d 873, 875 (La.App. 4 Cir.), writ denied, 334 So.2d 436 (La.), | sreversed on other grounds, 339 So.2d 843 (La.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 961, 97 S.Ct. 387, 50 L.Ed.2d 329 (1976), specifically "rejectfed] the view that a premarital understanding can repeal or amend the nature of marital obligations as declared by C.C. 119 [now La.Civ.Code art. 98]."
This Post-Nuptial Agreement clearly attempts to affect the parties marital and familial duties during the marriage, not after the marriage. The trial court was correct in declaring it invalid.
2. Were the parties required to seek judicial approval of the agreement?
The trial court, additionally, held the PosNNuptial Agreement was invalid because the parties did not obtain judicial approval as required by La.Civ.Code art. 2329, which provides:
Spouses may enter into a matrimonial agreement before or during marriage as to all matters that are not prohibited by public policy.
Spouses may enter into a matrimonial agreement that modifies or terminates a matrimonial regime during marriage only wpon joint petition and a finding by the court that this serves their best interests and that they understand the governing principles and rules. They may, however, subject themselves to the legal regime by a matrimonial agreement at any time without court approval.
(Emphasis added).
In Poirier v. Poirier, 626 So.2d 868 (La.App. 3 Cir.1993), writ denied, 94-161 (La.3/11/94), 634 So.2d 389, this court enunciated on the needs for strong safeguards against attempts to modify or terminate the matrimonial regime:
Since we find the Poiriers intended the agreement to terminate the matrimonial regime, the agreement is governed by Article 2329 and the formalities contained therein. Obviously, the Legislature found many spouses possessed such inferior bargaining positions, that the law could not allow them to give up their community rights without judicial supervision. In face of this strong legislative policy, we find the formalities of Article 2329 to be stricti juris.
Poirier, 626 So.2d at 870.
IrJt is undisputed that judicial approval was not obtained prior to or at any time during the parties' execution of the Post-Nuptial Agreement.
The trial court found the Post-Nuptial Agreement modified the matrimonial regime, thus requiring court approval prior to the parties entering the agreement. We agree. The agreement required prior judicial approval because "in operation" it clearly encumbered the future use and sale of a community asset, the home. As a consequence, it constituted a modification of the matrimonial regime.
Constance cites Langley v. Langley, 94-726 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/7/94), 647 So.2d 640, urging that spouses who are anticipating a divorce can enter into an interspousal contract that divides existing assets and debts without judicial approval. However, unlike the couple in Langley, Deno and Constance did not enter into the PosNNuptial Agreement in contemplation of a divorce. Rather, they signed the agreement to avoid a divorce. The facts in this case are distinguishable from those presented in Langley; and its holding, thus, is not controlling. The trial court did not err in holding the Post-Nuptial Agreement invalid for this reason as well.
Because we find the trial court did not err in finding the agreement invalid for the reasons thus mentioned, we elect not to address its finding that the agreement was invalid because Deno executed it under duress.
DECREE
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court declaring the Post-Nuptial Agreement invalid and unenforceable. Costs of this appeal are assessed against plaintiff-appellant, Constance Diane Carpenter Boudreaux.
AFFIRMED.
YELVERTON, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
PETERS, J., dissents for the reasons assigned by YELVERTON, J.