Case Name: Luis C. RIVAS, Petitioner, v. Honorable Henry L. OPPENBORN, Jr., Respondent
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1992-09-08
Citations: 605 So. 2d 516
Docket Number: No. 92-80
Parties: Luis C. RIVAS, Petitioner, v. Honorable Henry L. OPPENBORN, Jr., Respondent.
Judges: Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and HUBBART and GERSTEN, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 605
Pages: 516–519

Head Matter:
Luis C. RIVAS, Petitioner, v. Honorable Henry L. OPPENBORN, Jr., Respondent.
No. 92-80.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Sept. 8, 1992.
Miguel A. Suarez, Miami, for petitioner.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen. and Joan L. Greenberg, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and HUBBART and GERSTEN, JJ.

Opinion:
SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.
In our view, defense counsel did nothing more than silently fail to object to the setting of the trial date beyond the speedy trial time. It is, however, the law that
[m]ere silence of the defendant or defense counsel at the proceeding wherein defendant's trial date is set beyond the speedy trial period is not an effective waiver. State v. Ansley, 349 So.2d 837 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), cert. denied, 359 So.2d 1220 (Fla.1978).
State v. Swint, 464 So.2d 242, 243 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). See Stuart v. State, 360 So.2d 406 (Fla.1978). Since it is agreed that the speedy trial time, including the fifteen-day window provided by Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(i)(3) has lapsed without trial, the absence of an effective waiver requires that the trial court be prohibited from proceeding further on the substantive charge.
Prohibition granted.
GERSTEN, J., concurs.
. We cannot agree with the state's view that defense counsel's statement that he planned to be away on a date originally suggested by the trial court amounted to a functional equivalent of a motion for continuance and thus established that the defendant was not available for trial during the pertinent period. This is so because the trial court thereafter stated that, despite those plans, he would begin the trial later that same day and only after that, specifically without the agreement of defense counsel, mistakenly reset the case beyond the speedy trial time so that the court (as well as the defense lawyer) could go on vacation.
. This opinion has no effect on Rivas's pending probation hearing, including the reliance on the substantive charge as a violation. To the extent that the present proceeding seeks any relief with regard to the probation case, it is denied.