Case Name: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK ex rel. AARON B. GARDENIER, Appellant, v. THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF COLUMBIA COUNTY, Respondent
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1890-02
Citations: 63 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 17
Docket Number: 
Parties: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK ex rel. AARON B. GARDENIER, Appellant, v. THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF COLUMBIA COUNTY, Respondent.
Judges: Landon, J., concurred.
Reporter: Supreme Court Reports (Hun)
Volume: 63
Pages: 17–25

Head Matter:
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK ex rel. AARON B. GARDENIER, Appellant, v. THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF COLUMBIA COUNTY, Respondent.
Extradition proceedings — disbursements of a district attorney, in conducting the same, are a county charge — treaty betioeen the United States and Great Britain of August 9, 1842.
Where a crime has been committed, an indictment has been found, and the accused has escaped, the district attorney of the county in which the indictment has been found may properly incur reasonable expenses in efforts to procure the extradition of the fugitive from another country, and disbursements so made by him are a proper county charge. (Fish, J., dissenting.)
The provisions of the treaty between the United States and Great Britain of August 9, 1843, to the effect that “the expense of such apprehension and •delivery shall be borne and defrayed by the party who makes the requisition .and receives the fugitive,” has no relation to expenses thus incurred by the district attorney, but simply relieves the government which delivers the fugitive from the duty of incurring or paying any expenses connected therewith.
"Whether expenses incurred by the district attorney, preliminary to an application to the governor of the State for a requisition for the return of the fugitive, are or are not properly a county charge cannot depend on the regulation or directions of the department of State.
Appeal by the relator from an order granted at the Columbia County Circuit sustaining a demurrer to an alternative writ of manda/mus, which order was entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Columbia on the Ith day of November, 1888, and •also from the judgment of said court, entered in said clerk’s office -on the 15th day of November, 1888.
The facts alleged are as follows: One Cadby was indicted at Columbia county in April, 1886, for forgery. Previous to that time he had Ted to Hamilton, Province of Ontario, Dominion of Canada. In March, 1886, the relator, who was the district attorney of Columbia county went to Hamilton to institute extradition proceedings there against Cadby. The relator commenced these proceedings, but before Cadby could .be arrested he Ted from that Province to Halifax, Nova Scotia, in order to take ship for England. The relator pursued him to Halifax and there again commenced extradition proceedings. Cadby was arrested. While officers were carrying him through New Brunswick lie was taken under habeas corpus to St. John, New Brunswick, and there was discharged about March eighteenth. Proceedings for extradition were then taken in New Brunswick, and Cadby was arrested and held. At relator’s instance, on the requisition of the Governor of the State, the President of the United States demanded the delivery of Cadby, and he was thereupon delivered and Tnally lodged in the jail of Columbia county about June 2, 1886.
The relator presented to the supervisors a bill for his disbursements and expenses in this matter. The bill includes railroad fare, hotel bills, telegrams, meals on railroad travel, detectives’ services, services of attorneys employed in Canada and services of attorneys of this State. The aggregate of which was over $1,000. None of these expenses were made as agent either of the Governor or of the President for the purpose of receiving Cadby and bringing him to the State of New York. The relator’s bill was presented to the board of supervisors and they refused to audit or allow it, or any part of it.
Albert Hoysrccclt, for the appellant.
1L E. Andrews, for the respondent.

Opinion:
Learned, P. J.:
The relator relies, first, on the clause in article 10 of the treaty between the United States and Great Britain August 9, 1842. (Treaties of U. S., p 320), as follows: " The expense of such apprehension and delivery shall be borne and defrayed by the party who makes the requisition and receives the fugitive." The word " party " in this clause refers to the contracting parties to the treaty, as will appear by article eleven. It is intended to relieve the government which delivers the fugitive from the duty of incurring or paying any expense. It has no reference to the question which might arise between the government which receives the fugitive and any of its officers or citizens. That clause of the treaty does not touch the question here raised.'
Again, the relator urges that, by the regulation of the State Department, ajqilications must come from the Governor of the State, and that in this State applications to the Governor must come from the district attorneys. And it appears that, when Cadby had been finally held in New Brunswick, the relator applied to the Governor, and, according to the practice after stating that, in his ojiinion, the ends of public justice required that the criminal should be brought to the State for trial at public expense, he stated that he was willing that such expense be a charge on the county of Columbia.
This consent of the relator, of course, refers to such expense, and only to such expense, as might be incurred by the Governor on the part of the State, or by the President at his requisition. It does not refer to expenses already paid or incurred by the relator previously. It could not refer, therefore, to any part of this bill, for the writ expressly states that these expenses were not made as agent or the like in making the demand or bringing back the fugitive. These expenses wore all made as a preliminary to the application to the Governor. Whether they are, or are not, properly a county charge cannot depend on the regulations of the executive department of the State. Prior to the action of the Governor upon the relator's application the State had incurred no expense. All that had been previously done had been done by the relator voluntarily or in the performance of the duties of Ms office. And the question of the liability of the county must be decided by an examination of the powers and discretion intrusted to the district attorney. No light is thrown thereon by the treaty or by the regulations of the United States or the State government relative to extradition. Indeed, as to anything done in procuring the demand from the Governor and the like, the relator is forbidden to take compensation. (Penal Code, § 51.)
There is no doubt that it was the duty of the relator to conduct the prosecution of the offense of Oadby. (1 R. S., in. p. 383, § 89.) It was one cognizable in the Oyer and Terminer of the county of Columbia. Certainly, to conduct the prosecution means more than simply to attend the trial. A district attorney would be neglectful of his duty who should omit to take any steps to secure the attendance of witnesses or the presence of the accused at the trial. The investigation whether a crime has been committed, and the labor of seeing that the accused person shall not escape, may certainly, in some cases, come within the words: " Conduct all prosecutions for crimes and offenses." This language follows that used in chapter 8,. Laws of 1796, which authorized the appointment of assistant attorneys-general for several " districts " of the State, to " manage and conduct all suits and prosecutions for crimes and offenses;" Hence, undoubtedly, we have our present " district attorney." Thus it has long been the policy of the State that prosecutions should be conducted rather by a public, than by a private, prosecutor. To. conduct such prosecution must require the expenditure of money. Therefore, it is provided in 1 Revised Statutes (m. p. 385, § 3) that the following shall be county charges:
Subd. 2. The fees of the district attorney and all expenses necessarily incurred by him in criminal cases arising within the county.
Subd. 9. The moneys necessarily expended by any county officer in executing the duties of his office, etc.
Now, there is no question that the Cadby Case arose in the county of Columbia. Were these expenses necessarily incurred % The meaning of these words was passed upon in People ex rel. Hall v. Supervisors (32 N. Y., 473). They were said to include such expenditures as were not only needful and proper as distinguished from such as are needless and improvident, but also reasonable, .appropriate and necessary in the discharge of the particular official duty. This same principle is affirmed in People ex rel. Johnson v. Supervisors (45 N. Y., 196). It is not necessary to cite further •cases.
The supervisors, in refusing to audit the relator's account and in demurring to the alternative writ, have placed themselves on the ground that these expenses were not a county charge, even if they were necessarily expended in the case of Cadby. In this we think they were in error.
Probably it is not for us, on this ajipeal, to decide in detail as to the necessity of each item, as no proof on the matter is before us Prom the circumstances of the case, in any such criminal matter the district attorney, to a large extent, must be the judge of what expenditures are needed. It would interfere with the course of justice if he had to -decide, in every instance, when he expended money, at the peril of having the board of supervisors decide otherwise, after the public interest in the capture and conviction of the accused had subsided (People ex rel. Kinney v. Supervisors, 58 Barb., 139.)
The defendant's counsel, in commenting on this provision for the payment of expenses necessarily incurred, cite People ex rel. Ayres v. Supervisors of Fulton County (14 Barb., 56). But that was a claim for the payment of services rendered by the district attorney for which no compensation was provided by law. In this case he is not asking for payment for his services, but for reimbursement of expenses. And if these expenses were necessarily incurred (as is admitted by the demurrer), there is no justice in refusing to reimburse him. The expense of prosecuting crimes committed within the county must fall on the county, and not on an officer who has been vigilant in doing his duty. We are referred to no case by the defendant's counsel showing that such expenses as these are not a proper county charge. And it is hardly to be supposed that in many cases in which fugitive criminals have been arrested in other States and countries, and ultimately brought back to this State, the expense of discovering and arresting them has been borne by the district attorney of the county from his own private funds without reimbursement.
When a crime has been committed and an indictment has been found, and the accused has escaped, some one must decide whether any effort, and what effort, shall be made to capture him. We know of no other officer than the district attorney who is to decide this question. Certainly it is not one for the board of supervisors. If there is any benefit to the public in the punishment of crime, it is important that the criminal shall not escape such punishment by fleeing to another country. We should be very unwilling to say that expenses of a district attorney, honestly made in the effort to recapture in another county a fugitive from justice, were not to be regarded as necessarily incurred. It is carefully pointed out in People v. Supervisors of Delaware County (ut supra, 199, 200), what are the respective duties of the court and of the supervisors in regard to contingent charges against the county. And it is not on these papers our duty to determine the amount to which the relator is entitled. But he is entitled to have his bill audited in accordance with the views we have stated.
The order sustaining the demurrer must be reversed and judgment for the relator must be granted on the demurrer, that a peremptory mandamus issue as prayed for in the writ, with costs below and on the appeal.
Landon, J., concurred.