Case Name: HANNA v. NASSAU ELECTRIC R. CO.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1897-05-21
Citations: 45 N.Y.S. 437
Docket Number: 
Parties: HANNA v. NASSAU ELECTRIC R. CO.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 45
Pages: 437–442

Head Matter:
(18 App. Div. 137.)
HANNA v. NASSAU ELECTRIC R. CO.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.
May 21, 1897.)
1. Carriers—Ejecting Passengers—Enforcing Municipal Regulations.
A city ordinance which forbids passengers .to ride on the front platforms of street cars does not authorize a street-railroad company to accept a fare from a passenger while riding on the front platform when there is no room for him elsewhere, and then eject him from the car without returning the fare.
2. Same—Eights under Transfer Ticket.
A passenger on a street car who receives a transfer to another line is not entitled to board the first car that reaches the transfer point, regardless of whether there is room for him on the car.
Appeal from Kings county court.
Action by-John Hanna against the Nassau Electric Railroad Company for ejecting plaintiff from defendant’s street car. From a judgment entered on a verdict in favor of plaintiff, and from an order denying a motion for a new trial, defendant appeals.
Reversed.
Argued before GOODRICH, P. J., and CULLEN, BARTLETT, HATCH, and BRADLEY, JJ.
James C. Church, for appellant.
Edward C. Tucker, for respondent.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
The plaintiff was a passenger on one of defendant's railroad lines on Bergen street, in Brooklyn. When the car reached the intersection of Fifth avenue, he got a transfer slip entitling him to continue his journey on the line upon that avenue. When a car came along the avenue, the plaintiff boarded it by the front platform. He testifies that the conductor took from him his transfer slip; that subsequently two of the defendant's officers, who were riding on the front platform, instructed him that he could no longer ride on that platform, but must enter the car; that he found it impossible to enter the body of the car, and refused to leave the platform; that thereupon he was ejected from the car. For that assault the action is brought. The defendant's evidence tended to prove that there was room in the car for the plaintiff to enter, and also that plaintiff's transfer ticket had not been taken up. The court submitted the case to the jury, with instructions that if plaintiff's ticket had been taken from him by the conductor, and there was not sufficient room in the body of the car to permit the plaintiff to enter, then his ejection from the car was illegal, and he was entitled to recover, but that, if there was room in the car, he was bound to comply wdth the instruction to enter it, his removal from the car was lawful, and the defendant entitled to a verdict, unless excessive force was employed. We have no doubt of the correctness of this charge of the court on this main proposition involved in the case and presented on this appeal. There was at the time of the transaction, and still is, an ordinance of the city of Brooklyn as follows:
"Occupation of Platform. No persons except motermen, conductors or police officers in uniform, shall be allowed on the front platform of any such cars when in operation, except that such platform may be used for the exit of passengers at the comer stoppages."
The defendant contends that, even though it had received plaintiff's fare and taken his ticket, his presence on the front platform was, under the ordinance, unlawful, and that the defendant had the right to remove him therefrom. We think not. This ordinance imposed a duty on the railroad company. As between the railroad company and the passenger, it acted as a regulation of the former. It was undoubtedly a reasonable and proper regulation, and the defendant could enforce it; but it could not, when it had no accommodation open to him within the car, retain the plaintiff's ticket or accept his fare while riding on the front platform, and then eject him from the car. The acceptance of the ticket or fare did not necessarily preclude the defendant from enforcing the ordinance. If, either intentionally or through inadvertence, it receives the fare from a passenger for whom there is no glace within the car, we think it may repent of its action, and subsequently seek to comply with the ordinance. But restitution, in our judgment, is a condition precedent to repentance. If it had taken the plaintiff's fare, the defendant could not remove him from the car until it either returned or tendered to him the ticket which he had given up. Burnham v. Railway Co., 63 Me. 298; Bland v. Railroad Co., 55 Cal. 570. But the jury might have found that, while there was no room for the plaintiff to enter the car, still his ticket had not been in fact taken from him. In that case the plaintiff was properly ejected from the car. As to this, defendant's counsel requested the court to charge:
"That if the car that the plaintiff boarded was so crowded that it was impossible for the plaintiff to get inside of the same, that that fact did not give him the right to ride upon the front platform in violence of the said ordinance."
This was refused, and the defendant excepted. In response to a request for the plaintiff, the court charged:
"That where a street-railway company, after the passenger's fare, issues a transfer or ticket to the passenger to another line of cars belonging to its system, and a passenger to whom such transfer has been issued boards a car belonging to the line to which he has been transferred, the passenger so remains a passenger of such street-railway company both before and after the taking up of the transfer ticket by the conductor of the car to which he was transferred."
To this charge the defendant excepted. We think this request and refusal were sufficient to present the point involved in this branch of the case, and that the rulings of the court were erroneous. A transferred passenger has not necessarily the right to board the first car that approaches on the line, regardless of whether there is accommodation for him. As already stated, in our view he had not the right to remain on the front platform unless the company received him as a passenger. His duty was to wait till a car approached in proper condition to receive him. If none came, he could maintain his action against the company for breach of the contract to carry him. But he could not force himself into a dangerous or improper position upon the car, against the action and remonstrances of the defendant.
The judgment and order should be reversed, and a new trial granted; costs to abide the event.