Case Name: J. THOMPSON WARE and J. G. WARE v. T. B. KNIGHT
Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
Jurisdiction: North Carolina
Decision Date: 1930-07-02
Citations: 199 N.C. 251
Docket Number: 
Parties: J. THOMPSON WARE and J. G. WARE v. T. B. KNIGHT.
Judges: 
Reporter: North Carolina Reports
Volume: 199
Pages: 251–255

Head Matter:
J. THOMPSON WARE and J. G. WARE v. T. B. KNIGHT.
(Filed 2 July, 1930.)
1. Ejectment A a — Plaintiff may show title by adverse possession in action in ejectment.
In an action in ejectment the plaintiff may undertake to establish his title by sufficient adverse possession under known and visible lines and boundaries.
2. Ejectment D b — In this case held: issue of fact as to line called for in deed was raised and submitted to jury under correct instructions.
Where both parties in an action in ejectment- claim title by adverse possession, the plaintiff claiming presumptive possession to the outside boundaries of his deed, with conflicting evidence as to the boundaries called for in the deed: Held, an issue of fact is raised for the determination of the jury, and where a court survey, made and used without objection of either party, is introduced in evidence, a reference to the map as the “court map” by the trial court in his charge to the jury will not be held for reversible error, it appearing that an intelligent jury must have understood the correct instructions in regard thereto.
3. Adverse Possession A lb — Constructive possession under deed having known boundaries extends to outer boundaries of the deed.
Where one enters and occupies a tract of land under a deed having known and visible lines and boundaries, the law will ordinarily extend the force and effect of such possession to the outer boundaries of the deed, and where there is conflicting evidence as to the lines called for in the deed, the question of the amount of land occupied under presumptive possession under the deed is to be determined by the verdict of the jury as to the lines called for therein.
Adams, J., dissenting.
Civil actioN, before MacRae, Special Judge, at October Special Term, 1929, of RookiNgham.
This was an action of ejectment. The plaintiffs introduced a deed from Carrow, United States Marshal, to Stephen A. Douglass, dated 20 August, 1872, and recorded in May, 1874; also a deed from said Douglass to plaintiff J. Thompson Ware, dated 28 November, 1874, and recorded on 22 May, 1875. There was testimony in behalf of plaintiffs that they went in possession of the property in 1872 under a contract with said Carrow, and have lived upon said land since the purchase. The defendant claimed title under certain deeds made by Roberts and recorded in 1881, and deed from Yaughan, commissioner, recorded in 1890.
The evidence further discloses that the defendant built a small house upon the land claimed by the plaintiffs. There was also testimony by the man who built the house that it was constructed about 1906. There was testimony to the effect that the house might have been built a few years earlier than that date. The contract price for the house was $15.00 and one-third of the contract price was paid by five gallons of liquor at one dollar per gallon. The plaintiff built a shop on the land near the place where the tenant house was afterwards constructed.
There was much evidence with respect to adverse possession by both parties.
The issues were as follows:
1. “Is the plaintiff the owner of and entitled to the possession of the land shown on the court map between the red line and the solid white lines on the east and south?”
2. “What amount of damages, if any, is the plaintiff, J. Thompson Ware, entitled to recover for the wrongful detention of said land?”
3. “Is tbe plaintiff’s action barred by tbe statute of limitations?”
Tbe jury answered tbe first issue “Yes,” and tbe' second issue, “$150.00.”
From judgment upon tbe verdict tbe defendant appealed.
Sharp & Sharp for plaintiff.
Brown & Trotter and Glidewell, Dunn & Gwyn for defendant.

Opinion:
BkogkeN, J.
Tbe plaintiff undertook to prove title by showing possession under known and. visible lines and boundaries for twenty-one years before tbe action was brought. Such method of proving title in ejectment suits has been approved and established. Mobley v. Griffin, 104 N. C., 112, 10 S. E., 142; Moore v. Miller, 179 N. C., 396, 102 S. E., 627.
Tbe defendant contended that tbe plaintiff bad never been in actual possession of tbe small area of land in dispute; but, tbe plaintiff having gone into possession under a proper deed of conveyance older than that held by tbe defendant, relied upon tbe principle of constructive possession. Tbe pertinent principle of law was thus stated in Hayes v. Lumber Co., 180 N. C., 252, 104 S. E., 527: "That when one entered and occupied a tract of land, asserting ownership under deeds having-known and visible lines and boundaries, tbe law would ordinarily extend tbe force and effect of bis possession to tbe outer boundaries of bis claim as set forth in bis deeds, and on tbe facts in evidence, if accepted by tbe jury, tbe determination of tbe rights of tbe parties would depend largely on whether tbe boundaries of plaintiff's deeds by correct location covered tbe land in dispute. This ruling of tbe court is in accord with our decisions on tbe subject, and under it tbe jury, accepting plaintiff's version of the controversy, have rendered a verdict in her favor, and we find no valid reason for disturbing tbe results of tbe trial." Ray v. Anders, 164 N. C., 311, 80 S. E., 403.
Tbe plaintiff contended that tbe line in dispute called for a Spanish oak, and tbe defendant contended that tbe proper call was a pine. A court survey bad been ordered and a map was made in pursuance of such order, which was used by both parties at tbe trial. Tbe contentions of tbe parties as to tbe disputed call were submitted to tbe jury.
Certain exceptions were taken to tbe charge of tbe court referring to what was designated as tbe court map. However, tbe record discloses that tbe map was used by both parties and tbe contentions were thoroughly arrayed in detail, and a jury of intelligent men could not have failed to understand that tbe location of tbe disputed corner depended upon whether such corner was a Spanish oak as contended by tbe plaintiff, or a pine as contended by tbe defendant.
There was ample evidence of adverse possession of the locus in quo by both parties. Hence, in the main, the cause was resolved into an issue of fact. This issue of fact was found in favor of the plaintiff, and we perceive in the record no error of law warranting another trial.
No error.