Case Name: TULLY v. NEW YORK CITY RY. CO.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1908-07-08
Citations: 111 N.Y.S. 919
Docket Number: 
Parties: TULLY v. NEW YORK CITY RY. CO.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 111
Pages: 919–922

Head Matter:
TULLY v. NEW YORK CITY RY. CO.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
July 8, 1908.)
1. Street Railroads—Pedestrian’s Duty.
A pedestrian in crossing a street railway track was as much bound to look out for her own safety as the motorman of an approaching car was bound to look out for her, and, having seen the car, she should not have stepped upon the track without first ascertaining whether it was safe to do so.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 44, Street Railroads, §§ 204-209.]
2. Same—Negligence—Evidence—Sufficiency.
In an action against a street railway company for injury to a pedestrian struck by a car at a street crossing, a finding that the company was or that plaintiff was not negligent, was not warranted, where the evidence did not tend to show how far away the car was when she stepped on the track, or how far she was from the track when she looked and saw a car, or how long after she looked the accident occurred; that she was struck by a car while stepping from the track not showing the company's negligence.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 44, Street Railroads, §§ 243-250.]
3. Same.
A pedestrian before leaving a sidewalk curb to cross a street car track was bound to look out for approaching ears.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point; see Cent. Dig. vol. 44, Street Railroads, §§ 204-209.]
Laughlin, J., dissenting. •
Appeal from Trial Term.
Personal injury action by Ellen Tully against the New York City Railway Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, and from an order denying a new trial, defendant appeals.
Reversed, and new trial ordered.
Argued before INGRAHAM, McRAUGHRIN, RAUGHRIN, HOUGHTON, and SCOTT, JJ.
Bayard H. Ames, for appellant.
John H. Regan, for respondent.

Opinion:
McLAUGHLIN, J.
Action to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by defendant's negligence. About 8 o'clock on the evening of the 2d of April, 1906, the plaintiff, then about 68 years of age, while crossing the Bowery on the downtown crossing of Bleecker street from west to east, was struck by one of the defendant's cars and injured. She testified that, before attempting to cross the street, she looked up and down and saw a car about two blocks away, and then proceeded to cross; that as she was near the last rail of the fourth track she was struck; that she did not hear a bell sounded and the car which struck her came very fast; that she did not know what car it was that hit her, because, to use her own language, "I wasn't looking at the car. I don't know which car it was hit me." This is the only evidence offered tending to show defendant's negligence, except that the witness Kepke, who was about 100 feet from where the accident occurred, testified that he saw the plaintiff crossing the street, but did not see her struck by the car; that when he saw her "she was walking very slowly, very feebly," and he did not hear any gong sounded, and the witness Scherer, who testified that he saw the plaintiff after the accident and "assisted her to the hallway," that he could not say he heard a gong sounded, but there were "gongs sounding all day long along the Bowery." At "the conclusion of plaintiff's case, the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, upon the ground that plaintiff had failed to establish a cause of action against the defendant and had failed to show her own freedom from negligence. The motion was denied, and an exception taken.
In denying this motion I think the court erred. The plaintiff, while crossing the street, was as much obligated to look out for her own safety as was the motorman. She saw, according to her own testimony, a car approaching (whether it was the one which subsequently struck her does not appear), and, having noticed this car, she could not step upon the track without having first ascertained whether it was safe to do so or not. Jackson v. Union Ry. Co., 77 App. Div. 161, 78 N. Y. Supp. 1096. There is absolutely no evidence which shows, or tends to show, how far away the car which struck her was when she stepped upon the track; or how many feet she was from the track on which she stepped when she looked and saw a car, or how much time elapsed after looking before the accident occurred. The evidence, therefore, did not justify a finding that the defendant was negligent or the plaintiff free from negligence. Lofsten v. Brooklyn H. R. R. Co., 184 N. Y. 148, 76 N. E. 1035; Cranch v. Brooklyn H. R. R. Co., 186 N. Y. 310, 78 N. E. 1078; Dorienza v. N. Y. C. Ry. Co., 112 App. Div. 913, 99 N. Y. Supp. 1138, affirmed 187 NY. 567, 80 N. E. 1107; Trauber v. Third Avenue R. R. Co., 90 App. Div. 606, 85 N. Y. Supp. 1149, affirmed 181 N. Y. 541, 73 N. E. 1133; Jackson v. Union Ry. Co., supra. The fact that the plaintiff was struck by a car as she was leaving the track did not of itself justify a finding that the defendant was negligent, or that she was free from negligence. Kappus v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 82 App. Div. 13, 81 N. Y. Supp. 442. The truth is the plaintiff, according to her testimony, paid no attention to her own safety after she left the corner, and therefore her conduct does not sustain a legal inference that she exercised the degree of care which the law imposed upon her, and a finding of the jury to the contrary is based solely upon speculation, and nothing else.
I am also of the opinion that the judgment must be reversed because the court refused to charge the following request:
"I ask your honor to charge that the plaintiff was required to look after she left the curb before she tried to cross the track."
It is difficult to imagine why this request was refused. Plaintiff, as already suggested, was as much bound to look out for herself as the motorman was. She could not, having observed a car approaching, heedlessly cross the street and pay no attention to it, because the motorman had as much righ't to assume that she would keep out of the way of the car as she had to assume that the motorman would so control the car that it would not injure her.
The court also erred in refusing to charge a request to the effect that there was no evidence that the plaintiff was of infirm mind or had any physical impairment prior to the accident. There was no evidence to show that the plaintiff, prior to the accident, was of infirm mind or had any physical impairment whatever.
The judgment and order appealed from, therefore, must be reversed and a new trial ordered, with costs to appellant to abide event.
INGRAHAM, HOUGHTON, and SCOTT, JJ., concur.