Case Name: Tan Rang NGUYEN, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
Court: Texas Courts of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1989-06-22
Citations: 774 S.W.2d 348
Docket Number: No. C14-88-00246-CR
Parties: Tan Rang NGUYEN, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
Judges: Before PAUL PRESSLER, CANNON and ELLIS, JJ.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 774
Pages: 348–352

Head Matter:
Tan Rang NGUYEN, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
No. C14-88-00246-CR.
Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (14th Dist.).
June 22, 1989.
Discretionary Review Refused Oct. 25, 1989.
Michael B. Charlton, Houston, for appellant.
John B. Holmes, Jr., Winston E. Cochran, Jr., Houston, for appellee.
Before PAUL PRESSLER, CANNON and ELLIS, JJ.

Opinion:
OPINION
CANNON, Justice.
Appellant was convicted of murder and sentenced by the court to imprisonment for life in the Texas Department of Corrections. On appeal, appellant alleges the trial court erred in not suppressing his confession, in refusing to appoint an interpreter to assist defense counsel, and in limiting defense counsel's cross-examination of a witness. We affirm.
The facts show that on the night of the crime, a quarrel arose at the Vietnam Kitchen restaurant between a group including appellant and a companion of the victim, Mr. Tai. Before leaving the restaurant, appellant gestured toward the deceased's group in the manner of a pistol firing. Later, when the victim and his companion left the restaurant, the appellant drove up in an automobile and beckoned to the companion. The victim went over to the appellant's car and the appellant shot him.
In his first point appellant alleges error in the trial court's refusal to suppress his confession. According to appellant, the interpreter who translated his Miranda warnings failed to properly apprise him of his rights. In reviewing the record, we find that the confession complained about was never introduced into evidence. Therefore, it had no possible bearing on the jury's decision as to appellant's guilt.
The trial judge, who assessed punishment, knew of the confession but there is nothing in the record to suggest he considered the confession in assessing punishment. A trial judge who serves as fact finder at the punishment stage of a trial is presumed to ignore erroneously admitted evidence. Kimithi v. State, 546 S.W.2d 323 (Tex.Crim.App.1977). From that it follows that a trial court is presumed to ignore arguably inadmissible evidence that is not admitted. Appellant's first point of error is overruled.
In his second point of error, appellant alleges error by the trial judge in not appointing an interpreter to serve as a member of the defense team. We disagree. The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure states in pertinent part:
When a motion for appointment of an interpreter is filed by any party or on motion of the court, in any criminal proceeding, it is determined that a person charged or a witness does not understand and speak the English language, an interpreter must be sworn to interpret for him.
Tex.Code Crim.Peoc.Ann. art. 38.30 (Vernon 1981).
Plainly, the first sentence of article 38.30 does not provide for appointment of an interpreter to act as an intermediary between a defendant and his counsel and an examination of the remainder of article 38.30 shows that nothing else therein requires or even authorizes an appointment of an interpreter for that function. The only basis for the trial court's providing an interpreter to an accused is the constitutional and statutory guarantees of confrontation under the state and federal constitutions. Diaz v. State, 491 S.W.2d 166 (Tex.Crim.App.1973); Cantu v. State, 716 S.W.2d 688 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1986, no pet.). In this case, where all testimony was interpreted, we hold appellant's right to confrontation was satisfied and the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to appoint ^a second interpreter. We overrule appellant's second point of error.
In his final point of error, appellant contends the trial court erred in limiting defense counsel's cross-examination of a State's witness. The record shows that the victim's daughter testified for the State at trial. On cross-examination, she denied any knowledge that the deceased had operated a gambling place. Defense counsel then asked whether she knew in advance that the defense would raise the issue of her father's gambling and she said she did not. Counsel then asked: "Had anybody talked to you about that before I asked you?" The prosecutor objected that the question was irrelevant and the objection was sustained.
The trial court's decision as to limits on cross-examination should not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Satterwhite v. State, 499 S.W.2d 314, 317 (Tex.Crim.App.1973); Keegan v. State, 681 S.W.2d 806, 811 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, pet. ref'd). In the present case, the question was global in nature and remote from the facts in issue at trial. Accordingly, we hold the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in sustaining the relevancy objection. Appellant's point of error three is overruled.
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.