Case Name: James CRULLER, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2002-01-24
Citations: 808 So. 2d 201
Docket Number: No. SC99-49
Parties: James CRULLER, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
Judges: WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, ANSTEAD, and LEWIS, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 808
Pages: 201–210

Head Matter:
James CRULLER, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
No. SC99-49.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Jan. 24, 2002.
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Marti Rothenberg, Assistant Public Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, FL, for Petitioner.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Michael J. Neimand, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and M. Rebecca Springer, Assistant Attorney General, Fort Laud-erdale, FL, for Respondent.

Opinion:
HARDING, J.
We have for review Cruller v. State, 745 So.2d 512, 512 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), in which the Third District Court of Appeal certified conflict with the First District Court of Appeal's decision in Ward v. State, 730 So.2d 728 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. For the following reasons, we conclude that double jeopardy does not bar convictions and punishments for robbery and carjacking.
FACTS
Petitioner James Cruller was convicted of robbery without a firearm in violation of section 812.13, Florida Statutes (1995), and carjacking without a firearm in violation of section 812.133, Florida Statutes (1995). See Cruller, 745 So.2d at 512.
Cruller's convictions stemmed from an incident in which he and an accomplice robbed the victim of his wallet, car keys, and motor vehicle after following the victim home. See id. While standing outside the victim's automobile, the accomplice pointed a gun at the victim's head and demanded his car keys. At that time, Cruller reached into the victim's pocket and stole the victim's wallet. Immediately thereafter, utilizing the stolen car keys, Cruller and his accomplice drove away in the victim's motor vehicle. See id. Cruller was charged in the information with one count of armed robbery based on theft of a wallet and money, and in a second count with armed carjacking based on the theft of the motor vehicle.
On appeal, Cruller argued that the record supported only one forceful taking of the victim's property and, therefore, his constitutional protection against double jeopardy prevented dual convictions for both robbery and carjacking. The Third District disagreed and held that "under these circumstances the defendant was properly convicted for both of the separate offenses of robbery and carjacking." Id. (citing Smart v. State, 652 So.2d 448 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)). The Third District, however, certified conflict with the First District's decision in Ward v. State, 730 So.2d 728 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). See Cruller, 745 So.2d at 512.
THE CONFLICT CASE
In contrast to Cruller, the First District in Ward held that the defendant could not be convicted of both armed robbery and carjacking under nearly identical factual circumstances to those in Cruller. See 730 So.2d at 729-30. The First District summarized the facts in Ward as follows:
[T]he evidence established that the victim had parked her vehicle in the lot of a store, and then went into the store to do some shopping. After she had finished shopping, she returned to. her vehicle, pushing a cart. She opened the front passenger door and placed her purchases and her purse on the seat. As she was returning the cart, several young males, including appellant, approached her. One of them pointed a gun at the victim and told her to give them her keys and money. Appellant told the victim that the other male would shoot if she did not comply. Appellant then took the keys from the victim and gave them to one of-the others. Then all of the young males, including appellant, got into the vehicle and drove off.
Id. at 729. The armed robbery charge was predicated upon the taking of the victim's keys, purse, checkbook, and money, whereas the carjacking charge was predicated upon the taking of the victim's automobile. See id.
On appeal, Ward challenged his convictions for robbery and carjacking, arguing that dual convictions for these offenses violated the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the State and federal constitutions because the convictions arose out of a single criminal act. See id. at 728. The First District reversed Ward's armed carjacking conviction, concluding that "there was only one 'forceful taking.' All of the victim's property was taken as part of the same criminal transaction or episode, without any temporal or geographic break." Id. at 729-30. After applying the Block-burgee test, codified in section 775.021(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1995), for determining whether convictions for multiple crimes stemming from one criminal episode violated double jeopardy, the First District noted that the State conceded that armed carjacking and armed robbery contain the same statutory elements. See Ward, 730 So.2d at 729. The First District held that, under the circumstances, Ward could not be convicted of both robbery and carjacking. See id. at 730.
ANALYSIS
Cruller contends that his convictions for robbery and carjacking violate the principle of double jeopardy. The Double Jeopardy Clause protects criminal defendants from multiple convictions and punishments for the same offense. The standard for determining the constitutionality of multiple convictions for offenses arising from the same criminal transaction is whether the Legislature "intended to authorize separate punishments for the two crimes." M.P. v. State, 682 So.2d 79, 81 (Fla.1996). Section 812.13(1), Florida Statutes (1995), defines "robbery" as
the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another, with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the money or other property, when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear.
Section 812.133(1), Florida Statutes (1995), defines "carjacking" as
the taking of a motor vehicle which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another, with intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the motor vehicle, when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear.
We find that the language, structure, and legislative history of the carjacking statute represent a clear statement from the Legislature that it intended to authorize separate punishments for carjacking and robbery, when the indictment for robbery lists property other than a motor vehicle. Cf Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 779, 105 S.Ct. 2407, 85 L.Ed.2d 764 (1985) ("The language, structure, and legislative history of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse, Prevention and Control Act of 1970, however, show in the plainest way that Congress intended the CCE provision to be a separate criminal offense which was punishable in addition to, and not as a substitute for, the predicate offenses."). The language of the carjacking statute mirrors the language of the robbery statute with one exception — carjacking pertains only to motor vehicles whereas robbery pertains to all property. The carjacking statute is a very specific subset of the more general robbery statute. When the Legislature enacted the carjacking statute, it carved out a particular type of robbery. — .the forceful taking of a motor vehicle — and made it an enhanced crime (unarmed robbery is a second-degree felony compared to unarmed carjacking which is a first-degree felony). It is apparent from the legislative history that the Legislature was alarmed by an FBI study that highlighted the growing number of carjackings in Florida. See Fla. S. Comm, on Crim. Just., CS for HB 1085 (1993) Staff Analysis (March 22, 1993). Therefore, when a defendant forcefully takes several items of property, one of which is a motor vehicle, it is clear that the Legislature intended to punish the act of taking the car separately from any other property taken during the robbery.
To reach the opposite conclusion would render an absurd result. In the present case, the defendant forcefully took a wallet and money in addition to taking a motor vehicle. The money and wallet are not covered by the carjacking statute. Under these circumstances, the defendant would receive a substantial windfall if the State were precluded from charging both carjacking and robbery of the wallet and money. In other words, if we were to adopt Cruller's position, a defendant who forcefully takes a motor vehicle could take countless other items of property and be immune from robbery prosecution for these items. The Legislature could not have intended such an anomalous result. See City of Boca Raton v. Gidman, 440 So.2d 1277, 1281 (Fla.1983) (stating that statutes should not be given an interpretation that leads to an unreasonable or ridiculous conclusion).
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we approve the result of the Third District's decision in Cruller. We disapprove the First District's opinion in Ward.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, ANSTEAD, and LEWIS, JJ., concur.
QUINCE, J., concurs in result only.
PARIENTE, J., dissents with an opinion.
. In Smart, the defendant accosted the victim at an A.T.M. and, at gunpoint, robbed him of his jewelry and wallet. 652 So.2d at 448. After an accomplice struck the victim, the defendant drove off with his car. See id. The Third District held that under the circumstances the defendant properly was "convicted and sentenced for both armed robbery of the personal effects under section 812.13(2)(a), (b), Florida Statutes (1993), and the armed carjacking of a different item, the vehicle, which is forbidden by a different statute, section 812.133(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1993)." Id.
. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 302-04, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932).
. In concluding that double jeopardy precludes punishments for both carjacking and robbery, the dissent relies on the Blockburger test. However, courts only employ the Block-burger test if there is no clear statement of legislative intent to authorize separate punishments for the two crimes in question. See Gordon v. State, 780 So.2d 17, 20 (Fla.2001). As stated above, we find that the language, structure, and legislative history of the carjacking statute represent a clear statement from the Legislature that it intended to authorize separate punishments for carjacking and robbery; hence, there is no need to employ the Blockburger test in the instant case.