Case Name: Steve JEFFERSON, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee
Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2007-06-26
Citations: 958 So. 2d 1276
Docket Number: No. 2006-CP-00492-COA
Parties: Steve JEFFERSON, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
Judges: Before MYERS, P.J., IRVING and BARNES, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 958
Pages: 1276–1287

Head Matter:
Steve JEFFERSON, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
No. 2006-CP-00492-COA.
Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
June 26, 2007.
Steve Jefferson, Appellant, pro se.
Office of the Attorney General by Billy L. Gore, attorney for appellee.
Before MYERS, P.J., IRVING and BARNES, JJ.

Opinion:
BARNES, J.,
for the Court.
¶ 1. Steve Jefferson appeals the decision of the Marion County Circuit Court dismissing his petition for post-conviction collateral relief ("PCR"). Proceeding pro se, Jefferson asserts that the trial court committed reversible error by suspending part of his sentence and by sentencing him to house arrest. Additionally, Jefferson ar gues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel in that Jefferson's counsel misinformed him of the maximum sentence allowed for the charged crime. We are not persuaded by Jefferson's assignments of error; however, we find that the trial court committed plain error by sentencing Jefferson to a longer term of imprisonment than allowed by statute. Accordingly, we vacate Jefferson's sentence and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
FACTS
¶ 2. Steve Jefferson was indicted on May 5, 2004, by the Marion County Grand Jury for forging and presenting a bank check in the amount of $35 to a local grocery store. On July 8, 2004, Jefferson pled guilty to one count of uttering forgery. The Marion County Circuit Court entered its "Order of Conviction and Sentence" on July 15, 2004. That order provided, in pertinent part, as follows:
THEREFORE, for said offense and on said plea of guilty, and after consideration of a presentence investigation report, it is by the Court ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the said STEVE JEFFERSON be and he is hereby sentenced to serve FIFTEEN (15) years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. The defendant is to be placed immediately in the Therapeutic Community Drug and Alcohol Treatment Program with the Department of Corrections. Once the defendant has successfully completed the aforesaid Program, he is then to be released to serve the remaining balance of his FOUR (4) years in the Intensive Supervision House Arrest Program. Once the defendant has successfully completed the Intensive Supervision House Arrest Program then the remaining ELEVEN (11) years be SUSPENDED, pending successful completion of a FIVE (5) year period of post-release supervision, pursuant to Mississippi Code 47-7-34. The defendant shall receive credit for time served in the county jail on this charge to go towards the four year sentence.
¶ 3. "According to Jefferson, he completed the Therapeutic Community Drug and Alcohol Treatment Program on February 24, 2005, a fact which is not disputed by the State. Jefferson admits further that he violated the terms of the house arrest program on June 15, 2005, although the specifics of that violation are not apparent from the record. In any event, Jefferson was remanded to the custody of MDOC to serve out the remainder of his fifteen-year sentence. Jefferson filed a "Petition for Post-Conviction Collateral Relief to Vacate and Set-Aside Illegal Suspended Sentence" on November 8, 2005. In that petition, Jefferson argued that, because of his prior felony convictions, the circuit court was not authorized to suspend any part of his sentence nor to allow him to serve any portion thereof under house arrest.
¶ 4. While acknowledging that Jefferson's "sentence . was illegal to the extent that [Jefferson] was given house arrest and he was not eligible for such program," the circuit nevertheless summarily dismissed Jefferson's petition by order filed on November 15, 2005, finding that a defendant is not entitled to relief when he receives a more favorable sentence than the law allows. Aggrieved by the decision of the circuit court, Jefferson filed his "Notice of Appeal," which was dated January 24, 2006, and stamped filed on February 2, 2006.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 5. The circuit court dismissed Jefferson's PCR pursuant to the summary dismissal procedure authorized by Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-11(2) (Rev. 2000). In Young v. State, 731 So.2d 1120, 1122 (¶¶ 6-9) (Miss.1999), the Mississippi Supreme Court explained the procedural posture of an appeal from summary dismissal of a motion for post-conviction relief and the standard of review to be applied in such contexts. For purposes of this appeal, we need not recite the supreme court's entire explanation. Instead, we find sufficient the Young court's pronouncement that, on review of a PCR summary dismissal, "as in a 12(b)(6) dismissal, this Court reviews the record de novo to determine whether [the appellant] has failed to demonstrate 'a claim proeedurally alive substantially showing denial of a state or federal right, . ' " Id. at (¶ 9) (citations omitted).
DISCUSSION
¶ 6. Although not asserted by the State nor addressed by either party, we note, as a preliminary matter, that Jefferson's appeal appears to be untimely, as his "Notice of Appeal" was dated and stamped filed more than two months after the court's order dismissing Jefferson's PCR was entered. Rule 4(a) of the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure requires a notice of appeal to be filed within thirty days of entry of the order or judgment appealed from; however, considering the unique circumstances presented by this case, we choose to exercise the discretion vested in us pursuant to Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure 2(c) and allow Jefferson's out-of-time appeal. See Vance v. State, 941 So.2d 225, 227 (¶ 6) (Miss.Ct.App.2006); M.R.A.P. 4 cmt. (¶ 13). Accordingly, we find jurisdiction proper in this case, and we proceed to the merits of Jefferson's appeal.
¶ 7. Essentially, Jefferson's appeal raises two distinct issues. The first issue is based on the illegality of his sentence. More specifically, Jefferson asserts that, because of prior felonies on his record of which the trial court was aware, the trial judge was without authority to suspend any portion of his sentence and was without authority to place him under house arrest in lieu of being placed in the custody of MDOC. Second, Jefferson asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when, pri- or to entry of Jefferson's guilty plea, his trial counsel incorrectly informed him that the maximum possible sentence for uttering forgery was ten years. For reasons that we will briefly discuss below, we find Jefferson's argument with respect to both issues to be without merit. However, on review of the entire record, we find that the trial court committed plain error by imposing a greater sentence than was authorized by the applicable statute. It is upon this plain error that we base our decision to vacate the judgment of sentence entered below and remand for re-sentencing.
1. Whether Jefferson's suspended sentence and/or sentence to house arrest was illegal and, if so, whether such illegality constitutes reversible error
¶ 8. To support his contention that the trial judge in this case erred by suspending part of his sentence, Jefferson points to Mississippi Code Annotated section 47-7-33(1) (Rev.2004) which allows a trial court, "except in a case where a death sentence or life imprisonment is the maximum penalty which may be imposed or where the defendant has been convicted of a felony on a previous occasion, . to suspend the imposition or execution of sentence, and place the defendant on probation . " Because of Jefferson's undisputed prior felony convictions, Jefferson asserts that section 47-7-33(1) precluded the trial judge from suspending any portion of his sentence. Jefferson next argues that his placement in the Intensive Supervision House Arrest Program was illegal pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated sections 47-5-1001 to 1015 (Rev. 2004). In particular, section 47-5-1003 makes a defendant ineligible for the program where, among other disqualifying bases, "the defendant has been confined for the conviction of a felony on a previous occasion in any court or courts of the United States and of any state or territories thereof or has been convicted of a felony involving the use of a deadly weapon."
¶ 9. In ruling on Jefferson's PCR, the trial court found that Jefferson's sentence was illegal based on section 47-5-1003. According to the trial court, that section "sets forth the eligibility requirements for participation in the house arrest program and, based upon the prior felonies reported in [Jefferson's] pre-sentence report record ., the Court finds that [Jefferson] was not entitled to be placed on house arrest, his sentence was illegal." Nevertheless, the trial court dismissed Jefferson's PCR, reasoning that "[i]t is well-settled in Mississippi that when a Defendant is given an illegal sentence- that is more favorable than what the legal sentence would have been then he/she is not later entitled to relief through a postcon-viction action." We agree.
¶ 10. Even assuming, without deciding, that the trial judge in this case imposed an illegal sentence upon Jefferson by suspending part of his sentence and/or by sentencing Jefferson to house arrest, we find that such error by the trial court does not require reversal of Jefferson's conviction or sentence. In Myers v. State, 897 So.2d 198, 201 (¶ 11) (Miss.Ct.App.2004), we considered an argument identical to the one which Jefferson asserts in the instant case. There, the criminal defendant argued that, "because he had prior felonies, the only legal sentence he could have received was thirty years without parole. Therefore, [the defendant] claimfed] that his sentence was unconstitutional and must be set aside." Id. In finding that the errors urged in Myers did not rise to the level of reversible error, we stated that "a defendant's fundamental right of freedom from an illegal sentence is violated when the sentence imposes an undue burden on the defendant, such as when the offer induces a plea and the State later seeks to rescind the suspension solely because it was statutorily barred." Id. at 201 (¶ 12) (citing Graves v. State, 822 So.2d 1089, 1092 (¶ 11) (Miss.Ct.App.2002); Weaver v. State, 785 So.2d 1085, 1088 (¶ 11) (Miss.Ct.App.2001)).
¶ 11. Because the defendant in Myers benefitted from the illegal sentence in that the sentence imposed was more lenient than the sentence to which he was entitled, we held that he did not suffer "any fundamental 'unfairness from the illegal sen-ténce, nor [were] his fundamental fights [ ] violated." Id. (citing Graves, 822 So.2d at 1091 (¶ 8); McGleachie v. State, 800 So.2d 561 (¶ 4) (Miss.Ct.App.2001); Chancellor v. State, 809 So.2d 700 (¶ 8) (Miss.Ct.App.2001)). Similarly, because Jefferson benefitted from the allegedly illegal sentence imposed by the trial court in the case sub judice, we find any error committed by the trial court in imposing such illegal sentence to be harmless. See Sweat v. State, 912 So.2d 458, 461 (¶ 9) (Miss.2005) (adopting the holdings of this Court in finding that an error in sentencing is harmless error if it results in a more lenient sen tence for the defendant); see also Hughery v. State, 915 So.2d 457, 459 (¶ 8) (Miss.Ct.App.2005) (stating that defendant cannot reap the favorable benefits of an illegal sentence and then claim prejudice as a result thereof); Cook v. State, 910 So.2d 745, 747 (¶ 10) (Miss.Ct.App.2005) (holding that "an individual may not plead guilty to a crime, receive a lesser sentence than what is prescribed by statute, and then use the more lenient sentence as a sword to attack the entire sentence as illegal"). Jefferson's argument to the contrary is without merit.
2. Whether Jefferson received ineffective assistance of counsel
¶ 12. Jefferson claims that his trial counsel misinformed him that the maximum sentence possible for the charge of uttering forgery was ten years in the custody of MDOC. In his "Petition to Enter Plea of Guilty," Jefferson stated that he knew "the possible sentence is two year(s) minimum to ten years maximum, imprisonment. ." Furthermore, the transcript of the plea colloquy reflects that the trial judge questioned Jefferson regarding Jefferson's knowledge of the possible sentence which could be imposed, and Jefferson responded that he knew the maximum possible sentence was ten years' imprisonment. At the sentencing hearing held one week later, the trial judge sentenced Jefferson to fifteen years in the custody of MDOC. Accordingly, Jefferson asserts that he was prejudiced by his counsel's failure to inform him of the correct maximum sentence and that, therefore, his guilty plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made. We disagree for one very important reason: Jefferson's counsel was correct.
¶ 13. A successful claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires a showing that counsel's performance was deficient in some respect and that this deficiency caused prejudice to the defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). In the instant case, Jefferson's sole claim of deficiency is that his trial counsel misinformed him that the maximum sentence for uttering forgery was ten years when it was actually fifteen years. According to Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-21-59 (Rev.2006), the punishment for uttering forgery is the same as "herein provided for forgery." The penalty for forgery in effect at the time Jefferson was sentenced is outlined in Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-21-33 (Supp.2003), and provided that "[pjersons convicted of forgery shall be punished by imprisonment in the Penitentiary for a term of not less than two (2) years nor more than ten (10) years...." According to section 97-21-33, Jefferson's counsel correctly informed Jefferson that the maximum sentence for uttering forgery was ten years imprisonment, and as such, counsel's performance was not deficient. The trial judge, however, incorrectly imposed a greater sentence upon Jefferson than was allowed by section 97-21-33. Although not raised by Jefferson in either his peti tion for post-conviction relief or in the appeal before this Court, we find that this error rises to the level of plain error.
3. Whether the trial court's imposition of a greater sentence than allowed by statute constitutes plain error
¶ 14. Jefferson did not assert error by the trial court in imposing a fifteen year sentence in either his petition for post-conviction relief or in this appeal. In fact, Jefferson apparently asserts the opposite: that the trial judge correctly imposed a fifteen year sentence and that his counsel mistakenly informed him that the maximum sentence was ten years. As discussed above, the version of section 97-21-33 in effect at the time Jefferson was sentenced set the maximum sentence for forgery — and by reference, uttering forgery — at ten years. Despite Jefferson's failure to raise this issue, we find that the imposition of a greater sentence than allowed by statute amounts to plain error.
¶ 15. Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a)(3) ordinarily restricts our review to those issues raised by the parties on appeal. However, Rule 28(a)(3) provides that "the court may, at its option, notice a plain error not identified or distinctly specified." In addition, Mississippi Rule of Evidence 103(d) permits review of "plain errors affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention of the court." "According to the Mississippi Supreme Court, the reviewing court may address issues as plain error 'when the trial court has impacted upon a fundamental right of the defendant.' " Moore v. State, 755 So.2d 1276, 1279 (¶ 9) (Miss.Ct.App.2000) (quoting Berry v. State, 728 So.2d 568, 571 (¶ 6) (Miss.1999)). "The right to be free from an illegal sentence has been found to be fundamental." Davis v. State, 933 So.2d 1014, 1022 (¶ 32) (Miss.Ct.App.2006) (quoting Ethridge v. State, 800 So.2d 1221 (¶ 7) (Miss.Ct.App.2001)).
¶ 16. Because the circuit court sentenced Jefferson to a greater sentence than was allowed by statute, we find plain error in the sentence imposed by the circuit court. Therefore, we vacate the sentence previously imposed and remand this matter to the Circuit Court of Marion County for a new sentencing hearing at which time the court may impose a sentence not to exceed ten years in accordance with section 97-21-33 of the Mississippi Code.
¶ 17. THE JUDGMENT OF THE MARION COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IS AFFIRMED; THE JUDGMENT OF SENTENCE IN MARION COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT CAUSE NO. K04-0116E IS VACATED AND THIS CAUSE IS REMANDED FOR THE LIMITED PURPOSE OF RE-SENTENCING THE APPELLANT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 97-21-33 OF THE MISSISSIPPI CODE. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO MARION COUNTY.
KING C.J., LEE AND MYERS P.JJ., IRVING, CHANDLER, ISHEE AND CARLTON, JJ" CONCUR. ROBERTS, J., SPECIALLY CONCURS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY CHANDLER AND GRIFFIS, JJ.
. In his PCR, Jefferson did not specifically reference these provisions in asserting that his sentence to house arrest was illegal. However, the trial judge's determination that Jefferson's sentence to house arrest was illegal, as explained in the summary dismissal of Jefferson's PCR, was based on section 47-5-1003.
. As reflected in the portion of the sentencing order contained in paragraph two, above, eleven of those fifteen years were suspended with four years to be served under house arrest
. Section 97-21-33 was amended effective July 1, 2003, well before Jefferson was sentenced on July 15, 2004. One of the effects of this amendment was to lower the maximum sentence for forgery from fifteen years to ten years. According to our supreme court, "when a statute is amended to provide for a lesser penalty, and the amendment takes effect before sentencing, the trial court must sentence according to the statute as amended." Daniels v. State, 742 So.2d 1140, 1145 (¶ 17) (Miss.1999).