Case Name: McDANIEL v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1911-05-17
Citations: 139 S.W. 1154
Docket Number: 
Parties: McDANIEL v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 139
Pages: 1154–1154

Head Matter:
McDANIEL v. STATE.
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
May 17, 1911.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 18, 1911.)
1. Cbiminai, Law (§ 829 ) — Instructions — Request.
Where the main charge covered accused’s right to defend himself in a more favorable light than his requested instructions, such instructions were properly refused.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 2011; Dec. Dig. § 829. ]
2. Criminal Law (§ 825 ) — Instructions — Reasonable Doubt.
Where, in a prosecution for assault to murder, the court instructed as to the doctrine of reasonable doubt, as between the different degrees of assault, and upon the whole case, in absence of requested charges, it was not bound to instruct on reasonable doubt in the part of the charge defining aggravated assault.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 2005; Dec. Dig. § 825. ]
3. Criminal Law (§ 776 ) — Instructions — Accused’s Reputation.
Where the court charged on the presumption of innocence, a requested instruction was properly refused that, where accused’s good reputation was established by the evidence, it was affirmative evidence for him, to be considered in determining guilt.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1838-1845; Dec. Dig. § 776. ]
Appeal from District Court, Lamar County; Ben H. Denton, Judge.
J. W. McDaniel was convicted of assault with intent to murder, and he appeals.
Affirmed.
H. B. Birmingham and B. B. Sturgeon, for appellant. C. E. Lane, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
For other oases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
HARPER, J.
Appellant was indicted, tried, and convicted of assault to murder on C. E. Caldwell, and sentenced to two years' confinement in the penitentiary.
1. The first ground in the motion for a new trial alleges that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction. If the witnesses introduced on behalf of the state are to be believed, the evidence shows an attack by defendant on Caldwell with the specific intent to kill. It is true the evidence on behalf of the defendant raised the issue that he shot Caldwell in defense of an assault made on him, but this issue was submitted to the jury, and they found against appellant's contention.
2. Appellant complains that the court failed to give in charge the statutory definition of manslaughter. No special charge was requested, amplifying the charge of the court on this phase of the case. The elements, as applicable to this case, were defined in the court's charge, and the jury were instructed that, if the shooting took place under such circumstances, defendant, if guilty, would be guilty only of aggravated assault. Pollard v. State, 58 Tex. Cr. R. 299, 125 S. W. 390.
3. Appellant complains of the failure of the court to give in charge instructions Nos. 1 and 2, requested by defendant. These both relate to defendant's right to defend himself against real or apparent danger, as viewed from his standpoint. The court in his main charge presents the right to defend himself in a more favorable light than do the two instructions requested, and, having presented the matter in his main charge, there was no error in refusing to give the two charges requested.
4. There is complaint that the court did not instruct on reasonable doubt in those paragraphs of the charge in which the jury was told under what circumstances the shooting would amount to an aggravated assault only, in case they found the defendant guilty. The court instructed the jury on the application of reasonable doubt as between degrees, and on the whole case, and in the absence of requested charges, this has been held to be all that is necessary. Cockerell v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. R. 585, 25 S. W. 421.
5. Appellant introduced evidence that his reputation as a peaceable law-abiding citizen was good, and there was no contest on this issue. Defendant requested the court' to charge the jury: "Evidence of good reputation of the defendant has been introduced before you. You are instructed that where the good reputation of the defendant is established by the evidence it is affirmative evidence for the defendant, and accompanies him throughout the trial as an affirmative fact to be considered by you in determining his guilt or innocence." Every person is presumed to have a good reputation, unless the contrary appears in the evidence. The court charged the jury on the presumption of innocence, and there was no error in refusing this special instruction.
The judgment is affirmed. .