Case Name: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Dolores FIGUEROA, Appellant; COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Burton David PORTER, Appellant; COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Robert Irvin FERREE, Appellant
Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1997-03-18
Citations: 691 A.2d 487
Docket Number: 
Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Dolores FIGUEROA, Appellant. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Burton David PORTER, Appellant. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Robert Irvin FERREE, Appellant.
Judges: Before TAMILIA, SAYLOR and OLSZEWSKI, JJ.
Reporter: West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 691
Pages: 487–494

Head Matter:
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Dolores FIGUEROA, Appellant. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Burton David PORTER, Appellant. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Robert Irvin FERREE, Appellant.
Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
Submitted Aug. 26, 1996.
Filed March 18, 1997.
William R. Carroll, Somerset, for appellants.
Jerry L. Spangler, Assistant District Attorney, Somerset, for Commonwealth, appellee.
Before TAMILIA, SAYLOR and OLSZEWSKI, JJ.

Opinion:
TAMILIA, Judge.
Appellants, Dolores Figueroa, Burton David Porter and Robert Irvin Ferree, take this appeal from the judgments of sentence entered April 3, 1996 following their pleas of guilty to charges stemming from an incident which occurred on October 15, 1995 while all three were incarcerated in the State Correctional Institution of Somerset. Apparently, the victim, also an inmate, slapped appellant Figueroa, who subsequently requested fellow inmate Porter to "take care" of the victim. An altercation ensued involving the victim, Porter and Ferree in which the victim died as the result of blunt force trauma to the head.
On March 1, 1996, Porter pled guilty to involuntary manslaughter and Figueroa pled guilty to solicitation to commit assault; whereas, Ferree pled guilty to involuntary manslaughter on March 4, 1996. Sentencing occurred on April 3, 1994 in which Porter and Ferree each received two and one-half (2-1/2) to five (5) years' imprisonment and Figueroa received one (1) to two (2) years' imprisonment. Additionally, all three appellants were sentenced to pay, jointly and severally, restitution to the State Correctional Institution of Somerset in the amount of $51,314.83 for medical and hospital expenses arising out of the treatment of the victim from the date of the assault, October 15, 1995, until his death on October 20, 1995.
On appeal to this Court, appellants contend the trial court committed an error of law imposing restitution as the Department of Corrections is not a "victim" as defined by 18 Pa.C.S. § 1106(h) which defines "victim" as "[a]ny person, except an offender, who suffered injuries to his person or property as a direct result of the crime." In addition, appellants rely upon Commonwealth v. Runion, 541 Pa. 202, 662 A.2d 617 (1995), for the proposition that an agency of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania simply is not an appropriate victim to whom an award of restitution is made.
Initially, we note the trial court, in reaching its decision to impose restitution relied on 18 Pa.C.S. § 1106(c)(1) Mandatory Restitution, which provides:
(1) The court shall order full restitution:
(i) Regardless of the current financial resources of the defendant, so as to provide the victim with the fullest compensation for the loss. The court shall not reduce a restitution award by any amount that the victim has received from the Crime Victim's Compensation Board or other governmental agency but shall order the defendant to pay any restitution ordered for loss previously compensated by the board to the Crime Victim's Compensation Fund or other designated account when the claim involves a government agency in addition to or in place of the board. The court shall not reduce a restitution award by any amount that the victim has received from an insurance company but shall order the defendant to pay any restitution ordered for loss previously compensated by an insurance company to the insurance company.
(ii) If restitution to more than one person is set at the same time, the court shall set priorities of payment.
However, when establishing priorities, the court shall order payment in the following order:
(A) The victim.
(B) The Crime Victim's Compensation Board.
(C) Any other government agency which has provided reimbursement to the victim as a result of the defendant's criminal conduct.
(D) Any insurance company which has provided reimbursement to the victim as a result of the defendant's criminal conduct.
The court specifically looked at the amended section (c)(1)(ii)(C) and held the following:
Although the statute fails to define the phrase "which has provided reimbursement to the victim", we find that a common sense reading requires us to conclude that the Department qualifies as having provided reimbursement to the victim. There is no dispute that the decedent was a "victim" as that term is defined in the statute. Nor is there any dispute that the Department has expended this sum of money to provide medical treatment to the victim.
(Slip Op., Cascio, J/, 6/6/96, p. 3.)
To gain a better understanding of the legislative intent, the trial court thereafter looked to the language of subsection (c)(1)(i), specifically, "but shall order the defendant to pay any restitution ordered for loss previously compensated by the board to the Crime Victim's Compensation Fund or other designated account when the claim involves a government agency in addition to or in place of the board", and found it to be confusing at best. However, the trial court, reading this subsection in conjunction with subsection (c)(1)(ii)(C), determined the court is required to order these defendants to make restitution to the Department as another "designated account when the claim involves a government agency in addition to or in place of the board."
The primary purpose of restitution is rehabilitation of the offender by impressing upon him that his criminal conduct caused the victim's personal injury and that it is his responsibility to repair the injury as far as possible. Runion, supra. The imposition of restitution is within the sound discretion of the sentencing court and must be supported by the record. Id, After our review of the record, we find the facts to parallel that of Runion and thus are constrained to reverse the trial court decision based on the rationale set forth by our Supreme Court in Runion.
Runion, which was argued before but decided after the effective date of the amendments to section 1106, addresses the issue of whether the Department of Public Welfare may be considered a "victim" under section 1106 so as to be entitled to restitution for the costs it incurred covering the medical expenses of a victim who was on public assistance at the time she was injured. Our Supreme Court, relying on the previous definition of "victim", held that it is for the Legislature to expand the meaning of the term "victim" to include government agencies of this Commonwealth, as the Department of Public Welfare is not a "person" and as such may not be considered a victim. Specifically, the Court held a government agency may not be a victim for the purposes of restitution under the Crimes Code and it is the sole responsibility of the Legislature to expand the definition of "victim". Furthermore, we note the revised definition of "victim" simply expands the definition to include "the Crime Victim's Compensation Fund if compensation has been paid by the [Fund] to the victim and any insurance company that has compensated the victim for loss under an insurance contract." 18 Pa.C.S. § 1106(h). "Any other government agency which has provided reimbursement to the victim as a result of the defendant's criminal conduct", section 1106(c)(1)(ii)(C), does not extend the coverage of restitution to all government agencies required to provide services to victims. Such service, whether it be hospital care as in this ease, care of a criminally neglected or abused child (CYS), a fire department's costs to put out a fire caused by arson, or the cost of an ambulance and emergency treatment due to assaults, etc., is outside the limited scope of that section.
Reimbursement, in the context of subsection ii(C), means to reimburse in the classic sense which, by definition, is "[t]o pay back, to make restoration, to repay that expended; to indemnify, or make whole." Black's Law Dictionary, (5th ed.) In other words, the governmental agency must have compensated the victim in a monetary fashion as a result of the loss of "property [which] has been stolen, converted or otherwise unlawfully obtained, or its value substantially decreased as a direct result of the crime, or wherein the victim suffered personal injury directly resulting from the crime[.]" 18 Pa.C.S. § 1106(a). Other government agencies, similar to the Crime Victim's Compensation Board, that may qualify are those which specifically provide funds to the victim to compensate for the loss, such as the Supreme Court's Pennsylvania Lawyers Fund for Client Security. In enlarging the category to other government agencies which provide compensation to victims and insurance companies that do likewise, the Legislature never intended to include the numerous governmental agencies which provide social, medical and supportive services to victims of crime. The victim is not being given compensation by such agencies and the agencies are not entitled to restitution as reimbursement for the service. Here, the victim suffered the most egregious loss of all, that of his life, for which no financial compensation was given by the Department of Corrections. Medical care of an injured prisoner is an entitlement, not compensation. As such, the Department is not reimbursable pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 1106, Restitution for injuries to person or property. Clearly, the amendment did not intend to include the Department of Corrections, as a government agency entitled to reimbursement, and thus, in accordance with Runion, the Department cannot be deemed a victim under section 1106.
The dissent's view far exceeds the minimal changes enacted by the Legislature in the restitution section of the Criminal Code. To implicate the myriad of governmental agencies which provide services to people, as the dissent conveniently ignores, as being entitled to reimbursement would create chaos in an already difficult restitution system. The dissent would have the court responsible for reimbursement to Children and Youth Services, mental health agencies, every hospital and clinic in Pennsylvania, the Departments of Welfare, Education and Corrections, the Department of Health and others of the more than 230 departments under state control in Pennsylvania. See General Index to P.S. and Pa.C.S. under Departments. All of these agencies, in one form or another, receive state and/or federal aid and all, at one time or another, may be impacted by additional costs to service a victim.
The section on restitution, 18 Pa.C.S. § 1106, reads in its heading, "Restitution for injuries to person or property". Under subsection (h), Definitions, restitution is defined: "Restitution: The return of the property of the victim or payment in cash or the equivalent thereof pursuant to an order of court." The definition of victim is "[a]ny person, except an offender, who suffered injuries to his person or property as a direct result of the crime." The 1995 amendments to this section expanded the term "victim" to include the Crime Victims Compensation Fund and any insurance company that has compensated a victim for loss under any insurance contract. In each ease, they receive reimbursement for direct payment made to a victim which the victim could have received as restitution from the defendant under the act.
Restitution was not meant to be a reimbursement system to government but a compensation system to victims identified as such in the definitional section of the statute. The dissent would change the entire thrust of restitution from compensating victims (or reimbursement to those private or public agencies who compensate victims by insurance or quasi insurance) to a pure reimbursement system for costs involved in treating or caring for a victim. As such, it totally rewrites the legislation and imposes a burden on the court restitution collection system which it cannot support and for which it was not intended.
Judgment of sentence as to the Order of restitution against each of the named appellants is hereby vacated.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
SAYLOR, J., files a concurring statement.
OLSZEWSKI, J., files a dissenting statement.
. This section was amended May 3, 1995, effective in sixty (60) days.
. While the Dissenting Opinion in footnote 1 would disclaim application of the Prison Medical Service Act, it would have this Act guide us toward a conclusion that any government services, which in some way benefit a victim of a crime, should be reimbursable to the government agency by restitution from the defendant. This conclusion cannot be reached at this time and, in fact, recently, in Commonwealth v. Yanoff, - Pa.Super. -, 690 A.2d 260 (1997), a panel of this Court, relying on Commonwealth v. Runion, 541 Pa. 202, 662 A.2d 617 (1995), held that a restitution order to the Bureau of Laboratory and Communication Services (a state bureau) was improper and reversed that portion of the sentence, while allowing restitution for burial expenses of the victim to the victim's parents. Runion remains a strong statement against restitution to government agencies unless it can be proven that the agency was a victim or was intended by 18 Pa.C.S. § 1106, Restitution for injuries to person or property, to be a beneficiary-