Case Name: CROWE v. LIQUID CARBONIC CO.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1912-12-30
Citations: 139 N.Y.S. 587
Docket Number: 
Parties: CROWE v. LIQUID CARBONIC CO.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 139
Pages: 587–592

Head Matter:
CROWE v. LIQUID CARBONIC CO.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.
December 30, 1912.)
1. Sales (§ 481 )—Conditional Sales—Retaking and Sale—Liability oe Seller.
Under Personal Property Law (Laws 1909, c. 45 [Consol. Laws 1909, c. 41]) § 65, providing that where property is retaken by the seller under a contract of conditional sale, and is not sold by him at public auction within 30 days after the 30 days he is required to retain possession, he is liable for the return of payments made by the buyer, a seller who took control of a soda fountain under a contract of conditional sale, and rented same and appropriated the rent without crediting it on the contract, became liable to repay the installments paid by the buyer, though the contract purported to waive the statutory provision; an executory contract waiving such statutory provision being contrary to public policy, and void,
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Sales, Cent. Dig. §§ 1449-1455; Dec. Dig. § 481.*]
2. Appeal and Error (§ 1175*)—Reversal—Rendering Final Judgment.
Where, on appeal from a judgment against plaintiff in an action to recover payments made, plaintiff is held entitled to recover the payments, and the findings of fact show, without dispute, the amount of the payments, the judgment will be reversed and final judgment rendered without new trial, under authority of Code Civ. Proc. § 1317, as amended by Laws 1912, c. 380, authorizing rendition of judgment without a new trial when a new trial is unnecessary.
[Ed. Note.—For other eases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 4573-4587; Dec. Dig. § 1175.*]
Houghton and Lyon, JJ., dissenting.
Appeal from Trial Term, Broome County.
Action by George j. H. Crowe, as trustee, against the Liquid Carbonic Company. From a judgment dismissing the complaint, plaintiff appeals.
Reversed upon the law and facts.
Argued before SMITH, P. J„ and KELLOGG, HOUGHTON, BETTS, and LYON, JJ.
H. J. Hennessey, of Binghamton, for appellant.
T. B. & L. M. Merchant, of Binghamton, for respondent.
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
JOHN M. KELLOGG, J.
May 7, 1909, Pappas & ICarahall purchased of the defendant, under a contract of conditional sale, a soda fountain and apparatus for $1,885, $400 of which was paid by the delivery of an old fountain, $225 in cash, and the balance was represent- _ ed by 36 promissory notes of $35 each, with interest, dated May -7, 1909,- one note payable each month thereafter. On the 21st day of January, 1910, the said firm and its members were declared bankrupts, and thereafter the plaintiff was duly appointed trustee in bankruptcy. The notes which had become due up to that time had been paid.. Those subsequently maturing were not paid. The fountain was in the store carried on by said bankrupts. One Beaumann, under a chattel mortgage, acquired title to the goods and fixtures in the store-aside from the fountain, and continued the business in the same store. The fountain and apparatus were inventoried by the plaintiff in the schedules in bankruptcy as held under a conditional sale contract, but remained in the store. On February 3, 1910, the defendant leased the fountain in the store to Beaumann, the occupant of the store, for the month of February at $15, and like monthly leases were made for March, April, and May. The rental was duly paid, but was not indorsed by the defendant upon the contract of sale. In June the defendant removed the fountain and apparatus from the store, and claimed to have retaken it then, and after 30 days caused notice of sale to be given, and the fountain was subsequently sold, apparently according to the provision of the law relating to conditional sales.
There was no note in arrear on the day of the leasing, but one became due a very few days after, and when each subsequent lease was made, there were notes in default.
Section 65 of the Personal Property Law (chapter 45, Laws of 1909 [Consol. Laws 1909, c. 41]) provides that, where property is retaken by the vendor under a contract of conditional sale, it shall be retained by him for 30 days from such retaking in order to enable the vendee to comply with the contract, and, if the default continues, the vendor must within 30 days thereafter sell the articles at public auction, and, "unless such articles are so sold within thirty days after the expiration of such period, the vendee or- his successor in interest may recover of the vendor the amount paid on such articles by such vendee or his successor in interest under the contract for the conditional sale thereof." The plaintiff seeks to recover the installments paid upon the contract, but by the judgment appealed from he is denied relief.
The defendant had no right to lease the fountain to Beaumann unless he claimed that right under the contract of conditional sale, and it was proceeding upon the theory that default had been made or was about to be made. After default the plaintiff could not object to the defendant's retaking or renting the property, as it was its right under the contract. That the defendant considered it was leasing the fountain for its own benefit, and not for' the benefit of the plaintiff, is evident by its appropriating the rent, and not crediting it on the contract. It took control of the fountain and retained it for four months, and its attempt thereafter to comply with the statute was too late. _ It had incurred the liability to repay the installments paid upon retaining the property after thirty days without taking any steps for selling it. The contract purported to waive this provision of the statute as to retaining the property for thirty days after retaking it and selling it for the vendee's benefit, but provided that upon such retaking the vendee's right to comply with the terms of the contract and thereupon receive said property is expressly waived. This statute was passed pursuant to a wise public-policy. It was known that property was frequently sold upon conditional sales, and, after the vendee had nearly paid for it, the vendor would seize and resell it, and the vendee would lose the property and the payments as well. The Legislature evidently realized that the persons making this class of contracts were at a disadvantage, and were not entirely in a position to adequately take care of themselves by exacting favorable terms for such a contract, and therefore the law provided what should be the effect of such .a contract" and in what manner and how the vendor might retake and sell the property. If by an executory contract the provisions of the statute may be waived in advance, it practically nullifies the statute because a waiver will always be found. The authorities indicate that such a waiver by executory agreement in advance of default and at the time of making the contract is against public policy and ineffectual, and we so hold. Roach v. Curtis, 115 App. Div. 765, 101 N. Y. Supp. 333; s. c., 191 N. Y. 388, 84 N. E. 283; Hurley v. Allman Gas Engine & Machine Co., 144 App. Div. 300, 129 N. Y. Supp. 14. The defendant did not retake and sell the property in the manner required in the case of a conditional sale, and the attempted waiver of the provisions of the statute in that respect is without effect.
Under section 1317 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended in 1912 (Laws 1912, c. 380), this court may "render judgment of affirmance, judgment of reversal and final judgment upon the right of any or all of the parties, or judgment of modification thereon, according to law, except where it may be necessary or proper to grant a new trial or hearing, when it may grant a new trial or hearing.'' The evidence shows that this plaintiff is entitled to recover the payments actually made. The eighth and ninth findings of fact show upon undisputed evidence the payments made. There is therefore no necessity for a new trial. The judgment should therefore be reversed upon .the law and the facts. The fourteenth and fifteenth findings of fact are disapproved of as without evidence, and a final judgment directed for the plaintiff for the payments made on said contract as shown by the eighth and ninth findings of fact, with interest thereon from April 12, 1912, with costs to the plaintiff in the court below and upon this appeal.
All concur, except HOUGHTON and LYON, JJ., dissenting.