Case Name: R. D. Davies et als. vs. Monroe Water Works and Light Company, et als.
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1901-11
Citations: 107 La. 145
Docket Number: No. 14,001
Parties: R. D. Davies et als. vs. Monroe Water Works and Light Company, et als.
Judges: Provosty, J., dissents from the judgment on -the merits.
Reporter: Louisiana Reports
Volume: 107
Pages: 145–162

Head Matter:
No. 14,001.
R. D. Davies et als. vs. Monroe Water Works and Light Company, et als.
Syllabus.
On Motion to Dismiss.
1. In case of doubt, the doubt will revolve itself in favor of the appeal. The sufficiency and competency of the surety was a proper subject for inquiry in the District Court.
2. The return of appeals in matter relating to the appointment of receivers, under Statute 1898, is governed by special provision of that statute.
3. The_ lack of an affidavit to show interest of the appellant affords no ground to dismiss the appeal where the interest is admitted by all the parties to the appeal.
ON the Merits.
The management of the company brought it within the terms of the Statute 159 of 1898. A receiver was appointed by the District Court, and the court’s action in this respect is affirmed, subject to the rights of creditors under Section 10 of Statute 159 of 1898.
On Application por Rehearing.
1. It is good ground for the appointment of a receiver to a corporation wheri it appears that the directors or other officials are jeopardizing the rights of stockholders or creditors, by grossly mismanaging the business, or by committing acts ultra vires, or by wasting, misusing or misapplying the property or funds of the corporation; or, when it appears that a majority of the shareholders are violating the charter rights of the minority and putting their interests in imminent danger.
2. ' It is for the court to determine whether or not the showing made justifies and makes advisable the appointment of a receiver.
3. The appropriate place for officials in charge of the business of a corporation is the domicil of the company. If they live away from its domicil, they have no right to charge the company for traveling expenses to and fro between their homes and the domicil of the company.
4. Officials and majority shareholders have no right to extend favors to certain of the shareholders at the expense of the corporation, or of the body of tne shareholders.
5. The provision of the charter requiring thirty days’ previous notice to be given to stockholders of a meeting called to consider the question of the dissolution and liquidation of the corporation is held to be mandatory.
6. It will not do to say that because a corporation may be insolvent and nothing be eventually coming to the stockholders, they are without interest to take action to prevent abuses.
7. Where a case for a receivership is otherwise made put, it is no sufficient ground for denying the application that it will entail large costs and expenses. The courts of Louisiana will not permit the spoliation of estates and corporations in the way of the allowance of exhorbitant charges for commissions, fees, costs, etc.
APPEAL from- the Sixth Judicial District, Parish of Ouachita.— Hall, J.
Andrew Augustus Gunby and E. Tylor Lamkin, for Plaintiff, Appellee.
Hudson, Potts & Bernstein, for Defendants, and Intervenors, Appellants.

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered hy Breaux, J.
On rehearing by Blanchard, J.
On Motion to Dismiss.
Breaux, J.
Plaintiffs and appellees moved before this court to dismiss the appeal on a number of grounds.
First, because no appeal bond has been ¡filed as required. The two documents purporting to be appeal bonds filed by the defendants, the Monroe Waiter Works and Light Co. et als., are signed by L. D. McLain who is one of the defendants and appellants.
Second, because .the defendants' and intervenors' order of appeal is made returnable before the expiration of fifteen days from the date of the judgment, in contravention of Statute 92 of July 10th, 1900, which declares that the judge shall fix the day in the order granting the appeal, which shall not be less than fifteen days nor more than sixty days from the date of the order, except by the consent of the parties.
Third, because appellants have not complied with the provisions of Section 4 of Statute 159 of 1898, which requires that one appealing from an order appointing a receiver shall make affidavit to his interest in such appointment.
With reference to the facts bearing on the first ground for dismissal, it does appear that L. D. McLain is a party defendant and a party intervenor. The intervention, as it appears on the face of the judgment appealed against, was dimissed. With reference to the facts bearing on the second ground for dismissal, the orders of appeal were made returnable according to law. And, with reference to the facts upon which the third ground is based, no affidavit was taken by any one applying to this court.
Taking the first ground for decision, the court finds that there are a number of decisions in which it is held that questions relating to the sufficiency of the bond and the competency of the surety on the bond, both as relates to identification and competency, should be decided contradictorily before the court a qua. In view of the fact that questions should be decided in favor of sustaining the appeal where there is the least doubt, the court decides to adhere to the ruling .aS laid down in the following cases: Edwards vs. Edwards, 29 An. 599; Succession of Charmbury, 34, A. 21; Surget vs. Stanton, 10 A. 318; Wood vs. Harrell, 14, A. 61; Vredenburgh vs. Behan, 32 A. 475, and not to consider the construction in Barrow vs. Clack, 45 A. 478, as applying. This disposes of the first ground to dismiss.
As relates to the intervenors, no question for dismissal arises on this point. An appeal.bond was furnished by the.intervenors, not objectionable in any way.
As relates to the second ground of the motion to dismiss, .that 'is, that the return, day should have been fixed by the court, 'under tho Statute of 1898, we can only say that the Statute of 1900 relating-to appeals generally controls in all cases not governed by special rule. A general law does not repeal a special statute, unless its terms are such as to make it appear evident that the intention was to repeal the special statute. Repeal by implication is not presumed.
, As relates to the intervenors, they have furnished an appeal bond to which not the least objection has been urged.
With reference to the next objection made to the appeal in the motion to dismiss, the lack of the affidavit affords good ground for dismissing the appeal, appellees urge. The Statute 159 of 1898 provides that one who, by affidavit, appears to be interested, may appeal by furnishing bond as required. We think persons not parties to the proceedings are referred to and not those who are parties to the suit, whose interests are admitted by all parties to the litigation. The purpose in requiring the affidavit is to compel the appellant to swear that he, though not a party, has interests involved which afford him a right to be heard. The affidavit of one whose interest is admitted would be an entirely useless formality, as it would add nothing to that which has already been ascertained.
Eor these reasons, the motion to dismiss the appeal is denied.