Case Name: FRANK'S FINE MEATS and Travelers Insurance Company, Appellants, v. Sam SHERMAN and Division of Workers' Compensation, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1984-01-10
Citations: 443 So. 2d 1055
Docket Number: No. AQ-445
Parties: FRANK’S FINE MEATS and Travelers Insurance Company, Appellants, v. Sam SHERMAN and Division of Workers’ Compensation, Appellees.
Judges: NIMMONS, J., specially concurs with opinion.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 443
Pages: 1055–1058

Head Matter:
FRANK’S FINE MEATS and Travelers Insurance Company, Appellants, v. Sam SHERMAN and Division of Workers’ Compensation, Appellees.
No. AQ-445.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Jan. 10, 1984.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 7, 1984.
Richard E. Hodges of Miller, Hodges & Kagan, Miami, for appellants.
Stephen Marc Slepin of Slepin, Slepin, Lambert & Waas, Tallahassee, for appellee Sam Sherman.
Susan J. Silverman of Marlow, Shofi, Ortmayer, Smith, Connell & Valerius, Miami, for appellee Florida Ins. Guar. Ass’n.

Opinion:
THOMPSON, Judge.
The employer/carrier (E/C). appeal a compensation order contending that the deputy commissioner (deputy) erred in finding that the claimant sustained a compen-sable accident and in finding that the claimant was permanently totally disabled (PTD). We affirm in part and reverse in part.
There is competent substantial evidence to support the deputy's finding that the claimant sustained a compensable accident on January 7, 1980 and this finding is affirmed.
The deputy's finding that the claimant was PTD is not supported by competent substantial evidence. Section 440.- 15(1)(b), Fla.Stat. (1979), in effect at the time claimant sustained his accident on January 7, 1980, provides that no compensation for permanent total disability shall be payable "if the employee is engaged in, or is physically capable of engaging in, gainful employment, and the burden shall be upon the employee to establish that he is not able uninterruptedly to .do even light work due to physical limitation." The claimant cites approximately 15 cases in support of his argument that the finding of PTD was proper. However, these cases are inapplicable herein because not a single one involved an accident occurring on or after August 1, 1979, the effective date of the very substantial changes to § 440.15(1) which apply to this post-August 1, 1979 accident. Citing Tropicana Pools v. Truex, 287 So.2d 71 (Fla.1973), claimant also contends that by law the deputy could accept his own personal observation that the claimant was "patently" disabled "in the teeth of contrary medical evidence" given by his attending physician. The claimant also testified to physical limitations that were not supported by the medical evidence. Although Tropicana is the law applicable to accidents occurring prior to August 1, 1979, it is not applicable to cases involving accidents occurring on or after August 1, 1979. As to the latter accidents, the determination of the existence and degree of permanent impairment must be based upon medically or scientifically demonstrable findings and cannot be based on the claimant's complaints or the deputy's evaluation of those complaints and mere observation of the claimant. The only competent substantial medical evidence showed that the claimant was able to work. There was no competent substantial evidence to support the deputy's finding of PTD and his excusal of a further work search by the claimant. Neither the claimant's complaint of pain and his stated limitations, which were not supported by the medical evidence, nor the deputy's observations, are competent substantial evidence to support a finding of PTD. In Regency Inn v. Johnson, 422 So.2d 870, 873 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), this court pointed out the distinction between the language in the PTD Section 440.15(l)(b) and permanent impairment and wage loss benefit Section 440.-15(3) saying:
We also note that the statutory language on wage loss, supra, stands in contrast to that which governs a claimant's burden in establishing permanent total disability, i.e., "the burden shall be upon the employee to establish that he is not able uninterruptedly to . work due to physical limitations," and no compensation of that character shall be payable "if the employee . is physically capable of . gainful employment." (emphasis supplied by court)
The court went on to hold that the language in § 440.15(3) was less restrictive and would permit payment of wage loss benefits resulting from economic incapacity caused by job disruption as well as physical incapacity whereas the PTD is restricted to disability resulting from physical incapacity. There being no competent substantial evidence that the claimant is PTD because of physical incapacity, the award of PTD is REVERSED.
NIMMONS, J., specially concurs with opinion.
ERVIN, C.J., dissents with opinion.