Case Name: Louis Bartoli vs. Virginie Huguenard, his wife
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1887-04
Citations: 39 La. Ann. 411
Docket Number: No. 9602
Parties: Louis Bartoli vs. Virginie Huguenard, his wife.
Judges: 
Reporter: Louisiana Annual Reports
Volume: 39
Pages: 411–419

Head Matter:
No. 9602.
Louis Bartoli vs. Virginie Huguenard, his wife.
TLe statement, contained in the order of appeal, that there is not sufficient time to prepare the Tecord by the next regular return day for appeals from the court a qua, even if suggested by appellant’s counsel, must he held as adopted by, and as emanating from, the trial judge.
Hence, the Court, will not consider ax parta certificates, or affidavits, or other evidence outside of the record, touching the alleged error of such a statement.
Under Section 4 of Act 45 of 1870, Extra Session, the trial judge has the legal discretion to fix a different return day if time is required to prepare the record for appeal, and the Supreme Court will not presume that he has abused of the discretion vested in him by law.
There can be no reckoning between the spouses inter sese as to the quantum of labor bestowed, or capital by either withdrawn, during the existence of the community.
The distinct interest of the wife attaches at the dissolution'of the marriage,* butneithor spouse can sue for half the price of any specific thing acquired during the marriage, when the liquidation of the community does not show any gains to be divided.
The value of improvements and ameliorations made., upon separate property of either spouse, during the marriage, is at the expense of the community, only when it is not due to the ordinary course of things, to the rise in the value of property, or the chances of trade.
APPEAL from tlie Twenty-fourth District Court, Parish of Plaque-mines. íávcmdcvis, J'.
F. G. Zaoharie and F. Michmard for Plaintiff and Appellant:
1. Revenues of paraphernal property of either spouse, during marriage, form pare of the community, when the husband has had the administration of the same. R. C. C. 2386, 2402, 2406; 16 L.l; 17 L.296; 19 L.574; 3 Ann. 611; 4 Ann. 248; 6 Ann. 634.
2. The wife and her heirs and assigns have the privilege of exonerating themselves from the debts contracted during the niarriage. by renouncing the partnership or community of gains. R.C. C.2410.
3. The wife who renounces loses every sort of right to the effects of the partnership or community of gains. R. C. O. 2411.
4. The wife separated from bed and board, who has not, within the delays above fixed to begin from the separation finally pronounced, accepted the community, is supposed to have renounced the same; unless, being still within the term, she has obtained a prolongation from the judge, after the hnsband was heard, or after he was duly summoned. R. C. C. 2420.
5 She ought also to make her renunciation within the same delays which are allowed the beneficiary heirs within which to explain his intentions. R. C. C. 2414 ; t2 Ann. 76; 15 ' Ann. 416.
6. Under R. O. C. art. 1032, the duty is -imposed upon the beneficiary heir of having au inventory of the succession made. Under Art. 1050, R. C, 0M he is given thirty days within which to deliberate whether lie will accept or reject the succession. 12 Ann, 76 ; 15 Aim. 416.
F. Howard McOaleb for Defendant and Appellee:
1. "Where the witness is neither dead nor absent, hut shown to be present in the parish at the time of the trial, and his attendance could have been compelled by an attachment, testimony taken in a former suit between the same parties is not admissible, if objected to. GH. S. 351; 5L.364.
2. The renunciation of the community is presumed from the mere silence of the wife separated by judgment a mensa et thoro during the time prescribed by law. 11 Ann. 70; 12 Ann. 76; 15 Ann. 416.
3. The separate property of the wife, not shown to have been increased or improved during the marriage, by the common labor and expense, cannot be held liable to the husband especially where the increase, if any. is attributable to the ordinary course of things. R.C. G. 2408.
4. One-half of the enhanced value of the wife’s separate property, at the dissolution of the marriage, caused by improvements made thereon by the community, must be accounted for by her on final settlement. 4 R. 278; 6 R. 50S; 10 R. 373. The compensation due the community is regulated by the value of the improvements at the time of the dissolution of the marriage. 8 R. 182; 12 R. 389, 390; 2 Ann. 30. Here no improvements were made on the wife’s property during marriage, consequently she owed nothing at its dissolution.
5. Tlie incroaso in the annual sales of the orange crops, due to the fertility of the soil and not proven to have been the result of the common labor of the spouses, creates no liability on the part of the wife or her separate estate. 10 Ann. 258.
6. There is a striking analogy recognized by law between the relations of the usufructuary and the owner and the community to the wife as regards her paraphernal property. 6 Ann. 636; 10 R. 46
7. The community cannot recover for ordinary repairs made, nor for taxes paid upon the wife’s property. For such expenditures the usufructuary, and not the owner, is liable. R. O. C. 571-578. The wife cannot be held for the fruits of her paraphernal property administered by her husband and consumed during the existence of the community.

Opinion:
On Motion to Dismiss
The opinion of tlie Court was delivered by
Poché, J.
The ground of tlie motion is error in the return day, imputable to appellant.
The order of appeal bears date October 16, 1885, and the appeal is made returnable on the first Monday of December following; to the order is added the statement, "there not being time to prepare the transcript for tlie next ensuing term."
Tt is contended,'And it is not denied, that the return day was suggested by appellant's counsel. The question is therefore tlie alleged error of the return day.
The law of the case is Act No. 45 of the Legislature, approved March 16, 1870.
Under its first section, appeals from the parish of Plaquemines are returnable to this Court at New Orleans on the first and third Mondays of each month of tlie session here.
This appeal should therefore have been made returnable on tlie first Monday of November, 1885, unless the judge had the legal discretion or authority to select a different day.
Section 47 of the act provides in substance: That in all cases of appeal, the judge of the court from which it is taken shall make the appeal returnable to the Supreme Court at the next return day for appeals from the parish, if there shall he time enough after granting it to give the notice required by law and to prepare tlie record; if not, then lie shall fix the return day for some day within the next term after the appeal is granted.
In this case the order contains the information that the record could not be prepared in time for the ensuing term. But appellee contends that the statement is erroneous, and in support of the contention her counsel presents two certificates to which he directs our attention.
In granting the order as framed by appellant's counsel, the judge must in law be held to have adopted the statement for the necessity of a change of the regular return day, as well as his suggestion of the return day itself. Hence, this Court is authorized to conclude and it must therefore hold, that in the opinion of the judge a quo there was not sufficient time to prepare the record by the next regular return day.
That statement is part of the record, the size of the transcript corroborates its truth, and we find nothing in. the record to contradict it.
We cannot and we shall certainly not go out of the record for evidence to contradict that which appears in the record. Hence, wre must decline to consider either the certificates annexed by appellee or the counter affidavit filed by appellant's counsel. Wooten vs. LeBlanc, 32 Ann. 695.
We cannot presume that the judge in allowing the statement to be of record, that more time was necessary to prepare the transcript, meant to say otherwise, or erred in the statement which, under the effect of his ruling, became his own.
It is not even intimated that any attempt was made to deceive him, or to obtain any undue advantage over the appellee. The appeal taken is devolutive, and it could have been brought up by petition at any time within the year.
We have considered the cases relied on by appellee; they are not applicable to the restricted issue involved in this motion.
In those cases the motion hinged upon a motion day absolutely erroneous under the law, in which the judge transgressed the law at the suggestion of appellant, whereas in the instant case the inquiry is directed to the exercise of legal discretion by the judge of the court whence the appeal was taken. Wooten vs. LeBlanc, 32 Ann. 692; State ex rel. Lee vs. Jumel, 35 Ann. 980.
Tn the present order the judge has acted within the bounds of the legal discretion vested in him, and the appeal must be sustained.
The motion to dismiss this appeal is therefore overruled, with costs.