Case Name: W. G. Kennedy v. C. H. Morrison; C. H. Morrison v. W. G. Kennedy
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1868-10
Citations: 31 Tex. 207
Docket Number: 
Parties: W. G. Kennedy v. C. H. Morrison. C. H. Morrison v. W. G. Kennedy.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 31
Pages: 207–239

Head Matter:
W. G. Kennedy v. C. H. Morrison. C. H. Morrison v. W. G. Kennedy.
If the petition clearly set forth the cause of indebtedness against the defendant, from which the amount claimed is clear, and the plaintiff swear to the truth thereof, the attachment ought not to be quashed for want of the averment that the “ defendant is justly indebted,” in a specified amount, either in the petition or affidavit. (Paschal’s Dig., Arts. 138, 142, Notes 257, 259.)
The petition filed under oath must show clearly the amount due, and whether it be justly due or not does not depend upon the sworn statement, hut upon the proofs.
The stamp required by the act of congress of 1862, now repealed, might as properly be upon the writ of .attachment or summons as upon the petition, although the petition is the leading process in the suit. (Paschal’s Dig., Arts. 1426, 1431, Note 543.)
The object of the stamp law was to collect fifty cents revenue in every suit.
An interlocutory judgment is an order between the commencement of the suit and a final judgment.
The final judgment is the last or conclusive judgment, which settles the rights of the parties.
Where the defendant had given special bail in an attachment proceeding, and judgment went against the defendant, the court had to decide, as a final act, whether judgment should be rendered against the sureties, and the refusal to so render was final, from which the plaintiff could appeal. (Paschal’s Dig., Arts. 152, 153.)
Whether the judgment be that the defendant go hence, &c., or that the plaintiff recover, &c., or that a new trial be refused, this last act is a final judgment, and, if the defendant appeal from that, he may bring in review the whole record.
When the property is attached, the defendant may release it by giving a de livery bond, as provided in the 12th section of the act,, or by giving special bail for the amount of the debt, as provided for in the 14th section. (Paschal’s Dig., Arts. 150, 152.)
The 14th section reads as follows: “Any person against whose property an attachment has issued, his agent or attorney, may at any time before final judgment, upon giving special bail, with good and sufficient sureties, for the amount of the debt and interest, recover possession of the property so attached, from the person in whose hands it may be; but the giving- such special bail shall be deemed an appearance of the defendant, and the suit shall thereupon proceed as in ordinary cases; but if the plaintiff recover, he shall have judgment against all the obligors in the bail bond.” (Paschal’s Dig., Art. 152.) The defendant can easily replevy, which is not an appearance; or- he may give bail under this section, which is as much so as the acknowledgment of service.
' If the district court refuse to render judgment against the sureties, the Supreme Court will reform the judgment, and render it against all the obligors in the special bail bond.
[Lindsay, J., dissented, and reviewed the whole subject.]
Appeal from Bastrop. The case was tried before Hon. John Ieeland, one of the district judges.
There is a motion made by Morrison to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction, but as the court considered the material facts in the record, for the proper understanding of this motion it may be as well to state them.
On the 11th of October, 1865, Kennedy filed his suit in the district court of Bastrop county against Morrison to recover the sum of $5,530 11. He at the same time made an affidavit to the truth of the petition, which set forth the cause of action.
There was no revenue stamp on the petition, but one was placed on the writ of attachment.
An original citation to the defendant, Morrison, was also issued, on which there was a return by the sheriff that he had executed the writ “by leaving a certified copy of the plaintiff’s petition at the defendant’s house.”
By virtue of these proceedings twenty bales of cotton, twenty head of mules, and four wagons, the property of Morrison, were seized upon by the sheriff. This property the defendant regained possession of by executing a special bail bond.
There was no other service made, or attempted to be made, on Morrison of the original citation, other than the leaving of the papers at his residence.
Morrison, first in order on the day of trial, filed a motion to quash the attachment. He next filed a motion to quash the special bail bond.
The plaintiff then filed a demurrer to both the motions to quash. On this demurrer the record does not disclose any action of the court.
After the motions to quash were argued and disposed of, and the writ of attachment, levy, and bail bond quashed, the defendant called the attention of the court to the want of personal service on Morrison, as disclosed in the bill of exceptions, and moved to suspend or dismiss the case, which motion was overruled.
The plaintiff then asked and obtained leave to amend his petition, and amended the same by alleging that the defendant was justly indebted to him, and claimed interest on the amount. This was the first amendment made by the plaintiff to his petition, and was rendered necessary, no doubt, in the judgment of plaintiff, by the action of the court in sustaining the motions to quash, on the ground, among others, of the want of a sufficient allegation of indebtedness in his original petition.
After this, and next in order, the defendant filed a special exception, in the nature of a plea to the jurisdiction, on the ground that the petition showed a want of jurisdiction on its face, in that it failed clearly to disclose the residence of the parties.
This plea was at once considered by the court and sustained, and leave again given the .plaintiff to amend.
He then filed his second amendment to his petition, as it appears in the record, alleging clearly and distinctly the residence and citizenship of both the plaintiff and defendant,
Having filed the second amendment, and thus presented for the first time, according to the opinion of the judge below, a clear and specific averment as to the residence, that was issuable in its character, the defendant at once filed under oath his plea to the jurisdiction of the court, and “issue was joined on it.” A jury was impanneled, and, the onus being on the defendant as holding the affirmative of the issue, he was proceeding.to examine his witnesses before the jury, and had the witness K. W. Chandler on the stand, when the plaintiff asked and obtained leave of the court to file a general demurrer to the plea to the jurisdiction, and thereupon the trial of the cause was stopped by the court, the issue withdrawn from the jury, the defendant allowed time to put his demurrer in writing, and the same was then sustained by the court.
Hpon this, the court having decided that the void bail bond which had just been quashed operated as an appearance for defendant, the defendant, having exhausted all modes known to him of disputing the jurisdiction of the court, filed a general denial, reserving all his former exceptions. The cause was then ordered to the jury by the court, and the result was a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for the sum of $5,829 87, against the defendant, Morrison, alone.
The plaintiff was dissatisfied with this judgment, because it was not also at the same time rendered against the sureties on the special bail bond, which had already been quashed; he thereupon moved, at this stage, to reform the judgment, so as to include the sureties in the special bail bond, which motion the court overruled, and from this final ruling of the court the plaintiff appealed.
The appellant assigned as errors, 1st. The ruling of the court in quashing the original attachment. 2d. The ruling of the court in quashing the special bail bond. 3d. The refusal of the court to allow him to amend his affidavit for attachment. 4th. The refusal of the court to reform the final judgment so as to include in its scope the sureties on the special bail bond.
From the final judgment in this suit the defendant also prosecuted a writ of error, and' assigned the error of the court in not dismissing, or at least continuing, the case for want of jurisdiction and service after the quashal of the writ of attachment and the special bail bond.
Both cases were, by agreement, considered together.
Hancock West, for Morrison.
—1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction to entertain the appeal of Kennedy from the order of the court refusing to reform the judgment?
2. Did the court err in refusing the motion to dismiss or suspend the case for want of jurisdiction, after the attachment and bail bond were quashed?
3. Did the execution of the special bail bond operate as a waiver of all errors and irregularities in the issuance of the original attachment, and preclude the defendant from inquiring into its validity?
4. Did the court err in quashing the original attachment and special bail bond?
5. Had the plaintiff a right to file his demurrer to defendant’s plea in abatement after issue joined ? And, if so, was the demurrer well taken ?
' 6. Should this case be dismissed in this court for want of jurisdiction ?
I. A motion to dismiss the appeal in case Ho. 3038 has been made, and we believe it should be sustained, and the appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
It will be observed by an examination of the appeal bond of Kennedy that he does not appeal from the final judgment, but from a merely incidental order in the case as to the reformation of the judgment. This is expressly stated to be the fact in the appeal bond.
Under article IV, section 3, constitution of 1845, (Paschal’s Dig., p. 55, Note 176,) it was competent for the legis lain re to have provided for appeals or writs of error from orders or decrees other than final judgments, had they deemed it proper to do so, hut they have never exercised the power, and hence it has been frequently decided by our Supreme Court that no appeal or writ of error will lie from any mere interlocutory judgment, or for a refusal to grant a new trial, or any like motion of the class of this from which the defendant has appealed, other than such as are absolute and final in their character. (Houston v. Starr, 12 Tex., 429; Goss v. McLaurin, 17 Tex., 107; Cheatham v. Riddle, 8 Tex., 166, 10 Tex., 48; Ewing v. Kinnard, 2 Tex., 164; Byers v. Janes, 2 Tex., 530; Hancock v. Metz, 7 Tex., 177, 6 Tex., 37; Warren v. Shuman, 6 Tex., 441; Little v. Morris, 10 Tex., 260; Goss v. McLaurin, 8 Tex., 342; Scott v. Burton, 6 Tex., 322; Stewart v. Jones, 9 Tex., 469; Burrell v. The State, 16 Tex., 147; State v. Dougherty, 5 Tex., 3; State v. Paschal, 22 Tex., 584; State v. Pierce, 26 Tex., 114.)
From these authorities it is clear that no appeal can be had except from the final judgment; and, indeed, such is the language of the statute, which reads thus:
“Any party to a civil suit, believing himself aggrieved by any final judgment, &c., may appeal,” &e. (Paschal’s Dig., Art. 1510; O. & W. Dig., Art. 553; Hart. Dig., Art. 819.)
It will be further observed that there is no notice of appeal from the final judgment, but the notice relates solely to the ruling of the court on the motion to reform. This notice is essential to give the appellate court jurisdiction. (Burr v. Lewis, 6 Tex., 80; Lockhart v. Lockhart, 1 Tex., 199.)
The case of Messner v. Lewis, 17 Tex., 519, is in point.
In fact the appeal of the plaintiff is nothing more than an effort to amend in the Supreme Court a final judgment of the district court.
Paschal’s Digest, articles 47-51, points out the proper mode to proceed to amend judgments; the plaintiff has totally misconceived his remedy.
II. Should the motion to dismiss be sustained, it will be unnecessary to inquire into the rulings of the court in quashing the attachment and special bail bond, and the only questions remaining would be as to the ruling of the court in refusing to dismiss or continue the original suit for want of jurisdiction.
This motion was made after the quashing of the writ of attachment and special bail bond, and, there being no personal service or answer filed under the decision in Green v. Hill, 4 Tex., 465, it should have been sustained.
But the court held that the execution of the invalid special bail bond operated as an appearance.
III. If the court here should hold that, under the act of congress, (to which reference will hereafter be made,) the court below could not hear the case for **ant of jurisdiction, by reason of the failure of plaintiff to affix a revenue stamp to the original petition, or by reason of the want of personal service after the attachment and bail bond had been quashed, then, under the authority of the case of Roeser v. Bellmer, 7 Tex., 1, this court, instead of remanding the cause to the district court, should dismiss at Kennedy’s cost, as was done in the case above cited. But should we be mistaken in our view of the law, and in the applicability of the cases of Messner v. Lewis, 17 Tex., 519, and Green v. Hill, 4 Tex., 465, then it -will become necessary to consider the third point, which is to this effect:
Did the execution of the special bail bond operate as a waiver of all errors and irregularities in the issuance of the original attachment, and preclude the defendant from inquiring into its regularity or validity?
The court below decided that it did not operate as such waiver, and we are unable to perceive any good reason why it should be supposed to have that effect. It is not so de Glared by the statute; on the contrary, the law simply states that the execution of such bond shall operate as an appearance for the defendant, (Paschal’s Dig., Art. 152,) and it would seem, then, that no greater effect should be given to a bail bond than to the appearance itself. But an actual appearance and an answer to the merits, our Supreme Court has held, do not deprive a defendant of his right to move to quash an attachment. (Drake v. Brander, 8 Tex., 351.)
The point itself has been more than once passed upon, and the authorities on the subject will be found grouped in Drake on Attachment, §§ 317, 319, et seq., and leave no doubt of the correctness of the ruling of the court below. The case cited from the Supreme Court of the United States (Barry v. Doyles, 1 Pet., 311) goes solely upon the ground that the appearance of defendant and giving bail prevented an^ further inquiry into the attachment proceedings, which is not the law in this state. (Drake v. Brander, 8 Tex., 351, where it was held that the motion to quash may be made after appearance and answer to the merits; and such is constantly the practice in this state.)
The only case cited that really is in point and militates against the position we assume is the case of Payne v. Snell, 3 Missouri, 409.
On the other hand, in the State of New York, where these matters have been much considered, the rule, as laid down by the court, has been followed, and it has been held on several occasions that the execution of the special bail bond did not waive any errors or irregularities in the issuance of the attachment. (Cadwell v. Colgate, 7 Barb., 253: Kannouse v. Dormedy, 1 Denio, 267.)
The supreme court of Louisiana has followed the decisions of the courts of New York. (Schlater v. Broadus, 3 Mart., N. S., 34; Oliver v. Gwin, 17 La., 28; Quine v. Myers, 2 Rob., 510.)
The supreme court of Arkansas has also decided the point in the same manner. (Childress v. Fowler, 9 Ark., 159; Delano v. Kennedy, 5 Ark., 457.)
If, then, these decisions he followed, the defendant had a right, nowithstanding the execution of the special hail bond, to inquire into the legality of the issuance of the attachment.
IV. “ Because there was no petition filed in the court, there being no revenue stamp placed on the petition, (the petition being the commencement of a suit,) as required by the internal-revenue laws of the United States, which were passed by virtue of authority vested in the congress of the United States, and are binding upon the courts of the State of Texas, and all other states of the Union.”
In this case, by an inspection of the record, it will be seen that the revenue stamp was placed neither upon the original petition nor original citation, but was affixed to the writ of attachment. This was clearly contrary to law. The statute says the stamp “ shall be affixed to the writ or other original process by which any suit is commenced.” (2 Brightly’s U. S. Dig., 272, § 291.) By section 158 of the excise laws (2 Brightly’s U. S. Dig., 264, § 252) any instrument, of every kind, (necessarily including writs, declarations, or petitions,) is required to be stamped, and, if not so stamped, is declared to be “invalid and of no effect.”
The laws of Texas say .“that all civil suits shall be commenced by petition.” (Paschal’s Dig., Art. 1425.)
V. The statute declares that the party making the affidavit for the attachment shall state “that the defendant is justly indebted to the plaintiff, and the amount of the debt.” (Paschal’s Dig., Art. 142.) An examination of the petition will show that this important allegation is wanting.
The statute requires 'that the plaintiff shall swear that the defendant is “justly indebted” in the “amount” for which he sues out his attachment. A writ of attachment to secure $5,000 cannot issue on an affidavit that the defend ant- is justly indebted to the plaintiff for the sum of $1,000 or $2,000.
It has been held, not only that the party must swear that the defendant is indebted in the amount claimed, but that he is “justly” indebted. A mere affidavit to the indebtedness will not be sufficient. Marshall v. Alley, 26 Tex., 342, is conclusive on this point. (Thompson v. Towson, 1 Harris & McHenry, 524; Chevallier v. Williams & Co., 2 Tex., 239; Wooster v. McGee, 1 Tex., 17; Givens v. Taylor, 6 Tex., 315; Marshall v. Alley, 25 Tex., 342.)
The quashing of the attachment naturally carried the bail bond with it, as its validity necessarily depended upon the legality of the attachment. (Cadwell v. Colgate, 7 Barb., 253.)
[The residue of the argument was on the questions of practice.]
George W. Jones, for Kennedy,
insisted that the special bail bond amounted to an appearance, and, being good in form, the sureties became liable for the amount of the judgment.

Opinion:
Morrill, C. J.
—Kennedy brought suit in the district court of Bastrop county against Morrison, founded upon two promissory notes executed by Morrison to Kennedy or order, and upon an account for personal services, and another account for the use -and hire of two servants. Suit was brought by attachment, which was levied, and property released on special bail. There was no personal service of the petition on defendant. On the trial the defendant moved that the attachment be quashed, because the affidavit was not made according to the requirements of the statute. The petition states the indebtedness of the defendant with sufficient certainty, giving a full statement of the causes and foundation of such indebtedness, as well as the non-payment of the same. The affidavit is that the "facts and allegations in the petition are true and correct." The petition nowhere states that the defendant is "justly indebted" to plaintiff in any sum, in hcec verba, and because the affidavit does not contain the word "justly," before " indebted," defendant insisted in the district court and in this court that the same is bad. It is a rule in pleading, that whenever the same is doubtful or capable of two constructions, the one the more unfavorable to the pleader is to be adopted, and in extraordinary proceedings the rule shall apply with its full force and vigor. The other causes for the extraordinary process in this case are not questioned by the defendant, and therefore the whole is narrowed down to the one question above mentioned, whether the affidavit is defective because it does not state that the defendant is "justly" indebted.
In the case of Marshall v. Alley, 25 Tex., 342, the plaintiff in his affidavit stated that the defendant was "justly indebted" to him in a certain sum, but in the further statement of his cause, showing the grounds of the indebtedness, it appeared that there was really a less sum due than the said amount, and the affidavit was deemed insufficient.
In the case of Morgan v. Johnson, 15 Tex., 568, Justice Wheeler says : "It is objected to the judgment that the affidavit to obtain the attachment was insufficient, because it does not state the amount of the indebtedness. It, however, does state that the defendant is indebted to the plaintiff in the several sums of money mentioned in the petition, and this we think was sufficient. We are not aware that it has ever been held to be necessary to state the sum in the affidavit, where the sum demanded is thus expressly and definitely stated in the petition and the party makes oath that that sum is due."
Taking these two decisions, and giving them their proper construction, the inference is that the pleadings of the plaintiff in attachment, filed under oath, must show conclusively to the court a certain amount justly due. And whether or not it is justly due does not depend upon the sworn statement of the party of the justness, but upon the proper allegations of the indebtedness, showing the same to be just, and this statement to be under oath, and this we conceive the plaintiff has done. There can be no doubt that any court would, upon demurrer to the petition, decide that the defendant was "justly" indebted to plaintiff agreeably to the statement in the petition.
In the case of Livengood v. Shaw, 10 Mo., 274, the court, upon a similar case to the one at bar, said: "The affidavit alleges that the defendant is indebted, &c., omitting the word 'justly,' as prefixed in the statute to the word 'indebted.' According to the common legal acceptation of the term indebted, it means justly indebted, legally indebted, indebted according to law, and the superadding of the term justly does not therefore qualify or restrict the word 'indebted.'"
Another exception of the defendant is, that the stamp was placed on the attachment instead of the petition. The papers show that the petition, affidavit, and attachmejnt were all filed and issued at the same time.
The statute of 1862 provides as a stamp duty for every "writ or other original process by which any suit is commenced in any court of record, either law or equity, fifty cents." It is assumed by the act that a suit is commenced by a "writ or other original process," and it is believed that this is the case in most of the states. In this state the act of 18th May, 1846, says, "all civil suits in the district court shall be commenced by petition filed in the office of the clerk of the district court." [Paschal's Dig., Art. 1426.] The petition is entirely different from a writ or other process, as said process is obtained by filing the petition. The same statute provides what the style of writs shall be, and the article closes by stating that the clerk issuing any process shall mark thereon the day on which it issued. [Paschal's Dig. Art. 1431, Note 543.] It would therefore be impracticable to fix the stamp on the process by which suit is commenced in Texas, unless we confound terms, and call a petition a legal process, and that cannot be done, because the clerk never issues a petition, but files it and issues a process consequent on filing a petition. But when we take ' into consideration the reason of the law, that it was designed to raise a revenue, and that every suit in law or equity is to be taxed fifty cents for this purpose, and that the canceled stamp was to operate as a receipt for the payment of this tax, it would seem to be a matter of perfect indifférence whether the same be placed either upon the petition, the affidavit, the bond, the citation, or the attachment in this case. If, as we admit, it is not free from doubt to which of these papers the stamp should be applied, we certainly would not be justified in charging the plaintiff with a violation of duty, and dismiss his cause from court, even if we should decide that the same should have been placed upon the petition or citation. "We conceive that the statute would be complied with if the stamp were placed upon either of the papers, as they all appear to form one transaction.
The defendant also objects to this court taking any jurisdiction of this case, because the plaintiff has not appealed from a final, but, as he says, an interlocutory judgment. If there is any one point decided and re-decided by this court, it is that no appeal will lie from an interlocutory judgment. If a party were allowed to appeal from any and every interlocutory judgment during the pendency of a suit, and thus suspend the progress of the same during the pendency of the appeal, it would be an easy matter for a party unwilling to have a suit tried to have the same postponed indefinitely. But we must not confound an interlocutory with a final judgment. The definition of an interlocutory judgment is readily suggested by reverting to the original signification of the word, that it is a judgment between something; and, as it not unfrequently happens that a district court enters a number of judgments between the institution and close of a suit, such as continuances and rulings relating to evidence, &c., as each .and all of these are entered between the institution and termination of a suit they are called interlocutory judgments. The word final, signifying last, is of course the last judgment that the district court enters in a cause, and it is from this judgment that an appeal lies. To apply these facts to the case at bar, when the judge entered up judgment against the defendant, only the plaintiff requested that the sureties on the bail bond of defendant be included in the same. This request had no reference to any interlocutory judgment in this case, and there were many, but to the final judgment; and, because the plaintiff was denied in his request to have such a final judgment as he wished, he gave notice of appeal, and" in fact it is the only change that the plaintiff seeks in the proceedings, since he obtained the amount of the judgment he sued for. In appealing from the final or last judgment that was rendered in the cause, whether that judgment should be the adjudication of the court that the defendant go hence, &c., or that the plaintiff have and recover, &c., or that a new trial be granted or refused to a party applying for the same, in either of these cases the last judgment appealed from brings up, for the revision of this court, all of the previous proceedings or interlocutory judgments; and we now come to the final judgment, and the only question at issue on this point is, whether the judgment should have been rendered against all the obligors in the bail bond.
Upon the levy of the attachment the defendant had the option of the two courses to have his property released therefrom. Article 150, Paschal's Digest, provides, in substance, that the defendant shall have the right to replevy the property by giving bond with sureties for the amount of the debt or the value of the property, as he may choose, conditioned that he return the specific property in case he be unsuccessful in the suit. Article 152 provides, that the defendant may at any time before final judgment, upon giving special bail, with good and sufficient sureties for the amount of the debt and interest, recover possession of the property so attached from the person in whose hands it may be; but the giving such special bail shall be deemed an appearance of the defendant, and the suit shall thereupon proceed as in ordinary cases; but, if the plaintiff recover, he shall have judgment against all the obligors in the bail bond. In this case the defendant chose to give the special bail bond, and in so doing he assumed all the consequences. Had he simply replevied the property, he would not necessarily have, ipso facto, acknowledged service of the petition; but by giving special bail he agreed to acknowledge service of the petition and let the cause proceed as if the attachment had not issued, and he and his sureties further agreed, that whatever judgment should be entered against the defendant should be entered against all the obligors of the bond.
This court therefore, proceeding to render such a judgment as the district court should have rendered, because it seems to this court that the district court erred in not rendering judgment against said W. G-. Kennedy and his sureties on the bail bond, viz, J. D. Hash and A. "W. Moore, it is ordered that said judgment be set aside and reversed, and the judgment be entered against said Kennedy, Hash, and Moore.
Ordered accordingly.