Case Name: Honorable Joseph C. BRUNO, Appellee, v. Nathan M. ELITZKY and Judy Elitzky, his wife, Appellants
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1987-06-09
Citations: 515 Pa. 47
Docket Number: No. 86 E.D. Appeal Docket 1986
Parties: Honorable Joseph C. BRUNO, Appellee, v. Nathan M. ELITZKY and Judy Elitzky, his wife, Appellants.
Judges: Before NIX, C.J., and FLAHERTY, HUTCHINSON, ZAPPALA and PAPADAKOS, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania State Reports
Volume: 515
Pages: 47–54

Head Matter:
526 A.2d 781
Honorable Joseph C. BRUNO, Appellee, v. Nathan M. ELITZKY and Judy Elitzky, his wife, Appellants.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Argued Jan. 28, 1987.
Decided June 9, 1987.
Thomas F. Reilly, Philadelphia, for appellants.
James E. Beasley, Philadelphia, for appellee.
Before NIX, C.J., and FLAHERTY, HUTCHINSON, ZAPPALA and PAPADAKOS, JJ.

Opinion:
OPINION OF THE COURT
PAPADAKOS, Justice.
Appellants seek reversal of a sanction order imposed on them by the trial court for failing to answer interrogatories. Review by this tribunal was granted both in order to examine the relationship between state and local rules of civil procedure and, as well, because we felt a particular need to inquire (improvidently so, we now believe) into an action in which the Appellee is a sitting judge in this Commonwealth.
Appellants are defendants in a libel suit. On January 19, 1984, they were served with a set of nine interrogatories seeking the facts and law behind the defenses which they had raised in their New Matter. The record indicates that they failed to respond to the interrogatories within the mandated thirty-day period; they also failed to provide answers or objections pursuant to a subsequent agreement by both counsel in this case; and finally, they did not appear at the court's hearing on plaintiff's motion for sanctions held on May 3, 1984. Although they were required then to answer the motion within three weeks, and also were granted an extension of ten days, they again did not reply, and the motion was decided as uncontested.
Sanctions then were applied pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. No. 4019 which holds, in pertinent part that:
(a)(1) The court may, on motion, make an appropriate order if
(1) a party fails to serve answers, sufficient answers or objections to written interrogatories under Rule 4005;
(e) The court, when acting under subdivision (a) of this rule, may make
(2) an order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing in evidence designated documents, things or testimony, or from introducing evidence of physical or mental condition;
The court's final sanction order specifically strikes the New Matter alleged by Appellants. Appellants now argue that before it could impose sanctions, the trial court should have proceeded under the local rule set forth in Philadelphia General Rule 176 which provides:
1. Where (a) discovery has been ordered as a result of the filing of an Uncontested Motion to Compel or for Sanctions, (b) the defaulting party has served no response whatsoever during the time period provided for by the Order and (c) the moving party seeks sanctions, the moving party shall forward letter notices to the defaulting party, giving at least twenty (20) days notice of his or her intention to obtain such sanctions, which notice shall be substantially in the form attached to this Rule and shall set forth the sanctions which Court will be requested to impose.
Without addressing any other aspect of the case, we hold that this appeal is interlocutory. There is no distinction here between this particular order and other pre-trial orders on discovery or admissibility of evidence. Although a finding of the finality of an order is a judicial conclusion which results from a practical rather than a technical interpretation (Bell v. Beneficial Consumer Discount Co., 465 Pa. 225, 348 A.2d 734 [1975]), Pa.R.App.P. No. 311(a) indicates that an interlocutory appeal may be taken as of right from seven specified orders of a lower court, none of which applies to the facts of this case. In the absence of permission, appeals as of right can only be taken from a final order. Pa.R.App.P. No. 341. Because it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case, the order of Superior Court, 344 Pa.Super. 618, 495 A.2d 609, is vacated, and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this decision.
NIX, C.J., files a dissenting opinion.
HUTCHINSON, J., files a dissenting opinion.
LARSEN and McDERMOTT, JJ., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
. Mr. Justice Hutchinson has entered a dissent groping with the viability of Grota v. La Boccetta, 425 Pa. 620, 230 A.2d 206 (1967), which dealt with the substantive merits of an affirmative defense. By contrast, disposition of the case under review is based on the issue of a sanction order for failure to respond to interrogatories. This qualitative difference clearly distinguishes the two cases. But even more compelling, is the yawning spectre of an avalanche of appeals which easily could overburden the judicial system. By insisting that sanctions are final orders, the dissent, in effect, would open the floodgates to perpetual judicial impermanence and impotence at the trial level and an unmanageable quantum of cases choking the appellate system. We should be reminded that trial courts are empowered to sanction litigants in a variety of ways and enforce the obligations of the judicial system in a fair, fast, and firm manner. Followed to its logical conclusion, the argument of my learned colleague would lead inexorably to disastrous consequences.