Case Name: ZANT v. MEANS
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1999-10-18
Citations: 271 Ga. 711
Docket Number: S99A0924
Parties: ZANT v. MEANS.
Judges: All the Justices concur, except Fletcher, P. J., and Sears, J., who dissent.
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 271
Pages: 711–714

Head Matter:
S99A0924.
ZANT v. MEANS.
(522 SE2d 449)

Opinion:
Hines, Justice.
This appeal is from the grant of a petition for habeas corpus on a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Because the habeas court ruled that Means was prejudiced by counsel's conduct without there being any evidence showing such prejudice, we reverse.
Means was indicted in 1992 on charges of kidnapping, rape, and aggravated assault. When he was apprehended in Colorado, he told police that he had "raped a girl back there," but Means later told counsel that he believed he was not guilty of rape because no penetration occurred, although he ejaculated outside the victim's vagina. Counsel arranged for a DNA test which showed that the victim's vaginal sample contained DNA from only the victim. By plea agreement, Means pled guilty to the rape charge and received a recommended sentence of 20 years; an order of nolle prosequi was entered on the kidnapping and aggravated assault charges. At the plea hearing and after recitation of the facts of the case, Means stated that he was, in fact, guilty of rape.
Means filed a petition for habeas corpus relief challenging his conviction and sentence, claiming inefféctive assistance of counsel. He contends that the victim's medical record prepared after the event included her statement that the perpetrator did not penetrate her, and that counsel had not arranged to see this document, and that if he had, counsel would have recognized a complete defense to the rape charge. Counsel testified that he had not seen the record and had not spoken with the victim, but that even if he had, his advice would have remained that Means plead guilty to rape. Because of counsel's examination of the DNA test result and his discussions with Means, counsel was convinced that Means had a viable "no penetration" defense to the rape charge, but counsel also testified that even after discussing this with the prosecuting attorney, the only plea arrangement to which the prosecuting attorney would agree was a guilty plea on the rape charge. Counsel saw no viable defense to the kidnapping or aggravated assault charges and recognized the possibility that the victim could testify at trial that there had been penetration. Considering that the maximum penalty for rape was life in prison and the other charges each carried 20-year maximum sentences, counsel believed that by far the wisest course was to accept the State's offer of a guilty plea on the rape charge and a recommendation of a 20-year sentence.
The habeas court found that counsel's performance was deficient and granted the writ. Zant contends this was error.
In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Means must show both that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance was prejudicial to his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). As Means pled guilty, he must prove that had it not been for the deficient performance of counsel, he would not have pled guilty and instead would have gone to trial. Thompson v. Greene, 265 Ga. 782, 785 (2) (462 SE2d 747) (1995)'.
Because Means has failed to show prejudice, we need not address the habeas court's determination that counsel's performance was deficient. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact. Strickland, supra at 698; Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440 (3) (435 SE2d 600) (1993). The proper standard of review requires that we accept the habeas court's factual findings and credibility determinations unless clearly erroneous, but we independently apply the legal principles to the facts. Turpin v. Mobley, 269 Ga. 635, 639 (3) (502 SE2d 458) (1998).
As regards prejudice, the habeas court's order recites: "Petitioner has also shown that but for this unprofessional lack of assistance by Counsel, the result of the proceedings would have been different. Under the available facts in this case it would have been reasonable after obtaining the evidence in the case for Counsel to file a pre-trial motion or recommended [sic] to his client that since he had a defense to the charge of rape that they go to trial." However, the only evidence of the effect of any examination by counsel of further evidence is counsel's testimony that he would not have made any such recommendation even if he had seen the document at issue. Knowing he had a "no penetration" defense to the rape charge, Means still chose to plead guilty to that charge, stating that he was, in fact, guilty. At the habeas hearing, there was no evidence that Means would have insisted on going to trial despite counsel's continued recommendation to plead guilty to rape, and there was no evidence of what pretrial motion should have been made, what its likelihood of success would have been, or how that would have altered counsel's decision to recommend accepting the plea agreement. In the absence of any evidence showing prejudice as a result of counsel's actions, the habeas court erred in granting the petition.
Judgment reversed.
All the Justices concur, except Fletcher, P. J., and Sears, J., who dissent.
The medical record from the victim's initial examination was not admitted into evidence, but is in the record before this Court, and states that the victim reported "no oral-genital, or penetration unsure of ejaculation or penetration [illegible] for momentary penetrations." The hospital laboratory report is also in the record and states "sperm present."
Zant originally appealed to this Court arguing that the habeas court had applied the incorrect standard. This Court remanded the case to the habeas court to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law based on the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). See Zant v. Means, Case No. S98A1864 (decided January 15, 1999). The habeas court did so and found that counsel's performance was deficient, and that counsel's failure to consider the medical record evidence prejudiced Means.