Case Name: Mary A. Maitland v. Elizabeth Greer, Appellant
Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1898-10-24
Citations: 8 Pa. Super. 461
Docket Number: Appeal, No. 178
Parties: Mary A. Maitland v. Elizabeth Greer, Appellant.
Judges: Before Rice, P. J., Wickham, Beavee, Reedee, 0ready, Smith and Poe-tee, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports
Volume: 8
Pages: 461–468

Head Matter:
Mary A. Maitland v. Elizabeth Greer, Appellant.
Family relationship — Wages—Contract—Province of court and jury.
Where a person is received into a family as a member of such family and not as a servant, as an object of charity and not as a hireling, the relation is never changed by legal implication into a relation giving a right to wages.
When, however, there is evidence tending to show a promise to pay claimant, “for all she did,” then the question of the relation which plaintiff and defendant sustained to each other becomes a question of fact which comes within the province of the jury.
Argued May 12, 1898.
Appeal, No. 178, April T., 1898, by defendant, from judgment of C. P. Lawrence Co., Sept. T., 1895, No. 55, on verdict for plaintiff.
Before Rice, P. J., Wickham, Beavee, Reedee, 0ready, Smith and Poe-tee, JJ.
Affirmed.
Poetee and Oelady, JJ., dissent.
Assumpsit. Before Widsoh, P. J., of the 36th judicial district, specially presiding.
It appears from the evidence that Elizabeth Greer and her father, Thomas Greer, lived together on the latter’s farm in Lawrence county. Elizabeth was unmarried and kept house for her father from before January, 1881, until his death. In January, 1881, Elizabeth Greer, at the request of one, De Garmo, a poor man, who sought a place for his granddaughter, agreed with the grandfather that she would keep the child and as long as she kept her she would take care of her, clothe her and send her to school. Plaintiff continued to live with defendant until December 12,1894, when she married and she and her husband remained with the defendant until June, 1895, when they moved away. It appears that Elizabeth Greer cared for the plaintiff, clothed and maintained her, sent ‘her to school and church, taught her to knit and sew and do housework, and such work as was generally done by girls on a farm, paid her church stipend and treated her as a daughter. Plaintiff attended school, worked about the house, ate at the table with defendant and her father, and in all respects was treated by and acted towards defendant as a member of her family. She shared in all the work usually performed by a female member of a farmer’s house hold. Thomas Greer died April 10,1891. After his death the plaintiff and defendant continued to live together in the same house and as alleged by the defendant bearing towards each other the same relation they had before his death. It was contended by the defendant that no contract for wages or compensation was at any time made between the parties to this suit. It did not appear that plaintiff kept an account of time or work done and no account was made of the clothing furnished or money given to or paid out for her. At the time she left defendant’s house in June, 1895, she made no claim for wages or recompense until suit brought.
There was evidence on the part of plaintiff tending to show that after the death of Thomas Greer on April 10, 1891, the plaintiff remained on the same farm and in the same house under an arrangement and promise by which Elizabeth was “to pay her for all the work she did” and that she so continued to remain there until December 12, 1894, when she married.
The statement of claim was for a quantum meruit at the rate of $6.00 a week, amounting to $1,146 with interest from December 12, 1894.
Verdict and judgment for plaintiff for $271.80. Defendant appealed.
Error assigned was answer to defendant’s seventh point, which point and answer are as follows: “7. Under all the evidence in this case the verdict must be for the defendant. Answer: This point is refused, as there is a question of fact for the jury to determine as to what the relation was that existed between the parties in this case.”
J. Norman Martin, with him E. B. Kurtz and L. T. Kurtz, for appellant.
The court should have given binding instructions. The undisputed testimony shows the plaintiff had no right of action.
James De Garmo, the grandfather of the plaintiff who stood in loco parentis made an arrangement with defendant by which plaintiff lived with defendant, and under which they bore towards each other the relations and duties of parent and child.
' A child cannot recover from the parent for services rendered in the absence of an express contract: Masteller’s Appeal, 30 Pa. 473.
The implication of a promise arising from labor performed is rebutted by proof of a relation inconsistent with any understanding for compensation: Swires v. Parsons, 5 W. & S. 357; De Prance v. Austin, 9 Pa. 309.
The principle that a child is not entitled to demand wages from the parent in the absence of 'an express contract embraces also the liabilities of persons whom the law regards as standing-in that connection although connected by no ties of blood: Lantz v. Prey, 14 Pa. 201; Duffey v. Duffey, 44 Pa. 399; Miller’s Appeal, 136 Pa. 239.
Wages for domestic service are presumed to be paid at the periods customary at the time and in the neighborhood. The presumption grows stronger as each period of payment goes by: Carpenter v. Hays, 153 Pa. 432; Jarman’s Appeal, 161 Pa. 151.
Conversely, where wages are not paid and plaintiff has made no demand for wages, the presumption is that wages were not expected by the plaintiff — that there was no contract to pay wages.
The plaintiff admits there was no contract for wages, and the arrangement under which she came to live with plaintiff was never changed by anjr agreement to compensate her for service rendered. Plaintiff sued on an implied contract. The family relation is established by the testimony, therefore there could be no recovery. The court should have given binding instructions by affirming defendant’s seventh point: Neal v. Gilmore, 79 Pa. 421.
B. A. Winternitz, with him John Gr. MoOonahy, for appellee.
Generally where services are rendered by one person to another the law presumes a promise to pay what the services are worth. . . . Undoubtedly relationship either by consanguinity or affinity is a fact which tends to rebut the presumption which the law raises that a promise to pay is intended when personal services are rendered, but alone it does not overcome that presumption except in case of parent and child. In all other cases there must be evidence beyond the relationship that the creation of no debt was intended. If there be such evidence it must be submitted to the jury and it will be for them to say whether the presumption is overcome: Smith v. Milligan, 43 Pa. 107; Curry v. Curry, 114 Pa. 367; Gerz v. Demarra, 162 Pa. 530; Kauss v. Rohner, 172 Pa. 481.
October 24, 1898 :
The existence of the family relationship alone does not prevent a recovery for services rendered.
Where there is evidence of a contract, if it be unwritten, it is always for the jury to say whether it establishes the claim: Neel v. Neel, 59 Pa. 347.

Opinion:
Opinion by
Beaver, J.,
A father and daughter, living upon the farm of the former, received into their family a child who was an entire stranger to their blood. The child grew up in the family. When she was about nineteen years of age, the father died. Suit was brought by the child, who is the plaintiff here, against the defendant, who survived her father, for wages from the death of the father until and subsequent to the time of her marriage, when she left the defendant's house.
The plaintiff claimed on quantum meruit in assumpsit upon an implied contract arising from the fact that she rendered, and defendant accepted, her services in the family. There was no denial as to the fact of the services having been rendered, although there was some divergence in the views of witnesses as to their character and extent. The defense was based upon the fact that the defendant stood in loco parentis to. the plaintiff.
The court below ruled, in answer to defendant's point, that " where a person is received into a family as a member of such family and not as a servant, as an object of charity and not as a hireling, the relation is never changed by legal implication into a relation giving a right to wages," and that " whenever persons stand to each other in a family relation, as distinguished from that of master and servant, the law implies no contract for wages." There is, therefore, no contest as to the law governing the case.
The single assignment of error is to the answer by the court below to defendant's seventh point, the {Joint and answer being as follows: " Under all the evidence in this case, the verdict must be for the defendant. Answer: This point is refused, as there is a question of fact for the jury to determine as to what the relation was that existed between the parties in this case."
In what relation did the plaintiff stand to father and daugli ter when she came into the family? Who stood in loco parentis to the plaintiff — the father or the father and daughter together? Did the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant change at the death of the father? The defendant claimed in her testimony that she stood in loco parentis to the plaintiff, but the farm upon which she resided belonged to her father. He seemed to have provided for the family as long as he lived, and' it was distinctly testified by the aunt of the plaintiff, who was present when she made her first appearance in the family, that Mr. Greer (the father) said, " If she would stay until she got old enough, lie would pay her wages; the more she worked, the more he would pay her." The plaintiff, in answer to the question, " State whether or not you ever asked her (the defendant) for wages and how you asked her," said, " Well, we would be talking and I would ask if she wouldn't pay me wages and I pointed to one girl in particular that was living at her father's. He was paying her wages and I told her about this girl. She said I didn't need any money then, but I would be paid for all I did for her— for everything I did for her." It was not claimed that this constituted an express contract to pay wages upon which plaintiff could recover, but that it negatived the claim of the defendant that she stood in loco parentis to the plaintiff. The question, therefore, as to the relation which the plaintiff and defendant sustained toward each other was clearly one of fact which came within the province of the jury, and was properly submitted to them for their finding.
There is no complaint as to the manner in which this submission was made. The jury found, as under the facts of the case they could reasonably find, that, as between the plaintiff and defendant, the relationship claimed by the defendant did not exist and that, if such a relationship had ever existed, it terminated at the death of the defendant's father.
As we regard the facts of the case, it would have been error for the court below to have affirmed the defendant's seventh point. The case was properly submitted to the jury.
Judgment affirmed.