Case Name: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Larry Edward HIVELEY, Appellant; UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Ansil Ezra HENRY, Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1995-08-11
Citations: 61 F.3d 1358
Docket Number: Nos. 94-4094, 95-1171
Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Larry Edward HIVELEY, Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Ansil Ezra HENRY, Appellant.
Judges: Before BEAM, Circuit Judge; BRIGHT, Senior Circuit Judge; and MURPHY, Circuit Judge.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 3d Series
Volume: 61
Pages: 1358–1366

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Larry Edward HIVELEY, Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Ansil Ezra HENRY, Appellant.
Nos. 94-4094, 95-1171.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted June 14, 1995.
Decided Aug. 11, 1995.
Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc Denied Sept. 22, 1995.
E. Daniel O’Brien of Cedar Rapids, IA (argued), for Hiveley.
Thomas J. O’Flaherty of Cedar Rapids, IA (argued), for Henry.
Patrick J. Reinert, U.S. Atty’s. Office, Cedar Rapids, IA (argued), for appellee.
Before BEAM, Circuit Judge; BRIGHT, Senior Circuit Judge; and MURPHY, Circuit Judge.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
I. INTRODUCTION
A federal grand jury indicted Ansil Ezra Henry, Larry Edward Hiveley, and numerous other co-defendants for various drug trafficking crimes. A jury found both Henry and Hiveley guilty of conspiracy to distribute marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. The district court sentenced Henry to twenty-one years eight months and Hiveley to nineteen years six months of imprisonment.
On appeal, Henry argues that the district court erred by: (1) denying his motion to suppress evidence and request for hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978); (2) denying his post-sentence motion for new trial; and (3) improperly instructing the jury. Hiveley does not appeal his conviction, but claims that the district court committed error in: (1) determining his base offense level; and (2) increasing his sentence two levels for possession of a firearm during the commission of his crime. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
II. BACKGROUND
On May 27,1994, Ansil Ezra Henry, Larry Edward Hiveley, and numerous other co-defendants were indicted for various drug trafficking crimes, including conspiracy to distribute marijuana and cocaine. We limit our discussion of the facts to Henry's and Hiveley's participation in the conspiracy.
Hiveley and Henry participated in an organization which trafficked drugs from Arizona to Iowa. Hiveley operated a ranch near Phoenix, Arizona. Henry ran a network of storage and distribution facilities in central Iowa for the redistribution of controlled substances obtained from Hiveley. At trial, various members of the organization testified regarding numerous instances of transportation and delivery of controlled substances between Hiveley's ranch in Arizona and Henry's operation in Iowa which occurred between 1986 and 1993.
On September 2, 1993, authorities executed a search warrant at Hiveley's ranch and seized over 1,100 pounds of marijuana from a storage building located on the property. In addition, authorities seized a telephone book listing numerous co-defendants and records reflecting the shipment of marijuana. Hive-ley's fingerprints were found on a marijuana package and the records seized. Also, numerous firearms were recovered from Hive-ley's residence, including three loaded handguns in the master bedroom along with marijuana, cocaine, and over $3,000 of currency.
Prior to trial, Henry filed a motion to suppress evidence and requested a hearing to challenge the probable cause findings made by the magistrate judge pursuant to Franks v. Delaware. The district court denied Henry's motion. On August 1, 1994, a jury convicted Henry and Hiveley of conspiracy to distribute marijuana. The jury, however, did not find them guilty of conspiring to distribute cocaine.
At sentencing, pursuant to the sentencing guidelines, the district court determined Hiveley's base offense level to be thirty-two, added a two-level increase to reflect his possession of a firearm, and added a four-level increase to reflect his role in the offense. Thus, the district court determined Hiveley's total offense level to be thirty-eight, resulting in a sentencing range of nineteen years six months to twenty-four years four months. The district court sentenced Hiveley to nineteen years six months of imprisonment, and a five-year term of supervised release.
The district court determined Henry's base offense level to be thirty-two. The district court increased Henry's base offense level to reflect his obstruction of justice and his role in the offense, resulting in a total offense level of thirty-eight and a sentencing range of twenty-one years eight months to twenty-seven years two months. The district court sentenced Henry to twenty-one years eight months of imprisonment, a five-year term of supervised release, and ordered him to pay a $5,000 fine.
After sentencing, Henry filed a motion for new trial which the district court denied. This appeal followed.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Ansil Ezra Henry
Motion to Suppress and Evidentiary Hearing
Henry filed a motion to suppress evidence seized from his residence claiming the affidavit used to obtain the search warrant contained five alleged errors. Henry requested an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978). The district court found that even if it were to "omit the challenged statements and add information which the defendant asserts was intentionally omitted, there would remain a strong probability that evidence of drug trafficking and the fruits of drug crimes would be found at the Henry residence." Dist.Ct.Opinion and Order dated June 29, 1994 at 2.
Henry argues that the agents wanted to search for drugs. He alleges that the agents falsified their affidavit because they knew that it was not at all probable that drugs would be found at Henry's residence. Henry claims that when the references to falsehoods and reckless disregard for the truth are set aside, insufficient grounds remained upon which to base a finding of probable cause, and the district court erred by not granting an evidentiary hearing to test the Franks motion.
We review the district court's denial of Henry's motion to suppress and request for hearing under the abuse of discretion standard. See United States v. Shurn, 849 F.2d 1090, 1096 (8th Cir.1988). In order to obtain a hearing, a defendant must make a "substantial preliminary showing" of a false or reckless false statement or omission and must further show that the alleged false statement or omission was necessary to a finding of probable cause, and the "substantial preliminary showing" requirement needed to obtain a Franks hearing is not lightly met. United States v. Wajda, 810 F.2d 754, 759 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1040, 107 S.Ct. 1981, 95 L.Ed.2d 821 (1987). Probable cause exists when the application for a search "presents sufficient facts to justify a prudent person in the belief that there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." United States v. Riedesel, 987 F.2d 1383, 1390 (8th Cir.1993) (citations omitted).
After reviewing the record, we determine that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Henry's motion to suppress and request for a hearing. The district court appropriately on the record determined that even if the alleged false statements were omitted and the alleged intentionally omitted information were added, probable cause still existed to issue the search warrant. The search warrant indicated that there was probable cause to believe Henry had marijuana at his residence. At a pretrial hearing, the affiant stated an expectation not to find large quantities of marijuana. Although inaccuracies exist in the affidavit used to obtain the search warrant, probable cause still existed to believe there would be marijuana or other evidence of drug trafficking.
Jury Instruction
Next, Henry argues that the district court erred in instructing the jury because the district court failed to delete particular language from jury instruction number 30. At trial, Henry objected to the wording of jury instruction number 30. Instruction number 30 informed the jury that it had heard evidence that witnesses had been paid for expenses related to providing information to the government and that they could consider the testimony and give it such weight as the jury thought the testimony deserved. The instruction further told the jury that whether the information or testimony provided by the witness was influenced by any payments was for the jury to determine.
The paragraph in instruction number 30 that Henry objected to states, in part, that "[y]ou have also heard evidence that witnesses had arrangements with the government under which they got paid for expenses related to providing information to the government." Henry requested that the words "expenses related to" be deleted from the instruction, leaving room to argue that the informant witnesses were paid for their information. Henry claims that he made this request because the government ignored or refused to respond to repeated requests for disclosure of information about payments made to witnesses, and that the government's Brady violations, coupled with the trial court's refusal to grant a simple remedy, should result in a reversal in this case. We, however, disagree.
We review a trial court's refusal to delete a phrase from a jury instruction for abuse of discretion. United States v. Parker, 32 F.3d 395, 400 (8th Cir.1994). A "district court has wide discretion in formulating appropriate jury instructions." United States v. Walker, 817 F.2d 461, 463 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 863, 108 S.Ct. 181, 98 L.Ed.2d 134 (1987) (citations omitted). The court formulated instruction number 30 based upon Eighth Circuit Model Instruction 4.06. The district court modified its draft jury instructions to insert the phrase "expenses related to" to conform the jury instruction to the evidence produced at trial regarding payments made to Mervin White and Mike Hake. Both White and Hake testified they were paid for expenses related to providing information, and not purely for providing information. The district court did not err because the jury instruction properly sets forth the applicable law and the evidence presented on this subject.
Motion for New Trial
After sentencing, Henry filed a motion for new trial claiming that newly discovered evidence would have supported giving the jury an instruction on multiple conspiracies. Henry argues that the district court erred by denying the new trial motion based on the government's admission at sentencing that multiple conspiracies existed in this case. At sentencing, the district court asked the government to discuss the utilization of cocaine as part of the relevant conduct in sentencing Henry and Hiveley. In response, the government discussed a number of different ways the court could assess these defendants with a quantity of cocaine discussed at trial as part of their relevant conduct even though the jury did not return a unanimous verdict that cocaine was one of the substances involved in the conspiracy. Henry claims that the government's argument at sentencing is an admission by the government, which constitutes evidence of the existence of multiple conspiracies rather than one conspiracy. Therefore, Henry asserts that a new trial should be conducted so that a multiple conspiracy instruction could be presented to the jury.
A district court's denial of a new trial motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Costanzo, 4 F.3d 658, 667 (8th Cir.1993). Under Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a court may grant a new trial to a defendant if required in the interest of justice. "To obtain a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence, a defendant must show, among other things, that the evidence is in fact newly discovered, i.e., discovered since the trial; and that the newly discovered evidence is of such a nature that, on a new trial, it probably would produce an acquittal." United States v. Richards, 967 F.2d 1189, 1197 (8th Cir.1992) (citations omitted). No abuse of discretion appears here in denying Henry's motion for a new trial. The evidence to which reference was made by Henry does not con stitute evidence "newly discovered," and Henry did not demonstrate that the outcome of a new trial would probably result in an acquittal.
B. Larry Edward Hiveley
Drug Quantity
Hiveley- alleges the district court erred in making its findings of fact regarding the drug quantity attributable to him for his conduct in participating in this conspiracy. Hiveley contends that the district court erred in making factual findings assessing him with various quantities of controlled substances based upon the testimony of co-conspirators, corroborating evidence, and quantities of drugs seized. Because of claimed insufficient evidence to support some of the quantity determinations made by the district court, Hiveley argues that the case should be remanded for re-sentencing.
At sentencing, the court found that Hive-ley's relevant conduct included 1,695 kilograms of marijuana. Most of the quantity determinations required the district judge to rely on estimates of co-conspirators, Tom Burns, Tom Lowe and Butch White. Their estimates and guesses accounted for 1,195 kilograms of marijuana. The remainder of the total quantity was based on 1,100 pounds of marijuana seized from a trailer on Hive-ley's property. The thrust of Hiveley's argument is that the co-conspirators' testimony regarding the quantity of drugs is not credible because their testimony was rejected by the jury at trial.
At sentencing, the determination of drug quantity is a factual finding and is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. United States v. Sleet, 893 F.2d 947, 949 (8th Cir.1990). The district court's finding regarding the quantity of drugs is not clearly erroneous, and the court did not err in calculating the relevant drug quantity attributable to Hiveley for sentencing purposes. After reviewing the record, we determine that the district court's quantity determinations were based upon its review of the evidence and credibility of the witnesses. Although the court noted that some of the witnesses exhibited credibility problems, the court went on to make specific findings concerning each witness' testimony and the quantity attributed to determine the base offense level. The court considered all of the evidence presented, including credibility, and approximated a quantity of drugs attributable to Hive-ley.
Increase for Possession of a Firearm
The district court enhanced Hiveley's sentence two levels for possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime pursuant to U.S.S.G. Section 2Dl.l(b)(l). Application Note 3 provides:
The enhancement for weapon possession reflects the increased danger of violence when drug traffickers possess weapons. The adjustment should be applied if the weapon was present, unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense. For example, the enhancement would not be applied if the defendant, arrested at his residence, had an unloaded hunting rifle in the closet.
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1), comment, (n. 3).
Hiveley argues that the district court erred in increasing his sentence by two-levels to reflect his possession of a firearm during the commission of the conspiracy. Hiveley contends that the government failed to show that it was not clearly improbable that the weapons seized from his residence had a nexus with the criminal activity.
The guns seized by the government in this case were seized from the bedroom of a 1971 double-wide mobile home where Hiveley, his wife and her two minor children lived. There were a number of unloaded long-arm rifles and shotguns found in the closet off the master bedroom. Small handguns were located in the master bedroom. Kim Hiveley testified that the two loaded small caliber pistols belong to her, and that she obtained those prior to getting married to Larry Hive-ley in 1993. There were no weapons seized from the trailer where the 1100 pounds of marijuana were found. Hiveley contends that because there was no evidence that he had ever used any weapon in connection with drug trafficking, the district court committed clear error by assessing the two-level enhancement against him for the weapons. This argument does not mandate a reversal.
The district court could properly enhance Hiveley's sentence for possession of a firearm; evidence in the record supports the finding of the district judge. Moreover, proof of a connection between the firearms and the criminal activity "does not require a showing that [defendant] 'ever used or even touched the (gun).' . Constructive possession will suffice to justify an upward adjustment for possession of a firearm during the commission of an offense." United States v. Turpin, 920 F.2d 1377, 1386 (8th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 953, 111 S.Ct. 1428, 113 L.Ed.2d 480 (1991), citing United States v. Luster, 896 F.2d 1122, 1129 (8th Cir.1990).
During the search of Hiveley's ranch, officers recovered over 1,100 pounds of marijuana in a storage building located on the ranch. Also recovered in the search of the shed were drug records, scales, packaging materials, and a device to compress marijuana. The drug records seized from the shed contained twenty-four separate accounts designations reflecting a total shipment of 10,262 pounds of marijuana. During the search of the master bedroom, officers found marijuana, cocaine, over $3,000 cash, three loaded handguns, a .44 magnum revolver and two .25 caliber semiautomatic pistols, and a drug scale. Overall, the evidence supports the district court's enhancement of Hiveley's sentence of two levels for possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime.
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we affirm Henry's conviction and the sentence of twenty-one years eight months of imprisonment. In addition, we affirm Hiveley's sentence of nineteen years six months of imprisonment.
. The Honorable Michael J. Melloy, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Northern District of Iowa.
. To sentence an offender by the weight of drugs attributed to that person by a co-conspirator now cooperating with the government usually for a reduced sentence, is a procedure that can be subject to much error and can justifiably be criticized. See Addendum, infra.