Case Name: STATE OF HAWAII, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CLARENCE ALAN BAKER, Defendant-Appellant
Court: Supreme Court of the State of Hawaii
Jurisdiction: Hawaii
Decision Date: 1974-08-05
Citations: 55 Haw. 621
Docket Number: NO. 5480
Parties: STATE OF HAWAII, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CLARENCE ALAN BAKER, Defendant-Appellant
Judges: RICHARDSON. C.J.. LEVINSON. KOBAYASHI. OGATA AND MENOR. JJ.
Reporter: Hawaii Reports
Volume: 55
Pages: 621–624

Head Matter:
STATE OF HAWAII, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CLARENCE ALAN BAKER, Defendant-Appellant
NO. 5480
AUGUST 5, 1974
RICHARDSON. C.J.. LEVINSON. KOBAYASHI. OGATA AND MENOR. JJ.

Opinion:
OPINION OF THE COURT BY
RICHARDSON. C.J.
Defendant-appellant Clarence Alan Baker was convicted of three counts of forgery in the second degree. In the indictment the state charged that the appellant:
. . . did, with intent to defraud, falsely complete and utter a written instrument, to wit a check . . . thereby commit ting the offense of Forgery in the Second Degree in violation of Section 708-852 of the Hawaii Revised Statutes.
However HRS § 708-852 states in pertinent part:
(1) A person commits the offense of forgery in the second degree if, with intent to defraud, he falsely makes, completes, or alters a written instrument, or utters a forged instrument .
Defendant-appellant argues that because the indictment charging him incorrectly described the offense of forgery in the second degree, the offenses described in the charges were not proved and he was consequently tried and convicted of an offense never charged. Although we find the indictment to be inarticulately drawn, we hold that the appellant was not prejudiced by any technical error in the wording of the indictment. Each count of the indictment was explicitly drawn so as to describe in detail each allegedly forged instrument. The serial number, drawee, drawer, payee and amount of each commercial instrument were fully set forth in the indictment, as was the particular conduct of the defendant asserted by the state to be unlawful. Under these circumstances we cannot say that the indictment was fatally defective for failure to give the defendant reasonable notice of the offenses with which he was charged.
Pursuant to HRS § 726-34, in the indictment,
. . . the offense may be charged either by name or by reference to the statute defining or making it punishable; and the transaction may be stated with so much detail of time, place, and circumstances and such particulars as to the person (if any) against whom, and the thing (if any) in respect to which the offense was committed, as are necessary to identify the transaction, to bring it within the statutory definition of the offense charged, to show that the court has jurisdiction, and to give the accused reasonable notice of the facts.
On the basis of the foregoing we hold that the indictment specifically charged the appellant with three violations of HRS § 708-852, and, although inarticulately drawn, provided the appellant with sufficient facts to put him on reasonable notice of the charges against him. See Territory v. Henry, 43 Haw. 54, 57 (1958).
Philip H .Lowenthal, Deputy Public Defender (Donald K. Tsukiyama, Public Defender, with him on the briefs), for defendant-appellant.
Andrew T. Johnson, Jr., Ass't County Attorney (Arthur Ueoka, County Attorney with him on the brief), for plaintiffappellee.
Affirmed.
The Hawaii Penal Code is not yet published in the supplement to HRS, but the text of the Hawaii Penal Code may be found in S.L.H. 1972, Act 9, pp. 32-142.