Case Name: Ex parte Clarence Lee BRANDLEY, Applicant
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1989-12-13
Citations: 781 S.W.2d 886
Docket Number: No. 70719
Parties: Ex parte Clarence Lee BRANDLEY, Applicant.
Judges: WHITE, J., concurs in the result.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 781
Pages: 886–933

Head Matter:
Ex parte Clarence Lee BRANDLEY, Applicant.
No. 70719.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, En Banc.
Dec. 13, 1989.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 17, 1990.
Mike DeGeurin, Paul Nugent, Houston, Donald M. Brown, Conroe, for appellant.
Peter C. Speers, III, Dist. Atty., Conroe, Robert Huttash, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

Opinion:
OPINION
BERCHELMANN, Judge.
This is an application for writ of habeas corpus. Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 11.-07. Applicant was twice tried for the capital murder of Cheryl Ferguson. Applicant's first trial ended in a mistrial when the jury was unable to reach a verdict. In his second trial, applicant was found guilty as indicted. On direct appeal, we affirmed applicant's conviction holding, among other things, that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict. Brandley v. State, 691 S.W.2d 699 (Tex.Cr.App.1985): While the record on direct appeal supports that holding, the evidence adduced pursuant to this application raises other constitutional issues irrelevant to the sufficiency question.
Applicant's petition for writ of habeas corpus raises seven grounds, one of which alleges that the State's investigative procedure violated his right to due process of law and a fundamentally fair trial. One of the facts underpinning that assertion demonstrates that the State failed to provide appellant's counsel with potentially exculpatory information in the State's possession that two men were witnessed near the scene of the crime shortly after the victim was last seen alive.
Because applicant alleged claims of constitutional dimension based upon controverted, previously unresolved facts which are material to his confinement, we ordered the trial court to hold a hearing pursuant to this application. See Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 11.07, Sec. 2. In Ex parte Adams, 768 S.W.2d 281 (Tex.Cr.App.1989), less than a year ago this Court unanimously found that Adams's application for writ of habeas corpus, alleging a due process violation based upon facts requiring an evi-dentiary hearing, was properly before us. This Court has long recognized the cognizi-bility of due process claims in original habeas corpus proceedings. Ex parte Bush, 166 Tex.Cr.R. 259, 313 S.W.2d 287 (1958).
The trial court held an extensive hearing pursuant to this application and entered findings of fact and conclusions of law favorable to applicant. Therein the judge presiding over the hearing concluded that applicant was denied a fair trial and due process of law. Commenting upon the testimony adduced at the hearing, the trial court stated:
The litany of events graphically described by the witnesses, some of it chilling and shocking, leads me to the conclusion the pervasive shadow of darkness has obscured the light of fundamental decency and human rights. I can only sadly state justice has been on trial here, but of more significance, injustice has been on trial.
Applicant alleges that the State's pretrial investigative procedures were "so imper-missibly suggestive of applicant that it created false testimony calculated to manufacture circumstantial evidence against applicant in violation of his right to due process and a fundamentally fair trial." The trial court found that the State failed to "conduct a proper investigation," and that the investigation had a "blind focus" which ignored leads to evidence inconsistent with the "premature conclusion that [applicant] had committed the crime." The trial court's conclusions of law state that the investigative procedure was "so impermis-sibly suggestive that false testimony was created, thereby denying [applicant] of due process of law and a fundamentally fair trial."
While this Court is not bound by the findings of a trial court in a habeas corpus proceeding, Ex parte Bates, 640 S.W.2d 894 (Tex.Cr.App.1982), where the trial court's findings are supported by the record, they should be considered, if not accepted. Ex parte Adams, 768 S.W.2d at 288; Ex parte McCormick, 645 S.W.2d 801 (Tex.Cr.App.1983). In Ex parte Turner, 545 S.W.2d 470 (Tex.Cr.App.1977), we held that although this Court has the ultimate power to decide matters of fact in habeas proceedings, generally if the trial court's findings are supported by the record, they should be accepted by this Court.
I.
Set forth below is a summary of the findings of fact, entered by the judge presiding over the habeas hearing, which are supported by the record.
Applicant was indicted, convicted and sentenced to death for the sexual assault and murder of Cheryl Ferguson. Ferguson's death occurred on Saturday, August 23, 1980 during a girls' volleyball tournament held at Conroe High School. The fall semester was scheduled to begin on Monday, August 31. The authorities announced to the public that a suspect would be arrested prior to the commencement of classes. Texas Ranger Wesley Styles was called in to head the investigation. Styles began his investigation on the evening of Thursday, August 28, three days before classes were scheduled to resume. The next day, prior to interviewing any witnesses, Styles arrested applicant, a janitor of the high school. On Saturday, August 30, Styles arranged for three other Conroe High School janitors, Gary Acreman, Sam Martinez and John Sessum, to meet at the high school. Styles did not interview them separately, but instead conducted a "walk through" wherein the janitors were walked through the sequence of events of the day of the murder, and were questioned in each others presence. Gary Acreman did most of the talking at the walk through.
John Sessum testified at applicant's first trial. His testimony at trial was consistent with the story generated by the walk through, that is, that applicant approached the stairwell after the victim walked up the stairs and headed into the restroom. At the evidentiary hearing, however, Sessum admitted that he committed perjury at applicant's first trial and lied in his statement to the authorities because he was in fear of both Acreman and Styles. He testified at the hearing that Acreman talked to the victim as she approached the stairwell. Acreman followed her up the stairs, talked to her at the top of the stairs, and then grabbed the victim. Acreman was accompanied by a former janitor of the high school, later identified as James Dexter Robinson. The victim screamed, "No" and "Don't," and cried for help. Contrary to his prior statements, Sessum testified that applicant did not arrive until five or ten minutes after the girl was accosted.
Sessum further testified that when Acre-man drove him home the day of the murder, Acreman warned him that if Sessum told anyone there would be "trouble" for Sessum. Acreman repeated his warning to Sessum prior to the "walk through." When Sessum tried to tell Styles about Acreman, Styles threatened to arrest Ses-sum if Sessum did not cooperate with the walk through. Sessum testified that in 1987 he was assaulted by an unknown man who was inquiring about Sessum implicating Acreman in the death of the victim. The trial court found Sessum's testimony at the evidentiary hearing credible.
Gary Acreman testified at both of applicant's trials and the evidentiary hearing. His testimony at trial was consistent with the story generated by the walk through; viz: the victim walked up the stairs and toward the restroom, followed shortly thereafter by applicant. At the hearing, applicant entered into evidence two videotaped statements made by Acreman in which Acreman proclaimed applicant's innocence and stated that James Dexter Robinson followed the victim up the stairs, Acreman heard the girl yell, "No," and Acreman saw Robinson grab the girl and drag her into the restroom as she screamed for help. In the videotaped statements, Acreman stated that Robinson threatened him into lying about the murder. Acreman repeated again and again on the videotaped statements that applicant had nothing to to with the murder and that applicant was "being railroaded."
At the hearing, Acreman recanted the statements on the videotapes. After much vacillation, Acreman admitted that Robinson was, in fact, at the school that day. Acreman admitted that the statements generated by the walk through were incorrect in that they failed to acknowledge that Acreman spoke to the victim shortly before her death. Acreman claimed that the conversation completely slipped his mind until the evidentiary hearing held' seven years after the murder. Acreman testified to a new found memory that he left the other janitors after speaking with the victim, despite his trial testimony that he, Sessum and Martinez were together when the girl was murdered.
The third janitor attending the walk through was Sam Martinez. Prior to the walk through, Martinez gave a statement with a differing version of events of the day of the murder. Two days after the murder, Martinez gave a statement that the victim walked up a stairwell and headed towards the restroom after applicant had come up the stairs. After Styles' walk through, Martinez changed his story to coincide with walk through version of events; that is, applicant approached the stairwell after the victim walked up the stairs and headed into the restroom. Martinez explained the inconsistencies between the two statements by stating that the walk through "helped me a whole lot." At the evidentiary hearing, Martinez changed the story produced by the walk through by stating that the victim asked the janitors where the restroom was located and that Acreman spoke to the victim. Prior to the evidentiary hearing, Martinez, who gave two statements to the police and testified at both of applicant's trials, never admitted this conversation took place. Martinez also changed the walk through version of events to which he testified at applicant's trials by stating that Acreman spent approximately thirty minutes away from Martinez and Sessum shortly after the victim went into the restroom.
Sessum, Acreman and Martinez signed written statements following the walk through, but Styles did not supervise the taking of the statements. Styles testified that he had no idea whether the statements were accurate, and could offer no explanation why Sessum's statement was not signed until one month after the walk through. The trial court noted that the three written statements taken immediately following the walk through were consistent as to the critical sequence of events and the critical time frames.
Henry Martin Peace, the janitor who discovered the victim, testified on behalf of the State at both of applicant's trials. Peace circumstantially implicated applicant by stating that applicant repeatedly ordered Peace to search the loft where the girl's body was found, until Peace ultimately discovered the victim.
At the hearing Peace stated that Styles arrived at Peace's home one night and forced Peace against the wall, choking Peace by twisting the chain Peace wore around his neck. Peace, a man the trial court noted as being under five foot tall, was taken to the Cleveland Police Station until 1:30 in the morning. En route, Styles threatened to "blow" Peace's brains out. When Peace complained of Styles' treatment to the District Attorney's Office, Peace was told that the office would "take care of it." Later the members of the District Attorney's Office told Peace he was "hallucinating" that Styles had manhandled him. Peace testified that he continues to fear Styles.
Peace was not allowed to leave the police station until he signed a written statement, despite his inability to read or write. Peace asked that a family member be permitted to read the statement to him before he signed it, but the police denied Peace's request. On another occasion, Peace was told by a police officer that Peace was too small to have committed the sexual assault and murder, but that "the nigger" [referring to applicant] was big enough to have committed the crime; therefore, "the nigger was elected."
The trial court found that the murder investigation was so contrived that it created false testimony and that the investigation failed to follow any leads which did not comport with the preconceived, premature notion that applicant committed the murder. Styles admitted at the evidentiary hearing that before he arrived in Conroe and prior to interviewing any witnesses, applicant was his only suspect. Styles maintained this blind focus despite the fact that a Caucasian pubic hair, not belonging to the victim, was found near the victim's vagina. The State resisted all efforts to obtain hair samples for comparison from the three janitors who saw the victim moments before the assault. When pressed for a reason why he did not want to obtain a hair sample from Acreman to compare with the Caucasian pubic hair found near the victim's vagina, Styles testified at the evidentiary hearing, "Let's say I didn't do it and it wasn't done, and why it wasn't done, I don't know."
Additionally, the State resisted all attempts to obtain blood samples from Acre-man, Martinez and Sessum despite finding blood inconsistent with applicant's blood type on the victim's shirt. Type A blood was found on the shirt, and although the victim had Type A blood, there were no lacerations to any part of her body, indicating that the blood may have originated from the perpetrator. Applicant has Type 0 blood. Not until years after the murder, when the Texas Attorney General's Office began to investigate the validity of applicant's conviction, did the State finally obtain samples of blood from Acreman and Robinson. Both men have Type A blood.
Moreover, after the autopsy discovered the existence of semen in the victim's vagina, the State failed to run an analysis of the sample to determine the blood type of the donor. Dr. Joseph Jachimczyck, now the Harris County Medical Examiner, testi: fied at the evidentiary hearing that his office did not test for the blood type of the donor, and that he did not know whether the samples were given to the Conroe Police Department. A detective from the Sex Crimes Unit of the Homicide Division of the Houston Police Department testified at the hearing that it was standard police procedure in 1980 to preserve the vaginal swabs taken in sexual assault investigations, and that there is no justification to discard the swabs because they can scientifically exclude suspects based on blood typing, Rh factor and other genetic characteristics of the donor of the spermatozoa.
Likewise, the State failed to investigate a lead from Cheryl Bradford, a volleyball participant. Bradford testified at the evi-dentiary hearing that the day of the murder, she passed the victim in the hallway as Bradford returned from the restroom. Bradford thereafter proceeded to the gymnasium and began warming up for the game. Twenty to thirty minutes after last seeing the victim alive, Bradford observed two white men rushing through the gymnasium. She recalled seeing the men because there were no males attending the volleyball tournament. Her descriptions of the two men matched the height, weight and hair color characteristics of the pair now accused by Sessum as having committed the murder, Gary Acreman and James Dexter Robinson. After the victim's body was discovered, Bradford told her volleyball coach about the men. Bradford and her coach contacted the Conroe Police Department with the lead, but the police "were not real interested in [her] information and were in a rush to get [her] off the phone." The police never contacted Bradford for further information, nor did any government agency ever inform defense counsel of the incident. Eight years after the murder, Bradford saw a televised program questioning the validity of applicant's conviction. She got "chills" when she saw a televised picture of James Dexter Robinson, although unable to identify Robinson as one of the men she saw rushing through the auditorium. She subsequently recontacted the authorities about witnessing the men. Trial counsel for applicant were never informed about this information.
Styles also failed to investigate a lead given by Peace after Styles conducted the walk through with the other janitors. Peace informed Styles that the day of the murder Acreman re-entered the high school alone and stated that applicant was "having fun with a good looking girl." Despite the prospect that either Acreman may have witnessed the offense or a related act, or that Acreman may have floated a false story about applicant, Styles never asked Acreman about the meaning of the statement. Regarding his failure to investigate the statement, Styles testified, "I might've should have asked [Acreman], but I didn't." He also stated that he did not investigate the statement because it was "hearsay."
II.
Where the State's investigative procedure is so improper, it may result in a denial of an accused's rights to due process of law. Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 89 S.Ct. 1127, 22 L.Ed.2d 402 (1969); Dispensa v. Lynaugh, 847 F.2d 211, 218 (5th Cir.1988). In Foster, the Supreme Court held that where the State orchestrated an identification procedure "so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identification" of an accused, the State's conduct may amount to a denial of due process, judged by the totality of the circumstances. Id., 394 U.S. at 442, 89 S.Ct. at 1128, citing and quoting Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 1972, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967).
Although Foster involves impermissible State conduct in an identification procedure, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not limited to the State's action in that narrow context. For example, due process is not satisfied where the State contrives a conviction "through the pretense of a trial which in truth is but used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty." Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112, 55 S.Ct. 340, 342, 79 L.Ed. 791 (1935) (State's use of perjured testimony). Nor is due process' satisfied where the State fails to correct unsolicited perjury, Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 1177, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959), nor where the State suppresses evidence favorable to the accused. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196-97, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). Likewise, where the State's conviction is based in part upon the introduction of a coerced confession, a defendant's right to due process is violated, Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544, 81 S.Ct. 735, 741, 5 L.Ed.2d 760 (1961), and where the State conceals a material witness whose testimony is shown to create a reasonable doubt of guilt that did not otherwise exist, there is also a deprivation of due process. Hernandez v. Estelle, 674 F.2d 313 (5th Cir.1981).
Although our review of the record supports the trial court's finding that the State's investigation was flawed, we must now determine whether these facts support the trial court's conclusion of law that the investigation lead to a denial of applicant's right to due process and fundamental fairness. We look to the "totality of the circumstances" to make that determination. Ex parte Adams, 768 S.W.2d at 293; Foster, 394 U.S. at 442, 89 S.Ct. at 1128.
We note at the outset, as we did on direct appeal, that applicant's conviction is based entirely on circumstantial evidence. Brandley, 691 S.W.2d at 701. State misconduct is more likely to. affect the outcome of the trial based upon circumstantial evidence than one in which there is direct evidence, untainted by State misconduct, linking a defendant to the crime.
The State's suppression of Bradford's information that she saw a man meeting Acreman's description near the scene of the crime shortly after the victim was attacked undermines Acreman's now recanted testimony that he was in a different building with the other janitors at the time in question. At the very least, it establishes that men other than applicant were near the scene of the crime shortly after the victim was last seen alive. Given Bradford's hearing testimony that she saw no men attending the volleyball tournament at the time in question, this information becomes more significant by establishing other suspects, if not impeaching Acreman's testimony regarding his whereabouts.
A review of applicant's pleadings reflects that applicant, albeit inartfully, alleges that this evidence supports a due process claim under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 which prohibits State suppression of "evidence favorable to an accused . where the evidence is material either to guilt or to the punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution," Id., at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196. In United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985), the Supreme Court held that the due process requirements addressed in Brady, supra, applied to the suppression of impeachment evidence, and where such evidence was suppressed, a new trial must be granted where the confidence in the outcome of the trial is undermined. Bagley, at 683, 105 S.Ct. at 3383. To require reversal pursuant to a Brady claim, however, the State's suppression of evidence must be considered material. Evidence is considered material where there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Bagley, at 682, 105 S.Ct. at 3383 (1985).
In United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976), the Supreme Court addressed the materiality requirement:
It necessarily follows that if the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist, constitutional error has been committed. This means that the omission must be evaluated in the context of the entire record. If there is no reasonable doubt about guilt whether or not the additional evidence is considered, there is no justification for a new trial. On the other hand, if the verdict is already of questionable validity, additional evidence of relatively minor importance might be sufficient to create a reasonable doubt.
Id., at 112-13, 96 S.Ct. at 2402 (footnote omitted).
In Bagley, 473 U.S. at 683, 105 S.Ct. at 3384, the Supreme Court instructed appellate courts to make the materiality determination "in light of the totality of the circumstances and with an awareness of the difficulty of reconstructing in a post-trial proceeding the course that the defense and the trial would have taken had the defense [been given access to the suppressed evidence]." Whether Bradford's statements to the police are analyzed pursuant to applicant's broader due process claim based upon the entire investigation, or regarding applicant's more specific due process claim under Brady, we are compelled to look further and consider the totality of the circumstances of the trial.
Additionally, applicant submits that the "walk through" of Acreman, Sessum and Martinez contributed to a due process violation by creating false testimony. The trial court found that the walk through served as a means of intimidating Sessum into following the story generated by the walk through, for Sessum was threatened with arrest when he attempted to inform the authorities about Acreman's involvement in the murder. The walk through undoubtedly injected false testimony into applicant's first trial, for Sessum admitted that he committed perjury at applicant's first trial. However, Sessum did not testify at applicant's second trial. Acreman and Martinez did testify at the second trial, adhering to the walk through story. Both Acreman and Martinez acknowledged at the eviden-tiary hearing that the walk through story is incomplete, in that Acreman did, in fact, speak with the victim shortly before she was murdered. The habeas judge found Martinez's and Acreman's explanations that they forgot Acreman's conversation with the girl, until seven years after the murder, are unworthy of belief.
Both men also recanted the walk through story and professed a new found memory at the evidentiary hearing by testifying that Acreman was not with Martinez and Sessum for a thirty minute interval after Acreman spoke with the victim. The harm resulting from the walk through story that Acreman was with the other janitors when the victim was abducted is underscored by this Court's treatment of the evidence on direct appeal. We found the evidence sufficient to support applicant's conviction holding that there were no reasonable hypotheses other than applicant's guilt, based in part upon the fact that the whereabouts of Acreman, Sessum and Martinez were accounted for at the time of the murder. Brandley, 691 S.W.2d at 704.
Additionally, Styles' manhandling and threats to kill the diminutive Peace, the State's star witness, taints the reliability of Peace's trial testimony. The psychological pressure exerted on Peace to circumstantially implicate applicant would potentially undermine the fact finder's confidence in the product of such coercion.
The State's refusal to obtain hair and blood samples from the three janitors who saw the victim enter the restroom creates problems of a different type. Despite evidence that a Caucasian hair, not belonging to the victim, was found on her, and despite the evidence that blood inconsistent with applicant's blood type was found on the victim's shirt, the State resisted efforts to obtain samples from Acreman, Martinez and Sessum. Because these pieces of evidence were lost in Montgomery County while the record was being prepared for direct appeal, no tests can now be performed on these items.
Absent a showing of bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not, in and of itself, result in the denial of due process of law. Arizona v. Youngblood, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 333, 337, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988). However, in the case at bar, the State's apparent refusal to perform certain scientific tests on the physical evidence at hand resulted in a lack of direct evidence in this case. This lack of direct evidence buttresses applicant's claim that the error resulting from the State's other improper conduct affected the outcome of his trial.
Although any of these incidences alone might not support applicant's claim, there can be no doubt that the cumulative effect of the investigative procedure, judged by the totality of the circumstances, resulted in a deprivation of applicant's right to due process of law by suppressing evidence favorable to the accused, and by creating false testimony and inherently unreliable testimony. Accordingly, applicant's conviction must be reversed.
Due process of law is the cornerstone of a civilized system of justice. Our society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of justice suffers when an accused is treated unfairly. Brady, 378 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1197. The State's investigative procedure produced a trial lacking the rudiments of fairness. The principles of due process, embodied within the United States Constitution, must not, indeed cannot, countenance such blatant unfairness.
The violent end to Cheryl Ferguson's young life is both senseless and tragic. The end of a life so full of promise is a loss not only to her loved-ones, but also to our society as a whole. Our outrage over her murder, however, cannot justify the subversion of justice that took place during the investigation, which ultimately affected the trial of her accused perpetrator.
We therefore set aside applicant's conviction, and order applicant released to the Sheriff of Montgomery County to answer the indictment upon which applicant was convicted.
WHITE, J., concurs in the result.
. In his dissenting opinion to this cause, the Presiding Judge disregards the overwhelming evidence supporting the trial court's findings in an impassioned attempt to reject those findings. Instead of looking at the evidence in support of the findings, that opinion attempts to contradict them by citing snippets of grand jury and trial testimony, at times out of context and other times in a less than complete fashion, in addition to offering personal gratuitous observations. Of course, this is not, nor has it ever been, the appropriate standard of review of a trial court's findings. See, for example, Judge Duncan's concurring opinion, infra, for a more detailed explanation of this problem.
. Brenda Medina, the woman with whom Robinson lived at the time of the murder, testified at the evidentiary hearing that the day of the murder Robinson did not return home until after midnight. Robinson awakened Medina and stated that he had to leave the state because he killed a girl, but that he had hidden the girl's body so well that no one would find her until he was out of town. Robinson left the state early that morning, leaving behind his blood stained tennis shoes. The record reflects that Medina first told this information to her attorney in 1986. Medina's attorney informed the District Attorney's Office of the extra judicial confession. When Medina's attorney learned that the District Attorney's Office failed to inform defense counsel of this information, he notified defense counsel about Robinson's confession.
. It would be futile to obtain samples for comparison today, for the exhibit containing the Caucasian hair became missing while the record was being prepared for direct appeal.
. The blood samples finally obtained from Acre-man and Robinson cannot be compared with the blood found on the victim's shirt because the blood stained shirt also became missing when the record was being prepared for direct appeal.
Notwithstanding the Presiding Judge's assertion to the contrary in his dissenting opinion, these facts regarding the bloody clothing are uncontradicted by the record and the parties in this cause.
. Bradford's statements undermine the State's theory of the case that applicant was the only janitor whose presence was unaccounted for at the time of, and following, the murder. Additionally, this information conflicts with the now recanted trial testimony of Acreman, Martinez and Sessum that they were exclusively in each other's company after the girl entered the restroom.
. For example, where a defendant alleges a due process violation based upon the State's failure to inform him of potentially exculpatory evidence, the "materiality" requirement focuses upon whether the suppressed evidence might have affected the outcome of the trial. U.S. v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2398, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976). See also U.S. v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985).
. The State urges that the District Attorney's Office was not aware of Bradford's statements to the police. However, in determining a due process violation we have declined in the past to distinguish different agencies under the same government, focusing instead upon the prosecuting team, which includes both investigative and prosecutorial personnel. Ex parte Adams, 768 S.W.2d at 292, citing U.S. v. Antone, 603 F.2d 566, 569 (5th Cir.1979).
Additionally, any suggestion by the Presiding Judge in his dissenting opinion that Bradford's testimony at the hearing is unworthy of belief or is immaterial because it is "unsubstantiated" simply begs the question. Ex parte Brandley, 781 S.W.2d at 904 (McCormick, P.J. dissenting). Moreover, to imply that her testimony is irrelevant because a police officer testified at trial that there were men at the tournament is factually misleading. Bradford's testimony regarding seeing no other men concerns the time frame in which the victim disappeared. The police officer's testimony relates to a time frame hours later.
. Although acknowledging Peace's repeated perjury on collateral issues, the dissenting opinion surmises that the investigative procedure "did not produce any unreliable testimony" from Peace. Ex parte Brandley, 781 S.W.2d 904 (Campbell, J. dissenting). The record contradicts this bold assertion. Peace's hearing testimony conflicts with his trial testimony regarding Styles' mistreatment. At trial, Peace testified as follows:
Q. [Defense Counsel] Did Ranger Styles influence you in any way on your testimony in this case?
A. [Peace] No, Sir. Nobody has.
*
Q. Wesley Styles — was he good to you? Treat you fair?
A. He didn't mistreat me. No, Sir.
Peace's hearing testimony recounts abusive treatment which, according to Peace, was reported to the District Attorney's Office. Notwithstanding the District Attorney's knowledge of Styles' mistreatment of Peace, the State failed to correct Peace's false testimony adduced at trial. This evidence alone arguably supports yet another due process violation: The State's use of perjured testimony. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959); Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 78 S.Ct. 103, 2 L.Ed.2d 9 (1957). See also Ex parte Adams, 768 S.W.2d 281.
Moreover, Peace acknowledged at trial that the statement the police prepared for Peace, and signed by Peace despite his inability to read or write, is riddled with inconsistencies. He testified to five separate false statements in the document.
Lastly, Peace also acknowledged committing perjury at applicant's first trial regarding Peace's display of a pistol at the high school prior to the date of the murder. Simply put, the dissenting opinion's implication that Peace's statements have been consistent is simply not supported by the record.
. We hold that the error attendant to this case would not prevent the readmission of evidence upon retrial, assuming, of course, that the procedural prerequisites to its admission are met.