Case Name: Vincent BONVENTO and John Bonvento, Appellants, v. The BOARD OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION OF PALM BEACH COUNTY, Florida, a Florida public school corporation, Appellee
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1967-01-25
Citations: 194 So. 2d 605
Docket Number: No. 35038
Parties: Vincent BONVENTO and John Bonvento, Appellants, v. The BOARD OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION OF PALM BEACH COUNTY, Florida, a Florida public school corporation, Appellee.
Judges: THORNAL, C. J., and ROBERTS and ERVIN, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 194
Pages: 605–611

Head Matter:
Vincent BONVENTO and John Bonvento, Appellants, v. The BOARD OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION OF PALM BEACH COUNTY, Florida, a Florida public school corporation, Appellee.
No. 35038.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Jan. 25, 1967.
Miller, Cone, Owen, Wagner & Nugent and Larry Klein, West Palm Beach, for appellants.
Paty, Downey, Lewis & Daves, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
THOMAS, Justice.
This controversy comes to us under the provisions of Sec. 4 of Article V of the Constitution, F.S.A. providing that "appeals from trial courts may be taken directly to the supreme court, as a matter of right, from final judgments or decrees directly passing upon the validity of a state statute
The statute held by the Circuit Judge to-be unconstitutional is Chapter 65-894, Acts-of 1965, which follows:
"Section 2. The sum of fifty thousand dollars ($50,000.00) is hereby appropriated out of the funds in Palm Beach county board of public instruction to be paid to Vincent Bonvento, a minor, as compensation for his fractured spine and permanent paralysis to be held in trust for him by his father, John Bon-vento; and of which sum the father, John Bonvento, is entitled to reimbursement for actual expenses incurred for medical and related services."
The Circuit Judge concluded that the-law conflicted with Sec. 13, Article XII of the Constitution, proscribing the enactment of any law "authorizing the diversion or the lending of any County or District School Funds, or the appropriation of any part of the permanent or available school Fund to any other than school purposes He thought the legislature in a magnanimous desire to assist the unfortunate youth, whose plight we will presently describe, overlooked the restriction imposed by this Constitutional inhibition. So he declared the Act invalid since, he commented, the Supreme Court had declared that payment of school funds to an injured student was not use of the money for "school purposes." For support of the view he referred to Bragg v. Board of Public Instruction of Duval County, 160 Fla. 590, 36 So.2d 222, and Richter v. Board of Public Instruction of Dade County, Fla., 91 So.2d 794.
Before going into the question of the applicability of the cited cases to the controversy with which we are dealing we will briefly give the salient facts. The appellant, Vincent Bonvento, suffered serious injuries to his back when a "human pyramid" of which he was a part and which was formed under the supervision of a teacher in a class in physical education collapsed. His spine was fractured and his lower extremities were completely paralyzed. The treating physicians fix the extent of his injuries at 65 per cent, to 75 per cent, of his body. All these facts were declared by the legislature to be true in the preamble to the Act and, further, that the medical treatment to date had reached the sum of $25 thousand.
We think the validity of the Act does not require the narrow and strict interpretation attributed to it by the veteran Circuit Judge, much as we respect his judicial wisdom. First, we have held that acts of the legislature carry such a strong presumption of validity that they should be held constitutional if there is any reasonable theory to that end. Knight & Wall Company v. Bryant, Fla., 178 So.2d 5. Moreover, unconstitutionality must appear beyond all reasonable doubt before an Act is condemned. Campbell v. Johnson, Fla., 182 So.2d 244. In their argument the appellants pose the rhetorical question whether or not there could be any doubt that had a piece of furniture or equipment been damaged when the pyramid collapsed the repair of it could be made from school funds. We conclude that the answer would obviously be in the affirmative. And we add our own question, if school funds may be used to repair a broken piece of furniture or equipment, why not a broken human body?
The two cases cited in the judgment are not, in our opinion, as restrictive as the judgment indicates. In Bragg the question was whether or not a Board of Public Instruction was immune from liability in a tort action, and the court significantly stated, "The law may impose liability for tort on Boards of Public Instruction but the prevailing rule in this country is that they are not so liable unless made so by law." [Italics supplied.] In the same opinion there is reference to Sec. 234.03, Florida Statutes 1941, which the court thought was a recognition of immunity by the legislature, hence the need of the law protecting school children in transit.
In Richter this court, referring to Bragg, commented that it followed the universal rule where no provision had been made "by statute for such suits." It is true that the court cast doubt on the power of the legislature to authorize "such suits" (in tort). But we are immediately concerned with construction of the two words in the Constitution : "school purposes" and although there is similarity in the two cases cited and this one, the point of law involved is not identical.
There are provisions in the statutes for insuring athletes (Sec. 232.43) and requiring county boards to secure and keep in force insurance "covering liability for damages on account of bodily injury, or death to pupils legally enrolled in the public-schools" while they are being transported to and from a school or a school activity (Sec. 234.03). These statutes are not directly involved but they certainly reflect the attitude that students in schools shall be safeguarded.
We resolve the main problem by holding that the Act of the legislature has not been shown beyond a reasonable doubt to be invalid and should not be held unconstitutional on the ground that no reasonable theory supports its validity.
Although the Circuit Judge disregarded appellee's point Number II challenging the sufficiency of the notice of intention to apply for special legislation as required by Sec. 21 of Article III of the Constitution, we will notice it but only to remark that an examination of the notice convinces us it conforms to our many expressions on the subject.
Two other questions appear here both of which the Circuit Judge did not mention in his judgment, a position well taken as they are obviously without merit.
The judgment of the Circuit Court is reversed.
THORNAL, C. J., and ROBERTS and ERVIN, JJ., concur.
DREW, J., dissents with Opinion.
O'CONNELL and CALDWELL, JJ., dissent and agree with DREW, J.