Case Name: HALL v. MARVIN et al.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1910-12-07
Citations: 126 N.Y.S. 206
Docket Number: 
Parties: HALL v. MARVIN et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 126
Pages: 206–211

Head Matter:
HALL v. MARVIN et al.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.
December 7, 1910.)
Pleading (§ 29 )—Complaint—Mistake in Copy Served—Demurrer.
A complaint in an action on a note, which alleges that the note was executed April 25,1904, that it became due in one year, that a specified sum had been paid and indorsed on it, that the balance remained unpaid, and that payment thereof had been refused, and which sets forth a correct copy of the note, dated April 25, 1904, is not demurrable merely because the copies of the complaint served on defendants erroneously gave the date of the note as 1909, instead of 1904, as defendants could not have been misled by the clerical error.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Pleading, Cent. Dig. § 50; Dec. Dig. § 29.*]
Spring and Robson, JX, dissenting.
Appeal from Special Term, Onondaga County.
Action by Sarah A. Hall against William G. Marvin and another. From an interlocutory judgment sustaining demurrers to the com plaint, plaintiff appeals.
Reversed and demurrers overruled, with leave to plead over.
Arguedl before McLENNAN/ P. J., and SPRING, WILLIAMS, KRUSE, and ROBSON, JJ.
J. W. Shea, for appellant.
Higbee & Lay and Lyman & Canough, for respondents.
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
WILLIAMS, J.
The judgment should be reversed with costs and the demurrers overruled with costs, with leave to plead over on payment of such costs.
The action was brought upon a promissory note made by the defendants for $200 and interest, payable to the order of plaintiff one year after date. The complaint alleged the note was made April 25, 1904; that it became due and! payable April 25, 1905; that $83.50 had been paid and indorsed on it, and the balance remained unpaid; that plaintiff demanded payment of the note when it became due, which was refused; that there was due $194.99, with interest from May 5, 1909, for which judgment was demanded. A copy of the note was set out correctly in the original complaint, as datedl April 25, 1904, the day it was given, but in making the copies of the complaint which were served on the defendants, by mistake, the year in the date was written "1909," instead of "1904," as in the original. This was a mere clerical error which could not have misled the defendants. They must have known when they brought their copies of the summons and complaint to their counsel that the note was really dated in 1904, that the note was given on that day, that it became due and payable one year later, in 1905, and that payment of it was then demanded and refused as alleged in the complaint. Apparently, discovering this error in the date of the note in their papers, an opportunity presented itself to delay the collection of the note, and to secure some costs from the plaintiff. They appeared by separate attorneys, and served these demurrers. I suppose plaintiff's attorney knew nothing about this clerical mistake he had made, and, not understanding why demurrers should be served, he moved for judgment on account of the frivolousness of the demurrers. Upon the hearing before the Special Term the mistake was discovered by plaintiff's attorney. He insisted it was a mere clerical error, and should be disregarded, but the court did not regard the case as one where it could quite be said the demurrers were frivolous, and denied the motion. Then subsequently the demurrers were passed upon, and the court made the decision upon which the judgment appealed from was entered. The original complaint and the note have been produced here, and there is no question but that the date in both was 1904. The judge in his memorandum made on the decision of the demurrers states that the original complaint was before him and examined by him.
This seems to be a miscarriage of justice, and that the only benefit that can accrue to any one is the costs these two firms of attorneys hope to get out of the plaintiff. They must have understood it to be a mere clerical mistake after consultation with their clients, and could have easily called the attention of the plaintiff's attorney to it and have
I .allowed it to be corrected, and then, if defendants had any real defense to the action, they could have answered and submitted the issue to a 1 court or a jury. I do not think the court should encourage this sort ' of practice by attorneys, and I do not think it is necessary to do it in i this case. As early as 1853, in the case of Chamberlain v. Kaylor, 2 E. D. Smith, 134, it was held! by Court of Common Pleas of New j York City that the court on demurrers would overlook mere clerical j •errors. In that case the letter "s" was omitted from the word "defendant" in one of the allegations. It was held this was not ground ¡ for demurrer. In 1888 the Fifth Department, General Term, in Kenney v. N. Y. C., 49 Hun, 535, held in a death negligence case that-a mistake in alleging that the "defendant," instead of "decedent," left a • , widow surviving, did not render the complaint demurrable. There was I no allegation that the decedent left any widow or next of kin at all, ¡ but the use of the wrong word was a mere clerical error in drawing or I copying the complaint. No one could have been misled, and the error ] should have been disregarded, and the complaint considered as alleg- j ing that the "decedent," and not the "defendant" (the N. Y. C.), left j a widow and next of kin,—citing Code Civ. Proc. § 723, and Roussel v. St. Nicholas Ins. Co., 41 N. Y. Super. Ct. 279, in which case the I mistake of alleging the fire was not caused by any "accepted" instead •of any "excepted" risk was held by the New York Superior Court to be a mere clerical error, misleading no one, and to be disregarded on demurrer. In 1906 the Appellate Term of the Supreme Court in New York, in Burstein v. Levy, 49 Misc. Rep. 469, 98 N. Y. Supp. 853, held that the use of the word "plaintiff," where the word "defendant," should have been used, was a mere clerical error, and should be disregarded on appeal and in the same year the First Department, Appellate Division, held in King v. Express Company, 113 App. Div. 90, 98 N. Y. Supp. 891, that the use of the word "plaintiff," where the words "plaintiff's intestate" should have been used, was obviously a mere clerical error and would be disregarded on demurrer—citing séction 723, Code Civ. Proc., and Kenney v. N. Y. Central, supra.
Other cases might be referred to, but these are sufficient to show what the law is and has been for over 50 years. I think the principle is applicable here. The defendants and their attorneys cannot with any reason claim they were misled, that they did not understand this using of the figure "9" where the figure "4" should have been ' used, was a mere clerical error, and 11 cannot, under the circumstances here, consent to allow them to take the large costs that have been incurred from the plaintiff upon such a flimsy claim as is made here. .
McLENNAN, P. J., concurs. KRUSE, J., concurs in result in separate memorandum. SPRING and ROBSON, JJ., dissent in- an •opinion by SPRING, J.