Case Name: TEXAS & P. RY. CO. v. WILDER et al.
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1899-02-27
Citations: 92 F. 953
Docket Number: No. 722
Parties: TEXAS & P. RY. CO. v. WILDER et al.
Judges: Before McCOBMTCK, Circuit Judge, and BOAKMAN and PAB-LA X (1C, District Judges.
Reporter: Federal Reporter
Volume: 92
Pages: 953–965

Head Matter:
TEXAS & P. RY. CO. v. WILDER et al.
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
February 27, 1899.)
No. 722.
L Death by Wrongful Act — Actios by Parents — Measure or Damages.
In an action by parents, under the statute of Texas, to recover for the death of their minor son, alleged to have been due to the negligence of defendant, it is proper for the jury, in assessing the damages, to consider what reasonable expectations the plaintiffs had of pecuniary benefits to be received by them from their son after he had reached his majority, as the statute provides for full pecuniary compensation to the parents for the loss of their son, and the damages are not restricted to the loss of benefits to which the plaintiffs had a legal right.
8. Depositions Taken in State Court — Use in Federal, Court after Removal.
Depositions taken in a cause before its removal from a state court cannot be used on the trial In the federal court, where testimony taken In such court, under Rev. St. U. S. § 863, could not be read under the same circumstances, as where the witnesses are living within 100 miles of the place of trial and their oral testimony can be obtained.
Boarman, District Judge, dissenting, on the facts shown in this case.
In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Texas.
Joseph H. Wilder and his wife filed suit In the district court of Harrison county, Tex., against the Texas & Pacific Railway Co., for damages resulting from the killing of their son, Frank 6. Wilder. The son of the plaintiffs was in the employ of the defendant corporation as fireman on a switch engine. The plaintiffs alleged that, while their son was standing upon the apron that covers the space between the engine and tender, where they are joined together, and while he was performing his work as fireman, the apparatus which was used for coupling the engine and tender together gave way and broke, thus separating the engine from the tender, and. causing their son to suddenly fall between the engine and tender, upon the railway track, where he was crushed to death by the tender and several cars which were attached to the engine. The petition further alleged that Frank G. Wilder was 18 years and 5 months old at the time of his death; that he was the only son of the plaintiffs, and was earning, at the date of his death, $60 per month, all of which he contributed to plaintiffs for their support; that he was sober, healthy, robust, and industrious; ( that his capacity to earn money would have rapidly increased from the day of his death up to the age of 21 years, and that he would have earned, for the last two years of his minority, the sum of $150 per month, which he would have contributed to the support of plaintiffs, all of which earnings were relied upon by plaintiffs as a help for their support; that the capacity of Frank G. Wilder to earn money after majority would have increased to the sum of from $150 to $250 per month for a period of at least 30 years, and that he would have contributed that amount to their support as long as they and he lived; that the plaintiff Joseph H. Wilder is 52 years of age, and his wife is 46 years of age, and that they relied upon their son to contribute his earnings after he attained the age of 21 to help support them in their old age, when they should become unfitted to earn a livelihood; that the locomotive and tender were in bad repair, and unfit for the use to which they were being applied, in this: that the coupling apparatus was defective and out of repair, and that the safety chains were unfit for the use to which they were applied, — all of which was known to the defendant corporation, or could have been known to it by the exercise of ordinary care, and was unknown to Frank G. Wilder. Certain defects in the engine and the air brake were also averred. The defendant corporation applied to the state court for the removal of the cause to the federal court. The application was at first refused by the state court, but subsequently, and some months after the filing of the suit, the application for the removal was granted, and the cause was removed to the federal court. Before the determination by the state court of the application for the removal, the defendant corporation filed a general denial and answer in the^state court. As special defenses, the defendant corporation pleaded that Frank G. Wilder knew, or could have known, of the defects in the engine and coupling, and therefore assumed the risk which might result from those defects; also that the plaintiffs consented to the employment of their son, ánd released all claim to his wages in consideration of his obtaining the employment; also that Frank G. Wilder was injured by the negligence of his fellow servant, the engineer on the switch engine, by the rough manner in which the engine was handled, and by the failure of the engineer to see that the engine was in good working order. The case was tried in the federal court, and resulted in a verdict of $3,000 against the defendant corporation, apportioned as follows: $2,000 for Mrs. Lurena Wilder, the mother of the decedent, and $1,000 for Joseph H. Wilder, the father.
There are four specifications of error. The first sets out that the court erred in permitting the depositions of three witnesses to be read in evidence. These were depositions which were taken in the. state court before the removal. The second specification of error complains that the court, in substance, charged the jury that the plaintiffs could recover damages for the loss of prospective benefits to them after their son should have reached his majority. The third specification of error complains that the court refused, at the request of the defendant corporation, to give the following special charge: “In this case you cannot allow any damages for what Frank Wilder might have contributed to his parents after he became 21 years old; that would be too speculative and uncertain. You can only allow the present value of the amount Frank Wilder would have earned during his minority, after deducting the expenses of the support of said Frank Wilder during minority.” The fourth specification of error addresses itself to the refusal of the court to give the following special charge: “In this ease there is no Uiiect evidence as to whether the deceased, Frank Wilder, knew of the condition of the coupling between the engine and tender. Now, if you believe it was a part of said Wilder’s duty to examine and inspect said engine, then, in the absence of other evidence, he would be presumed to know of the actual condition of said- engine and the coupling appliances.”
T. J. Freeman and F. H. Prender gust, for plaintiff in error.
W. C. Lane and W. H. Pope, for defendant in error.
Before McCOBMTCK, Circuit Judge, and BOAKMAN and PAB-LA X (1C, District Judges.

Opinion:
PABI.AXG K, District Judge,
after stating tlie case, delivered the opinion of the court.
There is no merit in the second and third specifications of error, which are founded upon the false assumption that: the damages in the cause were restricted to the benefits which the plaintiffs might have derived from the services of their sou up to the time of his majority. We are clearly of opinion that the damages should not have been so restricted, and that in this cause it was proper for the trial judge to charge the jury that, in assessing the damages, they had a right to consider what reasonable expectations the plaintiffs liad of pecuniary benefits to be received by them from their son after he should have readied the age of majority. The statutes of the state of Texas which give a right of action in cases like the one at bar provide, among other matters, that a suit may be brought for actual damages on account of injuries causing the death of any person by the negligence or carelessness of the owner of any railroad, or of any person in charge or coni rol of any railroad, or of their servants or agents. The right of action is also given "when the death of any person is caused by the wrongful act, negligence, unskillfulness, or default of another." The action is declared by the statutes to be for the sole and exclusive benefit of the surviving husband, wife, children, and. parents of the decedent. The statutes provide, further, that, in the .actions just stated, "the jury may give such damages its they may think proportioned to the injury resulting from such death." Rev. St. arts. 2899, 2909. There is nothing in the statutes just referred to which limits the right of the parents in the present cause to the recovery of compensation for the services of their son during his minority. On the contrary, those statutes, as applied to the present cause, provide for full pecuniary compensation to the parents for the loss of their sou. This is shown both by the language conferring the right of action and by the power given the jui-y in assessing the damages.
It has often been held, in similar cases, that the damages are not restricted to the loss of benefits to which the plaintiff liad a legal right. It is plain that the compensation to the parents, under the statutes, would not be adequate if it was limited to the loss of the minor's services up to the time of his majority. If the objection be that it is difficult to ascertain the amount of the damages caused by loss of benefits after majority, it should be noted that this objection might also be made, although perhaps with less force, to the damages for loss of service before majority. There can be no certainty that a child will live co majority and perform services for his parents. If he lives, he may sicken, and become a burden to his parents. Still, it is not contended, as to damages up to a child's majority, that the difficulty in ascertaining them is a sufficient ground for rejecting a claim for them. It is evident that there is much difficulty in assessing damages resulting from loss of life, and that strict accuracy cannot be expected in a matter involving so much uncertainty. Yet the right of recovery for injuries resulting from death being plainly given, the courts, availing themselves of all the circumstances which may assist them in reaching a proper conclusion, must, whenever possible, afford the relief which the lawmaker intends to give.
The counsel for the plaintiff in error state in their brief that there is a conflict of authority on the point which we are now examining. It is plain to us that a number of cases which seem to hold in opposition to our views in this matter were founded upon statutes which restricted the right of recovery. In 3 Suth. Dam. § 1273, 1274, it is said that:
"In several states, the damages for the death of a child have been limited to the pecuniary benefits the parents had a legal right to claim for the child's services, and therefore the courts have confined the estimate to the period of minority. This restriction is believed to be contrary to the general principle on which pecuniary damages are allowed in favor of all classes who are next of kin to the deceased. That principle is that the jury should calculate the damages, in reference to the reasonable expectation of benefits as of right or otherwise, from' the continuance of the life. Legal ability alone is not the test of the injury in respect of which damages may be recovered under the statutes, but the reasonable expectation of pecuniary advantage by the relative remaining alive may be taken into account. Statutes which give the right to recover for the benefit of the next of kin permit the parents to recdver for the death of adult children, on the principle just stated. Why, therefore, when a minor is killed, should the estimate of damages stop arbitrarily at majority?"
In some jurisdictions, the parent has, by statute, an action against the child for support. But, apart from any such statute, there certainly is an indisputable natural obligation on the part of the child to support his necessitous parents. The plain dictate of nature requires a child, grown up to manhood, to relieve the wants of his destitute parents, and the obligation is one which men ordinarily fulfill. Why, then, should parents who have been deprived of their child by the fault of another be debarred from compensation for the full benefits which they reasonably expected from the child? In Railway Co. v. Compton, 75 Tex. 667, 13 S. W. 667; and in Railway Co. v. Sciacca, 80 Tex. 350, 16 S. W. 31, it was said that the parents' right of recovery is not limited to the services of the child up to majority. In the case at bar the son was over 18 years of age. He was strong, healthy, sober, and hard-working. He was dutiful, and evinced his willingness to assist his parents by freely giving his earnings to his mother. It was plainly proper in this cause for the trial judge to instruct the jury tjmt they could consider whether the parents had a reasonable expectation that their son would continúe to assist them after his majority.
The fourth specification of error, which complains of the refusal of the trial court to give a special charge, is without force. The trial judge, in his general charge, instructed the jury "that if deceased knew of the condition of the engine, or by the use of ordinary care could have known it, plaintiffs cannot recover." This was sufficient on the matter which is the subject of the special charge refused.
We find that the error complained of by the first specification of error is well founded, and compels the reversal of the judgment of the lower court. While this cause was pending in the state court, the depositions of certain witnesses were taken under the practice of the state of Texas. When these depositions were offered in evidence on the trial in the federal court, they vrere objected to on the ground that the witnesses were accessible, and resided within 100 miles of the place where this cause was tried, and that there was no proof of facts permitting the depositions to be read. We have carefully examined the point, and have readied the conclusion that the depositions should have been rejected. The court admitted them on the ground that they were taken and returned into court while the case was pending in the slate court, and before its removal. Act March 3, 1875, § 4, provides that, upon the removal of a cause from a state court, "all injunctions, orders and other proceedings had in such court prior to its removal, shall remain in full force and effect until dissolved or modified by the court to which such suit shall be removed." We understand that it is upon this statute that the court based its ad ion in admitting the depositions. To sustain the admission of fhe depositions, the counsel for the defendants in error cite, in addition to the act of March 3, 1875, the act of March 9, 1892, entitled "An act to provide an additional mode of taking depositions of witnesses in causes pending in the courts of the United States." It is evident that neither statute had the effect of making the depositions admissible, under the circumstances of this cause. There are but two cases cited by the counsel for the defendants in error in support of the admissibility of the depositions, viz.: Fogg v. Fisk, 19 Fed. 235, and Davis Railway Co., 25 Fed. 786. In Fogg v. Fisk, Judge Wallace held that an order to examine the defendant in the state court, made prior to the removal, was an "order or proceeding" which was removed to the federal court with the cause, under the act of 1875, and that the order should be carried out in the federal court. But Lire supreme court reversed Judge Wallace. 113 U. S. 713, 5 Sup. Ct. 724. In Davis v. Railway Co., just cited, Judge (now Justice) Brewer did not deal with the question of depositions. The point involved was whether a demurrer which was overruled in the state court prior to the removal should still be considered as overruled after the removal. Judge Brewer very correctly held that the overruling of the demurrer was an order or proceeding which, under the act of 1875, was removed with the cause. It is thus seen that the only two cases cited to support the admission of the depositions in tills case do not in fact sustain the contention of the counsel who cited them. In Ex parte Fisk, 113 U. S. 713, 5 Sup. Ct. 724, already cited, and in Railway Co. v. Botsford, 141 U. S. 256, 11 Sup. Ct. 1000, the supreme court made it clear that in the federal courts, regardless of state practice or statutes, the testimony must be oral. When a deposition is taken de bene esse, under Rev. St. U. S. § 863, it is not final, and, under the express terms of Id. § 865, it cannot be read on the trial, unless "it appears to the satisfaction of the court that tbe witness is then dead or gone out of the United States or to a greater distance than 100 miles from the place where the court is sitting, or that by reason of age, sickness, bodily infirmity or imprisonment, he is unable to travel and appear at court." See Insurance Co. v. Southgate, 5 Pet. 604; Harris v. Wall, 7 How. 693. In Shellabarger v. Oliver, 64 Fed. 306, it was held that the act of March 9, 1892, does not allow depositions taken under the state law to be read in the federal court unless they could be read under Rev. St. U. S. § 865. In Seeley v. Kansas City Star Co., 71 Fed. 555, Judge Phillips said that he knew of no instance in which the deposition taken in the state court was allowed to be read in the federal court. In Register Co. v. Leland, 77 Fed. 242, it was held that the act of March 9, 1892, only applies to the mode of taking depositions, and not to the use to which they are to be put. In Despeaux v. Railroad Co., 81 Fed. 897, Judge Dallas said that the act of March 9, 1892, applies only to the mode of taking depositions. He quoted, with approval, Shellabarger v. Oliver and Register Co. v. Leland, supra, and said that it would be unfortunate if the act of March 9, 1892, had been differently construed. In Whitford v. Clark Co., 119 U. S. 522, 7 Sup. Ct. 308, the supreme court reversed the case because depositions taken de bene esse, under Rev. St. U. S. § 863, had been admitted, though the witnesses were present and able to testify orally. It is plain that depositions taken under the federal statute cannot be read, if at the trial the witnesses can be obtained. It is not to be presumed that congress intended that depositions taken in the mode prescribed by the state law should be read in evidence, even though at the trial the witness could be had, and yet that testimony taken under Rev. St., U. S. § 863, could not be read under the same circumstances. It is plain to us that no such discrimination against the federal statute was intended by congress, and that the act of March 9, 1892, refers only, as appears from its plain reading, to the mode and manner of taking testimony, and not to its effect after it is taken, nor to the conditions under which it may be read. The bulk, if not the entirety, of the evidence of the plaintiffs below is contained in the depositions, and we are constrained to remand the cause. It is therefore ordered that the judgment of the lower court be reversed, and this cause is remanded to that court, with the instruction to grant a new trial.