Case Name: Stephen M. GOLDWAIT, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, for the Best Interest and Protection of Stephen M. Goldwait, Appellee
Court: Texas Courts of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1997-08-21
Citations: 961 S.W.2d 432
Docket Number: No. 01-96-01167-CV
Parties: Stephen M. GOLDWAIT, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, for the Best Interest and Protection of Stephen M. Goldwait, Appellee.
Judges: Before HEDGES, O’CONNOR and BASS , JJ.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 961
Pages: 432–437

Head Matter:
Stephen M. GOLDWAIT, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, for the Best Interest and Protection of Stephen M. Goldwait, Appellee.
No. 01-96-01167-CV.
Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (1st Dist.).
Aug. 21, 1997.
S. John Mastroneglo, Houston, for Appellant.
Michael P. Fleming, Melinda Brents, Houston, for Appellee.
Before HEDGES, O’CONNOR and BASS , JJ.
The Honorable Sam Bass, retired Justice, Court of Appeals, First District of Texas at Houston, participating by assignment.

Opinion:
OPINION
HEDGES, Justice.
Appellant, Stephen M. Goldwait, appeals his court-ordered commitment for temporary mental health services. He contends that (1) the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction, and (2) the State did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that he would cause immediate harm to himself or to others. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant's brothers, Patrick and Chris, flew to Boston where appellant resided out of concern for appellant's mental health. Their concern was based on appellant's bizarre behavior. Testimony indicated that appellant (1) wanted to start an international organization in order to provide his and his brothers' genetically superior blood to various hospitals to use for treatment of immune diseases; (2) had sold all of his belongings; (3) had jumped out of a bus because he feared that the bus driver was intentionally going to kill everyone; (4) feared that the CIA was after him; and (5) stated that he had been gassed by people who were after him. Appellant agreed to go with his brothers back to Houston. Once in Houston, appellant's bizarre behavior continued. Appellant's family initi ated involuntary commitment proceedings after appellant refused voluntary commitment. After evaluation and observation by a doctor, the trial court committed appellant for temporary mental health services.
JURISDICTION
In point of error one, appellant contends that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction. Specifically, appellant asserts that his presence in Texas was procured by his brothers' deception. Appellant contends that because he would not have been physically present but for this deception, the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction.
When his family initiated commitment proceedings, appellant was a resident of Massachusetts, but he was physically present in Houston. Notwithstanding appellant's brother's testimony that he led appellant to believe that he would "work with [appellant] to set the world free of illness," appellant never testified that his trip to Houston was deceptively procured. In fact, he denied the existence of the scheme that formed the basis of his brother's alleged trickery. Appellant stated that he traveled to Houston for vacation and to visit his family. In coming to Houston voluntarily, appellant subjected himself to the general jurisdiction of the State of Texas.
Furthermore, the Probate Court of Harris County had personal jurisdiction over appellant. Under section 574.001(b) of the Health & Safety Code, an application for court-ordered mental health services must be filed with the county clerk in the eounty in which the proposed patient either: (1) resides; (2) is found; or (3) is receiving mental health services by court order or under sections 573.001-.025. Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 574.001(b) (Vernon Supp.1997). Appellant was found in Harris County at the time the application was filed.
We overrule point of error one.
CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE
In point of error two, appellant contends that, even if the trial court had jurisdiction over him, the State did not meet its burden by clear and convincing evidence that he would cause immediate harm to himself or others.
Standard of Review
The judge or jury may determine that a proposed patient requires court-ordered temporary mental health services only if the judge or jury finds from clear and convincing evidence that:
(1) the proposed patient is mentally ill; and
(2) as a result of that mental illness the proposed patient:
(A) is likely to cause serious harm to himself;
(B) is likely to cause serious harm to others; or
(C) will, if not treated, continue to suffer severe and abnormal mental, emotional, or physical distress, will continue to experience deterioration of his ability to function independently, and is unable to make a rational and informed decision as to whether or not to submit to treatment.
Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 574.034(a) (Vernon 1992). To be clear and convincing under this section, the evidence must include expert testimony and, unless waived, evidence of a recent overt act or a continuing pattern of behavior that tends to confirm the likelihood of serious harm to the proposed patient or others or the proposed patient's distress and deterioration of ability to function. Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 574.034(c) (Vernon 1992). Expert diagnosis alone is not sufficient to confine a patient for compulsory treatment. Mezick v. State, 920 S.W.2d 427, 430 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ). The expert opinions and recommendations must be supported by a showing of the factual bases on which they are grounded. Id.
On the appeal of a fact finding made by clear and convincing evidence, we review the record to determine if the trial court could reasonably find that the fact was highly probable. Mezick, 920 S.W.2d at 430. Under this standard, we must consider whether the evidence was sufficient to produce in the mind of the factfinder a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the facts. Id.
Analysis
In this ease, the trial court ordered that appellant be temporarily committed for mental health services. Under Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 574.034(a)(2)(C) (Vernon 1992), it found that the evidence clearly and convincingly established that appellant was mentally ill and, as a result of that mental illness, if not treated, (1) would continue to suffer severe and abnormal mental, emotional, or physical distress; (2) would continue to experience deterioration of his ability to function independently; and (3) would be unable to make a rational and informed decision as to whether or not to submit to treatment. The trial court did not address the issues of whether appellant was likely to cause serious harm to himself or to others; given its other findings, it was not required to do so. After the trial court determined that appellant was mentally ill, it was required to determine only one of the three criteria listed in section 574.034(a)(2). See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 574.034(a)(2) (Vernon 1992); Mezick v. State, 920 S.W.2d at 430. It chose to temporarily commit appellant under section 574.034(a)(2)(C). Appellant's contention that the State was required to prove by clear and convincing evidence the first two criteria, therefore, is without merit. We must determine, then, whether the State met its burden in proving by clear and convincing evidence the elements under section 574.034(a)(2)(C).
At the hearing, Dr. Glass, appellant's examining physician who was qualified as an expert, testified that he examined appellant regularly and that, in his opinion, appellant was a paranoid schizophrenic. Because of his condition, Dr. Glass recommended that appellant not be released from the hospital at the time of the hearing. Dr. Glass testified that appellant's judgment was impaired beyond the point where he could function independently; appellant would further deteriorate mentally, emotionally, and physically; and he was incapable of making rational and informed decisions regarding the need for treatment.
Dr. Glitz, another expert, examined appellant once. He testified that appellant was not sufficiently mentally ill as to warrant his hospitalization, but admitted that his examination of appellant came several days after appellant had been hospitalized and stabilized with medication. He also admitted that the treating physician was in the best position to evaluate appellant's condition.
Appellant's brothers, Patrick and Chris, also testified at the hearing. Patrick had visited appellant in Boston on one occasion before his trip to bring appellant back. Patrick cited numerous events during his first visit that unnerved him. He also was disturbed by several subsequent phone calls and letters from appellant. Patrick heard that appellant had sold everything he owned, that he was losing contact with people he knew in Boston, and that the people there who were close to appellant feared for his well-being. Based upon those facts, Patrick decided to fly to Boston to bring Stephen back to Houston. At the airport, appellant appeared tired and stated that the reason he was in such condition was because he had just been "gassed" on his way to the airport and forced off the road. Appellant continued to exhibit extremely strange behavior, giving Patrick great cause for concern. At one point during Patrick's stay in Boston, appellant asked Patrick to stop the car and get suction supplies so that appellant could let his and Patrick's blood. Patrick was so concerned that he called his family, and Chris flew up immediately to help bring appellant back to Houston. Both convinced appellant that they would help him in his efforts to save the world with his genetically superior blood if he would return to Houston with them. In Houston, appellant continued his pattern of bizarre behavior. He slept on Patrick's driveway one night, telling Patrick that he did so because (1) the sun, stars, and moon all emitted particles that drained his gray matter; and (2) he was attracted to them. Chris supported much of Patrick's testimony.
Based upon the testimony of Dr. Glass and appellant's brothers, we hold that the State clearly and convincingly established the third criterion under section 574.034(a)(2). See Mezick v. State, 920 S.W.2d at 430 (holding testimony of a physician and sister sufficient to establish clearly and convincingly the necessary statutory criterion for temporary commitment).
We overrule point of error two.
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
O'CONNOR, J., dissents.
. We note that in a case recently issued by this court, Johnstone v. State, 961 S.W.2d 385, 390 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1997) (publication forthcoming), another panel held that the State did not meet its burden under the clear and convincing standard. It did not prove that appellant had committed overt acts or exhibited a continuing pattern of behavior such that court-ordered treatment was warranted. Id. In this case, however, there is more than sufficient evidence to support the trial court's order of temporary commitment and, thus, it is distinguishable from Johnstone.