Case Name: IREDELL COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION v. ZEB V. K. DICKSON
Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
Jurisdiction: North Carolina
Decision Date: 1952-04-09
Citations: 235 N.C. 359
Docket Number: 
Parties: IREDELL COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION v. ZEB V. K. DICKSON.
Judges: 
Reporter: North Carolina Reports
Volume: 235
Pages: 359–364

Head Matter:
IREDELL COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION v. ZEB V. K. DICKSON.
(Filed 9 April, 1952.)
1. Statutes § 5a—
Matters necessarily implied by tbe language of a statute must be given effect to tbe same extent as matters specifically expressed.
2. Schools § 8a—
Tbe re-election of a teacher or principal must be performed in tbe same manner in wbieb be was originally elected and therefore re-election by tbe school committee of a district is not effective until approved by tbe county superintendent of schools and tbe county board of education. G.S. 115-112, G.S. 115-354.
3. Same—
Dismissal of a teacher or principal by a county administrative unit is not effective until approved by tbe county board of education and tbe principal or teacher notified by registered mail of bis dismissal or rejection, thus approved, prior to the close of tbe current school term, it being required that all acts essential to the validity of the dismissal or rejection be fully performed prior to the end of the school year. G.S. 115-359.
4. Schools § 4b—
A county board of education can exercise its powers only in a regular or special meeting attended by a quorum of its members, and cannot perform its functions through its members acting individually, informally, and separately.
5. Same—
There being no statutory provision to the contrary, a majority of the members of a board of education constitutes a quorum. G.S. 115-37.
6. Schools § 8a—
A letter written by the county superintendent of schools “after consultation with the chairman of the county board of education” advising a principal of the termination of his employment is not approval of the dismissal by the county board of education, since the board may act only in a duly constituted meeting. Resolution of the board passed after the end of the school year, “supporting” any action of the local unit in regard to electing a principal for the particular school, is not retroactive approval of the attempted dismissal by tbe local unit and in no event could be effective since not passed prior to tbe close of tbe school term.
7. Same—
Tbe administrative unit undertook to re-elect a principal for tbe ensuing year and later undertook to dismiss or reject bim. Neither action was approved by tbe county board of education prior to tbe end of tbe school term. Held: Neither tbe attempted re-election nor tbe attempted dismissal is effective, and therefore the principal’s original contract automatically continued in force for tbe ensuing school year.
Appeal by plaintiff from Sink, J., and a jury, at November Term, 1951, of Iredell.
Summary proceeding in ejectment tried de novo in tbe Superior Court on tbe appeal of tbe defendant from tbe judgment of tbe justice of tbe peace.
Tbe plaintiff, tbe Board of Education of Iredell County, presented tbe following evidence on tbe trial in tbe Superior Court:
1. Tbe Central School District is located in tbe Iredell County Administrative Unit.
2. On 21 June, 1950, tbe School Committee of tbe Central School District, whose action was forthwith approved by tbe plaintiff and tbe county superintendent of schools, elected tbe defendant, Zeb Y. K. Dickson, principal of tbe Central School for tbe following school year. Tbe defendant accepted tbe employment, executed a written contract agreeably to it on forms furnished by tbe State Superintendent of Public Instruction, and actually served as principal of tbe Central School during tbe ensuing school term, which ended 18 May, 1951.
3. When tbe defendant began bis service at tbe Central School, tbe plaintiff leased to bim a nearby dwelling for a term coextensive with bis employment as principal of the Central School. Tbe defendant forthwith moved into tbe dwelling, and has continued in its actual physical possession ever since.
4. On 10 April, 1951, tbe School Committee of tbe Central School District met and “reelected (tbe defendant) as principal for tbe ensuing year.” Tbe committee immediately notified tbe defendant of its action, and tbe defendant straightway advised tbe committee that be accepted tbe extension of bis employment. Neither tbe plaintiff nor tbe county superintendent of schools was ever informed of tbe re-election of tbe defendant by tbe district committee, or ever took any action in respect to it.
5. On 8 May, 1951, tbe School Committee of tbe Central School met, and passed motions “to rescind (its) action on tbe re-election” of tbe defendant and to terminate tbe defendant’s “contract as . . . principal of Central School ... at tbe end of tbe 1950 and 1951 school year.”
6. Tbe School Committee of the Central School gave the county superintendent of schools oral notice of its passage of the motion to terminate the defendant’s contract as principal at the end of the school year. Two days prior to the close of the school term at Central School, to wit, on 16 May, 1951, the county superintendent of schools mailed a registered letter to the defendant, advising him that his contract as principal of Central School was to end “at the close of this school year.” He did this “after consultation with the chairman of the county board of education.”
Y. On 11 June, 1951, the School Committee of the Central School District mailed the- defendant a letter, notifying him to vacate the dwelling occupied by him on or before 15 July, 1951. The defendant refused to quit the premises.
8. On 23 July, 1951, the members of the county board of education met and “voted unanimously to go on record supporting the Central School Committee in whatever action they take in electing a principal for the Central School.”
9. On 2 August, 1951, the plaintiff brought this summary proceeding in ejectment against the defendant to recover possession of the dwelling.
When the plaintiff rested its ease, the trial judge allowed the motion of the defendant for a compulsory nonsuit and entered judgment accordingly. The plaintiff excepted and appealed, assigning the dismissal of the proceeding as error.
Scott & Collier, Z. V. Turlington, and M. L. Nash for plaintiff, appellant.
Burke •& Burke and J. G. Lewis for defendant, appellee.

Opinion:
Ebvin, J.
The defendant was elected principal of Central School for the school year beginning in 1950 and ending in 1951 in strict conformity to the statute now recompiled as G.S. 115-354. The plaintiff leased the dwelling to him for a term coextensive with his employment. Consequently the propriety of the compulsory nonsuit cannot be controverted unless the plaintiff's evidence shows that the employment of the defendant as principal of Central School came to an end prior to the institution of this proceeding in summary ejectment.
The answer to the problem presented by the appeal must be obtained from the statute cited above and the additional statute now recompiled as G.S. 115-359. No good purpose will be served by setting forth verbatim the somewhat awkward language in which these enactments are couched. Their meanings are to be found in what they necessarily imply as much as in what they specifically express. 50 Am. Jur., Statutes, section 242.
G.S. 115-354 provides, in substance, that where the school committee of a district in a county administrative unit elects a person to serve as principal or teacber of a school of the district with the approval of both the county superintendent of schools and the county board of education and the principal or teacher so elected executes a written contract covering his employment upon official forms, the contract of employment automatically continues in force from year to year until one or the other of these alternative events occurs: (1) The principal or teacher is dismissed or rejected in the manner prescribed by G.S. 115-359; or (2) the principal or teacher is affirmatively re-elected to serve during the following school year, and fails to give notice to the county superintendent of schools of his acceptance of the renewed employment within ten days after notice of his re-election. Davis v. Moseley, 230 N.C. 645, 55 S.E. 2d 329; Kirby v. Board of Education, 230 N.C. 619, 55 S.E. 2d 322.
Although G.S. 115-354 does not undertake to specify in terms how a principal or a teacher is to be re-elected, it does imply that he is to be re-elected in the same manner in which he was originally elected. This is so for the very simple reason that one is re-elected when he is elected again or anew. G.S. 115-354 explicitly declares that the school committee of a district in a county administrative unit shall elect the principals and teachers for the schools of the district, "subject to the approval of the county superintendent of schools and the county board of education." Under this statute and G.S. 115-112, the election of a principal or teacher by the school committee of a district has no validity whatever until such election has been approved by both the county superintendent of schools and the county board of education. 56 C.J., Schools and School Districts, section 319.
When G.S. 115-359 is read aright, it provides these things by express declaration or necessary implication: The school committee of a district in a county administrative unit has power to dismiss or reject a principal or teacher of a school of the district as of the end of the current school year, but such dismissal or rejection is subject to the approval or disapproval of the county board of education and has no validity whatever until it has been approved by the county board of education. And even though the county board of education approves the action of the district school committee in dismissing or rejecting a principal or teacher as of the end of the current school year, the dismissal or rejection does not become effective unless the county superintendent of schools notifies the principal or teacher by registered mail of his dismissal or rejection prior to the close of the current school term.
Where a power is entrusted to a board, such as a county board of education, composed of different individuals, the board can exercise such power only in a regular or special meeting attended by at least a quorum of its members. It cannot perform its functions through its members acting individually, informally, and separately. Bath v. Norman, 226 N.C. 502, 39 S.E. 2d 363; Bowles v. Graded Schools, 211 N.C. 36, 188 S.E. 615; O'Neal v. Wake County, 196 N.C. 184, 145 S.E. 28; London v. Comrs., 193 N.C. 100, 136 S.E. 356; Turner v. Wellford Special Consol. School Dist. of Chicot County, 192 Ark. 295, 91 S.W. 2d 285; Landers v. Board of Education of Town of Hot Springs, 45 N.M. 446, 116 P. 2d 690; Ward v. Board of Education, 80 W. Va. 541, 92 S.E. 741. Inasmuch as the statute creating county boards of education does not fix a different number, a majority of the members of a particular county board of education constitutes a quorum and can exercise its powers in meeting assembled. G.S. 115-37; Hill v. Ponder, 221 N.C. 58, 19 S.E. 2d 5; S. v. Woodside, 30 N.C. 104; Decker v. School Dist., No. 2, 101 Mo. App. 115, 74 S.W. 390.
Tbe task of applying these rules to the case at bar must now be performed.
The plaintiff's evidence does not suffice to show that the defendant was dismissed or rejected in the manner prescribed by G.S. 115-359. Indeed, it indicates the contrary. To be sure, the district school committee undertook to dismiss or reject the defendant as of the end of the 1950-1951 school year. The action of the district school committee was without validity in law, however, because it was not approved by the county board of education in meeting assembled at any time before the close of the school term. For this reason, the contract employing the defendant to serve as principal of Central School was not terminated by the act of the county superintendent of schools in mailing the registered letter, even though such act may have been done after consultation with the chairman of the board of education acting individually and informally.
In reaching this conclusion, we have not overlooked the resolution passed by the county board of education in meeting assembled on 23 July, 1951, "supporting the Central School Committee in whatever action they take in electing a principal for the Central School." When it adopted this resolution, the county board of education undertook to give the district school committee carte hlanche in the premises, and not to confer retroactive approval on the attempted dismissal or rejection of the defendant. The legal standing of the plaintiff would not be bettered a whit, however, if the construction last suggested could be justly placed upon the resolution. This is true because G.S. 115-359 contemplates that all acts essential to the validity of the dismissal or rejection of a principal or teacher as of the end of the school year must be fully performed prior to the close of the school term.
The plaintiff's evidence does not show that the defendant was affirmatively re-elected during the 1950-1951 school year to serve as principal of Central School for the following school year, and that he failed to give notice to the county superintendent of schools of his acceptance of the renewed employment within ten days after notice of his re-election. Indeed, it discloses that the defendant was not affirmatively re-elected, and that in consequence his original contract automatically continued in force for the school year beginning in 1951 and ending in 1952. To be sure, the district school committee met on 10 April, 1951, and undertook to re-elect the defendant as principal "for the ensuing year." But neither the county superintendent of schools nor the county board of education was ever informed of the re-election of the defendant by the district school committee, or ever took any action with respect to it. Hence, his supposed re-election never acquired any validity in law.
For the reasons given, the judgment of nonsuit is
Affirmed.