Case Name: Paul FARAH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WELLS FARGO HOME MORTGAGE, INC.; U.S. Bank N.A., as trustee for Bear Stearns Arm Trust, Mortgage Pass-through Certificates Series 2005-10, Defendants-Appellees
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2016-11-21
Citations: 670 F. App'x 929
Docket Number: No. 14-15357
Parties: Paul FARAH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WELLS FARGO HOME MORTGAGE, INC.; U.S. Bank N.A., as trustee for Bear Stearns Arm Trust, Mortgage Pass-through Certificates Series 2005-10, Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: Before: LEAVY, BERZON, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 670
Pages: 929–930

Head Matter:
Paul FARAH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WELLS FARGO HOME MORTGAGE, INC.; U.S. Bank N.A., as trustee for Bear Stearns Arm Trust, Mortgage Pass-through Certificates Series 2005-10, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 14-15357
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted November 16, 2016
Filed November 21, 2016
Paul Farah, Pro Se, Los Altos, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Elizabeth Holt Andrews, Jan T. Chilton, Severson <& Werson APC, San Francisco, CA, for Defendants-Appellees.
Before: LEAVY, BERZON, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Féd. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Paul Farah appeals pro se from the district court's judgment in his diversity action alleging state law claims related to the foreclosure of his home. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court's dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 9(b) and 12(b)(6). Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1102 (9th Cir. 2003). We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.
The district court properly dismissed Farah's "unlawful transfer of title and possession of property" claim, which we treat as a wrongful foreclosure claim, because Farah did not allege facts sufficient to show that he tendered or could have tendered the full amount of the debt, or any facts entitling him to an exception to the tender rule. See Lona v. Citibank, N.A., 202 Cal.App.4th 89, 134 Cal.Rptr.3d 622, 640-42 (2011) (setting forth the tender requirement and its four exceptions).
The district court dismissed Farah's fraud claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). However, the district court overlooked Farah's allegations that on May 31, 2012, three specific Wells Fargo employees, Jessica, Alton, and Ajay, mislead him by stating that his short sale offer and request to postpone the foreclosure sale were "in process," without also disclosing that the foreclosure sale was set to proceed on the following day, in order to prevent Farah from filing for bankruptcy to avert the sale. Farah further alleged that Wells Fargo employees, including his home preservation specialist Barbara Gaiter, had exclusive knowledge of, but failed to disclose, the rejection of his short sale offer in May 2012. In light of these additional allegations regarding nondisclosure of material information, we conclude that the district court erred in dismissing Fa-rah's fraud claim against Wells Fargo Home Mortgage. See LiMandri v. Judkins, 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 539, 543 (1997) (setting forth circumstances, including exclusive knowledge or partial suppression of material facts, in which nondisclosure constitutes actionable fraud); see also Neubronner v. Milken, 6 F.3d 666, 671-72 (9th Cir. 1993) ("A pleading is sufficient under Rule 9(b) if it identifies the circumstances constituting fraud so that the defendant can prepare an adequate answer from the allegations." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, we vacate the judgment as to Farah's fraud claim against Wells Fargo Home Mortgage and remand for further consideration consistent with this disposition.
Farah's amended motion for an extension of time to file the opening brief, filed on December 2, 2014, is denied as moot.
Each party shall bear its own costs.
AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.