Case Name: F. F. MENGEL COMPANY, Continental Casualty Company, and Sentry Insurance (a mutual company), Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Raymond L. CHECK, Jr., Labor & Industry Review Commission, and General Casualty Company, Defendants-Appellants
Court: Wisconsin Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Wisconsin
Decision Date: 1988-11-23
Citations: 147 Wis. 2d 666
Docket Number: No. 88-1342
Parties: F. F. MENGEL COMPANY, Continental Casualty Company, and Sentry Insurance (a mutual company), Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Raymond L. CHECK, Jr., Labor & Industry Review Commission, and General Casualty Company, Defendants-Appellants.
Judges: Before Gartzke, P.J., Eich and Sundby, JJ.
Reporter: Wisconsin Reports Second
Volume: 147
Pages: 666–674

Head Matter:
F. F. MENGEL COMPANY, Continental Casualty Company, and Sentry Insurance (a mutual company), Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Raymond L. CHECK, Jr., Labor & Industry Review Commission, and General Casualty Company, Defendants-Appellants.
Court of Appeals
No. 88-1342.
Submitted on briefs October 10, 1988.
Decided November 23, 1988.
(Also reported in 433 N.W.2d 651.)
For the defendant-appellant Labor and Industry Review Commission, the cause was submitted on the brief of Donald J. Hanaway, attorney general, and James P. Altman, assistant attorney general.
For the defendant-appellant Raymond L. Check, Jr., the cause was submitted on the briefs of James T. Haferman and Glinski, Haferman, liten, S.C., of Stevens Point.
For the plaintiff-respondents F. F. Mengel and Sentry Insurance Company, the cause was submitted on the briefs of Thomas W. Bertz and Anderson, Shannon, O’Brien, Rice & Bertz, of Stevens Point.
For the plaintiffs-respondents F. F. Mengel Company and Continental Casualty Company, the cause was submitted on the brief of Keith F. Ellison and Peter L. Hessert and Tinkham, Smith, Bliss, Patterson, Richards & Hessert, of Wausau.
Before Gartzke, P.J., Eich and Sundby, JJ.

Opinion:
EICH, J.
We granted Raymond Check leave to appeal a nonfinal order denying his motion to dismiss F.F. Mengel Company's petition for review of a decision of the Labor & Industry Review Commission (LIRC). The commission and Check moved to dismiss the petition on jurisdictional grounds, arguing that the commission's decision and order remanding the matter to the Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations for further hearings and findings, but leaving open the issue of monetary benefits, was not an order "granting or denying compensation," and thus was not subject to judicial review under sec. 102.23(l)(a), Stats. The trial court denied the motion. We conclude that the court lacked jurisdiction to review the order, and we therefore reverse.
The facts are not in dispute and may be briefly stated. Check had been employed by Mengel as a mechanic for approximately ten years. In 1985, he filed an application for worker's compensation, claiming that he had suffered a work-related injury to his back.
Prior to the hearing on the claim, Mengel's insurers made several payments to Check for medical expenses and temporary disability. The department eventually dismissed Check's application, concluding that there was no compensable injury. On appeal, the commission reversed the order in part, finding that Check sustained "conceded traumatic injury" and suffered permanent disability. Because the "exact periods of . disability" attributable to Mengel's various injuries, and "the amounts of compensation due, if any," for each injury could not be determined "upon the present state of the record," the commission remanded the case to the department to hold further hearings "for the purpose of determining the nature and extent of disability attributable to each . injury, and the amount of compensation due .Mengel sought judicial review.
Whether the order is one "granting or denying compensation," and thus subject to judicial review under sec. 102.23(l)(a), Stats., is a question of law. We decide such questions independently, owing no deference to the trial court's determination. Guerin v. LIRC, 121 Wis. 2d 183, 185, 359 N.W.2d 162, 163 (Ct. App. 1984).
Judicial review of administrative determinations is purely statutory, and unless a statute specifically authorizes review, the trial court acquires no jurisdiction in the matter. Rathjen v. Industrial Comm., 233 Wis. 452, 457-58, 289 N.W. 618, 621 (1940). Section 102.23(l)(a), Stats., governs judicial review of worker's compensation matters and restricts that review to "orderfs] . granting or denying compensation, either interlocutory or final —" (Emphasis added.)
The heart of the matter is the meaning of the word "compensation." Check argues that sec. 102.23(l)(a), Stats., is limited to orders specifying a monetary award, while Mengel argues that the commission's determination that Check sustained a com-pensable injury must be considered an award of "compensation" within the meaning of the statute, even though the order made no award but instead remanded the case to the department to determine the extent of Check's disability and what, if any, compensation he was entitled to.
"Compensation" is not defined in the act, and where the legislature attaches no specialized meaning to a word, we may consider its generally recognized definition. St. ex rel. Smith v. Oak Creek, 139 Wis. 2d 788, 795, 407 N.W.2d 901, 904 (1987). Webster's Third New International Dictionary at 463 (1976), defines the word as "something that constitutes an equivalent or recompense." Even the more specialized Black's Law Dictionary at 256 (5th ed. 1979), recognizes the monetary element, defining "compensation" as "payment of damages."
Few Wisconsin cases have considered the meaning of the word in the context of ch. 102, Stats. In Berg v. Industrial Comm., 236 Wis. 172, 179-80, 294 N.W. 506, 509-10 (1940), the court held that an order setting aside an examiner's findings that the claimant was not entitled to compensation and remanding the case to the department for determination of benefits was not reviewable under sec. 102.23(l)(a), Stats. And in Harrison v. Industrial Comm., 246 Wis. 106, 107-08, 16 N.W.2d 303, 303-04 (1944), the court held that an order refusing to set aside a compromise settlement upon which a compensation award had been granted was not an order "denying or awarding compensation."
Like the order here under consideration, the order in Berg required the department to reconsider its earlier decision to deny the claimant's application for benefits, and thus paved the way for compensation of some amount. The order in Harrison, which also was tangentially related to compensation, was held to be nonreviewable. We see no reason why the order in this case should be treated any differently, given the limiting language of sec. 102.23(l)(a), Stats., restricting review to orders "awarding" compensation. The commission's order made no such award.
By the Court — Order reversed.