Case Name: Delian BREWER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Derral G. ADAMS; Attorney General of the State of California; Thomas L. Carey, Respondents-Appellees
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2011-01-12
Citations: 412 F. App'x 30
Docket Number: No. 09-15980
Parties: Delian BREWER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Derral G. ADAMS; Attorney General of the State of California; Thomas L. Carey, Respondents-Appellees.
Judges: Before: COWEN, TASHIMA and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 412
Pages: 30–32

Head Matter:
Delian BREWER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Derral G. ADAMS; Attorney General of the State of California; Thomas L. Carey, Respondents-Appellees.
No. 09-15980.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted Dec. 6, 2010.
Filed Jan. 12, 2011.
Matthew Alger, Alger & Alger, Clovis, CA, for Petitioner-Appellant.
Darren Indermill, Sacramento, CA, for Respondents-Appellees.
Before: COWEN, TASHIMA and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.
The Honorable Robert E. Cowen, Senior United States Circuit Judge for the Third Circuit, sitting by designation.

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Delian Brewer, a California state prisoner who was convicted of first degree murder and other charges, appeals from the District Court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition. We will affirm.
The California Superior Court's decision rejecting Brewer's ineffectiveness claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Especially in light of the strength of the prosecution's case against his client, the defense counsel was confronted with the particularly difficult choice between: (1) an alibi defense, which was admittedly risky but furnished a complete defense to the relevant charges, was developed by Brewer himself, and otherwise was not obviously fraudulent or doomed to fail; and (2) an unreasonable self-defense theory, which had serious problems of its own and, even if successful, would still have resulted in a manslaughter conviction. Viewing the attorney's actions or omissions as of the time they occurred, it was reasonable to conclude that the attorney's performance in this matter fell within the wide range of constitutionally effective assistance. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-91, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
We likewise hold that the California Court of Appeal's rejection of Brewer's misjoinder claim did not contradict or unreasonably apply binding United States Supreme Court precedent and that the state appellate court's ruling was not otherwise based on any unreasonable factual determination. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). We recently indicated that a comment in United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 106 S.Ct. 725, 88 L.Ed.2d 814 (1986), about misjoinder and a defendant's right to a fair trial was dicta and therefore could not constitute "clearly established Federal law" under AEDPA. Collins v. Runnels, 603 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 243, 178 L.Ed.2d 162 (2010); see also id. ("Here, Lane expressly stated that 'improper joinder does not, in itself, violate the Constitution.' 474 U.S. at 446 n. 8, 106 S.Ct. 725. Collins' argument that Lane applies to state courts fails for that reason as well."). In any case, the state appellate court reasonably determined that Brewer failed to establish prejudice with respect to the joinder of the charges against him in a single trial. Among other considerations supporting this determination, we note that the prosecution had an especially strong case against Brewer as to both the 1994 home invasion robbery as well as the 1995 murder/robbery charges.
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.