Case Name: Sarah Margaret DE WEESE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. J. C. PENNEY COMPANY, a corporation, Defendant and Appellant
Court: Utah Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Utah
Decision Date: 1956-05-25
Citations: 5 Utah 2d 116
Docket Number: No. 8347
Parties: Sarah Margaret DE WEESE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. J. C. PENNEY COMPANY, a corporation, Defendant and Appellant.
Judges: McDonough, c. j., and wade, j., concur.
Reporter: Utah Reports, Second Series
Volume: 5
Pages: 116–141

Head Matter:
297 P.2d 898
Sarah Margaret DE WEESE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. J. C. PENNEY COMPANY, a corporation, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 8347.
Supreme Court of Utah.
May 25, 1956.
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker, Salt Lake City, for appellant.
Rawlings, Wallace, Roberts & Black, Salt Lake City, for respondent.

Opinion:
CROCKETT, Justice.
Sarah M. DeWeese slipped and fell in the entrance of the J. C. Penney Department Store at 213 South Main Street in Salt Lake City on the evening of November 30, 1953. From a jury verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, defendant appeals, attacking the judgment on the ground that the trial court erred in respect to a) rulings on evidence, b) submission of the question of defendant's negligence to the jury, and c) in not ruling that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
On the day of the accident Mrs. De-Weese left her home in the southeast part of town at 8 p. m. She caught a bus to go downtown to do some shopping, the stores being open on Monday night. Just after boarding the bus she noticed that snow began to fall in large flakes. She left the bus at Second South and State Streets and walked the one and one-fourth blocks to the Penney Store on Main Sreet. Snow was still falling and the sidewalks were wet. As she proceeded into the terrazzo entrance of defendant's store, which slopes upward as one enters, she admits noticing that the floor was wet and had muddy tracks upon it but says she had no thought of it being slick. She states that as she progressed a step or two she slipped, her right foot going forward and her left foot folding under her as she fell. She was helped into the store where she phoned her husband, an assistant manager of the W. T. Grant Company store located just south of Penney's, who came immediately to assist her. It is without dispute that there were no rubber mats or abrasives on the floor at that time. Medical examination later showed that Mrs. DeWeese suffered a severe injury to the lumbro sacral region of her back which will require her to undergo a spinal fusion operation to correct.
a) Rulings on evidence.
The principal attack made upon the judgment relates to errors assigned in admitting certain testimony which defendant characterizes as "an attempt by plaintiff to set up the purported actions and customs of W. T. Grant's store as a standard for defendant to meet." There can be no doubt that it would not have been proper to use the procedure of any particular individual, or of the W. T. Grant Co. store, either generally, or in connection with this particular storm, as a standard of care upon which to determine whether the Penney Company was negligent.
The testimony of Mr. Frank Caffall is singled out as having the fault just referred to. A man of many years' experience in installing terrazzo surfaces, he was called to testify as an expert. Asked generally about such surfaces, in connection therewith, he was questioned whether he had observed the terrazzo surface at Grant's and,
"Q. Did you observe whether the substance had an abrasive in it — that terrazzo surface at W. T. Grant's?
"Mr. Aadnesen, defendant's counsel: Object to that as immaterial.
"The Court > That may be answered 'yes' or 'no.'
*
"Q. I am talking about W. T. Grant —entrance to Grant's store at the present time, Mr. Caffall. A. Oh, yes, that has London Grits in it."
After a further question and answer,
"Mr. Aadnesen: May the record show that my objection goes to this entire line as to what W. T. Grant has?"
to which the Court answered: "Yes." Upon the next question pertaining to the surfacing at Grant's, an objection that it was immaterial was sustained. It will be noted that there was no objection to the particular question which elicited the statement that Grant's surface had "London Grits in it. The objection to the "entire line" came after that question, and there was no motion to strike it. It is therefore doubtful that defendant is now in a position to complainr of this evidence. However, we need not concern ourselves with niceties with respect thereto for reasons presently to be stated.
Assuming for the purpose of this discussion that the evidence above recited was admitted over proper objection by the defendant, it was neither incompetent nor could it have been prejudicial. It is undoubtedly true that if this question were considered in isolation, it would be immaterial whether the surfacing at the Grant store contained an abrasive or not. But evidence is not to be considered in isolation; it should be appraised in context with the entire testimony and in the light of the purpose for which it is offered. Mr. Caf-fall's testimony was to the' effect that all terrazzo surfacing becomes slick when wet, and that abrasives are used in the composition to roughen it. It is not amiss to permit him to refer to his specific knowledge or observation of particular surfaces in implementation and illustration of his statement that such abrasives were necessary and were customarily used. This would be true unless it should appear that the jury might understand that the surfacing of the Grant Company was being set up as an example or standard of care which the defendant company should meet, a circumstance not present here.
A more important and controlling consideration in regard to Mr. Caffall's evidence is that it could relate only to the issue as to whether terrazzo surfacing was in fact slippery when wet and whether some protective measure was necessary. -The record is unequivocal that there was no disagreement between the parties about this fact and that it is both customary and in keeping with due care to use rubber mats or some abrasive such as feldspar on the surfacing as a protection against patrons slipping when it is raining or snowing. In repartee concerning the evidence during the trial, the defendant's counsel stated:
" If he desires, we would be glad to stipulate that mats and feldspar are used on terrazzo during inclement weather."
and in their brief,
"Admittedly the defendant J. C. Penney Co. used mats and feldspar during inclement weather just as they were used by other stores on Main Street, including W. T. Grant's."
In fact, defendant makes a point of the fact that it had both mats and feldspar readily available for use. Thus the evidence that abrasives were used by Grant's and others in terrazzo surfacing was not discordant to the position that the defendant itself took.
The other matter of evidence which defendant stresses in support of its argument that its standard of care was being measured against that of the Grant Company relates to the testimony of plaintiff's husband, Hugh DeWeese. He was engaged in his duties as assistant manager of the .Grant store when the incident occurred and upon call came to assist his wife. He told of such facts and related that the mats in-their store were already out when he left. Upon motion of counsel for the defendant that such evidence be stricken and the jury admonished to disregard it, the court properly allowed such motion. This occurrence-does not support the position contended for by the defendant, but indicates to the contrary, that the court was not under any misunderstanding that the standard of care of the W. T. Grant Company could be used to measure the propriety of the defendant's, conduct, and that he was not allowing it to-be so presented to the jury. This is in accord with the import of the entire record. From it and the instructions we do not see any reasonable basis for apprehension that the jury was under any mistaken belief that the defendant was required to meet the particular procedure of the W. T. Grant store. Testimony as to the customs and practices of others similarly situated was admitted as bearing upon the issue of what ordinary and reasonable care under the circumstances was. Such was the only duty of care submitted to the jury as reflected in Instruction No. 10, wherein the court correctly charged that it was the defendant's duty, " to exercise reasonable care to keep the entranceway to [its] store reasonably safe for the use of its customers."
b) Defendant's negligence.
The essential inquiry relating to defendant's neglgience is whether in performing its duty of due care just recited, it knew or should have known, that a dangerous condition existed and whether sufficient time elapsed thereafter that, in due care, it should have put out the mats or sprinkled feldspar on the surface to reduce the slip-jperiness.
This case differs from those involving a foreign substance such as spilled oil or grease, or where a pool of water is allowed to accumulate, creating a hazardous condition which, under most circumstances, is as easily observable to the business invitee as the store owner. The terrazzo surfacing is part of the permanent structure of the building. While it is true "that the construction and maintenance of the entranceway of terrazzo on an inclined plane does not of itself constitute negligence, it comes within the rule that a negligent act may be one which "creates a situation which involves an unreasonable risk •to another because of the expectable action of the other, a third person, an animal or a force of nature."
The argument is made that the effect of affirmance of this judgment will be to make stores such as defendant insurers of the safety of their patrons, which argument we reject. The only basis upon which liability can be predicated is negligence. The standard upon which negligence is gauged is that of ordinary, reasonable care under the circumstances, which standard it is peculiarly fitting that juries determine. It is to be borne in mind that we are not holding that the defendant's conduct amounted to negligence as a matter of law. We are only required to determine whether there was any legitimate basis in the evidence upon which reasonable minds could believe that the defendant failed to meet its standard of reasonable care under the circumstances for the safety of its customers.
The evidence clearly shows that the defendant knew of the characteristic of terrazzo to become slippery when wet, and that it was its custom, and the custom of other stores with similar surfacing to use rubber mats or grit to prevent slipperiness during stormy weather. In view of this a jury question was posed as to whether the defendant discharged its duty to use reasonable diligence and watchfulness for storms, and to take such measures as the exercise of reasonable care under the circumstances would dictate.
The remaining question is as to the time element: was there sufficient time after the storm commenced that it should reason ably have been expected to put out the mats or feldspar to reduce the slipperiness ? The evidence is in sharp dispute both as to the amount of precipitation and the time that had elapsed. The defendant claimed that it had been raining or snowing for only 5 to 10 minutes and that the amount was very slight, whereas the plaintiff said that it continued to snow from the time she boarded the bus; that it usually took IS or 20 minutes to make the trip to town and probably another 5 to 10 minutes to walk from the bus stop to the Penney store. Th«; official weather report admitted in evidence showed a trace of precipitation beginning at 8:12 p. m. and continuing until 8:34 p. m. that evening, which is not necessarily inconsistent with the plaintiff's statement. It is recognized that in this mountain valley storms are sometimes spotty and irregular as to the time and place of starting, duration and amount of precipitation. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, it could have been 25 to 30 minutes after the storm began that the accident occurred, during which time it was, of course, observable by the defendant's employees out of the windows. Upon the basis of such evidence we conclude that reasonable minds could find that sufficient precipitation had fallen and that enough time had elapsed so that in the exercise of ordinary and reasonable care for the safety of its customers, the defendant should have employed the corrective measures.
c) Contributory negligence of the plaintiff.
Mrs. DeWeese was entitled to assume that the floor was reasonably safe. Though she saw dampness and muddy tracks thereon, there was nothing to give-her warning that it was particularly slippery when wet and there is no evidence that she was familiar with such fact. She testified to the contrary. In the nature of things, one entering a store must give at least part of her attention to watching where she is going to avoid other persons, or obstacles. She obviously is not required,, and likely in due care cannot, give her entire attention to any one hazard such as. possible extraordinary slipperiness of the floor, which she has no particular reason to. anticipate. Her testimony is susceptible of interpretation that she used the degree of care which ordinary and reasonable persons observe under such circumstances,, which was the measure of her duty.
We do not regard the evidence of her negligence as being so certain and persuasive that all reasonable minds would so. find. As we stated in Stickle v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. : " the question of contributory negligence is for the jury whenever the evidence is such that jurors, acting' fairly and reasonably, may say that they are not convinced by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence which proximately contributed to cause his own injury." The action of the trial judge 'was •consistent with the policy which has invariably been approved by this court of submitting disputed issues as to negligence and contributory negligence to the jury unless the matter is so clear as to be free from doubt and reasonable minds would not differ thereon.
Affirmed. Costs to respondent.
McDonough, c. j., and wade, j., concur.
. See Jackson v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific Railroad Company, 238 Iowa 1253, 30 N.W.2d 07; 67 C.J.S., Parties, § 79, p. 1049; 38 Am.Jur. 1015.
. See Brody v. Albert Lifson & Sons, Inc., 1955, 17 N.J. 383, 111 A.2d 504; Oil on floor see Frank v. J. C. Penney Co., 133 Cal.App.2d 123, 283 P.2d 291; Water on floor see Stoddard v. Roberts Public Markets, Inc., 27 Cal.App.2d 163, 80 P.2d 519; Lindsay v. Eccles Hotel Co., 3 Utah 2d 364, 284 P.2d 477.
. Restatement of Torts, Par. 302(b); See also Erickson v. Walgreen Drug Co., 120 Utah 31, 232 P.2d 210, 31 A.L.R.2d 177; W. T. Grant Co. v. Karren, 10 Cir., 190 F.2d 710.
. See Erickson v. Walgreer Drug Co., supra.
. Taylor v. Weber County, 4 Utah 2d 328, 293 P.2d 925.
. Coombs v. Perry, 2 Utah 2d 381, 275 P. 2d 680.
. Utah, 251 P.2d 867, 870; see also Linden v. Anchor Mm. Co., 20 Utah 134, 58 P. 355.
. See Malizia v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 53 Utah 122, 178 P. 756; Newton v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 43 Utah 219, 134 P. 567, 570.