Case Name: Victor BUSSIE et al. v. Mrs. Blanche Revere LONG et al.
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1971-01-18
Citations: 257 La. 623
Docket Number: No. 50703
Parties: Victor BUSSIE et al. v. Mrs. Blanche Revere LONG et al.
Judges: SUMMERS, J., is of the opinion that . a rehearing should be granted.
Reporter: Louisiana Reports
Volume: 257
Pages: 623–641

Head Matter:
243 So.2d 776
Victor BUSSIE et al. v. Mrs. Blanche Revere LONG et al.
No. 50703.
Jan. 18, 1971.
Dissenting Opinion Feb. 1, 1971.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 24, 1971.
DeBlieux, Guidry & Lowe, J. D. De-Blieux, Baton Rouge, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Jack P. F. Gremillion, Atty. Gen., Kenneth C. Dejean, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendants-appellees.
Plauche Villere, Jr., Blake G. Arata, City Attys., Beuker F. Amann, First Asst. City Atty., Jackson P. McNeely, Asst. City Atty., for amicus curiae.

Opinion:
SANDERS, Justice.
This case poses the question of whether a property taxpayer may maintain a mandamus proceeding against the Louisiana Tax Commission to require that body to perform its statutory duties relating to the equalization of property taxes. The lower court sustained a peremptory exception and dismissed the suit without trial. We reverse and remand the case for further proceedings.
Victor Bussie and his wife, property taxpayers, brought this class action on behalf of themselves and all other property taxpayers similarly situated to compel the Louisiana Tax Commission and its individual members to perform their mandatory duty to establish the actual cash value of all property in the state and to fix the percentage of actual cash value for the collection of state ad valorem taxes. They allege that the defendants have failed to perform their constitutional and statutory duties and that, as a result, the assessments and taxes collected are unequal and discriminatory, especially between taxpayers who reside in different parishes. The defendants filed several responsive pleadings, including an exception of improper venue and a peremptory exception. J. Barry Mouton, a property owner of Lafayette Parish, filed a petition of intervention joining with defendants in resisting plaintiffs' demands.
The district court overruled the exception ' of improper venue but sustained the peremptory exception on the ground that plaintiffs had failed to comply with the administrative procedures in LSA-R.S. 47:1998 and, additionally, that mandamus would not lie to enforce the performance of the duties described in the petition. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of the district court. 236 So.2d 68. We granted certiorari to review the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 256 La. 817, 239 So. 2d 344.
In this Court, the City of New Orleans and the Junior Chamber of Commerce of New Orleans have appeared as amicus curiae to support the legal position of plaintiffs.
The Court of Appeal held that the plaintiffs could not maintain the present suit, because they had not complied with LSA-R.S. 47:1998, requiring the advance filing of a sworn list of property within a specified time. As we construe this statute, it applies only to suits to contest the correctness or legality of tax assessments against the property of an individual taxpayer. It is inapplicable to a suit, like the present one, seeking the performance of the mandatory duties imposed upon the Louisiana Tax Commission in the statewide equalization of taxes.
The case of Dixon v. Flournoy, 247 La. 1067, 176 So.2d 138, relied upon by the Court of Appeal, is distinguishable from the present suit. In that case, a group of taxpayers in Caddo Parish filed suit against the Tax Collector for recovery of ad valorem taxes paid under protest. Although the taxpayers complained of the lack of uniformity in assessment practice, the relief sought was the recovery of individual taxes wrongfully assessed and collected. This Court correctly held that the taxpayers had to comply with the provisions of LSA-R.S. 47:1998 in order to maintain such a suit.
More difficult is whether mandamus is a proper remedy in the present case. Mandamus is a writ directing a public officer or others designated by statute to perform a duty. LSA-C.C.P. Art. 3861. Only a certain type of duty qualifies for enforcement under this extraordinary writ.
Article 3863 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure provides:
"A writ of mandamus may be directed to a public officer to compel the performance of a ministerial duty required •by law
The question framed, then, is whether the performance sought in the present suit is of "a ministerial duty required by law."
Article X, Section 12 of the Louisiana Constitution provides that all real estate shall be valued at actual cash value. This constitutional provision is implemented by statute.
LSA-R.S. 47:1957 provides:
"All taxable property in the state shall be assessed by the tax commission. The assessors shall be responsible, under the supervision of the tax commission, for listing and assessing all property within their respective parishes, except such property as is subject to direct assessment by the tax commission.
"All property subject to taxation shall be listed and assessed at actual cash value and the actual cash value of all property fixed by the tax commission shall be the actual cash value for all purposes. (Italics ours).
LSA-R.S. 47:1989 further provides:
"The value of all taxable property in the state shall be fixed by the tax commission. The assessors shall make up the assessment lists in the manner and method prescribed by the tax commission and shall deliver to the tax commission copies of such lists and abstracts thereof as may be required by the tax commission. The assessors shall furnish the tax commission all data and reasons governing them in fixing valuations and if necessary any assessor shall appear before the tax commission at its domicile or elsewhere or before any member or person authorized to represent the tax commission elsewhere. The tax commission shall pay the actual sworn and itemized expenses of any assessor required to appear outside of his parish.
"The tax commission shall fix the percentage of the actual cash valuation upon which the state taxes must he collected after the actual cash valuation for the whole state has been fixed in order to realize necessary revenues, according to legislative appropriation. The percentage of actual cash value upon which state taxes are to be collected shall be so fixed that the taxes collected thereon do not exceed such legislative appropriation after making allowances for a proper percentage in the failure of collections and after deducting from the total amount of the legislative appropriation, income from all sources other than property taxation. The tax on property shall not exceed the amount thus indicated." (Italics ours).
These statutory provisions impose a mandatory duty upon the Louisiana Tax Commission to establish the actual cash value of taxable property in the state and to fix the percentage of the actual cash value upon which state taxes must be collected. According to the allegations of the petition, the Louisiana Tax Commission has failed to perform these duties.
The Court of Appeal held that these duties were non-ministerial, because they involved "a significant use of judgment and discretion." In so holding, the court erred.
It is true that the establishment of the actual cash value of property involves a judgment factor. It is also true that fixing the percentage of that value appropriate for a uniform tax base includes a judgment factor. Nonetheless, the statutory duty to establish the actual cash value and fix some percentage is mandatory, direct, and positive. The Commission has no discretion as to whether or not the act will be performed.
In their petition, plaintiffs seek only the performance of the act made obligatory by statute. The pleadings suggest no intrusion into the discretion of the Commission.
Judicial decisions here and elsewhere support a holding that mandamus will lie to compel a taxing authority to perform a duty to assess property or to fix a value ratio for a tax base. See State ex rel. Sellers v. Fifth Jefferson Drainage Dist., 151 La. 1006, 92 So. 592; State ex rel. Cunningham v. Board of Assessors, 52 La. Ann. 223, 26 So. 872; Karno v. Louisiana Tax Commission, La.App., 233 So.2d 592, cert. denied 256 La. 251, 236 So.2d 30; Switz v. Kingsley, 37 N.J. 566, 182 A.2d 841; State ex rel. Castillo Corp. v. New Mexico State Tax Comm., 79 N.M. 357, 443 P.2d 850; Village of Ridgefield Park v. Bergen County Bd. of Taxation, 31 N.J. 420, 157 A.2d 829; McNayr v. State, etc. (Fla.), 166 So.2d 142; Pierce v. Green, 229 Iowa 22, 294 N.W. 237, 131 A.L.R. 335.
The jurisprudence on this point is correctly summarized in 52 Am.Jur.2d, Mandamus, § 258, p. 583 as follows :
"The use of the writ to compel the performance of ministerial duties relating to the levy and assessment of taxes is generally recognized. Thus, the writ has been held to be an appropriate remedy to enforce a statutory duty to assess and levy taxes, to compel a state tax commission to provide a uniform assessment percentage for use in all counties for ad valorem tax purposes, to assess property at a fixed percentage of its value, or at its true or full value, to assess property that has been omitted by the application of a wrong theory of assessment, or to enter in proper land books, and assess for taxation, land which should be so entered and assessed."
We conclude that the specific duties sought to be enforced here are ministerial duties imposed by law within the meaning of Article 3863 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure. Hence, mandamus is a proper remedy.
For the reasons assigned the judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed, the peremptory exception sustained by the lower courts is overruled, and the case is remanded for further proceedings according to law.
. The petition of intervention alleges that Sections 1 and 4 of Article X exclude "timber and timber lands" from the operation ' of this constitutional mandate. In passing upon the peremptory exception, we do not concern ourselves with the existence of special exceptions. Nor do we express an opinion on other pleadings that were not ruled upon in the lower' courts.