Case Name: PRESTON v. PALMER
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1889-10
Citations: 23 Abb. N. Cas. 452
Docket Number: 
Parties: PRESTON v. PALMER.
Judges: 
Reporter: Abbott's New Cases
Volume: 23
Pages: 452–474

Head Matter:
PRESTON v. PALMER.
N. Y. Court of Appeals ;
October, 1889:
[Reversing 42 Hun, 388.]
1. Action to enjoin assertion of legal rights.] A court of equity may enjoin from taking under a-will, a legatee who caused the death of-' the testator in order to prevent revocation.
2. Forms.] Form of a complaint in such case
Appeal from a judgment entered upon the decision of General Term, affirming judgment entered upon the report of a referee.
Cecelia G. M. Preston, and Lorette A. Riggs, brought, this action against Elmer E. and Eliza Palmer and Ira Dutton (as administrator with the will annexed of Francis B. Palmer, deceased), and Charles Lee, to enjoin the defendant Elmer E. Palmer, from taking under the will of the deceased,, whom he had murdered. The action was commenced on-September 29th, 1883. A temporary injunction was obtained and thereafter made permanent. The issues were.referred to a referee to hear, try and determine.
The referee found as conclusions of law that in this State the transmission of property by will and the descent of property are entirely creations of statute; that under the ■statute law of this State no exception on account of crime :is made as to the right to take by will or descent, and that defendant, though he murdered the testator, is still entitled to take under the will of the latter.
The sv/pi'eme court on appeal concurred in these, the ■conclusions of law, and affirmed the judgment.
The facts appear sufficiently in the opinion.
Leslie W. Russell (C. E. Sanford, attorney) for'plaintiffs,. The appellants.
The position for the plaintiffs was correct upon the general grounds, viz., on principle, by authority, and' for public policy.
I. On principle :—It is not claimed that the defendant Elmer Palmer may not take because there was a revocation of the will, or because there was a new will made, but because he unlawfully prevented a revocation or a new will by the crime, and because he terminated the enjoyment by his grandfather of his property, and effected his own succession to it by the same crime. All statutory law conferring rights rests upon the broad basis of acquiescence in abstinence from crime, as applied to the enforcement of a right dependent upon any statute. In all instruments by which the passage of title is effected, there is the ample obligation that the beneficiary will do nothing to either criminally obtain the execution of the instruments, or its performance. There is no need of legislation, or of written covenant, to insert this obligation in words in the instrument.
II. By authority :—The maxims of both the common and civil law apply with direct force. “No man shall take advantage of his own wrong ” (Broom’s Legal Maxims, 275 ; Voice’s Littleton, 148 b.).
Other maxims of the common law are directly applicable. Fx dolo malo non oritur actio; Nemo ex proprio dolo consequitur actionem / Frustra legis auxilium qui in legem committit. Where a third person by fraud prevents the execution of the contract which might have been consummated, a cause of action arises in favor of the vendee, who cannot enforce the contract against the vendor (Rice v. Manley, 66 N. Y. 82).
Where a beneficiary in a life insurance policy murdered the person whose life was insured it was held that the beneficiary, would not be entitled to take the proceeds of the policy (N. Y. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U. S. ■ 591, 600). No distinction lies between the passage of title by will and by contract. There is no distinction which obtains in the enforcement of such a rule of common justice. The reason of the rule applies in one instance as in the other. All the urgency that the moral, natural and municipal law brings to the contemplation of the application of law to occasion applies here as well as in case of contract. No man can take title by an unlawful act. If the unlawful act be provided for in the body of the instrument, it makes the instrument void ; and if that unlawful act be in execution of a contingency in a valid instrument, it destroys the efficacy of the instrument itself in its application to the criminal. In the construction of wills, in the application of extrinsic facts, happening subsequently to the execution of the will, the intent of the testator is the pole star to guide the courts. Here, had the testator anticipated the murderous intent, the bequest never would have been made or contimied (O’Hara Will Case, 95 N. Y. 403, 412. See also Wallgrave v. Tebbs, 2 K.& J. 313, 321; Schultz’s Appeal, 80 Penn. St. 396,405; Russell v. Jackson, 10 Hare,204). It is a fraud upon the testator that the beneficiary should intend to deprive him of the enjoyment of his property, and prevent the revocation of his will. The doctrines of the civil law are applicable here (Orleans County Bank v. Moore, 112 N. Y. 543, 549). If the beneficiary attempts the life of the testator he cannot take under the instrument (Domat Civil Law, part II, book I, title I, § 3, Cushing ed. 1850, 2d vol. 78, 80 ; Pothier on Successions, chap. I, § 2, art. IV, § 2; Toullier, Vol. VI, p. 111; Marcode, vol. III, p. 42; Code Napoleon, art. 727 ; Spanish Partidas, 994; Louisiana Code, 1560, 1570). The defendant is estopped by his own conduct from claiming the title to this property. The testator had the undoubted right to his life, and also the right to rely on the defendant’s not doing anything to shorten it. No man may take title, when, by so doing, he injures confidence which he has induced, or gets it by an act which the law recognizes as evil in itself (Bigelow on Estoppel, 370; Herman on Estoppel, §§ 733, 731, 740, 991; 2 Story’s Eg. Jur. §§ 1533, 1544 ; Caulfield v. Sullivan, 85 N. Y. 153 ; Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 43 Id. 424, 442 ; Leonard v. Crommelin, 1 Edw. Ch. 206; Shivers v. Goar, 40 Ga. 676; Cox v. Rogers, 77 Pa. St. 160).
III. For public policy: The statutory and unwritten law form a complete body applicable to the prevention of private wrongs, as well as the enforcement for public example of salutary rules forbidding the acquisition of property ‘by crime.
We might not be able to resist the probate of the will, because validly executed and not revoked; but we might show matters dehor the will, which prove that a devise or bequest is ineffective, as alienage of the taker. Confusion in regard to the person meant as beneficiary, incapacity to take from any cause, the efficacy or invalidity of the dispensing claims in a will, are not to be judged purely by ¡statutory law. Nine-tenths of the questions arising upon ■such claims are determined by the principles of the unwritten law. The statute was not intended to protect and «cover a foul crime. If it were, the statute itself would be void (Broom’s Legal Maxims, 19, 20; Coke on Littleton, 341 a ; Finch’s Law, 75, 76; Noy. Max. 9th ed. 2; Doct. & Stud. 18th ed. 15, 16). In the case of malum prohibitum, ¡artificial lines of action may require legislation to declare a wrong. In the cause of malum i/n se, it is never necessary to «declare by statute that an act, base in itself, shall not pass a property, or convey a right.
W. M. Hawkins and J. A. Vance for defendants, respondents.—I. The plaintiff’s counsel disclaimed any attempt, before the referee, to maintain that there had been a revocation of the will. He based his argument on the sole ground that public policy demanded that the defendant, because of his crime, should be barred from taking the property.
II. The mental capacity of the testator is not questioned.
III. The plaintiff, to avoid the will, must show a revocation thereof, or impeach its validity for fraud or duress.
IV. The declarations of the testator, upon the question, of a revocation, not made at the time of a virtual destruction, are not competent evidence (People v. Davis, 56 N. Y. 95, 102; Waterman v. Whitney, 11 Id. 157; Eighmy v. People, 79 Id. 546, 559). The statute having enumerated various methods hy which a will may be revoked, such enumeration implies a prohibition of any other method. There is no evidence to sustain a claim that the testator-revoked the will.
V. The capacity of the testator, the formal execution of the will, etc., being unquestioned, matter transpiring after-its execution cannot invalidate it (Seguine v. Seguine, 4 Abbott's Ct. of App. Dec. 191-194). The testator accepted every possibility as to the time and manner of his death.. Neither a court of equity nor of law can vary men’s wills,, or make wills or agreements for them (3 Blackstone, 350).
VI. Supposing a change in the will was prevented by the defendant, the act of prevention, rather than the manner,. is the ground of complaint (Leaycraft v. Simmons, 3 Bradf. 35 ; 12 Am. Deo. 375).
VII. The court will not thwart the object and will of deceased to please the plaintiffs. To thus deprive defendants of his rights would be in direct violation of the statute-(Penal Code, §§ 7 and 710 ; 3 JR. 8. 964, §42). It does not-lie with the court to enhance the pains, penalties and forfeitures provided by law for the punishment of crime, nor can it add any disability to those pains and penalties not expressly declared by the constitution or laws (People v. Thornton, 25 Hun, 456-68). Except when a civil action is given by statute to recover a penalty, or it appears that, the plaintiff has been injured in personal estate by the criminal act, the law gives no right to maintain a civil action based upon the crime.
IX. This is a case sni generis. It is not only new m instance, bnt also new in principle. There is a well established rule that when a case is new in principle, it is necessary to have recourse to legislative interposition to remedy the grievance ; but when the case is new in instance, and the only question is upon the application of a principle recognized in law, can the courts act (Broom’s Legal Maxims, 4th ed. 154). Recognizing the distinction, statutes in some countries and States have been enacted applicable to cases such as the one at bar. In this case the law has pronounced its sentence, and that sentence does not. embrace incapacity to take property under this will or in any other method provided by statute (Civil Code of Canada,. pages 95, 142; Owens v. Owens, 100 N. C, 240).
X. The maxim, “ No man shall take advantage of liisown wrong,” applies only when the money is the primary or principal formation of the claim made by the wrong-doer, and not when such money is only an incident.
XI. Since the repeal of the act of 1799, it cannot be-urged that the defendant is civilly dead (Platner v. Sherwood, 6 Johnson Ch. 118; 32 Alb. L. J. 68; 38 Alb. L. J. 394). This action can only relate to the real estate.. As to the personal, the probate is conclusive (Post v. Mason, 91 N. Y. 539).
The civil law has never been in force in this State, and the cases arising in courts bound by the civil law and cited by counsel, are not applicable.
The complaint, after stating the death of the testator, the relationship of the parties, and the ante-nuptial agreement made between the ■testator and one Eliza Breeze, the ownership of the lands, the making of the will and the probate thereof, proceeded in the following form:—
VI. That for some time prior to the 25th day of April, 1882, said "Elmer E. Palmer knew that said Francis B. Palmer had made his will; 'that said Elmer understood that by the terms of said will, the property of said Francis B. Palmer, or the greater part thereof, would pass to him on the decease of said Francis B. Palmer; that for some time prior 'to the 25th day of April, 1882, said Elmer was captious and disposed ■to do about as he. pleased, regardless of the wishes and directions of ■said Francis B. Palmer, staying out late at night, spending money for ■useless articles, and waiting on or courting girls with whom said Fran•cis B. Palmer did not desire him to associate; that said Francis B. Palmer often remonstrated with said Elmer for his conduct, and often (threatened him that unless he behaved himself better and did as Zhe wished, he would make a new will and not leave him his property; that he would not give him any of his property; that this state of ¡unpleasantness continued between them until the 25th day of April, '1882; that said Elmer E. Palmer was greatly desirous to come into the [possession and ownership of the property of said Francis B. Palmer, rand was fearful and apprehensive that said Francis B. Palmer would ■ make a new will and not leave him much or any of his property; that ■■desiring to get said property, and fearing said Francis B. Palmer would ¡make a new will, and with the fraudulent and pre-conscious intent to ■deprive the said Francis B. Palmer of the opportunity to make a will ■revoking the one then executed and disposing differently of his property, .-and to ensure the survival of himself beyond the life of the said Fran«cis B. Palmer, and to prevent the further enjoyment by the said Francis B. Palmer of his own property, by the use of strychnine or other deadly poison to the plaintiffs unknown, did fraudulently, wilfully,, feloniously and maliciously poison and murder the said Francis B. Palmer.
VII. That on or about the 18th day of May, 1882, at a court of oyer and terminer in St. Lawrence county where the offense was committed, said Elmer E. Palmer, as stated aforesaid, was afterwards, arraigned on said charge, and pleaded not guilty, and that his trial under such indictment came on and was had at a term of this court held at the court house in the village of Canton, on the 31st day of October, 1882, and that on or about the 11th day of November, 1882, upon the verdict of the jury duly rendered and recorded he was found and adjudged guilty of murder in the second degree, and was thereupon in pursuance of such conviction sentenced to imprisonment in the State Reformatory, where he has since been and now is imprisoned upon such sentence.
That the administrator with the will annexed is proceeding with the discharge of his duties under said will, as though the same were valid, legal and binding, and the said Elmer E. Palmer the beneficiary thereof, as stated therein, and is using the property in the same way for the benefit of said Elmer, and will continue to do so unless otherwise directed by this court, to the impairment and loss of plaintiffs” interest therein, and the said Elmer, aside from his claim under said' will, is irresponsible.
And the said Elmer is obtaining, using and enjoying the benefits of' the property left by the testator as though he was the legal beneficiary thereof.
The personal property left by the testator consisted of [description];; and the real estate, a description whereof is hereto attached and marked “Exhibit C” consists of [description].
Wherefore plaintiffs pray:
I. That they be declared to bo the owners of the property left by the said Francis B. Palmer, subject to the equities to Eliza Palmer, and. the benefits to the said Elmer in the will be cancelled, annulled and; held void.
II. That the administrator and all the other defendants be directed! to so recognize the plaintiffs’ lights.
III. That the administrator and the said Elmer be enjoined from using or disposing of the property for Elmer’s benefit, or in antagonism to plaintiffs’ rights.
IV. That a temporary injunction issue accordingly.
V. That the true interests of all the parties be declared.
A prayer for general relief followed, and a statement that all the allegations are made on information and belief.

Opinion:
Earl, J.
On August 13, 1880, Francis B. Palmer made his last will and testament, in which he gave small legacies to his two daughters, Mrs. Riggs and Mrs. Preston, the plaintiffs in this action, and the remainder of his estate to his grandson, the defendant, Elmer E. Palmer, subject to-the support of Susan Palmer, his mother, with a gift over to the two daughters, subject to the support of Mrs. Palmer, in case Elmer should survive him and die under age, unmarried, and without any issue. The testator, at the date of' his will, owned a farm and considerable personal property.. He was a widower, and thereafter, in March, 1882, he was married to Mrs. Bresee, with whom, before his marriage, he entered into an ante-nuptial contract, in which it was agreed that, in lien of dower and all other claims upon his estate, in case she survived him, she should have her support upon his farm, during her life, and such support was expressly charged upon the farm. At the date of the will and subsequently to the death of the testator, Elmer lived with him as a member of his-family, and at his death was sixteen years •old. He knew of the provisions made in his favor in the will, and, that he might prevent his grandfather from revoking such provisions, which he had manifested some intention to do, and to obtain the speedy enjoyment and immediate possession of his property, he wilfully murdered him by poisoning him. He now claims the property,' and the sole question for our determination is, can he have it ?
The defendants say that the testator is dead; that his will was made in due form and has been admitted to probate, and that, therefore, it must have effect according to the letter of the law.
It is quite true that statutes regulating the making, proof and effect of wills, and the devolution of property, if literally construed, and if their force and effect can in no way and under no circumstances be controlled or modified, give this property to the murderer.
The purpose of those statutes was to enable testators to dispose of their estates to the objects of their bounty at death, and to carry into effect their final wishes, legally expressed, and in considering and giving effect to them this purpose must be kept in view.
It was the intention of the law makers that the donees in ;a will should have the property given to them. But it never could have been their intention that a donee who murdered the testator to make the will operative should have any benefit under it. If such a case had been present to their minds, and it had been supposed necessary to make some provision of law to meet it, it cannot be doubted that they would have provided for it. It is a familiar canon of construction that a thing which is within the intention of the makers of a statute is as much within the statute as if- it were within the letter ; and a thing which is within the letter of the statute is.not within the statute unless it be within the intention of the makers.
The writers of law do not always express their intention perfectly, but either exceed it or fall short of it, so that judges are to collect it from probable or rational conjectures only, and this is called rational interpretation ; and itutherforth in his Institutes, page 407, says : " When we make use of rational interpretation, sometimes we restrain the meaning of the writer so as to take .in less, and sometimes, we extend or enlarge his meaning so as to take in more than his words express."
Such a construction ought to be put upon a statute as will best answer the intention which the makers had in view, for qui Jiaeret in litera, haeret in eortioe. In Bacon's Abr. Statutes, 1, 5, Pwffendorf, book 5, chap. 12 ; JRutherforth, pp. 422, 427; and in Smith's Commentaries, 814, many cases are mentioned where it was held that matters embraced in the general words of statutes nevertheless were not within-, the statutes, because it could not have been the intention of the law makers that they should be included. They were taken out of the statutes by an equitable construction, and it is said in Bacon : " By an equitable construction a case not. within the letter of the statute is sometimes holden to be within the meaning because it is within the mischief for which a remedy is provided. The reason for such construction is that the law makers could not set down every case in express terms. In order to form a right judgment whether a case be within the equity of the statute, it is a good way to suppose the law maker present, and that you have asked-him this question : did you intend to comprehend this case ? Then you must give yourself such answer as you imagine he, being an upright and reasonable man, would have given. If this be that he did mean to comprehend it you may safely hold the case to be within the equity of the statute; for, while you do no more than he would have done, you do not act contrary to the statute, but in conformity thereto." In some cases the letter of a legislative act is restrained by an equitable construction ; in others it is enlarged ; in others the construction is contrary to the letter. The equitable •construction which restrains the letter of a statute is defined by Aristotle as frequently quoted in this manner : Aequilas est correctio legis generaliter latm qua parti deficit. If the law makers could as to this case be consulted would they say that they intended by their general language that the property of a-testator or .of an ancestor should pass to one who had taken his life for the express purpose of getting his property ? -In 1 Blackstone Com. 91, the learned author, speaking of the construction of statutes, says : " If there arise out of them any absurd consequences manifestly contradictory to common reason, they are, with regard to those collateral consequences, void. . . . When some collateral matter arises out of the general words, and happened to be unreasonable, then the judges are, in decency, to conclude that this consequence was not foreseen by the Parliament, and therefore they are at liberty to expound the statute by •equity, and only quoad hoo disregard it," and he gives as an illustration, if an Act of Parliament gives a man power to try all causes that arise within his manor of Dale, yet, if a cause should arise in which he himself is party, the act is construed not to extend to that, because it is unreasonable that any man should determine his own quarrel.
There was a statute in Bolognia that whoever drew blood in the streets should be severely punished, and yet it was held not to apply to the case of a barber who opened a vein in the street. It is commanded in the Decalogue that no work shall be done upon the Sabbath, and yet giving the •command a rational interpretation founded upon its design, the Infallible Judge held that it did not prohibit works of necessity, charity or benevolence on that day.
What could be more unreasonable than to suppose that it was the legislative intention in the general laws passed for the orderly, peaceable and just devolution of property that they should have operation in favor of one who murdered his ancestor that he might speedily come into the possession •of his estate ? Such an intention is inconceivable. We need not, therefore, be much troubled by the general language contained in the laws.
Besides, all laws as well as all contracts may be controlled in their operation and effect by general, fundamental maxims of the common law. No one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found 'any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime. These maxims are dictated by public policy, have their foundation in universal law administered in all civilized countries, and have nowhere been superseded by statutes. They were applied in the decision of the case of the New York Mutual Life Ins Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U. S. 591,599. There it was held that the person who procured a policy upon the life of another, payable at his death, and then murdered the assured to make the policy payable, could not recover thereon. Mr. Justice Field writing the opinion said : " Independently of any proof of the motives of Hunter in obtaining the policy, and even assuming that they were just and proper, he forfeited all rights under it when, to secure its immediate payment, he murdered the assured. It would be a reproach to the jurisprudence of the country if one could recover insurance money payable on the death of a party whose life he had feloniously taken. As well might he recover insurance money upon a building that he had wilfully fired."
These maxims, without any statute giving them force or operation, frequently control the effect and nullify the language of wills. A will procured by fraud and deception like any other instrument may be decreed void and set aside, and so a particular portion of a will may be excluded from probate or held inoperative if induced by the fraud or undue influence of the person in whose favor it is (Allen v. McPherson, 1 H. Lds. Gases, 191 ; Harrison's Appeal, 48 Conn, 202). So a will may contain provisions which are immoral, irreligious or against public policy, and they will be held void.
Here there was no certainty that this murderer would survive the testator, or that the testator would not change his will, and there was no certainty that he would get this property if nature was allowed to take its course. He, therefore, murdered the testator expressly to vest himself with an estate. Under such circumstances, what law, human or divine, will allow him to take the estate and enjoy the fruits of his crime ? The will spoke and became operative at the death of the testator. He caused, that death, and thus by his crime made it speak and have operation. Shall it speak and operate in his favor ? If he had met the testator and taken his property by force, he would have had no. title to it. Shall he acquire title by murdering him % If he had gone to the testator's house and by force compelled him, or by fraud, or undue influence had induced him to-will him his property, the law would not allow him to hold it. But can he give effect and operation to a will by murder and yet take the property ? To answer these questions in the affirmative, it seems to me, would be a reproach to the jurisprudence of our State and an offence against public policy.
Under the civil law, evolved from the general principles of natural law and justice by many generations of juris consults, philosophers and statesmen, one cannot take property by inheritance or will from an ancestor or benefactor whom he has murdered (Domat, part II, book I, tit. I, § III; Code Napoleon, § 727; Mackelday's Roman Law, 530, 550). In the Civil Code of Lower Canada, the provisions on the subject in the Code Napoleon have been substantially copied. But, so far as I can find, in no country where the common law prevails has it been deemed important to enact a law to provide for such a case. Our re visors and law makers were familiar with the civil law and they did not deem it important to incorporate into our statutes its provisions upon this subject. This is not a casus omissus. It was evidently supposed that the maxims of the common law were sufficient to regulate such a case, and that a specific enactment for that purpose was not needed.
For the same reasons the defendant Palmer cannot take any of this property as heir. Just before the murder he was not an heir, and it was not certain that he ever would be. He might have died before his grandfather, or might have been disinherited by him. He made himself an heir by the murder, and he seeks to take property as the fruit of his crime. What has before been said as to him as legatee, applies to him with equal force as an heir. He cannot vest himself with title by crime.
My view of this case does not inflict upon Elmer any greater or other punishment for his crime than the law specifies. It takes from him no property, but simply holds that he shall not acquire property by his crime and thus be rewarded for its commission.
Our attention is called to Owens v. Owens, 100 N. C. 240, a case quite like this. There a wife had been convicted of being an accessory before the fact to the murder of her husband, and it was held that she was, nevertheless, entitled to dower. I am unwilling to assent to the doctrine of that case. The statutes provide dower for a wife who has the misfortune to survive her husband and thus lose his support and protection. It is clearly beyond their purpose to make provision for a wife who, by her own, crime, makes herself a widow and wilfully and intentionally-deprives herself of the support and protection of her husband. As she might have died before him and thus never-have been his widow, she cannot, by her crime, vest herself' with an estate. The principle which lies at the bottom of' the maxim volenti non fit injuria should be applied to such¿ a case, and a widow should not, for the purpose of acquiring, as such, property rights, be permitted to allege a widowhood which she has wickedly and intentionally created.
The facts found entitled the plaintiffs to the relief they seek. The error of the referee was in his conclusion of law. Instead of granting a new trial, therefore, I think the proper judgment upon the facts found should be ordered here. The facts have been passed upon twice with the same result, first upon trial of Palmer for murder and then by the referee in this action. We are, therefore, of opinion that the ends of justice do not require that they should again come in question.
The judgment of the General Term and that entered upon the report of the referee should, therefore, be reversed and judgment should be entered as follows: That Elmer E. Palmer and the administrator be enjoined from using any •of the personalty or real estate left by the testator for .Elmer's benefit; that the devise and bequest in the will to Elmer be declared ineffective to pass the title to him ; that ¡by reason of the crime of murder committed upon the ¿grandfather he is deprived of any interest in the estate left •by him ; that the plaintiffs are the true owners of the real .and personal estate left by the testator, subject to the charge in favor of Elmer's mother and the widow of the testator, Hinder the ante-nuptial agreement, and that the plaintiffs have costs in all the courts against Elmer.
All concurred, except Gbay, J., who read a dissenting opinion and Danfobth, J., who concurred therein.