Case Name: Sullenger v. Baecher
Court: Appellate Court of Indiana
Jurisdiction: Indiana
Decision Date: 1913-04-16
Citations: 55 Ind. App. 365
Docket Number: No. 7,842
Parties: Sullenger v. Baecher.
Judges: 
Reporter: Indiana Court of Appeals Reports
Volume: 55
Pages: 365–373

Head Matter:
Sullenger v. Baecher.
[No. 7,842.
Filed April 16, 1913.
Rehearing denied June 28, 1913.
Transfer denied January 14, 1914.]
1. Taxation.' — Tax Deeds.- — Validity.—Defective Description. — A tax deed to land forming a part of survey No. 17, containing 200 acres, based on descriptions in the various tax records as part of lot 17, township 1, range 10, 100 acres, was wholly ineffective to convey title, since the description was insufficient to identify the land sought to be conveyed, p. 367.
2. Taxation. — Records. — Description. — Sufficiency. — It is the policy of the law to preserve and enforce the lien of taxes, and courts will sustain descriptions in tax records to enforce such lien which would be insufficient to convey title by a tax deed based thereon, p. 368.
3. Taxation. — Tax Deeds. — Validity.— Presumptions. — The presumption arising from the prima facie case made upon the question of title under §10380 Burns 1908, Acts 1891 p. 199, §206, providing that a tax deed shall be prima facie evidence of the regularity of the sale and all prior proceedings, as well as prima ¡acia evidence of the premises described in the deed, and of a good and valid title in fee simple in the grantee of such deed, is subject to be rebutted by evidence showing the description to be so defective as to render the deed ineffectual to convey title, p. 309.
4. Appeal. — Weighing Evidence. — Records.—It is the province of the court on appeal to declare what force and effect shall be given to evidence consisting entirely of records, p. 369.
5. Deeds.— Title of Yendor.— Bona Eide Purchaser.— Statutes.— The grantee in a quitclaim deed from one who had been divested of his rights and interest by sale in bankruptcy proceedings took no title unless ho was at the time a good faith purchaser for a valuable consideration within the meaning of §3902 Bums 1908, §2931 R. S. 1881. p. 370.
6. Vendor and Purchaser. — Evidence as to Purchase in Good Faith. — Burden of Proof. — The grantee in a quitclaim deed from one who had been divested of his rights and interest, if he relies on such deed to establish title in himself, has the burden of proving that he was a purchaser in good faith and for a valuable consideration, without notice either actual or constructive of the rights of the person to whom the title of his grantor had previously passed, p. 370.
7. Deeds. — Quitclaim Deed. — Effect.—Except in so far as the grantee in a quitclaim deed may be protected by the recording act, the effect of such a deed is limited to the estate or interest held by the grantor at the time of its execution, p. 371.
8. Vendor and Purchaser.— Bona Fide Purchaser.— Purchaser Under Quitclaim Deed. — The grantee in a quitclaim deed may be entitled to the protection afforded a bona fide purchaser on establishing by proof that the purchase was in good faith and that the consideration paid was a fair price, p. 371.
9. Vendor and Purchaser.— Bona Fide Purchaser.— Evidence.— Sufficiency. — Where one seeking to establish title in himself by virtue of a quitclaim deed from a grantor who bad been divested of all right and interest in the land conveyed failed to prove that the consideration paid was a fair or reasonable price for the land, the evidence failed to show that he was a bona fule purchaser for value and was insufficient to sustain a verdict on the theory that he acquired title by such deed. p. 372.
From Enos Circuit Court; William H. Hill, Special Judge.
Action by Englebert A. Baecher against Mary Sullenger. From a judgment for plaintiff, the defendant appeals.
Reversed.
B. M. Willoughby and James M. Souse, for appellant.
Samuel W. Williams and Robert G. Cauthorn, for appellee.

Opinion:
Lairy, J.
Appellee recovered a judgment in the Knox Circuit Court quieting his title as against appellant to a certain tract of land in Knox County, Indiana. The only error assigned on appeal is the action of the trial court in overruling appellant's motion for a new trial.
For some time prior to the year 1904, Henry L. Wheatley was the owner of the real estate in controversy and was in possession of the same. On February 11, 1907, appellee purchased the land at a sale for taxes assessed against Henry L. Wheatley for the year 1906 and previous years, and received a certificate therefor. On February 12, 1909, the auditor of Knox County, upon presentation of this certificate, executed and delivered to appellee a tax deed, upon which appellee bases his claim of title to the land involved in this suit. At the time this action was brought, appellant was in possession of the land, claiming title thereto as heir of her father, Henry C. Mooney and by virtue of an unrecorded deed executed to him by the trustee in the bankruptcy proceeding of Henry L. Wheatley.
The first specification of appellant's motion for a new trial challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict. Appellant's contention is that the tax deed upon which appellee relies is not sufficient to convey title for the reason that the description contained in the records made for taxation purposes is so uncertain, indefinite and imperfect that no valid deed could be based thereon. It appears from the evidence that survey No. 17, of which the land in controversy formed a part, contained about 200 acres of land. The land which appellee purchased at the tax sale is described in the entry for taxation on the tax duplicate of Knox County as follows: "Henry L. Wheatley Part Lot 17, Township 1, Range 10, 100 acres." The description in the notice of tax sale is in the words and figures following: "Henry L. Wheatley pt. lot 17, tp. 1, range 10, 100 acres." In the delinquent list returned by the auditor the description is: "Pt. lot 17, Township 1, Range 10, acres 100. Johnson Township, Knox County, Indiana." In the tax sale record the land is described as follows: "All Survey 17 Township 1, Range 10, 100 acres, Johnson Township." and in the tax certificate upon which the deed purports to be issued the description reads: "Part of Sur. 17, Town one Range Ten containing 100 acres in Johnson Township, Knox County, Indiana." It is apparent we think that none of these descriptions were sufficient to indicate what part of survey 17 was covered by the description. No surveyor from this description alone would be able to locate and identify the particular tract intended, for the reason that 100 acres of land laid off any place within the survey would meet and comply with all of the terms of the description. Under the decisions of the courts of this State, the deed based upon these descriptions was wholly ineffective to convey title. Cooper v. Jackson (1880), 71 Ind. 244; Ball v. Barnes (1890), 123 Ind. 394, 24 N. E. 142; Armstrong v. Hufty (1901), 156 Ind. 606, 55 N. E. 443, 60 N. E. 1080; Brown v. Reeves & Co. (1903), 31 Ind. App. 517, 68 N. E. 604; Green v. McGrew (1905), 35 Ind. App. 104, 72 N. E. 1049, 73 N. E. 832, 111 Am. St. 149; Reed v. Earhart (1882), 88 Ind. 159; Ford v. Kolb (1882), 84 Ind. 198.
It is the policy of the law to preserve and enforce the lien of taxes, and, with that end in view, courts have frequently sustained descriptions in tax records for the purpose of enforcing the lien, which, under the decisions of the same courts, would be clearly insufficient to convey title by a tax deed based thereon. State, ex rel. v. Casteel (1887), 110 Ind. 174, 11 N. E. 219; Peckham v. Millikan (1885), 99 Ind. 352; Sloan v. Sewell (1881), 81 Ind. 180.
Appellee relies upon §10380 Burns 1908, Acts 1891 p. 199, §206, which, contains the following provision: "Such deed shall be prima facie evidence of the regularity of the sale of the premises described in the deed, and of the regularity of all prior proceedings, and prima facie evidence of a good and valid title in fee-simple in the grantee of said deed." He correctly asserts that by force of this statute, the introduction of the tax deed in evidence was sufficient to make a prima facie case in his favor upon the question of title. This may be conceded but the presumption arising from the prima facie ease so made is subject to be rebutted by evidence, and in this case it is so rebutted by evidence showing that the description of the land in the tax records upon which the deed is based is so defective as to render the deed ineffectual to convey title. This conclusion is not reached as a result of weighing conflicting parol evidence. The evidence which rebuts the prima facie case consists entirely of records, and it is the province of the court to declare what force and effect shall be given to evidence of this character. Sallee v. Soules (1907), 168 Ind. 624, 81 N. E. 587; State, ex rel. v. Board, etc. (1905), 165 Ind. 262, 74 N. E. 1091.
Other questions presented by this appeal are not considered for the reason that they will not probably arise upon another trial. The judgment is reversed with directions to grant a new trial.