Case Name: FULLER v. STATE OF GEORGIA et al.
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1974-07-25
Citations: 232 Ga. 581
Docket Number: 28984
Parties: FULLER v. STATE OF GEORGIA et al.
Judges: Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Hall, J., who concurs specially in Division IV.
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 232
Pages: 581–593

Head Matter:
28984.
FULLER v. STATE OF GEORGIA et al.

Opinion:
Per curiam.
This appeal results from a judgment that validated "general obligation debt" to be incurred by the State of Georgia pursuant to a constitutional amendment ratified November 7, 1972 (Ga. L. 1972, p. 1523; Code Ann. § 2-5601 through 2-5604.1). This amendment provided that the state may incur general obligation debt, and it created the Georgia State Financing and Investment Commission (Code Ann. § 2-5603). It further provided: "The Commission shall be responsible for the issuance of all public debt incurred hereunder and for the proper application of the proceeds of such debt to the purposes for which it is incurred: . . ."
This constitutional amendment also provided that debt incurred by the state pursuant to its provisions "may be validated by judicial proceedings in the manner provided by the General Assembly and such validation shall be incontestable and conclusive." Code Ann. § 2-5602.
In 1973 the General Assembly enacted the "Georgia State Financing and Investment Commission Act" (Code Ann. Ch. 87-1A). Code Ann. § 87-103a (a) provides: "Subject to the limitations contained in this chapter, the Commission shall be responsible for the issuance of all public debt incurred hereunder, for the proper application of the proceeds of such debt to the purposes for which it is incurred, and for the application and administration of the provisions of this chapter:..." Code Ann. § 87-103a (b) (1) provides for a construction division of the commission, and it further provides as follows: "In carrying out its responsibilities in connection with the application of any funds under its control, (including the proceeds of any debt or any appropriation made directly to it for construction purposes) the Commission is hereby specifically authorized to acquire and construct projects for the benefit of any department or agency of the State or to contract with any such department or agency for the acquisition or construction of projects under policies, standards, and operating procedures to be established by the Commission . . The construction division shall also perform such construction-related services for State agencies and instrumentalities as may be assigned to the Commission or to the construction division by executive order of the Governor."
Code Ann. § 87-103a (d) vests the commission with powers in addition to those powers contained in the constitutional amendment.
Code Ann. § 87-105a (c) provides for the issuance of debt pursuant to written resolutions adopted by the commission. This section also provides for the legal procedure for validating the debt to be incurred by the state.
It is clear that under this new constitutional method of incurring state debt, if the legislature authorizes the commission to incur debt in a specified amount for a specified purpose and makes the specified appropriation to the "State of Georgia General Obligation Debt Sinking Fund" (as was done in this case), then the commission created by the Constitution can resolve to incur the authorized debt, have it procedurally validated, deliver evidences of the state debt to the lenders, and receive the proceeds from the lenders; and once the commission created by the Constitution receives the proceeds of the debt incurred from the lenders, then the commission itself is responsible for "the proper application of the proceeds of such debt to the purposes for which it is incurred." Code Ann. § 2-5603.
In this case the General Assembly appropriated $3,043,478 for the purpose of financing and constructing and equipping a World Congress Center in the City of Atlanta and authorized the issuance of $35 million in principal amount of general obligation debt. The General Assembly then provided: "Should the Georgia State Financing and Investment Commission elect to issue general obligation debt to finance said undertaking, said amount shall be appropriated to the 'State of Georgia General Obligation Debt Sinking Fund.' "Ga. L. 1973, p. 1361.
These legislative requisites having been accomplished, the commission created by the Constitution then resolved to issue $35 million of general obligation debt for the purpose specified. The commission then took the necessary legal steps to validate the debt in advance of its being incurred. The appellant here intervened in the validation proceedings in the trial court to contest the validation of the proposed debt; his reasons for opposing validation were held by the trial judge to be without merit, and the trial judge entered a judgment validating $35 million of general obligation debt.
The appellant has come here seeking review of that judgment validating the debt.
I.
The appellant first contends that a proposed World Congress Center is not a purpose for which the power of taxation over the whole state may be exercised. This contention is without merit, because the 1972 constitutional amendment provides that general obligation debt may be incurred to acquire, construct, develop, extend, enlarge and improve land, waters, property, highways, buildings, structures, equipment or facilities of the state, its agencies, departments, and institutions. The constitutional amendment also provides that once such debt is incurred, the General Assembly shall raise by taxation such amounts as are necessary to pay the annual debt service requirements on all general obligation debt incurred pursuant to the constitutional amendment. Such amount shall be raised by taxation and appropriated by the General Assembly to the "State of Georgia General Obligation Debt Sinking Fund."
II.
Appellant's second contention is that the proposed World Congress Center is not a public purpose for which public debt may be incurred pursuant to subparagraph (c) of the 1972 constitutional amendment. This provision provides that general obligation debt may be incurred by issuing obligations to acquire, construct, develop, extend, enlarge or improve land, waters, property, highways, buildings, structures, equipment or facilities of the state, its agencies, departments, and institutions.
The General Assembly in 1973 authorized $35 million of state debt to be incurred for the purpose of constructing a World Congress Center. It also appropriated the sum of $3,043,478 to the "State of Georgia General Obligation Debt Sinking Fund" as an amount sufficient to pay the highest annual debt service requirements for such $35 million of indebtedness to be incurred.
This court cannot hold that the debt authorized by the legislature to finance a World Congress Center is not for a public purpose, because we believe the 1972 constitutional amendment permits the legislature to authorize such debt for any purpose that is consistent with the terms, noted above, of subparagraph (c).
III.
Appellant's third contention is that "no authorized user agency of the state has requested the issuance of state general obligation bonds to construct a World Congress Center." This contention has no merit. Under the 1972 constitutional amendment (Code Ann. § 2-5603) the Georgia State Financing and Investment Commission is responsible for the issuance of all public debt incurred pursuant to the amendment, and it is also responsible for the proper application of the proceeds of such debt to the purposes for which the debt is incurred.
IV.
Appellant's fourth contention is that the Executive Board of the Georgia World Congress Center created by Ga. L. 1972, p. 245 violates the "separation of powers" provision of the State Constitution. Code Ann. § 2-123. We recognize that this fourth enumerated error raises an important constitutional issue because the Executive Board of the Georgia World Congress Center, if it was a part of the Executive Department, had six members of the Legislative Department appointed to it. However, we do not reach or grapple with that issue in this case, because the 1972 Act creating the Executive Board was repealed by the 1974 General Assembly, and the repeal was effective prior to the entry of the validating judgment in the trial court. Furthermore, the State Financing and Investment Commission created by the 1972 constitutional amendment is primarily, totally, and singularly responsible for the proper issuance of the debt in this case and for the proper application of the proceeds of the $35 million debt to the purposes (financing, constructing, and equipping a World Congress Center) authorized by the General Assembly. After issuing the bonds or other evidences of debt, it is the Georgia State Financing and Investment Commission's duty and responsibility to use and apply the proceeds properly and legally.
Argued June 25, 1974
Decided July 25, 1974.
Brent, Castellani & Smith, Robert J. Castellani, for appellant.
Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General, Lauren O. Buckland, Assistant Attorney General, Lewis R. Slaton, District Attorney, King & Spalding, Pope B. Mclntire, Robert L. Steed, Gambrell & Mobley, John H. Mobley, II, for appellees.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except Hall, J., who concurs specially in Division IV.