Case Name: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Oscar CERDA, Defendant-Appellee
Court: Colorado Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Colorado
Decision Date: 1991-11-12
Citations: 819 P.2d 502
Docket Number: No. 91SA205
Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Oscar CERDA, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: YOLLACK, J., dissents and ROVIRA, C.J., joins in the dissent.
Reporter: Pacific Reporter 2d
Volume: 819
Pages: 502–507

Head Matter:
The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Oscar CERDA, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 91SA205.
Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.
Nov. 12, 1991.
A.M. Dominguez, Jr., Dist. Atty., R. Victoria Beyerinck, Deputy Dist. Atty., Greeley, for plaintiff-appellant.
David F. Vela, State Public Defender, Bryan D. Shaha, Deputy State Public Defender, Greeley, for defendant-appellee.

Opinion:
Justice ERICKSON
delivered the Opinion of the Court.
This interlocutory appeal by the prosecution, pursuant to C.A.R. 4.1, challenges the trial court's order granting the defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained from a traffic stop. The trial court held that there was no legitimate reason for the stop and the evidence obtained as a result of the stop should be suppressed. We affirm.
The prosecution contends the stop was permissible under section 16-3-103(1), 8A C.R.S. (1986), which provides:
A peace officer may stop any person who he reasonably suspects is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime and may require him to give his name and address, identification if available, and an explanation of his actions. The stopping shall not constitute an arrest.
(Emphasis added.) This section codified this court's holding in Stone v. People, 174 Colo. 504, 485 P.2d 495 (1971), that "[i]n order to detain an individual for questioning . the officer must have a reasonable suspicion that the individual has committed, or is about to commit, a crime." Stone, 174 Colo, at 509, 485 P.2d at 497; see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1967).
The prosecution claims that the officer saw Cerda operating an automobile with a cracked windshield in violation of section 42-4-201(4), 17 C.R.S. (1984 & 1991 Supp.). That section prohibits the operation of a vehicle "upon any highway unless the driver's vision through any required glass equipment is normal and unobstructed." The officer stopped Cerda and requested his driver's license. Cerda told the officer that his license had been suspended. After verifying the suspension, Cerda was arrested and charged with driving after his operator's license was revoked pursuant to the habitual traffic offender statute, section 42-2-203, 17 C.R.S. (1984).
Cerda moved to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the stop, contending that the officer did not have the reasonable suspicion required by section 16-3-103(1). The trial court granted Cerda's motion after hearing the officer's testimony and concluding that it was "very nebulous and unclear as to the type of crack [and] the location of the crack." The court found that although the officer observed a crack in Cerda's windshield, the officer conceded that it did not warrant a ticket. The court stated there was no testimony that the crack obscured the driver's vision. The court held that once Cerda was stopped, the officer "had no right to go on further with . questioning or any other contact" since there was no reasonable suspicion to support the stop.
In a supplemental ruling, the trial court elaborated on its findings. The court stated that, based on the evidence presented, it could not conclude why the stop was made. However, noting that the officer could not recall the severity or position of the crack and took no further actions regarding the crack, the court concluded that the stop was not made due to a crack in the windshield. Since no other legitimate reason was given, the court inferred there was no legitimate reason for the stop.
The trial court's findings are supported by the record. "It is not our function to redetermine factual issues even where, on the cold transcript of the record, we might have reached a conclusion different from that reached by the trial court." People v. Parks, 195 Colo. 344, 349, 579 P.2d 76, 79 (1978); see, e.g., People v. Corley, 698 P.2d 1336 (Colo.1985).
The prosecution also contends that People v. Clements, 665 P.2d 624 (Colo.1983), supports the conclusion that the stop was proper. We disagree. In Clements an officer testified that he stopped the defendant for having an illegible license plate in violation of section 42-3-113(2), 17 C.R.S. (1973). We concluded that the stop was proper even though the officer determined when he approached the vehicle that the license was valid.
The relevant facts in Clements are entirely different from those before us. Although the officer determined Clements' license was valid, he had a legitimate reason for the stop because Clements violated section 42-3-113(2), 17 C.R.S. (1973). Here, the trial court held that Cerda was not in violation of section 42-4-201, 17 C.R.S. (1984 & 1991 Supp.), and that the stop was not supported by a reasonable suspicion of a violation of the statute. Since the officer did not reasonably suspect that Cerda was committing, had committed, or was about to commit a crime, the stop was not permissible under section 16-3-103(1), 8A C.R.S. (1986). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order suppressing the evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop.
YOLLACK, J., dissents and ROVIRA, C.J., joins in the dissent.
. Section 42-2-113(1), 17 C.R.S. (1991 Supp.), requiring the exhibition of a driver's license provides:
No person who has been issued a driver's . license . or [a Colorado] identification card . who operates a motor vehicle in this state and who has such license . or identification card in such person's immediate possession shall refuse to . hand the same to any peace officer who has requested such person to do so if such peace officer reasonably suspects that such person is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a violation of article 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, or 8 of this [Vehicles and Traffic] title.
. Section 42-3-113(2), 17 C.R.S. (1973), provided:
Every number plate shall at all times be securely fastened to the vehicle to which it is assigned, . in a place and a position to be clearly visible, and shall be maintained free from foreign materials and in a condition to be clearly legible.
. We said in Clements:
Although [the officer] testified that he was able to determine that the plate was valid, that does not change the fact that it was illegible. The police officer had probable cause to stop and issue a summons to the defendant when he observed that the plate was not readable.
665 P.2d at 625 (emphasis added).