Case Name: Harry K. SINGLETARY, Jr., Appellant, v. Edward J. WHITTAKER, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1999-07-23
Citations: 739 So. 2d 1183
Docket Number: No. 97-128
Parties: Harry K. SINGLETARY, Jr., Appellant, v. Edward J. WHITTAKER, Appellee.
Judges: ANTOON, C.J., W. SHARP, and PETERSON, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 739
Pages: 1183–1188

Head Matter:
Harry K. SINGLETARY, Jr., Appellant, v. Edward J. WHITTAKER, Appellee.
No. 97-128.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
July 23, 1999.
Susan A. Maher, Deputy General Counsel, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Edward J. Whittaker, St. Petersburg, Pro se.

Opinion:
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING EN BANC
HARRIS, J.
We grant rehearing en banc, withdraw our previous opinion, and substitute the following:
Whittaker was originally sentenced for aggravated child abuse to a "true split sentence" of fifteen years — seven years incarceration to be followed by eight years probation. His criminal act was committed in 1990, which means that, pursuant to section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes (1989), any gain time earned by Whittaker during the serving of his sentence would be subject to forfeiture if, among other conditions, he later violated probation.
After spending approximately two-and-one-half years in prison (and after being awarded 1,368 days of conditional gain time), Whittaker was credited with serving the seven years of incarceration and released on probation. Sometime later, he violated probation, pled guilty to such violation, and was "resentenced" to an additional term of 638 days incarceration (five years less credit for all previous periods of actual incarceration either in prison or jail). Both the original true split sentence and the probation revocation "sentence" occurred outside our district.
The sentencing court at probation revocation refused to credit Whittaker's previously awarded conditional gain time against his new commitment to prison. It was not required to do so. In the context of a true split sentence, the court should award neither actual prison time nor gain time against an extension of incarceration imposed because of a violation of the probationary portion of the sentence. Although the supreme court held in State v. Green, 547 So.2d 925, 926 (Fla.1989), a case involving a probationary split sentence and not a true split sentence, that earned gain time was the functional equivalent of time spent in prison and could not be forfeited upon violation of probation, it was because "[tjhere is no statutory authority . for forfeiture of gain-time upon revocation of probation." Even though Green is inapplicable when the issue is merely extending the incarceration portion of a true split sentence, we note that the legislature changed the law immediately after Green in order to permit such forfeiture.
Upon Whittaker's return to prison (now within our district), the Department forfeited the 1,368 days previously awarded during the original seven-year sentence. The trial court herein granted Whittaker's petition for mandamus and required the Department to restore his gain time. The mandamus court reasoned that since Whit-taker had not been credited with the previously awarded gain time in the newly imposed five-year term of incarceration, there was nothing for the Department to forfeit. But this misses the point. Even though the court did not award the gain time a second time, as the court would have done had it credited the gain time also against the new extended term of incarceration, the fact remains that Whit-taker received conditional gain time during his initial sentence which permitted his early release and then violated the conditions for retaining the award. It is the 1,368 days Whittaker received during his first commitment that the DOC is forfeiting. Although Wliittaker will have to spend additional time in prison to fulfill the sentence imposed by the first court before starting his "new" sentence, DOC's action does not affect the extended term of incarceration imposed because of the violation. And DOC's action is authorized by section 944.28(1). The supreme court in Forbes v. Singletary, 684 So.2d 173, 174 (Fla.1996), held:
Thus, for defendants who committed their offenses between October 1, 1989, and December 31, 1993 [as ours did], DOC, like the sentencing judge, has the discretion to forfeit credit for prior gain time upon revocation of probation.
Hence, it appears that while both or either the court or DOC may forfeit prior gain time, neither may countermand the forfeiture ordered by the other. The simple fact is that Whittaker failed to meet the terms of his conditional gain time and must now suffer the consequence by serving such time in prison. It is only logical, and not a violation of some right, that such additional incarceration caused by the forfeiture will add to the prison time contemplated by the newly entered term of incarceration. It fulfills the legislative policy of using conditional gain time, not only to encourage good behavior in prison, but also to provide an incentive to follow the rules of probation and to reduce recidivism.
REVERSED.
ANTOON, C.J., W. SHARP, and PETERSON, JJ., concur.
COBB, J., concurs and concurs specially, with opinion.
DAUKSCH, J., concurs specially, with opinion.
GRIFFIN, J., dissents with opinion with which GOSHORN, and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.
. As indicated in Judge Cobb's concurring opinion, this was a negotiated upward depar-lure sentence.
. If it had done so, the court would have wound up owing Whittaker some 730 days.