Case Name: BRADY v. PERE MARQUETTE RAILWAY CO.
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1929-12-03
Citations: 248 Mich. 406
Docket Number: Docket No. 111, Calendar No. 33,510
Parties: BRADY v. PERE MARQUETTE RAILWAY CO.
Judges: North, C. J., and Fead, Butzel, and Sharpe, JJ., concurred with Wiest, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 248
Pages: 406–410

Head Matter:
BRADY v. PERE MARQUETTE RAILWAY CO.
Railroad s: — N egligence — Imputable N egligence — Contributory
Negligence — Directed Verdict.
Driver of automobile with, view, when 15 feet a.way, of 700 feet down track in direction from, which train was approaching crossing, who drove onto track, with result that automobile was struck and wife, who was riding with him, was injured, was guilty of negligence as matter of law, although there was testimony that he stopped, looked, and listened, and saw no train, since, if he did not see train, he failed to see what he should.have seen; and, his negligence being imputable to wife, her right to recover is barred by contributory negligence1. McDonald and Potter; JJ., dissenting.
On credibility and effect of testimony of person injured at railroad crossing that he looked and listened, where he must have detected the train had he looked or listened, see annotation in L. R. A, 1915B, 140,
Error to Ingham; Collingwood (Charles B.), J.
Submitted June 7, 1929.
(Docket No. 111, Calendar No. 33,510.)
Decided December 3, 1929.
Case by Cleo Brady against the Pere Marquette Railway Company, a Michigan corporation, for personal injuries sustained in collision at railway crossing. From a judgment upon directed verdict for defendant, plaintiff brings error.
Affirmed.
Walter M. Nelson, for plaintiff.
W. K. Williams and J. C. Shields (Thomas, Shields & Silsbee, of counsel), for defendant.

Opinion:
Wiest, J.
The circuit judge was right in directing the verdict for defendant.
If defendant was guilty of negligence, the husband of plaintiff, driver of the automobile, was clearly guilty of contributory negligence, and, under the doctrine of imputed negligence, she cannot recover.
The driver of the ear had open to him, and says he employed, a view of 700 feet down the track over which the train came, and that he saw no train, and yet, in driving his automobile a distance of about 15 feet, the train struck him. Where such a view is open, a collision between a train and an automobile moving across a railroad track is only possible by reason of want of care on the part of the automobile driver. No testimony can refute the unquestioned physical facts, and no indulgence in arithmetical soliloquy can make it otherwise. If the driver did not see the train he f ailed to see what he should have seen, and what he should have seen and heeded, instead of what he says he did not see, governs in a lawsuit. The court still heeds physical facts, even though disputed by testimony. Molby v. Railway, 221 Mich. 419; Baader v. Railway Co., 228 Mich. 104; Molda v. Clark, 236 Mich. 277; Kun v. Railway Co., 240 Mich. 598; Kneebone v. Lake Superior District Power Co., ante, 403. In connection with what I have said it will be profitable to examine the majority opinion in Rushford-Surine v. Railway Co., 239 Mich. 19.
The judgment is affirmed, with costs to defendant.
North, C. J., and Fead, Butzel, and Sharpe, JJ., concurred with Wiest, J.