Case Name: James J. O'Dea, Appellant, v. Mary O'Dea, Respondent
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1885-12-22
Citations: 101 N.Y. 23
Docket Number: 
Parties: James J. O'Dea, Appellant, v. Mary O'Dea, Respondent.
Judges: Ruger, Oh. J., Rapallo, Andrews and Earl, JJ., concur, for reversal; Miller and Finch, JJ., concur with Danforth, J., and dissent.
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 101
Pages: 23–45

Head Matter:
James J. O'Dea, Appellant, v. Mary O'Dea, Respondent.
In July, 1844, defendant, who was then residing in Toronto, Canada, married K.,in this State and lived with him here as his wife until January, I860, when she left him and returned to Toronto, where she continued to reside until 1865. K. removed to, and became a resident of Ohio, and in 1864, after a residence there of more than a year, he commenced an action in that State for divorce on the ground that defendant had been willfully absent from him for more than three years. A copy of the petition and summons were mailed to defendant at Toronto,' and were received by her. ISotice of the filing of the petition, the purpose thereof, the time for hearing, and that depositions would be taken at Toronto at a time and place named, was duly published. Depositions were taken in pursuance of said notice, defendant being present but taking no part personally or by counsel. Ho other service was made upon defendant; the service made was, under the laws of Ohio, a legal service. A divorce was granted in 1864. By the terms of the decree, each party was “ restored to the rights and privileges of unmarried persons.” Defendant afterward married the plaintiff, and they lived together as husband and wife until 1880. Plaintiff, prior to-liis marriage, knew of defendant’s former marriage and of the divorce proceedings, bat not of the particular circumstances under which the decree of divorce was obtained. At the time of such marriage K. was and is still living in Ohio. In an action to have the marriage between the parties annulled, on the ground that defendant, at the time of such marriage, had a husband living, and that her former marriage was still in full force, held (Miller, Danforth and Finch, JJ., dissenting), that the Ohio court acquired no jurisdiction over the defendant and the decree of divorce was, as to her, inoperative and void; that, therefore, the marriage between her and plaintiff was illegal and void.
Argued October 12, 1885;
decided December 22, 1885.)
Appeal from oraer of the General Term of the Supreme Court, in the fourth judicial department, made the second Tuesday of June, 1883, which reversed a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered upon the report of a referee.
The complaint in this action alleges and it was proved that the parties intermarried in this State on the 30th day of August, 1866, and from that time until shortly before the commencement of the action in 1880, lived and cohabited together as man and wife. The husband sued to have the marriage contract declared void and the marriage annulled upon the ground that at the time it took place a former husband of the defendant was living and the marriage with him was then in full force. The defendant by answer denied all the criminatory allegations.
The referee before whom the issue was tried found upon evidence sufficient, if admissible, that in July, 1844, the defendant resided in, and always before that time had been a resident of, Toronto, Canada West, but at that date was married in Lewiston, in this State, to one K. and lived with him'as his wife until January, 1860, when 'she left him and returned to Toronto, where she continued to reside until 1865, and he removed from this State “to, and became a resident of, Cuyahoga county in the State of Ohio,” where in March, 1864, and after a residence of more than one year, he commenced an action in the Court of Common Pleas of that county, “for the purpose' of obtaining a divorce from the defendant in this action, for the reason, as stated in the petition then filed, that she had been willfully absent' from him for three years or more. That a copy of this petition and of the summons issued thereupon were on the 24th of March, 1864, sent, by mail, to the defendant at Toronto, where she then resided, and were received by her soon after, that by said summons she was required to answer in the action by the 9th day of April, 1864. That a notice of the filing of the petition, and of the purpose thereof, and that said petition would be presented for hearing at the May Term of said court of Common Pleas, and that depositions would be taken in Toronto at a time and place mentioned, were duly published in a newspaper in said Cuyahoga county. “ That on the 20th day of April, 1864, depositions in said action were taken in pursuance of said notice. That the defendant was present when such depositions were taken, but took no part personally, or by counsel, at the taking of the same. That no other service of the process or proceedings in the action was made upon the defendant than is above stated; and that such service so made was, according to the Laws of the State of Ohio, a legal service upon the defendant, but that she never in any way appeared in said action.”
It also appeared that on the 24th day of May, 1864, the Ohio court, upon the proofs, found the facts stated in the petition to be true, that the defendant was willfully absent from the petitioner without cause, for more than three years anterior to the filing of the petition, and had at all times remained so willfully absent from him, and therefore it was decreed that the marriage contract alleged in petition, and heretofore existing between the parties, be and the same was “ declared annulled, cancelled and void, and no longer binding on the parties,” and each was “restored to the rights and privileges of unmarried persons.” The referee further found that the defendant afterward married the plaintiff and lived with him as above stated. It appeared from uncóntradicted evidence that plaintiff knew the person he was about to marry had been a wife and was not a widow; that he also knew of the divorce proceeding during its pendency, and in 1864 was informed of the result, but the referee finds that “he had no knowledge of the particular manner or circumstances under which the divorce was obtained,” and that when the plaintiff and defendant married, K. was living in Ohio and is still living there.
• As conclusions of law the learned referee found that the Court “ of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga county, Ohio, never acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in the proceeding prosecuted in that court, and therefore that the decree made and entered in it was without jurisdiction and so void and of no effect.” He directed judgment in favor of the plaintiff, declaring his marriage with the defendant to be illegal and void.
George J. Greenfield, for appellant.
A suit to dissolve a marriage is a proceeding in personam and not in rem. (People v. Baker, 76 N. Y. 78; Hunt v. Hunt, 72 id. 217.) To sustain a foreign divorce, jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, not a resident of that State, must be acquired, as in any other action, by the personal service of the summons within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or by voluntary appearance. (Borden v. Fitch, 15 Johns. 12; Shumway v. Stillman , 6 Wend. 447; Bradshaw v. Heath, 13 id. 407; Vischer v. Vischer, 12 Barb. 640; McGiffert v. McGiffert, 31 id. 69, Kerr v. Kerr, 41 N. Y. 272; Hoffman v. Hoffman, 46 id. 30; Todd v. Kerr, 42 Barb. 317; Moe v. Moe, 2 T. & C. 647; Phelps v. Baker, 60 Barb. 107; People v. Baker, 76 N. Y. 78.) The alleged desertion of her husband, Kollmyer, by the defendant, occurred in this State, before Kollmyer removed to Ohio, and acquired a domicile there. Such desertion was not a valid ground of divorce in this State, and jurisdiction was not acquired by the' Ohio court. (Holmes v. Holmes, 4 Lans. 388; Moe v. Moe, 2 T. & C. 647; 3 Am. L. Reg. [N. S.] 193.) The actual notice of the Ohio suit, and the presence of the defendant at the taking of testimony in Toronto, did not confer jurisdiction on the Ohio court. (Shepard v. Wright, 60 How. 512; Holmes v. Holmes, 4 Lans. 388; Dunn v. Dunn, 4 Paige, 425; Shetzler v. Shetzler, 2 Ed. Ch. 584; Fenton v. Garlick, 8 Johns. 94; Phelps v. Baker, 60 Barb. 107; Jones v. Jones, 36 Hun, 414; Ewer v. Coffin, 1 Cush. 23; Whart. Confl. of Law, § 649 ; Confl. of Baw affecting marriage and divorce by Judge Redfield, 3 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) 210; Irby v. Wilson, 1 Dev. and Bat. Eq. 568; Prosser v. Warner, 47 Vt. 667; Reed v. Reed, 52 Mich. 117; Wetherbe v. Wetherbe, 20 Wis. 499; Lyon v. Lyon, 2 Gray, 367; Garner v. Garner, 56 Md. 127; Pennoyer v. Neff 95 U. S. 714; Price v. Hickok, 39 Vt. 292; Bischoff v. Withen, 9 Wall. 812; Flower v. Parker, 3 Mason, 251; Reel v. Elder, 62 Penn. 308; Hart v. Samson, 110 U. S. 151; Penn v. Hayward, 14 Ohio St., 302; Williams v. Wilton, 28 id. 451.) Mere acquiescence in a void decree does not render it binding on the defendant. (Holmes v. Holmes, 4 Lans. 388; Todd v. Kerr, 42 Barb. 317; Jones v. Jones, 36 Hun, 414.) Even if the Canada law should come in question, it cannot, in the absence of evidence, be presumed that it is contrary to the law of this State or the principles of natural justice. (Shepard v. Wright, 60 How. 512.) The defendant was not subject to the jurisdiction of the Ohio court. (Mellen v. Mellen, 10 Abb. N. C. 331, 333; Hunt v. Hunt, 72 N. Y. 243; Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. 108; Story's Confl. of Laws (8th ed.), 311; Dutcher v. Dutcher, 39 Wis. 651; Schonwald v. Schonwald, 2 Jones Eq. (N. C.) 367; Colvin v. Reed, 55 Penn. St. 375; Reel v. Elder, 62 id. 308; Irby v. Wilson, 1 Dev. and Bat. Eq. (N. C.) 568; Briggs v. Briggs, L. R., 5 P. D. 163; Harvey v. Farnie, 6 id. 35; Pitt v. Pitt, 4 Macq. 640.) The plaintiff has a standing in court, and is not estopped by reason of his knowledge of the divorce decree. (Kinnier v. Kinnier, 45 N. Y. 543; Singer v. Singer, 41 Barb. 139; Wilmon v. Flack, 96 N. Y. 520; Thorp v. Thorp, 90 N. Y. 602; Smith v. Smith, 79 Mass. 210; Holmes v. Holmes, 4 Lans. 392; Todd v. Kerr, 42 Barb. 317; Collins v. Collins, 80 N. Y. 1; Mann v. Mann, 75 id. 614.)
De Lancey Crittenden for respondent.
As a basis for relief the plaintiff in an action to annul a marriage, upon the ground that the former husband was living, must establish the fact that the former marriage was in force at the time of the commencement of his action. (Code of Civ. Pro., § 1743 ; Roberts v. O. & L. C. R. R. Co., 34 Hun, 324; Moore v. Hegeman, 92 N. Y. 521.) The court in Ohio, or in this State, were Kollmyer to seek relief, would not permit him to question that divorce. (Kinnier v. Kinnier, 45 N. Y. 535; Nichols v. Nichols, 25 N. J. Eq. 60; Elliott v. Wohlfrom, 6 So. Law Rev. [N. S.] 618.) Were Kollmyer to die during the defendant’s life, the courts would not listen to a claim that she held the status of widowhood. (Whitsell v. Mills, 6 Ind. 229; Claim of Burr, 11 Opin. Att'y-Gen'l, 1; William's Appeal, 92 Penn. St. 69; In re Ensign, 32 Alb. L. J. 262; Moore v. Hegeman, 92 N. Y. 522; Roth v. Roth, 104 Ill. 48.) Upon the granting of the decree respondent had no former husband living, and at the time of her marriage in this .State she was not a wife of her former husband, for dower or distribution, in his real or personal property. (2 Bish. on Mar. and Div. § 705; 2 id. [6th ed.], §§ 165, 166, 167; People v. Baker, 76 N. Y. 78.) Full jurisdiction in the Ohio court was conferred over both parties to that action. (Hunt v. Hunt, 72 N. Y. 242; Kinnier v. Kinnier, 45 id. 540; Lange v. Benedict, 73 id. 26; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 727; Williams v. Armroyd, 7 Cranch, 423; Whar. Confl. of Laws, §§ 236, 237.) Respondent had no election to treat “ at her pleasure ” the judicial decree, as legal or illegal, as her feelings or interests should dictate. Status of the parties was controlled by the law of the Nation or State in which the domicile had been gained. (People v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 74 N. Y. 304; Thornton v. W. Ry. Co., 81 id. 467; Powers v. Benedict, 88 id. 609.) Full faith is to be given the decree and judicial proceedings of the State of Ohio in the action between the parties to such former marriage, wherein the defendant was respondent and upon which not only she but the plaintiff in that action and the appellant here have each and all relied, given full faith and credit and acted. (Swan & Critch. Stat. of Ohio, 1 R. S., chap. 37, 509, 510, 511, §§ 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8,15; note 2, § 3, 511.) That State had supreme and unlimited control over the status of its citizen, and the marital relation, as it affects the citizen, forms part of his status. (Strader v. Graham, 10 How. [U. S.] 82; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. ,714; Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. 108.) To banish the idea of secrecy and fraud, notice of some character is required. (People v. T. H. Car Co., 87 N. Y. 140.) Abstruse definition is not required as to what constitutes “ actual notice,” respondent’s receipt of the process having been a fact, and actual notice given to and served upon her, she being the sole defendant and the only person to be affected by it. (Williamson v. Brown, 15 N. Y. 354; Parker Mills v. Jacot, 8 Bosw. 175.) The respondent’s status and matrimonial relation pendente lite and upon the entry of the decree dissolving her marriage was not that of a citizen of the State of New York, nor was it sought to affect the rein there. (Ennis v. Smith, 14 How. [U. S.] 400; Roth v. Roth, 104 Ill. 46; Hunt v. Hunt, 72 N. Y. 217; Kinnier v. Kinnier, 45 id. 535; Williams v. Armroyd, 7 Cranch, 423; Roth v. Ehman, 104 Ill. 35; Story’s Confl. of Laws, §§ 223-4, 228, 230; Whar. Confl. of Laws, § 211; Bish. on Mar. & Div. [5th rev. ed.] 113, 113a, 162, 164.) All the matters involved in the Ohio action are res adjudicata. (Kamp v. Kamp, 59 N. Y. 215.) This marriage of respondent and appellant is neither contra bonos mores, nor in any manner void at law or upon application of equities or good conscience. (Singer v. Singer, 41 Barb. 139; Nichols v. Nichols, 25 N. J. Eq. 60.) By reason of his loches creating estoppel, the conclusive judgment dissolving the former marriage, unaffected by any act of either party to that action, plaintiff" cannot recover. (Kinnier v. Kinnier, 45 N. Y. 535; Simmons v. Simmons, 37 Hun, 551; Hynes v. McDermott, 91 N. Y. 451; 20 Weekly Dig. 522.)

Opinion:
Per Gariam.
We think the case of People v. Baker (76 N. Y. 78), is conclusive on the question brought up by this appeal, viz.: Whether the court in the State of Ohio had jurisdiction to try the issue raised by the petition of K., as between him and his wife, she then being a non-resident of Ohio, and never a resident of that State, nor at any time there served with process of the court. There are some differences in the detail of the circumstances of the two cases, but we think not enough to lead to any change in the result, nor sufficient to require a reconsideration of the law affecting it. The Baker Case was of great importance, involving, as it did, the liberty of a citizen; it was most fully argued, and we do not perceive that the discussion in the case at bar has developed any new principle, or brought to light any authority which was not then weighed by us. We do not think the question can be more fully investigated. Concerning the result there was, it is true, a dissent by the late learned chief judge, and the opinion recognized the fact that in other States, judgments contrary to the authorities followed in this State liad been rendered. This conflict of opinion, however much to be regretted, continues, and it yet remains for some ultimate authority to relieve the point from the difficulties now attending it, and determine the civil rights of parties whose relations, as legally defined by different State tribunals, are liable to be regarded on one side of the State line as matrimonial, and on the other side as meretricious. Adhering, however, to the rule established in this State, a majoj'ity of the court are of opinion that the order appealed from should be reversed and the judgment of the Special Term affirmed, but without costs.