Case Name: Angelina V. Burnham, Administratrix, vs. New York, Providence & Boston Railroad Company
Court: Supreme Court of Rhode Island
Jurisdiction: Rhode Island
Decision Date: 1894-03-01
Citations: 18 R.I. 494
Docket Number: 
Parties: Angelina V. Burnham, Administratrix, vs. New York, Providence & Boston Railroad Company.
Judges: 
Reporter: Rhode Island Reports
Volume: 18
Pages: 494–498

Head Matter:
Angelina V. Burnham, Administratrix, vs. New York, Providence & Boston Railroad Company.
Three trials of an action against a railroad company for causing the death of a person through its negligence, resulted in a verdict for the plaintifE at each trial. The court set aside the verdict and grant a new trial for the third time for the same reason that the verdicts rendered at the first two trials were set aside, the testimony given at the third trial being essentially the same as that given at the former trials, and showing that the plaintiff’s intestate was guilty of contributory negligence.
Defendants’ petition for a new trial.
This was an action of trespass on the case for negligence causing the death of G-eorge K. Burnham, the plaintiff’s intestate. On the evening of November 30, 1889, a switching engine belonging to the defendant company was run on to a track over which one of the trains of the Old Colony Railroad Company known as the “steamboat train” was about to pass. The steamboat train, on which Burnham was the engineer, ran into the switching engine and Burnham was killed.
The cause has been tried three times. The first trial resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff for $7,500. A new trial was granted for reasons appearing in the report of the case in 17 E. I. 544. At the second trial the plaintiff recovered a verdict for $8,000, which was also set aside at the October Term of the Supreme Court,. A. D. 1892. The rescript which the court then handed down is printed in a note. The third trial resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff for $11,000, whereupon the defendant petitioned for a new trial.
March 1, 1894.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
We do not see that the testimony in relation to the material points involved in this case is essentially different from that given at the two former trials, the verdicts in which were set aside as against the evidence. Our rescript in Exceptions, &c., No. 1770, sets forth clearly the grounds for setting aside the previous verdict, and is equally applicable to the present petition.
In addition to what is therein stated, we may say, that in our opinion the evidence shows that if the plaintiff's intestate had been looking, he could have seen the head light on the switcher before him in season to have stopped his train before the collision.
Defendants' petition for a new trial granted and case remitted to the Common Pleas Division.
Providence Sc. Supreme Court,
October Term, 1892.
RESCRIPT.
Filed December 8, 1898.
The contention of the plaintiff is that the accident was caused by the employees of the defendant corporation, who, she says, ran the switching engine upon the southward bound track directly in front of the steamboat train, on which the plaintiff's intestate was engineer, at a time when it was too late for the intestate to stop his train before it struck the switcher.
The defendant contends that the southward bound switch was turned and the signal light changed from green to red before the steamboat train came around the curve and in sight of the signal light. If this is so, the plaintiff's intestate was guilty of negligence in not noticing the red light, or in not heeding it, and the plaintiff cannot maintain her verdict.
All the direct testimony in the case upon this point concurs in the statement that when the reel signal was first shown the steamboat train had not come in sight. There is also, we think, a strong preponderance oí testimony to the effect that a red light was swung across the track in season to have prevented the collision if the engineer had seen and heeded it. The probability that the three men on and about the switching engine, all of whom had in mind the approach of the steamboat train, should have recklessly run their engine upon the southbound track after the steamboat train came in sight, is much less than that the engineer should have neglected to look for the signal at No. 8.
Again, the testimony is uncontradicted that the signal light was turned with the switch before the switcher started to leave the northbound track, and that the switcher had time before the collision to move slowly from one track to the other and down to the switch leading from the southbound track to track No. 1. When the switching engine commenced this movement the steamboat train must have been far enough off to have stopped in time to prevent the collision.
The theory advanced by the plaintiff is only supported by inference from disputed testimony, is contrary to all the probabilities of the case, and is impossible if the uncontradicted testimony is true.
Defendants' petition for now trial granted.
Tillinghast, J., dissenting.