Case Name: WESTERN & ATLANTIC RAILROAD CO. v. ATKINS
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1914-05-19
Citations: 141 Ga. 743
Docket Number: 
Parties: WESTERN & ATLANTIC RAILROAD CO. v. ATKINS.
Judges: All the Justices concur.
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 141
Pages: 743–747

Head Matter:
WESTERN & ATLANTIC RAILROAD CO. v. ATKINS.
'1. Where an action was brought to recover damages for a personal injury, C and the defendant pleaded a written release, based on a valuable consideration, as being an accord and satisfaction, the plaintiff could amend his petition, by adding allegations to the effect that the release was procured by fraud and should be set aside and not prevent a 'recovery on the original cause of action, and that’ the amount received by the plaintiff had been tendered to the defendant before the suit was brought.
(a) The allegations of the plaintiff’s amendments on the subject of fraud , were not open to objection on the ground that they were not sufficient to authorize the avoidance of the release.
2. If an injured person, who has been induced by fraud to sign a release . of all claim for damages and to receive a sum of money therefor, desires to avoid the release and sue on the original cause of action, he must tender back the consideration received by him.
3. Where a person who was injured by a railroad-train settled his claim ", for damages, signing a written release and receiving a sum of money, . if he afterward sought to avoid the release on the ground that it was procured by fraud, it was not a sufficient tender of the consideration to tender it to a local agent of the railroad company having charge of an office or offices in the county where the injury occurred, but who had nothing to do with settling damage claims against the company and no-authority to- accept the tender.
(a) An offer by counsel for the plaintiff, during the trial of a suit brought ' to recover damages for the injury, to pay the amount received by the plaintiff for the release to the local counsel for the defendant trying the case, but having nothing to do with the settlement of claims for damages- prior to suit, and no authority to accept the .tender, was npt sufficient to cure -the failure to make, a proper tender.
May 19, 1914.
Rehearing denied June 16, 1914.
Action, for damages. Before Judge Patterson. Cobb superior court. May 7, 1913.
Cam Atkins brought suit against the Western and Atlantic Bail-road Company, to recover for an injury to himself, resulting from a collision with a train. The defendant pleaded accord and satisfaction, setting up a written release from the plaintiff for all the damages arising from the occurrence in question, in consideration of fifty dollars. The plaintiff amended his petition by attacking the release as having been procured by fraud, and alleging that upon the discovery of the fraud he had immediately tendered to the defendant, before bringing suit, the amount paid to him. The defendant objected to the two amendments on that subject which the plaintiff offered, on the ground that they sought to set up a new cause of action, and also that they were insufficient to authorize the setting aside of the contract of release. The objections were overruled and the amendments allowed. The jury found for the plaintiff. The defendant moved for a new trial, which was refused, and it excepted.
D. W. Blair, for plaintiff in error.
George F. Gober and Charles H. Griffin, contra.

Opinion:
Lumpkin, J.
(After stating the foregoing facts.)
In jurisdictions where the distinction between courts of law and courts of equity has been abolished, it is generally held that in an action for damages, where a release has been procured by fraud, relief may be had in the same proceeding, by incorporating in the petition a count to set aside the release. 6 Thompson on Corporations (2d ed.), § 7380. In this State the code declares, that, on the trial of any civil case, the superior courts shall give effect to all the rights of the parties, legal or equitable or both, and apply such remedy or give such relief as the nature of the case may allow or require. Civil Code (1910), § 5406, 5407. The plaintiff having sued for damages, and the defendant having pleaded a release, based upon a consideration, as an accord and satisfaction, it was competent for the plaintiff to amend his petition by alleging that the release was procured by fraud. Southern Railway Co. v. Nichols, 135 Ga. 11 (68 S. E. 789). The amendments made were not subject to the objection that they were not sufficient to authorize the avoidance of the release.
There is some conflict among the authorities as to whether •an injured person, who receives money or property as a consideration for a release of liability, is bound to tender it back, if he seeks to obtain relief against the release. 3 Elliott on Railroads (2d ed.), § 1377. In this State the decisions take position with that class •of authorities which holds that, in order to obtain a rescission of the •contract of release and recover upon the original cause of action, restoration or tender of the amount paid for the release is necessary. Harley v. Riverside Mills, 129 Ga. 214, 216 (58 S. E. 711), and citations.
The tender must generally be made to the releasee who made the payment, or to some person having authority to receive the tender for him. 38 Cyc. 156, 157; Civil Code (1910), § 1910. In this ease the settlement was' made with the injured person, prior to the bringing of the action, by an employee of the railroad company who testified that he was its "law agent." The plaintiff's attorney testified that on the day after the making of the release, when he'learned of it, he obtained from the plaintiff the fifty dollars which had been paid to him, and tendered it to the agent of the railroad company who had charge of the- office at Marietta, in Cobb county, and also of the small office in the same county near the scene of the injury. He testified that the agent had charge of the selling of tickets from Marietta, and of shipments to and from that place, having general supervision oyer it. It was also stated in the brief of evidence that during the trial counsel for the plaintiff tendered to counsel for the defendant the same amount, and that the latter refused to receive it, on the ground that he had no right to do so. The law agent who made the settlement with the plaintiff testified that the agent at Marietta was a local agent, having nothing to do with settling claims against the company, and that the witness could not say whether the same agent was in charge of the other small station mentioned. He further testified that the local attorney had nothing to do with settling damage claims against the company, hut that all such claims were passed upon by another •named attorney. This was substantially the evidence in the case on that subject. From this it will appear that the tender made before the suit was filed was made to an agent without authority to 'receive it. It was not made to the company, or to the agent who effected a settlement and paid the money (as in Southern Railway Co. v. Nichols, 135 Ga., supra), or to any one shown to have had authority. . The offer to refund, made pending the trial, was not equivalent to a tender before making an effort to rescind the release; and it appears to have been made to local counsel who had no authority to receive it.
As the release, so long as it stands, operates as an accord and satisfaction and furnishes a complete answer to the plaintiff's action, .and as no tender was shown which would authorize the release to be set aside, if otherwise it could be done, it follows that the verdict, disregarding the release and finding a specified sum for the plaintiff, was contrary to law and the evidence. This ruling renders it unnecessary to discuss the other grounds of the motion for a new trial.
Judgment reversed.
All the Justices concur.