Case Name: MARY QUAIN, Appellant, v. MOSES RUSSELL and MORTIMER RUSSELL, Respondents
Court: New York Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1876-09
Citations: 15 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 319
Docket Number: 
Parties: MARY QUAIN, Appellant, v. MOSES RUSSELL and MORTIMER RUSSELL, Respondents.
Judges: Present — LeabNed, P. J., JBoabdmajbt and Booees, JJ.
Reporter: Supreme Court Reports (Hun)
Volume: 15
Pages: 319–322

Head Matter:
MARY QUAIN, Appellant, v. MOSES RUSSELL and MORTIMER RUSSELL, Respondents.
Oiml damage act— Oluvp. 646 of 1878 — when cause of action exists under.
It is not essential to the existence of a cause of action, under chapter 646 of 1873, against the vendor of liquors, that an action should also be maintainable against the intoxicated person; it is sufficient if Ihe wife has been injured in her means of support through the intoxication of the husband.
MotioN for new trial by plaintiff, after a dismissal of the complaint at the Circuit, upon the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The exceptions were ordered heard in the first instance at the General Term.
This action was brought to recover damages, under and by virtue of the provisions of chapter 646 of the Laws of 1873, entitled “An act to suppress intemperance, pauperism and crime,” commonly known as the “ civil damage act. ” The complaint showed that the plaintiff was the wife of James Quain, and was his wife, and was living with him as his wife and depending on him for her support at the times of the injuries complained of. The defendant Moses Russell was a .hotel-keeper, and rented and kept a building for the purpose of keeping a hotel and selling liquor therein. The defendant Mortimer Russell was the owner of such building, and rented the same to the defendant Moses Russell for the purpose of a hotel, and had knowledge of the sale of intoxicating liquors therein. The defendant Moses Russell sold and delivered intoxicating liquors to said James Quain, the plaintiff’s said husband, in said building. The said James Quain drank the said liquors in said building, and became intoxicated, and spent his money upon which the plaintiff relied for her support, and by reason of his intoxication the plaintiff was iuj ured in her means of support.
Burke & Kilburn, fo the plaintiff.
Albert Hobbs, for the defendants.
See ante, p. 151, note. — [Rep.

Opinion:
BoaedmaN, J.:
If the complaint were technically defective the more appropriate treatment would have been to have moved to make it more definite and certain, or to have allowed an amendment of course upon the trial. When the defendant answers, he impliedly admits the sufficiency of the complaint as to mere matters of form, and when the issues come down to trial before the jury, objections to the sufficiency in mere matters of form will be regarded with slight favor. But upon authority I think the complaint in the case was sufficient. (Peterson v. Knoble, 35 Wis., 80; Schneider v. Hosier, 21 Ohio, 98.)
I suspect, however, that the complaint was dismissed upon the broad ground that no right of action can exist against the vendor of liquors except in cases where it would also lie against the intoxicated person. The learned judge was inevitably led to such decision by the unfortunate manner in which Hayes v. Phelan, owing to an omission in the list of decisions sent to the reporter, was reported in 4 Hun, 733. As that report is corrected in 5 Hun, 335, it will be seen that no such principle was adopted by the court. Apart from such error, there appears to be no such doctrine sanctioned by authority. In Baker v. Pope (5 S. C. R., 102), the contrary view is taken, though it is obiter. In the leading case of Schneider v. Hosier (supra), it is distinctly held that the loss of means of support by the wife, through the intoxication of the husband, gives to the wife a cause of action against the vendor of the liquor. The exercise of legislative power in such respects is very ably considered by Dixon, C. J., in State ex rel. Henshall v. Luddington (33 Wis., 107).
Although a new trial was granted the defendant in Dubois v. Miller (5 Hun, 332), it was not suggested that a cause of action founded on loss of support could not be sustained. The precise question has not, I think, been decided by any General Term in this State unless in Jackson v. Brookins (5 Hun, 530). But I think I am justified by the language of the statute, and the decisions and opinions of judges and courts in this State and other States, in holding that a cause of action was stated in the complaint.
It follows that the dismissal of such complaint was error, and a new trial should be granted, with costs to abide the event.