Case Name: Adelaide Wall, Appellant, v. International Railway Company, Respondent
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1921-03-09
Citations: 195 A.D. 685
Docket Number: 
Parties: Adelaide Wall, Appellant, v. International Railway Company, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 195
Pages: 685–693

Head Matter:
Adelaide Wall, Appellant, v. International Railway Company, Respondent.
Fourth Department,
March 9, 1921.
Street railways — duty of alighting passenger passing to rear of car injured by oncoming car on another track — when guilty of contributory negligence as matter of law.
A passenger alighting from a street ear and passing around the end thereof towards another track upon which a ear may be approaching from an opposite direction must be satisfied that the way is clear before passing into the danger zone.
The mere fact that such passenger did not actually get upon or within the rails of the other track before she was injured by a car coming from an opposite direction, may not be invoked to exonerate her from the charge of being guilty of contributory negligence as matter of law under the circumstances of this case, since she actually got into the path of the oncoming car.
Kbtjse P. J., and Davis, J., dissent, with opinions.
Appeal by the plaintiff, Adelaide Wall, from a judgment of the Supreme Court, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Erie on the 29th day of October, 1919, dismissing the complaint at the close of the plaintiff’s case.
Charles W. Strong, for the appellant.
James C. Sweeney, for the respondent.

Opinion:
Lambert, J.:
The full presentation of the facts of the case, in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Davis, is adequate to the application of the controlling rules of law.
It may be conceded that the proof of speed, failure of warning and violation of the ordinances was sufficient to carry the case to the jury upon the question of the defendant's negligence. The charge of contributory negligence of the plaintiff is the serious inquiry here.
It is conceded that the plaintiff, upon alighting from the car, passed to the rear thereof and into a position where she was struck by an oncoming car upon the car track.
The nonsuit wa;s granted upon the authority of Reed v. Metropolitan Street R. Co. (180 N. Y. 315) and Schasel v. International R. Co. (185 App. Div. 196; affd., 230 N. Y. 538).
The rule as laid down in the Reed case is: "A person passing behind the rear of a car and stepping onto the track where a car may be approaching from the opposite direction, is bound to satisfy himself that the way is clear."
This is but another way of stating that a person so conducting himself proceeds at his peril.
The statement quoted, as to stepping upon the far track, obviously applies to a case like this, where the plaintiff did not actually get upon or within the rails of the track, but so close as to be in the path of the approaching car, and thereby sustained injury. In other words, the mere fact that the plaintiff did not actually get upon the track may not be invoked to exonerate her from the charge of contributory negligence. She did get into the path of the car. Her conduct brought her within the reason and application of the rule enunciated in the Reed and Schasel cases cited.
The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
All concur, except Kruse, P. J., and Davis, J., who dissent, each in a separate opinion.