Case Name: Darryl MANNING and James W. Phillips, Appellants, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1984-06-21
Citations: 452 So. 2d 136
Docket Number: Nos. AW-101, AW-102
Parties: Darryl MANNING and James W. Phillips, Appellants, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: BOOTH, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 452
Pages: 136–140

Head Matter:
Darryl MANNING and James W. Phillips, Appellants, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Nos. AW-101, AW-102.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
June 21, 1984.
Rehearing Denied July 17, 1984.
Affirmed.
P. Douglas Brinkmeyer, Asst. Public Defender, for appellants.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Lawrence A. Ka-den, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Opinion:
WENTWORTH, Judge.
Appellants seek review of judgments of conviction and sentences imposed for multiple burglaries, asserting that the trial court erred in departing from the Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.701 sentencing guidelines. We find that the trial court did not err, and we affirm the orders appealed based on circumstances relating to the offenses for which appellants were convicted, without regard to contemporareous charges which were nolle prossed.
Appellants Manning and Phillips were arrested and charged with numerous burglaries which occurred over a two-day period in June 1983. Both appellants admitted their guilt and entered pleas as to some of the burglary charges, in exchange for the state's agreement to dismiss other charges. Manning pled and was adjudicated guilty of four burglaries; Phillips pled and was adjudicated guilty of three burglaries. At the sentencing hearing in November 1983 both appellants elected to be sentenced under the new sentencing guidelines which had recently been adopted by the Florida Supreme Court.
The guidelines scoresheets prepared for both appellants authorized any non-state prison sanction. At the sentencing hearing the prosecutor argued that appellants "constituted a two-man gang war." In imposing sentence, the trial judge departed from the guidelines and imposed consecutive three-year terms of imprisonment for each offense, indicating that:
. the sentencing guidelines require a disposition which would be altogether inappropriate to this case. The Court is going to go outside the guidelines for sentencing in this case. My reasons for doing so is each of you went on a crime binge and created a two-man crime wave in Baker County, which cannot go unnoticed or will not be condoned by the people of this community. I'm not going to avoid my responsibilities as the conscience of this community and put you back on the streets .
Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.701(b) states that the sentencing guidelines "are intended to eliminate unwarranted variation in the sentencing process by reducing the subjectivity in interpreting specific offense- and offender- related criteria and in defining their relative importance in the sentencing decision." And Rule 3.701(b)(3) provides that the guidelines embody the principle that "the penalty imposed should be commensurate with the severity of the convicted offense and the circumstances surrounding the offense." However, Rule 3.701(b)(6) states that:
. the sentencing guidelines are designed to aid the judge in the sentencing decision and are not intended to usurp judicial discretion .
This provision also states that departures from presumptive guideline sentences may be made for articulated clear and convincing reasons.
Rule 3.701(d)(ll) re-emphasizes that departure from the guideline range of presumptive sentences should be made only for clear and convincing reasons. This rule, as effective at the time appellants were sentenced, also provided that:
Reasons for deviating from the guidelines shall not include factors relating to either instant offense or prior arrests for which convictions have not been obtained.
Appellants contend that this provision precludes the trial court's action in the present case, arguing that "the nature of the offenses . is expressly prohibited from being used as a justification for sentencing outside the guidelines." However, both the grammatical language and the logical import of the quoted rule would appear to preclude deviation only when predicated upon factors, related to either prior arrests or the instant offense, for which conviction has not been obtained. The rule has since been amended so as to replace what the Court refers to as the "cumbersome language," and to clarify its intended effect. As amended, the rule now provides that:
Reasons for deviating from the guidelines shall not include factors relating to prior arrests without conviction. Reasons for deviating from the guidelines shall not include factors relating to the instant offenses for which convictions have not been obtained.
In the present case the trial court's expressed reason for deviating from the guidelines is supported by the temporal and geographical circumstances of the offenses for which appellants were convicted, each appellant being convicted of multiple contemporaneous offenses amply substantiating the court's reference to a "crime binge" and "two-man crime wave." Rule 3.701(d)(ll) therefore does not preclude such deviation, and the trial court did not err in so deviating for the reasons stated. The order appealed is affirmed.
BOOTH, J., concurs.
ERVIN, C.J., specially concurs with opinion.
. Because we find that the deviation from the sentencing guidelines in the present case is permissible based upon the trial court's consideration of factors attending the offenses for which appellants were convicted, we do not address appellee's further assertion that Rule 3.701(d)(ll) should not preclude consideration of charges which are dismissed pursuant to plea bargain agreements.
. See In Re Rules of Criminal Procedure, 439 So.2d 848 (Fla.1983).
. See Amendment to Rules of Criminal Procedure, 451 So.2d 824 (Fla.1984).