Case Name: Andrew J. Evans v. State of Texas
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1860-10
Citations: 25 Supp. Tex. 303
Docket Number: 
Parties: Andrew J. Evans v. State of Texas.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 25 Supp.
Pages: 303–305

Head Matter:
Andrew J. Evans v. State of Texas.
Art. 475 of the Penal Code reads as follows: “ The use of any unlawful violence upon the person of another, with intent to injure him, whatever be the means or the degree of violence used, is an assault and battery. Any attempt to commit a battery, or any threatening gesture showing in itself, or by words accompanying it, an immediate intention, coupled with an ability to commit a battery, is an assault.” (Paschal’s Dig., Art. 2137, Note 600.)
This act follows the common law upon the subject of assault and battery.
And so the 476th art. declares, “When an injury is caused by violence to the person, the intent to injure is presumed, and it rests with the person inflicting the injury to show the accident or innocent intention.” This is following the common law. (Paschal’s Dig., Art. 2138.)
And “ it is not necessary to state anything in the indictment which it is not necessary to prove.” (Code of Grim, Pro., Art. 396; Paschal’s Dig., Art. 2864, Note 721.)
The common law form may well be adopted in an indictment for an aggravated assault.
Appeal, from McLennan. The case was tried before Hon. iST. W. Battle, one of the district judges.
The defendant, Evans, was indicted for a violent assault, for that with force of arms, &e., upon the body of Grisham Lee, &c., he did make an aggravated assault, with premeditated design, and with a stick, &c., did inflict upon the said Lee great bodily injury. Evans moved to quash the. indictment, because it did not state any offense. The motion was sustained, and the indictment quashed, upon which the State appealed.
Geo. Flournoy, Attorney General, for the State.—There are three objections stated to the indictment :
1. “That it does not appear from the face of the indictment that any offense against the law was committed by this defendant.”
The indictment is not very artistically drawn, but substantially and clearly charges the offense.
Penal Code, Art. 488, O. & W. Dig., p. 519, states, that an assault becomes aggravated'“ when a serious bodily injury is inflicted upon the person assaulted.”
The grand jury seemed to have had in view the statute, and have charged the offense in almost the precise language of the statute; certainly the indictment conforms' sufficiently with the statute.
Richard Coice, for appellee.
—The ruling of the court below, sustaining the motion to quash, is correct, because the “intent to injure,” which is a necessary ingredient in the offense sought to be charged, is not alleged in the indictment. (See Arts. 475, 483 Penal Code, O. &W. Dig.; The State v. West, 10 Tex., 555; Art. 399 Code Crim. Pro., O. & W. Dig.)

Opinion:
Roberts, J.
—The objection made to the indictment is, that it does not allege that the violence was inflicted "with intent to injure" the person assaulted, or some other person. That is an element which always enters into this offense. Our Penal Code simply follows the common law upon this subject. (Penal Code, Art. 475.) It also adopts the presumption of the common law, which is, that " when an injury is caused by violence to the person, the intent to injure is presumed, and it rests with the person inflicting the injury to 'show the accident or innocent .intention." (Penal Code, Art. 476.)
"It is not necessary to state in an indictment anything which it is not necessary to prove." (Code Crim. Pro., Art. 896.)
Ko reason is perceived why an indictment for this offense, in the forms adopted and sanctioned by the common law, is not sufficient.
This indictment plainly alleges an assault and battery, substantially in accordance with the recognized precedents, and it was error to sustain the exceptions to it.
Judgment reversed, and case
Remanded.