Case Name: POYE v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1920-10-13
Citations: 230 S.W. 161
Docket Number: No. 5731
Parties: POYE v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 230
Pages: 161–163

Head Matter:
POYE v. STATE.
(No. 5731.)
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Oct. 13, 1920.
Rehearing Granted April 20, 1921.)
1. Constitutional law t&wkey;258 — Statute denouncing as crime the discharge of employé not violative of due process of law clause.
Acts 36th Leg. (1919) c. 160, § 9, making it a crime to discharge an employé because of testimony given before the industrial welfare commission, was not in violation of the due process of law clauses of Const. U. S. Amends, 5, 14, and state Const, art. 1, § 19.
2. Contracts &wkey;>!67 — Include written law.
Every contract entered into includes, as a necessary part thereof, the written law of the land.
3. Constitutional Iaw'i@=»l54(l) — Statute making it a crime to discharge employé for testimony given held not to impair obligation of contract.
Acts 36th Leg. (1919) c. 160, § 9, making it a crime to discharge an employé because of testimony given before the industrial welfare commission, did not impair the obligation of contract in violation of Const. U. S. art. 1, § 10; such statute having become a part of the contract of employment.
4. Master and servant <&wkey;11 — Legislation forbidding discharge valid.
Acts 36th Leg. (1919) c. 160, § 9, making it a crime to discharge an employé because of testimony given before the industrial welfare commission, is valid; the Legislature having the power to enact such laws for the welfare and betterment of the conditions of working men, women, and children.
5. Criminal law &wkey;> 1159 (2) — 'Verdict supported by evidence not disturbed.
A verdict is not reviewable where there is evidence to support it.
On Motion for Rehearing.
6. Criminal law <&wkey; 15 — Prosecution dismissed where criminal statute is repealed pending defendant’s motion for rehearing.
In view of Pen. Code 1911, art. 16, prosecution of employer for discharge of employé for giving testimony before the industrial welfare commission, in violation of Acts 36th Leg. (1919) c. 160, § 9, will be dismissed where, pending the employer’s motion for rehearing before the Court of Criminal Appeals, such statute was repealed by Acts Reg. Sess,. 37th Leg. Senate Bill 41.
Appeal from County Court at Law, Harris County; George Sears, Judge.
J. Poye was convicted of discharging em-ployé because' she had testified before the industrial welfare commission regarding the terms and conditions of her employment; and he appeals.
Cause dismissed.
Heidingsfelders, of Houston, for appellant. E. T. Branch, Dist. Atty., of Houston, and Alvin M. Owsley, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

Opinion:
LATTIMORE, J.
Appellant was charged by complaint and information, in the county court at law of Harris county, with having discharged from his employment one Bessie Lee, because she had testified before the industrial welfare commission regarding the terms and conditions of her employment; it being provided by section 9 of chapter 160, Acts of the Regular Session of the 36th Legislature, as follows:
"Sec. 9. Any employer who discharges, or threatens to discharge, or in any other manner discriminates against any employé because such employé has testified or is about to testify, or because such employer believes that said em-ployé may testify in any investigation or proceedings relative to the. enforcement of this act, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall upon conviction be punished by a fine of not less than ten ($10.00) dollars nor more than one hundred ($100.00) dollars, or by imprisonment in the county jail of not more than thirty days, or by both such fine and imprisonment."
A conviction was had upon the trial, and appellant's punishment was fixed at a fine of $100.
It appears that when the case was called for trial appellant presented his motion to quash the complaint, setting up therein that the law under which the prosecution was had was unconstitutional, in that it was vio-lative of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, which provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; also, that said law was repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment of our federal Constitution, which provides that no state shall make and enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the United States, nor shall'any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; that also said law was in contravention of the provisions of article 1,^ § 10, of the federal Constitution, which forfiids any state to pass any bill of attainder, or ex post facto law, or law impairing tlie obligation of contract; also, that said law was contrary to section 19, art. 1, of our state Constitution, which is substantially the same as the provisions of the federal Constitution, as above set forth.
To the trial court's action in overruling this motion, appellant reserved his exception, and the matter is here presented as error. In appellant's brief there appears neither citation of authorities to support any of the above contentions, nor argument to enlighten or convince this court of the soundness of the same.
No claim is or can be made that this law which we have quoted is ex post facto or retroactive, nor can we see anything which denies or refuses- due process of law. The only remaining ground of contention would be that in some way the said law impairs some obligation of contract. It must be borne in m'ind that every contract entered into between our citizens includes, as a necessary part thereof, the written law of the land; and that such contracts are viewed and construed as embodying not only the expressed will of the parties, but also the provisions of such laws. It must be concluded, therefore, that when appellant employed Bessie Lee he knew that she might be called to testify before the said welfare commission, and that in such event the law had written into their contract that he had no right to discharge her for giving such testimony. This, then,' being a part of the contract of employment, no ground appears for holding that a law punishing appellant for his violation of this part of said contract by discharging her impairs or changes the obligation of such contract.
We have no doubt that the passage of such laws for the welfare and betterment of the conditions of working m'en, women, and children is matter well within the province of the Legislature; and there seems to us to be nothing of difference except degree, in the exercise of such power by direct legislation for such purpose and the exercise thereof in the creation of agencies which shall investigate, aid, and assist in the accomplishment of such purpose. Eight-hour laws have been upheld. Pure food laws have been upheld. Child labor laws have been upheld, and many others which affect the character of contract which parties may make, but such laws do not impair the obligation of contracts. We are unable to agree with any of these contentions of appellant.
It is further insisted that the evidence does not support the judgment. We have carefully examined the record, and note that appellant's contention was that he did not discharge Bessie Lee at all, but that she quit of her own accord, while she testified that he discharged her for appearing and testifying before the commission. No written charge appears to have been given the jury, and no complaint is made of the charge given; and we necessarily infer that the law was correctly put before said jury. The decision of the jury against the contention of appellant would not be reviewed by us, except in the absence of evidence to support it.
Finding no error, the judgment will be affirmed.
.On Motion for Rehearing.
This case was affirmed by us at a former day and motion for rehearing was filed by the appellant, and the case is now before us upon that motion. Pending its decision the law under which this prosecution was had was repealed by the terms of Senate Bill 41, passed at the Regular Session of the 37th Legislature, becoming effective on March 30, 1921. The said act contains no saving clause, but has for its purpose and effect the entire repeal of the law creating the industrial welfare commission. In obedience to the command of article 16 of our Penal Code, which, in effect, exempts from punishment all persons who have been prosecuted for violating the terms of a law, which law has been repealed, provided the cases against such offenders are pending at the time of the repeal of such law, and if the repealing statute substitutes no other penalty, it will be our duty to grant appellant's motion for a rehearing, and to reverse and dismiss this cause; and it is so ordered. There were questions in the mind of the court as to the validity of the law in question, which are not discussed in view of the repeal of the law.
ifc^For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
<§£^>For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digestó and Indexes