Case Name: Clayton et al. v. Ellis et al.
Court: Iowa Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Iowa
Decision Date: 1879-04-23
Citations: 50 Iowa 590
Docket Number: 
Parties: Clayton et al. v. Ellis et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Iowa Reports
Volume: 50
Pages: 590–596

Head Matter:
Clayton et al. v. Ellis et al.
1. Judicial Sale: redemption. Tlie holder of an unsatisfied balance of a . judgment cannot redeem from an execution sale made under the same judgment.
2. -: -: men. Real estate which has been sold in part satisfaction of a judgment and redeemed by the judgment debtor does not become again subject in his hands to the lien of the judgment. Overruling Crosby v. Mlcader Lodge, 16 Iowa, 399,
Appeal from Dallas Circuit Court.
Wednesday, April 23.
Action in equity to compel the defendant Ellis, as sheriff of Dallas county, to execute to the plaintiffs a deed of certain land in that county. The land was sold under execution, in pursuance of a decree of foreclosure of a mortgage, and was purchased at the execution sale by the execution creditor, who has since died intestate, leaving the plaintiffs as his heirs. The time of redemption has expired, but the sheriff refuses to execute a deed. The petition shows that he refuses because of the alleged rights of one Ellen Watson, who is made defendant with him. It further shows that the property was purchased at the execution sale by the plaintiffs’ ancestor for only a part of the amount of the judgment; that Ellen Watson is the owner of the part unsatisfied; that, within the time allowed for redemption, she paid to the clerk of the court the amount bid, with interest and costs, and claims that a redemption was thereby effected by her. These facts having been set out in the petition the defendant Ellen Watson demurred to it on the ground that it showed that she had effected •a redención, and that the plaintiffs were not entitled to a .sheriff’s deed. The court overruled the demurrer. Defendants appeal.
Barcroft, Given é Drabelle and North é Woodin, for appellants.
White é Varner and Phillips, Goode & Phillips, for appellees.

Opinion:
Adams, J.
The question presented is as to whether the holder of an unsatisfied balance of a judgment can redeem from an execution sale made under the same juc|gmen^ The appellants insist that he can. Section 3103 of the Code provides that any creditor of the •defendant whose demand is a lien upon the real estate may redeem the same at any time within nine months from the day of sale. The defendant Ellen Watson is certainly a creditor of the defendant in execution, and the only question is as to whether her demand is a lien upon the real estate. If so she is entitled to redeem, otherwise not. In Tuttle v. Dewey, 44 Iowa, 306, where real property had been sold on execution and bought in by the judgment creditor for a part of the judgment, it was held that a junior incumbrancer could, within the time allowed by statute, redeem from the sale by paying the amount of the bid, and that it was not necessary for him to redeem from the judgment under which the sale was made. This seemed to be in accordance with section 3106 of the Code, which provides that the terms of redemption shall be the reimbursement of the amount paid by the then holder, added to the amount of the redemptioner's own lien. The amount paid by the holder in that case was the amount for.which the property was sold. No doubt could have arisen in relation to the junior incumbrancer's right to redeem by paying that amount, except for the claim that was made that the unsatisfied portion of the judgment remained a lien upon the land paramount to that of the incumbrancer seeking to redeem. But it was held that the lien was divested by the sale. The same rule was held in Russell v. Allen, 10 Paige, 249. It follows that an execution creditor cannot redeem from his own sale. Por the same reason an assignee of the creditor could not redeem from the sale. We are satisfied not only that such is the law, but that to allow the execution creditor to redeem would often give him an unfair advantage, and work a great detriment to the debtor.
In the first place it may be observed that the execution creditor does not need the right to redeem from his own sale. He is always in the condition to bid the fair value of the property, if it does not exceed the amount of his claim. If he bids less than the value and less than his claim, it is in view of the contingency of its not being redeemed, and the advantage resulting therefrom. To the other incumbrancers and to the execution debtor a right of redemption is given because they need it for their just protection. The sale may be made without their knowledge. If made with their-knowledge it is not made with reference to their convenience. To allow them the right to redeem, while of great importance for their protection, cannot be presumed to work an injury to any one. If, however, the execution creditor is allowed such right, it might easily result in the sacrifice of the debtor's, property. The execution creditor could never be expected to-bid more than a nominal sum, in the absence of competition. We do not deny that an advantage might sometimes result to the debtor if the execution creditor were allowed to redeem. It might be so in this case, but it is plain to see that it would ordinarily be otherwise. The rule adopted tends to secure a sale of the property at its fair value, and that constitutes the- debtor's best protection. It is the policy of the law' to afford him such protection. Hays v. Thode, 18 Iowa, 51.
Affirmed.