Case Name: ABACO FINANCE, INC v. CITY OF BIRMINGHAM
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1981-12-18
Citations: 112 Mich. App. 664
Docket Number: Docket No. 53846
Parties: ABACO FINANCE, INC v CITY OF BIRMINGHAM
Judges: Before: V. J. Brennan, P.J., and N. J. Kaufman and E. E. Borradaile, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 112
Pages: 664–669

Head Matter:
ABACO FINANCE, INC v CITY OF BIRMINGHAM
Docket No. 53846.
Submitted June 15, 1981, at Detroit.
Decided December 18, 1981
Abaco Finance, Inc., brought an action for a writ of mandamus in Oakland Circuit Court against the City of Birmingham and the Birmingham City Commission seeking to compel defendants to issue a regulated use license for operation of a pawnshop. The court, Farrell E. Roberts, J., issued the writ after finding that the city’s regulated use ordinance as applied to plaintiff bore no reasonable relationship to the public health, safety and general welfare. Defendants appeal. Held:
The writ of mandamus was correctly issued. The section of the city ordinance which the city relied upon in denying plaintiffs application for the regulated use license neither required nor permitted denial of the license under the circumstances.
Affirmed.
V. J. Brennan, P.J., dissented. He would reverse the grant of the writ of mandamus and affirm the Birmingham City Commission’s denial of plaintiffs request for a regulated use license on the basis that the trial court erred in granting the writ of mandamus without first holding an evidentiary hearing and that the ordinance in question was a proper exercise of defendant’s police power.
Opinion of the Court
1. Mandamus — Zoning — Regulated Use License.
A trial court did not err in issuing a writ of mandamus requiring the issuance of a regulated use license to operate a pawnshop where the section of the city ordinance relied upon to deny the license application neither required nor permitted denial of the license under the circumstances.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1] 82 Am Jur 2d, Zoning and Planning §§ 328, 329.
[2] 82 Am Jur 2d, Zoning and Planning § 11.
[3, 4] 82 Am Jur 2d, Zoning and Planning § 38.
[5] 73 Am Jur 2d, Statutes §§ 42, 103.
82 Am Jur 2d, Zoning and Planning §§ 11, 12.
Supreme Court’s views as to constitutionality of residential zoning restrictions. 52 L Ed 2d 863.
Dissent by V. J. Brennan, P.J.
2. Zoning — Ordinances — Legal Justification — Determination — Evidence.
The rational or legal justiñcation for a zoning ordinance depends upon whether the restriction in that ordinance has some reasonable relationship to the health, safety, or general welfare, and such a determination of legality cannot be made without a thorough examination of all the evidence.
3. Zoning — Cities — State Police Powers.
A city has the power to zone and regulate land use within its boundaries so that the inherent police powers of the state may be more effectively implemented at the local level.
4. Zoning — Ordinances — Police Power.
A zoning ordinance must have a reasonable basis, grounded in the police power, which has been defined as including protection of the safety, health, morals, prosperity, comfort, convenience and welfare of the public or any substantial part of the public.
5. Zoning — Ordinances — Presumptions — Reasonableness — Courts — Constitutional Law — Evidence.
The presumption is in favor of the validity of ordinances and, while each ordinance must stand the test of reasonableness, courts may not invalidate an ordinance unless the constitutional objections thereto are supported by competent evidence or appear on the face of the ordinance.
John D. Lazar, for plaintiff.
Beier, Howlett, McConnell, Googasian & Mc-Cann (by Jane B. Garrow), for defendants.
Before: V. J. Brennan, P.J., and N. J. Kaufman and E. E. Borradaile, JJ.
Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
Plaintiff brought this action for a writ of mandamus to compel defendants to issue a regulated use license to operate a pawnshop. The trial court issued the writ of mandamus upon a finding that defendant City of Birmingham's regulated use ordinance as applied to plaintiff bore no reasonable relationship to the public health, safety and general welfare. Defendants appeal by right. A settled statement of facts has been filed pursuant to GCR 1963, 812.2(b) as a substitute for a transcript of proceedings in the lower court, no record having been made.
Title V, Chapter 39, § 5.101(6) of the Birmingham City Code provides:
"No regulated use shall be permitted within one thousand (1,000) feet of any lot for which a Certificate of Occupancy has been issued for another regulated use >>
It appears that plaintiff was denied a regulated use license because its location would be within 1.000 feet of two establishments which were regulated uses under Title V, Chapter 39, § 5.2(2)(g) of the ordinance.
However, according to the settled statement of facts, plaintiff applied for a license on December 12, 1979, and defendants denied the application on February 4, 1980. The two existing regulated uses on which defendants rely were not issued certificates of occupancy until after plaintiffs application was denied. As noted above, the ordinance prohibited establishment of a regulated use within 1.000 feet of another lot for which a certifícate of occupancy for another regulated use has been issued. Since no certificate of occupancy had been issued at the time of plaintiffs application, § 5.101(6) of the ordinance did not require or permit denial of the license. We hold that the writ of mandamus was correctly issued.
This finding makes it unnecessary to consider the constitutional challenge raised by plaintiff and addressed by the trial court. Lisee v Secretary of State, 388 Mich 32, 40-41; 199 NW2d 188 (1972), In re Winkle, 372 Mich 292; 125 NW2d 875 (1964), app dis 379 US 645; 85 S Ct 611; 13 L Ed 2d 551 (1965).
Affirmed.