Case Name: STATE of Arizona ex rel. Carl D. HAMMOND, Mohave County Attorney, and Wade Church, the Attorney General, Petitioner, v. KINGMAN JUSTICE PRECINCT COURT OF MOHAVE COUNTY, Nathaniel "Joe" Erickson, Justice of the Peace, and Ora Gruninger, Justice of the Peace, Respondents
Court: Arizona Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arizona
Decision Date: 1960-11-09
Citations: 88 Ariz. 342
Docket Number: No. 7136
Parties: STATE of Arizona ex rel. Carl D. HAMMOND, Mohave County Attorney, and Wade Church, the Attorney General, Petitioner, v. KINGMAN JUSTICE PRECINCT COURT OF MOHAVE COUNTY, Nathaniel “Joe” Erickson, Justice of the Peace, and Ora Gruninger, Justice of the Peace, Respondents.
Judges: STRUCKMEYER, C. J., and UDALL and LESHER, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Arizona Reports
Volume: 88
Pages: 342–349

Head Matter:
356 P.2d 694
STATE of Arizona ex rel. Carl D. HAMMOND, Mohave County Attorney, and Wade Church, the Attorney General, Petitioner, v. KINGMAN JUSTICE PRECINCT COURT OF MOHAVE COUNTY, Nathaniel “Joe” Erickson, Justice of the Peace, and Ora Gruninger, Justice of the Peace, Respondents.
No. 7136.
Supreme Court of Arizona.
Nov. 9, 1960.
Rehearing Granted Dec. 20, 1960.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 10, 1961.
Carl D. Hammond, Mohave County Atty., Kingman, Wade Church, Atty. Gen., Franklin K. Gibson, and John Vanlandingham, Asst. Attys. Gen., for petitioner.
O. Ellis Everett, Kingman, for respondent.

Opinion:
BERNSTEIN, Justice.
In this original proceeding for a writ of certiorari the State of Arizona seeks to set aside an order entered by respondent Justice of the Peace. The order, which was issued by the Justice following a preliminary examination of two defendants charged with committing a felony, is as follows :
"After hearing the evidence, it appears to me that there is not sufficient cause to believe the defendants, , are guilty of the charges here. Therefore, it is the order of the Court that the case be dismissed, and that the defendants, , be and they are hereby discharged."
The State's position is that, because the evidence at the preliminary examination showed there was probable cause that the defendants committed the crime charged, the Justice of the Peace exceeded his jurisdiction in entering the above order, and that certiorari is a proper remedy to set aside the order and hold the defendants to answer.
The State does not contend that in holding the hearing and receiving evidence the Justice of the Peace failed to comply in any respect with the Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rules 16 to 37), 17 A.R.S. The order under review was proper in form and recited the finding, prescribed in Rule 32, subdivision B, that there is "not sufficient cause to believe the defendants guilty
Thus, the State seeks, in effect, to have this Court review the evidence and determine that the Justice of the Peace was wrong in finding no' probable cause. Such review is not within the scope of a writ of certiorari.
This Court has on many occasions held that certiorari tests only the jurisdiction of the tribunal whose order is under review; that is, whether the tribunal had jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter, and had power to render the particular order; not whether its conclusion was right or wrong. See A.R.S. § 12-2001; also, e. g.: Welker v. Stevens, 82 Ariz. 233, 311 P.2d 832; Hazard v. Superior Court, 82 Ariz. 211, 310 P.2d 830; Wall v. Superior Court, 53 Ariz. 344, 89 P.2d 624; City of Phoenix v. Greer, 43 Ariz. 214, 29 P.2d 1062; State ex rel. Andrews v. Superior Court, 39 Ariz. 242, 5 P.2d 192.
Here, the Justice of the Peace had jurisdiction of the defendants and the subject matter of the preliminary examination, and had the power to issue the instant order iii its precise form. It is not for this Court to act as a magistrate and conclude that the Justice of the Peace was wrong on the facts. The presumption of innocence attaching to all defendants in criminal proceedings forbids us from so weighing the evidence.
State ex rel. Mahoney v. Stevens, 79 Ariz. 298, 288 P.2d 1077, relied on by the State, is completely distinguishable from the instant case. There, the magistrate, at a preliminary examination but without hearing any evidence, dismissed a criminal complaint on the ground that the charges should have been included in a previous criminal complaint and that the State's procedure in requiring defendant to answer successive criminal prosecutions "would eventually bankrupt him," in violation "of constitutional principles and the spirit of criminal law" (79 Ariz. at page 300, 288 P.2d at page 1078). This Court held that the magistrate had no power before receiving evidence to discharge the defendant and that the ground on which the complaint against the defendant was dismissed was not authorized by the Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Court granted certiorari because the magistrate had clearly acted without jurisdiction in these respects.
In the instant case the Justice of the Peace, acting as magistrate, held a hearing as required and entered an order on a ground authorized by law. His jurisdiction to do so is clear. That he may have been wrong may not be questioned by certiorari.
The State urges that certiorari is appropriate because an appeal does not lie from the orders here under review. We agree that under A.R.S. § 13-1712 the State may not appeal from an order of the magistrate dismissing a complaint for lack of "sufficient cause." That does not mean, however, that the State may obtain by certiorari the same relief to which it might be entitled if an appeal were permitted by statute. A.R.S. § 13-1712 forecloses review of evidence in a criminal proceeding at the instance of the State. Certiorari is designed not to circumvent that policy but to insure that inferior tribunals do not exceed the limits of their jurisdiction.
The State is not without remedy, however. As was stated in State v. McCombs, 164 Kan. 334, 188 P.2d 922, 924:
"[Counsel for the state] suggest that if the state were barred from further prosecution of a particular offense by an order of a city court or justice of the peace discharging a defendant on a preliminary hearing there could be no effective review of rulings of such magistrate no matter how capricious or erroneous they might be. The suggestion is more plausible than sound. In the first place it overlooks the settled law of this state, to which we have heretofore referred, that discharge by a magistrate is not a bar to another preliminary examination. The state has supplied itself with many magistrates . Out of all of these we rather imagine it would not be too difficult to find some magistrate who would lend a responsive ear in any case where the state seeks to bind over a person charged by a complaint with the commission of a crime if the facts or the law warrant its position. Next such suggestion entirely ignores the fact that matters are only appeal-able to this court when authorized by statute."
The writ of certiorari heretofore issued is ordered quashed.
STRUCKMEYER, C. J., and UDALL and LESHER, JJ., concur.