Case Name: PEOPLE v. WALKER
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1977-10-24
Citations: 401 Mich. 572
Docket Number: Docket No. 57611
Parties: PEOPLE v WALKER
Judges: Williams, Coleman, Ryan, and Blair Moody, Jr., JJ., concurred with Fitzgerald, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 401
Pages: 572–606

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v WALKER
Docket No. 57611.
Argued May 4, 1977
(Calendar No. 2).
Decided October 24, 1977.
Ulysses Walker was convicted by a jury in Berrien Circuit Court, William S. White, J., of possession of heroin. The defendant was arrested by police who were acting on an anonymous telephone tip that he would be making a trip along a certain route to pick up drugs in one of two cars which the caller described. The Court of Appeals, McGregor, P. J., and D. E. Holbrook and N. J. Kaufman, JJ., reversed and remanded for a new trial on ground that seizure of heroin by police when they stopped the defendant along the described route violated the Fourth Amendment because the police did not have probable cause to arrest him and the seizure did not fall within the plain view exception (Docket No. 19048). The people appeal. Held:
1. An anonymous tip may be the basis for probable cause to make an arrest if the information in the tip is sufficiently corroborated by independent sources. Some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they were must be disclosed and some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant was credible or his information reliable must be shown, something more substantial than a casual rumor circulating in the underworld or an accusation based merely on general reputation.
2. The informant’s tip in the instant case contained sufficient self-verifying detail to warrant an inference that the informant obtained his information in a reliable manner. The informant revealed where the defendant was going, the illegal purpose of the trip, a description of the two automobiles to which he had access, the approximate time of his return, the number of people with whom he would be traveling, and the address of his eventual destination.
3. Police could reasonably conclude that this was an informant whose reliability had been clearly demonstrated after several details of the tip were corroborated by independent police work. The police learned that the Oldsmobile automobile described by the informant was registered to a woman living at the specified address and that a bronze Cadillac meeting the description of the other car was in the driveway of that house, and police spotted the Oldsmobile on the specified route at approximately the time the informant stated.
Reference for Points in Headnotes
[1-12] 5 Am Jur 2d, Arrest § 46.
Reversed.
Justice Levin, joined by the Chief Justice, dissented. He wrote:
1. Where the informant is unknown, there is no information regarding his reliability. His reliability cannot reasonably be inferred on verification of innocuous information there is no reason to believe the accused would conceal. Corroboration of innocent details tends to show that the informant is acquainted with the accused, but does not tend to show present criminal activity absent the "track record” of the reliable informant who can tell the police when, without shooting in the dark, there is reason to proceed against the accused. Without a track record there is no way of knowing whether the anonymous tipster is acting on anything more substantial than personal animus or his suspicions — of less, certainly no greater, probity than a police officer's suspicions.
2. Suspicion shared by more than one or any number of officers is not probable cause. Police suspicion bolstered by an anonymous informant’s assertion not shown by some evidence of present criminal activity to be other than the product of suspicion has no greater dignity. Suspicion corroborated by suspicion is not probable cause.
3. The corroboration in the instant case of innocent details supplied by the anonymous informant and the unspecified suspicions that Walker dealt in narcotics did not establish the reliability of the anonymous tip that he would on this occasion be returning with a "load of dope”. The facts and circumstances known to the police of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were not sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that Walker was committing an offense.
4. The United States Supreme Court has announced what the Court regards as a sufficient showing of probable cause in the conñdential informant situation, where the police have a demonstration of a known informant’s reliability, but those opinions do not establish what is sufficient to show probable cause in an anonymous informant situation. Absent a record of reliability or other substantial reason to believe the assertions of present criminal activity, there is no thread of criminality elevating suspicion to probable cause unless further investigation or other information provides some evidence of present criminal activity.
5. Nor can an arrest be made merely because the report is more credible because the accused has been suspected by the police of engaging in the very criminal activity described by the anonymous tipster. Otherwise a person harboring malice or suspicions might harass anyone with a criminal record or suspected by the police who, on nothing more than a telephone call describing him and his anticipated movements, could be arrested. Absent incriminating evidence that substantiates the suspicion or anonymous assertion that the accused is currently engaged in criminal activity he cannot be arrested for the apparent purpose of conducting a search for evidence of criminal activity as an "incident” of a "lawful arrest” on the basis of an anonymous telephone call and substantiation of innocuous details any acquaintance and many strangers could provide.
64 Mich App 138; 235 NW2d 85 (1975) reversed.
Opinion of the Court
1. Arrest — Constitutional Law — Probable Cause — Informants.
An anonymous tip may be the basis for probable cause to make an arrest if the information in the tip is sufficiently corroborated by independent sources.
2. Drugs and Narcotics — Arrest—Constitutional Law — Probable Cause — Informants.
The test for determining when probable cause may be established in a narcotics arrest solely upon the basis of information from an informant is that some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they were must be disclosed, and some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant was credible or his information was reliable must be shown, something more substantial than a casual rumor circulating in the underworld or an accusation based merely on general reputation.
3. Drugs and Narcotics — Arrest—Constitutional Law — Probable Cause — Informants.
An informant’s tip in the arrest of a defendant for possession of narcotics contained sufficient self-verifying detail to warrant an inference that the informant obtained his information in a reliable manner where the informant revealed where the defendant was going, the illegal purpose of the trip, a description of the two automobiles to which he had access, the approximate time of his return, the number of people with whom he would be traveling, and the address of his eventual destination.
4. Arrest — Constitutional Law — Probable Cause — Informants.
One recognized method of establishing the trustworthiness of an informant is that he provided information on past occasions which later proved to be correct upon investigation, but this does not support the conclusion that the informant gained his information in a reliable way.
5. Drugs and Narcotics — Arrest—Constitutional Law — Probable Cause — Informants.
Police could reasonably conclude that an anonymous informant’s reliability had been clearly demonstrated after several details of the informant’s tip were corroborated by independent police work where police learned that one of two automobiles described by the informant as the ones the defendant would be using to transport narcotics was registered to a woman living at a specified address, a car meeting the other description was parked in the driveway of that house, and police spotted one of the cars on the specified route at approximately the time the informant stated.
Dissenting Opinion by Levin, J.
Kavanagh, C. J.
6. Arrest — Constitutional Law — Probable Cause — Informants.
Suspicion shared by more than one or any number of police officers is not probable cause for an arrest; police suspicion bolstered by an anonymous informant’s assertion not shown by some evidence of present criminal activity to be other than the product of suspicion has no greater dignity.
7. Arrest — Constitutional Law — Probable Cause — Informants.
Corroboration of innocent details supplied to police by an anonymous informant and unspecified suspicions that a defendant dealt in narcotics do not establish the reliability of the anonymous tip that the defendant would on the occasion he was arrested be travelling with a load of drugs.
8. Arrest — Constitutional Law — Probable Cause — Informants.
Police seeking an arrest warrant on information supplied by a conñdential informant must detail their knowledge of the informant, the underlying information he provided and any other facts and circumstances on which they rely so that the magistrate, independently of the officer’s conclusory allegations, can assess whether the informant is reliable and whether he appears to have obtained his information in a reliable manner; however, where the defendant is arrested without a warrant, the inquiry does not concern the contents of an affidavit — there is none — but whether the police officers themselves had information constituting probable cause for an arrest.
9. Arrest — Constitutional Law — Probable Cause — Informants.
Absent a record of reliability of an informant or other substantial reason to believe his assertions of present criminal activity of a defendant, there is no thread of criminality elevating suspicion to probable cause for an arrest unless further investigation or other information provides some evidence of present criminal activity.
10. Arrest — Constitutional Law — Probable Cause — Informants.
Police officers may proceed with an arrest upon the basis of information received from an informer and need not disclose the identity of the informer; however, in order to establish probable cause there must be a showing that the information was something more than a mere suspicion, a tip, or anonymous telephone call, and that it came from a source upon which the officers had a right to rely.
11. Arrest — Constitutional Law — Probable Cause.
Requiring probable cause for an arrest assures that a citizen will not suffer unjustified intrusions upon his privacy; simply stated, probable cause requires that there be good reason for an arrest.
12. Arrest — Constitutional Law — Probable Cause — Informants.
An arrest was without probable cause where the police acted on an anonymous tip which set forth innocent facts in support of an allegation of criminal activity and did not reveal the basis of the informant’s allegation, corroboration was weak because no criminal activity was observed and only part of the informant’s story was verified by the police before the arrest, and police information concerning the suspect’s possible prior criminal activities did not substantiate the charge of current criminal activity.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, John A. Smietanka, Prosecuting Attorney, and John Jeffrey Long, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
State Appellate Defender Office (by Michael E. Turner) for defendant.

Opinion:
Fitzgerald, J.
Ulysses Walker was convicted by a jury on May 31, 1973, of possession and control of a controlled substance, heroin, in violation of MCLA 335.153; MSA, 18.1123, and was subsequently sentenced to a term of 2-1/2 to 4 years imprisonment. Prior to trial, defendant made a timely motion to quash the information and suppress evidence based on the claim that the police had no probable cause to arrest defendant. The trial court denied defendant's motion, and the Court of Appeals denied defendant's application for interlocutory appeal of this denial. Defendant appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals as of right. The Court of Appeals reversed defendant's conviction and remanded for a new trial, finding that the seizure of heroin was unlawful because the police did not have probable cause to arrest defendant. 64 Mich App 138; 235 NW2d 85 (1975). We granted leave to appeal limited to the issue of whether the stop and arrest of defendant was unlawful, thereby rendering the evidence found at the scene of the arrest inadmissible. 396 Mich 812 (1976). We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the reasons stated herein.
Facts
Defendant was arrested for possession of narcotics at about 1 a.m. on February 28, 1971, by the Benton Township police, who were acting on an anonymous telephone tip. According to police testimony, the informant phoned the Benton Township Police Department at about 8:20 p.m. on February 27, 1971, and requested to speak with Captain Paul Farris. The caller was given a phone number at which Captain Farris could be reached. The informant called Captain Farris, insisted on remaining anonymous, and, according to Farris, told him that:
"Ulysses Walker left town a short time ago going to Detroit to pick up a load of dope, and that he would be driving either a bronze-colored Cadillac four-door with Indiana license plates or a black-over-yellow Oldsmobile four-door with Michigan plates, and that there would be two women in the car with him, and that they would be returning to Benton Harbor in approximately five hours and going to 668 Superior Street in the City of Benton Harbor."
After receiving the anonymous call, Captain Farris learned from the Benton Harbor Police Department that a Lucille Gayten lived at 668 Superior Street, and a LEIN report indicated that a 1969 Oldsmobile with 1970 Michigan plate GKV 275 was registered under the name of Ms. Gayten. Officers drove to 668 Superior Street and saw a bronze-colored Cadillac in the garage but not the Oldsmobile.
Captain Farris testified that after he received the anonymous tip he called Sergeant Lester at the police station, told him of the information he had received concerning defendant, and ordered him to determine which of the two cars were at the Superior Street address and then set up a surveillance to locate the other vehicle coming into Benton Harbor and to stop and make an arrest. At about 1 a.m., Sergeant Spencer and two other officers, who were waiting on the Main Street penetrator in an unmarked police car, spotted a black-over-yellow 1969 Oldsmobile with a 1970 Michigan license plate GKV 275 going west on the 1-94 business loop into Benton Harbor. As the police car approached the Oldsmobile, the Oldsmobile switched lanes and then made a left turn about 100 yards down the road. Sergeant Lester testified that at this point, the police thought that they had been spotted by the people in the Oldsmobile so they then turned on the siren and the red flashing lights. The driver of the Oldsmobile testified that the unmarked car did not sound a siren or flash its lights. The police stopped the Oldsmobile by forcing it over to the side of the road. When the three police officers got out of their car the Oldsmobile "lurched" forward another three feet before again stopping.
Sergeant Spencer testified that he drew his gun, told the occupants of the Oldsmobile that they were under arrest, and ordered them all to get out of the car. Officers Spencer and Peters testified that as defendant hurriedly exited from the right rear door, he bent over low and made a quick underhanded "throwing motion". Peters saw a "white powdery substance flying through the wind" and after approaching defendant, saw a strip of white powder on the ground near the right rear tire and patches of white powder on the right rear door of the Oldsmobile. The powder was removed from the road and the car and identified as heroin at trial.
Issue
The decisive issue in this case is whether the police had probable cause to make a valid arrest, thereby rendering the heroin found at the scene of the arrest admissible into evidence against defendant. We hold that an anonymous tip may be the basis for probable cause to make an arrest if the information in the tip is sufficiently corroborated by independent sources. Since we find that the police had probable cause to make a valid arrest of defendant, we need not address plaintiffs alternative theory that despite the fact that the police, with guns drawn, told the occupants of the stopped vehicle that they were all under arrest, the transaction constituted an investigatory stop, in accordance with Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1; 88 S Ct 1868; 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968).
The test for determining when probable cause may be established solely upon the basis of information from an informant or upon such information and corroborating facts has been developed in Aguilar v Texas, 378 US 108; 84 S Ct 1509; 12 L Ed 2d 723 (1964), and Spinelli v United States, 393 US 410; 89 S Ct 584; 21 L Ed 2d 637 (1969). In Aguilar, the United States Supreme Court held that probable cause for a warrantless arrest is established if the informant's tip meets two requirements: (1) "some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they were" must be disclosed, and (2) "some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant was 'credible' or his information 'reliable' " must be shown. 378 US 108, 114. This two-prong test was further developed in Spinelli, where the affiant swore that his informant was reliable, but gave the magistrate no grounds to support his conclusion.
In regard to the first prong of the test, the Spinelli Court said that "[i]n the absence of a statement detailing the manner in which the information was gathered, it is especially important that the tip describe the accused's criminal activity in sufficient detail so that the magistrate may know that he is relying on something more substantial than a casual rumor circulating in the underworld or an accusation based merely on an individual's general reputation". 393 US 410, 416. The Court in Spinelli found the detail provided by the informant in Draper v United States, 358 US 307; 79 S Ct 329; 3 L Ed 2d 327 (1959), a "suitable benchmark". 393 US 410, 416. In Draper, the informant reported that the accused was selling narcotics and that he would return from Chicago by train on one of two days with narcotics. The informant also described Draper and his clothing and said that he would be carrying a tan zipper bag and that he habitually walked "real fast". As the Court explained in Spinelli, "[a] magistrate, when confronted with such detail, could reasonably infer that the informant had gained his information in a reliable way". 393 US 410, 417.
In the instant case, the anonymous informant indicated to Captain Farris that defendant had just driven to Detroit to pick up a "load of dope" and would return to Benton Harbor in approximately five hours. Further, the informant revealed that defendant would be riding in one of two automobiles, which he described in detail, and would be riding with two women. Finally, the caller said that defendant would be going to 668 Superior Street upon his return to Benton Harbor.
We believe that the tip received by Captain Farris described defendant's criminal venture in sufficient detail so that the police could reasonably infer that they were relying on "something more substantial than a casual rumor" or information based on "an offhand remark heard at a neighborhood bar". Spinelli, supra, 393 US 410, 416, 417. Indeed, the informant revealed where defendant was going, the illegal purpose of the trip, a de scription of the two automobiles to which he had access, the approximate time of his return, the number of people with whom he would be traveling, and the address of his eventual destination. To be sure, the facts supplied by the anonymous informant in the instant case were substantially more numerous and detailed than those contained in the tip received in Spinelli. Accordingly, we hold that, as in Draper, the informant's tip in the instant case contained sufficient self-verifying detail to warrant an inference that the informant obtained his information in a reliable manner.
Defendant argues, and the Court of Appeals held, that the fact that the informant in Draper had supplied reliable information in the past precludes the drawing of an inference in the instant case that the detailed nature of the tip given to Captain Farris indicated that the information was gained in a reliable way. We find, however, that reliance on this distinguishing fact is misplaced, for the fact that an informant has given reliable information in the past is supportive of the conclusion that he is trustworthy, rather than the conclusion that the informant gained his information in a reliable way. Indeed, there was no evidence in Draper as to how the informant obtained his information, and this accounts for the importance which the Court attached to the detailed nature of the tip.
Upon satisfying the first prong of the Aguilar test, it is then necessary to turn to the second prong, concerning the credibility or reliability of the informant himself. One recognized method of establishing the trustworthiness of the informant is a disclosure that the informant provided infor mation on past occasions which later proved to be correct upon investigation. McCray v Illinois, 386 US 300; 87 S Ct 1056; 18 L Ed 2d 62 (1967). In the instant case, however, the informant was anonymous, and thus there was no prior experience upon which to base the informant's reliability. In Spinelli, the Court explained how the veracity of an informant may be established extrinsically when there is otherwise no basis upon which to establish the informant's veracity:
"If the tip is found inadequate under Aguilar, the other allegations which corroborate the information contained in the hearsay report should then be considered. At this stage as well, however, the standards enunciated in Aguilar must inform the magistrate's decision. He must ask: Can it fairly be said that the tip, even when certain parts of it have been corroborated by independent sources, is as trustworthy as a tip which would pass Aguilar's tests without independent corroboration?" 393 US 410, 415.
In the instant case, independent police work corroborated several of the details provided by the anonymous informant. Through independent investigation the police learned that the Oldsmobile described by the informant was registered to a woman living at the specified address on Superior Street. Also, the police found that a bronze Cadillac meeting the description by the informant was in the driveway of that house, and thus focused their surveillance on the Oldsmobile. Further, the police spotted the Oldsmobile registered to the woman living on Superior Street heading west on the 1-94 business loop leading into Benton Harbor at approximately the time the informant stated that defendant would be returning from Detroit.
When Captain Farris initially received the anonymous tip, he had no adequate basis to believe that the information was not a complete fabrication. After several details of the tip were corroborated by independent police work, however, the police could reasonably conclude that this was an informant whose reliability had been clearly demonstrated.
"Once again, Draper provides a relevant comparison. Independent police work in that case corroborated much more than one small detail that had been provided by the informant [in Spinelli]. It was then apparent that the informant had not been fabricating his report out of whole cloth; since the report was of the sort which in common experience may be recognized as having been obtained in a reliable way, it was perfectly clear that probable cause had been established." Spinelli, supra, 393 US 410, 417-418.
In conclusion, we find that the informant's tip in this case, upon being corroborated by independent sources, was sufficient to provide the basis for probable cause to make an arrest. Therefore, we hold that the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress was not in error.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
Williams, Coleman, Ryan, and Blair Moody, Jr., JJ., concurred with Fitzgerald, J.
Repealed by 1971 PA 196. See MCLA 335.341(4)(a); MSA 18.1070(41)(4)(a).
The tip received in Spinelli merely indicated that Spinelli was using two specified telephones and that these phones were being used in gambling operations.