Case Name: Odom Company, Respondent, v. King County, Appellant
Court: Washington Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Washington
Decision Date: 1970-11-19
Citations: 78 Wash. 2d 505
Docket Number: No. 40533
Parties: Odom Company, Respondent, v. King County, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Washington Reports
Volume: 78
Pages: 505–520

Head Matter:
[No. 40533.
En Banc.
November 19, 1970.]
Odom Company, Respondent, v. King County, Appellant.
Charles O. Carroll, James E. Kennedy, and William L. Paul, Jr., for appellant.
Aiken, St. Louis & Siljeg, Edward L. Mueller, and Arthur H. McKean, for respondent.
Reported in 477 P.2d 6.

Opinion:
Hunter, C. J.
This action involves the validity of personal property taxes levied by King County in the years 1966 and 1967 upon stocks of liquor held in storage by the plaintiff (respondent) Odom Company, in accordance with regulations of the Washington State Liquor Control Board.
The trial court, on the basis of motions for summary judgment and on the basis of the affidavits, depositions, and stipulated facts, granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.
The trial court held that the goods upon which the taxes were levied were in interstate commerce, and that the imposition of the taxes was in violation of the commerce clause of the United States Constitution, article 1, section 8, clause 3, and was therefore void. Judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff for the recovery of such taxes paid, and a permanent injunction was granted restraining collection of taxes levied and not paid and against further taxes of the same character.
The plaintiff imports alcoholic beverages from other states and foreign nations. The goods are stored in Washington and sold only in Alaska. The plaintiff operates pursuant to and is regulated by the Washington State Liquor Control Board. The plaintiff cannot sell any of the alcoholic beverages in this state except for occasional sales to the Liquor Control Board as an accommodation only, which is de minimus in nature.
The plaintiff solicits its business' through its local representatives in Alaska who mail their "orders" to the plaintiff. The orders are then filled from the warehouse stock and shipped directly to the respective customers in Alaska. The items remain in the warehouse from 1 month to 1 year. The average time is 1 to 2 months. The uncontradicted affidavit of Raymond Faubert, general manager and vice-president of Odom Company, states as follows:
The fast selling liquors, wines and beers, turn over from six to twelve times per year. Most of the other items turn over three or four times per year. Almost every line turns over at least once per year.
The plaintiff's inventory may be divided into two categories: (1) imports from other states and foreign countries but not stored in original packages, and (2) imports from foreign countries which are stored in their original packages. This category is also known as the "in-bond" inventory, which means that the federal tax has not yet been paid but will be when the inventory is taken from a warehouse where it is in-bond and shifted over to the Western Avenue warehouse, thereby taking it out of bond but still remaining in the original packages. The inventory falling in category (1) comprised the majority of the inventory during the questioned period.
In its 1966 "Personal Property Affidavit" the plaintiff reported its assessed valuation was $3,400. In 1967 it reported its assessed valuation as $2,940. Neither of these reported assessed valuations included stocks of liquor. Subsequently an audit was made by the county, and an amended audit report was sent out showing the 1966 assessed value as $273,240 and the 1967 assessed value as $223,040, which included the stocks of liquor in the warehouse upon a monthly average over a 12-month period.
The plaintiff paid the taxes for 1966 under protest and stated the grounds of the protest to be that the taxes were in violation of the United States Constitution, article 1, section 8, clause 3, commerce clause, and RCW 84.36.171 et seq. The taxes for 1967 were not paid, the collection of which was enjoined pending the outcome of the case.
The defendant (appellant) contends that the plaintiff failed to comply with RCW 84.68.020, authorizing a taxpayer to institute an action to recover taxes when paid under protest in that no valid grounds in support of the protest were alleged, which is a condition precedent to the right of a taxpayer to bring such an action.
The plaintiff claims the grounds given were valid. The controlling issue then in this case is whether the liquors, upon which the taxes were levied, were goods in interstate commerce in violation of the commerce clause of the United States Constitution, supra.
The trial court, in holding the goods were within the ambit of the commerce clause, based its decision on our holding in W. J. Lake & Co. v. King County, 3 Wn.2d 500, 101 P.2d 357 (1940); cert. denied, 311 U.S. 715, 85 L. Ed. 465, 61 S. Ct. 396 (1940), which in its opinion was dispositive of this case. Lake is remarkably similar to the facts in the present case, and we agree with the trial court that our decision there is controlling here.
In Lake, the respondent was a liquor broker and had purchased liquor for shipments to various states other than Washington. When an order was received, the merchandise was purchased and forwarded to Seattle from where the respondent reshipped the liquor to the buyer involved. Liquor was ordered in anticipation of additional sales although approximately 85 per cent of the liquor was not purchased until after an order was received. However, the liquor was shipped on bills of lading to the respondent, not to the ultimate destination, and no particular liquor was earmarked for any particular order or destination. The liquor was never in storage for more than 1 month to 6 weeks. In the case of Odom, the average storage time was 1 to 2 months. In Lake, as in the case of Odom, the importation of liquor and its sale in the state was restricted under the terms of the Washington State Liquor Act.
In W. J. Lake & Co. v. King County, supra, at 503, we cited from the provisions of the Washington State Liquor Act which at that time provided:
"Pursuant to Section 49 (2) of the Washington State Liquor Act, importations of liquor . . . cannot be made to any point in the State of Washington, for use or sale therein, unless such importations be consigned to the Washington State Liquor Control Board. . . .
"Shipments nf liquor to be stored in the State of Wash-' ington, for transshipment to points beyond the state, must be consigned to the Washington State Liquor Control Board, for the account of the shipper, in care of such public warehouses as are authorized by and bonded to the Washington State Liquor Control Board." (1935 Revised Rules and Regulations, p. 68.)
The similar provision of the present rules and regulations provides:
No liquor shall be imported into this state unless such liquor be consigned to the Washington state liquor control board; or unless such liquor be consigned to a holder of a liquor importer's license and delivered at a public storage warehouse authorized by the Washington state liquor control board to store liquor, or at the warehouse of the holder of the liquor importer's license in those cases where the board has authorized storage at such warehouse. . . . [Rule 89; filed 6/13/63.]
WAC 314-36-020.
We further stated in Lake:
Considering that the plan of operation followed by the respondent was that formulated by the state liquor board for facilitating transshipment in interstate commerce, and that the liquor could not be diverted to any use in the state, we are of the opinion that it was not taxable.
In the present case, the liquor was in storage under the liquor board's control. It could have been released for no other purpose than transshipment in interstate or foreign commerce.
W. J. Lake & Co. v. King County, 3 Wn.2d 500, 505, 101 P.2d 357 (1940).
In the present case, Odom Company is also prohibited by the rules and regulations of the Washington State Liquor Control Board, supra, and by statute from disposing of its inventory to any point within the state except to the Liquor Control Board, which is heretofore stated as de mini-mus. The statute, RCW 66.12.030, provides:
Licensed manufacturers not prevented from- storing liquor — Transshipment in interstate, foreign commerce— Interstate, foreign transactions protected. (1) Nothing in this title shall prevent any person licensed to manufacture liquor from keeping liquor in his warehouse or place of business.
(2) Nothing in this title shall prevent the transshipment of liquor in interstate and foreign commerce; but no person shall import liquor into the state from any other state or country, except, as herein otherwise provided, for use or sale in the state, except the board.
(3) Every provision of this title which may affect transactions in liquor between a person in this state and a person in another state or in a foreign country shall be construed to affect such transactions so far only as the legislature has power to make laws in relation thereto.
Odom Company must sell its goods outside of the state. Odom Company has the added factor that the goods are only sold in Alaska and are not sold to any surrounding states as was the situation in Lake.
The defendant contends, however, that the Lake case relied upon by the plaintiff is outmoded and is no longer the law under decisions of the United States Supreme Court. We disagree. We believe our reasoning in Lake to be sound and that our determination there is not inconsistent with United States Supreme Court decisions under the peculiar facts of the Lake case.
The defendant basically relied on Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U.S. 1, 78 L. Ed. 131, 54 S. Ct. 34 (1933), and Independent Warehouses, Inc. v. Scheele, 331 U.S. 70, 91 L. Ed. 1346, 67 S. Ct. 1062 (1947).
The Blasius case is discussed in the Independent Warehouses, Inc. case which, along with other cases, was considered by this court in Tidewater Terminal Co. v. State, 60 Wn.2d 155, 372 P.2d 674 (1962).
In Tidewater, referring to Independent Warehouses, Inc. v. Scheele, supra, we said at page 160:
The court reasoned that as the owner of the coal was free to market the goods to any places it desired, the interruption in transit was primarily for business interests rather than for purely ease-in-transit purposes; hence, the storage activity was part of intrastate commerce.
(Italics ours.)
We went on to say that the facts indicated that the storage facilities were not merely a conduit for a continuous flow from incoming to outgoing, and further, that the goods had as a destination both points within and without the state.
We believe the principles stated in Tidewater are correct; however, that' case is distinguishable upon its facts from the instant case. As in all of the cases discussed by the defendant, the key characteristic is that the goods may be sold both within and without the state. There has been no case cited, nor have we found one, where a state may subject goods to taxation when, by law, there is a limitation that prevents the party from disposing of those goods within that state.
Other cases relied upon by the defendant are distinguishable in that they involve a different category of tax, or that the goods are capable of being sold within the state, or that the ultimate destination is unknown. We hold that under the peculiar facts of this case as in Lake, where the goods by law are prohibited from sale within this state, that they are in the stream of interstate commerce, and the taxes as attempted to be levied are in violation of the commerce clause of the United States Constitution, supra, and are void.
In view of our disposition of this case, we need not discuss the other issues raised.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Rosellini, Hamilton, McGovern, Stafford, and Sharp, JJ., concur.