Case Name: James Paul BRYANT, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1994-12-02
Citations: 650 So. 2d 68
Docket Number: No. 93-2297
Parties: James Paul BRYANT, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: GRIFFIN, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 650
Pages: 68–72

Head Matter:
James Paul BRYANT, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 93-2297.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Dec. 2, 1994.
Order Denying Rehearing En Banc Feb. 24, 1995.
Richard A. Manzo of Manzo & Praver, P.A., Titusville, and Terrence E. Kehoe of Law Office of Terrence E. Kehoe, Orlando, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Kellie A. Nielan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
HARRIS, Chief Judge.
The issue, simply stated, is whether State v. Agee, 622 So.2d 473 (Fla.1993), mandates a reversal of many of Bryant's convictions because the State violated the speedy trial rule.
Bryant was arrested for various charges relating to sexual activity with or lewd acts on a minor (his stepdaughter). An information was filed almost three months later specifically charging numerous counts of oral and vaginal intercourse. Ten days before the running of the speedy trial period, the State nolle prossed the information. Over a month later, after receiving the DNA results, but also after the running of the speedy trial period, the State refiled the identical information. Not only did Bryant not move to dismiss the late information, but his counsel volunteered the following during a bond hearing:
Now I spoke [to the prosecutor], she specifically told me she had no objection to the court reinstating the bond that was previous. He hasn't gone anywhere. We haven't filed any motions to discharge under the speedy trial. We haven't done any of that. We want to get the case prepared and do it the right way.
Bryant then moved for and was granted a continuance.
At a later court hearing, the following occurred:
COURT: Does the defense announce ready for trial on the January docket?
DEFENSE: No judge, because they just provided us with a whole list of witnesses. Nothing happened on this case. Now they get the DNA and they file a list of supplemental witnesses, evidence technicians, chain-of-eustody witnesses and speedy trial had already run.
If we wanted to really press the matter and roll the dice, we would have filed a motion for discharge and pray that they could not get their witnesses together.
Realistically speaking here, again the history of this case reflects six second appearances. That is six 3-week continuances with no waiver of speedy trial through no fault of his own. He was out on bond at the time. We know these cases, sometimes they take six months and sometimes they take one year. We know at this point, through no fault of his own, he cannot go to trial at this point. We were just provided the DNA experts and was just provided a report and witnesses.
COURT: I would expect the case to be ready for trial on the January docket. Do you think you can accomplish that?
DEFENSE: Not with the additional witnesses that they have provided at this time. I mean, Judge, they have recently provided me a whole list of witnesses. I don't know, I cannot commit one way or the other.
Still later, Bryant again requested a continuance and filed a waiver of speedy trial. Shortly thereafter, the information was amended to add additional charges. It was several months later, after the release of Agee, that Bryant filed his motion for discharge. The trial court denied the motion. We affirm.
Bryant relies on the language in Agee that states:
Based on the foregoing, we hold that when the State enters a nol pros, the speedy trial period continues to run and the State may not refile charges based on the same conduct after the period has expired.
Agee, 622 So.2d at 475.
Bryant contends that the supreme court, by this language, has made the speedy trial rule self-executing and, in effect, has denied the trial court jurisdiction to consider any late filed information. We disagree. We think that the supreme court intended to create no greater defendant's rights under the speedy trial rule than the rights a defendant has under the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. Just as double jeopardy protection can be waived, so too can the right to a speedy trial.
Clearly, in this case and on several occasions, Bryant did just that.
AFFIRMED.
GRIFFIN, J., concurs.
THOMPSON, J., dissents, with opinion.
. Although Bryant raised other issues, we find them to be without merit.
. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191.
. Article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution (1968), provides that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c) states that failure to timely raise certain defenses constitutes a waiver of same but further provides that the court may at any time entertain a motion to dismiss on the ground that:
(2) The defendant is charged with an offense of which the defendant has previously been placed in jeopardy.
This indicates that even the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not self-executing but must be raised by a motion to dismiss. Further, the cases indicate that one can waive even double jeopardy protection. In Johnson v. State, 460 So.2d 954, 957 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984), approved, 483 So.2d 420 (Fla. 1986), this court stated:
After an unconditional nolo contendere plea to a lesser offense than charged is unqualifiedly accepted by the trial court, jeopardy attaches preventing the plea from being set aside and the original charges from being reinstated in the absence . of a knowing, intelligent and intentional consent or waiver....
The case recognizes that while a waiver will not be implied from mere silence or the failure to object, the defendant may nevertheless affirmatively waive even double jeopardy rights. See also, Lippman v. State, 633 So.2d 1061, 1065 (Fla.1994), in which the supreme court indicates that a defendant can "knowingly waive his double jeopardy protection." Here, there can be no doubt that Biyant was aware of the running of the speedy trial period. He mentioned it on several occasions. He disavowed filing for a release based on a speedy trial violation and instead moved for and received several continuances. He filed a written waiver of speedy trial. The fact that he did these things before the release of Agee does not alter the fact that he made a "knowing waiver of his" speedy trial protection.