Case Name: NICKERSON v. NICKERSON
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1898-09-14
Citations: 34 Or. 1
Docket Number: 
Parties: NICKERSON v. NICKERSON.
Judges: 
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 34
Pages: 1–9

Head Matter:
Decided 14 September, 1898.
NICKERSON v. NICKERSON.
[48 Pac. 423; 54 Pac. 277.]
1. Appeal — Abatement op Action. — The death of the husband pending an appeal by him from a decree of divorce which determines the property rights of the parties, does not abate the action nor the appeal; but iioth survive to the heirs of the deceased: State v. Martin, 30 Or. 108. cited.
2. Divorce — CitUELTY -It is no ground for divorce that plaintiff was unable to get along with defendant’s son by a former marriage, who was impudent, saucy, and sometimes abusive, to her, and that defendant refused to send away his son when plaintiff said one of them must go, and that on her returning, and attempting to enter the house, she was prevented by the son from doing so; the conduct of the son not having been encouraged or approved by defendant.
From Linn : Henry H. Hewitt, Judge.
Suit by Elizabeth M. Nickerson against Hugh Nickerson for a divorce on the ground of cruelty, in which she had a decree. Defendant appealed and died, whereupon there was a motion to dismiss the appeal, which was denied and the cause finally reversed.
Motion Overruled : Reversed.
For appellant there was a brief over the name of Whitney & Newport, with oral arguments by Messrs. N. M. Netvport, Melvin. C. George, and Wm. M. Gregory.
For respondent there was a brief over the name of Weatherford & Wyatt, with oral arguments by Mr. Jas. K. Weatherford.
Note. — A monograph of fifteen pages on Cruelty as a Ground for Divorce is printed in 65 Am. St. Rep. 69, where the authorities (including the Oregon cases) are grouped in proper classes. See, also, authorities collected in a note, Cruelty and Inhuman Treatment as a Ground for Divorce, 6 L. R. A. 187, and Drunkenness as Affecting Cruelty, 34 L. R. A. 454. — Reporter.

Opinion:
ON MOTION TO DISMISS THE APPEAL.
Mr. Justice Wolverton
delivered the opinion.
The plaintiff, on January 27, 1896, obtained a decree of divorce against the defendant, and thereby the title to an undivided third of defendant's real property. The defendant sought a divorce, also, by cross bill, which ivas dismissed. After an appeal had been perfected the defendant'died, and both parties, by their respective attorneys, upon suggesting his death, filed motions to dismiss the appeal, but for very different purposes. Counsel for defendant claims that his death abates the suit, and that this Court should dismiss the appeal, with directions to the court below to dismiss the suit, so that the relation of the parties would then stand as if no suit had ever been begun or decree rendered; while the plaintiff claims that defendant's death abates the appeal only, and that the decree of the court below remains in full force and effect, as a final determination of the rights of the parties thereto. Neither position can be maintained. In Day v. Holland, 15 Or. 464 (15 Pac. 855), it was decided that under the Code procedure an appeal from a decree does not break it up nor vacate it, and that it may be carried into execution notwithstanding the appeal, unless stayed by a supersedeas undertaking. We are aware that there is a strong dis senting opinion in the cause cited, wherein cogent reasons are given why the old equity practice should still prevail in that regard, notwithstanding the innovations of the Code ; but we feel bound by the prevailing opinion, and are constrained to follow it as a precedent. It is provided by statute that " No action shall abate by the death, marriage, or other disability of a party, or by the transfer of any interest therein, if the cause of action survive or continue and that "An action for a wrong shall not abate by the death of any party, after the verdict has been given therein, but the action shall proceed thereafter in the same manner as in cases where the cause of action survives." Hill's Ann. Laws, § 38, 39. These appear to be all the statutory provisions pertaining to the subject.
It is quite apparent, from the very nature of things, that the cause of suit does not survive the death of a party where the only relief sought is a dissolution of the marriage relations, for death effectuates more surely the very end which it is the especial purpose of the suit to accomplish. As was said by Cotton, L. J., in Stanhope v. Stanhope, 11 Prob. D. W. 103, 105, "It would be a singular thing, if, after the marriage had been dissolved by death, there were power to déclare it at an end on another ground." The authorities are uniform upon this proposition: See Barney v. Barney, 14 Iowa, 189; Wilson v. Wilson, 73 Mich. 620 (41 N. W. 817); Kirschner v. Deitrich, 110 Cal. 502 (42 Pac. 1064); Pearson v. Darrington, 32 Ala. 253; McCurley v. McCurley, 45 Am. Rep. 720. But, where the consequences of the divorce are such as affect the property rights of the parties to the suit, the heirs or personal representatives may have such an interest in the litigation as that the cause will survive, not for the purpose of continuing the controversy touching the right of divorce within itself; but for the ascertainment of whether the property has been rightfully diverted from its appropriate channel of devolution. The present case furnishes a good illustration. Had the defendant died prior to the divorce, his real property would have descended to his heirs, subject to his widow's right of dower, but under the decree she obtains an undivided one-third interest absolute therein, results of very different significance. So that the heirs have an interest in continuing the controversy to determine whether they have been rightfully or wrongfully affected in their property rights : See Thomas v. Thomas, 57 Md. 504; Downer v. Howard, 44 Wis. 82.
It has been suggested that the relief which the statute' affords by giving the prevailing party in the suit a one-third interest in the lands of the spouse is but an incident to the divorce, and operates as a penalty for a violation of the marital relations. And so it is, but it does not follow that the suit, after divorce granted, or even that the appeal, abates upon the death of a party thereto. At common law the general rule is that criminal actions abate with the death of the accused, but if the crime be that of treason, or felony which works an attainder, the heirs or personal representatives may prosecute an appeal to reverse the attainder (State v. Martin, 30 Or. 108, 47 Pac. 196), although the forfeiture is but an incident of the action. The cause was permitted to survive to prevent a wrongful devolution of the property of the deceased, should it appear that the judgment of attainder was erroneous. The analogy is apparent without elucidation. The clause of the statute preventing either party from contracting marriage with a third until the period allowed for the appeal has expired is a wise precautionary measure to prevent the evil results which might arise from conflicting marriage relations should the decree of the court below be reversed., but was not intended to suspend the decree. Such a decree has the "effect to terminate the marriage, ' ' and its finality must be governed and determined by the same rules as are applied in other suits in equity. From these considerations we conclude that the suit did not abate by the death of the defendant, except as it pertains to the cross bill, neither does the appeal, but that the cause and the appeal both survive to the heirs of the deceased, and they may prosecute the cause in this Court for the purpose of determining whether the divorce was rightfully granted, to the end that conflicting property rights as between them and the plaintiff may be settled and determined. Both motions will therefore be disallowed.
Motions Overruled.