Case Name: Roger Joseph DAVIS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
Court: Texas Courts of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1999-11-04
Citations: 7 S.W.3d 695
Docket Number: No. 01-98-00502-CR
Parties: Roger Joseph DAVIS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
Judges: Panel consists of Justices MIRAJBAL, WILSON, and ANDELL.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Third Series
Volume: 7
Pages: 695–699

Head Matter:
Roger Joseph DAVIS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
No. 01-98-00502-CR.
Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (1st Dist.).
Nov. 4, 1999.
Rehearing Overruled Dec. 9, 1999.
Paul J. Smith, Houston, for Appellant.
John H. Harrity, III, John F. Healey, Jr., Richmond, for State.
Panel consists of Justices MIRAJBAL, WILSON, and ANDELL.

Opinion:
OPINION
ANDELL, Justice.
Appellant pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the trial court assessed punishment at 15 years confinement. In issues one and two, appellant complains that his plea was involuntary, and the trial court erred by not hearing his motion for new trial. We affirm.
Jurisdiction
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2(b)(3), which became effective September 1, 1997, provides that a defendant who pleads guilty or nolo contendere pursuant to a plea agreement must provide notice to appeal the judgment. To appeal, a defendant is required to:
(1) specify that the appeal is for a jurisdictional defect;
(2) specify that the substance of the appeal was raised by written motion and ruled on before trial; or
(3) state that the trial court granted permission to appeal.
Tex.R.App. P. 25.2(b)(3) (formerly Rule 40(b)(1)).
In regard to former rule 40(b)(1), the Court of Criminal Appeals previously held that a knowing and voluntary plea is an implied prerequisite for application of the rule, and that compliance with the rule was not necessary to raise a voluntariness challenge on appeal. Flowers v. State, 935 S.W.2d 131, 133 (Tex.Crim.App.1996). Although the Court of Criminal Appeals has not considered whether Flowers applies to rule 25.2(b)(3), 11 courts of appeals have considered the issue. Nine courts have permitted a voluntariness challenge, while two courts have refused. In Long v. State, 980 S.W.2d 878, 878 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1998, no pet.), and Elizondo v. State, 979 S.W.2d 823, 824-825 (Tex.App.—Waco 1998, no pet.), the Fort Worth and Waco courts determined that a defendant cannot appeal the voluntariness of a plea agreement without obtaining the trial court's permission first. Nine courts of appeals have held to the contrary and considered the merits of a voluntariness challenge despite a general notice of appeal. Session v. State, 978 S.W.2d 289, 291 (Tex.App.—Texarkana, no pet.); Johnson v. State, 978 S.W.2d 744, 745-46 (Tex.App.— Eastland, no pet.); Vidaurri v. State, 981 S.W.2d 478, 479 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1998, pet. granted); Moore v. State, 4 S.W.3d 269, 271 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet,); Luna v. State, 985 S.W.2d 128, 129-130 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1998, pet. ref'd); Hernandez v. State, 986 S.W.2d 817, 820 (Tex.App.—Austin 1999, pet. refused); Price v. State, 989 S.W.2d 435, 437-38 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1999, pet. refused); Minix v. State, 990 S.W.2d 922, 923 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1999, pet. refused); and Banks v. State, No. 05-98-01539-CR, slip op. at 1, 1999 WL 323303 (Tex.App.—Dallas, May 24, 1999, no pet.). The Tyler and Corpus Christi courts have not decided whether voluntariness can be appealed with a general notice of appeal.
We believe the majority of the courts of appeals in this state have correctly permitted voluntariness challenges through general notices of appeal. The Court of Criminal Appeals has stated, "In delegating authority to this Court to promulgate a comprehensive body of appellate rules in criminal cases, the Legislature expressly provided that these rules could not abridge, enlarge or modify the substantive rights of a litigant." Davis v. State, 870 S.W.2d 43, 46 (Tex.Crim.App.1994); Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 22.108(a) (Vernon 1988). Therefore, we believe the omission of a provision permitting a voluntariness challenge in rule 25.2(b)(3) was not an attempt by the Court of Criminal Appeals to overrule Flowers. Furthermore, nowhere in the text of rule 25.2(b)(3) does it state that it intends to overrule Flowers in whole or part. Accordingly, we conclude that a defendant who files a general notice of appeal can appeal the voluntariness of a plea agreement without first obtaining the permission of the trial court. Thus, we conclude that we have jurisdiction to consider whether appellant's plea was entered voluntarily.
Voluntariness of the Plea Agreement
Appellant complains that because he was improperly admonished as to the range of punishment, his plea was involuntary. Before accepting a defendant's guilty plea, the trial court is required to admonish a defendant of the range of punishment attached to the offense. Tex.Code CRiM. P. Ann. art. 26.13(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1999). Substantial compliance with this requirement is sufficient unless an appellant affimatively shows he was not aware of the consequences of his plea and he was misled or harmed by the court's admonishments. See Hughes v. State, 833 S.W.2d 137, 139-40 (Tex.Crim.App.1992). Substantial compliance exists when the trial court has undertaken to admonish the defendant, the sentence given was within the range prescribed by law, and the defendant has faded to affirmatively show harm. See id. at 140.
In our case, appellant was indicted for two offenses. In cause no. 29591A, appellant was charged with possession of cocaine, but the State dropped the charges in accordance with appellant's plea agreement in cause no. 29591. Without the enhancement of cause no. 29591A, the punishment range in case 29591 dropped to two to 20 years from 25 years to life. As a result, the State changed the plea papers to reflect the non-enhanced punishment range. However, according to the State, when the punishment range was changed, the words "or life" were not crossed out. Consequently, the trial court improperly admonished appellant that the range of punishment was two to 20 years or life and a fine not to exceed $10,000. Although improperly admonished, appellant's sentence of 15 years was'within the actual statutory range, as well as within the stated range. The range of punishment for a second degree felony is two to 20 years and a fine not to exceed $10,000. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.33 (Vernon Supp.1999). The trial court's substantial compliance with the required admonishments constitutes a prima facie showing of a knowing and voluntary plea of guilty. Eatmon v. State, 768 S.W.2d 310, 312 (Tex.Crim.App.1989) (citing Ex parte Gibauitch, 688 S.W.2d 868, 871 (Tex.Crim.App.1985)). The burden shifted to appellant to show he entered the plea without understanding the consequences of his action and he suffered harm. Id. Appellant's motion for new trial does not argue he was misled or harmed by the improper admonishment. Nor does appellant make any attempt to supplement the record to satisfy his burden. We hold the trial court substantially complied with the admonishment requirements. We overrule issue one.
Motion For New Trial Hearing
In issue two, appellant complains the trial court erred by not hearing his second motion for new trial. Appellant filed a second motion for new trial on March 2, 1998, and presented it on March 13, 1998. ' Appellant's motion was overruled by operation of law. Tex.R.App. P. 21.6. Rule 21.6 requires a defendant to present the trial court with a motion for new trial within 10 days of filing the motion, unless the trial court, in its discretion, permits the motion to be presented later. See Musgrove v. State, 960 S.W.2d 74, 76 (Tex.Crim.App.1998). In our case, appellant did not present his motion within 10 days. We do not find anything in the record showing that the trial court, in its discretion, permitted the motion for new trial to be presented late; the motion was overruled by operation of law. Therefore, the trial court did not err in failing to conduct a hearing on the motion. See id.
We overrule issue two.
We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Justice TAFT dissents from the denial of en banc review.
Justice NUCHIA joins his dissent.