Case Name: UNITED STATES, Appellee, v. Private Roosevelt DORSEY, U.S. Army, Appellant
Court: United States Court of Military Appeals
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1983-07-05
Citations: 16 M.J. cvii
Docket Number: No. 44,321; CM 440998
Parties: UNITED STATES, Appellee, v. Private Roosevelt DORSEY, U.S. Army, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's Military Justice Reporter
Volume: 16
Pages: 1–13

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES, Appellee, v. Private Roosevelt DORSEY, U.S. Army, Appellant.
No. 44,321.
CM 440998.
U. S. Court of Military Appeals.
July 5, 1983.
For Appellant: Captain Kenneth G. Gale (argued); Colonel William G. Eckhardt, Lieutenant Colonel R. Rex Brookshire II, Major Paul J. Luedtke (on brief); Captain Thomas R. Peppier.
For Appellee: Captain John J. Park, Jr. (argued); Colonel R.R. Boiler, Lieutenant Colonel John T. Edwards, Major Joseph A. Rehyansky (on brief).

Opinion:
Opinion of the Court
FLETCHER, Judge:
A general court-martial composed of officer and enlisted members was assembled at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in February and March 1981. Appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges against him which had been previously referred to this court-martial. The members found him guilty of rape, assault with intent to commit voluntary manslaughter, and communication of a threat, in violation of Articles 120 and 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 920 and 934, respectively. Appellant was sentenced to a dishonorable discharge, confinement at hard labor for 10 years, total forfeitures, and reduction to the lowest enlisted grade. The convening authority approved these findings and the sentence as adjudged. The Court of Military Review affirmed this action. United States v. Dorsey, 14 M.J. 536 (C.M.R.1982).
This Court granted review in the present case on the following issue:
WHETHER THE MILITARY JUDGE ERRED BY DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE OF THE ALLEGED VICTIM'S PAST SEXUAL CONDUCT.
This issue is pertinent to appellant's conviction for rape as alleged in Charge I, and its specification thereunder. Its resolution does not affect the other findings of guilty in this case.
The Court of Military Review summarized the facts in this case concerning the granted issue (id. at 537-38):
The victim of the alleged rape, Private Rainey, testified that after midnight on the night in question, Dorsey came to her room three times. The first two times Dorsey claimed he was looking for his roommate, Murphy, because he (Dorsey) had locked himself out of their room. After the second visit, Murphy, who was then in Rainey's room, left with Dorsey. However, Murphy apparently did not have the keys, because on the third visit Dorsey returned alone and asked Rainey to look for Murphy's keys. After Rainey told him that the keys were not there, Dorsey invited her to visit him and Murphy in their common lounge area. She agreed in order to stop him from continuously coming back and told him that she would be there in ten minutes. After she dressed and came out of her room, Dorsey was waiting for her. When they arrived at Dorsey's room, he used a key to enter; they talked and then Dorsey forcibly prevented her from leaving and raped her.
Dorsey, on the other hand, testified that on his third visit to Rainey's room he told her that he wished he had some company and Rainey replied that she would be down in ten minutes. He left and was in his room watching TV and counting his money when, to his surprise, Rainey appeared at his door. They sat on his bed and talked; Dorsey "fiddled" with a small ornamental button on the shoulder of her sweater. When he stopped, she stood up and stripped to her slip. For a moment, he was speechless, because he did not want to have sex with her. He was tired, had to report for duty approximately one hour later, and, believing that Murphy had had sex with her earlier, was reluctant to be "second." Instead, he "kind of rubbed her knee like," and asked her how she "classified" her self; before she could answer, he beat her to the punch by telling her that she was a "whore," married, and just had sexual relations with his roommate and now wanted to have sex with him. In response, Rainey dropped her head, began to cry, ran out of Dorsey's room and left the billets.
The trial defense counsel moved that the defense be permitted to introduce evidence to show the sexual conduct between Rainey and Murphy several hours prior to the alleged rape on the ground that it would support a defense theory that the allegation of rape was Rainey's fabricated response to Dorsey's accusatorial statement. It was argued that such evidence would strengthen Dorsey's claim that the reason for Rainey's false accusation was her bias and anger towards Dorsey and that its admission was constitutionally required. Memorandum of Law, Appellate Exhibit IV.
The military judge limited presentation of such evidence. He barred introduction of extrinsic evidence concerning the alleged act of sexual intercourse between Rainey and Murphy but allowed presentation of testimony as to what Dorsey believed and may have said about it to Rainey.
Specifically, he ruled that "evidence about what the accused said in the entire statement will be admissible from whatever source---- Evidence of the act, itself, other than that statement, is inadmissible from whatever source."
The first problem we must address concerns the scope of the challenged ruling of the trial judge in this case. He ruled that "independent evidence" of the prosecutrix' act of consensual sexual intercourse with appellant's roommate could not be admitted at this court-martial. On its face, such a ruling implies that the form of the excluded evidence was a controlling factor in his determination that it was not "constitutionally required to be admitted" under Mil.R. Evid. 412(b)(1). See generally United States v. Banker, 15 M.J. 207, 211 (C.M.A.1983). It is the legal correctness of this implication, as a basis for his ruling, that we first must examine.
To appreciate the meaning of "independent evidence" as understood by the military judge, we must turn to the record of trial. In her Memorandum of Law, attached as an appellate exhibit to the record of trial, defense counsel sought permission to question appellant about a purported statement he made to the prosecutrix at the time of the alleged offense. She stated that appellant would testify that he said to her, "You just fucked my roommate, you're married and now you're trying to fuck me; how do you classify yourself?, a whore." Trial counsel in a Memorandum of Law, also attached to the record of trial, opposed this request to the extent that appellant should not be permitted to testify, "You just fucked my roommate." The Government noted initially that a problem existed as to whether appellant actually knew that the prosecutrix engaged in sexual intercourse with appellant's roommate. He then argued that such evidence of past sexual conduct of the prosecutrix was not critical to the defense in this case and not "constitutionally required to be admitted" in accordance with Mil.R.Evid. 412(b)(1).
The military judge questioned defense counsel at trial about her motion. He stated that he construed defense counsel's motion as a request to introduce not only evidence of appellant's statement about the prosecutrix' past sexual conduct but also "independent evidence" that the prosecutrix engaged in such sexual conduct. Defense counsel agreed and asserted that cross-examination of the prosecutrix or testimony from appellant's roommate would be probative of the great emotional impact appellant's statement had upon her and her strong motivation to falsely cry rape. Trial counsel also opposed this request on the basis of Mil.R.Evid. 412, and argued that the probative value of this evidence was outweighed by its prejudice. The military judge permitted defense counsel to question appellant about any statements he made to the prosecutrix about her past sexual behavior and his belief that they were true, but refused to allow "independent evidence" of her sexual conduct with appellant's roommate. Appellant testified that he made these statements to the prosecutrix and assumed they were true.
We have examined Mil.R.Evid. 412, and find no prohibition against admission of independent or extrinsic evidence of a prosecutrix' past sexual conduct if such evidence "is constitutionally required to be admitted" under section (b)(1). The fact the defense intended to evidence was that the prosecutrix, just prior to the alleged rape, engaged in consensual sexual intercourse with appellant's roommate. Testimony from appellant that he assumed this act occurred and made statements to this effect is less reliable evidence than the so-called "independent" testimony from the purported participants in this act, i.e., the prosecutrix and appellant's roommate. See Mil.R.Evid. 602. Moreover, defense counsel made it clear that the excluded evidence was not offered to show that the prosecutrix had a poor character for truthfulness and therefore was probably lying to the members. Mil.R.Evid. 608(b) does make a distinction between extrinsic evidence and evidence adduced on cross-examination, both of which are offered to show a witness' poor character for truthfulness. Yet, this distinction is not applicable where the evidence is offered to show a motive for certain conduct (Mil.R.Evid. 404(b)) or a motive for false testimony. Mil.R.Evid. 608(c); United States v. Banker, supra at 210. Here, defense counsel stated that the proffered evidence would be probative of the intense motive of the prosecutrix for falsely crying rape to her roommates and for falsely testifying against appellant at his court-martial. To the extent that the military judge based his ruling on the form of the evidence offered, his ruling was incorrect.
A second problem exists in this case. The Government at trial and on appeal asserts that evidence of the prosecutrix' sexual conduct with appellant's roommate, regardless of the form in which it was presented, was not admissible under Mil.R.Evid. 412(b)(1). At trial, the Government argued "that the probative value of . [this] evidence," if any, was clearly outweighed by its "danger of unfair prejudice." Mil.R.Evid. 412(c)(3); see generally United States v. Kasto, 584 F.2d 268 (8th Cir.1978), cert, denied, 440 U.S. 930, 99 S.Ct. 1267, 59 L.Ed.2d 486 (1979). On appeal, it argues that this evidence was not legally relevant and as such was not "constitutionally required to be admitted" under Mil.R.Evid. 412(b)(1). See Mil.R.Evid. 402 and 403. It also suggests that this evidence was not logically relevant to any issue of any consequence in the present case and constituted a thinly disguised attack on the rape victim's character for chastity. Mil.R.Evid. 401. The Court of Military Review agreed with the argument of appellate government counsel.
In addressing these arguments, some general comments concerning Mil.R.Evid. 412 are appropriate. This rule of evidence, except in certain procedural aspects, is "substantially" the same as Fed.R.Evid. 412. See Analysis of the Military Rules of Evidence, Appendix 18, Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1969 (Revised edition) (hereafter cited as Analysis), Mil.R. Evid. 412. Examination of the legislative history of Fed.R.Evid. 412 indicates that Congress intended that evidence of a rape victim's past sexual behavior not be routinely admitted at a criminal trial for rape. See D. Louisel and C. Mueller, Federal Evi dence § 197 (1982 supp.). Mil.R.Evid. 412 was intended to accomplish this same objective. See Analysis, supra. This is a significant change from past court-martial practice. See para. 153b, Manual, supra. Yet this new policy of exclusion is couched in terms permitting the admission of such evidence under certain circumstances. See Fed.R.Evid. 412(b)(1) and (2); Mil.R.Evid. 412(b)(1) and (2). From these circumstances, it is quite clear that this so-called "rape shield" rule is not an absolute bar to the admission of such evidence at a court-martial. See Analysis, supra; Doe v. United States, 666 F.2d 43 (4th Cir.1981); see generally Westen, Compulsory Process II, 74 Mich.L.Rev. 191, 211 n. 64 (1975).
In this light, it must be determined whether the defense demonstrated that the proffered evidence was "constitutionally required to be admitted." Mil.R.Evid. 412(b)(1). The meaning of this phrase is not particularly described in this evidentiary rule, but its legislative history makes clear the drafters' intention that this rule should not be applied in derogation of a criminal accused's constitutional rights. See generally Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). Under such circumstances, we believe the decisions of the Supreme Court expounding upon a defendant's constitutional right to present his defense will provide the proper scope of this evidentiary rule. See Westen, supra at 211 n. 65.
In a recent decision in this area, the Supreme Court has stated that a criminal accused has the right to present evidence which is relevant, material, and favorable to his defense. United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 102 S.Ct. 3440, 3446, 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982). See United States v. Lucas, 5 M.J. 167 (C.M.A.1978). In that case, the Supreme Court addressed claims by a criminal defendant that his constitutional rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth Amendment were violated by the Government's prompt deportation of aliens who had witnessed his alleged offense. The Supreme Court held a violation of these provisions requires some showing that the relevant evidence lost would be both material and favorable to the defense. Id. 102 S.Ct. at 3449. See also Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 16, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 1921, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967). The same type of analysis was employed in Davis v. Alaska, supra 415 U.S. at 309, 94 S.Ct. at 1107, where the Supreme Court found a real possibility existed that the prohibited cross-examination of a juvenile would have caused serious damage to the state's case.
The first question we must decide is whether appellant demonstrated the relevance of the proffered evidence to prove the existence of a fact asserted by the defense. See Analysis, supra, Mil.R.Evid. 401; see generally Westen, supra at 207-13. In other words, did the evidence have "any tendency to make the existence of any fact . more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence"? Mil.R. Evid. 401 (emphasis supplied). We conclude that it did.
The theory of the defense in this case was that no act of sexual intercourse occurred between the prosecutrix and appellant on the night in question. See Article 120; para. 199a, Manual, supra. To negate the Government's case on this element of the offense, it offered testimony from appellant to that effect. In addition, it attempted to undermine the credibility of the prosecutrix with respect to her assertions that an act of sexual intercourse occurred. See Mil.R. Evid. 607; United States v. Banker, supra. In particular it attempted to show a motive for the prosecutrix' complaint of rape (Mil. R.Evid. 404(b)) and for her testimony at trial. (Mil.R.Evid. 608(c)).
In general, motive can be described as an inward emotion, passion, or feeling in a person which "is likely to lead" that person to do an "appropriate act" as "an outlet" for this emotion. See J. Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 117 (3d ed. 1940) (hereafter cited as Wigmore). The defense particularly contended that the prosecutrix had a feeling of anger towards appellant and a feeling of guilt concerning herself. She argued that it was reasonable to infer that an angry person would do some act of revenge against the person who was the object of her anger. She further intimated that a person experiencing guilt would do some act of revenge against the person who caused this feeling of guilt to surface. The particular acts to be inferred from this emotional state of mind in the prosecutrix were her false accusations that appellant raped her. No argument has been presented by the Government which would lead us to conclude that such acts of revenge could not be reasonably considered appropriate outlets for these emotions. Id.
In order to secure the benefit of this evidential inference, the defense was required to show these emotions existed in the prosecutrix at the time she made her accusations. In this case, defense attempted to show circumstantially the existence of these emotions by evidencing facts or events about the prosecutrix which tended to excite these emotions in her — Wigmore, supra, § 117, 385-89; in other words, facts which would have real probative value as causes or stimuli for these emotions.
To show the prosecutrix' anger toward appellant, the defense introduced evidence that appellant rebuked her for her marital infidelity, demeaned her character for chastity, and rejected her sexual advances, all based on his assertion that she just had sex with his roommate. The military judge permitted such evidence to be admitted as relevant to her state of mind. To show her guilty feelings, the defense additionally offered the excluded evidence that the prosecutrix had in fact engaged in consensual sexual intercourse with appellant's roommate. The military judge refused to admit this evidence.
We conclude such evidence was relevant to her feelings of guilt. From it the inference can be drawn that the prosecutrix had knowledge that appellant's • accusations were true or at least had some basis in fact. In our opinion, it would not be unreasonable to further infer that a person brutally confronted with the harsh realities of her conduct might feel some guilt. See Wigmore, supra, § 389. Accordingly, the excluded evidence in conjunction with evidence of appellant's statements had some tendency to show the existence of a guilty state of mind on her part. See Westen, supra at 209.
The second question we must address is whether the defense demonstrated that the excluded evidence was material. See United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, supra. In other words, was the fact intended to be proved by the evidence "of consequence to the determination of" appellant's guilt? Mil.R.Evid. 401; Analysis, supra, Mil.R. Evid. 401. In making such a judgment, it is necessary to consider the importance of the issue for which the evidence was offered in relation to the other issues in this case; the extent to which this issue is in dispute; and the nature of other evidence in the case pertaining to this issue. See generally Westen, supra at 225.
The above criteria must be evaluated in light of the evidence of record. The prosecutrix was the only eye witness for the Government who testified that the act of rape occurred. She also testified that she was emotionally upset when she ran from appellant's room and complained to her roommates that appellant raped her. She stated that her emotional state was a product of appellant's physical attack upon her. The prosecutrix' roommates confirmed her emotional state and her complaint. Appellant denied that any act of sexual intercourse occurred. He also asserted that the jprosecutrix ran from his room in an emotional state only because of his statements to her. Appellant's roommate, Bradshaw, testified that he was awakened from his sleep and saw the prosecutrix and appellant in their room. He stated that he did not see them struggling at that time nor was he later awakened by any scream for help which the prosecutrix testified she made. Also, there was no physical or medical evidence introduced at this trial that demonstrated that an act of sexual intercourse, with or without force, occurred between the prosecutrix and appellant that night. Fi nally, the Government in rebuttal called to the stand the company commander of both appellant and the prosecutrix. He stated that appellant did not have a good reputation for truthfulness and, in his opinion, was a liar. He further testified that the prosecutrix did have a good reputation for truthfulness and, in his opinion, generally told the truth.
The evidentiary state of this record makes it quite clear that the relevant evidence excluded by the military judge would have had a reasonable likelihood of affecting the judgment of the trier of fact. See United States v. Vaienzuela-Bernal, supra 102 S.Ct. at 3450, citing Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S.Ct. 763, 766, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972); Westen, supra at 222. The critical issue in this case was the credibility of the prosecutrix and appellant. This conclusion is further buttressed by the closing arguments of both counsel. The excluded evidence, as indicated earlier, was relevant to the prosecutrix' credibility and therefore pertains to an important issue in this case. See Davis v. Alaska, supra. Second, the above evidentiary record makes it quite clear that the parties to this trial vigorously disputed the issue of the prosecutrix' credibility. Finally, it is readily apparent that the excluded evidence of motive was intimately connected to the defense evidence of motive already admitted by the military judge. Moreover, it would be provided by a witness other than appellant. Under these circumstances and in view of the fact that no other evidence was admitted in this case to show the prosecutrix' feelings of guilt, we conclude that the excluded evidence could reasonably be deemed to add substance and weight to the existing evidence of motive. See Westen, supra at 226.
The third question which must be answered is whether the defense demonstrated that the proffered evidence was favorable to its case. See United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, supra. No one at trial or on appeal disputes the fact that the prosecutrix engaged in consensual sexual intercourse with appellant's roommate a short time prior to the alleged offense. The existence of this fact is further supported by the testimony of the prosecutrix and appellant's roommate taken at the Article 32 investigation, the report of which is attached to the record. Accordingly, the excluded evidence was exculpatory to the extent that it undermined the credibility of the sole prosecution witness who directly testified to appellant's guilt of the charged offense. In addition, the excluded evidence could have corroborated appellant's testimony in that it might be considered more probable if a basis in fact existed for his assumption. Under these circumstances, the excluded evidence was favorable to defense.
The final question in this case is whether the proffered evidence was properly excluded because its probative value did not outweigh the danger of unfair prejudice which would result from its admission. Mil.R. Evid. 412(cX3). Trial counsel stated that the prosecution's case would suffer if the evidence was admitted because the jury would be inclined to decide appellant's guilt on the basis of the fact that the prosecutrix had a poor moral character. See Mil.R. Evid. 403; Tanford and Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth Amendment, 128 U.Pa.L.Rev. 544, 574-75 (1980). He also argued that the admission of this evidence would violate the policy of the federal government reflected in Mil.R.Evid. 412. He asserts that the Government has a strong interest in sheltering victims of rape from humiliation and psychological damage and in encouraging the reporting and prosecution of rape offenses. See Analysis, supra, Mil.R.Evid. 412. These legitimate governmental interests will be frustrated, he claims, by the admission of evidence of the prosecutrix' sexual behavior with appellant's roommate. See generally Mil.R.Evid. 402.
We reject trial counsel's first argument because the remedy of exclusion is overly drastic to protect against the potential prejudice he suggests. See 128 U.Pa.L.Rev. at 577; Note, Constitutional Restraints on the Exclusion of Evidence in the Defendant's Favor: The Implications of Davis v. Alaska, 73 Mich.L.Rev. 1465, 1491 (1975) (hereafter cited as Note). Under the circumstances of the present case, an instruction limiting the use of the evidence would be more appropriate. Mil.R.Evid. 105. See Westen, supra at 212.
In addressing his second argument, we note that Mil.R.Evid. 412(bXl) states that "evidence of a victim's past sexual behavior is" inadmissible "unless . admitted in accordance with subdivision (c)(1) and (c)(2) and is constitutionally required to be admitted." In view of this language, the balancing test prescribed in Mil.R.Evid. 412(c)(3) may not be appropriate to evidence offered under this particular provision. See Louisell and Mueller, supra, § 198[B] (at 223); S. Saltzburg, L. Schinasi, and D. Schlueter, Military Buies of Evidence Manual 208 (1981). Assuming that this balancing test is appropriate, we again must note that appellant demonstrated that the excluded evidence was relevant, material, and vital to his defense. See United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, supra. In such a situation, we believe the holding of the Supreme Court in Davis v. Alaska, supra 415 U.S. at 319-20, 94 S.Ct. at 1111-1112, dictates that the constitutional right of appellant to present such evidence is paramount. See also Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 51 S.Ct. 218, 75 L.Ed. 624 (1931). See generally Note, supra; Weinstein's Evidence para. 412[01] (1982); Westen, supra at 207-13.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the military judge erred to the prejudice of appellant's substantial rights by excluding the proffered evidence.
The decision of the United States Army Court of Military Review as to Charge I and its specification is reversed. The findings of guilty of Charge I and its specification, and the sentence, are set aside. The record of trial is returned to the Judge Advocate General of the Army. A rehearing on Charge I and the sentence may be ordered.
. Q: Now, Private Dorsey, were you surprised to see Specialist Rainey at the door to your room after you'd asked her earlier for some company?
A: Yes, I were. When I — when I made— when I said that to her, I was thinking of— like — that—that she, you know, that she wouldn't, you know, wouldn't — that perhaps that, you know, she would think about it and maybe some other time, you know, that, you know, I see her that she still, you know, remember that what I had said to her, you know, but at the time, I didn't think that she was going to come down to the room right then, within that same night. Well, I was kind of like, you know, making a point to her that I wouldn't mind, you know, having sex with her, you know.
. Appellate Exhibit IV:
In the present case the issue is not consent. There is denial that any intercourse ever took place between the defendant and the alleged victim. The defense does not intend to introduce the victims [sic] sexual history, merely one episode, closely related in time to the alleged rape to show her state of mind at the time the defendant made his statement. Such evidence is highly probative. It goes to the issue of bias and provides an explanation of the victims [sic] actions at the time the rape is alleged. It provides a motive for the victim to claim to her roommates that she was raped by the defendant. The evidence will hardly interfere with the States [sic] interests in encouraging rape victims to report rapes and to disallow the presentation of this evidence would amount to denying the defendant the right to defend himself.