Case Name: The State ex rel. Rhett & Robson vs. H. L. Pinckney, Tax Collector
Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1857-01
Citations: 10 Rich. 474
Docket Number: 
Parties: The State ex rel. Rhett & Robson vs. H. L. Pinckney, Tax Collector.
Judges: O’Neall, Wardlaw, Withers, WhitNer and MuNro, JJ., and DargaN and Wardlaw, CC., concurring.
Reporter: South Carolina Law Reports
Volume: 44
Pages: 474–490

Head Matter:
The State ex rel. Rhett & Robson vs. H. L. Pinckney, Tax Collector.
An Act of 1854, imposed a tax on “ tlie amount of sales of goods, wares, and merchandise,” &e.: Held, that where the sales were of goods brought from other States and sold by the importer in the original packages, they were nevertheless liable to the tax — not being exempt from State taxation by any provision of the Constitution of the United States.
So long as Congress forbears to exercise the constitutional power to regulate commerce among the several States, each State may, for itself, and within its own limits, regulate such commerce.
In the clause of the Constitution prohibiting a State from laying duties on imports, the term imports embraces only articles from foreign nations subject to the payment of duties to the United States, and not merchandise carried from one State to another.
Imports are exempt from State taxation only so long as they remain the property of the importer in his warehouse, in the forms or packages in which imported. When the packages are sold, or. broken up, and the goods mixed with the general mass of State property, they are not protected from State taxation. So also, it seems, a tax upon the importer, estimated by the amount of his sales, is not unconstitutional, even though his sales embrace imported articles.
BEFORE MUNRO, J., AT CHARLESTON, FALL TERM, 1855.
Tbe report of bis Honor, tbe presiding Judge, is as follows: Tbe motion in tbis case is for a prohibition, to restrain tbe respondent, tbe tax collector for tbe parishes of St. Philip’s and St. Michael’s, from enforcing tbe payment of a tax, on tbe amount of sales of goods, wares, and merchandise, imposed by an Act of tbe Legislature passed on tbe 21st day of December, A. D. 1854, entitled, “ An Act to raise supplies for tbe year commencing in October, 1854.”
Tbe clause of tbe Act imposing tbe tax in question is in the following words: “ There shall be raised and paid into the public treasury of this State, for the use and service thereof, ten cents upon every one hundred dollars of‘the amount of sales of goods, wares, and merchandise, embracing all the articles of trade for sale, barter,, or exchange, (the products of this State, and the unmanufactured products of any of the United States, or territories thereof, excepted,) which any person shall have made, from the first day of January in the present year, to the first day of'January, 1855, either on his, her, or their capital, or on account of any person or persons, as agent, attorney, or consignee.”
The suggestion sets forth, that the relators are merchants in the city of Charleston, trading under the name of Rhett & Robson; and that between the 1st day of January, 1854, and the 1st day of January, 1855, they imported into the said city, large amounts of produce from other States in the United States, and where the said several products were manufactured, to wit, flour in barrels from, the States of Georgia, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania; beef in barrels, and plaster, from the State of Maryland ; nails in kegs, from the States of Maryland and Virginia; and molasses in barrels from the State of Louisiana; all of which said manufactured articles were sold by the relators in the barrels, kegs, bales, and boxes in which they were imported, the sales whereof amounting in the whole to one hundred and forty-one thous and three hundred and five dollars; that they have made returns of their said sales to the tax collector, who insists upon the payment of the tax thereon, pursuant to the provisions of the Act of the Legislature; the provisions of which Act the relators however insist are null and void, the same being-repugnant to that clause of the 4th section of the first article of the Constitution of the United States, which declares that, “No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any impost or duties upon imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws ; and tbe net produce of all duties and imposts laid by any State on imports and exports, shall be for tbe use of tbe treasury of tbe United States; and all such laws shall be subject to tbe revision of Congress.”
Tbe Act in question having received tbe deliberate sanction of both branches of tbe Legislature, and ratified with all tbe formalities prescribed by tbe Constitution of tbe State, its several provision's must be held to be valid and binding, unless they be clearly repugnant to tbe Constitution of tbe United States, or to some law passed by tbe Federal Legislature, pursuant to some of its enumerated powers.
The grounds upon which tbe relators rest their objections to the constitutionality of tbe provisions of tbe said Act, may be thus stated:
1. That tbe tax in question is repugnant to that clause in tbe Constitution which empowers Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among tbe several States.
2. That tbe said tax virtually amounts to an impost or duty upon imports, within tbe prohibitory clause in tbe Constitution referred to; and that tbe clause in question extends as well to commodities imported from one State into another, as it does to those that are strictly foreign.
3. That under these several constitutional provisions, all imports, internal or domestic, as well as external or foreign, are under tbe protection of the Federal power, and are exempt from tbe taxing power of tbe States, so long as tbe commodity remains in tbe bands of tbe importer in bulk, and to a sale made by him while it retains its distinctive character of an import; and in support of these positions, they mainly rely upon the principles adjudged by the Federal Judiciary, in the case of- Brown vs. The State of Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419.
In tbat case, the Legislature of Maryland bad passed an Act requiring all importers of dry goods, wares, or merchandise, &c., and other persons selling the same, by wholesale, bale, or package, &c., before they sold the same to take out a license, for which they were required to pay fifty dollars; and for neglect or refusal to do so, the party offending was subjected to a forfeiture of the amount of the license tax and a fine of one hundred dollars, to be recovered by indictment.
Under this Act, the plaintiffs in error were indicted for selling a bale of dry goods without a license to do so; they demurred to the indictment, upon which judgment was' rendered against them in the State Court; from which judgment the case was carried up by writ of error to the Supreme'Court of the United States. A majority of the Court adjudged the law of Maryland to be null and void, on the ground of its repugnancy, to that provision in the Constitution which prohibits the States from laying an impost or duty upon imports; likewise to that other provision which empowers Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States.
In the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall, through whom the voice of the majority was announced, the following points were ruled:
1st. That a duty on foreign imports, is not merely a duty on the act of importation, but is a duty on the article imported.
2nd. That Congress has a right, not only to authorize importations, but the right to authorize the importer to sell.
3rd. That a commodity imported from a foreign jurisdiction, is exempt from the taxing power of the States, so long as it remains in the hands of the importer -in the form in which it was imported; and to a sale by him while it remains in such, form; and any penalty inflicted on the importer for selling in his character of importer, or any tax on the article imported, or on its sale by the importer, are alike hostile to the power conferred on Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations.
4th. That this exemption from the taxing power of the States, continues only so long as the commodity retains its distinctive character of an import; but that so soon as this condition of things is changed by the act of the importer, either by a sale of the commodity, or by breaking up his packages, or otherwise mixing it up with the general property of the State, it immediately becomes subject to the taxing-power and police regulations of the State, in the same manner, and to the same extent, to which all the property within its jurisdiction is subject.
Although this decision has not entirely escaped judicial criticism, it has nevertheless ranked, for the last quarter of a century, as the leading authority on this branch of constitutional law; and defines with almost mathematical exactness, the boundary line between the commercial power of the Federal Government and the municipal power of the States, over foreign imports, under the Constitution.
As the case of Brown vs. Maryland was a case of foreign commerce, subject in all respects to the laws of Congress regulating the same, pursuant to its constitutional powers: and the present case is one arising out of commerce among the States, for the regulation of which the legislative power of Congress has never been exercised: the first question I propose to consider, is, whether the power to regulate commerce, both foreign and among the States, the latter especially, is exclusively vested in. Congress by the Constitution, so as to exclude all State legislation over these subjects.
In the 2nd volume of Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution, at section 1068, the following doctrine is broadly laid down: “Tbe next enquiry is, whether tbe power to regúlate commerce is exclusive of tbe same power in tbe States, or is concurrent witb it. It bas been settled upon tbe most solemn deliberation, that tbe power is exclusive in tbe government of tbe United States.” And in support of tbis doctrine, be relies upon tbe cases of Brown vs. Maryland, supra, and Gibbons vs. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1. It is matter of no little surprise, that so eminent a jurist as was tbe late Mr. Justice Story, himself too a member of tbe Supreme Court at tbe time these cases were decided, should have relied upon them as judicial authority for tbe principle thus broadly and unqualifiedly asserted", when it is palpable on tbe most superficial examination of them, that in neither of them did tbe question of tbe exclusiveness of tbe commercial power of tbe Federal Government, under tbe Constitution, arise. It is true, that in both of these cases, much will be found to have been said on that subject in tbe arguments of counsel; and not a little, too, to tbe same effect, in tbe opinions of tbe Judges; but in Brown vs. Maryland, as we have seen, tbe case was one of foreign commerce already regulated by tbe laws of Congress, so that tbe sole question there was, tbe extent of tbe power of Congress, by virtue of such regulations, to protect foreign imports from State taxation: while in Gibbons vs. Ogden, which was a case in which tbe constitutionality of the exclusive license laws of New York was drawn into controversy, tbe only question was, whether tbe said license laws came in conflict witb tbe laws passed by Congress on tbe same subject. In fact, in tbe last mentioned case, so far from that question having been decided by tbe Court, we have tbe authority of tbe Chief Justice, by whom its opinion was pronounced, for saying, that its consideration was expressly waived. At page 200, be says, “ In dismissing tbe question whether tbe power is still in tbe States, in tbe case under consideration, we may dismiss from it tbe enquiry whether it is surrendered by tbe mere grant to Congress, or is retained until Congress shall exercise the power. We may dismiss that enquiry, because it has been exercised, and the regulations which Congress deemed it proper to make, are now in full operation. The sole question is, can a State regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the States, while Congress is regulating it.”
We thus see, that the question, whether the mere grant of power to Congress, to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the States, amounts of itself to an extinguishment of the power of the States to make valid commercial regulations, instead of having been settled upon solemn deliberation, by the cases relied upon by Mr. Justice Story, remained an open question for several years after their decision. It at length however came up, for the first time, for adjudication before the same tribunal in the case of Wilson vs. The Blackbird Greek Go., 2 Peters, 259.
In that case, the State of Delaware had granted a charter to the Company to erect a dam across the Blackbird Creek; the dam was 'constructed, and the plaintiff in error, being tin-able to pass it with his vessel, broke it, and the Company sued him for damages — to which he set up the defence, that the creek was a navigable highway, and that he did no more damage than was necessary to allow his vessel to pass. In delivering the opinion of the Court, Marshall, Chief Justice, said, “ The repugnancy of the law of Delaware to the Constitution, is placed entirely on its repugnancy to the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States: a power which has not been exercised by Congress so as to affect the question. We do not think that the Act empowering the Blackbird Creek Company to place a dam across the creek, can under all the circumstances of the case, be considered repugnant to the power to regulate commerce in its dormant state, or as being in conflict with any law passed on the subject.”
But the case in which the question came more directly up for consideration before tbe same tribunal, was tbe case of Peirce, et al., ys. The State of New Hampshire, reported, along with two other cases, under tbe title of tbe license cases, in 5 Howard, 504. In that case, tbe plaintiffs in error bad purchased a barrel of gin in Boston, Massachusetts, which was carried coastwise by water to Hover in New Hampshire, where it was sold in the same barrel or cask, in which it was imported, without obtaining a license for that purpose, pursuant to a Statute of New Hampshire, which prohibited the sale of distilled spirits without a license from the Selectmen of the town in which the party resided. Under this statute, the plaintiffs in error were indicted and convicted in the State Court, and the cause was carried up by writ of error to the Supreme Court.
In the argument of the case, similar grounds of objection were taken, in behalf of the plaintiffs in error, to the constitutionality of the law of New Hampshire, that were taken to the law of Maryland in Brown's case : — While on the other hand, it was urged, that the power of Congress to regulate commerce was not exclusive, and did not of itself amount to a prohibition upon the States, so as to render void all State legislation on that subject. The Judges delivered their opinions seriatim. TANEY, Chief Justice, at p. 578, says: “ The question brought up for decision is, whether a State is prohibited by the Constitution from making any regulations of foreign commerce, or of commerce with another State, although such regulation is confined to its own territory, and made for its own convenience, or interest, and does not come in conflict with any law of Congress. In other words, whether the grant of power to Congress, is of -itself a prohibition to the States, and renders all laws upon the subject null and void. This is the question upon which this case turns; and I do not see how it can be decided upon any other ground, provided we adopt the line of division between foreign and domestic commerce, marked out by the Court in tbe case of Brown vs. Mmyland.” After reviewing tbe case of Gibbons vs. Ogden, wbicb was supposed to countenance tbe doctrine, tbat tbe power to regulate commerce was exclusively vested in Congress, and showing very conclusively, tbat if any thing, it rather favored tbe opposite doctrine, .be concludes, as follows: “ Upon tbe whole, therefore, tbe law of New Hampshire is, in my judgment, a valid one. For although tbe gin sold was an import from another State, and Congress have clearly tbe power to regulate said importations, under tbe grant of power to regulate commerce among tbe several States; yet, as Congress has made no regulation on tbe subject, tbe traffic in tbe article may be lawfully regulated by tbe States as soon as it is landed in its territories; and a tax imposed upon it, or a license required, or tbe sale of it altogether prohibited, according to tbe policy wbicb tbe State may suppose to be to its interests, or duty to pursue.”
CATRON, Justice, said: “Tbe power to regulate commerce among tbe States may be exercised by Congress at pleasure, and tbe States cut off from regulating tbe same commerce at tbe same time it stands regulated by Congress ; but tbat until such regulation is made, tbe States may exercise tbe power within their respective limits.” Three of their associates, namely, Justices Nelson, Daniel, and Woodbury, substantially concurred in sustaining tbe above doctrine — these five constituting a majority of tbe Court. Mr. Justice McLean appears to have rested bis opinion partly on tbe ground, tbat tbe principle ruled in Brown vs. Marylandl, applied exclusively to foreign commerce ; and partly on tbe ground, tbat tbe license law was a mere police regulation, and in tbe exercise of 'an undoubted power in tbe State. While Mr. Justice Grrier rested bis opinion solely upon tbe ground, tbat tbe law was a purely police regulation, and not at all affected by tbe constitutional objection. It is undoubtedly competent for a State, in virtue of its police, or reserved powers — tbe right of self-preservation — to exclude from its territorial limits any thing which, has a tendency to endanger the public health, ox morals. It is to this high conservative power as Mr. Justice Grier properly remarks, that quarantine laws trace their origin; and to the supremacy of which, even constitutional obligations are compelled to give way. But it is far from being clear, that the license law of New Hampshire has any claim to rest upon such a basis, and to rank ardent spirits, an admitted article of commerce, in the same category with the causes which produce moral and physical pestilence — much less has she a right to invoke the aid of this high conservative power — not to exclude from her borders this pestilential commodity, but to sustain her in legalizing its traffic. The right to traffic in a licensed pestilence, can hardly be ranked among the reserved powers of a State.
But the fallacy in the argument, which claims to rescue the license law of New Hampshire from the charge of repugnancy to the Constitution, by intrenching it behind her police powers, is completely exposed when subjected to the following test. Suppose, for example, that the commodity, instead of a barrel of gin manufactured in Massachusetts, and imported from that State, had been a barrel of gin manufactured in Holland, and imported from that country ? Where, it may be asked, would have existed the distinction between such foreign import, and the case of Brown, who imported and sold a bale of dry goods in defiance of the license law of Maryland; and how, it may again be asked, would the license law of New Hampshire, her police powers to the contrary, have escaped the charge of repugnancy to the Constitution, and the fate that befel the law of Maryland under the rule laid down in Brown's case.
• It is clear, then, that the validity of the New Hampshire law can, with no show of reason, be made to rest upon its police powers ; but that the ground upon which it was placed by the majority of the Court was the true ground, namely, the competency oí the States to make valid commercial regu lations, until tbe Federal Government shall see proper to make plenary exercise of its power; for it is then, and then only, that tbe legislation of tbe latter becomes, in tbe language of tbe Constitution, “ the supreme law of the land."
Tbe question, then, of tbe concurrent power of tbe States to make valid commercial regulations, while tbe power of Congress remains in a dormant state, having been definitively settled by tbe Federal Judiciary in the two last cases referred to; tbe decision of tbe question involved in this case might safely be rested upon their authority; especially upon tbe case of Peirce vs. New Hampshire; for if it was competent for tbe legislature of that State, without infringing upon tbe grant of power to Congress to regulate commerce, to make a valid commercial regulation — for it was so considered by tbe Court — in tbe form of a license, operating, not merely as a direct charge, or tax, upon tbe import, while it remained in tbe bands of tbe importer, but as a prohibition upon its sale; it was, to say tbe least of it, equally competent for tbe legislature of South Carolina to impose a tax, which operates neither upon tbe importer in bis character of importer, nor upon tbe imported article — assuming it to be an import — but which operates only upon tbe proceeds arising from tbe sale of tbe article, after it has been divested of its character of an import, and become a component part of tbe general property of tbe State.
There is another ground, however, upon which tbe decision of tbe New Hampshire case might also have been rested, and as it forms tbe chief ground upon which tbe Relators rely in support of their motion, I propose briefly to consider it. Tbe position is this: that tbe tax in question virtually amounts to a duty upon imports, and is in direct conflict with that provision in tbe Constitution, which prohibits tbe States from “laying an impostor duty upon imports which provision extends to domestic as well as to foreign imports, and that tbe former are entitled to tbe same exemption from State taxation, tbat is extended to tbe latter under tbe rule adjudged in Brown vs. Maryland.
In support of tbis position, it was contended, tbat tbe term “ imports,” in tbe above clause of tbe Constitution, includes as well commodities tbat are transported from one State into another, as those tbat are imported from a foreign jurisdiction.
If tbe transportation of an article of merchandize from a port of entry in one State, to a port of entry in another; say from tbe port of Wilmington, in North Carolina, to tbe port of Charleston, in tbis State, be an import, within tbe constitutional or fiscal meaning of tbe term; then tbe conclusion is inevitable, tbat tbe transportation of a commodity across tbe boundary line which separates these States, at any point along its entire extent, must be equally an import.
It would be a startling proposition to affirm, tbat all tbe manufactured products which go to make up tbe vast amount of internal commerce tbat is continually carried on, among tbe several States and territories tbat compose tbis confederacy? by tbe almost infinite variety of modes of transportation now in use, are, tbe moment they pass tbe boundary line of tbe State, where produced, or manufactured, converted into imports, and tbe purchasers into importers, and entitled to tbe same exemption from State taxation, tbat is extended to foreign imports.
But, if we look to tbe history of tbe fiscal legislation of Congress, together with tbe judicial decisions giving construction to it, it is manifest tbat tbe term import, according to its fiscal acceptation — for it is in tbat sense it is used in tbe Constitution — is wholly inapplicable to tbe interchange of commodities among tbe States; but tbat'it is restricted in its meaning to such commodities only as are imported from abroad, are introduced into tbe country through its several ports of entry, and are subject to tbe taxing power of tbe Federal Government. In Arnold vs. The United States, 9 Crancb, 101, it is said: “To constitute an importation, according to tbe fiscal meaning of tbe term, so as to attach tbe right of duties, it is necessary not only that there should be an arrival within the limits of the United States, but also within the limits of some port of entry.’’ To the same effect see Vowell vs. The United States, 5 Cranch, 868; and 1 Mason, 499.
An article of merchandize, transported across the boundary line which separates the States of Kentucky and Tennessee, could hardly be said to come up to the above definition of “ an importation.”
“ The word import,” says Mr. Justice McLean, in the New Hampshire case, “ in a commercial sense, means the goods, or other articles brought into the country from abroad, from another country.” In speaking of the case of Brown vs• Maryland, he remarks: “ But neither the facts nor the reasons of that case, can apply to a person who transports an article from one State to another. In some cases, the transportation is only a few feet, or rods, and generally is attended with little risk; and no duty is paid to the Federal, or State Government; and why should property which is carried across a State line be exempt from taxation, which is common to all other property in the State.”
Daniel, Justice, said: “ Imports, in a political or fiscal, as well as in common practical acceptation, are properly commodities brought in from abroad.”
It is clear, then, that to constitute an import, within the meaning of that term, as it is employed in the Constitution, three things are indispensable; first, the commodity must be brought from abroad, pursuant to the laws of Congress, regulating commerce with foreign nations. Secondly, it must be brought within the limits of some port of entry; and lastly, it must be subject to the payment of an impost, or duty, to the Federal Government, for the privilege of introducing it into the country.
It is the payment, by the importer, to the Federal Govern ment, of tbis impost or duty, upon tbe imported article, wbicb secures to it an exemption from State taxation, so long as it retains its distinctive character of an import, and forms tbe basis of tbe rule in J^rown vs. Maryland.
But for tbis restraint upon tbe taxing power of tbe States over foreign imports, so long as they retain that character, it would have been perfectly competent for tbe State of Maryland to have imposed a tax, in any form, or to any extent, that either her interests or her policy may have dictated, tbe moment tbe commodity entered her territorial limits; and it was tbe distinction between foreign and domestic imports, that constituted tbe only real difference between tbe cases of Brown vs. Maryland and Pierce vs. New Hampshire, for in all other respects they were identical; tbe barrel of gin in Pierce's case being as much an import within tbe literal meaning of tbe term, as was tbe bale of merchandize in Brown's case; and but for tbe distinction referred to, the repugnancy of tbe license law of New Hampshire to tbe constitutional provision in question, would have been quite as palpable, as was tbe license law of Maryland in Brown's case.
In tbe former case, at page 601, CateoN, Justice, says: “ Had tbe gin imported been an import from a foreign country, tbe license law prohibiting its sale would have been void; my reasons are founded on Brown vs. Maryland." And at page 594, McLeAN, Justice, says: “It is supposed that tbe declaration, * that no State, without tbe consent of Congress, shall lay any impost or duty on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws,’ refers to foreign commerce.” Let it however be conceded for tbe argument’s sake, that a domestic import stands upon tbe same footing with a foreign import, and that it is entitled to tbe same exemption from State taxation that tbe latter is, while it retains that character, under tbe rule laid down in Brown vs. Maryland; it is nevertheless clear, that tbe rule can have no application whatever to tbe case made by the Eelators. The rule, as we have seen, is this: That a duty upon imports, is not a duty upon the act of importation, but upon the thing imported; and its exemption from State taxation continues only — in the language of the Court — “ so long as it remains the property of the importer in his warehouse in the original form, or package, in which it is imported.” And the reason why the imported commodity is thus protected from the fiscal power of the State, while it remains in this condition, is because, says the Court, “ the tax intercepts the import, as an import, in its way to become incorporated'-With the' general mass of property, and denies it the privilege of becoming so incorporated, until it shall have contributed to the revenue of the State. It denies to the importer the right of using the privilege which he has purchased from the United States, until he shall have also purchased it from the State.” But the Court goes on to say: “ This state of things is changed, if he (the importer) sells them, or otherwise mixes them with the general property of the State, by breaking up his packages, and travelling with them as an itinerant pedler.” And again: “He has used the privilege he had purchased, and has himself mixed them up with the common mass, and the law may treat them as it finds them.”
Now if the mere breaking up of the package by the importer, he still retaining possession of the article, or a sale by him of the imported commodity, eo instanti divests it of its character of an import, and at the same time removes the constitutional inhibition upon the taxing power of the State; the logic which claims to hold the proceeds arising from the sale of such commodity subject to the same rule, can hardly be considered unsound, or fallacious; unless, by the way, the rule in Brown vs. Maryland be so construed as to extend to the proceeds of such sale, and the profits or income of the importer — an exemption that is denied to the commodities themselves, from which such proceeds and income accrue.
The distinction, however, between the right of a State to impose a property or income tax upon its citizens, and a tax upon an imported article while it remains a part of foreign commerce, is well taken by Chief Justice Taney in his opinion in the license cases, at page 576, where he says: “Undoubtedly a State may impose a tax upon its citizens in proportion to the amount they are respectively worth; and the importing merchant is liable- to this assessment like any other citizen, and is chargeable according to the amount of his property, whether it consists of money engaged in trade, or of imported goods which he proposes to sell, or any other property of which he is the owner. But a tax of this description stands upon a very different footing from a tax upon the thing imported, while it remains a part of foreign commerce, and is not introduced into the general mass of property in - the State.”
Upon the whole, from the best consideration I have been able to give to the question, I am of opinion, that the tax imposed by the Act of 1854, upon the amount of sales of goods, wares, and merchandise, is clearly within the constitutional powers of the legislature; and I think I may venture the'assertion, that of the many revenue Acts that have been passed by that body, since the State became a party to the federal compact, none will be found less obnoxious to the charge' of repugnancy to the Constitution of the United States, or to any law passed by the federal legislature, pursuant to the powers vested in it by that instrument, than will, the provisions of the Act in question.
The motion is therefore refused.
The Relators, Rhett & Robson, appealed from the decision on the grounds to wit:
1. That the tax laid by the Act of Assembly dated the 21st day of December, A. D. 1854, entitled, “An Act to raise supplies for the year commencing in October, 1854,” upon the wares, goods, and merchandise mentioned in tbe Prohibition, is unconstitutional and void, because contrary to that clause of the Constitution of the United States which prescribes, that “ no State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any impost or duties on imports or exports.”
2. A-nd also because contrary to the clause which prescribes, that Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States and the Indian tribes.
B. B. Bhett, for appellants.
Eayne, Attorney-General, contra.

Opinion:
Per curiam.
This Court perceives no error in the circuit opinion, so that the motion is dismissed.
O'Neall, Wardlaw, Withers, WhitNer and MuNro, JJ., and DargaN and Wardlaw, CC., concurring.
Motion dismissed.