Case Name: PUBLIC HEALTH TRUST OF DADE COUNTY, Florida, Petitioner, v. Norma WONS, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1989-03-16
Citations: 541 So. 2d 96
Docket Number: No. 69970
Parties: PUBLIC HEALTH TRUST OF DADE COUNTY, Florida, Petitioner, v. Norma WONS, Respondent.
Judges: McDonald, SHAW, BARKETT and GRIMES, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 541
Pages: 96–105

Head Matter:
PUBLIC HEALTH TRUST OF DADE COUNTY, Florida, Petitioner, v. Norma WONS, Respondent.
No. 69970.
Supreme Court of Florida.
March 16, 1989.
Robert A. Ginsburg, Dade County Atty. and Aurora Ares, Asst. County Atty., Miami, for petitioner.
John D. Kelner of Kelner & Kelner, Miami, for respondent.
Martin G. Brooks of Martin G. Brooks, P.A., Hollywood, and Donald T. Ridley, Legal Department, Brooklyn, N.Y., amicus curiae for Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc. of New York, Inc.
Robert M. Buckel, Naples, amicus curiae for Christian Information Service, Inc.

Opinion:
KOGAN, Justice.
The Third District Court of Appeal has certified the following question as one of great public importance:
WHETHER A COMPETENT ADULT HAS A LAWFUL RIGHT TO REFUSE A BLOOD TRANSFUSION WITHOUT WHICH SHE MAY WELL DIE.
Wons v. Public Health Trust, 500 So.2d 679, 680 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(4), of the Florida Constitution. We answer the certified question in the affirmative and approve the decision of the third district.
The issues presented by this difficult case challenge us to balance the right of an individual to practice her religion, and protect her right of privacy against the state's interest in maintaining life and protecting innocent third parties.
Norma Wons entered Jackson Memorial Hospital, a medical facility operated by the Public Health Trust of Dade County, with a condition known as dysfunctional uterine bleeding. Doctors informed Mrs. Wons that she would require treatment in the form of a Wood transfusion or she would, in all probability, die. Mrs. Wons, a practicing Jehovah's Witness and mother of two minor children, declined the treatment on grounds that it violated her religious principles to receive blood from outside her own body. At the time she refused consent Mrs. Wons was conscious and able to reach an informed decision concerning her treatment.
The Health Trust petitioned the circuit court to force Mrs. Wons to undergo . a blood transfusion. At the hearing Mrs. Wons' husband testified that he fully supported his wife's decision to refuse the treatment and that, in the unfortunate event she were to die, their two children would be cared for by Mr. Wons and Mrs. Wons' mother and brothers. Nevertheless, the court granted the petition, ordering the hospital doctors to administer the blood transfusion, which was done while Mrs. Wons was unconscious. The trial judge reasoned that minor children have a right to be reared by two loving parents, a right which overrides the mother's rights of free religious exercise and privacy. Upon regaining consciousness, Mrs. Wons appealed to the third district which reversed the order. After holding that the case was not moot due to the recurring nature of Mrs. Wons' condition (i.e., it was capable of repetition, yet evading review), the district court held that Mrs. Wons' constitutional rights of religion and privacy could not be overridden by the state's purported interests.
An individual's right to refuse medical treatment must be analyzed in terms of our decision in Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So.2d 359 (Fla.1980), aff'g 362 So.2d 160 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). That case, in which this Court adopted the fourth district's reasoning in full, established four criteria wherein the right to refuse medical treatment may be overridden by a compelling state interest. These factors are:
1) Preservation of life,
2) protection of innocent third parties,
3) prevention of suicide, and
4) maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical profession.
362 So.2d at 162. It is important to note that these factors are by no means a bright-line test, capable of resolving every dispute regarding the refusal of medical treatment. Rather, they are intended merely as factors to be considered while reaching the difficult decision of when a compelling state interest may override the basic constitutional rights of privacy and religious freedom.
The Health Trust asserts that the children's right to be reared by two loving parents is sufficient to trigger the second compelling state interest in the Perlmutter list of criteria. While we agree that the nurturing and support by two parents is important in the development of any child, it is not sufficient to override fundamental constitutional rights. St. Mary's Hosp. v. Ramsey, 465 So.2d 666 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985). See also In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C.1972); In re Estate of Brooks, 32 Ill.2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965); Mercy Hosp. Inc. v. Jackson, 62 Md.App. 409, 489 A.2d 1130 (1985), vacated on other grounds, 306 Md. 556, 510 A.2d 562 (1986); In re Brown, 478 So.2d 1033 (Miss.1985). As the district court noted in its highly articulate opinion below:
Central to Ramsey and the above line of cases in other jurisdictions is a delicate balancing analysis in which the courts weigh, on the one hand, the patient's constitutional right of privacy and right to practice one's religion, as against certain basic societal interests. Obviously, there are no preordained answers to such problematic questions and the results reached in these cases are highly debatable. Running through all of these decisions, however, is the courts' deeply imbedded belief, rooted in our constitutional traditions, that an individual has a fundamental right to be left alone so that he is free to lead his private life according to his own beliefs free from unreasonable governmental interference. Surely nothing, in the last analysis, is more private or more sacred than one's religion or view of life, and here the courts, quite properly, have given great deference to the individual's right to make decisions vitally affecting his private life according to his own conscience. It is difficult to overstate this right because it is, without exaggeration, the very bedrock on which this country was founded.
Wons, 500 So.2d at 686-87. We hold that the state's interest in maintaining a home with two parents for the minor children does not override Mrs. Wons' constitutional rights of privacy and religion.
The Health Trust expressed concern during oral argument that in future cases of this nature, the inconvenience of taking each treatment refusal case to court for an emergency judicial hearing would create problems. The Health Trust complains that this would present too heavy a burden on the hospitals to provide care between court appearances. While we understand the Health Trust's dilemma, these cases demand individual attention. No blanket rule is feasible which could sufficiently cover all occasions in which this situation will arise. Thus, it will be necessary for hospitals that wish to contest a patient's refusal of treatment to commence court proceedings and sustain the heavy burden of proof that the state's interest outweighs the patient's constitutional rights.
We can add no more to the third district's well-reasoned and eloquent opinion. Accordingly, we answer the certified question in the affirmative and approve the decision of the district court.
It is so ordered.
McDonald, SHAW, BARKETT and GRIMES, JJ., concur.
EHRLICH, C.J., concurs specially with an opinion, in which GRIMES, J., concurs.
OVERTON, J., dissents with an opinion.