Case Name: PEOPLE v. PEPPER
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1971-10-19
Citations: 36 Mich. App. 437
Docket Number: Docket No. 9895
Parties: PEOPLE v. PEPPER
Judges: Before: J. H. Gillis, P. J., and R. B. Burns and Levin, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 36
Pages: 437–454

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v. PEPPER
Opinion of the Court
1. Criminal Law — Appeal and Error — Instructions to Jury.
Instructions to the jury, whether comprised of only a principal charge or principal and supplemental charges, are reviewed in their entirety in an effort not so much to determine whether errors were made on any isolated issue but to ascertain whether their effect was prejudicial, where the' defendant claims on appeal that the instructions given denied him a fair trial.
2. Criminal Law — Instructions to Jury — Supplemental Charoe — ■ Prejudice.
A supplemental instruction responding to questions submitted by the jury, which reiterated the previously enunciated elements of the offense charged, the lesser included offenses, and the possible verdicts, gave an approved definition of intent clarifying the principal charge, and admonished them of the necessity that they reach a verdict was not so prejudicial as to deny the defendant a fair trial where the instruction did not unduly emphasize the element of intent even though the definition might more appropriately have been included in the principal charge, did not direct the jury that they had a duty to infer intent, and did not coerce a verdict from them.
References for Points in Headnotes
1, 2] 53 Am Jur, Trial § 842.
’3] 53 Am Jur, Trial § 748 et seq.
'4] 53 Am Jur, Trial § 759 et seq.
’5] 53 Am Jur, Trial § 950 et seq.
6,11] 40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide § 514 et seq.
7] 40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide § 535.
'8] 31 Am Jur 2d, Expert and Opinion Evidence § 31.
'9,10] 31 Am Jur 2d, Expert and Opinion Evidence § 151.
12,13,18,19, 21] 40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide § 112.
14] 29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 11.
’15] 29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 167.
’16]- 53 Am Jur, Trial § 555.
17] 53 Am Jur, Trial § 680 et seq.
;20] 53 Am Jur, Trial § 514.
3. Homicide — Instructions to Jury — Elements of Crime — Reasonable Doubt.
A supplemental instruction to the jury that a reasonable doubt need only exist as to any one of the elements of homicide in order to allow an acquittal was not erroneous where the principal instruction had precisely and accurately defined the doctrine regarding the existence of a reasonable doubt.
4. Criminal Law — Instructions to Jury — Coercion of Verdict.
A supplementary instruction in a trial for homicide in which the trial court cautioned the jurors to deliberate slowly, with a mind open to the arguments of others and a willingness to re-examine personal beliefs, explained to them the time and expense involved in every trial, and encouraged them that no 12 citizens were any better suited to decide the issues presented was not improper, because it did not suggest that personal beliefs were to be compromised, coerce a verdict, or contradict the principal instruction that the verdict was the responsibility of each juror.
5. Criminal Law — Instructions to Jury — Coercion of Verdict.
Additional instructions to the jury which correctly state the law will not be held erroneous merely because they were given at one time rather than another and will not be presumed to be given for the purpose of coercing a verdict, nor so found, except upon convincing evidence.
6. Criminal Law — Instructions to Jury — Homicide—Theory of Defense.
Comments by the trial court in a jury instruction that no claim of self-defense appeared on the record in the homicide case before it was permissible where there was no evidentiary support for that defense, and did not obligate the court to instruct the jury as to the defense of accident for which the defendant had submitted proof where there had been no request made by the defendant to have the jury instructed on that theory of defense (MCLA § 768.29).
7. Homicide — First-Degree Murder — Lesser Included Offense. — • Manslaughter — Instructions to Jury — Evidence.
Testimony regarding hostile feelings between the decedent and a defendant being tried on a charge of first-degree murder sufficiently supported an instruction to the jury on the lesser included offense of manslaughter (MCLA § 750.321).
8. Witnesses — Qualification of Experts — Discretion.
The determination of a witness’s qualifications to testify as an expert is within the discretion of the trial court.
9. Homicide — Evidence—-Expert Witnesses — Propensity of Weapon — Admissibility—Discretion.
Admission of the testimony of a police officer concerning the particular propensities of the gun which caused the death of the decedent, used to rebut the defendant’s testimony that it had accidentally discharged, was not an abuse of discretion where the officer had been qualified as an expert on guns by evidence showing that he had worked in the area of firearms identification for 17 years whereby he obtained vast knowledge concerning the individual characteristics of such weapons.
10. Witnesses — Expert Witnesses — Opinion—Foundation.
An expert witness in a criminal trial may state his opinion concerning the propensities of the gun which caused the death of the decedent in a homicide case without first giving the factual data upon which that opinion is based unless an inquiry into that factual data is pursued by the opposing party.
Dissent by Levin, J.
11. Homicide — Defenses—Instructions to Jury.
Instructions to the jury that self-defense was not present in the homicide case before them had the effect of implying to the jury that the only defense available was self-defense, was misleading and confusing, and was reversibly erroneous where that instruction was inconsistent with the defense of accident for which the defendant submitted proofs and where the court did not instruct the jury that accident was a good a/nd valid defense even though, as an aside in a supplementary instruction, the court mentioned that accident was a possible defense.
12. Homicide — Defenses—Innocent Homicide.
There are two categories of innocent homicide for which there is no criminal liability: justifiable homicide authorized or commanded by law, and excusable homicide in which death is a result of an accident where the actor was not criminally negligent.
13. Homicide — Intent—Presumptions—Instructions to Jury.
An instruction to the jury that if it found that the defendant caused the death of the victim the law presumes that he did so intentionally was erroneous because it was tantamount to a peremptory instruction that the jury had the duty to find that the killing was intentional and had the effect of eliminating altogether the defense of accident for which the defendant had submitted proofs.
14. Criminal Law — Evidence—Instructions to Jury — Presumptions — Inferences.
The trial court may not instruct the jury in terms of “presumption” rather than in terms of “permissible inference” unless it is prepared to take an issue from the jury on the ground that the law conclusively presumes a fact from underlying facts; all that a judge may properly say to jurors where the prosecution has introduced evidence sufficient to give rise to a presumed fact is that if they find that underlying facts have been established, they may, not must, infer the fact that the prosecution seeks to establish and he may not tell the jury that if they find that the underlying facts have been established, the fact inferred from them must be presumed.
15. Criminal Law — Presumptions—Innocence.
The concept of a conclusive or mandatory presumption conflicts with the overriding presumption of innocence with which the law endows an accused in a criminal ease and which extends to every element of the crime.
16. Trial — Instructions to Jury- — -Erroneous Instruction.
Conflicting instructions to the jury, one of which is erroneous, require reversal of the jury’s verdict because it is presumed that the jury may have followed that which was erroneous.
17. Criminal Law — Intent — Presumptions — Instructions to Jury.
The law deduces intent from the act itself for purposes of shifting the burden of going forward with the evidence, but does not deduce intent as a substitute for decision by the jury, and it is misleading to instruct the jury in terms of the presumption regarding intent without a clear statement by the judge of the limited purpose for which the law deduces a presumed fact from the underlying facts.
18. Homicide — Murder—Intent—Accident.
A criminal intent, coupled with an accidental occurrence, cannot constitute either first or second-degree murder.
19. Homicide — Instructions to Jury — Intent—Defenses—Accident.
An instruction to the jury in a homicide case that they must return a verdict of guilty of some degree of felonious homicide if they found that the defendant intended to MU the victim but which failed to charge them regarding the defense of accidental shooting was erroneous where the defendant had submitted proofs for his defense of accident.
20. Criminal Law — Instructions to Jury.
The trial judge has a duty in a criminal case to instruct the jury as to the law applicable to the case even in the absence of a request to charge.
21. Homicide — Defenses—Accident—Instructions to Jury.
Failure to instruct the jury on the defense of accident in a homicide case was reversibly erroneous even in the absence of a request by the defendant for that instruction where the question of accident was made pivotal in the case by the defendant’s proofs at trial.
Appeal from Recorder’s Court of Detroit, George W. Crockett, Jr., J.
Submitted Division 1 February 5, 1971, at Detroit.
(Docket No. 9895.)
Decided October 19, 1971.
Leave to appeal granted, 386 Mich 785.
Jodie Pepper was convicted of manslaughter. Defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William L. Cahalan, Prosecuting Attorney, Dominick R. Garnovale, Chief, Appellate Department, and Angelo A. Pentolino, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Carl Ziemba, for defendant on appeal.
Before: J. H. Gillis, P. J., and R. B. Burns and Levin, JJ.

Opinion:
J. H. Gillis, P. J.
Defendant, Jodie Pepper, was charged with murder in the first degree, MOLA § 750.316 (Stat Ann 1971 Cum Supp § 28.548), and was convicted by a jury of manslaughter, MOLA § 750.321 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.553). His testimony was that the gun accidentally discharged while being removed from his pocket, but the rebuttal testimony of a police officer from the firearms identification division of the scientific bureau was that a gun such as the one involved herein could not accidentally discharge. With this and other evidence, the jury was instructed as to the applicable law and was requested to render its verdict.
It is as to these instructions that defendant raises 10 of the 11 issues presented on appeal, arguing primarily that the substance and effect of certain supplementary charges were so prejudicial as to deny him a fair trial. Our review goes to the charge in its entirety (People v. Dye [1959], 356 Mich 271), in an effort not so much to determine whether errors were made as to any one isolated issue, but to ascertain if defendant received a fair trial. People v. Mosley (1953), 338 Mich 559; People v. Boyles (1968), 11 Mich App 417. Supplemental charges are considered along with the principal charge (People v. Green [1967], 7 Mich App 346) and are therefore viewed as being a portion thereof.
We do not find the charge here under attack to be riddled with the prejudicial error attributed to it by the defendant. The supplemental charges resulted solely from questions submitted by the jury, and the court, in responding thereto, essentially reiterated the previously enunciated elements of the offense, the lesser offenses included therein and the possible verdicts to be rendered. Having anticipated the jurors' apparent problem in deliberating (not through any discussion with individual jurors as defendant suggests), the court provided an approved definition of intent (adapted from People v. Carmichael [1858], 5 Mich 10; People v. Scott [1859], 6 Mich 287; People v. Resh [1895], 107 Mich 251; see also 2 Gillespie, Michigan Criminal Law & Procedure [2d ed], §906, p 1244); such served to clarify the initial instruction that specific intent to commit an illegal act must be established beyond a reasonable doubt in order to permit a finding of guilt. It is argued that this definition belonged more appropriately in the principal charge, but we are not convinced, as defendant contends, that the giving of it separately unduly emphasized this element or directed the jurors that they had a duty to infer intent.
The juror's remaining concern regarding the existence of reasonable doubt was correctly explained by the trial court; defendant admits that a precise and accurate definition of this doctrine had been given previously, and we find no error to have occurred in the court's additional explanation that such doubt need only exist as to any one of the elements of homicide in order to allow an acquittal.
Finally, the trial court herein cautioned the jurors to deliberate slowly, with an open mind to the arguments of others and a willingness to re-examine personal beliefs, explained to them the time and expense involved in every trial, and encouraged them that no 12 citizens were any better suited to decide the issues presented. We do not find in such pronouncements a suggestion that personal beliefs were to be compromised nor any of the objectionable infirmities found in People v. Engle (1898), 118 Mich 287, or People v. Barmore (1962), 368 Mich 26. Having previously stated that the verdict was the responsibility of each juror, the court nowhere contradicted such statement or coerced a verdict.
In essence, we apply the statement found in People v. Hoffmann (1905), 142 Mich 531, 585, that if a trial court believes "that the instructions he has given a jury should be amended, corrected or enlarged, he ought to give additional instructions" so as to clarify any confusion. That is all the court herein attempted to do and we find no error in his presentation of these supplemental charges.
"If the law is correctly stated, instructions are not to be held erroneous because given at one time rather than at another time. That additional or repeated instructions are given for the purpose of coercing a verdict will not be presumed, nor be found except upon convincing evidence." People v. Hoffmann, supra, at 585.
The comments by the court that no claim of self-defense appeared on the record were permissible under the authority of MCLA § 768.29 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.1052), and do not, as suggested, obligate the court to instruct on a defendant's theory of the case. Such an instruction, if supported by the record, need be given only where a proper request is made; no request was submitted in this matter.
With the evidence before it, we conclude that the trial court precisely charged this jury as to the law applicable to this case. The testimony regarding hostile feelings between decedent and defendant sufficiently supported a charge on the lesser included offense of manslaughter. See People v. Galarno (1966), 3 Mich App 491.
The remaining issue concerns the admissibility of testimony from a police officer concerning the particular propensities of the type of gun which caused decedent's death. Determination of a witness's ex pert qualifications is addressed to the discretion of the trial court (People v. Hawthorne [1940], 293 Mich 15); as it was shown that this witness worked in the area of firearms identification for 17 years whereby he obtained vast knowledge concerning the individual characteristics of such weapons, we find no abuse of discretion in permitting the introduction of his testimony. People v. Charles Wilson (1970), 27 Mich App 171. The opinion offered by such a witness need not be prefaced by the factual data on which it is based unless such inquiry is pursued by the opposing party. People v. John Willie Williams (1970), 26 Mich App 218.
In conclusion, we hold that the trial court nowhere exceeded the bounds of his discretion or erred in his application and pronouncements of the law. On such a record, no error can be found.
Affirmed.
R. B. Burns, J., concurred.