Case Name: Juan Jose MIRANDA-GODINEZ, aka Juan Miranda, aka Juan Jose Miranda, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2016-04-28
Citations: 649 F. App'x 456
Docket Number: No. 14-71485
Parties: Juan Jose MIRANDA-GODINEZ, aka Juan Miranda, aka Juan Jose Miranda, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent.
Judges: Before: PAEZ, CLIFTON, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 649
Pages: 456–456

Head Matter:
Juan Jose MIRANDA-GODINEZ, aka Juan Miranda, aka Juan Jose Miranda, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent.
No. 14-71485.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted April 28, 2016.
Filed April 28, 2016.
Ben Winograd, Alexandria, VA, Jon Wu, Wu Jon Law Corporation, San Mateo, CA, for Petitioner.
Jesse Matthew Bless, Oil, Anthony Cardozo Payne, Senior Litigation Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel Ice, Office of the Chief Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.
Before: PAEZ, CLIFTON, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Petitioner Juan Jose Miranda-Godinez petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) determining that Miranda-Godinez's conviction for arson under California Penal Code § 451(d) was an "aggravated felony" within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F). Specifically, the BIA determined that Miranda-Godinez's arson conviction constituted a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b).
However, as the Attorney General concedes, our recent decision in Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir.2015), controls the outcome of this case. In Dima-ya, we adhered to the rationale articulated in Johnson v. United States, — U.S. -, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 2558, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015), where the Court held that the definition of a "violent felony" in the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act was unconstitutionally vague. We held that similar language in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), as incorporated into 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F)'s definition of a "crime of violence," is also unconstitutionally vague. See Dimaya, 803 F.3d at 1111. We are bound by this precedent, which does not support the BIA's determination.
The petition for review is GRANTED and we REMAND to the BIA for termination of removal proceedings.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.