Case Name: Ruby Lee BROOKS v. ACME CARTON CORPORATION and Aetna Casualty & Surety Company
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1975-04-15
Citations: 312 So. 2d 924
Docket Number: No. 6730
Parties: Ruby Lee BROOKS v. ACME CARTON CORPORATION and Aetna Casualty & Surety Company.
Judges: Before GULOTTA, MORIAL and BEER, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 312
Pages: 924–927

Head Matter:
Ruby Lee BROOKS v. ACME CARTON CORPORATION and Aetna Casualty & Surety Company.
No. 6730.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
April 15, 1 !)75.
Rehearing Denied .Inno 11, 1975.
Writ Refused Sept. 12, 1975.
O’Keefe, O’Keefe & Berrigan, Allen H. Danielson, Jr., New Orleans, for plaintiff-appellee.
Adams & Reese, Edward J. Rice, Jr., New Orleans, for defendants-appellants.
Before GULOTTA, MORIAL and BEER, JJ.

Opinion:
GULOTTA, Judge.
This is an appeal by defendants from a judgment awarding workmen's compensation benefits for total and permanent disability. In answer to the appeal, plaintiff seeks statutory penalties and attorney's fees. We affirm.
Plaintiff injured her thumb on August 16, 1973, while stapling fiber cartons for bottled beverages causing an impairment of the distal end of the thumb.
Plaintiff's claim, among others, is that the medical evidence supports the trial judge's conclusion that she is unable to resume her pre-injury employment as a skilled worker, and as such, is entitled to total and permanent disability benefits.
It is defendants' position that plaintiff is not entitled to total and permanent disability benefits since her treating physician discharged her to return to work. Defendants further contend that plaintiff's pain is mildly discomforting and not excruciating; that the loss of strength in the thumb is minimal and that plaintiff has sufficient strength in the thumb to carry out the responsibilities of her employment.
It is defendants' claim that plaintiff is a common laborer and not a skilled worker as erroneously determined by the trial judge. According to defendants, plaintiff suffered only a 23% maximum disability of the thumb and, therefore, is able to compete in a common labor market.
It is well settled that whether an employee is a skilled, a semiskilled or a common laborer depends upon the facts in each case. See Lawes v. Houston Fire and Casualty Insurance Co., 242 La. 251, 135 So.2d 920 (1961). A skilled or semiskilled employee is deemed to be permanently and totally disabled when he is unable to return to his pre-injury employment or substantially similar employment. See Smith v. Travelers Insurance Company, 174 So.2d 241 (La.App., 3d Cir. 1965) and Bellard v. Insurance Company of North America, 193 So.2d 922 (La.App., 3d Cir. 1967). See also Roberie v. Ashy Contraction Company, 215 So.2d 857 (La.App., 3d Cir. 1968), writ refused, 253 La. 323, 217 So.2d 414 (1969) and Carlock v. Gross, 200 So.2d 353 (La.App., 4th Cir. 1967).
Dr. David Aiken, a general surgeon who was originally consulted by plaintiff, and Dr. D. Delgado, a plastic surgeon who examined plaintiff, stated that Miss Brooks was unable to return to her former occupation and employment. They testified that plaintiff suffered substantial loss of dexterity because of the injury. In their opinion, plaintiff experienced pain when the distal end of the thumb was flexed and when pressure was applied to the thumb. According to these doctors, plaintiff will continue to suffer pain in the future.
On the other hand, Dr. George Hoffman, a plastic surgeon, discharged plaintiff to return to work. He was of the opinion that plaintiff was capable of performing the duties of her pre-injury employment.
We might say at this point that the doctors and the court had the benefit of a courtroom demonstration of the duties of plaintiff in her employment.
The lay testimony supports plaintiff's position that she is a skilled employee. Plaintiff and a coworker, as well as Albert Early, the vice president of Acme Carton Corporation, testified that dexterity is required in the operation of a stapling machine and that flexion of the thumb is necessary to apply pressure to the boxes.
Early stated a proficient box stam-pler stapled approximately 500 or 600 boxes a day. He indicated that plaintiff had been employed in her capacity for approximately 18 or 20 months and that experience was important in reaching the necessary speed and dexterity to operate the machine efficiently. Early classified plaintiff as being rather skillful in her occupation. He stated that more than a month operating the machine was required to become proficient.
We cannot say that based on the evidence in the instant case the trial judge erred in concluding plaintiff is a skilled laborer. Nor can we say the trial judge erred in concluding plaintiff is unable to carry out the duties required of her pre-in-jury employment. Accordingly, we conclude plaintiff is totally and permanently disabled.
Finally, we reject plaintiff's contention that she is entitled to penalties and attorney's fees in accordance with the provisions of LSA-R.S. 22:658. In view of Dr. Hoffman's testimony, which was to the effect that plaintiff was able to return to her former employment, we agree with the conclusion of the trial judge that the actions of the defendant insurer were not arbitrary, capricious or without probable cause. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.
BEER, J., dissents with written reasons.