Case Name: STATE v. WILLIAM G. SCOGGIN, JR.
Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
Jurisdiction: North Carolina
Decision Date: 1952-08-22
Citations: 236 N.C. 19
Docket Number: 
Parties: STATE v. WILLIAM G. SCOGGIN, JR.
Judges: 
Reporter: North Carolina Reports
Volume: 236
Pages: 19–34

Head Matter:
STATE v. WILLIAM G. SCOGGIN, JR.
(Filed 22 August, 1952.)
1. Municipal Corporations § 40—
TLe proof or admission that defendant owned an automobile registered in his name and that such automobile was parked on a city street in violation of its parking meter ordinance without evidence or admission tending to show who parked the automobile at the time and place in question, is held, insufficient to sustain a conviction of defendant of parking or permitting his vehicle to be parked in violation of the ordinance.
2. Constitutional Law § 10a—
It is the duty of the courts to interpret and apply the law as it is written; it is the function and prerogative of the Legislature to make the law.
3. Constitutional Law § 8a—
The General Assembly has the power to declare that proof or admission of certain facts shall constitute a presumption of the main or ultimate fact in issue so as to make out a prima facie case, provided there is a rational connection between what is proved and what is to be inferred, but in the absence of legislative enactment the courts will not invoke such presumptions or rules of evidence to declare a defendant guilty of a criminal offense.
Baknhill, J., concurring.
Devin, C. J., dissenting.
Johnson, J., dissenting.
Appeal by defendant from Carr, J., March Term, 1952, of T¥ai<e.
The defendant was tried upon a warrant charging him with parking-overtime in a parking meter zone on Fayetteville Street in the City of Ealeigh, between Morgan Street and Cabarrus Street, in violation of the City’s traffic ordinance limiting the time for parking motor vehicles.
The defendant was tried and found guilty in the Municipal Court of the City of Ealeigh. He appealed to the Superior Court.
In the Superior Court, the jury returned a verdict of guilty as charged and from the judgment imposed, the defendant appeals to this Court assigning error.
Attorney-General McMullan ancl Robert B. Broughton, Member of Staff, for the Stale.
Joseph B. Cheshire, Jr., for defendant, appellant.

Opinion:
DeNNy, J.
The defendant does not challenge the validity of any provision contained in the traffic ordinance of the City of Ealeigh, but appeals from the refusal of the court below to sustain his motion for nonsuit at the close of the State's evidence and renewed at the close of all the evidence.
It is provided in Section 19, Chapter 5, of the 1950 Code of the City of Raleigh, ". . . at any time between the hours of 8 :00 A.M. and 6 :00 P.M. of any day, except Sundays . No person shall park any vehicle for longer than ONE IIoub at any one time along the following streets within the areas and limits defined as follows: . . . (b) Along Fayette-ville Street between Morgan Street and Cabarrus Street." Section 58 of this chapter provides, "No person shall allow, permit or suffer any vehicle registered in his name to stand or park in any street in this city in violation of any of the ordinances of the city regulating the standing or parking of vehicles." And section 68 of the same chapter reads as follows: "It shall be unlawful for any person to cause, allow, permit, or suffer any vehicle registered in his name, or under his control, to be parked overtime or beyond the lawful periods of time as above set forth."
It was admitted by the defendant and his counsel that on 11 September, 1951, that day not being a Sunday, and between the hours of 8 :00 a.m. and 6 :00 p.m., the defendant's motor vehicle was parked in a parking meter space in a one-hour parking zone on Fayetteville Street, in the City of Raleigh, between Morgan Street and Cabarrus Street, and that at such time the defendant was the owner of such motor vehicle and was duly registered as such owner with the Motor Vehicle Department of the State of North Carolina and the Licensing Department of the City of Raleigh, and at such time and place the parking meter displayed a sign plainly indicating illegal parking and that the lawful parking period had expired. However, no evidence was offered or admission made tending to show who parked the defendant's car at the time and place set out in the warrant.
It is apparent this is a test case and we are called upon to pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conclusion that the defendant parked, or allowed his automobile to be parked, in violation of the law as charged in the warrant. The decisive question, therefore, is whether in the absence of any authorized legislative rule of evidence, the mere proof or admission of ownership of the automobile, and that it was parked contrary to the provisions of the traffic ordinance of the City of Raleigh, is sufficient to support an inference that the defendant parked, or allowed the automobile to be so parked, and to sustain a conviction if such inference is not explained or refuted by other evidence. We are not dealing with an inference that may be drawn from circumstantial evidence, but whether an inference of guilt may be drawn from certain admitted or proven facts.
The traffic ordinance of the City of Raleigh contains no rule of evidence to the effect that proof or admission of ownership of a motor vehicle which has been parked in violation of the law, shall be prima facie evidence that the owner thereof committed or authorized such violation. In fact, we know of no law in this State which, has delegated to municipalities the right to legislate upon the question of evidence, and of its weight and effect upon the courts.
Some of the authorities in other jurisdictions hold that no prima facie rule of evidence, based on ownership, is necessary to support a conviction for the violation of a traffic ordinance. They follow what might he termed the rule of expediency; the inconvenience of keeping watch over parked vehicles to ascertain who in fact operates them, if not the impossibility of such task. Commonwealth v. Ober, 286 Mass. 25, 189 N.E. 601; City of Chicago v. Crane, 319 Ill. App. 623, 49 N.E. 2d 802. The following authorities also hold that where a parking ordinance has been violated, proof or admission of ownership of the vehicle involved is sufficient to carry the case to the jury and to sustain a conviction in the absence of an explanation or denial on the part of the defendant. S. v. Morgan (by an equally divided Court), 72 R.I. 101, 48 A. 2d 248; People v. Marchetti, 154 Misc. 147, 276 N.Y.S. 708; People v. Rubin, 284 N.Y. 392, 31 N.E. 2d 501. Other Courts have upheld such convictions under the prima facie rule of evidence with respect to ownership. People v. Kayne, 286 Mich. 571, 282 N.W. 248; Commonwealth v. Kroger, 276 Ky. 20, 122 S.W. 2d 1006; City of St. Louis v. Cook, 359 Mo. 270, 221 S.W. 2d 468.
The State cites the following decisions of this Court in support of its contention that the verdict below should be upheld. S. v. Kittelle, 110 N.C. 560, 15 S.E. 103; S. v. Smith, 117 N.C. 809, 23 S.E. 449; S. v. Morrison, 126 N.C. 1123, 36 S.E. 329; S. v. Garner, 158 N.C. 630, 74 S.E. 458; S. v. Carter, 205 N.C. 761, 172 S.E. 415; S. v. Holbrook, 223 N.C. 622, 27 S.E. 2d 725; S. v. Brannon, 234 N.C. 474, 67 S.E. 2d 633.
In the case of S. v. Kittelle, supra, this Court upheld the conviction of the defendant, a licensed liquor dealer, where one of his employees sold beer to a minor in violation of the law. The conviction, however, was obtained under a statute which provided that such sale should be prima facie evidence of the violation thereof.
We do not consider the cases of S. v. Smith, supra, and S. v. Morrison, supra, to be in point on the question under consideration. Each of these cases involved an act which was illegal unless the defendant prior thereto had obtained a privilege license from the State authorizing the respective transactions complained of. In all such cases, when the State proves the commission of the act by the defendant, it makes out a prima facie case and the burden shifts to the defendant to show he was duly licensed to engage in the business or trade involved. In the instant case, the State seeks to prove by an inference or presumption that the defendant committed the offense complained of simply because he is the owner of the car and not by proof of any act committed by him, or by anyone under his control or by his permission.
In S. v. Garner, supra, the defendant was indicted under a statute which provided, "No cattle was to be moved or allowed to move from any quarantined area of this or any other State, . . The defendant lived in a quarantined area in Moore County near the Hoke County line. There was no fence between Hoke and Moore Counties. Hoke County was not in the quarantined area. The defendant owned a cow which was infected with cattle fever tick, and permitted her to run at large. As a result she strayed across the line into forbidden territory. The Court held that the act of turning the cow out, "whereby she was permitted to stray, was done purposely and therefore willfully." Likewise, we do not think this case in point. An automobile does not move upon our streets and highways except when operated by some individual. But the owner of the diseased cow knew when he turned her out and permitted her to run at large near the Hoke County line, that in all probability she would do exactly what he was forbidden by law to allow her to do.
In the case of S. v. Catier, supra, the defendant was convicted of violating an ordinance of the City of High Point which provided that, "it shall be unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to park any automobile, truck or any motor driven vehicle on the north side of English Street between College Street and Phillips Street . . ." The question presented on the appeal to this Court did not involve the question now before us. The defendant in that case challenged the authority of the City of High Point to adopt and pass such an ordinance. This Court, in upholding the ordinance, said: "All the evidence at the trial of this action shows that the defendant parked his automobile on English Street, between College Street and Phillips Street, in violation of a valid ordinance of the city of High Point."
The case of S. v. Holbrook, supra, in keeping with prior decisions of this Court, held that upon an indictment for larceny, possession of the fruits of crime recently after its commission justifies an inference of guilt, and, though only prima facie evidence of guilt, may be controlling unless explained or accounted for in some way consistent with innocence. Even so, in such case, the burden is on the State to prove that the goods have been stolen and that the defendant is in possession of them. Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 40 L. Ed. 1090. However, the recent possession of stolen goods, without more, will not raise an inference or presumption that will support the charge (Gr.S. 14-71) of receiving stolen goods knowing them to have been feloniously stolen or taken. S. v. Best, 202 N.C. 9, 161 S.E. 535; S. v. Lowe, 204 NO. 572, 169 S.E. 180; S. v. Oxendine, 223 N.C. 659, 27 S.E. 2d 814; S. v. Larkin, 229 N.C. 126, 47 S.E. 2d 697.
The State also, in citing S. v. Brannon, supra, points out that where, in a murder trial, it is proved or admitted that the defendant intentionally killed tbe deceased with a deadly weapon, tbe law implies malice, and tbe defendant is presumed to be guilty of murder in tbe second deg'ree unless be shows mitigating circumstances to reduce tbe homicide to manslaughter or excuse it altogether. It will be noted, however, in such a case, tbe presumption of malice does not arise until it is proved or admitted that tbe defendant intentionally killed tbe deceased with a deadly weapon.
Our Court, in tbe above cases, did not establish or recognize tbe prima facie rule of evidence in tbe absence of legislative authorization, in tbe sense or to tbe extent tbe State seeks to invoke such rule on the present record. No such rule of evidence or inference has been applied heretofore by this Court to a factual situation such as we have presented on this record. In fact, except in those cases where tbe prim.a facie rule of evidence has been established by legislative action, no such rule exists in this jurisdiction. Therefore, in order for us to sustain tbe verdict below, it would be necessary for us to establish a new rule of evidence and to give it retroactive effect.
In tbe very recent case of S. v. Lloyd, 233 N.C. 227, 63 S.E. 2d 150, in an opinion by Devin, J. (now Chief Justice), this Court held that where several automobiles were being driven upon a public highway at 75 to 90 miles an hour, and one of tbe automobiles was identified as a Mercury, which tbe highway patrolman testified belonged to tbe defendant Lloyd, such testimony was not sufficient to sustain a verdict. Tbe opinion stated : . . we are inclined to tbe view that tbe defendant's motion for judgment as of nonsuit should have been allowed. Though we observe tbe rule that on this motion tbe evidence should be considered in tbe light most favorable for tbe State, nevertheless tbe identification of tbe defendant Lloyd as tbe operator of one of tbe recklessly driven automobiles seems lacking. Hence, we think the judgment should have been reversed, and it is so ordered."
We readily concede that a prima facie rule of evidence, as contended for by tbe State, is desirable for tbe proper and adequate enforcement of tbe traffic ordinances of tbe various municipalities of tbe State. We think, however, that such rule should be made applicable to parking violations by legislative enactment and not by judicial decree. It is our duty to interpret and apply tbe law as it is written, but it is tbe function and prerogative of tbe Legislature to make tbe law. S. v. Welch, 232 N.C. 77, 59 S.E. 2d 199; S. v. Suddreth, 223 N.C. 610, 27 S.E. 2d 623; Wilson v. Town of Mooresville, 222 N.C. 283, 22 S.E. 2d 907; Millwood v. Cotton Mills, 215 N.C. 519, 2 S.E. 2d 560; S. v. Revis, 193 N.C. 192, 136 S.E. 346; S. v. Means, 175 N.C. 820, 95 S.E. 912. And where a Court has consistently declined through tbe years to permit an inference of guilt to be drawn from evidence such as that presented on this appeal, in order to make out a prima facie case, a radical departure from such long established rule of evidence should be authorized by the lawmakers rather than by judicial fiat.
In civil actions in this State for the recovery of property damages or personal injuries sustained in motor vehicle accidents, this Court has never permitted a recovery against a defendant where the sole evidence against such defendant was no more than ownership of the motor vehicle plus the negligence of the driver. We have required, in such cases, that, "to charge the owner of a motor vehicle with the neglect or default of another there must be some evidence of the agency of the driver at the time and in respect to the transaction out of which the injury arose, and that proof of ownership alone is not sufficient to warrant or support an inference of such agency." Carter v. Motor Lines, 227 N.C. 193, 41 S.E. 2d 586, and cited cases.
The above rule has now been changed by legislative enactment, Chapter 494, 1951 Session Laws of North Carolina, the pertinent parts of which read as follows: "(a) In all actions to recover damages for injury to the person or to property or for the death of a person, arising out of an accident or collision involving a motor vehicle, proof of ownership of such motor vehicle at the time of such accident or collision shall be prima facie evidence that said motor vehicle was being operated and used with the authority, consent, and knowledge of the owner in the very transaction out of which said injury or cause of action arose, (b) Proof of the registration of a motor vehicle in the name of any person, firm, or corporation, shall for the purpose of any action, be prima facie evidence of ownership and that such motor vehicle was then being operated by and under the control of a person for whose conduct the owner was legally responsible, for the owner's benefit, and within the course and scope of his employment; . . ."
In the case of Manley v. Georgia, 279 U.S. 1, 73 L. Ed. 575, it is said: "State legislation declaring that proof of one fact or a group of facts shall constitute prima facie evidence of the main or ultimate fact in issue is valid if there is a rational connection between what is proved and what is to be inferred. If the presumption is not unreasonable, and is not made conclusive of the rights of the person against whom raised, it does not constitute a denial of due process of law." See also Wharton's Criminal Evidence, Yolume 1, Sections 69 and 70.
Except for the rules of evidence which have been expressly sanctioned by the Constitution, such as the privilege against self-incrimination, the accused's right of confrontation, or cross-examination of opposing witnesses, etc., "the Legislature has the power to alter or create any rule of evidence. This is so for reasons inherent in the nature of legislative functions." Wigmore on Evidence, Yolume 1, Section 7, page 208, et seq. The same authority, in Yolume 4, Section 1356 (a), page 724, states: "A rule of presumption is simply a rule changing one of the burdens of proof, i.e., declaring that tbe main fact will be inferred or assumed from some other fact until evidence to the contrary is introduced . . . There is not the least doubt, on principle, that the Legislature has entire control over such rules, as it has (when not infringing the Judiciary's prerogative) over all other rules of procedure in general and evidence in particular . . . subject, only to the limitations of the rules of evidence expressly enshrined in the Constitution."
It has been a common practice of our Legislature to declare that proof of one or a group of facts shall constitute prima facie evidence of the main or ultimate fact in issue if there is a rational connection between what is proved and what is to be inferred. Among many of these instances are: (1) That the possession of more than one gallon of spirituous liquor at any one time shall constitute prima facie evidence that it is kept for the purpose of sale, G.S. 18-32; (2) that it is unlawful to have possession of any alcoholic beverages upon which the taxes imposed by law have not been paid, "and the possession of any alcoholic beverages in a container which does not bear either a revenue stamp of the federal government or a stamp of any of the county boards of the state of North Carolina shall constitute prima facie evidence of the violation of this section," G.S. 18-48; (3) that possession of lottery tickets shall be prima facie evidence of the violation of the provisions of G.S. 14-291.1; (4) that any one (not an officer or soldier on duty), not being on his own land, shall have about his person a deadly weapon, such possession shall be prima facie evidence of the concealment thereof, G.S. 14-269; (5) that an administrator or executor's account, when filed and approved, shall constitute prima facie evidence of its correctness, G.S. 28-117; (6) that a recital in a deed, shall be presumed tó be prima facie correct, G.S. 28-103; (7) that when land is sold to create assets to pay a decedent's debts and the record does not .show what disposition was made of the funds, "then it is presumed, prima facie, that the proceeds of the sale" have been properly applied, G.S. 28-101; (8) that "vouchers are presumptive evidence of disbursement, without other proof, unless impeached," G.S. 28-119; (9) that the transfer of property under certain circumstances, shall be deemed to have been made in contemplation of death, G.S. 105-2; (10) that killing of livestock by an engine or cars running upon any railroad, "shall be prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of the railroad company in any action for damages against such company," G.S. 60-81.
If no inference or presumption is permitted to be drawn from the ownership of a motor vehicle and its negligent operation by another, in the absence of a legislative rule of evidence, in a civil action, where the plaintiff is only required to carry the burden of proof, by the greater weight of the evidence, or by the preponderance thereof; we should not, in the absence of a legislative rule of evidence to the contrary, consider mere ownership of a motor vehicle, parked in violation of a city ordinance, and no more, sufficient to sustain a criminal conviction which must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
The judgment of the court below is
Reversed.