Case Name: BOYD v. DUTTON, WARDEN
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1972-02-22
Citations: 405 U.S. 1
Docket Number: No. 70-5075
Parties: BOYD v. DUTTON, WARDEN
Judges: with whom The Chief Justice joins,
Reporter: United States Reports
Volume: 405
Pages: 1–8

Head Matter:
BOYD v. DUTTON, WARDEN
No. 70-5075.
Decided February 22, 1972

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
The petitioner, Jack Boyd, pleaded guilty in a Georgia trial court to three counts of forging checks and to one count of possession of a forged check. He was not represented by a lawyer. The court sentenced him to serve 28 years in prison — four consecutive terms of seven years each. No transcript of that plea or sentencing proceeding exists.
He sought habeas corpus relief in the state trial court, alleging, among other things, that he had been denied the assistance of counsel. An evidentiary hearing was held, and relief was denied. An appeal was dismissed by the Georgia Supreme Court. The petitioner then filed a petition for habeas corpus in a Federal District Court, which denied relief without a hearing, basing its decision on the record of the state post-conviction proceeding. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, Boyd v. Smith, 435 F. 2d 153.
At the Georgia post-conviction hearing, where the petitioner was also without the assistance of counsel, the only witness for the State on the question of waiver of counsel at the arraignment was a man named Dunnaway, who had been present at the arraignment, as Deputy Sheriff of Terrell County, Georgia. According to Dunnaway, the prosecutor told the petitioner that he was entitled to legal counsel and that the court would appoint a lawyer if the petitioner could not afford one. By Dun-naway's account, the prosecutor then asked the petitioner if he wanted a lawyer, and the petitioner replied that he did not. Yet there were apparently no questions from either the judge or the prosecutor during the arraignment inquiring whether the petitioner understood the nature and consequences of his alleged waiver of the right to counsel or of his guilty plea.
The petitioner expressed a desire to call witnesses at the state post-conviction hearing, but the court did not ask him who the proposed witnesses were or inquire about the expected nature of their testimony. The judge simply noted that the petitioner, who obviously possessed no legal skills, had failed to subpoena those whom he wanted to testify.
A person charged with a felony in a state court has an unconditional and absolute constitutional right to a lawyer. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335. This right attaches at the pleading stage of the criminal process, Rice v. Olson, 324 U. S. 786, and may be waived only by voluntary and knowing action, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458; Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U. S. 506. Waiver will not be "lightly presumed," and a trial judge must "indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver." Johnson, supra, at 464.
The controlling issue in this case is whether the petitioner knowingly and voluntarily waived his constitutional right to counsel before entering the guilty plea in the state trial court. It is evident that the material facts bearing upon that issue were inadequately developed in the state court post-conviction hearing. That being so, the Federal District Court was under a duty to hold an evidentiary hearing. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293, 313; 28 U. S. C. § 2254 (d). Accordingly, we grant the petition for a writ of certiorari, vacate the judgment before us, and remand the case to the District Court for an evidentiary hearing.
It is so ordered.