Case Name: Catharine Hinnemann and Jacob Hinnemann, Administrators of Theodore Hinnemann, deceased, Appellants, v. Samuel Rosenback, Respondent
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1868-03
Citations: 39 N.Y. 98
Docket Number: 
Parties: Catharine Hinnemann and Jacob Hinnemann, Administrators of Theodore Hinnemann, deceased, Appellants, v. Samuel Rosenback, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 39
Pages: 98–106

Head Matter:
Catharine Hinnemann and Jacob Hinnemann, Administrators of Theodore Hinnemann, deceased, Appellants, v. Samuel Rosenback, Respondent.
An agreement to pay a party $1,700 in the lawful currency of the United States, and five hundred dollars in an order on W. & T., does not imply that the five hundred dollar order is to be paid in cash.
Parol evidence is admissible to show that the order was to be for sash and blinds, and not money; and it is competent to prove that W. & T. were engaged in the manufacture of articles necessarily used in house building (where the contract was for the building a house), to raise the presumption that the parties intended the order for such articles.
On the 16th of January, 1861, the defendant and Theodore Hinnemann made a written contract, by which the latter agreed to build a house for the defendant, which said contract was in the words and figures following, to wit: “ This agreement made and entered into, this 21st day of January, 1861, by and between Samuel Rosenback of the.city of Syracuse, county of Onondaga, and State of Hew York, of the first part, and Theodore Hinnemann of the above named city, county and State of the second part, witnesseth: That the said Theodore Hinnemann, party of the second part, for the consideration hereinafter mentioned, doth covenant and agree to and with the party of the first part to make and build and finish in a good substantial and workmanlike mannei, on the lot of the said party of the first part, on Jefferson street in the city of Syracuse, a dwelling-house, agreeably to the plans and specifications, of good substantial materials; and the said Theodore Hinnemann, party of the second part, doth further covenant and agree to finish and deliver the same into the hands of the party of the first part, on or Defore the first day of July next:
“ And the said party of the first part covenants and agrees to pay unto the party of the second part, for the faithful performance of the same, the sum of one thousand seven hundred dollars, lawful money of the Hnited State, and five hundred dollars in an order on Messrs. Woodruff & Taylor of Oswego, also a house and lot on the north-east corner of Jackson and Mulberry streets, in the city of Syracuse, and the house now on the lot on which the party of the first part designs to build. The money to be paid as follows: Five hundred dollars on the first day of May next, five hundred dollars the first day of June next, and the balance when finished. The house and lot on the corner of Mulberry and Jackson to -be deeded to said Hinnemann, upon the signing of this agreement, also the house now on the lot on Jefferson street.
“In witness whereof, the parties to these presents have hereunto set their hands and seals, the day and year first above written.
“ (Signed) SAMUEL ROSEMBAOK, [l s.]
“THEODORE HIHHEMAHK [l s.]
“ Signed, sealed and deliv- , ered in the presence of
“L. E. Jot.”
The plaintiff performed the whole work according to the t.erms of his contract, and the defendant paid him the price fixed by the contract and fully performed on his part, except the $500 payable in the order on Woodruff & Taylor, the plaintiff claiming and insisting that the contract entitled him to an order payable ip money, and the defendant insisting on the right to give him an order which, by its terms, was payable in sash, blinds and other joiner work, Woodruff & Taylor being manufacturers of such articles at Oswego.
Upon the trial of the cause the referee allowed the defend ant to give certain parol evidence for the purpose of showing that this expression in the contract meant an order payable #in the building materials manufactured by Woodruff & Taylor, and not in cash. And the real question on the case is whether this evidence was properly received; and, secondly, whether the referee was right in holding that the true intent and meaning of the contract was, that this order on Wood-ruff & Taylor should be drawn, payable in sash, blinds, etc. The referee found that such was the true construction of the contract, and as the defendant had offered the plaintiff such an order, the referee gave judgment for the defendant, and which was affirmed on appeal to the General Term, and from which judgment the defendant has appealed to this court.
W. V. Bruyn, for the plaintiff.
Wm. C. Rogers, for the defendant.

Opinion:
Mason, J.
I am satisfied, after a careful examination of this case, that the referee committed no error, in admitting the parol evidence to aid in the interpretation of this contract, which can pro, . ¡ice the plaintiff; and that he gave the correct construction to this agreement. The language of the contract itself favors the construction put upon it by the referee. By the temis of the contract, the defendant was to pay Hinnemann for the construction of this dwelling-house, the sum of $1,700, lawful money of the United States, and convey to him the house and lot on the corner of Mulberry and Jackson streets by deed to said Hinnemann, upon the signing of the agreement, and the house on the lot on Jefferson street and to pay him "five hundred dollars in an order on Messrs. Woodruff & Taylor, of Oswego."
It is not a reasonable construction of the contract itself to hold, that these parties meant a cash draft on Woodruff & Taylor. He was to pay $1,700 in cash, and $500 in an order on Woodruff & Taylor, of Oswego. The legal definition of an order does not ordinarily mean a cash draft. Bouvxeb says that " an informal bill of exchange on paper which requires one person to pay or deliver to another goods on account of the maker, to a third party, is called an order." (2 Bouv. Law Dic., Little Ord. 251.) While a draft or bill of exchange is defined to be an open letter of request from, and order by, one person on another to pay a sum of money therein mentioned to a third person on demand, or at a future time therein specified (1 Bouv. Law. Dic. 189), a draft at the present day is the common term- for a bill of exchange. (1 Burr. Law Dic. 401.) The title " draft " or " draft and bill of exchange " are used indiscriminately. Edwards says the bill of exchange, popularly termed a draft, is in the form of an open letter directing, to whom it is addressed, to pay the sum of money therein specified to a third person named in the instrument, on account of the writer or person by whom it is drawn. (Edw. on Bills and Prom. Notes, 41; Chitty on Bills, 130, 154.) It must be payable in money. (Thompson v. Sloan, 23 W., 73; Cook v. Satterlee, 6 Cow. 108 ; 5 id. 186.) Not so with an order; the more common definition is that given by Bouvier as an order to pay goods on account of the maker to a third person.
It was only necessary in this case to prove that Woodruff & Taylor were manufacturers of these articles, necessarily used at house building, to raise a reasonable presumption that it was the intention of these parties that this order should be for such articles, especially, it was proved that these parties knew that such was the business of Woodruff & Taylor. We cannot shut our eyes to the fact, that the plaintiff was, in this agreement, entering into a contract to build a .dwelling-house for the defendant, when these very materials would be required in its construction, and when we add to this, the fact, that the defendant in the contract agreed to pay $1,700 in cash, and an order on Woodruff & Taylor for $500; the presumption is very strong, that this order did not mean a cash draft on them. To my mind it is clear. Be this as it may, if the matter was left in doubt, it was certainly competent to remove it, by the parol evidence in the case. The rule is a common one, to receive evidence external to the contract in aid of the interpretation of its language. Such evidence, however, cannot be received to contradict or vary the terms of a written contract, and where the instrument has a settled legal meaning, its construction is not open to parol evidenc'e. (2 Parsons on Contracts, 63.) But where, as in this case, the order may mean a money order, or an order payable in these kind of building materials, there can be no doubt that the interpretation of the language of the contract may be aided by extrinsic evidence, showing the intention of the parties in the use of the lang uage in the particular instrument. (2 Parsons on Contracts, 76.)
I am quite inclined to the opinion, that it was not competent for the defendant to prove that he held a note or due-bill made by Woodruff & Taylor, payable in these materials. Its admission, however, affords no ground for granting a new trial, for the case is too clear for the defendant, without this evidence, to be doubted. If this evidence were out of the case, the finding must have been the same, and were the finding otherwise, it would be erroneous.
The judgment of the Supreme Court must be affirmed.