Case Name: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Sam COURTNEY, Defendant-Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1956-09-20
Citations: 236 F.2d 921
Docket Number: No. 398, Docket 24185
Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Sam COURTNEY, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 236
Pages: 921–927

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Sam COURTNEY, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 398, Docket 24185.
United States Court of Appeal's Second Circuit.
Argued July 17, 1956.
Decided Sept. 20, 1956.
On March 29, 1956, a Special Grand Jury was duly impaneled in the Southern District of New York to investigate allegations of racketeering in the garment and trucking industries.
On April 10, May 3, May 10, May 22 and June 26, 1956, defendant appeared as a witness and testified before this Grand Jury. He is a partner in Courtney Trucking Company, a firm engaged in business in the New York City “garment center.” He was interrogated at length about the overall operations of his company and until the appearance of June 26, 1956 gave answers to the questions posed.
A specific area of inquiry upon which the questioning centered was the expenditure by the trucking company of large sums of money averaging $15,000 to $20,000 a year — unsupported by vouchers — the major portion of which was claimed by Courtney’s testimony to have consisted of gratuities supposedly paid out in the course of business.
On June 26, 1956, the defendant testified that he himself distributed portions of these monies on daily visits to various persons in the many packing houses and buildings in which his company deals.
Then questioned as to his activities of the past week (i.e., June 18-22, 1956), he answered that he had visited ten packing houses and several buildings, giving gratuities in each case to checkers, freight-elevator starters, assistant starters and operators. Further interrogation exacted names of particular packing houses and buildings at which such payments were supposedly made. However, when asked to give the names of the recipients, he refused to answer, stating as his reasons: “That it affects my business”; “that it will impair my business”; that “there is no one who receives the money that will admit it”; and that “if we do tell, the man who receives it, the man will lose his job.”
Upon recommendation of the Assistant United States -Attorney, the witness was then excused by the Grand Jury Foreman to consult with counsel in the ante room. Upon his return to the Grand Jury room, Courtney — despite directions of the Foreman — persisted upon the same grounds in refusing to answer the questions, stating: “Sir, I am sorry, but for the reasons I gave I still refuse to answer the question.”
At the request of the Grand Jury, Judge McGohey held a hearing as to the propriety of the defendant’s refusal to answer. At this hearing, defendant asserted that the answers might tend to incriminate him. The judge held that the witness had no privilege, and directed him to answer the questions before the Grand Jury. Before the Grand Jury, defendant refused to do so, again asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege. The judge held him in contempt for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 401(3), and sentenced him to a term of three months imprisonment. The defendant has appealed.
Delaney & Donoghue, New York City (Joseph Leary Delaney, New York City, of counsel), for defendant-appellant.
Paul W. Williams, U. S. Atty. for Southern Dist. of New York, New York City (Arthur H. Christy, Herbert M. Wachtell, Asst. U. S. Attys., New York City, Fioravante G. Perrotta, Asst. U. S. Atty., Lynbrook, N. Y., Charles H. Miller, Asst. U. S. Atty., New York City, of counsel), for appellee.
Before CLARK, Chief Judge, and FRANK and LUMBARD, Circuit Judges.
. Among the questions to which witness then refused answers are the following:
“Q. Who did you give money to last week at National Packing?”
“Q. Whom did you give money to last week at Past Service?”
“Q. Who did you give money to last week, sir, at Gem?”
“Q. Who did you give money to last week at Interstate?”
“Q. Who did you give money to last week at any other packing house?”
“Q. To whom did you pay money at 463 Seventh Avenue?”
“Q. Did you pay to only one person seven or eight times or did you pay more than one person?”
“Q. Referring to 463 Seventh Avenue, Tiow much money did you pay last week?”
“Q. Which freight elevator operators did you pay money to at 463 Seventh Avenue last week?”
“Q. Which starter did you pay money to at 463 Seventh Avenue last week?”
“Q. To whom, sir, did you pay money at 462 Seventh Avenue last week?”

Opinion:
FRANK, Circuit Judge.
1. The government, in support of the judge's order, argues thus: Since defendant initially explained that he refused to answer because the answers would impair his business and harm other persons, his subsequent refusal, on Fifth Amendment grounds, was in bad faith and, on that account, should be disregarded. We do not agree. If he was clearly entitled to assert the privilege, his motives for doing so are immaterial. See Taft, J., in Ex parte Irvine, C.C., 74 F. 954, 964-965; cf. United States v. St. Pierre, 2 Cir., 128 F.2d 979, 980.
2. The government also contends that defendant had waived his right to assert the privilege because he had previously testified he had paid the gratuities in question, and in some instances had testified as to the places where the payments were made. But in those answers he had not stated the amounts of the several payments. If answers to the further questions would reveal that he had made a gift to any one person of $600 or more, within any one year, he would have supplied leads to evidence on the basis of which he could be convicted under Sections 145(a) and 147 of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.A. § 145(a), 147, and Sections 6041(a) and 7203 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C.A. § 6041(a), 7203. See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-487, 71 S.Ct. 814, 95 L.Ed. 1118.
On its facts, this case is not governed by Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 71 S.Ct. 438, 95 L.Ed. 344. For the same reason United States v. St. Pierre, 2 Cir., 132 F.2d 837, 147 A.L.R. 240, does not apply (even assuming that that decision still has vitality). Moreover, since the decision in Rogers v. United States, supra, the Supreme Court has, in general, more generously interpreted the Fifth Amendment privilege. See, e.g., Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190, 75 S.Ct. 687, 99 L.Ed. 997, and Trock v. United States, 351 U.S. 976, 76 S.Ct. 1048, reversing United States v. Trock, 2 Cir., 232 F.2d 839, on the authority of Hoffman v. United States, supra.
As we think the defendant was within his constitutional rights in refusing to answer, he was not guilty of contempt.
Reversed.
. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in that case; 318 U.S. 751, 63 S.Ct. 769, 87 L.Ed. 1126. Later, because the defendant had served his term, the Court dismissed the appeal as moot; 319 U.S. 41, 63 S.Ct. 910, 87 L.Ed. 1199. Subsequently, in Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 375, note 19, 71 S.Ct. 438, 443, the Court said: "United States v. St. Pierre, 2 Cir., 1942, 132 F.2d 837, 147 A.L.R. 240, presented a closer question since the 'detail' which St. Pierre was required to divulge would identify a person without whose testimony St. Pierre could not have been convicted of a crime. We, of course, do not here pass upon the precise factual question there decided by the Court of Appeals."
. This opinion should he read together with our opinion in United States v. Gordon, 2 Cir., 236 F.2d 916.