Case Name: PERCH v. NEW YORK CENTRAL RAILROAD CO.
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1939-12-19
Citations: 294 Mich. 227
Docket Number: Docket No. 56, Calendar No. 40,736
Parties: PERCH v. NEW YORK CENTRAL RAILROAD CO.
Judges: Butzel, C. J., and Wiest, Bushnell, Sharpe, Potter, Chandler, and McAllister, JJ., concurred.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 294
Pages: 227–239

Head Matter:
PERCH v. NEW YORK CENTRAL RAILROAD CO.
On Rehearing.
1. Railroads — Automobiles — Crossing Accident — Proximate Cause' — Evidence—Third Parties.
Under record in action under the death act by administratrix of estate of motorist killed in the nighttime at a railroad crossing at which gates had been lowered, showing that a third party, since convicted of negligent homicide, drove his car in such a negligent manner as to push decedent’s car some 92 feet on to fifth set of tracks where it was run into by defendant’s heavy passenger train then exceeding speed limit permitted by city ordinance, that although train operators perhaps could have seen car on the crossing and stopped train before reaching crossing had it been operated at the maximum lawful speed the engineer did not see the car and the fireman did not see it until just before the locomotive struck it, that the bell was ringing and that the whistle had been blown, train operators were, as a matter of law, not guilty of negligence since they had no reason to anticipate that an automobile would be on the crossing under such circumstances and were not otherwise under obligation to stop; the sole proximate cause of the accident being the fault of the motorist who pushed decedent’s car to the tracks.
2. Same — Protection of Highway Crossings — Discretion of Public Service Commission.
The kind and character of the protection that is to be erected at railroad crossings is left to the sound judgment and discretion of the State public service commission and it is based upon the reasonableness of the protection to be.afforded and may be in the form of warning signals, bells, or by the erection of crossing gates.
3. Negligence — Definition.
Negligence is the failure to exercise that degree of care which the law imposes for the protection of the interests of those persons likely to be injuriously affected by the want of it.
Necessity of adequate causal relation, see 2 Restatement, Torts, § 430.
Basis upon and agencies by which negligence is' found to be present, see 2 Restatement, Torts, § 285.
Sharpe, North, and McAllister, JJ., dissenting.
Appeal from Wayne; O’Neill (James E.), J., presiding.
Submitted October 5,1939.
(Docket No. 56, Calendar No. 40,736.)
Decided December 19, 1939.
Submitted on rehearing April 2, 1940.
Decided on rehearing June 4, 1940.
Rehearing denied September 6, 1940.
Case by Laura Perch, administrator of the estate of George Perch, deceased, against New York Central Railroad Company for damages under the death act. Yerdict and judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.
Reversed on rehearing.
Cashan P. Head and Berger, Manason & Barris, for plaintiff.
William A. Alfs (John J. Danhof and Harold H. McLean, of counsel), for defendant.

Opinion:
North, J.
Plaintiff, as administratrix of the estate of George Perch, seeks to recover damages arising from a railroad crossing accident which caused the death of her husband, Mr. Perch. Shortly before 1 o'clock on the morning of May 13,1937, plaintiff's decedent was driving a Dodge automobile north on Lonyo road in the city of Detroit. This road runs north and south and is intersected at right angles by six sets of tracks of the defendant railroad company. As plaintiff's decedent, proceeding in a northerly direction, approached defendant's tracks, the railroad crossing gates were down and one of defendant's westbound passenger trains was approaching. Mr. Perch stopped his car. As his car stood about 25 feet south of the crossing gates, another automobile driven in a negligent manner by one Roy Walton struck the Perch car in the rear with such force that it was knocked through the gates, across four sets of intervening tracks and came to rest on the fifth set of tracks upon whieh the train was coming. It was approximately 92 feet from the point where the car of plaintiff's decedent was standing south of the gates to the point where it stopped on defendant's westbound main track. Upon trial by jury plaintiff had verdict and judgment was entered thereon. Defendant contends that the proximate cause of this accident was the negligent act of Roy Walton, in consequence of which he was tried and convicted of the crime of negligent homicide. On this appeal appellant claims its motion for a directed verdict and its later motion for judgment non obstante veredicto should have been granted on the ground that as a matter of law Walton's negligence was the proximate cause of the accident. The sole question is whether this contention on the part of appellant is correct.
These additional facts are pertinent. As the automobile which plaintiff's decedent was driving was standing south of the railroad gates, defendant's train was approaching approximately 800 feet from the crossing and at a rate of speed in excess of 45 miles per hour. For a distance of 315' feet east of the center line of Lonyo road defendant's track is straight, but beyond that point it veers to the northeast on a three-degree curve. Because of this curve the headlight of the locomotive approaching* Lonyo road was shining south of the crossing and did not light the place where the automobile came to a stop on the track until the locomotive had passed around the curve and had reached a point directly east of the crossing. But the record discloses there were numerous other lights in the locality which rendered objects on the crossing visible at least to some ex-' tent. The engineer did not see the automobile prior to the impact. The fireman's view was obstructed by the boiler of the locomotive as it rounded the curve and lie did not see the automobile until practically the instant it was struck. It was at this time that the engineer made a heavy service application of the .brakes; but the train continued to travel a distance of approximately 1,500 feet. The engineer testified that even with the aid of the headlight on the locomotive he could not see more than 500 feet ahead; and further when 700 or 800 feet east of the crossing he could not see the south side of the crossing where the Perch automobile was presumably then standing. The train weighed substantially 1,500 tons, and there is testimony that at a speed of 30 miles an hour it would go from 700 to 1,000 feet after an emergency application of the brakes before coming to a stop, and at 60 miles per hour it would go 2,500 to 3,000 feet before stopping.
As above noted, appellant asserts that under this record the court should have held as a matter of law the proximate cause of this unfortunate accident was the wrong-doing of Roy Walton; but on the other hand plaintiff contends that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of defendant's employees in failing to discover plaintiff's decedent in his place of danger in time to avoid the accident and also negligence in operating the train at a rate of speed in excess of that provided by the city ordinance, i. e., 30 miles an hour. In this connection plaintiff asserts the collision occurred so soon after the Perch automobile stopped on the track on which the train was approaching- that her decedent did not have time or opportunity to get out of the automobile.
Appellant's contention that Walton's negligence was the sole proximate cause cannot be sustained. The trial court, after advising the jurors as to the legal significance of "proximate cause," instructed them as follows:
"You will observe in order to entitle her to recover plaintiff must establish by a preponderance of evidence: (1) That the defendant was negligent. (2) That such negligence was a proximate cause of the collision between the car which George L. Perch was occupying and the train."
Clearly there is abundant evidence of negligence both on the part of Walton and of defendant. On this record it cannot be said as a matter of law that the negligence of either was the sole proximate cause. Instead the jury may well have found that the negligence of each of these was. a proximate cause.
"There may be more than one proximate cause for the same injury, and the mere fact that some other cause co-operates with the negligence of the defendant to produce the injury for which suit is brought does not relieve him from liability. 2 Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law, p. 1204." Camp v. Wilson, 258 Mich. 38.
See, also, Fitzcharles v. Mayer, 284 Mich. 122, 128 (3 N. C. C. A. [N. S.] 565).
"It is elementary that where injury results from the concurrent negligence of two or more, each proximately contributing to the result, recovery may be had against one or more." Banzhof v. Roche, 228 Mich. 36.
"The two contributing causes must be held to be concurring where, as in this ease, the concurrence of both was essential to produce the injury." Welch v. Jackson & Battle Creek Traction Co., 154 Mich. 399, 408.
Defendant's alleged negligence, as the jury must have found, continued to the very instant of the impact and injury to plaintiff's decedent. There was no other intervening independent cause. On this record it cannot be said as a matter of law that defendant was not guilty of the alleged negligence or that such negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident and injury to plaintiff's decedent.
Defendant in support of its position relies upon Lineberry v. Railway Co., 187 N. C. 786 (123 S. E. 1); Thompson v. Railroad Co., 195 N. C. 663 (143 S. E. 186); and Johnson v. City of Omaha, 108 Neb. 481 (188 N. W. 122). We think each of these cases is readily distinguishable from the instant case. In each of the cited cases a defendant was held hot liable as a matter of law. This conclusion was reached because it conclusively appeared that the sole proximate cause of the injury was the wrongful act or negligence of a third party. In other words, in each case the injury would have been suffered wholly regardless of the negligence charged against the defendant which the court held, as a matter of law, was not liable. There is testimony in this record from which the jury might well have found that both the negligence of Walton and the negligence of defendant were proximate causes of the accident. Further, under the circumstances here presented, it quite conclusively appears this accident would not have happened except as the result of concurrent negligence on the part of both Walton and defendant.
The judgment entered in the circuit court is affirmed, with costs to appellee.
Butzel, C. J., and Wiest, Bushnell, Sharpe, Potter, Chandler, and McAllister, JJ., concurred.