Case Name: LOULIA B. SMITH and MARGARET SMITH, MARIAN SMITH, RUBY SMITH, FRANK SMITH, and JOHN SMITH, Minors, by their Guardian ad litem, LOULIA B. SMITH, Respondents, v. THE CENTENNIAL EUREKA MINING COMPANY, a Corporation, and THE RIO GRANDE WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellant
Court: Utah Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Utah
Decision Date: 1904-02-25
Citations: 27 Utah 307
Docket Number: No. 1473
Parties: LOULIA B. SMITH and MARGARET SMITH, MARIAN SMITH, RUBY SMITH, FRANK SMITH, and JOHN SMITH, Minors, by their Guardian ad litem, LOULIA B. SMITH, Respondents, v. THE CENTENNIAL EUREKA MINING COMPANY, a Corporation, and THE RIO GRANDE WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellant.
Judges: BASKIN, C. J., concurs.
Reporter: Utah Reports
Volume: 27
Pages: 307–335

Head Matter:
LOULIA B. SMITH and MARGARET SMITH, MARIAN SMITH, RUBY SMITH, FRANK SMITH, and JOHN SMITH, Minors, by their Guardian ad litem, LOULIA B. SMITH, Respondents, v. THE CENTENNIAL EUREKA MINING COMPANY, a Corporation, and THE RIO GRANDE WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellant.
No. 1473.
(75 Pac. 749.)
1. Master and Servant: Death by Wrongful Act: Contributory Negligence: Disobedience of Rules.
A laborer employed by a mining company, to fill freight cars with ore was required to loosen the brakes on the cars left by the railroad company at a distance from the orehouse, allow them to move downgrade to the orehouse, and stop them there by means of the brakes. While letting two ears down he lost control of them. They ran to the bottom of the grade, and he was killed. The brakes' were obviously very defective. On beginning work he had been instructed never to let more than one car down at a time, to place blocks on the track to.stop the car at the orehouse, and to inspect cars before attempting to move them, and report defects. Held, that his failure to do any of these things on the occasion in question was contributory negligence, precluding recovery for his death from the mining company.
2. Same: Contributory Negligence: Defense: Third Party.
Where an employee of a mining company was killed while using cars which a railroad company had negligently allowed to remain in a defective condition, but deceased was guilty of contributory neglig'ence in failing to observe' rules prescribed by the mining company, the defense of contributory-negligence was available to the' railroad company, though no contract relation existed between the railroad company and deceased.
McCARTY, J., dissenting in part.
(Decided February 25, 1904.)
Appeal from the Fifth District Court, Juab County.— Hon. Thomas Marioneaux, Judge.
Action to recover damages for death alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendants. From a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs against the railway company, it appealed.
Beveksed.
Messrs. Sutherland, Van Cott & Allison for appellant.
L. R. Rogers, Esq., and W. R. White, Esq., for respondents.
STATEMENT OE EAOTS.
This action was brought by the heirs of John P. Smith to recover damages for his death, which, they claim, was caused through the negligence of the defendants. The allegations of the complaint, so far as material to this decision, are, substantially, that on May 4, 1901, and for six or more months previous to that date, John P. Smith, the deceased, was employed by the defendant mining company in filling ore and other materials from a mine chute and other buildings belonging to the mining company into Height ears belonging to the defendant railway company; that at and during such time the deceased was so employed at Eureka, Juab county, Utah; that the mining company had engaged the railway company to haul ore from Eureka to various places for the purpose of smelting and selling it, and to provide strong, safe, and suitable cars therefor, which should be safe for the use of the employees of the mining company in loading ore on them; that freight cars were provided for the mining company by the railway company, and that it was the duty of both defendants to see that the cars were in good repair and condition for the said John P. Smith in loading them with ore for freighting; that on the date above mentioned the railway company furnished the mining company and the deceased with two cars for ore, and placed them higher np on the track than the ore chntes and building containing ore, and on a higher grade than the place where the chute is opposite to the track, thereby leaving the deceased to drive the two cars down to the chute; that on both cars the brakes, and appliances connected with them, were badly out of repair and loose, “the equalizer, pins, bolts, bars, and other appliances connected with the brakes were out of repair and loose; the shoes connected with the brakes and wheels of the ears were worn out and thin and badly out of repair, and would not hold or block the wheels of said cars, and some of the shoes of the cars were entirely gone on said day, and were negligently permitted for some time previous to remain so;” that the defective and unsafe condition of the brakes and appliances could, with the exercise of ordinary care and diligence, have been discovered by the defendants, and at the time mentioned' was known to them, but the same was unknown to the deceased; that on the day mentioned, while the deceased was performing his duties of loading ore, it became necessary for him to drive said cars from the higher grade, a distance of several rods, down near and under the ore chute, and in attempting to do so lost control of the cars, by reason of the defects aforesaid, and the same went down the grade, past the ore chute and building where the ore was, at a high rate of speed, and collided with certain loaded cars below, with such force that the deceased was thrown' between the cars, and there crushed and killed; and that the plaintiffs were dependent upon the deceased for support.
The railway company in its answer denies the allegations of the complaint respecting negligence, and pleads affirmatively contributory negligence of the deceased, and that his injuries and death were occasioned by the risks incident to his employment.
From the evidence it appears, in substance, that for about six months before and at the time of the fatal accident the deceased was in the employ of the defendant mining company, and his duties were to load ore from that company’s orehouse, through ore chutes, into cars furnished by the railway company. The building stood alongside of a side track belonging to the railway company, extending in an easterly direction from the company’s main line of railway to á point some distance beyond the orehouse. From the point where the deceased started the cars at the time of the accident to the orehouse there is a descending grade. In front of the building the track is level, but immediately after passing the building the track again has a down grade of about 4.35 feet in every 100 feet. From the point where the grade commences to descend to the lowest point in the grade before it commences to ascend the distance is about 610 feet. The railway company in furnishing cars to the mining company, ran them from its main line onto this side track, and left them standing above the orehouse. It was then the business of the mining company to run the cars, as it required them, down to the orehouse, by means of the brakes, load them with ore, and, upon being loaded, run them down below the orehouse to the lowest point on the grade, to be taken thence by the railway company onto its main line. On May 4, 1901, and for some months prior thereto, the deceased was in the employ of the mining company, and it appears this work of so loading and running down the cars was intrusted to him. On the afternoon of that day he attempted to run two cars, Nos. 631 and 678, coupled together, down the track, doubtless, as indicated by the circumstances, with the intention of stopping them at the orehouse and loading them. This he attempted to do by means of the hand brakes, but was unable to stop them, and the cars ran past the orehouse down the steep grade and collided with other cars loaded with ore. In the collision he was thrown between the cars, crushed, and killed.
The evidence introduced on behalf of the plaintiffs shows that the two cars which caused the collision were examined by a number of persons very shortly after the accident, and that the braking apparatus was badly out of repair; that on the one car the braking apparatus was so defective as to render it practically useless; that the brake shoes were worn very thin; that by manipulating the brake staff one could get no pressure on the brake wheel; that the brake chain on the staff was doubled on itself between a brace and the brake staff, so that the brake could not be set; that there was one cog broken out of the cog wheel on the brake staff; and that there was too much slack in the brake chain. As to the other car, the plaintiffs’ evidence shows that the brake shoes were badly worn; that one of them was riding on the flange of the wheel, which prevented the even application of the braking power; that two guide bolts were gone; and that the point of the brake dog was so chipped and worn that it would not lock into the ratchet on the brake staff. It further appears from such evidence that, while the braking apparatus on one of these cars might 'possibly have held it, it was entirely inadequate, owing to the defects, to hold the two cars, and that the defects were so numerous and obvious that they could readily be discovered.
Respecting the braking apparatus, the witness B. L. Short, testifying for the plaintiffs, in the course of his testimony, inter alia, made statements as follows: “I got up on No. 678, and tried to set the brake, and found out that the shoes would make no effect upon the brake wheel. I found that the chain was doubled on itself, and was binding with the brace that came down on the staff. You might twist there as long as you wanted to and you would not get any brake power, for the reason that it was iron-bound. The brake shoes did not take hold of the wheel. You could move it with your foot. After getting down out of the car onto the ground I examined the brake chain to determine whether there was too much slack in it or not, and found that there was; it could have been taken np. Assuming that the conditions on Saturday (day of accident) were the same as I found them on Sunday, I would say that the front car, No. 678, could not have been moved down that track by a man without its running away, because he would not have the brake power to hold the car — practically no brake power. My opinion is that if car 678 had been left standing on the side track loose, not coupled to any other car, it would not have remained stationary, for the brakes would not have held it. The car was simply held there by reason of the fact that it was coupled to the car above it (631). Coming down to the defects on car number 631, the dog which fits into the ratchet, thereby locking the brake after being set, was worn thick, and it would not lock into the ratchet. I could not get the dog to stay in the ratchet at all unless I put my foot against it. The brake chain was loose, but it did not seem to work just right. The brake shoe was out on the flange, which did not give an even pressure on both ends of the break beam. I discovered something was wrong immediately by turning the wheel. I found I could not get action on it like one in good order. I discovered at once that the dog was bad. I looked to see if it was in position, and saw that it was chipped. All I had to do to. discover this was to look down at the dog. I examined the brakes on these two cars, and found that the brake shoes on 631 were defective in the extreme. If car 631 was in the same condition the day previous as when I found it, it could not have stood on the incline by means of the brakes and the dog and the ratchet. If I would have to answer the question whether or not, in my opinion, the brakes on car 631 were sufficient in the hands of an experienced brakeman to handle it down that grade, I would say they were not. My opinion is that two experienced men could not have handled and controlled those two cars by means of the brakes; two men could not have handled them going down that incline by the brakes. ’ ’ The witness also stated that the two cars could have been un coupled by the use of brake blocks; and in relation to the ascertainable character of the defects in the braking apparatus the same witness, among bther things, in the course of his testimony, said: “If a man had looked for anything of that kind, he certainly would have seen it. A man who is accustomed to the business can tell very readily, when handling a brake staff, if he is getting any pressure, whether the car is in motion or standing still. A man who is accustomed to braking can tell pretty well whether a brake is in good condition by turning the handle. If there is a failure of the braking apparatus to work, and a consequent failure to get pressure, this could be determined by standing on the platform of the brake staff. I exerted all my strength on the brake staff on car 678, and got no pressure. I discovered these conditions in a very short time after I got on the car. I discovered that both of them were apt to run away.”
On the same subject the witness John F. Allen, testifying for the plaintiffs, and referring to the broken dog on the brake staff, said: “When Short called my attention to it I looked at it, and as soon as I looked I saw that it was broken off.”
The witness Bonney, also one of the plaintiffs’ witnesses, and who testified substantially the same as the witness Short respecting the defects in the braking apparatus of the two cars, and how readily a slight inspection revealed the defects, in the course of his testimony said: “When I went up on Saturday to inspect the cars I tried to apply the brake on, car 678 and could not do it. I noticed this immediately — very soon — just as soon as I took hold of the brake wheel and turned it. This I determined very easily and quickly — within half a minute; for, from what little braking I had done, I knew that the brake was not in proper condition to let a car down on a steep grade. I am just testifying to the conditions as I found them. Before I got down I knew there was something the matter with the brake; that there was something wrong with the braking ap paratus on the car. It took practically no time to find this out. I got up and tried the brake on 631, and immediately discovered that the dog was broken. It took a very short time to discover this. The broken dog was in plain view — easy to be seen. So far as holding these cars on a heavy grade is concerned, these cars might just as well have been stripped of their, entire braking apparatus. That is my opinion.”
There is also evidence to the effect that the cars, where they stood beyond the ore chute, would not start of themselves by gravitation after the brakes were off, so as to afford no opportunity for an inspection of the braking apparatus before starting. Upon this subject the witness Hickman, testifying for the plaintiffs, said: “I remember May 4, 1901, when Mr. Smith was killed. I saw him that day before he was killed. He was getting ready to lower a car with ore at the orehouse. I assisted him. It was about four o’clock. The car was being loaded at the orehouse. While performing that labor I observed some cars standing on the same track west of the orehouse — I should judge about one hundred feet west. As near as I can remember the cars were standing in the usual place. The cars that he got hurt on were standing in the usual place as the cars which were put in there on other days. The track at that point is practically level. I know he had a pinch bar for the purpose of moving those cars. I believe the mining company that employed him furnished him with the bar, which was used for that purpose — pinching cars so as to set them in motion. I say that it requires a pinch bar to start a car out of there when the brake is off; that is, to start the car east. After a car started it would run. It would run on to such a force that he would have to put on the brakes in order to hold the car when he got to the scales, which were right at the orehouse.”
On this same subject, Mrs. Loulia B. Smith, plaintiff, testified: “Before Mr. Smith was killed . 'i . I used to go up there frequently, and have seen him engaged in performing that work. He used to take a long crow bar, and put it under tbe wheel, and get tbe car in motion, and then be would get up quickly on tbe car and take bold of tbe brake; that is tbe way be ordinarily did it.”
Tbe defendant railway company introduced evidence tending to show that tbe braking apparatus was in proper condition, and in support of its affirmative plea of contributory negligence, testimony respecting rules and instructions of tbe mining company, tbe employer of tbe deceased, for bis guidance in his'employment. On this subject of rules and instructions tbe witness Hope, who immediately preceded tbe deceased in tbe employment, testified: “When I quit that job on November 12, 1900, Mr. Smith succeeded me, and be commencéd work at that time. I worked with him tbe first day that be worked there, and instructed him in bis duties, pursuant to instructions I received from tbe ■Centennial Eureka Mining Company. I showed him tbe way to, load cars and handle them. I instructed him never to load a car until be inspected tbe brakes to see whether tbe chain was all right and tbe dogs were on tbe car." I told him to do this for bis own safety. I told him to be very careful with tbe handling of tbe ■cars, and take proper precautions to use track blocks,, or stop blocks, as we termed them, which are pieces of timber made of Oregon lumber, probably three feet in length, and probably three or four inches in thickness. There were such blocks there for that purpose. I first ■showed him bow to drop tbe cars. I went up and let tbe cars down to the scales, using tbe block on this occasion in order to show him, and put it on tbe track across both rails, it being long enough to do this, on tbe scales opposite the chute, where I wanted to stop tbe car. After putting it there, I let tbe car down against it, and told him always to follow that routine of work. I told him never to let down more than one car at a time. I told him never to let tbe cars away from tbe chutes until tbe chutes were raised so that be could pull tbe chutes out. I talked with him during this day right along con- eeming Ms duty. I told Mm that every car we loaded that day was typical of how he should perform his work. I don’t know how many cars we took down and loaded on that day. We loaded as a rule anywhere from one to eig’ht or nine cars — probably on an average of four or five cars a day. I was with him all the time that day.-I let the cars down in the first place, and he stood on the ground watching me. After I had thus instructed him verbally, I reduced these various instructions to writing at his request. He asked me to write out the company’s rules, so as to help him do the work, in the event that he should overlook anything. I tacked these instructions up in the scalehouse — the house that the scale bar is inclosed in. He saw me tack them up.”
The testimony of the superintendent of the mine,, the witness Brown, in part, on this subject is: “When I employed him I gave him instructions concerning his. duties. I told him to see that all the brakes on the cars, were set, to examine them, and see if there were any defective parts, and, if so, to report to the mine office; to use his brake club and brake blocks, and move but one-car at a time, I told him to examine them when they were put on the side track by the railroad company. I didn’t specially mention the brakes, but I told him to examine the cars, and see if there were any defective parts. I instructed Mr. Hope, the gentleman who testified this afternoon, to go and assist him, and instruct, him in his work.”
.The witness C. E. Allen, the general superintendent of the mining company, testified: ’“I saw him at work probably within a week from the time he began. About a week after, when I first saw him at work, the first, thing I asked him was if he had plenty of brake blocks, and told him not to neglect using them, both at the scales where they loaded the ore and also at the place above where the last empty stood; that there were plenty of' brake blocks at tbe mine, and at any time that he got short he should send for more, and never be out of them. . . . I admonished him about keeping the scales. clean, and called his attention to the fact that he should never let but one car down the grade at a time, and that he should always see that the brakes were kept on the empties above it, and before letting cars down that he should examine them, and see if they were in good condition to be handled and ready to come down the grade. I told him that he should inspect the brakes and the braking apparatus in order to see that he could control his cars when he came down the grade.”
The testimony of the witness Barnard is of the same character and import, and none of this evidence appears to be conti adicted. It is not shown by the evidence that the deceased used brake blocks in his attempt to handle the two cars at the time of the accident.
At the close of the plaintiffs’ testimony a motion for a nonsuit on the part of - the mining company was sustained by the court, and one overruled as to the railway company, and thereupon, after the evidence of the railway company had been introduced, the case was submitted to the jury, who returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs. This appeal is from the judgment.
Butte v. Pleasant Valley Coal Co., 14 Utah 282, 47 Pac. 77; Higgins v. Southern Pac., 26 Utah 164, 72 Pac. 690; Burgess v. R. R. Co., 17 Utah 406, 53 Pac. 1013.

Opinion:
BARTCH, J.,
after a statement of the case as above, delivered the opinion of the court.
At the conclusion of the evidence in this case the defendant railway company requested the court to instruct the jury to return a verdict in its favor. The refusal of this request, among other things, has been assigned as error.
The appellant railway company contends that the jury ought to have been so instructed, for the reason, as is insisted, that the uncontradicted evidence shows the deceased was guilty of contributory negligence which was the proximate cause of his injury and death. It is argued that the deceased was negligent in failing to observe and in deliberately violating the rules and instructions provided and given by his employer for his guidance and safety in the performance of his work.
The contention of the respondents on this point ap pears to be that the relation of master and servant did not exist at the time of the accident between the appellant railway company and the deceased, and that, therefore, if the railway company was negligent in furnishing cars with defective braking apparatus, and the death resulted from handling such cars, the railway company can not, for the purpose of avoiding liability for its negligence, avail itself of a violation of the rules of the mining company. Such, at least, seems to be the result of the contention of the respondents.
That the braking appliances of the two cars in question were greatly defective is manifest from the evidence of. the plaintiffs, as shown in the statement of the case, and, while this is contradicted by evidence of the defendants, the jury must have found that the appliances were defective, and that the railway company was negligent in placing such ears upon the side track, and such finding, based, as it is, upon conflicting evidence, is conclusive on us upon such question. "Whether the allegations of the complaint, as.well as the evidence introduced by the plaintiffs, show such obvious defects in the braking appliances that the deceased ought to have observed them, and have refrained from attempting to handle the cars on the steep grade, and that his failure to do so rendered him guilty of contributory negligence fatal to a recovery for his death, is a question unnecessary to decide. It may be said, however, that the complaint itself shows that a mere cursory examination would doubtless have revealed the dangerous condition of the braking appliances. Was, then, the deceased himself so negligent, under the circumstances, as to preclude his heirs from recovering as against his employer?
Under agreement with his employer, the railway company' placed the cars which he was to operate upon the side track. When so placed they were under his exclusive charge. It seems he was both conductor and brakeman respecting the movements of those cars. That his employment was more or less hazardous was appar ent from the character of the grade and the nature of the labor to be performed. Ail this was obvious, and must have been known by the deceased. Upon engaging to perform the work, he assumed the risks ordinarily incident to the employment. Having entered into such a service, it was his undoubted duty, aside from any specific instructions, not only for his own safety, but also for the protection of the property of his employer, before attempting to run the cars down to the ore chute to inspect the appliances with which he expected to handle and stop them. Had he done this, it seems clear that he might have avoided the accident; for, if the defects existed, they were, according to the plaintiffs' evidence, ' open, obvious, and discoverable upon slight inspection. Notwithstanding his plain duty, however, to inspect the ears and their appliances, even without special instructions to do so, his employer did give the deceased, upon entering the service, special instructions, and adopted rules for his guidance and safety, which were to the effect that the employee should never attempt to run down on the side track more than one car at a time; that before letting a car down he should always examine it, and see that it was in condition to be handled, and that the brakes were kept set on the empties above it; that before loading a ear he should inspect the brakes and appliances, and see if there were any defective parts, and, if there were, to report to the mine office; and that he should take care to use track blocks across the track where the last empty car stood, and also at the orehouse to stop the car to be loaded. These instructions were promulgated for the employee's own_safety as well as for the protection of the property of his employer, and the law is well settled that an employer, engaged in a hazardous business, has the right, and that it is his duty, to formulate reasonable rules to enhance its orderly and safe conduct, so as to secure protection to property and the public, and to reduce the risks assumed by the employees.
In this case the employer not only promulgated reasonable and proper rules, but, upon.tbe employee entering into tbe service, imparted to bim special instructions for tbe safe management and performance of tbe business. Tbe rules and instructions, made and given for tbe employee's special benefit and safety, were by him, on tbe occasion of the accident, as appears from the plaintiffs' own testimony, wholly disregarded; for that testimony, which is binding upon tbe respondents, whatever, under tbe circumstances, tbe real fact may be, discloses, not only that, in violation of tbe positive instructions of tbe master, tbe deceased ran two cars coupled together down the grade instead of one, as instructed, but also that tbe braking appliances were so grossly defective as to be practically useless, a condition which required but slight inspection to reveal, and that no inspection could possibly have been made before tbe moving of tbe cars and tbe defects remain undiscovered. Nor was any report, so far as shown in evidence, made to tbe mine office. Thus, tbe evidence shows such a palpable disregard by tbe employee of tbe rules and instructions of the employer as clearly' absolves tbe employer, the mining company, from all liability to tbe plaintiffs for tbe unfortunate consequences of tbe disobedience of the employee; tbe proof clearly showing that tbe want of tbe employee's observance of tbe rules and instructions were tbe proximate cause of tbe resultant injuries and death.
It is plainly indicated by tbe evidence that tbe deceased made no effort to discover an open peril. There is nothing to show that be even made use of any brake blocks, while it is manifest that, in total disregard of bis employer's rule, be attempted to move two cars down tbe steep grade, with a braking apparatus wholly insufficient to bold one, and tbe insufficiency of which could have been ascertained upon slight inspection, in accordance with bis instructions. Tbe conclusion, from tbe evidence, is irresistible that tbe lamentable misfortune was tbe result of bis own beedlessness, being directly attributable to bis disobedience of tbe rules and instructions of Ms employer at a time when, so far as appears from the record, there was the existence of no emergency which required hasty action. This is so patent from the proof as to leave no room for reasonable minds to differ in relation thereto. Such disobedience, under the circumstances, rendered him guilty, in law, of contributory negligence, and such negligence, without doubt, was the proximate cause of his death. Clearly, therefore, no action is maintainable by the heirs against his employer, the mining company. The rules and instructions were proper and reasonable, and it was the duty of the deceased, under the law, to obey them, and, having failed to do so, his employer was released from liability for the injuries which were the direct result of such failure.
"It is," says Mr. Beach, "contributory negligence of an aggravated character on the part of an employee to disobey reasonable rules and regulations enacted to protect him from injury. If he is injured through such a gross and unwarranted disregard of his own safety, his remedy is gone. Such negligence is the most pronounced contributory negligence possible. It properly leaves the person injured by it wholly remediless." Beach, Contr. Neg., section 373.
In Scott v. Eastern Ry. Co. (Minn.), 95 N. W. 892, the Supreme Court of Minnesota, speaking through Mr. Justice Collins, said: "The universally established doctrine is that if an employee, of ordinary intelligence, is injured by reason of his disobedience or disregard of reasonable rules and orders issued by the master, and brought to his attention in ample time, and opportunity being given in which to obey, he cannot recover, as against the master, for an injury received, when a violation of a rule is the proximate cause of his injury. He will, as a matter of law, be deemed guilty of contributory negligence."
The same court, in Nordquist v. Great Northern Ry. Co. (Minn.), 95 N. W. 322, said: "An employee is bound to obey all of tbe reasonable rules of bis employer with reference to the conduct of bis business. Disobedience of sucb rules, if it contributes directly to tbe injury of tbe employee, conclusively charges him with negligence, which will bar any recovery of damages for bis injury."
In Karrer v. D. G. H. & M. R. R. Co., 76 Mich. 400, 43 N. W. 370, where tbe employees were acting under printed orders relating to tbeir safety, which the plaintiff failed to obey, the court said: "It was the plaintiff's duty to examine into the coupling arrangements of both cars before he attempted to couple them, and, as they were only a rod apart at most before he started the train back, and as- he says tbe defect was visible at once to any one looking, one or two seconds would bave furnished all tbe time needed to satisfy himself, bad be been acting under any one else's orders and not for himself ; but as be had personal direction of the engineer's movements, and could move when he pleased, the case, as he presents it, was an aggravated one of the grossest carelessness, for which he, and no one else, was responsible."
So, in La Croy v. N. Y., L. E. & W. Ry. Co., 132 N. Y. 570, 30 N. E. 391, the plaintiff, who had been injured, was employed as a brakeman on defendant's freight train. One of the printed rules required brakemen, before starting, to test the hand brakes. This was not done on the occasion of the accident which caused the injury for which recovery was sought. The court, bolding that disobedience of the rules caused the accident, and that, therefore, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover, said: "In the absence of printed instructions, the plaintiff and the rest of the train crew well knew that tbeir duty to their employer, and a proper regard for their own personal safety, made it incumbent •upon them to know, before reaching the point where the steep descent began, which continued for nearly six miles, whether tbe train contained tbe requisite number of brakes to properly check its speed, and as a necessary consequence the plaintiff can not require the defendant to mate good to him the damages resulting from an injury which could not have been sustained had he and his coemployees observed that reasonable care and caution which their experience suggested and the situation demanded."
In Darracott v. C. & O. R. R. Co., 83 Va. 288, 2 S. E. 511, 5 Am. St. Rep. 266, where the injury complained of was a result of a disregard of rules, it was said: "At all events, the evidence shows that the dangerous condition of the coupling was obvious, and that the plaintiff, in violation of the rules of the company, voluntarily put himself in a position of danger, in consequence of which he was injured: Under these circumstances in the eye of the law, he was the author of his own misfortune; that is to say, his negligence, or, what is the same thing, his want of ordinary care and caution, was the proximate cause of the injury complained of: The action is therefore not maintainable." C. & A. R. R. Co. v. Bragonier, 119 Ill. 51, 7 N. E. 688; Bennett v. Northern Pac. R. R. Co., 2 N. D. 112, 49 N. W. 408, 13 L. R. A. 465; Higgins v. Southern Pac., 26 Utah 164, 72 Pac. 690; Butte v. Pleasant Valley Coal Co., 14 Utah 282, 47 Pac. 77; Burgess v. R. R. Co., 17 Utah 406; Ill. Cent. R. R. v. Jewell, Adm'x, 46 Ill. 99, 92 Am. Dec. 240.
The heirs of the deceased, being thus precluded from a recovery against the employer because of the contributory negligence of the deceased, have they a right of recovery against the railway company who furnished the cars? It seems, as to this question the respondents assume the position that the railway company can not rely upon the contributory negligence of the deceased, because at the time of the accident he was not in its employ, and its rules were not violated. They claim that when the deceased entered the services of the mining company, and received its instructions, a contract relation was created between them, and that the railway company,. being no party to the contract, can take no advantage of its breach by the deceased.
The answer to this is that this action is one sounding in tort against the railway company, and not upon contract, to recover for the death of the deceased, and that the proof shows such death was caused by the deceased's own wrong, no act of gross or wanton negligence on the part of the railway company being charged. Such being the ease, the tortious acts or negligence of the railway company, if it was guilty of any, can not be made the basis of a recovery for injuries resulting from the wrong or negligence of the deceased. Clearly, if the unfortunate occurrence had resulted but in injuries, and not in death, and the deceased had brought an action against the railway company to recover damages for negligence, proof that his own negligence, and not that of the company, caused his injuries, would have been a complete defense, and where, as in this case, the recovery is sought for the death, the heirs are in no better situation than the deceased himself would be if living. Wherever contributory negligence is established as the proximate cause of an injury it is always a complete defense, and bars a recovery for such injury. In such case, the maxim, "Volenti non fit injuria," applies.
The existence of contract relations is not essential to an invoking of the rule as to contributory negligence. The right to the application of that rule is founded upon the principle that no person can be permitted to make his own wrong, or his own voluntary act, whether tor-tious or not, the basis for a recovery against another. Where an injury results to a person because of his own wrongful act or violation of duty, neither he nor his heirs can recover damages from another for such injury. In such a case no action is maintainable. One who, through want of ordinary care, inflicts a wound-upon his own body, must be content to bear the suffering and the loss, and neither he, nor, in the event of death, his heirs, have any redress. ' Contributory negligence, in its judicial sense, is usually the personal de fault of the plaintiff himself. The general rule is that when the plaintiff's own want of ordinary care is a proximate canse of the injury he sustains he cannot recover damages from another therefor. ' ' Beach, Contr. Neg, section 100.
Mr. Thompson, in his Commentaries on the Law of Negligence, vol. 1, see. 185, says: "Where a person, by his own deliberate act, brings an injury upon himself, he can not make it the ground of recovering damages against another, where he is not impelled thereto, by some imminent danger, or by some exciting or exasperating circumstances, for which that other is responsible. The principle that a person can not make his own wrong or his voluntary act, whether wrongful or not, the ground of recovering damages from another, has found an expression in the maxim, " Volenti non fit injuria.' "
In Railroad Co. v. Aspell, 23 Pa. St. 147, 62 Am. Dec. 323, Mr. Chief Justice Black said: "It has been a rule of law from time immemorial, and is not likely to be changed in all time to come, that there can be no recovery for an injury caused by the mutual default of both parties. When it can be shown that it would not have happened except for the culpable negligence of the party injured, concurring with that of the other party, no action can be maintained. ' ' 1 Thomp. Comm. Neg. section 186; Wharton, Neg. section 73; 2 Jaggard on Torts, 960; Ray, Neg. Imp. Dut. Pass. 669, 670; Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Moore (Tex. Civ. App.) 27 S. W. 962; New York, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Perriguey, 138 Ind. 414, 34 N. E. 233, 37 N. E. 976; Lewis v. Flint & P. M. Ry. Co., 54 Mich. 55, 19 N. W. 744, 52 Am. Rep. 790; Langridge v. Levy, 2 M. & W. 519; Carter v. Towne, 98 Mass. 567, 96 Am. Dec. 682; Crain v. Petrie, 6 Hill 522, 41 Am. Dec. 765.
Viewing the pleadings and the evidence contained in the record thus in the light of the law applicable to this case, we are of the opinion that the plaintiffs have shown no right to recover damages against the railway company, that the contributory negligence of the deceased is available to that company as a defense to this action, and that the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury to return a verdict as requested by the defense. This disposes of the case, and it is therefore of no importance to pass upon the other questions presented.
The judgment must be reversed, with costs, and a pew trial granted. It is so ordered.
BASKIN, C. J., concurs.