Case Name: DALLAS TRUST & SAVINGS BANK v. BROWN
Court: Texas Courts of Civil Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1932-02-12
Citations: 48 S.W.2d 1044
Docket Number: No. 4138
Parties: DALLAS TRUST & SAVINGS BANK v. BROWN.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 48
Pages: 1044–1046

Head Matter:
DALLAS TRUST & SAVINGS BANK v. BROWN.
No. 4138.
Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Texarkana.
Feb. 12, 1932.
Rehearing Denied March 31, 1932.
■ McBride, O’Donnell & Hamilton, of Dallas, for appellant.
Cunningham & Lipscomb, of Bonham, for appellee.

Opinion:
WILLSON, C. J.
(after stating the case as above).
That the interest stipulated for in the promissory notes evidencing the contract in question- was usurious, was not questioned in the evidence heard at the trial. ' While it appeared in that evidence that the notes were made by appellee to appellant, it appeared, further, that appellant had assigned same to the Connecticut life Insurance Company, and that in receiving and collecting the interest as it did; appellant acted for and as the agent of said insurance company. The contention that by force of the statute referred to in the statement above, appellant nevertheless was liable to appellee as claimed by him, was on the theory that it also appeared that appellant was estopped from asserting he was not the owner of the notes and in receiving the interest acted for said insurance company.
As supporting his contention, appellee points to evidence showing (as he contends) that when he paid the interest he did not know; appellant had assigned the notes, and was induced by- conduct of appellant with reference thereto to believe that it still owned them, and then quotes as follows from 21 Corpus Juris, 1060: "If a person by his conduct induces another to believe in the existence of a particular state of facts, and the other acts thereon to his prejudice, the former is estopped, as against the latter, to deny that that state of facts does not in truth exist."
We think the principle of law invoked has no application in the case, for, evidently, the injury to appellee was caused by his entering into the contract to pay usurious interest and afterward paying such interest when he was not bound to do so, and was not caused by appellant's failure to advise him, it had assigned the notes and was acting .for its assignee in receiving the interest.
As we view the case, it did not appear in the evidence that appellee had a cause of action against appellant; and certainly, if it did so appear, such a cause of action was not one created by the statute referred to, but was for damages for fraud inducing ap-pellee to believe it owned the notes and as owner was entitled to collect and receive the interest.
The judgment will be reversed, and judgment will be rendered here that appellee take nothing by his suit against appellant.