Case Name: Eddie Leroy MORTON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1984-06-26
Citations: 459 So. 2d 322
Docket Number: No. 83-1191
Parties: Eddie Leroy MORTON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: Before NESBITT, DANIEL S. PEARSON and FERGUSON, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 459
Pages: 322–326

Head Matter:
Eddie Leroy MORTON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 83-1191.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
June 26, 1984.
Rehearing Denied Nov. 2, 1984.
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender; Kalter & Kutner, Miami, and Robert Falter, Sp. Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen. and Diane Leeds, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Before NESBITT, DANIEL S. PEARSON and FERGUSON, JJ.

Opinion:
ON REHEARING
DANIEL S. PEARSON, Judge.
The State's motion for rehearing is granted, and the panel opinion filed March 13, 1984, is withdrawn and the following opinion substituted therefor.
Morton was charged with three counts of robbery. At the conclusion of the trial, the court instructed the jury on the lesser-included offenses of the crimes charged, but inadvertently failed to instruct on any of the elements of robbery. Morton was found guilty of robbery on Count I and grand theft, a lesser-included offense of robbery, on Counts II and III. On appeal, Morton challenges his robbery conviction only, contending that the trial court's failure to instruct on any of the elements of robbery is fundamental error, excusing Morton's otherwise fatal failure to object to this omission. We disagree and affirm.
The rule of law applicable to this case is that it is not fundamental error to fail to instruct on an essential element of a crime where the existence of that essential element is not in genuine dispute. See Stewart v. State, 420 So.2d 862 (Fla.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1103, 103 S.Ct. 1802, 76 L.Ed.2d 366 (1983); Henderson v. State, 429 So.2d 1284 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Lewis v. State, 411 So.2d 880 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), rev. denied, 418 So.2d 1279 (Fla.1982); Leary v. State, 406 So.2d 1222 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981); Gibson v. State, 403 So.2d 1019 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), rev. denied, 436 So.2d 32 (Fla.1983); McMurtroy v. State, 400 So.2d 547 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 408 So.2d 1094 (Fla.1981); Williams v. State, 400 So.2d 542 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1149, 103 S.Ct. 793, 74 L.Ed.2d 998 (1983). Although the rule has been employed in the above-cited cases to defeat the claim of fundamental error where there has been a failure to instruct the jury on a single undisputed and thus immaterial element of the robbery, namely, the intent to deprive another of his or her property, we see no reason why the rule is not equally applicable to the failure to instruct the jury on all elements of robbery where no element is in genuine dispute. In either case, the jury is not fully instructed, and it is not legally significant that they are more instructed in one and less instructed in the other.
The record in the present case reveals that no element of robbery was in dispute at any time during the trial, and thus, no element of robbery was material to the jury's deliberations. Counsel for the defendant told the jury in his opening statement:
"As to the crime being committed, you will see these people, this family. You will see they are decent people. They are law abiding people and we are not disputing the fact that they were robbed. "We are simply saying that the defendant did not do it.... The evidence will show that someone committed this crime and because someone committed this crime, these people will come into court and they will sound very credible, because in fact they were robbed."
As predicted by defense counsel, the sole defense throughout the trial was that the defendant was mistakenly identified by the victims of the robberies. Under these circumstances, where the only real issue put to the jury for its determination was whether the defendant was the person who committed the conceded robberies, it is inconceivable that the failure to instruct the jury on the elements of robbery prejudiced the defendant or that such an instruction would have made any difference in the jury's verdict.
Therefore, we hold that no fundamental error excusing the defendant's lack of objection to the omission of the robbery instruction exists where no element of the robbery was in dispute, and, a fortiori, no such fundamental error exists where, as here, for purposes of its deliberations, the jury was given the charging document, which fully described all the elements of robbery.
We do not for one moment suggest, as the dissenting opinion states, that where the defense is misidentification, "the State is relieved of its burden to prove anything other than identification." (emphasis omitted). This case has nothing whatsoever to do with proof of the essential elements of the crimes; all elements were indisputably proved, and the defendant does not contend otherwise. This case merely concerns the question whether the lack of a jury instruction as to these clearly established elements, where no objection to the omission is made, constitutes fundamental error.
Moreover, we think the dissent unfairly denigrates the holding in Williams v. State, 400 So.2d 542, by stating that the decision to affirm was reached in order to avoid a mass exodus from the prisons which might result from a contrary decision. This court has never been hesitant to reverse a conviction where it has been convinced that reversal is required under the law. The imagined consequences of a reversal simply do not play a part in our decision-making process.
Affirmed.
. The rule has not been applied solely to the omission of the intent element in a robbery charge. See Pratt v. State, 429 So.2d 366 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (omission of knowledge element in drug case). Indeed, one appellate court has extended the rule in holding that the failure to instruct on an essential element over the objection of the defendant is harmless error where the existence of the element is not in genuine dispute. See Gains v. State, 417 So.2d 719 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), rev. denied, 426 So.2d 26 (Fla. 1983). But see Holmes v. State, 412 So.2d 429 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).
. Williams v. State, 366 So.2d 817 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), upon which the defendant relies, does nothing to further his position. One simply cannot tell from that opinion what the defense or disputed issues were. Nor does the earlier Williams have any greater precedential value because distinguished in Williams v. State, 400 So.2d at 544 n. 6, as involving a failure to instruct on all elements. The key to fundamental error is prejudice resulting in a denial of due process.
. A representative count of the Information alleges in pertinent part that the defendant:
"did unlawfully, by force, assault or putting in fear, take certain property, to-wit: PURSE, JEWELRY and CASH, good and lawful currency of the United States of America, said property being the subject of larceny and of the value of more than ONE HUNDRED DOLLARS (1100.00) the property of [_] as owner or custodian, from the person or custody of [_], with the intent to permanently deprive [_] of said property, etc."
(emphasis supplied).
Thus, the elements of robbery, that is, (1) taking from the person or custody of the person, (2) the taking being by force, violence or assault, or by putting the person in fear, (3) the property taken was of some value, and (4) the intent being to permanently deprive the person of the property taken, were all before the jury.
. Williams most assuredly is not limited to the omission of the element of intent from the robbery instruction or a situation in which an erroneous, but consistently-used, standard jury instruction is the cause of the omission.