Case Name: Eli P. Miller et al., Respondents, v. The Edison Electric Illuminating Company of New York, Appellant
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1906-02-06
Citations: 184 N.Y. 17
Docket Number: 
Parties: Eli P. Miller et al., Respondents, v. The Edison Electric Illuminating Company of New York, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 184
Pages: 17–29

Head Matter:
Eli P. Miller et al., Respondents, v. The Edison Electric Illuminating Company of New York, Appellant.
1. Equity—When Court upon Denial op Equitable Relief, May Retain Jurisdiction and Determine Whether Damages Should Be Awarded. A court of equity, which has obtained jurisdiction of an action brought by a land owner to restrain the continuance of a nuisance, and for damages, alleged to he caused by the maintenance and operation of a plant for the production of electric light- and power, may retain the case, although it is found that the nuisance was abated at the time of the trial and that it was improbable that any would he created in the future, and may determine whether the plaintiff is entitled to any damages.
2. Right to Trial by Jury. The denial of equitable relief in an action brought to restrain the continuance of, a nuisance and to recover the damages sustained, does not make the action triable, as of right, by a jury.
3. Landlord and Tenant—Injury to Enjoyment and Occupation of Leased Premises—Tenant, Mot Landlord, May Recover Damages Therefor. Where it appears, upon the trial of an action to restrain a nuisance and for damages caused thereby, that the alleged nuisance was caused by the maintenance and operation of an electric light and power plant by the defendant; that, after the erection of such plant, the plaintiff’s premises were leased for a term of years; that, at the expiration of such term, they were leased to the same tenant for another term at a reduced rent; that, at the expiration of this term, they were again leased to the same tenant and at a still lower rent; and it is found by the trial court that, as the electric plant was operated at the time of the trial, no injury was being done to plaintiff’s premises and that none was likely to be done in the future; that no damage was suffered by the plaintiff after the beginning of the last lease and although the rental reserved in that lease was less than that for the preceding lease, the difference could he accounted for otherwise than by charging it to the defendant’s acts, so that, in effect, the only injury which had been caused by the operation of the electric plant was to the enjoyment and occupation of plaintiffs’ premises and was not of a permanent character, — the plaintiffs cannot recover for any depreciation in the rental value, since a tenant under a lease, made during the existence of a nuisance, is entitled to recover the depreciation of the value of the occupation of the premises, and the defendant cannot he subjected to a double recovery for the same injury.
Miller v. Edison El. Illuminating Co., 97 App. Div. 638, reversed.
(Submitted December 12, 1905;
decided February 6, 1906.)
Appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the first judicial department, entered October 29, 1904, affirming a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered upon a decision of the court on trial at Special Term.
The plaintiffs, by the institution of this action, have sought to restrain the defendant from continuing a nuisance, created through the maintenance and operation of a plant for the supply of electric light and power, whereby their property in neighboring dwelling houses has been injuriously affected. They, further, demanded judgment for damages already sustained. The property was in the occupancy of a tenant, holding under a lease by the plaintiffs. The trial court formulated its decision in findings of facts and conclusions of law, and the judgment recovered by the plaintiffs thereupon was affirmed by the Appellate Division. The facts found, so far as they need to be mentioned, show that the plaintiffs became the owners of the premises in question some years prior to 1888 ; in which year the defendant constructed, upon premises adjacent to those of the plaintiffs, a power house, equipped with machinery and appliances necessary for the purpose of generating electricity to be supplied to the public for lighting, or for power. In 1890, the plaintiffs leased their property for a term of five years; receiving a rental of $15,000 a year and certain privileges. Shortly prior to the expiration of the term of this lease, the premises were again leased to the same tenant for another term of five years from May 1, 1895, at the rental of $12,000 a year, with the reservation of the same privileges as in the previous lease. In 1900, the premises were, again, leased at a less rental, with the reservation of some additional privileges, and with a right to the lessors to share in the profits of the hotel business conducted by the lessee. After the construction of its power house, the defendant’s operations caused “ soot, cinders, ashes, steam, or water condensing from steam,” to be discharged upon plaintiffs’ premises. Noises, jars and vibrations resulted from the operation of the machinery, which impaired the peaceful enjoyment of the premises and affected their rental value. The court, further, found that, as the machinery was used at the time of the trial, no injury was being worked to the plaintiffs’ property and “ that it was improbable that it would be so used as to work injury in the future; ” but that, as the plaintiffs were entitled to the equitable relief prayed for when the action was commenced, the ■ court would retain the case and award to them their damages. Judgment was directed for the plaintiffs for such damages, in the amount of §4,500. The court decided that the plaintiffs failed to establish that they suffered any damage after the year 1900 and, though the rental for the premises, reserved to them in the new lease of that year, was less than that for the prior term, the difference could be accounted for otherwise than by charging it to the defendant’s acts. This was explained, in the changed character of the locality and in the fact that the lease, not only, provided that the plaintiffs should have a share of the profits, but that they should enjoy greater privileges than formerly. These findings of the trial court have sufficient support in the evidence.
Samuel A. Beardsley and Henry J. Hemmens for appellant.
The damages caused by the alleged nuisance, if any, were temporary in their nature and belong to the tenant and not to the landlord. (Bly v. E. E. T. Co., 172 N. Y. 1; Bates v. Holbrook, 89 App. Div. 548; Pritchard v. E. E. T. Co., 179 N. Y. 364; Francis v. Schoelkopp, 53 N. Y. 152; Hine v. N. Y. E. R. R. Co., 128 N. Y. 571.) The court below found that the evidence did not warrant equitable relief. The complaint, therefore, should have been dismissed. (Pech v. Goodberlett, 109 N. Y. 180.) The motion to strike the case from the Special Term calendar and send it to a jury for trial should have been granted for the reason that the plaintiffs were not entitled to an injunction at the time of the trial, and the defendant was entitled to a trial by jury as a matter of right on the question of damages. McNulty v. M. M. E. L. Co., 172 N. Y. 410; Tucker v. E. E. Il. Co. 100 App. Div. 407; Miller v. E. E. Il. Co., 78 App. Div. 390; Hudson v. Caryl, 44 N. Y. 552; Cogswell v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. Co., 105 N. Y. 319; Dorr v. D. L. Co., 18 Hun, 274; People v. M. T. Co., 31 Hun, 596; Lefrois v. County of Monroe, 88 Hun, 109 ; Bohan v. P. J. G. L. Co., 122 N. Y. 18; Parker v. Laney, 58 N. Y. 469.)
Frank M. Hardenbrook for respondents.
The damages awarded belonged properly to the plaintiffs. (Kernochan v. M. Ry. Co., 161 N. Y. 345 ; Hine v. N. Y. E. R. R. Co., 128 N. Y. 574.) The Special Term had jurisdiction to try the action. (Miller v. E. E. Il. Co., 78 App. Div. 390; Crane v. Bennett, 177 N. Y. 111; Stokes v. Stokes, 155 N. Y. 581; Roberson v. R. F. B. Co., 171 N. Y. 538; Cogswell v. N. Y, N. H. & H. R. R. Co., 105 N. Y. 319; Lynch v. El. R. R. Co., 129 N. Y. 274.)

Opinion:
Cullen, Ch. J.
I adopt Judge Gray's, statement of facts and I agree with him in the position that this action was properly brought in equity; that it was triable by the court, and that the defendant was not entitled to a jury trial as of right. I am unable, however, to concur in the view that the plaintiffs were properly awarded damages for diminution in the rental value of the property. The plaintiffs were in possession of the premises during no part of the period for which damages have been recovered, but the same were in the occupation of their tenants under a lease for a term of years. One of these leases expired during the existence of the nuisance, and, as the trial court has found, by reason of the nuisance the plaintiffs were compelled to rent the premises for a new term at a reduced rent. It is for this loss of rent that damages have been awarded. The question as to which party, the landlord or liis tenant, is entitled to recover for depreciation of the rental value by the existence of a nuisance has involved the courts in much perplexity. In the elevated railroad cases it has been settled that in the case of a lease made after the erection and operation of the railroad the landlord, not the tenant, is entitled to recover for such depreciation. (Kernochan v. N. Y. Elevated R. R. Co., 128 N. Y. 559.) In the Fernoehan case there is an elaborate discussion of the question by Chief Judge Andrews. A careful analysis of the opinion of the learned judge will show that the decision proceeded on the ground that the elevated road was a permanent structure and intended to he so maintained; that it was constructed in the street under legislative authority, and that as ample authority was granted to condemn any property rights on which it might trespass, the lessor had " no absolute remedy to compel the removal of the structure, since the right of condemnation can at any time be exercised by the defendants." The learned judge said: " It is also a necessary deduction from the circumstances attending the making of ordinary leases of improved property, executed after the construction of the elevated railroad, that the right to recover damages is vested exclusively in the lessor." To the doctrine of that case the court has steadily adhered. When, however, the doctrine was invoked to defeat the right of a tenant to recover damages against the present defendant for the very same acts which constitute a nuisance in the case now before us, it was held that the rule in the elevated railroad cases did not apply. In Bly v. Edison Electric Ill. Co., a tenant, hiring after the nuisance was created, recovered the depreciation in the rental' value of the premises. The Appellate Division, citing the authority of the Kernochan case, reduced the award to a nominal sum, holding that the tenant was not entitled to recover diminution in rental value. (54 App. Div. 427.) On appeal to this court the judgment of the Appellate Division was reversed, though a new trial was ordered because the trial court had awarded damages for a period* anterior to six years before the commencement of the action. (172 N. Y. 1.) This court said, per Werner, J.: "We think the Kernochcm case has no application to a case like the one at bar, and this without reference to the fact that it appears affirmatively that the rental paid by the plaintiff was the same during the existence of the nuisance as it was before. The elevated railroad cases', to which class the Ilernochcm case belongs, are sui generis. They are governed by principles which apply to no other class of cases." The elaborate discussion of the question by Judge Werner leaves nothing to be now added. It is sufficient to say that that case expressly held that a tenant under a lease made during the existence of the nuisance was entitled to recover the depreciation of the value of the occupation of the premises.
It is said to be the settled rule of law " that where the wrongful act affects different interests in the same property the owner of each interest may have his separate action against the wrongdoer. Landlord and tenant have separate assets, and each, if injured therein, may have redress, the one for the injury to the reversion, the other for the injury inflicted in diminishing his enjoyment of the premises." This statement is doubtless correct, but under this rule " to entitle a reversioner to maintain an action, the injury must be necessarily of a permanent character, and that a presumed intention to continue the nuisance is not sufficient, even where there is evidence that the premises would sell for less if the nuisance were continued." (Mott v. Shoolbred, opinion of Sir George Jessel, M. R., L. R. [20 Eq. Cas.] 22; see also cases cited in Judge Werner's opinion.) Here the only injury found by the trial court is to the enjoyment and occupation of the premises. That does not affect the reversioner. Had the trial court found that the operation of defendant's light plant cracked the walls or injured the structure, such damage would be of a permanent character and the reversioner entitled to recover. In the present case, however, not only is there no permanent injury to the plaintiffs' buildings, but the defendant's plant did not constitute the nuisance, but its operation, and such operation was not necessarily or inherently injurious because the trial court found that at the time of the trial its operation did not damage the plaintiffs. Judge Andrews said in the Kernochan case: "We should be very reluctant to make a decision which would expose the defendants to a double action in cases like this," and I imagine that the reluctance still continues. Nevertheless if the judgment before us is affirmed the defendant will be subjected to a double recovery against it, for under the Bly case the tenant is also entitled to recover, if in fact he has not already recovered, the diminu tion in the rental value during the same period for which the plaintiffs are awarded damages for such diminution. It is not a case like that suggested where the same act has caused injury to different persons and each recovers for the injury to himself ; but here two parties will recover for exactly the same injury. I may suggest this further distinction between the elevated railroad eases and that of a casual temporary nuisance. In the Kernoohcm case the defendant upon satisfactorily compensating the landlord could continue the operation of its road despite the complaint of the tenant. Here, no release from, or settlement with, the landlord could have prevented the tenant from restraining the operation of the defendant's plant. Moreover, the lease by the plaintiffs was for a term of years. The right of the tenant and landlord then became fixed and the damage to the plaintiffs at once. It was the diminished rent during the demised term. Had the defendant ceased the operation of its plant the day after the lease, the plaintiffs' injury would have been as great as if it had maintained the operation during the whole demised term. Tet I apprehend no one will contend that the defendant would have been liable for the whole period. But if we should assume that such a contention would be well founded the result would be that the day after the lease the operation of the plant might be stopped at the suit of the tenant and yet the defendant remain liable to the landlord for the loss of rent for the whole term of the lease. In other words the defendant's liability would depend not on the injury done by its trespass or nuisance, but on the manner in which the owner might deal with his property. The decision in the BJy case did not pass this court without discussion. On the; contrary there was a vigorous dissent by Jiidge Haight (concurred in by two other members of the court), who contended that the loss in rental value went to the landlord, not to the tenant. The'force of this position was appreciated by the majority of the court which, when it decided that the tenant could recover for that loss, substantially decided that the landlord could not.
I think the judgment should be reversed and a new trial granted, costs to abide event.