Case Name: SYLVESTER P. MELONE, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT CO., A CORPORATION OF NEW JERSEY. EDWARD J. WALLING AND LEO J. TEARS. DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
Court: New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1954-03-12
Citations: 30 N.J. Super. 95
Docket Number: 
Parties: SYLVESTER P. MELONE, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT CO., A CORPORATION OF NEW JERSEY. EDWARD J. WALLING AND LEO J. TEARS. DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Superior Court Reports
Volume: 30
Pages: 95–115

Head Matter:
SYLVESTER P. MELONE, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT CO., A CORPORATION OF NEW JERSEY. EDWARD J. WALLING AND LEO J. TEARS. DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.
Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division
Argued December 14, 1953
Decided March 12, 1954.
Before Judges Clapp, Goldmann and Ewart.
Mr. Abraham Frankel argued the cause for plaintiff-respondent (Messrs Frankel & Frankel, attorneys).
Mr. Mark Townsend argued the cause for defendants-appellants Jersey Central Power & Light Co. and Edward J. Walling (Messrs. Townsend & Doyle, attorneys).
Mr. William J. O’Hagan argued the cause for defendant-appellant Leo J. Tears (Messrs. Reid, Kelly and Flaherty, attorneys).

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Clapp, S. J. A. D.
This, in the main, is a fact case. A car driven by defendant Leo J. Tears, in which plaintiff was a passenger, ran into the rear of a stalled truck of defendant Jersey Central Power & Light Co., driven by defendant Edward J. Walling. The verdict was against the three defendants, and they appeal.
The accident happened 4 o'clock Sunday morning on Route 36 at its intersection with Broad Street, Keyport, N. J. The testimony was in conflict as to whether it was raining or drizzling heavily or slightly, and as to the visibility. It was still dark, but at the intersection there were two overhead are lights and also two traffic lights. Route 36 at that point is a two-lane concrete highway, 20 feet in width, with a macadam shoulder, on each side, of about 12 feet in width. The truck, when stalled, was facing north, right in the way of northbound traffic, with its left wheels at or very close to and parallel with the white center line and with its front wheels at the white stop line at the intersection. The truck had stopped for a traffic light, and the engine stalled and would not start after the light changed. Eor four to five or six to eight minutes the truck with its crew of five men stood there, a number of cars passing it, before the Tears' ear, proceeding northerly, hit it.
Did the court err in denying motions for dismissal and for judgment made by defendants, Jersey Central and Walling? The first matter here is whether there was negligence on the part of these defendants. Tears testified that "there were no lights at all on the back of the truck," though others testified that the tail light was lit. At any event, Tears said he saw the truck and the red reflectors on its rear iron grille.
More serious was the fact that the truck lacked the three flares, which are required by N. J. S. A. 39:3-64 outside of a residence or business district and which Walling knew had to be on the truck. Was the place where the truck stalled, within a residence district; that is (see N. J. S. A. 39:3-l), was it within
"that portion of a highway and the territory contiguous thereto where within any six hundred feet along such highway there are buildings in use for business or residential purposes which occupy three hundred feet or more of frontage on at least one side of the highway?"
To constitute any 600 feet a residence district, there must be, at least, on one side of the street, for example, 10 buildings, each averaging 30 feet front, each on a lot averaging 60 feet front; or, for example, 7 buildings each averaging 43 feet front, each on a lot averaging 86 feet front. A policeman testified that it was a residential district, but on cross-examination it appears clearly that he did not have in mind the statutory definition. Defendant Tears testified that it was a semi-residential district. At any event the testimony, taken with a photograph of the highway at the intersection (the photograph looks north, but Tears said the area "looks pretty much the same in both directions at that point in the highway"), furnished ample evidence upon which the jury could have found that this was not a residential district.
Failure to put out flares was a matter to be considered by the jury in determining whether or not there was negligence. Jones v. Lahn, 1 N. J. 358 (1949). Such is the law even though Tears saw a flashlight with a light "the size of your fist" (other proofs showed it' as a heavy portable light with a half-mile beam) which was being waved by a Jersey Central employee 65-75 feet to the rear of the truck. Flares, one in the center of the northbound lane of traffic a hundred feet behind the truck, and another at the left side of the truck, would have been much more indicative of a disabled truck than this waving light was. Further, see Restatement of Torts § 437.
It is urged that the violation of N. J. S. A. 39:3-64 was not an issue in the case as between plaintiff and defendants, Jersey Central and Walling, because the statute had not been pleaded. In the complaint and pretrial order it was alleged by plaintiff that "there were no warning signals of any kind, manual or mechanical, given to advise of the presence of said truck." However, this question need not be considered by us. Ho objection was taken below either when plaintiff on cross-examination adduced evidence with respect to the matter, or at any other time, and it may therefore be said that the issue was tried "without the objection of the parties." R. R. 4:15-3.
Even more important to the decision here than the matter of flares is the evidence from which the jury could properly have found that the five "pretty husky men," the Jersey Central employees on the truck at the time, could have pushed it from the highway to the "reasonably" level shoulder thereof in the four to eight minutes it stood there before the accident. This proof was accentuated by the fact that the foreman of these men first said that he did not think five men could push the truck off the road and then changed his testimony stating that there would not have been "a great deal of difficulty for five men to push that truck."
So we conclude that fairminded men might reasonably have found negligence on the part of the defendants, Jersey Central and Walling. Indeed that matter is hardly controverted in their brief. The point seriously pressed here is that this negligence was not the proximate cause of the accident.
The argument on the matter of proximate causation is based upon Tears' story. He and plaintiff had left Jersey City at 10 :30 i\ M. Saturday to spend Labor Day weekend at the shore, endeavoring to look up a friend there. Tears went into two bars (among other places) to find him, but did not recall "exactly" whether he had any refreshments at any of these, bars. He did not remember "actually" whether he had any beer or whisky at any of them, but there is "a very good possibility I may have" had something to drink between midnight and 3:00 in the morning. It may have been a highball. At any event, finding themselves unable to secure accommodations at the shore, Tears and plaintiff turned back toward Jersey City in the early morning.
Tears' story was that when he first saw the truck, it was 150 to 300 feet away. His impression then was that it was moving. His second impression was of a man stepping around the right side of the truck to the rear waving the above-mentioned flashlight, "waving me by." The man was about 40 feet from Tears when Tears first saw him. Tears then "pretty much determined" that the truck was stopped. "Not knowing what the conditions were, there was no emergency, no reason to stop." He "started to swing" out to the southbound lane and had gotten the car half-way or three-quarters way over the white center line, so that his headlights were lighting up the road beyond the truck. At that point two men (who, Tears states, had become scared) "definitely" jumped out, jumped out like rabbits, "actually leaped," "started to dodge" into that lane and were then "standing partially in the southbound lane." At other places in the testimony Tears gave versions differing from this slightly: at one place he said one of the men "jumped right out into the middle of the lane and one started to hug the side of the truck"; and at another place he said he was not certain whether they were going across the road or were hugging the side of the truck. At any event, Tears was about "a car length, two car lengths behind the truck" when these two men appeared. To avoid them, Tears "slammed on the brakes and the car started to swerve to fishtail like that on a wet pavement the back was swaying." Before the police court he testified that he turned the wheels into the back of the truck.
Defendants, Jersey Central and Walling, themselves, though they rely on Tears' story, claim that his credibility was completely destroyed. The story that two or one man jumped into the southbound lane was denied. Eour members of the Jersey Central crew who testified, all told a story that hardly comported therewith. The testimony as to the fifth member of the crew was that the force of the collision brought the hood of the truck down on his back (he was apparently looking at the engine at the time), and so he undoubtedly was not one of those who so jumped. A photograph of Tears' car. after the accident rather indicates that it was hit fairly near its..center and that it struck the truck squarely, and not at an angle as it might have if he turned his wheels to the right, .into the truck. Moreover one Jersey. Central employee testified that no part of Tears' auto was in the south lane after the accident.
Here is what the foreman who was waving the light yelled at the time of the accident, and he was corroborated by two other employees: "Eellows here comes another car" (a few cars had already passed), and as it kept approaching he hollered "Look out! This guy isn't going to stop." The foreman testified that Tears "was coming at quite a terrific rate of speed, and I stood out there flagging him with that light until the last moment, and I just jumped out of the way myself." In answer to the question "What did Tears do just before you jumped clear," the foreman replied, "didn't do anything so far as I could see." The foreman did not hear or see any skidding by Tears' car.
There were other doubts cast on Tears' story. He said he was travelling 25 to 30 miles an hour. Yet he drove this 4- to 8-ton truck forward 20 to 23 feet, even though its emergency brake was on, and, besides, did $1,005 of damages to his own ear. Then there is another matter. If he turned his wheels to the right and into the truck at the time of the collision so as to avoid the two men, and the rear of his car swerved on the wet pavement, would not the rear thereof have swung to the left, causing him to hit the truck on a much more acute angle than it did?
The question here is whether the matters above-mentioned, on the basis of which the jury could have found negligence on the part of the defendants, Jersey Central and Walling — that is, the failure to have the tail light lit, the failure to place flares on the road, and the failure to push the truck from the road — were the proximate cause of the accident. The argument by defendants, Jersey Central and Walling, is that Tears saw the truck and that in fact the accident is attributable to the two men who jumped into Tears' way, and not to these defendants' negligence.
The evidence here would have justified the jury in finding that the accident occurred in one of three ways: first, in the way Tears stated; second, not because Tears was forced to hit the truck in order to avoid the two men, but simply because he failed to stop bis car, even though he saw the standing truck and the waving of the flashlight; or third (having in view, particularly, the testimony of the foreman as to the car coming on at quite a terrific rate of speed without doing "anything"), Tears did not see the truck until he hit it or was practically on it.
As above indicated, the defendants, Jersey Central and Walling, in their brief seem to rely upon the first hypothesis stated. However, also as indicated above, we think it clear that the conflict in the testimony rendered it a jury question as to whether or not two men, or at least one of them, got into the way of Tears' car.
The second hypothesis stated — namely, that Tears saw the truck standing there, and yet smashed head on into it — is quite unlikely unless Tears was intoxicated, or in some state in which, though seeing the truck, his mind did not act to avoid the danger. Are we to assume, as a matter of law, that he was in this state when there is no, or hardly any, affirmative proof to support it? Are we, as a matter of law, to accept part of his story and reject the balance of it? Unless we do so, we must find that it was up to the jury to pass upon the validity of this second theory.
In our view, it'could not be decided, as a matter of law, which of the three alternative theories was the true one. That being so, it must be conceded that if on any one of the three theories, the matter of proximate causation was a jury question, then the motions for judgment and for dismissal were properly denied. Upon the first hypothesis above stated — namely, that Tears ran into the truck to avoid the two men — we think it was for the jury to determine whether the negligence in failing to push the truck off the road was a proximate cause of the accident. Upon the third hypothesis stated — namely, that Tears ran into the truck without seeing it — it also became a jury question to determine whether the failure to place flares on the road, the failure to have the tail light lit and the failure to push the truck from the road were not proximate causes of the accident.
Moreover (still looking at the third hypothesis), it could not be said, as a matter of law, that, so far as could reasonably be foreseen, all drivers going north would see the truck standing there and avoid the danger; Tears said "it was a dark night," "raining quite heavily," and plaintiff testified:
"It was raining so hard and it was so black in front of us that I don't know if yon could see anything in front of us unless it had a very, very bright light on it."
In that posture of the case, the court should not withdraw from the jury the question whether the negligent status of the truck on the highway was merely a condition under which the accident happened or whether it was a contributory cause thereof. Our law attaches liability not only to the dominating cause, but also to any cause which constitutes at any event a substantial factor in bringing about the injury. Daniel v. Gielty Trucking Co., 116 N. J. L. 172 (E. & A. 1935); Menth v. Breeze Corporation, Inc., 4 N. J. 428, 442 (1950); Restatement of Torts, § 431, 431 comment (d), 439 and 447.
The motions for judgment and for dismissal were properly denied. The defendants, Jersey Central and Walling, next claim that error was committed in charging the jury as to N. J. S. A. 39:3-64, the statute above-mentioned, with respect to flares. The principal point here is that the statute had not been pleaded, but that matter has been discussed above. Furthermore, no objection was made to this portion of the charge. R. R. 4:52-1. Nor is there plain error here of a shocking sort which we should take notice of under R. R. 1:5-3 (c). State v. Picciotti, 12 N. J. 205 (1953).
Defendants, Jersey Central and Walling, then charge that the order of the court denying their motion to set aside the verdict constituted error. However, these defendants did not appeal from that order, and we therefore cannot consider the matter. Besides it cannot be said that ihe trial court abused its discretion in holding that there» was no clear and convincing evidence, or inescapable inference, of contributory negligence on the plaintiff's part or of a lack of negligence on the part of these defendants proximately causing the accident.
Tears on his appeal raises four matters. The first has to do with the court's charge. However, as to this, no objection was taken below until after the jury retired. R. R. 4:52-1. Nor was there plain error here of a shocking sort. R. R. 1:5-3 (c); State v. Picciotti, 12 N. J. 205 (1953), supra. The argument here is over that portion of the charge where, by way of preamble to its discussion of the matter of damages, the trial court said:
'Tf you find [Tears] guilty of negligence you- would then go to the question of damages."
The ground of appeal is that the element of proximate causation was omitted from the sentence. However, it had been sufficiently covered in the charge three sentences before that, and we therefore find no error and clearly no shocking error. A charge must be considered in its entirety, and not piecemeal. '
Another ground of appeal goes to a question asked a policeman who arrived two minutes after the accident. The policeman had just testified, without objection, that there was "a man to the rear of the truck [he was making reference to the foreman, as above stated] handling a light somewhat like this." The question to which Tears' attorney took objection (that is, assuming that he impliedly adopted the objection made by the attorney for the other defendants) was: "And how far back from the truck was that?" In substance no answer was made to this except a repetition of what had just been said — the only modification therein being this, namely, that the policeman said that the man with the light was standing to the rear of "Tears' vehicle" not to the rear of the truck. Since Tears' car had just run into the truck and was clearly behind it, this, was a rather immaterial variation on the proof that was in, and it could not be said that there was any substantial injustice here. R. R. 1:5—3 (b).
Next Tears claims that the court should have granted a mistrial when the attorney for the other defendants asked Tears whether he had been convicted in a local magistrate's court as a result of this accident. No answer was given to the question, and the court instructed the jury to "disregard that entirely." Whether or not a mistrial should be granted is a matter resting in the discretion of the court. State v. Witte, 13 N. J. 598 (1953). There is no abuse of discretion here.
The final matter is that the court left it to the jury to determine whether this was a residential district within the meaning of N. J. S. A. 39:1-1, when it should have decided as a matter of law that it was not a residential district. No objection was taken to this portion of the charge even after the jury retired, and there is no shocking-error within R. R. 1:5-3 (c). State v. Picciotti, supra.
Affirmed.