Case Name: Tiffany Hagans, Appellant, v. Ramez S. Jaber et al., Respondents
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 2017-12-13
Citations: 156 A.D.3d 687
Docket Number: 
Parties: Tiffany Hagans, Appellant, v Ramez S. Jaber et al., Respondents.
Judges: Miller, J.P., Duffy, LaSalle and Brathwaite Nelson, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 156
Pages: 687–688

Head Matter:
Tiffany Hagans, Appellant, v Ramez S. Jaber et al., Respondents.
[64 NYS3d 902]

Opinion:
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Sampson, J.), dated June 6, 2016, which granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that she did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident.
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.
The defendants met their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). The defendants submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injury to the lumbar region of the plaintiff's spine did not constitute a serious injury under either the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Staff v Yshua, 59 AD3d 614 [2009]).
In opposition, however, the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to whether she sustained a serious injury to the lumbar region of her spine under the permanent consequential limitation of use and significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Perl v Meher, 18 NY3d 208, 218-219 [2011]).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Miller, J.P., Duffy, LaSalle and Brathwaite Nelson, JJ., concur.