Case Name: Ex parte BROOKS
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1919-04-30
Citations: 211 S.W. 592
Docket Number: No. 5385
Parties: Ex parte BROOKS.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 211
Pages: 592–593

Head Matter:
(85 Tex. Cr. R. 252)
Ex parte BROOKS.
(No. 5385.)
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
April 30, 1919.)
1. Habeas Corpus @==>4 — Remedy by Appeal —Validity of Judgment.
The Court of Criminal Appeals will not take jurisdiction of and inquire into the detention of a juvenile under a judgment by means of a 'writ of habeas corpus originally issued in such court, unless the judgment is absolutely void, but will relegate relator to his statutory remedy by appeal.
2. Habeas Corpus — Juveniles — Appeal.
Under Code Cr. Proc. art. 1197, as amended by Acts 35th Leg. (Fourth Called Sess.) c. 26, a juvenile convicted, no matter what the punishment, can appeal direct to the Criminal Court of Appeals.
3. Infants <§=>16 — Juvenile Delinquents— Appeal — Procedure.
As the juvenile law contains no provision governing appeals, appeals should be taken under the usual procedure in cases of felony or misdemeanor, as the case may appear, although such act contains a provision seeming to sweep away the distinction between misdemeanors and felonies when presented by complaint and information.
4. Infants <§=>16 — Commitment—“Pekson.”
The word “person,” in Code Cr. Proc. 1911, art. 1203, requiring order or judgment of commitment of a juvenile to prescribe length of time and conditions of commitment, refers to institutions as well as persons, in view, of Pen. Code 1911, tit. 1, c. 2.
[Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see-Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Person.)
5. Infants <§=>16 — Delinquents — Commitment — J UD GMENT.
In view of Code Cr. Proc. 1911, art. 1203, and Rev. Civ. St. art. 5231, limiting term of commitment to five years, a judgment commit-' ting a juvenile until he became 21 years of age was absolutely void, where infant was only 13 years of age.
6. Infants <§=>16 — Delinquents — Commitment.
In view of Code Cr. Proc. 1911, art. 1203, and Rev. Civ. St. art. 5231, a judgment committing a juvenile should state the length of time he is to be detained, and that he is not to be detained beyond the time he reaches the age of 21.
7. Infants <§=>68 — Jury <§=>21(1) — Juvenile Crimes — Statutes—Construction.
Much latitude must be given in the administration of the law concerning juvenile crimes, but the authorities cannot be too careful to see that no right is lost to one accused of a violation of the law through ignorance of the legal and constitutional guaranties of trial by jury and to be represented by counsel.
Hearing upon an original writ of habeas corpus granted upon application seeking to have one Raymond Brooks discharged from the custody of Charles E-. King, Superintendent of the State Training School for Boys at Gatesville.
Relator discharged.
J. T. Adams, of Gainesville, for appellant.
E. A. Berry, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

Opinion:
LATTIMORB, J.
This is a hearing upon an original writ of habeas corpus granted-upon application to this court seeking to have one Raymond Brooks discharged from the custody of Chas. E. King, superintendent of the state training school for boys at Gates-ville.
It appears that said Raymond Brooks was adjudged by the county court of Cooke county to be a delinquent child, and was by said court on the 31st day of December, 1918, committed to the training school at Gatesville until he reaches the age of 21 years, subject to the order of the court, which judgment was executed on January 2, 1919, by the delivery of said delinquent child to such state training school at-Gatesville.
We are met at the threshold of this inquiry with this proposition, to wit, is this judgment voidable or void? For, if merely voidable, this court will not take jurisdiction of an inquiry into the same by means of a writ of habeas corpus originally issued here, but would relegate relator to his statutory remedy by appeal.
The Fourth Called Session of the Thirty-Fifth Legislature, e. 26, amended article 1197, C. O. P., in many ways,- and one provision of the new article reads as follows:
"A prosecution and conviction of a juvenile shall be regarded as a criminal, or a misdemean- or, case, and an appeal lies -from such conviction directly to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas."
So it is now settled that in all such convictions, no matter what the punishment be, an appeal may be taken direct to this court, and that should have been the method adopted by this relator in case the judgment is not void.
No provision is set out in the juvenile law governing appeals, and one of the provisions of said act seems to sweep away the distinction between misdemeanors and felonies when presented by complaint and information; but, in the absence of any definite provisions governing same, we would hold such appeals should be taken under the usual procedure in cases of felony or misdemeanor, as the case may appear.
If the judgment in the instant case was one which the court had power to render therein, as stated above, we would dismiss this writ of error because no appeal was taken.
We observe that article 1203, C. C. P., specifically requires the order or judgment of commitment of a juvenile to prescribe the length of time and the conditions of such commitment. The precise language of said statute is when committed to such "person"; but we think, under the provisions of chapter 2 of title 1 of the Penal Code and the language of this act, that this includes all institutions as well.
It is specifically provided by article 5231 of our Revised Civil Statutes, which is part of the act creating the state juvenile training school, that no commitment thereto shall be for a longer term than five years. We believe, in order for this to be a proper judgment in the instant case, that it should not only define and set out the truth of the particular matter which constitutes the accused a delinquent child, but that such judgment should state the length of time which is the maximum commitment in such case, same in no event to be more than five years, and likewise in no event to extend beyond the time said juvenile reaches the age of 21.
It is shown'by the affidavits attached to this writ that at the time of his conviction for stealing 20 empty grain sacks worth 10 cents each, and his commitment to the state training school until he was 21, this child was only 13 years of age. His commitment being until he reached the age of 21 would mean possible restraint of him in said juvenile training school for a period of about eight years, or three years more than he could be sent up for if he was sixteen, and charged with murder. The affidavits accompanying
this writ would seem to indicate that the father of the accused child was with him at the time of his cmnmitment, and that the proceedings in the office of the county judge were such as that said father swears that he did not know his son was being tried on said charge; that his boy had made an appearance bond returnable in February; and that he fully intended retaining the services of an attorney to represent said boy upon his trial at said time. We are not deciding this case on this matter, and we know that in order to deal with the manifold problem" of juvenile crime much latitude must be given in the administration of the law; but the authorities cannot be too careful to see that no right is lost to one accused of a violation of the law, through ignorance of the legal and constitutional guaranties of trial by jury and to be represented by counsel.
Because we believe the particular judgment in this case was one which was not in conformity with the statute and which the court was therefore without power to render, the judgment of the trial court is held to be void, and the relator is discharged, subject to the terms of his appearance bond and the setting of the trial of the case against him in due form in the court below.
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