Case Name: Sylvia BRYANT and James W. Bryant, her husband, Appellants, v. LUCKY STORES, INC., a foreign corporation, d/b/a Kash 'N' Karry Discount Supermarkets, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1990-10-12
Citations: 577 So. 2d 1347
Docket Number: No. 89-01761
Parties: Sylvia BRYANT and James W. Bryant, her husband, Appellants, v. LUCKY STORES, INC., a foreign corporation, d/b/a Kash ‘N’ Karry Discount Supermarkets, Appellee.
Judges: RYDER, DANAHY and LEHAN, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 577
Pages: 1347–1354

Head Matter:
Sylvia BRYANT and James W. Bryant, her husband, Appellants, v. LUCKY STORES, INC., a foreign corporation, d/b/a Kash ‘N’ Karry Discount Supermarkets, Appellee.
No. 89-01761.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Oct. 12, 1990.
Hall, J., filed dissenting opinion in which Schoonover, C.J., and Scheb, Frank, and Threadgill, JJ., concurred.
Altenbernd, J., filed opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part in which Parker, J., concurred.
G. Larry Sandefer of Kimpton, Burke & White, P.A., Clearwater, for appellants.
John Robert Terry and Jerry B. Blevins of Bradham & Bennett, P.A., St. Peters-burg, for appellee.

Opinion:
PATTERSON, Judge.
Appellants challenge a final summary judgment entered in favor of appellee in a negligence action. We reverse.
As Sylvia Bryant was leaving a Kash 'N' Karry supermarket, she stepped from the sidewalk onto a raised speed bump in the fire lane in front of the store. She tripped and fell, sustaining injuries to her shoulder. Mrs. Bryant, joined by her husband, James, brought suit against Lucky Stores, Inc., owner of the premises, asserting that the speed bump was not "reasonably visible" to pedestrians and constituted a hazardous condition of which Lucky Stores had a duty to warn.
Lucky Stores moved for summary judgment on the ground that the speed bump was an open and obvious condition of which it had no duty to warn. Attached to the motion were four color photographs depicting the parking lot and the speed bump. The speed bump is constructed of asphalt of the same color as the parking lot, but a darker shade. The speed bumps extend into the fire lane where vehicular traffic is prohibited. The photographs also revealed that the edge of the adjacent sidewalk was painted in bright yellow. In opposition to the motion, the Bryants relied on their depositions and a notarized letter from Tip-pens, an engineer, wherein he opined that the speed bump was of an "unsafe design." In her deposition, Mrs. Bryant, who is seventy-five years of age, testified that as she stepped from the sidewalk she was looking for oncoming vehicles and did not see the speed bump.
At the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, counsel for Lucky Stores objected to the court's consideration of Tip-pens' letter as an affidavit, which it clearly is not. The court "noted" the objection but made no ruling on it. Later in the hearing the court referred to the letter as an "affidavit" and commented that in the court's opinion Tippens did not like speed bumps in general. It is apparent that the trial judge did consider the letter in arriving at his determination. He also determined from viewing the photographs that the speed bump was an obvious condition which did not give rise to a duty to warn. The court granted the motion and on June 1, 1989, entered a final judgment for the defendant. This timely appeal followed.
A party moving for summary judgment in a negligence case must show that there is no negligence or that the sole proximate cause of the injury was the negligence of the plaintiff. To establish that there was no negligence, the movant must demonstrate that there is no duty owed to the plaintiff or that it did not breach a duty which is owed. Cutler v. St. John's United Methodist Church, 489 So.2d 123 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). Lucky Stores owed a duty to Mrs. Bryant, as a business invitee, to maintain its premises in a reasonable and safe manner. See Luckey v. City of Orlando, 264 So.2d 99 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972) (plaintiff tripped over a door track which extended over the width of the door); Phillips v. Hartford Casualty Ins. Co., 373 So.2d 415 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979) (plaintiff fell from a ramp leading from a grocery store to a parking area); Zambito v. Southland Recreation Enterprises, 383 So.2d 989 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980) (plaintiff fell while stepping down from elevated area in roller skating facility). It is a disputed question of fact as to whether or not the manner in which the speed bump was placed, in relation to the traffic pattern of customers, constituted an unsafe condition. Eachus v. Big Daddy's Lounges, Inc., 380 So.2d 1154 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
The fact that the bump was open and visible is not determinative of whether or not Mrs. Bryant's negligence in failing to see the speed bump was the sole cause of her injury. The question is whether she used due care for her own safety, taking into consideration her age and all of the circumstances surrounding the incident. See Isenberg v. Ortona Park Recreational Center, Inc., 160 So.2d 132 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964). The trial judge determined from viewing the photographs that any person would have seen the speed bump. This finding fails to take into consideration all of the relevant factors as to whether or not Mrs. Bryant should have seen it. We have viewed the photographs and conclude that reasonable men can differ on these issues, requiring their resolution by the trier of fact.
Reversed and remanded.
RYDER, DANAHY and LEHAN, JJ., concur.
HALL, J., dissents with opinion in which SCHOONOVER, C.J., SCHEB, FRANK, and THREADGILL, JJ., concur.
ALTENBERND, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with opinion in which PARKER, J., concurs.