Case Name: A. John OSEPCHOOK, Appellant, v. GATEWAY INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation authorized to do business in the State of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1974-07-05
Citations: 298 So. 2d 169
Docket Number: No. 73-101
Parties: A. John OSEPCHOOK, Appellant, v. GATEWAY INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation authorized to do business in the State of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: LEE, J. CAIL, Associate Judge, concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 298
Pages: 169–172

Head Matter:
A. John OSEPCHOOK, Appellant, v. GATEWAY INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation authorized to do business in the State of Florida, Appellee.
No. 73-101.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
July 5, 1974.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 20, 1974.
James R. Caldwell, Jr., Pitts, Eubanks, Ross & Rumberger, Orlando, for appellant.
Leonard N. D’Aiuto, Edna L. Caruso, and Morgan S. Bragg, Howell, Kirby, Montgomery, D’Aiuto, Dean & Hallowes, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
OWEN, Chief Judge.
The question we decide here is whether physical contact between the insured vehicle and the at-fault vehicle is a prerequisite to recovery under basic property damage coverage issued pursuant to F.S. Section 627.738(2) (b), F.S.A. The trial court answered this question in the affirmative, and on undisputed facts showing that no contact occurred, entered summary judgment favorable to the insurer, from which the insured has appealed. We affirm.
Mr. Osepchook was the named insured under an automobile liability insurance policy issued by Gateway Insurance Company, which policy provided security under F.S. Section 627.730-627.741, F.S.A., known as the "Florida Automobile Reparations Reform Act". The insured elected to purchase basic property damage coverage which the insurer was authorized to offer by F.S. Section 627.738(2), F.S.A. This coverage was provided in the policy in the following language:
"The cpmpany will pay for direct and accidental loss . . . caused by contact with a motor vehicle whose owner, registrant, operator, or occupant, or other person or organization legally responsible for his acts or omissions, is entitled to an exemption from tort liability for such loss under the Florida Automobile Reparations Reform Act. . . . "
• During the policy period, Mr. Osepchook was driving the insured automobile in the center lane of Interstate Highway 4 within the city limits of Orlando, Florida, when another vehicle overtaking him on his left side abruptly swerved into his lane less than a car length in front of him. As a defensive measure, Mr. Osepchook applied the brakes to his vehicle and swerved to his right but upon realizing the presence of vehicular traffic in the lane to his right, he swerved back to his left to avoid a collision. As a result of this evasive maneuvering, his automobile went out of control, striking a concrete embankment and sustaining damage to the extent of approximately $1,500.00. There was no contact between Mr. Osepchook's automobile and the vehicle which swerved in front of him and that vehicle continued without stopping, the identity of its owner or operator being unknown and the vehicle itself being described only as a black, late-model Oldsmobile sedan bearing Florida registration. Timely notice and proof of loss was furnished to appellee, but coverage having been denied, this suit followed.
The court granted summary judgment in favor of the' insurer because first, the insured could not show that the at-fault vehicle was one subject to the Florida Automobile Reparations Reform Act, and second, there was no contact between the insured vehicle and the at-fault vehicle as required by the policy provision. Because the second of these grounds is wholly dis-positive of the case, we find it unnecessary to consider appellant's contentions relative to the other ground.
The insurance contract, tracking the plain and unambiguous language of Section 627.738(2) (b) provides for basic property damage coverage only when the damage results from contact between the insured vehicle and the at-fault vehicle. Appellant contends, however, that the requirement of actual contact is not a prerequisite to recovery under this coverage, relying upon Bulletin 545 issued by the Insurance Commissioner on February 14, 1972. In that bulletin, the Insurance Commissioner concluded, on the authority of Brown v. Progressive Mutual Insurance Co., Fla.1971, 249 So.2d 429, that the contact requirement under basic property damage coverage was not a prerequisite to recovery so long as the insured could provide reasonable proof that the damage was proximately caused by a vehicle for which security was required under the act. But in the Brown case (involving the contact requirement in a "hit- and-run" situation under uninsured motorist coverage), the court invalidated the contact requirement because it made the insurance policy more restrictive than the language of the uninsured motorist statute, Section 627.0851, F.S. In this case, we are concerned with language of the insurance policy which is not more restrictive than the language of the statute, but instead is identical to it. We cannot say that the language of the insurance policy in this case is void as against public policy when it is identical to the language in the statute, which is itself ipso facto declarative of public policy on this subject.
After all, the owner of a motor vehicle is not required to maintain security with respect to property damage to his own vehicle. See, F.S. Section 627.738(1), F.S.A. Even should he elect to have such coverage, he is afforded the option to purchase either full or basic coverage. Full coverage provides insurance without regard' to fault for accidents occurring within the United States or its territories or possessions or Canada. Section 627.738(2) (a), F.S. For one who does not wish to pay the premium for full coverage, basic coverage is available, but the statute permits this coverage to be limited to insurance against damage (1) caused by the fault of another (2) resulting from contact (3) between the insured vehicle and a vehicle with respect to which security is required under the act. The language of the statute is plain and unambiguous. We think equally plain and unambiguous is the legislative intent that those who elect to purchase basic property damage coverage can expect to find policy limitations identical to or no less restrictive than the limitations permitted by the statute. When the legislative intent as evidenced by a statute is plain and unambiguous, then there is no necessity for any construction or interpretation of the statute, and the courts need only give effect to the plain meaning of its terms. Alligood v. Florida Real Estate Commission, Fla.App. 1963, 156 So.2d 705. See also, State v. Egan, Fla. 1973, 287 So.2d 1, and cases cited in footnote 4 thereof.
If the requirement of physical contact is to be removed as a prerequisite to or limitation upon recovery under basic property damage coverage, it should be accomplished by the legislative branch of government, not the judicial. The language of the policy requires contact, the statute expressly authorizes such policy language, and it being conceded by all parties that contact did not occur, the trial court was eminently correct in entering summary judgment in favor of the insurer.
Affirmed.
LEE, J. CAIL, Associate Judge, concurs.
CROSS, J., dissents, with opinion.
. "627.738 Property damage, basic or full coverage ; tort liability.—
(2) Every insurer providing security under § 627.730-627.741 shall offer the owner either full or basic coverage for accidental property damage to the insured motor vehicle, as follows:
(b) Basic coverage shall be limited to insurance against damage caused by the fault of another resulting from contact between the insured vehicle and a vehicle with respect to which security is required under § 627.730-627.741."
. Now found in F.8. Section 627.727, F.S.A.