Case Name: SHEFFIELD v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1924-03-12
Citations: 268 S.W. 162
Docket Number: No. 8032
Parties: SHEFFIELD v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 268
Pages: 162–164

Head Matter:
SHEFFIELD v. STATE.
(No. 8032.)
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
March 12, 1924.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 28, 1925.)
1. Criminal law <&wkey;368(I)— Conversation between driver of truck, hired by accused to transport liquor, and prosecuting attorney, admissible.
Conversation of driver of truck, hired by accused to transport liquor, with prosecuting attorney at time of transportation charged, held admissible as part of res gesta, having taken place in presence and hearing of accused.
2. Intoxicating liquors <&wkey;*l38 — Charge of transporting intoxicating liquors sustained.
Where accused, in personal possession of checks for trunks containing intoxicating liquor, delivered them to truck driver, who was in ignorance of contents, directing him where to take them, and was immediately preceding truck in his car when apprehended, charge of transporting intoxicating liquors held sufficiently supported.
3. Criminal law <&wkey;814(17) — Refusal to charge on circumstantial evidence not error.
In prosecution for transporting intoxicating liquors, refusal to charge on circumstantial evidence held not error, where accused was present, accompanying and directing carriage of liquor by truck driver, who had same by ■direct order and command of accused.
On Motion for Rehearing.
4. Indictment and information 73(1) — Charge that accused directly and indirectly trans- ■ ported liquor held not to present contradiction.
Charge that accused “directly and indirectly transported” liquor did not present contradictory terms, words “directly” and “indirectly” being surplusage.
5. Indictment and information <&wkey;>83— Indictment for transporting liquor, in fact conveyed by truckman employed by accused, sufficient.
Indictment for transporting intoxicating liquor, which was in fact conveyed by truck-man employed by accused, though failing to so allege, 'held sufficient, where accused was principal within Pen. Code 1911, art. 77, in employing innocent agent, and within article 78 in being present at commission of offense which he advised; it being unnecessary to set out facts making him principal.
Appeal from Criminal District Court, Tar-rant County; Geo. E. Hosey, Judge.
W. A. Sheffield, alias Clyde Sheffield, was convicted of transporting intoxicating liquor, and he appeals.
Affirmed.
McLean, Scott & Sayers, of Fort Worth, for appellant.
R. K. Hanger, Cr. Dist. Atty., W. H. Tol-bert, and J. B. Mastín, Asst. Cr. Dist. Attys., all of Fort Worth, and Tom Garrard, State’s Atty., and Grover C. Morris, Asst. State’s Atty., both of Austin, for the State.

Opinion:
LATTIMORH, J.
Appellant was convicted in the criminal district court of Tarrant county of transporting intoxicating liquor, and his punishment fixed at one year in the penitentiary.
Appellant gave to a transfer man in Fort Worth two checks for trunks, and directed him to follow him with the trunks and deliver them at the place to which appellant should go. He then drove in a southeasterly direction from the city of Fort Worth closely followed by the truck carrying i the two trunks in question. Appellant was stopped by the district attorney of Tarrant county and a search made of his car. Immediately following this search, he was asked by said attorney relative to the contents of the trunks on said truck, and replied that there was whisky in same. Upon a later examination of the contents of the trunks the truth of this statement of appellant was verified. His prosecution and conviction followed.
Four bills of exception appear in the record. Complaint of a conversation had between the district attorney and the driver of the truck is without merit. The bill relating thereto shows that appellant was present and heard the conversation, which we believe to be part of the res gestse of the transportation charged. There is nothing in the complaint made of the definition of the term "transport" as same appears in the charge given by the learned trial judge.
Nor do we think the record to exhibit any failure to support the charge as laid. Appellant was in personal possession and control of the checks for the trunks which contained the liquor in question, delivered the checks to the truck driver (who was in ignorance of the contents of the trunks), directed the truck driver where to take said trunks, and was in his car in the road immediately preceding the truck on which were the trunks, when stopped by the district attorney and the contents of the trunks ascertained. We have no doubt that this makes the transportation of said trunks of liquor, the act of the appellant. Under a number of definitions of principal offender, as laid down in our statute, appellant would be a principal in the crime charged.
Nor do we think error appears in the refusal of the court to charge on circumstantial evidence. Appellant was present accompanying and directing the carriage of the liquor by the truck • driver, who had same by direct order and command of appellant.
Finding no error in the record, an af-firmance is ordered.
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