Case Name: PEOPLE ex rel. GUISEPPE BILLOTTI v. NEW YORK JUVENILE ASYLUM
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1901-01-25
Citations: 15 N.Y. Crim. 319
Docket Number: 
Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. GUISEPPE BILLOTTI v. NEW YORK JUVENILE ASYLUM.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Criminal Reports
Volume: 15
Pages: 319–327

Head Matter:
Supreme Court—Appellate Division—First Department.
January 25, 1901.
PEOPLE ex rel. GUISEPPE BILLOTTI v. NEW YORK JUVENILE ASYLUM.
(57 App. Div. 383; 102 St. Rep. 279.)
Habeas corpus.
Defendant, a juvenile asylum, before the writ was applied for, had bound out relator’s children to persons out of the state over whom the defendant had no power and who refused to produce the children or send them back into the state. Held, that defendant was not compelled to answer the writ and that relator should be remitted to his writ of habeas corpus in the foreign state.
Patterson, J., dissenting.
Appeal from order of special term directing defendant to restore to relator the custody of his three children.
Robert Goeller, for appellant.
M. J. Scanlan for respondent.

Opinion:
Rumsey, J.
We are not at all in doubt as to the rules of law applicable to cases of this kind, and there is no division of opinion in the court as to those rules. If the defendant in proceedings for a writ of habeas corpus has'the custody or control of the person whose release is sought, so that it is possible for him to obey the order of the court with respect to that person, the court has jurisdiction, not only to issue the writ, but to make a determination in the matter, and to require the delivery of such person, and this can be done although it appears that the person whose release is sought is without the state; but a writ of habeas corpus is not intended to punish the defendant for improperly depriving a citizen of his liberty, or for illegally deporting him out of the state. That is to be done by the criminal law. The sole object of the writ is to release from imprisonment a person who is unlawfully restrained from his liberty, or, in the case of a child, to take possession of it in order to deliver it to the person who is entitled to its custody. The writ existed at common law, but the proceedings of the court with respect to it are regulated by statute, and the courts múst be governed by that statute. Section 2015 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a person imprisoned or restrained of his liberty " within the state " is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus. That has been extended by the courts, and properly so, to authorize the court to require the release of a person who is not within the state if the defendant to whom the writ is addressed has the power to produce him and subject him to the power of the court.
Even if it should appear in the petition for the writ that the person whose release is sought is without the state, nevertheless the court has jurisdiction to issue the writ if the facts show that the person to whom it is directed may have the control of the person confined, or may be able to obey the command of the court by producing him. In such a case, when it appears that the person to whom the writ is directed may be able to produce the imprisoned person, the writ ought to issue, and, if for any reason the defendant is not able to obey it, that fact should be made to appear by the return or the proof, and when it does appear, and not until then, should the writ be vacated.
Although it may appear from the return or the proof that the person to whom the writ is directed, having had the custody of him for whose release the writ is issued, has connived at and assisted in removing that person out of the jurisdiction of the court, no or(ler can be made requiring his production, unless it should appear that such person has yet so much custody and control as that he would be able to obey the order; but, if it appears affirmatively that it is physically impossible for him to obey it, the writ must be vacated, and the petitioner remitted to his remedy in another state, and the defendant must be punished by the criminal law. Code Civ. Proc. § 2052; In re Jackson, 15 Mich. 415; Reg. v. Barnardo, 24 Q. B. Div. 283.
In view of these rules of law, the only question presented in this case is upon the facts. The writ was issued. The defendant made a return. It supported that return by affidavits. It claims that those affidavits show that before the writ was issued, and before there could have been any idea that a writ would be applied for, these children were bound out to persons in Illinois, over whom this court has-no jurisdiction, over whom the defendant has no power, and that these persons refuse to produce the children or send them back into this state. The only question is whether, these facts appearing, they answer the writ, and whether the father should not be remitted to his writ of habeas corpus in Illinois against the persons who controlled, and still control, the custody of the children. It appears that the two visitors of the defendant called upon the persons in Illinois who had charge of these children, and asked that they should be sent back to New York, and this request was positively refused; that James Billotti, the oldest son, stated that he absolutely refused to go back; that the person to whom James Billotti was indentured refused to give him up, and stated that, if the indenture should be cancelled in any other way than by mutual consent, he should demand an indemnity of $200. Just how it could be canceled except by mutual consent I am not aware, but his affidavit contains no suggestion that he would give up the child at the request of the juvenile asylum or anybody else. The same thing may be said of the affidavit of Law-head, to whom Annie Billotti was indentured, and the affidavit of McIntosh, to whom Rosie Billotti was indentured. It is quite evident that these children did not want to come back, and that the persons with whom they were indentured intended to keep them. It seems to me that it is indisputable that the New York Juvenile Asylum has no control or custody of these children in. any way, and that an order addressed to that society to produce them would be mere brutum fulmén, and the issuance of the order could only lay the asylum open to a charge of contempt of court for refusing to obey an order which it must have been known at the time it was issued could not be obeyed.
For these reasons, the order should be reversed.
Van Brunt, P. J., and McLaughlin, J., concur.