Case Name: Commonwealth vs. Peter Tuey
Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
Jurisdiction: Massachusetts
Decision Date: 1851-09
Citations: 8 Cush. 1
Docket Number: 
Parties: Commonwealth vs. Peter Tuey.
Judges: 
Reporter: Massachusetts Reports
Volume: 62
Pages: 1–4

Head Matter:
Commonwealth vs. Peter Tuey.
It is no ground of exception, that the presiding judge, on the trial of an indictment, instructed the jury, that if any of the jury differed in their views of the evidence from the majority of their fellows, they should be thereby induced to doubt the correctness of their own judgments, and be led to reexamine the facts of the case, for the purpose of revising their opinions.
On the trial in the court of common pleas, before Hoar, J., of an indictment against the defendant, the jury, having received instructions from the judge, to which no exception was taken, retired to consider of their verdict, and after an absence of several hours, were sent for by the judge, and reported that they had been unable to agree. The judge thereupon said to them, in substance, as follows:—
“ The only mode, provided by our constitution and laws foi deciding questions of fact in criminal cases, is by the verdict of a jury. In a large proportion of cases, and perhaps, strictly speaking, in all cases, absolute certainty cannot be attained or expected. Although the verdict to which a juror agrees must of course be his own verdict, the result of his own convictions, and not a mere acquiescence in the conclusion of his fellows, yet, in order to bring twelve minds to a unanimous result, you must examine the questions submitted to you with candor, and with a proper regard and deference to the opinions of each other. You should consider that the case must at some time be decided; that you are selected in the same manner, and from the same source, from which any future jury must be; and there is no reason to suppose that the case will ever be submitted to twelve men more intelligent, more impartial, or more competent to decide it, or that more or clearer evidence will be produced on the one side or the other. And with this view, it is your duty to decide the case, if you can conscientiously do so. In order to make a decision more practicable, the law imposes the burden of proof on one party or the other, in all cases. In the present case, the burden of proof is upon the commonwealth to establish every part of it, beyond a reasonable doubt; and if, in any part of it, you are left in doubt, the defendant is entitled to the benefit of the doubt, and must be acquitted. But, in conferring together, you ought to pay proper respect to each other’s opinions, and listen, with a disposition to be convinced, to each other’s arguments. And, on the one hand, if much the'larger number of your panel are for a conviction, a dissenting juror should consider whether a doubt in his own mind is a reasonable one, which makes no impression upon the minds of so many men, equally honest, equally intelligent with himself, and who have heard the same evidence, with the same attention, with an equal desire to arrive at the truth, and under the sanction of the same oath. And, on the other hand, if a majority are for acquittal, the minority ought seriously to ask themselves, whether they may not rea eonably, and ought not to doubt the correctness of a judg* ment, which is not concurred in by most of those with whom they are associated; and distrust the weight or sufficiency of that evidence which fails to carry conviction to the minds of their fellows.”
The jury were then directed to retire, and deliberate further upon the case; and having done so, found the defendant guilty, who thereupon alleged exceptions to the foregoing instructions.
T. Abbott, for the defendant.
Clifford, (attorney-general,) for the commonwealth.

Opinion:
Bigelow, J.
The defendant objects to the instructions given to the jury in this case, on the ground, that they were equivalent to a direction, on the part of the court, to a minority of the jury to yield their own opinions and judgment to the views of the majority, and render a verdict in conformity therewith; or, in other words, that a dissenting juror was bound to take into consideration the opinions of his fellows, as an element by which his own convictions were to be controlled. But we do not so understand the purport and effect of the language used by the judge who tried the cause. The instructions went no further, than to say, that if any of the jury differed, in their views of the evidence, from a large number of their fellows, such difference of opinion should induce the minority to doubt the correctness of their own judgments, and lead them to a reexamination and closer scrutiny of the facts in the case, for the purpose of revising and reconsidering their preconceived opinions. In this view, the court did nothing more than to present to the minds of the dissenting jurors a strong motive to unanimity.
Upon a careful consideration of these instructions, we are clearly of opinion, that so far from being improper, or of a nature to mislead, they were entirely sound, and well adapted to bring to the attention of the jury one of the means by which they might be safely guided in the performance of their duty. A proper regard for the judgment of other men will often greatly aid us in forming our own. In many of the relations of life, it becomes a duty to yield and conform to the opinions of others, when it can be done without a sacrifice of conscientious convictions; more especially is this a duty, when we are called on to act with others, and when dissent on our part may defeat all action, and materially affect the rights and interests of third parties. Such is the rule of duty constantly recognized and acted on by courts of justice. They not only form their opinions, but reconsider, revise, and modify their own declared judgments, by the aid and in the light of the decisions of other tribunals. But this could not be done, if it were not permitted to them to doubt and correct then opinions, when they were found to differ from those of other men, who have had equal opportunities of arriving at sound conclusions with themselves.
The jury room is, surely, no place for pride of opinion, or for espousing and maintaining, in the sprat of controversy, either side of a cause. The single object to be there effected is to arrive at a true verdict: and this can only be done by deliberation, mutual concession, and a due deference to the opinions of each other. By such means and such only, in a body where unanimity is required, can safe and just results be attained; and without them, the trial by jury, instead of being an essential aid in the administration of justice, would become a most effectual obstacle to it. Exceptions overruled.