Case Name: PARSONS v. TELLER
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1906-03-07
Citations: 97 N.Y.S. 808
Docket Number: 
Parties: PARSONS v. TELLER.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 97
Pages: 808–820

Head Matter:
PARSONS v. TELLER.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.
March 7, 1906.)
1. Contracts—Consideration—Seal—Acknowledbment.
Where a contract to pay for services was under seal and acknowledged the receipt of $1, it implied a consideration which could only be rebutted by extraneous proof.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see vol. 11, Cent. Dig. Contracts, § 406.]
2. Same—Sufficiency of Consideration.
Where plaintiff had faithfully served deceased during her childhood, while she was being reared in affluence, having a large estate in her own right, ,a contract voluntarily made between them by which deceased agreed in consideration of such service to pay plaintiff the sum of $1,800 a year during plaintiff’s life, was not voidable because such amount was in excess of the reasonable value of the services rendered.
3. Infants—Contracts—Ratification. ,
Plaintiff had cared for and been the constant companion of deceased from the time deceased was six years old until her marriage at the age of 19, after which deceased, while an infant, joined by her husband and father, executed a contract superseding a prior arrangement and providing that plaintiff should be paid for her services the sum of $1,800 per annum during the remainder of her natural life. Deceased had a large estate in her own right, some of which was located in New York, and after she became of age payments. were made from the income of her estate to plaintiff, both by deceased’s husband and by her New York agent. Held, that such payments constituted a ratification of the contract by deceased after she became of age, so as to render the same enforceable against her estate.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in'point, see vol. 27, Cent. Dig. Infants, §$ 140, 141.]
4. Contracts—Validity—What Law Governs.
Where a contract made by an infant for plaintiff’s services was executed in New York, was expected to be performed there, and a large portion of the services were performed in that state, where the agreement was also confirmed after the infant became of age, the agreement was governed by the New York laws.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see vol. 11, Cent. Dig. Contracts, § 2.]
6. Wills—Election.
Where, after deceased had ratified a contract made during infancy to pay plaintiff an annuity of $1,800 for services rendered, deceased executed a will by which she directed her trustees to invest £8,000 and pay the income thereof to plaintiff for life, an action by plaintiff to enforce the contract as against deceased’s administrator with the will annexed amounted to an election to take under the contract and to waive the will.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see vol. 49, Cent. Dig. Wills, § 2050.]
McLennan, P. J., and Nash, J., dissenting.
Appeal from Trial Term, Erie County.
Action by Sara Berwick Parsons against George R. Teller, as administrator of Daisy Fletcher King Smith. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
The plaintiff is a maiden lady residing in Buffalo. The defendant’s testatrix, in her early girlhood, by name Daisy King, lived with her grandmother, Mrs. Pratt, in that city until the latter’s death in 1885, when the child was 13 years of age. In 1878 the plaintiff also became a member of Mrs. Pratt’s family, remaining in the household until 1884, assisting in the care and education of Daisy, whose mother had died before the child was cared for by the grandmother. While an inmate of Mrs. Pratt’s household, the plaintiff was paid nothing for her services, but was supported as one of the family. Shortly after the death of Mrs. Pratt the girl went to New York and lived with the plaintiff for two years. They then took a six-month trip to Europe, and upon their return Miss King lived in a hotel or apartment house in New York and the plaintiff lived with her. Whether the plaintiff was paid for her services while abroad does not appear. She was incompetent to testify on the subject in her own behalf, and the defendant did not see fit to cross-examine her or give any proof in relation to the matter. In December, 1890, Miss King, then 18 years of age, intermarried with Willoughby Smith, a subject of Great Britain, and thereafter they resided in England until her death. Mrs. Smith, and her husband also, possessed considerable wealth. The relations existing between Mrs. Smith and the plaintiff were affectionate, and after the marriage Miss Parsons spent most of her time in England and Paris, and was a frequent and welcome visitor at the Smiths’. On March 1, 1888, the plaintiff wrote the following letter to Miss King: “March 1st, 1888. My Dear Daisy: As you have often expressed your willingness to give me the sum of eighteen hundred dollars per year until you arrive at the age of twenty-one years, if you will write me to this effect I shall be very grateful, Yours faithfully, Sara B. Parsons. To Miss Daisy F. King.” Miss King, then 16 years of age, replied as follows: “503 Fifth Ave., N. Y., Mch. 2, 1888. My Dear Sara: Your letter of the 1st inst. received’. I am perfectly willing to give you the sum therein mentioned ($1,800 per year) until I reach the age of twenty-one years. I think I can say in all truth and sincerity that there are few with whom I could have been constantly day and night as I have been with you and always have found them the same, true, devoted, faithful, fond, always willing to share and sympathize with me in my sorrow or joy as the case may have been. I can assure you that I appreciate all your kindness in past years, and if at any time I can aid you or yours in any way it will only be a great pleasure to me to do so if such an occurrence may present Itself. I trust we may always be together, that is, until either may find the proper person, one to whom we may give our heart, and even after that. I agree to your offer and with many, many thanks, I am, your sincere friend. D. B\ King.” A l'ew days after her marriage Mrs. Smith, her husband, and father entered into an agreement in writing with the plaintiff. The agreement recites that, “whereas” Miss Parsons “heretofore entered the employment of the said Daisy King Smith, then Daisy Fletcher King, upon the agreement that such payment should be continued whether so employed or not, or she be otherwise provided for in case of the marriage of said Daisy Fletcher King,” and then recites the marriage with Smith, her intention to live in England, and, desiring “to carry into effect such agreement and understanding” continues “now therefore, in consideration, of the premises, the services heretofore performed by said Parsons and of one dollar to them in hand paid, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged,” the said parties covenanted and agreed to pay to Miss Parsons during her natural life the-said sum of $1,800 annually in equal quarterly payments, “and the parties of the first part do hereby bind themselves, their heirs and representatives accordingly.” The father, as general guardian of Mrs. Smith, was directed to make these payments out of moneys belonging to her in his custody, and she agreed to confirm and ratify the same upon attaining her majority. The-contract further provided that, in case Mrs. Smith died, the liability of her husband by virtue of the agreement should terminate. The contract was under seal and executed by all the contracting parties. The allowance was paid in monthly payments during the minority of Mrs. Smith. After she reached the age of 21 years she had property in America producing an income and under the charge of the defendant, her agent. Remittances of this income were from time to time made to her in England, and the avails were placed to the credit of her husband, as she kept no separate account. For several years Miss Parsons was in England chiefly, caring for an elder brother of Mrs. Smith, and Mr. Smith, by direction of his wife, paid her in pounds and shillings the equivalent of $150 a month. The first payments after Mrs. Smith* became of age were paid by the defendant, as her agent, in the United States. Mr. and Mrs. Smith were on a visit to this country, and she personally requested her agent to make these payments. The stipend, pursuant to the contract, was paid monthly by her direction until her death. Concededly the only obligation imposing these payments was the written agreement between the parties. Mrs. Smith in speaking of these payments referred to the agreement, and it was found among her papers after her decease. In 1893, shortly after becoming of age, she executed her will in which she directed her trustees to invest £8,000, “and to pay the income thereof to my friend Sara Berwick Parsons * * * for her life.” On March 11, 1897, she executed her last will, which contained a like provision for the benefit of Miss Parsons. Mrs. Smith died in England in February, 1902. Letters of administration with the jvill annexed were issued to the defendant by the Surrogate’s Court of Erie county. The plaintiff presented to him her claim pursuant to the written agreement, which was rejected, and this action was thereupon commenced. Other facts appear in the opinion.
Argued before McLENNAN, P. J., and SPRING, WILLIAMS, NASH, and KRUSE, JJ.
John G. Milburn, for appellant.
Lyman M. Bass, for respondent.

Opinion:
SPRING, J.
At the close of the evidence each party moved for the direction of a verdict. By consent of the parties the jury was* discharged and the case submitted to the justice presiding, who subsequently rendered his decision containing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and directed judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The facts are found in the decision with great detail, and settle the conflicting facts and any inferences fairly deducible therefrom in favor of the plaintiff. Each finding is supported by evidence to sustain it, and a new trial should not be ordered unless we are satisfied that the decision in its material features is decidedly contrary to the evidence.
It is claimed by thé learned counsel for the appellant that the written agreement was without consideration and that it was not ratified by Mrs. Smith after she attained her majority, and these contentions comprise the principal questions requiring consideration. The agreement on its face imports a valuable consideration. The presence of the seal and the acknowledgment of the receipt of $1 imply a consideration (Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Yates County Nat. Bank, 35 App. Div. 218, 54 N. Y. Supp. 743; Matter of Steglich's Estate, 91 App. Div. 75, 86 N. Y. Supp. 257; American Encyc. of Law, vol. 6 [3d Ed.] p. 762; 2 Wharton on Evidence, § 1043), which may be rebutted by extraneous proof. Baird v. Baird, 145 N. Y. 659, 40 N. E. 222, 28 L. R. A. 375. Eliminating, however, the effect of the seal and the acknowledgment of payment, the agreement is founded on services performed by the plaintiff while in the employment of Miss King and for which she had agreed to pay. Had Mrs. Smith been an adult, the agreement in and of itself would have been sufficient to enable Miss Parsons to recover upon it, unless its validity was impeached by proof.
It becomes important, therefore, to refer to the evidence for the purpose of ascertaining if the recitals of employment and service in the agreement have been entirely disproved. In order to comprehend the scope of the agreement, it is essential to keep in mind the relations of these two people. Miss King was a motherless child who was living with her grandmother, and the plaintiff at 33 years of age came into the family when the child was 6 years of age and remained there for 6 years. They were together daily. They occupied the same bed. The plaintiff cared for the girl, assisted in her education, and they became closely attached to each other. After the death of the grandmother Miss King lived with the plaintiff in New York, and their keen affection existed unabated until the death of Mrs. Smith. For the services rendered the plaintiff received no compensation in money. It may be that none was expected to be paid. In any event, the services were valuable and were so regarded by Miss King, and they .were sufficient to constitute a valuable consideration for the promise to pay therefor. The adequacy of the price paid or promised is not significant. Miss King had property to the amount of $300,000. She had been reared in affluence. She alone had the right to measure the value of the employment and companionship of her friend. It is not for another to determine that she paid in excess of their real worth, and her agreement to extend the term of payment during the lifetime of the plaintiff cannot be overthrown because we may conclude that the plaintiff did not earn the full sum which Mrs. Smith chose to pay her. Yarwood v. Trust & Guarantee Co. Ltd., 94 App. Div. 47, 87 N. Y. Supp. 947, affirmed Court of Appeals 182 N. Y. 527, 75 N. E. 1128; Earl v. Peck, 64 N. Y. 596. The agreement was executed as Mrs. Smith and her husband were about to depart from this country for their future home in England. In entering into the agreement she was not acting alone or unadvisedly. Her husband and father were parties to the contract, and they personally became liable for the payment of the allowance which she fixed upon as the remuneration for the services rendered. The contract was drawn by her lawyer. The solemn recitals of consideration were not stealthily inserted in it or without her knowledge. The attorney was not preparing this important agreement for his client without information concerning the consideration. He ascertained the inducement for the agreement and embodied it clearly therein. There is no suggestion, and there could not be, of any overreaching in the preparation of the contract. So just was it, apparently, that her nearest relatives sanctioned it and were responsible for its performance. The prior agreement, even though voidable at the will of Miss King, denoted an intention to compensate the plaintiff. It was in effect canceled and the one in controversy substituted. Its cancellation was sufficient consideration for the more formal and explicit instrument. Hamer v. Sidway, 124 N. Y. 538, 27 N. E. 256,12 L. R. A. 463, 21 Am. St. Rep. 693; Melville v. Kruse, 174 N. Y. 306, 66 N. E. 965.
The two letters quoted, which are the first indication of any intention to pay, do not militate against the contractual liability. These ladies were close friends. We would not expect in their letters, filled with outbursts of affection, to find the one asserting a debt and the other insisting that any payment made was voluntary. There was no enforceable demand. Miss King was a minor during all the time of the rendition of the services which induced the agreement. When she approached womanhood, realizing that the services had been valuable to her and that her friend was needy, she saw fit to impose upon herself their payment as an obligation. The correspondence denotes that the amount had been the subject of conversation and had been agreed upon between them, and that sum was adhered to from the beginning. One or two of the witnesses testified that Mrs. Smith said these payments were voluntarily made by her. They were originally. She could not have been made to pay. She was animated by her love and affection in undertaking to compensate where no debt could have been established. None the less, the compelling moral obligation did not wipe out the services rendered upon which she had the right to put a money value and by a binding agreement assume their payment according to her own estimate. Her declarations, if competent, are not sufficient to warrant the setting aside of the judgment in view of the other evidence contained in the record, and all of which was considered by the trial justice in arriving at his' conclusion. These facts are established by evidence which is substantially undisputed. We think, therefore, the appellant has not affirmatively established that the agreement was without a valuable consideration; but, on the contrary, the facts affirm its validity.
It was, of course, essential to the validity of the agreement that it be ratified after Mrs. Smith became of age. The adoption of the agreement required no new consideration. There must be the confirmation, the definite recognition of the antecedent obligation, but nothing beyond to make it effective. Within the strict rule stated in the brief of the counsel for the appellant, Mrs. Smith confirmed the agreement after attaining her majority. The payments after that time were regularly made according to her direction. She was nearly 19 years of age at the time the contract was entered into. It must have been made at her instance. She was a married woman, and undoubtedly comprehended the nature and extent of the obligations she had assumed. She retained the agreement or a copy of it. There was no other agreement whereby she was called upon to pay the plaintiff. She recognized its existence in talking with her friends and with the- defendant, her agent. In her letters to the plaintiff she referred to her allowance. For eight years, without interruption, she caused the sum, which she had covenanted to pay, to be turned over to the plaintiff. An intelligent lady, with abundant means, with the active co-operation of her husband, she met the obligation graciously undertaken while a minor. She paid understandingly. It is too late now to claim that she did not intend to conform to the terms of the written agreement entered into with so much solemnity. If Mrs. Smith the year before her death had attempted to repudiate this' agreement, claiming that it was without consideration and that it had not been ratified by her, the endeavor would have been unavailing if based on the proof contained in this record. The contract was not void. The authorities are quite uniform in maintaining the principle that the contract of an infant is voidable only, irrespective of whether for his benefit or to his prejudice. Blinn v. Schwarz, 177 N. Y. 258, 69 N. E. 542, 101 Am. St. Rep. 806; Henry v. Root, 33 N. Y. 526; Kent's Commentaries, vol. 2, p. 234 et seq.; Parsons on Contracts, vol. 1 (5th Ed.) p. 293 et seq.; II Blackstone's Commentaries, 291; American-Eng. Encyc. of Law, vol. 16 (2d Ed.) p. 272 et seq. Mrs. Smith on becoming of age might have entered into a new agreement with like import to the old one. She preferred to keep the old one alive. She had the same power to do this as to enter into an independent contract.
It is claimed there was no ratification because Mr. Smith made the payments to the plaintiff. The money of his wife was deposited with his bankers to his credit, and he testified that it was his wife's wish that these payments should be made. The acknowledgment of payment in each instance was made by the plaintiff to Mrs. Smith, although the check was that of her husband. Commencing with 1899 and continuing until the death of Mrs. Smith, the payments were made monthly in this country by Mr. Teller, her agent and the custodian of her funds, and each statement rendered by him to her showed these payments made each month. A more- complete recognition of the agreement cannot be conceived.
Again, it is contended that the recital of consideration in the agreement is not binding on Mrs. Smith, because she was an infant at the time of its execution, and authorities are cited holding that the admissions of an infant are not binding against him. In these cases there had been no ratification, and the admissions made during infancy were attempted to be used to establish an estoppel or a liability notwithstanding the failure to show an affirmance of the agreement. In Sims v. Everhardt, 102 U. S. 300, 26 L. Ed. 87, cited in the dissenting opinion, the infant had executed a deed during her minority asserting that she was of age; There was no recognition of the deed after she attained majority, and she commenced an action to set it aside. It was claimed that she was estopped by her admissions made while she was an infant. The court held that the declaration could not be resorted to in order to uphold an agreement which depended- upon her affirmance after she became of age to give validity to it. The court said (at page 313 of 102 U. S., 26 L. Ed. 87.):
"The question is whether acts and declarations of an infant during infancy •can estop him from asserting the validity of his deed after he has attained his majority."
The court further said that the conveyance itself "is an assertion of his right to convey," and nothing is added to it by a contemporaneous admission. The recitals in the agreement amount to - an admission or declaration by Mrs. Smith that she owed the plaintiff for services while under age, at which time she had reached sufficient maturity to 'comprehend the scope and force of the declaration, and it is competent evidence against her tending to establish a consideration for the agreement. When Mrs. Smith became of age, she ratified the agreement ; not a portion, but the agreement as it existed. That indorsement was equivalent to a new agreement. The ratification- carried with it a recognition of the agreement to its fullest extent, and the recitals thus became effective against her. Of course, the agreement was in no part valid during the infancy of Mrs. Smith, and its validity depended upon her own conduct after she became of age. Its affirmance or disaffirmance rested entirely with her, and she elected to make this precise agreement valid and binding against her.
The agreement was executed in this state. It was expected to be performed here. The plaintiff was a resident of New York, and this had been the home of Mrs. Smith. The services had been rendered here. Mrs. Smith's property was in this state and in part, at least, remained invested here. After she became of age she was in this country and directed her agent to pay the allowance to Miss Parsons, so the initial ratification was in the state of New York. The confirmation of the agreement by Mrs. Smith made it operative from its inception. In these circumstances the agreement is to be governed by the laws of the state of New York. T£he effect of the bequest in the will of Mrs. Smith for the benefit of the plaintiff is not before us. That provision may have been intended as a substitute for the allowance fixed by the agreement. No such defense is pleaded, and no such question is suggested in the -brief. There is nothing in the record to indicate that Miss Parsons is claiming both provisions. If such is her position and the effect of the will upon the contract were to be considered upon this appeal, an entirely different situation might be presented. In any event, the plaintiff has elected to enforce the agreement. If she is not entitled to take pursuant to the will and also recover upon the contract, her election has been made. Caulfield v. Sullivan, 85 N. Y. 153.
There is no proof that the trust bequest under the will has been set apart for the benefit of the plaintiff or that any payment, or -tender of payment, pursuant to its terms has been made. There is no warrant in the record for the statement- that she is seeking to recover $3,600. We have simply to determine the validity of the agreement, with the inferences and facts, so far as they are conflicting, resolved in favor of the plaintiff, and we cannot be led away from this plain path by the suggestion that the plaintiff is endeavoring to take both by virtue of the will and of the agreement. Such an assumption may be entirely unwarranted. The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
Judgment affirmed, with costs. All concur, except McLENNAN, P. J., who dissents in an opinion in which NASH, J., concurs.