Case Name: Randall Wayne WALCOTT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1984-11-15
Citations: 460 So. 2d 915
Docket Number: No. 83-1083
Parties: Randall Wayne WALCOTT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 460
Pages: 915–921

Head Matter:
Randall Wayne WALCOTT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 83-1083.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Nov. 15, 1984.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 26, 1984.
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Lucinda H. Young, Asst. Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and W. Brian Bayly, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
ORFINGER, Judge.
Defendant was convicted of burglary of a structure and appeals that conviction. In addition to questioning the correctness of the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress his confession, defendant also questions the propriety of the trial court's retention of jurisdiction over the first half of his sentence.
There was substantial competent evidence to sustain the trial court's finding that defendant's confession was freely and voluntarily made, after he had been fully advised of his rights, so we will not disturb that finding. Rubasky v. State, 401 So.2d 894 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).
The court did err, however, in retaining jurisdiction over defendant's sentence. Section 947.16(3), Florida Statutes (1983) permits the retention of jurisdiction in sentences for certain enumerated offenses, among which is the offense of burglary of a structure or conveyance in which a human being is present (a second degree felony). The charging document did not allege that a human being was present in the structure, and defendant was not convicted of that offense. Instead, defendant was charged with and convicted of burglary of a structure, a third degree felony. Section 810.02(3), Florida Statutes (1983). Consequently, there is no statutory basis for the retention of jurisdiction here, and that portion of the sentence must be set aside.
The State contends, however, that there was no objection in the trial court to the retention of jurisdiction, and that the issue has not been preserved for appeal. The record reveals that there was an objection made when the court announced its intention to reserve jurisdiction. Although not couched in the most artful language, it appears sufficient to advise the trial court of defendant's objection. We are mindful of the admonition that "... magic words are not needed to make a proper objection." Williams v. State, 414 So.2d 509, 512 (Fla. 1982).
However, even should the objection be deemed insufficient to fully apprise the trial court of the basis for defendant's objection, we have previously held, contrary to the State's position, that the contemporaneous objection rule does not apply to sentencing errors where, as here, it is contended that there was an erroneous retention of jurisdiction. Brumley v. State, 455 So.2d 1096 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984) [9 FLW 1945], relying on Rhoden v. State, 448 So.2d 1013 (Fla.1984). For the reasons expressed in Brumley, we reject the State's argument on that issue. See also, Neal v. State, 451 So.2d 1058 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984).
So that the State may secure a definitive ruling on the applicability of the contemporaneous objection rule to sentencing errors such as involved here, and as we did in Brumley, we certify to the Supreme Court of Florida, as a question of great public importance, the following:
WHETHER, BY OPERATION OF THE CONTEMPORANEOUS OBJECTION RULE, A DEFENDANT IS PRECLUDED FROM CHALLENGING, ON DIRECT APPEAL, THE TRIAL COURT'S RETENTION OF JURISDICTION OVER ONE-HALF OF HIS SENTENCE WHEN NO OBJECTION TO SUCH RETENTION IS MADE AT THE TIME OF SENTENCING?
Conviction AFFIRMED; Retention of Jurisdiction VACATED.
FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., J., concurs.
COWART, J., concurs specially with opinion.