Case Name: Jim WRIGHT and Connie Wright v. CITY of LITTLE ROCK and Little Rock Board of Adjustment
Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 2006-04-13
Citations: 366 Ark. 96
Docket Number: 05-683
Parties: Jim WRIGHT and Connie Wright v. CITY of LITTLE ROCK and Little Rock Board of Adjustment
Judges: Glaze and Imber, JJ., dissent.
Reporter: Arkansas Reports
Volume: 366
Pages: 96–105

Head Matter:
Jim WRIGHT and Connie Wright v. CITY of LITTLE ROCK and Little Rock Board of Adjustment
05-683
233 S.W.3d 644
Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered April 13, 2006
Abies, Howe, & Standridge, P.L.L.C., by: Lisa Jones-Abies, for appellants.
Office of the City Attorney, City of Little Rock, by: E. Shane Springs, for appellees.

Opinion:
Jim Hannah, Chief Justice.
Jim and Connie Wright appeal a decision of the Pulaski County Circuit Court dismissing their case with prejudice. This appeal was certified to this court by the court of appeals because it concerns an issue of first impression. Our jurisdiction is pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. l-2(b)(l).
Facts
The Wrights live at 14 Maywood Drive in Little Rock, and Jim Wright operates a welding business at that location. In 2002, the City of Little Rock received a complaint that, in violation of zoning ordinances, a business was being run at 14 Maywood Drive. On March 18, 2002, the City of Little Rock Department of Neighborhoods 8c Planning issued a courtesy notice to the Wrights to cease use of their property for business purposes.
In response, the Wrights submitted documents to the City of Little Rock Department of Planning and Development seeking to have a nonconforming-use status declared because they were continuing to conduct a business in a location where a business had previously been run. The Wrights' request was denied. The zoning enforcement staff of the Department of Planning and Development concluded that the Wrights failed to show that a business was continuously run from that location.
The Wrights then appealed the decision of the zoning enforcement staff to the City of Little Rock Department of Planning and Development's Board of Adjustment. The Board held a hearing at which evidence was received concerning the prior business. Evidence was also received to show that there was no business activity at 14 Maywood Drive for at least twelve months before Jim Wright started his business, and that the business he started occupied more property than that used by the prior business. The Board denied the Wrights' appeal by a letter dated May 6, 2002.
The Wrights filed the record of the proceedings before the Board in the circuit court on May 22, 2002, as allowed under Ark. Code Ann. § 14-56-425 (Repl. 1998), and well within the thirty days allowed for such an appeal under Ark. Dist. Ct. R. 9. That appeal was assigned to the First Division of the Pulaski County Circuit Court and given the case number CV 2002-005512. However, the appeal was dismissed without prejudice by the circuit court on April 25, 2003, for a lack of service in accordance with Ark. R. Civ. P. 4(i) and (g).
On May 27, 2003, the Wrights filed a complaint for declaratory judgment stating that, "[t]his matter involves a timely appeal of a zoning ruling by Defendants' finding that Plaintiffs' property . is not recognized as a 'nonconforming' use." Although this was an apparent attempt to reinstate the previously dismissed appeal, it was assigned to the Second Division of the Pulaski County Circuit Court and given the new designation of case number CV 2003-5910. However, the case was subsequently transferred back to the First Division of Pulaski County Circuit Court. The transfer order noted that while the case bore a new case number, it was "the same case that was originally filed as Civil Case Number 2002-5512 on May 22, 2002."
The City answered, denying that there was a timely appeal. The matter was then stayed until November 8, 2004, because counsel for the City was on active duty in the United States military. On November 19, 2004, the City filed a motion to dismiss under Ark. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and (h)(3). The City argued that if the matter was an appeal from the decision of the Board, the Wrights had failed to perfect their appeal pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 14-56-425, and Ark. Dist. Ct. R. 8 and 9 and, if it was a declaratory judgment action, there was no jurisdiction because the exclusive remedy for review of a decision of the Board is by appeal pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 14-56-425. The City argued that while the Wrights did timely file the certified record of the Board's proceedings with the circuit court, the case was dismissed, and the Wrights failed to refile within twelve months, arguing that the savings statute (Ark. Code Ann. § 16-56-126 (1987)) did not apply.
The motion to dismiss was granted on March 9, 2005, based on a finding that there was a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because the Wrights failed to comply with Ark. Dist. Ct. R. 9 and because the savings statute did not apply.
The Wrights filed a notice of appeal. They argue here that the trial court erred in granting the motion to dismiss the administrative appeal and refusing to apply the savings statute.
Notice of the Appeal
"As long as the record of the inferior court proceeding was filed with the circuit clerk within 30 days of the entry of the judgment, the appeal is perfected." McBride v. State, 297 Ark. 410, 412, 62 S.W.2d 785, 786 (1989). See also Ark. Dist. Ct. R. 9. Perfected means that all legal steps have been taken which are necessary to complete the action undertaken. See Black's Law Dictionary 1173 (8th ed. 2004). Rule 9 is silent on how the circuit court is to schedule briefing and hearings on the appeal. Under the current rules, the procedural method used in the circuit court to hear the appeal is left to the circuit court's discretion.
Our rules fail to provide adequate procedure on appeals to the circuit court. It is apparent that the inadequate procedural rules in this case led to the confusion resulting in the circuit court's mistakenly dismissing an appeal for failure to perfect service when the appeal was already perfected by appellants' timely filing of the record. Once perfected, it was up to the circuit court to set a briefing schedule or order hearings as required.
We refer the question of what further procedure should be provided to the Arkansas Supreme Court Committee on Civil Practice.
This court held in Weiss v. Johnson, 331 Ark. 409, 961 S.W.2d28 (1998), that service of process under Ark. R. Civ. P. 4 was required for an appeal from an administrative decision. At the time Weiss was decided, Ark. Inferior Ct. R. 9(b) applied and was silent on notice. However, by amendment, this court specifically added to paragraph (b) that no notice of appeal is required. Once the record is timely filed, the appeal is perfected. To the extent that Weiss is inconsistent with this opinion, it is overruled. We also note that Rule 4 applies to service of the summons and complaint. There is no summons or complaint to be served in this case. When the record was timely filed, the appeal was ripe for adjudication.
Complaint for Declaratory Judgment
Once the matter was dismissed without prejudice, the Wrights were left to decide how to reinstate their appeal. The rules are silent on how an appellant should proceed in this regard.
The Wrights filed a complaint for declaratory judgment seeking to appeal the decision of the Board. A declaratory-judgment action seeks to avoid uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations. Wilmans v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 355 Ark. 668, 144 S.W.3d 245 (2004). However the pleading was captioned, it sought to continue the appeal of the decisión of the Board. Pleadings are to be liberally construed so as to do substantial justice. Ark. R. Civ. P. 8(f). They should be construed to give effect to the substance of the pleading rather than the form. Cornett v. Prather, 293 Ark. 108, 737 S.W.2d 159 (1987). The relief sought was the appeal of the decision of the Board, and that was clear from the pleading.
Since filing the record of the hearing before the Board with the circuit court, the Wrights have consistently sought to appeal that decision. We note that this case should not be confused with one where a party obtains a judgment, abandons an appeal from that judgment, and then attempts to have the matter adjudicated anew as if no judgment existed. This is prohibited because a judgment, or in this case the decision of the Little Rock Board of Adjustment, stands until it is set aside by a superior tribunal. See Swint v. State, 356 Ark. 361, 152 S.W.3d 226 (2004); Watson v. White, 217 Ark. 853, 233 S.W.2d 544 (1950); Fowlkes v. Central Supply Co., 187 Ark. 201, 58 S.W.2d 922 (1933); Burgess v. Poole, 45 Ark. 373 (1885). See also Wilson v. C & M Used Cars, 46 Ark. App. 281, 878 S.W.2d 427 (1994). In this case, the Wrights are not attempting to have the Board decide the issue anew, but rather, they are simply trying to reinstate their appeal that was dismissed in error.
Once the Wrights timely filed the record in the circuit court, their appeal was perfected. Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 4 concerns service of a summons and complaint and does not apply. This matter is reversed and remanded for reinstatement of the appeal.
Glaze and Imber, JJ., dissent.
The Wrights alleged that an auto repair shop had been run from this same location.
If no appeal is perfected within the time allowed and in the manner provided, the action of the Board is final and binding on all parties. See, e.g., Mosby v. Office of Prof'l Conduct, 356 Ark. 500, 156 S.W.3d 253 (2004).
"The Arkansas Inferior Court Rules were revised and renamed the Arkansas District Court Rules, effective January 1, 2005, to comply with Amendment 80 of the Arkansas Constitution." Camp v. State, 364 Ark. 459, 463, 221 S.W.3d 365, 367 (2006).
See In Re: Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure; Rules of Appellate Procedure — Civil; Rules of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals; and Inferior Court Rules, 355 Ark. Appx. 725 (2004).
The dissent states that, "[i]n sum, the bottom fine is that, despite the circuit court's dismissal 'without prejudice,' the Wrights should have appealed the erroneous dismissal of their appeal." Even though that decision was in error, the parties had a right to rely on that decision. King v. Carney, 341 Ark. 955, 20 S.W.3d 341 (2000). If there was an aggrieved party that should have appealed that first dismissal without prejudice, it was the City, who would obviously have preferred a dismissal with prejudice so that the matter was brought completely to an end. The City did not appeal. To hold that the Wrights had to appeal an order of dismissal without prejudice, which was at the least a voidable order, creates a new trap for the bar for no discernible purpose.