Case Name: Pennsylvania Company for Insurance on Lives and Granting Annuities v. Singheiser, Appellant
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1912-03-18
Citations: 235 Pa. 241
Docket Number: Appeal, No. 67
Parties: Pennsylvania Company for Insurance on Lives and Granting Annuities v. Singheiser, Appellant.
Judges: Before Fell, C. J., Brown, Mestrezat, Potter, Elkin, Stewart and Moschzisker, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania State Reports
Volume: 235
Pages: 241–252

Head Matter:
Pennsylvania Company for Insurance on Lives and Granting Annuities v. Singheiser, Appellant.
Ground rents — Husband and wife — Merger—Extinguishment— Act of April 27, 1855, P. L. 868 and June U, 1897, P. L. U9.
In 1858, a wife became owner of real estate subject to a ground rent. After she acquired the real estate and before any rent became due, her husband in the same year purchased the ground rent. In 1871 the wife died leaving the real estate subject to the ground rent to her husband for life with remainder over to her descendants. The husband died in 1900. No ground rent was paid during the wife’s ownership of the land or the husband’s life tenancy. During the husband’s life tenancy he endorsed on the envelope containing the ground rent deed, that the rent was “to be collected at my death.” The husband left a will by which he gave his estate to a trustee for his second wife and a child by her. Eight years after the husband’s death the owner of the land filed a petition against the trustee praying for the extinguishment of the ground rent. Held, (1) that, as the husband could not sue his wife, the Act of April 27, 1855, P. L. 368 did not run during the thirteen years in which the husband owned the ground rent and the wife the land; (2) that the Act of 1855 had no application during the nineteen years of the husband’s life tenancy, inasmuch as his endorsement on the envelope of the ground rent deed indicated his recognition of the existence of the ground rent, and the law did not require him to do the vain thing of paying as the owner of the land the ground rent to himself as owner of the rent; (3) that the ground rent was not extinguished, under the circumstances, although no rent had in fact been paid from 1858 to the filing of the petition in 1908.
Mr. Justice Potter and Mr. Justice Elkin dissent.
Argued Jan. 2, 1912.
Appeal, No. 67, Jan. T., 1911, by defendant from judgment of C. P. No. 2, PMla. Co., March T., 1908, No. 2737, for plaintiffs n. o. v. in case of Pennsylvania Company for Insurance on Lives and Granting Annuities and S. Kingston McCay, Executors of the last will and testament of Alfred C. Gibson, deceased, The Pennsylvania Company for Insurance on Lives and Granting Annuities, Trustee under the will of Alfred C. Gibson, deceased; Virginia Frances Gibson and Mary Emma Gibson v. Andrew Singheiser, Covenantor and Cecelia E. Crilly, Real Owner.
Before Fell, C. J., Brown, Mestrezat, Potter, Elkin, Stewart and Moschzisker, JJ.
Affirmed.
Issue under the first and second sections of the act of June 14,1897, P. L. 149, to determine whether a ground rent had become extinguished by presumption of law. The proceedings were instituted by petition by Cecelia E. Crilly, daughter of the devisee of the land under the will of Rosanna Gibson, wife of Alfred C. Gibson, praying for extinguishment as owner, the petition being filed eight years after Alfred C. Gibson’s death. Before Barratt, J.
In addition to the facts stated in the opinion of the Supreme Court, it appeared that Alfred C. Gibson left a will by which he gave his estate to a trustee for his said wife and a child by her.
At the trial the jury returned a verdict for defendants. Subsequently the court entered judgment for plaintiffs non obstante veredicto.
Error assigned was in entering judgment for plaintiffs non obstante veredicto.
D. Webster Dougherty, for appellant.
The statute is more than a statute of limitation, it is a statute of repose and was passed to relieve as far as possible an intolerable condition which hindered and obstructed the free alienation and enjoyment of property: Wingett’s App., 122 Pa. 486; Wallace v. Fourth U. P. Church, 152 Pa. 258.
The indorsement on the envelope was properly excluded : Clay v. McCreanor, 9 Pa. Super. Ct. 433; McKinney v. Snyder, 78 Pa. 497; Wesner v. Stein, 97 Pa. 322; Spangler v. Spangler, 122 Pa. 358.
That the seventh section of the act of 1855 is consti tutional was held in Korn v. Browne, 64 Pa. 55; Biddle v. Hooven, 120 Pa. 221; Clay v. Iseminger, 187 Pa. 108: Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U. S. 55 (22 Sup. Ct. Repr. 573).
The Act of June 14, 1897, is constitutional: Haines’ App., 73 Pa. 169; Korn v. Browne, 64 Pa. 55; Wingett’s App., 122 Pa. 486.
The twenty-one years having therefore begun to run on February 18, 1858, the running was not suspended after Mrs. Gibson’s death: Amole’s Appeal, 115 Pa. 356; Light’s Estate, 136 Pa. 211; McDonald v. Hovey, 110 U. S. 619 (4 Super. Ct. Repr. 142).
“The act of 1855 in its application of gound rents made this a legal presumption after twenty-one years which cannot be rebutted:” Biddle v. Hooven, 120 Pa. 221; Pratt v. Eby, 67 Pa. 396.
James Wilson Bayard and John G. Johnson, for appellees.
This act is one of the statutes of limitations, and is subject to the general rule governing all of such statutes. One of these which is directly applicable to the first of the three periods above mentioned in the present case, is, that as between husband and wife the statute of limitations does not run: Towers v. Hagner, 3 Whart. Pa. 48; Kutz’s Appeal, 40 Pa. 90; Lahr’s Appeal, 90 Pa. 507; Marsteller v. Marsteller, 93 Pa. 350; Grade’s Estate, 158 Pa. 521; Hillerman v. Ingersoll, 5 Phila. 143.
The law does not require the doing of a useless thing; and we submit that, if necessary, it should be held that a presumption arose that everything that was necessary to be done to preserve the life of the rent, was properly done. We have, in addition, the distinct acknowledgment of the existence of the rent in the endorsement by Alfred C. Gibson on the envelope containing the ground rent deed, made during this second period, that it was to be collected after Ms death. We submit, therefore, that the statute of limitations cannot be held to have run during this second period.
Ground rent does not accrue like interest from day to day. The rent is an estate in the land: Streaper v. Fisher, 1 Rawle 155; Cobb v. Biddle, 14 Pa. 444; White’s Estates, 167 Pa. 206; Hart v. Anderson, 198 Pa. 558; Amole’s App., 115 Pa. 356.
March 18, 1912:

Opinion:
Opinion by
Mr. Justice Brown,
The issue in the court below was framed under the act of June 11, 1897, P. L. 119, to determine whether an irredeemable ground rent had been extinguished by operation of law. A vedict was directed in favor of the owner of the land, the defendant in the issue, but subsequently judgment was entered in favor of the appellees, the present owners of the ground rent.
In a deed from James Smith to Andrew Singheiser, dated February 15, 1800, and duly recorded, an irredeemable ground rent of two hundred Spanish milled dollars per annum, which is the subject of this controversy, was reserved in the lot of ground conveyed, situated on the west side of Third street, in the city of Philadelphia. On May 8, 1858, Richard McAvoy conveyed the lot to his daughter, Rosanna Gibson, wife of Alfred C. Gibson, subject to the said ground rent, to which the said Alfred C. Gibson acquired title on the 21st day of the same month. Mrs. Gibson died October 12, 1871, having given, by her will, a life estate to her husband in all her property, with remainder over to her descendants. She also gave him a power of sale. He died December 7, 1900, having, during all the interval, retained possession of the premises, subject to the ground rent, without exercising the power of sale, and, upon his death, Cecelia E. Crilly, a granddaughter of Mrs. Gibson, became the owner of the property.
The last payment of the semi-annual rent was made , to Gibson's predecessor in title on February 18, 1858, and appellant's contention, as stated by her counsel, is "that the twenty-one years in this case began to run from the time of the last semi-annual payment of the ground rent, to wit: February 18, 1858, and having once begun to run was not stopped by the subsequent transfer of the land to Mrs. Gibson or of the ground rent to Mr. Gibson, and by virtue of the provisions of the seventh section of the act of April 27, 1855, P. L. 368, the ground rent became extinguished on the 18th day of February, 1879." The seventh section of the act of 1855 provides that "in all cases where no payment, claim or demand shall have been made on account of, or for any ground rent, annuity or other charge upon real estate for twenty-one years, or no declaration or acknowledgment of the existence thereof shall have been made within that period by the owner of the premises, subject to such ground rent, annuity or charge, a release or extinguishment thereof shall be presumed, and such ground rent, annuity or charge shall thereafter be irrecoverable."
It is first to be noted that, when Alfred C. Gibson acquired title to the ground rent, there was no payment due upon it, and nothing was demandable until August 18, 1858, the next semi-annual payment period fixed in the deed from Smith to Singheiser. But on that date Mrs. Gibson was the owner of the land, having acquired title to it in the previous May, and her husband could not have enforced payment from her of the semi-annual payment then due, for she held the title as his wife to the land charged with the rent. She so held the title until her death on October 12, 1871, and during that period of more than thirteen years any demand by the husband upon her for payment of the rent would have been vain and useless, for he could not have enforced his demand by an action against her. To this appellant makes answer that the act of 1855 makes no exception in favor of any one. This is true, but it is further true that nothing in that act contravenes the rule in force with us that the unity of persons which prevent^ a wife from maintaining an action against her husband also prevents a husband from maintaining an action against her: Gracie's Estate, 158 Pa. 521. On grounds of public policy, the law discountenances controversies between husband and wife and encourages inaction as to claims inter sese during the existence of the marital relation. But, aside from this, it is well contended by counsel for appellees that the manifest intention of the husband in acquiring the ground rent a few days after his wife had acquired title to the land was to keep them both in the family, not, however, with any intention on his part to merge both in her, else he would have had the deed for the ground rent made directly to her. If such was his intention, the presumption naturally follows that he, in effect, donated the ground rent to her as it accrued from time to time. We are clear that the act of 1855 has no application from February 18, 1858, to the date of Mrs. Gibson's death, and we come to the period during which her husband was in possession of the property as life tenant under her will. This period extended from October 12, 1871, to December 7, 1900.
Among the papers that came into the hands of Gibson's executor was an envelope containing his deed for the ground rent. On this envelope there was the following endorsement in his handwriting: "This ground rent is on property No. 820 and 822 and 824 North 3rd, running through to Charlotte street, to be collected at my death." Below that is written: "Ground rent debt $200 per annum to Thomas Williams, trustee. A. C. Gibson." The endorsement is without date, but it is admitted that it was written some time after January 1, 1874. It was excluded by the trial judge, and this was properly held to have been error by the court in banc. While the endorsement may not have been a declaration or acknowledgment of the existence of the ground rent "by the owner of the premises subject to" it, it was an acknowledgment of the existence of the ground rent by the life tenant of the property, upon whom there rested the burden of paying the semi-annual rents during his life estate, and, on the other hand, it is to be regarded as a claim made by him, as the owner of the ground rent, that it was in existence, but, for a manifest reason, not to be collected until his death. It was a declaration by him that, when the ground rent should, upon his death, pass to another, the payments which he had not exacted from himself while he, as life tenant, was in possession and enjoyment of the property out of which the rents were payable, should be made by those who, after his death, would come into possession and enjoyment of the land. While he lived he was, as life tenant, the payer, and, as owner of the ground rent, the payee. The hand that was to pay was the hand that was to receive, and to hold that the ground rent must be presumed to have been extinguished, because he did not leave behind him some evidence that, at some time during the last twenty-one years of his life, he had, as life tenant, taken the rent out of one of his pockets and put it in another, to pay himself as the owner of the ground rent, would be to require an uttterly vain, useless and foolish thing, never demanded by the law and certainly not contemplated by the act of 1855. Lex neminen cogit ad vana seu inutilia.
The assignments of error are overruled and the judgment is affirmed.