Case Name: Michael Jay COLLINS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1986-05-29
Citations: 489 So. 2d 188
Docket Number: No. 85-125
Parties: Michael Jay COLLINS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: DAUKSCH, ORFINGER and SHARP, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 489
Pages: 188–191

Head Matter:
Michael Jay COLLINS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 85-125.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
May 29, 1986.
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and James R. Wulchak, Chief Appellate Division, and Kenneth Witts, Asst. Public Defenders, Daytona Beach, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Richard B. Martell, Asst. Atty. Gen., Day-tona Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING EN BANC
COBB, Chief Judge.
Pursuant to a motion for rehearing en banc (isee Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.331(c)) filed by the State of Florida, we herewith grant said motion and vacate our prior opinion in this cause filed January 30, 1986, and substitute the following:
The appellant, Michael Jay Collins, appeals from a judgment of conviction and sentence on two counts for trafficking in stolen goods. His contention is that his dual convictions constitute double jeopardy because the trafficking counts (Counts IV and V of the Information) were couched in identical language, to-wit:
AND for further information DOUGLAS CHESHIRE, JR., State Attorney of the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Brevard County, Florida, prosecuting for the State of Florida, under oath CHARGES that in Brevard County, Florida, on the 7th day of August, 1984, MICHAEL JAY COLLINS, did then and there traffic in, and endeavor to traffic in, certain property, to wit: JEWELRY, the property of FLORENCE MOONEY, as owner or custodian, which HE knew or should have known was stolen, contrary to Section 812.019, Florida Statutes.
We find that there was no double jeopardy. Although the state failed in its infor mation to factually differentiate two separate, discrete incidents of trafficking which occurred on the same date at different locations, that failure was waived by the defendant's failure to file either a motion to dismiss or motion for more definite statement. Moreover, the prosecutor offered to specify on the verdict forms which trafficking count related to which location, and defense counsel failed to accept the offer. In any event, the prosecution in closing argument related count four to one location and count five to another location; thus, it must be presumed that the jury was aware of the distinction between the two counts when they returned guilty verdicts on both counts.
Miles v. State, 418 So.2d 1070 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982), relied upon by the appellant, is clearly distinguishable. In Miles the response of the state to an order granting a defense motion for a bill of particulars did not factually distinguish identical counts— nor did the proof at trial. As stated by the majority opinion in Miles: "Thus, it appears that [Miles] was twice charged with and later convicted of the same crime." This is not true in the instant case. The information was not challenged, and the proof at trial showed Collins was convicted of two separate offenses.
AFFIRMED.
DAUKSCH, ORFINGER and SHARP, JJ., concur.
COWART, J., dissents with opinion in which UPCHURCH, J., concurs.