Case Name: Allen David SHIVER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1990-07-10
Citations: 564 So. 2d 1158
Docket Number: No. 88-1051
Parties: Allen David SHIVER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: WENTWORTH, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 564
Pages: 1158–1162

Head Matter:
Allen David SHIVER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 88-1051.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
July 10, 1990.
Michael R. Buchanan, Trenton, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Bradley R. Bischoff, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.

Opinion:
BOOTH, Judge.
This cause is before us on appeal of appellant's conviction for second-degree murder. Appellant has raised numerous issues for our consideration, which we affirm without discussion with one exception.
In October 1987, appellant became involved in a barroom fight in Gainesville, Florida. Appellant had come to the bar with his girlfriend, who became extremely intoxicated. Sometime during the evening, she approached another man and asked for jukebox money. Appellant saw this and became angry, so he forced her to leave. She ended up on the ground once she was outside, although it is unclear whether that happened because of her intoxication or because of appellant's behavior. Paramedics were called. After they arrived, another patron informed them that appellant had been manhandling her while still inside the bar. Appellant overheard this.
When the patron returned to the bar, appellant followed close behind. Shortly thereafter he picked a fight with the patron's friend and knifed him to death. Several witnesses were asked to testify about appellant's demeanor and appearance as he was reentering the bar. One witness testified that it was evident that the men were angrily exchanging words. The witness stated, "I knew there was going to be trouble." Another witness stated, "I had a feeling that, you know, something was going to happen." The witness elaborated that, "It wasn't a friendly feeling. It was more like we was [sic] going to have trouble with him." A third witness testified that appellant "looked like he was going to get revenge on somebody." A fourth witness answered "yes" to the question, "Did you perceive or form an impression in your mind from any source that there might be trouble and that you had better get back inside the bar?"
Appellant challenges this testimony as inadmissible opinion evidence from lay witnesses. Section 90.701, Florida Statutes, provides:
If a witness is not testifying as an expert his testimony about what he perceived may be in the form of inference and opinion when:
(1) The witness cannot readily, and with equal accuracy and adequacy, communicate what he has perceived to the trier of fact without testifying in terms of inferences or opinions and his use of inferences or opinions will not mislead the trier of fact to the prejudice of the objecting party; and
(2) The opinions and inferences do not require a special knowledge, skill, experience, or training.
As it is practically impossible to describe another's appearance in such a manner as to convey to a jury an accurate picture of the emotions shown by him at the time, in criminal cases, a witness may testify that a person was angry, threatening, or pretty mad. See 23 Fla.Jur.2d Evidence and Witnesses § 653 (1981). However, it has been stated that a witness should not testify to the undisclosed intention or motive of a third person. Branch v. State, 118 So. 13 (Fla.1928). The distinction between these principles is fine indeed, as shown by comparing the "permissible" testimony that someone was threatening, to the "impermissible" testimony of someone's future intentions. The opinion rule has been criticized as virtually impossible to consistently apply in practice. See United States v. Pierson, 503 F.2d 173, 176 (D.C.Cir.1974).
In Kight v. State, 512 So.2d 922 (Fla.1987), the Supreme Court upheld a trial court ruling excluding the victim's lay opinion that a codefendant was encouraging appellant Eight to cut the victim's throat. The codefendant had made a somewhat ambiguous statement which the victim believed was intended to dare Eight to kill him. The court stated (512 So.2d at 929):
Under Section 90.701, before a lay witness may testify in the form of inference and opinion the party offering the testimony must establish that "the witness cannot [otherwise] readily, and with equal accuracy and adequacy, communicate what he has perceived to the trier of fact" and that the witness' "use of inferences or opinions will not mislead the trier of fact to the prejudice of the objecting party."
Because the record established that the codefendant made the statement while placing his hand on the hand Eight was using to hold the knife, and further established that the codefendant then pressed his hand into Eight's so as to force the knife into the victim's throat, the court concluded that the facts elicited about the knife and hands adequately conveyed the opinion to the jury so that it could draw its own inferences.
The record sub judice does not reflect that direct factual evidence of appellant's intentions was otherwise elicited before the jury, and we have no problem with three of the four challenged statements. More troubling, however, was the statement that appellant "looked like he was going to get revenge on somebody." Although characterized as a statement about appellant's appearance, it is arguable that this testimony also went to appellant's intent or motive when he reentered the bar.
The Florida Supreme Court and numerous other jurisdictions have permitted witnesses to give their opinion about another's mental state. See Bohannon v. Pegelow, 652 F.2d 729 (7th Cir.1981); United States v. Guzzino, 810 F.2d 687 (7th Cir.1987); 32 C.J.S. Evidence § .546(29) (1964); United States v. Mastberg, 503 F.2d 465 (9th Cir.1974); Sims v. State, 59 Fla. 38, 52 So. 198 (1910); and cases cited therein. Naturally, such testimony must otherwise satisfy the rule requirements that the testimony be uncommunicable in the form of objective, observed facts, and not be misleading.
After careful consideration, we conclude that the challenged testimony described the witness's factual observation of appellant's mental state at the time. We conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion in determining that the testimony met the rule requirements for admission.
WENTWORTH, J., concurs.
ERVIN, J., concurs and dissents with written opinion.