Case Name: RONALD M. BARNES, Appellant, v. S. Frank THOMPSON, Superintendent, Oregon State Penitentiary, Respondent
Court: Oregon Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1999-03-31
Citations: 159 Or. App. 383
Docket Number: 97C-10037; CA A100361
Parties: RONALD M. BARNES, Appellant, v. S. Frank THOMPSON, Superintendent, Oregon State Penitentiary, Respondent.
Judges: Before Haselton, Presiding Judge, and Landau and Armstrong, Judges.
Reporter: Oregon Reports, Court of Appeals
Volume: 159
Pages: 383–390

Head Matter:
On respondent’s motion to vacate and remand filed July 17, 1998,
appeal dismissed March 31, 1999
RONALD M. BARNES, Appellant, v. S. Frank THOMPSON, Superintendent, Oregon State Penitentiary, Respondent.
(97C-10037; CA A100361)
977 P2d 431
Hardy Myers, Attorney General, Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General, and Erika L. Hadlock, Assistant Attorney General, for motion.
Steven H. Gorham contra.
Before Haselton, Presiding Judge, and Landau and Armstrong, Judges.
LANDAU, J.
Armstrong, J., dissenting.

Opinion:
LANDAU, J.
Plaintiff petitioned for habeas corpus relief, alleging that the Board of Parole's (Board) extension of his projected parole release date for two years violated the ex post facto provisions of the state and federal constitutions. He sought release from prison. The trial court ruled against plaintiff and dismissed the writ. Plaintiff appealed the trial court's decision. During the pendency of the appeal, plaintiff was paroled from prison.
The state argues that the appeal has been mooted by plaintiffs release. Plaintiff responds that the case is not moot because collateral consequences flow from the Board's failure to parole him two years earlier than it did. He argues that, had he been released earlier, he would no longer be subject to the conditions of parole because the order of release indicated that his minimum term of active supervision would be 36 months. For the following reasons, we agree with the state that no justiciable controversy exists, and we dismiss the appeal.
We do not agree with plaintiffs suggestion that he would be free from the conditions of his parole had he been released earlier. Unlike the post-prison supervision system, which provides set periods of post-prison supervision for released inmates, the parole system allows the Board to release an inmate who has not finished serving his or her indeterminate prison sentence, and that person may be kept on parole until the sentence expires. Thus, a person serving a 10-year indeterminate sentence who was paroled after five years could be kept on parole for another five years, whereas a person serving a 10-year indeterminate sentence who was paroled after seven years could be kept on parole only for another three years. In short, there is no direct correlation between when one is paroled and when one's parole terminates. Plaintiffs sentences on multiple counts of rape and incest will not expire until April 2035, and he may be kept on parole until that time. That date is not dependent in any way on whether he was released on parole in 1995 or 1997.
There is, however, a possibility that a parolee might be changed from active parole supervision status to inactive parole supervision status, based on when he or she is paroled. In plaintiffs case, the release order indicates that he will be under active supervision "for 36 months, or to the sentence expiration date. Extension of the active supervision period is contingent on a recommendation from the supervising officer or Board approval." A change from active to inactive supervision status does not relieve a parolee of his or her responsibility to abide by the conditions of parole. Several of the conditions of parole, however, such as payment of supervision fees and the requirement to seek written permission before leaving the state, do not remain in effect when a parolee is changed to inactive supervision. See generally OAR chapter 255, division 94 (describing active and inactive supervision). The question, then, is whether the potential for an earlier transition from active to inactive supervision status somehow prevents an otherwise moot case from being considered moot.
A justiciable controversy exists where "the court's decision in the matter will have some practical effect on the rights of the parties to the controversy." Brumnett v. PSRB, 315 Or 402, 405, 848 P2d 1194 (1993). Even if the main issue in a controversy has been resolved, collateral consequences may prevent the controversy from being moot under some circumstances. In Brumnett, the petitioner challenged his commitment to the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review Board (PSRB), but was released during the pendency of his action. He argued that his release did not moot his case because of a potential collateral consequence, that the state could seek to recoup the costs of his confinement pursuant to a statute making people within PSRB's jurisdiction "liable for the full cost of care" depending on their ability to pay. Id. at 406-07. The court held, however, that the "mere possibility" that the state would seek to recoup the costs of the petitioner's care did not prevent the case from becoming moot on the petitioner's release.
The rationale of Brumnett leads us to the conclusion that this case, too, is moot. The relief that plaintiff initially sought, release from prison, has already occurred. Plaintiff suggests no other relief that might be appropriate should he prevail on the merits, and the only other potential relief that we can imagine would be something along the lines of instructing the Board to consider plaintiff for a transition to inactive supervision status at an earlier date. It would not be appropriate for this court to order plaintiff to be placed on inactive supervision, because that is clearly a decision that is left to the discretion of the Board, based on how the parolee has done on active supervision.
Given the nature of the parole system, as described above, we do not believe that the "mere possibility" that the Board might have changed an inmate from active to inactive supervision status and thus relieved the inmate from several conditions of parole is the type of collateral consequence that would prevent a habeas corpus claim that a plaintiff is entitled to immediate release from prison from becoming moot when the plaintiff is released from prison.
The dissent mischaracterizes the holding of Brumnett as being based on a rationale that "it was only possible, not probable, that the state would seek to require the petitioner to pay for care for the disputed period." 159 Or App at 389. The case does not discuss how "probable" it was that the state would seek to recoup its costs. The opinion first quoted the relevant statute, which provided that the petitioner " 'is liable for the full cost of care.' " Brumnett, 315 Or at 406 (emphasis added) (quoting ORS 179.620(1)). The court went on to note, though, that there were provisions "for waiver of collection of any amount declared payable" under certain circumstances. Id. at 407. Given that the state was not, at the time the case was decided, attempting to require the petitioner to pay for his care, the court held that the "fact that it might do so in the future" did not prevent the case from being moot. Id. (emphasis added). The court did not speculate on how "probable" it was that the state would seek to recoup its costs at some point.
Brumnett is virtually identical to the present case: In Brumnett, the court could not know if there would be a "waiver of collection" of any amount the petitioner was liable to pay pursuant to the statute; likewise, in this case, we can not know if there would be a change from active to inactive supervision, given that the Board has discretion to determine whether a person will be changed to inactive supervision.
Finally, plaintiff argues that "some cases that would normally be moot can still be considered by the Court if the 'defendant's acts are capable of repetition, yet evading review' and are matters of 'public importance.' " The case that plaintiff cites for this proposition, Barcik v. Kubiaczyk, 321 Or 174, 895 P2d 765 (1995), mentioned the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception to mootness in an extended discussion of how the court had repudiated the application of that exception under Oregon law in a long line of cases. "Oregon does not recognize the 'capable of repetition, yet evading review' doctrine." Pham v. Thompson, 156 Or App 440, 445, 965 P2d 482 (1998).
Appeal dismissed.