Case Name: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Stephen BIVONA, Jr., Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1984-12-05
Citations: 460 So. 2d 469
Docket Number: No. 84-95
Parties: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Stephen BIVONA, Jr., Appellee.
Judges: ROBERT C. SCOTT, Associate Judge, concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 460
Pages: 469–472

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Stephen BIVONA, Jr., Appellee.
No. 84-95.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Dec. 5, 1984.
Rehearing and/or Certification of Conflict Denied Jan. 9, 1985.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Joan Fowler Rossin, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Robert D. Jones, Royal Palm Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
BARKETT, Judge.
This is an appeal by the State of an order discharging criminal defendant Stephen Bivona, Jr., under the speedy trial rule. We affirm.
On June 29, 1983, Stephen Bivona, Jr., was arrested at a Sears store in Bakersfield, California, for petty theft (shoplifting) and assault and battery (altercation with a Sears security officer). He refused to give the Sears security officer his name, and the Bakersfield police were called. The police officer who responded indicated that Bivona would have to identify himself to be released. Bivona refused, and was taken to jail. Upon arrival, he volunteered his name, and indicated that the reason he had not identified himself at the Sears store was because he was wanted in Florida for a bank robbery and for violation of probation. He then advised the police officer of the details of the bank robbery which had occurred in West Palm Beach, Florida.
Most of the information relative to the Florida crime was communicated by Bivona even after the police indicated that there were no outstanding warrants for his arrest. The probable cause affidavit for the West Palm Beach bank robbery was executed the day after Bivona's arrest in California as a direct result of his confession. The Bakersfield police report reflected that after further investigation by the Bakersfield police regarding the Florida bank robbery, the West Palm Beach Police Department orally requested a "hold" on the defendant which was confirmed later by a teletype. Bivona was held in the California jail until he was collected by the West Palm Beach Police Department on August 4, 1983. He did not fight extradition, and there is no explanation in the record as to why the Florida authorities waited for approximately thirty-four days to pick him up in California.
On August 9, 1983, Bivona was arraigned, and on January 3, 1984, he filed his motion for discharge under the speedy trial rule. The motion was granted.
The State contends error in two ways. First, that the speedy trial period does not run from Bivona's California.apprehension on June 29, 1983, but from his coming into the custody of the West Palm Beach police on August 4, 1983. Second, that even if the speedy trial period is triggered by the California arrest, Bivona waived the time limit by delaying the trial date.
Bivona contends that he was held by the California authorities from June 29, 1983, solely as a result of the Florida criminal charges, and that this holding on a Florida detainer constituted a "taking into custody" within the context of Rules 3.191(a)(1) and (a)(4), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provide, in relevant part:
Rule 3.191. Speedy Trial
(a)(1). Speedy Trial Without Demand. Except as otherwise provided by this Rule, and subject to the limitations imposed under (b)(1) and (b)(2), every person charged with a crime by indictment or information shall without demand be brought to trial . within 180 days if the crime charged be a felony, and if not brought to trial within such time shall upon motion timely filed with the court having jurisdiction and served upon the prosecuting attorney be forever discharged from the crime; provided, the court before granting such motion, shall make the required inquiry under (d)(3). The time periods established by this section shall commence when such person is taken into custody as defined under (a)(4)....
(a)(4). Custody. For purposes of this Rule, a person is taken into custody, (i) when the person is arrested as a result of the conduct or criminal episode which gave rise to the crime charged, or (ii) when the person is served with a notice to appear in lieu of physical arrest.
The State argues that Rule 3.191(b)(1) should apply instead:
(b)(1). Prisoners Outside Jurisdiction. A person who is in federal custody or incarcerated in a jail or correctional institution outside the jurisdiction of this State or a subdivision thereof, or who is charged with a crime by indictment or information issued or filed under the laws of this State, is not entitled to the benefit of this Rule until that person returns or is returned to the jurisdiction of the court within which the Florida charge is pending and until written notice of this fact is filed with the court and served upon the prosecutor.
To support its position, the State calls our attention to the case of Hawkins v. State, 451 So.2d 903 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), which has interpreted Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(b)(1), supra, to apply to fugitives who are being held in another jurisdiction solely on the basis of the charges pending in this State. We cannot agree with the majority opinion in Hawkins, and agree rather with the dissent of Chief Judge Ervin in that case as the better-reasoned view.
We suggest that the facts of this case establish the danger of interpreting Rule 3.191(b)(1) as the majority does in Hawkins, rather than as Chief Judge Ervin interprets that rule in his dissent and as we interpret that rule now. Unlike the situation in Hawkins, where apparently the defendant deliberately made himself unavailable for trial during a portion of the 180-day period of time, Bivona cooperated fully with the arresting authorities. He awaited extradition, and did nothing to thwart the State's efforts to bring him to Florida to face the charges against him. Yet he was incarcerated in California for 34 days waiting for the Florida authorities to extradite. Under the Hawkins majority view, the Florida authorities could perhaps have left him there for 60, 90, or even 360 days without a trial. This hardly seems to comport with the intention of the speedy trial rule. When Rule 3.191 is read as a whole, it appears clear that subsection (b)(1), supra, must be interpreted to apply when a defendant is incarcerated in jails outside the jurisdiction of this state on charges pending in the other state. Otherwise, the provisions of subsection (a)(4) of Rule 3.191 become totally meaningless.
The only question remaining is whether the trial court correctly determined that Bivona was "taken into custody . as a result of the . criminal episode which gave rise to the crime charged . " under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(a)(4). The sole and unrebutted evidence before the trial court indicated that but for the incarceration request from West Palm Beach, he would have been free. Indeed, the State apparently conceded the point when asked by the trial court if there was any conflicting evidence regarding the reason for Bivona's detention:
THE COURT: [The California report] clearly says that when the gentleman gave his correct name that he was going to be released on the charges out there. Do you have any evidence to rebut that? THE PROSECUTOR: Not at the present time, judge.
At this point Bivona fell within the ambit of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(a)(1) and (a)(4). The State had the burden of showing that he was being held in California on the California charges. It made no effort to produce any evidence to support that contention.
We find no merit in the second point proposed by the State. Accordingly, the order of the trial court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
ROBERT C. SCOTT, Associate Judge, concurs.
GLICKSTEIN, J., dissents with opinion.