Case Name: PEOPLE v. SMITH
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1973-09-26
Citations: 49 Mich. App. 630
Docket Number: Docket No. 13636
Parties: PEOPLE v SMITH
Judges: Before: V. J. Brennan, P. J., and Levin and O’Hara, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 49
Pages: 630–641

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v SMITH
Opinion of the Court
1. Criminal Law — Preliminary Examination — Probable Cause.
The standard of proof for binding an accused over for trial is not as high as for conviction and requires only a showing of probable cause, which is a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.
2. Criminal Law — Preliminary Examination — Magistrates— Abuse of Discretion — Appeal and Error.
The Court of Appeals reviews the rulings of an examining magistrate only for abuse of discretion; where the facts are such that it strains the imagination to believe that the person accused of carrying a weapon in a motor vehicle did not know of the weapon’s presence in the vehicle, such strained imagination leaves little doubt that the magistrate did not abuse his discretion in binding the accused over for trial.
3. Criminal Law — Statutes—Weapons—Dangerous Weapons.
An M-l rifle is a dangerous weapon within the meaning of the concealed weapons statute (MCLA 750.227).
Dissent by Levin, J.
4. Criminal Law — Preliminary Examination — Burden of Proof.
The people, at a preliminary examination, must establish (1) that the offense charged was committed, and (2) that there is probable cause to believe the accused committed it; all of the essential elements of the offense must be established.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1, 4, 9] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 443, 449, 450.
[2] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 446.
[3] 56 Am Jur, Weapons and Firearms § 10.
[5-8] 29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence §§ 288, 623.
56 Am Jur, Weapons and Firearms §§ 10, 12.
5. Criminal Law — Carrying a Dangerous Weapon — Elements— Knowledge — Presumptions.
Knowledge is an essential element of the offense of carrying a dangerous weapon in a vehicle; knowledge must be shown by the people in a prosecution for carrying a dangerous weapon in a vehicle since there is no statutory presumption of knowledge arising from the presence of the weapon (MCLA 750.227).
6. Criminal Law — Codefendants—Association—Guilt—Evidence —Participation.
Guilt is personal even where more than one defendant is charged with a statutory crime; there must be evidence of participation in the act of carrying in order to convict a defendant of carrying a dangerous weapon in a vehicle and the inference of guilty participation may not be drawn from mere association among persons, even with knowledge of the presence of a weapon.
7. Criminal Law — Evidence—Inferences—Knowledge—Participation.
Evidence that a passenger in a vehicle was carrying ammunition permits the inference that he had knowledge of the presence of a weapon and participated in carrying it.
8. Criminal Law — Carrying a Dangerous Weapon — Evidence— Knowledge — Participation.
Guilty participation in carrying a dangerous weapon can be shown by the accused person’s close proximity to the weapon where the inference of the accused’s knowledge is strong, by admissions of the accused or testimony of a witness that the accused participated, or by the demonstration of facts sufficient to warrant the trier of fact in reasonably concluding that the accused and other persons were engaged in a common unlawful enterprise and that the weapon was being carried for the purpose of furthering the unlawful enterprise.
9. Criminal Law — Carrying a Dangerous Weapon — Preliminary Examination — Evidence—Sufficiency.
Evidence that an accused was found in the third seat in a van stopped by police at 11:20 p.m., that there was ammunition in the front seat between the driver and a passenger, and that an M-l riñe was found under the second seat occupied by another passenger is insufficient to bind the accused over for trial for carrying a dangerous weapon in a vehicle where there were no statements or movements by the accused or other passengers incriminating the accused and no evidence which would support a ñnding that the accused and the other passengers were engaged in a common unlawful enterprise involving the carrying of a dangerous weapon; that evidence, without more, does not establish the accused’s participation in carrying the weapon, an element of the offense charged, even if the accused’s knowledge of the presence of the weapon in the van is assumed.
Appeal from Recorder’s Court of Detroit, Joseph E. Maher, J.
Submitted Division 1 October 10, 1972, at Detroit.
(Docket No. 13636.)
Decided September 26, 1973.
Leave to appeal applied for.
Robert E. Smith was charged with carrying a dangerous weapon in a motor vehicle and was bound over for trial after a preliminary examination. Defendant appeals by leave granted.
Affirmed and remanded for trial.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William L. Cahalan, Prosecuting Attorney, Dominick R. Carnovale, Chief, Appellate Department, and Thomas M. Khalil, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Laurence C Burgess, for defendant.
Before: V. J. Brennan, P. J., and Levin and O’Hara, JJ.
Former Supreme Court Justice, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment pursuant to Const 1963, art 6, § 23 as amended in 1968.

Opinion:
V. J. Brennan, P. J.
Judge Levin in his dissent, we believe, has set up a standard which encompasses all gun-in-car cases and because of that reasoning it seems every situation where guns are found under the seat or on the floor and nobody claims them (and why should they) will require dismissal. And this standard we cannot agree to.
The defendant, Robert Early Smith, and three other persons were charged with committing the offense of carrying a concealed weapon in a motor vehicle. MCLA 750. 227; MSA 28.424. After the preliminary examination, the defendants including Smith were bound over for trial. Motions to quash the information were denied. Smith was granted leave to take an interlocutory appeal.
Detroit police officer Ward, the principal witness at the examination, testified that he and his partner observed a Ford Econoline van, in which Smith was a passenger, make several erratic U-turns in front of traffic. The four defendants were placed under arrest after officer Ward saw through the right window what he believed to be the stock of a rifle, opened the door, and grabbed an M-l rifle from underneath the second seat. The defendants had not moved when the officers approached.
The van had three seats. Codefendant Gaut was driving. Codefendant Turner was seated next to him in the right front passenger seat. Codefendant Williams was occupying the second seat alone. The gun was on the floor in front of the second seat between the seat and Williams' legs. Defendant Smith was stretched out on the third seat with his feet up on the seat.
A cartridge belt and clips containing ammunition were found in the front seat between co-defendants Gaut and Turner.
The first question is whether, under the concealed weapons statute, supra, this defendant's presence in this vehicle under these circumstances constitutes sufficient evidence to bind him over for trial. The relevant statute provides:
"Sec. 5. If it shall appear that an offense not cognizable by a justice of the peace has been committed, and that there is probable cause to believe the prisoner guilty thereof, and if the offense be bailable by the magistrate, and the prisoner offer sufficient bail, it shall be taken and the prisoner discharged; but if no sufficient bail be offered, or the offense be not bailable by the magistrate, the prisoner shall be committed to jail for trial." (Emphasis supplied.) MCLA 766.5; MSA 28.923.
At this stage, the people must first establish each element, not prove each beyond a reasonable doubt. In order for the examining magistrate to reach that conclusion, he must necessarily have proof before him of all of the elements of the offense. That is plain on the face of the statute. A holding to that effect should be based on the statute, not on the cases cited in Judge Levin's dissent. People v Randall, 42 Mich App 187; 201 NW2d 292 (1972), does make such a holding, but the cases it is based on (People v Kelsch, 16 Mich App 244; 167 NW2d 777 [1969], and People v Barron, 381 Mich 421; 163 NW2d 219 [1968]) both deal with a defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to convict, not to bind over. People v Bellanca, 386 Mich 708; 194 NW2d 863 (1972), just reiterates the statutory standard.
Assuming for the moment that the rifle falls within the meaning of the statute, it is clear that someone was carrying it in violation of the statute. There is abundant authority that we review the examining magistrate only for abuse of discretion, People v Paille #2, 383 Mich 621; 178 NW2d 465 (1970). We find no such abuse here. The standard of proof for binding over isn't as high as conviction, People v O'Leary, 6 Mich App 115; 148 NW2d 516 (1967). In Paille #2, supra, at 626; 178 NW2d at 467, the Court defined probable cause as follows:
"In People v Dellabonda, 265 Mich 486 [251 NW 594, 595] (1933), the Court at p 490, stated:
" 'To authorize the examining magistrate to bind appellant over for trial there must have been good reason to believe appellant guilty of the crime charged. Some cases hold a prima facie case against the accused must be made out. This Court has not deñned what constitutes probable cause, leaving each case to be determined upon its facts. Bouvier defines probable cause as, "A reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that a person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. " 3 Bouvier's Law Dictionary (Rawle's 3d Rev), p 2728.' " (Emphasis added.)
Thus, on this point we disagree with Judge Levin on the facts. An M-l is not an inconspicuous article; it's 43 inches long, and, since it's an infantry weapon, quite heavy, so that it could also be used as a club. It was found partially under the second seat, and defendant was lying on the third seat. While, if he were especially non-observant, he could have missed it, it strains the imagination. That strained imagination should leave little doubt that the magistrate did not abuse his discretion. We should, however, be careful to say that this isn't enough to convict — a strained imagination still leaves room for reasonable doubt.
Is a 43-inch M-l a "dangerous weapon" within the meaning of MCLA 750.227, MSA 28.424, which provides as follows:
"Sec. 227. Carrying concealed weapons — Any person who shall carry a dagger, dirk, stiletto or other dangerous weapon except hunting knives adapted and carried as such, concealed on or about his person, or whether concealed or otherwise in any vehicle operated or occupied by him, except in his dwelling house or place of business or on other land possessed by him; and any person who shall carry a pistol concealed on or about his person, or, whether concealed or otherwise, in any vehicle operated or occupied by him, except in his dwelling house or place of business or on other land possessed by him, without a license to so carry said pistol as provided by law, shall be guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than 5 years, or by fine of not more than 2,500 dollars." (Emphasis added.)
We can, if we choose, dive into the statute and examine it piece by piece making cross references to not only statutes but to statute-interpreting cases. However, we choose not to do so because we have no doubt that the Legislature, when they said "dangerous weapon", in fact meant dangerous weapon; and we have no difficulty at all placing M-1 rifles in the dangerous weapon category.
We affirm and remand to the trial court for trial.
O'Hara, J., concurred.