Case Name: STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. DANIEL EDWARD KATELY, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT; STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. GEORGE KATELY, SR., DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
Court: New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1994-02-10
Citations: 270 N.J. Super. 356
Docket Number: 
Parties: STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. DANIEL EDWARD KATELY, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. GEORGE KATELY, SR., DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Superior Court Reports
Volume: 270
Pages: 356–373

Head Matter:
637 A.2d 214
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. DANIEL EDWARD KATELY, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. GEORGE KATELY, SR., DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division
Argued December 14, 1993
Decided February 10, 1994.
Wefing, J.S.C., temporarily assigned, filed a concurring opinion.
Before Judges MICHELS, KESTIN and WEFING.
George T. Daggett argued the cause for respondents (Daggett & Kraemer, attorneys; Mr. Daggett, of counsel and on the letter briefs).
Thomas E. Bracken, Assistant Sussex County Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Dennis O’Leary, Sussex County Prosecutor, attorney; Mr. Bracken, of counsel and on the letter briefs).

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
MICHELS, P.J.A.D.
Following a joint jury trial, defendant Daniel Edward Kately was convicted of (1) death by auto, a crime of the third degree, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-5; (2) two counts of witness tampering, a crime of the third degree, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5a, and (3) driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50. Defendant George Kately, Sr. was convicted of one count of witness tampering, a crime of the third degree, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5a.
The trial court sentenced Daniel Kately to thirty days in the Keogh Dwyer Correctional Facility (Correctional Facility), fined him' $300, assessed a $30 Violent Crimes Compensation Board (VCCB) penalty and revoked his driving privileges for twelve months for his conviction for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. In addition, for the conviction for death by auto, the trial court sentenced Daniel Kately to three years probation conditioned upon his serving 270 days in the Correctional Facility without parole, which sentence was to be served consecutively to the thirty day sentence imposed for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, assessed a $500 VCCB penalty and revoked his New Jersey driving privileges for twenty four months, which revocation was to run consecutively to his release from the Correctional Facility and consecutively to the twelve month revocation imposed for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Finally, the trial court merged Daniel Kately's witness tampering convictions and sentenced him to two years probation, which was to run consecutively to the probationary term imposed for his conviction for death by auto, ordered him to perform fifty days of community service, fined him $2500 and assessed a $50 VCCB penalty. The trial court sentenced George Kately to three years probation on the condition that he perform ninety days of community service, fined him $5000 and assessed a $50 VCCB penalty for his conviction for witness tampering. Both Daniel Kately and George Kately appealed and their motions to consolidate the appeals were granted.
Defendant Daniel Kately seeks a reversal of his convictions on the following grounds set forth in his letter brief:
I. THE ADMISSION OF TESTIMONY ABOUT DRINKING PARTIES IN A FIELD ACROSS THE STREET FROM THE KATELY HOME WAS ERROR.
II. THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN ADMITTING INTO EVIDENCE THE BLOOD TEST RESULTS.
Defendant George Kately seeks a reversal of his conviction on the following grounds set forth in his letter brief:
I. THE ADMISSION OF TESTIMONY ABOUT DRINKING PARTIES IN A FIELD ACROSS THE STREET FROM THE KATELY HOME WAS ERROR.
II. THE EVIDENCE SUBMITTED IN THIS CASE AS TO HABIT WAS PREJUDICIAL TO THE DEFENDANT, GEORGE KATELY, OVER AND ABOVE A RULE 4 ANALYSIS.
We have carefully considered these contentions and all of the supporting arguments advanced by each defendant and find that they are clearly without merit. R. 2:11—3(e)(2).
Although we are satisfied that there is no basis upon which to overturn these convictions, we deem it appropriate to comment further on defendant Daniel Kately's claim that the trial court erred in admitting testimony describing his history of drinking in the field across the street from his home. Daniel Kately essentially argues that the challenged evidence did not qualify as "habit evidence" and, even if it did, it should have been excluded under Evid.R. 4 (now N.J.R.E. 403) because its probative value was minimal in light of the ample evidence of his intoxication on the evening of the fatal accident. We disagree for the following reasons.
At an Evid.R. 8 (now N.J.R.E. 104(a)) hearing to determine the admissibility of testimony concerning Daniel Kately's drinking habits, the State's proofs demonstrated that Daniel Kately, Andrew Sickel, Marcy Simmons Burke and Donna Demerest often met in the evening to drink. Sickel testified that he went to Daniel's home every night after work and that after dinner they would go to the field on the Kately farm, which was located near Daniel's home. According to Sickel, they had been drinking beer there on a regular basis every night for about one year prior to the accident. Sickel further testified that he and Daniel each would consume anywhere from one to two six-packs of beer at these gatherings. These parties took place even in cold weather. Sickel estimated that Daniel got drunk there three or four times per week. Demerest testified that starting in September 1986 she also frequented the field almost every night to drink. She testi-. fied that she saw both Sickel and Daniel get drunk, but could not recall how often. Burke testified that the group would get together either at Daniel's house or in the field. She began frequenting the parties every night in the Spring of 1987. Burke also testified that they usually drank beer and that she saw Daniel drunk approximately five nights per week.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court held that the testimony regarding Daniel Kately's habit of intemperance prior to the accident was admissible. The trial court reasoned that the habit testimony was "probative of the issue of intoxication insofar as it relate[d] to the issue of reckless behavior as being an element of the offense of death by auto." The trial court further found that the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighed any prejudice. The court explained that this evidence was admissible as a response to defendant's attempt to rebut an inference of recklessness by his asserting that the accident may have been caused by swerving to avoid a deer in the road.
A. Testimony Regarding Daniel Kately's Nightly Drinking Constituted Habit Evidence.
A prosecutor may not introduce evidence of a character trait of the defendant unless the defendant first offers evidence of good character. Evid.R. 47 (now N.J.R.E. 404(a)(1) and N.J.R.E. 405(a)). Evid.R. 49 (now N.J.R.E. 406(a)) provided, however, that "[e]vidence of habit or custom whether corroborated or not is admissible to prove conduct on a specified occasion in conformity with the habit or custom." The comment to Evid.R. 49 (now N.J.R.E. 406(a)) explained the difference between habit evidence and evidence of general character traits and the reasons for their admissibility:
The relevance of habitual behavior to an understanding of a man's conduct on a specified occasion is substantially greater than the relevance of his general character traits for care or skill. Thus, evidence of habitual careful behavior is admissible to prove that a person acted carefully on a particular instance, while evidence of a general character trait for carefulness is not. See Falknor, "Extrinsic Policies Affecting Admissibility," 10 Rutgers L.Rev. 574, 589-580 (1956). McCormick, Evidence (1972), sec. 195, at 462-463. [Biunno, Current N.J. Rules of Evidence, comment 1 on Evid.R. 49 (1992) 1.
Professor McCormick further explained this difference:
Although the courts frown on evidence of a person's traits of character when introduced to prove how he acted on a given occasion, they are more receptive to evidence of his habits or of the customary behavior of organizations. To understand this difference, one must appreciate the distinction between habit and character. The two. are easily confused. People sometimes speak of a habit for care, a habit for promptness, or a habit of forgetfulness. They may say that an individual has a bad habit of stealing or lying. Evidence of these "habits" would be identical to the kind of evidence that is the target of the general rule against character evidence. Character is a generalized description of a person's disposition, or of the disposition in respect to a general trait, such as honesty, temperance or peacefulness. Habit, in the present context, is more specific. It denotes one's regular response to a repeated situation. If we speak of a character for care, we think of the person's tendency to act prudently in all the varying situations of life— in business, at home, in handling automobiles and in walking across the street. A habit, on the other hand, is the person's regular practice of responding to a particular kind of situation with a specific type of conduct. Thus, a person may be in the habit of bounding doum a ceitain stairway two or three steps at a time, of patronizing a particular pub after each day's work, or of driving his automobile mthout using a seatbelt The doing of the habitual act may become semiautomatic, as with a driver who invariably signals before changing lanes.
Evidence of habits that come within this definition has greater probative value than does evidence of general traits of character. Furthermore, the potential for prejudice is substantially less. By and large, the detailed patterns of situation-specific behavior that constitute habits are unlikely to provoke such sympathy or antipathy as would distort the process of evaluating the evidence. [McCormick on Evidence, § 195 at 825-26 (Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added) ].
See also State v. Radziwil, 235 N.J.Super. 557, 564-65, 563 A.2d 856 (App.Div.1989), aff'd o.b., 121 N.J. 527, 582 A.2d 1003 (1990); State v. Bogus, 223 N.J.Super. 409, 428-29, 538 A.2d 1278 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 111 N.J. 567, 546 A.2d 497 (1988); Burd v. Vercruyssen, 142 N.J.Super. 344, 351, 361 A.2d 571 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 72 N.J. 459, 371 A.2d 64 (1976); see also Simplex, Inc. v. Diversified Energy Sys. Inc., 847 F.2d 1290, 1293-94 (7th Cir.1988); Loughan v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 749 F.2d 1519, 1524 (11th Cir.1985); Reyes v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 589 F.2d 791, 794-95 (5th Cir.1979); Wilson v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 561 F.2d 494, 511 (4th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1020, 98 S.Ct. 744, 54 L.Ed.2d 768 (1978).
Thus, the determination of whether the trial court properly admitted testimony of Daniel Kately's nightly drinking as habit evidence depends largely on whether that conduct constituted a character trait or habit.
Under the above analysis, testimony of Daniel Kately's nightly drinking was properly admitted as habit evidence because it was relevant and it described with specificity his routine practice of drinking in a particular situation. First, the evidence was relevant to prove that Daniel Kately was driving recklessly on the night in question. Daniel Kately was charged with death by auto in violation of N.J.S.A 2C:11-5, which provides:
Criminal homicide constitutes death by auto or vessel when it is caused by driving a vehicle or vessel recklessly.
"Recklessly" is defined by the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice as follows:
A person acts recklessly with respect to a materia] element of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation. "Recklessness," "with recklessness" or equivalent terms have the same meaning. [N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2b(3)].
With respect to drunk driving, "[o]ur courts have concluded that a jury may infer that an individual who drives while intoxicated is consciously disregarding the risk of an accident." State v. Radziwil, supra, 235 N.J.Super. at 563, 563 A.2d 856 (citing State v. LaBrutto, 114 N.J. 187, 204, 553 A.2d 335 (1989) and State v. Bogus, supra, 223 N.J.Super. at 419, 538 A.2d 1278). Thus, whether or not Daniel Kately was driving while intoxicated at the time the passenger in his vehicle, Kevin Figurelli, was killed is plainly relevant to the issue of recklessness.
Second, the evidence of Daniel Kately's attendance at the nightly drinking parties demonstrated that he drank to the point of intoxication on a regular basis. Sickel testified that Daniel became intoxicated approximately three or four times per week and Burke testified that Daniel was drunk about five times per week. Demerest also testified that Daniel was drunk during at least some of the parties.
The State's proofs further show a.sufficient pattern of alcohol consumption and intoxication by Daniel Kately and his friends to conclude that they had a habit of drinking beer nightly. Sickel, Burke and Demerest all testified that Daniel attended beer parties with them every night. Since the fatal motor vehicle accident occurred at night, after this same group of friends gathered together for at least a few hours, the trial court properly admitted evidence of Daniel Kately's regularly becoming intoxicated on the night that he left his home and ran his truck off the road, causing Figurelli's death. Therefore, because the testimony (a) was relevant to the issue of recklessness and (b) described with specificity Daniel Kately's practice of becoming intoxicated each night, the testimony was properly admitted as habit evidence within the meaning of Evid.R. 49 (now N.J.R.E. 406(1)). See State v. Radziwil, supra, 235 N.J.Super. at 565-66, 563 A.2d 856 (bartender's testimony that defendant became intoxicated nearly every week at social club was admissible habit evidence to prove defendant was intoxicated on weekend that fatal car accident occurred); see also Loughan v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., supra, 749 F.2d at 1523-24 (evidence that plaintiff tire mechanic routinely brought cooler of beer to work and drank on the job was admissible habit evidence to prove he was intoxicated and contributorily negligent in products liability action); State v. Wadsworth, 210 So.2d 4, 6-7 (Fla.1968) (liquor store clerk's testimony that defendant purchased miniature bottles of vodka two or three times per week for more than two years before fatal car collision was admissible habit evidence to prove intoxication). But cf. Reyes v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., supra, 589 F.2d at 794-95 (defendant's four prior misdemeanor convictions for public intoxication in three-and-one-half year period were of insufficient regularity to constitute habit evidence).
B. The Probative Value of the Habit Evidence Substantially Outweighed Its Possible Prejudicial Effect.
Nor should the habit evidence have been excluded under Evid.R. 4 (now N.J.R.E. 403) as unduly prejudicial. Evid.R. 4 (now N.J.R.E. 403) provided for the exclusion of relevant evidence if the trial court found that its probative value was substantially outweighed by the risk of undue consumption of time, substantial danger of undue prejudice, confusing the issues or misleading the jury. The comment to the former rules of evidence explains that
evidence claimed to be unduly prejudicial can only be excluded where its probative value "is so significantly outweighed by [its] inherently inflammatory potential as to have a probable capacity to divert the minds of the jurors from a reasonable and fair evaluation" of the basic issues of the case. State v. Thompson, 59 N.J. 396 [283 A.2d 513] (1971). It is error, for example, for a judge to exclude evidence under Rule 4 because it would "maybe" create substantial prejudice. State v. Bowens, 219 N.J.Super. 290-297 [530 A.2d 338] (App.Div.1987). [Biunno, supra, comment 1 on Evid.R. 4].
Daniel Kately contends that the trial court should have excluded the evidence of the nightly beer parties because "there was ample proof of [his] condition one way or the other without relying on habit." Daniel Kately asserts that the habit evidence testimony was unduly cumulative because sufficient evidence of his intoxication had already been admitted, including a blood test and the testimony of officers at the scene of the accident. Daniel Kately argues that, in his words, "when there is the opportunity for other evidence of intoxication, a Rule 4 [now N.J.R.E. 403] analysis may defeat the habit testimony" and that "habit testimony should be admissible only in situations where there is no other evidence." We disagree.
"If in a particular case the probative value of the evidence of habit or custom is substantially outweighed by the counterfactors of undue consumption of time, undue prejudice or confusion of issues, the offered evidence of habit may be excluded in the court's discretion under Rule 4 [now N.J.R.E. 403]." Biunno, supra, comment 1 on Evid.R. 49 (now N.J.R.E. 406(a)). With respect to assessing the probative value and prejudicial nature of habit evidence, Professor McCormick explained:
Evidence of habits that come within this definition has greater probative value than does evidence of general traits of character. Furthermore, the potential for prejudice is substantially less. By and large, the detailed patterns of situation-specific behavior that constitute habits are unlikely to provoke such sympathy or antipathy as would distort the process of evaluating the evidence. [McCormick on Evidence, supra, § 195 at 826 (footnotes omitted)].
Specifically addressing evidence of the habit of intemperance, Professor McCormick noted:
Intemperance seems one of the more potentially prejudicial habits. Partly, the problem stems from the fact that the term may denote a general disposition for excessive drinking (a trait) or a practice of drinking a certain number of glasses of whiskey every night at home (a habit). Thus, the probative force of what is loosely called the habit of intemperance to prove drunkenness on a particular occasion depends on the regularity and details of the characteristic behavior. This may help explain in part the conflicting results when evidence of "habitual intemperance" is brought forward. [McCormick on Evidence, supra, § 195 at 827 n. 8].
Thus, the assessment of the probative value of habit evidence under Evid.R. 4 (now N.J.R.E. 403) must focus on the "regularity and details of the characteristic behavior." See ibid. In this regard, although other evidence of Daniel Kately's intoxication on the night of the accident was admitted, the evidence of the nightly drinking was nonetheless highly probative because of the frequency and regularity with which he drank and the consistency of the details of these recurring parties. The same people always attended. They always drank beer. They always supplied relatively the same amount of beer, and Daniel Kately was known to become intoxicated at these parties. All of this occurred on a regular, nightly basis over a period of approximately one year. Additionally, the fact that they usually went to the field to meet, but on the night of the incident they drank elsewhere, does not detract from the probative value of their "habit" because at least one witness testified that occasionally they went to someone's home to hold their parties.
Furthermore, the probative value of the habit evidence was not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. We recognize that evidence of intemperance can be particularly prejudicial because a jury may have a tendency to convict based on a perceived general disposition for excessive drinking. See McCormick on Evidence, supra, § 195 at 827 n. 8. Nonetheless, in State v. Radziwil, supra, 235 N.J.Super. at 566-67, 563 A.2d 856, we concluded that "while the evidence of defendant's habitual intoxication . undoubtedly cast him in a bad light in the eyes of the jury, this prejudice to defendant did not outweigh the probative value of the evidence." See also State v. Stevens, 115 N.J. 289, 308, 558 A.2d 833 (1989) (quoting State v. West, 29 N.J. 327, 335, 149 A.2d 217 (1959)) ("That evidence is shrouded with unsavory implications is no reason for exclusion when it is a significant part of the proof."). The same is true in this case.
Finally, we point out that the trial court carefully and fully instructed the jury as to how the challenged testimony could be used with regard to Daniel Kately's conduct on the night of the fatal accident. In sum, the trial court did not err by admitting the challenged testimony as habit evidence.
Beyond this, even making the dubious assumption that the trial court erred by admitting the habit evidence, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. It was not "clearly capable of producing an unjust result." R. 2:10-2, State v. Lair, 62 N.J. 388, 392, 301 A.2d 748 (1973); State v. Hock, 54 N.J. 526, 538, 257 A.2d 699 (1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 930, 90 S.Ct. 2254, 26 L.Ed.2d 797 (1970); State v. Bogus, supra, 223 N.J.Super. at 429, 538 A.2d 1278. Since the proof of Daniel Kately's guilt was overwhelming, there was no real possibility that the claimed error "led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached." State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 336, 273 A.2d 1 (1971).
Affirmed.
By order dated September 15, 1992, the Supreme Court of New Jersey adopted the New Jersey Rules of Evidence, N.J.R.E. 101 to 1103. Pursuant to the Rule adoption provisions of N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-36, these new rules became effective July 1, 1993. Since these cases were tried in 1992, the new'rules are not applicable.