Case Name: Thomas Jackson, William Higdon, and Archibald Olds, owners of the Steamboat Wetumpka, Libellants and Appellants, v. The Steamboat Magnolia, her tackle, &c., William F. James, master, &c.
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1857-12
Citations: 20 How. 296
Docket Number: 
Parties: Thomas Jackson, William Higdon, and Archibald Olds, owners of the Steamboat Wetumpka, Libellants and Appellants, v. The Steamboat Magnolia, her tackle, &c., William F. James, master, &c.
Judges: Mr. Justice McLEAN delivered a separate opinion, and Mr. Justice CATRON, Mr. Justice DANIEL, and Mr. Justice CAMPBELL, dissented. Mr. Justice CATRON concurred with Mr. Justice CAMPBELL in the opinion delivered by him.
Reporter: United States Reports
Volume: 61
Pages: 296–343

Head Matter:
Thomas Jackson, William Higdon, and Archibald Olds, owners of the Steamboat Wetumpka, Libellants and Appellants, v. The Steamboat Magnolia, her tackle, &c., William F. James, master, &c.
The admiralty jurisdiction of the courts of the United States extends to cases of collision upon navigable waters, although the place of such collision may be within the body of a county of a State, and may be above the flux and reflux of the tide.
The District Courts exercise this jurisdiction over fresh-water rivers “navigable from the sea,” by virtue of the judiciary act of 1789, and not as conferred by-the act of 1845, which extends their jurisdiction to the great lakes and waters “not navigable from the sea.”
This was an appeal from the District Court of the United States for the middle district of Alabama.
The case came up on an appeal from the judgment of the District Court, dismissing the libel for want of jurisdiction, after the following agreement had been filed:
Be it remembered, that off the trial of this cause, which was a libel in admiralty, it was agreed that the question of jurisdiction should be submitted to the court on the facts heréinafter stated, which were admitted to be true; ■ and if the court should be of the opinion that the court had jurisdiction of the cause, then the cause should be submitted to a jury for trial. But if the court should be of opinion that it was without jurisdiction, the libel would be dismissed, and in the event an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of the United States, and the judgment of that court should reverse the judgment of this court, then the cause should be remanded to this court for trial.
The court agreed so to try the question of jurisdiction on the facts, which are admitted to be as follows: The steamboat Wetumpka was a vessel engaged in navigation and commerce between tbe port of New Orleans, in Louisiana, and tbe port of Montgomery, in Alabama, and was regularly licensed and enrolled as a coasting vessel, and was of more than thirty tons burden. The steamboat Magnolia was a boat regularly licensed and enrolled for the coasting trade, but was built for a packet boat to be employed between Mobile, Alabama, and Montgomery, Alabama. She was built in the Western country, and brought round to this State, and has ever since been engaged in running between Mobile and Montgomery, and has never been engaged in any other trade.
The collision, which is the subject of the libel against the Magnolia, took place between her and the Wetumpka. on the Alabama river, about two- hundred miles above tide-water. The Magnolia is a boat of over thirty tons burden. The foregoing are the facts in which the question of jurisdiction is submitted to the court, together with the libel and claim, and answer thereto. Watts & Dargan,
For the Magnolia and Claimants.
Henry C. Semple,
For the Libellants.
The case was argued at the preceding term of this court upon printed arguments by Mr. Francis Lee Smith for the appellants, and Mr. Largan for the appellees; also orally by Mr. Phillips for the appellees.
The difficulty of abbreviating arguments made by counsel upon constitutional points, and the circumstance that both sides of the question of jurisdiction are fully presented in the opinion of the court and in the dissenting opinions of Mr. Justice DANIEL and Mr. Justice CAMPBELL, are reasons why the Reporter omits sketches of the arguments of counsel. It will be perceived, also, that Mr. Justice McLEAN delivered a separate opinion, although concurring in the judgment of the court.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice GRIER
delivered the opinion of the court.
The only question presented for our consideration on this appeal is, whether the court below had jurisdiction.
The libel purports to be in a cause of collision, civil and maritime. It alleges that the steamboat Wetumpka, a vessel of three hundred tons burden, was on a voyage from New Orleans to the city of Montgomery, in Alabama; that while ascending the Alabama river., she was run into and sunk by the steamboat Magnolia, which was descending the same.
The answer of the respondents, among other things, alleges "that the collision took place far above tide-water, on the Alabama river, in the county of "Wilcox, in the State of Alabama, and therefore not within the jurisdiction of the District Court sitting in admiralty."
This plea was sustained by the court, and the libel dismissed. The record does not disclose the reasons on which this judgment was based. It is presumed, therefore, to be founded on the facts stated in the plea, viz:
1. That the collision was within the body of a county.
2. That it was above tide-water.
1. The Alabama river flows through the State of Alabama. It is a great public river, navigable from the sea for many miles above the ebb and flow of the tide. Vessels licensed for the coasting trade, and those engaged in foreign commerce, pass on its waters to ports of entry within the State. It is not, like the Mississippi, a boundary between coterminous States. Neither is it, like the Penobscot, (see Veazie v. Moore, 14. How., 568,) made subservient to the internal trade of the State by artificial means and dams constructed at its mouth, rendering it inaccessible to sea-going vessels. It differs from the Hudson, which rises in and passes through the State of New York, in the fact that it is navigable for ships and vessels of the largest class far above where its waters are affected by the tide.
Before the adoption of the present Constitution, each State, in the exercise of its sovereign power, had its own court of admiralty, having jurisdiction over the hai'bors, creeks, inlets, and public navigable waters, connected with the sea. This jurisdiction was exercised not only over rivers, creeks, and inlets, which were boundaries to or passed through other States, but also where they were wholly within the State. Such a distinction- was unknown, nor (as it appears from the decision of this court in the case of Waring v. Clark, 5 How., 441) had these courts been driven from the exercise of jurisdiction over torts committed on navigable water within the body of a county, by the jealousy of the common-law courts.
When, therefore, the exercise, of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction over its public rivers, ports, and havens, was surrendered by each State to the Government of the United States, without an exception as to subjects or places, this court cannot interpolate one into the Constitution, or introduce an arbitrary distinction which has no foundation in reason or precedent.
The objection to jurisdiction stated in the plea, "that the collision was within the county of Wilcox, in the State of Alabama," can therefore have no greater force or effect from the fact alleged in the argument, that the Alabama river, so far as it is navigable, is wholly within the boundary of the State. It amounts only to a renewal of the old contest between courts of common law and courts of admiralty, as to their jurisdiction within , the body of a county. This question has been finally adjudicated in this court, and the argument exhausted, in the case of Waring n. Clark. After an experience of ten years, we have not been called on by the bar to review its principles as founded in error, nor have we heard of any complaints by the people of wrongs suffered on account of its supposed infringement of the right of trial by jury. • So far, therefore, as the solution of the question now before us is affected by the fact that the tort was committed within the body of a county, it must be considered as finally settled by the decision in that case.
2. The second ground of objection to the jurisdiction of the court is founded on the fact, that though the collision complained of occurred in a great navigable river,' it was on a part of that river not affected by the flux and reflux of the. tide, but "far above it!"
This objection, also, is one which has heretofore been considered and decided by this court, after full argument and much deliberation. In the case of the Genesee Chief, (12 How., 444,) we have decided, that though in England the flux and reflux of the tide was a sound and reasonable test of a navigable river, because on that island tide-water and navigable water were synonymous terms, yet that "there is certainly nothing in the ebb and flow of the tide that makes the waters peculiarly suitable for admiralty jurisdiction, nor anything in the absence of a tide that renders it unfit. If it is a public navigable water on which commerce is carried on between different States or nations, the reason for the jurisdiction is precisely the same. And if a distinction is made on that account, it is merely arbitrary, without any foundation in reason — and, indeed, contrary to it." ' The case of the Thomas Jefferson (10 Wheaton) and others, which had hastily adopted this arbitrary and (in this country) false test of navigable waters, were necessarily overruled.
Since the decision of these cases, the several district courts have taken jurisdiction of eases of collision on the great public navigable rivers. Some of these cases have been brought to this court by appeal, and in no instance has any objection been taken, either by the counsel or the court, to the jurisdiction, because the collision was within the body of a county, or above the tide. (See Fritz v. Bull, 12 How., 466 ; Walsh v. Rogers, 13 How., 283; The Steamboat New World, 16 How., 469; Ure v. Kauffman, 19 How., 56; New York and Virginia S. B. Co. v. Calderwood, 19 How., 245.)
In our opinion, therefore, neither of the facts alleged in the answer, nor both of them taken together, will constitute a sufficient exception t.o the jurisdiction of the District Court.
It is due however, to the learned counsel who has presented the argument for respondent in this case, to say, that he has not attempted to impugn the decision ot this court in the case of Waring v. Clark, nor to question the sufficiency of the reasons given in the case of the Genesee Chief for overruling the case of the Thomas Jefferson; but he contends that the case of the Genesee Chief decided that the act of Congress of 1845, " extending the jurisdiction of the District Court to certain cases 'upon the lakes," &c., was not only constitutional, but also that it conferred a new jurisdiction, which the court did not possess before; and consequently, as that act was confined to the lakes, and "to vessels of twenty or more tons burden, licensed and employed'in the business of commerce and navigation between ports and places in different States and Territories," it cannot authorize the District Courts in assuming jurisdiction over waters and subjects not included in the act, and more especially where the navigable portion of the river is wholly within the boundary of a single State. It is contended also that the case of Eritz v. Bull, and those which follow it, sustaining the jurisdiction of the court of admiralty over torts on the Mississippi river, cannot be reconciled with the points decided in the former case, as just stated, unless on the hypothesis that the act of 1845 be construed to include the Mississippi and other great rivers of the West; which it manifestly does not.
But it never has been asserted by this court, either in the case of Fritz v. Bull, or in any other case, that the admiralty jurisdiction exercised over the great navigable rivers of the West was claimed under the act of 1845, or by virtue of anything therein contained.
The Constitution, in defining the powers of the courts of the United States, extends them to "all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." It defines how much of the judicial power shall be exercised by the Supreme Court only; arid it was left to Congress to ordain and establish other courts, and to fix the boundary and extent of their respective jurisdictions. Congress might give any of these courts the whole or so .much of the admiralty jurisdiction as it saw fit. It might extend their jurisdiction over all navigable waters, and all ships and vessels thereon, or over some navigable waters, and vessels of a certain description only. Consequently, as Congress had never before 1845 conferred admiralty jurisdiction .over the.Northern fresh-water lakes not "navigable from the sea," the District. Courts could not assume it by virtue of this, clause in the Con stitution. An act of Congress was therefore necessary to confer this jurisdiction on those waters, and was completely within the constitutional powers of Congress; unless, by some unbending law of nature, fresh-water lakes and rivers are necessarily within the category of those that are not "navigable," and which, consequently, could not be subjected to "admiralty jurisdiction," any more than canals or railroads.
When these States were colonies, and for a long time after the adoption of the Constitution of the United States, the shores of the great lakes of the North, above and beyond the ocean tides, were as yet almost uninhabited, except by savages. The necessities of commerce and the progress of steam navigation had not as yet called for the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction, except on the ocean border of the Atlantic States.
The judiciary act of 1789, in defining the several powers of the courts established by it, gives to the District Courts of the United States " exclusive original cognizance of all civil cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, including all seizures, &e., when they are made on waters which are navigable from the sea by vessels of ten or more tons burden, &c., as well as upon the high seas."
So long as the commerce of the country was centred chiefly on the Eastern Atlantic ports, where the fresh-water rivers were seldom navigable above tide-water, no inconvenience arose from the adoption of the English insular test of "navigable waters." Hence it was followed by the courts without objection or inquiry.
But this act does not confine admiralty jurisdiction to tidewaters ; and if the flux and reflux of the tide be abandoned, as an arbitrary and false test of a "navigable river," it required no further legislation of Congress to extend it to the Mississippi, Alabama, and other great rivers, "navigable from the sea." If the waters over which this jurisdiction is claimed be within this category, the act makes no distinction between them.- It is not confined to rivers or waters which 'bound coterminous States, such as the Mississippi and Ohio, or to rivers passing through more than one State; nor does the act distinguish between them and rivers which rise in and pass through one State only, and are consequently " infra corpus comiiatus." The admiralty jurisdiction surrendered by the States to the Union had no such bounds as exercised by themselves, and is clogged with no such conditions in its surrender. The interpolation of such conditions by the courts would exclude many of the'ports, harbors, creeks, and inlets, most frequented by ships and commerce, but which are wholly included within the boundaries of a State or the body of a county.
It seems to have been assumed, in the argument of this case, that because the District Courts had not exercised their admi ralty jurisdiction above tide-water before the decision of this court of the base of the Genesee Chief, that such jurisdiction had been exercised by them as conferred by the act of 1845. It is upon this mistaken hypothesis that any difficulty is found in reconciling that case with the case of Fritz v. Bull, which immediately followed it.
The act of 1845 was the occasion and created the necessity for this court to review their former decisions.
It might be considered in fact as a declaratory act reversing the decision in the case of the Thomas Jefferson- We coiila no longer-evade the question by a judicial notice of an occult tide without ebb or' flow, as in the case of Peyroux v. Howard, (7 Pet., 343.) The court were placed in the position, that they must either declare the act of Congress void, and shock the common sense of the people by declaring the lakes' not to be "navigable waters," or overrule previous decisions which had established an arbitrary distinction, which, when applied to our continent, had no foundation in reason.
In conclusion, we repeat what we then said, that " courts of .admiralty have 'been found necessary in all commercial countries, not only for the safety and convenience of commerce, and a speedy decision of controversies where delay would be ruin, but also to administer the laws of nations in a season of war, and to determine the validity of captures and questions of prize or no prize in a judicial proceeding. And it would be contrary to the first principles on which this -Union was formed, to confine these rights to the States bordering on the Atlantic, and to the tide-water rivers connected with it, and to deny them to the citizens who'border on tbe lakes, and the great navigable streams of the Western States. Certainly, such was not the. intent of the framers of the Constitution ; and if such be the construction finally given .to it by this court, it must necessarily produce, great pubiic inconvenience,' and at the same time fail to accomplish one of the great objects of the framers of the Constitution; that is, perfect equality in the rights and privileges of the citizens of the different States, not only in the laws of the General- Government, but in the mode of administering them."
The decree of the court below, dismissing the libel for want of jurisdiction, is therefore reversed, and it is ordered that. the record be remitted, with directions to further proceed in the case as to law and justice may appertain.
Mr. Justice McLEAN delivered a separate opinion, and Mr. Justice CATRON, Mr. Justice DANIEL, and Mr. Justice CAMPBELL, dissented. Mr. Justice CATRON concurred with Mr. Justice CAMPBELL in the opinion delivered by him.
Mr. Justice McLEAN:
I agree to the decision in this case; but as I wish to be on one or two points somewhat more explicit than the opinion of the court, I will concisely state my views.
The Constitution declares that the judicial'power shall extend "to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." The judiciary act of 1789 provides, "that the District Courts shall have exclusive original cognizance of all civil cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction."
The act of the 25th February, 1845, is entitled "An act to extend the jurisdiction of the District Courts to certain cases upon the lakes and- navigable waters connecting with the same." This act was considered by Congress as extending.. the jurisdiction -of the District Court; and it was so, very properly, treated by the court in the case of the Genesee Chief.
In the opinion, it .was said this act was not passed under the commercial power, but under the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction given in the Constitution. No terms could be more complete than those used in the Constitution to confer this jurisdiction. In all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, such suits may be brought in the District Court.
This jurisdiction was limited in England to the ebb and flow of the tide, as their rivers were navigable only as far as the tide flowed. And as in this country the rivers falling into the Atlantic were not navigable above tide-water, the same' rule was applied. And when the question of jurisdiction was first raised in regard to our Western rivers, the same rule was adopted, when there was no reason for its restriction to tide-v water, as in the rivers of the Atlantic. And this shows that the most-learned and able judges may, from the force of precedent, apply an established rule where, the reason or necessity on which it was founded fails.-
In England and in the Atlantic States, the ebb and flow of tlie tide marked the extent of the navigableness of rivers. But the navigability of our Western rivers in no instance depends upon the tide.
By the civil law, the maritime system extends over all navigable waters. The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,.like the common-law or. chancery jurisdiction, embraces a system of procedure knowm and established for ages. It may be called a system of regulations embodied and matured by the most enlightened and commercial nations of the world. Its origin may be traced to. the regulations of Wisbuy, of the Hanse Towns, the laws of Oleron, the ordinances of France, and the usages of other commercial countries, including the English admiralty.'
It is, in fact, a regulation of commerce, as it comprehends the duties and powers of masters of vessels, the maritime liens of seamen, of those who furnish supplies to vessels,' iriake advances, &c., and, in short, the knowledge and conduct required of pilots, seamen, masters, and everything pertaining to the sailing and management of a ship; As the terms import, these regulations apply to the water, and not to the land, and are commensurate with the jurisdiction conferred.
By the Constitution, " Congress have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes." The provision, "among the several States," limits the power of Congress in the regulation of com-. merce to two or more States; consequently, a State has power to regulate a commerce exclusively within its own limits; but beyond such limits the regulation belongs to Congress. The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction is essentially a commercial power, and it is necessarily limited to the exercise of that power by Congress.
Every voyage of a vessel between two or more States is subject to the admiralty jurisdiction, and not to any State regulation, A denial of this doctrine is a subversion of the commercial power of Congress, and throws us on the Confederation. It also subverts the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the Federal courts, given explicitly in the Constitution and in the judiciary act of 1789.
In this case, the steamboat Wetumpka was engaged in a commerce between New Orleans, in Louisiana, and MontSomery, in Alabama. The Magnolia was running between lobile and Montgomery, in the State of Alabama. The Wetumpka, within the State of Alabama, was as much under the Federal jurisdiction as it was in the State of Louisiana. No one will contend that one. State may regulate the commerce of another; nor can it be maintained that the power to regulate the commerce of the Wetumpka in this case was in either State. It was a commerce between the two States, which comes within the definition of commerce expressly given to Congress. While thus pi'oteeted and regulated by the power of Congress, the Wetumpka was run into by the Magnolia, and sunk, in the Alabama river; and it is earnestly contended that the admiralty can give no remedy for this aggravated trespass. Since the decision in the case of the Genesee Chief by seven judges, only one dissenting, the admiralty jurisdiction has been constantly applied on all our lakes and rivers of the North; and some of the cases have been reviewed in this court without objection. .The navigators of the Alabama river must have been more prudent and skilful than those of the North, or their voyages were less frequent, if the above collision is the first that has occurred on the' Alabama river.
It is true, the Magnolia was engaged in a commerce strictly within the State; but this does not exonerate her, as the trespass was on a vessel protected by the admiralty law. Cases have frequently occurred on the Ohio and Mississippi rivers, where steamboats, having run down and sunk flat-boats, were held responsible for the injury in the admiralty. And if a steamer is liable in such cases, a remedy for an injury done to it cannot be withheld in the same court.
In the Genesee Chief case, (12 How., 443,) this court held: "The admiralty jurisdiction granted to the District Courts of' the United States under the Constitution extends to the navigable rivers and lakes of the United States, without regard to-the ebb and flow of the tides of the ocean." It is-difficult to perceive how this language could have been mistaken, as alleged by the counsel in argument. All the lakes and all the navigable rivers in the Union are declared to be subject to this jurisdiction without reference to the tide, and it overrules, all previous decisions on that subject.
It was said in that case the act. of 1845 extended the jurisdiction of the admiralty; and this was so, as by the act of 1789 it was limited to rivers navigable from the sea by vessels of ten tons burden and upwards.
It is alleged that the assumption of this jurisdiction will absorb matters of controversy and the punishment of offences and misdemeanors now cognizable in the courts of the State, without the trial by jury, and before a foreign tribunal, contrary to the wishes and interests of a State.
The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction has been in operationon all the navigable rivers of our Atlantic coast since the organization of the Government, and its exercise has not been found dangerous or inconvenient. Experience is a better rule of judgment than theory. If this jurisdiction has been found salutary in that part of our country which is most commercial, it cannot be injurious or dangerous in those parts which are less commercial.
The Federal courts' have no cognizance of common-law of-fences, on the land or on the water. Jurisdiction has been conferred on them of common law and chancery in specified cases, in every State and Territory of the Union; but I am not aware that this has been considered a foreign jurisdiction, or one that has been dangerous to the people of any State. Occasional conflicts of jurisdiction have arisen between this tribunal and the State courts, to preserve the rights guarantied by the Federal Constitution; but this became necessary in maintenance of the fundamental law of the Union. And if Congress should deem it necessary for the regulation of our internal commerce, amounting to more than ten hundred anillions of dollars annually, to enact laws for its protection, they will no doubt be as mindful of the rights of the States as of those who, by their enterprise' and wealth, carry on the commerce of the country.
Every one knows how strenuously the admiralty jurisdiction was resisted in England by the common-law lawyers, headed by Coke: The contest lasted for two centuries. The admiralty civilians contended that the statutes of Richard II and 2 H. IV did not curtail the ancient jurisdiction of the admiralty over torts and injuries upon the high seas, and in ports within the ebb and flow of the tide, which was shown by an exposition of the ancient cases, as was opposed by the common-law courts; but they continued the contest until they acquired a concurrent jurisdiction over all maritime causes, except prize. The vice-admiralty courts in this couiatry, under the colonial Government, exercised jurisdiction overall maritime coaatracts, and over torts and injuries, as well in ports as upon the high seas, and this was the jurisdiction conferred on our courts by the Constitution.
But it was aaot until a late périod that the jurisdiction of the admiralty in England was settled by the statute of 3 and 4 Victoria, c.' 67, passed in 1840. This is entitled "An act to improve the practice and extend the jurisdiction of the High Court of Admiralty in England." And it is gratifying to the bar and bench of this country to know, that the above statute has placed the English admiralty substantially on the same footing that it is maintained in this country. To.this remark it is believed there are but two or three exceptions. Insurance, ransom, and surveys, are believed to constitute the only exceptions. The flow of the tide, as before remarked, is used to designate the navigableness of their rivers. Whether an insurance is within the admiralty, has not been considered by this court. It is singular, that while the English admiralty, by its extension, has been placed substantially upon the same basis as our own, ours should be denounced ás having a dangerous tendeiacy upoaa. our interests and institutions, and a desire expressed to abandon the enlightened rules of the civil law, and follow the misconstrued statutes of Richard H.
Antiquity has its charms, as it is rarely found in the common walks of professional life; hut it may be doubted whether wisdom is not more frequently found in experience and the gradual progress of human áffairs; and this is especially the case in all systems of jurisprudence which are matured by the progress of human knowledge. Whether it be common, chancery, or admiralty law, we. should be more instructed by studying its present adaptations to human concerns, than to trace it back to its beginnings. Every one is more interested and delighted to look upon the majestic and flowing river, than by following its current upwards until it becomes lost in its mountain rivulets.