Case Name: Rosalie C. JEMISON, wife of and Edward F. Jemison v. CITY OF KENNER
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1973-05-01
Citations: 277 So. 2d 728
Docket Number: No. 5359
Parties: Rosalie C. JEMISON, wife of and Edward F. Jemison v. CITY OF KENNER.
Judges: Before REDMANN, GULOTTA and SCHOTT, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 277
Pages: 728–732

Head Matter:
Rosalie C. JEMISON, wife of and Edward F. Jemison v. CITY OF KENNER.
No. 5359.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
May 1, 1973.
Rehearing Denied June 5, 1973.
Alvin Rudy Eason, Metairie, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Trombatore & Vondenstein, H. A. Von-denstein, Kenner, for defendant-appellee.
Before REDMANN, GULOTTA and SCHOTT, JJ.

Opinion:
GULOTTA, Judge.
A mandatory injunction is sought to compel the Kenner Board of Aldermen to rezone the southeast corner of West Me-tairie Avenue and Roosevelt Boulevard from R-l Residential to B-2 Commercial for the construction of a service station.
From a judgment of dismissal, plaintiffs appeal. It is plaintiffs' contention that the property is located at the corner of two major divided thoroughfares; and because of the high intensity traffic, it is not now suitable for its present zoning. They point out that the northwest corner of the intersection is occupied by a service station, and the denial of requested change, under the circumstances, is arbitrary and capricious.
We agree. The test of whether an elected official's acts are capricious and arbitrary is whether the action taken is reasonable under the circumstances. That is, was the action taken without reason? According to Black's Law Dictionary, the word "arbitrary" is defined, among other things, as "not done or acting according to reason or judgment." The same definition is used in 6 C.J.S. at page 145. Further, in the case of Steadman v. Pearl Assurance Company, 167 So.2d 527 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1964), the court, in concluding that the defendant insurer's failure to pay an insur-anee loss was arbitrary and capricious, defined those words as follows:
" The words arbitrary and capricious are practically synonymous and mean without reasonable cause and do not necessarily imply an opprobrious connotation. Arbitrary action is based upon one's will and usually implies an abuse of one's authority or power.
Also, in Torrance v. Caddo Parish Police Jury, 119 So.2d 617 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 1960), involving a suit wherein the resolution of a police jury is questioned as being arbitrary and capricious, the court, in concluding that the police jury did not abuse its discretion, in its opinion on page 619 defined a capricious conclusion as "a conclusion contrary to substantiated competent evidence."
In the instant case, the record consists of the testimony of Louis C. Bisso, a zoning expert, and Duane Crump, the Zoning Director of the City of Kenner, as well as that of Kenner Mayor, Joseph S. Yenni, Thomas LeBlanc, Keith Woodward, and Larry J. Hooper, all members of the Board of Aldermen of the City of Kenner.
Bisso testified he would not have zoned the four corners of the intersection "single family residential". He suggests because of heavy vehicular traffic, the property is more suitable for high intensity land use. Moreover, Bisso claims the balance of the intersection has been "torn off" since one corner is now commercial. A rezoning as requested would reestablish this balance. He concluded that the other three remaining corners should have the same "high intensity land use" zoning as the present northwest corner. In his words, the intersection will not be "at rest" until balanced.
Crump testified that a comprehensive zoning ordinance was adopted in December, 1969. He also recommended the instant property, as well as the other corners of the intersection, be rezoned. His recommendation included a change to "B-2" as one of several alternatives.
Kenner Mayor Yenni opposed the requested change because of the expressed opposition of interested property owners at the time he was campaigning for election.
The aldermen stated that they voted against the zoning reclassification because a comprehensive zoning study was being made and because of the character of the neighborhood, as well as because of the voiced oppositions to the change by the residents of the neighborhood. Thomas LeBlanc additionally stated he was of the opinion there was an overabundance of commercial property in Kenner.
We are not impressed by the expressed statements of the aldermen that their vote was influenced by the anticipated zoning classification study. This application had been pending for eleven months before the enactment of the 1969 Zoning Ordinance. The Board could have deferred action until the present study was completed rather than deny the application.
We are convinced from the testimony of the aldermen that the Board substantially based its decision denying the rezoning classification request on the objections voiced by some of the voters residing in the area.
This cannot be the basis upon which public officials are called upon to act. While we do not suggest the expression of interests of the electorate be disregarded, nevertheless, an elected official cannot reach a result consistent with the understandable self-serving wishes of some of the electorate in utter disregard of valid sound reasons to the contrary and successfully meet the test of reasonableness. Under the circumstances in the instant case, the denial, in our opinion, is unreasonable and, therefore, capricious and arbitrary.
Accordingly, it is ordered that the judgment denying the mandatory injunction be reversed and set aside. It is now ordered that a mandatory injunction issue directed to the City of Kenner through its elected officials, agents, and employees to forthwith rezone and reclassify the immovable property owned by plaintiffs designated as lots 20, 21, 22, 23, in square 44 of the Morningside Park Subdivision, Kenner, Louisiana, and forming the southeast corner of the intersection of West Metairie Avenue and Roosevelt Boulevard from R-l Residential to B-2 Commercial.
Reversed and rendered.
SCHOTT, J., dissents with written reasons.
. This service station was constructed after obtaining a reclassification from R-l to B-2 in 1967 or 1968. Plaintiff applied for a similar reclassification in January, 1969. We are informed by counsel that the most recent zoning ordinance classifies this service station property as Rr-1, but the station presumably continues in a nonconforming status.
. Request for rezoning classification, January 1, 1969; Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance No. 1161 adopted December, 1969.
. Hearing conducted March 22, 1971.
. Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance No. 1374 adopted February 14, 1972.