Case Name: AMERICAN GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. Mrs. Lillian E. SIMS et al., Appellees
Court: Texas Courts of Civil Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1955-01-26
Citations: 278 S.W.2d 586
Docket Number: No. 5054
Parties: AMERICAN GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. Mrs. Lillian E. SIMS et al., Appellees.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 278
Pages: 586–591

Head Matter:
AMERICAN GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. Mrs. Lillian E. SIMS et al., Appellees.
No. 5054.
Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. El Paso.
Jan. 26, 1955.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 16, 1955.
W. B. Browder, Jr., Stubbeman, McRae & Sealy, Midland, for appellant.
McDonald & Shafer, Odessa, for appel-lees.

Opinion:
McGILL, Justice.
This is a workman's compensation suit. Appellee sued appellant to recover compensation benefits under the workmen's compensation statute for the death of her husband, Barney Sims, alleged to have resulted from injuries received by him on November 17, 1952, while he was driving a dump truck as an employee of W. O. Pelphrey, who was insured by appellant. Trial to a jury resulted in a verdict on which the court rendered judgment for $7,189.08 as compensation and $121.10 for doctors' services in favor of plaintiff against defendant.
The principal questions presented by this appeal are whether there is any evidence, and if so whether such evidence is sufficient to support the jury finding that the deceased Barney Sims at the time he sustained his injuries on November 17, 1952, was an employee of W. O. Pelphrey. It is appellant's contention that under the undisputed facts only one inference can be drawn, which is that Sims was an independent contractor and therefore the court should have directed a verdict for defendant.
A great deal has been written on the question of when one employed by another is an independent contractor or an employee, and on.the elements bearing on the quality of a contract as affecting the character of the relationship. See Annotation to 20 A.L.R. 684. In this case we are relieved of a great deal of labor by the case of American General Insurance Co. v. Hightower, Tex.Civ.App., 264 S.W.2d 481, opinion by the Eastland Court of Civil Appeals, in which a writ of error was refused, n. r. e. Hightower was working for W. O. Pelphrey on another job when he was injured.
We agree with appellant that the facts in this case are uncontroverted. W. O. Pelph-rey had entered into a contract for the construction of a road located some distance west and north of the town of Stiles. He engaged trucks with drivers to haul the material for the construction of the road. With reference to the contract with Sims the testimony of J. H. Stroud, who was in charge of hauling the material for the road, is to the effect that Sims came out to where he was on the job and wanted to know if he could get.his truck on, that he told him he didn't know what the situation was right at the minute, but to stay there and he would probably get on a little bit; that Sims got in line and pulled under the bin as the other truckers did; that he knew the price that was paid by the yard, to be hauled a quarter of a mile; that he told him what the price was; that Sims asked him what time he started in the morning and he told him it was seven o'clock, that the plant, that is, the crusher plant, started at seven; that he (Sims) knew where they were hauling the material and the direction they were going. That was about the extent of the evidence as to the contract entered into between the parties. Sims was told that the crusher plant started at seven o'clock in the morning. It was not specifically agreed that Sims should be there at seven o'clock or work until five-thirty in the afternoon when the crusher closed down, or as to when he should eat his lunch. It was shown that the crusher usually closed down half an hour for lunch. It was operated by employees of the defendant, and when the trucks engaged iri hauling the material pulled under the chute of the crusher an employee of defendant would pull the lever and fill the truck. Defendant required that the trucks have a capacity of four or five yards. The defendant also had an employee at the place where the material was delivered who would direct the trucks to back up to the proper distance before they dumped the material. There is no evidence that the defendant exercised any control over the trucks during the time that they were traveling from the crusher to.the place where they dumped the material on the road. All of the operating expenses on the truck, including the gas and oil and repairs, were paid by Sims. It further appears that Sims did not consider that he had contracted to work every day on the job, or for any specific number of hours each day — it was more or less left to him to decide when he would work and the number of loads he would haul, depending on how fast he would drive. He was injured after he had delivered a load ot caliche and was returning to the crusher to get another load.
The facts in this case are very similar to the facts in Dave Lehr, Inc., v. Brown, 127 Tex. 236, 91 S.W.2d 693, in which the Commission of Appeals (opinion adopted) held that the evidence was insufficient, to' show the relationship of employee and employer. That case is well considered, and we should be inclined to follow it were it not for the decision of the Eastland Court in the High-tower case in which a writ of error was refused n. r. e. The principal difference in the facts of this case as above outlined and those of the Hightower case is that in the Hightower case the truck driver was required to be on the job at seven o'clock in the morning and remain until five o'clock in the afternoon with one hour out for lunch, whereas there are no such requirements in this case. In both cases the truck driver was warned not to exceed the speed limit, but there is no evidence in this case that any drivers were discharged because they did so, as in the Hightower case. It is our view that these distinctions are unimportant and that the decision in the Hightower Case is controlling here.
The court,' over appellant's objections, admitted testimony of the witness Norris as to the substance of contracts between W. O. Pelphrey and other persons than the deceased Barney Sims as bearing on the contract entered,into between Pelpn- rey and Sims. This was error. Such evidence could have no probative force to es- táblish the contract'between Pelphrey and Sims and was inadmissible. It was res inter alia ácta. Williams v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, Tex.Civ.App., 218 S.W.2d 482, w. r. n. r. e.; 17 Texas Jur. p. 388, Section 135. Appellee in her brief states that every-material fact developed from such witness had theretofore been developed without objection from- the witness Stroud and was subsequently developed-without objection from defendant's witness Allgood. Appellant does not challenge this statement. We therefore assume -that it is true. By not Objecting to the admission of such evidence appellant waived any complaint it may have had to the testimony of the witness Norris. Chesshir v. Nall, Tex.Civ.App., 218 S.W.2d 248, w. r. n. r. e.
The court did' not err in submitting Special .Issues Nos. 1, '2, 3, 4 and 5 which inquired (l)1 if Barney Sims sustained an injury on November 17, 1952; (2) if such injury was sustained when Sims' dump truck overturned; (3) if such injury was accidental; (4) if at the time Sims sustained the injury he was an employee of Pelphrey; and (5) if Sims sustained an injury on November 17, 1952, in the course of his employment for W. O. Pelphrey. All these matters were put in issue by defendant's general denial, and had the court not submitted then; but assumed that they were established as a matter of law, appellant would no .doubt have had just cause to complain.
The definition of the term "employee" given in connection with Special Issue No. 4 was:'
"The term 'employee' as used in this charge means every person in the service of another under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, except one whose employment is not in the usual course of the trade, business, profession or occupation of his employer."
This definition is given in the statute, Art. 8309, Section 1, Vernon's Ann.Civ.St, and as said in Texas Employees' Ins. Ass'n v. Jones, Tex.Civ.App., 70 S.W.2d 1014, 1017, wr. dis.
"We find nothing in the evidence or circumstances surrounding this cause that would call for any other or further. definition of the word 'employee.' "
All that was necessary was the statutory definition. Blankenship v. Royal Indemnity Co., 128 Tex. 26; 95 S.W.2d 366.
The definition of the term "independent contractor" given by the court in connection with Special Issue No. 6 was:
"The term 'independént contractor' as used in this.charge means any person, who in the'pursuit of an ihdepend-' ent business, undertakes to do a specific piece of work for other persons, using his own means and methods without submitting himself to their confrol in respect to all its details. The true test .of a contractor would seem to be that he renders service in the course of an independent occupation, representing the will of his employer only as to the result of his work, and not as to the means by which it is accomplished."
This definition was approved by the Commission of Appeals in Shannon v. Western Indemnity Co., 257 S.W. 522. Appellant's objections to -such, definition are not well founded.
The testimony of the witnesses Stroud, Norris and'Mrs. Sims was sufficient to warrant the submission of'Special Issue No. 8; and- to support the jury.'s answer thereto. This issue inquired' whether any other employees,' if Sims was an employee, Of the same class as Sims, if any, had' not worked substantially the whole of the year immediately preceding the 'injury, if any, of Sims on- November 17, 1952, in the- same of similar employment, in the same or neighboring place. The fact that Stroud did not know of any such employee during the 12 month period, and the fact that Norris did not know of any man engaged in the type of work that Sims was doing on November 17, 1952, who had worked as many as 300 days preceding November 17, 1952, and that Mrs. Sims testified that her husband did not work regularly was sufficient to show that no other employee of the same class as Sims had worked substantially the whole year immediately preceding November 17, 1952. Federal Underwriters Exchange v. Stewart, Tex.Civ.App., 109 S.W.2d 1031, wr. dis.
SpecialTssue No. 9 inquired as to the average weekly wage, if any, of Sims that was just' and fair to Sims, and to the American General Insurance Company, and the answer thereto was $70. The evidence was. ample to warrant .the submission of this issue and such answer thereto. The net earnings of Norris as a truck driver operating the same kind of a truck as Sims on the same job was shown; also the amount Pelph-rey paid to his truck drivers working on the same job as Sims; the amount Coates paid to drivers hired to drive his dump trucks on the same job as Sims, and the minimum wage schedule for truck drivers on the job on which Sims was working was specified in Pelphrey's contract under which he was building the road. These facts were sufficient to enable the jury to arrive at the average weekly wage of Barney Sims without mere conjecture or speculation.
From what we have said it follows that in our opinion all of appellant's points should be, and they are, overruled. However, we have no doubt that appellant pros- • ecuted this appeal in good faith and, that this is not a case which would warrant this court in assessing damages for delay.
The amount of the judgment is obviously erroneous, as pointed out by appellee.' The judgment is therefore reformed so as to award plaintiff a judgment against defendant in the sum of $8,339.86, with interest thereon from December 15, 1953, at the rate of 4% per'annum until paid. As so reformed the judgment is affirmed.