Case Name: DARABAN v. TOWNSHIP OF REDFORD
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1970-05-04
Citations: 383 Mich. 497
Docket Number: Calendar No. 31, Docket No. 52,337
Parties: DARABAN v. TOWNSHIP OF REDFORD.
Judges: Dethmers, Kelly, T. M. Kavanagh, and Adams, JJ., concurred with Black, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 383
Pages: 497–506

Head Matter:
DARABAN v. TOWNSHIP OF REDFORD.
Opinion op the Court.
1. Zoning — Equity—Invalid Ordinance. .
Owner of platted lots is entitled to equitable relief to have a township zoning ordinance classifying those lots as single family residence declared invalid where the township concedes that such a restrictive classification cannot validly be applied to them, as the owner is entitled to use such property as he pleases subject only to other presumptive valid provisions of such ordinance and such other laws and ordinances as may regulate its use.
2. Zoning — Injunction—Constitutional Law.
An amendatory zoning ordinance not having been adopted and the defendant township not having requested time to enact such an amendment and for leave to augment the record so as to make an amendment a part of the record, there is nothing wrong, constitutionally or otherwise, with the trial court’s judgment enjoining the township from interfering, under a zoning ordinance admittedly invalid as to plaintiff’s property, with erecting apartment buildings on the property.
3. Zoning — Constitutional Law.
Courts will not generally enjoin future action by municipal zoning authorities with respect to rezoning after judicial determination of unconstitutionality of a particular provision as applied to specific land; however, such injunctions have been permitted in certain circumstances.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1] 58 Am Jur, Zoning § 238.
[2,9] 58 Am Jur, Zoning § 188 et seq.
[3] 58 Am Jur, Zoning § 240.
[4-6] 58 Am Jur, Zoning § 229 et seq.
[7] 58 Am Jur, Zoning § 232.
[8] 58 Am Jur, Zoning § 234.
Dissenting Opinion.
T. E. Brennan, C. J., and T. G. Kavanagh, J.
4. Zoning — Courts—City Development.
The Supreme Court will not sit as a super-zoning board nor seeond-guess that branch of government vested with the duty and power to control the use of land in the development of our cities.
5. Zoning — Courts—Appeal and Error — Burden of Proof.
The court’s role in zoning is not to control the direction of zoning or to determine what is the best use of land but to prevent the abuse of the zoning powers; therefore, a landowner has the burden to show that, as zoned, his land is virtually useless, it not being enough to show that there is a better use.
6. Zoning — Courts—Appeal and Error — Stipulation-—Power of Court.
Parties cannot stipulate that the court could determine the best use of land and order it so zoned; a court would be powerless to do so.
7. Zoning — Constitutional Law — Courts—Power of Court.
Zoning is a legislative function that cannot constitutionally be performed by a court, either directly or indirectly, in law or in equity; therefore, the Court cannot order that a specific zoning ordinance be passed nor forbid passage of any zoning ordinance which precludes any use which the landowner seelcs to malee of his property.
8. Zoning — Courts—Power of Court — Injunction.
An order of a trial court which, in effect, zoned land to what the court considered to be its most desirable use was invalid as an improper exercise of judicial power and the affirmative injunction issued by the trial court should be vacated.
9. Zoning — Courts—Injunction—Precedents.
Cases apparently standing as authority for issuance of injunctions restraining municipalities from zoning property in a manner different from that sought by the landowners should be overruled.
Appeal from Court of Appeals, Division 1, Holbrook, P. J., and Levin and Pratt, JJ., affirming Wayne, Cornelia G. Kennedy, J.
Submitted De cember 3, 1969.
(Calendar No. 31, Docket No. 52,337.)
Decided May 4, 1970.
15 Mich App 132, affirmed.
Complaint by George Daraban against Township of Bedford, a Michigan municipal corporation, and Aldrick Bellaire, supervisor, to enjoin enforcement of certain provisions of defendant’s zoning ordinance as invalid. Judgment for plaintiff and injunction granted. Defendants appealed to Court of Appeals. Affirmed. Defendants appeal. Court of Appeals
affirmed.
Kitch, Suhrheinrich & Bess, for plaintiff.
Kasoff, Young, Gottesman & Kovinshy, for defendants.

Opinion:
Black, J.
This is a suit in equity; not an action for mandamus (as in Brae Burn, Inc., v. City of Bloomfield Hills [1957], 350 Mich 425). Its purpose is that of having declared invalid the application to plaintiff's platted lots of a township zoning ordinance classifying those lots as B-l (single family residence). The defendants concede that such a restrictive classification cannot validly be applied to the lots. This means that the plaintiff was and now is entitled to the relief sought by him. Such relief is the adjudged right to use his property as he pleases subject only to other presumptively valid provisions of the same ordinance and, of course, such other laws and ordinances as may regulate its use.
It is said however that the circuit court's judgment, and the affirming judgment of the Court of Appeals (15 Mich App 132), go too far in that they constitute a "judicial invasion of legislative power." The point made is that the judgment of the circuit court affirmatively authorizes R-3 distinguished from R-l construction on plaintiff's lots without, as we gather, permitting the township time to amend its ordinance so as to zone in some intermediately restrictive way the area which includes the aforesaid lots.
An ample answer is that no amendatory ordinance has been adopted. Nor has the defendant township requested time for enactment of such an amendment and for invocation of leave to augment the record under GCR 1963, 865.1(5), so as to make such an enacted amendment a part of the record. In these circumstances we perceive nothing wrong, constitutionally or otherwise, with the criticized portion of the circuit court's judgment. It reads:
"It is further ordered and adjudged that the defendants, township of Bedford, a municipal corporation, and Aldrick Bellaire, supervisor of the township of Bedford, be and each of them is further permanently enjoined from interfering with plaintiff's erection of apartment dwellings on the property in question in accordance with plaintiff's exhibit number 4,- referred to in the court's opinion on page 9, and in accordance with the R-3 zoning classification of the township of Bedford."
We agree, then, with the conclusion reached by Division 1 (15 Mich App 132, 136, 137):
"Generally, the courts will not issue injunctive orders restraining future action by municipal zoning authorities with respect to rezoning after judicial determination of unconstitutionality of a particular provision as applied to a specific parcel of land. Christine Building Company v. City of Troy (1962), 367 Mich 508 (where 'under the present record' the refusal of the trial court to set minimum lot sizes was affirmed); Roll v. City of Troy (1963), 370 Mich 94.
"A review of the cases indicates, however, that snch injunctions have been permitted in certain circumstances. Industrial Land Company v. Birmingham (1956), 346 Mich 667; Long v. City of Highland Park (1950), 329 Mich 146; Redford Moving & Storage Company v. City of Detroit (1953), 336 Mich 702; Dequindre Development Company v. Charter Township of Warren (1960), 359 Mich 634; Lacy v. City of Warren (1967), 7 Mich App 105."
Affirmed. Costs of all courts to plaintiff-appellee.
Dethmers, Kelly, T. M. Kavanagh, and Adams, JJ., concurred with Black, J.