Case Name: LOEWE v. NEW YORK CITY RY. CO.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1907-11-08
Citations: 106 N.Y.S. 488
Docket Number: 
Parties: LOEWE v. NEW YORK CITY RY. CO.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 106
Pages: 488–490

Head Matter:
LOEWE v. NEW YORK CITY RY. CO.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
November 8, 1907.)
Carriers—Injuries to Passengers—Instructions.
In an action against a street railway company for negligence in operating a car on which deceased was riding, resulting in his being thrown from the car while passing around a curve, it is error to instruct that, if the car was propelled at an unusual rate of speed, it became the duty of defendant’s servants to give deceased notice of that fact, or indicate to him that he must exercise at that point increased care for his safety, since the precautions required by ordinary care were for the jury, and the effect was to charge as a matter of law that defendant knew or should have known that the curve was dangerous, and that it owed an imperative duty to warn passengers if the car was operated around the curve at an unusual rate of speed.
Appeal from Trial Term.
Action by Johanna Loewe against the New York City Railway Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, and an order denying a motion for a new trial, defendant appeals. Reversed, and new trial granted.
Argued before PATTERSON, P. J., and INGRAHAM, LAUGH-LIN, CLARKE, and HOUGHTON, JJ.
Henry L. Scheuerman (Bayard H. Ames, on the brief), for appellant.
William J. Lippman, for respondent.

Opinion:
LAUGHLIN, J.
This is a statutory action to recover damages for the death of plaintiff's intestate, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant in operating a car upon which he was a passenger, resulting in his being thrown from the car while it was passing around a slight curve in Central Park on the track traversing Central Park from Eighty-Sixth street on the west to Eighty-Eifth street in the east, known as the "Eighty-Sixth Street Cross-Town Line."
I am of opinion that the evidence tending to show that the car was operated at an unusual rate of speed while passing around this curve was sufficient to make the question of the defendant's negligence one for the jury; but I think the learned trial court committed an error in instructing the jury, which necessitates a new trial. In the main charge the court instructed the jury that:
"If you find that the car in question was propelled at an unusual rate of ' speed, then it became the duty of the defendant's servants to give plaintiff's intestate notice of that fact, or indicate to him in some way that he must exercise .at that point increased care for his own safety."
To this charge the counsel for the defendant duly excepted. The effect of the charge was to instruct the jury, as matter of law, that the defendant knew or should have known that the curve was dangerous, and that it owed an imperative duty to its passengers to warn them, provided the car was operated along the track around the curve at an unusual rate of speed. The jury- might have found that, in propelling the car around the curve at an unusual speed, ordinary care required that the passengers who were standing be notified; but I am of opinion that it could not be said that the curve was such that as matter of law the duty rested upon the defendant of notifying the passengers on approaching the curve at an unusual rate of speed.
The order, therefore, should be reversed, and a new trial granted, with costs to appellant to abide the event.
CLARKE and HOUGHTON, JJ., .concur.