Case Name: PROPHITT v. THE STATE
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1987-06-17
Citations: 183 Ga. App. 332
Docket Number: 73725
Parties: PROPHITT v. THE STATE.
Judges: Birdsong, C. J., McMurray, P. J., and Sognier, J., concur. Beasley, J., concurs specially. Carley, J., concurs in Division 1 and in judgment. Been, P. J., Pope and Benham, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part.
Reporter: Georgia Appeals Reports
Volume: 183
Pages: 332–335

Head Matter:
73725.
PROPHITT v. THE STATE.
(358 SE2d 892)

Opinion:
Banke, Presiding Judge.
Ben David Prophitt was convicted of two counts of aggravated assault. The evidence presented at trial established that as appellant was operating a glue machine at his place of employment, a verbal altercation ensued between him and a co-worker, following which he hit the co-worker with a hammer and shot him with a .25-caliber automatic revolver. He then ran to another area of the plant, where he shot a second co-worker three times. Testifying in his own behalf at trial, appellant admitted the shootings but contended that he had acted in self-defense. His trial counsel asserted the defense of mental incapacity. See generally OCGA § 16-3-2. Held:
1. Because the appellant had raised the defense of insanity, the trial court charged the jury in accordance with OCGA § 17-7-131 (b) (3), which provides as follows: "In all cases in which the defense of insanity is interposed, the trial judge shall charge the jury, in addition to other appropriate charges, the following: (A) I charge you that should you find the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity at the time of the crime, this court will maintain custody and control of the defendant until the court is satisfied that the defendant is not a danger to himself or to others. (B) I charge you that should you find the defendant guilty but mentally ill at the time of the crime, the defendant will be given over to the Department of Corrections or the Department of Human Resources, as the mental condition of the defendant may warrant."
After the jurors had begun their deliberations, they asked for a "brief definition" of the possible verdicts they would be authorized to return. In response, the trial court instructed them, in pertinent part, that "a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity would discharge [the appellant] from the offense charged, [and] he would be committed to the Department of Human Resources until he is no longer a danger to himself or others." As this language was at best ambiguous with regard to the crucial issue of who would have custody and control of the appellant and who would ultimately have the authority to discharge him in the event he were found not guilty by reason of insanity, we must agree with the appellant that the recharge constituted reversible error. Accord Loftin v. State, 180 Ga. App. 613 (3) (349 SE2d 777) (1986).
2. The state was allowed to introduce a certified copy of the appellant's 1973 conviction of aggravated assault with a pistol, subject to the limiting instruction that it was to be considered solely on the issue of the appellant's state of mind. The appellant contends that this prior offense was irrelevant to the only contested issue which was his mental capacity at the time that the present shootings were committed.
This issue has been decided adversely to the appellant in Blake v. State, 239 Ga. 292 (236 SE2d 637) (1977), where the Supreme Court ruled admissible, evidence of a prior criminal act when the defendant's character was not in issue and when the only issue was his sanity at the time of the crime. The Court determined: "Evidence which is material and competent is not to be excluded merely because it is prejudicial. [Cit.] [The] testimony was both material and competent to show the state of mind, plan, and motive of the defendant. It tended to rebut his claim of insanity by showing a course of conduct . as contrasted to an act carried out while insane. Testimony relating to other crimes is admissible if such testimony aids in identification or shows the state of mind, plan, motive, or scheme of the accused." Id. at 295. See also State v. Johnson, 246 Ga. 654, 655 (272 SE2d 321) (1980).
Judgment reversed.
Birdsong, C. J., McMurray, P. J., and Sognier, J., concur. Beasley, J., concurs specially. Carley, J., concurs in Division 1 and in judgment. Been, P. J., Pope and Benham, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part.