Case Name: FLORIDA FARM BUREAU CASUALTY INSURANCE CO., Appellant, v. Eugene A. COX and Debra Cox, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2006-10-26
Citations: 943 So. 2d 823
Docket Number: No. 1D05-4111
Parties: FLORIDA FARM BUREAU CASUALTY INSURANCE CO., Appellant, v. Eugene A. COX and Debra Cox, Appellees.
Judges: THOMAS, J., concurs; POLSTON, J., dissents with opinion.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 943
Pages: 823–847

Head Matter:
FLORIDA FARM BUREAU CASUALTY INSURANCE CO., Appellant, v. Eugene A. COX and Debra Cox, Appellees.
No. 1D05-4111.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Oct. 26, 2006.
Order Granting Certification Dec. 15, 2006.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 15, 2006.
Mark J. Upton, Esquire of Daniell, Upton, Perry & Morris, P.C., Daphne, AL, for Appellant.
Gregory M. Shoemaker, Esquire of Schofield, Wade, Roane & Shoemaker, P.A., Pensacola and Louis K. Rosenbloum, Esquire of Louis K. Rosenbloum, P.A., Pensacola, for Appellees.
Charles F. Beall, Jr., Esquire of Moore, Hill & Westmoreland, P.A., Pensacola, for Amicus Curiae Helping Hands Legal Center.

Opinion:
BENTON, J.
Called upon to construe the 2004 version of Florida's Valued Policy Law (VPL or Law), the version in existence when Eugene A. and Debra Cox contracted with Florida Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company (Farm Bureau) for homeowners' insurance, we give the statutory language literal effect, and affirm the judgment entered in favor of the Coxes on the pleadings below. We hold the VPL forecloses an insurer's challenge to the measure of damages in the event of a total loss. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Redding, 411 Fla. 228, 37 So. 62, 65 (1904).
On October 16, 2004, Hurricane Ivan left the Coxes' home in Santa Rosa County, which the policy valued at $65,000.00, a total loss. Wind and water both contributed. Farm Bureau alleged in its complaint for declaratory judgment that the loss was caused primarily by flooding. The Coxes counterclaimed for policy limits. The VPL provides that, when there is a total loss of a structure which is insured "as to a covered peril, . the insurer's liability, if any," is in the amount for which the property was insured. § 627.702(1), Fla. Stat. (2004).
I.
At the outset, we note that the current Valued Policy Law differs dramatically from the earlier version that controls here, and that the Legislature explicitly provided that the amended Law would not apply retroactively. If the power the Florida Constitution assigns to the Legislature were ours instead, considerations like ease of actuarial analysis, the economics of the insurance industry, and even our own notions of fairness might well lead us to an interpretation of the 2004 statute not unlike what the statute has required since it was significantly revised in 2005. But reaching such a result in the face of the previous (and controlling) statutory language would violate our state's organic law, which commands us to refrain from exercising the powers of another branch of government. Art. II, 3, Fla. Const.
Judicial restraint requires us to defer to the Legislature's broad power to enact substantive law in conformity with the state and federal constitutions, even if we are persuaded that a particular law may have negative consequences. In construing statutes, we must hew as closely as possible to the statutory language. As Justice Scalia has written, we are bound by the "objective indication of the words, rather than the intent of the legislature," understood in some amorphous sense discoverable apart from the words themselves. See Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation 29 (Amy Gutmann, ed. 1997). Therefore, we hold that the insurer here is hable for the total loss under the 2004 Valued Policy Law. In so holding, we express no opinion regarding the merits either of the 2004 or of the 2005 version of the statute, matters which are properly for the Legislature, not the courts, in the absence of any constitutional challenge.
II.
Neither version of the VPL applies unless insured property is a total loss. In this narrow class of cases, however, plain language in the 2004 version of the statute makes the insurer liable, if at all, then in the full amount for which the property was insured. "The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of words.... " Anderson v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 485 So.2d 849, 851-52 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (quoting Fla. State Racing Comm'n v. Bourquardez, 42 So.2d 87, 88 (Fla.1949)). The operative language in the VPL is this:
In the event of the total loss of any . structure . insured by any insurer as to a covered peril, . the insurer's liability, if any, under the policy for such total loss shall be in the amount of money for which such property was so insured as specified in the policy and for which a premium has been charged and paid.
§ 627.702(1), Fla. Stat. (2004) (emphasis supplied). (The statute does not address any question concerning insurers' subrogation rights.) Nothing in the VPL reduces the insurer's liability to the insured when multiple perils contribute to the total loss of insured property. The VPL continues to operate as a liquidated damages provision. See Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Kirkland, 490 So.2d 149, 153 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (stating the VPL "valu[es] the loss in the nature of liquidated damages").
This is what the trial court ruled in the present case, relying on the Fourth District's decision in Mierzwa v. Florida Windstorm Underwriting Association, 877 So.2d 774 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004), where thé Fourth District characterized the VPL as "simple and straightforward":
The meaning of the VPL is simple and straightforward. There are two essentials in the statute. The first is that the building be "insured by [an] insurer as to a [e.s.] covered peril." § 627.702(1). The second is that the building be a total loss. If these two facts are true, the VPL mandates that the carrier is liable to the owner for the face amount of the policy, no matter what other facts are involved as to the cost of repairs or replacement. That is to say, if the insurance carrier has any liability at all to the owner for a building damaged by a covered peril and deemed a total loss, that liability is for the face amount of the policy.
Id. at 775-76. The Mierzwa court pointed out that the Legislature used the indefinite article "a" before "covered peril" rather than "the," and concluded that the use of "a" contemplates multiple perils. Id. at 776. Nothing in the statutory language limits the VPL's application to cases in which a solitary covered peril is the sole cause of the loss. The Law calls for more than partial payment in the event of total loss.
If an insurer has any obligation under the policy to pay on account of a covered peril, and the structure is a total loss, then the insurer is responsible for paying the total amount of the policy. The statute provides that the insurer's "liability" "if any" is in the amount for which the property is insured. § 627.702(1), Fla. Stat. (2004). "Liability" means "legal responsibility to another" or the "state of being legally obligated or accountable." Black's Law Dictionary 925 (7th ed.1999). "Liable" is defined as "legally obligated." Id. at ,927. "If any" in the VPL means "if there is any obligation to indemnify for loss attributable to the covered peril." Subsection one stands in contrast to subsection two, which provides that the "insurer's liability, if any" in "the case of a partial loss" "shall be for the actual amount of such loss but shall not exceed the amount of insurance specified in the policy as to such property and such peril." § 627.702(2), Fla. Stat. (2004). The insurer's responsibility to pay the full amount of the policy is triggered when a total loss occurs and the insurer has "any" liability for a covered peril.
At issue in the present case is nothing more or less than whether courts should give this unambiguous statutory directive effect. We recently said:
" '[T]his court is without power to construe an unambiguous statute in a way which would extend, modify, or limit its express terms or its reasonable and obvious implications. To do so would be an abrogation of legislative power.' Am. Bankers Life Assurance Co. of Fla. v. Williams, 212 So.2d 777, 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1968)." Beshore v. Dep't of Fin. Servs., [928 So.2d 411, 413 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) ]. " 'It is a settled rule of statutory construction that unambiguous language is not subject to judicial construction, however wise it may seem to alter the plain language.... We trust that if the legislature did not intend the result mandated by the statute's plain language, the legislature itself will amend the statute at the next opportunity.' " [Fla. Dep't of Child. & Fam. Servs. v. McKim, 869 So.2d at 760, 762 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) ] (quoting State v. Jett, 626 So.2d 691, 692 (Fla.1993)).
Atlantis at Perdido Ass'n, Inc. v. Warner, 932 So.2d 1206, 1212-13 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). We reaffirm our recently restated commitment to these fundamental principles, and acknowledge that our limited role in the constitutional scheme leaves statutory amendment to the Legislature.
When the statute is clear and unambiguous, courts will not look behind the statute's plain language for legislative intent or resort to rules of statutory construction to ascertain intent. In such instance, the statute's plain and ordinary meaning must control, unless this leads to an unreasonable result or a result clearly contrary to legislative intent. When the statutory language is clear, "courts have no occasion to resort to rules of construction — they must read the statute as written, for to do otherwise would constitute an abrogation of legislative power." Nicoll v. Baker, 668 So.2d 989, 990-91 (Fla.1996).
Koile v. State, 934 So.2d 1226, 1230-31 (Fla.2006) (quoting Daniels v. Fla. Dep't of Health, 898 So.2d 61, 64-65 (Fla.2005)) (internal citations omitted). To fail to "read the statute as written," the majority would unconstitutionally appropriate "legislative power" to this court. Id
III.
When the Legislature amended the VPL in the wake of the Mierzwa decision, it produced a very different statute, deleting the words "if any" and adding new language:
In the event of the total loss of any . structure . insured by any insurer as to a covered peril, . the insurer's liability under the policy for such total loss, if caused by a covered peril, shall be in the amount of money for which such property was so insured as specified in the policy and for which a premium has been charged and paid.
§ 627.702(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2005) (emphasis added). Other language was added, including notably the following:
It is the intent of the Legislature that the amendment to this section shall not be applied retroactively and shall apply only to claims filed after the effective date of such amendment.
§ 627.702(l)(e), Fla. Stat. (2005) (emphasis added). Our duty is to give clear statutory language its natural effect. We are not at liberty to transmogrify the earlier version of the statute into its inapposite successor, by reading the controlling version of the statute as if it were the later-enacted replacement now on the books.
The VPL amendment cannot be read as clarification of the legislative intent animating its predecessor, since the amendment states unambiguously that the amended statute is not to be applied retroactively to claims filed before enactment of the amendment. § 627.702(l)(e), Fla. Stat. (2005). The prior Law had been in effect in essentially the same form (applicable to any covered peril) since 1983. See Ch. 82-243, 539, at 1551, Laws of Fla. (amending the statute by deleting "fire or lightning," so that the statute applied to losses attributable to any covered peril, and changing "insured by any insurer as to such perils [fire or lightning]" to "insured by any insurer as to a covered peril").
Even in the absence of an express prohibition against retroactive application, the Legislature is presumed to intend a change in the law when it makes substan tive changes in the language of a statute. See Mangold v. Rainforest Golf Sports Ctr., 675 So.2d 639, 642 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) ("When the Legislature makes a substantial and material change in the language of a statute, it is presumed to have intended some specific objective or alteration of law, unless a contrary indication is clear."); United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 541 So.2d 1297, 1299 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) ("When a statute is amended, . one may assume, unless a contrary indication appears, that the legislature intended the amended statute to have a meaning different from that accorded to it before the amendment.").
The statute's specific antiretroac-tivity provision renders altogether irrelevant the general rule to the effect that, when the language of a statute is changed immediately after a controversy over the interpretation of the statute, the change may be construed as clarifying the intent of the original language. See Lowry v. Parole & Prob. Comm'n, 473 So.2d 1248, 1250 (Fla.1985) ("When . an amendment to a statute is enacted soon after controversies as to the interpretation of the original act arise, a court may consider that amendment as a legislative interpretation of the original law and not as a substantive change thereof."). But see Kaisner v. Kolb, 543 So.2d 732, 738 (Fla.1989) ("Subsequent legislatures, in the guise of 'clarification,' cannot nullify retroactively what a prior legislature clearly intended.").
The Legislature was, of course, aware of the Mierzwa decision when it amended the VPL. See Crescent Miami Ctr., LLC v. Fla. Dep't of Rev., 903 So.2d 913, 918 (Fla.2005) ("Florida's well-settled rule of statutory construction [is] that the legislature is presumed to know the existing law when a statute is enacted, including judicial decisions on the subject concerning which it subsequently enacts a statute.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). But, when several years intervene between the original en actment of a statute and some purportedly clarifying amendment, the courts decline to interpret the amendatory language as clarifying the original intent of the Legislature, in any event. See, e.g., McKenzie Check Advance of Fla., LLC v. Betts, 928 So.2d 1204, 1210 (Fla.2006).
Sometimes it may be appropriate to consider a subsequent amendment [as intended] to clarify original legislative intent of a statute if such amendment was enacted soon after a controversy regarding the statute's interpretation arose.... In this case, . we conclude that seven years [between the original enactment and the amendment] is too long to view the amendment as merely a clarification of legislative intent.
Id. Before its amendment in 2005, the statute had been in substantially the same. form for the preceding twenty-two years or more. An amendment nearly a quarter of a century after a statute is enacted cannot, under the cases, be considered "clarification" of the original enactment. See Betts, 928 So.2d at 1210. The Legislature amended the VPL to effect a (prospective) change in the law. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. LaForet, 658 So.2d 55, 62 (Fla.1995) ("It would be absurd . to consider legislation enacted more than ten years after the original act as a clarification of original intent.").
IV.
The purpose of a valued policy law is to fix the measure of damages when there is a total loss. See Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Boswell, 167 So.2d 780, 783 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964); see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Redding; 47 Fla. 228, 37 So. 62, 65 (1904) ("[The statute's] principal object and purpose is to fix the measure of damages in case of [total] loss . and, to this end, it requires the insurer to ascertain the insurable value at the time of writing the policy, and to write it therein."). In Springfield, this court observed:
Undoubtedly an important object of the statute is also to simplify and facilitate prompt settlement of insurance claims when a total loss occurs. It serves to remove what would otherwise be a very troublesome and difficult issue to resolve either between the parties by negotiation or by the courts in litigation. This issue is the money loss sustained which the insurer must indemnify. The value specific property had is hard to ascertain after its destruction because the usual evidence relied upon for such assessment is unavailable. The difficulties and uncertainties thus created were productive of suspicions of and opportunities for false or exaggerated claims on the one hand and for accusations, mini-mizations and oppressions on the other. Thus vexatious contests on this issue would persist when the best interests of all demanded prompt settlement and relief from the loss. A solution to this is found in the statute which in effect requires the parties to ascertain and agree in advance what the value is and in the case of total loss by the insured peril this amount shall be paid as liquidated damages.
Springfield, 167 So.2d at 784. The insurance company and the insured must agree on a figure when the policy is written, prior to any catastrophe. As the Springfield court explained, it is easier to decide the amount in which a total loss should be indemnified while the structure is still standing and available for inspection. Because the parties have to agree on the amount in advance, the insurance company is less' likely to be able to collect inflated premiums, and the insured is less likely to be in a position to make an inflated claim, in the event of a total loss of the property.
An important purpose of the VPL is to reduce administrative costs. Insurance companies need not incur expenses for experts to pick through rubble to ascertain, for example, whether hurricane damage was done by wind-driven surface water spray, on one hand, or rainfall in a windstorm, on the other; nor, when experts disagree on such questions, does the VPL require the parties to bear the additional expense of litigation. Under the approach the dissenting opinion advocates, valuation questions would have to be resolved in conjunction with — as part and parcel of — questions of "relative causation." Farm Bureau has conceded in the present case, moreover, that it is liable for the Ml $65,000 if the Coxes can show that their home would have been destroyed by wind, even if Farm Bureau can prove its allegation that water was the primary cause of the loss in fact.
V.
No insurance policy can effect the repeal of a statute. It is the other way around: insurance policies are deemed to incorporate applicable statutes, and conflicting policy provisions must give way. See Citizens' Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 98 Fla. 933, 124 So. 722, 723 (1929) (holding that a municipal ordinance was "part of the contract of insurance, and that the insurer [wa]s bound thereby," and explaining the holding was "in line with the general doctrine that, where parties contract upon a subject which is surrounded by statutory limitations and requirements, they are presumed to have entered into their engagements with reference to such statute, and the same enters into and becomes a part of the contract"); U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Van Iderstyne, 347 So.2d 672, 673 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977) (holding that, where an insurance policy fails to conform to an applicable statute, the court must write a provision into the policy to comply with the law).
Recently in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kaklamanos, 843 So.2d 885, 896 (Fla.2003), our supreme court relied on the statute codifying this requirement, and quoted it, as follows:
Any insurance policy, rider, or endorsement otherwise valid which contains any condition or provision not in compliance with the requirements of this code shall not be thereby rendered invalid, . but shall be construed and applied in accordance with such conditions and provisions as would have applied had such policy, rider, or endorsement been in full compliance with this code.
Id. (quoting § 627.418(1), Fla. Stat. (2001)). See also Young v. Progressive Se. Ins. Co., 753 So.2d 80, 83 (Fla.2000) (holding void provisions in uninsured motorist policies which provide less coverage than required by applicable statute).
With specific reference to the VPL, the Florida Supreme Court has held that "any provisions of the policy under consideration in conflict with the [valued policy law] statute are devitalized by it." Martin v. Sun Ins. Office of London, 83 Fla. 325, 91 So. 363, 365 (1922); see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Swearingen, 590 So.2d 506, 507 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (finding invalid a policy's three-year limitation on "med pay" coverage because it conflicted with applicable statute); Allison v. Imperial Cas. & Indem. Co., 222 So.2d 254, 256-58 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969). The VPL controls even when it conflicts with provisions of the insurance policy.
VI.
The VPL was applied as early as 1935, over an insurer's objection that more than one cause-including perils it had not insured against-contributed to the total loss of a structure. See Am. Ins. Co. of Newark, N.J. v. Robinson, 120 Fla. 674, 163 So. 17, 19-21 (1935). Until the 2005 amendment, the VPL operated in multi-peril and single-peril cases alike, and was repeatedly applied to defeat various policy exclusions.
In Robinson, where fire left an insured structure a total loss, the insurance company argued that dry rot or termites (perils that the policy excluded from coverage) had caused much of the damage, and that this damage reduced the value of the property. The Florida Supreme Court squarely rejected the argument, explaining:
[V]alued policy statutes, such as ours, will not permit a reduction of the amount of insurance specified in the policy by reason of depreciation in value caused by use, decay, accident, casualty, or otherwise, where such change arises from a supervening cause occurring subsequent to the issuance of the policy, and the allowance of such reduction will not amount to a change of the value fixed by the parties pursuant to the statute at the time the contract of insurance was issued-So the demurrer to each of said pleas was properly sustained in a case where it appeared that the entire building had been lost and there was no supervening cause alleged to take anything of value away from it and save it from the fire so as to entitle the insurer to credit for the amount of the saving.
Id. at 19-20 (emphasis supplied). The present case is closely analogous to Robinson. Here, too, Farm Bureau argues that, since an excluded peril — here, water — contributed to the damage done the Coxes' home during the hurricane, Farm Bureau's liability should be reduced (unless the Coxes can prove that wind by itself would have caused the same destruction anyway).
But the Robinson court refused to allow an insurer to pay less than the full amount of the policy even on the assumption that an excluded peril — there, dry rot or termites — had helped cause the total loss. The insurance "for which a premium has been charged and paid" in that case was fire insurance, not insurance against termites or dry rot. Although water helped cause the total loss of the Cox es' home, and water damage decreased the value of the structure, that depreciation does not render the VPL inoperative. On the authority of Robinson, Farm Bureau owes the full amount of the policy, inasmuch as the Coxes' home was a total loss, in not insignificant part as the result of windstorm damage.
The Second District reached a similar result in Netherlands Insurance Co. v. Fowler, 181 So.2d 692, 693 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966), where fire only partially destroyed an insured building, but another excluded peril-there the operation of a municipal ordinance-also came into play, combining with the fire damage to render the structure a total loss: Municipal authorities refused to allow repair of the building, adjudging it a hazard, and ordered its demolition instead. See also Regency Baptist Temple v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 352 So.2d 1242, 1244 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) (distinguishing Fowler from cases involving nothing but a partial loss, while agreeing with the rule in Fowler).
The insurance company in Fowler argued that the fire damage could have been repaired, so that the total loss of the building was properly attributable not to the fire, but to the operation of the city building code. It argued that the valued policy law did not control because fire had caused only a partial loss — not the total loss necessary for the VPL to apply — and the insurance policy contained a clause excluding liability for losses caused by ordinances regulating construction. The Second District ruled:
Therefore, we must first determine if the insured has sustained a loss as a result of the fire, which is the peril insured against as defined in Springfield Fire and Marine Insurance Co. v. Boswell, Fla.App.1964, 167 So.2d 780. Secondly, we must determine if the loss to the insured was total. The fire damaged the building to the extent that the City found it unrepairable without any finding as to what repairs, if any, could be made to avoid the order of condemnation.
We agree with the trial court which found the building a total loss under the circumstances of this case, and that the value policy statute applied....
Id. The Fowler court applied the VPL even though another, excluded peril-the city's construction ordinance — also contributed to (actually caused, according to the insurance company) the total loss. The structure in Fowler would not have been deemed a total loss if the court had considered only the covered peril, fire. The fire damage and the ordinance (an excluded peril) combined to cause the total loss. Similarly, a combination of wind and flood caused the total loss of the Coxes' home in the present case.
The dissenting opinion necessarily implies that the VPL has no application if multiple perils contribute to a total loss, at least "in valuing the loss in the nature of liquidated damages." Kirkland, 490 So.2d 149, 153. But the VPL did not require that a covered peril be the sole cause of a total loss, before it was amended in 2005. Before it was amended, the Law was routinely applied in cases where more than one peril combined to create a total loss. Partial recovery under an insurance policy is antithetical to the very notion of a valued policy law, where there has been a total loss.
VII.
Statutes governing insurance contracts are to be construed to protect the public. See Praetorians v. Fisher, 89 So.2d 329, 333 (Fla.1956) ("[T]he public interest requires that a policy be interpreted by the courts in the manner most favorable to the insured, and also that statutes governing insurance contracts be liberally construed so as to protect the public.") (citations omitted). As explained by the Mierzwa court, moreover, not only do statutes trump policy language, when multiple clauses in an insurance policy conflict, the clause providing greater indemnity prevails. See Mierzwa, 877 So.2d at 777-78; see also Poole v. Travelers Ins. Co., 130 Fla. 806, 179 So. 138, 141-42 (1937) ("Provisions of [an insurance] policy limiting or avoiding liability are construed strictly against the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured.").
Farm Bureau was in a position to require the Coxes to present proof of flood insurance coverage before providing windstorm coverage as additional protection against hurricanes. Because the VPL has been amended since, moreover, there is no danger that people will rush out to cancel their flood insurance, counting on windstorm insurers to cover any total loss. People seeking to insure buildings against total loss would also probably be concerned with insuring against partial losses, as to which the VPL has no application in any event.
VIII.
Today's decision serves the VPL's purpose "to simplify and facilitate prompt settlement of insurance claims when a total loss occurs." Springfield, 167 So.2d at 784. More fundamentally, this court lacks the authority — authority which the Legislature does have and actually did exercise after the Coxes' home was destroyed — to amend the VPL to render it nugatory when multiple perils combine to destroy an insured structure.
Affirmed.
THOMAS, J., concurs; POLSTON, J., dissents with opinion.
. The Legislature decided that the 2004 VPL required major revision. But we are not free to interpret the 2004 Valued Policy Law as if it were the 2005 Valued Policy Law. The Legislature made no findings that the court in Mierzwa v. Florida Windstorm Underwriting Ass'n., 877 So.2d 774 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) reached an incorrect decision interpreting the 2004 statute. Instead, the Legislature specifically ensured that the Mierzwa interpretation would not control prospectively by changing the law, which is, of course, the Legislature's prerogative. Significantly, the Legislature commanded that the new law would not be applied retroactively. Both the substantive changes and the non-retroactivity clause give support to and provide further rationale for our decision, which is firmly grounded, however, in the language of the 2004 statute.
. The current statute contains this language, which was not part of the version of the VPL that governs the present case, and is not to be given retroactive effect:
The intent of this subsection is not to deprive an insurer of any proper defense under the policy, to create new or additional coverage under the policy, or to require an insurer to pay for a loss caused by a peril other than the covered peril. In furtherance of such legislative intent, when a loss was caused in part by a covered peril and in part by a noncovered peril, paragraph (a) does not apply. In such circumstances, the insurer's liability under this section shall be limited to the amount of the loss caused by the covered peril. However, if the covered perils alone would have caused the total loss, paragraph (a) shall apply. The insurer is never liable for more than the amount necessary to repair, rebuild, or replace the structure following the total loss, after considering all other benefits actually paid for the total loss.
§ 627.702(l)(b), Fla. Stat. (2005).
. Florida's VPL has been in effect in one form or another since 1899. See Ch. 4677, § 1-2, at 33-34, Laws of Fla. (1899). According to the Staff Report, the Law was changed in 1982 because
[u]nder current law the coverage applies only to loss by fire or lightning. At the time the valued policy law was originally written most coverage did just cover those perils. Now, coverage is much broader, and to the extent that the valued policy law is good public policy it should apply to all covered perils.
Fla. H.R. Comm, on Ins., HB 4-F, as amended by HB 10-G (1982) Bill Analysis 91 (rev. June 3, 1982) (on file with the Fla. State Archives, Dep't of State).
. Our decision rests on the statutory language itself. The legislative history of the recent amendment to the VPL leaves many questions unanswered. See Ch.2005-111, at 1063, Laws of Fla. (Committee Substitute for Senate Bill No. 1486); see also Fla. S. Comm, on Banking & Ins., CS for SB 1486 (2005) Staff Analysis and Economic Impact Statement 1-7 (Mar. 9, 2005) (on file with comm.), available at http://www.flsenate. gov/data/session/ 2005/Senate/bills/ billtext/pdi/ sl486cl.pdf (discussing statutory changes to section 627.701, Florida Statutes, in analysis performed prior to floor amendment to Senate Bill 1486 adding changes to section 627.702). A similar bill, Senate Bill 1488, proposed to amend section 627.702, but did not include language stating that the amendment was not to be retroactive. See Fla. CS for CS 1488, § 15, at 57 (2005), available at http://www. flsenate. gov/data/session/ 2005/Senate/bills /analysis/pdfl 2005sl486.bi.pdf; Fla. CS for SB 1488, 15, at 58 (2005), available at http:// www.flsenate. gov/data/session/ 2005/Sen-ate/bills/ billtext/pdf/ sl488cl.pdf. The staff analysis accompanying the first proposed committee substitute for Senate Bill 1488 claimed, moreover, that "this would reverse the holding of the decision in Mierzwa." Fla. S. Comm, on Banking & Ins., PCS for SB 1488 (2005) Staff Analysis and Economic Impact Statement 20 (Mar. 26, 2005) (on file with comm.), available at http://www.flsenate. gov/data/session/ 2005/Senate/bills /analysis/pdf/ 2005sl488-pcs.bi. pdf. The same staff analysis also stated that, although the amendment was not expressly retroactive, "it may have that result." Id. at 21; see also Fla. S. Comm, on Banking & Ins., CS for SB 1488 (2005) Staff Analysis and Economic Impact Statement 7 (Apr. 7, 2005) (on file with comm.), available at http://www.flsenate. gov/data/session/ 2005/Senate/bills /analysis/pdA 2005sl488.bi.pdf ("The Legislature should consider amending the valued policy law . to clarify . that the Fourth DCA opinion in Mierzwa . was incorrect."). But Senate Bill 1488 ultimately did not pass, and Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 1486, which did pass, included the language which specified that the changes to section 627.702 were not retroactive.
. In Springfield, the court determined that even where there were multiple policies in place, the same principles applied, and that the statute entitled the insured to recover under each of the policies. See Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Boswell, 167 So.2d 780, 784 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964) ("The aggregate liability is the total of the various values specified and for which an appropriate premium has been paid."). After explaining the purpose of the statute, the court explained why the scheme was fair:
[T]he insured is stating the limits of his recovery and at the same time the insurer is basing his premium charges on the extent of his maximum exposure. When the total loss occurs neither can contend the value of the destroyed property is any different from what they had previously specified. When multiple policies are permissible, . the same principles apply. The aggregate liability is the total of the various values specified and for which an appropriate premium has been paid.
Id.
. The decision in Millers' Mutual Insurance Association of Illinois v. La Pota, 197 So.2d 21 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967), affords another example of the VPL's taking precedence over a contrary policy provision. There, the insurance company argued that its liability for a total loss should be shared with another insurance company on the same risk, because its policy contained a pro rata liability clause. The Second District held that the valued policy law was applicable and controlled, trumping the pro rata policy provision. See id. at 24-26.
. Farm Bureau's complaint for declaratory judgment alleges that perils other than windstorm were the "primaiy" cause of the total loss of the Coxes' home. Because we are reviewing judgment on the pleadings, we " 'must accept as true all well-pleaded allegations of the non-moving party. Judgment on the pleadings can be granted only if, on the facts as admitted for purposes of the motion, the moving party is clearly entitled to judgment.' " Crocker v. Pleasant, 778 So.2d 978, 981 n. 4 (Fla.2001) (quoting Windle v. W.W. Windle Co., 731 So.2d 36, 37 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)). As pleaded, however, Farm Bureau's complaint admits the possibility that wind may have caused forty-nine per cent of the damage. At the lower end of the spectrum-where a covered peril causes only minor damage, the deductible-deductibles in "hurricane" policies are strictly regulated, see § 627.701, Fla. Stat. (2004)-comes into play, and damage less than the deductible would not create "any" liability for the windstorm insurer.
. In Fowler, too, the insurance "for which a premium has been charged and paid" was fire insurance, not insurance against losses caused by ordinances regulating construction.
. The decision in Opar v. Allstate Insurance Co., 751 So.2d 758 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), disapproved sub nom. Johnson v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 828 So.2d 1021, 1026 (Fla.2002) is not to the contrary. In Opar, the insureds brought suit for a declaratory judgment declaring them entitled to an appraisal. Id. at 759. The insurance company had taken the position that windstorm did not contribute to the loss at all, and sought to avoid any liability whatsoever. Id. at 759. We held only that the insureds were entitled to an appraisal even before it was determined whether there was coverage. Id. at 760-61. The valued policy law was not in issue and was never addressed by the court.