Case Name: BE JING KE, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2012-04-05
Citations: 473 F. App'x 71
Docket Number: No. 10-3782-ag
Parties: BE JING KE, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 473
Pages: 71–72

Head Matter:
BE JING KE, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
No. 10-3782-ag.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
April 5, 2012.
Peter S. Gordon, Forest Hills, N.Y., for Petitioner.
Tony West, Assistant Attorney General; Ernesto H. Molina, Jr., Assistant Director; Jeffery R. Leist, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
PRESENT: ROBERT D. SACK, ROBERT A. KATZMANN, B.D. PARKER, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
SUMMARY ORDER
Petitioner Be Jing Ke, a native and citizen of the People's Republic of China, seeks review of the August 27, 2010, order of the BIA denying her motion to reopen. In re Be Jing Ke, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Aug. 27, 2010). We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case.
The BIA's denial of Ke's motion to reopen as untimely was not an abuse of discretion. See Kaur v. BIA, 413 F.3d 232, 233 (2d Cir.2005) (per curiam). An alien may file one motion to reopen, generally no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceedings sought to be reopened. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no dispute that Ke's 2010 motion was untimely because the agency issued the final administrative order in 2002. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The time limitation does not apply to a motion to reopen if it is "based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the previous hearing." 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). As the BIA concluded, Ke's practice of Falun Gong in the United States is not a changed circumstance arising in China. Wei Guang Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 273 (2d Cir. 2006); Yuen Jin v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 143, 155 (2d Cir.2008).
Ke argues, however, that she demonstrated an increase in China's persecution of Falun Gong practitioners since the 2008 Olympics. While the evidence indicates that repression of Falun Gong practitioners increased during the 2008 Olympics, Ke failed to proffer evidence indicating what conditions existed for Falun Gong practitioners in China at the time of her 2000 merits hearing. The BIA's determination that the evidence failed to demonstrate changed circumstances in China since the time of Ke's previous hearing is, therefore, supported by substantial evidence. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir.2008) (reviewing the BIA's factual findings regarding changed country conditions under the substantial evidence standard). Contrary to Ke's argument that the BIA ignored evidence, the BIA is not required to address each individual piece of evidence and its decision indicates that it considered the evidence. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 338 n. 17 (2d Cir.2006).
Because the evidence Ke submitted was insufficient to establish changed conditions in China, and her recent dedication to Falun Gong constitutes only a change in personal circumstances, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that she failed to meet an exception to the filing deadline, and, consequently, in denying her untimely motion to reopen. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i), (ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (3).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.