Case Name: PROGRESSIVE CASUALTY INSURANCE CO., Respondent, v. MARCA, Defendant, and SMISEK, Appellant; SMISEK, Appellant, v. MARCA, Respondent
Court: Oregon Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1990-03-14
Citations: 100 Or. App. 726
Docket Number: 88CV0218; CA A49505; 87CV1138; CA A50401
Parties: PROGRESSIVE CASUALTY INSURANCE CO., Respondent, v. MARCA, Defendant, and SMISEK, Appellant. SMISEK, Appellant, v. MARCA, Respondent.
Judges: Before Graber, Presiding Judge, and Riggs and Edmonds, Judges.
Reporter: Oregon Reports, Court of Appeals
Volume: 100
Pages: 726–732

Head Matter:
On petitions for reconsideration by respondent Progressive Casualty Insurance Company, filed December 28, 1989,
and respondent Raymond D. Marca, filed January 3,
reconsideration allowed, former opinion (99 Or App 489, 783 P2d 19) withdrawn; affirmed March 14, 1990
PROGRESSIVE CASUALTY INSURANCE CO., Respondent, v. MARCA, Defendant, and SMISEK, Appellant. SMISEK, Appellant, v. MARCA, Respondent.
(88CV0218; CA A49505 (Control))
(87CV1138; CA A50401)
(Cases Consolidated)
788 P2d 490
Michael A. Lehner and Lehner & Mitchell, Portland, for the petition of Progressive.
Gig Wyatt, Salem, and Law Offices of J.P. Harris, II, P.C., Salem, for the petition of Marca.
Before Graber, Presiding Judge, and Riggs and Edmonds, Judges.
EDMONDS, J.
Graber, P. J., dissenting.

Opinion:
EDMONDS, J.
Respondents separately petition for review of our opinion. 99 Or App 489, 783 P2d 19 (1989). We allow the petitions, withdraw our former opinion and affirm.
We incorporate by reference the facts in our former opinion except to delete this sentence:
"The record does not suggest that working around and moving tractors or similar equipment was an ordinary risk of Robbins' regular work as a farm hand."
In our opinion we said:
"The trial court correctly determined that the salvage work was a part of Robbins' employment.
"Moving the tractor, however, was not shown to be an integral part of the salvage project and, therefore, was not a part of Robbins' employment. On this record, moving the tractor was entirely for the benefit of the fire department, not Marca. He was not acting in the course of his employment when he died." 99 Or App at 496. (Emphasis in original; footnote omitted.)
The insurance policy in effect at the time of the accident provided, in pertinent part:
"We do not cover:

"(6) Bodily injury to an employee of an insured arising in the course of employment. This exclusion does not apply, however, to bodily injury to domestic employees who are not entitled to workers' compensation benefits."
The phrase "arising in the course of employment" has the same meaning as in ORS 656.005(7)(a). I-L Logging Co. v. Mfgrs. & Whlse. Ind. Exc., 202 Or 277, 325, 273 P2d 212, 275 P2d 226 (1954).
In Bos v. Ind. Acc. Com., 211 Or 138, 146, 315 P2d 172 (1957), the claimant was injured while returning from working for his employer doing farm work, which at that time was exempt from workers' compensation coverage. He was en route to work that was covered. The court held that the exempt work was but a small portion of his work for employer and merely incidental thereto. The court said, in holding for the claimant:
"The second category of troublesome cases is that which involves employees who go from one class of work to another. Here, as in the other specific exemptions, it is impractical to construe the act in such a way that employees and employers dart in and out of coverage with every momentary change in activity. The great majority of decisions, therefore, attempt to classify the overall nature of the claimant's duties, disregarding temporary departures from that class of duties even if the injury occurs during one of the departures." (Citation omitted.)
2. Here, there is no material difference. Had Robbins been killed while returning from the work site, the Workers' Compensation Law would have provided coverage. The fact that Robbins was killed while performing a task that was unrelated to the salvage project just before he and Marca were to depart from the work site did not remove Robbins from the protection of the Workers' Compensation Law.
The dissent relies on Rogers v. SAIF, 289 Or 633, 616 P2d 485 (1980), and would hold that it has implicitly overruled Bos v. Ind. Acc. Com., supra. Rogers holds that, if any injury of an employee has a unitary work-connected relationship to his employment, then it is compensable. The court said:
"In adopting a unitary 'work-connection' approach in place of the customary mechanistic two-stage method of analysis, it is not our intention to substantially change fundamental Workers' Compensation law." 289 Or at 643.
Bos v. Ind. Acc. Com., supra, is not inconsistent with fundamental workers' compensation law. It was decided under former ORS 656.202(1), which used the two-step analysis.
We hold that the task performed by Robbins, although it was a departure from his usual duties, was in the course of his employment and that the trial court properly held that Progressive had no duty to defend or indemnify Marca in the wrongful death action.
Reconsideration allowed; former opinion withdrawn; affirmed.
ORS 656.005(7)(a) provides, in relevant part:
"A 'compensable injury' is an accidental injury, or accidental injury to prosthetic appliances, arising out of and in the course of employment requiring medical services or resulting in disability or death; an injury is accidental if the result is an accident, whether or not due to accidental means."
We have used this rule in two recent cases in which the issue was whether the claimant was a "non subject worker" as defined in ORS 656.027(2). Gordon v. Farrell, 85 Or App 590, 593-94, 737 P2d 654, rev den 304 Or 55 (1987); Anfilofieff v. SAIF, 52 Or App 127, 627 P2d 1274 (1981).