Case Name: Scandrett and others, Trustees, Respondents, vs. Worden-Allen Company, Appellant; Thomson, Trustee, Respondent, vs. Same, Appellant
Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Wisconsin
Decision Date: 1941-06-25
Citations: 238 Wis. 272
Docket Number: 
Parties: Scandrett and others, Trustees, Respondents, vs. Worden-Allen Company, Appellant. Thomson, Trustee, Respondent, vs. Same, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Wisconsin Reports
Volume: 238
Pages: 272–287

Head Matter:
Scandrett and others, Trustees, Respondents, vs. Worden-Allen Company, Appellant. Thomson, Trustee, Respondent, vs. Same, Appellant.
May 20
June 25, 1941.
For the appellant there were briefs by Lecher, Michael, Whyte & Spohn, attorneys, and Daniel K. Hopkinson of counsel, all of Milwaukee, and oral argument by Malcolm K. Whyte.
For the respondents there was a brief by Rodger M. Trump, attorney for the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Company, and by /. F. Baker and Llewellyn Cole, attorneys for the Chicago & North Western Railway Company, all of Milwaukee, and oral argument by Mr. Trump and Mr. Cole.

Opinion:
Wickhem, J.
Defendant contends that the court erred in holding, (1) that the placement and. removal of the cars were prevented by a cause attributable to Worden-Allen; (2) that the cars were detained by it; (3) that plaintiffs made every effort in good faith to place and remove the cars; and (4) that plaintiffs fully performed the duty imposed upon them By the terms of the demurrage tariff. As we view this case it depends upon the construction to be given to the applicable tariffs and the relation of the facts, which are largely conceded, to those tariffs.
Freight Tariff 4-N, effective September 1, 1933, contains the following provisions:
Rule 1, Section A: "Cars . . '. held for or by consignors or consignees for loading, unloading, forwarding directions or for any other purpose . . . are subject to these demurrage rules. ."
Rule 6, Section B: "When empty cars placed on orders are not used in transportation service, demurrage will be charged from actual or constructive placement until released, with no free time allowance."
Rule 1, Section B, Note 1: "A private track is a track outside of carrier's right of way, yard and terminals, and of which the carrier does not own either rails, ties, roadbed or right of way; or a track or portion of a track which is devoted to the purpose of its user, either by lease or written agreement, in which case the lease.or written agreement will be considered as equivalent to ownership."
Rule 3, Section D, Note 1: " 'Actual placement' is made when a car is placed in an accessible position for loading or unloading or at a point previously designated by the . . . consignee. If such placing is prevented from any cause attributable to consignor or consignee and car is placed on the private or other-than-public-delivery track serving the . . . consignee, it shall be considered constructively placed, without notice." .
Rule 3, Section D, Note 2: "Any railroad track or portion thereof assigned for individual use will be treated as 'other-than-public-delivery track.' " f
Plaintiffs contend that they were prevented from making-actual placement of incoming' cars by a cause attributable to defendant; that having placed these cars on the private track serving defendant's plant, that amounted under the circumstances to a constructive placement as defined by Rule 3, Section D, Note 1, of the tariff, released them from further obligation to make actual delivery, and rendered defendant liable for demurrage as though there had been an actual spotting and placing of the cars. It is, of course, conceded that the nine loaded cars involved in the demurrage charges were not spotted by plaintiffs at available places for unloading. With respect to four empty cars which were delivered at available places for loading and promptly loaded, plaintiffs did not enter the premises to remove them and these cars remained at the loading points until the termination of the strike referred to1 in the statement ,of facts and then were unloaded and returned empty to the carrier. Plaintiffs claim that since these cars were not released by defendant during the period of the strike, defendant is liable for demurrage under Rule 1, Section A, and Rule 6, Section B, of the applicable tariff. A large portion of the briefs is devoted to a discussion of the question whether the strike of Worden-Alien employees was a cause effective to prevent placing or removal of the cars, and, if so, whether it was a cause attributable to the consignee. It is earnestly contended by defendant that the strike and particularly the violent manifestations of it which prevented entrance to the plant were not attributable to Worden-Alien and that therefore there was no constructive placing under the tariff. In Sinclair Refining Co. v. Schaff (8th Cir.), 275 Fed. 769, and Davis v. Keystone Steel & Wire Co. 317 Ill. 278, 148 N. E. 47, it was held that interference with the business of a consignee by strike does not excuse it from liability for demurrage. Doubtless these cases are not strictly in point. They probably do no more than hold that the existence of a strike neither avoids nor imposes a liability for demurrage. In other words, a strike ismot an excuse to the consignee for failure to make available the cars to the railroad under penalty of paying demurrage.
In Chrysler Corp. v. New York Central Ry. 234 I. C. C. 755, it was held that empty cars in a strike-locked plant had not been made available to the railroads in such a way as to prevent demurrage and that even an actual release of these empty cars is not accomplished until'the carriers have been afforded a real and effectual opportunity to remove the cars from the plant. ~;-
It is asserted by defendant that this case cannot be considered an authority since the determination is by an administrative body and not by a court. Assuming without deciding that this is true, the determination is certainly entitled to weight as an administrative construction of the tariff by the very commission to which is committed complete regulation of such tariffs. However, we recognize that the question whether a strike by employees of the consignee attended .with such violence as to make it impossible ffor the railroad to place cars or remove released cars "is a cause attributable to the consignee" presents substantial difficulties of solution and can give rise to reasonable differences of opinion. It is not a point upon which there are satisfactory legal authorities, and since in the view that we take-of the" case it is unnecessary to decide it, we shall not attempt a solution. We con sider that under the tariffs in force which are within the Interstate Commerce Act and required to be carried out by the parties, irrespective of private agreements, defendant was liable for demurrage. With respect to incoming cars placed upon the private tracks of defendant but not spotted at unloading points, we think it plain that there was a 'constructive placement for the reason that no placement orders were ever given to the railroad. When violent interference by strikers with the switching operations of the railroad occurred, involving, by the way, cars concerning which no claim for demurrage is made here, the railroad men were instructed by representatives of the defendant that they would be called when futher services were required. There were never during the period of the strike any directions to plaintiff as to the placing of these cars. Neither was there any release to plaintiffs of cars which had been actually placed and loaded. Until this release by defendant, these cars must be considered, under Rule 1, Section A, to have been held by defendant and to be subject under that tariff to demurrage rules. This tariff is explicit and broad. It applies demurrage rules to cars held for loading, unloading, forwarding directions, or for any other purpose, and we think this plainly applies to the cars which were ready for return to plaintiffs. Further than this, Rule 6, Section B, specifically provides for demurrage upon empty cars from the time of actual placement until release. As to the incoming cars already placed upon the private tracks of defendant, the failure of defendant tO' give instructions as to where to spot the cars for unloading made it manifestly impossible for plaintiffs to conduct'further switching operations, and this cause was certainly attributable to defendant. Under these conditions, Rule 3, Section D, Note 1, makes the placement upon the private tracks a constructive placement of the cars and renders the consignee liable for demurrage. The fact that defendant thought it unwise to request further switching of incoming cars or to release cars already loaded because of the danger of strike violence or its want of control over the territory of its plant .is-immaterial. Under the cases heretofore cited the strike is not an excuse for defendant's failure in these respects. The important thing is that under the tariffs there could be no release from demurrage charges until the empty cars were released to the railroad and that there was a constructive placement of the other cars in the absence of definite directions for placing. This established the right to demurrage under tariffs which are binding not merely as contracts between the parties but as rules of law governing shipments -in interstate commerce.
It is suggested that by a custom which had been long honored and carried out by the parties it was the practice for the railroad to send a switch engine into defendant's plant each day to get directions for the further placing of cars which had already been put upon defendant's private tracks, and that in this case the railroad during the period of the strike 'did not send its switch engine down for the usual directions. We are of the view that such a custom is ineffective to change the rights and duties of the parties under the tariffs. Even if this were not so, it appears by evidence which the court believed and which was sufficient to sustain a finding to that effect that plaintiffs were told that further switching operations need not be attempted until notification or request by defendant. This would obviate whatever effect such a custom might have on legal assumptions most favorable to- defendant because postponement of the switching meant also postponement of specific directions for placing which were by the custom conditions precedent to an obligation further to place or spot cars. It is unnecessary to decide what would have been the legal consequence had defendant released its outgoing cars or given specific direction's as to placing of the incoming cars. In that case we would have to decide whether the violence attending the Worden-Allen strike and making entry to its premises and switching operations thereon dan gerous or impossible would be a "cause attributable" to Wor-den-Allen. Under the facts that determination is unnecessary, and we express no opinion upon the matter.
By the Court. — Judgments affirmed.