Case Name: PEOPLE v. BUFKIN; PEOPLE v. ANDREW CARTER
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1972-11-27
Citations: 43 Mich. App. 585
Docket Number: Docket Nos. 8317, 8408
Parties: PEOPLE v BUFKIN PEOPLE v ANDREW CARTER
Judges: Before: Lesinski, C. J., and V. J. Brennan and O’Hara, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 43
Pages: 585–597

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v BUFKIN PEOPLE v ANDREW CARTER
Opinion of the Court
1. Homicide — Felony Murder — Permissible Verdicts — Decisional Rule — Prospective Application.
A trial judge in a prosecution for felony murder, i.e., any homicide committed in the perpetration, or the attempt to perpetrate one of the statutorily specified offenses, must instruct the jury that its verdict shall be guilty of murder in the first degree or not guilty; this decisional rule is prospective only and is effective on the release date of this opinion to the parties, November 27,1972 (MCLA 750.316).'
2. Homicide — Felony Murder — Included Offenses.
Felony murder is a creature of statute in which the element of premeditation is conclusively presumed by proof of the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate a specific felony; therefore, neither second-degree murder nor manslaughter can possibly be lesser included offenses of felony murder since the first two crimes and felony murder are mutually exclusive (MCLA 750.316, 750.317, 750.321).
3. Homicide — Felony Murder — Second-Degree Murder — Evidence —Sufficiency.
A jury finding that defendant and a codefendant had planned and had attempted to perpetrate an armed robbery during which the victim was killed would have been warranted where the evidence, with its permissible inferences, showed: that defendant drove his codefendant to the scene of the crime, picked him up afterwards, and knew that the codefendant had a .22-caliber silverplated pearl-handled handgun, described by a witness as being in the possession of a man running from the murder scene; that the victim was killed by a. shot from a .22-caliber weapon, and that defendant told a witness that his codefendant did not get any money in the holdup; the fact that the jury found defendant guilty of second-degree rather than first-degree murder affords no basis for reversing the conviction because the verdict was a permissible one under the judge’s instructions which correctly stated one version of the applicable law, i.e., a second-degree murder verdict is permissible where felony murder is charged (MCLA 750.316).
References for Points in Headnotes
[I] 40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide §§ 484, 499, 525 et seq.
40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide § 45.
40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide § 545,
53 Am Jur, Trial § 1033.
40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide §§ 35, 37, 44.
40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide §§ 46, 525 et seq.
40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide §§ 35, 474.
40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide §§ 53, 267.
40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide §§ 29, 37.
What amounts to participation in homicide on part of one not the actual perpetrator, who was present without preconcert or conspiracy, 12 ALR 275.
[II] 40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide § 559.
4. Homicide — Felony Murder — Second-Degree Murder — Compromise Verdict.
A verdict of guilty of second-degree murder returned against a defendant charged with a felony murder does not mandate the conclusion that the felony, or attempted felony, charged, was not involved in the killing; the jurors may have arrived at a compromise verdict.
5. Criminal Law — Compromise Verdict.
A compromise verdict in a criminal case is not infirm as a matter of law; a verdict cannot be upset by speculation or inquiry into how the jury reached its verdict.
6. Homicide — Felony Murder — Aiding and Abetting — Knowledge.
' The test for determining if a defendant aided and abetted in the commission of a felony murder is whether defendant participated in the legal sense in the attempted felony, not whether defendant knew beforehand that his accomplice would kill the victim in the attempt.
Concurrence in part, dissent in part by Lesinski, C. J.
7. Homicide — Felony Murder — Second-Degree Murder — Instructions to Jury.
A verdict of guilty of second-degree murder returned in a trial for a felony murder mandates the conclusion that no felony or attempted felony was involved in the killing where the jury was instructed that they could consider a verdict of second- degree murder or manslaughter only if they found that there was no robbery or attempted robbery (MCLA 750.316).
8. Homicide — Felony Murder — Second-Degree Murder — Evidence —Sufficiency.
A judgment of acquittal notwithstanding a verdict of guilty of second-degree murder should have been granted to a defendant charged with participating in the killing of a man during an attempted robbery, where the overwhelming evidence was that defendant drove the car and his codefendant did the shooting, and there was no evidence that the defendant and codefendant had any common design other than the hypothesized robbery which the jury expressly rejected in its verdict of second-degree murder (MCLA 750.316, 750.317).
9. Homicide — Second-Degree Murder — Malice—Inferences.
The malice necessary for second-degree murder may be inferred from the type of weapon used and the manner in which the crime was committed, but this inference goes no further than to supply the requisite intent of the actual killer and those engaged in a common design with him (MCLA 750.317)
10. Homicide — Felony Murder — Aiding and Abetting — Evidence.
A conviction of aiding and abetting the commission of a felony murder must be supported by evidence of the accessory’s common intent and concert of action; mere presence, even with knowledge that an offense is about to be committed or is being committed, is not enough to make a person an aider or abettor (MCLA 750.316, 750.317).
11. Homicide — Felony Murder — Second-Degree Murder — Evidence.
A motion for acquittal notwithstanding the verdict was properly denied to a defendant charged with killing a man during an attempted robbery where the evidence was sufScient to convict him of second-degree murder, the trial judge, sua sponte, correctly charged the jury regarding second-degree murder, and defendant failed to object to the charge thus waiving any possible right he might have to object on appeal, absent any manifest injustice.
Appeal from Recorder’s Court of Detroit, Joseph E. Maher, J.
Submitted Division 1 October 6, 1971, at Detroit.
(Docket Nos. 8317, 8408.)
Decided November 27, 1972.
Leave to appeal applied for.
Andrew Bufkin and Andrew Carter were convicted of second-degree murder. Defendants appeal.
Affirmed.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William L. Cahalan, Prosecuting Attorney, Dominick R. Carnovale, Chief, Appellate Department, and Michael R. Mueller, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Burton L. Borden, for defendant Bufkin on appeal.
Kenneth R. Teschendorf (M. Gerald Schwartzbach, of counsel), for defendant Carter on appeal.
Before: Lesinski, C. J., and V. J. Brennan and O’Hara, JJ.
Former Supreme Court Justice, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment pursuant to Const 1963, art 6, § 23 as amended in 1968.

Opinion:
O'Hara, J.
We concur with the Chief Judge in affirming the conviction of defendant Bufkin. As we read the record there was testimony adduced together with the reasonable inferences therefrom which would have sustained a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree as to defendant Bufkin. That the jury found him guilty of murder in the second degree affords no basis for reversing his conviction. The verdict was a permissible one under the charge of the court as given. The charge stated one version of the applicable law that has been approved by our Supreme Court, namely that under a charge of first-degree felony murder a verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree is permissible. However, as noted by the late Justice Dethmers writing for a unanimous Court in People v Dupuis, 371 Mich 395 (1963), there is also authority for holding that in felony-murder prosecutions, the trial judge may properly instruct the jury that they should find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree or not guilty, citing People v Repke, 103 Mich 459 (1895). This case has never been overruled. With this state of precedential authority we believe it is our proper province to choose what we consider the better rule of law and render it controlling. Our holding is of course reviewable by the Supreme Court, but if undisturbed by that Court we understand the trial bench will be bound thereby. Specifically we make clear that our opinion is to have no retrospective effect and to be effective as of the date of the release of this opinion to the parties.
We here hold decisionally that in a prosecution for felony murder, that is to say any homicide committed in the perpetration, or the attempt to perpetrate one of the statutorily specified offenses, the trial judge is obliged to instruct the jury that its verdict shall be guilty of murder in the first degree or not guilty. We do not reach this conclusion lightly. We have reviewed all of the case law of our state and of many other jurisdictions. We adopt this rule because "felony murder", so called, is a creature of statute in which the element premeditation is conclusively presumed by proof of the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate a specific felony. As such, neither second-degree murder nor manslaughter can possibly be lesser included offenses. These two latter crimes and felony murder are mutually exclusive offenses.
However, since the trial judge in this case instructed the jury according to one of two permissible alternatives, we must examine the verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree as to defendant Carter under that charge as given. The result reached in this case in part moves us to hold as we do as to future cases.
If defendant Carter's conviction is to be upheld, there must have been testimony or circumstantial evidence together with the permissible inferences therefrom that Carter knew of the intention of Bufkin to perpetrate or attempt to perpetrate a robbery; and that he, Carter, actively participated in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate a robbery.
What then was the testimony and other evidence that would meet the legal requirement of "participation" by Carter?
Incontestably, Carter drove the car to the place of the killing. Incontestably, Carter stopped the car prior to reaching the scene and picked up Bufkin for no explained reason. Incontestably, after the victim was killed, Carter drové along slowly and picked up Bufkin again. Witnesses testified, and it was the province of the jury to accept or reject the testimony, that Carter knew that Bufkin had a .22-caliber silverplated handgun. The cause of death was a gunshot wound from a .22-caliber weapon. One witness testified that he observed someone running from the vicinity of the killing carrying a silverplated, pearl-handled handgun. Another witness testified that at the time and place involved she saw someone "running out down the alley . He stood and becked for the car to come." A witness testified that when Bufkin re-entered the car Carter asked him "What happened how come he was running ", and that Bufkin replied that " he had shot the man. (Emphasis added.) A witness testified that " Andrew Carter told me that Andrew Bufkin told him he didn't get any money in the holdup".
We believe the jury would have been well within its province to find that Carter and Bufkin planned and attempted to perpetrate an armed robbery, during which attempt the deceased was killed. Thus we are convinced that the proofs would have sustained a verdict of guilty as to Carter of murder in the first degree. For whatever reason, the jury, as to defendant Carter, also returned a verdict of murder in the second degree. This, says our eminent and respected Chief Judge, mandates the following conclusion:
"Thus the inescapable conclusion of the jury's conviction of both defendants of second-degree murder is that no robbery or attempted robbery was involved in this killing."
With this we respectfully but firmly disagree. That conclusion is no more "inescapable" than that the jurors simply compromised their conflicting views. Hence we must determine whether a "compromise" verdict so called is infirm as a matter of law. We hold it is not. As Mr. Justice Holmes said in the opinion of the Court in Dunn v United States, 284 US 390, 394; 52 S Ct 189, 191; 76 L Ed 356, 359 (1932):
"That the verdict may have been the result of compromise, or of a mistake on the part of the jury, is possible. But verdicts cannot be upset by speculation or inquiry into such matters."
It may well be that defendant Carter had no foreknowledge that defendant Bufkin would kill the victim in the robbery attempt. This is not the test. Rather, the question is did defendant Carter participate in the legal sense in the attempted robbery. We think the record amply supports the conclusion that he did. As such he was susceptible of a conviction of murder in the first degree. That the jury found him guilty of murder in the second degree under the instructions which were not erroneous when given does not invalidate the verdict.
We vote to affirm both convictions.
V. J. Brennan, J., concurred.
MCLA 750.316; MSA 28.548.
MCLA 750.317; MSA 28.549.