Case Name: GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION v. Linda JACKSON, Individually and Next Friend and Natural Guardian of Her Minor Daughter Amanda Jackson and Terry Jackson
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1992-12-03
Citations: 636 So. 2d 310
Docket Number: No. 90-CA-0824
Parties: GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION v. Linda JACKSON, Individually and Next Friend and Natural Guardian of Her Minor Daughter Amanda Jackson and Terry Jackson.
Judges: Before HAWKINS, P.J., and SULLIVAN and McRAE, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 636
Pages: 310–353

Head Matter:
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION v. Linda JACKSON, Individually and Next Friend and Natural Guardian of Her Minor Daughter Amanda Jackson and Terry Jackson.
No. 90-CA-0824.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Dec. 3, 1992.
Opinion Denying Rehearing April 21, 1994.
Mandate Stayed May 13, 1994.
Opinion Dissenting in Part from May 13, 1994 Order Staying Mandate Filed June 23, 1994.
W. Swan Yerger, Gene D. Berry, Heidelberg & Woodliff, Jackson, John R. Reese, David M. Heilborn, McCutchen Doyle Brown & Enersen, San Francisco, CA, Chilton D. Varner, Atlanta, GA, for appellant.
David D. O’Donnell, S. Duke Goza, H. Scot Spragins, Benjamin H. Sanders, Hickman Goza & Gore, Oxford, S.T. Rayburn, Mitchell McNutt Threadgill Smith & Sams, David G. Hill, Maurie L. White, Craig Hill White & Minyard, Oxford, J. Max Kilpatrick, Philadelphia, for appellee.
Before HAWKINS, P.J., and SULLIVAN and McRAE, JJ.

Opinion:
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
McRAE, Justice,
for the Court:
On petition for rehearing, we reconsider General Motors Corporation's appeal from a jury finding that the fracture of a defective rear axle in a 1984 GMC Jimmy was the proximate cause of serious and permanent injuries suffered by Linda Jackson and her daughter, Amanda, in a December 14, 1984, single-vehicle accident. Terry Jackson further sustained loss of companionship with his wife and daughter. Following a ten-day trial in the Leake County Circuit Court, the jury awarded the Jacksons $7.15 million in compensatory damages. On December 1,1992, a three-judge panel of this Court heard oral arguments on the case. Finding that the manufacturer's arguments were without merit and presented no novel questions of law, we affirmed the decision per curiam. General Motors filed its petition for rehearing in January, 1993. The corporation raised many of the same assignments of error cited in its original appeal and requested that we issue a written opinion. Pursuant to Miss.Sup.Ct. Rule 35, this Court is required to publish a written opinion when to do so will add to the value of our jurisprudence. When this Court originally reviewed this case, we found that it presented no novel or distinctive issues of law or fact. In such cases, we long have held that we are not obligated to publish a written opinion. Morea v. State, 329 So.2d 527, 527-528 (Miss.1976); Duncan v. Perkins, 192 So.2d 386 (Miss.1966); Batson v. Draughon, 11 So.2d 203 (Miss.1942); Yazoo & Mississippi Valley Railroad Co. v. James, 108 Miss. 852, 67 So. 484 (1914).
After a careful reconsideration of the record, we deny General Motors' petition for rehearing. We do, however, take this opportunity to discuss whether evidence obtained in contravention of M.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(B) by deposing an expert witness, designated and later dismissed by one party, is admissible at trial. We further discuss whether the trial judge properly excluded the evidence under M.R.E. 403 and ultimately, whether the parties received a fair trial.
I.
On December 14, 1984, Linda Jackson and her six-week-old daughter, Amanda, were injured in a one car accident in Leake County, Mississippi. Linda was driving the family's 2.8 liter V-6 GMC Jimmy 4X4, which was designed and manufactured by General Motors Corporation in September, 1983. The Jacksons contend that the crash was caused by the fracture of a defective left rear axle which caused her to lose control of the vehicle; General Motors, on the other hand, asserts that the axle broke on impact.
At the time of the accident, Linda was travelling at a speed of approximately fifty to sixty miles per hour. She testified that she felt a bump or jarring in the left rear end of the vehicle. She glanced at Amanda, who was secured in her ear seat on the passenger side of the vehicle, to see if she had been disturbed. Within a few seconds, the Jimmy veered to the left, out of control. The vehicle flipped three times, coming to rest near a pond. Its left rear wheel was found some twelve to fourteen feet away. At the accident scene, Linda, in great pain and near death, described the bump to witnesses as a "sensation on the left side of my vehicle like you had run off the road," and stated that she no longer had any control over her vehicle.
II.
The left rear axle of the Jackson's vehicle fractured at the flange end, where the wheel is attached to the axle shaft. The damaged axle is distinguished by a white circle painted around the flange. This indicates that this particular axle shaft initially failed to meet General Motors' specifications and was put through the induction hardening process a second time or "retoccoed."
The axle was designed by General Motors and manufactured at its Saginaw-Buffalo plant in Buffalo, New York. Raw unma-chined shafts made of SAE 1050 modified steel were purchased from the Saginaw-To-nawanda Forge Plant. At the General Motors plant, the parts were partially machined, induction hardened, machine finished and put into the rear axle assembly. Manufacture of each axle costs approximately fourteen dollars.
At the Saginaw-Buffalo Plant, the raw axle shaft is put through a two-part heat induction process to make it hard on the outside but flexible. First the shafts are heated in the tocco unit and then, in the quench process, sprayed with water to harden the steel. Inside the tocco unit, the axle shaft is heated to a temperature of approximately 1760 degrees Fahrenheit. However, the unit is not equipped with gauges or other systems for monitoring the temperature of either the heating unit or the quench water. Whether the axle shaft has reached the proper temperature and hardness is determined largely by appearance.
After the shafts have been through the tocco unit, random samples from each work station are tested by an eddy current machine to determine whether the case depth specification has been met. Samples are also given a "file test" to make sure that the quench water has not become overheated. Any shafts which fail the eddy current test are retoccoed, that is, run through the heat induction hardening process again. General Motors maintains that the retocco process brings the shafts up to its case depth and hardness specifications.
After the tocco process and inspections, the axle shafts are placed in a tempering furnace to relieve quench stress. Again, the shafts are subjected at random to a series of inspections. They are ultrasound tested for internal defects such as chevrons or cracks. General Motors' witnesses testified that all axle shafts are so tested. However, the plaintiffs witness, the Saginaw-Buffalo plant lab supervisor at the time the Jacksons' axle shaft was manufactured, testified that in 1983, the retoccoed axles were not ultrasound tested because they had a 100% failure rate since the retocco process changes the nature of the steel. Further, evidence was presented that ultrasonic testing begins at the button end of the axle, but does not extend to the flange end where the Jacksons' axle fractured.
III.
As a result of the accident, Amanda suffered profound brain damage. At the age of five, test results indicated that her I.Q. was below 35, approximating the mental age of a twenty-two month old. A hydrocephalic condition which developed several days after the accident rendered her permanently shunt-dependent, requiring the maintenance of a lumbar peritoneal shunt to relieve the pressure on her brain and dispose of excess spinal fluid. Constant medication is required to control seizure activity. As a result of damage to the occipital lobe of her brain, Amanda also suffers visual, speech and motor control impairments.
Linda sustained multiple injuries, most notably, severe hip and pelvic damage, rendering her incapable of sustaining a pregnancy to term. Ultimately, it was necessary to perform a tubal ligation. Further, there is evidence that Linda also sustained closed brain injuries and that she suffers from severe psychological problems as result of the accident. These injuries, as well as the burden of caring for Amanda, has resulted in a serious loss of companionship and conjugal rights to Linda's husband, Terry.
IV.
The Jacksons filed a complaint against General Motors, a Delaware corporation, and Grenada Sales Company, Inc., a Mississippi corporation, in the Leake County Circuit Court on November 8, 1985. They alleged that General Motors and Grenada Sales were strictly liable on the theory of products liability, and that the defendants breached express and implied warranties of merchantability and fitness. Seeking both compensatory and punitive damages, they further charged that General Motors was negligent, reckless and wanton in the manufacture, tempering and testing of the rear axle of the vehicle.
After the defendants' unsuccessful attempt to remove the case to federal court, there ensued four years of discovery. The parties focused on developing expert opinions in support of their conflicting theories of axle failure: the Jacksons' assertion that the accident was caused by a stress fracture in the rear axle and General Motors' argument that the impact of the accident caused the axle to fracture.
The pretrial battle of the experts appeared to reach a crescendo in 1989, when John Marcosky, an expert in the field of accident reconstruction retained by the Jacksons, communicated to their attorneys that he believed that the axle did not fracture prior to the accident. The attorneys had responded through interrogatories that Marcosky was expected to testify that the crash was caused by a defective rear axle. Much later in the discovery process, Marcosky presented an opinion similar to that espoused by General Motors' experts, adding that he believed the axle broke in mid-air during the rollover. The attorneys filed supplemental responses withdrawing Marcosky as a potential expert, and withdrew as counsel for the Jacksons.
At trial, General Motors' two experts in the fields of accident reconstruction and metallurgy, as well as various employees in the laboratory and quality control areas, testified that the axle was not defective and broke on impact. The Jacksons' experts presented evidence that the axle was defective and further, that the accident was caused by a stress fracture in the axle. General Motors presented no experts to contradict any of the Jacksons' witnesses on the issue of damages.
After ten days of testimony, the jury returned a general verdict against General Motors, but in favor of Grenada Sales. It awarded Amanda Jackson damages in the amount of $5 million; Linda Jackson, $2 million, and Terry Jackson, $150,000.00 for loss of consortium. Judgment was entered on June 11, 1990.
V.
General Motors contends that the jury verdict and damages are against the weight of the evidence, that the circuit court erred in the admission and exclusion of certain evidence, and that the circuit judge made comments prejudicial to the manufacturer. Having carefully reviewed the twenty-four volume record and accompanying exhibits, we find that General Motors' assignments of error are without merit. As with any lengthy trial, this may not have been a perfect trial. However, it was a fair trial. The circuit judge was fair and even-handed throughout the proceedings. Our review of the 2,094 page trial transcript indicates that, if anything, the circuit court "bent over backwards" to accommodate General Motors and its witnesses. On direct examination, experts were allowed to indulge in long, uninterrupted narratives. They were even permitted to re-examine, measure and test evidence on two occasions during the trial. Moreover, throughout the trial, when counsel would allude to earlier testimony, the circuit judge admonished the members of the jury to remember that they, not the court or the attorneys, were the finders of fact, and to rely on their own recollections of the evidence presented.
VI.
General Motors' contention that the circuit court erred in striking the designation and testimony of John Marcosky as an expert witness for Grenada Sales provides us with an opportunity to address the application of M.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(B). In December, 1988, Marcosky, who had been retained by the Jacksons as an expert in 1987, communicated to their attorneys that based on his examination of the damaged rear wheel-axle assembly and the manner in which the flange end was bent, he had concluded that the axle shaft did not fail prior to impact. Consequently, in January, 1989, the Jacksons supplemented their interrogatories and withdrew Marcosky as a potential expert. On May 30, 1989, Grenada Sales noticed Mareo-sky's deposition. The Jacksons concurrently sought a protective order, asserting that deposition of Marcosky, as well as Grenada Sales' request for his files, was improper and beyond the scope of discovery allowed by M.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(B). The circuit court overruled the Jacksons' motion and authorized Grenada Sales to depose Marcosky, but reserved for trial his ruling on its admissibility. After the June 12, 1989 deposition, Grenada Sales designated Marcosky as an expert witness. The Jacksons filed a motion to strike the designation and to exclude his testimony. Applying a literal interpretation of Rule 26(b)(4)(B), the circuit court found "that ex pert, John Marcosky, should not have been allowed by this Court to have been deposed in the first instance and should not be allowed to testify in this cause."
We find that the circuit court properly acknowledged its error in allowing Grenada Sales to depose Marcosky prior to trial and agree that he should not have been allowed to testify. Rule 26(b)(4)(B) clearly limits the extent to which a party may discover the opinions or facts known by an expert retained by an adverse party but not expected to be called as a witness at trial. The rule provides as follows:
A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has been retained or specially employed by another party in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial only upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means.
M.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(B) (emphasis added). The rule makes no provision for ex parte communication with an expert witness. Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) further limits even the discovery of facts known by an expert witness expected to be called at trial, allowing depositions only after interrogatories.
Interpreting the analogous federal rule, courts have found that "[t]he party 'seeking disclosure under Rule 26(b)(4)(B) carries a heavy burden' in demonstrating the existence of exceptional circumstances." Ager v. Jane C. Stormont Hospital and Training School for Nurses, 622 F.2d 496, 503 (10th Cir.1980); Hoover v. United States Department of Interior, 611 F.2d 1132, 1142 n. 13 (5th Cir.1980). Neither Grenada Sales nor General Motors presented a showing of exceptional circumstances making it impossible or impractical for them to obtain facts or opinions about the cause of the accident by any other means. Absent such a showing, deposition of an expert retained by a party but not expected to testify is impermissible.
Our discussion does not end with Rule 26(b)(4)(B). The rules of discovery do not address whether the testimony of a non-witness expert retained or dismissed by a party is admissible at trial. Admission or suppression of evidence is within the discretion of the trial judge and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. Sperry-New Holland v. Prestage, 617 So.2d 248, 260 (Miss.1993); Hughes v. Tupelo Oil Company, Inc., 510 So.2d 502, 505 (Miss.1987); Brumley Estate v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 704 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir.1983), cert. denied 465 U.S. 1028, 104 S.Ct. 1288, 79 L.Ed.2d 690 (1984).
Rule 403 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence provides that evidence, though relevant, may be excluded "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading of the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." This Court will not "engage anew in the 403 balancing process," rather its scope is limited to determining "whether the trial court abused its discretion in weighing the factors and admitting or excluding the evidence." Williams v. State, 543 So.2d 665, 667 (Miss.1989), quoting Foster v. State, 508 So.2d 1111, 1118 (Miss.1987). Except for his hypothesis that the axle broke in mid-air during the rollover, Marcosky's theory of the accident was nearly identical to that articulated by General Motors' own experts. It added nothing new to the evidence presented and thus, would have been cumulative. Having found that Marcosky's deposition was obtained in contravention of Rule 26(b)(4)(B), we cannot say that the circuit court erred in refusing to allow his testimony.
As General Motors contends, no privilege exists to bar Marcosky's testimony. Except in those instances where an expert was originally retained in another capacity, a majority of jurisdictions have held that the rules of privilege do not preclude calling an expert witness originally retained by the adverse party. Knoff v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 380 N.W.2d 313, 319-320 (N.D.1986); Granger v. Wisner, 134 Ariz. 377, 379, 656 P.2d 1238, 1240 (1982). However, in the case sub judice, allowing Marcosky to testify would "create the anomaly that although a party cannot depose an adversary's non-testi fying expert, a court can compel the witness to testify at trial." Graham v. Gielchinsky, 126 N.J. 361, 368, 599 A.2d 149, 153 (1991).
Allowing General Motors to call Marcosky as a trial witness and to allude to the fact that he had been retained and later dismissed by the Jacksons would be highly prejudicial. Generally, when an expert formerly retained by a party is allowed to testify for an adverse party, he is restricted from mentioning the prior affiliation. Granger, 134 Ariz. at 381, 656 P.2d at 1242. The Arizona Court found:
[t]he admission of this evidence on direct examination would only serve to unfairly prejudice the plaintiff. Jurors unfamiliar with the role of counsel in adversary proceedings might well assume that plaintiffs counsel had suppressed evidence which he had an obligation to offer. Such a reaction would destroy counsel's credibility in the eyes of the jury.
Granger, 134 Ariz. at 381-382, 656 P.2d at 1242-1243, citing State v. Biggers, 360 S.W.2d 516, 517 (Tex.1962). Without such safeguards, the resultant prejudice would impede the search for truth.
VII.
The jury awarded compensatory damages in the amount of $5 million to Amanda and $2 million to Linda. Linda's husband, Terry, was awarded $150,000.00 for loss of consortium. General Motors asserts that the $7.15 million award is excessive. However, based on the unrefuted evidence in the record before us, these amounts are neither unreasonable nor outrageous. Considering the profound and permanent nature of the injuries sustained; pain, suffering, and the loss of enjoyment of life; and the costs of care and rehabilitation, we do not find that the award "evinces such bias, passion or prejudice on the jury's part as to shock the conscience" of this Court. Jordan v. McKenna, 573 So.2d 1371, 1378 (Miss.1990).
VIII.
In the trial of this case, the search for truth focused on a battle of the experts, each armed with a particular view of the parties' conflicting theories of how this tragic accident occurred. After hearing ten days of testimony, the jury, as the ultimate finder of fact, rendered a verdict in favor of the Jack-sons. Considering the serious and permanent nature of the injuries sustained, the damages awarded do not shock the conscience of this Court. Having carefully considered the record, particularly the more than two thousand ninety-four page trial transcript, we cannot say that the lower court judge acted with prejudice or partiality in his conduct of the trial. As with any lengthy trial, it was not a perfect trial. It was, however, a fair trial. Accordingly, we affirm the jury's verdict and deny General Motors' petition for rehearing.
AFFIRMED.
LEE, P.J., and SULLIVAN, PITTMAN, BANKS and JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., JJ., concur.
BANKS, J., concurs with separate written opinion joined by SULLIVAN, PITTMAN and JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., JJ.
SMITH, J., dissents with separate written opinion joined by HAWKINS, C.J., and PRATHER, P.J.
HAWKINS, C.J., dissents with separate written opinion joined by SMITH, J. and joined by PRATHER, P.J., in results only.
. The Court, sitting en banc, denied as moot General Motors' motion to allow Justices Roberts and Smith to participate in this case, pursuant to Supreme Court Internal Operating Rules. The Mississippi Manufacturer's Association's petition to file briefs as amicus curiae was denied as too little too late.