Case Name: MANDEVILLE et al. v. COOKENDERFER
Court: United States Circuit Court of the District of Columbia
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1827-12
Citations: 16 F. Cas. 580
Docket Number: 
Parties: MANDEVILLE et al. v. COOKENDERFER.
Judges: (THRTJSTON, Circuit Judge, absent).
Reporter: Federal Cases
Volume: 16
Pages: 580–586

Head Matter:
Case No. 9,009.
MANDEVILLE et al. v. COOKENDERFER.
[3 Cranch, C. C. 257.]
Circuit Court, District of Columbia.
Dec. Term, 1827.
Slavery — Action por Escape — Presumption as to Negro — Prima Facts Case — General Verdict — Judgment Arrested —Venire de Novo.
1. The keeper of a stage-office is liable to the owner of a colored slave, for damages sustained by the running away of the slave, if he suffers him to take passage and depart in the stagecoach, without the consent of the owner.
2. Color is primR facie evidence of slavery.
3. Fvery person, who undertakes a business in which the public is concerned, is bound by the general law of the land, to conduct that business with reasonable care; and if, for want of such care in such business, another person suffer damage, the conductor of such business is liable to make good such damage.
[Cited in Lowe v. Stockton, Case No. 8,567.]
4. Every negro is, by a rule of evidence well established in this part of the country, prima fade, to be considered as a slave, and the property of somebody; and he who acts, in respect to him, as if he were a free man, acts at his peril; and the burden of proof is on him to show that the negro is not a slave; or at least to show such circumstances as will rebut the presumption arising from color.
5. If the keeper of a public stage-office send a negro away in the stage-coach, it is primS. facie evidence of carelessness.
6. In Buch a case it is not necessary to aver in the declaration, any special law or custom, to raise a duty in the office-keeper, not to send away a negro slave without the leave of his master or owner.
7. Where it is necessary to set forth the duty, the averment must relate to the time of doing the act which is supposed to be a violation of that duty.
8. The words “wrongfully and improperly” are not alone sufficient to show, that the act to which they are applied, was unlawful or actionable; but the facts and circumstances, which make the act unlawful or actionable, must be set forth.
9. If there be a general verdict for the plaintiff. and one of the counts in the declaration be bad, the judgment must be arrested; but, if there be a good count in the declaration, a ve-nire facias de novo, may be awarded.
This was an action upon the case against [Thomas Cookenderfer] the keeper of a public stage-office in Washington, for suffering the plaintiffs’ slave to take passage in the stagecoach from Washington to Baltimore, whereby the slave escaped; and the plaintiffs [Mandeville and Larmour] were put to great trouble and expense in recovering him. At the trial, in May term, 1827, THE COURT (nem. con.) at the prayer of the plaintiffs, instructed the jury in effect, that color was prima facie evidence of slavery; and that if they should be satisfied by the evidence that the plaintiffs’ slave was a colored man; and that the defendant, without authority of the plaintiffs, suffered him to take a seat in the stage-coach for Baltimore, and that he went off in the coach, and thereby escaped, the defendant is liable to the plaintiffs in this action for the damages which the plaintiffs may have sustained by reason of such escape. The jury found a general verdict for the plaintiffs for 8200 damages.
The defendant’s counsel moved in arrest of judgment, and contended that the second count was bad.
1. The first count states that the plaintiffs were owners of a negro man, a slave for life, called Richard Bunbury; and that the defendant, on the 28th of September, 1825, was the “keeper and superintendent, and had the management and control of a stage-office, for the entry of lawful passengers, traveling from the city of Washington, in the said county. to Baltimore,” &c., “and whereas by the law and the custom of the county aforesaid, superintendents, keepers, and managers of stage-offices, are bound not to take any slave for life, belonging to any citizen or citizens of said county, out of the same, or to take any such slave or slaves, out of the district aforesaid, in any stage, carriage, or other vehicle, or in any wise to suffer or permit, or aid in suffering or permitting any such slave or slaves, to have passage or conveyance in any line of stages, coach, stage or other conveyance under their or his control, management or superintendence, by or through which any such slave or slaves, may be carried out of the district aforesaid, without .proper permission or authority from the owner of such slave or slaves; yet the said Thomas Cookenderfer,” (the defendant) “not regarding his duty in that behalf,” &c. “took so little and such bad care of, and conducted himself so carelessly and improperly in the management of the said line” “of stages,” “and the office of such stage line, in the said county, that the said” “slave” was by and through the carelessness, misdirection, mismanagement, and improper conduct of said defendant, permitted, suffered, and allowed, and by him unjustly authorized and enabled to take a seat and passage in the said line of stages, or one of the stages of the said line on the 28th of September, in the year 1825, at the county aforesaid, and the said “slave” "to be therein and thereby carried, and taken out of, and beyond the county and district of Columbia, aforesaid, and out of, and from the control of the said plaintiffs, and thereby caused the said plaintiffs to pay” &c., a large sum of money, namely, 8500, for recovering him, and to lose his services, &e.
2. The second count, “and whereas the said defendant Thomas Cookenderfer, was, on the 28th day of September, in the year 1825, at the county aforesaid, the keeper of the stage-office, for the line of stages which runs to and between, and on the route to and between, the city of Baltimore in the state of Maryland, from the city of Washington, in the county of Washington, and had, on the day and year aforesaid, and at the county aforesaid, the control and management of the same, and the superintendence of passages taken and entered on the books and way-bill, for and in the said line, route, and stages, from said city of Washington, and it is his duty as such superintendent, not to permit or suffer, or in any wise aid any slave for life, owned by any citizen or citizens, in said county and district, or any such slave owned by any citizen or citizens within said district, to make and effect his escape from the ownership, control of, or servitude to his lawful master or masters, by means of, or through the said stage-line, or stage-office, or by, or in any manner or mode of conveyance under and within his control, as superintendent of such line of stages, or stage, belonging or connected to, or with the said line or route, or office.- Nevertheless the said Thomas not regarding his duty aforesaid, wrongfully and improperly, did, on the 28th day of Septem ber, in the year 1S25, at the county of Washington aforesaid, suffer and allow, and give permission to, and aid the said negro slave, Richard Bunbury, the property, before and at that time, of said plaintiffs, to taire passage and conveyance in the said line or route of stages, or one of the stages of the said line or route, from Washington city, in the county of Washington, to, or on the route to Baltimore, in the state of Maryland, and to be therein conveyed and carried out of the district and county aforesaid, and out of the reach and control of said plaintiffs, whereby the said plaintiffs lost, and were deprived of the use, labor, services, and profits of the said slave,” Ac., “and also caused the said plaintiffs to pay” &c., “money for the recovery of said slave,” &e.
Morfit & Swann, for plaintiffs.
Mr. Key, for defendant.

Opinion:
CRANCH, Chief Judge
(THRTJSTON, Circuit Judge, absent).
It is moved in arrest of judgment, that one, if not both counts of the declaration are bad; and as the verdict is general, if either count be bad, the judgment must be arrested.
The first count sets forth the law and custom of the county of Washington, in relation only to the slaves of citizens of that county; and as the count does not aver the plaintiffs to be citizens of that county, the case is not within the law and custom set forth; and therefore the plaintiffs' case derives no support from that allegation. But the averment of the law and custom of the county may be considered as surplusage; and if, without that averment, there be enough left in the count to make the defendant liable, the count may be good.
The count avers that the defendant was, at the time, &c., the keeper, and had the management and control of the stage-office of a line of stages for passengers passing in such stages from Washington to Baltimore; that the defendant, not regarding his duty in that behalf, took so little care of, and conducted himself so carelessly and improperly in the management of his said office that the plaintiffs' negro slave, the property of the plaintiffs, was by the carelessness, misdirection, and mismanagement of the defendant permitted, suffered, and allowed, and unlawfully and unjustly authorized, and enabled to take a seat in one of the stages of that line, and to be thereby carried and taken out of the District of Columbia, and out of the control of the plaintiffs, whereby they sustained damage.
Every person who undertakes a business, in which the public is concerned, is bound, by the general law of the land, to conduct that business with reasonable care; and if, for want of such care in such business, another person suffer damage, the conductor of such business is liable to make good such damage. If the keeper of a stage-office carelessly send away my goods, without my authority, or send them in a wrong direction, so that I suffer damage through his carelessness, he is liable to make compensation for my loss, although he did not know the goods to be my property. Every negro is, by a rule of evidence well established in this part of the country, prima facie to be considered as a slave, and the property of somebody; and he, who acts in regard to him as if he were a free man, acts at his peril, and the burden of proof is upon him, to show that the negro is not a slave, or, at least, to show such circumstances as will rebut the ¿presumption arising from color. If the keeper of a stage-office, therefore, send a negro away in the stagecoach, it is prima facie evidence of carelessness. In such a casé, I do not think it necessary that the plaintiff should, in his declaration, aver any special law or custom, to raise a duty in the office-keeper not to send away a negro slave, without the leave of his master or owner. After striking out of the present count, the averment of the special law and custom of the county of Washington, I think there is enough left in the count to maintain the action.
In the second count, the duty of the defendant, the violation of which is the subject of complaint, is averred to be a duty existing at the time of the complaint, not at the time of the act of sending away the slave. The plaintiffs' case is, therefore, not aided by that averment; and if there be not enough left in the count to show a duty on the part of the defendant, the plaintiffs cannot recover on that count. If that averment be stricken out, the substance of the count is. That the defendant was, on the 28th of September, 1825, the keeper of the stage-office, &c., and had the control and management of the same, and of the passages taken, &c. Nevertheless, the said Thomas Cookenderfer (the defendant) wrongfully and improperly did. on the 28th of September, 1S25, at, &c., "suffer and allow, and give permission to, and aid the said negro slave, Richard Bunbury, the property, before and at that time, of the plaintiffs, to take passage in one of the stages," &c., "and to be therein conveyed and carried out of the district aforesaid, and out of the reach and control of the plaintiffs, whereby, the plaintiffs lost the service of the said slave," &c., "and sustained damage," &c.
This count does not aver negligence, or carelessness of the defendant, in his office or business; nor that the aid given to the slave, was knowingly, or unlawfully given, nor without the consent of the owners; nor does it show any cause of action, unless the words "wrongfully and improperly" can be considered as a sufficient averment of the wrong. But these epithets have never been considered of themselves as sufficient to show an act to be unlawful, or actionable, which would not appear to be so without those epithets. All the circumstances must be shown, that cause the act to be unlawful, so that the court may judge whether it be unlawful or not.
I am therefore of opinion, that the 2d count is bad, and not aided by the verdict; and, therefore, that the judgment must be arrested.