Case Name: BURRELL v. ANNAPOLIS HOSPITAL; KEY v. ROMULUS TOWNSHIP SCHOOLS
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1971-10-26
Citations: 36 Mich. App. 537
Docket Number: Docket Nos. 8842, 8843
Parties: BURRELL v. ANNAPOLIS HOSPITAL KEY v. ROMULUS TOWNSHIP SCHOOLS
Judges: Before: Quinn, P. J., and Y. J. Brennan and O’Hara, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 36
Pages: 537–544

Head Matter:
BURRELL v. ANNAPOLIS HOSPITAL KEY v. ROMULUS TOWNSHIP SCHOOLS
Opinion op the Court
1. Civil Rights — Appeal and Error — Pinal Orders — Trial De Novo.
Appeals from final orders of the Civil Rights Commission shall be tried de novo in the circuit court (Const 1963, art 5, § 29).
2. Civil Rights — Appeal and Error — Pinal Orders — Jury Trial.
A jury trial is. not available under any circumstances in casos where final orders of the Civil Rights Commission are appealed to circuit court.
3. Civil Rights — Appeal and Error — Trial De Novo.
The term “tried de novo” as applied to appeals to circuit court from final orders of the Civil Rights Commission means a full new evidentiary hearing before the circuit judge; however, the parties can, if they so choose and properly stipulate, agree to submission of the record made and transcribed before the Commission for a complete and independent reassessment by the circuit judge (Const 1963, art 5, §29).
Dissent in Part and Concurrence in Part by V. J. Brennan, J.
4. Civil Rights — Appeal and Error — Constitutional Law.
The provision governing appeals from the Civil Mights Commission, heing a constitutional provision, does not violate the constitutional provision that no person exercising powers of one branch of government shall exercise powers properly belonging to another branch except as expressly provided in the Constitution (Const 1963, art S, §2).
Reference for Points in He adnotes
[1-6] 15 Am Jur 2d, Civil Rights § 63 et seq.
5. Civil Eights — Appeal and Error — Trial De Novo.
Appellants from adverse final orders of the Civil Bights Commission are entitled to a complete new trial in circuit court, not merely some form of review based on the record before the Civil Bights Commission (Const 1963, art 5, §29).
6. Civil Eights — Appeal and Error — Jury Trial.
An appellant from a final order of the Civil Bights Commission is entitled to a jury trial upon demand if the nature of the relief sought is legal, not equitable, in nature; however, since the primary relief available to a complainant before the Civil Bights Commission is a cease and desist order, an equitable relief, trial by jury would usually be precluded.
Appeal from Wayne, Thomas J. Roumell, Theodore R. Bohn, and James N. Canham, JJ.
Submitted Division 1 June 11, 1971, at Detroit.
(Docket Nos. 8842, 8843.)
Decided October 26, 1971.
Complaint before the Michigan Civil Rights Commission by Earleen Burrell against Annapolis Hospital (No. 8842). Complaint before the Civil Rights Commission by James A. Key against the Romulus Township Schools (No. 8843). Orders entered by the Commission against defendants. Defendants appealed to Wayne Circuit Court. Judgment for plaintiffs. Defendants appeal.
Reversed and remanded.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, and William F. Bledsoe, Assistant Attorney General, for the Civil Rights Commission.
Gozadd, Shangle & Smith, for Annapolis Hospital.
B. B. Mosier, for Romulus Township Schools.
Amicus Curiae: Chrysler Corporation, hy Dickinson, Wright, McKean & Cudlip (hy Lawrence M. Kelly).
Before: Quinn, P. J., and Y. J. Brennan and O’Hara, JJ.
Former Supreme Court Justice, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment pursuant to Const 1963, art 6 § 23 as amended in 1968.

Opinion:
O'Hara, J.
In the main we agree with Judge Brennan in his interpretation of the constitutional language providing that appeals from final orders of the Civil Rights Commission shall he tried de novo.
"We cannot, however, agree that whether an appellant is entitled to a trial by jury, advisory or otherwise, is dependent on the "nature of the relief sought". We are obligated to say that such a conclusion is to us legally unsound.
Rather, we hold that trial hy jury is not available to either party under any circumstance. We so hold for the following reasons: When the constitutional convention included specifically, in the granted trial de novo on appeal, both cease and desist orders and refusals to issue complaints along with all other final orders of the commission, it evidenced conclusively the intention that the nature of the trial de novo on appeal he uniform. We cannot read that language to mean a jury trial in some instances and not in others. Indeed, there is in such construction at least a suggestion of an equal protection clause question.
It seems to us manifest that there is simply no feasible manner in which to submit to a jury the question of whether a complaint should have issued. The practical problems are virtually insurmount able. Tbe evidentiary questions alone would extend sucb an appeal almost to infinity. By its very nature, this is the type of proceeding best handled by a judge sitting without a jury. Since the delegates were so pointedly explicit in their language in all other respects, if "tried de novo before the circuit court" had meant trial by jury the convention would have used language expressly providing for it.
In holding that "tried de novo" means a full new evidentiary hearing before the circuit judge, we do not mean that the parties cannot, if they so choose and properly so stipulate, agree to submission of the appeal on the record made and transcribed before the commission for a complete and independent reassessment thereof by the circuit judge. It seems to us that the foregoing construction of the new constitutional provision insures at once uniformity of appellate right, and also that degree of flexibility which would not necessitate in every case a full rehearing of all the witnesses who testified in the proceedings before the commission.
Quinn, P. J., concurred.
See Const 1963, art 5, § 29.