Case Name: FULTON v. CANNO et al.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1914-05-06
Citations: 147 N.Y.S. 721
Docket Number: 
Parties: FULTON v. CANNO et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 147
Pages: 721–724

Head Matter:
(162 App. Div. 203)
FULTON v. CANNO et al.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.
May 6, 1914.)
1. Contracts (§ 321 )—Rescission—Breach.
While defendants had uq right to rescind a contract while plaintiff was faithfully performing his part of it, defendants were entitled to refuse to further perform and pay such damages as plaintiff might sustain therefrom.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Contracts, Cent. Dig. §§ 1508-3527; Dec. Dig. § 321.*]
2. Sales (§ 182*)—Performance of Contract—Question for Jury.
Where, under contract to purchase skim milk from a creamery, defendants installed vats in the creamery to receive the milk from the separator, and employed a cheese maker to receive the milk and manufacture it into cheese, and, after they had notified plaintiff that they would go no further with the contract, still maintained the cheese maker at the factory, who under their instructions from day to-day disposed of the milk, whether defendants had breached their contract, or were receiving milk under it notwithstanding their notice, was for the jury.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Sales, Cent. Dig. §§ 492-495; Dec. Dig. $ 182.*] . . - . . • .
3. Sales (§ 131 )—Rescission of Contract—Duty of Seller.
Where, pursuant to a contract for the purchase of skim milk from a creamery, defendants installed vats in the creamery to receive it, and a cheese maker to manufacture it into cheese, and thereafter notified plaintiff that they would no longer comply with the contract, but did not remove the tanks or cheese maker, and notified plaintiff not to use the tanks, plaintiff was not obliged himself to remove them, especially while the cheese maker remained in charge of them as defendant’s agent.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Sales, Cent. Dig. §§ 325-327; Dec. Dig. § 131.*]
Smith, P. J., and Howard, X, dissenting in part.
Appeal from Trial Term, Sullivan County.
Action by Arlington P. Fulton against Max Canno and another, trading as Canno’s Dairy. From a judgment for plaintiff, and from an order denying defendants’ motion for a new trial, they appeal.
Affirmed.
Argued before SMITH, P..J./and KELLOGG, LYON, HOWARD, and WOODWARD, JJ.
Arthur C. Kyle, of Monticello (Ellsworth Baker, of Hurléyville, of counsel), for appellants.
John D. Lyons, of Monticello, for respondent.
For other eases see same topic & § number in Dee; & Am.-Digs..1907 to-date. &Rep’rTiid6xés
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
JOHN M. KELLOGG, J.
By written agreement of December 15, 1911, the defendants purchased all the pure skim milk from the plaintiff's creamery, for one. year from December 1st, at 23 cents per can of 40 quarts, to be placed in the defendants' cans at the creamery until April 1st following, after which date the defendants might elect to receive it in the same manner, or they could instruct the plaintiff's butter maker how to make it into pot cheese at the creamery, without added expense to the plaintiff, the defendants furnishing the tanks andr fixtures therefor, in which case the plaintiff was to receive 25 cents per can, and if the cheese was not satisfactory the loss should be the defendants'.
Finding it difficult to remove the milk from the creamery to the place where they were to make the pot cheese, in January defendants obtained a modification of the contract, which the jury have found to be as follows: The plaintiff was to remove certain of his machinery and appliances, and fix the floor of the creamery so that the defendants could install two tanks, with a capacity of 600 gallons, each'tank being 16 feet long and 3% feet wide. That defendants were to put in a cheese maker of their own, and receive the milk into the tanks as it came from the separator, and to cover the expenses in fixing the building, and for its use and for the trouble in having the cheese made there, the plaintiff was to receive 25 cents per can, instead of 23 cents. From January until June 21st the. contract was performed in that manner. Cole was the defendants' butter maker and representative at the factory. On the latter date the defendants wrote the plaintiff that they would go no further with the contract. They, however, left their tanks in position and connected with the separator, and their cheese maker remained at the factory in charge of them, and from day to day, when the tanks became full, he opened them and allowed the milk to run into the whey vat.
The plaintiff was faithfully performing his contract, and the defendants had no right to rescind it. Nevertheless the defendants had the right to refuse to go any further with the contract, and were liable to pay such damages as the plaintiff might sustain. The fact that the defendants had written the plaintiff that they would go no further, and the fact that they still occupied the space in the creamery with their tanks connected with the separator, and that their agent remained in charge, disposing of the milk from day to day, rendered the defendants' position somewhat ambiguous, and it was a clear question of fact for the jury to determine whether the defendants had breached their contract or were receiving milk under it. The case was submitted to the jufy fully and fairly on that theory. In the charge the jury was directed to find for the defendants, unless it determined that Cole was the defendants' agent and that the defendants accepted the milk under the contract after June 21st. The case was not for damages for the breach of a contract, but proceeded solely upon the theory that the plaintiff had fully performed and that the defendants had accepted such performance. ,
After notifying the plaintiff that they would break the contract, defendants had the right to change their minds and observe it. They notified the plaintiff that he must not use the tanks, and by occupying the space in the factory they prevented him from using it. He was not obliged to remove their tanks, especially while their agent remained in charge of them. If the defendants unequivocally had refused to receive the milk, and had removed their tanks and agent from the factory, it is clear that the plaintiff could not discharge the milk upon the ground and recover the purchase price from the defendants. • That would not be the legal measure of damages. Apparently -the value of the milk was 23 cents per can. The plaintiff was to receive 2 cents per can for the expense incurred in putting the factory in shape for the defendants and for the privileges given them therein. The complaint alleges all the facts, and, in any event, the plaintiff was entitled to recover" 2 cents for each can of milk produced. But the evidence tended to show that the defendants accepted the milk, and the jury has so found. That was the only question in the case. No error of law was committed. The defendants were acting unreasonably and unfairly in notifying the plaintiff they would not receive the milk. Their conduct is without reasonable excuse. The verdict is fairly sustained by the evidence. I therefore favor an affirmance.
Judgment and order affirmed, with costs. All concur, except SMITH, P. J., writing for modification, in which HOWARD, J., concurs.