Case Name: MARTIN COUNTY, Appellant, v. Melvyn R. YUSEM, individually and as trustee, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1995-08-30
Citations: 664 So. 2d 976
Docket Number: No. 93-3025
Parties: MARTIN COUNTY, Appellant, v. Melvyn R. YUSEM, individually and as trustee, Appellee.
Judges: GLICKSTEIN, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 664
Pages: 976–982

Head Matter:
MARTIN COUNTY, Appellant, v. Melvyn R. YUSEM, individually and as trustee, Appellee.
No. 93-3025.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Aug. 30, 1995.
Order on Rehearing and Certification Nov. 22, 1995.
Noreen S. Dreyer, County Attorney, and Gary K. Oldehoff, Assistant County Attorney, Stuart, for appellant.
Thomas E. Warner and Tim B. Wright of Warner, Fox, Seeley, Dungey & Sweet, Stuart, for appellee.
Sherry A. Spiers, Tallahassee, for amicus curiae-Department of Community Affairs.

Opinion:
KLEIN, Judge.
This case presents the issue of whether Martin County was making a legislative or quasi-judicial decision when it denied the ap-pellee/landowner's request to amend the county's future land use map to allow more residential units on his property. We conclude that the county action was quasi-judicial.
The landowner's property consists of 54 acres which is part of a 900 acre tract classified in Martin County's Comprehensive Land Use Plan as a Primary Urban Services District (PUSD). Although a PUSD allows up to 2 units per acre under the comprehensive plan, the future land use map permits only 1 unit per 2 acres on this 900 acres. In 1990 the landowner filed an application seeking an amendment to the future land use map so as to allow 2 units per acre on his 54 acres, the maximum allowable under the PUSD category. If the landowner had been granted that change, he would then have requested a planned unit development (PUD) with 60 units. The PUD would not have required an amendment of the comprehensive plan.
After the county denied the amendment, the landowner sought relief in the circuit court, the details of which will be discussed later. Applying a strict judicial scrutiny standard of review, the circuit court concluded that the county improperly denied the landowner's requested amendment, and the county has appealed. The county argues that the trial court erred in using the strict scrutiny standard, and that we should reverse and remand so that the trial court can determine the propriety of the county's decision under the fairly debatable standard of review. The essence of the county's argument is that because a change in the density on these 54 acres could eventually affect the density of the remaining acres in the tract, the change is a legislative decision under Board of County Commissioners of Brevard County v. Snyder, 627 So.2d 469 (Fla.1993) {Snyder II). We do not agree.
In Snyder II, the Florida Supreme Court held that "Comprehensive rezonings affecting a large portion of the public are legislative in nature," but that:
[R]ezoning actions which have an impact on a limited number of persons or property owners, on identifiable parties and interests, where the decision is contingent on a fact or facts arrived at from distinct alternatives presented at a hearing, and where the decision can be functionally viewed as policy application, rather than policy setting, are in the nature of . quasi-judicial action....
Snyder, 627 So.2d at 474 (quoting Snyder v. Board of County Commissioners of Brevard County, 595 So.2d 65, 78 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (Snyder I)).
Our supreme court also stated in Snyder II that it is "the character of the hearing" which determines whether board action is legislative (policy making) or quasi-judicial (policy application). Id. at 474, citing Coral Reef Nurseries, Inc. v. Babcock Co., 410 So.2d 648, 652-53 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), in which the third district explained how a quasi-judicial hearing differs from one which is legislative:
[I]t is the character of the administrative hearing leading to the action of the administrative body that determines the label to be attached to the action_ The procedural due process which is afforded to the interested parties in a hearing on an application for rezoning . contains the safeguards of due notice, a fair opportunity to be heard in person and through counsel, the right to present evidence, and the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses; and it is the existence of these safeguards which makes the hearing quasi-judicial in character and distinguishes it from one which is purely legislative.
Applying Snyder II to these facts, we conclude that amending the future land use map to increase the density on this 54 acres will have a limited impact on the public, and that the action taken by the county in regard to this amendment would therefore be quasi-judicial. The board hearing "essentially addressed the change in the land use designation for a particular piece of property." Florida Inst, of Technology v. Martin County, 641 So.2d 898, 900 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).
This case is distinguishable from Section 28 Partnership, Ltd. v. Martin County, 642 So.2d 609, 612 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994), review denied, 654 So.2d 920 (Fla.1995), in which the amendment to the comprehensive plan involved the development of 638 acres which were bordered on 2 sides by Jonathan Dickinson State Park and the Loxahatchee River Preserve Area. The decision as to how that square mile would be developed was legislative because of "the pristine nature of the land in the park and around the river, the size of the park, and the use of it by the public." and the fact that the amendment would have created a new category of property which could be developed by using facilities from an adjacent county.
Although we have relied primarily on Snyder II to arrive at our conclusion that the county action was quasi-judicial, two cases which were being litigated in the fifth district during the period of time in which Snyder was working its way through the fifth district to the supreme court are worthy of discussion.
In City of Melbourne v. Puma, 630 So.2d 1097 (Fla.1994), the Florida Supreme Court did not write an opinion; however, the action which it took is of interest. According to Thomas G. Pelham, in Quasi-Judicial Rezonings, Journal of Land Use & Environ mental Law, Vol. 9, Number 2 (Spring 1994) of Florida State University, pages 282-83, the trial court in Puma, shortly after the fifth district decided Snyder I, held that a rezoning from low density residential to commercial, which required an amendment to the comprehensive plan's future land use map, was quasi-judicial. The fifth district affirmed, City of Melbourne v. Puma, 616 So.2d 190 (5th DCA 1993), merely citing Snyder I and another of its decisions. The Florida Supreme Court then accepted jurisdiction, City of Melbourne v. Puma, 624 So.2d 264 (Fla.1994), but after rendering its opinion in Snyder II, remanded Puma, stating that the conflict which had prompted it to take jurisdiction of Puma had been resolved by Snyder II. The supreme court's resolution of Puma is consistent with our conclusion that amendments to comprehensive plans are not necessarily legislative.
In Battaglia Properties, Ltd. v. Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission, 629 So.2d 161 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993), the landowner sought an amendment to the Orange County Comprehensive Plan to change 120 acres of low-density, single family residential property, to multi-family, office and commercial property. Although Judge Sharp wrote the "majority" opinion in Battaglia, she was the only member of the panel who believed that the amendment was a legislative decision. Judge Goshorn, concurring, and Judge Cowart, dissenting, both agreed that the amendment was not legislative under Snyder I. Battaglia was issued 6 days before Snyder II was issued by the Florida Supreme Court, and, although the fifth district had an opportunity on rehearing to consider Snyder II, it adhered to its original opinion.
Our conclusion that the amendment sought in the present case was quasi-judicial leaves the landowner with a jurisdictional problem. The proper method for reviewing a quasi-judicial decision by the county under these circumstances is by common law certiorari. Snyder II, 627 So.2d at 475; G.W. Dev. Corp. v. Village of North Palm Beach, 317 So.2d 828 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). In the present case the landowner timely filed a petition for certiorari. The county, however, moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that cer-tiorari was not the proper method to review the decision of the county and the landowner voluntarily dismissed it, only pursuing his subsequently filed complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief. Our conclusion that the county action was quasi-judicial, which is reviewable only by common law certiorari, means that the circuit court had no jurisdiction.
In Snyder II our supreme court said:
[I]n the posture of this case, we are reluctant to preclude the Snyders from any avenue of relief. Because of the possibility that conditions have changed during the extended lapse of time since their original application was filed, we believe that justice would be best served by permitting them to file a new application for rezoning of the property. The application will be without prejudice of the result reached by this decision and will allow the process to begin anew according to the procedure outlined in our opinion.
Id. at 476.
In light of the manner in which this area of the law was evolving when the landowner filed and dismissed his petition for common law certiorari in early 1991, we conclude that justice would best be served in the present case if the landowner were permitted to file a new application for amendment. We reverse the judgment because the trial court had no jurisdiction, but without prejudice to the landowner's starting anew.
GLICKSTEIN, J., concurs.
PARIENTE, J., dissents with opinion.
. There is a 30-day jurisdictional deadline for filing a petition for certiorari. Fla.R.App.P. 9.100(c). The complaint was not filed within 30 days of the county's denial of the amendment. Accordingly, the complaint could not have been treated as a petition for certiorari under the authority of Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.040(c), which provides that "if a party seeks an improper remedy, the cause shall be treated as if the proper remedy had been sought...."