Case Name: PEOPLE v. GLUCK
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1907-02-08
Citations: 102 N.Y.S. 758
Docket Number: 
Parties: PEOPLE v. GLUCK.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 102
Pages: 758–762

Head Matter:
(117 App. Div. 432)
PEOPLE v. GLUCK.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
February 8, 1907.)
1. Embezzlement—Larceny by Bailee—Appropriation—Evidence.
Defendant, after negotiating with B. for purchase of a diamond ring, received one, and signed, after reading it, a memorandum, reciting that the diamond weighed three-fourths of a kalrat, less a certain amount, and was of the value of $175, and that it was consigned by B. to defendant, returnable on demand, and that it was not sold, and that title did not pass, and at the same time defendant signed another paper, stating that he was "to deposit with B. $30 on execution of the agreement, and certain sums on subsequent dates, till the total deposits amounted to $175, when B. was to deliver to him a diamond, that all the deposits were to become the property of B., and that, if defendant defaulted in any payment, B. might deliver to defendant an article of the same nature reasonably wortn the sum deposited. On a trial for larceny of the ring it appeared that, when it was delivered to defendant, he gave to B. $5 and a check of a third person for $25, indorsed by him; that the check was returned to B. marked “N. G.”; that thereafter B. demanded return of the ring, and defendant said, “All right, I accept your demand,” but did not return it. Defendant testified that, when he got the ring, B. weighed the diamond, and told him that it weighed 1]4 karats, that thereafter he found this was not' its correct weight, and he thereupon stopped payment of the check and refused to make further payments. He also testified that he thereafter offered to return the ring if B. would return the $5 and the check. B. and another testified that such offer was not made. Held that, the jury being justified in finding that defendant did not stop payment of the check for the .reason assigned, the correct weight of the diamond being given in the memorandum, and he not having made the agreed payment at the time of delivery of the ring, and not having returned it when demanded, he could be found guilty under Pen. Code, § 528, declaring that a person who, with intent to deprive the owner of his property or to appropriate it to his own use. having in his possession, as bailee, any property, appropriates it to his own use, is guilty of larceny.
2. Witness—Gross-Examination of Defendant to Discredit Him.
Defendant on a trial for larceny having offered himself as a witness, thereby giving the state the right to prove specific facts tending to discredit him or impeach his moral character, and he having on his direct examination testified that he had been arrested in connection with a ticket agency of a steamship line, but was discharged, the state may on cross-examination ask him if such steamship ticket business was not that of selling to poor Jewish immigrants worthless orders for steamship tickets, and if he did not receive, in one instance, $83 for selling worthless orders for such tickets; such acts tending to show disregard of law, and contempt for the right of others.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 50, Witnesses, §§ 1144-1148.]
Patterson, P. J., and Houghton, J., dissenting.
Appeal from Court of General Sessions, New York County.
Mannie Gluck was convicted of grand larceny in the second degree, and appeals. Affirmed. ■
Argued before PATTERSON, P. J., and McLAUGHLIN, IN-GRAHAM, HOUGHTON, and LAMBERT, JJ.
Isadore L. Pascal, for appellant.
E. Crosby Kindleberger, for respondent.

Opinion:
McLAUGHLIN, J.
The defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him of the crime of grand larceny in the second degree, upon which he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment in state's prison, of not less than one nor more than four years.
The validity of the judgment appealed from is attacked principally upon the ground that, taking all the evidence together, it is insufficient to sustain the finding of the jury that the defendant was guilty of the crime charged, and for which he was convicted. The evidence, in substance, tends to show that on the 4th of January, 1906, the defendant went to the place of business of the complaining witness (one Behrens) for the purpose of purchasing, as he said, a diamond ring, and, on being shown several loose stones, selected one to be set in a ring; that the stone thus selected was set in a ring, and on the following day Behrens delivered it to the defendant, who at that time signed a memorandum, stating that "114 Kt. Solid Gold Tooth Ring, Roman colored,. set with solitaire diamond weighing less V18 V8*» value $175," was consigned by John Behrens & Co. to defendant, returnable on demand; that"the same was not sold, nor did title thereto pass; that the conditions on which the consignment was made were in writing, which the defendant read carefully before he signed the same and received the ring; that concurrently with the execution of this writing another one was signed by defendant, stating that he was to deposit with Behrens & Co. $30 on the execution of the agreement and certain sums on certain dates thereafter, until the total deposits amounted to $175, when Behrens & Co. were to deliver to him one diamond ring; that all the deposits then made were to become the property of Behrens & Co., who, in case defendant defaulted in any payment, were to deliver an article of the same nature, reasonably worth the sym deposited.
It was also made to appear that at the time the ring was delivered to the defendant he gave to Behrens & Co., or Behrens, the complaining witness, $5 in cash and a check of a third party, payable to his own order, and which was indorsed by him, for $25, which was not paid, the same being returned to Behrens marked "N. G."; that subsequently Behrens, in the presence of his son, demanded the return of the ring, and the demand was refused. The material part of the evidence offered on the part of the people was not disputed, but the defendant testified that, when he purchased the ring, Behrens weighed the diamond selected and told him it weighed a karat and a quarter, and that after the ring had been delivered to him he ascertained, by having it weighed, that this was not its correct weight, and he thereupon stopped payment of the check referred to and refused to make further payments; and that subsequently he offered to return the ring if Behrens would give back the $5 he had paid and return the check. This Behrens denied, and he was corroborated by his son as to the conversation which took place at the time the demand was made for the return of it, after the check had been dishonored. That a demand was made for the return of the ring was not denied by the defendant. . This, in substance, is the testimony offered by the respective parties, from which it appears that the defendant signed a memorandum at the time he accepted the ring, which, showed the weight of the diamond to be a little less than three-fourths of a karat. It was therefore unnecessary for the defendant to apply to other jewelers to ascertain the weight of the stone, nor could he in any way have been deceived upon that subject. He knew from the statement signed that the stone was not represented to weigh 1% karats, and therefore the jury was justified in finding that his stopping payment of the check was not for the reason assigned by him, but in pursuance of a purpose to obtain possession and keep the ring without paying for it.
The charge of the learned trial court was as favorable to the defendant as could be reasonably asked. He charged the jury that it must acquit if it reached the conclusion that the defendant offered to return the ring, or if he did not receive it as bailee. The defendant obtained the ring from Behrens & Co. He did not pay for it, and it was specifically agreed that until the deposits amounted to the price asked, viz., $175, the title to the ring was to remain in Behrens & Co., to whom the same should be returned on demand. He did not make the payment agreed at the time the ring was delivered, nor did he return the ring when demanded. Having failed" to return the ring when demanded, he was, under the provisions of section 528 of the Penal Code, guilty of larceny. The judgment of' conviction, therefore, should be affirmed unless there is merit in defendant's contention that errors were committed in the admission of evidence. During the defendant's direct examination he testified that he had been arrested in connection with a ticket agency of a steamship line, but was discharged. On cross-examination he was asked, and permitted to answer against objection and exception, if the steamship ticket business that hg was connected with was not that of selling to poor Jewish immigrants worthless orders for steamship tickets, and if he did not receive, in one instance, $83 for selling worthless orders for such tickets. To the first question he answered that he did not get money on false tickets from any one, and,- to the second question, that he sold an order for tickets which would be honored. He .contends that his exception in each instance was well taken. I am of the opinion that the ruling was proper and the evidence admissible. The defendant having offered himself as a witness, the people had a right to prove specific facts which tended to discredit him or to impeach his moral character. People v. Irving, 95 N. Y. 541; People v. Webster, 139 N. Y. 84, 34 N. E. 730.
In holding that the admission of this evidence was not error, the cases cited by the appellant have not been overlooked, but the distinction between evidence of previous arrest, indictments, or accusations of wrongful acts, and evidence of the commission of the wrongful acts themselves, is apparent. It is only the admission of evidence of the former character that the authorities condemn. On the other hand, the rule is well settled that acts showing disregard of law, and contempt for the rights of others, may be. shown on cross-examination to affect the credibility of the witness and to impeach his moral character, and the questions here propounded tended to elicit evidence bear ing on such subjects. People v. Irving, supra; People v. McCormick, 135 N. Y. 663, 32 N. E. 26.
The judgment of conviction is right, and should be affirmed.
INGRAHAM and LAMBERT, JJ" concur.