Case Name: STATE OF OREGON, Respondent, v. BRIAN WOODBRIDGE CLOWES, Appellant; STATE OF OREGON, Respondent, v. JUDY LOIS HAGER, Appellant; STATE OF OREGON, Respondent, v. MICHAEL JAMES KINSEY, Appellant; STATE OF OREGON, Respondent, v. RACHEL A. WOLCOTT, Appellant
Court: Oregon Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1990-01-25
Citations: 100 Or. App. 266
Docket Number: DA 372447-8806; CA A50128; DA 372448-8806; CA A50129; DA 372450-8806; CA A50132; DA 372446-8806; CA A50136
Parties: STATE OF OREGON, Respondent, v. BRIAN WOODBRIDGE CLOWES, Appellant. STATE OF OREGON, Respondent, v. JUDY LOIS HAGER, Appellant. STATE OF OREGON, Respondent, v. MICHAEL JAMES KINSEY, Appellant. STATE OF OREGON, Respondent, v. RACHEL A. WOLCOTT, Appellant.
Judges: BUTTLER, J.
Reporter: Oregon Reports, Court of Appeals
Volume: 100
Pages: 266–283

Head Matter:
Argued and submitted June 26,
resubmitted In Banc November 8, 1989,
affirmed January 25,
Clowes’s reconsideration, Hager’s reconsideration and Kinsey’s reconsideration denied March 14,
all petitions for review allowed April 26, 1990 (309 Or 698)
STATE OF OREGON, Respondent, v. BRIAN WOODBRIDGE CLOWES, Appellant. STATE OF OREGON, Respondent, v. JUDY LOIS HAGER, Appellant. STATE OF OREGON, Respondent, v. MICHAEL JAMES KINSEY, Appellant. STATE OF OREGON, Respondent, v. RACHEL A. WOLCOTT, Appellant.
(DA 372447-8806; CA A50128 (Control))
(DA 372448-8806; CA A50129)
(DA 372450-8806; CA A50132)
(DA 372446-8806; CA A50136)
(Cases Consolidated)
785 P2d 1071
Norman L. Lindstedt, Portland, argued the cause for appellants Judy Lois Hager and Rachel A. Wolcott. With him on the brief was Lindstedt & Buono, P.C., Portland.
William E. McCann, Tillamook, argued the cause and filed the brief for appellant Michael James Kinsey.
Richard L. Stradley, Hillsboro, argued the cause and filed the brief for appellant Brian Woodbridge Clowes.
Janet A. Klapstein, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were Dave Frohnmayer, Attorney General, and Virginia L. Linder, Solicitor General, Salem.
BUTTLER, J.
Graber, J., specially concurring.
Rossman, J., specially concurring.

Opinion:
BUTTLER, J.
Defendants were charged with criminal trespass in the second degree, ORS 164.245, for blocking the doors of the Lovejoy Surgicenter with the objective of preventing women from entering for the purpose of obtaining abortions. At their trials, defendants sought to assert the choice of evils defense, ORS 161.200, arguing that the trespass was an emergency measure that was necessary to avoid the imminent deaths of unborn children. The trial court granted the state's pretrial motion to exclude evidence of the defense on the ground that to allow its assertion would be inconsistent with federal law, specifically Roe v. Wade, 410 US 113, 93 S Ct 705, 35 L Ed 2d 147 (1973). Defendants appeal after their convictions, assigning error to the court's granting of the state's motion.
Defendants' first two arguments relate to the propriety of a pretrial exclusionary ruling in these circumstances. Defendants' arguments were rejected in State v. Whisman, 33 Or App 147, 151, 575 P2d 1005 (1978), in which we concluded:
"The intent of the legislature in enacting ORS 161.200 was to 'leave it to the trial judge to deal with the matter as he would any other offered evidence.' See Commentary, Proposed Oregon Criminal Code 20, § 20 (1970). See also, Minutes, Criminal Law Revision Commission, November 7, 1969, pp 25-30."
We went on to say that "the trial judge must determine in the first instance whether defendant's evidence relating to the defense of justification is relevant, material, competent and admissible." 33 Or App at 151. That is what the trial court did here and, in doing so, it acted within the range of its discretion.
In their remaining assignments, defendants argue that the court erred as a matter of law in excluding evidence in support of their choice of evils defense, ORS 161.200, thereby precluding their arguing their only defense to the jury. The trial court found that defendants had tendered sufficient evidence on all of the elements of the defense, generally, to submit it to the jury but concluded that to submit it would be inconsistent with Roe v. Wade, supra. Although it is not entirely clear, it appears that the court concluded that allowing defendants to present the defense would constitute state action, see, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 US 254, 264, 84 S Ct 710, 11 L Ed 2d 686 (1964); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 US 1, 68 S Ct 836, 92 L Ed 1161 (1948), by which the state would be sanctioning defendants' interference with the women's federal constitutional rights.
The trial court, on this record, was correct in holding that the women with whom defendants interfered had a federal constitutional right to be free of interference from the state in seeking an abortion. In Roe v. Wade, supra, the Court held that, through the first trimester of pregnancy, the right to an abortion is absolute. In the second trimester, a state may choose to regulate abortion procedures in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health. In the final trimester, the state may regulate abortion for the preservation of the life of the fetus. Defendants offered no evidence at the pretrial hearing that any of the women that they prevented from entering the clinic did not fall within the protection of Roe v. Wade, supra, or that they made any attempt to distinguish among them. Rather, their evidence was that life begins at the time of conception and that, therefore, none of the women had a right to abort their fetuses.
Because we conclude that there are independent state grounds on which to base our decision, we need not decide whether allowing the choice of evils defenses here would constitute state action, thereby running afoul of Roe v. Wade, supra.
ORS 161.200 provides:
"(1) Unless inconsistent with other provisions of chapter 743, Oregon Laws 1971, defining justifiable use of physical force, or with some other, provision of law, conduct which would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable and not criminal when:
"(a) That conduct is necessary as an emergency measure to avoid an imminent public or private injury; and
"(b) The threatened injury is of such gravity that, according to ordinary standards of intelligence and morality, the desirability and urgency of avoiding the injury clearly outweigh the desirability of avoiding the injury sought to be prevented by the statute defining the offense in issue.
"(2) The necessity and justifiability of conduct under subsection (1) of this section shall not rest upon considerations pertaining only to the morality and advisability of the statute, either in its general application or with respect to its application to a particular class arising thereunder."
Before considering subsections (a) and (b) of section (1), which set forth the elements of the defense, it is necessary to determine whether, in this case, defendants get past the threshold barrier that the defense is not available if its application would be "inconsistent with some other provision of law." Although there is little in the legislative history of the statute that helps us to discern what the legislature intended by that language, its conscious choice of very broad language indicates that, if allowing the defense would be inconsistent with any other discernable legislative or other governmental decision, it may not be asserted.
ORS 161.200 was enacted as part of the 1971 revision of the criminal code. Although the Commentary to the Proposed Oregon Criminal Code, § 20, states that it was derived from Model Penal Code § 3.02, New York Revised Penal Law § 35.05(2) and Michigan Revised Criminal Code § 605, the language of section (1) is identical to that of the Michigan statute, with some phrases deleted. The language with which we are concerned, specifying an exception to the availability of the defense, is the broadest of the three sources to which the drafters referred. The New York counterpart provides the least restrictive exception: The defense is available "[ujnless otherwise limited by the ensuing provisions of this article defining justifiable use of physical force[.]" New York Penal Law § 35.05. The exceptions in Model Penal Code § 3.02(1) lie somewhere between the other two. It permits the defense if
"(b) neither the Code nor other law defining the offense provides exceptions or defenses dealing with the specific situation involved; and
"(c) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed does not otherwise plainly appear."
Although we agree with Judge Graber's concurring opinion that the exceptions in the Oregon statute are closer to those in the Model Penal Code § 3.02(1) than they are to the New York Penal Law § 35.05(2), the Oregon language, taken from the proposed Michigan statute, is broader than that in either the other two. It is doubtful that the phrase of the Oregon statute, precluding the defense if it would be "inconsistent with some other provision of law," means the same thing as § 3.02(1)(c) of the Model Penal Code. ORS 161.200(1) does not require, as does the Model Penal Code, an express legislative foreclosure of the defense; it requires only that the defense be inconsistent with some other provision of law.
Here, it would be inconsistent with Oregon Laws 1983, chapter 470, section 1, which, after Roe v. Wade, supra, was decided, repealed all of the laws that might inhibit or restrict a woman in obtaining an abortion, former ORS 435.415; former ORS 435.425, former ORS 435.445, or mak ing it a crime to perform or aid in an abortion, former ORS 435.455, or permitting suspension or revocation of a doctor's license for performing an abortion. Former ORS 677.190. It would also be inconsistent with ORS 435.475(3), which prohibits any hospital operated by the state or by a political subdivision in the state from denying admission to a woman seeking an abortion. All of those legislative actions make it clear that the Oregon legislature has chosen, not only not to regulate abortions in any respect, but also not to interfere with a woman's right to seek and obtain an abortion. The present state of Oregon law is that a woman's decision to have an abortion is left to her and her physician. See ORS 435.435 et seq. To permit defendants to prevent or interfere with that freedom of choice would be inconsistent with the "other provisions of law." It is clear from the legislative action that no interference with a woman's choice to have an abortion is to be tolerated, and, therefore, the defense is unavailable. ORS 161.200(1).
Affirmed.
Although defendants were charged and tried separately, the trial court, as a matter of judicial economy, allowed all of them to join in the legal and factual assertions of other defendants in the pretrial proceedings. In this court, the cases of the named defendants are consolidated for argument and decision.
Webster v. Reproduction Health Services, et al, _ US _, 109 S Ct 3040, 106 L Ed 2d 410 (1989), was decided after these cases were submitted. There is nothing in that decision that would affect this case.
The Michigan Revised Criminal Code was not enacted.
The proposed Michigan statute provided:
"(1) Unless inconsistent with other provisions of this chapter defining justifiable use of physical force, or with some other provision of law, conduct which would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable and not criminal when it is necessary as an emergency measure to avoid an imminent public or private injury [which is about to occur by reason of a situation occasioned or developed through no fault of the actor, and which] is of such gravity that, according to ordinary standards of intelligence and morality, the desirability and urgency of avoiding the injury clearly outweigh the desirability of avoiding the injury sought to be prevented by the statute defining the offense in issue.
"(2) The necessity and justifiability of conduct under subsection (1) [may] not rest upon considerations pertaining only to the morality and advisability of the statute, either in its general application or with respect to its application to a particular class of cases arising thereunder. [Whenever evidence relating to the defense of justification under this section is offered by the defendant, the court shall rule as a matter of law whether the claimed facts and circumstances would, if established, constitute a justification.]"
The bracketed language was omitted from the Oregon statute.
Former ORS 435.415 provided:
"(1) A physician is justified in terminating the pregnancy of an Oregon resident if he has reasonable grounds for believing that:
"(a) There is substantial risk that continuance of the pregnancy will greatly impair the physical or mental health of the mother;
"(b) The child would be born with serious physical or mental defect; or
"(c) The pregnancy resulted from felonious intercourse.
"(2) In determining whether or not there is substantial risk under paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of this section, account may be taken of the mother's total environment, actual or reasonably foreseeable.
"(3) A justifiable termination of a pregnancy shall be performed only by a physician in a hospital."
Former ORS 435.425 provided:
"(1) No pregnancy shall be terminated unless two physicians who are neither related to each other by blood or marriage nor associated with each other in the practice of medicine have certified in writing the circumstances which they believe justify the termination. A signed copy of the certificate shall become part of the hospital record. However, no pregnancy shall be terminated after the 150th day of pregnancy except in accordance with ORS 435.445.
"(2) When there is reason to believe that the pregnancy was the result of felonious intercourse, the administrator of the hospital shall send a copy of the certificate to the district attorney of the county where the hospital is located.
"(3) Failure to comply with any of the requirements of this section gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that termination of the pregnancy was unjustified."
Former ORS 435.445 provided:
"(1) Nothing in ORS 435.405 to 435.495, 465.110, 677.188 and 677.190 prevents a physician from terminating a pregnancy without complying with ORS 435.405 to 435.495,465.110,677.188 and 677.190 if the physician believes in good faith that:
"(a) The life of the pregnant woman is in imminent danger; and
"(b) There is insufficient time to comply with the requirements of ORS 435.405 to 435.495, 465.110, 677.188 and 677.190.
"(2) A physician who terminates a pregnancy under subsection (1) of this section must report within 48 hours thereafter the termination to the appropriate committee of the hospital in which the termination occurred or to the Health Division if the termination occurred other than in a hospital. The report shall include his certification of the circumstances, conditions and reasons for which the pregnancy was terminated and the reasons why he was unable to comply with ORS 435.405 to 435.495, 465.110,677.188 and 677.190."
Former ORS 435.455 provided:
"(1) A person who purposely terminates the pregnancy of another for purposes other than delivery of a viable birth, unless justified under ORS 435.415, shall be punished upon conviction by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not more than 15 years or by a fine not exceeding $5,000, ¡or both.
"(2) Except as justified under ORS 435.415, a person who induces or knowingly aids a woman to -use instruments, drugs or violence upon herself for the purpose of terminating her pregnancy other than by viable birth shall be punished upon conviction by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not more than five years."
An exception is that facilities where abortions are performed are subject to state regulations as to what medical equipment and personnel must be available, depending on the stage at which the abortion is to be performed. See OAR ch 333, div 73.