Case Name: GAWF et al. v. GAWF
Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oklahoma
Decision Date: 1952-01-15
Citations: 206 Okla. 73
Docket Number: No. 34121
Parties: GAWF et al. v. GAWF.
Judges: CORN, GIBSON, DAVISON, JOHNSON, and BINGAMAN, JJ., concur. HALLEY, V. C. J., and O’NEAL, J., dissent.
Reporter: Oklahoma Reports
Volume: 206
Pages: 73–79

Head Matter:
GAWF et al. v. GAWF.
No. 34121.
Jan. 15, 1952.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 26, 1952.
240 P. 2d 1095.
E. C. Hopper, Eufaula, for plaintiffs in error.
White & Parris, by H. B. Parris, Eu-faula, for defendant in error.

Opinion:
WELCH, J.
By proper next friend the two minors commenced this action to recover 80 acres of farm land with specified damages for withholding it, to establish title in plaintiffs and to quiet title and for an accounting of rents and profits. We will treat the case as a jury case since all parties so treated it in the trial court and here, and no contrary contention is made by any one. The controlling question is whether the land is owned by the minor plaintiffs, or by defendant, W. W. Gawf.
Admittedly, the defendant acquired title in 1926, and occupied same by himself or by his tenants until late in 1930. Throughout 1931 and 1932 JohnL. Gawf and his family occupied and farmed the premises and they started farming the same for the year 1933, but John L. Gawf and his wife Charlsie separated early in 1933, perhaps on March 8th, or early in March, 1933, or earlier in the year 1933, and left the premises. The defendant, W. W. Gawf, came back into possession of the premises early in 1933, and farmed it that year by himself, or through tenants, and he has so occupied the premises ever since.
The plaintiffs contend that on November 30, 1930, W. W. Gawf gave the land to his son, John L. Gawf, by quitclaim deed, and that John L. Gawf conveyed the same by quitclaim deed to plaintiffs, who are his children, on January 19, 1948, and both such quitclaim deeds appear of record in proper form.
Defendant, W. W. Gawf, contends that the purported quitclaim deed from him to his son dated November 30, 1930, was a forgery; that he and his son discussed a plan of sale to the son, but it was never consummated and he never signed or delivered any deed to his son; that he did not know the quitclaim deed was of record until near the end of 1947, or early in January, 1948; that he then wrote his son John L. Gawf who had lived in Oregon for a number of years, sent him a prepared deed and requested his son to execute a quitclaim deed back to him to perfect his record title; that his son did not respond directly, but instead executed and delivered his quitclaim deed to the plaintiffs in this action. Thereafter this action was commenced by the minor plaintiffs on March 1, 1948.
The case was submitte'd to a jury on issues of whether or not the quitclaim deed shown of record as executed by the defendant was a forgery, and whether or not the defendant had been in continuous adverse possession of the land for the fifteen years preceding March 1, 1948, the date the present action was commenced. There was no request for separate or special findings.
The jury returned a verdict with general finding for the defendant and judgment was entered for the defendant.
In appeal the plaintiffs first contend:
"The fifteen-year Statute of Limitations is not applicable in the instant case; and if applicable, said period had not run at the time of filing suit, and service of summons."
As above noted, the defendant and others, in substance, testified that he had caused the land to be cultivated and a crop produced thereon in the year 1933, and had used the proceeds derived from such activity without claim from any one and had since used the land for his own purposes and profit without claim or molestation from any one until March 1, 1948. From this testimony, and testimony concerning the separations of John L. Gawf and wife, and their apparent disregard of any rentals or profits from the land during 1933, or at any time thereafter, a reasonable inference may be drawn that the defendant was in peaceable and exclusive possession of the premises throughout the year 1933 and the succeeding years until March 1, 1948, or a period of more than fifteen years.
It is suggested by the plaintiffs that under the testimony of Charlsie Gawf, now Wilson, the defendant could not have entered into exclusive possession of the premises until after March 8, 1933, the date of her departure therefrom.
Neither the court nor the jury was bound by any particular testimony of the witness though not directly contradicted, but they were free to consider all facts and circumstances in evidence and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom at variance with such testimony. Cummins v. Chandler, 186 Okla. 200, 97 P. 2d 765.
The jury is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and of the weight and value to be given their testimony, and when an issue framed by the pleadings is such as is properly triable to a jury and there is any evidence in any permissible inference reasonably tending to sustain the claims of a party, the evidence is sufficient to withstand demurrer and it is the duty of the court to submit such claim to the jury. Gordon v. Continental Ins. Co., 182 Okla. 240, 76 P. 2d 1055.
The plaintiffs introduced in evidence a petition for divorce filed by Charlsie Gawf and against John Gawf on April 24, 1933. The petition, bearing district court case No. 6845, contains an allegation that John Gawf is possessed of an 80-acre farm and certain personal property.
Admittedly, the reference was to the same tract of land that is here involved. W. W. Gawf, the defendant herein, was made an additional party defendant in the divorce action.
Plaintiffs introduced in evidence a journal entry of judgment from case No. 6845 which reflects that on August 8, 1938, Charlsie Gawf was granted divorce from John Gawf. The said journal entry recites that "the question of alimony and property rights or division is held open for the present."
The plaintiffs assert that since commencement of the divorce action, case No. 6845 in April or May, 1933, and particularly since the entry of the divorce decree therein in 1938, containing the provisions that "the question of alimony and property rights or division is held open," the property involved has been in custodia legis.
Custodia legis, or in custodia legis, literally means, "In custody or keeping of the law." The term involves the actual domination over some objective thing by the court. The thing may be corporeal or incorporeal, but it is not a controversy, a question, or an inquiry. 25 C. J. S. p. 68.
The order of the court in case No. 6845, that "the question of alimony, and property rights or division is held open for the present," is but an expression of the court's continuing jurisdiction over the question of alimony and property rights between the parties, and was in nowise a taking of any property in custody by the court. The mere filing of the action claiming rights in the property and the pendency of that action does not show an actual domination over the property by the court. Passing over the question whether this evidence was admissible, we find nothing therein to justify reversal.
The plaintiffs next contend:
"The evidence is clearly insufficient to establish that the deed from W. W. Gawf to John L. Gawf was a forgery; and the instructions to the jury thereon are a misstatement of the law, erroneous, improper and prejudicial to plaintiffs."
In argument plaintiffs cite Winn v. Willmott, 138 Okla. 177, 280 P. 808; Elliott v. Knappenberger, 177 Okla. 303, 58 P. 2d 1240, and other cases of like import. In the Winn case, in the syllabus, said the court.
"Where a deed of conveyance is regular on its face, and bears the signa ture of the grantors and the regular certificate of acknowledgment signed and sealed by a notary public of this state, it imports verity, and impeachment thereof on the ground of forgery can be sustained only by clear, unequivocal, and convincing testimony.
"The presumption of validity that attaches to a deed to realty, shown to be regular in execution upon its face, cannot be overcome by the uncorroborated testimony of the grantors alone, where the surrounding facts are as consistent with the validity of the deed as they are with the denials of the grantors."
In the Elliott case, in the syllabus, it is said:
"The evidence to impeach a certificate of acknowledgment to a deed must be clear, cogent, and convincing; such as produces a conviction to a moral certainty that the certificate is false.
"Unless the testimony of the grantor is sufficient to establish to a moral certainty that the certificate of acknowledgment to a deed is false, it must be corroborated.
"Where the circumstances are as strongly in favor of the truthfulness of a certificate of acknowledgment as in the falsity thereof, there is no substantial corroboration of the testimony of the grantor."
Herein, the evidence offered with respect to the execution of the deed was such as the record thereof imports. The acknowledging officer named in the instrument was shown to be deceased. The original instrument was not offered in evidence or its whereabouts explained. John L. Gawf, the grantee named in the instrument, gave no testimony in open court or by deposition.
The defendant, named as the grantor in the recorded instrument, testified that he did not sign the deed. We note there was testimony of a continuous course of action and conduct in the use and management of the land over a long period of years by the defendant as was clearly consistent with a continuing claim of ownership and inconsistent with an idea that he had parted with title to the land. These circumstances in proof appear strongly corroborative of defendant's testimony in denial of execution of the deed.
We deem the evidence sufficient to justify a finding of the jury that the deed in question was not executed by the defendant and that the instrument was a forgery.
The plaintiffs contend that the instructions given by the trial court were erroneous and insufficient in not containing a proper reference to the character of testimony and evidence as is necessary in impeachment of a certificate of acknowledgment to a deed. It is asserted "the instructions given by the court completely leave out and ignore the proposition of presumption of validity of such certificate and that the same cannot be overcome by the uncorroborated testimony of the grantor."
We note that in instruction No. 6 as given by the trial court the jury was advised that a certificate of acknowledgment to a deed, when the same is regular on its face, is presumed to speak the truth and is strong evidence of the fact therein stated. In the same numbered instruction the jury was advised that on the issue of whether or not the deed was a forgery the burden is upon the defendant to show the same was not executed by him, "and that said evidence can only be sustained by clear, cogent and convincing testimony which amounts to a moral certainty."
The rules we have set forth above, and as announced in the cases cited, supra, are all of proper consideration by the trial court in the consideration of a demurrer to the evidence, but on submission of the issue of forgery to the jury there can be no reason for a reference in the instructions to the effect of a lack of corroborative evidence or what constitutes corroboration.
Herein, the jury was advised of the probative effect, or of the evidentiary weight and value, to be accorded a certificate of acknowledgment to a deed regular on its face, and of the measure of proof required in impeachment of the certificate.
We find no erroneous statement of law in the instructions given nor any insufficiency therein of prejudice to the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs assert that prejudicial error was committed by the trial court in refusing to admit in evidence certain letters purportedly written by John L. Gawf to John Burns and received by John Burns.
John Burns was not a party to the instant action, and John L. Gawf was not a witness in person or by deposition at the trial of the case. We find no basis in law to support the complaint of the plaintiffs in reference to the exclusion of the letters from consideration of the jury.
The plaintiffs assert:
"The verdict of the jury and the judgment rendered thereon are clearly against the preponderance of testimony, and motion non obstante should have been sustained."
When a jury has returned its verdict the trial court is without jurisdiction to enter judgment non obstante vere-dicto, unless the party in whose favor such judgment is rendered would be entitled to judgment on the pleadings, or the jury has returned special findings of fact contrary to the general verdict.
A motion for a judgment non obstante veredicto does not present for consideration errors in submission of evidence or the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict. Martin v. National Bank of Claremore, 182 Okla. 217, 77 P. 2d 40, and Garrett v. Kennedy, 193 Okla. 605, 145 P. 2d 407.
Herein the pleadings are not such as would entitle plaintiffs to a judgment on the pleadings. No special findings or interrogatories were requested, or submitted, and the jury returned its verdict with a general finding for the defendant. The trial court committed no error in overruling the motion for judgment non obstante veredicto.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
CORN, GIBSON, DAVISON, JOHNSON, and BINGAMAN, JJ., concur. HALLEY, V. C. J., and O'NEAL, J., dissent.