Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. Charles D. WILLIAMS
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1980-10-06
Citations: 389 So. 2d 384
Docket Number: No. 67330
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Charles D. WILLIAMS.
Judges: BLANCHE, J., concurs and dissents for the reasons assigned.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 389
Pages: 384–387

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. Charles D. WILLIAMS.
No. 67330.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Oct. 6, 1980.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Harry F. Con-nick, Dist. Atty., J. Kevin McNary, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.
Steve Lemoine, New Orleans, for defendant- appellant.

Opinion:
DENNIS, Justice.
Defendant, Charles D. Williams, was convicted of obtaining credit with a stolen credit card, La.R.S. 14:67.3 (Supp.1964) and sentenced to two years in jail. We reverse his conviction and sentence, finding merit in his assignment of error based on a lack of constitutional proof of an essential element of the crime, viz., that defendant obtained credit. Since there was a constitutionally sufficient evidentiary basis for the jury to find the defendant guilty of an attempt to obtain credit with a stolen card, a lesser offense included within the charged crime, and since the jury necessarily made such a determination in this case, the case is remanded to the trial court with instructions to enter a judgment of conviction of attempt to obtain credit by use of a stolen credit card and to sentence the defendant accordingly.
On October 12, 1978, the defendant entered a J. C. Penney's store in New Orleans accompanied by a young woman. After shopping for some time, the woman brought several items to a cashier who proceeded to total their prices on her register. The defendant was standing several feet away from the young woman and whispered to her briefly during the transaction. The woman handed the cashier a Penney's credit card to pay for the items and a credit slip was made out and signed. The items of clothing were put into a bag along with a copy of the sales slip. The cashier then entered the account number on the credit card into the store's computer and was alerted that the card was stolen by a code appearing in the machine. The cashier then asked the woman for identification bearing her picture. When the woman was unable to comply, the cashier summoned her supervisor. Store personnel in the credit department confirmed that the card was stolen by calling the owner whose phone number was found in their records. A police officer working in the store on a paid detail then placed both the woman and the defendant under arrest. The merchandise never left the cashier's side.
The defendant does not question that the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he acted with intent to defraud and that he indirectly used a credit card belonging to another without authority. But he argues that no trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt from the evidence that he "thereby obtain[ed] credit or the privilege of making a deferred payment for the purchase or acquisition of money, goods or services . . . . " La.R.S. 14:67.3 (Supp.1964). Accordingly, he contends that the trial court erroneously rejected his motion for a new trial based on the constitutional insufficiency of the evidence.
In reviewing the denial of a motion for new trial based on insufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of facts could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). The issue, therefore, is whether any rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt from the evidence in this case that Williams obtained credit for the purchase or acquisition of money, goods or services.
The words of the statute in effect at the time of the offense clearly require the prosecution to prove that the defendant actually obtained credit by unauthorized use of a credit card. La.R.S. 14:67.3 (Supp.1964). The words "taking" and "obtain" have been used advisedly in our criminal code, and the latter requires both that someone lost and that the offender or someone else gained by "obtaining." See L.S.A.-R.S. 14:67, Reporter's Comment on obtaining by false pretenses.
In our review of the record we are unable to discover any evidence from which a trier of fact reasonably could find that the defendant obtained or gained credit. The goods were never delivered to the defendant or his companion. The store clerk never entrusted the merchandise to them or granted them the privilege of making a deferred payment. Instead, the computer system performed according to its design; it prevented a delivery of goods on credit based on a stolen credit card.
Accordingly, we must set aside the defendant's conviction and sentence for obtaining credit by use of a stolen credit card. However, defendant is not entitled to be discharged or receive a new trial. Attempted acquisition of credit with a stolen credit card, a lesser included offense, was necessarily found in this case by the jury, and there is sufficient evidence in the record to support such a finding beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Byrd, 385 So.2d 248 (La.1980). Accordingly, the defendant's conviction and sentence are set aside, and the case is remanded to the trial court with instructions to enter a judgment of conviction of attempt to obtain credit with a stolen credit card and to impose a sentence for this crime.
CONVICTION AND SENTENCE SET ASIDE; REMANDED FOR JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION OF LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE AND SENTENCE.
BLANCHE, J., concurs and dissents for the reasons assigned.
MARCUS, J., dissents, and assigns reasons.
WATSON, J., dissents for the reasons assigned.
. This case is distinguishable from State v. Victor, 368 So.2d 711 (La.1979), in which the offender, who committed a "taking" under La. R.S. 14:67, exerted control over a television adverse to the owner's dominion by hiding it in a box before reaching the cashier. The defendant in the present case did only what is expected and encouraged by owners of self-service stores; he and his companion selected and presented items to the cashier for payment.
. Specific intent, an essential element of an attempted crime, La.R.S. 14:27, was also required by the charged offense in this case, and necessarily found by the jury when it found defendant guilty as charged. La.R.S. 14:67.3 punishes one who "with intent to defraud knowingly" uses a credit card to obtain credit. Proof of specific intent is required where the statutory definition of a crime includes the intent to produce or accomplish some prescribed consequence (the frequent language being "with intent to . . . "). State v. Johnson, 368 So.2d 719 (La.1979); State v. Elzie, 343 So.2d 712 (La.1977).