Case Name: John Andrew CARTER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1989-06-06
Citations: 552 So. 2d 203
Docket Number: No. 88-911
Parties: John Andrew CARTER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: BARFIELD, J., concurs, with an opinion.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 552
Pages: 203–205

Head Matter:
John Andrew CARTER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 88-911.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
June 6, 1989.
Michael E. Allen, Public Defender; Maria Ines Súber, Kathleen Stover, Asst. Public Defenders, Tallahassee, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen.; John M. Koenig, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.

Opinion:
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
SHIVERS, Judge.
Appellant's Motion for Rehearing is granted in part. The opinion dated April 14, 1989 is withdrawn and the following opinioñ is substituted therefor.
Appellant John Andrew Carter was sentenced in 1985 to five years incarceration followed by ten years probation on a charge of lewd and lascivious assault. Shortly after being released from incarceration in December 1987 due to gain-time, appellant was charged with and convicted of battery. Probation was subsequently revoked. Appellant was then sentenced to ten years incarceration followed by five years probation, and given 923 days of credit, representing both the actual time served on the original five year term of incarceration and credit for time spent in jail following his arrest for battery. He now appeals, raising three issues: (1) whether the sentence imposed by the trial court upon appellant's violation of probation constituted a violation of double jeopardy; (2) whether the trial court erred in failing to give appellant credit for the entire term of his original sentence; and (3) whether the trial court erred in imposing court costs without affording appellant notice and an opportunity to object.
As to the first issue, we affirm the trial court's imposition of sentence after appellant's violation of probation. Since appellant was originally given a "probationary split sentence" (a period of confinement, none of which is suspended, followed by a period of probation), his new sentence does not constitute a violation of double jeopardy. Poore v. State, 531 So.2d 161 (Fla.1988). We reverse on the second issue, however, finding that the trial court erred in granting credit only for the time appellant actually served on the original 5-year sentence. Based on this court's recent opinion in Green v. State, 539 So.2d 484 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), appellant should have been granted full credit for the entire 5-year sentence, including his earned gain-time. In so holding, we note that Green is currently pending before the Florida Supreme Court. We therefore certify the issue involved in the instant case and in Green, whether a defendant is entitled to credit for earned gain-time where a new sentence is imposed for violation of probation, as one of great public importance. We also reverse the trial court's imposition of costs pursuant to sections 960.20 and 943.25(4), F.S., as it appears that appellant was not given the notice and opportunity to object required by Jenkins v. State, 444 So.2d 947 (Fla.1984).
Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse, and remand for the trial court to recalculate credit in accordance with this opinion and to give appellant the requisite notice and opportunity to object before imposing costs.
BARFIELD, J., concurs, with an opinion.
ZEHMER, J., specially concurs, with an opinion.