Case Name: In the Matter of Anthony Piazza et al., Appellants, v. John V. Lindsay, as Mayor of the City of New York, et al., Respondents
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1969-03-06
Citations: 24 N.Y.2d 186
Docket Number: 
Parties: In the Matter of Anthony Piazza et al., Appellants, v. John V. Lindsay, as Mayor of the City of New York, et al., Respondents.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 24
Pages: 186–196

Head Matter:
In the Matter of Anthony Piazza et al., Appellants, v. John V. Lindsay, as Mayor of the City of New York, et al., Respondents.
Argued January 13, 1969;
decided March 6, 1969.
Mario Matthew Cuomo for appellants.
I. The court at Special Term properly rescinded the Mayor’s purported approval and authorization of September 1, 1967 since it was premature and rendered in contravention of the unambiguous requirements of section 228. The court should also have declared the abortive hearing before the Board of Estimate on September 21, 1967 illegal, since it was conducted in a manner which contravened those requirements. II. The plain language of section '228 should not be distorted to accommodate the city’s so-called practical construction. (Ferraiolo v. O’Dwyer, 302 N. Y. 371; Matter of Hines v. La Guardia, 293 N. Y. 207; Matter of Roosevelt Raceway v. Monaghan, 9 N Y 2d 293; Beck v. Teachers’ Retirement Bd. of City of N. Y., 15 A D 2d 223; Matter of Roosevelt Raceway v. Bedell, 24 Misc 2d 374;
Mandel v. Waxman, 35 Misc 2d 1085; Carbonelli v. City of Amsterdam, 197 App. Div. 848; People v. Charbineau, 115 N. Y. 433; Matter of Washington St. Asylum & Park R. R. Co., 115 N. Y. 442; Society of N. Y. Hosp. v. Johnson, 5 N Y 2d 102.) III. 'The courts below erroneously denied the relief requested by the second cause of action in the petition. The uncontradicted proof indicating that the decision by the three designees of the Mayor on the Site Selection Board had been preordained, together with the other evidence in the record, established their bad faith and proved that they had proceeded in excess of their authority. At least, on this record, petitioners should have been granted the opportunity to try the issues. (Matter of Lemir Realty Corp. v. Larkin, 11 N Y 2d 20; Matter of Rothstein v. County Operating Co., 6 N Y 2d 728; Stahl Soap Corp. v. City of New York, 5 N Y 2d 200; Matter of Mastrangelo v. State Council of Parks, 22 A D 2d 947, 16 N Y 2d 540; Sleepy Hollow Val. Committee v. McMorran, 27 A D 2d 665, 20 N Y 2d 190; Cannata v. City of New York, 11 N Y 2d 210; Denihan Enterprises v. O’Dwyer, 302 N. Y. 451; Diehl v. O’Dwyer, 193 Misc. 1032; Nappi v. La Guardia 184 Misc. 775, 269 App. Div. 693, 295 N. Y. 652; Chelnik v. Wagner, 2 Misc 2d 29, 2 A D 2d 668, 2 N Y 2d 779.)
J. Lee Rankin, Corporation Counsel (John J. Loflin, Frederic S. Nathan and Laurence D. Cherkis of counsel), for respondents.
I. The procedure followed in this capital project complies with the provisions of Charter and the practice adopted and followed uniformly since the present Charter became effective. (Mandel v. Waxman, 35 Misc 2d 1085; RKO-Keith-Orpheum Theatres v. City of New York, 308 N. Y. 493.) II. The July 24, 1967 decision of the Site Selection Board was proper and not the result of prejudgment or bad faith. The September 21, 1967 hearing before the Board of Estimate was lawful and not the result of any acts of contempt. (Matter of Pelham Bay Taxpayers & Civic Assn. v. Lindsay, 29 A D 2d 843; Matter of Battista v. Board of Estimate of City of N. Y., 51 Misc 2d 962, 27 A D 2d 986.)

Opinion:
Bergan, J.
Statutory authority to select a site for a capital
project of the City of New York is expressly vested in a Site Selection Board, the members of which are stated by the law itself to be the Director of City Planning, the Director of the Budget, the Commissioner of Real Estate, the Comptroller and the President of the Borough in which the site is located (New York City Charter, § 227).
The petitioners, who are owners of land in Queens which will be acquired as part of a projected new high school, contend that the statutory scheme requires a further approval of the site by the Board of Estimate after the Site Selection Board has acted and before acquisition proceedings may be directed by the Mayor.
The question of statutory construction is thus very narrow in scope. The court at Special Term held such additional approval by the Board of Estimate was needed; the Appellate Division held that the statute had been complied with by approval of the Board of Estimate before the site was selected and the Mayor was authorized to direct acquisition proceedings. A reading of the statute sustains the view taken at Appellate Division.
The Capital Budget for 1966-1967 adopted by the City Council and the Board of Estimate contained an item " 106a E-1290 New High School Queens, Location Undetermined Including Site". This was part of a general appropriation for the Board of Education for school projects.
The appropriation was in conformity with the Charter which provides that indebtedness for a capital project may be contracted only where there has been an appropriation in the Capital Budget (Charter, § 225) and this after prescribed public hearings which are not in dispute here (Charter, § 216, 217, 219, 221).
Following' such appropriation, however, the initiation of the project rests solely in the executive judgment of the Mayor (Charter, § 228). This control and initiation of capital projects expresses a central policy of the Charter concentrating executive responsibility in the hands of the Mayor.
The first step in that executive action was taken by the Mayor in this case on June 14, 1966 by requesting the Board of Estimate to conduct a public hearing on the project which was then in the general form stated in the budget " location undetermined ". Section 228 provides that "before initiating" such a capital project in the budget by directing the acquisition of the property, the Mayor " shall cause a public hearing to be held " by the Board of Estimate.
This direction was followed exactly in the present case. The Board of Estimate held a public hearing on July 8. There was no opposition. Thereafter, on October 10, the Mayor initiated the project by determining and certifying to the Comptroller the amount of obligations to be used in financing.
The project having thus been initiated, the time then became appropriate for the Site Selection Board to function under section 227 of the Charter to select a site. It conducted a public hearing on due notice June 19, 1967 at which petitioners were heard in opposition to the proposed site.
Again following the language of section 228, the Mayor's direction to acquire, which had now cleared through both the Board of Estimate and the Site Selection Board, went to the Corporation Counsel on September 1, 1967. This direction, says the statute, " shall constitute an order to the corporation counsel and such agency to proceed with such capital project " (Charter, § 228).
"Whatever may be the argument for or against further action by the Board of Estimate on the site itself, it is manifest further approval is not required by the statute after the Site Selection Board has acted. The statute has been followed precisely in this present case.
The time at which the 'Site Selection Board shall act is not stated in relation to sequence with the other steps in the initiation of a project by the Mayor. But it is obvious that no site should be selected under the scheme of the statute before the Mayor's directive stated in section 228 and the resulting hearing by the Board of Estimate, because until after that hearing there would be no reasonable certainty the project would go ahead.
On the other hand, there is no need or statutory requirement to go back again to the Board of Estimate for its approval after the site is selected because the Site Selection Board, rather than the Board of Estimate, is given express statutory power to select the site under subdivision f of section 227.
This result is consistent, as the city also shows, with administrative construction of the statute by Mayors since the present Charter became effective on January 1, 1963.
The record shows two examinations, not one, of this project by the Board of Estimate. Its consideration did not end with the approval of the capital budget as an appropriation. The initiation of the project by the Mayor, after the appropriation, was directed to the Board of Estimate for its consideration and that board held a hearing and specifically approved this project as initiated by the Mayor. It did not need to approve the site because, as it has been seen, site selection was within the statutory jurisdiction of the Site Selection Board.
The order should be affirmed, without costs.