Case Name: Albert WHITE, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
Court: Texas Courts of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 2008-02-13
Citations: 256 S.W.3d 380
Docket Number: No. 04-06-00641-CR
Parties: Albert WHITE, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
Judges: Sitting: ALMA L. LÓPEZ, Chief Justice, PHYLIS J. SPEEDLIN, Justice, STEVEN C. HILBIG, Justice.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Third Series
Volume: 256
Pages: 380–390

Head Matter:
Albert WHITE, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
No. 04-06-00641-CR.
Court of Appeals of Texas, San Antonio.
Feb. 13, 2008.
Discretionary Review Dismissed March 19, 2008.
Lori O. Rodriguez, Assistant Public Defender, San Antonio, TX, for Appellant.
Enrico B. Valdez, Assistant Criminal District Attorney, San Antonio, TX, for Appellee.
Sitting: ALMA L. LÓPEZ, Chief Justice, PHYLIS J. SPEEDLIN, Justice, STEVEN C. HILBIG, Justice.

Opinion:
OPINION
Opinion by
PHYLIS J. SPEEDLIN, Justice.
Albert White appeals his conviction of aggravated assault asserting that the trial court erred in admitting: (1) evidence pertaining to the alleged sexual assault of the complainant; and (2) the complainant's statement to police. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
BACKGROUND
The complainant, a prostitute, was introduced to a man at a bar by a friend. The complainant and the man negotiated terms and left the bar. As they walked along the street, the complainant told the man she had changed her mind. The man grabbed the complainant by her neck, causing her to lose consciousness. When the complainant regained consciousness, she was bloody and hurt. An officer, who found the complainant at a pay phone, called EMS. Pictures of the complainant were introduced into evidence depicting her injuries which required her to remain hospitalized for six days. The injuries included an injury to her eye which required several surgeries. The complainant later identified White as the man from the bar.
Evidence op Sexual Assault
Although White was initially charged with both sexual assault and aggravated assault, the sexual assault charge was dropped by the State due to a problem with the indictment. In his first point of error, White contends that the trial court erred in admitting evidence pertaining to the sexual assault at trial because the sexual assault was an extraneous offense.
To preserve error in admitting evidence, a party must make a proper objection and get a ruling on that objection. Valle v. State, 109 S.W.3d 500, 509 (Tex.Crim.App.2003). In addition, a party must object each time the inadmissible evidence is offered or obtain a running objection. Id. An error in the admission of evidence is cured where the same evidence comes in elsewhere without objection. Id. If an appellant's objection at trial does not comport with his objection on appeal, the objection presented on appeal is not preserved. Medina v. State, 7 S.W.3d 633, 639 (Tex.Crim.App.1999).
Officer Manuel Peralta, who discovered the complainant at the pay phone, first provided evidence that the complainant was a sexual assault victim. Officer Peralta testified that although sexual assault victims are normally transported to Methodist Transplant Hospital, the complainant was transported to University Hospital because of the trauma to her head. No objection was made to this testimony.
When Yvonne Garcia, one of the paramedics who responded to the scene, initially testified that the dispatch she received was for a rape, defense counsel's objection that the testimony pertained to an extraneous offense was overruled. Although this objection might have preserved a complaint that Garcia's testimony was erroneously admitted because it pertained to an extraneous offense, defense counsel failed to object on that basis when Garcia later testified that the complainant told her that she had been raped. Instead, defense counsel only objected on the basis of hearsay. Moreover, Garcia made reference to the complainant stating she was raped two additional times, both on direct examination and cross-examination, without any objection.
Detective James D. Jones, the officer assigned to investigate the offense, made numerous references to the gathering of DNA and a sexual assault kit without objection. Shelly Botello, a custodian of records, also made reference to the records of the sexual assault exam performed on the complainant without objection. Finally, Mary Leblond, the sexual assault examiner, testified regarding the sexual assault exam that she performed on the complainant without objection.
Because White failed to object each time evidence of the sexual assault was offered as evidence, White has failed to preserve this point of error for our review.
Complainant's Statement
In his second point of error, White complains that the trial court erred in admitting the complainant's statement to police into evidence because defense counsel's questioning did not imply a recent fabrication. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has recently clarified the law regarding the admission of evidence in response to a charge of recent fabrication. Hammons v. State, 239 S.W.3d 798 (Tex.Crim.App.2007).
Rule 801(e)(1)(B) gives substantive, non-hearsay status to prior consistent statements of a witness offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the de-clarant of recent fabrication. Hammons, 239 S.W.3d at 804. There need only be a suggestion that the witness consciously altered her testimony in order to permit the use of the earlier consistent statements. Id. "There is no bright line between a general challenge to memory or credibility and a suggestion of conscious fabrication, but the trial court should determine whether the cross-examiner's questions or the tenor of that questioning would reasonably imply an intent by the witness to fabricate." Id. The trial court must consider the totality of the cross-examination, not isolated portions or selected questions and answers. Id. at 807. Even if the specific words used during cross-examination could be interpreted as a benign inquiry, much of the force of cross-examination depends upon the tone and tenor of the questioning, combined with the cross-examiner's demeanor, facial expressions, pregnant pauses, and other nonverbal cues. Id. A reviewing court must consider the totality of the questioning, giving deference to the trial judge's assessment of tone, tenor, and demeanor, and may also consider clues from the voir dire, opening statements, and closing arguments. Id. at 807. A subtly implied charge of recent fabrication may become vociferously express during closing argument where the " 'sinister seed of innuendo' sowed during cross-examination [can come] to full fruition." Id.
During cross-examination, defense counsel questioned the complainant regarding discrepancies between her testimony at trial and her statement to police regarding whether the complainant approached the man or the man approached the table for the introduction by the complainant's friend. Defense counsel further questioned the complainant about her failure to mention in her statement to police that: (1) she and the man discussed going to a motel; (2) the man picked her up by the throat; (3) the man threw or tossed her to the ground; or (4) the man held her up. During closing argument, defense counsel reminded the jury of the cross-examination stating:
Now there's a chance that when the State comes before you, the prosecutor, he may bring perhaps even a statement from [the complainant]. But I just want you to reflect as you go back into the jury room and deliberate the nature of the questioning of [the complainant] when I cross-examined her on the witness stand.
And I don't believe it was a situation where I actually offended, by in my questioning, I tried to be as polite as I could be. But whenever I asked about specific questions or responses that she made to the detective, you heard a lot of, "well, I didn't say that," or "I didn't mention it to the detective," a lot of things.
I submit to you that people oftentimes in the confusion they make mistakes. And I submit to you that [the complainant] in terms of pointing out my client as the person that assaulted her perhaps is a mistake in the state that it creates reasonable doubt.
In admitting the statement, the trial judge expressly stated that he considered the cross-examination as a challenge to the complainant's credibility. "From the totality of the questioning, giving deference to the trial judge's assessment of tone, tenor, and demeanor," and taking defense counsel's closing argument into consideration, we conclude that "a reasonable trial judge could conclude that [defense counsel was] mounting a charge of recent fabrication" during cross-examination; therefore, the trial judge did not abuse its discretion in admitting the complainant's prior consistent statement. Id.
Even if we were to assume that defense counsel's cross-examination in this case did not equate to a charge of recent fabrication, we may not reverse a defendant's conviction for non-constitutional error if, after examining the record as a whole, we have a fair assurance that the error did not have a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. Garcia v. State, 126 S.W.3d 921, 927 (Tex.Crim.App.2004). In assessing the likelihood that the jury's decision was adversely affected by the error, we consider everything in the record, including any testimony or physical evidence admitted for the jury's consideration, the nature of the evidence supporting the verdict, and the character of the alleged error and how it might be considered in connection with other evidence in the case. Haley v. State, 173 S.W.3d 510, 518 (Tex. Crim.App.2005).
The evidence in this case undeniably established that the complainant had been severely assaulted at a location near the bar where she went with her friends. White's identity was initially developed after Detective Jones interviewed Marietta Tucker, the complainant's friend who introduced her to White at the bar. The complainant subsequently identified White from a photographic line-up. Although the complainant's written statement contained details that were consistent with the details she provided at trial, those details generally related to the encounter prior to her assault. In light of the evidence of the complainant's injuries, Detective Jones's testimony regarding his development of a suspect, and the complainant's identification of that suspect as White, we have a fair assurance that the admission of the complainant's written statement did not have a substantial or injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. Accordingly, White's second point of error is overruled.
Conclusion
The trial court's judgment is affirmed.