Case Name: Alfred R. BOETTGER, Appellant, v. Thom LOVERRO and Easton Publishing Company, Ernest D. Preate, Jr., Attorney General, Intervenor
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1991-03-14
Citations: 526 Pa. 510
Docket Number: No. 31 E.D. Appeal Docket 1987
Parties: Alfred R. BOETTGER, Appellant, v. Thom LOVERRO and Easton Publishing Company, Ernest D. Preate, Jr., Attorney General, Intervenor.
Judges: Before NIX, C.J., and FLAHERTY, ZAPPALA, PAPADAKOS and CAPPY, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania State Reports
Volume: 526
Pages: 510–534

Head Matter:
587 A.2d 712
Alfred R. BOETTGER, Appellant, v. Thom LOVERRO and Easton Publishing Company, Ernest D. Preate, Jr., Attorney General, Intervenor.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Reargued April 2, 1990.
Decided March 14, 1991.
Dissenting Opinion March 26, 1991.
E. Jerome Brose, for appellant.
Ronald W. Shipman, Easton, for Thom Loverro.
April L. Cordts, Easton, for Easton Pub. Co.
Ernest D. Preate, Jr., Atty. Gen., Robert A. Graci, Chief, Deputy Atty. Gen., Anthony Sarcione, Executive Deputy Atty. Gen., for Intervenor.
Samuel E. Klein, Katherine Hatton, Laura E. Little, Philadelphia, for Amicus — Philadelphia Inquirer, Philadelphia Daily News, et al.
Michele Langer, Teresa A. Wallace, Philadelphia, for Amicus — American Newspaper Publishers Assoc., et al.
Before NIX, C.J., and FLAHERTY, ZAPPALA, PAPADAKOS and CAPPY, JJ.

Opinion:
OPINION
NIX, Chief Justice.
Judgment in this case, Boettger v. Loverro, 521 Pa. 366, 555 A.2d 1234 (1989, reargument denied May 18, 1989) ("Boettger I") has been vacated and remanded by the United States Supreme Court for further consideration in light of The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 109 S.Ct. 2603, 105 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) ("Florida Star"). After review and a constitutionally permissible construction of the statute involved, we affirm, on different grounds, the judgment of the Superior Court. 349 Pa.Super. 134, 502 A.2d 1310.
I.
On November 17, 1981, the Pennsylvania State Police obtained a wiretap permit from the Attorney General pursuant to section 5704(2)(ii) of the Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act ("the Act"), 18 Pa.C.S. § 5701, et seq. Shortly thereafter, the State Police intercepted a telephone conversation between the appellant and a consenting individual, Wayne Dickerson. The intercepted conversation revealed appellant's involvement in illegal gambling activities on college football games. The appellant was subsequently charged with bookmaking, pool selling and conspiracy. After being held over for trial on the charges, appellant requested discovery by letter under Pa. R.Crim.P. 305, and subsequently filed a motion to compel discovery, together with an order and a rule to show cause upon the District Attorney, demanding he produce a transcript of the intercepted call. The District Attorney's office complied and attached a copy of the transcript to the response filed with the Clerk of Courts, Criminal Division. Thereafter, appellant filed a Motion to Suppress. Section 5721 of the Act authorizes motions to suppress.
On March 31, 1982, a hearing was held on the suppression motion. A reporter (Loverro) for Easton Express, a newspaper owned by appellee Easton Publishing Company ("Easton"), attended the suppression hearing. After the hearing the reporter went to the Office of the Clerk of Court, Criminal Division, and asked to see the court file of the case. The file contained the transcript of the wiretaps and no restrictions as to access or disclosure; it was given to Loverro. He read the file and made extensive notes, then wrote a news story based upon, inter alia, his notes including certain quotes from the transcript.
Publication was withheld awaiting the issuance of the court order which, dated March 31, 1982, denied the Motion to Suppress. On April 7, 1982, the managing editor approved publication; the article, including excerpts from the wiretap transcripts, was published. Subsequently appellant Boettger pled nolo contendere to the charges, was convicted and sentenced to a fine.
On April 13, 1982, Boettger filed a civil action against Loverro and Easton on two grounds: common law tort for invasion of privacy and the civil action created by section 5725 of the Act. It was alleged that the publication was in violation of the provisions of section 5703. During the proceedings of September, 1983, the common law tort action was withdrawn and Loverro dropped as a defendant. The trial court directed a verdict as to liability for Boettger pursuant to section 5725(a) based upon its ruling that Easton's disclosure was unauthorized by the statute. The jury returned a verdict of $1,000.00 "actual" damages (the statutory minimum), no punitive damages and $17,409.43 attorney's fees and costs. Motions for judgment non obstante veredicto and for a new trial were denied by the trial judge sitting as the court en banc on March 6, 1984.
On appeal to the Superior Court, the judgment of the trial court was reversed and judgment entered for Easton by a three-judge panel, one judge concurring.
Boettger's allowance of appeal was granted and this Court in Boettger I reversed the Superior Court. Petition for Certiorari was filed by Easton in the United States Supreme Court where, as previously stated, our judgment was vacated and the matter remanded for further consideration in light of Florida Star. In that case a newspaper, The Florida Star, published in its "Police Reports" section a brief account of a robbery and sexual assault. The account included the name of the victim. The news story was based upon a police report (copied verbatim by a reporter-trainee) which had been placed in the press room of the Sheriffs Department. Access to the press room and reports made available therein were not restricted. A Florida statute makes it a misdemeanor of the second degree to "print, publish or broadcast . in any instrument of mass communication" the name of the victim of any sexual offense. The newspaper had an internal policy against publishing the names of sexual offense victims.
The victim, identified only as B.J.F., sued the Sheriffs Department and the newspaper civilly for negligent violation of the criminal statute. The Department settled with B.J.F. for $2,500. The newspaper defended on the grounds that imposing civil sanctions under the statute in question violated the First Amendment and that its publication of BJ.F.'s name was inadvertent. The trial court ruled the statute was constitutional and directed a verdict on the issue of negligence, finding the newspaper negligent per se. The jury awarded $75,000 compensatory damages and $25,-000 in punitive damages.
An intermediate appellate court affirmed the trial court and the Supreme Court of Florida declined review. The Florida Star appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States which held that "where a newspaper publishes truthful information which it has lawfully obtained, punishment may lawfully be imposed, if at all, only when narrowly tailored to a state interest of the highest order____" 491 U.S. at 541, 109 S.Ct. at 2613. (Emphasis added.) The conclusion that holding The Florida Star civilly liable pursuant to the Florida criminal statute violated the First Amendment was reached in reliance upon the limited First Amendment principle set forth in Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 99 S.Ct. 2667, 61 L.Ed.2d 399 (1979), in a synthesis of prior cases: " '[I]f a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order.' " (Citations omitted.) 491 U.S. at 533, 109 S.Ct. at 2609. A triad of considerations was demonstrated in the cases synthesized in Daily Mail: first, the government has "ample means of safeguarding significant interests upon which publication may impinge" since the publication of only lawfully obtained information is protected, id.; second, punishing the press for publication of information already publicly available is relatively unlikely to further the interest for which the state seeks to act, 491 U.S. at 535, 109 S.Ct. at 2610; and third, "timidity and self-censorship" may result from permitting punishment of the media for publishing truthful information. Id.
In applying the Daily Mail principle to Florida Star, the Supreme Court found the published article contained truthful information lawfully obtained and involved a matter of paramount public importance: "the commission, and investigation, of a violent crime which had been reported to authorities." 491 U.S. at 537, 109 S.Ct. at 2611. Florida Star also found that while there were highly significant state interests involved (protecting the privacy and physical safety from retaliation of victims of sexual offenses and a goal of encouraging such victims to fearlessly report the crimes) the method used by the state of Florida to advance those interests was too precipitous and extreme to come within the Daily Mail principle of a "need" to use the means employed because: a) the government had, and failed to use, more limited means of deterring dissemination than the extremity of punishing truthful speech; b) the negligence per se standard of the civil action was too broad; and c) the Florida statute was facially underinclusive.
II.
We begin our re-examination of the Act mindful of the teachings of Florida Star, and the principle that "when the validity of an act . is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, . [we] will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided." Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 348, 56 S.Ct. 466, 483, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Mr. Justice Brandéis, concurring). Application of the principle requires resistance to the risks of producing futile results, or an unreasonable result " 'plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole.' " Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 31, 68 S.Ct. 1375, 1391, 92 L.Ed. 1787 (1948).
The Act is legislation which permits wiretapping-eavesdropping by law enforcement officials or officers in Pennsylvania under circumstances intended to prevent an exposure of the citizens of the Commonwealth to unjust and improper invasions of their privacy. It contains a comprehensive schema. By whom and under what circumstances a citizen's privacy in wire and oral communication may be intercepted is set forth. One method of authorized interception is by way of a court order issued upon a showing of probable cause. 18 Pa.C.S. § 5708-10, 5712-14. Another method of authorized interception is through authorization of the Attorney General or his deputy attorney general designee (the method used in this instance), or the District Attorney or his assistant district attorney designee. 18 Pa.C.S. § 5704. A provision for the sealing of summaries of the contents of interceptions and recordings of the interceptions obtained by way of a court order is found in section 5714. The language of section 5715 requiring the sealing of applications, final reports, orders granted pursuant to the Act, supporting papers and monitor's records does not explicitly include "transcriptions of recorded interceptions." The Act palpably reveals the state's interest in protecting its citizens from illegal and abusive invasions of their privacy while giving law enforcement a needed tool. Unauthorized interception of wire or oral communications or improper disclosure of the contents of interceptions are felonies of the third degree. Strict liability in a civil action for unlawful interception, disclosure or use is provided.
Since the Act makes neither explicit exception nor authorization under any circumstances for publication by the press of the contents of wiretap transcriptions, the avoidance of a clash between First Amendment and privacy rights undergirds the remand of this case for reconsideration in light of Florida Star. We find Easton is not liable.
Initially we recognize the transcripts in this case do not fall within the category of recordation or transcription of interceptions intended to be protected by the Act. First, when the assistant district attorney filed a copy of the transcript with the Clerk of Courts, Criminal Division, it went in the public domain, irrespective of whether or not the action of the assistant district attorney was inadvertent. The lodging of the transcription in the clerk's office with no notations restricting access or disclosure made it public record. The intent of the law enforcement official, while relevant to an action brought by an aggrieved person against a law enforcement officer or public official for removal from office or employment under section 5726, does not prevent the transcript from being in the public domain as a matter of public record thereafter. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 537, 109 S.Ct. at 2611, 2612. It is to be noted that when Mr. Boettger's discovery motion was made, it could have been, but was not, accompanied by a request for the Commonwealth's response to be placed under seal.
Second, it cannot be said that the information in the transcripts fell within the class of conversations intended to be protected by a state interest of the highest order. The excerpts from the tapes printed in the news story show, inter alia, discussions about gambling on college football games and whether Mr. Dickinson would be permitted to continue to bet given his indebtedness to Mr. Boettger. This is precisely the type of conversation sought to be uncovered by the authorized interceptions of the Act. The state's interest in protecting our citizens' right to privacy does not extend to protecting a "right to privacy" in illegal endeavors. In a debate in the House of Representatives over the adoption of an amendment seeking to eliminate mandatory cooperation by telephone companies, the following concern about the ability of law enforcement authorities to trace intercepted conversations of criminal activities was vigorously expressed:
Mr. BRUNNER, Mr. Speaker, maybe this is not responsive to your question, but it is my judgment that at the present time, under the present law, if one party to the conversation consents, the agency can monitor that phone call. You can do that today, and they do it in the cases of obscene telephone calls. As long as one party consents to the monitoring, this can be done.
Mr. WAGNER. I am not sure. I do not think that can be done for a criminal prosecution on that. At any rate — and I hope Mr. Scirica is listening and can answer this when I am finished — this is my concern: The kidnapping raises a unique problem, but I am concerned about blackmail; I am concerned about extortion; I am concerned about the numbers racket; and I am concerned about drug smuggling. When you are in the numbers racket, when you are in drug smuggling, the person who is involved does not call people up and say, hey, do you want to gamble on tonight's race or, hey, I have got 10 pounds of heroin. He does not do that. He is at one location, and he only handles incoming calls. It will do no good to the law enforcement people to know what is being sold. They do not want to know if someone is selling so many kilos or so many pounds of narcotics. It does not make a difference to them. They have to know where the calls are coming from. I do not think the contents of the conversation are as important as the source. In a lot of types of crimes, you would have to know the source of them. I think with your amendment we would lose this tool.
Mr. BRUNNER. In response, I would just say that my amendment certainly places a premium on an individual's right to privacy. But more than that, I believe, as I pointed out earlier, the cost-benefit ratio, the way the bill is presently written, does not justify the inclusion of the present language. My amendment would simply place this whole matter back in perspective, particularly with regard to cost and with regard to the benefit that the present language would provide, in addition, of course, to the right of privacy that we are talking about.
MR. WAGNER. Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
Mr. Speaker, I am not aware of the cost. I do not understand electronic equipment. Quite frankly, I do not really care what the costs are. When you are dealing with the numbers racket and you are dealing with narcotics, you have to know where the calls are coming from. It does very little to know what they are saying. It is obvious. You tap a phone; you know what is being said. Numbers are being exchanged over the telephone; orders for drugs are being placed; deliveries are being made; it is all set up. You have to know where the calls are coming from.
I think if you go along with the amendment, you are going to seriously take away this tool from law enforcement, aside from the cost. (Emphasis added.) Legislative Journal-House of Representatives September 21, 1978, pp. 3150-51.
Third, the effect of the denial of the motion to suppress was to officially remove any arguably intended protection of the transcript by the Act. Section 5721(b) details the procedure to be used when a motion to suppress has been filed. It is glaringly silent on the effect of a denial of a motion to suppress for the obvious reason that the evidence gained by the interception, if not suppressed, will be used in adversarial judicial proceedings and thus in the public domain. To conclude to the contrary would produce an absurd result, violating legislative intent. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1). This we may not do. Goodman v. Kennedy, 459 Pa. 313, 329 A.2d 224 (1974). See also, Lehigh Valley Co-op, Farmers v. Commonwealth, Bureau of Employment Security, Department of Labor and Industry, 498 Pa. 521, 447 A.2d 948 (1982); Zimmerman v. O'Bannon, 497 Pa. 551, 442 A.2d 674 (1982); Schaefer v. Hilton, 473 Pa. 237, 373 A.2d 1350 (1977); Commonwealth v. Kates, 452 Pa. 102, 305 A.2d 701 (1973). The court order denying the motion to suppress placed the contents of the wiretapped conversation squarely into that category of evidence which is neither privileged nor protected.
Further, the trial court as well as the Superior Court and this Court in Boettger I erroneously and without support therefor, concluded the order referred to in section 5725(c), which provides a statutory defense of "good faith reliance on a court order or the provisions of th[e] chapter", must be an order unsealing the transcript of the wiretap. The explicit language of the section says "a court order"; it does not say "a court order authorizing disclosure"; it does not say "a court order to unseal." And the definitional section of the Act, section 5702, does not contain a definition of "a court order."
We look into the legislative history of the Act for the General Assembly's intent as to this statutory defense and find the House of Representatives decided to remove the language "A good faith reliance on a court order authorizing the interception shall constitute a complete defense to a civil or criminal action" because it was deemed to be unnecessary. However, after conference when the bill was finally passed by both bodies, the language "good faith reliance on a court order" had been inserted. This history reflects the earlier, stricken language was not intended to be reinserted. If it had been so intended, the General Assembly would have enacted the previously eliminated language. Moreover, to find otherwise is an anomaly that disregards two cardinal principles of statutory construction: "[T]he General Assembly does not intend to violate the Constitution of the United States____" and "[T]he General Assembly intends to favor the public interest as against any private interest." 1 P.C.S. § 1922(3) and (5). The teachings of Florida Star tell us that to disallow the reliance of Easton upon the court order as a defense to the civil suit is to run afoul of the constitutional infirmity of "timidity and self-censorship"
which may result from allowing the media to be punished for publishing certain truthful information. Cox Broadcasting [Corp v. Cohn ] supra, 420 U.S. [469] at 496, 43 L.Ed.2d 328, 95 S.Ct. 1029 [at 1046]. Cox Broadcasting noted this concern with overdeterrence in the context of information made public through official court records, but the fear of excessive media self-suppression is applicable as well to other information released, without qualification, by the government. A contrary rule, depriving protection to those who rely on the government's implied representations of the lawfulness of dissemination, would force upon the media the onerous obligation of sifting through government press releases, reports, and pronouncements to prune out material arguably unlawful for publication. This situation could inhere even where the newspaper's sole object was to reproduce, with no substantial change, the government's rendition of the event in question.
Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 535-536, 109 S.Ct. at 2610.
The newspaper, awaiting the written issuance of the order denying the suppression motion, delayed publication until receipt thereof. Clearly this was "good faith reliance upon a court order."
Finally, the press, in these United States, serves a public purpose although it is a private enterprise. "The Press Clause [of the First Amendment] focuses specifically on the liberty to disseminate expression broadly and 'comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion.' Lovell v. Griffin, [303 U.S. 444, 452, 58 S.Ct. 666, 669, 82 L.Ed. 949 (1938) ]." First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 800, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 1428, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978) (Chief Justice Burger concurring). It is the freedom of dissemination of information and ideas of public importance that is the bonding agent in a democracy. Without dispute, it is in the public interest to have a free press. Thus the legislature intended for the public interest in a free press to supersede the interests of an individual whose private conversation regarding his illegal activities had been lawfully intercepted and lawfully obtained by a newspaper. Therefore, we conclude Easton presented a valid defense under section 5725 of the Act.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Superior Court reversing the court of common pleas is affirmed.
LARSEN and McDERMOTT, JJ., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
CAPPY, J., files a concurring opinion.
ZAPPALA, J., files a dissenting opinion in which PAPADAKOS, J., joins.
. § 5704. Exceptions to prohibition on interception and disclosure of communications
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for:
*
(2) Any investigative or law enforcement officer or any person acting at the direction or request of an investigative or law enforcement officer to intercept a wire or oral communication involving suspected criminal activities where:
*
(ii) one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception. However, no interception under this paragraph shall be made unless the Attorney General or a deputy attorney general designated in writing by the Attorney General, . has reviewed the facts and is satisfied that the consent is voluntary and has given prior approval for the interception; however such interception shall be subject to the recording and record keeping requirements of section 5714(a) (relating to recording of intercepted communications) and that the Attorney General, deputy attorney general, district attorney or assistant district attorney authorizing the interception shall be the custodian of recorded evidence obtained therefrom.
. The entire electronic surveillance act was amended on October 21, 1988, after this lawsuit was instituted. However, because the changes effected by the Amendment do not bear upon the merits of the instant appeal, the sections herein are cited as they appeared in 1982, at the time of trial.
. The lower courts and the majority of this Court in Boettger v. Loverro, 521 Pa. 366, 555 A.2d 1234 (1989), ("Boettger /"), characterized the action of the District Attorney's office as inadvertence. "Inadvertently, but in violation of the disclosure section of the Act, 18 Pa.C.S. § 5717(b), the District Attorney attached a copy of the transcript to his answer and filed it with the clerk of courts." 521 Pa. at 369, 555 A.2d at 1236.
. That section provides, in pertinent part:
§ 5721. Suppression of contents of intercepted communication or derivative evidence
(a) Motion to suppress. — Any aggrieved person in any trial, hearing, or other adversary proceeding in or before any court or other authority of this Commonwealth may move to suppress the contents of any intercepted wire or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, on any of the following grounds:
(1) The communication was unlawfully intercepted.
(2) The order of authorization if required is insufficient on its face.
(3) The interception unless made in accordance with section 5704 (relating to exceptions to prohibition on interception and disclosure of communications) was not made in conformity with the order of authorization or in accordance with the requirements of section 5712 (relating to issuance of order and effect).
(b) Procedure. — The motion shall be made at least ten days before the trial, hearing, or other adversary proceeding unless there was no opportunity to make the motion or the moving party was not aware of the grounds for the motion. Motions by co-indictees are to be heard in a single consolidated hearing. The court, upon the filing of such motion by the aggrieved person, shall make available to the aggrieved person or his counsel the intercepted communication and evidence derived therefrom. If the motion is granted, the entire contents of all intercepted wire or oral communications obtained during or after any interception which is determined to be in violation of this chapter under subsection (a) or evidence derived therefrom, shall not be received in evidence in the trial, hearing or other adversary proceeding.
. § 5725. Civil action for unlawful interception, disclosure or use of wire, electronic or oral communication
(a) Cause of Action. — Any person whose wire or oral communication is intercepted, disclosed or used in violation of this chapter shall have a civil cause of action against any person who intercepts, discloses or uses or procures any other person to intercept, disclose or use, such communication; and shall be entitled to recover from any such person:
(1) Actual damages, but not less than liquidated damages computed at the rate of $100 a day for each day of violation, or $1,000, whichever is higher.
(2) Punitive damages.
(3) A reasonable attorney's fee and other litigation costs reasonably incurred.
(b) Waiver of sovereign immunity. — To the extent that the Commonwealth and any of its officers, officials or employees would be shielded from liability under this section by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, such immunity is hereby waived for the purposes of this section.
(c) Defense. — It is a defense to an action brought pursuant to subsection (a) that the actor acted in good faith reliance on a court order or the provisions of this chapter.
. § 5703. Interception, disclosure or use of wire or oral communications
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, a person is guilty of a felony of the third degree if he:
*
(2) willfully discloses or endeavors to disclose to any other person the contents of any wire or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire or oral communication; or
(3) willfully uses or endeavors to use the contents of any wire or oral communications, or evidence derived therefrom, knowing or having reason to know, that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire or oral communication.
. Florida Stat. § 794.03 (1987).
. See note 1, supra.
. 18 Pa.C.S. § 5714 states:
§ 5714. Recording of intercepted communications
(a) Recording and monitoring. — Any wire or oral communication intercepted in accordance with this chapter shall, if practicable, be recorded by tape or other comparable method. The recording shall be done in such a way as will protect it from editing or other alteration. Whenever an interception is being monitored, the monitor shall be an investigative or law enforcement officer certified under section 5724 (relating to training), and where practicable, keep a signed, written record which shall include the following:
(1) The date and hours of surveillance.
(2) The time and duration of each intercepted communication.
(3) The participant, if known, in each intercepted conversation.
(4) A summary of the content of each intercepted communication.
(b) Sealing of recordings. — Immediately upon the expiration of the order or extensions or renewals thereof, all monitor's records, tapes and other recordings shall be transferred to the judge issuing the order and sealed under his direction. Custody of the tapes, or other recordings shall be maintained wherever the court directs. They shall not be destroyed except upon an order of the court and in any event shall be kept for ten years. Duplicate tapes, or other recordings may be made for disclosure or use pursuant to section 5717 (relating to disclosure or use of contents of wire or oral communications or derivative evidence). The presence of the seal provided by this section, or a satisfactory explanation for its absence, shall be a prerequisite for the disclosure of the contents of any wire or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, under section 5717(b). [Authorizes disclosure to law enforcement officers and in testimony in criminal proceedings.]
. Intervenor, the Attorney General of Pennsylvania, asserts the transcription in this case was not required to be sealed on the ground there are no mechanisms in the Act for sealing transcripts of interceptions authorized by the Attorney General or the District Attorney under section 5704(2)(ii). Because of our resolution of the case, the propriety of the actions of the assistant district attorney here, which would bring into play the question of the applicability of section 5715, is not a determinative factor. We, therefore, leave the question of the applicability of section 5715 to the authorizations, supporting papers, monitor's records and contents of interceptions obtained pursuant to section 5704(2)(ii) to another day.
. The debate in the House of Representatives pending passage of the Act included the following remarks:
State Representative Rhodes: "Mr. Speaker we have reached a historical point with the question of providing adequate investigative and prosecutorial tools to our prosecutors and our attorney general in Pennsylvania to deal with the problems of organized crime and official corruption. This wiretapping eavesdropping legislation we send to the Senate today must be in a position to be adopted by concurrence in the Senate if we are to meet the legislative deadlines that the House and the Senate face at this late date in the session. This is critical legislation. I think the amendment offered by Mr. Scirica properly restores the balance that we think must be in our statute to give the proper wiretapping-eavesdropping ability to law enforcement in Pennsylvania and at the same time not to expose the citizens of this Commonwealth to unjust and improper invasions of their privacy. I strongly urge the membership to support Mr. Scirica's amendment."
Legislative Journal — House of Representatives, September 21, 1978, p. 3146.
State Representative Scirica, a co-sponsor and prime proponent of the bill, stated:
"Many of the businesses in organized crime operate behind a protective shield that can only be penetrated by wiretap authority."
Legislative Journal — House of Representatives, September 21, 1978, p. 3149.
. See note 5, supra.
. See note 4, supra.
. The assistant district attorney testified that his actions here were the practice in his county when discovery requests are made. N.T. pp 212, 213. According to the Attorney General, it is standard practice in this state not to seal transcripts of interceptions made under § 5704(2)(ii). Brief for Attorney General, p. 19.
. § 5726. Action for removal from office or employment
(a) Cause of action. — Any aggrieved person shall have the right to bring an action in Commonwealth Court against any investigative or law enforcement officer, public official or public employee seeking the officer's, officials or employee's removal from office or employment on the grounds that the officer, official or employee has intentionally violated the provisions of this chapter. If the court shall conclude that such officer, official or employee has in fact intentionally violated the provisions of this chapter, the court shall order the dismissal or removal from office of said officer, official or employee.
(b) Defense. — It is a defense to an action brought pursuant to subsection (a) that the actor acted in good faith reliance on a court order or the provisions of this chapter.
. While the Court is not bound to accept the statements made in floor debates, we may look at the legislative history and floor debates held during the consideration and passage of the Act only as guides to the legislative intent in our clarification of this ambiguous and opaque aspect of the statute. Unquestionably the starting point in statutory construction is always the language of the statute. However, when a statute is unclear a court "may embark upon the task of ascertaining the intent of the legislature by reviewing the necessity of the Act, the object to be attained, circumstances under which it was enacted and the mischief to be remedied. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c)." Coretsky v. Board of Commissioners of Butler Township, 520 Pa. 513, 517-18, 555 A.2d 72, 74 (1989).
. See note 3, supra.
. § 1922. Presumptions In ascertaining legislative intent
In ascertaining the intention of the General Assembly in the enactment of a statute the following presumptions, among others, may be used;
(1) That the General Assembly does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution or unreasonable.
. Mr. Scirica. What we are taking out in the section that you are referring to is the provision that says: "A good faith reliance on a court order authorizing the interception shall constitute a complete defense to a civil or criminal action ." In my opinion, it is not necessary. We provide that the violation must be a willful one, not an inadvertent one, and we wanted to tighten the bill as much as we possibly could. For that reason I am asking to amend it out. Legislative Journal-House of Representatives September 21, 1978, p. 3147.
. The dissent in the Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 543, 109 S.Ct. 2603, 2614, noted agreement with Boettger I's striking a balance between an individual's right to privacy and "the interest in public disclosure of such private telephone communications" in favor of the former. 491 U.S. at 551, n. 4, 109 S.Ct. at 2618, n. 4. Yet Mr. Justice White (author of the dissent) also stated "Surely the rights of those accused of crimes and those who are their victims must differ with respect to privacy concerns____'' 491 U.S. at 545, 109 S.Ct. at 2615.