Case Name: John H. SIMPSON and Hilda Simpson, Appellants (Defendants and Third-Party Defendants below), v. PETROLEUM, INC., a Kansas Corporation, Appellee (Plaintiff below), v. CARDINAL PETROLEUM CO. et al., Appellees (Third-Party Defendants below)
Court: Supreme Court of Wyoming
Jurisdiction: Wyoming
Decision Date: 1976-04-02
Citations: 548 P.2d 1
Docket Number: No. 4518
Parties: John H. SIMPSON and Hilda Simpson, Appellants (Defendants and Third-Party Defendants below), v. PETROLEUM, INC., a Kansas Corporation, Appellee (Plaintiff below), v. CARDINAL PETROLEUM CO. et al., Appellees (Third-Party Defendants below).
Judges: Before GUTHRIE, C. J., and McCLIN-TOCK, RAPER, THOMAS and ROSE, JJ-
Reporter: Pacific Reporter 2d
Volume: 548
Pages: 1–8

Head Matter:
John H. SIMPSON and Hilda Simpson, Appellants (Defendants and Third-Party Defendants below), v. PETROLEUM, INC., a Kansas Corporation, Appellee (Plaintiff below), v. CARDINAL PETROLEUM CO. et al., Appellees (Third-Party Defendants below).
No. 4518.
Supreme Court of Wyoming.
April 2, 1976.
Rehearing Denied'April 29,1976.
Bruce P. Badley, Badley & Shoumaker, Sheridan, signed the brief and appeared in oral argument for appellants.
Lawrence A. Yonkee and Tom C. Toner, Redle, Yonkee & Arney, Sheridan, signed the brief and Lawrence A. Yonkee appeared in oral argument for appellee, Petroleum, Inc.
Before GUTHRIE, C. J., and McCLIN-TOCK, RAPER, THOMAS and ROSE, JJ-

Opinion:
RAPER, Justice.
The appellants-defendants have here appealed from the granting of a preliminary injunction by the trial court. A preliminary injunction is to preserve the status until the merits of an action can be decided, Weiss v. State ex rel. Danigan, Wyo.l96/^34P2d^61, 762. The defendants here complain that^the district court erred in granting a preliminary injunction which had the effect of a final judgment without bringing the matter for trialjjj and cited Weiss in support of that proposition. This opinion will be squarely within the perimeter of that issue-as dispositive of the appeal.
The record discloses that on December 3, 1974, an application for preliminary injunction was filed by plaintiff-appellee for issuance of a preliminary injunction "restraining and enjoining" appellants-defendants from preventing or interfering with plaintiff shaling a road leading from an oil and gas well on defendants' land. The application for a preliminary injunction was set down for hearing on December 5, 1974, only two days later, by a district court commissioner, and on the date set, the district judge opened court and announced that court was convened for hearing on an application for preliminary injunction. After hearing, he made and entered what is labeled an Order Granting Preliminary Injunction. The trial court granted defendants a stay pending appeal conditioned upon defendants posting a supersedeas bond, which has been done.
The so-called preliminary injunction, however, granted to the plaintiff all the injunctive relief which it had requested. There was nothing left to be considered in any final hearing and it was, in effect, a final and germanent_injunction. Rule 65 (a)(2), W.R.C.P., in pertinent part, provides as follows:
"Before or after the commencement of the hearing of an application for a preliminary injunction, the court may order the trial of the action on the merits to be advanced and consolidated with the hearing of the application. "
The record discloses no order of any sort advancing the trial of the action on the merits, to be consolidated with the application. It is reasonable to believe that defendants appeared at the hearing expecting to defend only against the granting of a preliminary injunction. They were willing to do that and make no complaint about appearing for that limited purpose. It is one thing to appear for a hearing on the matter of a preliminary injunction and another to walk away from that hearing saddled with a permanent injunction.
The language of Rule 65(a)(2) is abundantly clear in its very terms that there must be an order advancing the hearing and should need no construction. Nevertheless, the federal courts have spoken in that regard. When a hearing on a preliminary injunction becomes a hearing on the merits, Rule 65(a)(2), F.R.C.P., identical to Wyoming's rule of the same number, there must be notice of such advancement. Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. United States, 10 Cir. 1975, 515 F.2d 926, 935-936, and the references there footnoted. Nationwide Amusements, Inc. v. Nattin, 5 Cir. 1971, 452 F.2d 651, 652, explains that though no written form of order is required, the parties must have some form of notice that their final day in court has come. No order was made by the court after the hearing began nor did the trial court in any manner indicate that he considered these hearings to be consolidated at the beginning of the hearing. Appellants were never advised that the court would determine this matter in such manner that there would be a final disposal thereof and appellants could not have known of this result until the judgment was entered. There is not the slightest hint in the record here that the defendants had their last say, before the final relief was granted, when only preliminary relief was sought.
The hearing was had upon two days' notice to the defendants and before any answer was filed. The purpose of the preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the rights of the parties can be fairly inquired into and determined under equitable conditions and principles. To do otherwise is perverting the function of the preliminary injunction.
Generally, a preliminary injunction will not be awarded where its effect is to give the principal relief plaintiff seeks without bringing the cause to trial. Weiss v. State ex rel. Danigan, supra; La Chemise Lacoste v. General Mills, Inc., 3 Cir. 1973, 487 F.2d 312; King v. Saddleback Junior College District, 9 Cir. 1970, 425 F.2d 426, on remand, D.C.C.D.Cal., 318 F.Supp. 89; Meiselman v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 4 Cir. 1950, 180 F.2d 94; Warner Bros. Pictures v. Gittone, 3 Cir. 1940, 110 F.2d 292; Hansen v. Galiger, 1949, 123 Mont. 101, 208 P.2d 1049. See Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil, § 2948-9. In the instant case, the issuance of a preliminary injunction would not preserve the status quo but would disturb it by allowing the shaling with pit-run scoria of a four-mile stretch of road which had not previously been extensively surfaced on defendants' land. Defendants claim there is a surface damage agreement violation and shal-ing of the road is injurious to their ranching operation.
The extraordinary remedy of an injunction is a far-reaching force and must not be indulged in under hastily contrived conditions. It is a delicate judicial power and a court must proceed with caution and deliberation before exercising the remedy. We hold that there was an abuse of the court's discretion demonstrated by the procedures followed in this particular case.
There is no problem with respect to the appealability of the "Order Granting Preliminary Injunction." It was not a preliminary injunction; it was, in fact, a final order and falls within Rule 72(a), W.R.C.P.:
"A final order is: (1) an order affecting a substantial right in an action, when such order in effect determines the action and prevents a judgment;
The order, in effect, determined the action and prevented any final judgment because there was nothing left to try when, in fact, defendants were entitled to status quo and a further final hearing on the merits.
The order of the district court is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to vacate the preliminary injunction and proceed to final hearing on the merits.