Case Name: MAY v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1943-01-20
Citations: 171 S.W.2d 488
Docket Number: No. 22346
Parties: MAY v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 171
Pages: 488–492

Head Matter:
MAY v. STATE.
No. 22346.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Jan. 20, 1943.
Rehearing Granted April 28, 1943.
Rehearing Denied June 2, 1943.
Application for Leave to File Second Motion for Rehearing Denied June 9, 1943.
R. Temple Dickson and Carl M. Anderson, both of Sweetwater, for appellant.
Spurgeon E. Bell, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

Opinion:
BEAUCHAMP, Judge.
Appellant was sentenced to the penitentiary for three years on a charge that he failed to stop and render aid to Cecil Beasley, Jr., whom he struck and injured while driving an automobile on the streets of Colorado City on the 11th day of November, 1941.
The conviction was had under the first count of the indictment which, after alleging the collision, reads: " the said L. D. May did then and there unlawfully fail to stop and render to the said Cecil Begley, Jr., the person struck and injured as aforesaid, all necessary assistance in this, the said L. D. May did then and there fail to stop and to carry the said Cecil Beealey, Jr., to a physician and surgeon for medical and surgical treatment
Appellant timely filed a motion to quash the indictment on the ground that the words "physician and surgeon" are connected by the conjunctive conjunction "and" instead of the disjunctive "or", as appears in the statute. No uncertainty is created by the use of "and" instead of "or" in this case and the authorities relied upon do not apply. See Branch's Penal Code, page SS6, § 967.
The State's evidence, largely circumstantial, was sufficient to show that appellant was the party who was responsible for the accident resulting in the death of the Beasley child. His extra judicial confession, his admissions in court, and his testimony on the Witness stand conclusively show this. The accident occurred at nighttime. Appellant and two companions had been attending a carnival and all had engaged in drinking during the afternoon or night. Apparently they were leaving the city when they overtook two boys on bicycles and collided with one of them. He did not stop to render aid and no one was able to identify the car which he was driving as being the one involved. In a very few minutes, a lady picked up the child and took him to the hospital but he was dead when they arrived. After the State had introduced its evidence resulting from the investigation which followed, appellant took the witness stand and testified that his two companions were drunk, that he was unable to stop because of that fact. He drove around a few blocks, had some kind of collision with another car and finally left his companions on a corner while he went to the scene of the tragedy "to see about the wreck". I-Ie says that when he got to the scene of the accident, somebody was carrying the boy off. He does not say how long it was after the collision until his return to the scene of the accident but he was not gone over three or four minutes from the time he left the two drunks until he returned to them. When he got to the place of the accident, he saw a number of-people there. He did not report his presence to anybody or let it be known that he was the one who had the collision. He made no offer of any assistance whatsoever and no other witness testified to having seen him at the place.
It is the contention on appeal that the foregoing testimony of the return of the accused to the scene of the accident and his testimony that he could not stop because he had the two drunk people raised excusable issues which, if found by the jury to be correct, called for a verdict of not guilty. Reliance is had upon Woods v. State, 135 Tex.Cr.R. 540, 121 S.W.2d 604. In that case, Woods, who was traveling on the streets of a city, had a lady with him in the car who was injured while he himself had an injury requiring medical attention. He gave as his excuse for not stopping that it was necessary to take her to a doctor as well as to secure treatment for himself. We held this to be a reasonable excuse under proper construction of the statute for his failure to stop and render aid and said it should have been submitted to the jury under proper instructions. The opinion in the Woods case discussed Williams v. State, 132 Tex.Cr.R. 33, 102 S.W.2d 212, and Greer v. State, 108 Tex.Cr.R. 356, 300 S.W. 640, together with other cases cited in this appeal. We think that such holding was correct under the facts for the reasons stated in the several cases relied upon but we are unwilling to expand the rule so far as to say that one who is guilty of the crime charged may be excused because he had with him parties who were drunk and for whom he felt the duty to shield them from any probable trouble because of such fact. Neither do we think that his story of his returr, and his willingness to then render aid suffi cient to comply with the law. He had com mitted the offense charged and, if he had the power thereafter to retrieve the wrong done, he fell far short of it in this case. Human life is not that cheap and no such construction could reasonably be read into the statute for it would result in destroying the very laudable purpose of it and the protection which it gives. Appellant's contention cannot be sustained under the facts of the instant case.
A more serious question has arisen because of the court's charge wherein he submits the facts of the case to the jury and tells them that if the accused "failed to stop and render to the said Cecil Beasley, Jr. all necessary assistance, then you will find the defendant guilty This is not in accord with the words of the indictment, for "necessary assistance" is there limited to his failure to stop and "to carry the said Cecil Bee^ley, Jr. to a physician and surgeon" whereas it is submitted to the jury on a more expanded issue. By the language of the indictment, they could only consider his failure to take him to a physician for treatment. Under the court's charge, they were authorized to consider anything that might have been necessary assistance. The charge was erroneous under the holding of the court in Moore v. State, 140 Tex.Cr.R. 482, 145 S.W.2d 887. The reasoning in that opinion is relied upon and here referred to with approval.
In Gooden v. State, 140 Tex.Cr.R. 347, 145 S.W.2d 177, this court had before it a very similar question in which the former holdings were summarized. While the facts were not the same, the reasoning in the Gooden case is applicable here. Good-en was charged with the offense of burglary by entering a house for the fraudulent purpose of taking therefrom corporeal personal property. In submitting the case to the jury, the court instructed them to find the defendant guilty if they found "that the entry was made with the intent to commit a felony or the crime of theft." We held that it submitted other offenses as the purpose for the entry than that charged in the indictment. No exception was taken to the charge at the time but the conclusion was reached that the error was one which may be considered on appeal. This reasoning and the same holding will be followed in the instant case and for the error thus pointed out the judgment of the trial court will be reversed and the cause remanded. All complaints not herein discussed are concluded against the appellant.