Case Name: Daniel H. Reynolds v. Charles H. Tucker and Cynthia Tucker, his wife
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio
Jurisdiction: Ohio
Decision Date: 1856-12
Citations: 6 Ohio St. 516
Docket Number: 
Parties: Daniel H. Reynolds v. Charles H. Tucker and Cynthia Tucker, his wife.
Judges: Bartlet, C. J., and Scott, J., concurred.
Reporter: Ohio State Reports, New Service
Volume: 6
Pages: 517–525

Head Matter:
Daniel H. Reynolds v. Charles H. Tucker and Cynthia Tucker, his wife.
1. In ah action of slander for words spoken against the chastity of the plaintiff’s wife, it is competent for the defendant, under the general issue, in mitigation of damages, to prove that the wife and an unmarried man had. lived together alone in 'one house, where a knowledge of such mode of living had come to the defendant before the speaking of the words.
2. If the court refuse to permit competent testimony to go to the jury, the error in such refusal is not cured by the consent of the adverse party afterward to go into the inquiry proposed by the rejected evidence.
This cause comes into this court upon a petition in error to reverse-the decision of the district court of Lorain county, made at the September term, 1855. The original action was case for slanderous words, and was commenced in October, 1852.
*The actionable words charged in the declaration were, that [517' said Cynthia was a whore, and defendant could prove it by Thomas Goman, and that she was Thomas Goman’s concubine. That she was ■ a. whore before she came from Vermont, and was still a common whore for anything that came along.
The general issue was pleaded, and the case tried before a jury,, and a'verdict^of six dollai’s rendered in favor of defendants in error, on which the district court gave judgment.
After the plaintiffs below had given proof of the speaking of the words, the defendant offered to prove that plaintiffs had lived. together alone in one- house before they were married; which fact was well known to the defendant below, at the time they so lived together, which was eight or nine years ago; to which evidence the-; plaintiffs below objected, and the court sustained the objection (but subsequently, while the same witness was under cross-examination, the plaintiffs below offered to go into the inquiry, which was declined by the defendant), and refused to allow the evidence to go to-the jury. The court held that the defendant below could not prove particular acts of misconduct on the part of the plaintiff, unless, they were such as related to the circumstances connected with the-words spoken by the defendant, but must be confined in his proof to general reports of her character for chastity in the neighborhood, and to general reports of her having lived with her husband under ■suspicious circumstances before marriage; and that defendant could not prove, as a fact, that she had lived with her husband under suspicious circumstances before her marriage, no circumstance connected with that having been referred to by the defendent in the words .spoken by him.
To the refusal of the court to admit this evidence, the defendant below excepted.
*Stevenson Burke, for the plaintiff in error:
The court below erred in ruling out the evidence offered by defendant below, and also in restricting the defendant below in his proof, to the showing of general reports, etc. The following cases .are in point: Haywood v. Foster, 16 Ohio, 88; Bush v. Prosser, 1 Kernan, 347; DeWitt v. Greenfield, 5 Ohio, 325; Knobell v. Fuller, Peakes’ additional cases, 137; Williams v. Miner, 18 Conn. 464; Rigdon v. Wolcott, 6 Gill & Johnson, 413; also Wilson v. Apple, 3 Ohio, 270.
H. D. Clark (with whom was J. Myres), for defendant in error,
cited 21 Pick. 404; 13 Johns. 475; 1 Pick. 1; 2 Ib. 376; Miller v. Spencer, Holt’s Nisi Prius cases, 535; 3 Eng. Com. Law, 177.

Opinion:
Bowen, J.
Por the purpose of mitigating damages it was competent for the defendant, under the general issue, ty prove facts, •connected with the speaking of the words, which were from the nature of them, calculated to induce the belief, on his part, that the plaintiff's was wife guilty of the impropriety imputed to her, provided such proof did not establish a justification. If an unmarried man and woman live alone in the same house, it may and very likely would raise an inference unfavorable to the latter's chastity. It may induce a belief that adultery has been committed by her, while holding that relation. Still, however, it does not convict her of the act.. Such mode of living may be entirely innocent and proper, adopted and continued for the most upright purpose. The whole reason for the rule for admitting such evidence, is to relieve the defendant from the consequences which attach to malice, in the speaking of the words. He may show particular acts of the plaintiff which, unexplained, gave him just reason to believe in the truth 519] of the declarations which he uttered; but *whon explained :and understood, mav be found to be compatible with the plaintiff's innocence. It is permitted upon the ground that the proof, when introduced, may serve to show that the defendant, in making the charge, was mistaken — that he misconstrued the act or conduct of the party, by supposing it to be criminal, while, in fact, it was not. When the testimony can have no other effect than to make apparent the plaintiff's guilt, and prove the truth of the words spoken, its introduction to the jury must necessarily tend to justify the speaking, and not to mitigate damages, by showing the absence of malice. To be competent for the former purpose, the facts relied on must be plead specially, and can not be given in evidence under the general issue. Such is the rule in Wilson v. Apple, 3 Ohio, 270; DeWitt v. Greenfield, 5 Ohio, 225; Haywood v. Foster, 16 Ohio, 88. The fact which the defendant offered to prove, was erroneously excluded from the jury.
The evidence having been improperly rejected by the court below, was the error cured by the offer of the plaintiffs, wh'ile the witness was on cross-examination, to go into the inquiry which the defendant's question proposed ?
: The error of the court consisted in ruling against the competency of the evidence. The consent of the party in whose favor the ruling was made, afterward to admit the evidence, could not relieve the party from the effect of the erroneous decision of' the court. The jury would receive it with knowledge that the court had pronounced it incompetent, and it would go to them under the stamp of judicial disapproval. It can hardly be said, in such case, that the party would derive the same benefit from it that he would have done, had he been allowed to examine the witness, as of right, upon the subject, by the sanction of the judges. When the court had expressed its opinion that the evidence should not be considered by the jury, the latter would *scarcely give it any consideration, [520 when admitted by the mere favor of the other side.
The consent of the plaintiffs to go into the examination, which was proposed by the defendant, could not restore the latter to the same condition before the jury, that he would have sustained, if the court had permitted him, as of right, to make the inquiry of the witness.
Judgment reversed, and cause remanded.
Bartlet, C. J., and Scott, J., concurred.
Swan, J., concurred as to the first point, but dissented as to the -second.