Case Name: Jon N. MOODY, Petitioner, v. Larry CAMPBELL, Sheriff of Leon County, Respondent
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1998-06-05
Citations: 713 So. 2d 1032
Docket Number: No. 98-1969
Parties: Jon N. MOODY, Petitioner, v. Larry CAMPBELL, Sheriff of Leon County, Respondent.
Judges: BARFIELD, C.J., and KAHN, J., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 713
Pages: 1032–1035

Head Matter:
Jon N. MOODY, Petitioner, v. Larry CAMPBELL, Sheriff of Leon County, Respondent.
No. 98-1969.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
June 5, 1998.
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Randolph P. Murrell, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for petitioner.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Mark C. Menser, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for respondent.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner Jon N. Moody is currently being held without bail awaiting trial on charges of burglary of a dwelling and petit theft. His detention under these particular circumstances is unauthorized and we therefore issue a writ of habeas corpus.
After his arrest on the above-described charges, petitioner posted bail and was released. He was subsequently arrested for trespass on property and removing a posted sign, both misdemeanors. A short time later he was arrested for a new offense of petit theft. The state then moved to revoke his bond and re-commit the defendant. After considering the defendant's record and hearing argument of counsel, the trial judge ordered pretrial detention, finding there to be no satisfactory conditions of release that would protect the community from the defendant's further criminal conduct.
As a threshold matter, while the trial court has the authority to arrest and commit a defendant released on bail for a breach of the undertaking, the subsequent proceedings are nevertheless controlled by the terms of section 907.041, Florida Statutes. Metzger v. Cochran, 694 So.2d 842 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). Here the .court ordered pretrial detention under section '907.041(4)(b)4., finding that the defendant poses a threat of harm to the community. Petitioner concedes that he is charged with a "dangerous crime" pursuant to section 907.041(4)(a)16. However, in addition to such a pending charge, section 907.041(4)(b)4. requires that the court must find at least one of three additional criteria to be met before a defendant may be detained because he poses a threat of harm to the community:
a. The defendant has previously been convicted of a crime punishable by death or life imprisonment.
b. The defendant has been convicted of a dangerous crime within the 10 years immediately preceding the date of his or her arrest for the crime presently charged.
e. The defendant is on probation, parole, or other release pending completion of sentence or on pretrial release for a dangerous crime at the time of the current arrest.
Petitioner has not been convicted of a crime punishable by death or life imprisonment nor was he on probation, parole, or other release pending completion of sentence or on pretrial release for a dangerous crime at the time of his arrest for burglary. The respondent argues, however, that the defendant's delinquency adjudications while a minor, including as many as 12 burglaries and a number of assaults and batteries, satisfy subsection 907.041(4)(b)4.b. We are unable to read the statute in that way.
Although this appears to be a question of first impression, the courts have found in analogous situations that a juvenile delinquency adjudication is not a "conviction." For example, in J.B.M. v. State, the court held that a juvenile who committed a delinquent act that would be a felony if committed by an adult did not, when subsequently found to be in possession of a firearm, violate section 790.23(1), Florida Statutes. 560 So.2d 347 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). In general, juvenile delinquency proceedings are neither wholly criminal nor civil in nature. State v. Boatman, 329 So.2d 309, 312 (Fla.1976). For that reason some of the procedural safeguards of adult proceedings, such as a right to a trial by jury, are not applicable in juvenile proceedings. Id. By contrast, the legislature has, in other contexts, spoken to the effect of prior juvenile convictions. See, e.g., § 921.0011(5), Fla. Stat. (1997)(sentencing guidelines); 90.610(l)(b) (evidence). The absence of any clarification by the legislature regarding the applicability of juvenile adjudications to section 907.041(4)(b)4.b. points to their exclusion from its scope, especially in light of the rules of statutory construction in criminal proceedings. See also State v. T.M.B., 23 Fla. L. Weekly S180 (Fla. April 2, 1998)(juvenile appeals are governed by chapter 39, Florida Statutes [now chapter 985] and section 924.051(4), Florida Statutes, does not apply in juvenile delinquency proceedings).
Upon consideration of the above, we find that the petitioner does not satisfy the statutory criteria for pretrial detention and we therefore order his immediate release from custody. Our holding is limited to an interpretation of section 907.041 as now in effect. It is within the scope of legislative authority to address this issue again in the future. This order does not preclude the trial court from setting reasonable conditions for the petitioner's pretrial release pursuant to section 903.047, Florida Statutes and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.131.
No motion for rehearing will be entertained and the clerk of this court is directed to issue mandate forthwith.-
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
BARFIELD, C.J., and KAHN, J., concur.
LAWRENCE, J., dissents with written opinion.