Case Name: In the Matter of the Compensation of Robert Dubray, Claimant. Robert DUBRAY, Petitioner, v. SAIF Corporation, Pat Leamy, and Ted Sharp, Respondents
Court: Oregon Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 2001-06-27
Citations: 175 Or. App. 112
Docket Number: 99-02514; A110816
Parties: In the Matter of the Compensation of Robert Dubray, Claimant. Robert DUBRAY, Petitioner, v. SAIF Corporation, Pat Leamy, and Ted Sharp, Respondents.
Judges: Before Edmonds, Presiding Judge, and Armstrong and Kistler, Judges
Reporter: Oregon Reports, Court of Appeals
Volume: 175
Pages: 112–113

Head Matter:
Argued and submitted May 30,
reversed and remanded for reconsideration June 27, 2001
In the Matter of the Compensation of Robert Dubray, Claimant. Robert DUBRAY, Petitioner, v. SAIF Corporation, Pat Leamy, and Ted Sharp, Respondents.
99-02514; A110816
27 P3d 519
R. Adian Martin argued the cause and filed the brief for petitioner.
Julene Marian Quinn argued the cause and filed the brief for respondents.
Before Edmonds, Presiding Judge, and Armstrong and Kistler, Judges
PER CURIAM

Opinion:
PER CURIAM
Claimant seeks review of an order of the Workers' Compensation Board affirming an order of an administrative law judge (ALJ) that determined the amount of claimant's permanent partial disability. He argues that the ALJ found that the existing rules do not cover his condition and that the ALJ should therefore have remanded the case to the Director for the promulgation of a temporary rule. See ORS 656.726(4)(f)(C); Gallino v. Courtesy Pontiac-Buick-GMC, 124 Or App 538, 863 P2d 530 (1993). SAIF argues that the ALJ correctly concluded that the existing rules apply to claimant's condition and that claimant failed to prove that he was entitled to additional compensation under those rules.
The difficulty with this case is that it is possible to read the ALJ's order to support both parties' interpretations. The ALJ may have concluded as a matter of law that he had no authority to remand the case because the director had expressly addressed the question of the adequacy of the existing rules. Alternatively, the ALJ may have determined as a matter of fact that the existing rules were adequate because they address claimant's disability. The first conclusion would raise a serious legal question under Gallino; the second could require review for substantial evidence. Because we do not know what the ALJ decided, we cannot review the order. On remand, the ALJ and the Board are to clarify the basis for the decision.
Reversed and remanded for reconsideration.