Case Name: SARAH E. WRIGHT, Garnishee, etc., vs. SAMUEL P. RYLAND et al.
Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland
Jurisdiction: Maryland
Decision Date: 1901-08-14
Citations: 92 Md. 645
Docket Number: 
Parties: SARAH E. WRIGHT, Garnishee, etc., vs. SAMUEL P. RYLAND et al.
Judges: The cause was argued before McSherry, C. J., Fowler, Briscoe, Boyd, Pearce, Schmucker and Jones, JJ.
Reporter: Maryland Reports
Volume: 92
Pages: 645–668

Head Matter:
SARAH E. WRIGHT, Garnishee, etc., vs. SAMUEL P. RYLAND et al.
Scire Facias to Revive Judgment — Alienees oj Judgment Debtor Not Bound Unless Made Parties — No Execution on Original Judgment After Fiat on Scire Facias■— Terre- Tenants.
Añera judgment of fiat in a scire facias proceeding to revive a judgment, the plaintiff cannot issue execution on the original judgment.
When a judgment is revived within the time during which execution could be issued on it, the alienees orterre-tenants of the land of the judgment debtor must be made parties to the scire facias, if they are to be bound by the new judgment.
While a judgment was in force against A he became entitled as distributee of an estate to an undivided third interest in a chattel real. He assigned this interest to his sister by a deed which was not recorded among the land records, but was lodged in the office of the register of wills where the estate was being administered, and A’s interest was distributed and conveyed by the administrator to the assignee in pursuance of an order of the Orphans’ Court. Subsequently, and before the expiration of the judgment against A the same was revived by a fiat on a scire facias, but the’said assignee was not made a party to this proceeding. An attachment, reciting both the original judgment and the fiat, was issued and levied on the interest of the judgment debtor in said chattel real. Held,
ist. That although the original judgment was a lien on A’s interest in said property, yet no execution could be issued thereon after the fiat which became the new and effective judgment in the case.
2nd. That the assignment and distribution as above mentioned of A’s interest to his sister, the garnishee in this case, and her possession thereunder, constituted her an alienee and terre-tenant of the land.
3rd. That the lien of the original judgment was not revived against the alienee and terre-tenant by the fiat, because she was not made a party to the scire facias, and consequently she is not bound hy the new judgment.
Appeal from the Baltimore City Court (Ritchie, J.)
The cause was argued before McSherry, C. J., Fowler, Briscoe, Boyd, Pearce, Schmucker and Jones, JJ.
Charles F. Harley (with whom was John Wheltle on the brief), for the appellant:
The deed from the administrator to Sarah E. Wright complies in form with all the requirements of Code, Art. 21;.and, whatever may have been the merits or defects of the assignment from Coath personally to Mrs. Wright, the question of validity vel non of the order of the Orphans’ Court authorizing the deed can not be raised in this case. Let us concede, however, ex gratia argumenti, that this question is a proper one in this case. The burden would be upon the appellee to show that the property attached at the time of laying the attachment was the property of Coath, whereas the proposition, if allowed, leads with irresistible logic to the conclusion that it was the property of the administrator. If this contention, made as it was by the plaintiff, is a proper one the garnishee should prevail in this case.
It is clear that if the plaintiff had not elected to renew its judgment by scire facias, the old judgment under the Act of 1890, chapter 114 (Supplement, Art. 26, sec. 20), would have been a lien upon this property at the time of laying the attachment on June 23rd, 1899, as the old judgment would not have expired till June 29th, 1899. Under the law the plaintiff had that remedy qualified by another remedy in the nature of a scire facias. Let us see what is the effect of the election of remedies. Attachment may issue at any time within twelve years from the date of judgment: “provided that at any time before the expiration of twelve years * * * the plaintiff shall have right to have a writ of scire facias to renew or revive the same.” It took advantage of this right; but the renewed judgment has no life as against this garnishee, because she was not made a party defendant therein, and the lands and tenements in controversy were not described in the sheriff’s return in said scire facias proceedings. Warfield v. Brewer, 4 Gill, 266, 269; Polk v. Pendleton, 31 Md. 118; Thomas v. Bank, 46 Md. 43; Bish case, 59 Md. 382, 386; Poe's Practice, sec. 593; Black on Judgments, sec. 492; Freeman on Judgments, p. 767. So strict is this rule, that a prior lien creditor can, under no circumstances, question the validity of his debtor’s conveyance, when he fails to make such grantee a party defendant in the scire facias proceedings. Armington v. Ran, 100 Pa. St. 165; Long v. McConnell, 158 Pa. St. 578.
It is thus clear that, having failed to avail itself of the right to revive this judgment against Sarah E. Wright, the plaintiff cannot attach this property under the renewed judgment which the writ recites. Can an attachment be issued upon the old judgment within the twelve years after its renewal by scire facias ? No case in point has as yet been presented by the able and diligent counsel for the appellee, in support of this proposition ; but the reasoning of a Pennsylvania authority seems to be favorable thereto. However, Pennsylvania authorities can have no bearing in this case, as the proceedings in scire facias in that State are peculiar statutory proceedings sui generis, being entirely different from the practice thereunder in all the other States and in England. Even the judgment therein is different, being quod recuperet, instead of fiat executio. 21 A. & E. Ency. of Law 870; Freeman on Judgments, sec. 442; Black oil Judgments, sec. 499; Freeman on Executions (4 ed.) sec. 81. The Pennsylvania proceeding in scire facias is very similar to the old action on judgment. Freei7ia7i on Executes, sec. 81. Where a fiad facias issued out after a scire facias on a judgment, the fieri facias must be grounded on the scÍ7'e facias, even though the scire facias was sued out umiecessa7dly. Hall v. Claggett, 63 Md. 61; see also Freeman on Executions, sec. 94; Richardson v. McDougall, 19 Wend. 80.
“Again in Rolle’s Abr., 900, there is a report of the case of Roberts v. Pesing tried in the King’s Bench at Trinity Term, 13 Charles I, in which it was decided that if the plaintiff sue a scire facias within a year after the judgment he cannot after-wards have a capias ad satisfacie7idum within the year till he hath a new judgment in the scire facias. This case is cited as good law in Foster’s Writ of scire facias 27 and Tidd’s Practice, 1103, and it does not appear ever to have been overruled or questioned.” Lambson v. Moffett, 61 Md. 431. “Where a fie7d facias is issued out after a scire facias on a judgment the fieri facias must set out the award of execution on the scire facias as well as the original judgment, even as it seems though the scire facias was sued out unnecessarily.” 2 Tidd’s Practice, 998. Where an execution issued out after a scire facias on a judgment, the execution must be grounded on the judgment in scire facias, though the scire facias was sued out unnecessarily. Davis v. Norton, 1 Bingham 133. “The original judgment was waived or suspended by the plaintiff, on his causing the writ of scire facias to be sued out to revive it.” Ibid., 7 Moore, 502. It has never been reanimated as to this garnishee. “ The judgment of scire facias seems also to merge the original judgment, so that if a second scire facias is desired, it can only be obtained on the first scire facias, and not on the original judgment.” Freeman, Judgment, sec. 447.
It is, therefore, clear that the attachment should recite the judgment on scire facias as well as the original judgment. See Hands' Entries, 690, as to form. “The able and thorough .discussion of this question by Judge Bakewell in Walsh v. Bosse, 16 Mo. App. 231, in which it is held that the preceding by scire facias to renew a judgment, while a continuation of the original proceeding, so far partakes of the nature of an action that, in effect, the judgment therein is a new judgment, designed to avoid the Statute of Limitations, which then runs from its date and not from that of the original judgment, is, in my humble opinion, conclusive in its reasoning and cited authorities.” Wonderly v. Lafayette County, 74 F. R. 706.
The plaintiff is entitled to scire facias one day or one year after his original judgment is rendered or at any time within twelve years. The only penalty is, that, if he sue out a scire facias, he must rely on his new judgment therein for his execution. Freeman on Executions, sec. 88; Roberts v. Pesing, Rolle’s Abr. 900; Lambson v. Moffett, 61 Md. 426, 431; Wonderly v. Lafayette Co., 74 F. R. 702.
As far as the terre-tenant is concerned, the scire facias is a new proceeding, although as to the defendant it is but a continuation of an old action. But whatever may be the nature of the proceeding or action, the judgment of fiat executio in the proceedings scire facias executionem non is a new judgment, certainly a renewed judgment as the statute says. Weaver v. Boggs, 38 Md. 264; Mullikin v. Duvall, 7 G. & J. 360; Warfield v. Brewer, 4 Gill 269; Bish case, 59 Md. 382; Lambson v. Moffett, 61 Md. 431; Coke's Littleton, sec. 505; Poe's Practice, sec. 585 and authorities quoted. Walsh v. Bosse, 16 Mo. App. 231; Lafayette Co. v. Wonderly, 34 C. C. A. 362, affirming 74 Fed. Rep. 702.
The record shows that the attachment was issued upon the renewed judgment; the authorities show that it was necessary to issue on the renewed judgment and to recite the original judgment. It furnished a new terminus a quo. Walsh v. Bosse, supra. It is good for twelve years from its rendition not twelve years from the date of the expiration of the original judgment. Poe's Practice, sec. 594. The execution is grounded upon the judgment in scire facias; and as the plaintiff has no rights thereunder against this garnishee, it is respectfully submitted that the Court below erred in granting the plaintiff’s prayer and in refusing the garnishee’s prayers and in overruling the garnishee’s motion to quash.
The motion to quash was filed out of abundance of caution, and presents in a different form the questions raised by the prayers; and it could properly be filed at any stage of the cause. Poe's Practice, sec. 539; Bruce v. Cook, 6 G. & J. 346; Stone v. Magruder, 10 G. & J. 387; Eveson v. Selby, 32 Md. 340; Hodge & McLane on Attachment, sec. 94. Can it be contended that the old judgment had five days to live as far as the terre-tenant was concerned, and that as to the defendant it was dead, and had been reanimated, renewed and revived in the judgment of fiatt After judgment of fiat, could the plaintiff have issued under old judgment against defendant? The plaintiff cannot play ‘ihot and cold” at the same time. It had its remedy. It made its election; and under the law it must stand by it.
Alexander Hardcastle, Jr., and Frank D. Wynn for the appellee :
The judgment lien was effective at the time of the issuing of the writ of attachment because, I. The appellant is not a terretenant. 2. That the lien of the original judgment is not extinguished by the judgment of fiat, but remains in force for the statutory period of twelve years.
i. The appellant is not a terre-tenant because she holds no title under William Coath, the judgment debtor. He, as administrator, acted as trustee for the distributees who were next of kin, one of whom was himself. Next of kin can obtain title only through the administrator. Neale v. Hagthop, 3 Bland, 551; Smith v. Dennis, 33 Md. 449 450; Rock Hill College v. Jones, 47 Md. 19; Matthews v. Turner & Woodyard, 64 Md. 121.
The administrator’s deed of April 23rd, 1895, purported to convey to the appellant two undivided third interests in the aforesaid leasehold estate. It did convey the appellant’s undivided one-third interest, but it did not convey the undivided one-third interest of William Coath, because his interest could not pass from the administrator to a third party, but must first pass to the distributee. Public General Laws, Art. 93, sec. 139. The assignment to the appellant from William Coath is invalid for the reason that, it was filed in the office of the Register of Wills of Baltimore City, whereas, it should have been recorded in the Superior Court of Baltimore City. Public General Laws, Art. 21, secs. 1 and 13; Constitution, Art. 4, sec. 38. The United States Insurance Company v. Shriver et al., 3 Md. Ch. 290.
The appellant holds no title under the judgment debtor, therefore, she is not a terre-tenant. It is conclusively established that terre-tenants are only those “Who are in possession, deriving title under the judgment debtor. ” Polk v. Pendleton, 31 Md. 123; Lee v. Early, 44 Md. 94; Freeman on Judgments, sec. 443,767—768. A mere occupier is, however, not a terretenant, 16 S. & R. (Pa.)455; 16 Amer. Dec. 587. It is clear the judgment debtor resorted to a skillful advice, and attempted to avoid the requirement of the registration laws. It is equally clear that to this day there is no duly recorded conveyance, divesting William Coath of the interest in land, which vested in him at the death of his mother.
2. The lien of the original judgment is not extinguished by the judgment of fiat, but remains in force for the statutory period of twelve years. The language of the statutes is absolute and unqualified in continuing the lien of the judgment for a period of twelve years. And it is, to say the least, incumbent upon the appellant to show some established principle of law, sufficient to deprive the judgment creditor of the lien thus expressly given. The appellee cannot be deprived by mere implication of a right positively conferred upon it. Code, Art. 26, sec. 19, 20, Acts of 1890, chaps. 114, 314.
In Doub v. Barnes et al, 4 Gill, 9, the Court explained and confirmed the decision in Murphy v. Cord, 12 G. & J. 182, and held : a, That the lien of the judgment was not lost with the right to issue an immediate execution * * * and the lien remained for twelve years; b, that when the debtor alienated lands subject to the lien of a judgment, before the right to issue an immediate execution was suspended, that is, within three years within the date of the judgment, a scire facias was unnecessary to affect the terre-tenants.” See Warfield v. Brewer, 4 Gill, 205.
The period is now twelve years within which execution or attachment may issue, and it is not necessary to notify terretenants within that time. The office of a scire facias to revive a judgment is to reinvest it with all the powers, attributes and conditions that originally belonged to it, and which have been wholly or in part suspended by lapse of time, change of parties and the like. Moore v. Garrettson, 6 Md. 448. The doctrine stated above was affirmed, and the language quoted, in Huston et al. v. Ditto et al., 20 Md. 328, also in Hoffman v. Shuff, 80 Md. 614; 2 Poe on Pleading and Practice, sec. 609. The scire facias and judgment of fiat are in effect nothing more than a compulsory acknowledgment by the judgment debtor of an existing obligation, which by force of such acknowledgment is kept alive for another period of twelve years.
There is no authority, statutory or judicial, in Maryland that supports the appellant’s contention, but there is strong, direct authority that a judgment is a lien upon property, aliened after judgment, for twelve years ; and we find the doctrine conclusively established outside of the State. Black on Judgments, sec. 492; Freeman on Executions, sec. 92A; 2 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 960.
“It is a common, plain and familiar principle that a scire acias to revive a judgment post annum et diem, is but a continuation of the original action, and the execution thereon is an execution on the former judgment. The judgment on the scire facias is not, as the Court erroneously supposes, a new judgment giving vitality only from that time, but it is the revival of the original judgment, giving, or rather continuing, the vitality of the original judgment with all its incidents from the time of its rendition. ” Irwin v. Nixon's Heirs, 11 Pa. Stat. 425.
“The judgment, on a scire facias, issued to revive the lien of a former judgment, is for some purposes in the nature of á new judgment * * * But it is not considered as operating to merge and extinguish the original judgment-, to all intents and purposes, so as to take away the rights of the plaintiff. The original judgment still has its operation and efficacy.” Fursht v. Overdeer, 3 Watts & Sergeant, 471; and Little v. Smyser. 10 Pa. St., 385, 386.

Opinion:
Schmucker, J.,
delivered the opinion of the Court:
Ryland & Brooks obtained judgment in the Baltimore City Court against Geo. W. Grafflin and William Coath for $457.16, on June 29th, 1887. The judgment was entered to the use of the Ryland & Brooks Lumber Company which caused a scire' facias to be issued thereon, in which a judgment of fiat was entered on May 8th, 1899. The only defendants to the scire facias were the original judgment debtors, no notice having been taken of their grantees or alienees.
In August, 1892, Maria Coath, the mother of the defendant, William Coath, died intestate, being the owner of a sub-ground rent of $180 per annum issuing out of a lot of ground in Baltimore City. She left three children including William, each of whom was entitled to an undivided one-third of her estate. He assigned his interest in the estate shortly before the distribution thereof to his sister Sarah E. Wright by a deed duly executed and acknowledged, which was lodged in the office of the Register of Wills of Baltimore City, but was not recorded in the land records. The assignment recited a consideration of $ i ,000, and its bona fides is not assailed in the record. By the final administration account of the estate two-thirds of the net residue, including the sub-rent of $180 was distributed to Sarah E. Wright, and a conveyance thereof was made to her by the administrator under the order of the Orphans' Court and she entered into possession of it. That conveyance was duly recorded in the land records, on August 16th, 1894, nearly four years before the issuing of the scire facias on the judgment against Grafflin & Coath.
On June 23rd, 1899, The Ryland & Brooks Lumber Company, after the judgment of fiat had beed entered, issued an attachment reciting both the original judgment and the fiat. On the next day, June 24th, the attachment was levied as per schedule upon the interest of William Coath in the sub-rent of $180., and on July 8th, 1899, it was laid in the hands of Sarah E. Wright.
She appeared to the attachment and pleaded property in herself to the interest in the sub-rent which had been levied on, and also moved to quash the attachment on the same ground and for the further reason that she had not been made a party to the scire facias by which the judgment had been revived before the attachment was issued. The motion to quash and the issue on the attachment were tried at the same time before the Court without a jury, and the Court overruled the motion to quash and rendered a verdict and entered judgment for the plaintiff for the property attached. and the garnishee appealed.
At the trial of the case the Court granted the prayer of the plaintiff which briefly recited the facts already stated in this opinion and asserted the plaintiff's right to a verdict thereon, and it rejected the three prayers of the garnishee which as serted that there was no evidence legally sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to a verdict, or to entitle it to a condemnation of the property levied on, or to show that the defendant had any interest therein either when the judgment was rendered, or when the attachment was issued, or at any time since. There are two bills of exceptions one on the Courts action on the prayers and the other to the refusal of the motion to quash.
The original judgment against Grafflin & Coath was a lien on Coath's one-third interest in the ground rent of which his mother died intestate. That.lien was not divested by the sale and conveyance of his share of the estate to his sister and the plaintiff might have seized it under a fi. fa. on the original judgment at any time before the issue of the scire facias. But after the judgment of fiat in the scire facias he could not have execution upon his original judgment.
This Court has repeatedly held that the fiat"is considered a new judgment;" Mulliken v. Duvall, 7 G. & J. 355; Weaver v. Boggs, 38 Md. 264; and that it is "the effective judgment" and must be "accurately recited in the process of execution" Hall v. Clagett, 63 Md. 61. In Lambson v. Moffett, 61 Md. 431, this Court cites with approval Roberts v. Pesing, Rolle's Abridgement, 900, where it was held that the plaintiff who sued out a scire facias within a year and a day after judgment, could not have execution until he had a new judgment in the scire facias, and say that it is authority, if any were needed, for the proposition that where a party unnecessarily sues out a scire facias when he is entitled to and can have an immediate execution, he thereby subjects himself to the inconvenience and delay of having the execution withheld until he obtains a judgment of fiat under the sci. fa.
The remaining question to be determined is whether the lien of the original judgment upon the sub-rent was revive!! by the scire facias to which Mrs. Wright, the vendee of Coath's interest therein, was not made a party as terre-ténant. The question who are necessary defendants to a scire facias has been frequently before this Court.
In Arnott v. Nicholls, 1 H. & J. 472, which was decided at a time when the law required a judgment to be revived by a scire facias after a year .and a day from its date before a fi.fa. could issue upon it, the Court held that if a defendant sells and conveys his lands bona fide for a valuable consideration after the judgment, even within the year and day, no execution can issue against the' lands of the vende.e until a scire facias has been sued out on the judgment and notice given to him as terre-tenant. That case has been erroneously referred to as having been overruled by M'Elderry v. Smith, 2 H. & J. 72, but an inspection of the latter case shows that it did not overrule the former one at all, but simply decided that where the defendant aliened his land during the pendency of a scire facias the plaintiff, after a fiat on the scire facias, might issue a fi. fa. and levy it on the land so aliened, without proceeding against the parties who become vendees pendente lite.
In Murphy v. Cord, 12 G. & J. 182, a fi. fa. levied upon lands which had been mortgaged by the defendant within a year and day after the judgment was upheld in an ejectment brought by the mortgagee against the purchaser of the land under the fi. fa., but no opinion was filed in the case and it does not appear upon what grounds or authority the Court relied in making the decision. In Warfield v. Brewer, 4 Gill, 268, the Court expressed the opinion that a fi. fa. issued within a year and day after the entry of the judgment might be levied on lands conveyed by the defendant after the judgment without first issuing a scire facias against the vendee, but the Court relied, in so holding, upon the erroneous assumption that Arnott v. Nicholls, supra, had been overruled by M'Elderry v. Smith, supra. It appears, however, from the record in Warfield v. Brewer, that the expression by the Court of the opinion just mentioned was merely an obiter dictum, as it did not appear in that case whether the alienation of the lands of the defendant had been made before or after the sci. fa. was issued and for that reason, among others, the judgment in favor of the terre-tenant was affirmed.
It has been uniformly held that when the scire facias was not issued until after the year and day, which period was extended by Act of 1823, ch. 194, to three years, during which execution might issue without resort to scire facias, it was necessary to make the alienees after judgment parties to the writ if it was desired to affect the lands conveyed to them. In Warfield v. Brewer, supra, the Court says : " We know, however, of no decision of our Courts that when the judgment is to be revived it is not necessary to make the terre-tenant a party m order to proceed against his land or that he is to be bound by any scire facias issued after the alienation, to which he was not a party." In Polk v. Pendleton, 31 Md. 123, the Court in speaking of the necessity of including the terretenants in the scire facias say: " They are in, as of the estate of the 'judgment debtor, and before the judgment can be revived and enforced by execution against the land so as to divest their title, it is necessary to warn them by the scire facias, so that they may have an opportunity of making their defense and of claiming contribution from others holding lands of the judgment debtor, bound by the judgment." See to same effect Walsh v. Boyle, 30 Md. 270.
Since the Act of 1884, ch. 178, authorized an execution to be issued upon a judgment at any time within twelve years from its date, this Court has not passed upon the necessity of making the terre-tenants parties to a scire facias issued within that time, but both the practice hitherto pursued in issuing the writ and the principles of pleading seem to require that they should be made parties. So far as they are concerned the proceeding is a new one and it may result in giving vitality for a long time to a burden on their lands which is about to expire. Scire facias although a judicial process " so far partakes of the nature of an action that the defendant may appear and plead to it in the same manner as to an action founded upon an original writ and the judgment thereon is a new judgment." Weaver v. Boggs, 38 Md. 264. It has been held in several cases that the writ is in the nature of a declaration and that it must " contain upon its face such a statement of facts as to justify the process in respect to the form in which it issues and the persons who are made parties to it." Prather v. Manro, 11 G. & J. 265; McKnew v. Duvall, 45 Md. 509. In view of the decisions to which we have referred it would be inconsistent to hold that the owner of the land thus put in jeopardy should have no notice of the proceeding which he is entitled to defend and which if undefended might prove destructive of his title to his lands.
(Decided February 8th, 1901.)
The law in its present status is very liberal toward the plaintiff who may issue execution on his judgment, at any time during the twelve years for which it is alien, and levy upon the lands of the terre-tenant without previous notice to that person. It imposes no hardship upon him' to require that, when he seeks to revive-and extend the lien of the judgment for another twelve years, the parties owning thé land to be affected by the revived lien should have notice and an opportunity to be heard in their own behalf before the fiat goes against them.
. We think that the appellant, Sarah E. Wright, was entitled to notice of the scire facias as térre-tennant and should have been made a défendant to it. The assignment to her of thfe equitable interest of her brother in their mother's estate, followed as it was by the distribution of it to her in the 'administration account and the subsequent conveyance of the legal title to her by the administrator in pursuance of the order of the Orphans' Court, and her entry into possession thereunder constituted her an alienee and terre-tenant of his interest in the rent. The omission to make her a party to the scire facias resulted in a failure to revive the lien of the judgment against the interest which she derived from her brother in the ground rent. The second and third prayers of the appellant presented this issue and they should have been granted by the Court below.
Judgment reversed with costs.