Case Name: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Robert Lee KARNES, Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1976-01-30
Citations: 531 F.2d 214
Docket Number: No. 75-1431
Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Robert Lee KARNES, Appellant.
Judges: Before WINTER, RUSSELL and WIDENER, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 531
Pages: 214–220

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Robert Lee KARNES, Appellant.
No. 75-1431.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Argued Sept. 10, 1975.
Decided Jan. 30, 1976.
Arthur E. Smith, Roanoke, Va. and (Evans B. Jessee, Roanoke, Va., on brief), for appellant.
Ronald D. Hodges, Asst. U. S. Atty., Roanoke, Va., for appellee.
Before WINTER, RUSSELL and WIDENER, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
WINTER, Circuit Judge:
After the jury was unable to agree upon a verdict and was discharged at his first trial, Robert Lee Karnes was tried a second time and convicted by a jury of concealing a motor vehicle moving as, or which is part of, or which constitutes interstate or foreign commerce, knowing the vehicle to have been stolen, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2313 (1970). Karnes has appealed, asserting as grounds of reversible error that the district court (a) improperly permitted the transcribed testimony at the first trial of a witness, absent at the second trial, to be read to the jury, (b) improperly called as court witnesses two witnesses whose testimony was essential to the government's case, (c) improperly advised the jury that the government had moved to dismiss one count of the indictment against a co-defendant, and (d) recorded a verdict of conviction for concealment which was inconsistent with a verdict of not guilty for transportation of a stolen motor vehicle in interstate commerce with knowledge that it was stolen.
We conclude that defendant's contention with respect to the court witnesses is of sufficient merit to reverse and grant a new trial. We see no merit in defendant's other contentions nor reason to discuss them except to comment about the use of transcribed testimony from the first trial.
I.
The somewhat complex facts need not be recited because in oral argument the government conceded that it had no case against Karnes without the testimony of the co-defendant, Fred Cassity, and Cassity's wife. At the bench, the government represented that it would not call them as its witnesses because they previously had made conflicting statements and had withheld information and the government could not therefore vouch for their candor. The district court then called the Cassitys as its own witnesses and in accordance with usual practice permitted both sides to cross-examine them. Fred Cassity was also questioned by the court to permit him to identify a witness who testified about an incident which was a crucial part of the chain of proof. The district court made no statement to the jury in explanation of why these two witnesses were called as its own.
II.
We agree with the parties that ordinarily the utilization of court witnesses is a matter within the discretion of the trial judge. The leading texts, supported by a plethora of precedents, support the rule. See McCormick on Evidence § 8 (1972); 9 Wigmore on Evidence § 2484 (1940). The power to call and to interrogate court witnesses is said to be derived from the judicial system's basic functions of disclosing truth and administering justice. Indeed, the rule is codified in Rule 614 of the new Federal Rules of Evidence, although that rule was not in effect at the time of Karnes' prosecution.
A trial judge is not captive within the case as made by the parties. He has the authority, if not the duty, to call witnesses who possess relevant information affecting the outcome of the issues when the parties decline to call them. But the due process clause requires that a court be impartial. This impartiality is destroyed when the court assumes the role of prosecutor and undertakes to produce evidence, essential to overcome the defendant's presumption of innocence, which the government has declined to present. Further, in this case the jury was never told why the witnesses were called as court witnesses and the jury was not instructed that these witnesses were entitled to no greater credibility because they had been called by the court. The jury, thus, may well have afforded them greater credibility than if they had been called as government witnesses. The jury's determination of credibility of witnesses may therefore have been unfairly, albeit unintentionally, influenced and the government's case thereby strengthened.
We have no doubt that, failing to appreciate that the government could not prove its case without them, the district court's motive in calling the witnesses was to get at the truth and to enable the government to cross-examine and perhaps to impeach them with regard to any testimony unfavorable to the government which was inconsistent with their prior statements. But the same result could have been achieved by an accepted means. The government must, of course, use its witnesses as it finds them. In many cases the prosecution must depend upon the testimony of persons who are co-defendants, co-conspirators, felons, accomplices, etc., and such witnesses often evidence hostility, are impeachable from their past or current activities, or change or slant their testimony from what, based upon prior statements, the government expects them to say. Under such circumstances, a district judge may afford wide latitude to the government to lead, to cross-examine, and partially to impeach such witnesses. Illustrative of current practice is Rule 607, Fed.R.Ev., which states flatly "[t]he credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the party calling him." See also St. Clair v. United States, 154 U.S. 134, 150, 14 S.Ct. 1002 (1894); United States v. Baldivid, 465 F.2d 1277, 1279 (4 Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1047, 93 S.Ct. 519, 34 L.Ed.2d 499 (1972); United States v. Stubin, 446 F.2d 457, 463 (3 Cir. 1971); United States v. Holsey, 414 F.2d 458, 461 (10 Cir. 1969).
Finally, we are not persuaded to a contrary view by United States v. Wilson, 361 F.2d 134 (7 Cir. 1966), and Smith v. United States, 331 F.2d 265 (8 Cir. 1964), on which the government relies for affirmance. In both cases, the propriety of the court's calling a witness in a criminal case who gave testimony unfavorable to the defendant was sustained. But in Wilson, the witness was not called until the government had closed its case and made a prima facie showing of defendant's guilt. Moreover, the testimony was taken out of the presence of the jury and, at the instance of the defendant, it was not revealed to the jury. In Smith, although the government had not closed its case before the witness was called, it is clear that the government had proved a case before the witness was called. We disagree with the result in neither case, but we do not think that either is in point here. Our holding is confined to an instance where the government's case would be insufficient as a matter of law without the court witnesses. Neither Wilson nor Smith arose in that context.
III.
Defendant also claims that there was reversible error when the district court permitted the government to read to the jury the testimony of an expert witness — a qualified document examiner — given at the previous trial. The witness was not present at the second trial, because he was in attendance at still another trial which, it is asserted, the government scheduled in conflict with Karnes' trial. The government claims that if not an actual agreement between counsel to stipulate the expert's testimony, the statements of defendant's counsel arguably gave rise to a reasonable belief on the part of the prosecutor that the witness would not be required to be present, and the demand of Karnes' counsel for production of the witness came so late that the witness could not reasonably be produced.
We do not decide the question. Defendants must be tried anew, and we think it unlikely that the government will seek again to use the prior testimony of the expert witness under the same circumstances. We call attention to Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725, 88 S.Ct. 1318, 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968), which recognizes that the confrontation clause does not preclude the use of transcribed testimony of an absent witness if the prosecutorial authorities have made an unsuccessful good-faith effort to obtain his presence at trial. See also Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 92 S.Ct. 671, 30 L.Ed.2d 661 (1972). We caution that over defendant's objection the testimony of the expert at the first trial may be used in the witness's absence only if it is clearly shown that a good-faith effort to secure his presence was unsuccessfully made.
Reversed; new trial granted.
. McCormick, supra, p. 12:
Under the Anglo-American adversary trial system, the parties and their counsel have the primary responsibility for finding, selecting, and presenting the evidence. However, our system of party-investigation and party-presentation has some limitations. It is a means to the end of disclosing truth and administering justice; and for reaching this end the judge may exercise various powers.
Prominent among these powers is his power to call and question witnesses.
The judge in his discretion may examine any witness to bring out needed facts which have not been elicited by the parties. Also, it is sometimes said that the judge may have a duty to question witnesses, although the exercise of such a duty does not appear to have been enforced by any appellate court decisions (footnotes omitted).
. See Advisory Committee's Note to subdivision (a), Rule 614, Fed.R.Ev.
. With respect to the manner of a court's interrogation of witnesses called by it, the Advisory Committee's note to subdivision (b), Rule 614, Fed.R.Ev., states: "The authority of the judge to question witnesses is . well established. . . . The authority is, of course, abused when the judge abandons his proper role and assumes that of advocate . . ." We see no abuse in the form of the district court's questions to Cassity, but we think that when the court called witnesses essential to the government's case whom the government declined to call, there was an analogous abuse.