Case Name: Martino, Appellant, v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1965-10-13
Citations: 419 Pa. 229
Docket Number: Appeal, No. 139
Parties: Martino, Appellant, v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company.
Judges: Before Bell, C. J., Musmanno, Jones, Cohen, Eagen, O’Brien and Roberts, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania State Reports
Volume: 419
Pages: 229–239

Head Matter:
Martino, Appellant, v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company.
Argued April 22, 1965.
Before Bell, C. J., Musmanno, Jones, Cohen, Eagen, O’Brien and Roberts, JJ.
Norman Seidel, with him Hogan & Scott, for appellants.
John Field Oldt, with him Fox, Oldt & Hambrook, for appellee.
October 13, 1965:

Opinion:
Opinion by
Mr. Justice O'Brien,
Appellants, husband and wife, went shopping, on September 29, 1961, in appellee's self-service market located in Easton. While they were proceeding through the produce department, wife appellant slipped and fell to the floor. Husband appellant, who was in front of his wife, did not see the fall but turned and saw her sitting on the floor. He testified that, immediately after the fall, he observed grape juice on his wife's left shoe and on the floor where she had fallen and a grape skin about a half a foot from where she was sitting. There was no evidence as to how any grapes got onto the floor or as to how long any grapes might have been there prior to the fall.
To recover their respective damages, appellants commenced an action of trespass which, after completion of their case in chief, terminated in the granting of appellee's motion for compulsory nonsuit. This appeal followed the refusal by the court en banc of appellants' motion to take off the nonsuit.
The light in which we view the record is governed by our oft-stated standard of review, namely, that a nonsuit should be entered only in a clear case, and on appeal from the refusal to take off a compulsory non-suit, the plaintiff must be given the benefit of all favorable testimony and every reasonable inference of fact arising therefrom and all conflicts therein must be resolved in favor of plaintiff. Penn v. Isaly Dairy Co., 413 Pa. 548, 198 A. 2d 322 (1964); Schwartz v. Urban Redev. Auth., 411 Pa. 530, 192 A. 2d 371 (1963); Miller v. McMinn's Industries, Inc., 410 Pa, 234, 188 A. 2d 738 (1963).
Tlie evidence discloses that grapes were displayed by appellee in an unpackaged condition on a counter. Bags for customer use were stored in the center of the counter approximately seven feet from the grapes. The scale at which produce was weighed and priced was across a two-foot wide aisle from the grape counter. Customers put grapes into bags and took them to the scale or carried them in their hands, unbagged, or in shopping carts to the scale, where a store employee priced them or bagged and priced them.
One of appellee's employees, called as a witness for appellants, testified that he had been employed in the produce section of the market for about a year prior to the accident. The court below succinctly summarized his testimony as follows: "From his experience, he stated lettuce leaves, grapes and cherries tended to fall on the store floor with more frequency than other items although other things such as bottles of jams and jellies, oranges, etc., also occasionally fell' to the floor. He testified grapes had fallen from the counter on numerous occasions and customers would either step on them or carts would be rolled over them and there would be black stains left on the floor of the store. He stated these stains were present on the floor by the counter where the grapes were displayed on many occasions during 1960 and until the accident in 1961. One of his duties was to keep the produce area clear of debris and he was under instructions when he was in the area if he saw anything on the floor to remove it and he did keep the floor clean. He also swept the floor and the floor was mopped."
We agree with the court below that, viewing the evidence in the light of the standard hereinabove stated, wife appellant fell as the result of slipping on a grape on the floor. The question is whether the presence of the offending grape on the floor imposed liability on appellee.
In order to recover, appellants must prove that appellee was negligent and that its negligence was the proximate cause of the accident. Cushey v. Plunkard, 413 Pa. 116, 196 A. 2d 295 (1964); Idlette v. Tracey, 407 Pa. 278, 180 A. 2d 37 (1962).
No citation of authority is necessary to support the hornbook proposition that the mere happening of an accident does not impose liability on any party. The negligence of the defendant in a trespass action must be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence. An accurate statement of the law of Pennsylvania applicable to the instant situation is set forth in §343 of the Restatement of Torts as follows: "A possessor of land is subject to liability for bodily harm caused to business visitors by a natural or artificial condition thereon if, but only if, he (a) knows, or by the exercise of reasonable care could discover, the condition which, if known to him, he should realize as involving an unreasonable risk to them." Kubacki v. Citizens Water Co. of Wash., 403 Pa. 472-475, 170 A. 2d 349 (1961).
Appellant's burden was to prove that the dangerous condition of appellee's premises causing the fall resulted from appellee's negligence; that appellee was aware that grapes and other refuse were on the floor and made no efforts to remove them. No such proof was, however, produced. Appellee was not an insurer of the safety of business visitors and owed only the duty of reasonable care under the circumstances, specifically, to correct unsafe conditions discoverable through the exercise of reasonable care and diligence. The testimony disclosed that one of appellee's employees was required to and did remove items of refuse from the floor when they were noticed.
The law of this Commonwealth remains as it was pronounced in Markman v. Bell Stores Co., 285 Pa. 378, 132 A. 178 (1926), wherein we stated at p. 382: "The mere presence of such refuse, as described, does not in itself show negligence, for this condition may temporarily arise in any store of this character, though the proprietor has exercised due care; and, if it appears that proper efforts are made to keep clean the passageways so they may be safely traversed, he is not to be held responsible if someone accidentally slips and falls."
So far as this record discloses, the offending grape might have found its way to the floor as the result of actions by husband appellant or wife appellant. There is no evidence from which the jury might reach a conclusion as to the cause of the presence of the grape in the aisle, and jurors may not be permitted to reach conclusions based upon guess or conjecture.
Nor can we accept appellant's argument to the effect that the display of non-packaged grapes on a counter some seven feet from the bags and across an aisle from the scale constitutes negligence in and of itself, since every reasonable effort was made to keep the passageway clean.
Judgment affirmed.
Mr. Justice Jones and Mr. Justice Cohen dissent.