Case Name: In re RETURN OF FORFEITED GOODS (PEOPLE v. MIERZEJEWSKI)
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1995-02-21
Citations: 208 Mich. App. 689
Docket Number: Docket No. 170171
Parties: In re RETURN OF FORFEITED GOODS (PEOPLE v MIERZEJEWSKI)
Judges: Before: Griffin, P.J., and Mackenzie and F. X. O’Brien, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 208
Pages: 689–696

Head Matter:
In re RETURN OF FORFEITED GOODS (PEOPLE v MIERZEJEWSKI)
Docket No. 170171.
Submitted July 6, 1994, at Lansing.
Decided February 21, 1995, at 9:40 a.m.
Dale R. Mierzejewski was charged in the St. Clair Circuit Court with -possession with intent to deliver less than twenty-five grams of cocaine. At the time of his arrest, the arresting officers seized cash and jewelry that was in the defendant’s possession. The defendant was given notice of an intent to seek forfeiture of the property, and the property was forfeited pursuant to the automatic administrative forfeiture provision of MCL 333.7523(l)(d); MSA 14.15(7523)(l)(d) when the defendant failed to file a timely claim for the goods. Later, when the criminal charge came to trial, the prosecution agreed to a dismissal of the criminal charge. Defense counsel moved for return of the property seized by the police, to which the prosecutor responded that "[a]ny property that is not clearly contraband or drug paraphernalia will be returned.” Thereafter, the prosecutor refused to return the cash and jewelry on the basis that the property had been forfeited to the county. The trial court, Ernest F. Oppliger, J., ordered the return of the cash and jewelry on the ground that the defendant’s motion for the return of the property had been consented to by the prosecutor and that the defendant had not received actual notice that those items had been forfeited. The prosecutor appealed.
The Court of Appeals held:
The prosecutor by consenting on the record in open court to the defendant’s motion to return any property that was not clearly contraband or drug paraphernalia became bound to return the cash and jewelry, because those items clearly were neither contraband nor drug paraphernalia. The prosecutor had apparent authority to bind the county when he made his _consent in open court to the return of the goods. There was sufficient consideration to support the prosecutor’s promise to return the goods.
References
Am Jur 2d, Compromise and Settlement § 11; Prosecuting Attorneys §§ 20, 23.
See ALR Index under Compromise and Settlement.
Affirmed.
Mackenzie, J., dissenting, stated that the trial court erred in ordering the return of the cash and jewelry on the basis of the failure to give the defendant actual notice of the fact that the property had been forfeited, because there is no statutory requirement that such notice be given. Further, there is nothing in the record indicating that the prosecutor was authorized as an agent of the government to make promises concerning the disposition of property that had been forfeited or to decide unilaterally that the property should be given away, and, if such authority did exist, there was no consideration given in exchange for the prosecutor’s promise. The defendant’s only recourse for seeking the return of the property was to have filed a timely claim in the forfeiture proceedings, which he failed to do.
Compromise and Settlement — Forfeited Goods — Prosecutors — Apparent Authority.
An agreement or consent by a prosecutor made on the record in open court to a defendant’s motion to return the property of the defendant that had been the subject of the automatic administrative forfeiture provision of the controlled substances provisions of the Public Health Code is binding and enforceable against the county holding such forfeited goods (MCL 333.7523[l][d]; MSA 14.15[7523][l][d]; MCR 2.507[H]).
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Elwood L. Brown, Prosecuting Attorney, and Timothy K. Morris, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
McIntosh, McColl, Carson, McNamee, Strickler & Rickel (by Nancy Bates Rickel), for the defendant.
Before: Griffin, P.J., and Mackenzie and F. X. O’Brien, JJ.
Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
Griffin, P.J.
The people appeal as of right from an order of the circuit court for the return of property seized from defendant. We affirm.
On January 23, 1992, defendant, along with two other occupants of a motel room, was arrested for possession with intent to deliver less than twenty-five grams of cocaine. Two gold bracelets, $3,420.77 in cash, and three gold chains were seized from defendant by the arresting officers. At the conclusion of the August 10, 1993, hearing to dismiss defendant's possession with intent deliver charge, the following colloquy occurred between defense counsel and the prosecutor:
Ms. Bates: Your Honor, with regard to the dismissal we would like to make a motion for the return of the property seized pursuant to the statute MCLA 600.4706.
Mr. Morris: Any property that is not clearly contraband or drug paraphernalia will be returned.
MCR 2.507(H) is controlling in this matter. MCR 2.507(H) provides as follows:
An agreement or consent between the parties or their attorneys respecting the proceedings in an action, subsequently denied by either party, is not binding unless it was made in open court, or unless evidence of the agreement is in writing, subscribed by the party against whom the agreement is offered or by that party's attorney.
An agreement or consent made in open court by the parties or their attorneys is binding on the parties. MCR 2.507(H); Reed v Citizens Ins Co of America, 198 Mich App 443, 448; 499 NW2d 22 (1993); Michigan Bell Telephone Co v Sfat, 177 Mich App 506, 515; 442 NW2d 720 (1989). We find the above record sufficient to establish that the prosecutor entered into a valid stipulation for the return of the seized property by consenting to defendant's motion in open court. Because the cash and gold jewelry were not drug paraphernalia or clearly contraband, the prosecutor was bound by the parties' agreement to return the property. MCR 2.507(H); Michigan Bell, supra.
Further, we find unpersuasive the dissent's unsupported view that the prosecutor's "promise" to return the seized property was not binding on the county. An agreement between counsel, subsequently denied by the parties, is binding under principles of apparent authority when it was made in open court. Nelson v Consumers Power Co, 198 Mich App 82, 89-90; 497 NW2d 205 (1993). Under Nelson and MCR 2.507(H), it is simply irrelevant whether the prosecutor specifically was authorized to return the property in the present case. We conclude that a prosecutor is "cloaked" with the apparent authority to settle all claims connected with a matter upon which the other party is entitled to rely. We see no reason to distinguish this case from the other occasions in which we routinely have enforced specifically a prosecutor's promise.
Finally, we disagree with the dissent that there was insufficient consideration to support the parties' agreement. Defense counsel's implied-in-fact agreement to withdraw her motion after the prosecutor promised to return defendant's property was clearly a sufficient quid pro quo to bind the parties. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in ordering the return of the seized property.
Affirmed.
F. X. O'Brien, J., concurred.