Case Name: Lucretia FARR v. RISCORP, et al.
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1998-04-08
Citations: 714 So. 2d 20
Docket Number: No. 97-CA-2164
Parties: Lucretia FARR v. RISCORP, et al.
Judges: Before KLEES, BYRNES and PLOTKIN, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 714
Pages: 20–28

Head Matter:
Lucretia FARR v. RISCORP, et al.
No. 97-CA-2164.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
April 8, 1998.
Gregory D. Guth, Sacks & Smith, New Orleans, for Plaintiff-Appellant Lucretia Farr.
Darryl J. Foster, Lemle & Kelleher, New Orleans, for Defendant-Appellee Loretta De-Soto.
Before KLEES, BYRNES and PLOTKIN, JJ.

Opinion:
hKLEES, Judge.
On October 3, 1996, plaintiff/appellant Lucretia Farr ("plaintiff") filed this lawsuit against defendant/appellee, Loretta DeSoto ("defendant"). Plaintiff filed a petition against the defendant alleging that defendant violated her constitutionally protected right of privacy. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that defendant wrongfully interfered with her physician/patient relationship by meeting with plaintiffs treating physician to discuss plaintiffs medical condition, prognosis and treatment. On February 4, 1997, defendant moved for summary judgment on three grounds: (1) that defendant did not violate the physician/patient privilege; (2) that defendant is immune from tort suits by virtue of the exclusive remedy provision of the Compensation Act; and (3) there was no damage to plaintiff. On April 22, 1997, the trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff filed a motion for New Trial which was denied. Thereafter, plaintiff filed an appeal this final judgment. After considering argument of counsel and reviewing the pleadings, we affirm.
FACTS
On October 23, 1995, plaintiff was exposed to the nitrogen tetroxide release at Gaylord Chemical in Bogalusa, Louisiana, while in the course and scope of her employment. Plaintiff made a claim for workers' compensation benefits with her employer, First Home Health. First Home Health contracted with a company called Riscorp to administer plaintiff's compensation claim. Thereafter, Riscorp hired Marianna Hixon and Associates to provide medical case management services for plaintiffs claim. Hixon assigned defendant to be the medical case Management consultant for plaintiffs claim. Thus, defendant was the agent for plaintiffs employer and Hixon.
On July 12, 1996, defendant attended a meeting with plaintiff and her attorney to discuss the management of plaintiff's case. Although plaintiff signed a standard medical authorization, plaintiffs counsel scratched out the provisions of the authorization that allowed defendant "to discuss my past, present and/or future medical and/or physical condition with." Plaintiffs counsel further scratched out "opinions" from the list of items authorized.
On July 18, 1996, defendant met with Dr. Mark James, plaintiffs physician, to discuss with him plaintiffs treatment. Thereafter, defendant wrote a letter to Dr. James reiterating the substance of that meeting. After Dr. James countersigned attesting to the letter's accuracy, a copy of the letter was sent to plaintiffs counsel.
In addition to the injunctive relief plaintiff seeks, plaintiff seeks damages for the invasion of her constitutional right to privacy; for violations of the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law; and for the violations of her rights under the law of negligence.
ARGUMENT
The issue presented in this appeal is whether the trial court properly granted a summary judgment in favor of defendant and against plaintiff, thereby dismissing plaintiff's suit with prejudice.
Appellate courts must review summary judgments de novo. The proper standard of review for the appellate court on a summary judgment claim is whether any genuine issues of material fact exists, and whether the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
In Louisiana, the Code of Civil Procedure Article 966 sets forth the law regarding summary judgment. In 1996, the legislature amended Article 966 to ¡proclaim that summary judgments are "favored" and that the rules should be liberally applied. Additionally, in 1997 the legislature again amended Art. 966 and enacted new provisions "with the intention of making it easier for the moving party to obtain summary judgment . by altering the burdens of proof in favor of the moving party." Young v. Dupre Transport Company, 97-0591, 700 So.2d 1156 (La.App. 4 Cir. 10/1/97). Consequently, the 1996 and 1997 amendments require courts to change their attitudes when reviewing motions for summary judgment from the attitude required under the pre-amendment jurisprudence which proclaimed just the opposite— that summary judgments were not favored and thus should be strictly construed. Moreover, the Supreme Court has recently held that the 1997 amendment to Article 966 should be applied retroactively. See Kaufmann v. Fleet Tire Service of Louisiana, 97-1428, 699 So.2d 75 (La.9/5/97).
Procedurally, the court's first task on a motion for summary judgment is to determine whether the moving party's supporting documents — pleadings, deposition, answers to interrogatories, admissions and affidavits — are sufficient to resolve all material factual issues. La.Code Civ. Pro. Art. 966(B). If moving party establishes a prima facie case that no genuine issues of material fact exists, then the party opposing the summary judgment must "produce factual support sufficient to establish that he will be able to satisfy his evidentiary burden of proof at trial." La.Code Civ. Pro. Art. 966(C)(2).
Although this case arose prior to the August 15, 1997 effective date of the 1997 amendment to the summary judgment law, we find that the summary judgment decree was proper under both the 1996 and 1997 law. In this case, plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case that: (1) her constitutional right to privacy was violated and (2) her rights under the law of negligence were violated.
Ll. WHETHER THE PLAINTIFF'S PHYSICIAN/PATIENT PRIVILEGE WAS VIOLATED BY DEFENDANT
The physician/patient privilege was waived when the plaintiff made a claim for workers' compensation benefits with her employer, First Home Health. Under Louisiana law, "in noncriminal proceedings, testimonial privileges, exceptions, and waiver with respect to communications between a health care provider and his patient are governed by the Louisiana Code of Evidence." La. R.S. 13:3734(B). The Louisiana Code of Evidence article 510 B(2)(a), provides that there is no privilege in a non-criminal proceeding as to a communication which relates to the health condition of a patient who brings or asserts a personal injury claim in a judicial or worker's compensation proceeding. Although Art. 510 E limits the exceptions of Art. 510 B(2)(a) "to testimony at trial or to discovery of the privileged communication by one of the discovery methods authorized by Code of Civil Procedure . ", the defendant argues that the plaintiff is still not protected under the physician/patient privilege.
Specifically, the defendant alleges that the physieian/patient privilege does not protect the plaintiff because the privilege only protects "confidential communications". See C'E. Art. 510 B(l). We agree. Under article 510 A(8)(a) "confidential communications" is defined as "the transmittal or acquisition of information not intended to be disclosed to persons other than: . (iv)[a] patient's health care insurer, including any entity that provides indemnification to a patient." The comment to C.E. art. 510 states that "the phrase 'health care insurer'... is broader than entities denominated as insurance companies, and, as the paragraph expressly states, includes any entity that provides indemnification to patients, hence including self-insurers and government plans, etc." See C.E. Art. 510 comment (h). We agree with the defendant that the worker's compensation carrier meets the definition of "healthcare insurer" because the compensation carrier is statutorily 15obligated to provide medical benefits to employees for on the job injuries. Thus, the plaintiff is not protected under the physician/patient privilege because the plaintiffs communications with Dr. James are not "confidential communications" with respect to the defendant — an agent of the compensation carrier.
II. WHETHER THE PLAINTIFF CAN STATE A NEGLIGENCE CLAIM AGAINST THE DEFENDANT
Plaintiff alleges that the Compensation Act provides a remedy for an intentional act. Specifically, plaintiff argues that she has a tort claim against the defendant for the injury she suffered as a consequence of the defendant's illegal and/or unlawful actions. Plaintiffs argument is without merit.
The Louisiana Worker's Compensation Act LSA-R.S. 28:1032 states:
Except for intentional acts . the rights and remedies herein granted to an employee or his dependent on account of an injury, or compensable sickness or disease for which he is entitled to compensation under this Chapter, shall be exclusive of all other rights and remedies of such employee, his personal representatives, dependents, or relations, against his employer, or any principal . or employee of such employer or principal, for said injury, or compen-sable sickness or disease.
The defendant cites to Hymel v. Cigna to support the argument that she is immune from tort claims. We agree. In Hymel, the employee brought a tort action against his worker's compensation carrier and its alleged employee to recover for maliciously and intentionally providing employer with false and misleading information. Hymel v. Cigna, 563 So.2d 488 (La.App. 1 Cir.1990). The court stated that because the- employee did not allege that the injuries he originally sustained in the course and scope of his employment were due to an intentional tort, the employee's only remedy was within the provisions of the Worker's Compensation Act— not in tort. Id. at 488.
16This situation is factually similar to Hy-mel. Here, the plaintiff does not allege that the injuries she sustained in the course and scope of her employment were due to an intentional tort. Rather, plaintiff argues that the intentional tort occurred, after she made the claim for workers' compensation benefits, when the defendant allegedly violated her constitutional right to privacy. Thus, although the exclusivity provision provides an exception for intentional torts, the plaintiff is not alleging that she was "originally intentionally injured in the course and scope of' her employment and should be denied a remedy in tort.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court rendering summary judgment in favor of defendant, Loretta DeSoto and against plaintiff, Lucretia Farr.
AFFIRMED.
BYRNES, J., concurs with reasons.
PLOTKIN, J., dissents with written reasons.
. La. 23:1032(B) provides that "Nothing in this Chapter shall affect the liability of the employer, or any officer, director, stockholder, partner, or employee of such employer or principal to a fine or penalty under any other statute or the liability, civil or criminal, resulting from an intentional act."