Case Name: TRUSTEES OF MISSION CHURCH IN CITY OF NEW YORK v. RIDLEY et al.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1913-04-16
Citations: 152 N.Y.S. 745
Docket Number: No. 6992
Parties: TRUSTEES OF MISSION CHURCH IN CITY OF NEW YORK v. RIDLEY et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 152
Pages: 745–750

Head Matter:
TRUSTEES OF MISSION CHURCH IN CITY OF NEW YORK v. RIDLEY et al.
(No. 6992.)
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
April 16, 1913.)
1. Deeds <@=>143—Construction—Meaning of Language—Situation and Pon duct of Parties.
The court, in construing a reservation in a deed, will consider not only the language thereof itself, but the situation of the-parties at the time of the making of the deed and their subsequent conduct.
[Ed. Note.—Eor other cases, see Deed.f, Cent. Dig. §§ 453-455, 465-468; Dec. Dig. <@=>143.]
2. Deeds <@=>143—Construction—Reservation—“All Claims for Damages.”
A grantor having a present right of action against an elevated railway company for damages for a continuing trespass reserved in the deed “all claims for damages.” Eor some 20 years neither the grantor nor any of his successors in interest evinced enough interest in the subject to make any inquiry whether or not any action had been commenced, Reid, that the reservation was limited to a claim for damages to which the grantor was entitled at the time of the execution of the deed, and did not cover a sum which might thereafter be paid by the company as compensation for the easement impaired or appropriated.
[Ed. Note.—Eor other cases, see Deeds, Cent. Dig. §§ 453-455, 465-468; Dec. Dig. <@=>143.]
3. Limitation of Actions <§=28—Implied Obligation to Pay Money.
Where a grantee in a deed which reserved to the grantor all claims for damages against an elevated railway company did not covenant to pay over to the grantor any money that might be received as compensation from the company for easements impaired or appropriated by it, so that at most there was only an implied obligation arising out of the reservation, the grantor’s claim, if any, was for money had and received.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Limitation of Actions, Cent. Dig. §§ 134, 135, 142; Dec. Dig. <§=28.]
McLaughlin, J., dissenting.
Appeal from Special Term, New-York County.
Action by the Trustees of the Mission Church in the City of New York against Edward A. Ridley and another. From an interlocutory judgment, entered on a decision after trial at Special Term for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Reversed, and complaint dismissed, with costs.
Argued before INGRAHAM, P. J., and McLAUGHLIN, LAUGHLIN, CLARKE, and SCOTT, JJ.
John Ewen, of New York City, for appellants.
I. E. Bermant, of New York City, for respondent.

Opinion:
SCOTT, J.
The essential facts are stated by my Brother McLAUGHLIN and it is unnecessary to recapitulate them. They are undisputed and the only question we have to consider is as to the legal effect flowing from them.
The first of these is as to the reservation contained in the deed from plaintiff to Erdmann. In considering that we are at liberty to consider, not only the language of the reservation itself, but the situation of the parties at the time it was made, and their subsequent actions.
Plaintiff's situation when it made the deed was that it had a present right of action against the elevated railway company for damages for the continuing trespass up to the day of the date of the deed. This was the only claim it had for damages within the legal acceptation of that term. It had also a cause of action in equity for an injunction,-which might have resulted in a money payment, not for damages, but as compensation for the easements which had been impaired or appropriated by the railway company. What it reserved was "all claims for damages," and there was no suggestion of an intention to reserve anything else. The deed was a formal document, couched in legal phraseology, and I see no reason why the terms used in it should be construed in -but their legal sense. The reservation will, I think, be fully satisfied if construed to apply only to that which it expresses in terms, to wit, the claim for damages to which the grantor was thus entitled. To extend the words to cover a sum which might thereafter be paid by the railroad company as compensation for the easements impaired or appropriated would, as it seems to me, be to give to the reservation a strained construction.
In all the cases relied upon by the respondent there has been something more than appears in this case. In some there has been an at tempt to reserve to the grantor the easements themselves; in others there has been an express covenant by the grantee to hold any moneys received for the release of the easements for the benefit of the grantor; and in yet others there has been a reservation of causes of action obviously intended to cover more than the accrued claim _ for past rental damages. The case, as I think, falls within the principle applied in Anderson v. N. Y. Cen. & H. R. R. R. Co., 132 App. Div. 183, 116 N. Y. Supp. 954; Id., 136 App. Div. 939, 121 N. Y. Supp. 1124, affirmed 203 N. Y. 577, 96 N. E. 1109. That the parties understood the reservation to be subject to the more restricted construction is strongly indicated by the fact that for a period of some 20 years neither the plaintiff, nor any one of its successors in interest, evinced enough interest in the subject to make an inquiry whether or not such an action had been commenced. All these circumstances seem to me to require us to construe the reservation as I have indi-, cated.
Further than this, I am of the opinion that, if plaintiff ever had any claim, it is barred by the statute of limitations. The action is not strictly. upon a sealed instrument, for there is no covenant by the grantee or the defendants to pay over to plaintiff any money that might be received as compensation for the easements. At most there would have been an implied obligation growing out of the reservation and other circumstances, and plaintiff's claim, if any, would have been for moneys had and received to its use.
What has already been said calls for a reversal of the judgment, and I therefore do' not discuss the remaining question; whether or not plaintiff, if it ever had any claim under the easement, had not parted with it.
The judgment appealed from must be reversed, and the complaint dismissed, with costs to appellant in this court, and the court below. Settle order on notice.
INGRAHAM, P. J., and LAUGHLIN and CLARICE, JJ., concur.