Case Name: PEOPLE v. THURMOND
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1977-05-02
Citations: 75 Mich. App. 310
Docket Number: Docket No. 26533
Parties: PEOPLE v THURMOND
Judges: Before: R. M. Maher, P. J., and V. J. Brennan and N. J. Kaufman, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 75
Pages: 310–319

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v THURMOND
Opinion of the Court
1. Criminal Law — Evidence—Similar Crimes — Rebuttal—Alibi Defense.
Evidence of other similar crimes committed by a defendant is not admissible to rebut an alibi defense.
Dissent by V. J. Brennan, J.
2. Criminal Law — Evidence—Rebuttal—Discretion.
Whether evidence is properly rebuttal evidence is a matter for the trial court’s discretion.
3. Criminal Law — Evidence-—Rebuttal—Issues in Case in Chief— Issues by Way of Defense.
Rebuttal is limited to the refutation of relevant and material evidence, i.e. evidence bearing on an issue properly raised in the case; such an issue could be one raised in the prosecutor’s case in chief or raised by way of defense, and evidence on either would be subject to rebuttal.
4. Criminal Law — Evidence—Rebuttal—Issues in Case in Chief.
Rebuttal evidence may be admitted where it bears on an issue properly raised by the defense; rebuttal evidence is not inadmissible simply because that evidence could have been presented in the prosecution’s case in chief.
5. Criminal Law — Evidence—Rebuttal—Alibi Defense.
Evidence of a common pattern of a defendant’s past offenses may be admissible to rebut an alibi defense.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1, 5] 29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 321.
[2] 29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 269.
[3, 4] 29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence §§ 250, 269.
[6, 7] 75 Am Jur 2d, Trial § 146.
[8, 9, 11] 75 Am Jur 2d, Trial § 876 et seq.
[10] 20 Am Jur 2d, Courts § 233.
6. Witnesses — Criminal Law — Rebuttal—Notice—Statutes—Discretion.
Testimony of rebuttal witnesses for the prosecution must be excluded where notice of rebuttal is not served on defense counsel as provided by statute; however, the statute also gives the trial court discretion to allow notice to be given after the period normally required by statute (MCLA 768.20[2]; MSA 28.1043[2]).
7. Witnesses — Criminal Law — Rebuttal—Late Notice — Discretion — Statutes.
A trial court’s exercise of discretion in allowing three prosecution rebuttal witnesses to testify was proper, although formal service of notice of rebuttal was not made prior to trial, where defense counsel knew of the existence of two of the witnesses well before trial, and he was informed during the prosecution’s cross-examination of a defense alibi witness of the possibility that the prosecution might call a rebuttal witness (MCLA 768.20[2]; MSA 28.1043[2]).
8. Criminal Law — Instructions to Jury — Necessarily Included Offenses — Retroactivity.
Refusal to instruct a jury on necessarily included offenses is generally reversible error; however, Supreme Court precedent to this effect is not retroactively applicable.
9. Criminal Law — Instructions to Jury — Included Offenses— Length of Incarceration Period — Retroactivity.
In any case where the charged offense is punishable by incarceration for more than two years, the court whether or not requested may not instruct the jury on lesser included offenses for which the maximum allowable period of incarceration is one year or less; however, Supreme Court precedent to this effect is not retroactively applicable.
10. Courts — Precedent—Prospective Effect — New Policy.
A decision of the Supreme Court which clearly sets new policy should be accorded only prospective effect.
11. Criminal Law — Instructions to Jury — Necessarily Included Offenses — Precedent—New Trial.
A case should not be reversed for failure to give a requested instruction on a necessarily included offense where the charged crime was punishable by more than two years incarceration, where the necessarily included offense was punishable by incarceration for one year or less, and where the defendant if given a new trial would not be entitled to an instruction on the necessarily included offense pursuant to recent Supreme Court precedent.
Appeal from Wayne, Richard D. Dunn, J.
Submitted December 17, 1976, at Detroit.
(Docket No. 26533.)
Decided May 2, 1977.
Leave to appeal applied for.
Kelly Thurmond was convicted of unarmed robbery and assault with intent to commit rape. Defendant appeals.
Reversed and remanded.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William L. Cahalan, Prosecuting Attorney, Edward Reilly Wilson, Research, Training & Appeals, and Charles P. Kel-lett, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Moore & Maloney, P. C. (by Laurence Shultz), for defendant.
Before: R. M. Maher, P. J., and V. J. Brennan and N. J. Kaufman, JJ.

Opinion:
R. M. Maher, P. J.
The dissent accurately states the facts. People v Parker, 65 Mich App 592; 237 NW2d 572 (1975), correctly held that testimony about other crimes does not properly rebut an alibi defense. Defendant's convictions must be reversed.
Reversed and remanded.
N. J. Kaufman, J., concurred.