Case Name: Frank Solon v. The State
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1908-05-22
Citations: 54 Tex. Crim. 261
Docket Number: No. 3423
Parties: Frank Solon v. The State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Criminal Reports
Volume: 54
Pages: 261–298

Head Matter:
Frank Solon v. The State.
No. 3423.
Decided May 22, 1908.
1. —Violation of the Election Law—Constitutional Law—Presumption.
The rule is universal that the court will not declare an act of the legislature unconstitutional unless such infirmity and vice clearly appears.
2. —Citizenship—Eight to Vote, Not Inherent.
The rule is that the right to vote is not a necessary or fixed incident to citizenship, or inherent in each and every individual, but that voting is the exercise of political power and no one is entitled to vote unless the people in their sovereign capacity have conferred on him the right to do so; and the right of suffrage may be regulated, modified or withdrawn by the authority which conferred it.
3. —Same—Legislative Power.
The legislature, both under its general authority as the law-making power of the State and under the express authority of the Constitution, is not prohibited from making such regulations as shall detect and punish fraud and preserve the purity of the ballot; even if such regulation may result in depriving citizens of the privilege of voting, so long as said regulation is intrinsically fair, and the failure to vote is the result of the failure of the citizen to bring himself within the terms of such regulation.
4. —Same—Constitutional Law—Qualification of Voter—Poll Tax,
Clause 7 of section 1, article 6 of the Constitution of Texas requires that the voter must have paid his poll tax before the first day of February next preceding the election at which he offers to vote; and the Legislature may enact such laws and regulations as may be necessary to preserve the purity of the ballot box, and impose reasonable and proper limitations upon the manner in which a citizen shall pay his poll tax, or the source from which he may obtain the money for paying same.
5. —Same—Case Stated.
Section 170 of the act of 1905 providing that any person who loans or advances money to another knowingly to be used for paying the poll tax of such other person is guilty of a misdemeanor, is constitutional, and the due exercise of legislative power, and does not interfere with the freedom of or impair the obligation of contract, and is not a deprivation of rights without due process of the law, or a denial of the equal protection of the law.
6. —Same—Loan of Money—Illegal Practices.
The practice of lending money on political assets is essentially vicious and corrupt, and no one has an indefensable right to do so; and while the ballot under our government is free, legislation has been and will be demanded to throw around the ballot box all the safeguards which the experience of the ages has shown to be necessary.
7. —Same—Poll Tax—Equal and Uniform Taxation.
Apart from other constitutional provisions, section 7, article 3, of the Constitution of Texas is self-executing, and in terms levies a poll tax on all persons between the ages named, and is uniform and equal throughout the State upon all persons subject to the payment of poll taxes.
8. —Same—Legislative Power.
The power of the Legislature with reference to providing for the qualifications of voters can be restrained only by a prohibition expressed or implied from some provision or provisions of the Constitution.
9. —Same—Right to Contract—Police Power.
The right to contract is subject to the limitation which the State may lawfully impose in the exercise of the police power.
10. —Same—Reasonable Regulation—Purity of Ballot Box.
The power to make such regulations as may be necessary to preserve the purity of the ballot having been confided by the Constitution to the Legislature without defining limits to its discretion, that power includes judicial and ■executive attributes.
11. —Same—Right to Borrow Money—Subordinate to Purity of Election.
The right to borrow money is subordinate to the more valuable right of the people to have their elections protected against fraud and corrupt influence; and it is for the Legislature to protect this right within reasonable limitations.
Appeal from the County Court of McLennan, Tried below before Hon, J. W. Baker,
Appeal from a conviction for unlawfully, willfully and knowingly loaning money to pay the poll tax of another, in violation of the election law; penalty, a fine of $200.
Leaving out formal averments, the information was as follows: That Frank Solon in the County of McLennan and State of Texas heretofore on the 26th day of January, A. D. 1907, did then and there unlawfully, willfully and knowingly loan and advance to another, to wit: A. J. Bay, a sum of money, to wit: the sum of one and 75-100 ($1.75) dollars, good and lawful money of the United States of America, to be used for paying the poll tax of him, the said A. J. Bay, he the said Frank Solon, then and there knowing at the time that he so loaned and advanced the said money, that the same was to he used by him, the said A. J. Bay, for paying the poll tax of him, the said A. J. Bay, for the year 1906, to the tax collector of McLennan County, Texas; he, the said A. J. Bay, being then and there a resident citizen of said county and State, and subject to the payment of a poll tax in said county for the year 1906 under the law, and there having been then and there duly and legally assessed against him, the said A. J. Bay, a poll tax for the State and said county for the year 1906, under the laws of the State, and the orders of the Commissioners Court of said county in the said sum of $1.75, to wit: $1.50 to the State and 25 cents to the county, and the said poll tax then and there being due and unpaid by him the said A. J. Bay, and he the said A. J. Bay, being then and there in all other respects, other than the payment of said poll tax, a qualified elector under the laws of the State of Texas, in said county, and he, the said A. J. Bay, did thereafter on the said day and date use said sum of money so loaned and advanced to him as aforesaid, in the payment of his said poll tax, to the said tax collector of McLennan County, Texas, and did thereupon receive from said tax collector his poll tax receipt for the year 1906, as provided by law, against the peace and dignity of the State.
The opinion states the case.
O. L. Stribling, Sanford & Denton, for appellant.
The statute levying a poll tax is in violation of the constitution, article 1, section 3, in that it is class legislation, and of article 8, section 1, in that it is not equal and uniform, and it is not for that reason within the province of the Legislature to enact a law making it an offense for a person to loan or advance money to another for the purpose of paying the poll tax of such other person, there being no poll tax legally due to the State of Texas or any county therein. State Constitution, art. 1, sec. 3; art. 8, secs. 1 and 2; and art. 7, sec. 3; and art. 6, secs. 1 and 2, amended; art. 5048, Bevised Statute; sec. 6, Act 1905, Terrell Election Law; see. 83, Act 1905, State Militia; see. 170, Act 1905, Terrell Election Law; Ex parte Jones, 38 Crim. Rep., 482; Poteet v. State, 53 S. W. Rep., 869; Ex parte Overstreet, 46 S. W., 825; Hoefling v. San Antonio, 85 Texas, 28; Ex parte Vance, 42 Texas Crim. Rep., 619; 62 S. W., 568; Ex parte Battis, 40 Crim. Rep., 112; The Pullman Palace Car Co. v. The State, 64 Texas, 274; Lyman v. Martin, 2 Utah, 136; State v. Ide, 35 Wash., 576; Ib. 67 L. R. A., 280; Ib. 102 American State Rep., 914; Cooley Const. Lim., 902; Ex parte Woods, 52 Texas Crim. Rep., 575; Pullman Company v. State, 64 Texas, 275; 27 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 634.
Section 170 of the Act of 1905, known as the Terrell Election Law, is void for the reason that it is an unnecessary abridgment of contract between citizens of the State of Texas. State Constitution, Bill of Rights, sec. 19; Constitution United States, art. 14, sec. 1; Milliken v. City of Weatherford, 54 Texas, 388, and authorities there cited; Commonwealth v. Kisenberg, 8 Culp., 116; 4 Pa. List. R., 579; Shaver v. Pa. Co., 71 Fed., 931; Leep v. St. L. I. M. & S. Ry., 25 S. W., 75 (Ark.); Powers v. Shepard, 1st Abb. Prac., 129; 45 Barb., 524 N. Y.; People v. Warren, 34 N. Y. Supp., 942; Frorer v. People, 141 Illinois, 171; 31 N. E., 325; 16 L. R. A., 492; Braceville Coal Co. v. People, 147 Ill., 66; 35 N. E., 62; 22 L. R. A., 340; Ex parte Kubach, 85 Cal., 274; 24 Pac., 737; 9 L. R. A., 482; Lochner v. N. Y., 198 U. S., 45; Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S., 578; Toney v. State, 109 A. S. R., 23; Booth v. People, 78 A. S. R., 299.
An Act which requires a voter to pay his own poll tax does not deprive him of the right to pay it by agent. State v. Dillon, 32 Fla., 586.
“Another rule of construction of Constitutions is that when the Constitution defines the circumstances under which a right may be exercised or a penalty imposed, the specification is an implied prohibition against legislative interference to add to the condition or to extend the penalty to other cases.” Cooley Const. Limitations, p. 99.
Under this rule of construction it has been held that “the Legislature can not add to the constitutional qualifications of voters.” Rison v. Farr, 24 Ark., 161; St. Joseph, etc., Railroad Company v. Buchanan County Court, 39 Mo., 485; State v. Williams, 5 Wis., 308; State v. Baker, 38 Wis., 71; Munroe v. Collins, 17 Ohio St., 665; State v. Symonds, 57 Maine, 148; Davies v. McKeeby, 5 Nev., 369; McCafferty v. Guyer, 59 Pa. St., 109; Quinn v. State, 35 Ind., 485; Clayton v. Harris, 7 Nev., 64; Morris v. Powell, 25 Ind., 281; s. c., 9 L. R. A., 326.
It is also held under the same rule of construction “that the Legislature can not diminish the constitutional qualifications of voters.” Allison v. Black, 57 N. J. L., p. 6; s. c., 25 L. R. A., 480. In the case of Allison v. Black, the Constitution prescribed the qualifications of an elector in elections of .all officers that were or would thereafter be elected by the people, and it was held that the Legislature could not change them. This is sustained fully by all the cases on the power of the Legislature to prescribe qualifications.
A statute imposing qualifications as to residence or payment of tax different from those authorized by the Constitution of the State is invalid. See note, Allison v. Black, 25 L. R. A., p. 480; also Rishel v. Luther, 2 Pa. Dis. Rep., 769; Quinn v. State, 35 Ind., 485; s. c., 9 Am. Rep., 754; People v. Canady, 73 N. C., 198; s. c., 21 Am. Rep., 465.
“While the elective franchise is a privilege rather than a right, and may be taken away by the power which conferred it, yet when it has been granted by the Constitution, it can not be abridged by the Legislature, and all laws and regulations of same must be reasonable, uniform and impartial.” Munroe v. Collins, 17 Ohio State, 665; In re Newport Charter, 14 R. I., 655; In re Appointment of Supervisors, 52 Federal, 254.
“Where the Constitution of the State fixes the qualifications and determines who shall be deemed qualified voters in direct, positive and affirmative terms, these qualifications can not be added to by Legislative enactment. The Legislature has no power thus to disfranchise voters who are qualified by the express terms of the Constitution.” Rison v. Farr, 24 Ark., 161; s. c., 87 Am. Dec., 52; People v. English, 139 Ill., 622; s. c., 15 L. R. A., 131; s. c., 29 N. E., 678; Quinn v. State, 35 Ind., 485; Kinneen v. Wells, 144 Mass., 497; s. c., 11 N. E., 916; State v. Fitzgerald, 37 Minn., 26; s. c., 32 N. W., 1113; State v. Findlay, 20 Nev., 198; s. c., 19 Pac., 241; s. c., 19 Am. State Rep., 346; Lyman v. Martin, 2 Utah, 136; State v. Tuttle, 53 Wis., 45.
“Any provisions which would impose upon a class of citizens conditions and requirements not imposed upon all others are void.” Lyman v. Martin, 3 Utah, 136. This case has heretofore been cited in original brief, and in effect holds that a provision of the election law requiring that all male voters should be tax payers, without imposing the same condition upon female voters, is void. “In short, it is not within the power of the Legislature to deny, abridge or extend the constitutional right of franchise; or in any way to change the qualifications of voters, as defined by the Constitution of the State.” Spier v. Baker, 120 Cal., 370; s. c., 41 L. R. A., 196; s. c., 19 Pac., 135; State v. Dillon, 32 Fla., 545; s. c., Sou. Rep., 383; s. c., 22 L. R. A., 124; 15 Cyc., p. 281-2; People v. Commissioners, 221 Ill., 9; s. c., 77 N. E., 321; State v. Drexel, 105 N. W., 174; State v. Monahan, 72 Kansas, 492-496; s. c., 84 Pac., 130.
“Extension of time to pay taxes does not extend time as required by the Constitution, so as to give right to vote.” Ex parte Wood, 52 Texas Crim. Rep., 575.
F. J. McCord, Assistant Attorney-General, and A. W. Terrell and John C. Townes, for the State.
Cited cases in opinion.
The Legislature of Texas has authority under our form of Government to enact any law which is not prohibited by the State Constitution, unless the power has been conferred on the Federal Government, or results as necessary and proper under some express 'grant of power—or is prohibited to the States.
"A State Constitution is not the origin, of private rights; it is not the fountain of law; it is not the cause but the consequence of personal and political freedom; it grants no rights to the people; but is the creation of their power, the instrument of their convenience. The Constitution of the United States is one of delegated powers and Congress can only act in the exercise of the powers conferred. Those powers that are not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States are reserved to the States and the people.”
"The right to vote is not an inherent right, but is a privilege which is granted or denied by State Constitutions on grounds of general policy. Cooley’s Constitutional Law, 752.
"The legislative power of Texas means all the power of the people which may be properly exercised in the formation of laws against which there is no inhibition in the fundamental law expressed or implied. * * * The power of legislation can be restrained only by a prohibition expressed or implied from some provision or provisions of the Constitution itself.” Brown v. Galveston, 97 Texas, 15.
All those powers which relate to the internal police regulations of a State are not surrendered or restrained by the Constitution of the United States and the authority of the States over them is unqualified and exclusive. New York v. Miln, 11 Peters, 1029.
The right to contract is subject to the limitations which the State may lawfully impose in the exercise of the police power. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S., 366.
By the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States, the power of States in dealing with crime within their borders is not limited, except that no State can deprive particular classes of persons of equal and impartial rights under the law. J. Leper v. State of Texas, 139 U. S., 225 (642, 668); Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S., 516, and cases cited.
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution is not designed to interfere with the power of the States (sometimes called the police power) to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education and general welfare of the people (nor as a result to prescribe regulations to secure the purity of the ballot, on which all other civil blessings depend). Barbour v. Connelly, 113 U. S., 27-28, 928.
Section 170 of the Texas election law which prohibits one man from loaning money to another with which to pay his poll tax knowingly is a proper exercise of the police power of the State; it was authorized by the State Constitution, and made necessary by conditions (which I will state further on) to preserve the purity of the ballot box. State Constitution, art. 6, sec. 4; State Constitution, art. 16, sec. 4.
The power to make “such regulations as may be necessary to preserve the purity of the ballot” (art. 6, sec. 4) having been confided by the Constitution to the Legislature, without defining limits to its discretion, that power includes judicial and executive attributes. 4 Dali, 141, 722.
If the loaning of money to pay a poll tax is contrary to public policy, inimical to public interest and to the purity of the ballot box (as I will show) then such a loan was subject to the police power of the State and within legislative control in the exercise of which the Legislature was vested with a large control beyond the reach of judicial inquiry, if it was exercised bona fide for the protection of the public. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 161 U. S., 677.
“The police power of a State is an inherent and necessary attribute of sovereignty; it antedates all laws and may be described as the assumption on which Constitutions rest.”
“The police power is not subject- to any defined limitations, but is eo-extensive with the necessities of the case and the safeguards of public interest.” Black's Constitutional Law, sec. 149, 335; Can-field v. U. S., 167 U. S., 518, 42; 260.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution did not take from the State the police power that it could exercise before that amendment. Such powers were left with the individual States and can not be taken from them wholly or in part and exercised under any legislation of Congress. Slaughterhouses cases, 16 Wallace, 36; Barbour v. Connelly, 113 U. S., 37; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S., 623; 129 U. S., 26; 9 Wallace, 41; 11 Bush, 311; 49 Mich., 617; 97 U. S., 214; 97 U. S., 542.
The Rational Government can not, through any of its departments or officers, exercise any supervision over the police regulations of a State. 5 Howard; 504; 7 Howard, 283; 107 U. S., 59; 112 U. S., 580.
“It is well established that the Federal Constitution which refers to the obligation of contracts has no application to the act of a State under its police power. All contracts and all rights are subject to this (the police) power; and not only may regulations which affect them be established by the State, but all such regulations must be subject to changes from time to time as the general well being of the community may require, or as the circumstances may change, or as experience may demonstrate the necessity for. Thorpe v. Burlington & Rutland R. R., 27 Vt., 140; Hageman v. Western R. Co., 16 Barb., 353; Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat., 518-629.
There is nothing in the Constitution of the United States which forbids the Legislature of a State from exercising judicial functions. Saterlee v. Mathewson, 2 Peters, 380.
The solicitude of those who framed the Constitution of Texas to invest the Legislature with ample power to secure the purity of elections is shown by the fact that it is twice emphasized in distinct and separate articles. Such a repetition on the same subject does not occur anywhere else in the Constitution. In each instance the regulations to protect the ballot are committed to the discretion of the Legislature and not to the courts. Section 3 of article 16 of the Constitution was copied from the Constitution of 1846. It reads as follows:
“Laws shall be made to exclude from office * * * and from the right of suffrage those who * * * shall hereafter be convicted of forgery or other high crimes. The privilege of full suffrage shall be protected by law, regulating elections, and prohibiting under adequate penalties all undue influence therein from power, bribery, tumult or other improper practicesSee sec. 3, art. 16, of State Constitution.
A command was issued to the Legislature again on the same subject in sec. 4, art. 6, as follows: “* * * The Legislature shall provide for the numbering of tickets and make such other regulations as may be necessary to detect and punish fraud and preserve the purity of the ballot box * * *.”

Opinion:
DAVIDSON, Presiding Judge.
Appellant was charged with violating section 170 of what is known as the Terrell election law passed by the Legislature in 1905, which reads, as follows: "Any person who loans or advances money to another knowingly to be used for paying the poll tax of such other person, is guilty of a misdemeanor." The facts show that appellant loaned A. J. Ray the sum of $1.75 for the purpose of paying his (Raja's) poll tax for the year 1906. Before Ray borrowed the money from appellant he informed bim of the purpose of 'borrowing it, and what he intended to do with it, and he further swears that he did pay his poll tax; $1.50 went to the State, and 35 cents to the county. Ray was in all respects other than payment of the poll tax a qualified elector under the laws of this State.
Several questions are suggested for revision; among others, that this section of the election law is unconstitutional in that it was an abridgment of the right of the voter to pay his poll tax and thereby qualify himself to exercise the right of suffrage. The Constitution requires that a person who desires to vote should pay his poll tax by the first of February of the year in which he offers to vote, but it does not prescribe the manner in which the paying shall be made, otherwise than to the tax collector; nor does it prohibit any one from borrowing money with which to pay the tax. Wherever the Constitution makes a declaration of political privileges or rights or powers to be exercised by the people or the individual, it is placed beyond legislative control or interference, as much so as if the instrument had expressly declared that the individual citizen should not be deprived of those powers, privileges and rights, and the Legislature is powerless to deprive him of those rights and privileges. It is another well settled proposition that the Legislature can not add to the Constitutional qualification of voters. It is also well settled that the Act of the Legislature must be as broad as the Constitution, or at least, it must not take from the citizen the rights, powers, and privileges conferred by the Constitution or reserved to the citizen in the Constitution. We believe that section 170 of the Terrell election law violates these propositions. This section 170 is illegal because it infringes the common right of voting reserved in the Constitution. Every citizen in Texas has a right to vote unless prohibited by the Constitution, or he cuts himself off from that right by either doing or refraining from doing something authorized by the Constitution by which his right to vote is curtailed. That the Legislature may regulate the manner of voting so as to guarantee pure and proper elections is fixed by the Constitution and every citizen of Texas has a right to vote except those who are interdicted by authority of the Constitution. Bay did not fall within any of those classes; he was a qualified voter, and the only impediment to his voting was his failure to pay his poll tax, and to secure that poll tax borrowed $1.75 from appellant; he had a right to borrow the money to pay his poll tax, as much so as he did to pay the ad valorem or any other tax required at his hands for the discharge of the obligations and duties devolving upon him as a citizen. The Constitution does not discriminate in favor of those who are able to pay their taxes and those who are not, and to give this section of the Terrell election law the construction that that law seeks would prevent or tend to prevent the poorer citizenship of the country from voting or qualifjdng themselves to vote by reason of their poverty. The construction of a law that would lead to such results certainly was never intended by the framers of the Constitution, and no such construction should be placed on the Constitution or a law that would lead to such conclusion. That the party must pay his tax before voting is contemplated by the Constitution, but that instrument does not bear the construction nor was it intended to bear the construction that a party who did not have the money should be cut off from borrowing it to pay his tax and qualify himself to vote. 'He has the right to vote, and the further right to take all legitimate means to qualify himself to exercise the power of franchise or right of suffrage, and it would make no difference whether the party lending the money knew the borrower's purpose or not. This does not militate against the idea that if the borrower received the money for the purpose of selling his vote, or of casting it in the manner indicated 'by the lender, or by lending the borrower the money to influence his vote one way or the other, these would be criminal. This situation or probable situation seems to have been carefully guarded by article 160, and subsequent articles of the same law of 1905. Article 160 expressly provides, "Any person who lends or contributes or offers or promises to lend or contribute or pay any money or other valuable thing to any voter, to influence the vote of any other person, whether under the guise of a wager or otherwise, or to induce any voter to vote or refrain from voting at an election for or against any person or persons, or for or against any particular proposition submitted at an election, or to induce such voter to go to the polls or to remain away from the polls at an election, or to induce such voter or other person to place or cause to be placed his name unlawfully on the certified list of qualified voters that is required to be furnished by the county tax collector, is guilty of a felony, and on conviction shall 'be punished by confinement in the penitentiary not less than one year nor more than five years, and in addition shall forfeit any office to which he may have been elected at the election with reference to which such offense may have been committed, and is rendered incapable of holding any office under the State of Texas." Section 163: "The penalty prescribed in the last preceding section against those who violate any of its provisions shall be imposed on any one who receives or agrees to receive any money, gift, loan or other thing of value, for himself or any other person, for voting or agreeing to vote, for going or agreeing to go to the polls on election dáy, or for remaining away, or agreeing to remain away from the polls on election day," etc. So, section 170 was not intended to punish men who are corrupted by means of borrowing money to pay their poll tax. Not only is that condition of things punished in the Terrell election law, but by other provisions of our Penal Code.
We, therefore, hold that section 170 of said law, supra, is void, and on the further ground that it is an unnecessary and unreasonable abridgment of the right of contract. Constitution, art. 1, secs. 16 and 19; U. S. Constitution, art. 14, sec. 1, and Milliken v. The City of Weatherford, 54 Texas, 388, and authorities there cited.
We are, therefore, of opinion that the complaint and information do not charge a violation of the law, and that a prosecution can not be maintained under section 170, for which reason the judgment is reversed, and the prosecution ordered dismissed.
Reversed cmd dismissed.
Brooks, Judge, absent.