Case Name: The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Charles F., Appellant
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1983-12-20
Citations: 60 N.Y.2d 474
Docket Number: 
Parties: The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Charles F., Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 60
Pages: 474–482

Head Matter:
The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Charles F., Appellant.
Argued October 25, 1983;
decided December 20, 1983
POINTS OF COUNSEL
J. Michael Jones and Dennis R. Dawson for appellant. I.
The State’s conduct of criminal trials, where defendant is subject to imprisonment upon conviction, violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when such trials are presided over by Village and Town Justices who are not attorneys. (Matter of Legal Aid Soc. v Scheinman, 53 NY2d 12; Matter of Murchison, 349 US 133; Argersinger v Hamlin, 407 US 25; North v Russell, 427 US 328; Estes v Texas, 381 US 532; Rideau v Louisiana, 373 US 723; People v De Lucia, 20 NY2d 275; People v McIntyre, 31 AD2d 964; Oregon v Hass, 420 US 714.) II. The constitutionality of the New York criminal court system which grants authority to nonlawyer Judges to preside over misdemeanor cases, with the possible resulting criminal record and/or incarceration, can only be preserved by construing CPL 170.25 (subd 1) as providing divestiture on defendant’s motion as a matter of right. (Matter of Legal Aid Soc. v Sheinman, 53 NY2d 12; People v Skrynski, 42 NY2d 218; Matter of Simpson v Swartwood, 69 AD2d 954; People v Dean, 96 Misc 2d 781; North v Russell, 427 US 328; People v Nieves, 36 NY2d 396; People v Epton, 19 NY2d 496, cert den sub nom. Epton v New York, 390 US 29; People v Finkelstein, 9 NY2d 342; Matter of Bell v Waterfront Comm., 20 NY2d 54.) III. CPL 170.15 does not provide an adequate alternative to CPL 170.25. (Matter of Legal Aid Soc. v Scheinman, 73 AD2d 411.)
Theodore E. Wiggins, Jr., District Attorney, for respondent.
I. Where no specific or substantial error exists, defendant lacks standing to complain of a denial of due process. (North v Russell, 427 US 328; People v Rivera, 39 NY2d 519; People v Satloff 56 NY2d 745; People v Jones, 55 NY2d 771; People v Egan, 72 AD2d 239; People v Jones, 81 AD2d 22.) II. A defendant subject to imprisonment is not denied due process of law when his trial is conducted by a Justice who is not an attorney. (Kinsella v Singleton, 361 US 234; Matter of Murchison, 349 US 133; North v Russell, 427 US 328; Colten v Kentucky, 407 US 104; Coolidge v New Hampshire, 403 US 443; Missouri v Lewis, 101 US 22; Francis v State of Maryland, 459 F Supp 163; McGowan v Maryland, 366 US 420; People v Skrynski, 42 NY2d 218.) III. CPL 170.25 provides for discretionary divestiture of jurisdiction by indictment where defendant is charged with a crime, and thereby provides an adequate assurance of due process of the law. (People v Rosenberg, 59 Misc 342; North v Russell, 427 US 328; Goltra v Weeks, 271 US 536; People v Mandrachio, 79 AD2d 278; Stein v New York, 346 US 156.)
Rene H. Reixach for Genesee Valley Chapter, New York Civil Liberties Union and another, amici curiae.
An absolute right to choose trial before a lawyer Judge is required by due process where a defendant is subject to incarceration upon conviction. (People v Skrynski, 42 NY2d 218; Armstrong v Manzo, 380 US 545; Matter of Murchison, 349 US 133; Powell v Alabama, 287 US 45; Bruton v United States, 391 US 123; Jackson v Denno, 378 US 368; Johnson v Zerbst, 304 US 458; Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335; Argersinger v Hamlin, 407 US 25; People v Witenski, 15 NY2d 392.)

Opinion:
OPINION OF THE COURT
Per Curiam.
Defendant has been found guilty of conduct which if done by an adult would constitute the crimes of menacing (Penal Law, § 120.15) and trespassing (Penal Law, § 140.05), offenses punishable by imprisonment. After a jury trial before the Conesus Town Court he was adjudicated a youthful offender and sentenced to a term of probation. His adjudication was affirmed subsequently by Livingston County Court. On this appeal he contends that his constitutional due process right to a fair trial has been violated because the charges were prosecuted before a lay Justice.
In People v Skrynski (42 NY2d 218) we held that the practice of employing laymen as Town and Village Justices was authorized by the State Constitution and that it did not violate the requirements of the Federal Constitution, citing North v Russell (427 US 328). In North, the appellant contended that an accused misdemeanant, facing possible incarceration, is entitled in all cases to trial before a law-trained Judge. Without passing on appellant's claim, the Supreme Court determined that as long as an accused who is initially tried before a nonlawyer Judge has an effective alternative of a criminal trial before a court with a traditionally law-trained Judge or Judges, there is no violation of the due process clause of the Federal Constitution. We noted in Skrynski that CPL 170.25 provides such an effective alternative by establishing a discretionary procedure to divest town and village courts, of, and remove to a superior court, the power to try and determine a criminal case.
In Skrynski defendant had not moved for removal pursuant to CPL 170.25. In the present case defendant did, alleging in his motion papers that he had an "absolute right to be tried before a lawyer judge." No other reason for removal nor any claim of possible prejudice was stated. County Court denied defendant's applications. In this post-trial appeal, defendant assigns no trial errors requiring reversal nor any specific prejudice resulting from the conduct of .the trial by a lay Judge. Indeed, the District Attorney claims that defendant did not register a single objection or protest during the trial. Thus, defendant neither anticipated any errors by reason of his trial before a lay Judge nor suffered any. His claim is the same as that advanced in Skrynski that he is entitled to a law-trained Judge, in any event, if the possibility of incarceration exists upon conviction of the charges and that the motion to remove necessarily had to be granted.
A defendant is constitutionally entitled to receive a fundamentally fair trial (see North v Russell, supra, at p 337) but the mere allegation that a Judge lacks legal training does not mandate removal. A defendant has no absolute due process right under New York or Federal law to trial before a law-trained Judge and defendant having asserted no other cause for removal here, County Court properly denied his pretrial motion and affirmed the judgment entered after trial.
Accordingly, the order of County Court should be affirmed.