Case Name: Mary C. BRANDT, Appellant, v. Perry A. EAGLE, M.D., Appellee
Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1992-02-18
Citations: 412 Pa. Super. 171
Docket Number: No. 00008
Parties: Mary C. BRANDT, Appellant, v. Perry A. EAGLE, M.D., Appellee.
Judges: Before WIEAND, McEWEN, OLSZEWSKI, DEL SOLE, BECK, TAMILIA, POPOVICH, JOHNSON and HUDOCK, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports
Volume: 412
Pages: 171–200

Head Matter:
602 A.2d 1364
Mary C. BRANDT, Appellant, v. Perry A. EAGLE, M.D., Appellee.
Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
Argued Sept. 12, 1991.
Filed Feb. 18, 1992.
Robert J. Goduto, Harrisburg, for appellant.
Randall G. Gale, Harrisburg, for appellee.
Before WIEAND, McEWEN, OLSZEWSKI, DEL SOLE, BECK, TAMILIA, POPOVICH, JOHNSON and HUDOCK, JJ.

Opinion:
BECK, Judge:
The issue is whether a plaintiff who has marked satisfied a judgment against one tort-feasor for less than the full amount of the judgment is barred from maintaining a second action against another tort-feasor for the same harm. We granted en banc reconsideration of this appeal to consider the effect of a recorded satisfaction of judgment. We conclude the trial court was correct in granting summary judgment to defendant and in dismissing appellant's second action.
The appeal is taken from an order granting summary judgment in favor of appellee, Perry A. Eagle, M.D., in a medical malpractice action. The basis of the action was Dr. Eagle's alleged negligence in treating appellant, Mary C. Brandt, after she had been injured in a 1976 automobile accident. Appellant contends that the court below erred in determining, as a matter of law, that the suit against Dr. Eagle was barred. The ground for the trial court's decision was that appellant had recovered a judgment in a previous action she had brought against the driver of the vehicle who caused her initial injuries, had then settled that action for an amount less than the judgment and marked the judgment satisfied of record.
On August 30, 1976, appellant was involved in a two-car automobile accident in which she sustained injuries to her neck and back. As a result of these injuries, appellant underwent an anterior cervical discectomy and fusion in March, 1977. In November, 1978, appellant underwent a second anterior cervical discectomy and fusion involving a different portion of her spine. The operations were performed by appellee Dr. Eagle and Ivan L. Butler, M.D. In 1978, appellant brought an action against Theodore W. Copp, the driver of the other vehicle in the 1976 accident. At the trial, evidence was presented concerning appellant's initial injuries as well as her pain and suffering following the operations. Appellant recovered a verdict in the amount of $148,251.00.
In February 1981, appellant filed the present lawsuit against Dr. Eagle. Appellant's complaint alleged, inter alia, that during the second operation Dr. Eagle negligently severed her lateral femoral cutaneous nerve while he was excising the bone graft from her right iliac crest, and that this negligence resulted in permanent injury. While this suit was pending, on May 23, 1985, appellant and Copp, the defendant in the first action, arrived at a settlement. Ap pellant received the settlement proceeds and the docket in that case was marked "satisfied."
In November 1986, by leave of court, Dr. Eagle filed new matter in this action, alleging that the "unconditional satisfaction" of the judgment against Copp barred a subsequent suit against any other defendant for the same harm. In her reply, appellant alleged that the judgment against Copp was not actually fully satisfied because she had received only the agreed settlement amount, i.e. $25,000, and not the full amount of the verdict. Thus, she argued that the first suit did not bar this action against Dr. Eagle. Dr. Eagle then filed a motion for summary judgment, premised on the prior satisfaction. The trial court initially denied the motion, finding that appellant had not presented evidence of the full extent of her injuries in her action against Copp and, therefore, that she could proceed in her action against Dr. Eagle in an attempt to recover for additional injuries not addressed in the Copp action.
However, after further factual development, including production of the complete transcript of the Copp trial, Dr. Eagle renewed his motion for summary judgment. Following briefing and its own review of the trial transcript, on November 27, 1989, the trial court issued an order and opinion granting Dr. Eagle's motion for summary judgment. The court opined that after its review of the Copp transcript it was apparent that appellant had in fact presented evidence of all of her injuries arising from the accident and from both subsequent operations in the Copp action. The trial court thus reasoned:
. there remains no damages that could be submitted to the present jury that were not submitted in the original jury trial. Thus, the Court's original decision to permit Plaintiff to proceed with her lawsuit against the doctor was based on an improper premise, i.e., that there were damages which had not been presented to the original jury.
Since Plaintiff has proceeded against a Defendant, submitted all damages to a jury in a lawsuit against that Defe[n]dant, and then settled and satisfied the docket, Plaintiff is precluded from proceeding against any other Defendant for the same injuries and damages.
Trial Court Opinion at pp. 3-4.
Appellant filed this timely appeal from the trial court order granting summary judgment in favor of Dr. Eagle.
Our standard of review of a grant of summary judgment is well-settled:
As an appellate court, we are bound to consider certain principles which dictate when and under what circumstances a trial court may properly enter summary judgment. Goebert v. Ondek, 384 Pa.Super. 100, 103-04, 557 A.2d 1064, 1066 (1989).....Summary judgment should not be entered unless the case is clear and free from doubt. Hathi v. Krewstown Park Apartments, 385 Pa.Super. 613, 615, 561 A.2d 1261, 1262 (1989). A grant of summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file support the lower court's conclusion that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Pa.R.C.P. 1035, 42 Pa.C.S.A.; Hatter v. Landsberg, [386 Pa.Super. 438, 440, 563 A.2d 146, 147-48 (1989)]. See Penn Center House, Inc. v. Hoffman, 520 Pa. 171, 176, 553 A.2d 900, 903 (1989) (entire record before lower court must be thoroughly examined and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact are to be resolved against a grant of summary judgment). We will overturn a trial court's entry of summary judgment only if there has been an error of law or a clear abuse of discretion. McCain v. Pennbank, 379 Pa.Super. 313, 318, 549 A.2d 1311, 1313 (1988).
O'Neill v. Checker Motors Corp., 389 Pa.Super. 430, 434-35, 567 A.2d 680, 682 (1989).
Appellant makes a single argument on appeal — that she should not be barred from proceeding with her action against Dr. Eagle because despite the recording of a satisfaction of judgment in the first action, she never actually received the full value of that judgment. She argues that since she accepted a settlement for less than the full amount of the judgment she should be permitted to proceed against Dr. Eagle in an attempt to recover the full value of her claim. We disagree.
There are important policy reasons and much wisdom behind the traditional rule that a plaintiff who records a satisfaction of judgment must treat that satisfaction as his or her commitment that the judgment has been fully satisfied. Judgments are frequently satisfied for less than their face value. The parties mutually agree that the plaintiff will accept less than he or she was entitled to under the judgment. The law encourages these as well as other settlements to end disputes between parties. To permit the plaintiff to later question the satisfaction on the basis of sufficiency of the consideration that she accepted in full satisfaction of the judgment would create uncertainty and unpredictability. It would erode the integrity of official public records. We see no reason to accord less respect for official public records than we would for promises between private parties.
The common law has traditionally attached great significance to the entry of a satisfaction of judgment. A plaintiff who is injured at the hands of more than one tort-feasor may sue and recover a judgment against any one or all of the tort-feasors and may attempt to collect the damages awarded by the judgment against any one or all of them. However, although a plaintiff may obtain a judgment against several tort-feasors for the same harm, he or she is entitled to only one satisfaction for that harm. See Thomp son v. Fox, 326 Pa. 209, 192 A. 107 (1937); Franklin Decorators, Inc. v. Kalson, 330 Pa.Super. 140, 479 A.2d 3 (1984). The rationale underlying this rule is clear — the remedy provided to an injured person is to receive only one full compensation for the wrong done to him. Thompson, supra. Moreover, once the judgment is marked satisfied, the plaintiff is legally barred from further recovery against any of the tort-feasors because the law presumes that full satisfaction for the harm incurred has been received. Hilbert v. Roth, 395 Pa. 270, 149 A.2d 648 (1959).
Appellant argues, however, that the important inquiry is not whether the plaintiff has marked the judgment satisfied, but rather whether the full amount of the judgment was actually received by the plaintiff. There is no support for this in the cases relied upon by appellant. For example, appellant contends that in Hilbert v. Roth, supra, the court held that a second action for damages for the same harm would not be barred unless two requirements were met— the judgment in the prior suit must have been marked satisfied and the plaintiff must in fact have received payment of the full amount of the judgment before a second action for damages for the same harm would be barred.
We do not read Hilbert as imposing these requirements. In Hilbert, the Court expressly stated that where a plaintiff has satisfied a judgment entered after an adversary trial, the common law presumption that he is satisfied will operate. Id., 395 Pa. at 275, 149 A.2d at 651-52. The Court did not carve out any exception for a case where a plaintiff recovers a judgment after an adversary trial, accepts less than the full judgment amount in total satisfaction of the judgment, and then marks the judgment satisfied. In fact, the court's language suggests the contrary. The court opined that the satisfaction of the judgment raises a presumption of full satisfaction and made no mention of permitting a plaintiff to rebut the presumption by showing that he or she had not in fact received the full amount of the judgment. As the Third Circuit in Frank v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 522 F.2d 321, 326 (3d Cir.1975), has stated in construing Pennsylvania law, "[wjhere the . satisfaction occurred after an adversary action on the merits, the presumption of full satisfaction would appear to be conclusive."
Appellant also argues that the case of Blanchard v. Wilt, 410 Pa. 356, 188 A.2d 722 (1963), suggests that a court may look beyond a recorded satisfaction of judgment to determine whether the plaintiff actually received the full amount of the judgment before marking it satisfied and that where such full receipt is not found, the satisfied judgment will not bar a subsequent suit against another tort-feasor for the same harm. This is not what Blanchard holds or even suggests.
In Blanchard, the plaintiffs employed a general contractor, Wilt, to do construction work on their home. Wilt hired Nehrig as a subcontractor on the project. The home burned down, allegedly due to the negligence of Wilt and Nehrig. Independent actions were commenced against Wilt and Nehrig. The action against Wilt was tried first and resulted in a compulsory nonsuit. The action against Nehrig was then called for trial, but pursuant to a settlement between the parties the jury was instructed to enter a consent verdict for plaintiffs in an amount less than the amount sought. A receipt of payment of the settlement amount was filed of record, the verdict was marked satisfied, and the action discontinued. No judgment was ever entered on the consent verdict and, therefore, no judgment was ever marked satisfied. The nonsuit against Wilt was then reversed on appeal and the case remanded for trial. On retrial, Wilt argued that the suit against him was barred by the consent verdict, marked satisfied, in the suit against Nehrig.
The Supreme Court disagreed, but not because the amount actually received by the plaintiffs in the Nehrig suit had been less than the amount of any judgment they had satisfied against Nehrig. As stated above, plaintiffs had never entered judgment against Nehrig and, therefore, obviously hád never satisfied a judgment against him. Rather, the Supreme Court specifically distinguished a case, like Hilbert, supra, where a judgment is marked satisfied, stating:
Nor can we agree with appellants that the satisfaction of the consent verdict was a satisfaction of a judgment thereby bringing the case under the rule of Hilbert v. Roth, supra. The verdict against Nehrig was not reduced to judgment and no judgment was ever entered against him. Even if judgment had been entered against Nehrig, appellants would not be discharged since, "The recovery of a judgment by the injured person against one joint tortfeasor does not discharge the other joint tortfeasor" . more importantly, no judgment against Nehrig was ever satisfied. In Hilbert, supra, judgment was entered and satisfied after an adversary action on the merits. The court was justified in assuming therein that the judgment represented the true value of the claim.
Id., 410 Pa. at 360, 188 A.2d at 725 (emphasis in original).
Clearly Blanchard concerns the effect of a satisfaction of a consent verdict and not the effect of a satisfaction of a recorded judgment entered after an adversary proceeding. As the Blanchard court itself stated, a consent verdict and a judgment entered after an adversary proceeding are significantly different in that the former is not a legal determination of the matters in controversy whereas the latter is the final and complete adjudication of those matters. Id., 410 Pa. at 360, 188 A.2d at 725. Given this marked difference, it is perfectly logical to conclude, as did the Blanchard court, that there is a corresponding difference between the effect of a satisfaction of a consent verdict and of a judgment. In sum, since Blanchard addressed only the effect of a satisfaction of a consent verdict, it is inapposite to the issue presented in this case.
In addition to the clear import of the cases discussed above, the more recent case of Hazelwood Lumber Co., Inc. v. Smallhoover, 500 Pa. 180, 455 A.2d 108 (1983), is particularly instructive on the question of the significance of a recorded satisfaction of a judgment. In Hazelwood, a judgment recovered by plaintiff was marked satisfied on the record by a party representing himself to be the agent of the plaintiff. The purported agent had entered into a settlement with the defendants pursuant to which an amount less than the full amount of the judgment would be accepted in full payment thereof. The purported agent received payment of the settlement amount and marked the judgment satisfied. Plaintiff contended that the party who had marked the judgment satisfied had no authority to do so and, moreover, that plaintiff had never actually received the settlement payment. The trial court found that the purported agent did have apparent authority to act on behalf of the plaintiff and held that the amounts paid were to be deemed received by plaintiff. However, the trial court struck the recorded satisfaction of judgment and reinstated the judgment for the balance due after deduction of the settlement amount. The court did so in reliance on an old common law rule that prohibited an accord and satisfaction of the amount due on a judgment by payment of less than the liquidated value of the judgment.
The Supreme Court reversed, overturning the traditional prohibition of an accord and satisfaction under such circumstances. The court did so because of its concern that to allow a court to look beyond a formally recorded satisfaction of judgment would undermine our legal system. The Hazelwood court expressed this concern as follows:
We believe this old common law rule ., should have no application to the satisfaction of a judgment entered on judicial records under current conditions. . it is a hindrance to our present legal system if allowed to prevent an otherwise valid record satisfaction of a judgment.
As stated in Schwartz v. California Claim Service, 52 Cal.App.2d 47, 125 P.2d 883 (1942),
[t]he satisfaction of judgments for less than their face value is of every day occurrence, and since every such settlement represents an agreement mutually satisfactory to the parties and fraught with some benefit to each, it should not be the policy of the law to discourage such sensible arrangements under which a creditor can satisfy a judgment for what he thinks it is worth and a debtor can settle it for what he can afford to pay.
Id. at 55, 125 P.2d at 888.
A formal entry of satisfaction upon public court records should . be free of later questions concerning the lack or sufficiency of the consideration found in the agreement for entry of satisfaction. The respect and solemnity accorded official public records should not be less than that given promises between private parties—
Id. 500 Pa. at 184, 455 A.2d at 110.
Although Hazelwood specifically decided that a plaintiff may not recover additional amounts from a defendant against whom a judgment is recovered when the plaintiff has already agreed to accept less than the full amount and marked the judgment satisfied, it is nonetheless pertinent to the issue before us in the instant case. The Supreme Court's language in Hazelwood could not be clearer in its confirmation of the traditional significance accorded to a recorded satisfaction of judgment and of the goals of certainty and predictability that are served by according that significance. We are not free to fashion an exception to this principle. Appellant's protestation that she should not be barred from prosecuting her second action because to bar her from doing so would unfairly deny her full compensation for the harm she has suffered is unpersuasive. It was appellant who chose to accept less than the full amount of her judgment in the first action as full satisfaction of that judgment and to mark it satisfied. Absent an allegation of fraud or mistake in entering the satisfaction, and there is no allegation of either in this case, the satisfied judgment represents full satisfaction of appellant for the harm alleged. Neustein v. Insurance Placement Facility, 271 Pa.Super. 126, 412 A.2d 608 (1979). It cannot be inquired into further.
The order of the trial court is affirmed.
TAMILIA, POPOVICH and HUDOCK, JJ., join this Opinion.
WIEAND, J., files a Concurring Opinion in which TAMILIA, J., joins.
JOHNSON, J., files a Dissenting Opinion in which McEWEN, OLSZEWSKI and DEL SOLE, JJ., join.
. Dr. Butler was also named as a defendant, but the claim against him was later dismissed and he is not a party to this appeal.
. Appellant also suggests that the trial court erred in entering summary judgment for Dr. Eagle because, in fact, she did not present evidence of the full extent of her injuries in the first trial and, thus, her later action against Dr. Eagle is not a second action seeking damages for the "same harm". This claim is not included in appellant's Statement of Questions involved and, therefore, is waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a); Vaskie v. West American Ins. Co., 383 Pa.Super. 76, 80 n. 1, 556 A.2d 436, 438 n. 1 (1989). In addition, even if this issue had not been waived, our review convinces us that appellant's argument is clearly meritless.