Case Name: In re BLANCHARD ESTATE BLANCHARD v. BLANCHARD
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1974-05-21
Citations: 391 Mich. 644
Docket Number: No. 7; Docket No. 54,525
Parties: In re BLANCHARD ESTATE BLANCHARD v BLANCHARD
Judges: T. G. Kavanagh, Williams, and Levin, JJ., concurred with M. S. Coleman, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 391
Pages: 644–665

Head Matter:
In re BLANCHARD ESTATE BLANCHARD v BLANCHARD
Opinion op the Court
1. Wills — Revocation—Presumptions.
The proper rule for determining whether a revocation of a will should be implied by law is that a presumption as to the testator’s intention must be reasonable and must take in consideration all of the circumstances; revocation should not automatically occur by operation of law, but only when the conditions or circumstances warrant such operation (MCLA 702.9).
2. Wills — Revocation—Divorce—Property Settlement — Presumptions.
Michigan Supreme Court cases containing statements to the effect that a divorce coupled with a property settlement creates a presumption of revocation of a will which cannot be rebutted by the acts or declarations of the divorced parties are contrary to a Court decision, which they are purportedly based upon, which urges a "common sense” and "reasonable” interpretation of the law; an irrebuttable presumption leaves no room for reason to fall upon fact nor for common sense to bring the application of the law into the world of reality.
3. Wills — Construction—Intent.
It is the Michigan Supreme Court’s goal "to effectuate within pertinent precedential and statutory limits” the intent of the testator, in cases involving wills probated in Michigan.
4. Wills — Revocation—Divorce—Property Settlement — Statutes.
The statute which provides the method for a revocation of a will makes no mention of divorce and property settlement as acts of revocation and the only reference is a "revocation implied by law from subsequent changes in the condition or circumstances of the testator”; each case must be analyzed within the perimeter of its particular facts (MCLA 702.9).
References for Points in Headnotes
57 Am Jur, Wills § 548 et seq.
Presumption and burden of proof as regards continuance or revocation of will produced for probate, 165 ALR 1189.
57 Am Jur, Wills §§ 535, 536.
57 Am Jur, Wills § 1133 et seq.
57 Am Jur, Wills § 148.
57 Am Jur, Wills §456.
57 Am Jur, Wills § 217.
29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 222.
5. Wills — Revocation—Divorce—Property Settlement — ^Remarriage-Presumptions — Statutes—Construction.
The words "subsequent”, "condition” and "circumstances” in the statute providing for the method for a revocation of a will, according to their generally accepted meaning, cannot be restricted to the facts of divorce and property settlement — and no more; therefore, in a case where between the making of a will by a husband designating his wife as the primary beneficiary and his death there was, in addition to a divorce and property settlement, a remarriage of the testator and beneficiary named in the will and seven years of marriage "on close terms” thereafter, it is not the natural and reasonable presumption from the chain of conditions and circumstances to imply revocation of the will because of the divorce between the parties; at the time of the testator’s death, the beneficiary and the testator were not strangers to each other, each owed the other obligations and duties, the beneficiary named in the will, the testator’s wife, was a natural object of his bounty, and at the time of death, testator’s circumstances in these respects were the same as when he executed his will (MCLA 702.9).
6. Wills — Revocation—Divorce—Property Settlement — Presumptions.
Neither statute nor common law justify a rule that there is an irrebuttable presumption of revocation of a prior will arising upon divorce and property settlement; to the extent that Michigan Supreme Court cases give credence to such a claim, they should be overruled.
Dissenting Opinion
T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., and Swainson, J.
7. Wills — Statutes.
The right to make testamentary disposition of property via a will is wholly statutory.
8. Wills — Revocation—Statutes.
The Michigan revocation statute is but one section of the Probate Code dealing with matters of descent and distribution; another section gives to all persons of Michigan of full age and sound mind the right to dispose of their estate by will; however, another section sets forth defínite conditions and procedures that must be followed by the testator before such wills become effective and once effective another section provides the only means whereby such wills may be revoked; thus in Michigan the right to revoke a will is wholly statutory (MCLA 702.1, 702.5, 702.9).
9. Statutes — Reenactment—Construction—Judicial Interpretation — Legislature—Presumptions.
The Legislature is presumed to have known of the judicial interpretation of a statute and when such a statute is substantially reenacted, the Legislature adopts such construction, unless the contrary is clearly shown by the language of the act.
10. Wills — Revocation—Statutes—Legislature—Supreme Court— Divorce — Property Settlement.
Michigan’s Legislature, in reenacting the Michigan revocation statute which states in relevant part that '[njo will nor any part thereof shall be revoked, unless by burning, * * * excepting only that nothing contained in this section shall prevent the revocation implied by law from subsequent changes in the condition or circumstances of the testator”, had every right to trust that the Michigan Supreme Court would interpret "subsequent changes in the condition or circumstances of the testator” as including divorce and property settlement of the testator, and that revocation would occur by operation of law upon the happening of such an event; since the task of the Michigan Supreme Court in interpreting that section is one of ascertaining legislative purpose, it holds that such is the result and readopts its prior opinions in Lansing v Haynes, 95 Mich 16 (1893), Wirth v Wirth, 149 Mich 687 (1907), and In re McGraw’s Estate, 233 Mich 440 (1926) (MCLA 702.9).
11. Wills — Revocation—Presumptions—Intent—Statutes—Supreme Court.
Michigan revocation statute which provides in part that "[njo will nor any part thereof shall be revoked, unless by burning, * * * excepting only that nothing contained in this section shall prevent the revocation implied by law from subsequent changes in the condition or circumstances of the testator”, does not address itself to the question of presumptions, rather it states that "revocation implied by law” will occur upon the happening of certain conditions or circumstances; the statute allows no room for the Michigan Supreme Court to inquire into the testator’s intent at the time of the change in circumstances in his life; it is only for the Court to look at the actual conditions that have occurred or the actual circumstances that have come about and to determine whether or not this particular type of circumstance or set of facts falls within the underlying principle which the Legislature sought to effectuate by passing the statute (MCLA 702.9).
12. Appeal and Error — Supreme Court — Rule op Law — Presumptions.
Michigan Supreme Court, in determining whether or not particular facts may 1it within a certain rule of law, may indulge in various kinds of reasonable presumptions to ascertain the true intent and purpose of the rule of law; however, once these presumptions have been utilized by the Court in its reasoning process, they no longer play any part in or in any way effect the operation of the rule itself; while it is within the province of the Court to reexamine the rationale behind a certain rule of law, and by so doing reexamine its original presumptions, the very fact it does so does not mean that the rule itself is only "presumed” operative, or "conclusively presumed” operative.
13. Wills — Revocation—Intent—Divorce—Property Settlement— Remarriage — Statutes—Presumptions.
Michigan Supreme Court only reexamines whether or not a divorce and property settlement falls within the deñnition of the phrase "subsequent changes in the condition or circumstances of the testator” as the Michigan revocation statute uses that phrase where a husband executed a will, his wife became divorced from him, a property settlement agreement was entered, she ñled a satisfaction of the decree of divorce, later they were remarried and remained husband and wife until the husband’s death; if the Court decides that it does, then the statute operates automatically by operation of the law to revoke the will and if it decides that it does not, then the will remains valid and in either case, the intention of the testator as to the operation of the rule itself is irrelevant; our law does not allow such intention to be taken into consideration when statutes of this nature are considered; either the statute operates on these facts or it does not; Michigan law permits presumed and rebuttable fact situations, it does not countenance rebuttable statutory rules of law (MCLA 702.9).
14. Wills — Revocation—Divorce—Property Settlement — Ademption — Statutes.
The reason "subsequent changes in the condition or circumstances of the testator”, as provided in the Michigan revocation statute, should be deemed to include divorce plus property-settlement is that a full property settlement between husband and wife is usually arrived at after a consideration of the value and extent of the husband’s estate, the wife is given an award in an amount inñuenced to a large degree by the inchoate interest she has in her husband’s property; such a settlement, so far as it affects the husband’s will, bears to some degree the characteristics of an ademption and it is the underlying principle of justice which supports the rule as to ademption which no doubt gives strength and reason to the implied revocation in case of a divorce and property settlement between husband and wife (MCLA 702.9).
15. Wills — Revocation—Husband and Wife — Remarriage—Statutes — Divorce—Property Settlement.
The sole fact that the testator remarries the same woman will not suffice to render nugatory the provisions of Michigan’s revocation statute which operated on the will and revoked it at the time of the divorce and property settlement; subsequent action by the testator not fulñlling the statutory requisites for makings will, are necessarily irrelevant (MCLA 702.9).
16. Wills — Revocation—Divorce—Property Settlement — Remarriage — Statutes.
A once valid will was revoked by operation of law by virtue of the Michigan revocation statute by the divorce and property settlement of the testator and his wife; the will ceased to exist, it was not reenacted in accordance with Michigan statutory rules and no new will has come into existence by the subsequent remarriage of the testator to his prior wife (MCLA 702.5, 702.9)
Appeal from Court of Appeals, Division 1, Lesinski, C. J., and Fitzgerald and Van Valkenburg, JJ., affirming Wayne, Harry J. Dingeman, Jr., J.
Submitted January 11, 1974.
(No. 7
January Term 1974,
Docket No. 54,525.)
Decided May 21, 1974.
Rehearing denied June 25, 1974.
43 Mich App 752 reversed.
Petition by Virginia W. Blanchard for the probate of the will of Fred B. Blanchard. Kenneth D. Blanchard, Jean M. Yost and Shirley Komer ob jected to the petition. Petition for probate denied. Plaintiff appealed to circuit court. Affirmed. Plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals. Affirmed. Plaintiff appeals.
Reversed and remanded to probate court.
Liberson, Fink, Feiler, Crystal & Burdick, P. C, for plaintiff.
Eliot Charlip, for defendants.

Opinion:
M. S. Coleman, J.
FACTS
Virginia and Frederick Blanchard were married on November 15, 1949. In 1952, Fred executed a will designating Virginia as executrix and primary beneficiary.
The Blanchards were divorced in 1960. A property settlement was made. Virginia maintains that the couple remained "on close terms" and that she cared for Fred when he was injured in an airplane accident. They were remarried in 1963 and lived together until Fred's accidental death in 1970.
Virginia petitioned for admission to probate of the 1952 will. This was opposed by decedent's children who claimed that the will had been revoked by the divorce. They sought to have Fred's estate pass intestate.
The probate court denied Virginia's petition. The circuit court affirmed as did the Court of Appeals at 43 Mich App 752; 204 NW2d 730 (1972). In the latter decision, Chief Judge Lesinski recognized that it "gives rise to what might be a harsh result". However, the Court of Appeals held that prior decisions of this Court permitted no other result.
ISSUE
Should the will, executed during the marriage and unaltered at any time after execution, be revoked by implication of law when the parties divorced, remarried and subsequently lived together for seven years until the testator's death?
STATUTE
This case involves that portion of MCLA 702.9; MSA 27.3178(79) emphasized below:
"No will nor any part thereof shall be revoked, unless by burning, tearing, canceling or obliterating the same, with the intention of revoking it, by the testator, or by some person in his presence and by his direction; or by some other will or codicil in writing, executed as prescribed in this chapter; or by some other writing, signed, attested and subscribed in the manner provided in this chapter for the execution of a will; excepting only that nothing contained in this section shall prevent the revocation implied by law from subsequent changes in the condition or circumstances of the testator."
DISCUSSION
The statute above sets forth specific acts which may revoke a will. Further, a revocation may be "implied by law" if "subsequent changes in the condition or circumstances of the testator" warrant such action. "Subsequent changes" do not mandate revocation. The statute provides that the listing of specific acts of revocation does not preclude a finding that "subsequent changes" might also necessitate the court's revocation of the will. The facts of this case demonstrate the validity of the 1952 will.
In Lansing v Haynes, 95 Mich 16; 54 NW 699; 35 Am St Rep 545 (1893), the testator and his wife executed mutual wills. There was a subsequent divorce accompanied by a property settlement. The Court noted that the "feeling between them, at least upon her part, became bitter". The wife stopped speaking to the husband three months before the divorce. She went out of her way to avoid contact with him.
The testator died without having revoked his will. The Court held that a revocation should be implied by law:
"By the decree of divorce in this case, the parties became as strangers to each other, and neither owed to the other any obligation or duty thereafter. There was, therefore, a complete change in these relations . It is not the natural presumption that, after the testator had settled with her, had conveyed to her a good share of his property, and they, by agreement, had terminated all their property, as well as their marital, relations, the will executed nearly 10 years before should remain in force, and operate upon his death as a conveyance of the remainder of his property to her, to the exclusion of his heirs."
The Court then said that the possibility of a different result would be "unusual, and contrary to common experience" and that the decision should be controlled by a "reasonable presumption" as to testator's intention.
Lansing established the proper rule for determining whether a revocation should be implied by law, to wit: such presumption must be réasonable and must take in consideration all of the circumstances. It follows that revocation should not automatically occur by operation of law, but only when the conditions or circumstances warrant such operation.
After the Lansing decision, and purportedly based upon that decision, came Wirth v Wirth, 149 Mich 687; 113 NW 306 (1907) and In re McGraw's Estate, 228 Mich 1; 199 NW 686 (1924). In these latter cases there are statements to the effect that a divorce coupled with a property settlement creates a presumption of revocation which cannot be rebutted by the acts or declarations of the divorced parties. These statements are, in fact, contrary to the decision in Lansing which urges a "common sense" and "reasonable" interpretation of the law. An irrebuttable presumption leaves no room for reason to fall upon fact nor for common sense to bring the application of the law into the world of reality.
In cases involving wills probated in Michigan, it is said always to be the court's goal "to effectuate within pertinent precedential and statutory limits" the intent of the testator. Rendle v Wiemeyer, 374 Mich 30; 131 NW2d 45 (1964) citing Johnson v Atchinson, 362 Mich 296; 106 NW2d 748 (1961). Justice Sharpe dissenting in the second McGraw case said that the "presumption of revocation is founded upon the inference that, had the testator made a will after the divorce, his former wife would not have been provided for as she was in the will he had theretofore made". Such an inference may not be drawn from the instant facts.
It should be noted that under the statute there is no mention of divorce and property settlement as acts of revocation. The only reference is a "revocation implied by law from subsequent changes in the condition or circumstances of the testator".
Each case must be analyzed within the perimeter of its particular facts. The defendants claim that the divorce and property settlement revoked the testator's will. They would not consider as a succeeding condition or circumstance the subsequent remarriage and the maintaining of that relationship until the husband's death.
It is understandable that a man or woman having already written one will — and none subsequently — would see no necessity to republish it or write another if the natural object of his or her bounty were the same after remarriage.
In this case, between the making of the will and testator's death, there was, in addition to the divorce and property settlement,- a remarriage of the testator and beneficiary named in the will and séven years of marriage thereafter. At the time of the testator's death, the beneficiary and the testator were not strangers to each other. Each owed the other obligations and duties. The beneficiary named in the will, the testator's wife, was a natural object of his bounty. At the time of death, testator's circumstances in these respects were the same as when he executed his will.
It is not the natural and reasonable presumption from the chain of conditions and circumstances in this case, including divorce, property settlement and remarriage, to imply revocation under the Lansing rule. The words "subsequent", "condition" and "circumstances", according to their generally accepted meaning, cannot be restricted to the facts of divorce and property settlement — and no more.
Neither statute nor common law justify a rule that there is an irrebuttable presumption (a conflict of terms) of revocation of a prior will arising upon divorce and property settlement. To the extent that Wirth and McGrawgive credence to such a claim, they are overruled.
If, • as in Lansing, we draw a reasonable presumption, taking into consideration all of the conditions and circumstances towards the end that the testator's intent be respected and followed, we must reverse the Court of Appeals. Such is our conclusion.
Reverse and remand to the probate court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
T. G. Kavanagh, Williams, and Levin, JJ., concurred with M. S. Coleman, J.
Words should be given a common construction according to their generally accepted meaning. Hawley v Snider, 346 Mich 181; 77 NW2d 754 (1956).
Retried and appealed, 233 Mich 440; 207 NW 10; 42 ALR 1283 (1926).
Also see cases cited in the decision of In re Graham Estate, 379 Mich 224; 150 NW2d 816 (1967) supporting this statement:
We speak of the problem as being one of determining the testator's intent. That intent must govern.
Although these cases pertain to the construction of will, the same philosophy is pertinent in determining whether certain changes in circumstances and conditions should imply a revocation. The statute should not be interpreted in a manner which frustrates the testator's intent.
9 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed), § 2492, p 292:
"In strictness there cannot be such a thing as a 'conclusive presumption'. Wherever from one fact another is said to be conclusively presumed, in the sense that the opponent is absolutely precluded from showing by any evidence that the second fact does not exist, the rule is really providing that, where the first fact is shown to exist, the second fact's existence is wholly immaterial for the purpose of the proponent's case; and to provide this is to make a rule of substantive law, and not a rule apportioning the burden of persuading as to certain propositions or varying the duty of coming forward with evidence.
"The term has no place in the principles of Evidence (***), and should be discarded."