Case Name: Raul GONZALEZ, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Chandra SPENCER; Franscell, Strickland, Roberts & Lawrence, a Professional Corporation; Los Angeles County, Defendants-Appellees
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2003-05-13
Citations: 336 F.3d 832
Docket Number: No. 00-55935
Parties: Raul GONZALEZ, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Chandra SPENCER; Franscell, Strickland, Roberts & Lawrence, a Professional Corporation; Los Angeles County, Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: Before HALL, KOZINSKI and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 3d Series
Volume: 336
Pages: 832–839

Head Matter:
Raul GONZALEZ, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Chandra SPENCER; Franscell, Strickland, Roberts & Lawrence, a Professional Corporation; Los Angeles County, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 00-55935.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted Nov. 6, 2001.
Filed May 13, 2003.
Robert Mann, Los Angeles, CA, argued for the plaintiff-appellant. Donald W. Cook, Los Angeles, CA, joined him on the briefs.
Cindy S. Lee, Franscell, Strickland, Roberts & Lawrence, Pasadena, CA, argued for defendants-appellees Chandra Spencer and Franscell, Strickland, Roberts & Lawrence.
Jennifer E. Gysler, Monroy, Averbuck & Gysler, Westlake Village, CA, argued for defendant-appellee County of Los Angeles. Clayton C. Averbuck, Monroy, Averbuck & Gysler, Westlake Village, California, joined her on the brief.
Before HALL, KOZINSKI and W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM Opinion; Dissent by WILLIAM A. FLETCHER.
OPINION
PER CURIAM.
While defending Los Angeles County in a civil rights suit brought by Raul Gonzalez (the "underlying action"), attorney Chandra Spencer accessed Gonzalez's juvenile court file without notifying him and without obtaining authorization from the juvenile court pursuant to California Welfare & Institutions Code § 827(a)(l)(M) and California Rule of Court 1423(b). Spencer used confidential records from the file to cross-examine Gonzalez during his deposition in the underlying action. Gonzalez then brought this suit against Spencer, her firm, Franscell, Strickland, Roberts & Lawrence, and the county for accessing and using his juvenile court file without authorization. He alleged that Spencer's conduct violated his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and California law. The district court dismissed his claims for damages and for declaratory and injunctive relief.
1. Appellees argue that settlement of the underlying action rendered this case moot because Gonzalez no longer faces a significant prospect of illegal inspection or disclosure. "A case is moot only if interim events have 'completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of an allegedly improper ruling." In re Pintlar Corp., 124 F.3d 1310, 1312 (9th Cir.1997) (quoting Wong v. Dep't of State, 789 F.2d 1380, 1384 (9th Cir.1986)). Although Gonzalez need not fear similar injury in the future, the settlement does not affect his claims for damages based on past conduct.
2. Spencer acted under color of state law. She was retained to represent state entities and their employees in litigation. She inspected Gonzalez's file in the course of that representation, and used her status to gain access to the file. Her role was analogous to that of a state prosecutor rather than a public defender, because she acted on behalf of the state rather than as its adversary. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 323 n. 13, 102 S.Ct. 445, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981).
Spencer was not "[c]ourt personnel" for purposes of section 827(a)(1)(A). She was not a court employee and did not perform functions routinely performed by court employees. Rather, she was an outside service provider retained to represent the court with respect to its pecuniary interests. Michael v. Gates, 38 Cal.App.4th 737, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 163 (1995), is not on point. One of the statutes at issue there, California Evidence Code § 1043, placed rights to LAPD personnel files in the LAPD as an institution. The privilege to the files belonged to the LAPD itself as well as the individual officers. See Michael, 38 Cal.App.4th at 744, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 163. By contrast, neither the juvenile court nor its personnel were entitled to share Gonzalez's case file with counsel simply to protect their own pecuniary interests.
Spencer therefore had to get court permission before inspecting Gonzalez's file. State law required her to petition the juvenile court. See Cal. Welf. & InstCode § 827(a)(l)(M); Cal. Rules of Court 1423(b). Although the district court could have ordered disclosure notwithstanding state law, the file was still presumptively protected until it did. See 23 Charles Alan Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and Procedure § 5428, at 817 (1980) ("[E]ven in cases where federal law applies, constitutional and prudential considerations suggest that courts should carefully assess any attempt to compel disclosure of confidential juvenile com-t [files]."). Spencer could not inspect the file on her own initiative on the theory that she could have obtained permission, had she asked. Cf. United States v. Echegoyen, 799 F.2d 1271, 1280 n. 7 (9th Cir.1986) ("[T]o excuse the failure to obtain a warrant merely because the officers had probable cause and could have . obtained a warrant would completely obviate the warrant requirement ."). Nor could the district court authorize her search retroactively. If Spencer violated Gonzalez's constitutional rights, he is entitled at least to nominal damages, even if Spencer could have obtained the documents lawfully. See Wilks v. Reyes, 5 F.3d 412, 416 (9th Cir.1993).
Because Spencer improperly obtained access to Gonzalez's juvenile court file, we need not reach the question whether Spencer's use of Gonzalez's file in depositions also violated his constitutional rights.
3. Spencer is not entitled to qualified immunity. She is a private party, not a government employee, and she has pointed to "no special reasons significantly favoring an extension of governmental immunity" to private parties in her position. See Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 412, 117 S.Ct. 2100, 138 L.Ed.2d 540 (1997).
Gonzalez's claims were not es-topped or waived by his mere pursuit of the underlying action or his failure to object immediately when Spencer first disclosed the file. He did not take "inconsistent positions" with respect to the file's confidentiality, Rissetto v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597, 601 (9th Cir.1996) (internal quotation marks omitted), nor did he voluntarily "relinquish[ ] . a known right," Yoshida v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 240 F.2d 824, 829 (9th Cir.1957).
The district court's dismissal of the damages claims is reversed. The injunctive claims are dismissed as moot. The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED in part, DISMISSED in part and REMANDED. Costs to appellant.