Case Name: PEOPLE v. HUNTER
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1979-05-01
Citations: 90 Mich. App. 1
Docket Number: Docket No. 78-224
Parties: PEOPLE v HUNTER
Judges: Before: D. C. Riley, P.J., and J. H. Gillis and Mackenzie, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 90
Pages: 1–6

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v HUNTER
Docket No. 78-224.
Submitted January 18, 1979, at Detroit.
Decided May 1, 1979.
Leave to appeal denied, 406 Mich 1006.
Robert D. Hunter was arrested under a Detroit municipal ordinance which prohibits knowingly loitering in a place where narcotics paraphernalia are kept or sold. A subsequent search of Hunter’s person revealed a quantity of suspected heroin, and he was charged with possession of heroin with intent to deliver. The defendant moved to quash the information and the Recorder’s Court of Detroit, George W. Crockett, Jr., J., granted the motion and dismissed the case, finding the ordinance under which the defendant was arrested to be unconstitutional. The people appeal. Held:
The ordinance restricts the fundamental right of freedom of association and, although it is concerned with the compelling state interest in curbing the illegal use and trafficking of drugs, a less drastic way of seeking to do so would be a requirement of an intent to participate in unlawful activity. Mere knowledge of the presence of narcotics paraphernalia is not always detrimental to the public good. The ordinance is unconstitutional.
Affirmed.
J. H. Gillis, J., dissented. He would hold that knowingly acquiescing to the presence of narcotics paraphernalia is sufficient to constitute conduct detrimental to the public good. Because the ordinance contains the knowledge requirement, it proscribes only conduct which is detrimental to the public good and is not overbroad. Its infringement on freedom of association is outweighed by the governmental interest in preventing illicit drug activity. He would reverse.
Opinion of the Court
1. Constitutional Law — Freedom of Association — Compelling State Interest.
Governmental restriction upon the fundamental right of freedom of association cannot be tolerated absent justification by a compelling state interest, and even where such an interest exists, a restrictive regulation will be held unconstitutional if the state interest can be achieved by a less drastic alternative.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1] 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law §§ 353, 355.
[2, 3] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 5.
56 Am Jur 2d, Municipal Corporations, Counties, and other Political Subdivisions § 361.
2. Criminal Law — Ordinances — Drugs and Narcotics — Loitering — Knowledge — Intent.
Mere knowledge of the presence of narcotics paraphernalia is not always detrimental to the public good; an ordinance which makes it illegal to "knowingly loiter” in a place where narcotics paraphernalia are present is unconstitutional because there is a less drastic way of seeking to curb drug abuse, which is to require the intent to participate in unlawful activity (Detroit Municipal Code, § 28-8-8).
Dissent by Gillis, J.
3. Criminal Law — Ordinances — Drugs and Narcotics — Loitering — Freedom op Association.
Knowingly acquiescing to the presence of narcotics paraphernalia is conduct which is harmful to the public good; the government interest in preventing illicit drug activity outweighs the minimal infringement on freedom of association which results where an ordinance proscribes "knowingly loitering" in a place where narcotics paraphernalia is located and where the ordinance proscribes only harmful conduct and is not overly broad (Detroit Municipal Code, § 28-8-8).
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William L. Cahalan, Prosecuting Attorney, Edward R. Wilson, Principal Attorney, Appeals, and Don W. Atkins, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney.
Before: D. C. Riley, P.J., and J. H. Gillis and Mackenzie, JJ.

Opinion:
Mackenzie, J.
The facts of this case are fully set forth in the dissenting opinion.
This case involves the fundamental right of freedom of association, and governmental restriction upon that right cannot be tolerated absent justification by a "compelling state interest". Roe v Wade, 410 US 113; 93 S Ct 705; 35 L Ed 2d 147 (1972). Further, despite the existence of such a concern, the regulation fails to pass constitutional muster if that interest can be achieved by a "less drastic alternative". Shelton v Tucker, 364 US 479; 81 S Ct 247; 5 L Ed 2d 231 (1960).
There is no doubt that the state's interest in curbing the illegal use and trafficking of drugs is a compelling one. However, that interest was not achieved through the most narrow means in the case at bar. We reject the assumption that mere knowledge of the presence of narcotics paraphernalia is always detrimental to the public good. Under such "knowledge" standard, persons with acceptable or laudable reasons for being knowingly present where paraphernalia and/or drugs are allegedly located could be prosecuted, under the ordinance. Counselors, religious advisors, or other persons seeking to work with drug users on their own ground would be covered. Family members, aware that a person was using drugs in the home, but not wishing to sever ties, could likewise be convicted.
As there exists a less drastic way of seeking to curb drug abuse, i.e., the requirement of an intent to participate in the unlawful activity, see People v Pagnotta, 25 NY2d 333; 253 NE2d 202; 305 NYS2d 484 (1969), we find the ordinance at issue unconstitutional, and affirm the lower court's decision to quash the information.
D. C. Riley, P.J., concurred.