Case Name: HARVEY v. UNITED STATES
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1954-07-15
Citations: 215 F.2d 330
Docket Number: No. 12011
Parties: HARVEY v. UNITED STATES.
Judges: 
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 215
Pages: 330–334

Head Matter:
HARVEY v. UNITED STATES.
No. 12011.
United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued March 23, 1954.
Decided July 15, 1954.
Danaher, Circuit Judge, dissented.
Mr. Edward J. Skeens, Washington, D. C., for appellant.
Mr. Gerard J. O’Brien, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., with whom Messrs. Leo A. Rover, U. S. Atty., and Lewis A. Carroll and Arthur J. McLaughlin, Asst. U. S. Attys., Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellee.
Before WILBUR K. MILLER, arid PRETTYMAN and DANAHER, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
WILBUR K. MILLER, Circuit Judge.
John F. Harvey was indicted in twelve counts for illegal traffic in narcotics. At his trial he was represented by competent counsel whom he selected and employed. He was found guilty by a jury and on February 20, 1953, received concurrent sentences of twenty months to five years, plus a fine of $500.
Harvey did not appeal from the judgment of conviction, but later employed new counsel who filed in his behalf on October 14, 1953, a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1952) to vacate the judgment on the following ground:
"That the defendant has been deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law within the meaning of the fifth amendment to the federal constitution in that the prisoner has been denied a fair trial by an impartial jury with the concientious [sic] and effective assistance of counsel within the meaning of the sixth amendment to the federal constitution.
"That because of the foregoing the Court was divested of its jurisdiction by operation of law to impose a lawful judgment in this cause."
This appeal followed the District Court's denial of the motion to vacate.
The motion stated no more than conclusions. But a memorandum of points and authorities submitted in support of it showed the basis of Harvey's claim that he had been deprived of the effective assistance of counsel at his trial. And in his brief on this appeal, filed by his newly-employed counsel, the appellant states the facts upon which he relies:
" Several months prior to trial the appellant took his so called sweetheart to his attorneys office where all three had a discussion concerning the coming trial. That on this occasion the appellant gave his sweetheart, one Patricia N. Brown, narcotics in the presence of his attorney; and that this occurred four or five times in the attorneys office; that she was given two sheets of paper to memorize which was prepared for the purpose of presenting an alibi defense; that Mr. Kayson instructed her how to answer questions under simulated cross-examination. As it turned out later Miss Brown told her father what had transpired and he took her to the office of the United States Attorney when she agreed to testify in behalf o[f] the government. This unexpected event was unknown to Mr. Kayson because Miss Brown was under subpoena by the defendant and remained so until the prosecutor made his opening statement.
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"Finally the cause came on for hearing and a jury was sworn on the 14th day of January, 1953. Mr. Kayson received his first surprise of the day when the prosecutor commenced mid-way through his opening statement to describe the testimony of the witness Patricia Brown. Mr. Kayson objected by stating: 'The prosecutor is making certain statements which will definitely be prejudicial unless he can show that this person actually is going to testify to this.'
" [B]ut the bombshell came, however, when Patricia Brown was called to testify. Immediately, Kayson entered a strenuous objection stating that: 'the evidence as it will be adduced by this witness is such that not only will the defendant be charged with things that he is not charged with in the indictment but also counsel himself will be charged with the commission of certain offenses which would be so greatly prejudicial to the defendant that the counsel for defendant will be put in a position of defending not only his defendant but defending himself which will be entirely unfair. ' "
It is argued that, as a consequence of these events, Harvey's trial attorney was so discredited in the eyes of the jury that he could not effectively present his client's case; and that the trial judge should have instantly declared a mistrial, although such action was not requested, and should have required Harvey to discharge the attorney whom he had employed, so he might have a new trial with untainted counsel. We observe that, when the prosecutor said Patricia Brown would testify concerning the attempted subornation of perjury, the trial judge inquired of Harvey's attorney whether he desired to associate other counsel with him, as he might find it necessary to testify. The court's offer was rejected; the trial counsel did not withdraw, and Harvey did not protest against continued representation by the attorney whom he had selected and employed.
Except for his alleged participation in the scheme to concoct a perjured alibi, Harvey's trial counsel conducted his defense with a high degree of professional skill, as the trial judge said in complimenting his able cross-examination, diligent production of witnesses, and general defensive strategy.
Patricia Brown's story of what happened in the attorney's office was clearly admissible, as fabrication of evidence of innocence is cogent evidence of guilt. Wilson v. United States, 1896, 162 U.S. 613, 621, 16 S.Ct. 895, 40 L.Ed. 1090; Harris v. United States, 1948, 83 U.S.App.D.C. 348, 169 F.2d 887, certiorari denied 335 U.S. 872, 69 S.Ct. 161, 93 L.Ed. 416.
If Patricia's evidence, which charged Harvey's counsel with gross misconduct, so prejudiced the jury against the attorney as to render his conduct of the defense ineffective, the fault is Harvey's. He chose his counsel and the evidence tended to show that he himself set in motion and participated in the scheme to present a false and fraudulent defense. He chose to continue throughout the trial with the same counsel. He is in no position now to say the court should have rescued him from his own wrongdoing.
In another connection, to be sure, but in words which are apt in the present situation, a distinguished justice of the Supreme Court once said: "A client who consults an attorney for advice that will serve him in the commission of a fraud will have no help from the law."
Affirmed.
. Harvey's trial attorney.
. The girl testified substantially as the prosecutor had predicted. Harvey denied practically everything she said. His counsel, Kayson, did not take the stand,
. Mr. Justice Cardozo in Clark v. United States, 1933, 289 U.S. 1, 15, 53 S.Ct. 465, 77 L.Ed. 993.