Case Name: Twombly v. Smith
Court: Colorado Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Colorado
Decision Date: 1898-09
Citations: 25 Colo. 425
Docket Number: No. 3973
Parties: Twombly v. Smith.
Judges: 
Reporter: Colorado Reports
Volume: 25
Pages: 425–447

Head Matter:
[No. 3973.]
Twombly v. Smith.
1. Elections—Political Pabties—County Centbal Committee— Removal of Ohaibman.
Where the chairman of the county central committee of a political party was elected by the committee, the committee had the power to remove such chairman and elect another. And where after the chairman had called a meeting of the central committee and before they met, another committee, called the executive committee, met and voted to remove the chairman of the central committee, and proceeded to elect another, but the chairman denied their authority and under the instructions of a number of the central committee who met in pursuance of his call, proceeded to call county primaries, but before the primaries were held, a majority of the central committee met and ratified the action of the executive committee in removing the old chairman and electing a new, and directed the new chairman to call primaries for the purpose of choosing delegates to a county convention, held, that the convention held by delegates elected at the primaries called by the new chairman was the regular and lawful convention of the party in preference to one held by delegates elected at the primaries called by the old chairman.
2. Elections—Political Conventions—Rival Delegations.
Where two factions of a political party chose delegates to the state convention, but only one of the sets of delegates attended the regular state convention, the other set attending another state convention claiming to represent the same party, as the rights of the rival factions were not adjudicated by the convention, its action in seating the only delegation that claimed seats was not conclusive on the courts as to which faction legally represented the party in the county, and was entitled to the name and emblem on the official ballot.
8. Elections—Official Ballots.
There is no provision of the election law which authorizes the preparation of the official ballot in such manner as to permit state and county tickets to be voted separately, each as a whole, under the same or distinctive emblems.
Upon Review from the District Court of Arapahoe County.
Actioh commenced in district court by petitioner, to review the ruling of respondent on the contest between two sets of nominees of the Silver Republican party for the county of Arapahoe. Judgment sustaining this ruling, with the modification that the nominees adjudged by respondent entitled to appear upon the official ballot should be designated separrate and apart from the state ticket, so that the state and county tickets can be voted separately.
In 1897 John D. Fleming was regularly selected by the central committee of the Silver Republican party for the county of Arapahoe as the chairman of such committee. At or about the same time, this body selected an executive committee. July 29,1898, at a meeting of this committee, chairman Fleming was deposed, and H. H. Eddy selected in his place. Two-days previous to such action, Fleming had issued a call for the central committee, to meet on the 30th of July, 1898,, pursuant to which a large number of the members assembled and directed Mr. Fleming to call the regular county primaries to meet on the 3d of September following, for the purpose of selecting delegates to a county convention, to be holden on 'the 5th of the same month, to select delegates to the state- and congressional conventions, and also delegates to a county convention, for the county of Arapahoe, for the purpose-of nominating a county ticket. August 20, 1898, by virtue of a call by chairman Eddy, a meeting of the county central committee was held, at which there was present a majority of the regularly constituted members of this committee, who affirmed the action of the executive committee, in removing chairman Fleming, and appointing chairman Eddy in his stead, and directed the latter to issue a call for primaries for the selection of delegates to a county convention, the purposes of which were the same as that called by Fleming. Both of these conventions were held. The county convention called by Fleming nominated petitioner and his conominees, and the one called by Eddy, the candidates who were ruled by respondent to be the regular nominees of the party for this county, and, also, so adjudged by the district court. The delegates to the state convention chosen under the Fleming call attended the meeting at Colorado Springs known as the Broad convention, while those selected under the Eddy call attended the one known as the Blood convention. Each of these conventions claimed to be the regular one of the Silver Republican party for the state. In TWhipple v. Broad, ante, p. 407, the Broad convention was held to be the legal one. The state delegates selected by the Eddy convention did not seek admission to the Broad convention, nor submit their claims to that body.
Mr. John R. Smith, Mr. Grant L. Hudson and Messrs. Ward & Ward, for petitioner.
Messrs. Bartels & Blood, Mr. Victor A. Elliott and Messrs. Fillius & Davis, for respondent.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Gabbert
delivered the opinion of the court.
The two questions to be determined in this case, are:
First. Which was the regular convention of the party, which incidentally includes a consideration of the regularity of the proceedings terminating 'in the removal of chairman Fleming and the appointment of chairman Eddy.
Second. Did the recognition by the state convention of the Fleming delegation conclusively settle the question as to which was the regular convention in Arapahoe county?
1. Mr. Fleming was appointed chairman of the county central committee by that body, and although the executive committee may not have had power or authority to remove. him as- such chairman, the central committee, having the power to appoint was vested with authority to remove its appointees, and this governing body of the party having subsequently ratified the action of the executive committee in making such removal, and appointing chairman Eddy, in his stead, the latter, by virtue of this action became the authorized chairman of the central committee, and empowered to perform the duties usually devolving upon the recognized head of such organizations.
At the time when the central committee met at the call' of chairman Eddy, and directed a call for primaries for the purpose of choosing delegates to the county convention, the one called by chairman Fleming had not been held, and the committee, duly convened, had the power and authority to rescind or revoke its previous action in regard to matters which had not been consummated; so that the convention heldinpursu- ' anee of the action of the Eddy faction should be held to be the regular one of the party for the county of Arapahoe, and the persons nominated at this convention adjudged entitled to appear upon the official ballot under the name and emblem of the party, in accordance with the judgment of the district court in this respect, unless the second proposition presented for consideration is conclusive of the question as to which was the regular convention of the party for this county.
2. The convention which met at Colorado Springs, which the Fleming delegation attended, convened for the purpose of making nominations for state officers. The question as to whether the delegation selected by the Eddy faction, or the one selected by the Fleming, was the delegation chosen by the lawful authorities of the party for the county, was not before it, nor determined, because the Eddy delegation did not claim to be entitled to seats in this convention, and merely because the Fleming delegation was admitted to this convention, without contest, in no manner settles or adjudicates the question as to which was the regular convention of the party for this county, which assembled for the purpose of nominating a county ticket.
To what extent a convention of a party for a particular district is a law unto itself, and the result of its action depend upon whether or not it was called in pursuance of the legally constituted authorities of the party for that district, without respect to the action of the state or other convention, recognizing any particular faction of the party, when a contest between factions is heard and determined by such convention, it is hot deemed necessary to pass upon. This case is distinguishable from In re Redmond, 25 N. Y. Supp. 381, and Cain v. Page, 42 S. W. Rep. 336, authorities cited by counsel for petitioner, in support of their position that the recognition by the Broad state convention of the Fleming delegation precludes the court from further inquiry on this subject. In the former case, the question as to which was the regular convention of the party for a specific district less than the state had been determined by the state convention of the party in a contest between rival delegations of different factions for this district, and for that reason, it was held that by such proceedings the party for the state had determined for itself which faction represented the party in that district.
In the latter case there appears to be a special statute by which the governing authority in the county or district in which a convention may be held for the nomination of candidates, is constituted a tribunal to hear and determine contests over such nominations, and a contest between rival candidates having been determined by this body and in the state convention of the party, the question as to whether or not the committee or governing authority which had determined the contest was the legal one of the party for the district in which it acted, having been directly presented and settled by the state convention in the affirmative, it was held that this action on the part of the state convention was conclusive of the question as to which was the regular committee for the district, and the judgment of such committee on the contest before it, therefore, final.
As above stated, no such question is presented in this case for our determination. There has not, in our opinion, been any adjudication by any authority or governing body of the party, in any manner determining which was the regular convention or who were the regularly constituted authorities of the party for the county of Arapahoe, nor does the judgment of this court, in the case of Whipple v. Broad, supra, under the circumstances affect the question as to which faction of the party for this county was the one called and held in pursuance of the legally constituted authorities of the party for that district. Without determining the question, directly, because it is not presented, it may be said that a convention of a party for one district has no authority to determine questions of the character here presented, so as to control nominations by a convention for public officers in another; there is no statute granting such right, nor is our attention called to any rules or regulations of the party under which such power or authority might be exercised. When the regularity of the proceedings of rival conventions making nominations is called in question, the courts should determine that question without respect to the action of any other convention of the same party, which included territory greater than the district in which such nominations were made. To hold otherwise would, in effect, result in delegating to conventions' the power to make nominations for public offices in a given district not authorized under the call so to do, to the exclusion of the •convention of the party for that district called for that particular purpose. In re Cowie, 11 N. Y. Supp. 838.
There is no provision of the election law which authorizes the preparation of the official ballot in such manner as to permit state and county tickets to be voted separately, each as a whole, under the same or distinctive names and emblems.
The judgment of the district court, in holding that the •convention held in pursuance of the Eddy call was the legal •one of the party for the county of Arapahoe, is affirmed; but its judgment directing that the nominees of that convention appear upon the official ballot so that the state and county tickets may be voted separately, is set aside, and the cause remanded, with directions to sustain the ruling of the respondent.
Modified and remanded.