Case Name: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Timothy William TRIPP, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1991-12-27
Citations: 591 So. 2d 1055
Docket Number: No. 90-02699
Parties: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Timothy William TRIPP, Appellee.
Judges: FRANK, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 591
Pages: 1055–1058

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Timothy William TRIPP, Appellee.
No. 90-02699.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Dec. 27, 1991.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Wendy Buffington, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellant.
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Andrea Norgard, and William Pena Wells, Asst. Public Defenders, Bartow, for appellee.

Opinion:
ALTENBERND, Judge.
The state appeals the defendant's sentence imposed after a revocation of probation. It argues that the trial court improperly awarded jail credit to the defendant for time that he had served on a separate conviction. We agree. Consistent with our decisions in Pacheco v. State, 565 So.2d 832 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990), review denied, 576 So.2d 289 (Fla.1991), and Harris v. State, 557 So.2d 198 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990), we reverse the sentence and remand for resen-tencing without jail credit for time served on the separate conviction.
Our decision follows similar decisions of the Fourth and Fifth Districts. Sylvester v. State, 572 So.2d 947 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); Ford v. State, 572 So.2d 946 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990); State v. Folsom, 552 So.2d 1194 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989); State v. Rodgers, 540 So.2d 872 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). Because the sentencing method approved in this case is not expressly recognized in Poore v. State, 531 So.2d 161 (Fla.1988), and may conflict with the spirit of the sentencing guidelines and the limitations imposed in Lambert v. State, 545 So.2d 838 (Fla.1989), and State v. Green, 547 So.2d 925 (Fla.1989), we certify the propriety of this sentencing method to the Florida Supreme Court.
Timothy William Tripp was charged with burglary, grand theft, and resisting an officer without violence for events occurring on November 24, 1988. The three offenses were charged in a single information. The burglary and grand theft offenses were third-degree felonies, and the resisting offense was a misdemeanor. § 810.02(3), 812.014(2)(c), 843.02, Fla.Stat. (1987).
Mr. Tripp and the state entered into a plea agreement. They agreed that he would plead guilty to the two felony charges, the state would dismiss the misdemeanor charge, and he would receive a sentence within the guidelines. Mr. Tripp's scoresheet recommended 3 years' incarceration and permitted up to 4 1/2 years' incarceration. For the burglary, the trial court adjudicated him guilty and sentenced him to 4 years' imprisonment. For the grand theft, the trial court withheld adjudication and placed him on 4 years' probation. The probation was consecutive to the imprisonment and was to begin upon Mr. Tripp's release from prison for the burglary-
Mr. Tripp served his four-year sentence on the burglary in less than ten months. He then began his term of probation on the grand theft. On January 6, 1990, at 2:33 a.m., Mr. Tripp allegedly trespassed on railroad property. On February 25, 1990, he allegedly burglarized a home. As a result, the state sought to revoke his probation. Mr. Tripp admitted the violations and his probation was revoked. During resentenc-ing, Mr. Tripp argued that the trial court had no authority to sentence him to more than 4 1/2 years' imprisonment with credit for the 4 years that he had served on his original burglary sentence. The trial court reluctantly agreed.
The dispositive issue is whether the sentencing method in this case produces a split sentence, as described in Poore, for which jail credit, including accumulated gain time, is mandatory under Green, or whether it produces a separate sentence of probation that is legally consecutive to the sentence of incarceration. As previously mentioned, this court and two other district courts have ruled that this sentencing method produces two separate sentences and that a defendant in this situation is not entitled to jail credit from the first sentence concerning any revocation of probation for the second offense. See Pacheco; Harris; Sylvester; Ford; Folsom; Rodgers. Our decision is also supported in part by the supreme court's recent decision in State v. Perko, 588 So.2d 980 (Fla.1991).
In addition to the reasons explained in those opinions, our decision is supported by the rules relating to jail credit for presen-tence imprisonment when a defendant receives consecutive sentences of imprisonment. § 921.161, Fla.Stat. (1987); Daniels v. State, 491 So.2d 543 (Fla.1986); Keene v. State, 500 So.2d 592 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); Yohn v. State, 461 So.2d 263 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Martin v. State, 452 So.2d 938 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Miller v. State, 297 So.2d 36 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974). It is well established that a "defendant 'is not entitled to have his jail time credit pyramided by being given credit on each [consecutive] sentence for the full time he spends in jail awaiting disposition.' " Daniels, 491 So.2d at 545 (quoting Martin which quoted Miller) (emphasis original).
On the other hand, unless the trial court is attempting to bring the sentence within the guidelines recommendation, it cannot impose consecutive sentences of incarceration at a single sentencing hearing absent a valid written reason for departure. See Branam v. State, 554 So.2d 512 (Fla.1990), approving, 540 So.2d 158 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); § 921.16, Fla.Stat. (1987); Fla. R.Crim.P. 3.701(d)12. By contrast, the sentencing method authorized by this case allows trial courts to greatly exceed the incarceration contemplated by the guidelines and Lambert upon a single violation of probation. See Sylvester; Ford.
There may be situations in which a term of probation consecutive to a sentence of imprisonment would be a valid and appropriate sentence. There are other situations in which this sentencing method could be abused. It may be that there should be some limitation on a trial court's authority to impose a term of probation consecutive to a sentence of incarceration. We, however, are unaware of any such restriction and are not authorized to create one. Because of this concern, we certify the following question to the supreme court:
IF A TRIAL COURT IMPOSES A TERM OF PROBATION ON ONE OFFENSE CONSECUTIVE TO A SENTENCE OF INCARCERATION ON ANOTHER OFFENSE, CAN JAIL CREDIT FROM THE FIRST OFFENSE BE DENIED ON A SENTENCE IMPOSED AFTER A REVOCATION OF PROBATION ON THE SECOND OFFENSE?
Reversed and remanded for resentenc-ing.
FRANK, J., concurs.
CAMPBELL, A.C.J., concurs specially.
. The record does not disclose the outcome of the trespassing and second-degree burglary charges.
. We note that the maximum sentence that Mr. Tripp could have received upon a revocation of probation was not 4 1/2 years' incarceration, but 5 years' incarceration. The high end of the permissive range of the next higher cell was 5 1/2 years' incarceration, which was limited by the 5-year maximum sentence for third-degree felonies. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.701(d)14; Lambert v. State, 545 So.2d 838 (Fla.1989).
. Although not presented in this appeal, one can easily imagine a multiple-count information, resulting in numerous consecutive terms of probation. This situation could allow for imprisonment far beyond the permitted guidelines range if a defendant violated each of his probations.
. The majority has no objection to the certified question suggested by Judge Campbell in his special concurring opinion. We have not incorporated that question into this opinion because we believe the supreme court will be further assisted by the comments and additional analy-ses which accompany his proposed question.