Case Name: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Alexis Jeiselle COLLIE, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1980-11-19
Citations: 390 So. 2d 441
Docket Number: No. 79-43
Parties: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Alexis Jeiselle COLLIE, Appellee.
Judges: COWART, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 390
Pages: 441–445

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Alexis Jeiselle COLLIE, Appellee.
No. 79-43.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Nov. 19, 1980.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Edwin H. Duff, III, Asst. Atty. Gen., Day-tona Beach, for appellant.
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, Ronald K. Zimmet, Chief, Appellate Division, Asst. Public Defender, and Carla Miller, Certified Legal Intern, Daytona Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
SHARP, Judge.
The state argues that Collie, the defendant, should not have been discharged by the trial court under Florida's "speedy trial" rule, because a notice of Collie's arraignment date was sent to her bondsman, although no one sent it to her, and she failed to appear at her arraignment. We affirm the discharge.
A summary of the events leading to Collie's discharge are as follows:
January 10, 1979 - Defendant arrested for grand theft.
January 11, 1979 - Defendant bonded by Earl W. -Houk Bonding Agency, through Curtis Ward, an associate.
March 30,1979 - Information filed charging defendant with grand theft.
April 3, 1979 Court clerk sent notice of arraignment to bonding agency; agency failed to notify defendant.
April 17, 1979 Arraignment date; defendant failed to appear; capias issued.
May 1, 1979 Ed Houck arrested defendant and placed her in custody.
May 24, 1979 Arraignment; defendant appeared.
May 25, 1979 Defendant filed discovery motions.
June 29,1979 - State replied to discovery motions.
July 9, 1979 - Speedy trial time (180 days) ran out.
July 19, 1979 - Defendant filed motion for discharge.
At the hearing on the defendant's motion for discharge, the state argued the speedy trial rule should be tolled because the defendant failed to appear at the April 17, 1979 arraignment. Collie testified she resided continuously for many years with her parents and children at the same address given to the police and bondsmen. She failed to appear at her April 17 arraignment because no one (neither the state nor her bondsman) sent her notice or told her of the date. Houk's associate, Ward, lost his license and his absence apparently caused the agency's failure to notify Collie. Collie, however, did not know about Ward's problems at that time. The court records indicate the clerk notified only the bondsman of the arraignment date. The court found that the defendant did not receive notice of the arraignment date and she was continuously available for trial during the 180 day period following her arrest.
The issue in this case is whether Collie is chargeable with "constructive" notice of the arraignment given to her bondsman, and thus willfully "not available for trial" within the meaning of the "speedy trial" rule. No Florida cases answer this question. Smith v. Nesbitt, 355 So.2d 202 (Fla.3d DCA 1978) states (by way of dictum) that failure of a defendant (free on bond) to appear at his arraignment is "evidence" of his "nonavailability for trial" under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(e). Upon the state's making such a showing, the defendant must then counter with proof that he was "continuously available." Nesbitt did not consider what would constitute such a showing. Similarly in Dara v. State, 278 So.2d 334 (Fla.3d DCA 1973), when the state objected to discharge because the defendant failed to appear at his arraignment, the defendant produced no proof of any kind regarding his "continuous availability" for trial.
In some contexts, courts hold that notice to a bonding company or surety is notice to the defendant. State v. United Bonding Ins. Co., 81 N.M. 154, 464 P.2d 884, 886 (1970); 10 Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice § 6092 (1943 & Supp.1980). But these cases involve proceedings to forfeit a bond upon failure of the surety to bring the defendant before the court in compliance with its bonded undertaking to do so. The courts allow bonding companies few excuses for not producing the defendant: acts of God; acts of the obligee; or acts of war. State v. United Bonding Ins. Co., 464 P.2d at 887. The "constructive notice" fiction is a tool in the court's armory to hold sureties strictly liable.
The purpose and policies of Florida's "speedy trial" rule are so different than those involved in bond forfeiture cases, we cannot justify the application of the "constructive notice" rule in this context. The speedy trial rule is our Supreme Court's effort to clarify and implement a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial. State ex rel. Butler v. Cullen, 253 So.2d 861 (Fla.1971). The "right" belongs to the defendant, and the state has the "duty" to bring him to trial within the 180 day period.
A waiver of this right should not be based on a legal "fiction" such as "constructive notice" of an arraignment date. Nothing less than the defendant's actual knowledge of the date and willful failure to appear, or intentional avoidance or evasion of receiving notice, which were not shown in this case, should be sufficient to waive a defendant's speedy trial right.
We agree with the trial judge's views expressed at the hearing:
I think the state has to be treated fairly, but the accused certainly has to be treated fairly too. And I consider it a miscarriage of justice when proper notice is not sent to an accused, to give them an opportunity to make themselves available to the Court.
Because the defendant made a sufficient showing of being "continuously available" for trial under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(e), even though she did not appear at her arraignment, her discharge is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
COWART, J., concurs.
COBB, J., dissents with opinion.
. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(a)(1).
. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.191(e) provides:
The trial of an accused who is not available shall be held in abeyance while such person is unavailable. A person who has not been continuously available for trial during the term provided for herein is not entitled to be discharged; no presumption of non-availability attaches, but if the State objects to discharge and presents any evidence tending to show non-availability, the accused then must by competent proof establish continuous availability during the term.
If an accused voluntarily removes himself from the jurisdiction of the court or otherwise acts to make himself unavailable for trial, the right to trial within the time herein provided shall on motion by the State be voidable by the court in the interests of justice. Upon such accused becoming available for trial and upon notice thereof by the accused or his counsel to both the court having jurisdiction over the trial and to the office of the prosecutor, or upon being retaken into custody, the time within which trial is to commence shall be as herein provided and begin anew.
. See Williams v. State, 383 So.2d 722 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).
. See Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 86 S.Ct. 1245, 16 L.Ed.2d 314 (1966); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938).