Case Name: K. Collins Kellogg, Respondent, v. Daniel Sweeney, Appellant
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1871-09-12
Citations: 46 N.Y. 291
Docket Number: 
Parties: K. Collins Kellogg, Respondent, v. Daniel Sweeney, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 46
Pages: 291–297

Head Matter:
K. Collins Kellogg, Respondent, v. Daniel Sweeney, Appellant.
The recovery in all actions should be for what is lost, whether by breach of contract express or implied, or by a tort.
Gold coin is not merchandise, but one kind of money; and in an action of tort to recover for its loss, the judgment should be for gold, and not for its value in currency. (Oh. J., and Allbn, J., dissenting.)
(Argued September 6, 1871;
decided September 12, 1871.)
Appeal from judgment of the General Term of the fifth judicial district, affirming judgment entered in Lewis county in favor of plaintiff, upon the report of a referee. (Reported below in 1 Lansing, 397.)
The action is brought to recover for a quantity of gold coin, alleged to have been lost through the negligence of defendant, an innkeeper.
Defendant was the proprietor of a hotel in the city of Kew York, known as Sweeney’s hotel, kept on the European plan. On the 9th of December, 1863, plaintiff went to said hotel as a guest, registered his name, and called for a room, but only succeeded in obtaining a bed in the parlor, where there were a number of temporary beds and other persons sleeping. Plaintiff had a satchel containing gold coin to the amount of §493.51. This he gave to the clerk, telling him it contained valuables, and receiving a check for the same. In the. morning he called for his satchel; search was made, but it could not be found. One of the employes of the house finally brought it from the upper part of the house, saying it was found on the roof of an adjoining building. It was found opened and the gold coin abstracted. The notice required by the statute was not posted on the door or in the room where plaintiff slept. The referee found, that some of defendant’s employes rifled the satchel of the gold. On the 10th December the value of gold coin in currency was 1.59. The referee gave judgment for the currency value, with interest.
J. H. Reynolds, for appellant.
Defendant was not an innkeeper, and not bound to care for the goods of his lodger. (Doe ex dem. Pitt v. Launcey, 4 Campb., 76; Carpenter v. Taylor, 1 Hilt., 195; Thompson v. Lacy, 3 B. & A., 287; Holder v. Soulby, 8 C. B., N. S., 254 ; 5 Bell’s Com., 7th ed., 498 and notes; Schmidt et al. v. Blood, 9 Wend., 268.) Plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence, and defendant not liable. (Bendetson v. French, 44 Barb., 31; Fowler v. Dorlon, 24 id., 384; Armistead v. Wilde, 17 Q. B., 261; Redfield on Con., 271.) Defendant provided a safe and gave notice, and is exempt. (Chap. 421, Laws 1855; Hyatt v. Taylor, 3 Hand, 258; Purvis v. Coleman, 21 N. Y., 111.) Defendant not liable for the money lost. (Merrill v. Grinnell, 31 N. Y., 210; Hallenback v. Fish, 8 Wend., 547; Grinnell v. Cook, 3 Hill, 489; Ingallsbee v. Wood, 33 N. Y., 79.) The property being money, the nominal amount only recoverable. (Edw. an Bailments, 61-65, 102, 103; 19 if. Y., 34.)
J. D. Kernan, for respondent.
Defendant is an innkeeper. (Bac. Abr., title Inns, sub. B; Story on Bailments, 5th ed., § 475; Thompson v. Lacy, 3 B. & A., 283; 2 Kent’s Com., 5th ed., 778, 779; Willard v. Reinhardt, 2 E. D. Smith, 148; Wintermente v. Clark, 5 Sandf., 242; Taylor v. Monnot, 4 Duer, 116; Bendetson v. French, 44 Barb., 31; Krohn v. Sweeny, 2 Daly, 202.) Defendant liable for the gold coin lost. (Grinnell v. Cook, 3 Hill, 485, 488 ; Hulet v. Swift, 33 N. Y., 571; Piper v. Manny, 21 Wend., 282; Clute v. Wiggins, 14 Johns., 174; t Bl. Com., 430; 2 Kent, 592, 593; Story’s Com.; 2 Kent, 470, 471, 479; Story on Bailments, §§470, 481; Wilkins v. Earle, Com. of Appeals, January, 1871; Kent v. Shuckard, 2 B. & A., 803; Needles v. Howard, 1 E. D. Smith, 54; Taylor v. Monnot, 4 Duer, 116; Stanton v. Leland, 4 E. D. Smith, 88, 93; Fowler v. Dorlon, 24 Barb., 389; McDonald v. Edgerton, 5 id., 560; Van Wyck v. Howard, 12 How., 147; Purvis v. Colman, 21 N. Y., 112, 116; 1 Smith’s Leading Cases, 309; Buinton v. Courtney, Hayw. N. C., 41.) Hot exempt under chapter 421, Laws of 1855. (Purvis v. Stetson, 21 N. Y., 111; Hollister v. Knowlton, 19 Wend., 234.) Plaintiff not guilty of negligence. (Keegan v. W. R. R. Co., 8 N. Y., 175; Fowler v. Dorlon, 24 Barb., 384; Piper v. Manny, 21 Wend., 282; Hulet v. Swift, 33 N. Y., 571; Gile v. Libby, 36 Barb., 70.) The rule of damages is the value at time of loss. (Needles v. Howard, 1 E. D. Smith, 54; Richmond v. Bronson, 5 Denio, 55.) Defendant entitled to value of gold in currency. (Bank of C. v. Van Vleck, 49 Barb., 508; Taylor v. Ketchum, 5 Robt., 507; Lubing v. At. M. I. Co., 50 Barb., 521.)

Opinion:
By the Court—Beckham, J.
Bendetson v. French, decided at the present term of this court, covers all the material questions in this case, except the point as to the amount of the recovery. The plaintiff recovered at the trial for the amount of gold coin lost: $493.50, premium, 59 per cent, $291.16 and interest on both.
When this coin was lost, there were two currencies in the United States established by law as the court has held.
The plaintiff lost gold coin. Why should he recover in paper currency % Why should not this case be decided precisely as if the legal tender act, so called, had never been enacted by congress %
I can see no reason for calling this gold coin merchandise; and therefore, a recovery should be had for its value in currency. It is clearly one kind of money; and there is no reason for recovering for its loss in any other kind of money. It cannot be said that the value of gold coin changes more than the other kind of currency, which an act of congress has declared to be money. The truth is the other way. The-fluctuation is in the congressional paper currency ; not in the gold coin. True, paper is now worth nearly fifty per cent more than it was in 1863 when this money was lost. It might easily have been worth much less. The gold coin is worth substantially the same.
We have recently held, that a bill of exchange, payable here in gold dollars, drawn since the passage of the legal tender act is recoverable in gold, and that the judgment should be for gold dollars. (Chrysler v. Renois, 4 Hand, 209.) Legal justice is done by a similar judgment in this case.
The court cannot regard the fact, that this coin will purchase much less paper currency now than it would in 1863. If it would purchase much more, the rule would be the same.
There is no reason for varying the judgment in this case, because the action is for what the law terms a tort. There is not the least distinction in principle. In Chrysler v. Renois there was a breach of an express contract payable in gold dollars.
Here, in reality, is a breach of an implied contract, on the part of the innkeeper, to keep the goods of his guest safely.
If it were a plain tort, accompanied with force, the principle is the same.
The recovery should be for what is lost, whether by breach of an implied or an express contract, or by a tort.
Ho sound distinction can be made in the eases. Hence, none is made in the judgment.
I have examined the other points raised at the trial, and do not think the court committed any error in their disposition. •
The judgment is modified so as to make the recovery for the amount of the gold coin lost, with interest thereon to the time of entry of the judgment below, payable in coin, with costs of the court below, payable in currency, without costs of appeal to either party.
Of course the plaintiff is entitled to interest on his judgment, except as to costs payable in coin.