Case Name: William Welden, Appellant, v. Frankfort General Insurance Company, Respondent
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1918-11-18
Citations: 184 A.D. 795
Docket Number: 
Parties: William Welden, Appellant, v. Frankfort General Insurance Company, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 184
Pages: 795–799

Head Matter:
William Welden, Appellant, v. Frankfort General Insurance Company, Respondent.
Third Department,
November 18, 1918.
Negligence — insurance — action against insurance company to enforce alleged settlement for liability for negligent operation of automobile by insured — evidence — erroneous dismissal of complaint.
Where, in an action to enforce an alleged settlement between the plaintiff and the defendant, it appeared that the jury might have found from the evidence that the plaintiff suffered an injury by reason of the negligence of the operator of an automobile who had an accident policy with the defendant; that after the accident the defendant authorized its attorneys to make a settlement and they requested plaintiff not to see a lawyer or bring an action and it was understood between them and the plaintiff, in substance, that he was to be paid a certain sum per week, the gross amount to be fixed when the time of disability could better be determined; that plaintiff accepted said terms, but the operator of the automobile, whose negligence caused the injury, died before the amount to be paid by defendant was determined, and thereupon it refused to pay, it was error to dismiss the complaint at the close of the plaintiff’s case.
H. T. Kellogg and Cochrane, JJ., dissented, with opinion.
Appeal by the plaintiff, William Welden, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the defendant, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Albany on the 8th day of June, 1918, upon a dismissal of the complaint by direction of the court at the close of plaintiff’s case, and also from the order entered on the same day dissmissing the complaint.
Visscher, Whalen & Austin [J. Harris Loucks of counsel], for the appellant.
Ainsworth, Carlisle & Sullivan [John N. Carlisle of counsel], for the respondent.

Opinion:
John M. Kellogg, P. J.:
Upon the evidence a jury might have found that the plaintiff suffered an injury by reason of the negligence of one Burns in the operation of his automobile; that Burns had an accident policy with the defendant company by which it was liable to reimburse him for all sums collected from him on such account not to exceed $5,000; it was to defend all actions brought for damages and to assume the defense thereof with full right of settlement. After the accident the defendant investigated the facts, and became satisfied that Burns was probably hable for the accident. It authorized Ainsworth, Carlisle & Sullivan to settle with the plaintiff for his damages, paying not to exceed $750. Pursuant to said authorization they requested the plaintiff not to see a lawyer, not to bring an action against any one, and that the defendant would settle with him for his damages, and that the time during which the plaintiff would be disabled from carrying on his ordinary work was uncertain, but that it was understood in substance that he was to be paid $50 per week for his actual disability. The gross amount was to be fixed when the time of disability could better be determined. The plaintiff accepted these terms, agreed not to see a lawyer, or to bring an action, and to settle upon the terms indicated. Burns, whose negligence caused the injury, died before the amount to be paid by the defendant was determined, and thereupon the defendant refused to pay, claiming that the death of Burns , terminated the plaintiff's right to recover. The company's representatives had the right to make such settlement. The injuries, however, were not great, and the damages should be limited to the $750, the amount which the representatives were authorized to pay. Such findings would have warranted a recovery. It was error to take the case from the jury. It was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove the authority of the persons claiming to represent the defendant, and unless the authority was conceded the letter authorizing them to act for the defendant could properly be received in evidence, so far as it showed the authority, and if confidential matters were stated outside of the authority to act, they could be omitted from the evidence.
The judgment should, therefore, be reversed.
All concurred, except H. T. Kellogg, J., dissenting with an opinion in which Cochrane, J., concurred.