Case Name: AUTO ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION, d/b/a J.D. Byrider, Inc.; and Auto-Owners Insurance Company, Appellants, v. T.I.G. INSURANCE COMPANY; Sharon Peege; and Wayne Chandler, Appellees
Court: Supreme Court of Kentucky
Jurisdiction: Kentucky
Decision Date: 2002-11-21
Citations: 89 S.W.3d 398
Docket Number: No. 2000-SC-0822-DG
Parties: AUTO ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION, d/b/a J.D. Byrider, Inc.; and Auto-Owners Insurance Company, Appellants, v. T.I.G. INSURANCE COMPANY; Sharon Peege; and Wayne Chandler, Appellees.
Judges: LAMBERT, C.J.; COOPER, GRAVES, STUMBO and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., concur.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Third Series
Volume: 89
Pages: 398–403

Head Matter:
AUTO ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION, d/b/a J.D. Byrider, Inc.; and Auto-Owners Insurance Company, Appellants, v. T.I.G. INSURANCE COMPANY; Sharon Peege; and Wayne Chandler, Appellees.
No. 2000-SC-0822-DG.
Supreme Court of Kentucky.
Nov. 21, 2002.
Guy Colson, Michael E. Liska, Fowler, Measle & Bell, Lexington, Counsel for Appellant, Auto Acceptance Corporation, D/B/A J.D. Byrider, Inc.
Thomas L. Travis, Clark, Ward & Cave, Lexington, Counsel for Appellant, Auto-Owners Insurance Company.
William D. Kirkland, Julie Cobble, J. Bradford Derifield, McBrayer, McGinnis, Leslie & Kirkland, Frankfort, Counsel for Appellee, T.I.G. Insurance Company.
Alan M. Hall, Manty, Hall & Associates, Elizabethtown, Counsel for Appellee, Sharon Peege.
Stephen R. Chappell, Landrum & Shouse, Lexington, Counsel for Appellee, Wayne Chandler.

Opinion:
JOHNSTONE, Justice.
At issue in this case is the identity, for insurance purposes, of the owner of a vehicle involved in an accident. Relying primarily on Nantz v. Lexington Lincoln Mercury Subaru, Ky., 947 S.W.2d 36 (1997), both the trial court and the Court of Appeals determined that the "owner" was the seller of the car, Appellant, J.D. Byrider, Inc. Because of an intervening revision to KRS 186A.220, we disagree and hold that the owner was the purchaser, Appellee, Wayne Chandler.
Facts and Procedural History
On January 21, 1997, Chandler and J.D. Byrider executed both a retail sales contract for the purchase of an Acura Integra automobile and a Kentucky application for title and registration for the Acura. Concurrent with these events, Chandler presented J.D. Byrider with proof of insurance for another vehicle. This insurance policy was maintained with Appellee, the T.I.G. Insurance Company. The insurance policy allowed Chandler to add a vehicle to his T.I.G. coverage within thirty (30) days of becoming the vehicle's owner. J.D. By-rider then gave Chandler actual' possession of the Acura. But J.D. Byrider had yet to receive a certifícate of title from the previous owner of the vehicle. J.D. Byrider received the title to the Acura on January 30, 1997, and, on February 4, 1997, J.D. Byrider presented the documents necessary to transfer title to Chandler to the Hardin County Clerk.
On January 22,1997 — one day after purchasing the vehicle — Chandler was involved in a collision with a vehicle driven by Appellee, Sharon Peege. Some time after Chandler reported the loss to T.I.G., T.I.G. filed a petition for a declaration of rights in the Hardin Circuit Court. In the petition, T.I.G. argued that it had no liability to Peege because Chandler failed to add the Acura to his policy within thirty days as required by Chandler's policy. In the alternative, T.I.G. argued that it had no liability because J.D. Byrider, not Chandler, was the owner of the vehicle for insurance purposes. Both T.I.G. and J.D. Byrider filed motions for summary judgment.
The trial court granted summary judgment to J.D. Byrider on December 10, 1998. In so doing, the trial court found that Chandler was the owner of the vehicle for insurance purposes. But the trial court subsequently reversed itself in response to T.I.G.⅛ motion to vacate or set aside the December 10 order. The trial court specifically found that J.D. Byrider was the owner of the vehicle for insurance purposes at the time of the accident. The trial court vacated the summary judgment entered in favor of J.D. Byrider and entered summary judgment in favor of T.I.G.
J.D. Byrider appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order granting T.I.G. summary judgment on June 30, 2000. We granted discretionary review on July 15, 2001, and heard oral arguments on February 14, 2002. After careful consideration of the briefs and the arguments presented, we reverse the Court of Appeals.
Discussion
At issue in Nantz v. Lexington Lincoln Mercury Subaru was "when title to a motor vehicle passes from a commercial car dealer to a buyer under Kentucky's titling and registration statutes . for the purpose of determining liability insurance coverage." Ky., 947 S.W.2d 36, 37 (1997). In Nantz, the car dealer sold an automobile to one Roger Simpson. Id. Concurrent with the sale, the car dealer supplied Simpson with all the necessary documents, including the title, to transfer the vehicle's title into his name. Id. Simpson failed to file the documents with the county clerk's office, failed to obtain insurance for the vehicle, and was involved in an accident some nine months after the sale of the vehicle. Id.
After reviewing the applicable titling statutes and relevant case law, the Nantz Court concluded that "when the proper legal documents are transferred from the dealer to the buyer, the responsibility for insurance coverage on the part of the deal er ceases." Id. at 38-39, citing Potts v. Draper, Ky., 864 S.W.2d 896 (1993) and Cowles v. Rogers, Ky.App., 762 S.W.2d 414 (1988). Additionally, Nantz states:
Our decision in Potts determined that Kentucky's titling statutes are clear and unambiguous that "the owner of a motor vehicle is the title holder" in the absence of a valid conditional sale.... We further emphasized the public policy of this state, as expressed in KRS 304.39-010(1), to keep uninsured motorists off Kentucky's roads.
Id. at 38.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly determined that, under Nantz, J.D. Byrider was the owner of the Acura for insurance purposes because it retained the title to the vehicle. But apparently both courts failed to take into account the revision made to KRS 186A.220 by the General Assembly in 1994.
The pre-1994 version of KRS 186A.220 applied in Nantz. See id. at 41 (Stumbo, J., dissenting). The 1994 revision changed KRS 186A.220(5) to read:
When he assigns the vehicle to a purchaser for use, he shall deliver the properly assigned certificate of title, and a properly executed vehicle transaction record, to such purchaser, who shall make application for registration and a certificate of title thereon. The dealer may, with the consent of the purchaser, deliver the assigned certificate of title, and the executed vehicle transaction record of a new or used vehicle, directly to the county clerk, and on behalf of the purchaser, make application for registration and a certificate of title. In so doing, the dealer shall require from the purchaser proof of insurance as mandated by KRS 301^.39-080 before delivering possession of the vehicle. Notwithstanding the provisions of KRS 186.020, 186A.065, 186A.095, 186A.215, and 186A.300, if a dealer elects to deliver the title documents to the county clerk and has not received a clear certificate of title from, a prior owner, the dealer shall retain the documents in his possession until the certificate of title is obtained.
(Emphasis added). (Section 5 has been subsequently revised since 1994, but none of the revisions affect the substance of the 1994 revision for the purposes of this case).
Nantz explains in dicta why the additional, above-emphasized language was added to Section 5:
Clearly, the legislature contemplated whether the commercial dealer should have a duty to require titling of the vehicle prior to relinquishing possession of it and has left such a determination to the vehicle dealer.
Nantz, 947 S.W.2d at 39. We read the purpose of the revision correctly in Nantz.
The 1994 revision created an exception to the general statutory scheme that makes the title holder the owner of a vehicle for insurance purposes. But a car dealer can only take advantage of the exception by first verifying that the buyer has a valid and current insurance policy that covers the purchased vehicle. This exception is consistent with the important public policy of keeping uninsured vehicles off Kentucky highways, roads, and streets.
For the reasons stated above, we hold that Chandler was the owner of the vehicle for insurance purposes and, therefore, reverse the Court of Appeals. Further, we remand this case to the trial court with instructions to vacate its order granting T.I.G.⅛ motion to vacate or set aside the December 10 order and to reinstate the summary judgment in J.D. Byrider's favor.
LAMBERT, C.J.; COOPER, GRAVES, STUMBO and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., concur.
KELLER, J., concurs by separate opinion.