Case Name: Adela SNELLENBERGER, a Widow, et al., Petitioner, v. Rosita Hernandez RODRIGUEZ, Respondent
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1988-05-04
Citations: 760 S.W.2d 237
Docket Number: No. C-5616
Parties: Adela SNELLENBERGER, a Widow, et al., Petitioner, v. Rosita Hernandez RODRIGUEZ, Respondent.
Judges: ROBERTSON, J., dissented, joined by RAY and MAUZY, JJ.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 760
Pages: 237–239

Head Matter:
Adela SNELLENBERGER, a Widow, et al., Petitioner, v. Rosita Hernandez RODRIGUEZ, Respondent.
No. C-5616.
Supreme Court of Texas.
May 4, 1988.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 7, 1988.
Robert Trenchard, Jr., Wesch & Trench-ard, Kermit, for petitioner.
Bruce Bangert, Shafer, Davis, McCollum, Ashley, O’Leary & Stoker, P.C., Odessa, for respondent.

Opinion:
OPINION
GONZALEZ, Justice.
This is an appeal in a wrongful death action brought by the heirs of Harold Snel-lenberger against Rosita Hernandez Rodriguez. The trial court granted a summary judgment for Rodriguez. The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. 711 S.W.2d 138. We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
On March 23, 1983, Rodriguez drove her automobile over and critically injured a small child. At the time of the accident, Snellenberger was employed as a police officer by the City of Pecos. When he and another officer were notified of the accident, they immediately proceeded to the scene in their separate patrol cars. Upon arrival, the other officer administered CPR to the child, while officer Snellenberger moved back the crowd of people which had gathered at the scene. Included in the crowd was the grief-stricken mother of the injured child. As officer Snellenberger began controlling the crowd, he suddenly collapsed and later died of a heart attack. His widow and children brought this action relying upon the rescue doctrine.
As a matter of public policy, the rescue doctrine supports the heroic acts of individuals who rush into danger to rescue others from imminent peril. This doctrine came into being before the adoption of comparative negligence in order to relieve the all or nothing effects of contributory negligence. See Wagner v. International Railway Co., 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437 (1921); Kelley v. Alexander, 392 S.W.2d 790 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
The court of appeals held that the rescue doctrine was not raised under the facts of this case because "no perilous situation existed to invite rescue." 711 S.W.2d at 139. Without ruling on whether this was a proper application of the rescue doctrine, we nonetheless affirm the judgment of the court of appeals because we hold, as a matter of law, that Officer Snellenber-ger's heart attack was not a foreseeable result of Rodriguez' negligence.
The rescue doctrine does not dispense with the requirement of foreseeability in negligence causes of action. In establishing the requirement of proximate cause in negligence actions, this court has stated:
[A] mere showing of negligence will not justify holding the one guilty thereof liable for damages. The evidence must go further, and show that such negligence was the proximate, and not the remote, cause of the resulting injuries. In order for it to be said that an injury proximately resulted from an act of negligence, the evidence must justify the conclusion that such injury was the natural and probable result thereof. In order to justify such a conclusion, the evidence must justify a finding that the party committing the negligent act ought to have foreseen the consequences thereof in the light of the attendant circumstances.
Carey v. Pure Distributing Corporation, 124 S.W.2d 847, 849 (Tex.1939).
Proximate cause consists of cause in fact and foreseeability. Both elements must be present. Nixon v. Mr. Property Management, 690 S.W.2d 546, 549 (Tex.1985); Missouri Pacific Railroad v. American Statesman, 552 S.W.2d 99, 103 (Tex.1977); See Keeton, Causation, 28 S.Tex.L.Rev. 231 (1986). "Foreseeability means that the actor, as a person of ordinary intelligence, should have anticipated the dangers that his negligent act created for others." Nixon v. Mr. Property Management, 690 S.W.2d at 549-50.
In Freeman v. City of Pasadena, 744 S.W.2d 923, 924 (Tex.1988) we rejected the notion that the "due care/foreseeability issue [is] totally within the jury's discretion." We held that as a matter of law it is not foreseeable that a step-father who was not at the scene of the accident would suffer emotional harm from the negligent injury to his step-son.
The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed.
ROBERTSON, J., dissented, joined by RAY and MAUZY, JJ.