Case Name: HESKETH v. NEW YORK CENT. & H. R. R. CO.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1899-01-25
Citations: 55 N.Y.S. 898
Docket Number: 
Parties: HESKETH v. NEW YORK CENT. & H. R. R. CO.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 55
Pages: 898–907

Head Matter:
HESKETH v. NEW YORK CENT. & H. R. R. CO.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.
January 25, 1899.)
1. Injuries to Employe—New Devices—Unknown Dangers—Precautions.
An employé injured while using a new device as a result of a danger that was unknown when the device was constructed may recover by reason of the employer’s negligence in failing to take reasonable precautions against unknown dangers, though he used every precaution which he knew was requisite.
2. Same—Evidence.
Defendant railroad company employed a skillful bridge constructor to design and take complete charge of the erection of a new device, consisting of a cabin extending 25 feet above the railroad track, and supported by a bridge-like structure, resting on iron legs imbedded in the ground. While plaintiff was in the cabin, engaged in the train-signal service, the cabin was blown over in a severe storm, which pulled one of the legs from the ground, and twisted the others, and plaintiff was injured. Held a question for the jury whether defendant had taken reasonable precautions against the unknown dangers incident to the use of the device.
Herrick, J., dissenting.
Appeal from trial term, Schenectady county.
Action by Thomas Hesketh against the New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Company. From an order setting aside the verdict, plaintiff appeals.
Reversed on remittitur.
In the year 1892 the defendant established along the line of its road what Is known as the “Block System” of signaling; and for that purpose it erected, or had erected, along its tracks, at intervals of 2y2 miles, iron bridge-like structures, resting upon iron legs or supports, one at each corner, imbedded «a the ground near the tracks, and which structures extended over and across See tracks in the manner of a bridge. On the top of this bridge, and at one end of it, was a cabin built of wood, within which the signal-man- stood, and discharged the duties of his position. The plan of these structures was designed by a construction company known as the Hilton Bridge Company, who were engaged in the business of constructing bridges and viaducts and work of similar character. Its president was a civil engineer, who had been engaged in the duties of his profession about 40 years—engaged in the construction of railroads and the building of bridges. He was an engineer of high repute, and had held the office of state engineer of this state. The plan of these structures was devised by this president of the construction company, and was by him submitted to the chief engineer of the defendant, who suggested that the legs or posts upon which the bridge was supported, at the point where they were inserted in the ground, be surrounded by a wooden box, and that box filled with concrete. With this modification, which was agreed to by the president of the construction company, the plans were accepted, and the contract was thereupon made with the Hilton Bridge Construction Company for the construction and erection of these signal towers or bridges upon the plans prepared by it. The Hilton Bridge Company both constructed and erected all the bridges or signal towers, some 71 in number, taking complete and sole charge both of their construction and erection, the only thing done by the defendant being the selection of inspectors to inspect the quality of the iron used at the establishment from which the Hilton Bridge Company purchased such iron; the wages or salaries of such inspectors being paid, however, by the Hilton Bridge Company. It is unnecessary to give all the details of the construction of these structures. Suffice it to say that at the foot of each leg or post, and attached to it, was a rectangular piece of iron, three-eighths of an inch thick, and about 10 by 12 inches in area, which plate was bolted to a foundation stone, which was to be 18 by 24 inches. Around each leg, extending from the surface of the ground to this foundation stone, was a box 10 by 18 inches, filled with concrete; the distance between each, of the legs, measured along the track, being about 9 feet from outside to outside. The bridge or truss supported upon these legs, and extending over the tracks, was made of angle iron. Upon such bridge was a wooden floor, covering its entire width, at one end being the cabin structure above referred to. The length of the structure was about 57 feet, the top of the bridge 25 feet 6 inches above the railroad tracks, and the top of the cabin 41 feet. All the structures were built upon the same plan. The legs or supports were not stayed in any manner with either wires, cables, or rods. The structure in which the plaintiff was injured was brought to the place where it was erected complete. The foundation stones were attached to the posts or legs, which were lowered into holes, prepared for them in an embankment, three or four feet deep, which embankment was composed of a sandy, gravelly soil. After the legs were lowered into the holes prepared for them, the earth was thrown back, and stamped down. The plans and use of these structures were new. On the 27th day of December, 1895, during a severe windstorm, the tower or bridge where the plaintiff was working was blown down; one of the posts, with the anchor stone and the box filled with concrete, was pulled out of the ground; the other posts were twisted and bent over; and the structure fell to the ground, greatly injuring the plaintiff. The plaintiff brought this action against the defendant, to recover damages for the injuries so received by him. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, and against the defendant, for the sum of $20,000. The defendant “moved on the minutes that the verdict be set aside, and a new trial granted, upon the ground of the exceptions; that the verdict was contrary to law and the evidence, and the damages excessive.” The motion was granted, upon the ground that the damages were excessive. After the entry of the order, the plaintiff applied to the trial justice for a modification thereof, so that the order would read that the order was granted solely on the ground that the damages were excessive, which application was denied; and, from the order setting aside the verdict, the plaintiff appeals to this court.
Argued before PARKER, P. J., and LANDON, HERRICK, and MERWIN, JJ.
Hastings & Schoolcraft and Alonzo P. Strong, for appellant. Samuel W. Jackson, for respondent.

Opinion:
LANDON, J.
Here was a new device,—a small house or cabin erected upon stilts, upon the top of an embankment of considerable height, in the open country, and so rising above the embankment that its bottom was clear above the reach of passing trains. . It was peculiarly exposed to the violence of the winds and storms. It was so constructed that its whole height and substance above the surface of the ground was, when subjected to the pressure of the wind, the long arm of a lever exerting its force to pry up the earth and stone that fixed and bound its shorter arm to and within the ground. This cabin was the post of the plaintiff's duty. Let it be conceded that this erection received, in its design, substance, and manner of construction, the careful consideration of experts in civil engineering and bridge construction, still this was the first of its kind; no experts in this identical class of structures were obtainable. The question is, who should take the risk of its practical test of storm-worthiness? Who should suffer if the breadth of its base was too narrow, the depths to which the supports were sunken into the ground too shallow, the anchorage of stone too light, the consistency or cohesion of the earth into which the supports were placed too sandy or too weak, the precautionary appliances of safety in the form of stays, braces, and lateral supports too few,—the mere laborer, whose knowledge could not attain to the range of any of these problems, and whose means were limited to his daily wages; or the railroad company, whose power compasses the knowledge of past experience, and which is able, in case such experience does not show the exact requirements of safety, to add such a margin of extra safeguards as shall secure it, if not beyond peradventure, at least to the extent of a reasonably cautious apprehension? The answer to this question depends upon the proper answer to be given to the further question: Did the railroad company use reasonable care in making and employing this device? This is to be answered in view of the absence of practical tests of this class of erections, their exposure to the violence of extraordinary storms, the presumed knowledge of' the company of the operation of natural and mechanical forces, its duty to supplement the theoretical needs of safety by a liberal margin of safeguards against mistakes or underestimates, and the danger to which its employés would be exposed if the structure should be overthrown.
Now, it is plain that the tests of care which are applied to the construction of well-known structures, such as houses, scaffolds, bridges, and" the ordinary tools and appliances of our various industries, are not adequate or fitting here, since experience has demonstrated the practicable requirements and limits of reasonable care respecting them. When, for the first time, the employer passes beyond the range of experience, and enters a new field of danger, the extent of the safeguards against which is not exactly known, reasonable care requires that he should provide a reasonable margin of safeguards against this unknown margin of danger. It is not a question whether new devices and experiments, with the view to the attainment of new factors of economy, efficiency, safety, or comfort, are not praiseworthy,—this is conceded,—but whether they who exploit them in the first instance, and place their employés in them as in a safe place to labor, and because of the lack of requisite safeguards thus injure their employés, have exercised reasonable care. This is a question of fact to be resolved upon consideration óf all the facts. The court cannot resolve it. The court cannot say as a matter of law that, when the requisite amount of care was known by the compaúy to be unknown, the company used all that was requisite. It may be that the company used all that it knew to be requisite. But the company knew that it did not know what was actually requisite, and hence it knew that, if it only used all it knew to be requisite, it was liable to fall short in respect to the unknown quantity. Hence it was its duty to do more than its actual knowledge of what was requisite suggested, and to make reasonable provision against the unknown. If it did not do this, it failed in reasonable care. Whether it so failed was a question for the jury. The court cannot assume to know the unknown, and it is for the jury to draw the true inference of fact from the evidential facts, some of which point to one conclusion, and others to another. To say that the jury is unreliable in such cases is to attack the system.
The verdict is very large,-—so large, indeed, as to suggest the idea that it is due in part to the supposed wealth of the defendant, and therefore to that extent excessive. I advise that it be reduced to §15,000, and that the order be: Order affirmed, with costs to abide the event, unless the. plaintiff stipulate within 20 days to reduce the verdict to §15,000, in which case the order is reversed, and the verdict is reduced to §15,000, and judgment for that amount directed thereon, with costs* below, but not of this appeal. All concur, except HEBBIOK, J., dissenting.