Case Name: Damien G. VICTORIAN v. Richard L. STALDER, Secretary, Louisiana Department of Corrections, et al.
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 2000-07-14
Citations: 770 So. 2d 382
Docket Number: No. 99 CA 2260
Parties: Damien G. VICTORIAN v. Richard L. STALDER, Secretary, Louisiana Department of Corrections, et al.
Judges: Before: SHORTESS, C.J., CARTER, FOIL, GONZALES, WHIPPLE, FOGG, PARRO, FITZSIMMONS, KUHN, GUIDRY, WEIMER, PETTIGREW, and CLAIBORNE, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 770
Pages: 382–392

Head Matter:
Damien G. VICTORIAN v. Richard L. STALDER, Secretary, Louisiana Department of Corrections, et al.
No. 99 CA 2260.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
July 14, 2000.
Damien G. Victorian, DeQuincy, Pro Se Plaintiff — Appellant.
William L. Kline, Baton Rouge, for Defendant — Appellee Richard Stalder and Priscilla Pitre.
Before: SHORTESS, C.J., CARTER, FOIL, GONZALES, WHIPPLE, FOGG, PARRO, FITZSIMMONS, KUHN, GUIDRY, WEIMER, PETTIGREW, and CLAIBORNE, JJ.
. Judge Ian W. Claiborne is serving as judge pro tempore by special appointment of the Louisiana Supreme Court.

Opinion:
LFOGG, J.
By this appeal, an inmate challenges a district court judgment dismissing with prejudice his suit for judicial review of an adverse decision of the Department of Public Safety and Corrections (DPSC) on a disciplinary report. For the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 1991, Damien G. Victorian was convicted of distribution of cocaine and remanded to the custody of the DPSC. On September 15, 1995, he was released on parole. He subsequently absconded parole supervision, and a warrant for his arrest was issued. On October 29, 1996, Victorian was apprehended and transported to the Jennings City Jail. On November 6, 1996, he formally waived his right to a final revocation hearing and pleaded guilty to violating the conditions of parole. His parole then was revoked, effective October 29, 1996. On May 5, 1997, while awaiting transfer to a DPSC facility, Victorian escaped from the Jennings City Jail. He was apprehended the following day and transferred to Phelps Correctional Center, where he presently is incarcerated, on June 16,1997.
On June 19, 1997, a disciplinary report was written against Victorian, alleging he violated a disciplinary rule prohibiting escape when he escaped from the Jennings City Jail. At the disciplinary hearing, Victorian pleaded guilty. The Disciplinary Board sentenced him to a custody change from medium to maximum security/working cellbloek and loss of thirty days good time and also referred him to "Special Court." The special court later [ 3modified Victorian's original sentence to "loss of all [good time] earned prior to the escape" pursuant to LSA-R.S. 15:571.4 B(l); this included good time earned by him prior to release on parole in 1995.
Victorian filed a request for administrative remedy, which was denied by the DPSC. Then, on July 22, 1998, he brought this suit, seeking judicial review by the Nineteenth Judicial District Court. The district court subsequently entered judgment adopting the recommendation of the commissioner and dismissing Victorian's suit with prejudice. He now appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In considering the issues raised herein, we discovered a conflict in the law of this circuit with respect to the application of the Corrections Administrative Remedy Procedure (CARP), LSA-R.S. 15:1171 et seq., to prison disciplinary actions. The conflict is reflected in the following jurisprudence.
In the case of Giles v. Cain, 98-0212 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/19/99), 734 So.2d 109, a prisoner was sentenced to a custody change to extended lockdown after being found guilty of constituting a threat to security. In reviewing the case, we applied the CARP stating, "LSA-R.S. 15:1171-1177 provide the statutory authority for the administrative review procedure established and followed by the penal institution . This procedure is designed to receive, hear, and dispose of 'any and all complaints and grievances by adult or juvenile offenders against the state, the governor, the department or any officials or employees thereof . ' and includes appeals of disciplinary actions." Giles, 98-0212, p. 6, 734 So.2d at 113; see also Rochon v. Whitley, 96-0835, pp. 5-6 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/14/97), 691 So.2d 189, 192.
Subsequently, on June 25, 1999, we rendered three opinions that dealt with the issue .of whether or not the CARP applies to appeals of disciplinary actions. In Johnson v. Department of Corrections, 97-1891 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/25/99), 738 So.2d 1165, a prisoner appealed a disciplinary action which consisted of the loss of telephone and canteen privileges. Therein, we determined that LSA-R.S. 49:964 of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), applies to appeals of disciplinary actions stating, "La. R.S. 15:1171(B) specifically states that 'the adult and juvenile offender disciplinary process, promulgated and effective prior to June 30, 1989,' is included as part of the exclusive procedures of the CARP. Therefore, agency and judicial review of disciplinary matters was not changed by the enactment of the CARP and is still performed in accordance with the APA . " Johnson, 97-1891, p. 4, 738 So.2d at 1167. In Hunter v. Stalder, 98-2326 (La. App. 1 Cir 6/25/99), 738 So.2d 1169, a case in which the disciplinary action consisted of the revocation of accrued good time, we again held that the APA, rather than the CARP, provides the proper path of judicial review for prison disciplinary matters. However, in Washington v. Louisiana State Penitentiary, 98-1310 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/25/99), 740 ,So.2d 761, a case in which a prisoner was found guilty of defiance and aggravated disobedience and sentenced to a loss of four weeks of telephone privileges and thirty days of good time, we stated that LSA-R.S. 15:1171-1177 provide the statutory authority for the administrative review procedure designed to hear all complaints and grievances by prisoners, including appeals of disciplinary actions.
Considering this conflict, we overrule Johnson and Hunter because the holdings in those cases are contrary to the express _J¿anguage of LSA-R.S. 15:1171(B), which provides, in its entirety, as follows:
The department or sheriff may also adopt, in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act, administrative remedy procedures for receiving, hearing, and disposing of any and all complaints and grievances by adult or juvenile offenders against the state, the governor, the department or any officials or employees thereof, the contractor operating a private prison facility or any of its employees, shareholders, directors, officers, or agents, or a sheriff, his deputies, or employees, which arise while an offender is within the custody or under the supervision of the department, a contractor operating a private prison facility, or a sheriff. Such complaints and grievances include but are not limited to any and all claims seeking monetary, injunctive, declaratory, or any other form of relief authorized by law and by way of illustration includes actions pertaining to conditions of confinement, personal injuries, medical malpractice, time computations, even though urged as a writ of habeas corpus, or challenges to rules, regulations, policies, or statutes. Such administrative procedures, when promulgated, shall provide the exclusive remedy available to the offender for complaints or grievances governed thereby insofar as federal law allows. All such procedures, including the adult and juvenile offender disciplinary process, promulgated and effective prior to June 30, 1989, shall be deemed to be the exclusive remedy for complaints and grievances to which they apply insofar as federal law allows.
(Emphasis added). The current version of the Disciplinary Rules for Adult Prisoners was adopted by the DPSC, effective February 15, 1993, and published in the Louisiana Register, Vol. 19, No. 5, pp. 648-659. See Rivera v. State, 98-0507 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/28/98), 727 So.2d 609, writ denied, 99-0289 (La.3/26/99), 740 So.2d 617. Therefore, the above statutory language clearly places appeals of such disciplinary actions under the provisions of the CARP. The conclusion in the Johnson and Hunter cases that judicial review of disciplinary matters is still performed in accordance with the APA is erroneous.
Inmates aggrieved by a decision rendered by the DPSC may seek judicial review pursuant to LSA-R.S. 15:1177. The standard of review is set forth in LSA-R.S. 15:1177 A, as amended by Acts 1997, No. 1216, § 1, effective July 15, 1997, as follows:
(9) The court may reverse or modify the decision | fionly if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(a) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions.
(b) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency.
(c) Made upon unlawful procedure.
(d) Affected by other error of law.
(e) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.
(f) Manifestly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record. In the application of the rule, where the agency has the opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses by firsthand observation of demeanor on the witness stand and the reviewing court does not, due regard shall be given to the agency's determination of credibility issues.
ANALYSIS
The statutory authority for forfeiture of diminution of sentence, or loss of good time, is found in LSA-R.S. 15:571.4 which provides, in pertinent part:
B. (1) An inmate who is sentenced to the custody of the Department of Public Safety and Corrections and who commits a simple or aggravated escape from any correctional facility or from the lawful custody of any law enforcement officer or officer of the department may forfeit all good time earned on that portion of his sentence served prior to his escape.
(Emphasis added). In the instant case, Victorian complains that the special court's sentence of loss of all good time earned prior to the escape, which included good time earned prior to his release on parole in 1995, was erroneous. He contends that the underscored language above only authorizes forfeiture of good time earned by him from October 29, 1996, the date of his parole revocation, through May 5, 1997, the date of his escape. After careful consideration, we disagree.
When an inmate commits simple or aggravated escape, LSA-R.S. 15:571.4 B(l) provides for forfeiture of "all good time earned on |7that portion of his sentence served prior to his escape." This loss is not limited to good time earned following a revocation of parole, as Victorian suggests. Rather, it includes all good time earned on a sentence served prior to escape. Therefore, the special court correctly sentenced Victorian to loss of all good time earned prior to the escape under LSA-R.S. 15:571.4 B(l).
Victorian also complains that the special court's sentence constituted imposition of a third penalty, in violation of the Disciplinary Rules for Adult Prisoners, which permit the imposition of only one or two listed penalties for escape, defined as a Schedule B violation. Nevertheless, we find that the special court's sentence of loss of all good time earned prior to escape rendered moot the earlier sentence of loss of thirty days good time. Therefore, the sentence of the special court did not constitute a third penalty.
DECREE
For the foregoing reasons, we expressly overrule the cases of Johnson and Hunter to the extent they conflict with the above analysis. Furthermore, we conclude that the DPSC's decision to deny Victorian administrative relief was neither manifestly erroneous nor arbitrary and capricious. Therefore, the judgment of the district court is affirmed, at appellant's cost.
AFFIRMED.
PARRO and WEIMER, JJ., concur.
PETTIGREW and FITZSIMMONS, JJ., concur in the result only.
GONZALES, J., concurs and assigns additional reasons.
KUHN, J., concurs for the reasons assigned by GONZALES, J.
. The DPSC's Master Record indicates Victorian also was convicted of simple burglary in 1988.
. According to Victorian's petition for judicial review, in August of 1997, he was convicted of simple escape in the Thirty-First Judicial District Court and sentenced to serve one year at hard labor.
. As an inmate suit, this case was assigned to a commissioner to conduct all proceedings and make a recommendation to the appropriate district court judge. This procedure is utilized by the Nineteenth Judicial District Court to accommodate the large volume of lawsuits filed by inmates for judicial review of decisions of the DPSC. Sea LSA-R.S. 13:713.