Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. Arthur J. PACKARD
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1980-10-06
Citations: 389 So. 2d 56
Docket Number: No. 66829
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Arthur J. PACKARD.
Judges: LEMMON, J., concurs and assigns reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 389
Pages: 56–60

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. Arthur J. PACKARD.
No. 66829.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Oct. 6, 1980.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., John Rowley, Dist. Atty., Robert Klees, Glenn E. Diaz, Abbott J. Reeves, Asst. Dist. Attys., for plaintiff-appellee.
Loyola Law School Clinic, William J. O’Hara, III, New Orleans, Supervising Atty., Barbara Stavis, Student Practitioners, John M. Lawrence, New Orleans, for defendant-appellant.

Opinion:
BLANCHE, Justice.
Defendant, Arthur J. Packard, following an adverse ruling on his motion to suppress evidence, pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, La.R.S. 40:966. He reserved his right to appeal pursuant to State v. Crosby, 338 So.2d 584 (La.1976). The trial court sentenced the defendant to serve one year at the Department of Corrections. The defendant now appeals on the basis of one assignment of error; that is, the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence. We find no merit to this assignment and confirm the defendant's conviction and sentence.
On August 7, 1977, two officers from the St. Bernard Parish Sheriff's Office went to the home of Mrs. Katherine Packard, the defendant's mother, with a warrant for her son's arrest. The defendant was not at home; rather, the officers were met at the front door by his mother. The officers expressed to Mrs. Packard their belief that her son had narcotics on the premises and, though they did not have a search warrant, they desired to search his bedroom.
The officers testified that, while talking to Mrs. Packard in the front of the house, defendant's wife, Angel Packard, who shared the bedroom with defendant, was in the room but remained silent. They further testified that when they asked Mrs. Packard if Arthur and Angel were paying rent, she said they were not. At the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress, Mrs. Packard denied this, saying that Arthur and Angel paid $35 per week rent. The trial judge obviously believed the officers rather than the mother, just as the trial court believed the police in State v. Bartley, 329 So.2d 431 (La.1976) over the biased witness who granted consent to search.
After talking with Mrs. Packard, the officers asked her to read and sign a consent form, which she did. They then proceeded with her to the defendant's bedroom, conducted the search, and found thirteen plastic bags of marijuana in the dresser drawer of defendant's bedroom.
Assignment of Error Number 1
The sole issue in this case is whether Mrs. Packard could consent to a search of her son's bedroom.
Unreasonable searches and seizures are prohibited by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and by the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, art. 1, § 5. A search conducted without a warrant is per se unreasonable unless it falls within one of the specifically delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971); State v. Williams, 366 So.2d 1369 (La.1978). One of these exceptions is a search conducted pursuant to consent. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); State v. Morris, 340 So.2d 195 (La.1976).
Mrs. Packard did voluntarily give her consent as required by Schneckloth, supra, to the police officers to search the defendant's room. She signed the search consent form after having been told of its contents, reading it, and having been told that she did not have to comply with the officers' request. Though she testified she was on medication for a back injury, nervous, and afraid the officers would get a search warrant, she noted specifically that no threats or coercion were used to obtain her signature and consent.
Mrs. Packard could voluntarily consent to the search of her son's room. We have previously held that, absent unusual circumstances, a parent possesses at least common authority over the residence occupied by the parent and his child. State v. Wagster, 361 So.2d 849 (La.1978). The defendant's situation is not unusual in this case as several married persons live with their parents, and to have a lock on one's door is a common occurrence. The defendant had to watch television in the common living room, eat in the kitchen, did not have to pay rent and, once separated, continued to live at home in his bedroom. Since no unusual circumstances are presented, the mother could exercise her common authority over the defendant's bedroom. In Wag-ster, supra, this Court found the father's consent to search his 19 year old son's van was permissible. Here, the Court sees just as clearly the mother's right of access to her son's bedroom and thus, his assumption of the risk that she might allow the bedroom to be searched. State v. Cook, 345 So.2d 29 (La.1977).
Mrs. Packard was the co-owner of the house and, arguably, had access to her son's room just as she did to the rooms of the other five children. She could, therefore, consent to the search. State v. Johnson, 319 So.2d 786 (La.1975) and State v. Broussard, 312 So.2d 325 (La.1975). It is not as though she were a distant landlord, Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 81 S.Ct. 776, 5 L.Ed.2d 828 (1961), or a night hotel clerk, Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 84 S.Ct. 889, 11 L.Ed.2d 856 (1964).
Furthermore, the defendant's mother believed she exercised such authority over the room occupied by the defendant, as revealed by her actions. The trial judge felt she had this belief, though she denied it, and it would be erroneous for us to substitute our interpretation when he has judged her credibility and arrived at his conclusion supported by reasonable facts.
An additional factor to consider is the role of Angel Packard in this scenario. She was present when the police arrived, present when her mother-in-law signed the form, and present while the room was searched. Since she lived in the room with the defendant, she obviously had the mutual use of the property. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1942). Agreeably, her silence alone cannot be seen as a voluntary consent on her part to have the room searched. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948); State v. Fontenot, 383 So.2d 365 (La.1980). However, her silence in front of the police officers and her mother-in-law certainly would reaffirm the defendant's mother's belief that she could grant the consent and the similar belief of the police officers.
Viewing the totality of the circumstances to see if a third party (the mother) could consent to the search convinces us that this consent was properly given and could have been given. Here, Mrs. Packard believed she had the power to consent as she indeed did; the police believed she was the proper person to consent as she co-owns the house and no rent was being paid; and the defendant's wife, who shared the bedroom with him, idly watched as her mother-in-law consented and the police searched her bedroom. These factors reveal that the mother did have the authority to consent to the search and that it was properly conducted.
The defendant's assignment of error is without merit and his conviction and sentence are affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
LEMMON, J., concurs and assigns reasons.
CALOGERO, J., dissents.
DENNIS, J., dissents with reasons.
DIXON, C. J., dissents for reasons given by DENNIS, J.