Case Name: Kenneth Wayne FIRST, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1992-12-16
Citations: 846 S.W.2d 836
Docket Number: No. 69832
Parties: Kenneth Wayne FIRST, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
Judges: WHITE and OVERSTREET, JJ., join this concurring opinion.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 846
Pages: 836–847

Head Matter:
Kenneth Wayne FIRST, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
No. 69832.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, En Banc.
Dec. 16, 1992.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 10, 1993.
Richard L. Wardroup (court-appointed), Lubbock, for appellant.
Travis S. Ware, Dist. Atty., Lubbock, Robert Huttash, State’s Atty., Austin, for State.

Opinion:
OPINION
BAIRD, Judge.
Appellant was convicted of capital murder. Tex.Penal Code Ann. § 19.03(a)(6)(A). The jury affirmatively answered the three issues submitted pursuant to Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 37.071(b) and appellant was sentenced to death. Tex.Code Crim. Proc.Ann. art. 37.071(e). Appeal to this Court is automatic. Tex.Code Crim.Proc. Ann. art. 37.071(h). Appellant raises thirteen points of error. We will reverse.
I.
The facts of this case are not in dispute. On May 30, 1986, the complainants, Luke Davis and Kimberly Holley, spent several hours at a Lubbock tavern. Later in the evening, appellant and Pierce Horton arrived at the tavern and began playing pool with Davis and Holley.' At approximately 1:00 a.m. appellant, Horton, Davis, and Holley left the bar together. While in the parking lot, Davis and Holley assaulted appellant and Horton. Davis overpowered appellant and repeatedly slammed appellant's head into the sidewalk and into the bumper of a parked automobile. Testimony as to the number of times appellant's head hit the car and sidewalk differed, but various witnesses agreed that Davis was in control of the fight. During the fight, Holley produced a knife and held Horton at bay by threatening to "cut [Horton's] goddamned guts out" if Horton attempted to assist appellant. Upon learning of the fight, the bar's doorman went outside and told the four to leave. When the fight between appellant and Davis ended, appellant retrieved a revolver from Horton's automobile. Appellant fired at and hit a passing vehicle. Davis and Holley attempted to escape in Holley's car. Appellant fatally shot Davis as Davis sat in the passenger seat of the car. Holley, standing on the driver's side, turned and attempted to flee. Appellant fired a fatal shot into the back of Holley. Moments later, police officers arrested Horton and appellant.
II.
In points of error one and two, appellant contends the capital sentencing scheme provided by Tex.Code Crim.Proc. Ann. art. 37.071 as applied to him is unconstitutional. Specifically, appellant contends that the interaction between Tex.Penal Code Ann. § 19.03(a)(6)(A) and Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 37.071(f) deprived the jury of a vehicle, namely the issue provided by Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 37.-071(b)(3), to give effect to the provocation on the part of Davis. For the following reasons, we sustain appellant's points of error one and two.
Appellant's indictment alleged the offense of capital murder, pursuant to § 19.-03(a)(6)(A), as follows:
. KENNETH WAYNE FIRST hereafter styled the Defendant, heretofore on or about the 30TH DAY OF MAY, 1986, did then and there intentionally and knowingly murder more than one person during the same criminal transaction, to-wit: the said KENNETH WAYNE FIRST did then and there intentionally and knowingly cause the death of an individual, Kimberly Sue Holley, by shooting the said Kimberly Sue Holley with a handgun, and the said KENNETH WAYNE FIRST did then and there intentionally and knowingly cause the death of an individual, J. Luke Davis, by shooting the said J. Luke Davis with a handgun[.]
Art. 37.071(f) provides:
If a defendant is convicted of an offense under section 19.03(a)(6), Penal Code, the court shall submit the three issues under Subsection (b) of this article only with regard to the conduct of the defendant in murdering the deceased individual first named in the indictment.
Prior to its submission to the jury, appellant objected to the proposed third issue as follows:
Your honor, we would like to also make the alternative objection that, and we are doing this for purposes of the record, that the statute as presented in article 37.07(1)(F) [sic] is unconstitutional on its face as applied to a capital murder conviction with multiple victims, in that it does not require the jury to make a specific determination as to each victim for each special issue. In that regard we would submit that the special issues should be presented in an alternate form.
We submit, that [the third punishment issue] should be submitted to the jury as, "Do you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the conduct of the defendant in killing Kimberly Sue Holley was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by Kimberly Sue Holley." And then the answer forms. And then special issue 3-B, "Do you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the conduct of the defendant in killing J. Luke Davis was unreasonable in response to provocation, if any, by J. Luke Davis?
We feel that based on facts of this particular case and as applied to this individual defendant, that that's the only logical and constitutional way to present these special issues in a case of this magnitude. We would object to the form of the charge in that the special issues are not presented in a constitutional manner.
Prior to overruling appellant's requested issue the following exchange occurred:
[THE COURT] . With regard to the denial — or the issue of the statute itself being unconstitutional, the Court will overrule the objection with regard to the constitutionality of the statute.
The Court over the evening had some time to deliberate and think about this particular statute and although I do not agree with the fact that it should be submitted only as to the individual first named or the deceased individual first named in the indictment, [but,] after doing a little bit of wresting with my own conscience with regard to the thing, that's the way the law says to present it. And although I do not agree that is the manner in which it ought to the [sic, be] submitted, based on the facts of this particular case, after some deliberation and the oath that I took when I took this office, I think I'm going to follow what the law is. I don't agree with it but I will follow what it is.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL] . Also, this abridges his [appellant's] rights in that it would function as a cruel and unusual punishment under the 8th Amendment to the United States Constitution, in that a full, fair determination under the law is not allowed as the special issues are to be presented, and this would function to favor the imposition of the death penalty, and therefore function as a cruel and unusual punishment to this defendant.
[THE COURT] The Court will overrule the objections to the act on its constitutional grounds.
The Court will rule that the act is constitutional and will allow the submission under the law as required in 37.-071(f), as regards special issue number one and special issue number three.
Accordingly, the punishment charge followed art. 37.071(f) and applied only the first named deceased in the indictment, Holley, to the third issue:
Do you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the conduct of the defendant in killing Kimberly Sue Holley was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by Kimberly Sue Holley?
Resolution of appellant's points of error one and two depends upon the relevant capital murder jurisprudence from the United States Supreme Court. The Texas capital sentencing scheme, provided by art. 37.071, passed constitutional muster in Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976). In Jurek, the constitutionality of art. 37.071 "turned on whether the enumerated questions allow[ed] consideration of particularized mitigating factors." Jurek, 428 U.S. at 272, 96 S.Ct. at 2956. Art. 37.071 withstood Jurek's constitutional challenge because of this Court's assurance that the special issues would be interpreted broadly enough to enable sentencing juries to consider all of the mitigating evidence. Id., 428 U.S. at 272-273, 96 S.Ct. at 2956-2957. Mitigating evidence is "any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any circumstances of the offense" that may serve as a basis for a sentence less than death. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2964-65, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110, 102 S.Ct. 869, 874, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982).
Under Lockett, "[t]o meet constitutional requirements, a death penalty statute must not preclude consideration of relevant mitigating factors." Lockett, 438 U.S. at 608, 98 S.Ct. at 2967.
In Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 185, 108 S.Ct. 2320, 2333, 101 L.Ed.2d 155 (1988), Justice O'Connor, in a concurring opinion, recognized that the right to have the sentencer consider and weigh the mitigating evidence would be "meaningless" unless the sentencer was also permitted to give effect to that evidence. However, Justice O'Connor concluded the jury was able to give effect to Franklin's mitigating evidence through the issues submitted pursuant to art. 37.071(b). Id.
The following term, Justice O'Connor spoke for a majority of the Court in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989), where the constitutionality of the Texas capital sentencing scheme was again challenged. Penry contended that art. 37.071 was unconstitutional as applied because the jury was not provided with a vehicle to give effect to the mitigating evidence of Penry's mental retardation and disadvantaged background. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed Penry's conviction.
After a discussion of Jurek and the subsequent death penalty jurisprudence, Justice O'Connor concluded:
Thus, at the time Penry's conviction became final [1986] it was clear from Lockett and Eddings that a State could not, consistent with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, prevent the sen-teneer from considering and giving effect to evidence relevant to the defendant's background or character or to the circumstances of the offense that mitigates against imposing the death penalty.
Penry, 492 U.S. at 318, 109 S.Ct. at 2946.
Therefore, in order for the Texas capital sentencing scheme to pass constitutional muster, the jury must not only be able to consider mitigating evidence, including the defendant's character, record or circumstances of the offense, but the jury must also be provided with a vehicle to give effect to that mitigating evidence. If the mitigating evidence is of such a nature that the jury can give effect to it through the issues submitted pursuant to art. 37.071(b) no additional vehicle is required and the Texas capital sentencing scheme is constitutional. See, Franklin. However, if the mitigating evidence falls beyond the scope of the issues, the Texas capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional unless the jury is provided with a vehicle to give effect to that evidence. See, Penry.
Clearly, provocation on the part of the deceased is a circumstance of the offense which the jury must be able to consider and give effect to before .the sentence of death may be imposed. See, Lockett, Eddings and Penry. By providing the third issue, in cases where it is raised by the evidence, the Texas Legislature recognized that provocation on the part of the deceased is a mitigating circumstance. In the instant case, the jury's consideration of provocation was limited to the provocation of Holley. Therefore, art. 37.071(f) imper-missibly precluded the jury's consideration of the mitigating evidence as it related to the provocation of Davis. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 608, 98 S.Ct. at 2967.
The trial judge, without the guidance of Penry, chose to follow the express language of art. 37.071(f). Penry constituted a dramatic change in Texas death penalty jurisprudence. In fact, we have determined that the holding in Penry represents a right not previously recognized by this Court. Black v. State, 816 S.W.2d 350 (Tex.Cr.App.1991) (Campbell, J., joined by McCormick, P.J., Clinton, Overstreet, Malo-ney and Benavides, JJ., concurring). Indeed, the Penry decision has been deemed so novel that a capital defendant need not have objected to the punishment charge at the time of his trial and, even if lodged, the objection need not comport with the point raised on appeal. Mooney v. State, 817 S.W.2d 693, 705 (Tex.Cr.App.1991).
Under these novel circumstances we cannot criticize the trial judge's decision to follow the statute which precluded the jury's consideration of the provocation of Davis. Based upon his comments when overruling appellant's requested instruction, it is clear the trial judge would have provided the jury with a vehicle to give effect to the mitigating evidence of provocation on the part of Davis had the trial judge had the benefit of Penry.
The State contends the punishment charge provided an adequate vehicle for the jury to give effect to appellant's mitigating evidence. For the following reasons, we reject the State's argument. The punishment charge stated:
You are instructed that the law recognizes the existence of certain facts or circumstances which, though not justifying or excusing the offense, may properly be considered by you as extenuating or reducing the degree of moral culpability of the defendant, so that it may be appropriate to reduce, diminish, or lessen the punishment to be imposed because of such mitigating circumstances. Such mitigating circumstances give you, as jurors, the option to recommend against the penalty of death by the answer that you make to the special issue on this matter.
Under our law, you cannot be precluded from considering as a mitigating factor any aspect of a defendant's character or record or background that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.
In this case, the defendant, KENNETH WAYNE FIRST, has proffered the following matters as evidence of mitigating facts or circumstances: (1) voluntary intoxication at the time of the offense, (2) sexual molestation of the defendant as a child, (3) lack of education, (4) the youthful age of the defendant.
In Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 394, 107 S.Ct. 1821, 1822, 95 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987), the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a Florida statute that limited the jury's consideration of the defendant's mitigating evidence to a list of approved circumstances. Id. at 396, 107 S.Ct. at 1823. The Supreme Court vacated the death sentence because the Statute violated the Eighth Amendment requirement that the sentencer may not refuse to consider or be precluded from considering any relevant mitigating evidence. See, Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 1671, 90 L.Ed.2d 1, Eddings, supra, and Lockett, supra. It is clear, from Lock-ett and Hitchcock, that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments are violated when the jury's consideration is limited to an inclusive list of mitigating circumstances. In the instant case, the mitigating circumstances were limited by both the trial judge and by art. 37.071(f). As the Supreme Court concluded in Lockett,
. the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, [footnote omitted] not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death. [Emphasis in original.]
Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605, 98 S.Ct. at 2965. As we said in Matson v. State, 819 S.W.2d 839, 851 (Tex.Cr.App.1991), "for the Texas death penalty statutes to meet constitution al muster, the sentencing authority in a capital case must be allowed to consider and give effect to all relevant mitigating evidence." Clearly, the inclusive list of mitigating circumstances did not provide a vehicle for the jury to give effect to the provocation of Davis.
We believe the punishment charge, in the instant case, by not providing a vehicle to specifically consider and give effect to the provocation of Davis, effectively precluded the jury from considering that mitigating circumstance. We hold that without such a vehicle the Texas capital sentencing scheme violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Therefore, the Texas capital sentencing scheme operated in an unconstitutional manner as applied to appellant. Accordingly, we sustain appellant's points of error one and two.
III.
In Point of Error Eight, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's affirmative answer to the second issue. Although we have determined that appellant is entitled to relief, because the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged we must also address this point of error. Lane v. State, 743 S.W.2d 617, 629 (Tex.Cr.App.1987); Selman v. State, 663 S.W.2d 838 (Tex.Cr.App.1984). The second issue, submitted in the court's charge on punishment pursuant to Tex. Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 37.071(b)(2), stated:
Is there a probability that the defendant, KENNETH WAYNE FIRST, would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society?
To assess the sufficiency of the evidence, we must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant would constitute a continuing threat to society. Keeton v. State, 724 S.W.2d 58, 61 (Tex.Cr.App.1987). The jury may consider evidence introduced at both the guilt/innocence and the punishment phases of the trial when determining future dangerousness. Mitchell v. State, 650 S.W.2d 801, 802 (Tex.Cr.App.1983). Evidence of appellant's reputation is also admissible and relevant at punishment. Rougeau v. State, 738 S.W.2d 651, 668 (Tex.Cr.App.1987).
In some cases, the circumstances of the offense alone can sustain an affirmative answer to the second issue. See, Willis v. State, 785 S.W.2d 378, 386 (Tex.Cr.App.1989), and cases cited therein. However, such a determination is not a declaration that every heinous crime automatically abrogates the need for a jury to wrestle with the second issue. See, Ellason v. State, 815 S.W.2d 656, 660 (Tex.Cr.App.1991) (and cases cited therein). Likewise, every offense under section 19.03(a)(6)(A) does not automatically warrant a sentence of death.
In the instant case, appellant shot and killed two unarmed people: Davis was shot while seated in the passenger seat of an automobile and Holley was shot in the back as she fled on foot. During the same spree, appellant shot at a passing automobile with two occupants. The bullet broke the passenger side window and lodged in the dashboard. The record reflects that appellant had a prior conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon in 1980 and was sentenced to seven years' confinement. Additionally, appellant engaged in a jail fight while awaiting trial in the instant ease. Three policemen who knew appellant's reputation for being peaceful and law-abiding in their community testified that appellant's reputation was bad. Finally, James Grigson, a forensic psychiatrist, testified that appellant constituted a continuing threat to society.
We find the evidence sufficient to sustain an affirmative response to the second issue. Appellant's point of error eight is overruled.
IV.
The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court.
.Appellant's brief contains a "Statement of Facts" which is documented with specific references to the appellate record. The State's brief also contains a "Statement of Facts" which states, "[t]he Appellant states the essential facts of the case as they developed at trial."
. It is the author's policy not to refer to complainants by name. However, because of the factual circumstances of this case, that policy cannot be followed.
. One witness testified that Davis struck appellant's head into the sidewalk "at least fifteen times" and against the car bumper "three or four times."
. Specifically, appellant's points of error state:
Point of Error One
Article 37.071 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure is unconstitutional as applied to appellant in that it does not require the sen-tencer to give independent weight to evidence of provocation on the part of both deceased.
Point of Error Two
The trial court erred in its charge to the jury on punishment in that the jury was only allowed to consider evidence of provocation with the respect to one of the deceased.
. The remaining allegations in appellant's indictment state:
II.
AND further the said KENNETH WAYNE FIRST on or about the 30TH DAY OF MAY, 1986 in Lubbock County and State of Texas, did then and there intentionally and knowingly cause the death of an individual, Kimberly Sue Holley, by shooting the said Kimberly Sue Holley with a handgun;
III.
AND further the said KENNETH WAYNE FIRST on or about the 30TH DAY OF MAY, 1986 in Lubbock County and State of Texas, did then and there intentionally and knowingly cause the death of an individual, J. Luke Davis, by shooting the said J. Luke Davis with a handgun; and it is further presented in and to said court, that prior to the commission of the aforesaid offense by the said KENNETH WAYNE FIRST, on the 20th day of June, 1980, in the 104th District Court of Taylor County, Texas, in cause number 6406-B, the said KENNETH WAYNE FIRST was convicted of a felony, to-wit: Aggravated Assault, and said conviction became final prior to the commission of the aforesaid offense....
.All emphasis herein is supplied by the author unless otherwise indicated.
. In Lockett the Supreme Court held:
. [A] statute that prevents the sentencer . from giving independent mitigating weight to . circumstances of the offense proffered in mitigation creates the risk that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty. When the choice is between life and death, that risk is unacceptable and incompatible with the commands of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605, 98 S.Ct. at 2965.
. Appellant requested the issue relating to the provocation of Davis on February 27, 1987; however, Penry was not decided until June 26, 1989.
. We pause to note the trial judge did not have benefit of Hitchcock, which was decided two months after appellant's trial.
. In his Eighth Point of Error, appellant claimed:
The State produced insufficient evidence to prove that there is a substantial probability
appellant will commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society.