Case Name: MILLIKEN v. DOTSON
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1907-02-15
Citations: 102 N.Y.S. 564
Docket Number: 
Parties: MILLIKEN v. DOTSON.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 102
Pages: 564–569

Head Matter:
(117 App. Div. 527)
MILLIKEN v. DOTSON.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
February 15, 1907.)
1. Appeal-Record—Evidence—Supplying Defect in Proof.
Where, on appeal by defendant in an action on a foreign judgment, it Is urged that the judgment record was not authenticated, as required by the statute, the defect may be remedied by the presentation on appeal of a duly authenticated record.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 3, Appeal and Error, 5 2964.]
2. Evidence—Judicial Notice—Statutes.
Const. U. S. art. 1, § 8, subd. 17, gives Congress power to exercise exclusive legislation in all eases over such district as may, by cession and acceptance, become the seat of government. Act Cong. March 3, 1863, c. 91, 12 Stat. 762, relates to the establishment of a judicial system for the District of Columbia, and organizes the courts of that district. Held that, in an action on a judgment rendered in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, the courts of New York will take judicial notice of the fact that the District of Columbia is the seat of government, and of the act of March 3, 1863.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent Dig. vol. 20, Evidence, §§ 54^56.]
Appeal from Trial Term.
Action by William A. Milliken against Napoleon B. Dotson. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, from an order denying a motion for a new trial, defendant appeals. Affirmed.
Argued before PATTERSON, P. J„ and McEAUGHRIN, HOUGHTON, SCOTT, and LAMBERT, JJ.
R. Burnham Moffat, for appellant.
Francis I. Osborne, for respondent.

Opinion:
PATTERSON, P. J.
On the 10th of November, 1905, this plaintiff recovered a judgment against the defendant herein in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, and, such judgment remaining wholly unpaid, this action was brought upon it in the month of March, 1906. On the trial of the present action a document purporting to be a duly authenticated copy of the record of the judgment of the Supreme 'ourt of the District of Columbia was offered in evidence, over the objection and exception of the defendant. It was also contended at the trial that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia to render the judgment upon which this action is based was not established. The trial justice directed a verdict for the plaintiff, and from the judgment entered thereon, and from an order denying a motion for a new trial, the defendant appeals.
The only reasons urged upon this appeal for a reversal of the judgment are those presented to and considered by the court below, and which have been hereinabove referred, to. That the judgment record was not authenticated in the manner required by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to the authentication of records to be read in evidence on the trial of actions in the state of New York was conceded on the argument; but the defect pointed out was remedied, and a duly authenticated record was presented on the argument of the appeal. That an appellate court may allow the production of such a record in support of a judgment is well understood. Dunham v. Townshend, 118 N. Y. 281, 23 N. E. 367. Indeed, that is not controverted by the learned counsel for the appellant here.-
The only remaining matter for consideration is the objection raised to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. On the trial the plaintiff appears to have read in evidence certain portions of the act of the Congress of the United States (Act March 3, 1863, c. 91, 12 Stat. 762), entitled "An act to reorganize the courts of the District of Columbia and for other purposes." It is claimed that this statute was not properly proven. This act of the Congress is one of which courts will take judicial notice. It is a public act. It re'ates to the establishment of a judicial system for the District of Columbia. It organizes the courts of that district, and the authority of the Congress of the United States to pass it is conferred by the Constitution of the United States, which provides in subdivision 17, § 8, art. 1, that the Congress shall have power "to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular states, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of government of the United States." The court will take judicial notice that the District of Columbia is the seat of government of the United States, made so in pursuance of the provision of the Constitution cited. Congress has exclusive authority to legislate in all matters relating to that district; and the Constitution and the acts of the Congress passed in pursuance thereof, and treaties made under the authority of the United States, are the supreme law of the land. The act of Congress of 1863, organizing and establishing the courts of the District of Columbia, is a public act, for the reason that the judicial system of the District of Columbia is part of the organization of the government of that district. The Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, by the first section of the act of 1863, has general jurisdiction in law and equity. An act of the Congress establishing such a court, to which all persons may resort who have causes arising or cognizable within the territory of that jurisdiction, is as much a public act as is any statute constituting a department of "government. That the jurisdiction may be exercised locally does not detract from the public character of the law establishing the court. We think this statute is one of which the court will take judicial notice.
The judgment and order appealed from should be affirmed, without costs.
HOUGHTON and SCOTT, JJ., concur.