Case Name: Estes v. The State
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1853
Citations: 10 Tex. 300
Docket Number: 
Parties: Estes v. The State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 10
Pages: 150–155

Head Matter:
Estes v. The State.
The statute (Hart. Dig.; art., 567) against betting at a gaming table or bank declares what shall be a. sufficient description of the offense in the indictment. But it does not prescribe a form which must invariably be pursued. Its intention obviously was to furnish the pleader with a description which in point of certainty should be sufficient, but not lo prescribe a form which he must follow. It furnishes one but not the only test of the sufficiency of the indictment. It is not necessary therefox*© that the indictment should describe tlie gaming table or bank by the proper name if known, or as a gaming table or bank the name of which is unknown.
Where the charge in the indictment was that the defendant “bet money at a certain gaming “table, at rondo, which said gaming table was then and there kept by one Andrew J. ■ “Smith, contrary to the form of the statute,” &c.: Held. That the indictment was sufficient. (Note 50.)
We do not understand that it is literally the table or structure, whatever that may be, on which the game is played which gives it the character and designation of a gaming table, but it is rather from the character of the playing or the game which is played that it receives its specific designation. If it be a billiard table which is used, the name and description of the game played is material only that it may appear that it is not the game which is protected by the license, or that it is of tlie description or species of gaming prohibited by the statute.
The statute (Hart. Dig., arts. 505, 5G0, 567) prohibits not only the gaming tables and banks named but others not named, and even those without any known name or designation.
It has often been remarked by this and other courts that laws enacted for the punishment of mere misdemeanors have never been subjected to tlie same strictness of construction as more highly penal statutes.
Appeal from Rusk. The appellant was convicted upon an indictment in which the charge was that he “did bet money at a certain gaming’ table, at “rondo, which said gaming- table was then and there kept by one Andrew J. “Smith, contrary to tire form of the statute,” &c.
The defendant moved the court to quash the indictment, which motion the court overruled. It was in proof that tlie defendant bet at a game called.rondo, played upon a billiard table. The game was also known and sometimes called by a different name. The evidence described the game particularly. It was a game on which money was bet. It was generally played upon á billiard table; but it was not the game of billiards but another and different game. The court charged the jury that if rondo was a gaming bank or table, essentially different in its principles from billiards, it was inhibited by the statute, and that the use of a billiard table in playihg' it would no more make it ■lawful than would the use of such a table sanction faro, which might be dealt upon it; and that if the betting in this case was at rondo, it was indictable; if at billiards, it was not. There was a verdict of guilty; a motion for a new trial overruled; and the defendant appealed.
S. Q. Shaw and W. Steelman, for appellant.
I. It is deemed unnecessary to reply upon the certainty required at common law in all indictments, or to recur to the reasons for (hat "requirement, as it is apprehended that the indictment here is fatally defective under the express provisions of the statutes of tills State. The act of 1848, section 71 (Ilart. Dig'., art. 1478) is the same in sub-tanee (and very nearly in language) as that of 1840, (Hart. Dig., art. 14G8,) and both provide “that it shall be sufficient for Hie indictment to charge that “tlie person or persons betting upon or concerned in betting upon such gam“ing table, or bank, describing the gaming table or bank by the proper name “if "known, or describing it as a gaming table or bank the name of which is “unknown.” Much greater certainty than these statutes require would have been absolutely indispensable at common law; and it is submitted that no indictment can be sustained which omits any of those charges, the object of them being to notify the person charged of the specific offense which lie is required to answer. Mow in this case the table upon which the appellant bet is not described by “the proper name,” nor as a table “the name of which is “unknown;” but the charge is, that “he bet at a certain gaming table at “rondo,” which may mean that he bet at a game called rondo, at some gaming table or other of a name different from that of the game or of no ímine at all, or that lie bet at a certain gaming table at a place or liouse called rondo. The evidence shows that there are several games peculiar to billiard tables, of which rondo is one ; and it is supposed that the naming of the game at which the betting took place will not, from its connection with the table, supply Hie want of a description of the table, especially as the statute does not require the game to be described, but only the table upon which the game was played. Suppose, for instance, that the charge had been that “ the defendant "‘‘did bet at a gaming table, named and called a billiard table:” evidence that he bet at the game of rondo on the table charged would have been admissible, because that is a game properly belonging to billiard tables, and a description of the table is sufficient under the statute.
H. The only gaming tables or banks the exhibiting or keeping of which is by name prohibited by the statute are A B C, E D, roulette, rowley powley, rouge ot noir, faro-bank, and monte-bank. (Vide Hart. Dig., art. 1470.) The 70tii section of the act of 1848 (Ilart. Dig., art. 1477) makes it indictable for any person to bet “ at any of the tables or banks mentioned in the preceding section, or at any other gambling' device whatever. The evidence shows that there is no such thing known as a rondo bank or table; aud, as billiard tables are not included in the act, t-he indictment cannot, be sustained unless the offense charged is included in the words “ any other gambling device whatever.” In the case of Crown. The State (6 Tex. It., 334) this court has strongly intimated that, those words are too vague, uncertain, and indefinite to sustain an indictment for any offense. Mow it is admitted that if this game of rondo was a mere device, trick, or stratagem, invented to elude the penalty denounced against gaming it would be otherwise; but when it is considered that it is a game belonging to billiard tables as much as the game of billiards properly so called, that it is well known and of long standing, it is thought that the reasoning of this court in the case of Crow v. The State, supra, is particularly applicable to this ease, viz: “That it is not a reasonable presumption “that names of games so well known for centuries without haying undergone “a change of names should have been intended to be included in the vague-“expression of ‘gambling- device;’” aud that, “if a liberal interpretation is “allowed to them, it would seem most likely that they were intended to have “reference to such device as changing the name of the table or bank without “ any essential change in the game to be played.”
III. The billiard table upon which the appellant bet at the game of rondo-was, as the evidence shows, a regularly licensed table. The game of rondo is properly playable upon such table and no other, aud there is no such tiling as-a rondo table; and the court in the case of Crow, above cited, says “that as “ billiard tables and ten-pin alleys are licensed on the payment of a tax, when, “no others are so taxed or licensed, an indictment cannot be sustained for bet* “ting at a game on cither of those tables.”
XV. The court below charged the jury that unless they believed that the game of rondo was in fact a game of billiards, it was as much inhibited by the statute as if a billiard table liad been used in dealing and betting at faro. ' The case put by the learned" judge is strictly within the reasoning of the court in Crow’s ease, and a “ device of that kind would be so transparent that it would require neither construction or authority to make it appear.”
Attorney General, for appellee.
I. The question presented and the grounds relied upon for a reversal in this case have been mainly decided upon and put at rest by the opinion of this court in the case of Randolph v. The State, (Galveston, 1853.) which announces the proposition that the exhibiting of or betting on the game called rondo is indictable. The court is also referred to my brief in Hie case of The State v. Prewitt, argued at this term, where the question is discussed as to the iudictability of betting on rondo as a “gaming “table.” The new ground-requiring an answer iii this case is the assumption that article 507 of the Digest'reqnires that an indictment for betting on a gaming table should state the name of the table if known, &e.
This is an erroneous construction of the section in question. It was designed by its obvious tenor to help the indictor; aiid so far from requiring particularity in the description of the offense beyond what the common law would exact, it is intended to dispense with the rigor of that system in indicting. It does not prescribe that tiie name of the table or bank shall be stated if known, but only places this among the few particulars which it declares it will be sufficient to slate. It is beyond question that the criminal pleader has still liis election to avail himself of the benefit of this helping section in describing the table or bank in question, or to describe it with the asnal aud requisite, certainty in any other maimer, or by stating other particulars equally definite and descriptive; aud that which was intended to allow of less particularity than the common law prescribes cau never be. properly so construed as to exact more at his hands. Tested by the common-law requisites in regard to certainty in the description of the offense, is this indictment amenable to the objection now urged against it? This court has often given its sanction to the well-established doctrine that in general it is sufficient in an indictment for a statutory offense to follow the words of the statute in describing the, offense;. but, at the same time, it is not necessary to do so, for any equivalent language will attain the same object and is equally allowable. The law of (his offense (art. 560) would, nuder these rules, be satisfied by charging that the defendant “did bet at a cerhuu gaming table,” with the. addition ÓE such circunWanees as would distinguish and point out the particular kind of game or table bet at, which is done by the, addition of the words “at rondo, which said gaming table “was then aud there kept by Andrew J. Smith,” which accomplishes the sole object of certainty in the matter under consideration, that of apprising the defendant of what he is called upon to auswer, as well as any other words in our language of reasonable length could effect it. He is charged with "betting at “rondo” on a certain gaming table kept, &c. As we have argued in tlie'ease o£ The State v. Prewitt, nothing more than this ought to be required" on demurrer, or can be stated in an indictment without doing more than is ever required of any pleader stating tlie evidence upon which alone depends the question of whether or not the table is of the class the exhibiting or betting on which is prohibited by the statute. Indeed, I am well satisfied, from the comprehensive and all-embracing character of the language of the 565th (the basis)*. article, that it would be sufficient to charge the betting on “a certain gaming “table, then and there exhibited, contrary to the form of the statute,” &c., wit limit slating the name or any other particulars, and let the evidence show, whether or not the game or contrivance was of a nature to come within the inhibition of the statute.
II. As to tlie assignment in regard to the charge of the court the district judge 1ms been sustained in every particular in tlie opinion of this court in the case above referred to.
TIL The last error assigned is easily disposed of. The evidence, especially of J. II. .Yeburs, abundantly supports the verdict as to the character of the table, and tlie testimony of Clark proves the betting, the when, where, &e. There is positively no conflicting testimony.

Opinion:
Wheeler, J.
It is objected to the sufficiency of tlie indictment that it does not desorille the gaming table on which it is averred the defendant bet by its proper name, nor as a gaming table tlie name of which is unknown.
The Matute, article 5G7 of the Digest, declares what shall be a sufficient description of (lie offense in the indictment; but it does not prescribe a form which must invariably be pursued. Its intention obviously was to furnish the pleader willi a description which in point of certainty should be sufficient, but not to proscribe a form which lie must follow. It furnishes one but not the-only test of sufficiency of tlie indictment. It may be regarded as indicative of the degree of certainty which the. legislature deemed sufficient to ap-piiso the defendant of tlie nature of tlie offense with which he stands charged, and to put. him upon his trial.
The present indictment does not describe the offense by the name of the-gaming table at which tlie defendant tier, but describes it by tlie averment that Hie defendant bet money, and by the name, of I,tie person who kept the table. "Noil her of these averments was necessary had tlie indictment contained tlie name of tlie gamingtable; yet the description by these averments — particularly the name of tlie keeper of tlie table — was certainly a description of equal if not greater certainty as matter of identity, and quite as well calculated to apprise the defendant of tlie particular betting with which he was charged as simply the. name of the table or tlie averment that its name was unknown. Though'not precisely tlie same, yet there is quite as much certainty of description in the indictment as that which the statute declares shall be sufficient. Tested, (lion, by the degree of certainty prescribed by tlie statute,.the indictment is sufficient. Is it not so, when tried by the general rules respecting the-requisite degree, of certainty applicable to indictments for other and graver offenses? T>y reference to the books of established precedents it will be seen that- the present contains quite as circumstantial a description of the offense as is given in approved forms of indictments for assault, and battery, or even larceny, and oilier crimes which might be, named, in respect, to which there is quite-a® much reason to require great certainty of description as in respect to the offense here charged. It would so,em that the graver the offense, the more severe the penally denounced by the law, the greater would be its solicitude to-apprise the accused of the nature of the accusation, and enable him to prepare-for his defense. We can perceive no reason why a greater degree of certainty should be required in an indictment for this offense, than has always been held' sufficient in those for tlie graver offenses mentioned. Whether, therefore, we determine the sufficiency of the indictment by analogy to the form which the legislature has declared shall be a sufficient description of the offense, or by .a comparison with the forms of indictments for other offenses which have been always held to contain the requisite degree of certainty, it will be found sufficient.'
Another principle has been invoked by the Attorney General in support of this indictment, and we think witli reason: that is, that in an indictment for an offense created by statute it is, in general, sufficient to describe the offense in the language of the statute creating it. The statute creating this offense, (art. 505,) after naming certain inhibited banks and tables, adds, "orany other "gaming table or bank of the like kind, or of any other description, under any "other name or denomination whatever, or without any name therefor." What follows the words "or any other gaming table or bank" is mere tautology, and serves no other purpose than to evince.the extreme solicitude of the Legislature to inhibit ah gaming tables and banks, whether with or without a name, manifesting the intention of treating the name as wholly immaterial and unnecessary to constitute the offense. Á few names, supposed to be well known, appear to have been given as descriptive of tlie species of gaming intended to be inhibited by this section of the statute; but it was evidently intended to prohibit not merely the gaming tables known by those names, but all gaming tables and banks, whether with or without a name. And the offense created by this section of the statute consists in tlie keeping or exhibiting of any gaming table or bank. Applying the rule to which we have adverted, respecting the description, in the indictment of offenses created by statute, it would be sufficient in an indictment against tlie keeper to aver, with tlie requisite certainty of time and place, that lie did keep a gaming table or bank, (as the case may be,) in the words of the statute, without other words of description. And in an indictment against the betters that they did bet at a gaming table kept by one A. B., the name of the person charged as keeper of the gaming table or bank. This description of the offense would be sufficient upon the general principles of tlie law respecting the degree of certainty requisite in indictments for offenses created by statute. Aud it is the description contained in the indictment in this case. We reject the words "at rondo " employed in the description of the offense as unnecessary, and conclude that the indictment is sufficient independently of the provision contained in the 71st section of tlie act. To hold it otherwise would be, it seems to us, to require a greater degree of certainty than is requisite on general principles, or than would be consistent with the legislative will as expressed in tlie statute.
The charge of the court was, we think, substantially correct. We do not understand that it is, literally, the table or structure, whatever that may be, on which the game is played which gives it tlie character and designation of a gaming table, but it is rather from-the character of the playing or the game which is played that it receives its specific designation. If it be a billiard table which is used, as from the evidence it appears it generally is, the name and description of tlie game played is material only that it may appear that it is not the game which is protected by the license, or that it is of tlie description or species of gaming prohibited by the statute. When thus employed and for such purposes tlie billiard table is perverted from its legitimate design and use. It is converted into a gaming table, for which it was not designed and licensed, and for the time ceases to be a licensed table. It may then be described by the name of tlie game played upon it. Or if it be designated by its proper name it will only be necessary to aver and prove the name of the game for the playing of which it is used, in order that it may appear that it is not the game for which the table was licensed. This appears to have been the view of the law taken by the judge in his charge to the jury, and it seems to us the cori-ect view.
The objection to the judgment that rondo is not one of the gaming tables or banks named in the 69th section of the statute, and is not therefore included in the prohibition of the 70th section, is well answered by the Attorney General by reference to the succeeding section. It is the well-settled rale in the construction of statutes that, in order to arrive at tlie legislative intention, the several provisions and parts of a law must ho taken, considered, and construed together. If a doubt existed as to the intention of tlie legislature in tlie two preceding sections, that doubt is removed by considering them with tlie section in question, which, in prescribing wliat shall be a sufficient indictment for the offense intended to be inhibited, declares that it shall be sufficient to describe tlie table or bank by the proper name, if known, or as a table or bank the name of which is unknown, thus placing it beyond a doubt that it was the intention to prohibit not only the gaming tables and banks named, but others not named, and even those without any known name or designation. (Dig., art. 567, also 565, 566.) Thus what was the intention of the legislature is manifest by considering the several provisions of the law in their natural connection as reflecting their meaning one upon tlie other, aiid what is the proper construction of .the statute is placed beyond a question by the application of a rule of construction so universally received and admitted as to have become a legal maxim. It has often been remarked by this and other courts that laws enacted for the punishment of mere misdemeanors have never been subjected to the.same strictuess of construction as more highly penal statutes. In construing the latter great strictness has justly boon observed, and the courts have sometimes, infavorem vitos, resorted to what may seem to be, even strained construction in cases of doubtful guilt to avert the terrible penalty denounced by the law. But, in the construction of statutes not more highly penal than the one in question, the rule has been to adopt that construction which will effectuate the clearly-expressed will of the legislature. It is conceived the indictment in this case must be held sufficient and the conviction legal and proper. The judgment is therefore affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Note 69. — Barker v. The State, 12 T., 273.