Case Name: WINDSOR CONTRACTING CORP., A NEW JERSEY CORPORATION AND SHADY REST TRUCKING CO., INC., A NEW JERSEY CORPORATION, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. VINCENT BUDNY AND BUDNY'S TIRE SERVICE, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
Court: New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1966-12-09
Citations: 93 N.J. Super. 235
Docket Number: 
Parties: WINDSOR CONTRACTING CORP., A NEW JERSEY CORPORATION AND SHADY REST TRUCKING CO., INC., A NEW JERSEY CORPORATION, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. VINCENT BUDNY AND BUDNY’S TIRE SERVICE, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Superior Court Reports
Volume: 93
Pages: 235–252

Head Matter:
WINDSOR CONTRACTING CORP., A NEW JERSEY CORPORATION AND SHADY REST TRUCKING CO., INC., A NEW JERSEY CORPORATION, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. VINCENT BUDNY AND BUDNY’S TIRE SERVICE, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.
Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division
Argued October 24, 1966
Decided December 9, 1966.
Before Judges Goldmann, Kilkenny and Collester.
Mr. Edward B. Meredith argued the cause for appellants (Meredith & Meredith, attorneys).
Mr. Anton J. Hollendonner argued the cause for respondent Windsor Contracting Corp.

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Kilkenny, J. A. D.
Defendants appeal from a judgment awarding $5003.91 as damages against them and in favor of plaintiff Windsor Contracting Corp. and denying their claims against- Windsor.
Plaintiffs sued in replevin for possession of 67 truck tires, inner tubes and tire rims, as well as other specified wheel locks, nuts, wheel studs and 13 unmounted used truck tires, allegedly wrongfully taken by defendants on or about August 29, 1964. They also sought damages for the value of the tires and other items, and also damages for the detention. Defendants admitted the taking and claimed legal justification for so doing under the Garage Keepers' Lien Act, N. J. S. 2A:4A-21. They alleged that plaintiffs owed them $2,423.24 for tires and automobile accessories sold and serviced. Defendants sought judgment for possession of the chattels involved, for the debt due and for damages occasioned by the repossession and storage.
We understand that plaintiffs filed a replevin bond and were awarded possession of the articles in question a few weeks after the taking by defendants and pending the trial.
In the pretrial order of June 9, 1965, it was provided that the parties would stipulate: "Sale of said tires, goods and chattels by defendants; that there is a balance due defendants by plaintiffs of $2,423.24 as of July 2, 1964; and that certain tires, goods and chattels were repossessed by their employees on or about August 29, 1964." The pretrial order framed the issues in the form of the following two questions :
(1) Does a garageman have the right to take possession of an entire vehicle part of which consists of goods and chattels sold by the garageman or only the items sold?
(2) Does the garageman's lien extend to equipment not sold by the garageman?
As hereinafter indicated, the pretrial order was poorly expressed and the questions posed were vague, inadequate and not specific enough, in the light of the facts of this case, as became manifest at the trial.
The case was tried without a jury on August 3, 1965. The following facts were developed. Plaintiff Shadjr Rest Trucking Co., Inc., had purchased some truck tires from defendants, had other tires recapped by them and purchased batteries and miscellaneous items for its trucks. Shady Rest owed defendants $2,423.24 for these items. Defendants made no sales to and rendered no services directly for plaintiff Windsor, a separate trucking company. In fact, they would not extend credit to Windsor because of prior dealings.
Shady Rest and Windsor occupied the same premises and there was a working arrangement between them. Windsor and Shady Rest had the same president, Joseph T. Hayes, and Windsor leased some trucks owned by Shady Rest. Although "Windsor was unable to get any credit from defendants and Shady Rest enjoyed a limited credit, some tires sold to or recapped for and billed to Shady Rest were placed on trucks owned by Windsor. There was testimony that Shady Rest purchased the tires and then sold them to Windsor for use on Windsor's trucks.
However, an inference could be drawn from the record that Windsor was using the credit of Shady Rest to acquire for the Windsor truck tires which Windsor itself could not purchase on credit from defendants. In fact, Windsor's officer, Lawrence E. Pecan, testified that defendants knew that, although the tires and accessories were being charged to Shady Rest, they were being used by Windsor. Defendants denied such knowledge.
Budny testified that, upon learning of the recent formation of Windsor, he went to the joint place of business to get the money due his firm and there spoke to Hayes, who was then president of both corporations. Hayes told him, "Larry Pecan took over that responsibility now, it is his job to pay your bill." Hayes led Budny to believe that there was a "sort of partnership" between the two corporations and that "Mr. Pecan was going to be total boss of the operation." As a result, Budny demanded payment from Pecan on several occasions, but received no payment. Budny testified that Hayes and Pecan came to his office and requested a further credit extension, which he refused. In all events, Budny stated that he was made to feel that Windsor could be looked to for payment, despite the fact that the book account showed Shady Rest as the debtor.
Unwilling to- wait any longer for payment, defendant Budny decided to take the law into his own hands. About 6 p. m. on August 29, 1964, a Saturday night, defendant Budny went to the premises jointly occupied by plaintiffs to look for tires recently sold to Shady Rest. He found some on that company's trucks and he found on Windsor trucks one or two, and in some instances three, tires that had been sold to Shady Rest. He then instructed his son to get a fleet of trucks, and men, and go down that same night to the Shady Rest-Windsor yard and there strip from the trucks of both companies every tire from any truck on which a Budny sold tire could be found, and to take enough tires from which to realize the $2,423.24 owed to him. The son and crew did this and returned somewhere between 9 and 10 p. M. They brought back some 65 tires. Some of these had been sold by defendants to Shad]*- Rest and not paid for. But they also took from Windsor's trucks some 43 tires, tubes and rims-, which had not been sold or serviced by defendants but which Windsor had purchased from other sources.
This replevin suit followed when defendants refused to turn over to plaintiffs the seized tires and other items upon demand made. The trial court ruled as a matter of law that defendants' seizure of Windsor's 43 tires, tubes and rims, was improper and not within the- purview of the Garage Keepers' Lien Act. N. J. S. 2A:4L-21. The matter was set down for a hearing as to damages only. As a result of that hearing, plaintiff Windsor was awarded damages against defendants in the sum of $5,003.91. Defendants were awarded damages against Shady Best alone in the sum of $2,423.24. A motion by defendants to reopen the judgment for further proofs, upon the basis of affidavits by defendant Budny and Ilayes, president of Shady Best, was denied. This appeal by defendants followed.
1
We agree with the trial court that defendants had no legal right to remove from Windsor's trucks the 43 tires, tubes, rims and accessory equipment, which Windsor had purchased from others, merely because one or two or three other tires, sold by defendants to Shady Best and not paid for, were found on Windsor's trucks by virtue of some business arrangement between Shady Best and Windsor.
There is no merit in defendants' argument that they had a common law artificer's lien on Windsor's trucks and were exercising their rights thereunder. The factual situation herein would not give rise to such a common law lien against Windsor's trucks. 7A Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Lav) and Practice, § 5099 (1950); Brown, Personal Properly, § 108, at p. 470 (1936). Neither would the common law artificer's lien continue once the artisan surrendered possession of the chattel whose value he had enhanced by his services. The common law lien was merely a right to retain possession. It would not apply or persist after surrender of possession in a case such as this.
Defendants claim justification under the statutory Garage Keepers' Lien Act, N. J. S. 2A:44-21, which provides:
"A garage keeper who shall repair a motor vehicle or furnish gasoline, accessories or other supplies therefor, shall have a lien upon the motor vehicle or any part thereof for the sum due and may, without process of law, detain the same at any time it is lawfully in his possession until the sum is paid." (Emphasis added)
See Crucible Steel Co. of America v. Polack Tyre & Rubber Co., 92 N. J. L. 221 (E. & A. 1918), upholding the constitutionality of the act, and the right of an unpaid seller of four rear wheel truck tires to seize the vendee's truck, to which the tires had been applied.
The facts herein are obviously different from those in the Crucible case. Defendants did not seize any truck to which their tires had been applied. Uor were they content to seize from Windsor's trucks the tires sold or serviced and charged to the account of Shady Rest,' for which payment had not been made. Rather, as noted above, defendants took from Windsor's trucks, besides the tires sold to or capped for Shady Rest, some 43 tires, tubes, rims and accessory parts which they had never sold or serviced for either Shady Rest or Windsor, but which Windsor had purchased from other sources. They argue that they had a right to do so, because of the language in N. J. S. 2A :44-21 which gives the garage beeper a lien "upon the motor vehicle or any part thereof." (Italics ours)
We find no authority in the law to support this strained and unreasonable interpretation of N. J. S. 2A :4A-21. Were we to adopt that rationale, the unpaid vendor of a battery, rear view mirror or gasoline could remove the engine of the car, even though he never sold or serviced the engine. We are satisfied that such was not the legislative intent. When reference is made in N. J. S. 2A :44^21 to the right of lien "upon the motor vehicle or any part thereof," it reasonably means the right to retain possession of or to retake peaceably possession of either the entire motor vehicle or that part thereof sold, repaired or serviced by the garage keeper.
' This legislative intent is further manifested by N. J. S. 2A :44-22, which provides in pertinent part:
"A garage keeper acquiring a lien under this article shall not lose the same by reason of allowing.the motor vehicle or part thereof to be removed from his control, and if so removed, he may seize without force and in a peaceable manner the motor vehicle or part thereof, wherever found in this state." (Emphasis added.)
This indicates that the right of lien may have existed in the first instance only as to a part of the motor vehicle, such as in the case of an engine removed from the vehicle for repair at the garage. If he allowed that pari to be removed after his repairs, he might thereafter regain possession thereof under N. J. S. 2A :44-22.
The stripping herein of all tires, tubes, rims and accessories from Windsor's trucks merely because there was found thereon one or more tires sold to Shady Eest, was in excess of any right conferred by N. J. S. 2A :44-21. Windsor's trucks were left in its yard, stripped of its tires and propped up on blocks. Demand for return of its tires was refused. Windsor obviously suffered damages as a result of this excessive wrongful seizure, having been temporarily put out of its trucking business until it could re-equip its trucks. Also, some of Windsor's trucks were allegedly damaged by defendants' agents.
II
The record before us precludes an evaluation of the correctness of the award of damages and we find it necessary to remand the matter to the County Court for a new trial on the issue of damages.
In the first place, the parties stipulated in the pretrial order, as noted above, "that there is a balance due defendants by plaintiffs of $2,423.24 as of July 2, 1964." (Emphasis added) The trial court recognized this stipulation when, in a preliminary memorandum of law disposing of the legal issues, it said prior to its ultimate findings of fact and conclusions:
"It was stipulated at trial that plaintiffs owed defendants $2423.24 which included items other than tires, tubes, rims, etc." (Emphasis added).
Despite this express stipulation in the pretrial order, and as to which there was no amendment, conflicting testimony was presented at the trial as to whether Windsor was or was not jointly or separately obligated to pay the debt of $2,423.24, carried on defendants' books solely in the name of Shady Rest.
This obvious inconsistency between the stipulation and the testimony evidently induced the trial court to ignore the stipulation and ultimately find that only Shady Rest owed the debt to defendants. Hence, the judgment therefor in defendants' favor was against Shady Rest, and not against Windsor.
However, we have more obvious difficulties in finding justification for the damages of $5,003.91 awarded to Windsor. The bulk of that damage claim represents the purchase price of new tires for Windsor's trucks to replace the used tires which defendants had wrongfully removed. No credit was given defendants for the tires, tubes, rims and accessories, whose return was obtained by Windsor within a relatively short time after their taking and as soon as plaintiffs filed their complaint and replevin bond. Thus, Windsor obtained a return of its old tires, etc., and at the same time has a judgment for an amount which includes in large measure the purchase price of many new and some used replacements. Eor this reason, the compensatory damages appear to be excessive. There was no finding of malice and no award was made for punitive damages, which could justify the apparent excessiveness.
Einally, the damage award of $5,003.91 seemingly was not based upon competent proof thereof. This was probably due to some confusion at the trial, born of a lack of clear articulation by trial counsel. When Windsor's attorney was questioning Lawrence E. Pecan, then its president, and had reached the point of proving Windsor's damages, the witness had before him a memorandum, evidently to be used to refresh his recollection, if the need arose. The trial court intervened at this point and suggested that the memorandum be received in evidence, subject to the right of defense counsel to move to strike it out. Obviously, plaintiff's attorney did not object to the suggested procedure and the memorandum was marked in evidence as an exhibit. As such, it was accepted by the trial court as sufficient proof of Windsor's damages. Defendants' attorney moved promptly to strike it out, but based Ms argument rather on the failure of plaintiffs to list Pecan's name in the answers to interrogatories as one of the officers or directors of either plaintiff corporation. The trial court denied the motion to strike.
Defendants' attorney ought to have based Ms argument to strike upon the more solid reason that this self-serving memorandum was not being used for its intended purpose, to refresh recollection, but as an improper proof of damages. Moreover, a supplementary affidavit, submitted to the trial court before judgment was entered, evidenced that some answers to the interrogatories were false, especially in respect to the names of the officers and directors of plaintiff corporations, albeit the affiant, Hayes, was the same person who verified the answers to the interrogatories, as the then president of plaintiff corporations.
We are satisfied that a plenary trial on all issues relating to damages is necessary in the interest of justice. The debt due defendants may be explored for a determination as to whether Windsor, by its agreement of merger or otherwise with Shady Best, subsumed that obligation so as to make it liable to defendants, as a third party beneficiary of that agreement, or upon any other legal theory. See Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N. Y. 268 (Ct. App. 1859).
Also, the propriety of Windsor's being awarded damages for the price of new tires and the other items purchased by it, when the repossession of their used tires and accessories was obtainable promptly by a replevin action, a remedy actually pursued a few weeks after defendants' taking, also requires a reexamination. Especially is this so, since Windsor has its former tires and other items, as well as a judgment for the replacements. The proof of damages, unless stipulated. should be in proper fashion and not by the method pursued at the former trial.
The judgment in favor of Windsor against defendants, both on the main suit and on the counterclaim, is reversed and the matter is remanded for a new trial, consistent with this opinion.