Case Name: Alton (Bud) PARKER, Hillsborough County Property Appraiser, Appellant, v. Charles N. BAKER, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1986-10-17
Citations: 499 So. 2d 843
Docket Number: No. 85-2900
Parties: Alton (Bud) PARKER, Hillsborough County Property Appraiser, Appellant, v. Charles N. BAKER, Appellee.
Judges: RYDER, A.C.J., and FRANK, J., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 499
Pages: 843–848

Head Matter:
Alton (Bud) PARKER, Hillsborough County Property Appraiser, Appellant, v. Charles N. BAKER, Appellee.
No. 85-2900.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Oct. 17, 1986.
On Motion for Rehearing Dec. 10, 1986.
Michael D. Malfitano, Earnest W. Dean, Jr. and Claude H. Tison, Jr. of Macfarlane, Ferguson, Allison & Kelly, Tampa, for appellant.
Thomas John Dandar and Kennan George Dandar of Dandar & Dandar, P.A., Tampa, for appellee.

Opinion:
LEHAN, Judge.
This is a declaratory judgment suit brought by the Hillsborough County Property Appraiser against a former employee of the property appraiser. The suit seeks to establish that defendant, who in 1984 while employed by the predecessor to the current property appraiser qualified to run against his superior for that elective office, was thereby obligated to resign, and in effect resigned pursuant to section 99.-012(7), Florida Statutes (1984). Defendant lost the election and applied to return to his employment. His application was refused by the predecessor appraiser on the grounds that he had resigned by operation of law. The issue before the trial court and before us is whether the "resign to run" provisions of that statute were applicable.
The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of defendant on the basis that, pursuant to section 25 of the Hillsbor-ough County Civil Service Law, chapter 82-301, Laws of Florida, (hereinafter "the local law") which was enacted after the enactment of section 99.012(7) (hereinafter "the statute"), defendant was required only to take a leave of absence upon running for that office. The trial court concluded that the statute and the local law were inconsistent and that the local law, being specifically applicable to Hillsborough County Civil Service employees, should govern because, quoting from the headnote in Housing Authority of the City of Sanford v. Billingslea, 464 So.2d 1221, 1222 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985), "special statute will prevail over general statute in absence of a clear legislative intent to contrary."
The statute and the local law read as follows.
SECTION 99.012(7), FLORIDA STATUTES (Supp.1984):
For the purposes of this section, no individual who is a subordinate personnel, deputy sheriff, or police officer need resign pursuant to subsection (2) or subsection (3) unless such individual is seeking to qualify for a public office which is currently held by an individual who has the authority to appoint, employ, promote, or otherwise supervise that subordinate personnel, deputy sheriff, or police officer and who has qualified as a candidate for reelection to that public office. However, any such personnel, deputy sheriff, or police officer shall take a leave of absence without pay from his employment during the period in which he is seeking election to public office.
SECTION 25, HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY CIVIL SERVICE LAW CHAPTER 82-301 (ENACTED 1982):
Any person holding a position with the county, in the classified or unclassified service, except an elected officer, must take a leave of absence, without pay, beginning when said person completes his qualification as a political candidate in any election for: (1) A City of Tampa office; (2) A County of Hillsborough office; (3) A State of Florida office; (4) A Federal office. Such leave of absence shall cease when the individual is no longer a candidate for one of said offices.
After consideration of the well-presented arguments on both sides, as well as the trial court's reasoning in which he referred to this as "an extremely close case," we reverse. We agree with the trial court and the parties that the local law did not require defendant to resign. But we agree with the argument of the appraiser that the statute did so require and that the statute was not inconsistent with the local law as to the matter in issue here. Although both the statute and the local law address the same general subject matter— that of certain governmental employees running for public office — the statute addresses the specific issue in this case which is an aspect of the general subject matter not addressed by the local law. That aspect concerns not simply governmental employees running for public office but addresses such employees "seeking to qualify for a public office which is currently held by an individual who has the authority to appoint, employ, promote, or otherwise supervise" such employees.
This represents an application of the principle that in these types of circumstances in which each of two different legislative enactments generally apply but only one specifically applies, the specific governs over the general.
Where there is in the same statute a specific provision, and also a general one which in its most comprehensive sense would include matters embraced in the former, the particular provision must control, and the general provision must be taken to affect only such cases within its general language as are not within the provisions of the particular provision; additional words of qualification needed to harmonize a general and a prior special provision in the same statute should be added to the general provision, rather than to the special one.... Similarly, with respect to a conflict arising between a statute dealing generally with a subject, and another dealing specifically with a certain phase of it, the specific legislation controls in a proper case.
73 Am.Jur.2d, Statutes § 257. See Bryan v. Landis, 106 Fla. 19, 142 So. 650, 653 (1932).
It is a well settled rule of statutory construction, however, that a special statute covering a particular subject matter is controlling over a general statutory provision covering the same and other subjects in general terms. In this situation " 'the statute relating to the particular part of the general subject will operate as an exception to or qualification of the general terms of the more comprehensive statute to the extent only of the repugnancy, if any.' "
Adams v. Culver, 111 So.2d 665, 667 (Fla.1959), quoting from Stewart v. DeLand-Lake Helen Special Road & Bridge Disk, 71 Fla. 158, 71 So. 42, 47 (1916), which quotes from State ex rel. Loftin v. McMillan, 55 Fla. 246, 45 So. 882 (1908). These same principles were recently applied by this court in Floyd v. Bentley, 496 So.2d 862 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986).
The local law was enacted after enactment of the statute. However, in these circumstances the order of enactment of the two makes no difference. "[A] more specific statute will be given precedence over a more general one, regardless of their temporal sequence." Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 406, 100 S.Ct. 1747, 1753, 64 L.Ed.2d 381, 389 (1980). See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489-90, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 1836, 36 L.Ed.2d 439, 450-51 (1973). "Only if the two statutory provisions present such an inconsistency as cannot be harmonized or reconciled will the latest expression of legislative will prevail." Floyd.
There is no dispute that the statute provides that an individual described in its above quoted "unless" clause must resign. More specifically, the statute provides that certain individuals who are government employees need not resign their positions to run for public office and shall take a leave of absence "unless" they run against their bosses. Thus, since, as we have concluded, the statute applies and the local law does not, we hold that the trial court erred in deciding that defendant was not required to resign.
The trial court characterized the last, "however" sentence of the statute as appearing "to dilute or confuse the resignation requirement" of the prior, "unless" clause by saying that "any such personnel . shall take a leave of absence" notwithstanding that resignation requirement. We agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the statute "is not a model of clarity and was inartfully written...." However, the trial court did not on that basis conclude that the "unless" clause did not mean what it says. That clause must be harmonized, if possible, with the preceding portions of the statute. We agree with the appraiser's argument that the "however" sentence can be harmonized with the "unless" clause by applying the "however" sentence only to someone other than the persons identified in the "unless" clause, i.e., only to a subordinate who runs against someone other than his boss.
That our holding reflects the intent of the legislature may be considered to have been confirmed by the legislature in its 1985 amendment to the local law. Pursuant to chapter 85-424, section 18, Laws of Florida the legislature added to the local law the same "unless" clause which was and is contained in the statute. Defendant argues that by adding that clause to the local law the legislature showed that the intent of the local law prior to its amendment was not to require a Hillsborough County employee running against his boss to resign. However, that argument must fail in the face of our foregoing conclusion that the statute applied to the issue at hand and the local law did not.
It is true, as defendant also argues, that another sentence, the last sentence, of the 1985 amendment to the local law provides that "[ejmployment in the classified service shall terminate upon election to . public office." Thus, defendant argues, the legislature meant that such an employee would lose his job only if elected. However, that sentence must be harmonized, if possible, with the preceding portions of the local law. Harmony is achieved by construing that last sentence to apply to those individuals running for public office other than those required to resign by the preceding "unless" clause.
Defendant additionally argues that the local law, as a special grant of power applicable only to Hillsborough County employees, controlled over the inconsistent general statute. But, as we have said, since the statute specifically addressed the issue at hand which was not addressed by the local law, the two are not inconsistent. We do not agree with defendant's further, oral argument that the local law, which defendant characterizes as a special act, controlled over the statute regardless of whether or not the two were inconsistent. This seems to be an argument that the local law preempted the subject, but we see no basis to find such preemption here. In fact, section 28 of the local law refutes this argument by providing that laws other than the local law are repealed only to the extent of conflict with the local law.
We are not at odds with Billingslea. The principle from the Billingslea headnote which was quoted by the trial court, as we have noted above, was contained in dicta said to be applicable "in the event of conflict" between two statutes. 464 So.2d at 1223.
In light of our holding in favor of the appraiser on the foregoing grounds we need not address the appraiser's additional contention that the trial court erred in holding section 25 of the local law to be constitutional.
Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent herewith.
RYDER, A.C.J., and FRANK, J., concur.