Case Name: John P. Krafts and J. C. Delpratt vs. Creighton & Woodville
Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1832-04
Citations: 3 Rich. 273
Docket Number: 
Parties: John P. Krafts and J. C. Delpratt vs. Creighton & Woodville.
Judges: Johnson, J. concurred.
Reporter: South Carolina Law Reports
Volume: 37
Pages: 273–276

Head Matter:
John P. Krafts and J. C. Delpratt vs. Creighton & Woodville.
One of the two partners executed a bond in his individual name to the United States, for duties on goods imported on account of the partnership, and the plaintiffs executed the bond as sureties. The plaintiffs paid the debt, and brought an action for money paid, against both partners. Held that they could not recover ; that their claim was against the partner, for whom alone they had signed as sureties, and not against the partnership.
Before GanTt,' J. at Charleston, Spring Term, 1832.
The report of His Honor, the Presiding Judge, is a§ follows:
“ The defendants were merchants in Baltimore, trading under the firm of Creighton & Woodville. Certain goods were entered at the Custom-House, the duties on which were secured by a bond. The bond is signed by Wood-ville, but not in his co-partnership character; the plaintiffs became security for the payment of the duties, and also executed the bond. The condition of the bond recites that the duties on the goods were chargeable to Creighton & Woodville, and it is customary to insert in bonds taken to secure the payment of duties, the names of the persons for whom the goods are imported, or those to whom the goods are consigned. The signatures to the bond, the articles of co-partnership entered into by the defendants, and the receipt of the money paid by the securities to the bond, are all fully and satisfactorily established by the examinations had under a commission. Mr. Cross moved for a nonsuit, on the ground that Creighton is not bound, and that none are responsible on the bond but those who have signed it. This action was not brought upon the bond, and the motion for nonsuit was refused.
“ It appeared that several attempts had been made to make Creighton liable on this bond, in the Federal Court, but ineffectually. The reason was, that the bond had not been executed by Woodville in the name of the firm, which the Act of Congress of the 18th April, 1820, requires to .bind the firm.
“ The whole case is this : The plaintiffs, at the instance and request of Woodville, of the house of Creighton & Woodville, and for their benefit, loaned their names at the Custom-House. They paid the debt, and they ask the reimbursement of the money thus paid.
“ Is it an answer to this just demand to say, that Creighton did not sign the bond ? What has the bond to do with the case 1 The plaintiffs laid out and expended monies for the defendants, and at their request, which the evidence shews — the recital in the condition of the bond, being a strong link in the chain of evidence to shew it, and one which estops the defendants from saying to the contrary. A very intelligent jury gave the verdict, which appears to have been well-founded, both in justice and in Jaw.”
The defendant appealed, and now renewed his motion in this court for a nonsuit.
Cross, for the motion.
Holmes, contra.

Opinion:
Curia, -per
O'Neall, J.
It appears that the defendants, Creighton & Woodville, were merchants in Baltimore ; that certain goods were consigned to them, and entered in the Custom-House in their name. The defendant, Woodville, in his own name, with the plaintiffs as his securities, executed a bond for the duties. Upon this bond the plaintiffs have been compelled to pay the duties for which it was given; and this action is brought for the recovery of the money so paid, against the defendant Creighton, who has been alone served with process. The question which is made is '"are the plaintiffs entitled to recover against him ?"
Originally both partners were liable for the duties, and if the money paid by the plaintiffs had been paid in discharge of this original liability, at the express or implied request of the defendants, they would have been'legally liable for its re-paymeut. But the execution of a bond discharges a simple contract, either express or implied. At common law one co-partner cannot bind another by deed. Under the Act of Congress of 1820, Ing. Dig. 268, one partner may, by executing a bond for duties in the partnership name, bind the firm. The bond, in this case, is not in the partnership name, and it, therefore, casts no liability on the defendant, Creighton. The execution of the bond, by Woodville, discharged the liability of the firm for the duties, and made the debt legally his own. When the plaintiffs paid it, they paid the money for Woodville, and at his implied request. They can, therefore, have no legal right of action against the firm of Creighton dfc Woodville.
If it was necessary to go back to the consideration of the bond, to ascertain whether both of the partners, or only the obliger, was liable to it, it would necessarily lead to an investigation and settlement of the accounts of the partners. For, if the partner who executed the bond, was in arrears to the firm, it could not be pretended that he would have the right to call on the other to contribute to its payment. This examination the court of law cannot make. It may be, that in Equity, if the plaintiffs could shew that Wood-ville is in advance to the firm the amount of the bond, and that he is insolvent, that they might make the defendant, Creighton, liable.
The case of Tom vs. Goodrich, 2 Johns. R. 213, is a case exactly analagous to the one before us, in which it was held " that proof of the payment of money for the surviving partners, after the death of a co-partner, would not support a declaration on an implied promise by all the partners ; that the claim of the United States " for the duties " against the co-partnership becam,e extinguished by the bond of the individual partner, who was alone responsible ; and that the surety who had paid the money had a right of action against the partner only who had signed the bond.'"
The motion for a nonsuit is, therefore, granted.
Johnson, J. concurred.