Case Name: Magda Sobhy Ahmed AMIN, et al. v. Abdelrahman Sayed BAKHATY
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 2001-05-11
Citations: 812 So. 2d 12
Docket Number: No. 2000 CU 2710
Parties: Magda Sobhy Ahmed AMIN, et al. v. Abdelrahman Sayed BAKHATY.
Judges: Before: PARRO, FITZSIMMONS, and GUIDRY, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 812
Pages: 12–37

Head Matter:
Magda Sobhy Ahmed AMIN, et al. v. Abdelrahman Sayed BAKHATY.
No. 2000 CU 2710.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
May 11, 2001.
Rehearing Denied June 20, 2001.
Writ Denied July 18, 2001.
Jack M. Dampf, Gregory P. Aycock, Hany A. Zhody, Baton Rouge, for Plaintiff-Appellee Magda Sobhy Ahmed Amin.
Randy J. Fuerst, Stockwell, Sievert, Vic-cellio, Clements & Shaddock, Lake Charles, Steve M. Irving, Baton Rouge, for Defendant-Appellant Abdelrahman Sayed Bakhaty.
Before: PARRO, FITZSIMMONS, and GUIDRY, JJ.

Opinion:
PARRO, J.
The father in this child custody case, Abdelrahman Sayed Bakhaty (Dr. Bakhaty) appeals judgments overruling his exceptions of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction, lis pendens, and insufficiency of citation and service of process; awarding provisional sole custody of his minor son, Ahmed, to his ex-wife, Magda Sobhy Ahmed Amin (Ms. Amin); and ordering him to pay provisional child support, to provide medical insurance coverage for the child, and to pay all non-covered medical and dental expenses for the child. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In this case of first impression, the issue is whether a Louisiana court may exercise jurisdiction over the custody and support of a child who was born in Egypt to an Egyptian mother and father, whose Egyptian father lives in New Jersey and is a United States citizen, when the mother removed the child from Egypt without the father's permission and filed for divorce and custody within one month after arriving in Louisiana.
In early December 1998, Ms. Amin traveled from Egypt to the United States with her son, Ahmed. She went first to New York and then came to Baton Rouge, Louisiana, where her sisters live. On January 7, 1999, she filed suit against Dr. Bakhaty in The Family Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge, seeking a divorce, sole custody of Ahmed, and child support. The petition stated she is an Egyptian citizen residing in East Baton Rouge Parish, that she and Dr. Bakhaty were married in Egypt on November 21, 1991, and that Ahmed was born in Egypt on August 23, 1992. The petition also stated that Dr. Bakhaty is a United States citizen domiciled in New Jersey, that he had abandoned the marriage and refused to support her and the child, and that the parties had been physically separated since June 1998.
On May 28, 1999, Dr. Bakhaty filed a "Petition for Civil Warrant" in The Family laCourt for the Parish of East Baton Rouge, alleging he was a citizen of Egypt and a medical doctor with a practice in New York. He claimed that Egyptian law required the husband/father's approval in order for his spouse and minor child to validly obtain travel documents, and that he did not give his approval for his wife to take Ahmed out of Egypt and, in fact, had no advance notice of her plans. Dr. Bak-haty also alleged that his wife had obtained travel documents for herself and their son under false pretenses. He claimed that when he learned of her actions, he divorced her in Egypt on January 8,1999; the divorce was filed and certified by the Egyptian court on January 9, 1999. He also stated that under Egyptian law, both the temporary guardianship and physical custody of Ahmed were exclusively with him, and that an order to confirm his custody was pending before the Egyptian court. The civil warrant petition was allotted to a different judge from the one in whose court Ms. Amin's divorce and custody matters were pending; the second judge signed an order authorizing a warrant to be issued for law enforcement personnel to assist Dr. Bakhaty in locating Ahmed and taking him back to Egypt. However, on June 1,1999, by agreement of the parties and by order of the court, all matters pertaining to the civil warrant were stayed and both parties agreed not to remove Ahmed from the court's jurisdiction without court approval. Ms. Amin was ordered to surrender her passport and Ahmed's passport to the court, which she did. The consent judgment allowed Dr. Bakhaty to visit with the child if he surrendered his passports to the court during his visit.
On June 15, 1999, Dr. Bakhaty filed exceptions. He claimed the pending divorce was subject to the exception of res judicata, due to the judgment of the Egyptian court, which also mooted all custody and support claims. He objected to the court's personal jurisdiction over him and subject matter jurisdiction over custody of his child. He also praised the exception of lis pendens due to the pending Egyptian case, and objected to the sufficiency of service of process on him.
On November 23,1999, Ms. Amin filed a rule for sole custody of Ahmed, admitting that she and Dr. Bakhaty had been divorced on January 8, 1999, in Cairo, Egypt. She also requested child support, retroactive to the date of her initial petition in the case, and periodic support for herself until she could find employment. On January 10, 2000, Dr. Bakhaty re-urged his exceptions and suggested he could not be compelled to participate in discovery, because the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. After several continuances and resolution of the contested discovery matters, a trial on his exceptions was set for March 9, 2000.
At that hearing, the parties stipulated that the Egyptian divorce was final and the court orally granted Dr. Bakhaty's exception of res judicata as to Ms. Amin's divorce action. After the hearing, at which both parties and several other witnesses testified and documentary evidence was introduced, the court took the remaining exceptions under advisement. On May 11, 2000, the court assigned written reasons and rendered judgment overruling all of Dr. Bakhaty's other exceptions. A hearing was scheduled for May 30, 2000, to determine provisional custody and support. Dr. Bakhaty filed an emergency writ action with this court, seeking a stay of that hearing and review of the court's ruling on the exceptions; this court denied the writ. Amin v. Bakhaty, 00-1164 (La.App. 1st Cir.5/30/00) (unpublished writ action).
The hearing proceeded on May 30, 2000; Dr. Bakhaty was represented by counsel, but was not present. In a judgment signed June 20, 2000, the court granted provisional custody of Ahmed to Ms. Amin, ordered Dr. Bakhaty to pay child support and to provide medical coverage for Ahmed, and ordered that Ahmed's residence remain in the Parish of Bast Baton Rouge pending further custody and support proceedings. Dr. Bakhaty brought another writ action challenging both judgments, which was again denied. This court noted that the judgment of June 20, 2000, was an appealable interlocutory judgment, that an appeal was pending by the time the writ was acted upon, and that the issues raised could be addressed on appeal. Amin v. Bakhaty, 00-1582 (La. App. 1st Cir.8/21/00) (unpublished writ action).
Un this appeal, Dr. Bakhaty argues the trial court erred in finding sufficient service of process and personal jurisdiction over him. He also contends the court erred in allowing Ms. Amin to plead the Fifth Amendment on questions concerning Ahmed's Egyptian passport, the answers to which were needed to assess her credibility and demonstrate her bad faith in removing him from Egypt. Dr. Bakhaty also argues the trial court demonstrated bias against the Egyptian legal system and improperly applied the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act in finding it had jurisdiction over the subject matter. Finally, he asserts the court erred in ordering him to pay interim child support when it had neither personal jurisdiction over him nor subject matter jurisdiction.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The appellate court's review of factual findings is governed by the manifest error — clearly wrong standard. The two-part test for the appellate review of a factual finding is: 1) whether there is a reasonable factual basis in the record for the finding of the trial court, and 2) whether the record further establishes that the finding is not manifestly erroneous. Mart v. Hill, 505 So.2d 1120, 1127 (La.1987). Thus, if there is no reasonable factual basis in the record for the trial court's finding, no additional inquiry is necessary. However, if a reasonable factual basis exists, an appellate court may set aside a trial court's factual finding only if, after reviewing the record in its entirety, it determines the trial court's finding was clearly wrong. See Stobart v. State, through Dep't of. Transp. and Dev., 617 So.2d 880, 882 (La.1993). Even though an appellate court may feel its own evaluations and inferences are more reasonable than the fact finder's, reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon review where conflict exists in the testimony. Stobart, 617 So.2d at 882. Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact finder's choice between them cannot be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Stobart, 617 So.2d at 883.
A legal error occurs when a trial court applies incorrect principles of law and such errors are prejudicial. Legal errors are prejudicial when they materially affect the outcome and deprive a party of substantial rights. When such a prejudi cial error of law Lskews the trial court's finding of a material issue of fact and causes it to pretermit other issues, the appellate court is required, if it can, to render judgment on the record by applying the correct law and determining the essential material facts de novo. Evans v. Lungrin, 97-0541, 97-0577 (La.2/6/98), 708 So.2d 731, 735.
DISCUSSION
This court has reviewed the arguments presented in this appeal, has examined the record, has researched the applicable law, and has studied the trial court's written reasons for judgment on the exceptions, rendered May 11, 2000. The factual findings of the trial court expressed in those reasons are fully supported by the documentary and testimonial evidence in the record, and we find no manifest error in those findings. Our comments concerning the factual posture of this case address only the factual finding that we consider the most significant to the trial court's resolution of the issues.
Crucial to the trial court's determination is the factual finding that Ms. Amin's intent when she came to the United States with Ahmed was not to abscond with the child, stay in this country, divorce her husband, and get custody of their child, as Dr. Bakhaty maintains. The court clearly believed Ms. Amin's testimony that she came to the United States intending to visit her husband, to allow Ahmed to spend time with him here, and to reconcile their marital problems, if possible. Ms. Amin bought a round-trip ticket; her return flight was January 4, 1999. Dr. Bakhaty claimed he did not know she was coming to the United States until she called him from Baton Rouge sometime in mid-December. This coincides with Ms. Amin's testimony; she said she was unable to reach Dr. Bak-haty at the phone number she had for him before and upon her arrival in New York. Ms. Amin said when she finally talked with Dr. Bakhaty in mid-December from Baton Rouge, he agreed to come to Baton Rouge to see her and Ahmed. Dr. Bakhaty admitted telling her that, but said he actually had no intention of coming under the circumstances. So while she and Ahmed waited for him in Baton Rouge, he flew to Egypt to confirm his suspicions about her removing Ahmed without his permission and without proper travel documents.
Sometime in early January, Ms. Amin heard from her father that Dr. Bakhaty was in Egypt and was investigating her actions for the purpose of bringing charges against 17her. At this point, realizing her marriage was irreparably broken and her ability to return to Egypt was seriously jeopardized, Ms. Amin decided to petition the Louisiana court for a divorce, custody, and support. That petition was filed before Dr. Bakhaty officially commenced anything in the Egyptian courts. As late as March 9, 2000, at the hearing on the exceptions, both parties were still willing to stipulate that Ms. Amin would return to Egypt with Ahmed and continue to care for him there, if the criminal sentence against her could be dismissed and if certain support arrangements could be made in the interim. These on-the-record discussions concerning a proposed stipulation were not resolved that day and apparently never reached fruition, but they belie Dr. Bakhaty's assertion that Ms. Amin's intentions were dishonorable or her conduct reprehensible. The trial court's factual conclusion concerning her initial intent and motivation is supported by the record and is not clearly wrong; this conclusion strongly influenced the court's decision concerning subject matter jurisdiction and application of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA).
Furthermore, we find no error of law in the court's application of the UC-CJA or in its judgment on the exceptions. We do not find it necessary to expand on the trial court's written reasons for judgment, as they fully address the issues raised here and in the trial court with respect to the exceptions. Therefore, we attach and adopt those reasons in their entirety in support of our decision on appeal. See Appendix.
Turning to Dr. Bakhaty's arguments on appeal addressing the conduct of the trial, we conclude there were no evi-dentiary irregularities or bias that tainted the proceedings or the result. Dr. Bakhaty claims the trial court erred in refusing to order Ms. Amin to answer certain questions pertaining to the method by which she obtained Ahmed's Egyptian passport and her application for asylum in the United States. Because of the criminal matters lodged against her in Egypt and possible ramifications |swith the Immigration and Naturalization Services in the United States, she pled the Fifth Amendment in response to those questions. Dr. Bakhaty argues the trial court should have insisted on answers to those questions, and its failure to do so prejudiced Ms ease.
However, the trial court listened to Dr. Bakhaty's testimony and that of his experts and noted in its reasons that under Egyptian law, Dr. Bakhaty's written approval was required before Ms. Amin or Ahmed could leave the country. Ms. Amin admitted she did not have his permission before she came to the United States with their son. Although the exact communications resulting in Ahmed's Egyptian passport were not elicited from her, documents submitted by Dr. Bakhaty were accepted into evidence. These indicated that in November 1998, Ms. Amin's brother-in-law, Hany Zohdy, an attorney who lives in Baton Rouge, obtained affidavits from two of his Egyptian friends, stating Ahmed needed medical treatment from his father and needed to visit him in the United States. Thus, the circumstances under which Ahmed's Egyptian passport were obtained were generally known to the court without additional testimony from Ms. Amin or Mr. Zhody. The court recognized in its written reasons that the circumstances under which Ms. Amin left Egypt with Ahmed were questionable, noting also that Ms. Amin had been convicted in Egypt for related criminal charges. It is unlikely her testimony would have provided any significant additional information to the court. Accordingly, the court's recognition of Ms. Amin's right to plead the Fifth Amendment on those very limited issues did not prejudice Dr. Bakhaty and was not legal error.
Similarly, it was clear from Ms. Amin's testimony that, although her original intent was merely to visit the United States, the circumstances occurring after her arrival caused her to change her mind and she now intended to stay here, if possible. | gHowever, she admitted she had been allowed to stay here on an extension of her visitor's visa. According to Mark Lazarre, an expert on immigration requirements, in applying for an extension of her visitor's visa, she must have declared her "non-immigrant" intention and status. Ms. Amin had also applied for asylum in the United States. Mr. Lazarre informed the court that the declarations needed for these various applications were internally inconsistent; either Ms. Amin intended to stay in the United States or she did not. The trial court was made aware of this inconsistency and had sufficient information to consider it in evaluating Ms. Amin's credibility on this and other issues. Therefore, Dr. Bakhaty was not prejudiced by the trial court's refusal to order Ms. Amin to answer questions about her asylum application.
Dr. Bakhaty also claims the court demonstrated bias against the Egyptian legal system by selecting only portions of Patricia Aby's testimony in support of its ruling. However, although the trial court specifically referred to that testimony in its written reasons, the court's selections reflect the totality of the evidence in the record concerning the applicable Egyptian law and its interrelationship with the Islamic law under which Dr. Bakhaty and Ms. Amin were married. Translations of certain court documents and judgments in several of the Egyptian legal proceedings initiated by Dr. Bakhaty were in evidence. These suggest a legal system that is vastly different from our own. Also, Dr. Bakhaty's affidavit when he petitioned for a civil warrant stated he believed that, by operation of Egyptian law, both the temporary guardianship and physical custody of Ahmed rested exclusively with him. The attached translation of a provision of the Egyptian Civil Code stated that the right to custody goes to the father, then to the grandfather in case a guardian was not appointed by the father. Therefore, although Ms. Aby did say physical custody of a young child would generally be with the mother, she also admitted guardianship or right of control was always with the father. After a divorce, the mother's physical custody of the child was generally allowed only if the father with guardianship lived nearby and could continue to exercise control. Ms. ImAby also said guardianship included the right to choose the habitual residence of the child.
In addition, Dr. Bakhaty and Ms. Amin testified concerning the practical effect of Islamic and Egyptian law in the areas of divorce and child custody, and much of their testimony was confirmed by the expert. Ms. Aby confirmed Ms. Amin's deposition testimony that under Islamic law, the husband could pronounce a divorce merely by stating so three times. Civil effect would be given to the declaration simply by having it notarized and served on the wife or her representative. Only after that was done could the wife raise certain limited issues with the court, and then only if she had reserved her right to do so in her original marriage contract. Based on Ms. Aby's review of the marriage contract entered into between Dr. Bakhaty and Ms. Amin, no such rights were reserved. In contrast, according to Ms. Aby, a woman could divorce her husband only through court action and for very limited causes, such as physical or emotional abuse.
We do not read the court's recitation of Egyptian law as biased, but as a fairly accurate summary based on the totality of the evidence in this case. The court characterized Egyptian family laws as "gender-biased." While this characterization might have been unnecessary, it is not inaccurate and does not demonstrate that the trial court misapprehended the nature of Egyptian law and customs.
Furthermore, the court made clear, and we agree, that the unique circumstances of this case required more consideration for the best interest of this child than for the extension of comity toward the Egyptian/Islamic legal system. Ahmed has never spent one night of his life away from his mother. In contrast, Dr. Bakhaty testified he visited Egypt, at the most, six times a year, staying only a week to two weeks each visit. During those visits, he and Ms. Amin would generally spend some private time in a hotel, not at her father's home where she and Ahmed lived. There was a period of almost two years of his son's life during which Dr. Bakhaty did not visit at all; he explained this extended absence by saying he was very angry with his wife at that time, InDr. Bakhaty has lived in the United States virtually all of his adult life; he became a citizen in 1989, and his medical practice is in New York. He testified that he has a minimal practice in Egypt also, in that colleagues allow him to use their offices when he is there. If his infrequent visits to Egypt also included time spent in a medical practice, there could not have been much time left to establish the "strong bond" with Ahmed that Dr. Bak-haty claimed to have.
Also, if Dr. Bakhaty were to gain custody of Ahmed, his stated intent was to send or take him back to Egypt immediately. As the trial court noted, because of the criminal convictions against Ms. Amin, she either could never return to Egypt or would be imprisoned upon her return. Either way, Ahmed would be deprived of his relationship with the parent who raised him. On the other hand, if Ms. Amin had custody, she intended to stay in the United States. Given Dr. Bakhaty's United States citizenship and long-time residence in this country, he would not be deprived of the opportunity to visit with Ahmed, perhaps even more often than he did in the previous eight years of the child's life. Therefore, we find no error in the trial court's application of the UCCJA and its decision to exercise "residual" jurisdiction in the best interest of this child, rather than deferring to the Egyptian legal system where that interest is not paramount.
This case is unique. It does not involve a parent taking a child from the country in which the other parent resides. Rather, it involves a parent bringing a child to the country where the other parent resides. This is an important difference. As a result of the court's judgment in this case, Ahmed lives with his mother in the United States, the country where both of his parents now live, rather than living with one parent in Egypt, while the other parent lives in the United States. This is a just result.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's judgments of May 11, 2000, and June 20, 2000, are affirmed. All costs of these proceedings are assessed against Dr. Bakhaty.
AFFIRMED.
. Ahmed has a United States passport issued in April 1995, indicating he also is a United States citizen. However, the child's citizenship is not a determinative factor in this case.
. The petition for divorce, custody, alimony, and other matters was filed by Magda Sobhy Ahmed Amin, "on behalf of herself and her child Ahmed Sayed Bakhaty." The child was later dismissed from the suit.
. An attachment to the petition for civil warrant shows that on February 12, 1999, Dr. Bakhaty brought a "civil misdemeanor" action in the Egyptian court, charging Ms. Amin with forgery of Ahmed's travel documents. In a March 9, 2000 hearing before the trial court in the case we are reviewing, Dr. Bak-haty submitted evidence of a judgment in the Egyptian case, sentencing Ms. Amin in absen-tia to one week in prison and payment of damages and court costs. He also submitted documents showing that, in a later criminal proceeding stemming from his complaints, Ms. Amin was convicted in absentia and sentenced to pay a fine of 500 Egyptian pounds and to serve three years imprisonment "with labour."
. In essence, this assignment of error restates Dr. Bakhaty's arguments on his exceptions of lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction.
. LSA-R.S. 13:1700-22.
. In particular, we agree with the trial court that it acquired personal jurisdiction over Dr. Bakhaty when he filed his "Petition for Civil Warrant," and thus purposefully sought the assistance of the Louisiana courts and laws to obtain custody of Ahmed. Because Dr. Bak-haty did not already have such custody by order of any court, he did not meet the statutory requisites for such a warrant and cannot invoke that statute's limitations on jurisdiction. See LSA-R.S. 9:343(A); LSA-R.S. 13:3201(B); LSA-Ch.C. art. 1302.1(8).
. Mr. Zohdy also acted as Ms. Amin's attorney in some of the initial stages of this proceeding, including assisting her in drawing up the petition. As part of his assignment of error, Dr. Bakhaty claims the court erred in refusing to allow discovery through the deposition of Mr. Zhody concerning his actions on behalf of Ms. Amin. However, the portions of the record sent to this court do not include the transcript of the hearing at which the discovery matters were resolved. The record does contain the court's judgment of January 27, 2000, as well as written reasons. The court found Dr. Bakhaty had failed to present sufficient evidence of all four factors required by Article 508 of the Louisiana Code of Evidence to justify the deposition of a party's attorney. The court also concluded that extraordinary circumstances were not shown. LSA-C.C.P. art. 1452(B). We find no legal error in the court's refusal to order Mr. Zohdy to submit to a deposition, nor do we find any prejudice to Dr. Bakhaty's case due to the court's decision.
. Ms. Aby is an expert on Egyptian/Islamic family law who testified on behalf of Dr. Bak-haty.
. Dr. Bakhaty cites cases from other jurisdictions in which Islamic family law was addressed in the context of applying the UCCJA. See Ivaldi v. Ivdldi, 147 N.J. 190, 685 A.2d 1319 (1996); Hosain v. Malik, 108 Md.App. 284, 671 A.2d 988 (Md.1996). These cases, while instructive, are factually dissimilar and are not binding on the trial court or this court, which must decide on the particular facts of the matter being considered.
. Contrary to Dr. Bakhaty's argument, the best interest of the child is made part of the jurisdictional determination under the "residual jurisdiction" provision of the UCCJA. LSA-R.S. 13:1702(A)(4)(ii).