Case Name: Madie BRADLEY, wife of Emanual JONES v. Emanual JONES
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1974-06-10
Citations: 297 So. 2d 198
Docket Number: No. 53657
Parties: Madie BRADLEY, wife of Emanual JONES v. Emanual JONES.
Judges: SANDERS, C. J., dissents with written reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 297
Pages: 198–205

Head Matter:
Madie BRADLEY, wife of Emanual JONES v. Emanual JONES.
No. 53657.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
June 10, 1974.
Rehearing Denied July 1, 1974.
Concurring Opinion July 2, 1974.
William L. Brockman, Student Practitioner, Arthur A. Lemann, III, Loyola Law School Clinic, New Orleans, for plaintiff-applicant.
Philippi P. St. Pee’, Metairie, Jefferson Bar Assn. President Francipane, Regan & St. Pee’, Metairie, for amicus curiae.

Opinion:
BARHAM, Justice.
This suit began as an action for divorce in forma pauperis. The petition for divorce prayed for appointment of an attorney to represent the defendant, alleged to be a non-resident believed to be residing in Hazelhurst, Mississippi. Upon learning that the relator, Madie Bradley Jones, could pay neither the fee nor the expenses of an appointed attorney, the district court refused to sign the necessary order for appointment of an attorney to represent the absent defendant. An application for supervisory writs to the Fourth Circuit was granted on November 21, 1972 but, subsequent to argument in the Court of Appeal, the writ was recalled and the action of the trial court in refusing to order the appointment was affirmed. 276 So.2d 802 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973). We granted writs to review the Court of Appeal's determination. 281 So.2d 735 (La.1973).
The issue for our determination is twofold: (1) Do the laws of the State of Louisiana grant relator, an indigent plaintiff in a divorce action against an absent defendant, the right to a determination of the merits of her suit by assuring the requisite notice and service of process through appointment of an attorney without requiring relator to compensate him for services and expenses, and (2) If the laws do not grant relator this right, do these laws which result in denial violate due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution ?
The statutory laws determinative of the issues requiring resolution are as follows:
Code of Civil Procedure Article 5181:
"An individual who is unable to pay the costs of court, because of his poverty and lack of means, may prosecute or defend a judicial proceeding in any trial or appellate court without paying the costs in advance, or as they accrue, or furnishing security therefor." (Emphasis here and elsewhere supplied).
Code of Civil Procedure Article 5091, in pertinent part, provides:
"The court shall appoint an attorney at law to represent the defendant, on the petition or ex parte written motion of the plaintiff, when:
(1)It has jurisdiction over the person or property of the defendant, or over the status involved, and the defendant is:
(a) a nonresident or absentee who has not been served with process, either personally or through an agent for the service of process, and who has made no general appearance;
"All proceedings against such a defendant shall be conducted contradictorily against the attorney at law appointed by the court to represent him."
Code of Civil Procedure Article 5096, in pertinent part, provides:
"The court shall allow the attorney at law appointed to represent a defendant a reasonable fee for his services, which shall be paid by the plaintiff, but shall be taxed as costs of court."
Code of Civil Procedure Article 1201, in pertinent part, provides:
"Citation and service thereof are essential in all civil actions except summary and executory proceedings. Without them all proceedings are absolutely null."
Code of Civil Procedure Article 5185 provides:
"When an order of court permits a party to litigate without the payment of costs, until this order is rescinded, he is entitled to:
(1) All services required by law of a sheriff, clerk of court, court reporter, notary, or other public officer in, or in connection with, the judicial proceeding including but not limited to the filing of pleadings and exhibits, the issuance of certificates, the certification of copies of notarial acts and public records, the issuance and service of subpoenas and process, the taking and transcribing of testimony, and the preparation of a record of appeal;
(2) The right to the compulsory attendance of witnesses for the purpose of testifying, either in court or by deposition, without the payment of the fees, mileage, and other expenses allowed these witnesses by law;
(3) The right to a trial by jury and to the services of jurors, when allowed by law and applied for timely; and
(4) The right to a devolutive appeal, and to apply for supervisory writs.
"He is not entitled to a suspensive appeal, or to an order or judgment required by law to be conditioned on his furnishing security other than for costs, unless he furnishes the necessary security therefor.
"No public officer is required to make any cash outlay to perform any duty imposed on him under any article in this Chapter."
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 91 S.Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971) held that, " given the basic position of the marriage relationship in this society's hierarchy of values and the concomitant ,state monopolization of the means for legally dissolving this relationship, due process does prohibit a State from denying, solely because of inability to pay, access to its courts to individuals who seek judicial dissolution of their marriages."
The statutory scheme at issue in Boddie was the State's requirement that a litigant's right to access to the courts in matters concerning the dissolution of marriage be conditioned on the payment of court fees and costs for service of process. The issue, however, was not simply the right to file a divorce action without payment of these court fees, but the right to obtain court relief. See Boddie v. Connecticut, supra, at p. 374, 91 S.Ct. 780. The Boddie court found that these statutory requirements for payment of court fees were an "exclusive precondition to the adjustment of a fundamental human relationship" and that the imposition of these requirements on indigent litigants as a prerequisite to obtaining court relief was a denial of due process.
Our statutory scheme provides a manner by which a person with adequate means may obtain a divorce when the defendant is an absentee or non-resident (C.C.P. Arts. 5091 and 5096), and provides a method whereby an indigent plaintiff may obtain without cost a divorce when the defendant's whereabouts are known and he is within the jurisdiction of the court (C.C.P. Art. 5185). However, C.C.P. Art. 5096's requirement of payment of attorney's fees by the plaintiff, as interpreted and applied by the courts below, effectively deprives an indigent plaintiff proceeding against an absent defendant in a divorce action due process and equal protection of the laws.
It is the opinion of this Court that the legislature's action in amending C.C.P. Art. 5181 in 1972 to include the right to litigate separation and divorce cases in forma pau-peris evidences a clear intent to fully conform to the requirements set forth in the Boddie decision. Nevertheless, there exists a hiatus in our statutory law evidenced by a neglect to provide an indigent plaintiff the right to service of process without cost when the defendant proceeded against is outside the jurisdiction of our courts. We cannot, consistent with due process, approve the application of C.C.P. Art. 5096, as interpreted by the lower courts, to this relator when the result would be to deprive her of her due process right to a judicial determination of the merits of her case.
Under the circumstances, we are constrained to hold Code of Civil Procedure Article 5096 inapplicable in this case because, if applied to this relator, it would abridge her due process right to judicial determination of the merits of her case and of the equal protection of the laws.
No alternative method for satisfying federal constitutional due process notice requirements is provided by our law. The only statutory method for affordng an absent defendant his due process right to notice and opportunity to be heard is by the appointment of an attorney for service of process who, in turn, is statutorily obliged to attempt to communicate with the defendant and urge all available defenses to the action. Although other less costly procedures, which do not involve the professional services of an attorney and which do meet minimum constitutional requirements of notice, are employed by other jurisdictions, Louisiana has chosen a pro cedure embodying higher and, we think, more satisfactory standards for effecting service on an absent defendant and safeguarding his rights. Relator is entitled to invoke this procedure.
It is the opinion of the Court that the decisions of the Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit in Bolden v. City of Shreveport, 278 So.2d 138 (1973) and Jones v. Anderson, 277 So.2d 697 (1973) (writs denied by this Court in both cases), though dealing with a different aspect of proceedings in forma pauperis, demonstrate proper handling of the related issues involved therein and, by analogy, parallel the result we reach here. Both of the cited cases dealt with motions by public official defendants to have indigent plaintiffs furnish bonds, pursuant to R.S. 42:261(D), to cover defendants' attorney's fees in the event that plaintiffs were unsuccessful in their actions. R.S. 42:261(D), in pertinent part, provides:
" The defendant public official shall have the right by rule to require the plaintiff to furnish bond, as in the case of 'bond for costs, to cover such attorneys' fees before proceeding with the trial of said cause."
The Jones decision points out that the statute governing bond for costs, R.S. 13:4522, notes its inapplicability to pauper cases, and concludes that the R.S. 42:261(D) bond is, therefore, likewise inapplicable.
In the case sub judice, the applicable C. C.P. Art. 5096 provides that fees due attorneys appointed by the court to represent absent defendants are to be "taxed as costs of court." Since C.C.P. Art. 5181 exempts the indigent plaintiff from the payment of costs of court, we have no difficulty, consistent with the application of Boddie principles, in making an analogy, similar to that made in Jones, in the case at hand. Since indigents are exempt from prepaying costs of court and from paying these costs as they accrue, and since the attorney's fees under C.C.P. 5096 are characterized as costs of court at least for "taxing" purposes, we hold that payment of the attorney's fees may not be made a condition precedent to the attorney's appointment by the court in forma pauperis proceedings.
An attorney's free representation of a client is a well established feature of our system of justice in certain classes of cases, i. e., criminal cases involving indigent defendants. Just as members of the profession are called upon to represent clients without payment of a fee, so are lawyers appointed by the court to represent the interests of absent defendants, non-residents, incompetents and minors where, often, more than adequate fees are paid. Unre-compensed service to indigent clients is considered a responsibility of attorneys who are privileged to practice law. Funds have been established for the payment of attorneys who represent indigent criminal defendants in many areas; similar provisions can be made to cover this situation.
Insofar as the out-of-pocket expenses of appointed attorneys are concerned, we believe that these expenses are minimal and that the instances when this situation will arise are negligible. Provisions for reimbursement of out-of-pocket expenses could easily be included in any fund established to provide fees for the appointed attorney. It is not our function or duty to fund attorneys for absentees in suits in forma pauperis. It is our obligation to afford equal protection and due process to litigants, including the indigent. Our present construction of the applicable law makes it constitutional in application.
For the reasons stated hereinabove, we reverse the judgments of the lower courts and remand the cause to the trial court for the appointment of an attorney to represent the named absent defendant in this suit and for subsequent proceedings in accordance with law.
SANDERS, C. J., dissents with written reasons.
MARCUS, J., dissents with written reasons.
. Prior to its amendment in 1972, this article excluded actions for divorce and separation from bed and board from that class of actions which was authorized to be prosecuted or defended in forma pauperis. In 1972, according to the Official Revision Comment added in that year, the article was amended to include such actions to conform to the rule in Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 91 S.Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971).
. Id. Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950), the United State Supreme Court stated, with reference to this issue: " Tlius, it has been recognized that in the case of persons missing or unknown, employment of an indirect and even a probably futile means of notification is all that the situation permits and creates no constitutional bar to a final decree foreclosing their rights. "