Case Name: STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Del E. ROMERO, Defendant-Appellee
Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico
Jurisdiction: New Mexico
Decision Date: 2003-11-11
Citations: 135 N.M. 53
Docket Number: No. 22,836
Parties: STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Del E. ROMERO, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: I CONCUR: LYNN PICKARD, Judge.
Reporter: New Mexico Reports
Volume: 135
Pages: 53–68

Head Matter:
2004-NMCA-012
84 P.3d 670
STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Del E. ROMERO, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 22,836.
Court of Appeals of New Mexico.
Nov. 11, 2003.
Certiorari Granted No. 27,411, Jan. 20, 2004.
Patricia A. Madrid, Attorney General, Margaret McLean, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant.
John B. Bigelow, Chief Public Defender, Laurel A. Knowles, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee.
Lester K. Taylor, Stephen H. Greetham, Nordhaus, Haltom, Taylor, Taradash & Bladh, L.L.P., Albuquerque, NM, for Amicus Curiae, Taos Pueblo.
Frank A. Demolli, Pueblo of Pojoaque Legal Department, Santa Fe, NM, for Amicus Curiae, Pueblo of Pojoaque.

Opinion:
OPINION
ALARID, Judge.
{1} This case presents a question of the State's jurisdiction to prosecute a member of Taos Pueblo charged with committing an aggravated battery upon another member of Taos Pueblo on land located within the original boundaries of the land grant from the King of Spain to Taos Pueblo, but which is now part of the town of Taos, New Mexico. We hold that by operation of federal law, the land on which the alleged crime occurred is no longer Indian country, and that the State has jurisdiction to prosecute Defendant.
BACKGROUND
{2} Defendant-Appellee, Del E. Romero, was indicted by a Taos County grand jury on one count of aggravated battery, stemming from an incident at the Pueblo Allegre Mall in the town of Taos, New Mexico. Defendant moved to dismiss the charge against him on the ground that he is an Indian, that the Pueblo Allegre Mall is located in Indian country, and that New Mexico lacked subject matter jurisdiction to prosecute criminal charges against an Indian for an offense committed in Indian country. Defendant requested an evidentiary hearing on his motion to dismiss. The State filed a short response asserting that the Pueblo Allegre Mall is "within the geographical boundaries of the Town of Taos, and outside the exterior boundaries of the Taos Pueblo."
{3} The trial court held an evidentiary hearing. Defendant and the State stipulated that both Defendant and the alleged victim are members of Taos Pueblo. The evidence presented to the trial court included various maps of the town of Taos and the lands surrounding Taos Pueblo.
{4} Defendant, citing State v. Ortiz, 105 N.M. 308, 731 P.2d 1352 (Ct.App.1986), argued that federal law preempted state criminal jurisdiction in Indian country. According to Defendant, the Pueblo Allegre Mall is located on land that was owned by Taos Pueblo at the time New Mexico was admitted as a state, and therefore is included within the definition of Indian country set out in Article XXI, Section 8 of the New Mexico Constitution: "lands owned or occupied by [the Pueblo Indians] on the twentieth day of June, nineteen hundred and ten, or which are occupied by them at the time of the admission of New Mexico as a state."
{5} The State, referring to a plat prepared by the Pueblo Lands Board, argued that Pueblo title to the tract on which the Pueblo Allegre Mall is located had been extinguished pursuant to the Pueblo Lands Act, eh. 331, 43 Stat. 636 (1924) (the PLA).
{6} In a letter decision, the trial court found that the Pueblo Allegre Mall is located on privately owned property within the town limits of Taos, in an area "within the original exterior boundaries of the Taos Pueblo Grant." The trial court further found that Pueblo title to the land underlying the Pueblo Allegre Mall was "extinguished" pursuant to the PLA. Applying Ortiz, the trial court held that extinguishment of Pueblo title pursuant to the PLA did not "diminish or change" the boundaries of Taos Pueblo. The trial court concluded that the State lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court entered a separate order of dismissal, incorporating its letter decision.
{7} The State filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
{8} Under federal law, the United States has exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute certain serious offenses committed by Indians within Indian country. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2000); Ortiz, 105 N.M. at 310, 731 P.2d at 1354 (discussing exclusive federal jurisdiction under Major Crimes Act). There is no dispute that Defendant is an enrolled member of Taos Pueblo, and that the offense with which he is charged — aggravated battery causing serious bodily harm — is one of the offenses listed in § 1153. Further, as previously noted, the trial court found that the Pueblo Allegre Mall is located on privately owned property within the town limits of Taos, in an area "within the original exterior boundaries of the Taos Pueblo Grant," and that Pueblo title to the land underlying the Pueblo Allegre Mall was extinguished pursuant to the PLA. These findings are not attacked by either party to this appeal and we therefore accept them as operative facts for purposes of this appeal. This appeal ultimately turns upon a question of law: did extinguishment of the Pueblo title to the lands underlying the town of Taos pursuant to the PLA permanently change the jurisdictional status of this land? We conclude that it did, and that the 926 acres underlying the town of Taos as to which title was quieted against Taos Pueblo pursuant to the PLA are not Indian country. Accordingly, the State may prosecute Defendant for his alleged offense.
Indian Country Defined
{9} In 1948 Congress enacted the current definition of Indian country:
"Indian country" . means (a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States ., and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same.
18 U.S.C. § 1151(2000). For the State to prevail, we must be persuaded that Pueblo Allegre Mall is not located within any of the three categories of lands comprising Indian country set out in § 1151.
{10} There is no serious question as to the inapplicability of Subsection (c). Allotment is a term of art in Indian law "referring to land owned by individual Indians and either held in trust by the United States or subject to a statutory restriction on alienation." Felix S. Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law 40 (Rennard Strickland, et al., eds.1982) (hereinafter "Cohen "). The lands comprising the Taos Pueblo land grant are owned communally, and therefore are not allotments. See United States v. Chavez, 290 U.S. 357, 360, 54 S.Ct. 217, 78 L.Ed. 360 (1933) (observing that the lands of Isleta Pueblo, "like those of other pueblos of New Mexico" are owned communally).
{11} We are also satisfied that Subsection (a) is not applicable in the present case. At one time it was generally accepted, and we so held, that the categories of Indian lands described in Subsections (a) and (b) were largely interchangeable for purposes of jurisdictional analysis. Cohen at 38; Ortiz, 105 N.M. at 310, 731 P.2d at 1354. However, that position is no longer tenable. In Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government, 522 U.S. 520, 118 S.Ct. 948, 140 L.Ed.2d 30 (1998), the United States Supreme Court held that dependent Indian communities "refers to a limited category of Indian lands that are neither reservations nor allotments." Id. at 527 (emphasis added). There can be no question that the Taos Pueblo land grant is a dependent Indian community: the very term "dependent Indian communities" was adopted in United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 34 S.Ct. 1, 58 L.Ed. 107 (1913), to describe New Mexico Pueblos. Indeed, "[t]he entire text of § 1151(b), and not just the term 'dependent Indian communities,' is taken virtually verbatim from Sandoval." Venetie, 522 U.S. at 530, 118 S.Ct. 948; see also Cohen at 34 (characterizing Subsection (b) as "codifying" the phrase "dependent Indian communities"). As a dependent Indian community the Taos Pueblo land grant by definition is not an Indian reservation. Applying Venetie, we hold that if the situs of the alleged crime in this case is Indian country, it is by operation of Subsection 1151(b).
The PLA
{12} Early decisions of the territorial supreme court and the United States Supreme Court held that Pueblo Indians of New Mexico, unlike other Indians, were not in a state of tutelage and that neither the Pueblo Indians nor their property were under the guardianship of the federal government. E.g., United States v. Joseph, 94 U.S. 614, 24 L.Ed. 295 (1876). As a result of these cases, it was understood that Pueblo Indians could convey good title to Pueblo lands notwithstanding federal law generally restricting the alienation of Indian lands. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237, 240-42, 105 S.Ct. 2587, 86 L.Ed.2d 168 (1985). "Relying on the rule established in Joseph, 3,000 non-Indians had acquired putative ownership of parcels of real estate located inside the boundaries of the Pueblo land grants." Id. at 243.
{13} In 1910 Congress enacted enabling legislation contemplating the admission of New Mexico as a state. New Mexico Enabling Act, ch. 310, 36 Stat. 557 (1910). As a condition of admission, Congress required the people of New Mexico to enact "an ordinance irrevocable without the consent of the United States and the people [of New Mexico]" recognizing that lands "now owned or occupied by the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico" were Indian country. New Mexico Enabling Act, ch. 310, § 2, 36 Stat. at 558. In view of the Joseph decision, there was a substantial question as to whether Congress had the authority under the Indian Commerce Clause to define Pueblo lands as Indian country. In Sandoval, the United States Supreme Court upheld the Enabling Act as a valid exercise of Congress's power to regulate commerce with Indian tribes. The Court held that Pueblo Indians are "Indians" within the meaning of the Indian Commerce Clause and that the Pueblo Indians, like other Indians, were to be viewed as wards of the •federal government. Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 46-47, 34 S.Ct. 1. The Supreme Court characterized Section 2 of the Enabling Act as having "prescribed, in substance, that the lands then owned or occupied by the Pueblo Indians should be deemed and treated as Indian country within the meaning of [federal law prohibiting the introduction of intoxicating liquor into Indian country] and of kindred legislation by Congress." Id. at 36-37, 34 S.Ct. 1 (emphasis added; footnote omitted).
{14} Sandoval's holding that Pueblo Indians were wards of the federal government generally subject to federal laws governing Indians called into question the validity of the Joseph decision, and clouded the title of thousands of non-Indians who had acquired lands within the boundaries of the Pueblo land grants without the approval of the federal government. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. at 243-44, 105 S.Ct. 2587.
{15} Congress responded to the problem of claims by non-Indians to lands within Pueblo land grants by enacting the PLA. The PLA established the Pueblo Lands Board to investigate the state of title of lands within the boundaries of the various Pueblos, and provided a mechanism whereby Pueblo title to tracts of land could be extinguished in favor of non-Indian claimants under prescribed conditions. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. at 244-45, 105 S.Ct. 2587. The Secretary of the Interior was to file "field notes and plat for each [Pjueblo . showing the lands to which the Indian title has been extinguished." PLA, ch. 331, § 13, 43 Stat. at 640. Certified copies of these field notes were to be "accepted in any court as competent and conclusive evidence of the extinguishment of all the right, title, and interest of the Indians in and to the lands so described . and of any claim of the United States in or to the same.'' Id. (emphasis added). A decree in favor of a non-Indian claimant pursuant to the PLA had "the effect of a deed of quitclaim as against the United States and said Indians." PLA, ch. 331, § 5, 43 Stat. at 637. Among the Pueblo lands as to which Pueblo title was extinguished by the PLA were 926 acres occupied by the town of Taos, which intruded into the southwest corner of the original Taos Pueblo grant. See generally United States v. Pueblo of Taos, 33 Ind. Cl. Comm. 82 (1974), aff'd, 207 Ct.Cl. 53, 515 F.2d 1404 (1975).
{16} Congress's provision in the PLA for the extinguishment of Pueblo title is particularly significant because prior to the enactment of § 1151 in 1948 "Indian lands were judicially defined to include only those lands in which the Indians held some form of property interest." Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 468, 104 S.Ct. 1161, 79 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984). In 1834 Congress had enacted legislation regulating commerce with Indians. Ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729 (1834). Section 1 of the 1834 act contained the following definition of "Indian country":
[A]ll that part of the United States west of the Mississippi, and not within the states of Missouri and Louisiana, or the territory of Arkansas, and, also, that part of the United States east of the Mississippi river, and not within any state to which the Indian title has not been extinguished, for the purposes of this act, be taken and deemed to be the Indian country.
4 Stat. 729 (emphasis added). Although Section 1 of the 1834 act was repealed in 1874, Cohen at 31, no new definition of Indian country was enacted until 1948, and the United States Supreme Court continued to refer to the 1834 definition even after its repeal. Clairmont v. United States, 225 U.S. 551, 557, 32 S.Ct. 787, 56 L.Ed. 1201 (1912); see also Cohen at 35 (observing that "[t]he 1834 statutory definition of Indian country was expressly tied to Indian land title and the Supreme Court had not rejected this requirement before passage of [§ 1151]"). Relying on the 1834 definition of Indian country as lands "to which the Indian title has not been extinguished," the United States Supreme Court repeatedly stated that upon extinguishment of Indian title, status as Indian country ceases. E.g., Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S. 204, 24 L.Ed. 471 (1877). Extinguishment of Indian title restored the land in question to the jurisdiction of the state (or territory) in which the land was located without further action by Congress. Clairmont, 225 U.S. at 558, 32 S.Ct. 787. This rule "govern[ed] in the absence of a different provision by treaty or by act of Congress." Clairmont, 225 U.S. at 559, 32 S.Ct. 787.
{17} Defendant and Amicus Taos Pueblo argue that in enacting the PLA Congress intended to extinguish title to Pueblo lands without altering their jurisdictional status. This argument "contradicts the common understanding of the time" that tribal ownership was a component of status as Indian country, South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 346, 118 S.Ct. 789, 139 L.Ed.2d 773 (1998), and that upon extinguishment of Indian title the land in question ceased to be Indian country without the necessity of further action by Congress, Clairmont, 225 U.S. at 558, 32 S.Ct. 787. We construe the PLA "in light of the common notions of the day and the assumptions of those who drafted [it]." Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 206, 98 S.Ct. 1011, 55 L.Ed.2d 209 (1978). We find nothing in the PLA suggesting that Congress intended to depart from the established rule that status as Indian country ceases upon extinguishment of Indian title. We conclude that in enacting the PLA, Congress clearly understood that it was altering the jurisdictional status of those lands as to which title was quieted in favor of a non-Indian, and that unless Congress subsequently acted to restore the Indian country status of these lands they remain outside Indian country.
Effects of § 1151 on the Jurisdictional Status of Non-Indian Lands Within a Pueblo Land Grant
{18} Defendant argues that Indian title is no longer dispositive of status as Indian country. According to Defendant, § 1151 uncoupled status as Indian country from Indian title. The flaw in this argument is the erroneous assumption that Congress uncoupled Indian title and status as Indian country in all three categories of Indian country set out in § 1151.
{19} A close examination of § 1151 reveals that Congress has expressly uncoupled Indian title and status as Indian country only in Subsection (a). Subsection (a) codifies the holding of such cases as Kills Plenty v. United States, 133 F.2d 292 (1943), which had construed the phrase "within any Indian reservation" to confer federal criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed on land within reservation boundaries notwithstanding the fact that the crime scene was located on land that had been patented in fee to non-Indians. See § 1151, Historical and Statutory Notes. Some lower courts, however, had reached a contrary result. Cohen at 36. When Congress enacted § 1151 in 1948, it eliminated any doubt that Subsection (a) represents a statutory departure from the traditional rule tying status as Indian country to Indian title by adding the additional language, "all lands" and "notwithstanding the issuance of any patent." Cohen at 35, 37. However, any suggestion that Congress generally intended to abrogate the rule tying status as Indian country to Indian title is refuted by Subsection (c), which expressly maintains the linkage between Indian title and status as Indian country. See Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Yazzie, 909 F.2d 1387, 1421-22 (10th Cir.1990) (recognizing that Congress has authorized "checkerboard jurisdiction" outside reservations in Subsections 1151(b) and (c)).
{20} Subsection (b) does not employ the phrases "all lands within the limits of any Indian reservation" and "notwithstanding the issuance of any patent" which accomplish the uncoupling of Indian title and status as Indian country in Subsection (a). As noted in Venetie, Subsection (b) is a codification of a different line of authority and is largely drawn from the Supreme Court's discussion of Pueblo Indians in Sandoval.
{21} We find support for the conclusion that Congress intended Subsection 1151(b) to maintain the linkage between Pueblo title and status as Indian country in the legislative history of the Santo Domingo Pueblo Claims Settlement Act of 2000. Pub.L. 106-425, 114 Stat. 1890 (2000) [codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1777 through 1777e (2000)](SDPCSA). Congress enacted the SDPCSA as enabling legislation for the settlement of longstanding disputes over lands claimed by Santo Domingo Pueblo, including a dispute arising out of a decision of the Pueblo Lands Board which purported to extinguish Pueblo title to 27,000 acres within the Santo Domingo Pueblo Grant'. SDPCSA, § 2. Section 6 of the SDPCSA, "Affirmation of accurate boundaries of Santo Domingo Pueblo Grant," provides:
(a) In general
The boundaries of the Santo Domingo Pueblo Grant, as determined by the 1907 Hall-Joy Survey, confirmed in the Report of the Pueblo Lands Board, dated December 28,1927, are hereby declared to be the current boundaries of the Grant and any lands currently owned by or on behalf of the Pueblo within such boundaries, or any lands hereinafter acquired by the Pueblo within the Grant in fee absolute, shall be considered to be Indian country within the meaning of section 1151 of title 18.
(b) Limitation
Any lands or interests in lands within the Santo Domingo Pueblo Grant, that are not owned or acquired by the Pueblo, shall not be treated as Indian country within the meaning of section 1151 of title 18.
SDPCSA, § 6 (emphasis added). Read together, Subsections 6(a) and (b) clearly link status as Indian country to Pueblo title.
{22} A statement by Congress that a subsequent act is intended merely to "clarify" earlier legislation supports the inference that Congress understood the later legislation as continuing earlier law. Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 789, 103 S.Ct. 2187, 76 L.Ed.2d 312 (1983). Subsection 2(b)(3) of the SDPCSA recites that one of the purposes of the act was "to clarify governmental jurisdiction over the lands within the Pueblo's land claim area." 25 U.S.C. § 1777(b)(3).
{23} The inference that a subsequent statute merely restates pre-existing law is strengthened when the legislative history of the statute contains a statement disclaiming any intention to significantly alter pre-existing law. Bell, 461 U.S. at 789, 103 S.Ct. 2187. The legislative history of the SDPCSA includes the statement that the SDPCSA "make[s] no changes in existing law." S. Rep. 106-506 at 13 (2000) (emphasis added).
{24} If § 6 of the SDPCSA merely clarifies pre-existing law without changing that law, then Subsection 1151(b) itself must have been understood by Congress as adopting a rule linking status as Indian country to nonextinguishment of Pueblo title. Congress' subsequent interpretation of Subsection 1151(b) in the context of the SDPCSA, while not definitive, nevertheless has "persuasive value." Bell, 461 U.S. at 784, 103 S.Ct. 2187. We consider it unlikely that Congress would have created a special rule solely applicable to one Pueblo, further complicating jurisdictional analysis. We consider it far more likely that, as the legislative history of the SDPCSA states, Congress merely was clarifying a rule that it understood already applied to Pueblo lands by operation of Subsection 1151(b).
{25} Defendant's case for exclusive federal jurisdiction is based on the misconception that § 1151 has completely abrogated the traditional rule linking status as Indian country to Indian title. While we agree that Subsection (a) has displaced Bates-Clairmont with respect to crime scenes "within the limits of any Indian reservation," a New Mexico Pueblo land grant is not a "reservation" within the meaning of Subsection (a). Because it is undisputed that the crime scene in the present case is located on land to which Pueblo title has been extinguished, the crime scene is not Indian country for purposes of § 1153 and the State retains jurisdiction to prosecute Defendant.
{26} Our analysis is consistent with the United State's Supreme Court's decision in Venetie. To constitute a dependent Indian community, the land in question must satisfy two requirements: "first, [the land] must have been set aside by the Federal Government for the use of the Indians as Indian land; second, [it] must be under federal superintendence." 522 U.S. at 527, 118 S.Ct. 948. As we have noted above, a PLA decree in favor of a non-Indian and against a Pueblo extinguished both the Pueblo's and the United States' title. Where neither the United States (as guardian) nor the Pueblo (as ward) retain an interest in the land in question, there is nothing that can be said to be set aside for the use of Indians. See Seymour v. Superintendent of Wash. State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351, 357-58, 82 S.Ct. 424, 7 L.Ed.2d 346 (1962) (suggesting that but for enactment of Subsection 1151(a) land within reservation owned in fee by non-Indian would not be Indian country because it "cannot be said to be reserved for Indians"); United States v. Conway, 175 U.S. 60, 68, 20 S.Ct. 13, 44 L.Ed. 72 (1899) (observing that grant by United States of property it does not own is "a simple nullity"). Land to which title has been quieted in favor of a non-Indian under the PLA cannot satisfy the set-aside prong of Venetie. 522 U.S. at 527, 118 S.Ct. 948.
{27} We are aware of the canon of construction that "statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit." Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 88, 122 S.Ct. 528, 151 L.Ed.2d 474 (2001) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). We will assume that it is to the Pueblos' benefit to have Subsection (b) construed so that the status as Indian country of Pueblo lands is not tied to Pueblo title. However, canons of construction are "guides that 'need not be conclusive.' " Id. at 94, 122 S.Ct. 528 (quoting Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 115, 121 S.Ct. 1302, 149 L.Ed.2d 234 (2001)). "[0]ther circumstances evidencing congressional intent can overcome their force." Id. at 94, 122 S.Ct. 528. We believe that such "other circumstances" are present here.
{28} We recognize that previously we have blurred the distinction between the definitions contained in Subsections (a) and (b). See Ortiz, 105 N.M. at 311-12, 731 P.2d at 1355-56. We did so prior to the Supreme Court's pronouncements in Venetie and without the benefit of Congress' subsequent legislative construction of Subsection 1151(b) in the SDPCSA. As the present case makes clear, there are potentially dispositive differences between the scope of Subsections (a) and (b). We therefore disavow Ortiz to the extent it suggests otherwise.
Solem is Inapplicable
{29} Defendant, citing Solem v. Bartlett, argues that the State was required to prove that the exterior boundaries of the Taos Pueblo land grant have been diminished so that the town of Taos is no longer within the land grant's exterior boundaries; and, that, absent such a showing, all land within the original boundaries of the land grant remains Indian country regardless of whether or not Indian title has been extinguished. We disagree.
{30} Diminishment analysis arises out of a completely different historical context: allotment and surplus lands acts.
Many Indian reservations contain significant amounts of nonmember lands, due to the late-nineteenth-century policy of allotting reservation lands to individual tribal members. Allotments were subject to an initial 25-year restriction on alienation, after which an allottee could receive a patent-in-fee to the land. Although the general restriction on alienation was later extended indefinitely, many allottees nonetheless received patents-in-fee to their allotments, which terminated the trust responsibilities of the United States and allowed alienation of the allotted parcels. Many of the patented allotments were eventually sold to nonmembers. Such allotments generally remain part of the reservation.
Once a reservation was fully allotted, Congress usually enacted legislation opening the remaining or "surplus" reservation lands to nonmember settlement. The method used to open reservation lands to settlement varied widely.... Whatever the method, the purpose of the surplus land acts was to return the lands to the public domain and thereby allow nonmember settlement under homesteading and other land disposal laws. While all the acts accomplished this, not all removed the lands from the reservation.
American Indian Law Deskbook 54 (Joseph P. Mazurek, et al., eds.1998). Diminishment analysis is concerned with determining whether Congress intended a surplus land act to remove reservation lands opened to non-Indian settlement from the reservation:
Whether Congress, in opening surplus lands to nonmember settlement, freed those lands from their reservation status is a question of congressional intent. Intent to remove reservation status is rarely found on the face of the involved statute since Congress, during the era of the surplus land acts, anticipated that the reservation system would shortly cease to exist. The process of allotting lands to tribal members and selling surplus lands to nonmembers was viewed as the "first step" toward Congress's ultimate aim of abolishing all Indian reservations, and Congress "failed to be meticulous in clarifying whether a particular piece of legislation formally sliced a certain parcel of land off one reservation." Since subsequent steps to abolish all reservations were never taken, the question becomes whether the surplus land acts, as the initial step in the process, were sufficient to complete the process in a single step instead of the expected series of steps. Courts have been unwilling to extrapolate from the overriding goal of abolishment a general congressional purpose of diminishing reservations with the passage of every surplus land act. Instead, courts examine each individual act to determine whether Congress intended the language of the specific act to diminish the reservation in question. Congressional intent is determined by examining the face of the act, its legislative history, events surrounding the act's passage, and subsequent treatment of the opened lands.
Id. at 56, 104 S.Ct. 1161. As Amicus Taos Pueblo concedes, "Congress never enacted a surplus lands act or otherwise opened Pueblo grant lands for non-Indian settlement."
{31} There is an additional historical ground for treating reservations and Pueblo land grants differently. In Solem the Supreme Court observed that
only Congress can divest a reservation of its land and diminish its boundaries. Once a block of land is set aside for an Indian reservation and no matter what happens to the title of individual plots within the area, the entire block retains its reservation status until Congress explicitly indicates otherwise.
465 U.S. at 470, 104 S.Ct. 1161. Solem relied upon United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278, 30 S.Ct. 93, 54 L.Ed. 195 (1909), as support for the above proposition. Solem, 465 U.S. at 470, 104 S.Ct. 1161. In Celestine, the United States Supreme Court observed that
[I]t was decided, in Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S. 204, 209, 24 L.Ed. 471, that all the country described . as "Indian country" remains such "so long as the Indians retain their original title to the soil, and ceases to be Indian country whenever they lose that title, in the absence of any different provision by treaty or by act of Congress."... But the word "reservation" has a different meaning, for while the body of land described in the section quoted as "Indian country" was a reservation, yet a reservation is not necessarily "Indian country." The word is used in the land law to describe any body of land, large or small, which Congress has reserved from sale for any purpose. It may be a military reservation, or an Indian reservation, or, indeed, one for any purpose for which Congress has authority to provide, and, when Congress has once established a reservation, all tracts included within it remain a part of the reservation until separated therefrom by Congress.
215 U.S. at 285, 30 S.Ct. 93 (emphasis added).
{32} The history of New Mexico Pueblos shows that Pueblo land grants are not "reservations" within the meaning of federal land law. Congress did not reserve the Pueblo lands out of lands ceded by the Pueblo Indians to the United States or out of public lands owned by the United States. United States v. Pueblo of San Ildefonso, 206 Ct.Cl. 649, 513 F.2d 1383, 1388 (1975). Rather, Congress merely confirmed the pre-existing claims of the Pueblos, authorizing the issuance of patents "as in ordinary cases to private individuals." Ch. 5, 11 Stat. 374 (1858). Pueblo land grants are no more federal reservations than are other private grants confirmed by the United States as required by international law and the treaty of Guadalupe Hildago. See 19 Pub. Lands Dee. 326, 327 (1894) [1894 WL 929 (D.O.I.)] (observing that patent to Cochiti Pueblo is "of the form adopted by the government with reference to all Spanish and Mexican land grants"); Pueblo of San Ildefonso, 513 F.2d at 1388.
{33} Defendant's reliance on Solem is misplaced. A test designed to determine Congress's intent in enacting a surplus lands act has no historical connection to Pueblo land grants.
CONCLUSION
{34} We reverse the trial court and vacate the order of dismissal. This matter is remanded for further prosecution of the charge against Defendant.
{35} IT IS SO ORDERED.
I CONCUR: LYNN PICKARD, Judge.
JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge (dissenting).
. We are aware that the United States government has set aside public lands in trust for the benefit of the Indians of Taos Pueblo. Pub.L. 91-55o, 84 Stat. 1437 (1970). The present appeal does not concern a crime scene located within the limits of these additional lands.
. In 1910, when Congress enacted the Enabling Act, the Joseph decision was still good law. Thus, both Congress in enacting the Enabling Act and the people of New Mexico in acceding to its terms would not necessarily have understood "all lands now owned or occupied by the Pueblo Indians" to have included lands within the original Pueblo land grants that were then owned and occupied by non-Indians.
. Congress maintained a statutory linkage between Indian title and federal jurisdiction in the enabling acts for states admitted between 1889 and 1959. See Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 479-80, 99 S.Ct. 740, 58 L.Ed.2d 740 (1979). Typical of these acts, § 2 of the New Mexico Enabling Act provides "that until the title of such Indian or Indian tribes shall have been extinguished the same shall be and remain subject to the disposition and under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the congress of the United States." Although the dissent correctly notes that the "[t]he Enabling Act recognized federal dominance and governance over lands then held or occupied by Pueblo Indians," Dissent, ¶ 39, it overlooks the language in § 2 by which Congress expressly linked federal dominance and governance of Indian lands to nonextinguishment of Indian title.