Case Name: VANCE v. ANANICH
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1985-09-30
Citations: 145 Mich. App. 833
Docket Number: Docket No. 73152
Parties: VANCE v ANANICH
Judges: Before: Danhof, C.J., and Beasley and M. R. Stempien, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 145
Pages: 833–846

Head Matter:
VANCE v ANANICH
Docket No. 73152.
Submitted November 9, 1984, at Lansing.
Decided September 30, 1985.
The City of Flint, by charter, created the post of city ombudsman and gave to that official the power to subpoena witnesses. James D. Ananich, in his capacity of Flint ombudsman, issued and had served upon Patricia Vance a subpoena requiring her to appear in his office to give testimony. Vance filed a petition in Genesee Circuit Court alleging that Ananich was without lawful authority to issue the subpoena and seeking that the subpoena be quashed and Ananich'be ordered to cease and desist from issuing subpoenas. The trial court, Thomas C. Yeotis, J., following a show cause hearing, held that the defendant had not been lawfully empowered to issue subpoenas and granted the requested injunctive relief. Defendant appealed. Held:
1. The power to issue a subpoena arises only from an express grant by the Legislature or where that power is essential to the fulfillment of some statutorily mandated objective.
2. While the home rule cities act does not specifically provide that home rule cities shall have the power to vest in a city ombudsman the authority to issue subpoenas, that act does grant sufficiently broad powers to home rule cities to warrant a finding that the power to issue subpoenas may be inferred from the powers granted, since it cannot be said that the granting of the power to issue subpoenas is contrary to any other statutory or constitutional mandate.
Reversed.
References for Points in Headnotes
Am Jur 2d, Witnesses §§ 9-13.
See the annotations in the ALR3d/4th Quick Index under Subpoena.
[2, 3, 4] Am Jur 2d, Municipal Corporations, Counties, and Other Political Subdivisions §§ 126-138.
Determination as to good faith and abolition of public office or employment subject to civil service or merit system. 87 ALR3d 1165.
Am Jur 2d, Court §§ 65, 66.
Inherent power of court to compel appropriation or expenditure of funds for judicial purposes. 59 ALR3d 569.
M. R. Stempien, J., dissented. He would hold that power to issue subpoenas should be found only where there is a specific grant of that power by the Legislature. Since the Legislature made no such grant of authority, the judiciary should not invade the province of the Legislature by determining that such power exists by implication. He would affirm the trial court’s granting of injunctive relief prohibiting the Flint ombudsman from issuing subpoenas.
Opinion of the Court
1. Witnesses — Subpoenas — Administrative Agencies.
The power to issue a subpoena, in general, must be expressly conferred by statute and, in the absence of a specific grant of authority, an administrative agency or official has no power to issue a subpoena; where the power to issue subpoenas is not expressly conferred, that power will not be implied unless essential to fulfillment of the objective of a statute.
2. Municipal Corporations — Home Rule Cities Act — Legislative Intent — Judicial Construction.
The home rule cities act was intended to secure a greater degree of home rule to cities and to confer on the cities almost exclusive right in the conduct of municipal affairs; to that end, the act is to be liberally construed, and the same presumption of constitutionality applies to a city ordinance as to a state statute (MCL 117.1 et seq.; MSA 5.2071 et seq.).
3. Municipal Corporations — Home Rule Cities Act — Subpoenas — Ombudsmen.
The grant of power under the home rule cities act is broad enough to allow a city to grant by ordinance to the city’s ombudsman the power to subpoena witnesses.
Dissent by M. R. Stempien, J.
4. Municipal Corporations — Subpoenas — Home Rule Cities Act — Ombudsmen.
Home rule cities do not have the authority to empower a city ombudsman to issue subpoenas, since the home rule cities act does not speciffcally grant to cities such authority, such authority is not reasonably inferable from the powers granted to home rule cities by the Legislature, and there is nothing to suggest that the Legislature intended to grant to home rule cities the authority to empower local officials with the right to issue subpoenas (MCL 117.1 et seq.; MSA 5.2071 et seq.).
5. Courts — Judicial Function.
It is not the judiciary’s function to legislate; the judiciary must interpret the law, not write it.
Howard R. Grossman, for defendant.
Before: Danhof, C.J., and Beasley and M. R. Stempien, JJ.
Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
Beasley, J.
This case presents an issue of first impression in Michigan which involves whether a municipal ombudsman may subpoena witnesses to appear before him. In fact, the whole matter of ombudsmen is of relatively recent origin in Michigan. Nationally, "ombudsmania" in the United States, which is defined as the emerging and growing ombudsman phenomenon, is sometimes said to date from 1966, when Walter Gellhorn published his seminal works on the subject. In the broad sense, the ombudsman concept is said to spring from the question of how best to inquire fairly and quickly into asserted official impropriety or insensitivity.
Some writers view the ombudsman concept as an informal procedural system which is in competition with our traditional adversary system for the resolution of governmental grievances. Those who believe in the ombudsman concept are likely to place limitations on the spread of adversary proceedings into every corner of the administrative law cupboard, as has occurred under the aegis of constitutional due process. Since we seem to be reaching the realization that use of the adversary process is, in some areas, bad social policy, perhaps the time has come to give the ombudsman concept a chance.
In the within case, defendant, James D. Ananich, in his capacity as ombudsman for the City of Flint, appeals as of right from a circuit court injunction permanently prohibiting him from issuing subpoenas.
Defendant is the ombudsman of the City of Flint and, in that capacity, he served plaintiff, Patricia Vance, with a subpoena to appear at his office on January 10, 1983, for the purpose of giving testimony. On January 5, plaintiff filed in circuit court a petition to quash the subpoena, alleging that defendant was without lawful authority to issue it. Following a show cause hearing, the circuit court granted plaintiff's petition and ordered defendant to "cease and desist from issuing subpoenas".
On appeal, defendant argues that conferring the power to issue an administrative subpoena upon the ombudsman was a valid exercise of permissive municipal powers under the home rule cities act, MCL 117.1 et seq.; MSA 5.2071 et seq. In general, the power to issue a subpoena must be expressly conferred by statute and, in the absence of a specific grant of authority, an administrative agency or official has no power to issue a subpoena. Subpoena power not expressly conferred will not be implied unless essential to fulfillment of the objectives of a statute.
Section 3-505 of the Charter of the City of Flint vests the city's ombudsman with subpoena power:
"A. The Ombudsman may request and shall be given necessary assistance and information by each agency.
"B. The Ombudsman may subpoena witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony, require the production of evidence relevant to a matter under investigation, enter and inspect premises within the control of any agency during regular business hours, and establish rules of procedure in accordance with Section 1-801 of this Charter."
The Flint City Charter was adopted pursuant to the home rule cities act. That act provides for certain mandatory provisions that all city charters must contain and also for other permissible provisions, which city charters may contain. The act also contains some express limitations on city power. The question of whether a city ombudsman has subpoena power involves neither a mandatory provision nor an express limitation. The issue in this case is whether it is a permissible exercise of municipal power. Section 4-j of the home rule cities act provides in pertinent part:
"Each city may in its charter provide:
"(1) For the establishment of any department that it may deem necessary for the general welfare of the city, and for the separate incorporation thereof: Provided, however, That these provisions shall not be construed to extend to and include public shcools;

"(3) For the exercise of all municipal powers in the management and control of muncipal property and in the administration of the municipal government, whether such powers be expressly enumerated or not; for any act to advance the interests of the city, the good government and prosperity of the municipality and its inhabitants and through its regularly constituted authority to pass all laws and ordinances relating to its municipal concerns subject to the constitution and general laws of this state." MCL 117.4j; MSA 5.2083.
It is this section that defendant contends gives cities the power of administrative subpoena.
Cases construing the home rule cities act have not been altogether consistent as to the scope of powers granted to the cities. People v Sell quoting from earlier decisions, explained the change in city government which resulted from the home rule cities act:
" 'The new system (referring to the home rule act) is one of general grant of rights and powers, subject only to certain enumerated restrictions, instead of the former method of only granting enumerated rights and powers definitely specified. We must assume the act was passed with that intent and construe it accordingly.' "
The act was intended to secure a greater degree of home rule and to confer almost exclusive right in the conduct of municipal affairs to the cities themselves. The act is to be liberally construed, and the same presumption of constitutionality applies to a city ordinance as to a state statute. Sell went on to state: "Except as limited by the Constitution or by statute, the police power of Detroit as a home rule city is of the same general scope and nature as that of the State."[ ]
In the within case, the trial court held that the home rule cities act granted the cities only those powers that are essential to local self-government, citing Dooley v Detroit, Home Owners' Loan Corp v Detroit, and Dawley v Ingham Circuit Judge. However, in Dooley, in addition to stating that powers exercised by home rule cities should be essential, the Court also went on to state that every power exercised by a city need not be specifi cally delegated by legislative grant. In Dawley, in which the Court sustained the power of the City of Lansing to pass a zoning ordinance, the Court stated:
"It is fundamental that the legislature has power to delegate to cities authority to enact such ordinances as are essential or incident to local governmental functions.[ ]
In holding that administrative subpoena power is not essential to city government, the trial court in the instant case placed much emphasis on the potential for abuse of subpoena power by the ombudsman and of a lack of standards controlling its use. As indicated, in Michigan, the ombudsman concept is of relatively recent origin. In part, it represents an effort to bring the bureaucracy under better public scrutiny and to give citizens a means to be heard regarding minor grievances against government. On the other side of the coin, an ombudsman lacking in judgment could unfairly harass and impede public officials, as the trial court suggests.
We view the ombudsman procedure as an innovative, experimental idea and believe that it should be given a chance to see how it works. In that way, the Legislature will be in a better position to decide whether to continue and expand the ombudsman concept or whether to limit and terminate the powers of the ombudsman. If the Legislature is to receive that opportunity, the ombudsman must be permitted to exercise subpoena power. Otherwise, the ombudsman could become a kind of toothless tiger, as ineffective as a nonvoting member of a debating society. In this case, no finding has been made that the subpoena power exercised herein was being abused, just that it might be in the future.
While, as the trial court stated, no express grant of administrative subpoena power can be found in the home rule cities act, there is statutory authority which supports such a power, at least by analogy. In MCL 88.18; MSA 5.1714, the Legislature provided the city councils of fourth class cities with a subpoena power to compel the attendance of witnesses pursuant to an investigation. Likewise, the Legislature has specifically allowed county boards of supervisors to issue administrative subpoenas in aid of investigations.
The home rule cities act was intended to confer upon the cities almost exclusive rights in the conduct of their affairs. As stated, its provisions are to be liberally construed. Only those local provisions in conflict with the constitution or state statutes should be found invalid. Since there is no constitutional or statutory authority which would invalidate municipal administrative subpoena power, and the act is to be liberally construed, we find that the home rule legislation authorizes issuance of subpoenas, as was done by the ombudsman in this case.
In summary, we believe that the home rule cities act allows the establishment of an ombudsman office by the City of Flint. Because we view this procedure as being within the lawful scope of the Flint City Charter and also a potentially promising alternative method of governmental grievance resolution, we decline to find unlawful the action of the city in equipping that office with the appropriate powers necessary to effectively carry out its objectives, i.e., administrative subpoena power. Thus, we find support for this conclusion in analogous statutes and in the policy objectives of the home rule cities act.
Finally, we would welcome action by the Legislature specifically dealing with ombudsmen, their powers and their limitations. Particularly, we would request expression of intention by the Legislature relative to issuance of subpoenas by ombudsmen. In holding that the statutes inferentially permit ombudsmen to lawfully issue subpoenas, we do not decide the limits on the purposes for which such subpoenas may be issued, except to indicate that their purposes must be within the parameters of the ombudsman's charter powers. For these reasons, we vacate the injunction issued by the trial court.
Reversed.
Danhof, C.J., concurred.
Verkuil, The Ombudsman and the Limits of the Adversary System, 75 Columbia Law Rev 845 (1975).
W. Gellhorn, Ombudsman and Others: Citizens' Protectors in Nine Countries (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1966), and W. Gellhorn, When Americans Complain: Governmental Grievance Procedures (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1966).
73 CJS, Public Administrative Law & Procedure, § 82, pp 563-564.
73 CJS 564, citing Combs v Lipton, 44 Misc 2d 467; 254 NYS2d 143 (1964).
310 Mich 305, 313; 17 NW2d 193 (1945).
310 Mich 313-314.
310 Mich 315.
370 Mich 194; 121 NW2d 724 (1963).
292 Mich 511; 290 NW 888 (1940).
242 Mich 247; 218 NW 766 (1928).
242 Mich 249.
MCL 46.3; MSA 5.323.