Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. Ernest Ray BROWN
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1973-08-20
Citations: 282 So. 2d 707
Docket Number: No. 53308
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Ernest Ray BROWN
Judges: SUMMERS, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 282
Pages: 707–711

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. Ernest Ray BROWN
No. 53308.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Aug. 20, 1973.
Dissenting Opinion Aug. 29, 1973.
Kirby & McLeod, Robert P. McLeod, Monroe, for defendant-appellee.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., LeRoy A. Hartley, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Ragan D. Madden, Dist. Atty., O. L. Waltman, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellant.

Opinion:
MARCUS, Justice.
The State has appealed from a ruling of the trial judge declaring R.S. 14:103(B) (2) (e) unconstitutional and sustaining the motion to quash the charge thereunder. Defendant was charged by bill of information with disturbing the peace as defined by R.S. 14:103(B)(2)(e) "in that he congregated and assembled in a street, road or highway, and in or around a public building, and engaged in loud and boisterous talking and other disorderly conduct, on the campus of Grambling College, Grambling, Louisiana."
The defendant filed a motion to quash the information, challenging the constitutionality of the statute. The motion avers that R.S. 14:103(B) (2) (e) is vague and overbroad in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and clearly punishes the conduct and speech which are protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
On the basis of this Court's recent holdings in State v. Ganch, 263 La. 251, 268 So.2d 214 (1972) and State v. Adams, 263 La. 286, 268 So.2d 228 (1972), both involving breach of the peace offenses, the trial judge ordered the bill of information herein filed quashed. He held that the portion of the statute under which the charge was brought R.S. 14:103(B) (2) (e), was overly broad and unconstitutional.
R.S. 14 ¡103(B)(2) in paragraph (e) denounces the following conduct so charged in the bill of information:
"(e) Congregates and assembles in any street, avenue, alley, road or highway, or in or around any public building or inclosure, or any park or reservation, or at the entrance of any private building or inclosure, and engages in loud and boisterous talking or other disorderly conduct, "
The State, in this appeal from that ruling, urges that the cases of State v. Ganch and State v. Adams are not apposite. It is submitted that the section of Title 14 herein declared unconstitutional is unlike Section 103(A)(2) in the Adams case and Section 103(A)(7) in the Ganch case. The State urges that the section now under consideration sets out specifically the place or places where the statute is applicable and also specifically the speech, conduct or expression which is prohibited.
We do not agree with the position of the State. The bill of information in this case brought under the statute charges disturbing the peace by assembly and speech, both constitutionally protected by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.
In Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 85 S.Ct. 453, 13 L.Ed.2d 471 (1965), R.S. 14:103.1 was held unconstitutional. The United States Supreme Court stated:
" [T]he statute is unconstitutional in that it sweeps within its broad scope activities that are constitutionally protected free speech and assembly. Maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion is a basic tenent of our constitutional democracy. As Chief Justice Hughes stated in Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369, 51 S.Ct. 532, 536, 75 L.Ed. 1117, 1122, 73 A.L.R. 1484: 'A statute which upon its face, and as authoritatively construed, is so vague and indefinite as to permit the punishment of the fair use of this opportunity is repugnant to the guaranty of liberty contained in the Fourteenth Amendment.' "
In State v. Harrison, 280 So.2d 215 (handed down by this Court on June 29, 1973), the defendants were charged with violation of R.S. 14:103.1, subd. A(l) in that they did "knowingly and intentionally crowd and congregate with each other and did fail and refuse to disperse and move on when requested to do so. . . We held that the trial judge correctly quashed the bill of information and cited Cox v. Louisiana and State v. Ganch as authority.
The Ganch case involved a charge of disturbing the peace in that defendants "committed an act in such a manner as would foreseeably disturb and alarm the public" under R.S. 14:103 (A) (7). We there held that, since conduct is often a means of expression, it can only withstand constitutional attack if it cannot be applied to expression which is protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. We concluded:
"The statute on its face is susceptible of application to expression protected by the Louisiana Constitution (Art. 1, Sec. 3) and the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Since we have not heretofore limited the statute in application to expression which is not constitutionally protected, it must fall as being overly broad and in contravention of the Louisiana and United States Constitutions."
The United States Supreme Court in Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 92 S.Ct. 1103, 31 L.Ed.2d 408 (1972), stated:
"The constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech forbid the States to punish the use of words or language not within 'narrowly limited classes of speech.' Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571, 62 S.Ct. 766, 769, 86 L.Ed. 1031, 1035 (1942). In other words, the statute must be carefully drawn or be authoritatively construed to punish only unprotected speech and not be susceptible of application to protected expression. "
The instant case is almost identical to that of State v. Adams, in which the bill charged violation of R.S. 14:103 (A) (2) in that the defendant "did use unnecessarily loud, offensive and insulting language in such a manner as would foreseeably disturb and alarm the public." We there stated that this section punishes only spoken words and, hence, on its face, the statute subjects persons exercising their constitutional right of expression to fear of criminal sanctions and is a curtailment of that right. This Court, in reaching its conclusion of unconstitutionality, relied upon Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 91 S.Ct. 1780, 29 L.Ed.2d 284 (1972); Gooding v. Wilson, as well as our holding in State v. Ganch.
In light of our holdings in the above cases, as well as those of the United States Supreme Court, we conclude that the trial judge correctly quashed the information. The statute herein, R.S. 14:103(B)(2)(e), is unconstitutional.
For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
SUMMERS, J., dissents and assigns reasons.