Case Name: Joe PONTHIEUX, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Bill LINDSAY and Charles Lowther, Defendant-Appellee
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1968-07-29
Citations: 216 So. 2d 407
Docket Number: No. 2430
Parties: Joe PONTHIEUX, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Bill LINDSAY and Charles Lowther, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: Before TATE, FRUGÉ and CULPEP-PER, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 216
Pages: 407–414

Head Matter:
Joe PONTHIEUX, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Bill LINDSAY and Charles Lowther, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 2430.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
July 29, 1968.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 3, 1968.
On Second Rehearing Dec. 5, 1968.
Writ Granted Dec. 10, 1968.
David A. Sheffield, Alexandria, and Roy & Roy, by Chris J. Roy, Marksville, for William Lindsay, in Pro per, plaintiff-appellant.
Gold, Hall & Skye, by William E. Skye, Leo Gold, Alexandria, for defendant-ap-pellee.
Before TATE, FRUGÉ and CULPEP-PER, JJ.

Opinion:
FRUGÉ, Judge.
Plaintiff, Joe Ponthieux, brought this suit for workmen's compensation benefits against Bill Lindsay and Charles Lowther.
Plaintiff's claims were rejected by the district court, and he effected this appeal against Charles Lowther alone.
Defendant, Charles Lowther, is, and has been for a number of years, a life insurance agent; and such has been his sole occupation. Mr. Lowther's father sold certain piece of land, and in the act of sale he was obligated to remove four buildings therefrom, or suffer a reduction of the price of the sale. Mr. Lowther decided that he could move these buildings for his father onto a piece of land that he had bought and make them into rental apart- merits. So he acquired the buildings from his father, contracted to have them cut into smaller structures, moved them to the property which he had purchased, and renovated them into twenty apartments. Toward this end, he hired several contractors to perform the various moving and remodeling and repairing operations. One of these contractors, Mr. Bonnette, agreed to cut these buildings into smaller structures so that they could be moved in accordance with the city ordinances. Mr. Bonnette hired plaintiff, Mr. Ponthieux, as a common laborer to help him cut the buildings into smaller structures. While working on the roof of one of the buildings, plaintiff fell, breaking his right wrist. Neither Mr. Bonnette nor the defendant carried workmen's compensation insurance.
The primary question for our determination is whether or not the defendant, Mr. Lowther is responsible to plaintiff for workmen's compensation benefits under R. S. 23:1061, which provides in pertinent part as follows:
"Where any person (in this section referred to as principal) undertakes to execute any work, which is a part of his trade, business, or occupation or which he had contracted to perform, and contracts with any person (in this section referred to as contractor) for the execution by or under the contractor of the whole or any part of the work undertaken by the principal, the principal shall be liable to pay to any employee employed in the execution of the work or to his dependent, any compensation under this Chapter which he would have been liable to pay if the employee had been immediately employed by him *
The crucial part of this section is that the plaintiff be performing "any work, which is part of [defendant's] trade, business, or occupation." Thus, the question of the defendant's liability in this case rests upon whether or not he was in the "business" of moving buildings of constructing apartment complexes.
In support of the appellant's contention that defendant should be found to be in the business of constructing apartment buildings, he relies principally upon the case of Lyons v. Pirello, 194 So.2d 147 (La.App. 1st Cir., 1966), and the principle that provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act should be liberally construed in favor of the injured employee.
We readily agree that Workmen's Compensation Act should be liberally construed so as to carry out its intent and design, but it is not the design or intent of the Act to render all employers liable for any type of hazardous services rendered to them by their employees. Edwards v. Stafford, 153 So.2d 106 (La.App. 1st Cir., 1963). Even construing the words "part of his trade, business, or occupation" broadly, we do not feel that this engagement on the part of defendant, Lowther, constituted a part of his trade, business, or occupation.
This undertaking which defendant did was for the pecuniary benefit of his father, with the hope that the rental income from the apartments would later sustain his elderly parents. In fact, subsequent to his placing the apartment buildings on his property, he sold the entire enterprise to his mother.
This enterprise was the first and only endeavor defendant had ever made at repairing or leasing any property for pecuniary gain. Such an isolated endeavor, unrelated to his full-time occupation as a life insurance agent, we feel, does not satisfy the requirements of Section 1061 to the effect that the work being done constituted "work which is a part of [defendant's] trade, business, or occupation". This position appears consistent with prior jurisprudence considering the same issue. See Edwards v. Stafford, supra, and the cases discussed therein.
The appellant strongly urges this court to follow the decision of Lyons v. Pirello, 194 So.2d 147 (La.App. 1st Cir., 1966). The facts in that case are very similar to that of the instant case. There, the defendant undertook to move older structures onto a lot and to repair and renovate the same into twenty rental apartments. Defendant's regular occupation was that of a realtor. The court in Pirello found that the defendant was "engaged in the business, trade, or occupation of constructing, repairing, and renovating buildings or other structures". The court commented that "the number, amount, nature, and extent of repair or renovation engaged in by an owner of rental property with respect to his individual holdings is not decisive of the issue of whether such a proprietor is engaged in the work of repairing or renovating buildings as a business" (Page 150). Recovery was permitted, however, in that case after finding that defendant had not engaged in only one isolated venture, but that he had previously built an office building to rent, an eighteen-unit apartment building, which he subsequently sold, and a restaurant, in addition to his contracting to construct and repair other commercial buildings.
The above evidence sufficiently indicates that the defendant in the Pirello case was in the business of construction and renovation of commercial buildings for profit. This is precisely the distinguishing feature of the Pirello case from the instant one; for here defendant has had no prior or subsequent dealings of the same nature as the moving and the renovation of this one group of apartments.
For the above reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed at appellant's costs.
Affirmed.
TATE, J.,, dissents and assigns written reasons.
. The suit against both defendants was brought in Avoyelles Parish. Both defendants were resident of Rapides Parish, where, also, the injury to plaintiff was sustained. Bill Lindsay did not appear or answer the petition and therefore, the suit against him was dismissed as of non-suit because of improper venue. Charles Lowther appeared in Avoyelles Parish and answered plaintiff's petition thereby waiving his exception as to improper venue, and subjecting himself to the jurisdiction of the Avoyelles Parish District Court. See C.C.P. Arts. 925 and 44.
. Plaintiff was injured while he was helping to cut one of the large buildings into smaller parts so that it might be moved into defendant's property. It is not contended that defendant was in the business of the demolition or the moving of building structures. But if we were to find that defendant was engaged in the business of constructing apartment corn-plexes then it might follow that plaintiff's injury resulted as a hazardous incident to the hazardous business of constructing apartments.
. See also Richard v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 247 La. 943, 175 So.2d 277 (1965).