Case Name: BLACK v. MICHIGAN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1983-09-13
Citations: 128 Mich. App. 606
Docket Number: Docket No. 60151
Parties: BLACK v MICHIGAN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY
Judges: Before: M. F. Cavanagh, P.J., and D. C. Riley and C. J. Hoehn, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 128
Pages: 606–612

Head Matter:
BLACK v MICHIGAN BELL TELEPHONE COMPANY
Docket No. 60151.
Submitted July 22, 1982, at Detroit. —
Decided September 13, 1983.
Plaintiff, Mary L. Black, also known as Mary L. Konieczny, was employed by defendant, Michigan Bell Telephone Company, until January 14, 1976. Defendant thereafter, in accordance with its policy, voluntarily paid plaintiff her full salary for 13 weeks, and one-half of her salary until June 11, 1976. Defendant discontinued these payments when plaintiff filed a petition for workers’ compensation. A hearing referee thereafter concluded that plaintiff was entitled to compensation for a personal injury arising out of and in the course of her employment with defendant and that defendant should receive credit toward the compensation ordered for the amount voluntarily paid by defendant subsequent to January 14, 1976. Both parties appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board which affirmed the award of compensation but determined that defendant should not receive credit for its voluntary payments. Defendant appeals contending that plaintiffs subsequent employment aggravated her personal injury, so that the last employer should be held liable instead of defendant, and that it should be entitled to offset the wages voluntarily paid. Held:
1. The record displays ample evidence to sustain the appeal board’s finding of fact that plaintiffs subsequent employment did not aggravate her personal injury. The appeal board’s ruling is affirmed as to plaintiffs right to compensation.
2. The record discloses that defendant has not proven that the wage continuation program which benefited plaintiff was either wages within the meaning of § 371 of the Worker’s _Disability Compensation Act or compensation paid pursuant to the act. The appeal board’s ruling that defendant may not set off the amounts voluntarily paid is affirmed.
References for Points in Headnotes
82 Am Jur 2d, Workmen’s Compensation §§ 633, 634.
[No reference]
82 Am Jur 2d, Workmen’s Compensation §§ 365, 366.
82 Am Jur 2d, Workmen’s Compensation § 568.
81 Am Jur 2d, Workmen’s Compensation § 77.
Affirmed.
C. J. Hoehn, J., concurred with the determination to affirm the board’s ruling as to plaintiff’s right to compensation but dissented from the determination to affirm the board’s ruling that defendant may not set off the amounts voluntarily paid. He noted that the disallowance of a setoff would result in an unintended double recovery for the plaintiff, a result repugnant to the principles of workers’ compensation law. He would affirm in part and reverse in part.
Opinion of the Court
1. Workers’ Compensation — Appeal Board — Appeal.
Findings of fact by the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board are binding on the Court of Appeals where the record discloses any evidence on which such a finding could be based.
2. Workers’ Compensation — Worker’s Disability Compensation Act — Judicial Construction.
The section of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act concerning savings, insurance or other benefits and their effect in the determination of compensation to be paid under the act was not ambiguous prior to its amendment in 1981 (MCL 418.811; MSA 17.237[811]).
3. Workers’ Compensation — Worker’s Disability Compensation Act — Award of Compensation — Setoffs.
An employer may not set off from an award of compensation amounts voluntarily paid to the injured employee where the amount voluntarily paid was neither wages within the meaning of weekly wage loss as defined in the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act nor compensation paid pursuant to the act (MCL 418.371, 418.811; MSA 17.237[371], 17.237[811]).
Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by C. J. Hoehn, J.
4. Workers’ Compensation — Appeal Board — Implied Finding of Fact.
The Court of Appeals may note an implied ñnding of fact not explicitly stated where the fact was necessarily determined by the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board in order to reach a certain conclusion.
5. Workers’ Compensation — Double Recovery for Injury.
Double recovery for the same injury is repugnant to the principles of workers’ compensation law.
Kelman, Loria, Downing, Schneider & Simpson (by Donald W. Loria), for plaintiff.
Lacey & Jones (by Stephen Jay Schwartz), for defendant on appeal.
Before: M. F. Cavanagh, P.J., and D. C. Riley and C. J. Hoehn, JJ.
Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
M. F. Cavanagh, P.J.
We adopt the facts as stated by our brother Hoehn and agree with his affirmance of plaintiff's right to compensation. However, we do not conclude that the record in this case requires a reversal as to defendant's right to set off amounts voluntarily paid. MCL 418.811; MSA 17.237(811) was not ambiguous prior to its amendment. We are persuaded by the Court's reasoning in Henry v Ford Motor Co, 291 Mich 535; 289 NW 244 (1939), and affirm the decision of the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board as this record discloses that defendant has not proven that the wage continuation program which benefited plaintiff was either wages within the meaning of MCL 418.371; MSA 17.237(371) or compensation paid pursuant to the Worker's Disability Compensation Act.
Affirmed.
D. C. Riley, J., concurred.