Case Name: Shawn M. ARTHUR, Appellant, v. Josette A. ARTHUR, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2008-07-25
Citations: 987 So. 2d 212
Docket Number: No. 2D07-1455
Parties: Shawn M. ARTHUR, Appellant, v. Josette A. ARTHUR, Appellee.
Judges: WALLACE, J., Concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 987
Pages: 212–217

Head Matter:
Shawn M. ARTHUR, Appellant, v. Josette A. ARTHUR, Appellee.
No. 2D07-1455.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
July 25, 2008.
William S. Chambers, IV, of GrayRobin-son, Lakeland, for Appellant.
Mark A. Neumaier, Tampa, for Appel-lee.

Opinion:
GALLEN, THOMAS M., Associate Senior Judge.
Shawn M. Arthur (the Husband) challenges a Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage, raising six issues. We find reversible error only in the provision of the final judgment requiring the Husband to maintain life insurance coverage to secure his child support obligation. In all other respects, we affirm the final judgment.
The main controversy in this case stems from the trial court's decision to authorize Josette A. Arthur (the Wife) to permanently relocate with the minor child to the state of Michigan, but only upon the child reaching the age of three. We explain herein our reasons for affirming the trial court's ruling on the relocation issue and for reversing on the life insurance issue. The other four issues raised by the Husband are rejected without discussion.
At the time of trial, the parties' minor child was sixteen months old. The trial court granted shared parental responsibility, with the Wife designated as the primary residential parent, subject to reasonable visitation by the Husband. In addressing the Wife's relocation, the court gave detailed reasons for its ruling, including that the Wife proposed to move to the area where she grew up and has family and that the area is close to the Husband's extended family in Ohio. The court explained its reasons for delaying the relocation until the child turns three, as follows: "[T]he Court is cognizant that children between infancy and approximately 3 years of age need more frequent contact with both parents in order to properly bond with the parents. But for the Court's concern for the Husband's ability to bond with his son, the Wife's relocation would have been granted without further delay."
The Husband argues on appeal that the trial court erred as a matter of law in determining that the Wife can relocate with the child approximately twenty months after the final hearing. He asserts that the trial court's ruling is a prospective determination of the child's best interest and that the court lacks authority to make such a determination. He asserts that the trial court was required to make a determination at the present time and to decide the issue with finality. He asks this court to direct the trial court on remand to deny the relocation request because it was not in the child's best interest at the time of the final hearing.
The Wife argues that the trial court's ruling was supported by competent, substantial evidence and the proper inference to be drawn from the ruling is that the trial court found relocation to be in the best interest of the child, based on conditions now known and reasonably foreseeable. She submits that in analyzing the factors under section 61.13001, Florida Statutes (2006), which governs the request for relocation, the trial court found that the majority of the factors supported the move. She contends that the trial court acted within its authority when it delayed implementation of the ruling until the child reaches his third birthday, and she analogizes this order to other routine awards in dissolution cases that become effective in the future: an award of rehabilitative alimony which terminates in the future and an award granting exclusive use of a marital residence for a set period of time.
We agree with the Wife that the trial court did not exceed its authority in granting the relocation request upon the child reaching the age of three. We reject the Husband's assertion that the trial court found relocation to be not in the best interest of the child as of the day of the trial. The Husband presumes that the trial court would have denied relocation if it had to decide whether the Wife could relocate on the date that the final judgment was entered. We cannot accept this interpretation of the trial judge's ruling because it is contradicted by the detailed findings in the final judgment supporting the Wife's relocation request. The trial court found relocation to be in the child's best interest, stating: "The Husband seeks to prevent relocation for legitimate reasons, but in weighing the child's best interests, relocation is the favored outcome."
The Husband cites Janousek v. Janousek, 616 So.2d 131 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993), for the proposition that when a child custody issue is presented to the trial court, the court is required to make a final determination on the issue at that time. In Jan-ousek, the wife was named the primary residential parent of the minor children and the final judgment provided that the wife was prohibited from relocating the children from Live Oak for a five-year period, after which the wife was prohibited from relocating more than 120 miles from Live Oak. 616 So.2d at 131-32. On appeal, the husband successfully challenged the provision allowing the wife to relocate after the five-year period. Id. at 132. The appeals court explained that the trial judge found that the children should remain in Live Oak and that this finding was supported by competent, substantial evidence. However, "[n]o evidence was presented which would support a determination that a substantial change in circumstances would occur at the end of this five-year period or that such a relocation would promote the welfare of the children." Id.
We conclude that Janousek is not controlling and is distinguishable on its facts. In the present case, the trial court's findings favored relocation by the Wife, whereas in Janousek the trial court's findings prohibited relocation by the wife. By upholding the relocation in the present case, we are sustaining a ruling that is supported by the trial court's findings. The appeals court did the same in Janousek when it vacated the provision which permitted the wife to relocate after five years. Thus, we conclude that our decision is not in conflict with Janousek.
The Husband next argues that the trial court erred in requiring him to maintain life insurance in the amount of $50,000 as security for the child support award because there was no evidence presented at trial as to the cost or availability of such insurance. We agree that this was error.
"In order for a trial court to order that a party purchase insurance to secure a support obligation, the record should contain evidence of the payor's insurability, the cost of the proposed insurance, and the payor's ability to afford the insurance." Lopez v. Lopez, 780 So.2d 164, 165-66 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). As we did in Lopez, we reverse for further proceedings on this issue.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
WALLACE, J., Concurs.
STRINGER, J., Concurs in part and dissents in part with opinion.