Case Name: PEOPLE v. LYONS
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1987-11-03
Citations: 164 Mich. App. 307
Docket Number: Docket No. 90598
Parties: PEOPLE v LYONS
Judges: Before: Sawyer, P.J., and G. R. McDonald and H. J. Szymanski, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 164
Pages: 307–313

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v LYONS
Docket No. 90598.
Submitted March 9, 1987, at Lansing.
Decided November 3, 1987.
Leave to appeal applied for.
Joseph Lyons was convicted of third-degree criminal sexual conduct following a jury trial in Washtenaw Circuit Court, Henry T. Conlin, J. During the deliberations of the jury, the jury gave the bailiff a note which stated: "The jury cannot reach a decision. What does the judge suggest?” Without consulting counsel, the judge instructed the bailiff to inform the jury to "keep on working.” The bailiff so informed the jury. Defendant raised the issue of the bailiffs communication with the jury in a motion for a new trial, which was denied. Defendant appealed.
The Court of Appeals held:
Michigan has a strict rule prohibiting communication with a deliberating jury outside of the courtroom and the presence of counsel. Such communications are grounds for a new trial regardless of whether the communications were prejudicial. Accordingly, a new trial is mandated.
Reversed and remanded.
Sawyer, P.J., concurred but wrote separately to indicate that he felt the Michigan Supreme Court should reexamine whether reversal is mandated even where, as here, no prejudice has been shown.
Criminal Law — Trial — Jury — Deliberation of Jury — Communication with Jury.
It is error mandating reversal for the trial judge in a criminal case to instruct the bailiff to inform the jury, outside the presence of the judge and counsel, that the jury should keep on working where the jury had given the bailiff a note indicating that the jury could not reach a decision and asking for the judge’s suggestion as to how the jury should proceed.
References
Am Jur 2d, Trial §§ 999 et seq.; 1001, 1045 et seq.; 1069.
Propriety and prejudicial effect, in federal criminal cases, of communications between judge and jury members made in the absence of counsel, regarding the ability of jury members to continue deliberations. 64 ALR Fed 874.
Communication between court officials or attendants and jurors in criminal trial as ground for mistrial or reversal — post-Parker cases. 35 ALR4th 890.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Louis J. Caruso, Solicitor General, William F. Delhey, Prosecuting Attorney, and Kirby W. Tabby, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Margaret M. S. Noe, for defendant.
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and G. R. McDonald and H. J. Szymanski, JJ.
Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
H. J. Szymanski, J.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of third-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520d(l)(c); MSA 28.788(4)(l)(c). Defendant was sentenced to three to fifteen years in prison. He appeals as of right and we reverse.
On April 16, 1985, complainant went to defendant's Ypsilanti apartment. There she drank several beers and smoked a marijuana cigarette. A number of individuals, including defendant, were present during the course of the evening. At one point, complainant sniffed from a small vial containing "rush." She immediately felt light-headed and soon thereafter requested that someone call her boyfriend to pick her up. Complainant then lost consciousness on a couch in defendant's apartment.
Sometime thereafter, she regained consciousness to find defendant sitting behind her on the couch with his hands underneath her shirt, touching one of her breasts. Complainant passed out again, and, when she regained consciousness, she saw defendant wearing only his underwear, standing in front of a window. Defendant approached complainant and began to undo her pants. Complain ant attempted to get up but was too weak and passed out again. When she regained consciousness, her. pants were off, and defendant was lying on top of her having sexual intercourse.
Defendant denied having intercourse with complainant and stated he saw her leave the apartment earlier that evening. Defendant contended that complainant accused him of rape because she was angry over money she had misplaced.
During the first day of deliberations, the jury gave the bailiff a note which stated: "The jury cannot reach a decision. What does the judge suggest?" Without Consulting either party, the judge instructed the bailiff to inform the jury to "keep on working." The bailiff did so. Following his conviction, defendant moved for a new trial. One of the grounds raised was the judge's communication with the jurors. The court denied defendant's motion for a new trial.
Defendant argues that a new trial is warranted due to the judge's communication with the jury, directing it to continue deliberating. We agree.
In Michigan there is a strict rule prohibiting communication with a deliberating jury outside of the courtroom and the presence of counsel. Rushing v Wayne Co, 138 Mich App 121, 150; 358 NW2d 904 (1984), accord, People v Cain, 409 Mich 858; 294 NW2d 692 (1980), rev'g 94 Mich App 644; 288 NW2d 465 (1980). In Cain, supra, the bailiff took to the judge a note from the jury which inquired whether the verdict need be unanimous. 94 Mich App 645. At the judge's direction, the bailiff told the jury their verdict had to be unanimous. The Supreme Court summarily reversed defendant's conviction in lieu of granting leave for the reasons stated in Judge (now Justice) M. F. Cavanagh's dissent below. Judge Cavanagh noted that the strict rule prohibiting any communication with the jury outside of the courtroom and the presence of counsel had not been relaxed in Michigan and was grounds for a new trial regardless of whether the communications or instructions were prejudicial. 94 Mich App 647.
We believe that the instant case mirrors Cain, supra, and preempts all other considerations. We do not agree with the prosecution that defendant need show prejudice before a new trial is granted. The prosecution cites for support People v Sullivan, 392 Mich 324; 220 NW2d 441 (1974), and People v Hardin, 421 Mich 296; 365 NW2d 101 (1984). However, both Sullivan and Hardin involved supplemental charges given to a hung jury. Sullivan, supra, adopted standard jury instruction 5.4 of the American Bar Association. Hardin, supra, refined the Court's ruling in Sullivan, supra, and examined whether the departure from the American Bar Association's standard jury instruction 5.4 required reversal. We believe these cases are inapplicable to a resolution of defendant's claim. Following the Supreme Court's summary reversal in Cain, supra, no prejudice need be shown in the instant case.
In light of our decision we decline to discuss the merits of defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Defendant's third-degree criminal sexual conduct conviction is reversed. The trial court erred in failing to grant defendant's motion for a new trial. Remand for a new trial is proper in the instant case due to the judge's communication with jurors outside of the courtroom and the presence of counsel.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
G. R. McDonald, J., concurred.