Case Name: Bell against The Administrators of Wood
Court: South Carolina Court of Common Pleas
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1792-05
Citations: 1 Bay 249
Docket Number: 
Parties: Bell against The Administrators of Wood.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Carolina Law Reports
Volume: 1
Pages: 249–252

Head Matter:
Bell against The Administrators of Wood.
A note given a° ™kl *tlle common lav.-, tbe bauds oi an inaoi'sct\ because orí» gmally found., _. . , , . ,,. ul m turpitude ; as much so as a note given on a usurious or gambling contract.
An indorsement after it is due, independent of the foregoing considerations, will permit the parties to go into the consideration of it in the hands of an indox-seo, as well as if if had remained in the bands of the original payee.
THIS was an action of assumpsit, by the indorsee, against the administrators of the drawer of a promissory note
It came out from the evidence in this case, that Wood, 7 y the drawer of this note, had, in his life-time, driven to mar- bet, eleven hogs belonging to one Warren, his neighbour 5 and upon his return home, Warren had him taken up for hog-stealing, and taken before a magistrate. When he appeared before thé magistrate, he recommended a compromise between the parties, at the same time telling Wood, if he would not settle with Warren, he should be taken to gaol. Wood', to avoid going to goal, accordingly complied, and gave the note in question, for 271. 10s. being one-half of SSL the sum he would have been compelled to pay, had he been convicted of hog-stealing in the court of sessions, (or have suffered the punishment of thirty-nine lashes,) agreeable to. the act of assembly in such case made. This note came into the hands of the indorsee, the present plaintiff, upwards of a year after it had fallen due.
Marshall and Hall, for the defendants,
took two grounds ; first, that this note was extorted from the defendant’s testator, by duress. Secondly, that it was given on an illegal Consideration, and therefore void by the common law. And if void in its original creation, no subsequent indorsement could give it validity, so as to charge the drawer, or his representative. That the indorsee could not have a greater pr better right than the original payee had; and if the payee could not have recovered on this note, the indorsee could not. Besides the note was indorsed after it became due, and therefore subject to every defence which the ori0 ginal payee might have set up.
Pringle, contra,
argued that there was no duress, in the transaction, because there was evidently a debt due from Wood, to the amount of the value of the hogs; and it was lawful for him to make satisfaction to Warren for them, even before the magistrate. But whatever the consideration of this note might have been, there was no privity of it, brought home to the indorsee, the present plaintiff. And, were such a doctrine, as that contended for by the defendants, to prevail, and be admitted, it would tend in a great measure, to destroy the negotiability of notes and bills of ex~ change, Uc. That nothing could affect notes and bills in ,+he hands of an innocent indorsee, except they were found-' id on usurious, or gambling contracts, or transactions ; and 'these were expressly rendered void by statute. Doug. 636. 640.

Opinion:
Bay, J.
Had the proceedings of Warren against Wood been of a civil nature, for the value of the hogs only, and a compro mise had taken place between the parties, it would not have been duress* But as it appears to have been a criminal proceeding for felony, and the note in question given to compound that felony, and to avoid going to gaol, it is void by the common law. All contracts made to compound felonies, or to prevent the due execution of the law, by the connivance of magistrates, sheriffs, or other officers, are void. Powell, 186. 3 Burr. 1675. The circumstance of this note being in the hands of an indorser ignorant of the original transaction, makes no kind of difference ; for, being void, in its original creation, for illegality and turpitude, it can never afterwards be valid, so as to charge the drawer, Some notes are void by the common law, others made so by statute; there is, however, no essential difference between them. They are in both cases equally void, and without any binding efficacy on the part of the drawer. If, then, they are so, no good reason can be assigned why the holder of a note, made void by the common law, should recover, any more than the indorsee of a note made void by the statute. In all these cases the common law and statutes hold the same powerful language ; to wit, that they never had á legal existence. Could a doubt, however, arise on this ground, yet, the last one taken by the defendant's counsel, is conclusive. Being indorsed a ijear after it became due : this is a circumstance which carries with it a suspicion of the fairness of the transaction, and is sufficient to throw it out of the course of trade ; in which case the indorsee taker it upon the credit of the indorser, and must therefore stand in the situation of the person to whom it was originally payable. And the drawer may offer in evidence any circumstance, which might be given in evidence, to imyseb. tbe consideration, or shew that it was illegal, in the same manner as if it had remained in the hands of the payee.
Jury found for the defendants.
Pringle gave notice that he intended to move for a new trial, on the ground of misdirection in the judge, in point of law, but never brought the motion forward ; consequently, acquiesced in the determination.