Case Name: STATE ex rel. SCOLLARD, Respondent, v. BOARD OF EXAMINERS FOR NURSES et al., Appellants
Court: Montana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Montana
Decision Date: 1916-03-01
Citations: 52 Mont. 91
Docket Number: No. 3,587
Parties: STATE ex rel. SCOLLARD, Respondent, v. BOARD OF EXAMINERS FOR NURSES et al., Appellants.
Judges: .Me. Chief Justice Brantly and Me. Justice Sanner concur.
Reporter: Montana Reports
Volume: 52
Pages: 91–100

Head Matter:
STATE ex rel. SCOLLARD, Respondent, v. BOARD OF EXAMINERS FOR NURSES et al., Appellants.
(No. 3,587.)
(Submitted February 11, 1916.
Decided March 1, 1916.)
[156 Pac. 124.]
Mandamus—Bow'd of Examiners for Nurses—Public Office and Officers—Good Moral Character—Evidence—Official Oath.
Nurses—Board of Examiners—Publie Office and Officers—Undertaking on Appeal.
1. Under Section 7196, Revised Codes, the board of examiners for nurses, being a publie office and its "members publie officers, is relieved from filing a bond on appeal from a judgment compelling it by writ of mandate to recommend to the governor an applicant for certification as a registered nurse.
Same—Official Oath.
2. The fact that Chapter 50, Laws of 1913, creating the board of examiners for nurses, does not provide that the members thereof take an official oath, cannot detract from their character as public officers, since Section 1 of Article XIX of the Constitution, requiring every publie officer within the state to take the oath therein prescribed, is self-executing.
Same—Good Moral Character—How Determined by Board.
3. In its determination of the question whether an applicant for registration as a nurse possesses the good moral character made a prerequisite to certification by Section 9 of the Act, the board of examiners is not bound to accept affidavits of citizens deposing to such good character as conclusive, but may hear evidence, to be produced before it in such manner as it may choose to adopt, both in opposition to as well as in favor of the applicant.
Same—Mandamus—Does not Lie—When.
4. In the absence of a clear showing that the board abused the discretion lodged in it in determining whether relator was a proper person to be recommended to the governor for certification as a registered nurse, the writ of mandate did not lie.
Same—Character of Applicant—Evidence.
5. Testimony touching the immoral character of the applicant, introduced at a divorce proceeding to which she was a party, could rightfully be taken into consideration by the board in passing upon the question of her character.
Appeal from District Court, Silver Bow County; J. B. Mc-Clernan, Judge.
Application by the State of Montana, on the relation of Alise B. Scollard, for writ of mandamus against the Board of Examiners for Nurses and the members thereof. From a judgment awarding a peremptory writ and an order denying a new trial, respondents appeal.
Judgment and order reversed and cause remanded, with directions to dismiss.
Messrs. Geo. D. Pease, J. J. McCajfery and Percy Napton, for Appellants, submitted a brief; Mr. Pease argued the cause orally.
In this proceeding the presumption of law is that the decision or judgment of the board was one of merit, that the board acted within its discretion and that the official duty has been regularly performed. (San Luis Obispo County v. Gage, 139 Cal. 398, 73 Pac. 174.) The duty devolves on the board to act, but if the board has discretion, and, in the exercise of that discretion has acted, the writ of mandamus does not lie to compel the board to act in a particular way or to exercise a particular discretion if there has been no abuse of the discretion exercised. (State ex rel, Stuewe v. Hindson, 44 Mont. 429, 436, 120 Pac. 485.) Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right which is in substantial dispute. (26 Cyc. 153; Williams v. Smith, 6 Cal. 91; Davis v. Jewett, 69 Kan. 651, 77 Pac. 704; People v. Curtis, 41 Mich. 723, 49 N. ~W. 923; State v. Ciarle (State v. Tillyer), 69 N. J. L. 609, 55 Atl. 690; People v. Board of Canvassers, 88 N. T. App. Div. 185, 84 N. T. Supp. 406; State v. Hastings, 10 Wis. 518.) Neither will mandewnus lie to enforce a right which is conditional or incomplete by reason of conditions precedent which are to be performed by the petitioners. (26 Cyc. 154.)
The case of Commonwealth ex rel. Scott v. Board of Education, 187 Pa. 70, 41 L. K. A. 498, 40 Atl. 806, is on “all-fours” with the case at issue. The board of education in that case was clothed with the discretionary power to determine the qualifications of teachers. It exercised its right of discretion by disqualifying female teachers, .and the court held that such action could not be disturbed in a mandamus proceeding. The general rule may be found in 26 Cyc. 283. (See, also, Bailey v. Ewart, 52 Iowa, 111, 2 N. W. 1009.):
Messrs. Nolan & Donovan, for Respondent, submitted a brief; Mr. Louis P. Donovan argued the cause orally.
Upon the hearing of the application for the writ of mandate in such cases, the court does not try the case de novo, but hears and determines it upon the record made before the board (State v. Chittenden, 112 Wis. 569, 88 N. W. 587; Inglin v. Happen, 156 Cal. 483, 105 Pac. 582, 585; Board of Prison Commissioners v. De Moss, 157 Ky. 298, 163 S. W. 183; People v. Circuit Judge, 36 Mich. 274), and the only question is whether or not the board has acted within its discretion, and in determining this question, the court can look only, to the showing that was made before the board upon which its order was necessarily based. Facts not appearing before the board naturally could not be made the basis for the order made by the board.
The statute requires that the applicant for registration shall make a satisfactory showing of her good character, but this is an ex parte showing. The statute does not permit that showing to be contradicted, makes no provision for charges being filed against the applicant, does not authorize the board to hear testimony against the applicant, nor permit any other person to furnish testimony respecting her character, either for or against her. It merely requires, as a condition precedent to her being admitted, that she shall furnish satisfactory evidence of her good moral character. It shows that the legislature contemplated that if she made a sufficient ex parte showing of her good character, then she should be registered, subject, of course, to the power of the governor upon recommendation of the board to revoke her certificate for any of the reasons set out in section 15. Such has been the holding of the courts under somewhat analogous statutes. (State ex reí. Hállen v. Utah State Board, 37 Utah, 339, 108 Pac. 347; In re License, 143 N. C. 1, 10 Ann. Cas. 187, 10 L. R. A. (n. s.) 288, 55 S. E. 635.)
If the court should be of the opinion that the board had a right to try, at the time of the nurse’s application, the question of her good moral character, then the Constitution requires that a charge against her should be filed, and that she should b.e advised of the nature and the cause of the accusation. (State v. Kellogg, 14 Mont. 426, 36 Pac. 957 • State v. Schultz, 11 Mont. 429, 28 Pae. 643.) And the party accused must be given a right to be heard before she is condemned. (Stale v. Schultz, supra.) It is true that the eases above cited-relate to the revocation of licenses already issued, but there can be no distinction in principle between the right of the accused to be heard in such cases, and the right to be heard when the accusation is made the basis of preventing the issuance of a license. In either case the purpose of the accusation is to deprive the accused person of a valuable right which she would otherwise have. This right should not be taken from her or denied her without due process of law. (Gage v. Censors etc. Medical Society, 63 N. H. 92, 56 Am. Rep. 492.)
The testimony of Pender is without value, because it does not prove, or tend to prove, the general character of the relatrix for morality. Aside from all other objections to it, it relates only to a single act alleged to have taken place some two years before the date' of Mrs. Seollard’s application. Character is not made or unmade by a single act. (3 Ency. of Evidence, 36-39; Jones on Evidence, see. 149.) The alleged act referred to in the transcript cannot be made the ground for excluding the relatrix from her occupation as a nurse, for the reason that the statute was not in force at the time of the alleged commission of the act in question, and, therefore, cannot operate upon the same unless the statute be given a retrospective construction. There is nothing in the Act itself indicating that it should have a retrospective construction, and under such circumstances it should take a prospective construction only. (36 Cyc. 1205-1208; see, also, Bullard v. Smith, 28 Mont. 387, 72 Pac. 761.) To give the statute a retrospective operation would render its constitutionality doubtful. (Art. Ill, sec. 11, Constitution of Montana; Art. I, sec. 10, Constitution of the United States; Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. (71 U. S.) 277; 18 L. Ed. 356; Kx parte Garland, 4 Wall.. (71 U. S.) 333, 18 L. Ed. 366.)

Opinion:
MR. JUSTICE HOLLOWAY
delivered the opinion of the court.
In December, 1913, Alise B. Scollard made application to the board of examiners for nurses to be recommended to the Governor for a license as a registered nurse, under Chapter 50, Laws of 1913. The application was refused, and proceedings in mandamus instituted. From a judgment awarding the peremptory writ and from an order denying them a new trial, the defendants appeal.
On Motion to Dismiss.
Appellants did not furnish any appeal bond, and the respondent insists that the appeals should be dismissed. Section 7196, Revised Codes, relieves the state, a county, a municipal corporation, or any officer in his official capacity on behalf of the state, a county, etc., from furnishing an undertaking where one is otherwise required. It is insisted that the board of examiners for nurses is not a public office, and that the members are not public officers. In passing we may say that, if the members of the board acted only as private individuals in refusing Mrs. Scollard's application, then mandamus would not lie at all. (26 Cyc. 386.) But we do not agree with respondent's contention. In 6 Words and Phrases will be found a large number of definitions of "public office" and "public officer," from which we select the following: " A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law, or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by and for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer. ' ' (Attorney General v. McGaughey, 21 R. I. 341, 43 Atl. 646, 647.)
In 1913 the state for the first time assumed to exercise to a limited extent its police power to regulate the business or profession of nursing. It created the board of examiners for nurses, provided for the appointment of the members by the governor for a definite term, prescribed the duties, and fixed .the compensation. This is sufficient to meet the requirements of the definition.
It is said that the Act does not require a member to take an official oath; but it is wholly unnecessary that it should do so. The official oath required of every public officer in this state is prescribed by section 1 of Article XIX of the Constitution, and that provision is self-executing. The board of examiners for nurses is a public office, and its members are public officers. They perform duties for the state, public in character, and the extent of those duties is not of consequence in determining the quality of their acts. The motion to dismiss is overruled.