Case Name: E. R. SQUIBB & SONS, INC., a Delaware corporation, Appellant, v. Clyde JORDAN and Goldie Jordan, his wife, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1971-11-02
Citations: 254 So. 2d 17
Docket Number: No. N-456
Parties: E. R. SQUIBB & SONS, INC., a Delaware corporation, Appellant, v. Clyde JORDAN and Goldie Jordan, his wife, Appellees.
Judges: RAWLS, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 254
Pages: 17–22

Head Matter:
E. R. SQUIBB & SONS, INC., a Delaware corporation, Appellant, v. Clyde JORDAN and Goldie Jordan, his wife, Appellees.
No. N-456.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Nov. 2, 1971.
Rehearing Denied Nov. 19, 1971.
Sanders, McEwan, Mims & McDonald, Orlando, for appellant.
Whitaker & Koepke, Orlando, and Lan-dis, Graham, French, Husfeld, Sherman & Ford, DeLand, for appellees.

Opinion:
JOHNSON, Judge.
This is an appeal by the defendant below, E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., from an adverse jury verdict and final judgment awarding appellees $42,000.00 in compensatory damages for personal injuries.
As gleaned from the voluminous record on appeal and the briefs and oral arguments submitted by the parties, the relevant facts of this case are as herein set out. In 1964, appellee Goldie Jordan sustained a spinal injury as the result of an on-the-job accident which occurred in the course of her employment as a restaurant waitress. After a year of conservative treatment, her surgeon, E. D. Davis, M.D., determined that she needed corrective surgery consisting of a spinal fusion at three levels. The surgery involved an operation on the patient's low back, the removal of the laminae from the three vertebrae and the preparation of a trough or mortise bed in each, the placing of a piece of bone, obtained from some other source, across the three vertebrae and wedging said bone into position. The desirable result to be obtained by such an operation was that the graft bone would provide a bridge across which the patient's own system would construct new bone so as to cause a fusion or a union between the three vertebrae.
For the purpose of bridging the three joints, Dr. Davis chose to use beef bone, processed and sold by Squibb under the trade name and "Bo-plant". The operation was performed on March 1, 1966. Several months later, x-rays of appellee's spinal repair indicated that some portions of the original beef bone had disappeared, having been absorbed by the body of the patient, and that the fusion was unsatisfactory. Exploratory surgery was performed on April 15, 1967; inflamed reactive tissue at the "Bo-plant" site was discovered, with the "Bo-plant" not fused but walled off or encapsulated; and the "Bo-plant" was removed. The hospital's pathologist determined that the reactive type tissue was a result of a rejection of a foreign body, and that it was the incompatible cow protein which was the cause of the reaction. In 1968, Dr. Davis performed a refusion, using the patient's own bone, with good results. Dr. Davis stated that as a result of all the operations, Mrs. Jordan's recovery time was extended from six months to three years and her disability increased from 15 percent (a result of the original accident) to 20 percent.
Mrs. Jordon, joined by her husband, brought this suit for damages against Squibb on various grounds. While the complaint stated five grounds for recovery, only the issues of implied warranty and negligence were submitted to the jury. A verdict was returned which awarded the appellee wife compensatory damages of $35,000.00 and the appellee husband was awarded $7,000.00 in compensatory damages.
The relevant evidence adduced at trial was that, at the time of Mrs. Jordan's first operation, there were three different types of bones which Dr. Davis could have used for the grafting procedure: (1) autogenous hone — bone coming from the patient's own body; (2) homogenous bone — human bone taken from another human being; and (3) heterogenous bone — bone from a species other than a human being (in this case, "Bo-plant"). It was established by experience, medical journals, and various other testimony and reports, that the order of effectiveness in grafting procedures such as this was autogenous, homogenous- and then heterogenous bone, although at least one of appellant's witnesses testified that the use of "Bo-plant" proved to be as effective as homogenous bone.
As noted above, Dr. Davis determined to use the heterogenous bone called. "Bo-plant", which was manufactured by Squibb. This was so even though he admitted that he had had "disastrous results" when using Squibb's baby beef bone in this type of operation on previous occasions. He stated that he had had over a 90 percent failure rate with some 50 other patients using "Bo-plant". Other testimony was presented by appellees as to the ineffectiveness of, "Bo-plant" use by other medical personnel.
Squibb's testimony regarding the processing of "Bo-plant" revealed that it was tested on various animals for several years before entering the market. It was determined by Squibb that if the calf bone could be specially processed to remove the marrow elements and other antigenic factors,, it would be safe and effective for use in. human bodies. Processing techniques having been developed, their product was approved by the Federal Drug Administration for sale to the medical profession in November of 1964.
The remaining conflicting testimony by various experts and researchers who had used or worked with "Bo-plant" went to the effectiveness of "Bo-plant" as compared to autogenous or homogenous bone; the meaning of various tests and experiments conducted by Squibb and others; and the manner in which "Bo-plant" was obtained, processed, tested and distributed. While this testimony has been considered, it is not felt to be pertinent to the matters raised in this appeal to set forth all such testimony herein.
In addition to the specific issues raised in this appeal, appellant Squibb asserts that the primary issue in this case revolves around the "responsibility of a pharmaceutical house which does no more than attempt to make available to the medical profession a purified form of a natural material well known to the medical profession". It is contended that the lower court's judgment holds, in effect, that a pharmaceutical house which processes and sells a natural material for use by doctors will be responsible-whenever a doctor does not get a successful result from the use of the product.
In contrast, appellees assert the primary issue to be whether or not "Bo-plant" was a safe and effective transplant material suitable for use in the human body as was represented by Squibb.
Specifically, Squibb contends that the trial judge should have directed a verdict for appellant since there was no evidence that there was a defect in the appellant's product. In the alternative, the jury should have been instructed, as requested, that it was incumbent upon the appellees to show a defect in the "Bo-plant" actually used on appellee Goldie Jordan. We disagree that a verdict should have been directed for Squibb, for the question of whether there was sufficient evidence to show a defect in the product was one for the jury.
As to the jury being instructed that, in order to find Squibb liable in damages for either a breach of implied warranty or negligence, a defect in the "Bo-plant" actually used on appellee must be found; we are of the opinion that such an instruction should have been given and that to fail to give the .instruction was reversible error which warrants a new trial.
Although the jury was instructed that negligence is failing to do something that should have been done or doing something that should not have been done which proximately injures another, there was no instruction regarding the requirement that a defect in the "Bo-plant" actually used upon appellee be found before Squibb could be held liable.
In a case for damages for a breach of an implied warranty, the plaintiff must show that the product was transferred from the manufacturer's possession while in a defective state, and as a result of the defect, the plaintiff was injured. Russell v. Community Blood Bank, Inc., 185 So.2d 749 (Fla.App.2nd, 1966). Under Florida law, the doctrine of implied warranty requires that there be shown an actual adulteration in the product before there can be liability for harm resulting from its use. Green v. American Tobacco Co., 391 F.2d 97, 111; 409 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir., 1969).
As pointed out in 79 A.L.R.2d 301, § 17, for a drug manufacturer to be held liable for harm allegedly caused by a product, regardless of the ground of liability asserted, it is necessary that it be shown that there was actually something wrong with the product used — for example, that the defendant furnished a product different from what was ordered, that the defendant negligently compounded the product, or that the product, although ostensibly harmless, was actually poisonous.
Even if this were a case involving strict liability in tort, the defective condition of the product would have to be shown. 13 A.L.R. 3rd 1057, § 5, 6.
In short, whatever form of liability is pursued, whether it be warranty, negligence or strict liability, the appellee's injury must have been caused by some defect in the product, Royal v. Black and Decker Manufacturing Co., 205 So.2d 307 (Fla.App.3rd, 1967), and the jury should have been so instructed.
Appellant Squibb further challenges the trial court's instructions to the jury regarding the issue of damages. The jury was instructed that they should determine which portion of Mrs. Jordan's condition resulted from an aggravation of her previous injury; and, if they could not make that determination or if it could not be said that the condition would have existed apart from the injury, they could consider and make allowance in the verdict for the entire condition. We think such a charge was erroneous in light of appellee's treating physician's testimony that she sustained a 15 percent permanent disability as a result of the original accident, separate and apart from any disability relating to the use of "Bo-plant", and that the additional impairment due to the use of "Bo-plant" was 5 percent more. There was no other evidence which tended to indicate that the use of "Bo-plant" was responsible for more than 5 percent of Mrs. Jordan's disability. There being no evidence from which the jury could find an aggravation of the preexisting condition in excess of the 5 percent as testified to by Dr. Davis, it was error to submit this issue to the jury and instruct them that they could make allowance in the verdict for the entire condition.
We have considered the remaining issues raised in this appeal and find them to be without merit.
For the reasons hereinabove stated, the . judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause is remanded for a new trial, in which trial the trial court shall be guided' by the dictates of this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
RAWLS, J., concurs.
SPECTOR, C. J., dissents.
. In connection with this theory, see § 402A, Second Restatement of Torts, Comment lc, which notes as an exception from the strict liability concept various new or experimental drugs which, because of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical experience, cannot be considered as being absolutely safe for human consumption, although available experience justifies the marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a medically recognized risk. McLeod v. W. S. Merrell Co., Div. of Richardson-Merrell, 174 So.2d 736 (Fla.1965).