Case Name: GEORGIA POWER COMPANY v. OWENS; and vice versa
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1971-09-29
Citations: 124 Ga. App. 660
Docket Number: 46159, 46160
Parties: GEORGIA POWER COMPANY v. OWENS; and vice versa.
Judges: Bell, C. J., Hall, P. J., Eberhardt, Deen, Quillian, and Whitman, JJ., concur. Pannell and Evans, JJ., dissent.
Reporter: Georgia Appeals Reports
Volume: 124
Pages: 660–670

Head Matter:
46159, 46160.
GEORGIA POWER COMPANY v. OWENS; and vice versa.
Argued May 5, 1971
Decided September 29, 1971
Rehearing denied October 22, 1971
Jones, Cork, Miller & Benton, Wallace Miller, Jr., for appellant.
Shi & Raley, Trammell F. Shi, F. Robert Raley, for appellee.

Opinion:
Jordan, Presiding Judge.
The plaintiff, who was born on March 25, 1956, sustained severe electrical burns at approximately 8:45 a.m., EDST, Sunday, May 7, 1967, in the yard in the rear of the premises where he resided with his mother and stepfather at 1976 Kitchens Road in the City of Macon, immediately adjacent to the right of way of the defendant. He was burned on his neck, feet, and other parts of his body, is now blind in his left eye, and the vision in his right eye is impaired. His younger brother, who was standing nearby, was also injured.
The electrical transmission system on the defendant's right of way adjacent to the premises consists of three 115 KV conductors, each of which is suspended and insulated by seven insulators from a wooden cross-arm held in the air by two wooden poles. Across the top of each pole is a static line which is grounded and connected to a strip of metal buried two feet in the ground on the right of way and extending some 200 feet along the right of way. Also connected to the ground system is a short length of wire extending vertically above each pole. This ground system serves as a counterpoise for the purpose of shielding the conductors from lightning, and will, theoretically at least, dissipate the force of lightning in the ground, thereby rendering it harmless.
In our opinion from a careful study of the evidence the injuries to the plaintiff and his brother can only be explained as having been caused by an electrical current of momentary duration, such as would be produced by a bolt of lightning. The plaintiff and his brother were suddenly struck down at a distance of some 50 feet from the transmission lines at a time when witnesses heard a sound variously described as a "loud explosion," a "shot off like a dynamite," and a "boom." Although the stepfather did testify regarding a tingling sensation while working on the ground preceding the incident, even if it were an electrical current it produced no injuries. Immediately after the incident the mother walked to the plaintiff without injury, and later others walked in the area without injury. The defendant's conductors were energized with 115 KV from two points, and at the same time that the plaintiff and his brother were struck down the lines were de-energized by the opening of two oil circuit breakers, one of which automatically closed immediately, whereas the other remained open until closed manually. The record as to the first shows that it opened and closed at 8:46 a.m. EDST, whereas the other opened at 8:44 a.m. EDST and remained open until 8:53 a.m. EDST. A visual inspection by employees of the defendant later in the day revealed damage to the conductor nearest the plaintiff indicating a burning of the type caused by lightning, and in the opinion of an expert it was damage of the type caused by lightning,1 which can and does occur despite the shielding effect of the grounded overhead static lines. The possibility of a conductor being grounded is completely discounted by the physical evidence to the contrary, as noted by the defendant's employees when they arrive at the scene plus the uncontroverted fact that following the opening and closing of the circuit breakers the transmission continued uninterrupted until deliberately cut off to allow employees to remove the damaged section of one of the conductors and replace it with some 60 feet of new line. No lines were ever down until deliberately cut by the defendant's employees to replace the damaged section.
It appears without dispute from the evidence that what would generally be regarded as a single bolt of lightning will strike more than one point in the same area. Thus lightning could have struck the conductors, or one of them, the grounding system, and the plaintiff and his brother simultaneously. The sole expert for the plaintiff, although he testified concerning several theories as to the cause of the plaintiff's injuries, was of the opinion that if lightning did injure the plaintiff and his brother, "I would say it would have had to have struck them directly. I don't see any other way that lightning could have gotten to them." He also testified that if it struck the transmission line, "I would have expected the grounding system to have safely dissipated it into the earth. If it did reach someone after having struck the line I would say that something is wrong with the grounding system at that time." But there is no evidence outside the realm of speculation that anything was wrong with the grounding system. Moreover, no basis appears from the evidence to disclose any act or omission on the part of the defendant in constructing or maintaining its transmission system which could be regarded as negligence having a causal connection with the injuries sustained by the plaintiff, even if the lightning did reach the plaintiff through the grounding system of the defendant. In fact it appears that the system was designed, constructed, and maintained in accordance with the prevailing standards of the industry.
The circumstances here shown clearly reveal that the occurrence was not an unexplained event caused by something owned, operated, maintained, or controlled by the defendant, which, absent proof of external cause, would not happen without negligence, whereby the principle of res ipsa loquitur would apply. See Parker v. Dailey, 226 Ga. 643, 645 (177 SE2d 44).
The evidence disclosing an Act of God as the cause of the plaintiff's injuries, and no basis appearing whereby the injuries can be explained as caused in some way by the negligence of the defendant, it follows that the trial judge erred in refusing to direct a verdict for the defendant and in overruling the defendant's motion for judgment n.o.v., and it is unnecessary to consider the remaining issues as made by the appeal and cross-appeal.
Judgment reversed on main appeal; cross appeal dismissed.
Bell, C. J., Hall, P. J., Eberhardt, Deen, Quillian, and Whitman, JJ., concur. Pannell and Evans, JJ., dissent.