Case Name: Dorothy CHRISTENSEN and Ann Marie Larsen, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Carla Beth PETERSON and Allstate Insurance Company, Defendants and Respondents
Court: Utah Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Utah
Decision Date: 1971-04-02
Citations: 25 Utah 2d 411
Docket Number: No. 12065
Parties: Dorothy CHRISTENSEN and Ann Marie Larsen, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Carla Beth PETERSON and Allstate Insurance Company, Defendants and Respondents.
Judges: Ellett, J., dissented and filed opinion.
Reporter: Utah Reports, Second Series
Volume: 25
Pages: 411–416

Head Matter:
483 P.2d 447
Dorothy CHRISTENSEN and Ann Marie Larsen, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Carla Beth PETERSON and Allstate Insurance Company, Defendants and Respondents.
No. 12065.
Supreme Court of Utah.
April 2, 1971.
Ellett, J., dissented and filed opinion.
Wendell P. Abies, Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs-appellants.
C. L. Kingston, D. Gary Christian, Salt Lake City, for defendants-respondents.

Opinion:
CALLISTER, Chief Justice:
Plaintiffs were insureds under an uninsured motorist provision in a policy issued by Allstate Insurance Company. Plaintiffs sustained injuries in an automobile collision with defendant Peterson. They filed a complaint against both Peterson and Allstate; the claim against Peterson sounded in tort; the claim against Allstate arose out of the insurance contract. Allstate filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that there was an improper joinder of parties and a misjoinder of remedies. The trial court granted the motion, and plaintiffs appeal.
On appeal plaintiffs urge that their action is a rational extension of the ruling of this court in Barnhart v. Civil Service Employees Insurance Company. With this contention we cannot agree. In the Barn-hart case, first, the tort-feasor was not a party to the action; secondly, the validity of an arbitration clause was the sole legal issue before this court. This court held that a clause was unenforceable in an uninsured motorist provision, which required the insured to submit his claim to arbitration on demand as a condition precedent to maintaining an action against the insurer.
There is a recent case in point. The reasoning that supported this court's decision in Young v. Barney is equally applicable in the instant action, although there are certain factual distinctions, namely, in the Young case, plaintiff joined the tort-feasor's liability insurer as a party defendant, and in the present action plaintiffs joined their own insurer as a party defendant.
In Young v. Barney this court held that Rules 18(b) and 20, U.R.C.P., could not be so construed as to permit joining an insurance company as a party defendant with the tort-feasor. This court observed that there was no reason to believe that the rules were intended to change the prior practice of not permitting disclosure to a jury of insurance coverage in a personal injury trial. The opinion stated that it had always been understood that it was prejudicial error to inject deliberately insurance into such a trial. In regard to Rule 20, U.R.C.P., this court stated:
First, it will be noted that the rule is permissive. Second, it is generally held that it is not proper to join an action such as the primary one here, which is based on negligence, and therefore in tort, with one like the claimed supplemental action, which would be in contract, and thus based upon a claim of an entirely different character.
In Lloyds' of London v. Blair, the court observed that plaintiff had joined two causes of action. One sounded in tort, and no contractual right or liability was involved. The other was against a group of insurance carriers; the liability asserted was solely and exclusively contractual. No liability in the nature of a tort committed by the insurance company was involved. The court stated:
The two causes of action were separate and distinct with entirely different bases in law. No single party defendant was liable both as a tort fea-sor and as contractual obligee for the payment of compensation under an insurance agreement. And the issues as between plaintiffs and the United States on one hand, and as between plaintiffs and the insurance carriers on the other hand, were not identical.
The court concluded that there was nothing in the Rules of Civil Procedure or their historical background which would lend support to the view that it was intended or purposed that a suit against insurance carriers for the enforcement of a contractual obligation contained in a policy of insurance could be joined with an action against the United States under the' Tort Claims Act. Accordingly, the court held that the motion to dismiss the defendant insurance companies should have been granted without prejudice.
In Holt v. Bell the court noted that it had consistently held in tort actions when liability insurance was involved that the insurer could not be joined with the tort-fea-sor unless it was a policy required by statute. The reason for such a rule is equally applicable where the insurer's obligation is under an uninsured motorist endorsement, namely, the presence of an insurer as a party defendant might have the same effect upon the jury as in a liability policy. The court stated:
When the parties are placed in a position where the interest of an insurer is to defeat the claim of its own insured, the position of the parties is such that the court cannot countenance the situation. The placing of the parties thusly virtually makes the plaintiffs' insurer the liability insurer of the defendant and interested in defeating plaintiffs' claim. Such being the case, under the holdings of this court, the insurer cannot be joined as a party defendant.
The trial court properly dismissed Allstate as a party defendant in this action, and its ruling is affirmed. Costs are awarded to defendant Allstate.
TUCKETT, HENRIOD and CROCKETT, JJ., concur.
. 16 Utah 2d 223, 398 P.2d 873 (1965).
. 20 Utah 2d 108, 433 P.2d 846 (1967).
.Note 1, supra. P.2d.
. At p. 112 of 20 Utah 2d, at p. 848 of 433
. (C.A.10, 1958) 262 F.2d 211.
. At p. 214 of 262 F.2d
. Okl., 392 P.2d 361, 363 (1964).
. Also, see State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Brown, 114 Ga.App. 650, 152 S.E.2d 641 (1966) ; Strickland v. English, 115 Ga.App. 384, 154 S.E.23 710 (1967).