Case Name: In Re Margaretta Local School District, Transfer of Funds
Court: Erie County Court of Common Pleas
Jurisdiction: Ohio
Decision Date: 1969-11-07
Citations: 20 Ohio Misc. 243
Docket Number: No. 37709
Parties: In Re Margaretta Local School District, Transfer of Funds.
Judges: 
Reporter: Ohio Miscellaneous Reports
Volume: 20
Pages: 243–251

Head Matter:
In Re Margaretta Local School District, Transfer of Funds.
(No. 37709
Decided November 7, 1969.)
Common Pleas Court of Erie County.
Mr. Paul E. Work, prosecuting attorney, and Mr. William E. Didelius, for petitioner.
Messrs. Tone, Maddrell, Eastman & Grubbe and Mr. Herbert P. Eastman, for defendant Finney.

Opinion:
WiNter, J.
(of Medina County, by assignment). Obviously, the only issue before the court in the instant case is whether Section 5705.15, Eevised Code, is to be distinguished from Section 5705.14 in that it authorizes the transfers of public funds from one fund of a subdivision to any other fund, or whether it is limited strictly to those funds not excepted in paragraphs (A) through (F), Section 5705.14, and not excepted by the language of Section 5705.15:
" except the proceeds or balances of loans, bond issues, special levies for the payment of loans or bond issues, the proceeds or balances of funds derived from any excise tax levied by law for a specified purpose, and the proceeds or balances of any license fees imposed by law for a specified purpose."
The Supreme Court of Ohio in the case of Wachendorf v. Shaver (decided March 17, 1948), 149 Ohio St. 231, stated:
' ' The court must look to the statute itself to determine legislative intent, and if such intent is clearly expressed therein, the statute may not be restricted, constricted, qualified, narrowed, enlarged or abridged; significance and effect should, if possible, be accorded to every word, phrase, sentence and part of an act, and in the absence of any definition of the intended meaning of words or terms used in a legislative enactment, they will, in the interpretation of the act, be given their common, ordinary and accepted meaning in the connection in which they are used."
As indicated in petitioner's resolution, adopted December 28, 1968, the application for approval of the trans fer of funds is brought pursuant to the provisions of Section 3311.06, Revised Code, which provides the procedures for annexation of territory and the division of funds by school districts within the state of Ohio. The other two sections involved in the case at bar are Section 5705.14 and 5705.15 which are included in the taxation chapter of the Revised Code and which specifically relate to the transfer of public funds.
With respect to the validity of school legislation, 48 Ohio Jurisprudence 2d (Pt. 2), at page 673, states:
"Insofar as they do not conflict with the Constitution, the courts have no responsibility or authority in respect to the wisdom or policy of legislation relating to the management and control of the school system
And again on pages 671 and 672:
"Education is a matter of state concern, and the purpose of the school laws is to give the common school system uniformity, harmony, unity and force throughout the state.
" the public schools and the school system of the state rest primarily in state supervision and control . The power of the General Assembly with reference to the public schools is plenary is without restriction except for the constitutional provision
Accordingly it is the opinion of this court that the language of the statute (3311.06) which says: "No transfer of school district territory or division of funds and indebtedness incident thereto, # shall be completed in any other manner than that prescribed by this section (Emphasis added.) clearly expresses the legislative intent, and this language, given its common, ordinary and accepted meaning, requires that the funds in question be deposited in the bond retirement fund.
As the Supreme Court many years ago pointed out in the case of Bank of Toledo v. City of Toledo (1853), 1 Ohio St. 623, regardless of the exact constitutional power to tax, it is clear that exercise of the taxing power is a legislative function and not a judicial one. And, as the court later said, in the case of Board of Education v. State, 51 Ohio St. 531, the courts should not interfere with the exercise of this legislative function, even in doubtful cases. (See, also, 51 Ohio Jurisprudence 2d pp. 35 and 48.)
It appears, as counsel for the defendant has argued, that the Legislature has placed a severe and tight, but praiseworthy, limitation on the transfer of funds by a board of education out of the bond retirement fund.
It is the opinion of this court that the statutes involved in the instant case, namely, Sections 3311.06, 5705.14 and 5705.15, Revised Code, must be construed as laws in pari materia, and that accordingly, the sum of $90,008.20 received from the Sandusky City Board of Education, having been properly deposited in the bond retirement fund, any application for an order to transfer funds therefrom shall be brought pursuant to the provisions of Section 5705.14, Revised Code.
The court further finds that defendant's demurrer is well taken; that the petition fails to state a cause of action; and that the demurrer is hereby sustained.
The ruling on the demurrer, being dispositive of the issue before this court, further discussion would serve no useful purpose. Counsel for the defendant will prepare the appropriate entry.