Case Name: JACKSON v. THE STATE
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 2001-07-16
Citations: 250 Ga. App. 617
Docket Number: A01A0642
Parties: JACKSON v. THE STATE.
Judges: Pope, P. J., concurs. Mikell, J., concurs specially.
Reporter: Georgia Appeals Reports
Volume: 250
Pages: 617–622

Head Matter:
A01A0642.
JACKSON v. THE STATE.
(552 SE2d 546)

Opinion:
Blackburn, Chief Judge.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Maurice Bruce Jackson pled guilty to three separate counts of entering an automobile, and he agreed to pay restitution on a number of additional counts with which the State consented not to charge him. Following a restitution hearing, the trial court ordered Jackson to pay six of his victims a total of $4,114.87. On appeal, Jackson contends that the State presented evidence regarding only the replacement cost of stolen items rather than their fair market value, as required by law. For the reasons discussed below, we agree and affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand the case for further consideration.
Under OCGA § 17-14-9, "(t)he amount of restitution ordered may be equal to or less than, but not more than, the victim's damages," which are further defined in OCGA § 17-14-2 (2) as "all damages which a victim could recover against an offender in a civil action . . . based on the same act or acts for which the offender is sentenced. . . ." "ThusQ the sufficiency of evidence to support an order of restitution should be measured by the civil standard of preponderance of the evidence." Lawrenz v. State.
Anderson v. State.
Determination of the amount of damages must be based upon fair market value, which must be determined exactly. Lovell v. State (evidence insufficient when amount of restitution determined by approximation). The correct determination for the amount of restitution is the fair market value of the property rather than the replacement cost. See Sutton v. State (value assigned to the property for which restitution ordered based upon a consideration of the fair market value of a truck of comparable age and condition). See also Hoard v. Wiley (testimony regarding cost price must be coupled with evidence showing condition of item both at time of purchase and at time of loss).
Gaskin v. State; Cardwell v. State.
Six witnesses testified at the restitution hearing. James Aycock stated that Jackson stole a compact disc (CD) player, a CD case, and 75 CDs from his car. Aycock provided only the replacement value of these items, not their fair market value. Tammy Jester also testified that Jackson stole a CD player from her car. She also provided the court with the cost to replace the CD player, not its fair market value. Roger Pierce stated that Jackson took a CD player and a shotgun from his car. Again, Pierce provided only the replacement value of these items. In addition, Pierce requested restitution for his truck window which was broken during the robbery, and he provided a receipt reflecting the cost of performing the repairs.
David Garcia testified that Jackson stole an amplifier from his car; however, rather than fair market value, he provided only the replacement value for the item. Another victim, Corey Adams stated that Jackson took an entire stereo system from his car, and, like the others, he offered the replacement value of the items, not their fair market value. Finally, Jackson does not contest being ordered to pay restitution to Aycock, Garcia, and Paul Massey for the cost of repairing their car windows which were broken during the robbery.
At the conclusion of this testimony, Jackson challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, pointing out to the trial court that the testimony of the witnesses provided only the replacement cost of the stolen items, not the fair market value. The trial court then agreed with Jackson that discounted values were necessary and stated: "The [trial court] . is the trier of fact and . . . can give some considera tion to what the discount might be on a, for example, CD player which was either a month or two months old that was stolen after it was purchased and also whether or not it was purchased at a sale and the replacement cost would now be higher." Afterward, the trial court, without explanation, set values for each of the stolen items.
With the exception of the noncontested items discussed directly above as well as Pierce's car window for which sufficient evidence was given, no evidence was placed in front of the factfinder in this case regarding the fair market value of these items, the condition of the items, or an appropriate method of discounting the items from their replacement value to their fair market value. Without any such evidence on the record, we cannot say that the State has shouldered its burden of proving the fair market value of the stolen items upon which an order of restitution may be based. Gaskin, supra. As such, with the exception of the costs of repairing windows on the cars of Aycock, Pierce, Garcia, and Massey, we must vacate the order of restitution in this case and remand the case for further hearings to determine the fair market value of the stolen property.
The State's argument that there is no way of calculating a fair market value for stolen stereo equipment is without merit and does not alter the law. In essence, the State argues that the only means to discover this value is to canvass pawnshop owners, who do not accept stereo equipment because it is often stolen. At the restitution hearing, the State called no pawnshop owners to support this proposition and failed to produce evidence having probative value of the victims' losses. The value of stolen property can be established by one having knowledge of the age and condition of the subject property and some knowledge, experience, or familiarity of such property.
Here, the State could have produced such a witness, including the victim of the theft, who is familiar with the stolen items and has a fact-supported opinion as to their value. Such proof is routinely required in civil cases.
Opinion evidence as to the value of an item, in order to have probative value, must be based upon a foundation that the witness has some knowledge, experience or familiarity with the value of the property . or similar property and he must give reasons for the value assessed and also must have had an opportunity for forming a correct opinion.
Sisk v. Carney. Therefore, contrary to the State's argument, it must prove the actual damages of the victims in order to justify restitution.
The special concurrence speculates that, in some cases, proof of restitution may not be possible and that the replacement value of stolen property may be the actual amount of a victim's loss. The concurrence further proposes that, in cases such as this, "the trial court should be given the authority to reconsider the sentence and, if appropriate, to allow the defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty." However, as the concurrence itself points out, the remedy provided for in this majority is the one established by case law and statute, and, without question, the amount of damages must be based on fair market value. See Cardwell, supra. To adopt the concurrence's proposed remedy would require that this Court overrule a legion of cases and rewrite the statutory authority setting forth the parameters of restitution. In this case, such an action goes beyond the limits of judicial restraint and constitutes inappropriate judicial legislation.
Judgment affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded with direction.
Pope, P. J., concurs. Mikell, J., concurs specially.
Jackson has not questioned the State's ability to enforce any such agreement, and, as such, we do not consider that issue in this appeal.
Lawrenz v. State, 194 Ga. App. 724, 725 (391 SE2d 703) (1990).
Anderson v. State, 226 Ga. App. 286 (486 SE2d 410) (1997).
Lovell v. State, 189 Ga. App. 311, 313 (3) (375 SE2d 658) (1988).
Sutton v. State, 190 Ga. App. 56, 57 (1) (378 SE2d 491) (1989).
Hoard v. Wiley, 113 Ga. App. 328, 333-334 (2) (147 SE2d 782) (1966).
Gaskin v. State, 221 Ga. App. 142, 145 (3) (b) (470 SE2d 531) (1996).
Cardwell v. State, 225 Ga. App. 337 (484 SE2d 38) (1997).
Sisk v. Carney, 121 Ga. App. 560, 563 (4) (174 SE2d 456) (1970).