Case Name: WALLACH ET AL. vs. VAN RISWICK
Court: Supreme Court of the District of Columbia
Jurisdiction: District of Columbia
Decision Date: 1873-04
Citations: 1 MacArth. 73
Docket Number: No. 2990
Parties: WALLACH ET AL. vs. VAN RISWICK.
Judges: 
Reporter: Reports of cases argued and determined in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia (District of Columbia - reported by Mackey)
Volume: 8
Pages: 73–82

Head Matter:
WALLACH ET AL. vs. VAN RISWICK.
In Equity.
No. 2990.
A person who engaged in the rebellion and whose real estate has been sold under the acts of Congress of August 6,1861, and July 17,1862, in pursuance of a judicial decree of confiscation, forfeits thereby its use during life; but such decree and sale does not work a divestiture of title, and he has afterward the right to execute a mortgage or conveyance of the same property; which, however, will only take effect on the termination of the life of the original owner.
STATEMENT OR THE CASE.
On the 28th of September, 1854, Charles S. Wallach and his wife, Susan L. Wallach, executed a deed to certain lots and parcels of land in the city of Washington to James M. Carlisle, trustee, to secure the payment of five thousand dollars, which said Wallach borrowed of Henry W. Lansdale. On the 12th day of July, 1862, the trustee sold parts of the land mentioned in the deed, and received therefor the sum of four thousand five hundred dollars, and entered the same as a credit on the note and said deed.
On the 1st day of December, 1862-, John Yan Biswick, the defendant, purchased the said note, and received an assignment of said deed for the balance due and unpaid on said note, amounting to one thousand five hundred and thirty-three dollars and sixty-five cents, besides ninety-four dollars and eighty-five cents costs.
The said Charles S. Wallach had resided in the city of Washington, District of Columbia, for many years, and had, previous to the 17th day of July, 1862, entered into the military service of the Confederate States, and was an officer in the army thereof doing duty in the State of Yirginia, and remained in said army till the termination of the armed rebellion.
On the 12th day of May, 1863, a libel of information against the parcels of land in controversy in this suit was exhibited on behalf of the United States in this court, and on the 29th day of July, 1863, the same was condemned by the decree of the court as forfeited to the United States for and during the natural life of said Charles S. Wallach, and the same was sold by the United States marshal of this District on the 9th day of September, 1863, and the defendant became the purchaser for the sum of $2,200, and received % deed therefor from said marshal.
On the 3d day of February, 1866, the said Charles S. Wal. lach and his wife, Susan L. Wallach, executed a paper writing, purporting to be a deed to the said parcel of land so condemned and sold by said decree, conveying the same to the defendant, John Yan Eiswick, the consideration expressed being $11,000.
Charles S. Wallach died February 3, 1872. Complainants are the children and heirs of the deceased Charles. They bring their bill of complaint against John Yan Eiswick, who is in possession of the lot of land condemned and sold by saiil decree of this court, and seek now a decree declaring the deed of February 3,1856, to defendant, to be null and void, and directing an account of the rents' and profits since the death of their father, and they offer to pay any balance found due on the note to Lansdale, and pray for general relief.
A demurrer was interposed by the defendant to the bill of complaint, and sustained by the justice holding the special term, and the bill was dismissed, with costs. From this decree an appeal was taken to the general term.
The principal question presented by the record is whether the sale of the property made in pursuance of the decree of confiscation divested absolutely and completely the title out of the original owner, so that no right remained in him, either to mortgage or convey the same.
Messrs. Pike and Johnson for complainants :
The plaintiffs’ case rests upon the proposition that by the decree of condemnation and sale, Mr. Chas. S. Wallach was deprived of all beneficial interest in the property, and that a settlement was effected in favor of his right heirs, the effect of the limitation prescribed by the concurrent joint resolution to the forfeitures directed by tbe 5th, 6th, aud 7th sections of the act of July 17,1862, being the same as that prescribed by the clause in section 3, Article III, of the Constitution, to forfeitures on attainders for treason, and that limitation prescribed by section 3, Article III, of the Constitution being the same as that prescribed by the statute of 7 Anne, C. 22, to forfeitures on attainders for treason in England. Miller vs. United States, 11 Wall., 268 to 213; Bigelow vs. Forrest, 9 Wall., 339 to 353; McVeigh vs. United States, 11 Wall., 259 to 267; Armstrong’s Foundry, 6 Wall., p. 769; United States vs. Klein, 13 Wall., pp. 138, 142; Blackstone’s Com., book 1, pp. 29, 47, 229; Blackstone’s Com., book 2, pp. 8, 12, 44, 57, 108, 110, 111, 112, 116, 251, 252, 309, 311, 312 ; Blackstone’s Com., book 4, pp. 382, 383; Kent Com., vol. 4, pp. 12, 258, 426, 442; Preston on Est., vol. 1, *p. 255; Preston on Est., vol. 2, *pp. 298, 303, 307, 313, 343, 357, 380, 453, 455; Washburn R. P., vol. 1, pp. 14, 16, 22, 27, 28, 66, 67, 69; Dwarris on Stats., *p. 702; Fearne on C. R., pp. 310, 452 to 458; Cornish on Rem.; Williams R. P., p. 18; Butler’s Fearne, 563; Spence Eq. Jus., vol. —, pp. 21, 140; Hallam Hist. Mid. Ages, vol. 2, pp. 83, 84, 98, 99, 117; Hallam Hist. Mid. Ages, vol. 3, p. 264; Hallam Hist. Mid. Ages, supplemental notes, 140, 143; Torke Considerations on Forfeitures, pp. 8, 14, 19, 53, 54, 56, 61, 88, 90, 154, 196 to 230; Story, on the Constitution, sections 1799, 1299; Appleton vs. Crowninshield, 3 Mass., 464; Dana’s note to Wheaton’s Int’l Law, sec. 388; Hargrave’s note, 1 Coke on Litt.; Burgess vs. Wheate, 1 Eden., ch. 191; Wellion vs. Berkley, Plowd., 233, 235, 249 ; 3 B. & P., 652; Sheffield vs. Radeliffe, Hobart, 340, 212; Foster’s Crown Law, 98, 222; Gordon’s case, Foster’s Crown Law, p. 100; Taylor vs. Atkys, 1 Burrows, p. 115; Brown vs. Waite, 2 Mod., 130; Burnet’s Hist., vol, 2, pp. 836, 837; Life of Chancellor Hardwicke, (Harris,) vol. 2, pp. 68, 69; Sir Salathiel Lovel’s case, 1 Salkeld, 85; Wheatley vs. Thomas, 1 Levinz, *p. 73; Walsingham’s case, Plowd., 563, 554, 556; Colchrist vs. Bejustin, Plowd., 25, 27, 28, 29.
The confiscation was final and conclusive as to Mr. Charles S. Wallach, no right of present or future enjoyment being left to him. Micon et al. vs. J. P. Benjamin et als., sup. ct. Louisiana, 1871; Tyler vs. Defrees, 11 Wall., 345; Benedict Admty., sections 359, 360, 364, 365, 434; Miller vs. United States, 11 Wall., 306; Attorney-General vs. Norstedt, 3 Price, 97; Coote Admty. Pr., p. 129; Parsons on Martime Law, p. 643; The Parlmyra, 12 Wheat., 1, 14; Bigelow vs. Forrest, 9 Wall., 350; Washburn R. P., vol. 1, p. 59; Preston on Est., p. 18, vol. 2; Amy Warwick, 2 Sprague, 145, 150; Prize cases, 2 Black., 671; Hayden’s case, 3 Rep., 7; Pierce vs. Hopper, Strange, 253.
Thomas J. Durant and T. A. Lambert, for defendants, argued that—
The deed of February 3,1866, was valid, having been made by and between parties able to contract about a proper subject-matter and for a valuable consideration, to wit, $11,000; and the fee-simple estate in the property therein described was by it conveyed to the defendant, the grantee.
The act of Congress of July 17, 1862, gave to the proceedings of condemnation provided for in its 7th section an effect or operation purely in rem ; the individual owner was in no sense the object of such proceeding. The latter occupying the relation of a public enemy and having withdrawn himself from his allegiance to the Government, left the former in some sort derelict, under which circumstance it was seized upon by the United States and the usufructuary right thereto, during a period commensurate with the life of the then owner, appropriated for the support of its Army.
This wrought a temporary incapacity of present enjoyment in the owner of the fee, but no divestiture of the fee itself.
The act (except in its first four sections, with which we have naught to do) was simply a measure of belligerent policy, and in no respect a municipal regulation. (Vide Miller vs. The United States, 11 Wall., 305, 306.)
All that the United States could take under and by virtue of proceedings under the act of July 17,1862, was a “right to the property seized, terminating with the life of the person, for whose act it had been seized.” Bigelow vs. Forrest, 9 Wallace, 350.
That it was necessary preliminarily to the exercise by Government of its war-powers to make such enactment as that of July 17,1862. (See Brown vs. The United States, 8 Cranch., 122.)
If the United States took the estate of Charles S. Wallach by way of use, it must have held by analogy with a holding under a conveyance operating by virtue of the statute of uses. In that event the fee must have remained in the grantor, (IV Kent, Com., 257,) who could have been none other than Charles S. Wallach. That being so, he must have had absolute disposition of the fee.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Wylie
announced—
That a majority of the court were in favor of affirming the decree appealed from, but that a written opinion had not been prepared. He would, therefore, simply announce the decision without reviewing the authorities or the elaborate and interesting-argument of counsel upon either side of the case. The court were of opinion that the deed executed by Mr. Wallach and wife on the 3d day of February, 1866, was a valid deed, and that the grantee took a good title, as against the complainants to the present bill. The decree sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the bill is, therefore, affirmed.