Case Name: STATE of Louisiana, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Nathaniel LEE, Defendant-Appellant
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1993-10-13
Citations: 625 So. 2d 645
Docket Number: No. CR92-1492
Parties: STATE of Louisiana, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Nathaniel LEE, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: Before DOUCET, KNOLL and COOKS, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 625
Pages: 645–655

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Nathaniel LEE, Defendant-Appellant.
No. CR92-1492.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
Oct. 13, 1993.
J. Phil Haney, New Iberia, for State.
William Robert Collins, New Iberia, for Nathaniel Lee.
Before DOUCET, KNOLL and COOKS, JJ.

Opinion:
DOUCET, Judge.
This is an appeal from a conviction of distribution of cocaine and a sentence of twenty years at hard labor.
In November 1990, the New Iberia Police Department was conducting an undercover narcotics operation aimed at street dealers in the City of New Iberia. Officer Tony Gant from St. Mary Parish was recruited to make narcotic purchases after being introduced to local drug dealers by a confidential informant. Undercover Agent Gant made a purchase of "crack" cocaine from Nathaniel Lee, defendant herein. The defendant was later charged. After his arrest, he admitted selling cocaine. An audiotape recording of the drug sale was admitted into evidence. One surveillance officer confirmed that the defendant, nicknamed "Casper," was in the area on the night of the sale.
The defendant was charged by bill of information with distribution of cocaine, a violation of La.R.S. 40:967. After trial by jury, the defendant was found guilty as charged. The defendant was later sentenced on June 29, 1992, to 240 months, or 20 years, at hard labor; since the defendant was a fifth felony offender, this sentence was the maximum provided under the sentencing guidelines.
The defendant appealed and assigned seven errors, of which two were abandoned on appeal.
ERRORS PATENT
La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8 provides that at the time of sentencing the trial court must inform the defendant of the prescriptive period for post-conviction relief. The record shows the court did not so inform the defendant. This defect has no bearing on whether the sentence is excessive. Therefore, it is not grounds to reverse the sentence or remand the case for resentencing. La.C.Cr.P. art. 921. The three year prescriptive period does not begin to run until the judgment is final under La.C.Cr.P. art. 914 or 922. As a result, prescription is not yet running. The purpose of the notice of Article 930.8(C) is to inform defendant of the prescriptive period in advance. Therefore, the district court is directed to inform the defendant of the provisions of Article 930.8 by sending appropriate written notice to the defendant within ten days of the rendition of this opinion and to file written proof that the defendant received the notice in the record of the proceedings. See State v. Cox, 604 So.2d 189 (La.App. 2 Cir.1992); State v. Stephens, 604 So.2d 203 (La.App. 2 Cir.1992).
A review of the record for errors patent also reveals that defendant was sentenced on the same day the trial court denied his motion for a new trial. La.C.Cr.P. art. 873 requires a minimum of 24 hours between the denial of a motion for a new trial and sentencing. The record does not reflect an express waiver of this delay by defendant. In order for this to constitute reversible error, defendant must be prejudiced by the lack of a sentencing delay. State v. Gaspard, 441 So.2d 812 (La.App. 3 Cir.1983); State v. White, 404 So.2d 1202 (La.1981). Defendant was not prejudiced by any lack of delay in sentencing. A period of over one month passed between the date of his conviction and sentencing. Before sentencing, defendant was given the opportunity to contest the criminal history report presented by the State, and to present any argument or evidence on his behalf. Any error in not delaying sentence did not have an impact on the fairness of the proceedings. As a result, it does not constitute reversible error.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Two of defendant's assignments of error concern the sufficiency of the evidence. The defendant assigned error in the denial of his motion for new trial "in that there was absolute insufficient evidence for the conviction ." and that the defendant should be granted a new trial "simply in the interest of justice, if for no other reason." The defendant claims that under the standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, rehearing denied, 444 U.S. 890,100 S.Ct. 195, 62 L.Ed.2d 126 (1979), the evidence presented was insufficient to sustain defendant's conviction.
When a defendant urges insufficiency of the evidence as a ground for a motion for new trial, the court should apply the "thirteenth juror" standard of review rather than the Jackson standard of review. State v. Landry, 524 So.2d 1261 (La.App. 3 Cir.), writ granted in part on other grounds, 531 So.2d 254 (La.1988), appeal after remand, 546 So.2d 1231 (La.App. 3 Cir.1989). On appeal, the defendant appears to urge simply the Jackson standard of review. At the trial court level, the trial judge denied the defendant's motion on both the "thirteenth juror" standard and a sufficiency of the evidence claim generally raised by a La.C.Cr.P. art. 821 motion for post verdict judgment of acquittal.
In order for the State to obtain a conviction, it must prove the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Agent Tony Gant of the St. Mary Parish Sheriffs Office was working with the New Iberia Police Department in November of 1990. Agent Gant testified he bought "crack" cocaine from an individual named "Casper" on November 27, 1990. This drug transaction occurred at approximately 6:00 to 6:30 p.m. near a gas station at the corner of Hopkins and Robinson Streets, in New Iberia. Agent Gant wore a body microphone which transmitted his conversation with the defendant to a recorder. A confidential informant introduced Agent Gant to defendant, who identified himself as "Casper." Agent Gant saw the defendant for five to ten minutes before the buy. Gant asked the defendant what did he have, and the defendant said he had some $40 and $25 rocks. The defendant then removed three rocks from a matchbox and gave them to Gant in return for $25 cash.
Forensic chemist David Epstein testified that the laboratory analysis of the rocks turned in by Agent Gant indicated that they contained cocaine.
The defendant's defense was that of mis-identification. At trial, the defendant showed the jury that his left arm was six to eight inches shorter than his right arm. However, Agent Gant never noticed this on the night of the drug sale even though he claimed to have studied the defendant's physical characteristics in order to later identify the defendant. This physical deformity of the defendant was also known to Officer Len-nis Landry III, who had known the defendant for many years before this crime. Officer Landry never told Agent Gant about the defendant's arm nor did Officer Landry ask Agent Gant about this noticeable characteristic when they met at the police office after the sale. Neither officer could recall if the defendant was wearing a jacket on the night of the sale in November. However, Officer Landry did drive by the area where the sale occurred and verified that "Casper," the defendant, was present. When Agent Gant returned to the police office, Officer Landry put a photograph on the table and asked Agent Gant, "Do you know that dude?" Agent Gant said that it was Casper, the person from whom he had purchased the crack cocaine. The photograph was of Nathaniel Lee.
The defendant was arrested in July of 1991. After his arrest, he gave a statement to Officer Landry admitting that he had sold cocaine and giving the names of his suppliers. The defendant wanted to assist the police in exchange for reduction or dismissal of criminal charges. This statement was not written nor recorded, but the notes taken by Officer Landry were introduced into evidence.
When the issue of sufficiency of evidence is raised on appeal, the critical inquiry of the reviewing court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, supra; State ex rel. Graffagnino v. King, 436 So.2d 559, at 563 (La.1983); State v. Duncan, 420 So.2d 1105 (La.1982); State v. Moody, 393 So.2d 1212 (La.1981). It is the role of the fact finder to weigh the respective credibility of the witnesses. Therefore, the appellate court should not second-guess the credibility determination of the trier of fact beyond the sufficiency evaluations under the Jackson standard of review. See State ex rel. Graffagnino, supra, citing State v. Richardson, 425 So.2d 1228 (La.1983).
The trial judge refused to find the evidence insufficient as set forth in La. C.Cr.P. art. 851(5) motion for new trial, or as set forth in La.C.Cr.P. art. 821 motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal. A review of the record supports these rulings. Furthermore, when a defendant's motion for new trial is based on the ground of satisfying the demands of justice, denial of the motion presents nothing for appellate review. State v. Bender, 598 So.2d 629 (La.App. 3 Cir), writ denied, 605 So.2d 1125 (La.1992).
JURY SELECTION
The defendant further contends that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing four jurors to serve on the defendant's jury who had served on a criminal jury the day before defendant's trial.
The defendant's trial began with jury selection on Wednesday, May 13,1992. On the day before, another petit jury selected from the same venire had convicted a different defendant of distribution of narcotics to an undercover agent. The defendant objected to any of the members of the previous jury serving on his jury because the crimes were similar and the same prosecutor was presenting the State's case. This blanket objection, or challenge for cause, was denied by the trial judge who noted that different witnesses would be called by the State, and the crimes had occurred at different times and different locations.
The Court notes for the record that the two cases are in fact very similar, however, I believe that the jurors understand what the issues will be, and I think that they understand. It's not going to be a question of simply rubber stamping a prior verdict whether they'd have to assess credibility of this officer. This officer who will testify is not the same officer. So you don't have the same to come back in and testify, who was the undercover agent at the time and, therefore, respecting defense counsel's order. I feel restrained to deny the motion for cause. For which ruling, Mr. Collins reserves his right to object in the event of a conviction.
Thereafter, the defendant challenged for cause each juror who served on the first jury, and after this challenge was denied, he exercised a peremptory challenge. The defendant exhausted all twelve of his peremptory challenges very early, and could not excuse Regina Migues, Shirley Alvarez, or Judith Jackson from serving on the defendant's jury. In his brief, the defendant also argues that a fourth juror was unsuccessfully challenged, but a review of the transcript shows that Sherena Gondron was accepted by the defendant and unlike the three other contested jurors, the defendant did not challenge her for cause.
Prior service on a petit jury is a ground for exemption from jury service as provided by Louisiana Supreme Court Rule 25, but this exemption does not apply in the present case:
Section 4. The jury commission shall not include in, and shall delete from, the general venire the names of those persons who have served as grand or petit jurors in criminal cases or as trial jurors in civil eases or in a central jury pool during a period of two years immediately preceding their selection for jury service; individual district courts may increase this two year period to a four year period by local rule of court. However, if the name of such a person is included in a general venire, that person may claim an exemption from jury service or may waive the exemption.
In State v. Hines, 311 So.2d 871 (La.1975), the source provision for this exemption was interpreted to require a juror to serve on more than one petit jury during the week he is called for jury service. In Hines, the juror wanted to claim the exemption because he served as a petit juror the day before, but he was not entitled to it because his service was for the one week period of his call and it included possibly serving on one or more juries.
Prior service on a petit jury is also not a per se ground for a challenge for cause except as provided by La.C.Cr.P. art. 797(5):
(5) The juror served on the grand jury that found the indictment, or on a petit jury that once tried the defendant for the same or any other offense.
The defendant argued that prior service in a petit jury was a per se ground for a challenge for cause. Standing alone, prior jury service even in similar cases will not support a challenge for cause per se. State v. Labostrie, 358 So.2d 1243 (La.1978). A defendant must show actual bias on the part of a particular juror to support a challenge for cause. Ordinarily, the trial judge has broad discretion in ruling on the merit of challenges for cause. The trial court's ruling will not be reversed on appeal unless the trial judge's exercise of that discretion has been arbitrary or unreasonable, resulting in prejudice to the accused as revealed on full review of the voir dire examination.
A review of the voir dire of the three challenged jurors reveals no actual bias. Therefore, there was no abuse of the trial court's discretion.
AUDIOTAPE EVIDENCE
By his third assignment of error the defendant claims the trial court erred in admitting into evidence an audiotape of the defendant's sale of "crack" cocaine to Agent Gant because this audiotape was unintelligible and therefore unduly prejudiced the defendant. Defendant argues it is inadmissible because it has absolutely no probative value, and any weight it had was far outweighed by its prejudice to defendant. No authority is cited by the defendant in his appellate brief. The State simply argues that if the audiotape was truly unintelligible, then it could have no prejudicial effect, and if the audiotape was intelligible, then its probative value outweighed any prejudice to defendant.
Lt. Kerry LeBlanc testified that, in addition to the background noises, one could hear defendant telling Agent Gant he had some $40 and $25 rocks of "crack" cocaine. Counsel for defendant had previously objected to the introduction of the audiotape and the trial judge recessed trial in order to listen to it and rule on defendant's objection:
Having listened to the tape, the Court will overrule defense counsel's objection to the tape. It is, as defense counsel points out, very difficult to understand. Many parts of it are in fact unintelligible. However, it is a tape that was made of the transaction. It's been identified by the, by Detective LeBlanc. And the Court is going to allow the prosecution to play it for whatever weight the jury wants to give it. I believe that if the prosecution wants to offer it, that the jury can assess its weight as effectively as it possibly can.
The audiotape of the alleged transaction is relevant evidence which tends to make the existence of a fact at issue more probable or less probable. La.C.E. art. 401. Relevant evidence is generally admissible. La.C.E. art. 402. Relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or waste of time. La.C.E. art. 403.
Counsel for the defendant appears to confuse weight of the evidence with relevancy of the evidence. The comments following La. C.E. art. 402 note that to be admissible under the Code of Evidence, relevant evidence need not have any pre-determined minimum weight. La.C.E. art. 402, comment (c). Article 402 is derived from former La.R.S. 15:441 (repealed), and in State v. O'Quinn, 342 So.2d 202 (La.1977), the court noted that the evidence offered does not need to have strong, full, representative value, or to produce persuasion by its role and intrinsic form, but it is sufficient if it is worth consideration by the jury. Previously, in State v. LaCoste, 256 La. 697, 237 So.2d 871 (1970), a surveillance videotape of a bank robbery was found admissible, and the Supreme Court ruled it was for the jury to decide whether or not it bore upon the guilt or innocence of the accused.
These same principles apply in the present case; the audiotape was found admissible by the trial judge and it was then up to the jury to determine what weight, if any, it would give the recording. The defendant introduced no evidence to support his claim of prejudice. Therefore, the defendant has failed to establish reversible error in the trial court's ruling. La.C.E. art. 103 and La. C.Cr.P. art. 921.
EXCESSIVE SENTENCE
The defendant also appeals the imposition of an excessive sentence. A review of the record reveals that no motion to reconsider sentence was filed by the defendant. A further request to the district clerk of court revealed no such motion has been filed. La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.1(D) provides that the failure to timely file a motion to reconsider sentence precludes appellate review of any claim concerning excessiveness of sentence. See State v. Gachot, 609 So.2d 269 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1992). Therefore, this assignment of error will not be considered.
Accordingly, the defendant's conviction and sentence are affirmed. This court orders the district court to comply with La. C.Cr.P. art. 930.8(C) by informing defendant in writing of the provisions of La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8 within ten days of the rendition of this opinion and file written proof that the defendant received such notice in the record of the proceedings.
AFFIRMED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
COOKS, J., dissents and assigns written reasons.