Case Name: Ollie Roberts v. The State
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1912-06-28
Citations: 67 Tex. Crim. 580
Docket Number: No. 1903
Parties: Ollie Roberts v. The State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Criminal Reports
Volume: 67
Pages: 580–584

Head Matter:
Ollie Roberts v. The State.
No. 1903.
Decided June 28, 1912.
Rehearing granted October 23, 1912.
1. —Murder—Evidence—Bills of Exception.
The statute requires that bills of exception must be filed with the clerk within the given time, and the file marks of the clerk must appear thereon; but where it is shown that such bills were filed, but the file mark inadvertently omitted in the transcript, the same will be considered on appeal.
2. —Same—Charge of Court—Practice on Appeal.
Where the defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree, a complaint of the charge of the court on murder in the first degree will not be considered on appeal.
3. —Same—Charge of Court—Manslaughter.
Where, upon trial of murder, the evidence would have sustained a verdict of murder in the first degree, there was no reversible error in the court’s definition of implied malice and his repetition thereof, as defendant was convicted of murder in the second degree and could not complain; there being no issue of manslaughter in the case.
4. —Same—Charge of Court—Insanity.
Where, upon trial of murder, the court’s charge placed the burden of proof on defendant to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he was insane, there was no error; besides, the complaint was too general.
5. —Same—Charge of Court—Uncontrollable Impulse.
Where, upon trial of murder, the defendant requested a charge on the question of uncontrollable impulse, there was no error in refusing same, as the question was whether he knew the nature and quality of the act charged against him.
6. —Same—Evidence—Continuance.
Where, upon trial of murder, defendant’s application for continuance showed due diligence, and that the absent testimony would be material in establishing the plea of insanity, the continuance should have been granted.
7. —Same—Evidence—Acts of Deceased.
"Upon trial of murder, it was error to admit testimony that prior to the "killing the deceased was kneeling down at the church altar crying, it not being shown that defendant was present or could have seen this.
8. —Same—Evidence—Confessions.
A confession can not be introduced in evidence unless it be reduced to writing under the requirements of the statute, nor can its contents be introduced in evidence unless the absence of the original is accounted for.
9. —Same—Argument of Counsel.
The statement of the county attorney, that the jury ought to hang the • defendant and that if they did not do so, and sent him to the penitentiary, the Governor would pardon him under some flimsy pretext, etc., while highly improper, was not reversible error, as the death penalty was not inflicted.
10.—Same—Practice on Appeal.
Complaints to the selection of a special judge, and other matters which will not arise on another trial need mot be considered on appeal.
Appeal from the District Court of Caldwell. Tried below before the Hon. M. C. Jeffrey, Special Judge.
Appeal from a conviction of murder in. the second degree; penalty, nine years imprisonment in the penitentiary.
The opinion states the case.
B. B. Goopwood, for appellant.
G. B. Lane, Assistant Attorney-General, for the State.

Opinion:
HARPER, Judge.
—Appellant was indicted for murder, found guilty of murder in the second degree and his punishment assessed at nine years in the penitentiary.
The facts would show that deceased had killed appellant's brother, some two or three years prior to this homicide. That deceased had left the county and moved to San Antonio, and went back on this trip to attend the funeral and burial of Elwood Johnson. That after the funeral exercises in the church as deceased started out of the door, appellant fired at him three times, two of the shots taking effect, both being fatal wounds in the opinion of the doctors who rvere called to attend him. The evidence would show that deceased was weeping and had his hand over his eyes, when the first shot was fired, and the others followed in rapid succession. The evidence for the defendant seeks only to sIioav that appellant was insane at the time he did the shooting, offering proof of no other justification.
There are in the record a number of bills of exceptions, and if Ave were permitted to review them they might present error, but inasmuch as they bear no file marks; do not show they were ever filed with the clerk of the court, and if they Avere delivered to the clerk, when they were so delivered. In an unbroken line of decisions this court has held that the bills must show, on appeal, that they had been filed with the clerk, when approved by the judge, and the date of filing must be shown. These bills do not shoAv when they were presented to the judge, nor when delivered to the clerk, bearing no date and no file marks. Consequently we will not review the bills of exceptions. The statute requires that the bills must be filed with the clerk, and filed within a given time, and this must be evidenced by the file marks of the clerk. The record being in. this condition we can not review the grounds in the motion for new trial, based on alleged bill of exceptions.
The defendant being found guilty of only murder in the second degree, and his punishment being assessed at only nine years in the penitentiary, we will not discuss nor pass on those paragraphs in the motion complaining of the charge on murder in the first degree.
The evidence did not raise the issue of manslaughter, and the court did not err in refusing to charge thereon, and the definition of implied malice is in language frequently approved by this court, and the fact that the court repeated this definition in his charge was not hurtful to defendant. The facts in this case would sustain a verdict of murder in the first degree, and if the court by making the definition of implied malice prominent, aided counsel for appellant in getting the offense reduced to that grade, with almost the minimum penalty, he should not complain. If his client is not insane, as found by the jury, counsel has cause to congratulate himself on the verdict returned.
Appellant complains that the charge on insanity is confusing, disconnected and not applicable to the fact's in the case. The charge is not subject to these criticisms, and the grounds are too general to be considered. The complaint that it placed the burden on defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that' he was insane, presents no error. This is in accordance with the decisions of this court. Fisher v. The State, 30 Texas Crim. Rep., 502, and eases cited in section 51, Whites' Annotated Penal Code.
The special charges requested, instructing the jury that "if defendant was moved to commit the homicide by an uncontrollable impulse," to acquit him, should not have been given. This question is thoroughly discussed in Leache v. The State, 22 Texas Crim. App., 279, wherein the rule laid down as the true rule is, that the law does not require as the condition on which criminal responsibility shall follow the commission of crime the possession of one's faculties in full vigor, or a mind unimpaired by disease or infirmity; he can only discharge himself from responsibility by proving that his intellect was so disordered that he did not know the nature and quality of. the act he was doing, and that it was an act which he ought not to do. (See also Hurst v. State, 40 Texas Crim. Rep., 378, and cases cited.)
The evidence amply supports the verdict and judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed