Case Name: Kenneth J. GANAWAY, Appellant, v. Dorothy HENDERSON, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1958-06-24
Citations: 103 So. 2d 693
Docket Number: No. A-15
Parties: Kenneth J. GANAWAY, Appellant, v. Dorothy HENDERSON, Appellee.
Judges: THOMAS, ELWYN, Associate Judge, concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 103
Pages: 693–705

Head Matter:
Kenneth J. GANAWAY, Appellant, v. Dorothy HENDERSON, Appellee.
No. A-15.
District Court of Appeal of Florida. First District.
June 24, 1958.
Rehearing Denied June 24, 1958.
Phillip D. Anderson, Palm Beach, and Roy T. Rhodes, Tallahassee, for appellant.
Hopkins & Folsom, Tallahassee, for ap-pellee.

Opinion:
WIGGINTON, Judge.
On January 1, 1954, appellant, who was-defendant before the Chancellor, entered, into a written agreement with appellee whereby defendant leased to plaintiff a certain "Dairy Queen" store building, together with the equipment and machinery-located therein, for a period of two years.. In accordance with the provisions of the lease plaintiff-lessee deposited $3,000 with the defendant-lessor to secure payment of the rents and performance of the covenants- and conditions thereunder. Plaintiff as lessee obligated herself to pay the stipulated' amount of $200 per month plus a sum equal to sixty' cents for each gallon of mix processed through the freezer, which was a part of the leased machinery. Shortly after taking possession of the premises-plaintiff wrote a series of letters to defendant in which, among other things, she complained of trouble with the machinery, and-requested that someone take over the lease. In accordance with plaintiff's request, defendant advertised in a newspaper to find' a new operator, and when he located one, he notified the plaintiff by telegram of the date on which the new operator would arrive to take over the store, thereby allowing plaintiff to make other plans for her livelihood. The plaintiff vacated the premises on June 30, 1954, but being unable to agree with defendant upon a settlement of their differences arising out of the lease contract, she filed the suit in chancery out of which this appeal arises.
As grounds for the relief prayed, plaintiff alleged that she was fraudulently induced to enter into- the lease agreement in that defendant represented the equipment as being in good working order whereas it was not. For further grounds, plaintiff alleged failure of consideration, breach of warranty, and mutual cancellation. As an offsetting credit against the unliquidated rental that accrued during the six months plaintiff was in possession of the leased property, she prayed for an accounting claiming reimbursement for certain quantities of ice cream mix allegedly spoiled due to faulty equipment. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, and upon denial thereof answered, denying plaintiff's allegations, and counterclaimed for damages for an alleged breach of contract. Upon consideration of the proofs the Chancellor found, inter alia, "there was no overreaching or fraud on the part of the defendant that contrary to defendant's express warranty " the machinery was never placed in first class condition", and that "defendant acquiesced in the cancellation of the Lease by the plaintiff."
From final decree awarding judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $2,096, defendant took this appeal challenging (1) the sufficiency of the evidence, (2) the Chancellor's denial of his motion to dismiss and (3) the Chancellor's failure to transfer the cause, ex proprio motu, for jury trial at law. The latter ground of the appeal is on the theory that when plaintiff's proof failed to establish fraud, the court was without jurisdiction to grant the equitable relief sought. Appellant argues that since an adequate remedy at law exists for determination of the damage issue, the case should have been dismissed or transferred to the law side of the court for a jury trial on that issue.
Our examination of the record convinces us that no error was committed in denying appellant's motion to dismiss, and that there is ample evidence to support the Chancellor's findings of fact. The question remains as to whether plaintiff's proofs established at least one premise upon which the relief sought was grantable by a court of equity.
The redress of a party who has been led into a transaction by false representations and deceit is not confined to his legal action for damages. He may seek appropriate relief in equity. Further, when one of the parties to a contract unjustifiably refuses to perform his agreement as a whole, or any substantial part of it, this gives the other party the option to rescind the entire contract, provided he offers to do so within a reasonable time, restores what he has received, and the situation of the parties remains so far unchanged that they can be restored to their original position. It has also been held that the parties themselves can rescind a contract by mutual consent when such rescission violates no established rule of law. Thus, the mere existence of a remedy at law for damages does not exclude the wider jurisdiction of equity to unravel the transaction, undo the contract, and restore the parties to their former position.
The power of a court of equity to enforce the cancellation of a contract, although exceptional, is well recognized. Its purpose is to supplement the powers of a court of law when there exists some unusual equity of a settled and well recognized nature; and its grounds are distinctly marked. These grounds are primarily fraud, mistake, turpitude of consideration and circumstances entitling relief on the principle of quia timet. As in the case of specific performance, relief by way of cancellation lies within the sound discretion of the court, to be exercised according to what is reasonable and proper .under the circumstances of each particular case.
By her complaint plaintiff prayed for certain equitable relief grounded upon fraud, turpitude of consideration and cancellation by mutual consent. Through her allegations she established prima facie entitlement to the relief sought. The importance of securing a decree cancelling the lease and thereby relieving plaintiff of further obligation thereunder is clearly demonstrated by defendant's counterclaim seeking damages in excess of $10,000 for plaintiff's alleged breach of contract. Ap-pellee indeed had very real cause to fear not only probable future injury, but a certain and present one.
In Williams v. Wetmore, our Supreme Court adopted the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction. Quoting from Tubb v. Fort, Mr. Justice Hocker stated: '"The general rule of practice in courts of equity, has long been settled that if the subject-matter of the suit is not without the jurisdiction of a court of equity, and there may be circumstances under which it would be competent for the court to grant relief, the objection that there is an effectual and complete remedy at law must be taken by demurrer, and comes too late at the hearing ' " In DeCottes v. Clarkson, it was held that: "Where no objection is made in any manner to the jurisdiction of a court of chancery in a partition suit, and the case is regularly brought to final hearing and decree on bill, answer, and testimony, the appellate court will not consider objections as to jurisdiction raised for the first time on appeal, where the record fails to disclose an entire absence of jurisdiction over the subject-matter."
It is clear that, although the fraud complained of failed to materialize under the proof, the subject matter in the case now before this court was not outside the jurisdiction of a chancery court. The relief prayed for by way of a decree of cancellation through consent of the parties was cognizable only in a court of chancery. The accounting, regardless of its complexity, and the damages sought were incidental to the primary relief of rescission. Based upon the evidence before him, the Chancellor in the exercise of his discretion granted both the primary and incidental relief. An examination of the record fails to reveal any abuse of that discretion. We are not here faced with the situation considered in the Miller case wherein the sole ground upon which equity could relieve failed in proof and the respondent forthwith moved for dismissal grounded upon a failure of jurisdiction.
The only remaining question concerns whether defendant, appellant here, raised the issue of jurisdiction before the Chancellor so as to save his right to attack that court's jurisdiction in this Court on the ground of adequacy of plaintiff's remedy at law.
The only action taken by defendant at trial that could be considered to have challenged the Chancellor's jurisdiction over the subject matter was his motion to dismiss the cause "for failure to state a cause of action." If this motion was not sufficient for that purpose a fortiori appellee must prevail.
Rule 1.7(b), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 30 F.S.A., provides that applications for orders addressed to the court shall be by motion and "shall state with particularity the grounds therefor." Further, the Supreme Court of Florida has held, as recently as Connolly v. Sebeco, Inc., that a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action admits all matters well pleaded and serves only to test the sufficiency of the pleadings. It must necessarily follow, therefore, that such a motion is not sufficient to challenge the court's jurisdiction as affected by the proofs. On the contrary, it tends toward an admission that the subject matter was in fact within the court's jurisdiction. Furthermore, the plaintiff and defendant having each invoked the jurisdiction of the equity court, the defendant places himself in an untenable position now to object to the jurisdiction of a court whose aid he affirmatively sought. Certainly the defendant, having by his own actions waived any right he may have had to a jury trial, could not at this late date urge that the Chancellor was without jurisdiction to hear and pass upon his counterclaim and that this claim should have been determined in a new or independent suit at law.
Having failed to interpose a timely challenge to the Chancellor's jurisdiction to grant the relief sought by appellee, appellant cannot now be heard to attack the decree affording that relief merely because there might have been another remedy available through recourse to a court of law.
Accordingly, the decree appealed from should be and the same is hereby affirmed.
THOMAS, ELWYN, Associate Judge, concurs.
. Willis v. Fowler, 102 Fla. 35, 136 So. 358.
.Peavy-Wilson Lumber Co. v. Brevard County, 159 Fla. 311, 31 So.2d 483, 172 A.L.R. 168.
. Holmberg v. Hardee, 90 Fla. 787, 108 So. 211.
. International Realty Associates, Inc., v. McAdoo, 87 Fla. 1, 99 So. 117.
. 51 Fla. 614, 41 So. 545, 549.
. 43 Fla. 1, 29 So. 442; See: Williams v. Wetmore, supra, Note 5; Rivas v. Summers, 33 Fla. 539, 15 So. 319.
. Miller v. Rolfe, Fla.App.1957, 97 So.2d 132.
. (Fla. 1956), 89 So.2d 482. See Stone v. Stone (Fla.App. 1957), 97 So.2d 352.
. Cf.: Marek v. Patterson, Ma.1954, 75 So.2d 808; Blanton v. Woodward, 107 Fla. 691, 144 So. 300.