Case Name: G. C. Barrier et al. v. H. J. Lowery et al.
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1929-02-20
Citations: 118 Tex. 227
Docket Number: No. 5033
Parties: G. C. Barrier et al. v. H. J. Lowery et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 118
Pages: 227–235

Head Matter:
G. C. Barrier et al. v. H. J. Lowery et al.
No. 5033.
Decided December 12, 1928. February 20, 1929.
(11 S. W., 2d Series, 298; 13 S. W., 2d Series, 688.)
Davis, Syniwtt & Hatchel and Bledsoe, Crenshaw & Dupree, for relators.
The Supreme " Court has authority to take cognizance of the pendency of the same or similar suits, between the same parties in two or more District Courts and to determine which one has original jurisdiction and the authority to proceed with the trial of such suit, and has correlative authority to make all orders, including prohibi tion and injunction, to protect exercise of that power. Cleveland v. Ward, 116 Texas, 1.
The District Court first obtaining jurisdiction and venue of the parties and subject matter of a suit has exclusive right to proceed with the trial of such cause unless such jurisdiction and venue has been lost or otherwise waived. Long v. Long, 269 S. W., 207; Goggan v. Morrison, 163 S. W., 120; Miller & Victor Lumber Co. v. Williamson, 164 S. W., 440; Sparks v. National Bank of Commerce, 168 S. W., 48; Camp v. First National Bank, 195 S. W., 217; Phillips v. Phillips, 223 S. W., 243; Ward v. Scarbough, 223 S. W., 1107.
The Dallas County Court having acquired jurisdiction and venue over the subject matter and parties to this suit, we submit that the Dallas County Court should be authorized to proceed with the trial of this case, as it is willing to do, and that the Lubbock County Court be restrained from in any way interfering with the orderly process of its proceedings and that this court issue such orders, decrees and writs as may be necessary- to protect and enforce its judgment herein.
Judge Royal R. Wheeler, as respondent, answered in pro. per.
Wilson & Randal and 7. 7. Kilpatrick, for respondent Lowery.
Where the respondent files suit against the relators in the District Court of Lubbock County, Texas, and applied for a temporary injunction, restraining the relators from prosecuting an alleged suit against the respondent in the District Court of Dallas County, Texas, and the temporary injunction having been granted by the District Court of Lubbock County as prayed for, and no motion to dissolve such injunction was ever filed by the relators, and no appeal ever prosecuted, the Supreme Court is without jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus, restraining the enforcement of the injunction, or the further prosecution of the Lubbock suit. Glenn v. Milam, 263 S. W., 900; Ridder v. Hall, 251 S. W., 497; Cleveland v. Long, 285 S. W., 1071.
Where the relators have failed to file a motion to dissolve the injunction granted by the 72d District Court of Lubbock County, Texas, and have failed to appeal from such judgment, and the judgment of the Lubbock District Court is a valid one, and one which the court had jurisdiction and legal right to render, a mandamus applied for to prevent such injunction from being enforced will not be issued by the Supreme Court. Hume v. Schintz, 90 Texas, 72; Smith v. Conner, 98 Texas, 434; Aycock v. Clark, 94 Texas, 375; Matthaei v. Clark, 110 Texas, 114; Glenn v. Milam, 263 S. W., 900; Robertson v. Work, 270 S. W., 1006; Cunningham v. City of Corpus Christi, 260 S. W., 266; American Construction Co. v. Jacksonville T. & K. W. Ry. Co., 148 U. S., 372; 37 L. Ed. 486.
Where the respondent files suit against the relators in trespass to try title to and to cancel a deed conveying land situated in Lubbock County, Texas, and the residence of one of the relators was unknown' to him, and the residence of one of the other relators was outside of The State of Texas, and it was necessary to serve these nonresident relators by publication, the District Court of Lubbock County, Texas, is the only court which would have jurisdiction to render a judgment in such case. Article 2039, Revised Civil Statutes of 1925; Article 2042, Revised Civil Statutes of 1925; Davenport v. Rutledge, 187 S. W., 988; Chapman v. Kellogg, 252 S. W., 151.
Where the respondent’s suit for title to his land, filed in Dallas County, has been dismissed, and suit was subsequently filed by him in Lubbock County for the recovery of the land, a cross action against him by some of the defendants for debt, filed in the Dallas suit, is not another suit pending in that there must be the same parties, the same rights asserted, the same relief prayed for, and a disposition of the first must finally control the second, and the pendency of the cross action in the first suit will not be grounds for evading or delaying the prosecution of the subsequent suit in Lubbock County. Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hargus, 99 S. W., 580; Pullman Co. v. Hoyle, 115 S. W., 315; K. C., M. & O. v. State, 155 S. W., 561; Affirmed by Supreme Court, 163 S. W., 582; Simmang v. Braunagul, 27 S. W., 1032; Wright v. Wright, 285 S. W., 909; Business Men’s Oil Co. v. Priddy, 250 S. W., 156; Long v. Long, 269 S. W., 207; Cunningham v. City of Corpus Christi, 260 S. W., 266; McCoy v. Bankers Trust Company, 200 S. W., 1138; Cooper v. Mayfield, 94 Texas, 107; 1 C. J., page 97, section 138, p. 98, sec. 140.

Opinion:
Mr. Judge LEDDY
delivered the opinion of the Commission of Appeals, Section B.
Relators seek in an original application for mandamus to require Royall Watkins, judge of the 95th District Court at Dallas, to proceed to trial of a cross action filed by them in a certain suit brought in that court by respondent PI. J. Lowery. It appears that plaintiffs' cause of action in that suit was dismissed for want of prosecution, but the cross action filed by relators therein remained on the docket for trial. Before a trial thereon could be obtained, the respondent Lowery filed an independent suit in the district court of Lubbock County covering the same subject matter as is involved in relators' cross action pending in Judge Watkins' court. It is conceded that a final judgment in the suit filed at Lubbock could successfully be pleaded in bar of the relief sought by relators in the cross action in the suit pending at Dallas.
The plaintiff in the Lubbock suit procured the issuance of a temporary writ of injunction restraining relators and their attorneys from further prosecuting their cross action in the 95th District Court at Dallas or from taking any orders therein.
The District Court for the 95th District having acquired jurisdiction of the subject matter involved in relators' cross action, its right to determine the questions therein involved was exclusive and could not be trenched upon by any other court. Cleveland v. Ward, 116 Texas, 1, 285 S. W., 1063, and cases there cited; Benson v. Fulmore, (Com. App.), 269 S. W., 71; Long v. Long, 269 S. W., 207; Goggan & Bros. v. Morrison, 163 S. W., 120; Miller & Vidor Lumber Co. v. Williamson, 164 S. W., 440; Camp v. First Nat'l Bank, 195 S. W., 217; State v. Reynolds, 209 Mo., 161, 107 S. W., 485, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.), 963, 123 Am. St., 468, 14 Ann. Cas., 198.
There existed some confusion in the authorities on this question prior to the decision of our Supreme Court in the case of Cleveland v. Ward, cited above. The decision in that case clarified the law of this state with reference to the jurisdiction of a district court to enter any order or take any action in a case where the jurisdiction of another district court has previously attached to the subject matter and the parties involved therein. It is there distinctly held that jurisdiction of a district court once acquired cannot be destroyed, diminished, or suspended, by any one of the parties, pending an action in another court, and any judgment or order of the latter is void so far as it conflicts with any judgment or order of the court first acquiring jurisdiction.
Under the rule announced in the above case, it is clear that the district court of Lubbock County was without jurisdiction to take any action concerning the subject matter of the suit pending in the 95th District Court at Dallas which would tend to prevent that Court from disposing of a case to which its jurisdiction had attached. The determination of all questions involved in that case belonged exclusively to the court in which the case was pending. The injunction issued by the district court of Lubbock County restraining relators from prosecuting their suit in the court where jurisdiction had already attached was therefore void, hence no reason exists why the district court at Dallas should not proceed to try the issues involved in relators' suit.
The writ of mandamus prayed for must be refused, however, because it appears from the" answer of respondent Judge Royall Watkins that he has not refused to try relators' cross action, but is ready and willing to do so. Relators no doubt assumed that a trial by Judge Watkins at a time when they were restrained from taking any action in the case by reason of the injunction served upon them out of tbe district court of Lubbock County would not be the character of trial to which they were entitled under the law of this state. This would be true if the injunction issued by the district court at Lubbock was valid and enforceable. As is said by Chief Justice Cureton in the Cleveland case, "to say that the case could be tried without the presence of the plaintiffs who brought the suit would be a denial to them of due process."
Writ of mandamus can only be issued when it appears that a judge improperly refuses to proceed to trial. Since it is shown that Judge Watkins is ready and willing to try the case, and that the action of the district court at Lubbock in enjoining relators from appearing or taking any action in the case pending in Judge Watkins' court is void, no reason exists why said cause of action should not be promptly disposed of.
We therefore recommend that the writ of mandamus prayed for be denied and that the restraining orders heretofore issued by the Supreme Court staying the proceedings in both courts and that of the district court of Lubbock County enjoining relators from appearing or taking any action in Judge Watkins' court be annulled and vacated. All cost of this proceeding will be assessed against re?spondent H. J. Lowery.
Opinion of Commission of Appeals is adopted and restraining orders of District Court of Lubbock County and of Supreme Court are vacated, and mandamus refused, with costs taxed against respondent Lowery.
Thos. B. Greenwood, Associate Justice.
William Pierson, Associate Justice.