Case Name: DAHNKEN, INC. OF COTTONWOOD, a corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Andy MARSHINSKY, an Individual, Defendant and Respondent
Court: Utah Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Utah
Decision Date: 1978-05-16
Citations: 580 P.2d 596
Docket Number: No. 15335
Parties: DAHNKEN, INC. OF COTTONWOOD, a corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Andy MARSHINSKY, an Individual, Defendant and Respondent.
Judges: ELLETT, C. J., and HALL, J., concur.
Reporter: Pacific Reporter 2d
Volume: 580
Pages: 596–599

Head Matter:
DAHNKEN, INC. OF COTTONWOOD, a corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Andy MARSHINSKY, an Individual, Defendant and Respondent.
No. 15335.
Supreme Court of Utah.
May 16, 1978.
Verden E. Bettilyon, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant.
John L. McCoy of Ryberg & McCoy, Salt Lake City, for defendant and respondent.

Opinion:
CROCKETT, Justice:
Plaintiff Dahnken, Inc. brought this action against defendant Andy Marshinsky, a Wyoming resident, for recission of a contract, or for the balance of the price, on a ring purchased by defendant at its store in Salt Lake County.
Defendant was served as provided in U.C. A.1953, 78-27-25, the so-called Long-Arm Statute. From the granting of defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over him, the plaintiff appeals.
The plaintiff's complaint alleges that on December 22, 1976, the defendant came into its store and purchased a ring for which plaintiff's clerk by mistake charged him $127.22 for it instead of the correct price of $1,595.00. It makes no contention that the defendant engaged in any other business, or had an address, telephone number, bank account or any other property or activity within the state of Utah.
The sole question presented is whether such a single transaction within this state is sufficient to render the defendant subject to jurisdiction of the Utah courts by the use of the long-arm statute.
It is true that our legislature has declared that the public policy of this state is to provide its citizens with the most effective means possible for seeking redress against nonresidents. Nevertheless, in doing so, fairness and good conscience require that we accord to citizens of other states who may visit in our state or who desire to make purchases here, the same protections from possible inconvenience and hardships by long distance lawsuits as we expect to be accorded our citizens in similar circumstances in our sister states. It is for this reason, among others, that we have held that a person who comes into our state as a visitor and makes single purchases or engages in single transactions of a transitory nature does not come within the meaning of the statute referred to, but there must be some activity of a more substantial and purposeful nature.
What has been said herein impels our agreement with the determination made by the trial court: that the single transaction upon which this action is based does not bring the defendant within the requirements of the long-arm statute referred to; and that consequently, the granting of defendant's motion to dismiss was justified.
Affirmed. Because defendant is in no position to ask for affirmative relief from our courts, no costs are awarded.
ELLETT, C. J., and HALL, J., concur.
MAUGHAN, J., concurs in result.
. See Hill v. Zale Corp., 25 Utah 2d 357, 482 P.2d 332, listing factors that may be considered.
. U.C.A.1953, 78-27-22 provides jurisdiction over nonresident defendants will be asserted, "to the fullest extent permitted by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution."
. Cate Rental Company v. Whalen, Utah, 549 P.2d 707.
. Transwestern General Agency v. Morgan, Utah, 526 P.2d 1186.
. Hanks v. Admr. of Est. of Jensen, Utah, 531 P.2d 363.