Case Name: Michael G. McDERMOTT and Barbara A. McDermott, husband and wife, Appellants, v. The CITY OF CLEARWATER, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1988-05-04
Citations: 526 So. 2d 121
Docket Number: No. 87-699
Parties: Michael G. McDERMOTT and Barbara A. McDermott, husband and wife, Appellants, v. The CITY OF CLEARWATER, Appellee.
Judges: THREADGILL, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 526
Pages: 121–124

Head Matter:
Michael G. McDERMOTT and Barbara A. McDermott, husband and wife, Appellants, v. The CITY OF CLEARWATER, Appellee.
No. 87-699.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
May 4, 1988.
Rehearing Denied June 8, 1988.
William P. O’Malley, Clearwater, for appellants.
M.A. Galbraith, Jr., City Atty., Clear-water, for appellee.

Opinion:
HALL, Judge.
The appellants, the McDermotts, the plaintiffs below, appeal from the trial court's order denying their motion for attorney's fees. The appellants contend that they were entitled to attorney's fees based upon the city's offer of judgment. We do not agree.
The record reflects that the appellants filed a three-count complaint against the city for its action in cutting down and destroying a large tree on their property on or about August 15, 1985. Thereafter, the city filed motions to dismiss and to strike the appellants' complaint. These motions, along with motions filed by the appellants, were heard on March 25, 1986. At this hearing the trial court orally dismissed count III of the appellants' complaint with leave to amend. Later that day the city served an offer of judgment on the appellants, based on the remaining counts of the complaint. On March 26 the city attorney sent a letter to the trial judge enclosing a proposed order reflecting the judge's ruling of March 25. The attorney for the appellants responded to that letter on March 27, objecting to the proposed order of the city and enclosing his own order. Both orders reflected the dismissal of count III. The trial judge signed the city's order on April 1, 1986. On April 2, 1986, the appellants filed a second amended complaint basically realleging count III. On April 4, 1986, they accepted the offer of judgment and filed a proof of service of notice of acceptance of the offer of judgment in which their attorney swore that he received the offer on the 25th day of March 1986 and that he accepted it within ten days. The offer of judgment specified the amount of damages as $1,001, together with costs accrued to the date of the offer.
The parties agree that the appellants are only entitled to attorney's fees under count III, a claim for inverse condemnation against the city.
On April 8,1986, the trial court entered a judgment on the offer and acceptance in which it reserved jurisdiction to fix and assess costs upon appropriate motion to tax costs. The appellants thereafter filed a motion to tax costs requesting attorney's fees in the amount of $5,530 and costs in the amount of $76.50.
The trial court entered an order on the appellants' motion in which it found that the offer of judgment was silent as to whether attorney's fees were to be a part of the costs specified therein and that at no time up until the filing of the motion to tax costs did the appellants make any claim for attorney's fees. The court therefore found that the appellants were only entitled to costs in the amount of $76.50.
We agree with the learned trial judge's order. Neither the correspondence between the parties, the offer of judgment, the acceptance thereof, nor any of the proposed orders or orders entered by the trial court contemplated the payment of attorney's fees by the city as part of the costs provided for in the offer of judgment. At the time the city made its offer of judgment, March 25, 1986, the trial court had orally dismissed count III. Therefore, it is clear that the city did not intend to offer judgment on count III, as it considered that count to no longer be a part of the complaint. And, as noted previously, the parties agreed that count III was the only count pursuant to which the appellants would have been entitled to attorney's fees.
Although we recognize that section 73.-091, Florida Statutes (1987), provides for a petitioner to pay attorney's fees as part of the costs incurred in an eminent domain proceeding, we do not feel that this statute is applicable in the instant case. The trial judge impliedly found in his order on the appellants' motion to tax costs that the parties did not intend to include attorney's fees as part of the costs provided for in the offer of judgment. We agree. Furthermore, we believe it would be inequitable to allow the appellants to collect attorney's fees based on an offer of judgment which was extended at a time when the only count allowing attorney's fees had been orally dismissed by the court.
Affirmed.
THREADGILL, J., concurs.
PARKER, J., dissents with opinion.
. "An order is usually considered rendered when it is pronounced by the judge in open court. Such order is the true order and its reduction to writing is merely for the purpose of completeing the record and of providing a predicate for execution or appeal." Wheeler Fertilizer Co. v. Rogers, 49 So.2d 83, 87 (Fla.1950); Sparkman v. McClure, 498 So.2d 892 (Fla.1986).