Case Name: FREE v. SOUTHERN RY.
Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1907-09-03
Citations: 78 S.C. 57
Docket Number: 6637
Parties: FREE v. SOUTHERN RY.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Carolina Reports
Volume: 78
Pages: 57–66

Head Matter:
6637
FREE v. SOUTHERN RY.
1. Evidence.- — The Statute Law op Another State can only be proved in this State by printed volumes, containing the statute, purported to have been published by State authority.
2. Foreign Laws — Negligence—Lord Campbell's Act — Pleadings.—A Cause op Action given by the statute law of a sister State may be enforced in the Courts of this State although the statute of that State and of this differ in minor particulars. Under the Lord Campbell’s act of North Carolina, granting recovery by personal representar tive of one killed by wrongful act of another, nonsuit should not be granted, because the North Carolina statute in evidence gave the personal representative the right to sue, without naming the beneficiaries, and the complaint alleged the action was for benefit of the parents of deceased.
Lilly v. R. R., 32 S. C., 142, distinguished from this case.
Mr. Justice Gary dissents.
3. Negligence — Contributory Negligence. — From evidence tending to show a servant employed in the yards of a railroad company while in" the discharge of his duties and watching another train, was run "over by a switch engine, running at a rapid rate of speed, without a watchman and without warning, jury may' infer -negligence in. the company and that servant was not guilty of contributory negligence.
B.efore Prince, J., Spartanburg,
July, 1906.
Reversed.
Action; by John Free, administrator of Jules Free, against Southern Ry. From order of nonsuit, plaintiff appeals.
Mr. Stanyarne Wilson, for appellant,
cites: As to construction of N. C. Statutes: 70 S. C., 256. Issue of contributory negligence is for jury: 75 S. C., 73; 60 S. C., 9. Motion for nonsuit should not be reinforced by additional ground after trial: 54 S. C., 226; 22 S. C., 560; 35 S. C., 609; Voorhees’ Code, 380(g).
Messrs. Sanders and DePass, contra,
cite: N. C. Statute should not have been set up by reply: Code of Proc., 163, 174; 66 S. C, 91. Statute of another State can only be proved by printed volume: 70 S. C., 254. Courts of one State will not enforce a statute of another State dissimilar to that of its own: 20 Am. St. R., 461; 22 Am. St. R., 803 ; 73 S. C, 215; 4 R. R. A., 814; 26 Am. R., 742; 39 Am. R., 244; 10 Ohio St., 121; 18 R. R. A., 804; 98 Mass., 85. Rapid rate of speed is not evidence of negligence: 4 Thomp. on Neg., sec. 4508; 55 S. W. R., 744; 25 S. W. R., 943; 5 S. C, 221; 7 S; C., 402. Motion to be permitted to add additional ground of nonsuit after trial should have been granted: 51 S. C, 419; 9 S. C., 330. Plaintiff was .guilty of contributory negligence: 145 U. S., 418; 36 S. E., 118; 48 S. E., 212; 133 N. C, 610; 113 N. C, 558; 72 S. C., 392; 74 S. C, 419; 75 S. C., 487.
September 3, 1907.

Opinion:
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Mr. Justice Woods.
Jules Free, an employee of the Southern Railway Company, was killed by one of its engines in September, 1904, at Charlotte, N. C.
His father, John Free, qualified as administrator in this State and brought this action to recover damages. The complaint contains this allegation: "That under the law of the State of North Carolina, known as the Rord Campbell Act, the defendant, by the said wrongful killing of Jules Free, became liable to this plaintiff as administrator, for. the benefit of his parents, for the damages caused by the said wrongful conduct, and that said plaintiff, as such administrator, was thereby damaged in the sum of two thousand dollars, for which he asks judgment."
A nonsuit was granted on the grounds that there was no proof of a statute in North Carolina allowing such a suit for the benefit of parents of the person killed.
The following statute of North Carolina was admitted: "That any servant or employee of any railroad company operating in this State, who shall suffer injury to his person, or the personal representative of any servant or employee who shall have suffered death, in the course of his service or employment with said company, by the negligence, carelessness, or incapacity of any servant, employee, or agent of the, company, or by any defect in the machinery, ways, or appliances of the company, shall be entitled to maintain an action against such company."
The plaintiff attempted to prove the statute law of North Carolina provided that such an action as this should be brought for the benefit of parents, by introducing the reports of the Supreme Court of North Carolina. A statute of a sister State cannot 'be so proved in the Courts of this State. Nothing less than printed copies of the volume containing the statute, purporting to have been published by the State authority will be taken as evidence. Civil Code, sec. 2890.
The Circuit Judge was, therefore, right in holding that the only statute law of North Carolina before the Court was the statute above quoted. An examination of the case of Killian v. Ry. Co., 38 S. E., 873, on which the plaintiff relied, shows that he was also right in holding that that case does not state the law of North Carolina to be that an action like this is to be brought for the benefit of the parents.
For the purposes of this case, therefore, the statute law of North Carolina must be taken as giving a right of action to the personal representative of the person who shall have suffered death in the manner laid down in the statute above quoted,, without providing for any special beneficiary.
The case, then, is this: The plaintiff in bringing this action as the administrator of Jules Free, made allegations complete and sufficient in all respects under the. statute, except he erroneously alleged the defendant became liable to him as administrator of Jules Free, for the benefit of his parents. The Circuit Judge granted the nonsuit, on the ground that the use in the complaint of the words "for the benefit of his parents," was a fatal departure from, the statute. We are unable to assent to this view. If the plaintiff, as administrator, was entitled to recover, his recovery should .not be defeated because he has erroneously alleged, he must hold his recovery for the benefit of certain persons. Under the statute of North Carolina, as proved, a complete cause of action was stated in the complaint, without the reference to the supposed beneficiary, and that should have been regarded as mere surplusage. This conclusion.rests well on the reasoning of Mr. Justice Jones in Morris v. Gas & Elec. Co., 70 S. C., 381, 49 S. E., 854: "The statute is remedial and should be liberally construed so as to accomplish its object. It was designed to remove the common law rule, founded on the maxim, actio personalis moritur cum persona, as an obstacle to the recovery of damages for the death of a party by a wrongful act, negr lect, or default of another, and to create a right of action in the administrator of the deceased for the benefit of the person named in the statute. In re Estate Mayo, 60 S. C., 401, 38 S. E., 634; 54 L. R. A., 660. The award of damages for the wrongful death is the important matter, the manner of distribution is of secondary consideration." The case of Lilly v. Ry. Co., 33 S. C. 143, was obviously, different, and we think the doctrine of that case should not be extended.
The defendant contends, however; that the law of North Carolina, as proved in this case,.is essentially different from the law of this State, in that it does not designate the per sons for whose 'benefit- the administrator is allowed to recover, while the corresponding statute of this State provided for distribution among certain kindred of the deceased.
As indicated in Morris v. Gas & Elec. Co., supra, the essential thing in the varying statutes of- the several States is the same, namely, the giving of a right of action to the administrator or some other person interested in the life of the deceased in his- own behalf or as trustee for others. Any variance as to the beneficiaries and the method of distribution ought to be regarded as a minor difference.
It was held in Dennick v. Central R. R. Co., 103 U. S., 11, 18, 26 L. Ed., 439: "Wherever, either by the common law or the statute law of a State, a right of action has become fixed and a legal liability incurred, that liability may be enforced and the right of action pursued in any Court which has jurisdiction of such matters and can obtain jurisdiction of the parties. If the liability to pay money was fixed by the law of the State where the transaction occurred, is it to be said it can be enforced nowhere else, because-it depended upon statute law and not upon common law? It would be a very dangerous doctrine to establish, that in all cases where the-several States have established the statute for the common law, the liability can be enforced- in no other State but that where the statute was enacted and the transaction occurred." After much judicial discussion, the authority and reasoning of this case is now generally recognized with this qualification, that the Courts of one State will not recognize a cause of action arising in another State, when the statute of such other State giving the right of action is contrary to the public policy of the State where the action is brought. Dennis v. R. R. Co., 70 S. C., 257, 49 S. E., 869; Huntington v. Attrill; 146 U. S., 657; Stewart v. R. R. Co., 168 U. S., 445; Texas &c. R. R. Co. v. Cox, 145 U. S., 593; Leonard v. Columbia S. E. Co., 84 N. Y., 48, 38 Am. Rep., 491; Higgins v. Central N. E. & W. R. R. Co. (Mass.), 29 N. E., 534. The numerous other Federal and State cases to the same effect will be found collated in 14 Am. State Rep., 354; 10 Roses Notes on U. S. Reports 3, 3rd Sup., Ib., 856.
The North Carolina statute on which this action rests is entirely consistent with the public policy of this State as expressed in its statute giving a right of action in such case to the personal representative of the deceased; and it is not opposed to the public policy of this State because in the subordinate matter of distribution the South' Carolina statute names the beneficiaries, and the North Carolina statute, as proved, leaves the recovery in the hands of the administrator for general distribution.
It is true the plaintiff's exception does not set out as clearly as is desired the error which we think was committed in granting the nonsuit. But exceptions should be liberally construed where they do not mislead or surprise opposing counsel. Rooking at the exception in that light, it doej raise the question that a nonsuit should not have been granted for failure to prove, by the printed volume of the statute of North Carolina, that any recovery by the administrator would be for the benefit of the parents. Respondent's counsel was not surprised nor misled, for the point on which we think the judgment should be reversed was fully and ably argued by him.
The defendant has given due notice that he would ask to have the nonsuit sustained on the additional grounds (1) that there was no proof of negligence by the defendant; and, (2) that no other inference could be drawn from the evidence than that he plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence.
Defendant offered no evidence, and plaintiff's witnesses were in substantial agreement as to the circumstances of the killing. Jules Free was a boy employed to'carry water to a gang of hands working near the station at Charlotte, N. C. As Free was returning across the tracks with water, his attention,- attracted by an approaching freight train, he was struck and killed by a switch engine coming from the opposite direction on another track. Witnesses variously esti mated the speed of the switch engine at from twenty to thirty-five miles an hour, and they all testified there was'no watchman on its pilot and no warning of its approach by bell or whistle. From this evidence the jury might well infer the defendant was negligent in running its switch engine at such a rate of speed in a yard where there were several tracks and the confusion of other moving trains, without a guard on the pilot and without signals; and that in these circumstances, the unfortunate boy in crossing the track in the discharge of the duty assigned to him was not guilty of contributory negligence in not seeing the engine and getting out of its way.
The judgment of this Court is, that the judgment of' the Circuit Court be reversed, and the cause remanded for' a new trial.