Case Name: Warren Arnold DRYDEN, Appellant/Cross Appellee, v. Kathleen M. PEDEMONTI, Appellee/Cross Appellant
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2005-04-15
Citations: 910 So. 2d 854
Docket Number: No. 5D04-1131
Parties: Warren Arnold DRYDEN, Appellant/Cross Appellee, v. Kathleen M. PEDEMONTI, Appellee/Cross Appellant.
Judges: GRIFFIN, J., concurs specially with opinion.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 910
Pages: 854–863

Head Matter:
Warren Arnold DRYDEN, Appellant/Cross Appellee, v. Kathleen M. PEDEMONTI, Appellee/Cross Appellant.
No. 5D04-1131.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
April 15, 2005.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 19, 2005.
Thomas C. Smith of Hassell, Moorhead, Carroll, Daytona Beach, for Appellant/Cross Appellee.
Karla T. Torpy of Graham, Moletteire & Torpy, P.A., Melbourne, for Appel-lee/Cross Appellant.

Opinion:
SHARP, W., J.
Dryden appeals an order of the trial court, which struck his proposal for settlement after a final judgment. He sought an award of attorney fees and costs pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442. The trial court struck the proposal because it determined that the release terms required by the proposal were ambiguous and were stated with insufficient particularity. We affirm.
The settlement proposal required Pede-monti to execute a full release, which was not attached to the proposal. It summarized the terms of the release as:
[R]elease of All Claims against the Defendant and all persons legally liable for the Defendant's actions in connection with the incident upon which the above styled cause of action is based, including the provision under which the Releasor shall indemnify and hold harmless their Releasees as to any and all liens and subrogated interests of any third party by virtue of any services or benefits provided by the Releasor, including, but not limited to, hospital liens, doctor's liens, worker's compensation liens, CHAMPUS liens, and any other liens....
At the oral argument in this case, the attorneys for the appellant, Dryden, and the appellee, Pedemonti, were asked whether the release clause language contained in the proposed settlement would potentially extinguish Pedemonti's first party PIP and health insurance claims. Dryden's attorney said it clearly would not and Pedemonti's attorney said it clearly would or could.
Who is correct on this issue? The "law" is not clear, in our view. Thus, pursuant to Nichols v. State Farm Mut., 851 So.2d 742 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003), rev. granted, No. SC03-1483 (Fla. Aug. 27, 2003) and No. SC03-1653 (Fla. Sept. 11, 2003), the proposal was invalid. The burden of clarifying the intent or extent of a settlement proposal cannot be placed on the party to whom the proposal is made.
In Nichols, this court held that a proposal for settlement was ambiguous, and thus ineffective under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442(c)(2)(C) and (D) because the general release requested potentially could have required the plaintiff-insured to give up her first party insurance claim for uninsured motorist coverage against the defendant-insurance company. In that case, the plaintiff-insured sued her insurance carrier under her personal injury protection clause for failure to pay her PIP claim and her uninsured motorist claim was not involved, although it was a potential additional claim. The general release language stated the insured would release all "claims, causes of actions, [etc.] . that have accrued through the date" on which the release was signed.
The attorney for the insurance company who sent the proposal for settlement argued that he did not know of the potential uninsured motorist claim and that he did not intend that the general release encompass that cause of action. In addition, counsel testified that had the insured's counsel called him, he would have clarified the intent. This court cautioned in footnote 3, that when a general release is sought, care should be taken to insure it does not extinguish claims that are extrinsic to the litigation. 851 So.2d at 746. In order to qualify under the rule, the terms of the proposal must be devoid of ambiguity, patent or latent, and not require any clarification or later judicial interpretation.
The dissent relies on three eases for the proposition that the release language in this case would not release Pede-monti's PIP or health insurance claims against first party carriers. We do not view the cases as either clear or conclusive on that point.
1. Longman v. Travelers Ins. Co., 371 So.2d 533 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). There the court held that a general release executed by the appellant (insured) in favor of a tortfeasor did not have the "automatic" effect of barring the insured's recovery from its own first party insurance carrier for PIP benefits, as distinguished from an uninsured motorist claim. What circumstances would not make it "automatic" were not specified by the court.
2. Keith v. B.E.W. Ins. Group, Inc., 595 So.2d 178 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). The insureds, who settled with the tortfeasor, were permitted to sue the insurance company's agent for a negligence count, unrelated to the tort claim, and to recover first party medical benefits under an insurance contract. However, the court qualified this holding by saying this ruling would not apply if the insurance carrier reserved a right of subrogation to itself by the inclusion of such a provision in the health insurance contract. The record is unclear whether appellee's insurance policies, in this case, contain such subrogation clauses.
3. Connecticut General Life Insurance v. Dyess, 569 So.2d 1293 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990), rev. denied, 581 So.2d 1307 (Fla.1991). The injured parties executed a general release in favor of the tortfeasor which provided they released "any and all claims . for . hospital and medical expenses . arising . out of the accident ." They then pursued medical benefit claims under a group policy against their first party insurer, Connecticut General. Connecticut General defended on the ground that the release provided that the injured parties had received full payment for medical expenses and no benefits were available pursuant to a "conditioned claim payment" provision in its policy, which purported to deny a double recovery to a claimant. Although the trial court ruled for the injured parties, this court reversed.
This court reasoned that by executing the general release, the injured party had sought to collect all expenses, including medical ones, from the tortfeasor, and accordingly, the effect of the release was to extinguish any claim to such expenses from the first part insurer. Judge Harris, writing for the court said:
After releasing their claim against the tortfeasor (thus preventing subrogation), appellees sought to recover double damages by filing a claim against their health care provider, (footnote omitted)
569 So.2d at 1295.
The release clause language in the Connecticut General case and this one are similar. In that case, the injured party released "any and all claims . for . hospital and medical expenses . arising . out of the accident...." In the instant case, the release included "any subrogated interest of any third party by virtue of any services or benefits provided by [sic] the Releasor, including, but not limited to, hospital liens, doctor's, [sic] liens, worker's compensation liens, Champús liens and any other liens.... "
By executing the general release proposed in this case, Pedemonti could have been found by this court, pursuant to Connecticut General, to have extinguished any subrogated claim against the tortfeasor then held or later acquired by her PIP carrier or health insurance carrier, thereby resulting in this court saying that he had recovered all such claims from the tortfeasor. At least, it is not as clear and as certain as it should be, in order to task a plaintiff with the duty to accept a proposal for settlement pursuant to the offer of judgment rule, or risk the sanction of paying the defendant's attorney's fees.
AFFIRMED.
GRIFFIN, J., concurs specially with opinion.
PLEUS, J., dissents with opinion.
. In the case below, Dryden made an offer to settle the tort lawsuit filed against him by Pedemonti, the appellee and plaintiff below, for $12,500. The jury determined damages in the suit were $10,000, and the trial court set off $3,768.42 in PIP benefits Pedemonti already received. The final judgment for Pede-monti was for $6,423.58.