Case Name: Edward T. URSIN, et al., v. NEW ORLEANS AVIATION BOARD and the City of New Orleans
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1987-11-30
Citations: 515 So. 2d 1087
Docket Number: No. 87-CC-0907
Parties: Edward T. URSIN, et al., v. NEW ORLEANS AVIATION BOARD and the City of New Orleans.
Judges: CALOGERO, J., concurs in part, dissents in part and assigns reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 515
Pages: 1087–1096

Head Matter:
Edward T. URSIN, et al., v. NEW ORLEANS AVIATION BOARD and the City of New Orleans.
No. 87-CC-0907.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Nov. 30, 1987.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 7,1988.
Donald A. Hoffman, Robert E. Siegel, Noel L. Delery, Carmouche, Gray & Hoffman, James J. Donelon, III, Partee, Leefe & Donelon, Ronald P. Nabonne, Jones, Na-bonne & Wilkerson, Michael Fontham, New Orleans, for applicant.
Edmund W. Golden, Golden, Fonte & Faulkner, Metairie, Henry Klein, Samuel Schudmak, III, New Orleans, for respondent.

Opinion:
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
WATSON, Justice.
In this suit for damages and inverse condemnation of residential property allegedly impacted by noise from the New Orleans International airport, a writ was granted to review the procedure used to enroll over 3,000 additional plaintiffs.
On August 29, 1980, six residents of a geographical area, described as the "Ldn 65 Noise Contour", filed this "class action" suit for damages allegedly resulting from intolerable noise levels near the airport. Thirty-seven other residents joined in the suit. An exception of no cause of action was sustained, and the suit was dismissed insofar as it asserted a class action on March 20, 1981. Subsequently, the trial court declared all property owners within the area to be indispensable parties to the litigation.
Pursuant to a trial court order on November 22, 1983, the residents of the area were notified directly and through public posting and advertising to complete a postcard and return it to the clerk of court to join in the lawsuit. Alternatively, they were advised that the court could order them named as defendants or they could be precluded from later asserting their rights. Over 6,000 residents responded and approximately one-half were joined in the suit by counsel for plaintiffs through a supplemental petition incorporating the pri- or pleadings by reference. Those answering who were made parties-plaintiff have been denominated "postcard plaintiffs".
On May 22, 1986, defendants moved to vacate the order notifying the additional plaintiffs and excepted to the supplemental petition. The motion and exception were denied. The court of appeal denied a writ and this court granted a writ, remanding the matter for briefing, argument and an opinion.
In its subsequent opinion, the court of appeal ruled that the judgment dismissing the suit as a class action is final. Because it concluded that the trial court's 1983 ruling that the other residents were indispensable parties was an interlocutory judgment causing irreparable injury under LSA-C.C. P. art. 2083, the court of appeal held that defendants had acquiesced in the judgment by failing to appeal. A writ was granted to review the judgment.
The fundamental error by the trial court was the holding, on motion of counsel for the original plaintiffs, that all residents within the noise contour are indispensable parties. The Code of Civil Procedure provides in Article 641:
"Indispensable parties to an action are those whose interests in the subject matter are so interrelated, and would be so directly affected by the judgment, that a complete and equitable adjudication of the controversy cannot be made unless they are joined in the action.
"No adjudication of an action can be made unless all indispensable parties are joined therein."
"[PJarties should be deemed indispensable only when that result is absolutely necessary to protect substantial rights_" State, Dept, of Hwys. v. Lamar Adv. Co. of La., Inc., 279 So.2d 671 at 677 (La.1973). The "postcard plaintiffs" are not indispensable because a complete and equitable adjudication of the controversy between the original plaintiffs and the airport can be made without joining the additional plaintiffs and without affecting their rights. If there are valid claims against the airport, the parties-plaintiff have different and separable interests depending on the location of their residences, proximity of overflights, length of residence, susceptibility to damage and many other factors.
Since the "postcard plaintiffs" are not indispensable parties, the notice to them was incorrect, misleading and probably alarming. It virtually compelled them to join in the suit, regardless of their wishes. They were threatened with loss of their rights and, perhaps worse in a layperson's view, being joined involuntarily as party-defendants in a lawsuit with unknown consequences.
The entire procedure was highly irregular and improper. The trial court seriously erred in authorizing the notification and in permitting the attorneys for the original plaintiffs to include their names, addresses, and telephone numbers in the notice for the convenience of those notified. The record is not precise as to the relationship between the attorneys and the added plaintiffs. The attorneys did not specifically state in the amending petition that they represented the "postcard plaintiffs". In oral argument, they purported to represent them.
The amended petition adding these "postcard plaintiffs" must be dismissed. To preserve their rights, if any, the dismissal is without prejudice.
For the foregoing reasons, the motion to vacate the court's order allowing plaintiffs to amend their petition to include the "postcard plaintiffs" is sustained and they are dismissed without prejudice. The trial court is instructed to order the Clerk of Court to notify them of the dismissal. The matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
Costs of all proceedings and notifications concerning the "postcard plaintiffs" are charged to the original plaintiffs.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
. "Granted to consider issue relative to procedure used to enroll additional plaintiffs." September 4, 1987, writ grant.
. See, Fadem and Berger, "A Noisy Airport is a Damned Nuisance!" 3 SWU L.Rev. 39 (1971).
. See Appendix A, Notice sent to parties.
. A few plaintiffs employed their own counsel.
. Although there was interim litigation in federal court, the petition for removal was not filed until June 22, 1984.
. 499 So.2d 79 (La.1987).
. 506 So.2d 947 (La.App. 5 Cir.1987).
. LSA-C.C.P. art. 2083 provides:
"An appeal may be taken from a final judgment rendered in causes in which appeals are given by law whether rendered after hearing or by default, from an interlocutory judgment which may cause irreparable injury, and from a judgment reformed in accordance with a remittitur or additur under Article 1814."
. 511 So.2d 1142 (La.1987).
. Compare Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 105 S.Ct. 2265, 85 L.Ed.2d 652 (1985), and see Note, 46 LaX.Rev. 923 (1986).