Case Name: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Sandy MITCHELL, Appellant
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1981-12-23
Citations: 497 Pa. 14
Docket Number: No. 348
Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Sandy MITCHELL, Appellant.
Judges: Before O’BRIEN, C.J., and ROBERTS, NIX, LARSEN, FLAHERTY, KAUFFMAN and WILKINSON, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania State Reports
Volume: 497
Pages: 14–23

Head Matter:
438 A.2d 596
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Sandy MITCHELL, Appellant.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Argued Oct. 20, 1981.
Decided Dec. 23, 1981.
Joseph A. Ciccitto, Asst. Public Defender, Francis M. Walsh, Norristown, for appellant.
Ronald T. Williamson, Chief, Appeals Div., Joseph Hylan, Norristown, for appellee.
Before O’BRIEN, C.J., and ROBERTS, NIX, LARSEN, FLAHERTY, KAUFFMAN and WILKINSON, JJ.

Opinion:
OPINION OF THE COURT
ROBERTS, Justice.
This is an appeal, by allowance, from an order of the Superior Court, 262 Pa.Super. 268, 396 A.2d 748, affirming an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County which denied the petition of appellant Sandy Mitchell to withdraw his guilty plea. We conclude that the plea was entered to charges on which the defendant had already been adjudged not guilty, in violation of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy embodied in both the federal and Pennsylvania Constitutions. The order of the Superior Court, therefore, is reversed.
On March 20, 1976, Norristown police filed a written complaint charging appellant with simple assault, aggravated assault, terroristic threats, and recklessly endangering another person for the alleged beating of an acquaintance, Helen Gilbert. That day appellant was arrested. While in police custody, appellant allegedly threatened Gilbert in a telephone call made to Gilbert the following day. This alleged call formed the basis of a second complaint, filed on March 21, charging appellant with an additional count of terroristic threats.
At a consolidated preliminary hearing, the Commonwealth presented testimony of Gilbert and the police officer who had heard appellant make the allegedly threatening telephone call. Appellant was held for trial on all five charges. Informations on the charges followed.
The case was scheduled for trial on August 11, 1976, approximately five months after the filing of the complaints. Appellant did not appear, a bench warrant was issued, and appellant was apprehended.
Two months later, on October 14,1976, the case was called for trial. Acting upon the representation of appellant, counsel for appellant advised the court and the prosecuting attorney that alleged victim Gilbert had decided not to testify. After calls for the Commonwealth's witnesses went unanswered, the court proceeded to find appellant not guilty.
Thereafter, the Commonwealth advised the court that Gilbert did wish to testify, and that she had not been present because the Commonwealth had assumed that the proceedings on October 14 would lead to a guilty plea. Three weeks after finding appellant not guilty, the court entered the following order:
ORDER
AND NOW, this 4th day of November, 1976, the finding of not guilty on October 14, 1976, is hereby revoked.* Defendant is ordered to be relisted for trial.
The Court Administrator is ordered to relist these cases forthwith.
BY THE COURT,
/s/ Vincent A. Cirillo J.
* The decision of October 14, 1976, was based upon a representation to the Court that the prosecutor did not intend to testify.
On November 2, 1976, eight months after the filing of the complaints, appellant pleaded guilty to all of the charges on which he had been found not guilty. The court placed appellant on probation for one year.
Shortly after the entry of the guilty plea, appellant was adjudged to be in violation of probation. The court then sentenced appellant to a term of imprisonment of eighteen months to five years.
In April of 1977, appellant commenced the present effort to obtain relief. After an evidentiary hearing, the court of common pleas denied relief on the ground that appellant had not been placed in jeopardy at the proceeding which led to the court's finding of not guilty. The Superior Court's affirmance was based upon similar reasoning.
The court's finding of not guilty constitutes a determination that, having no evidence to present when the matter was ready for disposition, the Commonwealth was unable to prove the charges against appellant. Because "[t]he Double Jeopardy Clause forbids a second trial for the purpose of affording the prosecution another opportunity to supply evidence which it failed to muster in the first proceeding," Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2147, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978), the court's finding of not guilty bars reprosecution.
That the court was misinformed regarding the victim's willingness to testify does not affect the finality of the court's finding of not guilty. " '[W]e necessarily accord absolute finality to a jury's verdict of acquittal — no matter how erroneous its decision .'" Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 442, 101 S.Ct. 1852, 1860, 68 L.Ed.2d 270 (1981), quoting Burks v. United States, supra, 437 U.S. at 16, 98 S.Ct. at 2150. "The factfinder in a criminal case has traditionally been permitted to enter an unassailable but unreasonable verdict of 'not guilty.' " Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 317 n.10, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2788 n.10, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). "[Wjhen a defendant has been acquitted at trial he may not be retried on the same offense, even if the legal rulings underlying the acquittal were erroneous." Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 64, 98 S.Ct. 2170, 2179, 57 L.Ed.2d 43 (1978). As Justice Rehnquist, speaking on behalf of the Supreme Court of the United States, has stated,
"the law attaches particular significance to an acquittal. To permit a second trial after an acquittal, however mistaken the acquittal may have been, would present an unacceptably high risk that the Government, with its vastly superior resources, might wear down the defendant so that 'even though innocent, he may be found guilty.' "
United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 91, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 2194, 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978), quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188, 78 S.Ct. 221, 223, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957). See, e.g., Borough of West Chester v. Lal, 493 Pa. 387, 391, 426 A.2d 603, 605 (1981) (corollary prohibition against Commonwealth appeals applicable even where acquittal based on " 'egregiously erroneous foundation' "). See generally J. Strazzella, Commonwealth Appeals and Double Jeopardy, 4 Pa.L.J. Nos. 39 & 40 (10/19/81 & 10/26/81).
The Commonwealth alleges that, at the time the court found appellant not guilty, appellant had not waived his right to a jury trial. Thus, the Commonwealth argues, the court was conducting a pre-trial hearing at which jeopardy had not attached.
Contrary to the Commonwealth's factual allegation, all that can be said on this record is that appellant did not execute the written waiver of his right to a jury trial contemplated by Pa.R.Crim.Proc. 1101. There is nothing in our Rules or our case law even to suggest that the absence of a written waiver of the right to a jury trial works to divest a court of jurisdiction to adjudge the merits.
Indeed, the Commonwealth's effort to ignore the significance of the finding of not guilty on the basis of the absence of a written waiver is utterly unpersuasive. Under Pa.R. Crim.Proc. 1100(a)(2), the Commonwealth was obliged to have commenced trial within 180 days of the filing of the complaints " 'by a substantive, rather than a pro forma, event.' " Commonwealth v. Kluska, 484 Pa. 508, 510, 399 A.2d 681, 682 (1979), quoting Commonwealth v. Lamonna, 473 Pa. 248, 260, 373 A.2d 1355, 1361 (1977) (Eagen, C.J., joined by Roberts, J., concurring). A mere preliminary calendar call would not have been sufficient to mark the commencement of trial. Commonwealth v. Lamonna, supra.
As of the date of the entry of a finding of not guilty, a "substantive event" was essential. As of that date, 208 days had already elapsed since the filing of the first complaint against appellant, and 207 days had elapsed since the filing of the second. Although the periods of delay arguably were excludable because of appellant's previous failure to appear when the matter was first scheduled for trial, see Pa.R.Crim. Proc. 1100(d)(1); Commonwealth v. Cohen, 481 Pa. 349, 392 A.2d 1327 (1978), surely when the matter was called for trial a second time the court would not have permitted further delay. Thus, the absence of a written waiver demonstrates only that the court chose to dispense with the formality of a written waiver in reaching the merits and finding appellant not guilty. Whatever the propriety of the court's finding of not guilty, reprosecution is barred by "the most fundamental rule in the history of double jeopardy jurisprudence." United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571, 97 S.Ct. 1349, 1354, 51 L.Ed.2d 642 (1977).
Order of the Superior Court reversed, order of October 14, 1976, adjudging appellant not guilty reinstated, and appellant discharged.
NIX, J., files a dissenting opinion.