Case Name: People of the State of New York, Resp'ts, v. Alexander Dumar, App'lt
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1887-10-04
Citations: 11 N.Y. St. Rep. 19
Docket Number: 
Parties: People of the State of New York, Resp’ts, v. Alexander Dumar, App’lt.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 11
Pages: 19–26

Head Matter:
People of the State of New York, Resp’ts, v. Alexander Dumar, App’lt.
(Court of Appeals,
Filed October 4, 1887.)
1. Criminal law—Pleading—Indictment—Grand larceny—Variance BETWEEN THE CRIME PRESENTED AND PROVED AND THAT CHARGED IN INDICTMENT.
The indictment accused the defendant and another of the crime of grand larceny, committed as therein alleged as follows. “ On the 3d of February, 1881, at Rochester,” certain carpets and rugs (describing them), of the goods, etc., of “Bus F. Carter, then and there being found, unlawfully and feloniously did steal, take and carry away contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided.” The case presented and the evidence offered by the people showed that the defendant obtained property of the value of $700 from the possession of Carter by false representations and a false writing. Meld, that the crime presented and proved varied from the crime charged in the indictment; that the variance was fatal.
2. Same—What objection relates to substance.
Held, that the objection related to the substance and not to the form of the indictment; that the defendant was left uninformed of the real act committed by him and subjected to the charge of larceny for an act which he did not perform.
8. Same—What indictment must state—Code Crim. Pro., §§ 273-276 INCLUSIVE.
Under Code Criminal Procedure, §§ 273-276/incIusive, the indictment must name the crime and state the acts constituting it, and if either one of several acts constitute the crime, the several acts must be separately stated in different counts.
Appeal from a judgment of the supreme court, general term, fifth department, affirming a judgment of the court of sessions of Monroe county convicting the defendant of the crime of grand larceny in the second degree and adjudging him to be imprisoned, etc.
P. Chamberlain, for app’lt; George A. Benton, Jr., Dist.-Att’y, for resp’t.
Reversing 3 N. Y. State Rep., 490.

Opinion:
Danforth, J.
—The grand jury of Monroe county, by indictment, accused the defendant Dumar and one Hensler of the crime of grand larceny, committed, as therein alleged, as follows: "On the third of February, 1885, at Rochester," certain carpets and rugs (describing them) of the goods, etc. "Ilus F. Carter then and there being found unlawfully and feloniously did steal, take and carry away contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided."
Dumar was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. The record shows that the issue so formed was brought to trial, and. the district attorney in opening the caseto the jury, as he was bound to do under section 388 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, said "the people would show that the defendant had committed the crime of grand larceny by obtaining from Carter certain personal property by false representations anda false writing," whereupon counsel for the defendant asked that he be discharged on the ground that the case so stated varied from the crime charged. The motion was denied. Evidence then given on the part of the plaintiff showed a sale and delivery of the carpets and other property by Carter to the defendant at the time stated in the indictment, in consideration of $742.81, in part payment of which the defendant gave ten dollars in cash and his two notes, each for $350, payable at two and three months respectively, leaving a balance due from him, as stated upon the bill then rendered by Carter, of $32.81. But the evidence also tended to show that fraudulent pretenses and representations had been made as to certain securities given by him in order to induce the sale, and no evidence was given of any taking against the will of the owner, nor of the act as charged in the indictment, and at the close of the plaintiff's evidence a motion to discharge the defendant was again made upon the ground, among others:
First. That the testimony on the part of the people fails to show that the crime of larceny has been committed as set forth in the indictment.
Second. That there is a variance between the proofs offered by the people and the allegations of the indictment.
The motion was denied, and in submitting the case to the jury the learned trial judge instructed them that the crime charged in the indictment was made out of the defendant " with intent to defraud and deprive the true owner of his property and to appropriate the same to his own use, obtained it from his possession by color or aid of fraudulent or false representation," saying: "If then you shall come to the conclusion that the defendant did on the third day of February last obtain from Mr. Carter property of the value of over $500, by reason, or through, or by the aid of false or fraudulent representations or pretenses, then you shall find him guilty of grand larceny in the first degree," and of some lower degree, as they should find from the value of the property.
By proper exception to the charge the point made at the beginning of the trial was again presented.
The defendant was convicted of grand larceny in the second degree and duly sentenced. Upon the appeal the conviction was affirmed by the general term of the supreme court, and the defendant appeals.
Many exceptions were taken upon the trial, not only to the course of procedure, but the sufficiency of the evidence to establish any crime. They are not destitute of merit, but the only question we think it necessary to consider is one of pleading. Our conclusion as to that will dispose of the appeal. The indictment on which conviction was had, was, as a learned counsel for the respondent says: "good at common law. Arch. Crim. Pr. and Pl., by Pomery, vol. 2, pages 1, 141. It was also good under the Revised Statutes of the state defining larceny (2 Rev. Stat., 679, § 63; 690, § 1), but if the doctrine contended for by him as to the form of the indictment, and evidence under it, in cases of larceny committed in the various ways now known to the law, be admitted, it would in our opinion not only lead us: (1.) To encounter known principles of natural justice, which in all criminal prosecutions entitled the accused, "to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation " (Bill of Rights, § 14); (2.) To wholly disregard the general current of judicial authority in this state, and (3.) To put aside the plain and explicit directions of the statutes by which the matters here involved are now regulated. Penal Code and Code of Civil Procedure, infra. Under the former system a substantial distinction was recognized between the crimes of larceny (2 Rev. Stat., 679, § 63; 690, § 1), and false pretenses (2 Rev. Stat., 677, § 53, 54). In order to constitute larceny there must have been a taking of personal property against the will of the owner. The other offense could not be confounded with it. In either case the property may have been obtained by artifice or fraud, but if in one the owner intended to part with his property absolutely, and to convey it to the defendant, but in the other intended to part with the temporary possession for a limited and specific purpose, retaining the ownership in himself, the latter case would be larceny, but the former would not. It was, therefore, uniformly held that if a person through the fraudulent representations of another, delivered to him a chattel intending to pass the property in it, the latter could not be indicted for larceny, but only for obtaining the chattel under false pretenses.
In Ross v. People (5 Hill, 294), a conviction for larceny was reversed because the goods were delivered by the owner with the intention to sell them, and so having obtained them under a purchase, although by fraud and false pretenses, the purchaser could not be convicted of larceny. The distinction was adhered to, although with reluctance and in deference only to early cases. The doctrine then applied was laid down before the adoption of the Revised Statutes in Mowrey v. Walsh (8 Cow., 238), and governed the courts of this state until the adoption of the Penal Code in 1881 (Bassett v. Spofford, 45 N. Y., 388; Zink v. People, 77 id., 114; Thorne v. Turck, 94 id., 90; People v. Morse, 99 id., 662), and it is obvious that if these decisions apply, neither the opening of the district-attorney nor the evidence put in by him, gave even color or support to the indictment and should not have been sustained. The indictment was for larceny as defined at common law, but concerning which, as above interpreted, no evidence was given, that crime, therefore, being left unproven, while the conviction was had upon proof of false representations, the making of which was not disclosed by the indictment. As to the act charged there was no proof; as to the act proved, no allegation.
But the Penal Code recognized that the moral guilt of the two offenses was the same and swept .away the theory by which the court had felt constrained to distinguish them in principle. By it larceny is so treated (chapter 4), as to include, not only that offense as defined at common law, and by the Revised Statutes (2 Rev. Stat., 679, 690); but, also, embezzlement, obtaining property by false pretenses and felonious breach of trust. We find in section 528 of that act, certain acts enumerated, either one of which performed by any person, with intent to defraud the true owner of his property, or of its use or benefit, or to appropriate the same to the use of the taker, or of any other person makes him guilty of larceny, and he in the language of the Code, steals such property.
The crime is committed when with that intent a person either, first, takes such property from the possession of the true owner or of any other person; or, second, obtains it from such possession by color or aid of fraudulent or false representations, or pretense, or of any false token or writing; or, third, secretes, withholds or appropriates to his own use or that of any person other than the true owner, any money, personal property, thing in action, evidence of debt or contract, or articles of value of any kind The second or following subdivision takes in a person occupying a place of trust or holding a fiduciary or semi-fiduciary relation to another person, and who, under other statutes, would have been guilty of embezzlement or breach of trust (2 Rev. Stat., 678, § 59, 60; Laws of 1865, chap. 729; Laws of 1867, chap. 955; Laws of 1873, chap. 688; Laws of 1874 chap. 207; Laws of 1877, chap. 208), and it declares that he upon converting the property of that other person, also "steals such property and is guilty of larceny."
We see, therefore, that there are at least four distinct and separate acts or ways by which a person may commit or be guilty of larceny. The first embraces larceny as described at common law, and under the Revised Statutes (supra) the second embraces the offense formerly known as obtaining property by false representations. In substance the defendant has been indicted for larceny for doing the first act, and has been convicted of larceny in doing the second. From what has already been said and the cases cited, it appears that under the former system concerning crimes and punishments prevailing in this state, the conviction could not be sustained. The variance between the indictment and proof would be fatal. The respondent relies, however, upon the system introduced by the Code of Criminal Procedure. Laws of 1881, chap. 442; Laws of 1882, chap. 360. That statute abolishes all the forms of pleading before existing in criminal actions, and enacts that the forms of pleading and the rule by which their sufficiency shall be determined, are those prescribed therein. Section 273. It declares that on the part of the people the first pleading is the indictment (section 274), and defines this pleading as an accusation in writing charging a person with a crime. Section 254. It must contain a plain and concise statement of the act constituting the crime, without unnecessary repetition. Section 275. The indictment, therefore, must charge the crime, and it must also state ' the act constituting the crime. The omission of either of these things would necessarily be fatal to the indictment. If there was no accusation of the crime the paper, however formal in other respects, would not be an indictment, and so there would be no criminal action. If it contained no statement of the act constituting the crime, there would be no description of the offense, and neither an acquital nor a conviction would enable the defendant to withstand a further prosecution for the same crime. Moreover, the plain words of the statute as well as its object, would be disregarded; for the manifest intention of the legislature in requiring the indictment to state the act constituting the crime was, among other things, that the accused should learn from it what he was called upon to defend. The form of the indictment given in the Code (section 276) leads to the same conclusion. It provides in one sentence for the statement of the name of the crime as murder, larceny, etc., whereof the grand jury accused the defendant; or, if it be a misdemeanor having no general name, such as libel, assault, etc., requires an insertion of a brief description of it as given by statute, and then adds, "here set forth the act charged as an offense." It provides also, that "the indictment must charge but one crime and in one form, except where it may be committed by different means" (section 278), in which case the crime may be charged in separate counts to have been committed by different means (section 279), and declares "the indictment sufficient if it can be understood therefrom that the act or omission charged as to the crime is plainly and concisely set forth."
We see, therefore, that the indictment must name the crime and state the act constituting it, and if either one of the several acts constitute the crime, the several acts must be separately stated in different counts. Can the indictment before us be supported as complying with these provisions ? It consists of one count. It accuses the defendant of the crime of grand larceny in the first degree, and then states with sufficient conciseness an act constituting the crime by saying the defendant "unlawfully and feloniously did steal, take and carry away " the property therein described. These words are to be construed in their usual acceptation in common language, except such as are defined by law, and those are to be construed according to their legal mean ing. Section 282. Undoubtedly under the Penal Code the offense or crime charged is sufficiently made out by these averments. But the act described was not proven. There was neither expectation nor intention on the part of th© plaintiff to prove it. This we know from the opening of the district attorney. The case he presented and the evidence he offered all tended to show that the defendant did not commit the act charged in the indictment, but did commit the act described in the second alternative of the statute, viz.: "obtaining property from the possession of the true owner by color or aid of false representations, or pretense or a false token or writing." And such is the only claim now made by the learned district attorney. He says in his printed points given to us as an answer to the appeal: " On the trial it was proven that on the 3d day of February, 1885, the defendant obtained from Ilus F. Carter a quantity of carpets of the value of about $700; that he obtained such carpets by means of fraudulent representation." The accused could not fail to understand from the indictment that he was charged with the crime of grand larceny. In that respect the Code was complied with. It stated also a particular act as constituting the crime. In that respect also the Code was complied with. The difficulty is that the act stated was not proven, and the act proven was not stated.
The objection that the proof varied from the crime charged in the indictment was, therefore, well taken. It related to substance and not form, and pointed to an imperfection which tended to prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant upon the merits. It must prevail.
The learned counsel for the respondent cites the People v. Willett (102 N. Y., 251; 1 N. Y. State Rep., 384), as substantially settling in his favor the present contention. In that case a very different question was involved—the sufficiency of an indictment upon demurrer. Here is a question of variance between the indictment and the proof. So far as the first involved the crime of larceny it was well charged; and so it is in the case under consideration, but it remains unproven. The important difference between the former law and the present, so far as this case is concerned, is that the court is no longer called upon to decide whether an offense is a larceny, embezzlement or false pretenses, nor is justice liable to be defeated by too nice a discrimination. Each of these acts is larceny. But the general principle of pleading has not been substantially changed. Under either system an offense consisting of certain acts done or omitted under certain circumstances and under neither, is any indictment sufficient which does not accur ately and clearly allege all the ingredients of which the offense is composed so as to bring the accused within the true meaning and intent of the statute defining the offense. Under the former this end was secured by a rule formulated and applied by the court through a long series of decisions; under the latter is made imperative by the provisions of the statute.
In the case at bar the defendant was left uninformed of the real act committed by him and subjected to the charge of larceny for an act which he did not perform. The variance is fatal to the proceeding. The judgment of the court below and the conviction should, therefore, be reversed and a new trial ordered.
All concur, except Ruger, Ch. J., not voting.