Case Name: State, Respondent, vs. Cardinal Lines, Inc., Appellant
Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Wisconsin
Decision Date: 1949-02-15
Citations: 254 Wis. 327
Docket Number: 
Parties: State, Respondent, vs. Cardinal Lines, Inc., Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Wisconsin Reports
Volume: 254
Pages: 327–332

Head Matter:
State, Respondent, vs. Cardinal Lines, Inc., Appellant.
January 21
February 15, 1949.
For the appellant there were briefs by Philip PI. Porter and John T. Porter, both of Madison, and oral argument by Philip H. Porter.
For the respondent there was a brief by the Attorney General and William A. Plats, assistant attorney general, and oral argument by Mr. Plats.

Opinion:
Rosenberry, C. J.
The question for decision requires a construction of sec. 194.14 (3), Stats., which is as follows :
"The commission shall make its finding and issue its order on any such application within sixty days after submission of all evidence and argument which may be offered or submitted upon behalf of any party to such case. If the commission shall fail to make its finding and issue its order within the time herein prescribed, a grant of the certificate, license or amendment thereto shall thereupon issue by operation of law."
Sec. 194.23 (4), Stats., was created by ch. 488, Laws of 1933, and reads as follows:
"The commission shall make its finding and issue its order on any application within sixty days after completion of the hearing on said petition. In the event of the failure to so make its finding and issue its order, said petition shall be deemed to be granted. . *. ."
By subsequent revisions and without substantial change, this section became sec. 194.23 (4), Stats. 1943.
On May 25, 1943, an action was begun in the circuit court for Dane county by Gateway City Transfer Co. v. Public Service Comm., reported in 245 Wis. 304, 14 N. W. (2d) 6, the determination of which depended upon the interpretation to be placed on sec. 194.23 (4), Stats. In that case the court held that where the commission failed to issue its order within sixty days after completion of the hearing, that is, conclusion of the taking of the evidence, the application was granted by operation of law. The court further held that the commission had no jurisdiction thereafter to issue an order denying the petition. It was also held that the courts could not review the granting of the application because it was a legislative and not a judicial act.
Following the decision of the court in 1943, and apparently because of it, the section was amended by ch. 557, Laws of 1945, to read as follows:
"The commission shall make its finding and issue its order on any application within ninety days after completion of the hearing on said petition, except in cases where the applicant has in writing or orally at the time of hearing agreed to a further extension of time."
• Under the 1945 amendment an applicant could no longer receive a license by operation of law. That act also extended the time within which the commission was required to act from sixty to ninety days.
By ch. 448, Laws of 1947, sec. 194.23 (4), Stats. 1945, was repealed. However, it was re-enacted as sec. 194.14 (3) set out above.
By the enactment of sub. (3) the time limit was restored to sixty days as in the original act, but did not begin to run until sixty days after the submission of all evidence and argument which may be offered or submitted on behalf of any party to such issue.
In this case it is undisputed that all the evidence had been received and that no argument had been offered or submitted upon behalf of any party to such case after the close of the hearing.
Under the plain language of the statute, no briefs or argument having been submitted, the sixty days began to run at the time the hearing was closed, and the commission having-failed to act within sixty days from that time the defendant's application was granted by operation of law.
The fact that the commission has a rule permitting parties to file briefs within fifteen days after mailing of transcript does not amend the statute which provides that the commission shall act "within sixty days after submission of all evidence and argument which may be offered." No argument or briefs were offered in this case after the close of the evidence. Therefore the sixty days began to run at the time the evidence closed.
It was clearly the intent of the legislature to shorten the time within which the commission should act by providing that it should act within sixty days instead of within ninety. Under the construction contended for by the plaintiff, the commission may fix a time within which arguments may be presented to suit its pleasure, extend such time, and so prevent the granting of a petition by operation of law as long as it pleases, so that from a practical standpoint, the statute operates the same as it did under the amendment of sec. 194.23 (4) by ch. 557, Laws of 1945. That construction defeats the purpose of sub. (3) as created by ch. 448, Laws of 1947.
By the Court. — The judgment appealed from is reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court with directions to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint.