Case Name: MILLER et al. v. FIRST STATE BANK & TRUST CO. OF SANTA ANNA
Court: Texas Courts of Civil Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1915-05-12
Citations: 184 S.W. 614
Docket Number: No. 5490
Parties: MILLER et al. v. FIRST STATE BANK & TRUST CO. OF SANTA ANNA.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 184
Pages: 614–620

Head Matter:
MILLER et al. v. FIRST STATE BANK & TRUST CO. OF SANTA ANNA.
(No. 5490.)
(Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Austin.
May 12, 1915.
On Motion for Rehearing, July 2, 1915.
On Appellee’s Motion for Rehearing, March 29, 1916.)
1. Appeal and Erbor <@=»188 — Reservation op Grounds — Defective Service of Process.
On appeal from the denial of a motion to set aside a default judgment, the sufficiency of service will not be considered, where it was not raised in the original motion to vacate, nor in the answer, but is presented for the first time in an amended motion to vacate not properly verified.
' [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 1190-1204; Dee. Dig. <§==> 188.]
2. Judgment &wkey;>145(2) — Setting Aside Default^— Sufficiency of Application.
To set aside a judgment by default the motion must show a meritorious defense as well as a sufficient excuse for failure to appear and answer.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Judgment, Cent. Dig. §§ 271, 293; Dec. Dig. &wkey;145(2).]
On Motion for Rehearing.
3. Judgment <&wkey;17(2) — Judgment by Default — Requisites—Sebvice OE PROCESS.
To authorize a judgment by default, the sheriff’s return must show service of citation upon defendants in the manner required by statute, even though the judgment shows that defendants were legally served.
[Ed.- Note. — For other cases, see Judgment, Dec. Dig. (2).]
4. Oobporations <&wkey;507(13) — Actions—Serv-aos of Process.
Under Vernon’s Sayles’ Ann. Civ. St. 1914, art. 1860, requiring the citation in suits against corporations to be served on one of the officers of the company named therein or some agent of the company, a citation showing service only, upon the company by name is insufficient, since to be binding service must be upon the identical officer or agent or one of the officers or agents prescribed by the statute.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 1995-1997, 2000; Dec. Dig. &wkey; 507(13).]
5. Judgment <&wkey;17(10) — Judgment by Default — Service of Process.
Where the petition or citation in an action against a corporation fails to direct upon whom service is to be made, then, in order to sustain a judgment by default, proof must be made when judgment is taken that the citation was served upon some one of the officers or agents named in the statute.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Judgment, Dec. Dig. &wkey;>17(10).]
6. Partnership <&wkey;204r — Action — Process-Service.
Jurisdiction to enter judgment by default against a partnership cannot be obtained by service on the partnership itself, Vernon’s Sayles’ Ann. Civ. St. 1914, art. 1863, requiring process to be served on a member of the firm.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Partnership, Cent. Dig. §§ 376-381; Dec. Dig. <@^204.]
7. Judgment <&wkey;143(l), 145(2) — Setting Aside Default — Sufficiency of Application.
Where no legal service is had upon defendant, a judgment by default may be set aside without showing a meritorious defense or a sufficient excuse for failure to appear; the judgment being void for want of jurisdiction.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Judgment, Cent. Dig. §§ 269, 271, 278, 279, 283, 285, 293; Dec. Dig. &wkey;143(l), 145(2).]
On Appellee’s Motion for Rehearing.
8. Chattel Mortgages <&wkey;229(2) — Conversion of Mortgaged Property — Actions— Answer.
In an action on notes, and to establish a mortgage lien on live stock and cotton, and to recover for conversion of part of such stock and cotton, an answer alleging that, if defendants purchased any cotton on which plaintiff held a valid lien or mortgage, the money paid by them therefor to the seller was by the seller paid to plaintiff in partial satisfaction of the demands sued upon by plaintiff, and that the seller paid to plaintiff the market value of the cotton less the cost of picking it, stated a meritorious defense.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Chattel Mortgages, Cent. Dig. §§ 481, 483; Dec. Dig. &wkey;> 229(2).]
9. Judgment <&wkey;163 — Setting Aside Default — Form and Requisites of Application.
On an application to set aside a judgment by default, it was proper for the court to consider the answer filed in connection with the motion in determining whether the motion disclosed a meritorious defense, though the verification of the answer was made on information and belief, without setting out the facts on which the belief was founded.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Judgment, Cent. Dig. § 323; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;163.]
10. Judgment &wkey;>143(13) — Setting Aside Default — Form and Requisites of Application.
A motion to set aside a judgment by default alleged that defendants lived 55 miles from C., the' place of trial, that the only available route was by rail via B., and in order to attend court they would have to spend a night in B. and proceed to C. the next day, that the trip was tedious and expensive, that their attorney assured them they could reach C. in time to answer and defend the suit by leaving home on the morning of the day the case was to be called, and that, if plaintiff’s attorney took judgment by default before their arrival, the court would set it aside, stating that he was well acquainted with the attorneys for plaintiff and had frequently exchanged courtesies with them, and that they would not insist upon judgment by default until after appearance cases were called for orders, that on the morning of September 8th they started for C. in an automobile, leaving home at 7 a. m., that a blowout delayed them for some little time, and that after repairing it they proceeded to C., arriving there a few minutes after the judgment was entered. Held, that this showed due diligence, and the motion to set aside the default judgment should have been granted.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Judgment, Cent. Dig. § 286; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;> 143(13).]
11. Appeal and Error <&wkey;1173(l) — Disposition of Case — Reversal—Coparties.
Where a member of a firm was sued only as a member of the firm, and therefore could not be held liable otherwise, and judgment was apparently rendered against him individually, pursuant to the statute making a judgment against a partnership collectible out of the individual property of the members of the firm served with citation, a reversal as to the firm required a reversal as to him, though he did not appeal, as plaintiff was not entitled to judgment against him, if not entitled to a judgment against the firm, and the statute prescribing that only one final judgment shall be rendered had application.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Eryor, Cent. Dig. §§ 4562-4567, 4569, 4656; Dec. Dig. &wkey;1173(l).]
12. Appeal and Error <&wkey;1173(2) — Disposition of Case — Reversal—Coparties.
The reversal of a judgment against appealing defendants did not require the reversal of a judgment against nonappealing defendants upon separate and distinct causes of action, in which no recovery was sought or had against the appealing defendants, as the statute prescribing that only one final judgment shall be rendered did not apply.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 4568, 4656; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;> 1173(2).]
Appeal from Coleman County Court; F. M. Bowen, Judge.
Action by the First State Bank & Trust Company of Santa Amia against R. F. Miller and others. From a denial of a motion to set aside a default, defendants appeal.
Reversed and remanded in part, and affirmed in part, on rehearing.
Shropshire & House, of Brady, for appellants. Snodgrass, Dibrell & Snodgrass, of Coleman, for appellee.

Opinion:
RICE, J.
This suit was brought by appel-lee against R. E. Miller, L. E. Miller, W. S. Gattis, James D. Gattis, Jim Bell, O. D. Mann & Sons, a partnership, and William Connolly & Co., a private corporation, all of McCulloch county; and against J. R. Ran-ey Company, a corporation, and Sam Woodward, of Coleman county, to enforce collection as against R. P. Miller, principal, and Raney Company as indorsers on a note for $250, with interest and attorney's fees, less a credit of $17.50; and as against said Miller and the two Gattises for balance on a note of $109, with interest and attorney's fees, and on a note for $677.41 and $100 attorney's fees, less certain credits; also to establish a mortgage lien on certain live stock and cotton, and as against the other defendants for conversion of part of said stock and 12 bales of cotton stating the aggregate value of such property alleged to be converted at $970. No value as to said other mortgaged property was stated, nor was a foreclosure thereon asked. An amended petition was filed September 3, 1914, stating that such other property described in the mortgage was not in existence, and averred that as to it no foreclosure was prayed.
On the 8th of September, when the appearance docket of said court was called, no answer having been filed on the part of .appellants, judgment by default was taken as against all of said parties except W. S. Gat-tis, Raney Company, and Woodward, the case as to first two being dismissed, but wont in favor of the latter on the ground of his having a prior mortgage on the live stock. Within 20 minutes after the entry of such default judgment, these appellants, Mann & Sons and Connolly & Co., with their attorney, arrived in Coleman, and upon entering the courthouse yard they met counsel for appel-Jee, whom they apprised of the fact that they had just arrived with their answer for the purpose of filing same and trying said cause, requesting him to return with them to the courthouse to set same down for trial, which said attorney declined to do, informing them that he had just a short while before, on the calling of the appearance docket, taken a judgment by default against them, and, upon his declining to agree that the same should be set aside, counsel for appellants filed in said court, about 2 o'clock on said day, their answer, and also their motion to vacate said judgment, in which said motion they set up their plea of personal privilege to be sued in McCulloch, the comity of their residence, also a plea of misjoinder of parties, and alleged that they had a meritorious defense, without stating what it was. They afterwards, on the 16th of September, filed an amended motion to vacate said judgment which, in addition to the matters set out in the original motion, asserted that Connolly & Co., who were sued as a corporation, were not in fact a corporation, and that the service upon McKenzie, their alleged secretary, was not in fact sufficient legal service, and that as to Mann & Sons said service was not sufficient, because O.' D. Mann, upon whom the citation was served, was not in fact a member of the said partnership and never had been; asserting, also, that the amount in controversy was more than $1,000, in that it was a suit to foreclose a mortgage on property of greater value than $1,000, and also that the amount sued for was over $1,000. And as an excuse for not sooner filing their answer, they alleged: That they lived at Brady, 55 miles from Coleman. That the only available route from Brady to Coleman was by rail via Brownwood, and in order to attend said court they would have to go from Brady to Brownwood and spend the night in the latter place, and proceed to Coleman the next day; that such trip was tedious and expensive. That upon receiving citation they promptly referred the matter to their attorney for attention, who stated that he would have to be at Austin on the 5th, but that he would attend the trial at Coleman on the 8th, assuring them that they could reach 'Coleman in time to answer and defend their suit by leaving Brady on the morning of September 8th; likewise stating to them that, in the event plaintiff's attorney should take judgment by default before their arrival, then the court would set same aside and permit them to file their pleadings; stating that he was well acquainted with the attorneys representing the plaintiff, with whom he had frequently exchanged courtesies, and that they would not insist upon a judgment by default till after the aijpearance cases were called for orders. That, relying upon such statements and assurances by their said attorney, they awaited his arrival from Austin, he returning earlier than expected. Securing an automobile on the morning of September 8th, these appellants, with their attorney, started for Coleman, leaving Brady at 7 a. m. That a few miles south of Coleman they had a blow-out in one of their tires, which delayed them some little time. That, after repairing same, they proceeded to Coleman, arriving there after judgment by default had been entered.
The court overruled the motion to vacate the judgment, from which appellants have prosecuted this appeal, urging, first, that the court had no jurisdiction, in that the valué of the property mortgaged exceeded $1,000. We overrule this contention, first because the amount sued for did not exceed $1,000; and further for the reason that the original peti tion did not seels a foreclosure upon the other ' property mentioned in the mortgage nor state its value, and did not indicate that such property was in existence; and the amended motion upon which appellee went to trial alleged that the other property described in the mortgage was not in existence at the time of filing the original petition, and expressly declared that it sought no foreclosure thereon, for which reason it did not appear from the face of the petition that the court was without jurisdiction. See Cantrell v. Cawyer, 162 S. W. 919.
The question as to the sufficiency of the service, we think, is improperly raised. Neither the original motion to vacate nor the answer present this question, and it is for the first time raised in the amended motion to vacate the judgment, which is not properly verified. Appellants in their answer not having denied under oath the partnership and incorporation as alleged, as required by article 1906, Vernon's Sayles' Civ. Stat., no issue was raised with reference thereto.
We think appellants' amended motion to set aside the judgment by default was properly overruled for the further reason that it failed to show a meritorious defense and a sufficient excuse for failing to appear and answer. In the absence of either, they were not entitled to have the same set aside.
"The rule seems to be well established in this state (Runge v. Franklin, 72 Tex. 585, 10 S. W. 721, 3 L. R. A. 417, 13 Am. St. Rep. 833, that, in addition to excusing his absence or failure to plead, the appellant must show by sufficiently circumstantial statement that he has a meritorious cause of action or defense; stating generally that he has a meritorious cause of action or defense is not sufficient. Enough should be stated, supported by affidavit, to show at least a prima facie case. Courts ought not in such cases set aside judgments rendered except upon a showing which, if true and unexplained, would change the result on a subsequent trial" — citing Cowan v. Williams, 49 Tex. 380; Montgomery v. Carlton, 56 Tex. 431; Contreras v. Haynes, 61 Tex. 103.
See, also, Foster v. Martin, 20 Tex. 119; Gillaspie v. Huntsville, 151 S. W. 1114; Schliecher v. Markward, 61 Tex. 99; Sharp v. Schmidt & Zeigler, 62 Tex. 263; Tinsley v. Corbett, 27 Tex. Civ. App. 633, 66 S. W. 913; Chambers v. Gallup, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 424, 70 S. W. 1009; W. U. T. Co. v. Skinner (Civ. App.) 128 S. W. 715; Bartlett v. Jones (Civ. App.) 103 S. W. 706.
In Foster v. Martin, supra, Mr. Justice Wheeler says:
"The motion to set aside the judgment was in the nature of a motion for a new trial. To entitle the defendant to have the judgment set aside, as a matter of legal right, he should have brought his application substantially within the rules governing the granting of new trials. He should have made Ms application within the time prescribed, or shown some sufficient excuse for his neglect. His application should have shown a sufficient excuse for his failure to appear and make his defense to the action within the time allowed for pleading, and also that he had a meritorious defense. The application is deficient in all these particulars."
In Sharp v. Schmidt & Zeigler, supra, Mr. Chief Justice Willie says:
"It is fully established by our own decisions that, 'notwithstanding an illegal writ or service of process, a court of equity will not interfere to set aside a judgment until it appears that the result will be different from that already reached.' Schleicher v. Markward, 61 Tex. 103; Kitchen v. Crawford, 13 Tex. 516. To make this appear the petition should aver matters which amount to a good defense to the original action. The nature of the defense must be given, so that the court for itself may determine the conclusion of law as to whether or not it is a good defense, and would produce a different result if proved upon another trial. The plaintiff's oath to such a conclusion is not sufficient."
Besides this, the motion was not properly verified. The affidavit was as follows:
"Before me, the undersigned authority, on this day personally appeared J. E. Shropshire, known to me to be the attorney for the defendants named in the foregoing motion, and upon oath stated that upon Ms own knowledge he believes the allegations of fact and statements contained in said motion are true."
In Ruling Case Law, vol. 1, p. 770, § 15, it is said:
"An affidavit should always be made by one having actual knowledge of the facts, if possible, and its allegations should be full, certain, and exact; a bare statement of one's belief being immaterial, unless the case is one where an affidavit as to belief only is required."
Again, on page 772, § 18, same volume, it is stated:
"Affidavits upon information and belief should allege facts definitely, and also set forth the sources of the affiant's information and the grounds of his belief, to enable the judicial mind to determine whether the belief is well or ill founded. Inasmuch as an affidavit upon information and belief cannot supply the place of a positive allegation, affidavits of this nature cannot ordinarily be used except when authorized by statute."
See, also, Texas Farm & Land Co. v. Story, (Civ. App.) 43 S. W. 933; Scheffel v. Scheffel, 37 Tex. Civ. App. 504, 84 S. W. 408; Graham v. Brown, 69 Tex. 323, 7 S. W. 342; Smith v. Banks, 152 S. W. 449; Whitemore & Co. v. Wilson, 1 Posey, Unrep. Cas. 213.
The motion did not set up any facts showing a meritorious defense. It is true, however, that it referred to the answer for such defense; but, even if we could consider the answer for this purpose (which is doubtful under the authority of Runge v. Franklin, supra), still, said answer is not properly verified, in that the verification is also made on information and belief, without setting out the facts upon which such belief is founded.
The excuse set up for failing to answer is insufficient. The parties were served in ample time and could have been present with their counsel at court, if they had left Brady the day before by rail. It is not sufficient to say that the trip would have been expensive and tedious. Furthermore, had they left an hour earlier in the morning by auto, they would have arrived at court, it seems, before judgment was entered. They should have anticipated just such, a' contingency as happened and started earlier.
Finding no error in the action of the court in overruling the motion to set aside the judgment by default, the same is affirmed.
Affirmed.
<5&wkey;For other oases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
<g=oFor other oases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER, in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes