Case Name: Stephen SULTENFUSS, Plaintiff-Appellant, Charles McMulling, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Wayne SNOW, Jr., James T. Morris, Mobley Howell, Michael H. Wing, Bettye O. Hutchings, Michael J. Bowers, Defendants-Appellees
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1994-10-05
Citations: 35 F.3d 1494
Docket Number: No. 91-8002
Parties: Stephen SULTENFUSS, Plaintiff-Appellant, Charles McMulling, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Wayne SNOW, Jr., James T. Morris, Mobley Howell, Michael H. Wing, Bettye O. Hutchings, Michael J. Bowers, Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: Before TJOFLAT, Chief Judge, KRAVITCH, HATCHETT, ANDERSON, COX, BIRCH, DUBINA, BLACK, CARNES and BARKETT, Circuit Judges, and CLARK , Senior Circuit Judge.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 3d Series
Volume: 35
Pages: 1494–1515

Head Matter:
Stephen SULTENFUSS, Plaintiff-Appellant, Charles McMulling, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Wayne SNOW, Jr., James T. Morris, Mobley Howell, Michael H. Wing, Bettye O. Hutchings, Michael J. Bowers, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 91-8002.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
Oct. 5, 1994.
Stephen G. Sultenfuss, Anna Maria, FL, Jill A. Pryor, Bondurant Mixon & Elmore, Atlanta, GA, for appellant.
David A. Webster, Sumner & Hewes, Atlanta, GA, for amicus — ACLU of Ga.
Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Daryl Alan Robinson, Terry L. Long, Atlanta, GA, for appellees.
Before TJOFLAT, Chief Judge, KRAVITCH, HATCHETT, ANDERSON, COX, BIRCH, DUBINA, BLACK, CARNES and BARKETT, Circuit Judges, and CLARK , Senior Circuit Judge.
Judge J.L. Edmondson recused himself and did not participate in this decision.
Senior U.S. Circuit Judge Thomas A. Clark elected to participate in this decision pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(c).

Opinion:
BIRCH, Circuit Judge:
In this case, we must decide whether the current Georgia parole system, as embodied in the Georgia Constitution, the Georgia statutes, and the rules and guidelines promulgated pursuant to the statutes, creates a liberty interest in parole protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court found no protected liberty interest, and we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A The Georgia Parole Guidelines System
The Georgia parole system is set out in the Georgia Constitution, several Georgia stat utes, and the rules and regulations promulgated by the state Board of Pardons and Paroles (the "Board") pursuant to those statutes. The Georgia Constitution vests the Board with the exclusive power to grant reprieves, pardons, and paroles. Ga. Const, art. IV, § 2, ¶ 2. In 1980, the Georgia legislature enacted a law requiring the Board to implement a parole guidelines system. That statute provides in pertinent part:
The board shall adopt, implement, and maintain a parole guidelines system for determining parole action. The guidelines system shall be used in determining parole actions on all inmates, except those serving life sentences, who will become statutorily eligible for parole consideration. The system shall be consistent with the board's primary goal of protecting society and shall take into consideration the severity of the current offense, the inmate's prior criminal history, the inmate's conduct, and the social factors which the board has found to have value in predicting the probability of further criminal behavior and successful adjustment under parole supervision.
O.C.G.A. § 42-9-40(a). Section 42-9-40 is qualified, however, by section 42-9-42, which provides in relevant part:
No inmate shall be placed on parole until and unless the board shall find that there is reasonable probability that, if he is so released, he will live and conduct himself as a respectable and law-abiding person and that his release will be compatible with his own welfare and the welfare of society. Furthermore, no person shall be released on pardon or placed on parole unless and until the board is satisfied that he will be suitably employed in self-sustaining employment or that he will not become a public charge.
Id. § 42-9-42(c).
Pursuant to these provisions, the Board adopted and maintains the Georgia Parole Decision Guidelines System (the "Guidelines"). That system is embodied in the rules and regulations passed by the Board pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 42-9-40 and in accordance with the Georgia Administrative Procedure Act, O.C.G.A. § 50-13-1 et seq. The stated purpose of the Guidelines is as follows: "In the parole decision process, the Board shall utilize a set of guidelines which consider both the severity of an individual's offense and the likelihood of the individual successfully completing a term of supervision on parole." Parole Decision Guidelines System ¶ 8-1.01.
Other rules and regulations of the Board also shed light on the purpose and function of the system. Chapter 475-3-.05, for instance, provides as follows:
The Parole Decision Guidelines System is an aid to the Board in making more consistent, soundly based and explainable parole decisions and does not create a liberty interest. The Board specifically reserves the right to exercise its discretion under Georgia Law to disagree with the recommendation resulting from application of the Parole Decision Guidelines and may make an independent decision to deny parole or establish a Tentative Parole Month at any time prior to sentence expiration.
Ga.R. eh. 475-3-.05. Moreover, Annexure 2, an essential component of the Guidelines, contains similar language:
Parole Decision Guidelines help the Board make a more consistent, soundly based, prompt, and explainable parole decision. Guidelines help the Board decide on a Tentative Parole Month for the inmate or decide that the inmate will complete his sentence without parole. When making decisions, the Board may depart from the Guidelines recommendation and make an independent decision using the full discretion given it under Georgia Law. The length of the prison sentence imposed by the court will be considered in establishing a Tentative Parole Month.
Parole Decision Guidelines System, Anne-xure 2. These provisions set forth the fundamental purpose and function of the Guidelines.
The Guidelines establish a step-by-step procedure for the Board to follow in making parole determinations for eligible inmates. First, the Board assigns the inmate a Crime Severity Level. According to the Guidelines, "[t]he Board deems the nature of the offense to be the most important element in the parole decision. Consequently, the guidelines are to be structured around a Crime Severity Index ranking crimes by increasing degree of seriousness." Parole Decision Guidelines System ¶ 8-1.01. Using a table ranking various crimes in terms of severity, the Board assigns each eligible inmate a Crime Severity Level of I to VII.
Next, the Board assigns the inmate a Parole Success Likelihood Score. "The second component of the Parole Decision Guidelines System combines eight social and criminal history factors found to relate to the likelihood of one's success on parole, which are labeled 'Parole Success Factors.' " Id. ¶ 8-17.01. Rating the inmate on each of these eight factors, the Board arrives at a Parole Success Likelihood Score ranging form 0 to 20 for each inmate.
The Board then uses the Parole Decision Grid to formulate the months-to-serve recommendation. The Parole Decision Grid combines the inmate's Crime Severity Level with the Parole Success Likelihood Score to arrive at a months-to-serve recommendation. Adding the months-to-serve recommendation to the date of the controlling sentence provides the inmate's Tentative Parole Month. "The Tentative Parole Month, during which the offender may expect to be released, absent new information or other cause to cancel the Board's tentative release decision, shall be calculated by adding the recommended months-to-serve to the compute-from date of the controlling sentence." Id. ¶ 8-27.01.
A central point of contention between the parties is whether the Tentative Parole Month is a final, binding determination. The appellant argues that the Tentative Parole Month may be changed only for "new information or other cause," id., as specified in the Guidelines. The Board, on the other hand, maintains that it has the authority to exercise discretion in departing from the grid recommendation. As noted earlier, several of the rules and regulations expressly provide for departure. Annexure 2, which contains the Parole Decision Grid, states that "the Board may depart from the Guidelines recommendation and make an independent decision using the full discretion given it under Georgia Law." Id., Annexure 2. The Board thus maintains that, in arriving at the Tentative Parole Month, it considers the individual circumstances in each inmate's case, as well as the recommendation of the Parole Decision Grid.
B. Application of the Guidelines to Sulten-juss
The appellant, Stephen Sultenfuss, was convicted of two separate drug charges involving possession of cocaine. He received two concurrent sentences, the longest of which was fifteen years set to run from August 24,1986, and set to expire on August 23, 2001.
In order to determine Sultenfuss' Tentative Parole Month, the Board used the Guidelines. Based on his two convictions, Sultenfuss' Crime Severity Level was II. The Board then analyzed the Parole Success Factors and gave Sultenfuss a Parole Success Likelihood Score of 11. Based on these two scores, the Parole Decision Grid resulted in a recommended incarceration period of ten months before parole. Nevertheless, the Board departed from the grid recommendation. Finding that the Crime Severity Level and Parole Success Factors did not adequately reflect the true nature of Sultenfuss' case, the Board recommended a term of 61 months, yielding a Tentative Parole Month of January 1992.
On July 15, 1988, Sultenfuss and several other inmates filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. Claiming that the Board had violated their rights to due process and equal protection by departing from the grid recommendation in setting release dates, the inmates sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as compensatory damages. Relying on Slocum v. Georgia State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 678 F.2d 940 (11th Cir.) (finding no liberty interest in Georgia parole system pri- or to 1980 changes), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1043, 103 S.Ct. 462, 74 L.Ed.2d 612 (1982), the district court sua sponte dismissed the complaint as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).
Sultenfuss was the only inmate to appeal the district court's dismissal. On appeal, we affirmed the dismissal of the claim for compensatory damages, but reversed the dismissal of the due process claim. Sultenfuss v. Snow, 894 F.2d 1277 (11th Cir.1990) (per curiam). We held that the district court erred by relying on Slocum because that decision had dealt with the previous parole system and did not address the issue under the current system. "While upon close examination, these changes may not have had an actual impact upon the Georgia parole system to vindicate the due process claim at issue, the changes are sufficiently significant to raise an arguable question of law so as to preclude § 1915(d) dismissal." Sultenfuss, 894 F.2d at 1279. We thus remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings.
On remand, the district court appointed counsel to represent Sultenfuss, and Sulten-fuss filed a restated complaint. On August 14, 1990, the Board filed a motion for summary judgment. Finding that Georgia's parole system does not create a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause, the district court granted the Board's motion for summary judgment.
Sultenfuss appealed pro se to this court, and, after briefs were filed, we appointed new counsel to represent him. Reversing the district court's grant of summary judgment, a panel of this court held that the current parole system does create a protected liberty interest. Sultenfuss v. Snow, 7 F.3d 1543, 1449-50 (11th Cir.1993), vacated and reh'g en banc granted, 14 F.3d 572 (11th Cir.1994). The panel concluded that "the mandatory language of the statute and the Guidelines, combined -with the particularized standards that guide the Board's parole determinations, create a liberty interest in parole release in Georgia." Id. at 1550-51. On February 4, 1994, we vacated the panel opinion and granted rehearing en banc. We now affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment and find that the Georgia parole system does not create a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.
II. DISCUSSION
A Standard of Review
Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). When a summary judgment motion has been made and properly supported, the nonmoving party may not rest upon its pleading, but "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). In making this determination, the district court "should 'resolve all reasonable doubts about the facts in favor of the non-movant' and draw 'all justifiable inferences . in his favor.' " United States v. Four Parcels of Real Property, 941 F.2d 1428, 1437 (11th Cir.1991) (alteration in original) (citations omitted). We review grants of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standards as the district court. Bannum, Inc. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 901 F.2d 989, 996 (11th Cir.1990).
B. Creation of a Liberty Interest
Sultenfuss alleges that the Board's departure from the grid recommendation violated his rights under the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. The Due Process Clause provides that "[n]o State shall . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1. The requirements of procedural due process, therefore, "apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and property." Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2705, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). As the Supreme Court has explained,
[t]he types of interests that constitute "liberty" and "property" for Fourteenth Amendment purposes are not unlimited; the interest must rise to more than "an abstract need or desire" and must be based on more than "a unilateral hope." Rather, an individual claiming a protected liberty interest must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.
Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 461, 109 S.Ct. 1904, 1908, 104 L.Ed.2d 506 (1989) (citations omitted). In order to establish that the Board violated his rights to due process, therefore, Sultenfuss first must demonstrate that the Georgia parole system provides inmates with a liberty interest in parole.
In Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979), the Supreme Court recognized that the mere establishment of a parole system by a state does not automatically create a liberty interest in parole. "There is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence." Id. at 7, 99 S.Ct. at 2104. This is not to say, however, that the establishment of a parole system cannot give rise to a liberty interest in parole.
When a state parole system creates a legitimate expectation of parole, an inmate has a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. Id. at 12, 99 S.Ct. at 2106. In Greenholtz, for instance, the Court found a Nebraska parole statute stating that the parole board "shall order [the inmate's] release unless it is of the opinion that his release should be deferred because" one of four specified criteria is met created a pro- tectible liberty interest in parole. Id. at 11, 99 S.Ct. at 2106. Based on the mandatory language of the statute and the presumption that parole be granted unless one of the factors is present, the Court accepted the inmates' view that the statute created an expectation of release protected by the Due Process Clause.
Likewise, in Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 107 S.Ct. 2415, 96 L.Ed.2d 303 (1987), the Court analyzed a Montana parole statute similar to the statute in Greenholtz. The Montana statute stated that "the board shall release on parole . any [inmate] when in its opinion there is reasonable probability that the prisoner can be released without detriment to the prisoner or to the community." Id. at 376, 107 S.Ct. at 2420 (emphasis omitted) (first alteration in original). According to the Court, the statute placed "substantive predicates" on the discretion of the decisionmakers and used mandatory language to create a presumption that release would be granted unless the designated findings are made. Id. at 377-80, 107 S.Ct. at 2420-21. Therefore, the Court found that a liberty interest existed.
In other cases, however, the Court has found that penal regulations and parole guidelines do not implicate the Due Process Clause where no liberty interest exists. In Thompson, for instance, the Court analyzed Kentucky prison regulations to determine whether inmates had a liberty interest in visitation. There, the Court focused on the discretion vested in state decisionmakers: "Stated simply, 'a State creates a protected liberty interest by placing substantive limitations on official discretion.' " Thompson, 490 U.S. at 462, 109 S.Ct. at 1909 (quoting Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249, 103 S.Ct. 1741, 1747, 75 L.Ed.2d 813 (1983)). The Court also emphasized the "requirement, implicit in our earlier decisions, that the regulations contain 'explicitly mandatory language,' i.e., specific directives to the decisionmaker that if the regulations' substantive predicates are present, a particular outcome must follow." Id. at 463, 109 S.Ct. at 1910. The Court found that the regulations at issue lacked the requisite mandatory language because "[t]hey stop short of requiring that a particular result is to be reached upon a finding that the substantive predicates are met." Id. at 464, 109 S.Ct. at 1910. The Court also focused on language in the regulations in which the administrative staff reserved the right to allow or disallow prison visits.
While the Supreme Court has written extensively on whether various prison guidelines create a liberty interest, the Court has declined to set forth any definitve rules. Instead, the Court has emphasized that "whether any . state statute provides a protectible entitlement must be decided on a case-by-case basis." Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12, 99 S.Ct. at 2106. In conducting this case-specific analysis, we are bound by certain principles. After reviewing the relevant caselaw from the Supreme Court and this circuit, we conclude that three, sometimes overlapping, factors are crucial in determining whether a liberty interest is created: (1) whether the system places substantive limitations on the discretion of the decisionmakers; (2) whether the system mandates the outcome that must follow if the substantive predicates are met; and (3) whether the relevant statutes and regulations contain explicitly mandatory language dictating the procedures that must be followed and the result that must be reached if the relevant criteria are satisfied. We explain these factors in more detail below as we examine their application to Georgia's parole system.
C. The Georgia Parole System
In examining these three factors in relation to the Georgia parole system, we must keep in mind that our analysis is inherently subjective.. The Supreme Court has recognized that "[n]either the drafting of regulations nor their interpretation can be reduced to an exact science." Thompson, 490 U.S. at 462, 109 S.Ct. at 1909. The Georgia statutes and regulations must be read together to derive the overriding purpose and function of the parole guidelines system. With this caveat in mind, we proceed to analyze the Georgia parole system in light of the three factors set forth above.
First, we must determine whether the system places substantive predicates on the discretion of state officials. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249, 103 S.Ct. 1741, 1747, 75 L.Ed.2d 813 (1983). The inmate must establish that the statute or regulations provide particularized criteria for the decisionmaker to follow, id., and that these standards "meaningfully constrain the discretion of state officials," Allen, 482 U.S. at 384, 107 S.Ct. at 2424 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In Slocum, we recognized the "critical distinction between 'a scheme that requires release "unless adverse findings based on [specific] criteria are made" [and] a scheme that simply obligates the board to consider such criteria in exercising its discretion.'" Slocum, 678 F.2d at 941 (quoting Boothe v. Hammock, 605 F.2d 661, 664 (2d Cir.1979)) (alteration in original).
We conclude that the Georgia parole system more closely fits within the latter category. Without a doubt, the Guidelines provide a set of particularized criteria that the Board must consider in making parole determinations. The crucial inquiry, however, is whether the relevant statutes and regulations provide standards that meaningfully limit the discretion of the decisionmakers. Not only do the Guidelines leave the Board significant discretion in applying the various factors, but the Board, in promulgating the Guidelines, expressly reserved the authority to depart from the grid recommendation. The criteria in the Guidelines provide a framework to "help the Board make a more consistent, soundly based, prompt, and explainable parole decision." Parole Decision Guidelines System, Annexure 2. The Guidelines were not intended to produce a predetermined outcome upon rote application of specific criteria.
Sultenfuss places great reliance on language from the parole statute mandating that the "guidelines system shall be used in determining parole actions on all inmates." O.C.G.A. § 42-9-40. He argues that this language and the language in the Guidelines dictating the criteria to be considered "constitute specific, substantive limitations on the board's exercise of discretion." Appellant's En Banc Brief at 20-21. We disagree; this language is consistent with the substantial discretion that the Guidelines reserve for the Board. The Board's decision to depart from the grid recommendation does not mean that the Guidelines were not used in determining parole action. The Board may utilize the Guidelines as a framework for making parole determinations, while still exercising the authority to depart from the grid recommendation if other factors, not adequately considered by the Guidelines, warrant such a decision. Therefore, we find that Georgia's parole system does not place limitations on the Board's discretion sufficient to create a liberty interest in parole.
Second, we examine whether the system mandates the outcome that must be reached if the relevant criteria have been met. Thompson, 490 U.S. at 462, 109 S.Ct. at 1909. Where the statute or regulation creates a presumption that release will be granted upon a finding that the substantive predicates have been met, a liberty interest in parole exists. Thompson, 490 U.S. at 463-64, 109 S.Ct. at 1910. In those cases where the Supreme Court has found a liberty interest, the Court has focused on the presumption of release found in the relevant statute or guidelines. See, e.g., Allen, 482 U.S. at 376, 107 S.Ct. at 2420 ("the board shall release on parole . any [inmate] when in its opinion there is reasonable probability that the prisoner can be released without detriment to the prisoner or to the community" (emphasis omitted) (first alteration in original)); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 470 n. 6, 103 S.Ct. 864, 871 n. 6, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) ("If no behavior violation has occurred, the inmate must be released as soon as the reason for the security concern has abat-ed_"); Greenhottz, 442 U.S. at 11, 99 S.Ct. at 2106 ("the Board . shall order [the inmate's] release unless it is of the opinion that his release should be deferred because" one of four criteria is met).
We do not find such a mandate in the Georgia statutes and regulations. Neither the relevant statutes nor the Guidelines contain any language mandating the outcome that must be reached after application of the specified procedures. Conversely, the Georgia statutes actually create a presumption against parole. Section 42-9-42, O.C.G.A., provides that "[n]o inmate shall be placed on parole until and unless the board shall find that there is reasonable probability that, if he is so released, he will live and conduct himself as a respectable and law-abiding person and that his release will be compatible with his own welfare and the welfare of society." O.C.G.A. § 42-9-42(c). This section must be read as a qualification of section 42-9-40, the provision requiring adoption of the parole guideline system. Thus, while the legislature has required the Board to adopt a guideline system to be used as a framework for making more consistent parole decisions, it also preserved the Board's authority to use its discretion in making final parole decisions. The statute and regulations, therefore, do not mandate that release be granted if the Guidelines criteria is met.
Finally, we look at the relevant statute and regulations to see if they contain explicitly mandatory language directing the decisionmaker to follow certain procedures. Thompson, 490 U.S. at 462, 109 S.Ct. at 1909-10. Although this third factor largely merges with the second, we find the use of explicitly mandatory language to be an important factor in determining whether a liberty interest exists.
It should be obvious that the mandatory language requirement is not an invitation to courts to search regulations for any imperative that might be found. The search is for relevant mandatory language that expressly requires the decisionmaker to apply certain substantive predicates in determining whether an inmate may be deprived of the particular interest in question.
Id. at 464 n. 4, 109 S.Ct. at 1910 n. 4. We recognized this crucial distinction in Staton v. Wainwright, 665 F.2d 686 (5th Cir. Unit B), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 909, 102 S.Ct. 1757, 72 L.Ed.2d 166 (1982), where we found no pro-tectable liberty interest in the Florida parole statutes. Although the Florida statutes were replete with mandatory language, we recognized that this language dictated what criteria should be considered, not what result must follow if those criteria are met. Id. at 688.
Similarly, as the panel in this ease recognized, the Georgia statutes and regulations frequently use mandatory language. See Sultenfuss, 7 F.3d at 1547-49 (highlighting use of the word "shall" in the relevant statutes and regulations). We find no mandatory language, however, expressly dictating the outcome that must follow if the criteria are met. The statutes mandate the implementation of a guidelines system, and the Guidelines mandate certain procedures that must be followed. But the Guidelines do not mandate release if the criteria are met. As noted above, the statutory presumption is against parole unless certain subjective criteria are satisfied. See O.C.G.A. § 42-9-42.
Viewing Georgia's parole system in its entirety, we conclude that no protected liberty interest in parole is created. To give rise to a liberty interest in parole, the statutes and regulations must meaningfully limit the discretion of state officials. Here, the substantial discretion reserved by the Board belies any claim to a reasonable expectation of parole. Although the Board is required to follow some relatively strict procedures, the statutes and the Guidelines, acting in conjunction, do not mandate the grant of parole if specified criteria are satisfied. Instead, the system contains a statutory presumption against parole and an explicit reservation of authority to depart from the grid recommendation, negating any reasonable claim of an entitlement to parole.
D. Deference to Administrative Interpretations
Our conclusion that the Georgia parole system does not create a protected liberty interest is strengthened by another factor, the Board's own interpretation of the Guidelines. It is a well-established rule of statutory construction in Georgia that the interpretation of a statute or regulation by an administrative agency responsible for enforcement of the provision is entitled to great deference, unless clearly erroneous. E.g., Hospital Auth. v. State Health Planning Agency, 211 Ga.App. 407, 408, 438 S.E.2d 912, 914 (1993), cert. denied (Ga.1994); National Advertising Co. v. Department of Transp., 149 Ga.App. 334, 337, 254 S.E.2d 571, 573 (1979); Mason v. Service Loan & Fin. Co., 128 Ga.App. 828, 831, 198 S.E.2d 391, 394 (1973); Belton v. Columbus Fin. & Thrift Co., 127 Ga.App. 770, 772, 195 S.E.2d 195, 197 (1972). Here, the Board is the administrative agency responsible for implementation of the statute and Guidelines under consideration. Under O.C.G.A. § 42-9-40, the Board has the responsibility for adopting, implementing, and maintaining a parole guidelines system. Pursuant to that statute, the Board adopted the Guidelines under consideration here and is the sole administrative agency responsible for administering the parole system. Therefore, unless its interpretation is unreasonable, it deserves great deference.
The Board has unequivocally evinced its opinion that the statute and Guidelines do not create a liberty interest in parole. In several portions of the rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 42-9-40, the Board has expressly reserved the right to depart from the grid recommendation. See Ga.R. eh. 475-3-.05. In fact, the portion of the Guidelines that contains the parole decision grid has the following "NOTICE" in capital letters at the top of the page:
THE BOARD SPECIFICALLY RESERVES THE RIGHT TO EXERCISE ITS DISCRETION UNDER GEORGIA LAW TO DENY PAROLE EVEN THOUGH GUIDELINES CRITERIA ARE MET BY AN INMATE. IT IS NOT THE INTENTION OF THE BOARD TO CREATE A LIBERTY INTEREST OF THE TYPE DESCRIBED IN GREEN-HOLTZ V. NEBRASKA PENAL INMATES 442 US 1 (1979).
Parole Decision Guidelines System, Anne-xure 2. The Board's unequivocal interpretation of the statute and Guidelines, therefore, is that no protected liberty interest is created. Because we find this interpretation to be reasonable, we owe it deference. We agree with the Board that Georgia's parole system does not create a liberty interest in parole protected by the Due Process Clause.
III. CONCLUSION
The district court found that Georgia's parole system does not create a liberty interest in parole implicating the protections of the Due Process Clause. Georgia's parole system contains a statutory presumption against parole and fails to limit meaningfully the discretion of state officials. We therefore agree with the district court that Georgia inmates do not have a legitimate expectation of parole. Because the protections of the Due Process Clause do not arise without a protectable liberty interest, the district court properly granted summary judgment to the Board.
AFFIRMED.
. There is some debate between the parties as to what documents are properly part of the record on appeal. In order to derive the contents of the Guidelines, the district court relied primarily on the affidavit of Christopher Hamilton, the Director of Legal Services for the Board. Rl-32 Ex. 3. That affidavit, attached to the Board's motion for summary judgment, describes the functioning of the guidelines system and contains a document entitled "State Board of Pardons and Paroles Parole Decision Guidelines." Rl-32 Ex. 3, Attach. B. The district court also relied upon Ga.R. ch. 475-3-.05, which sets out the framework for the parole guidelines system. Rl-32 Ex. 2.
The document entitled "Parole Decision Guidelines System," contained in the Appendix to Appellant's Brief, was introduced for the first time on appeal. Apparently, that document is part of the Board's internal operating manual. The Board contends that this document is not properly part of the record on appeal. For two reasons, and in the interest of judicial economy, we will consider the document in this appeal. First, the Board has never contended that this document is not a true and correct copy of the guidelines system. See Sultenfuss v. Snow, 7 F.3d 1543, 1548 n. 21 (11th Cir.1993) (panel opinion considering document for same reason), vacated and reh'g en banc granted, 14 F.3d 572 (11th Cir.1994). Second, even taking into consideration the language from this document, we find that a liberty interest in parole does not exist. Therefore, our result would be unaffected by exclusion of the document.
.Significantly, the first paragraph of Annexure 2 provides:
NOTICE: THE BOARD SPECIFICALLY RESERVES THE RIGHT TO EXERCISE ITS DISCRETION UNDER GEORGIA LAW TO DENY PAROLE EVEN THOUGH GUIDELINES CRITERIA ARE MET BY AN INMATE. IT IS NOT THE INTENTION OF THE BOARD TO CREATE A "LIBERTY INTEREST" OF THE TYPE DESCRIBED IN GREENHOLTZ VS. NEBRASKA PENAL INMATES 442 US 1 (1979).
Parole Decision Guidelines System, Annexure 2.
. See supra text accompanying note 2.
. Annexure 2 even provides a procedural safeguard for reviewing extreme departures from the Guidelines: "If the Board's tentative decision is to depart from the Guidelines recommendation, and the number of months to serve is more than three years beyond the Guidelines recommendation, the case will be reviewed at the Guidelines recommendation and each three years thereafter." Parole Decision Guidelines System, Anne-xure 2.
. Sultenfuss was released on parole after serving approximately four and one-half years and is no longer under active parole supervision. Nevertheless, we have concluded that this case is not moot because the issue presented is "capable of repetition, yet evading review." See Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 816, 89 S.Ct. 1493, 1494, 23 L.Ed.2d 1 (1969).
. Specifically, the Board in its Notice of Tentative Action provided the following reasons for its departure:
The severity of your offense(s) exceeds that accounted for in the Crime Severity Level. Factor D ["Parole or Probation Failure"] does not fully reflect the seriousness of your prior parole failures.
The success factors do not fully reflect the seriousness and scope of your criminal history. The success factors do not fully reflect the extent of your prior drug involvement.
Rl-32 Ex. 3, Attach. C.
.Sultenfuss' Tentative Parole Month was later adjusted slightly in conjunction with a periodic review to account for prison overcrowding. That adjustment is not pertinent to our analysis.
. The Court has recognized that there is no difference between a system that mandates release if certain criteria are met and one that mandates release unless certain criteria are met. Allen, 482 U.S. at 378, 107 S.Ct. at 2421.
. This interpretation is the only way that the two provisions can be harmonized. Section 42-9-42 prohibits the Board from releasing an inmate on parole until it believes certain subjective criteria are met. Thus, if application of the Guidelines in a particular case results in a recommendation of parole, but the Board is not satisfied that the criteria in section 42-9-42 are met, the Board is statutorily required to depart from the grid recommendation.
. While Sultenfuss relies heavily on certain language from the Guidelines to show the existence of a liberty interest, he ignores or downplays language that expressly refutes his interpretation. Sultenfuss cannot have it both ways. If, in searching for a liberty interest, we look to the language that the Board used in drafting the Guidelines, we must look at all of the language, not just portions of it. Taking as a whole all of the rales and regulations promulgated by the Board pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 42-9-40, we must agree with the Board's interpretation that the parole system does not create a liberty interest in parole.