Case Name: PEOPLE v. GALLAGHER
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1979-01-03
Citations: 404 Mich. 429
Docket Number: Docket No. 58506
Parties: PEOPLE v GALLAGHER
Judges: Williams, Coleman, Fitzgerald, Ryan, and Blair Moody, Jr., JJ., concurred.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 404
Pages: 429–448

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v GALLAGHER
Docket No. 58506.
Argued November 1, 1977
(Calendar No. 5).—
Decided January 3, 1979.
Raymond Gallagher, who was in the business of salvaging and rebuilding automobiles, was convicted by a jury in Wayne Circuit Court, George Wicklund, J., of receiving and concealing stolen property, an automobile he was towing from which the vehicle identification number had been removed. The Court of Appeals, McGregor, P.J., and Allen, J. (Bashara, J., concurring specially), affirmed (Docket No. 22006). Gallagher challenges the constitutionality of the statutory "altered serial number” presumption, which provides that a dealer in or collector of personal property who receives property with an altered or obliterated identifying number is presumed to have received the property knowing it to have been stolen. While released from prison on appeal bond in this case, the defendant was incarcerated in the Detroit House of Correction on a sentence in an unrelated state case and in Federal prison for income tax violations. The trial court ordered that he receive credit for the time served on the unrelated state case but denied credit for the time served on the Federal conviction. Defendant appeals. Held:
1. The statutory presumption does not violate the defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination. Under the statute, knowledge that the property is stolen is inferred from evidence that identifying numbers on the property were altered or removed. The effect of the presumption on the defendant’s privilege is like the effect of the introduction of direct evidence which establishes a prima facie case for the people. Introduction of evidence or a statutory presumption which tends to implicate a defendant increases the pressure on him to testify, but that pressure does not violate the privilege against self-incrimination. The Court disapproves a distinction between "state of mind” presumptions and other presumptions for the reasons expressed by the Court of Appeals in its opinion.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1, 2, 4, 12] 66 Am Jur 2d, Receiving and Transporting Stolen Property §§ 9, 25, 26, 28.
[3] 29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence §§ 10, 12.
[5] 5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 811.
[6] 75 Am Jur 2d, Trial §§ 758, 760.
[7] 75 Am Jur 2d, Trial §§ 754, 758, 759, 764.
[8] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 547.
Sentences by different courts as concurrent. 57 ALR2d 1410.
[9] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 545.
[10] 29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence §§ 161, 162.
[11] 29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence §§ 10, 11.
[13, 14] 7 Am Jur 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic § 308.
2. The statutory presumption does not violate the presumption of innocence or the requirement that the defendant be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. These principles do not prohibit the use of statutory rules of evidence which place upon a defendant the burden of going forward with the evidence after the "prima facie evidence” is introduced. The presumption of innocence may be overcome by the additional weight of a countervailing legislative presumption as well as by direct proof alone.
3. There is a rational connection between the proven facts and the fact presumed under the statute. Common experience tells one that a dealer who receives a car with an altered or obliterated identifying number is likely to know that the car was stolen. The presumption thus meets the due process test; it can be said with substantial assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the proven fact.
4. It is reversible error for a judge to instruct that an essential element of the crime exists as a matter of law. The jury should be instructed that it may, but need not, infer the existence of the presumed fact from the proven fact. In this case the judge did not commit reversible error by reading the statute, including the presumption, to the jury because he subsequently instructed the jury at length on the prosecutor’s burden of proof, the presumption of innocence, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. He also instructed the jury that circumstances are never presumed and that the prosecutor must prove every link making up the chain of circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.
5. A sentence may not be imposed to commence at the completion of another sentence in the absence of statutory authority. A defendant who is sentenced in a state court after receiving sentence in a Federal court is subject to the same uncertainty about when the state sentence begins as he is in the case of two or more state sentences. Any difference in the order of sentencing is not controlling where the actual impris onment for the Federal conviction began before the imprisonment on the state conviction. The defendant’s sentence is amended to give credit for time served on the Federal conviction.
Affirmed as modified.
Justice Levin, with whom Chief Justice Kavanagh concurred, would hold that the people have failed to prove that the statutory presumption is constitutional as applied to this defendant.
1. A criminal statutory presumption must be regarded as irrational or arbitrary, and hence unconstitutional, unless it can at least be said with substantial assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made to depend. An appellate court may not simply accept on faith a legislative assertion that proved and presumed facts are related; rather, it must satisfy itself, with facts developed through judicial notice if necessary, of a presumption’s empirical validity. In this case no data was presented in support of the presumption. The inference made under the statute is not rooted in the common law and the rationale for it has not been developed in case law.
2. The statutory presumption applies without differentiation with regard to the nature of the article, whether a fine porcelain, office or sporting equipment, or an automobile. It also applies without regard to whether the article has an identifying number in more than one place and less than all of the identifying numbers have been altered or obliterated. The reasonableness of the presumption may vary depending on the nature of the article and of the "dealer’s business”, the nature of the alteration, and whether there are identifying numbers remaining unaltered. Moreover, there was no alteration or obliteration of an identifying number. Rather, whole sections of the automobile, including one section of which a minute part was an identifying number, had been removed. There were, on other parts of the automobile, identifying numbers that had not been removed or defaced.
3. The presumption applies to dealers or collectors. Just as there are collectors of fine and decorative arts and memorabilia, there are collectors of automobiles. There was no evidence that Gallagher maintained a "collection” of automobiles. Nor was he a dealer, a person who buys property and ordinarily sells it without substantial alteration. Although it is assumed that Gallagher was a dealer and that there was an alteration or obliteration because the applicability of the presumption is not an issue in the appeal, the nature of the defendant’s business of salvaging and rebuilding automobiles must be considered in deciding the reasonableness of the presumption as applied to him.
4. The offense is receiving or concealing stolen property. An element of that offense is knowledge that the property was stolen. The inferences made from the possession of property with altered or obliterated identifying numbers are 1) that the dealer or collector knew that the identifying numbers had been altered or obliterated, and 2) that he knew that the property had been stolen. Another statute provides that one who buys or sells vehicles must be licensed by the Secretary of State, and is required to keep records with descriptions of the goods purchased or sold, including identification numbers, and a statement if the numbers have been obliterated, defaced, or changed. Therefore, at least as to those in the business of buying or selling vehicles, an inference of knowledge that a number was missing (whether or not "altered or obliterated”) is reasonable. But there is no empirical support for the further inference that a person who buys parts or less than the whole of vehicles knows, because of the absence of one or more identifying numbers from or on parts of the vehicle not in his possession, that the parts in his possession were taken from a stolen vehicle. There is no empirical evidence regarding a "dealer” such as the defendant who buys parts or less than the whole of automobiles or wrecked automobiles and rebuilds them, and whether it is reasonable to infer from possession of less than an entire automobile that the parts in his possession are stolen because a part of the automobile’ having an identifying number is missing although i) the parts in his possession have identifying numbers and ii) no identifying numbers have been removed from any of the parts in his possession. The information needed to determine whether this inference is reasonable is not within the specialized competence of the judiciary nor is it known from common experience. Until data is produced which supports the challenged presumption, it cannot be sustained.
68 Mich App 63; 241 NW2d 759 (1976) affirmed as modified.
People v Serra, 55 Mich App 514; 223 NW2d 28 (1974), overruled in part.
Opinion of the Court
1. Receiving Stolen Goods — Knowledge — Presumptions — Altered Serial Number — Self-Incrimination.
The statutory presumption that a dealer in personal property is presumed to know that property received with an altered serial number is stolen does not violate the defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination (US Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 1, § 17; MCL 750.535[2]; MSA 28.803[2]).
2. Receiving Stolen Goods — Knowledge — Presumptions — Altered Serial Number — Presumption of Innocence — Burden of Proof.
The statutory presumption that a dealer in personal property is presumed to know that property received with an altered serial number is stolen does not violate the presumption of innocence or the requirement that the defendant be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
3. Criminal Law — Presumption of Innocence — Proofs — Statutory Presumptions.
The presumption of innocence may be overcome by the additional weight of a countervailing legislative presumption as well as by direct proof alone.
4. Receiving Stolen Goods — Knowledge — Presumptions — Altered Serial Number — Due Process.
The statutory presumption that a dealer in personal property is presumed to know that property received with an altered serial number is stolen does not violate due process requirements because there is a rational connection between the proven facts and the fact presumed; common experience tells one that a dealer who receives a car with altered or obliterated identifying numbers is likely to know that the car was stolen (US Const, Am XIV; Const 1963, art 1, §17; MCL 750.535[2]; MSA 28.803[2]).
5. Criminal Law — Instructions to Jury — Elements of Crime.
It is reversible error for a judge to instruct that an essential element of the crime exists as a matter of law.
6. Criminal Law — Instructions to Jury — Presumption.
A jury should be instructed that it may, but need not, infer the existence of a presumed fact from a proven fact (MRE 302[b]).
7. Receiving Stolen Goods — Knowledge — Presumptions — Altered Serial Number — Instructions to Jury.
Reading to the jury the statute which provides that a dealer in personal property is presumed to know that property received with an altered serial number is stolen does not constitute reversible error where the judge subsequently instructed the jury at length on the prosecutor’s burden of proof, the presumption of innocence, the jury’s duty to acquit if the elements of the offense have not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and that circumstances are never presumed but must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt (MCL 750.535[2]; MSA 28.803[2]).
8. Criminal Law — Concurrent Sentences.
A sentence may not be imposed to commence at the completion of another sentence in the absence of statutory authority.
9. Criminal Law — Concurrent Sentences — Federal Conviction.
A defendant is entitled to credit for time served on a Federal conviction where the actual imprisonment for the Federal conviction began before imprisonment on the state conviction while the defendant was released from prison on bond pending appeal of the state conviction.
Dissenting Opinion by Levin, J.
10. Criminal Law — Presumptions — Due Process.
A criminal statutory presumption must be regarded as irrational or arbitrary, and hence violative of due process, unless it can at least be said with substantial assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made to depend (US Const, Am XTV; Const 1963, art 1, §17).
11. Criminal Law — Presumptions — Due Process — Judicial Notice.
An appellate court, in determining whether a criminal statutory presumption violates the Due Process Clause, may not simply accept on faith a legislative assertion that the proved and presumed facts are related; rather it must satisfy itself, with facts developed through judicial notice if necessary, of a presumption’s empirical validity (US Const, Am XIV; Const 1963, art 1, §17).
12. Receiving Stolen Goods — Knowledge — Presumptions — Altered Serial Number — Due Process.
The reasonableness under the Due Process Clause of the statutory presumption that a dealer in personal property is presumed to know that personal property received with an altered serial number is stolen may vary depending on the nature of the property and of the dealer’s business, and of the alteration, and whether there are identifying numbers remaining unaltered (US Const, Am XIV; Const 1963, art 1, §17; MCL 750.535[2j; MSA 28.803[2j).
13. Receiving Stolen Goods — Knowledge — Presumptions — Altered Serial Number — Automobiles — Due Process.
A statutory inference of knowledge that the manufacturer’s serial number of a vehicle was missing (whether or not altered or obliterated) is reasonable under the Due Process Clause at least as to those in the business of buying or selling vehicles because one who buys or sells vehicles is required by other statutes to be licensed and to keep a recorded description of the vehicles purchased or sold which must include certain statements concerning the identifying numbers of the vehicle (US Const, Am XIV; Const 1963, art 1, §17; MCL 257.248, 257.251, 750.535[2]; MSA 9.1948, 9.1951, 28.803[2]).
14. Receiving Stolen Goods — Knowledge — Presumptions — Altered Serial Number — Due Process.
There is no empirical evidence regarding whether it is reasonable to infer from possession of less than an entire automobile by a dealer who buys parts or less than the whole of automobiles or wrecked automobiles and rebuilds them that the dealer knows, because of the absence of one or more identifying numbers from or on parts of the vehicle not in his possession, that the parts in his possession were taken from a stolen vehicle; until evidence is produced which supports the challenged presumption as applied to such a dealer the presumption cannot be sustained under the Due Process Clause (US Const, Am XIV; Const 1963, art 1, §17; MCL 750.535[2]; MSA 28.803[2]).
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William L. Cahalan, Prosecuting Attorney, Edward Reilly Wilson, Research, Training & Appeals, and Timothy A. Baughman, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Faintuck, Shwedel, Roether, Wolfram, McDonald & Zipser for defendant.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
The defendant challenges the constitutionality of MCLA 750.535; MSA 28.803, on the grounds that it violates the privilege against self-incrimination, the presumption of innocence and due process.
That statute makes receiving or concealing stolen property a crime and provides that:
"Any person being a dealer in or collector of any merchandise or personal property, or the agent, employee or representative of a dealer or collector who fails to make reasonable inquiry that the person selling or delivering any stolen, embezzled, or converted property to him has a legal right to do so or who buys or receives any such property which has a registration, serial, or other identifying number altered or obliterated on any external surface thereof, shall be presumed to have bought or received such property knowing it to have been stolen, embezzled, or converted. This presumption may be rebutted by proof." MCLA 750.535(2); MSA 28.803(2). (Emphasis added.)
The defendant was in the business of salvaging and rebuilding automobiles. He was arrested for receiving or concealing stolen property after police observed that the vehicle identification number had been removed from the late model Cadillac he was towing. The defendant produced no proof of ownership or bill of sale. It was shown at trial that the Cadillac had been stolen approximately two weeks before his arrest. No witnesses were offered by the defense. The defendant was convicted by a jury of receiving or concealing stolen property and sentenced to one to five years imprisonment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. 68 Mich App 63; 241 NW2d 759 (1976).
We agree with the Court of Appeals conclusion that the statute does not violate the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. Under the challenged provision, knowledge that the property was stolen is inferred from evidence that identifying numbers on the property were altered or removed. The situation is like the one in which the prosecutor produces direct evidence establishing a prima facie case. The introduction of any evidence which tends to implicate the defendant increases the pressure on him to testify but this pressure does not violate his privilege against self-incrimination. Barnes v United States, 412 US 837; 93 S Ct 2357; 37 L Ed 2d 380 (1973); People v Kayne, 286 Mich 571; 282 NW 248 (1938); Yee Hem v United States, 268 US 178; 45 S Ct 470; 69 L Ed 904 (1925). We disapprove the distinction drawn in People v Serra, 55 Mich App 514; 223 NW2d 28 (1974), between "state of mind" presumptions and other presumptions for the reasons discussed by the Court of Appeals in this case. 68 Mich App 63, 67-73.
The statutory presumption does not violate the presumption of innocence or the requirement that the defendant be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. These principles do not prohibit the use of statutory rules of evidence which place upon a defendant the burden of going forward with the evidence after the "prima facie evidence" is introduced. People v Kayne, supra, 578-579. The presumption of innocence may be overcome by the additional weight of a countervailing legislative presumption as well as by direct proof alone. Yee Hem v United States, supra, 184-185. The statute in People v Licavoli, 264 Mich 643; 250 NW 520 (1933), made proof of reputation for engaging in an illegal business prima facie evidence of being engaged in an illegal business. Although it was noted in that case that the statute deprived a defendant of the presumption of innocence, the statutory presumption was held to be irrational and arbitrary. People v Licavoli, supra, 645.
Here, there is a rational connection between the proven facts and the fact presumed. Common experience tells one that a dealer who receives a car with altered or obliterated identifying numbers likely knows that the car was stolen. The presumption thus meets the due-process test as stated in Tot v United States, 319 US 463, 467-468; 63 S Ct 1241; 87 L Ed 1519 (1943):
"[A] statutory presumption cannot be sustained if there be no rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, if the inference of the one from proof of the other is arbitrary because of lack of connection between the two in common experience."
As required by Leary v United States, 395 US 6, 36; 89 S Ct 1532; 23 L Ed 2d 57 (1969), it can be said with substantial assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the proven fact. The defendant urges adoption of a test requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt that the presumed fact follows from the proven fact. The United States Supreme Court has not yet addressed this issue and we decline to adopt the suggested standard.
A clearer instruction on the presumption than that provided by a reading of the statute should have been given. By itself, an instruction that one who received stolen property with altered identifying numbers is presumed to have known the property was stolen could lead a jury to conclude that an essential element of the crime had been proven as a matter of law. It is reversible error for a judge to instruct that an essential element of the crime exists as a matter of law. People v Allensworth, 401 Mich 67; 257 NW2d 81 (1977). The jury should be instructed that it may, but need not, infer the existence of the presumed fact from the proven fact. MRE 302(b). Here, the reading of the statute did not constitute reversible error because the judge subsequently instructed the jury at length on the prosecutor's burden of proof, the presumption of innocence and the jury's duty to acquit if the elements of the offense had not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury was also instructed that:
"Circumstances are never presumed. Each thought making up the chain of circumstances must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and if the prosecution fails to prove any one link making up the chain of circumstances, the defendant must not be convicted".
The defendant's final claim is that he is entitled to credit for time served in Federal prison against his sentence in this case. He was sentenced to one to five years imprisonment for the conviction in this case on August 30, 1974 and was released after posting an appeal bond. While his appeal bond was in effect, he served from January 20, 1975 to June 4, 1975 in the Detroit House of Correction on a sentence imposed in an unrelated case and from June 25, 1975 to February 11, 1976 in Federal prison for Federal income tax violations. The defendant moved to amend the mittimus and the judge ordered that the defendant receive credit for time served on the other state conviction but denied credit for time served on the Federal conviction.
The rule in Michigan is that a sentence may not be imposed to commence at the completion of another sentence in the absence of statutory authority. In re Carey, 372 Mich 378; 126 NW2d 727 (1964). In that case, the defendant had been sentenced to 5 years imprisonment for a Federal offense four days before he was sentenced to serve 3 to 14 years on a state conviction. After noting that two state prison terms would run concurrently, it was held that the defendant should receive credit for the time served in Federal prison:
"A defendant who is sentenced in a State court after receiving sentence in a Federal court is subject to the same 'undefined and uncertain contingencies' about when State sentence begins, as he is in the case of 2 or more State sentences. The reason for the rule aptly applies in both types of cases. Therefore, we hold that where a defendant has been sentenced in Federal court, and is subsequently sentenced in a State court or courts, sentence may not be imposed to commence at the completion or expiration of Federal sentence, in the absence of statutory authority." In re Carey, supra, 381.
The people contend that Carey is distinguishable because the sentencing for the Federal offense occurred before the state sentencing. Here, the defendant was sentenced on the Federal offense after the state sentencing.
We do not find these differences in the order of sentencing to be controlling when the actual imprisonment on the Federal conviction began before imprisonment on the state conviction. In such a case, a defendant is subject to the same uncertain contingencies about when the state sentence will begin. The defendant is entitled to credit for time served on the Federal conviction. Pursuant to GCR 1963, 865.1(7), the defendant's sentence is amended to grant him credit for the time served in Federal prison.
The defendant's conviction is affirmed.
Williams, Coleman, Fitzgerald, Ryan, and Blair Moody, Jr., JJ., concurred.