Case Name: MARKS v. STOLTS
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1914-12-31
Citations: 150 N.Y.S. 952
Docket Number: No. 6598
Parties: MARKS v. STOLTS.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 150
Pages: 952–956

Head Matter:
MARKS v. STOLTS.
(No. 6598.)
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
December 31, 1914.)
1. Master and Servant (§ 288 )—Injury to Servant—Assumption oe Risk.
Where a chauffeur knew that the brake on the motor car he was driving was out of order, and that the machine was liable to start of its own motion, the question whether he assumed the risk of injury was for the jury.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 1068-1088; Dec. Dig. § 288.*]
2. Master and Servant (§ 278*)—Injuries to- Servant—Evidence—Suffi- . CIEN CY.
In a personal injury action by a chauffeur, evidence held not to show the master guilty of negligence in furnishing a defective machine.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 954, 956-958, 960-969, 971, 972, 977; Dec. Dig. § 278.*]
3. Master and Servant (§ 234*)—Injuries to Servant—Defenses.
Where an experienced chauffeur voluntarily operates, in a populous city, a machine, the brakes of which he knows are defective, his conduct is such as to estop him, as a matter of law, from recovering from his employer ior injuries resulting from the defect.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Master and Servant, Cent. Dig. §§ 684-686, 706-709; Dec. Dig. § 234.*]
Ingraham, P. J., and Hotchkiss, J., dissenting.
Appeal from Special Term, New York County.
Action by Charles E. Marks against Julius W. Stolts, as president, etc. From a judgment granting defendant’s motion to set aside the verdict, defendant appeals. Affirmed.
Argued before INGRAHAM, P. J., and McLAUGHLIN, LAUGHLIN, DOWLING, and HOTCHKISS, JJ.
Clifford C. Roberts, of New York City, for appellant.
Edward J. Walsh, of New York City, for respondent.
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
McLAUGHLIN, J.
The defendant moved to set the verdict aside upon the exceptions taken during the trial and that it was contrary to evidence. The motion was granted, and the appeal presents the question of whether any of the exceptions would be fatal to the judgment entered upon the verdict, and also whether the verdict is contrary to the evidence.
The court charged the jury:
"That, even though you find that the plaintiff knew of the defective condition of the dog, you cannot find from that fact that he assumed the risk of injury therefrom."
This, I think, was an erroneous instruction as to the law, and the exception thereto was well taken. The question whether the defendant assumed the risk from the defective condition of the brake was for the jury. Larsen v. Lackawanna Steel Co., 146 App. Div. 238, 130 N. Y. Supp. 887; Gorman v. Millikan, 142 App. Div. 207, 126 N. Y. Supp. 864; Milligan v. Clayville Knitting Co., 137 App. Div. 383, 121 N: Y. Supp. 763; Hurley v. Olcott, 134 App. Div. 631, 119 N. Y. Supp. 430, affirmed 198 N. Y. 132, 91 N. E. 270, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 238; Bria v. Westinghouse, Church, Kerr & Co., 133 App. Div. 346, 117 N. Y. Supp. 195.
The plaintiff, according to the testimony of his witness, Zoeller, knew of the defective condition of the brake and that the car was liable to start, as it is claimed it did on the occasion in question, at least two weeks before the accident occurred. Zoeller testified that he saw it start of its own motion and that he called the plaintiff's attention to it. The plaintiff was an experienced chauffeur. He had been engaged for upwards of five years in operating automobiles and for three or four weeks the one in question. If he knew that the brakes were defective, and by reason of that fact the machine liable to start of its own motion, then it was for the jury to say whether, by placing himself in the position which he did immediately prior to the time he was injured, he did not assume that risk. Under such circumstances, as was pointed out by Mr. Justice Miller in Hurley v. Olcott, supra, the assumption of risk had to be submitted to the jury. He said:
"The evidence shows: That the plaintiff was an experienced workman. That he had observed the rope used for the boom line and knew of its being broken, and that the practice of piling the columns one above the other had been continued for some time to his knowledge. It does not appear that he knew that the derrick was out of plumb. However, .a jury might well have found that the plaintiff fully understood and appreciated the dangers of the work as it was prosecuted, and that, by continuing in the service, he assented thereto. But, under the statute, that question had to be submitted to the jury."
In Milligan v. Clayville Knitting Co., supra, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff was reversed because the court had, in effect, withdrawn from the jury the question of assumption of risk. Mr. Justice Spring, who delivered the opinion of the court, said:
"If the risk is an obvious one, plain to be seen by the employe and due to the omission of the employer, the employé has no right to assume that his master has performed his duty and made the place safe. It is obvious that the master has not performed his obligation to the servant and the latter performs Ms work knowing of tMs delinquency. He cannot then, if injury results by reason of tMs apparent, plain omission of Ms employer,' relieve himself from assuming the risks upon the ground that the master did not perform his duty."
The plaintiff not only knew that the brake was out of repair, but he also knew, if the testimony of one of his witnesses is to be believed, that it had not been repaired during the time plaintiff had been operating the machine.
I am also of the opinion that the verdict is against the evidence. Defendant's witness Stolts, one of its officers, testified that a short time before the accident he asked the plaintiff if the brake had been repaired and a new dog put in, and the plaintiff told him that it had; that he put the new dog in himself. Stolts was corroborated by defendant's witnesses McCarthy and Shepard. The plaintiff had been furnished tools with which to make repairs of this kind, and he testified that to put in a new dog would take but a short time. It is improbable thát the plaintiff, with his experience in operating automobiles, would risk his own life, to say nothing of the lives of others, by taking the car out with a defective brake when it could be remedied in a very short time. It is equally incredible that the defendant, with knowledge that the brake was defective, would assume the responsibility of sending the car out when the repairs could have been made at a very slight expense and in a very short time.
There is another reason which it seems to me should be fatal to a recovery in this action. In a populous city like New York, where thousands of people are in the streets at all hours of the day and night, an experienced chauffeur, unless it be under exceptional circumstances, who runs an automobile in the street, knowing that the brake is defective, ought to be estopped, as matter of law, from recovering damages against his employer for injuries occasioned by such defect.
I think the order appealed from should be affirmed, with costs.
LAUGHLIN and DOWLING, JJ" concur.