Case Name: In the Matter of the Probate of the Paper Propounded as the Last Will and Testament of Mary Snelling, Deceased
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1894-05
Citations: 85 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 211
Docket Number: 
Parties: In the Matter of the Probate of the Paper Propounded as the Last Will and Testament of Mary Snelling, Deceased.
Judges: Pratt and Dykman, JJ., concurred.
Reporter: Supreme Court Reports (Hun)
Volume: 85
Pages: 211–213

Head Matter:
In the Matter of the Probate of the Paper Propounded as the Last Will and Testament of Mary Snelling, Deceased.
When the decision of a surrogate admitting a will to probate will not be disturbed on appeal.
■When, in proceedings brought for the probate of a will, the weight of evidence is in favor of the conclusion that when the testatrix executed the will she understood the character of her act and comprehended its consequences, the determination of the surrogate that she was competent to execute the instrument will not be disturbed on appeal.
Appeal by tbe contestants, John H. Lewis and others, from a decree of tbe Surrogate’s Court of tbe county of Suffolk, entered in tbe office of tbe clerk of tbe Suffolk County Surrogate’s Court on the 9th day of October, 1893, admitting to probate the instrument offered as the last will and testament of Mary Snelling, deceased, and also from an order entered in said clerk’s office on the 9th day of October, 1893, denying the contestants’ motion for a new trial made upon the minutes, and also from the facts, exceptions and rulings taken upon the trial.
L. 8. BecJcley, for the contestants, appellants.
Thomas Yovmg, for the proponents, respondents.

Opinion:
Bkown, P. J.:
When this case was before the Court of Appeals on a prior appeal the conclusion of the surrogate that the will was not the product of undue influence, and that the decedent possessed the necessary testamentary capacity to execute it, was not disturbed.
The decree then before the court was reversed for the erroneous admission of improper testimony.
Some new testimony was introduced upon the last hearing, but, after a careful examination of the whole case, I do not think it is changed in any essential feature from that presented on the first appeal. The evidence would not permit the conclusion that Mr. and Mrs. Cook exerted any undue influence upon Mrs. Snelling.
The important question is whether she possessed testamentary capacity.
That her mind was weak and that she was at times insane is clearly shown. But the periods of her insanity were generally of short duration and existed when she was sick. When she recovered from her sickness her mental powers returned and she was capable of taking care of herself and her property.
The will in question was executed on June 24, 1890. For about a year prior to that date she had resided with Mrs. Denton, and her mode of life and her physical and mental condition during that period have been fully described by that witness. During that time she had no sickness requiring the attendance of a physician, and her memory was fairly good, and she attended to and transacted her own business.
She appears to have understood the nature and condition of her property and the disposition which, by will or otherwise, she had made of it. She was, during this time, a near neighbor of Mr. .and Mrs. Cook, and on terms of intimacy with them, and regarded and treated them as her nearest friends.
The weight of evidence is in favor of the conclusion that when she executed the will she understood the nature and character of her act and comprehended its consequences, and the determination of the surrogate that she was competent to execute the instrument cannot be disturbed.
The decree must be affirmed, with costs to be paid by the contestants.
Pratt and Dykman, JJ., concurred.
Decree affirmed, with costs to be paid by contestants.