Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. Leo J. MULLER, Sr.
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1978-05-22
Citations: 365 So. 2d 464
Docket Number: No. 61348
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Leo J. MULLER, Sr.
Judges: DIXON, J., dissents with reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 365
Pages: 464–468

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. Leo J. MULLER, Sr.
No. 61348.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
May 22, 1978.
On Rehearing Sept. 5, 1978.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 5, 1978.
John Wilson Reed, New Orleans, for defendant-relator.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Harry F. Con-nick, Dist. Atty., Louise Korns, Wilton E. Bland, III, Asst. Dist. Attys., for plaintiff-respondent.

Opinion:
SUMMERS, Justice.
Defendant Leo J. Muller, Sr., was charged with obscenity, in that he did indecently and publicly expose his penis in the presence of another person in a location open to public view or the people at large with the intent of arousing sexual desire. In a former review of a bench trial conviction, we remanded the case to the trial judge on a finding that defendant had not knowingly and intelligently waived his right to trial by jury. State v. Muller, 351 So.2d 143 (La.1977). In doing so the Court pretermitted consideration of defendant's motion to quash the bill of information.
In the trial court on remand defendant reurged the motion to quash, alleging that it fails to charge an offense which is punishable under a valid statute. More particularly, the motion states the place of the offense as specified in the bill of particulars, a supermarket, is not a place contemplated by Section 106 of Title 14 of the Revised Statutes. Insofar as it is applicable to this motion to quash, the statute provides:
"A. The crime of obscenity is the intentional:
(1) Exposure of the genitals, pubic hair, anus, vulva or female breast nipples in any location or place open to the view of the public or the people at large such as a street, highway, neutral ground, sidewalk, park, beach, river bank or other place or location viewable therefrom with the intent of arousing sexual desire.
In a memorandum to support defendant's motion to quash it is contended that the inside of an enclosed supermarket is not a place covered by the statute. In reply the State's attorney argues that the supermarket is any location or place open to the view of the public or the people at large. The trial judge denied the motion to quash, and certiorari was granted on defendant's application. 354 So.2d 205. Relying upon the decision in Nelson v. Natchez, 197 Miss. 26, 19 So.2d 747 (1944), this Court in the original opinion in State v. Christine, 239 La. 259, 118 So.2d 403 (1960), rev'd. on rehearing on other grounds, approved this definition of "public place" as the term was used in a city ordinance, making it a crime for any person to profanely swear or curse or use vulgar or indecent language in any public place within the city:
" . . .a public place within the ordinance, and as applied to an enclosure, room or building, must be considered as one wherein, by general invitation, members of the public attend for reasons of business, entertainment, instruction or the like, and are welcome so long as they conform to what is customarily there done . . .An eating house is a public place . . and a restaurant is an eating house under another name. It is within this definition that a church is a public place . . . and so a barber shop."
According to the definition already approved by this Court, a public place is not limited to streets, parks, beaches, etc. It is "any location" which is open to the view of the public to which the statute applies. Surely, within this definition, a supermarket must be considered as a building wherein "by general invitation, members of the public attend for reasons of business . . . and are welcome so long as they conform to what is customarily there done." If that be so, the supermarket is a public place as contemplated by the definition in State v. Christine and in the statute before us.
And a holding that the supermarket is a public place as that phrase is used in the statute is not altered by the illustrative clause "such as a street, highway, neutral ground, sidewalk, park, beach, riverbank or other place or location viewable therefrom." "Such as" has traditionally been used in Louisiana law to set off an illustrative list. Realizing as we do that the Civil Code does not pertain to criminal law, the rule of reason that Article 3556(29) expounds is one which has prevailed here at least since 1825. It reads, "Such as. — These are words employed to give some example of a rule, and are never exclusive of other cases which that rule is made to embrace."
Certainly, as the defense contends, the rule of law announced in Section 3 of Title 14 of the Revised Statutes is that "The articles of this Code cannot be extended by analogy so as to create crimes not provided for [t]herein . . and this Court does not purport to do so by its decision. Instead, we read the whole article in arriving at our conclusion and are guided by this language also,
"in order to promote justice and to effect the objects of the law, all of its [the Code's] provisions shall be given a genuine construction, according to the fair import of their words, taken in their usual sense, in connection with the context, and with reference to the purpose of the provision."
Courts are directed by Section 3 to take a reasonable and common sense view of the evil at which a statute is directed and the protection it is designed to afford; and when these are within the letter of the statute, the enactment is to be construed in accordance with its purpose, although its letter would admit a narrower interpretation. State v. Butler, 331 So.2d 425 (La.1976). The conduct charged here can reasonably be considered as the evil contemplated by the legislature.
For the reasons assigned, the ruling of the trial judge is affirmed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.
DIXON, J., dissents with reasons.
CALOGERO, J., dissents with reasons.
DENNIS, J., dissents for the reasons assigned by DIXON and CALOGERO, JJ.