Case Name: Fabian FRAGOSO-GONZALEZ, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2016-10-04
Citations: 669 F. App'x 458
Docket Number: No. 14-72121
Parties: Fabian FRAGOSO-GONZALEZ, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent.
Judges: Before: TASHIMA, SILVERMAN, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 669
Pages: 458–459

Head Matter:
Fabian FRAGOSO-GONZALEZ, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent.
No. 14-72121
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted September 27, 2016
Filed October 4, 2016
Susan Elizabeth Hill, Hill & Piibe, Immigration Attorneys, Los Angeles, CA, for Petitioner
David J. Schor, Trial Attorney, DOJ— U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, for Respondent
Before: TASHIMA, SILVERMAN, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Fabian Fragoso-Gonzalez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' ("BIA") order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge's ("IJ") order denying his motion to reopen removal proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen. Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 678 (9th Cir. 2011). We deny the petition for review.
The agency did not abuse its discretion in denying Fragoso-Gonzalez's motion to reopen as untimely, where the motion was filed more than 14 years after the IJ's final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Fragoso-Gonzalez failed to establish the due diligence required for equitable tolling of the filing deadline, see Avagyan, 646 F.3d at 679 (equitable tolling is available to an alien who is prevented from timely filing a motion to reopen due to deception, fraud, or error, as long as petitioner exercises due diligence in discovering such circumstances).
Because the timeliness determination is dispositive, we do not address Fragoso-Gonzalez's contention that the BIA used the incorrect legal standard to analyze whether he received ineffective assistance of counsel or was prejudiced.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.