Case Name: Kevin KINDER, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2000-12-08
Citations: 779 So. 2d 512
Docket Number: No. 2D00-764
Parties: Kevin KINDER, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
Judges: ALTENBERND, A.C.J., and BLUE and FULMER, JJ., Concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 779
Pages: 512–516

Head Matter:
Kevin KINDER, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
No. 2D00-764.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Dec. 8, 2000.
Julianne M. Holt, Public Defender, and Stephen J. Stanley, Assistant Public Defender, Tampa, for Petitioner.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Richard L. Polin, Assistant Attorney General, Miami, for Respondent.

Opinion:
ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR REHEARING, REHEARING EN BANC, AND CERTIFICATION
This court has considered the State's motion for rehearing en banc, motion for rehearing, and motion for certification of a question of great public importance together with the response filed by the petitioner Kevin Kinder.
We deny the motions for rehearing which primarily reiterate the arguments presented in the State's response to Kinder's initial petition. We comment, however, on the State's argument that this court's opinion does not address the State's contention that "even absent a timely request for continuance within the initial 30 day period, good cause for a delay can be demonstrated after the expiration of the 30 days." The State asserts that "[i]n the context of the instant case, but for the threatening hurricane, this case would have proceeded in a timely manner, with pre-trial motions, the appointment of counsel, the setting and/or waiving of a trial date, etc. It was an act of God which prevented that from occurring on the scheduled date, and that act of God set in motion the subsequent chain of events." We declined to address this issue in our opinion because the state never sought a continuance either within the initial period or after its expiration. Therefore, the issue was not addressed by the trial court and is not properly before this court.
Moreover the "act of God," accounted for only one of the forty-four days that transpired before Kinder was served with the petition for commitment and appointed counsel. And, the "act of God" cannot be said to have set in motion the subsequent chain of events which consisted of the State's failure to take any action in this case. In fact, the trial court action was not stayed during the proceedings in this court and still the State did not proceed to trial until August 14, 2000, some eleven months after the ex parte probable cause hearing that resulted in Kinder's confinement.
We grant, however, the motion for certification, withdraw the prior opinion filed July 7, 2000, and substitute the attached opinion therefor.