Case Name: Eddy Dean CARR a/k/a Edwin Dean Carr v. The STATE of Texas
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1984-09-19
Citations: 733 S.W.2d 149
Docket Number: No. 337-83
Parties: Eddy Dean CARR a/k/a Edwin Dean Carr v. The STATE of Texas.
Judges: CLINTON, J., concurs in result.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 733
Pages: 149–158

Head Matter:
Eddy Dean CARR a/k/a Edwin Dean Carr v. The STATE of Texas.
No. 337-83.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, En Banc.
Sept. 19, 1984.
On Rehearing June 10, 1987.
Phil Nichols, Stephenville, for appellant.
Dan B. Grissom, Dist. Atty., Stephen-ville, Robert Huttash, State’s Atty., and Alfred Walker, First Asst. State’s Atty., and Cathleen R. Riedel, Asst., Austin, for the State.

Opinion:
OPINION ON STATE'S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
MILLER, Judge.
This is an appeal from a felony conviction for the offense of burglary under V.T. C.A. Penal Code, § 30.02. The punishment, enhanced pursuant to V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 12.42(d), was assessed at confinement in the Texas Department of Corrections for life.
On February 24, 1983, the Eastland Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and ordered the indictment set aside. In an unpublished decision, the Court of Appeals held that the State had failed to comply with the requirements of the Texas Speedy Trial Act, Article 32A.02, V.A.C.C.P. On June 22, 1983, we granted the State's Petition for Discretionary Review to determine whether the Court of Appeals correctly decided the matter. We find that it did and affirm.
The record reflects that on January 24, 1981, a hardware store in Erath County was burglarized and several items were taken. Appellant was arrested in connection with these events on May 4, 1981.
Appellant was initially indicted on May 21, 1981, for the offense of theft under V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 31.03(a) and (b)(1). The State first announced ready on the theft indictment on June 29, 1981. This announcement occurred 56 days after appellant's arrest. The State also announced ready on the theft indictment on two subsequent occasions: November 2, 1981, and January 11, 1982.
On June 2, 1982, appellant was indicted for the offense of burglary under V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 30.02, alleged to have been committed on January 24,1981. The previous indictment for theft was dismissed on the State's motion at some time after the burglary indictment was returned.
Appellant's indictment for burglary occurred 394 days after his arrest on May 4, 1981. On June 28, 1982, the State first announced ready on the burglary indictment, 420 days after appellant's initial arrest.
Article 32A.02, V.A.C.C.P., provides in pertinent part:
"Sec. 1. A court shall grant a motion to set aside an indictment, information, or complaint if the state is not ready for trial within:
(1)120 days of the commencement of a criminal action if the defendant is accused of a felony;"
A threshold determination we must secure is the commencement date of the "criminal action" for the purposes of the Speedy Trial Act. Section 2 of Article 32A.02 directs that, when arrest precedes indictment, the criminal action commences when the defendant is arrested to answer for the same offense or any other offense arising out of the same transaction.
In construing the meaning of "the same transaction" for purposes of the Speedy Trial Act, we held in Kalish v. State, 662 S.W.2d 595 (Tex.Cr.App.1983), that "when a person is . taken into custody by a peace officer, all such chargeable voluntary conduct in which the person was then and there engaged, constituting an offense continuing in nature, arises out of the same transaction."
In the instant case, the offense of theft and the offense of burglary were offenses committed in tandem by the appellant. Under Kalish, both offenses arose out of the same transaction for purposes of the Speedy Trial Act. Therefore under Section 2 of 32A.02, the "criminal action," encompassing both the offense of theft and the offense of burglary, commenced on the May 4, 1981, arrest of the appellant.
We granted the State's Petition for Discretionary Review to determine whether a timely announcement of ready on one indicted offense arising out of a transaction can be carried over to apply to a subsequently indicted different offense arising out of that same transaction. We find that under the facts of this case it does not.
Settled is the question that an indictment or information must be filed in a felony case within 120 days of arrest, unless the State establishes one of the exemptions to the Speedy Trial Act. In Pate v. State, 592 S.W.2d 620 (Tex.Cr.App.1980), we held that the defendant was entitled to relief under the provisions of Article 32A.02 when no indictment or information was filed until 165 days after the commencement date and the State failed to demonstrate why it was not ready within any of the exceptions to the Speedy Trial Act. Similarly, in Buford v. State, 657 S.W.2d 107 (Tex.Cr.App.1983), the indictment was dismissed under the Speedy Trial Act when 144 days elapsed between arrest and indictment and no exception to the Speedy Trial Act was shown by the State.
The Speedy Trial Act, however, does not require that the State be ready with a perfect indictment or information. In Ward v. State, 659 S.W.2d 643 (Tex.Cr. App.1983), the initial misdemeanor information was defective because the supporting affidavit was not signed. A second information alleging the same offense was filed outside the time limits of Article 32A.02. Nevertheless, we held that the State's announcement of ready on the defective information was an effective claim of the State's preparedness under the Speedy Trial Act. As Judge Campbell reasoned, "the distinction between an announcement of ready on no indictment or information and an announcement of ready on a defective indictment or information [is] of paramount significance." Id. at 646.
Also instructive in this area are cases which focus on the scope of a defendant's waiver of speedy trial, rather than the scope of the State's announcement of ready.
In Paris v. State, 668 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. Cr.App.1984), the defendant filed waivers of speedy trial under a felony information for aggravated robbery. An indictment alleging the same offense was filed outside the time limits of the Speedy Trial Act. We held that since the two charging instruments alleged the same offense, the defendant's earlier waiver of speedy trial transferred to the subsequent indictment.
Likewise in Rosebury v. State, 659 S.W.2d 655 (Tex.Cr.App.1983), the defendant waived his right to speedy trial under indictments which alleged possession of tet-rahydrocannabinol (THC). Subsequent to those waivers, the prosecution learned from the State's chemist that the controlled substance in question was marihuana, not THC. Thereafter, the defendant was indicted for possiession of marihuana. Even though the indictment for possession of marihuana was filed outside the time limits of Article 32A.02, we held in Rosebury that the defendant's previous waiver of his rights under the Speedy Trial Act applied to the marihuana indictment. We noted that the facts revealed that only a single offense had been committed. Only a single substance was possessed, and only a single offense was alleged, although at first erroneously pleaded.
Significantly in Rosebury, we observed that had the defendant in that case possessed both THC and marihuana, a different issue would be presented. Id. at 657. That "different issue" is presented in this case.
In resolving an issue parallel to the issue before this Court today, the Dallas Court of Appeals in Richardson v. State, 629 S.W.2d 164 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1982, pet. ref'd), held that the State's announcement of ready under one indictment does not carry forward to an indictment alleging a different offense.
As here, the two offenses in Richardson were theft and burglary. Although the State timely announced ready under the theft indictment, the burglary indictment was not even returned until 512 days after the commencement of the criminal action. In rejecting the State's argument that the burglary indictment was simply a "reindictment" of the earlier theft charge and the announcement of ready should be carried forward to the burglary indictment, the Court of Appeals reasoned:
"Although both [cases] have the same complaining witness, they are different offenses subject to different proof, and therefore are not the 'same case' even though they are from the same transaction. Consequently, the announcement of ready in one case will not apply to the other case.
Accord, Turner v. State, 646 S.W.2d 485 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 662 S.W.2d 357 (Tex.Cr. App.1984); Wilson v. State, 633 S.W.2d 952 (Tex.App. — El Paso 1982).
Richardson makes a valid point. There is a distinction between successive indictments for the same offense and a subsequent indictment for a different offense. As we held in Ward, Paris, and Rosebury, supra, when the latter indictment alleges the same offense, or where the facts show that only a single offense has been committed, the State's announcement of ready on the earlier indictment, or the defendant's waiver of speedy trial on the earlier indictment, will be effective. Conversely, when the subsequent indictment alleges a primary offense that is different from the one alleged in the earlier charging instrument, and the facts show that both offenses were in fact committed in one transaction, we hold that the State's timely announcement of ready on one offense does not constitute an announcement of ready on the second, different offense arising out of the same transaction.
This holding comports with the purposes of Article 32A.02. As noted earlier, when arrest precedes indictment, the commencement of the criminal action occurs on the date of arrest and encompasses all the chargeable offenses which arise out of the same transaction. See Art. 32A.02, § 2, and Kalish, supra. The prescribed periods of time in § 1 of Article 32A.02 may not be elongated by stringing out successive "reindictments" for the various offenses committed in that transaction far beyond the limitations imposed. See Rosebury, supra, at 659 (J. Clinton, concurring). To hold otherwise would be to defeat the purpose of the Act, and radically misapply its stringent requirements. If the State's contention were upheld in this case, the only bar to prosecution on the later indicted offense would be the Constitution or the statute of limitations. We hold that this was not the legislative mandate contained in the Speedy Trial Act.
We conclude, under the circumstances of the instant case, that appellant is entitled to relief under the provisions of Article 32A.02, Y.A.C.C.P. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed; and the judgment of the trial court is reversed, the indictment is ordered dismissed, and the appellant is discharged under the terms of the Speedy Trial Act. Art. 28.061, V.A.C. C.P.
CLINTON, J., concurs in result.
. Article 32A.02, § 2, V.A.C.C.P., provides in pertinent part:
"(a) . a criminal action commences for purposes of this article when an indictment, information, or complaint against the defendant is filed in court, unless prior to the filing the defendant is either detained in custody or released on bail or personal bond to answer for the same offense or any other offense arising out of the same transaction, in which event the criminal action commences when he is arrested."
(All emphasis throughout is supplied by the author of this opinion unless otherwise indicated.)
. Nothing in the Speedy Trial Act authorized carrying forward a prima facie showing of readiness from one indictment dismissed on the State's motion to a second indictment alleging a different offense.
. We note with approval Judge Clinton's observation that terminology such as "case" is alien to the Act. See, Turner v. State, 662 S.W.2d 357, 360 n, 6 (Tex.Cr.App.1984) (J. Clinton, dissenting); Rosebury v. State, 659 S.W.2d 655, 658-59 (Tex.Cr.App. 1983) (J. Clinton, concurring).