Case Name: PEOPLE v. DUNN
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1994-08-26
Citations: 446 Mich. 409
Docket Number: Docket No. 93832
Parties: PEOPLE v DUNN
Judges: . Cavanagh, C.J., and Brickley and Mallett, JJ., concurred with Levin, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 446
Pages: 409–434

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v DUNN
Docket No. 93832.
Argued December 1, 1993
(Calendar No. 3).
Decided August 26, 1994.
Alex F. Dunn was convicted by a jury in the Washtenaw Circuit Court, Edward D. Deake, J., of possession with intent to deliver 225 to 650 grams of cocaine. He subsequently pleaded guilty of being an habitual offender, second offense. During trial, detectives were permitted to testify regarding inculpatory statements made by the defendant during plea bargaining, and the prosecutor emphasized the statements during closing argument. In addition, the defendant appeared in the courtroom in leg irons. The Court of Appeals, Reilly, P.J., and Mackenzie and Weaver, JJ., affirmed in an unpublished opinion per curiam, concluding that although the defendant had a subjective expectation of negotiating a plea at the time he spoke with the detectives, his expectation was reasonable, given the totality of the objective circumstances, and, thus, admission of the statements violated MRE 410, reversal was not required because the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (Docket No. 116674). The defendant appeals.
In an opinion by Justice Levin, joined by Chief Justice Cavanagh, and Justices Brickley and Mallett, the Supreme Court held:
1. On de novo review of the whole record, admission of the testimony of the detectives concerning statements made by the defendant in connection with his offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense was error, and the error was not harmless. The defendant had a subjective expectation of negotiating a plea at the time of the discussion, and his expectation was reasonable given the totality of the objective circumstances.
2. A court may order shackling of a defendant during trial only on a finding supported by record evidence that shackling is necessary to prevent escape, injury to persons in the courtroom, or to maintain order. On retrial, the defendant is not to be shackled absent such a finding so supported.
Reversed and remanded.
Justice Riley, joined by Justices Boyle and Griffin, dissenting, stated that the defendant’s statements to law enforcement officers were not part of a plea negotiation and should have been admitted, making remand unwarranted.
To determine whether admissions occurred during plea discussions; the trial court must determine whether the accused exhibited an actual subjective expectation to negotiate a plea at the time of discussion, and whether the expectation was reasonable given the totality of the objective circumstances. Statements made during requests to arrange plea agreements are admissible, as are incriminatory statements offered by a defendant after forewarnings by law enforcement officials that they lacked authority to complete a plea bargain.
In this case, the officers informed the defendant of his Miranda rights and explained that they were incapable of guaranteeing a plea agreement because any agreement would have to be negotiated and approved by the prosecuting attorney. The defendant’s purported belief that he had entered bona fide plea negotiations or that the statements made to law enforcement officials would not be used against him is unreasonable. When he agreed to provide the information, he bore the risk that a plea agreement would not be reached.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Brian L. Mackie, Prosecuting Attorney, and Marilyn A. Eisenbraun and David A. King, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for the people.
State Appellate Defender (by Ronald E. Stein-berg) for the defendant.

Opinion:
Levin, J.
Alex Ferman Dunn was convicted of possession with intent to deliver 225 to 650 grams of cocaine. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
A
We granted leave to appeal to consider:_
• whether the admission at trial of Dunn's statements to police in connection with an attempt to negotiate a plea bargain was harmless error, and
• whether his appearance in the courtroom in leg irons deprived him of a fair trial.
We reverse because we find that the admission of Dunn's statements was error, and that the error was not harmless.
B
While Dunn's legs were shackled, the record does not show that any member of the jury saw or could see the leg irons, and, therefore, the record does not provide a basis for a finding that the use of leg irons deprived Dunn of a fair trial.
A court may order shackling of a defendant only on a finding supported by record evidence that shackling is necessary to prevent escape, injury to persons in the courtroom, or to maintain order. Dunn shall not be shackled on retrial, absent such a finding so supported.
i
The principal factual issue was whether it was Dunn who possessed the cocaine, or it was Lori Stegall or Michael Cranston, or possibly some other person, who possessed thé cocaine.
The people's evidence tended to show that Dunn appeared, at about midnight, in August. 1988 at the door of Stegall's apartment and was admitted. Also present was her boyfriend, Cranston. Stegall expressed a desire to use cocaine. She said that Dunn offered to obtain cocaine, and returned about half an hour later carrying a garbage bag containing a large amount of cocaine. Stegall and Cranston claimed that the large quantity frightened Stegall.
A relatively small quantity, less than fifty grams, was transferred from the larger quantity by Cranston, Stegall, or Dunn into a small baggie that Stegall testified she gave to Cranston. Stegall gave Dunn a brown paper bag in which to store the larger quantity of cocaine, and supplied him with a syringe, a belt, and a spoon to administer the drug.
With Dunn's assistance, Stegall injected herself with liquified cocaine. Dunn injected himself, and experienced a violent drug reaction. His eyes were bulging, he was shaking, freezing, jumping, swinging at things that were not there, and running around the house.
Cranston and Stegall claimed that they left the apartment with her children and telephoned the police from a neighbor's home.
When the police arrived, they were given permission to search Stegall's apartment. They seized the small baggie containing cocaine, but did not observe the larger bag of cocaine that was left, so Stegall or Cranston testified, in the middle of the bedroom floor. Stegall alerted the police to the bag of cocaine, whereupon they seized the bag. Fingerprints and a partial palm print on the large bag and the baggie could not be identified as belonging to Dunn, Stegall, or Cranston.
Dunn was arrested outside the apartment. A police officer testified that he was shaking, sweating, and barely able to stand. En route to the police station, Dunn said "the stuff was mine, that they didn't have anything to do with it." Dunn identified "they" as Stegall and Cranston. Dunn added that "he didn't want to get them in trouble, that they had nothing to do with it." Another officer testified that he stayed with Dunn for a number of hours in the emergency room, and that Dunn spontaneously asked "where is my cocaine[?]" Dunn did not, however, specify whether the "stuff " or "my cocaine" was the cocaine in the baggie or the cocaine in the larger bag or both.
n
Dunn initiated communication with the police several days after his arrest' in an effort to work out a plea bargain. The police indicated that they could not talk to the prosecutor about a plea bargain until they knew "what information he had."
Dunn said that he had been hired by a drug dealer in Florida to bring cocaine into this country from South America, that he obtained the drugs, that the drug dealer was still waiting for him to deliver the cocaine, and that he was willing to help police set up a delivery in exchange for a plea bargain that would permit him to plead guilty of possession of under fifty grams of cocaine.
Dunn was allowed to telephone the dealer in Florida, with police recording the telephone call. The police then believed that there might be some substance to what Dunn was saying, and told him they would communicate with the prosecutor. Dunn was unable to arrange a meeting with the Florida dealer, the negotiations for a plea bargain ended, and he was prosecuted for possession with intent to deliver 225 to 650 grams of cocaine.
Following a pretrial hearing, the circuit court ruled that Dunn's statements could be admitted in evidence. The police officers testified regarding the statements during the trial. The prosecutor emphasized Dunn's inculpatory statements during his closing argument.
III
The Court of Appeals held that Dunn's statements were made in connection with an offer to plead guilty, and that their admission into evidence was violative of MRE 410.
A
The Court of Appeals relied on its decision in People v Oliver, 111 Mich App 734; 314 NW2d 740 (1981), which in turn relied on United States v Robertson, 582 F2d 1356, 1366 (CA 5, 1978), in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, construed FRE 410, on which MRE 410 is based, and said:
The trial court must apply a two-tiered analysis and determine, first, whether the accused exhibited an actual subjective expectation to negotiate a plea at the time of the discussion, and, second, whether the accused's expectation was reasonable given the totality of the objective circumstances.
We conclude, in agreement with the Court of Appeals, that Dunn had a subjective expectation to negotiate a plea at the time of the discussion, and that his expectation was reasonable given the totality of the objective circumstances. Shortly after his arrest, Dunn initiated communication with the detectives for the express purpose of negotiating a plea bargain with the prosecutor. The detectives encouraged him to talk so they could discuss the possibility of a plea with the prosecutor. With the information supplied by Dunn, the detectives went to the prosecutor and obtained a warrant for the second phone call.
B
Effective October 1, 1991, the rule was amended to provide that evidence of a statement made during plea discussions is not admissible against a defendant who was a participant in the plea discussions if the statement was "made in the course of plea discussions with an attorney for the prosecuting authority which do not result in a plea of guilty or which result in a plea of guilty later withdrawn." (Emphasis added.)
Dunn was convicted in 1989 before the amendment of MRE 410. The question whether the amendment should be retroactive has not been briefed or argued. We intimate no opinion respecting the admissibility at the retrial of the detectives' testimony concerning Dunn's statements during the plea discussions.
iv
We turn to consideration of whether the error in admitting in evidence the testimony of the detectives concerning statements made by Dunn in connection with his offer to plead guilty of a lesser offense was harmless. We conclude, on de novo review of the whole record, that the error in admitting in evidence the testimony of the detectives concerning statements made by Dunn in connection with his offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense was not harmless.
A
Dunn did not testify. Nothing contradicts the testimony of one of the officers that Dunn spontaneously asked, while in the emergency room, "where is my cocaine[?]" or of another officer who testified that, en route to the police station, Dunn said, in effect, that Stegall and Cranston "didn't have anything to do with [the stuff"] that the "stuff" was his, and that he "didn't want to get them in trouble [because] they had nothing to do with it." (Emphasis supplied.)
The testimony erroneously admitted, that Dunn had stated that he obtained the cocaine "from a location in Equador [sic] which is located in South America," and that he flew into Miami from out of the country back into the United States, was supposed to deliver the cocaine to someone else, but did not, portrayed Dunn as part of the South American drug trade, rather than simply as a person who might have known where in the Ypsilanti area to obtain drugs on short notice in the middle of the night. The inadmissible testimony concerning Dunn's admissions during plea bargaining thus cannot be characterized as merely cumulative of the testimony concerning his admissions at the hospital and en route to the police station.
B
Dunn's lawyer theorized and argued that Dunn went to the apartment to purchase the little baggie of cocaine found by the police, and that that was the cocaine to which he was referring when he said, "where's my cocaine[?]"
Dunn's statements referring to "stuff" and "it" did not specify a particular quantity of cocaine. But for the erroneous admission of Dunn's confession that he had imported the cocaine from Ecuador, the jurors could have reasonably concluded, giving Dunn the benefit of a reasonable doubt — as they were required to do — that Dunn's statements in the hospital and en route to the police station, might have referred to the cocaine in the baggie rather than the larger quantity.
While Stegall and Cranston's testimony identifying Dunn as the owner of the cocaine would, if believed by the jury, be sufficient to support his conviction, the jury might very well have refused to believe their testimony standing alone. Both had an obvious self-interest in exculpating themselves from responsibility for the cocaine found in the apartment that Stegall and Cranston shared.
While Stegall and Cranston called the police, they gave bogus reasons for having done so. Dunn had overdosed on cocaine, and was going berserk in their apartment. The noise he was making, banging on the walls, and his appearance might have drawn the police to the apartment, even if Stegall and Cranston had not telephoned the police. Stegall and Cranston contradicted each other in a number of areas, conceded they had lied, and the jury might have disbelieved their testimony, attributing possession of the larger quantity and not just the cocaine in the baggie to Dunn, absent the inadmissible evidence.
c
In deciding if there was a reasonable doubt whether Dunn's statements referred to the cocaine in the baggie or the cocaine in the larger bag, the jury might, absent the inadmissible evidence that he had imported the cocaine from Ecuador, have taken into consideration that Dunn was delusional —green heads popping out of the ground to kill him — when he made the admissions in the hospital and en route to the police station that did not specify, as did the confessional statement that he had imported the cocaine from Ecuador, a particular quantity.
The prosecutor, in responding to Dunn's lawyer's argument that Dunn went over to the Ste-gall-Cranston apartment to buy cocaine, observed that, in contrast with the statements in the hospital and en route to the police station, the confessional statement that Dunn had imported the cocaine from Ecuador was made "at the jail when he wasn't talking about green heads, when he wasn't under the affects of the drug, when he knew full well what he was doing."
Absent the inadmissible evidence that Dunn had imported the cocaine from Ecuador, the jury might have taken into consideration, in deciding whether it was Stegall or Cranston, rather than Dunn, who possessed the larger quantity, that the police did not observe the larger quantity in the bag that Stegall said was in the middle of the bedroom floor and found it only after Stegall alerted them to their oversight. The jury could reasonably have concluded that if the police did not see the bag containing the larger quantity on their first sweep through the bedroom, Dunn may not have seen it, and indeed only Stegall and Cranston were aware of the larger bag, and thus that Dunn was referencing the baggie rather than the larger bag of cocaine when he spoke of "stuff" and "it" to the police, and given Dunn the benefit of the doubt on the central question whether he possessed as much as 225 to 650 grams of cocaine.
D
The prosecutor, having relied on the greater reliability of Dunn's confessional statement concerning the importation of the larger quantity from Ecuador, can hardly be heard to contend that, absent the inadmissible evidence, the jurors might not have concluded that there was a reasonable doubt whether it was Dunn who possessed the larger quantity, or whether it was Stegall or Cranston — who had prevaricated in a number of areas —who possessed the larger quantity of cocaine, and concluded that they could only decide beyond a reasonable doubt that Dunn possessed a smaller quantity, the quantity in the baggie.
The prosecutor emphasized the difference between the statements made to the officers in the hospital and en route to the police station and the statements made during plea bargaining, stating that "you can't get a much better admission from the Defendant that the cocaine was his" than the statements made in the hospital and en route to the police station, "except that we do have a better admission that the cocaine was his" (emphasis added), and then referred to the statements made by Dunn during the plea discussions about importation of the cocaine, and that he had brought the cocaine in the suitcase to Ms. Stegall's house— statements that clearly acknowledge that it was he who possessed the larger quantity.
In Arizona v Fulminante, 499 US 279; 111 S Ct 1246; 113 L Ed 2d 302 (1991), a majority of the United States Supreme Court, in opinions by Justices White and Kennedy, expressed the view that a full-confessional statement ordinarily is not harmless, and was not harmless under the circumstances:
A confession is like no other evidence. Indeed, "the defendant's own confession is probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted against him. . . . [T]he admissions of a defendant come from the actor himself, the most knowledgeable and unimpeachable source of information about his past conduct. Certainly, confessions have profound impact on the jury, so much so that we may justiñably doubt its ability to put them out of mind even if told to do so. " Bruton v United States, 391 US [123, 139-140; 88 S Ct 1620; 20 L Ed 2d 476 (1968)] (White, J., dissenting). See also Cruz v New York, 481 US [186, 195; 107 S Ct 1714; 95 L Ed 2d 162 (1987)] (White, J., dissenting) (citing Bruton). While some statements by a defendant may concern isolated aspects of the crime or may be incriminating only when linked to other evidence, a full confession in which the defendant discloses the motive for and means of the crime may tempt the jury to rely upon that evidence alone in reaching its decision. In the case of a coerced confession such as that given by Fulminante to Sarivola, the risk that the confession is unreliable, coupled with the profound impact that the confession has upon the jury, requires a reviewing court to exercise extreme caution before determining that the admission of the confession at trial was harmless. [Emphasis added.][ ]
[T]he court conducting a harmless-error inquiry must appreciate the indelible impact a full confession may have on the trier of fact, as distinguished, for instance, from the impact of an isolated statement that incriminates the defendant only when connected with other evidence. If the jury believes that a defendant has admitted the crime, it doubtless will be tempted to rest its decision on that evidence alone, without careful consideration of the other evidence in the case. [Emphasis added.][ ]
Often, as here, when the defendant confesses, there can be little doubt concerning his guilt. In light of Dunn's statements to the police officers during the plea discussions, there can be little or no doubt that he, rather than Stegall and Cranston, possessed the larger quantity of cocaine.
The jury, absent the inadmissible testimony that Dunn had imported the larger quantity from Ecuador, might have decided that Dunn should not be convicted on the basis of Stegall or Cranston's testimony because of their self-interest, conflicting stories, and admissions that they had lied, and declined to convict Dunn of possession of 225 to 650 grams with intent to deliver.
v
Dunn's lawyer moved that he not be required to wear leg irons in the courtroom. The court denied the motion, indicating that because of the physical arrangement of the courtroom, the shackles should not be visible to the jury. If Dunn were to testify— he did not — the leg irons would be removed before he took the witness stand. Dunn's lawyer claimed at one point that a juror saw Dunn wearing the shackles while outside the courtroom.
The record does not show, however, that any member of the jury saw or could see the leg irons, and, therefore, the record does not provide a basis for a finding that the use of leg irons deprived Dunn of a fair trial.
The rule is well-established in this and other jurisdictions that a defendant may be shackled only on a finding supported by record evidence that this is necessary to prevent escape, injury to persons in the courtroom or to maintain order. In People v Duplissey, 380 Mich 100, 103; 155 NW2d 850 (1968), this Court quoted with approval the following statement of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit:
"Freedom from shackling and manacling of a defendant during the trial of a criminal case has long been recognized as an important component of a fair and impartial trial. 14 Am Jur, Criminal Law, § 132. Ordinarily such procedure should be permitted only to prevent the escape of the prisoner or to prevent him from injuring bystanders and officers of the court or to maintain a quiet and peaceable trial." [Quoting Odell v Hudspeth, 189 F2d 300, 302 (CA 10, 1951)[ ]
The American Bar Association Standards of Criminal Justice provide that a defendant in a criminal case should not be subjected to physical restraint while in court unless the judge, for reasons entered on the record, finds such restraint "reasonably necessary to maintain order."
The record contains no evidence that would support an order requiring that Dunn wear leg irons or otherwise be physically restrained after he entered the courtroom. On the retrial, he shall not be required to wear leg irons or otherwise be physically restrained in the courtroom absent a finding supported by record evidence that would justify such restraint.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
. Cavanagh, C.J., and Brickley and Mallett, JJ., concurred with Levin, J.
MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(ii); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(ii). He pleaded guilty of being an habitual offender, second offense, MCL 769.10; MSA 28.1082, and was sentenced to serve fifteen to forty-five years.
Unpublished per curiam opinion, issued April 14, 1992 (Docket No. 116674).
443 Mich 852 (1993).
See part v, n 26, and the accompanying text.
See People v Duplissey, 380 Mich 100, 103; 155 NW2d 850 (1968), and authorities discussed in part v, n 26, and the accompanying text.
Dunn was originally charged with possession of less than fifty grams.
Stegall testified that he began banging on walls, swinging his arms, screaming, and running through the apartment trying to grab Stegall's throat.
Cranston testified that Dunn immediately overdosed, grunting, shaking, and swinging wildly at imaginary objects.
They provided the police a bogus story about an unknown person breaking into their house and chasing them with a cocaine syringe. A second phone call was made to the police indicating that shots were heard.
An officer testified that Dunn made those statements both before and after his eyes rolled back in his head.
Interspersed with this question were a number of incomprehensible statements in the emergency room attributable to his drug overdose, such as little green heads popping out of the ground to kill him.
An officer testified:
We then transported him back to the Ypsilanti Police station and he did make a call, which I recorded on a tape recorder and did speak with a subject in Florida that at least implied that that person was the one he was suppost [sic] to deliver the cocaine to.
A warrant was obtained to record a second phone call to Florida. Dunn placed a second call, but the alleged seller could no longer be reached.
See ns 19 and 20 and the accompanying text.
When Dunn made his statements to the police, MRE 410 read as follows:
Inadmissibility of Pleas, Offers of Pleas, and Related Statements.
Except as otherwise provided in this rule, evidence of a plea of guilty, later withdrawn, or a plea of nolo contendere, or of an offer to plead guilty or nolo contendere to the crime charged or any other crime, or of statements made in connection with any of the foregoing pleas or offers, is not admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding against the person who made the plea or offer. However, evidence of a statement made in connection with, and relevant to, a plea of guilty, later withdrawn, a plea of nolo contendere, or an offer to plead guilty or nolo contendere to the crime charged or any other crime, is admissible in a criminal proceeding for perjury or false statement.
A note accompanying the rule states:
MRE 410 is identical with Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and Rule 11(e)(6) of the. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure except that the concluding phrase "if the statement was made by the defendant under oath, on the record, and in the presence of counsel" is omitted from MRE 410.
MRE 410 was substantially amended effective October 1, 1991. See n 16, and the accompanying text.
The Court of Appeals said:
Defendant obviously had a subjective expectation that a plea might be negotiated. This is evident from his statements to the police officer — particularly when defendant informed the officer immediately that he wanted to make a deal.
Since the defendant exhibited an actual subjective expectation to negotiate a plea at the time of the discussion, the question is whether this expectation was reasonable given the totality of the objective circumstances. Oliver, supra. We conclude that it was. The police officer had told defendant that he could not negotiate a deal with defendant. However, the officer also told defendant he needed more information from defendant to go to the prosecutor. The officers were aware that defendant wanted a deal, and they encouraged him to talk even knowing he would not do so unless promised a deal.
MRE 410 was substantially rewritten by the amendment effective October 1, 1991, and there are changes other than those adverted to in n 14. Readers are cautioned to consult a current version of the rule.
Police officers are interested witnesses. They are engaged in, what Justice Jackson described as "the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." Johnson v United States, 333 US 10, 14; 68 S Ct 367; 92 L Ed 436 (1948).
If the officers' testimony had been contradicted, that alone, because of their interest, might have been sufficient to preclude a finding that the error in admitting the testimony regarding the admissions made during plea bargaining was harmless.
Okay, where is my cocaine, the little bag of cocaine that Alex Dunn went there to purchase remained at the scene, and that's where his cocaine was. The big bag of cocaine, the one that Lori Stegall says is in this big paper bag in the middle of the floor, the cops couldn't miss it, nonsense. She handed it over to the cops while the officers were searching. The officers saying no, no, we didn't see it, we were, you know, Lori Stegall is running scared on this case.
She's got this bag, I don't know where it came from; I don't even want to know where it came from; but take this, get rid of it. Absolutely everything Lori Stegall said is so far from the truth that a reasonable juror probably couldn't believe even that her name is Lori Stegall.
Mike Cranston, well, only minorly more credible. Still he lied up and down to you folks. Beyond that, what other evidence is there to link Alex Dunn to these drugs? The statement of these officers that Alex said that was my dope. Well, if you believe that, then again I can see that you'll probably find him guilty of one of these offenses.
While Stegall admitted providing Cranston with the baggie, she denied that she wanted a sample of the cocaine, and testified that she did not know why she gave the baggie to Cranston.
The palm print on the baggie did not belong to Dunn, Stegall, or Cranston. Dunn's lawyer argued to the jury that a fourth person might have been involved.
The prosecutor responded that it was ludicrous to suggest that Dunn went over to buy cocaine from Stegall, and that she would have turned over $40,000 worth of drugs to the police. But she did just that, whether it was her cocaine, Cranston's cocaine, or Dunn's cocaine. The prosecutor then said that her statements were supported by Dunn's statements during the plea discussions:
[And] by this man himself, not just in the police car, not just at the hospital, but at the jail when he wasn't talking about green heads, when he wasn't under the affects of the drug, when he knew full well what he was doing.
He told Detective Lewis, he told Detective Sergeant Hall, the drugs are mine; I brought them into the country. There is no other reasonable conclusion. To suggest that Lori Stegall is the owner of the drugs is unreasonable. It doesn't make common sense.
The only reasonable conclusion is that the drugs belonged to Alex Dunn, and that he intended to deliver them, and I ask you to return a verdict of guilty. [Emphasis added.]
The prosecutor referred to Dunn's statement to the officers acknowledging that it was his "stuff," argued that he must have been referring to "the drugs," and argued further that that was "the only thing that he brought over [to the apartment] according to the testimony of Ms. Stegall and Mr. Cranston," testimony that the jury, for reasons already alluded to, might have chosen to disbelieve. He then referred to the statement in the hospital "where's my cocaine[?]" and said:
You can't really get any more explicit than that; you can't get a much better admission from the Defendant that the cocaine was his, except that we do have a better admission that the cocaine was his, and that admission came to Detective Lewis and Detective Sergeant Hall.
The day after the Defendant was arrested, they went to the Washtenaw County Jail at his request to talk to him, and they advised him of his rights, and he told them at that time that the cocaine was brought into the country by him in a suitcase, and that he had brought it over to Ms. Stegall's house that day, and shared it with him.
So we have three statements from the Defendant two of which carry the very clear implication that the cocaine was his.
The third one is about as explicit as you can get, that the Defendant admitted not only that the cocaine was his, but he had actually brought it to the country from Ecuador. Clearly the Defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed the cocaine that he brought to Lori Stegall's house that day. [Emphasis added.]
Id., p 296 (White, J., with Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens, JJ., concurring).
Id., p 313 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
Dunn was originally charged with possession of less than fifty grams. He was bound over on a charge of possession of 225 to 650 grams with intent to deliver.
The jury was instructed that he could be convicted of possession of 225 to 650 grams with intent to deliver, or simply with possession of 225 to 650 grams. The jury was not instructed on the lesser offense of possession of less than fifty grams of cocaine. While Dunn's lawyer argued (see ns 18 ff) that Dunn may have possessed the cocaine in the baggie, but not the cocaine in the larger bag, he did not inexplicably request an instruction on the lesser offense of possession of less than fifty grams of cocaine. But for that failure, the jury might have convicted him, on the basis of the police officers' testimony, uncontradicted by Dunn, of the lesser offense of possession of less than fifty grams of cocaine.
See State v McMurtrey, 136 Ariz 93, 98; 664 P2d 637 (1983). State v Scott, 323 NW2d 790, 792 (Minn, 1982).
In an oft-quoted statement, the Supreme Court of Colorado stated in Eaddy v People, 115 Colo 488, 492; 174 P2d 717 (1946), that "[t]he presumption of innocence requires the garb of innocence . . . ."
The Supreme Court of California said in People v Duran, 16 Cal 3d 282, 290-291; 127 Cal Rptr 618; 545 P2d 1322 (1976):
We reaffirm the rule that a defendant cannot be subjected to physical restraints of any kind in the courtroom while in the jury's presence, unless there is a showing of a manifest need for such restraints.
Restraints have been viewed historically as' an extreme measure to be used only when necessary to prevent injury to those in the courtroom, to prevent disorderly conduct at trial, or to prevent an escape. [State v Hartzog, 96 Wash 2d 383, 398; 635 P2d 694 (1981).]
The courts of other jurisdictions have long recognized the substantial danger of destruction in the minds of the jury of the presumption of innocence where the accused is required to wear prison garb, is handcuffed or otherwise shackled. [Hickson v State, 472 So 2d 379, 383 (Miss, 1985).]
Similarly, see Anthony v State, 521 P2d 486, 496 (Alas, 1974); State v Thompson, 832 SW2d 577, 580 (Tenn Crim App, 1991); State v Billups, 368 SE2d 723, 725 (W Va, 1988); Woodards v Cardwell, 430 F2d 978, 982 (CA 6, 1970); Kennedy v Cardwell, 487 F2d 101, 104 (CA 6, 1973); Spain v Rushen, 883 F2d 712, 728 (CA 9, 1989). See also State v Allen, 397 US 337; 90 S Ct 1057; 25 L Ed 2d 353 (1970).
This Court ordered a new trial, stating that there had been an abuse of judicial discretion in denying Duplissey's motion for a separate trial.
Duplissey and three other persons were tried on armed robbery charges. Two of the codefendants were disruptive and all the defendants were handcuffed throughout the remainder of the trial. Duplissey took no part in the disruptive conduct, and, when his lawyer moved for a separate trial, the judge said that the lawyer could point with pride to the conduct and demeanor and behavior of his client, and denied the motion for a separate trial.
Custody and restraint of defendants and witnesses
(a) During trial the defendant should be seated where he or she can effectively consult with counsel and can see and hear the proceedings.
(b) The trial judge should not permit a defendant or witness to appear at trial in the distinctive attire of a prisoner, unless specifically waived by the defendant.
(c) Defendants and witnesses should not be subjected to physical restraint while in court unless the trial judge has found such restraint reasonably necessary to maintain order. If the trial judge orders such restraint, the judge should enter into the record of the case the reasons therefor. Whenever physical restraint of a defendant or witness occurs in the presence of jurors trying the case, the judge should instruct those jurors that such restraint is not to be considered in assessing the proof and determining guilt. [3 ABA Standards of Criminal Justice (2d ed), Standard 15-3.1, pp 15-77 to 15-78.]