Case Name: The State ex rel. Barlow, Plaintiff in Error, v. The Dallas County Court
Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1880-10
Citations: 72 Mo. 329
Docket Number: 
Parties: The State ex rel. Barlow, Plaintiff in Error, v. The Dallas County Court.
Judges: Henry and Norton, JJ., concur. Napton and Hough, JJ., dissent.
Reporter: Missouri Reports
Volume: 72
Pages: 329–337

Head Matter:
The State ex rel. Barlow, Plaintiff in Error, v. The Dallas County Court.
1. Railroads: power of county courts to subscribe stock. The act of March 23rd, 1861, (Sess. Acts, p. 60,) withdrew the power conferred on the county courts by the charter of the Laclede <& Fort Scott Railroad Company, (Sess. Acts 1859-60. p. 434,) to subscribe to the stock of that company without first submitting the question to a vote of the people.
Napton and Hough, JJ., dissented, holding that both upon a true construction of the statutes in question, and upon the principle stare decisis, the decision should have been otherwise. A similar point was otherwise decided in Smith v. Clark Co., 54 Mo. 58.
Error to Dallas Circuit Court. — Hon. R. W. Eyann, Judge.
Affirmed.
This was a proceeding by mandamus to compel the county court of Dallas county to provide and set apart funds to pay certain coupons held by the relator. The coupons were for interest on bonds issued in payment of a subscription which had previously been made by the county court, on behalf of the county, to the capital stock of the Laclede & Eort Scott Railroad Company, without first submitting the question to the qualified voters of said county. The circuit court refused the mandamus, and the relator sued out a writ of error.
Thos. C. Fletcher for plaintiff in error.
John P. Ellis for defendant in error.

Opinion:
Sherwood, C. J.
The act of March 23rd, 1861, (Sess. 1860-61, p. 60,) we regard as decisive of this case, so that it is unnecessary to pass upon any other point which has been discussed. Section 2 of that act provides : " It shall not be lawful for the county court of any county to subscribe to the capital stock of any railroad company, unless the same has been voted for by a majority of the resident voters who shall vote at such election under the provisions of this act."
Strange as it may appear, that act, though cited by counsel, was never discussed until the year 1878, when I undertook to discuss the force and effect of its prohibitory provisions in State ex rel. Wilson v. Garroutte, 67 Mo. 445. In that case I endeavored to show that that act, by the very force of its terms, was applicable to existing charters, as well as to those which might subsequently be created; that in short, it applied to " any railroad company," and that by that act it was made a misdemeanor, a penal offense, for the " county court of any county " to subscribe, etc., unless a vote had been first taken, as in that section prescribed. I endeavored also to show that even though no prohibitory words had. been employed in the act, yet the fact that a penalty having been provided thereby, (1 Russ, on Crimes, p. 45 ; 1 Wag. Stat., pp. 487, 488, § 17, 21, 23,) that this of itself implied prohibition, and I cited a number of authorities supporting that view. Since then, my attention has been called to an opinion of this court delivered by Mr. Justice Napton, in Doivning v. Ringer, 7 Mo. 585, where a promissory note given for a town lot before the plat of 'the town was acknowledged, filed, etc., as required by statute, was held " absolutely void," both at law and in equity, even in the hands of a transferee; and the' language of Lord Holt was in that case, quoted with approval, where he says : " Every contract made for or about any matter or thing which is prohibited, and made unlawful by any statute, is a void contract, though the statute itself doth not mention that it shall be so, but only inflict a penalty on the defaulter; because a penalty implies a prohibition, though there are no prohibiting words in the statute." It would appear not unreasonable that the same legal principles should govern where a railroad bond was issued contrary to law, as well as where & promissory note is executed in like disregard of the legislative will.
It is unnecessary to pursue this subject further. I refer for a more extended discussion of it to my opinion in the former case, State ex rel. Wilson v. Garroutte, supra. Henry and Norton, JJ., while concurring in the majority . opinion in that case, gave no expression of their views as to the force and effect of the act of 1861. Since then they have concurred in the views- which I heretofore had expressed in relation to that act. As the alleged subscription to the capital stock of the Laclede & Eort Scott Railroad Company was made without first submitting the matter to a vote of the people, we must approve the action of the circhit court in its denial of a peremptory, and its dismissal of the alternative writ, and affirm the judgment.
Henry and Norton, JJ., concur. Napton and Hough, JJ., dissent.