Case Name: DAVIES et ux. v. CONSOLIDATED UNDERWRITERS
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1943-03-31
Citations: 14 So. 2d 494
Docket Number: No. 6592
Parties: DAVIES et ux. v. CONSOLIDATED UNDERWRITERS.
Judges: 
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 14
Pages: 494–504

Head Matter:
DAVIES et ux. v. CONSOLIDATED UNDERWRITERS.
No. 6592.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Second Circuit.
March 31, 1943.
Rehearing Denied April 4, 1943.
Certiorari Denied June 21,1943.
John B. Files, of Shreveport, for appellant.
Booth & Lockard, of Shreveport, for ap-pellees.

Opinion:
DREW, Judge.
This suit was brought by Egbert E. Davies and Sue Shroeter Davies, father and mother of Billie Sue Davies, to recover damages and expenses resulting from injuries received by the daughter when she was run over by an automobile driven by Welby Stahl and owned by P. J. Mabry.
The sole defendant is Consolidated Underwriters, the insurer of the car, neither the owner nor the driver being a party to the suit.
We think at this time to fix the chronology of the various events and actions in order that in disposing of the questions presented for determination, we might make our findings clear:
The accident, which is the basis of plaintiffs' claim, occurred on July 1, 1938; petition on behalf of Egbert E. Davies, individually, and for the use and benefit of his minor child, Billie Sue Davies, the victim of the accident, and for Sue Shroeter Davies, the mother of the injured child, was filed in the District Court of Caddo Parish against Consolidated Underwriters as defendant, on March 15, 1939, and citation was served through the Secretary of State on March 16, 1939; by judgment filed October 21, 1939, the demands of plaintiffs were rejected; appeal was properly taken to'the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit; on February 6, 1940, the child, Billie Sue Davies, died; on May 10, 1940, counsel for plaintiffs filed in this court an alternative motion to remand; on November 29, 1940, this court rendered judgment affirming the judgment of the lower court; rehearing was applied for and granted; on January 28, 1941, an independent suit was filed by Egbert E. Davies and Sue Shroeter Davies against Welby Stahl, and by amendment filed February 1, 1941, the Consolidated Underwriters were made party; on June 18, 1941, this court, on rehearing, reinstated and made final its original decree 6 So.2d 347; on July 18, 1941, writ of certiorari was issued to this court by the Honorable The Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana; on January 5, 1942, The Supreme Court rendered judgment annulling the judgments of this court and the District Court, and remanding the case to the District Court "for the purpose of permitting plaintiffs to amend their petition in line with the allegations of their motion to remand and for further proceedings consistent with the views herein expressed" (emphasis ours) 199 La. 459, 6 So.2d 351, 357; on February 18, 1942, amended petition was filed in this suit by Egbert E. Davies and Sue Shroeter Davies praying for judgment for damages against the defendant for the death of their daughter; on February 18, 1942, amended petition was filed in the suit of Egbert E. Davies and wife against Welby Stahl et al., praying that the demands asserted in said suit as against the Consolidated Underwriters be withdrawn "so that they may be heard and determined in Cause No. 76,400 as therein alleged", allowance of which petition was objected to by defendant; on February 24, 1942, the court ordered Suit No. 81,625 dismissed as to the defendant, Consolidated Underwriters; there was judgment in favor of the plaintiffs signed October 31, 1942; the matter is now before this court on appeal from said judgment.
Defendant filed the following exceptions and pleas:
1. Prescription of thirty days and twelve months;
2. Motion to strike allegations in the amended petition inconsistent with the original petition;
3. Waiver and estoppel;
4. Jurisdiction of the District Court under the mandate of the Supreme Court; and
5. Exceptions of no cause and no right of action.
The organ of the court on the plea of prescription is Judge Hardy and his opinion is as follows:
Defendant has filed pleas of prescription of thirty days and one year, which have been strenuously urged by counsel in argument and briefs.
We feel that the plea of prescription of thirty days, which period is provided in the policy of insurance, is unworthy of consideration, because of the fact that the enforcement of such a contractual provision would have the effect of divesting injured parties of a right granted by law through the operation of the independent provision of a contract to which they were not parties.
Proceeding to a consideration of the plea of prescription of one year, it is observed that defendant's counsel contends that the period of one year set forth in Article 2315 of the Civil Code is in effect a period of peremption. Whether or not this is correct we do not consider that the designation of the period as a period of prescription or peremption materially affects the determination of the plea.
The prescription which is urged in this case may be defined as that rule of law which raises an absolute bar to the prosecution of a cause of action. Considered in this light, it is evident that the purpose of the prescriptive provision of Article 2315 is designed to relieve and release those who may be charged with the commission of a tort from the fear of litigation as the result of offending actions or liabilities. Accordingly, the provision is essentially a requirement of notice formally given by the institution of a suit, a notice that will inform a defendant of the action for damages that is brought against him.
Counsel for defendant has peatedly urged that the action for injury originally brought, and the action for death later attempted to be made a part of the proceedings, constitute two separate and distinct causes of action. With this conclusion we are unable to agree. The cause of action which resulted from the injury to the child, and subsequently from the death of the child, is the same, being a proceeding in •tort under the provisions of Article 2315 of the Civil Code. We infer from arguments advanced in support of the contention that the objection likely is aimed not at the cause of action but at the right of action, which, with regard to injury, belonged to the child or her legal representative, and upon death was vested in the surviving parents of the child. Since the parents of the child were already before the court in their individual as well as representative capacities, we cannot comprehend how the death of the child might materially change the situation that existed either as to the capacities of the parties plaintiff or the cause of action involved, save and except with reference to the nature and quantum of damages, being the distinction between damages for injury and damages for death.
Our courts have been increasingly liberal in application of the doctrine of prescription as a bar to action and a release from liability in connection with tort actions. The development of our jurisprudence has pointed to a disregard of the fatalities of minor technicalities in favor of a broad and liberal construction that would protect the fundamental rights of parties litigant rather than enforce fine distinctions and technicalities with reference to the method and manner of proceeding. The courts have recognized that justice is armed with the broad sword rather than the fencing foil, and thereby is enabled to cleave to the root of every case, undeterred by superficial interference rising from unimportant provisions. As. was well said by Justice Higgins in the opinion in Reeves v. Globe Indemnity Company, 185 La. 42, 168 So. 488, 491:
"This conclusion is not only in accord with the weight of authority, but consonant with constructions of equity and the modern trend of liberality in upholding substantive rights instead of subtle technicalities."
The above "case to which we réfer is, of course, the outstanding authority in support of the principle of permitting amendments, and in that case the court laid down the principle that a petition which was sufficient to apprise the insurer of the nature of the demand made was 'sufficient to interrupt the applicable one-year prescription, even though the allegations of the cause of action against the insurer were defective.
We feel that the case before this court is much stronger in favor of the plaintiffs than the Reeves case, because of the fact that the original petition was not lacking in necessary allegations and therefore there was no need for its amendment insofar as either the cause of action or the capacities of the parties were concerned.
Great stress has been laid upon the fact that shortly before the running of the prescriptive period these plaintiffs instituted a separate and independent action against Stahl, the driver of the car which was responsible for the accident, later amending the petition to include the insurer, the defendant in this case; that this action was subsequently dismissed and the claim for damages resulting from the death of the child transferred to this suit by amendment. From these facts it is argued on behalf of defendant that plaintiffs recognized the insufficiency of this action by instituting a separate suit and subsequently abandoned such separate suit, which action resulted in the accrual of prescription. We cannot subscribe to this view. Indeed, we are impressed with the fact that plaintiffs have consistently attempted to protect their rights, even against all technical objections that might have been asserted, by proceeding, not alone in one but in several ways, to assert and re-assert those rights.
It is impossible to consider the jurisprudence of our State and fail to be impressed by the fact that our courts have consciously sought to permit amendments so long as no material damage is sustained by the defendant. While 'it is true that the law does not favor .amendments, it is equally true that the law is slow to deny its right and forever bar a plaintiff from the assertion of a just claim. Accordingly, it has been held that where a defendant is sued in a representative capacity and later, sued in his individual capacity on the same cause of action, the first suit has been held to interrupt prescription, Vernon v. Illinois Central Railroad Company, 154 La. 370, 97 So. 493; where there has been improper service on the defendant it has been held that prescription was nonetheless interrupted, Anding v. Texas & P. Railway Company, 158 La. 412, 104 So. 190. Likewise it has been held that prescription was-interrupted even where citation was invalid because of technical errors in preparation or service. Similarly, where petitions have failed to state causes of action our courts have held that prescription has been interrupted, and in some cases, even after the exception has been sustained, amendment has been permitted.
An analysis of the clear trend of jurisprudence on this point confirms us in the conclusion that the essential element is that the proper defendant be judicially notified of the rights which are sought and of the plaintiff's intent to proceed with action. This element being present there is a legal interruption of prescription. We thoroughly approve of this interpretation and we are absolutely convinced that the instant case presents facts which entitle the plaintiff to the utmost consideration in the application of this principle.
Let us look at the facts. A mother and father bring suit against the insurer of an alleged negligent driver who has caused injury to their little daughter. The cause of action is found in the tort of the driver of the car, and the insurer is proceeded against by the parents, claiming damages individually and for the use and bemefit of the minor child. The case is tried, decided against the plaintiffs, and appealed. While on appeal the child dies and there is timely filed in the Court of Appeal a motion to remand. True, this was not an unqualified motion, and the reason is obvious. Plaintiffs had lost the case in the lower Court. If, and only if, the defendant should be held liable by a higher court would the motion to remand be necessary. Plaintiffs did not request the performance of a futile act, nor did they make a useless request, and counsel for plaintiffs denominated the pleading an "alternative motion to remand". The appellation we find as comprehensive and appropriate as any they might have selected. As a matter of fact, this court affirmed the judgment of the lower Court and plaintiffs then applied for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. The decision of the Supreme Court reversing the judgment of this court and the District Court became final on February 3, 1942. From the opinion of Justice Rogers the following is quoted:
"For the reasons assigned the judgments of the Court of Appeal and of the district court are annulled and the case is remanded to the district court for the purpose of permitting plaintiffs to amend their petition in line with the allegations of their motion to remand and for further proceedings consistent with the views herein expressed."
While it is true that no court can take notice of the running of prescription, and that a specific plea of prescription must be before the court, nevertheless, we are quite clear that the Supreme Court in that portion of the opinion above quoted recognized not only the presence but the efficacy of the alternative motion to remand which had been filed on behalf of plaintiffs.
However, plaintiffs did not entirely rely upon the effect of this motion, but continued by other methods' to assert their rights, and to this end filed an independent suit, which suit was only dismissed as to defendant with full reservation of plaintiffs' rights after the amended petition had been filed in this case.
However, as we have concluded, the principal question involved in- consideration of prescription turns upon notice to the defendant. We cannot conceive of any injury to the defendant,.or any lessening of its rights, or of any lack of protection that has come to pass as a result of these proceedings. Certainly the defendant has known from the date of the original filing of this suit that it must defend itself against a claim for damages arising out of a particular accident in connection with which it was or could have become thorr oughly familiar with all facts. There has never been any change in plaintiffs' position ; there has never been any change in plaintiffs, and the only element constituting a change in the entire course of 'this litigation has been that, whereas the injured child lived at the time of institution of the suit, it has since died. We cannot conceive how defendant can claim that its rights have been prejudiced through any technical failure to follow some course of procedure other than that pursued by plaintiffs in the instant case. The cause of action remains the same; the parties in whom is vested the right of action are now and have been before the court in their individual capacities since the institution of this suit.
For the reasons assigned, we are of the opinion that the pleas of prescription were properly overruled.
The motions to strike Paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 from the amended petition cannot be sustained for the reason such a motion has no place in our pleading and practice. Stanley v. Jones, 197 La. 627, 2 So.2d 45; State ex rel. Sutton et al. v. Caldwell et al., 195 La. 507, 197 So. 214; Perez v. Meraux, 195 La. 987, 197 So. 683; Babst v. Hartz et al., 161 La. 427, 108 So. 871; Central Savings Bank & Trust Company v. Oil Field Supply & Scrap Material Company, La.App., 12 So.2d 815; Id., 202 La. 787, 12 So.2d 819; Atchley v. Horne, 13 So.2d 75, rendered this day by us.
Defendant contends that all rights under the motion to remand filed in this court when the case was formerly before us have been waived and the plaintiffs are estopped to urge herein matters contained in said motion to remand by instituting a separate suit for damages for the death of their daughter.
The new suit was voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiffs and was not pursued to judgment. Such voluntary dismissal prior to trial has the same effect as if it had never been filed. If plaintiffs had continued with the new suit and suffered judgment to be rendered against them and then attempted to continue with the amended petition in the case at bar, the plea would undoubtedly be good, but since the new suit was dismissed voluntarily by plaintiffs before trial, they have neither waived nor are they estopped from proceeding under the amended petition.
Defendant relies on the case of Liles v. Texas Company, 166 La. 293, 294, 117 So. 229. It is not in point, for the reasbn plaintiffs filed a suit in tort and prosecuted it to final judgment and' then attempted to recover -that part of his claim which was rejected in the first suit in a second suit which was an action quasi ex contractu. The Court held the cause of action in both suits was the same and sustained a plea of res judicata.
Defendant contends that the District Court was without jurisdiction to try the case for the reason the Supreme Court was without power or authority to confer jurisdiction on the District Court when its jurisdiction had been divested by an appeal, not to the Supreme Court, but to the Court of Appeal. Its contention is that the Supreme Court should have remanded the case to the Court of Appeal with instructions and the Court of Appeal should have remanded it to the District Court with similar instructions.
The Supreme Court disposed of that question as is reported in 199 La. 459, 6 So.2d 351, 357, as follows:
"While this case was pending in the Court of Appeal, plaintiffs' injured child died and plaintiffs filed in the Court of Appeal an alternative motion to remand the case in -which they alleged that the death of their child was directly traceable to the automobile accident in which she was injured. In their motion, plaintiffs prayed 'that if the Court should find liability in the defendant that this case be remanded to the lower court for the amendment of the petition in accordance with the facts herein recited, and for the taking of further testimony on the question of the quantum of damages.'
"Since the Court of Appeal, in affirming the judgment of the district court, found that no liability attached to defendant under the terms of the policy, there was no necessity for the Court to pass upon the motion to remand. Neither the district court nor the Court of Appeal passed on the facts of the case.
"For the reasons assigned, the judgments of the Court of Appeal and of the district court are annulled, and the case is remanded to the district court for the purpose of permitting plaintiffs to amend their petition in line with the allegations of their motion to remand and for further proceedings consistent with the views herein expressed; defendant to pay the costs of appeal and of the proceeding in this Court, all other costs to await the final disposition of the case."
We feel sure the Supreme Court carefully considered the question of its power and authority in the premises before remanding the case to the District Court, which Court disposed of this issue as follows :
"Defendant cites Article 860 of the Code of Practice referring to mandates, which reads:
" 'This mandate can only be directed to an inferior judge by the court having immediate appellate jurisdiction over him, and by no other.'
and that by Article VII, Sec. 10 of the Constitution, the Court of Appeal has immediate appellate jurisdiction over district courts in suits for damages for physical injuries such as involved in this case, hence the Supreme Court was without right or authority to remand the case directly to the District Court, but should have sent it back to the Court of Appeal with instructions.
"The codal Article referred to was adopted in 1870, when it appears that the Supreme Court had only appellate jurisdiction. However, the matter is covered by Section 11 of Article VII of the Constitution, which provides in part:
" 'It shall be competent for the Supreme Court, to require by writ of certiorari, or otherwise, any case to be certified from the Courts of Appeal to it for review, with the same power and authority in the case as if it had been carried directly by appeal to said court.'
"Section 10 of Article VII:
" 'The Supreme Court shall have control of, and general supervision over all inferi- or courts.'
"Therefore, under these two articles of the Constitution the Supreme Court, having called up the case under the writ of certio-rari, had the power to dispose of it the same as if it had been carried directly to the Supreme Court from the District Court. Furthermore, if the Supreme Court had the right to send the case back to the Court of Appeal and require it to remand same to the District Court; and then to require the District Court to permit an amended petition to be filed, there seems to be no good reason why the Supreme Court could not under its supervisory powers direct the District Court directly what should be done, instead of directing the Court of Appeal to direct the District Court what should be done in the premises. We find no merit in the plea and it was properly overruled."
The case of Bloomfield v. Thompson, 134 La. 923, 64 So. 853, cited by defendant, is not authority for its contention. It only holds that the Supreme Court is without authority to hear a case on a writ of certiorari from the District Court when the law provides for an appeal to the Court of Appeal. The plea to the jurisdiction was correctly overruled.
The exceptions of no cause and no right of action are based upon the theory that since P. J. Mabry, the owner of the automobile, was admittedly not liable to plaintiffs, his insurer was not liable. This question has been foreclosed by the decision of the Supreme Court in this same case, cited supra.
We can hardly believe defendant is serious in its last contention on which the exceptions are based, which is that it was the duty of plaintiffs to cooperate in the defense of the case, its contention being that although plaintiffs are suing to recover judgment against the insurer, they are bound by the policy to assist the insurer in defeating their claim. Defendant evidently is confused as to who is the insured. The insured, under the policy in this case, is the driver of the car and not the plaintiffs. There is no merit to the exceptions and they were properly overruled.