Case Name: Anne E. TINGLE, Petitioner, v. DADE COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, Dade County Port Authority and Bituminous Casualty Corporation, and Industrial Relations Commission, Respondents
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1971-02-17
Citations: 245 So. 2d 76
Docket Number: No. 39315
Parties: Anne E. TINGLE, Petitioner, v. DADE COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, Dade County Port Authority and Bituminous Casualty Corporation, and Industrial Relations Commission, Respondents.
Judges: ROBERTS, C. J., and CARLTON, ADKINS and McCAIN, JJ„ concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 245
Pages: 76–80

Head Matter:
Anne E. TINGLE, Petitioner, v. DADE COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, Dade County Port Authority and Bituminous Casualty Corporation, and Industrial Relations Commission, Respondents.
No. 39315.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Feb. 17, 1971.
Rehearing Denied March 25, 1971.
J. H. Kaiser, Hialeah, for petitioner.
Eugene E. Williams of Williams & Ja-bara, Miami, Patrick H. Mears and J. Franklin Garner, Tallahassee, for respondents.

Opinion:
DEKLE, Justice.
This is the third appearance of this cause before this Court since the employee's accident June 1, 1963, and subsequent demise four days later. After having heard oral argument and carefully reviewing the record, we find that only two of petitioner's six points require comment.
The Deputy Commissioner who originally heard the claim and entered the first two orders died before the latest remand by the Industrial Relations Commission and this Court. The claim was subsequently assigned to Judge James R. Sabatino, who took additional testimony and evidence before entering the order approved by the Industrial Relations Commission and presently here for review.
Petitioner objects to Judge Sabati-no's reducing from 50 per cent to 25 per cent the proportion of medical expenses to be paid by the employer/carrier. The initial order awarding benefits was reversed and remanded, and the claim sent to Judge Sabatino with directions to redetermine the death benefits previously awarded. The law prevailing at the time of the injury made it mandatory under the circumstances of this case to apportion medical as well as compensation benefits. A reduction of compensation naturally led to a reduction in reimbursable medical expenses. Apportionment of the award between the preexisting disease and the industrial accident was the very point on which the case was reversed and remanded by this Court, so that the prior apportionment by the original deputy commissioner could not have become the law of the case, Under these circumstances the Judge of' Industrial Claims has correctly exercised his discretion and heard additional evidence on the apportionment issue. The medical expense reduction was proper.
Petitioner asserts that the Judge's finding that only 25 per cent of the employee's death is attributable to the accident is not supported by competent substantial medical evidence and that he erred in basing his findings in part upon the existing record made before his late predecessor. We do not agree.
The new judge heard additional medical testimony on the apportionment issue and allowed each party to point out specific portions of the record already compiled upon which they wished to rely. We do not find that the claimant was prejudiced by the fact that the Judge of Industrial Claims relied upon portions of a written record of prior evidence and testimony, as well as testimony taken before him. The opinion testimony supporting the Judge's findings was based upon reasonable medical certainty; there was competent substantial evidence to support the award made.
The historic rule was that a court's order remains inherently under the control of the court "during the term at which they are rendered." Even this limitation (to "the term") was removed by Civil Rule 1.-6(c). Civil Rule 1.540, 31 F.S.A. further extends the period and grounds for the court's continuing control of its orders and judgments.
There is a limitation, however, on a successor judge's reconsideration of his predecessor's final judgments and orders, (1) upon the merits on the same facts absent mistake or fraud (and now on the extended grounds in Civil Rule 1.540), and (2) upon discretionary final rulings where the facts remain unchanged. Such prior final rulings have been held by this Court not to be subject to reversal, modification or review by a successor judge, absent the grounds in Civil Rule 1.540. In the event, however, that subsequent events may defeat the prior judgment, the successor does have authority even after final judgment to make such further order as may be necessary to effectuate the judgment. Also, where the final order or judgment is not complete, the succeeding judge may supply the element which may have been omitted.
While a judge should hesitate to undo his own work, and should hesitate still more to undo the work of another judge, he does have, until final judgment, the power to do so and may therefore vacate or modify the interlocutory rulings or orders of his predecessor in the case. This "code" of restraint is not based solely on the law of the case but is founded upon considerations of comity and courtesy. It has been held that a succeeding judge may adopt the findings of fact of his predecessor and render judgment thereon. Upon a remand of the case, as here, the trial judge was of course back in the interlocutory stage of the proceedings, his predecessor's "final judgment" being no longer "final" upon the earlier remand by this Court, and was therefore authorized to proceed as he did.
Having found that the remaining points argued by petitioner are without merit, and that the Industrial Relations Commission made no error in affirming the compensation order of the Judge of Industrial Claims, the petition for writ of certiorari is denied. Petitioner's request for attorney's fees is also denied.
It is so ordered.
ROBERTS, C. J., and CARLTON, ADKINS and McCAIN, JJ" concur.
ERVIN, J., dissents with opinion.
. Tingle v. Board of County Commissioners, 174 So.2d 1 (Fla.1965) ; Tingle v. Board of County Commissioners, 214 So. 2d 1 (Fla.1968).
. Tingle v. Board of County Commissioners, 214 So.2d 1 (Fla.1968).
. Shores Development, Ine. v. Carver, 164 So.2d 803 (Fla.1964).
. Steele v. Pendarvis Chevrolet, Inc., 220 So.2d 372 (Fla.1969).
. Alabama Hotel Co. v. J. L. Mott Iron Works, 86 Fla. 608, 98 So. 826 (1924) ; State v. City of Sarasota, 154 Fla. 250, 17 So.2d 109, 111 (1944).
. Bamagli Realty Co. v. Craver, 121 So. 2d 648, 653 (Fla.1960).
. Lawyers Co-operative Pub. Co. v. Williams, 149 Bla. S90, 5 So.2d 871 (1942). (Involving Motion for New Trial, Petition for Rehearing, Motion to Vacate the Pinal Judgment)
. 33 C.J. Judges § 104 (p. 973) ; 48 C.J.S. Judges § 56c (pp. 1021-1022) ; Annot., 132 A.L.R. 14 (1940).
. Id.
. Newburyport Inst, for Savings v. Coffin, 189 Mass. 74, 75 N.E. 81; Edmonds v. Riley, 15 S.D. 470, 90 N.W. 139; 48 C.J.S. Judges § 56 (pp. 1019-1020).