Case Name: Henry McCord, Plaintiff in error, v. The People, Defendants in error
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1871-11-20
Citations: 46 N.Y. 470
Docket Number: 
Parties: Henry McCord, Plaintiff in error, v. The People, Defendants in error.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 46
Pages: 470–477

Head Matter:
Henry McCord, Plaintiff in error, v. The People, Defendants in error.
The design of the statute against obtaining money, etc., under false preten- ■ ces, is to protect those, who for an honest purpose, are induced by false and fraudulent representations to give credit or part with their property, and not to protect those, who do this for unworthy or illegal purposes.
When, therefore, the indictment charged that the prisoner falsely or fraudulently represented he had a warrant against M., and thereby induced him to deliver up to prisoner a watch and diamond ring.
Held, that the property must have been parted with, as an inducement to a supposed officer to violate the laws and his duties, and the indictment could not be sustained. (Peckham, J., dissenting.)
(Argued November 13th, 1871;
decided November 20th, 1871.)
- Error to the General Term of the Supreme Court in the first department to review judgment, affirming judgment of the Court of General Sessions in and for the county of Hew York, convicting the plaintiff in error upon an indictment for false pretences.
The plaintiff in error, Henry McCord, was tried and convicted in the Court of General Sessions of the Peace, in and for the county of Hew York, at the June term, 1870, upon ■.an indictment charging in substance, that with intent to cheat and defraud one Charles C. Miller, he falsely and fraudulently represented:
“ That he, the said Henry McCord, was an officer attached to the bureau of Captain John Young’s department of detectives, and that he had a warrant, issued by Justice Hogan, one of the police justices of the city of Hew York, at the complaint of one Henry Blinker, charging the said Charles C. Miller with a criminal offence and for his arrest; and that the said Henry Blinker had promised him, the said Henry McCord, $200 for the arrest of him, the said Charles C. Miller.”' .
And that said Miller, believing such false representations, was induced to and did deliver to McCord a gold watch and a diamond ring.
H. O. Allen a/nd W. T. Kmtzmg, for plaintiff in error.
The indictment does not set forth any offence. (People v. Thomas, 34 N. Y., 351; People v. Stetson, 4 Barb., 151; The People v. Williams, 4 Hill, 9 ; The People v. Clough, 17 Wend., 351; The People v. Thomas, 34 N. Y. Rep., 351; Young et al. v. R., 3 Term R., 98; Wharton Am. Cr. Law, 2 vol., 5th ed., 2081.) The statute was only to protect from frauds in commercial dealings. (People v. Clough, 17 Wend., 351.)
S. B. Garvin, for the people.
If any one pretence is false, to which persons of ordinary caution would give credit, it is sufficient. (People v. Haynes, 11 Wend., 557; People v. Thomas, 34 N. Y., 351; People v. Hewett, 13 Wend., 87; People v. Ainslie, 4 Den., 529.) The question is one of fact for a jury. (34 N. Y., 352; Reff v. People, 2 Parker, 139; Whar. Cr. Law, 2131.)

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
If the prosecutor parted with his property upon the representations set forth in the indictment, it must have been for some unlawful purpose, a purpose not warranted by law. There was no legitimate purpose to be attained, by delivering the goods to the accused, upon the statements made and alleged as an inducement to the act. What action by the plaintiff in error was promised or expected in return for the property given, is not disclosed. But whatever it was, it was necessarily inconsistent with his duties as an officer, having a criminal warrant for the arrest of the prosecution, which was the character he assumed. The false representation of the accused was, that he was an officer and had a criminal warrant for the prosecutor. There was no pretence of any agency for, or connection with any person, or of any authority to do any act, save such as his duty as such pretended officer demanded.
The prosecutor parted with his property as an inducement to a supposed officer, to violate the law and his duties; and if in attempting to do this he has been defrauded, the law will not punish his confederate, although such confederate may have been instrumental in inducing the commission of the offence. Heither the law or public policy designs the protection of rogues in their dealings with each other, or to insure fair dealing and truthfulness, as between each other, in their dishonest practices. The design of the law is to protect those who, for some honest purpose are induced, upon false and fraudulent representations, to give credit or part with their property to another, and not to protect those who, for unworthy or illegal purposes, part with their goods. (People v. Williams, 4 Hill, 9 ; Same v. Stetson, 4 Barb., 151.)
The judgment of the Supreme Court and of the sessions must be reversed and judgment for the defendant.'