Case Name: DEAK v. PACE, Jr., Secretary of Army; PATTON v. PACE, Jr., Secretary of Army
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1950-12-07
Citations: 185 F.2d 997
Docket Number: Nos. 10406, 10407
Parties: DEAK v. PACE, Jr., Secretary of Army. PATTON v. PACE, Jr., Secretary of Army.
Judges: Before EDGERTON, PRETTYMAN and PROCTOR, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 185
Pages: 997–1004

Head Matter:
DEAK v. PACE, Jr., Secretary of Army. PATTON v. PACE, Jr., Secretary of Army.
Nos. 10406, 10407.
United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.
Decided Dec. 7, 1950.
Mr. Ford E. Young, Jr., Washington, D. C., for appellants. Messrs. George A. Finch, Jr., and R. H. McNeill, Washington, D. C., entered appearances for appellant Deak.
Mr. Samuel D. Slade, Attorney, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., with whom Assistant Attorney General H. G. Morison and Messrs. George Morris Fay, U. S. Atty., Washington, D. G, and Edward H. Hickey, Special Asst, to the Atty. Gen., were on the brief, for appellee. Mr. Joseph M. Howard, Asst. U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., also entered an appearance for appellee.
Before EDGERTON, PRETTYMAN and PROCTOR, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
PROCTOR, Circuit Judge.
Appellants in these consolidated appeals were civilian employees of the War Department at the Army Finance Center, St. Louis, Missouri. They were summarily removed from their positions by the Secretary of War, acting under authority of Section 3, Act of December 17, 1942, 56 Stat. 1053, 5 U.S.C.A. § 652 note, upon the ground that such action was "warranted by the demands of national security."
As we view the case it is reduced to the simple question whether the Secretary complied with the requirement of the statute that the discharged employees "be fully informed of the reasons" for their removal. If they were not, the further question arises whether the Secretary may be required by mandatory injunction to furnish the necessary information and to grant hearings before the Army Security Review Board. This is the relief that appellants seek. No constitutional question is involved, for appellants contend only that the'ir rights under the statute have been denied. The case does hot involve a comparison between the status of employees in the various governmental agencies whether of a "sensitive" or "non-sensitive" nature. It does not involve a comparison between the procedures for discharge of employees under the LloydLaFollette Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 652, supplemented by the President's Loyalty Review Program on the one hand, and the removal of employees under the present statute on the other. It does not involve the right of a person to governmental employment nor the right of an employee to a hearing before discharge. It does not involve the authority of an agency head to employ, discharge, or reinstate an employee. These are false issues and we shall not deal with them. Nor shall we attempt to lay down any general rule applicable to the statute. What may satisfy the statutory requirement for full information in the circumstances of one case may be wholly irrelevant to the circumstances of other cases. We confine ourselves, as we think the situation requires, to the facts of the present case and the narrow issue we have stated.
In a notice of removal delivered to appellant Deak she was informed that the reasons for her removal were;
"1. That you attended a meeting open only to Communist Party members, and •
"2. That you have attended meetings openly sponsored by the Communist Party or organizations known to' be affiliated with the Communist Party, and 'have evinced active and sympathetic affiliation with these organizations."
In like manner appellant Patton was informed that the reasons for her removal were:
"1. That you have been active in organizations openly known to be part of the Communist Party, and
"2. You have attended meetings and rallies openly sponsored by the Communist Party or organizations known to be closely affiliated with the Communist Party."
It will be noted that times, places and organizations were not specified. Nevertheless the notice in each instance stated that the appellant might submit within thirty days statements and affidavits "by way of your defense" and that it would be helpful if the same were directed "toward the fullest possible answer to- all items in the reasons for your removal."
The cases were heard by the District Court on motions to dismiss, supplemented by stipulated facts. The judge, being of opinion that the plaintiffs had been fully informed, dismissed their complaints.
In support of the dismissals it is contended not only that sufficient information was furnished, but that further information and hearings would not change appellee's position, "in that there is no way in which the Secretary could be required to act favorably with respect to appellants' removal -after such a hearing was held." Great stress is laid upon the exclusive authority of the Secretary to remove and reinstate employees, or to refuse to reinstate them. But no one questions that authority. It is beside the point. The controlling question is whether the Secretary, acting through his designated officer, fully informed appellants of the reasons for their removal. The statute accords the right to such information. Coupled with the power to remove is the duty of the Secretary, acting through his subordinate, to furnish the information. The duty to inform and the right to be informed are for the manifest purpose of affording the employee a fair opportunity to oppose the removal order by submitting within thirty days after being fully informed, "such statement or affidavits, or both, as he may desire to show why he should be retained and not removed." They go to the statutory right of a removed employee to- apply for reinstatement. They do not concern the Secretary's power to reinstate or to refuse to reinstate.
The meaning of the statutory provision for information seems very clear. It is reflected in the Secretary's general orders of January 18, 1947 (War Department Circular No-. 17, Par. 7), and April 9, 1948 (War Department Circular No. 100, Par. 10), regulating administration of the statute. There it is provided that the letter of removal to an employee shall contain a statement of the reasons for removal which shall be as extensive as security interests will permit -and shall "furnish the employee such information of the evidence against him as will provide him a fair chance to- defend himself."
We think that in keeping with the plain terms of the statute and the Secretary's order the information must be sufficient to inform the employee with reasonable certainty and precision of the cause for bis removal. Only thus can he, upon receiving the information, take full advantage of the right granted by the statute to "submit, within thirty days thereafter, such statement or affidavits, or both, as he may desire to show why he should be retained and not removed." To avail themselves of this right it is important that appellants be informed of the dates, places and organizations referred to in the stated reasons for their removal. Otherwise they cannot have a fair opportunity to show reasons for reinstatement, which the statute holds out to- them. They are deprived in large measure of the right to clear the'ir names and appeal for reinstatement. To what specific thing could appellants' statements or affidavits be directed beyond their own general denials? Yet, with the specifications indicated, convincing proof might be obtainable to show their innocence. We need not speculate concerning the course that should be followed if "security interests" were thought to conflict with an employee's right to- precise information, for we see no reason to suppose, or to think that the Secretary supposed, that the information we specify for the instant cases would involve any risk to such interest. That it did not is obvious from the information given, which speaks of the organizations as "openly known" and the meetings as "openly sponsored." Moreover, no- claim is made that additional information would' have involved any risk to- security interests. In these circumstances, at least, we see no reason why details as to times, places and organizations, should not have been furnished. The information in the letters of removal even fell short of the Secretary's instructions.
The suggestion is m-ade that any lack o-f information in the letters of removal was supplied' by the questions put to appellants by the Army Security Review Board before whom appellants subsequently appeared. These questions were in the nature of cross-examination of appellants. In no instance was a question specifically connected with the information stated in the reasons for removal. Nor do we think that information given in cross-examination at the hearing can serve as a substitute for the full information required by the statute to be given thirty days before the prescribed time for submitting defensive statements and' affidavits. The statute clearly contemplates that discharged employees shall have th-at thirty day period within which to- submit such papers. Yet appellants were given no opportunity whatever to submit anything but their own spontaneous answers to the questions. So, even assuming the questions to have 'been informative, they came too- late. Appellants were deprived of their right to have the ensuing thirty days iwithin which to submit defensive statements and affidavits concerning the information received.
We conclude that in the circumstances of these cases appellants were entitled to the additional information we have indicated, and that it was the duty of the Secretary, acting through his designated officer, to have furnished such additional information. From these conclusions it necessarily follows that each appellant should have the opportunity, within thirty days of the furnishing of such additional information, to submit a statement, affidavits, or both, to show why she should be retained and not removed from her employment. For these purposes appellants are entitled to mandatory injunctions. They also pray that the Secretary be required to certify all evidence in the files of the Department of the Army concerning the charges and "action taken regarding the same" to the District Court for review, and that they be granted a hearing before the Army Security Review Board. But the statute on which appellants rely gives them no such right. The most it authorizes the court to require is th-at the Secretary furnish the additional information so- that appellants will be fully informed; receive and consider from each appellant such statement and affidavits as either may submit, and thereupon, on the basis of all the facts and circumstances before him, determine in each case whether the appellant should be "retained" and not removed from her position.
In each case the judgment of the District Court is reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
. "The provisions of section 6 of the Act of August 24, 1912 (37 Stat. 555; U.S.C., title 5, see. 652), shall not apply to any civil-service employee of the War or Navy Departments or of the Coast Guard, or their field services, whose immediate removal is, in the opinion of the Secretary concerned warranted by the demands of national security, but nothing herein shall be construed to repeal, modify, or suspend the proviso in that section. Those persons summarily removed under the authority of this section may, if in the opinion of the Secretary concerned, subsequent investigation so warrants, be reinstated, and if so reinstated may, in the discretion of the Secretary concerned, be allowed compensation for all or any part of the period of such removal in an amount not to exceed the difference between the amount such person would normally have earned during the period of such removal, at the rate he was receiving on the date of removal, and the interim net earnings of such person: Provided, That within thirty days after such removal any such person shall have an opportunity personally to appear before the official designated by the Secretary concerned and be fully informed of the reasons for such removal, and to submit, within thirty days thereafter, such statement or affidavits, or both, as he may desire to show why he should be retained and not removed."
The foregoing Act has been superseded by Act approved August 26, 1950, Pub. L. No. 733, Slst Cong., 2d Sess.