Case Name: In re the Marriage of Glenna M. MAHONEY, Petitioner, Appellant, v. Gene T. MAHONEY, Respondent
Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Minnesota
Decision Date: 1991-08-27
Citations: 474 N.W.2d 232
Docket Number: No. C7-90-2734
Parties: In re the Marriage of Glenna M. MAHONEY, Petitioner, Appellant, v. Gene T. MAHONEY, Respondent.
Judges: Considered and decided by KLAPHAKE, P.J., LANSING and LOMMEN , JJ.
Reporter: North Western Reporter 2d
Volume: 474
Pages: 232–235

Head Matter:
In re the Marriage of Glenna M. MAHONEY, Petitioner, Appellant, v. Gene T. MAHONEY, Respondent.
No. C7-90-2734.
Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
Aug. 27, 1991.
Review Denied Nov. 13, 1991.
Wilbert E. Hendricks, Hendricks Law Firm, Pine River, for appellant.
Victor H. Smith, Harlan E. Smith, Smith Law Office, Walker, for respondent.
Considered and decided by KLAPHAKE, P.J., LANSING and LOMMEN , JJ.
Acting as judge of the court of appeals by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const, art. VI, § 2.

Opinion:
OPINION
KLAPHAKE, Judge.
Glenna Mahoney appeals from an order dismissing her action to vacate a prior Minnesota judgment dissolving her marriage to respondent Gene Mahoney. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Glenna M. Mahoney and respondent Gene T. Mahoney were married on January 29, 1949, in California. They later moved to Alabama where they lived from 1968 to 1977. They separated in 1977 when appellant moved to Minnesota and respondent remained in Alabama.
In 1986, appellant brought an action for a divorce a vinculo matrimonii, a complete dissolution of marriage, in Alabama. Following an agreement between the parties, however, appellant amended the action to request a divorce a mensa et thoro, essentially a legal separation. On March 13, 1987, the Alabama court granted appellant a divorce a mensa et thoro, in which appellant received a property settlement and a maintenance award. On July 17, 1987, respondent obtained a Nevada divorce of dubious validity.
Unaware of the Nevada decree, appellant began dissolution proceedings in Minnesota on July 22, 1987. Respondent appeared specially to challenge the Minnesota court's exercise of personal jurisdiction. Appellant became aware of the Nevada decree in February 1988. A dissolution was granted to appellant without an order for maintenance or a property settlement because the Minnesota court lacked personal jurisdiction over respondent. This court affirmed the trial court's decision on appeal. Mahoney v. Mahoney, 433 N.W.2d 115 (Minn.App.1988), pet. for rev. denied, (Minn. Feb. 10, 1989) (Mahoney I).
Respondent then brought a declaratory action in Alabama to extinguish his support obligation under the Alabama separation decree. The Alabama trial court held the Minnesota decree terminated the marriage and the Alabama separation decree including respondent's support obligation. On appeal, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the trial court. Mahoney v. Mahoney, 568 So.2d 832 (Ala.Civ.App.1990).
Before the Alabama appeal was decided, appellant brought an action in Minnesota to vácate the Minnesota decree. The trial court held the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and dismissed with prejudice.
ISSUE
Did respondent commit a fraud on the court requiring the trial court to vacate the Minnesota dissolution decree?
ANALYSIS
Appellant claims the Minnesota decree should be vacated because respondent committed a fraud on the court by not disclosing the existence of the Nevada decree while contesting the Minnesota court's personal jurisdiction. We disagree.
Ordinarily a dissolution decree is final when entered, subject to the right of appeal. Minn.Stat. § 518.145, subd. 1 (1990). The court may, however, set the judgment aside in an independent action for fraud upon the court. Minn.Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2. Appellant brought an independent action to vacate the final dissolution decree under Minn.Stat. § 548.14 (1990) (court may set aside "[a]ny judgment obtained by means of any fraudulent act, practice, or representation of the prevailing party").
The supreme court has stated:
[Fjraud on the court must be an intentional course of material misrepresentation or nondisclosure, having the result of misleading the court and opposing counsel and making the property settlement grossly unfair.
Maranda v. Maranda, 449 N.W.2d 158, 165 (Minn.1989). A finding of fraud on the court must be made under the particular facts of each case. Id. at 164. A trial court's findings concerning allegations of fraud on the court must be upheld unless clearly erroneous. Minn.R.Civ.P. 52.01; Schroetke v. Schroetke, 365 N.W.2d 380, 383 (Minn.App.1985); Thomas v. Thomas, 356 N.W.2d 76, 80 (Minn.App.1984).
Here, the trial court found the Minnesota decree was granted by default. While respondent made a special appearance to contest personal jurisdiction, he did not otherwise contest the dissolution action. We conclude that respondent was not obligated to disclose information affecting the substantive issues of the case while contesting personal jurisdiction.
In addition, the trial court found the Minnesota court was aware of the Nevada decree before it granted the final dissolution. The Minnesota court heard arguments on the effect of the Nevada decree on April 19, 1988, well before it issued the judgment of dissolution on June 20, 1990. The transcript of the April hearing was part of the record that the court of appeals reviewed in deciding Mahoney I. Contrary to appellant's claim, neither court was misled as to the existence of the Nevada decree. We recognize the severe consequences of our decision here; however, we cannot vacate a final judgment where there was no fraud on the court. The record clearly supports the trial court's findings that no such fraud occurred.
Respondent filed a notice of review, challenging the trial court's refusal to assess attorney fees against appellant. An award of attorney fees may be upset only upon a finding of abuse of discretion. Wicker v. City of Maplewood, 386 N.W.2d 327, 329 (Minn.App.1986). We do not observe any abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of respondent's motion for attorney fees. Finally, appellant's motions to include briefs from the prior appeal, to expedite this appeal, and to award attorney fees on appeal are denied.
DECISION
Affirmed.