Case Name: DOSSIN'S FOOD PRODUCTS, INC., v. STATE TAX COMMISSION
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1960-06-07
Citations: 360 Mich. 312
Docket Number: Docket No. 41, Calendar No. 48,266
Parties: DOSSIN’S FOOD PRODUCTS, INC., v. STATE TAX COMMISSION.
Judges: Dethmers, C. J., and Carr and Kavanagh, JJ., concurred with Kelly, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 360
Pages: 312–320

Head Matter:
DOSSIN’S FOOD PRODUCTS, INC., v. STATE TAX COMMISSION.
1. Taxation- — State Tax Commission — Review of Determination— Administrative Procedure Act.
Circuit court order dismissing property owner’s petition for review of State tax commission’s determination of tax assessment on property, -sought under administrative procedure act, is affirmed by Dethmers, C.J., and Carr, Kelly, and Kavanagh, JJ., on ground that review of State tax commission’s orders may be had only pursuant to the provisions of the general property tax act, and by Smith and Edwards, JJ., on ground that a tax assessment -is not a contested case within the meaning of the administrative procedure act (CLS 1956, § 24.101 et seq.; CL 1948, §§ 211.150, 211.151; CLS 1956, § 211.152).
2. Costs — Public Question — Taxation—Administrative Procedure Act.
No eosts are allowed in action determining whether tax assessment by State tax commission was reviewable under the administrative procedure act, a public question being involved (CLS 1956, § 24.101 et seq.; CL 1948, §§ 211.150, 211.151; CLS 1956, § 211.152).
Black and Souris, JJ., dissenting.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1] 42 Am Jur, Public Administrative Law § 232; 51 Am Jur, Taxation § 768.
[2] 14 Am Jur, Costs § 106.
Appeal from Wayne; Bowles (George E.), J.
Submitted January 8, 1960.
(Docket No. 41, Calendar No. 48,266.)
Decided June 7, 1960.
Petition by Dossin’s Food Products, Inc., a Michigan corporation, against the Michigan Státe Tax .Commission for . redetermination of ■ assessed value of personal property. Petition dismissed.' Plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
Berry, Moorman & King (John L. King, oí counsel), for plaintiff.
Paul L. Adams, Attorney General, Samuel J. Torina, Solicitor General, T. Carl Holbrooh and William D. Dexter, Assistants Attorney General, for defendant.
Amicus. Curiae:
Nathaniel H. .Ooldstieh, Corporation Counsel, Bert R. Sogge and Julius C. Plislcow, Assistants Corporation Counsel, for City of Detroit.

Opinion:
Kelly, J.
Appellant, claiming that the administrative procedure act (PA 1952, No 197 ) granted the right to appeal, filed its pétition in the Wayne county circuit court seeking review of the Michigan State tax commission's determination of appellant's 1958 personal property tax. .
Defendant, .Michigan State tax copimission, filed its motion to dismiss, alleging that,PA 1952, No 197, does not apply to .the State tax commission; that instead the general property tax act applies and, therefore, appellant's remedy for any alleged impropriety in the hearing before the commission' would be by way of an original proceeding in mandamus in the Supreme Court and not by appeal to the circuit court.
Appellee's motion to dismiss was granted.'. Plaintiff appeals.
The general property tax act (PA 1893, No 206, as amended) establishes the State tax commission as the final reviewing body and supervisory authority in assessment matters. Hudson Motor Car Co. v. City of Detroit, 282 Mich 69, 80, 81 (113 ALR 1472); Moran v. Grosse Pointe Township, 317 Mich 248, 256-259; Helin v. Grosse Pointe Township, 329 Mich 396, 404. It is subject to review by appeal to the Supreme Court on either a question of jurisdiction, or on the question of whether the action of the commission, or a member thereof, has been performed as provided in the act. Hudson Motor Car Co. v. City of Detroit, supra, 83. The general property tax act prescribes the procedure to be followed by the comniission. CL 1948, § 211.150, 211.151, CLS 1956, § 211.152 (Stat Ann 1950 Rev § 7.208, 7.209, Stat Ann 1959 Cum Supp § 7.210).
The legislature defined the administrative procedure act (PA 1952, No 197) to be:
"An act to prescribe the rights of the public in the administrative procedure before State administrative agencies; to provide for the promulgation of procedural rules and regulations; to provide for the hearing of contested cases, and rules of evidence with respect thereto; and to provide for decisions and orders of State agencies."
The act defines "agency" as follows:
" 'Agency' means any State board, commission, department, bureau or officer, authorized by law to make rules or to adjudicate contested cases, except the workmen's compensation commission, the employment security commission, the department of revenue, the public service commission and those in the legislative and judicial branches."
Section 8 of said act (CLS 1956, § 24.108 [Stat Ann 1952 Rev § 3.560(21.8)]) provides that "any person aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case" may file "a petition (for review) in the circuit court in the county wherein appellant resides or has its principal place of business in Michigan or in the circuit court for Ingham county, within 30 days after personal service of the final decision of the agency."
The general property tax act is a "specific statute" dealing with taxation. The administrative procedure act is a "general statute" referring generally to administrative hearings and appeals therefrom. In determining whether PA 1952, No 197, directly or impliedly repeals the definite provisions of the property tax law, we shall apply the well-recognized rule of statutory construction holding that the repeal of a specific statute by a general statute will not he implied or assumed.
In the case of Mayor of Port Huron v. City Treasurer of Port Huron, 328 Mich 99, we held (pp 111, 112):
"In Boyer-Campbell Co. v. Fry, 271 Mich 282, 297 (98 ALR 827), we said:
" ' "Statutes will he construed in the most beneficial way which their language will permit to prevent absurdity, hardship, or injustice; to favor public convenience and to oppose all prejudice to public interests." 2 Lewis' Sutherland, Statutory Construction (2d ed), § 490.'
"A special statute shall be given effect as an exception to the general statute in order to carry out the legislative intent. Board of Education v. Blondell, 251 Mich 528. When a general intention is expressed and also a particular intention which is incompatible with the general one, the particular intention shall be considered as an exception to the general one. Attorney General, ex rel. Owen, v. Joyce, 233 Mich 619; Heims v. School District No. 6 of Davison Township, 253 Mich 248, and cases therein cited. Also, see Reed v. Secretary of State, 327 Mich 108. In Attorney General, ex rel. Owen, v. Joyce, supra, we held that the special act providing that the hoard of supervisors might fill vacancies in the office of road commissioner was not repealed by a later general act which provides for the filling of vacancies and appointments of county offices by the probate court, county clerk and prosecuting attorney, the later act not containing a repealing clause. We quoted the following:
" ' "An act will not be construed to repeal or modify earlier legislation, if, giving such effect to the act, an apparent purpose would appear to disturb an established system of written law, covering a vital field in our system of government." 25 RCL, Statutes, § 169, p 919.
" ' "The principle that the law does not favor repeals by implication is of especial application in the case of an important public statute of long standing, which should be shown to be repealed either expressly, or by a strong and necessary implication." 25 RCL, Statutes, § 169, p 920.
" ' "When a general intention is expressed, and also a particular intention which is incompatible with the general one, the particular intention shall be considered an exception to the general one." 1 Lewis' Sutherland, Statutory Construction (2d ed), p 532, § 275." ' "
The above quotation from Mayor of Port Huron v. City Treasurer of Port Huron, supra, was reiterated with approval in State Highway Commissioner v. Detroit City Controller, 331 Mich 337, 363.
The legislature was undoubtedly aware of the fact that this Court has repeatedly refused to permit review of property tax matters by procedures not provided in the general property tax act. See W. A. Sturgeon & Co. v. Board of Assessors of the City of Detroit, 159 Mich 199, 202; Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. City of Wakefield, 323 Mich 497, 509; Haggerty v. City of Dearborn, 332 Mich 304, 319.
In granting the motion to dismiss, the trial court stated: . . .
"The rights of the taxpayer' ihust be zealously guarded but the practical operations of government may not be unduly frustrated or impeded.' Therefore, the legislature necessarily must have'shown by clearly unmistakable language a legislative intention to superimpose the procedural requirements of Act No 197 together with the alternative method of judicial review before this court would be impelled to the petitioners' view, so compelling is the public need for continuity of services Which musFbepaid for by tax revenues." " '
We agree with the trial court on the whole-that the legislature did not intend to repeal the provisions of the general property tax act by enacting the administrative procedure act. The trial court did not err in entering the order of dismissal.
Affirmed. No costs, a public question involved.
Dethmers, C. J., and Carr and Kavanagh, JJ., concurred with Kelly, J.
OLS 1956, § 24.101 et seq.. (Stat Anii 1952 Rev and Stat Ann 1959 Oum Supp § 3.560 [21.fl et seq.).