Case Name: Anthony HINRICHS, Henry Gerner, Lynette Herold, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. SPEAKER OF the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF the INDIANA GENERAL ASSEMBLY, Defendant-Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2007-10-30
Citations: 506 F.3d 584
Docket Number: Nos. 05-4604, 05-4781
Parties: Anthony HINRICHS, Henry Gerner, Lynette Herold, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. SPEAKER OF the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF the INDIANA GENERAL ASSEMBLY, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: Before RIPPLE, KANNE and WOOD, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 3d Series
Volume: 506
Pages: 584–612

Head Matter:
Anthony HINRICHS, Henry Gerner, Lynette Herold, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. SPEAKER OF the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF the INDIANA GENERAL ASSEMBLY, Defendant-Appellant.
Nos. 05-4604, 05-4781.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Argued Sept. 7, 2006.
Decided Oct. 30, 2007.
Rehearing En Banc Denied Jan. 14, 2008.
Kenneth J. Falk (argued), Indiana Civil Liberties Union, Indianapolis, IN, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Steffen N. Johnson (argued), Winston & Strawn, Washington, DC, Thomas M. Fisher, Office of the Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendant-Appellant.
Mathew D. Staver, Anita L. Staver, Liberty Counsel, Maitland, FL, Eric W. Stanley, Rena M. Lindevaldsen, Lynchburg, VA, Amicus Curiae.
Gregory M. Jones, Foundation for Moral Law, Inc., Montgomery, AL, Amicus Curiae.
Michael D. Dean, Dean & McKoy, Waukesha, WI, Amicus Curiae.
Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Washington, DC, Amicus Curiae.
James Bopp, Jr., Bopp, Coleson & Bos-trom, Terre Haute, IN, Amicus Curiae.
Aaron Van Oort Faegre & Benson, Minneapolis, MN, Amicus Curiae.
Lowell Sturgill (argued), Dept, of Justice, Civil Rights Div., Appellate Sec., Washington, DC, Amicus Curiae.
Steven W. Fitschen, Nat. Legal Foundation, Virginia Beach, VA, Amicus Curiae.
Barbara J. Weller, Gibbs Law Firm, Seminole, FL, Amicus Curiae.
Jonathan K. Baum, Katten Muchin Ro-senman, Chicago, IL, Amicus Curiae.
Before RIPPLE, KANNE and WOOD, Circuit Judges.
Judges Rovner, Wood, Evans and Williams voted to grant the petition for rehearing en banc. Judges Flaum and Tinder took no part in the consideration or decision of the petition for rehearing en banc.

Opinion:
RIPPLE, Circuit Judge.
Four Indiana taxpayers, Anthony Hinrichs, Henry Gerner, Lynette Herold and Francis White Quigley, brought this action against the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Indiana General Assembly, challenging the House's practice of opening each session with a prayer. The district court agreed with the plaintiffs that the practice of legislative prayer as implemented by the House violated the Establishment Clause and issued a permanent injunction. The Speaker timely appealed and sought a stay of the district court's ruling pending full briefing before this court. We denied the stay but noted that our decision was based only on a preliminary understanding of the facts surrounding Indiana's practice. See Hinrichs v. Bosma, 440 F.3d 393 (7th Cir.2006). After briefing, oral argument and supplemental briefing, we now hold that the plaintiffs do not have standing to maintain this action. We therefore reverse the district court's judgment and remand the action with instructions to dismiss for want of jurisdiction.
I
BACKGROUND
A. Facts
Indiana's legislative authority is vested in the Indiana General Assembly, which is composed of the Senate and the House of Representatives. The House of Represen tatives meets in its chamber in the Indiana Statehouse, which has seating for the representatives and an observation gallery for about 75 to 100 members of the public.
House Rule 10.2 calls for a prayer or invocation to be given each meeting day before the House conducts any business. For the 188 years prior to the time the plaintiffs instituted this action, the Indiana House of Representatives opened each day with an invocation. The invocation occurs immediately after the Speaker's call to order. No legislative business takes place until the prayer is finished, and no one is required to remain in the House chamber during the prayer. The invocation is delivered from the Speaker's stand, and, according to House rules, no one may enter the Speaker's stand without invitation from the Speaker.
The invocation frequently is delivered by visiting clergy who have volunteered to pray and are nominated by a representative. On occasion, representatives have sponsored clergy who do not share their own religious affiliation. To nominate a member of the clergy, a representative fills out a "Minister of the Day" form setting forth the dates when the clergy member is available. The representative then submits the form to the Majority Caucus Chair, who schedules the cleric to deliver the invocation. No minister who has requested sponsorship ever has been turned down.
Prior to the date on which the visiting clergy member is to offer the invocation, a House staff member sends a letter setting forth the logistical details of the visit. The letter also states:
The invocation is to be a short prayer asking for guidance and help in the matters that come before the members. We ask that you strive for an ecumenical prayer as our members, staff and constituents come from different faith backgrounds. Thank you for your consideration.
R.16, Att. 2. No further guidance is provided and no review of the content of the prayer is conducted prior to its being given; typically, the Speaker does not know the identity of the minister until a few minutes prior to his or her introduction.
When a visiting clergy member has not been designated to give the prayer for a legislative session, a representative has given the invocation. On such an occasion, the representative does not receive guidance from anyone associated with the House concerning the form or content of the prayer. No one associated with the House ever has advised, corrected or admonished a minister or representative about the religious content of an invocation.
During the 2005 House session, the invocation was delivered by priests, Protestant ministers, several representatives, a rabbi and an imam. Of the forty-five prayers offered during this session for which text is available, twenty-nine prayers referenced "Jesus" or "Christ"; others invoked "God," "Lord," "Almighty God," or "Heavenly Father." Id. Att. 6 at 3, 7 (prayers of January 10 and 13, 2005 and February 17, 2005). At least one prayer was not ad dressed to a specific deity. See id. at 16-17 (prayer of April 14, 2005).
Several prayers were overtly Christian in content. For instance, one visiting cleric quoted several verses from a book of the New Testament as part of his prayer, see id. at 8 (prayer of February 28, 2005); still others referred to the "saving power of Jesus Christ," id. at 13 (prayer of March 28, 2005), to "our lord and savior Jesus Christ," id. at 14 (prayer of April 5, 2005), or to Jesus Christ as the son of God, id. at 16 (prayer of April 11, 2005). Many of these references were limited to the doxology at the end of the prayer. There also were invocations given that were not tied to any specific faith or denomination. For instance, the prayer offered on April 14, 2005, referenced Buddha, the Zen masters, a philosopher and a story from the Bible. See id. at 16-17. Still others invoked only "God" or "Lord" and simply requested wisdom for the Assembly or blessings for the State. See, e.g., id. at 18 (prayer of April 19, 2005); id. at 14 (prayer of March 31, 2005). Some prayers were offered as the personal prayer of the clergy member, see, e.g., id. at 14-15 (prayer of April 5, 2005); others purported to be offered on behalf of those assembled, see, e.g., id. at 17 (prayer of April 18, 2005).
Although minimal, there were costs associated with the practice of offering the invocation. The initial letter sent to clergy cost $.54 per mailing. Before a session commenced, the House members sometimes took photographs with the clergy scheduled to give the invocation. These photographs cost $.68 per print and were mailed at a cost of $1.60 per print. A thank-you letter sometimes was sent to visiting clergy, also at a cost of $.54 per mailing. Additionally, the sessions of the Indiana House are broadcast on the Internet at a cost of $112.85 per hour, or $1.88 per minute; each prayer, whether offered by a member of the clergy or by a representative, lasted a few minutes. All funds used to cover these costs came from the general budget; no funds were appropriated specifically to cover these expenses.
B. District Court Proceedings
On May 31, 2005, four Indiana taxpayers, Anthony Hinrichs, Henry Gerner, Lynette Herold and Francis White Quigley, brought this action for declaratory and injunctive relief challenging the existing practice of the Indiana House of Representatives to allow sectarian prayers to be given prior to each legislative session. The Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Indiana General Assembly was named as the defendant. In the complaint, the plaintiffs stated that they did not object to the practice of legislative prayer, but claimed that the practice of the Indiana House of Representatives violated the First Amendment because it allowed overtly sectarian prayers to be offered. The Speaker answered the complaint and, among other matters, asserted lack of standing.
On October 28, 2005, the district court conducted a trial on stipulated facts and written submissions of the parties. On November 30, 2005, the district court entered a final order declaring the Speaker's practice of allowing sectarian prayer to be violative of the Establishment Clause and permanently enjoining the Speaker from "permitting sectarian prayers to be offered as part of the official proceedings of the House of Representatives." R.31 at 1. The district court first addressed the Speaker's contention that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring this action. In the district court's view, the plaintiffs had established taxpayer standing under the Supreme Court's and this court's case law. It stated:
In this case the House's prayer practice is indeed paid for by taxpayer funds, through confirmation and thank-you letters and photographs sent to clergy, and additional web-streaming time. Though these costs are not directly attributable to the content of the invocations, they are directly attributable to the practice of legislative prayer that plaintiffs challenge. Because the plaintiffs are Indiana taxpayers who have proven "a measurable appropriation or disbursement of [public] funds occasioned solely by the activities complained of," Doremus [v. Board of Education], 342 U.S. [429,] 434, 72 S.Ct. 394, 96 L.Ed. 475 [(1952)], all four plaintiffs have standing under Article III to challenge the constitutionality of the official legislative prayers.
R.30 at 24. The district court then turned to the question of the constitutionality of the House's "Minister of the Day" program. It summarized its findings of fact and conclusions of law accordingly:
[T]he evidence shows that the official prayers offered to open sessions of the Indiana House of Representatives repeatedly and consistently advance the beliefs that define the Christian religion: the resurrection and divinity of Jesus of Nazareth. The Establishment Clause "means at the very least that government may not demonstrate a preference for one particular sect or creed (including a preference for Christianity over other religions). 'The clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.' " County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 605, 109 S.Ct. 3086, 106 L.Ed.2d 472 (1989), quoting Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244, 102 S.Ct. 1673, 72 L.Ed.2d 33 (1982). The sectarian content of the substantial majority of official prayers in the Indiana House therefore takes the prayers outside the safe harbor the Supreme Court recognized for inclusive, non-sectarian legislative prayers in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 103 S.Ct. 3330, 77 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1983). Plaintiffs have standing as Indiana taxpayers to bring their claims, and they are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief. This relief will not prohibit the House from opening its session with prayers if it chooses to do so, but will require that any official prayers be inclusive and non-sectarian, and not advance one particular religion.
R.30 at 2.
After the court's injunction issued, the Speaker filed a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). The Speaker claimed that the court's injunction "manifest[ed] clear legal error because it exceeded] the Court's jurisdiction in taxpayer-standing cases" and "because it [wa]s overly broad and d[id] not conform to the conduct challenged or the relief requested by the Plaintiffs." R.33 at 1. Additionally, the Speaker maintained that "the injunction [wa]s vague and [gave] the Speaker of the House no clear standard for application." Id. The Speaker also filed a motion to stay the enforcement of the injunction pending the district court's disposition of his Rule 59 motion. The plaintiffs opposed both motions.
On December 28, 2005, the court issued an order denying the Speaker's Rule 59 motion. In its order, the district court first rejected the Speaker's argument "that the court should give him the choice between either (a) modifying the prayer practice to bring it within constitutional bounds, or (b) eliminating the public spending but continuing the unconstitutional pattern of sectarian Christian prayers." R.47 at 3. The district court stated:
To describe the alternatives is to answer the question. The taxpayer plaintiffs have standing because of the public expenditures, but the law authorizes the court to order an end to the unconstitutional practice. The injury that gives the taxpayer-plaintiffs standing is the misuse of the public funds into which they pay their taxes.
In taxpayer standing cases, the injury to the plaintiff may be remedied by enjoining the expenditure of public funds, but may also be remedied by enjoining the unconstitutional practice, especially where the constitutional issues do not depend on the expenditure of public funds.
Id. at 3-4 (citations omitted).
The district court then turned to the Speaker's challenges to the terms of the injunction. The district court disagreed with the Speaker that the injunction should have been limited to opening prayers:
The plaintiffs challenged the House's practice of official prayers conducted under House Rule 10, which calls for a prayer after the Speaker calls the House to order and before the Pledge of Allegiance. As noted, plaintiffs showed that the practice of inviting clergy or House members to offer the prayer has produced a pattern of sectarian and exclusionary Christian prayers. If the court had limited the injunction to prayers offered pursuant to House Rule 10 as it currently exists, the injunction would not have affected, for example, an amended rule that would switch the order of the Pledge of Allegiance and the prayer, or a practice of sectarian prayer at the end of each session instead of the beginning.
Id. at 7-8.
Finally, the district court addressed the Speaker's contention that "the injunction is too vague to give him fair notice of what he is required to do to comply with it." Id. at 9. Although the district court believed that the "injunction here [wa]s sufficiently specific," it nevertheless answered some of the Speaker's questions "because of the larger public interests at stake." Id. at 10. The court explained that "[t]he injunction is not limited to sectarian Christian prayers"; this simply was the focus of the court's decision because "the evidence here shows a pattern of Christian prayer." Id. at 12. The court also elaborated on what would constitute prayers that "are sectarian in the Christian tradition," specifically those that "proclaim or otherwise communicate the beliefs that Jesus of Nazareth was the Christ, the Messiah, the Son of God, or the Savior, or that he was resurrected, or that he will return on Judgment Day or is otherwise divine." Id. at 16. With that clarification, the court denied the motion to alter or amend the judgment.
The Speaker timely appealed to this court.
II
DISCUSSION
Before we turn to the substantive claims, we first must address the "threshold jurisdictional question" of whether the plaintiffs possess the requisite standing to pursue this action. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 102, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998). The party "asserting federal jurisdiction" must "carry the burden of establishing [its] standing under Article III." Daimler-Chrysler Corp. v. Cuno, — U.S.-, 126 S.Ct. 1854, 1861, 164 L.Ed.2d 589 (2006).
When we first approached this issue on the Speaker's motion to stay, we noted that, in order to establish taxpayer standing — the only basis for standing asserted here — the plaintiffs "must demonstrate that the challenged program is supported by monies raised through taxes and that the use of those monies exceeds a specific constitutional limitation on the use of public funds, such as the First Amendment's prohibition on laws respecting an establishment of religion." Hinrichs, 440 F.3d at 396. Since briefing in this case was completed, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., — U.S.-, 127 S.Ct. 2553, 168 L.Ed.2d 424 (2007), in which the Court offered significant guidance concerning the breadth of its taxpayer standing jurisprudence. We invited the parties to submit supplemental briefs discussing the impact of Hein on the plaintiffs' standing in this case.
In light of Hein, the Speaker reasserts that the plaintiffs lack standing here. According to the Speaker, the Supreme Court made clear in DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, — U.S. -, 126 S.Ct. 1854, 1863, 164 L.Ed.2d 589 (2006), that the taxpayer standing requirements for federal taxpayers apply with equal force to state taxpayers. Accordingly, Hein directly applies to this action and "forecloses taxpayer standing in this case because the Plaintiffs have not identified — and cannot identify — any specific legislative appropriations that 'expressly authorize, direct or even mention the expenditures of which [the plaintiffs] complain.' " Appellant's Supp. Br. at 5. For their part, the plaintiffs maintain that Hein did nothing to disturb the holding of Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968), or of Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429, 434-35, 72 S.Ct. 394, 96 L.Ed. 475 (1952), which, unlike Flast, dealt explicitly with the question of state taxpayer standing. According to the plaintiffs, all that Doremus and Flast require of state taxpayers is a "good-faith pocketbook" injury, that is, "a financial interest that is, or is threatened to be, injured by the unconstitutional conduct." Doremus, 342 U.S. at 434-35, 72 S.Ct. 394; see Appellees' Supp. Br. at 4.
Upon consideration of the Court's disposition in Hein, and the parties' supplemental arguments, we believe that Hein requires us to revisit our preliminary determination that the plaintiffs possess the requisite standing to maintain this action. In order to explain our determination, a more plenary discussion of taxpayer standing, especially taxpayer standing to challenge alleged Establishment Clause violations, is in order.
A. Taxpayer Standing Prior to Flast v. Cohen
Our discussion must begin with the Supreme Court's initial pronouncements on taxpayer standing set forth in Frothingham v. Mellon, decided with Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 43 S.Ct. 597, 67 L.Ed. 1078 (1923). In that case, the plaintiffs, as federal taxpayers, challenged the constitutionality of the Maternity Act on the grounds that the appropriations authorized by the Act were "for purposes not national, but local to the states," and the effect of the statute was to take the plaintiffs' property, namely their tax dollars, without due process of law. Id. at 479-81, 43 S.Ct. 597. The Court determined that the interests of a federal taxpayer were not sufficiently direct or certain to support a general challenge to a congressional appropriations statute: "His interest in the moneys of the Treasury — partly realized from taxation and partly from other sources — is shared with millions of others; is comparatively minute and indeterminable; and the effect upon future taxation, of any payment out of the funds, so remote, fluctuating and uncertain, that no basis is afforded for an appeal to the preventive powers of a court of equity." Id. at 487, 43 S.Ct. 597. The Court explained that passing on the constitutionality of a statute, absent a plaintiff who has suffered a direct and concrete injury as a result of a congressional enactment, would result in a violation of the separation of powers:
We have no power per se to review and annul acts of Congress on the ground that they are unconstitutional. That question may be considered only when the justification for some direct injury suffered or threatened, presenting a jus-ticiable issue, is made to rest upon such an act. Then the power exercised is that of ascertaining and declaring the law applicable to the controversy.... The party who invokes the power must be able to show, not only that the statute is invalid, but that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally. If a case for preventive relief be presented the court enjoins, in effect, not the execution of the statute, but the acts of the official, the statute notwithstanding. Here the parties plaintiff have no such case. Looking through forms of words to the substance of their complaint, it is merely that officials of the executive department of the government are executing and will execute an act of Congress asserted to be unconstitutional; and this we are asked to prevent. To do so would be, not to decide a judicial controversy, but to assume a position of authority over the governmental acts of another and co-equal department, an authority which plainly we do not possess.
Id. at 488-89, 43 S.Ct. 597.
In articulating the rationale for denying standing to federal taxpayers, the Court noted that the interest of federal taxpayers with respect to the federal treasury were "very different" from that of a municipal taxpayer challenging an allegedly illegal use of municipal funds:
The interest of a taxpayer of a municipality in the application of its moneys is direct and immediate and the remedy by injunction to prevent their misuse is not inappropriate.... The reasons which support the extension of the equitable remedy to a single taxpayer in such cases are based upon the peculiar relation of the corporate taxpayer to the corporation, which is not without some resemblance to that subsisting between stockholder and private corporation.
Id. at 486-87, 43 S.Ct. 597.
The Court next addressed taxpayer standing in Doremus. There, state taxpayers challenged a New Jersey statute requiring the recitation of five verses of the Old Testament at the beginning of each school day; the activity was not "supported by any separate tax or paid for from any particular appropriation," nor did "it add[ ] any sum whatever to the cost of conducting school." Doremus, 342 U.S. at 433, 72 S.Ct. 394.
In deciding whether the taxpayers could pursue their challenge, the Court first reiterated its statements from prior cases that "the interests of a [federal taxpayer] in the moneys of the federal treasury are too indeterminable, remote, uncertain and indirect to furnish a basis for an appeal to the preventive powers of the Court over their manner of expenditure." Id. at 433, 72 S.Ct. 394. The Court went on to observe that what it had said "of a federal statute" was "equally true when a state Act [wa]s assailed: 'The party who invokes the power must be able to show, not only that the statute is invalid but that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite' " Id. at 434, 72 S.Ct. 394 (quoting Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 488, 43 S.Ct. 597). The Court then held that the case or controversy requirement is met by a state taxpayer only when the taxpayer brings "a good-faith pocketbook action." Id. It is a question, the Court stated, "of possession of the requisite financial interest that is, or is threatened to be, injured by the unconstitutional conduct." Id. at 435, 72 S.Ct. 394. Finding this financial interest lacking, the Court held that the state taxpayers could not maintain their challenge to the statute.
B. Flast v. Cohen
In Flast, the Court considered whether there were any exceptions to the bar against taxpayer standing erected in Frothingham. Specifically, the Court had to decide "whether the Frothingham barrier should be lowered when a taxpayer attacks a federal statute on the ground that it violates the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment." Id. at 85, 88 S.Ct. 1942. At issue in Flast was the constitutionality of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub.L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 241a et seq. (1964)), which, among other matters, "appropriated [funds] . to finance instruction in reading, arithmetic, and other subjects in religious schools, and to purchase textbooks and other instructional materials for use in such schools." Id. at 85-86, 88 S.Ct. 1942.
In addressing the standing issue, the Court first turned to its holding in Frothingham. In that case, the Court recounted, it had
noted that a federal taxpayer's "interest in the moneys of the treasury . is comparatively minute and indeterminable" and that "the effect upon future taxation, of any payment out of the (Treasury's) funds, . (is) remote, fluctuating and uncertain." As a result, the Court ruled that the taxpayer had failed to allege the type of "direct injury" necessary to confer standing.
Id. at 92, 88 S.Ct. 1942 (quoting Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 487-88, 43 S.Ct. 597). The Court then observed that its opinion in Frothingham had engendered some confusion concerning the legal and philosophical bases for standing. This confusion, the Court continued, suggested that it "should undertake a fresh examination of the limitations upon standing to sue in a federal court and the application of those limitations to taxpayer suits." - Id. at 94, 88 S.Ct. 1942.
The Court, however, did not turn immediately to the concept of standing, but first examined the limitations placed on federal courts by the case or controversy requirement of Article III. Justiciability, the Court explained, was not merely prudential, but firmly rooted in Article III:
[T]he implicit policies embodied in Article III, and not history alone, impose the rule against advisory opinions on federal courts. When the federal judicial power is invoked to pass upon the validity of actions by the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government, the rule against advisory opinions implements the separation of powers prescribed by the Constitution and confines federal courts to the role assigned them by Article III.
Id. at 96, 88 S.Ct. 1942. However, the Court also acknowledged that "[t]he 'many subtle pressures' which cause policy considerations to blend into the constitutional limitations of Article III make the justiciability doctrine one of uncertain and shifting contours." Id. at 97, 88 S.Ct. 1942 (footnote omitted).
The Court also noted that, as "an aspect of justiciability," "standing is surrounded by the same complexities and vagaries that inhere in justiciability." Id. at 98, 88 S.Ct. 1942. However, "[djespite the complexities and uncertainties," the Court continued,
some meaningful form can be given to the jurisdictional limitations placed on federal court power by the concept of standing.
The fundamental aspect of standing is that it focuses on the party seeking to get his complaint before a federal court and not on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated. The "gist of the question of standing" is whether the party seeking relief has "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."
Id. at 99, 88 S.Ct. 1942 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962)) (emphasis added). This requirement of a "proper party" was necessary so that "federal courts w[ould] not be asked to decide 'ill-defined controversies over constitutional issues,' " or cases which were "hypothetical" or "abstract." Flast, 392 U.S. at 100, 88 S.Ct. 1942 (quoting United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 90, 67 S.Ct. 556, 91 L.Ed. 754 (1947), and Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240, 57 S.Ct. 461, 81 L.Ed. 617 (1937), respectively). The Court then summarized the relationship between standing and Article III jurisdiction:
Thus, in terms of Article III limitations on federal court jurisdiction, the question of standing is related only to whether the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an adversary con text and in a form historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution. It is for that reason that the emphasis in standing problems is on whether the party invoking federal court jurisdiction has "a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy," and whether the dispute touches upon "the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests."
Id. at 101, 88 S.Ct. 1942 (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, and Aetna Life Ins. Co., 300 U.S. at 240-41, 57 S.Ct. 461, respectively).
This requirement did not eliminate the possibility that a federal taxpayer may have "the requisite personal stake in the outcome" of a particular case necessary to establish standing. Flast, 392 U.S. at 101, 88 S.Ct. 1942. Indeed, the Court stated that the requisite stake could be established under the following circumstances:
The nexus demanded of federal taxpayers has two aspects to it. First, the taxpayer must establish a logical link between that status and the type of legislative enactment attacked. Thus, a taxpayer will be a proper party to allege the unconstitutionality only of exercises of congressional power under the taxing and spending clause of Art. I, § 8, of the Constitution. It will not be sufficient to allege an incidental expenditure of tax funds in the administration of an essentially regulatory statute. This requirement is consistent with the limitation imposed upon state-taxpayer standing in federal courts in Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429, 72 S.Ct. 394, 96 L.Ed. 475 (1952). Secondly, the taxpayer must establish a nexus between that status and the precise nature of the constitutional infringement alleged. Under this requirement, the taxpayer must show that the challenged enactment exceeds specific constitutional limitations imposed upon the exercise of the congressional taxing and spending power and not simply that the enactment is generally beyond the powers delegated to Congress by Art. I, § 8. When both nexuses are established, the litigant will have shown a taxpayer's stake in the outcome of the controversy and will be a proper and appropriate party to invoke a federal court's jurisdiction.
Id. at 102-03, 88 S.Ct. 1942.
Turning then to the specific plaintiffs in the case, the Court held that each nexus had been established. With respect to the first nexus, the taxpayers' challenge was made to an exercise of Congress' taxing and spending power under Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution. With respect to the second nexus, the Court noted that the taxpayers alleged that the challenged expenditures violated the Establishment Clause, which operated as a specific limitation on Congress' spending power: "Our history vividly illustrates that one of the specific evils feared by those who drafted the Establishment Clause and fought for its adoption was that the taxing and spending power would be used to favor one religion over another or to support religion in general." Id. at 103, 88 S.Ct. 1942.
The Court then summarized its holding accordingly:
[W]e hold that a taxpayer will have standing consistent with Article III to invoke federal judicial power when he alleges that congressional action under the taxing and spending clause is in derogation of those constitutional provisions which operate to restrict the exercise of the taxing and spending power. The taxpayer's allegation in such cases would be that his tax money is being extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protections against such abuses of legislative power. Such an injury is appropriate for judicial re dress, and the taxpayer has established the necessary nexus between his status and the nature of the allegedly unconstitutional action to support his claim of standing to secure judicial review. Under such circumstances, we feel confident that the questions will be framed with the necessary specificity, that the issues will be contested with the necessary adverseness and that the litigation will be pursued with the necessary vigor to assure that the constitutional challenge will be made in a form traditionally thought to be capable of judicial resolution.
Id. at 105-06, 88 S.Ct. 1942.
C. Standing Cases after Flast
Over the next few years, litigants tested Flasfs boundaries by attempting to use taxpayer standing to challenge different kinds of federal governmental actions. For instance, in Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982), plaintiffs sought to challenge as violative of the Establishment Clause the transfer of federal property by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare to a sectarian institution. The Court, however, held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to maintain their action because "Flast limited taxpayer standing to challenges directed 'only [at] exercises of congressional power' " under the Taxing and Spending Power. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 479, 102 S.Ct. 752 (quoting Flast, 392 U.S. at 102, 88 S.Ct. 1942). Similarly, in United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 94 S.Ct. 2940, 41 L.Ed.2d 678 (1973), the Court held that a taxpayer did not have standing to pursue his action which sought a detailed accounting of expenditures by the Central Intelligence Agency. According to the Court, the taxpayer had not tied his status as a taxpayer to the "taxing or spending power," nor had he claimed that appropriated funds were being spent in violation of a specific constitutional limitation on that power. Id. at 175, 94 S.Ct. 2940.
The Court has been equally unwilling to see Flast as a means of extending state taxpayer standing. As noted above, the Court previously had suggested in Doremus that the limitations on federal taxpayer standing were equally applicable to state taxpayers challenging state actions. The Court again focused on the question of state taxpayer standing in Cuno. In Cuno, state taxpayers sought to challenge actions by the city of Toledo and the State of Ohio to encourage the manufacture of Jeeps in the Toledo area, specifically through offering local and state tax benefits for new investment. The taxpayers alleged that the granting of tax credits under these circumstances violated the Commerce Clause. Without addressing the parties' standing, the Sixth Circuit reached the merits of the plaintiffs' claims and held that the tax credit was invalid. The Supreme Court granted review, but requested that the parties also "address whether [the] plaintiffs have standing to challenge the franchise tax credit in this litigation." Id. at 1860.
In its opinion, the Court noted that it was asked to decide "an important question of constitutional law concerning the Commerce Clause." Id. at 1861. Before it turned to that question, however, it had to determine whether the "plaintiffs, as the parties now asserting federal jurisdiction, [had] carried] the burden of establishing their standing under Article III." Id. (internal citations omitted).
In addressing the standing issue, the Court reviewed the roots of its taxpayer standing jurisprudence in Frothingham:
In rejecting a claim that improper federal appropriations would "increase the burden of future taxation and thereby take [the plaintiffs] property without due process of law," the Court observed that a federal taxpayer's "interest in the moneys of the Treasury . is shared with millions of others; is comparatively minute and indeterminable; and the effect upon future taxation, of any payment out of the funds, so remote, fluctuating and uncertain, that no basis is afforded for an appeal to the preventive powers of a court of equity."
Id. at 1862 (quoting Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 486-87, 43 S.Ct. 597). The Court then noted that the "rationale for rejecting federal taxpayer standing applies with undiminished force to state taxpayers." Cuno, 126 S.Ct. at 1863. The application of the principle to the states was indicated, the Court stated, in Doremus:
In that case, we noted our earlier holdings that "the interests of a taxpayer in the moneys of the federal treasury are too indeterminable, remote, uncertain and indirect" to support standing to challenge "their manner of expenditure." We then "reiterate[d]" what we had said in rejecting a federal taxpayer challenge to a federal statute "as equally true when a state Act is assailed: 'The [taxpayer] must be able to show . that he has sustained . some direct injury . and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally.' "
Id. (quoting Doremus, 342 U.S. at 433-34, 72 S.Ct. 394).
Indeed, the Court noted that failure to extend the bar against general taxpayer standing to state taxpayers challenging appropriations made by state statutes could raise serious federalism issues:
Federal courts may not assume a particular exercise of this state fiscal discretion in establishing standing; a party seeking federal jurisdiction cannot rely on such "[s]peculative inferences . to connect [his] injury to the challenged actions of [the defendant]," Simon [v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org.], 426 U.S. [26, 45, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976)].... Indeed, because state budgets frequently contain an array of tax and spending provisions, any number of which may be challenged on a variety of bases, affording state taxpayers standing to press such challenges simply because their tax burden gives them an interest in the state treasury would interpose the federal courts as " 'virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness' " of state fiscal administration, contrary to the more modest role Article III envisions for federal courts. See [Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 760-61, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984)] (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15, 92 S.Ct. 2318, 33 L.Ed.2d 154 (1972)).
Cuno, 126 S.Ct. at 1864.
Thus, the Court concluded, "we hold that state taxpayers have no standing under Article III to challenge state tax or spending decisions simply by virtue of their status as taxpayers." Id. at 1864. Finally, the Court rejected the plaintiffs' attempts to analogize their challenge under the Commerce Clause to the Establishment Clause violation alleged in Flast. The Court believed that the broad application of Flast urged by the plaintiffs "would be quite at odds with its narrow application in our precedent and Flasf s own promise that it would not transform federal courts into forums for taxpayers' 'generalized grievances.' " Id. at 1865 (quoting Flast, 392 U.S. at 106, 88 S.Ct. 1942).
D. Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation
It is against this jurisprudential framework that we must view the Supreme Court's decision in Hein and consider its application to the present case. In Hein, federal taxpayers challenged part of the President's Faith Based and Community Initiatives program as violative of the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. The plaintiffs maintained that they possessed taxpayer standing to challenge the program because funds from the federal treasury, specifically "general Executive Branch appropriations," Hein, 127 S.Ct. at 2559, were used to fund the initiative. A divided panel of this court determined that the plaintiffs had shown the necessary injury under Flast, and its progeny, to establish taxpayer standing. Specifically, the majority held that:
The difference, then, between this case on the one hand and Flast and [Bowen v.] Kendrick[, 487 U.S. 589, 108 S.Ct. 2562, 101 L.Ed.2d 520 (1988),] on the other is that the expenditures in those cases were pursuant to specific congressional grant programs, while in this case, there is no statutory program, just the general "program" of appropriating some money to executive-branch departments without strings attached. The difference cannot be controlling.
Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Chao, 433 F.3d 989, 994 (7th Cir.2006). The Supreme Court disagreed. After reiterating the test for taxpayer standing set forth in Flast, see Flast, 392 U.S. at 102-03, 88 S.Ct. 1942, the plurality determined that the difference between a specific congressional enactment authorizing the expenditure of funds and an expenditure made from general funds appropriated to the Executive Branch was a critical one: The necessary link between "congressional action and constitutional violation that supported taxpayer standing in Flast [wa]s missing." Hein, 127 S.Ct. at 2566. The plurality explained that the
Respondents do not challenge any specific congressional action or appropriation; nor do they ask the Court to invalidate any congressional enactment or legislatively created program as unconstitutional. That is because the expenditures at issue here were not made pursuant to any Act of Congress. Rather, Congress provided general appropriations to the Executive Branch to fund its day-to-day activities. These appropriations did not expressly authorize, direct, or even mention the expenditures of which respondents complain. Those expenditures resulted from executive discretion, not congressional action.
Id. at 2566 (footnote omitted). Consequently, the plurality concluded that "this case falls outside the 'narrow exception' that Flast 'created to the general rule against taxpayer standing established in Frothingham.' " Id. at 2568 (quoting Kendrick, 487 U.S. at 618, 108 S.Ct. 2562). "Because the expenditures that respondents challenge were not expressly authorized or mandated by any specific congressional enactment," the Justices in the plurality explained, "respondents' lawsuit is not directed at an exercise of congressional power, and thus lacks the requisite 'logical nexus' between taxpayer status 'and the type of legislative enactment attacked.'" Hein, 127 S.Ct. at 2568 (quoting Flast, 392 U.S. at 102, 88 S.Ct. 1942) (additional citations omitted).
E. Application
We believe that there are several guiding principles to take away from the cases we just have discussed. First, the general rule, articulated first in Frothingham, and reiterated most recently in Hein, is that federal taxpayers may not lodge constitutional challenges against congressional appropriations. The exception to the general rule set forth in Frothingham is a narrow one: Indeed, the exception only applies when the taxpayer has established a "logical link between [his taxpayer] status and the type of legislative enactment attacked" as well as "a nexus between that status and the precise nature of the constitutional infringement alleged." Flast, 392 U.S. at 102-03, 88 S.Ct. 1942. Second, the nexus between the plaintiffs taxpayer status and the legislative enactment must be a direct one. The plurality of the Court made clear in Hein that only "expenditures made pursuant to an express congressional mandate and a specific congressional appropriation" met the first nexus requirement; the plurality rejected the plaintiffs' claim that any "expenditure of government funds in violation of the Establishment Clause" would meet this requirement. See Hein, 127 S.Ct. at 2565 (internal quotation marks omitted). In the context of an alleged Establishment Clause violation, the nexus requirement is not met absent "the very 'extraction] and spen[ding]' of 'tax money in aid of religion." Cuno, 126 S.Ct. at 1865 (quoting Flast, 392 U.S. at 106, 88 S.Ct. 1942). Finally, state taxpayers are held to the same standing requirements as federal taxpayers. They must establish the requisite nexus between them status and the challenged enactment in order to meet the test articulated in Flast. Anything less "would interpose the federal courts as " 'virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness' " of state fiscal administration, contrary to the more modest role Article III envisions for federal courts." Cuno, 126 S.Ct. at 1864 (quoting Allen, 468 U.S. at 760-61, 104 S.Ct. 3315). With these principles in mind, we turn to the standing claim made by the plaintiffs.
In the present case, the plaintiffs are challenging the practice of legislative prayer as implemented by the Indiana House of Representatives. It is clear from the parties' stipulations that Indiana's practice consists of a "Minister of the Day" program that involves the offering of a prayer by a member of the clergy with representatives filling in to offer the invocation only when "no cleric [is] present." R.16 at 3. The program, as it is presently administered, is not mandated by statute. The origin of the practice is House Rule 10.2, and that rule merely provides that a prayer or invocation be given each meeting day before the House conducts any business. The manner in which the program is currently administered is a matter of House tradition, implemented at the discretion of the Speaker. Although there is some minimal amount of funds expended in the administration of the program, the plaintiffs have not pointed to any specific appropriation of funds by the legislature to implement the program. Furthermore, other than the costs of web-casting, the only costs incurred are postage for the sending of thank-you letters and pictures. These costs not only are unrelated to the content of the prayers offered, they are unnecessary for the administration of the "Minister of the Day" program.
Under these circumstances, we simply cannot conclude that the nexus require ments of Flast, as explained in Hein, have been met. The plaintiffs have not tied their status as taxpayers to the House's allegedly unconstitutional practice of regularly offering a sectarian prayer. They have not shown that the legislature has extracted from them tax dollars for the establishment and implementation of a program that violates the Establishment Clause. The appropriations, which cover the incidental costs of the program, "did not expressly authorize, direct, or even mention the expenditures," Hein, 127 S.Ct. at 2566, attendant to the "Minister of the Day" program. Instead, the plaintiffs allege only an " 'expenditure of government funds in violation of the Establishment Clause,' " which the Court explicitly rejected as inadequate in Hein. Id. at 2565 (internal citations omitted).
Despite the lack of specific direction by the state legislature to establish the Minister of the Day program and the lack of specific appropriations dedicated to the program, the plaintiffs maintain that Hein does not require this court to reconsider the preliminary conclusion of the stay panel that the plaintiffs possessed standing to maintain this action. The plaintiffs note that the Supreme Court in Hein did not disturb its holding in Flast: "We do not extend Flast, but we also do not overrule it. We leave Flast as we found it." Id. at 2571-72. Because this court's initial determination was based on Flast (and case law interpreting Flast), the plaintiffs urge that Hein leaves undisturbed the stay panel's standing determination. We cannot agree.
Although the Supreme Court's plurality characterized its opinion as effecting no change in its view of the law of taxpayer standing, the plurality's decision, especially when read with Cuno, clarified significantly the law of taxpayer standing for the lower federal courts. For instance, our treatment of taxpayer standing at the time we addressed the Speaker's motion for stay articulated a more malleable vision of Flast than the one articulated by the plurality in Hein. In our earlier treatment, we stated: "Both parties accept that, in order to have standing as a taxpayer, a person must demonstrate that the challenged program is supported by monies raised through taxes and that the use of those monies exceeds a specific constitutional limitation on the use of public funds, such as the First Amendment's prohibition on laws respecting an establishment of religion." Hinrichs, 440 F.3d at 396. Hein, however, explains that the "use" of funds for the allegedly unconstitutional program, without more, is not sufficient to meet the nexus required by Flast. Instead, it is the appropriation of those funds for the allegedly unconstitutional purpose that provides the link between taxpayer and expenditure necessary to support standing.
We are well aware of the time and energy that the parties and the district court have expended on the merits of this matter. However, "[i]f a dispute is not a proper case or controversy, the courts have no business deciding it, or expounding the law in the course of doing so." Cuno, 126 S.Ct. at 1860-61.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court's judgment, and we remand the case to the district court with instructions to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. The Speaker may recover his costs in this court.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS
. The parties stipulated that members of the public seated in the balcony are "discouraged] from leaving the balcony during the Pledge of Allegiance or the Invocation so as to minimize noise. However, if any individual indicates that he or she objects to the prayer or Pledge or if the individual expresses a desire to leave immediately the individual will be allowed to leave freely." R.17 at 1-2.
. An exception to this typical arrangement occurs when the Speaker has sponsored the cleric of the day.
. Specifically, the district court decreed:
1. That defendant Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Indiana General Assembly, in his official capacity, is permanently enjoined from permitting sectarian prayers to be offered as part of the official proceedings of the House of Representatives. If the Speaker chooses to continue to permit non-sectarian prayers as part of the official proceedings, he shall advise all persons offering such prayers (a) that the prayers must be non-sectarian and must not be used to proselytize or advance any one faith or belief or to disparage any other faith or belief, and (b) that the prayers should not use Christ's name or title or any other denominational appeal. This injunction applies to the Speaker, and to his agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and all other persons in active concert with them who receive actual notice of this injunction by personal service or otherwise.
R.31 at 1-2.
. This order rendered moot the Speaker's motion to stay.
. As noted by our dissenting colleague, a pecuniary interest is not the only means of establishing standing. See dissent at 605-06. In the context of an alleged Establishment Clause violation, we have stated that "allegations of direct and unwelcome exposure to a religious message" are sufficient to show the injury-in-fact necessary to support standing. Doe v. County of Montgomery, Ill., 41 F.3d 1156, 1159 (7th Cir.1994); see also ACLU v. City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265, 268-69 (7th Cir.1986). The plaintiffs initially asserted both standing as taxpayers and, with respect to Mr. Hinrichs, standing as individual subject to "direct and unwelcome exposure" to the House prayers as a result of his job as a lobbyist. The plaintiffs, however, abandoned this alternative basis for standing in the district court when Mr. Hinrichs ceased being a lobbyist and informed the court that "he ha[d] no plans to lobby for any organization or entity in the Indiana General Assembly." R. 29 at 1. Thereafter, the plaintiffs relied exclusively on their status as taxpayers to support standing. Consequently, in order to maintain their action, the plaintiffs must meet the requirements for taxpayer standing set forth below.
. In Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429, 72 S.Ct. 394, 96 L.Ed. 475 (1952), the Court stated:
[W]e reiterate what the Court said of a federal statute as equally true when a state Act is assailed: "The party who invokes the power must be able to show, not only that the statute is invalid, but that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally."
Id. at 434, 72 S.Ct. 394 (quoting Frothingham v. Mellon, decided with Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488, 43 S.Ct. 597, 67 L.Ed. 1078 (1923)).
. Neither the district court, nor this court in considering the motion for stay, had the benefit of this decision.
. The dissent asserts that the requisite connection between the allegedly unconstitutional practice and the expenditure of funds is established by the initial adoption of House Rule 10.2 in conjunction with the House's later action in passing a budget, which included appropriations for the general operations of the House. We do not believe these two actions satisfy the requirement, set forth in Hein, that the challenged expenditures be "expressly authorized or mandated" by a "specific congressional enactment." Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc., - U.S.-, 127 S.Ct. 2553, 2568, 168 L.Ed.2d 424 (2007); see also id. at 2566 (finding the requisite nexus missing because "[t]hese appropriations did not expressly authorize, direct, or even mention the expenditures of which respondents complain"). The plaintiffs do not challenge Rule 10.2; indeed, they acknowledge the constitutionality of some form of legislative prayer. Instead, it is the present practice of employing a minister of the day, and the resulting sectarian prayers, that the plaintiffs seek to enjoin. However, as demonstrated above, there is no specific appropriation either for Rule 10.2 or for the Minister of the Day program. Absent such an appropriation, the necessary link between the taxpayer and the expenditure for the allegedly unconstitutional practice has not been established.
. The plaintiffs also argue that "this Court has also consistently acknowledged that Flast gives a taxpayer standing to challenge any type of state or local 'tax dollar expenditures that allegedly contribute to Establishment Clause violations. Flast v. Cohen.' " Appellees' Supp. Br. at 5 (quoting Gonzales v. North Township of Lake County, Indiana, 4 F.3d 1412, 1416 (7th Cir.1993)). However, as the plaintiffs acknowledge, the case on which they rest this proposition, Gonzales, concerns the standing of municipal taxpayers to challenge municipal expenditures. As already noted, since its first pronouncements on taxpayer standing, the Supreme Court has distinguished between the standing requirements for federal and state taxpayers, on the one hand, and municipal taxpayers on the other. With one exception, the other cases from this circuit which are cited by the plaintiffs fall into one of two categories: (1) state taxpayer challenges to specific state legislative appropriations (which would meet the standards under DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 126 S.Ct. 1854, 164 L.Ed.2d 589 (2006), and Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc.,-U.S.-, 127 S.Ct. 2553, 168 L.Ed.2d 424 (2007)), and (2) municipal taxpayer challenges to municipal actions (which are not subject to the same stringent standing requirements as state and federal taxpayers seeking to challenge state and federal actions, respectively).
The one case that warrants further comment is Van Zandt v. Thompson, 839 F.2d 1215 (7th Cir.1988). In Van Zandt, the Illinois House of Representatives passed a resolution "which provided for the conversion of a hearing room in the Illinois State Capitol Building . into a prayer room." Id. at 1216. The resolution "contemplatefd] that private donations w[ould] be raised to cover the cost of renovating and maintaining the room." Id. at 1217.
On appeal, our discussion of standing was brief:
The district court held and neither of the parties has disputed that Van Zandt has standing to sue since he is an Illinois taxpayer and since the proposed prayer room would arguably place economic burdens of various sorts on the State of Illinois and its taxpayers. Van Zandt v. Thompson, 649 F.Supp. 583, 587 (N.D.Ill.1986) (citing Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 n. 4, 103 S.Ct. 3330, 77 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1983)). Similarly, the district court held that the "Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc.," a Wisconsin not-for-profit corporation, has associational standing as a representative of its members who are Illinois taxpayers. Id. at 588 n. 4. These determinations appear to be correct and have not been challenged by any of the parties. We therefore accept them.
Id. (parallel citations omitted). After Cuno and Hein, such amorphous burdens on state taxpayers would not meet Flast's narrow exception to taxpayer standing. Indeed, the resolution at issue did not authorize any expenditure of funds, nor did it contemplate the use of any state taxes for the renovation and maintenance of the room. Consequently, the district court's assessment that the room would "place economic burdens of various sorts" on the state taxpayers was merely speculative and could not support the concrete injury to the plaintiffs as taxpayers necessary to support standing.