Case Name: Whitaker and others against Gavit and others
Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Connecticut
Decision Date: 1847-07
Citations: 18 Conn. 522
Docket Number: 
Parties: Whitaker and others against Gavit and others:
Judges: In this opinion, Church, Ch. J. and Storks and Hinman, Js., concurred.
Reporter: Connecticut Reports
Volume: 18
Pages: 522–535

Head Matter:
Whitaker and others against Gavit and others:
IN ERROR.
A} having a claim against J5, for having willfully and maliciously mutilated the model of a propeller belonging to A, and being insolvent, made an assignment for the benefit of his creditors, under the statute of 1828. In making this assignment, it was intended and agreed by A, that such claim against I? should be included therein and conveyed to the assignee, as well as the property specified, but through the mistake of the draftsman, it was omitted. On a bill in chancery brought by Ü, a purchaser of such claim from the assignee, praying for the reformation of the assignment according to the intention of A, and other relief, it was held, that such claim not having been included in the assignment, there was no assignment thereof in writing, pursuant to the statute, and the court of probate had no jurisdiction over it; and consequently, C was not entitled to the relief sought. [One judge dissenting]
If, however, such claim had been specified in the assignment, it would have passed to the assignee, being in its nature assignable.
This was a bill in chancery, brought by Edwin Gavit and others against Horace Whitaker, Jedediah Williams and George W. Clark, praying the court to establish an assignment made by Clark in trust for his creditors, and give the plaintiffs the benefit of it, and also enjoin Whitaker against the further prosecution of a writ of scire-facias which he had brought against Williams.
The case stated in the bill was as follows. Clark, having a claim against Williams for willfully and maliciously mutilating a certain model of a propeller which he was building for Williams, with intent to interrupt him in his business, and having become insolvent, conveyed to Edward Chappell, in trust for the benefit of all his creditors, pursuant to the statute of 1828, the timber and other materials for ship building in his ship-yard, and also the balances due to him from Williams, and certain other persons, for and on account of the propeller, and other vessels built for them. In making the assignment, it was designed, intended and agreed, by Clark, that his claim against Williams for the damages sustained by the mutilation of the model, should be included therein, and conveyed to the assignee, as well as the balance due him for the construction of the propeller; but from the particulars not having been explained to and understood by the draftsman of the assignment, the. claim was not so fully described as to be effectually transferred thereby. This assignment was-duly lodged in the office of the court of probate, on the day of its date. Chappell declined to accept the trust; and thereupon the court of probate appointed Giles M. Eaton, trustee under the assignment, who accepted the trust, and gave bonds according to law. This trustee, under the authority and interest vested in him, as such trustee, and by virtue of the orders of the court of probate, and with the assent and approbation of Clark, sold to the plaintiffs, at public auction, among other things, all Clark's claim upon Williams, for the balance due from him, for the construction of the propeller, and also his claim for the damages occasioned by the injury to the model. The plaintiffs having thus become the purchasers of these claims, caused a suit to be instituted against Williams, to recover the damages occasioned by the injury to the model, and recovered judgment for 75 dollars, damages, and 40 dollars, 38 cents, costs. The suit was brought in the name of Clark, with his understanding and consent, but was instituted and prosecuted by the plaintiffs, as the owners of the claim, at their expense and for their benefit. The defendants had full knowledge of all these facts; but Whitaker, designing and contriving to deprive th¡| plaintiffs of the benefit of the judgment which they had obtained, afterwards instituted a suit against Clark, by process of foreign attachment, and left a copy with Williams, as the debtor of Clark, and then brought a scire-facias against Williams, which is pending.
After a full hearing, the superior court found all the facts stated in the bill to be true, and passed a decree, establishing the plaintiffs’title to the judgment, and enjoining Whitaker against interfering with the collection thereof.
The defendants thereupon filed their motion in error, to procure a reversal of that decree ; assigning for error, that no title to the claim against Williams, for the mutilation of the model, ever vested in the assignee, such claim never having been assigned to him, by any instrument in writing; and because the claim was a mere naked right to sue for a tort, and was not assignable, either in law or equity.
E. Perkins, for the plaintiffs in error,
contended, 1. That an assignee for the benefit of creditors, under the statute of against fraudulent conveyances, can derive* a title to Pr0Perty only trough an instrument of assignment in writing. Stat. 301. s. 1. (ed. 1838.) This is the foundation of all proceedings under the statute. Without it, the court of probate has no jurisdiction over the property. The intent and agreement of the debtor to execute such an instrument, not carried into effect, will not supply the want of it. That this is true at-law, will not be denied. It is equally true in equity. Are not the positive provisions of a statute binding upon a court of equity, as well as upon a court of law ? If equity can supply the want of such an instrument as to any part of the property, it may as to the whole ; and the consequence will be, that a parol assignment, or an intent and agreement to assign, is regarded in equity as a compliance with the statute ; and this will amount to a repeal of this part of the statute — so far as the jurisdiction of a court of equity extends.
2. That the claim of Clark against Williams for the willful and malicious mutilation of the model, was a mere naked right to sue for a tort; and if it were expressly included in the assignment, it would not pass to the assignee. By the common law, neither possibilities, nor rights of entry, nor things in action, nor causes of suit, could be assigned. Co. Litt. 214. a. 2 Bla. Com. 442. Scholey v. Daniel, 2 Bos. <§• Pul. 541. 1 Sw. Dig. 170. The object of this rule of the common law, is, to prevent champerty and maintenance ; and courts of equity will not, any more than courts of law, uphold an assignment which involves such offensive ingredients. 2 Sto. Eq. 312. Harrington v. Long, 2 Mylne <f- Keene 592. This claim would not vest in the assignee, under the bankrupt law. Bird v. Hempsted, 3 Day 272.
3. That this case presents no features, which will induce a court of chancery to extend its jurisdiction beyond its well defined limits. The aid of this court is sought to secure to the plaintiffs the profits of a speculation in the malicious feelings and quarrels of neighbours.
Strong and Rockwell, for the defendants in error,
contended, 1. That an assignment under the statute of 1828, may be reformed, by a court of equity, as well as any other instrument. It is said the statute requires the assignment to be in writing. So another statute requires a deed of land to be in writing ; but if there is a mistake in drawing it- — -in the-description of the premises, or in any other material part — is it not the daily practice of a court of equity to correct that mistake ? If a conveyance from A to B directly, may be rectified, why may not one from A to C, for the benefit of B, be rectified? Assignments under the statute of 1828 stand indeed on higher ground, and ought to be more favour-ed, than ordinary conveyances from one party to another. They are made to disinterested trustees, who are required to give bonds for the faithful performance of their duties, and whose proceedings are subject to the controul of the court of probate.
2. That the claim in question was assignable under the statute. And here we are relieved from any discussion about the common law rule as to the assignability of choses in action ; because the statute specifies “ choses in action” among the subjects of the assignment. Stat. 300. s. 1. That this claim was a chose in action, is unquestionable, Clark’s property had been injured ; and he was entitled to an indemnity ; which he had a right to recover by suit. This was a thing in action, as much as though it had originated in a contract. “ Damages due for breach of covenant, for the detention of chattels or for torts, are included under this general head.” 2 Kent’s Com. 251. If Clark had died, after his right of action had accrued and before the assignment, the claim would have survived to his personal representative. Gris-wold v. Brown, 1 Day 180.
3. That these points being established, the plaintiffs were entitled to the relief sought, and the decree passed by the court below, was a proper one.

Opinion:
Ellsworth, J.
The first error complained of, is, that the court below decided, that the plaintiffs had an equitable title to the chose in question. In this, we think, there is error. The plaintiffs pretend' to no title, except one from Giles M. Eaton, a trustee, substituted, by the court of probate, for Edward Chappel. From whence did Eaton derive his title, if the chose in action was not, as confessedly it was not, in the assignment? the '«-design, intention and agreement of Clark" (though with whom it is not said,) to the contrary, notwithstanding. Since Clark has not, by any general or particular descriptive language, included this claim in his assignment, it is not assigned ; that is all. The court cannot make an assignment for him, whether the omission is attributable to design or mistake. Besides, an assignment under the statute of 1828, must be in writing, and recorded. All the property, which it is claimed passes by it, must be embraced within the description used in it. The description may be very general; but it must be there, and speak for itself. A parol assignment, and much less one only intended, is no assignment at all, under the statute, and gives no jurisdiction to the probate court. Property not found in the assignment cannot, properly, be inventoried, or appraised ; nor is it covered by the bond executed to the judge of probate. If it is, how can the surety know the extent of his liability, or the court know when the trustee has closed his trust l
Other questions have been made, but they become unimportant, for the reasons already assigned.
We will remark, however, that it is by no means certain, any mistake in fact has intervened. And if not, then according to the cases of Hunt v. Rousmanier, 1 Pet. 1. and 8 Wheat. 211. Wheaton v. Wheaton, 9 Conn. R. 96. The Chesnut-Hill Resorvoir Co. v. Chase, 14 Conn. R. 124. and cases cited in 1 Story's Eq. 124. a court of equity cannot interfere, and especially in behalf of a statute trustee against an attaching creditor.
The defendants deny that the claim of Clark against Williams, is, before judgment, of the nature of property, and capable of assignment. They say, it is a mere right of personal redress for a tort, and that to buy it is champerty and maintenance. It is certain that a right of action for a personal injury, as for an assault and battery, slander, malicious suit &c. is not assignable even in equity; nor would a right of action for an injury to personal property pass to an executor or administrator, except by the statute of 4 Edw. 3. or in this state, by the same statute, or that of 1836. Stat. 75. (ed. 1838.) Modern authorities, it appears to us, go far towards deciding, that this claim might have been assigned, had it been specified in the assignment. They» hold, that a right of action for an injury to property growing out of con tract, if not for all injuries to property, will pass to an assignee in bankruptcy. In the case of Comegys v. Vasse, 1 Pet, 213 where this subject is fully discussed, Story, J. in giving the opinion of the court, says: " In general, it may be affirmed, that mere personal torts, which die with the party and do not survive to his personal representative, are not capable of passing by assignment, and that vested rights ad rem and in re — possibilities coupled with an interest, and claims growing out of and adhering to property, may pass by assignment." In Smith v. Coffin, 2 H. Bla., 451. Lord Ch. J. Eyre says, " every beneficial interest, which the bankrupt has, shall be disposed of, for the benefit of his creditors." And Butter, J., in the same case, says — " The object of the statute of bankruptcy is, that every thing belonging to the bankrupt, that can be turned into profit, shall pass by the assignees for the benefit of creditors." So in Wright v. Fairfield, 2 B. & Adol. 727. (22 E. C. L. 175.) Lord Tenterden says, " that the object of the statute 6 Geo. 4. ch. 16. was, to give the assignment, for the benefit of the creditors, every beneficial matter belonging to the estateand it was held by the court, that a right to sue for a breach of a contract to supply stones, passed to the assignees, though the damages were unliquidated. Lord Tenterden considered that the right of action was part of the bankrupt's estate. In Drake v. Beckham, 11 Mee. & Wels. 316. Lord Denman, Ch. J., in giving the opinion of the court, says : "There is no doubt, that a right of action for an injury to the body or feelings of a trader arising from a tort, independent of contract, does not pass to his assignees, e. g. for an assault and battery, or slander, or the seduction of a child or servant. And the same may be said of some personal injuries arising out of breaches of contract, such as contracts to cure or marry ; and if in the cases last supposed, a consequential damage to the personal estate follows from an injury to the person, that may be so dependent upon, and inseparable from, the personal injury, which is the primary cause of action, that no right to maintain a separate action in respect of such consequential damage, will pass to the assignees of a bankrupt. In all those cases, the primary cause of action, if of a nature, properly speaking, personal, and the right to maintain it, would die with the bankrupt. In the present case," he continues, " although the contract was for the > personal skill and labour of the bankrupt, the breach of that -contract does not appear to cause him any other injury than the diminution of his personal estate. In the cases referred to, the injury (if any) to the personal estate, is the consequence of an injury to the person: in this case, the injury to the person (if any) is the consequence of an injury to the personal estate. The injury to the personal estate is. therefore, in this case, the primary and substantial cause of action ; and we think, according to the authorities, such right of action would pass to the assignees, as part of the personal estate, it being a matter belonging to the bankrupt, whereof profit may be made." In Howard v. Crowther, 8 Mee. Wels. 601. 604. Lord Abinger says: " Nothing is more clear, than that a right of action for an injury to the property of the bankrupt, will pass to his assignees ; but it is otherwise as to an injury to his personal comfort. Assignees are not to make a profit of a man's wounded feelings. Causes of action, therefore, which are purely personal, do not pass to the assignees; but the right to sue remains with the bankrupt." See further Sullivan, asssignee, v. Bridge, 1 Mass. R. 511. Shoemaker & al. v. Keeley, 1 Yeates 245. 2 Dall. 213. 9 Ser. & Raw. 244. 4 Ser. & Raw. 19. 28. 13 Ser. & Raw. 54. Eden on Bank. 235. s. 10.
As the decision of the court does not rest on this question, we shall not further pursue it. We have a strong impression, that the chose in action, which is here the subject of controversy, would have passed, had it been in the assignment.
We would further remark, if the question of jurisdiction can properly come before us, under the assignment of errors, we do not perceive why the plaintiffs have not adequate relief at law. They can successfully defend in the scire-fa-cias ; for they have an equitable title to this chose in action, as was decided, in the case of Barber v. The Hartford Bank, 9 Conn. R. 407.
We advise that there is manifest error.
In this opinion, Church, Ch. J. and Storks and Hinman, Js., concurred.