Case Name: W. J. Dent v. The State
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1901-06-05
Citations: 43 Tex. Crim. 126
Docket Number: No. 2101
Parties: W. J. Dent v. The State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Criminal Reports
Volume: 43
Pages: 126–168

Head Matter:
W. J. Dent v. The State.
No. 2101.
Decided June 5, 1901.
Motion for Rehearing Decided June 26, 1901.
1. —Accessory to Murder—Indictment.
An indictment for accessory to murder need not set out any act that was done by defendant, or any means used by defendant where defendant is charged with aiding his principal to evade the execution of his sentence by an escape from the penitentiary where he was serving out his sentence. Following Gann v. State, 42 Texas Criminal Reports, 133.
2. —Same—General Verdict.
Where an indictment for accessory to murder in aiding the principal to escape from the penitentiary, where he was undergoing his sentence, contained several counts, the first of which failed to state the means used and employed by defendant in aiding such escape, and the second count specifically alleges the means, a general verdict against defendant may be applied to such second count, and thus may avoid and render harmless any supposed defect in the first count.
3. —Same—Judgment Against Principal as Evidence—Confrontation by Witnesses.
On a trial of accessory to murder, the judgment of conviction returned against the principal in the murder is admissible in evidence on the trial of the accessory in order to show, as is authorized by article 90, Penal Code, that said principal has been tried and convicted; and also to enable the court to properly predicate its charge as to the punishment to be inflicted upon the accessory as is provided in Penal Code, article 88. And such evidence is not inadmissible upon the ground that defendant is entitled, under the Constitution, to be confronted with the witnesses against his principal. Distinguishing Cline v. State, 36 Texas Criminal Reports, 320, and Kirby v. State, 174 United States, 47.
4. —Same—Evidence—Extent of Guilty Knowledge of Accessory.
It is not essential to a conviction of an accessory to murder to show that he had actual knowledge of all the facts going to establish the criminality of his principal; and where the principal was tried, convicted, and sentenced to the penitentiary long before the accessory had any knowledge of the facts, the judgment of conviction against the principal is, as to the accessory, sufficient evidence of the conviction of the principal and of its legality.
5. —Same—Prima Facie Evidence.
Judgment against the principal, when adduced in evidence on the trial of an accessory, is merely prima facie evidence of the guilt of the principal, and may be combated on the part of the accessory so as to entitle him to an acquittal if he can prove the innocence of the said principal. Davidson, P. J., holds such evidence conclusive and that the accessory can not go behind it.
6. —Same—Charge of Court—Harmless Error.
On a trial for accessory to murder, where the judgment of conviction of the principal had been introduced in evidence, and the court erroneously charged the jury that said evidence was conclusive and not prima facie evidence only of the guilt of the principal, such charge was harmless error and not calculated to injure defendant’s rights. Davidson, P. J., holds that the charge of the court was correct.
7.—Continuance—Testimony Immaterial.
On a trial of accessory to murder, where the record of conviction of the principal shows that the verdict, which was general, may have legitimately, under the indictment, found him guilty either as a principal or accomplice to the murder, the proposed testimony of absent witnesses, in an application for continuance, to prove that said principal was not present at the time and place of said murder, but was in fact some half a mile away, was immaterial, and it was not error to refuse the continuance; for if one is an accomplice he may have been guilty although half a mile away from the scene of the killing.
8. —Same—Charge of Court.
On a trial of an accessory to murder, where the charge of the court has applied the law directly to the facts, it is not essential that said charge should further define what constitutes an accessory, and what constitutes murder in the first degree.
9. —Same—Venue of Prosecution.
On a trial of an accessory to murder, where it appeared that defendant acted through an innocent agent in having the principal released from the penitentiary upon a forged pardon, which pardon was used for that purpose in 0. County where the principal was imprisoned in the penitentiary, the venue of the prosecution of the accessory was properly laid .and the trial prosecuted in said C. County.
10. —Same—Extent of Aid Rendered by Accessory.
On the trial of an accessory to murder for aiding the escape of his prinfrom the penitentiary where he was serving a life term “as punishment for murder, it is not necessary to show that he enabled his principal to escape permanently part or all of his punishment; any assistance given to one known to be a felon in order to hinder his punishment is sufficient. Henderson, J., dissents.
ON MOTION FOB REHEARING.
.11.—Accessory to Murder—Indictment.
In an indictment against an accessory to murder after conviction of the principal, it is not necessary to aver that the latter committed the murder, or on the trial to enter into a detail of the evidence adduced against him; it is sufficient to recite, with certainty, the record of conviction.
12.—Same—Continuance to Prove Alibi of Principal.
On a trial of an accomplice to murder, an application for continuance to prove an alibi of the principal was properly overruled, in the light of the record, where the indictment charged him in three counts, one of which was as an accomplice to the murder, and the verdict was a general one. Such testimony was not material in view of the fact that an accomplice to the crime need not be personally present at its commission. Davidson, P. J., holds that defendant could not go behind the judgment of conviction of the principal and inquire into the details of the killing, and hence the testimony sought in the application was inadmissible. Henderson, J., dissents.
Appeal from the District Court of Cherokee. Tried below before Hon. 'Tom C. Davis.
Appeal from a conviction of accessory to murder; penalty, imprisonment for life in the penitentiary.
The following statement of the case is taken from appellant’s brief:
The appellant, W. J. Dent, was indicted at the May term, 1900, of the District Court of Cherokee County, as accessory to murder. _ In order that the court may correctly understand the points made in the brief, we desire to make a statement a little more complete than the .record of this case presents.
In November, 1894, in Hemphill County, Texas, one Tom T. McGee was killed. A short time after the killing one George Isaacs was arrested and incarcerated in jail, charged with being an accomplice to the killing of said McGee. He was afterwards indicted by the grand jury of Hemphill County, the indictment charging him as a principal and as an accomplice with one Jim Harbolt and Joe Blake in the killing of McGee, and as being an accomplice with persons, to the grand jury unknown, in the killing of McGee. Isaacs was afterwards, in October, 1895, on a change of venue to Hardeman County, tried and convicted, the jury returning a general verdict finding him guilty of murder as charged in the indictment, without determining whether as principal or as an accomplice. The evidence in that case showed that at the time of the homicide Isaacs was not present and participating in the same, and the only connection that he could have had with said murder grew out of a supposed conspiracy between Isaacs, Jim Harbolt, Joe Blake, and probably others, to hold up and rob a train at Canadian, the scene of the homicide, and that on the attempted perpetration of said robbery, the said McGee was killed. For a complete statement of the evidence proved on the trial of Isaacs, see the case of Isaacs v. State, in 36 Texas Criminal Reports, 505.
Isaacs was afterwards confined in the penitentiary at Rusk undergoing his sentence and conviction. About the 27th day of September, 1899, a pardon was received at the Rusk penitentiary, by the authority of which George Isaacs was released from the penitentiary. A short while after the release of Isaacs said pardon was called to the attention of the Governor, who at once denounced the same as a forgery, and the appellant was arrested, charged with the crime, and on a trial was convicted of being an accessory to the murder of said Tom McGee, in Hemp-hill County, Texas, by reason of the fact that by the means of said pardon he had aided George Isaacs to evade the execution of his sentence.
Weeks & Fleager, for appellant.
The indictment on which the defendant was tried was fatally defective and the court erred in overruling the motion to quash the indictment and motion in arrest of judgment.
As I understand the law, it was necessary for' the State to prove: (1) That Tom T. McGee was dead; (2) that George Isaacs killed him; (3) that knowing this fact, viz., the murder of McGee by Isaacs, the appellant, W. J. Dent, gave aid to the said George Isaacs to assist him to evade the execution of his sentence. This being true, the State was necessarily compelled to plead these facts in the indictment. We concede the first count in the indictment to be good until it reaches the concluding paragraph, charging the defendant with having aided the said Isaacs. There the pleader uses the statutory language of the offense only, and does not set out the means used by which such aid was given. This is a fatal error, in my judgment, and measured by the former decisions of this court, this indictment can not stand. In Huntsman v. State, 12 Texas Criminal Appeals, 619, the court says:
“The constitutional right to demand the nature and cause of the accusation guarantees to the accused that the indictment shall state every fact and circumstance necessary to a certain, specific, and complete description of the particular offense imputed to him. A person tried for a crime not so set forth and described in the indictment is not held to answer for the crime on Indictment of a grand jury5 as contemplated by the Constitution.”
“Facts constituting an offense must be distinctly stated in an indictment by positive averment, and must not be left to be deduced by argument or inference.” Bush v. Republic, 1 Texas, 45; State v. Powell, 28 Texas, 626; White v. State, 3 Texas Crim. App., 609; Parker v. State, 9 Texas Crim. App., 351.
“To be valid an indictment must charge all the acts or omissions essential to constitute the offense of which the defendant is accused. An indictment which charges the conclusions of law deducible from certain facts is insufficient.” Williams v. State, 12 Texas Crim. App., 395; Brewster v. State, 12 Texas Crim. App., 612; Young v. State, 12 Texas Crim. App., 614; Reed v. State, 14 Texas Crim. App., 662; Pierce v. State, 17 Texas Crim. App., 222; Jones v. State, 25 Texas Crim. App., 621; Neely v. State, 32 Texas Crim. Rep., 370; Martin v. State, 36 Texas Crim. Rep., 125.
Unless the statute in its phraseology contains all the essential elements necessary to a complete description of the offense, the indictment is not sufficient if it only follows the statutory language. McAfee v. State, 38 Texas Crim. Rep., 124; Williams v. State, 38 Texas Crim. Rep., 377; Payne v. State, 38 Texas Crim. Rep., 494; Pierce v. State, 28 Texas Crim. App., 604.
The second count of the indictment is defective in that it discloses the existence of a written instrument, viz., the alleged forged pardon, and does not set the same up in haec verba, or failing so to do,’ give the reasons for such failure and set the same up in substance. White C. C. P., par. 378, and authorities there cited.
We will discuss the motion for continuance in connection with the charge of the court, for if the court be correct in his view of the law he very properly overruled the motion for continuance.
We next desire to discuss the question raised in our bill of exceptions number 7.
The court, over the objection of the defendant, admitted in evidence the certified copy of a judgment of conviction of murder in the first degree in cause No. 334, State v. George Isaacs, from the District Court of Hardeman County. The district attorney announced that this copy of judgment was introduced for the purpose of proving the guilt of George Isaacs of the murder of Tom T. McGee as charged in the indiet ment against W. J. Dent. We submit the admission of this record verdict was an error.
If admissible at all, it could only be for the purpose of proving that George Isaacs, the principal, had been tried and convicted in order to comply with article 90 of the Penal Code. For the purpose for which it was introduced it was clearly inadmissible and in violation of the tenth section of the Bill of Rights and the sixth amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
On this proposition we content ourselves with a citation of the authorities, as the same question is involved and will be discussed in connection with the charge of the court. Cline v. State, 36 Texas Crim. Rep., 320, and cases cited; Kirby v. United States, 174 U. S., 890.
The court erred in his charge to the jury in charging them that the certified copies of the indictment of George Isaacs, the verdict of the jury, and the judgment of the Hardeman County District Court were conclusive proof on the trial of W. J. Dent as to the guilt of George Isaacs of the murder of Tom T. McGee in Hemphill County, Texas.
In the Poston case the court, speaking through Judge Hurt, said:
“The first proposition was the guilt of Lewis. The second was that the defendant, having knowledge of Lewis’ guilt, concealed and aided him in preventing or evading arrest. That Lewis was guilty of an assault to murder was a fact to be proved by the State. The guilt of Lewis therefore must be established to the same degree of certainty as if he were on trial. The guilt of the accessory depended upon that of the principal, hence the court must charge the law as fully in regard to the offense charged against Lewis, the principal, as if he had been on trial.” This is the law, and has been followed by the court since that opinion, and I have been unable to find any case in any of the other States that announces a contrary doctrine. How, the guilt of Isaacs is the first proposition that confronts "the State in the trial of appellant, and if, as the Poston case says, the guilt of Isaacs must be proved to the same degree of certainty as if he, Isaacs, were on trial, then we submit that it necessarily follows that only such evidence as would be admissible and competent on the trial of Isaacs can now be used to prove the guilt of Isaacs on trial of appellant, and yet we find his honor instructing the jury that the record of the conviction of George Isaacs is conclusive proof of the guilt of Isaacs on the trial of appellant. One of the fundamental guarantees of life and liberty is found in the sixth amendment of the Constitution of the United States and the tenth section of the Bill of Rights of. Texas, which provides, “in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall be confronted with the witnesses against him.” Instead of confronting the appellant, Dent, with witnesses to establish the vital fact, the guilt of George Isaacs of the murder of Tom T. McGee, he was confronted only with the record of another criminal prosecution with which he, Dent, had no connection and the evidence in which was not given in his presence. A fact which can be primarily established only by witnesses can not be proved against the accused except by witnesses who confront him at the trial, upon whom he can. look while being tried, whom he is entitled to cross-examine, and whose testimony he may impeach in any mode authorized by established rules governing the trial of criminal cases. The presumption of innocence attends him throughout the trial and has relation to every fact that must be established in order to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. But this presumption has been held for naught by the court below, for as to a vital fact which the State was bound to establish affirmatively by competent evidence, and, by authority of the Poston case, beyond a reasonable doubt, he was put upon the defensive by reason of what appears to have been said in another criminal prosecution with which he, the defendant, had no connection. In other words, the State of Texas, having secured the conviction of the principal, George Isaacs, the appellant charged by a. separate indictment with a different offense was held to be guilty, so far as the vital fact of the guilt of Isaacs was concerned, so soon as the State introduced the record of the conviction of Isaacs, and without any proof on the part of the State as to the vital fact by witnesses confronting the accused. This is clearly in violation of .and impairs the very substance of a right long deemed essential for the due protection of life and liberty, and embodied in the Bill of Bights of this State and the Constitution of the United States.
Under authority of the Cline case, in my judgment, there can be no doubt not only of the inadmissibility of the record testimony above referred to, but of the error committed by his honor charging this record testimony to be conclusive proof of the guilt of Isaacs. This judgment was admissible only for the purpose of proving that Isaacs had been convicted, and to admit it for any other purpose would be in violation of the Bill of Bights.
A note in Starkie on Evidence, page 367, is to this effect: “In Rex v. Turner, 1 Moody C. C., 347, Rex v. Ratcliffe, 1 Lewin C. C., 121, it is stated that many of the judges (all the judges except two being assembled) were of opinion that record of the conviction of the principal would not be evidence of the fact, where the indictment against the accessory alleged, not the conviction, but the guilt of the principal. And on principle it would seem to be evidence only when the indictment alleges the conviction of the principal and simply to support that conviction.”
Phillips in his treatise on Law of Evidence, referring to the rule as to the inadmissibility and effect of verdicts or judgments in prosecution, says: “A record of conviction of a principal felony has been admitted in some cases not of modern date as evidence against the accessory. This has been supported on the ground of convenience, because the witnesses against the principal might be- dead or not to be found, and on the presumption that the proceedings must be taken to be regular and the guilt of the convicted party to be established. From the report of the recent case of Rex v. Turner it seems that a record of conviction of a principal in the crime of stealing who pleads guilty would not now be viewed as evidence of the guilt of the principal against the accessory after the fact, and it is said to be doubtful whether a record of the conviction of the principal on his plea of not guilty would be admissible against the accessory. As proof of the fact of conviction the record would be admissible and conclusive, but it seems not to be admissible evidence of the guilt of the convict as against another person charged with being connected with him in the crime. The record being in this respect res inter alios acta, it is evidence that a certain person named in the record was convicted by the jury but not evidence as against a third person, as to the ground on which the conviction proceeded, viz., that the convict committed the criminal act described in the record.” 2 Phil, on Ev., 3 ed., 22, 23.
We could go on almost without end citing authorities that bear out our contention, but do not deem it necessary. We will say this, that we have been unable to find any authority holding that the record of conviction of the principal is other than prima facie evidence of his guilt on trial of the accessory, and accepting that view of it as being correct, the court still erred in charging the jury that such record was conclusive proof. And in this connection we desire to discuss briefly the defendant’s motion for a continuance which was overruled by the court.
Those authorities which hold the record of the conviction of the principal to be prima facie proof of his guilt on trial of accessory, all hold that the accessory may impeach the record and show his principal to be not guilty. See 1 Am. and Eng. Enc. of Law, 209, and authorities cited in note at foot of the page. For this purpose the defendant had process issued for J. J. Sutherland and Fred Hasbrugh, by which said witnesses he proposed to prove that at the time of the killing of McGee, George Isaacs was not present at the scene of the homicide, but was at least half a mile away. On the trial these witnesses were not present, and the appellant asked for a continuance to obtain their testimony.
The court below overruled the motion on the ground that the record of the conviction of Isaacs was conclusive proof of his guilt on trial of' appellant; that appellant could not impeach the record or controvert the guilt of his principal. The appellant having shown due diligence in his motion and the testimony being material, the court should have-granted the motion for continuance, and failure so to do of itself will necessitate a reversal of this case.
The court erred in failing to define murder in the first degree. The-indictment against the appellant charged Isaacs killed Tom T. McGee with express malice, and it was necessary for the jury to find this fact first, and in order to so do the court should have not only submitted this issue to the jury, but should have defined malice aforethought.
His honor in his charge to the jury tells them that the records admitted in evidence are conclusive proof of the guilt of George Isaacs, but in applying the law to the facts, his honor authorizes the jury to-convict the defendant without submitting to them that they must first find that Isaacs was guilty. In other words, he assumes that because the evidence submitted is conclusive proof of the fact, the guilt of Isaacs, it is not necessary for the jury to find that fact from the evidence. To cure this error in the charge the appellant asked a special charge, submitting this issue to the jury, this charge being as follows:
“In this case the guilt of the defendant must depend on the guilt of his principal, George Isaacs. The guilt of George Isaacs must therefore be established by competent evidence to the same degree of certainty as if he (George Isaacs) was on trial, and before you can convict the defendant you must find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that George Isaacs, in Hemphill County, Texas, on the 23d day of November, 1894, killed Tom McGee, and that such killing was murder in the first degree, as murder in the first degree has been defined in the charge of the court, and if you have a reasonable doubt of that fact, you will acquit the defendant. In this connection you are further charged, that if you should find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that George Isaacs was guilty of the murder of Tom McGee, and that the defendant, as charged in the indictment, by means of a forged pardon, aided the said George Isaacs to evade the execution of his sentence, then before you can convict the defendant, you must further find from the evidence that at the very time he so aided the said Isaacs, he the defendant, knew that Tom McGee had been killed, and that George Isaacs was guilty of his murder, and if you have a reasonable doubt as to defendant having such knowledge when he so aided the said Isaacs (if he so aided him), then you will acquit the defendant.”
We have no hesitancy in saying that said special charge embodied the law of this case, and his honor’s refusal to give the same or to substantially give it in his main charge was a fatal error, such failure being excepted to.
Robert B. Seay, also for appellant.
—Appellant was convited for re-
leasing George Isaacs from the penitentiary at Busk by means of a forged pardon. We first call the attention of the court to the defects in the indictment. Errors are raised in the motion to quash and in motion to arrest the judgment.
The first proposition is in the first count. No facts are alleged which constitute the crime. This has been discussed by cocounsel.
The second proposition is, that a forged instrument being the basis of this prosecution, it must be set out in tenor. The fact is, the alleged forged instrument mentioned in the second count is not set out either in tenor or by its purport. In summing up the cases Judge Willson, in section 1995 of his notes on the Code of Criminal Procedure, uses the following language at the bottom of his note: “As a general rule, whenever an instrument in writing enters into an offense as a part or a basis thereof, or when its proper construction is material, the instrument should be set out in haec verba in the indictment.” Quoting White’s case, 3 Texas Crim. App., 605; Baker, 14 Texas Crim. App., 332; Colson, 16 Texas Crim. App., 189; Thomas, 18 Texas Crim. App., 213; Dwyer, 24 Texas Crim. App., 132.
The same principle is laid down in State v. Baggerly, 21 Texas, 757, and Ferguson v. State, 25 Texas Criminal Appeals, 451. This law is also laid down in Wharton’s Pleading and Practice, 167, et seq., and Wharton’s Precedent Forms, 264, and notes. It will be found that in cases of libel, swindling, forgery, uttering forged instruments, disposing of mortgaged property, and in fact all cases where a written instrument is a part of the basis of the charge, the instrument must be set out. The only exception we now remember is in perjury, and in this instance the pleader was relieved of setting it out by the statute (2 George, 2). . The same rule has been followed by the Dnited States courts in reference to mail matters, and for this reason we believe the indictment should be held void.
In the use of any forged instrument in perpetrating a crime it is absolutely necessary the scienter should be alleged. It must be alleged that the defendant either forged the instrument himself before he used it, or that he knew the same to be a forgery at the time he used it. To illustrate this proposition in this very ease: If it is not necessary to allege and prove the knowledge that the instrument was forged, then the superintendents and the officers of the penitentiary who released George Isaacs would be guilty of the crime. A large portion of the proof on the part of the State was for the purpose of showing that the defendant either forged the instrument or knew that it was a forgery, yet there is' no basis in the indictment for such proof. If authorities are needed on so simple a proposition we cite the following: White’s Ann. Penal Code, sec. 902; Peterson v. State, 25 Texas Crim. App.
We insist that if a convict has been confined in a penitentiary, and if the defendant is guilty of any wrong, then it is for the release of a prisoner. It was conceded by counsel on the trial of this case that at common law a person could not be prosecuted as an accessory who released a prisoner undergoing a sentence. But it is claimed that it can be done in this State because of the language of our statutes. We insist that the statute is no broader that the definition of an accessory after the fact at common law. The whole idea of an accessory is making him aid in the original crime of the principal, and he becomes participant of the original crime. It is held in our State by the courts, based on the common law, that the death of the principal stops the prosecution against the accessory. See State v. McDaniel, 41 Texas, 229. How can it be said on principle that a man aids in the execution of a crime years afterwards, when the sentence has been consummated and the prisoner'is in the penitentiary? We quote the following authorities to the effect that a party releasing the prisoner in confinement on sentence is not an accessory, and shows that the definition of accessory at common law covers the same idea as our accessory statutes, article 86 of the Penal Code.
Every one is an accessory after the fact to a crime who, knowing a crime has been committed by another, receives, comforts, or assists him in order to enable him to escape from punishment. 1 Whart. Crim. Law, 241; Russell on Crimes, 9 Am. ed., 63-66.
The overruling of an application for continuance; the admission of the judgment; the language of the court in his charge, “You are instructed that such records are conclusive proof of the conviction and the guilt of George Isaacs of murder in the first degree, of the murder of Tom T. McGee;” the refusal of the court to submit to the jury, upon special instruction requested, the main fact in this case, the guilt of George Isaacs, can all be presented together, because each of them in different ways raises the same question. This question is the pivotal one of this case. It raises the questions:
1. That the judgment and the conviction of the principal is not evidence against the defendant, and can not be used at all for the. purpose of showing the guilt of the principal which is to be imputed to this defendant. Cline v. State, 36 Texas Crim. Rep., 320; Kirby v. United States, 174 U. S., 890; sec. 10, Bill of Rights, Texas Constitution; amendment 6, Const, of U. S.
2. It is held that the State need not prove by witnesses, but could presume against the defendant because of the verdict in the case to which he was not a party, (a) that Tom McGee is dead; (b) that he was killed in Hemphill County; (c) that he was killed by George Isaacs; (d) that George Isaacs killed McGee with express malice.
3. It is held, even if the judgment against Isaacs is legitimate proof, that the defendant can not rebut evidence on the main point by showing that Isaacs did not kill McGee, and that he was not guilty of the murder of McGee.
4. It is held that the court upon the above point can find the main fact for the jury and tell'them what their verdict shall be. We insist that this position deprives a man of the right of jury trial and allows the judge to find a verdict against him. It deprives him of the right to face the witnesses to his guilt. It takes away from him his presumption of innocence, because of the judgment against another man of which he knew nothing. In fact it destroys nearly every principle of law and provisions of the Constitution which are thrown as safeguards around the rights of the defendant.
The gravamen of this offense is the guilt of George Isaacs. This has been shown heretofore, because in this State it has been held that the crime dies with George Isaacs. Under the law of accessory, the defendant becomes a partner in that crime by aiding the principal, knowing that his principal is charged with the crime or has been convicted of it. He must know his guilt, and this is the charge in the indictment in this case, but the court would admit no evidence on this point, nor would he charge it, though requested to do so. Why is it that kin people and servants are by statutes not accessories, except that they believe in the innocence of those nearest them ? Why is it that if a friend aids a man charged with crime, you must first convict the principal, then try the man who aided him, and again prove that the principal is guilty, and prove that the friend aided him when he knew he was guilty ? It is because if he thought his friend innocent he is not criminal when he aids him. This is the reason why it is made a penal offense with small punishment for relatives or anyone else to commit a prison breach knowing that the person was legally confined in jail or penitentiary.
The strongest decisions at common law, as stated by Wharton and Bishop, are that the conviction of the principal is prima facie against the accessory. But even under these decisions the accessory can rebut the presumption and introduce different proof from that used against the principal on his trial. 1 Whart. Crim. Law, 237-244; 1 Bish. Crim. Law, 669.
Note, however, in section 237, Wharton, that also even at common law, after the dissolution of the conspiracy, the confession of the principal (much less his conviction where there was never "a conspiracy) can not be used against the alleged accessory.
It will be noticed that even this principle stated by Wharton and Bishop, which is contrary to the doctrine stated by Starkey and Phillips, as cited by cocounsel, was before the American idea was ever adopted that a man must be confronted before the jury by the witnesses against him. See Kirby case and Cline case, already cited.
We call the attention of the court especially to the special requested charge number 1. The court below absolutely refused to submit to the jury the only two issues involved in this case. If we have any comprehension of the case,' there were but two points involved: 1. Did George Isaacs, with malice aforethought, kill and murder Tom McGee in Hemphill County? • 2. Did the defendant, W. J. Dent, knowing that Isaacs did so murder McGee, give him aid to escape? Not only did the court refuse in his general charge to submit these issues to the jury, but also refused to do so when specially requested. We therefore have the strange and peculiar state óf affairs, that the court does not submit to the jury either of the vital questions in this case. The court itself finds on the first proposition that Isaacs was guilty of murder in the first degree, and then refuses to submit the second proposition to the jury as to whether or not the. defendant knowingly aided him if he did eommit the offense. If this case is upheld it will be indeed a strange case in the history of Texas jurisprudence.
We cite Armstrong v. State, 13 Southwestern Reporter, 864. That case was reversed because the guilt of the principal was not proven. In this ease no witness as to the guilt of the principal was introduced, and defendant was not allowed to prove that he was innocent.
Rob’t A. John, Assistant Attorney-General, for the State.
The State submits that the first count in the indictment is good as has been specifically decided by this court. Gann v. State, 57 S. W. Rep., 837.
Concede, however, that the first count is not good; then upon motion for new trial or in arrest of judgment the second count is unquestionably good, in that the means or methods are alleged specifically that were used by appellant in aiding his principal, George Isaacs, in evading the execution of his punishment is therein alleged. And tested in the light of the sufficiency of either count, the verdict being general, the same is not ground for reversal. Pitner v. State, 37 Texas Crim. Rep., 272; Henderson v. State, 2 Texas Crim. App., 88; Southern v. State, 34 Texas, Crim. Rep., 144.
The State insists that the motion to continue was properly overruled, because the guilt of Isaacs did not depend upon his physical presence at the time of the killing of Tom T. McGee, and the__two witnesses for whom the continuance was sought would have testified only that he was not present. It was a conceded fact in the trial of Isaacs that his guilt did not rest upon his actual presence, but his connection with the crime other than by presence. It was therefore not a material issue whether Isaacs was present or not when Tom T. McGee was killed. Therefore it could not under appellant’s contention—that the guilt of Isaacs was a triable issue—have been material as to whether or not the principal, Isaacs, was present when he was killed. Isaacs v. State, 36 Texas Crim. Rep., 505.
The gist of the case turns upon this proposition: What was the effect of the introduction of the indictment, judgment, sentence, etc., in the Isaacs case? (1) Was the same admissible at all? (2) If admissible was it conclusive in its effect; that is, did it conclusively show that George Isaacs was guilty of the murder of Tom McGee, it being the crime for which he was incarcerated, and the manner that appellant aided him to escape from its punishment ?
The State submits the crime is in the nature of an' accessory after the fact. 1 Russ. on Crimes, sec. 907; Rex v. Burrage, 3 P. Wms., 439. It is nevertheless to be grouped under and in the nature of an accessory after the fact, made so by our statute. The elements of the crimes are the same as the crime which is known under the common law as a rescue. A rescue-is defined to be a deliverance of a prisoner from lawful custody by any third person. 21 Am. and Eng. Enc. of Law, 97; 2 Bish. Crim. Law, sec. 1065.
The distinction between a rescue and a breach of prison or jail breaking is, that jail breaking is a crime committed by a prisoner himself, while rescue is a crime committed by a third person, the gist of the offense being the aiding of a prisoner to escape from lawful custody, or to escape from the execution of his punishment. 2 Bish. Crim. Law, 1085; 2 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, 185; 2 Inst., 590.
The gravamen of the offense of prison breaking, which is the same as rescue in principle, is not the innocence of the prisoner, but the legality of his incarceration. 1 Russ. on Crimes, p. 597; 2 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, chap 18, sec. 6.
It being admitted by appellant that the effect of the judgment, sentence, etc., is to show the conviction of George Isaacs, that is, that he was legally confined in the penitentiary as a convict, if this offense is to be considered as analogous to and akin to a rescue, then the judgment, sentence, etc., become absolutely conclusive in their nature, and their introduction is conclusive evidence of the fact that George Isaacs (appellant’s principal) was legally incarcerated as a convict in the State penitentiary. This the judge charged and made the guilt of Dent depend on a knowledge of that fact, for which there is ample proof, and the further fact that he willfully and unlawfully aided by a forged pardon the said Isaacs to escape the execution of the sentence.
But concede that this evidence, that is to say, the introduction of the judgment, sentence, etc., was not conclusive in its nature, then the effect is unquestionably to make a prima facie case of the guilt of the principal as against the accessory, Dent. The introduction of the judgment convicting George Isaacs, the principal, has been universally held to make a prima facie case as to his guilt in the trial of his accessory, the appellant in this case. Whart. Crim. Law, sec. 602; 2 Bish. Crim. Proc., sec. 12.
The State then submits, conceding it is not conclusive but that it is only prima facie, that evidence of judgments and decrees of the court introduced make a prima facie case when not controverted, and that evidence prima facie becomes conclusive for the reason that it is undisputed. Schilling v. State, 51 S. W. Rep., 240.
The evidence is not against the constitutional rule that defendant must be confronted by his witnesses. This has been specifically decided in this State. Patterson v. State, 17 Texas Crim. App., 114; People v. Jones, 24 Mich., 214; 1 Whart. on Ev., sec. 614; 1 Bish. Crim. Proc., sec. 1134.
In order to show that George Isaacs was a convict the record is the best evidence, because, when the fact depends for its existence upon the record, other evidence than the record is parol in its nature; Stewart v. State, 35 Texas Crim. Rep., 174; Elsner v. State, 22 Texas Crim. App., 687.
The State further submits that the following two cases decided by our courts, whilst the expression used in them might be deemed obiter, still clearly indicate that the guilt of the principal must be shown as if the principal were on trial in the trial of an accessory, does not apply after the conviction of a principal. Arnold v. State, 9 Texas Crim. App., 434; Armstrong v. State, 33 Texas Crim. Rep., 421.
The court did not err, therefore, in admitting the judgment, decree, etc. Nor did it err in charging that the same was conclusive; being unquestionably prima facie, it became conclusive by reason of it not being controverted. And the further fact that it was not controverted, and the fact that it becomes then overwhelming in its nature, would make the charge, even conceding that the court erred in saying that the evidence was conclusive, not calculated under these circumstances to injure the rights of the defendant. Code Crim. Proc., art. 723; Barnett v. State, Dallas term, 1901.
The court did not err in its charge in failing to define what constitutes an accessory or what constituted murder in the first degree, he having applied the law directly to the facts. This is the best practice. Wagner v. State, 35 Texas Crim. Rep., 257.
The court property charge the venue to be in Cherokee County. Appellant acting through an innocent agent, the venue of the crime is where the agent acts, although the appellant may have instigated the action of the agent in another and different place. Sax v. State, 28 S. W. Rep., 688; Carlisle v. State, 37 Texas Crim. Rep., 108; Green v. State, 13 Miss., 382; People v. Adams, 3 Denio, 190; Commonwealth v. Harvey, 8 Am. Jurist, 69; People v. Rathburn, 21 Wend., 509.
The facts in this case being undisputed, showing that appellant unlawfully and willfully and by means of false and forged pardon aided his principal, George Isaacs, who was legally confined in the penitentiary, to escape the execution of his sentence, which is punishment by confinement for life, and the essence of the offense being unlawfully giving this aid, it was not necessary to charge in the indictment nor in the court’s charge that the knowledge of the instrument being false and forged was with appellant. This is involved in the allegation, unlawfully and willfully, and in the charge of the court. It is only where a special intent or a peculiar knowledge is an element of the crime that it has to be charged in the indictment, such as where willful intent is an element of the crime or the knowledge of the existence of a certain fact is an element of the crime. This is not made so under the statute under which appellant was convicted.

Opinion:
BROOKS, Judge.
Appellant was convicted as accessory to murder, and his punishment assessed at confinement in the penitentiary for life.
The record shows that in November, 1894, in Hemphill County, Texas, one Tom T. McGee was killed. A short time after the killing George Isaacs was arrested, and incarcerated in jail, charged with being an accomplice to the murder of McGee. Subsequently he was indicted by the grand jury of Hemphill County, the indictment charging him as a principal and as an accomplice with Jim Harbolt and Joe Blake in the killing of McGee, and as an accomplice to persons to the grand jury unknown in the killing of McGee. In October, 1895, on a change of venue to Hardeman County, Isaacs was tried and convicted, the jury returning a general verdict finding him guilty of murder as charged in the indictment, without determining whether they found him guilty as principal or as an accomplice, assessing his punishment at confinement in the penitentiary for life. The evidence upon the trial of Isaacs showed that at the time of the homicide Isaacs was not present and participating in the same, but that his connection was as a party to the conspiracy between himself and the above-mentioned parties, and probably others, to hold up and rob a train at Canadian, Texas, the scene of the homicide; and in the attempted perpetration of said robbery McGee was killed. For a further and more detailed statement of the evidence on the trial of Isaacs, see Isaacs v. State, 36 Texas Criminal Reports, 505. After the conviction of Isaacs, he was duly sentenced and incarcerated in the State penitentiary at Rusk, Texas. About the 27th day of September, 1899, a pardon was received at the Rusk penitentiary, by the authority of which George Isaacs was released from the penitentiary. The evidence shows that appellant, Dent, forged the.pardon, which forgery shows intimate knowledge on part of appellant of Isaacs' guilt. The indictment for accessory to murder is predicated upon the foregoing state of facts, in that by said forged pardon appellant aided Isaacs to evade the execution of his sentence.
Appellant presented the following motion to quash the indictment: "Defendant excepts to the indictment filed against him, and says the same charges him with no offense against the laws of the State. Defendant specially excepts to the first count in said indictment because the same does not charge any act that was done by defendant or any means used by defendant in the perpetration of any offense. Nor does it set out any means used by defendant in assisting or aiding the said George Isaacs. In fact, said count of the indictment does not allege any facts, matters, circumstances, act, or anything else to give notice to this defendant of what was expected to be proved against this defendant by the State." Appellant's main insistence seems to be that the first count of the indictment is defective, in that it does not charge any act done by defendant or any means used by defendant in the perpetration of any offense. An indictment similar to the first count here has been held good in Gann v. State, 42 Texas Criminal Reports, 133, and, without further discussion of the matter, we refer to that case. We think the count is good. Even conceding the first count is insufficient, yet in view of "the fact that the verdict of the jury against appellant is general, and that the second count does specifically state the means used by appellant in aiding his principal, George Isaacs, to evade the execution of his punishment, the supposed error becomes harmless. Pitner v. State, 37 Texas Crim. Rep., 272; Henderson v. State, 2 Texas Crim. App., 88; Southern v. State, 34 Texas Crim. Rep., 144.
Appellant's next contention in his able brief is based upon his seventh bill of exceptions, to wit: "The court erred in admitting in evidence the certified copy of a judgment of conviction of murder in the first degree in cause No. 334 (State of Texas v. George Isaacs), from the District Court of Hardeman County. The district attorney announced this copy of judgment was introduced for the purpose of proving the guilt of George Isaacs of the murder of Tom T. McGee, as charged in the indictment against defendant, Dent. Appellant contends that, if said judgment was admissible at all, it could only be for the purpose of proving George Isaacs, the principal, had been tried and convicted, in order to comply with article 90, Penal Code, and was clearly inadmissible, and in violation of section 10 of the bill of rights and the sixth amendment to the Constitution of the United States." To sup port appellant's position, he cites ns to Cline v. State, 36 Texas Criminal Reports, 320, and to Kirby v. United States, 174 United States, 47, 19 Supreme Court, 574, 43 Lawyers' Edition, 890. We do not think the case of Cline v. State, supra, is at all in point on the question here involved. In Kirby's case, supra, the court was considering the following matter: Under the act of Congress of March 3, 1875, it is provided, where one is convicted of feloniously stealing stamps and carrying them away from the postoffice, and upon a subsequent trial of a third party for receiving said stamps, the judgment of conviction of the principal shall be conclusive evidence against said receiver that the property of the United States therein described had been embezzled, stolen, and purloined. Justice Harlan, delivering the opinion of the court, held that the provisions of the statute violated the clause of the Constitution of the United States which declares that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall be confronted with the witnesses against him. By the facts it appears that Wallace, Baxter, and King (the first two upon pleas of guilty, and the last upon trial) had been adjudged guilty of the theft of stamps from the United States postoffice. In the trial of Kirby for receiving said stolen property the judgments against the three first-named parties were introduced in evidence under the terms of the above quoted statute. Justice Harlan said: "As heretofore stated, the crime charged against Wallace, Baxter, and King, and the crime charged against Kirby were wholly distinct; none the less so because in each case it was essential that the government should prove that the property described was actually stolen. The record of proof of a vital fact in one prosecution could not be taken as proof in the other of the existence of the same fact. The difficulty was not met when the trial court failed, as required by the Act of 1875, to instruct the jury that the record of the conviction of the principal felons was conclusive evidence of the fact that the property had been actually stolen, but merely said that such record made a prima facie case as to such fact. The fundamental error in the trial below was to admit in evidence the record of the conviction of the principal felons as competent proof for any purpose. That those persons had been convicted was a fact not necessary to be established in the case against the alleged receiver; for, under the statute, he could be prosecuted even if the principal felons had not been tried or indicted." From the excerpt quoted, and after a careful perusal of the entire opinion, it will appear that the Kirby case is not in point upon the question here at issue, since, as said by Justice Harlan, one can be convicted of receiving stolen property before indictment or conviction of the thief. We see another distinction between the Kirby case and the one at bar in this: The judgment of conviction of the thief would be evidence solely of the fact that Wallace, Baxter, and King had stolen some stamps; but said judgment, after its introduction, would not be any evidence going to show that the stamps so stolen by them were the stamps that Kirby was alleged to have received, knowing them to have been stolen. But in the case at bar, if Isaacs killed McGee, the judgment adjudges him guilty of that offense, and the evidence in this case shows appellant aided Isaacs to escape the execution of his sentence for the murder of McGee. We do not understand that the Supreme Court of the United States in the Kirby Case, supra, were passing upon the ordinary doctrine of accessory after the fact, or the character and kind of proof necessary to make out a conviction of the accessory. The receiver of stolen property is not an accessory, as ordinarily understood, since the guilt of the receiver does not depend in any sense upon the guilt or conviction of the thief. Be this as it may, if Kirby's case be correct, that the judgment of conviction of the principal in the trial of an accessory is not admissible for any purpose, as a casual reading of the decision might indicate, then we say that said authority is so at variance with the long line of precedents on the subject that we can not follow it.
We do not think the decision in the Kirby case, supra, applies to the introduction of the judgment against Isaacs in this case. We think the question considered by the court in the Kirby case is altogether at variance with the question before us in this case. Appellant concedes in his argument that the judgment is admissible for the purpose of showing that Isaacs, the principal, has been tried and convicted in order to comply with article 90, Penal Code. We apprehend appellant would further concede the judgment was admissible as a predicate for a charge on the part of the trial court as to the punishment that should be inflicted upon the accessory after the fact, since article 88, Penal Code, provides: "Accessories to offense shall be punished by the infliction of the lowest penalty to which the principal in the offense would be liable." Now, if the principal has not been convicted, it is proper to introduce testimony showing the guilt of the principal as a predicate for the prosecution of the accessory after the fact, as was properly held by us in Poston v. State, 12 Texas Criminal Appeals, 409. And here we will remark that appellant seems to rely with some degree of strenuousness upon this case as authority -for his position here. The principal in the Poston case had never been convicted, so far as the record shows, and certainly then the facts would be admissible going to show the guilt of the principal in a proper prosecution of the accessory. Then the sentence of the principal, as stated above, would be admissible, as a predicate upon which the trial court would base a charge as to the amount of punishment to be inflicted by the jury upon the accessory. This fact is made apparent by the following statement: If the principal has been acquitted, the accessory can not be prosecuted. If the principal has been acquitted of either degree of homicide, or both of the higher degrees, to wit, murder in the first and second degrees, and convicted of manslaughter, then we take it that the accessory could be convicted of no higher degree of offense than the principal had been convicted. Therefore, although the evidence upon the trial of the case might show that the principal was guilty of a higher grade of offense than he had previously been convicted of, yet appellant would be entitled to a charge from the court telling the jury that they could not convict him of a higher grade of offense than the principal had been convicted. We therefore hold that the judgment was admissible in order to show the conviction of the principal as authorized by article 90, and also as a predicate for the charge or the part of the trial court, as we construe article 88, Penal Code. If this were an original question, we would hold, as ably contended by the State, and as charged by the trial court, that the verdict of the jury and judgment and sentence of the District Court of Hardeman County are conclusive proof of the guilt of Isaacs of the murder of Tom T. McGee. But we have searched in vain for authority supporting this position. In Broxton v. State, 9 Texas Criminal Appeals, 97, we held, where the court below instructed the jury that a certain indictment and capias put in evidence by the State were sufficient proof to establish the allegation contained in the indictment that P. A. Lattimore, the person described in said indictment and capias, was confined on an accusation of felony, was a correct charge, and not on the weight of the evidence, and was a proper explanation of the legal effect of the records of the court. In this case appellant appears to have been prosecuted for prison breach, and we merely cite same as authority supporting the proposition that it is the imperative duty of the trial court to give the jury a rule as to the probative force of judgments and sentences in cases of this character. In Arnold v. State, 9 Texas Criminal Appeals, 438, we used the following language: "The principals not being tried and convicted, so that the record of their conviction could be introduced to establish their guilt, the State was required to prove their guilt in the same manner and to the same certainty as if they themselves had been upon trial, for their guilt must be shown before the accomplice can be legally convicted." We think the inference from the latter case is thoroughly fortified by reason, and is in strict line and consonance with the proper presentation of the evidence going to show the accessory's guilt. If the principal has not been convicted prior' to the conviction of the accessory, when evidence is introduced to prove the principal's guilt in the trial of the accessory it is to demonstrate but one fact,—not any culpability on the part of the accessory in the original crime, but simply and solely to prove the guilt of the principal, and from said guilt to erect one circumstance going to show the accessory's guilt, which alone is predicated upon knowledge of the guilt of the principal. This knowledge, as contemplated by article 86, Penal Code, does not carry with it the idea of full, perfect, and absolute consciousness of all the salient features of the evidence going to show the principal's guilt. But, as stated above, this is not now an original question. The courts of last resort all over the Hnited States have held that the judgment of conviction of the principal upon the trial of the accessory is merely prima facie evidence of the guilt of the principal; and that said judgment, although admissible in the trial of the accessory, may be combated by evidence on the part of the accessory, and the absolute innocence of the principal demonstrated, and ultimate thereby in the acquittal of the accessory. 1 Rosc. Crim. Ev., p. 279; Whart. Crim. Ev., 519, 602; 2 Bish. Crim. Proc. sec. 12; 1 Bish. Crim. Law, secs. 667, 668; 1 Am. and Eng. Enc. of Law, 270; Lynes v. State, 36 Miss., 617; Anderson v. State, 63 Ga., 675; State v. Mosley, 31 Kan., 355, 2 Pac. Rep., 782; State v. Chittem, 2 Dev. Law, 49; Commonwealth v. Knapp, 10 Pick., 477, 20 Am. Dec., 534; Baxter v. People, 7 Ill., 578; People v. Buckland, 13 Wend., 592; Levy v. People, 80 N. Y., 327; People v. Gray, 25 Wend., 465; Keithler v. State, 10 Smedes & M., 192; State v. Crank, 23 Am. Dec., 117; State v. Duncan, 6 Ired., 98.
Then, in conclusion upon this matter, we will say that a judgment and conviction of Ishacs makes out a prima facie case as to the guilt of said Isaacs under the above-cited authorities; and the only remaining question to be considered is whether or not appellant is guilty, knowing that an offense has been committed, of aiding said Isaacs to escape the execution of his sentence. In the case of Tully v. Commonwealth, 13 Bush, 143, the court said: "It is sufficient that appellant has good reason to believe Osborne was guilty of the murder charged, and was fleeing from justice, to render the aid or comfort given himvunlawful. It was not necessary to prove that he had actual knowledge of these facts." Nor do we think it necessary for the accessory after the fact to have absolute knowledge or actual knowledge of all the facts going-to show the criminality of Isaacs. If so, then the State in this case would be without evidence upon which to base a valid prosecution. Isaacs was tried, convicted, and sentenced, and incarcerated in the penitentiary long before the record shows any knowledge on the part of defendant, Dent, of said facts. Then, is it possible to say that the rules of evidence require the facts going to show the accuracy of said conviction to be introduced on the trial of Dent, when the introduction of said facts does not bring home with any greater or fuller force knowledge of said conviction to Dent than the judgment introduced upon the trial of this case? Whart. Crim. Law, sees. 237, 242, 244; White v. People, 81 Ill., 333.
The court charged the jury as follows: "These records [that is, the judgment, sentence, and indictment of Isaacs] are admitted alone for the purpose of proving that George Isaacs was guilty of the murder of Tom T. McGee, as charged in the indictment in this case, and you will not consider this evidence for any other purpose than that for which it was admitted; that is, for the purpose of proving George Isaacs to have been guilty of murder in the first degree, as charged in the indictment against him, as determined by the judgment of the Hardeman County District Court. You are instructed that said records are conclusive proof of the conviction and guilt of George Isaacs, of murder in the first degree, and of the murder of Tom T. McGee by said Isaacs." We think the court erred in this charge. It was the duty of the court to tell the jury that the records introduced (naming them) were prima facie proof of the conviction and guilt of George Isaacs of the murder in the first degree of Tom T. McGee, and not conclusive proof of said fact. Floeck v. State, 34 Texas Crim. Rep., 314. But, in view of the fact that appellant introduced no evidence, we are then confronted with the proposition as to whether the error of the court was calculated to injure the rights of appellant. We have searched in vain for a distinction between evidence that makes out a prima facie case that is uncontroverted and a charge to that effect and a charge that says said evidence is conclusive. If the jury in this case had been told by the court that the records were prima facie evidence of the guilt of Isaacs, could there be any controversy over the fact that they would have concluded under the evidence before them that defendant was guilty? We think not. Then certainly, under the mathematical aphorism that "things that are equal to the same thing are equal to each other," we think it can be accurately stated that this charge was not calculated to injure the rights of appellant. So believing, we do not think appellant is entitled to a reversal. Barnett v. State, 42 Texas Crim. Rep., 302, 2 Texas Ct. Rep., 447; Johnson v. State, 42 Texas Crim. Rep., 87.
Appellant filed a motion for continuance for want of the testimony of J. J. Sutherland and Fred Hasbrugh, by whom he proposed to prove that Isaacs was not present at the time McGee was killed, but was half a mile away. The court did not err in refusing this application, since we do not think it shows diligence. But, even conceding it does, we do not think the testimony is material, or probably true, in the light of the record before us. An inspection of the case of Isaacs v. State, 36 Texas Criminal Reports, 505, and the statement of facts before us in this case, wherein a certified copy of the mandate of the Court of Criminal Appeals in said case was introduced, which affirmed the judgment convicting said Isaacs of murder in the first degree; and also the indictment against George Isaacs as contained in the record before us, and the verdict of the jury thereon,—all show that said Isaacs was indicted both as a principal and accomplice to murder, and the verdict of the jury was general, thereby making no direct application of the guilt of Isaacs to either count in the indictment. This being true, the testimony becomes immaterial, because, under the indictment against Isaacs, he may have been guilty and still have been half a mile away, and is proposed to be proven by said witnesses. If said witnesses had been present and testified as indicated in said application, would it have probably affected the result of this case? We think not. Furthermore, we do not think said testimony was material upon another phase. An inspection of the forged pardon, as contained in the statement of facts, shows that defendant therein states, "George Isaacs had been adjudged guilty of the offense of murder, and his punishment assessed at confinement in the State penitentiary for life; and whereas, the said murder consisted in his being charged as an accessory to the commission of the crime of murder,"—thus showing that appellant, at the time he forged said pardon, knew that Isaacs was convicted as an accomplice to mur der, or believed he was. Therefore we conclude that the testimony of the absent witnesses was not material in the light of this record, and would not probably have changed the result of the trial if the absent witnesses had been present and testified as alleged by appellant.
Appellant also contends the court erred in its charge in failing to define what constitutes an accessory, or what constitutes murder in the first degree. The court applied the law directly to the facts. We commend this as the best practice. Wagner v. State, 35 Texas Crim. Rep., 257.
He also contends the court erred in charging the jury that the venue was- properly laid in Cherokee County. The proof shows appellant acted through an innocent agent in having Isaacs .released from the penitentiary upon the forged pardon, which pardon was used in Cherokee County for that purpose, Isaacs being confined in the penitentiary in said county. We think this properly places the venue in Cherokee County for the trial of the accessory, Dent. Sikes v. State (Texas Crim. App.), 28 S. W. Rep., 688; Carlisle v. State, 31 Texas Crim. Rep., 537.
It may be contended that the facts 'in this case do not make appellant an accessory under article 86, Penal Code. We think the evidence is sufficient. It makes no difference whether appellant enabled Isaacs to escape all of his punishment or not. It is not necessary, in order to constitute one an accessory, that he should enable the principal to escape permanently part of all of his punishment. This question is very satisfactorily settled in favor of the proposition just announced in Wren v. Commonwealth, 26 Grattan, 952. There it was held that any assistance given to one known to be a felon, in order to hinder his apprehension, trial, or punishment, is sufficient to make one an accessory after the fact,—as that he conceals him in the house; or shut the door against his pursuers until he should have an opportunity to escape; or took money from him to allow him to escape; or supplied him with money, a horse, or other necessaries in order to enable 'him to escape; or that the principal was imprisoned, and the jailer was bribed to let him escape, or conveyed to him instruments to enable him to break the prison and escape. True, the test as there laid down as to whether one is an accessory after the fact or not was whether or not the accessory furnished aid by way of personal help to his principal with the view of enabling his principal to elude punishment; the kind of help rendered appearing unimportant. By carefully reading this case it will appear that the common law authorities on the subject are collated by the court; among others: 2 Hawk, P. C., chap. 29, par. 32; 4 Bl. Comm., 37; 1 Hale, P. C., 322, 622; 3 P. Wms., 496. But we are not without authority on this, question in our own State. The question is thoroughly discussed in Blakely v. State, 24 Texas Criminal Appeals, 616. See also Schackey v. State, 41 Texas Crim. Rep., 255.
We can not close this opinion without testifying to the very able and matchless way in which the appellant's counsel and the able Assistant Attorney-General have presented their respective sides of this case. Their research has been tireless, and all the authorities have been reviewed by them in a painstaking effort to solve the many vexing questions involved in this record, and we can not too strongly commend them.
We have carefully reviewed all of appellant's assignments of error, and to no case have we given more investigation than the one now before us. We feel constrained to say there has been no such error committed as was calculated to injure the rights of appellant, and that the verdict of the jury is amply sustained by the evidence adduced.
The judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Henderson, Judge, dissents.