Case Name: JAY BURNS BAKING COMPANY ET AL. v. BRYAN, AS GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF NEBRASKA, ET AL.
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1924-04-14
Citations: 264 U.S. 504
Docket Number: No. 94
Parties: JAY BURNS BAKING COMPANY ET AL. v. BRYAN, AS GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF NEBRASKA, ET AL.
Judges: (with whom Mr. Justice Holmes concurs)
Reporter: United States Reports
Volume: 264
Pages: 504–534

Head Matter:
JAY BURNS BAKING COMPANY ET AL. v. BRYAN, AS GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF NEBRASKA, ET AL.
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OP NEBRASKA.
No. 94.
Argued October 19, 1923.
Decided April 14, 1924.
1. The power of a State to protect the public from imposition by sale of short-weight loaves of bread cannot be exerted in such a way as arbitrarily to prohibit or interfere with, or impose unrea sonable and unnecessary restrictions upon, the business of making and selling it. P. 513.
2. It is the duty of the court to determine whether a regulation challenged under the Constitution has a reasonable relation to, and a real tendency to accomplish, the purpose for which it was enacted. Id.
3. A statute of Nebraska prescribes the minimum weights of loaves of bread to be made, or offered, for sale in the State, and, in order to prevent the palming off of smaller for larger sizes, fixes a maximum for each class, by allowing a “ tolerance ” of only two ounces per pound in excess of the minimum, the weights to be determined by averaging loaves of each class in lots of twenty-five, and to apply for twenty-four hours after baking. The evidence demonstrated that owing to normal evaporation from bread under conditions of témperature and humidity often prevailing in Nebraska, it is impossible to manufacture good bread in the regular way without frequently exceeding the prescribed tolerance and incurring the burden of penalties prescribed by the statute, and that compliance would necessitate selection of ingredients making an inferior and unsalable bread, or wrapping the loaves, although wrapping is not required by the statute and unwrapped loaves are wholesome food in much demand by consumers. Held, That, in the circumstances, the provision .that average weights shall not exceed these maxima is not necessary to protect purchasers against imposition and fraud by short weights, and not calculated to effectuate that purpose; and that it subjects bakers and sellers of bread to restrictions essentially unreasonable and arbitrary; and is therefore repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment. P. 514.
108 Neb. 674, reversed.
Error to a judgment of the Supreme Court of Nebraska affirming a decree dismissing a suit brought by bakers and sellers of bread against state officials to restrain enforcement of a statute regulating the weights of loaves.
Mr. Matthew A. Hall, with whom Mr. Raymond G. Young and Mr. Carroll S. Montgomery were on the briefs, for plaintiffs in error.
Laws fixing specific weights for loaves of bread are construed to be only against short weights, and do not prohibit greater weights than the standards provided, People v. Wagner, 86 Mich. 594; State v. Huber, 4 Boyce, 259; Allion v. Toledo, 99 Oh. St. 416; Chicago v. Schmid-.inger, 243 Ill. 167; Schmidinger v. Chicago, 226 U. S. 578; Chicago v. Schweijurth, 174 Ill. App. 64.
The same is true in regard to other articles. Spokane v. Arnold, 73 Wash. 256; State v. Co-Operative Store Co., 123 Term. 399.
A law fixing a maximum as well as a minimum weight for a loaf is illegal and invalid. Harwood v. Williamson,-1 Sask. L. Rep. 66.
Dangerous articles are subject to regulation by law, where harmless articles are exempt. Williams v. Walsh, 79 Kan. 212; s. c. 222 U. S. 415.
There must be some logical connection between the object sought to be accomplished by the law and the means prescribed. Chicago v. Chicago, etc. By. Co., 275 Ill. 30; Chicago, etc. By. Co. v. State, 47 Neb. 549.
The right to contract is property. Taylor, Due Process of Law, § 265, pp. 490, 491; State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va. 179; Braceville v. People, 147 Ill. 66.
Laws enacted under the guise of police regulation must have some relation to the public health, welfare or safety. Smiley v. McDonald, 42 Neb. 5; Wenham v. State, 65 Neb. 394; Union Pacific By. Co. v. State, 88 Neb. 247; State v. Withnell, 91 Neb. 101; Urbach v. Omaha, 10 L Neb. 314; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623.
The regulation must not be an arbitrary and unreasonable interference with the rights of individuals. In re Anderson, 69 Neb. 686; Lawton v. Steele, 152 IÍ. S. 133; Connecticut Co. v. Stamford, 95 Conn. 26.
Police power means the power of the State to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety or welfare of the community. License Cases, 5 How. 504.
The police power does not justify an enactment merely because there is a possibility of danger which it is sought to avert, Ex parte Whitewell, 98 Cal. 73; Freund, Police Power, § 494; State v. Sperry, 94 Neb. 785; Young v. Commonwealth, 101 Va. 853; State v. Ramseyer, 73 N. H. 31.
If an invalid portion of an act formed an inducement to the passage of the act, the whole act will be declared invalid. Trumble v. Trumble, 37 Neb. 340; State v. Poyn-ter, 59 Neb. 417; State v. Junkin, 85 Neb. 1.
The Constitution is violated when persons engaged in the same business are subjected to different restrictions. Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703; Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Bosworth, 230 Fed. 191; Standard Oil Co. v. Red River Parish Police Jury, 140 La. 42; Black v. State, 113 Wis. 205; In re Von Horne, 74 N. J. Eq. 600.
A law palpably unreasonable and arbitrary and exceeding all reasonable classification, is not within the police power of a State. Price v. Illinois, 238 U. S. 446; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623.
Determination by the legislature of what constitutes proper exercise of police power is subject to supervision by the courts. Meyer v. Nebraska, supra; Mugler v. Kansas, supra.
The business of baking is not clothed with a public interest. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U. S. 522.
Freedom of contract is the general rule, and restraint is the exception; and restraint can only be justified by exceptional circumstances. Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U. S. 525’; State v. Edgecomb, 108 Neb. 859.
Only public necessity can justify the exercise of the police power by a State. Chicago, etc. Ry. Co. v. Drainage Commissioners, 200 U. S. 561; State v. Edgecomb, supra; People v. Klinck, 214 N. Y. 121.
The constitutionality of a law may depend upon the result of its practical operation. Erickson v. Nine Mile Irrig. Dist., 192 N. W. 694.
Mr. Lloyd Dort, Assistant Attorney General of the State of Nebraska, with whom Mr. O. S. Spillman, Attorney General, was on the brief, for defendants in error.
Equity will not interfere with the enforcement of criminal statutes.
The mere possibility that property rights, of an individual may be affected is not sufficient.
In the present case no criminal prosecution had been instituted and even before .the law was in operation it was attacked. The bakers have never made any bona fide effort to comply with the law.
The law in question does not violate the Constitution of the United States nor that of Nebraska.
The law is a regulatory law and it does not in any manner confiscate the property or business of the bakers nor prohibit them from continuing their occupation.
It is claimed that the law makes no provision for the punishment of nonresidents of the State. It is not required, howevér, that the law be uniform except as operating within the jurisdiction of the State.
It has been definitely decided that the regulation of the manufacture and sale of food articles, bread in particular, is a proper subject of legislation. Schmidinger v. Chicago, 226 U. S. 578; Chicago• v. Schmidinger, 243 Ill. 167; People v. Wagner, 86 Mich. 594; State v. Normand, 76 N. H. 541; State v. Layton, 160 Mo. 474.
The bread law is not invalid under § 14, Art. Ill, of the Constitution of Nebraska, which provides that no bill shall contain more than one subject and that .the same shall be clearly expressed in the title. Merrill v. State, 65 Neb. 1.
The law does not deprive the bakers of their vested property rights without compensation. Enos v. Han)ff, 95 Neb. 184; Chicago, etc. By. Co. v. State, 47 Neb. 549.
The law cannot be held unreasonable because it limits the size of the loaves to specified weights or because it does not permit loaves of other weights to be made for sale by special contract. Schmidinger v. Chicago, 226 U. S. 578.
The mere fact that there may be expense in connection with change of appliances and equipment of the bakeries does not constitute a taking of vested property rights without compensation, in violation of law. The right to operate any business is always dependent upon the general welfare of the people and the operation of the police power. The legislature has determined that the law is necessary on account of the frauds being perpetrated upon the purchasing public and in order that the public may be advised of the merchandise which they receive for the purchase price.
This being true, it appears that any of the property of the bakers which can be used only for the baking of bread which is in fraud of the public would have been used in the perpetration of a fraud upon the public in the production of short weight loaves.
It is contended by the bakers that they fluctuated the sizes of the loaves to meet the cost of the ingredients. The legislature, however, has said with good reasoning that it is just as easy for the bakers to give a standard weight loaf and to fluctuate the price instead of the weight of the loaves.
Considering the minimum weight provision in the law, it has been decided that laws prescribing standard size loaves of bread and prohibiting with minor exceptions the sale of other sizes, should be sustained. Schmidinger v. Chicago, supra; Mobile v. Yuille, 3 Ala. 137; Chicago v. Schmidinger, 243 Ill. 167; People v. Wagner, supra; Commonwealth v. McArthur, 152 Mass. 522.
The law is uniform in operation within the State.
Necessity for the law is exclusively a legislative question. State v. Morehead, 99 Neb. 527; Schultz v. State, 89 Neb. 34; State v. Collum, 138 La. 395; Halter v. State, 74 Neb. 757; 205 U. S. 34.
Plaintiffs in error have introduced much evidence concerning the scientific baking of bread. If, after frequent attempts to bake bread which complies with the provisions of the law, they had failed, such evidence would have some bearing. They failed to make one attempt to comply with the law. The evidence shows that bread may easily be baked within the two ounce tolerance.

Opinion:
Mb. Justice Butler
delivered the opinion of the Court.
An act of the legislature of Nebraska, approved March 31,1921 (Laws 1921, c. 2, p. 56) provides that every loaf of bread made for the purpose of sale, or offered for sale, or sold, shall be one-half pound, one pound, a pound and a half, or exact multiples of one pound, and prohibits loaves of other weights. It allows a tolerance in excess of the specified standard weights at the rate of two ounces per pound and no more, and requires that the specified weight shall be the average weight of not less than 25 loaves, and that such average shall not be more than the maximum nor less than the minimum prescribed. Violations of the act are punishable by a fine or imprisonment.
Four of the plaintiffs in error are engaged in Nebraska in the business of baking and selling bread for consumption there and in other States. Their total annual output is alleged to be 23,500,000 pounds. The other plaintiff in error is a retail grocer at Omaha, and sells bread to consumers principally in single loaf lots. They brought this suit against the Governor and the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture of the State to restrain the enforcement of the act on the ground, among others, that it is repugnant to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The State Supreme Court sustained the act. The case is here on writ of error.
Plaintiffs in error do not question the power of the State to enact and enforce laws calculated to prevent the sale of loaves of bread of less than the purported weight; but they contend that the provision fixing the maximum weights in this statute is unnecessary, unreasonable and arbitrary.
The brief of the Attorney General states that the law is concerned with weights only. The State Supreme Court said (108 Nebr. 674, 678): " It is to prevent a loaf of one standard from being increased in size until it can be readily sold for a loaf of a larger standard that a maximum weight is fixed. The test is reasonableness. . . . (p.679.) The statutory margin or tolerance being two ounces to the pound, can bakers, for example, make a loaf 18 ounces in weight that will weigh not less than 16 ounces 24 hours after it is baked? The tests and proofs on behalf of the State tend to show that the regulation is reasonable and can be observed at all times. [In most of these tests, wrapped loaves were used.] It is fairly inferable from the evidence adduced by plaintiffs that compliance with the regulation is practicable most of the time, but that tested by their experiments as made, there are periods when the operation of natural laws will prevent compliance with legislative requirements. There are a number of reasons, however, why the tests made to prove unreasonableness should not be accepted as conclusive. If correctly understood, these tests were made with bread manufactured in the regular course of business, without any attempt to change ingredients or processes or to retard evaporation of moisture in loaves by the use of wax-paper or other means. . . . (p. 680.) The act of the legislature does not fix prices but leaves bakers free to make reasonable charges for bread wrapped in inexpensive wax-paper for its preservation in transportation and in the markets. . . . Precautions to retard evaporation of moisture in bread for the purpose of keeping it in a good state of preservation for 24 hours may be required as an incidental result of a police regulation establishing standards of maximum weights for loaves of bread. Palatableness, a quality demanded by the public, is affected by excessive evaporation, if food value is not. . . . The evidence does not prove that, if reasonable means or precautions are taken by plaintiffs and other bakers to retard evaporation, they cannot comply with the act of the legislature, or that the regulation is unreasonable."
Undoubtedly, the police power of the State may be exerted to protect purchasers from imposition by sale of short weight loaves. Schmidinger v. Chicago, 226 U. S. 578, 588. Many laws have been passed for that purpose. But a State may not, under the guise of protecting the public, arbitrarily interfere with private business or prohibit lawful occupations or impose unreasonable and unnecessary restrictions upon them. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133, 137; Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399. Constitutional protection having been invoked, it is the duty of the court to determine whether the challenged provision has reasonable relation to the protection of purchasers of bread against fraud by short weights and really tends to accomplish the purpose for which it was enacted. Meyer v. Nebraska, supra; Welch v. Swasey, 214 U. S. 91, 105; Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U. S. 223, 236; Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540, 556; Lawton v. Steele, supra.
The loaf is the usual form in which bread is sold. The act does not make it unlawful to sell individual loaves weighing more or less than the standard weights respectively. Loaves of any weight may be sold without violation of the act, if the average weight of not less than 25 does not exceed the permitted maximum or fall short of the specified nominal weights during 24 hours after baking. Undoubtedly, very few private consumers purchase at one time as many as 25 loaves of the same standard size or unit. And it is admitted that the sale of a lesser number not within the permitted tolerance does not constitute an offense. Plaintiffs in error do not claim that it is impossible to make loaves which for at least 24 hours after baking will weigh not less than the specified minimum weights, but they insist that the difference per mitted by the act between the weight of loaves when taken from the oven and their weight 24 hours later is too small, and that it is impossible for bakers to carry on their business without sometimes exceeding the maximum or falling short of the minimum average weights. Any loaves of the same unit at any time on hand during 24 hours after baking may be selected to make up the 25 or more to be weighed in order to test compliance with the act. Therefore, if only a small percentage of the daily output of the loaves in large bakeries shall exceed the maximum when taken from the oven or fall below the minimum weight within 24 hours, it will always be possible to make up lots of 25 or more loaves whose average weight will be above or below the prescribed limits.
The parties introduced much evidence on the question whether it is possible for bakers to comply with the law. A number of things contribute to produce unavoidable variations in the weights of loaves at the time of and after baking. The water content of wheat, of flour, of dough ' and of bread immediately after baking varies substantially and is beyond the control of bakers. Gluten is an important element in flour, and flour rich in gluten requires the addition of more water in breadmaking and malees better bread than does flour of low or inferior gluten content. Exact weights and measurements used in doughmaking cannot be attained. Losses in weight while dough is being mixed, during fermentation and while the bread is in the oven, vary and cannot be avoided or completely controlled. No hard and fast rule or formula is followed in breadmaking. There are many variable elements. Bread made from good flour loses more weight by evaporation of moisture after baking than does bread made from inferior flours. Defendants' tests were made principally with loaves which were wrapped so as to retard evaporation; and it was shown that by such wrapping the prohibited variations in weight may be avoided. On the other hand, the evidence clearly establishes that there are periods when evaporation under ordinary conditions of temperature and humidity prevailing in Nebraska exceeds the prescribed tolerance and makes it impossible to comply with the law without wrapping the loaves or employing other artificial means to prevent or retard evaporation. And the evidence indicates that these periods are of such frequency and duration that the enforcement of the penalties prescribed for violations would be an intolerable burden upon bakers of bread for sale. The tests which were described in the evidence and referred to in the opinion are not discredited because " made with bread manufactured in the regular course of business." The reasonableness of the regulation complained of fairly may be measured by the variations in weight of bread so made. The act does not require bakers to select ingredients or to apply processes in the making of bread that will result in a product that will not vary in weight during 24 hours after baking as much as does bread properly made by the use of good wheat flour. As indicated by the opinion of the State Supreme Court, ingredients selected to lessen evaporation after baking would make an inferior and unsalable bread. It would be unreasonable to compel the making of such a product or to prevent making of good bread in order to comply with the provisions of the act fixing maximum weights. The act is not a sanitary measure. It does not relate to the preservation of bread in transportation or in the market; and it applies equally whether the bread is sold at the bakeries or is shipped to distant places for sale. Admittedly, the provision in question is concerned with weights only. The act does not regulate moisture content or require evaporation to be retarded by the wrapping of loaves or otherwise. The uncontradicted evidence shows that there is a strong demand by consumers for unwrapped bread. It is a wholesome article of food, and plaintiffs in error and other bakers have a right to furnish it to their customers. The lessening of weight of bread by evaporation during 24 hours after baking does not reduce its food value. It would be unreasonable to prevent unwrapped bread being furnished to those who want it in order technically to comply with a weight regulation and to keep within limits of tolerance so narrow as to require that ordinary evaporation be retarded by wrapping or other artificial means. It having been shown that during some periods in Nebraska bread made in a proper and usual way will vary in weight more than at the rate of two ounces to the pound during 24 hours after baking, the enforcement of the provision necessarily will have the effect of prohibiting the sale of unwrapped loaves when evaporation exceeds the tolerance'.
No question is presented as to the power of the State to make regulations safeguarding or affecting the qualities of bread. Concretely, the sole purpose of fixing the maximum weights, as held by the Supreme Court, is to prevent the sale of a loaf weighing anything over nine ounces for a one pound loaf, and the sale of a loaf weighing anything over eighteen ounces for a pound and a half loaf; and so on. The permitted tolerance, as to the half pound loaf, gives the baker the benefit of only one ounce out of the spread of eight ounces, and as to the pound loaf the benefit of only two ounces out of a like spread. There is no evidence in support of the thought that purchasers have been or are likely to be induced to take a nine and a half or a ten ounce loaf for a pound (16 ounce) loaf, or an eighteen and a half or a 19 ounce loaf for a pound and a half (24 ounce) loaf; and it is contrary to common experience and unreasonable to assume that there could be any danger of such deception. Imposition through short weights readily could have been dealt with in a direct and effective way. For the reasons stated, we conclude that the provision, that the average weights shall not exceed the máximums fixed, is not ^necessary for the protection of purchasers against imposition and fraud by short weights and is not calculated to effectuate that purpose, and that it subjects bakers and sellers of bread to restrictions which are essentially unreasonable and arbitrary, and is therefore repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment.
Judgment reversed.
An Act establishing a standard weight loaf of bread for the State of Nebraska and providing a penalty. . . .
Section 1. Department of agriculture to enforce. — It shall be the duty of the Department of Agriculture to enforce all provisions of this Act. It shall make or cause to be made all necessary examinations and shall have authority to promulgate such rules and regulations as are necessary to promptly and effectively enforce the provisions of this Act.
Sec. 2. Bread, standards of weight. — Every loaf of bread made or procured for the purpose of sale, sold, exposed or offered for sale in the State of Nebraska shall be the following weights avoirdupois, one-half pound, one pound, one and one-half pounds, and also in exact multiples of one pound and of no other weights. Every loaf of bread shall be made of pure flour and wholesome ingredients and shall be free from any injurious or deleterious substance. Whenever twin or multiple loaves are baked, the weights herein specified shall apply to each unit of the twin or multiple loaf.
See. 3. Tolerance, how determined. — A tolerance at the rate of two ounces per pound in excess of the standard weights herein fixed shall be allowed and no more, provided that the standard weights herein prescribed shall be determined by averaging the weight of not less than twenty-five loaves of any one unit and such average shall not be less than the minimum nor more than the maximum prescribed by this Act. All weights shall be determined on the premises where bread is manufactured or baked and shall apply for a period of at least twenty-four hours after baking. Provided, that bread shipped into this state shall be weighed where sold or exposed for sale.
Sec. 4. Penalties for violation. — Any person, firm or corporation violating any of the provisions of this Act, shall be punished by a fine of not less than ten dollars nor more than one hundred dollars or by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than thirty days. Provided, however, that upon the second and all subsequent convictions for the violation of any of the provisions of this Act such offender shall be punished by a fine of not less than fifty dollars nor more than one hundred dollars, or by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than ninety days.
Wheat bread dough is the dough consisting of a leavened and kneaded mixture of flour, potable water, edible fat or oil, sugar and / or other fermentable carbohydrate substance, salt, and yeast, with or without the addition of milk or a milk product, of diastatic and / or proteolytic ferments, and of such limited amounts of unobjectionable salts as serve solely as yeast nutrients, and with or without the replacement of not more than three per cent of the flour ingredient by some other edible farinaceous substance. (Definition of Joint Committee on Definitions and Standards, September 28, 1922, and approved by the Association of American Dairy Food and Drug Officials, October 5, 1922, and by the Association of Official Agricultural Chemists, November 17, 1922.)