Case Name: STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Christopher HETZEL, Defendant and Appellee
Court: South Dakota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: South Dakota
Decision Date: 1999-07-14
Citations: 598 N.W.2d 867
Docket Number: No. 20591
Parties: STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Christopher HETZEL, Defendant and Appellee.
Judges: [¶ 12.] MILLER, Chief Justice and KO-NENKAMP, Justice, concur.
Reporter: North Western Reporter 2d
Volume: 598
Pages: 867–876

Head Matter:
1999 SD 86
STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Christopher HETZEL, Defendant and Appellee.
No. 20591.
Supreme Court of South Dakota.
Considered on Briefs on April 26, 1999.
Reassigned June 11, 1999.
Decided July 14, 1999.
Mark Barnett, Attorney General, John E. Haak, Assistant Attorney General, Sioux Falls, South Dakota, for plaintiff and appellant.
John P. Peterson of Johnson, Eklund, Nicholson,Peterson and Fox, Sioux Falls, South Dakota, for defendant and appellee.

Opinion:
GILBERTSON, Justice (on reassignment).
[¶ 1.] The trial court dismissed with prejudice the State's indictment of Christopher Hetzel due to an alleged violation of SDCL 23A-44-5.1 (180-day rule). State appéals and we reverse.
FACTS
[¶ 2.] On September 27,1997, Hetzel was arrested without a warrant on three uniform traffic tickets. He was taken to the Bon Homme county jail and held on a $1,000 cash bond. The tickets charged the offenses of ingestion of a controlled substance (SDCL 22-42-15), possession of drug paraphernalia (SDCL 22-42A-3), and possession of a controlled substance (SDCL 22-42-5). •
[¶ 3.] On September 28, Hetzel was released on bond subject to certain conditions by order of magistrate Roger J. Hi-sek. Apparently, he did not physically appear before the magistrate. He was ordered not to depart from the circuit or violate any laws or ordinances and to keep the court advised of his whereabouts at all times. He was also required to sign a waiver of extradition rights as a condition of his bond. He was told to appear in court on October 20.
[¶ 4.] Bon Homme County State's Attorney, Lisa Rothschadl, contacted the Attorney General's office for assistance with the drug prosecution. The Attorney General's office, through John Haak, recommended canceling the October 20 court date and instead presenting the case to the grand jury for indictment. Therefore, no formal complaint was filed. On November 4, the grand jury returned an indictment charging Hetzel with possession of a controlled substance. He appeared in court on November 18 for arraignment on the indictment. A trial was set for April 29, 1998.
[¶ 5.] On April 17, 1998, Hetzel filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to SDCL 23A-44-5.1. A hearing on the motion was held on April 21 and the trial court took the matter under advisement. After the hearing, but prior to the trial court's decision, State filed a motion for good cause delay. Hetzel objected to State's motion at a hearing held May 19.
[¶ 6.] The trial court found that the 180-day period of SDCL 23A-44-5.1 commenced on September 28, 1997 and expired on March 27, 1998. It dismissed with prejudice the indictment against Het-zel because the State failed to bring the matter to trial or otherwise dispose of the case before the period expired. It further found that the State had not established good cause for the delay. State appeals and raises the three issues, one of which is dispositive.
[¶ 7.] Whether the trial was scheduled within 180 days under SDCL 23A-44-5.1
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The trial court's findings of fact are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. State v. Pellegrino, 1998 SD 39, ¶ 23, 577 N.W.2d 590, 599 (citing State v. Shilvock-Havird, 472 N.W.2d 773, 776 (S.D.1991)). "However, we review the determination of whether the period has expired as well as what constitutes good cause for delay, under a de • novo standard." Pellegrino, 1998 SD 39 at ¶ 23, 577 N.W.2d 590, 599 (1998) (citing State v. Fowler, 1996 SD 79, ¶ 10, 552 N.W.2d 391, 392 (citing State v. Cooper, 421 N.W.2d 67, 69 (S.D.1988))).
State v. Sorensen, Hawk, 1999 SD 84, ¶ 6, 597 N.W.2d 682, 682.
ANALYSIS
[¶ 8.] Whether the trial was scheduled within 180 days under SDCL 23A-44-5.1.
[¶ 9.] In this case the trial court found the 180-day period began to run on the date the prosecution "should" have filed a charging document. The court found this date to be September 29, 1997. Since trial for the matter was set for April 29, 1998, the trial court found a violation of the 180-day rule.
[¶ 10.] This issue was recently resolved in Sorensen, 1999 SD 84, 597 N.W.2d 682. In that case, we stated the trial court cannot tack on a new requirement to the 180-day rule. Id. at ¶ 14, 597 N.W.2d at 682.
[ T]he rule does not read, the 180-day period will commence when the prosecution should have filed the charging document. The rule provides two requirements relevant to the issue now before us for the 180-day period to commence: 1) the defendant appears on a charging document; and 2) before a judicial officer.
Id.
[¶ 11.] The defendant first appeared before a judicial officer on a charging document or the indictments on November 17, 1997, not September 29, 1997. The trial was scheduled to begin within 180 days of that date. Since the case was scheduled to go to trial within 180 days of the date he first appeared before a judicial officer on a charging document, there is no violation of SDCL 23A-44-5.1. We reverse and remand to the trial court for trial.
[¶ 12.] MILLER, Chief Justice and KO-NENKAMP, Justice, concur.
[¶ 13.] SABERS and AMUNDSON, Justices, dissent.
. SDCL 22-42-15 provides:
Any person who intentionally ingests, inhales, breathes or otherwise takes into the body any substance, except alcoholic beverages as defined in § 35-1-1, for purposes of becoming intoxicated, unless such substance is prescribed by a practitioner of the medical arts lawfully practicing within the scope of their practice, is guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.
. SDCL 22-42A-3 provides:
No person, knowing the drug related nature of the object,, may use or to possess with intent to use, drug paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale. or otherwise introduce into the human body any controlled substance or marijuana in violation of this chapter. Any person who violates any provision of this section is guilty of a Class 2 misdemeanor.
. SDCL 22-42-5 provides:
No person may knowingly possess a controlled drug or substance unless the substance was obtained directly or pursuant to a valid prescription or order from a practitioner, ' while acting in the course of the practitioner's professional practice or except as otherwise authorized by chapter 34-20B. A violation of this section is a Class 4 felony.