Case Name: Jackie Ray PATRICK v. STATE of Mississippi
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2000-01-13
Citations: 754 So. 2d 1194
Docket Number: No. 97-KA-01260-SCT
Parties: Jackie Ray PATRICK v. STATE of Mississippi.
Judges: BEFORE PRATHER, C.J., MILLS AND COBB, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 754
Pages: 1194–1200

Head Matter:
Jackie Ray PATRICK v. STATE of Mississippi.
No. 97-KA-01260-SCT.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Jan. 13, 2000.
Edmund J. Phillips, Jr., Newton, Attorney for Appellant.
Office of the Attorney General by Charles W. Maris, Jr., Attorney for Appel-lee.
BEFORE PRATHER, C.J., MILLS AND COBB, JJ.

Opinion:
COBB, Justice,
for the Court:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
¶ 1. On October 6, 1997, Jackie Ray Patrick was convicted in the Circuit Court of Scott County, Mississippi, of the following crimes: Count I: Aggravated assault; Count II: Armed robbery; Count III: Aggravated assault; Count TV: Armed robbery; Count V: Burglary of a dwelling; and Count VI: Grand larceny. Accordingly, the trial judge sentenced Patrick to two consecutive life sentences plus an additional 40 years to be served in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Aggrieved by the judgment and sentence issued against him, Patrick now appeals to this Court raising the following issues:
I. COMBINING CHARGES FROM THREE SEPARATE INCIDENTS INTO A SIX-COUNT INDICTMENT AND ONE TRIAL VITIATED THE APPELLANT'S PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE FROM EVIDENCE NOT MUTUALLY ADMISSIBLE IN SEPARATE TRIALS.
II. PROSECUTORIAL ABUSE DURING VOIR DIRE DENIED APPELLANT A FAIR TRIAL.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
¶ 2. On the morning of Friday, May 23, 1997, Jessie Gowan met with Patrick, whom Gowan had known all of his life. The two had been visiting at a friend's house and decided to go riding around in Gowan's car, a blue 1989 Ford Crown Victoria. At some point later in the afternoon, Gowan pulled over to relieve himself in a soybean field south of Morton, Mississippi, in Scott County. While Gowan was out of the vehicle, Patrick found Gowan's .22 caliber pistol and announced to Gowan his intention to shoot him and take his car. Patrick then shot Gowan twice and drove off in Gowan's Ford automobile.
¶3. After shooting Gowan and stealing his car, Patrick drove to the home of Jim Armstrong, who lived in Scott County between Forkville and Ludlow, Mississippi. Armstrong was sitting in his living room around 4:30 p.m. when Patrick entered his home pointing the gun and demanding Armstrong's billfold and keys. Armstrong gave him the billfold and told him the keys were in the truck. Patrick then shot Armstrong in the chest, and when Armstrong turned to flee, Patrick shot him again in the back. Armstrong managed to secure a weapon from his bedroom and exchanged gunfire with Patrick in the driveway while Armstrong was trying to reach his truck. Armstrong managed to reach his truck and drove to Forkville where he was assisted and taken to the hospital.
¶4. Patrick next went to the home of Mr. and Mrs. Charles Fairchild, neighbors of Armstrong, who lived about ten (10) miles north of Morton in Scott County. The Fairchilds had left their house about 5:15 or 5:30 p.m. to check on Armstrong in the hospital. Upon their return about 11:00 p.m. that same evening, they discovered that their home had been burglarized and that their blue Chevy farm truck was missing. Several guns, $50, and some clothes had also been taken from the home. They later found in their home the clothes that Patrick had been wearing.
¶ 5. Patrick was apprehended early the next morning by a highway patrolman, driving the stolen farm truck which contained the items stolen from the Fair-child's residence. He gave a statement to officers in which he denied any wrongdoing.
DISCUSSION
I. COMBINING CHARGES FROM THREE SEPARATE INCIDENTS INTO A SIX-COUNT INDICTMENT AND ONE TRIAL VITIATED THE APPELLANT'S PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE FROM EVIDENCE NOT MUTUALLY ADMISSIBLE IN SEPARATE TRIALS.
¶ 6. Patrick first contends that he was prejudiced by the multi-count indictment because the jury was more likely to presume that since Patrick was charged with many crimes, he must have been guilty of at least one. Patrick argues that the jury would have been less likely to convict him if they had only considered the counts arising out of each incident instead of considering them all together. The State responds that Patrick is procedurally barred from raising this issue because it was never argued at trial. Alternatively, the State claims that the multi-count indictment charging Patrick with these various crimes was proper because all of the separate incidents were part of a common scheme or plan.
¶ 7. The State is correct when it points out that Patrick never raised this present issue at the trial level. The record is devoid of any objections by defense counsel regarding the multi-count indictment or its potential prejudicial effects. In instances where a defendant fails to raise an objection at the trial level, this Court nor mally applies the standard we advanced in Leverett v. State, 197 So.2d 889, 890 (Miss. 1967), where we explained,
The Supreme Court is a court of appeals, it has no original jurisdiction; it can only try questions that have been tried and passed upon by the court from which the appeal is taken.
(quoting Collins v. State, 173 Miss. 179, 180, 159 So. 865 (1935)). However, on occasion we find it necessary to apply the plain error rule advanced in Mississippi Rule of Evidence 103(d) as follows:
Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention of the court.
In Grubb v. State, 584 So.2d 786, 789 (Miss.1991), we held that
[t]his Court, on occasion when circumstances warranted, has noted the existence of errors in trial proceedings affecting substantial rights of the defendants although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court or of this Court.
¶ 8. Notwithstanding the procedural bar, we will address the merits of Patrick's claim that he was prejudiced by the use of a multi-count indictment.
¶ 9. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-7-2 (1994) addresses the propriety of multi-count indictments in pertinent part as follows:
(1) Two (2) or more offenses which are triable in the same court may be charged in the same indictment with a separate count for each offense if:
(a) the offenses are based on the same act or transaction; or (b) the offenses are based on two (2) or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.
(2) Where two (2) or more offenses are properly charged in separate counts of a single indictment, all such charges may be tried in a single proceeding.
(3)When a defendant is convicted of two (2) or more offenses charged in separate counts of an indictment, the court shall impose separate sentences for each such conviction.
¶ 10. In Woodward v. State, 533 So.2d 418, 422 (Miss.1988) we recognized the propriety of § 99-7-2 when we found, "no error in the State's charging of three felony counts within a single indictment since this indictment was returned after the effective date of the statute and followed its dictates." We further acknowledged this statutory provision when we adopted the Uniform Circuit and County Court Rules in 1995, which incorporate § 99-7-2 into Rule 7.07.
¶ 11. The multi-count indictment issued by the State in this case was in compliance with § 99-7-2. The record demonstrates that Patrick's Scott County crime spree constituted a "common scheme or plan" as contemplated in subsection 1(b) of the statute. All of the events occurred over the brief period of seven (7) hours in relatively close proximity to each other. Although the crimes involved different victims, the offenses were interrelated as they each involved assault and/or theft of property. Additionally, the judge complied with subsection (3) of the statute when he issued separate sentences for each conviction.
¶ 12. We find that this claim is procedurally barred, but alternatively is without merit.
II. PROSECUTORIAL ABUSE DURING VOIR DIRE DENIED APPELLANT A FAIR TRIAL.
¶ 13. Patrick next argues that during voir dire, the State asked the jurors questions which effectively forced them to pledge a guilty verdict against Patrick. Specifically Patrick takes issue with two comments made by the prosecutor during voir dire:
It's the jury's job, if there is a conflict in the evidence, the State's witnesses may testify one way, and if the Defendant chooses to call witnesses, they may say something else, but do you understand that a mere conflict in the evidence doesn't necessarily create a reasonable doubt? That's why we have jurors to resolve that conflict and to determine the truth. Everyone understand that?
So, my final question to you is simply this: After you have heard all of the evidence on all six counts of the indictment, if you believe that the State has proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt, if you believe that's the truth of what happened, can you all tell me that you will return a verdict in this Court as guilty as to all six counts? If you could do that, would you raise your hand at this time. Thank you.
¶ 14. As in the first issue, the State properly raises the point that no objection was made during voir dire or trial regarding these statements and thus this issue is procedurally barred. Unlike the multi-count indictment issue, however, these statements by the prosecution do not raise the specter of denial of substantial rights or plain error. Thus, this issue is without merit.
CONCLUSION
¶ 15. We find that the multi-count indictment issued against Patrick was proper because all the counts were related to crimes committed under a common scheme or plan, and all the crimes occurred within a period of only a few hours. Additionally, we find that the prosecutor's comments and questions to prospective jurors during voir dire did not constitute plain error. Patrick's failure to object to these statements at trial now raises a procedural bar against our review of them. We affirm the judgment of the Scott County Circuit Court.
¶ 16. COUNT I: CONVICTION OF AGGRAVATED ASSAULT AND SENTENCE OF TWENTY (20) YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AFFIRMED. THE SENTENCE IN COUNT I IS TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY TO THE SENTENCES IN COUNTS II AND IV. COUNT II: CONVICTION OF ARMED ROBBERY AND SENTENCE OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AFFIRMED. COUNT III: CONVICTION OF AGGRAVATED ASSAULT AND SENTENCE OF FIFTEEN (15) YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AFFIRMED. THE SENTENCE IN COUNT III IS TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY TO THE SENTENCES IN COUNTS II, IV, AND I. COUNT IV: CONVICTION OF ARMED ROBBERY AND SENTENCE OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AFFIRMED. THE SENTENCE IN COUNT IV IS TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY WITH THE SENTENCE IN COUNT II. COUNT V: CONVICTION OF BURGLARY OF A DWELLING HOUSE AND SENTENCE OF FIVE (5) YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AFFIRMED. THE SENTENCE IN COUNT V IS TO RUN CONCURRENTLY WITH THE SENTENCES IN COUNTS II, IV, I AND III. COUNT VI: CONVICTION OF GRAND LARCENY (AUTO) AND SENTENCE OF FIVE (5) YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AFFIRMED. THE SENTENCE IN COUNT VI IS TO RUN CONCURRENTLY WITH THE SENTENCES IN COUNTS II, IV, I, III, AND V.
PRATHER, C.J., PITTMAN, P.J., SMITH, MILLS AND WALLER, JJ" CONCUR. BANKS, J, CONCURS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY PRATHER, C.J.: SULLIVAN, P.J., AND McRAE, J.