Case Name: STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. Jerry ZORNES, Appellant
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 2002-04-03
Citations: 814 So. 2d 113
Docket Number: No. 34,070-KA
Parties: STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. Jerry ZORNES, Appellant.
Judges: Before BROWN, GASKINS and CARAWAY, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 814
Pages: 113–116

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. Jerry ZORNES, Appellant.
No. 34,070-KA.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
April 3, 2002.
Peggy J. Sullivan, Louisiana Appellate Project, Counsel for Appellant.
Richard Ieyoub, Attorney General, Paul J. Carmouche, District Attorney, Edwin L. Blewer, III, Tommy J. Johnson, Assistant District Attorneys, Counsel for Appellee.
Before BROWN, GASKINS and CARAWAY, JJ.

Opinion:
B BROWN, J.,
This court previously affirmed Jerry Zornes' aggravated rape conviction and mandatory life sentence in State v. Zornes, 34,070 (La.App.2d Cir.12/06/00), 774 So.2d 1062. The supreme court, in State v. Zornes, 01-0112 (La.01/21/01), 801 So.2d 1082, granted defendant's writ application in part and remanded the matter to this court, "for reconsideration of defendant's assignment of error number two, challenging the trial court's ruling which permitted evidence at trial of (defendant's) sexually assaultive behavior with another minor victim and member of his family, in light of State v. Kennedy, 00-1554 (La.04/03/01), 803 So.2d 916." We have reconsidered this issue and, under the facts of this case, find no merit to the assignment of error and therefore affirm the conviction.
The court in State v. Kennedy, 803 So.2d at 920, noted that, for evidence of other crimes to be admissible, "at least one of the enumerated purposes in article 404(B) [of the Louisiana Code of Evidence] must be at issue, have some independent relevance, or be an element of the crime charged ." The court further noted that intent is not at issue when specific intent is not an element of the charged offense. Aggravated rape is a general intent crime. Thus, in State v. Kennedy, and in this case as well, intent is not an issue.
| ¡Jn this case, however, defendant alleged that the entire incident was fabricated. Thus, the occurrence of a crime was at issue. Defendant's sexually assaul-tive behavior on the victim's half-sister was virtually identical. This improper sexual conduct was carried out in the same manner, place and time as the charged offense. In both cases, the young children were in defendant's home and in his custody. Although the criminal conduct involving the older half-sister started earlier than the behavior in the charged offense, it continued to occur during the same time frame. The similarities warrant admissibility to show the occurrence of a crime through a common design. State v. Jackson, 625 So.2d 146 (La.1993).
As already noted, following State v. Kennedy, supra, the legislature enacted La. C.E. art. 412.2.for the purpose of allowing evidence of (an)other offense(s) in sexual assault cases or in cases involving sex offenses against minors regardless of whether the charged offense is a general intent or specific intent crime. • This legislative decision corresponds to the suggestion set forth in the concurrence of Justice Victory in State v. Kennedy, supra at 925-926.
A reversal would necessitate a new trial and, unless ex post facto, La.C.E. art. 412.2 would allow evidence of other acts committed by defendant on the victim's half-sister at retrial. See Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 120 S.Ct 1620, 146 L.Ed.2d 577 (2000).
Defendant's conviction and sentence are AFFIRMED.
CARAWAY, J., concurs with written reasons.
. We also note that, following the State v. Kennedy decision, the legislature enacted La. C.E. art. 412.2. This article implicitly overruled Kennedy "when an accused is charged with a crime involving sexually assaultive behavior or with acts that constitute a sex offense involving a victim who was under the age of seventeen at the time of the offense ." La.C.E. art. 412.2.