Case Name: EMIL HANSER, Appellant, v. JACOB BIEBER, PHILIP BIEBER and SOPHIE BIEBER
Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1917-06-30
Citations: 271 Mo. 326
Docket Number: 
Parties: EMIL HANSER, Appellant, v. JACOB BIEBER, PHILIP BIEBER and SOPHIE BIEBER.
Judges: Graves, C. J., and Woodson, J., concur in separate opinion by Graves, C. J.; Blair and Williams, JJ., concur in result; Bond and Faris, JJ., dissent
Reporter: Missouri Reports
Volume: 271
Pages: 326–359

Head Matter:
EMIL HANSER, Appellant, v. JACOB BIEBER, PHILIP BIEBER and SOPHIE BIEBER.
In Banc,
June 30, 1917.
1. DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE: Admission of Truth. Demurrant by filing a demurrer to plaintiff’s evidence admits the truth of said evidence and of all conclusions a jury may reasonably draw therefrom, and the court in passing upon the demurrer must draw every inference in plaintiff’s favor that the evidence and law- will • warrant.
2. FALSE IMPRISONMENT: Elements: Malice and Probable Cause. False imprisonment consists of the direct restraint of personal liberty. To establish it, want of probable cause and malice need not be proved. Unlawful detention is the basis of the action. Nor is actual seizure or the laying on of hands necessary to con stitute an unlawful detention. If the party is within the power of the person making the arrest and, subject to such power but not of his own will, goes with his captor, it is such an arrest as authorizes an action for false imprisonment.
3. -: Arrest Without a Warrant. Ordinarily plaintiff makes out a prima-facie case of damages for false imprisonment when "he introduces evidence tending to show that the unofficial defendants caused his arrest and detention without a warrant and that he was subsequently acquitted of the crime charged.
4. -:--: Lawful Arrest: By Police Officer in St. Louis. The statute (Sec. 9805, R. S. 1909) authorizing police officers of St. Louis to “prevent crimes and arrest offenders” does not in all cases make lawful the arrest by such officer, without a warrant. To make lawful an arrest for a misdemeanor not committed in his presence, the officer must have reasonable grounds to suspect that the offense has been committed. The existence of such reasonable grounds rests upon the facts in each particular case, and their force and sufficiency must be determined by the officer before he acts, and they must be sufficient to establish a substantial belief in his mind that an offense has been committed. If the facts afford no basis for such reasonable . suspicion, and the officer by due diligence could have ascertained that the plaintiff, at the time the officer arrested him and defendants capriciously charged him with disturbing the peace, was in an orderly discharge of his duties, the trial court should submit the issue of false imprisonment to the jury.
Helé, by BOND, J., dissenting, that if the arrest was lawful there can be no recovery of damages for false imprisonment, even though made without a warrant; and an unlawful arrest may be justified by the ultimate conviction of the party of the crime for which he was taken into custody; and even though the conviction be reversed upon appeal, a police -officer in St. Louis who has reasonable grounds to suspect that a misdemeanor has been committed may arrest the suspected party without a warrant; and evidence adduced by plaintiff tending to prove that an altercation between himself and defendants occurred, that a police officer was called in and a complaint made to him of a breach of the peace, and that upon an assurance by defendants that they would prosecute the charge the plaintiff was taken to the police station where a formal charge was made and a trial had, in which plaintiff was convicted, established a reasonable ground for a belief on the part of the officer that plaintiff had .een guilty of a breach of the peace, and a demurrer to plaintiff’s evidence was rightly ruled.
5. PLEADING: Palse Imprisonment and Malicious Prosecution. Causes of action sounding in false imprisonment and malicious prosecution growing out of the one arrest may be joined in the same petition in different counts, but recovery can be had on only one count.
6. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION: Probable Cause: Conviction in Police 'Court: Acquitted on Appeal. A conviction in a police court, followed by an acquittal upon an appeal and a trial de novo in thei proper appellate court, does not establish the probable cause which is a necessary' element of malicious prosecution. Nor is the showing of probable cause made conclusive by the defensive interposition of the judgment for former conviction.
Held, by BOND, J., dissenting, that a conviction of the accused by a judicial tribunal, not procured by fraud or unfair means, is conclusive evidence of the existence of probable cause for his prosecution, and defeats any civil action therefor, notwithstanding such conviction may be reversed in a court of last resort.
7. -: -: -: -: Evidentiary. The judgment of conviction in the police court, which after a full and fair hearing on the merits in a trial de novo in the proper appellate court was destroyed by an acquittal, is not evidentiary of the existence of probable cause. It cannot be said that the judgment of conviction in the police court is in existence for the purpose of proving probable cause, and not in existence for any other purpose. When nullified for one purpose it was destroyed for every purpose. [Opinion of WALKER, J., and concurring opinion of GRAVES, C. J., in which WOODSON, J., concurs.]
8. -; -: -: -: Offered Subject to Rebuttal. The judgment of conviction may be offered as prima-faeie evidence of probable cause, but is subject to rebuttal by proof of reversal by a trial de novo on the merits in the proper appellate court,' and by any other relevant evidence.
Held, by BOND, J., dissenting, that the judgment of conviction is conclusive of the existence of probable cause, and cannot be rebutted by a showing that the judgment was reversed in the proper appellate court.
9. -: -: Proof Rests Upon All Facts. The question of probable cause in an action for malicious prosecution, where disputed, is one of fact for the jury upon all the evidence in the case. [BOND, J., dissenting.]
10. -: -: Acquittal- as* Evidence. The acquittal of plaintiff in a court of competent jurisdiction constitutes persuasive evidence of a want of probable cause for his arrest. Acquittal will not alone establish want of probable cause; but supplemented by other facts and circumstances, it is evidence tending to establish the essential element of want of probable cause. [BOND, J., dissenting.]
11. -: Essential Elements: Demurrer. Evidence that the criminal prosecution upon which the civil action for malicious prosecution is based, was instituted by defendants, that said prosecution terminated in plaintiff’s favor, that there was want of probable cause on the part of defendants to believe defendants guilty of the offense charged and that there was malice on defendants’ part in the institution of the prosecution, is sufficient to take the case to the jury, for it tends to establish every necessary element of said civil action. lBOND, J., dissenting.]
Appeal from St. Louis City Circuit Court. — Hon. Éhodes E. Cave, Judge.
Reversed and remanded.
Sale & Sale and A. B. Frey for appellant.
The court erred in giving the instruction in the nature of a demurrer to appellant’s (plaintiff’s) evidence on his first cause of action, to-wit, that in false imprisonment. (1) In passing on a peremptory instruction in the nature of a demurrer to plaintiff’s evidence, the court must consider the evidence introduced by plaintiff as true, and make every finding and deduction in his favor which the jury would have been warranted in making. Meenach v. Crawford, 187 S. W. 882; Williams v. Railroad, 257 Mo. 112, 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 443; Grouch v. Heffner, 184 Mo. App. 372. (2) False imprisonment is any direct unlawful restraint of a person’s liberty. 11 R. C. L. sec. 2. (3) It takes less to make a case of false imprisonment than one of malicious prosecution. In false imprisonment it is not necessary to prove malice, or want of probable cause. The lack of malice, or the belief in the guilt of the accused, do not constitute a defense by a private citizen who. causes the arrest of another citizen: Pandjiris v. Hartman, 196 Mo. 545; Monson v. Rouse, 86 Mo. App. 102; Thompson v. Bucholz, 81 S'. W. 490; Mc-Caskey v. Garrett. 91 Mo. App. 358. (4) The only justification that a citizen has who orders a police officer to make an arrest for an alleged violation of a city ordinance not committed in the presence and view of the police officer, is that the ordinance was actually violated, and the determination of that issue is a question for the ju'ry. Pandjiris v. Hartman, 196 Mo. 539; Taafe v. Slevin, 11 Mo. App. 507; Thompson v. Bucholz, 81 S. W. 490; Ross v. Leggett, 61 Mich. 445; McGarrahan v. Lavers, 15 R. I. 302; Grimes v. Greenblatt, 47 Colo. 495; Grinnell v. Weston, 95 App. Div. (N. Y.) 454; Park v. Taylor, 55 C. C. A. 56; Palmer v. Railroad, 92 Me. 399; Wehmeyer v. Mulvihill, 150 Mo. App. 197. (5) The same state of facts may give rise to two causes of action, one for false imprisonment, and the other for malicious prosecution. 19 Cyc. 358; Boeger v. Langenberg, 97 Mo. 390; Guest v. Warren, 9 Ex. Rep. 378; Bradner v. Faulkner, 93 N. Y. 578; Krug v. Ward, 77 111. 603; Bauer v. Clay, 8 Kas. 580; Berger v. Saul, 113 Ga. 869; Long v. Judge, 27 ÍVlich. 164; Scott v. Flowers, 60 Neb. 675; Railroad v. Rice, 36 Kan. 600; Stout v. Omaha Co., 97 Neb. 818. The respondents caused and ordered a police officer to arrest the appellant for an alleged violation of a city ordinance, to-wit, a disturbance of the peace, which alleged offense was not committed in the presence of the officer, and then the respondents some time later charged the appellant before the police representative, who issues information, with the same offense, and prosecuted him therefor. The appellant was adjudged “not guilty.” This gave rise to two possible causes of action, one for false imprisonment, the other in malicious prosecution. While there could be but one recovery on the same state of facts, the appellant had the unquestioned right to set up his cause of action in two different ways. To deny the appellant this right, and to hold that he could not recover as a matter of law on either cause of action was to deny him any redress for the wrongful interference with his personal liberty. It was likewise violative both of the common law and code procedure to hold inferentially as was done in this case that appellant’s action, if any, was in malicious prosecution and then to hold he could not recover therein. Boeger v. Langenberg, 97 Mo. 390; Brinkman v. Hunter, 73 Mo. 172; Milton v. Dairy Co., 175 S. W. 108; Palmer v. Railroad, 92 Me. 399; McMorris v. Howell, 85 N. Y. S. 1021, 89 App. Div. (N. Y.) 272; Stout v. Omaha Co., 97 Neb. 817. While there is a distinction between the liability of a police officer who makes an arrest, and a private citizen, still the courts have held that even a police officer is liable for making an arrest for the alleged violation of a city ordinance not committed in his presence and view, unless the ordinance has actually been violated. A fortiori, a private citizen, who causes the arrest to be made, is liable. Stittgen v. Rundel, 90 Wis. 80; Quinn v. Heisel, 40 Mich. 576; Pester-field v. Vickers, 3 Cald. (Tenn.) 205; Pinkerton v. Verberg, 78 Mich. 573; Newton v. Locklin, 77 111. 103; Parke v. G-illigan, 14 Misc. 123; Ross v. Leggett, 61 Mich. 445. (6) The defendants Philip and Sophie Bieber, having actually caused the arrest, are liable, because it was their own tort. McMorris v. Howell, 89 App. Div. (N. Y.) 272, 85 N. Y. S. 1018; Burk v. Howley, 179 Pa. 539; Boeger v. Langenberg, 97 Mo. 390; McGarrahan v. Lavers, 15 R. I. 302; Ross v. Leggett, 61 Mich. 445. The defendant Jacob Bieber is liable for the following reasons: (a) The defendants Philip and Sophie Bieber were his agents and servants in charge of the business, and were acting within the apparent scope of their authority; (b) Jacob Bieber was present before the arrest was consummated, learned of the facts, assented sub silentio, made no protest against the arrest, and permitted his employees and eo-defendants to depart with the police officer to renew the charge; and (e) it may be inferred that Jacob Bieber had planned some snch action' as this in order to strengthen' the case that he proposed to bring against the Century Building Co., Knowles v. Bullene. 71 Mo. App. 341; Monson v. Eouse, 86 Mo. App. 97; Cooper v. Johnson, 81 Mo. 483; Grimes v. Greenblatt, 47 Colo. 499; Singleton v. Ball Co., 172 Mo. App. 229. (7) The court erred in sustaining the demurrer to appellant’s evidence on the second cause of action — that in malicious prosecution. Appellant was convicted by a police magistrate of the charge of disturbing the peace of one of the defendants, and fined ten dollars, but on a trial de novo on appeal to the Criminal Court of Correction, a court of record, was adjudged not guilty. The correct rule is, and should be, that a conviction by a police magistrate or justice of the peace is not conclusive evidence of probable cause, but is evidence which should be submitted to the jury along with the other evidence in the case. To establish the rule that a conviction by a police magistrate is conclusive evidence of probable cause is to do a manifest injustice to various persons who are brought in without cause before these magistrates, are fined, and then are immediately acquitted in a trial de novo in the courts of criminal correction. Michelson v. Sternberg, 61 App. Div. (N. T.) 54; Skeffington v. Eylward, 97 Minn. 246; Goodrich v. Warner, 21 Conn. 443; Nelson v. Harvester Co., 117 Minn. 301; Moffitt v. Fisher, 47 Iowa, 473.
Schnurmacher £ Bassieur for respondents.
(1) If plaintiff is entitled to damages, upon the facts in this case, it must be either for false imprisonment or malicious prosecution — it cannot be both. Nor can there be any election of remedies. False imprisonment implies an unlawful arrest, — an arrest without lawful authority in the person making it, to make it. If the arrest was lawful, that is under lawful process, or as a step in the prose- ration, then the action must be for malicious prosecution. 1 Cooley on Torts (3 Ed.), p. 315; Finley v. Refrigerator Co., 99 Mo. 559; Wehmeyer v. Mulvihill, 150 Mo. App. 197; Dunlevy v. Wolferman, 106 Mo. App. 50; Dougherty •v. Snyder, 97 Mo. App. 495; Bierwith v. Pieíronnet, 65 Mo. App. 431; 19 Cyc. 321, 322 (notes). Here the arrest was lawful. It was the first step in the prosecution. It was the same as if a warrant for the arrest had been previously issued. In the city of St. Louis, a police officer, under the statute, in making an arrest for a misdemeanor (whether under the law or the city ordinances) requires no warrant, if he has reasonable ground for believing that a misdemeanor has been committed. The fact that the prisoner is ultimately acquitted, does not convert the arrest into an unlawful one. State v. Hancock, 78 Mo. App. 19; State v. Boyd, 108 Mo. App. 518,196 Mo. 52; Grayson v. Transit Co., 100 Mo. App. 73; Wehmeyer v. Mulvihill, 150 Mo. App. 197; State v. Grant, 76 Mo. 236. Nor can there be a splitting of the cause of action. If the arrest and prosecution were without probable cause and actuated by malice, there is nevertheless but one tort for which the defendants are liable — that is malicious prosecution. It cannot be said that the arrest by the officer furnishes one cause of action, and the prosecution of the charge another. Leonard v. Transit Company, 115 Mo. App. 349. The damages inflicted by the arrest are part of the damages recoverable for the malicious prosecution. The arrest is but the preliminary step in the prosecution. Ruth v. Transit Co., 98 Mo. App. 1; Leonard v. Transit Co., 115 Mo. App. 349. (2) In an action for malicious prosecution, it is incumbent upon plaintiff to show that there was an absence of probable cause for his arrest. A judgment of conviction (that is, upon a trial, as distinguished from a mere preliminary hearing before a committing magistrate), is conclusive as to the existence of probable cause, unless the conviction was procured through fraud on the court, or possibly through perjury, etc. To deprive the judgment of conviction of this conclusiveness, facts must be alleged and proved, which impugn the integrity of the judgment. This is true even though the judgment of con viction be afterward set aside on appeal. Here there were no such allegations or proofs. Boogher v. Hongh, 99 Mo. 183; Live Stock Co. v. Butchers’ Union Co., 120 U. S. 140; Saunders v. Baldwin, 112 Va. 431, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 958; Haddad v. Railroad, 88 S. E. 1038; Topolewski v. Packing Co., 143 Wis. 52; Smith v. Thomas, 149 N. C. 100; Price v. Stanley, 128 N. C. 38; Griffis v. Sellars, 2 Dev. & Batt. L., 492; Griffis v. Sellars, 4 Dev. & Batt. L., 176; Sidelinger v. Trowbridge, 113 Me. 537; Witham v. Gowen, 14 Me. 362; Payson v. Caswell, 22 Me. 212; Adams v. Bickwell, 126 Ind. 210; Blueher v. Zonker, 19' Ind. App. 615; Thick v. Washer, 137 Mich. 155; Whitney v. Peck-ham, 15 Mass. 243; Hartshorn v. Smith, 104 Ga. 235; Root v. Rose, 6 N. Dak. 575; McElroy v. Press Co., 254 111. 290; Fones v. Murdock, 157 Pac. 148; 1 Cooley on Torts (3 Ed.), p. 333; 26 Cyc. 39. The above rule applies not only to judgments of courts of record, or to verdicts of juries, but to all judgments of conviction, including judgments of justices of the peace and other inferior magistrates. See cases cited. And the evidence sufficient to overcome the effect of such judgment of conviction, ought to be of the same character as required in actions in equity to set aside judgments. Railroad v. Merrieless, 182 Mo. 126.

Opinion:
WALKER, J.
This suit was instituted in the circuit court of the city of St. Louis. The petition is in two counts, one alleging false imprisonment, the other malicious prosecution. The court sustained a demurrer to both counts at the close of plaintiff's testimony. From the court's refusal to set aside the nonsuit necessitated by its ruling on the demurrer, the plaintiff appeals.
Plaintiff, then an employee of a glass company, went on July 20, 1913, under the direction of his employer, to make certain measurements of windows in the Century Building in the city of St. Louis to enable his employer to bid upon some plate glass to be furnished in the reconstruction of the building. In the discharge of this duty he entered the rooms on the second floor of said building occupied for mercantile purposes by the defendant Jacob Bieber. On entering, plaintiff explained his errand to an employee, who making no reply, plaintiff proceeded to the windows and commenced measuring them. While calling out the sizes to an assistant the defendant Philip- Bieber, an employee, or having an interest in the store, entered and ordered them out. After an ineffectual effort to explain their business they started towards the door. When within a few feet of it Philip Bieber called out "Sophie," whereupon a Miss Bieber, one of the defendants and' also an employee of Jacob Bieber, appeared and pushed or shoved the plaintiff as he was backing out of the door, and upon his attempting to explain their presence she said she was going to have them arrested. Soon thereafter, while plaintiff and his assistant were measuring windows elsewhere in the building, a police officer accompanied by Miss Bieber approached and she pointed them out saying, "Those are the men." The officer asked why she desired the arrest made and she said, "For disturbing our peace. ' ' The officer replied that the men were at work and they did not look like they were disturbing anyone's peace. Miss Bieber insisted on the arrest being made and plaintiff and his assistant were informed by the officer that they were under arrest. Jacob Bieber, the proprietor of the store, also a defendant, saw plaintiff and his assistant in custody of the officer as they were being taken out of the building and was informed of the facts by Sophie Bieber at the time of the arrest, as he was also by Philip Bieber a few minutes thereafter. A patrol wagon such as is employed in conveying prisoners charged with crime to police stations was called and plaintiff and his assistant were placed therein and were conveyed in the custody of officers to a police station on Clark Avenue. Philip and Sophie Bieber followed the officers when they took the plaintiff and his assistant into custody and were present while they waited for a time at 11th and Pine streets for the patrol wagon. Arriving át the station, to which Philip and Sophie Bieber had also repaired, charges were preferred against the plaintiff and his assistant for disturbing the peace, with Philip and Sophie Bieber as complaining witnesses. While in custody at the police station an officer started to search the plaintiff, but was notified by tbe desk sergeant that this was not necessary. After giving personal bonds in the sum of $300 each for their appearance, they were, after half an hour's detention, released. Thereafter, upon a trial before a police court, they were found guilty and fined. Upon an appeal to the Court of Criminal Correction the judgment of the police court was reversed and plaintiff and his assistant were discharged.
I. In filing a demurrer to plaintiff's evidence the demurrant admits the truth of same and the conclusions a jury may reasonably draw therefrom. Hence a trial court in passing upon such a demurrer must consider the evidence to be true, and in so doing draw every inference in its favor that the law will warrant. Thus much for the rule, well established in our procedure, by which we are to determine the trial court's correctness in ruling upon the demurrer filed herein. [Meenach v. Crawford, 187 S. W. l. c. 882.]
TT- False imprisonment consists of the direct restraint of personal liberty. To éstablish it want of probable cause and malice need not be proved. [Tiede v. Fuhr, 264 Mo. l. c. 625.] Unlawful detention is the basis of the action. Actual seizure or the laying on of hands is not necessary to constitute an unlawful detention. If the party is within the power of the person making the arrest and subject to such power, but not of his own will, goes with his captor, it is an arrest such as is contemplated to authorize an action for false imprisonment. [Ahern v. Collins, 39 Mo. 146; Fellows v. Goodman, 49 Mo. 62; Dunlevy v. Wolferman, 106 Mo. App. l. c. 51.] We said in Tiede v. Fuhr, supra, that the character of the restraint, however courteous, would not destroy the plaintiff's right of action if it appeared that the writ under which he was held was without justification; and in a well considered case by the Nansas City Court of Appeals (Singleton v. Exhibition Co., 172 Mo. App. l. c. 307) it was held that if in the exercise of his authority an officer commands a person to accompany him and takes him to a place where persons ar rested are usually taken and the person taken goes in submission to such authority and not of his own volition, this constitutes an arrest. This is in accord with the current of authority on this subject.
Let us recall briefly the vital facts in the instant case; the officer, under the direction of defendants, took plaintiff into custody, placed him in a patrol wagon and conveyed bim to a police station where a charge was preferred against him for disturbing the peace, the defendants Philip and Sophie Bieber being entered as complaining witnesses. To compel his appearance at a hearing he was held to bail. Tried before a police court he was found guilty. On appeal to the court of criminal correction he was acquitted.
In Pandjiris v. Hartman, 196 Mo. 539, in which the issuable facts had their origin in the city of St. Louis, we said: "It is the right and privilege of any citizen knowing that one has committed or is in the act of committing a crime to arrest the offender or cause him to be arrested without waiting for a warrant, but in doing so the unofficial citizen takes this risk, to-wit, if it should turn out that the man whom he has arrested was not guilty of the crime, the citizen causing the arrest is liable in a civil action for whatever damages the arrested man sustained in consequence of his arrest and imprisonment. In such case it is no answer to the plaintiff's demand for damages for the defendant to say, 'I had reasonable cause to believe the plaintiff was guilty; I acted without malice; I took the advice of counsel learned in the law.' The only plea of justification or excuse is that plaintiff was guilty of the crime for which he was arrested. ' '
- The court's reasoning in the Pandjiris case is based upon facts sufficiently parallel to those in the instant case to authorize the application of the conclusion there reached to the latter. Thus applied, it follows, as expressly stated in that case (p. 548), that the plaintiff made out a prima-facie case when he introduced evidence tending to show that defendants had caused his arrest and detention without a warrant.
Defendants contend, however, despite these facts, that the arrest was lawful and hence that they cannot be held answerable therefor. This contention is based on the statute (Sec. 9805, R. S. 1909) applicable to cities of 300,-000 or over, which authorizes police boards in such cities, through the instrumentality of the police force, to "prevent crime and arrest offenders." (This statute, as construed by the St. Louis Court of Appeals in State v. Boyd, 108 Mo. App. 518, and impliedly approved in a review of. that case by this court (196 Mo. l. c. 59), is held to authorize a police officer within the jurisdiction defined to arrest for a misdemeanor not committed in his presence, provided he has reasonable grounds to suspect that the offense has been committed. The construction given the statute is a salutary one. Anyone at all familiar with civil conditions in cities as contradistinguished from the country, realizes that greater power should be given police officers to preserve the peace and arrest offenders in cities than is given to peace officers elsewhere. The court's interpretation of the statute, therefore, is no more than a recognition of this fact and arises, as have many of our laws defining crimes and regulating criminal procedure, out of the necessities of metropolitan life. Arising as the statute does out of necessity and impinging in its application on the liberty of the individual, the courts have been wisely wary to so limit its enforcement as to afford the least possible danger to the rights of the individual. Hence the court's proviso in its interpretation of the statuté that the officer must have "reasonable grounds to suspect that a crime has been commited" before an arrest is authorized. The existence of such reasonable grounds rests upon the '• facts in each particular case and their force and sufficiency must be determined by the officer before he acts, otherwise there would be no limitation upon the power thus granted and human liberty would be subject to the whim and caprice of police officers or individuals and render possible arrests and detentions for trivial causes. While it is not necessary that an examination should disclose that an offense has really been committed, the facts upon which the arrest was based, to render the same lawful so far as concerns the officer, must be such as to afford at the time a substantial belief in his mind that an offense has been committed.
This subject has recently received the careful consideration of the St. Louis Court of Appeals in an opinion by Nortonx, J. (Wehmeyer v. Mulvihill, 150 Mo. App. 197), in which the wholesome doctrine is announced under a state of facts similar in their material features to those in the case at bar, that an arrest made under the statute (Sec. 9805) must be based upon something more than the mere vaporings of an excited citizen complaining of fancied wrongs which the officer has the opportunity to ascertain the true nature of before he arrests the accused.
The evidence here does not afford a basis for such a reasonable suspicion, much less the conclusion, that the plaintiff was engaged in other than an orderly discharge of his duties when the complaint was made against him which resulted in his arrest; and the officer, who is chargeable-with having a knowledge of all of the facts he could have obtained by due diligence before he made the arrest (Stubbs v. Mulholland, 168 Mo. 47), had no facts in his possession at the time he took the plaintiff into custody, nor did he attempt to obtain any, other than the empty declaration of the defendant Sophie Bieber, to justify his action. The arrest, therefore, was unauthorized; the detention resulting therefrom unlawful, and the trial court should have' submitted this case on the first count of the petition to the jury.\
III. While causes of action sounding in false imprisonment and malicious prosecution may be joined in the same suit in different counts, which was the course pursued here, recovery can only be had on one count. [Boeger v. Langenberg, 97 Mo. 390; State ex rel. v. Robertson, 187 S. W. 1. c. 37.] Under this state of facts our ruling on the count for false imprisonment may render unnecessary any discussion as to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the count for malicious prosecution, except to determine the question acutely arising as to whether the conviction of plaintiff before a police court, notwithstanding his subsequent acquittal of the same charge upon a trial de novo before the Court of Criminal Correction, constitutes such probable cause as to justify the ruling of the- trial court in sustaining the demurrer.
According to the weight of authority elsewhere a judgment of conviction in a criminal case is conclusive evidence of probable'cause in an action for malicious prosecution, although the conviction has been reversed on appeal. [Hartshorn v. Smith, 104 Ga. 235; Thomas v. Muehlmann, 92 Ill. App. 571; Adams v. Bicknell, 126 Ind. 210; Witham v. Gowen, 14 Me. 362; Payson v. Caswell, 22 Me. 212; Sidelinger v. Trowbridge, 113 Me. 537; Thick v. Washer, 137 Mich. 155; Price v. Stanley, 128 N. C. 38; Smith v. Thomas, 149 N. C. 100; Fones v. Murdock, 157 Pac. (Ore.) 148; Womack v. Circle, 32 Grat. (Va.) 324; Saunders v. Baldwin, 112 Va. 431.]
The only case in this jurisdiction in which the rule above stated has been announced is that of Boogher v. Hough, 99 Mo. 183. If the rule as thus declared may properly be considered as a precedent in the determination of the case before us, then the contention of the respondent that the action of the trial court in sustaining the peremptory instruction so far as same applies to the count for malicious prosecution, must be sustained.
In the jurisdictions named it is held generally that a conviction before a justice of the peace followed by an acquittal on appeal is given the same probative force as in cases of conviction before courts of record, subject to the limitation in many cases that the hearing upon which the conviction was based must be fair and free from perjury.
In other jurisdictions a conviction before a justice of the peace is only regarded as prima-facie evidence of probable cause where on appeal to a higher court the same is set aside. [Nelson v. Harvester Co., 117 Minn. l. c. 301; Moffatt v. Fisher, 47 Iowa, 473; Olson v. Neal, 63 Iowa, 214; Skeffington v. Eylward, 97 Minn. l. c. 246; Nicholson v. Sternberg, 61 N. Y. App. Div. 54; Hanchey v Brunson, 175 Ala. 236; Goodrich v. Warner, 21 Conn. 432; Delany v. Lindsay, 46 Pa. Sup. Ct. 26; Lindsey v. Couch, 22 Okla. 4.]
The reasons urged for the application of the rule with or without the limitation are that the accused, upon appeal, may have been acquitted by reason of some technicality not involved in the merits of the prosecution and having no bearing on the question of probable cause (Stone v. Stevens, 12 Conn. 219; Fox v. Smith, 26 R. I.1); or the accused may have been acquitted when probable cause for his guilt has been shown, but the evidence failed to show his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [Philpot v. Lucas, 101 Iowa, 478; Godfrey v. Soniat, 33 La. Ann. 915; Britton v. Granger, 13 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 281; Eastman v. Monastes, 32 Ore. 291; Anderson v. Friend, 85 Ill. 135; Saunders v. Baldwin, 112 Va. 431.]
In none of these cases, except that of Sidelinger v. Trowbridge, 113 Me. 537, were the convictions had before police courts. That in Boogher v. Hough, 99 Mo. 183, was before the St. Louis Court of Criminal Correction. In a large majority of the cases the reversals and consequent acquittals were not the results of trials de novo before judges of courts of record or juries, but upon appeals where the reviews were of necessity confined to an examination of the record alone of the proceedings below. Under such circumstances the reasons adduced for the application of the rule are evident. But where, as in a police court, the jurisdiction is limited to suits for the recovery of fines, penalties and forfeitures for violations of city ordinances and the proceedings' are in the nature of civil actions (See. 1863, p. 939, R. C. of St. Louis, Rombauer, 1912; City of St. Louis v. Tiefel, 42 Mo. l. c. 593; St. Louis v. Knox, 74 Mo. 79; St. Louis v. Weitzel, 130 Mo. 600; Ex parte Hollwedell, 74 Mo. 395; Canton v. McDaniel, 188 Mo. 207), and whatever criminal character they possess is due more to their effect .than the procedure (Stevens v. Kansas City, 146 Mo. 460; Douglas v. Kansas City, 147 Mo. 428), and an arraignment or plea is not a prerequisite to the validity of the judgments rendered; and in the absence of an express ordinance, neither the Federal nor the State Constitution guarantees a trial therein by jury (DeLaney v. Police Court, 167 Mo. l. c. 678), there is an absence of those characteristics which in the cases cited render pleas of former conviction, although subsequently reversed, conclusive evidence of probable cause in actions for malicious prosecution.
While not urged as determinative of this case, because the precedents cited afford, in our opinion, ample support for the conclusion reached, but as an individual opinion, another reason deemed substantial may be urged against the effective interposition of a plea of probable cause in a case of this character. It is this: a judgment upon reversal becomes not only non-existent, but as though it has never been. This is true in regard to every relation sustained by a reversed judgment except in actions for malicious prosecution. Where, upon appeal, there is simply a review of the record in case's of this character, reason may exist for the propriety of the plea of probable cause, although based on a reversed judgment of conviction; but where, as here, there has been a full and fair hearing upon the merits in the appellate court, there exists no reason why the general rule should not be applied and the record or judgment of conviction held to have no evidentiary force.
In accord, however, with what we deem to be a right application of the cases reviewed, we conclude that a showing of probable cause conclusive in its nature was not made, under all of the facts in this case, by the defensive interposition of the judgment'of former conviction. To hold otherwise would be to deny a right of redress to one who perhaps had been illegally arrested and unlawfully detained, simply because in a hurried and perfunctory hearing before a police court following such arrest he had been convicted, although upon a trial de novo the judgment of conviction has been held for naught.
This holding is not to be understood as precluding the showing of a former conviction as prima-facie evidence of probable cause subject to rebuttal by proof of the reversal of the judgment of conviction in an appellate court after a full and fair hearing of all of the facts and any other relevant evidence, thus making the qtiestion of probable cause, as it should he where disputed, one of fact for the jury upon all. of the evidence in the case. Repeating the elementáis applicable here as elsewhere: The question of probable cause is a mixed one of law and fact. Whether the circumstances alleged show probable cause is a question of fact to be found by the jury. Whether if true such circumstances amount to probable cause is a question of law to be determined by the court. [Brant v. Higgins, 10 Mo. 728; Hill v. Palm, 38 Mo. l. c. 22; Stubbs v. Mulholland, 168 Mo. l. c. 76; Carp v. Ins. Co., 203 Mo. l. c. 351.]
Holding as we do that the judgment of conviction here does not constitute probable'cause, it follows that the acquittal of the plaintiff in the Court of Criminal Correction constituted, under our rulings, persuasive evidence of want of probable cause. (Sharpe v. Johnston, 59 Mo. l. c. 577, 76 Mo. l. c. 670; Sappington v. Watson, 50 Mo. 83; Casperson v. Sproule, 39 Mo. 39; Brant v. Higgins, 10 Mo. 728; Christian v. Hanna, 58 Mo. App. 37.]
We are not unmindful of the fact that the doctrine is announced generally in Boeger v. Langenberg, 97 Mo. l. c. 397, that evidence of an acquittal of a crime does not tend to establish want of probable cause in an action for malicious prosecution. Barclay, J., in speaking for the court in that .case, uses this language: "This contention is so clearly contrary to the precedents that we dispose of it by merely referring to them. ' ' Williams v. Vanmeter, 8 Mo. 339, is the only Missouri case cited in support of the rule as thus announced. An examination of the opinion in that case, as well as the other authorities cited, does not support the unqualified announcement made in Boeger v. Langenberg. Judge Scott, who spoke for the court in Williams v. Vanmeter, said that "an acquittal is evidence of a want of probable cause to go to the jury, but of itself, and unaccompanied with any circumstances, would not be sufficient." The other authorities cited in Boeger v. Langenberg are of like tenor. The rule, therefore, correctly declared, cannot mean more than as indicated in Williams v. Vanmeter, in the light of which the declaration in Boeger v. Langenberg should be read. The Kansas City Court of Appeals so holds in a discriminating opinion by Smith, P. J., in Christian v. Hanna, 58 Mo. App. 37. The Springfield Court of Appeals in Eckerle v. Higgins, 159 Mo. App. 177, 140 S. W. 616, after a review of the cases, holds that evidence of an acquittal of a criminal charge on the merits will not suffice to establish a prima-facie case of want of probable cause in an action for malicious prosecution. This ruling, rightly interpreted, is not at a variance with that of this court in Williams v. Vanmeter, which is still the leading case on this subject, or of that of the Kansas City Court of Appeals in Christian v. Hanna. In fact, the Eckerle case, however much the reasoning may indicate a contrary opinion, is in exact accord with the doctrine announced in those cases and adopts the language of Christian v. Hanna in its conclusion. There is, therefore, no contrariety of opinion in this State on the subject, whatever may be the rulings thereon in other jurisdictions.
The evidence of plaintiff's acquittal, supplemented by other facts and circumstances, tended therefore to establish the essential element of a want of probable cause necessary, among others, to the successful maintenance of a suit of this character.
The evidence disclosed that the criminal prosecution upon which this action was based was instituted by defendants; that same terminated in plaintiff's favor'; that there was want of probable cause on the part of the defendants to believe plaintiff guilty of the offense charged; and that there was evidence of malice in the institution of the prosecution by defendants. [Ruth v. Transit Co., 98 Mo. App. 1.] These are the requisites to the maintenance of an action for malicious prosecution and in their presence the case should not be taken from the jury by a peremptory instruction. [Stubbs v. Mulholland, 168 Mo. l. c. 89.]
The action of the trial court, therefore, in sustaining the peremptory instruction, so far as same was based upon the presence of probable cause as a defense, was not authorized.
This necessitates a reversal, that a trial may be had in conformity with this opinion. It is so ordered.
Graves, C. J., and Woodson, J., concur in separate opinion by Graves, C. J.; Blair and Williams, JJ., concur in result; Bond and Faris, JJ., dissent