Case Name: THE MADISON AVENUE BAPTIST CHURCH, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. THE BAPTIST CHURCH IN OLIVER STREET, Defendants and Respondents
Court: New York Superior Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1869-04-16
Citations: 1 Sweeny 109
Docket Number: 
Parties: THE MADISON AVENUE BAPTIST CHURCH, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. THE BAPTIST CHURCH IN OLIVER STREET, Defendants and Respondents.
Judges: 
Reporter: Reports of cases argued and determined in the Superior Court of the city of New York
Volume: 31
Pages: 109–139

Head Matter:
THE MADISON AVENUE BAPTIST CHURCH, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. THE BAPTIST CHURCH IN OLIVER STREET, Defendants and Respondents.
A religious corporation Is the aggregation of the male members of the church and congregation, who have been stated attendants and contributed to its support.
A notice given from the pulpit of a meeting to be held for the purpose of authorizing the trustees to take the proper legal steps to effect a union with another church and congregation, is a sufficient notice, and the proceedings of a meeting, convened in pursuance of such notice, are binding upon the corporation.
A resolution adopted at such a.meeting, authorizing the trustees to apply to the Court for permission to convey the real estate of the corporation, is valid, notwithstanding a majority of ail the corporators were not present.
In such a case the consent of pew owners or pew holders was not necessary.
The trustees of a religious corporation, being vested with all the temporalities of the church, have power, with the sanction of the Court, to dispose of the real as well as the personal estate of such church, without obtaining any express authority from the corporators; and upon an application by the trustees for leave to convey, it would not be the subject of legitimate inquiry to investigate the preliminary proceedings which set the trustees in motion, unless their action was attacked by those who were opposed to the sale. Per Monell, J."
The question of the common-law power of religious corporations to alien their real property re-examined by Monell, J., and affirmed.
Before Monell, Jones, and Fithian, JJ.
[Decided April 16, 1869.]
(For opinion of General Term on a former appeal in this case, see 3 Robt., 570.)
Action to recover the possession of a lot of land, and the building thereon, situate on the south-east corner of Madison avenue and Thirty-first street, in the City of New York.
s The action was tried before Mr. Justice Jones, without a jury, who ordered judgment in favor of the defendants, confirming their title to the premises in question, from which judgment the plaintiffs have appealed.
On a former trial, all the proof offered in support of the defences set up in the answer was excluded by the Court, as not constituting a defense to the action, and judgment was thereupon rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, that they recover possession of the premises. From that judgment the defendants appealed to the General Term of this Court, where the judgment was reversed, and a new trial ordered (see case reported in 3d Robertson, p. 570).
On the second trial the defendants introduced all the evidence which had been excluded on the first trial, including a petition to the Supreme Court, presented in the name of the Trustees of the Madison Avenue Baptist Church, and signed and verified by the President and Secretary of the Board of Trustees; also resolutions, consent of pew owners, and of pew holders, annexed to and forming part of said petition. All the evidence was objected to by the plaintiffs. The objection was overruled, and the plaintiffs excepted.
The plaintiffs then offered evidence with the view to impeach or contradict some of the statements contained in the petition to the Supreme Court for its approval of the conveyance of the property, which statements, so attacked, are as follows :
That, owing to causes stated in the petition, the petitioners were unable to pay their liabilities, or meet the current expenses of the church:
That, the plan of union having been agreed to by the joint committee of the two churches, at a public meeting of the church and congregation of the plaintiffs’ church, duly called, and held on the 29th of September, 1862, the report of the committee appointed by the plaintiffs, setting forth the plan, terms, and arrangement of the union, was adopted and approved, and the trustees of the plaintiffs authorized and directed to petition the Court for an order authorizing them to convey their church property to the defendants:
That there were twenty-eight pew owners, and thirty-nine pew holders, or hirers of pews, in the plaintiffs’ church; that sixteen of the pew owners and twenty-five of the pew holders signed the consent and request annexed to the petition; and that all the other pew owners and pew holders in said church approved, and' were in favor of forming a union with the defendants, on the terms of the agreement set forth.
The evidence thus offered by the plaintiffs tended to prove that on the 29th of September, 1862, the number of corpora-tors of the plaintiffs’ church was seventy-two, including such as merely contributed to the support of the church, but were neither pew owners nor pew holders, and that some of the persons who signed the consents, as pew owners or pew holders, were not corporators. It was further proved, that the meeting of the 29th of September was held in pursuance of the following notice, read from the pulpit of the plaintiffs’ church, on the preceding Sabbath, namely:
“A meeting of the church and congregation will be held in the chapel to-morrow evening, at Y& o’clock, for the purpose of authorizing the trustees to take the proper legal steps for effecting a union with the Oliver street Baptist Church.”
At that meeting, the plan of union was adopted, and the trustees of the church authorized and directed to obtain the consent of the Court to a conveyance of their property to the defendants. There was proof that there was present at the meeting only twenty-one corporators. The proceedings of a meeting of the trustees, on the first day of October, 1862, were proved, at which it was voted, by a majority of those present, that the President be authorized to petition the Supreme Court for permission to convey, &c., and that the President and Secretary be authorized to sign a deed conveying the property.
Mr. Hilbank, one of the plaintiffs’ witnesses, contradicted the statement in the petition, that a majority of the pew owners and pew holders had signed a consent and request that an order be made authorizing the trustees to convey. He stated, that instead of forty-one being a majority, it was a minority of the pew owners and new hirers; that there were at that time - eighty-seven altogether, including both pew owners and pew holders. He also testified, that the meeting of the church and congregation, after the plan of union had been suggested, held on the 29th of September, was to consider the propriety of a union, and not to pass on the propriety of conveying the property. He further stated that only twenty-eight pew owners and pew holders signed the consents. There was also evidence that the petition, after it was prepared, was not submitted, or shown to, or brought to the knowledge of the trustees, before it was presented to the Court; and there was also some evidence in regard to the financial condition of the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs offered a variety of evidence, documentary and otherwise, tending to show that a large number of the corporators were opposed to the conveyance of the property. But it was objected to, on the ground that it was posterior to the delivery of the deed, and was excluded by the Court.
Upon all the evidence, the Justice found, among others, the following facts:
That the meeting of the 29th of September was a meeting of the corporation of the Madison avenue Baptist Church, duly called and convened, and that the resolutions authorizing and directing the trustees to petition the Supreme Court for an order to convey their property to the defendants, and, upon obtaining permission, to execute a conveyance thereof, were passed by a majority of the corporators present and voting in their favor.
That none of the allegations contained in the two petitions presented to the Supreme Court were shown to be untrue, except the allegation that the plan or terms of the projected union, mentioned in the first petition, were agreed on by a joint committee, appointed by the corporate bodies respectively.
The other findings of the Court were merely in affirmance of the matters of defence set up in the answer, and are not necessary to be stated.
The plaintiffs’ counsel requested the Court to make several findings of fact, among them: That the meeting of the 29th of September was attended by certain members of the church and congregation, not exceeding thirty in all, of whom not more than twenty-one were corporators of the church:.
That the petition to the Supreme Court, prior to being presented, was not seen by, or its contents communicated to, any officer, or trustee, or corporator of the plaintiffs, except the President and Secretary:
That of the sixteen persons who signed the consent of pew owners, not more than fourteen were corporators; that of the twenty-five persons who signed the consent of pew holders, not more than fourteen were corporators:
That at the time of such meeting there were not less than fifty-two corporators who neither attended such meeting nor signed such consents; and that the pew owners and pew holders were not less than eighty-seven.
The Justice refused to make such findings.
The conclusions of law were, that the defendants were vested with a good and valid title in fee in the premises, and were entitled to judgment confirming such title, and the possession thereof, with costs.
The plaintiffs made exceptions to the several findings of fact, and to the refusals to find, and to the conclusions of law.
Judgment was entered, and the plaintiffs appealed.
Mr. C. C. Langdell for appellants.
The action was brought in proper form.
In making the order under which the deed to the defendant was executed, the Supreme Court was not exercising its general jurisdiction, but was acting by virtue of a special statutory authority. Unless, therefore, the application upon which the order was made came within the terms of the statute, and all the,requirements of the statute were complied with, the order was null and void, and not merely erroneous. - The distinction between a void and an erroneous proceeding has no application to proceedings of this nature. They are either in conformity to the statute and so free from error, or they are absolutely void (Wheaton v. Gates, 18 N. Y., 395). Assuming the order to be void, an action of ejectment was the proper remedy (Denning v. Corwin, 11 Wend., 646; Rogers v. Dill, 6 Hill, 415). In Clark v. Van Surlay (15 Wend., 436; 20 Wend., 365), it was held that the decretal order there drawn in question was made by Chancellor Kent in the exercise of his general jurisdiction, and was subject to appeal or rehearing, like a decree rendered upon a bill filed ; and hence, however erroneous it might be, it was not void, and so could not be attacked collaterally. If the premises were correct, the conclusion would obviously follow (see 15 Wend., 448, per Bronson, J.; 20 Wend., 378-9, per Walworth, C.; 20 Wend., 384-6, per Verplanck, Sen.; 8 How. (U. S.), 536-544, per Wayne, J.; 8 How., [U. S.], 552-8, per Nelson, J.).
The fourth section of the act for the incorporation of religious societies (2 R. L. of 1813, pp. 214, 215), by its true and settled construction, renders the real property of such societies absolutely inalienable, except for a term of years; and but for the 11th section of the same act, no such society could make a conveyance in fee of its real estate for any purpose whatever, without obtaining special authority from the legislature (De Ruyter v. St. Peter’s Church, 3 Comst. 238, 240,' 241; 2 Kent’s Com., 281). The Supreme Court is only authorized by that section to order a sale of the property of a religious society, i. e., a transfer thereof for money. “Sale is a word of precise legal import, both at law and in equity. It means at all times a contract between parties, to give and pass rights of property for money, which the buyer pays or promises to pay to the seller for the thing bought and sold.” The 11th section requires the application for the order of sale to be made by the corporation, which consists, not of the trustees, but of those who have in this suit been termed corpora-tors (Robertson v. Bullions, 1 Kern., 243). The application, therefore, must be authorized by at least a majority of the corpo-r rators; it cannot be made by the mere authority of the board of trustees (Wyatt v. Benson, 23 Barb., 327). It is not claimed that a majority of the corporators signed the consent annexed to the petition, or assented to the petition individually in any form; but it is claimed that the resolutions adopted at the meeting of the 29th September, 1862, were, in legal contemplation, adopted by the entire body of corporators, and, consequently, express the assent of each individual corporator to the transaction. To tliis proposition several conclusive answers may be made. 1. The meeting in question was not a meeting of corporators, but of the congregation generally, including women and infants. 2. The meeting was not called for the purpose of authorizing an application for the conveyance of the plaintiffs’ property to the defendants, but simply “ for the purpose of authorizing the trustees to take the proper legal steps for effecting our union with the Oliver street Baptist Church.” “ Wherever notice is given for one particular business only, the body cannot go on to other business, unless the whole body is met, and it is done by consent ” (8 East., 546). 3. The meeting was not legally called for any purpose whatever. The only meetings specifically provided for in the statute, are the annual meetings for the election of trustees (2 R. L., pp. 214-, 216, secs. 3, 6), though other meetings are recognized (P. 217, sec. 8). The call must be supported, if at all, upon common-law principles, without the aid of any statute. And it is settled that, at common law, a corporate meeting can only be called by serving a notice personally upon every corporator (Stow v. Wise, 7 Conn., 19; Wiggin v. Freewill Baptist Society, 8 Met., 301). Independently of any statutory restriction, a religious society cannot make any conveyance of its real estate for any and all purposes it may see fit; but only for some purpose which may be considered to be for the interest of the society, “ as an association which is to continue organised for the purposes of its creation ” (Wheaton v. Gates, 18 N. Y., 395, 403).
Mr. William R. Martin for respondents.
The findings and conclusions at the Special Term were correct upon the evidence. The plaintiffs failed to establish that their petition was in any material respect untrue, or a fraud upon the Court; that the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to make the order they asked for; or that their deed to defendants is void. The petition was formally presented by the trustees, and it was unnecessary to the legality of the proceedings that they should consult the corporators. The statute confers on the trustees (sec. 3) authority “ to take the charge of the estate and property belonging to the church, congregation, or society, and to transact all affairs relative to the temporalities thereof.” By that statute the trustees are, in fact, the only persons who can represent the interests of the society in Court. They have full control of the temporalities. They have the same authority to sell land as to sell any article of personal property. But for the requirement that the consent of the Court must be had to a sale, no question of their power to sell a lot of ground belonging to the society could arise. It may be proper, as a guide to the discretion of the Supreme Court, that the wishes of the corporators should be ascertained and stated. But that appertains wholly to the result of the proceeding in the Supreme Court, and has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of that Court to act in the premises (opinion of General Term in this case, 3 Robt., 570; in re St. Ann’s Church, 23 How. R., 285; in re Baptist. Soc. of Canaan, 20 How. B., 324; Wyatt v. Benson, 23 Barb., 327). By statute (1 Rev. Stat., 599, sec. 1), “ every corporation, as such, has power to hold, purchase, and convey such real and personal estate as the purposes of the corporation shall require, not exceeding the amount limited in its charter ” (see sec. 2; and see Bowen v. Irish Pres. Cong., 6 Bosw., 266-7).
How, the trustees are the parties, and the only parties, who are authorized by the statute “ to transact all affairs relative to the temporalities of the society.” Of course, then, they may apply for the consent of the Court, and, if it be given, may make the sale. If necessary that the trustees shall consult the corporators on the subject, it was done in this case, and is so proved. The proceeding was expressly authorized by them. The resolution authorized the consummation of the union, in the very manner in which it was carried out. There was no evidence that women voted. Silence implies assent to the act of the majority (Angell & Ames Corp., sec. 499; Commonwealth v. Green, 4 Whart. Penn. R., 531). The proceedings of the meeting of September 29 are a full authority for the application, although a majority of the corporators were not present. That meeting was duly called and was in all respects a regular meeting. It was called by public notice from the pulpit on the preceding Sabbath, inviting a full attendance, and expressing a purpose to “ authorize the trustees to take the proper legal steps for effecting the union ” of the churches. The notice called a meeting of the “ church and congregation.” These are the words used in the statute to designate the electors or corporators. It was called from the proper place—the pulpit—at the proper time, and reached the “ stated attendants.” Ho rule is prescribed by the statute for the repetition of such notices, nor for any interval between the notice and the meetings.

Opinion:
Monell, J.
When this case was before the Court upon the former appeal, it was held, that the matters set forth in the answer, and which had been offered to be proved on the trial, constituted a defense to the action. I do not, therefore, propose to examine at much length any of the questions disposed of by the former decision, except as those questions may be affected by the evidence given on this trial.
It is now claimed that such evidence renders the proceedings to obtain the permission of the Court to convey the plaintiffs' property entirely void, for the following reasons:
First—That no legal notice was given of the meeting at which the Trustees were authorized to make the application;
Second—That the resolution containing such authority was not adopted by a majority of all the corporators of the church; and,
Third—That a portion only of the pew owners and pew holders, who consented to such application, were corporators.
The only notice for the first meeting of the society was given from the pulpit of the church, notifying the- church and congregation that a meeting would be held for the purpose of authorizing the trustees to take the proper legal steps for effecting the union. Such notice, it is claimed, was not sufficient to bind the corporation, by a vote of a majority of those present at the meeting, unless such vote was a majority of all the corporators of the church.
The eleventh section of the act to provide for the incorporation of religious societies (Laws 1813, vol. 2, p. 212, see. 11) provides, that an order for the sale of its real estate may he made " upon the application of the " corporation," but no mode or form is anywhere prescribed for making the application.
The corporation is the aggregation of the male members, of church and congregation, who have been stated attendants, and have contributed to its support; and it is such aggregation that is authorized to make the application.
All corporations act by and through their officers and agents, whose powers are delegated at public or private meetings. Such meetings may be convened in such manner, upon such notice, and at such place, as may be provided in the by-laws, or otherwise agreed upon by the corporation. The statute does not require that any notice shall be given; and it is entirely competent for a corporation to adopt any by-law respecting the notices which may be proper or necessary to be given, or in any other manner prescribe the mode of notifying the corporators, provided it is not in conflict or inconsistent with the statute. The only notice of which the statute has prescribed the nature and manner of giving, is in respect to the election of trustees; and it is provided, that the minister, elders, or deacons, &c., shall "publicly notify " the congregation of the time and place of the election. But whether such notification shall be by announcement from the pulpit, or, as the plaintiffs claim it should be, in respect to other meetings, by personal service upon each corporator, is not defined. Yet I think it cannot he successfully contended that a notice announced from the pulpit would render an election of trustees void. In one case (People v. Peck, 11 Wend., 604), the Court held that even the omission altogether to give the notice prescribed by the statute in respect to elections of trustees, did not vitiate an election. If any thing can be gained from the statute, it is, that if the legislature thought the rights and interests of corporators, in so important a matter as the selection of trustees, in whom is vested the custody and control of all the property,' were sufficiently protected, by requiring a mere public notice in the church, it is not unreasonable to suppose that a similar notice of meetings for other purposes, of no more importance, would also be sufficient.
It may be, that the rule contended for by the plaintiffs is, to a limited extent, applicable to .all that class of corporations in which the corporators or stockholders have a material and direct interest in the property of the corporation, and have a right to be consulted with regard to its disposition. In those cases, I have no doubt that, if it is desired to get authority from the stockholders, and there is no particular mode of notifying them provided either in the charter or in any by-law, personal notice should be given. But in a religious corporation, where the corporators have not, individually, any pecuniary interest, and where any male person, who merely statedly attends divine worship and contributes a few pence annually to the support of the church, is a corporator, no such strictness can be required. And therefore, if a meeting is convened, after a public notice given in the manner usually adopted for giving notices of all meetings of the church and congregation, the proceedings of such meetings cannot, it seems to me, be otherwise than valid and binding upon all the corporators.
The two cases to which we were referred by the plaintiffs' counsel have not, upon examination, been found to strengthen the position, that the notice of the meeting, in the case before ns, was not sufficient to bind the corporation. In one of the cases (Wiggin v. First Freewill Baptist Church of Lowell, 8 Met., 30), the decision was put upon the ground that there were special provisions in the incorporating law, directing the manner in which meetings should be convened, which were, " in such manner as the society shall, by any by-law or vote, provide;" if there be no by-law or vote, then " in such manner as the assessor, or the standing committee, shall, in their warrant for such meeting, direct." And there was a further provision in case the assessors or committee refused or neglected. The meeting was not called in any of the ways provided, and the Court merely, and very correctly, I think, decided, that the proceedings were not binding on the corporators.
The other case (Stow v. Wyse, 7 Conn., 214) was .a manufacturing corporation, and there was no notice whatever to the stockholders of the meeting, and the Court said, that if there was no particular mode of notifying stockholders provided either in the charter or in any by-law, personal notice might be given ; and it was held, in that case, that without such personal notice the meeting had no authority to direct a sale of its property. But the doctrine of that case, even if it he approved, must be confined, I think, to the class of corporations to which I have before referred, in which the stockholders, as in the case from Connecticut, have a material and pecuniary interest, and where the trustees or directors are clothed with none of the large powers which are conferred by the statute upon church trustees.
If I am correct in supposing that the notice of the meeting was sufficient and the meeting was legally convened, it necessarily disposes of the second objection, namely, that the resolution authorizing the application to the Court was not adopted by a majority of all the corporators. It was adopted by a majority of the persons present and voting at the meeting; and that, upon well-established principles, was sufficient to bind the corporation. No question was raised that a quorum was not present; nor was the right of any person to vote challenged or questioned ; and we have the right to assume that a majority of the persons entitled to vote were present. If, therefore, the meeting was legally called, and there was a sufficient number present, of those who had the right to be present, the proceedings of the meeting, adopted by a majority, were binding upon all the corporators.
The third objection has even less force. It was not necessary to obtain the consent of the pew owners or pew holders at all, and it is quite immaterial whether or not they were corporators. They certainly had no greater rights than corporators, and it was not necessary to consult their wishes, after having obtained the authorization of the corporators. This was held by Mr. Justice Harris, in Matter of Second Baptist Church in Canaan (20 How. Pr. R, 324).
Hone of the objections, therefore, taken by the plaintiffs, seem to me to affect the validity and sufficiency of the proceedings to obtain the sanction of the Supreme Court to the proposed conveyance. As found by the learned Justice, the meeting was duly called and convened, and the resolutions authorizing the application of the Court properly passed, and nothing more was required to confer jurisdiction, or give binding effect to the action of the trustees.
I see no reason for disturbing such finding. The evidence, when subjected to well-understood principles, which I have attempted to express, would justify no other conclusion.
But if it were necessary to go a step farther in this case, the petition to the Court, and the order made thereupon, could be sustained on the further ground, that the authority of the corporators was not necessary, and, therefore, all question as to the sufficiency of the notice, or of the vote at the meeting, is disposed of. It has been held, by two judges at least (Matter of Second Baptist Church in Canaan, supra, and Matter of St. Ann's Church, 14 Abb., 424), that the trustees of a religious society have power to make the application, without being authorized by the express vote of the corporation.
The fourth section of the Act of 1813 (supra;) vests all the temporalities belonging to the church, as well its real as its personal estate, in its trustees. They are authorized to purchase other real or personal estate, and to demise, lease, and improve the same; to erect meeting-houses, and to dispose of all moneys belonging to the corporation. All this authority may be exercised without consulting or obtaining the consent of the corporators; and therefore, in virtue of the care and custody of the real estate of the corporation with which the statute intrusts them, the trustees are the proper persons to obtain the sanction of the Court to a sale. As the giving or withholding its sanction is wholly in the discretion of the Court, it will always listen to objections from the corporators, as was done in the case of Wyatt v. Benson (23 Barb., 327), and will probably withhold its approval, if a majority of the society is found to be opposed to thé sale. But I apprehend the Court would not entertain the application át all, unless it proceeded from the trustees; and it would not be a subject of 'legitimate inquiry to investigate the preliminary proceedings which set the trustees in motion, unless their action was attacked by those who were opposed to the sale.
In short, trustees of religious- corporations have the power and the right, <and, as I think, the sole power and right, to seek the sanction of the Court to a proposed sale of the corporate property; and if an order is made allowing the sale, and the order is executed by a conveyance of the property, it must be that the title acquired would be valid and effectual.
It was earnestly contended by the plaintiffs' counsel, that this Court was in error in holding, upon the decision of the former appeal, that the real property of a religious corporation was alienable at common law, and that such power of alienage was merely restrained by the statute.
The confidence with which that position was attacked has led me to a further examination of the question, although it is not necessary to the decision of the case.
That corporations aggregate have at common law such right, and, independently of any statute, the absolute jus disjoonendi, which is neither limited as to object nor circumscribed as to quantity, seems to be well settled upon authority (The Mayor and Commonalty of Colchester v. Lawton, 1 Ves. & Bea., 226; 1 Sid., 161, note at the end of the case ; Sutton's Hospital, 10 Co., 30, b ; 1 Kid on Corp., 108 ; Com. Dig., tit. " Franchise," and cases cited in 3 Robt., 570).
In England, this common-law right of disposition was greatly restrained, on the part of religious corporations, by numerous statutes from 13 Ed. 1 (c. 41), to 5 Geo. 3. (ch. 17), and particularly by several statutes passed in the reign of Elizabeth. By those statutes the common-law right of disposition was taken away as to religious corporations. But it is enough to say that none of those statutes formed a part of the law of the Colony of ¡New York, at the adoption of our first constitution, and have not since been reenacted in this State; although the act of March, 1806, and the eleventh section of the act of 1813, are in effect a restraint upon such common-law right of alienation. Still it is understood that the right remained (Dutch Church in Garden Street v. Mott, 7 Paige, 77, 83), and-that the act of March, 1806, was passed merely to remove a doubt whether the English statutes were not applicable to church property here (Mott v. Dutch Church in Garden Street, supra). And the object, therefore, of that act was to give to every religions corporation an unlimited power to convey its real property, provided the previous consent of the Court was obtained.
The English statutes to which I have referred were enacted for no other purpose than to take from religious corporations their common-law powers of alienation. If such common-law powers had not existed, the Statutes of Westminster were supererogative and needless, and we should have to impute to the British Parliament ignorance of their own common law.
The first general incorporating act of religious societies, in this State, was passed in 1784 (1 Greenleaf ed. Laws of 1784, p. 71). That statute did not contain the present eleventh section of the act of 1813; and whether, until the act of 1806, there was any restraint upon alienation, depended upon whether the statutes of England, in regard to religious corporations, had been adopted by the colonial government in this country, of which Chancellor Walworth says there was a doubt (supra). Consequently, the special acts of 1803, authorizing sales of church property, were passed, and also the general act of 1806.
The reexamination of this question has confirmed the opinion I have heretofore expressed, that in this country, at least, the common-law right of alienation has not been taken away, unless the required sanction of the Court to a sale can be construed into something more than a restraint upon alienation.
The question, however, is of but little importance, inasmuch as it is not doubted, I think, that the only correct construction of the statute is, that with the approbation of the Court a religious corporation can convey its real property, and give a valid title in fee, in the same manner and with like effect as other corporations.
I have examined the exceptions taken to the exclusion of evidence offered by the plaintiff, and do not think any of them well taken. They were offers of evidence of matters transpiring after the order had been made by the Supreme Court, and after the deed of the premises had been executed and delivered to the defendants, and would at most have tended to show that some, and possibly a majority of the corporators, did not approve of or consent to the transfer. For the reason I have already stated, such evidence would have been immaterial upon the issues in the case, and ineffectual to impair or defeat the defendants' title, and were therefore properly excluded.
I find no error in the decision or judgment, and think they should be affirmed, with costs.