Case Name: Daniel A. CRUMMEY v. Linda MORGAN, John R. Fulton a/k/a J.R. Fulton, J.R. Fulton d/b/a the Trading Post, [d/b/a] Watercraft Unlimited
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 2007-08-08
Citations: 965 So. 2d 497
Docket Number: No. 2007 CW 0087
Parties: Daniel A. CRUMMEY v. Linda MORGAN, John R. Fulton a/k/a J.R. Fulton, J.R. Fulton d/b/a the Trading Post, [d/b/a] Watercraft Unlimited.
Judges: Before: WHIPPLE, KUHN, GAIDRY, WELCH, and HUGHES, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 965
Pages: 497–511

Head Matter:
Daniel A. CRUMMEY v. Linda MORGAN, John R. Fulton a/k/a J.R. Fulton, J.R. Fulton d/b/a the Trading Post, [d/b/a] Watercraft Unlimited.
No. 2007 CW 0087.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
Aug. 8, 2007.
Clayton J. Joffrion, New Orleans, Counsel for Respondent Daniel A. Crummey.
Keith D. Crawford, Gonzales, Counsel for Relator Linda Morgan, John R. Fulton a/k/a J.R. Fulton, J.R. Fulton d/b/a The Trading Post, d/b/a Watercraft Unlimited.
Before: WHIPPLE, KUHN, GAIDRY, WELCH, and HUGHES, JJ.

Opinion:
KUHN, J.
| PApplicants-defendants, Linda Morgan, John R. Fulton also know ás J.R. Fulton, and J.R. Fulton doing business as The Trading Post, doing business as Watercraft Unlimited, apply for supervisory writs, seeking a review of the trial court's denial of their exception of lack of personal jurisdiction. We deny the application.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This litigation arises from the sale of an allegedly defective 1981 recreational vehicle ("RV") by the Texas defendants to a Louisiana resident, plaintiff-relator, Daniel A. Crummey, who learned of the availability of the vehicle by viewing it on eBay. On June 29, 2006, after purchasing the RV from the defendants, Crummey filed a petition for damages averring that it was defective. He alleged that the Louisiana district court had jurisdiction under the Louisiana long arm statute and that service had been made on the defendants on July 6, 2006.
The allegations of Crummey's petition set forth the following facts. Crummey viewed numerous pictures of RVs for sale on eBay. After settling on one, he used an Ascension Parish telephone service line and sent inquiries to defendants about the condition and price of the RV. Crummey made an $800 down payment by credit card via telephone in Ascension Parish, and he expressly reserved the right to rescind the sale pending inspection and testing of the vehicle.
Although the defendants offered delivery in Ascension Parish, he chose to pick up the RV in Princeton, Texas, to allow him the opportunity to actually test the vehicle's condition. After he had "conducted as much of an inspection as was possible without actual highway driving," Crummey paid the balance of $3,025 to lathe defendants. About 40 miles into his journey back to Louisiana, the vehicle quit running. Crummey also determined that the- dashboard air conditioner did not work, and that the RV's generator would not run continuously. Crummey phoned defendants' representatives, who were unable to fix the RV. Defendants' representatives towed away the RV.
Crummey called Fulton, advising that he desired to rescind the sale and wanted a refund of $3,825, which included both the down payment and the balance he had paid to defendants. Defendants eventually agreed to rescind the sale, sent him a check for $3,025 marked "paid in full," kept the down payment of $800, and charged another $500 "for [Fulton's] trouble."
Additionally, Crummey's petition avers that the defendants made the following misrepresentations to him. On the eBay website, they posted the statement, "everything works great on this RV and will provide comfort and dependability for years to come. This RV will go to Alaska and back without problems!" In a subsequent telephone conversation with Crum-mey, Morgan misrepresented that she had been inside the vehicle and could confirm that the eBay representations were true. And after the RV had broken down, Morgan again misrepresented, in written correspondence dated June 6, 2006, that Crummey had rejected the offer to repurchase the RV and the defendants were holding the RV for him to pick up or they could deliver it to Ascension Parish if he sent adequate funds.
Defendants have not answered Crum-mey's petition, filing instead a declinatory exception raising the objection of lack of jurisdiction over the person. Plaintiff thereafter propounded interrogatories, which were objected to by | defendants' counsel, who refused to respond to the interrogatories until a trial court ruling on the issue of jurisdiction. At the hearing on the exception, the trial court deferred ruling on the declinatory exception, issuing instead an order requiring defendants to answer the interrogatories relevant to the issue of whether the court had personal jurisdiction over them. The trial court expressly stated that these responses to the interrogatories "shall not be deemed as [an] appearance" and would not be considered a "submission" by defendants to the court's jurisdiction.
Pursuant to the trial court order, defendants gave the following responses in their answers to the interrogatories:
Two (2) items, which were sold by defendants, was (sic) delivered to the State of Louisiana within the last year. However, all sales and transfer of ownership took place in the State of Texas. Clear titles were provided on ALL sales to EVERY customer. The customer was free to obtain a title in any state they so chose after the sale. Of the two (2) deliveries in Louisiana, defendants were only able to locate information on one of these transactions.
Defendant's son... delivered a boat . July 5, 2006 to . Houma, Louisiana. .
They also stated that a vehicle may be purchased from them through the Internet if the purchaser is the high bidder or if the reserve amount was met or exceeded.
The trial court overruled the defendants' exception of lack of personal jurisdiction, indicating:
[The defendants] originally entered Louisiana through the computer.... And that's when they made the minimum contacts. When they entered Louisiana and they tried to sell a vehicle . to an individual in Louisiana, they have entered our jurisdiction when they did that, and this is not an information-only site... eBay is not a site where you go and you advertise, although some people do maybe.... [I]n this particular case, it was obviously put on eBay for sale. This person contracted with them to buy that vehicle, sent them a deposit, and just went and just happened to sign the papers and all in Texas.... [T]hey did make minimum contact at that time, when they tried to solicit business here in Louisiana.
1 sFrom an order in conformity with the trial court's ruling issued on January 20, 2007, defendants apply for supervisory writs.
DISCUSSION
Appellate courts conduct a de novo review of the legal issue of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident by a Louisiana court. Frederic v. Zodiac Dev., 02-1178, p. 4 (La.App. 1st Cir.2/14/03), 839 So.2d 448, 452. A district court's factual findings underlying a decision on the legal issue of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident are reviewed under the manifest error standard of review. Griffith v. French, 97-2635, p. 3 (La.App. 1st Cir.12/28/98), 723 So.2d 1140, 1142, writ denied, 99-0220 (La.3/19/99), 740 So.2d 116.
On the trial of declinatory exceptions, evidence may be introduced to support or controvert any of the objections pleaded when the grounds thereof do not appear from the petition, citation, or return. See La. C.C.P. art. 930. Evidence of the existence of those predicate facts is crucial to the proper disposition of the exception. McKnight v. D & W Health Serv., Inc., 02-2552, pp. 9-10 (La.App. 1st Cir.11/7/03), 873 So.2d 18, 24; see also Byers v. Edmondson, 00-1985, p. 4 (La.App. 1st Cir.11/9/01), 807 So.2d 283, 285, writ denied, 01-3238 (La.2/8/02), 809 So.2d 142 (affirming the trial court's grant of an exception of lack of personal jurisdiction relying in part on excerpts from defendants' deposition and their ^answers to discovery propounded by plaintiffs). Thus, we find no error in the trial court's order requiring defendants to respond to interrogatories insofar as they were limited to elicit information on the underlying facts necessary to dispose of the issue of the court's jurisdiction over the defendants.
The Louisiana long arm statute, La. R.S. 13:3201, provides for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, stating in pertinent part:
A. A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from any one of the following activities performed by the nonresident:
(1) Transacting any business in this state....
(4) Causing injury or damage in this state by an offense or quasi offense committed through an act or omission outside of this state if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this state....
B. In addition to the provisions of Subsection A, a court of this state may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident on any basis consistent with the constitution of this state and of the Constitution of the United States.
With the enactment of La. R.S. 13:3201 B, the sole inquiry is whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with constitutional due process. Alonso v. Line, 02-2644 (La.5/20/03), 846 So.2d 745, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 967, 124 S.Ct. 434, 157 L.Ed.2d 311 (2003).
The due process test, which was first enunciated in Int'l Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320, 66 S.Ct. 154, 160, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945), requires that to subject a nonresident defendant to a personal judgment, the defendant must have certain minimum contacts with the forum state such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. The |7test has evolved to include a "minimum contacts" prong, which is satisfied by a single act or actions by which the defendant "purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." Ruckstuhl v. Owens Coming Fiberglas Corp., 98-1126, p. 6 (La.4/13/99), 731 So.2d 881, 885-86, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1019, 120 S.Ct. 526, 145 L.Ed.2d 407 (1999) (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2183, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985)). The nonresidents "purposeful availment" must be such that the defendant "should reasonably anticipate being haled into court" in the forum state. Ruckstuhl, 98-1126 at p. 6, 731 So.2d at 885 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Wood- son, 444. U.S. 286, 297, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980)). Such contacts may be effectuated by mail and electronic communications, as well as physical presence. Spomer v. Aggressor Int'l, Inc., 00-1646, p. 5 (La.App. 1st Cir.9/28/01), 807 So.2d 267, 272, writ denied, 01-2886 (La.1/25/02), 807 So.2d 250.
The "purposeful availment" requirement for the exercise of specific jurisdiction over nonresident defendants ensures that they will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of a random, fortuitous, or attenuated contact, or by the unilateral activity of another party or a third person. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. at 475, 105 S.Ct. at 2183. To determine whether minimum contacts exist, a court must engage in a factual determination of "the relationship among the forum, the defendant, and the litigation." A & L Energy, Inc. v. Pegasus Group, 00-3255, p. 6 (La.6/29/01), 791 So.2d 1266, 1271-72, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1022, 122 S.Ct. 550, 151 L.Ed.2d 426 (2001) (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 2580, 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977)).
| ^Defendants maintain that they do not have the requisite "minimum contacts" for a Louisiana court to exercise personal jurisdiction, asserting that: (1) the mere placing of an item for sale on eBay should not subject a foreign domiciliary or corporation to the personal jurisdiction of a Louisiana court; (2) entering a Louisiana judicial district via the computer through eBay or an information-only Internet website with no other forms of advertising or solicitation are insufficient "minimum contacts" to justify Louisiana's exercise of personal jurisdiction; (3) they are a Texas-based corporation or individual residents and domiciliaries of Texas and should not be haled into a Louisiana court; (4) they do not maintain an office, bank account, telephone number, or post office box in Louisiana; and (5) they are not registered or licensed to do business in Louisiana and do not directly advertise, solicit business, or employ anyone in Louisiana. Defendants point out that Crum-mey initially made a deposit using a telephone; he flew to Texas to purchase the RV; all deliveries and cash transactions occurred in Texas; and the vehicle was test driven in Texas. Thus, they contend, the only contact the parties have with Louisiana in this case is that plaintiff lives here.
Defendants rely on Quality Design and Constr., Inc. v. Tuff Coat Mfg., Inc., 05-1712 (La.App. 1st Cir.7/12/06), 939 So.2d 429, an opinion of this court, which addressed the issue of "minimum contacts" in the context of Internet transactions. In Tuff Coat, a Louisiana general contractor brought an action against a Colorado supplier, alleging that damages occurred when coating, purchased from the supplier using information gained from the supplier's Internet site, leached into a water park's water purification system.
|9In reaching its conclusion that the Louisiana court lacked personal jurisdiction over the Colorado supplier, the Tuff Coat court looked to Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F.Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D.Pa.1997), as a measure of an Internet site's connection to a forum state, which had explained:
[O]uf review of the available cases . reveals that the likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet. This sliding scale is consistent with well developed personal jurisdiction principles. At one end of the spectrum are situations where a defendant clearly does business over the In ternet. If the defendant enters into a contract with residents of a foreign jurisdiction that involve the knowing and repeated transmission of computer files over the Internet, personal jurisdiction is proper. E.g., CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir.1996). At the opposite end are situations where a defendant has simply posted information on an Internet Web site which is accessible to users in foreign jurisdictions. A passive Web site that does little more than make information available to those who are interested in it is not grounds for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. E.g., Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F.Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y.1996). The middle ground is occupied by interactive Web sites where a user can exchange information with the host computer. In these cases, the exercise of jurisdiction is determined by examining the level of interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs on the Web site. E.g., Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F.Supp. 1328 (E.D.Mo.1996). (Emphasis added.)
Applying the sliding scale, the Tuff Coat court concluded that the supplier's website was passive because it was informational only. Noting that Internet users could not purchase products from the supplier's website and that web users could not download repeated or regular information from the website, the Tuff Coat court pointed out that the extent of interactivity between the Tuff Coat website and a web user was limited to an invitation to actual customers to make a one-time contact— initiated by the customers — which would allow them to have their names placed on a web page list if they so desired. The orders were then shipped 11()by the supplier FOB (free on board), which had the effect of transferring ownership of the products to customers when it left the loading dock. As such, it was not grounds for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the supplier. The Tuff Coat court also concluded that four other sales by the supplier to Louisiana entities were "fortuitous," emphasizing that the prior shipments into Louisiana had been made FOB, and refused to find jurisdiction on that basis.
In the case presently before us, Crum-mey alleges that he was able to actually purchase an item, securing the sale by credit card payments initially issued from Louisiana and accepted by the defendants over the Internet. Thus, defendants' use of eBay to sell the RV does not involve a merely passive website. Unlike the Tuff Coat website, which had been used only for informational purposes to advertise the supplier's products, the sale before us involves the services of eBay, an Internet sales mechanism, which permitted the defendants' product to be marketed for sale in Louisiana. Clearly, the defendants did business with Crummey over the Internet. Thus, the use of the eBay website to market and sell the RV to a Louisiana buyer is, on the Zippo sliding scale, more akin to those situations for which a finding of personal jurisdiction is proper.
The issue of whether an eBay seller was amenable to another state's personal jurisdiction was addressed in Dedvukaj v. Maloney, 447 F.Supp.2d 813, (E.D.Mich.2006): There, a Michigan federal court held that it had personal jurisdiction over a New York eBay seller accused of breach, of contract, fraud, and Inmisrepresentation. The court noted that the defendant's auction listing stated he would ship paintings anywhere in the United States. The listing also provided customers with a toll-free telephone number and an e-mail address to allow them to contact the New York eBay seller. Because the defendant did not limit buyers from Michigan from participating in his auction and displayed a willingness to communicate with buyers from any state, the Dedvukaj court concluded that the defendant had purposefully availed himself of the benefits of conducting business in Michigan. The number of e-mails and phone calls between the parties, the intentional and misleading nature of the communications between the parties, and the defendant's acceptance of payment from Michigan were other factors that influenced the court's finding of a "purposeful availment" by the New York eBay seller. The court stated:
Internet forums such as eBay expand the seller's market literally to the world and sellers know that, and avail themselves of the benefits of this greatly expanded marketplace. It should, in the context of these commercial relationships, be no great surprise to sellers— and certainly no unfair burden to them — if, when a commercial transaction formed over and through the Internet does not meet a buyer's expectations, they might be called upon to respond in a legal forum in the buyer's home state. Sellers cannot expect to avail themselves of the benefits of the Internet-created world market that they purposefully exploit and profit from without accepting the concomitant legal responsibilities that such an expanded market may bring with it.
Dedvukaj, 447 F.Supp.2d at 820. See also Tindall v. One 1973 Ford Mustang, (E.D.Mich.2006), 2006 WL 1329168 (a Michigan court concluded it had personal jurisdiction over California residents, who had sold a resident a car via eBay, because they had transacted business in Michigan) and Montalvo v. First Interstate Finance Corp. (Me.Super.2005), 2005 WL 380727 (a Maine court ^concluded it had personal jurisdiction over Florida residents, who had sold a resident a 2000 Ford Ranger truck via eBay, because Maine has a strong interest in protecting consumers from fraudulent sales practices).
Analyzing the facts before us, applying the standards articulated in Tuff Coat, particularly Zippo's sliding scale, we deny the writ application. The defendants entered into a contract to sell a vehicle — alleged to be defective — to a Louisiana resident utilizing the website, eBay, which greatly expanded their market. They accepted the original down payment, securing the sale with a credit card sent from Louisiana through the Internet. Defendants also provided Crummey with a telephone number which allowed him to engage in additional conversations with the sellers while he was in Louisiana. This was not an "information only" situation. Defendants used a variety of means of electronic communication to advertise, puff, negotiate, and accept payment for its product directed to a Louisiana consumer. Thus, sufficient minimum contacts, effectuated by electronic communications, have been established to maintain personal jurisdiction. See Hunter v. Meyers, 96-1075, p. 5 (La.App. 1st Cir.3/27/97), 691 So.2d 318, 323. To hold to the contrary would have a chilling effect on e-commerce in that buyers, wary of being haled into the home courts of out-of-state sellers, will refrain from purchasing goods on eBay and other similar internet websites should the merchandise they considered purchasing be defective or otherwise not conform to the advertised online representations.
We additionally note that Crum-mey has averred that defendants posted allegedly false representations on the website about the quality of the RV which were viewed in Louisiana; similarly Morgan is alleged to have made | ^misrepresentations about the quality of the RV and the parties' negotiation history. Thus, defendants have allegedly caused injury or damage in Louisiana by the offense of misrepresentation through their acts, and they have derived revenue from goods used or consumed in Louisiana so as to permit a Louisiana court another basis upon which to exercise personal jurisdiction over them under La. R.S. 13:3201 A(4).
DECREE
For the foregoing reasons, we find no error in the trial court's ruling concluding that it has personal jurisdiction over the defendants, Linda Morgan, John R. Fulton a/k/a J.R. Fulton, and J.R. Fulton d/b/a The Trading Post, d/b/a Watercraft Unlimited. Accordingly, the writ application is denied.
MOTION TO DISMISS WRIT APPLICATION DENIED; WRIT DENIED.
WELCH, J., dissents with reasons.
GAIDRY, J., dissents for reasons assigned by WELCH, J.
. Plaintiff-relator filed a motion to dismiss the writ application asserting that it was untimely and lacked required documentation. The gist of his contention is that, although the request for writs was timely, the trial court set the return date outside the thirty-day limitation set forth in La. U.R.C.A. Rule 4-3; therefore, the application is untimely. This court routinely treats a return date set by the trial court outside the thirty-day limit as an extension of the return date under Rule 4-3. See e.g., Gibbs v. Delatte, 05-0281, p. 6 n. 5 (La.App. 1st Cir. 12/22/05), 927 So.2d 1131, 1135 n. 5, writ denied, 06-0198 (La.4/24/06), 926 So.2d 548 (citing Barnard v. Barnard, 96-0859 (La.6/24/96), 675 So.2d 734). And relator has supplied the missing documentation. Thus, we find the application complies with the rules and deny the motion to dismiss.
. "Free on board" is defined as "A mercantile-contract term allocating the rights and duties of the buyer and the seller of goods with respect to delivery, payment, and risk of loss, whereby the seller must clear the goods for export, and the buyer must arrange for transportation." Black's Law Dictionary 690 (8th ed.2004).