Case Name: Tyrone SIMPSON v. STATE of Arkansas
Court: Arkansas Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 2003-04-30
Citations: 83 Ark. App. 201-A
Docket Number: CA CR 02-963
Parties: Tyrone SIMPSON v. STATE of Arkansas
Judges: Pittman, Gladwin, Bird, Griffen, and Baker, JJ., agree.
Reporter: Arkansas Appellate Reports
Volume: 83
Pages: 201-A–201-I

Head Matter:
Tyrone SIMPSON v. STATE of Arkansas
CA CR 02-963
Court of Appeals of Arkansas Divisions I, II, and IV
Opinion delivered April 30, 2003
[82 Ark. App. 76]
[Substituted Opinion Upon Grant of Rehearing delivered October 1,2003.]
S. Butler Bernard, Jr., for appellant.
J. Leon Johnson, Att’y Gen., by: Kent G; Holt, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
Note: The substituted opinion in this appeal appears in a separate volume due to a change in official contract printers and the exigencies of the printing schedule.

Opinion:
D. Vaught, Judge.
Appellant Tyrone Simpson was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder and sentenced to twelve years' imprisonment. On appeal, Simpson argues that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to allow lay-opinion testimony by an eyewitness that the shooting was accidental. We disagree and affirm.
Simpson was charged with first-degree murder in connection with the shooting death of Rufus Lytle, which occurred on October 20, 2001. At trial, the State called as a witness James Lytle, a brother of the victim and-an owner of Lytle's Grocery and Arcade, the establishment where the shooting took place. Lytle testified that, on the evening of October 20, there was a fight taking place in the back room, known as the poolroom, of the store. Lytle stated that he went from the poolroom into the front room of the store and encountered Simpson, who was carrying a shotgun. Lytle testified that he told Simpson that he did not need to be in the store with a shotgun, but that Simpson remained there pointing his shotgun in the air and trying to see what was going on in the poolroom. While talking to Simpson, Lytle stated that his brother, Ralph Lytle, Sr., came into the store carrying a shotgun. According to Lytle, Ralph came up behind Simpson and struck him on the side of the head with the butt of the gun. As Simpson fell to the floor, Lytle testified that Simpson's gun discharged,' striking another brother, Rufus Lytle, in the head and killing him. Lytle stated that both Simpson and Ralph immediately left the premises.
. On cross-examination, Simpson asked Lytle, "What kind of shooting would you characterize this as?" The State objected, arguing that the question called for a conclusion and invaded the province of the jury to determine the circumstances of the shooting. Simpson replied that it was permissible for a witness to a shooting to testify as to whether in his opinion, the shooting was accidental or intentional. The trial court sustained the objection and disallowed the testimony, stating that it was not demonstrated that the testimony would be helpful to the jury and that it invaded the province of the jury for a layperson to testify as to the ultimate conclusion. Simpson was allowed to proffer the expected testimony of Lytle. In the proffered testimony, Lytle stated that he witnessed every moment of the events surrounding the shooting and that he would characterize the shooting as an accident. Lytle testified that in his opinion, Simpson was not intending to shoot the gun when he fell.
Simpson's sole argument on appeal is. that the trial court erred in refusing to allow the opinion testimony of the eyewitness. The decision on whether to admit relevant opinion evidence rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, and the trial court's ruling will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Marts v. State, 332 Ark. 628, 968 S.W.2d 41 (1998). Arkansas Rule ofEvidence 701 (2002) permits lay witnesses to testify in the form of opinions or inferences, as long as those opinions or inferences are (1) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (2) helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference that is otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact. Ark. R. Evid. 704 (2002); Marts v. State, supra. Although opinion testimony on the ultimate issue is admissible, if the opinion mandates a legal conclusion or "tells the jury what to do," the testimony should be excluded. Marts v. State, supra (citing Salley v. State, 303 Ark. 278, 796 S.W.2d 335 (1990)). For example, an opinion by an expert witness in a medical malpractice case that a doctor was not negligent was held to be inadmissible because it did not merely embrace the ultimate issue, but was tantamount to telling the jury what result to reach. Gramling v. Jennings, 274 Ark. 346, 625 S.W.2d 463 (1981).
Simpson contends that the proffered opinion in this case, which was that the shooting was accidental, was rationally based on James Lytle's perception, that it would have been helpful to á clear understanding of his testimony or a determination of a fact in issue, and that it does not mandate a legal conclusion. As support for his argument, Simpson cites Mathis v. State, 267 Ark. 904, 591 S.W.2d 679 (Ark. App. 1979). In Mathis, the defendant was convicted of second-degree murder for the shooting death of his girlfriend. According to the testimony of an eyewitness, the parties were arguing, and the defendant went to get his gun. The witness testified that she placed herself between the defendant and his girlfriend and that the defendant then reached around and shot his girlfriend. The witness was allowed to testify that in her opinion, the shooting was not accidental. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in allowing an opinion on the ultimate issue. He also argued that her opinion was not rationally based on her perception because it went to his state of mind and not to something that could be perceived by her senses. This court held that the opinion was properly admitted, finding that the opinion was rationally based on her observations of the struggle and that it was helpful to the trier of fact to know whether the eyewitness felt the shooting was accidental. Id. We stated that opinion testimony is no longer viewed as "usurping the function of the trier-of-fact" and that the "trier of fact considers the opinion along with the other evidence and determines the weight to be attached to the testimony." Id. at 907, 591 S.W.2d at 681.
While Mathis would be support for sustaining the trial court if it had admitted the testimony, it does not mandate reversal of the court's decision not to admit. The question is not what we would have done, but whether the trial court abused its discretion by making a judgment call that was arbitrary or groundless. Walker v. State, 304 Ark. 393, 803 S.W.2d 502 (1991).
In this case it did not. The court set forth a rational basis for denying admission:
We have here a situation where the gun was brought into a place where it's a single shot weapon that had to be loaded, it had to be cocked, and given that that had to have gone on before. I am going to leave it to the jury to determine the nature of the shooting, the nature of what occurred there [rather] than let lay witnesses testify as to how they might characterize it.
I am [going to] let them testify as to facts rather than opinions or conclusions [.]
All of the witness's testimony up to the conclusion was admitted, and the court's reasoning that the jury could reach its own conclusion is rational and not arbitrary or groundless. There was, therefore, no abuse of discretion.
Affirmed.
Pittman, Gladwin, Bird, Griffen, and Baker, JJ., agree.
Hart, Neal, and Roaf, JJ., dissent.