Case Name: PEOPLE v. KATZ
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1912-12-20
Citations: 139 N.Y.S. 137
Docket Number: 
Parties: PEOPLE v. KATZ.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 139
Pages: 137–156

Head Matter:
(154 App. Div. 44.)
PEOPLE v. KATZ.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
December 20, 1912.)
1. Indictment and Information (§ 174 )—Allegations as to Parties— Aiders and Abettors.
Though an indictment for larceny does not allege that any one-else was concerned in the larceny, or that accused is only charged as aider and abettor, .but simply charges that he committed the crime, he may be convicted upon proof that he was an accessory.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Indictment and Information, Cent. Dig. §§ 540-543; Dec. Dig. § 174.*]
2. Criminal Law (§ 1159*)—Appeal—Conclusiveness of Verdict.
It is not the duty of the Appellate Division to examine the evidence de novo, to determine whether it would have arrived at the same result as the jury, and it will not reverse because it might have decided differently.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3074-3083; Dec. Dig. § 1159.*]
3. Criminal Law (§ 345*)—Evidence—Different Transactions.
Where accused was charged with larceny by conspiring with others to loan another money upon collateral security of a much greater value than the sum loaned, and to then dispose of the collateral, making it necessary to find a well-known bank or trust company to make the loan, evidence was admissible, by a broker, that defendant solicited him to assist in finding a suitable intermediary to act as the ostensible lender, being admissible to show the nature of the conspiracy and the preparations made to carry it out.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 764, 765, 777; Dec. Dig. § 345.*]
4. Witnesses (§ 414*)—Evidence—Extrajudicial Declarations.
Where it is claimed that a witness testified with a motive as to free himself, prompting him to testify falsely, evidence of similar declarations, at a. time when such motive did not exist, was admissible, especially where the jury were informed that such evidence could not be considered as proof of such facts, but merely as it bore on the credibility of witness’ evidence at the trial.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Witnesses, Cent. Dig. §§ 1287-1288; Dec. Dig. § 414.*]
5. Criminal Law (§ 1038*)—Appeal—Objections—Presentation Below.
Where the court- stated that its reasons for refusing to charge several requests were that they had already been covered, it was counsel’s duty to call the court’s attention to any particular omitted proposition and request an instruction thereon, and, not having done so, but merely having excepted to the failure to charge each and every request, she cannot complain, on appeal, of failure to give an instruction.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 2646; Dec. Dig. § 1038.*]
6. Criminal Law (§ 1173 )—Instructions—Refusal of Requests.
Where requested charges were not read in the jury’s presence, a refusal to charge any of them could not have been taken by the jury as equivalent to charging the contrary.
[Ed. Note!—For other cases,’ see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3164-3168; Dec. Dig. § 1173.*]
7. Criminal Law (§ 1173*)—Appeal—Harmless, Error—Failure to Instruct.
Failure to instruct that, if the jury believed that the witness testified falsely as to any material fact, they could disregard his entire testimony, if they saw fit, was not reversible error, especially where' the jury was specially selected under the statute.
. [Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3164r-3168; Dec. Dig. § 1173.*]
Laughlin, J., dissenting.
Appeal from Trial Term, New York County.
Charles Katz was convicted of first degree grand larceny, and he appeals.
Affirmed.
Argued before INGRAHAM, P. J., and LAUGHLIN, CLARKE, SCOTT, and MILLER, JJ.
Morgan J. O’Brien (John F. McIntyre and Samuel S. Koenig, both of New York City, on the brief), for appellant.
Robert C. Taylor, of New York City, for the People.
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes
For other cases see same topic & {¡number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
SCOTT, J.
The defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him of grand larceny in the first degree.
The basis of the charge against the defendant, as it developed upon the trial, was the allegation that he conspired with one Clark, described as a curb broker, one Persch, and one Sherwood, the cashier of a stockbrokerage firm, to steal certain stock, the property of one Heinze. The scheme devised to obtain possession of" the stock was bold and ingenious, and involved the intervention of the officers of a trust company. It was not charged that defendant actually and physically stole the stock. He was claimed to be what, in former days, would have been termed "an accessory before the fact," but was charged and indicted as a principal under the provisions of section 29 of the Penal Code (now section 2, Penal Law [Consol. Laws 1909, c. 40J). He was*indicted alone; Clark, Sherwood, Persch, and Field being separately indicted. Defendant's indictment does not mention any one else as having been concerned in the larceny, and does not explain that defendant is charged with the crime because he aided and abetted others in committing it. It simply charges him, substantially in the words of the statute, with having committed the crime. It is strongly urged that such an indictment is insufficient under the circumstances of the case, and that the indictment should have alleged who is said to have physically committed the crime. The Court of Appeals in People v. Bliven, 112 N. Y. 79, 19 N. E. 638, 8 Am. St. Rep. 701, seems to have entertained a contrary opinion, and it is a well-known fact in the legal history of this state that the same contentions now made by the defendant were vehemently urged upon the Court of Appeals on the motion for a reargument of the appeal from the conviction for murder in People v. Patrick, and were necessarily overruled when the motion for reargument was denied. People v. Patrick, 183 N. Y. 52, 75 N. E. 963. 'We are of the opinion, therefore, that this objection to the indictment is not well founded.
We have examined and re-examined the record with great care, •and with the aid of exhaustive and able briefs on the part both of the people and of the defendant. We do not consider it necessary to recite at length the evidence upon which the jury reached their verdict. To prove the conspiracy and defendant's alleged relation to it, the people were, of course, obliged to rely upon the evidence of persons whose character was no better than that which it was sought to attribute to the defendant himself, including at least two self-confessed participants in the conspiracy. They were, however, for the most part, the defendant's self-chosen associates in other matters, if not in the particular crime charged against him. Their veracity and that •of defendant, who contradicted them flatly, was essentially a question for the jury, which, as the record shows, was a special jury drawn from the list authorized by chapter 602, Laws 1901. This special jury list, as the statute requires and as is the fact, is composed of persons specially selected from the general jury list after careful personal examination as to their general intelligence and experience as jurors. We should hesitate long before overturning, on a mere question of veracity, a verdict reached by such a jury, especially when the defendant has been represented, as in this case by counsel of long experience in criminal trials and of unquestioned energy and devotion to .his client's cause.
It would be easy to go through this record, as it would in many •other cases, and argue, from the evidence as it appears in type, that the jury must have believed some witnesses whom it should not have believed, and disbelieved some whom it should have believed; but it would also be equally easy to pick out corroborative evidence in many places, which, taken in connection with the testimony of the people's witnesses, would fully justify the verdict. It is not our duty to usurp the functions of the jury and to examine the evidence de novo, with a view to determining whether or not, on the same evidence, we should have arrived at the same result as that at which the jury arrived. So long as the verdict is not clearly against the evidence, as we think it is not in this case, and it appears that the defendant has had a fair trial before an impartial judge and an intelligent jury of his own selection, as well as the aid of competent counsel, we cannot feel that it is our duty to reverse the conviction because, perchance, if we had been sitting as jurors, we might have decided differently. People v. Taylor, 138 N. Y. 398, 34 N. E. 275; People v. Shea, 147 N. Y. 78, 41 N. E. 505; People v. Egnor, 175 N. Y. 419, 67 N. E. 906; People v. Rodewald, 177 N. Y. 408, 70 N. E. 1; People v. Long, 150 App. Div. 500, 135 N. Y. Supp. 491, affirmed 206 N. Y.-, 99 N. E. 1114.
The record bristles with defendant's exceptions, of which nearly 400 were taken during the course of the trial. Comparatively few of them are now relied upon, and of these some present no question requiring discussion here. Much stress is laid upon the fact that the court admitted evidence to be introduced concerning what is characterized as a different and distinct transaction. The conspiracy-charged was that defendant and others had devised a plan to actually loan Heinze a considerable amount of money upon collateral security of a value much larger than the sum loaned, and then to dispose of the collateral. To carry out this scheme it was necessary to find a well-known Stock Exchange house, or a bank or trust company, to "clear the loan," as it was called, or, in other words, to become the ostensible lender, as Heinze was unwilling to intrust his securities to an irresponsible lender. To obtain a firm or corporation to "clear the loan," which would be of sufficient reputation to satisfy Heinze, and at the same time to be sufficiently pliable to deliver the securities to the conspirators, was not the least difficult feature of the scheme. The evidence objected to was that of a broker named Schwede, who testified that defendant solicited him to assist in finding a suitable intermediary. In our opinion the evidence was relevant, as tending to show the nature of the conspiracy upon which the defendant had embarked, and the preparations which he made to carry it out. Evidence of preparation to commit a crime stands upon the same footing as evidence of previous attempts to commit it, and is always relevant. Thus, in murder cases, it has been held relevant to show that the accused redeemed a pawned revolver (People v. Scott, 153 N. Y. 40, 46 N. E. 1028), or practiced shooting at a mark (People v. McGuire, 135 N. Y. 639, 32 N. E. 146 People v. Youngs, 151 N. Y. 210, 45 N. E. 460), or, where the crime was committed by stabbing, ground a knife (People v. Tice, 131 N. Y. 651, 30 N. E. 494, 15 L. R. A. 669). In the present case Schwede's testimony merely tended to show that the defendant had endeavored to find a tool to use in committing the crime.
It is contended that the court erred in admitting in evidence a statement made by one of the witnesses for the people (Clark) to his own counsel prior to the trial.. Clark's character and previous history were, as the district attorney frankly stated, none of "the best. On his direct examination he had given testimony to establish the defendant's guilt. He was subjected to a prolonged and unusually severe cross-examination, aimed at breaking down his credibility with the jury, and upon the cross-examination the defendant's counsel himself read from and used parts of Clark's previous statement to his own counsel. •This statement substantially agreed with the evidence given upon the trial. The evident purpose of the defendant's counsel was to persuade the jury that in giving his evidence upon the trial Clark was actuated by a motive to save himself at the expense of the defendant, and therefore that his evidence was untrustworthy. We are of the opinion that the evidence was properly received. The rule applicable to such a case is well settled by Matter of Hesdra, 119 N. Y. 615, 23 N. E. 555, and Robb v. Hackley, 23 Wend. 50. It is thus stated:
"Where a witness is charged with giving his testimony uhder the influence of some motive prompting him to make a false or colored statement, it may be shown that he made similar declarations at a time when the imputed motive did not exist."
The learned trial justice was at great pains to impress upon the jury the fact that Clark's previous statement was not received, and could not be considered, as proof of the facts therein stated, but was to be considered only with reference to its bearing upon the evidence given by Clark at the trial. For the same reason, and under the rule of evidence above quoted, the defendant can take nothing by his exception to tire admission of proof of former statements made by the witness Birmingham. Nor was it error to leave it to the jury to determine whether or not the defendant Birmingham was an accomplice. Such submission was, if anything, more rather than less than the defendant was entitled to demand. The court would probably have committed no error if it had held that Birmingham was not an accomplice.
The other exceptions to which we deem it proper to refer relate to those taken, or endeavored to be taken, to the refusals to charge as requested by the defendant. The charge of the trial justice was eminently fair, full, and impartial. The defendant's counsel took many exceptions to its language, in pursuance apparently of a general policy, maintained throughout the trial, to except to everything, but now insists upon only one, and that raises no question necessary to be discussed.
Before the jury was charged., counsel for the defendant handed to the court 102 written requests to charge. It is apparent that the court intended to incorporate into the charge practically all of these, and in fact did so incorporate, either in paraphrase or in the language of the request, nearly every proposition thus .submitted. That the court intended to charge all of the proper requests, and believed that they had been covered, is evidenced by what took place at the end of the charge. Referring to the requests, defendant's counsel said:
"May they all go on the record, and may we have an exception to each oneV"
To which the court replied :
"Certainly. The. counsel have submitted to the court 102 requests to charge, and the court grants an exception to each and every request refused by the court, on the ground that they are already covered in the charge."-
It is very doubtful whether exceptions taken in this wholesale fashion raise any question of error. To submit so large a list of requests, and then interpose an omnibus exception, amounts to little else than a trap "better adapted to confuse and trip a court than to serve any useful purpose." People v. McCallam, 3 N. Y. Cr. R. 189-198, affirmed 103 N. Y. 587, 9 N. E. 502.
Counsel had been clearly and distinctly advised by the court that the reason for refusing to repeat and recharge the several propositions embraced in the requests was "that they had already been covered in the charge." If some of' the proper requests had been overlooked" by the court, and thus not included in the charge, it was the duty of counsel to have called the attention of the court to the omitted propositions, and ask specifically as to them that the jury be instructed. People v. Birnbaum, 114 App. Div. 480-489, 100 N. Y. Supp. 160. Having failed to take this course, the defendant is not entitled as a matter of right to insist upon his exception; and we are not required, in consequence, to reverse the judgment by reason of the exception, unless we can clearly see that the defendant has been prejudiced. We are satisfied that the defendant has not been prejudiced.
The requests were not read in the presence of the jury, and the refusal to charge any of them cannot have been accepted by the jury as tantamount to charging contrary thereto. People v. Lumsden, 141 App. Div. 158-169, 125 N. Y. Supp. 1079. One of the requests (numbered 72 on the list) was that the jury be charged that:
"T'be fact that two or more accomplices testify to the commission of a crime does not dispense with the necessity of corroboration, and the same amount of evidence is required to connect the defendant with the crime as if there had been but one accomplice."
The court had already charged fully upon the necessity for corroboration of the admitted accomplices, and, while he had not adopted the words of the request above quoted, he had covered the same idea in language which an intelligent jury could hardly have failed to understand. If counsel desired a more ample charge on this subject, he should have clearly indicated his desire by calling attention specifically to his request.
The other omissions to which our attention is called are those, relating to the requests numbered 74 and 93, in which the court was requested to charge as to certain witnesses that:
"if the jury believe that the witness willfully testified falsely as to any material fact, they are at liberty to disregard the entire testimony of the-witness if they see fit."
This request is not covered by the main charge; but it is entirely certain that if counsel had been more explicit with the court, and had directed its attention to the omission to charge as requested in this particular, the court would have instantly supplied the omission, probably stating the rule as it should be stated—that the jury under such circumstances might, but need not, reject the whole testimony of the witness. We do not consider that the omission of this particular charge constitutes reversible error.- The proposition embraced in the request is scarcely a rule of law, although its propriety has been affirmed in many cases. It is rather the statement of a rule by which the weight of evidence is to be tested—a rule derived from the experience of mankind, both lay and legal. A jury, carefully selected-for their intelligence and experience, as this jury was, would undoubtedly apply this rule in considering how far a witness was to be believed, even without a reference to the rule by the court.
We are satisfied that the conviction was without legal error, and was-justified by the-evidence.
The judgment is therefore affirmed.
INGRAHAM, P, J., and CLARKE and MILLER, JJ., concur. -
Reported, in full in the" Northeastern Reporter; reported as a memorandum decision without opinion in the New York Reports.