Case Name: DEMAREST ET AL. v. DEN EX DEM. HOPPER ET AL.
Court: New Jersey Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1850-01
Citations: 22 N.J.L. 599
Docket Number: 
Parties: DEMAREST ET AL. v. DEN EX DEM. HOPPER ET AL.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Law Reports
Volume: 22
Pages: 599–623

Head Matter:
DEMAREST ET AL. v. DEN EX DEM. HOPPER ET AL.
When lands are devised to any person for life, and at his death to go to his heirs, the children of the tenant for life take immediately a vested remainder in fee, by virtue of the first section of the act further regulating the descent of real estates. Lev. Laws 774 .
This was an action of ejectment brought in the Supreme Court by John Den, on the demise of Maria Louisa Hopper, Eliza Ann Hopper, Charity Euphemia Hopper, Henry Lewis Hopper, Catharine Jane Hopper, Emily Hopper, Lewis Hopper, John Bush, and Peter P. Wortendike and Baohael his wife, against Garret J. Demarest, Daniel D. Blauvelt, James Holdrum, and Henry A. Terhune, in trespass and ejectment for lands in Bergen county.
It was tried before the Chief Justice at the Bergen Circuit, in February, 1847, when a special verdict was found under the direction of the court.
John Bush and Baohael the wife of Peter P. Wortendike, two of the lessors of the plaintifíj -were found to be lawful heirs of Catharine Salyer, now deceased, the daughter of Johannes Perry. A general verdict was found that the defendants were guilty of the trespass and ejectment complained of, and the damages of the plaintiffs were assessed at six cents, subject to the opinion of the court upon the following case, and the facts so.specially found by the said verdict:
Johannes Perry, of Orangetown, Rockland county, New York, by his last will, dated May 29, A. D. 1823, and duly signed and attested to pass real estate in New Jersey, devised, among other things, as follows: “ I give unto my daughter Catharine, for and during her life, the remainder of my real estate; after her death, I will and require the same shall be equally divided among her heirs, and be unto them, their heirs and assigns for ever.”
That the said Johannes Perry died in about the year 1832, and was, at the time of his death and at the date of said will, seized in fee of the premises in question, which, with a lot of wood land, containing about 18-J acres, adjoining the said premises, and some lands in Rockland county, constitute the remainder of his real estate, and were not included in any specific devise in his will.
That said testator, at the date of said will, had three children, Margaret, Mary, and Catharine; that Catharine was, before the date of said will, lawfully married to Michael Salyer, who is still living, and from whom she never was divorced; that after said marriage, and during the cohabitation of said Michael Salyer and Catharine his wife, she had one child, Maria, afterwards the wife of Lewis Hopper; that, after the birth of said Maria, Michael Salyer and his wife Catharine separated and lived apart, under written articles of separation; that during said separation the said Catharine was formally married to Peter Bush, by the Reverend Stephen Goetchius, a settled and.ordained minister of the gospel, settled at the Reformed Dutch Church at Pascack, in the .county of Bergen; and that after said ceremony of marriage they cohabited as man and wife, and that during said cohabitation John P. Bush and Rachael 'Wortendike, two of the lessors of the plaintiff, were born of said Catharine. John was born about two years after said marriage by S. Goetchius, and before the date of the will; Rachael was born a few years after John, and after the date of said will, but in the lifetime of Johannes Perry.
That Maria, the daughter of Catharine Salyer, was married to Lewis Hopper in 1821, and died May 22, 1846, leaving six children, born daring said marriage, to wit: Maria Louisa, aged 18 years; Eliza Ann, aged 16; Charity Enphernia aged 11; Henry Lewis, aged 11; Catharine Jane, aged 8; and Emily aged 4 years, and leaving no other descendants.
That Catharine, the daughter of Johannes Perry, died, in September, A. I). 1845, before her daughter Maria, and leaving no other descendants than said Maria, John, and Rachael; that said Catharine and Peter Bush, after said marriage ceremony before S. Goetchius, cohabited as man and wife until her death, and that her children, John and Rachael, were always called by the name of Bush.
That Lewis Hopper and Maria his wife, by deed, duly acknowledged, dated April 13, 1832, recorded May 28, 1832, reciting a consideration of §500, witnessed that they had granted, bargained, sold, aliened, remised, released, conveyed, and confirmed, unto Peter Bush and his heirs and assigns, all the right, title, and interest which they then had, or thereafter might have by virtue of the will of Johannes Perry, in the premises in question, and on seventeen acres in Rockland comity, without any covenants.
That Peter Bush and Catharine, called his wife, by deed, duly acknowledged, dated April 13, 1832, recorded October 23, 1833, reciting a consideration of $300, witnessed that they had granted, bargained, sold, aliened, remised, released, conveyed, and confirmed, unto Lewis Hopper and Maria bis wife, the wood lot of 18J acres adjoining the premises in question, and part of the lands devised by Johannes Perry to his daughter Catharine, for her life, without any covenants.
That Peter Bush, by bond, dated April 13, 1832, became bound to Lewis Ilopper in the sum of §1000, with a condition reciting, that whereas John Bush and Rachael Bush, heirs of Catharine aforesaid, were minors, and incapable to transfer real estate, that if said John Bush and Rachael Rush,, when of age, should convey their interest in said 18J acre wood lot, or if said Peter Bush should pay said Lewis, his heirs or assigns, all costs or damages which he may sustain by reason of their not so doing, that bond to be void.
That said bond and said last mentioned deed were the true and only consideration of the release executed by Lewis Hopper and wife to Peter Bush • that Peter Bush and the said Catharine, before that, and at the opening and reading of the will of Johannes Perry, had expressed themselves much dissatisfied with the limitations on Catharine’s share, and he threatened that if some arrangement was not made he would sweep all the wood off the same; that, after this, negotiations began, which ended in the above conveyances.
That Peter Bush, at and before the date of the release to him, was in possession of the premises, and that Lewis Hopper entered upon the 18J acre lot, and has sold the same to divers persons, by deeds with full covenants of warranty and seizin, for the sum of $850, in all.
That Peter Bush and Catharine, called his wife, by deed, duly acknowledged, dated October 23, 1833, and never recorded, reciting a consideration of $1982, witnessed that they bargained, sold, and conveyed to the defendants, Daniel D. Blauvelt and Garret J. Demarest, 30.72 acres, part of the premises in question, in fee simple, with full covenants of title.
That Peter Bush, at the date of said last mentioned deed, executed to said Garret J. Demarest and David D. Blauvelt his bond, with a condition reciting that said John Bush and Rachael Bush, as heirs of Catharine, were interested in the said 38.72 acres by virtue of said will, and that said bond should bo void on their releasing to said Garret and Daniel, when they came of full age.
That Peter Bush and Catharine, called his wife, by deed, dated October 23,1833, duly acknowledged, but never recorded, conveyed, by bargain and sale, with full covenants, 13.76 acres, the residue of the premises in question, to James Holdrum, for the consideration of $602.27.
That Peter Bush, at the date of the said deed, gave to James Holdrum his penal bond, with like recital and condition as is contained in the bond above slated, to Garret J. Demarest and Daniel D. Blauvelt.
That John P. Bush, when of age, executed a deed to Garret J. Demarest and Daniel D. Blauvelt, dated December 31, 184.2, duly acknowledged, but never recorded, reciting a consideration of one dollar, whereby he witnessed that he had granted, bargained, sold, remised, released, and for ever quit-claimed to said Garret and Daniel, in fee, the lands so conveyed to them by Peter Bush, without any covenant of any kind, and executed a like release for like consideration, with like words of conveyance, of said date, and also without any covenant of any kind, to James Holdrum, for the lauds so conveyed him by Peter Bush.
The question for the opinion of the court is, whether, on the facts above stated and the facts specially found by the jury, as above stated, the lessors of the plaintiff, or any of them, have any title to the premises in question, or any part thereof; and if the court shall be of opinion that the lessors of the plaintiff, or any of them, have title to said premises, or any part thereof, then the verdict is to be entered for the plaintiff as aforesaid, or for such part of the premises as the lessors of the plaintiff, or any of them, have titie to ; but if the court should be of opinion that the lessors of the plaintiff, or any of them, have not title to the premises in question, or any part thereof, then a verdict to be entered for the defendants.
And either party is to be at liberty, within ninety days after the judgment of the Supreme Court shall be rendered on this case stated, to turn this special case into a special verdict, and to enter the same on the record, by giving notice of such election within said ninety days to the opposite party, or his attorney, in order that a writ of ertor may be brought thereon.
The Supreme Court upon this case decided that the lessors of the plaintiff were entitled to recover two undivided third parts of the premises in question, and judgment was so ordered accordingly.
After judgment was thus rendered, the defendants below brought their writ of error to reverse the said judgment, and within the time specified turned the special ease into a special verdict.
The plaintiffs in error assigned the following causes in error:
First. Because the Supreme Court decided that the devise in the will of Johannes Perry to his daughter Catharine during heir life, of the remainder of his real estate, and after her death to her heirs, and to be unto them, their heirs and assigns for ever, gave to the children of the devisee for life only a contingent interest in the estate devised, and that such children on the testator^ death took a contingent, and not a vested interest in the remainder.
Second. Because the said court decided that the deed from Lewis Hopper and Maria his wife to Peter Bush and his heirs, mentioned in the state of the case, passed no title whatever in the said lands.
Third. Because the said court decided, that Lewis Hopper was not tenant by the curtsey of his wife Maria of the premises in question.
Fourth. Because the said court decided, that the lessors of. the plaintiff, being the husband and children of Maria Hopper, were not estopped, either technically so or in any way barred in law, from setting up a title adverse to the deed of the said Lewis Hopper and the said Maria bis wife, herein before mentioned, or from averring that no title passed by that grant.
Fifth. Because the said court decided, that Maria Hopper was never in either the actual or constructive possession of the premises in question, and had only a bare right to possess them.
Sixth. Because the said court ordered judgment for two undivided third parts of the premises in favor of the plaintiff, when judgment should have been ordered for the defendants.
W. Pennington, for plaintiffs in error.
The title of the defendants, as well as of the lessors of the plaintiff, is deduced from the will of Johannes Perry, who died in 1832, having devised the residue of his estate, which comprised the premises in question, to- bis daughter Catharine for life, and after her death to heirs, &c. Catharine had three children, Maria, undoubtedly a lawful child, and John and Rachael, the two last bom after a second marriage, entered into according to the peculiar notions of Dominie Goetchius. Rut the jury have found that they are the lawful heirs of Catharine Salyer, and they are to be considered such ia this discussion. The defendants claim title to two-thirds of the premises ia question. They do not claim title from Rachael, who has not released since she came of age. We suppose that here the sole controversy will be in regard to the share of Maria Hopper, conveyed by her and her husband before the death of her mother, Catharine. [The counsel of the defendants here stated that they should also claim the share of John P. Brash and judgment for the entire premises.]
1. What is the effect of the devise to Catharine? Atconaraoa law, under the rule in Shelleys ease, tSse devise would be in fee. The statute of 1820 (Rev. Stcd. 340, § 10) comes in, and its operation is to torn it into a devise to Catharine for life, with remainder to her childma ia fee. We contend that remainder is a vested inleresi, a vested remainder ia the three children, as tenants in common. When Hopper and wife and John P. Basil made their several conveyances, they had a vested interest, which they could convey, and not. a mere contingent interest, which could aot he conveyed, and could have bo operation except by estoppel.
The courts incline to consider remainders as vested, rather than contingent; and the court below had no difficulty on the first clause of the statute, that on the death of tenant for life the estate should go to, and vest in the children of such devisee. The difficulty was upon the second clause, but which must yield to the policy of the Jaw and obvious intent of the statute. The court will labor to vest it, if possible.
Maria did not die before her mother, and the case provided for in the subsequent clause never occurred; her children claim aot by force of the statute, bat as heirs. They claim not under the will, but under the mother, and she, with her husband, has conveyed the premises ia fee. She took a vested remainder in fee, whiela would opea ia favor of aftcrboru children. She was entitled to convey, and the purchaser took a fee subject to be divested, bad she died before the death of the mother. Den v. Allaire, Spenc. 6. See also 4 John. 61; 2 B. C. 169; 5 Mass. 535; 1 Serg. & R. 378; Ives v. Legge, 1 Fearne C. T. 319, note; 2 Har. 281 ; 4 Kent 201. If vested remainder, there is an end of the cause.
2. But suppose the remainder to be contingent, and no title passed by the deed of Maria Hopper and her husband or of John P. Bush, yet the estate vested on the death of the mother, and enures by estoppel to the benefit of the purchaser. It may be said that there is no recital or covenant of title, and therefore no technical esto,ppel. I admit it, but'it stands on the broader ground, that courts will not- permit persons to claim in opposition to their own deed. The deed of a married woman, executed according to the form prescribed by the statute, is effectual to pass her title, and the principle will equally apply to her. 1 John. Cas. 81; 12 John. 201; 13 Ib. 316 ; 14 Ib. 193 ; 3 Ib. 331 ; 5 Halst. 102; 2 Gr. 1; Cowp. 600; 3 Wash. C. C. R. 549.
3. One count is on the demise of Lewis Hopper, as tenant by the curtesy. If his wife was ever so seized as to entitle him to a life estate, we have his deed.1
Zabriskie and A. S. Pennington, for defendants in error.
The court below were mistaken in regard to the deed of John P. Bush. His release was before, and not, as supposed by the court, after the death of his mother, Catharine Salyer. We shall therefore insist, that if the remainder over is held contingent, that we are entitled to judgment for the entire premises. The record was one brought into this court by the writ of error, and such judgment may here be given as the court below should have given,
1. Maria Hopper and John P. Bush, at the time of executing the conveyances by them, had not such estate as they could convey by release or bargain and sale. No estate vested in them during the life of their mother. There was not even a contingent remainder, but merely a possibility or expectancy, such as a child may have during the lifetime of a parent.
The word “ heirs,” in the .will, is a word of limitation, and not of purchase or designation, unless made so by the plain language of the will. 4 Kent 537, note; 2 Jao. & Walk. 65, ¡189; I Paw. Dev. 301, 304, 311. At common law, then, there is no dispute but that, under the rule in Shelley’s case, Catharine would liave taken a fee.
But the words come within our statute, (Rev. L. 774, § 1; Rev. Stat. 340, § 10,) and the construction of that statute must govern this devise. The statute does not provide for the case where no descendants. Its object is not to abolish the rule in Shelley’s case, but, when there are descendants, to carry out the will of the testator, despite the rule. The rule seems not to be abolished, but is averted when there is issue. If neither child nor grandchild the rule operates, aud the estate descends to the heirs of the first taker. The vesting of the freehold was not the mischief, it was the contravention of the will of the donor by the first taker. The statute is one to regulate descents, not to construe wills, and should be construed as near the common law as will attain the object of the statute.
No estate, upon this construction, vests during the life of the ancestor, but there is only a possibility or expectancy as heir.
But, if this construction cannot be adopted, still the remainder to the children is contingent, not vested. It is contingent to vest in case the child survive the parent, if not, then go to the grandchild, who is to take not by descent from the parent, hut by purchase, according to the disposition in the will. The person to lake is uncertain, which is the characteristic of one class of contingent remainders. This construction is conformable to the view taken in Den v. Provost (4 John. 65), where, under such provision, it was admitted that the remainder would be contingent, viz. that the estate should go to children living at the time of the death of the mother, and if any deceased, then to the issue of such deceased child. So in Pettetreau v. Jackson, 11 Wend. 121-2.
In New York there is a statute very similar to ours, in which, however, it is declared in express terms, that the “ heirs,” on the termination of the life estate, shall take as purchasers; and this is said by Kent to be a contingent remainder. See 4 Kent 511, note (5th edition).
2. If contingent, then no title passed by the conveyance, and none can be set up, uidess by way of estoppel, of which principle no question can be made.
No estate passes by deed of release, bargain and sale, or other deed taking effeot under the statute of uses, except what was vested in the grantor at the time of the conveyance. Nor will the grantor be estopped from setting up any after acquired estate, unless such deed contains an express recital of title or covenants of warranty. The cases can have proceeded only on the ground that there was no estoppel, either technical or equitable. Lift. § 446; Co. Lit. 265 a&b ; Wyvil’s case, Hob. 45; Whitfield v. Fausset, 1 Ves. Sen. 387; Seymour’s case, 10 Co. 95; Adm. arg. in Doe v. Whitehead, 2 Burr. 704; Doe & Lumley v. Scarborough, 3 Ad. & Ell. 2 ; Right v. Bucknell, 2 B. & Adol. 278 ; Bensley v. Burdon, 2 Sim. & Stuart 519; McCracken v. Wright, 14 John. 193 ; Jackson v. Vanderheyden, 17 Ib. 167; Jackson v. Hubble, 1 Cow. 613; Jackson v. Winslow, 9 Ib. 13; Jackson v. Bradford, 4 Wend. 622; Pelletreau v. Jackson, 11 Ib. 110; Jackson v. Waldron, 13 Ib. 178; Blanchard v. Brooks, 12 Pick. 47 ; Kinsman v. Loomis, 11 Ohio 475 ; Allen v. Sayward, 5 Greenl. 227; 2 Smith’s L. Cas. by Hare & Wallace, 454, et seq. (Law. Lib. ed. 1844).
The words “grant, demise, and release,” in a conveyance in fee, do not imply a warranty, whatever might be the case in a lease for years. Frost v. Raymond, 2 Caines 188 ; Grannis v. Clark, 8 Cow. 36 ; Co. Lit. 384, a, and note.
The case of mortgage stands on special grounds. Den w Gardner, Spenc. 556, 560, and authorities there cited.
The doctrine is well settled, and most of the cases that seem to conflict are consistent, so far as the decision goes, though they contain dicta too broadly expressed. Jackson v. Murray (12 John, 202), the only case in which the point seems decided in New York, and the dicta of Kent, J., in Jackson v. Bull, (1 John. Cas. 81), have been overruled by the subsequent cases in the same state, already cited. See also the dictum, as stated in 4 Kent 260 and note (5th edition).
Den v. Vanness, 5 Halst. 102, was a mortgage case, and the dieta to be found there were unnecessary to the decision. The case of Lessee of Cooper v. Galbraith (3 Wash. 516), was that of ejectment by purchaser at sheriff’s sale against the defendant in execution, who must surrender the possession ; this point is also decided in Den v. Winans, 2 Gr. 1. There are dieta, however, in these three cases which it is submitted are not law.
In Den v. Allaire, the party who conveyed had a plain vested estate in fee simple by executory devise, subject only to be defeated by subsequent contingency. Had the court held the party in remainder could have conveyed before the contingency happened on which the subsequent estate was to vest, that ease might then have had some application to this argument.
3. But clearly a married woman is not bound by warranty or estopped by her deed of bargain and sale ; and this applies to conveyance by Maria Hopper. 17 John. 167 ; 6 Wend. 1; 2 Kent 168
Again, the heirs of Maria Hopper do not claim by descent from her, but per formam doni. She was never actually seized, aud therefore her husband never became tenant by curtesy.
Vroom, in reply.
Under this will and the act of 1820 (Rev. L. 774), which is supposed to abolish the rule in Shelley’s ease, Catharine took simply an estate ibr life, aud was deprived of the power to alienate from her children. She left three children, and the residue of the estate was in them. The construction cannot be adopted, which would leave part of the estate undisposed of.
If this construction prevails, the same must also apply to all devises, which, but for the act, would have been estates tail. The same construction must apply to the second, as to the first section of the act.
The children of Catharine take as purchasers under the act; that cannot be disputed, and we insist they take an estate in fee, subject to the contingency on which it is to go down ; something like a condition subsequent, of living until the death of the mother.
Cited and commented on Den v. Allaire, Spenc. 6, and Dingley v. Dingley, 5 Mass. 537.
2. Suppose we are wrong, and the children have merely a contingent interest: a contingent remainder is an estate known in the law, an interest which one hath in lands, &c. Estates are divided .into estates in possession, reversion, and remainder. Maria, as well as her brother, had an estate in lands, and she made a conveyance of an estate which she then held, not of an after acquired estate. She did not attempt to convey a mere possibility or expectancy, as in case of a son during the lifetime of the father, in which case nobody ever dreamed the son would be estopped. I do not argue for sueh a case. Maria conveyed her interest or estate; she survived her mother; her interest then beca me'absolute, and enured to us, and vested for our benefit. I take it, an estoppel- depends upon whether any estate existed in the grantor; which is not the ease where the interest is merely speculative, as in the case of a son during the life of his father.
The counsel cited, and commented on the cases already referred to.
The conveyances profess to carry all the title which the grantors then had or which they might have, and this is tantamount to an assertion of title. It would sanction a fraud to permit them now to deny that they had title.
But it is said that Mrs. Hopper was a married woman, and cannot be estopped. This is putting the doctrine of estoppel on the technical ground of warranty. It is true a married woman cannot bind herself by covenants of warranty, but estoppel rests on broader grounds. Under our statute, a wife can convey as firmly as her husband ; but title passes, and she shall not deny that she had title.
Re-enacted, Lev. Stat. 340, $ 10.

Opinion:
The Chancellor.
Johannes Perry died in 1832, leaving a will, by which, after other devises, he devised as follows: " I give unto my daughter Catharine for and during her life, the remainder of my real estate; after her death, I will and require the same shall be equally divided among her heirs, and be unto them, their heirs and assigns, for ever."
At the death of the testator, Catharine had a daughter, Maria, her only child by her husband, Michael Salyer, the said Maria being then married to Lewis Hopper.
After the death of the testator, and in the lifetime of Catharine, Lewis Hopper and the said Maria his wife, by deed, duly acknowledged, conveyed to Peter Bush, his heirs and assigns, all the right, title, and interest which they then had, or thereafter might have, by virtue of the said will, in the premises in question.
Maria survived Catharine, and afterwards died, leaving six children. The question is, whether these children can recover the property from the said grantee of Maria and her husband.
The foregoing statement is sufficient to raise all the questions involved in the case.
I am of opinion that the estate which Maria had before Catharine's death was an alienable estate. By the provisions of our statute, excluding the last clause, " and if any child be dead, the part which would have come to him or her shall go to his or her issue in like manner," Maria had, while Catharine lived, a vested remainder. And if this last clause can be considered as doing any thing more than declaring what would be the result in ease the person in whom the remainder was vested had not conveyed it, and had died leaving children ; if it can be considered as legislating an additional limitation to the estate ; my opinion is, that it is a limitation by way of executory devise. If it is an executory devise, then the person to whom Maria, in Catharine's lifetime, conveyed took subject to be defeated of her estate by the happening of the contingency on which the executory devise was to take effect Blit this event did not happen, Maria survived Catharine. On the death of Catharine, the remainder was executed in possession. If Maria had not conveyed, it would have been executed in possession in her. She having conveyed, it was executed in the person who represented her, that is, her grantee.
There can be no doubt that, by the word " heirs," first used in this will, the testator meant children. Substituting the word children, this will give a life estate to Catharine, with a vested remainder in fee to her children or child.
•The artificial construction adopted by the English judges hi the Shelley ease, was a clear violation ef the intention of the testator. Oar legisl&tere have -repudiated that construction by the statute; and the resalte of such a will, as declared by the statute, are just the results which the substitution of the word ehildren, instead of the word heirs, produces, that is t© say, a life estate with a vested remainder over in fee to the children. Of •course, if ©ne of the children die leaving Issue, and without ¿laving aliened, his interest will go to his issue. And this, I apprehend, -is all the statete means.' It is certainly all tiie testator meant; and we shoald hardly suppose that the legislature, •In a statute made for the purpose of carrying out the intention of the testator, would make a different will, by adding a limitation which would defeat the intention.
The courts in England, to avoid a contingent remainder and its consequences, felt bound to say, against the dear intention of such a will, that it gave a fee to the person therein named as •devisee for life. If prohibited from sueh construction, they would certainly, to avoid the same consequences and to carry out the dear intention, have construed the word heirs to mean ckililrm, and have said that such a will gives an estate for life with a vested remainder in fee. And it cannot he doubted that courts under our institutions would have done the same, if our legislature had simply declared that such a will should net give a fee to the person therein named as devisee for life.
Now the object of per statute was to restore to such a will the construction demanded by the intention. And it is admitted fey the Supreme Court that, without the l&stdause in the statute, the-estate of the children or child is a vested remainder. A vested -remainder is descendible. Has the statute, by simply declaring a result of this principle, as applied t© the ease, undone its intended work, and converted the estate, after all, into a contingent -remainder, and defeated at once the intention of the testator and its own purpose ? I think not. But, as before observed, if we are at liberty to consider this last clause as an additional limitation, it appears to rne it shoald be held to be a • limitation in the nature of an executory devise.
The case presents another question; Maria survived the devisee for lifer the remainder became thereby executed in possession ; could she, against her said deed,, maintain ejectment for the lands? In the view I have taken of the ease, it in not necessary for me to go into an examination of this question, or to express a decided opinion upon it; bst I am strongly inclined to think she could not, I concur in the reversal of the judgment.
Judges Wall,, Seknickbon, and MoCaeteb concurred with the Chancellor.