Case Name: BLACKBURN v. BLACKBURN
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1982-06-29
Citations: 249 Ga. 689
Docket Number: 38561
Parties: BLACKBURN v. BLACKBURN.
Judges: All the Justices concur, except Jordan, C. J., who concurs specially, and Marshall and Smith, JJ., who dissent.
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 249
Pages: 689–700

Head Matter:
38561.
BLACKBURN v. BLACKBURN.

Opinion:
Gregory, Justice.
This case involves a dispute for custody of a minor child between the child's natural mother and his paternal grandmother.
Appellant was divorced from appellee's son in July, 1979. Under the terms of the separation agreement, appellant received custody of the only child of the marriage, Nicholas Evans Blackburn. In May, 1981 appellant gave birth to an illegitimate daughter. On June 25, 1981 appellee filed a petition for change of custody in Jenkins Superior Court, seeking legal custody of Nicholas Blackburn on the grounds that appellant had failed to provide necessities for the child; that appellant "frequently" left the child unattended; and that appellant "has been a lewd person" who "has given birth to an illegitimate, racially mixed child" since she was granted custody of Nicholas Blackburn. On the same day the trial court issued an ex parte order giving appellee temporary custody of Nicholas Blackburn. On November 2, 1981 following a hearing and the submission of briefs by the parties, the trial court awarded permanent custody of the child to appellee, finding by "clear and convincing evidence [that appellant] has surrendered her right to custody of the child." In its order the trial court found that appellant "has failed to provide adequate supervision, moral guidance and medical attention as are necessary for the child's well-being and the [appellant] has given birth to an illegitimate female child while in custody of . . . Nicholas Evans Blackburn has become an unfit custodian of Nicholas Evans Blackburn." In an addendum to this order, filed February 15, 1982, the trial court specified that its original finding of appellant's unfitness was based on the following facts: (1) appellant had sexual intercourse with a man to whom she was not married; from this relationship was born an illegitimate daughter; (2) appellant "took the child out in her car at 1:00 or 2:00 in the morning"; (3) when appellant worked in a hospital cafeteria the child was left to play on the floor; and (4) "the child was not growing or increasing in weight."
Appellant's application for discretionary appeal was denied by the Court of Appeals. We granted certiorari to consider "whether there was clear and convincing evidence (exclusive of the issue of race) of the natural mother's unfitness as a parent, which authorized the termination of her custody of her legitimate child."
(1) At the hearing on the petition for change of custody, appellee testified that on one occasion she had visited Nicholas while he was in appellant's custody, and found him playing with other children in the parking lot of appellant's apartment building; appellee testified that the child was not under adult supervision and that appellant was "about 300 feet" away from the child. Appellee also testified that on one occasion appellant fed Nicholas a bottle of milk which had been unrefrigerated for nine hours; as a result the child developed diarrhea. Appellee was permitted to state her opinion that appellant is an immoral person because she has given birth to an illegitimate daughter. Appellee also testified that on occasion when she visited appellant's apartment she found it to be dirty, that sometimes Nicholas's diapers needed changing and that the child was frequently sick.
The child's physician, Dr. Abreu, testified he had treated Nicholas once for an ear infection in June, 1979; for respiratory infections in November, 1979, February, 1981 and August, 1981; and for a gastrointestinal disorder in June, 1981. This witness testified that respiratory disorders are "normal . in children . . . [T]hey develop some kind of respiratory condition frequently, mainly during the winter time." Dr. Abreu opined, however, that "the patient wasn't growing according to normal" as he had gained only two pounds between February, 1981 and August, 1981. Dr. Abreu testified that a six pound gain would be "normal" for this time frame. The physician stated his belief that it was an unwise practice to allow the child to play in the hospital cafeteria while appellant worked there, as "a high degree of contamination" exists in the hospital cafeteria. When asked whether he had any reason to believe appellant was not meeting the child's needs, Dr. Abreu responded, "I cannot say too much because I see the child only when the child was sick. It's true that the mother was with the child always when I saw the child in the emergency room or in the hospital or in my office."
Prior to the completion of construction on the apartment in which appellant has resided for approximately two years, she lived in a Jenkins County Motel. The night clerk at this motel testified that she sometimes saw appellant leave the motel with Nicholas as late as 2:00 in the morning. When asked if she observed visitors going to appellant's motel room, she responded, "Yes sir. Oh, I don't know, I couldn't see her motel or anything."
Appellant admitted that children from her apartment complex played in the complex parking lot as there was no play area available. She testified, however, that the mothers of these children took turns supervising the children while they played there. This testimony was corroborated by the testimony of another resident of the complex who stated that she frequently supervised the children herself. Appellant also testified that during the time she worked in the hospital cafeteria she was forced to allow Nicholas to remain there with her from 7:00 a.m. to 8:00 a.m. as the child's babysitter would not accept him before 8:00 a.m. Appellant admitted that her relationship with the father of her illegitimate daughter is ongoing and that she has entertained him in her home. She maintained, however, that she had never had sexual relations with this man while Nicholas was present in the apartment.
Appellant also offered the testimony of a grocery store cashier that she had observed appellant buying "mostly fruits and vegetables . several times a week" while Nicholas was in appellant's custody.
Pursuant to an agreement between the parties, the trial court ordered the Department of Family and Children's Services to evaluate the home life of both appellant and appellee. The caseworker who visited appellant noted in her report that the occasions when appellant left the motel with Nicholas in the early morning hours indicated "a lack of mature judgment." However, this report also states that appellant "has [presently] exhibited some maturity and good judgment in generally providing adequate housing and daycare for her [daughter] despite limited funds. She has been resourceful in meeting [her daughter's] basic needs on a limited income____[Appellant] presently has an adequate child care plan while she is working." The caseworker also noted that while appellant's apartment is "orderly" and "adequately furnished," there are "numerous cockroaches" in the kitchen.
(2) In an action for divorce where custody is an issue, the trial court exercises its discretion in awarding custody by determining "the best interests of the child." On appeal this court will affirm the award if there exists "any evidence" in the record to support the trial court's decision. Gazaway v. Brackett, 241 Ga. 127, 128 (244 SE2d 238) (1978). However, where a third party sues the custodial parent to obtain custody of a child and to terminate the parent's custodial rights in the child, we have required a stricter standard. In such a case, the parent is entitled to custody of the child unless the third party shows by "clear and convincing evidence" that the parent is unfit or otherwise not entitled to custody under Code Ann. § 74-108, 74-109 or 74-110. Additionally, evidence of past unfitness, standing alone, is insufficient to terminate the rights of a parent in his natural child; clear and convincing evidence of presen t unfitness is required. Wright v. Hanson, 248 Ga. 523 (283 SE2d 882) (1981); Shaddrix v. Womack, 231 Ga. 628 (6) (203 SE2d 225) (1974). On review the award of custody to a third party will be affirmed only if there is "reasonable evidence" to support it. Wright v. Hanson, supra; Miele v. Gregory, 248 Ga. 93 (281 SE2d 565) (1981); Gazaway v. Brackett, supra; White v. Bryan, 236 Ga. 349, 350 (223 SE2d 710) (1976).
Acknowledging that "freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty interest" protected by the United States Constitution, the United States Supreme Court has recently held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment demands that before a state may sever the rights of parents in their natural child, the state must support its allegations "by at least clear and convincing evidence." (Emphasis supplied.) Santosky v. Kramer, - U. S. - (102 SC 1388, 71 LE2d 599) (1982).
Requiring that the trial court find "clear and convincing evidence" of a parent's unfitness prior to terminating the parent's rights in his child reflects the value society places on the "freedom of personal choice in matters of family life" and the judgment society makes "about how the risk of error should be distributed between the litigants." Santosky, supra, 102 SC 1395. Demanding that this high burden of proof be met furthers the State's legitimate interest in protecting the child, yet forestalls arbitrary State interference with the integrity of the family unit. It also reduces the " 'possible risk that a factfinder might decide to (deprive) an individual [of the rights to his child] based solely on a few isolated instances of unusual conduct (or) . idiosyncratic behavior.' " Santosky, supra, at 1400; Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418, 427 (99 SC 1804, 60 LE2d 323) (1979).
Noting that the appropriate burden of proof in a given type of case is "shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truth-finding process," Santosky at 1396, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the goal of society is to restrict the possibility of error in termination of parental rights cases more so than in civil cases where the burden of proof may be met by a "preponderance of the evidence" and the risk of error is fairly equally allocated to the parties. Conversely, the Court found that the application of a reasonable doubt standard would not be proper in a termination of parental rights proceeding because evidence "adduced at [these] proceedings is rarely susceptible to proof beyond a reasonable doubt." 102 SC 1402.
In the wake of the Supreme Court's holding that the quantum of proof we have heretofore required to terminate a natural parent's custodial rights in his child is mandated by the Constitution, we are left to determine whether the "reasonable evidence" standard of appellate review in such a case remains viable.
"[J]udicial review is generally limited to ascertaining whether the evidence relied upon by the trier of fact was of sufficient quality and substantiality to support the rationality of the judgment." Woodby v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 385 U. S. 276, 282 (87 SC 483, 17 LE2d 362) (1966). Where a fundamental liberty interest involving the right to "the companionship, care, custody, and management [of a child]" is at stake, 102 SC 1397, neither the "any evidence" standard of review in civil cases nor the "reasonable evidence" standard of review currently applied in termination of parental rights cases is of "sufficient quality and substantiality to support the rationality of the judgment." Rather, we hold that due process requires that we afford this liberty interest the same protection on appellate review as we afford those constitutionally protected interests in cases where a criminal conviction is had. In this regard we look for guidance to the scope of review in criminal cases set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). We hold that the appropriate standard of appellate review in a case where a parent's rights to his child have been severed is "whether after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellee, any rational trier of fact could have found by clear and convincing evidence that the natural parent's rights to custody have been lost." This standard of review safeguards the high value society places on the integrity of the family unit and helps eliminate the risk that a factfinder might base his determination "on a few isolated instances of unusual conduct [or]... idiosyncratic behavior." 102 SC 1400.
We hasten to point out that in determining whether the appellee has met her burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that appellant's rights to the custody of her child should be terminated, it is not the duty of the trial court to strike a balance between the relative merits of the third party seeking custody and the parent. "A finding of unfitness must center on the parent alone, that is, can the parent provide for the child sufficiently so that the government is not forced to step in and separate the child from the parent. A court is not allowed to terminate a parent's natural right because it has determined that the child might have better financial, educational or even moral advantages elsewhere. . . . Only under compelling circumstances found to exist by clear and convincing proof may a court sever the parent-child custodial relationship." (Emphasis supplied.) Carvalho v. Lewis, 247 Ga. 94, 95 (274 SE2d 471) (1981).
We find that appellee's evidence falls short of demonstrating present unfitness such as to justify the termination of appellant's rights in her son. This evidence showed that on several occasions over two years ago, appellant allowed her son to accompany her on late night trips. The evidence also showed that appellant allowed her son to remain for one hour each day in a hospital cafeteria where there existed a "high degree of contamination." However, appellant is no longer employed by the hospital and the DFCS report indicates that she now has an adequate child care plan. The child's physician testified that it is normal for a child to be beseiged with respiratory ailments during the winter months, as was the case with Nicholas's illnesses while in the custody of appellant. Further, the doctor did not give an opinion as to why Nicholas failed to gain weight while in appellant's care. In a case where the substantial rights of a parent to custody are at stake, we will not infer from the doctor's conclusion that Nicholas's failure to gain weight was "not normal" that appellant failed to properly care for the child. Examining the record as a whole we conclude that the evidence fails to meet the standard of appellate review we now adopt. We do not mean to suggest by this conclusion, however, that appellant's extra-marital relationship resulting in the birth of an illegitimate child should be condoned. It would be unrealistic to ignore the fact that society may stigmatize Nicholas because his sibling is illegitimate. However, we do not think that the fact that appellant has borne an illegitimate daughter is sufficient evidence of appellant's unfitness to raise Nicholas. Rather, the record shows that appellant is presently exercising "maturity and good judgment" and "resourcefulness" in providing for her daughter on a limited income. There is nothing in the record to suggest that she would not exercise this same maturity, good judgment and resourcefulness in providing for Nicholas.
Decided June 29, 1982
Rehearing denied July 21, 1982.
Ozell Hudson, Mary Carden, William J. Cobb, John L. Cromartie, Jr., for appellant.
Robert Sims Lanier, for appellee.
Judgment reversed.
All the Justices concur, except Jordan, C. J., who concurs specially, and Marshall and Smith, JJ., who dissent.
Appellee's son, the natural father of the child, is not a party to this action.
Medical records show the child gained no weight between February and June, 1981. Between June 26 and August 13, 1981, Nicholas gained two pounds.
Appellant is now employed by Crider's Poultry Processors.
The record shows that Nicholas's father does not pay child support. The father of appellant's illegitimate daughter pays between $55-$75 per month in child support.
Code Ann. § 74-108 provides, in part, that the parental power over a child may he lost through (a) voluntary contract to a third party; (b) consent to adoption of the child by a third party; (c) failure to provide "necessaries" for the child or abandonment of the child; or (d) cruel treatment of the child.
Code Ann. § 74-109 authorizes the probate court to appoint a guardian for a child who has received cruel treatment at the hands of his parents.
Code Ann. § 74-110 provides, in part, that the probate court may appoint a guardian for a child "being reared under immoral, obscene or indecent influences likely to degrade his moral character and devote him to vicious life."
Every state in the union has a statutory scheme authorizing the termination of parental rights in a natural child upon findings of inadequate care or cruel treatment of the child. The rationale for these statutes originated in the doctrine of parens patriae, literally, "father of the country." The basis of this doctrine is that the state has a legitimate interest in protecting those individuals unable to protect themselves. See, generally, Comment, "Application of the Vagueness Doctrine to Statutes Terminating Parental Rights," 1980 Duke Law Journal, 336-359; and Note, "The Right to Family Integrity: A Substantive Due Process Approach to State Removal and Termination Proceedings," 68 Georgetown Law Journal, 213-248 (1980).
By reference to the standard for appellate review in criminal cases, we do not mean to suggest that, on review, any application of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard will come into play.