Case Name: DIXON, Appellant, v. DIXON, Respondent
Court: St. Louis Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1904-10-18
Citations: 107 Mo. App. 682
Docket Number: 
Parties: DIXON, Appellant, v. DIXON, Respondent.
Judges: Goode, J,, concurring,
Reporter: Missouri Appeal Reports
Volume: 107
Pages: 682–700

Head Matter:
DIXON, Appellant, v. DIXON, Respondent.
St. Louis Court of Appeals,
October 18, 1904.
(Per Reybu'rn, J.)
ACCORD AND SATISFACTION: Maintenance of Children. Where, pending a suit for divorce by a wife against the husband, they reached an agreement which was not reduced to writing for a settlement of all their differences and in pursuance of such settlement, the husband paid the wife a sum of money and they exchanged deeds for various lands held by > each, such settlement was an accord and satisfaction and barred the wife’s right to recover for the maintenance thereafter of two minor children, though they were not specifically mentioned in the settlement.
Dissenting Opinion by Bland, P. J.
1. REFERENCE: Findings of Referee: Review by Court. The circuit court may, on motion of either party, review the findings of the referee and make its own findings, and the appellate court, on appeal, may review the proceedings and affirm or reverse the judgment of the circuit court.
2. DIVORCE: Maintenance of Children. It is not the policy of the law to deprive children of their rights on .account of dissension of their parents, to which they are not parties, and a divorced wife may maintain an action against her divorced hus band for tbe maintenance of tbeir children, although she deserted him and refused to live with him and withheld their custody and society from him.
3. ACCORD AND SATISFACTION: Burden of Proof. It devolves upon a party who asserts a settlement in defense of an action, to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the settlement included the matters which are involved in the suit.
Appeal from St. Louis City Circuit Court. — Hon. Franklin Ferriss, Judge.
Affirmed.
Henry A. Hamilton, Thomas Stallings and Henry Higginbotham for appellant.
(1) In cases of compulsory reference,. where the proper motion was filed, and where the evidence taken by the referee is brought upon full abstract, the appellate court will review the findings of the referee and of the trial court and approve, reverse, or modify them. Buxton v. Debrecht, 95 Mo. App. 599; Roth v. Continental Wire Co., 94 Mo. App. 236; Williams v. Railway, 153 Mo. 495; Small v. Hatch, 151 Mo. 300; Wentzville Tobacco Co. v. Walker, 123 Mo. 671; State ex rel. v. Hurlstone, 92 Mo. 327; McCullough v. DeWitt, 163 Mo. 306. (2) • It is the duty of the father to provide the necessaries of his minor children, and nothing will excuse him from performing that duty, but an award of the custody of the children, by a competent court, to the mother, together with an order of adequate provision for their support out of the father’s estate; and the compliance by the father with the court’s order. Biffle v. Pullam, .114 Mo. 50, 21 S. W. 450 ; Penningroth v. Penningroth, 71 Mo. App. 438; Chester v. Chester, 17 Mo. App. 657. (3) When a marriage is dissolved by divorce, it is still the father’s duty to provide for his minor children; and when they remain with the mother, and she pays for their necessary support and education she is entitled to recover from the father the amounts so expended. Keller v. St. Lonis, 152 Mo. 596, 54 S. W. 438 ; Rankin v. Rankin, 83 Mo. App. 335; McOloskey v. McOloskey, 93 Mo. App. 393, 67 S. W. 669; Meyers v. Meyers, 91 Mo. App. 151. (4) A divorced man, who leaves his children with their mother, and does not assert his right to their custody by appropriate proceedings in court, waives that right; his willingness' or offers to support them on condition he be given their custody is no defense to an action by the mother for the sums expended in providing for the children. Accord and satisfaction does not operate as a bar to matters not contemplated by the agreement. The burden is on defendant to establish his defense of accord and satisfaction by a preponderance of the evidence and he must not only establish a settlement, but also that it covered and included the very items of expense incurred by plaintiff. 1 Oyc. of Law and Procedure, pp. 308, 348; Ferguson v. Davidson, 147 Mo. 664, 49 S. W. 859; Supply Co. v. Wolfe, 127 Mo. 616; Littell v. Ellison, 17 N. Y. Supp. 294; Scully v. Delamater, 28 Fed. 114.
Jamison <& Thomas for respondent.
(1) The evidence in this case establishes the fact that the parties settled all of their differences and passed deeds to their respective properties on or about October 28,1895; that at that time defendant paid plaintiff $1,000 in satisfaction of all claims, past, present and future which she claimed to have against him. The court, therefore, properly entered judgment for the defendant. (2) “A husband has the right to establish his domicile at any time, wherever he pleases, and the wife must follow him through the world. If she refuses to go with him, his own conduct being upright and honorable in the premises, she places herself in the wrong, and while she persists, he is not bound to support and maintain her.” Schuler’s Domestic Relations, see. 38; Schuman v. Schuman, 93 Mo. App. 99; Messenger v. Messenger, 56 Mo. 329; Kosta v. Kosta, 43 Mo. App. 115. (3) Where the wife deserts her husband and takes the children with her, he is not liable for maintenance and support of said children furnished by her. Chester v. Chester, 17 Mo. App. 657; Fitter v. Fitter, 33 Pa. 50; Baldwin v. Foster, 138 Mass. 449; Schuler’s Domestic Delations, sec. 66, p. 110; Eogers v. Turner, 59 Mo. 116.

Opinion:
EEYBUEN, J.
After a thorough review of the testimony in this proceeding, to my mind the action of the opposing parties in the negotiations finally closed October 28, 1895, must be construed as a decisive disposition of all claims and subjects of dispute between them, and that no reasonable doubt exists that the adjustment then reached was at that time so understood, treated and intended not merely by both plaintiff and defendant but by the counsel of the opposite parties. The consummation of this transaction was reached only after protracted deliberation and parley with the aid of professional advisers, and after situations in the negotiations had been presented where a specific settlement appeared destined to fail and its abandonment ensue. With the exception presently adverted to, the narrative of all conversant with and participating in the preliminary mediations, which ultimately ripened and culminated in delivery of the instruments of conveyance and the substantial payment made, demonstrates that all concerned in and participating in the transaction from its inception to its final stage, so understood and deemed the purpose and effect of the compromise proposed and carried out. The extracts quoted from the testimony (in separate opinion by Bland, P. J.), suffice to establish this, and if required, they might be elaborated by cumulative proof taken from the declarations of those attending the discussions and engaged in the completion of the negotiations. The correspondence between opposing counsel further lends weight to this interpretation and the surviving member of the legal firm which represented plaintiff's interests and who took an active part in her behalf, as recited in the foregoing statement, testified that the payment and passing of the deeds constituted a full settlement of all differences between the parties at the time. Arrayed against the testimony of these witnesses, the disclaimor of plaintiff stands conspicuously apart and without corroboration, opposed in the smallest details to the recollection and testimony of all including her own attorney, and especially affirming that during the time of the deliberations and intercessions no thought or mention was made of the children, their custody or maintenance. That the past expenditure upon the children and provision for their future were not in the minds of the parents and failed to receive attention or consideration by them at such a critical period in the lives of all, would seem incredible. At this stage the claim of appellant against respondent for the expenses incurred by her in the maintenance and support of the older children existed, at least as clearly as the like demand for the children later boim, as much of the cost attending the younger had not accrued and, more logically, expenses that were inore closely determined in amount should be treated as embraced in the settlement than disbursements respecting the younger children at least partially prospective and to be incurred in the future. In my judgment the understanding then reached and carried into effect between the parties comprehended and disposed of all claims on the part of the plaintiff against the defendant and is an insurmountable barrier precluding the maintenance of this action, and the judgment for tihs reason, if for no other, should be affirmed.
Goode, J,, concurring,
the
judgment is therefore affirmed.