Case Name: Nelson BOCK and Patricia Lawless-Avelar, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. WESTMINSTER MALL COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee
Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Colorado
Decision Date: 1990-05-10
Citations: 797 P.2d 797
Docket Number: No. 87CA1346
Parties: Nelson BOCK and Patricia Lawless-Avelar, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. WESTMINSTER MALL COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: DAVIDSON, J., concurs.
Reporter: Pacific Reporter 2d
Volume: 797
Pages: 797–800

Head Matter:
Nelson BOCK and Patricia Lawless-Avelar, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. WESTMINSTER MALL COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 87CA1346.
Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. IV.
May 10, 1990.
Rehearing Denied June 14, 1990.
Certiorari Granted Oct. 15, 1990.
American Civil Liberties Union, David H. Miller, Denver, for plaintiffs-appellants.
James Aab, Denver, Brown, Koralchik & Fingersh, Elizabeth Drill, Overland Park, Kan., for defendant-appellee.

Opinion:
Opinion by
Judge PLANK.
The sole issue presented here is whether defendant Westminster Mall Company may constitutionally deny plaintiffs access to Mall open-areas in order to distribute leaflets. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant, and we affirm.
Plaintiffs are members of an organization known as the "Pledge of Resistance" which advocates a cessation of U.S. government involvement in Central America. Plaintiffs requested permission from the Mall to distribute leaflets and solicit petition signatures in the Mall's interior common areas, but the Mall denied permission based upon a general policy prohibiting distribution of leaflets and other solicitation. However, the Mall has made exceptions to that policy for certain promotional activities and charitable organizations.
The trial court found that plaintiffs' free speech activity is not directly related to the use of the defendant's property and that plaintiffs have other reasonable alternative forums in which to voice their opinions. The trial court relied on Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 92 S.Ct. 2219, 33 L.Ed.2d 131 (1972) and Handen v. Colorado Springs, 186 Colo. 284, 526 P.2d 1310 (1974) in granting summary judgment for the Mall. This appeal followed.
I.
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in determining that they do not have a right under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to distribute leaflets within a privately owned mall. We agree with the trial court's conclusion but affirm on different grounds.
In its determination, the trial court applied Handen v. Colorado Springs, supra, which held that a large shopping center was the functional equivalent of a community business block for purposes of a First Amendment analysis. The Handen ruling was based on the analysis set forth in Amalgamated Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308, 88 S.Ct. 1601, 20 L.Ed.2d 603 (1968) and Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, supra. However, subsequent to Handen, the U.S. Supreme Court overruled the Lloyd Corp. ruling in Hudgens v. National Labor Relations Board, 424 U.S. 507, 96 S.Ct. 1029, 47 L.Ed.2d 196 (1976), and thereby, in effect, undermined the Handen analysis. Hudgens held that private shopping centers were not sufficiently identified with state action to invoke First Amendment protection.
Moreover, in light of the Hudgens holding, plaintiffs concede they no longer have a protected right under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to distribute leaflets and gather petition signatures in a privately owned shopping center. Therefore, the reasoning in Handen is not appropriate to resolve the issue presented here.
II.
Plaintiffs next contend Colo. Const, art. II, § 10, requires defendant to provide plaintiffs the opportunity to exercise their rights to distribute leaflets and gather signatures. We disagree.
Colo. Const, art. II, § 10, provides:
"No law shall be passed impairing the freedom of speech; every person shall be free to speak, write or publish whatever he will on any subject, being responsible for all abuse of that liberty; and in all suits in prosecution for libel the truth thereof may be given in evidence, and the jury, under the direction of the court, shall determine the law and the fact."
Both the federal and state Bill of Rights were adopted to protect the citizen against intrusion by the government. People v. Harris, 104 Colo. 386, 91 P.2d 989 (1931).
In In re Canon 35, 132 Colo. 591, 296 P.2d 465 (1956), the court held that the Colorado Constitutional provision is more inclusive and protective of the rights of citizens than is the First Amendment. In that holding, however, the court stated that Colo. Const, art. II, § 10, acts as a limitation upon the power of state officials in the three branches of government. Thus, that holding implicitly requires governmental involvement before the provision becomes applicable, and therefore, it does not extend the scope of the provision to private property-
The majority of states with provisions similar to Colo. Const, art. II, § 10, that have addressed the issue of the applicability of freedom of speech provisions to private malls have concluded that these provisions do not grant persons the right to distribute leaflets or gather referendum signatures in malls. See Woodland v. Michigan Citizens' Lobby, 423 Mich. 188, 378 N.W.2d 337 (1985); Shad Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall, 66 N.Y.2d 496, 498 N.Y.S.2d 99, 488 N.E.2d 1211 (1985); Western Pennsylvania Socialist Workers v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co., 512 Pa. 23, 515 A.2d 1331 (1986). We find the majority rule persuasive and therefore adopt it.
Here, the plaintiffs have not provided any historical evidence that the drafters of Colo. Const, art. II, § 10 intended to state a right for one private citizen to speak, distribute leaflets, or gather signatures on another's private property. Moreover, there is nothing in the words and phrases of Colo. Const, art. II, § 10 which reveals such an intent.
We reject plaintiffs' suggestion that the affirmation contained in Colo. Const, art. II, § 10 that every person shall be free to speak, write, or publish "whatever " he will on any subject also means "wherever."
We further reject plaintiffs' assertion that this court should balance one's right to free speech against the property interests and rights of another. In our view, this balancing test is applicable only in those instances in which a constitutionally protected right of free speech exists, and not where, as here, the forum is privately owned. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 105 S.Ct. 3439, 87 L.Ed.2d 567 (1985).
Moreover, we agree with the conclusion reached by courts in other jurisdictions that the extension of the right to distribute leaflets and gather signatures at malls is a legislative function and not a judicial one. See Shad Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall, supra; Batchelder v. Allied Stores Intern., Inc., 388 Mass. 83, 445 N.E.2d 590 (1983); Western Pennsylvania Socialist Workers v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co., supra.
We are not persuaded by plaintiffs' contention that, since malls have become the focal center of community life, this court should bring activities conducted in their public areas on private property within the scope of Colo. Const, art. II, § 10. Plaintiffs assert that, because of the growth of suburbs and other outlying areas, city centers are no longer effective places for the exercise of free speech. However, although it may be more difficult to distribute leaflets and obtain petition signatures in public places, there are still reasonable forums available for plaintiffs to exercise their rights.
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.
DAVIDSON, J., concurs.
DUBOFSKY, J., specially concurs.