Case Name: STATE v. REINOEHL
Court: Idaho Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Idaho
Decision Date: 1949-11-04
Citations: 70 Idaho 361
Docket Number: No. 7509
Parties: STATE v. REINOEHL.
Judges: HOLDEN, C. J., TAYLOR and KEE-TON, JJ., and SUTTON, District Judge, concur.
Reporter: Idaho Reports
Volume: 70
Pages: 361–369

Head Matter:
218 P.2d 865
STATE v. REINOEHL.
No. 7509.
Supreme Court of Idaho.
Nov. 4, 1949.
On Rehearing May 19, 1950.
W. L. Dunn, Twin Falls, for appellant.
Robert E. Smylie, Attorney General, J. R. Smead, Asst. Atty. Gen., E. M. Sweeley, Twin Falls, Graydon W. Smith, Twin Falls, for respondent.

Opinion:
GIVENS, Justice.
Appellant was prosecuted and convicted under an information charging attempted extortion as follows:
"That the said Orville Reinoehl at and in the County of Twin Falls, and State of Idaho, and on or about the 13th day of September, 1948, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attempt to extort $1,000 lawful money of the United States from one O. A. Rambo, in that he, the said Orville Reinoehl, feloniously intending to extort the said money by obtaining the consent of the said O. A. Rambo to the payment thereof by fear, induced by the threat of the said Orville Reinoehl that unless the said money was paid to him, the City Council of the City of Twin Falls would on September 13, 1948, without cause revoke all slot machine licenses issued by the said City to the said O. A. Rambo for slot machines operated in his place of business in the said City, and thereby cause him great financial loss, did then and there intentionally, unlawfully and feloniously for the purpose of carrying out and completing the said attempt to extort the said money from the said O. A. Rambo, make the said threat verbally to the said O. A. Rambo and did thereby, so far as he the said Orville Reinoehl knew, succeed in obtaining, and did intentionally, unlawfully and feloniously so obtain, receive and take $1,000 in lawful money of the United States from the said O. A. Rambo, he the said Orville Reinoehl believing and acting on the belief that the payment of the said money by the said O. A. Rambo was by him consented to and made because of fear of the injury to his business induced by the said threat, but that, unknown to the defendant, the said O. A. Rambo consented to make and did make the said payment for the purpose of allowing the defendant to complete and carry out his said felonious intent to so obtain the said money, and to succeed in obtaining and taking the same so that he might be prevented or intercepted in the perpetration of the said extortion."
Appellant's assignments of error all raise but one point, and that is that an attempt to extort money or property from another by a verbal threat is a misdemean- or and punishable as such only under Sec. 18-2808, I.C., urging that the information herein so charges. Section 18-2808, I.C. makes an unsuccessful attempt by verbal threats an offense. The amended information did not charge appellant with this ofiense, but with attempt to commit extortion.
An attempt is a grade lower than a completed offense, People v. Anderson, 1 Cal.2d 687, 37 P.2d 67; Correspondingly, an unsuccessful attempt is a grade lower than attempt, and the courts have consistently recognized this difference. State v. Donovan, 5 Boyce 40, 28 Del. 40, 90 A. 220.
"The law has declared many actions to be misdemeanors where the purpose of the offender was not consummated, although, if consummated, it would have been only offense of this grade." Lamb v. State, 67 Md. 524, 10 A. 208, at page 209.
"In some cases acts preparatory to the commission of a crime are themselves a crime and indictable as such and not as an attempt to commit the crime. Decisions based upon the doing of such acts, as constitute a substantial crime in themselves, should be distinguished from those decisions which hold certain acts to be crimes only on the ground that they are attempts to commit crimes. As examples of cases where the doing of certain preliminary acts which look to the commission of certain crimes are regarded per se as indictable, as substantive crimes and not property as attempts to commit the future crime contemplated, I may refer to the carrying of concealed weapons. Whether or not carried with the specific purpose of being used to assail a particular individual, this is a substantive crime and should be indicted as in itself a crime and not as-an attempt to commit a crime, even though they were carried with the specific intent of assailing a certain person. So the procuring of dies wherewith to counterfeit is an indictable offense per se, and should be indicted as an independent misdemeanor and not as an attempt to counterfeit. It is on this ground that the conclusion reached in Rex v. Roberts, 33 Eng. Law & Eq. 553 (Dears, 539) can be sustained." State v. Baller, 26 W.Va. 90, 53 Am.Rep. 66, at page 70. State v. Bowers, 35 S.C. 262, 14 S.E. 488, 15 L.R.A. 199, 28 Am.St. Rep. 847, at page 849; Hicks v. Commonwealth, 86 Va. 223, 9 S.E. 1024, 19 Am. St. Rep. 891.
It was unnecessary for the Legislature to provide in the Chapter on extortion, for attempted extortion, s-ince that was already provided for in the general Section, Sec. 18-306, I.C., State v. Downing, 23 Idaho 540, 130 P. 461.
The sentence pronounced in this case of not more than two and a half years is in accordance with Sec. 18-2803, I.C. and Sec. 18-306, I.C.
Judgment is, therefore, affirmed.
HOLDEN, C. J., TAYLOR and KEE-TON, JJ., and SUTTON, District Judge, concur.
. "Every person who unsuccessfully attempts; by means of any verbal threat,such as is specified in this chapter, to extort money or other property from another, is guilty of a misdemeanor." Section 18-2808 I.C.