Case Name: Mary Carpenter v. James M. Kurn and John G. Lonsdale, Trustees of St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company, Appellants
Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1940-02-21
Citations: 345 Mo. 877
Docket Number: 
Parties: Mary Carpenter v. James M. Kurn and John G. Lonsdale, Trustees of St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company, Appellants.
Judges: Westhues and' Bohling, CC., concur.
Reporter: Missouri Reports
Volume: 345
Pages: 877–897

Head Matter:
Mary Carpenter v. James M. Kurn and John G. Lonsdale, Trustees of St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company, Appellants.
136 S. W. (2d) 997.
Division Two,
February 21, 1940.
J. W. Jamison, Gene Frost and Mann, Mann <& Miller for appellants.
Harry G. Waltner, Jr., 8izer <& Myres and Franklin F. Reagan for respondent. .

Opinion:
COOLEY, C.
This action was brought by respondent as the widow of Reuben Carpenter, deceased, to recover damages for the alleged wrongful death of the deceased, which occurred on the 25th day of May, 1937, near Henryetta, Oklahoma, the plaintiff alleging that she brought the action for the benefit of herself and the deceased's four minor children. There was a verdict and judgment for plaintiff for $18,000. Defendants appealed. Before stating the facts or proceeding to consideration of the case on the merits we will dispose of a motion to dismiss the appeal.
Appellants' abstract of record was filed here August 22, 1939. On July 11, 1939, respondent filed a motion to dismiss the appeal and a "supplemental transcript," certified by the clerk of the circuit court. The ground of the motion is that no sufficient affidavit — in fact no affidavit — for appeal was filed in the circuit court, wherefore this court acquired no jurisdiction. Appellants' abstract does not.set out the affidavit. In the "short form transcript" certified here by the circuit clerk the circuit court's order granting the appeal is set out, reciting in substance that the defendants filed their affidavit praying an appeal and "same being seen, heard and fully understood is by the court sustained and appeal granted to the Supreme Court of Missouri as prayed for." The supplemental.transcript above mentioned shows entries appearing on the court's docket relative to the case. After setting out entries showing various steps in the trial it shows "Affidavit for appeal filed (14) Appeal granted to Supreme Court of Missouri (14)." Included in said supplemental transcript is a copy, certified by the clerk, of the affidavit for appeal. Omitting caption, it reads:
' ' On this day personally appeared before me, the undersigned Circuit Clerk, within and for Barry County, Missouri, GENE FROST, who, being first duly sworn upon his oath, says that he is attorney and agent for the defendants in the above entitled cause and that, as such, he is authorized to and does make this affidavit in their behalf.
"Affiant further states that the appeal prayed for by the defendants is not made for vexation or delay, but because affiant believes defendants are aggrieved by the judgment or decision of the Court.
"Gene Frost
' ' Subscribed and sworn to before me, this -— day of November, 1937.
' ' Circuit Cierk.
"FILED
"DEC. 1, 1937.
"OTIS COX,
"Circuit Clerk."
On September 19, 1939, appellants, in order to show that the affidavit for appeal was in fact sworn to, filed in this court, two affidavits. In order to give a clear understanding of the allegations thereof, we set them out, except the jurats, which- certify as to both that they were subscribed and sworn to on July 17, 1939. They read:
"State of Missouri, County of Barry, ss.
"Gene Frost, of lawful age, being first duly sworn upon his oath, states that he is an attorney at law, residing at 'Cassville, Missouri, and was one of the attorneys" of record for the defendants in the case of Mary Carpenter, plaintiff, versus J. M. Kurn and John G. Lonsdale, trustees of St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company, which was tried in the Circuit Court of Barry County, Missouri, on November 19th and 20th, 1937, and as attorney and agent for said defendants executed the affidavit for appeal filed in said cause, following the overruling of the motion for new trial on December 1st, 1937; that the motion for new trial in said case was orally argued before the court on Monday, November 29th, 1937, during the regular November Term of said court; that following the arguments of counsel the court took the motion under advisement and announced that it would pass upon said motion before the adjournment of the term, but was uncertain as to when the term would adjourn. On that day, while in Cassville, the form of affidavit for appeal was prepared by Frank C. Mann, one of the attorneys for defendants and left with affiant to be executed and filed in the event the court should overrule said motion; that this explains the fact that at the close of said affidavit and in the jurat the date is shown as 'This-' day of November, 1937.'
"Affiant further states that the motion for new trial in said cause was, by the court, overruled on December 1st, 1937; that on that date and immediately following the overruling of said motion for new trial, this affiant, in the office of Otis Cox, the Circuit Clerk, and in the presence of the said Otis Cox, signed said affidavit for appeal and handed it either to Mr. Cox, the clerk, or to Eileen Thomas Sanders, the deputy circuit clerk, both of whom were standing at the clerk's desk, and at the time of so doing stated to Mr. Otis Cox, the clerk, that he made oath to the facts set forth in said affidavit, and asked the clerk to affix his jurat thereto and file the same; and that said clerk took said oath and stated he would affix his jurat thereto; that affiant then went into the court room and had the court enter upon its docket the filing of said affidavit for appeal, following which the court made an entry upon its docket granting defendants an appeal to the Supreme Court of Missouri.
"Affiant further states that he relied upon the said Otis Cox, clerk of said court, to affix his signature and jurat to said affidavit for appeal, and that his attention w^s not called to said affidavit for appeal thereafter and until in December, 1938, when, upon examining said affidavit for appeal so signed by him and filed by the clerk on December 1st, 1937, he found that the clerk had not affixed his signature or jurat; that the said Otis Cox had died prior to that time, on or about the 18th day of May, 1938.
"Affiant further states that when the Circuit Court of Barry County, Missouri, is in session it has been the practice for many years, and was on December 1, 1937, the practice of the clerk of said court to keep all of the files in cases then upon the docket in a filing cabinet upon his desk in the court room, and also there to keep the seal of said clerk and the filing stamp with which papers filed in said court are marked filed; that he is reasonably certain that on that day and at the time he handed the affidavit for appeal to the said Otis Cox in the latter's office adjoining the court room that the clerk's seal was then in the court room and not in the office of the said Otis Cox, and it is the opinion of affiant that the said Otis Cox, upon receiving said affidavit from this affiant took the same into the court room, where he there stamped it filed but failed, through inadvertence and oversight, to sign or affix his jurat to said affidavit.
"Gene Frost."
"State of Missouri, County of Barry, ss.
"Eileen Thomas Sanders, of lawful age, being first duly sworn upon her oath, states that on, and for some time prior to, December 1st, 1937, and thereafter until December 31st; 1938, she was a deputy circuit clerk in the office of the circuit clerk of Barry County, Missouri; that Otis Cox was, on December 1st, 1937, and for some time prior thereto and until his death on or about the 18th day of May, 1938, the clerk of the Circuit Court of Barry County, Missouri; that during the- time said Otis Cox was circuit clerk, it was his practice personally to wait upon the court and be in the court room most of the time during the sessions of said court; that affiant remained in the circuit clerk's office adjacent to the court room; that while the Circuit Court was in session it was the custom and practice of the circuit clerk to keep at his desk in the court room all of the court files in cases then upon the docket, his seal as circuit clerk, and the stamp with which he stamped as filed all papers filed in said court; that neither the seal nor the file stamp were generally kept in the clerk's office while court was in session; that she does not now remember any of the circumstances in connection with the filing of an affidavit for appeal in the case of Mary Carpenter, plaintiff, versus J. M. Kurn and John G. Lonsdale, trustees of St. Louis-San Francisco. Railway Company, defendants, or of the execution of said affidavit for appeal by Gene Frost, one of the attorneys for defendants in said case, but that frequently attorneys and others would execute affidavits to be sworn to by the circuit clerk, or one of his deputies, in the office of the circuit clerk, and when that was done, while said Circuit Court was in session, after swearing the affiant to the affidavit, it was the practice of the clerk, or of the deputy before whom the affidavit was made, to take the same to the court room and there to complete the jurat and affix the seal, and that she has seen the said Otis Cox do this on numerous occasions.
"Eileen Thomas Sanders."
It seems to be conceded that in order to confer jurisdiction upon the appellate court there must be filed in the trial court an affidavit for appeal, as provided by statute, substantially complying as to its averments with the requirements of the statute, and that the order of the circuit court grahting an appeal does not confer such jurisdiction in the absence of a sufficient affidavit. [See Cassidy v. City of St. Joseph, 247 Mo. 197, 203, 152 S. W. 306.] Respondent cites numerous' Missouri cases so holding but they need not be referred to herein because appellants do not dispute those propositions, but contend those cases do not apply — a contention with which we agree. They are cases in which the averments of the affidavit did not substantially comply with the requirements of the statute or cases in which the record showed only an affidavit or purported affidavit without a jurat and there was no showing that the affidavit had in fact been sworn to. If in the instant case we had for consideration only the affidavit as certified to us by the circuit clerk in the supplemental transcript we would have to hold it insufficient. But it has been held several times that where an affidavit for appeal does not show the jurat of the officer taking it, it may nevertheless, be shown that it was in fact sworn to.
Section 1099, Revised Statutes 1929 (Mo. Stat. Ann., p. 1388), enumerates many imperfections for which judgments shall not be reversed or affected. Section 1100, Revised Statutes 1929 (Mo. Stat. Ann., p. 1395), provides that: "The omissions, imperfections, defects and variances in the preceding section enumerated, and all others of a like nature, not being against the right and justice of' the matter of the suit, and not altering the issues between the parties on the trial, shall be supplied and amended by the court where the judgment shall be given, or by the court into which such judgment shall be removed by writ of error or by appeal. ' '
The above quoted section was treated as applying to the omission of the jurat on an affidavit for appeal in Cooley v. Kansas City, P. & G. Railroad Co., 149 Mo. 487, 51 S. W. 101. In that case there had been a former trial and an appeal to the Kansas City Court of Appeals, which court reversed the judgment and remanded the cause. After the remand the defendant filed, in the circuit court, a motion to dismiss the cause on the ground that no affidavit for appeal had been filed and the appellate court therefore had been without jurisdiction to render the judgment of reversal. The circuit court, after hearing evidence as to whether or not the plaintiff's -attorney, by whom the affidavit was signed, made oath thereto, overruled the motion to dismiss and permitted the clerk to attach the proper affidavit. This court, 149 Mo. l. c. 491, 51 S. W. 102, quoted Section 2114, Revised Statutes 1889, now Section 1100, supra, and said:
"No reason is therefore seen why the omitted jurat could not have been supplied by leave of either this or the circuit court, even, after the judgment of reversal was given by the- court. "
The "preceding section" referred to in Section 2114, Revised Statutes 1889, is now Section 1099, Revised Statutes 1929 (Mo. Stat. Ann.', p. 1388).
In Clark v. St. Joseph Term. Railroad Co., 242 Mo. 570, 590-593, 148 S. W. 472, a judgmént was rendered and appeal taken in March, 1908. In 1911 it was discovered that the name of the officer before whom the affidavit was made was missing. That officer was then dead. The circuit court heard evidence, found that the affidavit had been sworn to and caused nunc pro tunc entries to be made so showing. The respondent in this court challenged the court's right thus to amend its records and moved to dismiss the appeal, which motion was denied. The court cited and quoted from the Cooley case, including quotation of Section 2114, Revised Statutes 1889, emphasizing the statement that "no reason is therefore seen why the omitted jurat'could not have been supplied by leave of either this or the circuit court." On this point see also State ex rel. Title Guaranty & Trust Co. v. Broaddus, 210 Mo. 1, 14, 108 S. W. 544, citing said statute and the Cooley case.
In Davidson v. LaClede Land & Improvement Co., 253 Mo. 223, 228, 161 S. W. 686, the jurat was not signed. A motion to dismiss the appeal was filed here, based upon such omission. It was overruled. The court said that,
"Depositions have been taken and are on file which disclose that the circuit clerk personally entered the minutes of the filing of the affidavit for appeal, the allowance of the appeal, etc., but he testifies he does not know why the jurat was unsigned. He has no. direct recollection of the happenings at the time, but testifies the- orders were taken in this and several other cases during the hurry of the closing hours of the term. By deposition appellant's attorney testifies positively he signed and was sworn to the' affidavit in this case and in another at the same time and filed both affidavits with the clerk. ' '
The court further said that, it sufficiently appearing that the affidavit was in fact sworn to, it would be so treated, "there being no necessity of going through the now 'bare and meaningless formality' of literally inserting the clerk's name above his official designation as it now appears in the affidavit."
It is not definitely stated in the Davidson case that the depositions were taken by leave .of this court but they must have been, since the circuit court, having granted an appeal, no longer had control of the case and it was pending in this court.
It is thus evident that the lack of a jurat appearing on an affidavit for appeal may be supplied after the case reaches this court upon proof that it was in fact sworn to. We find no direct ruling of this court as to how the proof must be made. In some of the cases nunc pro tunc entries were made in the circuit court after hearing of evidence by that court. In the Davidson case it was made by deposition. In Viertel v. Viertel, 99 Mo. App. 710, 75 S. W. 187, it was made by affidavits filed, as here, in the appellate court. In that ease the court accepted the affidavits, said they stood uncontradicted and overruled the motion to dismiss the appeal. In the case before us the affidavits stand uncontradicted. Mr. Frost swears positively that he made oath to the affidavit for appeal. In the Davidson case the court said, speaking of the attorney's deposition: "There is nothing, except the absence of the" clerk's signature, tending to overthrow this testimony and the tendency of the record entries to corroborate it." That, we think, may as well be said in this case. We have no doubt that the affidavit was in fact sworn to and that the clerk's failure to attach his jurat was á mere oversight or inadvertence on his part. The motion to dismiss the appeal is overruled.