Case Name: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. PAUL A. DE LA PAZ, Appellant
Court: Illinois Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 2003-05-08
Citations: 204 Ill. 2d 426
Docket Number: No. 93208
Parties: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. PAUL A. DE LA PAZ, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Reports, Second Series
Volume: 204
Pages: 426–455

Head Matter:
(No. 93208.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. PAUL A. DE LA PAZ, Appellant.
Opinion filed May 8, 2003.
THOMAS, J., specially concurring.
KILBRIDE, J., dissenting.
Michael J. Pelletier, Deputy Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, and Alison J. Norwood, of Streamwood, for appellant.
James E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Richard A. Devine, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (William L. Browers, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, and Renee G. Goldfarb, Linda Halperin and Alan J. Spellberg, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

Opinion:
JUSTICE FREEMAN
delivered the opinion of the court:
Petitioner, Paul De La Paz, is currently serving an extended-term sentence for an armed robbery conviction. He has exhausted his direct appeals and is now before this court on appeal from the dismissal of his petition for postconviction relief. He argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in the postconviction proceedings and also argues that his extended-term sentence should be reversed because the procedures followed by the circuit court did not comply with the Supreme Court's mandate in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). We affirm, finding specifically with respect to the latter claim that Apprendi does not apply retroactively to causes in which the direct appeal process had concluded at the time that Apprendi was decided.
BACKGROUND
In 1985, a jury in the circuit court of Cook County convicted petitioner of armed robbery, armed violence, home invasion and aggravated battery. A detailed recitation of the circumstances of the crime is not necessary for our analysis, but the facts adduced at trial established that petitioner entered the home of the 77-year-old victim brandishing a hammer and demanding the victim's wallet. After the victim produced his wallet, petitioner hit him on the head with the hammer and began to ransack his home. Petitioner later also hit the victim with a gun, knocking him unconscious. The circuit court sentenced petitioner to a 55-year extended sentence on the armed robbery conviction and a concurrent 5-year sentence for the aggravated battery conviction. The appellate court affirmed petitioner's convictions on direct appeal. People v. De La Paz, No. 1 — 85—3293 (1989) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
Petitioner first petitioned for postconviction relief in September 1986, while his direct appeal was still pending. Appointed counsel filed an amended petition in October 1999, and petitioner followed with a supplemental pro se petition. Because the arguments raised on appeal do not involve the arguments raised in the various petitions, we will not recount them in detail. We do note that in petitioner's supplemental pro se petition, he stated that he had "spoken with the Assistant Public Defender Ingrid Gill, [p]rior to her filing this Supplemental Petition for Post Conviction relief, whereas she had said in a telephone conversation that she was only going to raise One Issue and that issue being the one she now raised in" the October petition. (Emphasis in original.) Petitioner continued: "Petitioner not only argued with her about this only issue [szc], he filed a complaint with the ARDC Attorney Registration Disciplinary Commission of the Illinois Supreme Court." Petitioner stated that according to his review of the authorities — specifically citing People v. Britz, 174 Ill. 2d 163 (1996) — the issue counsel raised in the amended petition was "worthless."
The State moved to dismiss, and the court granted the State's motion in March 2000. Petitioner appealed, and the appellate court affirmed the dismissal. No. 1 — 00—0976 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
During the unusual length of time that the petition remained pending in the circuit court, petitioner composed numerous documents complaining of the circumstances that had resulted in his conviction. These included a complaint with the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission (ARDC) against his trial attorney; a letter to the circuit court of Cook County that indicated that he was planning to file a lawsuit against the trial judge, his trial attorney, and the State's Attorney; and a second letter to a deputy clerk of the circuit court of Cook County reiterating that the assistant State's Attorney and petitioner's trial judge were prejudiced against him.
Also, after petitioner filed his postconviction petition, he filed a "motion for leave to file an original petition for writ of mandamus" and a "petition for writ of mandamus," requesting that his postconviction petition be heard in another county. This request was based on petitioner's contention that Judge Gillis, who had presided over petitioner's original trial, was prejudiced against him to such an extent that petitioner could not receive a fair hearing on his postconviction proceeding before Judge Gillis or any other judge in the circuit court of Cook County. The motion was denied. Later, petitioner filed motions for extensions of time to file a "supplemental brief," contending that the assistant public defender assigned to his case was indifferent to his claims. As a result of these allegations, the assistant public defender was permitted to withdraw as counsel in 1987, and petitioner proceeded pro se. However, no further activity occurred in the case until the court granted a motion to reinstate the petition in June 1993, with the matter reassigned to a different judge. In July 1997 petitioner filed a motion for supervisory order, naming as respondents the judge before whom his petition was pending, the public defender, and two assistant public defenders. In that motion petitioner complained that no progress was being made in his case.
A new assistant public defender, Ingrid Gill, filed an appearance in the case in May 1999. Soon thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint against her with the ARDC, which the ARDC found to be "unfounded."
The matter was set for hearing in March 2000. At that time, counsel filed a certificate of compliance with Rule 651(c). Counsel then summarized for the court's benefit the course of proceedings until that point, including the fact that in addition to the filings above, petitioner had also filed lawsuits in federal court against the police and Cermak Hospital, which had been dismissed. The court dismissed the postconviction petition, the appellate court affirmed, and we granted petitioner leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a).
ANALYSIS
Before this court, petitioner raises two issues. He contends that (1) his sentence should be reversed because the circuit court did not comply with the procedures required by Apprendi in sentencing him, and (2) his post-conviction counsel was ineffective in failing to request a hearing on petitioner's competency to participate in post-conviction proceedings.
I. Apprendi
We first address petitioner's argument that his 55-year sentence for armed robbery must be vacated and the cause remanded for resentencing because the circuit court entered that sentence without following the procedures required by the Supreme Court in Apprendi.
Initially, we note that petitioner failed to present this argument in his postconviction petition. A petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act must, inter alia, "clearly set forth the respects in which petitioner's constitutional rights were violated." 725 ILCS 5/122 — 2 (West 1994). Just as the legislature has set forth what must be contained in a petition, it has specified the consequences of omitting a claim: "[a]ny claim of substantial denial of constitutional rights not raised in the original or an amended petition is waived." 725 ILCS 5/122 — 3 (West 1994). "Waiver" is a well-established term of art in the legal field. This court has long recognized that we may, in appropriate cases, reach issues notwithstanding their waiver. At least as long ago as 1957, this court had held that
"the general rule is that where a question is not raised or reserved in the trial court, or where, though raised in the lower court, it is not urged or argued on appeal, it will not be considered and will be deemed to have been waived. However, this is a rule of administration and not of jurisdiction or power, and it will not operate to deprive an accused of his constitutional rights of due process. 'The court may, as a matter of grace, in a case involving deprivation of life or liberty take notice of errors appearing upon the record which deprived the accused of substantial means of enjoying a fair and impartial trial, although no exceptions were preserved or the question is imperfectly presented.' " People v. Burson, 11 Ill. 2d 360, 370-71 (1957), quoting 3 Am. Jur. Appeal & Error § 248, at 33 (1936).
See also Flynn v. Ryan, 199 Ill. 2d 430, 438 n.l (2002) (waiver is an admonition to the parties, not a limitation upon the powers of this court); Hux v. Raben, 38 Ill. 2d 223, 225 (1967) (this court has "the responsibility * for a just result and for the maintenance of a sound and uniform body of precedent [that] may sometimes override the considerations of waiver that stem from the adversary character of our system").
" 'Where statutes are enacted after judicial opinions are published, it must be presumed that the legislature acted with knowledge of the prevailing case law.' " Burrell v. Southern Truss, 176 Ill. 2d 171, 176 (1997), quoting People v. Hickman, 163 Ill. 2d 250, 262 (1994). We may thus assume that the legislature understood the legal ramifications of the term "waiver" — including the fact that reviewing courts may overlook waiver in appropriate circumstances — when it enacted section 122 — 3 in 1964.
In view of the principles noted above, this court has never considered section 122 — 3 to be jurisdictional in nature. Indeed, we have consistently rejected any notion that section 122 — 3 stands as an "ironclad" bar to attempts to litigate claims not raised in the original or an amended petition. People v. Free, 122 Ill. 2d 367, 376 (1988). In this case, the State has not made any argument based on defendant's waiver of the issue. It is well established that the State may waive waiver. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 193 Ill. 2d 306, 347 (2000); Fagan v. Washington, 942 F.2d 1155, 1157 (7th Cir. 1991).
Accordingly, we address the waived issue on the merits.
These preliminary concerns aside, we now turn to the question whether Apprendi should be applied retroactively to criminal cases in which direct appeals were exhausted before Apprendi was decided.
In general, new rules do not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. People v. Moore, 177 Ill. 2d 421, 430 (1997); Flowers, 138 Ill. 2d at 239. However, this court has adopted the test the Supreme Court promulgated in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989) (plurality op.), to determine when, in derogation of the default rule, a new rule should apply retroactively. According to that test, retroactivity will obtain when
"the new rule either (1) places certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law making authority to proscribe, or (2) requires the observance of those procedures that are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Flowers, 138 Ill. 2d at 237, citing Teague, 489 U.S. at 307, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 353, 109 S. Ct. at 1073 (plurality op.).
Petitioner does not argue that retroactive application of Apprendi is authorized under the first Teague exception. Nor would such an argument be persuasive, if made — Apprendi did not "decriminalize" (see Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 345, 124 L. Ed. 2d 306, 320, 113 S. Ct. 2112, 2119 (1993), citing Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495, 108 L. Ed. 2d 415, 429, 110 S. Ct. 1257, 1263 (1990)) any conduct. The case dealt solely with procedural, not substantive, law.
Accordingly, if Apprendi is to be applied retroactively, it can only be because the rule announced in that case falls within the second Teague exception. We conclude that this is not the case. Thus, Apprendi should not be taken outside the general rule barring retroactivity.
A new rule does not qualify for the second Teague exception merely because it "is aimed at improving the accuracy of trial. More is required." Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 242, Ill L. Ed. 2d 193, 211, 110 S. Ct. 2822, 2831 (1990). The second Teague exception permits retroactive application only of those " 'watershed rules of criminal procedure' " that " ' "alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements" ' essential to the fairness of a proceeding" (emphasis omitted) (Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 241-42, Ill L. Ed. 2d at 211, 110 S. Ct. at 2831, quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 311, 315, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 357, 359, 109 S. Ct. at 1076, 1078 (plurality op.), quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693, 28 L. Ed. 2d 404, 421, 91 S. Ct. 1160, 1180 (1971)), "without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished" (Teague, 489 U.S. at 313, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 358, 109 S. Ct. at 1077 (plurality op.)). See also Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620, 140 L. Ed. 2d 828, 838, 118 S. Ct. 1604, 1610 (1998) ("The Teague doctrine is founded on the notion that one of the 'principal functions of habeas corpus [is] "to assure that no man has been incarcerated under a procedure which creates an impermissibly large risk that the innocent will be convicted" ' "). Teague cautioned that because "such procedures would be so central to an accurate determination of innocence or guilt, we believe it unlikely that many such components of basic due process have yet to emerge." Teague, 489 U.S. at 313, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 358, 109 S. Ct. at 1077.
Our appellate court is divided on the issue of whether Apprendi should be given retroactive application under the second Teague exception. The seminal cases for the two lines are People v. Beachem, 317 Ill. App. 3d 693 (2000), vacated & remanded, 201 Ill. 2d 577 (2002) (supervisory order) (Apprendi is retroactive), and People v. Kizer, 318 Ill. App. 3d 238 (2000) (Apprendi is not retroactive).
In Beachem, the appellate court acknowledged that "[finding retroactivity never should be lightly done" (Beachem, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 706), and recognized that neither this court nor the Supreme Court has ever found any new rule to qualify for retroactivity under the second Teague exception (Beachem, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 702). Nevertheless, the court concluded that am Apprendi violation is so "repugnant to our notions of fundamental fairness" as to necessitate retroactive application under the second Teague test. Beachem, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 702, 706. That conclusion was based on the following characterization of Apprendi-.
"We take Apprendi to mean that once the defendant serves the prescribed maximum sentence, he or she remains in prison on a charge never made and never proved. And if we acknowledge the defendant remains in prison on a charge never made or proved, we have impugned the integrity of our criminal justice system. It is as if the sentencing judge actually said to the defendant: T have convicted you of a charge never made against you and never heard by the jury, and I have done it based on the preponderance of the evidence.' " Beachem, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 702.
In Kizer, the appellate court diverged from Beachem. Kizer looked first to Flowers, the case in which this court adopted the Teague framework. The appellate court noted that in Flowers, this court declined to extend retroactive application to our earlier decision in People v. Reddick, 123 Ill. 2d 184 (1988). In Reddick, we had determined that
"the Illinois pattern jury instructions regarding murder and voluntary manslaughter, used by the trial court at the Reddick defendants' trials, incorrectly advised the jury that it was the State's burden to prove one of the mitigating mental states that would reduce murder to voluntary manslaughter. This court determined that the instructions should have told the jury that it was the State's burden to disprove the pertinent mitigating mental states." (Emphases in original.) People v. Salazar, 162 Ill. 2d 513, 518 (1994) (discussing Reddick).
The Kizer court reasoned that if the second Teague exception was to be so narrowly construed that a determination that instructions reversing the burden of proof did not merit retroactive application, neither then could Apprendi.
The difficulty with the approach taken in Beachem stems from the overstatement in its characterization of Apprendi. Apprendi is about sentencing only. For Apprendi concerns to come into play, a criminal defendant must already have been found guilty of the underlying crime. A defendant raising an Apprendi claim on appeal is simply complaining that he received a sentence in excess of the normal sentencing range, without the fact or facts necessary to permit such sentence having been proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Sanchez-Cervantes, 282 F.3d 664, 671 (9th Cir. 2002) (rejecting retroactive application of Apprendi because Apprendi "only affects the enhancement of a defendant's sentence once he or she has already been convicted beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, it does not rise to the level of importance of' other cases which have been found to apply retroactively). Thus an Apprendi violation does not mean that a defendant is imprisoned on "a charge never made * and never heard by the jury." The most that can be said is that an Apprendi violation results in a defendant's imprisonment on a charge one element of which — the sentencing enhancement — was not proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court has already held that "failure to submit [an] element of' a crime to a jury may constitute harmless error (Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 19-20, 144 L. Ed. 2d 35, 53, 119 S. Ct. 1827, 1839 (1999)), a holding which applies in the Apprendi context (People v. Thurow, 203 Ill. 2d 352 (2003)). We decline to hold that an Apprendi violation comprises such constitutional "bedrock" as to require retroactive application, when such error is potentially harmless.
In a similar vein, we also find guidance in United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 152 L. Ed. 2d 860, 122 S. Ct. 1781 (2002). There, the Court held that an Apprendi violation was not plain error because there was " 'no basis for concluding that the error "seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings." ' " Cotton, 535 U.S. at 633, 152 L. Ed. 2d at 869, 122 S. Ct. at 1786, quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 470, 137 L. Ed. 2d 718, 729, 117 S. Ct. 1544, 1550 (1997).
We recognize that the Court so concluded because the evidence of the particular fact in question in the case before it was "overwhelming." Nevertheless, the implication of the Court's statement for the instant case is plain. Retroactivity is an all-or-nothing proposition. See Kizer, 318 Ill. App. 3d at 249, citing E. Boshkoff, Resolving Retroactivity After Teague v. Lane, 65 Ind. L.J. 651, 658 (1990); Sanchez-Cervantes, 282 F.3d at 671. An error which does not seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings in one or more cases cannot be such a bedrock procedural element essential to the fairness of a proceeding as to fall within the second Teague exception, requiring retroactive application in all cases.
Additional support for our conclusion is drawn from Teague itself. There, the specific question before the Court was whether Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986) — which concerned the sixth amendment "fair cross-section" requirement— should be given retroactive application. The Court answered this question in the negative. In the course of its analysis, the Court stated that
"the fair cross section requirement '[does] not rest on the premise that every criminal trial, or any particular trial, [is] necessarily unfair because it [is] not conducted in accordance with what we determined to be the requirements of the Sixth Amendment.' " (Emphases added.) Teague, 489 U.S. at 314-15, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 359, 109 S. Ct. at 1077-78 (plurality op.), quoting Daniel v. Louisiana, 420 U.S. 31, 32, 42 L. Ed. 2d 790, 793, 95 S. Ct. 704, 705 (1975).
In other words, a sixth amendment violation does not necessarily render every or any particular trial unfair— thus, again, lending support to our conclusion that the violation of the sixth amendment recognized in Apprendi is not such a "bedrock procedural element" as requires retroactive application under the second Teague exception.
Finally, although as noted our own appellate court is divided on the question, our conclusion that Apprendi does not apply retroactively is in accord with the vast majority of foreign authority, both state and federal. Indeed, our research has revealed no current decision extending retroactive effect to Apprendi outside of Illinois. Although this is not a deciding factor, it does lend additional weight to the conclusion we reach. We choose to align ourselves with these other jurisdictions, and hold that Apprendi does not fall within the second Teague exception. Accordingly, it does not apply retroactively.
Because we have found that Apprendi does not apply in this case, we need not further address petitioner's Apprendi-h&sed argument.
II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
Petitioner also contends that his postconviction counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue of his mental fitness to participate in postconviction proceedings. We find this issue to be without merit. A defendant is presumed to be mentally fit at the time of postconviction proceedings. People v. Johnson, 191 Ill. 2d 257, 269 (2000). The level of competency required during postconviction proceedings is less than that required at trial:
"A defendant is considered unfit to stand trial when, 'because of his mental or physical condition, he is unable to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings against him or to assist in his defense.' 725 ILCS 5/104 — 10 (West 1998). In contrast, a defendant is considered unfit to proceed with the post-conviction process [only] when, because of a mental condition, he cannot communicate his allegations of constitutional deprivations to counsel, thus frustrating his entitlement, under the Act, to a reasonable level of assistance." Johnson, 191 Ill. 2d at 269.
Moreover, as a defendant has no constitutional right to the assistance of counsel at a postconviction proceeding, we require only "a reasonable level of assistance" by appointed counsel at such proceedings. People v. Moore, 189 Ill. 2d 521, 541 (2000).
In this case, nothing indicates that petitioner did not receive that level of assistance to which he was entitled. He complains before this court that his various filings complaining about the judge and the attorneys in his original trial should have alerted postconviction counsel that he was possibly mentally unfit to participate in post-conviction proceedings. We find no basis for concluding that postconviction counsel erred in failing to raise this claim. We note that counsel was cognizant of the presence of issues concerning mental fitness, as the amended petition counsel filed contained allegations concerning petitioner's fitness at the time of trial. However, postconviction counsel filed a Rule 651(c) certificate (see 134 Ill. 2d R. 651(c)), in which she certified, inter alia, that she had "consulted with the petitioner by letter and phone on numerous occasions to ascertain his contentions of deprivations of constitutional rights." Further, in petitioner's own supplemental pro se petition, he affirmatively stated that he had "spoken with the Assistant Public Defender" about the issues to be included in the supplemental petition, that he had indeed "argued with" counsel about the matter, filed a complaint with the ARDC because of their disagreement, and conducted his own review of the authorities counsel cited.
All the "fitness" that was required for the postconviction matter to proceed was that petitioner be able to "communicate allegations of constitutional violations to counsel." Johnson, 191 Ill. 2d at 270. Petitioner's anger and frustration with the outcome of his initial criminal trial, and his exploration of many potential alternative avenues in search of relief, does not overcome the presumption of fitness, the plain language of postconviction counsel's Rule 651(c) affidavit, and petitioner's own admission that he had communicated with counsel. Nothing in the record before us leads us to conclude that counsel failed to provide a "reasonable level of assistance" by believing the evidence of her own eyes that petitioner was perfectly capable of communicating with her about the alleged constitutional violations at his trial. An angry or difficult client is not, intrinsically, a client unfit to participate in postconviction proceedings.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court, which affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of defendant's postconviction petition.
Affirmed.
See People v. Bradbury, No. 01 — CA—0541 (Colo. App. September 12, 2002); State v. Sepulveda, 201 Ariz. 158, 32 P.3d 1085 (App. 2001); Sanders v. State, 815 So. 2d 590, 591-92 (Ala. App. 2001); Whisler v. State, 272 Kan. 864, 36 P.3d 290 (2001); State ex rel. Nixon v. Sprick, 59 S.W.3d 515 (Mo. 2001); Teague v. Palmateer, 184 Or. App. 577, 591, 57 P.3d 176, 186 (2002); Greenup v. State, No. W2001 — 01764—CCA—R3—PC (Tenn. App. October 2, 2002). See also Hughes v. State, 826 So. 2d 1070 (Fla. App. 2002) (finding Apprendi nonretroactive under pre-Teague test set forth in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1199, 87 S. Ct. 1967 (1967), and Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 14 L. Ed. 2d 601, 85 S. Ct. 1731 (1965)).
See Goode v. United States, 305 F.3d 378, 385 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Brown, 305 F.3d 304 (5th Cir. 2002); Curtis v. United States, 294 F.3d 841, 842-43 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Mora, 293 F.3d 1213, 1219 (10th Cir. 2002); Sanchez-Cervantes, 282 P.3d at 671; McCoy v. United States, 266 F.3d 1245, 1258 (11th Cir. 2001); United States v. Moss, 252 F.3d 993, 1001-02 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Sanders, 247 F.3d 139, 150-51 (4th Cir. 2001).