Case Name: BOISE CITY v. ARTESIAN HOT AND COLD WATER COMPANY
Court: Idaho Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Idaho
Decision Date: 1895-02-23
Citations: 4 Idaho 351
Docket Number: 
Parties: BOISE CITY v. ARTESIAN HOT AND COLD WATER COMPANY.
Judges: Huston, J., concurs.
Reporter: Idaho Reports
Volume: 4
Pages: 351–364

Head Matter:
(February 23, 1895.)
BOISE CITY v. ARTESIAN HOT AND COLD WATER COMPANY.
[39 Pac. 562.]
Pleading — Water Company — Sections 2711 and 2712 of the Revised Statutes — Free Water for Fire Purposes. — A complaint alleging the organization and operation of a water company under sections 2711 and 2712 of the Revised Statutes of Idaho and praying for decree of court compelling said company to furnish water for fire purposes free to the city of its location.
Ordinance or Contract with Company must be Set Forth. — Must set forth substantially the ordinance or contract with such city permitting such company to furnish water and regulating the manner thereof, if any such ordinance or contract is in existence.
Section Requiring Water Company to Furnish Water Free Constitutional. — The clause of section 2711 requiring a water company receiving and accepting the privileges conferred by the statute, to furnish the city or town water for fire purposes and other great neeesities free, held, to be constitutional.
(Syllabus by the court.)
APPEAL from District Court, Ada County.
S. L. Tipton and W. E. Borah, for Appellant.
Hnder section 2711 the company was bound to furnish water to the plaintiff free for “fire and other great necessities.” This-question and every phase of it has been clearly and distinctly settled by the supreme court of California. (Idaho Rev. Stats., see. 2711; Spring Valley Water Works v. San Francisco, 52 Cal. Ill; San Diego Water Go. v. San Diego, 59 Cal. 517; San-Francisco v. Spring Valley Water Works, 48 Cal. 493.) A constitutional provision may be self-executing if it supplies a sufficient rule by means of which the right may be enjoyed. (Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations, 99, 100; Ewing v. Orovills Min. Go., 56 Cal. 649.) Provisions of the constitution, not self-executing, lie dormant until there is legislation, and do not annul prior laws. (Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations, 98, 100; Supervisors of Doddridge v. Stout, 9 W. Va. 703; Williams v. Mayor etc. of Detroit, 2 Mich. 560; Goatsville Gas. Co. v_ County of Chester, 97 Pa. St. 476; Gaboon v. Commonwealth, 20 Gratt. 733.)
Johnson & Johnson and George Ainslie, for Respondent.
The contention of appellant is that respondent is bound by section 2711 of the Revised Statutes to furnish water to the city for fire and other great necessities free of charge. The contention of respondent is that the complaint does not show that it is so bound. The complaint does not show that respondent is organized under or is authorized by chapter 5 of title 4 of the ■Civil Code to supply the city with water. Section 2710 provides that: “No corporation formed to supply any city or town with water must-do so unless previously authorized by an ordinance of the authorities thereof, or unless it is done in conformity with a contract entered into between the city or town ■and the corporation.” The complaint does not allege the passage of any such ordinance, or the terms of any such contract, ■or that any such contract has been entered into between the city and respondent. “The law supposes that every suitor will state his case as strongly as the facts warrant; and hence the rule that a 'pleading is taken most strongly against the party making it.” (Green v. Govilldud, 10 Cal. 317, 70 Am. Dec. 725; Be Castro v. Ciarle, 29 Cal. 16; Callahan v. Lochran, 102 Cal. 417.) “It is a cardinal rule in equity, as in all other pleading, that the ■allegata and prohata must agree, and that averments material to the case omitted from the pleading cannot be supplied by the evidence.” (Green v. Covillaud, 10 Cal. 317, 70 Am. Dee. 725; Murdoch v. Clarhe, 59 Cal. 693.) The constitution declares that “the right to collect rates or compensation for the use of water supplied to any county, city or town, or water district, or the inhabitants thereof, is a franchise, and cannot be exercised except by authority of, and in the manner prescribed by law” — that is, by statute law, thereby contemplating the enacting by the legislature, where they do not exist, of all laws necessary to give effect to its commands, and that none should be passed in contravention of its provisions. (Idaho Const., art. 15, sec. 2; People v. Stephens, 62 Cal. 209-234 et seq.) The constitution of Idaho declares that “the legislature shall provide by the law the manner in which reasonable maximum rates may be established to be charged for the use of water sold, rented or distributed for any useful or beneficial purpose.” (Idaho Const., art. 15, sec. 6.) The needful laws did exist under which such rates of charges or compensation for water furnished could be fixed, and established section 3711 of the Bevised Statutes of Idaho. And under the rule laid down by Judge Cooley the whole of section 3711 is operative, and not repugnant to the constitution, except that portion, commencing in line 5 thereof, and ending in line 7, comprising the following: “and must furnish water to the extent of their means in case of fire or other great necessity free of charge.” That portion of said section is perfectly distinct and separable, does not depend on the other portion of the section, does not operate together with the other portions for the same purpose; and the balance of the section may stand even though the words, or portion mentioned fall, as being in conflict with, or repugant to the constitution. (Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations, 6th ed., 209, and following; Corn-stock v. City of Syracuse, 129 N. Y. 643, 27 N. E. 1081, 29 N. E. 289, 294.)
Plaintiff alleges: Corporate existence of' both plaintiff and defendant. That defendant became incorporated on or about March 27, 1891, and a short time thereafter commenced doing business. That the purpose for which said corporation was formed was to furnish water to the inhabitants of Boise City for domestic and family use, and to supply plaintiff with water for municipal purposes, as for fire and sanitary uses. That the defendant has laid its water mains and pipes through the streets of Boise City, and is now using and operating said mains and pipes for conducting and furnishing water for pay to the inhabitants of Boise City for domestic and family uses. • That plaintiff, for protection against fire, has placed pipes and fire hydrants, to the number of fifty-five, in convenient places throughout the city, and connected the same to the water mains by means of pipes so that water may be secured through the same for the use of the city in ease of fire and other great necessities. That defendant has, by means of its connection with the pipes, supplied and is supplying, through its water mains and pipes, water to said hydrants for fire purposes and other great necessities, and that the plaintiff has paid the defendant for said water the sum of $1,375 per annum. Plaintiff now refuses to pay the defendant any further sum for water for fire purposes and other great necessities, and alleges that plaintiff is entitled to said water free of charge. That, by reason of the refusal on the part of the plaintiff to pay said defendant for said water furnished for fire purposes, the defendant has threatened and is threatening to immediately shut off said supply, and threatens, if not paid, to disconnect the pipes in the fire hydrants of the plaintiff; and, if permitted so to do, the defendant will leave the plaintiff without adequate means to protect the said city in case of fire; and if said threats be carried into execution it will cause irreparable injury and damage to plaintiff. That plaintiff is without remedy at law, and praj's that the defendant and its agents be restrained from interfering in any way with the ¡lipes and connections of said hydrants with the water mains and pipes of the defendant, and that the defendant be restrained from cutting off or in any way interfering with the water supply furnished by defendant to the plaintiff for said fire purposes; and that, pending this action, the said defendant be so restrained; and for other and further relief, etc. Defendant demurred to the complaint, stating, as cause, that complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Demurrer was sustained by the district court, plaintiff given leave to amend, but declined to do so, and from the order sustaining demurrer and entering default appeals to this court.

Opinion:
MORGAN, C. J.
(After Stating the Facts.) — The date given as the time when this corporation was organized and commenced business was at a time when the statute (Idaho Rev. Stats., secs. 2710-2712) was in force, and therefore the said corporation is subject to the provisions thereof. Section 2712 provides that any corporation created under the provisions of that title, for the purposes named, subject to the reasonable direction of the city or town authorities as to the mode and manner of using such right of way, may use so much of the streets, ways and alleys, in any town or any city as may be necessary for laying pipes for conducting water into such town or city, or through or into, any part thereof. Section 2711 provides that all corporations formed to supply water to cities or towns must furnish pure, fresh water to the inhabitants thereof for family use, so long as the supply permits, at reasonable rates, and without distine tion of persons, upon proper demand therefor, and must furnish water to the extent of their means, in case of fire or other great necessity, free of charge. This section also provides a means of fixing the rates to be charged by the corporation for water furnished the inhabitants, which is that the city shall appoint two commissioners, two to be selected by the water company, and, in case the four cannot agree, a fifth shall be selected by these four, or in case of disagreement the probate judge shall appoint a fifth. With these provisions in view, and with the facts as above alleged, which by the demurrer are admitted to be true, this court is asked to compel said water company to furnish water to said city for fire purposes and other great necessities free of charge. But section 2710 states "no corporation formed to supply any city or town with water must do so unless previously authorized by an ordinance of the authorities thereof or unless it is done in conformity with a contract entered into between the city or town and the corporation," and states, further, that contracts so made are valid and binding in law, etc. In the face of this statute, the court is asked, in effect, to enter up a decree directing and requiring said water company to furnish the city water for fire purposes free of charge, with this statute (section 2710) standing at the head of the chapter which absolutely forbids this corporation or any corporation to furnish any water to the city, either free or for a compensation unless said corporation is previously authorized to do so by ordinance or by contract entered into between the corporation and the city. In order to illustrate the position the court would be in, let us suppose this court should reverse the decision of the court below, and direct the district court to enter up a decree in compliance with the prayer of the complaint, in case the defendant should decline to answer. The district court would, in effect, be required to adjudge and decree that the defendant should furnish the city water for fire purposes and other great necessities free of charge, in the face of section 2710, which says it shall not furnish water for any purpose, either free or for compensation, unless previously authorized by ordinance or contract so to do. The complaint must state everything necessary to enable the court to enter up the, judgment prayed for if the defendant does not answer, but this the court cannot do in this ease, because the plaintiff has not alleged that said company is authorized to furnish water at all, «either by ordinance or contract. While we think the city could enter into no contract which could nullify the provision of the statute which requires said company to furnish water free for fire purposes to the extent of its means, still we think the court should know the exact condition of things between the city and water company, as there may be a contract or ordinance which -would affect the character of the decree the court would be authorized to render.
.¿Respondent contends, also, that the portion of section 2711 which requires the water company accepting the privileges granted by the statute to furnish any city so occupied water for fee purposes free is unconstitutional, as repugnant to section 2, -article 15 of the constitution. This section simply announces a general principle, and the first clause amount's only to a definition; that is, that the right to collect rates, etc., for water supplied to any county, city or town, or the inhabitants thereof, is a franchise, and cannot be exercised except in the manner prescribed by law. This section does not amend sections 2710, 2711, or 2712 of the statute, but would authorize the .enactment of just such a statute, unless it interferes with the right of the legislature to say that a corporation so formed sVial] furnish water for fire purposes free. In our view of it, this section is not prohibitory at all. It is, as said above, simply a definition. It does not say the legislature shall not pass ¡a law compelling a water company, in consideration of the acceptance of certain privileges and rights, or in consideration of ámy privileges or rights, to furnish a city or town water for fire ¡purposes free. Neither is this law repugnant to the provisions «of section 6, article 15 of the constitution, which says: "The legislature shall provide by law the manner in which reasonable maximum rates may be established to be charged for the use of water sold, rented or distributed for any useful or beneficial purpose." That is, the legislature shall provide by law the manner in which reasonable maximum rates may be fixed for ¡the use of water furnished for which the corporation is authorized to charge anything, and does not prevent the legislature from granting certain privileges, in consideration' of the ac ceptance of which the corporation shall furnish water for fir© purposes free, as above stated. As at present advised, we se© no reason for declaring this portion of section 2711 to be unconstitutional. There seems to be really but little reason, in th© view we take of this cause, for touching upon the question of the constitutionality of this provision of the law; but counsel seemed to make it one of the issues to be determined, and therefore we have said the judgment of the court below is affirmed,, with costs to respondent, but the district court is directed to sec aside the judgment of dismissal, allow plaintiff to amend the complaint, and issue a restraining order restraining the defendant from cutting off or interfering in any way or manner with the water supply furnished by defendant to plaintiff for fire purposes and other great necessities until the rights of the parties can be finally determined.
Huston, J., concurs.