Case Name: RUDOLPH E. NESSELRODT v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA; -and- MALCOLM WAYNE THOMPSON v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA; -and- TONY LEE TUSING v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA; -and- WILLIE A. SCOTT v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA; -and- WANDA LYNN HERALD v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA; -and- GEORGE F. CARTER, III v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
Court: Court of Appeals of Virginia
Jurisdiction: Virginia
Decision Date: 1994-12-20
Citations: 19 Va. App. 448
Docket Number: No. 1286-92-4; No. 1311-92-4; No. 1314-92-4; No. 1328-92-4; No. 1331-92-4; No. 1371-92-4
Parties: RUDOLPH E. NESSELRODT v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
Judges: 
Reporter: Virginia Court of Appeals Courts
Volume: 19
Pages: 448–459

Head Matter:
Richmond
RUDOLPH E. NESSELRODT v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
No. 1286-92-4
-and-MALCOLM WAYNE THOMPSON v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
No. 1311-92-4
-and-TONY LEE TUSING v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
No. 1314-92-4
-and-WILLIE A. SCOTT v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
No. 1328-92-4
-and-WANDA LYNN HERALD v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
No. 1331-92-4
-and-GEORGE F. CARTER, III v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
No. 1371-92-4
Decided December 20, 1994
Counsel
Dabney Overton, Jr. (Walter F. Green, IV; Green & O’Donnell, on brief), for appellants.
Jeffrey A. Spencer, Assistant Attorney General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on briefs), for appellee.

Opinion:
UPON A REHEARING EN BANC
Opinion
WILLIS, J.
On May 24, 1994, a panel of this Court reversed and remanded the habitual offender adjudications of Rudolph E. Nesselrodt, Malcolm Wayne Thompson, Tony Lee Tusing, Willie A. Scott, Wanda Lynn Herald, and George F. Carter, III. See Nesselrodt v. Commonwealth, _ Va. App. _, 444 S.E.2d 261 (1994). The Commonwealth's petition for rehearing en banc was granted and the mandates of the May 24, 1994 opinion were stayed. Upon rehearing en banc, we affirm the judgments of the trial court and order that the mandates of the May 24, 1994 opinion be vacated.
Because an habitual offender adjudication imposes a forfeiture, strict compliance by the Commonwealth with the statutory requirements for such adjudication is required. See Hoye v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 587, 589, 405 S.E.2d 628, 629 (1991); Flaherty v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 148, 151, 415 S.E.2d 867, 868 (1992). However, a proceeding under the Habitual Offender Act is not a criminal proceeding. Commonwealth v. Stanley, 232 Va. 57, 348 S.E.2d 231 (1986). Its purpose is to protect the traveling public. Virginia ex rel. Shifflett v. Cook, 333 F. Supp. 718 (W.D. Va. 1971). Therefore, the Commonwealth's strict compliance obligation applies only to the specific requirements for adjudication.
The Commonwealth's Attorney of Rockingham County filed in the trial court informations seeking to have the appellants declared habitual offenders under the Habitual Offender Act, Code § 46.2-351 through 46.2-363. Attached to each information was a document prepared by the Commissioner of the Department of Motor Vehicles and certified in the manner provided by Code § 46.2-215. Two of these documents were designated "Abstract of Driver History" (Nesselrodt and Scott). Four were designated "Transcript of Record" (Thompson, Tusing, Herald, and Carter). Each document set forth the convictions alleged to bring its respective subject driver within the definition of an habitual offender, reciting, with respect to each conviction, the trial court, the offense, the offense date, and the conviction date.
Code § 46.2-352 provides, in pertinent part:
The Commissioner shall certify, from the Department's records, substantially in the manner provided for in § 46.2-215, three transcripts or abstracts of those conviction documents which bring the person named therein within the definition of an habitual offender .
The transcript or abstract may be admitted as evidence as provided in § 46.2-215. The transcript or abstract shall be prima facie evidence that the person named therein was duly convicted, or held not innocent in the case of a juvenile, by the court wherein the conviction or holding was made, of each offense shown by the transcript or abstract.
The documents furnished by the Commissioner may be transcripts of the Department's records. However, they are not transcripts of the underlying conviction documents because they are not literal recitations or reconstructions of those documents. Therefore, however those documents may be captioned by the Commissioner, the issue is whether they are abstracts of the appellants' conviction documents within the contemplation and requirement of Code § 46.2-352. We hold that they are.
Black's Law Dictionary 10 (6th ed. 1990) defines "abstract," in pertinent part, as follows:
A lesser quantity containing the virtue and force of a greater quantity; an abridgement.... [A] [sjummary or epitome, or that which comprises or concentrates in itself the essential qualities of a larger thing or of several things.
An abstract is a concentration of information characterized by essence and relevance.
Code § 46.2-352 calls for the provision of information necessary to "bring the person named therein within the definition of an habitual offender." It does not require that the trial court rec ord be cluttered with material extraneous to that specific purpose. The information furnished in these cases satisfies that plain purpose and requirement.
The appellants contend that Code § 46.2-386, which sets forth the requirements for inclusion in abstracts of conviction certified by trial courts to the Department of Motor Vehicles, should be read to specify the information required to be provided under Code § 46.2-352. They argue that this section is the only statutory statement of required content for abstracts. We find this argument unpersuasive. By its express terms, Code § 46.2-386 relates only to abstracts required by Code § 46.2-383. It requires the provision of information by trial courts to the Department of Motor Vehicles, a record keeping agency. It purports in no way to define the term "abstract" in any other respect. We perceive no reason to strain the scope of this statute to require the interjection of useless and irrelevant information into a specific statutory proceeding.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Moon, C.J., Baker, J., Coleman, J., Elder, J., Bray, J., Fitzpatrick, J., concurred.