Case Name: WILLIAMS v. O'CONNOR
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1981-08-18
Citations: 108 Mich. App. 613
Docket Number: Docket No. 47369
Parties: WILLIAMS v O’CONNOR
Judges: Before: M. F. Cavanagh, P.J., and T. M. Burns and R. H. Campbell, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 108
Pages: 613–624

Head Matter:
WILLIAMS v O’CONNOR
Docket No. 47369.
Submitted October 15, 1980, at Lansing.
Decided August 18, 1981.
Leave to appeal applied for.
Anna R. Williams, as administratrix of the estate of Gerald L. Williams, deceased, brought an action for medical malpractice against James A. O’Connor, D.O., R. R. Cornwell, D.O., Jackson Osteopathic Hospital, and Jackson Osteopathic Hospital Radiology Department. Defendants moved for accelerated judgment on the ground that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiffs decedent had entered into certain arbitration agreements. Jackson Circuit Court, James G. Fleming, J., granted defendants’ motion. Plaintiff appeals, alleging that the arbitration agreements are violative of due process. Held:
The provision in the R. Hood-McNeely-Geake Malpractice Arbitration Act of 1975 (MAA) requiring one member of an arbitration panel convened pursuant to an arbitration agreement consistent with the act to be a hospital administrator or a physician does not violate a patient’s due process rights.
Affirmed.
T. M. Burns, J., dissented. He would hold that the specification in the MAA of the arbitration procedure and the composition of the arbitration panel provides a sufficient nexus with the state to constitute state action, thus making an arbitration agreement entered into pursuant to the act subject to challenge on due process grounds. He would hold further that a patient who is unaware that a physician is required to be a member of an arbitration panel cannot make a valid waiver of his right to trial by entering into an arbitration agreement which so provides and that, in addition, because a physician member of a medical malpractice arbitration panel has a direct pecuniary interest in the amount of any arbitration award which is neither remote nor insubstantial, the requirement is violative of due process. He would reverse and remand.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1, 2, 4, 7] 5 Am Jur 2d, Arbitration and Award §§ 8, 9.
61 Am Jur 2d, Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers §§ 374, 376.
Arbitration of medical malpractice claim. 84 ALR3d 375.
16A Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law §§ 855, 857.
16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law § 205.
16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law § 205.
46 Am Jur 2d, Judges § 94 et seq.
Opinion of the Court
1. Arbitration — Medical Malpractice — Arbitration Panels — Due Process — Statutes.
The provision in the R. Hood-McNeely-Geake Malpractice Arbitration Act of 1975 which requires that one member of the three-member arbitration panel specified in the act be a hospital administrator or a physician does not violate a patient’s due process rights (MCL 600.5040 et seq.; MSA 27A.5040 et seq.).
Dissent by T. M. Burns, J.
2. Arbitration — Medical Malpractice — Due Process — State Action — Statutes.
An arbitration agreement entered into pursuant to the R. HoodMcNeely-Geake Malpractice Arbitration Act of 1975 may be challenged on due process grounds; the arbitration procedure and the composition of the arbitration panel which functions in a judicial capacity as an alternative to trial are established by a statute, providing a sufficient nexus with the state to constitute state action (MCL 500.3053[1], 600.5040 et seq.; MSA 24.13053[1], 27A.5040 et seq.).
3. Constitutional Law — Due Process — Fair Trial.
A person’s right of access to a fair and impartial tribunal is within the penumbra of interests protected by the Due Process Clause (US Const, Am XIV).
4. Arbitration — Medical Malpractice — Voluntary Agreements — Statutes.
A patient’s decision to agree to submit a dispute arising out of health care provided by a hospital to arbitration pursuant to the R. Hood-McNeely-Geake Malpractice Arbitration Act of 1975, thereby waiving his constitutional right to trial, is distinctly voluntary (MCL 600.5042; MSA 27A.5042).
5. Constitutional Law — Waiver — Appeal.
A waiver of a constitutional right, to be effective, must be informed, intentional, and voluntary; an acknowledgement of a receipt of material which explains the results of a waiver is insufficient absent evidence that the material was read and understood prior to the waiver, and, on appeal, such understanding will not be presumed.
6. Judges — Disqualification of Judges — Due Process.
A judge or decision maker in a case may be disqualiñed on due process grounds where he (1) has a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the dispute, (2) has been a target of personal abuse or criticism from a party to the dispute, (3) is enmeshed in other matters involving one of the parties, or (4) might have prejudged the case because of prior participation therein as an accuser, investigator, factñnder, or initial decision maker.
7. Arbitration — Medical Malpractice — Due Process — Statutes.
A physician-member of a medical malpractice arbitration panel has a direct pecuniary interest in the amount of any award which is neither remote nor insubstantial; thus, that provision of the R. Hood-McNeely-Geake Malpractice Arbitration Act of 1975 which requires one member of an arbitration panel to be a physician violates due process (MCL 600.5040 et seq.; MSA 27A.5040 et seq.).
Lopatin, Miller, Bindes, Freedman, Bluestone, Erlich & Rosen (by Steven G. Silverman), for plaintiff.
Foster, Swift, Collins & Coey, P.C. (by David H. Aldrich), for defendant O’Connor.
Stanton, Bullen, Nelson, Moilanen & Klaasen, P.C. (by Charles A. Nelson and William J. Braaksma), for defendant Cornwell.
Best, Arnold, Gleeson & Best, P.C. (by Dennis L. Viglione), for defendant hospital.
Before: M. F. Cavanagh, P.J., and T. M. Burns and R. H. Campbell, JJ.
Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
M. F. Cavanagh, P.J.
We adopt the facts of this case as they are presented by our brother Burns in his dissent.
There is a difference of opinion among judges of the Court of Appeals as to whether the require ment of the R. Hood-McNeely-Geake Malpractice Arbitration Act (MAA), MCL 600.5040 et seq.; MSA 27A.5040 et seq., that one member of the three-member arbitration panel be a hospital administrator or physician violates a patient's due process rights. Two recent cases from this Court addressed this issue and held that that requirement does not infringe unconstitutionally upon the due process right to a hearing before a fair and impartial tribunal. See Judge Cynar's opinion in Morris v Metriyakool, 107 Mich App 110; 309 NW2d 910 (1981), and Brown v Siang, 107 Mich App 91; 309 NW2d 575 (1981).
We find the reasoning in Brown, supra, to present the better view on the issue sub judice. Based upon the reasoning presented there and in Morris, supra, we affirm the trial court's decision.
Affirmed.
R. H. Campbell, J., concurred.