Case Name: Hamilton et al. v. Wright
Court: Iowa Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Iowa
Decision Date: 1870-01-27
Citations: 30 Iowa 480
Docket Number: 
Parties: Hamilton et al. v. Wright.
Judges: 
Reporter: Iowa Reports
Volume: 30
Pages: 472–483

Head Matter:
Hamilton et al. v. Wright.
1. Adverse possession; husband and wipe: estoppel. Where one holding adverse possession of lands, under a claim of right, died, leaving his widow and heirs in possession, and afterward the widow married and continued to reside on the premises with her second husband and said heirs, it was held, that a judgment against such second husband, in an action against him for the recovery of the property, did not bind the wife and heirs, nor estop them from insisting upon the title acquired by the adverse possession of their ancestor and themselves.
2. -claim op right : color op title. To constitute an adverse possession, under our statute, it is not necessary that the party must have taken" and held possession under color of title. It is sufficient if such possession was taken and held under a claim of title.
3. -The terms “ color of title,” and “ claim of title,” are not synonymous. To constitute the former, a paper title is requisite in the party claiming, but the latter may exist wholly in parol.
4. --- WHERE ENTRY WAS NOT ORIGINALLY ADVERSE. An entry Upon lands, by one without color of title or claim of right, may subsequently become adverse by his acquiring and asserting a claim of title, and the statute would begin to run from that time.
5. -color OF title : by descent. A descent cast upon heirs by the death of the ancestor, though he was but a mere trespasser, dying in possession, gives color of title to their heirs.
6. -defective title. To constitute color of title it is not requisite that the title under which the party claims should be a valid one, and it is immaterial whether its want of validity results from its original and inherent defects, or from matters transpiring subsequently, nor whether such want of validity is attributable to individual or judicial action.
Appeal from General Term, First District (Lee County).
Friday, January 27.
In October, 1842, one Jeremy G. Anderson purchased of Richard F. Barrett the north fractional half of fractional section thirteen, in township sixty-six, north of range five west, it being a part of the land known in this State as the Half Breed Tract. The said Barrett’s title was derived under tax sales and deeds for all said tract for taxes of 1838 and 1839, his deeds being dated in May and December, 1841. The said Jeremy G. Anderson took possession of said land the same month, October, 1842, and continued to reside thereon with his family up to his death, in September, 1845; and his widow and children have resided thereon ever since. In 1849, the widow intermarried with one L. D. Hamilton, who lived with her and her children by Anderson, upon the premises in controversy, until about 1860, when he went to Colorado.
About January, 1860, the defendant in this action brought suit in the Lee district court. against said L. D. Hamilton for the recovery of said real property, and in February, 1862, he recovered judgment therein. Afterward and in July, 1862, as the plaintiff in that suit was about to issue execution, and thereunder to procure himself to be put in possession of said real estate, this action was brought by the widow and heirs of said Jeremy G. Anderson against the plaintiff in that suit, M. D, Wright, and said L. D. Hamilton was also made defendant, to enjpin the issuance of execution whereby to disturb their possession, and to quiet their title, etc.; said plaintiffs claiming that the judgment against L. D. Hamilton was not binding upon them and did not affect their title, and that their title was perfect by reason of their color of title and adverse possession for more than ten years. Upon the issues made there was a large amount of testimony taken. The district court made the injunction perpetual, and quieted plaintiff’s title. The general term affirmed, and defend ant, Wright, now appeals to this court.
Gibson Browne & B. P. Lowe for the appellant.
D. F. Miller for the appellees.

Opinion:
Cole, Ch. J.
I. A careful examination of the testimony satisfies us, that although the defendant in the action right had married the widow, who had an nnassigned dower interest in the land in con. troversy, and made his home with said widow upon said land, yet it is quite apparent that he was mainly engaged in other business than farming said land, and was in no just sense in possession of it either as tenant or claimant; and that, under the facts shown in this case, the judgment recovered against him in the action of right gave to the plaintiff therein no claim whatever to turn these plaintiffs out of possession of their real estate, under an execution issued upon such judgment. There is no claim that the said defendant in said action of right, L. D. Hamilton, had any title or interest in said land, except such as he acquired by reason of his inter-marriage with the widow of the former owner thereof; and, even if he might be regarded as a tenant, there was no reasonable notice of the action given to the landlords or holders of the title, as would make' the judgment of any effect against them, under the provisions of the Code of 1851, section 2003, or the Revision of 1860, section 3571; and the plaintiff in that action had full knowledge of the claim and title of all the parties.
II. A most able and elaborate argument was made by-appellant's counsel in this case,, in support of the doctrine that to constitute such adverse possession as would toll the right of entry under our statutes of limitations, the entry upon the land, as well as the subsequent possession, must have been made and continued under color and claim of adverse title; that a tortious entry upon land, and the subsequent acquiring of an adverse title will not toll the right of the true owner, however long the possession may be continued; and it is further claimed in this case, that, as a matter of fact, the ancestor of plaintiffs had no color of title, and made no claim to the land when he made his entry thereon.
We find the fact otherwise, and hence have no occasion to pass upon the legal proposition so ably and fully argued. The only witness who testifies as to the precise time at which the plaintiffs' ancestor, Jeremy G-. Anderson, entered upon the premises in dispute, says it was " in the month of October, 1842;" other witnesses indicate generally about the same period, and it appears that the deed for the land, made by Bennett to said Anderson, was made October 7, 1842. The fact that he also obtained another deed or title from his brother, in March, 1843, would not, of course, defeat the color of title given by the first deed under which he entered; Ruddick v. Marshall, 28 Iowa, 487; and further, several witnesses testify to the fact that plaintiffs' ancestor purchased the- claim or title of one Burtis, whose wife was of Indian descent, a quarter blood, and succeeded to his possession, which certainly was not under nor consistent with the defendants' title, which, it is not disputed, is the paramount or decree title.
'
The suggestion in argument, that Barrett's tax title was merged in the decree of partition — the decree title, because under the statute of partition it became the duty •of all persons having claims of title to present them to the court for allowance, is robbed of its force, as we think, by the fact that, while the decree of partition was made May 8, 1841, Barrett's tax deed, the last, was not made till after the decree, December 9,1841.
It follows from these views that the judgments of the district court and of the general term must be
Affirmed.