Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. Marva L. WATSON a/k/a Lawrence Lackings
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 2000-05-03
Citations: 763 So. 2d 713
Docket Number: No. 99-KA-0243
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Marva L. WATSON a/k/a Lawrence Lackings.
Judges: (Court composed of Judge WILLIAM H. BYRNES, III, Judge MOON LANDRIEU, Judge DENNIS R. BAGNERIS, Sr.).
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 763
Pages: 713–723

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. Marva L. WATSON a/k/a Lawrence Lackings.
No. 99-KA-0243.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
May 3, 2000.
Harry F. Connick, District Attorney Of Orleans Parish, Nicole Barron, Assistant District Attorney of Orleans Parish, New Orleans, LA, Counsel for Plaintiff/Appel-lee.
Yvonne Chalker, Louisiana Appellate Project, New Orleans, LA, Counsel for Defendant/Appellant.
(Court composed of Judge WILLIAM H. BYRNES, III, Judge MOON LANDRIEU, Judge DENNIS R. BAGNERIS, Sr.).

Opinion:
| LANDRIEU, Judge.
Defendant appeals his conviction and sentence for possession of heroin.
On October 7, 1998, the appellant was charged with one count of possession of heroin. At his arraignment, he pled not guilty. On October 19th, after reviewing the police report, defense counsel withdrew his motions for preliminary hearing and all discovery motions. On October 26th, a twelve-person jury found defendant guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced him on November 3rd to serve four years at hard labor without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence. On that same date, the court denied his motion to reconsider sentence, but granted his motion for appeal.
FACTS
At approximately 5:00 p.m. on October 5, 1998, officers of the Community Oriented Policing Squad in the Florida Housing Project were on patrol in the 3500 block of Law Street. They observed an unknown man walk into the hallway of one of the project's buildings. The man soon walked out of the hallway with another unknown man. One of the men, later identified as the defendant Marva Watson ba/k/a Lawrence Lackings, was holding his right hand in a balled-up manner. The officers approached Lackings and asked him to open his hand to show them what was in his fist. At that point, Lackings dropped a small tinfoil packet from his hand, and the packet fell to the ground. One officer told Lackings he was under investigation for narcotics activity, while the other officer retrieved the packet. Lackings started to leave, and when the officers discovered a white powder residue inside the packet, they advised Lackings he was under arrest. A struggle ensued, during which the officers subdued Lackings through the use of pepper spray. The other man escaped during the struggle. The officers handcuffed Lackings and took him to Charity Hospital for treatment. They later transported him to Central Lockup.
The parties stipulated that the substance inside the tinfoil tested positive for heroin.
The defendant identified himself at trial as Anthony Lackings. He testified he was riding through the project on his bicycle when the officers stopped him. He testified the officers told him he was under arrest and started asking him questions about a young man with plaits in his hair. The defendant testified that when he protested that he did not know that person, the officers removed him from his bicycle with such force that he later went to the hospital. He denied fighting with the officers. He testified the officers did not tell him why he had been arrested until after he had been put in the police car. On cross-examination, he admitted having pri- or misdemeanor convictions.
| ^ERRORS PATENT
Our review of the record reveals there are no errors patent.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
By his first assignment of error, the defendant contends the evidence seized at his arrest should have been suppressed. However, he is estopped from raising this issue on appeal because it was not raised in the trial court. By his second assignment, the defendant contends his counsel was ineffective for two reasons: (1) Counsel withdrew his motion for preliminary hearing upon receiving the police report in this case; and (2) Counsel failed to file a motion to suppress the evidence.
Concerning the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, this court in State v. Francis, 96-2389, pp. 8-9 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/15/98), 715 So.2d 457, 462, writ denied, 98-2360 (La.2/5/99), 737 So.2d 741, stated:
Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), a defendant must show that his counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced him. With regard to counsel's performance, the defendant must show that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as "counsel" guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. As to prejudice, the defendant must show that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, i.e. a trial whose result is reliable. Id. Both showings must be made before it can be found that the defendant's conviction resulted from a breakdown in the adversarial process that rendered the trial result unreliable. Id. A claim of ineffective assistance may be disposed of on the finding that either one of the two Strickland criteria has not been met. State v. James, 555 So.2d 519 (La.App. 4 Cir.1989), writ denied 559 So.2d 1374 (La.1990). If the claim fails to establish either prong, the reviewing court need not address the other. Murray v. Maggio, 736 F.2d 279 (5th Cir.1984).
| ¿This court has recognized that if an alleged error falls "within the ambit of trial strategy" it does not "establish ineffective assistance of counsel." State v. Bienemy, 483 So.2d 1105 (La.App. 4th Cir.1986); see also State v. Addison, 94-1423 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/13/96), 684 So.2d 477. Moreover, as "opinions may differ on the advisability of a tactic, hindsight is not the proper perspective for judging the competence of counsel's trial decisions. Neither may an attorney's level of representation be determined by whether a particular strategy is successful." State v. Brooks, 505 So.2d 714, 724 (La.1987), cert. denied, Brooks v. Louisiana, 484 U.S. 947, 108 S.Ct. 337, 98 L.Ed.2d 363 (1987).
Here, defense counsel withdrew his motion for preliminary hearing after reading the police report. The purpose of a preliminary hearing is to determine if there is probable cause to believe a defendant has committed a crime in order to hold him on his bond obligation for trial. See La.C.Cr.P. art. 296. However, a conviction of a defendant renders moot any failure to provide a preliminary examination in the absence of prejudice. State v. Washington, 363 So.2d 509 (La.1978); State v. Price, 482 So.2d 135 (La.App. 4th Cir.1986). Here, the trial transcript indicates there was probable cause to hold the defendant for trial because there was probable cause to believe he had committed the crime. When the officers stopped the defendant, he dropped a tinfoil packet that was found to contain heroin. As such, even if counsel had requested a preliminary hearing and one had been held, the State could have shown probable cause to believe the defendant committed the crime charged, simple possession of heroin. Thus, we find that there was no prejudice to the defendant by counsel's failure to request a preliminary hearing. Because the appellant is unable to prove the "prejudice" 1 sprong of the Stñckland test, counsel was not ineffective for his failure to move for a preliminary hearing;
Defendant's second argument is that his counsel was ineffective because he failed to file a motion to suppress the evidence based upon his review of the police report, a copy of which is not in the record before this court. Counsel also failed to object to the introduction of this evidence at trial. However, if there was no basis for the suppression of this evidence, then the defendant was not prejudiced by defense counsel's failure to move to suppress the evidence or to object to its introduction. Without a showing of prejudice, the defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails. Therefore, this court must consider if the evidence was illegally seized. If it was, then the defendant was prejudiced by counsel's failure to move to suppress it and to object to its introduction at trial. However, if the evidence was properly seized, then it was admissible at trial, and there was no basis for a motion to suppress it or an objection to its introduction.
The defendant dropped the tinfoil packet containing the heroin after the officers stopped him and asked him to open his hand, which was clenched into a fist. He argues the officers were without authority to stop him. In State v. Sneed, 95-2326, p. 3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/11/96), 680 So.2d 1237, 1238, writ denied, 96-2450 (La.3/7/97), 689 So.2d 1371, this court discussed the standard for determining if officers have reasonable suspicion to support an investigatory stop:
An individual may be stopped and questioned by police if the officer has a reasonable suspicion that the person "is committing, has committed, or is about to commit an offense." La.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 215.1. While "reasonable suspicion" is something less than the probable cause needed for an arrest, it must be based upon particular articu-lable facts and circumstances known to the officer at the time the individual is approached. State v. Smith, 94-1502, p. 4 (La.App. 4th Cir.1/19/95), 649 So.2d 1078, 1082. The officer's past experience, training and common sense may be considered in determining if the inferences drawn from the facts presented were reasonable. State v. Jackson, 26,138 (La.App. 2nd Cir.8/17/94), 641 So.2d 1081, 1084.
See also: State v. Smiley, 99-0065 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/3/99), 729 So.2d 743, writ denied, 99-0914 (La.5/14/99), 743 So.2d 651; State v. Allen, 95-1754 (La.9/5/96), 682 So.2d 713.
An "actual stop" occurs when an individual submits to a police show of authority or is physically contacted by the police. Tucker. An "imminent actual stop" occurs when the police come upon an individual with such force that, regardless of the individual's attempts to flee or elude the encounter, an actual stop of the individual is virtually certain. Id.
Here, because the officers actually stopped the defendant and asked him to open his hand, they needed reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to do so. The defendant argues the officers had no reasonable suspicion to stop him. In State v. Ratliff, 98-0094 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/19/99), 737 So.2d 252, writ denied, 99-1523 (La.10/29/99), 748 So.2d 1160, a case similar to the instant one, this court found the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to stop and detain the defendant. In Ratliff, officers on patrol in an area known for drug activity saw the defendant and other men standing on the sidewalk in front of a residence. The defendant had his arms crossed and his fist clenched. The officers ordered the men to approach and put their hands on the police car. As defendant did so, he dropped something from his clenched hand. The officers retrieved the object and found it to be crack cocaine. Rejecting the State's arguments that the defendant abandoned the cocaine without any police interference, this court then looked to see if the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop and detain the defendant. This court recognized that 17the reputation of an area is a factor to be considered in determining reasonable suspicion, and that deference must be given to an officer's experience. However, considering the totality of the circumstances, this court found the defendant's folded arms and clenched fist, in the absence of any indication of criminal activity, was insufficient to support a finding of reasonable suspicion.
In other cases involving fists in which this court has found reasonable suspicion, there have been additional suspicious factors that contributed to this finding. In State v. Williams, 98-3059 (La.App. 4 Cir. 3/3/99), 729 So.2d 142, officers patrolling in an area known for drug activity saw the defendant and an unknown man standing together. The unknown man had his palm upturned, showing something to the defendant. The defendant was reaching into the other man's hand when he noticed the officers. The other man withdrew his hand and ran, while the defendant remained in place. The officers detained the defendant, frisked him, and felt a bulge in his pocket, which was discovered to be drugs. This court upheld the stop. The court noted that the action of showing something in a hand to another person, by itself, would not have given the officers reasonable suspicion. However, this court found the flight of the defendant's companion supplied the factor necessary to support a finding of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity on the defendant's part. The court further found the officers were justified in frisking the defendant and were justified in seizing the drugs, which were discovered by "plain feel" during the frisk.
In State v. Riley, 95-0664 (La.App. 4 Cir. 5/1/96), 673 So.2d 1279, writ denied, 96-1294 (La.11/1/96), 681 So.2d 1257, offi cers on patrol in the French Quarter saw the defendant standing with another man, showing the man something in his upturned palm. Shortly thereafter, the officers saw the defendant on another | Rcorner with another man, this time with something in a towel in his upturned palm. The officer testified that an upturned palm was common in street sales of drugs. This court found the defendant's actions, in two separate places in a short period of time, added to the officer's testimony concerning the use of upturned palms in drug sales, was sufficient to give the officers reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant. In State v. Parker, 94-0624 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/18/94), 645 So.2d 1309, writ denied, 94-3042 (La.9/15/95), 660 So.2d 446, the officers had received a tip from a pedestrian that a man on a bicycle was selling drugs on a certain corner. The officers went to the corner and saw the defendant, whose clothing fit the description given in the tip. The defendant approached the officers with a clenched fist. At the officers' request, he opened his hand, which contained drugs. On review, this court found the tip, combined with the clenched fist, gave the officers reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant.
Here, by contrast, there is no indication the officers had received a tip about drug activity in the hallway from which the defendant emerged. Indeed, the officers did not even testify that the area was known for drug activity; the most they testified was that the events took place in the hallway of a housing project. They did not see any criminal activity. The only thing they saw was (apparently) the defendant walking into the hallway and then he and another man walking out of the hallway, and at that time the defendant had a clenched fist.
Based upon only these factors, we find that as in Ratliff, the State failed to show there was reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant and order him to open his clenched fist. We therefore conclude the evidence was illegally seized and should not have'been admitted at trial. Because there would have been no basis to support the defendant's conviction without this evidence, we find the defendant 18was prejudiced by counsel's failure to file a motion to suppress. Accordingly, based on the record before this court, we conclude that defendant's counsel was constitutionally ineffective.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we vacate the defendant's conviction and sentence, and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
BYRNES, J., Dissents With Reasons.
. Although the minute entry reflects that the court imposed the sentence without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. the transcript indicates the court did not prohibit parole eligibility. In cases of conflict between a minute entry and a transcript, the content of the transcript controls. See State v. Page, 95-2401 (La.App. 4 Cir. 8/21/96), 680 So.2d 700, writ denied 96-2352 (La.2/21/97), 688 So.2d 522.