Case Name: Joseph Robert SPAZIANO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1989-06-15
Citations: 545 So. 2d 843
Docket Number: No. 72464
Parties: Joseph Robert SPAZIANO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: EHRLICH, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW and GRIMES, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 545
Pages: 843–846

Head Matter:
Joseph Robert SPAZIANO, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 72464.
Supreme Court of Florida.
June 15, 1989.
Rehearing Denied July 25, 1989.
Edward S. Stafman, Tallahassee, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Richard B. Martell, Asst. Atty. Gen., Day-tona Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Joseph Robert Spaziano appeals the trial court's denial of his second motion for relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We have jurisdiction, article V, section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution, and, for the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court.
This is the fourth time that this cause has been before this Court. In 1976, Joseph Robert Spaziano was convicted of first-degree murder for the killing of Laura Harberts. The jury recommended a life sentence; however, the trial judge declined to follow the jury's recommendation and imposed the death sentence. A detailed rendition of the facts is set forth in Spaziano v. State, 393 So.2d 1119 (Fla.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1037, 102 S.Ct. 581, 70 L.Ed.2d 484 (1981), in which we affirmed Spaziano's conviction but remanded the cause for resentencing after finding error in the sentencing process. On resentenc-ing, the trial judge again sentenced Spazi-ano to death. We affirmed the death sentence in Spaziano v. State, 433 So.2d 508 (Fla.1983), aff'd, 468 U.S. 447, 104 S.Ct. 3154, 82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984), noting that the trial judge properly considered evidence in aggravation that was not presented to the jury. After the governor signed a death warrant, Spaziano sought postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. The trial court denied this motion, and we affirmed the trial court in Spaziano v. State, 489 So.2d 720 (Fla.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 995, 107 S.Ct. 598, 93 L.Ed.2d 598 (1986). Spaziano then sought postconviction relief through this second rule 3.850 motion, which the trial court summarily denied, stating, in pertinent part:
Defendant's initial motion alleged ineffective assistance of counsel during trial and the original penalty phase. Defendant's present motion alleges ineffective assistance of counsel at resentencing. Unless petitioner shows justification for failure to raise the present issue in the first petition, the second successive petition pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 may be dismissed as an abuse of procedure. Witt v. State, 465 So.2d 510 (Fla.1985). In addition, where the initial motion for post-conviction relief raises the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the trial court may summarily deny successive motions raising additional grounds for that ineffectiveness. Christopher v. State, 489 So.2d 22 (Fla.1986). Since the present motion does not allege that Defendant was precluded from asserting the issue of ineffectiveness of counsel at the resentenc-ing in the initial motion, the allegation should have been raised in the initial motion. Tafero v. State, 524 So.2d 987 (Fla.1987). Based on the foregoing, that Defendant has shown no issue in the first motion, the second successive motion presently before the Court is inappropriate for consideration and must be summarily denied.
Spaziano appeals the trial court's denial, arguing that he was denied the right to effective assistance of counsel because his lawyer, at both the resentencing hearing and the initial rule 3.850 motion, failed to introduce mitigating evidence, most of which concerned Spaziano's mental condition. We affirm the trial court.
Spaziano's motion is procedurally barred for the reasons set forth in the trial court's order. Alternatively, and in any event, the evidence which Spaziano contends was not introduced is merely cumulative. At the original trial, the jury recommended that Spaziano be given a life sentence based in all probability on evidence of Spaziano's mental condition. On resentenc-ing, the trial judge, after properly considering additional evidence which was not presented to the jury, overrode the jury's recommendation and imposed a death sentence. The additional evidence included a prior violent felony conviction and a pretrial sentencing report, which revealed the automobile accident which Spaziano was involved in and the accident's effect on his mental condition. That aspect of Spazi-ano's condition has been before this Court previously, as is clearly articulated in Justice McDonald's dissent, in which he stated: "After all, Spaziano was known as 'Crazy Joe.' When he was 20 years old he was involved in a serious accident. Ever since then he has not been 'normal.' The jury could well find that he was entitled to the statutory mental mitigating factors." 433 So.2d at 512 (McDonald, J., dissenting). Additionally, this evidence was before this Court in Spaziano's initial rule 3.850 motion. 489 So.2d at 721. We hold that, under the principles set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), Spaziano's counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel either at resentencing or at the initial rule 3.850 motion.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's denial of Joseph Robert Spaziano's rule 3.850 motion.
It is so ordered.
EHRLICH, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW and GRIMES, JJ., concur.
McDONALD, J., concurs with an opinion.
KOGAN, J., dissents with an opinion, in which BARKETT, J., concurs.