Case Name: Rufus Martin v. The State
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1904-06-24
Citations: 47 Tex. Crim. 29
Docket Number: No. 2830
Parties: Rufus Martin v. The State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Criminal Reports
Volume: 47
Pages: 29–35

Head Matter:
Rufus Martin v. The State.
No. 2830.
Decided June 24, 1904.
1. —Charge of the Court—Murder—Manslaughter.
Where the evidence showed that the defendant was guilty of murder upon express malice, there was no necessity to charge on manslaughter in connection with murder in the second degree, the latter being justified upon the circumstantial evidence in the case.
2. —Jury and Jury law—Conscientious Scruples.
Where three jurors were excused for cause by the State, on account of conscientious scruples to inflict the death penalty in case of circumstantial evidence, there was no error.
3. —Same—Conclusions Established—Bill of Exceptions.
Where the bill of exceptions fails to show whether the jurors, claimed to have been subject to challenge for cause, on account of having conclusions established were peremptorily challenged or whether they sat upon the jury, the same shows no error.
4. —Evidence—Murder in Perpetration of Robbery.
Where the evidence shows that according to defendant’s confessions that he was with T. and the latter shot deceased from ambush with defendant’s pistol and that the killing was done for the purpose of robbery and evidently well planned, the same sustains the conviction and the death penalty.
ON REHEARING.
5. —Charge of the Court—Accomplice Testimony.
Where the evidence showed that defendant could not be guilty of a lesser degree of culpable homicide than murder, it was not error to charge that the ques tion of accomplice depended upon the fact whether the killing by the accomplice constituted murder and there was no necessity to allude to other character of culpable homicide, there being no exception that the charge was on the weight of the evidence.
6.—Same—Killing After Bobbery—Express Malice.
If as a matter of fact appellant robbed deceased by the use of a pistol and killed him to destroy his testimony and the evidence of his crime of robbery, it would be murder upon express malice and the jury could not have been misled by the court’s charge.
Appeal from, the District Court of Tarrant. Tried below before Hon. Irby Dunlcin.
Appeal from a conviction of murder in the first degree; penalty, death.
In addition to the facts stated in the opinion, and among the many circumstances in evidence, it was shown that defendant and Jordan Thompson had been picking cotton for the deceased, Charles Swackhammer, and on the day before the homicide had a conversation with deceased, in which the latter told them that he intended to take his cotton to market at Arlington the following day; that he would take it that day, if it were not so late; that he feared returning home at night, suggesting the thought that he feared being robbed. It was shown that defendant and Thompson lived a few miles probably from deceased at one Brockman’s, where they went Tuesday, staying there that night, and that defendant left Brockman’s in the forenoon of the next day, saying he was going pecaning, or to Dallas, and carried his pistol, which was afterwards found on him. That deceased started to Arlington with his cotton Wednesday morning, was seen there, sold his cotton and was returning home, when defendant was seen with him in deceased’s wagon, standing or sitting behind him. That they were seen together that way, along the road by several persons and at Culp’s store about dark; that there deceased got out of his wagon, went into the store and bought a few dollars’ worth of groceries, and took some $40 or $50 in money, mostly greenbacks, out of his pocket, in making payment for the groceries, and then put the rest of the money back into his pocket; that defendant was seen looking at deceased when he handled and showed the money, but that defendant remained in the wagon; that deceased handed defendant 45 cents, which was a balance due him for picking cotton; that defendant inquired of deceased when he should drive on, and the latter replied that he would go on in a few moments; that they left together as they had come, in the wagon of deceased; they were seen together in the same way on the road to the home of deceased within a mile or two of said home, and a short time before the wagon and team reached the house of the deceased with the dead body of deceased. Shortly before the team reached the house of deceased, three shots were heard in the direction, where was also heard the rumbling of a wagon on the road over which deceased was going home; also cries of distress and the moving of a wagon and team towards the house of deceased; then the cries of the "wife of deceased as she discovered her husband’s dead body in his wagon when it reached home, which was early on Wednesday night of the killing.
The State also introduced in evidence threats of defendant against deceased, his contradictory statements with reference to the murder; his admission that he was in the wagon of deceased; his statement that he saw Thompson fire the shot at deceased out of the cane; that he divided with Thompson the money they took from deceased; also his contradictory statements as to where he got the money found on him; also contradictory statements of defendant as to his pistol, etc.
Jas. S. Davis and W. T. Simmons, for appellant..
Howard Martin, Assistant Attorney-General, for the State.

Opinion:
DAVIDSON, Presiding Judge.
The extreme penalty of the law was given appellant by the jury under a charge of murder. He discusses two errors as grounds for reversal: first, the court's charge defining malice and murder; second, in sustaining State's challenge for cause to three jurors who stated on their voir dire they had conscientious scruples in regard to inflicting the death penalty in a case of circumstantial evidence. The definition of murder in both degrees and malice express and implied are given in the stereotyped form, such as has been held by the decisions of this State to be proper. The criticism seems to center itself upon the following excerpt from the charge: "You are further instructed that implied malice is that malice which the law infers from or imputes to certain acts; that is to say, if the fact of an unlawful killing is established by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, and there are no facts or circumstances in evidence which establish express malice, and none which tend to justify, mitigate or excuse the killing or which reduce the same to manslaughter, then the law implies malice, and such killing would in that event be murder in the second degree." The court nowhere defines manslaughter, adequate cause or sudden passion. It is urged that because the court did not define manslaughter, the definition of murder in the second degree is not sufficient, and we are referred to Thomas v. State, 7 Texas Ct. Rep., 818. That case is not in point. The court in this case did not instruct the jury that murder in the second degree was a killing on a sudden transport of passion without adequate cause, nor was it necessary that such a charge should have been given. There are no facts upon which to predicate passion of any sort, either with or without adequate cause The deceased was shot in his wagon in the back by appellant or Jordan Thompson, or both. There were no facts calling for a charge on passion with or without adequate cause, and we are led to believe the reason the court gave in charge murder in the second degree was by reason of the fact that it was a case of circumstantial evidence. There were no witnesses to the homicide except the perpetrators. The jury could not have possibly been misled or the defendant's legal rights in any way jeopardized by omitting all allusion to manslaughter. As applicable to the facts of the ease we believe the court's, charge is correct; and it is only to the facts we can look in determining the legality or illegality of a charge.
In regard to the exception in the court's action permitting the county attorney to challenge three jurors who had conscientious scruples against inflicting the death penalty in cases of circumstantial evidence, we say that the ruling is correct. Bills of exception show that each juror when questioned on his voir dii'e stated he had no conscientious scruples about inflicting the death penalty. This was in reply to the general question. The county attorney then asked if they would inflict the death penalty in case of circumstantial evidence," or did they have conscientious scruples in regard to inflicting the death penalty in cases of circumstantial evidence. Each answered they had such scruples. Whereupon the court sustained the cause for challenge. This ruling was correct. Franklin v. State, 51 S. W. Rep., 951. The statute does not limit the cause of challenge upon this ground to cases of positive or direct evidence. It applies with equal force to cases of circumstantial evidence, and the State is as much entitled to have the jury free of conscientious scruples in regard to inflicting the death penalty in cases of circumstantial evidence as in cases of direct or positive evidence. There are also some bills of exception to overruling cause of challenge urged by appellant to certain of the jurors claimed by him subject to cause for challenge on account of having a conclusion established in their minds as to the guilt or innocence of defendant. These bills fail to show whether the jurors were peremptorily challenged or whether they sat upon the jury. Presumably they were peremptorily challenged and were not upon the jury, for the court certifies that he extended, to appellant three additional peremptory challenges. The bills do not show any error. No objectionable juror is shown to have been on the jury.
It is ^Jso urged that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. As before stated, while the evidence is circumstantial, still it is of a very cogent character. Whoever committed the homicide is guilty of murder in the first degree, and the facts tend most cogently to show appellant did the killing. The defense sought to cast the killing upon Jordan Thompson. He was used as a witness upon the stand, and proved an alibi, which was corroborated by other witnesses. Appellant admits practically that the killing was done with his pistol. He states himself, as did the other witnesses, that he was riding in the wagon with deceased for some distance and shortly before the homicide. He testified that he got out of the wagon and that Jordan Thompson borrowed his pistol. Statements of appellant were introduced showing that while he was with Thompson that Thompson shot deceased from ambush from a cane patch. The killing was for the purpose of robbery and evidently well planned. We are of opinion that the evidence- sustains the conviction, and the judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.