Case Name: BRYANT v. BRANNEN
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1989-09-05
Citations: 180 Mich. App. 87
Docket Number: Docket No. 111708
Parties: BRYANT v BRANNEN
Judges: Before: Holbrook, Jr., P.J., and Gillis and Gribbs, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 180
Pages: 87–110

Head Matter:
BRYANT v BRANNEN
Docket No. 111708.
Submitted September 20, 1988, at Lansing.
Decided September 5, 1989.
Leave to appeal applied for.
Dale A. Bryant, Sr., a tenant in an apartment building in which numerous criminal activities had occurred, including a prior shooting, drug dealing, and breakings and enterings, was shot by Gene Blakely, the apartment manager, who lived directly across the hall from Bryant. At the time of the shooting, the individuals were standing in their respective apartments. Bryant was paralyzed from the chest down as a result of the shooting and eventually his legs were amputated. The two men had gotten into an argument concerning Bryant’s alleged tampering with a fire escape door. Bryant testified that he had retreated into his apartment and had returned to close the door to his apartment when he was shot. Blakely told the police that Bryant had threatened him and then gone into his apartment. Blakely thought Bryant went after a weapon and he got a rifle and shot Bryant. Blakely reported the incident and turned himself in to the police. He later fled the jurisdiction. Bryant and others filed suit against C. J. Brannen, the owner of the apartment building, and Blakely in Wayne Circuit Court, claiming, inter alia, that Brannen should have provided security guards to protect Bryant from the assault by Blakely and that Brannen, Blakely’s employer, was liable for Blakely’s assault under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Witnesses testifying on behalf of Brannen stated that Blakely was fixing the fire escape door and told Bryant not to remove the lock on the door and that Bryant then threatened to kill Blakely and returned with a pistol in his hand. Blakely then shot Bryant. Brannen testified that he did not know that Blakely had a rifle and there was no evidence that Blakely was authorized to carry a rifle or had carried a rifle while performing his duties. Blakely’s rifle was the only weapon recovered by the police. The trial court, Susan D. Borman, J., denied Brannen’s motion for a directed verdict, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiffs, finding that Brannen was negligent in failing to provide security guards and that Blakely was acting within the scope of his employment when he assaulted Bryant. The court denied Brannen’s subsequent motions for remittitur, a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or a new trial. Brannen appealed. The Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion per curiam, affirmed the trial court’s decision. Brannen sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, which, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration in light of Williams v Cunningham Drug Stores, Inc, 429 Mich 495 (1988). 431 Mich 864 (1988).
References
Am Jur 2d, Landlord and Tenant §§ 805 et seq.; Master and Servant §§ 404 et seq.
Landlord’s liability for injury or death due to defects in areas of building (other than stairways) used in common by tenants. 65 ALR3d 14.
On remand, the Court of Appeals held:
1. Blakely shot Bryant while they were in their respective apartments. Thus, a common area under Brannen’s control was involved only to the extent that a bullet flew through the common hallway. Given this fact, Brannen had no duty to provide security guards to protect Bryant from the assault by Blakely. A landlord may be liable for foreseeable criminal acts which are facilitated by his failure to keep the physical premises under his control, i.e., common areas, reasonably safe or in good repair, but has no duty to provide the tenants police protection from the foreseeable criminal acts of other tenants. To hold otherwise would shift the duty of police protection from the government to the private sector, which would amount to advocating that members of the public resort to self-help, and that would contravene public policy.
2. Blakely was not acting within the scope of his employment as a matter of law when he used deadly force upon Bryant, therefore Brannen is not liable under the theory of respondeat superior.
3. The circuit court’s denial of Brannen’s motion for a directed verdict is reversed.
Reversed.
Holbrook, Jr., P.J., dissented. He would hold that Bryant presented a viable theory of recovery supported by sufficient proofs to support the verdict of the jury and that the trial court correctly denied Brannen’s motion for a directed verdict on the issue whether Brannen had a duty to take additional security measures, such as providing trained security personnel, to protect tenants from the criminal activities of third parties, regardless of whether those third parties were other tenants or intruders. He would also hold that Brannen’s liability under a theory of respondeat superior for an employee’s intentional tort presented a jury question able to withstand a motion for a directed verdict. He would affirm the circuit court’s denial of Brannen’s motion for a directed verdict.
1. Landlord and Tenant — Criminal Acts — Police Protection.
A landlord may be liable for foreseeable criminal acts which are facilitated by his failure to keep the physical premises under his control, i.e., common areas, reasonably safe or in good repair, but he has no duty to provide tenants with police protection from the foreseeable criminal acts of other tenants.
2. Master and Servant — Torts — Respondeat Superior.
An employer is liable for the intentional tort of his employee if the tort is committed in the course and within the scope of the employee’s employment; if the employee does the act while engaged in the employer’s work but is without authority to do so, the employer is not liable.
3. Master and Servant — Criminal Acts — Scope of Employment.
An act may be within the scope of employment although consciously criminal or tortious; the fact that the employee intends a crime, especially if the crime is of some magnitude, is considered in determining whether or not the act is within the employment, since the employer is not responsible for acts which are clearly inappropriate to or unforeseeable in the accomplishment of the authorized result; the employer can reasonably anticipate that employees may commit minor crimes in the prosecution of the business, but serious crimes are not only unexpected but in general are in nature different from what employees in a lawful occupation are expected to do.
4. Master and Servant — Torts — Respondeat Superior — Landlord and Tenant.
The owner of an apartment building is not liable under a theory of respondeat superior for the shooting of one of his tenants by his building manager and fellow tenant of the victim where the shooting was not an act within the scope of the building manager’s employment.
Becker & Van Cleef, P.C. (by Frank G. Becker), for plaintiffs.
Berkley, Rudick & Chernikov (by Stuart M. Rudick), for defendant.
Before: Holbrook, Jr., P.J., and Gillis and Gribbs, JJ.

Opinion:
Gillis, J.
Plaintiff Dale A. Bryant, Sr., (hereinafter plaintiff), testified that on Sunday evening, May 30, 1982, he was working on his own door while standing in his apartment. Plaintiff was making noise and defendant Blakely, the apartment manager, who lived directly across the hall from plaintiff, opened his apartment door and said: "Don't mess with that door." Plaintiff asked: "What door?" Blakely repeated: "Don't mess with that door." Plaintiff believed that Blakely was talking about the fire escape door, which was locked and boarded up. Plaintiff continued to work on his own door. Blakely then said: "I'm not scared of you." Plaintiff did not know what Blakely was talking about. Blakely then said: "Wait a minute." Blakely then went into his apartment and returned to his doorway with a rifle at his side. Plaintiff retreated into his apartment, but realized that he had left the door open. When plaintiff went to close the door he was shot in his own apartment's hallway which led to the door. Plaintiff was paralyzed from the chest down and eventually his legs were amputated.
Plaintiff testified:
I don't think the guy [Blakely] was in his right mind. I don't think he was sober. I think he was drunk or high . I haven't [sic] provoked the guy before.
Plaintiff denied having a gun.
Plaintiff also testified that numerous criminal activities had occurred in the building, including a prior shooting, drug dealing, and breakings and enterings.
Two unidentified witnesses carried plaintiff into his living room after the shooting. Only Blakely's rifle was recovered by the police.
Blakely told police that he was nailing the fire escape door closed and that plaintiff kept removing the nails. They got into an argument. Plaintiff threatened Blakely and then plaintiff went into his apartment. Fearing plaintiff was retrieving a weapon, Blakely got his rifle and shot plaintiff. The officers testified that Blakely did not appear intoxicated. While Blakely reported the incident and later turned himself in, he subsequently fled the jurisdiction.
On the other hand, defendant-appellant Brannen's witnesses testified that Blakely was fixing the fire escape door and told plaintiff not to remove the lock thereon. Plaintiff then threatened to kill Blakely. Plaintiff returned with a pistol in his hand and Blakely shot plaintiff.
Defendant Brannen (hereinafter defendant), the apartment building owner, testified that Blakely was a handyman and noted that many tenants, including plaintiff and his wife, had performed tasks in the building for pay. Defendant did not know that Blakely had a rifle and there was no evidence that Blakely was authorized to carry a rifle or had carried a rifle while performing his duties.
Plaintiff sued defendant, claiming that he should have provided security guards to protect plaintiff from the assault by Blakely, defendant's employee and plaintiff's fellow tenant, and that defendant was liable for Blakely's assault under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
The trial court denied defendant's motion for a directed verdict on these theories. The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff for $2,500,000, finding that defendant was negligent in failing to provide security guards and that Blakely was acting within the scope of his employment when he assaulted plaintiff. The jury awarded plaintiff's wife $12,500 and his son $50,000. The trial court denied defendant's subsequent motions for remittitur, a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or a new trial.
Defendant then appealed as of right, claiming the trial court should have granted his motion for a directed verdict. This Court affirmed. Bryant v Brannen, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, decided February 19, 1988 (Docket No. 93843). Defendant then appealed to our Supreme Court, which remanded for reconsideration in light of Williams v Cunningham Drug Stores, Inc, 429 Mich 495; 418 NW2d 381 (1988). Bryant v Brannen, 431 Mich 864; 428 NW2d 346 (1988). In its order, our Supreme Court stated:
This order should not be understood as precluding reconsideration of the issue involving the doctrine of respondeat superior should the Court of Appeals desire to do so. [Id. at 864-865.]
In reviewing the trial court's denial of a motion for a directed verdict, this Court examines the testimony and all legitimate inferences that may be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Butt v Giammariner, 173 Mich App 319, 323; 433 NW2d 360 (1988). If there are material issues of fact upon which reasonable minds could differ, the matter is properly submitted to the jury. Id.
Plaintiff's first theory of recovery was that defendant as a landlord had a duty to provide security guards to protect plaintiff from the assault by Blakely, plaintiff's fellow tenant and defendant's employee.
In Johnston v Harris, 387 Mich 569; 198 NW2d 409 (1972), our Supreme Court held that the defendant landlord was not entitled to a directed verdict where the tenant plaintiff presented evidence that he was robbed and assaulted by a youth who was lurking in the poorly lit, unlocked vestibule of the defendant's apartment building. The plaintiff presented expert testimony linking poor lighting and night crime. The Court ruled that, while an intentional crime is a superseding cause of harm where a person's negligence created a situation which afforded a third person the opportunity to commit the crime, such a crime is not a superseding cause of the plaintiff's harm if the negligent actor at the time of his conduct realized or should have realized the likelihood that such a situation might be created and that a third person might avail himself of the opportunity to commit such a crime. Id. at 574 (quoting 2 Restatement Torts, 2d, §448, p 480).