Case Name: UNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. Gwendolyn E. JOHNSON
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1973-02-14
Citations: 475 F.2d 977
Docket Number: No. 71-1715
Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. Gwendolyn E. JOHNSON.
Judges: Before BAZELON, Chief Judge, and McGOWAN and TAMM, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 475
Pages: 977–983

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. Gwendolyn E. JOHNSON.
No. 71-1715.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued June 7, 1972.
Decided Feb. 14, 1973.
As Amended May 11, 1973.
James A. Adams, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Thomas A. Flannery, U. S. Atty., at the time the brief was filed, John A. Terry and Brian W. Shaughnessy, Asst. U. S. Attys., were on the brief, for appellant.
Edwin C. Brown, Alexandria, Va., for appellee.
Before BAZELON, Chief Judge, and McGOWAN and TAMM, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
McGOWAN, Circuit Judge:
The issue raised by the Government's appeal in this prosecution for federal narcotics offenses, 26 U.S.C. § 4704(a) and 21 U.S.C. § 174, is the correctness of the trial court's pretrial suppression of evidence of narcotics found in appellee's purse. We hold that the order granting appellee's motion to suppress was in error; and we reverse.
I
On or about January 5, 1971, members of the Narcotics Branch of the Metropolitan Police Department obtained a warrant authorizing a search for narcotics of the entire apartment of one James L. Stewart, subsequently indicted as a codefendant with appellee. The warrant was issued upon an affidavit which recited that within the preceding two weeks information had come to the police from a reliable informant that narcotics were being sold in Stewart's apartment, and that on January 5 an agent of the Department had purchased narcotics at that apartment. In the early morning of January 6, approximately seven members of the Department gained access to Stewart's apartment building and, leaving some of their party outside, proceeded to his apartment, knocked, and announced their identity and purpose. The officers waited nearly a minute, then heard a noise within the apartment followed by the sound of a window breaking, whereupon they forced the door open.
The first officers to gain entry observed Stewart apparently attempting to escape from the apartment through the bedroom window. He was apprehended, and, after the bedroom search revealed narcotics, was arrested. Other officers had entered the living room, where appellee was found sitting on the couch. A purse, which was on a coffee table in front of the couch, was immediately searched, yielding narcotics, and appellee was placed under arrest. Before entering Stewart's apartment, the police detail had been advised that appellee was a visitor on the premises.
The District Court granted appellee's motion on the ground, as stated by it on the record, that the search of the purse preceded her formal arrest, and therefore could not be sustained as incident thereto. Since, in ruling on her motion, the trial judge assumed probable cause existed to arrest appellee prior to the search of her purse, we need not inquire into its existence even though the crime for which he believed she could be arrested is unclear. Neither do we find it necessary to pursue the question of whether the formal placing under arrest of a criminal suspect is invariably a condition precedent to a lawful search incident to an arrest, although we note the trial judge's view is at variance with the decisions in this circuit. What we do find is that, in the circumstances disclosed by this record, the search of appellee's purse was lawful as having been within the scope of the warrant to search the premises.
II
The prohibition of the Fourth Amendment is against "unreasonable" searches and seizures. In determining whether under the circumstances of this case the search of appellee's purse violated that standard, the protection of individual privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment must be weighed against the public interest in effective law enforcement with respect to narcotics violations. The specific question for resolution is whether the scope of the search warrant embraced an object in the ap- . parent possession nf_a person not an oceqpflnt. n.f_t.ha — n.ramises searched. Although the District Court did not expressly consider this issue, its suppres sion of the evidence contained the implicit holding that appellee's purse fell without the warrant.
Turning first to the privacy element of the question, we note that the search was of a purse resting separately from the person oUits owner. As such, it was not being "worn" by appellee and thus did not, constitute an extension of her person so as to make the search one of her person. United States v. Teller, 397 F.2d 494 (7th Cir. 1968); United States v. Riccitelli, 259 F.Supp. 665 (D.Conn.1966). The invasion of appellee's privacy was therefore of a lesser degree than if she had been subjected to a search of her clothing or of objects being held by her.
On the Government's side of the balance lies both the information presented in the affidavit supporting the warrant, indicating that Stewart's apartment was a place where narcotics were sold as well as stored; and the delay, the suspicious noises that preceded the executing officers' entry into the apartment, and the apparent effort of Stewart to escape through the bedroom window, all suggesting attempts to thwart discovery of the illegal activity that the police suspected was being carried out on the premises. With emphasis on the limited nature of the circumstances presented, we hold that the search of appellee's purse was consistent with the demands of the Fourth Amendment. Under these facts, the police could reasonably have — h&Ueved that items sought and described in the warrant naü peen concealed in the nurse. and, notwithstanding appellee's status as a visitor on the premises, could have searched the purse in nnrsm.t.of items for winch the warrant issued
In Walker v. United States, 117 U.S.App.D.C. 151, 327 F.2d 597, 600 (1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 956, 84 S.Ct. 1635, 12 L.Ed.2d 500 (1964), this court permitted the search of a wallet and bag held by one who shared occupancy of the residence searched under authority of a warrant, holding that a contrary result "would be to suggest that a warrant to search premises may be frustrated by the device of simply picking up the guilty object and holding it in one's hand." Similarly here, frustration of the warrant's purpose should not be permitted where the facts reveal that to be the likely result were the purse not searched. See Clay v. United States, 246 F.2d 298, 304 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 863, 78 S.Ct. 96, 2 L.Ed.2d 69 (1957); Nicks v. United States, 273 A.2d 256 (D.C.Ct.App.1971); and dictum in United States v. Festa, 192 F.Supp. 160, 163 (D.Mass.1960) (Wyzanski, J.); State v. Wise, 284 A.2d 292, 294 (Del.Sup.Ct.1971).
Accordingly, we reverse the District Court's order of suppression, and remand the case for trial.
It is so ordered.
. While the record is silent concerning the trial judge's thoughts on this matter, at oral argument appellant asserted that the crime thought to be involved was presence in an illegal establishment. 22 D.O.Code § 1515.
. United States v. Brown, 150 U.S.App.D.C. 113, 463 F.2d 949 (1972). Where circumstances constituted lawful detention amounting to arrest, we had earlier held that "[e]ven if the formal arrest was not made until after the search, the search will be upheld so long as there is probable cause for an arrest before the search is begun." Bailey v. United States, 128 U.S.App.D.C. 354, 389 F.2d 305, 308 (1967).
. It was also a reasonable belief that, in light of the affidavit, appellee might-have been a customer who had purchased narcotics and planed.them ip her purse. The warrant was issued on allegations that the apartment was a place where narcotics were being sold; and the purposes of the warrant would seem to include the seizure of narcotics still on the premises but which had been sold there to a customer.
. The ADI Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure § 220.3(5) (Official Draft No. 1, 1972) states that the scope of a search warrant shall be only such as is "reason-n.hhi mer.ps.in,rn t.o discover the things specified therein." (emphasis added). In this case the opening of appellee's purse was so necessary for the discovery of the narcotics which were tlie supject or-the search warrant.
. Our purposeful emphasis on the precise factual context of this case reflects our view that the narcotics located in the apartment (in purses or elsewhere) — and not appellee — was the central focus of the search authorized by the warrant. The facts shown by the warrant and affidavit as to the narcotics-retailing nature of the premises warranted the construction of the scope of the warrant placed upon it by the police. Indeed, our failure to uphold that construction would divert the vital law enforcement effort against narcotics traffic here involved to alternatives unwise from both a practical and legal standpoint. To obtain a warrant permitting the search of anyone found on the premises would, apart from being unnecessary in these circumstances, appear to be unsupportable as lacking the particularity constitutionally required, see, e. g., Wise, supra, 284 A.2d at 294. To justify inclusion in the warrant of appellee by name would require an investigative effort not reasonably to be expected of officers seeking only the narcotics owned and retailed by, and the narcotics paraphernalia of, the occupant. And to detain appellee and preserve the status quo while a warrant to search the purse was obtained would constitute a more serious invasion of appellee's privacy than did the search at issue. Contrary to the holding of the court in Nicks, supra, 273 A.2d at 258, which permitted evidence to be seized from the hand of the appellant there on authority of a warrant to search the premises for narcotics and the likelihood appellant would destroy the evidence sought— which the dissent here would seem to uphold as an exemption from the warrant requirement, see note 9 infra — we hold only that the purse, not appellee's person, was embraced by the warrant.