Case Name: The Commonwealth v. Nix
Court: General Court of Virginia
Jurisdiction: Virginia
Decision Date: 1841-06
Citations: 11 Leigh 636
Docket Number: 
Parties: The Commonwealth v. Nix.
Judges: CHRISTIAN, J., said, he concurred in the opinion of judge Lomax on the preliminary point.
Reporter: Virginia Reports
Volume: 38
Pages: 739–741

Head Matter:
The Commonwealth v. Nix.
June. 1841.
General Court — Adjournment of Question to — When Proper. — Upon the trial of an indictment for felony, prisoner’s counsel moves an Instruction to the jury, in effect, that the evidence adduced lor the prosecution does notprove that the crime charged in the indictment was consummated, and therefore they ought to find for the prisoner; the court, with assent of the prisoner and of the attorney for the commonwealth, adjourns the questions arising on the motion to this court, discharges the jury, and continues the cause till the next term: EQsld, upon construction of statute 1 Key. Code, ch. 69, § 14, it was regular to adjourn the questions to this court, and the court ought to decide them.
Criminal Law — Free Negro — Conditional Sale — Effect-Statute — Case at Bar. — Upon an indictment on statute 1 Rey. Code, ch. Ill, § 38, for selling a free negro for a slave, the evidence of the sale is a written agreement, importing that prisoner sold the negro to yendee, for which he was to deliver and pay goods and money to vendor, hut vendee was to take the negro on trial for a month, and if at end thereof yendee likes him, vendee is to pay the price, and vendor to give a bill of sale; yendee pays a small part of purchase money; within the month negro runs away; and upon suspicion that he was a free negro, or had been stolen by the prisoner, the prisoner is apprehended within the month: Held, 1. that the sale of a free negro, to constitute the felony within the statute, must be an absolute sale; 3. that the contract in this case was in its terms a conditional sale, to be affirmed or annulled, at vendee’s option, within a month, but if alllrmed by him, the sale then became absolute, and the felony was complete; and 3. that such affirmance of the sale by the vendee may be proved, either by positive act of yendee, or by mere lapse of time without any act of yendee affirming or annulling the sale.
Case adjourned from the circuit superior court of Lee. Nix was indicted upon the statute 1 Rev. Code, ch. Ill, § 28, for feloni-ously selling and delivering to one Jones a negro man as and for a slave, who was at the time of the sale and delivery free, knowing the neg-ro man so sold to be free. He pleaded not guilty, and was put upon his trial at April term 1841.
Upon the trial, it was proved on the part of the prosecution, that the prisoner made a contract in writing with Jones, in the following words; “Article of an agreement made this 11th January 1841, Daniel Nix of one part and Stephen Jones of the other, that said Nix do sell to said Jones a certain negro called Dive ; witness, that said Jones gives said Nix a roan stud horse, a certain brown horse called Jack, and one saddle, and 20 dollars in store goods, and 200 dollars in lawful money of Virginia, and a carry all wagon, for said boy;- -which said Jones takes the said boy on trial for one month, and if said Jones likes the said boy at the end of the month, said Jones delivers the above named property to said Nix ; also said Nix binds himself to give a good bill of sale to said boy ; also said Nix insures said boy to be sound and clear of any impediment whatever. We witness our hands and seals the day and year above written ” (signed and sealed by both parties). That in pursuance thereof, the prisoner forthwith delivered the negro to Jones, who shortly afterwards, at the prisoner’s instance, advanced him about seven dollars on account of the price of the negro. 'That the negro remained with Jones about twenty days, and then ran away ; which, with other circumstances which Jones learned,- led him to suspect that the negro was either free, or had been- stolen by the prisoner previous to the sale to him-; and under this belief, Jones pursued the prisoner, who was then passing through the county of Lee, and apprehended him before the -expiration of the month. And that the prisoner voluntarily and frequently made the fullest confessions, saying among other things, that at the time of the sale to Jones, he knew the negro to be free. Whereupon, the prisoner’s counsel moved the court to instruct the jury, that if they should believe from the evidence, that the contract of sale of the negro as a slave, was a conditional contract, to be made binding or not. at the option of the vendee Jones at the expiration of one month from the date of .the conditional • contract, during which time Jones was to keep the negro on trial, and that before the month expired the negro ran away, and this prosecution was instituted; then, although the prisoner at the time of sale well knew the negro to be free, the sale was not an absolute sale, such as the statute required it should be to constitute the offence for which the prisoner was indicted ; and that the jury should find for the prisoner. And the court doubting as to the propriety of giving such instructions, with the prisoner’s assent, adjourned to this court for novelty and difficulty, the following questions — 1. Is the contract of the 11th January 1841 such an act as amounts to a sale within the meaning o.f the statute ? And 2. what instruction ought the court to give to t,he jury?’ And then, with the consent as well of the prisoner as of the commonwealth’s attorney, the, jury from rendering a verdict were discharged, and the case continued till the next term.
The principal case is cited In Briggs v. Com., 83 Va. 561.
1116 words of the statute are — “If any person shall hereafter be guilty of stealing or selling any free person for a slave, knowing the person so sold to be free, and shall be thereof lawfully convicted, the person so convicted shall undergo a confinement in the public jail and penitentiary house for a term not less than one nor more that ten years.’’ — Note in Original Edition.
The statute 1 Rev. Code, cli. 69, § 14, p. 23a, whereby it is provided, that the circuit superior courts, “ in any criminal case, may, with the consent of the person accused, adjourn a question of law to the general court, which may be there argued and decided though such accused person be not present.” — Note in Original Edition.

Opinion:
UPSHUR, J.,
delivered the resolution of the majority of the court. A preliminary point, not submitted by the circuit superior court, was examined by the judges in conference. The questions adjourned arose in the progress of the trial, and thereupon the jury were discharged, and the trial postponed till the next term. A majority of the judges -are of opinion, that the statute authorizes this course-of proceeding, although they disapprove it as both inconvenient and hazardous.
In answer-to the first question adjourned, this court is of opinion, that the contract between the prisoner Nix and Jones, set out in the record, is not, by the mere force of its terms, such an act as amounts-to a sale within the meaning of the statute. That contract is not a sale, but an agreement to sell, which the vendee had a right to affirm, or- annul, as he might think proper, at any time within the month allowed by its terms; and until it was so affirmed, the sale was incomplete, and no change of property was effected thereby. Whether it-was so affirmed or not, is a question for. the jury to determine upon the evidence which may be laid before them. Its affirmance may be proved, either by some positive act on the part of the vendee Jones shewing his election to affirm it, or by the mere lapse of the time • allowed in the contract, without any act on his part affirming or annulling it. I-f affirmed in either of those modes, it ceased to be conditional, and-became absolute ; the sale was thus rendered complete and perfect, and came within the provisions of the statute. This opinion affords a full answer to the second question adjourned.