Case Name: BOWEN v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1916-05-10
Citations: 186 S.W. 220
Docket Number: No 4065
Parties: BOWEN v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 186
Pages: 220–220

Head Matter:
BOWEN v. STATE.
(No 4065.)
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
May 10, 1916.)
Criminal Law <@=>1092(9) — Appeal—Bill oe Exceptions.
The bills of exception in a criminal case filed more than 90- days after the overruling of the motion for a new trial and the pronouncement of sentence, notwithstanding .two orders in the record each extending the time for filing 30 days, cannot be considered.
[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2803, 2857-2860; Dec. Dig. <@=>1092(9).]
Appeal from District Court, Grimes County; S. W. Dean, Judge.
Elias Bowen was convicted of murder, and he appeals.
Affirmed.
T. P. Buffington, of Anderson, and Carl T. Harper, of Madisonville, for appellant. O. C. McDonald, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

Opinion:
DAVIDSON, J.
Appellant was convicted of murder, his punishment being assessed at seven years' "confinement in the penitentiary. The statement of facts was filed within the time required by law, but the bills of exception were not. They, therefore, are not considered. The record with reference to the bills of exception shows that they were filed more than 90 days after the overruling of the motion for a new trial and pronouncing the sentence. This statement is made in view of the fact that the court lasted, over eight weeks. The bills of exception were filed more than 90 days after sentence was pronounced. There are two orders in the record for 30 clays, each extending the time in which to file the bills of exception, but these, computed together, do not bring the filing of the bills within the 90 days. In support of this see Carden v. State, 70 Tex. Cr. R. 271, 156 S. W. 683, Roberts v. State, 70 Tex. Cr. R. 588, 157 S. W. 1193, and Jones v. State, 73 Tex. Cr. R. 153, 165 S. W. 144.
There were no exceptions to the charge at the time it was read to the jury. In fact, there seems to be no particular criticism of tbe instructions of the court.
It is' contended that the jury was not authorized to find appellant guilty of murder and a consequent verdict of seven years in the penitentiary; that under the facts and the charge of the court appellant's conviction should have been of no higher offense than manslaughter. The evidence clearly raises the issue of manslaughter on account of the insulting conduct of the deceased toward the wife of the defendant. While the issue of manslaughter was'strongly presented by the defendant, the evidence for the state was sufficient to authorize the jury to find that his mind was not in such condition as demanded a conviction for manslaughter. That the jury could have done so is not questioned, yet the evidence justifies them in finding that his mind was not so influenced. The two issues were in the case, and we think sufficiently strong for the jury to have arrived at the verdict they did reach. We deem it unnecessary to recapitulate the evidence. It would serve no useful purpose to do so.
Finding no reversible error in the record as it is presented to ns, the judgment will be affirmed.