Case Name: CRINER v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1921-02-16
Citations: 229 S.W. 860
Docket Number: No. 6110
Parties: CRINER v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 229
Pages: 860–862

Head Matter:
CRINER v. STATE.
(No. 6110.)
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Feb. 16, 1921.
State’s Rehearing Granted March 9, 1921.
Further Rehearing Denied April 27, 1921.)
1. Forgery ©=334(6) — No variance because of words following signature in check offered in evidence.
In a prosecution for forging a check given in payment for a hat, there was no variance because the check offered in evidence bore the words “a satisfied customer” following the signature, as they were not a part of the instrument, and it was not necessary to incorporate them.
On State’s Motion for Rehearing.
2. Witnesses ©=3337(6) — Proof'that legal charge of theft has been preferred against defendant admissible to affect credibility.
Theft is an offense involving moral turpitude, and the fact that a legal charge thereof has been preferred against defendant is admissible as affecting her credibility as a witness.
3. Witnesses ©=3337(6)— Question as to number of times defendant had been charged in county court with theft held proper.
A question asked defendant on cross-examination as to how many times she had been charged in the county court with theft was proper, as she could only be charged in such court by complaint and information or indictment.
4. Witnesses ©=3337(5) — Arrest or mere charges of other offenses not admissible to affect defendant’s credibility.
Questions asked defendant on cross-examination as to mere arrests for other offenses or charges not- shown to be legal charges by complaint, information, or indictment are too general.
On Defendant’s Motion, for Rehearing.
5. Criminal law ©=31144(10) — No presumption that prosecutor’s question as to charges of other offenses was purposely improper.
Where the assistant district attorney asked defendant on cross-examination how many times she had been charged in the county court with theft, where the record was insufficient to show that the question was improper, it cannot be presumed on appeal that he was -purposely doing an improper thing in that there had been no legal charge filed against defendant.
Appeal from Criminal District Court, Tar-rant County; Geo. B. Hosey, Judge.
Mildred Criner was convicted of forgery, and she appeals.
Affirmed on rehearing.
Poulter & Koenig, of Fort Worth, for appellant.
C. M. Cureton, Atty. Gen., and Walace Hawkins, and Tom B. Beauchamp, Asst. Attys. Gen., for the State.

Opinion:
MORROW, P. J.
The conviction is for forgery and punishment fixed at confinement in the penitentiary for a period of three years.
The instrument purports to be signed "J. H. Campbell, 1514 Ba. Ave." As offered in evidence, under the signature, there appears the term "a satisfied customer." This does not constitute a variance. The words "a satisfied customer" are not a part of the instrument, and it is not necessary to incorporate them. Bishop's New Crim. Procedure, § 407; Young v. State, 40 S. W. 793; Branch's Ann. Penal Code, § 1409; Hennessy v. State, 23 Tex. App. 354, 5 S. W. 215.
From the evidence it appears that a young woman entered Mrs. Brown's Millinery Store and purchased a hat from one of the clerks, executing a check for $27.50, purported to be signed by J. H. Campbell, in payment of the hat. The- purchaser was unknown to the clerk and the others in the store. J. H. Campbell, who resided at 514 Bouisiana avenue, the address attached to the check, testified that it was not signed by him or under his authority. Two employees of the store testified to the identity of the appellant with the purchaser of the hat; the clerk claiming that her attention was drawn particularly to the purchaser by reason of an expensive dress that she wore. This testimony is relied upon by the state for the identification. It is not claimed that the hat was found in the possession of the appellant nor that she was the owner of the dress which was worn by the purchaser at the time of the transaction. Appellant, in her own behalf, testified, denying all connection with the matter.
In cross-examination, against appropriate objection, the appellant was required to testify that she had at one time within two years been arrested and brought into court for shoplifting, had been tried and nothing had been done about it., In many jurisdictions the testimony that a witness had been indicted or convicted of another offense is not received as discrediting evidence. Wig-more on Evidence, § 98S; Underhill on Criminal Evidence, § 245, p. 445; Wharton's Criminal Evidence, § 50.
In our state, where the accused testifies as a witness, the fact that he has been convicted or indicted for a felony or an offense involving moral turpitude may be proved for the purpose of impeachment or discrediting his testimony.
Broad as is our practice, it does not embrace the mere proof of arrest. If the state is not prepared at least to show that there was a prosecution legally established, it should not be permitted to prove that the accused had been arrested. Barkman v. State, 52 S. W. 71. "Mere accusations of felonies could not be used unless they had assumed the form of legal charges or complaints." Red v. State, 39 Tex. Cr. R. 422, 46 S. W. 408. Even where there has been a complaint filed, it is not always provable. Wright v. State, 63 Tex. Cr. R. 437, 140 S. W. 1105.
The appellant's denial of her identity should not in the instant ease have been burdened by the hurtful testimony that she had been arrested for another offense in the absence of proof that the detention was by virtue of some lawful process. In solving the sharply drawn issue of identity, the jury should have been confined to the relevant evidence. To what extent the damaging facts improperly received is reflected in the verdict adjudging this young woman guilty and assessing against her a penalty much in excess of the minimum cannot be determined. Its character was such as would probably prejudice her case. The presumption is that it did.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the cause remanded.
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