Case Name: THOMAS D. SATTERWHITE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. WILLIAM MELCZER et al., Defendants and Appellees
Court: Arizona Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arizona
Decision Date: 1890-04-18
Citations: 3 Ariz. 162
Docket Number: Civil No. 280
Parties: THOMAS D. SATTERWHITE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. WILLIAM MELCZER et al., Defendants and Appellees.
Judges: 
Reporter: Arizona Reports
Volume: 3
Pages: 162–175

Head Matter:
[Civil No. 280.
Filed April 18, 1890.]
[24 Pac. 184.]
THOMAS D. SATTERWHITE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. WILLIAM MELCZER et al., Defendants and Appellees.
1. Banks and Banking—Checks—Bsfusal to Pat—No Liability to Holder.—A bank is not liable to the holder of a cheek drawn by a general depositor for its refusal to pay the check, though it has sufficient funds of the drawer to pay the amount called for.
2. Executions—To.Whom Directed—Laws 1889, Sec. 2, p. 37, Construed—Bev. Stats. Ariz. 1887, Par. 1895, Bepealed—Bev. Stats. Ariz. 1887, Par. 512, Cited.—Statute, supra, provides that an execution must be directed to the sheriff of the county where it is served, and repeals the provision of the Bevised Statutes of Arizona of 1887, supra, which permitted its direction to constables. The “other officer” referred to in the act of 1889 refers to the provision of paragraph 512 of the Bevised Statutes of Arizona of 1887, which designates other officers who shall perform his duties in case of his disqualification.
Wright, C. J., dissenting.
3. Same—Levy—Upon Money—Acts 1889, p. 39, Sec. 9, Clause 2, Cited.—Under statute, supra, to make a valid levy upon money the officer must reduce it to possession.
Weight, C. J., dissenting.
4. Same—Same—Beturn—Binding upon Judgment Creditor.—Where an officer has made return of an execution stating that he has levied upon money in the hands of a bank belonging to the judgment debtor, Wise, the fact that such bank was a simple debtor to Wise and that he had no specific money in its hands as bailee cannot change the effect of the levy from one upon money to one upon a debt.
Weight, O. J., dissenting.
APPEAL from a judgment of the District Court of the First Judicial District in and for the County of Pima. William H. Barnes, Judge.
Affirmed.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Maxwell & Satterwhite, for Appellant.
No officer, except the one authorized by statute, can make a valid levy. The execution in this ease could only be served and levied by the sheriff. The said levy was attempted to be made by a constable and was void.
It is true that the writ itself was directed to the “sheriff or any constable,” but there was no statutory authority for the issuance of the writ. The Revised Statutes of 1887 (par. 1895) authorized the writ to be directed to a constable. But the execution was issued under the act of the last legislative assembly. (See Acts of 1889, p. 37.) Section 2 of that act provides that' the clerk shall direct the execution to the sheriff. That section, supplemented by sections 7, 22, and 24 of the same act, shows conclusively not only that the law was changed, but that it was intentionally changed, so that the service of an execution issued by the clerk was restricted to the sheriff. Hence any act of the constable in the attempted levy of said execution was necessarily void. The execution might as well have been directed to any other officer, or to a private individual.
If anything was levied on under this execution, as claimed by respondent, it would come within the general designation of personal property. No levy of an execution can be made upon personal property without taking actual possession of it. This is settled by.our statute, and by the decisions of all the states. Session Laws of 1889, p. 30, sec. 9; Rorer on Judicial Sales, sec. 1002, p. 329; 6 Wait’s Actions and Defenses, 752; Carey v. Bright, 58 Pa. St. 84; Westervelt v. Pickney, 14 Wend. 123, 28 Am. Dec. 516; Levi v. Shockley, 29 Ga. 710; Duncan’s Appeal, 37 Pa. St. 500; Brown v. Lane, 19 Tex. 203; Leach v. Pine, 41 Ill. 66, 89 Am. Dec. 375; Beekman v. Lansing, 3 Wend. 446, 20 Am. Dec. 707; Logsdon v. Spivey, 54 Ill. 104; Osborn v. Cloud, 23 Iowa, 108, 109, 92 Am. Dec. 413.
A general deposit of money in a bank is not subject to levy, because the depositor has no title to any specific pieces of money, but only a right to have an equal amount of money returned to him. 6 Wait’s Actions and Defenses, 752; Scott v. Smith, 2 Kan. 438; Carroll v. Cone, 40 Barb. 220; Freeman on Executions, see. 111, p. 197; McMillan v. Richards, 9 Cal. 366, 369, 418, 70 Am. Dec. 655, and note; Doyle v. Sleeper, 1 Dana, 531.
The right to seize and sell property on execution is coextensive only with the power to take and deliver possession. Campbell v. Leonard, 11 Iowa, 495; Osborn v. Cloud, 23 Iowa, 109, 92 Am. Dec. 413.
The officer must have the goods or property in his view and power. He should enter the store and take actual possession. He must assert his title to the property under execution, and his acts must be such that except for the protection of the execution he would be a trespasser. 6 Wait’s Actions and Defenses, 756, 757; Beekman v. Lansing, 3 Wend. 446, 20 Am. Dec. 707; Creen v. Burke, 23 Wend. 490; Westervelt v. Pickney, 14 Wend. 123, 28 Am. Dec. 516; Connah v. Dale, 23 Wend. 462.
In all cases there must be something more than a mere pen-and-ink levy. It is not sufficient that the officer make an inventory of the property and indorse the levy upon the writ. He must go where the property is. He must be where he can exercise control over it. He must do some act by reason of which he could be successfully prosecuted as a trespasser if it were not for the protection afforded by the writ. Freeman on Executions, sec. 260, p. 413; Goode v. Longmire, 35 Ala. 668, 76 Am. Dec. 309; Westervelt v. Pickney, 14 Wend. 123, 28 Am. Dec. 516; Minor v. Herriford, 25 Ill. 344; Beekman v. Lansing, 3 Wend. 450, 20 Am. Dec. 707; Davidson v. Waldron, 31 Ill. 120, 83 Am. Dec. 206; Bryan v. Bridges, 6 Tex. 141; Logsdon v. Spivey, 54 Ill. 104; Smith v. Niles, 20 Vt. 320, 49 Am. Dec. 782; Allen v. McCalla, 25 Iowa, 464, 96 Am. Dec. 56; Sheffield v. Key, 14 Ga. 528; Crawford v. Newell, 23 Iowa, 453; Levy v. Shockley, 29 Ga. 710; Newman v. Hook, 37 Mo. 207, 90 Am. Dec. 378; Gates v. Flint, 39 Miss. 408; Watts v. Cleveland, 3 E. D. Smith, 553; Douglas v. Orr, 58 Mo. 573.
To avoid the conclusion from the foregoing authorities, the appellant seeks to maintain that it was the debt due to Morgan R. Wise from said bank which the constable levied upon, and not the money which he had on deposit. The officer says in his return that he. levied On money—$1,233.91. • This concludes the appellees from claiming that anything else was levied on. As to the party who procured the levy, the return of the officer is an absolute verity. Freeman on Execution, 364; Hallowell v. Page, 24 Mo. 590; Allen v. Martin, 10 Wend. 300, 25 Am. Dec. 564; Bank v. Domigan, 10 Ohio, 220; Paxson’s Appeal, 49 Pa. St. 195; Brown v. Kennedy, 15 Wall. 597.
As long as the return remains in force, it is conclusive, either of its validity or invalidity. Freeman on Executions, 387, p. 653; Willington v. Gale, 13 Mass. 483; Williams v. Amory, 14 Mass. 28, 29.
The return cannot be supplemented or added to by parol evidence. Freeman on Executions, 365, p. 603.
The statutes of the territory provide for a levy on a debt by a garnishment proceeding, and in no other way.
The question as to whether or not the payee of a check can maintain an action on the check against the bank before the bank has accepted the check, does not arise in the case. The only person who could raise the question is the bank, and it has not done so.
Frank Hereford, for Appellees.

Opinion:
KIBBEY, J.
On the 24th of March, 1889, the appellees were copartners in the banking business at Nogales, Arizona, and had on general deposit, in the ordinary course of their business, $1,233.91, the money of one Morgan R. Wise. On that day, James Speedy, a constable of district No. 18 of Pima County, had in his hands an execution issued on a judgment rendered in the district court of Pima County, in favor of J. C. Waterman, against F. M. Yernon, S. B. Wise, and Morgan R. Wise, for $506, upon which there was due that amount, and accrued interest and costs. On the 25th of March the constable, as he testifies, levied upon $1,233.91 belonging to Morgan E. Wise, the same being held under an injunction issued out of the district court for Pima County; also notifying Melczer & Co. that, if that injunction was dissolved, that execution would hold good. This the constable says,' in response to a question asked him to detail all the circumstances of the service of the execution, was all he did. The officer did not take possession of the money. The constable indorsed upon the execution his return, which is as follows: "I hereby certify that I received the within execution on the twenty-fourth day of March, 1889, and served the same on the twenty-fifth day of March, 1889, by levying upon $1,233.91 in the hands of William Melczer & Co., at Nogales, Pima County, A. T., belonging to the within-named defendant, Morgan Wise; the above being amount under attachment and suit pending in district court, Pima County, A. T. [Signed] James Speedy, Constable, Precinct No. 18.'-' The execution was dated 20th March, 1889, and was returnable within ninety days. Nothing more was done under the writ. On the seventh day of June, 1889, Morgan E. Wise signed and gave to the appellant a check upon appellees for $642. On the 24th of June, 1889, the check was presented to appellees for payment, which was refused because of the levy, if levy it was, of the Waterman execution. Wise had at that time a credit of $642 with Melczer & Co. On the 26th of June, 1889, appellant began suit against appellees for $642. There was a trial by the court, and finding and judgment for the appellees.
This case presents some anomalous features. The complaint alleges that on the 24th of June, 1889, the appellees were indebted to appellants in the sum of $642.50; that on said day said sum of money was on deposit in appellees' bank, subject to appellant's order, and was due the appellant, and unpaid; and that appellant on said day drew on appellees, •and payment was refused. The complaint is insufficient to constitute a cause of action, upon the theory of plaintiff. The only legal inference to be drawn from it is that appellant had deposited $642.50 with appellees, and that appellees refused to honor his cheek for that sum. But the facts disclosed upon the trial, and before stated, negative any such inference. The trial proceeded upon the theory, without question, that appellant, as holder of a check drawn by Morgan R. Wise for $642.50 upon appellees, had a cause of action against appellees for their failure to pay the check upon presentation. It is not pretended that appellees accepted the check, or did any act equivalent to an acceptance. A bank is not liable to the holder of a check drawn by a general depositor for its refusal to pay the check, though the bank has sufficient funds of the drawer to pay the amount called for. Bank v. Millard, 10 Wall. 152; Bank v. Whitman, 94 U. S. 343; Ætna Nat. Bank v. Fourth Nat. Bank. 46 N. Y. 82, 7 Am. Rep. 314, and numerous other cases. And especially would the bank be not liable for its refusal to pay the check under circumstances such as those that existed in this case, where it must determine between the rights of rival claimants. It is unnecessary for us to proceed further to consider the question raised and discussed by counsel in their briefs. Two points, however, we will notice, as they may again arise in subsequent proceedings. Appellant contends that the levy of the execution was insufficient—1. Because it was addressed to, and served by, an officer unauthorized thereto by law; and 2. That the money levied upon by the officer was not reduced to possession by him.
Section 2 of the Acts of 1889 (p. 37) prescribes specifically that the execution must be directed to the sheriff of the county where it is to be served. This repeals the provision in paragraph 1895 of the Revised Statutes of 1887 that the execution might be directed to the sheriff or any constable of the county. Appellees argue that the mention of the "sheriff or other officer" in other parts of the act of 1889 evinces the intention of the legislature not to repeal the provision in the Revised Statutes of 1887. The "other officer" referred to in the act of 1889, we think, refers to the provision of section 512 of the Revised Statutes of 1887, which designates •other officers who shall perform the duties of sheriff in case of his disqualification by reason of interest. The attempted levy was insufficient. The money, to have constituted a valid levy, must have been reduced to possession by the officer. This is expressly required by statute. Clause 2, sec. 9, Acts 1889, p. 39. Appellees contend that the acts of the officer constitute a levy upon a debt due Morgan R. Wise. We think clearly not. The fact that the bank was a simple debtor of Wise, and that Wise had no specific money in the hands of the bank as bailee, cannot now operate to give a different effect to the acts of the officer. It simply shows that the officer was mistaken either as to the facts, or in the matter of his duty.
There are other questions presented, but, for the reason first stated, the judgment must be affirmed; and it is so ordered.
Sloan, J., concurs.