Case Name: Gaius Whitfield, appellant, v. The United States, appellees
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1876
Citations: 11 Ct. Cl. 444
Docket Number: 
Parties: Gaius Whitfield, appellant, v. The United States, appellees.
Judges: 
Reporter: United States Court of Claims Reports
Volume: 11
Pages: 444–461

Head Matter:
WHITFIELD’S CASE.
(9 Court of Claims R., 276 ; 92 U. S. R., 165.)
Gaius Whitfield, appellant, v. The United States, appellees.
On the claimant’s Appeal.
The claimant sells cotton to the Confederate government, receiving Confederate bonds in payment. The cotton remains m his possession, subject to delivery at the order of the Confederate government. The war ends, and the bonds, still in his hands, beeomeworthless. In September, 1865, a Treasury agent seizes the cotton. It is sold, and the proceeds paid into the Treasury. The claimant brings suitunder the Abandoned or captured property Act as owner, and asserts his right of stoppage in transitu, on the ground that the vendee became insolvent-while he, the vendor, retained possession. The court below decides that the claimant cannot assert a right of stoppage in transitu after the seizure of the property by the Government as successor of the Confederate States. Judgment for the defendants. The claimant appeals.
I. The Confederate States could acquire property, by purchase, to personal as well as real property.
II. Where one sold cotton to the Confederate government and received in payment bonds which passed from hand to hand as money, the sale was not on credit; it was complete when the bonds were accepted in payment; the title then passed, and the vendor, though in possession, was not in a position to assert the right of stoppage in transitu because of the insolvency of the Confederate government.
III. The law leaves parties to illegal contracts where it finds them, and affords relief to neither.
IV. The courts of this country will not relieve one who sold cotton to the Confederate government against oue who bought it from the Confederate government, and acquired possession; neither will they interfere in behalf of one who bought from the Confederate government, but did not acquire possession. When possession has been lost or acquired by reason of the illegal sale, no matter how, the courts will afford no relief to the injured party against his loss. A contract tainted with the vice of the rebellion cannot be enforced in the courts of this country.
The Reporters' statement of the case:
The following are the facts found by the court below:
The claimant was, during the war of the rebellion, a resident of Marengo County, Alabama.
While said war was in progress, he sold to the so-called Confederate States of America 177 bales of cotton, agreeing to accept in payment therefor eight-per-cent, bonds of said Confederate States, and retaining possession of the cotton, subject to future delivery. The price for which the cotton was sold was $15,651.60, which was paid to claimant by a cotton-agent of the confederate government, in January, 1865, on a certificate previously given to claimant, the terms of which do not appear. The said payment was made by delivering to claimant bonds of the description aforesaid to the amount of $15,500, and paying him $113.72 in confederate money, and charging him with $37.88 interest, which suras together made the aforesaid amount of the price of the cotton. Upon what the charge of interest was made against him does not appear. The said cotton-agent, at the time of said payment, made a memorandum on the bonds, showing the mode of the settlement. The claimant kept the bonds aforesaid in his possession, and at the trial of this case produced them in open court.
The said bonds were of the amounts, dates, and times of maturity, as follows : Fifteen, of five hundred dollars each, dated March 3, 1863, and payable to the bearer on the 1st day of July, 1868; one, of five hundred dollars, dated January 15,1863, payable to bearer on the 1st dayjjof January, 1880; and five, of one thousand dollars each, dated January 15, 1863, payable .to bearer on the 1st day of January, 1871; all with coupons attached for the interest.
The said cotton remained in claimant’s possession till about the 1st of September, 1865, when it was seized by Leslie Ellis, an assistant special agent of the Treasury Department of the United States. Upon the claimant’s remonstrating against the seizure, and appealing to the supervising special agent, that officer authorized said Ellis to contract with claimant for the putting of said cotton in good order and the delivery of two-thirds thereof to said Ellis for the United States, the claimant retaining one-third thereof. In pursuance of this authority, the said Ellis, on tbe 13fch of November, 1865, directed the claimant to deliver to the captain of the steamer Huntsman 118 bales of Government cotton, being so much of the said 177 bales, which was done the next day ; when the said Ellis delivered to claimant a receipt therefor in the following terms :
“Office Assistant Supervising- Special Agent,
u Demopolis, November 14, 1865.
“Received of Colonel Gaius Whitfield one hundred and eighteen (118) bales Government cotton, being two-thirds (§ds) of the amount of his indebtedness to the Government, as per contract with Joseph R. Dillin, supervising special agent; and Mr. Whitfield is now released of all obligations for cotton sold to the so-called confederate government.
“LESLIE ELLIS,
“Assistant Supervising Special Agent,
Treasury Department.”
The said 118 bales of cotton were shipped to New York, and sold by Simeon Draper, cotton-agent of the United States, and the net proceeds thereof, amounting to $14,817.26, paid into the United States Treasury.
Mr. P. Phillips for the appellant:
There was no legal authority for the seizure by the Treasury agents.
The act of 12th March, 1863, limited their powers to the colléction of captured and abandoned property. (12 Stats., 820.) "
The act of 2d July, 1864, defined abandoned property as that from which the “lawful owner is voluntarily absent, and engaged, either in arms or otherwise, in aiding or encouraging the rebellion.” Captured property was defined by the circular of Secretary Chase, 3d July, 1863, to be such “as has been seized or taken from hostile possession by the military or naval forces of the United States.” This latter definition is approved by this court in United, States v. Paddleford, (9 Wall., 537.)
Notwithstanding this, Secretary McCulloch instructed his . agents that whenever the descriptive lists captured showed property owned or controlled by the confederate government, such property should be taken, “ leaving all questions of right, title, or value of consideration to be adjusted by the Court of Claims, to which claimants of said property are referred by the act of Congress.” Again, in another instruction, he directs the collection of all cotton voluntary subscribed, as the Department holds that such a subscription is a dedication to the purposes of the rebellion, which forfeits the title of the owner. “ The property itself (says he) is offending, and should be taken wherever found.” (Acts and Begulations, pp. 152, 153.) In his report to Congress, 8th November, 1867, he states that he had desired to recall his agencies after the circular of 27th June, 1865, but it being urged that cotton belonging to the confederate government was scattered through the States, and it being also urged that property belonging to ‘the Confederate States should be considered as captured property, he considered it his duty to collect the same, and therefore continued the agency for this purpose. (Ex. Doc. 97, H. Eep., 39 Cong., 2d sess., p. 4.)
It is very clear there was no legal authority for the seizure in this case, without we may substitute the instructions of the Secretary for the provisions of the act of 1863. This was not only a proper subject for legislation, but one which, in fact, received the action of Congress in the Act 6th August, 1861. (12 Stats., 319.) To sell or give property to aid the rebellion, by the terms of this act, subjects it to “prize and capture wherever found,” and the President is directed to cause it to be “ seized, confiscated, and condemned.” With the provisions of this act the Treasury was no more concerned than the Department of the Post-Office.
This cotton having been illegally taken from the possession of the owner under the instruction of the Secretary, reserving “ all questions of right, title, &c., to the Court of Claims,” there should have been a judgment in this court for at least the net proceeds in the Treasury under the general jurisdiction of u implied contracts.”
The Secretary undoubtedly supposed he had the power to seize this cotton, and, if in this he was in error, ex equo et bono, the Government is bound to restore at least so much of it as remains in its possession: no proceedings for its seizure, confiscation, or condemnation having been made as the act requires.
That the claimant had owned the cotton, and that he was in possession of it at the time of seizure, are facts not denied. It is, however, insisted that he had sold the same to the confederate government and received its bonds, and thus (notwithstanding his uninterrupted possession) had been divested of all title as owner. Whether the confederate government was capable of becoming a purchaser of property is a question which I do not understand to have been decided by this court.
Assuming, however, that the confederate government was capable of entering into a contract of purchase recognizable in our courts, the question is then presented, whether property, the possession of which was never parted with by the owner, can be taken fro'm him by the United States after the overthrow and dissolution of that government, by virtue of such a contract of sale, the party in possession being then the holder of the securities given as the consideration of the purchase.
Milligan, J., who concurred with the Chief-Justice in the adverse decision, admits that this case, when viewed merely as a transaction between individuals, ought to entitle the claimant to a judgment. But he says, as “it involves, in some degree, the right of the National Government to succeed to the movable property controlled by the Confederate States for war purposes, I yield to the opinion just read by the Chief-Justice, but with h esitation and doubt.” We insist that there is no difference between the case put by us, where the contract of sale was made with an individual, and the case before^us, w7here the contract, under the same circumstances, was made with the confederate government.
When a government enters into a contract of purchase or other mercantile operation it puts off its sovereignty; and in such transactions its rights and obligations are regarded by the court as standing on no higher grounds than like transactions between individuals. (2 Story Com., § 1330; United States v. Buford, 3 Pet., 12; Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall., 232.)
If this cotton was neither captured nor abandoned, nor has been condemned under any act of Congress directing its confiscation, the Government of the United States can only claim title to it by virtue of its right to succeed to the property owned by the conquered government. This right must rest alone upon general principles of international law, as Congress has never acted on the theory that the confederate government ever had such an existence as would justify a title by succession. It was on this theory of succession or representation alone it was held that the suits brought in England by the United States against the agency of the confederacy could be maintained. The vice-chancellor, after announcing as a clear principle of public law that any government which de facto succeeds to any other, whether by revolution or restoration, conquest or reconquest, succeeds to all the public property of the displaced power, held that “this right is the right of succession. This right of representation is a right not paramount, but one derived through the displaced authority, and can only be enforced in the same way, and to the same extent, and subject to the same correlative obligations and rights, as if that authority had not been suppressed, and was itself seeking to enforce it.” (United States v. Prioleau, 2 Hem. & Miller, Chan. Cases, 560; United States v. McRae, 8 L. R. Eq., 75.)
It is proper now to advert to the principles which govern the contract of sale.
It is admitted that when terms of sale are agreed on, and everything the seller has to do with the goods is complete, the contract of sale becomes absolute between the parties, without actual payment or delivery, and the property, and the risk of accident of goods, vest in the buyer. When the sale is for cash, the vendee, though he acquires a right of property by the contract of sale, does not acquire the right of possession until he pays or tenders the price. When the sale is on a credit, the vendee in the absence of stipulation is entitled to immediate possession, as the right of possession and the right of property vest at once in him. But this doctrine is subject to the important qualification that this right of possession is not absolute, and will be defeated if the buyer becomes insolvent before he obtains the actual possession. For though the buyer has the property vested in him, so as to subject him to the risk of any accident, he has not an indefeasible right to the possession, and his insolvency without payment defeats that right, equally after the transitus has begun as before the seller has parted with the actual possession. (Bloxam v. Saunders, 6 B. & C., 941.)
Says Shaw, C. J., “there is- manifestly a marked distinction between those acts which as between vendor and vendee go to make a constructive delivery, and vest the property in the ven- dee, and that actual delivery which puts an end to the right of the vendor to hold the goods as security for the price. (Arnold V. Delano, 4 Cush., 38.) There is a strong leaning in the courts to enforce this right. “It is a leaning (says Lord Kenyon) in furtherance of justice.” (Northey v. Meld, 2 Esp., 613.) In another case it is said that the right is based “on the plain reason of justice and equity, that one man’s goods shall not be applied to the payment of another man’s debts.” (D1 Aguila v. Lambert, 2 Eden., 77.) Again it is declared that “this right does not depend on the fact that the vendor having parted with the lien, may get it back if he can stop the goods in tran-situ, but it is described as a right arising out of his relation to the goods, qua vendor, which is greater than a lien. Factors are entitled to liens, but they have no right of stoppage.” (Kin-loch v. Craig, 3 T. R., 119.) It may perhaps be proper to refer to the leading case of Mason v. Liolcbarrow, (1 H. BL, 357,) in which this right of the vendor is very fully described by Lord Loughborough, whose decision has been followed in England to this day, and is fully sustained by the American authorities. “I state it (says he) to be a clear proposition, that the vendor of goods not paid for may retain possession against the vendee, not by aid of any equity, but on grounds of law. Our oldest books consider the payment of the price (day not being given)as a condition-precedent and implied in the contract of sale. If day had been given for the payment, and the vendee could have sustained an action of trover against the vendor, the price unpaid must be deducted from the damages, in the same manner as if he had brought an action on the contract for non-delivery. The sale is not executed before delivery; and in the simplicity of former times a delivery into the actual possession of the vendee.was always supposed.” “A destination of the goods by the vendor to the use of the vendee, the marking them or making them up to be delivered, the removing them for the purpose of being delivered, may all entitle the vendee to act as ‘ owner,’ to assign, or maintain an action against a third person into whose hands they may have come. But the title of the vendor is not entirely divested until the goods have come into the possession of the vendee. He has therefore a complete right, for just cause, to retract the intended delivery and stop the goods in transitu. The cases in our courts of law have confirmed this doctrine, and the same law obtains in other countries.”
In the Roman law “the tradition was so neeessary tbat do-minium could not be acquired by contract merely. To obtain dominium there must have been added tradition or delivery. So if a man bought a house and paid the purchase-money, and was not put in possession, he had not the least right in the house, but only an action arising out of the obligation.” (Comm, of Gaius, p. 232.)
Nor is the right of the vendor affected by the fact that he had received the note or bond of the vendee in payment of the price. It is said by Gibson, O. J., that “nothing but an extin-guishment of the debt is satisfaction between the buyer and the seller. A power to check for a deposit in bank would not be payment to suspend the vendor’s right. The liability on the .original contract is not supplanted by a security given for the price, as is instanced by the buyer giving his own note or bill, which, though it operates as an extension of credit, extinguishes not the original contract, nor are the bills of a third person an absolute satisfaction unless declared to be so by the terms of the bargain.” (Bell v. Moss, 5 Whart., 204.)
In the case of Townley v. Grump, (4 Ad. & El., 63,) a party having goods in his warehouse sold them and gave the vendee the following order: “We hold to your order 39 pipes, &c., rent free to the 25th November next.” In this case there was also proof of a usage that such an order in the hands of the vendee would enable him to obtain credit as having the possession of the goods. The goods remained in the warehouse until the purchaser became bankrupt. Trover was brought by the assignee in bankruptcy. After a C. A. V., Lord Tenterden, C. J., held that the lien was not lost. “Gases.(said he) have been cited, but none where the question arose between the original vendor and vendee.”
In Miles v. Groton, (2 Or. & M., 511,) the goods were sold under an invoice which expressed that they remained with the vendee at rent. The vendor also accepted a bill of exchange for the price drawn by the vendee — the bill he had negotiated. While the bill was running the vendee sold a part and gave an order on the vendor for the same. The vendor delivered this part to the subvendee and charged him the proportionate rent. Subsequently the vendee became bankrupt, the bill was dishonored, and the assignee in bankruptcy brought trover to recover the property. Bailey, B., said: “It is insisted that the bill is still outstanding. That is true, and it may perhaps operate to prevent tbe sel]er from having a complete rig’ht to the goods, so as to be able to give a valid title by reselling to a third party. But the only question in the present case is whether he had not the right to hold them until the price is paid. But it is said that the warehouse rent was charged upon these goods. I am of the opinion this fact makes no difference.” After distinguishing this from the case of Hurry v. Mangles, (1 Camp., 442,) the decision proceeds: “Here the effect is not to make (as has been argued) the warehouse of the vendor the warehouse of the vendee, but to make it a part of the contract that the goods were not to be delivered until not only the price but the rentispaid. Yaughan, B., said: “It is said that the warehouse rent makes a difference and constitutes a delivery.” In Winkes v. Hassals, (9 B. & 0., 372,) Mr. Justice Littledale said, “The charge of warehouse rent does not, I think, constitute such a delivery as to give a plaintiff the right to maintain an action.” Guerney, B., concurred.
Again, though the general rule is that when once the actual possession is delivered, the vendor’s lien is extinguished, the law so highly favors the equity of this lien, that where the possession had actually passed, and the vendor, by a tort, retakes the possession, he is still protected for the unpaid purchase-money. In such a case of tortious retaking, the vendee may bring his action of trespass or trover, but the decisions limit his recovery of damages by the deduction of the amount of the unpaid purGhase-money. (Stephens v. Wilkinson, 2 B. & Ad., 320; Page v. Oowasjee, L. R., 1; P. 0. App., 127.)
The seizure made in this case, by the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, under the power supposed to have been conferred by the act of 1863, did not divest the title held by the claimant.
We therefore submit that whatever may be the proper designation of the right of retention by the owner when the vendee has become insolvent, whether we term it a lien, as is expressed in some of the cases, or whether it is to be described as a “right arising out of his relation to the goods, qua vendor, which is greater than a lien,” as stated in Kinlook v. Oraig (supra,) it is ' a right in and to the thing, constituting.ownership within the fair meaning and purview of the act of 1863.
Mr. Solicitor-General Phillips for the appellees:
Sprott’s Case (19 Wall., 459) was one in which the cotton whose proceeds were claimed had been sold by the Confederate States to the claimant, while in the present the claim is for the proceeds of cotton that had been sold by the claimant to the Confederate States. Both cases are affected with the vice attending all dealings in cotton with the Confederate States. The sale by the claimant to the Confederate States, being upon a credit, vested the property and the right of possession in the vendee.
It is, however, contended by the claimant that the subsequent disappearance of the vendee is equivalent to an insolvency, and therefore that upon such insolvency a lien arose in him which gave him authority to detain the cotton, an authority which he can assert against the United States. This lien is treated by the claimant as if the insolvency had the effect of rescinding the contract and making him owner again. The rule, however, is that insolvency does not rescind the contract, but merely gives a right to detain the goods until the price is secured. (Benjamin on Sales, § 897; 2 Kent, 541 and 546, Holmes’s note; Ex parte Chalmers, 8 Chancery Appeal, (L. R.,) 289.)
According to that principle the claimant, who has been deprived of the possession of 118 of the 177 bales to which the lien attached, may have (supposing other objections removed) a right to an account by which he shall get out of the net proceeds of the 118 bales so much of the price for which he sold to the Confederate States as has not been obtained from the 59 bales which he has kept. This concession goes upon the ground that in such case the lien of a vendor is ownership within the statute giving jurisdiction to the Court of Claims over the proceeds of captured and abandoned property, (12 Stat. L., 820, sec. 3,) a point which is hereby submitted without discussion.
However this may be, the cotton in question after the sale and at the termination of the rebellion, was the property of the Confederate States. As such it was then captured by the military power of the United States, although it did not until several months thereafter come into their possession, and then only by the hands of a civil officer. “ Complete conquest, by whatever mode it may be perfected, carries with it all the rights' of the former government; or, in other words, the conqueror, by the completiou of his conquest, becomes the absolute owner of the property conquered from the enemy, nation, or state. His rights are no longer limited to mere occupation of what he has taken into his actual possession, but they extend to all the property and rights of the conquered state, including even debts as well as personal and real property. (United States v. Huelc-abee, 16 Wall., p. 434.)
The claimant places his right to recover upon two distinct grounds, viz, (1) his sale of the cotton to the Confederate States was a nullity, inasmuch as they were incapable of taking by purchase; and (2) if that be not so, he has at all events a right to the proceeds, because of the interest which reverted to him upou the insolvency of the Confederate States.
As to the former of these grounds it seems enough to say that this court has twice held that the Confederate States could purchase lands, which seems a fortiori to apply to the present question. (United States v. HueMbee, 16 Wall., 434; Titus v. United States, 20 Wall., 475.)
As to the right of the claimant in respect of his lien as vend- or. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the claimant that this lien did not arise upon the sale, which was in consideration of bonds that were not due; but that it arose (a áort of springing use) upon the happening of the insolvency of the vendee. And so are all the authorities. I may say here that Mason v. Liclcbarrow, as cited by the claimant, (H. Bl., 357,) was overruled in the House of Lords. (See Smith Lead. Cas., 1, 1039, 6th Am. ed.) What is termed the insolvency of the vendee is its disappearance.
It may be asked before what law was that government solvent or insolvent ¶ Only after its destruction could it be called insolvent, and that insolvency came of the circumstances that it was destroyed by force, and that its destruction was of that peculiar sort that vested all its means in the power by which it was destroyed. If the destroyer took its means subject to its obligations, then it did not become insolvent, and so no lien arose. If a solvent vendee upou credit die,no lien arises as against his executors. The alleged insolvency arises from the fact that the United States captured all the means of the Confederate States without becoming liable for its obligations; and this proposition of course annuls the claim before the court.
If the claimant have no debt as against the United States, he can have no lien as against them. A captor does not take subject to incumbrances in favor of other citizens of the hostile government. Much less can it be allowed that by the capture such an incumbrance arose, even though in the antecedent state of things it had no existence; which is the present suggestion.
It is submitted that the United States, by capture, took this cotton in precisely the same right in which previously to such capture it was held by the Confederate States, i. e., that it took it with a right of property and a right of immediate possession. The circumstance that the United States at the moment when the Confederate States disappeared captured all of the means of the latter without liability to account, so far from initiating in favor of the claimant a specific right which he did not theretofore possess, is of itself the strongest denial of such right.
What was captured here was the cotton itself, not a chose in action in respect of such cotton. This distinguishes the present from the cases of Prioleau and McRae, cited for the claimant. In those cases the goods and means were within the dominion of Great Britain. Therefore, of course, the things themselves could not be captured.
Mr. P. Phillips in reply:
Whether, upon the concession that Whitfield could re-retain the cotton for the unpaid purchase-money, such right constituted him an owner within the terms of the act of 1863 authorizing a suit in the Court of Claims, is a question which the Solicitor-General says “ is submitted without discussion.”
We say, in the first place, that as the claimant was illegally deprived of his possession by the Treasury agent under instructions of the Secretary, which distinctly declared that such taking would not deprive the possessor from raising in the court all questions of claim thereto, the party is entitled, ex equo et bono, to the amount of the proceeds in the hands of the Government under the general jurisdiction of the court. But we insist that the right of recovery can be maintained as well under the act of 1863. It is true that the act uses the word “ owner,” and requires proof of his u ownership.” It would require a very technical construction of the act to exclude a party who had an undivided interest, or to require an absolute ownership. - Although there can be but one absolute owner, there may be a qualified ownership of the same thing by many. Thus the bailor has the general .ownership of the thing bailed, but the bailee the special ownership.
The next proposition of the Solicitor-General is that, however this may be, the cotton was captured by the military power of the United States, although it did not come until several months thereafter into their possession, and then only by the hands of a civil officer.” This is followed by the position that the “ captor does not take subject to incumbrances in favor of other citizens of the hostile government.” We deny that this cotton further evidence on this point$ and Mil ward was examined to was ever captured. A. “capture” is the taking of property by one belligerent from another.” In the case of United States v. Paddleford, captured property is defined to be such “as has been seized or taken from hostile possession by the military or naval forces of the United States.” (9 Wall., 537.) Capture is a belligerent right, attached to a state of hostilities, and cannot therefore exist when hostilities have terminated. To sustain his position, the Solicitor-General refers to the case of Suekabee v. United States, (16 Wall., 435.) The facts in that case show that the property was actually captured by the military forces of the United States, and the possession thereof turned over to the Government during actual hostilities.
To prove a capture in the case before us, reliance is placed on the doctrine announced in the case cited, “ that complete conquest carries with it all the rights of the former government, and that these rights aré not limited to mere occupation of what has been taken into actual possession, but extends to all property and rights of the conquered state, including even debts as well as personal and real estate.” There is nothing in this citation which justifies the position that the Government holds such property by the right of capture.
Reference to sustain my position was made to the cases of United States v. Prioleau, and United States v. McRae. The Solicitor-General, not denying the law as laid down in those cases, to wit, that the United States could only maintain their suit as successor or representative of the defunct government, and therefore subject to all the defenses and rights which could have been asserted against it, says: “ In these cases, the goods and means were within the dominion of Great Britain. Therefore, of course, the things themselves could not be captured. Consequently, what the United States took in regard to these things was a matter of suit.” These principles, says he, do not apply to the case of actual capture.
If the extinction of the rebellion rested all rights of property in the United States which belonged to the overthrown government in virtue of a title by capture, and the captor does not take subject to incumbrances in favor of citizens of the hostile government, as contended for, then it is of no consequence where the property is situate, whether in this or another country. .
The dispute between my learned brother and myself on this branch of the case is not that the Government of the United States acquired no title to this property, but it is as to the nature of that title. He desires to place it on the paramount ground of capture, which is a belligerent right, freeing the captor from all rights attached to the thing captured; while my position is that the Government acquires the property as successor or representative of the overthrown power, as asserted in the English cases.
The claimant is denied a recovery on the ground that the cotton was sold to the confederate government, whose title on its dissolution passed to the United States. This necessitates the decision of two questions: First. Was not the transaction in aid of the rebellion, and therefore void ? Second. Had the confederate government such a legal existence as enabled it to acquire property by contract? As to the first, this court has decided in Sprotffs Case that a purchase of cotton from the confederate government was illegal, and this without regard to the motive of the purchaser. A sale of cotton to that government would seem to be subject to the same rule.
In further illustration of this point, we may refer to the case of Hancmer v. Woodruff, (15 Wall., 439.) This was a suit on a promissory note, the consideration of which was State bonds, styled, “ war bonds.” The note was held to be illegal and void. The attempt to bring this transaction within the dqc-trine laid down in Thorington v. Smith was overruled by the court. Mr. Justice Miller, in a separate opinion, stated he had reluctantly assented to that doctrine, which he regarded as unsupported by, and in some degree at variance with, the general doctrine of the turpitude of consideration, as affecting the validity of contracts;” and, while expressing his opinion that tbe ease before tbe court fell within the principles of Thoring-ton v. Smith, said that be was content that its doctrine should be so limited, modified, and explained “ as to make it inapplicable to any further class of cases at all probable in the history of the country.”
Again, in Horn v. Loclchart, (17 Wall., 580,) which presented a question of in vestment in the bonds of the confederacy, the court say: “This investment was, therefore, a direct contribution of the resources of the confederate government, and the invalidity of any such transaction ought not to be a debatable matter in the courts of the United States.”
It would, therefore, appear, by the application of the principles of these repeated adjudications to the case before us, that the contract of sale between Whitfield and the Confederate government was null and void; and, this being so, Whitfield was the owner of this cotton as fully and completely after this attempted sale as he was before it was made.
As to the second inquiry, it is to be observed that in SprotVs Case the first conclusion of law as found by the Court of Claims is very direct and emphatic, to wit: “The government of the Confederate States was an unlawful assemblage, without corporate power to take, hold, or convey a valid title to property, real or personal.” This court, in the opinion of the majority, declined to consider this proposition. But after describing the character of the state government, and the effect which had been given by the court to their legislation and acts, the court proceeds to distinguish between such acts and those of the Confederate government. They say “the government of the Confederate States can receive no aid from this course of reasoning. It had no existence, except as a conspiracy to overthrow lawful authority.” Again, “ when it was overthrown, it perished totally. It left no laws, no statutes, no decrees, no authority which can give support to any contract.” This would seem to be tantamount to the declaration of the Court of Claims.

Opinion:
Mr. Chief-Justice Waite
delivered the opinion of the court:
During the war of the rebellion, Whitfield, a resident of the State of Alabama, being the owner of 177 bales of cotton raised by himself, sold it to the Confederate States government, agreeing to receive in payment the eight-per-cent, bonds of the Con federate States. In January, 18G5, payment of tlie purchase-price was made and accepted in bonds of the kind agreed upon, payable to bearer, and falling due in the years 1868, 1871, and 1880. Whitfield kept the bonds in his possession, and, at the trial of this case below, produced them in open court. The cotton was never taken away by the Confederate States authorities, but remained in the possession of Whitfield until September 1, 1865, when it was seized by the Treasury agents of the United States, acting under color of the authority of the Abandoned and captured property Acts. After the seizure, 59 bales were restored to Whitfield, pursuant to an arrangement made with him, as compensation for putting the cotton in good order, aud the remaining 118 bales sent forward to New York, where they were sold by the cotton agent of the United States, and the proceeds paid into the Treasury. This suit was brought to recover these proceeds.
Iu United States v. Huckabee, (16 Wall., 414,) we held that real property purchased by and conveyed to the Confederate States during the war passed to the United States at the restoration of peace, by capture, and we sustained the title of the United States thus acquired against a claim made by the vendors of the Confederate States, that the conveyance was obtained from them by duress. The same principle was recognized and acted upon in United States v. Titus, (21 Wall., 475.) WTe have thus decided that the Confederate States government could acquire title to real property by purchase, and it is not easy to see why a different rule should be applied to personal property. The ownership of that, even more than real property, was required for the operations of the confederacy. Contracts of sale made in aid of the rebellion will not be enforced by the courts, but completed sales occupy a different position. As a general rule, the law leaves the parties to illegal contracts where it finds them, and affords relief to neither. A sale of personal property, when completed, transfers to the purchaser the title of the property sold.
Whitfield's sale in this case was not on credit, but for bonds which passed from hand to hand as money. The transaction in this respect was not different from a sale to the United States for any of their public securities payable at a future day. The sale was complete when the bonds were accepted in payment. The title then passed to the Confederate States without a for mal delivery. From that time Whitfield ceased to be the owner of the cotton.
The claim, then, that he had the right to retain the possession of the cotton until the purchase-money was paid, because of the insolvency of the Confederate government, is not applicable to the facts established by the evidence, as the purchase-money had been paid before the insolvency. Butif this were otherwise, it is not easy to see how his claim, growing out of his illegal contract as it does, can be enforced against the United States in the Court of Claims. In Sprott v. United States, (20 Wall., 463,) it was decided that one owing allegiance to the Government of the United States could not avail himself of the courts of the country to enforce a claim under a contract by which, for the sake of gain, he knowingly contributed to the " vital necessities of the rebellion." For that reason we refused to give effect to a purchase of cotton from the confederate government. This case is not distinguishable from that iu principle. Cotton, as we have often said, was, during the late war, as much hostile property as the military supplies and munitions of war it was used to obtain. When Whitfield, therefore, sold his cotton to the confederacy and took their bonds in payment, he contributed directly to the means of prosecuting the rebellion. He says in his petition, it is true, that his sale was not made to aid the rebellion; but the purchase was clearly for that purpose and no other. This he could not but have known. Under such circumstances "he must be taken to intend the consequences of his voluntary act." (Hanauer v. Doane, 12 Wall., 347.) By his sale he knowingly devoted his cotton to the war, and his rights must follow its fortunes. The courts of the country would not relieve him against one who held title by conveyance from the Confederate States, and under that title had obtained possession. Neither would they interfere in behalf of a purchaser from the Confederate States, to enforce possession under his sale. But when his possession has been lost by reason of his sale, no matter how, the courts will afford him no relief against the loss. Having by his acts entered the lists against his rightful Government, he cannot, if he loses, ask it for protection against what he has voluntarily done. In this case he seeks to enforce a right growing out of his contract of sale, which was tainted with the vice of the rebellion. It was a contract which could not have been enforced against him, and he is equally powerless under its provisions against others. He seeks, in effect, by this action to recover, in the courts of the United States, the purchase-money due from the Confederate States, upon the principle that a sale upon credit implies a guarantee of the solvency of the purchaser until the payment is made. We have already seen that such is not his position here; but if it were, having lost his possession he has no standing in court for relief. He is not the owner of the property, and his lien is not one the courts of the United States will enforce.
The judgment of the Court of Claims is affirmed.