Case Name: Kimberly WITTY, Individually and as Surviving Parent of Baby Witty, a Nonborn Child, Appellant, v. AMERICAN GENERAL CAPITAL DISTRIBUTORS, INC., Appellee
Court: Texas Courts of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1985-07-03
Citations: 697 S.W.2d 636
Docket Number: No. 01-84-0667-CV
Parties: Kimberly WITTY, Individually and as Surviving Parent of Baby Witty, a Nonborn Child, Appellant, v. AMERICAN GENERAL CAPITAL DISTRIBUTORS, INC., Appellee.
Judges: Before EVANS, C.J., and COHEN and DUNN, JJ.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 697
Pages: 636–648

Head Matter:
Kimberly WITTY, Individually and as Surviving Parent of Baby Witty, a Nonborn Child, Appellant, v. AMERICAN GENERAL CAPITAL DISTRIBUTORS, INC., Appellee.
No. 01-84-0667-CV.
Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (1st Dist.).
July 3, 1985.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 22, 1985.
Jeffery M. Stern, Michael W. Melton, Houston, for appellant.
Michael G. Terry, Vinson & Elkins, Houston, for appellee.
Before EVANS, C.J., and COHEN and DUNN, JJ.

Opinion:
OPINION
EVANS, Chief Justice.
The plaintiff, Kimberly Witty, appeals from a take-nothing summary judgment entered in favor of the defendant, American General Capital Distributors, Inc. The judgment is reversed apd the cause is remanded.
The plaintiff sued individually, and also as surviving parent of her deceased unborn child, alleging that her baby had been fatally injured as a result of the defendant's negligence. She alleged that while employed by the defendant as a receptionist, she tripped over a utility outlet and fell with such force that her unborn baby was fatally injured. She asserted that the defendant was negligent in various particulars, and that as a direct and proximate result of the occurrence: (1) her baby was bruised and suffered great shock to its nervous system, as well as physical pain and mental anguish, (2) she was deprived of her baby's support, companionship, society, affection, and comfort, (3) she suffered severe emotional trauma and mental anguish because of her uncertainty about the baby's fate until its body was surgically removed from her womb nine days after the accident, and (4) alternatively, that she sustained property damage because of the destruction of her fetus.
As the baby's surviving parent, Mrs. Witty sought $1 million for her child's prenatal injuries and other damages relating to its death; and in her individual capacity, she sought an additional $1 million as damages for the loss of her baby's support and companionship; $500,000 as damages for her own emotional trauma and mental anguish, which she allegedly suffered during and after the nine-day period following the accident; and $500,000 as property damages for the loss of her fetus.
The motion for summary judgment set forth two legal theories of defense, in which the defendant contended:
(1) That Mrs. Witty was barred from asserting a claim against the defendant, her employer, under article 8306, section 3a, of the Texas Workers' Compensation Act. Mrs. Witty had made a claim for and had received worker's compensation payments of $546 for wages lost during a three-week period after the accident;
(2) That the deposition testimony of the physician who surgically removed Mrs. Witty's dead baby from her womb established that the fetus was not alive at the time of such separation, and therefore, Mrs. Witty's petition did not state a valid cause of action.
The summary judgment recites that Mrs. Witty, individually and as next friend of her unborn child, was entitled to take nothing against the defendant, but it does not specifically refer to either of the grounds set forth in the defendant's motion.
The trial court correctly determined that because the child was not born alive, Mrs. Witty was not entitled to recover damages, in her capacity as representative of the estate of her deceased child, for the child's physical pain and suffering or for other damages relating to the child's death. Although these damages ordinarily would be recoverable by the representative of a deceased child's estate under the Texas Survival Statute, Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 5525 (Vernon 1958), the Texas Supreme Court so far has not recognized an action to recover such damages unless the child is bom alive. See Yandell v. Delgado, 471 S.W.2d 569 (Tex.1971). In Yandell, the supreme court by per curiam opinion approved the holding of the Fort Worth Court of Civil Appeals, stating:
We hold that subject, of course, to the proof required in such cases a cause of action does exist for prenatal injuries sustained at any prenatal stage provided the child is born alive and survives.
471 S.W.2d at 570 (emphasis supplied).
Mrs. Witty contends that the supreme court's decision in Yandell is not squarely on point with the facts here and that this is a case of first impression. She urges that we seize the initiative and give legal recognition to the claims she asserts on behalf of her baby's estate.
An intermediate court is obliged to follow the Texas Supreme Court's authoritative expressions of the law and to leave any changes in the law to that court. Swilley v. McCain, 374 S.W.2d 871, 875 (Tex.1964); see also Leal v. C.C. Pitts Sand and Gravel, Inc., 413 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio), rev'd on other grounds, 419 S.W.2d 820 (Tex.1967); Stephenson v. Perlitz, 524 S.W.2d 786, 788-89 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 532 S.W.2d 954 (Tex.1976); Metal Structures Corp. v. Plains Textiles, Inc., 470 S.W.2d 93, 99 (Tex.Civ.App.— Amarillo 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
It is accordingly this court's duty to recognize and apply the supreme court's deliberate statement of the law and, by exercising judicial self-restraint, to refrain from extending or restricting the scope of the supreme court's declaration. See Watson v. Zep Manufacturing Co., 582 S.W.2d 178, 180 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.). This court therefore adopts, as the law of this case, the decision of the Texas Supreme Court in Yandell, which recognizes a cause of action brought on behalf of a child for prenatal injuries, provided the child is bom alive.
Yandell does not preclude Mrs. Witty's causes of action, in her individual capacity, at common law and under the Wrongful Death Statute. In her petition, Mrs. Witty alleged individual causes of action at common law and under the Wrongful Death Statute, independently of the claim asserted by her as representative of her deceased child's estate, for damages allegedly sustained because of her emotional distress during the nine-day period following the accident, and because of the loss of her baby's society and companionship, and for the mental anguish she suffered.
Since the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Hill v. Kimball, 76 Tex. 210, 13 S.W. 59 (1890), and with increased frequency in recent years, our courts have recognized a common law cause of action for emotional distress based upon a plaintiff's "contemporaneous perception" of an injury either intentionally or negligently inflicted upon another. See Dave Snelling Lincoln-Mercury v. Simon, 508 S.W.2d 923 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, no writ); Landreth v. Reed, 570 S.W.2d 486 (Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1978, no writ); Covington v. Estate of Foster, 584 S.W.2d 726 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Bedgood v. Madalin, 589 S.W.2d 797 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 600 S.W.2d 773 (Tex.1980); Newman v. Minyard Food Stores, Inc., 601 S.W.2d 754 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas), writ ref'd per curiam, 612 S.W.2d 198 (Tex.1980); Apache Ready Mix Co. v. Creed, 653 S.W.2d 79 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1983, no writ); Dawson v. Garcia, 666 S.W.2d 254 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1984, no writ). This theory of recovery has been applied in a case of prenatal injury to an unborn child. Haught v. Maceluch, 681 F.2d 291 (5th Cir.1982).
A statutory cause of action is also recognized under the Texas Wrongful Death Statute, Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 4671 et seq. (Vernon Supp.1985), which allows damages for loss of a minor child's society and companionship and for mental anguish. See Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex.1983); City of Houston v. Stoddard, 675 S.W.2d 280, 285 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The Wrongful Death Statute does require that the wrongful occurrence be of such a character as would have entitled the injured party to maintain an action had death not ensued. Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 4672 (Vernon Supp.1985); Leal v. C.C. Pitts Sand and Gravel Co., 419 S.W.2d at 821. But this requirement speaks to the character of the wrongful occurrence, see Schwing v. Bluebonnet Express, Inc., 489 S.W.2d 279, 280 (Tex.1973), not to the status of the injured party. The Wrongful Death Statute creates a statutory cause of action for designated beneficiaries of the injured party. Therefore, Mrs. Witty's claim, in her individual capacity, under the statute was not dependent upon a showing that the child was born alive, but rather on whether the act that caused the injury was wrongful and would have given Mrs. Witty's child the right to sue if it had survived those injuries.
Mrs. Witty's petition sufficiently alleges a viable claim at common law, based on the emotional distress she allegedly suffered as a result of her perception of her child's injury following the accident, and also a viable claim under the Wrongful Death Statute for mental anguish and for the loss of her baby's society and companionship.
The defendant's motion for summary judgment also alleges that Mrs. Witty's claims are barred by the Workers' Compensation Act, Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 8306, sec. 3(a) (Vernon Supp.1985), which provides in pertinent part:
The employees of a subscriber . shall have no right of action against their employer . for damages for personal injuries. .
Mrs. Witty's petition and her response to the defendant's request for admissions conclusively show that she was injured while working in the regular course of her employment for the defendant at its offices, and that she filed a claim and received worker's compensation benefits in the amount of $546.00, representing lost wages for three weeks following the accident in June and July 1983.
Because the summary judgment record does not affirmatively show that the defendant is a subscriber under the Workers' Compensation Act, it is questionable whether its status as a covered employer is the only inference that may be drawn from the summary judgment proof. See Puga v. Donna Fruit Co., 634 S.W.2d 677 (Tex.1982); see also Smith v. Otis Engineering Corp., 670 S.W.2d 750, 752 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ). But even assuming that the defendant met its burden in that respect, the summary judgment proof does not conclusively establish that the Workers' Compensation Act constitutes a bar to the assertion of Mrs. Witty's claims.
The Workers' Compensation Act would constitute a bar to Mrs. Witty's common-law and statutory claims for damages resulting from her own injuries, including any claims based upon emotional disturbances resulting from such injuries. Paradissis v. Royal Indemnity Co., 507 S.W.2d 526 (Tex.1974). But the claims asserted by Mrs. Witty in her individual capacity do not derive from the injuries that she, herself, sustained in the fall, but instead, those claims relate entirely to the injury and loss of her child.
In support of its position that the Workers' Compensation Act bars Mrs. Witty's claims against her employer, the defendant cites Hedgeman v. Berwind Railway Service Co., 512 S.W.2d 827 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.), and Grimes v. Jalco, Inc., 630 S.W.2d 282 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Both cases are distinguishable on their facts.
In Hedgeman, an employee filed a claim for worker's compensation benefits, which the Industrial Accident Board denied on the ground that the claimed disability was not one covered by the Act. The employee then sued to obtain worker's compensation benefits from the compensation carrier, and in the alternative, alleged common law damages from his employer for failure to provide a safe place to work or to provide safety equipment. The insurance carrier confessed judgment as to the worker's compensation liability, and after severance, the trial court proceeded to hear evidence on the common law action. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the employer, and this decision was affirmed on appeal. The Court of Civil Appeals concluded that the employee's alternative claims were entirely inconsistent, and that having claimed and accepted compensation benefits, the employee was barred by his election of remedies from seeking a common law remedy for the same disability.
In Grimes, the employee alleged in his petition that he was either an independent contractor or an employee of the defendant company, and he joined the company along with the compensation carrier as a defendant. This court, in a majority opinion, concluded that the employee had not made an election of remedies by filing a claim and accepting and receiving compensation benefits, because the award of the Industrial Accident Board had been appealed, and no final judgment had been entered. In so doing, this court distinguished Hedgeman and similar cases.
We have not been referred to any case involving the precise issue presented here, i.e., whether the Workers' Compensation Act bars an employee's common law action for emotional distress and a statutory recovery for loss of society and companionship and for mental anguish, resulting from an injury to a third party victim. Certainly, the act would not constitute a bar to a claim asserted by the third party victim, even though both the employee and the victim were injured together as the result of the same negligent act in a single transaction. The words "personal injury" as used in article 8306, section 3, refer only to an injury sustained by the employee because of injury to his own body, including any mental anguish resulting therefrom. It would be unreasonable to expand the meaning of such words to include an employee's mental anguish or other loss resulting from some injury inflicted upon a third party. Indeed, it is inconceivable that the legislature intended such a result when it in enacted art. 8306, section 3.
It is this court's holding that the trial court erred in deciding that Mrs. Witty was precluded, as a matter of law, from asserting her individual claims for damages at common law, based on her alleged emotional distress, and under the Wrongful Death Statute, based upon her alleged loss of society and companionship and for her alleged mental anguish. Because the trial court erred in entering judgment on the grounds asserted in the defendant's motion, Mrs. Witty's first two points of error are sustained. It is therefore unnecessary to consider her third point of error.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.
. The concurring and dissenting opinions do not distinguish between the nature of the two statutory actions brought by Mrs. Witty. Mrs. Witty asserts a cause of action for her child's prenatal injuries, which she seeks to recover in her representative capacity under the Texas Survival Statute (article 5525), and in addition, a cause of action, which she asserts in her own right, to recover damages for the loss of her child's society and companionship and for mental anguish, under the Wrongful Death Statute (article 4671). The confusion between these two actions is understandable, because courts and text writers alike have loosely characterized actions for prenatal injuries as "wrongful death actions." Further confusion has been created by general statements to the effect that a right of action under the Wrongful Death Statute exists only where the injured party could have maintained an action for damages had death not ensued. See, e.g., Leal, 419 S.W.2d at 821. When the distinction between the two statutes is perceived, it becomes clear that the Texas Supreme Court decision in Yandell applies only to the claim asserted by Mrs. Witty in her representative capacity under the Texas Survival Statute (article 5525).