Case Name: STATE of Missouri, ex rel. VANDERPOOL FEED & SUPPLY CO., INC., Relator, v. The Honorable Charles H. SLOAN, Judge of Division 3 of the Eighth Judicial Circuit of Missouri, Ray County, Missouri, Respondent
Court: Missouri Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1982-02-02
Citations: 628 S.W.2d 414
Docket Number: No. WD32888
Parties: STATE of Missouri, ex rel. VANDERPOOL FEED & SUPPLY CO., INC., Relator, v. The Honorable Charles H. SLOAN, Judge of Division 3 of the Eighth Judicial Circuit of Missouri, Ray County, Missouri, Respondent.
Judges: Before SOMERVILLE, C. J., and SHAN-GLER, PRITCHARD, WASSERSTROM, TURNAGE, CLARK and KENNEDY, JJ.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 628
Pages: 414–420

Head Matter:
STATE of Missouri, ex rel. VANDERPOOL FEED & SUPPLY CO., INC., Relator, v. The Honorable Charles H. SLOAN, Judge of Division 3 of the Eighth Judicial Circuit of Missouri, Ray County, Missouri, Respondent.
No. WD32888.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.
Feb. 2, 1982.
Roger M. Driskill, Richmond, for relator.
Larry D. Harman, Aaron L. Love, Liberty, for respondent.
Before SOMERVILLE, C. J., and SHAN-GLER, PRITCHARD, WASSERSTROM, TURNAGE, CLARK and KENNEDY, JJ.

Opinion:
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN PROHIBITION
WASSERSTROM, Judge.
Vanderpool Feed & Supply Co., Inc. ("Vanderpool") is the plaintiff in the ease Vanderpool Feed and Supply Co., Inc. v. Taylor, et al., pending before The Honorable Charles H. Sloan, Circuit Judge of Ray County. Vanderpool gave notice of the taking of depositions of Jim C. Colwell in Tulsa, Oklahoma, and of Mark Hill in Dallas, Texas. Defendants Taylor then sought a protective order under Rule 56.01(c) asking either an order staying the taking of the depositions or in the alternative that the depositions be permitted only on condition that Vanderpool pay the fees and expenses of Taylors' attorneys incidental to attending the depositions. Judge Sloan held a hearing on the motion and announced his intention to enter an order conditioning the taking of the depositions upon Vanderpool's supplying airplane tickets to Taylors' attorney to the places of deposition and return plus $200 per diem expenses. Vanderpool thereupon filed petition in this court for a Writ of Prohibition to prevent entry of that protective order.
The question as to whether or not a trial court has authority under Rule 56 to condition the taking of a deposition upon the payment of the opponent's attorneys' costs of attending has never been ruled in Missouri. However, it is well settled under the parallel federal rule and under similar procedural rules in other states that the trial court does have such power. 8 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 412, Section 2112 (1970); Annot., 70 A.L.R.2d 685, 760 (1960); Gibson v. International Freighting Corporation, 8 F.R.D. 487 (E.D. Pa.1947), affirmed, 173 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1949); Ganem v. Greene, 31 F.R.D. 175 (W.D.Pa.1962); Moore v. George A. Hormel & Co., 4 F.R.D. 15 (S.D.N.Y.1942); Meredith v. Gavin, 51 F.R.D. 5 (W.D.Mo.1970); Nagle v. United States Lines Co., 242 F.Supp. 800 (E.D.Va.1965); Madison v. Travelers Insurance Company, 308 So.2d 784 (La.1975); Adkins v. International Harvester Company, 286 S.W.2d 528 (Ky.1956); State of Arizona v. Mahoney, 103 Ariz. 308, 441 P.2d 68 (1968).
The leading case on the subject is Gibson v. International Freighting Corporation, supra, where a four judge district court held that the taking of a deposition at a place far distant from the place of trial, not as discovery but to be offered as evidence in the case, would be subjected to the condition that the deposing party pay the travel expense of the opponent's attorney. On appeal, the appellate court held: "We think that under the quoted rule this matter was well within the discretion of the court below."
Other cases have gone beyond Gibson by allowing attorneys' fees as well as per diem expenses of the attorney. Ganem v. Greene, supra; Moore v. George A. Hormel & Co., supra; Nagle v. United States Lines Co., supra. However, State of Arizona v. Mahoney, supra, expressly rules that while the trial court may order the party taking the deposition to pay the expenses incurred by his adversary's attorney attending the deposition, the court has no discretion to order the payment of attorney's fees. See also Nagle v. United States Lines Co., supra, holding that "it is generally sufficient to make an allowance of travel expense and reasonable subsistence without an attorney's fee."
In many other situations where Missouri has modeled a rule of civil procedure upon a similar federal rule, the Missouri courts have considered as a persuasive guide the construction placed upon the rule by the federal courts. Kingsley v. Burack, 536 S.W.2d 7 (Mo.banc 1976); State ex rel. Kincannon v. Schoenlaub, 521 S.W.2d 391 (Mo.banc 1975); Bauldin v. Barton County Mut. Ins. Co., 606 S.W.2d 444 (Mo.App.1980); State ex rel. Litton Bus. Sys., Inc. v. Bondurant, 523 S.W.2d 587 (Mo.App.1975). That respect should be accorded here. Accordingly, we hold that under Rule 56.01(c), the trial court does have discretion to condition the taking of a deposition upon the party taking the deposition paying the adversary the necessary travel expenses for his attorney to attend the deposition. We need not and do not decide at this time whether that discretion extends to the allowance of an attorney's fee in addition to the travel expenses. This is for the reason that Judge Sloan stated in a docket entry that the allowance would be "$200.00 per diem" and the proposed formal judgment entry contains a finding that "a reasonable per diem expense would be in the amount of Two Hundred & No/100 Dollars ($200.00) for each day or part of a day." This is in contrast to Taylors' motion which asked for "expense money and attorney fees." Judge Sloan's order should be read as allowing only expenses, with no provision for attorney fees.
Having determined that the trial judge has a discretion as to whether these expenses should be allowed as a condition to taking the depositions, the next question ordinarily would be whether the circumstances of this case warranted such allowance. However, Vanderpool does not claim that the facts are insufficient, but rather has limited itself to the contention that the trial judge has no authority at all in any case to impose such a condition. Concom-mitant to that position, Vanderpool has not supplied us with a transcript of the hearing on this matter before Judge Sloan, or even a statement as to the nature and extent of the evidence there presented or matters conceded or matters of which judicial notice was taken. In the absence of any record or agreement concerning the trial proceeding in this regard, there is nothing in which to root a decision concerning the adequacy of the evidence to justify the order, and this court is left with no basis upon which to prohibit that order.
There can be no doubt but that Taylors had the burden, as movants, to demonstrate to the trial court facts sufficient to justify making the allowance in question. Indeed, the burden was heavy to show cause for departure from the usual and customary rule that each party should bear its own expenses of litigation. But after the trial court entered its order, Van-derpool initiated the present prohibition proceeding, thereby bringing a new and different rule into operation. In this prohibition proceeding, the burden is on Vander-pool as the petitioning party to show that Judge Sloan exceeded his jurisdiction, and that burden includes overcoming the presumption of right action in favor of Judge Sloan's ruling. State ex rel. Headrick v. Bailey, 278 S.W.2d 737 (Mo.banc 1955); State ex rel. City of Maplewood v. Crandall, 569 S.W.2d 338 (Mo.App.1978); State ex rel. Allen v. Yeaman, 440 S.W.2d 138 (Mo.App.1969); State ex rel. Boswell v. Curtis, 334 S.W.2d 757 (Mo.App.1960). In the absence of any showing to the contrary by Vander-pool, the presumption of right action by Judge Sloan under the above cases controls. State ex rel. City of Maplewood v. Crandall, supra; State ex rel. Boswell v. Curtis, supra.
Stogsdill v. General Am. Life Ins. Co., 541 S.W.2d 696 (Mo.App.1976), heavily relied upon by Vanderpool, is distinguishable. In Stogsdill, the defendant had noticed a deposition of a certain witness on two previous occasions, but each time had canceled the deposition in advance of the scheduled date. Upon receiving a third notice scheduling deposition of this witness, the plaintiff objected. The court ordered the deposition to proceed, but provided for counsel expenses to be taxed as costs to the extent of $200 out of pocket expenses and $200 for the attorney's time.
On appeal, the plaintiff attempted to justify that order under Rules 57.03(h)(1) and 61.01(f). The appellate court held those rules to be inapposite for the reason that on each of the two occasions in which the deposition was canceled, plaintiff's attorneys were notified in advance, so that they were not forced to attend a deposition at which the other party failed to appear.
The court went on to discuss Section 492.-590, RSMo 1969 (now RSMo 1978) which it held to be the relevant statute. That statute deals with the taxation as costs of expenses of depositions. The court held that: "This statute limits costs and expenses of taking depositions to those enumerated— none of which could be construed as encompassing attorney's fees." In the present case Judge Sloan did not attempt to tax the attorney expense as costs under Section 492.590. Neither did he purport to act under the authority of either Rule 57 or Rule 61. Rather the authority here rests on Rule 56 which was in no way in issue or discussed in Stogsdill.
A motion has been filed by defendants Taylor on behalf of Judge Sloan to dismiss this proceeding on the ground that Vander-pool's brief fails to comply with Rule 84.04. The foregoing disposition of this case on the merits renders it unnecessary to rule on that motion.
The preliminary rule in prohibition is quashed.
TURNAGE and KENNEDY, JJ., concur.
CLARK, J., concurs in separate opinion filed.
SHANGLER, J., concurs in the separate concurring opinion of CLARK, J.
PRITCHARD, J., dissents in separate opinion filed.
SOMERVILLE, J., concurs in separate dissenting opinion of PRITCHARD, J.
. Rule 56.01(c) provides as follows:
"Protective Orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, the court may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the follow-⅜'
(2) that the discovery may be had only on specified terms and conditions.... "
. Certain later cases have allowed the expenses even though the deposition is taken primarily for discovery. Meredith v. Gavin, supra; Nagle v. United States Lines Co., supra.