Case Name: Louella Jones JOHNSON, Individually, as Administratrix of the Estate of Betty Jean Jones Brown, Deceased, and as Guardian of Bichard Jones, Jeffery Jones, Johnnie Jones, Debra Jones and James Jones, Minors, v. Frank P. FOSTER, Chancery Clerk of Coahoma County, Mississippi, as Administrator of the Estate of Alice Birdsong Mitchell, Deceased
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1967-06-12
Citations: 202 So. 2d 520
Docket Number: No. 44365
Parties: Louella Jones JOHNSON, Individually, as Administratrix of the Estate of Betty Jean Jones Brown, Deceased, and as Guardian of Bichard Jones, Jeffery Jones, Johnnie Jones, Debra Jones and James Jones, Minors, v. Frank P. FOSTER, Chancery Clerk of Coahoma County, Mississippi, as Administrator of the Estate of Alice Birdsong Mitchell, Deceased.
Judges: All Justices concur, except PATTERSON and SMITH, JJ., who dissent.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 202
Pages: 520–533

Head Matter:
Louella Jones JOHNSON, Individually, as Administratrix of the Estate of Betty Jean Jones Brown, Deceased, and as Guardian of Bichard Jones, Jeffery Jones, Johnnie Jones, Debra Jones and James Jones, Minors, v. Frank P. FOSTER, Chancery Clerk of Coahoma County, Mississippi, as Administrator of the Estate of Alice Birdsong Mitchell, Deceased.
No. 44365.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
June 12, 1967.
Suggestion of Error Overruled Oct. 2, 1967.
Howard G. Woodward, Ross & Ross, Clarksdale, for appellant.
Semmes Luckett, Brewer, Brewer & Luckett, Clarksdale, for appellee.

Opinion:
ROBERTSON, Justice:
Plaintiff, Louella Jones Johnson, individually, as Administratrix of the Estate of Betty Jean Jones Brown, Deceased, and as Guardian of the five minor children of deceased, brought suit in the Circuit Court of Coahoma County against Defendant, Frank P. Foster, Chancery Clerk of Coa-homa County, Mississippi, as Administrator of the Estate of Alice Birdsong Mitchell, Deceased, for damages for the wrongful death of Betty Jean Jones Brown. She was killed instantly when the automobile in which she was riding as a guest passenger and which was driven by Alice Birdsong Mitchell left the right side of the paved highway and struck a culvert and embankment on the left side of the highway. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant and the court entered a judgment thereon. It is from this verdict and judgment that the appellant appeals to this Court.
About 8:00 a. m. on April 23, 1965, Mrs. Alice Birdsong Mitchell, as was her custom, left her residence located about five miles south of Clarksdale, Mississippi, on County Road D-36 in the family car to take her three children to school in Clarksdale. She delivered the children at their school and, as also was her custom, picked up her maid, Betty Jean Jones Brown, and started back borne driving southward on County Road D-36, also known as the New Africa Road. The asphalt pavement of this road is about thirty feet wide, and in good condition, with four foot shoulders on each side of the pavement. The weather was clear and dry and the sun was shining.
About one and one-half miles from Clarksdale on a straight and level stretch of Highway 36, the automobile driven by Mrs. Mitchell with Betty Jean Jones Brown sitting on the front seat with her, left the right side of the highway, crossed over the left side of the highway, went down a rather steep embankment into a ditch, dragged along the ditch for approximately ten yards and then struck with great force a steel culvert embedded in a roadway to a field on the east side of the highway.
The left front of the automobile was completely demolished and the left front wheel was driven back almost under the dashboard by the force of the impact. Mrs. Mitchell, the driver, and Betty Jean Jones Brown, her maid and guest passenger, were killed instantly. Mrs. Mitchell's body was still behind the steering wheel and Betty Jean Jones Brown's body was on the floor between the front seat and the dashboard when removed from the car.
Mrs. Ada Estes, at the time of the impact, was looking at the flowers along the north side of her home which was situated about 100 yards east of the New Africa Road. There was a wire fence along the Road, hut she had a good view of the Road, both north and south of the point of impact. The accident happened 75 feet north of her mailbox at the corner of her property. When she heard the noise, she turned around and described what she saw in these words: "I saw the car settling in the ditch — the back end was still bumping." She did not see any traffic going north or south on the Road, nor were there any pedestrians or farm machinery in the area. Mrs. Estes ran out to the car, tried to speak to Mrs. Mitchell, but getting no response rushed back to her home and asked the telephone operator to get an ambulance and police out to the scene right away.
Travis McGahey, owner and operator of the wrecker that pulled the car out of the ditch, testified that the wrecked automobile was nosed into the ditch at about a 45° angle to the road, that the rear of the car was up on the edge of the blacktop, that the ditch was about five feet deep at the point of impact, that there were no skid marks on the paved portion of the road, and that there were no signs that the brakes had been applied. He further testified that the engine was pushed back under the dashboard, the steering mechanism "was all torn up and pushed back, and the steering wheel was broken or bent," and that the "tire on the driver's side was pushed all up under the fender."
Jesse Bonner, Deputy Sheriff of Coahoma County, testified that the car hit a 10 or 12 inch steel culvert and the embankment over it. He stated that it was about ten steps from the back of the car to where it first started dragging along the top of the ditch bank.
James L. Whittington, the Service Manager of Owen Chevrolet Company for eighteen years, testified that the 1964 Chevrolet four-door Impala was sold new to the Mitchells in late 1964 and that it had about 15,000 to 17,000 miles on it. The tires were not original equipment tires, but were new tires purchased about a month before the accident. The front end was aligned, and the steering mechanism, brakes, and exhaust system checked at the same time the new tires were put on the car. Whittington examined the car after the accident and found the steering mechanism on the left front badly damaged, the brake lines on the left front severed and all the brake fluid leaked out. The left front tire was flat, but there was no hole in it, and the other three tires were standing up and in good condition. It was impossible to tell whether anything had happened to the steering mechanism, the brakes or the left front tire prior to the accident because they were so badly damaged by the impact.
Dr. Frank T. Marascalco testified that he had examined Mrs. Mitchell regularly since June of 1950 and that her health was good. On her regular annual check-up in May, 1964, he found that she had some pelvic relaxation which was a chronic condition, but did not advise surgery at that time. He found nothing on his last examination to indicate that Mrs. Mitchell was not perfectly capable of operating an automobile carefully, prudently and without negligence.
Mr. Harold Mitchell, husband of Mrs. Mitchell, testified that she was forty-two years of age at the time of her death, that her health was good and she had never fainted except on one occasion about two or three months before the accident. While watching television one night the phone rang and she got up to answer it. After hanging up the receiver she fainted and fell. He put her to bed and she felt all right the next morning and didn't think that she needed to see a doctor. He dismissed it from his mind as being nothing serious.
On the morning of April 23, 1965, she prepared breakfast for her husband and three children, they all ate breakfast together that morning, they talked and she appeared to be in good spirits and was not complaining about anything. After breakfast, as was her custom, she left in the family car to take the children to school and to pick up the maid and return home. The accident happened on the way home about U/2 miles south of Clarksdale.
The appellant assigned as error:
1. The failure of the trial judge to direct a verdict for the plaintiff inasmuch as the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applicable, the inference of negligence was clear and the defendant offered no explanation in rebuttal.
2. The granting of instructions numbered 3 and 4 for the defendant.
3. The granting of instruction number 5 for the defendant.
4. The granting of instruction number 6 for the defendant.
5. The failure of the court itself to determine the issue of liability in view of the fact that at the conclusion of all testimony both the plaintiff and defendant moved for a directed verdict.
The question of whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable lies at the very threshold of this case. This question must be answered before we can proceed to answer others.
The appellant contends that such doctrine was certainly applicable, that the inference of negligence was clear and that inasmuch as the appellee offered no explanation in rebuttal, that the trial judge should have directed a verdict for the plaintiff. On the other hand, the appellee contends that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not applicable and that there was insufficient proof to make a jury issue on the question of negligence, and that, therefore, the trial judge should have directed a verdict for the defendant.
The declaration alleged that Alice Birdsong Mitchell had exclusive control and management of her automobile at the time it ran off the road and struck the culvert and embankment, and that it was her duty to use due care to operate the vehicle in a careful and prudent manner so as not to negligently injure her guest passenger, Betty Jean Jones Brown. It was also alleged that in the ordinary course of events an automobile driven in a careful and prudent manner would not be driven off the highway under the circumstances then prevailing, and that, for this reason, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applicable.
The proof showed that the accident occurred about 8:30 a. m. on a paved and straight highway. The weather was clear and dry, and no other vehicle, person or object was involved.
In Alabama & Vicksburg Ry. Co. v. Groome, 97 Miss. 201, 52 So. 703 (1910), this Court applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in a case where an employee of a railroad sued his employer. It was there said that the doctrine applies where the circumstances are such that the accident presumably would not have occurred if due care had been exercised. The Court stated that the occurrence of the accident under the circumstances raised a presumption of negligence. The Court did not distinguish between a presumption and a permissible inference. A true presumption is a rule of substantive law which compels a certain conclusion, usually a judgment, absent rebutting evidence. See 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2491 (3d ed. 1940). On the other hand, res ipsa loquitur is a rule of circumstantial evidence from which the jury is entitled to draw an inference of the defendant's negligence. This is usually a permissible inference, however, and the jury is not bound to infer negligence even where there is no rebutting evidence. Palmer v. Clarksdale Hospital, 206 Miss. 680, 40 So.2d 582 (1949); Lo Piccolo v. Knight of Rest Products Corp., 7 A.D.2d 369, 183 N.Y.S.2d 301 (1959), aff'd, 9 N.Y.2d 662, 212 N.Y.S. 2d 75, 173 N.E.2d 51 (1961).
In Palmer v. Clarksdale Hospital, supra, this Court stated that there are three conditions necessary for the application of res ipsa loquitur: (1) the accident must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence; (2) it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; and (3) it must not be due to any voluntary action on the part of the plaintiff.
We find no Mississippi case where an automobile left the roadway under similar circumstances to the case at bar. However, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has been applied in a number of cases from other states where the circumstances of the accident, caused by a motor vehicle leaving the road, remained unexplained. See Orme v. Burr, 157 Fla. 378, 25 So.2d 870 (1946); Rupe v. Smith, 181 Kan. 606, 313 P.2d 293 (1957); Vernon v. Gentry, 334 S.W.2d 266, 79 A.L.R.2d 1 (Ky.1960); Hamburger v. Katz, 10 La.App. 215, 120 So. 391 (1928); Nyberg v. Kirby, 65 Nev. 42, 188 P.2d 1006, 193 P.2d 850 (1948); Sibley v. City Service Transit Co., 1 N.J.Super. 199, 63 A.2d 708 (1949); Manker v. Shaffer, 161 Ohio St. 285, 118 N.E.2d 641 (1954); Threadgill v. Anderson, 303 P.2d 297 (Okl.1956); Kotal v. Goldberg, 375 Pa. 397, 100 A.2d 630 (1953). An exhaustive annotation on this subject is found in 79 A.L.R.2d beginning at Page 6.
In Vernon v. Gentry, supra, the Court, in applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur said:
"The facts herein conclusively show that defendant was in control of the automobile and that plaintiff's injury resulted from the accident. It is well known that an automobile does not ordinarily leave the roadway unless the person in control has been negligent in some manner. ‡ sjs
"Here the accident was such that under ordinary circumstances it should not have happened unless the defendant had been negligent. It therefore became incumbent upon the defendant to explain how the accident did happen. "
"If the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is to be invoked, then it must follow that the presumption of negligence immediately and inevitably arises. The happening of the event itself is proof of defendant's negligence, and if not satisfactorily explained will support a verdict for the plaintiff. It was the proper function of the jury to determine whether defendant satisfactorily rebutted the presumption raised by the happening of the accident." 334 S.W.2d at 268.
We are of the opinion that the jury should be permitted to determine from all the facts and circumstances whether Alice Birdsong Mitchell was guilty of negligence in the operation of her automobile. This does not violate the rule against basing judgments on surmise or conjecture since the jury, applying facts of common knowledge and human experience, could determine whether it was more probable that the driver of the automobile failed to use reasonable care than that the accident was caused by something beyond her reasonable control.
Both the driver and the passenger were killed, and the evidence as to what caused the Mitchell automobile to leave the highway is not available to either party to this action. One of the reasons for the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is that the evidence is usually within the exclusive knowledge and control of the defendant. But this is not the sole reason for the rule. In the case before us the basic reasons for the doctrine are: (1) that the automobile was being driven by Alice Birdsong Mitchell and was under her exclusive control at the time of the accident, and (2) the accident was such as would not have occurred in the ordinary course of events if the driver had used reasonable care and caution. Exclusive knowledge and control of the evidence may be a sufficient reason to apply the doctrine, but it does not necessarily follow that the doctrine will not be applied when the evidence is not available to either party.
This precise question was discussed in 79 A.L.R.2d at Page 41 wherein it was said :
"The fact that the driver of the motor vehicle died in the accident, thus making his superior knowledge unavailable, does not render the doctrine inapplicable. Thus, in Weller v. Worstall (1934) 50 Ohio App 11, 3 Ohio Ops 414, 19 Ohio L Abs 479, 197 NE 410, affd 129 Ohio St 596, 3 Ohio Ops 12, 196 NE 637, the court expressly rejected the contention that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur could not be invoked against the estate of one who died as a result of the accident, by saying: 'It is stated that the real reason for the rule lies in the fact that the cause of injury is usually known by the defendant and unknown to the plaintiff, and that when the reason for the rule fails the rule becomes inoperative. In other words the management and control of the automobile having been in the decedent, and he being dead, he can not now speak the true cause of the accident. That theory may be one of the reasons for the rule, but it is not the basic cause for its adoption. The true reason is found in the rule itself, in that the act complained of, or, the thing, speaks for itself. It is therefore not the matter of the defendant's ability to speak, but the fact that the act itself speaks. It would be just as logical to say that if a defendant does not know the cause of an accident, a plaintiff might not recover. A defendant might purposely say he did not know. If he did so he might as well be dead in so far as a plaintiff was concerned, for if a defendant could or would not speak the plaintiff must fail. The rule permits a defendant to speak the cause of the accident and perhaps thereby escape liability. He may do that by testimony other than his own. The plaintiff's right to recover can not be grounded on a defendant's inability or refusal to speak.' "
We hold that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applicable, and that neither the appellant nor the appellee was entitled to a peremptory instruction. Since it was a question for the jury to decide it now becomes necessary to determine whether the appellant's other assignments of error are well taken.
The appellant contends that there was no evidence in the Record to justify the trial court in granting Instruction No. 5 for the defendant. That instruction is as follows:
"The court instructs the jury for defendant that Alice Birdsong Mitchell was not guilty of negligence if the fact that the automobile she was driving left the road and ran into a culvert and embankment alongside the left side of the road was caused by a momentary loss of consciousness which was not foreseeable, or a blowout of a tire which was not foreseeable."
We agree with the appellant. There was no testimony that Mrs. Mitchell suffered a momentary loss of consciousness. In fact the testimony of her husband was to the opposite effect. He testified that on the morning of the tragic accident she prepared breakfast for him and the children as usual, that they all ate breakfast together, that they talked, that she was in good spirits and was not complaining, and seemed to be in good health.
There was no testimony of a tire blowout. The testimony was that the left front of the automobile hit a steel culvert with such force that the left front was completely demolished, that the engine was driven back under the dashboard, and that the left front wheel was driven back along with the engine. The left front tire was flat, but there was no hole in it. From a study of the pictures in evidence, it is hard to understand how the tire itself was not completely torn to pieces by the force of the impact. The other three tires which did not come in contact with the steel culvert were standing up well and in good condition.
This Court has consistently held over the years that there must be testimony in the Record on which to base instructions to the jury. McArthur v. Pruitt, 244 Miss. 649, 145 So.2d 163 (1962); Pevey v. Alexander Pool Co., 244 Miss. 25, 139 So.2d 847 (1962); Fink v. East Miss. Elec. Power Assn., 234 Miss. 221, 105 So.2d 548 (1958); Wilburn v. Gordon, 209 Miss. 27, 45 So. 2d 844 (1950).
The granting of Instruction No. 5 for the defendant constituted reversible error.
The appellant complains of the granting of Instructions 3 and 4 for the appellee. These instructions are as follows:
"INSTRUCTION NO. 3 FOR DEFENDANT
The court instructs the jury for defendant that while it has granted plaintiff an instruction to the effect that you may infer that Alice Birdsong Mitchell was negligent from the fact that the automobile which she was driving left the road and ran into a culvert and embankment on the left side of the road, it also instructs you that you are not compelled or required to draw such inference from such fact; that is, that you are not compelled or required to infer that Alice Birdsong Mitchell was negligent from the fact that the automobile she was driving left the road and ran into a culvert and embankment on the left side of the road. Even though such instruction was granted plaintiff, it remains for you to decide whether the fact that the automobile which Alice Birdsong Mitchell was driving left the road and ran into a culvert and embankment on the left side of the road justifies the conclusion that Alice Birdsong Mitchell was negligent. If you do not believe from a preponderance of the evidence that the fact that the automobile left the road and ran into a culvert and embankment on the left side of the road was caused by some negligent act committed by Alice Birdsong Mitchell, then it is your duty to find for defendant."
"INSTRUCTION NO. 4 FOR DEFENDANT
The court instructs the jury for defendant that the mere happening of the accident does not raise any presumption of negligence on the part of Alice Birdsong Mitchell.
Negligence is a failure to observe, for the protection of one's self or of others, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand. In other words, it is the want of that care and precaution which an ordinarily careful and prudent person would exercise under all the circumstances of the case.
Unless you believe from a preponderance of the evidence that Alice Birdsong Mitchell failed to do what an ordinarily careful and prudent person would have done under the circumstances of the case, or did something that an ordinarily careful and prudent person would not have done under the circumstances of the case, it is your duty to find for the defendant."
Similar instructions were soundly condemned in Fisher v. Daniels, 252 Miss. 662, 677, 173 So.2d 908, 915 (1965), wherein the Court speaking through Chief Justice Lee said:
"The principle in DeLaughter v. Wo-mack, supra, was completely nullified in the above instruction. Under it, the falling of the machines and the injury were not proof of negligence, nor could negligence be presumed or inferred therefrom. This was error. The presumption and inference were sufficient to make a case. The appellee's defense should have been to rebut that presumption and inference.
The giving of the quoted instruction constituted reversible error."
The appellant also assigned as error the granting of Instruction No. 6 for the defendant, as follows:
"The Court instructs the jury for defendant that if you find from the evidence that the accident was unavoidable, then it is your duty to find for defendant.
An unavoidable accident is one happening suddenly and unexpectedly and without negligence on the part of anyone."
Neither the appellant nor the appellee advanced any reason why Mrs. Mitchell on a clear, dry and sunny day while driving on a straight and level paved highway suddenly turned her automobile, or the automobile itself without human touch suddenly swerved, from the right side of the highway, crossed the left side, travelled along-the left shoulder of the road and then nosed into a culvert and embankment with great force. Mrs. Mitchell, the driver, and Betty Jean Jones Brown, her maid and passenger,, were the only two people who could tell what actually happened, and death has. sealed the lips of both. Both were killed instantly in the wreck. This is one of those peculiar cases where the underlying cause is unknown and will ever remain so.
An instruction applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was granted the appellant whereby the jury was given the opportunity to infer that the accident happened because of the driver's negligence. It seems to us that the only possible instruction that the appellee could get, which would allow the jury to consider the testimony or the lack of it from the defendant's point of view, would be an unavoidable accident instruction such as was granted in this case.
Under the peculiar circumstances of this case where the cause of the accident is not known, and will never be known, we feel that the appellee was entitled to an unavoidable accident instruction, and therefore, find that the trial judge was correct in granting Instruction No. 6 for the defendant.
However, because reversible error was committed in granting Instructions 3, 4 and 5 for the defendant, the judgment of the trial court must be reversed and this cause remanded for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.
All Justices concur, except PATTERSON and SMITH, JJ., who dissent.