Case Name: In re ESTATE OF Ira C. BOYD, Deceased
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1988-02-03
Citations: 519 So. 2d 692
Docket Number: No. 87-0093
Parties: In re ESTATE OF Ira C. BOYD, Deceased.
Judges: GLICKSTEIN J., concurs specially with opinion.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 519
Pages: 692–695

Head Matter:
In re ESTATE OF Ira C. BOYD, Deceased.
No. 87-0093.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Feb. 3, 1988.
Craig Boudreau, of Kohl and Mighdoll, West Palm Beach, for appellant-William Joel Moore.
James E. Weber, of James E. Weber, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellee-Joanne Price, Personal Representative of the Estate of Jettie R. Boyd, deceased.

Opinion:
ANSTEAD, Judge.
We affirm because we do not believe the concept of abandonment, in the manner in which it was applied in Barlow v. Barlow, 156 Fla. 458, 23 So.2d 723 (1945), survived the amendment of the homestead provisions of the Florida Constitution in 1985. Accordingly, we believe the appellee, as the surviving spouse, is entitled to the homestead real property of her deceased husband.
It appears that the abandonment concept set out in Barlow and other cases was inextricably tied to the "head of household" requirement of the prior constitutional homestead scheme. The abandonment concept appears to be predicated on two possible bases. The first is that a homeowner whose spouse abandons him and sets up her own residence elsewhere with no intent of returning cannot be a "head of household" because there is no longer a family residing with him in the home. In that case, the property loses its homestead status by definition and the surviving spouse has no claim simply because there is no homestead. A second possible basis for Barlow's holding is the court's concern that it would be inequitable to allow a spouse who has "abandoned" the homestead to come back and claim it when her spouse dies. This equitable concern would also appear to be tied to the family unit definition of homestead. Even if it is not, however, we do not believe the courts have the authority to act upon such concerns no matter what the equities may be, in view of the clear and unequivocal language to the contrary in the constitutional and statutory homestead scheme.
The 1985 amendment to the Constitution conferred homestead status on any real property owned and occupied by a "natural person" and eliminated the previous requirement that the property be owned by a "head of household." It is undisputed that the property in question is homestead property as defined by Article X, Section 4(a) of the Florida Constitution, since the appel-lee's deceased husband was a natural person who owned and occupied the property at the time of his death. Article X, Section 4(c) provides that the homestead is not subject to devise if the owner is survived by a spouse. Also see § 732.4015, Fla.Stat. (1985). In this case the owner was survived by his spouse, the appellee, although they were living apart at the time of the owner's death. Section 732.401 provides that the homestead property will descend in the same manner as other intestate property, which means in this case that it will go to the appellee, there being no lineal descendants of the deceased. See § 732.4015. There is no language in the Constitution or the statutes conditioning the surviving spouse's rights on her residing with the deceased homesteader at the time of his death. In our view, we cannot judicially graft such a condition upon the homestead scheme set out in the Constitution and the statutes.
We believe the issue we have decided is one of great public importance and we certify the following question to the Supreme Court:
IS THE CONCEPT OF ABANDONMENT AS SET OUT IN BARLOW V BARLOW STILL VIABLE IN VIEW OF THE 1985 AMENDMENT OF THE HOMESTEAD PROVISIONS OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION?
GLICKSTEIN J., concurs specially with opinion.
WALDEN, J., concurs in part, dissents in part with opinion.
. This case is somewhat confusing procedurally. The trial court originally upheld appellee's homestead claim. We relinquished jurisdiction for the trial court to resolve the abandonment issue and the trial court concluded that appellee had "abandoned" her homestead claim. We are affirming the original order awarding the property to appellee.
. In addition to the elimination of this requirement in the 1985 amendment to Article X, the legislature eliminated section 222.19(1) of the statutes which had declared that the legislative intent in providing homestead exemptions was to shelter the family and the surviving spouse.
.We note that the only evidence as to the circumstances of the parties' separation here is the appellee's testimony which indicates she left the home because of the deceased's conduct.