Case Name: EUGENE CALLAHAN, Jr., AN INFANT, BY HIS GUARDIAN AD LITEM, MARY CALLAHAN, AND MARY CALLAHAN AND EUGENE CALLAHAN, HER HUSBAND, PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS, v. DEARBORN DEVELOPMENTS INC., A NEW JERSEY CORPORATION, DEPENDANT-APPELLANT
Court: New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1959-10-23
Citations: 57 N.J. Super. 437
Docket Number: 
Parties: EUGENE CALLAHAN, Jr., AN INFANT, BY HIS GUARDIAN AD LITEM, MARY CALLAHAN, AND MARY CALLAHAN AND EUGENE CALLAHAN, HER HUSBAND, PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS, v. DEARBORN DEVELOPMENTS INC., A NEW JERSEY CORPORATION, DEPENDANT-APPELLANT.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Superior Court Reports
Volume: 57
Pages: 437–452

Head Matter:
EUGENE CALLAHAN, Jr., AN INFANT, BY HIS GUARDIAN AD LITEM, MARY CALLAHAN, AND MARY CALLAHAN AND EUGENE CALLAHAN, HER HUSBAND, PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS, v. DEARBORN DEVELOPMENTS INC., A NEW JERSEY CORPORATION, DEPENDANT-APPELLANT.
Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division
Argued September 21, 1959
Decided October 23, 1959.
Before Judges Conford, Foley and Scherer.
Mr. John W. Leyden, Jr., argued the cause for plaintiffs-respondents (Messrs. Leyden and Monaghan, attorneys).
Mr. William R. Morrison argued the cause for defendant-appellant (Messrs. Morrison, Lloyd & Griggs, attorneys).

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Foley, J. A. D.
This is an appeal from a judgment entered on a jury verdict in plaintiffs' favor. The question presented is whether or not defendant's motion for a judgment of involuntary dismissal should have been granted.
The essential facts are not in dispute. Defendant corporation was in the course of constructing a multiple housing development in Paramus. At the time of the accident the homes therein were in various stages of completion. Defen d-ant had knowledge that children played in the area, this being limited, however, to knowledge that they played on a topsoil pile on the exterior of the premises.
On March 9, 1955 the infant plaintiff, then 11-years of age, accompanied by four other boys wandered into the development area. Once there, they were attracted by a house, the exterior of which had been completely framed. They tried the front door but it was locked. Finding a ladder leaning against the building they propped it up and the smallest child climbed it, opened a window, crawled in and then opened the locked door from the inside allowing the others to enter. Because the foundation excavation had not yet been refilled, the window was located about 12 feet above ground level. In going through the house they came upon an electric chain saw which was on a work table, located a switch on the under side of the table and set the saw in motion. One of the boys who had some familiarity with the use of electric tools ran a board through while the others looked on. Plaintiff, in attempting to do the same severed one of his fingers and injured another. He admitted that he had seen the saw in operation and that he knew it was a dangerous device. Upon this evidence defendant moved for dismissal urging that there was no proof of the violation of a duty to the infant and also that he was guilty of contributory negligence and assumption of risk as a matter of law.
The sole ground assigned for reversal is that plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case of defendant's infraction of its duty to the trespassing infant plaintiff.
The infant trespasser rule laid down in Restatement, Torts, § 339 is now firmly imbedded in the law of this state. Simmel v. New Jersey Coop Co., 28 N. J. 1 (1958); Wytupeck v. Camden, 25 N. J. 450 (1957); Harris v. Mentes-Williams Co., Inc., 11 N. J. 559 (1953); Coughlin v. U. S. Tool Co., Inc., 52 N. J. Super. 341 (App. Div. 1958), certification denied 28 N. J. 527 (1959); Diglio v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co., 39 N. J. Super. 140 (App. Div. 1956); Hoff v. Natural Refining Products Co., 38 N. J. Super. 222 (App. Div. 1955). The section states:
"Artificial Conditions Highly Dangerous to Trespassing Children.
A possessor of land is subject to liability for bodily harm to young children trespassing thereon caused by a structure or other artificial condition which he maintains upon the land, if
(a) the place where the condition is maintained is one upon which the possessor knows or should know that such children are likely to trespass, and
(b) the condition is one of which the possessor knows or should know and which he realizes or should realize as involving an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm to such children, and
(c) the children because of their youth do not discover the condition or realize the risk involved in intermeddling- in it or in coming within the area made dangerous by it, and
(d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition is slight as compared to the risk to young children involved therein."
As was said in Simmel v. New Jersey Coop Co., supra, 28 N. J. at page 9, no inflexible rule can be set forth concerning the "prophylactic measures" to be taken by a defendant in a particular situation; and in Diglio v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co., supra, 39 N. J. Super, at page 145, the circumstances of each case are of pivotal significance. Thus the factual complex must be examined to determine -whether or not the ease falls within the governance of the rule. Guidance in the pursuit of this inquiry is found in the precedents which have developed since the acceptance of the doctrine by oar courts. Simmel v. New Jersey Coop Co., supra, emphasized that the land owner or occupier is not an insurer of the infant; and in Strang v. South Jersey Broadcasting Corp., 9 N. J. 38, 45 (1952) the court said "The basis of liability is the foreseeability of harm, and the measure of duty is care in proportion to the foreseeable risk." Coughlin v. U. S. Tool Co., supra, in which recovery was denied, stressed that proof of compliance with all four conditions recited in the rule is requisite to a prim,a facie case, 52 N. J. Super, at page 346.
In the Restatement itself the bounds of the duty imposed are discussed:
"The duty which the rule stated in this Section imposes upon the possessor of land is based upon the well-known tendency of children to trespass upon the land of others and the necessity of protecting them, even though trespassers, from their childish lack of attention and judgment. The duty of the possessor, therefore, is only to keep so much of the land upon which he should recognize the likelihood of children trespassing, free from those conditions which, though observable by adults, are likely not to be observed by children or which' contain risks the full extent of which an adult would realize but which are beyond the imperfect realization of children. It does not extend to those conditions the existence of which is obvious' even to children and the risk of which is fully realized by them." Restatement, Torts, § 339, note b. (Emphasis added.)
With these principles in mind, we deem it advisable to treat with each of the conditions and with the proof in support thereof separately, as far as that may be practicable.
"(a) the place where the condition is maintained is one upon which the possessor knows or should know that such children are likely to trespass."
"This means first of all that the defendant must have reason to anticipate the presence of the child at the place of danger. where any such reason is lacking, there is no duty to look out for him, and no liability." (Emphasis added.) Prosser, Trespassing Children, 47 Cal. L. Rev. 427, 448 (1959). As we have already noted, defendant's only knowledge of the prior presence of children on any part of the premises was that on occasion they played on the topsoil pile. Judged by any reasonable interpretation of "foreseeability" we cannot accept the proffered thesis that knowing of this, defendant should also have known that it was likely that a child would enter its building by climbing through a window 12 feet above ground level; open a door which defendant had taken the precaution to lock, and admit other children to the building. Nor do we think that defendant should be charged with foreseeing that, having entered, the children would place in motion and operate an electric saw and by their own acts create a "place of danger." To hold otherwise would be to make "foresight" synonymous with "omniscience."
"(b) the condition is one of which the possessor knows or should know and which he realizes or should realize as involving an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm to such children."
Here again "foreseeability" is the bedrock upon which, the proof requirement is founded. If, as we hold, the defendant had no reason to foresee that children would reach the "place of danger" then certainly in logical thinking the capacity of the saw to become "an unreasonable risk of serious injury," considering its location behind a locked door, cannot be said to have been a thing which defendant "realized or should have realized."
"(c) the children because of their youth do not discover the condition or realize the risk involved in intermeddling in it or in coming within the area made dangerous by it"
In this case the infant plaintiff's realization of the risk involved in intermeddling with the saw is beyond debate as the following excerpt from his testimony establishes:
"Q. Did you gee George cut the piece of wood with the saw?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you know from what you saw right in front of you that this electric saw would tear a piece of wood, cut it right in half? Did you know that?
A. I saw it.
Q. You saw that?
A. Yes.
Q. Would it be fair for me to say you knew that that saw would cut your hand, to, if it got in the way?
Mr. Leyden: I object to that, arguing with the witness.
Q. From what you saw of this saw, too, right in front of you, when George was using it, did you know it was dangerous?
A. Yes."
It has been suggested that notwithstanding plaintiff's acknowledgment that he knew the instrumentality to be dangerous, he should not be debarred from recovery since it does not appear that he was aware of the danger which inhered in the manner in which he used it. We deem such test of culpability to be entirely subjective and in disaccord with the intent of the rule. See Restatement, Torts, § 339, note b, supra.
"(4) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition is slight compared to the risk to young children involved therein."
In support of the contention that the utility of the saw was outweighed by the unreasonable risk of harm to which plaintiff was subjected, it is urged that the risk would have been obviated if the main switch which was located in the basement of the building had been turned off. This completely overlooks the adventurous nature of the infant trespasser, the very characteristic that exempts him from the sanctions which would be imposed upon his adult brother in the same circumstances. We find it unreasonable to infer that had this been done the boy would not have been injured. More likely it seems that the frustration engendered in the visitors when they found the device incapable of immediate operation would have been a challenge to their boundless ingenuity, which they would have promptly accepted. The locked door having presented no barrier • to their entrance it is doubtful indeed that they would have experienced any hesitancy in searching the premises until they found the source of the electrical supply.
Thus it would appear that the only course open to the defendant as a precaution against the intermeddling of infant trespassers was to remove the saw from the premises each day at the close of work. If such is held to have been defendant's obligation, it would naturally encompass- the removal of all other tools and devices in or about the building project which might be or become dangerous when put to use. Considering the unlikelihood of the trespassers (a) entering the building, and (b) putting the machinery in operation,, we find that the utility of the device in serving the legitimate purposes of the defendant was far greater than the foreseeable risk of injury — if by any process of reasoning the risk here involved can be held to have been foreseeable.
Implicit in a just application of the infant trespasser doctrine is a concept which is stated by Dean Prosser thus:
"To begin with, there is virtually no condition upon any land with which a child may not possibly get himself into trouble. He may choke to death upon a green apple, pick up a stick and poke it into his eye, or have his skull fractured by a rock found and thrown by his companion. Children may, and do, do practically everything. Unless the possessor is to shoulder the impossible burden of making his land completely 'child proof,' which might mean razing it to the bare earth, something' more is called for than the general possibility of somehow coming to some harm which follows the child everywhere throughout his daily existence." Trespassing Children, 47 Cal. L. Rev. at page 452.
The totality' of the facts leads us to the conclusion that the proof neither conforms literally with the principles recited in Restatement, Torts, § 339, supra, nor with the objective the doctrine was designed to achieve. This we take to be the providing of a fair and reasonable basis for the adjustment of the conflict between human rights and property rights which gives recognition to the superior position in the social scheme of the former yet refrains from unduly burdening the latter. Cf. Strang v. South Jersey Broadcasting Corp., supra, 9 N. J. at page 45.
"We therefore reverse and direct that judgment be entered in favor of the defendant.