Case Name: Stuart Leslie POMERANZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1994-04-13
Citations: 634 So. 2d 1145
Docket Number: No. 93-0794
Parties: Stuart Leslie POMERANZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: GUNTHER, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 634
Pages: 1145–1148

Head Matter:
Stuart Leslie POMERANZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 93-0794.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
April 13, 1994.
Keith M. Krasnove of Keith M. Krasnove, P.A., Coral Springs, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Sharon A. Wood, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
PARMER, Judge.
This is still another case in which a trial judge has unreasonably limited cross examination of a key state witness, an alleged co-conspirator, regarding a separate murder prosecution against the witness and a motive therein to testify falsely. As we have previously explained in Taylor v. State, 623 So.2d 832 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), and Auchmuty v. State, 594 So.2d 859 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992), a defendant is allowed wide latitude in these circumstances to show that the witness has colored his testimony to suit a plea agreement or other considerations from the state.
Here the judge abused his discretion in not allowing defense counsel to pursue a line of questioning designed to show that the witness faced capital murder charges for his participation in the separate crime which constituted a powerful incentive for this witness to adjust his testimony in this ease. We are unable to find this error harmless, as we have no way of knowing what responses the questioning might have elicited; and, in any event, on the present record we cannot say that the state has shown it to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
We also conclude that it was an abuse of discretion to limit the cross examination of the state's only eyewitness, the night manager of a fast food restaurant making a night deposit at a bank depository. Briefly stated, the proposed questions centered on a debt which the manager allegedly owed to a previous employer in a sum equal to the amount stolen, as a motive for the night manager to have himself stolen the money and fabricated the robbery as a cover for the crime.
While we agree with the state that it is possible that this line of questioning could quickly have gone astray, we nevertheless conclude that the trial judge erred in failing to allow any questions at all on the subject. As with the above, we cannot say that this error was harmless.
REVERSED FOR NEW TRIAL.
GUNTHER, J., concurs.
GLICKSTEIN, J., concurs specially with opinion.