Case Name: HUME v. ROGUE RIVER PACKING CO.
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1907-12-17
Citations: 51 Or. 237
Docket Number: 
Parties: HUME v. ROGUE RIVER PACKING CO.
Judges: 
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 51
Pages: 237–261

Head Matter:
Argued June 20,
decided December 17, 1907;
rehearing denied August 4, 1908.
HUME v. ROGUE RIVER PACKING CO.
[83 Pac. 391; 92 Pac. 1065; 96 Pac. 865.]
Appeal—Record—Transcript—Identification op Evidence.
1. B. & O. Comp., Section 827, providing that, when an equity case has proceeded to final decree, the judge shall within 10 days after the entry of the decree identify the evidence by a proper certificate, i.s not mandatory; and where there is some confusion touching the evidence, exhibits, and documents proper to be brought to the Supreme Oourt with the transcript, a motion to strike such evidence, etc., because not identified by the judge, will be granted, with permission to appellant to apply to the judge for a proper certificate.
Same—Motion to Strike Evidence—disposition.
2. Where it will require an extended survey of all the voluminous evidence brought up on appeal in an equity case to determine what is proper and what is not proper, a motion to strike from the transcript evidence, documents, and exhibits which were not introduced on the trial, will be left undetermined until the cause is heard upon its merits.
Same—Motion to Strike Stipulation.
3. The consideration of a motion to strike a stipulation from a transcript will be postponed until final hearing, where the court is unable to determine from the information before it at the time the motion is made, the propriety of striking such stipulation.
Navigable Waters — Lands Under Water — Ownership—Fish.
4. Where the gradual shifting of a river submerged that part of a shore to which plaintiff claimed title by purchase from the State as tide land, the title to such land became revested in the State, and plaintiff had no dominion over the water covering such land or the fish in it.
Fish — 1“Fishery”—“Fishing Place.”
5. A fishery, which is a right to employ within a particular stretch of water lawful means for the taking of fish which may be found there, is to be distinguished from a fishing place, which is the right to use a particular shore or beach as a basis for carrying on the business, and is always vested in the shore owner.
Same — Fishery—Nature of Property.
6. A fishery is real and not personal property — a part of the soil — and not an entity having an independent existence.
Same — Fishery on Land of Another
7. A fishery, so far as it is exercised on another’s land, is a proüt a prendre, and cannot therefore be claimed by way of easement.
Same — Private Right of Fishery in Public Water.
8. Where a mere right of fishery in public water has been conferred by the sovereign, it will not be regarded as exclusive, in the absence of anything to indicate an intention to make it exclusive, although the title to the soil is also in the grantor.
Same — Rights of Public.
9. Rogue River being a navigable stream, all the rights at common law incident to navigable waters attach, and hence it is a public highway, where all the people of common right may go, and prima facie have a common right to fish.
Navigable Waters — Lands Under Water — Ownership and Control in General.
10. By virtue of its sovereignty, the State, upon its admission into the Union, became vested with the title to all of the shores and arms of the sea, covered and uncovered by the ebb and flow of the tide, as well as the land under all of the navigable waters within the State, subject to the public right of navigation and to the common right of the citizens of the State to fish therein.
Same.
11. The right of the several states to regulate and control the shores of tide waters and the land under them, is the same as that exercised by the Crown of England.
Same — Riparian Rights.
12. By the laws of this State, the owner of uplands bordering on navigable water has no title in the adjoining lands below high-water mark, nor any right in or over the adjoining waters as appurtenant thereto; and hence plaintiff’s title to the uplands adjacent to that part of Rogue River above tide water runs only to ordinary high-water mark, and cannot be made the basis of an exclusive right to fish in its waters.
Fish — Fisheries in Public Waters — Grants of Tide Lands — Right of Fishery as Appurtenant.
18. Tide land deeds from the State under the tide land act of 1872 (Laws 1872, p. 129), as amended by the acts of 1874 (Laws 1874, p. 76), 1876 (Laws 1876 p. 69), and 1878 (Laws 1878, p.41), which provides that the grantee shall hold the lands subject to the easement of the public to enter thereupon and remove, under certain provisions, oysters and other shell flsh therefrom, do not, under the rule expressio unius est exelusio altering, convey the exclusive right of catching floating flsh as appurtenant to the lands granted, since the right to use the oyster beds would have remained in the public irrespective of the reservation; anda conveyance of the exclusive right to catch floating flsh, being in derogation of a public right, will not be presumed unless clear and special words are used to denote it.
Same — Exclusive Private Right oe Fishery — Establishment by Custom.
14. A custom among fishermen along a river, to the effect that the shore owner has the exclusive right to flsh to the middle of the stream opposite his land, especially where he has cleared out a place in the bed of the stream for seining, does not entitle, such owner to a several fishery within the limits prescribed, since clearing out a fishing place, whether in navigable waters or nonnavigable waters, does not give an exclusive right of fishing, and right to take fish in another’s fishery, being a profit a prendre, cannot be claimed by custom.
Easements — Acquisition by Prescription.
15. The use and enjoyment which will give title by prescription to an easement or other incorporeal right, is substantially the same in quality aud characteristics as the adverse possession which will give title to real estate.
Same — Hostile Character oe Acts Relied on — Ground oe Action.
16. To constitute adverse user, the acts relied upon in maintenance of a prescriptive right must have been an invasion of the rights of the party against whom it is set up, and of such character as to afford him grounds of action.
Fish — Private Right oe Fishery in Public Waters — Acquisition by Prescription.
17. Where the owner of lands adjacent to the waters of Rogue River had long been alone in exercising the right to flsh therein with seines and nets, such exercise is not adverse to any one in the sense of establishing a prescriptive right, since it did not necessarily prevent other citizens from exercising the same right during the alleged prescriptive period.
Same — Intent to Acquire Title.
18. The mere fact that an owner of lands adjacent to Rogue River warned intending fishermen away from the waters opposite his lands, is not sufficient to constitute adverse possession of the right to flsh in such waters, since the intent upon which adverse possession is founded is determined by what was done, not by what was said, and such warning to some fishermen would not be a notice to others, much less a notice to the State.
Same — Hostile Character oe Acts.
19. No private right to participate in a fishery can be acquired by an exercise of a public right, though enjoyed for 50 years, since such exercise is not based on a claim inimical to the right of others, and does not afford any one grounds of action to question the assumed right.
Adverse Possession — Nature oe Prescription — Presumption oe Grant.
20. Prescription rests on the presumption of a grant which has been lost by process of time, and hence no prescription can have a legal origin where no grant could have been made to support it.
Constitutional Law — Special Privileges or Immunities — Grant oe Exclusive Right oe Fishery in Navigable Waters.
21. The act of February 17,1899 (Acts 1889, p. 72, § 2), which provides that the - wners of tide lands and riparian owners above tide water on certain rivers, as appurtenances thereto, shall have the exclusive right of fishing for salmon with seines and nets, etc., in so far as it attempts to vest in such owners the exclusive right to fish in navigable waters, is in violation of Const., Or., Article 1, Section20, providingthat “nolawshallbe passed granting to any citizen privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall not legally belong to all citizens,” in that it grants a monopoly in a lawful and uninjurious business, which may be conducted as of common right.
From Curry: James W. Hamilton, Judge.
Suit by R. D. Hume to establish the exclusive right to take salmon fish in certain parts' of Rogue River. From a decree dismissing the complaint, the plaintiff appeals.
Motion to strike out certain matters from the transcript was allowed in part.
Motion Allowed in Part: Affirmed.
Decided December 4, 1905.
On Motion to Strike.
[83 Pac. 391.]
Mr. M. G. Munly and Mr. John F. Hall for the motion.
Mr. Robert H. Countryman and Mr. William C. Hale contra.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
The respondents seek by motion to have stricken from the transcript and files of this court in the above cause the testimony, exhibits and documentary evidence accompanying such transcript, assigning as grounds therefor: (1) That such testimony, documentary evidence and exhibits were not identified by the trial judge rendering the decree, as the law requires; (2) that such testimony, etc., are not certified as required by rule.l of this court; and (3) that there appears to be incorporated with such testimony the evidence of witnesses, including documents and exhibits, which was never given or admitted at the trial of the cause. The respondents also seek by a further motion, filed at the1 same time, to have stricken from the transcript a stipulation, entered into' between' counsel .for the parties, touching certain evidence it was desired'to have admitted.m .the,cause. . . ;
Referring to the first motion, the statute provides that "when an equity cause has gone to a final decree, the judge of the court rendering the decree shall, within ten days after the entry of the decree, by a proper certificate, identify all the evidence in the case, whether consisting of the testimony of the witnesses, documentary evidence or exhibits": B. & C. Comp. § 827. We have not regarded this statute as mandatory (Osgood v. Osgood, 35 Or. 6: 56 Pac. 1017), and, there appearing to be some confusion touching the evidence, exhibits and documents proper to be brought to this court with the transcript, the motion will be allowed, with permission to the appellant to apply to the trial judge for the proper certificate respecting such testimony, etc., and for this sixty days' time will be given. The certificate of the clerk can also.be obtained within the time, if deemed important.
As it pertains to the third ground, it will require an extended survey of all the evidence brought here, which is very voluminous, to determine what is proper and what is not. Hence it is deemed advisable, the cause being in equity, to leave the matter unsettled until the same is heard upon its merits.
Referring to the further motion, we are unable to determine with the information before us touching the propriety of striking out such stipulations. Hence this matter will also be postponed until the final hearing of the cause, with leave to renew the motion then.
The order will be entered in accordance with this opinion. Motion Allowed in Part.