Case Name: Zeratsky, Appellant, vs. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company, Respondent
Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Wisconsin
Decision Date: 1910-02-01
Citations: 141 Wis. 423
Docket Number: 
Parties: Zeratsky, Appellant, vs. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: Wisconsin Reports
Volume: 141
Pages: 423–446

Head Matter:
Zeratsky, Appellant, vs. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company, Respondent.
October 28, 1909
February 1, 1910.
Railroads: Injuries to employees: Statute construed: Proximate cause: Contributory negligence: Comparative negligence: Questions for jury: Degrees of negligence: Appeal: Review of evidence: Rules of railway company: .Construction: Burden of proof.
1. In suM. 3, sec. 1816, Stats. (Laws of 1907, ch. 2S4), in the phrase “negligence directly contributing to the injury,” the word “directly” is used in the sense of próxknately, and its use does not operate to change the law.on the_subject of proximate cause.
2 Under sec. 1816, Stats. (Laws of 1907, ch. 254), in an action against a railway company for injuries sustained by an employee, it is for the court to determine whether the evidence tends to show negligence attributable to the company and whether it tends to show contributory negligence of the injured person. If the evidence does-so;tend, it is for the jury to determine therefrom whether or not_ there was in fact such negligence or contributory negligence. If it is found that the negligence of both parties concurred .te- produce the injury, the jury is then to determine whethe.r the negligence of the injured person was slighter or greater as a contributing cause to the injury than that attributable to the company, unless the evidence permits of but one inference] in which case the question is to be decided by the court_as"a matter of law.
■ 3.' It is not impracticable to have the jury determine whether the negligence of the injured person was slighter or greater as a contributing cause to the injury^than the negligence of the company; and the determination of that question need not be based upon the classification of the degrees of negligence into slight, ordinary, and gross.
4. In reviewing a decision of the triad'court to the effect that, as matter of law, plaintiff’s negligence was at least equal to that of defendant as a contributing cause’ to the injury, the permissible inferences from the evidence'which are most favorable to plaintiff must be assumed to be the inferences which the jury would have drawn.
5. Under a rule of a railway compaiiy :that when a train stops between stations a flagman must immediately go back with proper signals to stop any train that may be following, and another - .rule that train and engine men will be held equally responsible for a violation of any of the rules governing the safety of trains and must take every precaution for the protection of trains even if not provided for by the rules, it was the duty of the rear brakeman of a freight train which stopped between stations to go back with the required signals, though not directed to do so by the conductor or by signal from the engineer as provided in another rule.
6. Under the evidence in this case it was a question for the jury whether the negligence of the rear brakeman on a freight train which had stopped between stations, in failing to go back with signals to stop any train which might be following, was slighter or greater, as a contributing cause to his injury in a collision between a train so following and his train, than the negligence of other employees, attributable to the company.
7. In passing upon such question all the acts of other employees occupying positions of responsibility with respect to the movement of the trains (including in this case the train dispatcher, the engineer of the following train, and the conductor and engineer of the freight train) must be viewed in comparison with the acts of plaintiff, in the light of their respective duties and responsibility.
8. Sec. 1816, Stats. (Laws of 1907, ch. 254), does not change the rule that in an action by a servant for personal injuries the burden of showing contributory negligence is upon the defendant.
Maeshall, J., dissents.
Appeal from a - judgment of the circuit court for Brown county: S. D. Hastings, Circuit Judge.
Reversed.
Plaintiff was the rear brakeman on the defendant’s extra freight train, consisting of -fifty-four cars, a caboose, and an engine, which left Green Bay, Wisconsin, September 28,1907, at 10:10 p. m., bound for Milwaukee. It had a full crew of trainmen, consisting of the engineer, fireman, conductor, and two brakemen. The train proceeded south through De Pere at 11:05 p.’m., and through Askeaton, and when about one and one-fourth miles from Hilbert Junction the engine ran out of water and was unable to- pull the train to Hilbert Junction. The plaintiff was in the caboose when the train stopped. The engineer, fireman, conductor, and other brakeman, without informing plaintiff of their intention, cut the engine from the train and proceeded with it to Hilbert Junction to get a ■supply of water without giving a signal to the plaintiff, as required by the following rule of thehompany:
“Rule 26. The one long, two short, and one long blast of the whistle thus,-,--, will be given by engineers when they find it necessary to stop between stations and to notify conductor, thus enabling him to drop off and send back a fiagman.” ' , --■
As soon as plaintiff observed that the train had stopped he left the caboose and went forward-to about the middle of the train to ascertain the cause of The stopping. He there observed that the engine had been cut off and had left with the rest of the crew, and he then started back. The plaintiff stated that while going forwarcPand coming back he observed the odor of a hot box, and he tapped the boxes to find the one, and immediately upon his return he went into the caboose to get his dope bucket to fix it. He testified that he took no- more time than was necessary to make this, trip.- “Special rules for train and engine men” of the defendant contains the following : ,
“Rule B4. Conductors and brákemen must examine their trains, whenever there is an opportunity to do so, looking particularly for hot boxes and defective draft and brake rigging.”
. Meanwhile the defendant’s regula?' passenger train bound for Milwaukee on the same line as that on which the freight was proceeding had arrived at Grrfeen Bay at about 12:30 a. m. and had left a few minutes later.- At Be Pere it was permitted to enter the block which was occupied by the freight train. One of the rules of the defendant u^as as follows: “Rule 3. Trains must not pass a block signal- at danger except under authority of a clearance card form 168.” The conductor and engineer were given permissive and clearance cards under the following rules, which trainmen axe supposed to know and obey:
“Rule 4. When the block signal stands at danger, the operator issues a clearance card which states that he has no orders or no further orders for the train named. The train receiving clearance card may proceed if its time-table rates or special orders permit it to do so.
“Rule 5. The permissive card is used when trains are permitted to pass a block signal at danger and enter the section ■under notice that the preceding train has not cleared the same section. This is to be used only by direction of the train dispatcher.
. “Rule 6. When a train is to proceed under a permissive card, the conductor and engineer must each have a card of the following form properly filled out and signed by the train dispatcher.”
“Rule 10. Trains running under the authority of a permissive card or caution signal must run with great care and at reduced speed to insure against collisions with trains ahead.”
A special caution order was issued to the conductor and engineer in these words:
“Extra east, Dietzler conductor, left De Pere at 11:42 p. m. and has not yet arrived at Hilbert Junction. Proceed cautiously, expecting to find them on main line at any point without flag protection.”
The passenger proceeded south — or east as it is called in railroad parlance — and, when running at a speed of about thirty miles per hour, collided with the rear end of the freight train which had stopped on the main track a mile and one-quarter from Hilbert Junction. The freight train crew had not been specifically informed that the passenger train had been permitted to enter the same block or section of track as was occupied by the freight train. The plaintiff, who was in the caboose of the freight train, was seriously injured by the collision. The fireman of the passenger train was killed and the engineer was injured. There was a straight and unobstructed stretch of track back of the caboose of 3,000 feet. Whether or not the red lights were burning on the caboose was a disputed question on the trial.
The following rules of the defendant regarding the operation of trains were in force at the time of the collision:
“Rule 62. When a tr' in stops between stations, a flagman must immediately go back with proper signals to stop any trains that may be following. Not a. moment must be lost in inquiry as to tbe cause of stoppage or its probable duration. Tbe flagman must go back instantly’ and shall take not less tban three torpedoes, also a red flag by day and a red and white light by night, and shall place one torpedo on the rail on the engineer’s side when three-fourths of a mile (twenty-three telegraph poles) distant from the rear of train, and at a further distance of one-fourth of a-.'mile (eight telegraph, poles), he shall place two torpedoes on the rail on the engineer’s side. He will then, selecting a place where the view is long and clear, remain until the train is stopped or he is recalled. Returning he will leave two torpedoes at the most distant point from his train and take up-the rest. Whenever-it becomes necessary, the forward end of the train shall be protected in the same manner.” _ .
“Rule 50. Train and engine men will be held equally responsible for violation of any of the rules governing the safety of trains, and they must take every-precaution for the protection of trains, even if not provided for by the rules.”
“Rule 26. Conductors will be held responsible for the faithful performance of the duty required on the part of their brakemen.”
“Rule A58. Trains moving under permissive card will beheld responsible for an accident in the nature of colliding with the train occupying the section which required movement under the permissive card. Engineers wilknot be censured for-moving at a speed to insure against accident.”
The defendant alleges that the collision was caused by the failure of the passenger engineer to observe its train orders- and the rules and regulations known -to him, together with the contributory negligence of the plaintiff and his violation of the defendant’s rules and regulations.
At the close of the testimony the_/Court, on defendant’s motion, directed a verdict for the defendant, and judgment was entered upon the verdict so directed. This is an appeal from-the judgment.
Eor the appellant there was a brief by Wigrrum, Martin &■ Martin, and oral argument by P. H. Martin..
Eor the respondent there was a brief by Greene, Fairchild, North & Parker^ and oral argument by N. 0. Fairchild.

Opinion:
Tbe following opinion was filed December 7, 1909 :
Siebecker, J.
The right of the plaintiff to recover in this •action is governed by the provisions of sec. 1816, Stats, (ch. 254, Laws of 1907), which provides that:
"Every railroad company shall be liable for damages for all • injuries . . . sustained by any of its employees, . . . when such injury . . . shall have been sustained by any . . . employee of such company, while engaged in the line of his duty as such and which such injury shall have been caused in whole or in greater part by the . . . negligence of any other officer, agent, servant or employee of such company, . in the discharge of, or . . . by reason of failure to discharge his duties as such."
It is also provided that the court shall submit to the jury the questions whether any negligence attributable to the company "directly contributed to the injury," and, if such negligence is found, "whether the person injured Was guilty of any negligence which directly contributed to the injury," and, if the jury shall find the injured person guilty of contributory negligence, the court shall then submit to them the inquiry "whether the negligence of the party so injured was slighter or greater as a contributing cause to the injury than that of the company." It is further provided:
"In all cases where the jury shall find that the negligence of tire company . . . was greater than the negligence of the employee so injured, and contifibuting in a greater degree to such injury, then the plaintiff shall be entitled to recover.
The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant upon the ground that the evidence in this case showed as matter of law that the company's negligence, which concurred with that of the plaintiff to produce his injuries, was not greater and contributed in no greater degree to such injuries than the plaintiff's contributory negligence.
In Kiley v. C., M. & St. P. R. Co. 138 Wis. 215, 119 N. W. 309, 120 N. W. 150, we had occasion to declare that these provisions of the law did not affect the judicial power of the-court to determine whether the evidence presented tended to> show negligence attributable to the company and contributory negligence of the person injured, and, if the evidence tended' to show such negligence, it was. foi? the jury to determine therefrom whether or not in fact such negligence or contributory negligence existed. It was also decided that the provisions declaring that the contributory negligence of the person should be no bar to his recovery in cases wherein the jury should find that the negligence attributable to the company "was greater than the negligence of the employee so injured, and contributing in a greater degree to such injury," were within the legislative power of police regulation.
Upon this and other appeals, in actions under this statute, additional considerations have arisen respecting the interpretation of the context of the act and its effect' in the modification of the law as it theretofore existed. Subd. 3 of the act requires that there shall be submitted to the jury the question whether the company's negligence and the injured person's contributory negligence directly contributed to the injury. The inquiry is suggested: Does the use of the word "directly" operate to modify the law of proximate cause in the law of negligence ? We discover nothing in the phraseology of the act indicative of a legislative intent-to- modify the law on this subject. Nor does the language employed necessarily operate to effect a change as to what shall constitute proximate cause. The provisions are that the jury shall determine whether the company and .the injured person are guilty of negligence "directly contributing to- the injury." The word "directly" was evidently employed here in the sense of proximately, and-was intended to include and comprehend the negligence which naturally and probably caused the injury; that is, the negligence which proximately contributed to produce the injury. True, it has. been said, in cases reviewing instructions to juries in negligence cases where the jury were informed that tbe proximate cause of an injury was such negligence as directly caused it, that such instructions were incorrect and failed to properly inform the jury that the right to recover rested on the fact that the damages claimed were the natural and probable result of the negligence charged. The criticism in these cases of the use of the word, as there applied, was that it did not convey to the jury the idea that the alleged injury must be shown to have naturally resulted from the negligence charged and that it was within reasonable anticipation that such negligence might cause an injury. As used in this statute it is applied to negligence in the accepted legal sense of responsible and efficient causation. This seems to us the reasonable and natural inference from the phraseology of the statute. We think it was so intended by the legislature, and that the words of the statute, "negligence directly contributing to the injury," were employed as expressive of the idea of negligence proximately contributing to the injury, and in the trial of cases wherein it is appropriate to inform juries of the provisions of the law it is to be interpreted that the clauses referring to "negligence directly contributing to the injury" are applied to the negligence proximately contributing to the injury.
The statute also provides that if the jury shall find that the negligence attributable to the company "was greater than the negligence of the employee so injured, and contributing in a greater degree to such injury," then plaintiff's contributory negligence shall be no bar to< his recovery. This abrogates the pre-existing law that the contributory negligence of the injured person may defeat recovery. This provision is a complement to the preceding subd. 2, which makes railroad companies liable for injuries to employees which have resulted "in whole or in greater part" from the negligence attributable to them. It is to be noted that the questions prescribed by subd. 3 are made to harmonize with subd. 2, in that the negligence -of tbe company and tbe contributory-negligence of tbe person Injured are treated, in effect, as contributing causes to tbe injury. While tbe same phraseology is not employed in subd. 4 in dealing with this subject, it is evident that tbe legislature intended this provision to carry into effect tbe liability created by subd. 2 and to so modify the contributory rule as to accord therewith and to enforce recovery in.those cases wherein tbe negligence of tbe injured person should be found to be slighter as a contributing cause to the injury than that of the company.
Interpreting these provisions together, we are persuaded that the legislative intent was to apply this legislation to the law as'established by the decisions of this court. It had been recognized by this court that the negligent acts of two or more responsible agencies might proximately contribute to produce an injury and that their negligences might concur in different degrees in proximately causing it. Xn Ounningham, v. Lyness, 22 Wis. 245, the court, referring to the concurrence of an injured person's negligence with that.of another as a bar to recovery, states: "A party cannot recover for an injury of which 'his own negligence was in whole or in part the proximate cause." In an exhaustive review of the decisions of this court-on the subject of negligence and contributory negligence in Bolin v. C., St. P., M. & O. R. Co. 108 Wis. 333, 84 N. W. 446, the subject was adverted to. The result is embodied in the headnote and is stated thus: ~
"In an action to recover damages claimed to have been caused by actionable negligence of the defendant, contributory negligence of the plaintiff, however slight, precludes his recovering damages, notwithstanding negligence of the defendant, however great, contributed thereto."
This idea that the concurrence of the negligences of both parties to a legal controversy might constitute the proximate cause is also recognized and exemplified in numerous crossing cases that have come before this court.
The context of the statute indie,ates that the legislature as- snmed this to be within the legal conception of proximate' cause in the law of negligence, and proceeding thereon framed this statute to modify the right of recovery in negligence cases^ against railroad companies by providing that if the company's-negligence contributed to cause the injury in greater degree' than that of the injured person, then the company should be-liable for the resultant damages as if its negligence had been the sole cause of the injury; or, in the language of subd. 4, if "the negligence of the company . . . was greater than the negligence of the employee so injured, and contributing in a greater degree to such injury, then the plaintiff shall be entitled to recover." In administering the statute in cases as they actually arise, it devolves on the court to determine whether there is any evidence tending to show negligence attributable to the company and contributory negligence of the-injured person which proximately contributed to the injury complained of. If the evidence produced shows that the neg-ligences of both parties to the action concurred to produce the injury, unless the evidence is so clear and undisputed as to' permit of only one inference on the question, it then becomes a question for the jury to determine whether the negligence of the injured party was slighter or greater as a contributing' cause to the injury than that attributable to the company. In case the evidence permits of only the one inference it devolves on the court to decide the issue as a matter of law. Whether a case is one for a court or jury to determine cannot be settled by any general rule or classification of cases, but must be determined in the light of the facts and circumstances of each particular case. The question is not ascertainable by any rule of absolute measurement, and it therefore must be submitted to human judgment.
It has been claimed and the suggestion is made in argument on this feature of the law that it is practically impossible for a jury to determine such controversies upon a scale of infinite degrees, and that the legislature therefore must have intended tbat the laiv should be applied in view of the generally accepted classification of the degrees of negligence into slight, ordinary, and gross, and that such- degrees of negligence should be observed in comparing as;'contributing causes the negligence of the company and that of the injured person. We discover no such intent or provision in the law, nor do we deem it impracticable to have the jury judge whether the negligence of the injured person contributing to cause the injury is- slighter or greater than that attributable to the company. Applying the statute to the case before us, we cannot accede to the defendant's claim that it would be mere speculation and guesswork for the jury to attempt to determine whether plaintiffs contributory negligence was slighter or greater as a contributing cause than that of the defendant.
It is alleged -that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence in omitting to perform his duty as brakeman on the occasion in question, in that he failed to protect the rear of the freight train from the passenger train, and that this failure of duty by him was a proximate cause of the collision and his injuries. The contention is that but "for plaintiff's contributory negligence the injury would not have been received, and hence that the negligence of the plaintiff in its most favorable aspect under the law is equal to the negligence attributable to the defendant as a contributing cause to the injury. In the solution of this question all of the inferences from the evidential facts most favorable in support of the plaintiff's alleged cause nf action must be assumed to be the view of the case which may be taken by the jury. The contention that plaintiff's duty did not require him to flag the train under rule 62 unless directed so to do by the train conductor or by a signal from the engineer by a blast from the whistle cannot be sustained. The rule is clear in its provision that when a train stops between stations a flagman must go back to stop any train that may be following, give the prescribed signals, to it, and remain at the place to which he has gone until the train stops or he is re called. This duty is further enjoined by rule 50, which informs persons engaged in the train service that:
"Train and engine men will be held equally responsible for a violation of any of the rules governing the safety of trains, and they must take every precaution for the protection of trains even if not provided for by the rules."
We find no support for plaintiff's claim that the duty imposed by these regulations was disregarded in practice to such an extent as to abrogate them. Nor is it shown that the plaintiff was informed while in defendant's service that these rules and the duties imposed thereby were not obligatory on him. We think that the plaintiff as rear brakeman of this train was required to perform whatever duty these rules imposed on him.
The evidence tends to show that the plaintiff was the rear brakeman on a freight train which came to a stop on the main track between stations. He had not been informed by the engineer's signal that the train was to make a stop. So far as he then knew, the train might be stopped only momentarily. In the operation of trains stops of a momentary character must inevitably occur, and on such occasions it would be both unnecessary and impracticable for the rear brakeman to leave the train at once to signal a train that might be following. It is obvious that if the brakeman should immediately so leave his train on all such occasions, he would on many occasions be wholly separated from his train. He testifies that he went forward to a point where he observed that the engine had been detached from the train and had departed for Hilbert Junction ; that then he crossed over to the other side of the train; that he observed the odor of a hot box, and that he attempted to locate it while he was returning to the caboose; that he took no more time than it naturally takes to make such a trip; that he returned to the caboose without intending to go and signal the coming passenger train; that he at once looked for the dope bucket in the caboose to fix the hot box; and that the col lision occurred immediately, it is argued that this amounts to a violation of his duty under the rules and establishes his contributory negligence. Upon learning that the engine had departed for Hilbert Junction it became the duty of the plaintiff to procure the means and to go back to signal a coming train, and in omitting so to do he was guilty of not exercising that care which the situation, and the exigencies of the case demanded, but it is not so clear that it can be held as matter of law in what degree it contributed to produce the injury. The contention that it amounted to the very highest degree of negligence because the accident would not have happened but for the violation of defendant's rules seems necessarily to assume that the plaintiff, in making this trip to ascertain whether the train was to stop more than momentarily, and in not instantly, upon the stopping of- the freight train, taking steps to signal the coming passenger train, was guilty of suqh a high degree of negligence as to preclude his recovery. He testifies that he consumed from fifteen to twenty-five minutes on his trip; that he relied on the' red-light signals displayed on the rear of the caboose to signal the coming passenger train; that he went to the caboose for the dope bucket to fix the hot box, and. while in this act the collision occurred. It is not clear from the record that if on his return to the caboose he had immediately proceeded to procure his lantern and torpedoes to signal the coming train he would have prevented the collision. The degree of negligence involved in these acts is not so clear that it can be determined as a matter of law. Under the circumstances it is a mixed question of law and fact Which must-be resolved by the jury.
The case also demands of the jury that they determine in what degree the negligence attributable to the company contributed to produce the injury. Among the matters bearing on this question it is alleged that the train dispatcher was derelict in his duty in permitting the passenger train to enter the block as be did; that the engineer of tbe passenger train omitted to obey special and express orders in running his train on tbe block; and that the conductor and tbe engineer of tbe freight train were negligent in not signaling or warning this brakeman of the stop, and in failing to ascertain before stopping that the plaintiff as rear brakeman was on duty or capable of protecting the rear of the train. In passing on the question of whether or not the company's negligence caused plaintiff's injuries in greater degree than that of the plaintiff, all of these facts relating to the omission of duty on the part of these servants who occupied positions of great responsibility in the conduct of the defendant's business must be viewed in comparison with the acts of the plaintiff in the light of their respective duties and their responsibility to exercise a degree of care commensurate to the exigencies of the situation. The case is not so plain and clear that but one inference can reasonably be drawn from the evidence as to these questions, and they therefore should have been submitted to the jury for determination.
The plaintiff's contention that the defendant is estopped from charging plaintiff with contributory negligence because he was sent out on this trip in such a state of physical and mental exhaustion from being in constant service for the defendant immediately preceding it as to malee him incapable of comprehending and performing the duties required of him is not sustained. The evidence is undisputed to the effect, and plaintiff claims, that he attended to and comprehended all his duties. His whole claim and the showing refute the inference that he was unable to attend to Ms duties.
It is averred by the defendant that since the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the negligence attributable to the defendant was a greater contributing cause to the injury than that of the plaintiff, this involves a modification of the rule which has heretofore obtained in this state which casts the burden of proving plaintiff's contributory negligence on the defendant. This rule operated to relieve the plaintiff from the necessity of showing himself free from contributory negligence. We discover nothing in the law evincing an intention of the legislature to change the rule, nor do we find that such a change is necessary for the orderly administration of the various provisions of the law.
Erom the views indicated, it results that the court erred in directing a verdict. The case should have been submitted to the jury for determination of the issues under the law as amended by eh. 254, Laws of 1907.
' By the Gowrt. — Judgment reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial.