Case Name: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Nathaniel Hirum THOMAS, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1992-09-11
Citations: 604 So. 2d 1277
Docket Number: No. 91-1756
Parties: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Nathaniel Hirum THOMAS, Appellee.
Judges: W. SHARP, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 604
Pages: 1277–1281

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Nathaniel Hirum THOMAS, Appellee.
No. 91-1756.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Sept. 11, 1992.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Nancy Ryan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellant.
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and M.A. Lucas, Asst. Public Defender, Dayto-na Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
HARRIS, Judge.
Nathaniel H. Thomas was a convicted felon suspected of selling small quantities of cocaine from his home. After conducting a controlled buy, the officers obtained a search warrant on February 4, 1991. Four days later a second controlled buy was effected at 7:56 p.m. The warrant was executed one hour and thirty four minutes after the second purchase.
The officers did not comply with the knock and announce rule. When they entered, Thomas was not there. The search revealed no drugs but a firearm was dis covered. Thomas was arrested for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.
Thomas moved to suppress, and the court granted suppression, solely on the basis that the officers had failed to knock and announce. We reverse.
Officer Barnes testified that the cocaine purchased from Thomas had been small size rock cocaine. The officer had reason to believe that additional cocaine was in the house. The size of the rocks involved in this case could easily be disposed of by being "eaten, flushed, crushed or hidden." The utility records were checked and the house was determined to have normal plumbing facilities.
The officer further testified that normally drug dealers with small amounts of drugs will try to conceal or discard such drugs. The officers believed that Thomas, dealing in small amounts of cocaine, would follow that "general normal procedure."
The trial judge suppressed the evidence for two reasons. First, the knock and announce rule should be enforced because the search warrant was executed more than 30 minutes after the last controlled buy. This fact is totally irrelevant as to whether the destruction of evidence exception is applicable to the knock and announce rule.
The trial court gave as the second reason: "Officer Barnes did testify that he had no articulable facts in this particular case that would lead him to believe that the destruction of evidence would occur, except that in all cases of user-type quantities, that is a possibility."
The trial judge apparently relied on the Second District opinion in State v. Bamber, 592 So.2d 1129 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) which disagreed with our Bell decision. The Bamber court held:
Addressing the merits of the rule announced in Armenteros and Bell, we are not convinced that the existence of normal plumbing in one's home dispenses with the need to knock and announce during the execution of a warrant to search for small quantities of cocaine. Plumbing is required in virtually any home that complies with applicable building codes. Many warrants involve searches for small items that could in theory be flushed down a toilet. If flushable items and plumbing are allowed to create an exigent set of circumstances, then the exception will begin to overshadow the rule.
In this case, the police did not provide a case-specific explanation that reasonably caused them to believe that Mr. Bam-ber's household was likely to destroy evidence. There clearly are facts and circumstances under which the police can reasonably decide, at the time they serve a warrant, that a household presented an unusual risk concerning the destruction of evidence. Such circumstances are not presented in this case.
Bamber at 1132-33.
Neither Bell, Armenteros v. State, 554 So.2d 574 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989), nor Berryman v. State, 368 So.2d 893 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979) require "that a household present an unusual risk concerning the destruction of evidence" in order to justify the exception.
If the concern about the destruction of evidence is a valid exception to the knock and announce rule, it must be interpreted reasonably or, rather than the exception overshadowing the rule, the exception will be rendered meaningless. The Second District has not told us what "facts and circumstances" would justify a belief that the "household presents] an unusual risk." It appears that drains and fireplaces would be insufficient. Certainly if the officers viewed the destruction of the evidence from outside, or heard the suspects planning or carrying out the destruction, the Bamber test might be met. That is of little comfort, of course, if the small quantities of contraband have been destroyed during this delay. The practical effect of Bamber will render the execution of search warrants where only a small amount of contraband is involved totally ineffective.
Bell is still the law of this district and only requires that the officers believe that because of the small amount of contraband and the facilities available to the suspect, destruction is likely if immediate execution of the warrant is not effected.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
W. SHARP, J., concurs.
GOSHORN, C.J., dissents with opinion.
. The record does not indicate how or where the firearm was discovered.
. State v. Bell, 564 So.2d 1235 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990).
. Actually Berryman requires that "the police must have some facts pertaining to the case which would reasonably cause such apprehension." (Berryman at 895). The requirement in Berryman was satisfied because "the police had viewed the small amount of narcotics and other contraband . hence, they had good reason to fear destruction of the evidence if there was any delay in making their entry."
Consider also State v. Roman, 309 So.2d 12 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975), rev. denied, 312 So.2d 761 (Fla.1975), in which the court refused to apply the destruction of evidence exception where "the occupants of a room which had no drain and only two exits, at both of which armed police officers were standing, had no opportunity at all to get rid of the seized marijuana ." (Roman at 14.)