Case Name: Julie Denise BAKER, an Unmarried Minor Who Sues by Her Adult Next Friend and Mother, Caroline A. WILLIAMS v. Charles W. WILLIAMS & Leland Carroll Baker
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1987-02-18
Citations: 503 So. 2d 249
Docket Number: No. 55982
Parties: Julie Denise BAKER, an Unmarried Minor Who Sues by Her Adult Next Friend and Mother, Caroline A. WILLIAMS v. Charles W. WILLIAMS & Leland Carroll Baker.
Judges: ROY NOBLE LEE, P.J., and DAN M. LEE, ROBERTSON and SULLIVAN, JJ„ concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 503
Pages: 249–259

Head Matter:
Julie Denise BAKER, an Unmarried Minor Who Sues by Her Adult Next Friend and Mother, Caroline A. WILLIAMS v. Charles W. WILLIAMS & Leland Carroll Baker.
No. 55982.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Feb. 18, 1987.
John Booth Farese, Farese, Farese & Farese, Ashland, for appellants.
Phillip L. Tutor, Roberts & Tutor, Ponto-toc, for appellees.

Opinion:
PRATHER, Justice,
for the Court:
This appeal raises the question to what extent children who are not formal parties to a divorce action are bound by some aspects of the decree of divorce. More specifically, this case questions whether a child's prospective right to establish paternity is barred by the adjudication of paternity in a divorce decree. This Court answers in the negative.
Julie Denise Baker, an eleven year old minor child, suing by her mother Mrs. Caroline A. Williams as her next friend, filed a paternity suit against her presumed natural father, Leland Carroll Baker, and her step-father, Charles W. Williams, defendants, in the Chancery Court of Union County-
On motion the chancellor dismissed the complaint with prejudice sustaining the father's affirmative defenses of estoppel, laches and res judicata without a hearing on the merits. Aggrieved as to this ruling, Julie Denise Baker appeals assigning as error that the trial court erred in sustaining defendant-appellee Leland Baker's ore tenus motion to dismiss the complaint.
I.
To the marriage of Leland Carroll Baker and Caroline M. Baker (now Williams), two children were born, one of which was the minor female child involved here, Julie Denise Baker. A divorce was granted to Caroline Baker, together with custody of the two children and child support. The presumed natural father, Leland Carroll Baker, paid all support payments and exercised visitation rights with the minor child for some eleven years.
At some point in time, Caroline Baker (Williams) married Charles W. Williams, and the minor resided with her mother and stepfather. Adoption of Julie was sought by Charles W. Williams, but reserving the maternal rights in the natural mother. That adoption was opposed by the natural father, and the proceeding was dismissed without prejudice. Subsequently, the minor, by her mother as her next friend, filed a petition to establish paternity under Miss. Code Ann. § 93-9-1 et seq. (1972), the Mississippi Uniform Law on Paternity, against her presumed natural father and her stepfather. The allegations of the petition charge the minor in fact to be the issue of the mother and stepfather, rather than the mother and presumed natural father. It was further alleged that blood testing of the minor, mother, and stepfather indicated a ninety-nine percent probability that the stepfather was in fact the father. The petition requested a court ordered blood testing of the presumed natural father.
Relying upon the strong presumption of the legitimacy of a child born in wedlock, the chancellor granted the motion to dismiss on three grounds that: (1) the prior adjudication of paternity in the divorce decree was res judicata, (2) the mother's representations on the minor's birth certificate and in the divorce proceedings estopped her present contrary assertions, and (3) the mother's eleven year delay after receipt of child support constituted laches. The appellant's position here is that the affirmative defenses relied upon by the court cannot be asserted against a minor.
II.
Throughout our legal history, laws have been enacted to support and protect those moral concepts and institutions deemed by society to be sacred. The most fundamental institution of society is the family unit, and legislation promoting legitimate family relationships has been promulgated. The mores of society have sought to strengthen the family unit by rejecting and shunning illicit relationships.
But equally important in the development of our jurisprudence is another fundamental concept of attaining fairness, justice, and equality. It is in this endeavor, to afford fairness and equal protection of the law for illegitimate children, that these two basic principles collide. The resulting conflict was addressed by the United States Supreme Court in Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 97 S.Ct. 1459, 52 L.Ed.2d 31 (1977). The Supreme Court acknowledged that prior legislation seeking to deter illegitimate relationships of parents had not been effective for that purpose. Further, the Trimble Court recognized that illegitimate children were penalized by denying to them inheritance rights from their parents. With that decision and its progeny, an entire new jurisprudence has developed regarding illegitimate children's rights and, to some extent, a change in social attitudes. This case, however, represents a case illustrating those two conflicting basic principles in a unique situation where a legitimate child challenges her paternity.
III.
This proceeding is a paternity suit by a legitimate minor child against her presumed natural father and her stepfather under authority of Miss.Code Ann. § 93-9-9 (1972), which in pertinent part provides: "Paternity may be determined upon the petition of the mother, the child, or any public authority chargeable by law with the support of the child...."
Since the effective date of this statute, July 1, 1962, antedated the Trimble decision of 1977, it can be determined that the legislative intent for its passage was to provide a method for determining paternity of illegitimate children in order to enforce support. However, the Court can find no prohibition for a presumed legitimate child's use of the statute to establish the fact of paternity when, as here, (1) the child is properly before the Court through her next friend and (2) alleges facts to support her claim. Palmer v. Mangum, 338 So.2d 1002 (Miss.1976) (the status of the mother as next friend is not prohibited under the statute). Likewise, this Court has held that a minor may maintain an action against her father for child support under this statute after the minor has attained the age of one year. Palmer, supra. Putative fathers also have the right to file a petition for filiation. Grimsley v. Tyner, 454 So.2d 482 (Miss.1984). Thus, this Court holds that a minor child, legitimate or illegitimate, may sue under this statute by next friend. This may be a case for legislative discussion.
A.
Our attention does not end here, but consideration of the identity of the parties is important since the mother appears in the capacity of next friend. The real party in interest here is the child, not the mother, and it is presumed that the mother, as a natural guardian of her child, Miss.Code Ann. § 93-13-1 (1972), acts in the best interest of the child. Here, however, the certified birth certificate of Julie Denise Baker representing the father of the minor child to be Leland Carroll Baker was signed by Caroline Williams, the mother. In the divorce proceedings filed on April 25, 1974, Caroline Williams stated under oath that Julie Denise Baker was "born of this marriage". The chancellor in the divorce decree awarded custody of the minor child to Caroline Williams and ordered the appellee, Leland Carroll Baker, to pay the sum of $40.00 per week as child support for that minor child, as well as one additional minor child born to that marriage. Leland Carroll Baker was further awarded certain visitation privileges with Julie Denise Baker. An attempt to file adoption proceedings failed due to the objection of the presumed natural father; this weighs heavily against the mother's impartiality. Additionally, prospective property rights of the child are involved.
The interest of the mother may or may not be co-extensive with the interest of the child. The chancery court as the guardian of persons under disability of minority has authority to appoint a guardian ad litem.
M.R.C.P. 17(d) provides that when the appointment of a guardian becomes neces sary, the court shall appoint an attorney to serve in that capacity whose compensation shall be determined by the court and taxed as a cost of the actions. See also V. Griffith, Mississippi Chancery Practice § 34, 45 (2nd ed. 1950); Union Chevrolet Co. v. Arrington, 162 Miss. 816, 138 So. 593 (1932). These facts strongly direct the appointment of such a guardian in this case is needed.
In selection of a guardian ad litem, the Court should appoint a person who is unbiased and independent of the natural mother to insure protection for the child's best interests. The realities of present day domestic relationships suggest that the trauma of divorce may not end, and that a mother may desire to break all ties to a former marriage or the inconveniences of visitation with a former spouse.
Therefore, before a just determination is concluded, this Court strongly suggests that the chancery court exercise its authority to appoint a guardian ad litem to insure and protect the best interests of the child.
B.
Our attention is now directed to whether a claim has been stated upon which relief may be granted. In alleging the facts that the minor has reason to believe that her presumed natural father is not in fact her actual father, the minor's proof must overcome one of the strongest presumptions known to the law, and applies even though the child was conceived prior to the marriage. Madden v. Madden, 338 So.2d 1000 (Miss.1976); Krohn v. Migues, 274 So.2d 654 (Miss.1973). The presumption that a child born in wedlock is legitimate continues until it is shown that the husband is incapable of procreation or that he had no access to the wife at times when the child could have been begotten. Alexander v. Alexander, 465 So.2d 340 (Miss.1985); Stone v. Stone, 210 So.2d 672 (Miss.1968); Boone v. State, 51 So.2d 473, 211 Miss. 318 (1951).
However, since it is a presumption, it is subject to being rebutted. Since the burden of proof for a husband denying paternity has been established to be proof beyond a reasonable doubt, it follows that the same burden of proof should be applicable to the presumed legitimate child challenging her paternity. Madden, supra.
To overcome such a strong presumption, proof is difficult. In Jacob v. Jacob, 417 So.2d 1367 (La.App.1982) the Louisiana Court noted that the purpose of their statute requiring the mother, child and alleged father to submit to blood tests was to provide a way to rebut the strong presumption of paternity. In the case sub judice attached as an exhibit to the complaint was the result of HLA blood tests of Julie Denise Baker, Charles Williams and Caroline Williams, which showed to a 99% probability that Charles Williams was the father of the child.
HLA testing is a recent scientific development which has advanced the role of blood and tissue type testing in paternity cases. When used in conjunction with the standard serologic testing, HLA test results can produce a high degree of discrimination either excluding or including a given male as the father of a particular child. In Grimsley v. Tyner, 454 So.2d 482 (Miss. 1984), this Court recognized HLA testing in conjunction with blood tests conducted by a doctor together with other matters to hold that the verdict of the lower court was contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. This test is available for rebutting such presumption if available and authenticated.
Appellant/plaintiff requested a court decree ordering Leland Baker to submit to blood tests. The authority for such order is Miss.Code Ann. § 93-9-21 (1972):
The court, upon motion of the defendant, shall order the mother, the child, and alleged father to submit to blood tests. If any party refuses to submit to such tests, the court may resolve the question of paternity against such party or enforce its order if the rights of others and the interests of justice so require.
It is clear that the court may order such blood test, but according to the statute, it must be upon motion of the defendant. In this case, the defendant, Leland Carroll Baker, made no such motion. Therefore, no blood tests under Miss.Code Ann. § 93-9-21 were required.
This complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted. M.R.C.P. 12(b)(6); Whitten v. Commercial Dispatch Pub. Co., Inc., 487 So.2d 843 (Miss.1986); Luckett v. Mississippi Wood, Inc., 481 So.2d 288, 290 (Miss.1985); Stanton & Associates, Inc. v. Bryant Construction Company, Inc., 464 So.2d 499, 505-506 (Miss.1985); McCain v. Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co., 484 So.2d 1001, 1002 (Miss.1986); Smith v. City of West Point, 475 So.2d 816, 818 (Miss.1985); Busching v. Griffin, 465 So.2d 1037, 1039 (Miss.1985).
IV.
The dismissal of this cause was grounded in affirmative defenses pled by the appellee of (A) res judicata, (B) laches, and (C) es-toppel. Appellant contends that dismissal of the case denied her due process rights guaranteed under both the Mississippi Constitution, Art. 3, § 14, and Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
A.
The affirmative defense of res judicata is pled by virtue of the adjudication in the divorce decree that this child was born of the marriage of Caroline and Leland Baker. The question here is whether that adjudication of paternity in the marital dissolution decree is binding on the child.
Appellant argues that in order for the doctrine of res judicata to apply four conditions must be satisfied citing Standard Oil v. Howell, 360 So.2d 1200 (Miss.1978), wherein the following test is set forth:
The requisites for application of the doctrine of res judicata are: (1) identity of the thing sued for, (2) identity of the cause of action, (3) identity of the persons and parties to the action, and (4) identity of the quality and the persons for and against whom the claim is made.
Id. at 1202. Appellant contends that none of the four preconditions is satisfied in the case at bar.
This Court addresses only the identity of the persons and parties to the action of the divorce.
In dealing with the prospective rights of a minor child to establish paternity, the child, if not formally a party, is not bound by a paternity determination in a marital dissolution action. Ruddock v. Ohls, 91 Cal.App.3rd 271, 154 Cal.Rptr. 87 (1979). Similarly a decree in equity cannot adjudicate the rights or liabilities of persons not parties to the proceeeding. Mannard v. Loche, 18 So. 374 (Miss.1895); McPike v. Wells, 54 Miss. 136 (1876). See also Griffith Mississippi Chancery Practice § 612 (2d ed. 1950). In accord: True-Hixon Lumber Co. v. Thorne, 155 So. 181, Suggestion of error overruled, 171 Miss. 783, 158 So. 909, 911 (1935) (where a party to a former suit relies upon the judgment in that suit as being conclusive upon an issue in a subsequent suit between the same parties, the parties so asserting must show that it is certain that the precise issue of fact, so relied on, was actually determined in his favor in the former suit).
Therefore, this Court holds that Julie Denise Baker is not bound by the prior proceedings or oaths taken by the mother or presumed father in previous divorce proceedings. The Court holds that res judica-ta is no bar to the present civil action.
B. and C.
As to the defenses of estoppel and lach-es, the appellee's position was that Caroline Williams waited several years after the divorce decree to bring this action on behalf of Julie; therefore, the mother is guilty of laches. Baker's second position was that the divorce complaint and birth certificate stating that Julie Denise was the daughter of Leland Baker bars the lawsuit under the doctrine of estoppel.
The facts cited by the Court to support this application of estoppel and laches were actions of the mother. This is the child's suit, and the mother's actions cannot be imputed to the child to invoke these doctrines. Wilson v. Wilson, 464 So.2d 498 (Miss.1985).
Therefore, this Court concludes that the affirmative defenses of res judicata, laches and estoppel should not have been relied upon for dismissal. The chancellor's ruling will be reversed, and the cause will be remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this decision.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
ROY NOBLE LEE, P.J., and DAN M. LEE, ROBERTSON and SULLIVAN, JJ" concur.
WALKER, C.J., HAWKINS, P.J., and GRIFFIN and ANDERSON, JJ., dissent.
. Human Leukocyte Antigen Tests, sometimes spelled as Human Leucocyte Antigen Tests.
. This Court recognizes that in all cases, any child born to the marriage of a man and woman is presumed legitimate and issue of that marriage, and does not imply that a guardian ad litem must be appointed for minors in every domestic relations case.