Case Name: Edward Samuel HIRST, Appellant/Cross Appellee, v. Edith Margret HIRST, Appellee/Cross Appellant
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1984-07-11
Citations: 452 So. 2d 1083
Docket Number: No. 83-756
Parties: Edward Samuel HIRST, Appellant/Cross Appellee, v. Edith Margret HIRST, Appellee/Cross Appellant.
Judges: DOWNEY, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 452
Pages: 1083–1086

Head Matter:
Edward Samuel HIRST, Appellant/Cross Appellee, v. Edith Margret HIRST, Appellee/Cross Appellant.
No. 83-756.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
July 11, 1984.
David R. Schwartz of Mitchell, Hanser & Schwartz, West Palm Beach, for appellant/cross appellee.
Allen R. Seaman of Weathers & Seaman, Lantana, for appellee/cross appellant.

Opinion:
DELL, Judge.
This appeal and cross appeal arise out of a dissolution action.
At the time of the final judgment, the parties had been married for seventeen years and had one son, age fifteen. The wife, age thirty-seven, and the husband, age thirty-eight, were both in good health. Neither party had brought any assets to the marriage.
In 1982, the husband earned approximately $62,000. The wife has an eleventh grade education and has worked as a waitress temporarily at several restaurants over the years. At the time of the final hearing, she was earning approximately $125 to $175 per week. The trial court awarded the wife rehabilitative alimony for a period of seventeen years, the exclusive possession of the marital home for six years and a $10,000 interest in the husband's half of the proceeds from the eventual sale of the marital home as compensation for her interest in his stock, IRA and pension plan. The husband appeals and the wife cross appeals.
The husband contends the trial court erred in awarding the wife rehabilitative alimony for a period of seventeen years and in providing for the wife to have possession of the marital home for three years after their child reaches majority. The wife contends the trial court should have awarded permanent periodic alimony rather than rehabilitative alimony and that it abused its discretion in awarding only partial attorney's fees.
Neither the record, the briefs, nor argument of counsel discloses a reasonable basis for the trial court's award of rehabilitative alimony for seventeen years. We conclude from the trial judge's comments that the intent of this award was to do equity between the parties. However, we are confronted with an award which provides for an excessive period of rehabilitative alimony which cannot be supported by the record. Permanent, periodic alimony provides for the needs of life to a former spouse as they have been established by the marriage of the parties, while the purpose of rehabilitative alimony is to
establish the capacity for self support of the receiving spouse, either through the redevelopment of previous skills or provision of the training necessary to develop potential supportive skills.
Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197, 1202 (Fla.1980). Nine factors must be taken into consideration in deciding whether to award permanent periodic alimony: the needs of one spouse for the funds; the ability of the other spouse to provide the funds; the parties' earning ability, age, health, and education; the duration of the marriage; the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage; and the values of the parties' estates. Canakaris at 1201-1202. Our review of the record satisfies us that the wife qualified for an award of permanent alimony under the criteria set forth in Canakaris v. Canakaris, supra. The only factor significantly militating against such an award is her relative youth, and the judge's comment indicates that was the primary reason for awarding rehabilitative rather than permanent alimony.
We agree with appellant's contention that the trial court's award of the exclusive use and possession of the marital home for a period of three years after their minor child has reached majority constituted an abuse of discretion.
The award of "exclusive possession" of property subject to disposition in a dissolution proceeding should either be directly connected to the obligation to pay support or be temporarily necessary to prevent reduction in the value of the subject property. The critical question is whether the award is equitable and just given the nature of the case. A grant of exclusive possession of property to one of the parties in a final judgment must serve a special purpose.
Duncan v. Duncan, 379 So.2d 949 (Fla.1980).
Appellant stipulated that the wife should have the exclusive use and possession of the marital home until such time as their minor child reached his majority. However, no testimony was offered to support the award of the exclusive possession of the marital home beyond the child's minority-
We find that the trial court acted within its discretion in accomplishing an equitable distribution of the parties' assets when it awarded the wife $10,000 and related the award to the husband's interest in his stock, IRA and pension plan. On the other hand, we conclude that the trial court erred in failing to award appellee the full amount of her attorney's fees since at the time of the final judgment appellee had little or no liquid assets and only minimal income from which she could pay her attorney's fees.
Therefore, we reverse and remand the final judgment entered in this cause with directions to the trial court to award appel-lee permanent alimony, to modify the award of the exclusive use and possession of the marital home to terminate when the parties' minor child attains the age of majority and to determine and award to appel-lee the full amount of the reasonable attorney's fees which she expended in the lower court proceeding. We affirm the final judgment in all other respects.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; and REMANDED.
DOWNEY, J., concurs.
ANSTEAD, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part with opinion.
. The trial judge stated, "At thirty-seven you are really too young to be dependent on him for the next one hundred years. That's not right, nor should he have to pay thirty years from now. That should give you some help from here on out for the next seventeen years."