Case Name: State ex rel. Carpenter and another vs. Backus, Acting Judge
Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Wisconsin
Decision Date: 1917-03-13
Citations: 165 Wis. 179
Docket Number: 
Parties: State ex rel. Carpenter and another vs. Backus, Acting Judge.
Judges: 
Reporter: Wisconsin Reports
Volume: 165
Pages: 179–190

Head Matter:
State ex rel. Carpenter and another vs. Backus, Acting Judge.
January 19
March 13, 1917.
Racine municipal court: Change of venue in criminal action: Power of circuit court to grant second, change to another county.
1. The right to a change of venue exists in this state only hy virtue of the statute, and such change can be had only upon the terms prescribed.
2. The first sentence in sec. 10 of the act creating the municipal court of Racine county (ch. 72, Laws 1897) is applicable to criminal as well as to civil actions, and the exception therein stated operates to prevent the said court from granting a change of venue in a criminal case to any court of another county; but after the venue in a criminal action has been changed, on the ground of prejudice of the judge, from said municipal court to the circuit- court for Racine county, the circuit court may grant a change to another county, under sec. 4679, Stats., upon a satisfactory showing that an impartial trial cannot be had in Racine county. Esohweu.ee’ and Kerwin, JJ., dissent.
3. Where, in such a case, a change of venue was asked on the ground last mentioned, it was not error- for the circuit court to deny it without prejudice to a renewal of the motion “if it shall appear on the voir dire that the defendants . . . cannot have a fair and impartial trial in Racine county.” Such an order, not being a final determination of the rights of defendants, does not show an abuse of the' discretion vested in the court by sec. 4679, Stats.
This is an original proceeding brought in this court in the form of a mandamus and certiorari. An alternative writ of mandamus and a writ of certiorari auxiliary thereto are addressed and directed to Honorable August C. Baoiojs, acting as judge of the circuit court for Racine county, commanding him to vacate and set aside a certain order made in his court on November 25, 1916, dismissing the petition of the relators and denying them a change of venue because of the prejudice of the people of Racine county, or show cause to the contrary before this court. The respondent moved to quash the alternative writ of mandamus upon the ground that neither the petition nor the writ’shows that the relators are entitled to the relief prayed for.
On December 30, 1915, five indictments were returned by the grand jury against the relators. Eour of them were directed against Charles B. Carpenter and the fifth was directed against both, of the relators. They charged violations of the banking laws of the state of Wisconsin. These indictments were returned to the municipal court of Racine county, and on the 24th day of January, 1916, the relators each filed affidavits of prejudice against the judge of the municipal court. The cases were then transferred to the circuit court for Racine county. On April 10th the relators moved in circuit court for a change of venue on account of the prejudice of the people of Racine county. In support of the motion they filed affidavits to which were attached certain newspaper clippings. An order to show cause why the motion of relators should not be denied was issued out of circuit court on the 29th of April, 1916. This order to show cause was heard, and on the 13th of May Judge Baceus, sitting for Circuit Judge Bekdeit, denied the motion for change of venue without prejudice to the defendants to renew the motion if it appear. upon the voir dire that a fair trial cannot he had in Racine' county. On November 18, 1916, relators filed another motion for change of venue based upon a verified petition and newspaper clippings showing that these cases had been made an issue between two candidates for the office of district attorney at the November election, 1916. This motion was heard and denied by Judge Backus on November 25, 1916. The recital of the order denying such motion states that the court is of the opinion that the defendants are not entitled to a second change of venue as a matter of statutory right. The order then declares:
“It is ordered that the motion of the defendants Ojiarles B. Carpenter and B. Ilinrichs, and each of them, made and entered upon the 18th day of November, 1916, for a change of the place of the trial of said actions, and each of them, be and the same hereby is each severally denied, without prejudice, however, to said defendants, and each of them, to renew said motions if it shall appear on the voir dire that the defendants, and each of them, cannot have a fair and impartial trial in Racine county, Wisconsin.”
On November 29, 1916, writs of mandamus and certiorari were issued out of this court directed to Judge Backus to review his action in making and entering the order of November 25th. Respondent made due return to the writ of cer-tiorari and moved to quash the alternative writ of mandamus.
For the relators there was a brief by Quarles, Spence <& Quarles and Guy D. Goff, all of Milwaukee, attorneys for Charles B. Carpenter, and Thompson & Harvey of Racine and 17. H. Bennett of Milwaukee, attorneys for B. Ilin-richsj and the cause was argued orally by Mr. Goff and Mr. 17. C. Quarles.
For the respondent there was a brief signed by A. C. Um-breit of Milwaukee and William W. Storms of Racine, attor neys for respondent and special counsel for tbe state, and by Vilas TI. Whaley, district attorney for Racine county, and there was oral argument by Mr. Storms and Mr. Umbreit.

Opinion:
Siebecker, J.
It seems clear that tbe right to a change of venue in this state is regulated by statute. This is declared by the decisions in this court on the subject. The effect of such decisions is stated in French v. State, 93 Wis. 325, 335, 67 N. W. 106:
"The right to a change of venue depends entirely upon the statute. It is not guaranteed by Const, art. I, sec. I, or any other provision of the constitution. As the right exists only by virtue of the statute, a change of venue can be had only upon the terms the statute prescribes."
See Baker v. Slate, 56 Wis. 568, 14 N. W. 118; Boldt v. State, 72 Wis. 7, 38 N. W. 177; Oborn v. State, 143 Wis. 249, 126 N. W. 737.
The difficult Question here presented involves the construction of the act establishing the municipal court of Racine county (sec. 10, ch. 72, Laws 1897). The original act provides :
"The provisions of law applicable to changes of venue in the circuit courts of this state, shall be applicable to said municipal court, except that when the venue of any action shall be so changed, it shall be changed to the. circuit court of Racine county; and such change of venue shall not prevent the granting by said circuit court of a further change of venue as provided in section 2622, of the revised statutes of this state."
This act also provides that in case any "person charged upon indictment or information with a criminal offense shall have procured a change of venue to the circuit court of Racine county, ." the party shall be committed or held to bail in circuit court, and the papers and copy of record and proceedings, properly certified, shall be transmitted to the circuit court, "which shall then have full jurisdiction of tbe action." Sec. 5, cb. 117, Laws 1899, re-enacted tbis section, but added after tbe above quoted words, "as provided in section 2622, of tbe revised statutes of tbis state," a provision to tbe effect that tbe right to change tbe venue under sec. 2621 by tbe municipal court shall be "direct to tbe proper county for tbe trial of tbe action." Tbe language of tbe original act which is retained in tbe amended act expresses in explicit terms that tbe law as embodied in tbe statute applicable to circuit courts "shall be applicable to said municipal court, except that when the venue of any action shall he so changed, it shall he changed to the circuit court of Racine county." The exception clearly is a limitation on the statutes as they applied to tbe circuit courts and operates to prevent tbe municipal court from granting a change of venue in a criminal case to any court of another county, and thus tbe provision of see. 4679, Stats., applicable to circuit courts, providing that, when it appears that a fair and impartial trial cannot be bad in tbe county, tbe circuit court wherein tbe action is pending may send it to some adjoining county where a fair and impartial trial can be bad, is rendered inapplicable to tbe Eacine county municipal court. It appears from the clause immediately following that tbe legislature intended to preserve tbis right under sec. 4679, Stats., by providing for tbe exercise of tbis right pursuant to tbe provisions of sec. 2622, Stats., namely, "and such change of venue shall not prevent tbe granting by said circuit court of a further change of venue as provided in section 2622, of tbe revised statutes of tbis state." Tbis section is in tbe chapter of tbe statutes regulating "Tbe Place of Trial of Civil Actions," but it specifies in sub. (2) thereof a ground for change of venue in cases "Where there is reason to believe that an impartial trial cannot be bad therein" (tbe county), which is tbe same ground provided for in sec. 4679 in criminal cases. While tbis legislative method of providing for tbe exercise of tbis right in criminal cases pursuant to tbe provisions of sec. 2622 is not a common practice, yet we are confronted with the fact that it did so, and the courts cannot nullify its action on account of the circuitous way employed to accomplish this object. We are persuaded that the legislature intended , to make the provisions of sec. 2622 applicable to all civil cases and to make the provision of sub. (2) thereof applicable to criminal cases that are embraced within sec. 4679 and transferred from the municipal to the circuit court for Racine county, and thus preserve to the accused the right of securing a change of venue on account of the prejudice of the people of the county. The provisions of the special act establishing this municipal court provide, in the last clause of the section here involved, that upon certification of a case to the circuit court such court "shall then have full jurisdiction of the action." This clearly shows that the circuit court is to exert its powers to protect the accused in all his rights granted by the law. It necessarily follows that it devolves on the circuit court for Racine county, upon application of defendants, to direct that they be tried in some adjoining county if it appears to the court's satisfaction that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in Racine county.
This brings us to the question of the effect of the order of November 26, 1916. The court denied the applications of defendants for a change of the place of tidal "without prejudice, however, to said defendants, and each of them, to renew said motions if it shall appear on the voir dire that the defendants, and each of them, cannot have a fair and impartial trial in Racine county, Wisconsin." It is apparent that the court has not refused and does not refuse to act in the proceeding in the future. While the court in terms denies the applications, it expressly does so with the intent to further consider the matter "on the voir dire." The substance and effect of the ruling is that the court declared that it does not "appear to the satisfaction of the court, by affidavits, that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had" in Racine county, but that he will consider the matter further in the light of the facts relevant to tbe question disclosed on tbe voir dire, if tbe defendants desire further action. It is therefore established that tbe court does not refuse to act in tbe matter if it can legally do so in tbe manner as indicated, on tbe voir dire. This procedure may be somewhat novel, but it is well adapted to aid tbe court in its inquest to determine whether or not a fair and impartial trial cannot be bad in Racine county. Such inquiry upon tbe voir dire in no way adversely affects any of tbe defendants' rights and will be completed before they are put in jeopardy. It is considered that tbe court properly withheld its final determination of tbe question upon tbe grounds specified in tbe order. Tbe statute, sec. 4679, provides that the court must he satisfied that a fair and impartial trial cannot he had in Racine county in order to justify a change of the place of trial of a case. This plainly indicates that a decision of this question by -a trial court cannot be assailed as erroneous unless it is shown that tbe court abused tbe discretion vested in it by tbe statute. Since tbe court in tbe instant proceedings has not finally determined tbe rights of defendants in tbe matter, no question of an abuse of its discretion is before us. Tbe record shows that tbe trial court has not finally denied tbe defendants tbe right to a change of tbe place of trial of tbe cases; that it expects to proceed with tbe inquest as to this matter upon tbe voir dire. Since tbe court has tbe power to entertain tbe applications under tbe statutes, as above shown, it follows that no case is presented which entitles relators to tbe writ of mandamus as prayed for, and judgment must be ordered quashing tbe writ, and that tbe record transmitted to this court in response to tbe writ of certiorari be returned to tbe circuit court for Racine county. All of tbe justices participated in this decision.
By the Court. — It is so ordered.