Case Name: STATE of Louisiana, v. Joseph FLAGG
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 2002-03-26
Citations: 815 So. 2d 208
Docket Number: No. 01-KA-965
Parties: STATE of Louisiana, v. Joseph FLAGG.
Judges: Panel composed of Judges JAMES L. CANNELLA THOMAS F. DALEY and SUSAN M. CHEHARDY.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 815
Pages: 208–215

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana, v. Joseph FLAGG.
No. 01-KA-965.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit.
March 26, 2002.
Paul D. Connick, Jr., District Attorney, Parish of Jefferson, State of Louisiana, Terry M. Boudreaux — Appellate Counsel, Alison Walks — Counsel of Record on Appeal, Louis Butler — Trial Counsel, Assistant District Attorneys, Gretna, LA, for Appellant State of Louisiana.
Panel composed of Judges JAMES L. CANNELLA THOMAS F. DALEY and SUSAN M. CHEHARDY.

Opinion:
I «CANNELLA Judge.
The State of Louisiana appeals the enhanced sentence imposed on the Defendant, Joseph Flagg, after a habitual offender proceeding. We vacate the sentence and remand for re-sentencing.
The Defendant, Joseph Flagg, pled guilty on July 17, 2001 to possession with the intent to distribute cocaine, a violation of La.R.S. 40:967 A. The incident leading to his guilty plea occurred on September 13, 2000. Pursuant to the plea agreement, he was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment at hard labor, concurrent with any other sentence that he was serving. The State subsequently filed a habitual offender bill of information, alleging that the Defendant was a fourth-felony offender. La.R.S. 15:529.1 A(l).
At the hearing in the habitual offender proceeding conducted on July 17, 2001, the State offered evidence of three prior felony offenses, all for possession of cocaine, violations of La.R.S. 40:967 C(2). Each violation has a maximum ^sentence of five years at hard labor, with a possible fine of $5,000. The prior convictions were obtained on June 21, 1999, April 12, 1995, and June 14,1994.
The Defendant waived his right to object, admitted to the three prior offenses and to his identity with regard to those offenses. After the trial court advised the Defendant of a sentencing range of 20 to 60 years, the State objected, arguing that the Defendant should be subject to life imprisonment, because the penalty provision as it existed under the habitual offender statute at the time of the commission of this offense controlled. La.R.S. 15:529.1 A(l)(c)(ii). The trial judge disagreed, finding that, under the law as enacted in 2001 prior to the habitual offender hearing, the Defendant was not subject to life imprisonment. He then vacated the Defendant's initial sentence and sentenced him to serve 20 years at hard labor, concurrent with other sentences that the Defendant was serving.
On appeal, the State asserts that the trial judge erred in failing to impose the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor pursuant to the law in effect at the time of the commission of the underlying offense.
The trial judge gave the following reasons for ordering the reduced sentence:
THE COURT:
Thank you. It is the finding of this Court that while it is true that I must sentence Mr. Flagg in accordance with the statute containing the penalty for the violation of the criminal conduct that was in effect at the time of the offense, specifically R.S. 40:967(a), that the enhancement proceeding, the multiple bill proceeding, if you will, that we're going through now is governed by, in my judgment, the provisions of the current Act. And the current Act clearly indicates prospective application only. I do not believe that the case law that you referenced makes reference to the enhancement article, I should say Title 15, but references only the penalty provisions as contained 14within the Act that proscribes the conduct for which he has pled guilty.
And for those reasons your argument is rejected and this court will grant the multiple bill, all right, but the sentence, the previous sentence is vacated of 20 years and this Court imposes 20 years as your sentence at hard labor with the Department of Corrections, which will run concurrently with any sentence you may be currently serving. And if you're entitled to credit for time served, so be it.
(R., pp. 58-59).
At the time of the commission of the offense, September 13, 2000, possession with the intent to distribute cocaine in the amount possessed by the Defendant carried a penalty of imprisonment at hard labor for not less than five nor more than thirty years, with the first five years of the sentence to be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence and a possible fine of not more than $50,000.00. La.R.S. 40:967 B(4)(b). At that time, La.R.S. 15:529.1(A)(1)(c)(ii) provided for the imposition of a life sentence without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence:
If the fourth or subsequent felony or any of the prior felonies is a felony . is a violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law punishable by imprisonment for more than five years .
In this case, the Defendant's underlying offense was punishable by more than five years. Therefore, under the habitual offender statute as it existed at the time of the commission of this offense (September 13, 2000), he was subject to life imprison- merit at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
The Louisiana Legislature enacted Act 403, which became effective on June 15, 2001. Section 7, 2001 La. Acts 403. It amended the penalty provisions of numerous statutes, including the substantive drug offense involved in this case, | sLa.R.S. 40:967 B(4)(b), the penalty provisions under the habitual offender statute for fourth-felony offenses meeting the requirements of La.R,S. 15:529.1 A(l)(c)(ii), and the article that prohibited suspension of sentence for certain drug offenses, La. C.Cr.P. art. 893 A. Sections 2, 4, 5, 2001 La. Acts 403. In Section 6, the Act specified that the provisions "shall only have prospective effect."
Under the amended version of R.S. 40:967 B(4)(b), the sentencing range for a violation of possession with the intent to distribute cocaine was reduced from not less than five nor more than 30 years, with the first five years to be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, to imprisonment at hard labor for not less than two and not more than 30 years, with the first two years of the sentence to be served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
The amended provision of the habitual offender statute for fourth felony drug offenders now provides for the imposition of a life sentence only if the fourth felony and at least two of the three prior felonies are violations of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law and if they are punishable by imprisonment of ten years or more. Previously, a life sentence was mandated if the fourth or any of the prior felonies were punishable by imprisonment of more than five years. La.R.S. 15:529.1 A(l)(c)(ii), as amended by Section 2, 2001 La. Acts 403.
In the present case, the penalty for the three prior drug offenses is imprisonment of "not more than five years." La.R.S. 40:967 C(2). Therefore, if Act 403 of 2001 is applicable to this case, the trial judge correctly sentenced him because the Defendant would not be subject to mandatory life imprisonment. He would be exposed to a sentence between 20 years and life. La.R.S. 15:529.1 A«(l)(c)(i).
We addressed the issue of the applicability of Act 403 of 2001 in two recent cases. In both cases, it became effective after the commission of the offense, but before the sentence was imposed.
The first case, State v. Jordan, 01-KH-1034 (La.App. 5th Cir 10/12/01), arose from a writ application in which relief was sought prior to sentencing. Jordon had been convicted of theft of goods in excess of $500.00, a violation of La. R.S. 14:67.10. He was later found to be a fourth-felony offender and sentenced as a habitual offender under La.R.S. 15:529.1 A(c) prior to its amendment. In Jordon, we stated:
Second, considering whether the new law or the law in effect at the time of the offense should apply to the habitual offender proceedings, we again find no error in the trial court determination that the law prior to its amendment should apply. While this issue presents a closer question, and some states have held that the new law would apply under similar circumstances, that has not heretofore been the holding in this state. The leading case on this point is State v. Clark, 391 So.2d 1174 (La.1980), which held that the law in effect at the time the offense is committed is applicable. That holding has not been overturned. See also: State v. Jones, 99-2207 (La.1/30/01), 778 So.2d 1131; State v. Bosworth, 415 So.2d 912 (La.1981). We find it controlling in this case.
Additionally, we note that the Court in Clark went on to find that the sentenc ing court should - consider the current legislative intent in determining whether the sentence under the statute as it existed prior to its amendment is excessive, and to sentence the Defendant lawfully.
The second case, State v. Sugasti, 01-770 (La.App. 5th Cir.11/27/01), 802 So.2d 943, was an appeal by the State. Sugasti was convicted of possession of heroin, first offense, and was given a suspended sentence after the trial judge applied the amended and reduced penalty in Act 403 of 2001. We vacated the |7sentence and remanded the matter to the trial court, following the general rule that the law in effect at the time of the commission of the offense is determinative of the penalty which the convicted accused must suffer. State v. Wright, 384 So.2d 399, 401 (La.1980). Pursuant to State v. Clark, 391 So.2d 1174, 1176 (La.1980), we recognized that the ameliorative change in the law is a factor to be weighed by the sentencing judge, but clarified that it can only be a consideration "within the limits fixed by law at the time of the commission of the crime," quoting State v. Jones, 99-2207 (La.App.1/29/01), 778 So.2d 1131, 1134. Since a suspended sentence was not available in the prior penalty, we concluded that the trial judge erred in suspending the sentence "in derogation of the sentencing provisions applicable at the time of the offense."
Based on our prior dispositions of this issue with which we agree, we find that the trial judge erred in giving Act 403 of 2001 retroactive application in sentencing this Defendant to 20 years at hard labor as a fourth-felony drug offender. For the reasons stated, the Defendant's sentence is illegally lenient.
Although this Court would normally have the authority to correct an illegal sentence under La.C.Cr.P. art. 882, since the State properly raised the issue, the sentence resulted from a plea bargain in which the trial judge agreed to give the Defendant 20 years at hard labor on the habitual offender bill of information. Because 20 years was part of the plea agreement, but is illegally lenient, the | ^sentence must be vacated and the case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings, with the reservation of the Defendant's right to withdraw his guilty plea. State v. Guilbeaux, 99-591 (La.App. 5th Cir.11/10/99), 749 So.2d 16, 18-19.
We note that the trial judge may consider the legislative change in the penalty as evidence of its intent. Clark, 391 So.2d at 1176. And, although the life sentence is mandatory in this case, the trial judge is permitted to deviate from the mandatory sentence imposed by La.R.S. 15:529.1 if he finds, and articulates in the record, that the mandated punishment is unconstitutionally excessive.' State v. Dorthey, 623 So.2d 1276 (La.1993).
Accordingly, the enhanced sentence is hereby vacated. The case is remanded for re-sentencing in accordance with this opinion.
SENTENCE VACATED; CASE REMANDED.
DALEY, J., dissents with reasons.
. The State may appeal a sentence imposed which is not in conformity with mandatory statutory requirements. La.C.Cr.P. art. 881.2 B(l)(a). State v. Sugasti, 01-770, p. 4 (La. App. 5th Cir.l 1/27/01), 802 So.2d 943.
. Writs were applied for and granted in the Louisiana Supreme Court. The results are pending.
. In supervisory writs to this Court, we have recently applied Act 1163 of 2001 prospectively from the date of the offense in cases involving the reduction in penalties for DWI offenses. See State v. Hung Vu, O1-K-1228 (La.App. 5th Cir. 11/2/01); State v. Porte, 01-KH-1191 (La.App. 5th Cir. 11/16/01); State v. Fleming, 01-K01332 (La.App. 5th Cir. 1/9/02). Act 1163 of 2001, which went into effect the same date as Act 403 of 2001, reduced penalties in certain DWI cases.
.The State notes that three writ dispositions by the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal have also followed the same rationale in applying Act 403 of 2001. State v. Legendre, 01-K-1483 (La.App. 4th Cir.10/3/01); State v. Carter, 01-K-1560 (La.App. 4th Cir.10/3/01); State v. Serpas, 01-K-1477 (La.App. 4th Cir.10/3/01).
. We reviewed the record for patent errors, according to La.C.Cr.P. art. 920; State v. Oliveanx, 312 So.2d 337 (La.1975); State v. Perrilloux, 99-1314 (La.App. 5th Cir.5/17/00), 762 So.2d 198, 206 and find no patent errors requiring action by this Court.