Case Name: VERNA MAY PALKO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. DANIEL PALKO, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT
Court: New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1976-03-02
Citations: 150 N.J. Super. 255
Docket Number: 
Parties: VERNA MAY PALKO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. DANIEL PALKO, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Superior Court Reports
Volume: 150
Pages: 255–262

Head Matter:
VERNA MAY PALKO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. DANIEL PALKO, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.
Superior Court of New Jersey-Appellate Division
Argued November 17, 1975
Decided March 2, 1976.
Before Judges Fritz, Seidman and Milmed.
Mr. Frederic J. Bossi argued the cause for appellant (Messrs. Wegner & Wegner, attorneys).
Mr. Walter B. Dewey argued the cause for respondent.
Mr. David J. Goldberg argued the cause for intervenor Linda Palko, an infant (Mr. George Warren, guardian ad litem).

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
In this matrimonial action plaintiff wife sought, by motion dated July 17, 1974 and filed July 22, 1974, to reopen a final judgment entered May 16, 1972 and to set aside so much of that judgment as incorporated a separation agreement dated February 14, 1972. While the motion sought much more, including "equitable distribution," the only ground asserted on this appeal is a charge of error on the part of the trial judge in refusing this relief in view of plaintiff's allegations that her husband "intentionally and wilfully withheld material information as to the value of his holding during negotiations of the said property settlement agreement." It is to be observed that defendant died on June 18, 1973 and his -will was admitted to probate on July 5, 1973.
While the procedure below, lacking an evidential hearing and ending in a determination in which the judge's findings had to be elicited by inference from his colloquy with counsel, left much to be desired, we are satisfied, as was the trial judge, that plaintiff set forth no substantial circumstances justifying the reopening of this judgment.
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the motion to reopen was not made for more than a year after probate of defendant's .will and some 36' months after entry of the judgment sought to be set aside. We believe that nothing appears to invoke the relief available in R. 4:50, either by way of the specifics of B. 4:50-1 (a), (b) or (c) (outlawed in this ease by B. 4:50-3), or by the generality of the "other reason" provision in (f). See Doyle v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 80 N. J. Super. 105, 125 (App. Div. 1963), certif. den. 40 N. J. 508 (1963).
We observe that plaintiff has enjoyed the advantage of defendant's fully executed covenant, incorporated in the judgment and now beyond modification, to leave unchanged a will executed prior to their agreement. In less compelling circumstances than these we have formulated and honored the "important policy that litigation must have an end." Hartford Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 68 N. J. 430, 434 (1975).
The matter of relief from a judgment or order under our rules is one addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, whose decision will be upheld absent an abuse of that discretion. Greenberg v. Owens, 31 N. J. 402, 405 (1960). In the circumstances here present, we are unwilling to characterize the determination below as an abuse of discretion.
Affirmed.