Case Name: FREELAND v. BROOKLYN HEIGHTS R. CO.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1900-10-12
Citations: 66 N.Y.S. 321
Docket Number: 
Parties: FREELAND v. BROOKLYN HEIGHTS R. CO.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 66
Pages: 321–327

Head Matter:
(54 App. Div. 90.)
FREELAND v. BROOKLYN HEIGHTS R. CO.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.
October 12, 1900.)
1. Negligence—Pleading—Evidence—Damages.
Where a complaint alleges an accident in which plaintiff received personal injuries, and had a horse killed and a carriage destroyed, but does not allege any damage for the loss of the horse and carriage, evidence of the value thereof is inadmissible.
2. Same—Continuance.
A complaint alleged an accident in which plaintiff received injuries by reason of defendant’s negligence, and that he had a horse killed and a carriage destroyed, but did not allege any damage for the loss of the horse and carriage; the plaintiff having commenced another action to recover damages for their loss. The court refused to allow the plaintiff to amend his complaint at the opening of the trial, to insert a claim for the horse and wagon, but permitted him to introduce evidence of the value of the horse and carriage under the complaint as it stood. Held, that it was error to refuse to allow the defendant to withdraw a juror, as the introduction of such evidence entitled him to a postponement of the trial for surprise.
3. Same—Damages.
Where special damages are claimed for an injury to plaintiff’s hand which would prevent him from continuing his business as a carriage draftsman, it is error to admit fancy drawings and sketches made by him which have no connection with such business.
Woodward, J„ dissenting.
Appeal from trial term, Kings county.
Action by William Freeland against the Brooklyn Heights Railroad Company. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, and from an order denying a motion for a new trial, defendant appeals.
Reversed.
Argued before GOODRICH, P. J., and BARTLETT, WOODWARD, HIRSCHBERG, and JERKS, JJ.
John L. Wells, for appellant. ,
Stephen C. Baldwin, for respondent.

Opinion:
WILLARD BARTLETT, J.
This action grows out of a collision between one of the cars of the defendant and a wagon in which the plaintiff was driving, which resulted in the destruction of the horse and wagon, and inflicted personal injuries of considerable severity upon the plaintiff. A clear case was made out for submitting the question of the defendant's negligence and plaintiff's freedom from contributory negligence to the jury; and there would be no difficulty in sustaining the judgment upon the merits, were it not that the record discloses several erroneous rulings which appear to have been prejudicial to the defendant, and which probably had the effect of materially increasing the amount of the recovery.
The complaint in this suit mentions the killing of the horse and the demolition of the plaintiff's wagon, but it contains no allegation that the plaintiff suffered any loss by reason of the destruction of the animal or vehicle. The only averment of damage relates to the personal injuries which the pláintiff himself claims to have sustained. At the opening of the trial his counsel moved to amend the complaint by inserting an allegation to the effect that the horse which was killed by the defendant's negligence was worth the sum of $1,750/ and,that, the demolishedvcarriage, was worth the sum of $100. ; This motion yyas opposed in behalf of, the defendant on the ground that after bring-, ing this suit another1 action had been brought' by the plaintiff, through ' the same attorney, against the same defendant, to recover for ¡dam-,' ages to the liorSe and wagon; that ah answer ;had'been interposed therein! setting up t]h¡e "pendency of the, present! action, as a'defense; and that counsel was not ready to try. the question of the value of the horse and wagon herein, but would be taken by surprise.by any evidence on that subject - The court denied the plaintiff's motion to amend, but announced that it would allow; the plaintiff to recover the value of the horse and wagon under thé pleadings its théy! stood. When evidence was, offered to .establish, the' value of the animal, .counsel for the defendant objected on the ground that it was not receivable, within the pleadings'. The objection was overruled; and an exception" was Taken. Counsel, théreuptin asked "permisbibti tq- withdraw a juror, upon the, ground'that he had had no sufficient notice to enable him to prepare to meet the proof in regard to the loss occasioned by the destruction of the horse and wagon. The court, which; , had-already intimated-that the defendant ought to stipulate-in the second action that the issue of' negligence ' should" abide' the event in thé present actidii, declined tq alloy? thé withdrawal of a juror! and counsel for the defendant again excepted!, The court .declared that there was no surprise in the case, and, oyer objection and exception, received all the evidence offered by the.plaintiff in regard-to the-value of: the horse'and Wagon! We are of thé opinion that this eyidénce was 'not'1 admissible/- únder the complaint! '1 There was - n'ó-állegátion * that the -plaintiff- had stiffened any'loss by reason of- the destruction'of ? thé horse and wagon; nor did the complaint-demand that ariy damages should be awarded on that account. Indeed/ thé bringing" of the second action by the samp, attorney indicated ¡thaf the pleader, did/not intend to include in this suit any claim for such damages.; In the absence of an amendment the proof should not have been received. It is. true that counsel for the. defendant objected to _ the proposed amendment, hut this was only on the ground that the .change in the complaint would operate to place him at a disadvantage by reason, of, surprise, inasmuch as he did qqt anticipate that any proof would he offeréd as.iq ,the value of the horse and wagon in this cáse. That, oh), jection did not prevent him from, insisting subsequently¡that the evidence was inadmissible under the complaint,as it, síqqd. We;q.re.also, -of the opiniop!fhat afi;er ,the court had, concluded; ,fq! rqceiye this .evig •deuce, whether an amendment was allowed or not, it should have granted tiré, .application of; thq defendant for, the yvithdrayvai; of, a j uror. hfotice that such applicatiqn'would!be made was given before the casé, had! bpen qpened to the jury, by the .counsel for plainttfij. . hihe appliea-" tian was equivalent to a! motion for the postponement pf the trial, and, the exception tallen by the defendant warrants us in reviewing, flip'.refusal of the cpurt to grant it, Bank v. Colwell (Sup.) 8 N. Y. S. 380. 'It is, !trne .fqai, the casgs, hold tjia/t -sucl). applications may.be, granted;qr,,(iqnie,d' in i/he discretion,"qf'thp, trial cburt,,i)ut ."ihat;-,^, cretion is reyiqwablehere. !,"'. ! ,... , ; ,v! !..;
The jury rendered a general verdict of $12,50,0. in favor of the plaintiff, and made a special finding fixing the, value of the horse and .wagon at $1,250. The effect of the errors already discussed might be obviated by deducting, from the amount of the verdict the $1,250 representing the value qf the horse and wagon,, if, it did not appear that another erroneous ruling in the case probably had; the effect of, .enhancing the sum awarded as compensation .for the plaintiff's personal .injuries, This ruling related to the plaintiff's ability to draw fancy pictures. His occupation, was that of a manufacturer., of carriages, "My business is .carriage, manufacturer," he .said. "I have been in business in the'borough of Bropklyn, formerly the city of Brooklyn, as a carriage, manufacturer, for .about,.twenty years. I. have a.trade. I, am a draftsman and painter, and all connected with the business. I made drafts of carriages, and I worked at the bench,—used the saw and, plane, and all those .tools connected, with a, mechanical business.". His testimony tended to show that he had lost the use of the fingers of his right hand in consequence of.the accident, so that he could no longer use a pencil or paint brush or pen, and that, he was np ,longer able to do any work as a draftsman .or painter,in connection with his, business as a carriage manufacturer.1 The testimony was proper for this purpose,, and. wholly unobjectionable.; .It, was supplemented, how-, ever, by the introduction of 26 pictures, on 26 different small cards., The plaintiff testified that these were .samples,, of .work done by him, before the accident, that ,they.were just drawings that came info his, head, and that he could give counsel a wheelbarrow load, of .them, if he desired. To the court, he said, ."I have got a wagon load more, if they want them." A book containing .other drawings of the same character was also admitted; the cpurt, holding that they .showed the cunning .of the plaintiff's right hand, which he said had been destroyed. These drawings were received; over, the objection and .exception of the defendant. They represent landscapes and other scenes, either copied from nature or the offspring,of the plaintiff's fancy, having no.conceivable relation to his business as a.carriage, maker.,,They offered no basis,for .any estimate, pf pecuniary. ,lpss" sustained.,by. the plaintiff, in, consequence of his inability to produce similar sketches in the future; yet it is impossible, to avoid the conclusion .that the production and exhibition to the jury, of. these pictures, coupl.ed. with, the statement that the plaintiff could no longer:enjoy the,artistic satisfaction which he had formerly derived from thus using his, pencil, must, have had. an effect ,to. augment the verdict. As - appears from the record,., the learned, trial judge, entertained serious doubts as to £he admissibility of. this evidence,.,saying that>he w°nid like t.o have time to reflect about¡ it, hut, woujd. let.it ip, q$ counsel was willing to. falee, the risk. We .think ft. should have been,excluded. The extent, of the plaintiff's disability; was shown when it was. proven that he could not use a pen, pencil, or paint.brush,with,,his right hand, ,For all this he,was entitled to compensation. , Put there was no allegation in. the complaint, that. his disability debarred him from any particular pursuit aside tiom his usual.vocation, nor could specific,damages be allowed, therefor , unless, itr was a. pursuit in, which he earned money. Baker v. Railway Co., 118 N. Y. 533, 23 N. E. 885.
Judgment reversed and new trial granted; costs to abide the event. All concur, except WOODWARD, J., who dissents.