Case Name: LEWIS S. CHASE, Appellant, v. THE SECOND AVENUE RAILROAD CO., Respondent
Court: New York Superior Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1882-05-01
Citations: 16 Jones & S. 220
Docket Number: 
Parties: LEWIS S. CHASE, Appellant, v. THE SECOND AVENUE RAILROAD CO., Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: Reports of cases argued and determined in the Superior Court of the city of New York
Volume: 48
Pages: 220–228

Head Matter:
LEWIS S. CHASE, Appellant, v. THE SECOND AVENUE RAILROAD CO., Respondent.
Contract for advertising privilege—nature of—presumption as tocontinuance.—Statute of frauds.
Plaintiff and defendant entered into a "written contract whereby defendant allowed plaintiff to place advertisements in its cars for two years ending December 30, 1878, plaintiff to pay $100 monthly. After the first term plaintiff continued to put advertisements in said cars, defendant stating as to compensation, “ Let it go on at the same rate.” No other agreement was made. On March 21, 1881, defendant notified plaintiff that the advertisements must be removed on May 1, following, which not being done, defendant removed them. It appeared that when the original contract was made, plaintiff stated that his business was to obtain contracts to put advertisements in the cars, and that a privilege from defendant for one year only would be of no use to him. The complaint charged that on December 30, 1882, a new agreement for two years was entered into, and claimed damages for its breach.
Held, on appeal from decision of single judge, the court considering only the facts, that the privilege was rightfully terminated by defendant. Russell, J., dissenting, Held, that the contract was analogous to the letting of a chattel, that notwithstanding plaintiff’s statement at the time of making the original agreement, the contract at the time plaintiff’s advertisements were wrongfully removed, must be deemed to have been from year to year.
Before Sedgwick, Ch. J., Freedman and Russell, JJ.
Decided May 1, 1882.
Appeal by plaintiff from judgment dismissing complaint, entered upon decision of judge at trial term, a jury having been waived.
The plaintiff and defendant entered into a contrac t in writing, whereby the defendant was to allow the plaintiff to place certain advertisements in the cars of the company, for two years, to end on December 30, 1878, and the plaintiff was to pay $100 monthly. The parties proceeded under the contract down to December 30, 1878.
The plaintiff testified on the trial that at the time of making the contract, he informed the officers of the defendant that his business was to get advertisements and make contracts with parties by the year, or as near to it as he could, and put them in the cars ; that he could not possibly make the contract with the defendant for one year, because the contract he could make the next day would run past such a lease: that he could not do anything at all on one year, because he took all his business, as near as he possibly could,—that is seven-eighths of it,—on yearly contracts for advertising ; that he could not take a lease for one year, as it was impossible for him to carry on his business, without having a lease for more than one year.
At the end of the first term, the plaintiff continued the business of advertising in the car, and as to the amount of compensation to the defendant, its officer said, let it go on at the same rate. There was no new written contract after the first one. On March 21, 1881, the defendant gave to the plaintiff notice, that on the following 1st of May, he must remove the advertisements from the.car. On that day, the defendant not complying with the notice, the defendant took the advertisements from the car.
The complaint charged, on December 30, 1880, that there was an agreement between the parties, “ whereby the said lease was further renewed for the space of two years therefrom,” and that the removal by the defendant was a breach of that agreement," and claimed damages for his being “deprived of the opportunity of making new contracts for the remainder of the two years.”
Hutchins & Platt, attorneys, and Austin Q. Fox, of counsel, for respondent.
John Brooks Leavitt, attorney, and James S. L. Cummins, of counsel, for appellant.

Opinion:
By the Court.—Sedgwick, Ch. J.
If, as the complaint claimed, the contract for renewal, after December 30, 1878, was for the further term of two years, it was void, under the statute of frauds, as being a contract that by its terms was not to be performed within one year.
The further claim is made, in view of this conclusion, that at least the contract must be intended as one from year to year. This position is taken upon the proposition, that if the time of the duration of the contract is not specified, it will be intended to be for the time that the circumstances show it must last to be useful to the party who takes it; or that is equitable under the circumstances. As to this, the facts were so decisive, that it is unnecessary to examine how far, if at all, the legal proposition involved is correct. The plaintiff expressly testified that a contract for a year would not suit his business; that it was impossible to carry on the business without having the right for more than one year. Such being the term which would be implied from the circumstances of the business, a contract for it, if not in writing, could not be performed within a year, and would be void.
Indeed, if we again look at the circumstances, the kind of termination used by defendant as to time was suited to the needs of the plaintiff. It is plain that his contracts with advertisers did not end on any one day, much less on the 30th of each December. There is nothing to show that at the end of December, 1882, he would not have on hand implied engagements, as numerous as he had in March, 1881, when the notice was given. He gave no evidence to show what notice to terminate, short of a year, would be reasonable, if such a test were the one to be applied. The notice of five weeks given, gave him warning to stop making new contracts, and there is nothing to show that it was not sufficient for other purposes.
I examine only the facts, without intending to state the true rule of law to be applied.
Judgment affirmed, with costs.
The defendant appealed from an order which should be affirmed with $10 costs.
Freedman, J., concurred.