Case Name: James B. SWINDELL, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Park T. Swindell, a/k/a P.T. Swindell, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Catherine S. CROWSON, a/k/a C.S. Crowson, Appellee/Cross-Appellant
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1998-06-12
Citations: 712 So. 2d 1162
Docket Number: No. 96-05130
Parties: James B. SWINDELL, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Park T. Swindell, a/k/a P.T. Swindell, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Catherine S. CROWSON, a/k/a C.S. Crowson, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Judges: FULMER and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 712
Pages: 1162–1165

Head Matter:
James B. SWINDELL, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Park T. Swindell, a/k/a P.T. Swindell, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Catherine S. CROWSON, a/k/a C.S. Crowson, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
No. 96-05130.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
June 12, 1998.
John W. Frost, II and John Marc Tamayo of Frost, O’Toole & Saunders, P.A., Bartow, for AppellanVCross-Appellee.
William S. Blakeman, Bartow, for Appel-lee/Cross-Appellant.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
James B. Swindell, as personal representative of the estate of Park T. Swindell, challenges a final judgment entered against the estate in favor of Catherine Crowson for unjust enrichment, as well as orders denying his two motions to dismiss for failure to prosecute. Ms. Crowson cross-appeals the trial court's failure to award prejudgment interest. We affirm the trial court's orders denying the motions to dismiss. We reverse the final judgment in favor of Ms. Crowson because the record is devoid of substantial competent evidence to support the award of damages for unjust enrichment. Our reversal moots the cross-appeal.
A contract implied in law is an obligation imposed by law to prevent unjust enrichment. The essential elements that must be proven under a theory of unjust enrichment are a benefit conferred upon a defendant by the plaintiff, the defendant's appreciation of the benefit, and the defendant's acceptance and retention of the benefit under circumstances that make it inequitable for him to retain it without paying the value thereof. Ruck Brothers Brick v. Kellogg & Kimsey, 668 So.2d 205 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Rite-Way Painting & Plastering v. Tetor, 582 So.2d 15 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). There is no evidence from which the trial court could have concluded that the defendant appreciated the benefit or that retention of any benefit by the defendant without compensation would be unjust.
Ms. Crowson testified that she had done bookkeeping, in the form of check writing, bill paying and keeping a ledger for Park T. Swindell, the decedent, for a ten-year period prior to his death. She also said she made trips to his residence to get cheeks signed and did other errands on his behalf. During this period Ms. Crowson worked- for attorney George Coward as a legal secretary. Mr. Coward testified that he observed Ms. Crow-son perform these nonlegal chores for Park T. Swindell. He further stated that Ms. Crowson was free to do nonlegal work for his clients in his office and that she had his permission to bill the clients.
Ms. Crowson testified she expected to be paid for her services yet no bills were submitted to the decedent prior to this claim against his estate. Moreover, at no time during that period did Ms. Crowson ever make a memorandum indicating the frequency of these chores or the amount of time spent at each task. Yet, at trial and during her deposition she stated she spent forty-five minutes a day initially performing these services, with the frequency decreasing when Park T. Swindell moved into a nursing care type facility. She claimed $7,850.50 was owed for the services, but she could not say how much was owed for each year.
This evidence falls short of demonstrating that the decedent appreciated the benefit and that it would be inequitable for him to retain the benefits without paying for them. The mere fact that the decedent's son may have asked Ms. Crowson about payment does not demonstrate the appreciation of the benefit by the decedent.
Additionally, the damages in this case are highly speculative. Damages cannot be based on speculation, conjecture or guesswork. Florida Outdoor v. Stewart, 318 So.2d 414 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975). Ms. Crowson had no documents or other evidence to support her assertion that she worked forty-five minutes a day for the decedent. She admitted she guessed or estimated both the amount of time spent at these chores as well as the hourly rate. She would not give the court any reasonable determination by year as to the amount of time and value of her services. Ms. Crowson swore under oath in her statement of claim that the $7,850.50 covered the period from 1980 to 1989. Yet she now argues this amount only covers 1987, 1988, and a part of 1989. On the evidence presented, it is impossible to determine what is included in the final judgment figure of $7,850.50.
We, therefore, reverse the final judgment awarding Ms. Crowson $7,850.50 for unjust enrichment.
FULMER and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
THREADGILL, A.C.J., concurs in part; dissents in part.
. Ms. Crowson filed a claim with the probate court and sued for monies she alleged were owed for the entire ten-year period. However, the trial court ruled her claim was limited to the four- year period of November 25, 1985 to November 25, 1989. That ruling is not at issue in this appeal.