Case Name: In re GRAND JURY SUBPOENA SERVED UPON John DOE, Esq. Richard ROE, Intervenor-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1986-01-09
Citations: 781 F.2d 238
Docket Number: No. 638, Docket 84-6319
Parties: In re GRAND JURY SUBPOENA SERVED UPON John DOE, Esq. Richard ROE, Intervenor-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
Judges: Before FEINBERG, Chief Judge, CAKES, TIMBERS, MESKILL, NEWMAN, KEARSE, CARDAMONE, PIERCE, WINTER, PRATT and MINER, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 781
Pages: 238–263

Head Matter:
In re GRAND JURY SUBPOENA SERVED UPON John DOE, Esq. Richard ROE, Intervenor-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
No. 638, Docket 84-6319.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Originally Argued Before Panel Dec. 13, 1984; Decided April 1, 1985.
Petition for Rehearing Submitted to Panel May 24, 1985; Decided June 13, 1985.
Petition for Rehearing En Banc Submitted to En Banc Court Sept. 6, 1985; Argued Oct. 3, 1985;
Decided Jan. 9, 1986.
Applications for stays pending certiorari denied by Justice Marshall on Feb. 18, 1986 and by Justice Brennan on Feb. 24,1986.
Certiorari Denied April 7,1986.
Ronald E. DePetris, Asst. U.S. Atty., Brooklyn, N.Y. (Raymond J. Dearie, U.S. Atty., L. Kevin Sheridan and Mary McGowan Davis, Asst. U.S. Attys., Brooklyn, N.Y.; Edward A. McDonald, Attorney-in-Charge, U.S. Dept, of Justice, Organized Crime Strike Force, E.D.N.Y., Brooklyn, N.Y.; Michael A. Guadagno, Sp. Atty., Organized Crime Strike Force, Brooklyn, N.Y., on the brief) for the United States, appellee.
Mark M. Baker, New York City (John H. Jacobs, New York City, on the brief) for in-tervenor-appellant.
Richard Emery and Ann Defiere, New York City, submitted a brief for New York Civil Liberties Union, amicus curiae.
Herman Kaufman and Austin V. Cam-priello, New York City, submitted a brief for New York Criminal Bar Ass’n, amicus curiae.
George H. Newman, Philadelphia, Pa., for Nat. Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers and New Jersey Ass’n of Criminal Defense Lawyers, submitted a joint brief amicus curiae.
Gerald B. Lefcourt and John H. Doyle, III, New York City, for Ass’n of the Bar of the City of New York; and Mordecai Ro-senfeld, New York City, for New York County Lawyers Ass’n, submitted a joint brief amicus curiae.
Before FEINBERG, Chief Judge, CAKES, TIMBERS, MESKILL, NEWMAN, KEARSE, CARDAMONE, PIERCE, WINTER, PRATT and MINER, Circuit Judges.
Circuit Judges Kaufman and Altimari have elected not to participate in this en banc appeal.

Opinion:
TIMBERS, Senior Circuit Judge (with whom OAKES, MESKILL, NEWMAN, KEARSE, PIERCE/WINTER, PRATT and MINER, Circuit Judges, concur):
We have before us for en banc reconsideration an appeal from an order entered October 22, 1984 in the Eastern District of New York, Eugene H. Nickerson, District Judge, which denied a motion to quash a grand jury subpoena duces tecum.
A panel of this Court on April 1, 1985, by a divided vote, 759 F.2d 968, reversed the order of the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings.
For the reasons set forth below, we vacate the judgment and opinion of the panel and we affirm the order of the district court.
I. FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
A grand jury in the Eastern District of New York is investigating the activities of the Colombo organized crime family and a faction of that enterprise known as the "Anthony Colombo crew". Under investigation are a number of serious offenses, including murder, racketeering, narcotics trafficking, robbery, gambling, extortion, interstate transportation of stolen property and other federal crimes. On September 5, 1984, in connection with this ongoing investigation, a subpoena duces tecum was served on Barry I. Slotnick, attorney for Anthony Colombo, intervenor-appellant. The subpoena commanded Slotnick to appear before the grand jury and to produce:
"any and all records of fees, monies, property or other things of value received, accepted, transferred or held by BARRY SLOTNICK or by any associate of BARRY SLOTNICK on his behalf, from, on account of, or on behalf of [tv/enty-one named individuals including Anthony Colombo].
These records are to include, but not be limited to, records of fees, monies, property or other things of value received, accepted, transferred to or held by BARRY SLOTNICK or by any associate of BARRY SLOTNICK on his behalf in connection with [nine enumerated criminal proceedings]."
The grand jury seeks to determine whether Colombo paid for, or otherwise arranged for, the legal representation of members of his crew. Evidence of such benefactor payments made to Slotnick might establish Colombo as the head of "an enterprise", as that term is defined in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1982).
At oral argument before this en banc court, the government stated that the subpoena duces tecum, although admittedly broad on its face, will be limited specifically to benefactor payments made by Colombo on behalf of his "crew" members. The subpoena, according to the government, will not encompass Colombo's payments to Slotnick for his own representation in the past, nor for Colombo's representation in connection with other outstanding indictments. Thus, the scope of the subpoena is limited to the government's inquiry as to a possible RICO violation.
Slotnick moved to quash the grand jury subpoena pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 17(c), asserting that the government had failed to establish the relevance of, or need for, the information. Judge Nickerson denied the motion to quash. Colombo was granted intervenor status to appeal. In a 2-1 decision, a panel of this Court reversed the district court.
Subsequent to the panel decision, Colombo and members of his crew were indicted on charges of conspiracy to violate the narcotics laws, 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1982); engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise, 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1982); participating in multiple violations of the Hobbs and Travel Acts, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, 1952 (1982); and transporting stolen property interstate, 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1982). Colombo was not indicted for the RICO violation in connection with which the grand jury seeks the information called for in the subpoena duc-es tecum.
Colombo claims that the appearance and testimony before a grand jury of his attorney, Slotnick, who has represented Colombo for nearly eighteen years, will lead, inevitably, to the disqualification of the attorney. A grand jury appearance, according to Colombo, would undermine this long-established relationship of confidence between Colombo and Slotnick. Thus, Colombo claims that his Sixth Amendment rights are implicated; and that, absent the government's demonstration of need for the information and that the attorney is the only source of that information, the subpoena should be quashed. Colombo also claims that, since he now has been indicted on some criminal charges and his Sixth Amendment rights have attached as to them, the subpoena constitutes an impairment of such rights and an abuse of the grand jury process.
In the balance of this opinion, we shall address each of these claims asserted by Colombo. We shall discuss, first, the pre-indictment issue and, second, the post-indictment issue.
II. PRE-INDICTMENT ISSUE
Turning to appellant's claims urged upon this en banc court, we shall focus first on the questions presented to the district court in October 1984, i.e., during the pre-indictment period. The question as to whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion to quash the subpoena prior to indictment is not moot. Whether the government must establish a need for the information, in addition to its relevance, before a subpoena served on the attorney for an unindieted target of a grand jury investigation can be enforced, is a question that is "capable of repetition yet evades review". See In Re Special April 1977 Grand Jury, 581 F.2d 589, 591 (7 Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978); In Re Grand Jury Proceedings (Freeman), 708 F.2d 1571, 1573 (1 Cir.1983). Grand jury investigations must proceed expeditiously. The length of time required for appellate review often is protracted. Frequently indictments will be returned before the appellate process is completed, as occurred here. The instant subpoena was served on Slotnick on September 5, 1984, more than a year ago.
Colombo asserts that compliance with the subpoena will chill the relationship between his attorney and himself and thus violate his Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel and his I^ifth Amendment due process rights. Colombo therefore argues that, before this subpoena can be enforced, the government must demonstrate both a compelling or reasonable need for the information regarding benefactor payments and that his attorney is the only source of that information. Colombo contends that the traditional standard of relevance, see In Re Liberatore, 574 F.2d 78, 82-83 (2 Cir.1978), is not adequate to protect his "implicated" right to counsel. Colombo further contends that Fed.R.Crim.P. 17(c), which empowers a district court to quash a subpoena where "compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive", is not sufficient protection.
For the reasons stated below, we find Colombo's essential claims referred to above to be without merit. We decline to impose upon the government the additional requirement that it demonstrate a need for the information. At the pre-indictmént stage, appellant's Sixth Amendment rights have not attached; nor at that stage, absent interrogation of a custodial target himself, are there additional rights grounded in the due process clauses. The fee information which the government seeks is not privileged. The appropriate time to balance the interests of the government and Colombo's right to counsel is at the pretrial stage, not at the grand jury stage.
A.
There is no constitutional basis for imposing additional requirements for the government to meet before the grand jury subpoena can be enforced in this case. The Sixth Amendment does not require a preliminary showing of need before enforcing a grand jury subpoena served upon an attorney whose client is an unindicted target of a grand jury investigation.
The Sixth Amendment provides in part that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. Const, amend. VI. At the time the district court denied Colombo's motion to quash the subpoena, he had not been indicted. Since Sixth Amendment rights do not attach until "the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated", Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972) (plurality opinion), Colombo could not assert a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights at the time of the district court's ruling.
In Kirby, the Court refused to "import into a routine police investigation an absolute constitutional guarantee historically and rationally applicable only after the onset of formal prosecutorial proceedings." Id. at 690 (emphasis added). The Court explained that
"[t]he initiation of judicial criminal proceedings is far from a mere formalism. It is the starting point of our whole system of adversary criminal justice. For it is only then that the government has committed itself to prosecute, and only then that the adverse positions of government and defendant have solidified. It is then that a defendant finds himself faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized society, and immersed in the intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal law. It is this point, therefore, that marks the commencement of the 'criminal prosecutions' to which alone the explicit guarantees of the Sixth Amendment are applicable."
Id. at 689-90.
We have followed the Supreme Court in holding that "[a] person comes under the protection of the sixth and fourteenth amendment right to counsel from the moment judicial proceedings are initiated against him, 'whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.' " Carvey v. LeFevre, 611 F.2d 19, 21 (2 Cir.1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 921 (1980), quoting Kirby v. Illinois, supra, 406 U.S. at 689; see also United States v. Mohabir, 624 F.2d 1140, 1149 (2 Cir.1980) ("[Ajfter prosecution has begun, the right to obtain the assistance of counsel at all crucial stages is essential if both the symbol and reality of a fair trial are to be preserved_"). We have further held that, during the grand jury investigation of an unindicted target, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach. United States v. Vasquez, 675 F.2d 16, 17 (2 Cir.1982) (per curiam); see also United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 581 (1976) (plurality opinion; dictum); In Re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 333 (1957) (dictum). Since adversary judicial proceedings had not been initiated against Colombo at the time of the entry of the district court order under review, his Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not attached, absent Colombo's interrogation as a suspect in custody, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966). His interest in continuing to be represented by his present counsel was not of constitutional dimensions.
The Supreme Court has made clear that, when a grand jury subpoena does not infringe upon a constitutionally protected interest, there is no reason to require a preliminary showing before allowing the government to enforce the subpoena. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 16 (1973). Since Colombo's Sixth Amendment right to counsel has not attached, there is no merit to his contention that the Constitution requires any greater showing to be made in order to enforce this grand jury subpoena than to enforce any other.
Throughout his challenge to enforcement of the instant subpoena, Colombo has insisted that, even if his Sixth Amendment rights have not attached, his attorney's appearance before the grand jury will chill his potential Sixth Amendment rights, that the relationship between Colombo and Slot- nick will be undermined irreparably, and that Slotnick will be disqualified from representing Colombo. He argues that to call his attorney before the grand jury is to set the stage for the attorney's forced withdrawal. The Model Code of Professional Responsibility states:
"If, after undertaking employment in a contemplated or pending litigation, a lawyer believes or it is obvious that he or a lawyer in his firm may be called as a witness other than on behalf of his client, he may continue the representation until it is apparent that his testimony is or may be prejudicial to his client."
Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 5-102(B) (1979); Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.7. Even assuming that this rule is intended to encompass grand jury testimony as well as trial testimony, Colombo's argument assumes too much. We decline to adopt what amounts to a per se rule that testimony of an attorney before a grand jury as to benefactor payments inevitably will lead to disqualification of that attorney from representing his client.
Before disqualification can even be contemplated, the attorney's testimony must incriminate his client; the grand jury must indict; the government must go forward with the prosecution of the indictment; and ultimately, the attorney must be advised that he will be called as a trial witness against his client. As a court, we decline to speculate that all those events will occur. Apparently Colombo ignores the possibility that his attorney's grand jury testimony may be exculpatory or neutral, or that the government may decide not to use such information at trial, or that the information may be presented at trial in such a way that the attorney can avoid testifying, or that the trial judge may rule in limine that the information is not admissible, perhaps because its probative force does not justify a resulting disqualification of counsel. Disqualification of counsel is not inevitable.
We hold that Colombo's Sixth Amendment rights will not be violated by enforcement of this subpoena.
Colombo's second constitutional challenge to the subpoena is a vague assertion that requiring his attorney to testify as to fee information somehow implicates his Fifth Amendment due process rights. The claim is without merit.
We hold that the Fifth Amendment does not require a preliminary showing of need prior to enforcement of a grand jury subpoena served on counsel for an unindict-ed target of a grand jury investigation. The due process clause provides no greater opportunity for Colombo to halt the grand jury investigation than does the Sixth Amendment.
The Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel is "of such a character that it cannot be denied without violating those 'fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions' ", Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932), quoting Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926), and therefore necessarily is included in the concept of due process of law. Powell v. Alabama, supra; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Powell v. Alabama and Gideon v. Wainwright made the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applicable to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. While violations of an accused's right to counsel are encompassed within the concept of due process, the due process clauses neither expand nor contract the constitutional protection provided by the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
A close examination of the cases discloses that even if there were no Sixth Amendment, historically the Fifth Amendment due process clause would protect that right. See Oakes, The Proper Role of the Federal Courts in Enforcing the Bill of Rights, 54 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 911, 919-23 (1979):
"The interrelationship of the enumerated rights is significant for several reasons. The Bill cannot be construed merely taxonomically, as a set of pigeonholes or preconceived rules into which a given factual situation does or does not fit. Rather it must be viewed as a whole; it is an interlocking complex of basic principles of fairness and individual entitlement that carries a continuing meaning applicable to entirely different or changed circumstances."
Id. at 922. In United States v. Flanagan, 679 F.2d 1072, 1075 (3 Cir.1982), rev'd on other grounds, 465 U.S. 259 (1984), the court indicated that a defendant's decision to select a particular attorney is afforded some protection by the Sixth Amendment and by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, citing Davis v. Stamler, 650 F.2d 477, 479-80 (3 Cir.1981). Without any reference to the Fifth Amendment, the court in Davis v. Stamler stated that "[t]he right to counsel of one's choice also derives from the due process clause", id. at 480, citing United States ex rel. Carey v. Rundle, 409 F.2d 1210 (3 Cir.1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 946 (1970). Carey held that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments require that an accused be afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel of his choice. Id. at 1211, 1215. Presumably, the court in Davis v. Stamler also was referring to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since that case involved a state criminal defendant, and the court cited Carey as support for its statement. This, however, leaves United States v. Flanagan with no support for its proposition that the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment protects a defendant's decision to retain particular counsel. The cases simply do not support the proposition that Colombo's due process rights under the Fifth Amendment are more expansive than the protection which the Sixth Amendment affords and therefore would require a greater showing before the government can enforce the subpoena. Even the Third Circuit cases cited above which do indicate that a defendant's decision to select a particular attorney is afforded protection by the Fifth as well as by the Sixth Amendment do not suggest that the Fifth Amendment protects a defendant's right to counsel more in either a qualitative or a quantitative sense than does the Sixth.
We hold that there is no merit in Colombo's argument that calling an attorney for an unindicted grand jury target to testify before the grand jury will violate his constitutional rights. Whether on constitutional grounds, or pursuant to our federal supervisory power, we decline to impose an additional showing of need before the grand jury subpoena can be enforced under the circumstances of this case.
B.
Aside from the absence of any constitutional basis for Colombo's position, there is no statutory or common law privilege protecting the information which the grand jury seeks to have disclosed. The government states that it seeks the information regarding fees and client identity as evidence of a criminal enterprise and Colombo's position as head of that enterprise. The government claims that evidence that Colombo, as "benefactor", paid for or otherwise arranged for legal representation for members of this criminal enterprise who were apprehended during the course of illegal activity would be relevant to determine whether Colombo should be indicted for his activities as head of a criminal enterprise.
We consistently have held that, absent special circumstances, client identity and fee information are not privileged. E.g., In Re Shargel, 742 F.2d 61, 62 (2 Cir.1984); Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 637-38 (2 Cir.1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963); United States v. Pape, 144 F.2d 778, 782 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 752 (1944). See also United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1354 (9 Cir.1977). "The goal of enabling attorneys to offer informed professional advice and advocacy cannot be accomplished if courts may compel disclosure of communications between the client and attorney necessary to the provision of such services." In Re Shargel, supra, 742 F.2d at 63. But where the communication is not confidential and is not necessary to obtain informed legal advice for the client, no privilege exists. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976). While consultation with an attorney, and payment of a fee, may be neces sary to obtain legal advice, their disclosure does not inhibit the ordinary communication necessary for an attorney to act effectively, justly, and expeditiously. For this reason, absent special circumstances not present here, disclosure of fee information and client identity is not privileged even though io might incriminate the client. In Re Shargel, supra, 742 F.2d at 63. Fee information may be sought as evidence of unexplained wealth which may have been derived from criminal activity, and information that fees were paid either by other clients or by third persons may be sought to determine the identity of a benefactor. Id. at 63-64. As a general rule, and specifically in this case, such information is not protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege.
Moreover, at the time a benefactor offers an attorney payment for the legal representation of others, the attorney should be aware that fee information is not privileged and, indeed, should explain to his client that a potential conflict may arise. Aware of the potential conflict at this initial stage of communication, the attorney and client later should not be heard to complain that disclosure of benefactor payments might chill their relationship of trust. This is a self-imposed problem that very well could have been avoided.
C.
To impose additional requirements that the government show its need for the information sought and that the attorney is the only source for that information would hamper severely the investigative function of the grand jury, if not stop the grand jury "dead in its tracks". See In the Matter of Klein, 776 F.2d 628 (7 Cir.1985). To create new standards for obtaining fee information at the grand jury stage risks unacceptable interruption of the grand jury process and inevitable probing into what information the grand jury already has in order to determine whether a heightened "need" standard has been met. To allow a grand jury target to challenge the subpoena on the basis of a "need" requirement would seriously jeopardize the secrecy of the proceeding and the grand jury's investigative functions.
The courts have long recognized the importance of expeditious grand jury proceedings. "The grand jury is an integral part of our constitutional heritage which was brought to this country with the common law." United States v. Mandujano, supra, 425 U.S. at 571. Historically, it has been viewed as "a basic guarantee of individual liberty", and it "continues to function as a barrier to reckless or unfounded charges." Id. Grand jury proceedings serve not only the investigative function of determining whether an indictment should be returned, but also the protective function of securing persons "against arbitrary or oppressive action, by insuring that serious criminal accusations will be brought only upon the considered judgment of a representative body of citizens acting under oath and under judicial instruction and guidance." Id.
The investigative powers of the grand jury necessarily are broad so that it may carry out adequately its task of deter mining the existence of criminal activity and returning well-founded indictments. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972). The grand Jury is authorized to subpoena witnesses and to require the production of evidence.
"Although the powers of the grand jury are not unlimited and are subject to the supervision of a judge, the longstanding principle that 'the public . has a right to every man's evidence,' except for those persons protected by a constitutional, common-law, or statutory privilege, is particularly applicable to grand jury proceedings."
Id. at 688 (citations omitted). Every person within the jurisdiction of the government has an obligation to appear and give his evidence before the grand jury. United States v. Dionisio, supra, 410 U.S. at 9-10.
"A grand jury's investigation is not fully carried out until every available clue has been run down and all witnesses examined in every proper way to find if a crime has been committed...." United States v. Stone, 429 F.2d 138, 140 (2 Cir.1970). It is part of the grand jury's function of protecting persons against arbitrary or unfair action to call before it persons suspected of criminal activity and "persons suspected of no misconduct but who may be able to provide links in a chain of evidence relating to criminal conduct of others". United States v. Mandujano, supra, 425 U.S. at 573. "It is entirely appropriate — indeed imperative — to summon individuals who may be able to illuminate the shadowy precincts of corruption and crime." Id. Attorneys are not exempted from this duty to appear before this investigative body.
A new requirement to be complied with by the government before it may enforce a grand jury subpoena served upon an attorney can be justified only if the information sought is protected by a constitutional, common law, or statutory privilege. See Branzburg v. Hayes, supra, 408 U.S. at 688.
"Any holding that would saddle a grand jury with minitrials -and preliminary showings would assuredly impede its investigation and frustrate the publics interest in the fair and expeditious administration of the criminal laws. The grand jury may not always serve its historic role as a protective bulwark standing solidly between the ordinary citizen and an over-zealous prosecutor, but if it is even to approach the proper performance . of its constitutional mission, it must be free to pursue its investigations unhindered by external influence or supervision so long as it does not trench upon the legitimate rights of any witness called before it."
United States v. Dionisio, supra, 410 U.S. at 17-18 (citations omitted). Where, as here, neither an attorney-witness nor a client-intervenor raises a valid constitutional claim or statutory privilege, "there is no more reason to require a preliminary showing . than there would be in the case of any witness who, despite the lack of any constitutional or statutory privilege, declined to answer a question or comply with a grand jury request." Id. at 16. Such interference with grand jury proceedings is not justified by the Constitution or case law. Moreover, the Supreme Court has noted with disapproval the delays caused by requiring the government to make a preliminary showing of need, and unavailability of other sources, before it can enforce a grand jury subpoena. Id. at 17 n. 16.
Even where constitutional rights are involved, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to create constitutional exemptions to the duty to appear before a grand jury and furnish relevant information, or to require preliminary showings to be made before persons claiming an infringement of their constitutional rights can be compelled to testify. E.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, supra, 408 U.S. at 690, 708.
We are sensitive to the need to prevent an arbitrary and unnecessary disqualification of an attorney. We hold, however, that the potentially competing in terests at stake concerning disqualification should be examined at the pretrial stage, not the grand jury stage. A district court, at the pretrial stage, can weigh the public interests — the probative value of the lawyer's testimony, the need to preserve ethical standards in the legal profession and the integrity of the judicial system— against the accused's right to counsel of his choice. Our decision today on the pre-indictment issue is supported by other courts which have examined that issue. In the Matter of Klein, supra, (rejecting imposition of "need" requirement before calling attorney to testify before grand jury); In Re Grand Jury Proceedings (Weiner), 754 F.2d 154, 156 (6 Cir.1985) ("Precedent does not support Doe's assertion that the government must make a showing of need in order to direct a subpoena to an attorney."); In Re Grand Jury Proceedings (Freeman), 708 F.2d 1571, 1575 (11 Cir.1983) (rejecting limitation on grand jury power which "need" requirement would pose).
III. POST-INDICTMENT ISSUE
Having held that there is no constitutional right or statutory or common law privilege upon which Colombo can rely to impose a "need" requirement on the government at the pre-indictment stage, we turn to the effect of his subsequent indictment on the non-RICO counts. After the district court's denial of Colombo's motion to quash the subpoena served upon his attorney and after the filing of the panel opinion of our Court, Colombo was indicted on April 22, 1985 on several counts other than the RICO violation. It is in connection with the RICO violation that the government seeks information relating to benefactor payments.
As a result of the indictment on the non-RICO counts, Colombo's Sixth Amendment rights have attached. Kirby v. Illinois, supra, 406 U.S. at 688. Colombo argues that, since some criminal proceedings against him have begun, his Sixth Amendment rights now require that the government show a compelling need for the benefactor payments information in order to enforce the subpoena. We disagree.
Although an indictment has been returned, the fee information which the government seeks still is not protected by any privilege. In Re Shargel, supra, 742 F.2d at 62.
With respect to Colombo's constitutional claims in the post-indictment context, the Sixth Amendment assures him the right to be free of unduly burdensome interruption of his counsel's trial preparation and protects him from any unnecessary or arbitrary disqualification of his counsel. Assessment of whether the subpoena is unreasonable or burdensome, especially when sought to be enforced against counsel for an indicted defendant, can be determined under the standards of Rule 17(c), informed by Sixth Amendment considerations. The risk of disqualification should remain for determination at an in limine hearing by the trial judge who must weigh the probative value of the information the government seeks against the loss of counsel of the accused's choice.
The right to retain counsel of one's choice, however, is not absolute. It "must give way when required by the fair and proper administration of justice." United States v. Ostrer, 597 F.2d 337, 341 (2 Cir.1979). While involuntary disqualifi cation of counsel may prevent an accused from retaining counsel of his choice, courts have the power and duty to disqualify counsel where the public interest in maintaining- the integrity of the judicial system outweighs the accused's constitutional right. Criminal defendants have been constitutionally required to retain other counsel when "the need to preserve the highest ethical standards of professional responsibility" outweighs the accused's constitutional right, United States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064, 1070 (2 Cir.1982), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 951 (1984), and "where the inability of retained counsel to serve gives promise of unreasonable delay or inconvenience in completing the trial". United States v. Cicale, 691 F.2d 95, 106 (2 Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1082 (1983), quoting United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916, 936 (2 Cir.1963).
Having held that Rule 17(e) adequately protects the accused from unreasonable or oppressive demands upon his counsel, we could return the ease to the district court for determination of the Rule 17(c) claim in light of the fact that an indictment has been returned and Sixth Amendment rights have attached. However, since the record before us is comprehensive and we are sufficiently informed to examine these competing interests, there is no need to cause further delays by remanding this issue to the district court.
Since September 5, 1984, more than a year ago, the government has been seeking information from Slotnick, the attorney involved in this case. The subpoena duces tecum seeks information relating to Colombo's payments for the legal representation of others. As we recognize in In Re Shargel, supra, 742 F.2d at 63, where we declined to create a testimonial privilege for fee information and client identity, denying grand jury access to this information "would create unnecessary but considerable temptations to use lawyers as conduits of information or of commodities necessary to criminal schemes or as launderers of money." Moreover, payment for legal representation may be a form of compensation to members of a crime "crew". In the instant case, evidence of benefactor payments clearly is relevant to the grand jury's investigation of the Colombo crime family. The information sought is highly probative of the role of Colombo as head of that "enterprise", as that term is defined in RICO. 18 U.S.C. § 1961, 1962 (1982). Although the subject of the grand jury subpoena is engaged in representation of Colombo in connection with the present indictment, trial is not imminent, and there is no reason to anticipate that Slotnick's appearance at the grand jury for a limited inquiry will be time-consuming. Applying the standards of Rule 17(c), and finding the information which the government seeks highly probative of a RICO violation, we hold that in this ease Colombo's Sixth Amendment interests do not outweigh the grand jury's need for this information.
Colombo also contends that the government's failure to indict him for a RICO violation constitutes an abuse of grand jury process, apparently on the theory that the government, by holding back the RICO violation, is endeavoring to use the subpoena to prepare for trial on the counts in the indictment. There is no evidence in the record to support this claim. The government has sought the information in question for more than fifteen months, long before the indictment. We do not agree with Colombo that the government is seeking this information to bolster its trial material on the present indictment. Cf. In Re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated January 2, 1985 (Simels), 767 F.2d 26 (2 Cir.1985) (timing of subpoena, first issued after indictment, suggested that its purpose was to obtain trial material). It was Colombo who caused the delays in this litigation by moving to quash the subpoena and appealing from the district court's order denying the motion to quash the subpoena. The government was faced with the statute of limitations running on some violations. The government was entitled to indict Colombo on those counts and await the completion of the grand jury investigation before considering whether to indict him for RICO violations.
IV.
To summarize:
In the pre-indictment context, Colombo has failed to establish that any constitutional rights or common law or statutory privileges require the government to demonstrate a need for information relating to benefactor payments. Such a requirement would unjustifiably impede the grand jury process. The pretrial stage, not the grand jury stage, is the appropriate time to balance Colombo's interest in his right to counsel against the public interest in obtaining benefactor payment information, should the issue of disqualification arise.
The subsequent indictment of Colombo on non-RICO counts is not a bar to requiring Slotnick to testify before the grand jury as to benefactor payments. We hold that the probative value of this information — information which may establish Colombo as head of a RICO enterprise — outweighs the Sixth Amendment rights which he asserts. And, as with the pre-indictment claim, the possibility of disqualification is not a basis for declining to enforce the subpoena; it is an issue for the trial judge if disqualification should arise. We find no evidence to support Colombo's claim that the government's decision not to seek indictment of him for RICO violations at the time of the return of the indictment on the non-RICO counts constitutes an abuse of the grand jury process.
We vacate the judgment and opinion of the panel entered April 1, 1985 and we affirm the order of the district court entered October 22, 1984.
. The government, in its argument before the district court, stated: "[W]e realize Mr. Slotnick would probably be conflicted out if he gave testimony to the Grand Jury that was useful." Colombo has seized upon this statement to bolster his argument that disqualification is inevitable. We do not interpret this statement of the government as a concession that Slotnick would be disqualified. Not only are there numerous contingencies involved in disqualification of counsel, but the disqualification issue is not one for the government to determine. It is an issue for the courts. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.7.
Appellant also points to the Department of Justice Guidelines which suggest that "[a]l! reasonable attempts shall be made to obtain information from alternative sources before issuing a subpoena to an attorney relating to the representation of a client_" That the government does not issue such subpoenas at whim is hardly a concession that the government also believes that a heightened showing, assessed by the courts, is required before an attorney may be called to appear before the grand jury.
. It may be possible, for example, to introduce the evidence by a stipulation. Moreover, the Canons of Ethics permit a lawyer to testify while representing a client in four instances:
"(1) If the testimony will relate solely to an uncontested matter.
(2) If the testimony will relate solely to a matter of formality and there is no reason to believe that substantial evidence will be offered in opposition to the testimony.
(3) If the testimony will relate solely to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case by a lawyer or his firm to the client.
(4) As to any matter, if refusal would work a substantial hardship on the client because of the distinctive value of the lawyer or his firm as counsel in the particular case."
Model Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 5 — 101(B).
.We note that this case involves information which is peculiar to only one attorney. Colombo is not in a situation where, even if the information was ruled admissible, a snowball effect would deprive him of retained counsel entirely. See, e.g., United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F.Supp. 194, 197-98 (S.D.N.Y.1985) (potential loss of attorney's fees under forfeiture provisions of RICO presents problem of retaining any lawyer).
. Colombo relies on the reasoning in In Re Special Grand Jury No. 81-1 (Leon D. Harvey), 676 F.2d 1005 (4 Cir.), vacated and withdrawn when grand jury indicted target and he became a fugitive, 697 F.2d 112 (4 Cir.1982) (en banc), for the proposition that such a subpoena will "drive a wedge between the attorney and the client and the relationship will be destroyed," id. at 1009, and that the courts, under their supervisory powers, should prevent such abuses. We note that Harvey no longer has any precedential value even in the Fourth Circuit. Subsequent to Harvey, the Fourth Circuit, in an unpublished opinion by Judge Murnaghan, United States v. Morchower, No. 83-1816 (4 Cir. Sept. 28, 1983), explained the lack of precedential value of Harvey:
"The precedential value of the Harvey case was eliminated, however, when a majority of the circuit judges in regular active service ordered rehearing en banc. See 28 U.S.C. § 46(c), FRAP 35(a). Under the established practice of the Court, as a consequence, the panel decision was automatically vacated. Furthermore, the fact that Leon D. Harvey had, in the interim, (a) been indicted and (b) become a fugitive from justice led to an order withdrawing the panel opinions. In re Special Grand Jury 81-1 (Leon D. Harvey), 697 F.2d 112 (4th Cir.1982)."
Slip op. at 3. The court explained further that
"... the granting of rehearing en banc [in Harvey ] was a demonstration of the presence of a serious question in the mind of the Court as a whole as to the correctness of the opinion emanating from the panel majority."
Slip op. at 4. The court concluded that
"Since the facts of Harvey make it 'nearly identical' [to Morchower\ ., causing it to present 'the precise question' [as in Morchower] ., and since we have concluded that the Harvey dissent has the better chance of prevailing, we apply the reasoning advanced in it and
Affirm."
Slip op. at 4-5. Judge Murnaghan was also the author of the dissent in Harvey. There he stated that
"... the grand jury should be free to subpoena without preliminarily, on a generalized basis, being required to justify the relevance and necessity of its action."
Id., 676 F.2d at 1012 (footnote omitted).
With the elimination of any precedential value of the Fourth Circuit decision in Harvey, the position of Colombo in the instant case is fatally undermined. There no longer is any authority whatsoever to which he can point in support of his reliance upon the supervisory powers of a court of appeals over federal grand jury proceedings to justify requiring the government, prior to enforcing a subpoena served upon counsel for an unindicted target of a grand jury investigation, to establish need.
. But see Note, Benefactor Defense Before the Grand Jury: The Legal Advice and Incrimination Theories of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 6 Cardozo L.Rev. 537 (1985) (suggesting that benefactor identity and fee arrangements should be privileged); and see generally Developments In The Law—Privileged Communications, 98 Harv.L.Rev. 1451, 1501-09, 1514-24, 1522 & n. 124 (1985).
. If in fact Slotnick accepted benefactor payments, he should have heeded the warning of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility against accepting payment of clients' fees from a third party. DR 5-107(A), EC 5-21, 5-22. Accepting payment of clients' fees from a third party may subject an attorney to undesirable outside influence, particularly where the attorney is representing clients in criminal matters, Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.7, and the third party is the head of a criminal enterprise of which the clients are members. In such a situation, an ethical question arises as to whether the attorney's loyalties are with the client or the payor. See Judd, Conflicts of Interest—A Trial Judge's Notes, 44 Fordham L.Rev. 1097, 1099-1101, 1105 n. 41 (1976).
. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has taken a different approach to this issue. New Rule Set on Lawyer Subpoenas, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 4, 1985, at 3, 42. In October 1985 that court adopted a new disciplinary rule which makes it "unprofessional conduct" for a prosecutor to issue a subpoena to a criminal defense attorney without obtaining prior judicial approval. We believe that in the federal courts Fed.R.Crim.P. 17(c), which shields all witnesses, including attorneys, from "unreasonable or oppressive" abuses of grand jury proceedings, and the traditional standard of relevance of the information sought, In Re Liberatore, 574 F.2d 78, 82-83 (2 Cir.1978), provide sufficient safeguards.
. See United States v. Anthony Colombo, 777 F.2d 96, 97 (2 Cir.1985).