Case Name: CALVERT v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1914-11-11
Citations: 170 S.W. 744
Docket Number: No. 3308
Parties: CALVERT v. STATE.
Judges: HARPER, J.
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 170
Pages: 744–749

Head Matter:
CALVERT v. STATE.
(No. 3308.)
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Nov. 11, 1914.)
ASSAULT AND BATTERY (§ 54 ) — AGGRAVATED Assault — Evidence .
Where accused struck complaining witness on being called a liar by him, and witness fell, fracturing his skull, it was insufficient to support a conviction of aggravated assault.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Assault and Battery, Cent. Dig. §§ 75-78; Dec. Dig. § 54. ]
Prendergast, P. J., dissenting.
Appeal from McLennan County Court; Geo. N. Denton, Judge.
Halbert Calvert was convicted of aggravated assault, and he appeals.
Reversed and remanded.
C. E. Lane, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig:. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
DAVIDSON, J.
The information contains two counts. Only the second count was submitted to the jury, which charged an aggravated assault upon J. B. Woody on the part of defendant by striking Woody with his fist and knocking him down, which caused his head and skull to come in contact with the pavement of the street and sidewalk where the assault occurred, thereby causing to be inflicted serious bodily injury on Woody. Without going into a detailed statement, the facts, in substance, disclose that Woody was the owner of a gin. Appellant had been running the gin, taking part of the profits for his pay. Woody had been collecting tolls due the gin without accounting for any of it to appellant, which caused Woody to be indebted to him for a considerable amount. There is some evidence of ill will between the parties, and the state introduced threats on the part of appellant to whip or inflict injury upon Woody. There is evidence going to show that Woody was a contentious man, and evaded paying Ms debts. Tbe immediate facts show, substantially, that Woody was on tbe street in tbe city of Waco, with bis foot on tbe fender of an automobile talking to tbe occupant of tbe automobile, when appellant passed along tbe sidewalk. Seeing Woody, be said to bim that as soon as be finished bis conversation be desired to see bim. Woody turned and went to appellant. They shook bands, and appellant handed bim a letter and asked bim what be meant by writing it. Woody said be knew nothing about it. Appellant said, "You surely dowhereupon Woody says, "You are a God damned liarwhereupon appellant with bis fist struck him on tbe right cheek or jaw, from wMcb Woody fell. In falling Woody's bead struck tbe auto, causing him to roll from it. His bead struck tbe curbing. Tbe witnesses widely differ as to tbe point of contact of Woody's bead in falling, whether it was tbe auto or the curbing. Appellant went to tbe city court and offered to make bond. That court declined to take bis bond or to receive a fine. Appellant was arrested, and' charged with aggravated assault. He testifies that be struck Woody upon being called a God damned liar, but with no purpose or intent to really injure bim. The physicians show that there was on tbe left side of bis bead behind bis ear a fracture of tbe skull something like an inch or an inch and a half in length which produced unconsciousness, and that be was in this condition for some time. They also state that the blow produced insanity. In this connection it is indicated that tbe insanity was produced from a growth on tbe inside of tbe skull at tbe point of fracture.
Appellant contends, under this state of case, be was and is not guilty of aggravated assault. Aggravated and simple assault were both submitted to tbe jury. We are of tbe opinion tbe facts do not constitute aggravated assault. Tbe trouble was a sudden one; ill feeling between tbe parties; one blow struck with tbe fist, and tbe witnesses indicate that it was not a severe blow, but that it did knock bim down. Wherever a party inflicts intentional injury, tbe intent to injure is presumed, and it rests with the party inflicting tbe injury to show tbe innocent intent or want of purpose to inflict tbe injury. In this ease there could be no question of appellant's intent to strike with bis fist, for be did it intentionally, on account of having been called a God damned liar. Tbe result of that was to knock Woody down. Tbe fact that bis bead struck, tbe auto or curb was evidently not in contemplation. If tbe injury be considered serious, within contemplation of tbe statute, then tbe proposition confronts us whether it was a natural and probable result of a blow. That appellant intended to strike with bis fist is evident. Whatever was tbe natural or intended result of that blow would be imputed to appellant. If be did not purpose or have in mind tbe idea of knocking bim against tbe curb or tbe auto or both, then be should not be held responsible for that result. That be did not so intend is clear, and it is equally clear that it was an accident not contemplated át tbe time by appellant. He says be bad no intention to injure or to hurt bim, but was resenting tbe language used by Woody. Tbe striking of tbe auto or tbe curbing, either or both, was the result, it is true, of tbe fall, but it was accidental and evidently not in contemplation. It would be straining tbe facts beyond any legitimate conclusion to bold that appellant contemplated that be would strike either tbe auto or tbe curbing, or that be even would fall, as tbe witnesses testified tbe blow was light.
Tbe meeting seems to have been purely accidental, and tbe fight came up in tbe manner stated. Tbe result was not necessary or intended result, but an accident. Under this condition of the evidence we are of tbe opinion that aggravated assault was not in tbe case.
There are other errors in tbe record that should not have occurred. Some of these are pointed out by bills of exception, but in such an indefinite way as hardly to be considered. One of tbe bills recites that Gardner was permitted to testify that tbe firm of Woody & Calvert owed tbe Industrial Cotton Oil Company approximately $265; that such proof was made by introducing a ledger in which tbe witness testified be did not make all tbe entries in relation to the accounts of Woody & Calvert, and which be (witness) testified was not tbe book of original entry, but was tbe book of third entry; that is, tbe original entries were made on vouchers, thence transferred to a cash book, and then into tbe ledger. All this was objected to, but no grounds of objection stated. Tbe court approved this bill by stating that Gardner was bookkeeper for tbe Industrial Cotton Oil Company, and that it was bis duty to keep tbe ledger introduced in evidence; that tbe vouchers on which tbe original entries were made were very voluminous, covering one whole side of tbe office in which they were kept, and that tbe vouchers representing the items introduced from tbe ledger were scattered indiscriminately through this large volume; that tbe vouchers were entered into tbe cashbook in tbe order they were issued, regardless, as to whose account they were later to be transferred, and tbe ledger was tbe first book of tbe complete system in which the items were placed in individual accounts. What tbe accounts, ledger, and books of tbe Industrial Cotton Oil Company had to do with this transaction is not made to appear. We are of opinion upon another trial these independent matters between third parties should not be introduced. If tbe contention was that Woody & Calvert bad been partners in the gin business, then the entry on the ledger of the Industrial Cotton Oil Company would not be proof of that fact or any evidence of it, unless it was in some way shown that this was called to the attention of appellant so as to show that he was being treated by this oil company as a partner in the transaction, provided that was an issue in the case. There is some complaint also of the county attorney's argument. We are of the opinion that the county attorney went a little too far, and upon another trial he should be a little more circumspect.
There is also a clause in the charge to which we call attention, though not so presented here as to require a reversal, this being a misdemeanor. The court charged with reference to the use of excessive force. That was not, and could not be, an issue in this case. The state's theory was that appellant struck with his fist, knócking Woody down, and incidentally his head struck against the auto or curbing. Appellant's theory was when Woody called him a God damned liar he raised a loaded walking stick, which witnesses all say he was carrying, and threatened to strike him with it, and that he struck with his fist in self-defense. There is nothing in this case which calls for the doctrine of excessive force.
There is also a matter called to our attention by the Assistant Attorney General in regard to the condition of this record. None of the papers show to have been filed. The evidence and all the evidence shown by the record of their filing is that on the margin of the transcript it is noted 7-10-14 by way of illustration. We suppose that this was intended to show that that document was filed on the 10th of July, 1914. In regard to the statement of facts, we find this 9-4-14, which presumably was intended for the 4th day of September, 1914, but nowhere in the record does the clerk place his file mark upon the papers or show that they were ever filed outside of the above statement. This occurs with reference to various other papers in the transcript. We hope this matter will not occur again, and that the clerks or their deputies will take time to properly file papers and make the transcript show the proper filing. The file mark is often very important in this court to know whether the law has been complied with in filing papers within the time allowed by law so as to be considered on appeal. We hope not to be called on to mention such matters as these, and the clerks will be more careful, following the rules and practice in regard to such matters.
The judgment is reversed, and the ' cause is remanded.
HARPER, J.
I concur in the reversal of the case, because, in my opinion, the evidence would not support a verdict finding appellant guilty of aggravated assault. The only serious injury shown is that in the back of the head, caused by Woody striking something in his fall. This injury, in my opinion, the evidence does not even suggest was the necessary or probable result of appellant's acts, and could not have been contemplated by him when he struck Woody in the face for calling him a liar. The blow in the face caused no injury, and the witnesses all say that it was but the spontaneous act of a man when called a liar.
The other matters presented I do not think present any error.