Case Name: MANUS et al. v. THE STATE
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1986-10-23
Citations: 180 Ga. App. 658
Docket Number: 73118
Parties: MANUS et al. v. THE STATE.
Judges: Benham and Beasley, JJ., concur. Beasley, J., also concurs specially.
Reporter: Georgia Appeals Reports
Volume: 180
Pages: 658–662

Head Matter:
73118.
MANUS et al. v. THE STATE.
(350 SE2d 41)

Opinion:
Deen, Presiding Judge.
On October 5, 1985, appellant Verna Manus was driving an automobile in which her husband, appellant Marvin Manus, and her daughter, Lisa, were passengers, when Deputy Sheriff Duncan pulled appellants to the side of the road. Duncan stopped appellants so that he could talk to Marvin Manus about a report that Mr. Manus had received a stolen power saw. Duncan did not have a warrant for arrest; nor was the stop justified by any traffic or motor vehicle violation. At trial, there was dramatically conflicting testimony as to what occurred after the stop. Officer Duncan testified that he questioned Marvin Manus concerning the stolen saw and then received a blow to his back by Mr, Manus while Verna Manus pulled on his right arm. Marvin Manus testified that Duncan stated that he was arresting appellant for receiving stolen property, grabbed appellant and twisted his arm, threw him against the car and then onto the pavement. Duncan then proceeded to forcefully put Verna Manus in the car and in the process, knocked Lisa down, breaking her glasses.
At trial, the jury found Marvin Manus guilty of simple battery and Verna Manus guilty of obstructing an officer. Appellants filed a Motion and an Amended Motion for a New Trial, which were denied by the trial court. In their appeal from the convictions and sentences and from the denial of their Amended Motion for New Trial, appellants assert four enumerations of error.
1. Verna Manus contends that she was denied her right to confront a witness against her. The transcript shows that she left the courtroom after her daughter testified and the defense rested. The state called a rebuttal witness and counsel waived her presence. We find that she cannot now complain for the first time on appeal that she was denied her right to confront a witness. A defendant waives his right of confrontation if he voluntarily absents himself from trial after jeopardy attaches, which occurs immediately once the jury is selected and sworn. Pollard v. State, 175 Ga. App. 269 (333 SE2d 152) (1985). See also Byrd v. Ricketts, 233 Ga. 779 (213 SE2d 610) (1975), and Croy v. State, 168 Ga. App. 241 (308 SE2d 568) (1983), for the rule that a defendant who is out on bail and voluntarily absents himself from trial waives his right of confrontation.
2. Appellants were not denied effective assistance of counsel as they contend. An examination of the transcript of the motion for new trial shows that trial counsel testified that he was employed by Mrs. Manus approximately one week before trial, that he talked to her husband once, but he worked out of town and would not come in to see him. He talked to Mrs. Manus several times and she told him that she had talked to a witness, but he claimed that he didn't see anything. He did not interview the Manuses' twelve-year-old daughter prior to trial because he was undecided about calling her as a witness. Her mother had told him what the child's testimony would be and he would not now change any of the questions that he asked her when he did decide to use her as a witness. He decided not to use any character witnesses after he learned that Mr. Manus had a prior felony conviction. In selecting the jurors, counsel consulted with the accused, he made an opening statement, cross-examined the state's witnesses, made a closing argument, and based his defense on appellants' contention that Officer Duncan instigated this incident. As for failure to conduct pre-trial discovery, there was nothing to discover; there were no in-custody statements, no documentary evidence, no scientific evidence, and no physical evidence that might be suppressed. He received a copy of the accusation and a list of the state's witnesses. It was probably the inconsistency of the defendants' statements that led the jury to believe the state's witnesses. Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 686 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984), there are two components to the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel: deficient performance and prejudice resulting from such deficient per formance. Jones v. State, 177 Ga. App. 531 (339 SE2d 786) (1986). We find neither exists in the instant case.
3. Appellants cannot now complain about the trial court's charge on impeachment of witnesses. Counsel responded that he did not have any exceptions to the trial court's charge after the court asked if he had any objections. White v. State, 243 Ga. 250, 251 (253 SE2d 694) (1979); Henry v. State, 176 Ga. App. 462, 464 (336 SE2d 588) (1985).
4. The evidence adduced at trial, when viewed in a light favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the defendants guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Crawford v. State, 245 Ga. 89 (263 SE2d 131) (1980).
Judgment affirmed.
Benham and Beasley, JJ., concur. Beasley, J., also concurs specially.