Case Name: JOHN G. BRAGAW v. SUPREME LODGE KNIGHTS AND LADIES OF HONOR. (Kentucky Corporation)
Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
Jurisdiction: North Carolina
Decision Date: 1899-03-14
Citations: 124 N.C. 154
Docket Number: 
Parties: JOHN G. BRAGAW v. SUPREME LODGE KNIGHTS AND LADIES OF HONOR. (Kentucky Corporation).
Judges: ‘Eueohes, J., delivers tbe opinion.
Reporter: North Carolina Reports
Volume: 124
Pages: 154–161

Head Matter:
JOHN G. BRAGAW v. SUPREME LODGE KNIGHTS AND LADIES OF HONOR. (Kentucky Corporation).
(Decided March 14, 1899).
Service of Notice by Mail — Presumption—Judge’s Gharge.
1. Where there is evidence tending to show that a notice, capable of service by mail, was enclosed in a letter, properly addressed to the proper party, with postage prepaid, and deposited in the post office — these are matters for the consideration of the jury, and if established to their satisfaction, there is a presumption that the notice was received, in the absence of evidence to the contrary — and this presumption amounts to prima facie proof of service of the notice.
2. Where his Honor correctly charges the law in such case, but af-terwards uses expressions implying that notwithstanding this presumption, the question of service was still an open one for the jury — these expressions impair the force of his charge; are misleading and subject to exception.
Civil AotioN upon a certificate of life insurance in the sum of $1,000, payable to the plaintiff upon the death of his wife, Annie C. Bragaw, tried before Uolce, J., at Fall Term, 1898, of the Superior Court of Beaufort County.
The defendant was a corporation, under the laws of Kentucky, for benevolent and charitable purposes, and had subordinate Lodges in other States, among them' Pamlico Lodge, in Washington, N. C., of which the plaintiff and his wife became members. By its charter the defendant was empowered to issue certificates to participate in the 'relief fund of the Order, payable at death to the beneficiary named therein upon compliance with certain conditions. The plaintiff was the beneficiary named in a certificate issued to his wife, and at her death brought this suit, on demand and refusal to pay. Tbe defence was tbat tbe subordinate Lodge of Pamlico bad defaulted in meeting assessments or other stipulated engagements, and bad been suspended by action of tbe Supreme Lodge, and tbat tbe requisite notice of tbe suspension bad been properly served.
Plaintiff and wife bad met tbeir personal obligations, but Pamlico Lodge bad defaulted and bad been suspended.
There were numerous exceptions taken by defendant and noted, to tbe charge as given and as refused, but for tbe purposes of this appeal they were winnowed down to tbe single question — whether proper notice of tbe suspension was served on Pamlico Lodge by tbe Supreme Lodge.
Tbe evidence and charge relative to this question appear in tbe opinion and concurring opinion.
There were verdict and judgment for tbe plaintiff; appeal by defendant.
Messrs. Charles F. Warren and J. L. Bridgers, for defendant. (appellant).
Mr. John H. Small, for plaintiff.
‘Eueohes, J., delivers tbe opinion.
Eaiecloth:, O. J., delivers a concurring opinion.

Opinion:
EueChes, J.
While tbe law may have been properly stated in tbe charge of tbe Court, it was done in such a way as to mislead tbe jury.
Tbe case turned upon tbe question as to whether tbe local Lodge has bee served with notice of suspension by tbe Grand Lodge. And this seems to be tbe view taken by bis Honor who triedtbecase. Tberewasno evidence tbat such notice bad been actually received by tbe local Lodge, and tbe defendant relied on constructive notice. Tbe defendant contended tbat it properly mailed a notice of suspension, and tbat this was constructive service upon tbe subordinate Lodge, and that plaintiff bad offered xlo evidence to rebut tbis presumption. This seems to have been the way the Court understood the law. Rut the evidence as to mailing the notice was not such as authorized the Court to charge the jury, that if they believed the evidence the notice had been mailed, as the law required it should be, to create the presumption of service. And we think this question was properly left with the jury to find whether it was mailed or not. It seems to us that the Court, in one part of the charge, sufficiently instructed the jury that, if the notice was properly addressed and put in the post-office, with postage paid, then the law would presume a service.
But in a long charge, answering a great many prayers for instructions, he repeatedly said, "Was this notice served on Cherry? (the secretary). Did he receive it? This is the question." In this way, it seems to us, the jury were most likely left with the impression that it was necessary for the defendant to show that Cherry actually received the notice. Eor this, reason there ought to be a new trial.
New trial.