Case Name: JOHNSTONE et al. v. THOMPSON
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 2006-06-12
Citations: 280 Ga. 611
Docket Number: S06A0400
Parties: JOHNSTONE et al. v. THOMPSON.
Judges: All the Justices concur, except Benham, J., who concurs in the judgment only, and Sears, C. J., and Melton, J., who dissent.
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 280
Pages: 611–620

Head Matter:
S06A0400.
JOHNSTONE et al. v. THOMPSON.
(631 SE2d 650)

Opinion:
HUNSTEIN, Presiding Justice.
Joseph C. Thompson, a Cobb County taxpayer, brought a petition against the Cobb County School Board, its members and its superintendent (hereinafter "appellants"), seeking mandamus and injunc-tive relief regarding appellants' use of proceeds from a special purpose local option sales tax ("SPLOST") for educational purposes. At issue was the $75 million technology portion of the SPLOST proceeds, specifically, appellants' decision to use $59 million of the technology portion to fund its "Power to Learn" initiative, which would provide a laptop computer for every middle and high school student in the Cobb County School District. Appellee contended that appellants' decision constituted an abuse of discretion and that appellants were required by statutory and case law to use the SPLOST technology funds to implement the system-wide technology initiatives set out in documents, such as a SPLOST notebook, a facility group report and pamphlets, promulgated by appellants and widely disseminated to obtain voter approval of the SPLOST. The trial court granted appel-lee's petition for writ of mandamus and enjoined appellants from proceeding with the Power to Learn initiative. We affirm because appellants were not legally authorized to use the SPLOST proceeds for a purpose entirely different from that contained in the SPLOST documents and the evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that the Power to Learn initiative was such an entirely different purpose.
Pursuant to Art. VIII, Sec. VI, Par. IV (a), Ga. Const. 1983, the Cobb County Board of Education sought to reimpose a SPLOST for educational purposes. "Proceedings for the reimposition of such [a SPLOST] shall be in the same manner as proceedings for the initial imposition of the tax." Id. As to that initial imposition, Art. VIII, Sec. VI, Par. IV (a) provides that "except as otherwise provided in this Paragraph," the SPLOST in all other respects "shall correspond to and be levied in the same manner as the tax provided for by [OCGA § 48-8-110 et seq.]." See also OCGA § 48-8-141. By this language, Art. VIII, Sec. VI, Par. IV (a) requires reference to all of the provisions of OCGA § 48-8-110 et seq., "except as otherwise provided" by the constitutional provision. The statutory provision pertinent to this appeal is OCGA § 48-8-121 (a) (1), which requires that a SPLOST "shall be used... exclusively for the purpose or purposes specified in the resolution or ordinance calling for imposition of the tax." See also OCGA § 48-8-111 (a) (l).
In this case, the resolution for the reimposition of the SPLOST provided that the funds generated by the SPLOST would be used, in part, on certain designated capital outlay projects, including
[mjaking system-wide technology improvements, including, but not limited to: acquisition and installation of instructional technology and information systems hardware and associated software, and infrastructure at all schools and selected other facilities .
The ballot language sought voter approval to impose the SPLOST for educational purposes including "new schools, land, additions, renovations, equipment, and technology systems." The SPLOST notebook promulgated by appellants detailed eight "Curriculum/Technology Initiatives," with an estimated cost for each initiative. Included among the initiatives was "refresh obsolete workstations," which the notebook estimated required replacing 30,563 units that would affect "students and staff in all academic areas."
Appellants argue that the Power to Learn initiative comports with the directive in OCGA§ 48-8-121 (a) (1) that SPLOST proceeds be spent exclusively for the purposes specified in its resolution because the phrases "technology systems" and "technology improvements" used, respectively, in the resolution and ballot language were general enough to include the Power to Learn initiative. This Court has recognized that a local school board "has discretion to make decisions that fall within the authorization of [a SPLOST] referendum" as long as the alteration in its plans does not "contravene the terms of the referendum or otherwise violate the law. [Cits.]" Thornton v. Clarke County School Dist., 270 Ga. 633, 636 (514 SE2d 11) (1999). Thornton relied upon Dickey v. Storey, 262 Ga. 452 (423 SE2d 650) (1992), a case involving a county SPLOST referendum to generate funds to build " 'recreational facilities and multi-purpose governmental facilities,' " but which did not identify sites for the facilities. Id. at 456 (3). Instead, "[b]udget and account reports were then prepared listing the specific SPLOST projects to be developed." Id. The Dickey Court construed the applicable statutes and held that
the Board is not authorized to use proceeds from the SPLOST tax [sic] for a purpose entirely different from that contained in the SPLOST budget and account reports. We further hold that the Board is bound by the SPLOST budget and account reports to complete all projects listed therein unless circumstances arise which dictate that projects which initially seemed feasible are no longer so. In this regard the governing authority has discretion to make adjustments in the plans for these projects, but may not abandon the projects altogether.
Id. Accordingly, we upheld the trial court's determination that the Board was required to complete the multi-purpose government facility at the site as specified in the plans and specifications drawn for the site, id., but reversed the ruling as to a recreational facility where it was "not apparent from the record before us that the Board has ever voted to abandon the original site" identified in the report adopted by the SPLOST committee. Id. at 455 (2).
Contrary to appellants' argument that our holding in Thornton, supra, required the trial court to uphold the decision to use the technology SPLOST funds for the Power to Learn initiative, we find the trial court correctly recognized that Thornton is factually distinguishable, given the holding that none of the plans by the school board in Thornton violated that particular SPLOST referendum, id., 270 Ga. at 635 (2), and indeed that the school board in that case had specifically advised the public during meetings and public fora conducted in anticipation of the referendum about the particular plan option it eventually chose to pursue. Id. at 634. In contrast, the evidence in this case authorized the trial court to find, as in Dickey, supra, that the general language in the referendum and ballot about technology improvements and technology systems referred to the proposed capital outlay projects detailed in the SPLOST notebook and that appellants were bound by these specifically delineated projects in the SPLOST notebook, just as the county Board in Dickey was bound by the SPLOST budget and account reports promulgated in that case. The evidence also authorized the trial court to reject appellants' argument that the Power to Learn initiative was the functional equivalent of the SPLOST notebook project to "refresh obsolete workstations," given that the Power to Learn initiative provided laptop computers only to middle and high school students, whereas the SPLOST notebook project specified it was for the purpose of updating computer laboratory workstations used by all of the school district's students, elementary as well as middle and high schools. We are not persuaded by appellants' argument that the SPLOST referendum language gave them the discretion to use the funds to provide any type of technology system to less than all of the school district students.
"Mandamus will issue only where the petitioner has demonstrated a clear legal right or a gross abuse of discretion. [Cit.]" City of Alpharetta v. Estate of C.R. Sims, 272 Ga. 680 (533 SE2d 692) (2000). The evidence authorized the trial court to find that appellants failed to comply with their clear legal duties when they sought to "re-budget" the original technology initiatives in favor of the Power to Learn initiative and that they abused their discretion when they abandoned the original initiatives even though those initiatives remained feasible of completion. See Dickey, supra, 262 Ga. at 456 (3). For the reasons set forth above, the trial court's ruling was consonant with our decisions in Thornton and Dickey, supra, and thus we reject appellants' argument that appellee had no clear legal right to the mandamus relief granted in this case.
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur, except Benham, J., who concurs in the judgment only, and Sears, C. J., and Melton, J., who dissent.
Appellee's motion to dismiss the appeal as moot is denied.
In light of this constitutional and statutory language, we find no merit in appellants' argument that the trial court inappropriately looked to the county SPLOST provisions in OCGA § 48-8-110 through § 48-8-122 and case law interpreting those provisions when resolving this case.
We thus reject appellants' argument that for purposes of an education SPLOST, reference to OCGA§ 48-8-110 et seq. is limited to matters of levying and collection.
We find no merit in appellants' argument that OCGA § 48-8-111 (a) (1) provides "otherwise" than Art. VIII, Sec. VI, Par. IV (c), when it requires the SPLOST resolution to "specify" the purposes (including capital outlay projects) for which the SPLOST proceeds are to he used, see also OCGA § 48-8-121 (f), whereas the constitutional provision requires the resolution to "describe" those purposes. This argument overlooks the fact that Art. VIII, Sec. VT, Par. IV (c) (1) requires the resolution to "describe" the "specific capital outlay projects to be funded." (Emphasis supplied.)
The SPLOST notebook commented that "[t]he number of computers to be replaced includes those reported on the 2001 DOE inventory plus those provided for schools by SPLOST in 2002 and 2003 as well as 700 used by district level staff in 2002."
Appellants challenge the trial court's "assumption" that the Power to Learn initiative would be fully implemented. Although there was evidence to support the trial court's finding, even assuming, arguendo, that appellants had decided against fully implementing the initiative, this shows only that the initiative would benefit an even smaller number of the district's students and thus reinforces the trial court's finding that by promulgating the initiative appellants sought to use the SPLOST proceeds for an entirely different purpose from that contained in the SPLOST notebook.
Under appellants' rationale, they could have earmarked all the SPLOST technology funds for, e.g., the purchase of electronic musical instruments, studio mixers and computer audio interfaces for the school district's band students to the exclusion of other students and their technology needs.