Case Name: The STATE, Respondent v. Ernest M. RIDDLE, Appellant
Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1990-02-26
Citations: 301 S.C. 68
Docket Number: 23166
Parties: The STATE, Respondent v. Ernest M. RIDDLE, Appellant.
Judges: Gregory, C. J., and Harwell and Finney, JJ., concur.
Reporter: South Carolina Reports
Volume: 301
Pages: 68–74

Head Matter:
23166
The STATE, Respondent v. Ernest M. RIDDLE, Appellant.
(389 S. E. (2d) 665)
Supreme Court
David I. Bruck and John H. Blume, Columbia, Kenneth L. Holland, Arthur L. Shemwell, Jr., Gaffney, and S. C. Office of Appellate Defense, Columbia, for appellant.
Atty. Gen. T. Travis Medlock and Asst. Attys. Gen. Harold M. Coombs, Jr., and William Edgar Salter, III, Columbia, and Sol. Holman C. Gossett, Jr., Spartanburg, for respondent.
Heard Dec. 5, 1988.
Decided Feb. 26, 1990.

Opinion:
Chandler, Justice:
Ernest M. Riddle (Riddle) was convicted of murder, burglary, and armed robbery in connection with the August 8, 1985, slaying of Abbie Sue Mullinax. He was sentenced to death for murder, to life imprisonment for burglary, and to 25 years for armed robbery. This Court affirmed the convictions, reversed the death sentence, and remanded for a new sentencing trial. State v. Riddle, 291 S. C. 232, 353 S. E. (2d) 138 (1987).
Following his resentencing to death, Riddle's appeal has been consolidated with the review mandated by S. C. Code Ann. § 16-3-25 (1985). We again reverse and remand for another resentencing.
FACTS
At resentencing, the Solicitor was permitted to introduce the records of Riddle's burglary and armed robbery convictions from the first trial to establish statutory aggravating circumstances that the "[m]urder was committed while in the commission of . burglary . [and] robbery while armed with a deadly weapon____" See S. C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20(C)(a)(1)(c) & (d) (Supp. 1988). These were the aggravating circumstances relied upon by the State.
During his jury summation, the Solicitor argued that the requisite aggravating circumstances were established by introduction of the prior convictions into evidence. He stated:
We only have to prove one of those — it was — she was killed in the process of robbery with a deadly weapon or burglary to her home. We contend we have proved both of them, beyond a reasonable doubt.
It's been admitted into evidence, Count 2 and Count 3, burglary and armed robbery. He was convicted on both of those charges.
That's that. That's for you to look at, take back there with you. We have proved those aggravating circumstances beyond any reasonable doubt to you. They are there in the public records. It's been done.
You remember the facts. You remember what we've shown you____We have proved to you by entering this document the aggravating circumstance of burglary and killing while in the process of burglary was done by him. He robbed with a deadly weapon and in the process killed Mrs. Mullinax.
Those are the aggravating circumstances you are to consider. We have proved them to you beyond a reasonable doubt. [Emphasis supplied.]
The trial judge did not include in his jury charge any instruction on the elements of burglary and armed robbery.
ISSUE
The sole issue we address is whether admission into evidence of the burglary and armed robbery convictions, combined with omission of any instruction on the elements of these crimes, constitutes reversible error.
DISCUSSION
The death penalty may be imposed only upon a finding by the sentencing authority beyond a reasonable doubt of at least one statutory aggravating circumstance. S. C. Code Ann. § 16-8-20(C) (Supp. 1988). [ . "Unless at least one of the statutory aggravating circumstances enumerated in this section is so found, the death penalty shall not be imposed."] This requirement applies to those trials in which the same jury determines guilt in phase I, then imposes sentence in phase II. However, it applies with equal force when a new jury is empaneled for purposes of resentencing only.
Aggravating circumstances serve to guide and limit the sentencing authority's discretion so as to reduce the likelihood that sentence will be imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 49 L. Ed. (2d) 859 (1976); State v. Shaw, 273 S. C. 194, 255 S. E. (2d) 799 (1979). "[T]he channeling and limiting of the sentencer's discretion in imposing the death penalty is a fundamentally constitutional requirement for sufficiently minimizing the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action." Maryland v. Cartwright, 486 U. S. 356, 362, 108 S. Ct. 1853, 1858, 100 L. Ed. (2d) 372, 380 (1988). This discretion must not be affected by "state-induced suggestions that the sentencing jury may shift its responsibility" for determining whether death is the appropriate punishment in a particular case. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U. S. 320, 330, 105 S. Ct. 2633, 2640, 86 L. Ed. (2d) 231, 240 (1985).
Here, the State was permitted to prove statutory aggravating circumstances by introducing from the first trial Riddle's convictions for burglary and armed robbery. This was error.
The burglary and armed robbery convictions represent findings by the jury in Riddle's previous trial that he committed those crimes, for which he received sentences of life imprisonment and 25 years. These convictions, however, had no legal efficacy at the subsequent proceeding: they were in no way binding upon the resentencing jury. Moreover, their introduction injected an unreliable factor into the resentencing which subverted the jury's responsibility to find the existence, or not, of a statutory aggravating circumstance.
State's reliance upon State v. Stewart, 288 S. C. 232, 341 S. E. (2d) 789 (1986) is misplaced. Stewart holds that at a resentencing trial the State or the accused may offer evidence previously presented at either the guilt or sentencing phase of the original trial; however, convictions for aggravating crimes which accompany the murder do not constitute such evidence.
The error here was underscored by the trial court's failure to instruct on the elements of burglary and armed robbery. Absent such an instruction the resentencing jury was without guidance in determining whether murder occurred while in the commission of aggravating crimes. See State v. Williams, 690 S. W. (2d) 517 (Tenn. 1985).
We hold the trial court erred in failing to instruct on the elements of burglary and armed robbery and in admitting the convictions to prove statutory aggravating circumstances.
Reversed and remanded.
Gregory, C. J., and Harwell and Finney, JJ., concur.
Toal, J., concurs in separate opinion.