Case Name: UNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. Frank ALTESE, a/k/a Frankie Feets, et al., Appellees
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1976-07-01
Citations: 542 F.2d 104
Docket Number: No. 902, Docket 76-1008
Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. Frank ALTESE, a/k/a Frankie Feets, et al., Appellees.
Judges: Before CLARK, Associate Justice, Ret., and TIMBERS and VAN GRAAFEILAND, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 542
Pages: 104–111

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. Frank ALTESE, a/k/a Frankie Feets, et al., Appellees.
No. 902, Docket 76-1008.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Argued April 15, 1976.
Decided July 1, 1976.
Certiorari Denied Jan. 10, 1977.
See 97 S.Ct. 736.
David G. Trager, U. S. Atty., E. D. N. Y., David Margolis, Fred F. Barlow, Sp. Attys., Brooklyn, N. Y., Shirley Baccus-Lobel, Robert H. Plaxico, Attys., Dept, of Justice, Wash., D. C., for appellant.
Maurice Brill, New York City, for appellee Salvatore Annarumo.
Wild & Goldstein, New York City, for appellee Napoli.
Richard I. Rosenkranz, Brooklyn, N. Y., for appellee Jerry D’Avanzo.
Gustave H. Newman, New York City, for appellee Sabato Vigorito.
Before CLARK, Associate Justice, Ret., and TIMBERS and VAN GRAAFEILAND, Circuit Judges.
Associate Justice, Retired, Supreme Court of the United States, sitting by designation.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM:
This is an appeal pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3731 from an order of the District Court dismissing, prior to trial, counts one and two of an eight count indictment alleging gambling and racketeering offenses in violation of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 922. The indictment charged twenty two defendants in the various counts, with count one charging sixteen of them w'th being associated with an enterprise engaged in interstate commerce and conducting its affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity and through the collection of debts in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c); all twenty two of the defendants were charged in count two with having conspired to violate Section 1962(c), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). The remaining counts, none of which are involved here, charged the conduct of an illegal gambling business in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1955, and § 1952, obstruction of justice by two defendants in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1510 and conspiracy to violate Sections 1955 and 1952. The counts under § 1952 and § 1510, being counts six and seven, were dismissed without objection of the government for failure to allege essential elements of the offenses.
The gravamen of the two counts before us (counts one and two) is that the named defendants had conducted a large scale gambling business through a pattern of racketeering activity and the collection of unlawful debts, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), (5) and (6).
The appellees claimed and the District Court held that Section 1962(c) applied only to a legitimate enterprise that was conducted through a pattern of racketeering activity or the collection of unlawful debts and not to an illegal gambling business. In so holding the district court held that Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act, of which Section 1962(c) is a part, "deals with the problem of infiltration of legitimate business by persons connected with organized crime" and was not designed by Congress "to cover the types of activity charged in (counts one and two) of this indictment." We disagree and reverse.
1. The Language of the Act:
We first note that each of the four paragraphs of Section 1962 begins with the all inclusive phrase: "It shall be unlawful for any person . . . " who has received any income derived from any pattern of racketeering activity, etc., to use any part of such income in the acquisition of "any enterprise engaged in . interstate or foreign commerce." (emphasis supplied). The word "any" is explicit. In addition, we note that in Section 1961 the Congress in defining the words "person" and "enterprise" again uses the word "any". In the light of the continued repetition of the word "any" we cannot say that "a reading of the statute" evinces a Congressional intent to eliminate illegitimate businesses from the orbit of the Act. On the contrary we find ourselves obliged to say that Title IX in its entirety says in clear, precise and unambiguous language — the use of the word "any" — that all enterprises that are conducted through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debts fall within the interdiction of the Act. Congress could, if it intended any other meaning, have inserted a single word of restriction. Instead it left out the word and inserted a clause providing that the provisions of Title IX "be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes." 84 Stat. 947. We cannot — in the light of such language — hold that Congress did not say what it meant nor meant what it said.
2. The Cases on Title IX:
If the language of Title IX is not found to be so explicit as we hold it to be and we are obliged to construe the language of Title IX, we come out with the same result. As this Circuit held in United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 439 fn. 12 (1974) cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105, 95 S.Ct. 775, 42 L.Ed.2d 801 (1974), we are obliged to construe the Act liberally. Indeed, Congress declared in the Act itself:
It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime. 84 Stat. 923.
These new penal prohibitions, enhanced sanctions, and new remedies clearly extend to an illegitimate business as well as a legitimate one; to read the Act otherwise does not make sense since it leaves a loop hole for illegitimate business to escape its coverage.
We note that three other Circuits have reached this same result. United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974) cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925, 95 S.Ct. 1121, 43 L.Ed.2d 395 (1975); United States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050, 96 S.Ct. 777, 46 L.Ed.2d 638, 44 U.S.L.W. 3397 (1976), United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1976), and United States v. Morris, 532 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1976). We are pleased to make it a foursome.
Reversed and remanded.
. 18 U.S.C. 1962 provides:
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
. 18 U.S.C. 1962:
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
. Section 1961 provides:
(1) "Racketeering activity" means (A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, (B) any act which is indictable under any of the following provisions of title 18, United States Code; Section 201 (relating to bribery), section 224 (relating to sports bribery), sections 471, 472, and 473 (relating to counterfeiting), section 659 (relating to theft from interstate shipment) if the act indictable under section 659 is felonious, section 664 (relating to embezzlement from pension and welfare funds), sections 891-894-(relating to extortionate credit transactions), section 1084 (relating to the transmission of gambling information), section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire fraud), section 1503 (relating to obstruction of justice), section 1511 (relating to the obstruction of State or local law enforcement), section 1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal investigations), section 1511 (relating to the obstruction of State or local law enforcement), section 1951 (relating to interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion), section 1952 (relating to racketeering), section 1953 (relating to interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia), section 1954 (relating to unlawful welfare fund payments), section 1955 (relating to the prohibition of illegal gambling businesses), sections 2314 and 2315 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen property), sections 2421-24 (relating to white slave traffic), (C) any act which is indictable under title 29, United States Code, section 186 (dealing with restrictions on payments and loans to labor organizations) or section 501(c) (relating to embezzlement from union funds), or (D) any offense involving bankruptcy fraud, fraud in the sale of securities, or the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, punishable under any law of the United States;
(5) "pattern or racketeering activity" requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any pe riod of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity;
(6) "unlawful debt" means a debt (A) incurred or contracted in gambling activity which was in violation of the law of the United States, a State or political subdivision thereof, or which is unenforceable under State or Federal law in whole or in part as to principal or interest because of the laws relating to usury, and (B) which was incurred in connection with the business of gambling in violation of the law of the United States, a State or political subdivision thereof, or the business of lending money or a thing of value at a rate usurious under State or Federal law, where the usurious rate is at least twice the enforceable rate; .
. "Any" is defined in Webster's New International Dictionary, Second Edition, as follows: "Indicating a person, thing, etc., as one selected without restriction or limitation of choice, with the implication that everyone is open to selection without exception; all, taken distributively; every; used especially in assertions with emphasis on unlimited scope."
. It was held that the word "enterprise" in the Act included both foreign and domestic.
. Two district courts have held to the contrary: United States v. Amato, 367 F.Supp. 547 (S.D. N.Y.1973) and United States v. Moeller, 402 F.Supp. 49 (D.Conn.1975) while United States v. Costellano, 75 Cr. 51 (E.D.N.Y.1975) upheld the Act's coverage as to both illegal and legitimate enterprises.