Case Name: EDWARD J. FARLEY et al., Petitioners, v. BASIL HEALEY, as Acting Registrar of Voters, et al., Respondents
Court: Supreme Court of California
Jurisdiction: California
Decision Date: 1967-09-18
Citations: 67 Cal. 2d 325
Docket Number: S. F. No. 22567
Parties: EDWARD J. FARLEY et al., Petitioners, v. BASIL HEALEY, as Acting Registrar of Voters, et al., Respondents.
Judges: 
Reporter: California Reports
Volume: 67
Pages: 325–338

Head Matter:
[S. F. No. 22567.
In Bank.
Sept. 18, 1967.]
EDWARD J. FARLEY et al., Petitioners, v. BASIL HEALEY, as Acting Registrar of Voters, et al., Respondents.
Garry, Dreyfus, MeTernan & Brotsky, Benjamin Dreyfus and Allan Brotsky for Petitioner.
Marshall W. Krause, M. Lawrence Popofsky and Paul N. Halvonik as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioners.
Thomas M. O’Connor, City Attorney, and George E. Kruger, Deputy City Attorney, for Respondents.

Opinion:
TRAYNOR, C. J.
Petitioners have obtained the signatures of more than 21,000 electors of the City and County of San Francisco to a petition to place an initiative measure on the ballot urging an immediate ceasefire and American withdrawal from Vietnam. Seeking submission of the measure to the voters at the November 7, 1967, municipal election, petitioners tendered the signatures to the acting registrar of voters. On the advice of the city attorney, the acting registrar refused to determine the sufficiency of the signatures to qualify the measure for the ballot. Petitioners then sought a writ of mandate from the superior court. That court denied relief on August 31, 1967. On September 5, petitioners filed a petition for a writ of mandate in this court to compel the acting registrar of voters and the county clerk to determine the sufficiency of the signatures and to place the measure on the ballot.
Petitioners allege that relief must be granted by September 22, 1967, to permit the determination whether they have sufficient signatures to qualify the measure for the ballot. Accordingly, they contend that an appeal from the superior court's order is not an adequate remedy. Under these circumstances they may invoke this court's original jurisdiction to determine their right to submit the proposed initiative to the electorate despite the pendency of the superior court action. (Perry v. Jordan (1949) 34 Cal.2d 87, 90-91 [207 P.2d 47].)
It must be noted at the outset that the acting registrar of voters exceeded his authority in undertaking to determine whether the proposed initiative was within the power of the electorate to adopt. Under section 180 of the Charter of the City and County of San Francisco, his duty is limited to the ministerial function of ascertaining whether the procedural requirements for submitting an initiative measure have been met. It is not his function to determine whether a proposed initiative will be valid if enacted or whether a proposed declaration of policy is one to which the initiative may apply. These questions may involve difficult legal issues that only a court can determine. The right to propose initiative measures cannot properly be impeded by a decision of a ministerial officer, even if supported by the advice of the city attorney, that the subject is not appropriate for submission to the voters. Given compliance with the formal requirements for submitting an initiative, the registrar must place it on the ballot unless he is directed to do otherwise by a court on a compelling showing that a proper case has been established for interfering with the initiative power. (McFadden v. Jordan (1948) 32 Cal.2d 330, 332 [196 P.2d 787].) In Mervynne v. Acker (1961) 189 Cal.App.2d 558 [11 Cal.Rptr. 340], and Riedman v. Brison (1933) 217 Cal. 383 [18 P.2d 947], such a showing was made, and the court therefore had no occasion to consider whether an election official on his own motion may refuse to submit an initiative measure to the electorate on the ground that it deals with a matter not subject to the initiative. Accordingly, neither case is contrary to our conclusion herein. (See Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co. (1960) 54 Cal.2d 339, 343 [5 Cal.Rptr. 863, 353 P.2d 575] ; People v. Banks (1959) 53 Cal.2d 370, 389 [1 Cal.Rptr. 669, 348 P.2d 102].)
Since respondents in the present ease, however, have refused to proceed and seriously contend that the proposed measure should not be submitted to the voters, we deem it appropriate to determine whether the charter enables the electorate to adopt it.
The proposed measure is denominated a declaration of policy. It provides that "It is the policy of the people of the City and County of San Francisco that there be an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam so that the Vietnamese people can settle their own problems."
Section 179 of the charter provides: "The registered voters shall have power to propose by petition, and to adopt or reject at the polls, any ordinance, act or other measure which is within the power conferred upon the board of supervisors to enact, or any legislative act which is within the power conferred upon any other board, commission or officer to adopt, or any amendment to the charter. . . .
' Any declaration of policy may be submitted to the electors in the manner provided for the submission of ordinances; and when approved by a majority of the qualified electors voting' on said declaration, it shall thereupon be the duty of the board of supervisors to enact an ordinance or ordinances to carry such policies or principles into effect, subject to the referendum provisions of this charter. ' '
This power of initiative must be liberally construed (Blotter v. Farrell (1954) 42 Cal.2d 804, 809 [270 P.2d 481]) to promote the democratic process. (Mervynne v. Acker, supra, 189 Cal.App.2d 558, 563.) Despite this rule of construction and the broad language of the charter, respondents contend that initiative measures cannot be submitted to the electorate unless they concern municipal affairs on which the board of supervisors could enact binding legislation. Section 179, however, is not so limited. It reserves to the people the power to initiate "any ordinance, act or other measure which is within the power conferred upon the board of supervisors to enact. . . ." As representatives of local communities, boards of supervisors and city councils have traditionally made declarations of policy on matters of concern to the community whether or not they had power to effectuate such declarations by binding legislation. Indeed, one of the purposes of local government is to represent its citizens before the Congress, the Legislature, and administrative agencies in matters over which the local government has no power. Even in matters of foreign policy it is not uncommon for local legislative bodies to make their positions known. By their Resolution No. 341-67, approved June 2, 1967, for example, the San Francisco Board of Supervisors commended President Johnson "for his stand on the present Arab-Israeli crisis" and urged "that all necessary action be taken to insure freedom of navigation for all countries in the Gulf of Aqaba." Pursuant to section 179 the people as well as their elected representatives may adopt such resolutions.
Respondents contend, however, that petitioners' measure is not a "resolution," but a "declaration of policy" governed by the second paragraph of section 179. They urge that only declarations of policy that can be put into effect by ordinances can be adopted by initiative.
The second paragraph of section 179 neither restricts the measures that may be submitted pursuant to the first paragraph nor limits the declarations of policy that it authorizes by its own force. It does not expressly restrict the type of declaration that may be submitted, but instead refers to "any" declaration. The fact that the board's duty "to carry . . . into effect" approved policies is inoperative when the policy is beyond the power of the board to effectuate, affords no basis for restricting the right to declare the policy. Only by construing the paragraph narrowly against the power of initiative could it be held that the voters may only declare policies that the supervisors could effectuate by ordinance.
Even under such a narrow construction, however, the proposed initiative is authorized, for the board of supervisors can enact ordinances carrying out the policy of the declaration to express the popular will. The board by ordinance can use the avenues of advocacy available to it to express that will. It can, for example, direct its legislative representative in Washington to make the people's position known, rename streets or buildings, or order the posting of the declaration in public buildings.
The charter contains a numerical requirement as a built-in safeguard against frivolous use of the initiative process. There is no other limitation that prevents petitioners from submitting thqir measure to a general vote.
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing respondents to determine the sufficiency of the signatures to the petition and, if determined to be sufficient, to place the proposed initiative on the ballot for the municipal election of November 7,1967. This decision is final forthwith.
Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., and Sullivan, J., concurred.
The parties have stipulated to waive issuance of an alternative writ or order to show cause and to submit the ease without oral argument upon the petition and the memorandum of points and authorities in opposition.