Case Name: Peter Gasz, Resp't, v. Michael Strick, App'lt
Court: Buffalo Superior Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1890-03-24
Citations: 30 N.Y. St. Rep. 226
Docket Number: 
Parties: Peter Gasz, Resp’t, v. Michael Strick, App’lt.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 30
Pages: 226–232

Head Matter:
Peter Gasz, Resp’t, v. Michael Strick, App’lt.
(Superior Court of Buffalo,
General Term,
Filed March 24, 1890.)
1. Ejectment—Correction oe errors in decision.
The decision in an action of ejectment omitted to state the nature of plaintiffs estate in the property and directed the entry of judgment in his favor, “without costs.” A motion to correct the judgment by striking out the words “without costs” was denied without prejudice to a right to move therefor before the judge presiding at the trial. Subsequently the judgment was set aside and a new trial granted under § 1525 of the Code. Thereafter orders were made amending the original judgment in the aforesaid particulars. Held, that the latter orders were properly granted and were not objectionable on the ground that they overruled the decision of another judge at special term.
2. Same.
Section 1525 is mandatory and the court is not called upon to make any judicial determination.
3. Same—Appeal not necessary.
An appeal is not necessary to correct such errors, but relief may be granted on motion.
Ejectment. The plaintiff recovered judgment. The cause was. tried before the Hon. Edward W. Hatch, Judge, without a jury. His decision, after setting forth his findings of fact and law, contained the direction “ that judgment should be entered accordingly but without costs to either party.” Judgment thereupon, without costs, was entered, September 20, 1888. The decision omitted to state as required by § 1519 of the Code u the estate of the plaintiff in the property recovered.” Pursuant to § 1525 of the Code, on application of the defendant, the court, at special term, by an order dated October 31, 1888, vacated the judgment and granted a new trial. After service of notice of the application for a new trial, tire judgment yet standing, the plaintiff upon an order to show cause brought on a motion to amend the j udgment and decision so as to allow the plaintiff to recover costs by striking out the direction for judgment “ without costs.” The court, Hon. Robert C. Titus, Judge, denied the motion “ without prejudice to the plaintiff’s right to move before Judge Hatch for such relief if desired.” Subsequently. December 10, 1888, on motion of the plaintiff, defendant opposing, Judge Hatch made an order, which, as entered, directed that “ the findings ” (referring to the court’s decision), be corrected by striking out the words “ but without costs to either party,” and that a modified judgment be entered in accordance with the corrected findings awarding costs to the plaintiff, and further ordered and directed that “ the defendant may avail himself of the order made , herein ordering a new trial after payment of the costs of the action.” Thereupon the modified judgment was entered December 15, 1888.
The defendant afterwards, April 18,1889, made a motion at special term held by Judge Hatch to vacate the modified judgment and the order directing the amendment of the decision, which motion was denied and a further order made, not, so far as appears, on motion of either party, that the judgment last entered be further amended by specifying the estate of the plaintiff, and on the 23rd day of April, 1889, a new judgment was entered containing the substance of the two former judgments and an addition specifying the plaintiff’s estate to be a fee. This appeal is from the judgment entered December 15, 1888, and from the order of December 10, 1888. correcting the original judgment, striking out the provision “ without costs,” and from the order of April 18, 1889, denying the defendant’s motion to vacate the order amending the decision and judgment entered, and further amending the judgment.
D. G-. Jaclcson, for app’lt; Le Roy ParJcer, for resp’l.

Opinion:
Beckwith, Ch. J.
I think the orders correcting the decision and judgment were properly granted. Opinion of Hatch, J., 19 N. Y. State Rep., 315. The orders were not objectionable on the ground that they overruled the decision of another judge at a special term. The defendant applied at special term under § 1525 of the Code for an order setting aside the judgment and granting a new trial. In ejectment there is no power or discretion vested in the judge or court as to granting a new trial. In ejectment actions the right to such order and to a second trial is vested in the defeated party to the action by statute. In this case the statute was mandatory, and the order was granted by the court, as it were, ministerially. The court was not called upon to make any judicial determination of an issue or as to an alleged right. Therefore, the reason of the rule that one judge at special term should not overrule the decision of another judge, but leave the aggrieved party to his appeal, does not find applicability here. The reason for the rule failing, the rule itself is not controlling. Moreover, it will be observed that when the plaintiff first applied for an order to correct the decision and judgment which was before a judge who did not try the case, his application was made upon affidavits showing that a motion was pending to vacate the judgment and for a second trial, and although the order of the court refused the application, it expressly provided that it was without prejudice to an application before the judge who tried the cause. That order was in force when the defendant obtained from the same judge the statutory order setting aside the judgment and for a new trial It is contended on behalf of the appellant that it was not competent for the court, although the judge who tried the cause 'was presiding, to revoke the order made by another judge vacating the judgment orto make an order correcting his decision and directing the re-entry of judgment.
Although the order did not, in direct words, vacate the order setting aside the judgment, it in effect did so by correcting the decision, authorizing the entry of a new judgment in conformity with the corrected decision, and providing that the defendant might avail himself of the order for a new trial by payment of the costs awarded by the new judgment. Neither the order correcting the decision and judgment as to costs, nor the order directing an amendment of the judgment so that it should specify the estate of the plaintiff, reviewed or overruled any judicial determination of the issues . that the trial court had made, nor did they add anything to the adjudications of the trial judge. The direction in the decision-that judgment should be entered in accordance with the decision "without costs," was not a "finding," nor an exercise of judicial discretion so as to require an appeal in order to correct the error. Code, § 1022. It may be conceded for the present purpose that the court on motion cannot amend the record when the defect sought to be corrected is one that can be reached only by an appeal, and that an appeal is the remedy where the occasion is an alleged error' in the process by which the contested rights of the parties are judicially determined, or in the final determination of those rights. But beyond such necessity of appeal to review "findings" and adjudications, the power exercised by courts in the way of correcting their judgments seems to have-been nearly unlimited. " The administration of justice would be extremely imperfect if this power did not exist." The N. Y. Ice Co. v. Northwestern Ins. Co., 23 N. Y., 357; Adams v. Ash, 46 Hun, 105; 11 N. Y. State Rep., 618; Produce Bank v. Morton, 67 N. Y., 199; Kenney v. Apgar, 93 id., 539 ; Williams v. Thorn, 81 id., 381; Hunt v. Grant, 19 Wend., 90; Stakes v. Campbell, 7 Cow., 425; Clark v. Hall, 7 Paige, 382.
It appeared on the record and from the findings that the action was ejectment, and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover. It followed as an incident that upon entry of judgment the plaintiff has a right, under the statute, to have the clerk tax and allow his costs. This is so obvious as to make it fairly presumable that the-direction found in the decision of the court for judgment "without costs " was inserted from mistake or inadvertence.
There are several inadvertences apparent in the language of the order appealed from, e. g., in referring to the direction without costs in the decision as a " finding " and in the order directing judgment instead of the decision to be amended so as to specify " the estate of the plaintiff." Code § 1519.
There was no legal necessity for an appeal by the- plaintiff in order to get a proper direction from the trial judge as to costs, or rather to get the non-jurisdictional direction as to costs stricken out. Van Denburgh v. City of New York, 7 N Y. Supp., 675; 28 N. Y. State Rep., 578. There was nothing susceptible of argument on such an appeal. The plaintiff's right to costs arises upon a direction in the statute to the clerk of the court and was outside the jurisdiction of the court and called for no exercise of discretion on the part of the court.
The insertion in the judgment of the specification of the nature of the plaintiff's estate, if not authorized by the decision, should have been reached by a motion to strike out instead of by appeal. There is no proof as to the occasion for the court to order the judgment so amended, though the respondent's brief says it was done by consent of counsel. But the evidence taken on the trial is not before us, no case having been made for review, and we cannot say that the nature of the plaintiff's estate in the land recovered did not plainly appear to be a fee as adjudged.
The court has inherent power to correct its judgment in the-manner it did in this case. Ladd v. Stevenson, 112 N. Y., 325 , 20 N. Y. State Rep., 746; Hatch v. Central Nat. Bank, 78 N. Y., 487; Vanderbilt v. Schreyer, 81 id., 646.
The order appealed from should be affirmed; and the judgment appealed from should be affirmed, with costs.