Case Name: William Snelgrove vs. Micajah Martin and A. H. Patrick
Court: Constitutional Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1822-11
Citations: 2 McCord 241
Docket Number: 
Parties: William Snelgrove vs. Micajah Martin and A. H. Patrick.
Judges: Justices Gantt and Johnson, concurred.
Reporter: South Carolina Law Reports
Volume: 13
Pages: 241–244

Head Matter:
William Snelgrove vs. Micajah Martin and A. H. Patrick.
The declarations of the payee, indorsing a note, made after the note was drawn, but prior to his indorsement, that the note had been given for an illegal consideration (gaming) are competent testimony to invalidate the note in the hands of an indorsee.
THIS was an action on two notes drawn by the defendants, payable to G. D. Lester, and indorsed to the plaintiff for a valuable consideration.
The defence was that the notes were given for a gaming consideration. To support this defence, evidence of the subsequent declarations of Lester was offered by the defendants, and objected to by the plaintiff; but the presiding judge overruled the objection, and the evidence went to the jury.
The defendants also gave in evidence some loose declarations of the plaintiff in support of the same defence.
The jury found a verdict for the defendants.
The plaintiff moved the Constitutional- Court for a new trial, upon the following grounds, to-wit:
1st. Because evidence of the declaration of Lester should not have been received.
2d. Because the finding of the jury that these notes were given for a gaming consideration, was not warranted by the evidence.
Vide, Antei214, Martin vs. Lightner.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Richardson
delivered the opinion of the court:
The question- submitted is, whether the declarations of the payee indorsing a note, made after the note had been drawn, but prior to his indorsement, that the note had been given for an illegal consideration, is competent testimony to invalidate the note in the hands of an indorsee ?
It must be borne in mind, that by an Act of the Legislature, a note given for a gaming consideration is void in the hands of an indorsee', so that, the question before us is governed by the general rules of evidence, and not by any peculiar doctrine of the mercantile law, or of bills, notes,. &c. By the act, gaming'takes a note out of the usual doctrine, and places the indorsee quoad hoc, in the situatioji of an assignee of an unnegotiable debt.
Now at common law, the acts, declarations and confessions of a party to a suit have been always received as the highest evidence against such party, and in like manner the declarations, acts, &c. relating to the matter in dispute, made by a person while he was interested, is good evidence against a party claiming subsequently under such person. Were this not the rule, a debtor could not be safe in taking the receipt of his creditor. For instance, the obligee of a bond might give loose receipts, or acknowledge the bond paid in full; but 'if he afterwards assigned the bond, the assignee would hold the bond independent of such acknowledgment of receipts. In a word, there could be no reliance placed in a settlement with a debtor or arrangement with the owner of an estate, as he would have merely to assign the one or convey the other, in order to get rid of his own acts.
I take the general rule of the common law to be, that wherever the act or declaration of a party then interested, would be evidence against himself, such will be evidence against his subsequent assignee, or party claiming under him.
In the case before us, the payee and owner declared the note to have been given for a consideration, which, if thp true consideration, destroyed it, not only in his own hands but in the hands of an indorsee.
As then the indorsee claimed under the payee, such declaration is necessarily evidence against such indorsee, whose title and claim depend upon the former.
The motion is therefore refused.
Justices Gantt and Johnson, concurred.