Case Name: G. REID DUSENBERRY, III v. SUE BROWN DUSENBERRY (NOW FOWLER)
Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
Jurisdiction: North Carolina
Decision Date: 1985-11-05
Citations: 314 N.C. 608
Docket Number: No. 160PA85
Parties: G. REID DUSENBERRY, III v. SUE BROWN DUSENBERRY (NOW FOWLER)
Judges: Justice BILLINGS joins in this dissenting opinion.
Reporter: North Carolina Reports
Volume: 314
Pages: 608–618

Head Matter:
G. REID DUSENBERRY, III v. SUE BROWN DUSENBERRY (NOW FOWLER)
No. 160PA85
(Filed 5 November 1985)
Divorce and Alimony § 30— equitable distribution — finding of affair as factor to consider — remanded
An equitable distribution action in which the trial court found that the wife’s adulterous affair was a proper factor to consider in determining the distribution of marital assets was remanded for further proceedings in accord with the principles set forth in Smith v. Smith, 314 N.C. 80.
Justice Meyer dissenting.
Justice Billings joins in the dissenting opinion.
On plaintiffs petition for discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31(a) of a decision of the Court of Appeals reported at 73 N.C. App. 177, 326 S.E. 2d 65 (1985), vacating and remanding Chief District Court Judge J. B. Allen’s order entered at the January 17-20, 1984, Session of ALAMANCE County District Court, determining distribution of marital property pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 50-20(c).
Holt, Spencer & Longest, by James G. Spencer, Jr., and Hunter, Wharton & Howell, by John V. Hunter III, attorneys for plaintiff-appe Uant.
Boyce, Mitchell, Burns & Smith, by Carole S. Gailor, attorney for defendant-appellee.

Opinion:
BRANCH, Chief Justice.
In this equitable distribution action Judge Allen found, inter alia, that defendant-wife "began having an adulterous affair . . . and began neglecting the plaintiff and their three minor children" which conduct was a "major reason for the break-up of this marriage . . . and . . . was the only serious and significant mistreatment of either party by the other party during the course of this marriage." There were other extensive findings concerning the fault of the defendant-wife in this connection. Based upon his findings, Judge Allen concluded that the "relative fault of the parties leading to the disintegration of their marriage" was a proper factor for consideration in determining the distribution of the marital assets. Subsequent to the entry of this order by Judge Allen, the Court of Appeals held that fault was not a relevant factor in determining the equitable distribution of marital property. Wade v. Wade, 72 N.C. App. 372, 325 S.E. 2d 260 (1984), disc. rev. denied, 313 N.C. 612, 330 S.E. 2d 616 (1985); Smith v. Smith, 71 N.C. App. 242, 322 S.E. 2d 393 (1984); and Hinton v. Hinton, 70 N.C. App. 665, 321 S.E. 2d 161 (1984). The Court of Appeals vacated Judge Allen's order and remanded the cause for a new order "based solely upon relevant and appropriate findings." The Court of Appeals' decision in this case was filed 19 February 1985. In the meantime, we allowed plaintiffs petition in Smith v. Smith, one of the cases relied upon by the Court of Appeals in its decision in the case now before us.
In Smith v. Smith, 314 N.C. 80, 87, 331 S.E. 2d 682, 687 (1985), filed subsequent to the Court of Appeals' decision in the instant case, we held that "marital fault or misconduct of the parties which is not related to the economic condition of the marriage is not germane to a division of marital property under 50-20(c) and should not be considered."
This cause is remanded to the Court of Appeals for remand to the District Court of Alamance County for further proceedings in accord with the principles set forth in our opinion in Smith.
Modified and affirmed.