Case Name: DADE COUNTY, Florida, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Appellant, v. Malcolm MATHESON, Jr., et al., Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1992-07-21
Citations: 605 So. 2d 469
Docket Number: No. 92-1069
Parties: DADE COUNTY, Florida, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Appellant, v. Malcolm MATHESON, Jr., et al., Appellees.
Judges: Before HUBBART, LEVY and GODERICH, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 605
Pages: 469–475

Head Matter:
DADE COUNTY, Florida, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, Appellant, v. Malcolm MATHESON, Jr., et al., Appellees.
No. 92-1069.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
July 21, 1992.
On Motion for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Oct. 20, 1992.
Schwartz, Chief Judge, with whom Levy and Gersten, JJ., concurred, filed opinion specially concurring with denial of motion for rehearing en banc.
Ferguson, J., filed opinion dissenting from denial of motion for rehearing en banc.
Robert A. Ginsburg County Atty., and R.A. Cuevas, Jr. and Joni Armstrong Coffey, Miami, for appellant.
Jorden Schulte & Burchette and Dan Paul and Frank Burt and David Ashton, Miami, for appellees.
Hicks, Anderson & Blum, Miami, for the International Players Championships, Inc., as amicus curiae.
Before HUBBART, LEVY and GODERICH, JJ.

Opinion:
LEVY, Judge.
In 1988, heirs of Malcolm and Julia Matheson initiated a lawsuit ("the first case") seeking to prevent Dade County from completing the construction of the International Tennis Center in Crandon Park on Key Biscayne. Specifically, the heirs claimed that the tennis complex, including the planned 12,000-seat permanent stadium, violated a deed restriction requiring Crandon Park to be used for public park purposes only.
The trial court ruled that the heirs were not entitled to the relief that they were seeking. The heirs appealed that decision to this Court. On May 22, 1990, this Court filed its opinion resolving the issues that had been raised before it by the parties in "the first case". White v. Metropolitan Dade County, 563 So.2d 117 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). Thereafter, on September 24, 1990, the trial court issued a Final Judgment in conformity with the mandate of this Court that had been issued on June 15, 1990.
In 1991, the heirs filed another lawsuit ("the second case") seeking to prohibit the construction of a 7,500-seat permanent stadium that Dade County intended to construct as part of the tennis complex. Dade County argued before the trial court, in the second case, that the question concerning the construction of a tennis stadium had already been determined in the White case decided by this Court in mid-1990. In the Final Judgment rendered by the trial court in the second case, on May 8, 1992, the County was permanently enjoined and prohibited from further construction of the tennis stadium. The County now appeals to this Court from that Final Judgment.
The heirs argue that it was permissible for them to file the second case, rather than seeking relief within the context of the first case before the judge having jurisdiction of that case, because of their contention that this Court's opinion in White, which emanated from the appeal filed in their first case, did not address or resolve the question as to whether the construction of a stadium in the tennis complex would violate the deed restriction that was the subject of the litigation in the first case. Rather, the heirs argue that White only addressed the way that the tournaments were conducted and the general concept of a tennis complex, and how such a complex might affect the deed restriction, without specific consideration being given to the construction of a permanent tennis stadium. We disagree.
The. County's argument before this Court, which is identical to its position before the trial court in the second case, is based upon the contention that the ultimate issue of whether or not a stadium may be built as part of the tennis complex has already been decided by the White court. Specifically, the County argues that when the White court held that the concept of a tennis complex did not violate the deed restriction, the court was envisioning a stadium as being included within the complex. We agree. It is clear that the White court both addressed and resolved the question as to whether the construction of a stadium in the tennis complex violated the deed restriction. Concerning this issue, we note the following portions of the White opinion:
We will therefore consider whether the tennis complex, including the stadium, should be required to undergo DRI review .
White, 563 So.2d at 129 (emphasis added).
The construction of the "tennis complex," including the projected stadium, even though it is to be accomplished in phases, .
White, 563 So.2d at 130 (emphasis added).
We therefore reject Dade County's assertion that it is premature to require the tennis complex, including the projected tennis stadium, to undergo DRI review.
White 563 So.2d at 131 (emphasis added).
Accordingly, it was legally impermissible for the heirs to ask the Circuit Court trial judge, in the second case, to rule upon the same question that had already been heard and decided by the District Court of Appeal in White.
The County next contends that the heirs lack the standing necessary to contest the construction of the stadium. That question was also addressed and resolved in White wherein the court stated:
Since this restriction in the deed was intended for the benefit of the heirs of the grantors, we concur that the appel lants/heirs have the requisite standing to enforce the deed restriction.
White, 563 So.2d at 123.
Neither the County nor the heirs filed any motions for rehearing or clarification in connection with this Court's May 22, 1990, Opinion or the trial court's September 24, 1990, Final Judgment. Furthermore, none of the parties involved in the first case sought to have the White opinion reviewed by the Florida Supreme Court. Accordingly, and with the apparent acquiescence of all of the parties in the first case, the decision rendered in White is now binding on all of the parties involved in that case. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company v. Industrial Contracting Company, 260 So.2d 860 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972).
The heirs' arguments before the trial court, and this Court, focused solely on the question of whether the construction of the proposed stadium violated the deed restriction. Despite the fact that the current proposed plan involves a contract through which the County agreed to give the United States Tennis Association "exclusive" use (whereby the public could be excluded from even viewing U.S.T.A. activities) of twelve of the seventeen hard courts and four of the eight clay courts at the tennis complex virtually all day, on every Thursday, Friday, Saturday, and Sunday all year long, the heirs specifically advised the trial court, and this Court at oral argument, that they did not want the Court to consider these facts or to address the question of how the tournament was going to be run or whether it amounted to a "virtual ouster" of the public from the tennis complex itself. In addition, the heirs advised this Court at oral argument that they did not want this Court to address the fact that the total number of parking spaces that would be needed in connection with a single day of the tournament was large enough so as to appear to require the County to apply for, and receive, approval as a Development of Regional Impact. Accordingly, since this Court is only permitted to rule on the questions presented to it, we specifically do not address the manner in which the tournament will be run, the "virtual ouster" question, or the need for.DRI approval.
The County correctly acknowledges that anyone with the proper standing who wishes to challenge the nature or design of the stadium or any other part of the tennis complex, including questions of how tournaments are run or whether the public is being improperly ousted from the use of the park in violation of the deed restrictions litigated in the White case, would have the right to go back before the original trial court, who has jurisdiction over this matter, to seek the appropriate relief or enforcement, be it of a equitable nature or otherwise.
For the foregoing reasons, the Final Judgment rendered by the trial court on May 8,1992, is reversed, and the trial court is directed to dismiss the remaining portion of the Complaint filed by the heirs, to-wit: Count II. The said dismissal is to be without- prejudice to any party having legal standing to initiate an appropriate proceeding, before the trial judge having jurisdiction of the first case, to ensure complete compliance with the trial court's Final Judgment entered on September 24, 1990.
Finally, the heirs cross-appeal the trial court's dismissal of Count I of their Complaint which sought to have the entire Tract 2 portion of Crandon. Park revert back to them pursuant to the reverter clause contained in the deed. Clearly, the heirs gave up their right to seek such relief in the first case. As noted in the White opinion,
Appellant/heirs, however, clearly represented to this court and the trial court that they were not seeking a reversion. What appellant/heirs want is a declaratory judgment that all use of the park is in violation of the deed restriction and an injunction to prevent any further erosion of the "public park purposes only" deed restriction.
White, 563 So.2d at 126. Florida law generally provides under the "rule against splitting causes of action," that all damages sustained by a party as the result of a single wrongful act must be claimed and recovered in one action. Gaynon v. Statum, 151 Fla. 793, 10 So.2d 432 (Fla.1942); Schimmel v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, 506 So.2d 1162 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987), abrogation recognized on other grounds, Robinson v. State Farm Fire & Cos. Co., 583 So.2d 1063 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991); Thermofin, Inc. v. Woodruff, 491 So.2d 344 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). As this Court recognized in Schimmel v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, 506 So.2d at 1164:
The rule against splitting causes of action requires that all damages sustained or accruing to one as a result of a single wrongful act must be claimed and recovered in one action or not at all. The rule is founded on the sound policy reason that the finality it establishes promotes greater stability in the law, avoids vexatious and multiple lawsuits arising out of a single incident, and is consistent with the absolute necessity of bringing litigation to an end.
Especially in cases where a party voluntarily drops a claim in a first action, and then later seeks to maintain a separate second action on the abandoned claim, the rule against splitting causes of action applies to preclude that party from maintaining the separate second suit on the abandoned claim. See Casto v. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co., 597 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir.1979); Johnson v. Southwestern Battery Company, 411 P.2d 526 (Okl.1966). Accordingly, the trial court's dismissal of Count I of the heirs' Complaint is affirmed.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions.
Before HUBBART, LEVY and GODERICH, JJ.
. Although the White opinion reflected the fact that this Court felt that there were legal problems presented by (1) the manner in which the tennis tournaments would be conducted (amounting to a "virtual ouster" of the public from the park), and (2) the fact that the County had not applied for and received approval as a development of Regional Impact, and (3) the fact that the planned complex affected zoning in a manner inconsistent with Dade County's Master Plan, the White decision made it clear that the concept of a tennis complex, in and of itself, did not violate the deed restrictions. White, 563 So.2d at 123 and 126.
. In fact, the proposed stadium considered by the White court contained more than 4,000 more permanent seats than is to be contained in the proposed stadium that is now being challenged in the second case.
. The proper trial judge to entertain such a matter would be the trial judge who has jurisdiction over the first case in which the final judgment was rendered on September 24, 1990, in response to this Court's mandate issued in White.