Case Name: Patricia TERRELL and Rosie Terrell, Appellants, v. David A. REINECKER and Keen Transport, Appellees
Court: Iowa Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Iowa
Decision Date: 1992-03-18
Citations: 482 N.W.2d 428
Docket Number: No. 89-1962
Parties: Patricia TERRELL and Rosie Terrell, Appellants, v. David A. REINECKER and Keen Transport, Appellees.
Judges: All Justices concur except ANDREASEN and LARSON, JJ., who dissent.
Reporter: North Western Reporter 2d
Volume: 482
Pages: 428–432

Head Matter:
Patricia TERRELL and Rosie Terrell, Appellants, v. David A. REINECKER and Keen Transport, Appellees.
No. 89-1962.
Supreme Court of Iowa.
March 18, 1992.
Anthony Jamison of Anthony Jamison Law Offices, Rock Island, Ill., for appellants.
John D. Telleen of Lane & Waterman, Rock Island, Ill., for appellees.

Opinion:
HARRIS, Justice.
The court of appeals reversed a district court judgment in this tort suit arising from a collision of motor vehicles. Reversal was predicated on an evidentiary ruling which allowed testimony of an investigating officer. We conclude the court of appeals decision was correct and hence reverse and remand.
Rosie Terrell and Patricia Terrell, mother and daughter, were injured when their car collided with a truck proceeding in the same direction on an interstate highway bridge over the Mississippi River. The accident occurred shortly after the Terrell vehicle had entered the interstate highway and had merged into the right-hand lane of the two eastbound lanes crossing the bridge. The facts of the accident are otherwise disputed.
The Terrells maintain that the truck was behind them when they entered the interstate highway, that the truck then passed them in the left-hand lane, and that the truck sideswiped them while passing or while trying to return prematurely to the right-hand lane. The truck driver maintains that he was deliberately straddling both of the eastbound lanes because of his wide load, that he did not pass the Terrell car at any time, that the Terrell car failed to yield when entering the interstate highway, and that the Terrell car hit the truck while entering one of the two lanes already occupied by the truck.
The Terrells sued the driver and owner of the truck. A jury returned a verdict finding that the truck driver was not at fault. (The jury did not expressly reach the question whether the Terrells were at fault.) On the basis of this verdict, the district court entered a judgment in favor of the defendants. The Terrells appealed from this judgment.
The court of appeals reversed the district court's judgment. The court of appeals majority held the district court erred by permitting an investigating officer to testify he believed the Terrell vehicle had failed to yield. The majority concluded the officer's testimony exceeded the proper scope of expert testimony because it involved a legal conclusion concerning a statutory violation. We granted further review to consider whether admission of the officer's testimony was reversible error.
In general an expert witness is not permitted to state a legal conclusion. Miller v. Bonar, 337 N.W.2d 523, 529 (Iowa 1983). This rule is modified somewhat if a legal issue is raised in such a way as to become a necessary operative fact; when however the legal conclusion is a rule of decision to be applied by the judge or jury in deciding the case, it is not a proper subject for expert testimony. United Central Bank of Des Moines v. Kruse, 439 N.W.2d 849, 852 (Iowa 1989).
Here the investigating officer testified that in his opinion Patricia Terrell had "failed to yield the right-of-way to the Rei-necker vehicle." This testimony does state a legal conclusion that Patricia Terrell had violated a statutory duty. See Federal Land Bank v. Woods, 480 N.W.2d 61, 69 (Iowa 1992) ("Legal conclusions are peculiarly for the court to decide and not the jury."). Although the testimony stopped short of stating negligence had occurred, it did extend too far into the realm of legal conclusion. The testimony was not inadmissible merely because it recited operative facts which happened to echo the contents of a motor vehicle statute. It was inadmissible because it called for a conclusion of law in addition to the operative facts. The court of appeals was correct in determining the testimony should have been excluded.
Although defendants contend otherwise, we cannot find the error was harmless. The jury may well have relied on a belief that the accident was caused by Patricia Terrell's failure to yield, and done so on the basis of the officer's improper testimony.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED AND REMANDED.
All Justices concur except ANDREASEN and LARSON, JJ., who dissent.
. The relevant portion of the trial testimony was as follows:
Q. Okay. Now I would once again ask you if you have an opinion as to the cause of the accident?
MR. JAMISON: Well, your honor, I think there is still insufficient foundation. In Bomn versus Madagan—
THE COURT: The objection is now overruled.
A. What I thought after looking at the accident, the damage to the vehicle and the truck, and everything else is that the truck driver, Mr. Reinecker, had pulled over in time and I thought vehicle number two coming up on the inside—
MR. JAMISON: Well, your honor, I object to what he thought. He was supposed to be rendering an opinion.
THE COURT: The objection is overruled. He's stating his opinion.
A. Yes, sir, the bottom line what I thought was vehicle number two just tried to get up inside the truck on the bridge, inside where there was no room.
Q. In your opinion, did the vehicle fail to yield? A. Which vehicle, sir?
MR. JAMISON: Objection, your honor, that calls for a conclusion of law.
THE COURT: Objection is overruled. By Mr. Telleen:
Q. The Terrell vehicle? A. That was vehicle number two, the passenger car?
Q. Yes. A. Yes, sir. I thought she made a bad choice of judgment trying to get up between the truck and the bridge where there was no room.
Q. It's your opinion she failed to yield the right-of-way to the Reinecker vehicle? A. Yes, sir, I do.