Case Name: Sheryl DYKSTRA-GULICK, Appellant, v. Douglas GULICK, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1992-09-11
Citations: 604 So. 2d 1282
Docket Number: No. 91-1992
Parties: Sheryl DYKSTRA-GULICK, Appellant, v. Douglas GULICK, Appellee.
Judges: GOSHORN, C.J. and DIAMANTIS, J., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 604
Pages: 1282–1284

Head Matter:
Sheryl DYKSTRA-GULICK, Appellant, v. Douglas GULICK, Appellee.
No. 91-1992.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Sept. 11, 1992.
Dock A. Blanchard of Blanchard, Custur-eri, Merriam, Adel & Kirkland, P.A., Ocala, for appellant.
Anthony J. Salzman of Moody & Salzman, Gainesville, for appellee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Appellant Sheryl Dykstra-Gulick was injured while riding as a passenger in an automobile owned and operated by appellee Douglas Gulick. Appellant and appellee were married after the accident, and appellant subsequently filed a negligence action against appellee seeking damages for injuries she sustained in the accident. The trial court granted appellee's motion to dismiss the complaint with prejudice holding that appellant's action was barred by the doctrine of interspousal immunity. We reverse the final judgment only to the extent that it provides for a dismissal with prejudice and remand with instructions to abate this action.
The doctrine of interspousal immunity bars an action between a husband and wife based upon negligence. See Snowten v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 475 So.2d 1211 (Fla.1985); Raisen v. Raisen, 379 So.2d 352 (Fla.1979) cert. denied, 449 U.S. 886, 101 S.Ct. 240, 66 L.Ed.2d 111 (1980). See also Sturiano v. Brooks, 523 So.2d 1126 (Fla.1988). However, if the parties' marriage should terminate by death or dissolution appellant could then maintain her action for negligence. In a case such as this, where the cause of action accrues prior to marriage, abatement of the action pending the possible termination of the marriage by dissolution or death is the proper disposition. See Gaston v. Pittman, 224 So.2d 326 (Fla.1969); Dykstra-Gulick v. Gulick, 579 So.2d 406 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991); Shoemaker v. Shoemaker, 523 So.2d 178 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Chatmon v. Woodard, 492 So.2d 1115 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986).
Because of the important social implications of the doctrine of interspousal immunity, we certify the following question to the Florida Supreme Court as one of great public importance:
WHERE ONE SPOUSE PRIOR TO MARRIAGE NEGLIGENTLY INJURES THE OTHER SPOUSE, SHOULD THE DOCTRINE OF INTERSPOUSAL IMMUNITY BE ABROGATED COMPLETELY TO ALLOW THE INJURED SPOUSE TO MAINTAIN A NEGLIGENCE ACTION DURING THE MARRIAGE AGAINST THE ALLEGEDLY NEGLIGENT SPOUSE FOR ALL OF THE INJURED SPOUSE'S DAMAGES, OR SHOULD THE DOCTRINE BE ABROGATED PARTIALLY TO ALLOW SUCH AN ACTION WHERE RECOVERY IS LIMITED TO THE EXTENT OF INSURANCE COVERAGE?
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's holding that the instant action is barred by the doctrine of interspousal immunity. However, we reverse the final judgment to the extent that it provides for a dismissal with prejudice, and remand for entry of a final judgment abating this action until such time as the doctrine of interspousal immunity is no longer applicable.
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part and REMANDED.
GOSHORN, C.J. and DIAMANTIS, J., concur.
DAUKSCH, J., concurs specially, with opinion.
. Sturiano v. Brooks, 523 So.2d 1126 (Fla.1988). In Sturiano the supreme court held that the wife could maintain a negligence action which arose during marriage against her late husband's estate. Because she was the sole surviving family member with no lineal descendants, no disruption of the family unit could occur and there was nobody with whom she could conspire. The court in Sturiano does not specifically address the situation of surviving lineal descendants and the possible disruption of the family unit. Cf. Ard v. Ard, 414 So.2d 1066 (Fla.1982).
. Gaston v. Pittman, 224 So.2d 326 (Fla.1969).