Case Name: George A. Hodges versus Samuel D. Harris
Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
Jurisdiction: Massachusetts
Decision Date: 1828-03
Citations: 6 Pick. 359
Docket Number: 
Parties: George A. Hodges versus Samuel D. Harris.
Judges: 
Reporter: Massachusetts Reports
Volume: 23
Pages: 362–364

Head Matter:
George A. Hodges versus Samuel D. Harris.
An assignment of goods at sea and their proceeds, is sufficient to pass a legal title to the proceeds.
The United States have a lien on goods imported, for only the duties on the specific goods, and not for other debts due from the importer.
Trespass for taking and carrying away twenty boxes of sugar. Plea the general issue.
To prove his property, the plaintiff produced in evidence an instrument purporting to be an assignment to him, by John Fairfield and Samuel M. Holland, of certain merchandise specified in an invoice and bill of lading annexed to such instrument, and the proceeds thereof, the merchandise being then an adventure to Matanzas shipped by Fairfield and Holland. The sugars in question were the proceeds of that adventure. The instrument was signed, “ John Fairfield by John Fairfield,” with a seal. When the vessel, on board of which the sugar was laded, arrived at Boston, Fairfield went on board with the plaintiff and delivered the sugar, having indorsed to the plaintiff a bill of lading thereof, which the plaintiff had with him at the time. The invoice of the sugar was indorsed to the plaintiff, and he entered the sugar at the customhouse on the 24th of March, 1827, the day of the delivery above mentioned, and gave bonds for the duties. On the 10th of April following, the defendant, as marshal of the United States, seized the sugar on an execution in favor of the United States against Fairfield, Holland and one Otis, and sold the same and applied the proceeds in part satisfaction of the execution. It was also proved that Holland was a secret partner of Fairfield and equally interested in the sugar, and that the business was carried on in the name of Fairfield alone.
April 1st,
The defendant contended that the action of trespass could not be maintained ; that the instrument of assignment did not pass the property, inasmuch as it was intended to be a transfer of the outward-bound adventure, and the sugar, although the proceeds of the same adventure, could not pass ; that the instrument being signed by Fairfield alone, could not pass the joint property of Fairfield and Holland ; and that the United States had a lien on the sugar, Fairfield and Holland being indebted to them on bonds. The bonds did not become due until after the assignment was executed.
All these objections were overruled, and a verdict taken for the plaintiff; whereupon the defendant moved for a new trial for misdirection on the above points.
Blair, for the defendant,
now argued that the assignment was invalid on account of the mode of its execution, one partner having no right to bind another by deed; Fowler v. Shearer, 7 Mass. R. 14; Harrison v. Jackson, 7 T. R. 207; Banorgee v. Hovey, 5 Mass. R. 11; Laws U. S. 1818, c. 74, § 23; that at most it passed only Fairfield’s moiety; Cutter v. Whittemore, 10 Mass. R. 442; Adams v. Bean, 12 Mass. R. 137; that if only a moiety passed, trespass would not lie; Brown v. Hedges, 1 Salk. 209; Bond v Ward, 7 Mass. R. 123; and that the United States had a lien. U. S. Laws, 1799, c. 128, § 62.
Bassett, contra,
cited as to the validity of the assignment, Halsey v. Fairbanks, 4.Mason, 206; Gardner v. Howland, 2 Pick. 599. [See also D'Wolf, v. Harris, 4 Mason, 515; Howland v. Harris, ibid. 497.]
June 26th

Opinion:
Parker C. J.
delivered the opinion of the Court. There can be no doubt in this case that the verdict is right.
The assignment by one partner to pay a bond fide partnership debt is good, and the indorsement of the bill of lading by Fairfield, with a claim of possession by the plaintiff immediately on the arrival of the sugars, passed the property, even if the preceding assigmnent was insufficient. But it is very clear that the transfer of an invoice of an outward cargo, after the sailing of the vessel, operates upon the proceeds so as to make them the property of the purchaser. We think it cannot be pretended that the United States have a lien upon all the property of their debtors, to secure bonds which they may owe to the customhouse. They have hitherto claimed no lien beyond the very goods out of which the debt grew, and to extend it as claimed in the present instance, would put an end to all faith and confidence among merchants, and effectually destroy trade.
The seizure on execution by the marshal was undoubtedly a trespass ; for having no authority to take the property of the plaintiff by his execution, he must be considered like every other stranger who meddles with the property of another.
See Angell on Assignments, 49 to 56; Collyer on Partn. 217, and note 69; 3 Kent's Comm. (3d ed.) 44, note a; Haven v. Hussey, 5 Paige, 30; Pierpout v. Graham, 4 Wash. C. C. 232, 234.
See 2 Kent's Comm. (3d ed.) 548 to 550; 3 Kent's Comm. (3d ed.) 207, Abbott on Shipping (4th Aml ed.) 389 and note 1.
The lien of the United States for duties is restricted to the specific arti cles on which the duties have accrued. Dennie v. Harris, 9 Pick. 364; Harris v. Dennie, 3 Peters, 292; Dennie v. Harris, 5 Pick. 123.