Case Name: Mark ALBERT, Individually and as Representative of the Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Kyla Albert, Deceased v. SCOTT'S TRUCK PLAZA, INC., Incorrectly Named as Ronny Huddnal and Dorothy Huddnal, A Partnership, Doing Business as Scott's Amoco, Longspur, L.P., and Burns and Burns, Inc.
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2008-02-28
Citations: 978 So. 2d 1264
Docket Number: No. 2007-CA-00008-SCT
Parties: Mark ALBERT, Individually and as Representative of the Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Kyla Albert, Deceased v. SCOTT’S TRUCK PLAZA, INC., Incorrectly Named as Ronny Huddnal and Dorothy Huddnal, A Partnership, Doing Business as Scott’s Amoco, Longspur, L.P., and Burns and Burns, Inc.
Judges: SMITH, C.J., WALLER, P.J., CARLSON AND DICKINSON, JJ., CONCUR. EASLEY AND GRAVES, JJ., DISSENT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. RANDOLPH, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE OPINION JOINED BY DIAZ, P.J.; EASLEY, J„ JOINS IN PART.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 978
Pages: 1264–1270

Head Matter:
Mark ALBERT, Individually and as Representative of the Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Kyla Albert, Deceased v. SCOTT’S TRUCK PLAZA, INC., Incorrectly Named as Ronny Huddnal and Dorothy Huddnal, A Partnership, Doing Business as Scott’s Amoco, Longspur, L.P., and Burns and Burns, Inc.
No. 2007-CA-00008-SCT.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Feb. 28, 2008.
Jeffrey Dean Leathers, Tupelo, Attorney for Appellant.
James Ryan Perkins, J. Wyatt Hazard, Carolyn Curry Satcher, Jackson, Attorneys for Appellees.

Opinion:
LAMAR, Justice, for the Court.
¶ 1. In this wrongful-death case, Kyla Albert, Mark Albert's wife, was struck and killed while crossing a public roadway en route from Scott's Truck Plaza to the gravel parking area across the road where her truck was parked. Mark Albert ("Plaintiff') filed suit against Scott's Truck Plaza; Longspur, L.P., the owner of the property upon which Scott's Plaza was situated; and Burns and Burns, Inc., the provider of the gas and gas equipment, (collectively, "Defendants") for failure to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition and failure to warn of the unsafe condition concerning the public roadway. The Circuit Court of Lauderdale County granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The dispositive premises-liability question is whether Defendants owed a duty to Kyla Albert at the time she was fatally injured while crossing a public highway abutting the truck stop. We affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶ 2. Appellant Mark Albert was a truck driver. His wife, Kyla Albert, accompanied him on trips. On December 9, 2002, during a working trip, the Alberts stopped at Scott's Truck Plaza in Meridian, Mississippi, for breakfast. They parked the truck in a gravel lot on the west side of Russell Mt. Gilead Road. Scott's was across the road on the east side. The Alberts ate inside the truck stop. While crossing Russell Mt. Gilead Road to return to the truck, Kyla Albert was struck and killed by a vehicle driven by Terra Lanter-man McDonald. The accident occurred about 5:08 a.m., while it was still dark outside.
¶ 3. Mark Albert filed a wrongful-death suit against McDonald; Longspur, L.P., the landowner and lessor of the truck stop; and Ronny and Dorothy Huddnal, the operating partners and lessees of the truck stop. Mark Albert alleged that Scott's acted negligently in that it: (1) failed to provide adequate lighting; (2) placed a propane tank and advertising in its parking lot, which obstructed the view of pedestrians and drivers of oncoming traffic; and (3) failed to warn of hidden dangers. He alleged that these failures amounted to a breach of the business's duty to provide reasonably safe premises.
¶ 4. Defendants filed for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment as to all defendants on November 27, 2006, finding that Albert failed to produce evidence which would establish a genuine issue of material fact concerning (1) whether the propane tank, advertising or alleged inadequate lighting was a proximate cause of the accident; or (2) whether the Defendants had a duty to provide adequate lighting or warn the decedent of the dangers associated with crossing Russell Mt. Gilead Road. From this judgment, Albert filed a notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
¶ 5. This Court employs a de novo standard in reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Green v. Allendale Planting Co., 954 So.2d 1032, 1037 (Miss.2007). Such review entails examination of all the evidentiary matters before us, including admissions in pleadings, answers to interrogatories, depositions, and affidavits. Id. The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Id. The movant bears the burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Id. The existence of a genuine issue of material fact will preclude summary judgment. Massey v. Tingle, 867 So.2d 235, 238 (Miss.2004). "The non-moving party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials in the pleadings but must set forth specific facts showing that there are genuine issues for trial." Id. (citing Richmond v. Benchmark Constr. Corp., 692 So.2d 60, 61 (Miss. 1997)). See also Mayfield v. The Hairbender, 903 So.2d 733, 735 (Miss.2005) (same); KBL Props., LLC v. Beilin, 900 So.2d 1160, 1163 (Miss.2005) (same).
¶ 6. Summary judgment is mandated where the non-movant fails to establish the existence of an essential element of that party's claim. Smith v. Gilmore Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 952 So.2d 177, 180 (Miss.2007) (citing Galloway v. Travelers Ins. Co., 515 So.2d 678, 683 (Miss.l987)(quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265(1986))). Mark Albert claims the defendants were negligent. Thus, for Mark Albert's claim to survive summary judgment, he must have set forth specific facts sufficient to establish the existence of each element of negligence — duty, breach, causation and damages. Simpson v. Boyd, 880 So.2d 1047, 1050 (Miss.2004).
¶ 7. For a premises-liability claim, as in this case, duty is contingent on the status of the injured person. Thus, the first step in determining duty is to identify the status of the injured at the time of the injury. Massey, 867 So.2d at 239. Mississippi adheres to the invitee/licensee/trespasser trichotomy when analyzing the property owner's duty of care. Corley v. Evans, 835 So.2d 30, 37 (Miss. 2003) (citing Hudson v. Courtesy Motors, Inc. 794 So.2d 999 (Miss.2001)). This Court has described the distinction, stating:
As to status, an invitee is a person who goes upon the premises of another in answer to the express or implied invitation of the owner or occupant for their mutual advantage. A licensee is one who enters upon the property of another for his own convenience, pleasure or benefit pursuant to the license or implied permission of the owner whereas a trespasser is one who enters upon another's premises without license, invitation or other right.
Holley v. Int'l Paper Co., 497 So.2d 819, 820 (Miss.1986) (internal citations omitted). "The determination of which status a particular plaintiff holds can be a jury question, but where the facts are not in dispute the classification becomes a question of law." Clark v. Moore Mem'l United Methodist Church, 538 So.2d 760, 763 (Miss. 1989) (citing Lucas v. Buddy Jones Ford Lincoln Mercury, Inc., 518 So.2d 646, 648 (Miss.1988); Adams v. Fred's Dollar Store, 497 So.2d 1097, 1100 (Miss.1986)).
¶ 8. It is undisputed that Kyla Albert was an invitee when she was upon the premises of the truck stop. The issue this Court must resolve is whether Kyla Albert retained that invitee status upon entering the public roadway.
¶ 9. Scott's argued in its motion for summary judgment that "[Kyla] Albert's status as an invitee was lost as she entered Russell Mt. Gilead Road.... " Mark Albert claimed he would show that "the parking lot across the road from the restaurant was an integral part of Defendant's business and therefore, the decedent, in the moments immediately prior to crossing the road and [while] crossing the road itself, was a business invitee of [Scott's]."
¶ 10. Mark Albert asserts that Kyla Albert retained her status as an invitee of Scott's while walking across the street, since the gravel area was an integral part of Scott's business. Indeed, a "tenant/lessee/occupier of premises owes a duty of reasonable care to its invitees for the demised property and such necessary incidental areas substantially under its control . and which he invites the public to use." Wilson v. Allday, 487 So.2d 793, 798 (Miss.1986) (emphasis added). However, this Court finds that Mark Albert failed to set forth specific facts sufficient to establish that the gravel area across Russell Mt. Gilead Road was an integral part of Scott's business. Mark Albert merely directs the Court to deposition testimony in which Dorothy Huddnal of Scott's and Dale Burns of Longspur and Burns and Burns admitted to knowing that patrons sometimes park across the road. Knowledge of patrons' occasional use of the gravel area was insufficient to show that the area was a "necessary incidental area substantially under [the defendants'] control." Albert likewise failed to show that the defendant invited the public to use the gravel area across the road. Therefore, Plaintiff was unable to establish a question of fact as to whether Defendants owed any duty to Kyla Albert after she left their premises and entered the public roadway, where she was fatally injured.
¶ 11. Establishing the status of the injured party is the first step in determining the property owner's or lessee's duty. Unable to accomplish this first step, Albert failed to establish the existence of a duty under the premises liability theory. Therefore, the inquiry of this Court is complete. The trial court properly granted summary judgment for the defendants.
CONCLUSION
¶ 12. Mark Albert failed to set forth specific facts sufficient to establish by affidavit, deposition, interrogatories, or other means acceptable for summary judgment purposes that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendants owed a duty to Kyla Albert when she was fatally injured. Duty is an essential element of a negligence claim. Since summary judgment is mandated where the non-movant fails to establish the existence of an essential element of that party's claim, summary judgment was appropriate in this case. The judgment of the Circuit Court of Lauderdale County is affirmed.
¶ 18. AFFIRMED.
SMITH, C.J., WALLER, P.J., CARLSON AND DICKINSON, JJ., CONCUR. EASLEY AND GRAVES, JJ., DISSENT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. RANDOLPH, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE OPINION JOINED BY DIAZ, P.J.; EASLEY, J" JOINS IN PART.
. The Huddnals rented the premises on which the truck stop was located from Longspur; however, there was no written lease agreement.
. Mark Albert reached a settlement agreement with McDonald which resulted in McDonald's release. Additionally, Burns and Burns, Inc., though not named in the style or the substance of either complaint, subsequently was added as a defendant. Burns sold gasoline to the truck stop and provided the gasoline-dispensing equipment.
. This Court notes that the trial court also addressed the issue of proximate cause raised by the parties during summary judgment proceedings. The trial court found that Mark Albert failed to prove either that the alleged obstructions were a proximate cause or that the lighting was insufficient on the premises. The court further found that the danger of crossing a public roadway was not hidden but open and obvious, thus requiring no warning. Since this Court finds no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendants owed a duty, it is unnecessary to address the trial court's findings concerning causation.