Case Name: DUVALL v. PHILADELPHIA, BALTIMORE & WASHINGTON RAILROAD COMPANY
Court: Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia
Jurisdiction: District of Columbia
Decision Date: 1915-04-05
Citations: 43 App. D.C. 395
Docket Number: No. 2723
Parties: DUVALL v. PHILADELPHIA, BALTIMORE & WASHINGTON RAILROAD COMPANY.
Judges: 
Reporter: Reports of Cases Adjudged in the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia
Volume: 43
Pages: 395–414

Head Matter:
DUVALL v. PHILADELPHIA, BALTIMORE & WASHINGTON RAILROAD COMPANY.
Railroads $ Master and Servant; Negi.ioence; Assumption or Risk; Questions eor Jury.
Where a brakeman in the employ of a railroad company, having been ordered by his conductor to c-ouple garbage cars on a bridge, the girders of which extended about 2 feet above the tracks on either side of the bridge, was caught between the moving cars and one of the girders, a space of about 11 inches, and injured, and it appeared that while prior to the accident no difficulty had been experienced in coupling ordinary cars on the bridge, the garbage cars were of wider and lower construction than ordinary cars, and none of the trainmen testifying, including the plaintiff, hado ever coupled such cars on the bridge, it was held in an action by the brakeman against the railroad company to recover damages for liis injuries, that whether the defendant had provided a reasonably safe place for the use of the plaintiff, and whether the extra hazard to the plaintiff resulting from the coupling of the garbage cars on the bridge was so open and obvious as to charge the plaintiff with assuming the risk, were question’s for the jury, and that it was error for the trial court to direct a verdict for the defendant. (Mr. Justice Van Orsdel dissenting.)
No. 2723.
Submitted January 7, 1915.
Decided April 5, 1915.
Hearing on an appeal by the plaintiff from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, on a verdict directed by the court, in an action to recover damages for personal injuries.
Reversed.
The Court in the opinion stated the facts as follows:
Appeal from a judgment upon a verdict for the defendant, The Philadelphia, Baltimore, & Washington Railroad Company, appellee here, directed at the close of plaintiff’s evidence, in an action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained June 18, 1912, while coupling cars on South Capitol, street bridge, in this city. In its motion for a directed verdict, defendant alleged assumption of risk by plaintiff, Harvey A. Duvall, and no negligence by it.
In addition to his own testimony, plaintiff introduced as witnesses the conductor in charge of the train and crew at the time of the accident, the engineer in charge of the engine, his fireman and another brakeman, another freight conductor who was present, and a man who made certain measurements which ivill hereafter be noticed.
All the tracks of the defendant from the Potomac River to the Capitol Hill tunnel are embraced within the yard limits. Six tracks cross South Capitol street by means of a steel bridge supported by girders which extend upward on both sides of each track to the height of about 2 feet above the track. Prior to the accident, whenever cars that were to be coupled or uncoupled happened to stop on the bridge, it was the practice to make the coupling where they stood, the conductor testifying “that in making the couplings the men go in to where the cars stand, and set the couplings, and they can then either stay inside between the girder and the cars, or come out on to one of the other tracks, or they might climb out on top of the girder; that the various tracks crossing the bridge were used from time to time by the engines and trains that might be shifting or passing over them; that at and before the time Duvall was injured men frequently stood (inside the girder) between the girder and the track on which the coupling was being made, and that the witness himself had done so; that at that time they had no idea they would get hurt, as nobody had been injured before; that since Duvall was injured the men do not remain inside the girder to see if the couplings are made.”
Across the river in Virginia was a garbage plant, and this train crew handled the garbage cars every time they made a trip. From four to fourteen cars a day, filled with garbage, were taken from the garbage yard to the garbage plant. Formerly these garbage cars were hauled out of the garbage yard, and connected with other cars in the subway on the Navy Yard track. Some time before the accident, the plaintiff in his testimony fixing it as “probably a month or six weeks before,” the practice was changed, and the garbage cars were hauled out of the garbage yard on to the “high line” or tracks above the level of the streets, and coupled at the rear of other cars on one of the tracks crossing the South Capitol street bridge.
The accident occurred at about 6:30 in the evening, and before sundown. Garbage cars had been pulled out of the garbage yard, backed on to one of the tracks crossing said South Capitol street bridge, and there connected or coupled to several box cars, the easterly one of which was a Pennsylvania car that stood on the bridge. The conductor directed the plaintiff to make the coupling at the place where the box car was standing. In pursuance to this order Duvall walked out on to the bridge on track No. 4, the box car standing on track No. 3. After looking at the coupling, and without getting inside the girder, that is, while standing on track No. 4, Duvall gave the proper signal for the engine to hack up the garbage cars for the coupling. In response to the signal they were hacked up, but for some reason failed to couple. The conductor testified “that Duvall then go inside between the girder and track No. 3, set the knuckles (it being sometimes necessary for the knuckles to he taken hold of and set by the hands, as there is no other ivay to move the draw-head), and, standing inside the girder at the point where he was making the coupling, gave another signal meaning that the coupling was ready for the ears to come back; that when the cars were backed, in response to Duvall’s signal that the coupling was ready, he ivas caught between the end of the garbage car and the girder and thrown across the girder,” and seriously injured. The witness “did not apprehend any danger to Duvall from running the cars back.” On cross-examination he testified that “it ivas not customary for the brakeman in doing the work which Duvall was doing to get on top of the girder; that there was nothing different in the way the coupling was made from what had been done there before;” that after setting the knuckles Duvall “moved back against the girder, standing right back against the girder facing the car,” and gave the proper signal to back up; that the witness backed up to make the coupling, and “caught Duvall between the sill of the car (garbage car) and the girder.” Another brakeman testified that he had made couplings standing between the car and the girder. The other conductor stated that “up to the time Duvall was hurt the men had not had any particular place to stand in making couplings on the bridge; that he had seen men stand inside the girder and had done so himself. * * * He could not say that when he saw Duvall go to make the coupling that he was getting into a dangerous place, as nobody had been injured before.” While some of the Pennsylvania box cars were wider than the garbage cars, most box cars were narrower, and there was another important difference between the two classes of cars. The measurements showed that the height of the sill of the lowest box car from the rail was a little over 34 inches, while the distance from the sill of the garbage cars to the rail was only■ £5 inches. In other words, while the sill of the box cars'would be several inches above the top of the bridge girder, the sill of the garbage car would be lower than the top of the girder, and it was but 11 inches from the outside of the garbage car to the girder. Although Duvall had served as a brakeman, extra conductor, and conductor, for more than six years, and had coupled these garbage cars on many occasions, and was familiar with their general appearance, he had never coupled one of them on this bridge, testifying that “it was a new thing to bring slop cars around there and couple them at that point.” Nor could any of the other witnesses say that they had ever previously seen a garbage car coupled on this bridge. The plaintiff further testified that as the garbage car came back the second time he caught hold of the cut-lever on the end of the car, which the brakeman works in connection with the coupling, and which raises and lowers the latch .pin when the cars are uncoupled; that this “was a very common thing to do, and which very often releases it (the latch pin) and causes it to drop into its place, and make it unnecessary to jar the engine ahead; that the pin drops down if you shake it; that in doing so the end of the ear caught” and injured him. He had made up or broken up trains on or near other similar bridges in the yard, but had never shifted any of the garbage cars on one of these bridges. He did not remember fixing a coupling standing on top of a girder, “because it was difficult to stand on top of the girders because of the bolt heads with which they are set full.” Neither he nor any other member of the train crew had ever taken any particular notice of the difference between the width and construction of the box cars and the garbage cars.
Mr. George C. Shinn, Mr. Claude W. Owen, Mr. Joseph W. Cox, and Mr. J. T. Sherier for the appellant.
Mr. Frederic D. McKenney, Mr. John S. Flannery, Mr. William Hitz, and Mr. G. B. Craighill for the appellee.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Robb
delivered the opinion of the Court:
The declaration alleges that the defendant company negli gently failed to provide the plaintiff a reasonably safe place in which to work; that while there was "a space sufficiently wide for a person to stand with safety between said girder and a passing car of usual and proper dimensions, in the performance of his duties; the said space was entirely inadequate, and became a dangerous and hazardous place in which to work, whilst a car of unusual or improper width or construction should be passing." Certainly it cannot be said, as matter of law, that the conditions on this bridge at the time of the accident constituted a safe place for the movements of a switchman when coupling a garbage car to another car. It is said that the plaintiff needlessly exposed himself to danger by remaining inside the girder, but such was the practice according to the testimony of the witnesses. With trains passing and repassing on the adjacent track, that would not have been a particularly safe place to stand, and while he could have stood upon the girder, that, according to the evidence, did not constitute a very secure standing place. Moreover, no difficulty had been experienced in the coupling of ordinary cars. The evidence tended to show that it was the unusual construction and width of the garbage car that caused the accident. The plaintiff was as much in the line of his duty when he was doing the thing he had been directed to do by his conductor and in the usual manner as was the hostler who was fatally injured while sitting in the cab window on an engine, as disclosed in Texas & P. R. Co. v. Harvey, 228 U. S. 319, 57 L. ed. 852, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 518. Tie had experienced no difficulty in coupling ordinary cars in that manner, and had received no notice that it was dangerous to do so. There was no evidence that it was necessary to construct these girders as they were constructed, but, if it be assumed-that it was necessary so to construct them, it cannot be assumed that it was necessary to couple garbage cars while standing on the bridge. It therefore was for the jury to say whether the defendant had performed the duty imposed upon it to provide a reasonably safe place for the use of the switchmen in its employ.
The more serious question with which we are confronted, is whether the width of the garbage car,' the nearness to the rail of that car, and the extra hazard to switchmen resulting therefrom, were so open and obvious that the plaintiff must be held to have assumed the risk of injury. The plaintiff, of course, liad the right to assume that the defendant had performed its duty, He had a right to assume that in constructing these girders his own safety and that of the other switchmen would be taken into consideration. As stated by the court in Texas & P. R. Co. v. Swearingen, 196 U. S. 62, 49 L. ed. 388, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 164, 17 Am. Neg. Rep. 422, he had a right "to assume that the defendant company had used due care to provide a reasonably safe place for the doing by him of the work for which he had been employed." In that case the plaintiff, a switchman, while riding on the side of a, box car, was struck by a scale box 194 inches from the car. This scale box was the standard distance from the track. The plaintiff knew it was there, was an experienced brakeman, but testified that lie had paid no particular attention to its proximity to the track, and that he did not know it was so near that it could not be passed in the performance of his duties as a switchman without danger. The court sustained the judgment of the court of appeals, saying: "The dangerous contiguity of the scale box to track No. 2, and the extra hazard to switchmen resulting therefrom, was not so open and obvious on other than a close inspection, as to justify taking from the jury the determination of the question whether there had been an assumption of the risk." In reaching this conclusion the court took into consideration the testimony of the plaintiff "as to his actual want of knowledge of the danger." In Gila Valley, G. & N. R. Co. v. Hall, 232 U. S. 94, 101, 58 L. ed. 521, 524, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 229, the rule was again stated as follows: "An employee assumes the risk of dangers normally incident to the occupation in which he voluntarily engages, so far as these are not attributable to the employer's negligence. But the employee has a right to assume that his employer has exercised proper care with respect to providing a safe place of work, and suitable and safe appliances for the work, and is not to be treated as as suming the risk arising from a defect that is attributable to the employer's negligence, until the employee becomes aware of such defect, or unless it is so plainly observable that he may be presumed to have known of it. Moreover, in order to charge an employee with the assumption of a risk attributable to a defect due to the employer's negligence, it must appear not only that he knew (or is presumed to have known) of the defect, but that he knew that it endangered his safety; or else such danger must have been so obvious that an ordinarily prudent person under the circumstances would have appreciated it."
Not a member of the train crew in the present case, when the engine and garbage cars were backing on to the bridge where the plaintiff stood, inside the girder, realized that he was in a position of danger, nor did he, according to his testimony. While the testimony shows that some Pennsylvania box cars were even wider than the garbage cars, it also shows that a large percentage of box cars were narrower, enough narrower that a man "was able to walk up and down with ease between the edge of the girder and the side of the car." But a still more important difference existed by reason of the garbage car being lower, so that, as the testimony showed, the bottom of its sills was lower than the top of the girders. It will be readily appreciated, when once the attention is drawn to this point, that the higher the car the less the danger of being crushed between it and the girder; and, vice versa, the lower the car the greater the danger. The witness who testified as to measurements he had made said "that the side of a box car, if extended, would touch a man way up above his hips" while standing inside the girder. A garb 'ge car, being at least 9 inches lower, would strike a man that much lower. It probably was owing to the height of ordinary cars that no one considered it dangerous to stand inside the girders while coupling them.
But it is said the plaintiff handled these cars day after day, and must be presumed to have known that they were wider and lower, and that, being wider and lower, it would be dangerous when coupling them to stand inside the girder, where he stood in coupling other cars. Substantially the same contentions were unsuccessfully made in the Swearingen Case, 196 U. S. 51, 49 L. ed. 382, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 164, 17 Am. Neg. Rep. 422, where the circumstances were quite similar. Of course, every brakeman knew that cars varied in width, but neither the plaintiff nor anyone else, so far as the record discloses, had expeJ rienced any trouble in coupling cars other than garbage cars. In other words, width alone did not constitute the danger, as obviously the brakeman, given room to stand inside the girder, could, by slightly inclining his body backward, avoid being crushed. The mere width, then, of a garbage car, was not calculated particularly to attract plaintiff's attention. The danger arose, or at least it would be a question for the jury to determine whether it did not arisen from the fact that the car was wider and also lower than other cars, so that a man standing inside the girder would be likely to be struck. Can it be said that the difference between the construction of these garbage cars and the other cars was so obvious and its significance so apparent that an ordinarily prudent person, under the circumstances, would have appreciated both % In other words, can it be said that the plaintiff, in the circumstances of this case, should have known that the coupling of garbage cars on this bridge was more hazardous than the coupling of other cars % To reach such a conclusion we must arrogate to ourselves greater knowledge than that possessed by the experienced witnesses who, without exception, testified to the contrary. The plaintiff had a right to assume that the defendant company would not, without notice to him, attempt to couple cars on the bridge unless it could be accomplished without special danger, and we think it was for the jury to say whether the extra hazard to switchmen resulting from the coupling of those garbage cars on the bridge was so open and obvious as to charge the plaintiff with assuming the risk. Now that the accident has happened and all the facts are before us, it is easy enough to say that the dangerous condition should have been obvious to the plaintiff, but the question is, How did it look to him before the accident ?
It follows from what wfe have said, that whether the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, and, if so, the extent of it, will be a question for tbe jury under proper instructions from the court.
Judgment reversed, with costs, and cause remanded.
Reversed and remanded.