Case Name: UNITED STATES v. BEACH
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1945-02-26
Citations: 324 U.S. 193
Docket Number: No. 620
Parties: UNITED STATES v. BEACH.
Judges: Mr. Justice Roberts took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Reporter: United States Reports
Volume: 324
Pages: 193–200

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES v. BEACH.
No. 620.
Argued February 9, 1946.
Decided February 26, 1945.
Mr. Robert L. Stern, with whom Solicitor General Fahy, Assistant Attorney General Tom C. Clark, Messrs. Robert S. Erdahl, Irving S. Shapiro and W. Marvin Smith were on the brief, for the United States.
Mr. James R. Kirkland, with whom Mr. Nathan M. Lubar was on the brief, for respondent.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
Respondent was indicted and convicted upon a jury trial, in the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia, of transporting another woman in Washington, D. C., for the purpose of prostitution, in violation of the Mann Act. 36 Stat. 825, 18 U. S. C. § 397, et seq. Section 2,18 U. S. C. § 398, makes it a penal offense knowingly to "transport or cause to be trans ported, or aid or assist in obtaining transportation for, or in transporting, in interstate . . . commerce, or . . . in the District of Columbia, any woman . for the purpose of prostitution . or with the intent and purpose to induce, entice, or compel such woman . to give herself up to debauchery, or to engage in any other immoral practice . . ." The prohibited transportation with the intent or purpose to induce or entice the woman transported to practice prostitution violates the statute. Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S. 308; Athanasaw v. United States, 227 U. S. 326; Harris v. United States, 227 U. S. 340, 341; Wilson v. United States, 232 U. S. 563, 571; cf. Mortensen v. United States, 322 U. S. 369, 374.
The Court of Appeals for the District set aside the conviction on the ground that the Mann Act was inapplicable to transportation taking place wholly within the District. 144 F. 2d 533. That court found support for its conclusion in the numerous acts of Congress enacting local laws for the District, which make it a criminal offense for "any prostitute" to invite or persuade any person to go with her to any building for the purpose of prostitution, or for any person to entice or force any woman to go to a house of assignation, or for any person to invite, induce, or procure another to engage in prostitution or to go to any place for purposes of prostitution. The court thought that the addition of the prohibition of the Mann Act to this legislation, specifically applicable only in the District, was so useless and unnecessary as to indicate that the Mann Act was not designed to apply to the District of Columbia "except in its interstate aspect." No other question was considered or decided below or discussed in the briefs and argument of counsel here, and we decide no other.
But none of these enactments of local application speak of "transportation" for immoral purposes, which is the act condemned by the Mann Act. The Mann Act not only penalizes such transportation in interstate commerce, which is defined in § 1,18 U. S. C. § 397, as including any commerce into or out of the District, but it specifically and repeatedly includes in its prohibition, such transportation "in any territory or the District of Columbia." Congress, in enacting the Mann Act, made it perfectly plain by its Committee Reports on the proposed legislation that it was intended to apply to transportation taking place wholly within the District of Columbia. II. Rep. No. 47, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 2; S. Rep. No. 886, 61st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 2. Both Reports declare: "All of the provisions which make the crime depend upon transportation in interstate or foreign commerce are made applicable to the District of Columbia, the Territories and possessions of the United States, including the Panama Canal Zone, without regard to the crossing of district, territorial, or state lines . . ." This was recognized both by the proponents and by the opponents of the bill on the floor of the House. 45 Cong. Rec. 812-813, 816; 45 Cong. Rec. App. 14. (The point was not debated in the Senate.) Congress thus, through the exercise of its police power over the District, followed its usual policy of extending legislation based on the commerce power to the same substantive acts taking place wholly within the District.
Whether the District was already adequately protected from the evils of prostitution without the added prohibition of transportation for that purpose, was for Congress, not the courts, to decide. The prohibition was deliber ately adopted by Congress, and it conflicts with no other legislation applicable in the District. Hence the present reversal of the conviction for its violation was erroneous.
As the Court of Appeals did not pass upon other grounds for reversal urged by respondent, the case is remanded to it for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Bates v. United States, 323 U. S. 15, 17, and cases cited.
Reversed.
Mr. Justice Roberts took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
D. C. Code (1929) Tit. 6, § 177, 179; D. C. Code (1940) § 22-2701, 22-2702, 22-2705 to 22-2712.
See, for example, the Sherman Act (15 U. S. C. § 12), the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U. S. C. § 44), the Federal Denture Act (18 U. S. C. Supp. Ill, 1943, § 420g), the Anti-Racketeering Act (18 U. S. C. §420b), and the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U. S. C. § 16).