Case Name: Osama Mikho ORAHA, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2016-03-22
Citations: 643 F. App'x 633
Docket Number: No. 14-72123
Parties: Osama Mikho ORAHA, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent.
Judges: Before: GOODWIN, LEAVY, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 643
Pages: 633–634

Head Matter:
Osama Mikho ORAHA, Petitioner, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, Attorney General, Respondent.
No. 14-72123.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted March 15, 2016.
Filed March 22, 2016.
James B. Rudolph, Esquire, Rudolph, Baker & Associates, San Diego, CA, for Petitioner.
Laura M.L. Maroldy, Trial, OIL, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.
Before: GOODWIN, LEAVY, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Osama Mikho Oraha, a native of Iraq and citizen of Canada, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge's denial of his motion to reopen. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen. Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 791 (9th Cir.2005). We deny the petition for review.
The agency did not abuse its discretion by denying as untimely Oraha's motion to reopen on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, where he filed the motion over two years after his final order of removal, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1), and he failed to demonstrate the due diligence necessary to warrant equitable tolling of the filing deadline, see Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 679 (9th Cir.2011) (equitable tolling is available when a petitioner has exercised due or reasonable diligence and tolling period should end . when petitioner definitively learns of the harm resulting from counsel's deficiency, or obtains vital information bearing on the existence of his claim (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
Because untimeliness is dispositive, we do not reach Oraha's remaining contentions regarding eligibility for relief from removal. See Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 538 (9th Cir.2004) ("As a general rule courts . are not required to make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.").
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3,