Case Name: Moses Hodgdon v. Walter Robinson, Neal Cate, Phinehas Johnson, and Robert Lyford. (Johnson and Lyford struck out, by consent, at trial.)
Court: New Hampshire Superior Court
Jurisdiction: New Hampshire
Decision Date: 1814-11
Citations: 1 Smith (N. H.) 320
Docket Number: 
Parties: Moses Hodgdon v. Walter Robinson, Neal Cate, Phinehas Johnson, and Robert Lyford. (Johnson and Lyford struck out, by consent, at trial.)
Judges: 
Reporter: Decisions of the Superior and Supreme Courts of New Hampshire, from 1802 to 1809, and from 1813 to 1816.
Volume: 1
Pages: 320–322

Head Matter:
Moses Hodgdon v. Walter Robinson, Neal Cate, Phinehas Johnson, and Robert Lyford. (Johnson and Lyford struck out, by consent, at trial.)
Where an execution is extended on two tracts of land, it is not necessary that the same persons should be appraisers on both tracts.
This was ejfectanent, to recover one-third of Lot No. 37, Second Division, in Brookfield.
Each of the defendants, Robinson and Cate, disclaims all but 20) acres, without bounding the same, and defends the residue.
It was agreed that one Rebecca Footman was entitled, by descent, to one-third of the lot.
David Rogers [under whose deed the plaintiff claims] claims her share by levy of execution, Sept. 14, 1811.
One exception only was taken to the levy. By the return, it appears that the execution was extended on two parcels, — the one now in issue, and another. One person was appraiser in both; two others were joined with him in each.
[The defendants claimed under a tax title.]
Verdict for plaintiff, subject to the opinion of the Court.

Opinion:
Smith, C. J.
Suppose return states that A., B., and C. were chosen (duly stating how) to appraise the parcel now in dispute, and that C., D., and E. were chosen to appraise the other parcel, and all five were sworn to appraise such estate as should be shown them. Is this a good appraisal ?
If not, it must be because, by the statute, the same persons must appraise all the estate of the same debtor to satisfy the same execution; and that, if this be not the course pursued, the whole is void.
If it appear, by the return, that the debtor has chosen one of the appraisers, or has had an opportunity to choose, it would seem that he could not complain that the creditor and the officer have chosen different persons for different parcels, except on the score of expense. And where he chooses different persons for different parcels, he cannot, even on this account, complain.
It is not recollected that it has ever been holden that the same three persons must appraise all the lands extended on the same execution.
Cannot the creditor put his execution, after extent on one parcel, into the hands of a different officer? Suppose, after extent on one parcel, one of the appraisers shall happen to die. When the lands lie in different counties, there must be different officers and different appraisers.
When the statute speaks of three appraisers, it may in all cases, and in some must, be understood to refer to a particular parcel Ur parcels appraised by the same men, and not necessarily to all the lands which may be extended to satisfy the same judgment, or even the same execution.
[The Court then considered the defendant's tax title, and held it invalid. In the course of the opinion, it was said: —
" This assessment seems to be a literal compliance with the statute, and yet it does not seem to be what the statute requires. . The framers of the act seem to have been in fault, and not the poor assessors or collector."]
Judgment on the verdict.
S. P. Boylston v. Carver, 1814, 11 Mass. 515.