Case Name: Michael G. NORRIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Brian KING, Defendant-Appellant
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1978-01-16
Citations: 355 So. 2d 21
Docket Number: No. 6007
Parties: Michael G. NORRIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Brian KING, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: Before HOOD, FORET and HEARD, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 355
Pages: 21–33

Head Matter:
Michael G. NORRIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Brian KING, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 6007.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
Jan. 16, 1978.
Dissenting Opinion Jan. 17, 1978.
Rehearing Denied March 1, 1978.
Brame, Bergstedt & Brame by Bret L. Barham, Lake Charles, David A. Sheffield, Alexandria, for defendant-appellant.
Kramer & Davis by Bernard Kramer, Alexandria, for plaintiff-appellee.
Before HOOD, FORET and HEARD, JJ.

Opinion:
FORET, Judge.
This suit was instituted by Michael G. Norris against Brian King alleging that King's action in erecting a bulletin board in his place of business, upon which were placed photographs of the plaintiff taken while he was in the act of committing a theft upon the defendant's premises and which also contained captions referring to the subsequent guilty plea entered by Norris for the commission of the theft, caused him embarrassment, humiliation and constituted harassment. Judgment was rendered in favor of Michael Norris, and defendant, Brian King, appealed. Plaintiff, Michael Norris, has answered the appeal asking that the award of damages be increased.
Plaintiff, Michael Norris, was arrested for the theft of money taken from a Coke machine located in a washateria in the City of Alexandria which is owned by defendant, Brian King. On November 5,1974, Michael Norris pled guilty to the charge of theft in the Alexandria City Court. For the commission of the theft, Norris was given a $100.00 fine, a suspended jail sentence, and was placed on probation for a period of one year.
During the above mentioned theft, photographs were taken of Norris and an alleged accomplice by means of a hidden security camera located in the washateria. Subsequent to the guilty plea entered by Norris, defendant, Brian King, erected in his was-hateria a bulletin board upon which he posted two photographs of Michael Norris and one photograph of his alleged accomplice taken during the commission of the theft. Posted at the top of the bulletin board was the following printed heading:
"CAUGHT IN THE ACT!
THESE ARE ACTUAL PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN BY HIDDEN CAMERAS OF A THEFT IN PROGRESS." Immediately below this heading was a typewritten caption which read:
"ANY THIEVES OR VANDALS OPERATING ON THIS PRIVATE PROPERTY SHOULD REMEMBER TO SMILE
. . . THEY'LL BE ON CANDID CAMERA!"
Immediately below this caption were two typewritten captions printed on cut out arrows, each of which pointed to one of the photographs taken of Norris and which read:
"HMMMM . . . HERE WE HAVE MICHAEL NORRIS OF RT. 1 BOX 556, PINEVILLE, LOUISIANA. MICHAEL IS CAREFUL — HE WANTS TO BE SURE NO ONE IS WATCHING!"
"WOW . . . MICHAEL IS SWIFT — IF HE RUNS FAST ENOUGH WHILE HOLDING THE MONEY BOX WITH BOTH HANDS — MAYBE HE WON'T GET CAUGHT."
Immediately following the above two captions was another caption which stated: "TOO BAD . . . MICHAEL ISN'T
FASTER THAN OUR CAMERAS! AND MICHAEL ISN'T FASTER THAN THE POLICE!
MICHAEL PAYS THE COURT $105.00
MICHAEL GETS 91 DAYS IN JAIL (suspended)
MICHAEL MUST REPORT TO A PROBATION OFFICER FOR 1 YEAR MICHAEL NOW HAS A POLICE RECORD"
Below the caption immediately quoted above was located a photograph of the alleged accomplice in the theft and located to the left of this photograph was the following typewritten caption which was placed on an arrow pointing to the alleged accomplice's photograph:
"WELL . . . ANOTHER ONE!
THE POLICE SAY THIS SPECIMEN IS NONE OTHER THAN MARVIN SHARP OF RT. 1, BOX 181, PINE-VILLE, LOUISIANA, THE POLICE SAY MARVIN WAS WITH MICHAEL NORRIS DURING THE ABOVE THEFT.
WAS MARVIN AN ACCOMPLICE? WAS MARVIN A LOOKOUT?
WHAT WILL THE JUDGE SAY?
WHEN WILL HIS TRIAL BE HELD?
WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO MAR-YIN?"
Norris brought suit against Brian King alleging that the publication of the photographs and captions referring to the theft and subsequent guilty plea caused him considerable humiliation and embarrassment and constituted undue harassment. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Norris in the amount of $500.00 and permanently enjoined the defendant, Brian King, from further publicizing in any manner the arrest and conviction of Michael Norris.
The trial judge stated that the issue facing the Court was whether the actions of Brian King constituted an unlawful invasion of the "Right of Privacy" of the plaintiff, Michael Norris. He further stated that the award was to compensate the plaintiff both for the improper use of his name and picture on the bulletin board and for any over-zealous attempts to collect for the damages resulting from the theft.
ISSUES
A. Did the actions of Brian King constitute an invasion of the privacy of Michael G. Norris?
B. Does the holding of the trial court violate the rights of Brian King which are guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution?
Defendant denies that he displayed the pictures to pressure the plaintiff into making restitution. We find difficulty in reconciling that contention of the defendant with the fact that he delayed six or seven months before posting the pictures in his place of business. The defendant stated that his purpose in displaying the pictures was to discourage or deter others from burglarizing his place of business. When questioned on cross-examination as to why he could not have omitted the name and address of the plaintiff, and/or have blacked out the identifiable facial features of the plaintiff, defendant replied that the desired effect of the publication would have been lost, because they would not appear as authentic, and therefore be of less benefit to the defendant.
The cause of action known as "invasion of privacy" has long been recognized and pronounced by the jurisprudence of this State . Tooley v. Canal Motors, Inc., 296 So.2d 453 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1974) described the right of privacy as follows:
" . . . 'the right to be let alone' and as 'the right to live one's life in seclusion without being subjected to unwarranted and undesirable publicity'."
"As appears from the cited cases and as discussed at length in the Comment at 28 La.Law Rev. (April 1968) malicious intent on the part of the defendant is not a necessary element in the prosecution of an invasion of privacy claim. If the defendant's conduct is unreasonable and seriously interferes with plaintiff's privacy the invasion is actionable."
This tort has usually been associated with conduct falling into one or more of the following classifications:
(1) Intrusion (Lucas v. Ludwig, 313 So.2d 12 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1975), certiorari denied, 318 So.2d 42 [La.]);
(2) Public disclosure of private facts (Lambert v. Dow Chemical Co., 215 So.2d 673 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1968); Hamilton v. Lumbermen's Mutual Cas. Co., 82 So.2d 61 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1955);
(3) False light in public eye (Tooley v. Canal Motors, Inc., supra);
(4) Appropriation of another's name (Tooley v. Canal Motors, Inc., supra; McAndrews v. Roy, 131 So.2d 256 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1961).
See also Prosser, 48 Calif.Law Review, 383.
We are unable to find, and nor was any case in this State or any other state cited to us, wherein the issue involved herein was met squarely. In Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Association, 4 Cal.3d 529, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866, 483 P.2d 34 (1971), the California Supreme Court was faced with a conflict between the right of freedom of the press and the right to privacy. The trial court in the case at bar had this to say in reference to Briscoe :
"Without quoting extensively from that opinion, it suffices to say that the court concluded that one of the major objectives of society and of the administration of our penal system is the rehabilitation of the fallen. Where a person has rehabilitated himself, he should be permitted to continue in the path of rectitude rather than be thrown back into a life of shame or crime. The court pointed out that even the thief on the cross was permitted to repent during the hours of his final agony. The court went on to say that:
'One of the premises of the rehabilitative process is that the rehabilitated offender can rejoin that great bulk of the community from which he has been ostracized for his anti-social acts. In return for becoming a "new man" he is allowed to melt into the shadows of obscurity.'
"The California court then went on to hold that it is for the trier of fact to determine (1) whether the plaintiff has become a rehabilitated member of society, (2) whether identifying him as a former criminal would be highly offensive and injurious to the reasonable man, (3) whether defendant published its information with a reckless disregard for its offensiveness, and (4) whether any independent justification for printing plaintiffs identity existed. This Court accepts the above test and applying it here finds that the plaintiff has married and become a rehabilitated member of society, that the defendant's conduct is highly offensive and injurious to the reasonable man, that the defendant published the information with total disregard for its offensiveness and that there is not sufficient independent justification for defendant's act.
"A factor to be considered in making the above determination and in assessing damages is the recentness of the criminal offense. There seems little doubt that the defendant was entitled to truthfully discuss this criminal act and even to publish it on the bulletin board in his business. However, this Court feels that as of the filing of this suit the plaintiff had rehabilitated himself and that the continued publication of his offense served no public interest. It is extremely difficult if not impossible to point out an exact time after which the defendant's conduct was legally impermissible. It is also difficult to allocate the embarrassment and humiliation which the plaintiff suffered between the period when the publication was permissible and the period thereafter. All things considered, the Court feels that an award of $500.00 would adequately compensate the plaintiff both for this improper use of his name and the picture on the bulletin board and for any overzealous attempts to collect for damages resulting from the criminal act."
In addition to awarding the monetary damages hereinabove mentioned, the trial court also permanently enjoined the defendant, Brian King, from publicizing in any manner the arrest and conviction of the plaintiff, Michael G. Norris.
Defendant cites several United States Supreme Court decisions for his contention that the conduct did not constitute an invasion of privacy and that the ruling of the trial court violated defendant's Constitutionally-guaranteed freedoms of speech and press. However, without going into an extensive discussion of the various cases cited by defendant-appellant, we find these cases not applicable to the case at bar. These cases cited by defendant-appellant all involve publication by either the news media, or by some other organization acting in the public interest. This case involves a publication by one individual, involving information concerning another individual. The cases cited by defendant-appellant involve the privilege and/or responsibility of the news media to openly publish, and this case involves a private citizen's right and privilege to do so. The responsibilities of the news media are very different from those of the individual citizen. The whole pur pose and aim of the news media is to bring forth information to the public, to apprise the public of the events transpiring from day to day. That responsibility, duty, and purpose are not shared by the ordinary individual. At least no cases to the contrary have been brought to our - attention by defendant-appellant.
The facts of this case illustrate the repeated harassment by defendant King of plaintiff and his family. That harassment was unreasonable, and seriously interfered with plaintiffs privacy. Accordingly, the invasion is actionable. Tooley v. Canal Motors, Inc., supra. Instead of pursuing restitution in a civil proceeding, defendant King instead chose to telephone plaintiff and his mother and make threats to plaintiff, the mother, and the integrity of the entire family. When these threats did not produce the results which he sought, defendant finally chose to display the photographs of plaintiff in a manner most ridiculing to plaintiff, and to announce to the world that plaintiff had been convicted of a crime, in a manner motivated by reasons which would continuously enure to defendant's benefit (and to plaintiff's detriment) by aiding defendant in safeguarding his property from theft, etc.
We are unable to discern any public interest to be served by defendant's actions such as to bring him within the protection of the rights of free speech and press. Any such right that he might have had were lost to him when his motives evolved into continued punishment and harassment of the plaintiff; and his selfish motive of protection of his property became the main motivation for his continued publication of plaintiff's picture and the information pertinent thereto.
It appears obvious, from the record, that one of defendant's motives in displaying plaintiff's picture in defendant's washateria was to coerce payment of that which defendant claims that plaintiff took from him. Accordingly, the Louisiana jurisprudence dealing with the extent to which a creditor may apply pressure on a debtor should be examined.
A creditor may employ any reasonable, non-coercive methods in an attempt to collect that which is owed to him. However, when he oversteps the bounds of propriety and takes unreasonable, coercive action, he has committed tortious conduct for which the law provides a remedy. In the following cases it was found that the conduct of the defendant-creditor was actionable: Tuyes v. Chambers, 144 La. 723, 81 So. 265 (1919) (the defendant printed and published plaintiff's name on a list of delinquent debtors); Booty v. American Finance Corp. of Shreveport, 224 So.2d 512 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1969) (the defendant sent a series of letters — no less than ten — -to plaintiff's employer informing it of the status of its employee's debt; creditor telephoned the office of employer and requested assistance in the collection of the debt; agents of the defendant told plaintiff that they would have him fired from every job until he left town); Boudreaux v. Allstate Finance Corp., 217 So.2d 439 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1968) (the creditor telephoned plaintiff's neighbors and characterized plaintiffs as deadbeats, apprised the neighbors of plaintiff's delinquency in payment of the debt due defendant); Pack v. Wise, 155 So.2d 909 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1963), writ refused 245 La. 84, 157 So.2d 231 (the defendant-creditor contacted plaintiff's employer of an alleged delinquent indebtedness; he telephoned the employer and explained the situation; he furnished the employer with a letter received by him from plaintiff's attorney informing him of potential litigation were he to continue his collection efforts; plaintiff was fired as a result of the foregoing). See also Malone, 25 La.Law Rev., 341 (1965).
Plaintiff has answered this appeal seeking an increase in the damages awarded by the trial court. While the award may be somewhat low, we do not find it to be outside of the perimeters of Coco v. Winston Industries, Inc., 341 So.2d 332 (La. 1976). Accordingly, we will not disturb the award.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. All costs of this appeal are assessed against defendant-appellant, King.
AFFIRMED.
HOOD, J., dissents and assigns written reasons.
. Denis v. Laclerc, 1 Mart., O.S. 297 (1811).