Case Name: UNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. Robert J. SCIOS a/k/a Robert Schwartz
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1978-07-21
Citations: 590 F.2d 956
Docket Number: No. 75-1619
Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. Robert J. SCIOS a/k/a Robert Schwartz.
Judges: 
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 590
Pages: 956–997

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. Robert J. SCIOS a/k/a Robert Schwartz.
No. 75-1619.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued En Banc May 26, 1977.
Decided July 21, 1978.
As Amended July 27, 1978.
Hamilton P. Fox, III, Asst. U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., with whom Earl J. Silbert, U. S. Atty., John A. Terry, Asst. U. S. Atty., and Barry W. Levine, Asst. U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., at the time the brief was filed, were on the brief, for appellant.
Walter H. Fleischer, Washington, D. C., with whom Axel Kleiboemer, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellee.
Before WRIGHT, Chief Judge, and BAZELON, McGOWAN, TAMM, LEVENTHAL, ROBINSON, MacKINNON, ROBB and WILKEY, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed by LEVEN-THAL, Circuit Judge.
Dissenting opinion filed by MacKINNON, Circuit Judge.
Dissenting opinion filed by ROBB, Circuit Judge.
Dissenting opinion filed by WILKEY, Circuit Judge, with whom TAMM, Circuit Judge, joins.

Opinion:
LEVENTHAL, Circuit Judge:
On June 28, 1974, defendant Robert J. Scios was indicted for unlawful interception of wire communications and related offenses. By order of May 20, 1975, the district court suppressed the testimony of a potential witness, Thomas Massa, Jr., on the ground that. Massa's testimony was the product of an illegal search. The govem ment appealed that order, and on Aug. 23, 1976, a panel of this court reversed the district court order on the ground that the "taint" attaching to Massa's testimony by virtue of the illegal search had been "attenuated" sufficiently to permit introduction of the testimony at defendant Scios's trial.
We have reheard the case en banc and concluded that the challenged testimony must be excluded as tainted by the illegal search.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On Sept. 29, 1972, telephone linemen came upon electronic devices attached to the telephone lines of a pharmacy in Washington, D. C., known as Your Pharmacy Service. The FBI began an investigation, which led eventually to the defendant Scios, a licensed private investigator. A warrant for his arrest was issued on Feb. 15, 1974. The prosecuting attorney concluded that there was no basis for application for a search warrant, and no search warrant was sought.
FBI agents proceeded to Scios's residence in New York City and arrested him there. After Scios had been physically taken into custody and a gun had been removed from his desk, one of the agents looked around the room "for nothing in particular." His attention focused upon a credenza, located three or four feet in back of defendant's desk. On top of the credenza were about 60 file folders, in wire racks, labeled with various projects Scios had worked on in his capacity as a private investigator. Defendant's access to the credenza was, according to FBI testimony, blocked by the presence of an FBI agent between defendant and the credenza. The trial court found that the credenza was beyond the area of defendant's immediate control.
At this point one of the agents went to the credenza and removed a file folder labeled "Your Pharmacy Service" — the name of the pharmacy upon whose telephone lines the electronic devices had been found. The government contended that the label on this folder was in plain view of the agents. The court found as a fact to the contrary; rather, the agent had "bent over, read through the folders, and fingered them so that their labels could be read."
The folder was found to contain various papers, including a credit card charge slip with Scios's name on it from a motel in Washington, D. C., and an itemized bill from the same motel, indicating "Mr. Massa" had registered for the room. These items bore the date July 26, 1972, which established a likely temporal link to the period of the wiretapping. Using the motel's record of telephone calls made from the room, the F.B.I. was able to locate in New York City the potential witness— Thomas Massa, Jr.
A subpoena was issued commanding Massa to appear before a grand jury in the District of Columbia. Massa was initially reluctant to speak to the prosecutor in Washington, but on the advice of his family he appeared, on May 5,1974, in the prosécutor's office. Massa was told that preparations were being made to grant him immunity from prosecution for matters to which his grand jury testimony might relate. In his first appearance before the grand jury, before immunity had been granted, Massa refused to testify, asserting his privilege against self-incrimination.
On May 8,1974, the District Judge issued an order directing Massa to testify — conferring appropriate immunity. Massa was again taken before the grand jury and again refused to testify, but then reluctantly acquiesced after Judge Hart's order was read to him. The indictment of Scios followed.
II. PROCEEDINGS IN THE DISTRICT COURT
In October, 1974, defendant Scios moved the district court to suppress as evidence the file folder and its contents, as well as all evidence derived therefrom. He moved, in addition, to suppress all oral statements made by him at the time of arrest, and any evidence derived therefrom. On Dec. 10, 1974, the court granted these suppression motions. Its order was based on two alternative grounds. It ruled, first, that the affidavit in support of the warrant for Scios's arrest had failed to establish probable cause to believe that Scios had commit-, ted a crime; consequently, the challenged evidence was suppressed as the product of an illegal arrest. The court then assumed, arguendo, that the arrest had been lawful, and went on to hold that the seizure of the file folder was nevertheless illegal since the folder was not seized in a search incident to arrest as permitted under Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), nor was it in plain view. Neither defendant's motions to suppress nor the government's responses to these motions mentioned the testimony of the witness Massa.
On April 23, 1975, long after the period for appeal of the foregoing order had elapsed, the government moved the court for a determination of whether Massa's testimony was admissible at trial. The government argued that the taint attaching to Massa's testimony by virtue of the illegal seizure of the folder had been attenuated by intervening events, contending particularly that there was attenuation in Massa's ultimate "act of volition" in deciding to testify. On May 20, 1974, the district court ruled that the taint had not been sufficiently attenuated to permit introduction of Massa's testimony.
III. QUESTIONS PRESENTED
The district court's December 10, 1974, order holding the seizure was illegal was not appealed. On this appeal, from the April 23, 1975, order, suppressing Massa's testimony, the government does not contest the district court's ruling that the seizure was a violation of the fourth amendment. It argues a claim of attenuation — that the taint attributable to the illegal seizure of the defendant's file folder has been sufficiently dissipated to permit introduction of the testimony of Thomas Massa, Jr., at trial.
The exclusionary rule was established in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914). The purpose of the rule is to safeguard fourth amendment rights. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974). The rule bars the introduction at trial not only of evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment, but also of evidence obtained as an indirect result of the illegal seizure — the fruit of the poisoned tree. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 40 S.Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). An exception to this "tainted fruit" doctrine has been established for the case where the connection between the illegal seizure and the subsequent discovery of the challenged evidence has "become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint," Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341, 60 S.Ct. 266, 268, 84 L.Ed. 307 (1939). It is related to the rule, plainly not available to the government here, that permits the introduction of evidence to which the government was led by means independent of the illegal search or seizure.
In certain circumstances, the attenuation doctrine has been applied where the witness who has been located as the result of an illegal search or seizure has voluntarily decided to testify. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. at 491, 83 S.Ct. 407. The principle underlying this application of the attenuation doctrine has not been articulated with clarity. It is probably an adaptation, with adjustment, of the general legal conception that sees the link of causation broken when an intervening cause is independent.
Turning to the case before us, we examine first the claim that the taint of the illegal seizure was attenuated by a voluntary decision to testify; and next, the claim of attenuation of the taint by the complexity of intervening factors.
A. Voluntariness: In Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963), the Court excluded the incriminating statements of defendant Toy, made shortly after his illegal arrest, while handcuffed and surrounded by federal narcotics agents. The Court said it was unreasonable to judge that his response to the police interrogation "was sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint" of an illegal arrest, 371 U.S. at 486, 83 S.Ct. at 416. The statement of Wong Sun, a co-defendant, was, by contrast, deemed admissible.' Wong Sun had also been arrested without probable cause. His statement, however, was not made immediately after arrest; rather, he was released in his own recognizance and returned voluntarily several days later to make the statement. Id. at 491, 83 S.Ct. 407. The Supreme Court found that "the connection between the arrest and the statement had 'become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.' . ." Id. at 491, 83 S.Ct. at 419, quoting Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341, 60 S.Ct. 266, 84 L.Ed. 307 (1939).
It seems clear from Wong Sun that for an act of free will to operate as a dissipation of . taint, it must occur in circumstances devoid of coercion.
The principle was further developed in Smith and Bowden v. United States, 117 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 324 F.2d 879 (1963), decided shortly after Wong Sun. This court excluded a statement made by a defendant during unnecessarily long post-arrest detention, and tangible evidence taken from him at that time. But it admitted the testimony of an eyewitness to a murder who had been located as a result of a statement made by a defendant. The eyewitness initially provided no incriminating evidence. After considering the matter for a period of time, during which he "kept thinking about the dead man . .," Record at 629, he decided to testify against defendant.- In support of the distinction thus made, Judge (now Chief Justice) Burger stressed the element of volition and other aspects of human behavior that contribute to its indeterminacy:
[A] witness is not an inanimate object which like contraband narcotics, a pistol or stolen goods, "speak for themselves." The proffer of a living witness is not to be mechanically equated with the proffer of inanimate evidentiary objects illegally seized. The fact that the name of a potential witness is disclosed to police is of no evidentiary significance, per se, since the living witness is an individual human personalty whose attributes of will, perception, memory and volition interact to determine what testimony he will give. The uniqueness of this human
117 U.S.App.D.C. at 3-4 & n. 2, 324 F.2d at 881-82 & n. 2.
The concept of "reflection" as the key element of admissibility in Smith and Bow-den was emphasized in Smith and Anderson v. United States, 120 U.S.App.D.C. 160, 344 F.2d 545 (1965).
However, for purposes of this case, we need not pursue the question when or in what circumstances voluntary testimony will be admissible.
In the present case, it is plain that Massa's giving of testimony — before the grand jury, and presumably at the trial — is purely and simply a product of coercion. Massa's decision to testify is not a matter of choice, or free will, but made solely to avoid being jailed for contempt. His decision to testify in such circumstances can hardly be what Judge Burger had in mind in Smith and Bowden when he spoke of the "human personality whose attributes of will, perception, memory and volition interact to determine what testimony he will give." 117 U.S.App.D.C. at 3, 324 F.2d at 881.
B. Claim of attenuation of the taint by intervening factors: The government also argues there are numerous "intervening factors" between the illegal seizure of the file folder and Massa's testimony making the chain from the illegal seizure of the file folder to the testimony of Massa "so complicated, remote, and indirect" as to dissipate the connection.
The claim, in substance, is that there was no direct link between the file folder and Massa, because the file document that showed Massa's name in the record of the motel room paid by defendant did not establish his identity. That only appeared when the police checked the motel's telephone records.
We must begin with the illegal search. At the arrest for the offense of tapping the line of Your Pharmacy Service, the agent unlawfully riffled through defendant's file folders and removed his file for Your Pharmacy Service. The agents tracked the Massa lead found in that file. They did not pursue a trail independent of the illegal search (see note 9). The location of Massa was not the product of an improbable, unforeseeable coincidence. It was good police work, but a straightforward exploration of the leads in the Pharmacy file. The fact that the exploration took some time, although a material consideration, does not of itself demonstrate that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable. "The road . may be long, but it is straight."
*
We add to the opinion that had been written for this case a reference to United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 98 S.Ct. 1054, 55 L.Ed.2d 268 (1978), which in our view is not only congruent with but affirmatively supports our reasoning and result.
In Ceccolini, a police officer (Biro), op duty at school crossings, was taking a break in defendant's flower shop, when he noticed an envelope, with money sticking out, on the cash register behind the counter. He examined the contents of the envelope, found policy slips, and questioned a shop employee (Ms. Hennessey) who told him that the envelope belonged to defendant, and that he had instructed her to give it to someone. Some four months later, the FBI interviewed her at her home in the presence of her family, and said the government would appreciate any information regarding defendant's activities that she had acquired in the shop. She told the FBI agent she was studying police science in college and would be willing to help, and she then related the events that had occurred when the police officer was at the shop- A month later she testified to the same effect before the grand jury, thus contradicting the grand jury testimony given by defendant, who was indicted for perjury.
The Supreme Court held that the testimony of employee Hennessey was admissible at defendant's trial.
Justice Rehnqui'st, for the Court, found that the taint of the illegal search by the officer had been sufficiently attenuated to permit introduction of the testimony. The Court rejected the notion that the exclusionary rule was subject to a per se exception that rendered all live witness testimony admissible, regardless of whether obtained as a consequence of illegality. Instead, the particular features of a case must be examined to balance the benefits of the exclusionary rule, with its deterrent purpose, against the costs.
In his summarizing paragraph Justice Rehnquist states:
Viewing this case in the light of the principles just discussed, we hold that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the degree of attenuation was not sufficient to dissipate the connection between the illegality and the testimony. The evidence indicates overwhelmingly that the testimony given by the witness was an act of her own free will in no way coerced or even induced by official authority as a result of Biro's discovery of the policy slips. Nor were the slips themselves used in questioning Hennessey. Substantial periods of time elapsed between the time of the illegal search and the initial contact with the witness, on the one hand, and between the latter and the testimony at trial on the other. While the particular knowledge to which Hennessey testified at trial can be logically traced back to Biro's discovery of the policy slips, both the identity of Hennessey and her relationship with the respondent was well known to those investigating the case. There is, in addition, not the slightest evidence to suggest that Biro entered the shop or picked up the envelope with the intent of finding tangible evidence bearing on an illicit gambling operation, much less any suggestion that he entered the shop and searched with the intent of finding a willing and knowledgeable witness to testify against respondent. Application of the exclusionary rule in' this situation could not have the slightest deterrent effect on the behavior of an officer such as Biro. The cost of permanently silencing Hennessey is too great for an even-handed system of law enforcement to bear in order to secure such a speculative and very likely negligible deterrent effect.
435 U.S. at 279, 98 S,Ct. at 1062.
The case at bar stands in marked contrast to Ceccolini on these critical factors: (1) In Ceccolini, Hennessey's testimony "was an act of her own free will in no way coerced or even induced by official authority." In contrast, Massa initially refused to consult with the authorities, and agreed to confer and to testify only in response to pressure by the prosecutor, including the threat of a contempt citation.
(2) Massa's existence as a potential witness was entirely unknown to the authorities before they searched Scios's files.
(3) The search of Scios's files was to gain evidence, the FBI having come to the scene to arrest Scios for illegal wiretapping.
Excluding the fruit of that illegal search cannot be dismissed as of "negligible deterrent effect."
# *
We conclude, in sum, that the taint of the illegal search and seizure of the folder was not dissipated by the fact that police investigation of the leads in the folder was required in order to locate Massa, or that Massa decided to testify under the constraint of a court order. We therefore affirm the order of the district court suppressing his testimony.
So ordered.
. Defendant was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2511(l)(a) (unlawful interception of wire communications); 18 U.S.C. § 2511(l)(c) and (d) (disclosure and use of such unlawfully intercepted communications); and 18 U.S.C. § 2512(l)(a) (interstate transportation of wire communication interception devices).
. In an opinion and order, issued Dec. 10, 1974, the district court held the search was illegal and suppressed "tangible evidence" and "oral statements" that derived from the search. The government did not appeal that order. On April 23, 1975, the government moved the district court to "elaborate" on its earlier order. In response, the court on May 20, 1975, issued the order from which the government now appeals, ruling that Massa's testimony was inadmissible as the product of an illegal search. Defendant has taken the position that the second order of the district court was merely a clarification of the first — i. e., that Massa's testimony was ruled inadmissible on Dec. 10, 1974 —and that therefore the government's present appeal is barred by expiration of the 30-day period for taking an appeal, 18 U.S.C. § 3731. This issue was decided adversely to the defendant in the opinion and order issued by a panel of this court on Aug. 23, 1976. The panel held that the "oral statements" suppressed by the order of Dec. 10, 1974 were, like the "tangible evidence," evidence that had already been obtained and that was admissible on its own, such as anything Scios may have said at the time of arrest. We adopt the reasoning of the panel on this point, and its decision that the order of Dec. 10 did not, therefore, determine the admissibility of Massa's testimony.
. U. S. v. Scios, No. 75-1619 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 23, 1976).
. Memorandum Opinion of District Court (filed Dec. 10, 1974), reproduced in Appellant's Br. at 34, 53.
. Memorandum Opinion of District Court (filed Dec. 10, 1974), reproduced in Appellant's Br. at 34, 54.
. There was some initial confusion between Thomas Massa, Sr. and Thomas Massa, Jr., both of whom resided at the New York City address to which the FBI had been led.
. In this motion the government took the position that the admissibility of Massa's testimony had not been determined by the court's earlier order — a view disputed by defendant.
. The position injected by Judge MacKinnon's opinion, that there was no violation of the fourth amendment, is in our view without merit. See note 15 infra.
. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 40 S.Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920). There is no serious assertion by the government in the case before us that Massa would have been identified as a potential witness without the aid of the leads provided by the contents of the file folder.
. Where the person who made the statement is the one against whom it is sought to be used, see, e. g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d-441 (1963), it can be argued that, by volunteering the statement after careful consideration, he has waived his objection to the illegal search or seizure.
This is illustrated here by the circumstance that when initially located Holman [the eyewitness] gave no information adverse to appellants; only after reflection and the interaction of these faculties of human personality did Holman eventually relate to the jury the events of the night of the killing. These factors in part account for the rule allowing a party to cross-examine his own witness on a claim of surprise and ultimately to impeach his own witness. process distinguishes the evidentiary character of a witness from the relative immutability of inanimate evidence.
. Brief and Appendix for Appellant at 16.
. United States v. Alston, 311 F.Supp. 296, 299 (D.D.C.1970) (restating the holding of Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341, 60 S.Ct. 266, 84 L.Ed. 307 (1939)).
. United States v. Tane, 329 F.2d 848, 853 (2d Cir. 1964). See also United States v. Karathanos, 531 F.2d 26, 32-35 (2d Cir. 1976).
United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 98 S.Ct. 1054, 55 L.Ed.2d 268 (1978), discussed more fully below, is not to the contrary. The Court there indicated, inter alia, that the period of time that has elapsed between the time of the illegal search and the discovery of a witness, or his testimony at trial, is one of several factors to be considered in determining whether the taint occasioned by the illegality has been attenuated. Id. at 279, 98 S.Ct. 1054. Here the elapsed time was, admittedly, not in significant. But it is far outweighed by the other considerations set forth in Ceccolini. See pp.---of - U.S.App.D.C., pp. 962-963 of 590 F.2d infra.
Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 92 S.Ct. 1620, 32 L.Ed.2d 152 (1972), cited by Judge Wilkey, is not in point. Johnson was arrested without a warrant, and detained under a magistrate's commitment. While under detention he was identified in a lineup. He argued that the lineup identification was a forbidden fruit of an arrest that violated his fourth amendment rights. The Court held (p. 365, 92 S.Ct. p. 1626): "At the time of the lineup, the detention of the appellant was under the authority of this commitment. Consequently, the lineup was conducted not by 'exploitation' of the challenged arrest but 'by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.' " The premise underlying Johnson is the historic doctrine that the victim of an illegal arrest cannot on that ground attack a subsequent detention or other processes of criminal justice. See Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 7 S.Ct. 225, 30 L.Ed. 421 (1886); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 72 S.Ct. 509, 96 L.Ed. 541 (1952); E. C. Fisher, Laws of Arrest (1976) § 181, 182. Obviously, if the victim of an illegal arrest were released, he could be rearrested and committed by a magistrate upon a finding of probable cause, and would not thereafter be immune from any criminal proceeding. A lineup identification may be compelled as a corollary of a current detention by the magistrate, which stands on ground that is independent of the arrest (valid or invalid), and may not properly be considered the fruit of the earlier (allegedly invalid) arrest. As to the present case, there is no historic rule like that which establishes the magistrate's commitment as resting on an independent cause. The court order compelling testimony from Massa is necessarily rooted in the discovery of Massa through an illegal search.
. Accordingly, we shall not respond to the discourse in Judge Wilkey's dissent supplying us with a discussion of the virtues of such an exception. The case reports are already too long, and our time too short, for our ruminations on an issue so recently and squarely addressed and resolved.
. Two dissenting opinions argue that the seizure of the file folder was permissible under Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), or under the plain view doctrine.
Plain View Doctrine
The folder was not in plain view. Agent Swayze testified that after he had conducted a search for weapons, and after Scios had been arrested, "I started to read up the various files that were in these little wire stands." (Swayze Tr. 18.) It had previously been testified that these were on a "counter top" (referred to by others as a credenza). "There were about 60 or 70 files in these two or three wire stands and these files were stacked one right behind the other." (Swayze Tr. 18.) He testified that he "did not thumb through the files" and did not "leaf through them." (Swayze Tr. 19.) He acknowledged that the particular file was not "sticking out" and that it was "somewhere in the middle of the stack of files with about "ten, fifteen . in front of this particular file." (Swayze Tr. 21.)
When he saw the "Your Pharmacy" file, he pulled it out and said to agent Breen, "Isn't this the company involved in this thing?" (Swayze Tr. 21.) The trial judge summarized the testimony of Mr. Scios that Swayze "thumbed through the file folders." The trial judge did not credit the testimony of agent Swayze that he did not finger through the files. In a memorandum opinion rejecting the applicability of the plain view doctrine, the trial judge ruled: "The court heard conflicting testimony concerning seizure of the file folder. In resolving this conflict the court concludes that the discovery of the file folder was not inadvertent; rather, the agent bent over, read through the folders, and fingered them so that their labels could be read." (Emphasis added.)
Chimel Doctrine
In Chimel, the Court limited the area of permissible warrantless search to the area of "immediate control" of the person arrested. In formulating this rule, the Court observed that it certainly precludes the search of another room, as beyond the area of immediate control. From this, Judge MacKinnon seems to argue that Chimel blesses a warrantless search that is made within the same room. The fallacy is evident.
Judge MacKinnon also urges that the search was legitimated by the fact that Mr. Scios may have had access to the file folder at certain times prior to the search. In attempting to demonstrate such access, he purports to reconstruct facts that were not genuinely explored at trial. More importantly, such prior access, if it existed, is in any event immaterial, under the holding and rationale of Chimel, as a justification for search.
The trial judge found: "In this case, even if the FBI version is believed, the defendant was seated at his desk and had been disarmed. There were three FBI agents in the room, including one who blocked defendant's immediate control . . . The findings are incontrovertible, and they establish the inapplicability of the doctrine under which Chimel authorizes certain searches.
That it was not possible for defendant to snatch and destroy the folder appears from agent Swayze's undisputed testimony that he was physically blocking defendant's access. Mr. Scios, who did not know what his visitors wanted, invited them into his office "to discuss whatever it was we were there to talk about" (Swayze Tr. 11.) When Mr. Scios entered the office, he "sat down at his desk"; agent Swayze positioned himself "between the desk and the wall" facing Scios; the counter top was behind the agent, and "yes, I was physically blocking . . . Mr. Scios' access to those files." (Swayze Tr. 15.) Then agent Breen notified Mr. Scios of the arrest warrant and advised him of his rights; the agents searched for weapons; and agent Swayze, having established that there were no weapons in the desk drawer, turned around and saw the files. While agent Breen was explaining the arrest mechanics to Mr. Scios, agent Swayze "casually looked about the room" and "started to read up the various files that were in these little wire stands." (Swayze Tr. 18.)
Agent Swayze's blocking of the files was not a mere "momentary presence" at the time of seizure (Judge Robb's phrase). It identified the relative positions of the persons during the full episode of arrest, notification of rights, and search for weapons as well as the subsequent search and seizure.