Case Name: PEOPLE v. BARNES
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1974-03-05
Citations: 51 Mich. App. 735
Docket Number: Docket No. 16038
Parties: PEOPLE v BARNES
Judges: Before: McGregor, P. J., and Gillis and O’Hara, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 51
Pages: 735–741

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v BARNES
Opinion op the Court
1. Burglary — Evidence—Fingerprints—Question for Jury.
A single fingerprint on a fragment of glass from a door or window of burglarized premises was suificient to support a jury’s verdict finding defendant guilty of breaking and entering; the question of what point in time the print was made on the glass, whether it was on the inside or the outside of the pane, its clarity, and its reliability went to the weight of the evidence and were questions for the jury.
Dissent by J. H. Gillis, J.
2. Criminal Law — Evidence—Circumstantial Evidence.
Circumstantial evidence, to support a conviction, must exclude every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence.
3. Burglary — Evidence—Fingerprints—Sufficiency.
Evidence that a ñngerprint obtained from a glass fragment from a public door broken at a service station during a burglary matched the defendant’s ñngerprint was totally inadequate to support a conviction of breaking and entering because the existence of this ñngerprint shows only that the defendant at some time touched the glass; nothing shows that the print could only have been impressed at the time the crime was committed.
4. Criminal Law — Prosecutor’s Remarks — Failure to Testify— Burden of Proof.
A prosecutor’s comment which indicated the lack of any testi mony about the defendant’s innocent presence at the scene of the crime effectively shifted the burden of proof, in the average layman’s mind, to the defendant; since the prosecutor, not the defendant, has the burden by his proofs to exclude hypotheses consistent with innocence, and since the prosecutor may not comment on defendant’s failure to testify, the prosecutor’s comment was prejudicial and requires a reversal.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1] 13 Am Jur 2d, Burglary §§ 50, 51, 66.
[1, 3] Fingerprints, palm prints, or bare footprints as evidence. 28 ALR2d 1115.
[2] 29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 266.
30 Am Jur 2d, Evidence §§ 1091, 1125, 1126.
[3] 30 Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 1144.
[4] 63 Am Jur 2d, Prosecuting Attorneys § 27.
Appeal from Recorder’s Court of Detroit, Samuel Brezner, J.
Submitted Division 1 January 9, 1974, at Detroit.
(Docket No. 16038.)
Decided March 5, 1974.
Gordon J. Barnes was convicted of breaking and entering a business place with intent to commit larceny. Defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William L. Cahalan, Prosecuting Attorney, Dominick R. Carnovale, Chief, Appellate Department, and Thomas A. Ziolkowski, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Judith K. Munger, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for defendant.
Before: McGregor, P. J., and Gillis and O’Hara, JJ.
Former Supreme Court Justice, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment pursuant to Const 1963, art 6, § 23 as amended in 1968.

Opinion:
O'Hara, J.
This is an appeal of right from a conviction of breaking and entering a business place with intent to commit larceny. MCLA 750.110; MSA 28.305.
We have reviewed the assignments of error and conclude that only one merits decisional discus sion. It is the question of the sufficiency of evidence of guilt established by a single fingerprint on a fragment of glass from a door or window of the burglarized premises. The fragment was one of many that was found inside and outside the building. It is concluded that the police did not collect, preserve, and offer for admission of all the fragments in and about the scene.
The defense argues that this failure amounts to a breach of duty to furnish all evidence of guilt or innocence. It is further argued that this fact coupled with the prosecutor's argument that the evidence of the defendant's fingerprint on the window fragment was uncontradicted and unexplained deprived the defendant of any defense. This because defendant chose not to take the witness stand. Thus appellate counsel argues with great vigor and admirable candor that defendant was placed in the position of either exposing a record of prior offenses by taking the stand, or being unable to explain the inculpating print. We can appreciate the difficulty of the choice. About all we can say is "C'est la guerre". It was the defendant's choice and he made it, wisely or unwisely. The question of what point in time the print was made on the glass, whether it was on the inside or the outside of the pane, its clarity, reliability, and other questions of similar import went to the weight of the evidence. These are jury questions and not for us to disturb unless we can say the evidence was totally inadequate to support the verdict. This we cannot do as we view the record.
Perforce, we affirm.
McGregor, P. J., concurred.