Case Name: David C. GOODMAN, Appellant, v. Harvey GOODMAN and Benez, Inc., a corporation, et al., Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1973-08-30
Citations: 290 So. 2d 552
Docket Number: No. P-291
Parties: David C. GOODMAN, Appellant, v. Harvey GOODMAN and Benez, Inc., a corporation, et al., Appellees.
Judges: JOHNSON, J., specially concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 290
Pages: 552–560

Head Matter:
David C. GOODMAN, Appellant, v. Harvey GOODMAN and Benez, Inc., a corporation, et al., Appellees.
No. P-291.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Aug. 30, 1973.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 18, 1973.
David R. Lewis, of Blalock, Holbrook, Lewis, Paul & Bennett, Jacksonville, for appellant.
Goldstein & Goldstein, Albert Datz, of Datz, Jacobson & Dusek, and John S. Duss, of Duss, Butler & Marees, Jacksonville, for appellees.

Opinion:
WIGGINTON,. Acting Chief Judge.
Appellant-David C. Goodman brought suit for damages allegedly suffered by him as a result of appellees' failure or refusal to consummate a contract of purchase and sale involving a parcel of unimproved real estate in Duval County. From an adverse judgment Goodman has appealed.
Appellee-Benez, Inc., a corporation, together with some of its individual stockholders collectively own a parcel of unimproved land which appellant-David C. Goodman was interested in purchasing. The Benez owners entered into a written option contract with Goodman by which they agreed to convey the land to him or his assign for a specified purchase price, the option containing such provisions as the amount to be paid at the time the option was exercised, the amount of down payment to be made at the time of closing, a provision for a purchase money mortgage to be given by the purchaser, and an agreement for a release clause by which portions of the land could be released from the lien of the mortgage prior to final payment thereof. David Goodman thereafter negotiated with appellee-Harvey Goodman, as a result of which Harvey agreed to purchase from David the option held by the latter on the Benez property. David and Harvey entered into a separate written agreement by which Harvey agreed to pay David a stipulated sum of money as his "profit" in the transaction, a portion of which sum was to be paid in cash at the time of closing the purchase transaction with Benez, the balance to be paid in deferred payments over a period of ten years. Harvey paid to the escrow agent the initial payment required to be paid upon notification by him of his intention to exercise the option, and the transaction proceeded in an uneventful manner.
In an exchange of correspondence it was expressly or impliedly agreed between Harvey and Benez that several critically material aspects' of the transaction would be left open for later determination at the time of closing. At the closing conference, where all parties were present, a dispute arose as to the terms and provisions set forth in the proposed purchase money note and mortgage which were tendered to Harvey for execution. It is apparent from the record that Harvey interpreted the option agreement to mean that the purchase money mortgage would provide for an initial payment and subsequent deferred payments in certain specified amounts, whereas the owners Benez intended the payments to be in different amounts. Harvey also interpreted the release provisions contained in the option agreement to mean one thing, while the Benez owners intended for them to mean something altogether different. As the discussion between the parties proceeded, it became more heated and resulted in name calling which terminated when the attorney for Benez belligerently announced that the transaction was "dead" and ordered everyone out of his office. Harvey accepted the termination of the transaction by Benez and departed for his home in New York, promptly notifying the escrow holder not to disburse the initial payment made by him under the option agreement. A few days later David, in an attempt to reconcile the differences between Harvey and Benez, made certain proposals to the latter, as. a result of which Benez offered to revive the transaction by accepting a purchase money note and mortgage drafted strictly in accordance with the provisions of the option agreement and essentially in accordance with Harvey's interpretation of the option contract. Harvey refused to enter into any further negotiations with either David or Benez and took the position that he was released from any and all liability to either of them. David then brought this action against both Harvey and Benez seeking a judgment for an amount representing the loss to him of his prospective "profit" in the transaction which he could have expected to receive had the contract for the purchase and sale of the property not been breached by ap-pellees.
It is appellant's position that the option agreement assigned by him to Harvey ripened into a binding contract of purchase and sale at the moment Harvey gave notice of his intention to exercise the option and paid to the escrow agent the advance deposit called for in the agreement. Appellant asserts that the terms and provisions of the option agreement are clear and unambiguous and that Harvey breached the contract when he refused to consummate the transaction by accepting a deed to the land and executing the purchase money note and mortgage tendered to him at the closing conference. Benez agrees with appellant that the option agreement ripened into a firm contract of purchase and sale upon its exercise by Harvey and that the latter breached the contract by refusing to sign the purchase money note and mortgage tendered him at the closing. Benez therefore reasons that since it was Harvey who breached the contract and the sellers were at all times ready and willing to close the transaction strictly in accordance with the terms of the option agreement, they are not liahle to David for the damages he claims.
On the contrary, Harvey contends that the terms and provisions of the option agreement are vague and ambiguous and his notice of election to exercise the option by making the initial payment to the escrow agent constituted nothing more than an agreement to later work out the details of the transaction in a manner acceptable to both parties. He insists that his interpretation of the provisions of the option agreement is just as reasonable as is the interpretation placed upon it by David and Benez. He therefore reasons that since there was never a meeting of the minds as to the exact terms and provisions to be incorporated in the purchase money note and mortgage regarding the amount of the deferred payments to be made thereunder and the exact manner in which land could be released from the lien of the mortgage, there never came into being an enforceable contract of purchase and sale. Harvey takes the position that even if a contract existed it was breached when the attorney representing Benez suddenly concluded the closing conference by declaring the transaction dead and ordering all of the principal parties out of his office. Harvey concludes that he was justified in accepting termination of the contract, declining to participate further in negotiations concerning the transaction, and disclaiming any further liability either to David or to Be-nez. In taking this position, he relies on the generally accepted principle that where a contract is violated by one of the parties thereto, the other party is released from any further obligations and his liability thereunder is discharged.
The trial court found from the evidence adduced at the trial that the provisions of the option agreement left open for future consideration of the parties several critically important aspects of the transaction relating to the selection and release of a portion of the land at the time of closing and the selection and release of other land which would be subject to the lien of the purchase money mortgage. Based upon this finding the court concluded that the option agreement never ripened into a contract of purchase and sale because there was never a meeting of the minds on all material aspects of the transaction nor an acceptance by the purchaser of a certain and definite offer by the seller.
It is an established principle of real property law that an option to purchase land is but a continuing irrevocable offer by the seller until expiration of the time limited which ripens into a binding contract of sale only upon the optionee's acceptance of the offer within the time stipulated. Whether there has been such an acceptance as to create a binding contract is determined by rules governing acceptance of any other offer.
The rule governing acceptance of an offer under circumstances sufficient to create a binding contract was said by the Supreme Court in Strong & Trowbridge Co. v. H. Baars & Co. to be:
"In order to create a contract, it is essential that there should be a reciprocal assent to a certain and definite proposition. So long as any essential matters are left open for further consideration, the contract is not complete, and the minds of the parties must assent to the same thing in the same sense. . . ."
The Supreme Court of Indiana elucidated the foregoing rule when it held that if a controversy resolves itself into a situation where one of the parties meant and intended one thing and the other meant and intended another, it is manifest that the first element of a contract, the mutual meeting of the minds of the parties, is lacking and there is no contract.
Williston, in his work on contracts, proclaims the general rule to be that where a phrase of a contract is reasonably capable of different interpretations, and is in fact differently understood, there is no contract.
Our review of the record reveals competent and substantial evidence sufficient to support the finding of fact by the trial court. We cannot agree with appellant that, in the conclusions reached, the court applied to the facts found by it incorrect principles of law.
In addition to the foregoing, Harvey contends that under no circumstances can he be held liable to David for the latter's loss of prospective profit in this transaction. He takes this position for the reason that the separate contract they signed with each other at the time of the assignment of the option contract to Harvey provided:
"Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained herein, if . Buyer (or his nominee) does not purchase the property for any reason whatsoever, Buyer shall have no obligation to Seller hereunder. . . ." (Seller refers to David, and Buyer refers to Harvey.)
Similarly, Benez likewise contends that under no circumstances can it be held liable to David for the damages he seeks. It takes this position for the reason that upon David's assignment of the option agreement to Harvey, there no longer existed any privity of contract between them nor any obligation on its part to protect David in his claim to a prospective profit growing out of his contract with Harvey.
We are inclined to agree that the foregoing defenses interposed by appellees Harvey and Benez are well taken and constitute additional reasons why David is not entitled to a recovery against either of ap-pellees on the breach of contract theory. If he has a cause of action against them, a question on which we express no opinion, it would necessarily be in tort for interference with contract relations existing between him and Harvey, but not upon the contract itself.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed herein is affirmed.
JOHNSON, J., specially concurs.
SPECTOR, J., dissents.
. 7 Fla.Jur. 229, Contracts, § 164; Bryan and Sons Corp. v. Klefstad, (Fla.App.1970) 237 So.2d 236, 238.
. 55 Am.Jur. 506, Vendor & Purchaser, § 38; Ratner v. Coral Television Corporation, (Fla.App.1962) 139 So.2d 437.
. Strong & Trowbridge Co. v. H. Baars & Co., 60 Fla. 253, 54 So. 92, 93; See also Webster Lumber Co. v. Lincoln, 94 Fla. 1097, 115 So. 498.
. Winnemucca Water & Light Co. v. Model Gas Engine Works (1913), 179 Ind. 542, 101 N.E. 1007.
. 1 Williston on Contracts 344, § 95 (3rd Edition).