Case Name: The STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Enrique SOBRINO, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1991-06-11
Citations: 587 So. 2d 1347
Docket Number: No. 89-2540
Parties: The STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Enrique SOBRINO, Appellee.
Judges: Before BARKDULL, COPE and GERSTEN, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 587
Pages: 1347–1355

Head Matter:
The STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Enrique SOBRINO, Appellee.
No. 89-2540.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
June 11, 1991.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Angelica D. Zayas, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant.
Carl H. Lida, Miami, for appellee.
Before BARKDULL, COPE and GERSTEN, JJ.

Opinion:
GERSTEN, Judge.
Appellant, the State of Florida, appeals the suppression of evidence seized from appellee, Enrique Sobrino, after he was stopped by a police officer outside the officer's territorial jurisdiction. We affirm.
A City of Medley police officer observed appellee driving out of the parking lot of a business area, where an audible burglar alarm was ringing. The business area was located across a canal, in the City of Hialeah Gardens. The officer followed appel-lee into Hialeah Gardens where he eventually stopped him. Hialeah Gardens is outside of the officer's territorial jurisdiction.
When the officer stopped appellee, the officer had no knowledge that appellee had committed a crime. While the officer detained appellee, other officers from Hialeah Gardens discovered that a burglary had been committed in that business area.
Upon stopping appellee, the officer discovered vise grips and a set of alarm keys on the front seat of appellee's car. The trial court suppressed this evidence based on the authority of Phoenix v. State, 455 So.2d 1024 (Fla.1984).
Phoenix v. State, involved an arrest made by police officers outside their juris diction. In Phoenix, the Florida Supreme Court held that an extrajurisdictional arrest could be validated as a "citizen's arrest." The court reasoned that "law enforcement officials, when they are outside their jurisdictions, should not be any less capable ., nor should they have any greater power . than private citizens." Phoenix v. State, 455 So.2d at 1025. The standard to be applied to an extrajurisdic-tional police arrest is the same as a "citizen's arrest":
A private citizen [has a] . right to arrest a person who commits a felony in his presence, or to arrest a person where a felony has been committed and where the arresting citizen has probable cause to believe, and does believe the person arrested to be guilty. [Emphasis added.]
Phoenix v. State, 455 So.2d at 1025; see also U.S. v. Ible, 630 F.2d 389 (5th Cir.1980).
Thus, the two prong test set out in Phoenix clearly mandates both: (1) probable cause; and, (2) the belief that the person arrested is guilty of a felony. Here it is possible that the officer may have had probable cause, but the record fails to reveal compliance with the second prong, the belief that the person is guilty of a felony.
In this case, it is uncontroverted that the officer did not intend to arrest appellee. Further, the officer did not know that a felony had been committed. Finally, the officer did not believe that appellee had committed a felony. The officer testified that he had stopped appellee "for investigative purposes." The officer also testified that he did not stop appellee to place him under arrest.
The dissent's reliance on McAnnis v. State, 386 So.2d 1230 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) is misplaced. In that case, a Broward County police officer completed the purchase of drugs in a home in Dade County, while Dade County police officers waited outside. The Broward County officer pulled his weapon to detain the drug dealer and prevent him from escaping. Ultimately, the Dade County officers entered the home and arrested the drug dealer. Clearly, the Bro-ward County officer in McAnnis had probable cause and believed that a person committed a felony. Thus, the detention in McAnnis constituted a proper citizen's arrest.
Succinctly, a police officer has no power to effect a "stop" outside of his territorial jurisdiction unless there exists exigent circumstances, or the officer is on fresh pursuit. See § 901.25, Fla.Stat. (1989); see, e.g., Hansen v. State, 385 So.2d 1081 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied, 392 So.2d 1379 (Fla.1980).
The powers wielded by police officers are vast, and subject to abuse. Accordingly, such power has been restricted by strict construction, limited exceptions, and harsh remedies for violations of police powers.
Because abuses of police powers diminish our individual and collective civil rights, the penalty for any violation is one of the most serious . suppression. See Steagald v. U.S., 451 U.S. 204, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981). To find otherwise, would result in an unjustified unbridled expansion of police "stop" powers:
Our rejection of [the State's] claim is not due to a lack of appreciation of the difficulty and importance of effective law enforcement, but rather to our firm commitment to "the view of those who wrote the Bill of Rights.... "
Illinois v. Rodriguez, — U.S. —, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990) (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978)). Unlike the dissent, we find no need to add a citizen's investigative stop to the lexicon of the Fourth Amendment.
Accordingly, the trial court correctly followed the law and properly suppressed the evidence.
Affirmed.
BARKDULL, J., concurs.