Case Name: D. L. Wardlaw and another, Administrators, vs. Michael Buzzard; Same vs. John P. Buzzard
Court: South Carolina Court of Errors
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1867-12
Citations: 15 Rich. 158
Docket Number: 
Parties: D. L. Wardlaw and another, Administrators, vs. Michael Buzzard. Same vs. John P. Buzzard.
Judges: DunkiN, C. J., Glover, J., Muxbo, J., Carroll, 0., iNGLis, A. J., and Moses, J., concurred.
Reporter: South Carolina Law Reports
Volume: 49
Pages: 158–163

Head Matter:
D. L. Wardlaw and another, Administrators, vs. Michael Buzzard. Same vs. John P. Buzzard.
Constitutional Law — Limitations, Statitte of.
An Act of tlie Legislature suspending the statute of limitations in actions upon contracts then existing, does not impair the obligation of contracts, and is constitutional.
The fifth section of the Act of 1801, commonly called the Stay Law, applied to actions on contracts then existing, and suspended the statute of limitations in actions on such contracts; the suspension, by successive renewals of the Act, having lasted until December, 1866.
BEFORE DAWKINS, J., AT NEWBERRY, SPRING TERM, 1867.
The report of bis Honor, the presiding Judge, is as follows:
“These suits were brought upon two joint and several promissory notes, dated 3d October, 1859. One of the notes is drawn payable twelve months after date, and has a credit endorsed thereon for seven hundred dollars, dated the 6th February, 1861.
“The other note is drawn payable the 3d October, 1861, without any credit. The defendants pleaded the statute of limitations. The plaintiffs replied the Act of the General Assembly, entitled “An Act to extend relief to debtors, and to prevent the sacrifice of property at Sheriff’s sales,” ratified the 21st December, 1861. To this replication the defendants demurred. The demurrers fin both cases were overruled, and verdicts were found for the plaintiffs.”
The defendants appealed and moved the Court, of Appeals to reverse the judgment below, and for a new trial, on the grounds :
1. Because bis Honor, the presiding Judge, erred in holding that the Act of the General Assembly entitled “An Act to extend relief to debtors, and to prevent the sacrifice of property at Sheriff’s sales,” was sufficient to avoid the plea of the statute of limitations filed by the defendants.
2. Because the fifth section of said Act suspends the statute of limitations only so long as the Act, prohibiting the service of mesne and final process, should be of force ; and said Act was never of force as to these cases, the promissory notes sued on having been made, and plaintiffs’ right of action thereon having accrued, before the passage of said Act.
The case was ordered to this Court, where it was now heard.
Garlington & Súber, for the motion.
Baxter, contra.

Opinion:
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Dawkins, J.
The actions in the above cases were brought on two promissory notes given before the passage of the Act of the Legislature of December, 1861, known as the Stay Law, and the only question for the consideration of the Court arises under the fifth section of that Act, ami the Acts subsequent thereto continuing in force the s»H until December, 1866. /
If that section suspended the operation of the stat^^HJ limitations, or in effect extended the time the were entitled to recover, the (Circuit decision sustained. If it did not have tbe effect to do either, the decision was erroneous and should be reversed, more than four years having elapsed between the times when the causes of action arose, and the commencement of the suits thereon.
Two cases have been before 'this Court in which the constitutionality of the first section of the Act has been considered. In the first case, the State vs. Carew, (13 Rich. 498,) it was held that the provisions of the Act which interdicted the service of process on causes of action which arose previous to its passage, were unconstitutional and void. The second was the case of Barry vs. Iseman and others, (14 Rich. 129,) in which it was held that the same Act was constitutional and binding, so far as it related to future contracts made and to be executed within the State.
It has been held in many cases that the remedy for the enforcement of a contract may be changed or modified without impairing its obligation, and it is no where better stated than in the celebrated case of Sturges vs. Crowninshield, (4 Wheat. 200 and 207,) (which has been so often quoted of late that it is almost threadbare,) where it says, " without impairing the obligation of a contract the remedy may be modified as the wisdom of the nation may direct, and statutes of limitations relate to remedies furnished in the Courts." (Angel on Lim. 18.) If the question presented here was whether the first section of the Act of 1861, which forbids the service of process on causes of action arising previous, was constitutional, this Court would recognize the authority of the case of the State vs. Carew.
Tí was not contended seriously that if one part of an Act ft| unconstitutional it vitiated the whole, or that the same Hkii might not be unteonstitutional as affecting any class HR^s, and constitutional as to others, nor was it denied that H^B|islature might extend the statute of limitations be-B||U& was complete (without impairing the obligation of the contract. In fact its extension gives additional vitality to tbe contract and furnishes no ground of complaint to debtor or creditor. The debtor if he wishes to pay can do so, and if the creditor desires to sue, there is nothing in its extension to prevent him. The argument mainly relied on was that the first section of the Act did not embrace causes of action which arose previous to December, 1861; and if in terms it did so, it was unconstitutional and void, and there was no impediment to the plaintiffs' suing at any time, therefore they are not entitled to the benefit of the fifth section.
The fifth section is in these words: "That the operation of the statute of limitations be and the same is hereby suspended during the period in which this Act is of force, so far as applicable to causes coming within the meaning of this Act."
As before remarked, the Legislature had the constitutional right to extend or suspend its operation, which is practically the same, and the question is, have they done so? What were the causes coming within the meaning of the Act ?
The first section forbids the service of any process for the' collection of money until after the expiration of the first session of the next General Assembly. There is no distinction made as to the time when the causes of action arose, and they unquestionably " meant " and intended to embrace all money demands. If not intended to apply to causes of action then existing, the fifth section was unnecessary, and we cannot suppose the Legislature would be guilty of the folly of passing an Act suspending the operation of the statute of limitations, if intended to apply only, to causes arising thereafter, when the Act itself was limitad, in its duration to one year. /
It would be more reasonable to conclude that by/the fifth section the Legislature " meant " to apply i/ ex clusively to causes of action then existing, and when they said to the creditor, you must stay your band in the collection of your debt, they gave him the assurance that he should not be prejudiced by the delay. It is said, however, that this Act was never " of force " so far as the cases under consideration are concerned. The language is " suspended during the period in which this Act is of force." This Act and the successive Acts similar have been of force until December, 1866, and if the meaning was to embrace all money demands, there is no reason why the plaintiffs should not have the benefit of the suspension of the statute. If the Legislature had said that the statute of limitations shall be suspended on all money demands until the adjournment of the first session of the next Legislature, there can be no doubt but that they had the right and power to do so; and upon a fair construction of the Act that is precisely what they intended to do and did. It is the business of the Court to give effect to the intention of the Legislature when it can be ascertained, and not to lend too ready an ear to hinder or subvert it. It may well be questioned if the first section of the Act of 1861 should not be regarded as valid and of force, as to all the actions ex con-tractu, until it was declared unconstitutional in part, by the Court of Errors. It is, however, unnecessary to conclude anything on that point, as the decision rests on the views already stated.
The statute stood unimpeached for four years without any attempt to test its constitutionality, until the case of the State vs. Carew; during which period there was an acquiescence on the part of creditors, and there would be a manifest injustice in punishing with a forfeiture of a right, traose who rendered an uncomplaining obedience to the expressed will of the Legislature.
T^ie Court is unanimously of opinion that the demurrers wereVroperly overruled in both cases, and the motions to reverse the decision of tlie Circuit Court are refused, and tlie appeals dismissed.
DunkiN, C. J., Glover, J., Muxbo, J., Carroll, 0., iNGLis, A. J., and Moses, J., concurred.
Wardlaw, A. J., being a party, did not sit.
Apyieais dismissed.