Case Name: William Todd LARIMORE, Petitioner, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2004-12-10
Citations: 910 So. 2d 847
Docket Number: No. 1D03-2739
Parties: William Todd LARIMORE, Petitioner, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.
Judges: ALLEN, PADOVANO, JJ., concur; HAWKES, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with opinion.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 910
Pages: 847–851

Head Matter:
William Todd LARIMORE, Petitioner, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent.
No. 1D03-2739.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Dec. 10, 2004.
William Todd Larimore, petitioner, pro se.
Louis A. Vargas, General Counsel, and Carolyn J. Mosley, Assistant General Counsel, Department of Corrections, Tallahassee, for respondent.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
William Larimore petitions for certiorari review of the circuit court's order denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus. In that petition, Larimore argued that the Department of Corrections ("DOC") acted without statutory authority when it forfeited previously awarded gain-time following revocation of the probationary portion of his original split sentence, and that absent that unauthorized forfeiture he was entitled to immediate release. Finding that the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of law by failing to apply a controlling decision of this court, we grant the petition, remand to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion, and certify a question of great public importance.
Larimore pled in two separate cases to two offenses of lewd, lascivious or indecent acts on a child under the age of 16 years. Each of these offenses are second degree felonies punishable by up to 15 years in prison. The first offense was committed in 1987, and the second offense was committed in 1990. There was a different victim in each case. The trial court, pursuant to a plea agreement and using a single sentencing guidelines scoresheet, initially sentenced Larimore to a 15-year term of incarceration for the 1987 offense, followed by a five-year term of probation for the 1990 offense.
Through accumulation of actual time served (2,645 days, or just under 7.25 years) and gain-time (2,830 days, or just over 7.75 years), Larimore was released from prison to begin serving the probationary portion of his sentence. He violated the terms of his probation and, consequently, his probation was revoked. In accordance with Tripp v. State, 622 So.2d 941 (Fla.1993), Larimore thereafter succeeded in securing an award of credit for time served on the initial term of incarceration imposed for the 1987 offense against the five year sentence imposed upon revocation of probation with respect to the 1990 offense. See Larimore v. State, 823 So.2d 287 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). Once that credit was applied, however, DOC forfeited all gain-time earned by Larimore during the incarcerative portion of his initial sentence, relying on section 944.28(1), Florida Statutes, and Eldridge v. Moore, 760 So.2d 888 (Fla.2000).
We conclude that since one of Lari-more's crimes occurred prior to the effective date of the 1989 amendment to section 944.28 authorizing the forfeiture of gain-time upon revocation of probation, our decision in Tranquille v. State, 828 So.2d 1034 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002), rev. denied, 845 So.2d 889 (Fla.2003), bars DOC from applying that amendment in calculating Lari-more's Tripp credit. However, because this results in Larimore necessarily receiving 15 years of credit towards his five-year sentence, which effectively precludes the trial court from imposing any sanction upon a violation of probation, we certify the following question as one of great public importance:
WHERE A DEFENDANT SERVING A PROBATIONARY SPLIT SENTENCE AS DEFINED IN TRIPP, IS INCARCERATED FOR A CRIME COMMITTED PRIOR TO OCTOBER 1, 1989, AND PLACED ON PROBATION FOR A CRIME COMMITTED AFTER OCTOBER 1, 1989, IS THE DEFENDANT EXEMPT FROM THE FORFEITURE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 944.28(1), FLORIDA STATUTES (1989), IN CALCULATING THE TRIPP CREDIT UPON THE REVOCATION OF PROBATION?
On the basis of the foregoing, we quash the circuit court's order and remand with directions to order Larimore's immediate release from custody.
PETITION GRANTED, ORDER QUASHED, and REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.
ALLEN, PADOVANO, JJ., concur; HAWKES, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with opinion.
. The forfeiture was permissive since both offenses occurred prior to 1994 when the legislature mandated the forfeiture of gain-time.
. The trial court, under any scenario, could only sentence Larimore up to the statutory maximum of 15 years for the second degree felony that was the underlying offense of the probation. Therefore, no matter what sentence was imposed, Larimore would have sufficient credit to satisfy.