Case Name: In re PECK
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1909-02-16
Citations: 168 F. 48
Docket Number: No. 157
Parties: In re PECK.
Judges: Before EACOMBE, COXE, and WARD, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: Federal Reporter
Volume: 168
Pages: 48–49

Head Matter:
In re PECK.
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
February 16, 1909.)
No. 157.
Bankruptcy (§ 328 ) — Time fob Provino Claims — Power to Extend.
Under Bankr. Act July 1,- 1898, c. 541, § 57n, 30 Stat. 561 (U. S. Comp. St 1901, p. 3444), which expressly provides that “claims shall not be proved against a bankrupt estate subsequent to one year after the adjudication” unless they are liquidated by litigation, the court has no power to extend the time merely because creditors were misled as to the value of assets by statements in the schedules and neglected to prove their claims.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. § 518; Dec. Dig. § 328. ]
Petition to Review Order of the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of New York.
This cause comes here upon petition to revise an order of the District Court, Northern District of New York, denying an application by certain creditors of the bankrupt to be allowed to come in and file and prove their claims after the expiration of one year from adjudication. The opinion of the District Court is reported in 161 Eed. 762.
Edgar E. Brown, for bankrupt.
H. M. Mott, for petitioners.
Before EACOMBE, COXE, and WARD, Circuit Judges.
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
PER CURIAM,
We think the language of section 57n, Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 561 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3444), is conclusive of this appeal. It reads:
"Claims shall not be proved against a bankrupt estate subsequent to one year after the adjudication or if they are liquidated by litigation and the final judgment therein is rendered within thirty days before or after the expiration of such lime, then within sixty days after the rendition of such judgment."
The latter clause of this paragraph is somewhat ambiguous, and has been construed in cases which are relied upon by the petitioner. Such are In re Noel, 150 Fed. 89, 80 C. C. A. 43; In re Baird (D. C.) 154 Fed. 215; Keppel v. Tiffin Savings Bank, 197 U. S. 356, 25 Sup. Ct. 443, 49 L. Ed. 790. But the first clause of paragraph is unobscure and specific; it prescribes a period of limitations, and there is nothing in the act which relieves any creditor from its operation, except in the case where claims are being liquidated by litigation. Whether or not there may be exceptional cases which would not fall within the statute is a question on which we now express no opinion; but to hold that this clear and imperative provision is to be disregarded whenever a creditor may assert that he was misled because the bankrupt's schedules stated that some particular asset was of little or no value seems to us to be legislation, not construction.
The order of the District Court is affirmed.