Case Name: In re State of Minnesota, Petitioner, STATE of Minnesota, Appellant, v. Myon DeMarlo BURRELL, Respondent
Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Minnesota
Decision Date: 2008-01-03
Citations: 743 N.W.2d 596
Docket Number: No. A07-727
Parties: In re State of Minnesota, Petitioner, STATE of Minnesota, Appellant, v. Myon DeMarlo BURRELL, Respondent.
Judges: GILDEA, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Reporter: North Western Reporter 2d
Volume: 743
Pages: 596–606

Head Matter:
In re State of Minnesota, Petitioner, STATE of Minnesota, Appellant, v. Myon DeMarlo BURRELL, Respondent.
No. A07-727.
Supreme Court of Minnesota.
Jan. 3, 2008.
Michael 0. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, J. Michael Richardson, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis MN, Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, MN, for Appellant/Petitioner.
Tracy R. Eichhorn-Hicks, Minneapolis MN, for Respondent.

Opinion:
OPINION
ANDERSON, Russell A., Chief Justice.
Appellant State of Minnesota (the "State") petitioned the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus ordering the removal of the judge assigned to the retrial of respondent Myon DeMarlo Burrell ("Bur-rell"). The court of appeals denied the writ, and we granted review as to whether the judge should be removed for cause. We affirm.
In 2003, Burrell was convicted and sentenced in Hennepin County District Court for the first-degree murder of Tyesha Edwards for the benefit of a gang and the attempted first-degree murder of Timothy Oliver for the benefit of a gang. On appeal, we reversed and remanded for a new trial based on concerns about Miranda violations, vouching testimony, and the adequacy of discovery. State v. Burrell, 697 N.W.2d 579, 605 (Minn.2005). We also addressed the propriety of admitting expert testimony from a Minnesota Gang Strike Force officer. Id. at 601-02. We directed the district court on remand to admit expert gang testimony only if necessary and helpful and to "weigh our directives in DeShay and Lopez-Rios carefully as it exercises discretion over what expert gang testimony is admitted." Id.
A judge new to the case was assigned to the retrial. At a pretrial hearing, the State presented the testimony of a Minneapolis Police Department Gang Strike Force investigator. Also, at a Frye-Mack hearing, the State presented the testimony of two academic researchers on gangs who essentially challenged the underlying rationale of DeShay and Lopez-Rios. In an effort to comply with our directives, the judge made a series of rulings adverse to the State, including that "there is to be no [expert gang] testimony based on hearsay." See State v. Roman Nose, 667 N.W.2d 386, 394 (Minn.2003) ("On remand, it is the duty of the district court to execute the mandate of this court strictly according to its terms.").
The State argued that the judge's rulings precluded proof of certain elements of the for-benefit-of-a-gang offense. Acknowledging that under the circumstances it might be difficult to prove that the underlying crime was committed for the benefit of a gang, the judge referred to our mandate and declined to change his ruling. Nevertheless, he attempted to resolve his and the parties' confusion about expert gang testimony by certifying four questions to the court of appeals. The court of appeals dismissed the certifications. State v. Burrell, No. A06-149, 2006 WL 2807166, at *5 (Minn.App. Oct.3, 2006), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 20, 2006).
On January 16, 2007, the judge held a pretrial conference in chambers. At this conference, Assistant County Attorney Michael Furnstahl, who had taken over the prosecution, made his first appearance on the case. What exactly transpired at the conference is disputed. There is no transcript. According to Furnstahl's affidavit, the judge twice said that the State could not prove "the case" and should dismiss it. Burrell's attorney, on the other hand, avers that the judge never commented on the merits of the case. He explains that the judge •
mentioned that if the State was going to make a test case for the issue of [expert gang] testimony that perhaps this wasn't the case in which to do it. If [the judge] mentioned dismissal it was only in this context as the discussion centered around the recent refusal by the Supreme Court to hear the certified questions.
He indicates that the discussion referred to the previous prosecutors' comments, to which Furnstahl was not privy.
The parties and the judge discussed the January 16 conference on the record at Burrell's jury trial waiver hearing, which took place on March 26, 2007. At the hearing, the State objected to the waiver or, alternatively, to the judge's remaining on the case. The State argued that the judge should remove himself because he had drawn conclusions about the merits of the State's case and because his knowledge of disputed facts made it improper for him to preside at a bench trial. The State referred to the judge's alleged comments at the January 16 conference that the case should be dismissed. The judge denied having gone so far but noted that the State should consider the risks associated with pursuing the for-benefit-of-a-gang offense in light of the evidentiary hurdles. During the hearing, the judge said, "I represent to you unqualifiedly that I will listen to your case, hold you to your standard of proof, and that I have not prejudged the guilt or innocence of Mr. Burrell." He accepted the waiver and denied the request for removal.
The State next filed a motion with the chief district judge to remove the trial judge for cause. The chief judge denied the motion, finding no evidence that the trial judge said the case should be dismissed. Instead, she determined the judge "was simply alluding to the same problems that the previous prosecutor complained about." She noted that the judge "has stated absolutely and unequivocally that he has not prejudged the guilt or innocence of Mr. Burrell" and that he "will try this case fairly and impartially."
Three days later, the State filed with the court of appeals a petition for writ of Mandamus directing removal. The court of appeals denied the writ, deferring to the chief judge. The court noted that "the assigned judge has stated unequivocally that he '[has] not prejudged the guilt or innocence of [Burrell].' " The State petitioned this court for review, which we granted as to the issue of removal.
I.
The State seeks a writ of mandamus ordering removal of the trial judge for cause. See Minn.Stat. § 586.01 (2006). We have held, however, that "[t]he proper remedy to pursue when a motion to remove has been denied is a writ of prohibition." State v. Cermak, 350 N.W.2d 328, 331 (Minn.1984). Although we have not specifically defined the relationship between mandamus and prohibition, we need not construe the State's petition as for one or the other. "The question is not the form of relief but rather the validity of the basis upon which it was awarded." McClelland v. Pierce, 376 N.W.2d 217, 219 (Minn.1985). Accordingly, we review the underlying issue of whether the State has shown cause for removal. See State v. Dorsey, 701 N.W.2d 238, 246 (Minn.2005) ("Whether a judge has violated the Code of Judicial Conduct is a question of law, which we review de novo."); State v. Cheng, 623 N.W.2d 252, 256, 257 (Minn.2001) (indicating that "[w]e review the issuance of a writ of prohibition by reviewing the underlying issue" and noting that we have "inherent authority to ensure the effective functioning of the judiciary").
"A motion to remove a judge for cause is procedural and is therefore governed by the rules of criminal procedure." Hooper v. State, 680 N.W.2d 89, 93 (Minn.2004). Under the rules, "[n]o judge shall preside over a trial or other proceeding if that judge is disqualified under the Code of Judicial Conduct." Minn. R.Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 13(3). However, "[n]o notice to remove shall be effective against a judge who has already presided 'at the trial, Omnibus Hearing, or other evidentia-ry hearing , except upon an affirmative showing of cause." Id., subd. 13(4).
The Code requires a judge to "Perform the Duties of the Office Impartially and Diligently." Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3.
A judge shall disqualify himself in a proceeding in which [his] impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where: (a) [he] has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party's lawyer, or personal knowledge of disputed evi-dentiary facts concerning the proceeding.
Id., Canon 3D(1). " 'Impartiality' or 'impartial' denotes absence of bias or prejudice in favor of, or against, particular parties or classes of parties, as well as maintaining an open mind in considering issues that may come before the judge." Id., Canon 3F. "The grounds for disqualification in Canon 3D(1) are stated broadly, leaving considerable room for interpretation in their application, to any given set of circumstances. Canon 3D(1) does not provide a precise formula that can automatically be applied." Greer v. State, 673 N.W.2d 151, 156 (Minn.2004) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus the canon requires a case-by-case analysis of particular circumstances.
In determining whether a judge should be disqualified under Canon 3D(1), the question is whether an objective examination of the facts and circumstances would cause a reasonable examiner to question the judge's impartiality. See Dorsey, 701 N.W.2d at 248; Powell v. Anderson, 660 N.W.2d 107, 116 (Minn.2003). The mere fact that a party declares a judge partial does not in itself generate a reasonable question as to the judge's impartiality.
Judges, of course, should be sensitive to the "appearance of impropriety" and should take measures to assure that litigants have no cause to think their case is not being fairly judged. Nevertheless, a judge who feels able to preside fairly over the proceedings should not be required to step down upon allegations of a party which themselves may be unfair or which simply indicate dissatisfaction with the possible outcome of the litigation.
McClelland v. McClelland, 359 N.W.2d 7, 11 (Minn.1984). Likewise, the fact that a judge avows he is impartial does not in itself put his impartiality beyond reasonable question.
In this case, the State argues that the trial judge's statements at the January 16 conference create a reasonable question as to his impartiality. Relying on Furns-tahl's affidavit, the State asserts that the judge twice said the State had insufficient evidence for "the case" to "go to the jury."
The State's characterization of the judge's comments improperly conflates the for-benefit-of-a-gang claims with the underlying murder charges. The for-benefit-of-a-gang statute operates to enhance the penalty for the underlying crime. See Minn.Stat. § 609.229, subds. 3-4 (2006). Inability to prove with admissible evidence that the underlying crimes were committed for the benefit of a gang, however, would not preclude prosecution of the murder and the attempt. See State v. Jackson, 714 N.W.2d 681, 699 (Minn.2006) (Hanson, J., concurring). Pretrial, the parties extensively litigated the scope of permissible expert gang testimony. The resulting evidentiary rulings caused the former prosecutors to claim that they could not prove the for-benefit-of-a-gang claim. This concern induced the judge to certify the questions on expert gang testimony. The court of appeals declined to answer them on October 3, 2006, and we denied review on December 20. On January 16, the parties met in chambers to set a trial date. Given this timeline, it is evident that comments about dismissal on January 16 pertained to the gang crimes. As the judge explained at the March 26 hearing, the January 16 discussion was based on concern over having "this be the test-case on the gang issue." Other than Furnstahl's remarks at the March 26 hearing and his subsequent affidavit, nothing in the record suggests that the judge expressed an opinion about the State's ability to prove the underlying crimes. The judge's comments constituted a valid observation based on the history of the case and the State's own comments, not prejudgment on the merits of the underlying charges. Our objective examination of the facts and circumstances satisfies us that the judge's January 16 comments created no reasonable question as to his impartiality.
II.
The State also appears to argue that the judge's knowledge of disputed facts acquired during pretrial proceedings should disqualify him from presiding at a bench trial. The United States Supreme Court has held that
opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994). We have noted that "it is presumed that judges will set aside collateral knowledge and approach cases with 'a neutral and objective disposition.' " Dorsey, 701 N.W.2d at 248-49 (citing Liteky, 510 U.S. at 562, 114 S.Ct. 1147). To defeat this presumption, the State would have to adduce evidence of favoritism or antagonism. The State has failed to do so. Therefore, we conclude that the judge's knowledge of disputed facts does not merit disqualification.
We hold that the State did not meet its burden to make an affirmative showing of cause for the trial judge's removal and that the court of appeals properly denied the extraordinary writ.
Affirmed.
GILDEA, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
. Burrell was sentenced to life for the murder and 15 years for the attempt. He received an additional 12 months for the murder and 6 months for the attempt pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 609.229 (2006), which provides enhanced penalties for crimes committed for the benefit of a gang. See Minn.Stat. § 609.229, subds. 3-4.
. DeShay and Lopez-Rios provide guidelines for assessing the admissibility of expert gang testimony. In DeShay, we stated, "That criminal gang involvement is an element of the crime does not open the door to unlimited expert testimony." State v. DeShay, 669 N.W.2d 878, 886 (Minn.2003).
[Ejxpert testimony must assist the jury to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. The district court should scrutinize proffered gang expert testimony, preferably outside the presence of the jury, and exclude it where irrelevant, confusing, or otherwise unhelpful. Such testimony must add precision or depth to the jury's ability to reach conclusions about matters that are not within its experience. Moreover, this testimony must be carefully monitored by the court so that the testimony will not unduly influence the jury or dissuade it from exercising its independent judgment. [Ejxpert testimony should be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
Id. at 887-88 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Lopez-Rios, 669 N.W.2d 603, 612 (Minn.2003).
. The judge certified the following questions:
(1) Do the Minnesota Supreme Court's decisions in [DeShay and Lopez-Rios ] prohibit expert opinion testimony regarding Rolling 30s Bloods gang culture and history, if the opinion is based on hearsay?
(2)(a) Do DeShay and Lopez-Rios prohibit expert opinion testimony that the Rolling 30s Bloods constitute a criminal gang under Minn.Stat. § 609.229, if the opinion is based on hearsay?
(2)(b) If the answer to (2)(a) is yes, and there is no evidentiary stipulation or adequate first-hand knowledge testimony, should the "criminal gang" element be proved through "Spreigl-type evidence," where evidence of individual gang members' offense histories is presented?
(3) If the trial court finds that the prosecution's first-hand knowledge testimony regarding the defendant's gang membership is insufficient to meet its burden of proof under Minn.Stat. § 609.229, can an expert opine that the defendant is a member of the Rolling 30s Bloods based upon the gang Strike Force identification criteria?
(4)Is the phrase "first-hand knowledge," as used in DeShay and Lopez-Rios, the equivalent of personal knowledge on the part of the expert?
State v. Burrell, No. A06-149, 2006 WL 2807166, at *2 (Minn.App. Oct. 3, 2006), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 20, 2006).
. Minnesota Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 110.03 permits the use of a trial-court-approved statement of the proceedings when a transcript is unavailable. The State elected not to avail itself of this option.
.The March 26 transcript contains the following exchange:
MR. FURNSTAHL: But, Judge, you made a statement to me, and here is where I want to be delicate, you made the statement to me that you thought the case should be dismissed.
THE COURT: I thought that there were sufficient concerns about the State's ability to pursue this case given where it now lies and given the impact on everybody that you ought to consider whether it's appropriate to go forward or not. That's all I said. I didn't say you should dismiss it. I said you ought to think about whether you ought to go forward or not. I think you still should think that. But that doesn't mean that if I hear the facts and they are different or one version is more believable than the other, which at this point I don't know because I haven't heard all those versions, that it's a different deal altogether.
MR. FURNSTAHL: With all due respect, I remember you telling me twice you thought the case should be dismissed. Maybe my memory isn't as clear as yours.
THE COURT: Well, I think you maybe — you may have heard something that I didn't in fact say.
MR. FURNSTAHL: Okay. But the fact that you have been privy to disputed factual evidence and the fact that you've made that comment, it causes me a great deal of concern as to—
THE COURT: Well, let me tell you what my concern is here about this case that was the basis for that discussion, and that is whether you should consider whether it's really in the interest of the State to have this be the test case on the gang issue. I don't think that I'm asking you or suggesting to you that you dismiss the case on the merits. I don't know whether you can prove the case or not on the merits, but I think you are running a substantial risk that we get one more go-round of appeals and maybe even one more go-round of reversals. Because if your colleagues were correct when we issued the certified questions, we really don't know what the rule is on gang testimony. And I don't think — and I suggest that you ought to think about at least to that extent whether this is the right case to do that in. And I still think that.
MR. FURNSTAHL: I recall the discussion about the dismissal was in the context of our ability to prove the case because of, for example, Tim Oliver is no longer alive and Dr. Bruggemeyer is no longer alive.
THE COURT: But you know, the Tim Oliver problem is also a gang testimony problem. I mean the problem with the Tim Oliver previous trial transcript testimony is really much more attributable to the for-the benefit-of-a-gang problem .
. "A request to disqualify a judge for cause shall be heard and determined by the chief judge of the judicial district Minn. R.Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 13(3).
. The petition alternatively sought writs of prohibition (1) declaring that the trial judge abused his discretion by approving the jury trial waiver and (2) barring waiver without the State's consent. The court of appeals denied the writs of prohibition, and we denied review.
. Burrell argues that the State is seeking removal of the trial judge not because of genuine concern about impartiality but because it is "shopping" for a judge who would more liberally admit expert gang testimony. In the context of the larger battle over expert gang testimony, it is conceivable that the State is seeking a judge who will rule more favorably as it seeks to challenge DeShay and Lopez-Rios. Even if the State were successful in replacing him, however, the current judge's pretrial rulings would stand unless the State could demonstrate "extraordinary circumstances." See Minn. R.Crim. P. 11 cmt. ("[Wjhen the Omnibus Hearing is held before a judge other than the trial judge, the trial judge, except in extraordinary circumstances will adhere to the findings and determinations of the Omnibus Hearing judge."); see also State v. Hamling, 314 N.W.2d 224, 225 (Minn.1982) ("[W]e do not believe that this is an appropriate case for attempting a full-scale examination of the factors which are relevant to a determination of when a trial judge is justified in modifying or changing an omnibus order of another district court judge."). The concurrence mischaracterizes what we have said in this note, but we will not engage in an extended debate over the meaning of our words. It suffices to state that we have not concluded and do not imply that the State's motion to remove was motivated by judge-shopping or that the motion was frivolous. Nor have we concluded, or even suggested, that the current judge's pretrial rulings would be "binding" if a different judge presided at trial.