Case Name: WOOD v. THE STATE
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1943-05-22
Citations: 69 Ga. App. 450
Docket Number: 30073
Parties: WOOD v. THE STATE.
Judges: Gardner, J., concurs.
Reporter: Georgia Appeals Reports
Volume: 69
Pages: 450–453

Head Matter:
30073.
WOOD v. THE STATE.
Decided May 22, 1943.
Rehearing denied May 29, 1943.
IF. (7. Neville, Gohen Anderson, Randall Evans, Jaclc D. Evans, for plaintiff in error. Fred T. Lanier, solicitor-general, contra.

Opinion:
Broyles, C. J.
(After stating the foregoing facts.)
While the offense charged was denominated in the indictment as an "assault," the facts set forth therein show that it was actually an assault and battery, and it is well settled that in such a case the facts and not the denomination determine what particular offense is charged. And it is conceded in the brief of counsel for the accused that the facts set forth in the indictment show "a completed battery." The indictment was not subject to special demurrer because it failed to give the exact name of the gas which the defendant was alleged to have released. Under the facts of the ease, as set out in the indictment, the allegation that the name of the gas was not known to the grand jurors was sufficient. Nor was the indictment subject to the general demurrer. And the lan guage in that part of the indictment which charged an attempt to commit an injury upon Elvin Mitchell was mere surplusage and should be treated as such. In Black's Law Dictionary surplusage in pleading is thus defined: "Allegation of matter wholly foreign and impertinent to the cause. All matter beyond the circumstances necessary to constitute the action." (Italics ours.) Without the allegation as to an attempt, the indictment sets forth the offense of assault and battery, and upon the trial, if the evidence failed to show an assault and battery but showed an attempt to commit such offense, the defendant could be convicted of such attempt. Therefore the allegation of such attempt was entirely unnecessary in the indictment and was mere surplusage. The cases cited in behalf of the defendant which hold that where an indictment sets out an offense as committed in a particular manner the proof must support the allegations thus made, even though the offense be stated with unnecessary particularity, are not applicable to the facts of this case. cJudgment affirmed.
Gardner, J., concurs.