Case Name: BIGGS et al. v. LEE
Court: Texas Courts of Civil Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1912-04-25
Citations: 147 S.W. 709
Docket Number: 
Parties: BIGGS et al. v. LEE.
Judges: McKENZIE, J., disqualified and not sitting.
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 147
Pages: 709–711

Head Matter:
BIGGS et al. v. LEE.
(Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. El Paso.
April 25, 1912.
On Motion for Rehearing, May 15, 1912.)
1. WATERS AND WATER COURSES (§ 47 ) — Rights oe Riparian Owner.
A riparian owner has no right to have any particular amount of water flow on past his land, even as against those who are diverting water to irrigate nonriparian lands; his right being limited to that needed to irrigate his own land.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Waters and Water Courses, Dec. Dig. § 47. ]
2. Waters and Water Courses (§ 87 )— Decree — Sueeiciency.
A decree in a riparian owner’s suit, which enjoined the defendants from taking any water for nonriparian lands except when the river was overflowing its banks at the plaintiff’s land, was too indefinite and uncertain to be enforced.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Waters and Water Courses, Cent. Dig. §§ 77-81, 83, 89, 90; Dec. Dig. § 87. ]
3. Waters and Water Courses (§ 87 )— Parties — Suit by Riparian Owner.
In a riparian owner’s action to enjoin the diversion of water, an intermediate appropriator, whose diversion of water is claimed by the defendants to be the cause of the plaintiff’s loss of the use of the water on his land, if any, is a proper, although not a necessary, party.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Waters and Water Courses, Cent. Dig. §§ 77-81, 83, 89, 90; Dec. Dig. § 87. ]
4. Waters and Water Courses (§ 87 )— Diversion oe Water — Injunction—Admissibility oe Evidence.
In such an action, the defendants had the right to prove that the intermediate appropriator’s diversion of the water was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s loss of the use of the water upon his land, and to prove the amounts of the diversion.
[Ed. Note.- — For other cases, see Waters and Water Courses, Cent. Dig. §§ 77-81, 83, 89, 90; Dec. Dig. § 87. ]
On Motion for Rehearing.
5. Waters and Water Courses (§ 130 )— Ownership — Statutory Appropriations.
The waters of the Pecos river are public property, subject to the easement right of riparian owners to use such water as is reasonably sufficient for domestic and stock raising purposes and for irrigating the riparian lands, and a statutory appropriation of the water in excess of the riparian owners’ needs is effective.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Waters and Water Courses, Cent. Dig. § 145; Dee. Dig. § 130. ]
6. Waters and Water Courses (§ 42 )— Rights oe Riparian Owners.
If the water of a river is sufficient only for the riparian owners using it, it must be equally divided between them.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Waters and Water Courses, Cent. Dig. §§ 33, 34; Dec. Dig. § 42. ]
7. Waters and Water Courses (§ 44 )— Right oe Riparian Owner — Water eor Irrigation.
A riparian owner was entitled to the amount of water reasonably necessary to irrigate his land after making due allowance for that water which at times, by reason of the small flow, was so charged with mineral substance as to be useless for irrigation.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Waters and Water Courses, Cent. Dig. § 36; Dee. Dig. § 44. ]
Appeal from District Court, Ward County; S. J. Isaacs, Judge.
Action by W. H. Lee against S. V. Biggs and others. From a decree for plaintiff, defendants appeal.
Reversed and remanded.
See, also, 137 S. W. 138.
Ross & Hubbard, of Pecos, and Monroe & Roark, of Topeka, Kan., for appellants. J. E. Starley, of Barstow, and Hefner & Hudson and McKenzie & Brady, all of Pecos, for ap-pellee.
For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER, in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
PETICOLAS, C. J.
This was a suit by W. I-I. Lee, who owned 320 acres of land riparian to the Pecos river in Ward county, against the appellants to enjoin a diversion of water from the river through an irrigation system owned by appellants. It resulted in a decree absolutely enjoining the appellants from taking any water to nonriparian lands under their system, except when the river is in flood and overflowing its hank at appel-lee's land, which is 25 to 30 miles below by the river, and at which point the banks are 14 to 15 feet high. The answer of the appellants, on which the trial was had, alleged that there was located on the Pecos river, between the appellants' dam and ap-pellee's land, a public service irrigation system known as the "Barstow System," which diverts more water than does appellants' system, and that because thereof the amount of the flow of the stream at any time taken by appellants does not interfere with or appreciably affect the natural flow past appel-lee's land.
There are 19 assignments of error, which present in varying forms a number of difficult questions, (a) The question is presented whether the appellee, the owner of riparian land, could enjoin the appellants from diverting the water to nonriparian lands unless in good faith he intended and needed to use the water on his riparian land and appellants' use was preventing him from so doing; (b) whether or not- the Barstow Irrigation Company, the intermediate appropriator, is a necessary or proper party; (c) whether or not there could be an estoppel as against the right of the riparian owner; (d) whether or not the court erred in not making his findings of fact complete to cover all the questions raised in the case; and (e) that the judgment herein is so indefinite and uncertain that it is impracticable and impossible to observe it or enforce it. These 19 assignments of error have been compared by us with the original assignments in the transcript. The only one which is a copy is the seventeenth assignment of error, and for that reason we shall decline to consider any assignment except the seventeenth.
Tile seventeenth assignment of error is addressed to the form of the court's judgment, and should, we think, be sustained. It is apparent that, conceding that the riparian owner is first entitled to the use, the only right he has is to use sufficient water to irrigate his land. As to any excess water which there may be, he has no rights of any sort against appellants. It is apparent therefore that the court's judgment, which, in effect, declares that the riparian owner has the right, without disturbance, to have flow past his land a volume of water 10 or 15 feet deep, must necessarily be erroneous.
It is equally true that the court's decree should be certain and definite. Having established the normal flow of the Pecos river, and having established the amount of water reasonably necessary for the riparian lands, in the event it should be found that the riparian owner, under the circumstances here present, has the preference right (as to which we express no opinion), the decree should then adjudicate that lie have from said flow water reasonably sufficient to irrigate his land. In so far as the excess water is concerned, he has no right of action against an upper statutory appropriator, and thus far the judgment is fundamentally erroneous. See Biggs v. Miller, 147 S. W. 632, just decided by this court.
Although, for the reason stated, we have declined to consider any other assignment of error, for the guidance of the court below, we think it not improper to state that we are of the opinion that while the intermediate appropriator, the Barstow Company, was not a necessary party in the sense that it was an indispensable party, yet clearly the appellant had the right, if it desired, to make it a party, and it also had the right to prove, if it could, that their diversion of the water was the proximate cause of plaintiff's loss of the use of water on his land, if any, and to make certain and definite these amounts.
- The question whether plaintiff, as riparian owner, could enjoin an upper statutory appropriator, if he himself were not needing and intending, in good faith, to use the water on his land, is one which we expressly refuse to consider or decide at this time. We suggest further, however, that the court's conclusions of fact and law should cover fully every issue arising in the case.
\ For the reasons indicated, the case is reversed and remanded. "
McKENZIE, J., disqualified and not sitting.