Case Name: Carlos SUAREZ-BURGOS, Mario Suarez-Burgos and Government Employees Insurance Company, Appellants, v. Amy MORHAIM, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1999-10-06
Citations: 745 So. 2d 368
Docket Number: No. 97-4160
Parties: Carlos SUAREZ-BURGOS, Mario Suarez-Burgos and Government Employees Insurance Company, Appellants, v. Amy MORHAIM, Appellee.
Judges: TAYLOR, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 745
Pages: 368–377

Head Matter:
Carlos SUAREZ-BURGOS, Mario Suarez-Burgos and Government Employees Insurance Company, Appellants, v. Amy MORHAIM, Appellee.
No. 97-4160.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Oct. 6, 1999.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 21, 1999.
Angela C. Flowers and Caryn Bellus-Lewis of Kubicki Draper, Miami, for appellants — Carlos Suarez-Burgos and Mario Suarez-Burgos.
Terry L. Watson of the Law Office of Gary E. DeCesare, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant — Government Employees Insurance Company.
Philip M. Burlington of Caruso, Burlington, Bohn & Compiani, P.A., West Palm Beach, and E. Hugh Chappell, Jr. of E. Hugh Chappell, Jr., P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.

Opinion:
WARNER, C.J.
In this appeal appellant claims that the trial court abused its discretion in granting a post-trial motion for mistrial because of the introduction of new opinions of an expert at trial without notice to the opposing party.' We hold that the trial court was within its broad discretion in granting a new trial based upon prejudice and surprise where the opinions of the expert, who had performed an examination of the plaintiff pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.360(a), were not made known to the opposing party until the expert testified at trial.
Plaintiffiappellee sued defendant/appellant for injuries suffered in a rear-end collision which was the fault of the defendant. As plaintiffs major complaint concerned a temporomandibular joint injury ("TMJ"), defendant requested and received a compulsory medical examination, performed by Dr. Robert Mack, a dentist. Dr. Mack's reports were furnished to plaintiff as was required by Rule 1 .360(b).
Plaintiffs attorney took the deposition of Dr. Mack. At his deposition, the doctor agreed that plaintiff exhibited signs of TMJ, the most distinctive being a click in the jaw which was not reported until several months after the accident. Although plaintiffs general physician recorded in her medical records that she had experienced some symptoms often related to TMJ before the accident, including headaches, neck, ear, throat and stomach pain, Dr. Mack agreed that these could also be related to causes other than TMJ, such as a viral infection or job stress. Dr. Mack did not offer an opinion in his report or at the deposition that her TMJ condition was unrelated to the accident.
After plaintiff produced evidence at trial that she suffered a TMJ injury as a result of the accident and that the condition was permanent, the defense called Dr. Mack. Plaintiffs attorney advised the court that he was concerned that Dr. Mack may offer opinions other than those contained within his report and deposition. His specific concern was that Dr. Mack might offer an opinion that the TMJ was unrelated to the accident. His concern was not unfounded, as Dr. Mack testified at trial that in his opinion the plaintiff did not suffer a TMJ injury due to the collision and that he believed her symptoms were preexisting with psychological overlay. Plaintiff cross-examined the doctor and discovered that Dr. Mack had been provided additional medical records of the plaintiff which he read just an hour before his testimony, and that some of his conclusions were based on these newly supplied reports. Plaintiffs attorney objected, moved to strike the doctor's testimony, and moved for a mistrial. The trial court reserved ruling on the motion for mistrial.
After a verdict was returned in favor of the plaintiff, but finding plaintiff suffered no permanent injury as a result of the accident and awarded her only past medical expenses, the plaintiff renewed her motion for mistrial in a post-trial motion. The trial court granted the motion, thus requiring a new trial. The defendants appeal that order.
Reversal of an order granting a motion for new trial or post-verdict mistrial is left to the very broadest discretion of the trial court. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Manasse, 707 So.2d 1110, 1111 (Fla.1998). In Castlewood International Corp. v. La-Fleur, 322 So.2d 520, 522 (Fla.1975), the court explained the standard of review of such decisions:
Since at least 1962, it has been the law of Florida that a trial court's discretion to grant a new trial is "of such firmness that it would not be disturbed except on clear showing of abuse.... " Cloud v. Fallis, 110 So.2d 669, 672 (Fla.1959). A heavy burden rests on appellants who seek to overturn such a ruling, and any abuse of discretion must be patent from the record. See Hendricks v. Dailey, 208 So.2d 101, 103 (Fla.1968); Russo v. Clark, 147 So.2d 1, 3-4 (Fla.1962).
(Emphasis supplied) (footnote omitted). Because we cannot find that the trial court's decision was completely arbitrary and fanciful or that no reasonable judge would agree with it, we are required to affirm.
The case most closely analogous to the instant case is Office Depot, Inc. v. Miller, 584 So.2d 587 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991). That case involved the deposition of an expert who conducted an examination of the plaintiff pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.360(a) and produced a report pursuant to Rule 1.360(b). Our court stated with respect to the rule:
Clearly the purpose of Rule 1.360(b) is to require disclosure of the opinions of expert witnesses so that the other side may take those opinions into account in defending or prosecuting the case. A party can hardly prepare for an opinion that it doesn't know about, much less one that is a complete reversal of the opinion it has been provided.
We agree with the trial court that the spirit and purpose of Rule 1.360(b) requires the disclosure of a substantial reversal of opinion such as occurred here,- if a party intends to offer that changed opinion at trial. Parties who fail to make such disclosure do so at their peril, depending on the circumstances of the particular case. In this case, allowing the presentation of the changed opinion was tantamount to permitting an undisclosed adverse witness to testify as in Binger.
Id. at 590-91 (emphasis in original). Rule 1.360(b) requires the disclosure of all opinions and conclusions reached by the expert which the expert plans to testify to at trial. There is no requirement or need for the opposing party to take the deposition of every expert where the party has been provided a report pursuant to the mandatory requirements of Rule 1.360(b). Nor is it necessary to exhaustively question the expert to discover whether the expert has come to other significant opinions not expressed in the report. Indeed, such requirements would fuel the ever increasing cost of litigation. Thus, a litigant who receives a report of the examination conducted under the rule should be confident that the report lists all of the major conclusions of the examining expert. See Office Depot, Inc., 584 So.2d at 590. In this case, Dr. Mack opined at trial, that the plaintiff did not suffer permanent injury as a result of the accident. This opinion was the most significant opinion in the case. Thus, the plaintiff could claim surprise under Binger v. King Pest Control as a result of Dr. Mack's failure to include this opinion in his report. See 401 So.2d 1310, 1314 (Fla.1981) (testimony of a witness can be excluded where witness was not disclosed causing surprise to opposing party); see also Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. J.B., 675 So.2d 241, 244 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (recognizing Binger applies equally to situations involving the presentation of an undisclosed change of opinion).
Appellant cites Ganey v. Goodings Million Dollar Midway, Inc., 360 So.2d 62 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), as being analogous. It is distinguishable and was decided well before the Binger case. In Ganey, plaintiffs treating physician testified at trial that her injury was permanent and a result of the accident at question in the case. The defendant moved for a new trial, claiming surprise as to this testimony which had not been revealed'in pretrial discovery even though the doctor's deposition had been taken. The trial court granted the motion for new trial. The appellate court reversed because the plaintiff had never asked in the deposition whether she had suffered a permanent injury. See id. at 63. Thus, defendant could not claim surprise. However, the court noted specifically that the defense had not sought a physical examination pursuant to Rule 1.360(a). Ganey did not deal with the testimony of an expert who performed a compulsory medical examination and was required to furnish the opposing party with a report of the expert's opinions.
Moreover, in support of the trial court's order, we think it is arguable that the doctor's testimony and reports misled the plaintiff as to the doctor's opinion of permanency. Both in his report and in his deposition testimony, he noted that the plaintiff exhibited TMJ symptoms which began several months after the accident. While there were symptoms of headaches, neck, ear, throat, and stomach pain recorded by her general physician prior to the accident, Dr. Mack testified that if those were based upon physical findings of an ear infection or viral infection or related to job stress, those pre-accident complaints would have nothing to do with TMJ syndrome. In addition, Dr. Mack found a discernable click in her jaw that was not reported until several months after the accident. The click was most likely caused by a dislocation in the jaw.
Dr. Mack's review of the records of other treating physicians revealed a consistent reporting of TMJ symptoms following the accident. At the conclusion of the record review, Dr. Mack stated that "a determination needs to be made as to whether this is merely a physical finding [the click] or whether an internal derangement is potentially etiologic in the patient's complaints." One could glean from the report that Dr. Mack clearly found clicking in the temporomandibular joint, but he was still undecided as to whether the TMJ problem was causing the plaintiffs varied physical complaints of pain. Dr. Mack's subsequent reports indicated that other doctors found no complaints of TMJ disorder until after the accident.
At trial, Dr. Mack for the first time unequivocally testified that the plaintiff received no permanent injury as a result of the accident - in question in this suit. Moreover, he admitted that some of his conclusions were based on material he had seen just hours before testifying. We think that this modification could be viewed as either a reversal of prior opinions, or the admission of opinions not contained in the reports furnished pursuant to Rule 1.360(b). In either case, the plaintiff could claim surprise and prejudice, which would support the trial court's order granting the renewed motion for mistrial. As such, appellants have failed to show that the trial court's ruling was such a patent abuse of the broad discretion afforded to it that reversal of its ruling is required. We therefore affirm.
TAYLOR, J., concurs.
SCHACK, LARRY, Associate Judge, dissents with opinion.