Case Name: THE PEOPLE v. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1917-07-13
Citations: 36 N.Y. Crim. 95
Docket Number: 
Parties: THE PEOPLE v. WILLIAM J. BURNS.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Criminal Reports
Volume: 36
Pages: 95–106

Head Matter:
SUPREME COURT — APPELLATE DIVISION — FIRST DEPARTMENT.
July 13, 1917.
THE PEOPLE v. WILLIAM J. BURNS.
(178 App. Div. 845.)
Penal Law, section 533—Taring and publishing letters or papers WITHOUT AUTHORITY.
Where a banking firm, acting as fiscal agent of foreign countries and. engaged in the purchase of munitions for them and in daily receipt of a large number of confidential cablegrams, discovered that so-called munition brokers, having desk room in a lawyer’s office, were obtaining information as to the contents of said telegrams, and thereupon engaged the services of a licensed private, detective, said detective, who, while in the lawyer’s office for the purpose of installing a deteetaphone, caused unsealed letters to the munition brokers by dealers in war munitions and certain other unsealed papers, copies of letters sent by munition brokers to dealers, to be copied in shorthand by his secretary and later transcribed and delivered to an employee of the banking firm which, was prosecuting the inquiry, is not guilty of opening or publishing the letters or papers without authority in violation of subdivision 3 of section 553 of the Penal Law.
Same.
In order to violate said subdivision a person, must both “take” a paper or a copy thereof and also “ publish ” it.
Same—When private detective not liable for violation of statute— “ Publishing.”
The delivery by the private detective of the copies of the letters to a single individual, his employer, who had a legitimate interest in knowing what use was being made of the information stolen from his office, and who was not interested in giving general publicity to the facts, did not constitute “ publishing within the meaning of the statute.
Dowling, J., dissented, with opinion.
Appeal by the defendant, William J. Burns, from a judgment of the Court of Special Sessions of the City of New York, Part VI, rendered against him on the 26th day of January, 1917, convicting him of violating subdivision 3 of section 553 of the Penal Law.
James M. Beck, for the appellant.
Robert S. Johnstone, for the respondent.

Opinion:
Scott, J.:
The defendant appeals from a conviction in the Court of Special Sessions of the crime of violating subdivision 3 of section 553 of the Penal Law.
The material facts disclosed upon the trial may be briefly summarized as follows:
In the latter part of 1915 and the early part of 1916 the banking firm of J. P. Morgan & Co., of the city of Hew York, was the fiscal agent in this country of both Great Britain and France, and in that capacity were engaged in making large purchases of munitions of war and other articles required by said foreign countries in the prosecution of the great war in which they are now engaged. In the course of this business they received daily a large number of cablegrams of a highly confidential nature, most of which were in code. At a certain time the firm became convinced that there was a leak somewhere in their office, and that outside persons, who had no right to do so, were obtaining information as to the contents of cablegrams received by the firm, and were dealing upon the information so.obtained for their own advantage. The firm thereupon engaged the services of defendant, a duly licensed private detective, of much experience and of good repute, to ascertain how the information leaked out of their office and by whom it was received and acted upon. It was soon discovered that the information was being used by four persons calling themselves " munitions brokers," and who occupied desk room in ¿the offices of a firm of lawyers located in the Equitable Building, a large building in the city of Hew York. The main purpose of the inquiry was to learn from whom in the banker's office the information came, and to this end defendant leased an office next to the lawyers' office, and arranged with the superintendent of the building to gain access at night to the lawyers' office and to install therein a deteetophone. While in the office on this errand, defendant found lying on a desk certain unsealed letters to one or other of the munitions brokers by dealers in war munitions, and certain other unsealed papers which were apparently copies of letters sent by the munitions brokers or one of them to said munitions dealers. While these papers did not serve to disclose who was furnishing the information from the bankers' office, they did serve to disclose the use that was being made by the so-called. brokers of the information obtained by them. It afterwards transpired that the information had been obtained by corrupting certain of the bankers' clerks. Defendant did not remove any of the papers above described from the offices in which he found them, but. caused his secretary, who accompanied him, to copy them in shorthand, and later to write them out in long hand or typewriting. These long hand or typewritten copies were delivered to one Egan, an employee of the banking firm, who had engaged defendant and was charged with prosecuting the inquiry. It does not appear that defendant communicated the contents of these papers to any other person, or that Egan made them public.
The statute under which defendant was convicted reads, so far as pertinent, as follows:
" § 553. Opening or publishing a letter, telegram or private paper. A person who wilfully, and without authority:
" 3. Takes a letter, telegram or private paper, belonging to another, or a copy thereof, and publishes the whole or any portion thereof; Is guilty of a misdemeanor."
It is apparent that to violate this section .a person must both " take " a paper or a copy thereof, and must also " publish " it. To " take " without publishing, or to " publish " without taking, does not constitute a violation of this particular subdivision. Both of these words are subject to construction. If by "take" the Legislature meant asportation the defendant did not offend against the section in this particular, for he did not take any paper away, even temporarily. It would seem that the word must be thus construed, for otherwise it would be. inappropriate. It is true that making a copy is sometimes spoken of as " taking " a copy, but this is not the usual sense in which the word is used, and is wholly inapplicable to original papers.
The argument at bar, however, chiefly turned upon the meaning to be attached to the word " publish," for even if defendant did " take " the letter and copies he was not guilty unless he also published them. What he did was to deliver the copies to a single individual, his employer, who had a legitimate interest in knowing what use was being made of the information stolen from his office; and who was certainly not interested in giving-general publicity to the facts. The question is whether or not this constituted " publishing " the letters and copies. We think not. The words used in criminal, as well as civil statutes, are to be given, as a general thing, the common, usual meaning, and in a criminal statute especially the words are not to be extended to cases not clearly within them. (Sherwin v. People, 100 N. Y. 351, 361, 3 N. Y. Crim. 524; People v. Nelson, 153 id. 90, 94, 12 N. Y. Crim. 368.) The word "publish" as commonly understood means to give to the public, and is usually associated with printing by pamphlet or newspaper. As was said in United States v. Williams (3 Fed. Rep. 484, 486) : " The idea of publicity, of circulation, of intended distribution, seems to be inseparable from the term £ publication.' " Even a' communication to a considerable number of persons, for a special purpose, is not always considered a publication. Thus business circulars, sent out only to persons engaged in or supposed to be engaged in the trade to which the circulars refer, are not deemed publications (New Process Fermentation Co. v. Koch, 21 Fed. Rep. 580), nor is the representation of an unprinted play to persons especially selected considered a publication under the copyright laws (Keene v. Wheatley, 14 Fed. Cas. 180, 199.) In the latter case the court said: " When the word ' publication ' is used without an express qualification, a general publication is usually meant."
The learned district attorney insists that the word " publish " in the subdivision under consideration must be construed as it is construed in libel cases, and that the communication of the contents, of a private paper to but a single person constitutes publication thereof. We see no reason, in the statute itself, for giving this very unusual construction, which is peculiar to the law of libel. Indeed, the Penal Law (§ 1343) compels that construction in a prosecution for libel, but omits to do so in reference to the crime for which this defendant was convicted.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that defendant was not shown1 to have technically violated the statute under which he was convicted. In reversing his conviction, however, we must not be understood as commending or justifying his act in obtaining access by surreptitious means into the office occupied by the " munitions brokers," and in reading and copying papers which he found there.
All we are concerned with is whether or not he was legally convicted of the charge upon which he was tried. For the reasons above given we think he was not. The judgment of conviction is, therefore, reversed and the defendant discharged.
Smith, Page and Sheabn, JJ., concurred; Dowling, J., dissented.