Case Name: Marylin Church COMMONS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1978-05-17
Citations: 575 S.W.2d 518
Docket Number: No. 54485
Parties: Marylin Church COMMONS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
Judges: Before ONION, P. J., and DALLY and VOLLERS, JJ.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 575
Pages: 518–521

Head Matter:
Marylin Church COMMONS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
No. 54485.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, Panel No. 2.
May 17, 1978.
Opinion on State’s Motion for Rehearing Jan. 17, 1979.
Kerry P. Fitzgerald, John Cravens, Dallas, for appellant.
Henry Wade, Dist. Atty., William M. Lamb, Dan Guthrie and Coleman Sylvan, Asst. Dist. Attys., Dallas, Jim D. Vollers, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.
Before ONION, P. J., and DALLY and VOLLERS, JJ.

Opinion:
OPINION
ONION, Presiding Judge.
This is an appeal from a conviction of the misdemeanor offense of fraudulently substituting price tags in violation of V.T.C.A., Penal Code, § 32.47. The jury assessed punishment at a probated fine of $50.00.
The record reflects that appellant, while shopping in a Skaggs-Albertson store in Dallas County, removed a $1.79 price tag from a box containing liquid Tylenol and substituted therefor a $.99 price tag which she had taken from a box of Tylenol tablets. When she checked out at the cashier's stand, she was charged $.99 for the liquid Tylenol. A Dallas police officer, Murray Jackson, who was working as a security officer in his off-duty hours for this Skaggs-Albertson store, observed appellant substitute the price tags, kept her under surveillance until she checked out of the store, and then apprehended her.
The relevant portion of the information upon which appellant was tried follows:
". . . did unlawfully then and there knowingly and intentionally with intent to injure, defraud and harm, another, Murray Jackson, remove and substitute a writing, to wit: price tag, which was not a governmental record."
It is apparent that when price tags are switched on merchandise, as was the case here, it is the owner of the merchandise who is injured, defrauded and harmed be cause it is the owner who stands to receive less for his goods as a result of the fraudulent act.
Here the information alleges that appellant substituted the price tags with the intent to injure, defraud and harm Murray Jackson, the security officer of the store; yet there is no evidence that he was the owner of the merchandise or the person who exercised care, control and custody thereof. See Article 21.08, V.A.C.C.P.; Eaton v. State, 533 S.W.2d 33 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); Roberts v. State, 513 S.W.2d 870 (Tex.Cr.App.1974); Harriford v. State, 487 S.W.2d 351 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Castillo v. State, 469 S.W.2d 572 (Tex.Cr.App.1971).
Under these circumstances, we agree with appellant's contention that there was a fatal variance in the allegations in the information and the evidence introduced.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.