Case Name: BOROUGH OF OIL CITY v. McABOY, for use
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1873-10-20
Citations: 1 Foster 357
Docket Number: 
Parties: BOROUGH OF OIL CITY v. McABOY, for use.
Judges: 
Reporter: Legal Chronicle reports of Cases decided in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (Foster)
Volume: 1
Pages: 357–359

Head Matter:
BOROUGH OF OIL CITY v. McABOY, for use.
1. A judgment confessed by a borough containing a warrant of attorney, empowering ‘‘any attorney of any court of record in this commonwealth to confess judgment,” only authorizes the entry of judgment in the county in which the borough is-located.
2. An action against a borough or other municipal corporation can only be maintained in a court having jurisdiction over the territorial limits where such corporation is located.
Certiorari to the district court of Allegheny county.

Opinion:
Opinion delivered October 20, 1873, by
Ágnew, J.
Counties and townships are the legally recognized municipal divisions of the State. The second section of the act of 15 th April, 1834, relating to counties and townships and county and township officers, provides that every city shall be deemed and taken to form part of the county in which it is or may be situate. Much more, then, is a borough to be deemed a part of the county. Indeed formerly boroughs were treated as parts of the respective townships to which they belonged, though since the passage of the act of 3d April, 1851, every borough incorporated from within a township is now to be considered a distinct district. These municipal divisions are in their nature local, being within a fixed territory ; and the people residing there, no matter how fluctuating in regard to individuals, being the true corporation. Hence it has been held, that actions against counties are not transitory but local, and must be brought in the courts of the proper county : Lehigh County v. Kleckner, 5 W. & S. 181. The reasons are founded in the convenience and policy of the State, and the limited remedy for the payment of debts. The same rule, therefore, applies with equal force to cities and boroughs.
It is thought the case before us differs, inasmuch as the writing upon which judgment was confessed against the borough of Oil City contains a warrant of attorney, empowering " any attorney of any court of record of this commonwealth to confess judgment for the sum due at maturity, with costs of suit, release of errors, &c." But this is a question of jurisdiction in the court, and not an irregularity or error in the confession ; and we think the judgment can be confessed only in the courts of the proper county, no other having power to enforce payment. The commissioners to revise the civil code, reporting upon the act of 15th April, 1834, 2 Park & Johnson's Dig. 724, remark that the only remedy to obtain payment of the debt of a county or township, .was the tedious; and'expensive course-of an application to the supreme court for a mandamus. ' They, therefore reported the remedy by writ of command and attachment, contained in the 6th and 7th sections of the act of 1834. In Wilson v. The Commissioners of Huntingdon County, 7 W. & S. 197, Justice Kennedy said, there can be no seizure, extension, or sale of the property of the county, and payment can only be enforced after judgment, by issuing a writ, commanding the commissioners to pay, &c., and not otherwise. The 72d section of the act of 16th of June, 1836, relating to> executions, expressly excepts out of the provisions for executions against corporations, counties, townships, and other public municipal bodies. .Hence .it was' held in Lehigh county v. Kleckner, supra, that the courts of. pne county could not'issue; process to compel1 payment against , the "commissioners of .another county;. Had there'been no such expression, of this court, the reásóns for confining the remedy by writ of command, and attachment to the courts of the proper county in which the municipality is situate are so- strong we could do no otherwise than hold the law to be so. p It would be a gross hardship to subject the people of a prescribed territory, 'who can act only through certain officers, to the-multiplied jurisdiction of as many courts as there are counties in the State, to suit the mere convenience of a single person who may be a creditor. Different bonds in the hands of different persons might, in this instance, subject the borough of Oil City to as many different jurisdictions at the same time all over the State. Of necessity the records and papers of a municipality should be kept within its own territory for the use of the people who are governed within it. So the public officers of the municipality should be permitted to remain at home in the performance of duties, local in their nature, and not dragged away from their offices and duties to run over the State at the call of individual creditors. - In view of these reasons, and of the provisions in the 6th and 7th sections of the act of 1834, and 72d section of the act of 1836, we are of opinion that the district court of Allegheny county has no jurisdiction to compel payment of debts by a municipality existing in Venango county. The reference to the bond suits against counties and cities in the federal courts furnishes no argument in favor of the jurisdiction of the district court of Allegheny county in this case. In all such actions the counties sued in the federal courts were within their territorial jurisdiction : while the right to entertain jurisdiction was founded on the non-residence of the plaintiff within the State, under the constitution and laws of the United States. The reference to these bond suits is useful, however,' in reminding us of the infinite inconveniences those suits caused to the officers of distant counties. We are therefore'of opinion that the warrant of attorney did not legally authorize a confession of judgment against the borough of Oil City in the district court of this county. Consent cannot confer jurisdiction against the laws of the State. The writ of certiorari in this having been amended Tinder leave granted, and converted into a writ of error, the judgment in this case is reversed, and all proceedings under it are set aside. - •
The same'judgment is rendered in the following cases, viz., Nos. 171, 172, 173 and 174, of October and November Term, 1873, between 'the same parties.