Case Name: ANGELINA DI NAPOLI, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF KERN COUNTY, Respondent; TEJON POTATO COMPANY et al., Real Parties in Interest
Court: Court of Appeal of the State of California
Jurisdiction: California
Decision Date: 1967-06-29
Citations: 252 Cal. App. 2d 202
Docket Number: Civ. No. 823
Parties: ANGELINA DI NAPOLI, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF KERN COUNTY, Respondent; TEJON POTATO COMPANY et al., Real Parties in Interest.
Judges: 
Reporter: California Appellate Reports, Second Series
Volume: 252
Pages: 202–208

Head Matter:
[Civ. No. 823.
Fifth Dist.
June 29, 1967.]
ANGELINA DI NAPOLI, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF KERN COUNTY, Respondent; TEJON POTATO COMPANY et al., Real Parties in Interest.
Angelina Di Napoli, in pro. per., for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Borton, Petrini, Conron & Brown and Warren C. Wetteroth for Real Parties in Interest.

Opinion:
STONE, J.
Angelina De Napoli, 69 years of age and a resident of Bell in Los Angeles County, which is 120 miles from Bakersfield, brings this proceeding in prohibition to annul and set aside an order of the superior court made in the case of Di Napoli v. Tejón Potato Company, Kern County No. 92971, requiring the petitioner to go to Bakersfield and there give her deposition in the ease, notwithstanding the failure of defendants to pay a witness fee and mileage in response to her demand.
In the Kern County action, Mrs. Di Napoli attempts to secure damages for the death of her son, alleged to have been caused by negligence of the defendants. After the filing of the complaint, counsel for the defendants, on three separate occasions, set in motion attempts to take the deposition of the plaintiff, pursuant to the provisions of section 2019, subdivision (a) (4), of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The documents for the taking of the deposition in Bakersfield were properly drawn and served by counsel for the defendants, except that as there was no payment of the mileage and witness fee, repeatedly demanded by her in writing, Mrs. Di Napoli claims that she was not required to attend. On November 21, 1966, the plaintiff, acting in propria persona, filed what she denominated "Notice of Motion for Protective Order re Deposition. ' ' In that writing, she said, among other things: "Plaintiff is 69 years of age and will need travel companions if she is required to come to Bakersfield, to give her deposition." She asked that her mileage and witness fee be paid. The court denied the motion without making any written reference to the request for mileage and witness fee.
Finally, the attorneys for the defendants made a motion before another judge of the Kern County Superior Court for an order striking out the complaint and dismissing the action ". . . or such other penalties as the Court may deem just, and for reasonable expenses, including reasonable attorneys fees, on the ground that plaintiff, Angelina Di Napoli, wilfully failed to appear at the times and places set for the taking of depositions on oral examination, pursuant to proper notices in accordance with the provisions of Subdivision (a) (4) of Section 2019 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the State of California. ' '
It is the contention of counsel for the defendants as expressed in their memorandum of points and authorities in opposition to the petition for writ of prohibition: " Inasmuch as plaintiff resides within 150 miles from the place set for her deposition, a proper notice of deposition in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure, Section 2019 (a) (4) is all that is required in order to require her attendance. Code of Civil Procedure, Section 2019 (a)(4). Code of Civil Procedure, Section 2019 (b) (2)."
Mrs. Di Napoli contends that the trial court was in error in not recognizing and protecting her right to demand payment of her witness fee and mileage as a prerequisite to her attendance at the place of taking the deposition. It has long been settled in California that witnesses in civil cases may demand the payment of their mileage and fees for one day in advance, and, when so demanded, shall not be compelled to attend until the allowances are paid. (Gov. Code, § 68093 and 68097.) In 1961, the Legislature by enactment of Code of Civil Procedure section 1986.5 extended this right to "any person who is subpoenaed and required to give a deposition." This section was enacted subsequent to the 1957 Discovery Act, which provided by Code of Civil Procedure section 2019, subdivision (a)(4): "In the ease of depositions of a party to the record of any civil action or proceeding or of anyone who at the time of taking the deposition is an officer, director or managing agent of any such party, the service of a subpoena upon any such deponent is not required if proper notice of the taking of such deposition is given to the attorney for such party or to the party, if he has no attorney." Had Code of Civil Procedure section 1986.5 been enacted before the discovery statutes, we would face the question whether it was repealed by implication as to parties to an action by the enactment of section 2019, subdivision (a) (4). But, since section 1986.5 followed section 2019, by some four years, it must be assumed that when the Legislature enacted 1986.5 it was fully cognizant of section 2019, subdivision (a) (4), permitting a party's deposition to be taken on notice and without a subpoena. Yet, the subsequent statute limits witness fees and mileage to persons "subpoenaed and requred to give a deposition. ' '
A party is not left entirely unprotected against financial imposition or from harassment by the discovery statutes. The last sentence of section 2019, subdivision (a)(4), places the following explicit limitation upon the taking of a party's deposition: "A notice to take the deposition of a person described in this subdivision (4) cannot require the attendance of such person at a place more than 150 miles from the residence of such person, unless the party desiring to take such deposition first obtains an order, pursuant to the provisions of Section 2019 (b) (2) of this code." A party may also appeal to the discretion of the court if threatened with "annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression." (Code Civ. Proc., §2019, subd. (b)(1).) Here, petitioner refused to attend the original deposition as noticed; no annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression within the sense of Code of Civil Procedure section 2019, subdivision (b) (1) was shown. Petitioner's refusal was, in the eyes of the trial court, without good cause. Consequently, the court imposed sanctions in the form of costs under the authority of Code of Civil Procedure section 2034.
We do not find an abuse of discretion in these circumstances. (See Discretion of the trial court in Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal.2d 355, 378-387 [15 Cal.Rptr. 90, 364 P.2d 266].)
For the foregoing reasons, the temporary restraining order heretofore issued is dissolved and the petition for writ of prohibition is denied.
Gargano, J., concurred.