Case Name: West v. Smith
Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 1955-02-28
Citations: 224 Ark. 651
Docket Number: 5-633
Parties: West v. Smith.
Judges: Justices Millwee, George Rose Smith and Robinson dissent.
Reporter: Arkansas Reports
Volume: 224
Pages: 651–666

Head Matter:
West v. Smith.
5-633
278 S. W. 2d 126
Opinion delivered February 28, 1955.
[Supplemental Opinion on Rehearing Delivered April 18, 1955.]
Melvin E. Mayfield, for appellant.
Spencer & Spencer, for appellee.

Opinion:
Ed. F. McFaddin, Justice.
This case was docketed under our Rule 5 (as contained in tbe Rules promulgated January, 1954), so that the appellant could file a motion for a rule on the Clerk of this Court, who had declined to accept the record because he considered it was tendered too late. Since the question here presented arises under Act No. 555 of 1953, we are delivering this opinion as a precedent for future cases.
The tendered record shows the following:
(1) That the Circuit Court judgment was rendered July 15, 1954.
(2) That appellant's notice of appeal (under § 2 of said Act 555) was filed on August 13, 1954.
(3) That neither side applied to the Circuit Court for an extension of time to file the record, until November 15, 1954 when appellant filed a motion in the Trial Court for extension of the time to file the record (see § 20 of the said Act 555).
(4) That on November 18, 1954, the Trial Court made an order giving the appellant 20 additional days (from that date) in which to file the record; but this order of extension was made more than 90 days after the filing of the notice of' appeal and was not made within the period extended by any previous order.
(5) That the record was filed in the Trial Court on November 22, 1954 and tendered in this Court on December 2, 1954.
Two questions, therefore, present themselves: (1) whether the Trial Court could make a valid order on November 18, 1954, under the facts here existing; and (2) whether this Court should allow the record to be filed under our inherent powers.
I. Validity of the Circuit Court Order of November 18, 1954. Section 20 of Act 555 of 1953 provides:
"The record on appeal shall be filed with the appellate court and the appeal there docketed within 90 days from the date of filing the notice of appeal; except that, the trial court may prescribe the time for filing and docketing, which in no event shall be less than 90 days from the date of filing the first notice of appeal. In all cases the trial court, in its discretion and with or without motion or notice, may extend the time for filing the record on appeal and docketing the appeal, if its order for extension is made before the expiration of the period for filing and docketing as originally prescribed or extended by a previous order; but the trial court shall not extend the time to a date more than seven months from the date of the entry of the judgment or decree."
When the present appellant filed his notice of appeal in the Circuit Court no order was made for prescribing the time for filing and docketing the record in the appellate court. So under the above quoted Statute, the time was fixed by law at 90 days from the filing of the notice of appeal (which date was August 13, 1954). The next order made by the Circuit Court was on November 18, 1954, which was more than 90 days from the filing of the notice of appeal. The quoted Statute says that the Trial Court ". . . may-extend the time for filing the record on appeal and docketing the appeal, if its order for extension is made before the expiration of the period for filing and docketing as originally prescribed or extended by a previous order-, . . ." Now in the ab-. sence of any previous order, the one made by the Circuit Court on November 18th was too late.
But the appellant argues that § 20 of Act 555 was copied from the Federal Rules, and that when we adopted the Federal Rules, we adopted the construction which the Federal Courts had placed on such Rules; that the Federal Courts allow extensions to be made; and that we should, therefore, allow such extensions. Section 20 of Act 555 comes to us from § 73 (g) of the Federal Rules; but there are differences between § 20 of Act 555 and § 73 (g) of the Federal Rules. Section 20 of Act 555 allows 90 days from the filing of the notice of appeal, whereas § 73 (g) allows only 40 days; and § 20 of Act 555 allows seven months from judgment for final filing, whereas § 73 (g) allows only 90 days. So we did not adopt § 73 (g) verbatim as § 20 of Act 555.
Furthermore, when we enacted § 20 of Act 555, we had a long line of decisions in Arkansas on the power of the Trial Court to extend the time for filing the bill of exceptions ; ánd this line of decisions had always held that the order of extension had to be made before the expiration of the period as previously fixed. It is far more reasonable to presume that the Arkansas Legislature enacted Act 555 in the light of our own holdings on the power of the Trial Court to extend time, than it is to presume that it enacted Act 555 in the light of particular federal cases — some of which hold one way and some the other.
An illuminating case is Chandler v. State, 205 Ark. 74, 167 S. W. 2d 142. There, the motion for new trial was heard and overruled on September 10, 1942, and the Court allowed the appellant 45 days to prepare, tender and file the bill of exceptions, which was not tendered to the Trial Judge until October 29, 1942, which was later than the 45 days so allowed. As of October 29, 1942, the Trial Judge signed the bill of exceptions, but this was after the expiration of the time he had previously fixed for it to be tendered. We held that the bill of exceptions was filed too late and ordered it stricken, following our earlier cases of Boatright v. State, 195 Ark. 611, 113 S. W. 2d 107; and Austin v. State, 183 Ark. 481, 36 S. W. 2d 400.
At the time of the decision in Chandler v. State, the Statute on filing a bill of exceptions was contained in § 1543 Pope's Digest, and the pertinent part reads:
"The party objecting to the decision must except at the time the decision is made, and time may be given to reduce the exception to writing, but not beyond the succeeding term; . . ."
Under that Statute we repeatedly held that the bill of exceptions had to be filed within the time allowed by the Court, and that the parties could not by agreement dispense with such requirement. Faulkner v. Bank of McCrory, 177 Ark. 628, 7 S. W. 2d 326. In a long line of cases we held that a bill of exceptions which was not filed within the time required was a nullity and could not be considered on appeal. See Green v. State, 96 Ark. 175, 131 S. W. 463; Austin v. State, 183 Ark. 481, 36 S. W. 2d 400; Boatright v. State, 195 Ark. 611, 113 S. W. 2d 107. Then came the case of Chandler v. State, 205 Ark. 74, 167 S. W. 2d 142, in which we held that the bill of exceptions could not be considered when filed after the time fixed even though the Trial Judge had signed it.
It was to overcome that situation that the Legislature first passed Act 10 of 1943, and then Act 90 of 1949, to specifically allow the extension of time to be granted by the Trial Court even after the expiration of a previously fixed time. So when the Legislature passed Act 555 of 1953 there was a long line of decisions in this State that the Trial Court (or Judge thereof), in the absence of express Statute so allowing, had no power to grant an extension of time after the expiration of a previously fixed time; and § 20 of Act 555 clearly states that any extension of time must be within a period previously allowed.
We hold that these Arkansas decisions when applied to this case and applied to Act 555 impel the conclusion that the Trial Court was without power to grant an extension after the expiration of the previous time; so the order of the Trial Court of November 18,1954, was made too late and the record was not filed in this Court within the time allowed by law.
II. Should This Court Allow the Record to Be Filed? The appellant insists that even though the Trial Court lacked authority to extend the time, nevertheless this Court should allow the record to be filed because of the language found in § 2 of Act 555.
It is not to be doubted that under our inherent constitutional power, this Court could, in a most exceptional case, allow a record to be filed after the time fixed. However, the fact that we have the power does not mean that it should be exercised except in a most extraordinary case. Here, there is no such: the parties let the time expire for filing the record and also let the time expire in which to ask the Trial Court to grant an extension. There was no flood, death, riot, act of God, or other great unavoidable casualty that prevented either the filing of the record within time or timely request to the Trial Court to grant extension. This Court has possessed the same inherent power ever since Statehood; but in a long line of cases we have refused to exercise that inherent power to allow an appellant to present the evidence when it was filed too late. Some such cases are: Chandler v. State, 205 Ark. 74, 167 S. W. 2d 142; Johnson v. U. S. Gypsum Co., 217 Ark. 264, 229 S. W. 2d 671; Criner v. Criner, 217 Ark. 722, 233 S. W. 2d 393; and Prescott, Ark. Tel. Corp. v. McFarland, 217 Ark. 731, 233 S. W. 2d 70. We see no reason for departing, in the case at bar, from the rule established in our adjudications.
It is claimed that Norfleet v. Norfleet, 223 Ark. 751, 268 S. W. 2d 387, is authority for us to allow the record to be filed in the case at bar; but we do not so understand the Norfleet case. There, the losing litigant in the Trial Court filed a timely notice of appeal but took no further action and allowed the 90-day period to expire. The prevailing litigant in the Trial Court then filed the record in this Court under the authority of § 17 of Act 555 of 1953, and here moved for dismissal. We granted the motion because the appellant showed no reason for asking us to exercise our inherent power. The same rule applies here. In the Norfleet case we said of the failure of the losing litigant to file the record within the 90 days: ' ' The result was to leave the appellee in a state of uncertainty as appellant might either have abandoned the appeal or have intended to offer an excuse for the delay." In dismissing the appeal in the Norfleet case we were saying that our inherent power would not be exercised. That is what we are saying in the case at bar.
The prevailing litigant in any case is entitled to know when the judgment becomes final. If the Trial Court has fixed a time for the filing of the record on appeal and that time has expired then the prevailing litigant should be allowed to presume that the judgment is final in the absence of great unavoidable casualty. If four days after the time has expired the Trial Court can then grant a further extension, then three months after the time has expired the Trial Court can grant an extension; and no judgment would ever be final until seven months from the date of rendition in the Trial Court. That was not the purpose of the law: and in the interest of finality this Court should not exercise its inherent powers except in a most extraordinary situation.
Therefore the rule on the clerk in this case is denied.
Justices Millwee, George Rose Smith and Robinson dissent.
The appellee also filed notice of appeal on August 14, 1954, hut we are not here concerned with any such cross-appeal.
Here is § 73 (g) of the Federal Rules:
"The record on appeal as provided for in Rules 75 and 76 shall be filed with the appellate court and the appeal there docketed within 40 days from the date of filing the notice of appeal; except that, when more than one appeal is taken from the same judgment to the same appellate court, the district court may prescribe the time for filing and docketing, which in no event shall be less than 40 days from the date of filing the first notice of appeal. In all cases the district court in its discretion and with or without motion or notice may extend the time for filing the record on appeal and docketing the appeal, if its order for extension is made before the expiration of the period for filing and docketing as originally prescribed or as extended by a previous order; but the district court shall not extend the time to a day more than 90 days from the date of filing the first notice of appeal."
In the dissenting opinion in General Box Co. v. Scurlock, 223 Ark. 967, 271 S. W. 2d 40, there is a table that shows the Federal Rule from which each Section of Act 555 of 1953 was patterned.
The filing of the bill of exceptions under our practice before Act 555 of 1953 is in many respects equivalent to the filing of the record under Act 555.
The fact that some federal cases hold one way and some hold the other may be demonstrated by citation of the following cases: In the case of In Re: Gammil, 129 F. 2d 501, it was held that the District Court had no authority to grant extensions of time for docketing an appeal except within the period for filing and docketing. To the same effect see Burk v. Canfield, 111 F. 2d 526; and U. S. v. Gallagher, 151 F. 2d 556. On the other hand there are cases which hold that the Circuit Court of Appeals, if it so desires, may allow a record to be filed after the time fixed by the District Court. Some of these cases are listed in Footnote (7), infra.
See Floyd v. Richmond, 211 Ark. 177, 199 S. W. 2d 754.
The language found in § 2 of Act 555 comes — with variations— from § 78 (g) of the Federal Rules; and the part particularly cited and relied on by appellant, reads: "Failure of the appellant to take any of the further steps to secure the review of the judgment or decree appealed from shall not affect the validity of the appeal but shall he grounds only for such action as the appellate court deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal." The Federal Courts (under § 73 (g) of the Federal Rules) hold that the Federal Court should be slow to exercise the power to allow appeals to be filed when the record was not tendered within the designated time. See In Re: Gammil, 129 F. 2d 501; Arline v. Brown, 190 F. 2d 180; Stumpf v. Matthews, 195 F. 2d 25; Markham v. Kallimanis, 151 F. 2d 145; Citizens Protective League v. Clark, 178 F. 2d 703; and Maghan v. Young, 154 F. 2d 13.