Case Name: Gallego's Ex'ors v. The Attorney General; Same v. Lambert and Wife and Others
Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
Jurisdiction: Virginia
Decision Date: 1832-02
Citations: 3 Leigh 450
Docket Number: 
Parties: Gallego’s Ex’ors v. The Attorney General. Same v. Lambert and Wife and Others.
Judges: (Absent Brooke, J.)
Reporter: Virginia Reports
Volume: 30
Pages: 690–704

Head Matter:
Gallego’s Ex’ors v. The Attorney General. Same v. Lambert and Wife and Others.
February, 1832.
[24 Am. Dec. 650.]
(Absent Brooke, J.)
Charitable Trusts — Validity —Case at Bar. — Testator directs his ex’ors to lay by $2000, to be distributed among- needy, poor and respectable widows; and, in case the roman catholic chapel shall be continued at the time o£ his death, to pay $1000 towards its support; and, if the roman catholic congregation shall come to a determination to build a chapel at Richmond, to pay $3000 towards its accomplishment; and he devises a lot in Richmond, to four trustees in fee, upon trust to permit all and every person belonging to the roman catholic church, as members thereof, or professing that religion, and residing in Richmond at the time of his death, to build a church on the lot, for the use of themselves and all others of that religion who may hereafterresideinRichmond: upon information filed by the attorney general, in chancery, to enforce the charitable bequests and devise, Held, that the bequests and devise are uncertain as to the beneficiaries, and therefore void.
Same — Statute of 43 Elizabeth — Repeal of. — The english statute of charitable uses (43 Eliz.) having been repealed in Virginia, the courts of chancery have no jurisdiction to decree charities, where the objects are indefinite and uncertain.
Wills — Case at Bar. — Testator, having by his will, bequeathed legacies to amount of $69,600, directs, the whole residue of his estate, real and personal, shall be sold by his ex’ors, and out of the proceeds of such residue, he bequeaths 26 pecuniary legacies to 26 legatees, amounting to $114,000; and he charges on the same funds, such other legacies as he shall bequeath by any codicil; and gives the residue of the fund to residuary legatees; then, by codicils, he bequeaths other pecuniary legacies to amount of $47,550; as to one of the legatees mentioned in the will, he directs the legacy "to be paid as soon as possible, knowing the legatee is in need,” and as to another, that it be paid, "if possible as soon as it may be convenient for the legatee to receive it;” by one codicil he “leaves it to the judgment of his ex’ors to begin paying the legacies to those legatees they ‘may think most in need;” and by another codicil, "he desires his ex’ors to use their best judgment in making sales of his real estate (on which the legacies are charged) without hurrying the sales, which might cause sacrifices, and be to the detriment of his residuary legatees, he thinking the time unfavorableowing to depreciation of the property, the fund proves inadequate to pay the amount of the legacies charged thereon, without any fault of the ex'ors; the ex'ors, before any deficiency of the fund was apprehended, paid some of the legatees, whom they thought most in need, the whole amount of their legacies: Held.
1. The legacies bequeathed by the codicils stand on the same foot with those bequeathed by the will;
2. Legacies — Abatement—All the legacies shall abate in proportion:
3. Legatees — Unpaid—To Whom They May Look for Payment —The unpaid legatees have a right to look to the ex’ors for their rateable proportions of the fund, and are not bound to have recourse to the legatees who have been fully paid, to compel them to refund the excess by them received above their just proportions; nor,
4. Same — Same—Right to Cail on Paid Legatee to Refund. — The ex’ors being quite solvent, have the unpaid legatees any right to call upon the other legatees to refund:
g Executors -Right to Make Fully Paid Legatees Refund— Qucere. — whether the ex’ors have a right to require the legatees whose legacies they have fully paid, to refund? It seems, they have; per Tttoker, P.
Joseph Gallego, late of the city of Richmond, died in July 1818, seized and possessed of a large estate, real and personal: and by his last will and testament, — after bequeathing 50,000 dollars to his executors, John Richard and Peter J. Chevallie, in trust for certain relations in Spain; and devising and bequeathing to P. J. Chevallie a merchant manufacturing mill with its appurtenances, a lot in Richmond, all his slaves not otherwise disposed of, and 15,000 dollars, and after emancipating his slaves Rachel, Blsey and her daughter Cora, Nancy and her three children, and David, James, Aaron and Joe, and bequeathing to Rachel 2000 dollars, to Elsey, Nancy, Cora and Mary, 500 dollars, each, and to David, James, Aaron and Joe, 150 dollars each,— he devised and bequeathed all the residue of his estate, real and personal,- not specifically disposed of by the will or any codicil thereto (this residue comprised far the greater part of the testator’s estate, and consisted, chiefly, of real property in the city of Richmond) to his executors Richard and Chevallie, upon trust to take possession of the *moneys, to collect the debts due him, to sell the visible property of all kinds, and to apply the whole, as follows: To pay funeral expenses, and to pay themselves a commission of 6 per cent, for their trouble; and then to pay, 1. to Mrs. C. Currie, 2. to Mrs. M. A. Bambert, 3. to Mrs. J. M’Kenzie, 4. to Mrs. S. Gray, 5. to Mrs. C. Thornton, and 6. to Mrs. II. Reubell, a legacy of 8000 dollars, each; 7. to Mrs. S. Hancock, 8. to Miss J. Pascault, 9. to Miss E. E. Robert, 10, to Miss E. Bindsay, 11. to Miss Susan Duval, 12. to Mrs. M. C. Gilliat, and 13. to M. B. Poitiaux, 4000 dollars, each; 14. to Miss B. O’Donal, and 15. to Andrew Sweeny, 1000 dollars, each; 16. to J. R. G. Scott, 3000 dollars; 17. to Mrs. Fisher, 5000 dollars, “to be paid as soon as possible knowing she is in need;” 18. to Miss E. Gibbon, 19. to Miss M. Gibbon, 20. to Miss M. Pickett, 21. to Miss E. Pickett, 22. to Miss V. Pickett, 23. to Miss R. Dixon, and 24. to W. M’Kenzie for Rosalie Poe, 2000 dollars, each; 25. to the children of W. Conyers, 4000 dollars; 26. to the testator’s brother Francisco, 10,000 dollars, to be paid him, “if possible, as soon as it may be convenient for him to receive the amount;” 27. to pay any legacies which should by any codicil be directed to be paid out of the residuary estate; and 28. to divide the residuum into six equal parts, and to pay one sixth part thereof to each of the five children (naming them) of the testator’s sister Antonia, and the other sixth part to the two first born children of his brother Emanuel’s daughter. And he added, “I am sorry it has not been in my power to be as generous to my friends mentioned in my will, as I should have wished, and to shew my regard and good wishes towards some others, as I had done in some former wills; but the distressed situation into which my relations in Spain have fallen of late, and a probability of a fall in the price of property, which will of course*reduce the amount that my estate would have produced, compels me to refrain from doing more than what I have done, at least for the present — and should circumstances alter, and become more favourable, I shall not forget them. ”
*The will was dated the 13th May 1818, and the testator added eleven codicils to it, the last of which was dated the 28th June following.
1. By the first, he directed his executors, out of the general residue of his estate (on which the twenty-six pecuniary legacies bequeathed by the will, to Mrs. Currie and others, were charged), to pay his nephew Henry Grivegnee, 10,000 dollars; which should not affect his rights as one of the residuary legatees. (This legatee was one of the children of the testator’s sister Antonia.) And he added, “With respect to the legacies left by my foregoing will, or part of my residuary estate, I leave to the judgment of my executors, to begin paying those that they may think are more in need.”
2. By the second codicil, he bequeathed (out of the same general residue of his estate) to P. J. Chevallie, 5000 dollars' — to Mrs. Currie, Mrs. La’mbert, Mrs. M’Kenzie, Mrs. Gray, Mrs. Thornton, Mrs. Reubell, and J. R. G. Scott, 2000 dollars, each — and Mrs. Hancock, Miss Pascault, Miss Robert, Miss Lindsay, Miss Duval, Mrs. Gilliat, and M. B. Poitiaux, 1000 dollars, each, — in addition to the legacies bequeathed to those legatees, respectively, by the will. He bequeathed, to Miss P. and Miss A. Leiper, 2000 dollars, each; and to J. Royle, 1500 dollars. And he directed his executors, ‘‘if the roman catholic chapel should be continued at the time of his death, to pay 1000 dollars towards its support; and if the roman catholic congregation should come to the determination to build a chapel in Richmond, to pay 3000 dollars towards its accomplishment.”
3. By the third codicil, he desired his executors to pay Paul 50 dollars.
4. The fourth was in these words: ‘‘I desire my executors to use their best judgment in making the sales of my real estate, without hurrying the sales, which might create sacrifices, and be to the detriment of my residuary legatees — I think the time- is unfavourable. ’ ’ .
*5. By the fifth codicil, he bequeathed to his freed-woman Rachel, in addition to what he had given her by his will, 50 dollars per annum.
6. By the eighth, he emancipated his slave Jack, and bequeathed to him an annuity of 150 dollars for life.
7. By the tenth, he directed his executors to lay by 2000 dollars, to be distributed among needy, poor and respectable widows.
8. The. eleventh codicil was in these words: “I direct that my lot of land in Richmond, number 630, shall be divided by an east and west line into two equal moieties ; and I give and devise one of the said moieties to J. Richard, P. J. Chevallie, M. B. Poitiaux, and A. Lemosy, their heirs and assigns forever, (directing that they shall have choice of the said two moieties of the said lot of land) ; upon trust to permit all and every person and persons belonging to the roman catholic church as members, thereof, or professing the roman catholic religion, and residing in the said city of Richmond at the time of my death, to build a church on the said moiety of the said lot of land, for the use of themselves, and of every other person and persons of that religion who may hereafter reside in the said city of Richmond.”
The sixth, seventh and ninth codicils were specific bequests of wines, plate, furniture &c. to the testator’s friends.
The preferred pecuniary legacies, bequeathed by the will, amounted to 69,600 dollars. The pecuniary legacies bequeathed by the will, and charged on the general residue of the estate, amounted to 114,000 dollars; and the legacies bequeathed by the codicils, charged on the same fund, amounted to 47,550 dollars, besides the annuities of 50 dollars bequeathed to the freed-woman Rachel, and of 150 dollars bequeathed to the freed-man Jack: so that the amount of the legacies charged on the general residue, exceeded 161,550 dollars.
*The attorney general exhibited a bill and information, against the executors, Richard and Chevallie, in the' superiour court of chancery of Richmond, setting forth the bequests, contained in the second codicil, of 1000 dollars, to the roman catholic chapel existing at the testator’s death, and of 3000 dollars, to aid the roman catholic congregation to build a chapel in Richmond — the devise contained in the eleventh codicil, of a moiety of the lot number 630, to Richard, Chevallie, Poitiaux and Lemosy, to hold in trust for the roman catholics residing in Richmond, to build a church on — and the bequest contained in the tenth codicil directing the executors to lay by 2000 dollars, to be distributed among needy and respectable widows: that the roman catholic congregation had determined to build a chapel in Richmond; and that he (the attorney general) had been applied to and requested by the president and trustees appointed by the roman catholic congregation in Richmond, to assert their claims to the benefit of the bequests and devise to their church r and praying a decree, declaring and enforcing the execution of the trust of the moiety of the lot number 630; directing the executors to pay the two legacies of 1000 and 3000 dollars to the president and trustees of the roman catholic congregation, or to such other trustees as the court should appoint, to be applied to the charitable uses to which the money was destined by the testator;: directing the executors to pay to trustees to be appointed by the court, the 2000 dollar§ bequeathed to be distributed among needy and respectable widows; and directing the administration of this charity, according to the benevolent intentions of the. testator, — and general relief.
And William Lambert and Mary Anne his wife, James Currie and Caroline his wife, M. W. Hancock and Sophia his wife, and Elizabeth Gibbon, also exhibited a bill against the executors, in the same court; praying that the executors should be compelled to render accounts of their testator’s estate, and of their administration thereof; and a decree for the legacies bequeathed to Mrs. Lambert, Mrs. Currie, Mrs. Hancock and Miss E. Gibbon, respectively.
*The executors, in their answers to these bills, submitted the questions to the court, whether the roman catholic congregation, or the president and trustees it had appointed, or the attorney general for them, were entitled to demand and receive the legacies they claimed, and the execution of the trust as to the moiety of the lot number 630? and whether the bequest of 2000 dollars to be distributed among needy and respectable widows, could be enforced, and if so, to whom it should be paid, and how applied and administered? And they said, that they had paid such of the testator’s debts as had been made known to them: and that, soon after the testator’s death, believing (erroneously as they now feared) that his estate would be more than sufficient to satisfy not only all the preferred legacies amounting to 69,600 dollars, but all the pecuniary legacies ■charged by the will and codicils on the general residue, amounting in all to above 161,550 dollars, — they had proceeded to pay some of the legatees of the second class, the whole amount of their respective legacies, under circumstances that rendered it proper, in their opinion, that they should do so; but they now found, that the proceeds of the e,state would fall far short ox the amount of the pecuniary legacies of the second class; and they insisted, that the legatees whose legacies they had paid off in full, should be made parties defendants, in order that they might respectively be compelled to refund to the unsatisfied legatees, so much as had been paid them over and above their just rateable dividend. That their testator having cautioned them to use their best judgment in making sales of his real estate, without hurrying the sales, which might lead to sacrifices, and be detrimental to his residuary legatees, and real property having begun to depreciate about the time of his death (as he was aware) and still continuing to depreciate, they had forborne to make sale of the greater part of the property at the low prices of the times, hoping a more favourable period would arrive, and had applied the rents and profits as they accrued, to debts and legacies. And that they still thought, that, if sales of the ^subject should be precipitated, it would result in great loss to all the legatees.
In the progress of these suits, the executors, under orders of the court, rendered accounts, from time to time, before one of its commissioners, of all their transactions, and of the funds that came to their hands; and they proceeded, with all convenient de-spatch, to make sales of the real estate, the proceeds of which, as they were collected, were brought to the credit of the estate; and the accounts were reported to the court. It turned out, in the event, that the whole proceeds of the estate, after discharging the amount of the preferred legacies (69,600 dollars) sufficed to pay the legatees of the second class (those whose legacies were charged on the general residue by the will and codicil, amounting to 161,550 dollars) only a rateable dividend of fifty three cents eight mills in the dollar. It appeared, that the executors had paid to the following legatees, the full amount of their respective legacies; namely, Mrs. Fisher, Miss M. Gibbon, Miss Robert, W. M’Kenzie for Rosalie Poe, Miss Duval, Miss Pascault, Mrs. Reubell, and A. Sweeny. But the commissioner, without regard to the payments to these legatees of the full amount of their legacies, charged the executors, in account with the unsatisfied legatees, respectively', with the rateable dividends of the whole fund, 53 cents 8 mills in the dollar; placing the legacies to the charities on the same foot with the rest, that is, making them abate in proportion, and allowing them their rateable dividends; and ranking all the pecuniary legacies bequeathed by the codicils, with the second class of pecuniary legacies bequeathed by the will.
The executors excepted to the report, 1. Because the commissioner had not given them credit for the full amount of their payments to Mrs. Pisher, Miss M. Gibbon, Miss Robert, Miss Poe, Miss Duval, Miss Pascault, Mrs. Reubell, and A. Sweeny; since, by the express terms of the will, the legacy to Mrs. Fisher was to be paid immediately, and it was the duty of the executors to pay it, so soon as *funds sufficient came to their hands; as to the paymentlo Mrs. Reubell, it was effected by the application thereto of a debt due the estate, so doubtful, that perhaps, it could no otherwise have been made an available fund, and, in this instance, the executors took a refunding bond; and as to the others, the will gave the executors authority' to judge of priority among the legatees; and the deficiency of the estate, which, at the time these payments were made, was thought equal to the payment of all the pecuniary legacies, having arisen from causes not foreseen, without any fault in the executors, who were instructed by the will not to hurry the sales, they ought not to bear the loss which the other legatees have sustained, but these should have recourse against the other legatees whose legacies had been satisfied in full, to compel them to refund what they had received over and above their just proportion. And 2. Because the legacies bequeathed by the codicils, were ranked with the legacies of the second class bequeathed by the will; whereas, they insisted those bequeathed by the will, were entitled to preference, and those given by the codicils could only rank on the surplus; for the legacies bequeathed by the codicils, were given by the testator, only because he supposed there would be a surplus after satisfying those given by the will, sufficient to pay them.
It was agreed, on all hands, that the testator, at the time of making his will and the codicils to it, supposed, and had good reason to suppose, that the general residue of his estate, upon which he charged the pecuniary legacies of the second class bequeathed by the will and codicils, was much more than sufficient to pay all those legacies, and that a large surplus would be left for his nephews and nieces, the residuary legatees: that, though the real estate in Richmond, had begun to depreciate before the testator’s death, and afterwards continued to depreciate, yet the executors, when they paid Mrs. Fisher and the other seven legatees their legacies in full, supposed, and had good reason to suppose, that the fund would prove more than equal to the payment *of all the legacies: that the depreciation, however, was greater, and continued longer, than any body anticipated, or could have foreseen: that the executors, in forbearing as they did, to make early sales of the real property, and waiting for a change in the state of the market, acted with perfect good faith, and though it turned out unfortunately, not imprudently; in short, that their conduct throughout, was faithful, just and blameless: and that the executors were in-tirely solvent, and able to make the amounts due, according to the commissioner’s report, to all the legatees.
The chancellor declared, 1. That the bequests to the charities were good, but that they should abate in proportion, like the other pecuniary legacies of the second class; and that the devise of the moiety of the lot number 630, to trustees for the use of the roman catholic congregation, was also a good devise. 2. That the twenty-six pecuniary legacies of the second class, bequeathed by the will, and all the pecuniary legacies bequeathed by the codicils, stood on the same foot, and ranked equally on the fund on which they were charged, and, in the case which had occurred, of a deficiency in the fund, should all abate pro-portionably. 3. That there was nothing in the will to justify the executors in paying the whole of any of these legacies to any of the legatees, to the prejudice of the others. And 4. that, the fund having eventually proved insufficient to pay all, the unpaid legatees were entitled to look to the executors themselves, for their rateable proportions of the fund, and could not be turned round to demand of the satisfied legatees, that they should refund the excess they had received above their just proportion. And made an interlocutory decree accordingly. The executors appealed to this court.
The cause was argued here, by Stanard and Johnson, for the executors, by Daniel and Nicholas for the charities, and by Taylor and Deigh for the unsatisfied legatees.
The points debated, were—
*1. Whether the bequests of 1000 dollars for the support of the roman catholic chapel existing at the testator’s death, of 3000 dollars to aid in building a chapel for the roman catholic congregation in Richmond, and of 2000 dollars to be distributed among needy and respectable widows, or either of them, were good and valid bequests? and whether the devise of the moiety of the lot number 630 to trustees for the use of the roman catholics, as a scite for a church, was a good devise?
The counsel for the executors, and for the individual legatees of the second class, cited and relied on Baptist Association v. Hart’s ex’ors, 4 Wheat. 1, and the reasoning of chief justice Marshall there.
The counsel for the charities, cited Beatty & al. v. Kurtz & al., 2 Peters, 566; Inglis v. The Trustees of Sailor’s snug harbour, 3 Peters, 99; Story’s opinion in Baptist Association v. Hart’s ex’ors, Id. append. 481; Attorney General v. Matthews, 2 Dev. 167; Same v. Syderfen, 1 Vern. 224; Dd. Falkland v. Bertie, 2 Vern. 342; Rexv. Porting-ton, 1 Salk. 162; Eyre v. Shaftersbury, 2 P. Wms. 119; White v. White, 1 Bro. C. C. 12, 15; Moggridge v. Thackwell, 7 Ves. 35; Cary v. Abbot, Id. 490; Attorney General v. Fowler, 15 Ves. 85; Attorney General v. Price, 17 Ves. 371; Mills v. Palmer, 1 Meriv. 54.
II. Whether the legacies bequeathed by the will were preferable to those bequeathed by the codicil? if not, Whether the executors were warranted by the will, in paying any of the pecuniary legacies of the second class bequeathed by the will and codicils, in preference to the others? Whether they were not warranted at least in paying the egacy bequeathed to Mrs. Fisher, in full, as | soon as sufficient funds came to their hands? Whether, under all the circumstances of the case, the unsatisfied legatees could have recourse against those whose legacies had been paid in full, to compel them to refund the excess paid them above their just proportion? And if they could, whether they ought not to have recourse and exhaust their remedy against them, before thejr *could call upon the innocent executors to make good the loss?
The authorities cited for the executors, were Dewin v. Dewin, 2 Ves. sr. 415; Attorney General v. Robins, 2 P. Wms. 23 5 Crofts v. Dindsey, 11 Vin. Abr. Executors, B. c. pi. 11, p. 430; Holt v. Holt, Id. pi. 16: 1 Chan. Ca. 190; Miller’s ex’or v. Rice, 1 Rand. 438.
On the other side were cited 1 Roper on Deg. ch. 9; Tilsy v. Throckmorton, 2 Cft. Ca. 132; Coppin v. Coppin, 2 P. Wms. 292-6; Orr v. Kaimes, 2 Ves. sen. 194; Blower v. Morret, Id. 420; Walcott v. Hall, 2 Bro. C. C. 305; Noel v. Robinson, 1 Vern. 92, 460; Newman v. Barton, 2 Vern. 205; Keylinge’s case, 1 Sq. ca. abr. 239, pi. 25; Brisbane v. Dacres, 5 Taunt. 214; Skyring v. Greenwood, 4 Barn. & Cres. 281; 1 Com. Daw Rep. 43, 6; 10 Id. 335, 8, same cases; Dawrason v. Davenport, 2 Call, 95; Ruth & al. v. Owens, 2 Rand. 507.
Charitable Trusts — Validity.—The rule laid down in the principal case in regard to vague and indefinite charities (which is the first and leading case on this subject) is approved in Seaburn v. Seaburn, 15 Gratt. 425, where it is said that the English doctrine in regard to indefinite charities does not prevail in this state; it was founded mainly upon the statute of 43 Elizabeth, called the statute of charitable uses which if it ever was in force here, was repealed by the general repealing act of 1792.
The principal case is also cited at pp. 426, 430, 433. To the same effect, see, citing the principal case, Roy v. Rowzie, 25 Gratt. 608.
In Hill v. Bowman, 7 Leigh 657, Tucker, P., says, it is agreed on all hands that the words "any other person or persons who may be in distress,” are too vague and uncertain, and that the declaration of trust as to such persons is altogether inoperative and void, citing Gallego v. Attorney General, 3 Leigh, 450. To the same effect, see, citing the principal case, Brooke v. Shacklett, 13 Gratt. 310; Com. v. Levy, 23 Gratt. 40.
In Stonestreet v. Doyle, 75 Va. 364, it is held that, a devise of land to certain persons as trustees to build a school house for the purpose of a free school, the testator not contemplating that a charter shall be obtained for it, is null and void at law on the grounds of the uncertainty of the beneficiaries intended, citing Gallego v. Attorney General, 3 Leigh 450. To the same effect, the principal case is cited in foot-note to Kinnaird v. Miller, 25 Gratt. 107; Kelly v. Love, 20 Gratt. 130. And in Literary Fund v. Dawson, 1 Rob. 418, it is said the seminaries of learning which the testator sought to endow by the provisions of the 16th clause of his will were notin existence and could only be created by an act of incorporation; therefore a devise to or for them was inoperative and void upon the principles decided by the supreme court of the United States in Baptist Association v. Hart, 4 wheat. 1, and by this court in Gallego v. Attorney General, 3 Leigh 450. See Literary Fund v. Dawson, 10 Leigh 147, and note. But a devise of a charitable trust to a corporation thereafter to be created, may be enforced as an execu-tory devise. Literary Fund v. Dawson, 10 Leigh 147; Kinnaird v. Miller, 25 Gratt. 107; Stonestreet v. Doyle, 75 Va. 364.
And a bequest to a corporation capable to take is, and always was, valid as a charitable gift. Wilson v. Perry, 29 W. Va. 188, 1 S. E. Rep. 316, citing Gallego v. Attorney General, 3 Leigh 450.
In Brooke v. Shacklett, 13 Gratt. 309, 318, the principal case is cited as holding that the courts of chancery have no jurisdiction to enforce devises and bequests to religious societies and congregations. To the same effect, the principal case is cited in Carskadon v. Torreyson, 17 W. Va. 83. But in Protestant Episcopal E. Soc. v. Churchman, 80 Va. 763, it is said, no decision in this state has gone to the unreasonable extent of holding that a charity for religious uses is for that reason- void: even Gallego v. Attorney General, 3 Leigh 450, stops far short of deciding that. An examination of all the Virginia cases will show that whenever a charitable trust, though for religious uses, has been declared void, it has not been because religious in its character, but because it was too indefinite to be executed by the courts.
And in Protestant Episcopal E. Soc. v. Churchman, 80 Va. 718, the principal case is discussed on pp. 767, 769, 774, 776, 777, 780, and overruled, and the court approving the decision in Vidal v. Girard, 2 How. 127, holds that, at common law, courts of chancery had jurisdiction to enforce bequests for charitable uses, and the statute of 43 Elizabeth did not confer such jurisdiction, but only created an auxiliary remedy. Such statute was local, and never enforced here, but if it was general in its operation in some respects, it was.not repealed by the act of 1792, but in those respects it was preserved by the saving clause of that act. In any event ch. 77, Code of 1873, clearly validates and makes enforceable all gifts for.such purposes, subject to certain restrictions therein contained. Also, in Trustees v. Guthrie, 86 Va. 125, 10 S. E. Rep. 318, the principal case is discussed at pp. 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, and overruled, and the Churchman Case followed. But in Fifield v. Van Wycke, 3 Va. Law Reg. 209, 94 Va. 557, the two preceding cases are overruled and Gallego v. Attorney General followed. In this case (Fifield v. Vanwicke) it is said, so much of the opinions in Episcopal Education Soc. v. Churchman, and Trustee v. Guthrie, as discussed the j urisdiction of courts of chancery over charities at common law, how far, if at all, 43 Elizabeth was in force in this state, and the decision of Gallego v. Attorney General, and the cases which followed it are recognized and reiterated the principles of that case as to indefinite charities, except so far as they have been changed by the legislature, were wholly unnecessary to the decisions of those cases, and therefore must be regarded as mere obiter dieta and not binding upon the court, which is unwilling to hold that a line of decisions running back over a period of more than fifty years was thus overturned. If further changes are necessary or desirable upon the subject, the legislature, and not the courts, should make them.
In west Virginia the rule laid down in the principal case and those cases which follow it has been followed as will be seen from Bible Soc. v. Pendleton, 7 W. Va. 87, where it is held that, these indefinite charities, however it may be in other states, have in Virginia been held invalid at common law and since the repeal of the statute of 43 Elizabeth been held incapable of execution. The want of clearly recognized grantees or beneficiaries constitutes the indefinite character of these charities and renders them void at common law. This doctrine is clearly act forth by Judge Tucker in Gallego v. Attorney General, 3 Leigh 450. To the same effect the principal case is cited in Knox v. Knox, 9 W. Va. 139, 142, 144, 145, 147, 149; Carskadon v. Torreyson, 17 W. Va. 84, 85, 107; Wilson v. Perry, 29 W. Va. 169, 1 S. E. Rep. 316, 317, 318, 320, 321, 322: Wilmoth v. Wilmoth, 34 W. Va. 436, 12 S. E. Rep. 734; Pack v. Shanklin, 43 W. Va. 314, 317, 318, 27 S. E. Rep. 394, 395,
In Morris v. Morris. 48 W. Va. 430, 37 S. E. Rep. 573, it is said; "I know that in the creation of a trust by will or deed the beneiiciary must be a definite, certain. ascertainable person, natural or corporate, else the trust is not enforceable. Brown v. Caldwell, 23 W. Va. 187, 193; Association v. Hart, 4 Wheat. 3, 4 L. Ed. 499, cited in Pack v. Shanklin, 43 W. Va. 304. 27 S. E. Rep. 389; Gulleao's Ex'rs v. Attorney General, 3 Leigh 465; Carskadon v. Torreyson, 17 W. Va. 43. But It does seem to me. as this bequest is not to the congregation, but to trustees appointed by the will, and the pastor of the Methodist Protestant Church at Morganstown is a church officer placed in charge and pastorate of a definite church by the legitimate authority of that church, such trustees could have no difficulty in ascertaining the beneficiary, because he is no other person than the incumbent of the position of pastor of that church." See 3 Va. Law Reg. 537.
Same — How Enforced. — To the point that the attorney general or one of the trustees may exhibit a bill asking the aid of a court of equity to compel the due execution of a trust, whether charitable or otherwise, the principal case is cited in Clark v. Oliver, 91 Va. 427, 22 S. E. Rep. 175. See monographic note on ‘’Charities" appended to Kelly v. Love, 20 Gratt. 124.
Churches — Incorporation.—In Powell v. Dawson, 45 W. Va. 783, 32 S. E. Rep. 216, the principal case is cited to the point that the incorporation of churches is contrary to the constitution of Virginia.
See generally, monographic note on "Church Property’’ appended to Brooke v. Shacklett, 13 Gratt. 301.
Legatees — Overpayment—Refunding.—On! this question the principal case is cited in Davis v. Newman, 3 Rob. 666, 669, and note; Hurst v. Morgan, 31 W. Va. 531. 8 S. E. Rep. 291; Wilcocks v. Phillips, 29 Fed. Cas. 1201; foot-note to Burnley v. Lambert, 1 wash. 308. See monographic notes on “Legacies and Devises" appended to Early v. Early, Gilm. 124; “Executors and Administrators” appended to Rosser v. Depriest, 5 Gratt. 6.

Opinion:
CARR, J.
This case involves several very important questions, which I shall consider in the order they were discussed at the bar.
First, then, as to the charities. The attorney general filed an information and bill, to have them applied to the objects for which they were bequeathed, and to enforce the execution of the trusts in respect to them; and the chancellor considering them good and valid, decreed them. It was contended in the argument that this decree was erroneous, because the devise and bequests were vague and indefinite, and therefore void. Det us examine this. The pecuniary legacies of 4000 dollars are, in effect, given to the roman catholic congregation, but for the building and support of a chapel; and the ground is given to trustees to permit the roman catholics to build a church on, for the use of themselves, and all persons of that religion, residing in Richmond. The bare statement seems sufficient to shew, that under the general rule, as applicable to ordinary legacies, these would be void. Who are the beneficiaries? the *roman catholic congregation residing in Richmond. And who are they? Suppose you name them to-day: are those the same persons who constituted the congregation yesterday? Or who will constitute it to-morrow? Will none remove from, or come to Richmond, to reside? Will none be converted to or from the roman catholic religion? For it is to the roman catholic congregation for the time being, that the legacies are given. This however is a point which need not be pressed; for it was not pretended, that they could be supported, as legacies to individual persons. But it was strongly insisted,' that as charitable legacies they were entitled to the aid and protection of a court of equity; and the practice of the english courts, irs similar cases, was referred to in proof of the position. The course of decisions in England was admitted on the other side, but it was contended, that they rested in-tirely on the statute of charitable uses, 43 Eli», and did not at all belong to the ordinary powers of a court of equity. This was the only serious question. I certainly shall not discuss it; for I find 'this completely done to my hand, by chief justice Marshall, in the case of The Baptist Association v. Hart's ex'ors. The cases cited and examined, and the reasons given by him, prove, conclusively to my mind, that in England, charitable bequests, where no legal interest is vested, and which are too vague to be claimed by those for whom the beneficial interest was intended, cannot be established by a court of equity, either exercising its ordinary jurisdiction, or enforcing the prerogative of the king as parens patriae, independently of the statute 43 Elizabeth; and as that statute, if ever in force here, was repealed in 1792, I conclude that charitable bequests stand on the same footing with us, as all others, and will alike be sustained, or rejected, by courts of equity. X think the bill of the attorney general must be dismissed.
Wc come now to the other questions arising between some of the legatees and the executors. There can be no doubt, that the specific legacies are first to be delivered. *Next in order, are the legacies of 50,000 dollars to the testator's Spanish relations, 15,000 dollars to P. J. Che-vallie, and the legacies given to the slaves emancipated by the will. The legacies of this class amount to 69,600 dollars. The testator, then, after directing all the residue of his estate to be converted into mcrnej', directs his executors to pay, out of it, his funeral expenses, and their own commission; then, twenty six legacies to as many legatees, amounting to 114,000 dollars, and all legacies which he should bequeath by codicil; and lastly, he creates another residuum, which he bequeaths to residuary legatees. Then come eleven codicils, giving pecuniary legacies to an amount exceeding 47,550 dollars. I think the twenty six legacies bequeathed by the will, out of the first general residue, and the pecuniary legacies bequeathed by the codicils, stand all on the same footing. Erom the passage directing that Mrs. Eisher should be paid her legacy as soon as possible, knowing she was in need, and another in the first codicil, saying that as to the payment of the legacies left by his will, he directs his executors to begin to pay those that they think most in need, and a similar direction as to his brother Erancisco's legacy, it was contended, that the testator meant to place Mrs. Eisher, and those who should be thought by the executors most needy, .on higher ground than the other legatees, and to authorize the executors to pay them in preference to the others, in case of a deficiency: and this was said to be rendered more clear, by that clause in the fourth codicil, by which he "desires his executors to use their best judgment in making the sales of his real estate, and not to hurry them, as it might create sacrifices." But I do not think that the testator ever intended such preference, or dreamed of such deficiency. He believed that the fund would be abundant for all the legacies; and only feared, that to hurry the sales at an unfavourable time might injure his Spanish relations, who were to have the residuum, tie wished this residuum as large as possible, and therefore cautioned the executors; but he never thought about exclusive *preferences among the second class of legatees. The executors however have gone on to pay some of the legatees intirely, others partially; and it is now discovered, that the fund will fall far short of paying all the claims upon it. Jn this state of things, the unsatisfied legatees insist, that the executors are liable to them, for their fair and equal proportion, of the whole fund; while the executors contend, that they must be credited by the full amount of all legacies, or parts of legacies paid, leaving the unpaid legatees to make those who have been overpaid, account to them for the excess. I have the fullest confidence, that the executors have proceeded honestly in this business; but, assuredly, most incautiously. Thejr had the fund in their hands; the will for their guide; and the best counsel at their call: they could have secured themselves, either by paying pari passu, or by taking bonds to refund, or by bringing the whole affair under the control of the chancellor. The legatees could do nothing to prevent improper disbursements: their claim was against the executors alone; and they have made it by suit. Would it not now be most cruel injustice to tell them, the executors, to be sure, ought to have paid you your proportion of the fund; but they have, by mistake, paid it to other legatees; and your only remedy, now, is to seek them over the face of the earth, and call them to account? I can never agree to tell them so. I think it but simple justice to give them a decree against the executors for their fair proportion of the whole fund, and let the executors if they can (a question which I pass by, as it is not before us) recover from the over-paid legatees. It was also contended, that the defect of assets resulting from the general and rapid fall in the value of property, presents a case, where equity will relieve executors from the effects of what the law would call a devastavit: and the cases from 11 Vin. abr. 430, and 1 Chan. Ca. 190, are cited. In one, the property was consumed by the great fire in London; in the other, it was taken away by the restoration: these were cases in which no vigilance or prudence of the executor *could have protected him. But the case before us is different ; safety was perfectly in the executors' power.