Case Name: MEHRING et al, Appellants, v. ARPKE et al, Respondents
Court: Oregon Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1983-11-30
Citations: 65 Or. App. 747
Docket Number: 30655; CA A26136
Parties: MEHRING et al, Appellants, v. ARPKE et al, Respondents.
Judges: Before Buttler, Presiding Judge, and Warren and Rossman, Judges.
Reporter: Oregon Reports, Court of Appeals
Volume: 65
Pages: 747–754

Head Matter:
Argued and submitted April 4,
affirmed November 30, 1983,
reconsideration denied January 13,
petition for review denied February 8, 1984 (296 Or 411)
MEHRING et al, Appellants, v. ARPKE et al, Respondents.
(30655; CA A26136)
672 P2d 382
Ronald L. Saxton, Portland, argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs was Lindsay, Hart, Neil & Weigler, Portland.
Ronald L. Marceau, Bend, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondents Arpke and Durdan.
Richard L. Isham, Deschutes County Legal Counsel, Bend, filed the brief for respondent Deschutes County.
Before Buttler, Presiding Judge, and Warren and Rossman, Judges.
WARREN, J.
Rossman, J., specially concurring.
Buttler, P.J., dissenting.

Opinion:
WARREN, J.
Plaintiffs appeal from a circuit court order granting defendants' motion to dismiss this action for lack of jurisdiction. We affirm.
In April, 1978, defendants, developers of Indian Ford Ranch, received county approval for a proposed condominium development and zone change for Lake Village as a "Planned Development" zone. In November, 1979, before construction on the project, the county changed its zoning laws in a manner which would preclude defendants' proposed use. In October, 1980, the county approved defendants' site plan for the project authorizing construction of 175 condominium units based on the 1978 zone change. The site plan approval was not challenged.
In October, 1981, plaintiffs brought this action to enjoin the planned development under ORS 215.185, which provides:
"In case a building or other structure is, or is proposed to be, located, constructed, maintained, repaired, altered, or used, or any land is, or is proposed to be, used, in violation of an ordinance or regulation designed to implement a comprehensive plan, the governing body of the county or a person whose interest in real property in the county is or may be affected by the violation, may, in addition to other remedies provided by law, institute injunction, mandamus, abatement, or other appropriate proceedings to prevent, temporarily or permanently enjoin, abate, or remove the unlawful location, construction, maintenance, repair, alteration, or use. When a temporary restraining order is granted in a suit instituted by a person who is not exempt from furnishing bonds or undertakings under ORS 22.010, the person shall furnish undertaking as provided in ORCP 82 A.(l)."
Plaintiffs contend that the development project is in violation of the 1979 zoning of the property as rural residential and argue that the 1978 zoning change and project approval thereunder are ineffective in the light of the 1979 changes. Plaintiffs claim that defendants must, but have failed to, establish a vested right in order to proceed as a nonconforming use. The essence of plaintiffs' contention is that, there being no vested rights, the site plan approval is unlawful in view of the 1979 zoning ordinance.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to review the county's decision to grant the site plan approval. Defendants argue that the approval is a "land use decision" under Or Laws 1979, ch 722, § 3(1) and that review of the county's action is, therefore, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA) under Or Laws 1979, ch 772, § 4(1), which provides:
"Review of land use decisions under sections 4 and 6 of this 1979 Act shall be commenced by filing a notice of intent to appeal with the Land Use Board of Appeals. Subject to the provisions of section 6a of this 1979 Act relating to judicial review by the Court of Appeals, the board shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review any land use decision of a city, county or special district governing body or a state agency in the manner provided in sections 5 and 6 of this 1979 Act."
Plaintiffs' claim (1) that the trial judge erred in finding that the county had made a "land use decision" and (2) that the circuit court has jurisdiction under ORS 215.185 to adjudicate plaintiffs' claim.
The first issue is resolved by Hilliard v. Lane County Commrs., 51 Or App 587, 592, 626 P2d 905, rev den 291 Or 368 (1981), where we held that a site review approval is an application of an ordinance which implements the comprehensive plan, Or Laws 1979, ch 772, § 3(1), and therefore comes within the definition of "land use decision" reviewable exclusively by LUBA. Defendant developers in this case received site review approval from Deschutes County in October, 1980. They continued to proceed with their project, relying on the county's determination that their project was within the comprehensive plan. Because the 1980 site plan approval was a "land use decision" under Or Laws 1979, ch 772, § 3(1), LUBA has "exclusive jurisdiction" to review it, Or Laws 1979, ch 772, § 4(1), and the circuit court was correct in granting defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
We cannot agree with plaintiffs' contention that ORS 215.185 provides a judicial remedy for a proposed violation of a comprehensive plan and zoning ordinance in a case where defendants' actions are taken in accordance with a "land use decision" by a local government.
In enacting Or Laws 1979, ch 772, establishing LUBA, the legislature intended to furnish review of land use decisions in LUBA, rather than the circuit courts, both for the sake of consistency and to expedite the process. League of Women Voters v. Washington County, 56 Or App 217, 221, 641 P2d 608 (1982). ORS 215.185 has been in effect since 1955. Before the creation of LUBA, it might well have been applicable to the facts of this case. However, in view of the exclusive jurisdiction of LUBA over land use decisions, whatever continued application it may have, it cannot apply to this case. As the trial court pointed out, the ultimate result of allowing plaintiffs to use an action under ORS 215.185 to review defendants' site plan approval a year after it was granted would be that any person not satisfied with a land use decision by a local governing body could make a similar allegation and litigate the matter in circuit court. That clearly was not the intent of the legislature. It intended that review of land use decisions be expedited in a single forum having exclusive jurisdiction.
We hold that the circuit court does not have jurisdiction under ORS 215.185 to resolve disputes in which the alleged activity is taken pursuant to a "land use decision" by a local governing body.
The dissent is based on the premise that, if the county approved a site plan without requiring the developers to show a vested right, LUBA does not have exclusive jurisdiction. It appears to argue that LUBA does not have exclusive jurisdiction because the local decision was wrong. Whether or not the site plan was erroneously approved is not the issue. If it is conceded that site approval should not have been given, the question remains which forum, LUBA or the circuit court, has jurisdiction to correct the error.
A site plan approval is a land use decision. However wrong and for whatever reason the local decision was wrong, the legislature has given LUBA exclusive jurisdiction to correct errors in land use decisions. Whatever ORS 215.185 authorized before the creation of LUBA, the vesting in LUBA of exclusive jurisdiction over land use decisions by definition leaves no jurisdiction elsewhere.
Affirmed.
Rural residential zoning requires a minimum of ten acres per structure. Plaintiffs contend that the proposed development project would have a density over 29 times greater than permitted by rural residential zoning.
Or Laws 1979, ch 772, § 3(1) provided:
"(1) 'Land use decision' means:
"(a) A final decision or determination made by a city, county or special district governing body that concerns the adoption, amendment or application of:
"(A) The state-wide planning goals;
"(B) A comprehensive plan provision; or
"(C) A zoning, subdivision or other ordinance that implements a comprehensive plan; or
"(b) A final decision or determination of a state agency other than the Land conservation and Development commission, with respect to which the agency is required to apply the state-wide planning goals.
*>>
This statute was amended by Or Laws 1981, ch 748, § 4(1). The amendments made no substantive change in LUBA jurisdiction.
The definition of "Land use decision" was amended by the 1981 Legislature and is now contained in ORS 197.015(10). Those amendments do not affect the outcome in Hillard or in the present case.
Plaintiffs argue that the site plan review was not a "decision" of local government, because it failed to comply with ORS 192.610(1) public meeting notice requirements. The record is inadequate to evaluate this claim. Plaintiffs fail to explain how ORS 192.610(1) applies to land use laws, or what kind of notice is required. They fail to set out facts sufficient to determine whether they were entitled to notice under that statute. We cannot tell from the record whether plaintiffs owned their property at the relevant time or the location of plaintiffs' property with respect to the proposed development.