Case Name: KEENAN v. COUNTY OF MIDLAND
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1966-01-05
Citations: 377 Mich. 57
Docket Number: Calendar No. 60, Docket No. 50,573
Parties: KEENAN v. COUNTY OF MIDLAND.
Judges: T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., and Smith, O’Hara, and Adams, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 377
Pages: 57–70

Head Matter:
KEENAN v. COUNTY OF MIDLAND.
Decision of the Court.
1. Counties—Death of- Minor at Swimming Beach—Summary Judgment.
Order granting defendant county’s motion for summary judgment in action against it and others for death of child at swimming beach owned, operated, and staffed by defendants is reversed and cause remanded for trial.
Separate Opinion.
T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., and Smith, O’Hara, and Adams, JJ.
2. Counties—Abrogation of Governmental Immunity—Death of Minor at Swimming Beach.
Abrogation of rule of governmental immunity as to counties in tort cases pending at time of such abrogation applied to instant case, an action to recover damages from county for death of a 5-year-old child at a swimming beach operated by the county, pending on appeal at tvrne of abrogation.
3. States—Governmental Immunity from Tort Liability.
The State and its agencies, including school districts, have remained immune from tort liability since the abrogation of the rule as to political subdivisions j the statute pertaining to liability of the State and governmental agencies for negligence is controlling from its effective date (FA 1964, No 170).
References for Points in Headnotes
[1, 2, 7,13] 39 Am Jur, Parks, Squares, and Dlaygrounds § 39.
Municipal operation of bathing beach or swimming pool as governmental or proprietary -function, for purposes of tort liability. . 55 ALR2d 1434.
[3] 49 Am Jur, States, Territories and Dependencies §§ 91, 96, 100-102.
[4] 5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 1009.
[5, 8. 9,11] 20 Am Jur 2d, Courts §§ 189, 195.
[6,10] 20 Am Jur 2d, Courts §§ 233-236.
[12] 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law § 210 et- seq.
4. Costs—Death—Counties.
No costs are allowed on appeal from summary judgment for defendant county in action by administrator of estate of 5-year-old child arising out of drowning at a swimming beach.
Separate Opinion.
Souris, J.
5. Courts—Majority Necessary to Give Precedential Weight to Decision.
A decision of the Supreme Court does not attain precedential force unless a majority of the full Court agrees on a rationale for decision.
6. Same—Precedents—Ex Post Pacto Effect.
The Supreme Court cannot give precedential force to a previously rendered decision that was without precedential force at the time it was decided, but may give such prior decision precedential force prospectively.
7. Counties—Negligence—Abrogation of Doctrine of Governmental Immunity.
Claims against a county for negligent injury are limited to period commencing 3 years prior to date of abrogation of doctrine of governmental immunity by the Supreme Court in the decision rendered herein and terminating upon the effective date of statute pertaining to liability of governmental agencies, inclusive of counties, for negligent injuries (CLS 1956, § 609.13; CLS 1961, § 600.5805; FA 1964, No 170).
Dissenting Opinion.
Black, J.
8. Courts—Precedents.
Language of an opinion subscribed to by less than a majority of an appellate court does not constitute a precedent for future guidance.
9. Same—Precedents—Majority.
No point of law is established by an appellate comt where the members unanimously or by majority vote to reach a decision but cannot, even by a majority, agree on the reasoning therefor.
10. Same—Overruled Cases—Prospective Basis.
Overruling of a case should be on a wholly prospective basis.
11. Same—Precedents.
Five unrestricted indorsements of an opinion of the 8-man Supreme Court are necessary to constitute it a precedent even though there be but 7 Justices participating in the case.
Dissenting Opinion.
Dethmers and Kelly, JJ.
12. Constitutional Law—Governmental Immunity—Separation op Powers.
The power to extend, modify, or abrogate the doctrine of governmental immunity is wholly legislative in character and is not vested in the judiciary.
13. Counties—Swimming Beaoi-i—Drowning—Governmental Immunity prom Liability por Torts.
The common-law doctrine of governmental immunity from liability for torts of agents and employees of a municipal corporation, not having been abrogated or modified by the legislature as to counties engaged in operating a swimming beach, may properly be made the ground for granting county’s motion for summary judgment in action against it by administrator of estate of 5-year-old child who drowned at the beach.
Appeal from Midland; Holbrook (Donald E.), J.
Submitted March 2, 1965.
(Calendar No. 60, Docket No. 50,573.)
Decided January 5, 1966.
Declaration by Francis Keenan, administrator of the estate of Kimberly ‘ Keenan, against the county of Midland, township of Jerome, William A. Francis and Mary K. Francis, doing business as Francis Grove Beach, Duane Valerio, and Vernon M. Meier for the wrongful death of Kimberly Keenan, who drowned at a beach that was owned, operated, and staffed by defendants. Summary judgment for defendant county. Proceedings stayed pending outcome of appeal by plaintiff.
Reversed and remanded.
Cicinelli, Mossner, Majoros & Harrigan (Peter F. Cicinelli and Eugene D. Mossner, of counsel), for plaintiff.
Stanton, Taylor, McGraw & Collison (John Davidson, of counsel), for defendant county.

Opinion:
Adams, J.
This lawsuit results from the drowning of a 5-year-old child. Death occurred in July, 1960, at a swimming beach in Midland county. For purposes of decision on motion for summary judgment, the beach was acknowledged to have been operated by the county of Midland. Defendant was granted a summary judgment, the trial court reasoning that, under prior decisions of this Court, the county of Midland was engaged in a governmental function. The court also reasoned that since the alleged tort occurred prior to decision of this Court in Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich 231, the rule of governmental immunity, if abrogated by that case, was nevertheless a bar to a claimed cause of action which arose prior to September 22, 1961.
On March 1, 1965, one day before oral argument in this case, in Myers v. Genesee County Auditor, 375 Mich 1, this Court, with seven members sitting, by reversing and remanding for trial, decided by a clear majority of those participating to abrogate the rule of governmental immunity as to counties, thus overruling Lewis v. Genesee County, 370 Mich 110, and also held that said abrogation was applicable to "pending and future cases."
Inasmuch as this case was pending at the time of decision in Myers, the application of the rule of governmental immunity is no longer valid. The case is remanded to the trial court for vacation of the order granting summary judgment as to de fendant county of Midland and for such, further proceedings as may he appropriate.
Myers abolished (until the effective date, July 1, 1965, of PA 1964, No 170) the defense of governmental immunity as to all political subdivisions of government not theretofore abolished. The State and its agencies, including school districts, remained immune from tort liability. McDowell v. State Highway Commissioner, 365 Mich 268; Sayers v. School District No. 1, Fractional, 366 Mich 217. The problem now, and as of July 1, 1965, is governed by the provisions of PA 1964, No 170 (CL 1948, § 691.1401 et seq. [Stat Ann 1965 Cum Supp § 3.996(101) et seq.]). Our decision here does not affect the provisions of article 7, § 6, of the Constitution of 1963.
No costs.
T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., and Smith and O'Hara, JJ., concurred with Adams, J.
See GCR 1983, 117.—Reporter.