Case Name: Latray Lamont COLLINS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Justin JONES, Respondent-Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2012-12-10
Citations: 491 F. App'x 937
Docket Number: No. 12-6042
Parties: Latray Lamont COLLINS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Justin JONES, Respondent-Appellee.
Judges: Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, McKAY and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 491
Pages: 937–938

Head Matter:
Latray Lamont COLLINS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Justin JONES, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 12-6042.
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
Dec. 10, 2012.
Latray Lamont Collins, Lawton, OK, pro se.
Jay Sehniederjan, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Oklahoma, Oklahoma City, OK, for Respondent-Appellee.
Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, McKAY and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
JEROME A. HOLMES, Circuit Judge.
Petitioner-Appellant Latray Lamont Collins, proceeding pro se, seeks a certifi cate of appealability ("COA") to challenge the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Mr. Collins also moves to proceed in forma pauperis. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we deny Mr. Collins's application for a COA and dismiss this matter. We grant Mr. Collins's motion to proceed in forma pau-peris.
A COA is a jurisdictional prerequisite to our review of the merits of a § 2254 appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 2258(c)(1)(A); Clark v. Oklahoma, 468 F.3d 711, 713 (10th Cir.2006); see also Gonzalez v. Thaler, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 641, 647-49, 181 L.Ed.2d 619 (2012) (discussing, inter alia, the "clear" jurisdictional language in § 2253(c)(1)). We will issue a COA only if the applicant makes "a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." Woodward v. Cline, 693 F.3d 1289, 1292 (10th Cir.2012) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2)) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Clark, 468 F.3d at 713. An applicant "satisfies this standard by demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court's resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude that the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further." Dulworth v. Jones, 496 F.3d 1133, 1136-37 (10th Cir.2007) (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Following a jury trial, Mr. Collins was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Mr. Collins filed a habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, seeking relief on four grounds: (1) failure to give accomplice instructions to the jury deprived him of a fundamentally fair trial; (2) admission of testimony by Agent Rizzi about his interview with Garland Mbaneme deprived him of a fundamentally fair trial; (3) he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to a fair and impartial jury; and (4) his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to request accomplice instructions. The district court denied the petition. Mr. Collins seeks a COA to challenge that decision.
Pursuant to the analytic framework that the Supreme Court has established, most notably in Miller-El, we have carefully reviewed Mr. Collins's combined opening brief and application for COA and the record, including the district court's order that adopted in full the report and recommendation of a magistrate judge and, consequently, denied Mr. Collins's § 2254 petition. Based upon this review, we conclude, that Mr. Collins is not entitled to a COA on any of his claims because reasonable jurists would not debate the correctness of the district court's decision. Furthermore, Mr. Collins has not demonstrated that the issues he has presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.
For the foregoing reasons, we deny Mr. Collins's request for a COA and dismiss this matter. We grant his motion to proceed informa pauperis.
This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1.
. Because Mr. Collins is proceeding pro se, we construe his filings liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (per curiam); Garza v. Davis, 596 F.3d 1198, 1201 n. 2 (10th Cir.2010).