Case Name: German MELGARES, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1999-11-10
Citations: 762 So. 2d 921
Docket Number: No. 99-2586
Parties: German MELGARES, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: Before NESBITT, COPE and SORONDO, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 762
Pages: 921–923

Head Matter:
German MELGARES, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 99-2586.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Nov. 10, 1999.
Opinion Granting Rehearing in part June 28, 2000.
German Melgares, in proper person.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Dominique T. Suite-Brown, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Before NESBITT, COPE and SORONDO, JJ.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
German Melgares appeals an order denying his motion for postconvietion relief under Florida Rule of Criminal of Procedure 3.850. We affirm.
In defendant-appellant Melgares' direct appeal from his conviction of sale of cocaine, he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence. This court affirmed without discussion, but citing a number of authorities. See Melgares v. State, 711 So.2d 1389 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). From the citations chosen, it appears the panel accepted the State's argument that the question of the sufficiency of the evidence had not been properly preserved for appellate review because, among other things, the argument being, raised on appeal differed from the argument presented in the trial court.
Defendant claims in his motion for postconvietion relief that counsel was ineffective by reason of the foregoing. The trial court properly rejected this claim. Even if trial counsel had made a more elaborate sufficiency argument, the motion for judgment of acquittal would have been correctly denied. The testimony of the undercover officer was that the defendant approached him to ask him what he wanted; the undercover officer told him that he wanted cocaine rocks; and defendant then "instructed someone else to obtain the cocaine rocks for me." (Tr. 84). The undercover officer then went with the third person, Rafael Rodriguez, and purchased the coeaine rocks, after which the defendant and Rodriguez were arrested. The evidence was sufficient to go to the jury. See Douglas v. State, 627 So.2d 1190 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); L.J. v. State, 578 So.2d 360 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); Fernandez v. State, 639 So.2d 658, 659-60 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); § 777.011, Fla. Stat. (1995). The testimony that the defendant approached the officer to ask him what he wanted, and then "instructed" Rodriguez to obtain cocaine for the officer is sufficient to create a jury question on the charge of sale or delivery of cocaine.
Defendant contends that his trial counsel should have called as a witness Officer Frazier, who was with the testifying undercover officer during the transaction. However, the Rule 3.850 motion fails to state what the substance of Officer Frazier's testimony, would have been. This ruling is without prejudice to defendant to file a more particularized motion on this point.
Defendant was sentenced as a habitual offender. He contends that the 1995 version of the habitual offender statute is unconstitutional because chapter 95-182, Laws of Florida, violates Florida's single subject rule, and that he is entitled to postconviction relief. This court has rejected the single subject challenge to chapter 95-182. See Higgs v. State, 695 So.2d 872 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); see also Crawford v. State, 743 So.2d 1136 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); Hill v. State, 740 So.2d 581 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). But see Thompson v. State, 708 So.2d 315 (Fla. 2d DCA), review granted 717 So.2d 538 (Fla.1998). We reject the defendant's constitutional challenge on authority of Higgs.
We find no merit in defendant's remaining Rule 3.850 claims.
Affirmed.
Before COPE and SORONDO, JJ., and NESBITT, Senior Judge.
. The date of the crime was October 11, 1996.
. Defendant also argued that the 1995 version of the habitual offender statute was unconstitutional because of a claimed single subject violation in chapter 95-184, Laws of Florida. We reject this claim, as chapter 95-184 did not modify the habitual offender statute.
.We have taken judicial notice of the briefs and record in defendant's direct appeal, Melgares v. State, 711 So.2d 1389 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998).