Case Name: WAL-MART STORES, INC. and Hector Dominguez, Appellants, v. Petra ROSA, Appellee
Court: Texas Courts of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 2001-05-31
Citations: 52 S.W.3d 842
Docket Number: No. 04-99-00791-CV
Parties: WAL-MART STORES, INC. and Hector Dominguez, Appellants, v. Petra ROSA, Appellee.
Judges: Sitting: PHIL HARDBERGER, Chief Justice, TOM RICKHOFF, ALMA L. LÓPEZ, CATHERINE STONE, PAUL W. GREEN, SARAH B. DUNCAN and KAREN ANGELINI, Justices.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Third Series
Volume: 52
Pages: 842–847

Head Matter:
WAL-MART STORES, INC. and Hector Dominguez, Appellants, v. Petra ROSA, Appellee.
No. 04-99-00791-CV.
Court of Appeals of Texas, San Antonio.
May 31, 2001.
Kevin D. Jewell, Magenheim Bateman <& Helfand, P.L.L.C., Houston, for Appellant.
David E. Dilley, Dilley Law Firm, San Antonio, Jose Luis Garza, Rio Grande City, for Appellee.
Sitting: PHIL HARDBERGER, Chief Justice, TOM RICKHOFF, ALMA L. LÓPEZ, CATHERINE STONE, PAUL W. GREEN, SARAH B. DUNCAN and KAREN ANGELINI, Justices.

Opinion:
Opinion On Appellee's Amended Motion FOR REHEARING En BaNC
Opinion by:
SARAH B. DUNCAN, Justice.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. appeals the trial court's judgment against it in Petra Rosa's premise defect suit. The court has reconsidered the case en banc and withdraws the panel opinion and judgment dated October 31, 2000. We hold there is no evidence from which it can be inferred that Wal-Mart had actual knowledge or constructive notice of the premise defect for so long that it should have been discovered and removed. We therefore reverse the trial court's judgment and render judgment in Wal-Mart's favor.
Factual and Procedural Background
After paying for her groceries, Petra Rosa slipped and fell on a piece of banana. She later sued Wal-Mart for negligence. After a jury trial, the trial court rendered judgment in Rosa's favor. Wal-Mart appeals. .
Standard of Review
The scope and standard for legal sufficiency review is well-established. To determine whether there is legally sufficient evidence, we review "only the evidence and the inferences tending to support the [jury's] finding and disregard all evidence and inferences to the contrary." Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex. 1965). If there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support the finding, the legal sufficiency challenge must fail. Stafford v. Stafford, 726 S.W.2d 14, 16 (Tex.1987).
Discussion
To recover in a slip-and-fall case, a plaintiff must establish:
(1) Actual or constructive knowledge of some condition on the premises by the owner/operator;
(2) That the condition posed an unreasonable risk of harm;
(3) That the owner/operator did not exercise reasonable care to reduce or eliminate the risk; and
(4) That the owner/operator's failure to use such care proximately caused the plaintiffs injuries.
Keetch v. Kroger Co., 845 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex.1992). "[W]hen circumstantial evidence is relied upon to prove constructive notice, the evidence must establish that it is more likely than not that the dangerous condition existed long enough to give the proprietor a reasonable opportunity to discover the condition." Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Gonzalez, 968 S.W.2d 934, 936 (Tex. 1998).
There is no evidence any Wal-Mart employee had actual knowledge of the piece of banana upon which Rosa fell. To meet the circumstantial evidence standard, Rosa points to the testimony of her daughter-in-law, Melissa Rosa. She testified the piece of banana was "brown," and when her children dropped pieces of banana, it took at least forty-five minutes to one hour for the banana to turn brown. However, this testimony is no evidence that the banana had been on the floor long enough to charge Wal-Mart with constructive notice. See Corbin v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 648 S.W.2d 292, 296 (Tex.1983) ("Corbin's testimony that the grapes lying around him were discolored and ruptured does not tend to prove that the grapes had been on the floor a sufficient time to impute knowledge of their location to Safeway."); Furr's, Inc. v. McCaslin, 335 S.W.2d 284, 286 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1960, no writ) ("Where it is equally as probable that the withering, blackening and deterioration . occurred before it got on the floor, a finding that it took place afterward is an unwarranted inference and may not be sustained.").
Melissa Rosa also testified the piece of banana looked to her to have been there a while. Again, however, this is not evidence from which constructive notice may be inferred. See Gonzalez, 968 S.W.2d at 937-38 ("The testimony that the macaroni salad 'seemed like it had been there awhile' is mere speculative, subjective opinion of no evidentiary value. The' witnesses had not seen the macaroni salad prior to the fall and had no personal knowledge of the length of time it had been on the floor.").
Rosa also points to the number and proximity of Wal-Mart employees near where she fell, as well as a 3-inch wide-angled mirror on the wall behind her, as evidence that Wal-Mart should have discovered the piece of banana. In support of this argument, Rosa cites Stoner v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 35 F.Supp.2d 958 (S.D.Tex.1999), Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Tinsley, 998 S.W.2d 664, 669 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1999, pet. denied), and Furr's Super Market v. Garrett, 615 S.W.2d 280, 281 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1981, writ refd n.r.e.). However, this evidence does not tend to prove the piece of banana had been on the floor long enough to charge Wal-Mart with constructive notice. See Gonzalez, 968 S.W.2d at 938 ("Gonzalez had to demonstrate that it was more likely than not that the macaroni salad had been there for a long time.").
Conclusion
As in Gonzalez, "the circumstantial evidence . supports only the possibility that the dangerous condition existed long enough to give Wal-Mart a reasonable opportunity to discover it." Gonzalez, 968 S.W.2d at 936. We therefore reverse the trial court's judgment and render judgment in Wal-Mart's favor.
Justice RICKHOFF concurring.