Case Name: Ronald A. MILLER, Sr., Administrator of the Estate of Ronald A. Miller, Jr., Appellant, v. The BRASS RAIL TAVERN, INC., A Pennsylvania Corporation, and Thomas E. McMaster
Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1994-06-23
Citations: 643 A.2d 694
Docket Number: 
Parties: Ronald A. MILLER, Sr., Administrator of the Estate of Ronald A. Miller, Jr., Appellant, v. The BRASS RAIL TAVERN, INC., A Pennsylvania Corporation, and Thomas E. McMaster.
Judges: Before CAVANAUGH, WIEAND and SAYLOR, JJ.
Reporter: West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 643
Pages: 694–698

Head Matter:
Ronald A. MILLER, Sr., Administrator of the Estate of Ronald A. Miller, Jr., Appellant, v. The BRASS RAIL TAVERN, INC., A Pennsylvania Corporation, and Thomas E. McMaster.
Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
Argued Feb. 9, 1994.
Filed June 23, 1994.
Robert Lugg, Lock Haven, for appellant.
Paul D. Welch, Jr., Lock Haven, for appel-lee.
Before CAVANAUGH, WIEAND and SAYLOR, JJ.

Opinion:
CAVANAUGH, Judge:
This appeal is from a judgment entered against appellant after a non-jury trial. Appellant represents the estate of his deceased son who died in a single car accident after an evening of drinking alcoholic beverages. Ap-pellees are the corporate owner of a bar and its principal shareholder. The lower court found that appellant had not proven liability because he did not demonstrate a causal link between appellee's negligence in serving the visibly intoxicated decedent and the occurrence of the accident.
On appeal, appellant challenges the exclusion of the proffered testimony of the county coroner to establish the time of decedent's death. No other evidence was offered to prove time of death. The lower court excluded the evidence for two reasons: (1) the coroner, Dean K. Wetzler, Jr., was not identified as an expert witness, merely as a fact witness, by appellant in pretrial discovery, and (2) appellant did not qualify Wetzler as an expert by establishing his competency to give an opinion on time of death.
Whether a particular witness qualifies as an expert is a matter within the discretion of the trial court. Ruzzi v. Butler Petroleum Company, 527 Pa. 1, 10, 588 A.2d 1, 5 (1991). A decision on competency of an expert will not be reversed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion. Id. The witness must have a reasonable pretension to specialized knowledge on the subject under investigation. Id. If a witness possesses neither experience nor education in the subject matter under investigation, he should be found not qualified. Dierolf v. Slade, 399 Pa.Super. 9, 581 A.2d 649 (1990).
Previous cases in which a coroner was allowed to testify concerning the time of a decedent's death involved a coroner who was a physician. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lewis, 472 Pa. 235, 372 A.2d 399 (1977); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 265 Pa. 491, 109 A. 218 (1920). Appellant has cited none, nor are we aware of any, in which a lay coroner has been found qualified to render an opinion as to time of death.
Nothing in the record indicated that Wetz-ler was a medical doctor or physician or that he had received any type of medical training. Appellant's offer of proof concerning Wetz-ler's qualifications to render expert testimony was as follows:
Q. You're a mortician, sir?
A. I am a licensed funeral director in the Commonwealth, yes.
Q. And you operate a funeral home in Mill Hall?
A I do.
Q. And for how many years?
A. Almost 22 years.
Q. How many years have you been a licensed mortician?
A. Twenty-seven.
Q. You have an active practice or an active business in Mill Hall?
A. Yes.
Q. Are you also a Coroner of Clinton County?
A Yes, sir.
Q. And for how many years have you been a Coroner?
A. I am in my 15th year as Coroner.
Q. Just tell us briefly what your duties are as Coroner.
A. To investigate sudden and suspicious deaths, such as those which have occurred from homicide, suicide, motor vehicle fatalities, drownings, cave-ins, sudden infant deaths, and, obviously, natural deaths which have occurred suddenly without prior medical attendance.
Q. And who notifies you in cases of these deaths where an investigation is necessary?
A. Most frequently, Clinton County Communications Center. However, I have also received personal notifications directly from individuals to my office as well as direct notification by various hospitals.
Q. And do you conduct your investigation in connection with the Pennsylvania State Police and other police departments?
A. I do.
Q. Do you furnish and fill out death certificates?
A. I do.
Q. Do you sign them?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you you sign them in your official capacity as Coroner?
A. I do.
Q. Do you make determination as to cause of death?
A. I do.
Q. And you fill that in on the Death Certificate?
A. Yes.
Q. And how long have you been doing that?
A. Going on about fifteen, fourteen and a half years; in my fifteen years as Coroner.
Q. And when you make that determination, you do it based on your findings from your investigation?
A. That is correct.
Q. And from your conferences with the various medical people involved?
A. Correct.
Q. Do you also make a determination as to the time of death?
A I do.
Q. And how long have you been doing that?
A. Fifteen years.
Q. Sixteen years?
A. Going on fifteen, yes.
Q. And is that determination based upon your investigation and findings from your investigation?
A. That is correct.
Notes of Testimony, May 11, 1992 at 27-29.
This testimony established that Wetzler was a licensed funeral director and elected county coroner. He testified that since becoming coroner fifteen years ago, he has determined the time of death in cases based upon investigations that include conversations with medical personnel.
We find that on the basis of the record before it, the lower court did not err in finding that Wetzler was not qualified to give an opinion on time of death. Appellant did not sustain his burden in showing that Wetzler's education or experience was such that he had a responsible pretension to specialized knowledge in the area under investigation. Although he testified that he had determined time of death previously, he did not indicate the number of cases in which he had done so. He did not explain the methodology he used, his basis of knowledge, his investigative techniques, nor his background in this area of forensics. His credentials to render an opinion as to time of death were not established. The lower court did not err in excluding his testimony on this basis.
Because we find the testimony was properly excluded on the ground of lack of competency, we do not reach the merits of the issue regarding the adequacy of appellant's identification of Wetzler in pre-trial discovery.
Judgment affirmed.
WIEAND, J., files a dissenting opinion.
. Based upon the provisions of the Dram Shop Act, 47 P.S. Sec. 4-493, 4-497.