Case Name: COHALAN et al. v. PARKER et al.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1910-06-03
Citations: 123 N.Y.S. 343
Docket Number: 
Parties: COHALAN et al. v. PARKER et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 123
Pages: 343–343

Head Matter:
COHALAN et al. v. PARKER et al.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
June 3, 1910.)
Execution (§ 45 )—Property Subject to Execution—Remainder.
Under Real Property Law (Consol. Laws, c. 50) § 59, providing that an expectant, estate is descendible, devisable, and alienable, in the same manner as an estate in possession, a testamentary remainder _ interest, whether vested or contingent, is subject to sale to satisfy a judgment against the devisee, and whatever .interest the devisee has will pass to the purchaser at the sale.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Execution, Cent Dig. §§ 141, .142; Dec. Dig. § 45.*]
Appeal from Special Term, New York County.
Action by Michael J. Cohalan, as receiver in proceedings supplementary to execution of Clifford E. Parker, a judgment debtor, and others, against Clifford E. Parker and others. Erom a judgment for plaintiff Cohalan, defendant Clifford E. Parker appeals.
Affirmed.
Argued before INGRAHAM, P. J., and McEAUGHLIN, LAUGH-LIN, MILLER, and DOWLING, JJ.
Horace E. Parker, for appellant.
Gilbert W. Minor, for respondent.
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep'r Indexes

Opinion:
MILLER, J.
The judgment appealed from directs the sale of the defendant's interest in and to the estate of Ransom Parker, deceased, to satisfy two judgments. The interest directed to be sold is the judgr ment debtor's interest in and to the remainder of two separate trusts, created by the testator.
The appellant contends that one of the "remainders is contingent, and therefore not the subject of sale. We are cited to no statute or rule of law which prevents the sale of a remainder interest, whether vested or contingent, and the statute expressly provides that an expectant estate is descendible, devisable, and alienable, in the same manner as an estate in possession. Section 59 of the real property law (chapter 50 of the Consolidated Laws). It is unnecessary, therefore, to pass upon the question argued by the appellant. Whatever interest the judgment debtor has will be acquired by the purchaser at the sale. That may be an expectancy, which will never ripen into an estate in possession.
The judgment should be affirmed, with costs. All concur.