Case Name: Mrs. C. Brown and Her Husband vs. Pontchartrain Land Company et als.
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1897-12-28
Citations: 49 La. Ann. 1779
Docket Number: No. 12,488
Parties: Mrs. C. Brown and Her Husband vs. Pontchartrain Land Company et als.
Judges: 
Reporter: Louisiana Annual Reports
Volume: 49
Pages: 1779–1792

Head Matter:
No. 12,488.
Mrs. C. Brown and Her Husband vs. Pontchartrain Land Company et als.
On Motion to dismiss.
Appellate Court-may exercise jurisdiction to interpret its o-wn decree.
The appeal was a branch of the first case in which this court rendered judgment. The appellate court had jurisdiction in the matter of interpreting its own judgment. C. P., 6 N. S. 276; 9 An. 496; 6R.92; 48 An. 33.
Statement or Pacts.
while it is true that a statement of facts when relied on to bring the cause before the appellate court must be made out before the judgment Is signed, a motion to dismiss an appeal on the ground that it had not been made out before the ¡judgment must be filed within three (3) judicial days alter the filing of the record. 3 An. B26.
On the Merits.
The return of tax collector should include all sums,
A tax collector can not be compelled to disobey the directions of the auditor besides violate the law in order that he may retain in his hands the purchase price of a tax sale, which may be pronounced null.
Money should be returned by the State.
If the money has been paid into the treasury it should be returned by the State; but no recovery can be had from the tax collector.
The price is not due by him personally nor can it be paid out of any funds remaining in his hands.
On Rehearing.
Nichoiisy a y.
It does not follow as a necessary consequence of the fact that some of the evidence adduced on a trial in the District Court was not preserved and transcribed in the record filed on appeal or brought up through bills of exceptions that the appeal should be dismissed. It frequently happens that issues are presented for decision on appeal in order to come to a knowledge of which the testimony taken in the case is not needed. State vs. Bank of Louisiana, 5 N. S. 341. Whether a (particular record presents sufficient data upon which the Supreme Court would be justified in avoiding or amending a judgment below can only be known after it shall have ascertained the contentions of the parties and made an examination of the transcript filed.
After an appeal has been regularly taken the appellee is entitled to have a judgment rendered upon the issues raised. It is the duty of an appellant to place matters before an appellate court in manner such as to permit of such a judgment being rendered, and if he does not do so the logical sequence of the situation is that the judgment should be affirmed rather than that the appeal should be dismissed in limine. Appeals are frequently dismissed after hearing which it would be improper to dismiss in limine.
Where defendant in a petitory action having called his vendor in warranty has been cast in the action, but has obtained a judgment over against his warrantor, takes an appeal in open court, the appeal carries the entire case, including the case in warranty, into the appellate court — though the amount directly involved in the case in warranty may be less than that which would be required to give the Supreme Court jurisdiction in an original andseparate and independent suit.
Where the Supreme Court has on appeal disposed under such circumstances of the case in warranty, it has the power to supervise the execution of that part of the judgment and see that it be carried out according to its terms under Art. 629 of the Code of Practice, even though the question be presented in the “¡form” of an “appeal” Though the proceeding take that form it is really one supervisory in character in aid of and to make effectual appellate jurisdiction. State vs. Judge, 19 La. 180,181.
The State is not subject to a call in warranty nor liable for costs of court.
Act No. 82 0/1884 is not a general act covering all tax sales made in the State. Its provisions refer to the tax sales made under that special act. All its sections point to the funds out of which commissions, expenses, costs and the refunding of the purchase price to evicted purchasers of property bought at tax sales are to be met as those which will pass into the hands of the tax collector as arising from sales of that particular class of property under that act.
A PPEAL from the Civil District. Court for the Parish of Orleans. Bightor, J.
Benjamin Bice Forman for Pontchartrain Land Company, Plaintiff in Rule to tax costs and execute judgment, Appellee.
F. O. Zacharie for B. T. Walshe, Tax Collector, Defendant in Rule, Appellant,
Argued and submitted April 29, 1897.
Opinion handed down May 10, 1897.
Rehearing granted May 30, 1897.
Argued and submitted on rehearing December 4, 1897.
Opinion handed down December 28, 1897.

Opinion:
On Motion to Dismiss.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Breaux, J.
The appellee moved to dismiss on grounds, to-wit:
1. The amount in dispute is less than the jurisdictional amount.
2. The statement of facts was not procured before the appeal was granted, citing in support of this proposition the following: Scott vs. Blanchard, 8 N. S. 305; Hodge vs. Creditors, 3 L. 455; LeBlanc vs. Broussard, 16 L. 137, and Logan vs. Windsor, 20 An. 253.
The facts are, as relates to the first ground to dismiss, that on plaintiff's petition the tax sale which had been made of her property in 1894 to the defendant was decreed null and void by the District Court, and the tax collector was expressly ordered to return the amount of the purchase price. This judgment was rendered in March, 1896. The tax collector did not appeal.
On appeal to this court the judgment was affirmed in May, 1896. Mrs. Brown and Husband vs. Land Co., 48 An. 1188.
Before the District Court the defendant, in October, 1896, filed a rule on the tax collector, (who had been called in warranty in the case in which the judgment of nullity of the tax title was pronounced) , to compel him to pay the purchase price and costs to the mover. This rule was filed after the tax collector had paid the amount to the Auditor of the State.
The rule was made absolute, and the tax collector was condemned to pay the purchase price and costs, quoting from the judgment, " out of any funds in his hands, and that the said company have any writ of process, authorized by law, to enforce this order."
The appellant's contention is, that this court is without jurisdiction.
The appellant, in support of his appeal as relates to jurisdiction, invoked Art. 629 of the 0. P., (conferring authority needful in matter of the interpretation and execution of the judgment it has rendered, irrespective of the amount involved), and urged that the present appeal was merely a branch of the case cited supra, in which jurisdiction was incontestable; that judgments of the court a qua interpreting the decree of this court are appealable.
Our attention was directed to the early case of Holstein vs. Henderson, 6 N. S. 276, in which the court asserted jurisdiction and the power of revision, if the court of first instance does not correctly interpret its judgment as rendered on appeal.
The question was considered in Lovelace vs. Taylor, 6 R. 92, and the court said in substance, if the one against whom the judgment was pronounced thinks himself injured by a mistaken interpretation of the judgment he must seek relief by a suspensive appeal. In relation to a final judgment, similar views were expressed in Hays vs. March, 11 Louisiana, 369.
The question was argued in the case of Dennistoun vs. Rist, 9 An. 464, and the court said, while indisposed to interfere with the court of the first instance, it would interfere in the matter of interpreting its judgment, if the " record presented a clear case of denial of justice or oppression."
The last utterance of this court upon the subject was in State ex rel. Construction Co. vs. Tax Collector, 48 An. 33, in substance reiterating the views expressed in the decisions from which we have quoted. The court asserted jurisdiction and control of the interpretation to be placed upon its judgment.
We pass to the next ground urged, i. e., that the statement of facts should be made before the appeal is obtained.
We think it in place to state that the statement of facts prepared by the judge after the appeal had been taken shows that the tax collector gave public notice that "incase the purchaser failed to obtain possession within thirty days after the sale, he would' hold the proceeds and refund the price to the purchaser if applied to within that delay; that the purchaser did apply within the delay for a second extension of thirty days, at the end of which the defendant applied for a third extension of thirty days. When the time for the settlement of the tax collector with the Auditor had arrived, the tax collector referred the application for further delay to the Auditor, who refused and ordered the tax collector to turn the funds into the State treasury in his settlement, which was past due. The tax collector complied with the law and from that time he was without funds to refund the purchase price; that he. was without authority to divert any other funds from tax sales or tax collections to the reimbursement of the purchase price, and that if he was obliged to pay the amount he would have to pay out of his private funds."
To the ground to dismiss because df the delay in applying for and procuring the foregoiug statement of the facts, the appellant interposes the objection that it was too late to have any effect.
It is true, as stated by the appellee, that the motion to dismiss was filed after tne delay for filing such motions had elapsed. The ground not being jurisdictional, we can not entertain it. This court said: "A motion to dismiss on the ground of any informality in the mode of bringing up an appeal must be made within three judicial days after the filing of the record." Hall vs. Nevill, 3 An. 326. This rule has been enforced in a number of cases.
The motion to dismiss is overruled.