Case Name: The State of Washington, Appellant, v. Conifer Enterprises, Inc., et al., Respondents
Court: Washington Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Washington
Decision Date: 1973-03-29
Citations: 82 Wash. 2d 94
Docket Number: No. 42018
Parties: The State of Washington, Appellant, v. Conifer Enterprises, Inc., et al., Respondents.
Judges: 
Reporter: Washington Reports
Volume: 82
Pages: 94–109

Head Matter:
[No. 42018.
En Banc.
March 29, 1973.]
The State of Washington, Appellant, v. Conifer Enterprises, Inc., et al., Respondents.
Slade Gorton, Attorney General, and J. Keith Dysart, Chief Deputy, for appellant.
William S. Howard, for respondents.
Ferguson & Burdell and Charles S. Burdell, amici curiae.

Opinion:
Brachtenbach, J.
Respondents challenge the constitutionality of RCW 29.79.490(4). Under that statute they were charged with the crime of giving or offering payment to persons to solicit or procure signatures upon an initiative petition.
Respondents, pursuant to RCW 10.40.110, demurred to the information. The trial court sustained the demurrer and dismissed the charges.
At the outset, we deal with respondents' motion for dismissal for want of prosecution. Respondents point out that the King County prosecutor filed the notice of appeal while the briefs and arguments were prepared and presented by the Attorney General. Respondents contend this was an abandonment of the appeal by the prosecutor, that the Attorney General is without authority to prosecute the appeal, and therefore the appeal was abandoned, in effect. On January 20, 1972, this court, the King County prosecutor and respondents' attorney were notified by the Attorney General's office that, with the consent of the King County prosecutor, the Attorney General was being substituted as counsel for the state.
We believe that RCW 43.10.030 (4) , under these circum stances, constitutes sufficient authority for the Attorney General to prosecute this appeal. The motion is denied.
Turning to the merits, the challenged portion of the statute reads:
Every person shall be guilty of a gross misdemeanor who:
(4) Gives or offers any consideration or gratuity to any person . to solicit or procure signatures upon an initiative . . .
RCW 29.79.490.
This provision was part of a comprehensive act relating to the mechanics of exercising the initiative and referendum. Its enactment followed the voters' adoption in 1912 of an amendment to our constitution providing to the people the power of initiative and referendum. In his inaugural speech to the 1913 legislature, Governor Lister called upon that legislature to enact the provisions necessary to make this amendment effective. (1913 Senate Journal, page 80.) A joint senate-house committee introduced the bill, substantially in the form ultimately passed. It received overwhelming approval. (1913 Senate Journal, page 1002; 1913 House Journal, page 943.)
Our initial inquiry is whether the statute is a valid exercise of the police power. Two steps are involved in measuring the constitutionality of a legislative enactment against the permissible bounds of the police power. First, does it tend to promote the health, peace, morals, education, good order and welfare of the people? More specifically, does it tend to correct some evil or promote some interest of the state? Shea v. Olson, 185 Wash. 143, 53 P.2d 615 (1936); Clark v. Dwyer, 56 Wn.2d 425, 353 P.2d 941 (1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 932 (1961). If the answer is yes, the wisdom, necessity and policy of the law are solely within the jurisdiction of the legislature. State v. Bowen & Co., 86 Wash. 23, 149 P. 330 (1915); Reesman v. State, 74 Wn.2d 646, 445 P.2d 1004 (1968).
The second inquiry, more narrow, but equally important, is whether the particular statute under scrutiny bears a reasonable and substantial relation to accomplishing the purpose established in step one. Markham Advertising Co. v. State, 73 Wn.2d 405, 439 P.2d 248 (1968); Lenci v. Seattle, 63 Wn.2d 664, 388 P.2d 926 (1964).
These tests cannot be applied in a vacuum. The state interest to be promoted or the evil to be corrected, and the relationship of the statute to this purpose, must be sought out. However, in a state where legislative intent is seldom recorded, and where only infrequently does a legislative act carry a recital of facts upon which the legislature is acting, the court necessarily has had to engage in certain presumptions.
The basic rule is that if the court can reasonably conceive of a state of facts to exist which justify the legislation, those facts will be presumed to exist. Further, it will be presumed that the statute was passed with reference to those facts. State v. Laitinen, 77 Wn.2d 130, 459 P.2d 789 (1969); Markham Advertising Co. v. State, supra; Shea v. Olson, supra.
In addition to that presumption, the court is guided by two other rules. First, the burden of establishing the invalidity rests heavily upon the party challenging constitutionality. Second, every presumption will be in favor of constitutionality. Lenci v. Seattle, supra.
These rules are more than mere rules of judicial convenience. They mark the line of demarcation between legislative and judicial functions.
Lend v. Seattle, supra at 668.
With these presumptions and principles at hand, we apply the first test. It is indisputable that there is a substantial state interest in the integrity of the whole scope of the elective processes, including those procedures involved in the direct legislative efforts of the people via the initiative. "It is clear that the integrity of elections, essential to the' very preservation of a free society, is a matter 'in which the State may have a compelling regulatory concern.' " Canon v. Justice Court, 61 Cal. 2d 446, 452, 393 P.2d 428, 39 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1964).
If the state has an interest in regulating junkyards (Lend v. Seattle, supra), outdoor signs (Markham Advertising Co. v. State, supra) and apple grades (Clark v. Dwyer, supra), it unquestionably has an interest in the elective processes. In short, we can readily and reasonably conceive of a state of facts justifying various statutes dealing with and regulating elections, initiatives and referendums. There is a state interest to be promoted and potential evils to be corrected.
The more knotty issue is whether the statute prohibiting the payment of solicitors bears a reasonable and substantial relation to the legitimate end, i.e., the integrity of the initiative and referendum processes.
We conclude that the prohibition in issue does bear such a reasonable and substantial relationship for we can reasonably conceive of a state of facts warranting this particular limitation. It is reasonably conceivable that persons who solicit signatures for pay — not for principle's sake — may adopt measures, employ tactics and assert pressures inconsistent with a free and uncorrupted exercise of the right of initiative. Paid solicitors may or may not go to such lengths to earn their pay. That they may is sufficient.
The tainted results of paid solicitors stand out vividly in State v. Olcott, 62 Ore. 277, 125 P. 303 (1912). The proponents of a petition hired a solicitor to be paid 3% cents peí-name. He in turn employed a large number of circulators. Some .employed ingenuity rather than principle for they simply joined forces, passed the petitions around -among themselves, taking turns in forging signatures. The net result was that 3,778 signatures were admitted forgeries out of 13,715 filed. The court itself discovered another 936 names which were either fictitious or absolute forgeries.
In Stirtan v. Blethen, 79 Wash. 10, 139 P. 618 (1914), this court refused to allow recovery on a contract employing the plaintiff to solicit signatures on a recall petition, basing its decision on the ground that contracts to influence elections are void as contrary to public policy. The court said at page 14:
The employment of hired canvassers to bring about either result [to influence an election or a recall] has an inevitable tendency to corrupt the electorate.
In our judgment RCW 29.79.490 (4) is a valid exercise of the state's police power.
We turn then to the conclusion of the trial court that RCW 29.79.490(4) is unconstitutional because it contravenes rights guaranteed by the first amendment to the United States Constitution, as applied to state legislation by the Fourteenth Amendment.
We reject appellant's contention that a legislative enactment challenged as being violative of First Amendment freedoms is entitled to a presumption of constitutionality. Although we will presume a statute challenged as an improper exercise of the state's police power to be valid, any legislative restraint imposed upon a First Amendment freedom "comes into court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutionality." Fine Arts Guild, Inc. v. Seattle, 74 Wn.2d 503, 506, 445 P.2d 602 (1968); accord, Adams v. Hinkle, 51 Wn.2d 763, 322 P.2d 844 (1958).
Moreover, the state bears a heavy burden of justification where First Amendment rights are threatened; "[m]ere legislative preferences or beliefs" standing alone will not support such legislation. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161, 84 L. Ed. 155, 60 S. Ct. 146 (1939). Rather, "only a compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional power to regulate can justify limiting First Amendment freedoms." NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438, 9 L. Ed. 2d 405, 83 S. Ct. 328 (1963). And, the requisite connection between the statute and the permissible state interest is necessity; a mere rational, reasonable, or even substantial relationship will not suffice. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488, 5 L. Ed. 2d 231, 81 S. Ct. 247 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307-08, 12 L. Ed. 2d 325, 84 S. Ct. 1302 (1964).
The trial court did not specify-, which First Amendment rights are violated by RCW 29.79.490(4). Hpwever, during oral argument before this court counsel for respondents expressly limited his argument to the freedom of speech and the right of assembly. We consider first whether the relevant portion of RCW 29.79.490 (4) violates respondents' freedom of speech.
Clearly, the solicitation of signatures for an initiative petition is political expression falling within the ambit of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment. But RCW 29.79.490(4) does not make it unlawful for respondents to solicit signatures on an initiative petition. Nor does it forbid others from doing likewise at respondents' request. The statute only makes it unlawful for the respondents to pay (or offer to pay) other persons to solicit signatures. This narrow proscription does not abridge respondents' freedom of speech since such payment bears no necessary relationship to their exercise of that right.
As for the right of assembly, respondents have failed to indicate how their right to assemble is in any way impaired by RCW 29.79.490 (4), and we find no such impairment. An abstract invocation of a First Amendment right is not suffir cient to trigger the more stringent standard of review applicable in those cases where fundamental rights are actually endangered. ,
We conclude that RCW 29.79.490 (4) violates neither respondents' freedom of speech nor their right to assemble.
Respondents finally contend that RCW 29.79.490(4) is prohibited by the last sentence of Const, art. 2, § 1 (d) (part of the initiative-referendum clause), which provides that "This section is self-executing, but legislation may be enacted especially to facilitate its operation." Respondents argue that only acts which facilitate the exercise of these constitutional rights can be enacted and, therefore, the statute prohibiting payment of solicitors is void because it "delineates, restricts and hampers" the individual rights of the members of the electorate, rather than facilitating their exercise of the power of initiative.
- It is correct that legislation adding to the constitutional provisions governing the initiative and referendum can only be enacted "especially to facilitate" the operation of the reserved powers. State, ex rel. Donohue v. Coe, 49 Wn.2d 410, 302 P.2d. 202 (1956). But, although the legislature is limited to "facilitating" the exercise of the power reserved to the people, this in no way implies that the legislature is unable to prevent corruption of that exercise. Indeed it has been held that any safeguard against deception and fraud in the exercise of the initiative and referendum powers tends to assure the benefits of those powers. State v. Snell, 168 Ore. 153, 121 P.2d 930 (1942).
The challenged statute here was enacted to prevent fraud, forgery and corruption, as was its 1913 predecessor. State ex rel. Case v. Superior Court, 81 Wash. 623, 143 P. 461 (1914). We hold that ROW 29.79.490(4), which tends to assure the free and uncorrupt exercise of the initiative and referendum powers, facilitates, rather than restricts or hinders, the operation of the powers reserved to the people by article 2, section 1 of the Constitution of the State of Washington.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
Hale, C.J., Finley, Hamilton, Stafford, Wright, and Utter, JJ., concur.'
RCW 43.10.030(4) provides that the Attorney General shall:
"Consult with and advise the several prosecuting attorneys in matters relating to the duties of their office, and when the interests of the state require, he shall attend the trial of any person accused of a crime, and assist in the prosecution;"