Case Name: Taliaferro v. Gatewood
Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
Jurisdiction: Virginia
Decision Date: 1819-03-27
Citations: 6 Munf. 320
Docket Number: 
Parties: Taliaferro v. Gatewood.
Judges: 
Reporter: Virginia Reports
Volume: 20
Pages: 755–758

Head Matter:
Taliaferro v. Gatewood.
Decided, March 27th, 1819.
s. Demiwrei* to Evidence —Coiatrol of Coatí over Proceedings TSiereispom. — The whole proceeding upon a demurrer to evidence, is under the control of the Court before whom the trial is had. If, therefore, by mistake or otherwise, a material fact, on which the point in issue depends, and which tile Court judie?,Uy knows to exist, be omitted ill such demurrer, it ought to be set aside, as too uncertain for a judgment to be, given thereon; and this, upon an appeal taken by either party.
2. Bond— Action by Assignee against Assignor -Due Diligence- Evidence. — In an action by the assignee against the assignor of a bond, the point in dispute being whether the assignee has used due diligence in suing the obligor; if the plaintiii produce a transcript of the proceedings in a suit which he brought against the obligor, shewing the time when the declaration was filed, but not the date of the Writ; and the defendant demur to the evidence; the Court not interfering nor requiring a copy of the Writ to be produced; such demurrer should be set aside, and a venire de novo awarded.
Anne Gatewood brought assumpsit in the County Court of Caroline against John Taliaferro; setting forth in her declaration that the defendant, on the 22,d day of October 1804, assigned to her a writing obligatory, of a certain John Baylor to 1 he said defendant: — (describing it;) that, by the said assignment, the defendant became bound to the plaintiff, that, in case the amount of the said obligation could not be recovered of the said John Baylor, she the said plaintiff using due diligence to recover the same, that then the said defendant should make good the same, and pay the amount thereof, to the plaintiff:— that, subsequent to the said assignment, (without saying when,) she instituted a suit thereupon in the District Court of Fredericksburg, which she duly prosecuted until the 11th day of May 1808, when, the said John Baylor having departed this life, a scire facias was ordered to be issued against Thomas R. Rootes administrator with the Will annexed; and the said scire facias was regularly returned executed; that, afterwards, at the final hearing and trial, it was found by the Verdict of a Jury that the said Thomas R. Rootes had fully administered, and had not then, nor on the day of the commencement of the said suit, nor at any time thereafter, any assets to pay the said debt; and therefore it was considered by the Court that the plaintiff take nothing, &c; by reason of which premises, the defendant assignor of *said obligation became bound to pay to the plaintiff the amount thereof, with Interest and the costs of the said suit; and the said defendant, being so liable, did in consideration thereof assume, &c.
At the trial, on the plea of non assump-sit, the plaintiff, to support the issue joined on her part, offered a transcript of the proceedings in the said suit, brought by her, as assignee of the writing obligatory aforesaid, against John Baylor the obligor; which transcript shewed that the declaration in that suit was filed on the 29th day of April 1807; but the date of the Writ previously issued did not appear. The defendant demurred to the evidence, and spread on the record the said transcript, the writing obligatory, and the assignment, which was proved to have been made by the defendant. The plaintiff joined in demurrer; and the Jury found a conditional verdict.
The County Court entered judgment for the defendant, which, upon an appeal to the Superior Court of law, was reversed; that Court being ‘ ‘of opinion that the as-signee of the writing obligatory in the record mentioned did use due diligence in en-deavouring to recover the amount thereof from the obligor and his representative by a judicious mode of prosecution ; and that a want of due diligence could not be imputed to the assignee from a failure to sue the obligor at an earlier period; seeing that the assignor did not request or call upon her to commence such suit, and that no evidence is produced by the assignor Tal-iaferro to shew that an earlier prosecution would probably have been more effectual than the one which was carried .on by the said assignee.”
The Superior Court, for these reasons, entered judgment for the plaintiff; to which the defendant obtained a writ of Super-sedeas from a Judge of this Court.
Stanard for the appellant.
Call for the appellee.
lOciüiFWirreB* to Evüderace — Cdswirol ©1 Gotiri over Pi1©-eoedSsDgs ThcreajpoMi.--When the plaintiff gives evidence to the jury and says he rests liiu case, and the defendant tenders a demurrer to the evidence ñiveií to the jury, the court mav, in the exercise of sound discretion, permit the plaintiif to give additional relevant evidence to the jury, when U te satisfied chat the failure to introduce it was owing to mere inadvertence of counsel or other suí'ñcient cause, and refuse to comped the plaintiff to join hi the demurrer to the evidence given to the jury "before die additional evidence was admitted. Hunter v. Snyder, 11 W. Va. 213; Burns v. Morrison, 36 W. Va. 426, 15 S. E. Rep. 63, both citing the principal case. The principal case is also cited on this subject in Green v. Judith, 5 Rand. 29; Wilson v. Bank of Mt. Pleasant, 6 Leigh 572; Fairfax v. Lewis, 11 Leigh 241; Peabody Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 29 W. Va. 535, 537, 542, 2 S E. Rep. 992, 393. In Green v. Judith, 5 Rand. 30. Judge Cabell said that although he con • curred with the majority ol the court in the principal case, yet, on subsequent reflection, he was inclined to doubt the correctness of the decision in that case. See generally, monographic note on “Demurrer to the Evidence” appended to Tutt v. Slaughter, 5 Gratt. 364.

Opinion:
JUDGE) ROANE)
pronounced the Court's opinion.
This is an action brought by the appel-lee, as assignee of a bond, against the assignor, on the ground of not being able to recover it's amount from the obligor, altho' *she had used due diligence to recover it from him. Issue was joined on the plea of non assumpsit ; and the question whether due diligence had been used or not, is directly in issue between the parties. It is that question upon which the decision of the cause is entirely to turn.
At the trial, a demurrer to evidence was tendered by the defendant, and joined by the plaintiff. The demurrer sets out a record of a suit, by the appellee against Baylor the obligor, in the District Court. This record states the time of filing the bill, but is wholly silent as to that of taking out the writ, although it is evident that that E)poch may be very important on the question in issue between the parties. On that Demurrer a Judgment was rendered in the County Court for the defendant. Had it been shewn that the suit had been instituted at an earlier day, (as doubtless it might,) the decision on the demurrer might have been different. The Judgment of the County Court was reversed by the Superior Court, and judgment rendered for the debt.
It is a principle that "that whole proceeding upon a Demurrer to evidence is under the control of the Judge, before whom the trial is had;" Gibson v. Hunter, 2 H. Bl. rep. 208; so the notes of the testimony are taken down by the Judge or his associate, and signed by Counsel. Buller's N. P., 313; 5 Bac. 468. If that be the case, the Court should require that fact to be stated in the Demurrer, on which alone the point in issue must depend, and which the Court judicially knows has an existence. The Court judicially knows that every declaration is founded on a Writ, and that the latter is prior in point of time to the former. If, owing to mistake or other causes, this material fact be omitted, without which the merits of the case can not be decided, and that thro' the default of the superintending tribunal, (the Court,) it ought to be corrected for the sake of justice, and on the principle, that it is incident to a Court to correct it's own errors. If a Court has power to set aside a case agreed, which is the act of the parties, or a special verdict, which is the act of the jury, because they omit to find facts material to the decision of the point in issue, *it would seem to have that power a fortiori in the case before us; in a case in which the fault is in some sense it's own. But this point does not rest on general reasoning. It is laid down in the case of Cocksedge v. Fanshaw, (Dougl. 132,) that the reason of resorting to a Demurrer to evidence, is "because the Jury may refuse to find a "special verdict, and then the facts never appear of record; but that, whether the case comes before the Court on a demurrer to evidence, or a special verdict, the law is the same:" that is, as we presume, the necessary facts must be shewn in the former case, as well as in the latter. The case before us being of a record, in which, it is judicially known to the Court that a Writ existed, and preceded the filing of the bill, our decision will have no effect as to cases in which ulterior evidence may or may not exist, and in which it is not certainly known to the Court that it does exist. In such cases, the party must abide by the testimony he has exhibited. But, in this case, the Court, for it's own sake, and in order to get at the real merits, should have called for a fact, which it judicially knew had existence, and for want of which, a decision contrary to the right of the cause may have taken place.
The Court in this case should say, as it has often said in relation to special verdicts, and as it did in relation to an agreed case in Brewer v. Opie, 1 Call 214, that the same were, respectively, too uncertain for a judgment to be given thereon. 11 ought to say. as was said, in effect, in the case of Gibson v. Hunter in the House of Lords in England, (2 H. Bl. 207,) that this demurrer has been so negligently framed that there are not the necessary facts, on which a judgment can be founded. It ought to say, as was said in the last mentioned case, that a venire de novo ought to be awarded, because "the issue joined between the parties, in effect, has not been tried." It has not been tried by the Jury, owing to it's translation to the forum of the Court by the demurrer; nor by the Court, for the want of the necessary facts whereon to ground it's decision. In this case, therefore, as in that, and in the case of Wright v. Pindar quoted in it, the Demurrer *should be set aside, and a venire de novo awarded.
The Judgments of both Courts are therefore to be reversed, the demurrer to evidence set aside, and a venire de novo awarded. We do not regret that the cause thus goes off without a decision on the merits. The points embraced in those merits are very important, and we hope may hereafter receive the consideration of a fuller Court.