Case Name: Lawrence Scott ANDREWS, Appellant, v. The FLORIDA PAROLE COMMISSION and The Florida Department of Corrections, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2000-10-18
Citations: 768 So. 2d 1257
Docket Number: No. 1D98-1931
Parties: Lawrence Scott ANDREWS, Appellant, v. The FLORIDA PAROLE COMMISSION and The Florida Department of Corrections, Appellees.
Judges: BOOTH, J., concurs; BENTON, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with written opinion.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 768
Pages: 1257–1272

Head Matter:
Lawrence Scott ANDREWS, Appellant, v. The FLORIDA PAROLE COMMISSION and The Florida Department of Corrections, Appellees.
No. 1D98-1931.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Oct. 18, 2000.
John D. Middleton of Middleton & Prugh, P.A., Melrose, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Amelia L. Beisner, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellees.

Opinion:
SMITH, LARRY G., Senior Judge.
Lawrence Scott Andrews appeals the dismissal of his complaint against the Florida Parole Commission (Commission) and the Department of Corrections (DOC) for false imprisonment and for negligent discharge of official duties. The trial court dismissed the complaint concluding both that sovereign immunity barred recovery, and that Andrews had been taken into custody and incarcerated by DOC under a facially valid warrant. We conclude that the actions of the Commission were quasi-judicial in nature and entitled to protection under the doctrine of judicial immunity. We further conclude that no action for false imprisonment can be maintained against DOC because, as shown by the allegations of the complaint itself, Andrews had been taken into custody and incarcerated by DOC based upon a presumptively valid warrant and commitment order issued by the Commission. We therefore affirm the order and judgment of dismissal; however, we certify to the Florida Supreme Court a question of great public importance concerning whether the Commission and DOC can be held liable for false imprisonment under circumstances such as were presented in this case.
Proceedings Bebw
Andrews' complaint for money damages based on his alleged wrongful imprisonment, alleged, in part, as follows:
7. Plaintiff was convicted of crimes occurring before and after October 1, 1988.
8. On April 1, 1991, the Plaintiff was sentenced to 30 months incarceration . in case number 88-642.... The criminal conduct in that case occurred prior to October 1, 1988.
9. Again, on April 4, 1991, Plaintiff was sentenced to 30 months on case numbers 90-574 and 91-25 . which ran consecutive [to] the thirty months given in case number 88-642 referred to above. The criminal conduct in those cases occurred [after] October 1, 1988.
10. Upon expiration of the sentences through gain time on May 28, 1993, Plaintiff was released on conditional release to be supervised until December 25, 1995. This date was calculated by considering the two separate sentences as one 60 month sentence despite the fact that only the second thirty month sentence was subject to the provisions of Florida Statute § 947.1405(1) and (2). The first thirty month sentence was subject to provisions of § 944.291, Fla. Stat. which dictate that the inmate shall have no supervision by either Defendant.
11. On May 13,1994, the First District Court of Appeal in Westlund v. Florida Parole Commission, 637 So.2d 52 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) specifically held that it was illegal for [the Defendants] to include sentences for criminal conduct occurring prior to October 1, 1988 in their calculation of the length of conditional release.
12. Under Westlund, the maximum time that the Plaintiff could have been supervised to, and hence subject to revocation by Defendant COMMISSION was September 12,1994.
13. Based on a warrant issued by Defendant Commission after September 12, 1994, the Plaintiff was returned to Defendant DOC custody on Defendant COMMISSION'S first illegal warrant initially as a parole release violator on December 9, 1994 but then illegally was reinstated to conditional release by Defendant COMMISSION on January 31, 1995....
14. The Plaintiff again was illegally returned to Defendant DOC custody on December 28, 1995 on Defendant COMMISSION'S void warrant and was given a tentative release date by Defendant DOC of November 11, 1997. The Defendants knew or should have known of the decision in Westlund when they considered Plaintiffs case at this time.
15. Within a very short time of his re-incarceration, Plaintiff filed many inmate grievances, both at the institutional level and Defendant DOC at Tallahassee Central Office complaining about the illegality of his incarceration and citing the Westlund case.
23. Plaintiff filed a writ of habeas corpus, 'but prior to the Court's ruling, Defendant COMMISSION issued an emergency order dated October 16, 1996 which resulted in the unconditional release of the Plaintiff on October 17, 1996 from incarceration.
24. As a direct and proximate cause of [the Defendant's] actions or omissions, Plaintiff was falsely and illegally incarcerated....
DOC and the Commission moved to dismiss arguing that sovereign immunity shielded them from liability. The Commission also claimed that its actions were protected by the doctrine of judicial immunity.
In Westlund v. Florida Parole Comm'n, 637 So.2d 52 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), we held that under the provisions of section 947.1405, Florida Statutes (1991), the
last date of conditional release supervision may lawfully be calculated with reference only to sentences imposed for offenses committed on or after October 1, 1988. Sentences imposed on account of . offenses . committed . [before October 1,] 1988, cannot be the basis for determining . [the] last date of conditional release supervision under the Act.
Id. at' 54; see also Parole Comrn'n v. Cooper, 701 So.2d 543, 545 (Fla.1997) ("[I]n Westlund v. Florida Parole Comm'n, 637 So.2d 52 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), the First District correctly determined that sentences for uncovered offenses that were committed before the effective date of the Act are distinct from covered offense[s] committed after its effective date.").
Andrews' complaint alleged, consistent with the Westlund interpretation of section 947.1405 as applied to the facts here, that his last lawful date of conditional release supervision was September 12, 1994. As explained in Westlund, the gain time applied to reduce the period of incarceration under pre-October 1, 1988 offenses cannot be used in calculating the period of time an inmate is subject to conditional release supervision. See Westlund, 637 So.2d at 54. Notwithstanding this limitation on the Commission's authority to exercise supervision, the Commission at the time of Andrews' initial release established December 25,1995 as the termination date for his conditional release supervision. Thereafter, on two occasions subsequent to September 12, 1994, the Commission issued warrants for Andrews' arrest based upon alleged violations of the terms his conditional release. DOC took custody of Andrews pursuant to these warrants.
The trial court initially denied the motion to dismiss but, upon motion for reconsideration, accepted the state's position and granted the motion to dismiss as to both defendants, reasoning
that under the facts alleged in the Complaint sovereign immunity bars recovery. Specifically, under the facts alleged, there is neither an underlying common law or statutory duty of care with respect to the alleged negligent conduct, which would give rise to an individual cause of action for the Plaintiff. The remedy for the Plaintiff and others similarly situated is through appeal, writ of mandamus, habeas corpus^ ] or similar review. Additionally, the claim for false imprisonment is barred because Plaintiff was taken into custody upon a valid warrant, even if issued because of some alleged negligence.
This appeal followed.
Standard of Review
We review the order granting the motion to dismiss de novo. See Rittman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 727 So.2d 391, 393 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) ("The sufficiency of a complaint in a civil action is a question of law."). In ruling on the motion, the trial court had to accept as true all well-pleaded allegations of the complaint and limit its consideration of factual matters to the four corners of the complaint. See Brewer v. Clerk of the Circuit Court, 720 So.2d 602, 603 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); Varnes v. Dawkins, 624 So.2d 349, 350 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). A reviewing court operates under the same constraints. See Rittman, 727 So.2d at 393; McKinney-Green, Inc. v. Davis, 606 So.2d 393, 394 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).
Negligence Claims
As a preliminary matter, we dispose of those allegations of the complaint seeking to impose liability upon both the Commission and DOC based upon their alleged breach of duties placed upon them by statute. It is clear to us that the statutes invoked, specifically, sections 944.275 and 947.1405 , are simply a part of an overall statutory scheme whose sole purpose is the protection of the public through a system of apprehension, conviction and incarceration of criminal offenders. These statutory provisions, and other related provisions, create no duty on the part of the Commission or DOC for the benefit of any private person, and thus afford no basis for an action by any aggrieved individual for alleged negligence or errors in their application or enforcement. See Vann v. Department of Corrections, 662 So.2d 339, 340 (Fla.1995) ("A governmental duty to protect its citizens is a general duty to the public as a whole, and where there is only a general duty to protect the public, there is no duty of care to an individual citizen which may result in liability.") (quoting Everton v. Willard, 468 So.2d 936 (Fla.1985)).
False Imprisonment Claims
Appellant argues that even in the absence of a statutory duty, DOC and the Commission are liable for damages for the common law tort of false imprisonment. We hold that under the facts alleged there is no liability on the part of either party for false imprisonment.
Florida's highest court has clearly established that the doctrine of judicial immunity exists in Florida apart from the concept of sovereign immunity; that this type of immunity embraces persons who exercise a judicial or quasi-judicial function; and that this immunity is unaffected by Florida's waiver of sovereign immunity. See Office of State Attorney, Fourth Judicial Circuit of Florida v. Parrotino, 628 So.2d 1097 (Fla.1993). In our view, the Commission was clearly acting in a quasi-judicial capacity in establishing the terms and length of Andrews' conditional release, and in the issuance of the warrants for his arrest and re-commitment to the custody of DOC. These duties, expressly imposed upon the Commission by the provisions of section 947.1405, require a determination and consideration of numerous factors concerning the inmate after an inmate review by a member of the Commission and a review of the inmate's record by the Commission before it finally acts. The Commission is the agency charged with the initial responsibility for interpreting the "Conditional Release Program Act," which it must then apply based upon the circumstances presented by a particular inmate's record. This of necessity includes interpretation of the sentences and offenses of which the inmate is convicted, the dates of the offenses, and a determination of the expiration date of the maximum sentence imposed by the court. Although DOC under section 944.291 is required to provide the Commission with the name and inmate identification number for each eligible inmate, the responsibility for an inmate's actual conditional release is solely with the Commission.
We conclude that the Commission functions in a quasi-judicial capacity in carrying out its duties under the statute. Among the enforcement powers given to the Commission, under section 947.141, is the power to issue a warrant, after a probable cause determination, for the arrest of a releasee for his or her violation of the terms and conditions of his or her release. Because "[t]he issuance of a . warrant is unquestionably a judicial act," Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 492, 111 S.Ct. 1934, 1942, 114 L.Ed.2d 547 (1991), the Commission's functions under the statute, if not virtually indistinguishable from, are at least "functionally comparable" to, those of a judge. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 423 n. 20, 96 S.Ct. 984, 991 n. 20, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976) ("It is the functional comparability of their judgments to those of the judge that has resulted in both grand jurors and prosecutors being referred to as 'quasi-judicial' officers, and their immunities being termed 'quasi-judicial' as well.").
To a large extent, the Commission, and to some extent DOC, operate as the "arm of the sentencing judge," in that sentences from the courts are for terms of months, or years, rather than specific release dates, and the daunting task of converting those sentences into definite periods of incarceration, through the application of a maze of ever-changing statutes, is left to these agencies. It would be ironic indeed if the decision of the Commission in this case, based upon its assessment of the facts or its misinterpretation or misapplication of the statute, could be found to subject the Commission to tort liability, while the actions of the trial courts in Westlund and Cooper, considering the same facts and interpreting the same law, would be protected by total immunity.
The language of section 947.1405(6), admonishing that the length of supervision "must not exceed the maximum penalty imposed by the court," taken literally, and without proper consideration of constitutional ex post facto implications, can be interpreted, as did the Commission, to mean that supervision could extend for the entire sentence being served by an inmate subject to conditional release, rather than only that portion of the sentence being served for his post-October 1, 1998, offenses. Of course, with the clear vision of hindsight, particularly after Westlund it becomes much easier to determine that the Commission's reading does not pass muster. On the other hand, the nuances of the ex post facto effect on statutory interpretation frequently present issues upon which even the most seasoned appellate judges often disagree. See State v. Lancaster, 731 So.2d 1227 (Fla.1998) (noting historic differences of opinion between Florida Supreme Court and United States Supreme Court on ex post facto issues arising in the context of statutory early release programs).
Apparently recognizing the quasi-judicial nature of the functions of the Commission, Andrews nevertheless urges that the Commission should have known that it had "lost jurisdiction" at the time it issued the warrants for his arrest. Citing to Farish v. Smoot, 58 So.2d 534 (Fla.1952), Waters v. Ray, 167 So.2d 326 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964), and Beckham v. Cline, 151 Fla. 481, 10 So.2d 419 (1942), Andrews maintains that when a judicial or quasi-judicial officer exercises jurisdiction where he has none, there is no immunity for false imprisonment. While we do not disagree with this general statement of the law, the cases cited are so factually dissimilar from this case as to render them inapposite. As noted by the court in Berry v. State, 400 So.2d 80 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), judges are not liable in civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are "in excess of their jurisdiction." Id. at 83 (quoting the landmark case on judicial immunity of Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871)). For the same reasons, prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity for acts "within the scope of [their] prose-cutorial duties." Id. at 84. Immunity, as stated in Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 108 S.Ct. 538, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988) "is justified and defined by the junctions it protects and serves, not by the person to whom it attaches." Id. at 227, 108 S.Ct. at 544 (emphasis added).
We hold that the Commission was acting within the scope of its quasi-judicial duties when it placed Andrews on conditional release. It clearly had jurisdiction over Andrews, and had jurisdiction under the statute to fix the terms and conditions of his conditional release. That the Commission's misapplication of the statute as applied to Andrews' particular circumstances resulted in incarceration beyond the time permitted does not justify an action for false imprisonment. To rule otherwise would be to hold that an officer, whether judicial or quasi-judicial, may be viewed as acting within his or her jurisdiction only when acting without error. We do not understand that to be the intent of the law.
With regard to DOC, even if the warrants upon which Andrews had been arrested were issued improperly by the Commission based upon a mistake as to the facts or the law, the trial court correctly dismissed the false imprisonment claim against DOC, because DOC was entitled to accept the warrants as lawful, as they were regular on their face and issued by a legal body having authority to issue warrants. Cf. Erp v. Carroll, 438 So.2d 31; 40 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983) (noting that even if a prosecution is commenced and carried out maliciously, "the imprisonment is under process regular and in legal form issued by lawful authority and the resulting imprisonment is not false"). The complaint alleged that Andrews had been arrested and incarcerated upon warrants issued by the Commission, and there was no allegation of any irregularity of the process other than the claim that they were issued "without jurisdiction," an argument we have rejected in our preceding discussion.
Conclusion
It is not our purpose to attempt to minimize the deprivation of liberty of which appellant complains in this case. It is fair, however, to discuss some additional aspects of this case that appear to us to support the soundness of the result we reach. As stated above, the complaint alleged that Andrews had been convicted of pre-October 1, 1988 offenses for which he received a sentence of thirty months, and for post-October 1, 1988 offenses for which he received an additional thirty month sentence, the sentences to run consecutively. Absent the existence of various gain time statutes, Andrews would have been incarcerated continuously from April 1, 1991 until approximately March 81, 1996, less credit for any time served prior to sentence, which is not disclosed by the complaint. By comparison, the duration of his total actual confinement after being sentenced, including the alleged excess eleven-month period, amounts to approximately thirty-five months. In addition, Andrews was lawfully on conditional release supervision for approximately fifteen months. Although as we indicated earlier, gain-time and conditional release statutes are for the protection of the public, Andrews and others similarly situated incidentally benefit from these statutes by having their sentences reduced.
Although it is not our task to render decisions based upon matters of policy, there is reason to question whether the State could or would maintain its programs of early release, by whatever mechanism, if tort actions such as the one before us could be brought by aggrieved inmates. In this vein we find instructive the reasoning of the court in Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 100 S.Ct. 558, 62 L.Ed.2d 481 (1980), in which the court held constitutional a statute shielding from liability its public agencies and employees for any injury resulting from a decision whether or not to parole, release, or revoke the parole or release of a prisoner. The court held that the California Legislature could reasonably conclude that judicial review of a parole officer's decisions could inhibit the exercise of discretion, stating,
That inhibiting effect could impair the State's ability to implement a parole program designed to promote rehabilitation of inmates as well as security within prison walls by holding out a promise of potential rewards.
Id. at 283, 100 S.Ct. at 558. We think the same reasoning applies with equal effect here; we are therefore confident that the legislature in enacting section 768.28 could not and did not intend to waive any quasi-judicial immunity enjoyed by the Commission and DOC. The existence of adequate remedies for inmates, including appeal, mandamus and habeas corpus, precludes the necessity or advisability of doing away with the immunities that protect such officials for acts within the scope of their official duties. Yet, because the question in this case concerning the Commission's and DOC's liability for false imprisonment is an important one with statewide implications, we certify the following to the Florida Supreme Court as a question of great public importance:
WHETHER THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND THE PAROLE COMMISSION ARE AMENABLE TO SUIT FOR FALSE IMPRISONMENT WHERE THE PAROLE COMMISSION ESTABLISHED THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF AN INMATE'S CONDITIONAL RELEASE PURSUANT TO SECTION 947.1405, FLORIDA STATUTES (1989), BUT THROUGH AN ALLEGED ERROR IN DETERMINING THE INMATE'S RELEASE DATE, THE INMATE WAS SUBJECTED TO INCARCERATION FOR MORE THAN ELEVEN MONTHS BEYOND THE MAXIMUM RELEASE DATE PERMITTED BY THE STATUTE?
For the reasons stated, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.
BOOTH, J., concurs; BENTON, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with written opinion.
. So far as appears from his complaint, at no time did Andrews challenge the Commission's charge that he violated the terms of his conditional release.
. The complaint alleged not that Andrews is presently unlawfully detained but that earlier he had been twice detained unlawfully for a total of more than eleven months. Money damages are not ordinarily available in habe-as corpus proceedings. See Flournoy v. Moore, 752 So.2d 35 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), rev. denied, No. SC00-569, 767 So.2d 456 (Fla. July 7, 2000).
. Section 944.275 is the basic gain-time statute. A related section, 944.291, restricts release of certain offenders by providing for their release only upon conditional release as prescribed by section 947.1405. Section 944.291 also requires DOC to certify to the Commission the names and identification numbers of eligible inmates.
. Section 947.1405, the "Conditional Release Program Act," provides, in paragraph (2), in its entirety, and paragraph (6), in part, as follows:
(2) Any inmate who:
(a)Is convicted of a crime committed on or after October 1, 1988, and before January 1, 1994, and any inmate who is convicted of a crime committed on or after January 1, 1994, which crime is or was contained in category 1, category 2, category 3, or category 4 of Rule 3.701 and Rule 3.988, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure (1993), and who has served at least one prior felony commitment at a state or federal correctional institution;
(b) Is sentenced as a habitual or violent habitual offender pursuant to § 775.084; or
(c) Is found to be a sexual predator under § 775.23,
shall, upon reaching the tentative release date or provisional release date whichever is earlier, as established by the Department of Corrections, be released under supervision subject to specified terms and conditions, including payment of the cost of supervision pursuant to s. 948.09_ A panel of no fewer than two commissioners shall establish the terms and conditions of any such release.... The commission shall also determine whether the terms and conditions of such release have been violated and whether such violation warrants revocation of the conditional release.
(6) . The length of supervision must not exceed the maximum penalty imposed by the court.
.Cases are legion declaring parole commissions protected by quasi-judicial immunity. See, e.g,, Sellars v. Procunier, 641 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1981) (tracing the development of the rule of quasi-judicial immunity from the common law to its extension to modern-day parole boards, which were unknown at common law). The Sellars court held parole board members entitled to absolute immunity from suits by prisoners for actions taken "when processing parole applications." Id. at 1302; see also Walrath v. United States, 35 F.3d 277 (7th Cir.1994) ("Most federal courts . have consistently held that parole board members are absolutely immune from suit for their decisions to grant, deny, or revoke parole.").
. See Bricker v. Michigan Parole Board, 405 F.Supp. 1340, 1345 (E.D.Mich.1975) ("In deciding to grant, deny, or revoke parole, [parole board officials] act in a quasi-judicial capacity, as an arm of the sentencing judge .") (emphasis added).
. See Fleming v. State, 697 So.2d 1322 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) ("[T]he sentence [the defendant] received for his crimes is a term of years, not a specific release date.").
. The complaint alleged no error on the part of DOC or the Commission in subjecting appellant to conditional release supervision. From the complaint it affirmatively appears that Andrews was released by the Commission on conditional release on May 28, 1993, and from that date until September 12, 1994, a period of more than fifteen months, he was properly being supervised by the Commission. There is no allegation that during this period, nor at any time prior to his re-incarceration on December 9, 1994, did Andrews request review, reconsideration or correction of the term of his conditional release supervision which, as he was well aware, had been ordered to extend to December 25, 1995.
. We have examined the decisions from other jurisdictions cited by Andrews in which the courts imposed liability for false imprisonment. Our review indicates that these cases involve facts and statutory provisions so different from those before us as to provide little guidance for our decision. Cf. Sullivan v. County of Los Angeles, 12 Cal.3d 710, 117 Cal. Rptr. 241, 527 P.2d 865 (1974); Williams v. State, 5 A.D.2d 936, 172 N.Y.S.2d 206 (1958). Furthermore, decisions from other jurisdictions must be viewed within the framework of that jurisdiction's constitutional, legislative, and judicial treatment of the doctrine of governmental immunity, which may vary considerably from Florida's.