Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. Raymond E. HECK and Mike Scheel
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1975-01-20
Citations: 307 So. 2d 332
Docket Number: No. 55251
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Raymond E. HECK and Mike Scheel.
Judges: BARHAM, J., dissents with reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 307
Pages: 332–336

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. Raymond E. HECK and Mike Scheel.
No. 55251.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Jan. 20, 1975.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 21, 1975.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ossie Brown, Dist. Atty., Warren J. Hebert, Sp. Pros., for plaintiff-appellant.
Murphy W. Bell, Director, R. Judge Eames, Trial Atty., Baton Rouge, for defendant-appellee Michael C. Scheel.
Tom F. Phillips, G. Michael Pharis, Taylor, Porter, Brooks & Phillips, Baton Rouge, for defendant-appellee Raymond E. Heck.

Opinion:
SANDERS, Chief Justice.
Defendants were charged with disturbing the peace by engaging in a fistic encounter, a violation of LSA-R.S. 14:103, subd. A(l). They filed a joint motion to quash the bill of information, attacking the constitutionality of the statute. The trial court sustained the motion, and the State appealed.
LSA-R.S. 14:103, subd. A(l), the statute in question, provides:
A. Disturbing the peace is the doing of any of the following in such manner as would foreseeably disturb or alarm the public:
(1) Engaging in a fistic encounter;
Defendants allege that the phrases "fistic encounter" and "disturb and alarm the public" are vague and overbroad, leaving to the court unlimited authority to define the offense. Hence, they assert the criminal statute violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Sections 2 and 10 of the Louisiana Constitution (1921).
The State, on the other hand, argues that the contested phrases have a reasonably accepted definition and give fair notice of the nature of the criminal conduct.
The trial court held that the phrase "fistic encounter" was unconstitutionally vague and struck down the statute. We disagree.
In testing constitutionality, the statute should be given "a genuine construction, according to the fair import of [its] words, taken in their usual sense, in connection with the context." LSA-R.S. 14:3; State v. Truby, 211 La. 178, 29 So.2d 758 (1947).
If, because of vagueness, the statute fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his conduct is criminal, it violates the constitutional safeguards. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 74 S.Ct. 808, 98 L.Ed. 989 (1953); City of Shreveport v. Brewer, 225 La. 93, 72 So.2d 308 (1954).
This principle, however, does not invariably require a detailed specification of the various ways in which the crime can be committed. In the absence of detailed specification, a statute is nonetheless valid if the phraseology has a well known or commonly understood meaning. City of Baton Rouge v. Norman, La., 290 So.2d 865 (1974); State v. Evans, 214 La. 472, 38 So.2d 140 (1948); State v. Saibold, 213 La. 415, 34 So.2d 909 (1948); State v. Varnado, 208 La. 319, 23 So.2d 106 (1944); State v. Pete, 206 La. 1078, 20 So.2d 368 (1944); 10 La.L.Rev. 198.
In City of Baton Rouge v. Norman, supra, this Court stated:
"The requirement of definiteness need only give a person of ordinary intelli gence fair notice that his conduct is criminal. To accomplish this the legislature may employ generic terms. Cumbersome enumeration or explicit delineation of all possible situations is not required. 'The enumeration in a statute of every item or variation in conduct is frequently impossible.' "
The trial judge, apparently, had no difficulty in concluding that the phrase "in such manner as would foreseeably disturb or alarm the public" was sufficiently definite. We likewise have none. In effect, the phrase is restrictive. It limits the criminal conduct to a fistic encounter that is foreseeably disquieting or alarming to the public. See Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 82 S.Ct. 248, 7 L.Ed.2d 207 (1961); State v. Sanford, 203 La. 961, 14 So.2d 778 (1943).
The phrase "engaging in a fistic encounter" also appears to be reasonably clear. Taking the words in their usual sense, the phrase means engaging in a fistfight. We find in the phrase no unusual distortions to defeat comprehension by a person of ordinary intelligence.
Defendants assert that the sweep of the statute is so broad as to invade the area of protected freedoms, especially the freedom of speech. They cite Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971), and NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 84 S.Ct. 1302, 12 L.Ed.2d 325 (1964).
Contrary to the defendants' assertion, we find the statute to be narrowly drawn. It proscribes only those fistic encounters, or fistfights, that foreseeably disturb or alarm the public. The right of the State to impose penalties for the utterance of "fighting words" tending directly toward breaches of the peace has been constitutionally recognized. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 85 S.Ct. 476, 13 L.Ed.2d 487 (1965); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942). See also Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 94 S.Ct. 970, 39 L.Ed.2d 214 (1974); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 92 S.Ct. 1103, 31 L.Ed.2d 408 (1972). If the State may ban the utterance of such "fighting words," it may for a stronger reason enact measures for the suppression of fighting.
The two decisions cited by defendants, Coates v. Cincinnati, supra, and NAACP v. Alabama, supra, are inapposite.
In pressing their argument based on overbreadth, defendants question whether various activities are covered by the statute, e. g., a karate chop. Concededly, the present defendants were engaged in a fistfight. We need not, therefore, classify the numerous hypothetical situations cited. Such questions can be raised concerning the coverage of any criminal statute, no matter how well phrased.
In United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 67 S.Ct. 1538, 91 L.Ed. 1877 (1946), the United States Supreme Court stated:
"That there may be marginal cases in which it is difficult to determine the side of the line on which a particular fact situation falls is no sufficient reason to hold the language too ambiguous to define a criminal offense."
We conclude that the attack upon the constitutionality of the statute is without merit.
For the reasons assigned, the ruling of the Nineteenth Judicial District Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge is reversed, the motion to quash is overruled, and the case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings according to law.
BARHAM, J., dissents with reasons.