Case Name: BENJAMIN WEEKS, Appellant v. JAMES O'BRIEN, as Executor, etc., Respondent
Court: New York Superior Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1891-01-05
Citations: 27 Jones & S. 28
Docket Number: 
Parties: BENJAMIN WEEKS, Appellant v. JAMES O’BRIEN, as Executor, etc., Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: Reports of cases argued and determined in the Superior Court of the city of New York
Volume: 59
Pages: 28–32

Head Matter:
BENJAMIN WEEKS, Appellant v. JAMES O’BRIEN, as Executor, etc., Respondent.
Building contract—Architect's certificate, refusal of same—Breach of contract.
This action was to recover the amount of the last payment upon a building contract, in which it was provided that this payment should be paid upon the architect’s certificate, which had been refused. It appeared that the cellar bottom had not been laid in accordance with the contract which required that it should be made water-tight. It had been laid, but about the time for the completion of the contract the water had come into the cellar and broken up the bottom, and it was in this state when the plaintiff left the work and the architect refused the certificate.
Held, that a cel lar has an important relation to the building above it in respect to health, comfort, and the state of the building itself, and that the omission to comply with the contract in respect to its completion, etc., could not be called unintentional in the sense of those cases which have alio wetl the certificate to be dispensed with. The plaintiff failed to establish that the contract had been substantially performed and that the certificate had been unreasonably withheld and this failure called for the dismissal of the complaint.
Before Sedgwick, Ch. J., Freedman and Ingraham, JJ.
Decided January 5, 1891.
Appeal from a judgment entered upon an order dismissing the complaint at trial term.
George W. McAdam, attorney, and Albert Mathews of counsel, for appellant.
Edmund Huerstel, attorney, and Abram Kling of counsel, for respondent.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
The action was to recover the amount of the last payment upon a building contract provided to be paid upon the architect's certificate. In the plaintiffs case it appeared that the contract had not been performed in several particulars. The most important of these was that the cellar bottom had not been laid in accordance with the contract which required that it should be made water-tight. Its situation was such that it was subject to the flowing of water. It had been once laid by a sub-contractor of the plaintiff, but about the time for the completion of the contract water had come in and broken up the bottom. It was in this state when the plaintiff left the work. The architect refused to give a certificate.
On the trial it was argued by the plaintiff that the architect's refusal was unreasonable, as the work not done was a minor and comparatively unimportant part of the work done under the contract, and the contract had been substantially performed.
A cellar has an important relation to the building above it, in respect of health, comfort, and the state of the building itself. The omission to comply with the contract could not be called unintentional in the sense of those cases which have allowed the certificate to be dispensed with. Phillip v. Gallant, 62 N. Y. 256 ; Woodward v. Fuller, 80 Ib. 312. There was not an omission to notice it because the other details of the contract were numerous. Attention had been given to the cellar, and everything done or omitted had purpose and intention. The plaintiff failed to prove that the contract had been substantially performed, or that the certificate had been unreasonably withheld. This called for the dismissal of the complaint. The jury could not have used the testimony in a way that would have justified them in finding for the' plaintiff on these matters.
There was a second cause of action, and the counsel for appellant argues that it should have gone to the jury. There was no request that this should be presented to the jury, and the manner in which the action was treated led to the second cause of action not being noticed.
Judgment affirmed, with costs.