Case Name: Cain v. The C., R. I. & P. R. Co.
Court: Iowa Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Iowa
Decision Date: 1880-06-24
Citations: 54 Iowa 255
Docket Number: 
Parties: Cain v. The C., R. I. & P. R. Co.
Judges: 
Reporter: Iowa Reports
Volume: 54
Pages: 255–265

Head Matter:
Cain v. The C., R. I. & P. R. Co.
1. Homesteaddamages to homestead interest: right to recover. The widow of the owner of real estate, who occupied the same as a homestead after the death of her husband, was held entitled to maintain an action to recover special damages alleged to have been caused to her homestead right by the wrongful maintenance and use of a railroad track upon the street in front of the property, although such maintenance and use commenced during the lifetime of her husband.
2. Bailroads: use of streets: nuisance. Where a railroad company laid a side track upon the street of a city within six feet of the line of the street, in violation of the provisions of the city ordinance granting it the right of way, which prohibited the construction of any track within eighteen feet of such line, it was held that such track, and the use thereof, constituted a nuisance, for the maintenance of which a property holder who had sustained special damages by reason thereof might-maintain an action; the discretion necessary to be exercised in determining the limits to be imposed upon the use of the street by the railroad being vested in the city council.
3. -: damages: continuing injury. The track, being a side-track,’ and having been wrongfully constructed, in violation of the city ordinance, could not be considered a permanent structure, the damages arising from the maintenance of which would be original, and not continuous, nor, being a nuisance, could the right to continue such maintenance be acquired by prescription.
Appeal from Polls Circuit Court.
Monday, June 24.
The substance of the petition is: that in the year 1872 Robert Cain, plaintiff’s husband, jmrchased a lot on the north side of Vine Street in the city of Des Moines, and erected thereon a brick dwelling house, the .outer wall of which was upon the south line of' the lot and abutted on the sidewalk. Before the purchase of the lot- and the erection of the house, the city by an ordinance had granted to the defendant the right to run its railroad tracks along said street, which was 82-J feet wide, the said tracks to be constructed as nearly as practicable to the middle line of the stx*eet, and so as to leave at least eight feet on each side of said street between the sidewalks and said tracks. In the year 1873 the defendant, without the permission of said Robert Cain or the plaintiff, and in violatioix of said ordinance, laid a side-track within six feet of the line of said street, and within six feet of said dwelling house, and upon four feet of the space allowed for a sidewalk by the city plat; that there was sufficient space iix said street for defendant to lay its side-ti-ack without enci’oaching on the space allowed for sidewalk, on either side, and defendant put down said side-ti’ack to x’each warehouses along the north side of said Tine Street, and not because it was necessary to operate said road.
The said Robert Cain died in the year 1876, and it is averred that the plaintiff has occupied said house as her dwelling and homestead from the time it was erected up to the present; “ that defendant leaves cai*s standing upon said side-track in front of plaintiff’s doorway often for periods of a day or two at a time; that leaving said cars standing so- near plaintiff’s house axxd running them aixd their engines past, and the genei-al use of said siding for railroad purposes has shaken the walls of said house, and so shaken it as to x’ender it almost worthless; that it is rendered unfit for a dwelling, and for such pdrpose is rendered valueless; that plaintiff has suffered great annoyance and disturbance from the close proximity of the cars, to her damage in the sum of $1,500,” for which she asks judgment.
There was a demurrer to the petition, the substance of which is that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover upon the facts stated in her ]xetition. The demurrer was sustained. Plaintiff appeals.
Claris da Connor, for appellant.
Wright, Gatch d¡ Wright, for appellee.

Opinion:
Eothrock, J. I.
That a railroad company may locate and build its road in the public streets of a city or town in this State, without the consent of the corporate authorities of such city or town, has been definitely settled by frequent decisions of this court. City of Clinton v. C. R. & M. R. R. Co., 24 Iowa, 455; Chicago, Newton and Southwestern R. Co. v. Mayor, etc., 36 Id., 299; Cook v. City of Burlington, 36 Id., 357; Slatten v. Des Moines Valley R. Co., 29 Id., 148; City of Clinton v. C. & L. R'y Co., 37 Id., 61; Davis v. C. & N. W. R. Co., 46 Id., 389.
. It is also well settled that such right is subject to equitable control, and proper police regulations, and if a railroad be constructed upon a street in such a careless, improper or negligent manner as to be an injury to the owner of property abutting upon the street, he may recover damages by reason of such careless, negligent and improper construction, provided his injury be special and not common to the general public. Cadle v. Muscatine Western R. Co., 44 Iowa, 11; Paris v. C. & S. W. R. Co., 43 Id., 636; Frith v. City of Dubuque, 45 Id., 406.
This court has never determined that a person cannot recover damages for special injuries to his property by reason of the construction of a railroad in the street of a city; and, the right to construct being subject to equitable control and proper police regulations, the ordinance of the city of Des Moines prescribing the extent to which Yine street should be occupied by railroad tracks was just such an ordinance as it had the power to make and enforce, provided it was not an unreasonable restriction upon the railroad company. That it was not unreasonable must be presumed, in the absence of a showing to the contrary. The allegations of the petition being conceded by the demurrer to be true, Eobert Cain un doubtedly had the right to recover damages of the plaintiff for building a railroad trade within six feet of his house, in violation of the ordinance of the city, and operating it in the manner set forth in the petition. His right of recovery would have been grounded upon the fact that he was the owner in fee of the property. The plaintiff herein could not have maintained an action before her husband's death, because, while she jointly with her husband occupied the homestead, the title was in the husband.
The main ground of the demurrer is that the plaintiff cannot recover because the damages which accrued to the husband in his life-time were entire, and were capable of being determined at the time the side track was laid. In other words, it is said, if the husband had commenced an action he would .have recovered not only such damages as had then accrued, but all subsequent damages, because the railroad track was a permanent structure, and the damages were susceptible of immediate estimate. To sustain this view, reference is made to Powers v. Council Bluffs, 45 Iowa, 652. That was an action against the city for constructing a ditch along a public street in such a negligent manner that the plaintiff's property was injured, not from the original construction, but by reason of the action of the water in washing away the bottom and sides of the ditch along the plaintiff's lots. It was held that the damage was original, susceptible of immediate estimation, and was the difference between the value of the lots as they would have been if the ditch had been properly constructed and the value of them as they were, with the ditch as it was. It is said in that case: "While no infallible test can be applied to enable us to determine whether a structure is permanent or not, inasmuch as nothing is absolutely permanent, yet, when a structure is practically determined to be a permanent one, its permanency, if it is a nuisance and will necessarily result in damages, will make the damages original."
The broad distinction between that case and the case at bar is that the damages in the former, necessarily resulted from the construction of the ditch, without the interposition of any human agency, while in the latter the damages arise not so much from the laying of 'the side-track as by its continued and improper use by the defendant. It is averred in the petition that the use of said side-track for railroad purposes has shaken the walls of said house so as to render it useless, and by leaving cars standing upon the track in front of plaintiff's door for a day or two at a time, and by other annoyances connected with the operation of the road, the plaintiff is damaged. It is said in Town of Troy v. Cheshire Railroad Co., 3 Porter (N. H.), 83, that: "Where the nuisance is of such character that its continuance is necessarily an injury, and where it is oka permanent character that will continue without change from any cause but human labor, then the damage is an original damage and may be at o.nce fully compensated." The case at bar is in no proper sense within this rule. The damage is a continuing one, resulting largely from the daily operation of the road by running engines and ears over it, and allowing them to remain upon it. The nuisance, so far as is occasioned by operating the road, would be abated, not by human labor, but by ceasing to use human labor to the plaintiff's injury.
The general rule is that every continuance of a nuisance is a fresh one, and that successive actions may be maintained for damages so long as the nuisance is continued. This principle has been so often announced that a citation of cases seems scarcely necessary; a few will suffice. Staples v. Spring, 10 Mass., 72; Holmes v. Wilson, 10 Adolphus & Ellis, 503; Blesh v. C. & N. W. R. R. Co., 43 Wis., 183; Carl v. The Sheboygan & Fond du Lac R. Co., Sup. Ct. Wis., 1 N. W. Rep., 295.
Having found that the damage alleged in the petition is not original but continuing, and that successive actions may be maintained, so long as it is continued, it remains to be determined whether the' plaintiff can maintain an action, she being tlie occupant of the property as her homestead. That she cannot recover for any injury to the property which accrued during the life of the husband seems to us to be clear. But it appears equally clear that she may recover for such damage as she has sustained since the death of her husband. That the owner of a life estate, or even a lessee, may recover damages occasioned by a nuisance affecting the real estate held or occupied by him, can admit of no question. The plaintiff in this case has a homestead interest in the property. It may continue for life, depending upon the occupancy of it. If the enjoyment of her right is impaired or prevented by a wrong done, she may maintain an action. She cannot, of course, recover for an injury to the reversionary interest, but if the side-traclc was wrongfully laid, as alleged, she may compel its removal. Code, § 3331.
Eeversed.