Case Name: St. John and others against The American Mutual Fire and Marine Insurance Company
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1854-12
Citations: 11 N.Y. 516
Docket Number: 
Parties: St. John and others against The American Mutual Fire and Marine Insurance Company.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 11
Pages: 508–523

Head Matter:
St. John and others against The American Mutual Fire and Marine Insurance Company.
A policy, by which property was insured against loss or damage by Are, contained a condition that the insurer would not be liable for amy loss occasioned by the explosion of a steam boiler; and there was an explosion of a steam boiler in use in the building where the property was situated, whereby Are was brought in contact with and consumed the property; Held, that the loss was within the exception created by the condition, and the insurer not liable.
Appeal from a judgment of the superior court of the city of New-York. The action was upon a policy of insurance issued by the defendants to the plaintiffs. On the trial before Campbell, J., in May, 1853, the plaintiffs read in evidence the policy of insurance, which was dated the 31st of March, 1849, by which the defendants insured the plaintiffs during one year “ against loss or damage by fire, to the amount of two thousand dollars, on their machinery and fixtures for blowing fur and forming hat bodies, including shafting and fixtures for communicating power, contained in the brick building situate Nos. 5 and 7 Hague street, in the city of New-York, occupied for mechanical purposes ; the policy to cover lathes and tools for making machinery contained in the building.” Among the conditions annexed to, and forming a part of the policy, was the following: “ This company will be liable for losses on property burnt by lightning, but not for any loss or damage by fire happening by means of • an invasion, insurrection, riot or civil commotion, or of any military or usurped power, nor for any loss occasioned by the explosion of a steam boiler, or explosions arising from any other cause, unless Specially specified in the policy.” The plaintiffs proved that there was a steam engine and boiler in the basement of the building in which the insured property was contained, used in propelling machinery; that on the fourth of February, 1850, there was an explosion of the boiler which threw down the building, and immediately thereafter smoke and flames issued from the ruins, and the building and its contents, including the property covered by the policy, were consumed. The plaintiffs read in evidence the proofs of loss delivered by them to the defendants soon after the destruction of the insured property. In their affidavit, composing a part of these proofs, the fire and the manner in which it originated are stated and described as follows : 11 That on the fourth day of February, 1850, a fire occurred in the said building, numbers 5 and 7 Hague street, whereby great and immediate loss and damage were sustained by deponents, by the injury done to their property insured as aforesaid. That the said fire originated on the said fourth day of February, 1850, and was immediately preceded by an explosion of a steam boiler on the said premises, whereby the walls of the said building were mostly thrown down, and the fire which was used in the furnace of the steam boiler, and in stoves in various parts of the said building, was communicated to the frame and woodwork of said building, and the materials and machinery contained therein.”
At the close of the plaintiffs’ case, the counsel for the defendants moved the court to dismiss the complaint, on the ground that it appeared from the evidence that the insured property was brought into contact with the fire solely by means of the explosion of the boiler, and that thus the loss, so far as the same was caused by fire, was occasioned directly by such explosion of the boiler; and that, by the express conditions of the policy, the defendants were not liable for loss so occasioned. The justice granted the motion, and ordered judgment dismissing the complaint, and the counsel for the plaintiffs excepted. This judgment was affirmed by the superior court at general term; and the plaintiffs appealed to this court.
A. L. Jordan, for the appellants.
C. P. Kirkland, for the respondent.

Opinion:
Denio, J.
As the sole peril insured against by this policy of insurance was loss or damage by fire, we should naturally expect, in examining exceptions contained in the contract, to find pointed out some circumstances under which the insurers would not hold themselves liable though a loss by fire should take place. Hence a loss occasioned by invasion, insurrection, riot and the like, has usually been found excepted in such policies; and although in this, and perhaps in policies generally, the exception in this respect is in terms of losses by fire, the clause would be equally definite and intelligible if those words were omitted in the clause stating the exception. When, therefore, this policy proceeds to declare that the defendants will not be liable for any loss " occasioned by the explosion of a steam boiler," it refers prima facie to such a loss as by the prior provisions of the contract the defendants would be bound to indemnify against, and not to one which would not be embraced in the general terms of the policy, and as to which there was no occasion to introduce an exception. The most usual consequence of the explosion of a steam boiler, is the breaking and rending the building in which it is contained and the movable property therein; and if this were the only consequence to be apprehended from such an occurrence, the exception introduced into this policy would be quite unnecessary, and we may presume it would not have been inserted. It would not be a loss or damage by fire, unless there was combustion, and then only to the extent of. the damage properly attributable to the combustion. (Millandon v. New Orleans Insurance Company, 4 Rob. Lou'a R. 15.) In one sense it is true the explosion is the consequence of fire, as steam is created by the application of heat; but it is understood that where fire is applied by design, as in culinary and several manufacturing processes, and a loss occurs in consequence of overheating or other misapplication of fire to the subject upon which it was intended to operate, and the injury is limited to that particular subject, such damage is not considered a loss by fire within the meaning of this class of contracts. (Beau mont on Ins. 37 and seq.) But another very usual concomitant of the explosion of a steam boiler is that the place in which it is situated is set on fire. Though this is not universally the case, it is sufficiently common to constitute a subject of consideration in entering into contracts for insurance. As the furnace is required to be in immediate proximity to the boiler, and as the explosion usually overturns and displaces every thing in its vicinity, the danger of a loss by burning is very imminent. I think, therefore, we must understand by the assertion that the company will not be liable for any loss occasioned by the explosion of a steam boiler, that the defendants contracted for an exemption not from responsibility for such losses as they would not be bound to make good if no such clause had been inserted, but for those which by the preceding terms of the policy they had agreed to indemnify, against, and which were very likely to be caused by an explosion. It is true, as argued by the plaintiffs' counsel, that the language would have been more distinct and certain if the words by fire had been inserted, as in the earlier member of the sentence where losses by invasion, &c., are excepted; but where we see that the comprehensive words, any loss, are used in the place of any loss or damage by fire, we cannot, upon any authorized rules of'interpretation, hold that a restricted meaning was intended.
It is also true, as was insisted at the bar, that where the proximate cause of a loss, either in a marine or a fire policy, is one of the perils expressly insured against, the insurer cannot escape responsibility by showing that the property was brought within that peril by a cause not mentioned in the contract. The familiar example of a loss attributable to the negligence of the servants of the assured has recently been before this court, and we have recognized the principle to be as stated by the plaintiffs' counsel. (Matthews v. The Howard Ins. Co., ante, p. 9.) If, therefore, there had been nothing said in this policy respecting a steam boiler, this loss, having been occasioned by fire as its proximate cause, would have rested on the insurers, though it had been shown, as it might have been, that the fire was kindled by means of the explosion. But this principle does not, I think, aid the plaintiffs. The doctrine is, that the courts will not go back to the remote cause where the immediate one belongs to the class insured against. Hence, as before remarked, the negligence of servants does not relieve the insurers. But suppose, by the very terms of a policy against fire, the parties agree that the insurers shall not be answerable for losses occasioned by the negligence of the servants of the assured, and it is found that a dwelling insured has been burned by the neglect of some necessary precaution which should have been taken by the housekeeper of the assured. It would clearly be a loss within the very terms of the exception, and the insurers would be discharged. The case is the same here. The parties knowing that fires were liable to be kindled by the explosion of a steam boiler, and that by the general terms of the policy the insurers would be liable for a fire thus originating, agreed that for such losses ' the party would be his own insurer.
The loss is within the terms of the exception, according to its popular meaning as well as its grammatical construction, and I do not see any thing in the nature of the case which would war- ' rant us in indulging in a criticism which should give the language a different meaning.
There is, as was mentioned on the argument, a possible case where the language in question would not be entirely unmeaning upon the construction contended for by the defendants' counsel. An explosion may be caused by a fire exterior to the boiler or furnace, and the building and moveables may be injured by the force of the steam, though no combustion takes place, and it may be true that the insurer would be protected from answering for that loss by the exception in question. But this theory requires a set of circumstances so unlikely to happen, that I cannot think that the contract was framed with any view to them. We shall, I am persuaded, be more likely to construe the contract according to the intention of the parties, by adopting that interpretation which is most natural and obvious, rather than to suppose possible cases, very unlikely to happen, and which it is improbable the parties had in view.
I am of opinion, therefore, that the judgment of the superior court should be affirmed
Johnson, J.
The question in this case is, whether the loss sustained by the plaintiffs by the burning of their property, under the circumstances of this case, was a loss occasioned by the explosion of a steam boiler. If it was, the defendants have expressly stipulated that they shall not be charged with it.
Several interpretations of the clause in question offer themselves for consideration. In the first place, it may be that the clause was introduced to exclude the mere injury by explosion without fire, and that although such an injury is not by law to be borne by an insurer against fire, yet that the insurers thought it wise to guard against the possibility of its being considered a loss by fire. That such a loss has been sought to be recovered as a loss by fire, though unsuccessfully, (Millandon v. New Orleans Insurance Co., 4 Lou'a R. 15,) and that the clause in question immediately follows a stipulation in respect to liability for property burnt by lightning, which undeniably is merely a statement of the exact measure of the liability Which the law imposes in the absence of any stipulation, are grounds for taking the view suggested of the clause in question.
Another interpretation suggested applies the exception to damage produced by explosion, when the explosion is caused by a fire which itself comes within the perils insured against: as in case a fire should occur in the engine room and its heat should cause the boiler to explode. Upon the interpretation suggested, the damage occasioned by the explosion would not be recoverable against the company. Still another interpretation applies the exception to any loss by fire occasioned by the explosion, and so exempts the company from responsibility for the loss in this case. This interpretation was adopted by the superior court, upon the ground that every stipulation in a contract should be so expounded as to give it some operation, and that this clause could have none unless it was so construed. Though the principle of exposition on which that court proceeded is sound, we have already seen that the clause is capable of meaning, without -recourse to the particular interpretation put upon it in that court. If either of these proposed interpretations is entirely satisfactory. The general peril against which the defendants undertook to indemnify the plaintiffs was " immediate loss or damage by fire." That was the subject matter, and the only one about which the contract was made. All the defendants' relations with the plaintiffs grow out of that one subject matter; and any qualifications of their liability, contained in the contract, presumptively relate to the indemnity which they have contracted to afford to the plaintiffs, and to eases which but for those qualifications would or might be covered by the contract for indemnity. The language used, construing it with reference to the subject matter, is equivalent to a declaration on the part of the insurers that they are not to be held responsible for any loss, whether it comes within the general peril of fire or not, and without undertaking to consider whether it does or not, if such loss happen to be occasioned by the explosion of a steam boiler. This is, I think, the fair sense of the language employed. The prominent intention is to exclude the risk from the explosion of steam boilers—not the risk merely of the exploding force, but all risk. That peril the insured were content to bear. Among the risks consequent upon an explosion, the most prominent, next to the direct destruction by the explosive force, is the hazard from the fire of the furnaces and other fires in the building being thrown about among combustible matter. So patent is it, that no one can contemplate the event of an explosion, without recognizing this risk as one of the most obvious and important hazards attending upon such an event. Only one casualty happened to the premises and occasioned the destruction of property which the defendants are called upon to answer for. That was the explosion of the boiler. The burning was the direct and natural consequence of the explosion of the boiler, although it did not necessarily follow that fire would take place. It was as direct a consequence as the falling of the walls would have been in case the explosion had broken but a single timber, and the walls had not fallen for some hours. In such a case it might be argued that the explosion'broke but one timber, which brought too great weight upon some other, which giving way produced the catastrophe, and that therefore the fall of the whole was not a direct consequence of the explosion. The answer in both cases is, that 'the resulting destruction followed from the original casualty, without the intervention of any new cause, and followed from the nature and condition of the subject at the time of the casualty. The breaking ef the beam in the supposed case, and the scattering of the coals from the stoves in the actual case, are the direct and immediate consequences of the explosion of the boiler; the fall and the fire are the natural consequences, due to no new casualty, but resulting from obvious, natural forces, operating under the circumstances produced by the original exploding force. The whole loss in-both cases is the immediate consequence of the explosion of the boiler. It was urged upon the argument that as fire was the actual means of destruction of the property in question, the court could not look back beyond the fire, upon the familiar principle, " causa próxima non remota spectatur." It is undoubtedly true, that if the policy contained no exception, this loss would clearly have been a loss by fire. There would be no occasion to consider how the fire happened, the parties not having contracted for indemnity against fire occurring only in particular ways, but generally against fire. The existence of the exception renders the inquiry necessary to enable us to say whether the loss is within its terms, and the meaning of those terms we have already considered. It was also argued, that if the parties had intended to except loss by fire, occasioned by the explosion of a steam boiler, those words should have been used ; but that would have narrowed the exception to losses by fire only, whereas the language now used is broad enough to cover all losses so occasipned, whether by fire or explosive force, or in any other way in which losses by the excepted peril could be produced. The judgment should be affirmed.
Parker, J.
In this policy of insurance against fire- was an exception in the following words" This company will be liable for losses on property burnt by lightning, but not for any loss or damage by fire happening by means of any invasion, insurrection, -riot or civil commotion, or of any military or usurped power, nor for any loss occasioned by the explosion of a steam boiler, or explosions arising from any other cause, unless specially specified in this policy." It is a question of law whether the facts of the case, which are undisputed, are covered by this exception of the policy.
The policy must be so construed, if practicable, as to give effect to all its parts and make them severally consistent with each other. The insurance being against damage by fire alone, the exception of loss occasioned by the explosion of a steam boiler would be needless and-entirely inappropriate to the subject of the contract, unless it had some reference to damage done by fire. I think this clause was inserted with reference to the agency of fire, not in burning after the explosion, but in causing the explosion itself. All explosions of steam boilers are referrible to the action of fire. Without fire, there could be no steam and no explosion; and I think it was to save all doubt as to the question whether the destruction consequent upon an explosion was caused by fire, that the exception was inserted. That doubt may have been suggested by Waters v. The Merchants' Louis. Ins. Co., (11 Peters, 213,) and Millandon v. The N. O. Ins. Co., (4 Lou'a R. 15.) The- insured premises, having on them a steam- engine and boiler,- were much more exposed to injury than they would have been without them ; but by making an exception, which threw upon the insured the risk of injury from explosion, the premises could be insured at the same premium as other premises on which- there were no engine and boiler. The ordinary risk was thus cast upon the insurer, the extraordinary risk upon the insured. I do not think the parties to the contract had in view, at the time it was- made,- any other fire than that which, by its heat, caused the explosion.
But they provided, in express- terms,- that the insurers should not be liable for any loss occasioned by the explosion of a steam boiler. This is a full and complete protection against loss of every description which might be occasioned by such explosion. Such explosion might occasion loss in different ways. It did so in this cáse ; and because fire happened to be one of the means of destruction; it does not take that portion of the loss out of the exception and bring it within the general terms of the policy. The burning was as much a consequence of the explosion as the breaking and destruction from expansion- All were "occasioned" by the explosion. The explosion was caused by fire, but, with all its immediate consequences, it was excepted from the operation of the policy. The injury by fire is plainly within the exception, as the injury would have been, if the property had been destroyed by water in consequence of the breaking of the water-pipes by the explosion.
As to the extent to which consequential damage may be traced and charged to the moving cause, I suppose the same rule applies to the exception as to the policy itself. In an action on the policy for loss by fire, the insured would be indemnified not only for goods actually burned, but also for those wet and soiled, for furniture cracked and warped, and under some circumstances, for goods stolen and lost by the removal of goods. The construction I have put on the extent of the exception is certainly not broader. The fire was an immediate consequence of the explosion; and the loss of property by fire, as well as by breaking and displacement, was clearly occasioned by it.
The plaintiff could not recover for any damage caused by the explosion; and I think he had no more claim for that done by burning, than for that portion broken and crushed by the concussion. The judgment of the superior court should be affirmed.
Buggles and Edwarjjs, Js., were in favor of affirming the judgment.
Selden, J.; did not hear the argument, and took no part in the decision.