Case Name: In the Matter of the WELFARE OF J.L.B., Child
Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Minnesota
Decision Date: 1989-02-14
Citations: 435 N.W.2d 595
Docket Number: No. C4-88-1251
Parties: In the Matter of the WELFARE OF J.L.B., Child.
Judges: Considered and decided by FORSBERG, P.J., and CRIPPEN and NORTON, JJ., without oral argument.
Reporter: North Western Reporter 2d
Volume: 435
Pages: 595–604

Head Matter:
In the Matter of the WELFARE OF J.L.B., Child.
No. C4-88-1251.
Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
Feb. 14, 1989.
Review Denied March 17, 1989.
C. Paul Jones, State Public Defender, Susan K. Maki, Asst. Public Defender, Minneapolis, for appellant.
Alan L. Mitchell, St. Louis Co. Atty., Gordon P. Coldagelli, Asst. Co. Atty., Virginia, for respondent.
Considered and decided by FORSBERG, P.J., and CRIPPEN and NORTON, JJ., without oral argument.

Opinion:
OPINION
NORTON, Judge.
J.L.B. appeals from an order of the St. Louis County District Court, Juvenile Division, referring him for adult prosecution on charges of second degree murder, or in the alternative aiding a suicide, and murder of an unborn child. The trial court found that the state proved by clear and convincing evidence in the totality of the circumstances that the public safety is not served by retaining J.L.B. in the juvenile system. We affirm.
FACTS
J.L.B. is charged with one count of second degree murder, an alternative count of aiding a suicide, and murder of an unborn child in connection with the death of his girlfriend, R.C. R.C. was approximately six and one-half months pregnant at the time of her death. J.L.B. was then seventeen years and two months old. J.L.B. turned nineteen on January 28, 1989.
On the night of April 9, 1987, the St. Louis County Sheriff's Office received a telephone call from Father Brian Schultz, a local Catholic priest. Schultz reported a telephone call from an anonymous teenage caller who stated that his girlfriend had shot herself in the woods that afternoon. The caller told Schultz that he hid the body and walked home. Approximately four hours later, the sheriff's office received a call from R.C.'s father, reporting that his 18-year-old daughter was missing. R.C.'s father stated that R.C. had been having problems with her boyfriend, J.L.B., and that J.L.B. had been evasive when R.C.'s father questioned him earlier that evening. R.C.'s father telephoned the sheriff's office again about an hour later and reported that R.C. had told her grandmother that she was pregnant and that J.L.B. was the father of her child.
The sheriffs office obtained a search warrant for J.L.B.'s home, and received permission from J.L.B.'s mother to question him. J.L.B. waived his Miranda rights. According to J.L.B., he had spoken by telephone with R.C. after school, and they agreed to meet at their regular place in the woods between their homes. J.L.B. waited an hour, but R.C. did not show up. When the sheriff's officer confronted J.L.B. with the telephone call to Schultz, J.L.B. asked if he could "start all over again." J.L.B. then related his account of R.C.'s death. According to J.L.B., R.C. asked him to meet her and to bring a gun to the meeting. J.L.B. brought a Ruger .44 magnum rifle and ammunition with him. J.L.B. and R.C. talked together, and R.C. said they should shoot themselves. J.L.B., who did not want to commit suicide, loaded the gun and R.C. placed it in her mouth. They continued talking for approximately fifteen minutes. R.C. asked J.L.B. to "help her" by counting to three. J.L.B. counted to three, and when R.C. did not do anything, he turned and began walking away. J.L.B. heard a "noise" and realized R.C. had shot herself. He became frightened and dragged her body into a wooded area where he hid it. J.L.B. returned home through the woods. When he got home, J.L.B. changed clothes and washed his hands and arms. He pried a jammed shell out of the gun and threw away two live rounds in the woods behind his home. J.L.B. then cleaned the gun with WD-40.
J.L.B. stated that he and R.C. had discussed R.C.'s pregnancy while at the meeting place. J.L.B. maintained that he was not the father of her child and had never had intercourse with her. J.L.B. led sheriff's deputies to the meeting place in the woods where they located R.C.'s body.
Tests performed during the- ensuing investigation revealed that R.C. was killed by a large caliber gunshot wound; that the gun had been in her mouth or in close proximity to her mouth at the time it was fired; that she was approximately six to six and one-half months pregnant; that the fetus died as a result of asphyxiation secondary to maternal death; that the likelihood of J.L.B.'s paternity was 99.132; and appellant was a possible source of semen found in a vaginal swab taken from R.C.'s body and on the panties which she had been wearing at the time of her death. The sheriff's office conducted an extensive investigation, including numerous interviews.
On April 1, 1988, a delinquency petition and motion for reference to adult court were filed. A reference hearing was held on May 17-18, 1988, following a court ordered reference study and psychological examination. Several people testified at the hearing, including Jean Specht, the probation officer who conducted the reference study; Dr. Olmsted, the psychologist who performed the court ordered examination; Mr. McAllister, a psychologist, and Dr. Roberts, a psychiatrist, both of whom counseled J.L.B.; and several friends or relatives of R.C. and J.L.B.
Both McAllister and Roberts diagnosed J.L.B. as having a schizoid personality disorder. Olmsted stated that his observations could be consistent with this diagnosis. McAllister characterized schizoid personality disorder as a pervasive pattern of indifference to social relationships including a sense of detachment and alienation and a sense of passivity. J.L.B.'s experts stated that although outpatient psychotherapy could help J.L.B., he does not have a mental illness, and that many people with schizoid personality disorder do not seek treatment because they are able to function in a limited capacity. Roberts opined that J.L.B. is not a danger to society, and that if J.L.B. received weekly treatment for twelve months, he would be much more "socially adaptive." McAllister could not predict how long it would take to effectively treat J.L.B. Olmsted stated that treatment for this disorder is usually long-term, and in his opinion it was doubtful that someone could be satisfactorily treated in a one-year period.
There was also testimony that R.C. told a friend and the school guidance counselor that she was afraid J.L.B. might hurt her, and that she was concerned for the welfare of her baby.
The trial court granted the motion for reference, finding that the public safety is not served by retaining J.L.B. in the juvenile system.
ISSUE
Did the trial court err in granting the state's motion for reference to adult court?
ANALYSIS
A juvenile court has considerable latitude in determining if certification for adult prosecution will be made. Its decision will not be upset unless its findings are clearly erroneous so as to constitute an abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of I.Q.S., 309 Minn. 78, 86-87, 244 N.W.2d 30, 38 (1976).
In order to refer a child for adult prosecution, the trial court must find (1) probable cause to believe the child committed the offenses alleged in the delinquency petition and (2) a demonstration by clear and convincing evidence that the child is not suitable to treatment or that the public safety is not served under the provisions of law relating to juvenile courts. Minn.Stat. § 260.125, subd. 2 (1988); Matter of Welfare of D.F.B., 433 N.W.2d 79, 81 (Minn.1988). For purposes of the reference hearing, the charges against the juvenile are presumed to be true. In re Welfare of W.J.R., 264 N.W.2d 391, 393 (Minn.1978).
A prima facie case that the public safety is not served or that the child is not suitable for treatment is established if the child was at least sixteen years old at the time of the alleged offense, and:
(1) Is alleged by delinquency petition to have committed an aggravated felony against the person and (a) in committing the offense, the child acted with particular cruelty or disregard for the life or safety of another;
Minn.Stat. § 260.125, subd. 3 (1988).
We agree with the trial court that a prima facie case was established. J.L.B. is alleged to have committed second degree murder; he was over sixteen years old at the time; and allegations in the petition indicate that the offenses were committed with particular cruelty and disregard for the life of R.C. and her unborn child.
A prima facie case may be rebutted by significant evidence that the juvenile is suitable for treatment or that public safety is served under the provisions of laws relative to juvenile courts. There is no necessity to prove both these elements. Matter of Welfare of T.R.C., 398 N.W.2d 662, 665 (Minn.Ct.App.1987) (citing Matter of Welfare of Haaland, 346 N.W.2d 190, 193 (Minn.Ct.App.1984)). "Significant evidence" is the same as substantial evidence, and the quantum of evidence required to rebut a prima facie case in a reference hearing is the same as in other civil matters. D.F.B., 433 N.W.2d at 81.
The trial court determined that J.L. B. presented significant evidence to rebut the prima facie case. We agree. Expert witnesses testified that J.L.B. has a schizoid personality disorder; that he is immature, not at all violent, and does not pose a threat to others; and that he is suitable for treatment. This testimony is sufficient to rebut the presumption in favor of reference. See D.F.B., 433 N.W.2d at 81.
If the prima facie case is rebutted, the court considers the totality of the circumstances, which includes, but is not limited to, the factors listed in subdivision 2 of Minn.R.Juv.Cts. 32.05. These factors are:
(a) the seriousness of the offense in terms of community protection,
(b) the circumstances surrounding the offense,
(c) whether the offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated or willful manner,
(d) whether the offense was directed against persons or property, the greater weight being given to an offense against persons, especially if personal injury resulted,
(e) the reasonably foreseeable consequences of the act,
(f) the absence of adequate protective and security facilities available to the juvenile treatment system,
(g) the sophistication and maturity of the child as determined by consideration of the child's home, environmental situation, emotional attitude and pattern of living,
(h) the record and previous history of the child,
(i) whether the child acted with particular cruelty or disregard for the life or safety of another,
(j) whether the offense involved a high degree of sophistication or planning by the child, and
(k) whether there is sufficient time available before the child reaches age nineteen (19) to provide appropriate treatment and control.
Minn.R.Juv.Cts. 32.05, subd. 2(a-k).
In determining if the statutory test for reference has been met, the court must consider all of the relevant circumstances and not just age or seriousness of the offense. See D.F.B. 433 N.W.2d at 81-82. Because evidence of the offense alone is not sufficient to justify reference, it is necessary to examine non-offense related factors. We recognize the continued validity of the multifactor analysis enunciated in Matter of Welfare of Dahl, 278 N.W.2d 316 (Minn.1979). We note, however, that the supreme court justified reference in D.F.B.
"bearing in mind the legislature's revised statement of purpose and looking at all the factors listed in R. 32.05, including the offense with which D.F.B. is charged, the manner in which he committed the offense, the interests of society in the outcome of this case, the [expert] testimony
D.F.B., 433 N.W.2d at 81-82. We believe Dahl has been modified in accordance with the above statement.
The trial court determined that reference is justified based on several of the Rule 32 factors. Although the court did not specifically apply each factor, the court's findings and memorandum indicate that the court did not base its decision solely on factors related to the alleged offenses. Applying the Rule 32 factors, we believe that the trial court's decision to refer J.L.B. for adult prosecution is correct. The charged offenses are acts which caused personal injury, resulting in death; death was a foreseeable consequence of the acts; and the acts were committed with particular cruelty and disregard for the lives and safety of R.C. and her child. Additionally, the author of the court-ordered reference study reported an absence of available programs in the juvenile system, other than commitment to the Commissioner of Corrections until J.L.B.'s nineteenth birthday.
The trial court based its decision to refer J.L.B. on its conclusion that the public safety is not served by retaining jurisdiction in the juvenile court. Although J.L. B.'s experts stated that they did not believe J.L.B. to be dangerous, the trial court believed that J.L.B. managed to conceal dangerous aspects of his personality from the experts. The court noted that J.L.B. had lied about parts of the incident.
Dr. Olmsted testified that J.L.B. "put a lot of energy into keeping the lid on" and that at a subconscious level, there could be anger and aggressive potential. McAllister stated that J.L.B. may have considerable unconscious hostility. Two of the psychological tests administered to J.L.B. were invalid because of defensiveness. Olmsted testified that at one point while evaluating J.L.B., Olmsted was concerned as to whether J.L.B. was trying to overplay a good impression, and whether some of his statements were credible. J.L.B.'s experts characterized him as non-violent. Both experts, however, refused to say that J.L.B. could not commit a violent act. In addition, the court found that J.L.B. had made statements to others at school that he could kill someone and get away with it, and that he wanted to kill R.C.
In light of this evidence, the trial court could believe that the experts' opinions did not accurately reflect J.L.B.'s personality or potential risk to society. Unfortunately, the trial court did not have the guidance of the recent decisions in D.F.B. when it formulated its opinion. We cannot say, however, that the trial court clearly abused its broad discretion in this area.
Additionally, we believe that reference would be justified on the alternative ground _ of unamenability to treatment. The trial court's memorandum indicates that the court considered the significance of the time remaining for treatment before J.L.B. reached age nineteen. At the time of the reference hearing J.L.B. was eighteen years and four months old. The probation officer who performed the reference study testified that given the time limits here, she did not believe there was any appropriate place for J.L.B. in the juvenile system. Dr. Olmsted administered psychological tests and testified that in his opinion, considering J.L.B.'s age and the type of problem involved, there would not be sufficient time for treatment. Under these circumstances, the trial court could find that J.L.B. could not be successfully treated within the time remaining before the juvenile court's jurisdiction is terminated. This is a proper basis for concluding that a juvenile is unsuitable for treatment. See Dahl, 278 N.W.2d at 319.
Consequently, we believe that the trial court did not abuse its considerable discretion in determining that J.L.B. should be referred to adult court for prosecution. There is sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court's decision.
DECISION
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that reference to adult court for prosecution is justified.
AFFIRMED.
CRIPPEN, J., dissents.