Case Name: Melvin GARY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Louella GARY, Defendant-Appellee
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1962-07-05
Citations: 143 So. 2d 411
Docket Number: No. 615
Parties: Melvin GARY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Louella GARY, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: HOOD and TATE, JJ., dissent and will assign written reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 143
Pages: 411–417

Head Matter:
Melvin GARY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Louella GARY, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 615.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Third Circuit.
July 5, 1962.
Rehearing Denied July 27, 1962.
Certiorari Denied Oct. 9, 1962.
Nathan A. Cormie and Chris J. Roy, Lake Charles, for plaintiff-relator.
Knight & Knight, By Herschel N. Knight, Jennings, for defendant-respondent.

Opinion:
SAVOY, Judge.
In the exercise of our supervisory jurisdiction, we granted writs in the instant case. The case was orally argued by counsel for the parties, and briefs were also filed in support of their respective positions.
Plaintiff filed a suit for separation from his wife on the ground of abandonment, and also prayed for the custody of the children born of the union between him and his defendant wife. Defendant did not contest the suit, and the trial judge, by judgment dated May 8, 1959, granted plaintiff a separation "a mensa et thoro" from his said wife and awarded him the permanent care, custody and control of the children born of the marriage, reserving to defendant wife reasonable visitation privileges.
On June 2, 1961, plaintiff filed a suit for an absolute divorce on the grounds that he and his wife had been living separate and apart since the judgment of separation. He also asked for the continued custody of the minor children born of the union between him and his wife.
The defendant wife filed an answer to the divorce action admitting living separate and apart since the original decree. She asked for the care and custody of the minor children born of the union, stating that she is now employed and feels financially able to resume the custody of her children, and desires them to be with her.
After a hearing in the lower court, the judge granted plaintiff the divorce, but granted the custody of the children to the defendant mother. From this ruling plaintiff applied to this Court for supervisory writs. This Court granted writs and the matter is before this Court for determination.
The district court granted the children to the defendant mother under the provisions of Article 157 of the LSA-Civil Code. This-article provides:
"In all cases of separation and of divorce the children shall be placed under the care of the party who shall' have obtained the separation or divorce unless the judge shall, for the greater advantage of the children, order that some or all of them shall be entrusted to the care of the other party. The party under whose care a child or children is placed, or to whose care a child or children has been entrusted, shall of right become natural tutor or tutrix of said child or children to the same extent and with the same effect as if the other party had died."
The court stated that under the decisions of the Supreme Court of this state, the court has always granted the custody of young' children to the mother unless she is found morally unfit or financially or physically unfit to care for them.
Counsel for appellee contends in this-Court that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed on appeal. He advances-substantially the same reasons for his position as those found by the trial court in granting the children to defendant wife.
Counsel for plaintiff-appellant contends that the trial judge was in error in his interpretation of the meaning of Article 157 of the LSA-Civil Code of Louisiana. Counsel states that Article 157 of the LSA-Civil, Code is applicable only in the case where custody has not been awarded before to either husband or wife. He argues that once custody has been awarded to a parent, it cannot be changed without some showing by the party desiring to have the custody changed that conditions have changed so that the party granted the children originally should no longer retain custody.
The record reveals that the children, who are of school and church age, in the instant case, are attending school and church regularly; that they are not being neglected; and, that the plaintiff father is providing a good home for them. The record reveals also that plaintiff has had the custody of the children for over three (3) years and that the mother has visited them at infrequent intervals, namely, approximately every three (3) months.
After reviewing the authorities on the subject before this Court, we find that they sustain the position taken by counsel for appellant.
The most recent case on the subject is that of Hanks v. Hanks, (La.App., 1 Cir., 1962 certiorari denied), 138 So.2d 19. In that case, defendant husband was granted a separation from plaintiff wife on the ground of abandonment. He was also awarded the custody of the children. Plaintiff wife, who was defendant in the separation suit, filed suit against her husband for a divorce on the ground of adultery, and also for the permanent custody of the children born of the marriage. She obtained a judgment of divorce on the grounds of adultery, but her demand for custody of the children was denied.
The evidence in the Hanks case, supra, revealed that for a period of approximately 4^4 months following the judgment of separation, the wife made no attempt to see the children. They lived with their father and grandmother who took care of them. There was no showing that plaintiff was possessed of better facilities to rear the children. On appeal, counsel contended that under the provisions of Article 157 of the LSA-Civil Code, the mother should be awarded custody of minor children unless it be shown that she is morally unfit or otherwise unsuitable to have their custody. The Court of Appeal held that while the principle of law was correct, it had no application to the situation there presented. The court said:
"The principles and rules to be followed in a case such as this were just recently reviewed by us at length in the matter entitled Gentry v. Gentry, No. 5430 of the docket of this court, handed down December 18, 1961, 136 So.2d 418, wherein we held in a case where custody had once been granted (as here) that:
" 'The changes contemplated by law as justification for depriving a parent of custody previously granted by judicial decree, do not solely concern changes in the circumstances of the party seeking custody but equally (if not more important) changes attending conditions affecting the party to whom custody was initially granted. In such instances, the party requesting a change in custody must establish not only his- or her ability to provide for the child but also show that because of material changes which have occurred since the initial decree the best interest and welfare of the child has been placed in jeopardy and, therefore, in the interest of the child's welfare revision of the initial judgment is warranted.' "
The cases cited by. counsel for plaintiff and defendant are all cited in Gentry v. Gentry, supra, and they all sustain the position taken by counsel for appellant in the instant case.
The trial court also allowed defendant alimony for herself and her minor children. Since we have determined that plaintiff is entitled to the custody of the-minor children, he will not have to pay alimony for their support. The defendant is- not entitled to alimony for herself for the reason that she was at fault when her husband obtained the decree of separation, and the trial judge granted the parties a final divorce for the reason that the parties had not lived together since the judgment of separation.
Under the provisions of Article 160 of the LSA-Civil Code, the wife may receive alimony after she and her husband have been granted a divorce providing she has not been at fault in the divorce proceeding.
For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the district court is affirmed insofar as it grants a divorce to plaintiff. Said judgment is reversed in all other respects, and judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff, Melvin Gary, and against defendant, Louella Gary, granting him the permanent care and custody of the minor children born •of the marriage, namely, Dearil Dale Gary, Carl Wayne Gary, Gregory Lane Gary, Debora Ann Gary, and Caron Louise Gary, with the right of defendant to visit said children as set forth in the judgment of •separation dated May 8, 1959.
Judgment is further rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendant decreeing him to be free from the payment of any alimony to defendant.
Costs of court in the district court and on appeal are taxed against defendant.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and rendered.
HOOD and TATE, JJ., dissent and will assign written reasons.
Before TATE, FRUGÉ, SAVOY, FIOOD and CULPEPPER, JJ.