Case Name: Catherine Lynn ADAMS v. CINEMARK USA, INC.
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2002-12-05
Citations: 831 So. 2d 1156
Docket Number: No. 2001-CA-01305-SCT
Parties: Catherine Lynn ADAMS v. CINEMARK USA, INC.
Judges: PITTMAN, C.J., SMITH, P.J., COBB AND CARLSON, JJ., CONCUR.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 831
Pages: 1156–1170

Head Matter:
Catherine Lynn ADAMS v. CINEMARK USA, INC.
No. 2001-CA-01305-SCT.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Dec. 5, 2002.
James F. Steel, Jackson, Donald C. Dor-nan, Biloxi, for appellant.
Grover Clark Monroe, II, Jackson, Wiley Johnson Barbour, Jackson, for appel-lee.

Opinion:
WALLER, Justice,
for the Court:
¶ 1. Catherine Lynn Adams brought suit against Cinemark USA, Inc. for injuries sustained when Weigelia Thomas, a Cine-mark employee, struck Adams after refusing to admit Adams and two minors to an R-rated film. The Circuit Court of Harrison County, First Judicial District, granted summary judgment in favor of Cine-mark. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶ 2. On February 22, 2000, Catherine Lynn Adams, her fifteen-year-old sister Marie, and Marie's fourteen-year-old friend Amanda traveled to Cinemark's Crossroads Mall Theater in Gulfport to view the R-rated film Scream 3. Cinemark employee Weigelia Thomas was working as a box office employee. Thomas's responsibilities that day included selling tickets to patrons and handling money.
¶ 3. Adams attempted to purchase three tickets for Scream 3 from Thomas. Since the film was R-rated, Thomas requested identification from the three. Adams produced identification for herself and told Thomas that she was Marie's legal guardian and that she had been given permission from Amanda's mother for her to view the film. Thomas refused admission to Marie and Amanda whereupon Adams asked to speak with a manager.
¶ 4. Thomas hailed her manager, Michael Everett, via walkie-talkie. She then asked that Adams step out of the line so that she could continue selling tickets to the other patrons. After waiting for several minutes, Adams stepped back into line and again inquired of Thomas to see a manager. According to Adams, Thomas told her "[t]o get [Adams's] ass up in there and go talk to [the manager herself]." However, according to Thomas, Adams repeatedly interrupted her as she sold tickets to other customers and called her a "bitch." Adams moved to enter the theater and, at that point, Thomas exited the box office, went through some double doors, and confronted Adams. It is undisputed that Thomas struck Adams and then choked her while they were outside of the theater near the double doors. Adams suffered scratch marks on her neck and complained of a tingling sensation about the head. As a result of the altercation, Cinemark terminated Thomas's employment.
¶ 5. Adams sued Cinemark, alleging that Cinemark was vicariously liable for Thomas's actions under the doctrine of respon-deat superior. Adams also alleged that Cinemark negligently hired, trained, supervised and retained Thomas.
¶ 6. Following discovery, Cinemark filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that respondeat superior did not apply because Thomas's acts "were undertaken solely for personal motive and not in furtherance of Cinemark's business, thereby placing her acts wholly and completely outside the scope of her employment." Joseph Corbin, a Gulfport Cinemark on-site manager, stated in his deposition that employees were repeatedly instructed never to argue with a patron, always to avoid confrontation, and to summon a manager if a dispute with a patron arose.
¶ 7. After receiving Adams's response, the circuit court granted Cinemark's motion for summary judgment without an oral hearing. It held that "Thomas had abandoned her employment and was about some purpose of her own, not incidental to her employment and not done in the course of and as a means to the accomplishment of the purposes of her employment as a box office cashier." Adams appeals from this adverse ruling.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 8. We employ the de novo standard in reviewing a trial court's grant of summary judgment. O'Neal Steel, Inc. v. Millette, 797 So.2d 869, 872 (Miss.2001). In conducting the de novo review, we look at all evidentiary matters before us, including admissions in pleadings, answers to interrogatories, depositions, and affidavits. Lee v. Golden Triangle Planning & Dev. Dist., Inc., 797 So.2d 845, 847 (Miss.2001) (citing Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Berry, 669 So.2d 56, 70 (Miss.1996)). This evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment has been made. Leslie v. City of Biloxi, 758 So.2d 430, 431 (Miss.2000).
DISCUSSION
I. WHETHER SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS APPROPRIATE.
¶ 9. Adams asserts that Cine-mark is vicariously liable for her injuries under the doctrine of respondeat superior. An employer is liable for the torts of his employee only when they are committed within the scope of employment. Odier v. Sumrall, 353 So.2d 1370, 1372 (Miss.1978). To be "within the scope of employment," the act must have been committed in the course of and as a means to accomplishing the purposes of the employment and therefore in furtherance of the master's business. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Creekmore, 199 Miss. 48, 23 So.2d 250, 252 (1945); Alden Mills v. Pendergraft, 149 Miss. 595, 115 So. 713, 714 (1928). Also included in the definition of "course and scope of employment" are tortious acts incidental to the authorized conduct. Creekmore, 23 So.2d at 252. Stated another way, a master will not be held liable if the employee "had abandoned his employment and was about some purpose of his own not incidental to the employment." Odier, 353 So.2d at 1372 (citing Loper v. Yazoo & M.V.R. Co., 166 Miss. 79, 145 So. 743 (1933); Canton Cotton Warehouse Co. v. Pool, 78 Miss. 147, 28 So. 823 (1900)). That an employee's acts are unauthorized does not necessarily place them outside the scope of employment if they are of the same general nature as the conduct authorized or incidental to that conduct. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Quick, 167 Miss. 438, 149 So. 107, 109 (1933).
¶ 10. It is obvious that Thomas's tor-tious act of assaulting Adams was not authorized or in furtherance of Cinemark's business. We must therefore determine whether Thomas's conduct was "incidental to" her employment. Such a determination is highly fact sensitive such that it can have no fixed legal meaning. Loper, 145 So. at 745. A multitude of factors and circumstances must be considered, such as Thomas's responsibilities and mind-set, as well as those of a temporal and spatial nature.
¶ 11. Thomas's job description on the date of the incident was "box office cashier." Her only duties were to sell tickets and handle money. She was stationed in a secure box office into which the general public could not gain access. She received substantial training in customer relations which expressly prohibited arguing with and confronting patrons. If a hostile situation arose, a box office cashier was instructed to contact a manager via walkie-talkie so that the manager could diffuse the situation. At no time whatsoever was a box office cashier authorized to interact with patrons other than to sell tickets.
¶ 12. Adams incorrectly characterizes the altercation as Thomas's attempt to carry out Cinemark's policies of preventing minors from viewing certain films. Thomas was allowed to refuse to sell a ticket to someone who was not old enough to see a certain movie, but she was not allowed to leave the box office.
¶ 13. Thomas's assault of Adams was not incidental to her employment. Adams cites a litany of Mississippi cases imputing liability to employers for the intentional torts of their employees. See Horton v. Jones, 208 Miss. 257, 44 So.2d 397 (1950) (imputing liability to employer cab company for employee driver's hastily driving off in cab still containing plaintiffs possessions because driver could get another fare and make money for his employer); Interstate Co. v. McDaniel, 178 Miss. 276, 173 So. 165 (1937) (imputing liability to employer snack company for employee train car snack vendor's assault and battery of man employee suspected of stealing oranges because said employee was "required to protect it [his inventory] within reasonable bounds from depredations"); Continental Cas. Co. v. Garrett, 173 Miss. 676, 161 So. 753 (1935) (imputing liability to employer insurance company for employee agent's calling elderly insured a "liar" and accusing him of fraud because agent was doing assigned job of adjusting a claim); Singer Sewing Mach. Co. v. Stockton, 171 Miss. 209, 157 So. 366 (1934) (imputing liability to employer sewing machine manufacturer for salesman's misconduct in attempting to cultivate personal relations with prospective customer plaintiff because he went to plaintiffs home to sell a sewing machine); Gill v. L.N. Dantzler Lumber Co., 153 Miss. 559, 121 So. 153 (1929) (imputing liability to employer farm for superintendent employee's assault in ejecting plaintiff tenant because superintendent "had authority to let [defendant's] houses and do all things in connection with the tenancy of said houses"); Alden Mills v. Pendergraft, 149 Miss. 595, 115 So. 713 (1928) (imputing liability to employer for foreman's assault of laborer to prevent laborers from demanding higher wages where foreman could employ and discharge laborers and fix the amount of their wages because such an act was in furtherance of employers's goal of realizing a profit). In all of these cases, the employee was performing his authorized duties, be it driving a cab, protecting inventory, adjusting insurance claims, selling a sewing machine, or ejecting tenants. These cases are distinguishable from the facts of the instant case because Thomas's act was motivated by personal animosity. She was never vested with any duty on that day other than selling tickets. She assaulted Adams because of anger, not because she was concerned about protecting Cinemark's property or increasing Cinemark's profit.
¶ 14. Furthermore, Adams's reliance on Odom v. Hubeny, Inc., 179 Ga.App. 250, 345 S.E.2d 886 (1986) is misplaced and is also misconstrued in the dissent. There, the trial court granted summary judgment to the employer restaurant on the basis that the acts of DeLima, the waitress, were intentional, private, and unrelated to her employment when DeLima grabbed a customer by the hair, punched her in the face, and poured a pot of coffee on her back because of plaintiffs misbehavior. Id. at 887. The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the summary judgment, noting that DeLima "had been authorized to request a troublesome patron to leave.... " Id Physical contact and interaction with patrons was incidental to, if not a necessary element of, DeLima's job as a waitress. In contrast, Thomas, in her authorized performance as a box office cashier, would have had no opportunity for such interaction.
¶ 15. The dissent misconstrues our discussion of Odom stating that we "agreed that physical contact and interaction with patrons was incidental to, if not a necessary element of, Thomas's employment." We stated above that physical contact was a necessary element of DeLima's, the waitress in Odom, employment, and not Thomas's employment here.
¶ 16. We find that Adams failed to create a jury issue that Thomas acted within the course and scope of her employment in her assault of Adams. Thomas's acts were not "incidental to" the performance of her duties as a box office cashier. Consequently, the circuit judge did not err in granting summary judgment to Cinemark.
¶ 17. Justice Diaz, in his dissent, asserts more than once that Thomas "was the gatekeeper of Cinemark" and that patrons had to pass through her to gain admission. With all due respect, the dissent's characterization of Thomas's duties and responsibilities is completely contrary to the deposition testimony and submitted documents. Box office cashiers have neither the authority nor the ability to prevent underage patrons from entering the theater. All Thomas could do was refuse to sell a ticket and call a manager. Patrons gain admission by handing a ticket to an usher who controls access to the theater.
¶ 18. The assertions that "Thomas was required to prevent underage patrons from entering the movie theater" and that her actions "may have also been fueled by the responsibility vested in her by Cinemark" find no basis in the record. Thomas knew her actions were in complete derogation of Cinemark policy and testified to as much at her deposition:
Q: Were you aware that arguing with or maybe cussing at or hitting a customer was against Cinemark's policy?
A: Yes.
Q: So you knew that was against policy when you did it?
A: Yes.
Q: Because you said just a minute ago that you pretty much assumed you were fired after the incident?
A: Yes.
Q: Had you been trained that that would be the case?
A: I mean, it was common sense.
(emphasis added).
¶ 19. The dissent even acknowledges the allegations it makes are "speculation that is best resolved by a jury." However, unsupported speculation and allegations are not sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Reynolds v. Amerada Hess Corp., 778 So.2d 759, 765 (Miss.2000); Herrington v. Leaf River Forest Prods., Inc., 733 So.2d 774, 779 (Miss.1999); Crystal Springs Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 554 So.2d 884, 885 (Miss.1989). See also Hurst v. Ala. Power Co., 675 So.2d 397, 400 (Ala.1996); Rice v. Hodapp, 919 S.W.2d 240, 243 (Mo.1996); Darrah v. Bryan Mem'l Hosp., 253 Neb. 710, 571 N.W.2d 783, 786 (1998); Howard Hughes Med. Inst. v. Gavin, 96 Nev. 905, 621 P.2d 489, 491 (1980); Paradigm Hotel Mortgage Fund v. Sioux Falls Hotel Co., 511 N.W.2d 567, 569 (S.D.1994); Wriston v. Raleigh County Emergency Servs. Auth., 205 W.Va. 409, 518 S.E.2d 650, 662 (1999). Given the established facts here in this record, we are inescapably led to the conclusion, as was the trial court, that Adams presented in sufficient evidence to create a jury issue on respondeat superior liability.
II. WHETHER A COURT MAY GRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT WITHOUT AN ORAL HEARING.
¶ 20. Adams filed her response to Cinemark's motion for summary judgment on June 1, 2001. A hearing on the motion was scheduled for June 11, 2001, but was later postponed and rescheduled for August 6, 2001, at Cinemark's request. The trial court entered summary judgment on July 24, 2001. As a result, Adams asserts that the trial court deprived her of a valuable right afforded under Rule 56(c) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure by granting Cinemark's motion for summary judgment without conducting a hearing.
¶ 21. A summary judgment may be entered "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." M.R.C.P. 56(c) (emphasis added). Based upon a review of Adams's itemization of undisputed facts and Cinemark's response thereto, the only disputed facts were those concerning the oral exchanges between Adams and Thomas and Adams and the two minor girls. Cinemark never disputed the fact that Thomas left her station in the box office and assaulted Adams or the fact that Adams was injured as a result.
¶ 22. We fail to see how the exact tenor and nature of the words exchanged prior to the assault are material as required by Rule 56(c) to a determination of whether Thomas was acting in the course and scope of her employment as a box office cashier. A fact is "material" if it tends to resolve any of the issues properly raised by the parties and matters in an outcome determinative sense. Wallace v. Town of Raleigh, 815 So.2d 1203, 1208 (Miss.2002); Armistead v. Minor, 815 So.2d 1189, 1192 (Miss.2002); Hudson v. Courtesy Motors, Inc., 794 So.2d 999, 1002 (Miss.2001); Robinson v. Cobb, 763 So.2d 883, 886 (Miss.2000); Powell v. City of Pascagoula, 752 So.2d 999, 1003 (Miss.1999); Prescott v. Leaf River Prods., Inc., 740 So.2d 301, 309 (Miss.1999). Regardless of the oral exchanges made or even a lack thereof, Thomas clearly had no authority to leave her post in the box office, exit the double doors to the theater, and assault Adams. Furthermore, regardless of the oral exchanges made, we fail to see how such exchanges would assist in proving whether the assault was incidental to Thomas's employment.
¶ 23. Adams argues that the trial court's failure to grant a hearing was "a procedural error which affected Appellant's substantial rights as a litigant." She submits that Rule 56(c) itself clearly contemplates that the trial court will conduct a hearing prior to entering a summary judgment. Rule 56(c) states in pertinent part the following:
(c) Motions and Proceedings Thereon. The motion shall be served at least ten days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of the hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
¶ 24. We do not recognize an explicit or implicit right to a hearing under Rule 56(c) but do so under other rules. M.R.C.P. 78 provides:
Each court shall establish procedures for prompt dispatch of business, at which motions requiring notice and hearing may be heard and disposed of; but the judge at any time or place and on such notice, if any, as he considers reasonable may make orders for the advancement, conduct, and hearing of such actions.
To expedite business, the court may make provision by rule or order for the submission and determination of motions not seeking final judgment without oral hearing upon brief written statements of reasons in support and opposition.
(emphasis added). In circuit court, motion practice is regulated by Uniform Circuit and County Court Rule 4.03. Paragraph 5 of Rule 4.03 states that "[a]ll dispositive motions shall be deemed abandoned unless heard at least ten days before trial." (emphasis added).
¶ 25. We have yet to have a case definitively holding that a litigant has a right to an oral hearing on a motion for summary judgment. We have, however, held that such a right exists in the context of a default judgment. In King v. Sigrest, 641 So.2d 1158 (Miss.1994), the Sigrests brought an action to remove a cloud on title to real property. When no answer or responsive pleading was filed within 30 days, the Sigrests forwarded a request for entry of default which' the chancery clerk subsequently signed and filed. Id. at 1160. The trial court entered a default judgment without notice of a hearing. Id. In reversing the trial court, we held that M.R.C.P. 55(b)
provides, however, that where a person against whom default is sought has "appeared," that party shall be served with notice of the application at least three days prior to "the hearing of such application." This rule "clearly contemplates that a hearing will be held" and that the party against whom default is sought shall be notified of the hearing. Fortifying this view is our Rule 78, prescribing motion practice, which, unlike its federal counterpart, indicates that only motions not seeking final judgment should by rule or order be disposed of without oral hearing. Miss. R. Civ. Pro. 78.
(citation omitted & emphasis added).
¶ 26. Based upon the foregoing, the trial court in the instant case erred in granting summary judgment without an oral hearing. However, we find such error to be harmless. In Sherrod v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 518 So.2d 640 (Miss.1987), we applied the harmless error test to a procedural error. The trial court in that case heard a summary judgment motion two days early, or eight days after filing. Id. at 644. Even though the time requirement of M.R.C.P. 56(c) is couched in the imperative, we held that "[t]o be sure, the Court should not have heard the motion without full compliance with the ten day notice rule. But where ruling is withheld pending completion of discovery, violation of the time requirement of Rule 56(c) will often, as here, be harmless." Id. at 645. As in Sherrod, Adams had ample time for discovery prior to the entry of summary judgment.
¶ 27. The Eleventh Circuit also applied the harmless error test in a case in which a magistrate judge violated a mandatory summary judgment procedure rule. Restigouche, Inc. v. Town of Jupiter, 59 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir.1995). In Restigouche, a magistrate judge heard argument on the Town of Jupiter's motion for summary judgment at a pretrial status conference after giving the parties only two days' notice. Id. at 1213. The next day Resti-gouche filed a motion to supplement the summary judgment record. Thirteen days later, Restigouche's motion was denied and summary judgment entered for the Town. Id. Regarding the violation of the ten-day rule, the Eleventh Circuit held:
Even if notice was insufficient under Rule 56(c), we find this error harm-less_The purpose of the 10-day notice rule is to give the non-moving party notice and a 10-day window of opportunity to marshal its resources and present any additional materials and arguments in opposition to the motion. We are convinced that we have before us, on de novo review of the summary judgment motion, all of the facts and arguments that Restigouche would have or could have presented had Restigouche been given the required notice. The magistrate court denied Restigouche's December 2 motion to supplement because Restigouche failed to identify the specific portions of the supplemental materials which would create material issues of fact. Moreover, our independent review of the proffered supplemental materials disclose no genuine issues which would prevent summary judgment. . Because Restigouche has not been deprived of the opportunity to present facts or arguments which would have precluded summary judgment in this case, any violation of the 10-day notice rule is harmless.
Id. (citation omitted & emphasis added). See Lone Star Steel Co. v. Scott, 759 S.W.2d 144 (Tex.Ct.App.1988) (applying harmless error rule to errors "involving the violation of procedural rules couched in mandatory language").
¶ 28. This position also has application in this case. Adams presented no evidence which would defeat Cinemark's motion for summary judgment. It is highly unlikely that any material or pertinent facts would have been disclosed at a summary judgment hearing had it been held. Adams would be ill-served by responding to Cinemark's motion and including 108 pages of exhibits and then waiting until an oral hearing to disclose material facts which would deliver a coup de grace to Cinemark's motion.
¶ 29. In this case, a summary judgment hearing would have been centered around the oral exchanges prior to Thomas's assault of Adams. Such inquiries would have no bearing in this action alleging vicarious liability. We simply fail to see how the circuit court's grant of summary judgment without an oral hearing nearly two months after Adams's response to Cinemark's motion constituted reversible error when there were no material facts in dispute and a hearing would have been of no utility.
¶ 30. Although M.R.C.P. 78 differs from Fed.R.Civ.P. 78, M.R.C.P. 56(c) is identical to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), and federal courts have ruled that the decision to grant a summary judgment hearing lies with the trial judge:
Courts generally recognize the advisability of allowing oral argument on summary-judgment motions, but, even the Fifth Circuit now agrees that the court has the power to order summary judgment without a hearing if it feels that sufficient information is available in the pleadings and the papers in support of and opposition to the motion so that a hearing would be of no utility.
10A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2720.1, at 357 (3d ed.1998) (footnotes omitted & emphasis added). Given the facts of the instant case, an oral summary judgment hearing would have centered around legal arguments since all of the fact-centered issues were immaterial or undisputed.
CONCLUSION
¶ 31. Although the trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of Cinemark without an oral hearing, such error was harmless on this record. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to Cinemark in the absence of a dispute as to any material fact which would indicate that Cinemark's employee was acting in the course and scope of her employment when she assaulted Adams. Therefore, the Harrison County Circuit Court's grant of summary judgment to Cinemark is affirmed.
¶ 32. AFFIRMED.
PITTMAN, C.J., SMITH, P.J., COBB AND CARLSON, JJ., CONCUR.
DIAZ, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY McRAE, P.J. AND GRAVES, J.
EASLEY, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
. Adams is in fact Marie's legal guardian.
. Thomas was also arrested and pled guilty to simple assault.
. The Cinemark Employee Guidelines handbook states that with regard to admitting patrons: "The usher is to approach the Customer first with an outstretched hand and an appropriate greeting such as, 'Good, evening . may I tear your tickets, please.' Everyone entering the theatre . must buy a ticket." (emphasis in original). Also, the handbook states that "[t]he Cashier needs to stay in the box office at all times. Do not leave the box office unattended."
. M.R.C.P. 61 addresses harmless error and states:
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence and no error in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the parties is ground for granting a new trial or for setting aside a verdict or for vacating, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties,
(emphasis added).
. Federal courts employ a more liberal definition of "hearing." Specifically,
[t]he word "hearing" within the meaning of Rule 56 has been held to refer to the final submission of summary judgment motion papers, rather than implying a requirement that a full-fledged hearing with receipt of oral evidence take place with every motion. Frequently, the pleadings and other materials submitted with the summary judgment motion are considered sufficient material to satisfy the Rule 56(c) hearing requirement.
11 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 56.15[l][a] at 56-200.1 (3d ed.2002).