Case Name: City of Ashland, Respondent, vs. Northern Pacific Railway Company, Appellant
Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Wisconsin
Decision Date: 1903-09-29
Citations: 119 Wis. 204
Docket Number: 
Parties: City of Ashland, Respondent, vs. Northern Pacific Railway Company, Appellant.
Judges: Cassoday, C. J. I concur in tbe opinion of my brother MARSHALL.
Reporter: Wisconsin Reports
Volume: 119
Pages: 204–222

Head Matter:
City of Ashland, Respondent, vs. Northern Pacific Railway Company, Appellant.
September 10 —
September 29, 1903.
Municipal corporations: Vacation of streets: Void, ordinance: Occupation by railways: Estoppel.
By an agreement between railway companies and a city the former were to contribute to the improvement of a certain street and the city was to vacate parts of certain other streets to accommodate the railway yards and depots. The city passed an ordinance in form vacating said parts of streets, and the companies fulfilled the agreement on their part. The ordinance was void because statutory requirements were not complied with, and six or seven months after its passage it was repealed. In the absence of proof that defendant (one of said railway companies) had erected any structures or incurred a’ny considerable expense in reliance upon the attempted -vacation, it is held that the city is not estopped to claim that tho streets had not been vacated. Ashland v. O. cG N. W. It. Co. 105 Wis. 398, followed.
Makshaix, J., and Cassoday, C. J., dissent, being of the opinion that in view of all the circumstances (including the- undisturbed occupancy of the streets by the railway companies for more than ten years, positive acts of encouragement on the part of the city to continue such occupancy, the expenditure of large sums by the railway companies in improvements, and the final creation of a situation from which they cannot recede without great loss) the city should be held estopped.
Appeal from a judgment of the circuit court for Ashland county: James O’Neill, Judge.
Affirmed.
This is a companion suit to that presented in Ashland v. Chicago & Northwestern 11. Co. 105 Wis. 398, 80 N. W. 1101. To the statement of facts there made we now refer. A clear understanding of the situation, however, requires a little more amplification of the facts. The three railroad companies, or their predecessors, the Chicago & Northwestern, Northern Pacific, and Wisconsin , Central, some time prior to 1887 owned a large tract of land in Ashland between Third street on the north and Sixth street on the south, and between Vaughn avenue on the west and Prentice avenue on the east, a distance of seven blocks east and west, which had been largely donated to them by the individual owners, and in that space had their depots, as also did the present defendant and the Wisconsin Central have their yards. The business part of the city stretched along Pront street and Second street, and also along the lake shore, where the mills were situated; the most central part of that business portion being at about Third Avenue West. Meanwhile a considerable residence settlement had grown up to the south of this railway tract, access from which to the business portion would naturally be attained over the various avenues, including Second, Third, and Fourth Avenues West. The scheme of vacating streets and alleys embraced in the contract of October 1, 1887,.and in the ordinance of December 1, 1887, involved the vacating of all the avenues through this tract except Ellis avenue and Third Avenue West, thereby cutting off the use of Second and Fourth Avenues West and of Second and Third Avenues East. Ellis avenue was to be a thoroughfare. Third Avenue West was not affected, but has since been wholly obstructed by a stone passenger station. At the time of the commencement of this action the three railroad companies had quite extensive switching yards within this tract, each of them having five, six, or seven tracks crossing tbe avenues and substantially occupying Fourth and Fifth streets, and the defendant having put in place a roundhouse, small repair shops, and some other structures. To what extent this was an increase over what existed prior to 1887 is not proved, but the case was argnied on both sides on the assumption that a very considerable amount of the expenditure had been since that time. But there was no proof that any part thereof had been made prior to the ordinance of June 26, 1888, repealing the vacating ordinance of the December previous. The present action affects both Second and Fourth Avenues West. There was no. evidence that the defendant had erected any structures in either of these avenues, except as it had laid tracks across the same; nor was there evidence that any of the railroads had any structures in either of these streets, except that the Wisconsin Central freighthouse extended nearly across Second avenue, but that had been erected prior to 188Y. The evidence is substantially undisputed to the effect that the opening and use of these two avenues for general travel will seriously incommode the railroad companies in the use of this territory for yard purposes; perhaps to an extent to force them to find other locations for their yards. There is also evidence that the Wisconsin Central has erected upon Third avenue an expensive passenger station, but not in reliance upon the claimed vacation of 1887. Whether by other authority, is not made lo appear. There is no evidence as to whether the defendant did or did not have notice of the passage of the repealing ordinance of June, 1888, but it was stipulated that it was duly published, as required by the charter, on June 30, 1888.
The court found as a fact that between October 1,° 1887, and September 9, 1888, no step was taken, and no act performed, money expended, or obligation incurred, by the defendant in reliance upon or induced by the passage of the vacating ordinance of December 1, 1887, or other, acts of the common council of the city of Ashland or of the plaintiff, growing ont of or connected with, tbe proposition of October 1, 1887; but tbat tbe defendant paid to tbe treasurer on September 9, 1888, $2,307.32, as its part of tbe cost of excavating Vaughn avenue and constructing a drain or box culvert therein. Judgment was entered in favor óf tbe plaintiff, tbe result of wbicb was to command tbe defendant to bebave toward Second and Eourtb avenues as if they were streets, instead of as if they were its property. Erom tbat judgment tbe defendant appeals.
Eor tbe appellant there was a brief by Louis Hanitch, attorney, and O. W. Bunn and Emerson Hadley, of counsel, and oral argument by Mr. Hanitch.
Eor tbe respondent there was a brief by F. J. Colignon, attorney, and Dillon & Colignon and Tomhins & Tomhins, of counsel, and a supplemental brief and oral argument by F. J. Colignon..

Opinion:
Dodge, J.
This case, having been presented in two arguments, has been carefully examined and re-examined, to ascertain whether it is distinguishable from Ashland v. C. & N. W. R. Co. 105 Wis. 398, 80 N. W. 1101, so as to take it out of tbe rule established in tbat case. We find nothing of material distinction. Tbe two actions, as also another against tbe Wisconsin Central Eailway, were commenced at tbe same time, and issue joined by practically identical pleadings. Tbe alleged contract between tbe railroads and tbe city and tbe action of tbe council and the citizens with reference to tbe streets relied on by appellant are common to both actions. Tbe proof as to occupation of tbe streets and intervening blocks and expenditure of money thereon is for all legal purposes tbe same, although carried somewhat more into detail in this action. Tbe time when any of tbe acts were done or expenditures incurred with reference to dates of ordinance purporting to vacate tbe streets and tbe repeal thereof is left no less vague now than it 'was in tbe former case. Tbe proof of acts by tbe citizens and. by city officers by way of insistence-upon right of passage and of - maintaining sidewalks on Fourth avenue is, if anything, stronger and more definite in this record, as also is the proof that defendant- had already established its depot and yards in their present locality before any of the acts on the part of the city council now urged as ground for belief in the abandonment of the streets. It is-also made more clearly apparent that the portion of Fourth avenue on which an engine house and certain other city offices were built — some before and some after 1887 — was not included in the vacation contract or ordinance. The only material distinction consists in that the trial court in the former case decided that facts were established to warrant a court of equity in arousing equitable estoppel, while in this case the trial court has decided the other way., In the Northwestern Case we were obliged to decide that there was a clear preponderance of evidence against such a state of facts as would justify estoppel, while in the instant case we need only to find absence of clear preponderance in favor of such state of facts. As a result of such comparison of the two cases we cannot but consider this ruled by the former, and affirm the present judgment, if the rule stare decisis is to control.
Some attempt — though in justice to appellant's counsel we must concede not a very urgent one — is made to assert that we held in the former case that the illegal action of the city council in contracting to vacate and in enacting vacating ordinance could not be given weight in deciding whether the conduct of the city and of the appellant had been such that the former must be held estopped to insist on the existence of these streets, and upon such assertion to predicate an argument against the soundness of the doctrine. We find no such position taken, as is apparent from the opinion, properly understood in the light of the discussion in the case. We— for our lamented brother, BaedeeN, J., spoke for the court,, and with its hearty approval — first declared reaffirmation of tbe doctrine of Goodrich v. Milwaukee, 24 Wis. 422, 436, and Paine L. Co. v. Oshkosh, 89 Wis. 449, 61 N. W. 1108, that acts and conduct on tbe part of a city might be such as to arouse equitable estoppel. Then we turned to tbe principal argument of tbe railway company's counsel — that, because tbe company paid money for grading Vaughn avenue as a consideration for a pretended contract to vacate certain streets, the city was estopped; which, as evinced by tbe findings, was a pi'incipal consideration with tbe trial court. As to that we said that such an attempted contract is not sufficient, for tbe reasons there well stated. To bold otherwise would be to deny all efficacy to laws restricting powers of city officers j would place tbe public at tbe mercy of those who might, by improvable means, induce such officers to deliberately break such laws. We did not, however, declare that tbe attempted vacating of streets by a void ordinance might not be considered in association with other facts and circumstances, and the whole be held cogent enough to bring into operation an estoppel against a city. That we had no such intention is rendered plain by the very context of the opinion, pointing-out that there was no clear and sufficient proof that the railway company had erected any structures or incurred any considerable expense in reliance upon that attempted vacation, they being chargeable with knowledge of its repeal. The necessity of proof of both the inequitable conduct of the city and great and irreparable wrong to parties honestly and in good faith relying thereon is well and properly declared. That is forcibly expressed by the courts of Illinois, on whose decisions the doctrine of Paine L. Co. v. Oshkosh, supra, largely rested. They have very recently had occasion to insist upon great caution in applying it. Catlett v. People, 151 Ill. 16, 24, 37 N. E. 855; De Kalb v. Luney, 193 Ill. 185, 190, 61 N. E. 1036; Shirk v. Chicago, 195 Ill. 298, 63 N. E. 193. See, also, Elliott, Roads & Streets (1st ed.) 660. We find nothing in the rules of law laid down in Ashland v. C. & N. W. R. Co. with which we cannot now agree, and therefore deem it controlling in the decision of the present case.
By the Gourt. — Judgment affirmed.