Case Name: PEOPLE v. MASSEY
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1996-03-01
Citations: 215 Mich. App. 639
Docket Number: Docket No. 179352
Parties: PEOPLE v MASSEY
Judges: Before: Michael J. Kelly, P.J., and O’Connell and J. R. Giddings, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 215
Pages: 639–647

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v MASSEY
Docket No. 179352.
Submitted October 11, 1995, at Detroit.
Decided March 1, 1996, at 9:05 a.m.
Leave to appeal sought.
Larry Massey was charged in the Recorder’s Court for the City of Detroit with possession with intent to deliver more than 225 but less than 650 grams of cocaine. The defendant brought a motion seeking to suppress the evidence, alleging that the evidence was obtained as a result of an illegal and unconstitutional search. The trial court, Prentis Edwards, J., denied the motion. The Court of Appeals, Griffin, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr., and Weaver, JJ., granted the defendant leave to appeal the denial of his motion and entered an order staying the proceedings in the trial court. Unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered November 30,1994 (Docket No. 179352).
The Court of Appeals held:
1. The police officer’s search of the contents of the defendant’s jacket pocket, which had made a bulge that the officer thought might be a weapon, was not justified under the limited scope of the “plain feel” exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
2. The police officers’ stop of the vehicle in which the defendant was a passenger was lawful, and the observation of a bulge in the defendant’s jacket pocket at the waist justified a patdown search pursuant to Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1 (1968). However, when the officer conducting the search learned that the object was not a weapon, and the officer only had some idea that the object might be a controlled substance, the officer’s continued search was no longer constitutional. The seizure of the bag from the pocket was illegal and the contents of the bag must be suppressed as evidence against the defendant.
Reversed.
O’Connell, J., dissenting, stated that the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence was not clearly erroneous and should be affirmed. The officer who the patdown search felt an object that his experience led him to believe was cocaine. It was immediately apparent to the officer that the defendant was in possession of narcotics. The fact that the officer had to remove the item from the jacket pocket to confirm his initial impression does not affect the fact that the identity of the item was immediately apparent. The plain feel doctrine permits an officer to seize an object if its incriminating character is immediately apparent during a lawful protective patdown search. Here, the police officer had probable cause to believe that the defendant was in possession of narcotics.
References
Am Jur 2d, Searches and Seizures §§ 51, 55,164,172,191.
See ALR Index under Search and Seizure.
Searches and Seizures — Automobiles — Patdown Searches.
A police officer who makes a lawful stop of a vehicle and observes a bulge in a passenger’s pocket that the officer fears may be a weapon may conduct a patdown search; when the search reveals that the object causing the bulge is not a weapon and the officer only suspects that the object is narcotics, but cannot confirm that suspicion without removing the object from the pocket, the officer may not continue the search and any evidence found in a continued search must be suppressed.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, John D. O’Hair, Prosecuting Attorney, Timothy A. Baughman, Chief of Research, Training, and Appeals, and Janice Joyce Bartee, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Karri Mitchell, for the defendant.
Before: Michael J. Kelly, P.J., and O’Connell and J. R. Giddings, JJ.
Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
Michael J. Kelly, P.J.
Defendant was a front-seat passenger in an automobile stopped by police in the City of Detroit for exceeding the speed limit. The two officers from the patrol car approached the vehicle from the front. Officer Dwayne Jackson approached the passenger side of the car and recognized defendant as a man he had known for several years as a schoolmate of his brother. While at the vehicle and speaking with defendant, Officer Jackson noticed a bulge in defendant's jacket pocket in the area of his waist; For his protection and the protection of his fellow officer, the defendant was asked by Officer Jackson to step from the car for a patdown search for weapons. Defendant complied with the officer's request, got out of the vehicle and submitted to the patdown search.
As the officer proceeded with the patdown search, he placed his fingers around the bulge and immediately realized it was not a weapon. The officer thought it might be narcotics. At a hearing regarding the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence, the officer testified: "When I touched it, I had some idea what it was." The officer then removed the object creating the bulge from defendant's pocket and, upon inspection, found it to be a. brown paper bag that was open. Inside was a clear plastic bag containing narcotics.
Defendant was charged with possession with intent to deliver over 225 but less than 650 grams of cocaine. MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(ii); MSA 14.15(7401) (2)(a)(ii). Before trial, defendant moved to suppress the evidence, alleging the evidence was obtained by an illegal and unconstitutional search. The trial court denied the motion, and this Court granted leave to appeal.
We review a trial court's decision regarding a motion to suppress evidence under the clearly erroneous standard. People v Burrell, 417 Mich 439; 339 NW2d 403 (1983). "Clear error exists when the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." People v Kurylczyk, 443 Mich 289, 303; 505 NW2d 528 (1993); People v Burrell, supra. It does not appear to us that the officer's search of the contents of defendant's jacket pocket was justified under the limited scope of the "pilain feel" excep tion to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
A review of the testimony at the hearing regarding the motion to suppress the evidence establishes a lawful stop of the vehicle in which defendant was riding as a passenger. The observation of defendant and the other passengers in the vehicle by Officer Jackson, while the driver was being interviewed regarding the civil infraction of exceeding the speed limit, was appropriate. Officer Jackson's observation of the bulge in defendant's jacket pocket at the waist justified a patdown search. Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1; 88 S Ct 1868; 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968).
However, when Officer Jackson conducted the patdown search of defendant, he quickly learned that the object creating the bulge in the pocket was not a weapon; he became suspicious that the object was narcotics. To confirm his suspicion, he removed the object from the pocket and found it to be a brown paper bag, open at the top. He looked in the bag and saw a clear plastic bag that contained a substance that he believed to be a narcotic. The contents of the bags were seized and defendant was arrested.
Defendant claims that the patdown search didn't make the identity of the object causing the lump immediately apparent to the officer, though he had some idea what it was. When he knew it wasn't a weapon and when he had only some idea of what it was, his continued search was no longer constitutional. The seizure of the brown paper bag was illegal and its contents must be suppressed as evidence against defendant. Minnesota v Dickerson, 508 US 366; 113 S Ct 2130; 124 L Ed 2d 334 (1993); People v Champion, 205 Mich App 623; 518 NW2d 518 (1994).
Reversed.
J. R. Giddings, J., concurred.