Case Name: Mae Reiburn, Respondent-Appellant, v. Abraham Roseman, Appellant-Respondent
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1968-05-16
Citations: 22 N.Y.2d 143
Docket Number: 
Parties: Mae Reiburn, Respondent-Appellant, v. Abraham Roseman, Appellant-Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 22
Pages: 143–146

Head Matter:
Mae Reiburn, Respondent-Appellant, v. Abraham Roseman, Appellant-Respondent.
Argued April 10, 1968;
decided May 16, 1968.
Edward A. Winkelman for appellant-respondent.
I. The modification agreement dated October 18, 1962 reduced the weekly salary from $100 per week to $70 per week, if plaintiff had continued to work. (Heller v. Pope, 250 N. Y. 132; Cream of Wheat Co. v. Crist Co., 222 N. Y. 487 ; Lockwood v. Embalmers Supply Co., 233 App. Div. 189.) II. That part of the modification agreement, which states that the parties will discuss the future weekly salary for the purpose of revision upwards, is an agreement to agree and is unenforcible. (United Press v. New York Press Co., 164 N. Y. 406; Bogy v. Berlage, 265 App. Div. 249; Ansorge v. Kane, 244 N. Y. 395; Spier v. Hyde, 78 App. Div. 151; Hurwitz v. Gleicher, 284 App. Div. 1056, 309 N. Y. 699.) III. Plaintiff has breached the contract of employment as modified. IV. The trial court erroneously injected equity principles in this action at law and erroneously granted judgment in favor of plaintiff. (Cornell v. T. V. Development Corp., 17 N Y 2d 69; Lockwood v. Embalmers Supply Co., 233 App. Div. 189; Kotcher v. Edelblute, 250 N. Y. 178; Saperstein v. Mechanics & Farmers Sav. Bank, 228 N. Y. 257.)
Frank H. Connelly for respondent-appellant.
I. Plaintiff’s position as appellant: the rate went back to $100 on March 17, 1964 because of failure to agree on some different rate. As defendant refused to pay the reinstated $100 rate, it was he, not she, who committed the breach. (United Press v. New York Press Co., 164 N. Y. 406; Bogy v. Berlage, 265 App. Div. 249; Napier v. Spielmann, 127 App. Div. 711.) II. Plaintiff’s position as respondent: assuming that the rate stayed at $70, plaintiff’s misconception of that nice point was not so inexcusable that she should forfeit all her rights under the contract because of her supposed error.

Opinion:
Memorandum.
Immediately prior to the death of plaintiff's
husband in 1959, he and defendant Eoseman had agreed that the surviving partner in their accounting firm would employ the widow of the deceased partner for $100 per week until an aggregate sum of $52,000, or in the case of remarriage $40,000, was paid. The agreement was modified by the plaintiff and the defendant Eoseman in 1962. The disposition of this appeal is dependent upon the effect of this modification. The modification provided in pertinent part:
" Instead of the payments in said agreement [the 1959 agreement] being at the rate of $100.00 weekly, the said payments will be at the rate of $70.00 weekly, payable Semi-Monthly, and further it is stipulated that such modification of amount to be paid weekly shall commence as of September 17, 1962 and con tinue to March 17, 1964 at which time the rate of future weekly payments shall be discussed for the purpose of revision upwards only.
' ' Except as herein expressly modified, all other terms, covenants and conditions of the said agreement dated July 9, 1959, shall remain in full force and effect."
That portion of the modification agreement which states that the parties will discuss the future weekly salary for the purpose of revision upward is an agreement to agree and is unenforcible because it is indefinite and uncertain (Bogy v. Berlage, 265 App. Div. 249, 251). That portion of the agreement which is void for indefiniteness may be excised without affecting the validity of the remainder (cf. 1 Williston, Contracts [3d ed.], § 48). What is left, then, is a clause specifying that the change in the weekly rate " shall commence as of September 17, 1962 and continue to March 17, 1964 ' '. The change in the amount is referred to as a " modification," and, more importantly, a date is given when the modification ends. While the issue is a close one, the more reasonable construction of this inartfully drafted instrument is that it effects a "temporary modification of the original salary rate, rather than a rescission. Moreover, this conclusion is bolstered by the paragraph of the modification agreement which provides that, except as expressly modified, all terms and conditions of the 1959 agreement shall remain in full force and effect.
Consequently, the salary reverted to $100 on March 17, 1964 and plaintiff would be entitled to 94 weeks of arrearages at that rate rather than at the rate of $70 a week which was awarded by the Supreme Court.
In our view the plaintiff should have a judgment for the sum of $9,400, plus interest, instead of the $6,500 awarded.
The order appealed from should be modified in accordance with the memorandum herein and, as so modified, affirmed, without costs.
Judges Burke, Scileppi,- Breitel and Jasen concur in Memorandum ; Chief Judge Fulo and Judges Bergan and Keating dissent and vote to affirm on the opinion at Trial Term.
Ordered accordingly.