Case Name: Voldemar Lestienne and Others, Appellants, v. Max Ernst, Respondent, Impleaded, etc.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1896-05
Citations: 5 A.D. 373
Docket Number: 
Parties: Voldemar Lestienne and Others, Appellants, v. Max Ernst, Respondent, Impleaded, etc.
Judges: 
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 5
Pages: 373–380

Head Matter:
Voldemar Lestienne and Others, Appellants, v. Max Ernst, Respondent, Impleaded, etc.
Accord and satisfaction — unliquidated account — when the creditor is concluded Tyy the acceptance of a sum tendered in full payment — the debtor need not reply to a letter accepting the tender conditionally.
In an action brought to recover $347.10 as a balance clue for goods sold and delivered, tlic answer denied that that amount was due, and also pleaded an accord and satisfaction, with reference to which plea it appeared that the firm of Lestienne, Labhe & Co., composed of the present plaintiffs and a person named Labbe, dissolved partnership June 30, 1890, and that there was then organized the present firm, composed of the plaintiffs, by whom, on August 7, 1890, the goods in question were hilled to the defendants, who claimed that the sale was made in May, 1890, delivery to he made between the date of the sale and October 1, 1890.
The plaintiffs demanded $1,977.65, the amount of their bill, in January, 1891, to which the defendants interposed an offset of $150, claimed as damages upon- a sale made by the former firm; they also claimed a trade discount of $134.70 and a sum of $8.95, representing interest for an anticipated payment; and, on January 8, 1891, the defendants tendered a check for $1,630.55 as full pay- meat, which the plaintiffs refused to accept as full payment, returning-it to the defendants, who gave the check into the custody of a hank, and notified the plaintiffs that it was there, at their disposal. On the 19th day of March, 1891, the plaintiffs took the check from the hank, and on the same day wrote to the defendants: “ We will now accept same, subject to the settlement of the matters in dispute between you and Mr. Wormser,” to which letter no reply was made by the defendants.
Upon the trial o'f the action it was conceded that the claim of the plaintiffs was subject to a reduction of §143.65, this being the amount of the trade discount and the sum representing interest for the anticipated payment.
Held, that the acceptance of the check by the plaintiffs constituted an accord and satisfaction;
That the demand was unliquidated, as the claim of the plaintiffs concededly ought to have been reduced by the amount of the trade discount and by the sum representing interest for the anticipated payment;
That the claim being unliquidated, the acceptance of a part, coupled with an agreement to cancel the entire debt, furnished a new consideration found in the compromise;
That the plaintiffs could not take the check deposited in the bank and relieve themselves from the condition attending its deposit by writing, at the time when they had used the check, a letter, saying that they accepted it, subject to the adjustment of the amount in dispute.
Ingraham, J., dissented.
Appeal by the plaintiffs, Voldemar Lestienne and others, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the defendants, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 14th day of November, 1895, upon the dismissal of the complaint directed by the court after a trial before the court and a jury at the New York Circuit.
This action was brought to recover $347.10, a balance due for goods sold and delivered.' The answer denied that under any circumstances the unpaid balance amounted to as much as $347.10, and further pleaded an accord and satisfaction, upon which plea this .action was determined.
The firm of Lestienne, Labbe & Co., composed of the plaintiffs and one Labbe, dissolved partnership June 30, 1890, when the present firm of Lestienne Freres, composed of the plaintiffs, was organized. The goods in respect to which the action was brought were billed to the defendants, as shown by the invoice, as of August -'7,1890, to wit: 1,069 yards @ $1.85 = $1,977.65. The respondents claim that the transaction relating to their sale took place in May, 1890, the agreement being for a delivery of the same between the date of the sale and October 1, 1890. Upon a demand for the $1,977.65 in January, 1891, the defendants insisted that they were entitled, to an offset in the sum of $150, claimed as damages upon a sale made by the former firm of Lestienne, Labbe & Co.; also a trade discount of $134.70 upon the last invoice, and an additional sum of $8.95, representing interest for anticipated payment, and that, therefore, their indebtedness was only $1,630.55. It was conceded upon the trial that the former amount was incorrect, in that the defendants were entitled to the allowance claimed by them for the trade discount and the additional sum for interest.
On January 8, 1891, the defendants sent to plaintiffs their check on the Columbia Bank for the sum of $1,630.55, tendering it as full payment. The plaintiffs rejected the tender and refused to receive the check as full payment, returning it to one of the defendants, who thereupon delivered the check into the custody of the Columbia Bank, and at once notified the plaintiffs that it lay there at their disposal and subject to their order. The check so remained in the bank until the 19th of March, 1891, when the plaintiffs concluded to receive it and sent one of their clerks to the bank, who asked for and obtained it, and on the same day plaintiffs wrote to the defendants: “¥e will now accept same, subject to the settlement of the matters in dispute between you and Mr. Wormser.”
James Dunne, for the appellants.
David Leventritt, for the respondent.

Opinion:
O'Brien, J. :
The ground taken by the learned trial judge was, that the acceptance of the check by the plaintiffs was an accord and satisfaction of the debt in dispute, and the question upon this appeal is as to the correctness of such ruling.
According to the complaint, the demand was for $347.10; but, irrespective of the defendant's claim for the $150, it was conceded upon the trial that this amount was subject to a reduction of $143.65, being the trade discount and the sum representing interest for anticipated payment. This becomes important upon the question as to whether the demand was liquidated or unliquidated. If the former, the mere tender of a check for a smaller amount than was called for by the terms of the invoice, in full satisfaction thereof; the refusal to accept the same by plaintiffs on such conditions; the depositing of the check in the Columbia Bank and its remaining there for two months, and its subsequent acceptance, as set forth in plaintiffs' letter, would not furnish the essential elements of a valid agreement to relinquish the remainder of the claim. As said in Fuller v. Kemp (138 N. Y. 237): " Where the demand is liquidated, and the liability of the debtor is not in good faith disputed, the acceptance of a less sum than is the creditor's due will not of itself discharge the debt, even if a receipt in full is given." If, on the other hand, the amount was unliquidated, the sending of a check, coupled with a condition that it should be received in full payment, and its subsequent receipt by the plaintiffs, and their using it without an assent on the part of the defendants to any change in the conditions upon which it was given, would constitute an accord and satisfaction. " Always the manner of the tender and of the payment shall be directed by him who made the tender or payment, and not by him who accepts it." (Pinnel's Case, 5 Co. 117; quoted with approval in Nassoiy v. Tomlinson, 148 N. Y. 326, at p. 331.) As said in the latter case: " An accord and satisfaction requires a new agreement and the performance thereof. It must be an executed contract founded upon a new consideration. If the claim is liquidated, the mere acceptance of a part, with the promise to discharge the whole, is not enough, for there is no new consideration. If the claim is unliquidated, the accejffance of a part and an agreement to cancel the entire debt furnished a new consideration, which is found in the compromise. A demand is not liquidated even if it appears that something is due, unless it appears how much is due, and when it is admitted that one of two specific sums is due, but there is a genuine dispute as to which is the proper amount, the demand is regarded as unliquidated, within the meaning of that term, as applied to the subject of accord and satisfaction."
We cannot see any distinction between that case and the one at bar. There the defendant sent to plaintiff a check for $300 to pay him a commission on a sale, and inclosed a receipt which read, "in full for commissions," which plaintiff was to sign and return. The latter immediately wrote, stating: " I don't know wliat you mean by sending me a check for $300," but retaining the check and saying that his claim was $1,500. After hesitating for five months he used the check and sent the defendants a receipt on account, writing them that he claimed a balance, which the defendants repudiated by insisting that the check which they had sent was in full.
Here the defendants, upon receipt of the letter notifying them that the plaintiffs had taken the check and intended to receive it, subject to the adjustment of the amount in dispute, did not reply, and in this respect there is a difference between the facts in the two cases; but we do not see that this makes any difference in the principle, because that letter was sent on the very day that the check was taken from the Columbia Bank and used by the plaintiffs, and, as said in the opinion from which we have already quoted, in speaking of the effect of the letter there sent by the plaintiff after he had taken and used the check and claimed the balance : " This declaration was ex post facto and could have no effect unless acquiesced in by the defendants, but they promptly disclaimed and insisted that their debt was paid. "We think that the undisputed evidence shows conclusively that the offer was made in settlement of the claim and that the plaintiff so understood it, when by using the check he accepted the offer." So here the undisputed facts are that a check for an unliquidated amount was tendered as payment in full, and was so understood by the plaintiffs, and their subsequently taking the check which was deposited upon such a condition and using it was conclusive upon them, because they could not take a check upon which a condition was imposed and relieve themselves of such condition by writing at the very time that they had used the check a letter saying that they accepted it subject to the adjustment of the amount in dispute, and as they never obtained the consent of the defendants to such a modification of the condition under which the check was tendered and deposited, they must be held to have accepted and used it cv/m onere.
Certain exceptions were taken to rulings upon evidence, but none of them are very material as bearing upon the question of accord and satisfaction, and those that have such bearing wore not harmful, because upon what must be regarded as the conceded facts we think the judge below, following Nassoiy v. Tomlinson (supra), correctly disposed of the question of law.
The judgment, therefore, should be affirmed, with costs.
Van Brunt, P. J., Rumsey and Williams, JJ., concurred.