Case Name: HAWLEY v. ANDERSON, County Judge
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1920-07-06
Citations: 99 Or. 191
Docket Number: 
Parties: HAWLEY v. ANDERSON, County Judge.
Judges: Burnett, Bennett and Bean, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 99
Pages: 191–210

Head Matter:
Argued May 19,
demurrer to writ sustained and proceeding dismissed July 6,
rehearing denied orally October 5, 1920. On second rehearing, former opinion set aside and writ sustained February 8, 1921.
HAWLEY v. ANDERSON, County Judge.
(190 Pac. 1097; 195 Pac. 358.)
Constitutional Law—Amendment to Constitution not Self-executing —Counties — Increase of Indebtedness for Permanent Roads — Statute for That Purpose.
1. Amendment of Article XI, Section 10, of the Constitution, in 1919 (see Laws Sp. Soss. 1920, p. 5), to permit counties to incur indebtedness for permanent roads up to 6 per cent of the assessed valuation, is not self-executing so as to enlarge the debt limit without t'he enactment of a statute for that purpose.
Constitutional Law—Amendment—Limiting Indebtedness of Counties—Power of Legislature to Limit Indebtedness to a Smaller - Amount Than by the Amendment.
2. Since the legislative powers of the state are absolute except as limited by the Constitution, the legislature can limit the indebtedness of a county to a smaller amount than the limit fixed by an amendment to the 'Constitution.
Constitutional Law—Amendment Increasing Debt Limit Does not Change Statute Fixing Old Limit.
3. The amendment to Article XI, Section 10 of the Constitution (see Laws Sp. Sess. 1920, p. 5), limiting county indebtedness for permanent roads to 6 per cent of the assessed valuation, not being self-executing, does not increase the limit of 2 per cent fixed by General Laws of 1913, page 175, Section 19, passed in accordance with the Constitution prior to its amendment.
Counties—Election for Excessive Bond Issue Does not Authorize Issue Up to Limit.
4. An election for the issuance of county road bonds under General Laws of 1913, page 170, Section 4 of which requires the order to declare the minimum amount to be expended upon each specified road, which authorized the issuance of bonds in excess of the limit prescribed by Section 19 of that act, does not permit the issuance of bonds up to that limit, since the bond issue of the smaller amount presents an entirely different question from that submitted.
1. Self-executing provisions of Constitutions, see notes in 7 Ann. Cas. 627; 18 Ann. Cas. 199; Ann. Cas. 1914C, 1116; 16 L. R. A. 281.
ON SECOND REHEARING. .
Constitutional Law—A Constitutional Amendment may Amend, or Repeal Prior Conflicting Law.
5. While a constitutional amendment is a higher law than a legislative, enactment, it has the same effect upon existing legislation, and may amend or repeal a prior constitutional or statutory provision conflicting with it if such is its necessary effect or intent.
Constitutional Law — Statutes — Constitution or Statute Construed With Reference to Circumstances.
6. Courts in determining the construction of a Constitution or statute .will consider the circumstances under which it was enacted and the misehief to be remedied with a view to construing it if reasonably possible to correct the supposed defect.
Constitutional Law—Constitutional Amendment Increasing Debt Limit Held Self-executing.
7. In view of Article XI, Section 7, of the Constitution, and the original Section 10, as amended in 1910 (see Laws 1913, p. 9), relating to limit of indebtedness, and Laws of 1913, page 170, furnishing the election machinery for incurring indebtedness, the 1919 amendment to Section 10 (see Laws Sp. Sess. '1920, p. 5) changing the limit from 2 to 6 per cent of assos'sed valuation of county property for highway purposes became effective without additional legislation, since, if not self-executing, there was sufficient election machinery for carrying it into effect.
Constitutional Law—Amendment Takes Effect at Once if There is Proper Legal Machinery for Its Exercise.
8. A constitutional amendment takes effect at once when there is at the time of its adoption legal machinery by which its mandate can be enforced or its privileges exercised, even if not self-executing: that is, not furnishing by its own terms such necessary legal machinery.
Constitutional Law—Legislative Construction Entitled to Weight.
9. The legislative construction of the effect of a constitutional amendment is always entitled to weight in determining its construction.
6. Proceedings of constitutional' conventions as aid in construing Constitution, see note in 10 Ann, Cas. 1146.
Original proceeding in Supreme Court in Mmvdamus.
In Banc.
This is an original proceeding in mandamus. The alternative writ, heretofore issued herein, recites the various steps taken by legal voters of Clackamas County petitioning for an election upon the question of issuing bonds for the construction of permanent roads in the county, and the several proceedings had thereupon by the County Court, resulting, finally, in an election wherein a majority of the votes cast favored the issue of 3,400 bonds of the denomination of $500 each, including the final order for snch issue, and the advertisement of the sale of a portion of such bonds, including $70,000, par value, maturing in six years, and $70,000, par value thereof, maturing in seven years. It is further recited that the plaintiff submitted bids for the purchase of 100 of such bonds maturing in six years, and 100 thereof maturing in seven years, at par, plus accrued interest; that the County Court accepted such bids, and plaintiff has tendered payment therefor in accordance with the terms of his bids, but that defendants have failed and refused to make delivery. From the exhibits which are attached to and made a part of the writ, it appears that the proceedings were had under the provisions of Chapter 103, General Laws of Oregon for 1913. In the order made by the-County Court declaring the result of the election, in accordance with Section 11 of the Act of 1913, Chapter 103, occurs the following recital:
“ And it further appearing to the court that the total assessed valuation of all property within Clackamas County, Oregon, as shown by the assessment-roll of 1918 and upon which the taxes payable in 1919 are levied, is $28,968,526.48, and that there are no bonds outstanding against Clackamas County for permanent road purposes and remaining unpaid at this time, or at the time of the authorization of this bond issue.”
This 'excerpt is of interest in connection with the fact that the bond issue involved amounts to $1,700,000.
Section Í9 of the act reads thus:
“No bond shall be issued under this act that will in the aggregate, together with the bonds outstanding, and the bonds offered to be sold, be in excess of two (2) per cent of the assessed valuation of the county at the time the bonds are issued.”
Section 4 of the act requires that the order calling the election shall declare, among other things, the minimum amount to be expended upon each specified road, and the-County Court, in obedience to this mandate included in the order, this recital:
“It is further ordered that the following described roads in Clackamas County be built and improved by the money so raised, and that the location of said roads, the beginning and terminus thereof, and the maximum amount, to be expended on each be as follows,” etc.
Both the petition and the .order calling the election contain the following provisions:
“Each road district shall levy special road taxes to prepare the grade, and lay the base for hard surfacing in its district.
“When such grade and base are completed - the County Court shall, with due diligence, proceed to lay the hard surface. '
“The County Court is authorized to lay the hard surface with its own plants at force account, or to contract the same: Provided, that if a contract shall be let only for the laying of said hard surface, and the County Court shall purchase and furnish to the contractor all the material necessary in the laying of the hard surface.
“Each road district shall be authorized at its annual meeting held for the purpose of levying a special road tax to elect three freeholders who shall constitute an advisory committee to confer with the County Court in disbursing the road fund belonging to such district.”
A demurrer was filed by the defendants challenging the sufficiency of the complaint upon the face of the foregoing recitals.
Demurrer Sustained and Proceeding Dismissed.
Mr. Gilbert L. Hedges, District Attorney, for the demurrer.
Mr. O. D. Eby, contra.

Opinion:
BENSON, J.
There is but one serious question presented by the defendants upon the demurrer, and that is raised by their contention that the election is invalid because it calls for a bond issue largely in excess of 2 per cent of the assessed valuation of the property in the county, and therefore violates Section 19 of Chapter 103 of the Laws of 1913, which is the only statute providing the means whereby a county may hold an election for the issue of bonds for the construction of roads. Plaintiff's reply to this contention is that the limitation expressed in Section 19 of the act referred to has been removed by the latest amendment of Section 10, Article XI, of the Constitution, which became effective some months before the inception of the proceedings now under consideration. This section of the Constitution, as originally adopted, read thus:
"No county shall create any debts or liabilities which shall singly or in the aggregate exceed the sum of five thousand dollars, except to suppress insurrection or repel invasion; but the debts of any county at the time this Constitution takes effect shall be disregarded in estimating the sum to which such county is limited."
In 1911, when the crusade for better highways had become vigorous throughout the state, the people, by an initiative measure, amended this section, to read as follows:
"No county shall create any debts or liabilities which shall singly or in the aggregate exceed the sum of five thousand dollars, except to suppress insurrection or repel invasion, or to build permanent roads within the county, but debts for permanent roads shall be incurred only on approval of a majority of those voting on the question."
Shortly after this amendment became effective, an election was held in Jackson County, wherein a majority of the legal voters determined upon the issue of bonds to the amount of $1,500,000, for the construction of permanent roads, and suit was commenced to enjoin the issue of such bonds in the case of Andrews v. Neil, 61 Or. 471 (120 Pac. 383, 123 Pac. 32). In that case it was held that the constitutional amendment was not self-executing, so far as it enlarged the debt-creating power of the county, and that there could be no election for the issue of bonds thereunder without prior legislation- providing the means or procedure whereby the voters of the county might register their wishes in the matter. Following this decision, the legislature enacted Chapter 103, General Laws of Oregon for 1913, which is the act under which the defendants proceeded in the election which is here involved. Prior to the passage of this act, at the general election in 1912, the people, by initiative action, again amended Section 10, Article XI, of the Constitution to read thus:
"No county shall create any debts or liabilities which shall singly or in the aggregate with previous debts or liabilities exceed the sum of five thousand dollars, except to suppress insurrection or repel invasion or to build and maintain permanent roads within the county; and debts for permanent roads shall be incurred only on approval of a majority of those voting on the question, and shall not either singly or in the aggregate with previous debts and liabilities incurred for that purpose exceed two per cent of the assessed valuation of all the property in the county": See Laws 1913, p. 9.
This 2 per cent limitation was reiterated in Section 19 of the act of 1913, supra.
Again, in 1919, under the influence of a vigorous campaign for good roads, this section of the Constitution was amended so that the concluding clause reads as follows:
"And debts for permanent roads shall be incurred only on approval of a majority of those voting on the question, and shall not either singly or in the aggregate, with previous debts and liabilities incurred for that purpose, exceed six per cent of the assessed valuation of all the property in the county": Or. L., Sp. Sess. 1920, p. 5.
Keeping in mind the ruling of this court in Andrews v. Neil, 61 Or. 471 (120 Pac. 383, 123 Pac. 32), that this section of the Constitution is not self-executing as regards its enlargement of the debt-creating power of counties, it seems to be clearly established by the authorities that Section 19 of the act of 1913, limiting such indebtedness to 2 per cent of the assessed valuation of the county, is still in full force and effect. It is fundamental that the powers of the legislative department of a state are absolute, except as limited by the Constitution: 12 C. J. 804. In other words, the Constitution says to the legisla tive department, You may provide the machinery whereby counties may issue bonds, incurring an indebtedness for permanent roads, but your machinery is ineffective if it undertakes to authorize such a debt in excess of 6 per cent of the assessed value of the property in the county. This leaves the legislature with full power to limit the county to a still smaller indebtedness, as it has done in the act of 1913.
This conclusion is not affected by the fact that the statute was already in existence when the constitutional amendment was adopted. It appears to be the uniform holding of the courts that a constitutional provision which is not self-executing does not affect existing legislation until the enactment of legislation putting it into effect: 12 C. J. 739; 6 R. C. L. 34; Hall v. Dunn, 52 Or. 475 (97 Pac. 811, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 193); State ex rel. v. Portland Ry., L. & P. Co., 56 Or 32 (107 Pac. 958).
It might be (although it is not necessary to decide) that, if the act of 1913 were differently framed, the election in this case could be regarded as valid up to the limit of 2 per cent of the assessed valuation of the county, but, since the statute requires the order submitting the question to a vote of the people to specify the roads which are to be constructed or repaired, and the minimum amount to be expended upon each of them, it will be readily seen that a bond issue of a much smaller amount would be an entirely different question from that upon which the people have voted. It follows that the demurrer must be sustained, and the proceeding dismissed.
Demurrer Sustained. Proceedings Dismissed.
Rehearing Denied.
Burnett, Bennett and Bean, JJ., concur.