Case Name: The United States of America against Lathrop
Court: New York Supreme Court of Judicature
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1819-08
Citations: 17 Johns. 4
Docket Number: 
Parties: *The United States of America against Lathrop.
Judges: 
Reporter: Johnson's Reports
Volume: 17
Pages: 9–29

Head Matter:
*The United States of America against Lathrop.
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THIS was an action of debt brought in this court, to recover a penalty of 150 dollars, under the act of Consn s«, passed the 2d of August, 1813, (13 Cong. sess. 1. ch. 3a.) entitled, “An act for laying duties on licenses to retailor - of wines, spirituous liquors, and foreign merchandise,” for sellina, by retail, spirituous liquors, without license, contrary to the provisions of the said act.
The defendant pleaded to the jurisdiction of this court, alleging, that, under the constitution and laws of the f ,ñt< I Stales, the action ought to have been brought in the Di-tact Court of the United States, for the southern district of Site-York, and not in this court,
*The plea was as follows: “ That this court here ought not to take, nor will take, cognizance of the plea aforesaid, be< au-w he, the said J). Lathrop, says, that the said state of JSew-\otk is one part, or member, of the said United States, in the said declaration mentioned, and within and under the constituí ion, laws, and government of the same: And that the said Unhid States are divided into districts, and the state of New- Y/nk composes two of the said districts, for the more convenient transaction of business in the courts of the United States, one 0£ vviiieh said two districts is called the Southern District of New- York, and within which said last mentioned district, the said county of Albany is contained: And the said D. L. fur-saySj t|ia| within the said Southern District of New-York, there is, and at the time of the exhibition of the bill of the said United States in this behalf, and long before that time, was, a Circuit Court of the United States, called a District Court, holden for the Southern District of New-York. before the judges assigned to hold the said court, in the said Southern District of New- York: And that all and singular, pleas, suits, or actions, for penalties and forfeitures incurred under the laws of the United States, to which the United States are parties, arising within the said Southern District of New-York, are, and at the time of the exhibition of the said bill were, and of right ought to be, pleaded and pleadable within the said District Court of the United States, holden in and for the said Southern District, before the judges thereof, for the time being; and not in the court before the justices of the people of the state of New-York, of the Supreme Court of Judicature of the same people; and that he, the said !>. L., at the time of exhibiting the said bill, and before, was, and from thence hitherto has been, resident and commorant within the same Southern District of New-York, that is to say, at the city of Albany, in the county of Albany aforesaid, where the said offence, charged in the said declaration, is alleged to have been committed; and this he is ready to verify to the said court here; and wherefore, since the cause of action aforesaid arose within the said Southern District of New-York, within and under the government, constitution, and laws of the said United States, and for penalties and forfeitures incurred under the law's of the 'United States, and to which the said United States are a party, and of which the said District Court, for the said Southern District of New- York, *has exclusive original cognizance, the said defendant prays judgment, if the saidJSupreme Court of Judicature of the people of the state of New- York, before the justices of the said people, holden under and in virtue of the laws and constitution of the state of New- York, here, will, or ought, to have further cognizance of the plea aforesaid.” To this plea there was a demurrer and joinder.
Fisk, in support of the demurrer to this plea,
contended, that this court had jurisdiction of the cause. By the act of Congress, (13 Cong. sess. 1. ch. 38. sect. 5.) passed August 2, 1813, and the act, (13 Cong. sess. 3. ch. 100.) passed March 3, 1815, (Vid. Colvin’s ed. of Laws of U. S. vol. 4. p. 611. and 854.) jurisdiction is given to the state courts, who are authorized to take cognizance of all complaints, suits, and prosecutions for taxes, duties, fines, penalties, and forfeitures. arising and payable under the act of August 2, 1813, or any act of Congress, to be passed for the collection of any direct tax or internal duties of the United States. By the judiciary act of the United States, (1 Cong. sess. 1. ch. 20. sect. 9. 11.) the district courts of the United States have cognizance concurrent with the state courts, of all suits at common law, when the United States sue, and the matter in dispute amounts to the sum or value of 100 dollars; and the circuit courts of the United States have original cognizance concurrent with the courts of the several states, oí all suits of a civil nature, at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of 500 dollars, and the United States are plaintiffs or petitioners. What was the true understanding of the second section of the third article of the constitution of the United, States, relative to the judicial power, may be seen by the exposition given, at the time, by one of the members of the convention who framed the constitution, and who was, also, a learned and able jurist. (Here the counsel read from the Federalist, No. 82. of the Letters of Publius, written by General Hamilton.) And, in conformity to this construction, it had been the uniform practice, since the adoption of the constitution of the United States, for suits to be brought by the United States in the courts of the several states. In the case of the United States v. Dodge, (14 Johns. Hep. 95.) which was an action of debt, on a bond given by the defendant, for the payment of duties to the collector of the district of Champlain, pursuant to the act of Congress of March 2, 1799, this court said, that they could not see how any doubt could exist on the question of jurisdiction, and, accordingly, gave judgment for the plaintiffs. Where there has been a contemporary exposition of the constitution practised and acquiesced under for a period of years, and from the very commencement of the judicial system, it fixes the construction, which ought not, afterwards, to be questioned or disturbed. (Stuart v. Laird, 1 Crunch, 299.)
I. Hamilton, contra.
Rv the constitution of the United States, (Art. 3. s. 1.) it L declared, that the judicial power of the United States shall '!)<■ vested in a Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as Comc'ess shall, from time to time, ordain and establish. The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, are to hold their offices during good behavior; and they are to receive, at stated times, a compensation for their services, which is not to be diminished during their continuance in office. The second section prescribes and defines the extent of the judicial power. The sixth article declares, that the constitution and laws of the United States, made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties, &c., shall be the supreme law of the land, by which the judges in every state are to be bound : and the 8th section of the first article declares, that Congress shall have power to constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court. By the 9th and 10th articles of the amen<jments to the constitution, it is declared that the enumeration in the constitution of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people ; and that the powers not delegated to the United States, by the constitution, nor prohibited by it, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.
By the constitution of this state, (Art. 24, 25.) the judges are to hold their offices during good behavior, or until they shall have respectively attained the age of sixty years; and they cannot, at the same time, hold any other office, except as delegates to Congress on special occasions.
Have not the people of the United- States, by the constitution, made an express grant of the whole judicial power ? Is not that grant exclusive ? Can Congress vest it elsewhere ?
In the case of Mar bury v. Madison, (1 Crunch, 137—174.) Chief Justice Marshall, in delivering the opinion of the court, says, it was not the intention of the constitution to leave it to the discretion of the legislature to apportion the judicial power between the supreme and inferior courts according to the will of that body. “ If Congress/’ says lie, “ remains at liberty to give this court appellate jurisdiction, where the constitution has declared their jurisdiction shall be original; and original where the constitution has declared it shall be appellate ; the distribution of jurisdiction, made in the constitution, is form without substance.” This language may be applied with great force to the present case. If Congress remains at liberty to vest the judicial power of the United States in the state courts, which power the constitution has declared shall be vested in the courts of the United- States: if Congress is at liberty to declare that the state courts shall have jurisdiction of causes where the United States is a party, when the constitution has declared that the jurisdiction of the United States courts shall extend to controversies to which the United States is a party,—then, in the language of Chief Justice Marshall, the distribution of jurisdiction made by the constitution is form without substance. And further, to use the language of that learned judge, “ affirmative words are often, in their operation, negative of other objects than those affirmed; and, in this *case, a negative or exclusive sense must be given to them, or they have no operation at all.”
In the case of Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, (1 Wheat. Rep. 305—328.) Story, J., who delivered the opinion of the court, says, “ that the language of the article (Art. 3. Const, of U. S.) throughout, is manifestly designed to be mandatory on the legislature.” “ If then,” he says, “ it is the duty of Congress to vest the judicial power of the United States, it is a duty to vest the whole judicial power.” “ Congress cannot vest any portion of the judicial power of the United States, except in courts ordained and established by itself; and if, in any of the cases enumerated in the constitution, the state courts did not then possess jurisdiction, the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (admitting that it could act on state courts) could not reach those cases, and, consequently, the injunction of the constitution, that the judicial power shall be vested, would be disobeyed. It would seem, therefore, to follow, that Congress are bound to create some inferior courts, in which to vest all that jurisdiction which, under the constitution, is exclusively vested in the United States, and of which the Supreme Court cannot take original cognizance.” “ As to cases arising under the constitution, laws, and treaties, of the United States, the states could not, ordinarily, possess a direct jurisdiction. The jurisdiction over such cases could not exist in the state courts, previous to the adoption of the constitution, and it could not, afterwards, be directly conferred upon them ; for the constitution expressly requires the judicial power to be vested in courts ordained and established by the United States(p. 35.) We have, in this case, the judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States on this very question.
Wherever the cases upon which the jurisdiction attaches, grow out of the constitution of the United States, the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction ; and the reason assigned is, that, in such cases, there was no previous authority in the state courts, for the cases did not exist; and, of course, that amendment which reserves to the states, or to the people, the powers not granted by the constitution, has no application. (1 Bin-net/s Rep. 143.) “ It seems scarcely to admit of controversy,” says Mr. Hamilton, in the Federalist, (No. 80.) “ that the judicial authority of the Union ought to extend to these several descriptions of cases: 1st. To all those which arise out of the laws of the United States, passed in pursuance of their just and constitutional powers of legislation: 2d. To all those which concern the execution of the provisions expressly contained in the articles of union: 3d. To all those in which the United States are a party,” &c.
A corporation aggregate cannot litigate in the courts of the United States, unless in consequence of the character of the individuals who compose the body politic, and which character must appear, by proper averments, on the record. (5 Crunch, 57.) Why should not this court apply the same rule to the United States; and refuse permission to them to litigate here, unless bound by the constitution of the United * States to hear them ? The courts of the United States consider their powers limited by the constitution, and the right of the plaintiff to sue must appear on the record. (1 Crunch, 343. 2 Cranch, 9. 126. 5 Crunch, 303.) Marshall, Ch. J., (case of Holman and Swartwout, 4 Crunch, 97.) says, “ the state courts are not, in any sense of the word, inferior courts, except in the particular cases in which an appeal lies from their judgment to this court; they are not inferior courts, because they emanate from a different authority, and are the creatures of a distinct government,” Mr. Hamilton says (Federalist, No. 81.) that the power of constituting tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court, was intended to enable the national government to institute or authorize, in each state, or district of the United States, a tribunal competent to the determination of matters of national jurisdiction within its limits and he states the reasons why the state courts should not be made use of for this purpose. In this case, the right arose under a law of Congress. It did not, and could not, have existed previous to the constitution of the United States.
Again ; if the court should have any doubts on the question, they ought to decide in favor of the defendant, who would, otherwise, be without remedy : for if the decision should be in favor of the plaintiffs, no writ of error would lie. The Su preme Court of the United, States have no jurisdiction upon a writ of error to a state court, if the decision of the state court is in favor of a privilege claimed under an act of Congress. (Gordon v. Caldcleugh, 3 Crunch, 268.) Even the legislature of a state cannot determine the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States. (The United States v. Peters, 5 Crunch, 115—136.)
This same question has been brought before the courts of several of the states, and, after solemn argument, and the most mature deliberation, they have decided, that the state courts have no jurisdiction. (The counsel here referred to the following cases: The State of Maryland v, Thomas Rutter, and the opinion of Judge Bland, 12 Niles’s 'Weekly Register, April 19, 1817, p. 115. 377. Ex parte Rhodes, opinion of Judge Cheeves, South Carolina, 12 Niles’s Weekly Register, 265. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Rosloff, 12 Niles’s Weekly Register, 139, April 26, 1817. Almeida’s case, Judge Hanson’s opinion, 12 Niles’s Weekly Register, 231, June 1, 1817. United States v. Campbell, opinion of Judge Tapp an, of Ohio, 10 Niles’s Weekly Register, 405, August 17, 1816, Commonwealth of Virginia v. Feely, MS. Jackson v. Rose, decided before the nine judges of the General Court of Virginia, November 11, 1313, MS.) These cases conclusively show, that Congress has no power to give to a state court jurisdiction over cases of a penal or criminal nature, arising under the laws of the United States. The case of the United States v. Dodge, in this court, is very different from the present. It was an action of debt, on a bond for the payment of duties. In Scoville v. Canfield, the court said, that the penal acts of one state have no operation in another state, nor would they enforce the criminal laws of another state. In the * Trustees of Randall v. Rensselaer, (1 Johns. Rep. 94.) this court decided, that they would take no notice of the revenue laws of another country.
The observations in the Federalist, (No. 82.) which have been read, amount to no more than this: that where the state courts had pre-existing power to take cognizance of the case, before the constitution, they might still exercise that power ; but that where the case arises out of the constitution or laws of the United States, the state courts have no jurisdiction. ' J
Fisk, in reply,
reiterated the arguments before stated, and said, that he relied much on the practical construction given to the constitution. In the case of Martin v. Hunteds Lessee, Judge Johnson, though he acquiesced in the judgment of the court, did not concur in the reasoning of the judge who delivered it. He said that the plain and obvious meaning of the word “ shall” is, that it is in the future tense, and has nothing imperative in it.

Opinion:
Spencer, Ch. J.,
delivered the opinion of the court. The plea demurred to can only be supported on the ground, that, by the constitution of the United States, no state court can take cognizance of any suit in behalf of the United States, for penalties or forfeitures. The whole case, then, depends on the provisions of' the constitution of the United States.
By the first section of the third article, it is provided, that •'the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish." The second section of the same article declares, that " the judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under this constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction ; to controversies between two or more states; between a state and citizens of another state ; between citizens of different states ; between citizens of the same Asíate claiming lands under grants of different states ; and between a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens, or subjects."
The act of Congress under which this suit is brought, was passed at the first session of the 13th Congress, (ch. 38.) After declaring the forfeiture for noncompliance with its provisions, it proceeds to enact, that for the recovery of all fines, penalties, and forfeitures, incurred under it, suits may be prosecuted and maintained, in the name of the United States, before any court of the state having jurisdiction in like cases, where tfie cause of action shall arise or accrue more than fifty miles distant f orn the nearest place by law established for the holding a district court, within the district in which the same shall arise or accrue.
The question which we are called upon to decide involves considerations of great delicacy and magnitude, and on which several very enlightened tribunals have held different opinions. Í cannot doubt, that in some of the enumerated cases, to which the constitution declares the judicial power of the United Stafes shall extend, the courts of the United States, Strictly speaking, have exclusive jurisdiction; and that in others of these enumerated cases, the courts of the several states have a concurrent jurisdiction. I entirely concur in the opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Story, in the case of Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, (1 Wheat. Rep. 323.) that the language of the constitution is imperative, " that the judicial power of the United States shall be vested," " and that it shall extend," for the reasons offered by that learned judge ; but this does not necessarily divest the state courts of jurisdiction in all those cases to which their jurisdiction extended, before the adoption of the constitution. The vesting of jurisdiction in newly-constituted courts, without any words of exclusion of the jurisdiction possessed by other courts before, does not, ex vi termini, oust those courts of jurisdiction; unless, indeed, there should be an incompatibility in the exercise of the same powers, by distinct and independent tribunals; in such case a negative might be implied from the very nature of the case.
*It is not eulogy to say, that, perhaps, there never was a human production more profoundly considered, by an assemblage of the most distinguished men, than this great national pact, which has secured to the people of the United States such innumerable blessings. Many members of that illustrious convention were eminent lawyers, conversant with the practice, organization, and proceedings of the courts of the several states; and we are, therefore, authorized to conclude, that in vesting the judicial power of the United States, they would avoid every thing leading to confusion or derangement in the proceedings of the state courts; and, if I am not greatly mistaken, it will appear, that a denial to the state courts of a concurrent jurisdiction with the courts of the United States, in some of the specified cases, and an imposition upon them of jurisdiction in others, would, in the one case, lead to the most absurd and extraordinary results, and, in the other, to a violation of fundamental principles.
There were several great objects in the view of the convention in adjusting the judiciary system. The government was invested with the powers of peace and war; they assumed the national debt, and became liable for future national engagements ; they were charged with the common defence of every portion of the empire ; the power of fulfilling these obligations required the collection of a revenue, in the shape of taxes, duties, imposts, and excises; and to preserve the public peace, and fulfil the public faith, it was all important that the power to do both should be enjoyed and exercised by the government itself. It would have been unwise and unsafe to depend on the judiciary of the several states, over whom the United States had no control, for the exposition or execution of the laws of the United States, It would have been incompatible with the stability or permanency of the government itself.
It was necessary to guard against the probable partialities ana prejudices incident to the state courts, in legal controversies between citizens of different states. Indeed, the declaration of the extent of the judicial power of the United States, in all the specified cases, was justified by the great interests of the nation. It is not, however, necessary that *the courts of the United. States should have exclusive primary jurisdiction in all the enumerated eases. A subsequent part of the third article of the constitution declares, " that in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all other cases, before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions and under such regulations, as the Congress shall make."
The requisitions of the constitution are satisfied, if the judicial power of the United States is ultimately vested in a court constituted by them, without excluding the state courts from a concurrent jurisdiction; and from whose decisions a right of appeal, both as to law and fact, is secured. I cannot but conclude, on this branch of the subject, that inasmuch as there is no express negation of jurisdiction to the state courts, in the specified cases, their jurisdiction is not taken away, except as to such of the cases as they did not before hold cognizance of, and such as, from the nature of the jurisdiction, they could not hold cognizance of, from the incompatibility between the powers granted to the courts of the United States, and a reservation of any portion of the same powers to the state courts.
This conclusion derives support from another part of the constitution. The sixth article provides, " that this constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding; " and the constitution further requires, that judicial officers, both of the United States and of the several states, shall be bound, by oath or affirmation, to support the constitution.
If. is evident that the framers of the constitution contemplated, that the state courts might entertain questions involving the consideration and construction of the constitution and laws of the United States, and treaties made under their authority, and yet the judicial power of the United States #extends " to all cases in I mi or equity arising under the constitution, the laws o f the United States, and treaties made under their authorityIt seems to me, that if we regard the whole instrument, as we are bound to do by every sound rule of construction, it cannot be doubted that the constitution ue\er intended to negate the pre-existing jurisdiction» of the state courts.
Perhaps it was unnecessary to discuss a proposition, which I do not learn has ever been doubted in any of the courts ; but it came within the range of observations called for by the case.
How far Congress can confer power or jurisdiction upon the state courts, and whether those courts, if the act was silent upon the subject of jurisdiction, could take cognizance of actions for penalties and forfeitures incurred under the laws of the United States, remains to be considered. We hare seen, that the judicial power of the United, States is to be rested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish.
On this clause of the constitution, we have the direct opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case already cited, of Martin v. Hunter's Lessees. (] fi'licut. Rep. 330.) that " Congress cannot vest any portion of the judicial power of the United States, except in courts ordaimd and established by itself." Indeed, it appears to me too plain for discussion, that the expression in the constitution, " and in such inferior courts as the Congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish," can have no reference to the courts established by the respective state legislatures: the conferring of jurisdiction on such courts, is not to ordain and establish them; and in no sense can the state courts become the inferior courts intended in the constitution. Where, then, it may be asked, is the authority in the constitution to invest the state courts with jurisdiction of causes, which they did not enjoy concurrently before the adoption of the constitution ? On this point, also, we have the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States. They say, (1 Wheaton, 337.) " no part of the criminal jurisdiction of the United States can, consistently with the constitution, be delegated to state tribunals. The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction ⅜ of the same exclusive cognizance ; and it can only be in those cases where, previous to the constitution, state tribunals, possessed jurisdiction, independent of national authority, that they can now, constitutionally, exercise a concurrent jurisdiction."
It cannot be doubted, that a pecuniary penalty for a violation of, or nonconformity to, an act of Congress, is as much a punishment for an offence against the laws, as if a corporal penalty had been inflicted; and, as regards crimes and offences, made so by legislative enactment, the government of the United States stands in the same relation to the state governments, as any foreign government; and it is a fundamental maxim, that the courts of one sovereignty will not take cognizance of, nor enforce the penal code of, another. Thus, in the case of Scoville v. Canfield, (14 Johns. Rep. 339.) we held, that we would not enforce a penal statute of Connecticut, on the broad principle, that the courts of this state will not carry into effect the penal laws of another state. The act of Congress, in this case, undoubtedly reaches the offender, but this court cannot touch him.
The act of Congress establishing the judicial courts of the United States, passed the 24th of September, 1789, I consider as a true exposition of the constitutional provision, with respect to the concurrent jurisdiction of the state courts, and the exclusive jurisdiction of those of the United States. When we call to mind, that it is among the first acts of the first Congress, held under the constitution, and that many of the leading members of the convention were, also, members of that Congress, we cannot but regard it as entitled to the most profound respect, in settling the question of concurrent, and exclusive, jurisdiction.
The 9th section of this act gives the District Courts of the United States cognizance, exclusively of the courts of the several states, of all crimes and offences that shall be cognizable under the authority of the United States, and exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty, and maritime jurisdiction, and of all suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred under the laws of the United States, and cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several states, of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only, in ^violation of the laws of nations, or of a treaty of the United States, and of all suits at common law, where the United States sue, and the matter in dispute amounts to 100 dollars, and jurisdiction, exclusively of the state courts, of all suits against consuls and vice-consuls. The 1.1th section vests the Circuit Court of the United States with original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several states, of all suits of a civil nature, at common law, or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds 500 dollars, and the United States are plaintiffs or petitioners, or an alien is a party, or the suit is between a citizen where the suit is brought and a citizen of another state; and exclusive cognizance of crimes and offences.
It will be perceived, that this act, throughout, makes the distinction between those cases of a civil nature, and of which the state courts had, or would have had, cognizance, independently of the constitution, and such as originate under the laws of Congress. The jurisdiction of the state courts is in no instance excluded where they had a pre-existing jurisdiction, except in those cases of a national character, such as admiralty and maritime cases, and suits against ambassadors and other public ministers, consuls, and vice-consuls ; but the jurisdiction of the state courts is excluded in cases of crimes and offences cognizable under the authority of the United States; and in cases of suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred under the laws of the United States.
It cannot be supposed that there existed any distrust of the state courts when the act of 1789 was passed. On the contrary, if, as is contended by some distinguished jurists, it is in the power of Congress to vest the cognizance of all the cases enumerated in the constitution, exclusively in courts established by Congress, (a proposition on which I give no opinion,) it will at once be seen, that the act of 1789 left a great mass of jurisdiction in the state courts untouched.
In whatever light, then, this question is considered, I am fully of the opinion, that this court has no jurisdiction of the criminal offences, or penal laws of the United States; and that it is not competent to Congress to confer jurisdiction ; *and that, therefore, the defendant must have judgment on the demurrer.