Case Name: FARLEY v. THE STATE
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1995-06-30
Citations: 265 Ga. 622
Docket Number: S95A0277
Parties: FARLEY v. THE STATE.
Judges: All the Justices concur, except Fletcher and Sears, JJ., who concur specially.
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 265
Pages: 622–632

Head Matter:
S95A0277.
FARLEY v. THE STATE.
(458 SE2d 643)

Opinion:
Carley, Justice.
Appellant, David James Farley, was tried before a jury and found guilty of the simple battery of Sarah Davis and of the felony murder of Joseph Croft while in the commission of an aggravated battery. He appeals from the judgments of conviction and sentences entered by the trial court on the jury's guilty verdicts.
1. Appellant enumerates the general grounds. When the evidence is construed most favorably for the State and most strongly against appellant, the jury was authorized to find the following: Appellant and James Benefield drove from Chicago to the Bartow County home of Croft and Ms. Davis. Benefield knew Croft, but appellant did not. According to Davis, the next day appellant became "real hateful and ill" after drinking several beers and he accused Croft of stealing money from his wallet. Appellant then began to beat Croft about the head and, although Croft did not fight back, appellant continued to beat and kick him even after he lost consciousness and fell to the ground. When Ms. Davis tried to intervene, appellant struck her and exclaimed that he "ought to finish killing him, and I ought to kill you." Croft died from brain injuries.
This evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find proof of appellant's guilt of simple battery and of felony murder while in the commission of an aggravated battery beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
2. In 1986, appellant was convicted of an aggravated battery. After a hearing which complied with the mandate of Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640 (409 SE2d 649) (1991), the trial court found that evidence of this prior aggravated battery would be admissible to show appellant's "course of conduct" or "bent of mind." Several of appellant's enumerations of error relate to this evidentiary ruling.
OCGA § 24-9-20 (b) deals with the testimony of a criminal defendant and provides, in part, "that no evidence of general bad character or prior convictions shall be admissible unless and until the defendant shall have first put his character in issue." However, OCGA § 24-9-20 (b) has no applicability here, since we do not deal with any issue concerning appellant's testimony or the evidentiary conse quences of his opening of the "character" door. The issue for resolution is the admissibility of "other transactions" evidence without regard to whether appellant testified or put his own character in issue. Thus, the applicable authority is OCGA § 24-2-2 which provides that "other transactions" evidence is "irrelevant matter unless the nature of the action involves such character and renders necessary or proper the investigation of such conduct." Unlike evidence which is relevant solely to "character" and admissible under OCGA § 24-9-20 (b) only if the "character" door has been opened by the defendant himself, relevant "other transactions" evidence is admissible notwithstanding its tendency to discredit the character of the defendant. Childs v. State, 257 Ga. 243, 247 (3) (c) (357 SE2d 48) (1987). "Proof of crimes which are similar or are closely connected to the crime charged does tend to establish the crime charged." (Emphasis in original.) State v. Johnson, 246 Ga. 654, 655 (272 SE2d 321) (1980).
Appellant was being tried for a felony murder in which an aggravated battery was the underlying offense and his defense was justification. One is not justified in using force which is either intended or is likely to cause death or great bodily harm if he is the aggressor or if he was engaged in combat by agreement unless he withdraws and effectively communicates to the victim that he intends to do so. Lancaster v. State, 250 Ga. 871, 873 (3) (301 SE2d 882) (1983). It is clear, therefore, that this case necessarily involved appellant's propensity for initiating or continuing an encounter wherein he "maliciously cause [d] bodily harm to another by depriving him or her of a member of his or her body, by rendering a member of his or her body useless, or by seriously disfiguring his or her body or a member thereof." OCGA § 16-5-24 (a). Accordingly, evidence of appellant's commission of the prior aggravated battery would be admissible if it was so sufficiently similar to the instant aggravated battery as to be relevant to his "bent of mind" or "course of conduct" in initiating or continuing such encounters. Under those circumstances, the evidence of his prior commission of a sufficiently similar aggravated battery would tend to rebut his claim of justification by showing a "bent of mind" or "course of conduct" in initiating or continuing such encounters, as contrasted to acting in self-defense. Gentry v. State, 250 Ga. 802, 803 (1) (301 SE2d 273) (1983). See also Edwards v. State, 261 Ga. 509 (1), fn. 2 (406 SE2d 79) (1991) ("propensity to use firearms to avenge himself against someone who he thought had wronged him"); Haywood v. State, 256 Ga. 694, 696 (2) (353 SE2d 184) (1987) ("bent of mind and his propensity for the use of a gun when intoxicated"); Brock v. State, 254 Ga. 682, 683 (2) (333 SE2d 593) (1985) ("habit of periodically firing a gun" admissible to rebut claim of self-defense); Sport v. State, 253 Ga. 689, 690 (1) (324 SE2d 184) (1985) ("bent of mind and propensity for use of a pistol"); Saylors v. State, 251 Ga. 735, 738 (7) (309 SE2d 796) (1983) ("prior conduct involving knives").
In urging that the evidence was inadmissible, appellant erroneously focuses upon the differences between the prior and instant aggravated batteries, rather than correctly focusing upon their similarities. In both occurrences, appellant was shown to have initiated an unprovoked attack upon one with whom he was ostensibly sharing a friendly drink. When he succeeded in subduing both victims, appellant persisted in beating and kicking them in the head, thereby inflicting serious injuries. After each encounter, appellant was boastful about his acts.
The test of admissibility of evidence of other criminal acts by the defendant is not the number of similarities between the two incidents. Rather, such evidence "may be admitted if it ' "is substantially relevant for some purpose other than to show a probability that (the defendant) committed the crime on trial because he is a man of criminal character. . . ." ' " [Cit.]
Maggard v. State, 259 Ga. 291, 293 (2) (380 SE2d 259) (1989). Under numerous decisions of this court, the prior aggravated battery committed by appellant was relevant to rebut his claim of self-defense in this case by showing that he has a propensity for initiating and continuing unprovoked encounters which result in bodily harm to those whom he attacks. "Since appellant claimed self-defense, evidence of previous unprovoked attacks was relevant to show malice, intent, motive, and bent of mind." Gentry v. State, supra at 803 (1).
The testimony was not admitted to show a probability that [appellant] committed the crime charged because [he] has a criminal character but was properly admitted to show a similarity that tends to prove a peculiar bent of mind or course of conduct. [Cit.]
Stephens v. State, 261 Ga. 356, 357 (2) (405 SE2d 470) (1991). See also Edwards v. State, supra at 509 (1), fn. 2; Haywood v. State, supra at 696 (2); Brock v. State, supra at 683 (2); Sport v. State, supra at 690 (1); Saylors v. State, supra at 738 (7). To hold, as the special concurrence proposes, that the evidence of Farley's commission of a prior aggravated battery was erroneously admitted would require that we overrule not only Gentry, Stephens, Edwards, Haywood, Brock, Sport, and Saylors, but that we also overrule a host of other cases in which this court has held "other transactions" evidence to be admissible under comparable circumstances. See generally Ward v. State, 262 Ga. 293, 295 (2) (417 SE2d 130) (1992); Starks v. State, 262 Ga. 244, 245 (2) (416 SE2d 520) (1992); Chastain v. State, 260 Ga. 789, 790 (3) (400 SE2d 329) (1991); Bromley v. State, 259 Ga. 377, 381 (6) (380 SE2d 694) (1989); Mincey v. State, 257 Ga. 500, 505 (7) (360 SE2d 578) (1987); Byrd v. State, 255 Ga. 674 (2) (a) (341 SE2d 453) (1986); Harris v. State, 255 Ga. 500, 502 (3) (340 SE2d 4) (1986); Goodman v. State, 255 Ga. 226, 227 (5) (336 SE2d 757) (1985); Cunningham v. State, 255 Ga. 35, 37 (4) (334 SE2d 656) (1985); Rich v. State, 254 Ga. 11,13 (1) (325 SE2d 761) (1985); Hooks v. State, 253 Ga. 141, 142 (2) (317 SE2d 531) (1984).
After conducting a hearing in full compliance with the mandate of Williams v. State, supra, the trial court found that the prior aggravated battery was relevant and admissible for a limited purpose in determining appellant's guilt of the aggravated battery which was the underlying felony for the felony murder with which appellant was charged. That having been done, there is no further requirement that the record reflect the trial court's express balancing determination as between the probative value of the evidence and its prejudicial impact. Such an express determination would be entirely superfluous, since evidence which "is otherwise relevant . . . does not become inadmissible simply because it incidentally puts a defendant's character or reputation into evidence. [Cit.]" Jones v. State, 263 Ga. 835, 839 (3) (439 SE2d 645) (1994). If a trial court finds that "other transactions" evidence is so attenuated and dissimilar as to lack relevancy, then that evidence should be excluded because its prejudice outweighs its probative value. "[W]ithout some sort of probative connection between the prior act and the crime charged, the prejudicial nature of the prior act evidence will outweigh its probative value." Barrett v. State, 263 Ga. 533, 534 (2) (436 SE2d 480) (1993); Larkins v. State, 230 Ga. 418, 420-421 (2) (197 SE2d 367) (1973), overruled on other grounds, Hunt v. State, 233 Ga. 329, 331 (211 SE2d 288) (1974). However, a trial court's finding that "other transactions" evidence is relevant necessarily constitutes an implicit finding that the probative value of that evidence outweighs its prejudicial impact. Such evidence should be admitted and the prejudicial impact of that otherwise relevant evidence is a matter for jury instruction, and is not a factor in its admissibility vel non. The evidence was not overly prejudicial in this case, because the trial court gave detailed limiting instructions at the time of the admission of the evidence and at the close of the case. Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 369, 370 (2) (434 SE2d 479) (1993). See also Campbell v. State, 234 Ga. 130 (214 SE2d 656) (1975); Hicks v. State, 232 Ga. 393, 397 (207 SE2d 30) (1974). Appellant erroneously cites Adams v. State, 208 Ga. App. 29, 34 (3) (a) (430 SE2d 35) (1993) as authority for imposing an unnecessary requirement upon a trial court to make an express balancing determination as between probative value and prejudice as a condition to admission of "other transaction" evidence. Only four judges concurred in Division 3 of Adams, whereas five judges did not. Accordingly, Division 3 of Adams is not binding authority and is a physical precedent only by virtue of the Court of Appeals own Rule 33 (a). Moreover, Adams' conclusion that such an express balancing determination is mandated appears to have been created ex nihilo because none of the cases cited supports such a requirement.
Evidence of a defendant's prior bad acts is admissible solely for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith in the case on trial, if those prior bad acts are shown to be so sufficiently similar "other transactions" as to become relevant evidence of his "bent of mind" or "course of conduct" under OCGA § 24-2-2.
We do not concede, as suggested by some, that the exceptions have swallowed the rule of inadmissibility of separate crimes. The only separate crimes which are admissible are those that are either similar or logically connected to the crime for which defendant is being tried. Crimes which are not similar or which are not logically connected to the crime for which defendant is being tried should be excluded from evidence.
(Emphasis in original.) State v. Johnson, supra at 655. Appellant's prior commission of an aggravated battery was so sufficiently similar as to become relevant to the limited non-cháracter issues of his "bent of mind" or "course of conduct" and the evidence was properly admitted for that purpose.
3. Appellant enumerates as error the trial court's failure to give a more detailed unrequested charge on the limited admissibility of the "other transactions" evidence. The record shows that the trial court gave the standard charge on this issue, which charge was in substantial conformity with that set forth in the Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions as having been approved by numerous cited appellate decisions. The only authority cited by appellant for the proposition that a trial court should give unrequested additional charges on this issue is Division 3 of Adams v. State, supra. As previously discussed, however, that division of Adams is only a physical precedent which we find to be unpersuasive. The charge, as given, was not erroneous under the controlling decisions of this court. Davis v. State, 202 Ga. 13, 20 (3) (41 SE2d 414) (1947); McKay v. State, 200 Ga. 120 (2) (a) (36 SE2d 55) (1945); Fluker v. State, 184 Ga. 809, 810 (5) (193 SE 749) (1937); Cooper v. State, 182 Ga. 42, 52 (4) (184 SE 716) (1936).
4. Appellant enumerates as error the admission into evidence of photographs of the victim of the prior aggravated battery and of Croft. The photograph of the victim of the prior aggravated battery was admitted without objection. The photographs of Croft were ad missible to rebut appellant's claim that he only hit Croft once on the chin. Brown v. State, 262 Ga. 833, 836 (9) (426 SE2d 559) (1993). Accordingly, this enumeration of error has no merit.
Judgments affirmed.
All the Justices concur, except Fletcher and Sears, JJ., who concur specially.
The crimes occurred on March 23, 1993 and appellant was indicted on August 4, 1993. The jury returned its verdicts on September 1,1993 and, on that date, the trial court entered a judgment of conviction and imposed a life sentence for the felony murder. On September 10, 1993, the trial court entered a judgment of conviction and a 12-month consecutive sentence for the simple battery. Appellant filed a timely motion for new trial which was denied on August 23, 1994. A notice of appeal was filed on September 8, 1994 and the case was docketed in this court on November 4, 1994. Oral argument was heard on February 14, 1995.