Case Name: SIGNAL PROPERTIES, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. N. Bus FARHA et al., Defendants-Appellants
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1973-07-20
Citations: 482 F.2d 1136
Docket Number: No. 72-3375
Parties: SIGNAL PROPERTIES, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. N. Bus FARHA et al., Defendants-Appellants.
Judges: 
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 482
Pages: 1136–1140

Head Matter:
SIGNAL PROPERTIES, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. N. Bus FARHA et al., Defendants-Appellants.
No. 72-3375.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
July 20, 1973.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 14, 1973.
Gerald Sawatzky, Wichita, Kan., J. Michael Willatt, Houston, Tex., for def endants-appellants.
C. Michael Gallman, O. Otis Bakke, Houston, Tex., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before AINSWORTH, GODBOLD and CLARK, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM:
On December 5, 1971, N. Bus Parha and other parties holding record title to a certain tract of land in Galveston County, Texas, brought an action in Sedgwick County, Kansas, against Signal Properties, Inc., seeking to recover the reasonable value of Signal's use and occupation of the land. Signal purchased the property in 1964 from a third party who had purportedly acquired title to the property by adverse possession. No question is here raised as to the Kansas Court's personal or subject matter jurisdiction of this action. On February 11, 1972, Signal filed a trespass to try title action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas and procured from that court an injunction prohibiting the Farhas from bringing the pending Kansas court action to trial. Since such an injunction was not in aid of the district court's jurisdiction, it was barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2283 and cannot stand.
It may well be, and we assume arguendo, that this trespass to try title proceeding is an in rem, proceeding or a quasi in rem proceeding. See Reed v. Turner, 489 S.W.2d 373 (Tex.Civ.App. 1972); State v. Bryan, 210 S.W.2d 455 (Tex.Civ.App.1948), writ refused n.r.e.; cf. Lefkowitz v. McQuagge, 296 F.2d 50 (5th Cir. 1961). Under this assumption, the federal court first acquired jurisdiction of the res — the title to the land. (The Kansas proceeding is conceded by all to have been an in personam action.) Thus, other courts are excluded from exercising jurisdiction which would interfere with the federal's possession and control of the property. See Miller v. Miller, 423 F.2d 145 (10th Cir. 1970). In two in rem or quasi in rem proceedings this factor could be dispositive; however, the Kansas in personam action cannot result in any judgment or decree which would interfere with the constructive possession of the federal court.
A court may properly adjudicate rights in property in the possession of another court and may render any judgment "not in conflict with that court's authority to decide questions within its jurisdiction and to make effective such decisions by its control of the property." United States v. Klein, 303 U.S. 276, 58 S.Ct. 536, 82 L.Ed. 840 (1938). See also Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490, 66 S.Ct. 296, 90 L.Ed. 256 (1946); Princess Lida of Thurn and Taxis v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456, 59 S.Ct. 275, 83 L.Ed. 285 (1939); United States v. Certified Industries, Inc., 361 F.2d 857 (2d Cir. 1966); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 376 U.S. 398, 84 S.Ct. 923, 11 L.Ed.2d 804 (1964); Albuquerque National Bank v. Citizens National Bank, 212 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1954); Purcell v. Summers, 126 F.2d 390 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 640, 63 S.Ct. 32, 87 L.Ed. 516 (1942).
While such title issues as are first determined by the Kansas court may become binding on the parties to the Texas District Court action under the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel if properly set up by plea in the latter court, the mere act of resolving those disputed issues which are common to both proceedings in Kansas will not disturb the Texas District Court's constructive possession or control of the land. An irreconcilable conflict between the state and federal judiciaries would only arise if both sought to exercise authority to dispose of the same res. See 1A J. Moore, Federal Practice fifí 0.222 and 0.223.
Section 2283 was enacted to limit federal injunctions of state court proceedings in ordinary litigation between private litigants to those situations necessary to avoid unseemly conflict between state and federal courts. It is entitled to a strict construction. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.S. 281, 90 S.Ct. 1739, 26 L.Ed.2d 234 (1970); Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220, 77 S.Ct. 287, 1 L.Ed.2d 267 (1957). It is well settled that the statute's prohibition cannot be evaded by addressing the order to the parties rather than to the state court. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, supra. Since this injunction does not come within any of the statute's specifically defined exceptions, it must be vacated. The cause is remanded to the district court for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith.
Vacated and remanded.