Case Name: SMITH v. STANDARD OIL COMPANY
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1971-01-07
Citations: 227 Ga. 268
Docket Number: 26222
Parties: SMITH v. STANDARD OIL COMPANY.
Judges: All the Justices concur, except Grice, Felton, and Hawes, JJ., who dissent.
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 227
Pages: 268–279

Head Matter:
26222.
SMITH v. STANDARD OIL COMPANY.

Opinion:
Undercofler, Justice.
The Standard Oil Company, a division of Chevron Oil Company, as transferee, filed a petition seeking specific performance of an option contract wherein the defendant had agreed to convey described real property upon payment of $15,000. A motion to dismiss for failure to._st-a.te a claim was filed and overruled by the trial judge. This court affirmed such ruling on appeal. See Smith v. Standard Oil Co., 226 Ga. 339 (175 SE2d 14). Thereafter the plaintiff moved for a summary judgment.
The defendant's affidavit filed in opposition to the motion for summary judgment stated that the option contract was delivered to the optionee subject to the condition that her husband approve it and his approval was not obtained. The plaintiff moved to strike this portion of the defendant's affidavit on the ground that the facts set out in the affidavit constitute parol contemporaneous evidence which contradicts or varies the terms of the written option set out in the complaint; and that parol contemporaneous evidence is inadmissible to contradict or vary the terms of this option. The trial court sustained the motion to strike, found that there was no material issue of fact, and granted the plaintiff a summary judgment. This appeal is from that judgment. Held:
1. The appellant contends that the option contract is unenforceable because the delivery thereof to the optionee was conditioned on the approval of her husband and that his approval was not obtained.
The evidence in this case shows that the appellant executed a written option agreeing to sell certain described property. The option agreement contains the following provisions: "That the seller, for and in consideration of the sum of one dollar, to her in hand paid'at'and before the sealing and delivery of these presents, the receipt and sufficiency whereof is hereby acknowledged, has granted, bargained, sold and delivered, and by these presents does grant, bargain, sell and deliver unto the said purchaser, his heirs and assigns, an option to purchase under terms and conditions hereinafter set out . . . This option shall be for a period beginning this date and ending at midnight at the end of the day on the 31st October, 1968 . . . Time is of the essence of this contract."
This case is controlled by the principle, known as the "parol evidence rule," that a valid written contract, which is complete, and the terms of which are not ambiguous, can not be contradicted, added to, altered, or varied by parol agreements. Stonecypher v. Ga. Power Co., 183 Ga. 498, 501 (189 SE 13); Code § 38-501, 20-704.
The contention of the appellant that the option was delivered on condition that her husband approve it is inconsistent and at variance with the written option which clearly states that the instrument for a valid consideration had been delivered and that the option "shall be for a period beginning this date."
In the unanimous opinion of this court in Bass Dry Goods Co. v. Granite City Manufacturing Co., 119 Ga. 124, 127 (45 SE 980) we said: "Whether the firm or Arnold was the principal was in dispute; but that being once settled, the terms of the sale were in writing, and parol evidence was inadmissible to vary the written instrument, and to convert what appeared to be an absolute sale into one conditioned upon Arnold's approval."
Although it was said in Hansford v. Freeman, 99 Ga. 376 (27 SE 706) that, "It is no contradiction oí a written agreement, which does not of itself purport to have been delivered, to assert its non-delivery, and, therefore, parol evidence is admissible to disprove the fact of delivery," this rule has no application to the instant case where the written option recites the delivery. To the same effect is Moore v. Farmers' Mutual Ins. Assn., 107 Ga. 199, 201 (33 SE 65), wherein it was also stated, "The evidence admitted did not in any way alter any stipulation in the paper claimed by the plaintiff to be a contract of insurance."
This court stated in Lee v. Garland, 208 Ga. 251 (1) (66 SE2d 223): "The whole tenor of the petition in the case at bar is to change by parol an absolute unconditional promissory note into a conditional obligation; and that can not be done in the absence of fraud, accident, or mistake, the allegation of which must always be full and explicit. Lester v. Fowler, 43 Ga. 190; Haley v. Evans, 60 Ga. 157; Hirsch v. Oliver, 91 Ga. 554 (18 SE 354); Lunsford v. Malsby, 101 Ga. 39 (28 SE 496); Bullard v. Brewer, 118 Ga. 918 (45 SE 711); Johnson v. Nisbet, 137 Ga. 150 (72 SE 915); Probasco v. Shaw, 144 Ga. 416 (87 SE 466). In other words, where parties have reduced to writing what appears to be a complete and certain agreement, it will in the absence of fraud, accident, or mistake be conclusively presumed that the writing contains the entire contract. Bullard v. Brewer, supra. 'It is in vain to have writings, if parties can be allowed deliberately to reduce a contract to writing and then set up by parol a totally different contract.' Haley v. Evans, supra. It is true, of course, that the maker of a note, when sued, has the right to show by parol, if he can, a want or failure of consideration, but he will not be allowed to prove that his obligation to pay was dependent or conditional upon the promisee's compliance with a prior or contemporaneous agreement not expressed in the note, unless the execution of the note was induced by fraud, accident, or mistake. Lester v. Fowler, supra; Howard v. Stephens, 52 Ga. 448; Goodman v. Fleming, 57 Ga. 350; Dixon v. Bond, 18 Ga. App. 45 (88 SE 825). In the present case, it is not alleged that any prior or contemporaneous agreement making payment of the note contingent on the happening of some future event was omitted from the note either by fraud, accident, or mistake. As to that the petition is wholly silent, and in the absence of such an allegation we must and will presume conclusively that the note in question correctly speaks the contract."
It follows that the parol evidence is inadmissible in this case to change the terms of the written option.
2. The appellant contends that the validity of the transfer of the option to the appellee is a material issue of fact raised by her pleadings and therefore summary judgment should not have been granted. The appellee in its affidavits showed the transfer of the option to it. The appellant further contends that she was denied the right of cross examination of the affiants and that this created a material issue of fact barring a summary judgment.
"When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this section, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this section, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him." Ga. L. 1966, pp. 609, 661 (Code Ann. §81A-156 (e)). The appellant did not respond by affidavit or otherwise setting forth specific facts showing that there was a genuine issue for trial.
"Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavits facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just." Ga. L. 1966, pp. 609, 661 (Code Ann. §81A-156 (f)). The appellant made no such showing.
There is no merit in these contentions of the appellant.
3. The appellant's contention that there is no proof of the corporate existence of the appellee is without merit. This was not made an issue in the trial as is required by Ga. L. 1966, pp. 609, 620 (Code Ann. §81A-109 (a)), which provides: "When a party desires to raise an issue as to the legal existence of any party or the capacity of any party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity, he shall do so by specific negative averment, which shall include such supporting particulars as are peculiarly within the pleader's knowledge."
4. In her affidavit in opposition to the motion for summary judgment the appellant states that she was unable to read the option when it was presented to her for signature due to her faulty eyesight; that she did not have her magnifying glass with her at that time but signed it only on the representations and assurances given to her; that as soon as she arrived at her home, she obtained her magnifying glass, and with that aid was able to read the option; and that she found it did not contain the reservations and conditions she had been led by the optionee to believe were in it.
In Morrison v. Roberts, 195 Ga. 45 (23 SE2d 164), this court held: "Where one who can read signs a contract without apprising himself of its contents, otherwise than by accepting representations made by the opposite party, with whom there exists no fiduciary or confidential relation, he can not defend an action based on it, or have it canceled or reformed, on the ground that it does not contain the contract actually made, unless it should appear that at the time he signed it some such emergency existed as would excuse his failure to read it, or that his failure to read it was brought about by some misleading artifice or device perpetrated by the opposite party, amounting to actual fraud such as would reasonably prevent him from reading it. [Citations]." The fact that the appellant did not have her magnifying glass with her would not justify her failure to read the instrument since no emergency was shown making it necessary that she sign it without delay. Lewis v. Foy, 189 Ga. 596 (6 SE2d 788); Thomas v. Eason, 208 Ga. 822 (69 SE2d 729).
Argued December 15, 1970
Decided January 7, 1971
Rehearing denied January 29 and February 15, 1971.
Robert H. Herndon, for appellant.
Dickens & Hall, G. L. Dickens, Jr., for appellee.
The grant of summary judgment in favor of the appellee was not error for any reason assigned.
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur, except Grice, Felton, and Hawes, JJ., who dissent.