Case Name: SMITH v. SMITH
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1907-06-14
Citations: 104 N.Y.S. 1106
Docket Number: 
Parties: SMITH v. SMITH.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 104
Pages: 1106–1113

Head Matter:
(120 App. Div. 278)
SMITH v. SMITH.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
June 14, 1907.)
1. Easements—Termination—Merger.
Where easements over one tract of land for the benefit of another existed and both tracts come into the hands of one person, the easements were thereby extinguished, and he, in conveying the tracts to others, could create easements over one for the benefit of the other or not, as he chose.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 17, Easements, § 75.]
2. Same—Creation—Implication.
Where the owner of both the lots abutting upon a proposed street and the bed of the street conveyed the lots by a description bounding them by the street, describing it as Avenue A, the purchaser and his grantees have an easement of light, air, and access over the land in the street abutting upon the lots.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 17, Easements, §§ 56-58.]
3. Same.
Where the conveyances through which a party derived title to land abutting on a street and the bed of the street expressly referred to a map on which the street was laid out, and there was in existence at the time an official map showing the street, mention in his conveyance of the land abutting upon the street to another, that it was bounded by the street, had the same effect, so far as the grant of an easement in the street is concerned, as if the map showing the street had been referred to.
4. Same—Extinguishment.
Where the owner of both the land abutting upon a proposed street and the bed of the street conveyed the land by a description bounding it by the street, thereby creating an easement in the street for the benefit of his grantees, the easement was not affected by the discontinuance of the street by public authority.
McLaughlin and Houghton, JJ., dissenting.
Appeal from Special Term, New York County.
Action by John R. Smith against Rebecca Smith. From a judgment dismissing the complaint, plaintiff appeals.
Reversed, and new trial granted.
Argued before PATTERSON, P. J., and McLAUGHLIN, LAUGHLIN, HOUGHTON, and SCOTT, JJ.
Richmond Weed, for appellant.
Leonard J. Obermeier, for respondent.

Opinion:
SCOTT, J.
In this action the plaintiff seeks to enforce private easements of light, air, and access over lands belonging to defendant immediately in front of and abutting upon lands belonging to plaintiff, and from a judgment dismissing his complaint upon the merits the plaintiff appeals.
The plaintiff owns four lots of land in the city of New York, which, taken together, contain 100 feet on 103d street, extending back 100 feet 9 inches to the middle of the block between 103d and 104th streets, and bounded on the east by a line which once constituted the westerly line of Avenue A as projected on the official city map. The defendant owns the land lying directly to the east of plaintiff's property; her land being what formerly constituted the westerly half of the bed of Avenue A, as shown on said official map. It is not disputed that Avenue A was laid out as a street in 1807 by commissioners appointed under an act of the Legislature. In 1841 a private owner's map was made by Francis Nicholson, city surveyor, and filed with the land records of the city of New York. This map corresponds as to streets and avenues with the official city map, above mentioned, and on both maps the property now owned by plaintiff is shown as bounded on its easterly side by the property designated as Avenue A, now owned by defendant. The common source of title was one James S. L. Cummins, who owned both parcels of land in 1869. He derived his title by a series of conveyances from one Andrew McGowan, who conveyed the property (with numerous other lots) by a description which referred to the Nicholson map, giving the map numbers of the lots as shown on said map, and bounding the lots by the streets and avenues shown on that map (including Avenue A). The deed from McGowan, as well as those which followed it, to and including the deed to Cummins, embraced "all the right, title, and interest of the parties of the first part in all the undivided one-half of all the streets and avenues in point of and adjoining the premises above described," and in all of the said deeds, except the one to Cummins, the words of grant were followed by the qualifications, "subject to the use of the lands laid down on said map as public streets and avenues by all the owners of the lots laid down on said map, and by the public generally as public streets and avenues according to said map." It appears to be quite clear that plaintiff can base no claim against defendant by reason of the limitations above quoted. Wheeler v. Clark, 58 N. Y. 267. The effect of the conveyance to Cummins was that he acquired title both to the lots now owned by plaintiff and to the westerly part of Avenue A, and as between these two properties he could create easements over one part for the ben efit of the other or not, as he chose. The description of the property conveyed in his immediate deed, and in those which preceded it in the chain of title, imported notice to him, however, that the streets and avenues by which the lots were bounded were intended to be used at some time as public streets. The plaintiff's rights, if any, must rest upon the conveyance by which Cummins disposed of the property. In 1869 Cummins executed a mortgage to the Equitable Life Assurance Society of 13 lots (including those now owned by plaintiff), in which he bounded them on the easterly side by the westerly side of Avenue A. He thus retained in himself the fee title of the westerly half of the roadbed of Avenue A, and the sole question in the case is whether he incumbered that fee with private easements of light, air, and access in favor of the lots specifically covered by the mortgage, and which abutted upon the avenue. This mortgage was afterwards foreclosed; and, since the referee's deed relates back to the mortgage and conveys all the title that the mortgagor had, we may most conveniently treat the mortgage as a deed of conveyance by Cummins. The case presented, therefore, is that Cummins, owning both the lots abutting upon a proposed street and the bed of the street, conveys the lots by a description bounding them by the avenue, describing it as Avenue A.
I do not understand that it is proposed at this late day to question the rule, firmly established by a multitude of authorities and succintly stated in Lord v. Atkins, 138 N. Y. 184, 33 N. E. 1035, as follows:
"When the owner o£ land lays it out into distinct lots with intersecting streets and avenues, and sells the lots with reference to such streets, his grantees or successors cannot afterwards be deprived of the benefit of having such streets kept open. When in such case a lot is sold bounded on a street, a purchaser and his grantees have an easement in the said street for the purposes of access, which is a property right."
And the same result follows where the streets and avenues have been laid out on a public or official map adopted by the parties as defining the limits and location of the property conveyed. Matter of Eleventh Ave., 81 N. Y. 436; Village of Olean v. Steyner, 135 N. Y. 341-345, 32 N. E. 9, 17 L. R. A. 640; Kerrigan v. Backus, 69 App. Div. 329, 74 N. Y. Supp. 906; White's Bank of Buffalo v. Nichols, 64 N. Y. 73. The easement thus impliedly granted is quite distinct from any public right to use the streets and avenues, and is a property right of which the owner cannot be deprived except by condemnation or purchase. It is suggested, however, that the rule of law above quoted has no application to the present case, because Cummins in his mortgage, made no reference to any map or plan on which Avenue A was laid down. This, as I consider, is of no importance. Cummins was bound to know his own title, and, so knowing it, he must have known that the several conveyances through which he derived title had expressly referred to the Nicholson map. Furthermore, there was in existence at the time the mortgage was made the official map showing Avenue A laid out precisely as it was laid out on the Nicholson map. When Cummins described the lots covered by his mortgage as running "along the westerly side of Avenue A," he. must of necessity have intended Avenue A as laid down on the Nich olson map or the official map, for it was only on those maps (and the tax map) that Avenue A had at that time any existence. Under the circumstances existing at the time of the mortgage, the mention of Avenue A as a boundary must be deemed to have the same effect, so far as the grant of an easement is concerned, as if the map showing that avenue had been expressly referred to.
Much reliance is placed by the respondent upon Matter of Brook Ave., 40 App. Div. 517, 58 N. Y. Supp. 163, affirmed on opinion below, 161 N. Y. 622, 55 N. E. 1093. While there are undoubtedly expressions in that opinion which, read alone, would seem to favor the respondent's contention, the question herein presented was not presented, and consequently was not intended to be decided. The controversy there was over the payment of an award for opening the avenue; and all that was decided was that the owner of the abutting lots was entitled to no part of the award, because by the opening of the avenue he received all that his deed entitled him to—that is, that the avenue should be opened and kept open as a public street—in this regard following Matter of 116th Street, 1 App. Div. 439, 37 N. Y. Supp. 508, and City of Buffalo v. Pratt, 131 N. Y. 293, 30 N. E. 233, 15 L. R. A. 413, 27 Am. St. Rep. 592. Other cases are cited to us as tending in one way or another to qualify or limit the general rule upon which the plaintiff's case rests. It is unnecessary to discuss or distinguish them at length, as that has already been done by the Court of Appeals in Holloway v. Southmayd, 139 N. Y. 390, 34 N. E. 1047, 1052. It appears in this case that Avenue A was never opened or worked as a public street; and that after the making of the Cummins mortgage, and before its foreclosure, the Legislature by an act (chapter 494, p. 573, Laws 1875) altered the map of the city by striking therefrom Avenue A at this point. This, as I consider, had no effect upon the plaintiff's claim to enforce the private easement such as was included in and covered by the mortgage. Such an easement, as has frequently been held, is property; and is, by its very nature, as indestructible by the acts of the public authorities or of the grantees of the premises as is the estate which is the subject of the grant, and to which the easement is appurtenant. Holloway v. Southmayd, 139 N. Y. 402, 34 N. E. 1047, 1052. The often cited case of White's Bank of Buffalo v. Nichols, 64 N. Y. 65, is closely in point. In that case the defendant had acquired a private easement over Garden street, as laid out on a certain map, because the conveyance under which he held had bounded his lot by the street, then only shown on a map, but not opened or even staked out. Thereafter the street was narrowed by municipal authority, leaving a strip of land between defendant's property, as described in his deed with reference to the original line of the street, and the line of the street as narrowed and actually acquired and opened. The Court of Appeals held that, while the fee title to this strip remained in the original grantors or their successors, yet that the defendant's private easement in and over it remained unimpaired by reason of the refusal of the public authorities to open it as a public street to its full original width, saying:
"When land is granted bounded on a street or highway, there is an implied covenant that there is such a way, that so far as the grantee is concerned it shall be continued, and that the grantee, his heirs and assigns shall have the benefit of it"
And again:
"Neither the corporation of the city, or the state authorities, or the grantor, can do any act to impair this right or restrict the grantee in the enjoyment of it."
Upon the undisputed facts the plaintiff was entitled to relief, and the judgment should therefore be reversed and a new trial granted, with costs to the appellant to abide the event.
PATTERSON, P. J., and LAUGHLIN, J., concur.