Case Name: COMMONWEALTH LAND TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, Petitioner, v. Kenneth HIGGINS and Deete Higgins, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Respondents
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2008-03-06
Citations: 975 So. 2d 1169
Docket Number: No. 1D07-0946
Parties: COMMONWEALTH LAND TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, Petitioner, v. Kenneth HIGGINS and Deete Higgins, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Respondents.
Judges: BENTON, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 975
Pages: 1169–1183

Head Matter:
COMMONWEALTH LAND TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, Petitioner, v. Kenneth HIGGINS and Deete Higgins, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Respondents.
No. 1D07-0946.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
March 6, 2008.
Mark A. Brown, Joseph Hagedorn Lang, Jr., and Marty J. Solomon of Carlton Fields, P.A., Tampa, for Petitioner.
P. Scott Russell, IV, of P. Scott Russell, P.A., Jacksonville; Stanley M. Grossman, D. Brian Hufford, and Robert J. Axelrod of Pomerantz, Haudek, Block, Grossman & Gross, LLP, New York; and Jeffrey M. Liggio of Liggio, Benrubi & Williams, P.A., West Palm Beach, for Respondents.

Opinion:
VAN NORTWICK, J.
Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company has filed a petition for writ of certiorari seeking this court's review of an order granting a motion to compel discovery filed by Kenneth E. Higgins and Deete Higgins, respondents and plaintiffs below. The respondents sued Commonwealth on their own behalf and on behalf of a putative class of homeowners, alleging that they were not provided a discounted title insurance rate, known as the "reissue rate," for which they may have been eligible when they refinanced their homes for the period July 1, 1999 to the present. The question presented here is whether the trial court abused its discretion when, prior to a class certification determination, it ordered, in effect, full merits discovery of all "documents concerning, referring or relating to title insurance reissue rates" in the possession of Commonwealth and approximately 1,000 of its independent title insurance agents. We find that Commonwealth introduced uncontradicted evidence demonstrating that the precertification discovery requested is unduly burdensome and will result in irreparable injury at this stage of the litigation; and that the trial court departed from the essential requirements in ordering full merits discovery of the closing files of Commonwealth and its agents. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion and grant certiorari relief.
Factual and Procedural Background
In their putative class action suit, the respondents raise claims of breach of third party beneficiary contract and unjust enrichment on behalf of themselves and others who did not receive a discounted title insurance reissue rate when they refinanced their home mortgages. Common wealth is a title insurance underwriter, licensed to sell title insurance in the State of Florida. See § 627.7711(3), Fla. Stat. (2003). The respondents allege that they were entitled to receive the statutory reissue premium rate for title insurance from Commonwealth, pursuant to section 627.7825(27), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 690-186.003, when they refinanced their mortgage on June 6, 2003. The respondents assert that under section 627.780, Florida Statutes (2003), a title insurance company and its agents are prohibited from deviating from the rates established by Florida law. The complaint alleges that Commonwealth "has a non-delegable duty associated with the sale of title insurance . to calculate the correct premium;" that the actions of Commonwealth's agents involved in the sale of title insurance are attributable to Commonwealth;, that Commonwealth "systematically failed to train its sales and other agents, employees, apparent agents, and representatives adequately concerning the applicability of the reissue rates that should have been made available to" the respondents and the other members of the class; and that, in the course of conducting title searches on the property of the respondents and other class members, Commonwealth would have learned that the parties were refinancing their mortgages.
The complaint further alleges that when the respondents purchased their home in 1999 they obtained an owner's title insurance policy from Commonwealth. When they refinanced their mortgage loan in 2003, the new lender obtained a lender's title insurance from Commonwealth under which the respondents were third party beneficiaries. At the time of the 2003 refinancing, the respondents were charged and paid at closing a premium of $1,390.00, which is the full premium based upon the applicable initial loan rate under Florida law. The reissue rate applicable to refinancing of their home, however, was $819.00. Thus, according to the complaint, Commonwealth overcharged the respondents by $571.00 in 2003.
The respondents filed requests for production and sets of interrogatories seeking, among other things, "documents concerning, referring, or relating to title insurance reissue rates." Commonwealth objected to each request and interrogatory and ultimately filed a Motion for Protective Order. In this motion, Commonwealth stated that complying with the discovery requests "would be a monumental task" because Commonwealth has over 1,000 independent agents who issue hundreds of policies each year. Commonwealth further claimed it had "no practicable systematic method for locating such documentation within agents' files because each agent documents its files in its own way, and such documentation is not ordinarily provided by the agent to Commonwealth." Commonwealth further stated:
While Commonwealth recognizes that there is likely some documentation in these files that may be relevant to the class certification issues in this case, the overwhelming burden presented by review of independent agents' files is not justified in light of the relationship between these documents and the burden Plaintiffs bear on their anticipated motion for class certification.
Commonwealth asserted that, although some documents in the agents' files would show that some transactions involved consumers eligible for the reissue rate who were not told of their right thereto, "the individual issues of what unnamed members of the putative class knew and were told overwhelm any common issues in this case" and "this documentation cannot assist Plaintiffs in carrying their burden on class certification" because "Plaintiffs could carry that burden only by demonstrating that there is a method whereby, at trial, they could prove their own case and simultaneously prove the case of each unnamed member of the putative class." Commonwealth concludes, "In other words, only by demonstrating that they do not need these documents could Plaintiffs prevail on the issue of class certification."
In support of its Motion for a Protective Order, Commonwealth introduced an affidavit of the Florida general counsel for Land America Financial Group, Inc., Commonwealth's parent corporation. This affidavit shows that Commonwealth does not maintain the closing files which contain the requested documents. Rather, the files are maintained by 1,073 title insurance agents which are separate, distinct, and independent entities from Commonwealth, including 445 lawyers and law firms in Florida. These agents and the requested documents are located in separate facilities in 168 cities throughout Florida. In response to the discovery request, Commonwealth produced a CD-Rom containing the equivalent of 6,155 pages of Excel spreadsheets detailing the agent number, policy number, policy date, amount of insurance, type of premium (i.e. original or reissue), and amount of premium for each of the 319,744 non-simultaneously issued loan policies from July 1999 (the beginning of the putative class period) through April 2006 (when the data were generated). The affidavit further states that, based on the experience of the affiant in the title insurance industry, the issuance of non-simultaneously issued loan policies "most often suggest[] a financing transaction." As a result, the affidavit states that the respondents are seeking production of approximately 319,744 loan closing files in the possession of the independent title agents. The affiant explained that the respondents' loan closing file produced below contains 216 pages of documents, which, in affiant's view, is not unusual in size. Thus, if each of the 319,774 closing files contains an average of 216 pages, the discovery request involves 69,064,704 pages of documents.
The respondents then filed a Motion to Compel Discovery from Defendant. A hearing occurred and, in an order rendered on January 26, 2007, the trial court granted the motion to compel. The subject order directs Commonwealth to "forthwith respond fully and completely to interrogatories and request for production at issue on this motion." The order further provides: "To the extent that information sought can not be derived except by review of paper files, [Commonwealth] may implement alternatives which have been suggested by Plaintiffs through counsel in their discussions and correspondence with [Commonwealth], including producing files to Plaintiffs so that Plaintiffs may review the files themselves." Commonwealth now seeks relief in the form of a writ of certiorari.
PreceHification Discovery
Under rule 1.220(d)(1), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, a court "may order postponement of the determination [of class certification] pending the completion of discovery concerning whether the claim or defense is maintainable on behalf of a class." As a general rule, however, precertification discovery should be limited to matters relevant to class certification, not the merits of the case. Policastro v. Stelk, 780 So.2d 989, 991 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001); see also Baptist Hosp. of Miami v. DeMario, 683 So.2d 641, 643 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)(granting a petition for certiorari, quashing the trial court's order denying petitioner's motion for protective order, and remanding with directions that the trial court stay merits discovery "pending its determination of [respondent's] standing to serve as the class representative"); and Taran v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 685 So.2d 1004, 1006 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)(affirming denial of full merits discovery pending determination of plaintiffs' standing, citing Baptist Hosp.).
Further, federal courts have frequently restricted precertification discovery to class certification matters and otherwise limited the scope and burden of such discovery. As a federal court has observed:
Certainly, class determination is preferable before substantial discovery on the merits has been conducted. Where the plaintiffs seek to represent a large national class on a broad spectrum of [issues], discovery can require immense commitments of time, money and resources and involve innumerable documents and records. Neither party would benefit from such extensive expenditures when it could have been determined in the early stages that a class action was not appropriate or that the class must be more limited in scope than originally alleged by the plaintiffs.
Karan v. Nabisco, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 388, 396 (W.D.Pa.1978); see also Washington v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 959 F.2d 1566, 1570-71 (11th Cir.1992)("To make early class determination practicable and to best serve the ends of fairness and efficiency, courts may allow classwide discovery on the certification issue and postpone classwide discovery on the merits"); Steioart v. Winter, 669 F.2d 328, 331 (5th Cir.1982)("In light of the mandate of Rule 23(c)(1) that a certification determination be made '(a)s soon as practicable after the commencement of (the) action,' we think it imperative that the district court be permitted to limit pre-certification discovery to evidence that, in its sound judgment, would be 'necessary or helpful' to the certification decision."); Grigsby v. North Mississippi Med. Ctr., Inc., 586 F.2d 457, 460 (5th Cir.1978)(distriet court "acted well within its discretion in circumscribing plaintiffs' request [to class certification matters] to prevent an undue burden on defendants").
We recognize that there is not always a bright line between issues relating to class certification and issues relating to the merits of a claim or defense. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 & n. 12, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978)(reasoning that "the class determination generally involves considerations that are 'enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiffs cause of action' " and that " '[evaluation of many of the questions entering into determination of class action questions is intimately involved with the merits of the claims'" (quoting Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, 558, 83 S.Ct. 520, 9 L.Ed.2d 523 (1963); see generally, 15 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3911, at 485 n. 45 (1976)). Here, Commonwealth acknowledges that the files sought may contain some information relevant to class certification, although it asserts that discovery of all of the files is not necessary for class certification and is overly burdensome. Especially in the context of precer-tification discovery, the trial court must balance the need to discover facts relevant to class certification issues with the burdens imposed by the discovery request. To achieve this balance,
[t]he discovery permitted must be sufficiently broad in order that the plaintiffs have a realistic opportunity to meet these [class certification] requirements; at the same time, the defendant must be protected from discovery which is overly burdensome, irrelevant, or which invades privileged or confidential areas. Discovery is not to be used as a weapon, nor must discovery on the merits be completed precedent to class certification.
National Organization for Women, Farmington Valley Chapter v. Sperry Rand Corp., 88 F.R.D. 272, 277 (D.C.Conn.1980) (citation omitted).
The Manual for Complex Litigation provides practical guidance for a court faced with substantial precertification discovery:
Some precertification discovery may be necessary if the allegations in the pleadings — with affidavits, declarations, and arguments or representations of counsel — do not provide sufficient, reliable information. To make this decision, the court should encourage counsel to confer and stipulate as to relevant facts that are not genuinely disputed, to reduce the extent of precertification discovery, and to refíne the pertinent issues for deciding class certification....
It is often useful . to require a specific and detailed precertification discovery plan from the parties. The plan should identify the depositions and other discovery contemplated, as well as the subject matter to be covered and the reason it is material to determining the certification inquiry under Rule 23.... If some merits discovery is permitted during the precertification period, consider limits that minimize the time and effort involved, such as requiring the use of questionnaires or interrogatories rather than depositions, and consider limiting discovery to a certain number or a sample of proposed class members.
Manual for Complex Litigation (4th) § 21.14 (2006).
In limiting precertification discovery, courts recognize the cost of compliance that may be imposed on the party responding to discovery. Judge Frank H. Easterbrook has observed that discovery is not only "a tool for uncovering facts essential to accurate adjudication," but also "a weapon capable of imposing large and unjustifiable costs on one's adversary." Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U.L. Rev. 635, 636 (1989). Since the costs of compliance are usually borne by the responding party, a party making burdensome discovery requests can improve its negotiation position by maximizing those costs. "The prospect of these higher costs leads the other side to settle on favorable terms." Id.
Certiorari Review
Discovery orders granting over-broad, unduly burdensome, or oppressive discovery are traditionally reviewed by certiorari. See Horne v. Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade County, 901 So.2d 238, 240 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)("0rders granting discovery requests have traditionally been reviewed by certiorari because once discovery is wrongfully granted, the complaining party is beyond relief' (citation omitted)); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Cooey, 359 So.2d 1200, 1201 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978)(stat-ing "[i]t is well established that interlocutory orders rendered in connection with discovery proceedings may be reviewed by common law certiorari when petitioner can demonstrate that the order complained of does not conform to the essential requirements of law and may cause material injury through subsequent proceedings for which remedy by appeal will be inadequate," and granting certiorari quashing discovery order). Review by certiorari is appropriate when a discovery order departs from the essential requirements of law, causing material injury of an irreparable nature which cannot be remedied on appeal from a final order. Martin-Johnson, Inc. v. Savage, 509 So.2d 1097, 1099 (Fla.1987); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Langston, 655 So.2d 91, 94 (Fla.1995). "[A]s a condition precedent to invoking a district court's certiorari jurisdiction, the petitioning party must establish that it has suffered an irreparable harm that cannot be remedied on direct appeal." Jaye v. Royal Saxon, Inc., 720 So.2d 214, 215 (Fla.1998). Thus, the reviewing court must first conduct a jurisdictional analysis to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie showing of the element of irreparable harm. See, e.g., Parkway Bank v. Fort Myers Armature Works, Inc., 658 So.2d 646, 649 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (court must first determine jurisdictional requirements of (1) an irreparable injury, (2) that cannot be corrected by plenary appeal, before deciding whether petitioner has shown departure from essential requirements of law); accord Bared & Co., Inc. v. McGuire, 670 So.2d 153, 156 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Beekie v. Morgan, 751 So.2d 694 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000).
In support of certiorari review, Commonwealth argues that the discovery ordered is overly broad and unduly burdensome causing irreparable harm and that the relevance of the requested documents to the class certification issue is not sufficient to justify the burden of attempting to review and produce them at the precertification stage of the litigation.
The uncontradicted evidence in this record establishes that for Commonwealth and the non-party title insurance agents the burden of collecting the requested closing files would be immense. For the 445 attorney title agents, the closing files would be required to be retrieved from storage and attorney-client privileged information in those files would have to be redacted prior to copying or producing the files. Assuming that the 445 attorney agents possess a proportionate share of the closing files, that would require 15 minutes to review each file for privileged information, and that the review could be accomplished by paralegals at a relatively low rate of $50 per hour, the cost of this privilege review alone would be $1,658,675. Finally, assuming a conservative copying cost of 10 cents per page, the cost of simply copying the closing files would exceed $6.9 million.
Florida courts have declined to grant certiorari relief from orders allowing pre-certification merits discovery where the petitioners have failed to carry the burden of demonstrating that the order will result in irreparable injury. See, e.g., Richardson v. Gyves, 874 So.2d 658 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004); Florida Power & Light Co. v. Thomas, 838 So.2d 1240 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). Here, however, Commonwealth has amply demonstrated that the appellees' discovery request is unduly burdensome and will result in irreparable injury.
Similarly, in Union Fidelity Life Insurance Company v. Seay, 378 So.2d 1268, 1269 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979), the Second District reviewed an order denying a motion for a protective order on a request for production seeking "all records concerning the denial of coverage for claims filed under a particular policy language, without limitation as to time or as to the number of claims for which records must be produced." The court granted certiorari and quashed the order, stating that "the records requested are 45,000 policies which are stored on computer software in Tre-vose, Pennsylvania. We find the production of these records to be unduly oppressive and burdensome to petitioner unless further discovery establishes such to be necessary."
Appellate courts in other jurisdictions have limited precertification discovery where the trial court granted discovery broader than necessary to establish the elements for establishing class certification. In Chimenti v. American Express Co., 97 A.D.2d 351, 467 N.Y.S.2d 357, 358 (N.Y.App.Div. 1st Dept.1983), the plaintiff filed a putative class action seeking damages from American Express based upon its alleged misrepresentations and breach of contract for failing to honor the travelers check refund policy allegedly contained in the agreement entered into on purchase of the checks. The trial court certified a class and granted broad discovery. The Appellate Division reversed the class certification and substantially limited the discovery. The court explained:
However, the discovery request approved by Special Term, directing defendant to produce the names and addresses of all potential class members throughout the United States, is unduly broad for the limited purpose of allowing plaintiff access to proof of numerosity and the existence of a class.
Id. at 359 (citation omitted).
The respondents argue that the burden imposed by the discovery sought here does not warrant certiorari relief, citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hodges, 855 So.2d 636, 639-40 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), and Topp Telecom, Inc. v. Atkins, 763 So.2d 1197, 1199-1201 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). In Topp, the court held that for the economic cost imposed by a discovery request to constitute an "undue burden," the burden must be so severe that it would "cast the recipient into financial ruin." 763 So.2d at 1200. Thus, "[a]n erroneous order compelling discovery when the cost and effort to do so is burdensome but not destructive is simply not 'sufficiently egregious or fundamental to merit the extra review and safeguard provided by certiorari.' " Id. (quoting Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So.2d 523, 531 (Fla.1995)).
Even if we were to agree that the Topp Telecom "financial ruin" test was the correct legal standard to apply generally in certiorari proceedings challenging an order allowing burdensome discovery, an issue we do not address, as the cases discussed above establish, it is not the correct standard to apply at the precertifi-cation stage of a putative class action. See Karan v. Nabisco, Inc., 78 F.R.D. at 396; see also In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litigation, 55 F.3d 768, 780 (3d Cir.1995)(noting staging of class certification and merits discovery); Stewart v. Winter, 669 F.2d at 331 ("we think it imperative that the district court be permitted to limit pre-certification discovery to evidence that, in its sound judgment, would be 'necessary or helpful' to the certification decision."); Grigsby v. N. Miss. Med. Ctr., Inc., 586 F.2d at 460(district court "acted well within its discretion in circumscribing plaintiffs' request [to class certification matters] to prevent an undue burden on defendants"); Burstein v. Applied Extrusion Techs., Inc., 153 F.R.D. 488, 491 n. 7 (D.Mass.1994)(declining to allow merits discovery during class certification discovery); Rodriguez v. Banco Central, 102 F.R.D. 897, 902-03 (D.P.R.1984)(appropriate for court to limit precertification discovery to the issue of whether the requirements of Rule 23 are met).
The respondents also cite to the decisions of other state and federal courts that have granted class certification in eases, like the case before us, that involve claims relating to an alleged failure to charge a re-issue rate for title insurance sold in a mortgage refinancing transaction. See Cohen v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 242 F.R.D. 295 (E.D.Penn.2007); Mitchell-Tracey v. United Gen. Title Ins. Co., 237 F.R.D. 551 (D.Md.2006); Dubin v. Sec. Union Title Ins. Co., 162 Ohio App.3d 97, 832 N.E.2d 815 (2005); In re Coordinated Title Ins. Cases, 2 Misc.3d 1007(A), 784 N.Y.S.2d 919 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. Jan. 8, 2004); Mitchell v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., No. CT 02-017299, 2003 WL 23786983 (Minn.Dist.Ct. Dec. 22, 2003)(unreported decision). These cases, however, do not involve a discovery order entered prior to class certification. In each of these cases, the court has certified the class and is addressing the burden of merits discovery or the manageability of the case given the task of reviewing many thousands of loan and policy transaction files. Thus, we do not find these cases persuasive with respect to precertification discovery issues. Interestingly, although these decisions do not discuss precertification discovery matters, one can infer from these decisions that precertification discovery of the refinancing files short of full merits discovery must have been undertaken to provide the factual basis for class certification.
Although we grant the petition for writ of certiorari sought by Commonwealth, our decision here does not deny respondents the discovery of the Commonwealth closing files as necessary to establish facts relating to class certification. On remand, the trial court has the discretion to limit discovery to decrease substantially the time, effort and expense involved in responding, including limiting discovery to a certain random sample of the files. See John Randall Whaley, Craig M. Freeman & Richard J. Arsenault, Precertification Discovery: A User's Guide, 80 Tul. L. Rev. 1827, 1878 (2006)("Where the defendant can prove the exorbitant cost in identifying its customers or insureds, the court may consider a random sampling that provides some information to the plaintiff."). Further, the trial court has the discretion to require the parties to jointly produce a detailed discovery plan "which prioritizes 'class' related discovery, while not depriving a plaintiff or defendant from engaging in 'merits' discovery when facts and issues are inextricably intertwined .;" In Re: Hamilton Bancorp, Inc., Sec. Litigation, No. 01CV0156, 2002 WL 463314 (S.D.Fla. Jan. 14, 2002).
BENTON, J., concurs.
KAHN, J., dissents with written opinion.
. Commonwealth's independent title insurance agents are not parties to this action and have not been heard with respect to the respondents' discovery request to produce the agents' closing files.
. Section 627.7825, Florida Statutes (2002), provides that "premium rates to be charged by title insurers . from July 1, 1999 through June 30, 2002, for title insurance contracts shall be as set forth in [the statute]." Subsection (1) governs original title insurance rates and provides the following prescribed rates:
Per Thousand
From $0 to $100,000 of liability written $5.75
From $100,000 to $1 million, add $5.00
Over $1 million to and up to $5 million, add $2.50
Over $5 million and up to $10 million, add $2.25
Over $10 million, add $2.00
Subsection (2) governs reissue rates and provides as follows:
(2) REISSUE RATES.—
(a)The reissue premium charge for owner's, mortgage, and leasehold title insurance policies shall be:
Per Thousand
Up to $100,000 of liability written $3.30
Over $100,000 and up to $1 million, add $3.00
Over $1 million and up to $10 million, add $2.00
Over $10 million, add $1.50
The minimum premium shall be $100.
(b)Provided a previous owner's policy was issued insuring the seller or the mortgagor in the current transaction and that both the reissuing agent and the reissuing underwriter retain for their respective files copies of the prior owner's policy or policies, the reissue premium rates in paragraph (a) shall apply to:
1. Policies on real property which is unimproved except for roads,, bridges, drainage facilities, and utilities if the current owner's title has been insured prior to the application for a new policy;
2. Policies issued with an effective date of less than 3 years after the effective date of the policy insuring the seller or mortgagor in the current transaction; or
3. Mortgage policies issued on refinancing of property insured by an original owner's policy which insured the title of the current mortgagor.
(c)Any amount of new insurance, in the aggregate, in excess of the amount under the previous policy shall be computed at the original owner's or leasehold rates, as provided in subsection (1) [which provides for original title insurance rates].
Section 627.7825 was repealed, see Chapter 2003-261, § 1978 at 2709, Laws of Florida, and the applicable rates after June 30, 2002 are governed by Florida Administrative Code Rule 690-186.003(2), effective July 1, 2002, which is identical in all material respects to the statute, and remains in force to the present.
.Section 627.780(1), Florida Statutes (2003), provides that "[a] person may not knowingly quote, charge, accept, collect, or receive a premium for title insurance other than the premium adopted by the commission."
. The record reflects that there is a dispute concerning whether the respondents could access the data on the CD produced by Commonwealth. From the record, the parties appear willing to work together to assure that the respondents could obtain the information on the CD.
. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.220 is based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Richardson v. Gyves, 874 So.2d 658, 659 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)(Klein, J., concurring). "When Florida rules of procedure are patterned after federal rules, Florida has a longstanding tradition of relying on federal case law." Id. (citations omitted).