Case Name: APPALACHIAN INSURANCE COMPANY, an insurance company authorized to do business in the State of Florida, Appellant, v. UNITED POSTAL SAVINGS ASSOCIATION, a Missouri corporation, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1982-10-26
Citations: 422 So. 2d 332
Docket Number: No. 81-1296
Parties: APPALACHIAN INSURANCE COMPANY, an insurance company authorized to do business in the State of Florida, Appellant, v. UNITED POSTAL SAVINGS ASSOCIATION, a Missouri corporation, Appellee.
Judges: Before NESBITT, BASKIN and DANIEL S. PEARSON, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 422
Pages: 332–335

Head Matter:
APPALACHIAN INSURANCE COMPANY, an insurance company authorized to do business in the State of Florida, Appellant, v. UNITED POSTAL SAVINGS ASSOCIATION, a Missouri corporation, Appellee.
No. 81-1296.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Oct. 26, 1982.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 16, 1982.
Ligman, Martin, Shiley & McGee, Coral Gables, Jeanne Heyward, Miami, for appellant.
Herbert A. Warren, Miami, Sibley, Giblin, Levenson & Glasser, Miami Beach, for ap-pellee.
Before NESBITT, BASKIN and DANIEL S. PEARSON, JJ.

Opinion:
DANIEL S. PEARSON, Judge.
United Postal Savings Association sued Appalachian Insurance Company, its property insurer, to recover more than a quarter of a million dollars plus interest, costs and attorneys' fees for damages to United Postal's shopping center arising from vandalism and theft. The insured alleged that the vandalism and theft occurred in the approximate four-month period between April 1 and August 3, 1978. The policy of insurance issued by Appalachian provided that United Postal was not entitled to recover under the policy unless its damages from a theft or an act of vandalism exceeded the deductible amount of $1,000. The trial court instructed the jury that it was the insured's burden to establish that any claim exceeding $1,000 was attributable to a single occurrence of theft or vandalism. The jury, apparently finding, as most certainly the evidence would have permitted it to do, that no single act of theft or vandalism caused a loss in excess of $1,000, returned a verdict for Appalachian. Deciding that its instruction erroneously placed the burden on the insured rather than the insurer, the trial court granted United Postal's motion for new trial. The insurance company appeals.
Initially, if the trial court's instruction to the jury was correct in the first instance, the grant of a new trial, based only on the perceived impropriety of the instruction, was error. We need not indulge, or defer to, the trial court's superior vantage point where all that is at stake is the propriety of a legal ruling, and the appellant need make no special showing to overturn the new trial
order. Nesbitt v. Auto-Owners Insurance Company, 390 So.2d 1209 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
The insured, primarily relying on Phoenix Insurance Co. v. Branch, 234 So.2d 396 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970), and Jewelers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Balogh, 272 F.2d 889 (5th Cir.1959), says that the burden was the insurer's, the jury instruction was incorrect, and the new trial was properly granted. However, the concern of both Phoenix and Jewelers Mutual was whether the insured had the burden to negative exceptions to an all-risk policy, or the insurer had the burden to bring itself within an exception. The rationale for placing this particular burden on the insurer was explained in Jewelers Mutual:
"If the insurer's contention is sound, then as a condition precedent to liability, the assured would have to establish by a preponderance the negative of each of these manifold exceptions. Were he required to exhaust the gamut of these provisions what had been purchased and sold as all risks insurance would turn out to be something else. Instead of the policy affording coverage against all causes of damage except those specifically excluded, it would amount only to a named perils cover since the assured to negative the exception would have to establish for this case an actual theft or some other such event not specifically excluded." 272 F.2d at 892.
In our view, this rationale is applicable only where what is at issue is the risk insured against in an all-risk policy. Where, as here, the issue is not the risk, but the application of a deductible, then the fact that the instant policy happens to be an all-risk policy is totally immaterial.
The question, then, is where the insurer does not contend that the loss arose from a cause that is excepted from the policy, and indeed, as here, concedes that the type of loss is covered, whose burden is it to show that the loss exceeds the deductible amount? We believe this court answered this question in U.S. Liability Insurance Company v. Bove, 347 So.2d 678 (Fla.3d DCA 1977). In Bove, the insured claimed a loss due to theft of jewelry to the policy limits of $16,000. The policy contained a further provision that the insurer shall not be liable for such a loss "in any one occurrence" for more than $500. The trial court placed the burden on the insurance company to show that the loss was attributable to one occurrence. Finding that the insurer failed to satisfy the burden, the trial court entered judgment for the insured. This court reversed. While acknowledging the correctness of the rule of Phoenix Insurance Co. v. Branch, supra, that "the burden is on the insurer to establish that the loss arose from a cause that is excepted from the policy," the court distinguished the issue in Phoenix from the one under consideration:
"There is no dispute between the parties that the theft is covered by the policy and defendant is not contending that plaintiff's loss arose from a cause that is excepted from the policy. The phrase 'in any one occurrence' sets no limit to the number of losses which the insured may claim, but merely sets a limitation on the coverage as to each loss. Thus, the plaintiff had the burden of proving more than a single theft occurred on April 4." U.S. Liability Insurance Company v. Bove, 347 So.2d at 680.
Similarly, where, as here, recovery under the policy is limited to a loss from a single occurrence of theft or vandalism resulting in excess of $1,000 in damages, it is the insured's burden to prove that any single theft or act of vandalism resulted in such a loss. See also Evans v. Pacific National Fire Insurance Company, 367 S.W.2d 85 (Tex.Civ.App.1963) (a deductible provision, being as much a basic part of the policy as the provision which sets the maximum amount of money recoverable under the policy, is not an affirmative defense which must be proved by the insurer).
Accordingly, we reverse the order granting a new trial and remand the cause with directions to reinstate the jury verdict in favor of Appalachian and enter judgment thereon.
. In Nesbitt, the court reversed an order granting a new trial where the reason for the grant was the trial court's mistaken view that it had incorrectly instructed the jury "not because of critical evidentiary rulings, improper conduct of a trial participant or other matters which are commonly ones which require the use of discretion on the part of the judge whose decision [in such instances] is given the greatest of deference because of his unique position." 390 So.2d at 1210.
. Phoenix relied on Jewelers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Balogh, supra, which for the reasons stated does not apply to the present case.
. Beaumont-Gribin-Von Dyl Management Co. v. California Union Insurance Co., 63 Cal. App.3d 617, 134 Cal.Rptr. 25 (1977), relied on by the insured, contains a statement, the thrust of which is that a deductibility clause must be treated as any other limitation in the policy. The context of that statement is, however, that ambiguities, wherever they appear in an insurance policy, will be construed against the insurer. The issue in that case was "whether the word 'claim' meant the individual claim of each person harmed by the insured's act, error, or omission or, the insured's claim against the insurer for the total liability incurred by reason of a single act, error, or omission on its part." (emphasis in original). That is hardly the issue in the present case.