Case Name: Dolores WERNET and Helen Golden, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. AMALGAMATED MEAT CUTTERS AND BUTCHERMEN, LOCAL 17, AFL-CIO, Defendant-Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1973-08-24
Citations: 484 F.2d 403
Docket Number: No. 72-2113
Parties: Dolores WERNET and Helen Golden, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. AMALGAMATED MEAT CUTTERS AND BUTCHERMEN, LOCAL 17, AFL-CIO, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: 
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 484
Pages: 403–407

Head Matter:
Dolores WERNET and Helen Golden, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. AMALGAMATED MEAT CUTTERS AND BUTCHERMEN, LOCAL 17, AFL-CIO, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 72-2113.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Argued June 4, 1973.
Decided Aug. 24, 1973.
Lawrence H. Curtis, Amerman, Burt & Jones Co., Canton, Ohio, on brief, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Jerry P. Hontas, Canton, Ohio, on brief, for defendant-appellee.
Before WEICK, EDWARDS and Mc-CREE, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
EDWARDS, Circuit Judge.
Appellants Wernet and Golden appeal from the dismissal after trial of their complaint against their union. They had filed complaints under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970), against Pioneer Food Company, their employer, and against the Amalgamated Meat Cutters Union.
On trial of this case plaintiffs settled their differences with Pioneer Food Company and dismissed the case as to the employer. The case continued against the union, with the evidence showing that Pioneer Food during the years 1967, 1968 and 1969 maintained two seniority lists, one for men and one for women, in order to comply with the female protective statutes of the State of Ohio then in effect, O.R.C. § 4107.-43, 4107.46 (1965). Both employees filed grievances with the union in 1968, and the second of these grievances filed by plaintiff Golden was ultimately arbitrated under the union-management contract, with the issue being resolved in favor of the company. The arbitrator relied upon the Ohio statute previously referred to.
The District Judge expressed the opinion that "the defendant union failed to adequately represent the plaintiffs, and that the allegation of the complaint that the defendant union failed to employ proper grievance procedures on behalf of the plaintiffs is well taken."
However, the District Judge also specifically found that "there was a lack of bad faith and there was an absence of an intentional wrongful act on the part of the defendant union," citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967), and Ridinger v. General Motors Corp., 325 F.Supp. 1089 (S.D.Ohio 1971).
This court has recently, of course, had occasion to deal with the defense of employers based upon good faith adherence to state female protective laws not yet found to have been violative of the federal Constitution. See United Steelworkers v. United States Steel Corp., 479 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1973); Manning v. International Union, 466 F.2d 812 (6th Cir. 1972). In Manning this Court said:
The defendant, General Motors, did not have the benefit of any judicial determination of the validity of the Ohio female protective laws until 1971, and the enforcing agency had not handed down any definitive administrative interpretation which would assist in resolving the conflict between any such state statutes and the provisions of Title VII until August 19, 1969. Under all the circumstances of this case we cannot conclude that the District Judge abused his discretion in denying back pay to these plaintiffs. Id. at 816.
In this case we reach this same result in relation to appellee union and for the same reason affirm the District Judge.
Here the only allegations which concern the union are the following:
(5) Defendant Union willfully engaged in unlawful employment practices in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, by discriminating against them because of their sex by failing to represent them in grievance procedures.

(8) Defendant Union, upon being duly informed of plaintiffs' grievances as aforementioned, failed and has continued to fail to employ proper grievance procedures on behalf of plaintiffs to remedy said discrimination, and this failure was and is discrimination on behalf of its male members.
The discrimination alleged against the union is entirely derivative in this case. It arises out of the company's alleged discriminatory maintenance of separate seniority lists for men and women.
We read the findings of the District Judge (arguably somewhat contradictory) as indicating that the union employed something less than all-out efforts on behalf of these two female members but that its lack of vigor was mitigated by reliance in good faith upon the female protection laws of Ohio which mandated the employer's separate seniority lists and which at that time had not been declared unconstitutional.
If good faith reliance upon the state female protection statute (until found unconstitutional) is a defense which a District Judge may consider in denying money damages as to the employer who created the separate seniority lists, it must likewise serve as a defense for the union from such damages for waging something less than an all-out battle on behalf of its female members in the face of an apparently valid state law.
We agree with the dissent that, as to allegations of discrimination by a union directly affecting employment (i. e., in hiring halls or apprentice programs, etc.), plaintiffs are no more required to prove "bad faith" than they are in relation to similar complaints against employers. Under Manning, supra, however, good faith reliance upon a presumptively valid state law may represent an exception to the general rule.
We note that appellants' brief appears to argue their case as if it were a breach of contract action under § 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970). No reference to § 301 was made in plaintiffs' complaint, however. Further, if this action be viewed as a § 301 complaint, it is governed by the standards of Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967), and Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 91 S.Ct. 1909, 29 L.Ed.2d 473 (1971). The standard of these two cases requires the plaintiff to prove "arbitrary or badfaith conduct on the part of the Union." Vaca v. Sipes, supra at 193 of 386 U.S., at 918 of 87 S.Ct.; Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, supra at 299 of 403 U.S., 91 S.Ct. at 1913. The District Court Judge herein rejected such a finding.
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
. Appellants in this case failed to order a transcript or present any appendix. In the absence of an appellate record, every reasonable assumption should be indulged in favor of the court's decree. See Fraser v. Doing, 130 F.2d 617 (D.C.Cir. 1942).