Case Name: PEOPLE v. RAMSEY; PEOPLE v. BOYD
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1985-09-17
Citations: 422 Mich. 500
Docket Number: Docket Nos. 67269, 68636
Parties: PEOPLE v RAMSEY PEOPLE v BOYD
Judges: Williams, C.J., and Ryan, J., concurred with Brickley, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 422
Pages: 500–553

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v RAMSEY PEOPLE v BOYD
Docket Nos. 67269, 68636.
Argued December 6, 1983
(Calendar Nos. 4, 5). —
Decided September 17, 1985.
Rehearing denied in Ramsey, 424 Mich 1201. Rehearing denied in Boyd, 424 Mich 1202.
Bruce Ramsey was found guilty but mentally ill of second-degree murder following a bench trial in the Wayne Circuit Court, Peter B. Spivak, J. Prior to trial, the defendant’s motion that the verdict of guilty but mentally ill be held unconstitutional and that the jury not be instructed with respect to that verdict was denied. Thereafter, the defendant waived his right to a jury trial. The Court of Appeals, Allen, P. J., and R. B. Burns and N. J. Kaufman, JJ., remanded the case to the trial court for further findings of fact (Docket No. 77-3680). After remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion per curiam. The defendant appeals, arguing that the danger of compromise by the jury because of the existence of the guilty but mentally ill verdict caused him to waive his right to a trial by jury and thus was an unconstitutional burden on the right and that the trial court’s findings that he was mentally ill, yet possessed the requisite intent to support a conviction of second-degree murder, were legally and factually inconsistent.
Gary Boyd was found guilty but mentally ill by a jury in the Detroit Recorder’s Court, Michael F. Sapala, J., of armed robbery and assault with intent to commit robbery while armed. The Court of Appeals, Cynar, P.J., and V. J. Brennan and Deming, JJ., affirmed in an unpublished opinion per cu-riam (Docket No. 50542). The defendant appeals, contending that the submission of the guilty but mentally ill verdict to the jury encouraged it to return the verdict as a compromise between the verdict of guilty and the verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1-7] Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 129 et seq.
Modem status of rules as to burden and sufficiency of proof of mental irresponsibility in criminal case. 17 ALR3d 146.
[4] Am Jur 2d, Homicide §§ 114, 115.
Modem status of test of criminal responsibility — state cases. 9 ALR4th 526.
[5] Am Jur 2d, Trial § 738 et seq.
Mental or emotional condition as diminishing responsibility for crime. 22 ALR3d 1228.
In an opinion by Justice Beickley, joined by Chief Justice Williams and Justice Ryan, and an opinion by Justice Boyle, the Supreme Court held:
The distinction drawn by the Legislature between mental illness and insanity was not confused by the creation of the guilty but mentally ill verdict. The distinction, when considered in the light of the verdict of guilty but mentally ill combined with the verdicts of guilty, not guilty, and not guilty by reason of insanity remains clear and does not deny a defendant the right to a fair trial.
1. A defendant who raises an insanity defense may be found guilty but mentally ill if the trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of an offense and was mentally ill but was not legally insane at the time the offense was committed. A person is legally insane if, as a result of mental illness, he lacles substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. Mental illness is a substantial disorder of thought or mood which significantly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or ability to cope with the ordinary demands of life.
2. In creating the guilty but mentally ill verdict, the Legislature created a clear distinction between mental illness and insanity. Any confusion created by the verdict is within a jury’s competence to comprehend. The distinction does not result in a denial of the right to a fair trial. Nor does the availability of the verdict infringe upon the right to a fair trial by creating an unjustifiable risk of the jury’s reaching a compromise verdict. The possibility of compromise is present in every case. All members of a criminal jury are required to agree beyond a reasonable doubt to the same verdict. There is no prohibition against a juror changing positions during deliberations. Reversal is required where the jurors foresake their convictions simply to reach a compromise verdict that is not legally or factually supportable because the defendant would not have been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt by all members of the jury. Parties who are concerned that a jury has compromised are free to poll the jury.
3. Evidence concerning a defendant’s mental condition is admissible to show whether the defendant had the requisite intent to support a conviction of the crime charged. A finding of mental illness, even when defined as a substantial disorder of thought or mood, does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that the defendant did not entertain the requisite intent. In a prosecution of first-degree murder, a finding of mental illness does not negate malice aforethought as a matter of law.
4. In Ramsey, the trial court, sitting as the trier of fact, found that the defendant entertained the malice aforethought necessary to support a conviction of second-degree murder. It was not necessary that the court additionally state affirmatively that all potential mitigating factors, including the defendant’s mental illness, had been considered and rejected. In Boyd, the defendant’s claim that instruction of the jury, over his objection, on the possible dispositions of a defendant found guilty but mentally ill and a defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity was error and that his assertion of error should not have been rejected by the Court of Appeals in light of People v Goad, 421 Mich 20 (1984), does not require reversal because the holding in Goad was expressly stated to be prospective and thus inapplicable to Boyd.
Justice Boyle, concurring, stated that it is not error to instruct the jury as to the disposition of a defendant found guilty but mentally ill. It is just as wrong and erroneous to mislead a jury into believing there is no public safety factor in a verdict of guilty but mentally ill because a defendant will not be released until it is certain that he will not commit further violent crime as it is to mislead a jury into believing a defendant will automatically be released from a mental hospital within a very short time if such a verdict is returned. The best way to combat efforts by the defense and the prosecution to persuade the jury to accept their respective versions of the defendant’s disposition is to instruct the jury on what the law provides. Confidence in the jury should override the fear that somehow knowledge of what happens to a defendant when a verdict of guilty but mentally ill is returned will result in an unjust verdict.
Ramsey, affirmed.
Boyd, affirmed.
Justice Levin, joined by Justice Cavanagh, dissenting, would hold the guilty but mentally ill verdict to be unconstitutional because a jury cannot, consistent with an accused’s right to a trial by jury, be called upon to provide a special finding explicating a guilty or not guilty verdict. The form of the special finding called for by the statute establishing the guilty but mentally ill verdict, the jury instructions contemplated by the statute, and the instructions given in Boyd are violative of due process because they focus the jury’s deliberations and verdict on a finding that is not determinative of the central issue of guilt or innocence, thereby impermissibly impairing the accused’s right to a fair trial and to be presumed innocent. Unlike verdicts of not guilty by reason of insanity, the special finding of mental illness required where the defendant is found guilty but mentally ill does not affect the finding of criminal responsibility, the sentence that may be imposed, or any treatment that the defendant may receive.
Justice Riley took no part in the decision of this case.
Opinion by Brickley, J.
1. Criminal Law — Insanity — Mental Illness — Guilty but Mentally III.
A defendant who raises an insanity defense may be found guilty but mentally ill if the trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of an offense and was mentally ill but was not legally insane at the time the offense was committed; a person is legally insane if, as a result of mental illness, he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law; mental illness is a substantial disorder of thought or mood which significantly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or ability to cope with the ordinary demands of life (MCL 330.1400a, 768.21a, 768.36[1]; MSA 14.800[400a], 28.1044[1], 28.1059[1]).
2. Criminal Law — Insanity — Mental Illness — Guilty but Mentally III.
The distinction drawn by the Legislature between mental illness and insanity was not confused by the creation of the guilty but mentally ill verdict; the distinction, when considered in the light of the verdict of guilty but mentally ill combined with the verdicts of guilty, not guilty, and not guilty by reason of insanity, remains clear and does not deny a defendant the right to a fair trial (MCL 330.1400a, 768.21a, 768.36[1]; MSA 14.800[400a], 28.1044[1], 28.1059[1]).
3. Criminal Law — Fair Trial — Guilty but Mentally III — Compromise Verdicts.
The availability of the verdict of guilty but mentally ill does not infringe upon the right to a fair trial by creating an unjustifiable risk of the jury’s reaching a compromise verdict; the possibility of compromise is present in every case; reversal is required where the compromise is not legally and factually supportable and results in a failure of all members of a jury to find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt (MCL 768.36[1]; MSA 28.1059[1]).
4. Homicide — First-Degree Murder — Mental Illness — Requisite Intent.
Evidence concerning a defendant’s mental condition is admissible to show whether the defendant had the requisite intent to support a conviction of the crime charged; a finding of mental illness, even when defined as a substantial disorder of thought or mood, does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that the defendant did not entertain the requisite intent; in a prosecution of first-degree murder, a finding of mental illness does not negate malice aforethought as a matter of law (MCL 750.316; MSA 28.548).
Concurring Opinion by Boyle, J.
5. Criminal Law — Jury Instructions — Guilty but Mentally III — Disposition of Defendant.
It is not error to instruct the jury as to the disposition of a defendant found guilty but mentally ill; it is just as wrong and erroneous to mislead a jury into believing there is no public safety factor in returning such a verdict because a defendant will not be released imtil it is certain that he will not commit further violent crime as it is to mislead a jury into believing a defendant will automatically be released from a mental hospital within a very short time after the verdict is returned; such instruction is the best way to combat efforts by the prosecution and the defense to persuade the jury to accept their respective • versions of disposition.
Dissenting Opinion by Levin, J.
6. Criminal Law — Insanity — Mental Illness — Guilty but Mentally III.
The guilty but mentally ill verdict infringes on the constitutional right of an accused to a trial by jury by requiring the jury to make a special ñnding of mental illness in partial explication of its general verdict of guilty (MCL 768.36; MSA 28.1059).
7. Criminal Law — Insanity — Mental Illness — Guilty but Mentally III.
The ñnding that a defendant was mentally ill at the time of the commission of a crime has no effect on the ñnding of criminal responsibility, the sentence that may be imposed, or any treatment that the defendant may receive (MCL 768.36; MSA 28.1059).
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Louis J. Caruso, Solicitor General, John D. O’Hair, Prosecuting Attorney, Edward Reilly Wilson, Deputy Chief, Civil and Appeals, and Timothy A. Baugh-man, Principal Attorney, Research, Training and Appeals, for the people in Ramsey and Boyd.
State Appellate Defender (by Norris J. Thomas, Chief Deputy Defender and Rolf E. Berg, Assistant Defender) and Lauck, Leto & Cavanaugh, P.C. (by Frederick W. Lauck), for defendant Ramsey.
State Appellate Defender (by Rolf E. Berg) for defendant Boyd.
Amici Curiae:
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Louis J. Caruso, Solicitor General, and Michael A. Nicker-son, Assistant Attorney General, for the Attorney General.
Arthur J. Tarnow and Mark Granzotto for Michigan Psychiatric Society.
John F. Salan for Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan.

Opinion:
Brickley, J.
These cases involve the constitutionality of MCL 768.36; MSA 28.1059, the statute which introduced the verdict of guilty but mentally ill to this state. In both cases, it is asserted that the guilty but mentally ill verdict violates principles of due process of law. We hold the statute to be constitutional.
I
Defendant Bruce Ramsey was charged with first-degree murder, MCL 750.316; MSA 28.548, as a result of the death of his wife. Ramsey had first choked her, and then stabbed her thirty-two times. At trial, he raised the defense of insanity, claiming he believed that he was exorcising a demon from his wife by stabbing her and that she would return to life once the demon was removed.
In the trial court, defendant moved that the verdict of guilty but mentally ill be held unconstitutional and that the jury not be instructed on that verdict. According to defendant, he opted for a bench trial because his motion was denied.
Several witnesses, including Ramsey himself, testified in support of his claim of insanity. Defendant was portrayed as the product of a Southern fundamentalist religious family who had strayed from the church by drinking alcohol, smoking marijuana, and having an extra-marital affair.
A few months before the killing, Ramsey visited his mother in Kentucky. She gave him a pamphlet entitled "Defeated Enemies," which concerned demons and demon-possessed people. Both Ramsey and a woman by the name of Cross testified that that weekend, Ramsey, while engaged in sexual intercourse with Cross, suffered a psychotic episode; Ramsey thought that Cross was a devil. Ramsey fled the room. When later found by Cross, Ramsey insisted that they return to their room to pray, which they did.
Ramsey testified regarding an episode the day before the killing. He found in the clogged choke of his truck a sign from God that he should stay with his wife. He also found messages from God in the lyrics of popular songs.
The day of the killing, Ramsey, after a full day of work, called his mother in Kentucky. He was excited; his mother described him as exuberant over his "return to God."
As for the killing itself, which was witnessed by Ramsey's children, who testified at trial, the victim and Ramsey had apparently argued. One of Ramsey's children testified that the victim came to the child's room crying. Ramsey entered the room and said, "Walk." The victim left the room and locked herself in the bathroom. Ramsey broke down the bathroom door.
Ramsey testified that he had attempted to choke, and then to stab, the demon out of his wife. Ramsey's son testified that he heard Ramsey say, "Die demon, die." When Ramsey realized that the victim was dead and was not returning to life, he placed her body in bed, crawled in next to her, and stabbed himself in the chest. Found in that position by the police (the children had fled to a neighbor's home), Ramsey was taken to a hospital. There, he made statements to family and friends to the effect that he was "screwed up" and that his wife "wasn't supposed to die." Hospital psychiatrists diagnosed Ramsey as acutely psychotic upon admission.
Psychiatrists called by the prosecution and the defense differed over whether Ramsey was mentally ill or insane at the time of the killing. Dr. Emanuel Tanay testified for the defense that Ramsey was acutely psychotic and legally insane at the time of the killing. A lengthy taped interview between Ramsey and Dr. Tanay was played to the court. Dr. Philip Margolis, however, testified for the prosecution that Ramsey was neither mentally ill nor insane at the time of the crime. Dr. Mar-golis stated that Ramsey's behavior, rationalizing the killing after it had taken place, was consistent with an attempt to escape responsibility for the crime.
Dr. Irving Edgar, also testifying for the prosecution, initially testified that Ramsey was not psychotic at the time of the killing and that it was possible that the demon story was fabricated. On cross-examination, however, Dr. Edgar testified that he was not sure if Ramsey knew right from wrong when he was choking his wife and that Ramsey was probably psychotic following the choking.
The trial court found Ramsey guilty of the crime of second-degree murder, but mentally ill. Following a remand to the trial court for further factual findings, 89 Mich App 468; 280 NW2d 565 (1979), the Court of Appeals affirmed Ramsey's conviction by way of an unpublished opinion per curiam. This Court granted Ramsey's application for leave to appeal. 414 Mich 864 (1982).
Defendant Gary Boyd was charged with armed robbery, MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797, and assault with intent to commit robbery while armed, MCL 750.89; MSA 28.284, for conduct at the home of his former girlfriend. Boyd, after being admitted to the home of Ruby Hughes, suddenly and withoüt provocation grabbed her around the neck, held a knife to her throat, and demanded money. He led Hughes upstairs and assaulted two other women, robbing one of the other women of a few dollars. Boyd then dropped his knife and fled after stating that he knew that Hughes was going to shoot him in the back.
At trial, Boyd did not dispute that the events occurred. He presented an insanity defense. He related an extensive psychiatric history, including several hospitalizations, with one hospitalization exceeding eighteen months. Regarding the events of the crime, Boyd testified, "I don't know. One minute we was talking and the next minute, before I know it, I had a knife around her side."
Boyd presented three witnesses as to his mental state. Dr. Bruce Danto, a psychiatrist, testified that defendant was schizophrenic, psychotic, and insane at the time of the crime. Boyd's mother and his sister testified to the effect that Boyd had been exhibiting strange behavior patterns for years and that he was alternately violent and paranoic, a compulsive gambler, and would sometimes see and hear nonexistent things.
Dr. Steven Bank, a psychologist, testified for the prosecution that Boyd was mentally ill, but not insane. He noted that defendant had denied that the crime had occurred when he was arrested. This denial, according to Dr. Bank, indicated a purposeful behavior inconsistent with insanity. He further testified that defendant had described himself as a "good con-man."
The jury returned a verdict of guilty but mentally ill to both charged counts and the Court of Appeals affirmed Boyd's convictions in an unpublished opinion per curiam. This Court granted Boyd's application for leave to appeal. 415 Mich 851 (1982).
II
Both Ramsey and Boyd contend that the guilty but mentally ill verdict denied them the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Their arguments, however, are subtly different. Ramsey argues that the danger of jury compromise due to the existence of the guilty but mentally ill verdict caused him to waive his right to a jury trial, and, therefore, he should be allowed to challenge the constitutionality of the verdict. Boyd's argument is more straightforward. He contends that the submission of the guilty but mentally ill verdict to the jury encouraged the jury to return that verdict as a compromise between the verdict of guilty and the verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. We will treat the arguments of both defendants jointly.
A fair trial is a right guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Drope v Missouri, 420 US 162; 95 S Ct 896; 43 L Ed 2d 103 (1975). Therefore, our task is to decide if the guilty but mentally ill verdict violates principles of fairness by, according to defendants, deflecting a jury's attention from the issues of guilt or innocence by adding an irrelevant verdict which brings the risk of impermissible jury compromise. We must stress, however, that we are not concerned with the wisdom of the verdict. Arguments that a statute is unwise or results in bad policy should be addressed to the Legislature. Our concern here is only whether the statute is invalid because it denies criminal defendants a fair trial.
MCL 768.36(1); MSA 28.1059(1) provides:
If the defendant asserts a defense of insanity in compliance with section 20a [MCL 768.20a; MSA 28.1043(1)], the defendant may be found "guilty but mentally ill" if, after trial, the trier of fact finds all of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:
(a) That the defendant is guilty of an offense.
(b) That the defendant was mentally ill at the time of the commission of that offense.
(c) That the defendant was not legally insane at the time of the commission of that offense.
MCL 768.21a; MSA 28.1044(1) defines insanity:
A person is legally insane if, as a result of mental illness . . . that person lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
Finally, mental illness is defined in MCL 330.1400a; MSA 14.800(400a) as:
[A] substantial disorder of thought or mood which significantly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or ability to cope with the ordinary demands of life.
The history of the guilty but mentally ill verdict is well set forth in Smith & Hall, Evaluating Michigan's guilty but mentally ill verdict: An empirical study, 16 U Mich J L Ref 77 (1982). For our purposes here, it suffices to state that the statute was a reaction to this Court's decision in People v McQuillan, 392 Mich 511; 221 NW2d 569 (1974). Following that decision, a large number of persons found not guilty by reason of insanity, whom professionals had determined to be presently sane, were released from institutions, with tragic results. Two of the released persons soon committed violent crimes. See Comment, Guilty but mentally ill: An historical and constitutional analysis, 53 U Det J Urban L 471, 471-472 (1976); Robey, Guilty but mentally ill, 6 Bull of Am Ass'n of Psychiatry 374-375. Amid public outcry, the Legislature responded with the guilty but mentally ill verdict.
The major purpose in creating the guilty but mentally ill verdict is obvious. It was to limit the number of persons who, in the eyes of the Legislature, were improperly being relieved of all criminal responsibility by way of the insanity verdict. As stated in the House analysis of the bill creating the verdict, one argument in favor of the verdict was that:
The new verdict will help a jury. Perhaps because there seems to be a tendency for people to assume that someone who commits a particularly offensive crime "must be insane," juries frequently find defendants in such cases "not guilty by reason of insanity." Sometimes, however, the defendants are not legally insane, and although it may well have been the intent of the jury that such defendants be committed for a long period, they must be automatically released under a Michigan Supreme Court ruling of September, 1974. [Third Analysis of HB 4363, Michigan House Legislative Analysis Section (July 15, 1975).]
There is nothing impermissible about such a purpose. It is well within the power of the Legislature to attempt to cure what it sees to be a misuse of the law. What we must decide, however, is whether the verdict acts to deny defendants a fair trial.
It is claimed that the guilty but mentally ill verdict introduces a confusing irrelevancy into jury deliberations. Therefore, the first question we must face is whether the inclusion of the guilty but mentally ill verdict is so confusing to the jury that it denies a defendant a fair trial.
To a certain extent, we must agree that the inclusion of the verdict complicates a trial and creates a greater opportunity for confusion. Under prior law, the jury had only to decide whether the defendant was sane. Under present law, the jury must engage in a two-step inquiry. But the fact that an extra step is added to the inquiry hardly makes the inquiry beyond a jury's competence.
Furthermore, we reject the claim that a jury is unable to comprehend the distinctions made by the Legislature between the concepts of mental illness and insanity. Our statutory scheme recognizes a continuum of mental functioning. A person is mentally ill if suffering from "a substantial disorder of thought or mood which significantly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or ability to cope with the ordinary demands of life." MCL 330.1400a; MSA 14.800(400a). A person is insane, however, only if that substantial impairment results in the lack of "substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law." MCL 768.21a; MSA 28.1044(1). Under these definitions, one must be mentally ill before he can be found insane, but the converse is not true. As stated by Justice Cav-anagh in People v Fultz, 111 Mich App 587, 590; 314 NW2d 702 (1981):
Insanity by definition is an extreme of mental illness. When a person's mental illness reaches that extreme, the law provides that criminal re sponsibility does not attach. To put it alternatively, the statutes provide that all insane people are mentally ill but not all mentally ill people are insane.
Also, MCL 768.36(1); MSA 28.1059(1) requires the jury to find that the defendant is not insane, that is, that the defendant does not lack the substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or the ability to conform his conduct to the law, before it can conclude that the defendant is guilty but mentally ill.
We conclude that the Legislature has created a clear distinction between mental illness and insanity. Of course, in particular cases, this distinction may be very subtle and difficult for the jury to apply. But, it is no more subtle or difficult than the distinction between the intent to do great bodily harm and the intent to kill, a distinction we allow juries to make which often determines whether a defendant is guilty of first- or second-degree murder. In short, we cannot say that the legislative distinctions between mental illness and insanity deny the right to a fair trial.
Both Ramsey and Boyd also contend that the inclusion of the guilty but mentally ill verdict infringed on their right to a fair trial by creating an unjustifiable risk of a compromise verdict. We find this claim to be wholly speculative, and must reject it.
All members of a criminal jury must agree beyond a reasonable doubt to the same verdict. That is not to say that individual jurors cannot change their initial view of a case and ultimately reach a common ground with the others. Provided that in the end all jurors agree beyond a reasonable doubt as to the verdict, there is absolutely no prohibition of a juror changing positions during deliberations. Juror deliberations, however, must be distinguished from juror compromise. When jurors give up their beliefs to settle on a common ground with other jurors, who may have also abandoned their convictions in the interest of agreement, a compromise verdict results. When jurors forsake their convictions simply to reach a verdict, the defendant has not been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt by all members of the jury.
In People v Stahl, 234 Mich 569; 208 NW 685 (1926), People v Gessinger, 238 Mich 625; 214 NW 184 (1927), and People v Vail, 393 Mich 460; 227 NW2d 535 (1975), we recognized that jurors, as people generally, often will compromise with regard to their differences. In those cases, we recognized a fact, consistent with human nature. In each of those cases, however, the issue was not whether the jury had, in fact, compromised. Instead, the issue was whether allowing a greater charge not supported by the evidence to go to the jury constituted error requiring reversal of the defendants' convictions, even though the defendant in each case was convicted of the lesser charge. And, it was not only the possibility of impermissible compromises which led this Court to conclude that reversal was required, but also the possibility that all jurors could be equally swayed by the inclusion in their deliberations of a greater, but legally improper, charge. The point of those cases, however, is not that the possibility of jury compro mise requires a conviction to be reversed. That possibility is present in every case. To the contrary, our decisions were based on the reality that compromise does occur, and, therefore, the boundaries within which it occurs must be legally and factually supportable.
The problem raised in Stahl, Gessinger, and Vail is not present in the present case. Jurors had not begun their discussions considering charges of which the defendants could not have been convicted as a matter of law. Exactly how the jurors in Boyd reached their decision, or how the typical jury would act in the case of Ramsey, is entirely a matter of speculation.
Parties who are concerned that the jury has compromised are free to poll that jury pursuant to MCR 2.512(B)(2). See also People v Pizzino, 313 Mich 97; 20 NW2d 824 (1945). Since there is no other error identified in the present cases which, in light of the possibility of compromise, could have prejudiced defendants, we must reject their claims. See Illinois v DeWit, 123 Ill App 723; 463 NE2d 742 (1984), which also rejected the argument that the possibility of a compromise violates due process. To hold otherwise would require us to presume a jury compromise in every case where more than one verdict or charge is submitted to the jury.____
Ill
Ramsey raises two additional issues regarding the guilty but mentally ill verdict. First, he argues that as a matter of policy this Court should hold that a mentally ill defendant cannot entertain the malice necessary to support a murder conviction. Alternatively, he argues that we should find that a trial court must, in its findings of fact following a bench trial, affirmatively state that the mental illness did not negate the necessary intent for second-degree murder.
Malice aforethought, or stated otherwise, the mental state necessary for the crime of murder, requires the intent to kill, the intent to do great bodily harm, and the intentional creation of a great risk of death or great bodily harm with the knowledge that death is the probable result. People v Aaron, 409 Mich 672; 299 NW2d 304 (1980). A finding of mental illness, even when defined as a substantial disorder of thought or mood, does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that the defendant did not entertain the requisite malice aforethought for murder. As explained in LaFave & Scott, Criminal Law, § 42, p 326:
A defendant in a criminal case, at the time he engaged in the conduct giving rise to the charges against him, may have been suffering from an abnormal mental condition which was not of a kind or character to afford him a successful insanity defense under the right-wrong test or other standard applicable in that jurisdiction. But, while this defendant is therefore ineligible for a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity, his mental abnormality may nonetheless be a most relevant consideration in the determination of whether he is guilty of the crime charged. Under the doctrine referred to as partial responsibility, diminished responsibility, or (somewhat less accurately) partial insanity, evidence concerning the defendant's mental condition is admissible on the question of whether the defendant had the mental state which is an element of the offense with which he is charged.
Thus, while his mental illness may be a consideration in evaluating the requisite state of mind for the crime charged, we decline to accept Ramsey's invitation to hold that a finding of mental illness negates malice aforethought as a matter of law.
The trial court in this case found that Ramsey entertained the malice aforethought necessary to support a conviction of second-degree murder. Defendant would have us require that the trial judge affirmatively state that the mental illness did not affect the defendant's ability to form the requisite intent.
Had the trial judge indicated a refusal to consider the defendant's mental illness as a diminishing factor in his decision of whether defendant possessed the requisite malice aforethought, we would find it necessary to address the question of the extent to which mental illness could diminish the intent requirement for second-degree murder. But he did not. We therefore are faced with a statement by the judge that defendant possessed the requisite intent.
We are disinclined, under the circumstances of this case, to place a further burden on the fact-finding of a judge in a bench trial which would require, in addition to a finding of guilt on the elements of the crime, an affirmative statement that all potential mitigating factors have been considered and rejected.
Boyd raises one matter which requires additional consideration. He claims that error which requires reversal occurred when the trial court, over objection, instructed the jury on the disposition of a defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity and on the disposition of a defendant found guilty but mentally ill. The Court of Appeals rejected Boyd's claim on the strength of authorities now questionable in light of our recent decision in People v Goad, 421 Mich 20; 364 NW2d 584 (1984).
In Goad, we held that it was error to instruct the jury as to the disposition of a defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity. However, we expressly stated that our holding was prospective, which makes it inapplicable to Boyd. As to the propriety of giving instructions on the disposition of a defendant found guilty but mentally ill (CJI 7:8:01), Goad, supra, p 37, strongly intimated that such instructions are also improper:
We hold that in all jury instructions given more than 30 days after the filing of this opinion, the jurors shall not be given any information including, but not limited to, CJI 7:8:07 and 7:8:08 requiring the disposition of the defendant after their verdict.
We would now similarly hold that jurors should not be instructed on the disposition of a defendant found guilty but mentally ill. Although error occurred in the instant case, it does not require reversal, for the reasons stated in Goad.
Williams, C.J., and Ryan, J., concurred with Brickley, J.
Amicus curiae Michigan Psychiatric Society, branch of American Psychiatric Society, also contends that the guilty but mentally ill verdict is unconstitutional because it creates an irrational distinction. The society contends that, in psychiatric terms, the definitions of mental illness and insanity are identical. We note that claim was contradicted by the testimony of psychologist Dr. Steven Bank in Boyd, who found Boyd mentally ill but not insane. In any event, it is not the custom of this Court to decide constitutional issues raised by amici, but not the parties, and we express no opinion on the matter.
Ramsey also contends that we must review this case to determine if the Legislature used the least intrusive means to accomplish its purpose, citing Dunn v Blumstein, 405 US 330; 92 S Ct 995; 31 L Ed 2d 274 (1972), an equal protection case. We do not find that standard applicable to the due process challenge made here.
A study by the Center for Forensic Psychiatry in September of 1974 indicated that of some 350 persons found not guilty by reason of insanity only twenty percent of them suffered from mental illness sufficient to exculpate their actions. Thirty percent of those persons were found to have no mental illness whatsoever. The remaining fifty percent were viewed as having some psychosis or neurosis, but with no evident relationship between their mental state and their crime. Robey, supra. Of course, a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity determines a defendant's mental state at the time of the crime, not afterwards. Still, in view of these statistics and the number of persons released after McQuillan, and unless treatment of the mentally ill has progressed far beyond the level of which we are aware, one can hardly conclude that the Legislature was irrational in finding the insanity verdict to have been misused.
Ramsey and Boyd also find a verdict which does not distinguish a separate degree of criminal responsibility to be "so extraordinary that no direct analogy exists." We note that novelty does not equal unconstitutionality. Furthermore, since sanity is only presumed in a normal prosecution, and must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt by the prosecution in this state when evidence of insanity is raised, see People v Savoie, 419 Mich 118; 349 NW2d 139 (1984), there is a direct analogy, the verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. See Underwood v People, 32 Mich 1 (1875).
Nor do available statistics support the claim that jury compromise is actually occurring. Prior to the adoption of the guilty but mentally ill verdict, 0.024 percent of adult males arrested were found not guilty by reason of insanity. In 1982, 0.032 percent of adult males arrested were found not guilty by reason of insanity. Smith & Hall, supra, p 101. These statistics, while not only hopeful, can be interpreted to mean that the guilty but mentally ill verdict, having not decreased insanity verdicts, has been ineffectual and, perhaps, irrelevant. One could also interpret these statistics to mean that the guilty but mentally ill verdict has been very effective in avoiding improper insanity verdicts, as evidenced by the almost insignificant rise in the percentage of such verdicts. In any event, there is no real empirical support for the claim that juries have compromised what should be insanity verdicts by returning verdicts of guilty but mentally ill.
Ramsey also raises two issues which do not, strictly speaking, deal with the guilty but mentally ill verdict. We find neither argument persuasive. First, he claims that the prosecution introduced insufficient evidence of his sanity. The prosecution responds with a request that the case relied on by defendant, People v Murphy, 416 Mich 453; 331 NW2d 152 (1982), should be overruled. We decline to now consider that request. Expert witnesses testified for both the prosecution and the defense. Even though the prosecution's experts were subjected to an unusually strong cross-examination by defendant, we cannot say that their testimony, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was insufficient evidence that Ramsey was sane, even under Murphy.
Ramsey's remaining issue was not brought to the attention of the trial court or the Court of Appeals, and we will not consider it for the first time now.
Of course, if we were to hold that mental illness negates malice aforethought as a matter of law, a jury would have to be instructed that if they found the defendant mentally ill they could not find him guilty of murder. Considering the history of the guilty but mentally ill verdict, we doubt that such a result would comport with the intent of the Legislature.
Boyd also finds error in the trial court's failure to reopen the proofs sua sponte. We find no clear error in the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the trial court did not err.