Case Name: State ex rel. Umbreit vs. Helms, Circuit Judge
Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Wisconsin
Decision Date: 1908-10-20
Citations: 136 Wis. 432
Docket Number: 
Parties: State ex rel. Umbreit vs. Helms, Circuit Judge.
Judges: 
Reporter: Wisconsin Reports
Volume: 136
Pages: 432–467

Head Matter:
State ex rel. Umbreit vs. Helms, Circuit Judge.
September 14
October 20, 1908.
Supreme court: Superintending control of inferior courts: Quashing' bp trial court of criminal complaint: Review: Mandamus to* compel trial.
1. The power of this court to exercise its superintending control, under sec. 3, art. VII, Const., always exists when an inferior-court either refuses to act within its jurisdiction or acts beyond its jurisdiction to the serious prejudice of the citizen and there is no other adequate remedy.
2. The fact that it becomes necessary to review judicial action of an inferior court is not an insuperable obstacle to the exercise of the power of superintending control in a proper case.
3. With respect to the superintending control of trial courts in criminal actions, any question arising by objection to the proceeding before the jury is impaneled and sworn is a preliminary-question.
4. Any erroneous disposition of a criminal case before a jury is impaneled and sworn by which the court below refuses to proceed' further with the trial upon a valid complaint, indictment, or information, where it appears that the duty of that court was plain, the result of the refusal prejudicial, and the remedy by writ of error or appeal utterly inadequate, is sufficient to arouse the jurisdiction of this court under its power of superintending control.
5. Thus, where the circuit court, before entering upon the trial,. quashes a valid complaint, indictment, or information charging a criminal offense and discharges the accused, this court, in the absence of other adequate remedy, may, under its power of superintending control, by appropriate writ, require the inferior-court to proceed within its jurisdiction and try the accused.
G. The power of superintending control will not be exercised upon light occasion or when other and ordinary remedies are sufficient, but only when the exigency is of such an extreme nature-as obviously to justify and demand the interposition of that extraordinary power.
7. The quashing by the circuit court of a complaint charging a person with practicing medicine without having a license or certificate of registration as required by law, is held not to create an exigency calling for the exercise of this court’s power of superintending control.
Per Maeshall, X:
1. The “general superintending control over all inferior courts,” granted to the supreme court in sec. 3, art. VII, Const., is not limited other than by the necessities of justice. It extends to judicial as well as to jurisdictional errors.
2. The necessities of justice, in a legal sense, do not reach beyond the scope of governmental policy as to righting wrongs by judicial interference; as for example, it stops in criminal cases at the constitutional prohibition of a second jeopardy.
3. The grant of superintending control, though without specified means or instrumentalities for its exercise, includes by necessary implication all common-law writs and means applicable thereto and all power necessary to make such writs and means fully adaptable for the purpose.
4. The extent of the power of superintending control, as to any particular group of circumstances, is not measurable by that of the common-law writ most adaptable in its ordinary scope to vitalize such power in regard tp such circumstances. Such extent is referable to the necessities of the case, and the ordinary-use feature of the writ is to be expanded to meet the exigencies thereof.
5. The common-law writs with the power indicated to adapt them leave no part of the court’s superintending control power to be necessarily dormant for want of means to vitalize it.
6. The existence of error in the field of the controlling power does not, necessarily, upon proper request in form, require the doors of the jurisdiction to open. When that should occur rests in sound judicial discretion.
7. By the policy of this court its superintending control power is to be exercised only when the right of the matter involved is plain, there is no other efficient remedy for its invasion or denial, such invasion or denial is prejudicial, and, generally, and especially as to errors not strictly jurisdictional, the case presents circumstances of exceptional or extraordinary hardship.
Winslow, C. X, assents to the holding that in a proper case this court will not only review by mandamus the action of an inferior court in dismissing a case upon a preliminary question without trial, but will review any ruling which results in the practical throwing of a case out of court before trial upon the evidence — this meaning, as applied to criminal cases, any ruling resulting in dismissal prior to the impaneling of a jury and the placing of the defendant in jeopardy. He also agrees with the conclusion that this case is not of sufficient importance to move this court to action.
Dodge, J., concurring in tlie judgment, is of tlie opinion that the power of superintending control conferred on this court by the constitution is coterminous with the power vested in the court of King’s Bench; that it extends to a review of decisions on preliminary questions needing to be decided before the trial court can take into consideration the merits of a controversy, but does not extend to a review of a decision that the facts stated in a criminal complaint constitute no offense — that not being the decision of a preliminary question but a decision of the merits upon an issue of law.
Mandamus to Eugene W. Helms, Judge of the Circuit Court for St. Croix County.
Peremptory writ denied.
Application on the part of the state, through the relator, was made to this court, praying that it exercise its power of superintending control over inferior courts by directing Hon. E. W. Helms, respondent herein and judge presiding of the circuit court for St. Croix county, to set aside an order made by him quashing and dismissing a criminal complaint against one John Till in a criminal action pending in the circuit court for said county against said Till, and to direct said court to reinstate said action and proceed with the trial thereof. This proceeding was commenced upon petition by the relator as attorney for the Wisconsin Board of Medical Examiners, and upon consent granted of the district attorney for St. Croix county and the attorney general of the state of Wisconsin. An alternative writ of mandamus was issued out of this court directed to the respondent and served. Due return was made to the writ, admitting substantially the allegations of the petition.
It appears from the admitted facts that on the 24th day of February, 1908, a complaint was made to a justice of the peace of St. Croix county against said John Till upon the charge of wrongfully and unlawfully practicing medicine in this state. The complaint charged;
That “John Till did on the 16th day of December, A. D. 1907, at said county, wrongfully and unlawfully practice medicine, by then and there prescribing, for a fee and for compensation, drugs, medicines, and other medical treatment to and for one John A. Larson, for the cure and relief of wounds, fractures, bodily injuries, infirmities, and diseases of him, the said John A. Larson, without him, the said John Till, having then and there and theretofore obtained from the Wisconsin State Board of Medical Examiners a license to practice as a physician or surgeon in said state as provided and required by the provisions of chapter 426 of the Laws of Wisconsin for the year A. D. 1903, and acts amendatory thereof, and without then and there having a certificate of registration issued to him, the said John Till, pursuant to the provisions of chapter 87 of the Laws of Wisconsin for the year 1899, and the said John Till not being then or there a dentist or resident refracting optician engaged in the practice of such profession. . . .”
Upon this complaint a warrant was issued and said John Till brought before the justice, tried, and found guilty as charged in the complaint, and sentenced to pay a fine of $100 and costs and to imprisonment in the county jail for a period of three months. From this judgment Till appealed to the circuit court for St. Croix county. The action was placed on the regular calendar, and on the first day of the term, before any jury was impaneled in the case, said defendant, by his attorney, moved the court to quash the complaint and for dischargé, for the reason that the complaint did not state facts sufficient- to constitute an offense under the laws of Wisconsin. The motion was granted and the court refused to further proceed with the action.
Eor the relator there was a brief signed by A. O. Umbreil in pro. per. as attorney for the Wisconsin State Board of Medical Examiners and by the Attorney General, and oral argument by Mr. Umbreit.
For the respondent the cause was submitted on the brief of W. F. M’Nally. ' ‘

Opinion:
The following opinion was filed October 20, 1908:
KeRWIST, J.
The important question presented by the record is whether this court, under its .power of superintending control over inferior courts granted to it by sec. 3, art. VII, Const., has power to review and control the action and determination of the circuit court in respect to the matter .complained of. Sec. 3, art. VII, Const., provides:
"The supreme court, except in cases otherwise provided in this constitution, shall have appellate jurisdiction only, which shall he coextensive with the state; hut in no case removed to the supreme court -shall a trial by jury he allowed. The supreme court shall have a general superintending control over all inferior courts; it shall have power to issue writs of habeas corpus, mandam/us, injunction, quo warranto, cer-tiorari and other original and remedial writs, and to hear and determine the same."
This court has had occasion to pass upon this provision of the constitution at an early day in All'y Gen. v. Blossom, 1 Wis. 317, and many times since. The general scope of the subject has been quite fully covered in former decisions of this court. Att'y Gen. v. Blossom, 1 Wis. 317; Att'y Gen. v. Railroad Cos. 35 Wis. 425; State ex rel. Fourth Nat. Bank v. Johnson, 103 Wis. 591, 79 E. W. 1081; State ex rel. Mitchell v. Johnson, 105 Wis. 90, 80 N. W. 1104; State ex rel. Fourth Nat. Bank v. Johnson, 105 Wis. 164, 83 N. W. 320; State ex rel. Milwaukee v. Ludwig, 106 Wis. 226, 82 N. W. 158; State ex rel. W. G. Taylor Co. v. Elliott, 108 Wis. 163, 84 N. W. 149; State ex rel. Coffey v. Chittenden, 112 Wis. 569, 88 N. W. 587; In re Gates, 117 Wis. 445, 94 N. W. 292; State ex rel. Milwaukee Med. Coll. v. Chittenden, 127 Wis. 468, 107 N. W. 500. In view of what has been said in the above cases, we do not feel that any extended discussion of the history and scope of the doctrine of superintending control under our constitution is necessary. Moreover, we think the case before us is embraced within narrow limits, and the determination of it we regard sufficient without laying down rules for the government of future cases which may arise and require the discussion of legal principles not necessary to be considered here. The words of the constitution granting to this court tiie power of superintending control over inferior courts are defined in State ex rel. Fourth Nat. Bank v. Johnson, 103 Wis. 591, 79 N. W. 1081, and other cases heretofore cited. The question, therefore, arises in the instant case whether when the circuit court, before entering upon the trial, dismisses a criminal complaint, indictment, or information charging a criminal offense, and discharges the accused, this •court has power under the authority conferred by the constitution to require by appropriate writ the inferior court to proceed within its jurisdiction and try the accused, where there is no other adequate remedy.
The high prerogative authority, though sparingly used, applies as well to criminal as to civil eases. State ex rel. Fourth Nat. Bank v. Johnson, 103 Wis. 591, 614, 79 N. W. 1081; State ex rel. McGovern v. Williams, ante, p. 1, 116 N. W. 225; State ex rel. Harris v. Laughlin, 75 Mo. 358; Benners v. State, 124 Ala. 97, 26 South. 942; 1 Bishop, Eiew Grim. Proc. § 1402. In State ex rel. McGovern v. Williams, supra, the question presented was whether this court has jurisdiction, under its power of superintending control, to compel the circuit court to reinstate a criminal action and proceed to the trial thereof, where the indictment had been wrongfully quashed by the trial court before a jury was impaneled on the ground that the indictment was bad because the grand jury returning such indictment was illegally constituted. In that case this court held the question of whether the grand jury was an illegal grand jury, and therefore the indictment void, was a preliminary question, and that this court could order the trial court to reinstate the case and proceed with the trial of it. That case, we think, is the same in principle as the one now before us. Here the court below held the complaint bad for want of sufficient facts, and there because of illegality of grand jury. In each case, before entering upon the trial, the court passed upon the validity of the indictment, or, to be accurate, in the one case the complaint and in the other the indictment, and the question is whether an erroneous ruling that the indictment or complaint is had for want of sufficient facts can be reviewed by this court in a proper case under its power of superintending control.
It will be observed under the rule laid down in the cases before cited, and especially in State ex rel. Fourth Nat. Bank v. Johnson, 103 Wis. 591, 19 N. W. 1081, that power always exists when an inferior court "either refuses to act within its jurisdiction or acts beyond its jurisdiction to the serious prejudice of the citizen" and there is no other adequate remedy. Does the quashing of a valid indictment charging an offense known to the law and refusal to proceed to the trial of the accused for the offense charged amount to a refusal to act within its jurisdiction? As we have seen, this court held that it was where the ground upon which the indictment was quashed involved a preliminary question, namely, defect in impaneling the jury, and no other adequate remedy existed (State ex rel. McGovern v. Williams, ante, p. 1, 116 N. W. 225), and it was said:
"That the act of the circuit court is a refusal to exercise its jurisdiction and perform its duty to consider the criminal charge against the accused seems too plain for discussion."
So we come to the question before us, whether, in the absence of other adequate remedy, this court has power to compel the trial court to assume jurisdiction of a criminal action after it has quashed a good complaint upon the ground that it did not charge an offense. We see no difference in principle between the two cases, hence we think the doctrine laid down in State ex rel. McGovern v. Williams, supra, rules this case. The fact that it becomes necessary to review judicial action of an inferior court is no insuperable obstacle to the exercise of the power of superintending control in a proper case. Slate ex rel. Fourth Nat. Bank v. Johnson, 103 Wis. 591, 623, 19 N. W. 1081; State ex rel. Milwaukee v. Ludwig, 106 Wis. 226, 234, 82 U. W. 158; State ex rel. Winchell v. Circuit Court, 116 Wis. 253, 93 N. W. 16; State ex rel. McGovern v. Williams, supra. True, the rule is laid down generally in the text-hooks and decisions of the courts to the effect that mandamus issued under the power of superintending control cannot he used to serve the purpose of a writ of error to review judicial action of the trial court. State ex rel. McGovern v. Williams, supra; High, Extr. Leg. Hem. (3d ed.) § 188; State ex rel. Oshkosh, A. & B. W. R. Co. v. Burnell, 104 Wis. 246, 80 U. W. 460; State ex rel. Fourth Nat. Bank v. Johnson, supra. But this general rule, like all others, is subject'to its limitations, and it is only necessary to refer here to such as apply to the case before us. Others have been referred to in former decisions of this court where it is held that "this court is not universally restrained from reviewing acts done within the jurisdiction and judicial power of the inferior court in the exercise of superintending control." State ex rel. McGovern v. Williams, supra; State ex rel. Fourth Nat. Bank v. Johnson, supra; State ex rel. Milwaukee v. Ludwig, supra; State ex rel. Winchell v. Circuit Court, supra. A well-recognized exception to the general rule is the one laid down by this court in State ex rel. McGovern v. Williams, supra, respecting a preliminary question arising in a criminal action before entering upon the trial thereof. Mr. Justice Dodge, speaking for the court, said:
"The courts, English and American, agree with practical unanimity that such preliminary decision, however judicial in character, may be reviewed under the superintending power, and, in case of erroneous -decision thereof by the inferior court, the latter -should be required, by mandamus, to proceed to perform its duty toward the principal controversy notwithstanding its decision upon the preliminary question" — citing a long line of authority, English and American, in support of the proposition. ,
The cases do not appear to be in harmony as to wliat constitutes a preliminary question. State ex rel. McGovern v. Williams, supra. But we think the better authority and reason support the rule that a preliminary question respecting the control of trial courts in criminal actions arises upon any action of the court which amounts to a refusal to enter upon the trial of the case before a jury is duly impaneled and sworn to try the accused. So that' any question arising by objection to the proceeding before the jury is impaneled and sworn is a preliminary question. State ex rel. McGovern v. Williams, supra, and cases cited in opinion; Reg. v. Brown, 7 E. & R. 757. Indeed, it is not important whether wc call the question upon which the court passes and thus assumes to dispose of the case, and refuses to proceed within its jurisdiction, a preliminary question or not. Any erroneous disposition of a criminal case before a jury is impaneled and sworn by which the court refuses to further proceed with the trial upon a valid complaint, indictment, or information, where it appears "that the duty of the court below was plain, the refusal to perform such duty clear, the result of the refusal prejudicial, and the remedy by writ of error or' appeal utterly inadequate," is sufficient to arouse the jurisdiction of this court under its power of superintending control. State ex rel. McGovern v. Williams, ante, p. 1, 116 N. W. 225, and cases cited; State ex rel. Fourth Nat. Bank v. Johnson, 103 Wis. 591, 79 N. W. 1081; State ex rel. Oshkosh, A. & B. W. R. Co. v. Burnell, 104 Wis. 246, 80 N. W. 460; State ex rel. Fourth Nat. Bank v. Johnson, 105 Wis. 164, 83 N. W. 320; State ex rel. Milwaukee v. Ludwig, 106 Wis. 226, 82 N. W. 158; Att'y Gen. v. Blossom, 1 Wis. 317; State ex rel. Mil. Med. Coll. v. Chiltenden, 127 Wis. 468, 107 N. W. 500; State ex rel. Schutz v. Williams, 127 Wis. 236, 238, 106 N. W. 286; Reg. v. Brown, 7 E. & B. 757; Merrill, Mandamus, § 203; State ex rel. Harris v. Laughlin, 75 Mo. 358; State ex rel. New Orleans v. Judge, 52 La. Ann. 1275, 27 South. 697; Grand Rapids v. Brandy, 105 Mich. 670, 64 N. W. 29; Terrell v. Greene, 88 Tex. 539, 31 S. W. 631; State ex rel. Smith v. Smith, 69 Ohio St. 196, 68 N. E. 1044; Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 339; In re Grossmayer, 177 U. S. 48, 20 Sup. Ct 535 ; In re Connaway, 178 U. S. 421, 20 Sup. Ct. 951; State ex rel. Shannon v. Hunter, 3 Wash. St. 92, 27 Pac. 1076; Cassidy v. Young, 92 Ky. 227, 17 S. W. 485; McCreary v. Rogers, 35 Ark. 298; State ex rel. Keane v. Murphy, 19 Nev. 89, 6 Pac. 840; State ex rel. Bayha v. Philips, 97 Mo. 331, 10 S. W. 855. We therefore conclude that this court has power in a proper case to compel the circuit court to proceed with the trial of a criminal case when it refuses to do so and wrongfully quashes the complaint, information, or indictment upon which the accused is brought to trial before a jury is impaneled and sworn.
2. The next question to be considered is whether an exigency exists for the exercise of the power prayed for in the petition. Assuming, without deciding, that the complaint states a criminal offense and therefore that the court erroneously quashed the complaint, we approach the question of whether a proper case is made calling for the exercise of the power of superintending control. This court has repeatedly held that it should not exercise its power of superintending control upon light occasions or when other and ordinary remedies are sufficient. State ex rel. Fourth Nat. Bank v. Johnson, 103 Wis. 591, 79 N. W. 1081; State ex rel. Meggett v. O'Neill, 104 Wis. 227, 80 N. W. 447; In re Mielke, 120 Wis. 501, 98 N. W. 245; State ex rel. Tewalt v. Pollard, 112 Wis. 232, 87 N. W. 1107; State ex rel. Mitchell v. Johnson, 105 Wis. 90, 80 N. W. 1104; State ex rel. Milwaukee v. Ludwig, 106 Wis. 226, 82 N. W. 158. In Stale ex rel. Tewalt v. Pollard, supra, it is said:
"But this court will not exercise its jurisdiction when there is another adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise, nor unless the exigency is of such an extreme nature as obviously to justify and demand the interposition of the extraordinary superintending power of the court of last resort of this state."
In view of the nature of the offense and the facility with which future prosecution may be maintained, should it be found necessary on the part of the state to do so, it is considered by this court that no such serious prejudice will result from the action of the trial court in quashing the complaint as to create an exigency calling for the exercise of the power of superintending control. It therefore follows that the writ "hould be denied.
By the Court. — The writ is denied.