Case Name: Kari L. COOK, Appellant, v. Nancy WOZNIAK and Patrick Wozniak, Appellees
Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana
Jurisdiction: Indiana
Decision Date: 1986-11-24
Citations: 500 N.E.2d 231
Docket Number: No. 3-885A207
Parties: Kari L. COOK, Appellant, v. Nancy WOZNIAK and Patrick Wozniak, Appellees.
Judges: HOFFMAN, J., concurs.
Reporter: North Eastern Reporter 2d
Volume: 500
Pages: 231–234

Head Matter:
Kari L. COOK, Appellant, v. Nancy WOZNIAK and Patrick Wozniak, Appellees.
No. 3-885A207.
Court of Appeals of Indiana, Third District.
Nov. 24, 1986.
R. Kent Rowe, Jerry E. Huelat, Rowe & Laderer, South Bend, for appellant.
Mark Lienhoop, Newby, Lewis, Kaminski & Jones, La Porte, for appellees.

Opinion:
GARRARD, Judge.
In this interlocutory appeal we are asked to determine the effect of Small Claims Rule 11(F), which provides:
"A judgment shall be res judicata only as to the amount involved in the particular action and shall not be considered an adjudication of any fact at issue in any other action or court."
The appellees having elected to file no brief, we accept appellant Cook's statement of the facts upon which the issue arises.
On October 11, 1983 an automobile collision occurred between vehicles driven by Cook and Nancy Wozniak. Wozniaks commenced an action against Cook in the Small Claims Division of the LaPorte County Court. Cook initially filed a counterclaim for her damages but later dismissed it without prejudice and commenced a separate action in the LaPorte Circuit Court.
Cook moved to transfer the small claims action to circuit court but was unsuccessful. Wozniaks then answered the complaint in circuit court and counterclaimed for personal injuries sustained by Mrs. Wozniak and damages to the Wozniak vehicle.
In June 1984, the Wozniaks' action in Small Claims Division was submitted for trial with Wozniaks submitting evidence of property damage, storage costs and loss of use of their automobile in an amount exceeding $2,000. They were awarded judgment against Cook for $1201.50 plus costs. Cook paid the judgment.
Later when a pretrial conference was conducted in the action brought by Cook in circuit court it appeared that Wozniaks were still seeking damages for damage to their automobile, storage costs and loss of its use. Cook moved for partial summary judgment to remove those claims from the case. The motion was denied and the issue was then certified for appeal. The question is whether the small claims recovery was res judicata on the question of all damages owing to Wozniaks for damage to their automobile, loss of its use, and storage costs incurred as a consequence of the collision. We hold that it was.
Obviously, Small Claims Rule 11(F) is designed to limit the res judicata effect of judgments secured in small claims divisions of our court system. It seems apparent that the reason for restriction relates to the substantial informality of small claims proceedings coupled with the jurisdictional limitations on the amounts and types of controversies which may be litigated. The New York courts have identified such a purpose in that state's similar rule. See Supreme Burglar Alarm Corp. v. Mason (1953), 204 Misc. 185, 122 N.Y.S.2d 398, 399. The purpose of the rule is to limit the conclusive effect of small claim judgments to the very claim determined in the action. Id.
Two things are noteworthy concerning 'the language of SC 11(F). First, it simply refers to "res judicata." This term is sufficiently broad to encompass both phases of the doctrine (claim preclusion and issue preclusion) and avoids the confusion which seems to attend our efforts to label either aspect. See, eg., South Bend Fed. Teachers v. Nat'l, Ed. Assoc. (1979), 180 Ind.App. 299, 389 N.E.2d 23 which also employs the terms "estoppel by judgment," "collateral estoppel" and "estoppel by verdict."
Secondly, the rule declares that res judi-cata applies "as to the amount involved." (our emphasis) We believe this clearly imports more than the recovery, if any, actually had. As the New York court observed in Mason, supra, if the rule permitted a plaintiff who recovered nothing in a small claims action to sue again on the same-claim in another court, the small claims proceeding and judgment would be "sheer futility."
Moreover, we find no basis either in the language of the rule or in the law generally for the distinction the dissent would draw based upon which party commences the second action.
Instead it appears that the rule was intended primarily to limit issue preclusion where some fact in the small claim action is at issue in another case. It is stated broadly enough, however, to also apply to claim preclusion to the extent that claim preclusion would ordinarily bar all matters which might have been litigated but were not actually litigated in the small claims action. See Town of Flora v. Indiana Service Corp. (1944), 222 Ind. 253, 53 N.E.2d 161. This would be in keeping with a limitation whose purpose was to discount far reaching effects based upon the informality of a small claims proceeding and the limited exposure for liability.
On the other hand, the sole purpose of the doctrine is to bring finality to judicial proceedings and protect litigants from being harassed by being called upon to repeatedly defend against the same claim. That purpose is furthered by applying res judicata not just to the amount recovered but to the amount involved in the claim which was litigated.
In the instant case the amount involved in the small claims suit was the damages suffered by Wozniaks in property damage to their auto, storage costs and loss of use. As previously mentioned, they presented evidence claiming that such damages exceeded $2000 and secured a judgment for $1201.50.
That judgment is res judicata upon their claim for such damages and the trial court should have granted partial summary judgment removing that portion of their counterclaim.
Reversed and remanded for such further proceedings as may be necessary consistent herewith.
HOFFMAN, J., concurs.
STATON, P.J., dissents and files separate opinion.