Case Name: Avery JONES, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1991-11-19
Citations: 589 So. 2d 1001
Docket Number: No. 90-2846
Parties: Avery JONES, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and NESBITT and FERGUSON, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 589
Pages: 1001–1005

Head Matter:
Avery JONES, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 90-2846.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Nov. 19, 1991.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 3, 1992.
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Louis Campbell, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Avi Litwin, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and NESBITT and FERGUSON, JJ.

Opinion:
SCHWARTZ, Chief Judge.
On the basis of an infinitesimal "residue" of cocaine on a small piece of metal ribbon, commonly used in smoking the drug, which was found in his jacket pocket, Jones was convicted of possession of cocaine and of narcotics paraphernalia. The defendant does not challenge the latter conviction. He does, however, contend that the cocaine, which was visible on the screen and detectable both by a field test and subsequently in the laboratory, but which was, in the technician's words, not "realistically weighable," was, as a matter of law, of insufficient quantity to justify a possession charge. We do not agree.
It is fully established in the Florida cases that "the quantity [of drugs] possessed is immaterial." State v. Eckroth, 238 So.2d 75, 77 (Fla.1970); see State v. Thornton, 327 So.2d 227 (Fla.1976); Jefferson v. State, 549 So.2d 222 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); see also Evans v. State, 543 So.2d 326 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). This is the inevitable result under the statute which, of course, makes no qualification as to the amount of controlled substance required. § 893.13(l)(f), Fla.Stat. (1989). To insert, as the appellant suggests, a requirement that the quantity be somehow "usable" for sale or consumption, e.g., People v. Leal, 64 Cal.2d 504, 413 P.2d 665, 50 Cal.Rptr. 777 (1966), would require a degree of expertise which we do not possess, and, more important, an act of judicial statutory amendment in which we may not indulge. See Florida Real Estate Comm'n v. McGregor, 268 So.2d 529, 531 (Fla.1972).
It is true that the ordinary presumption that one has knowledge of drugs found in his possession, State v. Medlin, 273 So.2d 394 (Fla.1973), may not apply when there are only trace amounts of drug "lint" or "dust" which, we are told, now adhere to almost everything in South Florida. See United States v. One Gates Learjet, Serial No. 28004, 861 F.2d 868 (5th Cir.1988); State v. Dempsey, 22 Ohio St.2d 219, 259 N.E.2d 745 (1970). This claim is wholly irrelevant to this case, however, in which the cocaine was found on an implement which is usable only for the obviously knowing use of the drug. See Evans, 543 So.2d at 327 (minuscule amounts of cocaine found in smoking pipe). We are content to adopt the language, if not the holding of People v. Aquilar, 223 Cal.App.2d 119, 35 Cal.Rptr. 516 (1963), cited by appellant:
As forensic science, measuring devices and techniques improve, smaller and smaller amounts of residue are required for the chemist to detect the presence of the narcotic. The presence of the narcotic must be reflected in such form as reasonably imputes knowledge to the defendant.
Aquilar, 223 Cal.App.2d at 123, 35 Cal.Rptr. at 519 (emphasis supplied). The facts of this case obviously fall within this standard.
Affirmed.
NESBITT, J., concurs.
. Jones did not, in any event, establish that this was the case below.