Case Name: Richard Roe, cas. ejector, and John Lee and Sampson Prowell, tenants in possession, plaintiffs in error, vs. John Doe, ex dem., John Cato's orphans, Daniel Cato, Elijah Johnson, et al., defendant in error
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1859-03
Citations: 27 Ga. 637
Docket Number: 
Parties: Richard Roe, cas. ejector, and John Lee and Sampson Prowell, tenants in possession, plaintiffs in error, vs. John Doe, ex dem., John Cato’s orphans, Daniel Cato, Elijah Johnson, et al., defendant in error.
Judges: McDonald J. concurred.
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 27
Pages: 637–648

Head Matter:
Richard Roe, cas. ejector, and John Lee and Sampson Prowell, tenants in possession, plaintiffs in error, vs. John Doe, ex dem., John Cato’s orphans, Daniel Cato, Elijah Johnson, et al., defendant in error.
Where a purchaser of land, with notice of a prior unrecorded deed, sells to one, without notice, the old deed being still unrecorded, the title of the latter will be protected. — Bekkesq J. dissenting.
Ejectment, from Fannin county. Tried before Judge Rice, at October Term, 1858.
This was an action of ejectment brought by John Doe, upon the several demises of John Cato’s orphans, Daniel Cato, Elijah Johnson, and the executor of Abel N. Dugger, deceased, against Richard Roe, casual ejector, and John Lee' and Sampson ProweSl, tenants in possession, for the recovery of lot of land number fifty-seven, (57,) in the ninth district of originally Cherokee now Fannin county, containing one hundred and sixty acres.
The defendant pleaded the general issue and the statute of limitations.
Upon the trial on the appeal, the plaintiff offered and read in evidence, a grant from the State to John Cato’s orphans, of Walker’s district, Houston county, for the land in controversy — grant, dated May I4th, 1847. Next, a deed of conveyance from Daniel Cato to Elijah Johnson, dated 25th June, 1849. This deed was not recorded, and its execution was proved by one of the subscribing witnesses. Plaintiff next read such portions of the depositions of witnesses, taken by commission, as were descriptive of the said Daniel Cato, and went to identify him as the drawer of the lot in question. He proved the value of the rent, and that Lee and Prowell were in possession, under Samuel Rutherford, at the commencement of the suit, and closed.
Defendants moved for a nonsuit, on the ground, that plaintiff had failed to prove that Daniel Cato was the drawer or grantee of the land. The Court refused the motion, and defendants excepted.
Defendants then went into their defence, and introduced a deed for the lot in dispute, from Daniel Cato to George W. Slappey, dated 19th June, 1854, and recorded 3d July, 1S54; then a deed from Slappey to Samuel Rutherford, under whom defendants hold, this deed dated 23d June, 1854, and recorded 3d July, 1854. Defendants next offered in evidence, a deed from Elijah Johnson to John Dugger, Junior, and John Dugger, Senior, executors of Abel N. Dugger, late of Autauga county, North Carolina, dated 13th March, 1850, and recorded 26th March, 1851. This deed was produced by plaintiff, in response to a notice from defendants.
Plaintiff offered testimony in rebuttal; and a great deal of evidence was introduced, which it is unnecessary to set out here.
The great — the main question in the case was, as to the effect of Slappey’s notice of Johnson’s unrecorded deed from Cato, upon the title of Rutherford, Slappey’s grantee, who» bought without notice of said deed, although his grantor, Slappey, had notice.
The Court below charged the jury, that when two deeds-are executed by the same person, conveying the same premises to different persons, the one recorded within twelve months from the execution thereof, (if the feoffee have no notice of .a prior unrecorded deed at the time of the execution of the deed to him,) shall have priority; but if, at the time of the execution of the deed, he has notice of the prior unrecorded deed, then his deed shall not have priority, bufe the elder deed shall prevail.
The Court further charged the jury, that if Slappey, at the; time he received the deed from Cato, had notice of the deed, from Cato to Elijah Johnson, then no title passed to him,, Slappey, and he gained nothing by having his deed recorded in time, and the title was still in Johnson, or the Duggers, if Johnson has conveyed to them. Also, that it was not incumbent on plaintiff to prove that Samuel Rutherford had notice of Cato’s deed to Johnson.
Defendants requested the Court to charge the jury, that if Rutherford bought of Slappey without notice of the deed to. Johnson, he was not affected by the notice to Slappey. This-the Court refused to charge.
Defendants also requested the Court to charge the jury, that as John Dugger, Senior and John Dugger, Junior, had failed to file any evidence of their being the executors of Abel N„ Dugger, deceased, that plaintiff had no right to recover on the demise from them ; which charge the Court declined to give.
The Court further charged the jury, that the terms “John Cato’s orphans,” in the grant, implied that John Cato was dead, and that it was for the jury to determine, from the evidence, what person or persons were meant and intended by the word's “John Cato’s orphans.”
To all of which charge and refusals to charge, defendants excepted.
The jury found for the plaintiff, and defendants tender their bill of exceptions, assigning as error the aforesaid rulings, charges and refusals to charge, excepted to.
Walker; Underwood, for plaintiff in error.
J. K. Brown; and Milner, contra.

Opinion:
By the Court.
Lumpkin J.
delivering the opinion.
The only question we deem it our duty to consider and decide in this case is this: Concede that George W. Slappey bought of Daniel Cato, the orphan of John Cato, deceased, with notice of the prior unrecorded deed, made by Daniel Cato to Elijah Johnson, and sold to Samuel Rutherford, who bad no notice of the conveyance to Johnson — is Rutherford protected in his purchase ?
As between Johnson and Slappey, the two immediate grantees of Cato, the Act of 1837 declares, that Johnson's title shall prevail. That Act settles nothing beyond this; and such was the general decisions of our State Courts before that Act was passed. A departure from this doctrine led to the passage of this Act, as X am induced to believe from information derived from one of the old Circuit Judges. And so far as we are advised, the adjudications were equally well settled and uniform upon the other point, namely: That if A. buys land of B., and takes a deed which he fails to record In time, and B. subsequently sells the same land to 0., who records his deed in time, with notice, and C. conveys to D. without notice of A's deed, and both C. and D's deeds are registered within the twelve months, that D. has priority over A.
Without citing any other authority, which is scattered broadcast over the books of reports, we rest our judgment upon the case of Trueluck and others against Peoples and oth ers, 3 Ga. Rep. 446. That case, it is true, was not decided under the Act of 1837. But, as wc have already said, the point we are discussing is not provided for by that Act. But Trueluck against Peoples was referred to and affirmed in Herndon and others vs. Kimball and others, 7 Ga. Rep. 432. And this latter decision was upon a deed made in 1839.
The facts of the case in 3d Georgia, were identical with the facts in this case. The learned Judge, (Warner,) in delivering the opinion of the Court, says: "It is a settled rule, that if one affected with notice, conveys to one without notice, the latter shall be protected equally as if no notice ever existed. So, where one without notice, conveys to one with notice, the purchaser with notice will be protected; for otherwise, a bona fide purchaser might be deprived of the benefit of selling his property for its full value." And this rule is sustained by innumerable precedents.
And it occurs to me, that it is founded in reason. If the second grantee, from the same vendor who buys, acquires the priority over the old unrecorded deed, why should not the vendee of the second grantee, who purchases without notice, be equally protected ? If the laches of the first grantee, in not having his deed recorded in time, is made the reason for giving precedence to the second purchaser, without notice, does it not operate with equal force in favor of the innocent purchaser without notice, from the second grantee with notice ? It is by the same laches that this second purchaser is enabled to perpetrate a fraud upon his innocent vendee.
It is said that he may resort to his warranty, and thus cause the loss to fall upon the right person. The same argument would apply as between the two original grantees from the same vendor. And yet the Legislature has not deemed that a satisfactory reason; and hence passed the Act of 1S37. A warranty is not always given; and the warrantor may be irresponsible. Moreover, it is not disputed but that there are a class of cases, where this principle does ob tain. Why should it prevail in any case, if the foregoing reply is satisfactory ? Neither law nor equity ever looks beyond an innocent purchaser, but spreads its broad ccgis over him.
Again, it is contended that this doctrine is illogical. For, say counsel, if the first purchaser with notice takes nothing, how can he convey a title to a bona fide vendee ? When A. sells in fee to B., has he any thing left ? And yet it is yielded, for the statute so declares, that if B. fails to record in time, A. may subsequently sell the same land to C. The right, in both cases, depends upon the law which may regulate the rights of the parties, as to justice shall seem proper.
But I forbear to elaborate any further. Such being the settled rule in this State, and out of it, prior to the passage 01 the Act of 1837, (which, so far from discountenancing, rather favors the doctrine, by inference at least, for which we are contending;) and of this Court since the unanimous decision of this Court in Trueluck's case, in 1847; and the General Assembly, with full knowledge of the old law, not having seen fit to disturb it, we think it best to adhere to the practice, however ingenious and plausible the argument submitted to the contrary, until changed by statute to operate prospectively. To overrule all past adjudications, whether ill or well founded, whether with or without sufficient authority, and establish a contrary rule, would be to overthrow a vast number of land titles in this State. No Court ought to do this.
Judgment reversed.
McDonald J. concurred.