Case Name: BERGER v. CITY OF BERKLEY
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1978-12-05
Citations: 87 Mich. App. 361
Docket Number: Docket Nos. 31382, 77-716
Parties: BERGER v CITY OF BERKLEY
Judges: Before: Bronson, P.J., and Allen and T. M. Burns, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 87
Pages: 361–384

Head Matter:
BERGER v CITY OF BERKLEY
Docket Nos. 31382, 77-716.
Submitted November 15, 1978, at Detroit.
Decided December 5, 1978.
Ford Berger and Peggy Berger, his wife, brought a tort action in Oakland Circuit Court against the City of Berkley and 57 other municipalities, police departments and individuals to recover for personal injury to Ford Berger, an employee of the Royal Oak Police Department, who was totally blinded and suffered severe facial disfigurement when he was struck in the face by rice kernels fired from a shotgun by a fellow police officer while they were participating in a police training exercise of the tactical support unit of the South Oakland County Municipal Aid Pact. Farrell E. Roberts, J., dismissed the complaint against all defendants holding (1) that plaintiffs’ exclusive remedy was under the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act, and (2) that the defendants were entitled to governmental immunity. Plaintiffs appeal. Held:
References for Points in Headnotes
57 Am Jur 2d, Municipal, School, and State Tort Liability §§ 27, 28.
Municipal immunity from liability for torts. 60 ALR2d 1198.
57 Am Jur 2d, Minicipal, School, and State Tort Liability §§ 31, 32, 243.
Municipal immunity from liability for torts. 60 ALR2d 1198.
57 Am Jur 2d, Municipal, School, and State Tort Liability §§ 243, 250.
57 Am Jur 2d, Municipal, School, and State Tort Liability §§ 118-120.
What is "motor vehicle” or the like within statute waiving governmental immunity as to operation of such vehicles. 77 ALR2d 945.
57 Am Jur 2d, Municipal, School, and State Tort Liability § 30. Municipal immunity from liability for torts. 60 ALR2d 1198.
56 Am Jur 2d, Municipal Corporations, Counties, and Other Political Subdivisions §§ 199, 200.
57 Am Jur 2d, Municipal, School, and State Tort Liability § 27.
Municipal immunity from liability for torts. 60 ALR2d 1198.
57 Am Jur 2d, Municipal, School, and State Tort Liability §§ 85, 89.
46 Am Jur 2d, Judgments §§ 770, 775, 776, 780.
81 Am Jur 2d, Workmen’s Compensation §§ 50, 51.
82 Am Jur 2d, Workmen’s Compensation §§ 547, 635.
73 Am Jur 2d, Summary Judgment § 4.
1. No immunity is granted to an individual for personal acts of negligence solely because he is a governmental employee; therefore, the grant of accelerated judgment in favor of the individual police officers was improper and the issue of negligence of the individual officers should be remanded for trial.
2. Injury to a plaintiff by the act of a coemployee in a situation covered by the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act bars tort recovery. On remand, before reaching the issue of individual liability, the trial court must determine whether the police exercise was a joint venture creating a coemployer-coem-ployee relationship and whether plaintiffs are therefore barred from proceeding against the individual defendants by the exclusive remedy provision of the compensation act.
3. Governmental immunity applies in all cases wherein a governmental agency is engaged in the exercise of a governmental function. The management, operation and control of a police department is a governmental function, and since officer training is part of the operation of a police department, participation in a police training exercise is a governmental function; therefore, tort actions directed against the police department are defeated on the grounds of governmental immunity.
Reversed and remanded on the issue of individual liability of the police officers. Affirmed as to the grant of accelerated judgment in favor of the municipalities and police departments not in default.
Bronson, J., concurred with Judge Allen, not so much because he agrees with the policy of governmental immunity announced in Judge Allen’s opinion, but because he feels that the Supreme Court has not yet embraced a position which would allow the decision to go the other way.
T. M. Burns, J., dissented in part. He would hold that governmental immunity cannot be established until after the facts are developed and the relationship of the various defendants to each other and to the plaintiffs can be determined. He would reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Opinion of Allen, J.
1. Torts — Governmental Agencies — Governmental Immunity— Statutes.
Governmental agencies are immune from tort liability in all cases wherein the governmental agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function (MCL 691.1407; MSA 3.996[107j).
2. Municipal Corporations — Police Departments — Torts—Governmental Immunity.
The management, operation and control of a police department is a municipal function and tort actions directed against such departments are defeated on the grounds of governmental immunity.
3. Municipal Corporations — Police Training — Governmental Function.
Officer training is part of the operation of a police department and participation in a police training exercise is therefore a governmental function.
4. Statutes — Torts—Governmental Agencies — Governmental Immunity — Operation of Vehicle — Discharge of Firearm.
A statute provides that governmental agencies shall be liable for bodily injury resulting from the negligent operation of an agency owned motor vehicle by an officer of the agency; the statute clearly requires that the injury result from the operation of a vehicle and does not apply where injury results from the discharge of a firearm which was in no way caused by, or the result of, the operation of the vehicle (MCL 691.1405; MSA 3.996[105]).
Concurrence by Bronson, J.
5. Torts — Governmental Immunity — Injury to Individual.
The doctrine of governmental immunity is a carryover from days when it was thought that "it is better that an individual should sustain an injury than that the public should suffer an inconvenience”; such an idea is not the prevailing mood today and a concept which imposes the entire burden of government’s wrongful acts on the single injured individual is abhorrent to our social philosophy.
6. Torts — Governmental Immunity — Societal Interests — Interests of Individual.
A balance should be struck in examining the doctrine of governmental immunity so that society is no longer automatically viewed as the superior and the individual necessarily as the inferior; instead the rights of the individual should be considered paramount and the government must be able to justify interfering with those rights.
7. Torts — Governmental Immunity — Liability—Policy for Immunity.
Governmental immunity should not be invoked merely because a government agency or official performed the activity which caused an injury, but should be invoked only when there are sound policy reasons behind exempting the government from tort liability; governmental immunity should be the exception not the norm.
8. Torts — Governmental Immunity — Governmental Activities.
Government activities, for purposes of analyzing the application of governmental immunity, generally can be divided into two categories: 1) policy making, and 2) policy implementing.
9. Torts — Governmental Immunity — Policy-Making Activities.
Policy making activities are uniquely governmental in nature and should be insulated from liability for society to function; thus there is justification for invoking the doctrine of governmental immunity for policy making activities.
10. Torts — Governmental Immunity — Government Officials — Policy Implementing Activities.
Governmental immunity should not be available as a defense to actions for damages for injuries caused by governmental officials engaged in policy implementing activities; policy implementing activities have numerous counterparts in the private sector and there is no justifiable reason in denying recovery to persons injured during the course of these activities merely because they were unfortunate enough to be injured by a negligent governmental official instead of his counterpart in the private sector.
11. Torts — Governmental Immunity — Policy Making Decisions— Police Training Exercises — Balancing of Policy Considerations.
A decision to conduct a police training exercise is clearly a policy making decision which should not subject a governmental body to liability; however, the actual shooting of a person by an official involved in the exercise is simply the negligent act of a government official and involves no balancing of policy considerations and public concerns, it is merely the negligent implementation or operation of a previously determined policy decision and as such should not be shielded from liability by the defense of governmental immunity.
Dissent in Part by T. M. Burns, J.
12. Judgment — Default Judgment — Court Rule.
Once a default of any party has been duly hied or entered, that party shall not proceed with his case until his default has been set aside; since a party cannot proceed with his case until the default is set aside, it is improper for the court to grant judgment in his favor (GCR 1963, 520.1).
13. Workmen’s Compensation — Torts—Exclusive Remedy Provision — Statutes.
A tort suit is barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act where a plaintiff was injured by the act of a coemployee in a situation covered by the statute (MCL 418.131; MSA 17.237[131]X
14. Torts — Workmen’s Compensation — Employment—Evidence— Jury.
The issue of whether a plaintiff was an employee of the defendant in a tort suit, as opposed to a worker’s compensation hearing, should be submitted to a jury, under proper instructions, for a determination based on all the evidence.
15. Municipal Corporations — Police Officers — Negligence—Governmental Immunity.
Police officers have an individual common-law duty to exercise due care in the performance of their duties; no immunity is granted to an individual for personal acts of negligence solely because he is a governmental employee.
16. Judgment — Summary Judgment — Torts—Duty of Care — Material Fact — Court Rules.
Summary judgment for a defendant may be proper in a tort action where there is no question of material fact concerning a breach of the defendant’s duty to the plaintiff, that is, if the defendant is not involved with the injury (GCR 1963,117.2[3]X
Lacey & Jones (by John L. Salter), for plaintiffs.
Lakin & Worsham, P.C., for defendants City of Oak Park and R. Howell.
John N. Highland, for defendants Bloomfield Township and Bloomfield Township Police Department.
Bernard Girard, for defendants City of Bloomfield Hills and Bloomfield Hills Police Department.
Conklin & Maloney, for defendants City of Claw-son, Clawson Police Department, Lathrup Village, Lathrup Village Police Department, Farmington, Farmington Police Department, City of Novi, and City of Novi Police Department.
Vandeveer, Garzia, Tonkin, Kerr & Heaphy, P.C., for defendants City of Southfield, Southfield Police Department, Daniel Mead and James Gu-tenburr.
Johnson, Campbell & Moesta, for defendants City of Troy and Troy Police Department.
Harvey, Kruse & Westen, P.C., for defendants City of Huntington Woods, Huntington Woods Police Department, Huntington Woods Department of Public Safety, Village of Beverly Hills, Beverly Hills Police Department and Officer Danaher.
Dice, Sweeney, Sullivan & Feikens, P.C., for defendants City of Madison Heights and Madison Heights Police Department.
Stewart, O’Reilly, Cornell, Donovan, Lascoe & Rancilio, P.C., for defendants City of Ferndale, Ferndale Police Department and Officer Kellogg.
Plunkett, Cooney, Rutt, Waters, Stanczyk & Ped-ersen (by Joseph V. Walker and Jeannette A. Paskin), for defendants City of Berkley, Berkley Police Department, City of Birmingham and Birmingham Police Department.
Davidson, Gotshall, Kohl, Secrest, Wardle, Lynch & Clark (by Wayne C. Gardner), for defendant Village of Bingham Farms.
Before: Bronson, P.J., and Allen and T. M. Burns, JJ.

Opinion:
Allen, J.
This author and Judge Bronson, who writes separately, concur in the opinion of Judge T. M. Burns except that portion thereof holding that the defense of "governmental immunity" does not apply to the municipal defendants themselves. We simply cannot agree that the police training exercise being conducted when plaintiff was struck in the face by rice pellets was not a governmental function. Therefore, we would affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of those municipalities and police departments not in default. In all other respects we agree with Judge Burns's opinion.
The pertinent section of Michigan's governmental immunity act, MCL 691.1401 et seq.; MSA 3.996(101) et seq., reads:
"Except as in this act otherwise provided, all governmental agencies shall be immune from tort liability in all cases wherein the government agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function." MCL 691.1407; MSA 3.996(107). (Emphasis supplied.)
While our courts have frequently disagreed as to whether a specific negligent act was committed "in the exercise or discharge of a governmental func tion" nothing seems clearer or more settled than the doctrine that the management, operation and control of a police department is a municipal function, and tort actions directed against such department are defeated on the grounds of governmental immunity. McPherson v Fitzpatrick, 63 Mich App 461, 463; 234 NW2d 566 (1975), Anderson v Detroit, 54 Mich App 496; 221 NW2d 168 (1974), Walkowski v Macomb County Sheriff, 64 Mich App 460, 463; 236 NW2d 516 (1975). The only difference between those cases and the instant case is that in the cited cases the officers' actions were committed while on routine police duty whereas in the case before us the wrongful action took place during a training exercise. We find the difference inconsequential. Training is part of the operation of a police department, and participation in a police training exercise is therefore a governmental function. As was stated in Dionne v City of Trenton, 79 Mich App 239, 246; 261 NW2d 273 (1977), an opinion released subsequent to oral argument in the instant case:
" [W]e would have little hesitation in finding that the training of police officers, including the establishment and operation of a shooting range to accomplish that purpose, is of a public nature, for the public good, and the exercise of a governmental function. If the injury had occurred as the result of a shot negligently ñred by a policeman or by an instructor in the course of police training, there would be a basis for holding that immunity from liability existed." (Emphasis supplied.)
Plaintiffs acknowledge the McPherson-Walkowski rule that "the operations of police departments are governmental functions" but claim that pursuant to Thomas v Dept of State Highways, 398 Mich 1; 247 NW2d 530 (1976), such case law no longer has force. To support this contention, plaintiffs cite footnote 4 at page 17 of Thomas. However, that footnote appeared in the dissenting opinion in Thomas. The Thomas majority approach looks to existing case law to determine what is and what is not a governmental function. Under existing case law the operation of a police department is a governmental function.
Subsequent to oral argument in the instant case our Supreme Court issued its opinion in Pichette v Manistique Public Schools, 403 Mich 268; 269 NW2d 143 (1978). In that opinion the justices divided evenly on the question of whether or not the conduct complained of was in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function. Three justices opted to adopt the policy making/policy implementing test as set forth in the minority opinion in Thomas, supra. Three justices would follow the majority in Thomas and look to the common law for guidance in deciding whether a specific activity was in the discharge of a governmental function. One justice felt it unnecessary to reach that decision. It is this author's opinion that even if a majority of the justices had adopted the policy making/policy implementing test, it would not follow that the training exercise in the present case would not be a governmental function. On this issue, this author and Judge Bronson disagree. But since that test did not command a majority of the justices, both Judge Bronson and I agree that given the current state of the law, governmental immunity is a defense in the case before us.
Lastly, we address an issue which Judge Burns found it unnecessary to touch upon. Plaintiffs claim that even if participation in a police training exercise is a governmental function, § 5 of the Michigan governmental immunity act, MCL 691.1405; MSA 3.996(105), permits recovery. That section provides:
"Governmental agencies shall be liable for bodily injury and property damage resulting from the negligent operation by any officer, agent, or employee of the governmental agency, of a motor vehicle of which the governmental agency is owner, as defined in Act No. 300 of the Public Acts of 1949, as amended, being sections 257.1 to 257.923 of the Compiled Laws of 1948." 1964 PA 170, § 5, eff. July 1, 1965. (Emphasis supplied.)
Under this section liability attaches only to the single governmental unit owning the vehicle. Plaintiffs argue that the vehicle from which the injured officer was "escaping" was in a "state of being at work" in that it was being used as a mobile jail. However, the statute clearly required that the injury result from the operation of the vehicle. In the instant case the injury resulted from the discharge of a firearm. The firearm discharge was in no way caused by or a result of the operation of the vehicle. It was the negligence of the other officers participating in the training exercise and not the negligence of the driver of the vehicle, which caused the injury. The trial court did not err in finding that the § 5 exception to governmental immunity did not apply.
In summary, the grant of accelerated judgment in favor of the individual defendants is therefore reversed. The issue of individual negligence is remanded for trial. Before reaching this issue, however, the trial court will first have to determine whether the South Oakland Tactical Support Unit was a joint venture and whether plaintiffs are therefore barred from proceeding against the individual defendants by the exclusive remedy provision of the worker's compensation act. MCL 418.131; MSA 17.237(131). The grant of accelerated judgment in favor of defendants who have not moved to set aside the entry of default is also reversed. The grant of accelerated judgment in favor of those municipalities and police departments not in default is affirmed.
No costs, a public question being involved.
Compatible with Judge Burns's opinion we would: (as to Issue I)— -reverse the judgments entered against those defendants who were defaulted, and remand to allow plaintiffs to move for entry of a default judgment or other appropriate relief; (as to Issue II) — remand to the trial court for determination by the trier of fact whether plaintiff was an employee of defendant; (as to Issue III) — reverse judgment in favor of the individual defendant and allow discovery and consideration of individual motions for summary judgment.
"The mere fact that a governmental agency is doing a certain act does not make such act a 'governmental function' if a private person or corporation may undertake the same act. Thus, 'governmental function' is not delineated by questions of the broad scope of an activity undertaken or by financial or insurance considerations which may be indicative of a governmental undertaking, but rather by viewing the precise action allegedly giving rise to liability, and determining whether such action is sui generis governmental — of essence to governing. Supervision of road construction (as opposed to the making of decisions as to whether to build a road), operation of hospitals and schools (as opposed to planning or deciding what health services to offer or what subject to teach), operation and supervision of playgrounds and swimming pools (as opposed to deciding whether to operate such playgrounds or pools) are not governmental functions within this definition. On the other hand, certain aspects of the exercise of the executive, legislative, or judicial powers are by their very nature governmental functions and necessarily removed from the undertakings of the private sector." Thomas, supra, at 21-22. (Emphasis supplied.)
This author believes that the underscored words would preclude police operations from being considered nongovernmental. Unlike road building, the operation of hospitals or the construction of swimming pools, the operation of a police department does not have a counterpart in the private sector.
Having found in plaintiffs' favor on the issue of "governmental function" it was unnecessary to reach this issue.