Case Name: Mrs. Anne R. BARNETT et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. TRINITY UNIVERSAL INSURANCE COMPANY et al., Defendants-Appellees
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1973-05-01
Citations: 286 So. 2d 770
Docket Number: No. 12077
Parties: Mrs. Anne R. BARNETT et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. TRINITY UNIVERSAL INSURANCE COMPANY et al., Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: Before PRICE, HEARD and HALL, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 286
Pages: 770–779

Head Matter:
Mrs. Anne R. BARNETT et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. TRINITY UNIVERSAL INSURANCE COMPANY et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 12077.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
May 1, 1973.
On Rehearing Oct. 10, 1973.
Rehearing Denied En Banc Nov. 13, 1973.
Booth, Lockard, Jack, Pleasant & Le-sage by Troy E. Bain, Leonard L. Lockard, Joseph R. Bethard, Shreveport, for appellants.
Bodenheimer, Jones, Klotz & Simmons by G. M. Bodenheimer, Jr., Lunn, Irion, Switzer, Johnson & Salley by Charles W. Salley, Shreveport, for appellees.
Before PRICE, HEARD and HALL, JJ.

Opinion:
HALL, Judge.
This suit was instituted by the widow and children of Charles L. Barnett who died from injuries sustained when he fell down an elevator shaft in the Ward Building in Shreveport. Barnett was found at the bottom of the shaft on the morning of November 30, 1969, seriously injured, and he died later that day of these injuries. Defendants named in the suit were the owners of the building, Hallie Ward Har-grove, Alice Ward Fowler, D. R. Moreland and Cornelia R. Moreland; Safe, Inc., lessee and operator of the building; and its insurer, Trinity Universal Insurance Company. Defendants filed a third party petition against Otis Elevator Company which was subsequently dismissed with prejudice on motion of defendants. Following a trial on the merits the district court sustained a plea of contributory negligence and rejected plaintiffs' demands. Plaintiffs then perfected an appeal to this court. We affirm the decision of the district court.
The following facts are established by the evidence:
1. On Sunday morning, November 30, 1969, at about 10:30 a. m., Barnett was found seriously injured at the bottom of the passenger elevator shaft in the Ward Building. Barnett died of the injuries at about 5:30 that same afternoon.
2. He was found by Fred Joanen, another tenant of the building. Joanen unlocked the front door to the lobby, started up the stairs to his office, heard a noise and noticed the elevator door was open, went on upstairs and heard a noise again as he came back down the stairs, walked over to the elevator and looked down the shaft but could not see anything because of darkness, went to his car and got his flashlight, went back to the elevator and saw Barnett at the bottom of the shaft.
3. The Ward Building is a three-story office building in downtown Shreveport. Barnett, an attorney, had been a tenant of the building for more than twenty years. He, along with several other tenants, was furnished a key to the front door so he could get in on the weekends when the building was closed to the public. He had been to his office on numerous occasions on Sundays and had used the elevator on Sundays.
4. In 1960, the building was leased by the owners, Hallie Ward Hargrove, et al, to Safe, Inc. which company operated the building under the management of Paul Shapiro, its president, from that time through the date of trial.
5. The building was equipped with two elevators installed in 1937, located side by side at the rear side of the first floor lobby. The elevator involved in this litigation was used as a passenger elevator and the other for freight. At one time there may have been an operator on duty seven days a week, but at least since 1963 there was an operator on duty from 7:30 a. m. to 6:00 p. m., six days a week, but not on Sundays.
6. The elevator was manually operated and was not designed as an automatic self-service elevator. It could be moved up and down only by use of a lever or control inside the elevator car. It could not be called from floor to floor by a button outside the elevator. It had no interlocking safety device to prevent the door from opening when the elevator car was not present. The elevator car itself had no door, but there was a door .on each floor for access to the elevator. All doors had to be closed in order for the elevator to move up or down.
7. With no operator present and with the door closed, the only way to open the door to the elevator at the first floor is by use of a metal rod, called an emergency or lunar key. This key was left hanging behind a door under the stairs in the lobby across from the elevator. To open the door, the key was inserted through a hole in the door and moved to break the locking bar across the inside of the door, which then opened about six inches. The door could then be pushed completely open in which position it would stay open. The person opening the door would normally then return the key to its place under the stairs and walk back to the elevator to enter and use it.
8. An ignition key was left in the control panel inside the elevator at all times. To operate the elevator after getting into it, the key had to be turned on, the door shut, and the lever control moved up or down. There was a light inside the elevator car controlled by a switch on the control panel.
9. If the elevator was taken to the second or third floors by someone wishing to visit their office or stay on that floor, the elevator necessarily remained on the upper floor until that person or someone else got into it on that floor and brought it back to the first floor. After taking the elevator to one of the upper floors, it was necessary to prop the door open at that floor because if the door shut there was no way to get it back open through any method available to the tenants.
10. Under orders from the building manager, Shapiro, the lights in the lobby and in the elevator car were regularly turned off each day at 6:00 p. m., and were off on Sundays. There is a display window at the rear end of the lobby located two or three feet from the elevator in which a light was left on at all times. Thus, the only light in the lobby on the Sunday of the accident was the light from the display window and any daylight that came in through the windows at the front of the lobby and a small window over the stairs.
11. When Barnett was found on Sunday morning, the first floor door to the elevator was wide open. The elevator car was on the third floor. The emergency key was in its usual place Rehind a door under the stairs.
12. Although Barnett was found about 10:30 in the morning and it was a bright, sunshiny day at that time, there is no evidence as to what time he entered the building or when the accident happened. It could have happened either before or after daylight.
13. Plaintiffs' expert witness, W. S. Poole, an electrical engineer experienced in lighting and with elevators, made light meter readings in the lobby at a later date, on a cloudy day with no artificial lights on except that in the display window. The available light at the entrance to the elevator measured two foot candles. Poole testified any sunlight would have a negligible effect on the lighting at the entrance to the elevator, ninety-five per cent of the available light at that point being from the display window. The expert testified five foot candles would be usual for lighting the entrance to an elevator. On cross-examination, to illustrate the amount of light provided by two foot candles, Poole testified he could, with such light, see counsel standing some three and a half full steps away from him.
14. Shapiro testified that with the display window light on, you could see whether the elevator car was on the first floor. Joanen testified that he could see to walk around the lobby and could seé the elevator car was not there at the first floor.
15. From the foregoing evidence relating to the lighting present at the entrance to the elevator, we conclude that, regardless of what time the accident happened, there was enough light for a person to see whether the elevator car was or was not there upon making normal observation, even though the lighting was less than should have been provided by the building operator.
The trial judge decided the case on the basis of Barnett's contributory negligence, barring recovery. The trial judge concluded that the lighting was sufficient to see the elevator was not there and whether Barnett himself opened the door or whether it was already open, he could and should have seen the elevator was not in place before stepping into the empty elevator shaft. We concur, in these findings, both as a matter of fact and of law.
Barnett, as a long-time tenant of the building who had previously used the elevator without an operator, was necessarily familiar with its general operations. Under the circumstances, he had the duty, for his own safety, to look before entering the elevator shaft. Although the exact manner of how the tragic accident happened will never be known, the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the known facts is that Barnett either did not look or, if he looked, did not see what he could and should have seen. His own fault or lack of due care was a contributing legal cause of the accident, barring recovery by his survivors.
Breen v. Otis Elevator Company, 217 So.2d 776 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1969) is au-authority for "the basic concept that it is negligence for a person to open the door leading to an elevator and step therein without looking". In that case an employee of a hotel opened the door of a manually operated elevator similar to the one in this case with the emergency or lunar key, was distracted by someone, and walked into the empty elevator shaft backwards without looking. The court preter-mitted -the issue of the defendant's negligence and found plaintiff contributorily negligent in failing to "exercise that minimum degree of care by looking in the direction in which he was walking' in order to ascertain the presence or absence of the elevator". The principle that one using an elevator of the type involved in this suit must exercise at least a minimum degree of care by looking to see if the elevator car is present is sound. That principle, coupled with the rule that one is held to see that which he could and should have seen if he had looked, is applicable here and renders the decedent contributorily negligent.
Plaintiffs cite Johnson v. Johness, 145 So.2d 588 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1962), in which recovery was allowed by a maid who fell into an empty elevator shaft in an apartment building where she worked for one of the tenants. The elevator in that case was a self-service elevator equipped with an interlocking device which kept the door from being opened until the car was in position behind it. The interlocking device failed, plaintiff .opened the door and stepped to the rear of the darkened area to turn on a light at the rear of the car, the car was not there, and plaintiff fell down the shaft.
The court held the defendant building owner negligent, applying res ipsa loquitur to the malfunction of the automatic self-service elevator. Plaintiff's employer was also found negligent in ordering the light in the elevator turned off when not in use, thereby forcing the maid to ordinarily step to the back of the dark elevator in order to turn on the light.
On the issue of plaintiff's contributory negligence, defendants argued plaintiff did not keep a proper lookout when she entered the elevator shaft. The court rejected this contention in view of the fact that plaintiff was accustomed to relying on the fact that the door would not open unless the car was in position behind it. Her reliance on the normal mechanical predictability of the elevator's safety devices was not negligence.
The Johnson case is distinguishable from the instant case on the issue of contributory negligence because the elevator in the Ward Building did not have an interlocking safety device and consequently the decedent had no reason to rely on it and was not relieved of his duty of observation.
Able counsel for plaintiffs vigorously argues the burden is on defendants to prove contributory negligence, which they have failed to do. Further, counsel argues that where there are no eyewitnesses it is presumed the decedent acted with due care for his own safety, citing Stansbury v. Mayor and Councilmen of Morgan City, 228 La. 880, 84 So.2d 445 (1955). These principles of law relied on by plaintiffs are correct and applicable to this case. Nevertheless, it is our opinion the burden of proof has been carried and the presumption of due care overcome by the known facts established by the evidence and the reasonable conclusions necessarily drawn therefrom.
Plaintiffs contend this case is governed by LSA-Civil Code Article 2695 which, they contend, imposes strict liability on a landlord for loss sustained by a tenant, regardless of negligence, and which pre- eludes a defense of contributory negligence. Article 2695 provides:
"The lessor guarantees the lessee against all the vices and defects of the thing, which may prevent its being used even in case it should appear he knew nothing of the existence of such vices and defects, at the time the lease was made, and even if they have arisen since, provided they do not arise from the fault of the lessee; and if any loss should result to the lessee from the vices and defects, the lessor shall be bound to indemnity him for the same."
Article 2695 is not applicable in this case because the loss did not result from a "vice or defect" in the leased premises. This Article contemplates a loss resulting from a physical vice or defect either in the original construction or by reason of failure to make repairs. There was no such vice or defect in the construction or maintenance of the elevator in this case. Although of somewhat ancient vintage, there is no evidence the elevator was not in sound condition or that it was not properly constructed for safe use when used as intended with an operator present. Any liability on the part of defendants in this case must be based on fault under LSA— Civil Code Article 2315, and contributory negligence, under the jurisprudence, is a valid defense.
Having found decedent contributorily negligent, it is unnecessary to discuss negligence on the part of defendants. We are constrained to note, however, that we have reviewed the issue of negligence and, in the absence of contributory negligence, would conclude that the operator of the building was at fault and liable by reason of making available to tenants a manually-operated elevator without an operator and modern safety devices, combined with providing less than usual lighting.
For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the district court is affirmed, at appellants' costs.
Affirmed.