Case Name: Robert W. VAUGHN v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1978-05-31
Citations: 359 So. 2d 339
Docket Number: No. 49937
Parties: Robert W. VAUGHN v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY.
Judges: PATTERSON, C. J., SMITH and ROBERTSON, P. JJ., and WALKER, BROOM and COFER, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 359
Pages: 339–345

Head Matter:
Robert W. VAUGHN v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY.
No. 49937.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
May 31, 1978.
Miller & Dean, Mike L. Cordell, Green-ville, for appellant.
Robertshaw & Merideth, Randolph Noble, Jr., Greenville, for appellee.

Opinion:
SUGG, Justice,
for the Court:
This is an appeal from a garnishment proceeding in the Circuit Court of Washington County which resulted in a directed verdict for State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. The question for decision is whether the operator of an insured automobile was an additional insured within the terms of the omnibus clause of a motor vehicle liability policy.
Robert Vaughn obtained a judgment against James Creely, a minor, in the amount of $9,048.17. The judgment arose out of an accident which occurred on November 7, 1970 in which Vaughn's minor son, Michael, sustained injuries while he was a passenger in an automobile driven by Creely. The automobile which Creely was driving was owned by E. H. McGarrh who had obtained a motor vehicle liability policy from State Farm on the automobile naming McGarrh as the insured.
Vaughn filed a suggestion of garnishment against State Farm suggesting that State Farm was indebted to Creely under the omnibus clause of the policy issued to McGarrh. State Farm answered the writ of garnishment and denied that it was so indebted. Vaughn contested the answer, and thus the issue was made up as to whether Creely was an additional insured within the meaning of the omnibus clause. The trial court held that Creely was not an additional insured and directed a verdict against Vaughn.
On the date of the accident McGarrh was divorced from his wife who lived separate and apart from him with some of the children of the parties, including Deborah McGarrh (now Deborah McGarrh Walls). McGarrh allowed his ex-wife to keep the automobile in question at her residence and permitted her unrestricted use of the automobile. Neither Mrs. McGarrh nor any of the children were named as insureds under the policy.
The automobile was within the primary and unrestricted control of Mrs. McGarrh who would allow Deborah to use the car upon request. Although Deborah used the car on frequent occasions, the key was kept by her mother and Deborah's use was conditioned upon first obtaining permission from her mother. Deborah visited her father frequently, and he visited Deborah in the home of his ex-wife frequently. On some occasions Deborah drove the automobile to her father's home for the purpose of a visit, but he did not object to the use of the automobile by Deborah, and placed no specific restrictions on her use of the automobile.
On November 9, 1970, Deborah was sixteen years of age. She requested use of the automobile from her mother to visit a local skating rink. After obtaining permission to use the automobile, Deborah arrived at the skating rink at approximately 7:00 p.m. She testified that she was approached by Michael Vaughn, who requested permission to use the automobile to go to a girlfriend's home near the skating rink. Although Deborah initially refused to allow Michael the use of the automobile, she stated that she finally consented and permitted him to take the automobile with the understanding that he would go to his girlfriend's home and return in approximately 30 minutes.
Michael Vaughn testified that he did not have a conversation with Deborah at the skating rink, but said that James Creely obtained permission to use the car. Michael said that he and Creely first went to his girlfriend's house about two blocks from the skating rink, then to a local convenience store, and then to another friend's home. After completing a visit at the second friend's home, Michael and Creely were returning to the skating rink with Creely driving the automobile when the accident occurred.
Vaughn assigns as error the action of the lower court in sustaining the motion of State Farm for a directed verdict. When considering a motion for a directed verdict the court must examine the evidence for the plaintiff in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Paymaster Oil Co. v. Mitch ell, 319 So.2d 652 (Miss.1975). There is a conflict in the testimony of Deborah and Michael as to who obtained permission from Deborah to use the automobile. Deborah said she gave permission to Michael, but he maintained she gave permission to James Creely. We accept Michael's version under the rule stated above; however, it does not matter whether permission was given to Michael or Creely because neither is an additional insured under the omnibus clause for the reasons stated hereafter.
The omnibus clause in the policy issued to McGarrh reads as follows:
Insured — the unqualified word 'insured' includes
(1) the named insured, and
(2) if the named insured is a person or persons, also includes his or their spouse(s), if a resident of the same household, and
(3) if residents of the same household, the relatives of the first person named in the declarations, or of his spouse, and
(4) any other person while using the owned motor vehicle, PROVIDED THE OPERATION AND THE ACTUAL USE OF SUCH VEHICLE ARE WITH THE PERMISSION OF THE NAMED INSURED OR SUCH SPOUSE AND ARE WITHIN THE SCOPE OF SUCH PERMISSION, and
(5) under coverages A and B any other person or organization, but only with respect to his or its liability for the use of such owned motor vehicle by an insured as defined in the four subsections above.
While the omnibus clause of the policy extends coverage to another person only while using the automobile with the permission of the insured within the scope of such permission, section 63-15-43 Mississippi Code Annotated (1972) requires that such liability policies cover persons using the vehicle with either the express or implied permission of the named insured. Section 63-15-43 follows:
(1) A 'motor vehicle, liability policy' as said term is used in this chapter shall mean an owner's or an operator's policy of liability insurance, certified as provided in section 63-15-39 or section 63-15-41, as proof of financial responsibility, and issued, except as otherwise provided in section 63-15-41, by an insurance company duly authorized to write motor vehicle liability insurance in this state, to or for the benefit of the person named therein as insured.
(2) Such owner's policy of liability insurance:
(a) shall designate by explicit description or by appropriate reference all motor vehicles with respect to which coverage is thereby to be granted.
(b) shall pay on behalf of the insured named therein and any other person, as insured, using any such motor vehicle or motor vehicles with the express or implied permission of such named insured, all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of such motor vehicle or motor vehicles within the United States of America or the Dominion of Canada, subject to limits exclusive of interest and costs, with respect to each such motor vehicle, as follows: ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00) because of bodily injury to or death of one (1) person in any one (1) accident and, subject to said limit for one (1) person, twenty thousand dollars ($20,000.00) because of bodily injury to or death of two (2) or more persons in any one (!) accident, and five thousand dollars ($5,000.00) because of injury to or destruction of property of others in any one (1) accident.
It is now settled in this state that, if there is any difference between the terms of a motor vehicle liability policy as written, and the requirements of the above statute, the requirements of the statute are incorporated into and become a part of the policy. State Farm Automobile Insurance Company v. Moore, 289 So.2d 909 (Miss.1976); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Stafford, 253 So.2d 388 (Miss.1971).
In five cases we have considered omnibus clauses in motor vehicle liability policies to determine whether the operators of the motor vehicles were covered as permittees of the named insured. Two of the cases dealt with restricted permission given by the named insured to use a vehicle while three dealt with unrestricted permission.
Employers Mutual Casualty Co. v. Poe, 191 So.2d 541 (Miss.1966) involved restricted permission given by the named insured to a third party to use the vehicle. In this case we noted that three different rules have been applied in various jurisdictions in passing on the effect of a deviation from the scope of permission. The three rules are, (1) the strict or conversion rule, (2) the liberal rule, and (3) the moderate or minor deviation rule.
Although the Court did not "adopt categorically" either rule, it applied the minor deviation rule in deciding the case. The Court held that the employee was guilty of violent deviation from the permission granted by the named insured; consequently, the policy did not cover the use of the vehicle by the permittee.
In Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Watkins, 209 So.2d 630 (Miss.1968), we specifically adopted the minor deviation rule. This case also involved restricted permission given by the named insured, and we held that the Travelers policy covered the original permittee because his use of the truck was within the time, geographic and purpose limitations of the permission granted, and constituted only a minor deviation from the permission granted.
The case of International Service Insurance Company v. Ballard, 216 So.2d 535 (Miss.1968) involved unrestricted permission given by a named insured to a third person to use an automobile. This case announced the rule that use by a second permittee is covered under the omnibus clause, provided the named insured gives unrestricted permission to another (first permittee) to use an insured vehicle, and the first permittee allows a third party (second permittee) to use the insured vehicle to serve some purpose of the first permittee. This rule was followed in Moore and Stafford, discussed infra.
United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company v. Stafford, 253 So.2d 388 (Miss.1971) is another case where the named insured gave unrestricted permission to use an insured automobile. The automobile was being driven by a third person, the second permittee, while serving the benefit and purpose of the original or first permit-tee. We stated the general rule governing operation of an automobile by a second permittee with the permission of the original permittee in the following language:
In National Farmers Union Property & Casualty Company v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Company, 277 F.Supp. 542 (D.Mont.1967), the Court, after dealing with facts somewhat similar to the facts in this case, quoted with approval from 7 Am.Jur. Automobile Insurance section 117 (1963) as follows:
The "general rule" that a permittee may not allow a third party to "use" the named insured's car has generally been held not to preclude recovery under the omnibus clause where (1) the original permittee is riding in the car with the second permittee at the time of the accident, or (2) the second per-mittee, in using the vehicle, is serving some purpose of the original permittee. The courts generally reason that under such circumstances the second permit-tee is "operating" the car for the "use of the first permittee" and that such "use" is within the coverage of the omnibus clause.
(253 So.2d at 392)
We held the omnibus clause covered the operation of the vehicle by the second per-mittee, and that he was driving the vehicle with the implied consent of the named insured, because: (1) the original permittee was riding in the vehicle at the time of the accident, and (2) the second permittee, in operating the vehicle, was serving some purpose of the first permittee.
The case of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Moore, 289 So.2d 909 (Miss.1974) also involved the use of an insured vehicle where the named insured had given the first or original permittee unrestricted use of the vehicle, although he was not riding in the vehicle when the accident occurred. The first permittee allowed a third person, as second permittee, to use the automobile for his, the first permittee's, benefit. We held that the omnibus clause covered the use of the vehicle by the second permittee because the first permittee was given unrestricted use of the automobile and, when the accident occurred, the second permittee was serving a purpose of the first permittee.
In our case, E. H. McGarrh was the named insured, and his ex-wife, as first permittee, had unrestricted use of the insured automobile. The second permittee was Deborah McGarrh, the daughter of the parties, who had possession of the automobile the night in question with the express consent of her mother. The third permit-tee, James Creely, was driving the automobile with the consent of Deborah, the second permittee. Mrs. McGarrh, the first permittee, did not give Creely permission to drive the automobile, she was not riding in the automobile at the time of the accident, and Creely was not using the automobile to serve any purpose for Mrs. McGarrh. The facts do not justify the inference that Creely was using the insured automobile with the implied permission of the named insured; therefore, Creely's use of the automobile was not covered by the omnibus clause of the policy.
The other assignments of error have been considered but do not merit discussion.
AFFIRMED.
PATTERSON, C. J., SMITH and ROBERTSON, P. JJ., and WALKER, BROOM and COFER, JJ., concur.
LEE and BOWLING, JJ., dissent.
. The record does not affirmatively show that James Creely was driving the automobile in which Vaughn was injured. However, a copy of the declaration in the case of Robert W. Vaughn v. James Creely was introduced for identification. The declaration affirmatively alleged that Creely was operating the automobile in which Vaughn was riding when he was injured. The suggestion for writ of garnishment was tried on the theory that Creely was in fact the driver of the automobile. No objection was made by the garnishee that Creely was not driving the automobile, because, in our opinion, the garnishee knew Creely was driving the automobile.
. See 5 A.L.R.2d 600-660 (1949) for annotation on the subject of coverage of automobile liability insurance policies under the "omnibus clause."
. See 7 Am.Jur.2d, Automobile Insurance, Sections 120, 121 and 122 for statements of the strict or conversion rule, the liberal rule and the moderate or minor deviation rule.