Case Name: RIPPLE and others against RIPPLE and others
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1829-06-15
Citations: 1 Rawle 386
Docket Number: 
Parties: RIPPLE and others against RIPPLE and others.
Judges: Tod, J. having been concerned as counsel, took no part in Che decision.
Reporter: Reports of cases adjudged in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (Rawle)
Volume: 1
Pages: 386–391

Head Matter:
[Sunbury,
June 15, 1829.]
RIPPLE and others against RIPPLE and others.
appeal.
The laws of another state, a member of the Union, are to be proved as the laws of a foreign Gountry. ' ‘
The maxim omnia jiresumuntur rite esse acta, is as applicable to judicial- pro-1 ceedings in such á state, as‘ to those in our own.
Those who take an estate under a defective conveyance, are estopped from denying its validity. • .
Although land devised is not expressly charged with the maintenance of infirm children of the testator, yet, if such an intention can be clearly collected from all the parts of the will, considered in reference to the testator’s circumstances, the charge will attach upon the land, and follow it into the hands of subsequent purchasers. '
What is a sufficient notice of such a charge’ to affect subsequent purchasers.
The court inclined to think, that paupers, supported by the township, might unite with the overseers of .the poor in an ejectment; but at any rate, refused to grant a new trial on that ground.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Huntingdon county, held by Smith, J., August 18th, 1828.
The action removed from the Court of Common Pleas, wg.s an ejectment for a tract of' land in Springfield township, brought by Elizabeth Ripple, and Catharine Ripple, and the overseers of the poor of Shirley township against Peter Ripple, John Cook, and Charles M'-Gee. The two women were idiot's, the daughters of Philip Ripple, and were supported by the township. Their father being desirous of purchasing the tract of land in question, wrote a letter, .dated February 8th, 1813, directed to his brothers-in:law, John Shaver and Peter Shaver, sons of Nicholas Shaver, who had been owner of the property, intimating his desire to make the purchase, and authorizing his son John, the bearer of the letter, to. conclude the bargain; but, before the return of the son, the father sickened and died. His will bore date February 15th, 1813, and appeared to have been proved on the twenty-third, of the same month, in the County Court of Jefferson count}', Virginia, where the testator resided. The probate was certified by the clerk of the court, under his official seal, and the presiding justice of the same court, certified under his hand and seal,- that the individual was clerk of the said court, apd that his attestation was in due form of law.
The .will, so far as it is material to. the present case, was in these words:—“First. It is my will, and I desire' that the articles of agreement that I entered into with George Reynolds, sen. on the 8th day of February, 1813, for the premises I live on, and the other articles therein mentioned, shall be complied with by my executors hereinafter mentioned.
11 Item. And if my son John should have articled for-the land that belonged to my father-in-law, according to a letter I wrote to the executors of his estate, it is my will, that the title is to be made in manner and form as follows, that is, if he has articled for the two places I wrote to them I wished to purchase, the tract on which my father-in-law lives; it is my will that the title should be made to my sons John and Philip; the title for óne-foúrth part of the said tract, at thé upper end, is to be made to my son John, his heirs, and assigns for eyer, and the other three parts is- to be made to my son Philip, his,heirs and assigns, for ever. And my son John is to pay two hundred and eighty pounds towards the said lands; and, my son Philip is to keep and provide for my beloved wife, and my two eldest daughters, Catharine and Elizabeth, during their natural lives. And my son John is to have my wife’s share of her father’s moveable estate, to be paid-in part of the two hundred and eighty pounds that he is to pay towards the said land'. It is my will, that if my son John has articled for the other .place, directed in my letter, the title for the said lands is to be made to my sons Peter and Lewis, them, and their heirs,‘and assigns, for ever. And the said Peter and Lewis is to pay my youngest daughter, Susanna, eighteen pounds every year, until she arrives to the'age of eighteen years; my sons Peter and Lewis is to pay three hundred pounds to her, her heirs, and assigns; and, if the last-mentioned tract -should not be purchased, the money- left of my estate, after paying for the first-mentioned tract, is to be equally divided between my sons Peter and Lewis, and my .daughter Susanna;- and if neither of the tracts are not purchased by my son, according to my letter, the articles first-zhentioned between me and Reynolds, is to be null and void; and the place whereon I now live, is to.be held by my beloved wife and children until my youngest arrives to her lawful age, and then it is my will, that it shall be sold by my executors, and divided as follows, in the znanner and proportions I had ■ allotted the lands to be divided: the tract on which my father-in-law lived was supposed to contain two hundred, and sixty .acres, at eighteen dollars per acre, and the other place, was supposed to contain the same number of acres, at ten dollars per acre; and if my son should have made the purchase herein mentioned, it is my will, that all my moveable property shall -be sold, excepting, &e., and the money arising from the sale of my moveable property, is to pay my debts, and the residue, if any, after my debts are paid, is to be appropriated to the paying for the lands herein mentioned. It is lhy will, and also my meaning, that the’plaee whereon I now'live, is to be held under the above .conditions, (that is'to say,)-that my son Philip is to work the land, and pay a rent of one-third, for the use of my beloved wife and three daughtei’s herein named. It is my will, that Martin Beltmire and George Reynolds, jr, be my executors,” &c. •
An article of agreement, dated February ,-1813, between Peter Shaver and John Shaver of the onespart, and Philip Ripple of the other; (not signed,) for the sale of- the premises in question, was next given in evidence, though objected to by the defendants’ coun- . sel. After the death "of old-Philip Ripple, an agreement for the sale of the place was entered into between P. and J. Shav.er, as administrators of Nicholas Shaver, and Martin Bellmire and -George Reynolds, executors of Philip Ripple, dated March 3d, 1813, the reading of which was objected to by the defendants, but admitted by the court;. The purchase money was .paid by the executors of Philip Ripple to the -administrators o'f Nicholas Shaver, whose heirs afterwards, in' pursuance of the last-mentioned agreement, executed á deed for the premises to Philip Ripple, the devisee. Philip Ripple leased the property to Peter Ripple, who was “ to keep the two girls, Catharine and Elizabeth Ripple.” Oh the 4th of March, ' 1830, judgment was obtained by one John Bd.rker against Philip Ripple,, son of the testator; and, on the 30th of May, in the same year, Cook and M‘Gee also obtained judgments against him, on which they proceeded to execution and sale, became the purchasers, and received a.deed-poll from the sheriff. . Notice was publicly given at the time of the sale, and previously .to it, that the land was liable to the maintenance of the two females. '• The manner in which- notice was given, is stated' by the Chief'Justice, in, giving the opinion of the court, and, therefore, néed not'be repeated here.
Several exceptions were taken to the charge of His Honour, as well as to the admission of certain parts of the evidence. The jury found a verdict for. the plaintiffs, u to be released on the'payment of six‘hundred and-forty-one dollars and ninety-nine, cents, already expended in- the support of Catharine and Elizabeth Ripple, and on the maintenance and support .of the said Catharine and Elizabeth by the defendants, John Cook and Charles
After, an ineffectual attempt to obtain a new trial, the defendants appealed to this court, where Miles, for the appellant, contended, that the will of Philip Ripple was improperly admitted in evidence. Our act of assembly requires, that th'e -probate of a- will, executed out of the state, shall be made before persons having authority to take probates of-wills, &c,, and it was not shown, as it ought to'have been, that the court of Jefferson county had any such authority.
3d. -The articles of agreement ought not to have been received in evidence. It did not appear that Peter Shaver and' John Shaver, administrators of Nicholas Shaver, had any authority as such, to pass the land to any person whatever. ’.The will of Philip Ripple was not to operate upon. the land, unless his son John had entered into valid articles for .the purpose, prior to the death of the testator.
3d. The will 'is not sufficient to charge the land in the hands of Philip. No provisiones made out of .the land as a fund.
4th. The notice at the time of the sheriff’s sale was insufficient, not having come from the very party in interest. Sugd. on Rend. 533. But if the notice were given by the proper parties, it was not full and sufficient. Purd. 390. 4 Dall. 320. There was a regular chain of title on record, of which the will was no part; and, therefore, the notice-was not sufficient to lead to full knowledge. Peebles v. Reading, 8 Serg. & Rawle, 495. "The question of notice is matter of law. On this point he also cited, The Bank of North America v. Fitzsimons, 3 Binn. 361. Semple v. Burd, 7 Serg. & Rawle, 291.
5. The action is improperly brought in the names of the paupers, and of the overseers of the poor. After the paupers were settled in, and supported by the township, the title wholly vested in the overseers of the poor. The two females cannot support .an action jointly with the overseers. Purd. 683.
Blanchard and Potter, contra,
were stopped by the court.

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Gibson, C. J.
The certificate of the presiding justice of Jefferson county, that the attestátion of the clerk is in due form of law, was sufficient to introduce the exemplification of the will. The laws of Virginia are to be proved- as the laws of a foreign Country; but, the acts of its courts may,' undoubtedly, bé resorted to for their exposition. To the act of the county court, in holding jurisdiction of the subject of probate, the.maxim omnia presumuntur rite esse acta, is aS applicable as it is to judicial proceedings in our own state.
The articles of agreement were competent evidence, because they constitute a part" of the title under which all parties claim; and, it is, therefore, immaterial, whether the executors derived an .authority to complete the purchase under the will. Having ratified their acts by taking the estate subject to the provisions of the will, Philip, or any one claiming under him, is estopped from denying their authority. ' '
The intention to charge the'premises with the maintenance of the testator's -daughters, Catharine and Elizabeth, although .not expressed in terms, is, nevertheless, clear and satisfactory. • It is to be collected from all-the parts of the will considered in reference to the testator's circumstances. Having articled for the sale of the mansion place -in Virginia, he sends his son to Pennsylvania to purchase the premises in' dispute; but before his return, sickens, makes his will, and dies. He. provides contingently for the projected purchase, by directing his executors, in- case it should be effected, to execute the contract for the sale of the mansion- place; and he devises the premises in question to his son Philip, coupled with this clause:—"My son Philip is to keep and provide for my wife and my two oldest daughters, Catharine and Elizabeth, during their natural lives. " He also provides for the failure, of the contemplated- purchase, by forbidding the executors, in that event, to complete the sale of the mansion place, and by directing, that it be held by his wife and children till the youngest come of age, Philip working the land, and rendering a third of the produce for their use. He further directs the place to be sold when the youngest shall have come, of age, and the proceeds to be distributed in the same proportions, and among the same persons to'whom the land expected-to be purchased by his son, would have gone. ThusJ the premises in dispute were to be a substitute for the mansion place, which was expressly.charged with the maintenance of the widow and children, while such a charge should no,t be in the way of the testator's ulterior arrangements in respect of distribution. But as regards the premises in dispute, there are no-arrangements which are inconsistent with-an indefinite,continuance of such a charge; and there is, therefore, no reason, why his views in regard of the premises, should be, in any respect, different from those he enter.tajned in regard to the mansion place. The gift to Philip was on a condition which, in consequence of its very nature, adhered to the land. A legacy may undoubtedly be- charged on the land by implication, as was done in Nichols v. Postlethwaite, 2 Dall. 131; Hassanclever v. Tucker, 2 Binn. 526; Witman v. Norton, 6 Binn. 395, and Dobbins v. Stevens, 17 Serg. & Rawle, 13. No form of words is necessary to produce the effect; and, where the intent is manifest, courts are bound to carry it into .execution. .There were powerful motives for such an intention here. The subsequent insolvency, and death of Philip, have shown, that .his personal responsibility would have been an -unsafe pledge for the performance of his duties to his sisters. No -father would consent to commit the maintenance of his-daughters, in all the helplessness of:-idiocy, to a security so precarious.
Pursuant to the instructions of the testator, his son agreed with the vendors on the terms of the purchase, but did not enter into articles agreeably to the letter of, the condition on which the land was to pass by the will; and.it was nevertheless agreed on all hands, that the executors.should complete the purchase as if. articles had been executed. Accordingly, they,paid the purchase, money, and the vendors executed a conveyance to Philip, according to the testator's directions. Hence, as the defendants, claiming under Philip, derive the legal estate directly from the vendors, and not through the will, it was necessary to affeGt .them with notice of the equitable incumbrance of,the daughters' maintenance. To this end, it was proved, that an uncle of the daughters, and an inhabitant actually ráledin the township in which,they are settled, gave actual notice to one off them at the sale, and to the other a short time previous, the third being merely a tenant. In addition, it was shown, that another rateable' inhabitant of the same township, had not only informed them of the existence of the incumbrance, but had repeated to them nearly the-words (if the will by which it was created. Now, although a purchaser may disregard "rumours, set . afloat by those who have no right to intermeddle, lie is bound to attend to the admonitions of a party in .interest. Here the daughters, although actually charged to the township, had an interest of their own, from attending to which, they were disabled by idiocy; and, surely one so near in blood' as án uncle, might lawfully interpose for their protection. The overseers may also interpose; but, as they may be ignorant of the rights or claims of the paupers committed to their charge, every rateable inhabitant has an interest which renders him competent to act ih the matter for the common good. The information given was full, direct, -explicit, and amply.sufficient to put the purchasers on an inquiry, which, had' it been pursued, would have terminated in a perfect knowledge of all-the circumstances.
The concluding, objection is to the joinder of the ov.erseers and the paupers in the same ejectment. By the -act of the 29th of March, 1819, overseers of the poor are empowered to recover the money, •or other property, of paupers committed to their charge, for the purpose of applying it to their maintenance; but, whether in their, corporate name, or in the name of the pauper, is not specified; Perhaps an action would lie in the name of either. But, it is said, that whichsoever way it be taken, there cannot be an action in the names of both. By the act of the 31st of March, 1823, it is provided, that in ejectments by more than one, a plaintiff failing to establish his title, may become nonsuit, and a verdict nevertheless pass for the others. Now, had the Overseers, or the-paupers, become nonsuit here, -the case would have been within the letter of the act. Even as it. stands, it. is so entirely within its spirit, that we would not exercise a sound discretion, were we t,o say, it is unsustainable. All parties are, in fact, interested: the overseers, in the application of the property in ease of the township; and, the paupers, to be let into the enjoyment of their father's bounty. They have thus an interest in common, which entitles them to the possession. But, were all this otherwise, we ought not to use our discretion so as to trip up the parties really entitled, oh a trifling objection to the form of the action. .
Tod, J. having been concerned as counsel, took no part in Che decision.
Judgment a®rmed.