Case Name: John R. LEE, et al., Appellants, v. INDUSTRIAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, et al., Defendants, Conkey & Associates, Inc., Respondent; and McKENZIE-HAGUE-GILLES COMPANY, Defendant and Third Party Plaintiff, v. FARMERS UNION GRAIN TERMINAL ASSOCIATION, Third Party Defendant
Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Minnesota
Decision Date: 1985-10-29
Citations: 375 N.W.2d 572
Docket Number: No. C8-85-654
Parties: John R. LEE, et al., Appellants, v. INDUSTRIAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, et al., Defendants, Conkey & Associates, Inc., Respondent, and McKENZIE-HAGUE-GILLES COMPANY, Defendant and Third Party Plaintiff, v. FARMERS UNION GRAIN TERMINAL ASSOCIATION, Third Party Defendant.
Judges: Heard, considered and decided by POPO-VICH, C.J., and SEDGWICK and LANSING, JJ.
Reporter: North Western Reporter 2d
Volume: 375
Pages: 572–576

Head Matter:
John R. LEE, et al., Appellants, v. INDUSTRIAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, et al., Defendants, Conkey & Associates, Inc., Respondent, and McKENZIE-HAGUE-GILLES COMPANY, Defendant and Third Party Plaintiff, v. FARMERS UNION GRAIN TERMINAL ASSOCIATION, Third Party Defendant.
No. C8-85-654.
Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
Oct. 29, 1985.
Review Granted Dec. 31, 1985.
Susan R. Nelson, St. Paul, for appellants.
David S. Doty, Minneapolis, for respondent.
Heard, considered and decided by POPO-VICH, C.J., and SEDGWICK and LANSING, JJ.

Opinion:
OPINION
SEDGWICK, Judge.
This appeal is from an order granting respondent's motion to dismiss and judgment entered April 4, 1985. The trial court determined that appellant's claim against respondent Conkey & Associates, Inc. was barred by Minn.Stat. § 541.051 (1980), which imposes a two-year statute of limitations on actions brought in regard to improvements to real property. We reverse.
FACTS
Appellants John R. Lee, Daryl J. Lee, and James W. Kroska sustained severe injuries when a fire and explosion ripped through the Farmer's Union Grain Terminal Association's elevator (GTA No. 2) in St. Paul on June 10, 1980. Respondent Conkey & Associates, Inc. (Conkey) designed, sold, and installed the original dust collection system in the subject elevator approximately four years before the explosion occurred.
In June, 1981, appellants commenced suit against the Port Authority of St. Paul and Industrial Electric Company. National Farmer's Union Grain Terminal Association was also named as a defendant in the case of John Lee as he was not their employee at the time of the explosion.
In the fall of 1982 appellants' attorneys met with David Conkey, the president of Conkey, to discuss the dust collection systems installed and in operation at GTA No. 2 when the explosion took place. He described the modifications to his company's original system made by two engineering firms, McKenzie-Hague-Gilles Company (MHG) and Walker Jamar Company (Walker Jamar). Based on this discussion, appellants amended their complaint on November 10, 1982, to include Walker Jamar and MHG as defendants, alleging that the modifications to the Conkey system created a dust control problem which proximately caused the explosion.
In June, 1984, appellants' attorneys met with an expert in grain dust control who examined the design of the Conkey control systems. It was the expert's opinion (his examination was made on the condition that his identity be kept secret) that significant defects in the Conkey dust control systems caused excessive and explosive levels of airborne and layered dust to accumulate in the elevator, contributing in part to the explosion.
With this new information, appellants moved a second time to amend their complaint to include Conkey as an additional defendant. Conkey argued that appellants' claims were barred by Minn.Stat. § 541.051 (1980), which imposes a two-year statute of limitations on actions brought in regard to improvements to real property. The trial court agreed and granted respondent's motion to dismiss.
ISSUE
Did the trial court err in determining that appellants' negligence claim against Conkey was barred by the statute of limitations?
ANALYSIS
Minn.Stat. § 541.051 imposes a two-year statute of limitations on actions relating to injuries arising out of "the defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to real property." In 1977, the Minnesota Supreme Court declared section 541.051 (1965) unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548 (Minn.1977). On April 7, 1980, the Minnesota Legislature amended the statute to its present form to cure the constitutional defects cited in Pacific Indemnity. Although passed in early April, the statute did not become effective until 115 days later, on August 1, 1980. (1980 Minn.Laws Ch. 518, § 541.051, subd. 1). The amended statute provides in pertinent part:
Except where fraud is involved, no action by any person in tort to recover damages for bodily injury arising out of the defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to real property shall be brought against any person performing or furnishing the design, planning, supervision, materials, or observation of construction or construction of the improvement to real property more than two years after discovery thereof.
Respondent Conkey argued and the trial court agreed that amended Minn.Stat. § 541.051 (1980) should be retroactively applied to bar appellants' personal injury actions which arose two months before the law became effective. Appellants disagree, contending that the legislature did not clearly evidence an intent that the statute operate retroactively. Without retroactive application, the general tort six-year limitation period would apply. See Wegan v. Lexington, 309 N.W.2d 273, 281 (Minn.1981) (Dram Shop action was governed by six-year statute of limitation until legislature corrected constitutional infirmities of liquor liability statute.).
In finding that § 541.051 applied retroactively, the trial court relied on two Minnesota cases, Kozisek v. Brigham, 169 Minn. 57, 210 N.W. 622 (1926) and State ex rel. Anderson v. General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corp., 134 Minn. 21, 158 N.W. 715 (1916), which held that postponement of an amended limitations statute's effective date evidenced a clear intent by the legislature to apply the new law retroactively.
The court's reliance on Kozisek and Anderson is misplaced. Both Kozisek and Anderson were decided before passage of Minn.Stat. § 645.21 (1941), which requires clear legislative intent to apply a statute retroactively.
Further, Kozisek and Anderson's holdings are doubtful in light of Cooper v. Watson, 290 Minn. 362, 187 N.W.2d 689 (1971), decided by the Minnesota Supreme Court with the command of Minn.Stat. § 645.21 firmly in mind.
No law shall be construed to be retroactive unless clearly and manifestly so intended by the legislature.
Minn.Stat. § 645.21 (1984) (originally enacted in 1941 Minn.Gen. Laws, ch. 492, § 21).
In Cooper, the court considered the retroactive effect of a workers' compensation statute, which, like Kozisek and Anderson, was passed with a specific postponement date. The Cooper court refused, however, to apply the statute retroactively. It stated:
The legislature has stated the effective date of subd. 10 and has not given the slightest hint of an intention that it should be applied retroactively. In the absence of such an intention, the courts in this state are not entitled to impart retroactive effect to subd. 10.
Cooper, 290 Minn. at 368, 187 N.W.2d at 693.
We found a difference between statutes of limitations and substantive statutes in Lovgren v. Peoples Electric Co., 368 N.W.2d 16 (Minn.Ct.App.1985), pet. for rev. granted (Minn. July 26, 1985). The resolution of the issue of retroactive application of § 541.051 in Lovgren was neither involved with, nor necessary to, the resolution of that case. We consider that portion of the decision to be obiter dictum and therefore of no precedential value.
Minn.Stat. § 645.21 draws no distinction between laws affecting procedural and substantive rights. "Generally, it is immaterial in this state whether a law alters procedural or substantive rights; the legislature still must express its intention to make it retroactive." Estate of Murphy v. State, Department of Public Welfare, 293 Minn. 298, 308, 198 N.W.2d 570, 576 (1972) (citing Chapman v. Davis, 233 Minn. 62, 65, 45 N.W.2d 822, 824 (1951)).
The determination of whether a law complies with Minn.Stat. § 645.21 requires a two-tiered analysis. First, the statutory requirement of § 645.21 must be met. Did the legislature clearly intend the statute to be applied retroactively? If it is determined that the legislature intended retroactive application, then consideration of the constitutional question is appropriate. Did the legislature afford reasonable time for parties to commence their actions? Because we cannot find a clear intent by the legislature to apply Minn.Stat. § 541.-051 retroactively, we do not reach the second part of the analysis.
DECISION
Minn.Stat. § 541.051 (1980) cannot be applied retroactively. Appellant's claim against respondent Conkey is not barred.
Reversed.
POPOVICH, C.J., dissents.