Case Name: Valgean D. BRITTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2006-04-07
Citations: 928 So. 2d 386
Docket Number: No. 5D04-1040
Parties: Valgean D. BRITTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: ORFINGER, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 928
Pages: 386–392

Head Matter:
Valgean D. BRITTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 5D04-1040.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
April 7, 2006.
James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Marvin F. Clegg, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Bonnie Jean Parrish, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

Opinion:
LAWSON, J.
Valgean D. Britton, ("Britton"), appeals her judgment and sentence for manslaughter with a knife for the stabbing death of her husband, ("the decedent"). The single issue raised on appeal is whether the trial court erred in excluding testimony about an incident that occurred almost three years before the stabbing, during which the decedent is alleged to have threatened two men by saying: "Don't be laughing at me. I'll blow your head off." We affirm.
At trial, Britton admitted to stabbing her husband, but claimed self-defense. In support of her self-defense claim, Britton and three independent defense witnesses testified at length regarding multiple prior incidents of violence by the decedent against Britton. With respect to the excluded evidence, however, the trial judge found that the unfair prejudicial effect of the evidence substantially outweighed its probative value considering the prior incident's remoteness in time, the lack of connection between the incident and the crime charged, and the speculative nature of "any real connection whatsoever as far as any apprehension in her [Britton's] mind."
When addressing a defense proffer of third-party testimony regarding specific acts of violence by a victim, a trial court is required to consider "the need to limit evidence of specific acts [of violence] because, inter alia, a jury may tend to give the evidence too much weight, or it may sidetrack the jury's focus." State v. Smith, 573 So.2d 306, 318 (Fla.1990). Therefore, even where a proper predicate is laid showing that the defendant was aware of the prior act of violence, "corroborative evidence should be admitted cautiously." Id.
In this case, Britton told police officers prior to her arrest that she knew the decedent was not carrying a weapon when she stabbed him. Further, the defense presented no evidence that the decedent had ever threatened Britton with a gun. Additionally, Britton testified that she did not think about any of the decedent's past acts of violence prior to stabbing him. In fact, she even testified that she did not fear her husband at all because of his past violence. Rather, the only thing that caused her fear on the morning of the stabbing was the fact that he would not stop striking her and had a "rage in his eyes." In light of these facts, the threat that the decedent is alleged to have uttered to two men almost three years earlier does not seem to have had any relevance to Britton's state of mind on the morning of the stabbing. Given the proffered testimony's lack of probative value, and the possibility of prejudice or confusion had it been admitted, we find the trial court was well within its discretion to exclude the evidence.
Alternatively, Britton argues that even if this testimony was properly excluded as part of her direct case, she should have been allowed to use it after the State "opened the door" by calling the decedent's employer to testify about the decedent's reputation in the community for peacefulness. While we agree that the trial court erred by not allowing the defense to cross-examine the State's rebuttal witness regarding his knowledge of specific acts of violence by the decedent, we recognize the defense accomplished the same end by securing an admission from the witness that he really did not know about the decedent's reputation outside of the workplace. The witness also admitted on cross-examination that he knew nothing about the decedent's home life, and never socialized with him away from the work setting. In light of these concessions, and the extensive testimony from multiple witnesses regarding the .decedent's violence outside of the work setting, we find no reasonable possibility that the error com tributed to the conviction. See generally State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129 (Fla.1986).
AFFIRMED.
ORFINGER, J., concurs.
TORPY, J., concurs specially, with opinion.
. § 782.07, 775.087, Fla. Stat. (2004).
. The two men would have testified that the decedent was holding a shotgun when he made the threat, but that he never pointed it at them. Instead, he immediately turned and retreated without incident.
.See Johnson v. State, 718 So.2d 848 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (noting evidence of the victim's prior acts of violence are generally admissible in support of the self-defense theory when known to defendant at the time of the alleged crime to show the defendant's state of mind and the reasonableness of defendant's apprehension and actions).
. § 90.403, Fla. Stat. (2004).
. The judge expressly stated that he would not exclude the evidence based solely upon the prior incident's remoteness in time to the stabbing.
. According to Britton, she had disappeared on a several-day cocaine binge before returning on the morning of the stabbing. This was, according to Britton, a somewhat regular occurrence. It was also the event that had historically precipitated the decedent's violence against her. Britton testified that when she would disappear on a 'drug binge her husband would generally strike her several times upon her return, after which they would "make up." This had happened, according to Britton, about three or four times over a three-year period. Because of this history, Britton testified she anticipated that her husband would strike her when she returned on the morning of the stabbing.
. See § 90.404(l)(b)2, Fla. Stat. (2004) (allowing prosecution in a homicide case to offer "[ejvidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim . to rebut evidence that the victim was the aggressor").
. See Cornelius v. State, 49 So.2d 332 (Fla. 1950) (recognizing the purpose of cross-examination is to enlighten the jury as to whether the witness actually—as a matter of fact— knows the general reputation of the defendant and to place the jury in a better position to pass upon the credibility of the witness' testimony.)