Case Name: George J. ARNSTEIN, Petitioner, v. Ethel J. ARNSTEIN, Respondent
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1982-12-01
Citations: 422 So. 2d 1052
Docket Number: No. 82-877
Parties: George J. ARNSTEIN, Petitioner, v. Ethel J. ARNSTEIN, Respondent.
Judges: BERANEK, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 422
Pages: 1052–1053

Head Matter:
George J. ARNSTEIN, Petitioner, v. Ethel J. ARNSTEIN, Respondent.
No. 82-877.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Dec. 1, 1982.
Richard S. Russell, Deerfield Beach, for petitioner.
No appearance for respondent.

Opinion:
HERSEY, Judge.
Petitioner seeks certiorari review of an order quashing service of process. In dissolution proceedings petitioner inappropriately chose to effect personal service on his wife in New Jersey under the Long-Arm Statute. § 48.193(e) Fla.Stat. (1981). The wife is not now and never has been a resident of the State of Florida, making publication the statutorily designated mode of obtaining service of process. Unquestionably the court does not have personal jurisdiction over the wife. On the other hand, the court does have subject matter jurisdiction over these dissolution proceedings; it is indisputable that the wife has had adequate notice forestalling any due process attack on the final judgment and we have no indication that the court intends to (and of course it could not) adjudicate questions of alimony or division of property, requiring personal jurisdiction over the absent wife.
In view of the foregoing there is no impediment to continuing with the dissolution proceedings on the basis of in rem jurisdiction and adequate notice to the absent wife.
Responding to the concerns of the special concurring opinion, Section 49.011 Florida Statutes (1981) provides that service of process "by publication may be made in any court on any person mentioned in s. 49.021, in any action . (4) For dissolution . of marriage; ." The section referred to (§ 49.021) provides that service may be by publication "Where personal service of process cannot be had, ." This would appear to contemplate personal service of process in preference to or at least as the substantial equivalent of service by publication when the current address of the party to be served is known. In either event the purpose of service under these circumstances is not to acquire or exercise jurisdiction. It is to give notice in a due process sense so that the method selected should be one reasonably calculated to bring the proceedings to the attention of the party upon whom service is sought. Personal service, when feasible, seems admirably suited to accomplish that purpose.
Accordingly, we reverse the order quashing service of process and remand for further appropriate proceedings.
WRIT OF CERTIORARI GRANTED.
BERANEK, J., concurs.
ANSTEAD, J., concurs specially with opinion.