Case Name: FIRST PENNSYLVANIA BANK, N.A. v. Carl LEHR, Appellant
Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1981-02-06
Citations: 293 Pa. Super. 189
Docket Number: No. 2987
Parties: FIRST PENNSYLVANIA BANK, N.A. v. Carl LEHR, Appellant.
Judges: Before SPAETH, HESTER and CAVANAUGH, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports
Volume: 293
Pages: 189–211

Head Matter:
438 A.2d 600
FIRST PENNSYLVANIA BANK, N.A. v. Carl LEHR, Appellant.
Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
Argued Sept. 11, 1979.
Filed Feb. 6, 1981.
Stuart H. Savett, Philadelphia, for appellant.
Norman R. Bradley, Philadelphia, for appellee.
Before SPAETH, HESTER and CAVANAUGH, JJ.

Opinion:
HESTER, Judge:
Presently before the court is appellant Carl Lehr's (sometimes Lehr) appeal from the order of the lower court dated November 30, 1978 wherein the court denied appellant's petition to open judgment and denied appellant's petition to strike off the judgment, excepting for interest payments made subsequent to the entry of said judgment.
On July 29, 1977, appellee, First Pennsylvania Bank, N.A. (sometimes bank) confessed judgment against the appellant in the amount of $3,782,160.00 pursuant to a warrant of attorney contained in a personal Guaranty dated April 25, 1972. On December 7, 1977, appellant filed a Petition to Strike or Open the Judgment. Depositions of the appellant and other individuals involved in this matter were taken and oral argument was heard by the court en banc on September 8 and November 8, 1978.
On November 30, 1978, appellant's petition to strike off the judgment was granted but only in regard to interest payments made subsequent to the entry of the judgment; in all other respects it was denied. Appellant's petition to open judgment was also denied. Thereafter, this timely appeal followed.
We reverse and open the judgment taken by confession and remand to the lower court for a trial on the merits.
Our scope of review on appeal from either the opening or the denial of opening a judgment taken by confession has been clearly delineated over numerous years. We reiterate as we have done on numerous occasions, our scope of review on appeals from the lower court's grant or denial of a petition to open judgment is very narrow. A petition to open judgment is first an appeal to the equitable and discretionary powers of the lower court and as such, the exercise of the lower court's discretion in either opening or refusing to open a judgment taken by confession, will not be disturbed on appeal unless the lower court has committed a manifest abuse of discretion or an error of law. M. H. Davis Estate Oil v. Sure Way Oil, 266 Pa.Super. 64, 403 A.2d 95 (1979); Fidelity Bank v. Act of America, Inc., 258 Pa.Super. 261, 392 A.2d 784 (1978); Christie v. Open Pantry Marts, 237 Pa.Super. 243, 352 A.2d 165 (1975).
It is well settled that "(o)ne who petitions to open a confessed judgment must act promptly and aver a meritorious defense", Wenger v. Ziegler, 424 Pa. 268, 272, 226 A.2d 653, 655 (1967). There is no question that the appellant herein acted promptly; thus the sole issue is whether he set forth a meritorious defense.
The standard to be applied by a court in determining whether a moving party has properly averred a meritorious defense so as to require that a confessed judgment be opened and the moving party let into a defense is succinctly set forth at Pa.R.C.P. 2959(e), effective December 1, 1973, which provides in relevant part:
". . . If evidence is produced which in a jury trial would require the issues to be submitted to a jury the court shall open the judgment." (Emphasis added).
In testing the. sufficiency of the evidence, the facts as alleged must be viewed by the court in the exercise of its discretion in the light most favorable to the moving party (the appellant herein) and further, the lower court must accept as true all evidence and reasonable and proper inferences flowing therefrom. (Emphasis added). Greenwood v. Kadoich, 239 Pa.Super. 372, 357 A.2d 604 (1976); M. H. Davis Estate Oil v. Sure Way Oil, supra. As Judge Van der Voort of our court in M. H. Davis Estate Oil v. Sure Way Oil, supra, declared:
".. . the test in evaluating the petitioners' evidence is not whether the evidence will probably win a verdict from the jury, but only whether there is sufficient evidence to allow the disputed issue to go to the jury."
Rule 2959(e) has been interpreted since its promulgation in 1973 as prohibiting a court from "weighing" the sufficiency of the evidence. See Christie v. Open Pantry Marts, supra; Joseph A. Puleo & Sons, Inc. v. Rossi et ux., 234 Pa.Super. 612, 340 A.2d 557 (1975); Wolgin v. Mickman, 233 Pa.Super. 218, 335 A.2d 824 (1975); Commonwealth ex rel. Mazza v. Sarvice, 227 Pa.Super. 38, 323 A.2d 41 (1974).
With the above statement of the law as our guide, the record reveals the following: Appellant Lehr was one of several individuals who provided capital for the construction and operation of the Pocono International Raceway, Inc., (hereinafter Raceway), when a group of investors, including Lehr, decided to expand the Pocono Racetrack into a super speedway. At divers time, Lehr was a stockholder, director of the corporation, treasurer of same and creditor, personally holding $400,000.00 in judgment notes for loans to the corporation. Additionally, Lehr held warrants to purchase additional shares of common stock. Finally, a family enterprise owned by Lehr also was a $100,000.00 creditor of the Raceway. Dr. Joseph R. Mattioli was then chief executive officer and chairman of the board at the time of the completion of the Raceway in 1971. At that time, the investors realized that additional capital was needed to meet both current and future short-term operating obligations. Following extensive negotiations, the bank, the appellee herein, was chosen to provide this financing and a complex loan agreement package was structured. In return for five million dollars, the Raceway executed a note, at 4% over prime (16% at that time), which note was collateralized by a first mortgage on the Raceway's real estate. To further secure said loan, the investors, which obviously included appellant Lehr, were called upon to execute a pledge agreement with respect to their equity in the Raceway, a subordination agreement of their debt obligations in favor of the bank's loan, a joint indemnification agreement, and personal guaranty agreements (Exhibit 1 to appellee's complaint in confession of judgment).
It is this guaranty agreement, purportedly executed by appellant Lehr, which is at the heart of this litigation. Contained in said guaranty agreement at paragraph 5 is a warranty of attorney provision authorizing any attorney to appear for the guarantor and confess judgment against him for the amount for which the guarantor may be or become liable under said guaranty agreement, plus 2% thereof as attorney's fees. Further contained in said document, entitled Guaranty, appeared the following paragraphs:
1. The Guarantor hereby unconditionally guarantees to Bank, its successor and assigns, the prompt and punctual payment of $3,500,000 of the principal amount of the Note, when due by acceleration on account of default, maturity or otherwise, together with interest on the said $3,500,000 in principal amount at the rate specified in the Note. The liability of the undersigned for a $3,500,000 portion of the indebtedness evidenced by the Note, together with interest on that portion as specified above, shall not be limited or reduced by any partial recovery by Bank on account of the indebtedness evidenced by the Note from the mortgaged real estate, from any other guarantor, or otherwise. The liability of the Guarantor hereunder may be enforced by Bank or any subsequent assignee of this Guaranty.
7. The liability of any Guarantor hereunder is not conditioned upon the liability of any other Guarantor. If the Guarantor is more than one person, their liability hereunder shall be joint and several.
The record reflects that on Sunday, April 23, 1972, appellant Lehr, Dr. Mattioli and their wives dined together. Following their meal, Mattioli presented Lehr with a packet of papers indicating that they were the documents for the bank loan and requesting that Lehr review the same. Following a partial review of same, appellant, on April 25,1972, dictated a memorandum to Mattioli which included the following statements:
". . . Further, if anyone of the capital guarantors would be unable to come up with his share of the $3,500,000 pool, anyone or all of us would be on the hook to take up the slack. . . . "
Near the end of the memorandum, appellant further wrote:
"But I can't let you or the track down at this time so just have to go along like a lamb to the slattering block. . . . " (signed) Carl B. Lehr.
It is at this juncture in time that Lehr's and Mattioli's recollections differ.
In his deposition, Lehr testified:
A That would be April 28th, and it was late in the day Friday afternoon, I should say about 4:30, and he appeared in a hurry, never sat down in my office. I had a private office there which had two entrances, and he came in the private entrance, knocked on the door, and I opened it, and he came in, and he told me at the time that he was in a hurry, he had a taxicab there which he left running there waiting, and he came to get my signatures on the papers that would be required to close the loan.
He explained that somebody at the bank—and I don't recall who that was—had agreed to wait for him until five o'clock, and he had to be sure to get this parcel of papers back to that individual by five o'clock. So he said, you know, "Carl, either you sign it, or you don't sign, but if you don't sign it, why, the Raceway goes down the tubes right now."
Q Now, had he brought with him any documentation, or did he ask you to—
A Well, he had a lot of papers with him, and I signed perhaps four or five different things. Now, there was no time afforded to read these things individually, and I trusted Dr. Mattioli. After all, had been working with him in the building of the Raceway for two years.
So he said, "You have to sign here, you have to sign here, and you have to sign there." And I did this simply to prevent the whole thing from collapsing at the moment, according to the way he phrased it.
Q Do you recall whether one of the documents you signed was a guaranty on that Friday, April 28?
A No, I have no recollection of any specific items that were signed. It was just a case like, you know, "Here are the papers now. You sign here." And I signed. "And here is another one," and then so I signed.
Q Now, do you recall, is it your recollection that you did sign some guaranty?
A Oh, yes. They were the—apparently they were the documents that were required by the bank. (T. 54a-55a)
On cross examination, appellant reiterated his recollection of the April 28, 1972 meeting with Dr. Mattioli:
Q You did go along, and you did sign the documents, including the Guaranty?
A I signed whatever he brought to me that day. I didn't enumerate it. I didn't count it. I didn't read it.
Q But I think you did say in answer to Mr. Swift's direct examination earlier this morning that among those documents which you say you signed on that Friday was a guaranty of the loan.
A No, I didn't say there was a guaranty in it. I said, as I-am saying now, that I signed four or five times, whatever papers Doc put in front of me, and that was it. But whether the papers included a guaranty, I didn't know. (T. 94a)
It is interesting to note that the Pledge Agreement (and probably Subordination Agreement, although the record is unclear) with Appellant's purported signatures affixed are dated April 28, 1972! (T. 73a)
Most critical to the instant case is Appellant's unequivocal—almost dogged—testimony that the signature appearing on the guaranty dated April 25, 1972 was not his; that it was a forgery.
Q I am asking if you can identify the one on the right.
A This signature is not mine on the right.
Q But the words spell your name, do they not?
A There are two words that do spell my name.
Q Why isn't that your signature, if you can tell?
A Well, if I say so myself, as I write my name in a unique way of forming the capital letter "C" of my first name, and this is a poor imitation.
Q Is there any other reason?. . .
A And that was a Tuesday (meaning April 25, 1972). Yes. That was a Tuesday. I definitely signed nothing on that Tuesday, definitely. (T. 53a)
And, on cross-examination:
Q Now, Mr. Lehr, I am going to hand you a document entitled "Guaranty," which has just been produced by Mr. McKim from the bank's records, which on the fourth page bears a date of April 25, 1972, and ask whether that is your signature appearing thereon....
A This is not my signature, and this is dated April 25th, a date on which I signed nothing. I can absolutely guarantee that. I am certain—(T. 73a-74a)
Q I am asking about this one, Mr. Lehr. I am asking you whether—
A That is what you have that purports to be my signature.
Q I am not—
A And it isn't. (T. 95a)
And, for the fourth and fifth time:
Q I am talking about the document which Mr. McKim has produced from the bank records.
A I told you that this is not my signature. (T. 102a)
Q You have testified—and at this point we are not arguing whether or not it is your signature, but I am asking you whether by your saying you can't say whether it was or was not your penciled handwriting on there, and I am asking whether you deny that you made the pencil marks on the original Guaranty which I have handed you from the bank's records produced here today.
A Yes, I would deny that. I would deny that, because the thing isn't my signature in the first place so how did—how then did one or two or three or four sheets come into your possession with many scribblings on it that you think I wrote? (T. 103a)
Dr. Mattioli's recollection of the sequence of events differs sharply from that of Lehr's. Mattioli recalled delivering the loan papers, including the guaranty, to Lehr on April 23, 1972, but specifically recalled that he did not stop by Lehr's office for purposes of obtaining his signature on April 28, 1972.
. . . "Are you sure of the fact that you did not go to Mr. Lehr's home with documents in connection with this loan?"...
Q Did you ever go to Mr. Lehr's office to attempt to get him to sign any documents relating in any way to the term loan agreement prior to the closing?
A No. (T. 141-142a)
Earlier, Dr. Mattioli testified that he was. out of the jurisdiction on Friday, April 28, 1972.
I left for Terre Haute, Indiana, on Friday, The 28th, around ten or eleven o'clock in the morning, I believe it was, to attend an affair. I got back into my office about the following Monday or Tuesday, and then I received Mr. Lehr's letter at that time. (T. 136a)
The Guaranty Agreement upon which judgment was confessed against Appellant was dated April 25, 1972 and witnessed by Dr. Mattioli. In his deposition however, Dr. Mattioli was unable to recall the specifics. . .
Q Now, was the signature which you have identified as that of Mr. Lehr on page 4—
A Yes.
Q —on that document placed there in your presence?
A I don't know.
Q You have no recollection?
A No, no.
Q Do you know whether the signature that you have identified as your own on page 4 of this document was placed there in Mr. Lehr's presence?
A I don't know that; I don't know that. (T. 139a)
Winston J. Churchill, an associate of the bank's law firm which participated in this transaction and who was present at the closing of the term loan agreement, testified that he neither witnessed Appellant's execution of any of the documents nor was appellant present at the closing on April 28, 1972.
Q Did you witness Mr. Lehr's execution of any documents at the closing of the term loan agreement?
A Not that I recall. I don't believe that Mr. Lehr was personally present at the closing. (T. 154a)
Quaere, who dated the pledge and Subordination Agreements and witnessed Appellant's signature on April 28, 1972?
Mr. Churchill's testimony did conflict dramatically with that of Dr. Mattioli—
A No, that is correct. I think Dr. Mattioli executed the "Witness" line in my presence on the 28th, but Mr. Ben-singer presented the document at that time already signed by Mr. Lehr.
Q So it was witnessed on an occasion separate from the actual execution; is that correct?
A That is my recollection. It is a guaranty, of course, not a will. (T. 155a)
Finally, Walter D. McKim confirmed that Appellant did not execute the Guaranty Agreement in question in his presence:
Q Am I correct in concluding that the guaranty of Mr. Lehr, which is part of the bank's file and the closing of the term loan agreement, was not executed in your presence?
A That is correct. (T. 159a)
No expert testimony regarding Lehr's signature was presented by either side.
There are numerous inconsistencies and conflicts in the record. For instance, Lehr admittedly signed numerous documents on the 28th (the Pledge and Subordination Agreements are dated April 28, 1972), but the Guaranty is dated April 25th, a date upon which Lehr recalls he signed no documents. Lehr admits that he would have signed a Guaranty Agreement if one had been presented to him by Dr. Mattioli on the 28th; but he testified clearly and directly that he signed no documents on the 25th, although the Guaranty, witnessed by Dr. Mattioli is dated April 25th. Contrariwise, Dr. Mattioli testified he doesn't even recall witnessing same (on the 25th or at any other time). Further, Dr. Mattioli testified that he left for Terre Haute, Indiana on the morning of the 28th; however, one of the appellee's attorneys recalled that Dr. Mattioli attended the closing on the 28th and at that time witnessed appellant's signature.
Finally, appellant testified on five separate occasions that the signature appearing on the Guaranty Agreement dated April 25, 1972 and witnessed by Dr. Mattioli was not his.
Lehr has raised three issues on appeal: He claims (1) that the signature on the Guaranty is a forgery; (2) that his signature was obtained by fraud as part of a bank conspiracy with Dr. Mattioli; and (3) that his signature was obtained by duress and coercion.
Because we believe that appellant has produced sufficient evidence pursuant to Rule 2959(e) on the issue of the forgery of his signature, which would required same be submitted to a jury, we need not discuss issues 2 and 3 as stated above. Accordingly, we reverse and remand consistent with this opinion.
Prior to the adoption of Rule 2959(e) in 1973, the law of the Commonwealth was clear as to what standard of evidence was required in an action to open a confessed judg ment based upon the defense that the moving party's signature was a forgery. Our Superior Court in Carlson v. Sherwood, 416 Pa. 286, 287, 206 A.2d 19, 20 (1965) stated:
A party who relies on fraud or forgery has the burden in the first instance of proving the facts upon which the alleged fraud or forgery is based, and these facts must be established by evidence that is clear, direct, precise and convincing: Sterling Electric & Furnace Co. v. Peterson, 409 Pa. 435, 187 A.2d 285 (1965). (emphasis added)
In other words, pre 2959(e), the judgment debtor was required to offer clear, direct, precise and convincing evidence in the first instance that his purported signature was a forgery; thereafter, the burden of proof shifted to the judgment holder to establish the genuineness of the debtor's signature.
Obviously, prior to the adoption of 2959(e) the lower court was expected to weigh the sufficiency of the evidence presented by both parties and, thereafter, either open or refuse to open the judgment in question.
That onerous burden of proof imposed upon the moving party in the first instance where forgery was alleged has been altered by the adoption of Rule 2959(e).
Now, the lower court may not weigh the sufficiency of the evidence as presented in opening or refusing to open a judgment taken by confession. The change caused by the adoption of 2959(e) impacts squarely on the degree of proof required when forgery is raised as a meritorious defense. As the court in Ritchey v. Mars, 227 Pa.S. 33, 324 A.2d 513 (1974) opined, a judgment debtor does not have to prove his case conclusively. No longer must the moving party present evidence of forgery that is clear, direct, precise and convincing as was previously the case in Carlson v. Sherwood (supra). We believe that the key change caused by 2959(e) above, is the elimination of the requirement of "convincing" evidence; for "convincing" evidence by definition requires a weighing of the evidence. Now, we believe that a moving party no longer is required to produce clear, direct, precise and convincing evidence; now that requirement has been substantially liberalized to require only clear, direct, precise and "believable" evidence, which would in a jury trial preclude the entry of a directed verdict against the party raising forgery as a defense, and which, if believed by a jury, would not be reversed by the entry of a judgment non obstante veredicto.
We conclude that the lower court, therefore, abused its discretion when it denied appellant's petition to open. We are of the opinion that appellant has presented clear, direct, precise and believable evidence of forgery which, not to be redundant, a jury could believe. Under the circumstances at bar, the question of appellant's signature on the Guaranty dated April 25, 1972 presents a question of fact which should be resolved by jury.
Therefore, we find that the lower court abused its discretion when it concluded that the evidence of record could only support one finding and, therefore, erred when it denied appellant's petition to open the judgment taken by confession.
The order of the lower court is reversed and the case remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
CAVANAUGH, J., files a dissenting opinion.
. The itemization of amount due contained in the complaint for confession of judgment was as follows:
ITEMIZATION OF AMOUNT DUE:
Principal unpaid balance $3,500,000.00
Interest thru July 31, 1977 208,000.00
Attorney's fee (2%) 74,160.00
Total $3,782,160.00