Case Name: STAFFORD et al. v. LICK et al.
Court: Supreme Court of California
Jurisdiction: California
Decision Date: 1857
Citations: 7 Cal. 479
Docket Number: 
Parties: STAFFORD et al. v. LICK et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: California Reports
Volume: 7
Pages: 479–503

Head Matter:
STAFFORD et al. v. LICK et al.
The forty-first section of the Recording Act, requires conveyances, made before the passage of the act, to be recorded, and the penalty of failing so to do is the same as with conveyances made after the act was passed.
This section of the act is neither in violation of the Constitution of the United States nor of this State, as it does not impair the obligation of contracts, but merely establishes what shall be constructive notice to third parties ,* nor does it divest vested rights, but only introduces a rule for the subsequent protection of the rights of parties.
The act abolished all constructive notice of unrecorded conveyances; but it did not do away with notice in fact. Possession, therefore, is not constructive notice of title, but it may be admitted in evidence, along with other facts, to establish fraud or actual notice.
Per Burnett, «7., dissenting.—The sale of land in presentí, with a delivery of possession, there being no adverse claim, is valid under the Mexican law; and the delivery of the title-papers is a symbolical delivery, and for all purposes equally valid with a delivery by formal entry on the land.
The only penal section of the Registry Act is the twenty-sixth section, which is, by its own express limitation, confined to conveyances i( thereafter made.” Had it been intended to apply its provisions to conveyances theretofore made, language equally explicit would have been used; no such application can be adopted by mere inference and implication.
It cannot be said that the statute intended to allow a reasonable time for the recording of past conveyances, for it specifies the time, viz.: before a subsequent purchaser shall record his deed, which might be immediately after the passage of the act.
It seems, that it was the intention of the act to procure the recording of past conveyances, by offering rewards, and not by inflicting penalties.
Conceding that it was the intention of the Legislature to render void prior deeds, unless recorded in accordance with the provisions of this, act, such a statute would be unconstitutional, as impairing the obligation of contracts, by annexing thereto a condition unknown to the law at the date of the contract, and as divesting vested rights.
Such a statute differs from a statute of limitations, in this, that it imposes new burdens on parties; and it differs from a law imposing taxes not previously existing, in that the latter is expressly authorized by the Constitution.
Appeal from the District Court of the Twelfth Judicial District, County of San Francisco.
This was an action of ejectment for the recovery of the possession of fifty-vara lot FTo. 195, in the city of San Francisco. The plaintiffs rely on a conveyance to them in 1854, from Maximo Z. Fernandez, the original grantee of the lot. The defendants, James Lick and Jean Ducau, claim title, each to one-half of the lot, under conveyance by Fernandez to José Jesus Koé, in 1846, and by conveyance from Koe. All the title-deeds of defendants were duly recorded, except the conveyance of Fernandez to Koé, which was as follows:
“ Por el presente doy poder amplio y bastante á Don José de Jesus Hoé, para que use ó disponga de mi solar que tengo concedido, como mejor paresca; y para que conste, doy el presente poder, en el punto de Yerba Buena, el día de Octubre, 1846.
“ Maximo Z. Fernandez.”
Defendants proved that Fernandez had not yet taken his grant from the alcalde’s office, at the date of the above, and that FToé, in pursuance of the above, took the grant from the alcalde’s office, paying the municipal dues thereon, put improvements on the lot, and, subsequently, sold it in his own name to the plaintiffs. Defendants also proved a verbal sale of the lot by Fernandez to Roé, accompanying the above instrument. Defendants also proved a possession of the lot for over five years preceding the commencement of this suit. Both defendants purchased in 1848 and 1849, and Ducau has had possession ever since of the original petition and grant, as well as of the instrument set forth from Fernandez to Noé.
The Court below charged the jury, that if, at the time Fernandez executed the deed to plaintiffs, the defendants were in the visible and exclusive possession of the premises in controversy, such possession would be sufficient to put the plaintiffs on inquiry, and charge them with notice of defendants’ rights. The jury found a verdict for defendants, and judgment was entered accordingly. Plaintiffs 'appealed.
Gregory Yale for Appellants.
The points in this case embrace two principal questions, to which the attention of the Court is directed :
1. Was it necessary that the paper from Fernandez to Noé, dated on the sixth of October, 1846, supposing it to have been a valid deed, should have been recorded, to operate as notice to Stafford, a subsequent purchaser, without notice of that paper, actual or constructive ?
2. Is that paper, in terms, a conveyance, or a mere power to convey ?
It will be contended that the first question should be in answered in the affirmative, and the second in the negative.
The twenty-sixth section of the act concerning conveyances, of the sixteenth of April, 1850, provides as follows :
§ 26. Every conveyance of real estate within this State, hereafter made, which shall not be recorded as prescribed in this act, shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser, in good faith, and for a valuable consideration, of the same real estate, or any portion thereof, where his own conveyance shall be first duly recorded.
§ 41 provides: “All conveyances of real estate heretofore made, and acknowledged or proved according to the laws in force at the time of making such acknowledgment or proof, shall have the same force as evidence, and be recorded in the same manner, and with the like effect, as conveyances executed and acknowledged in pursuance of this act.”
These two sections, construed as a part of the same statute, and relating to the same subject-matter, intended to establish a system of legislative or constructive notice, respecting former. and subsequent conveyances, place the conveyances which were made before the statute upon precisely the same footing with conveyances executed under the statute, that is, they shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser. The only difference is, that the conveyance made before the passage of the act need not be acknowledged or proved according to the forms prescribed by the act for conveyances under it.
This is not an open question, but one which has been decided by this Court, so as to leave no doubt upon the application of the principle. Call et al. v. Hastings, 3 Cal., 179.
In the opinion of the Court, Mr. Justice Heydenfeldt, referring to the statute, says:
“It is unnecessary to decide whether the mortgage under which the plaintiffs claim was valid under the Mexican municipal laws which prevailed at the time it was made. Its validity may be conceded, and if so, it not only was unaffected, but was specifically protected by the act concerning conveyances, passed April 16, 1850.
“That act, however, introduced a new rule for the government of these contracts, not as affecting their validity, but in respect to their relation to the rights of other parties which might afterwards grow up.”
The same principle has been announced in other States, as to the registry of deeds existing at the passage of the act, within a certain time, and such deeds have been declared inoperative as to third persons.
In Hew York, upon the creation of a new county, conveyances recorded in the county of which it was formerly a part, were required to be recorded again in the new county. The Court say: “ As this act allowed a reasonable time for the recording of conveyances which had then been given, there cannot be any constitutional objection to its validity, in reference to deeds that were then in existence, and which the grantees in such deeds, or those claiming under them, might have procured to be recorded by the exercise of reasonable diligence, within the prescribed period.” Varick v. Briggs, 6 Paige, 330.
The same principle is recognized in Iowa, under an act requiring deeds then in existence to be recorded. Hoping v. Burnan, 2 Green, 49.
The object of the statute was to establish a uniform system of registry, substituting the record for all other kinds of notice, both as to deeds in esse and deeds to be executed; to create a statutory rule as to notice, and abolish all others. It is only upon this principle that an imperfect record, for the want of proper acknowledgment or proof of execution, is held to impart no notice at all. Wolf v. Fogarty, 6 Cal., 146; Kelsey v. Dunlap, 7 Cal.
It is not pretended that the paper in question should have been acknowledged or proved to have entitled it to record. The statute does not make that pre-requisite as to deeds in esse, but simply that they should be recorded as they were. The statute makes the record the only notice, and so this Court has held, making- all the decisions under this statute consistent and harmonious.
In commenting upon the effect of the twenty-fifth section, this Court says : “ If, however, the act of recording imparts notice, independent of the consequence, as provided in the statute, and its effects are not limited by the terms thereof, it is at best but constructive notice, and therefore insufficient to charge a party with fraud necessary to set aside the act in a Court of Equity, as the rule is well established that it requires actual notice in fact to constitute fraud, or such acts in the premises as some positive statute characterizes as fraudulent.” Dennis v. Burritt, 6 Cal., 191-2. Mesick v. Sunderland, 6 Cal., 149.
“If it is contended that the possession of the defendants put the plaintiff upon inquiry, and that it was his duty to ascertain the character of the defendants’ possession and title, we answer that it was the intention of the statute to protect the purchase of the legal title against latent equities, or mere executory agreements, and to abolish the presumption of notice arising from possession.”
Here, there is no pretence of actual notice or fraud. The direction of the Court to the jury, therefore, that the visible possession of the defendants was sufficient to put the plaintiffs upon inquiry, was erroneous, and in conflict with the policy of the State.
Sydney V. Smith for Respondents.
This respondent submits that the law of April 16, 1850, concerning conveyances, so far as it requires, for the purpose of imparting notice to subsequent purchasers, that deeds, etc., made prior to the passage of the act, should be recorded, is a retrospective law, one impairing the obligation of a contract, and therefore unconstitutional.
Under the Spanish and Mexican law, there was no office created or in existence for the record of deeds for the conveyance of land. In that respect, their law was identical with the old English law. The possession of the land and the title-papers was the evidence of ownership, and all persons dealing with a party claiming the right to sell, were bound to look to the one and inquire for the other.
Under the Spanish and Mexican law, a party purchasing always bought at his peril; the doctrine of caveat emptor invariably applied.
The rule laid down is, that “ no one can sell that which does not belong to him, or which he is not authorized to sell •” and the result to the purchaser is stated as follows: “ If the purchaser knew not that the thing sold belonged to another, the vendor is bound to restore the ‘ price, and to pay damages/ ” “ If the vendee knew that the thing sold belonged to another, he loses the price paid/' Schmidt’s Law of Spain and Mexico, pp. 133, 134.
The laws of Spain and Mexico expressly provide for the case of sales made of the same thing to different persons, and decree that he who first takes possession of the thing sold, is the one entitled to retain it, even though he be the one who purchased second in the order of time.
The law is to be found in the third volume of the Siete Partidas, page 334, and is designated as Ley 50, tit. 5, part 5.
Bscriche, in his dictionary, under the title “ Venta,” subdivision fourteen, states the same to be the rule, and refers to the above quoted law of the Partidas.
But in the case of mortgages of lands, for the security of others, a record ofiice was created, and in order to give notice of such mortgages, they were required to be recorded in the ofiice of the district where the mortgaged property was situated.
The reason for this is obvious. In the ease of a sale, the vendor not only divested himself of the actual possession, but also of his title-papers; in the case of a mortgage, he pledging the land only, still remained in the occupation of it, enjoying its use and being avowedly the owner of it. The policy of the law, therefore, required that some notice to third persons of the lien or pledge should be given, and it was provided for in the creation of the mortgage office.
The law on the subject is found in Schmidt’s Civil Law of Spain and Mexico, p. 180, etc.
How, under this law, respondent Ducau, as appears by the statement, purchased the easterly half of the fifty-vara lot in question in the early part of 1849, and has lived on it since then, having since then, the possession of the original-petition and grant, the paper given by Fernandez to Hoé, and also the subsequent deeds conveying the lot to him, Ducau.
Treating, for the present, that paper as a valid deed of conveyance, it then follows that, down to the sixteenth of April, 1850, Ducau had complied fully with all the requisites of the Spanish and Mexican law, having not only bought his lot, but being in actual possession of it, living on it, and having in his own hands all the title-papers which had ever been made.
As before said, there was, prior to April 16, 1850, no law making it necessary for Ducau to record his title. His possession of the lot and the title-papers was notice to the whole world of his title. Any one, therefore, wishing to buy of Fernandez, bought at his peril. The law of April 16,1850, was passed after all that has been above stated had taken place, and provided for a new condition of things; abrogated entirely the old mode of giving notice, and required that it should only be given by means of a recorder’s office.
The effect of this provision is to annex a new condition to a theretofore perfect and valid executed contract; perfect and valid, not only as between the parties, but as against the whole world; and is to render that executed contract entirely invalid for the purposes of notice, which it till then possessed, except the evidence of the contract should be recorded.
We have, then, clearly, a law not only retrospective in its character, but one impairing the obligation of a contract.
It was on this very ground that the Court of Errors of New York, in Varick v. Briggs, 22 Wendell, 543, overruling 6 Paige, 630, cited by appellants, decided that it was not competent to the Legislature to pass an act declaring a deed which, previous to the passage of the act, was a good and valid conveyance of lands, fraudulent and void, unless recorded previous to the recording of a subsequent deed or conveyance obtained by a bona fide purchaser.
Were it not for the decision already given by this Court, in Call v. Hastings, the doctrine invoked by the Court, in the latter part of the above-quoted opinion, might be well applied to our statute concerning conveyances, since a strong doubt might exist whether section forty-one was really intended by the Legislature to have the same penalty attached to it as is given by sections twenty-four and twenty-five. In the latter section, it is clear the language used is only intended to apply to conveyances made thereafter, and enacts that unless such be recorded, the penalty-shall attach to them, that is, they shall not operate as notice to third persons.
But in section forty-one there are no words found indicating any intention to attach the same penalty.
It is submitted, however, that the forty-second section of the law referred to, controls the previous sections, and exempts conveyances made prior to the passage of the law, from the operation of sections twenty-four and twenty-five.
As has been stated above, a sale of land, followed by possession in the vendee, and the delivery of the title-papers to him, under the Spanish and Mexican law, carried with it notice to the whole world; and the saving clause of the forty-second section evidently was intended to preserve to deeds, made prior to the passage of the act, such validity, in every respect and for every purpose, 'as had been given to them under the laws in force at the time they were made.
The doctrine laid down in the case in Wendell, as to the retrospective effect of recording laws, is also enunciated in Robinson v. Rowan, 2 Scam. R., 499.
The case of Hopping v. Burnham, 2 Green’s Iowa R., 39, cited by appellants, does not conflict with the foregoing decisions.
This respondent, however, desires to call the attention of the Court particularly to the facts of the cases of Call v. Hastings, and Mesick v. Sunderland, for the purpose of showing that the facts of those cases are essentially different from the facts of the case at bar.
In Call v. Hastings, the question was between two mortgagees, the first mortgagee holding a mortgage made prior to the act of 1850. It was recorded, it is true, but in a recording office not known to or created under the Spanish or Mexican law; this point is adverted to in the argument of the counsel in that case. The second mortgagee held a mortgage made after the passage of the law of 1850, and recorded in the recorder’s office created for the purpose, under the laws of 1850.
Under these circumstances, there could have been no other decision than the one which was made by this Court in that case.
In Mesick v. Sunderland, the deeds under which both plaintiff and defendant claimed title were made after the passage of the law in question, and they therefore depended for their validity upon that law.
As to the second point, whether the paper given by Fernandez to Hoé, dated October, 1846, was a power or a conveyance, it is submitted that, under the facts proved on the trial, under the well-known custom which existed here as to the simple form of instruments, the Court below was not in error in holding it a conveyance, though an informal one, it is true, of the lots to Moé.
When it is considered that, at the time of the sale by Fernandez to the appellants, Fernandez had not been in possession for nearly the period of ten years; that he had not in his possession a single paper to show his right to the lot; that the very petition made by Fernandez, and the grant to him, were then in the possession of the respondent Ducau, and had been in his possession from the time of his purchase, in 1849; that Ducau was living on the lot, and had lived on it since 1849 ; that the appellants only paid five hundred dollars for property worth ten thousand dollars and more; that on the trial, in order to make proof of their title, the appellants were forced to give notice to respondent Ducau, to produce the original petition and grant; it is not saying too much, that any Court would, from such facts alone, be warranted in inferring due notice to appellants, of a prior sale of the property in question, by their grantor, Fernandez, and in enforcing against their demand, whatever equitable rule could be applied for that purpose.

Opinion:
Murray, C. J.,
delivered the opinion of the Court—Terry, J., concurring.
This was an action of ejectment in the Court below. Trial and judgment for defendants. Several grounds of error are assigned by the appellants, which it is considered unnecessary to mention.
Passing by the question, whether a parol sale of real estate was good under the Mexican law, and treating the written instrument as a conveyance from Fernandez to Uoe, we will proceed to inquire what the effect of such a conveyance is as against a subsequent purchaser in good faith. This inquiry involves three questions: 1st, "Whether the forty-first section of the Recording Act requires conveyances made before the passage of the act to be recorded ? 2d, If the terms of the act extend to such conveyances, is the law unconstitutional ? 3d, Was the defendants' possession notice of their title ?
The act concerning conveyances, passed April 30th, 1850, provides the mode in which conveyances shall be made, acknowledged, and recorded. That when so made and recorded, they shall impart notice of their contents to all persons; and if not so made and recorded, they shall be void as against subsequent purchasers in good faith. § 24, 25, and 26. The forty-first section of the act provides that all conveyances of real estate theretofore made and acknowledged, or proved according to the laws in force at the time of such making, and acknowledgment or proof, shall have the same force as evidence, and be recorded in the same manner, and with like effect, as conveyances executed in pursuance of this act.
It is contended that this section does not require these conveyances to be recorded, but .simply permits them to be. That when so recorded, they do not impart notice, but are allowed to be used as evidence, and that there is no penalty for the non-recordation thereof.
In order to arrive at a correct understanding of the intention of the Legislature, it will be necessary to examine the whole act. The design was to establish a system of constructive notice in relation to conveyances affecting real estate. At that time all the lands not claimed by patent from the Mexican government were supposed to belong to the United States. Years would intervene before these lands could be surveyed and brought into the market, and it does seem absurd to suppose that the Legislature intended to require future conveyances 'to be recorded under certain penalties, and leave the originals from which they derive their validity to rest in undertainty and doubt.
The act must be taken as a whole. In the foregoing sections the duty of recording future conveyances is enjoined, and the penalty declared in the forty-first section, which is but a continuation. It is provided that past conveyances shall be recorded in the same manner, and with like effect. It is true, that the section does not say in so many words that, unless so re corded, the deed shall be void, but this results by necessary implication from the other section of the statute. Such, at least, was the decision of this Court in the case of Call v. Hastings, 3 Cal.; and whatever might be our opinion, were the question res integra, we are not now disposed to disturb a rule of property that has been so long settled. The public have governed themselves by that opinion, and the question ought not to be again re-opened to meet the exigencies of a few cases arising from the laches of the parties, and not from the harshness or injustice of the rule. .
We will proceed next to inquire if the forty-first section of the act is in conflict with the Constitution of the United States, or of the Constitution of the State of California.
It is claimed, first, that the act conflicts with that provision of the Constitution which forbids the States from passing laws impairing the obligations of contracts; and second, that it is obnoxious to our Constitution, because it divests vested rights.
It is difficult to see how it can be claimed that this act impairs the obligation of contracts. A sells his lands to B, before the passage of the act; the deed contains covenants of warranty and seizin. The law does not impair the obligation of the contract, by declaring that A shall not be liable on his covenant to B, neither does it say that the fee shall be divested, or that B shall have less, or A retain anything in the land sold; between them, the statute expressly declares the conveyance shall be good. But as to third parties, it says, if B does not make his title known by recordation, thereby giving constructive notice of Ms right, and A sells to an innocent purchaser who has no notice of B's title, B shall be deemed guilty of fraud, and his conveyance shall be postponed to that of an innocent purchaser. The contract between the original parties is not interfered with. A has passed all his title in the land, and B is the owner thereof. If B chooses to neglect his duty, as pointed out by the law, and another, in ignorance of his rights, purchases the land, how can B avail himself of his own laches ?
It appears to us, that one of the purposes for which government was ordained, was to protect and give security to property, and if salutary laws of this character, ordained for public convenience and to prevent the perpetration of fraud, cannot be passed, that the Legislature is impotent indeed.
In Jackson v. Lamphier, 3 Peters U. S. Rep., p. 289, the Court say : " It is within the undoubted power of State Legislatures to pass recording acts, by which the elder grantee shall be postponed to a younger, if the prior deed is not recorded within the limited time, and the power is the same, whether the deed is dated before or after the passage of the recording act. Though the effect of such a law is to render the prior deed fraudulent and void against a subsequent purchaser, it is not a law impair ing the obligation of contracts; such, too, is the power to pass acts of limitations, and their effect. Seasons of sound policy have led to the general adoption of laws of both descriptions, and their validity cannot be questioned. The time and manner of their operation, the exceptions to them, and the acts from which the time limited shall begin to run, will generally depend on the sound discretion of the Legislature, according to the nature of the titles, the situation of the country, and the emergency which leads to their enactment. Cases may occur where the provisions of a law on those subjects may be so unreasonable as to amount to a denial of a right, and call for the interposition of the Court, but the present is not one."
In support of the contrary doctrine, the case of Yarick's Executors v. Briggs is relied on. In this case, Chancellor Walworth, in 6 Baige, held that the power of the Legislature to pass acts requiring prior conveyances to be recorded was undoubted, but the decision turned on the point that the deed in question, executed in 1802,. was not within the act of 1813. On appeal to the Court of Errors, see 22 Wend., the decision of the Chancellor was sustained by a unanimous vote. Senator Yerplanck, who delivered the decision of the Court, dissented from the opinion of the Chancellor as to the power of the Legislature to pass acts affecting past conveyances. The statement is sufficient to show that the case cited has no authority, and that the Court did not overrule the opinion of the Chancellor, in fact; that part of the opinion to which Senator Yerplanck dissented may be regarded as mere dictum, but when we take into consideration the high authority from which it emanated, it is not without weight.
The case of Bobinson v. Bowan, 2 Scammon, Illinois Bep., has also been cited. The question there was, whether the statute was designed to act retrospectively, and it was held that it was not. It is true that Chief Justice Wilson, in commenting on the case, intimates that such a law would be unconstitutional, but as this point was not involved, it may be regarded as mere obiter.
Let us next inquire if this act divests vested rights.
Again, it may be remarked that it would be difficult to see wherein the act had such an effect. It does not take the property from one man and give it to another; it does not impair his title or take away his right, but simply establishes a rule of evidence. It says to A, if you do not record your deed, and suffer an innocent purchaser to buy your land without the notice hereby established as between yourself and such purchaser, you shall be postponed to his rights. It introduces a new rule, plain and simple, the terms of which may easily be complied with, and he who refuses to bring himself within it, ought not to be allowed to defend in a -Court of Justice. We can see no difference in principle, between this and limitation laws, or acts abolishing imprisonment for debt, or revenue acts. It might as well be claimed that if a certain class of property was exempt from taxation under the laws of Mexico, that the Legislature of California could impose no burdens on it.
The power to regulate this subject, has never been disputed. It is the high prerogative of State sovereignty, and when properly and justly exercised, should be maintained. If the act was unreasonable or onerous in its provisions, there might be a question, but where parties have neglected for years the plain mandate of the statute, they cannot complain that it is unjust.
We come now to inquire how far the plaintiffs were affected with notice of the defendants' title, by reason of their possession. In the case of Mesick v. Sunderland, we held that it was the intention of the Legislature to do away with all constructive notice, other than that arising fromfthe record, preserving, at the same time, as far as compatible with the rule, actual notice in fact. This intention, we thought, clearly appeared from the statute concerning conveyances, which, on examination, will be found to differ from every statute in the Union on the same subject; and unless this construction be maintained, then one-half of the act must be treated as mere surplusage.
It was the first time the question had come before this Court. Judges in England and the United States had frequently regretted that a more rigid adherence to the rule had not been enforced. It was obvious that sound policy and morality required that the whole doctrine of constructive notice arising from facts and circumstances in pais, should be exploded, and nothing but the former decisions of those Courts, tied down as they were by precedent, prevented them from taking a new departure, and establishing a new rule. In this State, while our jurisprudence is in its infancy, it is competent for us to do what the Courts of other States could not; and by conforming strictly to the statute, to afford the public a safe and commodious means by which they may acquire information and protect themselves against fraud. When once the rule is understood, that every man must record his title, no hardship will be found in it, and it will serve as a protection against those who by unrecorded titles seek to perpetrate frauds upon the community.
In the case of Mesick v. Sunderland, we expressly held, that the statute did not do away with notice in fact but only constructive notice, as to those instruments required to be recorded, so that the doctrine of notice of title arising from possession, no longer obtained. But we nowhere said that possession, together with another fact, might not be admitted in evidence, for the purpose of establishing fraud or notice in [fact; such, on the other hand, was our understanding of the case, and in the present case, we think it would be proper to admit evidence of possession, as a fact tending to establish notice of title, though not a fact from which notice would follow as a conclusion of law.
On the argument of this case, the counsel for the respondent reviewed the decision of Mesick v. Sunderland, and seemed to think that it was intended to apply to all conveyances of any estate in lands, legal or equitable, and that, unless recorded, they were void as against subsequent purchasers in good faith without notice. Such certainty appears to be the language of that decision, and it is due to the Court, as well as to the counsel who argued the case, to state that the fact of notice arising from possession was not a distinct ground relied on in the case, the object of both parties being to get the opinion of the Court as to the character of the instrument and the estate conveyed.
In Cook v. McChristian, which was a suit involving a right of homestead, it was contended that the intention of the parties to dedicate the premises for homestead purposes should have been made in writing, and recorded in the county recorder's office; but we held, the law did not require that such estates should be recorded, to operate as notice, and that in the absence of any statute on the subject, the common law rule obtained, and possession would put the purchaser upon notice of the occupant's title. Such, I suppose, must be the rule in every case where the law does not require a particular species of conveyance to be recorded ; but wherever the statute has said, that certain instruments shall be recorded, to operate as constructive notice, it is absolutely necessary that the law should be complied with; otherwise they will be void as against subsequent purchasers in good faith without notice;—the doctrine of constructive notice arising from possession having been superseded or abrogated by notice established by the statute.
So far as the opinion of the Court in Mesick v. Sunderland militates against this position, it is erroneous, and cannot be sustained on principle or authority.
Judgment reversed, and cause remanded.