Case Name: William Carlisle v. Catharine McCall and others
Court: New York Court of Common Pleas
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1857-08
Citations: 1 Hilt. 399
Docket Number: 
Parties: William Carlisle v. Catharine McCall and others.
Judges: 
Reporter: Hilton's Common Pleas Reports
Volume: 1
Pages: 399–409

Head Matter:
William Carlisle v. Catharine McCall and others.
' In summary proceedings to recover possession of demised premises, the evidence showed that defendants entered upon the premises immediately before the expiration of the term of plaintiff’s tenant; but the tenant testified positively that she never gave defendants permission to come in, nor sold nor assigned her lease to them; that they came in as she was moving out, claiming that the premises were theirs.
Held, that, upon the evidence, the entry was under a claim of title hostile to plaintiff, and not under his demise; and that there was, therefore, no relation of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and defendants which could support summary proceedings. (Bbady, J., dissented.)
A justice of the district court has jurisdiction of summary proceedings to obtain possession of demised premises within the city and county of New York, although neither of the parties reside and the premises are not situated within the district for which such justice is elected. Per Bbady, J.
On the trial of an issue joined in summary proceedings to recover possession of demised premises, the evidence was closed u^on both sides, and the cause submitted, with the single reservation of leave to put in written points, and, after adjournment, the counsel for the landlord applied to the justice to discontinue the proceeding-. No decision in the cause was ever rendered by the justice.
Held, that this proceeding was no bar to a subsequent one, although between the same parties and involving the same questions.
Appeal from the judgment of the justice of the Fourth District Court, in summary proceedings to recover possession of land. The affidavit of William Carlisle, on which the proceedings before the justice were based, stated that he was owner of the premises claimed (the back basement room of the house 47 Troj street, in New York city); that be rented them to Elizabeth Markey for one month ; that, daring that term, Catharine McCall, Jane McCall and Richard Carlisle entered on the premises under Markey, and she,, as deponent was informed and believed, demised the same to them; that the term had expired, but the McCalls and Carlisle continued in possession without deponent’s permission.
The defendants filed an affidavit, denying that they entered on the premises under Markey, and denying that the claimant was owner of the premises, or that the defendants were his tenants; and averring that Catharine and Jane McCall were owners of the premises in their own right, and were entitled to the posses-n, and entered as owners and not otherwise.
On the trial before the justice, the defendants added to their answer the allegation that the same question had been previously tried before the same justice, and he had given judgment thereon.
They then moved to dismiss the proceedings for want of jurisdiction, on the ground that the premises claimed were not within the justice’s district, and neither of the parties resided within the district. This motion was denied.
The plaintiff proved the letting to Elizabeth Markey, by the testimony of Margaret Carlisle, and rested. The defendants then moved to dismiss the proceeding, on the ground that there was no evidence that they entered under Mrs. Markey. This motion was denied.
They then introduced evidence of former proceedings of the same nature, between the same parties, and involving the same questions. It appeared, however, that after the former case had been heard and submitted, excepting leave reserved to submit written points, the proceedings were discontinued and no decision was ever rendered.
They then called as a witness Elizabeth Markey, who testified that she never sold or assigned the lease, and never gave defendants any permission to come in. They came in as she was moving out, saying that the place was theirs.
Tbe defendants called William Carlisle and Ricbard Carlisle,' but tbe justice excluded tliem as incompetent. They also offered evidence of title in the McCalls, but this was also excluded.
The justice rendered judgment for the plaintiff, that he have possession of the premises, and that a warrant issue to put him in possession. The defendants appealed from this judgment.
G. N. Potter, for the appellants. .
I. The ruling of the justice, upon the motion to dismiss fox want of jurisdiction, was clearly erroneous. The landlord’s affidavit must show that the relation of landlord and tenant exists. Benjamin y. Benjamin, 1 Sekl. 887. And his affidavit cannot aided by intendment. Prindle v. Anderson, 19 Wend. 895; Far-rington v. Morgan, 20 Wend. 209.
* II. The testimony of the landlord wholly failed to show that such relationship in fact existed. 'No implied or constructive tenancy can be raised in aid of these proceedings. Benjamin v. Benjamin, 1 Seld. 888 ; 'Poach v. Cozine, 9 Wend. 227; Syms v. Humphrey, 4 Don. 186.
III. The testimony of the appellants showed that they entered' either legally as heirs, or illegally by forcible entry and detainer; and the respondent’s remedy was either ejectment or summary proceedings for forcible entry and detainer.
IY. The former proceedings were a bar. The statute does not allow a withdrawal of the case, but only provides for a “ final decision.” 2 Rev. Stat., 4th ed., 759 ; Laws of 1849, ch. 198, § 5. If these proceedings may be discontinued, it must be before the cause is submitted for advisement. 2 Cow. Tr. 334; Flwell v. McQueen, 10 Wend. 519 ; Ideas v. Beehman, 11 Johns. 457. Here it appeared that the cause was only kept open to receive points. Then it was closed for all other purposes — for a motion to discontinue included.
Y. The refusal of the justice to permit the examination of William and Richard Carlisle was erroneous. There can be no reason why the trial should not be governed by the ordinary rules of evidence. The statute conferring jurisdiction does not except these proceedings from those rules. .
II. P. Fessenden, for the respondents.
I. It is true that the landlord’s affidavit must show that the relation of landlord and tenant exists, or existed, and that it arose out of contract; but it is not true that the contract must be between the landlord and the present tenant directly. On the contrary, a sub-tenant, or one who comes in by arrangement of any kind, or collusion, with the original tenant, is just as much the tenant, and the tenant by contract, of the landlord, as the original tenant himself; that is, at the landlord’s option. 2E.S. ^fl2 (marg. pag.), § 28, as amended by Laws of 1849, ch. 193, p. 291; Birdsall v. Phillips, 17 Wend. 472, 473. Where there is a lease, a third person, found in possession of the premises, is presumed, prima facie, to be assignee of the term. Williams v. Wood-arel, 2 Wend. 487,492, 493 ; Acker v. Wetherell, 4 Hill, 112,116; Rleivart v. Roderick, 4 Watts & S. 188. Nor is the landlord’s affidavit to be construed with any special strictness, but rather with liberality. ‘Lynde v. Noble, 20 Johns. 80, 82; Gardner v. Ketel-tas, 3 Hill, 332.
II. The evidence showed facts from which the justice might well infer, as he did infer, that the defendants came in by arrangement with the .first tenant, and so became tenants as much as she was. One who comes into lands under another can set up no title which the first could not. Jackson v. Harder, 4 Johns. 202, 210, 211, 212 ; Jackson v. Davis, 5 Cowen, 129, 130; Rankin v. Ten Brook, 4 Watts, 386,388; Graham v. Moore, 4 Serg. & E. 467,472.
III. The landlord, doubtless, might have brought ejectment, and so ho may in every case where summary proceedings are proper. He had no remedy as for a forcible entry and detainer, for no force on the ap2eellants’ part is shown ; nor was he bound to proceed as for a forcible detainer, if only the appellants could be regarded as his tenants. All summary proceedings are a substitute for ejectment. Lynde v. Noble, 20 Johns. 80, 82 ; Birdsall v. Phillips, 17 Wend. 472, 473.
TY. The former proceedings were not submitted or closed, nor were they pending. They were properly discontinued. There is no prohibition, on a landlord to discontinue summary proceedings at any time before a decision. has been made; and it is a natural incident to every proceeding. In Ogsbury v. La Farge (2 Corns. 113) there was nothing more for the parties to do, and there had been a decree dismissing the complaint.
Y. The Code, which alone allows the examination of adverse parties and co-defendants, has no application to these summary proceedings, but expressly excludes them from its scope. Code, § 471; 2 R. S. 511 (marg. pag.)

Opinion:
Daly, J. —
The foundation for this proceeding was the demif® from the plaintiff to Mrs. Markey, and unless the evidence will support a finding, on the part of the justice, that the defendants' possession was under that demise, the judgment was erroneous! As the defendants entered while Mrs. Markey was in possession and before the expiration of the month for which she had paid rent, the legal presumption might be that they remained in possession after she left, as her assignee. But that presumption 'is destroyed by her positive statement that she never gave thexni, permission to come in, or sold or assigned her lease to them 9 that she did not want to stay in the premises, and that they • came in as she was moving out, claiming that the place was theirs; that she did not forbid them from coming in, because she thought that she had no right to forbid their coming into their own house. The entry and possession of the defendants, therefore, was under a claim of title hostile to the plaintiff, and not under or by virtue of his demise. As Mrs. Markey was leaving, they entered, claiming that the premises were theirs, When they entered, she had the right to the possession until the expiration of the month; and, as between her and the landlord, he had the right to possession after that time, as she gave up the premises. As the defendants claimed that the premises were theirs when they entered, that claim was as hostile to the right of possession she had under the demise as it was hostile to any claim the plaintiff might have thereafter ; nor did ber acquiescing in their right to enter and take possession make it the less so, or render them ber assignee. The nature of their entry admitted neither title in her nor in her landlord, but was a claim of title and a right of possession not derived from, growing out of, or ñowing from the demise by the plaintiff to her. Upon this evidence, the justice could not assume that ¡ the relation of landlord and tenant subsisted between the defendants and the plaintiff; and, if it did not, there was no foundation for the proceeding. If they were intruders, holding the possession without right, the only remedy of the plaintiff was by an action of ejectment, the entry of the Ídefendants not having been accompanied by any force to war-ant the institution of proceedings for forcible entry and detainer
The judgment should be set aside.