Case Name: Rosie M. WRIGHT, Appellant, v. FLORIDA UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS COMMISSION and Mitsui & Company U.S.A., Inc., Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1987-09-15
Citations: 512 So. 2d 333
Docket Number: No. 86-2988
Parties: Rosie M. WRIGHT, Appellant, v. FLORIDA UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS COMMISSION and Mitsui & Company U.S.A., Inc., Appellees.
Judges: Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and NESBITT and DANIEL S. PEARSON, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 512
Pages: 333–335

Head Matter:
Rosie M. WRIGHT, Appellant, v. FLORIDA UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS COMMISSION and Mitsui & Company U.S.A., Inc., Appellees.
No. 86-2988.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Sept. 15, 1987.
Paulette Ettachild, Miami, for appellant.
John D. Maher, Tallahassee, for appel-lees.
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and NESBITT and DANIEL S. PEARSON, JJ.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Wright appeals from an order of the Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission (FUAC). We reverse.
Wright was laid-off from her full-time job at Western Union after seventeen years of employment. At that time, Wright was working for Mitsui & Co., U.S.A., Inc. (Mit-sui) on a part-time basis, and had been there for six months. Wright quit her job at Mitsui in order to facilitate her search for full-time employment.
Wright applied to the Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security, Division of Unemployment Compensation (the Division) for unemployment benefits she claimed entitlement to as a result of her termination by Western Union. The Division denied her claim for benefits, finding that she was disqualified pursuant to section 443.101, Florida Statutes (1985), because she voluntarily left her job at Mitsui without good cause. FUAC upheld the Division's order upon Wright's appeal. Wright then brought this appeal.
Wright contends that the Division erred in denying her unemployment benefits for the "non-disqualifying" termination from Western Union based upon the fact that she voluntarily left her part-time, second job. We agree. Wright is not rendered ineligible for unemployment benefits simply because she left a part-time position, which, according to the Division's own findings, represented only .621 percent of her yearly income. Neese v. Sizzler Family Steak House, 404 So.2d 371 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981) (interpreting former section 443.06, Florida Statute (1979), subsequently renumbered to section 443.101), review denied, 412 So.2d 471 (Fla.1982)). To deny benefits to an individual in Wright's position would not further the legislative purpose of Unemployment Compensation law — to ease the financial hardships caused by unemployment — but could discourage part-time employment and give a windfall in the form of reduced contribution rates to the former full-time employer. Neese, 404 So.2d at 372; cf. Massey v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 478 So.2d 1140 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (applying the same reasoning where a claimant turned down part-time employment after she had been terminated from a full-time job). Instead, section 443.-101 should be applied on a job-by-job basis. Thus, Wright should have been disqualified only to the extent that her benefits would have been decreased by the income from her part-time employment. Massey, 478 So.2d at 1141; Neese, 404 So.2d at 372. Accordingly, we reverse FUAC's order and remand with directions to enter an order allowing benefits for her non-disqualifying termination.
SCHWARTZ, C.J., and NESBITT, J., concur.
. Section 443.101 provides in pertinent part:
1. Disqualification for voluntarily quitting shall continue for the full period of unemployment next ensuing after he has left his work voluntarily without good cause and until such individual has become reemployed and has earned wages equal to or in excess of 17 times his weekly benefit amount; "good cause" as used in this subsection shall include only such cause as is attributable to the employer or which consists of illness or disability of the individual requiring separation from his employment.