Case Name: Willis T. Honsinger et al., Respondents, v. The Union Carriage and Gear Company, Appellant
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1903-06-02
Citations: 175 N.Y. 229
Docket Number: 
Parties: Willis T. Honsinger et al., Respondents, v. The Union Carriage and Gear Company, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 175
Pages: 229–238

Head Matter:
Willis T. Honsinger et al., Respondents, v. The Union Carriage and Gear Company, Appellant.
(Argued May 12, 1903;
decided June 2, 1903.)
Counterclaim — When Judgment Rendered Thereon, on Depend-ant’s Failure to Appear, Rot a Bar to a Subsequent Action. Where the defendant in an action brought for the purchase price of goods sold and delivered to him interposed a counterclaim for a breach of warranty in tlnj sale of such goo'ds, which he afterward sought to withdraw and of which he gave no evidence, defaulting in appearance at the trial, the result of his failure to appear and sustain the counterclaim is, under section 974 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the same as a failure to appear- and sustain a cause of action; the effect of the judgment obtained against him is nothing more than a nonsuit as to the counterclaim, and such judgment is not a bar to a subsequent action brought by him upon such breach of warranty against the plaintiff in the former action.
Honsinger v. Union Carriage & Gear Co., 70 App. Div. 621, affirmed.
Appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the third judicial department, entered March 15, 1902, affirming a judgment in favor of plaintiffs entered upon the report of a referee.
The nature of the action and the facts, so far as material, are stated in the opinion.
John Lansing for appellant.
The judgment in the former case, of the defendant against the plaintiffs, in the action for the balance of the contract price for these same carriages remaining unpaid, is a bar to this action. (Averill v. Day, 26 Hun, 319; Lorillard v. Clyde, 122 N. Y. 41; Davis v. Tallcot, 12 N. Y. 184; Dunham v. Bower, 77 N. Y. 76; Barber v. Kendall, 158 N. Y. 401; Collins v. Bennett, 46 N. Y. 490; Gates v. Preston, 41 N. Y. 113; Blair v. Bartlett, 75 N. Y. 150; Reich v. Cochran, 151 N. Y. 122; Jordan v. Van Epps, 85 N. Y. 427; Brawner v. Fahy, 64 App. Div. 122.)
L. L. Shedden for respondents.
The former judgment was not a bar to this action. (Mayor, etc., v. Ketchum, 67 How. Pr. 163; Burwell v. Knight, 51 Barb. 267; Jones v. Underwood, 35 Barb. 211; Foster v. Milliner, 50 Barb. 395; Colwell v. Bleakly, 1 Abb. Ct. App. Dec. 400; Matter of Butler, 101 N. Y. 309; Raeder v. Lockwood, 30 Misc. Rep. 531.) The counterclaim was not involved or comprehended in the former action. (Bancroft v. Sheehan, 21 Hun, 550; Davis v. Tallcot, 12 N. Y. 184; Long v. Farrell, 165 N. Y. 346; Aurora City v. West, 7 Wall. 106; Dunham v. Bower, 77 N. Y. 79; Barber v. Kendall, 1 App. Div. 247; B. B. Co. v. Haley, 16 App. Div. 489; Young v. Farwell, 165 N. Y. 341.)

Opinion:
Cullen, J.
Undoubtedly a judgment is conclusive not only of the issues actually litigated in the action, but also of any matter necessarily comprehended and involved therein, although the same was not litigated. Pray v. Hegeman (98 N. Y. 351) states this rule clearly. But the question remains, did the recovery by the defendant in the action brought by it for the purchase price of the goods necessarily involve the proposition that there had been no breach of the warranty given by it? I submit that that question is authoritatively determined by the decisions in this state. In Cook v. Moseley (13 Wend. 277) the action was for the breach of a warranty on the sale of a horse. The defendant pleaded in bar a former recovery in his favor against the plaintiff in an action brought for the price of the horse. It was held by the old Supreme Court that the judgment in the first action was not a bar to the second. That was the case of a present sale. It was mooted for some time whether there was not a difference in the rights and remedies of the parties in the case of an executory contract of sale, and it was questioned whether the right to recover for a breach of the warranty survived an acceptance of the articles sold. This question, however, was put at rest by Day v. Pool (52 N. Y. 416), where it was held that a warranty on an executory contract of sale survived acceptance and payment of the purchase price, and that for a breach an action might be maintained by the vendee. The same argument was made there that is made now, that fulfillment of the warranty was an integral part of the contract, compliance with which was necessary to entitle the vendor to payment, and that hence acceptance of the goods was an admission that the vendor had performed the contract. The claim was overruled.
The fact that the present plaintiff interposed in the first action a counterclaim for breach of the warranty, a counterclaim which he sought to withdraw and of which he gave no evidence, defaulting in appearance on the trial, gives the judgment recovered by the defendant no greater effect than otherwise would have been accorded to it. I concede that the notice of withdrawal was a nullity, and I also concede that a party has not the absolute right under all circumstances to withdraw a suit brought by him, and that the principle equally applies to a counterclaim. Doubtless the court may refuse to allow a suit to be discontinued where the discontinuance will prejudice the rights of the other party. But suppose the court does refuse to allow a party to withdraw his action, the court cannot make him try his claim, and if he refuses to appear on the trial and the court dismisses his action, the effect is nothing more than a nonsuit. By section 974 of the Code the trial of a counterclaim is governed by the same rules as if the defendant had brought his affirmative action for the demand set up as a counterclaim. Therefore, the result of a failure to appear at trial and sustain a counterclaim is just the same as a failure to appear and sustain a cause of action. That a judgment on a nonsuit does not conclude the parties requires the citation of no authority.
The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.