Case Name: FANNIE B. LEGGETT ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. THE INHABITANTS OF THE CITY OF PLAINFIELD, RESPONDENT; HENRY D. HIBBARD ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. THE INHABITANTS OF THE CITY OF PLAINFIELD, RESPONDENT
Court: New Jersey Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1922-02-09
Citations: 97 N.J.L. 341
Docket Number: 
Parties: FANNIE B. LEGGETT ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. THE INHABITANTS OF THE CITY OF PLAINFIELD, RESPONDENT. HENRY D. HIBBARD ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. THE INHABITANTS OF THE CITY OF PLAINFIELD, RESPONDENT.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Law Reports
Volume: 97
Pages: 341–343

Head Matter:
FANNIE B. LEGGETT ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. THE INHABITANTS OF THE CITY OF PLAINFIELD, RESPONDENT. HENRY D. HIBBARD ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. THE INHABITANTS OF THE CITY OF PLAINFIELD, RESPONDENT.
Argued November 11, 1921
Decided February 9, 1922.
On appeal from the Supreme, Court, in which the following per curiam was filed:
“These are certioraris to review assessments for paving in Plainfield. The assessment commissioners in their report certify that in no ease was any property owner assessed beyond the special and peculiar benefits actually derived from the improvement. We find nothing in the evidence to overcome the presumption arising out of the report of the commissioners. The chief point made is that the paving was not for the benefit of the abutting property owners hut for the general benefit of the city. No doubt a pavement of important streets is for the general benefit of the city and it mlay he that the general benefit was the moving cause, of the improvement, but that does not negative the existence of special benefits to the individual property owners, which are the only benefits for which a special assessment like this can be made. Ordinarily we should think that the, benefit of well paved streets would be an enhancement of value to the propertj'. It ma}'- well be in a special case, that an improved pavement may lend to increased traffic and that it may not be desirable for a residence street, but ordinarily we should think the reverse would he true. We think there is no objection to limiting the special assessment to property along the line of improvement and ordinarily it is probable that would be more just than to distribute the expense and impose part of it upon property that does not abut on the street. It is said1 that a distinction ought to be made between lots where the curbing was not renewed and lots where it was, hut in our judgment the curbing of a long section of street and the paving together make one job and all parties .are benefited1 by the amount saved by utilizing the old curbing. We think the assessment was not vitiated by. the fact that one of the commissioners was in the employ of the city. If in fact this had led to Ms taking a prejudiced view there should have been some; proof of it.
“We find one error in the assessment. The property belonging to the Presbyterian church was dedicated to public use for a park, although the title was. in the church. We think this fact brings the case within the rule of New York Bay Railroad Co. v. Newark, 82 N. J. L. 591, and distinguished it from New York Telephone Co. v. Newark, 90 Id. 362.
“With the exception' of the park, the assessments are affirmed, with costs.”
For tlie appellants, Collins <£• Corbin.
For the respondent, Charles A. Reed.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
The judgment under review herein should- be affirmed, for the reasons expressed in the opinion of the Supreme Court.
For affirmance — The Chancellor, Chief Justice, Tkgnchard, Bergen, Kalisch, Katzenbach, Williams, Gardner, Ackerson, Yan Buskirk, JJ. 10.
For reversal — None.