Case Name: COMMERCIAL NAT'L BANK OF OGDEN v. ECCLES et al.
Court: Utah Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Utah
Decision Date: 1913-06-07
Citations: 43 Utah 91
Docket Number: No. 2448
Parties: COMMERCIAL NAT'L BANK OF OGDEN v ECCLES et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Utah Reports
Volume: 43
Pages: 91–105

Head Matter:
COMMERCIAL NAT'L BANK OF OGDEN v ECCLES et al.
No. 2448.
Decided June 7, 1913
(134 Pac. 614).
1. Pasty Wauls- — Termination oe Right — Destruction of Wall. Where one has acquired an easement of support in a party wall, its accidental destruction determines the easement, and extinguishes all rights arising thereunder. (Page 98.)
2. Party Walls — Continuance of Right — Removal and Reconstruction. Plaintiff, hy purchase, acquired an easement for the support of its building to the height of three stories in a wall five stories high, standing wholly on defendant’s land. Defendant’s building was thereafter entirely destroyed by fire, leaving the wall standing and furnishing the same support to plaintiff’s building as it did before, but not sufficiently strong, to support the hind of building which defendant intended to erect on the same site.. Held, that the plaintiff’s easement had not terminated, that defendant had the right to remove the wall using ordinary care to avoid injury to plaintiff’s building and to rebuild without unnecessary delay, provided he gave to plaintiff the same right' of support in the new wall that he had in the old. (Page 98.)
FRICK, J., dissenting.
Appeal from District Court, Second’ District; Hon. N.. J. Harris, Judge.
Action for an injunction by tbe Commercial National Bank of Ogden against David Eccles and others.
Judgment for plaintiff. Defendants appeal.
Affirmed.
Richard & Boyd for appellants.
Valentine Gideon and J. G. Heywood for respondent.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
This action was originally commenced against David Eccles, S. T. Whitaker, and Boy Sheedy to enjoin them from tearing down and removing a certain stone and brick wall situated along the south of defendant Eccles’ land, which constituted the north boundary of the land and building owned by the plaintiff. During the pendency of the action on this appeal, David Eccles died, and the cause is continued in the name of his administrator. For the purpose of brevity and convenience, the name of Eccles will be used in this opinion instead of the administrator. It appears from the record that the other defendants have no interest in the subject-matter of the action other than as employees of the defendant Eccles; hence further reference will not be made to them.
The findings of fact made by the trial court, all of which are within the issues, are so far as material here, as follows:
“(2) That the defendant, David Eccles, is the owner and in possession of the following described real property situated in Ogden Oity, Utah, to wit: A part of lot seven (7), block twenty-five (25), plat ‘A,’ Ogden Oity survey,' and further described as beginning at the northeast comer of said lot seven (7), running thence south along the west boundary of Washington Avenue 71.80- feet to the,” etc.
“(3) That the plaintiff Commercial National Bank of Ogden, was and is the owner and holds the title to certain lands lying south of the land of the defendant, and that be tween such lands so owned by the plaintiff and the south boundary of defendant’s land described in finding of fact No. 2 there is an intervening irregular strip of land which the plaintiff purchased from the defendant David Eccles in the year 1903, and paid to said defendant for said irregular strip of land the sum of $1894, and upon said strip of land the north side of the plaintiff’s building was constructed and is situated.
“(4) That along the south boundary of the premises described in the second finding of fact there is a stone foundation and a brick wall upon said foundation extending upward from the ground three stories; that said foundation is thirty-six inches thick, that the first story of said brick wall is thirty-two inches thick, and the two upper stories are twenty-eight inches thick. That the -said wall is situated wholly upon the said ground belonging to the defendant D'avid Eccles.
“(5) That the plaintiff constructed its building upon its land immediately south of the said land of the said defendant David Eccles in the year 1903, and at that time, for the sum of $634.67 paid to the said defendant, the plaintiff purchased and became the owner of an easement in the foundation and brick wall situated along the south boundary of said defendant’s premises from the basement to the center of the sills of the third story, and the said plaintiff has used said wall for the support and maintenance of its building situated on its said premises from the time of the construction of the same. That no interest in the wall and foundation other than the easement aforesaid, and no interest in the lands upon which said wall stands was purchased by the plaintiff from the defendant.
“(6) That the joists supporting the roof and different floors of plaintiff’s building situated upon its said land along the north side thereof rest upon and are supported by the wall on the south boundary of said defendant’s land, and the steam and water pipes attached to and as a part of plaintiff’s building are now attached to and placed in said wall, and were placed there at the time of its construction ■under the rights granted to plaintiff by the said defendant,, and that the said wall, together with the openings for the joists and other supports and for the placing the steam and water pipes therein, are necessary for the support of plaintiff’s said building, and are a part of said building, and the rights to have the joists and other supports, steam and water pipes placed in the north wall of said defendant’s, building belong to and are a part of the rights belonging to plaintiff’s easement in and to said wall.
“(7) That at the time of the construction of plaintiff’s building on its said premises, and prior thereto, and since that date, up to and including the 15th day of November, 1911, there was situated upon the premises of the defendant David Eccles a five-story brick and stone building with a basement, and that the said building was on said 15th day of November, 1911, partially destroyed by fire, but that the walls of said building were left standing, and that the south wall was and is sufficient and ample for the support and maintenance of the plaintiff’s building as constructed on its said premises.
“(8) That the said five-story building on the lands of defendant has been twice wholly destroyed by fire, so that the walls alone were left. That by reason of the action of said fires and the elements thereof said south wall has been so impaired and damaged that it is insufficient upon which to safely rebuild or to support such a building as was formerly situated and supported on defendant’s land, and that same is insufficient to support such higher modem building as defendant proposes to erect on his land.
“(9) That the plaintiff’s building has no other or additional support along its north side, save the support of the said wall, and, that the taking out and removing of said wall would cause the plaintiff’s building to fall, and become a mass of ruins.
“(10) That the said defendant David Eccles is desirous of and intends to construct a new and more modem building upon his said land, and that the said south wall of said building is insufficient in its present condition to support the building wbicb the said defendant contemplates and is desirous of and intends to construct upon said premises, ■and that the said wall cannot be made sufficiently strong to support the contemplated building without great expense and without reinforcing same by taking additional space of the said defendant’s premises, and for that reason the said defendant desires to remove and tear down the present wall'along the south boundary of his said premises to make room for and permit the construction of the new building as aforesaid.
“(11) That prior to the institution of this action the said defendant David Eccles served written notice upon the plaintiff of his intention to tear down and remove said wall, but without offering any easement or support in the new wall which he proposed to construct, or any protection or support to the plaintiff’s premises by reason of the removal of said wall, and maintained and contended that the said plaintiff had no right or interest in the present wall, and should have no right or interest in the wall to be constructed.
“(12) That all of said plaintiff’s building is occupied by tenants, and that the Ered M. Nye Company hold the ground or first floor and basement under lease, and have therein an extensive and large stock of men’s furnishing goods.”
As conclusions of law the court found:
“(1) That the plaintiff is the owner of an easement for the support of its building in the present wall situated on the defendant’s premises along the south boundary thereof, and that the said plaintiff is entitled to a like easement and support and right in the wall to be constructed by said defendant over and along the south boundary of his said premises.
“(2) That the defendant David Eccles is the owner of the said wall and the ground on which it has stood, subject only to the easement of support of the plaintiff in such wall, as stated in the findings of fact.
“(3) That said wall is insufficient to support another building of like kind as that destroyed, and insufficient to support such new and modern building as defendant proposes to erect, and that tbe defendant David Eccles is entitled to tear down and remove tbe wall situated along tbe south boundary of bis said premises, exercising such due care and diligence in tbe prosecution thereof as will prevent injury to tbe plaintiff’s premises.
“(4) That tbe said defendant will be required to replace said wall at bis own expense with such new and stronger wall as will meet tbe requirements of bis said new proposed building, and shall so construct tbe said wall so as to afford and give to tbe plaintiff tbe same easement, right, and support and use for its building in tbe said wall to be constructed as tbe plaintiff now has and enjoys in tbe present wall.”
A judgment responsive to and supported by tbe foregoing findings of facts and conclusions of law was rendered in ■favor of plaintiff. Tbe judgment, among other things, provides that “David Eccles is hereby permitted to remove tbe wall mentioned ... at bis own expense with due care so as not to injure plaintiff’s building; . . . and tbe said plaintiff is hereby adjudged and is hereby awarded tbe same rights, easement, and support in tbe wall to be constructed by said defendant, David Eccles, and tbe south boundary of bis premises as plaintiff now has and enjoys in tbe present wall.” To reverse tbe judgment, defendants appeal.

Opinion:
MeOABTY, O. J.
(after stating tbe facts as above).
One of tbe grounds upon which appellants ask for a reversal of tbe judgment is that tbe findings of facts are not supported by tbe greater weight of tbe evidence. We do not deem it necessary to a clear understanding of tbe questions presented for us to either review tbe evidence in detail or set forth tbe substance thereof. We think it is sufficient to here state that we have carefully examined tbe record; and, while we find that there is a conflict in tbe testimony of some of the witnesses on certain issues, we are of tbe opinion tbat the findings of fact are supported by a clear preponderance of the evidence. The wall in question is entirely upon the land of appellant Eccles, and, as found by the court, respondent has "no interest in the lands upon which said wall stands." There is much evidence, however, which tends to show that respondent purchased an interest in and became part owner of the wall up to the third story thereof. But since the court found that respondent acquired an easement only in the wall, and as respondent has not appealed or filed a cross-assignment of errors, we shall, for the purposes of this appeal, assume that respondent acquired no greater property right in the wall than an easement.
The important question, therefore, is; Did respondent's right to an easement-in the wall terminate when the wall was rendered useless to appellant Eccles by the destruction of his building of which the wall formed a part? The position of appellants on this question is clearly stated by their counsel in their printed brief as follows: The purposes of the wall were "to support mutually two buildings, one of five stories and the other (respondent's building) of two stories. The rights of the adjoining owners therein were mutual, a cross-easement, each with the right to have its building supported. When from calamity or accident such wall became useless for either of these mutual purposes, the condition or relation ceases. The purposes were gone." And again they say: "The destruction of a party wall for the purpose for which it was used during the easement attaching thereto ends the easement and all rights thereum der." Despondent acquired by purchase from appellant an easement in the wall up to the third story thereof, and has used the same as the north wall of its building. The joists of respondent's building are fastened to and rest on the wall.
The authorities practically all agree that, where a party has acquired an easement of support in a party wall, the accidental destruction of the wall terminates the ease ment and extinguishes all rights arising thereunder. Therefore, if the wall in question had been rendered useless or unsafe as a support to respondent's building, or if it had been entirely destroyed by the fire, it might be argued with much force that such impairment or destruction terminated the easement. But this case does not fall within this well recognized rule. Under existing conditions respondent's easement — property right — in the wall is just as valuable and available as a support to its building as it was before the destruction of appellant Eccles' building. The question therefore arises: Mary Eccles, because of the destruction by fire of his building which so weakened the wall that it cannot be retained and used as a support for 'the kind of building he contemplates erecting on the site of the one destroyed, deprive respondent of - its property, easement, in the wall which furnishes the same support to its building as it did before the fire occurred ? To permit Mr. Eccles to tear down the wall and remove this support from respondent's building without requiring him, at his own expense, to erect another wall in its place, and thereby provide the same support for respondent's building as the present wall furnishes, would in effect be a confiscation of respondent's property.
It does not follow because the wall is unsafe as a sup.port for the kind of building appellant Eccles intends to erect that he has the right to terminate respondent's easement of support therein for its building, and proceed to take down and remove the wall to the irreparable damage of respondent. That Eccles has the right to remove the wall and erect another in its stead suitable for the building he contemplates erecting no one will deny, but in doing so he is bound to use ordinary care to avoid injury to respondent's building and to rebuild' without unnecessary delay. (Putzel v. Drovers' etc., Bank, 78 Md. 349, 28 Atl. 276, 22 L. R. A. 632, 44 Am. St. Rep. 298; Lexington Lodge v. Beal, 94 Miss. 521, 49 South. 833.) In the case last cited the principle of law applicable to the case at bar is well illustrated -in the following language:
"Where one of the buildings supported by a party wall has been destroyed, and the wall itself has been so weakened as to be dan-derous or insufficient as a support for the building which the owner of the destroyed building is about to erect, he has the right to tear down the insufficient or dangerous party wall and replace it with one stronger and better, provided he gives to the adjoining house the same right of support as it had in the old one. He is but exercising his legitimate rights of property. If it follow from this that the owner of the adjoining building will be put to inconvenience while the work of demolition and construction is going on, this is an unavoidable consequence . attendant upon the adoption and use of party walls. It cannot be the law that the fortunate adjoining owner, whose building is not destroyed, and who may be content with the wall, although weakened dr partially destroyed, can, by refusing to the co-owner, whose building has been destroyed, permission to tear down and rebuild the wall, compel him either not to build again or to build only such a structure as the wall remaining may suffice to support. While the adjoining owner, whose building has been destroyed, and who wishes to tear down and rebuild an insufficient or dangerous party wall, will be accorded this right, it must be exercised so as to work no avoidable injury to the owner of the adjoining building. He will be liable if the work is done negligently and damage to the co-owner results therefrom."
See, also, 30 Cye. 181, 182.
The judgment is affirmed, with costs to respondent.