Case Name: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Patricia M. FARRELL, Appellant
Court: Iowa Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Iowa
Decision Date: 1974-11-13
Citations: 223 N.W.2d 270
Docket Number: No. 55658
Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Patricia M. FARRELL, Appellant.
Judges: All Justices concur, except McCORMICK, J., who dissents.
Reporter: North Western Reporter 2d
Volume: 223
Pages: 270–275

Head Matter:
STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Patricia M. FARRELL, Appellant.
No. 55658.
Supreme Court of Iowa.
Nov. 13, 1974.
Mark E. Schantz, Iowa City, for appellant.
Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., Fred M. Haskins and Richard Winders, Asst. Attys. Gen., Carl J. Goetz, County Atty., and Thomas M. Martin, Asst. County Atty., for appellee.

Opinion:
RAWLINGS, Justice.
We here accord further consideration to State v. Farrell, vacated opinion 209 N.W.2d 103 (Iowa 1973), pursuant to a directive issued August 6, 1974, by the Supreme Court of the United States. See Farrell v. Iowa, - U.S. -, 94 S.Ct. 3198, 41 L.Ed.2d 1154 (1974).
More particularly, this court is called upon to now reevaluate its position in Farrell, supra, in light of Spence v. State of Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 94 S.Ct. 2727, 41 L.Ed.2d 842 (1974).
At the threshold it is to us apparent, for reasons later set forth, Spence, supra, is inapposite. We again respectfully affirm on defendant's Farrell's appeal to this court.
I. State v. Farrell, supra, unquestionably involved the mutilation by burning of a United States flag in a public place. In other words, the offense occurred in an open courtyard of a dormitory in which an unknown number of university students occupied quarters facing upon the aforesaid incident-related area.
Conversely, Spence, supra, dealt with the nonmutilative removable taping of a peace symbol on a flag then displayed on defendant's privately occupied premises. This was done, as says Spence, supra, 418 U.S. at 415, 94 S.Ct. at 2732, 41 L.Ed.2d at 849: " in a way closely analogous to the manner in which flags have always been used to convey ideas." See also State v. Kool, 212 N.W.2d 518 (Iowa 1973).
Furthermore, as noted by Mr. Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Spence, supra, 418 U.S. at 418, 94 S.Ct. at 2734, 41 L.Ed.2d at 851: "The Court takes pains to point out that petitioner did not 'permanently disfigure the flag or destroy it' ."
Significantly, defendant Farrell made no pretense of displaying our national emblem in a manner akin to that historically done to express a personal belief. Rather, she permanently and contumaciously, in a public place, destroyed our symbol of patriotism, of pride in the history of our country and of the service, sacrifice and valor of millions of Americans. See Spence, supra, 418 U.S. at 413, 94 S.Ct. at 2732, 41 L.Ed.2d at 848.
We are again constrained to hold the statute here in question (Section 32.1, Code of Iowa 1971), as instantly applied, is directed to and regulates the form by which defendant Farrell's message was expressed, not the content thereof, and is sufficiently irrelative to suppression of free expression. See Farrell, supra, 209 N.W.2d at 107.
II. Additionally, defendant Farrell was charged under our flag desecration statute (Code § 32.1), not for violation of an "improper use" enactment, a distinction observed in Spence, supra, 418 U.S. at 407, 94 S.Ct. at 2728, 41 L.Ed.2d at 845.
Moreover, Spence testified "his purpose was to associate the American flag with peace instead of war and violence." See Spence, supra, 418 U.S. at 408, 94 S.Ct. at 2729, 41 L.Ed.2d at 845.
On the otherhand, Farrell offered no trial testimony as to her motive, purpose or intent in mutilating the flag as she did. Actually, this court indulged in a mere inference her conduct was related to a prior and distance-remote student demonstration protesting the Indo-China War and presence of R.O.T.C. on the university campus. See Farrell, supra, 209 N.W.2d at 104.
III. It is also to us evident a "risk of breach of the peace" attended Farrell's aforesaid flag desecration in a public place. See Spence, supra, 418 U.S. at 409, 94 S.Ct. at 2729, 41 L.Ed.2d at 846.
In that vein, as observed in Farrell, supra, 209 N.W.2d at 107, this court is persuaded the State of Iowa does have a viable interest in the preservation of peace and order within this jurisdiction. Otherwise, the general public would have little or no assurance of orderly behavior on the part of others or of that tranquility which the people are entitled to enjoy. See Cox v. State of New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574—576, 61 S.Ct. 762, 765-766, 85 L.Ed. 1049 (1941); Newby v. Woodbury County District Court, 259 Iowa 1330, 1340, 147 N.W.2d 886 (1967).
Also, risk of breach of the peace must perforce depend upon the place and circumstances. 12 Am.Jur.2d Breach of Peace Etc., § 4 — 7; 11 C.J.S. Breach of the Peace § 1-2.
The question thus posed is whether Patricia Farrell, by her flag burning conduct in a public place, created a risk of breach of the peace.
The term "risk", as here employed, does not to us mean a breach of the peace must have occurred or even be imminent. On the contrary, it denotes nothing more than words or conduct creating exposure to a chance, danger, hazard or peril of breach of the peace. See "Risk", Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged, at 1961; 77 C.J.S. Risk at 441.
Looking again to the factual situation here at hand we said in Farrell, supra, 209 N.W.2d at 104:
"[T]wo Iowa University security officers testified to the effect each felt personal distress upon witnessing the flag burning incident. Defense witnesses stated no interaction occurred between demonstrators, and no hostility was 'sensed'. Patricia did not testify."
In that regard it is also only fair to assume the above mentioned officers were present to maintain order, if possible, not to instigate trouble, and that they accordingly restrained themselves.
A review of the record in Farrell, supra, upon the aforesaid United States Supreme Court reconsideration directive, further reveals two individuals were seen leaving the main body of the instantly involved assem blage and that one of those departees pulled a dormitory fire alarm. There re-sultantly followed an immediate emergence of residents from the housing facility.
Upon the foregoing factual basis we are persuaded defendant Farrell's conduct created a risk of breach of the peace.
In light of the foregoing we find Code § 32.1 furthers the preservation of peace and order, a substantial State interest, with nothing more than incidental restriction on First Amendment liberties. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 1810, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974).
From this flows the conclusion Code § 32.1 was constitutionally applied to defendant Farrell's conduct.
IV. Moreover, upon the aforesaid mandated reconsideration of the case at bar, we further conclude Code § 32.1, to the extent here involved, serves a viable State interest in preserving the physical integrity of the United States flag as an unalloyed symbol of our country.
On that subject the Court aptly stated in Spence, supra, 418 U.S. at 413, 94 S.Ct. at 2732, 41 L.Ed.2d at 848:
"For the great majority of us, the flag is a symbol of patriotism, of pride in the history of our country, and of the service, sacrifice and valor of the millions of Americans who in peace and war have joined together to build and to defend a Nation in which self-government and personal liberty endure. It evidences both the unity and diversity which are America. For others the flag carries in varying degrees a different message. 'A person gets from a symbol the meaning he puts into it, and what is one man's comfort and inspiration is another's jest and scorn.' West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, supra, 319 U.S. [624], at 632-633, 63 S.Ct. [1178], at 1182 [87 L.Ed. 1628]. It might be said that we all draw something from our national symbol, for it is capable of conveying simultaneously a spectrum of meanings. If it may be destroyed or permanently disfigured, it could be argued that it will lose its capability of mirroring the sentiments of all who view it."
Admittedly, the court then concluded the State of Washington "improper use" statute (Wash.Rev.Code, § 9.86.020) was unconstitutional as applied because Spence, by nonmutilation of his own flag on his own property, was plainly and peaceably protesting the fact that his views were not endorsed by the government. See Spence, supra.
But, as aforesaid, Patricia Farrell's incendiary flag mutilating conduct does not approach the degree of tranquility attendant upon that denoted in Spence.
On the contrary, Farrell manifested a total disregard for the flag as a symbol of patriotism, and by the same token espoused disunity. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 1678-1679, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968).
As aforesaid we are persuaded the State of Iowa has a substantial interest in preserving the flag of this Nation, and § 32.1, Code of Iowa, is to us sufficiently justified upon that basis. It furthers an important governmental interest unrelated to free expression and, as applied in the case now before us, any incidental restriction on First Amendment freedoms was no greater than essential to the furtherance of this State's interest in the protection of our national emblem.
For each and all of the reasons above set forth we again respectfully affirm on defendant Patricia Farrell's appeal to this court.
All Justices concur, except McCORMICK, J., who dissents.