Case Name: PEOPLE v. DOYLE
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1982-07-13
Citations: 117 Mich. App. 731
Docket Number: Docket No. 51612
Parties: PEOPLE v DOYLE
Judges: Before: Beasley, P.J., and R. B, Burns and M. B. Breighner, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 117
Pages: 731–739

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v DOYLE
Docket No. 51612.
Submitted December 1, 1981, at Grand Rapids.
Decided July 13, 1982.
Leave to appeal applied for.
Perry Doyle was convicted by a jury of premeditated first-degree murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment by the Cass Circuit Court, James E. Hoff, J. Defendant appeals alleging error in the admission of his confession and other errors. Held:
1. The defendant’s confession should not have been admitted into evidence. Absent this confession, there was no evidence of premeditation and deliberation.
2. A review of the record indicates that the defendant’s confession was involuntary.
3. The questioning of the defendant should have ended when the assistant prosecutor telephoned the prosecuting attorney to inform him that defendant might have been under the influence of drugs.
4. The pretext "rap” session conducted with the defendant, who was obviously mentally ill, rendered the statements given at such session inadmissible as involuntary.
Reversed.
Beasley, P.J., dissented. He would find, contrary to the majority, that there was no impropriety in the detaining and questioning of the defendant when viewed in the full context indicated by the record. He, like the majority, believes it was obvious defendant suffered some mental problems. However, he would not preclude the police from attempting to question an obvious suspect because there might be doubt as to mental competency for trial. He does not believe improper police tactics were employed here. He would find the trial judge’s findings of fact after the Walker hearing were supported by the evidence and would not hold his conclusions of law clearly erroneous. He would not find the 2-1/2 hour interrogation unreasonably long under the circumstances of this case since there has never been any serious question that defendant killed the deceased. He would affirm defendant’s conviction.
References for Points in Headnotes
4 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 76.
29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 590.
29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 585.
29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence §§ 573, 575, 576.
Opinion of the Court
1. Criminal Law — Appeal — Walker Hearings.
The Court of Appeals reviews a trial court’s ruling on the admission of a confession following a Walker hearing for clear error.
2. Criminal Law — Appeal — Evidence — Statements.
The Court of Appeals is required to examine the entire record below and make an independent determination of voluntariness when a defendant alleges that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of certain statements the defendant made to the police which were allegedly involuntary, and the relevant factors to be considered in such a determination are: (a) the duration and conditions of detention; (b) the manifest attitude of the police toward the accused; (c) the physical and mental State of the accused; and (d) the diverse pressures which sap or sustain the accused’s powers of resistance or self-control.
3. Criminal Law — Confessions.
The courts stand guard for those who, because of mental incapacity or low intellectual development, are easily led to confess by improper pressures.
4. Criminal Law — Appeal — Statements.
The critical issue before the Court of Appeals in an appeal where a defendant alleges that the trial court improperly admitted an involuntary confession is whether the confession made by the defendant and introduced at trial was the product of a rational intellect and a free will.
Dissent by Beasley, P.J.
5. Criminal Law — Police Questioning — Suspect’s Mental Competency — Evidence.
The police may question an obvious suspect in a criminal case despite the fact that they might doubt the suspect’s mental competency for trial; the question of whether statements by the suspect are admissible in evidence is to be answered later in a courtroom.
6. Appeal — Walker Hearings — Court Rules.
The Court of Appeals, in reviewing a trial judge’s findings after a Walker hearing, gives considerable weight to the judge’s ñnd ings and hestitates to substitute its judgment for that of the trial judge; error in such ñndings is not shown where the findings of fact are supported by the evidence and where the conclusions of law are not clearly erroneous (GCR 1963, 517.1).
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Louis J. Caruso, Solicitor General, William T. Grimmer, Prosecuting Attorney, and Mary C. Smith, Assistant Attorney General, for the people.
Susan J. Smith, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for defendant on appeal.
Before: Beasley, P.J., and R. B, Burns and M. B. Breighner, JJ.
Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
Defendant was tried and convicted on a single-count information charging him with premeditated first-degree murder. MCL 750.316; MSA 28.548. After a jury verdict, defendant was sentenced to serve a term of life imprisonment. He appeals by leave granted.
Our disposition of the final issue raised by the defendant in his appeal renders the discussion of the other issues raised unnecessary. We reverse because defendant's confession should not have been admitted into evidence. Absent this confession, there was no evidence of premeditation and deliberation.
This Court reviews a trial court's ruling on the admission of a confession following a Walker hearing, People v Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich 331; 132 NW2d 87 (1965), for clear error. People v McGillen #1, 392 Mich 251, 257; 220 NW2d 677 (1974). This Court is required to examine the entire record below and make an independent determination of the ultimate issue of voluntari ness. People v Robinson, 386 Mich 551, 558-559; 194 NW2d 709 (1972).
After a review of the record below, we are convinced that the defendant's confession to the murder of Kathryn Lucas was involuntary.
The factors which we have considered are: (a) the duration and conditions of detention; (b) the manifest attitude of the police toward the accused; (c) the physical and mental state of the accused; and (d) the diverse pressures which sap or sustain the accused's powers of resistance or self-control. Culombe v Connecticut; 367 US 568, 603-606; 81 S Ct 1860; 6 L Ed 2d 1037 (1961); People v Carl Johnson, 99 Mich App 547, 554-555; 297 NW2d 713 (1980).
The courts stand guard for those who, because of mental incapacity or low intellectual development, are easily led to confess by improper pressures. Culombe, supra; Blackburn v Alabama, 361 US 199; 80 S Ct 274; 4 L Ed 2d 242 (1960); Fikes v Alabama, 352 US 191; 77 S Ct 281; 1 L Ed 2d 246 (1957); People v Langston, 57 Mich App 666, 675; 226 NW2d 686 (1975); People v Stanis, 41 Mich App 565; 200 NW2d 473 (1972); People v King, 27 Mich App 619; 183 NW2d 843 (1970).
The critical issue before us is whether the confession made by the defendant, introduced at trial, was "the product of a rational intellect and a free will". Lynumn v Illinois, 372 US 528, 534; 83 S Ct 917, 920; 9 L Ed 2d 922, 926 (1963), quoting Blackburn v Alabama, supra.
A few hours after the victim's body was found, the defendant was interrogated at the Cassopolis Police Department. The interrogators did not tell him they were investigating the victim's death. Instead, the police and prosecutor had a "rap" session with defendant concerning his earlier re quest for help in locating his "real parents". After two hours of questioning, during which defendant did not confess to the crime, he was taken to the scene of the crime. On the way back to the sheriffs office, defendant blurted out "I killed her". Defendant then was taken to the police department where the confession was taken.
On the basis of what the police and the assistant prosecutor who conducted the interrogation must have known, the questioning of this defendant should have ended when the assistant prosecutor telephoned the prosecuting attorney to inform him that defendant Doyle might have been under the influence of marijuana and/or other drugs. Doyle hallucinated during the initial interview. He said that he wanted a "test" to find his real parents. He talked about poisonous spiders and insects in his room. He suggested, alternatively, that the FBI, CIA and Mafia were after him. Some answers that the defendant gave during the interview were unresponsive, others involved totally different subjects. He spoke repeatedly about his fears concerning his masculinity, fearing that his "real" parents might have changed him from a girl to a boy shortly after his birth.
It should have been clear to the police chief and the assistant prosecutor conducting the questioning that defendant Doyle was a very sick man. This fact was widely known in the community and specifically known to Chief Williams. Any statement, admission or confession from Doyle by this interrogation method is not voluntary within the technical meaning developed in the courts. The pretext "rap" with this defendant who was obviously mentally ill rendered the statements given inadmissible as involuntary. Langston, supra; King, supra; Stanis, supra.
Reversed.