Case Name: Julia F. Colley vs. Inhabitants of Westbrook
Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court
Jurisdiction: Maine
Decision Date: 1869
Citations: 57 Me. 181
Docket Number: 
Parties: Julia F. Colley vs. Inhabitants of Westbrook.
Judges: Cutting, Walton, Dickerson, Barrows, and Daneorth, JJ., concurred.
Reporter: Maine Reports
Volume: 57
Pages: 181–187

Head Matter:
Julia F. Colley vs. Inhabitants of Westbrook.
There is no rule of law prescribing for what length of time the continuance of an open visible defect in a highway shall constitute notice of its existence.
An instruction that if the jury should find a legal defect, and that it was open and visible during the whole of a certain month, that such fact would constitute sufficient notice, is erroneous.
On exceptions to the ruling of Goddard, J., of the superior court for the county of Cumberland.
Case for an injury caused on the evening of December 24,1868, at the foot of Graves’ Hill, in Westbrook, by being thrown from a sleigh by the covering stones of a culvert across a highway leading to the city of Portland.
It appeared that the earth had worn and washed away from the lower side of the covering-stones, leaving them from four to six and one-lialf inches above the snow, and the snow two and one-half inches deep.
There was much testimony tending to show the defective condition of the way.
There was testimony, also, that the way was repaired October 6, and that the rains in October washed out the repairs.
The judge instructed the jury, inter alia, “ that actual notice is not required in all cases. If the defect has existed so long that citizens must be presumed to have known its existence, that notice is sufficient. Open and visible defects, such as could be prevented by common and ordinary diligence, towns are by law bound to notice and guard against. Chapter 154, of the public laws of 1868, provides that “ It shall be the duty of . . . highway surveyors of towns, to go over their several highway districts, or cause it to be done by others, in the months of April, May, June, August, September, October, and November, in each year, and remove the loose obstructions to the public .travel, and repair such defects as may occur from time to time, rendering travel dangerous, or give notice of such defect to the municipal officers of the town.”
And if you find that the defect which occasioned the injury was open and visible during the whole month of November, I instruct you that that fact is sufficient notice, even though actual notice to the town is not proved.
If you find a legal defect, and that it was open and visible during the whole month of November, I instruct you that that fact constitutes sufficient notice.
To these instructions the defendant alleged exceptions.
IV. Webb, in support of the exceptions,
cited Bradbury v. Falmouth, 18 Maine, 65; Bragg v. Bangor, 51 Maine, 539; Winn v. Lowell, 1 Allen, 178.
Shepley Strout, for the plaintiff.
The statute makes it the duty of the surveyor of highways to take notice of the defects in the highways, and give notice to municipal officers. Pub. Laws of 1868, c. 154. The law presumes the surveyor did his duty. The town is estopped to deny it.
The town had notice prior to October 6, when the repairs were made. But repairs were not thorough, and did not remedy the defect. Horton v. Ipswich, 12 Cush. 488. Stinson v. Grardiner, 42 Maine, 248.
The instruction goes no further than Bragg v. Bangor, 51 Maine, 533. In that case the defect was hidden; in this, open, palpable, potent, obvious.
The judge ruled, “ that if -the defect had existed so long that citi zens must be presumed to have known its existence, that notice is sufficient.”
It is evident that the defendants had notice, and if the ruling was wrong, a new trial will not benefit them. A different verdict could not have been found under correct instructions. Noyes v. Shepherd, 30 Maine, 173. Copeland v. Copeland, 25 Maine, 525.
Instruction was not erroneous. Savage v. Bangor, 40 Maine, 176. Beed v. Northfield, 3 Pick. 94. Bragg v. Bangor, 51 Maine, 533. Pub. Laws of 1868, c. 154. Drury v. Worcester, 21 Pick. 44.

Opinion:
Appleton, C. J.
This is an action on the case against the defendant town, for an injury occasioned by a defect in an highway, which they were bound to keep in repair.
To entitle the plaintiff to recover, notice to the town of the defect must be proved. It may be proved directly or inferentially. It may be proved by actual notice to one of the inhabitants, or facts and circumstances may be shown, from which notice may be inferred. But the inference is not of law, but of fact. It is one for the jury to draw.
The presiding justice instructed the jury that if they found that the defect, which occasioned the injury, was open and visible during the whole month of November, that that fact was sufficient notice, though actual notice was not proved, and that if they found a legal defect, and that it was open and visible during the whole month of November, that that fact constituted sufficient notice.
There is no rule of law prescribing for what length of time the continuance of a defect shall constitute notice of its existence. There is no presumption of law on the subject. Whether there was a defect, the length of time it had continued, and whether from its continuance, notice to the town of its existence could be inferred, were alike questions to be determined by the jury, and not by the court. The ruling of the presiding justice was erroneous, in withdrawing from the jury one of the very questions which it was their province to determine, and in determining it for them, instead of submitting it to them decision. Exceptions sustained.
Cutting, Walton, Dickerson, Barrows, and Daneorth, JJ., concurred.