Case Name: Monte Kitana CUEVAS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1999-10-01
Citations: 741 So. 2d 1234
Docket Number: No. 98-2818
Parties: Monte Kitana CUEVAS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: PETERSON, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 741
Pages: 1234–1240

Head Matter:
Monte Kitana CUEVAS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 98-2818.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Oct. 1, 1999.
J. Peyton Quarles, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Carmen F. Corrente, Assistant Attorney General, ‘ Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

Opinion:
ANTOON, C.J.
Monte Cuevas appeals his judgments and sentences, arguing that he is entitled to receive a new trial because the verdict rendered by the jury in this case constituted a truly inconsistent verdict. We disagree and affirm.
In March 1996, Mr. Cuevas and his co-defendant attended "Bike Week," a motorcycle event in Daytona Beach. On the evening in question, the victim accepted the codefendant's invitation to enter a tent which the codefendant was sharing with Mr. Cuevas. While the codefendant and the victim were inside, Mr. Cuevas entered the tent. Once inside, Mr. Cuevas brandished a knife and told the victim that he and the codefendant were going to have sex with her. The codefendant then engaged in vaginal sex with the victim; thereafter, Mr. Cuevas engaged in anal sex with the victim.
As a result of these acts, the state charged in count I of the information that Mr. Cuevas had committed the crime of sexual battery by anal penetration; the state also charged in count I that the punishment for the crime should be enhanced because Mr. Cuevas was one of multiple perpetrators. In count II, the state charged that Mr. Cuevas had aided and abetted his codefendant in committing the crime of sexual battery by vaginal penetration.
At the conclusion of the evidence the trial court instructed the jury on the crimes charged. With regard to count I, the court instructed the jury on the crime of sexual battery by anal penetration only. As a part of the instruction on sexual battery by anal penetration, the jury was advised as follows:
If you find that the State has proved that during the same criminal transaction or episode, more than one person committed an act of sexual battery on the same victim, you should find the defendant guilty of sexual battery with threat of force by multiple perpetrators.
(Emphasis added). The instruction on count I did not include any reference to sexual battery by vaginal penetration, nor did any subsequent instruction explain to the jury that verdicts of guilty as to both counts would qualify Mr. Cuevas for sentencing as a multiple perpetrator.
After deliberating, the jury returned verdicts finding Mr. Cuevas guilty of count I, sexual battery by anal penetration, but did not find that the crime should be enhanced because there were multiple perpetrators. The jury also found Mr. Cuevas guilty of count II, aiding and abetting his codefendant in committing the crime of sexual battery by vaginal penetration. Mr. Cuevas argues that these verdicts are "truly inconsistent" thereby entitling him to receive a new trial. We disagree.
Generally, Florida courts permit inconsistent jury verdicts to be entered in criminal cases thereby allowing for jury lenity because such verdicts do not speak to the guilt or innocence of the defendant. See State v. Powell, 674 So.2d 731, 732 (Fla.1996). However, Florida courts have recognized that an exception exists to this general rule when the jury's verdict is legally inconsistent; that is, when the charges against the defendant are legally interlocking and the verdicts are truly inconsistent. Id. at 732. In Powell, the supreme court adopted the definition of the term "truly inconsistent" verdict which was crafted by Justice, then Judge, Anstead in Gonzalez v. State, 440 So.2d 514 (Fla. 4th DCA), review dismissed, 444 So.2d 417 (Fla.1983). Justice Anstead defined truly inconsistent verdicts as those verdicts " 'in which an acquittal on one count negates a necessary element for conviction on another count.' " Powell, 674 So.2d at 733 (quoting Gonzalez, 440 So.2d at 515). Examples of this concept include instances where a defendant is convicted on a felony-murder charge but acquitted on the underlying felony charge, and where a defendant is found guilty on a possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony charge but acquitted on the underlying felony charge. See Mahaun v. State, 377 So.2d 1158 (Fla.1979); see also Redondo v. State, 403 So.2d 954 (Fla.1981). In both cases the acquittal on the lesser charge negated an essential element in the more serious charge because "without the underlying felony the [more serious] charge could not stand." Eaton v. State, 438 So.2d 822 (Fla.1983). Importantly, the Powell court cautioned that this "truly inconsistent" verdict exception to the jury pardon rule can apply only when the possibility of a wrongful conviction "outweighs the rationale for allowing verdicts to stand." Powell, 674 So.2d at 733. This distinction between factually inconsistent verdicts and legally inconsistent verdicts was recently recognized by the supreme court in State v. Connelly, No. 93,507, — So.2d -, 1999 WL 628784 (Fla. Aug. 19, 1999).
Here, the jury's decision declining to apply the multiple perpetrator enhancer did not negate any element of the offense of sexual battery or otherwise diminish the integrity of. the jury's verdict. We note that the jury's decision to find Mr. Cuevas not guilty on the multiple perpetrator charge may have been based on its misunderstanding of the law as a result of the jury instructions. In any event, there is no possibility that Mr. Cuevas was wrongfully convicted in this case. Accordingly, we affirm Mr. Cuevas' judgments and sentences.
JUDGMENTS and SENTENCES AFFIRMED.
PETERSON, J., concurs.
HARRIS, J., concurs specially, with opinion.
. § 794.011(4), Fla. Stat. (1995).
. § 794.023, Fla. Stat. (1995).
. § 794.011(4); 777.011, Fla. Stat. (1995).
.Mr. Cuevas has not challenged his judgment and sentence entered on count III, relating to the crime of false imprisonment, section 787.02, Florida Statutes (1995).