Case Name: Le Roy et al. v. State Commission for Reorganization of School Corporations of the State of Indiana
Court: Supreme Court of Indiana
Jurisdiction: Indiana
Decision Date: 1967-10-31
Citations: 249 Ind. 383
Docket Number: No. 30,908
Parties: Le Roy et al. v. State Commission for Reorganization of School Corporations of the State of Indiana.
Judges: 
Reporter: Indiana Reports
Volume: 249
Pages: 383–400

Head Matter:
Le Roy et al. v. State Commission for Reorganization of School Corporations of the State of Indiana.
[No. 30,908.
Filed October 31, 1967.
Rehearing denied January 18, 1968.]
Bowen Myers Northam & Given, of Indianapolis, for appellants.
John J. Dillon, Attorney General, and Anthony Champa, Assistant Attorney General, for appellees.

Opinion:
Mote, J.
This appeal comes to us from the Starke Circuit Court wherein the Judge thereof sustained a Motion to Dismiss Appellants' complaint against the Appellees.
The Assignment of Errors is as follows;
"1. The court erred in sustaining the motion to dismiss filed by the Appellee State Commission for Reorganization of School Corporations of the State of Indiana.
2. The court erred in holding and deciding that the State Commission for the Reorganization of School Corporations is not required to follow the Administrative Adjudication and Court Review Act.
3. That the finding and decision of the court was contrary to law."
Aside from the technical question raised as to whether the motion to dismiss would serve the same purpose as a demurrer, which we hold under the circumstances in the affirmative, the only question (in two parts) presented by this appeal is whether (1) the Administrative Adjudication and Court Review Act of Indiana, the same being Ch. 365 of the Acts of 1947, as amended and found in Burns' Ind. Stat. § 63-3001 et seq., has any application to the case at bar; and (2) whether the same must be followed by the State Commission established by the provisions of the School Corporation Reorganization Act of Indiana, General Assembly 1959, as amended, the same being found in Burns' Ind. Stat. 1966 Cum. Supp. § 28-6101 et seq.
Even a cursory examination of the provisions of the two Said Acts leads to the conclusion that the former mentioned Act does not apply to the latter Act in this particular proceedings and it would be difficult to imagine a situation in which there would be any application, for the reason that the proceedings before the said State Commission, although necessary, are not final and for the further reason that the contemplated statutory functions of said State Commission generally, as here, are ministerial and not judicial. This reasoning can be supported by a line of respectable authorities.
In McGraw v. Marion County Plan Commission (1960), 131 Ind. App. 686, 174 N. E. 2d 757, it was stated:
"It has been decided that the word 'decision' as used in such a statute refers only to judicial decisions, meaning decisions involving a judicial act. Ross v. Becker (1907), 169 Ind. 166, 170, 81 N. E. 478. Purely ministerial decisions or administrative acts are not within the concept of such terms. Potts v. Bennett et al. (1895), 140 Ind. 71, 76, 77, 39 N. E. 518; Collins v. Laybold (1914), 182 Ind. 126, 104 N. E. 971; In re Northwestern Indiana Tel. Co. (1930), 201 Ind. 667, 171 N. E. 65. It is clear that the hearing and action before the Plan Commission can only lead to some action or non-action on the part of the County Commissioners, as they alone have the power to accept, amend or reject what the Plan Commission proposes. There is no finality to the Plan Commission's action. Its recommendations are not binding on any one."
We shall not lengthen this opinion by further citations. The School Corporation Reorganization Act of 1963 does not vest in the State Commission authority for finality of action herein.
Concerning Appellees' motion to dismiss, the case of Calumet National Bank of Hammond v. McCord et al. (1963), 243 Ind. 626, 189 N. E. 2d 583, this Court held and stated:
"However, even though the motion to dismiss is improper procedurally, this court has held that such a motion will be treated in unusual instances as a demurrer if the complaint or petition could not possibly be amended to state a good cause of action in connection with the controversy."
Therefore, our conclusion is that the trial court did not err in sustaining the motion to dismiss, nor did it err . in holding and deciding that the State Commission for the Reorganization of School Corporations is not required to follow the Administrative Adjudication and Court Review Act.
We find and conclude also that Appellants have failed to demonstrate that the finding and decision of the trial court was contrary to law. Judgment affirmed.
Jackson and Lewis, JJ., concur.
Hunter, C. J., dissents with opinion, in which Arterburn, J., concurs.