Case Name: STATE ex rel. Paul W. COLLINS, Director, Missouri Division of Highway Safety, and Dr. Byron I. Axtell, D.O., Coroner, Mercer County, Missouri, Relators, v. The Honorable J. Morgan DONELSON, Judge of the Circuit Court of Mercer County, Missouri, Respondent
Court: Missouri Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1977-10-11
Citations: 557 S.W.2d 707
Docket Number: No. 29237
Parties: STATE ex rel. Paul W. COLLINS, Director, Missouri Division of Highway Safety, and Dr. Byron I. Axtell, D.O., Coroner, Mercer County, Missouri, Relators, v. The Honorable J. Morgan DONELSON, Judge of the Circuit Court of Mercer County, Missouri, Respondent.
Judges: Before PRITCHARD, C. J., and SHAN-GLER, DIXON, SWOFFORD, WASSER-STROM, SOMERVILLE and TURNAGE, JJ.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 557
Pages: 707–715

Head Matter:
STATE ex rel. Paul W. COLLINS, Director, Missouri Division of Highway Safety, and Dr. Byron I. Axtell, D.O., Coroner, Mercer County, Missouri, Relators, v. The Honorable J. Morgan DONELSON, Judge of the Circuit Court of Mercer County, Missouri, Respondent.
No. 29237.
Missouri Court of Appeals, Kansas City District.
Oct. 11, 1977.
John D. Ashcroft, Atty. Gen., Sheila K. Hyatt, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for relators.
Slagle & Bernard, Ben R. Swank, Jr., Kansas City, for amici curiae.
Phil Hauck, Erwin L. Milne, Stockard, Andereck, Hauck, Sharp & Evans, Trenton, for respondent.

Opinion:
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN PROHIBITION
Before PRITCHARD, C. J., and SHAN-GLER, DIXON, SWOFFORD, WASSER-STROM, SOMERVILLE and TURNAGE, JJ.
TURNAGE, Judge.
This original proceeding in prohibition was brought by the Director of the Missouri Division of Highway Safety and the Coroner of Mercer County. The object of the writ is to restrain the respondent judge from enforcing his order compelling the re-lators to comply with a subpoena duces tecum to produce a report made by the Coroner to the Director as required by § 58.445, RSMo 1977 Supp.
This court issued its preliminary rule in prohibition. Relators contend the rule should be made permanent because § 58.-449, RSMo 1977 Supp. prohibits the results of the test made by the Coroner from being used except for statistical purposes. Preliminary rule made permanent.
The underlying case, which brought about the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum, involves a claim against Old American Insurance Company on a policy of insurance issued on the life of Robert L. Girdner. Girdner died within four hours after being involved in an automobile accident and the Coroner of Mercer County performed the blood test required by § 58.-445. Results of this test, along with the required report, were sent to the Director of the Missouri Division of Highway Safety.
Both the plaintiff and the defendant in the underlying case sought the results of the test made on Girdner and to that end issued a subpoena duces tecum to the Director and Coroner. When these two officials appeared for their deposition, they both stated they had in their possession a copy of the report together with the results of the test made by the Coroner on Girdner. However, both refused to divulge the results of the test because of the provision of § 58.449.
A motion was filed with the respondent judge to compel compliance with the subpoena duces tecum and the judge ordered both officials to comply with the subpoena and to produce the results of the test and the report made to the Director. The filing of this proceeding in prohibition followed.
Section 58.445 provides:
1. If any driver or pedestrian within his jurisdiction dies within four hours of and as a result of an accident involving a motor vehicle, the coroner shall report the death and circumstances of the accident to the Missouri division of highway safety in writing. The report shall be made within five days of the conclusion of the tests required in sub-section 2.
2. The coroner shall make or cause to be made such tests as are necessary to determine the presence and percentage concentration of alcohol, and drugs if feasible, in the blood of the driver or pedestrian. The results of these tests shall be included in the coroner's report to the division.
Section 58.449 provides:
The contents of the report and results of any test made pursuant to the requirements or authorizations of sections 58.445 to 58.449 shall be used only for statistical purposes which do not reveal the identity of the deceased.
Prohibition is the proper remedy when a trial court has ordered discovery and the order exceeds the jurisdiction of the court State ex rel. Thomasville Wood Products, Inc. v. Buford, 512 S.W.2d 220, 221[1-5] (Mo.App.1974). Thus, if the order made by the respondent judge compelling the officials here involved to produce the results of the test made pursuant to § 58.445 is in violation of § 58.449, then the preliminary rule in prohibition should be made permanent because such would be in excess of his jurisdiction.
The relators contend § 58.449 is clear and unambiguous and by its plain terms prevents such officials from disclosing the result of the test to anyone. Relators point to the language "shall be used only for statistical purposes" and argue that such phrase manifests a clear legislative intent the test result shall not be used in any other manner.
The respondent and Amici Automobile Club of Missouri and General American Life Insurance Company contend the statute, if construed according to relators' view, would thwart discovery and prevent vital relevant evidence from being made availa ble in the underlying suit. No question is raised concerning the power of the legislature to restrict the use of the test results.
A well settled rule of statutory construction states: "When the language of a statute is unambiguous and conveys a plain and definite meaning, the courts have no business to look- for or to impose another meaning. DePoortere v. Commercial Credit Corporation, 500 S.W.2d 724, 727[1] (Mo.App.1973). If a statute is unambiguous, a court should regard it as meaning what it says since the legislature is presumed to have intended exactly what it states directly. DePoortere v. Commercial Credit Corporation, supra at 727[2]. Pedroli v. Missouri Pacific Railroad, 524 S.W.2d 882, 884[1, 2] (Mo.App.1975).
It is readily apparent the language of the statute involved here is written in plain and simple English. The Coroner is required to make such test as necessary to determine the presence and percentage concentration of alcohol, and drugs, if feasible, in the blood of a driver or pedestrian who dies within four hours after an accident involving a motor vehicle. The Coroner is directed to make a report of the death and circumstances of the accident to the Division of Highway Safety in writing. The contents of the report and results of any test shall be used only for statistical purposes which do not reveal the identity of the deceased.
The provision that the contents of the report and the results of any test shall be used only for statistical purposes is a broad and complete restriction as to the use which may be made of the report and test results. The word "only" is defined as meaning "alone in its class, sole, single, exclusive, solely, this and no other, nothing else or more." Hiner v. Hugh Breeding, Inc., 355 P.2d 549, 551[2] (Okl.1960). See also 67 C.J.S. pp. 498, 499.
By use of the word "only" the legislature has limited the use of the report and test results for statistical purposes solely, exclusively and for nothing else or more. This is the plain meaning of the statute when the word "only" is used.
Respondent and Amici contend the restrictive phrase, "shall be used only for statistical purposes," applies only to the use which the Director shall make of the information. However, the statute does not limit any person or agency. The limitation is directed to the use which may be made of the report and test results. The limitation on this use solely for statistical purposes results from the plain language employed.
The conclusion necessarily follows that this statute, written in plain English, restricts the use of the report and test results to statistical purposes. It inevitably follows that such report and test results cannot be made available to litigants or anyone else.
Respondent further contends that restricting the use of the report and test results to statistical purposes creates a conflict with § 109.180 and 109.190, RSMo 1969. Those sections provide that public records shall be open for inspection and copying at all reasonable times. However, § 109.180 restricts the application of that section by providing "except as otherwise provided by law." Likewise, § 109.190 provides "in all cases where the public or any person interested has a right to inspect." The legislature has provided under § 58.449 the report and test results are not public records and the public does not have a right to inspect such records. Thus, there is no conflict with the sections providing for the inspection and copying of public records.
Respondent and Amici further contend that a denial of their right to the report and test results will make § 58.449 unconstitutional on the grounds it denies to them equal protection of the laws in violation of both the Missouri and United States Constitutions. This argument is based on a contention § 58.445 creates an unlawful classification between tests performed on persons who die more than four hours following an accident and tests performed on persons who die within four hours of an accident. No reason is advanced to demonstrate why this alleged arbitrary classification is discriminatory, however, the State suggests the effects of alcohol may be dissipated in the body over a period of time and a four-hour limit is reasonable. Amici, in their brief, agree with this suggestion.
The rule in this situation is stated in State ex rel. Toedebusch v. Public Service Com'n, 520 S.W.2d 38, 46[6] (Mo. banc 1975) as follows: "The only requirements the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Mo.Const. Art. III, § 40(4), (28), (30), prescribe is that such classification be based upon a reasonable ground (not arbitrary), and that the law operate equally upon all in the same class."
Equal treatment is afforded by the sections under consideration. The report and tests results are not available to anyone when a death occurs within four hours of the accident. A death occurring after four hours does not require a report or a test to be made, however, if such were made, it would not be restricted in its use. The law operates equally upon everyone. No unlawful classification or discrimination is discernible.
Amici further suggest that the statute unconstitutionally grants coroners immunity from testifying. The statute does not grant any immunity to coroners from testifying, but only restricts the use and disclosure of the report and the test results made by the coroner. As to any other information the statute in question does not prevent the coroner from testifying or grant to him any immunity.
The preliminary rule is made permanent.
SHANGLER, DIXON and SOMER-VILLE, JJ., concur.
WASSERSTROM, J., concurs in separate concurring opinion.
PRITCHARD, C. J., dissents in separate dissenting opinion.
SWOFFORD, J., dissents in separate dissenting opinion.
. Other states have enacted similar statutes: (1) Illinois, Minnesota and New York specifically provide test results shall not be admissible in evidence in any civil or criminal action. Ill. Stats.Ann. ch. 31, § 10; Minn.Stats.Ann. § 169.-09 (1977 Supp.); N.Y.Consol.Laws ch. 11, County Law § 674, subd. 3[b] (1972). Idaho provides "The results of such tests shall be used exclusively for statistical purposes and the sample shall never be identified with the name of the deceased. Any person releasing or making public such information other than as herein prescribed, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." Idaho Code § 49-1016 (1977 Supp.). New Mexico provides the report shall not be subject to judicial process. N.Mex.Stats.Ann. § 15-43-45B (1953). (2) Nev.Rev.Stats. § 484.-394 (1973) makes the findings of examinations a matter of public record. Colo.Rev.Stats. § 42-4-1211 (1973) provides the records of results of the tests shall not be public information, "but shall be disclosed on request to any interested party in any civil or criminal action arising out of the collision." North Dakota provides the results shall be released upon the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum by a court of competent jurisdiction in any civil or criminal action. N.Dak. Century Code Ann. § 39-20-13 (1975 Supp.). (3) Connecticut, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania statutes neither restrict nor make public the test results. Conn. Rev.Stats. § 14-227c (1977 Supp.); Mass.Rev. Stats, ch. 38, § 6A (1972); Pa.Consol.Stats. Ann. Title 75, § 3749 (1977 Supp.). The precise question here presented has not been decided in any state where the result was not plainly dictated by the statute.
. Evidence of the blood content of a deceased is available. § 194.115 RSMo 1969, provides an autopsy may be performed on any body upon the consent of a very broad range of persons from the surviving spouse to a friend who assumes the right to control the disposition of the body. Further, § 58.725, RSMo 1975 Supp. grants the medical examiner the right to perform an autopsy when, in his opinion, it is necessary. The circumstances of the death under which the autopsy may be performed by the medical examiner are detailed in § 58.720, RSMo 1977 Supp. and include deaths by accident. § 58.725 requires a detailed description of the findings of the autopsy and the conclusions drawn therefrom to be filed in the office of the medical examiner. No restriction is placed on the use or availability of this report.