Case Name: SOUTHERN STATES TRANSPORTATION, INC., Petitioner, v. The STATE of Texas, Respondent
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1989-05-24
Citations: 774 S.W.2d 639
Docket Number: No. C-8050
Parties: SOUTHERN STATES TRANSPORTATION, INC., Petitioner, v. The STATE of Texas, Respondent.
Judges: GONZALEZ, J., files a dissenting opinion in which HIGHTOWER, J., joins.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 774
Pages: 639–644

Head Matter:
SOUTHERN STATES TRANSPORTATION, INC., Petitioner, v. The STATE of Texas, Respondent.
No. C-8050.
Supreme Court of Texas.
May 24, 1989.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 13, 1989.
James M. Doherty, Austin, for petitioner.
Jim Mattox, Robert Ozer, Douglas Fraser, Anne E. Swenson, Austin, for respondent.

Opinion:
MAUZY, Justice.
The issue in this case is whether Southern States Transportation, Inc. engaged in intrastate motor carrier operations without a permit from the Texas Railroad Commission in violation of the Texas Motor Carrier Act, Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 911b (Vernon 1964 & Supp.1989). The State of Texas sued Southern States for penalties and an injunction under section 16(b) and (c) of the Act. After a bench trial, the district court found that Southern States' shipments which were the object of the State's complaint were made in interstate commerce, not intrastate commerce, under a certificate of convenience and necessity issued to Southern States by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Accordingly, the district court concluded that Southern States had not violated the Act, and rendered judgment that the State take nothing against Southern States. The court of appeals reversed, holding as a matter of law that Southern States had engaged in intrastate motor carrier operations in violation of the Act. 756 S.W.M 98. The court of appeals remanded the case to the district court for entry of judgment against Southern States. We hold that whether Southern States's shipments were in interstate or intrastate commerce is a question of fact, not a matter of law, and that there is evidence to support the district court's findings. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and affirm the judgment of the district court.
The court of appeals reviewed the evidence and the district court's findings and concluded as a matter of law that the shipments at issue occurred in intrastate commerce. The court of appeals could reach this conclusion only by determining that there was no probative evidence to support the district court's findings that the shipments were in interstate commerce. See Ray v. Farmers' State Bank, 576 S.W.2d 607, 609 (Tex.1979). In making this determination the court of appeals was required to consider only the evidence favorable to the trial court's findings and judgment, and to disregard all evidence to the contrary. Id. The court of appeals did not purport to perform this analysis, but simply stated its disagreement with the district court. The court of appeals was not, of course, authorized simply to substitute its assessment of the evidence in this case for that of the district court. Id. If the district court's findings are supported by probative evidence, then the court of appeals could not disregard them as a matter of law.
The evidence most favorable to the district court's findings is that W. Silver, Inc. purchased scrap steel rail from railroads, had it delivered from various points inside and outside the state to its plant in Vinton, Texas, re-rolled the steel rail there into rebar, and then shipped via Southern States' trucks to various destinations inside the state. Southern States operated under a certificate of convenience and necessity issued by the Interstate Commerce Commission, and a transit privilege on file with the Commission.
Whether transportation between points in a single state is interstate or intrastate in nature, "the essential character of the commerce, not its mere accidents, should determine." Texas & New Orleans Railroad Co. v. Sabine Tram Co., 227 U.S. 111, 126, 33 S.Ct. 229, 234, 57 L.Ed. 442 (1913). Crucial to this determination is the fixed and persisting intent of the shipper, or others for whose benefit the shipment is made, at the time of the shipment. Baltimore & Ohio Southwestern Railroad Co. v. Settle, 260 U.S. 166, 174, 43 S.Ct. 28, 31, 67 L.Ed. 189 (1922); Texas v. United States, 866 F.2d 1546, 1556 (5th Cir.1989). In this case there was probative evidence that W. Silver's intent was to import scrap steel rail from outside Texas, store it temporarily in Vinton while it was being rerolled, and then continue it on to its ultimate destinations in Texas. There was substantial evidence from which the district court could have concluded that the movement of the steel through Vinton and from there to other cities in Texas was part of its continuous and essentially uninterrupted journey in interstate commerce. Southern States' operation under an ICC transit privilege was also strong evidence that its shipments for W. Silver were in interstate commerce. See Settle, 260 U.S. at 171, 43 S.Ct. at 30-31; Texas, 866 F.2d at 1557.
The court of appeals and the State rely heavily on Galveston Truck Line Corp. v. State, 123 S.W.2d 797 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1938, writ ref'd), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 571, 60 S.Ct. 85, 84 L.Ed. 479 (1939). In that case, the district court found that the shipments in question were in intrastate commerce, and the court of appeals affirmed. In the present case, the court of appeals points out the many similarities between the facts in Galveston Truck Line and the facts here. From these similarities the court of appeals reasons that the shipments in the present case, like those in Galveston Truck Line, must have been intrastate in character. The logic of this reasoning is flawed. The fact that the evidence in one case will support a finding of intrastate commerce does not mean that evidence in another case, however similar, will not support a finding of interstate commerce. Indeed, the court in Galveston Truck Line stated:
The character of the shipment in such a case depends upon all the evidential circumstances, looking to what the owner has done in carrying out the journey.
123 S.W.2d at 801.
Because the essential character of commerce determines its characterization as interstate or intrastate, and the intent of the shipper is crucial to this determination, the nature of any given shipments depends entirely upon the facts and circumstances surrounding those shipments. The determination is thus ordinarily one for the finder of fact, in this case, the district court. If there is sufficient evidence to support the fact finder's determination, it is conclusive. In the present case, as in most such cases, the evidence was conflicting. Southern States' shipments were certainly not intrastate as a matter of law. Consequently, the court of appeals erred in reversing the district court and directing that judgment be rendered in favor of the State.
The State raised additional points of error in the court of appeals which that court did not address. Each of those points complains that the trial court erred as a matter of law in refusing to hold or find facts against Southern States. With respect to each such point, either the issue is inconsequential to the trial court's conclusion, or the evidence was conflicting and therefore a matter of fact for the trial court to resolve. We have carefully reviewed these points and determined that they are without merit. There is thus no reason to remand the case to the court of appeals for further consideration of those points. We therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and affirm the judgment of the district court.
GONZALEZ, J., files a dissenting opinion in which HIGHTOWER, J., joins.
. Specifically, the State complained that the trial court erred as a matter of law in holding that Southern States did not violate the Texas Motor Carrier Act, in refusing to hold that the railroads which transported the scrap steel rail to Vinton were the original shippers of the material and were private carriers as to that material, and in refusing to find that the railroads did not intend that the scrap rail be shipped past Vinton and that movement by private carriage is not subject to ICC jurisdiction.