Case Name: THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, COLES COUNTY, Petitioner-Appellee, v. JEFFREY EARLE COMPTON et al., Respondents-Appellants; THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, COLES COUNTY, Petitioner-Appellee, v. JEFFREY EARLE COMPTON et al., Respondents (The Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, Intervenor and Respondent-Appellant)
Court: Illinois Appellate Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 1987-06-25
Citations: 157 Ill. App. 3d 439
Docket Number: Nos. 4—86—0427, 4—86—0475 cons.
Parties: THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, COLES COUNTY, Petitioner-Appellee, v. JEFFREY EARLE COMPTON et al., Respondents-Appellants. — THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, COLES COUNTY, Petitioner-Appellee, v. JEFFREY EARLE COMPTON et al., Respondents (The Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, Intervenor and Respondent-Appellant).
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Appellate Court Reports, Third Series
Volume: 157
Pages: 439–449

Head Matter:
THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, COLES COUNTY, Petitioner-Appellee, v. JEFFREY EARLE COMPTON et al., Respondents-Appellants. — THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, COLES COUNTY, Petitioner-Appellee, v. JEFFREY EARLE COMPTON et al., Respondents (The Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, Intervenor and Respondent-Appellant).
Fourth District
Nos. 4—86—0427, 4—86—0475 cons.
Opinion filed June 25, 1987.
LUND, J., specially concurring.
GREEN, J., dissenting.
Neil F. Hartigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Roma Jones Stewart, Solicitor General, Imelda R. Terrazino, Assistant Attorney General, and Randi C. Hammer, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board.
Gregory J. Malovance, of Winston & Strawn, of Chicago, and Ralph H. Loewenstein, of Drach & Deffenbaugh, P.C., of Springfield, for appellants Jeffrey Earle Compton and Charleston Education Association.
Brian A. Braun, of Miller, Tracy, Braun & Wilson, Ltd., of Monticello, for appellee.
Charles P. Rose and John R. Spitzig, both of Vedder, Price, Kaufman & Kammholz, of Chicago, for amicus curiae.

Opinion:
PRESIDING JUSTICE SPITZ
delivered the opinion of the court:
Petitioner, board of education of Community School District No. 1 (District No. 1), and respondent, Charleston Education Association (Association), had entered into a collective-bargaining agreement in March 1984. Under this agreement District No. 1 recognized the Association as the exclusive bargaining representative of District No. l's certified teaching personnel and the agreement provided certain procedures for the evaluation and termination of teachers and a grievance-arbitration procedure for resolving disputes concerning alleged violations of the agreement.
District No. 1 terminated Compton's employment as a teacher at the conclusion of the 1983-84 school year without following the requirements of the collective-bargaining agreement. Compton was a first-year nontenured teacher at the time of dismissal. The Association filed a- written grievance on behalf of Compton contending a violation of the bargaining agreement. The grievance was submitted to binding arbitration and the arbitrator ruled in favor of the Association and Compton and ordered Compton reinstated with full back wages and other benefits.
District No. 1 refused to comply with the award and filed a petition to set aside and vacate the award in the circuit court. The Association and Compton petitioned the circuit court to confirm the award and enter judgment accordingly. Subsequently, both parties moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of District No. 1 and vacated the arbitration award. The Association and Compton moved for a reconsideration of the trial court's judgment alleging lack of jurisdiction in the circuit court. The Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board (Board) filed a motion to intervene and a motion to dismiss or in the alternative to reconsider. The circuit court allowed the Board to intervene.
In June 1986, the circuit court denied the Association's motion for reconsideration and the Board's motion to dismiss or reconsider. The Association, Compton, and the Board filed a timely notice of appeal.
On appeal, Compton, the Association and the Board contend the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over actions seeking to vacate or enforce arbitration awards involving educational employers and unions representing teachers. We agree.
In 1983, the Illinois Education Labor Relations Act (Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, pars. 1071 through 1721) was enacted, becoming effective January 1, 1984. The Act was a major change in school labor law, permitting collective bargaining and allowing, with certain limitation, the right to strike. The policy stated for the enactment is set forth in section 1, and, in part, provides:
"It is the public policy of this State and the purpose of this Act to promote orderly and constructive relationships between all educational employees and their employers. Unresolved disputes between the educational employees and their employers are injurious to the public, and the General Assembly is therefore aware that adequate means must be established for minimizing them and providing for their resolution." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, par. 1701.
We are aware, as is the general public, of the problem created by the strikes affecting public education. In Illinois, such walkouts were illegal, being against public policy. The continuation of these strikes, often in violation of court orders, coupled with conflicts between interests in collective bargaining and issues of delegability, was of great concern to all and was the impetus for the legislative action. We must consider the reasoning for the enactment in determining the extent of its application.
The Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act provides for employee organizational rights and the selection of an employee representative. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, par. 1703.) Employer rights, limiting certain areas from bargaining, and an obligation to "bargain collectively with regard to policy matters directly affecting wages, hours and terms and conditions of employment as well as the impact thereon" are created. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, par. 1704.) The Board was established, given subpoena power, and mandated to "adopt, promulgate, amend or rescind rules and regulations in accordance with 'The Illinois Administrative Procedure Act' " (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, par. 1705(h)). The requirement of recognition of the bargaining agent is created (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, par. 1707), and the method of selection of the representative by secret election is provided (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, par. 1708). The duty to bargain collectively, to meet at reasonable times, to confer in good faith, and to execute a written agreement is provided (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, par. 1710).
Section 10(c) provides as follows:
"(c) The collective bargaining agreement negotiated between representatives of the educational employees and the educational employer shall contain a grievance resolution procedure which shall apply to all employees in the unit and shall provide for binding arbitration of disputes concerning the administration or interpretation of the agreement. The agreement shall also contain appropriate language prohibiting strikes for the duration of the agreement. The costs of such arbitration shall be borne equally by the educational employer and the employee organization." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, par. 1710(c).
Impasse procedures outline a course of mediation (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, par. 1712) which seeks to avoid the strikes allowed (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, par. 1713). Included within the specific list of unfair labor practices is the refusal "to comply with the provisions of a binding arbitration award" (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, par. 1714(a)(8), (b)(6)). The procedure for handling an alleged unfair labor practice is established, providing for enforcement using the injunction powers of the circuit courts (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, par. 1715). Review is through "the Appellate Court of the judicial district in which the Board maintains its principal office" (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, par 1716(a)), which happens to be this court. Provisions of the Act prevail and control over conflicts with any other law, executive order, or administrative regulation (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, par. 1717).
The Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act and the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, pars. 1601 through 1627) were adopted in the same legislative session and at: tempted to provide "a comprehensive regulatory scheme for the public sector collective bargaining in Illinois." (Chicago Board of Education v. Chicago Teachers Union (1986), 142 Ill. App. 3d 527, 530, 491 N.E.2d 1259, 1261-62.) The Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1984 Supp., ch. 48, par. 1608) provides for enforcement in accordance with the Uniform. Arbitration Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 10, pars. 101 through 123). The Educational Labor Relations Act does not refer to the Uniform Arbitration Act but provides for enforcement through the Board (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, par. 1715).
Under the Uniform Arbitration Act, proceedings to compel arbitration, to stay arbitration, to seek vacation of an award, and to enforce an award, are through the circuit court. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 10, pars. 102, 112, 114, 116.) The Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act does not provide for administrative review in the circuit court, providing only for review of Board action in the appellate court.
Thus, there are strong indications in the Hlinois Educational Labor Relations Act's legislative history that courts were not intended to have jurisdiction under the Uniform Arbitration Act to vacate arbitration awards arising out of collective-bargaining agreements in public education. Had the legisláture intended to incorporate the provisions of the Uniform Arbitration Act into the Educational Labor Relations Act, it could have used express language to that effect as it did in the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act.
We come to the conclusion that there is a legislative interest in streamlining the litigation proceedings governing public education. The advantage to educational employers and employees in having a statewide center of interpretations and decisions is obvious. If every circuit court can be used to question arbitration jurisdiction, necessarily interpreting the effect of the various terms of collective-bargaining agreements, there will be a lack of consistency. Early resolve of educational labor disputes will not be possible.
The statutory requirement calling for "a minimum of 5 years of experience directly related to labor and employment relations in representing educational employers or educational employees in collective bargaining matters" (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, par. 1705(a)) when selecting Board members, provides an expertise hardly available to some 700 different trial judges from 102 different counties. The policy provision of the Hlinois Educational Labor Relations Act recognizes the difference between educational employees and other employees and recognizes the need to minimize disputes. Unresolved disputes are called' "injurious" (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, par. 1701). We come to the conclusion that all disputes which arise from the filing of grievances allegedly relating to violations of collective-bargaining agreements must be contested through the Board.
We recognize that the facts in this case present a jurisdictional question! Section 14(aX5) of the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, par. 1714(a)(5)) lists one of the unfair labor practices as:
"(5) Refusing to bargain collectively in good faith with an employee representative which is the exclusive representative of' employees in an appropriate unit, including but not limited to the discussing of grievances with the exclusive representative; provided, however, that if an alleged unfair labor practice involves interpretation or application of the terms of a collective bargaining ¿greement and said agreement contains a grievance and arbitration procedure, the Board may defer the resolution of such dispute to the grievance and arbitration procedure contained in said agreement."
The employer questioning arbitration jurisdiction, relating to a specific grievance, may elect to refuse discussion and await a hearing before the Board or may go to the arbitrator, questioning jurisdiction, with the right to appeal the jurisdictional issue to the Board, and then to the appellate court. The statutory provision allowing the Board to first require arbitration is not unreasonable.
The absence of a provision in the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act similar to section 12 in the Uniform Arbitration Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 10, par. 112) is not fatal to the position now taken by this court. Provisions similar to those of section 12, subparagraphs (a)(1), (2), (3), and (4) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 10, pars. 112(a)(1), (2), (3), (4)) are necessarily included within the scope of re-. view of the Board to provide necessary due-process protection in arbitration hearings.
We agree with the decision in Chicago Board of Education v. Chicago Teachers Union (1986), 142 Ill. App. 3d 527, 491 N.E.2d 1259, that a decision contrary to the one we now enter would make many of the provisions of the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act meaningless. We also agree it is for the appellate and supreme court exercising the power of judicial review to keep the Board within its jurisdiction.
For the reasons set forth, we concur with respondent's position that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction.
Reversed.