Case Name: Eliz. Pleyte, Plaintiff in Error, v. Dirk Pleyte, Defendant in Error
Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Colorado
Decision Date: 1891-09
Citations: 1 Colo. App. 70
Docket Number: 
Parties: Eliz. Pleyte, Plaintiff in Error, v. Dirk Pleyte, Defendant in Error.
Judges: 
Reporter: Colorado Court of Appeals Reports
Volume: 1
Pages: 70–84

Head Matter:
Eliz. Pleyte, Plaintiff in Error, v. Dirk Pleyte, Defendant in Error.
1. Practice in Divorce Cases—Trial by Jury.—The grounds for divorce in this state are purely statutory, and the district courts are invested by the statute with jurisdiction in this class of actions, although other acts have extended the jurisdiction to other courts. Restrictions and limitations are imposed by the statute respecting the right of action and the mode of procedure, one of which is that when the charges in the bill are denied by the answer of the defendant the trial shall be by jury.
2. Construction oe Superior Court Act in Divorce Trials.—The act creating the superior court of Denver provided that it should have and exercise, within certain territorial limits, “ such jurisdiction and powers in civil actions, and be governed by such practice and proceedings as are now or may hereafter be provided by law, or may be applicable to the district courts.” The section relating to the summoning of juries provided that they should be summoned in the manner provided by law for summoning juries to try causes in the county courts. The latter provision, as applicable to divorce cases wherein the charges of the bill are denied by the answer, is to be limited to the manner of summoning the jury, and not to the requirement of the county court act, that the party demanding a jury shall advance the fees. The denial of a jury trial in such case, on failure of the party demanding it to advance the jury fees, was therefore erroneous.
Mrror to Superior Court of Denver.
In 1888 Mrs. Pleyte filed a bill against the defendant in error to obtain alimony by way of separate maintenance. The husband answered, denied the various allegations of the complaint, set up sundry affirmative matters of a defensive character, and filed a cross-complaint. In the cross-complaint he prayed for a divorce a vinculo. On the 10th day of December following the cause was set for trial on the 7th day of January, 1889. When the cause came on for trial under the order, Mrs. Pleyte demanded a jury for the trial of the issue which had been tendered on the cross-complaint, but the court refused to grant it except on condition' that she advance the costs incidental to the procurement of a jury as in the county court. This she refused to do, and thereupon the court denied the application and proceeded to try the case, and entered a decree of divorce.
The superior court in which the cause was tried was created by an act of the legislature February 10, 1883. Its jurisdiction is granted in this language: “ shall have and exercise such jurisdiction and powers in civil actions, and be governed by such practice and proceedings as now are, or may hereafter be, provided by law or may be applicable to district courts.” By section 3 of the act the jurisdiction was to be exercised within certain territorial limits, and that section in general provided that the court should be governed in all proceedings with reference to practice and pleadings, by the laws determining such matters for the district court. Its process was to be issued and served in like manner as processes were issued and served from the district court. Section 15 of the act related to the procurement of juries in civil causes and it substantially provided: “ in any action * * * in which a party is entitled to a jury, such party may have a jury summoned, etc., * * * in the manner provided by law for the summoning of jurors to try causes in the county courts.” There were no other provisions in the act which related either to the jurisdiction of the court, or to the method which was to be adopted to obtain the juries by which the causes should be .tried. The county court act contained a section which substantially enacted, that in any action pending in that court either party might have a jury by advancing the fees for the payment of the jurors, and that the amount paid should ‘be taxed as costs. The act likewise provided that the jurors should be summoned by an open venire directed to the sheriff of the county. There was no other provision in the act with reference to the process or means by which a jury should be procured in that court.
In 1868 an act upon the subject of divorces was adopted by the territorial legislature, and it has remained in force from that time to the present, having been re-enacted in the general laws of 1877, and the statutes of 1888. By these acts, which were in force at the time of the trial of this suit, the district court was given jurisdiction in all cases of divorce and alimony. Its process, practice and proceedings were to be as in chancery, “ except as modified by this particular statute.” By the 5th section cases of this sort must be tried by jury when the “charges in the bill are denied.” It would appear from the record that the superior court had adopted a rule, requiring parties who demanded a jury to prepay the fees as a condition precedent to the enjoyment of that sort of a trial. The trial without a jury is the principal error complained of.
Messrs. Sullivan & May, and Messrs. Coe & Freeman, for plaintiff in error.
Messrs. Pattebson & Thomas, for defendant in error.

Opinion:
Bissell, J.
The question presented by the record is one of gravity to the parties in this action, but is of little consequence to the profession. The superior court has been abolished, and the act to be construed entirely repealed, and the question to be determined is therefore of slight general interest. The importance of the decision to the parties to the action is the only excuse for a citation of the statutes, and the assignment of the reasons upon which the decision is based. The act creating the court contains but one section which specifically relates to the matter of the present inquiry, viz.:—the right of trial by jury in these actions in the superior court. The question cannot be answered by a consideration of that section. It is neither definite, absolute nor unequivocal, and under these circumstances may be taken to be controlled as to its implications by other portions of the act. To construe the act with reference to this matter it is essential to ascertain what jurisdiction was granted, and whether that jurisdiction was, as to particular actions, subject to any limitations which were expressed in the statute, or -which necessarily resulted from the fact that the jurisdiction conferred was of itself limited. It will be useful first to inquire whether the jurisdiction-of the district courts was in anywise limited in respect of this matter, since it will appear that this was the only jurisdiction conferred upon the superior court. A discussion as to the extent and scope of the jurisdiction of chancery courts in actions for divorce is wholly unnecessary. It may be conceded at the outset, that originally, when triable at all by such tribunals, these causes were triable only by the procedure which was suited to courts of equity, and which always prevailed in them. By analogy, wherever the action for divorce existed by statute, and there was no provision made with reference to the method of trial the courts always followed the established practice in those particulars, tried the cases as in equity, and rendered such decree as the statute and the case warranted. It must be conceded that in this state the cause of action for divorce is purely statutory. No suit for divorce will lie unless it be based upon sojne one of the statutory grounds, and unless it be brought in the manner prescribed. When, therefore, litigants are by statute given the right to bring suits in the district court for the dissolution of their matrimonial obligations upon certain specified grounds, and the statute imposes certain restrictions and limitations, either as to the right, of action or as to the method of procedure, those conditions must be complied with to entitle the court to render a decree in such suit. There might have been some embarrassment in the determination of this question, if the statute had simply provided that the district court sitting as a court of chancery should have jurisdiction, but it further enacted that the chancery process, practice and proceedings should be subject to the limitations expressed in the act. It therefore follows, that when the act subsequently provided that every issue of fact raised by a denial of the alleged grounds for divorce must be tried by a jury, such an issue could only be tried in that way, and the right to maintain an action for a divorce was subject to that particular and special limitation, and to' disregard it, and try the case and render a decree without the verdict of a jury upon the issues, would be error, unless in some legally binding manner the party had waived the right. That the same result must follow when the superior court failed to observe the statutory requirement seems equally clear. By the terms of the act its jurisdiction was made concurrent with that of the district court. The jurisdiction was to be exercised within specified territorial limits over those subject matters of which the district court had general jurisdiction. The causes were to be tried by the same methods, and under the identical statutes regulating the practice, pleadings, and proceedings in the district court. It cannot be urged, as in the case of the county court, that by virtue of its general chancery jurisdiction it might hear and determine according to the ancient chancery methods, because by the express terms of the statute creating it the only jurisdiction granted was one co-ordinate with that of the district court. This co-ordinate jurisdiction must thus be taken with every expressed limitation; the powers granted must be as general, and likewise as circumscribed, as those possessed by the district courts. There would thus seem to be no escape from the conclusion, that if the jurisdiction of the district court, in matters of divorce, was subject to the right of trial by jury where an issue of denial was made by the answer, that of the superior court could only be exercised under the same condition, and subject to the same restriction. The force of this position is sought to be avoided by reference to the 15th section, which provided for the method of summoning a jury in causes triable in that court. No other provision upon the subject, or having any bearing upon it, can be found in the act. That section only enacts that a jury shall be summoned in the manner provided for summoning juries in the county court. It places no limitation upon the right to a trial by jurjr, nor does it re-enact the section contained in the county court act by reference to it, nor does it, by inference or implication, adopt the limitation upon the right to a jury contained in that provision. The right to a jury trial in the county court is undoubtedly dependent upon the prepayment of the fees of the jurors by the party who makes the demand. It is likewise true that the jury in that court is to be summoned by an open venire directed to the sheriff of the county, under the rules and regulations which may be adopted by the court for the purpose. But it is not easy to see in what way the method of procurement is at all affected by the limitation upon the right to a jury elsewhere expressed in the statute. Because it happens to be true that a litigant in the county court can only obtain a jury by a prepayment of the fees, that circumstance in no wise modifies, affects, or in any way relates to the mode of procuring the jury when once the right to it has attached. The two parts of the 'statute relate to two different subdivisions of the same general subject matter; the one having a relation to the right itself, and the other providing means by which the right shall be enforced' when it has once accrued. The true construction of section 15 of the superior court act is thus rendered apparent and easy. It did not attempt, either in terms or by implication, to re-enact the entire county court provision with reference to the matter of juries,—it simply enacted that a jury should be summoned in the manner provided by law for summoning jurors in the county court. It neither stated nor provided that the right to a jury should be subject to the limitations, or should be had upon the conditions, under which they might' be had in the county court, nor did it enact that parties might have juries as and when they might in such courts, and that such juries should be summoned under like conditions and circumstances as were provided for in the act relating to county courts, but, apparently by legislative intention, withheld all reference to the right of trial by jury, and made only that portion of the statute applicable which related to the method of procurement; the language being, " when a party is entitled, it shall be summoned in the manner provided for summoning juries " etc. Had the statute provided that a party might have a jury to try the issue as in the county court, or under like circumstances and upon like terms, which should he summoned in the manner provided by law for the summoning of jurors in that tribunal, no question could have been raised in the premises. A careful selection of such phraseology as would only relate to the method of procurement, when less than half a dozen words would have made plain their intention and impose a condition upon the right, renders it evident that the legislature had no such purpose. To import, by an unnecessary construction, a condition into a statute which would have such an important effect upon the rights of parties in this class of causes would be a violation of all well recognized canons of statutory construction. The unwisdom of importing a condition into a statute is easily seen when once the nature of the cause of action is considered. The interests of good morals and of society require that these actions should be surrounded by every impediment which would either tend to prevent their increase, or to render an unjust result impossible. Publicity creates a wall over which none but just suitors can climb. For many years it has been patent to all courts, and to all observant citizens, that there is no class of controversies in which the courts are more frequently imposed upon, and the right more often defeated, than in suits of this description. The policy of the legislature in its enactment upon the subject of divorce and alimonjr is plainly foreshadowed by the provisions with reference to trials by jury. It should be followed and enforced by the courts, unless in plain terms, or by necessary statutory construction a different rule has been declared applicable to actions of this description. Various other errors have been assigned and discussed by counsel in their briefs, but they are not likely to be of importance upon the subsequent trial of the case. The case is reversed and remanded.
Reversed.