Case Name: KENT COUNTY PROSECUTOR v. ROBERT EMMETT GOODRICH CORPORATION
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1974-05-02
Citations: 53 Mich. App. 267
Docket Number: Docket No. 18420
Parties: KENT COUNTY PROSECUTOR v ROBERT EMMETT GOODRICH CORPORATION
Judges: Before: T. M. Burns, P. J., and Holbrook and McGregor, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 53
Pages: 267–299

Head Matter:
KENT COUNTY PROSECUTOR v ROBERT EMMETT GOODRICH CORPORATION
Opinion of the Court-
1. Obscenity — Constitutional Law — Statutes—Construction.
Federal case law sets down three alternatives under which a state obscenity statute could be deemed constitutional: (1) the statute must specifically define the prohibited sexual conduct, (2) the statute as heretofore authoritatively construed must specifically define the offensive conduct, or (3) the statute as hereafter authoritatively construed must specifically define the prohibited sexual conduct.
2. Obscenity — Constitutional Law — Statutes—Specificity.
The Michigan civil obscenity statute is constitutionally inadequate because it is couched in terms of expression rather than specifically defined sexual conduct as required by Federal case law (MCLA 600.2938).
3. Statutes — Construction—Constitutional Law — Jurisdiction.
A local trial court cannot authoritatively construe offensive conduct defined by a state obscenity statute; as used by the United States Supreme Court, the term "authoritatively construe” implies a construction rendered by an appellate court with statewide jurisdiction, which in Michigan is the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals.
4. Obscenity — Constitutional Law — Statutes—Injunctions.
A trial court may not grant an' injunction against a theater owner to prevent the exhibition of an admittedly offensive motion picture where there is no state law, either statutory or judicial, which "specifically defines” the depictions of sexual conduct which the state may regulate.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1-7, 9] 50 Am Jur 2d, Lewdness, Indeceny, and Obscenity §§ 6-8, 11.
Modern concept of obscenity. 5 ALR3d 1158.
Validity of procedures designed to protect the public against obscenity. 5 ALR3d 1214.
50 Am Jur 2d, Lewdness, Indeceny, and Obscenity § 12.
Dissent by Holbrook, J.
5. Obscenity — Constitutional Law — Statutes—Specificity.
The civil obscenity statute, which proscribes the sale, distribution, acquisition or possession of material containing " * * * an article or instrument of indecent or immoral use * * * ” speciñcally defínes the proscribed conduct of public exhibition of a motion picture which contains pictures of a dildo (an article or instrument) being physically used for indecent purposes (MCLA 600.2938).
6. Obscenity — Constitutional Law — Statutes—Construction—Authoritative Construction.
The Court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court have authoritatively construed the state obscenity statute so as to incorporate therein the deñnition of the words "obscene” and "obscenity” as defined in prior Federal case law, and by limiting its effect to cover acquisition and possession for sale or distribution only of the proscribed material, and not personal possession or acquisition (MCLA 600.2938).
7. Obscenity — Constitutional Law — Statutes—Construction— Specificity. '
The civil obscenity statute is not unconstitutional as being vague or overbroad, and the statute as authoritatively construed sufficiently describes the proscribed conduct as required by Federal case law (MCLA 600.2938).
8. Obscenity — Constitutional Law — Due Process — Notice.
A defendant theater owner was not deprived of fair notice or due process in a proceeding under the civil obscenity statute where he was Served with the plaintiff’s complaint containing speciñc descriptions of the material claimed to be proscribed by law and was given an evidentiary adversary hearing wherein all issues of fact and law were considered by the court; the defendant was not faced with a criminal charge that would threaten a deprivation of liberty or property.
9. Obscenity — Constitutional Law — Statutes—Construction.
The civil obscenity statute, providing a method to prevent future misconduct by means of a civil injunction, is remedial only and should be liberally construed; the Court of Appeals, in order to preserve the statute, should read into the statute the standards required by Federal case law so that the statute can conform to Federal and state constitutional ■ requirements (MCLA . 600.2938).
Appeal from Kent, John H. Vander Wal, J.
Submitted Division 3 December 7, 1973, at Grand Rapids.
(Docket No. 18420.)
Decided May 2, 1974.
Leave to appeal applied for.
Complaint by the Kent County Prosecutor and the City Attorney for the City of Grand Rapids against the Robert Emmett Goodrich Corporation for a temporary and permanent injunction to prevent exhibition of a motion picture. Injunctions granted. Defendant appeals.
Reversed.
James K. Miller, Prosecuting Attorney, and Donald A. Johnston, III, Chief Appellate Attorney, for plaintiffs.
Warner, Norcross & Judd (by John D. Tully), for defendant.
Before: T. M. Burns, P. J., and Holbrook and McGregor, JJ.

Opinion:
McGregor, J.
On October 3, 1973, the defendant owner-operator of the Savoy Theatre in Grand Rapids began showing the film, "The Devil in Miss Jones". That same day, the Kent County Prosecutor and the Grand Rapids City Attorney filed a complaint seeking a temporary and permanent injunction against further showing of the film, pursuant to Michigan's civil obscenity statute, MCLA 600.2938; MSA 27A.2938. Based on this complaint, the trial court granted a temporary injunction on October 4, 1973, and set trial for October 10, 1973. Defendant waived his statutory right to a hearing within one day. MCLA 600.2938(4); MSA 27A.2938(4).
For purposes of the action in the lower court, the parties stipulated that the film depicted patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated, and patently offensive representations or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions and lewd exhibitions of the genitalia. The parties further stipulated that the film's predominant appeal is to prurient, shameful, and morbid interest in nudity, sex, and excretion, which went substantially beyond customary limits of candor in the community in describing or representing such matters. Finally, it was stipulated that the movie lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
After hearing the oral arguments of the parties, reviewing the memorandums of law submitted by the parties, and after personally viewing the film, the trial court permanently enjoined the showing of the film. The defendants were granted a stay of the injunction pending appeal.
The sole question on appeal is whether the injunction was proper, in light of Miller v California, 413 US 15; 93 S Ct 2607; 37 L Ed 2d 419 (1973).
In June of 1973, the United States Supreme Court handed down a series of decisions re-examining the nebulous area of obscenity regulation. In Miller v California, supra, Chief Justice Burger, for a majority of the Court, spoke of the dangers in attempting to regulate expression:
"State statutes designed to regulate obscene materials must be carefully limited. [Citation omitted.] As a result, we now confine the permissible scope of such regulation to works which depict or describe sexual conduct. That conduct must be speciñcally defíned by the applicable state law, as written or authoritatively construed."413 US 15, 23-24; 93 S Ct 2607, 2614-2615; 37 L Ed 2d 419, 430 (1973). (Emphasis added.)
Miller sets down three alternatives under which the Michigan statute could be deemed constitutional: (1) The statute must specifically define the prohibited sexual conduct. (2) The statute as heretofore authoritatively construed must specifically define the offensive conduct. (3) The statute as hereafter authoritatively construed must .specifically define the prohibited sexual conduct.
The Michigan civil obscenity statute, MCLA 600.2938(1); MSA 27A.2938(1) regulates conduct:
" which is obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, indecent or disgusting, or which contains an article or instrument of indecent or immoral use or purports to be for indecent or immoral use or purpose."
This statute is couched in terms of expression rather than specifically defined sexual conduct, as required by Miller. A cursory examination of the Oregon and Hawaii statutes referred to approvingly in Miller points out the inadequacy of the Michigan statute.
Cases decided prior to Miller are of little help in deciding this issue, given the new requirement of specificity as set out in Miller. Research fails to turn up any case heretofore decided which would meet the new standards. At any rate, that problem is not before us, as the trial judge attempted to "authoritatively construe" the statute himself.
What is "authoritative construction" of the statute? Can a circuit judge's interpretation of the statute he considered "authoritative"? While the United States Supreme Court has frequently used this term in First Amendment cases going back several years, the Court has never defined exactly what it meant by the term. United States v Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 US 363; 91 S Ct 1400; 28 L Ed 2d 822 (1971); Gooding v Wilson, 405 US 518; 92 S Ct 1103; 31 L Ed 2d 408 (1972). Placed in context, however, the reference was always directed at the state Supreme Court.
One of the best discussions of "authoritative construction" can be found in Gooding v Wilson, supra, in which the Court considered a challenge to a Georgia statute making it a misdemeanor for any person, without provocation, to use certain words or abusive language causing a breach of the peace. In discussing the constitutional challenge to the statute, the Supreme Court stated:
"It can therefore withstand appellee's attack upon its facial constitutionality only if, as authoritatively construed by the Georgia courts, it is not susceptible of application to speech protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments." 405 US 518, 520; 92 S Ct 1103; 31 L Ed 2d 408, 413 (1972).
Also in Gooding, the Supreme Court referred approvingly to the New. Hampshire Supreme Court's limiting construction of their statute. That Court construed their statute to prohibit only "fighting words". The Court stated that, in view of this "authoritative construction", the statute was not constitutionally infirm.
Gooding refers to an authoritative construction by the Georgia courts. In Paris Adult Theatre I v Slaton, 413 US 49; 93 S Ct 2628; 37 L Ed 2d 446 (1973), Justice Burger also made a reference to this authoritative construction by the state courts. It can be argued that this reference to courts indicates that a trial court could "authoritatively construe" the statute. This contention can be laid to rest by an examination of a key footnote in Gooding.
In Gooding v Wilson, supra, reference was re peatedly made to the construction given to the statute by the Georgia appellate courts. The Supreme Court accepted the interpretation by the Georgia appellate bench as being authoritative in the following footnote:
"We were informed in oral argument that the Court of Appeals of Georgia is a court of statewide jurisdiction, the decisions of which are binding upon all trial courts in the absence of a conflicting decision of the Supreme Court of Georgia. Federal courts therefore follow these holdings as to Georgia law." 405 US 518, 525; 92 S Ct 1103, 1107-1108; 31 L Ed 2d 408; n 3 (1972) .
The clear import of this footnote is that an appellate court with statewide jurisdiction could render an authoritative construction of a state statute. However, a local trial court could not do so.
In Michigan, this Court is of statewide jurisdiction and in many cases is the court of last resort. As such, this Court would be capable of making an "authoritative construction" of the statute in question. A circuit judge, whose jurisdiction is limited to the county in which he sits, cannot qualify to "authoritatively construe" state issues. The key word is "authoritatively", for there is no question but that trial courts can and do construe state statutes. The Supreme Court's use of the term "authoritatively" implies either the highest court in the state or a court of last resort, i.e., the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Since the decision in Miller, several state courts have had occasion to interpret their respective statutes in light of the new standards. State v J-R Distributors, Inc, 82 Wash 2d 584; 512 P2d 1049 (1973) ; State ex rel Keating v "Vixen ", 35 Ohio St 2d 215; 301 NE2d 880 (1973); Rhodes v State, 283 So 2d 351 (Fla, 1973); Stroud v State, 300 NE2d 100 (Ind, 1973). The Supreme Court of Washington and the Florida Supreme Court "authoritatively construed" their statutes according to the requirements of Miller. The Ohio Supreme Court felt that their statute, as theretofore construed, was constitutional, and the Indiana Supreme Court stated that their statute was too general and thus constitutionally vague.
It is important for this Court to note that it was the highest court in all four states which construed the respective statutes in light of Miller. It does not follow, as the plaintiffs argue, that since other state supreme courts could "authoritatively construe" their statutes, the trial judge in the instant matter had the power to do so. The only logical conclusion to be drawn from the post-Miller cases is that an appellate court of statewide jurisdiction is the proper body to "authoritatively construe" the state obscenity statutes.
The Louisiana Supreme Court recently held that the requirement of Miller v California, supra, that prohibited conduct be specifically described in statutory language cannot be supplied by mere construction of an unspecific pre-Miller obscenity statute. The Louisiana Supreme Court thus struck down the state's obscenity law and advised the Legislature to get to work. State v Shreveport News Agency, decided December 3, 1973, 287 So 2d 464 (La, 1973).
The Louisiana Supreme Court holds with the Indiana Supreme Court, that to "construe" specific descriptions of prohibited sex acts into a simple obscenity statute that has already been judicially narrowed to satisfy the RothMemoirs test would be to err on the side of judicial activism. It is one thing to interpret a Legislature's words, and an other to write new elements of crime, with definitions, into a statute.
It is our conclusion that the injunction was improperly granted since there is no state law, either statutory or judicial, which "specifically defines" the depictions of sexual conduct which the state may regulate. The trial judge lacked the power to authoritatively construe the statute.
It is noted that the Michigan Supreme Court has just heard arguments on People v Bloss, 388 Mich 409; 201 NW2d 806 (1972), vacated by the United States Supreme Court at 413 US 909; 93 S Ct 3060; 37 L Ed 2d 1021 (1973). Given the fact that our highest Court will have the opportunity to re-examine the Michigan obscenity laws in light of Miller, we decline to act further than reversing the trial judge and ordering the injunction vacated.
Reversed; injunction vacated. No costs, a public question being involved.
T. M. Burns, P. J., concurred.
Oregon taws 1971, c 743, art 29, § 255-262.
Hawaii Penal Code, Tit 37, § 1210-1216.