Case Name: Warner Hines et al. v. Jesse M. Shumaker
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1909-03
Citations: 95 Miss. 477
Docket Number: 
Parties: Warner Hines et al. v. Jesse M. Shumaker.
Judges: Wilbourn, Special Judge, delivered the final and controlling opinion of the court.
Reporter: Mississippi Reports
Volume: 95
Pages: 477–497

Head Matter:
Warner Hines et al. v. Jesse M. Shumaker.
[50 South. 564.]
Motion to Strike the Stenographer’s Report oe the Evidence promt the Record.
Stenorgapher’s Report oe Evidence. Notice to attorneys of filing.. Code 1906, § 797.
Under Code 1906, § 797, requiring the clerk of the circuit court, as soon as the stenographer’s report (notes transcribed) of the evidence is filed, to notify each attorney or firm of attorneys interested in the case, by mail or in person, that the same is on file:— (a.) Notice that the report (notes transcribed) is on file may be-given to the attorneys personally by another authorized to do so-by the clerk; and
(6) The attorneys to be notified are the attorneys of record in the ease; and
■ (c) A notice to a member to a firm of attorneys, shown of record to have represented one of the parties, is notice to all of them, although the firm dissolved pending the suit; and
(d) Formal notice to a party’s attorneys is unnecessary where'his leading counsel had the report (notes transcribed) for the purpose of examining it for several days after it was filed, and returned it to the clerk, without making suggestion for its correction; the only purpose of notice being to give opportunity to inspect the report and suggest corrections.
Prom the circuit court of, first district, Hinds county.
Hon. Wiley H. Potter, Judge.
Shumaker, appellee, was plaintiff in the court below; Hines ■and another, appellants, were defendants there. From a judgment in plaintiff’s favor the defendants appealed to the supreme ■court.
When the case reached the supreme court the appellee moved the court to strike from the record the stenographer’s report (notes transcribed) of the evidence. The facts upon which the motion was based are stated in the opinions of the court.
Flowers, Fletcher & Whitfield, for motion.
The stenographer’s notes in this case have never been signed ■or approved by the trial judge.
No notice was ever given to the firm of Flowers & Whitfield ■or Nay & Sanders by the clerk, either by mail or in person, that the said notes had been filed and were subject to their examination.
There has been no agreement between counsel for appellant .and for the appellee that the said notes are true and correct.
Code 1906, § 707 reads: “as soon as the stenographer’s •notes, transcribed, shall be first received by the clerk of the cir•cuit court he shall notify each attorney or firm interested in •such case by mail or in person that the said notes were received -and are on file.” This is mandatory. The clerk has never notified the attorneys for the appellee or any one of them, either by mail or in person that the said notes had been received or were on file. There is no effort made by counsel for appellant 'to show that the clerk complied with this statute.
Counsel for the appellant present an affidavit of the clerk to 'the effect that the stenographer in order to save the clerk the ‘trouble voluntarily agreed to carry a copy of the notes to each •of the attorneys in the case. There is no provision in the statute, however willing the stenographer might be, which relieves rthe clerk from performing his duty under the statute. The statute does not say .that if a stenographer agrees to give the notice that this relieves the clerk of his duty and that it is a compliance with this statute which is mandatory, that he, the clerk, notify each attorney, either by mail or in person.
There is no effort on the part of counsel for appellant to show that the said stenograhper gave notice to each attorney and to each firm representing the appellee in accordance with his promise to the clerk. As a matter of fact, according to the affidavit of George W. May, of the firm of May & Sanders, no notice was ever given him or his firm that the said notes had been transcribed and were on file and subject to examination until long after the time allowed by law for the examination and approval of said notes as provided by Code 1906, § 797. According to his affidavit neither he nor his firm ever agreed or consented that the said notes are correct. They did not know and do not know whether the said notes are correct.
There is an effort on the part of counsel for appellant to show a conversation between J. N. Flowers and Y. Otis Eobinson in which counsel for appellant state that the said Flowers stated that he would not of his own motion take advantage of the technicality but that his client might insist, and that he would reserve the right to do so. This does not constitute an agreement that the said notes were correct or that a motion would not be made to strike out the said notes. Indeed, according to the affidavit filed by counsel for the appellant in reference to this point it tends to show that they realize that the appeal in this case was not perfected in accordance with the law and did not comply with the law in reference to the filing of the stenographer’s notes and the notice to be given by the clerk had not been complied with.
Tim R. Oooper and V. Otis Robinson, contra.
It must be admitted frankly by counsel for appellants that the clerk did not mail or serve personally a notice to attorneys, of the filing of the transcript of stenographer’s notes in the clerk’s office, and further that the notes were not delivered to George W. May personally.
Counsel claim that Code 1906, § 797, is “mandatory.” We admit it, but we deny that the clerk shall himself, in his own proper person mail a notice that the notes are on file, or else go in person and deliver notice. The evident intention of the statute is to secure notice, not method of notice. Certainly learned counsel for appellee would not contend that the clerk might not send a courier with a notice ? Could he not send a deputy ? Could he not deputize a court stenographer, the official court stenographer, to deliver the notes themselves to' attorneys ? What better notice could be given ? It would seem that this method would be a service, a convenience to attorneys. It is the plan pursued in more than half of the appeals. The service of the very filed record itself is, no doubt, quite as good as the service of a verbal or written brief notice that the record is on file. We can scarcely believe that attorneys for appellee are serious in their contention that the delivery of the filed record, with a request that same be approved without delay, and a reply asking for time in which to read over same, is not notice fully made under the statute.
But it is contended that the notes, or notice, was not delivered to George W. Mayj whom it is claimed is, and was at the time, a separate attorney.
If there were firms of lawyers on each side of the case, would it be necessary for each firm to sign the notes in approval? Mr. May, we submit, gives evidence of desiring to touch lightly in contending for this motion. He .was a member of the-firm of May, Flowers & Whitfield when the suit was filed. The client looked to' J. N. Flowers, of the firm, as his attorney. No notice in a paper, or otherwise, on the dissolution of the firm made it appear that the old firm relations would not exist as to business then in course of trial.
It was perfectly natural for. the clerk and for attorneys for appellant to look upon the firm as still in existence until the case was disposed of. No notice was given, and none alleged to have been given, except through the medium of newspaper notices, and window signs, that the firm had dissolved, and there was nothing to show that the firm of May, Flowers & Whitfield was not in existence and acting as a firm in the conduct of this case. The firm of May & Sanders is not mentioned anywhere and at no time appeared as a firm on any paper until the filing of the brief to which this is an answer.
Flowers was chief attorney, so admitted by May, and neither May nor Flowers allege that the notes are incorrect, and May says in his affidavit that he would be bound by any agreement made by Flowers.
The firm of May, Flowers & Whitfield are estopped hy their own act to deny correctness of notes or to set up failure to approve stenographer’s notes.
The transcribed notes were delivered to the firm and were kept by them for three weeks.
No objections were ever filed and none made now.
Attorneys for appellee sent notes back to clerk with no comment and thus led the clerk into innocent error.
By these acts they have virtually placed the clerk in the attitude of having prejudiced the rights of appellants, simply because he relied on the fact that attorneys for appellee had not the notes in their possession and made no objections and refiled them with the clerk in such a way as to lead any-confiding clerk into error.
It is hardly meet and proper to discuss the personal or official character of a man in a brief, but even though we have suffered the inconvienience and expense of fighting this motion, by the so-called and incorrectly alleged mistake of the clerk, we must say we do not think the less of him. He did just as hundreds of other men -would have done under similar circumstances. We know that he would have suffered much rather than have placed attorneys for appellants in an embarrassing situation like this. E. IX Fon dren, the clerk, is a man of honor and integrity of the highest degree.
When the notes were marked filed by him on May 6, 1909, and promptly sent by the court stenographer to the two firms of attorneys on each side of the case, as they appeared on his docket, he thought that he had complied with his duty, and we submit that he had.
When the original-was returned to the clerk’s office three weeks later, by the employed stenographer of Flowers, and there was no objections filed and no comments, he thought the matter was closed and never dreamed that the silence meant not consent, but contention. We feel sure that Fondren was mailing an honest effort to give both sides a fair chance to try the case on its merits. In addition to this, let it be noted that it appears affirmatively that the notes are approved by Flowers of said firm.
Code 1906, § 4913, reads: “Appeal not to fail, for certain reasons. An appeal to the supreme court shall not be dismissed for want of jurisdiction because of a defect in the- application for appeal, or in the bond, or because of any failure of an officer to comply with the requirements of law in reference to appeals; but all defects and irregularities may be cured by amendment so as to perfect the appeal and obtain the judgment of the supreme court in the case; but the court may dismiss an appeal for a failure of the appellant to do, within a reasonable time, what may be necessary to perfect his appeal.”
We call special attention to Oas & Electric Co. v. Simpson, 118 Tenn. (10th case) 532, wherein an injunction was granted in a very similar case enjoining attorneys from prosecution of a motion to strike out on the ground of equitable estoppel where they had conditionally approved the transcribed notes.

Opinion:
Wíhteield, O. I.,
delivered the (first) opinion of the court; the one afterwards set aside; it was as follows:—
The stenographer's notes in this case were not signed by the judge. Nor is there any agreement, in writing or otherwise, between the counsel for the respective parties that they were correct. At the time of the institution of this suit the declaration was filed by May, Flowers & Whitfield, but before the trial of the ease in the court below that firm had been dissolved; Mr. May associating himself thereafter with Mr. Saunders, so that thereafter there were two separate firms, May & Saunders, and Flowers & Whitfield. Due notice of this dissolution was published in the city papers, and of the formation of the other partnerships. In addition to this, both the firm of May & Saunders and Flowers & Whitfield had the names of their respective firms, and the parties composing them, painted in large letters on the windows of their offices, opposite the offices of the attorneys for the appellant. It is evident, from the affidavit in the case, that the circuit clerk knew of these dissolutions, and that Mr. May was in a new and separate firm, before these notes were filed.
On the trial in the court below, both these separate firms were present and participated in the trial; that is to say, the firm of Flowers & Whitfield, and the other independent firm of May & Saunders. It is conceded, very frankly, by learned counsel for appellant, that no notice of any kind whatever was given to Mr. George May of the filing of stenographer's notes, as the statute imperatively requires should be done. The language of the statute is express, and has been over and over again declared by this court to be imperative and mandatory. See section 797, Code of 1906. That section reads as follows on this point: "As soon as the stenographer's notes, transcribed, shall be first received by the clerk of the circuit court, he shall notify each attorney, or firm, interested in such case, by mail or in person, that said notes were received and are on file." As stated, there is no pretense whatever that this provision in this statute was complied with in any manner whatever. Mr. May never had any notice of any kind. The circuit clerk testifies, in the second affidavit, that the name signed to the declaration in the case was May, Flowers & Whitfield; but this is no sort of excuse for failure to notify Mr. May, who was not, at the time of the trial in the court below even, much less at the time of the filing of the notes after the trial, a member of the firm of May, Flowers & 'Whitfield, but was a member of an independent firm, created after the declaration was filed in the case in the court below. The statute does not stop with directing the clerk of the circuit court to notify each attorney or firm, but expressly provides how he shall notify them' — >"by mail or in person." And in this case it is frankly admitted by counsel for appellant that, not only did he not notify Mr. May by mail or in person, but that he never notified him in any manner whatever.
The provision in the statute that each attorney or firm interested shall be notified is one of the highest wisdom. Suppose a case in which three separate attorneys represent the plaintiff on the trial in the court below, and the clerk gives notice to one of them, but not to the other two of the attorneys; these attorneys residing at points distant from each other in the state. Is it possible that the two- attorneys not notified as required by the statute can be bound by reason of notice given to the other attorney, in the face of the express declaration in the statute that each attorney should be notified ? Manifestly, not. Suppose, again, in such case, one of these attorneys is the leading counsel in the case, and the other two, being mere assistants should .be notified, and the leading counsel not notified. Is it possible that the leading counsel can be bound by notice given to the other two? Just as manifestly not. And, of course, what is true of separate attorneys is true of separate firms. It is impossible to fail to see the wisdom, therefore, of the statute, when it imperatively and mandatorily requires the circuit clerk to give notice of the filing of the stenographer's notes to each attorney, and also to each firm intei'ested in the cause. It is not for us to judicially legislate. The statute is so written, and wisely so written; and it is the duty, the imperative and mandatory duty, of the clerk to give the notice in the manner required by the statute.'
We may also mention that in the very admirable substituto for section Y97, Code of 1906, prepared by Judge Fletcher, and adopted by the Bar Association, for recommendation for pas sage by the legislature, this same provision that each attorney and each firm shall be notified by the clerk is retained, and wisely retained. It was the simplest thing in the world for the circuit clerk, since Mr. May lived in Jackson, in easy reach of his office, to give him the notice required. He negligently failed to do so. It is not for this court to engraft exceptions upon this statute, which has been construed so often as a mandatory statute, or in any wise alter its express direction.
Therefore the motion is sustained, and the stenographer's notes hereby stricken from the record.