Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. Tye Phillips MIMS
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1976-03-29
Citations: 330 So. 2d 905
Docket Number: No. 57073
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Tye Phillips MIMS.
Judges: DIXON, J., dissents with reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 330
Pages: 905–914

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. Tye Phillips MIMS.
No. 57073.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
March 29, 1976.
Lloyd F. Love, Ferriday, E. H. Fitzpatrick, Jr., Natchez, for defendant-appellant.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen.; W. C. Falkenheiner, Dist. Atty., John Sturgeon, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Opinion:
MARCUS, Justice.
Tye Phillips Mims was charged by bill of information with possession of a controlled dangerous substance, to-wit: marijuana, in violation of La.R.S. 40:966C and D(l). After trial by judge on Febru- • ary 26, 1975, he was found guilty as charged and sentenced to pay a fine of five hundred dollars plus costs and to be imprisoned in the parish jail for ten days. An appeal was taken to this court. A case is apealable to this court if the defendant has been convicted of a felony or a fine exceeding five hundred dollars or imprisonment exceeding six months actually has been imposed. Defendant was not convicted of a felony, nor did the fine or term of imprisonment actually imposed exceed five hundred dollars or imprisonment for six months. Hence, the case is not ap-pealable to this court. However, we will consider the appeal as an application for a writ of review under our supervisory jurisdiction. Relator asserts four assignments of error for the granting of this writ and reversal of his conviction and sentence.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1
Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized from his car on the ground that it was recovered as a result of an illegal search and seizure. After a hearing, the motion was denied. Defendant contends that the trial court erred in this ruling.
A bulletin was broadcast over the police radio regarding a complaint that occupants of a particularly described vehicle had purchased cigarette papers from a local store in Ferriday, and one of the occupants had "a strong smell of marijuana" on his person. This bulletin was logged at 5:00 p. m. on August 3, 1974. Shortly thereafter, Trooper James W. Farris of the Louisiana State Police observed a vehicle meeting this description traveling "pretty fast." He followed the vehicle to where it stopped at the Spokane grocery. The occupants alighted from the car and started walking toward the store. Officer Farris got out of his vehicle and, as he walked past their vehicle in the direction of the store, he observed what appeared to be numerous marijuana seeds on the seats and floorboard of their vehicle. Upon inquiry, relator, Tye Mims, admitted his ownership of the vehicle and identified himself by exhibiting his driver's license to the police officer. Trooper Farris then radioed Trooper Blunschi, who was in the vicinity, for assistance. Trooper Blunschi arrived at the scene in about five to ten minutes. Relator was presented with a "permission to search" form which he read, acknowledged that he understood, and thereafter signed. This form was executed at 5:25 p. m. A thorough search of the vehicle was then conducted by the police officers who recovered marijuana seeds and gleanings from the front and back seats, under the seats, the floorboard, and the glove compartment of this car. They likewise found a "roach" holder, cigarette papers and a cardboard tube from a coat hanger, that latter of which smelled of marijuana and was burned on one end. Relator was then placed under arrest and advised of his Miranda rights.
Relator admitted stopping at the store in Ferriday but denied purchasing any cigarette papers. He admitted signing the "permission to search" form, stating that he had nothing to hide in his car. However, he explained that he consented to the search and signed the permission form because of representations by the police officers that a search warrant could be obtained if he refused to do so. The' testimony of several of the occupants of the vehicle generally corroborated relator's testimony except that they admitted that an inquiry had been made at the store in Ferri-day about the purchase of cigarette papers but they denied purchasing any as there was none available.
After hearing the evidence, the trial judge concluded that relator's consent had been validly obtained.
In Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972), the United States Supreme Court stated:
In Terry this Court recognized that 'a police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest.' [citation omitted] The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his -shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape. On the contrary, Terry recognizes that it may be the essence of good police work to adopt an intermediate response. [citation omitted] A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time, [citations omitted]
See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); State v. Rogers, 324 So.2d 403 (La.1975); State v. Jefferson, 284 So.2d 882 (La.1973); La. Code Crim.P. art. 215.1(A).
Applying the standards set forth in Adams and Terry, we conclude that Trooper Farris clearly had reasonable cause to ap- . proach and briefly detain relator for investigatory purposes. Trooper Farris had just received a police bulletin describing the vehicle in question as being occupied by persons suspected of possessing marijuana and had personally observed marijuana seeds on the seats and floorboard of said vehicle.
A consent search is one of the specifically established exceptions to the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). Hence, a valid search or seizure may be made without a warrant where the accused consents to such a search or seizure. State v. Rogers, supra; State v. Sears, 298 So.2d 814 (La.1974); State v. Comeaux, 252 La. 481, 211 So.2d 620 (1968). Voluntariness of consent is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances. Schneckloth v. Busta-monte, supra; State v. Rogers, supra.
After reviewing the evidence adduced at the hearing on the motion to suppress, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial judge's conclusion that relator's consent to search the vehicle was freely and voluntarily given. Therefore, the trial judge correctly denied defendant's motion to suppress the evidence seized from his car. Assignment of Error No. 1 is without merit.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2
Defendant's motion to suppress his written statement was denied by the trial judge. In brief, defendant asserts that the arresting officers.failed to give him his Miranda warnings prior to questioning and therefore any information obtained cannot be used at trial.-
There is no merit to this contention. As indicated in the facts under the previous assignment of error, immediately after the seizure of the marijuana seeds and gleanings and drug paraphernalia from relator's car, relator was placed under arrest and orally advised of his Miranda rights by Trooper Farris, who testified that Mims affirmatively acknowledged his understanding of his rights and agreed to cooperate with them. Mims was then taken to the Concordia Parish sheriff's office in Vidalia where he was again advised of his rights and signed a "waiver of rights" form. This form was executed at 6:55 p. m. Relator then made a statement which was written and signed by him. In the printed portion above the written statement, there is an acknowledgment of his rights and waiver of same. Mims admitted that Officer Farris read the printed portion to him prior to his writing the statement. The statement was started at 6:57 p. m. and completed at 7:12 p. m. While relator denied receiving his rights at the Spokane grocery, he admitted that his rights were read to him and that he signed the waiver of rights form at the courthouse. However, he denies understanding them. At the time of trial (some six months after the date of the alleged crime), relator was seventeen years old and senior in high school. Under the facts of this case, we find that relator was fully advised of his Miranda rights and that he knowingly and intelligently waived same.
Furthermore, we do not find under the facts of this case that relator was under custodial interrogation until after the marijuana seeds and gleanings and drug paraphernalia were seized from his car and he was placed under arrest. At this point, Miranda warnings must and did follow. Prior to this time, questioning by police amounted to only "general on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding the crime" during which no Miranda warnings are required. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); State v. Roach, 322 So.2d 222 (La.1975).
Hence, the trial judge properly denied defendant's motion to suppress his written statement. Assignment of Error No. 2 is without substance.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 3
Defendant contends that the trial judge erred in denying his motion for a new trial on the ground that there was "no evidence elicited to prove the essential elements of the offense for which defendant was tried."
Article 858 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure provides:
Neither the appellate nor supervisory jurisdiction of the supreme court may be invoked to review the granting or the refusal to grant a new trial, except for error of law.
Where a motion for a new trial is grounded on the assertion that there was no evidence at all on which the verdict of conviction can be supported, a question of law is presented for our review. However, it is well settled that where there is some evidence to sustain the conviction, no matter how little, this court cannot pass on the sufficiency thereof. That comes within the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury. It is only where there is no evidence at all of some essential element of the crime charged that we have the right to annul the conviction. City of Monroe v. Barfield, 246 La. 315, 164 So.2d 340 (1964); State v. Vines, 245 La. 977, 162 So.2d 332 (1964); State v. Bueche, 243 La. 160, 142 So.2d 381 (1962); State v. Copling, 242 La. 199, 135 So.2d 271 (1961); State v. Dunnington, 157 La. 369, 102 So. 478 (1924).
La.R.S. 40:966C provides in pertinent part:
It is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled dangerous substance classified in Schedule 1 .
The jurisprudence has firmly established that a person may be in "constructive" possession of a controlled dangerous substance if, though not in physical custody, it is subject to his dominion and control. State v. Knight, 298 So.2d 726 (La.1974); State v. Porter, 296 So.2d 302 (La.1974); State v. Smith, 257 La. 1109, 245 So.2d 327 (1971). The jurisprudence has also established that guilty knowledge is an essential ingredient of the crime of possession of a controlled dangerous substance. State v. Knight, supra, and cases cited therein. Although intent is a question of fact, it need not be proven as a fact; it may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction. La.R.S. 15:-445; State v. Vines, supra.
In the instant case, marijuana seeds and gleanings were recovered from the front and back seats, under the seats, on the floorboard and in the glove compartment. Likewise, a "roach" holder and cigarette papers were found in the car. A cardboard tube, which smelled of marijuana and burned on one end, was also found behind the sunvisor. While the vehicle in question was owned by relator's father and sometimes used by other members of his family, it was regularly used by relator to go to school. Relator had been driving the vehicle, together with several of his friends, for a couple of hours prior to the search and seizure. There was evidence that one of the boys in the vehicle had entered the grocery in Ferriday about 4:00 or 5:00 p. m. (shortly before the search and seizure) and caused a disturbance by pushing people around in the store. He also had a "strong smell of marijuana" about his person. There was expert testimony to the effect that the tested substance recovered from the vehicle was marijuana. Finally, relator made a written confession to the police. While the statement is subject to various interpretations, the trier of fact could construe it as being partially in-culpatory.
Under the foregoing circumstances, we conclude that the record contains some evidence that Mims knowingly or intentionally possessed the marijuana in question. The numerous seeds and gleanings and drug paraphernalia, although not found on his person, were discovered in areas under his direct control and dominion. This amounts to some evidence of constructive possession. Likewise, the circumstances of this case present some evidence from which guilty knowledge may be inferred. Hence, the conviction will not be disturbed. Assignment of Error No. 3 is without merit.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 4
Defendant urges that the trial judge erred in permitting in evidence a bottle of marijuana seeds and gleanings recovered during the search. He alleges that the prosecution did not prove.an unbroken chain of custody from the time the substance was seized until it was admitted in evidence. As proof of the state's improper storing procedure, he points to Trooper Farris' admission that he kept the evidence for sixteen days at his residence before transporting it to the crime lab in Baton Rouge.
This argument has no substance. In State v. Dotson, 260 La. 471, 256 So.2d 594 (1971), we stated:
To admit demonstrative evidence at a trial, the law requires that the object be identified. The identification can be visual, that is, by testimony at the trial that the object exhibited is the one related to the case. It can also be identified by chain of custody, that is, by establishing the custody of the object from the time it was seized to the time it is offered in evidence.
The law does not require that the evidence as to custody eliminate all possibility that the object has been altered. For admission, it suffices if the custodial evidence establishes that it is more probable than not that the object is the one connected with the case. A preponderance of the evidence is sufficient, [citations omitted]
The lack of positive identification goes to the weight of the evidence, rather than to its admissibility. Ultimately, connexity of physical evidence is a factual matter for determination by the jury, [citations omitted]
See also State v. Roach, 322 So.2d 222 (La.1975); State v. Freeman, 306 So.2d 703 (La.1975); State v. Flood, 301 So.2d 637 (La.1974); State v. Isaac, 261 La. 487, 260 So.2d 302 (1972).
In the instant case, Troopers Farris and Blunschi conducted the search wherein the marijuana seeds and gleanings and drug paraphernalia were recovered from relator's car. Some of the seeds and gleanings were placed into an envelope and others into an empty medicine bottle. Trooper Farris then made a list of the items seized. He kept them in a locked filing cabinet at his home from the date of seizure (August 3) until he personally delivered them to the crime lab in Baton Rouge (August 19). The items were tested and kept in the evidence locker there until brought to court on the day of trial by a criminalist from the crime lab. The bottle containing the marijuana was received in evidence.
The chain of custody was • amply established by this testimony. Clearly, it was more probable than not that the marijuana introduced in evidence was related to the case. The trial judge properly permitted its admission in evidence. There is no merit in this assignment of error.
DECREE
For the reasons assigned, the appeal is dismissed, and the application for a writ under our supervisory jurisdiction is denied.
DIXON, J., dissents with reasons.
CALOGERO, J., dissents with reasons.
. La.Const. art. V, § 5(D) (1974) provides:
Appellate Jurisdiction. In addition to other appeals provided by this constitution, a case shall be appealable to the supreme court if (1) a law or ordinance has been declared unconstitutional; (2) the defendant has been convicted of a felony or fine exceeding five hundred dollars or imprisonment exceeding six months actually has been imposed.
. Penalty for violation of La.R.S. 40:9660 and D(l) (possession of marijuana — first conviction) is a fine of not more than five hundred dollars and/or imprisonment in the parish jail for not more than six months. A felony is defined as an offense that may be punished by death or by imprisonment at hard labor. La.Code Crim.jP. art. 933(3). A misdemeanor is defined as any offense other than a felony, and includes the violation of an ordinance providing a penal sanction. Id. art. 933(4).
.La.Const, art. V, § 5(,A) (1974).
. Marijuana is classified as a controlled dangerous substance in Schedule I. La.R.S. 40:964.
. .