Case Name: The Board of Commissioners, of Crawford County, Appellants, vs. The Board of Commissioners, of Iowa County, Appellees
Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Wisconsin
Decision Date: 1850-01
Citations: 2 Chand. 14
Docket Number: 
Parties: The Board of Commissioners, of Crawford County, Appellants, vs. The Board of Commissioners, of Iowa County, Appellees.
Judges: 
Reporter: Chandler
Volume: 2
Pages: 14–28

Head Matter:
The Board of Commissioners, of Crawford County, Appellants, vs. The Board of Commissioners, of Iowa County, Appellees.
Where two counties are annexed to each other for judicial purposes under a Statutory provision of the Government, to which they were respectively subject, and such Statute provided that certain Courts should bo held exclusively in one of the counties, drawing to it thereby the trial of all causes arising in each county; and where by such legislative act no provision was made relating to the expanses to be incurred by the holding of such Courts," but which expenses wore currently paid by the county in which such Courts were provided to be holden — the non-paying county cannot be coerced either in a Court of equity or of law to refund the paying county any part of the expenses paid by it, for such purpose, unless by some act of consent to pay it shall oreate an enforceable binding duty.
The absence of any provision by the law, creating the connection of the two eountieá for judicial purposes, providing how or by whom the Court expenses should be paid, does not furnish to either County a legal ground of action as against the other, for contribution.
It is a fair presumption, in the absence of any legislative provision to the contrary, that it was the duty of Iowa County to pay the expenses of the Courts, as an equivalent for the advantages which it derived from the holding the Courts within its limits, and the disadvantages arising to Crawford County by being compelled to go abroad to transact their judicial business;
There being no privity of contract between the parties litigant, nor any assumption of payment by the County of Crawford of any part of the expenses, the law does not raise a presumption of duty, for the non-performance of which, a suit can be sustained. The acquiescence of Iowa, for years, in the payment of the Court expenses without mating any Claim upon Crawford for eoritribution, in the meantime; amounts to a waiver of any claim against ÍU
The Statute of limitations of this State has the same application in suits in equity, as in law; and tho claim now set up by the complainant having been of more than six years standing, prior to the bill, and, in the meantime, no payments having been made, nor any promise or undertaking to pay, having been made to appear, the claim, if any there was, is barred by the Statute.
This was a suit instituted in Chancery, by the Board of County Commissioners of Iowa county, as the legal Representatives of Iowa county, while it was in the Territory of Michigan, against the Board of County Commissioners of Crawford county as the legal Representatives and Successors of Crawford county, of Michigan Terri • tory.
The bill sets up, substantially, the following facts and charges: — 1st, That in the year 1830, the counties of Iowa and Crawford, were, by an act of Michigan, attached for judicial purposes. 3d, That, under such act, the judiciary of said counties was organized, and Courts held in Iowa county, “though said counties had a separate existence, for all purposes, except Circuit and County Court purposes.” 3d, That such counties remained so attached from the spring of 1830 to July, 1836, during which time terms of the Circuit Court were held. 4th; That, from the spring of 1830 to July, 1836, as niany as two terms of the Circuit Court were held for such counties, continuing on an average for ten days each, and that lárgé sums of money were expended therefor, many indictments found and tried, the expense of which had to be born by Iowa county — that the two counties, from the spring of 1830 to July, 1836, had but one sheriff, clerk or coroner attached to the Circuit Court; but had many other officers in common — that bul ótie grand jury was summoned at each term to inqtiife for both counties on the Territorial side of the Court; and that the fees, charges, &c., were charged to both counties jointly, an equal share to each ~rthat each county had a separate Government and organization as far as revenue was concerned, and each county assumed and collected its own revenue; and there was no common fund between them, out of which any joint indebtedness could be paid — that for the whole period, from the spring of 1830 to July, 1836, the Courts were filled with civil and criminal business, and that an equal, if not a majority of such business came from Crawford county, especially those of criminal character: and that the length of the terms were materially extended in consequénce ofthq business coming from.Crawford county; and that the terms of the Courts were mainly held in Crawford county — rthat all the expenses incurred by the counties jointly were, defrayed by the county of Iowa; that that county was compelled to adopt such course or permit such expenses to go unpaid — that the sum so paid as aforesaid amounted in the whole to $7,139,06, a bill of the particulars of which was appended to the bill of complaint — that the. county of Crawford has paid no part or share of such expenses so paid, by Iowa; and the complainants set up an indebtedness against the county of Crawford to the amount of one half of the sum alleged to have been paid as aforesaid,, and, pray that said county may be decreed, to pay the one half of that sum, &c.
The answer of ■the Representatives, of Crawford county admits the organization of tire counties substantially, as alleged’by the appellants; admits the annexation of'two counties for. the purposes alleged in the bill, but that each of said counties had, during all the time in question, sepa-, sate county. Courts, having concurrent jurisdiction with, the Circuit Court in eivil actions under one thousand dol- . 3ars, and appellate jurisdiction over Justices Courts, and of all crimes not punishable capitally. Admits 'the counties were attached for the time alleged in the bill, but denies that any term of the Circuit Court was held in Crawford county, after Oct. 1835. Denies also that as many as two terms a year of the Circuit Court were held, or that there was but one Extra Term held during the whole time, and that that one was held for the purpose of trying a man for an alleged murder committed at Mineral point in Iowa co. Denies that the terms held continued so long as stated in the bill; or that the alleged expenditures are chargeable to both counties. Alleges that each county had its own Sheriff, Coroner, an.d Clerk, but that the Sheriff of Iowa had power to execute process in both counties. Admits the Grand Jury had power to inquire and did inquire for both counties. Denies that the expenses alleged in the bill were chargeable to Crawford county. Denies that an equal amount of business arose in Crawford county, with that ‘ of Iowa. Admits that the expenses incurred for Courts, besides what was paid by the-United States, were paid by Iowa county. That a large part of the expenses set up in the bill of particulars of expenditure, accrued after the holding of the last Court in Iowa.- Denies all the equities set up or alleged in the Bill, or that the defendants are bound to pay the sum demanded. The answer also insists that the complainants have a remedy at law; and also, that the Statute of limitations bars the claim of complainants. That as the laws of Michigan were from 1830 to 1836 the counties of Iowa and Crawford were not corporations* and therefore, that neither they or the representatives of either could sue or be sued in a case like that made by the Bill, and prays that the Defendants may have granted to them all the defence tyhich they might have had, had they demurred to the Bill.
This cause was brought to a hearing before the late District Court of Crawford county, and was submitted to that Court upon Bill, answer and proofs. The Judge ordered and decreed that the Board of Commissioners of Crawford county pay to the Board of Commissioners of Iowa county, $1,752,00, with interest thereon until paid, together with costs. From this decree the Plaintiffs in Error appealed.
. The opinion of this Court, so perspicuously states the case made by the parties, that it becomes unnecessary to enlarge it by a further statement of it.
B. C. Eastman, for Appellants.
Dunn & Crawford, for Appellees.
The appellants made the following points, and. cited the authorities appended thereunto, to wit:
I.Neither the county of Iowa nor the county of Craw;ford vyere corporations under the laws^of Michigan. — • Slat. Mich. 1827, p. 35.8, §_ 13. — lb., 378, § 11. fb., 374, § 7. 16., 375, § 10. 16., 198, § 7.
None of the county officers were requirnd to give bonds to the county. — ^Wilcox on Cor. (15) 9.
1. The county of Iowa could not become a creditor.
2. The. county of - Crawford could not contract debts.
3. Iowa county cannot sue Crawford upon a cause of action which arose anterior to the time when they be-? Came bodies corporate.
II. The relation existing between the two counties was created by the Legislature, and was limited by the terms of the Statute creating it. — 4 U. S. L. 3.93.
1. Iowa county took nothing by implication, but was governed by and restricted within the letter of the act.— Medford vs. Pratt — 4 Pick. 226 — 7 Hamshire vs. Franklin 16 — Mass. Rep. 67. 4 U. S. Laws 393.
2. Crawford could not become a debtor to Iowa without its own consent, either expressed or implied. — 2 Com. Con. 151. Chit. Com. 178-9. — Lightfoot vs. Creed. 8. Taunt 269-70.
3. As the Statute is silent as to the expenses of the Court, the law will presume that Iowa county should, bear the whole expense, in consideration of the benefits it derived by having the Court holden within the county of Iowa. — Hamshire vs. Franklin — 16 Mass. Rep. 89.
4. All the fines and forfeitures accrued to the benefit of Iowa county.' — Ludlow vs. Sikes — 19 Pick. 328. Wind-ham vs. Portland — 4 Mass, Rep. 389. Stat. Mich. 1833, p. 501, § 1. ■
III. Iowa county is estopped from setting up any claim upon Crawford.
1. The expenses were voluntarily paid by Iowa.— Story's Com. E. PI. & E. § 483.
2. Iowa treated the accounts as debts against itself only, and passed upon and allowed the sums mentioned in the bill, without calling upon or consulting Crawford, thereby depriving Crawford of the opportunity of investigating the validity of the accounts claimed of Crawford.
3. It is not admitted in the answer, nor is there any testimony that any of the accounts was paid by Iowa.
IV. There is no equity in the bill. — Story’s Com. Eq. PI §472, § 482,
1. It prays no account.
2. It seeks no discovery.
3. The remedy asked for is one at law.
Y. The claim is barred by Statute of limitations ana lapse of time. — Mit. PI. [272] 333-4-5 and note. Story’s Com. Eq. pi. .§ 484, § 485, 489, .§ 503, ,§ 751, § 851, St at. Lim. Bank U. S. vs. Daniel et. ah, 12 Pet. 56.
I. The alleged indebtedness accrued prior to July 4th, 1836. The suit commenced April, 1844. — Ludlow vs. Sikes, 19 Pick. 327. Story’s Com. Eq. P. §847. Story’s Eq. § 64, and cases there cited. Ib., § 529, and authorities there cited.
On the part of the Appellees it was argued that a co-partnership existed between the counties of Iowa and Crawford touching the expenses of holding the Courts in the respective counties. That this relation necessarily sprung from and was the result of the Statute of Michigan, by which the courts, were to be held for both counties. That inasmuch as Iowa county had paid all the expenses which had been paid, it was the right of that county to bring the county of Crawford into the Court of Equity to account for and to pay its share and proportion of the expenses which had accrued for the mutual benefit of each.

Opinion:
By the Court.
Hübbell, J.
This is a case of considerable peculiarity and interest, and it has received a corresponding consideration by the Court.
The county of Iowa, by its legal representatives, brings suit against the county of Crawford, by its legal representatives, for a large sum of money claimed to have been paid by the former, for the latter, for Court expenses, while the two counties were united for judicial purposes. The bill alleges that the counties of Iowa and Crawford, by an act of the Legislature of Michigan, in 1830, were attached for the purposes of Circuit Courts, which were holden at Mineral Point, from the spring of 1830 to July, 1836; that the Sheriff and other officers of Iowa county acted for both counties during all this period; and tháí Iowa county paid all the expenses, except such as were defrayed by the United States, and claims that these expenses were incurred on joint account, and that Crawford •is bound to refund one-half the amount. The bill claims $3,564 53, and interest from July, 1836: and prays for an •account and payment.
It was filed on the first day of April, 1844: and the case was decided upon bill, answer, replication, and proofs.
The principal points of defence were:
1st. That neither of the counties was a body corporate, under the laws of Michigan: and that neither could become a debtor or creditor'.
2d. That the relation between th'e two counties was created and limited by Statute: and that, as the Statute •is silent on the subject of expenses, Iowa takes nothing by implication.
3d. That Iowa having voluntarily paid the expenses, is estopped from setting up any claim on Crawford.
4th. That the claim is barred by the Statute of limitations.
Several other points were raised, which it is not material to consider.
In order to the proper understanding of the relation of these parties, it will be necessary to examine somewhat into their history. On the 26th day of October, 1818, Crawford county was organized by proclamation of the Governor of Michigan Territory: embracing the.present county of Iowa in its bounds; the county seat being located at Prairie du Chiep. By an act of the Legislature pf Michigan, passed October 9, 1829, the separate county of Towa was set off from Cranford: and the seat of justice fixed at Mineral Point.
On the 2d of April, 1830, about six months after the organization of Iowa county, the following act of Congress was passed:
" That the term of the Court appointed to be held annually, on the second Monday in May, at the village of Prairie du Chien, by the additional Judge of the United States for the Territory of Michigan, shall be held on the first Monday in October, annually, at Mineral Point, in the county of Iowa, in the said Territory; and the cases which shall be pending in the said Court, on the second Monday in May next, shall be tried and determined at the time and place above designated in the county of Iowa., and thp Clerk and Sheriff of said county shall be the Clerk and' Sheriff of this Court; and its jurisdiction ?hall be and continue the, sam,e as if said county of Crawford had not been divided."
Under this act, the judicial proceedings of Crawford, so far as the Circuit Court was concerned, were transferred ‡-o the county of Iowa: and the expenses alleged to have been incurred by Iowa, accrued in pursuance of this law. At the same time, these counties had separate County Courts; and were in every other respect, separate and independent. In 1836, by an act of the Legislature of the Territory of Wisconsin, passed at Belmont, the counties ftf Crawford and Iowa were in form, constituted bodies corporate and politic, and the relationship which had, existed between them, as to their Circuit Court, was finally dissolved. It does not appear that any specific grant of corporate powers had ever previously been made to either ©f the counties; at least no Legislative act to that effect is found, and the Proclamation of the Governor of Michigan, organizing Crawford, is. not at hand.
Certain it is, however, that their fiscal affairs were managed by Boards of Supervisors or Commissioners, constituted by laws of the Territory; who had the power of auditing accounts and charges against the county; and that all the ordinary expenses o.f County Government were, from time to time, audited and paid by .taxes raised in the manner prescribed by law. The relation of debtor and creditor, on the part of the county, was recognized by such a series of Legislative Acts and public transactions, that it would be now hardly reasonable or just, to suffer either to exempt itself from liability on the ground of want of legal capacity. If the claim in the present case, were admitted to be honest and lawful, the defence interposed, upon this ground, would partake so strongly of fraud, as to compel this Court to hold the defendant estopped from setting it up. This disposes of the respondent's first point. The second is, that the relation between the two counties was created and limited by Statute; and that as the Statute is silent on the subject of expenses, Iowa takes nothing by implication. This position is true in point of fact. No mention whatever is made, in any of the several laws, which have been referred to, of the expenses of the Circuit Coprt held at Mineral Point, and exercising jurisdiction over the two counties. During the six years pendency of this, united jurisdiction, both coun% ties were represented in Ihe Legislative Assembly of Michigan. Their respective rights, interests, and wants, must have been understood by their Delegates; as well as the fact that Iowa was Continually paying the current expenses of the Court. The omission of the Legislature, under these circumstances, to make any provision of law, for the apportionment or joint payment of the court expenses, is strongly significant of a common understanding-at the time, that they were to be borne in the county where the courts were held. The -auditing and paying of these sums, wholly, by the county of Iowa, for a series of years, also raises a strong presumption of the same fact.
In the Belmont Legislature also, both counties were represented; and yet a law providing for their permanent separate jurisdiction and existence, was passed, without any provision fora settlement of their alleged joint liabilities. It is to be considered further, that the Legislature well knew that a large part, indeed, quite the largest part ,of the current expenses of the Circuit Court were paid by the General Government, (those of the Judge, the Grand Jury, the Clerk, &c.,) and that most of the fees of other officers was collectable by :law, from the parties litigant. The expenses that remained, might well be regarded as a fair equivalent for the superior advantage enjoyed by Iowa, in having the County Seat located at Mineral Point, and for the extra trouble and cost, on the part of the inhabitants of Crawford, in traveling to and • attending upon a distant court. This consideration was recognized in the case of the County of Hampshire vs. the County of Franklin, 16 Mass. 76 — a case remarkably similar to-the.present, and decided upon the same princi- pie, except that the Court held, the parties. bou.nd by an award of Commissioners, instead of adjudicating directly upon the question at issue.
Chief Justice Parker says: " We do not see that Hampshire would have any claim upon Franklin for a share of these expenses: for the act was silent about them: and for aught which would appear, it was intended by the Legislature, and agreed to by the parties, that the county of Hampshire should bear all this expense in consideration of the inconveniences the inhabitants of Franklin would be subjected to in attending the Court at such a distance from their homes; and the advantages which Hampshire would derive from being the judicial center of three counties." These reasons would seem conclusive, as to the understanding and intention, both of the Legislature and the parties: and, in the absence of any Statutory provision, requiring payment of a part, by Crawford, and in view of the voluntary payment of the whole, by Iowa, this Court might justly hold Iowa absolutely concluded, by-her silence and by her open acts.
But there is yet. a stronger objection to the complainant's recovery. This is a suit, in the nature of an action in assumpsit, for the recovery of a sqm of money which Iowa claims she ha.s paid for Crawford. To sustain such an action, there must have been a request, express or implied; or a joint, liability on the part of bpth counties. There was no express request, in any form: and an implied one cannot well be drawn from the facts. The act of Congress, transferring the Cqurts, was compulsory upon the people of Crawford. Their seat of justice, which for many years had existed at Prairie du Chien, was transferred to a distant locality; and they were required to travel beyond their county limits, as well to obtain redress of their own grievances, as to answer the demands of others. And this change was effected, only a few months after Iowa was first set o£F from Crawford, and organized as an independent county.
The presumption is quite as strong, that Congress intended, under the circumstances, that Iowa Should pay the whole, as that Crawford should pay a part. It is fair to observe on this point, that When Iowa was set off from Crawford, by the act of 9th October, 1829, all suits then pending in Crawford county in which the people of Iowa were concerned, were required to be prosecuted and concluded as if no separation had been made; and thus, a considerable item of expense was thrown upon Crawford. By the same act, the taxes of Iowa, for the year 1829, Were remitted. (Laws of Mich. 1833, p. 675-6.
No claim, on this account, has ever been set up by Crawford; and it would probably be thought absurd at this day, to assume an implied request on the part of Iowa, that Crawford should pay her part of these joint expenses. Yet, such an assumption would be scarcely less violent than the present. There is, in truth, no ground in reason or fact to assume a request of Crawford, that Iowa should pay the alleged bill of expenses. The only question that remains, is, was there a joint legal liability ? There was none by express law. The act which required the Circuit Courts to be holden within the county of Iowa, as we have seen, is silent as to the expenses: and no implication can be raised, upon that silence, in favor of Iowa. But if the expenses were to be jointly paid, in what proportion 1 Iim> plications of law are founded upon reason and justice. And the reason and justice must be so clear as to admit of no doubt, or denial. If a joint liability is implied, it mUst arise from a joint interest and benefit. But, in this case, the benefit to the one may have been a positive injury to the other. It is impossible to adopt any scale by which the advantages, if there were any on the part of Crawford, can be ascertained. It is clear that the ar^ rangement was not, and could not have been mutually and equally beneficial. Iowa had the better side. But the circumstances of the two counties were so different, that any attempt to ascertain their respective advantages, must end in mere conjecture. The law does not raise implications, nor take aWay or confer rights, upon conjecture. In a court of law, this claim could not be maintained, and the same principle rules in equity. Indeed, there is no ground for pursuing this demand in Equity, except the assumed necessity for a discovery from the respondents, or the pfayer for an account. The occasion for a discovery is not apparent; and the account is fully set forth in the complainant's bill. But as the case is in substance, fairly before this Court, it has been deemed best to decide it here, and not send the parties into a Court of Law, to renew an unnecessary litigation.
Having arrived at the conclusions above stated, it is not necessary to discuss the other point, growing out of the Statute of limitations. It may be remarked however, that the same rule of construction applies in equity, as at law; and that as the alleged liabilities, on the part of Crawford, accrued more than six years before the filing of thé Bill, the recovery would be cut off by the Statute, unless it should be made to appear, that there was a current account existing between the parties, of which some items had been paid or charged, within the six years.
No evidence of such mutual account has been given. On every ground, therefore, it is believed that the defence has been sustained, and the decree of the court below must be reversed with costs.
Judgment of reversal of decree.