Case Name: WITTE v. WEINBERG
Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1893-04-21
Citations: 37 S.C. 579
Docket Number: 
Parties: WITTE v. WEINBERG.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Carolina Reports
Volume: 37
Pages: 579–602

Head Matter:
WITTE v. WEINBERG.
1. Findings of Fact—Equitable Defence.—In an action at law, this court cannot consider alleged errors in the findings of fact by the court below. Where, however, an equitable defence is interposed to a legal demand, findings involved in the issue raised by such defence may be reviewed on appeal, but will not be reversed, where there has been concurrence by referee and judge, unless the clear result of the testimony points manifestly to a different conclusion, or there is no testimony to support such findings.
2. Ibid.—Payment by Note.—Where dealings between factor and customer had gone on for several successive years, a note given for the balance due at the end of every year, and carried forward into the account of advances for the next succeeding year, and payment of the note for the balance at the end of 1887 was provided for in an agreement made to cover the advances for 1888, this court approved the findings by the master, concurred in by the Circuit Judge, that the account prior to 1888 was paid by this note.
3. Usury—Note for Past Interest.—A note given in January, 1888, for the balance due on an open account, which included interest at ten per cent. on advances, the note calling for ten per cent, interest on the principal of the note is not usurious.
4. Agreement—Estoppel.—In January, 1888, a factor sent to his customer to sign an agreement calling for advances by the former to the latter for the ensuing year to an amount not exceeding $7,000, the advances to bear ten per cent, interest per annum. The customer interlined the words, “guanos not included in this,” and signed the agreement and returned it, but the factor, while retaining it, declined to accept the modification. Nevertheless, the customer continued to draw and the factor to advance nearly to the amount of $7,000. Held., that the customer was estopped from alleging that there was no written agreement for the payment of ten per cent, interest on the advances of that year.
5. Usury—Proof.—Usury cannot be claimed to exist where it is not made to appear that usurious interest was charged.
6. Ibid.—Liquidated Damages.—Advances being made under an agreement calling for the shipment of a specified number of bales of cotton, or the payment of liquidated damages for the number of bales short, such liquidated damages may be recovered under the agreement.
7. Ibid.— Counter-Claim—Same Transaction.—Where accounts containing usurious interest have been closed and settled by note, and action is brought on the note, the defendant cannot recover double the usury by counter-claim, as the claim did not arise out of the transaction set forth in the complaint, and was not connected with the subject of the action.
8. Damages—Proof.—A party cannot recover damages of his factor for failing to advance to the full amount agreed to be advanced, where there is no evidence to show any damage.
Mr. Chief Justice McIver dissenting.
Before Fraser, J., Darlington, March, 1891.
This was an action by George W. Witte and Arinin F. Witte, copartners as Witte Bros., against Abram Weinberg, commenced February 7, 1889. The Circuit decree was as follows:
The case came up on a report of a referee, to whom had been referred all the issues and exceptions on the part of the defendants. Without taking up the exceptions seriatim, I will state briefly the conclusions at which I have arrived upon what I consider the material points in the case.
A written agreement in reference to the rate of iuterest to be paid upon money to be loaned to the defendant by the plaintiffs was sent to the defendant for his signature. It was returned to plaintiffs signed by the defendant, but with the words “guano not included in this” added by the defendant. This alteration was objected to by the plaintiffs, and the addition of these words has been a source of dispute between these parties ever since. The instrument has been in the possession of plaintiffs ever since. Defendant has drawn bills on the plaintiffs for money, and they have paid them nearly up to the amount of $7,000, for which the written instrument provided. I am inclined to think that the paper, as amended by the defendant, is the true contract, and that the defendant having acted on it and drawn money upon it, should now be estopped to deny that there was a written agreement, as required by law, to validate the ten per cent, interest. If there was any agreement, it was this written agreement.
I am by no means sure that the word “charge” in the Statute does not mean something more than a mere entry on a factor’s book of the ten per cent, interest as an item of the account, and that such an entry alone, even coupled with a demand of payment in an action, can taint the whole account with usury, in the absence of some agreement on the subject between the parties. This action has, then, been brought on demands not tainted with usury, unless it be that the dealings between plaintiffs and defendant constitute one continuous transaction for years, commencing, say, in 1881 and ending in 1888, during which latter year occurred the transaction here sued on. I coueur with the referee in the view that they were not continuous transactions. Each year’s contract stood for itself, and was in pursuance of a special agreement, though balances were by special agreement carried forward upon an adjustment and settlement of the accounts for the year. Their dealings were not continuous, but successive and separate and distinct. Each year stood for itself.
This note for $1,682.63-100 was given for the balance due at the close of 1887, and was accepted in full settlement and payment of the old accounts, and its payment provided for in the terms of agreement for 1888. It is as much payment as so much money would have been. It is in payment of the debt, and the amount considered as so much money advanced in the special arrangement between the parties for the year 1888 which is in writing. Upon the supposition, however, that this note was the representation of usurious transactions, then it cannot affect the other transactions for the year, and taint them with usury, unless they have been connected by some usurious contracts, which I have concluded did not otherwise exist. See Utley v. Cavender, 31 S. C., 284-289. The payments for the year 1888 were more than sufficient to pay this note and interest, and plaintiffs have a right until judgment so to apply the payments made in the absence, as here, of any direction given by the debtors at the time of payment. Thatcher & Go. v. Massey, 20 S. C., 549.
All the usurious interest having been paid or extinguished by a proper application of the payments, and this action having been brought, not upon the origihal usurious contract (as is alleged), the defendant, may have a separate action for double the excess of interest over seven per cent., but he cannot have a counter-claim in this action. If this note was usurious,'it has been paid. My conclusion, from an examination of the cases of Hardin v. Trimmier, 27 S. C., Ill, and McOoivn v. McSween, 29 Id., 134, is that double the excess of interest may be recovered on notes dated either before or after the act of 1882, either in a soparate'action or as a counter-claim in an action on the usurious debt. Up to seven per cent., if once paid, the interest may become a credit on the note or other usurious contract, but cannot otherwise be recovered, either as counter-claim or in a separate action. In Hardin v. Trimmier, supra, the action was brought for the whole amount of double the interest and excess. The Supreme Court limited the recovery to double the excess. I do not see how the- amendments of 1882 can in any way affect the question. The only changes made by it are as to the written agreement and the right to recover what is now held to be only double the excess of interest over seven per cent. Assuming, then, also, that defendant’s construction of the written agreement is the right one, and that guanos were not included, there is no evidence before the court upon which there can be any estimate of damages for plaintiffs’ failure to perform his contract upon which the court can render a judgment for damages.
The defendant is also liable to plaintiffs for the stipulated amount of damages for the non-shipment of cotton as by the terms of the agreement. My attention has not been called to any error of calculation by the referee, and I, therefore, accept his figures and compute the interest accordingly.
It is, therefore, ordered and adjudged, that the plaintiffs have judgment for the sum of eight thousand nine hundred and ten 63-100 dollars and for costs.
The defendant, appealed on the following grounds:
That his honor erred, it is respectfully submitted, in holding and adjudging:
(1) That there was a written agreement between plaintiffs and defendant for the year 1888, providing for the payment of iuterest at. the rate of ten per cent, and for damages for the non-shipment of cotton.
(2) That defendant is estopped from denying that there was a written agreement for that year, as required by law, to validate the ten per cent, interest.
(3) That if there was no written agreement, the entry on plaintiffs’ books of the ten per cent, charge and the demand for payment, in the absence of an agreement to pay interest at ten per cent., would not taint the account of 1888 with usury.
(4) That the action “has been brought on demand not tainted with usury, uuless it be that the dealings between plaintiffs and defendant constitute one continuous transaction for years, commencing, say, in 1881 and ending in 1888.”
(5) That the transactions between plaintiffs and defendant, commencing in 1881 and ending with the beginning of 1889, were not continuous, but successive, separate, and distinct. That each year stood for itself, and was in pursuance of a special agreement.
(6) That the note for $1,682.63 was given and received as payment in full of the balance due by defendant on the transactions of 1887, and was “as much payment as so much money would have been.”
(7) That even if this note was the representative of usurious transactions—in other-words, was usurious—it could not affect the other transactions for the year 1888, and taint them with usury.
(8) That this note, under the law governing the application of payments, must be held to have been fully paid and satisfied.
(9) That in this action defendant has no right to counterclaim for double the excess of usurious interest over seven per cent, paid since the act of 1882, amending the usury law of the State.
(10) That “double the excess of lawful interest may be received on notes dated either before or after the act of 1882, either in a separate action or as a counter-claim in an action on the usurious debt.”
(11) That up to seven per cent., if once paid, the interest may become a credit on the note as other usurious contract, but cannot otherwise be recovered, either as a counter-claim or in a separate action.
(12) That defendant is liable for the amount of the damages claimed by the plaintiffs for non-shipment of cotton, and this even upon the assumption that guanos were not to be included in the amount to be advanced.
(13) That plaintiffs should have judgment for the sum of $8,910.62 and costs.
..That his honor erred in not holding and adjudging as follows:
(14) That there was no agreement between plaintiffs and defendant, whereby defendant bound himself to ship to plaintiffs, during the cotton season of 1888, for sale on commission, at least 400 bales of cotton, with damages for non-shipment, as claimed in the complaint, and unwritten agreement for the payment of interest at the rate of ten per cent, per annum on the amount to be advanced during that year, including the balance brought over from the year 1887.
(15) That if there was an agreement for the shipment of cotton for the year 1888, defendant is not liable for damages for non-shipment, inasmuch as the condition was, therefore, not performed by plaintiffs, and there was failure of consideration.
(16) That the transactions between plaintiffs and defendant, from the commencement to the close of their connection and relation as cotton factors and country merchant, were continu ous and connected, aud sufficiently so to entitle defendant to the counter-claims and other defences set forth in his answer.
(17) That the drafts and notes executed by defendant, causing yearly balances, were in no instance given, accepted, understood, or intended as payment, and such is the correct legal conclusion from the undisputed facts of the case.
(18) That defendant is entitled to judgment against the plaintiffs for the amount of the counter-claims set up in his answer, and to the elimination of all interest in the account between the parties, from its commencement in 1881 to its close.
(19) That defendant is at least entitled in equity to have the account from its commencement restated, all interest in excess of seven per cent, eliminated, and plaintiffs allowed judgment only for the balance that may be found after the account has been thus purged of usury.
(20) That on the assumption that there was a written agreement to pay ten per cent, on the advances of 1888, the interest of that year is usurious by reason of the compounding of interest by plaintiffs.
(21) That the parties never having purged the transactions of usury, but having carried over balances tainted with usury, every part of the account from 1881 to its close is affected with usury.
Plaintiffs gave notice of the following additional grounds in support of the judgment:
1. That the written agreement prepared by Witte Bros., and sent to Abram Weinberg for his signature, was the true contract between the parties, and that Abram Weinberg assented thereto. 2. That Abram Weinberg, having received notice from Witte Bros, that they would not consent to the alteration which he had proposed to the said written agreement, and continuing to act thereunder, is now estopped from denying the same. 3. That as Abram Weinberg asks the interposition of the court, in its equity jurisdiction, to open and restate a settled account, that he may interpose a plea of usury, the court should first require him to do equity by tendering to Witte Bros, the amount of his actual indebtedness to them, with legal interest thereon. 4. That having failed and neglected to do equity, the court should refuse the relief now asked for by Abram Weinberg.
Messrs. Boyd & Brown, for appellants.
Messrs. Buist & Buist and Nettles & Nettles, contra.
April 21, 1893.

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Mr. Justice McGowan.
This was an action at law, brought for the recovery of money by Witte Brothers, factors and commission merchants, of Charleston, against Abram Weinberg, of the County of Darlington. The complaint contained three causes of action:
First. Upon a promissory note, of which the following is a copy: "Darlington, S. 0., 23d January, 1888. $1,682.63. Eleven months after date I promise to pay to the order of Witte Brothers, sixteen hundred and eighty-two 63-100 dollars, at their office in Charleston, S. C., with interest from date until paid, value received, at the rate of ten per cent, per annum.
"(Signed) A. Weinberg."
Second. That during the year 1888, the plaintiffs made advances in money and fertilizers as factors to the defendant at his request, as specified in a "statement thereof hereto annexed, and amounting to the sum of $6,696.17," together with the further sum of $451.70, interest on the said account at the rate of ten per cent, per annum from the date of advancement, which said rate of interest the said defendant agreed in writing to pay, as follows: "In consideration of advances to be made me by Witte Bros, during the season of 1888, to the amount of seven thousand dollars, which includes the balance which may be due them on the transactions of 1887, for which balance I will give my note when the account is closed, I engage to ship them for sale on a commission of 21 per cent, on all cotton which may come under my control, guaranteeing that an amount not less than 400 bales shall be shipped. I also agree that interest on all advances made me is to be charged at the rate of ten per cent, per annum. Guano not included in this.
"(Signed) A. Weinberg."
Third. That as above set forth, the defendant agreed to ship to the plaintiffs for sale, on a commission of 2i per cent., all cotton which should come under bis control during the year 1888, and guaranteed that the number of bales of cotton so shipped should not be less than 400. But the defendant made default, and failed to ship 364 bales on account thereof. And they prayed j udgment for $7,508.09, with interest from January 12, 1889, at the rate of ten per cent, per annum.-
The defendant in his answer alleged that the note constituting the plaintiffs' first cause of action, and the factors' account constituting the second cause of action, are but portions of a factors' account, commencing with the beginning of the year 1881 and ending with the commencement of the year 1889, and forming one continuous transaction between plaintiffs and defendant; that plaintiffs were defendant's factors in the city of Charleston, from whom he, as a country merchant, obtained his supplies and advances, and to whom he shipped his cotton for sale on commission; that from the beginning of the year 1881, there has been one continued and unbroken account; that the note constituting plaintiffs' first cause of action was executed and received as a mere memorandum and voucher of the amount claimed to be due on said account on January 23, 1888; that the defendant is entitled to have the said account, beginning in 1881 and ending January, 1889, restated, and the balance ascertained, after excluding therefrom all items of interest.
For a counter-claim to plaintiffs' causes of action, the defendant alleges that on said portion of plaintiffs' account included in exhibit A, in accordance with the said usurious agreement, plaintiffs charged and the defendant paid plaintiffs' interest on all advances therein included, at a rate of interest greater than that allowed by law, and that the excess of interest so charged and received over the amount of interest allowed bylaw amounts to the sum of $1,349.94. Wherefore the defendant demands judgment against the plaintiff for the sum of $2,699.88, the same being double the amount of the sum charged and received in excess of interest at the legal rate. For a second counterclaim, the defendant alleges and makes the same plea as to the usurious interest paid on the accounts, which are missing, the plaintiffs having refused to furnish copies of the same.
For a further defence, the defendant says that, under the agreement for advances, the plaintiffs agreed and bound themselves to advance to the defendant the sum of $7,000, exclusive of fertilizers, which plaintiffs agreed to furnish to defendant. The plaintiffs failed to carry out their said.agreement, declined to advance the said sum of $7,000, exclusive of fertilizers, and refused to pay the drafts of defendant for the balance of which he was entitled under said agreement, whereby this defendant sustained damages in the sum of $300, which said amount this defendant claims shall be deducted from whatever may be proved against him, under plaintiffs' third and last cause of action, &c.
It does not appear in the record how or at whose instance he was appointed, but it does appear that E. O. Woods, Esq., was appointed special referee. He took the testimony, and made a report remarkable for its clearness and fullness. He found as matters of fact:
"First That Abram Weinberg obtained advances from the plaintiffs, Witte Bros., doing business as factors and commission merchants, from the year 1881 to 1888, inclusive, the said defendant making each year a separate and distinct agreement for the advances to be made each year during said period.
' "Second. That there existed between the plaintiffs and the defendant, during the course of their business dealings, no agreement whatever to make advances for a longer period than one year.
"Third. That at the end of each current year balances were struck, and the defendant executed to the plaintiffs his negotiable promissory note in settlement of the balance due to the plaintiffs for said year's advances, which amount was to form a part of the advances agreed to be made for the year following.
"Fourth. That as above set forth separate and distinct agreements were made for each year for the period above named, and that the defendant, prior to the commencement of this action, paid each and every of the said notes, and that said notes as they were liquidated were returned to the defendant by the plaintiffs, save and except the note for $1,682.63, being the balance due for the year 1887, and which became a part of the advances agreed to be made for the year 1888.
"Fifth. That during the year 1888, the plaintiffs made advances to the defendant in the sum of $6,696.17, and that the balance remaining unpaid, in addition to the note above mentioned, upon his factorage account, the sum of $4,653 for said year; upon which said amount and the amount of said note the defendant agreed in writing to pay interest at the rate of ten per cent, per annum.
"Sixth. That on January 23,1888, the defendant executed and delivered to the plaintiffs an agreement in writing, whereby, in consideration of advances to be made by the plaintiffs to the defendant in the sum of $7,000, the said defendant promised and agreed to ship to the plaintiffs, during the season of 1888, all cotton which should come under defendant's control during the said year for sale by the plaintiffs, on a commission of 21 per cent., and guaranteed that the number of bales so shipped should not be less than four hundred; and that defendant only shipped thirty-six bales of cotton in pursuance of said agreement.
"Seventh. That on January 23, 1888, the defendant executed and delivered to the plaintiffs his promissory note, whereby he promised to pay, eleven months after date, to the order of plaintiffs, $1,682.63, with interest from date until paid at the rate of ten per cent, per annum, and that no part of said note has been paid.''
And the said referee held as matter of law, that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover (1) on the note set forth in the first cause of action, $1,682.63, with interest; (2) the additional sum of $4,653.40, the amount due upon the factorage account for the year 1888; and (3) $451.70, interest thereon charged from the date of advancement, as per agreement, at the rate of ten per cent, per annum—aggregating $6,951.08, with interest from January 12, 1889, and $356.92, liquidated damages, for non-shipment of cotton, &c.
To this report the defendant filed numerous exceptions, upon which the case came up for hearing before his honor, Judge Fraser, who substantially concurred with the referee both in his findings of fact and his rulings of the law. From his decree the defendant appeals to this court upon numerous exceptions, which are all printed in the record.'
This action for money, certainly at its commencement, was one at law, pure and simple. If it continued to be such, the decree of the Circuit Judge, as to all matters of fact, would stand in the place of a special verdict of the jury, and this court would have no right to review the testimony. Adickes v. Allison & Bratton, 21 S. C., 245. But as the defence here seems to partake somewhat of the nature of a proceeding in equity, asking discovery and to reopen successive accounts, seemingly stated, settled, and paid, we will give him the benefit of having it considered as an equitable defence, in which this court has the jurisdiction to review and reverse the findings of fact. But so considered, the rule is, that this court will not disturb findings of fact by the referee, which have been concurred in by the Circuit Judge, unless the clear result of the testimony points manifestly to a different conclusion, or there is no testimony to support them. As was said in the case of Callum v. Rice, Administrator, 35 S. C., 557: "While this court may review and reverse findings of fact in an equity case, it is perfectly well settled that it will rarely disturb a finding of fact in which the Circuit Judge concurs with the master or referee. Some such rule is well nigh a necessity. There must, in the nature of things, be an end of controversy," &c.
Now, in this case the referee found, and the Circuit Judge concurred with Mm, "that the dealings of these parties, plaintiffs and defendant, were not continuous transactions, but that each year's contract stood for itself, and in pursuance of a special agreement, though balances were, by special agreement, carried forward upon an adjustment and settlement of the accounts of the year. Their dealings were not continuous, but successive, separate, and distinct. This note for $1,682.63 was given for the balance due at the close of 1887, and was accepted in full settlement and payment of the old accounts, and its payment provided for in the terms of agreement for 1888. It is as much payment as so much money would have been. It is in payment of the debt, and the amount considered as so much money advanced in the special arrangement between the parties for the year 1888," &c. Under the rule propounded above, we can not say that this finding of facts was erroneous. Whether one security is taken in satisfaction of another, is a question of intention, and the acts of both these parties, and especially of the defendant, in destroying the old notes, and in allowing the notes at the beginning of each year to be put in by the plaintiffs among the advances as their property, show that he thought he owed nothing but the notes. The defendant himself says in the "memorandum" agreement, "for said balance (1887), I will give my note when the account is closed." Under these circumstances, there was no conceivable reason for keeping them open, and we have no doubt that, at the time, payment and satisfaction was intended by both parties. See Bolt v. Dawkins, 16 S. C., 198; Ex parte Williams, 17 Id., 396.
As we are bound to take it as established, that there was no continuous agreement between the parties from the year 1881 to 1887, inclusive, this action for-the dealings of 1888 stands alone; and the next question is, whether there is any inherent usury in the causes of action embraced in the plaintiffs' complaint. The law declares, that "no greater rate of interest than seven (7) per cent, per annum shall be charged, taken, agreed upon, or allowed upon any contract arising in this State, for the hiring, lending, or use of money or other commodity, except upon written contracts, wherein, by express agreement, a rate of interest, not exceeding ten per cent., may be charged," &c. (1) The first cause of action is the note of January 23, 1888, for $1,682.60. It conformed to the law in expressly stating, "with interest from date until paid, value received, at the rate of ten per cent, per annum." We suppose that, considered as money, there was no usury in the note.
(2) Then as to the second cause of action, upon the other advances of 1888, made in money. The "memorandum" agreement states as follows: "I also agree that interest on all advances made me is to be charged at the rate of ten per cent." This would seem, also, to be a compliance with the law. It is, however, suggested that the "memorandum" agreement never took effect, or was annulled by the amendment ("guanos not included in this") which the defendant made to it before he signed and enclosed it back to the plaintiffs. It is true that the plaintiffs did not understand the guano matter as the defendant did, and they had some correspondence upon thesubject, but the defeudantsigned the paper as amended, and proceeded to take advantage of its provisions by drawing-on the plaintiffs and receiving advances under it to the amount of $6,696.17, only $303.83 short of the whole amount of $7,000 agreed to be advanced, and for that shortage, in our view of the case, he now claims damages. Under these circumstances, surely the defendant can not now be heard to deny that the contract was binding upon him, as to the rate of interest, upon the very advances drawn alone by virtue and authority of that "memorandum" agreement. Estoppel is very well defiued to be "an admission of so conclusive a nature, that the party whom it affects is not permitted to aver against it or to offer evidence to controvert it." 2 Sm. Lead. Cas., 778; and the Duchess of Kingston's Case; Big. Estop., 556.
But, on the assumption that there was a written agreement, it is further urged that, the interest on the advances of 1888 was usurious by reason of the compounding of the interest by the plaintiffs. It does not appear that this point was made in the court below, or that it was considered by the referee or Circuit Judge. But, waiving that, it has not been made to appear that the plaintiffs charged more than at the rate of ten per cent, per annum on the money advances of 1888.
The third cause of action. As to the liquidated damages " claimed for the non-delivery of cotton, according to the terms of the agreement, there is no pretence of usury here; ancl we concur with the Circuit Judge, that, according to the authorities, the plaintiffs are entitled t.o recover. See Norwood v. Faulkner, 22 S. C., 371; Williams v. Vance, 9 Id., 374; Devereaux v. Champion Cotton Press, 17 Id., 66.
Now, inasmuch as the transactions of 1888 are cut off from the transactions of these parties in the years prior to 1888, and, as we have seen, there being no original usury in these transactions, the final question is, whether the defendant can now recover back by counter-claim in this action any money he may have paid the plaintiffs in excess of the legal interest in the transactions of the different years prior to 1888. It seems to us that the Circuit Judge was right in holding that it could not be done, under the general law as to counter-claims (section 171 of the Code), for the reason that said counter-claim did not arise out of the transaction set forth in the complaint, "or was connected with the subject of the action;" nor under the second section of 1882, which provides that "any person who shall receive as interest, any greater amount than is herein provided for, shall, in addition to the forfeiture herein provided for, forfeit, also, double the sum so received, to be collected by a separate action, or allowed as a counter-claim to any action brought to recover the principal sum." The expression is a peculiar one, not entirely free from obscurity; but, as we understand it, "the principal sum," as here used, means the debt out of which the usurious interest sprung. We do not think that this action can properly be considered as brought to recover "the principal sum," in the sense of the act.
The defendant, for a further defence, contends that he has been damaged to the extent of $300, by reason of the failure of the plaintiffs to advance him the whole amount stipulated for by the deficiency of $303.83. The referee reported, "that there is an entire absence of proof to sustain damages in the amount claimed by the defendant, or, indeed, in any sum whatever." In the account the plaintiffs only charged the amount actually advanced, $6,696.17. There being no evidence upon the subject, there is no way of correcting it, if the court below was in error. We concur upon all 'the questions made with the Circuit Judge.
The judgment of this court is, that the judgment of the Circuit Court be affirmed.
The point made and hero eonsidered is that a balance was struck on April 15, 1888, and interest charged on such balance to the end of the year ; but the account shows, that while the interest charged- in the account up to April 15, amounted to §113.93, the credits aggregated §549.37. That is to say, that while the advances up to April 15, including the principal of the note, aggregated $7,578.80, the balance carried down as the interest-bearing fund on that day was only §7,143.36.—Reporter.