Case Name: WILLIE BELLE DEATON v. EDGAR J. DEATON
Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
Jurisdiction: North Carolina
Decision Date: 1953-04-08
Citations: 237 N.C. 487
Docket Number: 
Parties: WILLIE BELLE DEATON v. EDGAR J. DEATON.
Judges: 
Reporter: North Carolina Reports
Volume: 237
Pages: 487–490

Head Matter:
WILLIE BELLE DEATON v. EDGAR J. DEATON.
(Filed 8 April, 1953.)
1. Divorce and Alimony § 15—
A decree of absolute divorce obtained by the wife on the ground of two years separation, G.S. 50-6, does not annul the right of the wife to receive permanent alimony under a judgment rendered in her action for alimony without divorce before the commencement of the proceedings for absolute divorce, since such ease falls squarely within the second proviso of G.S. 50-11.
2. Constitutional Law §§ 8a, 10a—
Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, the courts are without power to attribute any other meaning to its words on the ground of public policy, since public policy is in the exclusive province of the General Assembly.
Appeal by defendant from Nettles, J., at February Term, 1953, of CabaReus.
Motion to vacate prior judgment awarding permanent alimony to wife on theory that such judgment was annulled by subsequent decree of absolute divorce obtained by wife under two-year separation statute.
These are the facts:
1. On 6 September, 1950, the plaintiff Willie Belle Deaton brought this action against her husband, the defendant Edgar J. Deaton, in the Superior Court of Cabarrus County for alimony without divorce under G.S. 50-16. The defendant was served with summons and entered a general appearance. When the action was tried on its merits before Judge F. Donald Phillips and a jury at the June Term, 1951, of the Superior Court of Cabarrus County, the jury answered the issues of fact in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, and Judge Phillips rendered a judgment on the verdict awarding the plaintiff $100.00 monthly from the earnings of the defendant as permanent alimony. The judgment was affirmed by us on the defendant’s appeal. Deaton v. Deaton, 234 N.C. 538, 67 S.E. 2d 626. The defendant has complied with the judgment in all respects.
2. Subsequent to the trial of this action, to wit, on 2 December, 1952, the plaintiff brought an action against the defendant in the Superior Court of Cabarrus County for an absolute divorce on the ground of two years’ separation under G.S. 50-6. The defendant was served with summons in the action. When the action was tried on its merits before Judge Zeb Y. Nettles and a jury at the January Term, 1953, of the Superior Court of Cabarrus County, the jury answered the issues of fact in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, and Judge- Nettles entered a judgment on tbe verdict absolutely divorcing the plaintiff and the defendant from the bonds of matrimony.
3. Thereafter, to wit, at the February Term, 1953, of the Superior Court of Cabarrus County the defendant applied to Judge Nettles by a motion in the cause for an order vacating the judgment rendered in this action at the June Term, 1951, on the ground that his liability to pay alimony to the plaintiff terminated as a matter of law when the marriage of the parties was dissolved by an absolute divorce on the application of the plaintiff. Judge Nettles entered an order denying the motion, and the defendant appealed, assigning the denial of his motion as error.
B. Furman J ames for plaintiff, appellee.
Hartsell & Hartsell, William L. Mills, Jr., and F. Johnston Irvin for defendant, appellant.

Opinion:
Ebvin, J.
The appeal presents this question for decision: Does a decree of absolute divorce obtained by the wife under the two-year separation statute codified as G.S. 50-6 annul the right of the wife to receive permanent alimony under a judgment rendered in an action for alimony without divorce before the commencement of the proceeding for absolute divorce?
The plaintiff asserts that this question ought to be answered in the negative. To sustain her position, she lays hold on the second proviso in the statute embodied in G.S. 50-11 and cites these decisions: Simmons v. Simmons, 223 N.C. 841, 28 S.E. 2d 489; Dyer v. Dyer, 212 N.C. 620, 194 S.E. 278; Howell v. Howell, 206 N.C. 672, 174 S.E. 921; and Lentz v. Lentz, 193 N.C. 742, 138 S.E. 12. G.S. 50-11 is couched in this language : "After a judgment of divorce from the bonds of matrimony, all rights arising out of the marriage shall cease and determine, and either party may marry again unless otherwise provided by law: Provided, that no judgment of divorce shall render illegitimate any children in esse, or begotten of the body of the wife during coverture; and, provided further, that a decree of absolute divorce upon the ground of separation for two successive years as provided in section 50-5 or section 50-6 shall not impair or destroy the right of the wife to receive alimony under any judgment or decree of the court rendered before the commencement of the proceeding for absolute divorce."
The defendant insists that the question raised by the appeal should be answered in the affirmative. He argues that the cases invoked by the plaintiff do not decide this precise question; that the right of the wife to alimony stems from the marital obligation of the husband to support her; that it is unjust and contrary to public policy for the wife to receive alimony from the husband after she has put an end to the marital relation by procuring a decree of absolute divorce; and tbat tbe Legislature intended tbe second proviso of G.S. 50-11 to protect a prior award of alimony only in case tbe decree of absolute divorce is obtained by tbe husband.
We are inclined to accept as valid tbe contention of tbe defendant tbat tbe decisions cited by tbe plaintiff do not adjudicate tbe precise question now before us. Tbe decrees of absolute divorce involved in tbe Simmons, Dyer, and Howell cases were procured by husbands rather than by wives. Tbe decision in tbe Lentz case that tbe subsequent decree of absolute divorce obtained by tbe wife did not invalidate a prior consent judgment obligating tbe husband to make certain future payments for tbe benefit of tbe wife was rested squarely on tbe proposition tbat tbe consent judgment constituted a contract between the husband and wife and stipulated in express terms tbat nothing short of tbe remarriage of tbe wife should relieve tbe husband of tbe obligation to make tbe specified payments.
Ve are unable, however, to reconcile tbe contentions of tbe defendant respecting legislative intent and public policy with' tbe wording of tbe second proviso in G.S. 50-11. Tbe General Assembly inserted tbe second proviso in tbe statute for tbe purpose of taking tbe special cases mentioned in such proviso out of the general enactment tbat a decree of absolute divorce puts an end to all rights arising out of the marriage. Cameron v. Highway Commission, 188 N.C. 84, 123 S.E. 465. In so doing, tbe General Assembly expressed in unambiguous language its plain purpose tbat a subsequent decree of absolute divorce obtained by either tbe husband or tbe wife upon tbe ground of separation for two successive years as provided in G.S. 50-5 or G.S. 50-6 shall not impair or destroy tbe right of tbe wife to receive alimony from tbe husband under any judgment of tbe court rendered before tbe commencement of tbe proceeding for absolute divorce. We cannot attribute any other meaning to tbe proviso without usurping a legislative power denied to us by our organic law. 50 Am. Jur., Statutes, section 228. Where tbe General Assembly has spoken in a constitutional manner, public policy is what the General Assembly has declared tbat policy to be. Batesville Casket Co. v. Fields, 288 Ky. 104, 155 S.W. 2d 743; Park Const. Co. v. Independent School Dist. No. 82, Carver County, 209 Minn. 182, 296 N.W. 475, 135 A.L.R. 59; State v. Lincoln County Power Dist. No. 1, 60 Nev. 401, 111 P. 2d 528. This being so, public policy respecting tbe effect of decrees of absolute divorce is to be found in tbe second proviso of G.S. 50-11 as well as in tbe general enactment which tbe proviso qualifies.
Whether a statute produces a just or an unjust result is a matter for legislators and not for judges. We are nevertheless constrained to observe tbat justice does not necessarily require tbat a faithless husband shall be relieved of all responsibility for tbe support of an innocent wife who has spent her youth in his service merely because the wife sees fit to put an end in law to a marriage long since ended in fact by his broken vows.
What has been said necessitates an affirmance of the order refusing to vacate the alimony judgment.
Affirmed.