Case Name: Rhett R. RUSSELL, Appellant v. J. Stewart WILLIFORD, M.D., D.G. Kobs, M.D., and Reikes Hale Kobs & Strauss Radiologists, a Partnership, Appellees
Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2004-11-30
Citations: 907 So. 2d 362
Docket Number: No. 2003-CA-01573-COA
Parties: Rhett R. RUSSELL, Appellant v. J. Stewart WILLIFORD, M.D., D.G. Kobs, M.D., and Reikes Hale Kobs & Strauss Radiologists, a Partnership, Appellees.
Judges: BRIDGES AND LEE, P.JJ., GRIFFIS, BARNES AND ISHEE, JJ„ CONCUR. IRVING, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY KING, C.J. AND CHANDLER, J.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 907
Pages: 362–376

Head Matter:
Rhett R. RUSSELL, Appellant v. J. Stewart WILLIFORD, M.D., D.G. Kobs, M.D., and Reikes Hale Kobs & Strauss Radiologists, a Partnership, Appellees.
No. 2003-CA-01573-COA.
Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
Nov. 30, 2004.
Rehearing Denied May 3, 2005.
Certiorari Denied July 21, 2005.
Frank A. Russell, George E. Dent, Tu-pelo, attorneys for appellant.
Dorrance Aultman, Hattiesburg, J. Robert Ramsay, Matthew D. Miller, Gulfport, Chadwick L. Shook, Hattiesburg, attorneys for appellees.

Opinion:
MYERS, J.,
for the Court.
¶ 1. On May 28, 2002, Russell filed his complaint against J. Stewart Williford, M.D., D.G. Kobs, M.D., and Reikes Hale Kobs & Strauss Radiologists, a Partnership ("the doctors"), alleging medical malpractice. The doctors filed motions to dismiss, arguing that the action was barred by the statute of limitations. The court, in considering the motions to dismiss, consid ered some material outside of the pleadings, and the motions to dismiss were thus transformed into motions for summary judgment. The court granted the doctors' motions orally on June 12, 2003 and entered its written order on June 23, 2003, thereby dismissing Russell's action with prejudice. Aggrieved by this ruling, Russell now appeals.
¶ 2. Russell raises the following issues, which, for clarity and convenience, we have combined and recast from their original wording in his brief:
I. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE APPELLANT FAILED TO EXERCISE DUE DILIGENCE?
II. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN APPLYING THE 1998 VERSION OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE?
III. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE AFFIDAVITS PRESENTED IN OPPOSITION TO THE APPELLEES' MOTIONS TO DISMISS?
1Í 3. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
FACTS
¶ 4. On July 31, 1973, Russell had surgery on his left leg in order to correct injuries he suffered in an automobile accident. Immediately after the surgery, Russell noticed that his left leg was turned out toward the left in an abnormal way. Because of this abnormal turning in his left leg, Russell consulted Dr. Williford in order to determine the nature of the problem, if any. Dr. Williford concluded that there was a muscular problem brought on by the nature of the incisions he had to make in performing the surgery. Dr. Wil-liford advised Russell that the problem could be corrected through physical therapy-
¶ 5. Although Russell learned to force his left leg to face forward, the physical therapy did not completely correct the problem, and for many years thereafter, Russell lived with this condition in his left leg. The condition was most noticeable when Russell was exhausted or fatigued, because at those times he had to make a more conscious effort to keep his leg from turning. Russell's pleadings and testimony were not entirely consistent on the question of pain in his left leg after surgery. The complaint alleges that Russell experienced severe pain periodically to his left knee, and his testimony indicates that he would experience pain when a cold front or rain would pass through. However, his testimony and his affidavit filed in opposition to the motions to dismiss allege that he felt no pain in his left knee until June 2000. Thus, Russell's pleadings and testimony on the question of pain in his left leg are contradictory.
¶ 6. Twenty-seven years after the surgery, Russell again sought the advice of a doctor on the subject of his left leg. In June 2000, Dr. Clyde Phillips informed Russell that his femur was misaligned and that this misalignment of the femur was responsible for the problems with his left leg. Russell received some corrective surgery, and, having incurred this expense and facing the possibility of additional expense through further corrective surgery, Russell brought this action.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
I. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE APPELLANT FAILED TO EXERCISE DUE DILIGENCE?
¶ 7. Russell argues that the trial court improperly invaded the province of the jury by making a factual determination on the issue of due diligence. He argues that the case law of Mississippi holds that the presence or absence of due diligence is a fact issue to be decided by the jury. The doctors argue that the application of statutes of limitations is a question of law to be decided by the trial judge, and that in any event, the undisputed facts demonstrated that Russell failed to exercise due diligence for purposes of determining accrual under the applicable statute of limitations.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 8. Before reciting the standard of review, we note that there was some disagreement among the parties as to whether the doctors' Rule 12(b)(6) motions were converted to Rule 56 motions by the introduction of matter outside of the pleadings. While we agree with the doctors' contention that the introduction of matter extrinsic to the pleadings, but used in formulating the pleadings, does not automatically convert a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a Rule 56 motion, we find that the motions here were converted into Rule 56 motions. Sennett v. U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co., 757 So.2d 206, 209 (¶¶ 10-11) (Miss.2000). However, we do not believe that the result in this case would be different were we to treat the motions as 12(b)(6) motions.
¶ 9. Having found that the motions at issue are to be treated as motions for summary judgment, the applicable standard of review is, therefore, de novo. Hudson v. Courtesy Motors, Inc., 794 So.2d 999, 1002(¶ 7) (Miss.2001). Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." M.R.C.P. 56(c). "The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the [ ] party against whom the motion has been made." Hudson, 794 So.2d at 1002(¶ 7). In addition, the moving party bears the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Lewallen v. Slawson, 822 So.2d 236, 237(¶ 6) (Miss.Ct.App.2002).
DISCUSSION
¶ 10. As stated above, Russell's primary argument under this issue is that a fact issue existed on the question of due diligence, and that the judge improperly invaded the province of the jury. In support of this argument, Russell cites two cases: In re Catfish Antitrust Litigation, 826 F.Supp. 1019, 1031(¶ 14) (N.D.Miss.1993) and Robinson v. Cobb, 763 So.2d 883, 889 (¶¶ 37-38) (Miss.2000). Our examination of these cases leads us to conclude that they do not support Russell's arguments.
¶ 11. The In re Catfish Antitrust Litigation case fails to support his argument for two reasons. First, that case dealt with a price fixing scheme, not a latent injury/medical malpractice claim; therefore, that case is readily distinguishable. Second, the In re Catfish case stated, contrary to plaintiffs assertions, a rather stringent requirement to exercise due diligence in the context of a specific claim of fraudulent concealment. The court said:
In order to avail the doctrine of fraudulent concealment and its equitable tolling of the statute of limitations, the plaintiffs must show that they failed, despite the exercise of due diligence on their part, to discover the facts that form the basis of their price fixing claim. "[T]he statute of limitations is tolled only until such time as the plaintiff, exercising reasonable diligence, could have discovered the facts forming the basis for the claim." Allan Construction Co., 851 F.2d at 1533. The plaintiffs need not have actual knowledge of the facts before the duty of due diligence arises; rather, knowledge of certain facts which are "calculated to excite inquiry" give rise to the duty to inquire.
In re Catfish, 826 F.Supp. at 1031 (emphasis added).
¶ 12. The In re Catfish case, thus, stands for the proposition that in order to prevail on a claim of fraudulent concealment a plaintiff has a duty to have exercised due diligence. Id. This means that if a plaintiff has failed to exercise due diligence, he does not have a claim for fraudulent concealment. Moreover, and very significantly, the In re Catfish court states that "plaintiffs need not have actual knowledge of the facts before the duty of due diligence arises; rather, knowledge of certain facts which are 'calculated to excite inquiry' give rise to the duty to inquire." Id. (emphasis added). Both of these aspects of the In re Catfish holding argue against reversing the judgment of the circuit court, because the record reveals facts that almost certainly should have been calculated to excite inquiry on the part of Russell.
¶ 13. Another problem with plaintiffs citation to this case is apparent from the court's statements. The court is discussing due diligence specifically in the context of a claim of fraudulent concealment. As the trial court and the doctors correctly note, Russell did not state facts that would demonstrate some affirmative act of concealment on the part of the doctors, the first requirement for a claim of fraudulent concealment. Id. At most, the record reflects that Dr. Williford may have misdiagnosed Russell's left leg condition, but there is nothing to indicate that the misdiagnosis was anything other than a mistake. Thus, since Russell did not state sufficient facts to make out a claim for fraudulent concealment, his citation to In re Catfish, a case specifically dealing with fraudulent concealment, is misplaced.
¶ 14. Robinson v. Cobb, 763 So.2d 883 (Miss.2000) is also distinguishable. Specifically, the Robinson court held that a fact issue existed as to whether the defendant engaged in affirmative acts of concealment. Id. at 888(¶ 25). Significantly, however, the plaintiffs in Robinson put forth proof that one of the defendants had lied about his involvement in the automobile accident forming the basis of the lawsuit. Id. Thus, in Robinson the plaintiff stated facts and put forth proof of affirmative acts of deception and/or fraud.
¶ 15. In addition, on the question of due diligence the facts in Robinson are distinguishable. In Robinson, roughly two weeks after the incident, the plaintiffs hired a private investigator to try to determine all of the parties involved in the accident. Id. at 885(¶ 11). The investigator labored for several years in an attempt to locate all of the possible defendants; however, despite his efforts, the plaintiff was not able to discover the involvement of a key defendant, Cobb, until roughly four years after the accident. Id. at 888 (¶¶ 27-36).
¶ 16. Both of these circumstances in Robinson, namely the showing of affirmative acts of concealment and due diligence, make that case stand in stark contrast to the case sub judice. Here, Russell made no showing of any affirmative acts of concealment, nor did Russell take any investigative actions that could be described as due diligence. Thus, the cases relied upon by Russell to support his argument lend him little support, given the material we find in the record.
¶ 17. In short, the trial court did not err in finding that Russell failed to exercise due diligence. While the cases discussed above do stand for the proposition that sometimes the questions of due diligence and discovery can create factual issues, in this case there are no disputed fact issues on the question of due diligence.
II. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN APPLYING THE 1998 VERSION OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE?
¶ 18. Russell argues that the correct statute of limitations to be applied to this case is the version of Mississippi Code Annotated § 15-1-36 in effect in 1976. Russell argues that the 1976 version contained a more liberal discovery rule and standard for determining accrual that would allow his action to proceed, even though it was brought twenty-seven years after the alleged act or omission.
¶ 19. The doctors argue that, by Russell's own assertions, the applicable statute of limitations is the version as amended in 1998. This argument runs: Russell insists that his action did not accrue until 2000, and the 1998 statute, by its own terms, applies to actions accruing after July 1, 1998. Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-36(2). Thus, argue the doctors, under his own theory Russell has placed his action under the 1998 statute, which contains a seven year statute of repose. The seven year statute of repose runs from the date the alleged act or omission occurred, and this clearly bars Russell's action, which was filed twenty-seven years after the alleged act or omission.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 20. " 'This Court uses a de novo standard of review when passing on questions of law including statute of limitations issues.' Stephens v. Equitable Life Assur. Society of U.S., 850 So.2d 78, 81 (Miss.2003) (quoting ABC Mfg. Corp. v. Doyle, 749 So.2d 43, 45 (Miss.1999))." Alexander v. Womack, 857 So.2d 59, 62(¶ 10) (Miss.2003).
DISCUSSION
¶ 21. We find the issue of whether the trial court erred in applying the 1998 version of the statute to be without merit, because we find that this action would be barred under either version of the statute. Thus, even accepting that the 1976 statute should have applied, Russell's action would still be barred.
¶ 22. The case of Kilgore v. Barnes, 508 So.2d 1042 (Miss.1987), cited by Russell, provides a helpful illustration of how the 1976 version of the statute is applied. That version of the statute reads in relevant part: "[§ 15-1-36] subsection (1): 'the date the alleged act, omission or neglect shall or with reasonable diligence might have been first known or discovered.' " Id. at 1045 (emphasis added).
¶ 23. In the Kilgore case, the plaintiff continued experiencing chest pains after he underwent heart surgery. Id. at 1044. Because of this he received numerous chest x-rays and other tests from various different doctors. Id. Unfortunately, it took the patient roughly eight years to find a doctor who was able to detect the true problem: a surgical needle had been left in the lining of his heart. Id. The Kilgore court found the patient's action to be timely, setting the time of accrual as the date the patient discovered the needle, because the patient had exercised due diligence for years trying to determine the nature of his continuing heart problems. Id. at 1045.
¶ 24. This is perhaps the most significant thing about the Kilgore case for our purposes: its illustration of what constitutes due diligence. The patient in the Kilgore case sought and received numerous tests and procedures from numerous doctors in the years following his surgery and, in spite of the diligence he exercised in seeking to determine the nature of his continuing heart problems, he was unable to discover the true source of the problem until eight years after the fact. Id. at 1044. The court found that, as was readily apparent from his course of action post surgery, the patient could not have known of the true nature of his problem, even though he exercised reasonable diligence. Id. at 1045. Those facts stand in stark contrast to the facts of the case sub judice, where Russell failed to seek further treatment or second opinions until twenty-seven years after the fact.
¶ 25. A straightforward application of the due diligence standard, as illustrated in the Kilgore case, clearly supports affirming the lower court's grant of summary judgment. Russell's leg, post surgery, was noticeably turned or protruding to the left. Put another way, Russell had an abnormal, post-operative condition of which he was aware immediately after surgery in 1973. Russell demonstrated his knowledge of this abnormal post-operative condition in his leg by inquiring with Dr. Williford about the condition. Dr. Willi-ford suggested that the problem was muscular and could be cured with physical therapy. Russell took this advice; however, physical therapy did not fully correct the problem.
¶26. The 1998 version of the statute reads in relevant part:
(2) For any claim accruing on or after July 1, 1998, and except as otherwise provided in this section, no claim in tort may be brought against a licensed physician, osteopath, dentist, hospital, institution for the aged or infirm, nurse, pharmacist, podiatrist, optometrist or chiropractor for injuries or wrongful death arising out of the course of medical, surgical or other professional services unless it is filed within two (2) years from the date the alleged act, omission or neglect shall or with reasonable diligence might have been first known or discovered. .
Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-36 (emphasis added).
¶ 27. We note that the language relating to when the statute begins to run in both versions is identical: when the alleged act or omission might have been first known or discovered through reasonable diligence. Id. Thus, since the Kilgore court applies language identical to that of the 1998 version, we find the analysis of reasonable or due diligence in that case to be equally applicable under the 1998 version. But our more recent case of Simpson v. Lovelace, 892 So.2d 284 (Miss.Ct.App.2004) which specifically applied the 1998 version of the statute, provides a helpful analysis of the issue of reasonable diligence.
¶ 28. The facts of the Simpson case are nearly identical to the facts of the case sub judice. There, the plaintiff brought a medical malpractice action, alleging that the defendants negligently operated on his right leg. Id. at (¶ 1). In that case, as in the case sub judice, the plaintiff failed to file his action within the two year limitations period prescribed by Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-36. The plaintiff argued that he did not discover or know of his claim until several years after the surgery and that, therefore, the statute of limitations did not begin to run until he discovered his injury. Id. at (¶ 5).
¶29. In affirming the circuit court's grant of summary judgment, we noted that the plaintiff had a visible, post operative abnormality in his right leg after surgery. Id. Specifically we declared, "[the plaintiff] knew from the very beginning, following the procedure performed by Dr. Lovelace, that something was not quite right." Id. at (¶ 10). The condition began immediately after surgery and persisted for three years, after which time the plaintiff ob tained a second opinion indicating that the surgery was negligently performed. Id. at (¶ 9). On the question of reasonable diligence we also noted, "if [the plaintiff] is to prevail he must show that he, using reasonable diligence, could not have discovered Dr. Lovelace's negligence." Id. at (¶ 13). The similarities between the Simpson case and the case sub judice are striking, and we find that case to be directly on point.
¶ 30. When we view the above in the light of a motion for summary judgment we find in the record that it is undisputed that Russell experienced a visibly abnormal, post-operative condition that led him to take corrective measures, pursuant to Dr. Williford's instructions; however, these corrective measures were not entirely successful and the condition persisted. In this case, then, we have a situation very similar to Simpson, yet even more compelling, given the amount of time involved here: Russell knew that there was something wrong with his left leg immediately after the surgery, and he knew that the condition persisted for years after surgery. Therefore, in the absence of fraudulent concealment by the doctor, Russell's action accrued immediately after or very soon after surgery.
¶ 31. But even if we assume for argument's sake that the turn or twist in his left leg by itself did not give Russell notice of a potential claim for accrual purposes (a questionable proposition, at best), we would still find that, at the very least, after the physical therapy recommended by Dr. Williford failed to fully correct the problem, due diligence would have prompted Russell to seek a second opinion or some further additional treatment, as other, reasonably diligent patients have done before. Kilgore, 508 So.2d at 1044. In other words, Russell could have discovered the true problem if he had exercised due diligence after the physical therapy failed to correct the problem; therefore, his action accrued, at the latest, sometime soon after the physical therapy proved ineffective and after he failed to further investigate the condition of his leg. This conclusion follows from the fact that the standard under either version of the statute is what might have been discovered through due diligence.
¶ 32. Therefore, we find that there was no reversible error in the circuit court's application of the 1998 version of the statute of limitations, since the circuit court's ruling was based upon Russell's failure to exercise reasonable or due diligence.
III. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE AFFIDAVITS PRESENTED IN OPPOSITION TO THE APPELLEES' MOTIONS TO DISMISS?
¶ 33. Russell argues that the trial court failed to consider two affidavits filed in opposition to the doctors' motions to dismiss and that this failure constituted reversible error. The doctors argue that Russell failed to object at the summary judgment hearing and failed to seek a continuance for the purpose of obtaining affidavits under M.R.C.P. 56(f); therefore, argue the doctors, Russell may not validly raise this issue now on appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 34. As noted under our discussion of the first issue, we employ de novo review of matters relating to summary judgment. Hudson, 794 So.2d at 1002(¶ 7).
DISCUSSION
¶ 35. The record reveals that the trial judge issued an oral ruling from the bench on June 12, 2003, the day of the hearing, granting the doctors' motions to dismiss. On June 18, 2003, Russell filed a motion to reconsider and included with that motion two affidavits in opposition to the doctors' motions. On June 23, 2003, the court filed its order of dismissal, noting that the court was "fully advised in the premises." As noted, Russell argues that this order was deficient, because it allegedly failed to consider the affidavits he filed after the hearing.
¶ 36. We find Russell's argument on this issue to be unpersuasive, and we agree with the argument of the doctors. The doctors correctly point out that the affidavits in question were filed after the hearing had already been conducted and the judge's bench ruling declared. Noting the timing of the filing of the affidavits, the doctors cite to the case of Koestler v. Mississippi College, 749 So.2d 1122, 1125(¶ 10) (Miss.Ct.App.1999). The Koestler court declared:
A litigant desiring to avail herself of the right to present more evidentiary material has an affirmative duty to timely raise the issue with the trial court or be deemed to have waived objection to the court proceeding on the motion. MST, Inc. v. Miss. Chemical Corp., 610 So.2d 299, 305 (Miss.1992). In that case, the Mississippi Supreme Court pointed out that Rule 56(f) provides that a party opposing a summary judgment motion who "cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition . " must file an affidavit to that effect in order to claim her right to a continuance to obtain such affidavits or to pursue further discovery. M.R.C.P. 56(f).
Id.
¶ 37. We find that principle from the Koestler case to be applicable here. If Russell was indeed fully aware that the posture of the motions had changed to that of summary judgment and desired to submit affidavits, he was required to object or move for continuance at the hearing. Id. Our review of the record indicates that Russell took no such action. Therefore, any objection he may have had to the way the court conducted the hearing on the motion for summary judgment has been waived. Id.
¶ 38. Before concluding we note another significant thing about these affidavits, given the dissent's argument that a fact question exists on the issue of pain: the affidavits are inconsistent with factual representations made in the complaint. For instance, in his complaint Russell states, "Over the years, after the surgery by Dr. Williford, Mr. Russell's left knee intermittently caused him problems.... He also experienced severe pain periodically to his knee area.... " Yet, puzzlingly, Russell's affidavit states, "Subsequent to the 31st day of July, 1973,1 experienced no unusual pain to my left thigh or femur.... At no time subsequent to 1973 did I experience any pain to my left leg or any portion thereof which would put me on notice.... " In contrast to these inconsistent statements made by Russell, the record demonstrates that the doctors never disputed any factual representations on the issue of pain. For example, in Dr. Williford's separate answer and motion to dismiss, he admits the allegations in the complaint to the effect that Russell experienced pain periodically after the surgery.
¶ 39. Therefore, we do not find the record to establish a genuine issue of fact regarding pain, because the only disputed factual theories on the subject of pain were presented by Russell himself, not the doctors. Moreover, even if we were to accept that a fact issue exists on the issue of pain, we can not say that the question of pain was a material fact for accrual purposes under the statute of limitation.
¶ 40. While there may be some question as to whether and to what extent Russell may have been in pain because of the post operative condition of his left leg, given the visible and persistent nature of the turning of his left leg, we cannot say that the presence or absence of pain "matters in an outcome determinative sense" on the issue of accrual. Wingerter v. Brotherhood Productions, Inc., 822 So.2d 300, 302(¶ 6) (Miss.Ct.App.2002). This is because, whether there was pain or not, the undisputed fact remains that Russell knew that there was something wrong with his left leg and that the physical therapy recommended by Dr. Williford was not fully effective. The undisputed material facts could have led the lower court to the legal conclusion that there was no genuine issue of material fact on the question reasonable diligence and discovery of the injury.
CONCLUSION
¶ 41. The material facts in this case are undisputed: Russell knew immediately after surgery that something was wrong with his left leg. Moreover, he lived with this condition for close to thirty years. This condition was apparent immediately after surgery; it was frequently, if not always visible; it was at least sometimes painful; and it was not completely remedied by Dr. Williford's prescribed treatment, physical therapy. If the reasonable diligence standard in our statutes of limitations means anything, it must mean that patients should be reasonably diligent in investigating post-operative abnormalities that persist for years after surgery.
¶ 42. What that should mean in the case sub judice is this: reasonable diligence would have led Russell to seek a second opinion or additional treatment many years ago when the abnormal condition in his left leg persisted, even after physical therapy. This simple action, if taken within one to two years after surgery instead of twenty-seven years after, might have made the true problem with Russell's leg known a long time ago. The problem with Russell's leg might have been discovered through reasonable diligence immediately after or very soon after the surgery; therefore, Russell may not bring this action now, over a quarter of a century after the alleged act or omission. To allow Russell to proceed under this set of facts on such an ancient claim would set a very dangerous precedent.
¶ 43. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.
¶ 44. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FORREST COUNTY IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.
BRIDGES AND LEE, P.JJ., GRIFFIS, BARNES AND ISHEE, JJ" CONCUR. IRVING, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY KING, C.J. AND CHANDLER, J.