Case Name: THE TWENTY-PER-CENT. CASES. Patrick Welch, appellee, v. The United States, appellants
Court: United States Court of Claims
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1873-10
Citations: 9 Ct. Cl. 103
Docket Number: 
Parties: THE TWENTY-PER-CENT. CASES. Patrick Welch, appellee, v. The United States, appellants.
Judges: I am authorized to say that the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Davis concur in this opinion.
Reporter: United States Court of Claims Reports
Volume: 9
Pages: 103–125

Head Matter:
THE TWENTY-PER-CENT. CASES. Patrick Welch, appellee, v. The United States, appellants.
(Post p. —; 18 Wall. R., p. — )
And numerous other Cases.
On the defendants Appeal.
T/ieTwenty-per-cent. Resolution, 28th February, 1867, (14 Stat. L.,p. 569,) provides that there shall he paid to “ civil officers, clerks,” &c., “ now employed in the civil service at Washington,” in eluding “ employés, male and female, in the Executive Mansion and in any of the following-named Departments, or any Bureau or division thereof, to wit, State, Treasury, War, Navy,” &c., an additional compensation of 20per cent, “on their respective salaries as fixed by law, or where no salary is fixed by law,-upon their pay, respectively,” for the current fiscal year. A number of persons, not holding formal appointment, but receiving a fixed compensation, such as watchmen, the public gardener, fyc., bring suits for the increase. The court below decides that they are within the Departments in which they are employed, and entitled to recover. The Supreme Court affirms the decision. Certain other persons, such as the mechanics and laborers on the Treasury extension, receiving, generally, daily wages, not borne^ on the official register of the civil service,paid at the highest market rate given by ordinary employers for similar services, also bring suits. The court beloto decides that they arre not persons in the civil service, but are mere contractors with the Government, and that the twenty-pen'-cent. resolution must be construed as a remedial statute, the old law being the statutes fixing arbitrary compensation for persons in the civil service, the mischief being the incommensurate compensation paid to persons in the civil service, and the remedy being an increase of those salaries, which could only be increased by legislative enactment. Also, that the resolution should not be extended to.persons tohose compensation could have been, and in fact was, varied and increased without the interposition of Congress. The court below also de- tides that employés in the Medical Department of the Army are not persons in the civil service, nor employés of an Executive Department. Judgment pro forma for one claimant of each class, for the purposes of an appeal. The defendants appeal.
I. Laborers, mechanics, machinists, &c., employed on the Treasury extension, in the city of Washington, paid by the day, and .receiving the highest rate of wages given by ordinary employers for similar services, which rate is constantly varied and never requires the interposition of Congress to effect an increase, are nevertheless to be regarded as employés in the civil service within the true intent and meaning of the Twenty-per-cent. Desolation, 28th February, 1867, (14 Stat. L., p. 569,) if they were employed by the head of a Department or Bureau charged with that duty and authorized to make such contracts and to fix the compensation of the persons employed; and they are as much entitled to the benefits of the resolution as the officers and clerks who receive a fixed and arbitrary compensation, which can only be increased by legislative enactment.
II. No statute, however positive in terms, is to be construed as designed to interfere with existing rights of action or vested rights, unless the intention that it shall so operate is expressly declared or necessarily implied. Therefore the Act 12th July, 1870, (16 Stat. L., p. 250,) repealing the Twenty-per-cent. Resolution, (14 Stat. L., p. 569,) does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims over cases brought to recover the additional compensation allowed by the resolution, for the right to this additional compensation became fixed and vested at the end of the fiscal year. (The Chief Justice and Swayne and Davis, JJ., dissenting.)
III. Plate-note engravers, paid by the piece, and employing assistants under them whom they compensate, are not employés in an Executive Department within the meaning of th<sTwenty-per-cent. Resolution, 28th February, 1867, (14 Stat. L., p. 569,) though actually employed in the Treasury Department.
IV. A person employed by a quartermaster, on duty in the Department of Washington, but whose services are rendered at Arlington, Va., is not employed “ at Washington ” within the meaning of the Twenty-per-cent. Resolution, 28th February, 1867, (14 Stat. L., p. 569.)
V. Semble, the employés at Washington of the Medical Department’ of the Army, employed by the authority of the Surgeon-General, are entitled to the benefits of the Thoenby-per-cent. Resolution, 28th February, 1867, (14 Stat. L., p. 569.)’
VI. Semble, the employés at Washington of the Commissary Department are not excluded from the benefits of the Twenty-per-cent. Resolution, 28th February, 1867, (14 Stat. L., p. 569,) although the Commissary Department is not named in the resolution, and the Quartermaster Department, Pay Department, and other military Bureaus are named.
VII. Semble, the detectives in the secret-service division of the Treasury at Washington are entitled to the benefit of the Twenty-per-cent. Resolution, (14 Stat. L., p. 569.)
VIII. Semble, the right to the additional compensation given by the Twenty-per-ceni. Resolution, 28th February, 1867, (14 Stat. L., p. 569,) did not ac- orue until the end of the fiscal year, although the employé was hired by the day and paid at the end of each month. Therefore the statute of limitations does not bar suoh a claim, if the action was brought within sis years after the end of the fiscal year.
The Reporters' statement of tbe case:
More than seven hundred cases for the additional compensation allowed by the twenty-per-cent, resolution having been submitted in the court below, and the opinion of the court below being adverse to the greater part of them, but the court having doubts whether the former decision of the Supreme. Court in somewhat similar eases (7 C. Cls. K., pp. 290, 294) was not favorable to the claimants, determined to decide one of each class for the purposes of an appeal, inasmuch as the claimants, by reason of the smallness of their demands, had no right of appeal. All of these decisions were advérse to the Government, irrespective of the opinion of the court. The following findings from several of these class-cases will sufficiently . illustrate the decision of the Supreme Court, and are arranged here in the order of the points stated in the syllabus.
WELCH’S CASE.
I and II.
During the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1866, and ending June 30, 1867, the claimant was employed as a laborer on the Treasury extension, in the city of Washington. He was employed and paid at the same rates then paid by private individuals or corporations for like services, and was thus in the service of the Government on the 28th day of February, 1867. During the fiscal year he received $544.24; 20 per cent, of which amounts to $108.85.
Specific appropriations were made by Congress prior to the time that the claimant’s services were rendered for the construction of the north wing of the Treasury building. Under such appropriations contracts were entered into for finished work, comprehending both materials and labor; materials separately, and labor by the day separately. The services claimed were rendered under the latter contracts. The consideration agreed upon was the highest market wages. The payments upon these contracts were made from the specific appropriations above mentioned, in the same manner as the expenditures for the construction of all other buildings erected under the supervision- of the Supervising Architect of the Treasury.
BELL’S CASE.
III.
During tbe fiscal year beginning July 1,1866, and ending June 30,1867, tbe claimant was employed as a plate-printer, in tbe Bureau of Engraving and Printing in tbe Treasury Department. He was paid the ruling market price paid by private parties for similar services at that time, being an agreed rate per one hundred sheets of face and per one hundred sheets of back printing. He employed an assistant, to be paid by him from his earnings, but the assistant was paid directly by the disbursing officer of the Department, and the..sum thus paid was deducted from the gross earnings of the claimant. He was thus employed during the month of February, 1867, but it does not appear that he worked or was employed on the 28th day of February, 1867, as the rolls of the Department show only the number of sheets printed during the month. Neither does it appear what was the gross amount paid to him during the fiscal year; but it does appear that the balance paid to him, after deducting the amount paid to his assistant, was $1,184.30; 20 per cent, of which will amount to $236.86.
HOFFMAN’S CASE.
IV.
During the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1866, and ending June 30,1867, one of the quartermasters on duty in the Department of Washington employed the claimant by the day as sexton at the Arlington Cemetery, in the State of Virginia, where his services were rendered. He was employed and paid at the same rates then paid by individuals or corporations for like services, and was thus in the service of the Government on the 28th day of February, 1867. During the year he worked three hundred and sixty-three days, and received $718; 20 per cent, of which amount is $143.60.
WILD’S CASE.
V.
During the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1866, and ending June 30,1867, the claimant was employed as a carpenter at the depot for receiving and distributing medical supplies in the city ot Washington, under the Medical Department of the Army, and by the authority of the Surgeon-G-eneral of the Army. He was employed and paid at the same rates then paid by individuals or corporations for like services, and was thus in the service of the Government on the 28th day of February, 1867. His wages were $3 per day, and amounted, during the fiscal year, in the aggregate, to $624 ; 20 per cent, of which amounts to $124.80.
HANNAN’S CASE.
VI.
During the fiscal year beginning July 1,1866, and ending June 30, 1867, the claimant was employed as a laborer by the Commissary Department at Washington. He was employed and paid at the same rates then paid by individuals or corporations for like services, and was thus in the service of the Government on the 28th day of February, 1867. During the fiscal year he received $420 •, 20 per cent, of which is $84.
TUCKER’S CASE.
VII.
During the fiscal year beginning on July 1, 1866, and ending June 30, 1867, the claimant was employed in the secret-service division of the Treasury Department, in the city of Washington, in the capacity of detective, at a monthly salary of $150 per month; which was at the rates then paid by individuals or corporations for like services, and he was thus in the service of the Government on the 28th day of February, 1867. During the fiscal year he was paid the sum of $1,800; 20 per cent, of which is $360. He continued in the service until the 30th of June, 1867, and his suit was brought against the defendants on the 30th day of June, 1873.
Jir. Assistant Attorney-General Goforth, with whom was the Attorney-General, for the United States, appellants:
These cases differ from the Twenty-per-cent. Gases in 13 Wallace, 568, in this: In those cases the salary or pay was fixed directly or limited indirectly by law, and was a fixed and arbitrary rate of compensation, and the employé had no part in naming the amount to be paid him. In the oases now here, the compensation was not fixed nor limited by any law or by the head of any Department or division, but was the highest ruling rate in the market for similar labor, and was fixed by the employé himself, and changed by him as the market changed ; the wages were under the restriction of no statute, and the services were such as might be rendered to any employer.
Welch’s Case. — That it was notthe intention of Congress to give this additional pay to the class which the claimant represents, is evident from the language of the resolution. The Departments, divisions, and Bureaus in which the beneficiaries of the resolution are to be found are enumerated at length, but the descriptio personarum is u the following-described persons, now employed in the civil service of the United States.”
The word civil service in 1807, as now, had a distinctive meaning, designating a class of persons in the employ of the Government who were not in the military service, and who were appointed, not hired, by the President or heads of Department, whose existence was recognized by Congress, and whose compensation was fixed directly by law or indirectly by appropriation acts, &g. Outside of the military service have always been a large force of laborers, teamsters, and contractors, hired or employed for particular work, and paid either by the job or day. These constitute no part of the Army, and neither in war nor peace are they entitled to the immunities or privileges of the military service. So outside of the civil service are a large number of laborers, mechanics, and craftsmen, performing work which is not peculiar to a government, and whose compensation is a matter of contract between the employer and the employé. It has never been supposed that Congress meant to include these men in the civil service in the various acts which have been passed to reform that service. Section 9 of Act March 3, 1871, (16 Stat. L., p. 514,) authorizes the President to prescribe rules for the admission of persons into the civil service, and to establish regulations for the conduct of persons who may receive appointments into the civil service. Section 3 of Act of 20th April, 1871, (17 Stat. L., p. 7,) made an appropriation for carrying out the provisions of the preceding act. Section 1 of the Act of 8th May, 1872, (17 Stat. L., p. 82,) made an appropriation to enable the President to perfect and put in force rules regulating the civil service, and the Act of 3d March, 1873, (17 Stat. L., p. 530,) re-appropriated any balance to enable the President to perfect and put in force such rules regulating the civil service.
The Official Register, published biennially, by authority of Congress, since the year 1816, “ containing correct lists of all officers and agents, civil, military, and naval, in the service of the United States,” is further proof of the meaning given to the words “ service of the United States ” by the executive and legislative branches of the Government. No mechanics or laborers connected with either civil, naval, or military services appear therein, except those whose salaries have been fixed by law, and whose connection with the Government has resulted from appointment, not hiring nor contract. No law has ever been passed requiring the names of those so hired or contracted with to be placed in the Register, nor has Congress ever recognized their existence, except by making appropriations for certain work, and authorizing certain officers to contract for the materials and labor necessary for the same. Being thus- officially unknown to Congress, they ought not to be considered in the mind of Congress at the time of the passage of an act, unless specifically mentioned therein.
“ The most universal and effectual way of discovering the true meaning of a law, when the words are dubious, is by considering the reason, and spirit of it, or the cause which moved the legislator to enact it; for when the reason ceases, the law itself ought likewise to cease with it.” To ascertain the cause of this resolution, which is remedial, there are three points for consideration : the old law, the mischief, and' the remedy.
The old lorn consisted of the statutes which had been passed from time to time fixing the compensation of the various persons belonging to the civil service of the United States.
The mischief was that the compensation thus fixed had remained unchanged, while the price of necessaries and the cost of living had advanced greatly.
The remedy applied by Congress to this mischief was the restoration of that old ratio by the additional allowance of twenty per cent. It being the duty of the court so to construe the statute as to suppress the mischief, and not to extend the remedy beyond cases within the mischief, it is necessary to ascertain whether this claimant was suffering from the mischief which Congress sought to remedy.
Thomas Fugitt was employed at daily wages. He was employed and paid at the highest rates then paid by private parties for similar services, and this price was affected neither directly nor indirectly by law or the head of any Department, division, or Bureau, but was fixed by Thomas Fugitt himself.
Both the language and the reason of the resolution exclude this claimant from its benefits. When Congress did intend to benefit this class of laborers, they used very different language: “That eight hours shall constitute a day’s work for all laborers, workmen, and mechanics now employed, or who may be hereafter employed, by or on behalf of the Government of the United States; and that all acts and parts of acts inconsistent with this act be, and the same are hereby, repealed.” (15 Stat. L., p. 77.)
The Resolution of February 28,1867, was repealed by Act of July 12, 1870, (16 Stat. L., p. 250, § 4.)
This act of repeal prevented the officers of the Treasury from paying the additional twenty per cent, after the date of its passage. If the passage of the resolution created an implied contract on the part of the Government to pay this twenty per cent, and gave jurisdiction to the Court of Claims, the act of repeal divested that jurisdiction. As to the eight mouths of the fiscal year which had expired at the passage of the joint resolution no contract could arise, for there was no consideration, and the promise to pay the additional allowance was nudum pactum. It was a bounty. “A pensioner, by being placed on a pension-roll, acquires no vested rights by being placed there, which may not be divested by some subsequent act.” (Dale v. The Governor, 3 Stew., Ala., 387.)
As to the remaining four months of the fiscal year, perhaps the allowance becomes a part of the consideration for the work of those included within its terms.
A law repealed is obliterated, and must be considered as a law that never existed, except for the purpose of those actions or suits which were commenced, prosecuted, and concluded while it was an existing law. (Key v. Goodwin, 4 Moóre & Payne, 341; Butler v. Palmer, 1 Hill, 324; Dwarris on Statutes, Potter’s ed., 153; Miller’s Case, 3 Burr., 1456; Surtees v. FUison, 9 B, & 0., 750.)
Wild’s Case. — John Wild was employed by tlie authority of the Surgeon-General of the Army as a carpenter, at the depot for receiving and distributing medical supplies in Washington. He was employed and paid at the same rates then paid by individuals or corporations for like services. By the 17th section of Act of July, 1866, (14 Stat. L., p. 334,) the Medical Department of the Army is defined. At the head of it is the Surgeon-General; its officers are five medical store-keepers. The appropriation for this Department for the fiscal year ending June 30,1867, is found in the Act making appropriations for the support of the Army, (14 Stat. L., p. 91.) The appropriation for the Surgeon-General’s Office is found among the appropriations for the War Department, (14 Stat. L., p. 199;) but this man’s duties were with one of the medical store-keepers, and not in the office of the Surgeon-General.
Hannan’s Oase. — The appellee was employed as a laborer by the Commissary Department at Washington, and was employed and paid at the same rates then paid by individuals or corporations for like services. He is not entitled to the benefits of the resolution, for he was employed in connection with the military, not the civil service. The Subsistence Department is not a Bureau or division of the War Department, but of the Army, as appears from section 16 of Act of 28th July, 1866, (14 Stat. L., p. 224.) Among its officers, as therein prescribed, are eight commissaries of subsistence, with the rank, &c., of major. By one of these commissaries of subsistence (Major Bell) is evidence of claimant’s service furnished. The appropriation for subsistence is found in the Army appropriation bill, (14 Stat. L., p. 90.) The specific enumeration of the offices of the Paymaster-General and Commissary-General .of Prisoners, and the Quartermaster’s Bureau, in the resolution, works an exclusion of all other Bureaus of the War Department, even if the Department of Subsistence should be deemed a part of the War Department.
Tucker’s Oase. — Maurice Tucker was employed in the secret-service division of the Treasury Department, in the capacity of detective, at a monthly salary of $150 per month, which was the rate then paid by individuals or corporations for like services. He continued in this service until the 30th of June, 1867, and filed his petition on the 30th of June, 1873.
The services of Tucker having been rendered under an agree ment for monthly services, he was entitled to that salary at the end of every month, independent of any law of Congress relative to the payment of annual salaries. The statute of limitations would commence to run on the salary for each month six years from the end of that month. That Congress intended this 20 per cent, to be computed on the instalments of compensation as they fell due is evident from the language of the resolution: “ When any of said persons is or shall be only entitled to receive salary or pay for a part of said year, the said 20 per cent, shall be computed on the amount such person is so entitled to receive for services.” The addition being an incident of the salary, the statute would run against the instalments of twenty per cent, in the same manner as against the instal-ments of salary. (Angelí on Limitations, § 110, p. 125.) Nor would the payment of any part of such salary within six years prevent the statute from running against instalments of additional allowance that were due before that time. Payment of the principal did not take the interest oat of the statute in Gollyer v. Willoelc, (4 Bing., 314.) The doctrine of running accounts does not apply to this case, for there were no mutual dealings and no reciprocal demands. (See 1 Smith’s Leading Cases, pt. 2, pp. 878-881; marginal, pp. 719, 720, and cases there cited.)
Mr. N. P. Ohinman for the claimants, appellees :
In FitzpairicWs Case, (13 Wall., p. 568,) it is decided that “ certain described persons and classes of persons are plainly entitled to the provision, whether regarded as officers or as mere employés.” And again, as to the question who are em-ployés, the court say that this word was “intended to embrace a class of persons other and different from the persons having appointment as officers.” And in a classiflcatipn of officers the court find two classes, civil and military. Of the former there are three classes: political, judicial, and ministerial. To the latter, ministerial, the court refers these employés; and say, “ neither a commission nor a warrant of appointment is necessary to entitle an employé to the benefit of the provision under consideration, provided he was actually and properly employed” in any of the described Departments, Bureaus, &c. No ques tion is here made that the appellees were employed by one of the described Departments, Bureaus, &c., and if this court adhere to its decision, they must be held to be employés. (United States- v. Belleiv, 2 Brock, p. 2805 Graham v. United States, 1 C. Gis. R., p. 380; Mallory v. United States, 3 C. Gis. R., p. 257; Kirby v. United States, 3 O. Ols. R., p. 265; Story’s Comm, on Const., §§ 791, 792; Webster, as to the meaning of the words “civil,” “service,” and “employé,” or “employed;” Com. v. Sutherland, 3 L. & R., p. 149.)
Here the cases at bar are perfectly described by this court, if we are capable of making any true analysis of what this court has decided. These claimants are employés, and they were employed by a head of Department, or Bureau, or division, charged with the duty and authorized to make the contract. In noticing each case separately, it will be found that the officer making the contract with the employé was authorized to do so; and if only color of authority appears, we think the proper rule would be that the lawful authority for making the contract would be presumed, and the burden of proof to show that the officer was without authority would fall upou the defendant.
II. Patrick Welch’s Case. — The court below find the facts to be, that during the fiscal year 1866-’67 the claimant was employed as a laborer on the Treasury extension, in the city of Washington; that he was p^aid at the rates then paid by private individuals or corporations for like service, and was in the service of the United States on the 28th of February, 1867, and received as a total compensation $544.24; 20 per cent, of which amounts to $108.85. That specific appropriations were made by Congress prior to the time claimant’s service was rendered for the construction of the north wing of the Treasury building; and under this appropriation a contract was made with claimant for labor, and at a priee equivalent to the highest market wages, and he was paid out of the specific appropriation for the Treasury extension, under the supervision of the Supervising Architect of the Treasury. Two questions wall arise here in determining whether this case comes within the decision of this court: First, was the claimant employed by the head of a Department, Bureau, or division of a Department, charged with the duty and authorized to make the contract of employment and fix the compensation of the person employed? Second, was the employment such as is described in the joint resolution ? In answer to the second question, it is only necessary to say that the person was not a military officer, nor in the military service; and if in the employment of Government at all, he was in what this court has held the law to mean by the phrase ‘‘civil service.” In answer to the first question, we must first ascertain whether the person employed was contracted with by an officer authorized to make the contract and fix the compensation. The case is almost identical in the particulars now being noticed with Manning’s Gase, (13 Wall., p. 568.) He was a guard at the jail, employed by the warden. The warden’s compensation was fixed by the Secretary of the Interior, but the guard was employed by the warden. Here the employment was by the Supervising Architect, who is an officer of the Treasury Department, and the head of a Bureau therein, and lie was paid from an appropriation “ in the same manner as the expenditures for the construction of all other buildings erected under the supervision of the Supervising Architect of the Treasury Department.” The distinguishing feature in this case from Manning’s, and upon which we suppose the Government relies, is the fact that the compensation was fixed at the “highest market wages.” This precise question we believe was not decided in the former cases; but we thjnk it is plainly deducible from those cases that this court will not inquire into the method adopted by the head of ,the Bureau to ascertain a fair compensation for its employés. We think if Congress had intended to exclude that class of employés — officers, clerks, messengers, or watchmen — whose compensation was fixed at a rate equivalent to the “ highest market wages,” it would have indicated such purpose in some unmistakable manner; but plainly the object of the act was not to equalize the civil service in any manner, but to add 20 per cent, to the gross compensation of all persons employed by the Government coming within the classes of those described. The language of the act is “employés of the Treasury extension.” How are we to know that Congress meant to exclude any class of employés in the Treasury extension, when ithasnotindicatedany such purpose by anj language to be found in the act? The, principles of statutory construction will not allow the court to interpolate the exception “highest market wages.” In Miller’s Oase, decided by this court, (13 Wall., p. 568,) the claimant was an employé on the Capitol extension. It is true the findings did not show that his pay was equivalent to the “ highest market wages,” but if they had so shown we cannot see wherein the decision of the court could have been different. Suppose in all these eases it had crept into the finding of facts that the persons bringing suit had been paid as much or more than they could have received anywhere in Washington for like employment, (which we readily admit to be the case in most instances,) would this court change its opinion of the law? We think not.
III. John Wild’s Case. — Claimant was employed as a carpenter at the depot for receiving and distributing medical supplies at Washington, under the Medical Department of the Army, and by the authority of the Surgeon-General of the. Army. He was employed and paid at the rates then paid by individuals or corporations for like service. His-wages were three dollars per day, and amounted during the fiscal year to $624; twenty per cent, of which amounts to $124.80. In the opinion of the court below, made part of the record by the Attorney-General, Mr. Justice Nott adds, (paragraph 4 of his opinion :) “ The Surgeon-General’s Office is recognized in the annual appropriations made by Congress as a part of the War Department, but the claimant was not in the Surgeon-General’s Office.” But the finding is clear that Wild was employed as a carpenter by authority of the Surgeon-General of the Army, and that the Surgeon-General’s Office is a part of the War Department. This would . seem to make it beyond doubt that the claimant was employed by competent authority, and comes within the class of persons described in the joint resolution. The learned judge below, however, thinks that Wild was a civil employé of the Army, but not in any sense in the civil service. We here have a distinction hitherto unknown either to this court or to the Court of Claims, to wit, a civil employé of the Army not in the civil service. We think a moment’s reflection will convince the court that the learned judge errs in this view. Almost the entire body of employés of the War Department, from the Secretary down to the laborer of that Department, are civil employés of the Army. The same is true of many of the employés of the Quartermaster and Commissary General’s Departments. The joint resolution does not say nor does it mean that the civil employés mentioned in the act must not be civil employés of the Army ; for the act itself provides for the payment of enlisted men of the Army, detailed on civil service. Wild was a carpenter and civil employé. He did not belong to the Army or Navy. But the law does not restrict the employé to the civil service of the Army or Navy, or the judicial, legislative, or executive branches of the Government. The language of the act is “ employé in the civil service of the United States.” It means that the person shall not be employed in the military service proper, nor in the naval service proper. We say proper, for the law specially provides for the payment of the Navy and War Departments and the various Bureaus and divisions thereof, and this service is to be distinguished from military or naval duty proper. Indeed, they may, and in fact do, perform certain kincfe of military or naval duty at the War or Navy Department, as watchmen, or messengers,*or laborers, or mechanics, and yet be entitled to pay. Certainly those employed at the navy-yard, at the arsenal, at the War and Navy Departments, and the different Bureaus thereof, were all performing the same class of duty performed by Wild. They might all be excluded on the same ground, that' they were civil employés of the Army and Navy4 but none of them were, and most of them have been paid. We conclude, then, that the view suggested by the court below is error.
IY. James Hannan'1 s Case. — Claimant was a laborer in the Commissary Department at Washington. He was employed and paid at the same rates then paid by individuals or corporations for like service, and was thus in the service of the Government on the 28th February, 1867, receiving a total compensation of $420; 20 per cent, of which is $84. The court find/as conclusions of law, that the claimant was in the civil service of the United States within the meaning of the joint resolution, and that the Commissary Department is a division or Bureau of the War Department.
'Y. JohnDonnely’s Case. — Claimant was employed by the Quartermaster Department, at the city of Washington, as watch man, laborer, and teamster, and was paid at the rates for like service in private employment. He received $329; 20 per cent, of which is $65.80. His services continued to the 30th day of June, 1867, and his suit was brought against the defendants on the 30th day of June, 1873. The only new question here presented, we suppose, is the effect of the statute of limitations, which is pleaded in the case.
Without going into the question of the different dates when petitions were filed, we hold that the act clearly means that claimants should receive 20 per cent, upon the gross amount of their compensation for one year, beginning the 30th of J une, 1866, and ending the 30th of June, 1867. We think the language of the act determines this, according to our view. It is, naming the persons, &c., that they shall receive “ an additional compensation of twenty per cent, on their respective salaries as fixed by law, or where no salary is fixed by law, upon their pay, respectively, for one year from and after the 30th day of June, 1866.” The court will see that it is not 20 per cent, upon their daily pay when paid by the day, nor 20 per cent, upon their monthly pay when paid by the month, nor 20 per cent, upon their annual pay when paid annually; but it is 20 per cent, upon the gross amount of compensation paid them for a year, commencing and ending at a time fixed by the law. Clearly, if it had been the object of Congress to have limited the operation of the statute to those only who demanded the 20 per cent, from day to day, or from month to month, it would have been easy to make the law clear on this subject. But Congress seems to have not only intended, but to have said, in language clear and explicit, that its purpose was to give to those employés of the Government within the scope of the act 20 per cent, upon the gross compensation received during the period of one year between certain dates. The Assistant Attorney-General would have these claimants bring separate suits for each day’s compensation, or articulate in their petitions by distinct counts the claim each makes for compensation growing out of each day’s or month’s service. The law cannot mean this. The debt which the Government incurred by this act was for a gross sum, which became due on the 30th of June, 1867. We do not doubt that a liberal construction of the statute (and all such statutes should be liberally construed) would allow the disbursing officers of Government, after the passage of this act, to pay monthly or daily 20 per cent, additional. But in those cases where the Government refused to make payment of any sum we think clearly it was a debt of a gross amount after the 30th of June, 1867. It does not follow, because the language of the act and its spirit would allow of these payments being made during the period named in the act from time to time, that therefore, at the end of each day or of each month, a distinct debt of the United States was created, and that suit should have been begun within six years from that time. The language of the act precludes this view. It is that this compensation shall be computed upon their pay “ for one year from and after the 30th day of June, 1866,17 not for each day or each month between the dates of 30th June, 1866, and 30th June, 1867, but for “ one year.” This view is sustained, we think, by the further provision of the law, which is, that where persons are not entitled to receive pay for a whole year, but shall be so entitled only “ for a part of said year,” this 20 per cent, shall be computed on the amount which the person is entitled to receive. But in this part of the act the court will not fail to observe that here as elsewhere the idea of the legislator seemed to have been to combine the year’s salary or the total amount due the person within the year, and upon that to compute the 20 per cent. For there is nowhere in the act any language which would seem to indicate an indebtedness from day to day or from month to month.
The Chief-Justice of the court below, while disclaiming any. opinion generally, suggests that the Court of Claims has no juris - diction. We are at a loss to understand upon what ground he holds this view, as he gives no reasons, and as the Assistant Attorney-General has assigned none which have reached us. We suppose, however, this view rests upon the effect of the Aet of July 12,1870, (16 Stat. L., p. 260, sec. 4:) “ That all acts and joint resolutions, or parts thereof, and all resolutions of either House of Congress, granting extra compensation or pay, be, and the same are hereby, repealed, to take effect on the 1st day of July, 1870.” We think the radical error, if this act be relied upon, is, first, in supposing the Court of Claims has no jurisdiction where there is no appropriation; or, second, in supposing that the repeal of an act destroys rights which have already accrued. As we understand the law, the Court of Claims derives its jurisdiction of these cases from the Act of February 24, 1855, (10 Stat. L., p. 612, sec. 1,) and not from the Joint Resolu-tmi of February 28, 1867. The claimants had a contract of service with the United States, and the joint resolution only increased the pay under that contract. They sue on the contract, and this it is which gives jurisdiction. But it may be that it is this part of the contract relating to extra compensation which' is held to be repealed, and thus the jurisdiction is ousted. This cannot be. This extra compensation became a part of the contract so soon as offered by Congress, and at the expiration of the year became as much a vested interest as any other portion of the salary or pay. Congress cannot now destroy this right, except by withholding appropriations to pay the judgments of the Court of Claims. A court will never presume that Congress has forbidden the execution of a contract with Government; it must appear in unmistakable language. The act relied upon does not only not provide for a retroactive operation, but it provides that it shall take effect after July 1, 1870. Surely Congress never intended to destroy rights accrued in 1867. The truth is, this act was passed to cut off this general class of extra compensation, which had crept into various statutes, the cutting-off of which in future Congress thought advisable. We assume that this court will adhere to its decisions heretofore made, and assuming this, we feel relieved from discussing all the questions involved in a proper construction of a joint resolution.
Mr. O. P. Culver for the claimants, appellees:
In the first place, the Joint Resolution of Congress approved February 28,1867, does not warrant this distinction of classes of employés who come within the provisions of the resolution by virtue “ of an employment,” and which are not excepted by the terms of the proviso. This view of the case is borne out by the unanimous decision of this court in the case of Fitzpatrick and others, (13 Wall., p. 568.)
The law creating this Bureau within the Treasury Department declares, u That the Secretary of the Treasury be, and is hereby, authorized, in case he shall think it inexpedient to procure said notes, or any part thereof, to be engraved and printed by contract, to cause the said notes, or any part thereof, to be engraved, printed, and executed, in such form as he shall prescribe, at the Treasury Department in Washington, and under Ms direction; and be is hereby empowered to purchase and provide all the machinery and material, and to employ such persons and appoint such officers as may be necessary for this purpose.” (12 Stat. L., p. 532.)
Upon carrying out this provision of the act, a new Bureau was created within the Treasury Department, called the “Bureau of Engraving and Printing,” and a new class of officers was appointed to supervise and superintend its organization and workings ; some at fixed salaries, while others were paid per-diem wages. These were empowered by the Secretary of the Treasury to employ artisans, superintendents, and laborers. These, again, were employed, some upon fixed salaries, some by the piece or job, while others were employed by the day, and all at some fixed price, determined upon by the heads of the several divisions of this Bureau. The most that can be said of this mode of securing labor is, that the officers or superintendents employing the person exercised great prudence and diligence to protect the Government against extravagant wages or compensation for the amount of labor done. It seems to us reasonable that, if Congress intended in the joint resolution to discriminate against those who were receiving per-diem pay or pay per contract or job, within any of the Departments named in the said resolution, Congress would have suggested some such discrimination in the act. But not having done so, either by word or implication, we must infer that they intended to embrace all who were in the employment of the Government at Washington ; and if any are to be excepted, excepting as provided for in the act, the court below, as well as the learned Attorney-General, has failed thus far to point it out. Certainly he could not ask the court to interpolate into the law a distinction that does not now exist, and which does not appear from the phraseology of the act to have been in the mind of the legislator at the time he penned it. These discriminations are not made in the act, and the court cannot now make them. It either means all the employés in the several Departments, excepting those mentioned in the second proviso of the act, or it means nothing.
Mr. Joseph Daniels was also heard for the claimants.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Clieeokd
delivered the opinion of the court:
Additional compensation is claimed by the respective appellants, as employés in the civil service of the United States in this city, by virtue of the Joint Resolution of the 28th of February, 1867, which provides that 20 per cent, additional compensation shall be allowed and paid to cercain classes of such employs in Washington as therein designated.
Civil officers, whose annual salaries do not exceed $3,500, and all clerks, whether temporary or permanent, and messengers and watchmen, are specifically named in the resolution, including enlisted men detailed as such, and the provision is that the additional allowance shall be computed upon the gross amount of the compensation received by such employé as fixed by law, or where no salary is fixed by law, upon the pay of the employé for that fiscal year, and that the benefit of the resolution shall extend to employés, male and female, in the Executive Mansion, and in any of the following-named Departments, or any Bureau or division thereof, to wit, State, Treasury, War, Navy, Interior, Post-Office, Attorney-General, and Agricultural, and including civil officers, and all clerks and employés, male and female, in the offices of the Coast Survey, Naval Observatory, navy-yard, arsenal, Paymaster-General, Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen and Abandoned Lands, Quartermasters, Capitol and Treasury extension, city post-office, and Commissioner of Public Buildings; to the photographer and assistant photographer of the Treasury Department; to the superintendent of meters, and to lamp-lighters under the Commissioner of Public Buildings.
Judgments rendered by the Court of Claims, involving controversies of a like character, were removed into this court by appeal on a former occasion, when it became the duty of this court to examine the joint resolution in question, and to determine what, in the judgment of the court, is its actual scope and true intent and meaning, as applied to the several cases then before the court.
Attempt was then made in argument to convince the court that the words of the resolution, "in the civil service of the United States," as there employed, should be restricted to persons filling offices or holding appointments established by law; but the court rejected that narrow construction of the phrase, and unanimously decided that neither a commission nor a warrant of appointment is necessary to entitle an employé to the benefits of the joint resolution, provided he was actually and properly employed in the Executive Mansion, or in any of the Departments, or in any bureau or division thereof, or in any of the offices specifically designated in the said joint resolution; that persons so employed here are properly to be regarded as employés in the civil service of the United States within the true intent and meaning of that phrase as there used, if they were employed by the head of the Department, or of the Bureau, or any division of the Department, charged with that duty and authorized to make such contracts and fix the compensation of the person or persons employed, even though the particular employment may not be designated in an appropriation act. (Twenty-per-cent. Cases, 13 Wall., p. 576.)
Such was the unanimous opinion of the court as to the true construction of the joint resolution under consideration on that occasion, and the court, with equal unanimity, adheres to that conclusion in the cases before the court.
Many persons, not employed as clerks or messengers of a Department, are in the public service by virture of an employment by the head of a Department, or by the head of some Bureau of a Department, or division thereof, authorized to make such contracts, and such persons are as much in the civil service of the United States, within the meaning of the joint resolution, as the clerks and messengers employed in the rooms of the Department building. (United States v. Bellew, 2 Brock., p. 280; Graham v. United States, 1 C. Cls. R., p. 380; Com. v. Sutherland, 3 S. & R., p. 149.)
Much discussion of that topic, however, is unnecessary, as the question was explicitly determined in our former decision, to which reference is made for a full exposition of the present views of the court upon that subject.
Grant all that, still it is insisted that the joint resolution has been repealed since that decision was made, and that the effect of the repealing act is to bar the right of recovery in all of the cases under consideration; in support of which proposition reference is made to the fourth section of the appropriation act of the 12th of July, 1870, which enacts that all acts and joint resolutions, or parts thereof, and all resolutions of either House of Congress granting extra compensation or pay be, and the same are hereby, repealed, to take effect on the 1st day of July in the same year. (16 Stat. L., p. 250.)
Two propositions are submitted by the United States, based upon that repealing act, to show that the respective appellants in these cases cannot recover: (1) That the repeal of the joint resolution prevents the officers of the Treasury from paying the additional compensation after the date of its passage. (2) That the repealing act, even if the resolution created an implied contract and gave jurisdiction to the Court of Claims to enforce it, divested the Court of Claims of all jurisdiction in such controversies.
Both of the propositions, as it seems to the court, overlook the material facts of the case, all of which are undisputed. They are as follows: (1) That the joint resolution ceased to be operative at the end of the fiscal year in which it was enacted. (2) That such additional compensation is allowed only for that year. (3) That the qlaims in these cases are only for such additional compensation during that fiscal year. (4) That the joint resolution ceased to be operative at the close of that fiscal year. (5) That the right to such additional compensation became fixed and vested when the yeaFs services were faithfully performed. (6) That. the repealing act, which it is supposed constitutes a bar to the cause of action in these cases, did not become a law until more than three years after the right to the additional compensation had become fixed and vested, and the joint resolution had ceased to be operative in respect to prospective services.
Viewed in the light of these suggestions, grave doubts arise whether the repealing act in question applies at all to the joint resolution, as it is difficult to believe that the Congress would deem it necessary to repeal a provision which had expired by its own limitation more than three years before they acted upon the subject.
Mere supererogation, however, it is said, cannot properly be imputed to the national legislature, and there would be much force in the suggestion if the joint resolution had at that time been in operation and had been the only provision of the kind to which the descriptive words of the repealing act would apply; but the fact is plainly otherwise, as there are several acts of corresponding import which were in full force at that date, and which, it must be admitted, are unquestionably included within those descriptive words. (12 Stat. L., p. 587; 14 Stat. L., p. 206; 15 id., 77.)
Enough appears in the repealing act itself to show that Con- . gress did not intend to give it any retroactive effect, except as therein provided, as the act expressly enacts that the provision in question shall take effect on the 1st day of July next before the day it was approved; which affords a demonstration that Congress never intended that it should retroact to any other or greater extent. (16 Stat. L., p. 250.)
Courts of justice agree that no statute, however positive in its terms, is to be construed as designed to interfere with existing contracts, rights of action, or with vested rights, unless the intention that it shall so operate is expressly declared or is to be necessarily implied, and pursuant to that rule courts will apply new statutes only to future cases, unless there is something in the nature of the case or in the language of the new provision which shows that they were intended to have a retroactive operation. Even though the words of a statute are broad enough in their literal extent to comprehend existing cases, they must yet be construed as applicable only to cases that may hereafter arise, unless the language employed expresses a contrary intention in unequivocal terms. (Potter's Dwarris, 161; Wood v. Oakley, 11 Paige, 403; Butler v. Palmer, 1 Hill, 325; Jarvis v. Jarvis, 3 Edw. Ch., 466; McEwen v. Bulkley, 24 How., 242; Harvey v. Tyler, 2 Wall., 329; Blanchard v. Sprague, 2 Sum., 535; United States v. Heth, 3 Cran, p. 399.)
Such a law, if passed by a State, and construed to have the effect claimed for it in this case by, the appellants, would be unconstitutional and void. But it is not necessary to discuss any such proposition in this case, as there is not a word in the repealing act to support the conclusion that Congress intended to rescind any antecedent contract, or to enact any bar to the right of recovery in such cases, where the service had been faithfully performed before the repealing act was passed.
Apply those rules to the cases before the court, and it is clear the appellees in the first twelve are entitled to recover, as the finding of the court below shows that the claimant in each of those cases is included within the joint resolution, as construed and defined by this court. But the other two claimants, to wit, The United States v. O. H. O. Hoffman, and Same v. George A. Bell, are not entitled to recover, the former because he was employed as sexton at the Arlington cemetery, in the State of Virginia, and not "in Washington," and consequently his claim is not within the words of the joint resolution. Nor was tbe latter in the civil service of the United States within the meaning of that provision, as he was a plate-printer, working under a contract, at an agreed rate " per one hundred sheets of face printing and per one hundred sheets of back printing." He employed an assistant, for whose compensation he was responsible ; but the finding of the subordinate court shows that the assistant was paid directly by the disbursing officer, and that the sum thus paid was deducted from the gross earnings of the claimant. Suffice it to say that the claimant was a contractor, and that he employed another to do most or all of the work, and in the judgment of the court such a contractor is not entitled to the additional compensation allowed and directed to be paid by the joint resolution under consideration.
Judgment affirmed in the twelve cases first named. Judgment reversed in the two cases last named, and the causes remanded, with directions to dismiss the respective petitions.