Case Name: Leonide Lacroix vs. P. Nodal & Co.
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1889-12
Citations: 41 La. Ann. 1018
Docket Number: No. 10,223
Parties: Leonide Lacroix vs. P. Nodal & Co.
Judges: 
Reporter: Louisiana Annual Reports
Volume: 41
Pages: 1018–1020

Head Matter:
No. 10,223.
Leonide Lacroix vs. P. Nodal & Co.
A party, avowedly not the owmn- of a trade-mark for the use of which he had been sued under the allegation that it was an imitation of another trade-mark, lias no standing' in court to sue for damages,as a vindication of such trade-mark, after the dismissal of plaintiff’s ac“ tion on his own motion.
APPEAL from the Civil District Court, for the Parish of Orleans, KU/Mor J.
Farrar, Jams <li Kmllse.hnitt for Plaintiff'and Appellee :
r.
A warrantor is only a defendant in a restricted sense of the term, i. e. in such a sense as to enable him to resist by all legal moans or defense a judgment against the defendant, which, by reason of the recourse against him, would affect his interest; but no judgment can bo rendered, against tlio warrantor, oxcopt one in favoi of defendant for such amount as lie may bo liable for under libs warranty. Suo Stoolo vs. Smith. i)fcli Ann. p. 172.
II.
A petition praying for a judgment against defendants, recognising the, tittle of plaintiffs to such goods as they may hereafter acquire, and forbidding plaintiffs from slandering the title of defendants to sell such goods as they may here,after acquire from a third person, exhibits no cause of action, and a reconventiomil demand is of course subject to the same mlLS'
II r.
Answers to interrogatories on facts and articles form part of the pleadings and of the record. They bind a party as fully as. and are really part of, the answer itself. Whiting vs. Ivey, 3 Ann. 649; Walker vs. Villavaso. 18 Anu. 716; HcLear & Kendall vs. Succession of Hansickor, 29 Ann. 546.
E. T. Elomiifíc for Defendants aud Appellants.

Opinion:
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Poché, J.
Defendants appeal from a judgment which dismissed their «'.conventional demand on the ground that it disclosed no cause of action.
Plaintiff's action was based on an alleged infringement of Ms trade-in arle for cigarette paper, which defendants were charged to have imitated in selling a spurious article bearing such trade-mark; in consequence of which lie prayed for damages in tiie sum of ten thousand dollars and for an injunction. To his petition he annexed interrogatories on facts and articles intended to bring out the substantial facts alleged in Ills pleadings.
In their answers to the questions thus propounded to them, the defendants denied emphatically that they had sold cigarette paper corresponding in all respects with that covered by plaintiff's trade-mark, and which had not been manufactured by him. For answer to the suit they liled a general denial, followed by a special denial, that the cigarette paper which they had sold was an imitation of that manufactured by plaintiff.
They then aver that two other named parties were the owners of the trade-mark under which they were selling, and they call said parties in warranty. They conclude with a prayer to be decreed entitled to sell the paper bearing the trade-mark of tlieir warrantors, which t-liey annex to their answer, and claiming in reconvention damages against plaintiff for having, by his suit, slandered their business, and impeded their legal and'free use of their warrantors' trade-mark.
The warrantors pleaded before service of process, affirming their title to the trade-mark annexed to defendants' answer, and praying that defendants he quieted in their right to re-sell cigarette paper hearing their said trade-mark. At this juncture plaintiff discontinued Iris suit, hut defendants, hacked by their warrantors, insisted for'a trial of their re-conventional demand, which the court dismissed on plaintiffs suggestion that at that stage of the proceedings it disclosed no cause of action. From the foregoing statement of the pleadings it appears to our satisfaction as follows:
That defendants were not the owners of the trade-mark which they sought to vindicate, and that therefore they had no canse or reason to judicially claim any other right than that of using it in their dealings under the authority of their warrantors. But that right was conceded and f.uly recognized by the discontinuance of plaintiff's action which was the only obstacle in their way. That left them without any grievance or complaint which they could judicially assert, and therefore the case was thus stripped of all litigious contention. The ends of justice were fulfilled and the mission of the court was thus accomplished.
IVe therefore conclude that there is no error in the disposition made of the case by the District Court.
Judgment affirmed.