Case Name: Robert DYE, Robert Dye, II, and Lowell Dye v. SCHWEGMANN BROTHERS GIANT SUPERMARKETS, INC.
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1993-11-19
Citations: 627 So. 2d 688
Docket Number: No. 91-CA-1456
Parties: Robert DYE, Robert Dye, II, and Lowell Dye v. SCHWEGMANN BROTHERS GIANT SUPERMARKETS, INC.
Judges: KLEES, BYRNES, CIACCIO, WARD and LANDRIEU, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 627
Pages: 688–699

Head Matter:
Robert DYE, Robert Dye, II, and Lowell Dye v. SCHWEGMANN BROTHERS GIANT SUPERMARKETS, INC.
No. 91-CA-1456.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
Nov. 19, 1993.
Jerald N. Andry, Gilbert V. Andry, III, Andry & Andry, New Orleans, for Robert Dye, Robert Dye, II and Lowell Dye.
Wayne J. Lee, Kyle D. Schonekas, Mary L. Dumestre, Stone, Pigman, Walther, Witt-mann & Hutchinson, New Orleans, for Sehwegmann Bros. Giant SuperMarkets, Inc.
KLEES, BYRNES, CIACCIO, WARD and LANDRIEU, JJ.

Opinion:
WARD, Judge.
Robert Dye and his two sons sued Schweg-mann Giant Super Markets, Inc., claiming damages from Schwegmann for the death of Mrs. Delores Dye, his wife and their mother. Mrs. Dye was murdered in Schwegmann's parking lot during an armed robbery, and plaintiffs' claim Schwegmann is liable because (1) Schwegmann breached a duty to warn of unreasonable dangers of criminal activity on Schwegmann's parking lot, (2) Schwegmann breached a general duty to protect customers from criminal acts of others, and (3) Schwegmann's security employees were negligent. These claims raise two possibilities of Schwegmann's liability: Schweg-mann may be directly liable for its own negligence under La.C.C. art. 2315; either by failure to warn or by failure to protect, and Schwegmann may be liable by virtue of La. C.C. art. 2320 for the negligent acts of its employees, under the principle of respondeat superior.
This Court in Dye v. Schwegmann Giant Supermarkets, Inc., 599 So.2d 412 (La.App. 4 Cir.1992), affirmed by a two to one vote the jury verdict finding that Schwegmann was not negligent nor liable. The majority found that the trial court's instructions were wrong, but also found that the error represented a small part of a lengthy instruction which did not mislead the jury to such an extent as to prevent it from doing justice. Citing Cuccia v. Cabrejo, 429 So.2d 232 (La.App. 5 Cir.1983). Dye, supra, at 416. The Supreme Court, believing a manifest error standard was erroneously used, reversed that judgment and remanded to this court "to make an independent determination of the facts from the record without according any weight whatsoever to the factual findings of the erroneously instructed jury. Gonzales v. Xerox Corp., 320 So.2d 163 (La.1975)." Dye v. Schwegmann, 607 So.2d 564 (La.1992).
After remand, a three judge panel could not agree and a five judge panel was convened to decide the case, and its members differ as to what facts have been proven. For the most part, however, there is general agreement on the following:
On the afternoon of September 20, 1984 Mrs. Delores Dye went shopping at the Schwegmann Giant Super Market Gentilly store in eastern New Orleans. Mrs. Dye was a frequent customer, having shopped at the store for many years. Between 2:15 and 2:30 p.m. Mrs. Dye left the store carrying groceries to her car which was parked in the parking lot in front of the store. That parking lot is a five acre tract of pavement and it is situated between Old Gentilly Road, which runs in front of and adjacent to the store, and Chef Menteur Highway, which runs in front of but marks the outer limits of the parking lot. Mrs. Dye was shot and killed by a lone gunman when she resisted his efforts to rob her in the parking lot. Her killer, Curtis Kyles, was later apprehended, convicted of the murder, and now awaits execution. See State v. Kyles, 513 So.2d 265 (La.1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1027, 108 S.Ct. 2005, 100 L.Ed.2d 236 (1988).
That decision summarizes other relevant facts.
The mid-afternoon armed robbery and murder of a sixty-year old woman in the parking lot of Schwegmann Brothers' Supermarket was witnessed by four persons. The witnesses saw a black man accost the' woman as she placed her groceries in the trunk of a red Ford LTD. The victim threw her purse into the trunk, slammed the lid, and tried to get away. The assailant chased her and wrestled her to the ground. When she attempted to escape again, the robber grabbed her arm, drew a revolver from his waistband, and fired it into her left temple, killing her instantly. The gunman then took her keys from her hand, got into her car, and drove slowly from the parking lot. State v. Kyles, supra, at 267
Most of the factual dispute centers on differing interpretations of testimony of Schwegmann's security supervisors and guards who were on duty at the time, and this will be considered when Plaintiffs' allegations of negligence are discussed.
Plaintiffs rely most heavily on claims that Schwegmann itself was negligent and liable under C.C. art. 2315, alleging Schwegmann breached a duty to warn customers of potential criminal acts that may cause them harm while on the premises; and that Schweg-mann breached a general duty to protect its customers from criminal acts of third party tortfeasors. Plaintiffs' petition, Art. VI.
First, we will consider what we believe is the least persuasive of Plaintiffs argument, a "duty to warn." Mr. Dye and his children contend that Schwegmann, when operating in a high crime area, should warn potential customers of possible criminal occurrences. This duty to warn, they argue, arises because Schwegmann's parking lot presents an unreasonable risk of harm to shoppers from criminal acts on the premises. The nature of the warning is not suggested, but presumably, it would have to be specific to have effect; that is, it would not be sufficient to warn customers that there is some criminal activity in the area. All would agree that these warnings would go unheeded. To be effective, such warnings would have to warn customers that they should protect themselves against the possibility of robbery, mugging, assaults, kidnappings, rape, or murder in a Schwegmann parking lot, day or night. If there exists a duty to warn in such a manner, there would be no customers to warn.
While it is true that a "landowner has a duty to discover any unreasonably dangerous conditions on the premises and to either correct the conditions or warn of the danger, Shelton v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 334 So.2d 406 (La.1976), that duty refers to existing dangerous conditions,' meaning physical conditions which exist on the premises and are unknown to the person who ventures on the land. That rule has never been applied to create a duty to warn of danger from criminal acts that may be committed by third parties who come onto the premises. We do not interpret "conditions" to mean intangible dangers of third party criminal conduct that may happen in the future. Nor do we believe that the dangers of crime everywhere in New Orleans need special warnings to customers of grocers about parking lots, a matter well within the knowledge of any resident. We decline to hold that a grocer owes a duty to warn potential customers that they may be the victim of a crime while on the business premises.
Although Plaintiffs claim Schwegmann breached a duty to warn, their main contention is that Schwegmann is liable under La. C.C. art. 2315 for its own acts of negligence — deficient management policies and practices for security in the parking lot. These claims are stated in Plaintiffs' petition,, paragraph VI, b through f. They allege Schwegmann breached a duty (b) to provide adequate security, (c) hire security guards with professional training, (d) to properly train the guards it hires, (e) post armed guards in the parking lot, (f) provide adequate security in the parking lot, (f) other unnamed acts of negligence.
In other words, Plaintiffs contend that Schwegmann breached a duty to protect customers from third party criminal acts. Whether a duty exists is generally a question of law, which courts decide by consideration of various factors.
Plaintiffs rely on Banks v. Hyatt Corp., 722 F.2d 214 (5th Cir.1984) as support for the rule that businesses have a duty to protect its customers. In that case the Court considered the duty of an innkeeper, traditionally a business that owes a great duty to guests who, as the Court pointed out, have historically entrusted their welfare to their host. The Bank's court recognized the difference, and acknowledged there was "a duty of care higher than ordinary or reasonable care" on innkeepers. A grocer, however, is not analogous to an innkeeper either in his service to customers or in his customers' expectations of safety. (722 F.2d at 226). Patrons of a grocery do not place their welfare in the hands of a grocer as a guest places his trust in a hotel, his host. Thus, hotels may well have a duty to protect under all circumstances, but Banks does not support Plaintiffs' argument that a grocer owes a duty.
Plaintiffs also erroneously rely on Harris v. Pizza Hut, 455 So.2d 1364 (La.1984) for the same proposition. Although the majority opinion in Harris cites cases from other jurisdictions when speaking of the issue of a duty to protect, the majority does not hold that such a duty exists. As a matter of fact the majority in footnote 16 says that issue is left for another time, emphasizing that it did not have to consider whether Pizza Hut owed a duty to protect, because Pizza Hut had assumed that duty. In other words Harris considered Pizza Hut's liability under a re-spondeat superior doctrine of liability for the negligent acts of its security guard; and, as the concurring opinion emphasized, this was a case of ordinary negligence. It is not a definitive statement that restaurants owe a duty to provide protection to their customers from third party criminal acts.
Plaintiffs also rely on Willie v. American Casualty Co., 547 So.2d 1075 (La.App. 1 Cir.1989) remanded on other grounds, 553 So.2d 467 (La.1989), and Hanewinckel v. St. Paul's Property & Liability Insurance Co., et al., 611 So.2d 174 (La.App. 5th Cir.1992). Willie lends support to Plaintiffs. In Willie the Court of Appeal upheld trial court instructions which said a shopping center's duty to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition "includes an obligation to protect patrons from criminal acts by third persons if such criminal acts under the circumstances prevailing are reasonably foreseeable." While the Appellate Court considered a shopping center's duty in that case, and indicated that the type of businesses and other factors determine if there was a duty to warn or protect, there is no substantial difference here where the grocery is as large as a shopping center and sells as many varieties of goods. The First Circuit Court of Appeal also held that the jury finding was not manifestly erroneous when it found breach of that duty, presumably by not providing sufficient security or proper lighting for the parking lot.
Plaintiffs, however, erroneously rely on Hanewinckel. In Hanewinckel the Appellate Court denied it was considering "novel legal principles concerning strict liability of business for the criminal acts of third persons, ., and said 'it is simply a suit for negligence involving essential facts almost identical to those presented in Harris v. Pizza Hut' ." In Hanewinckel there was evidence that Ochsner had received information that a particularly described suspicious person was on the premises at 4:30 A.M., something quite different from our facts, and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals simply affirmed the trial court finding that security guards of the Alton Ochsner Medical Foundation were negligent by not taking action based on that information.
We decline to follow Willie in so far as it may hold that a grocer has a duty to protect shoppers from inarticulated criminal conduct that may be committed by unnamed and unknowable third persons at some indefinite and unknown time in the future. While it is true that courts have recognized a duty to protect even under these circumstances, this duty has been placed only on those businesses which have a unique relationship to customers-hotels to their guests, hospitals to their patients, common carriers to their customers. In these situations the guests, patients, and customers have placed their safety in the hands of hotels, hospitals, and common carriers who in turn have assumed the responsibility for their welfare. But generally, businesses have never been held to be the insurer of the safety of their customers from third party criminal acts. Coblentz v. North Peters Parking, Inc., 538 So.2d 98 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988).
Plaintiffs' argue this court should follow Willie and urge this court to place such a duty to protect on certain businesses based on its size, or its nature, or its location and past criminal activity on the premises. This suggestion, even if fair, just and economically feasible, merely adds uncertainty to all businesses. As an example, when does a business become large enough? And what types of businesses should owe such a duty? A grocery but not a restaurant? A restaurant but not a shoe store? And what locations require security? Like most urban centers, all of New Orleans knows crime, and to attempt to distinguish one area as a high crime area and another as "safe" is a dubious undertaking. We believe the general rule is applicable to grocers: A business establishment is not the insurer of the welfare of its patrons. Coblentz, supra. Therefore, in the absence of any other factors, we decline to hold that a grocer owes a general duty to protect its customers from third party criminal acts.
Moreover, the Supreme Court emphasized in Harris that the duty of Pizza Hut was to provide "a reasonably safe place to purchase and consume food", Id. p. 1375, and Pizza Hut was liable under ordinary, general negligence laws, not under novel ideas of strict liability of a business for third part criminal acts that harm its customers. We do not find Schwegmann breached its duty to provide a reasonable safe place to purchase and consume food. The following factors show it did not.
Much of the trial testimony came from and focused upon Schwegmann's security staff and their performance. The plaintiffs produced New Orleans Police Department records and Schwegmann's in-house reports showing the number and types of crimes occurring in the store's parking lots. The data showed that during the period of January 1, 1977 through the date of Mrs. Dye's death, 57 armed robberies were committed on the Schwegmann premises. In the two-year period alone preceding Mrs. Dye's death, there had been 22 armed robberies at the store. Plaintiffs strenuously argued at trial and on appeal that the crimes occurring in the area were of sufficient number and of such alarming violence as to place Schweg-mann on notice that Mrs. Dye's death was foreseeable and to take proper precautions against it.
Schwegmann showed that it employed in-house security force and trained all of its security personnel at that store. The force consisted of a Director of Safety who was responsible for security operations for the entire Schwegmann chain and a Supervisor of Security, whose primary responsibility was the training and supervision of the uniformed guards at the stores. Additionally, Schweg-mann's Gentilly store, just as the other Schwegmann stores, had its own security chief who was directly responsible for security operations.
The security program included both inside security personnel and outside guards. The outside guards wore uniforms, did not carry arms or radios, and were assigned to patrol the exterior areas of the store, including the parking lots on foot and by motor scooter. The inside security personnel included plainclothes officers and uniformed safety officers. The plainclothes personnel as well as the safety officers were required to make periodic checks of the exterior areas to verify that the outside security guards were patrolling as directed, and the interior personnel served as backup for outside security. The Director of Safety, Supervisor of Security, and the Security Chief also made periodic outside checks.
Santo Vindigni, Chief of Security at the Gentilly store, testified that he had been employed by Schwegmann since 1973 and received his certification as an auxiliary police officer in 1972. He stated that a normal compliment of outside guards ranged from a minimum of four to a maximum of eight. Included in this number was at least one guard patrolling the parking lot in a motorized scooter. At the time of this murder Schwegmann's security supervisors had assigned four personnel to act as outside guards. However, one of those guards, Terry Thomas, was in the security office filing a report describing a crime that had just occurred and another guard, Fred Moore, had not yet come on duty, although he was in the store, preparing to go outside after he received final instructions. Everett Mosely was on patrol in the parking lot as was Miriam Lewis on the scooter. One other guard, who normally would have been on duty that day, was transferred to another store to fill an illness vacancy.
Lawrence Williams, a 17-year Schweg-mann employee, head of uniformed security for the entire chain since 1984 and the person responsible for hiring and training uniformed guards, testified that he had served as a military policeman in the armed services. He later received his college degree in safety engineering in 1982. He continued his education in security by attending seminars and taking classes at local vo-tech schools while working for Schwegmann. He explained that uniformed security officers were briefed on company policies and applicable criminal statutes as well as their duties and responsibilities in patrolling the parking lots. There was continuing instruction and periodic written testing to gauge the security officers' understanding and retention of store policies. Weekly safety meetings were held in which incident reports or records of any "happenings" on the premises, were reviewed in an attempt to better station or position personnel to counter problems in the parking lots. The guards were instructed to move constantly, patrol in a random fashion so that prospective perpetrators could not predict where the officers would turn next and to investigate any suspicious activity in the lots.
Both Vindigni and Williams testified they were inside the store at the time of the shooting. Terry Thomas, Everett Mosely, Miriam Lewis and Fred Moore all testified, basically verifying previous testimony concerning training procedures, job duties and descriptions of the security hierarchy. Further, Thomas and Moore confirmed that they were in the store at the time of the shooting; while Mosely pinpointed his location in the west side of the parking lot, "not far from" the site of the murder.
Miriam Lewis told the Court she was operating the scooter during the time of the armed robbery and murder and that she had in fact passed the area of the shooting only minutes before and did not notice any suspicious people in the area. Plaintiffs argue that the security personnel were negligent by being absent from the area, but the record does not support those arguments. Rather, it shows that Ms. Lewis drove the scooter to the front of the store to take a break and deliver the scooter to the person relieving her, Fred Moore. To insure alert effective security, the guards changed shifts and took breaks. It was unfortunate that during the necessary changing of the personnel, the shooting occurred, but there was not a breach of Schwegmann's duty to provide a reasonably safe place to shop.
Although Schwegmann may not be liable for breach of a duty to warn or to protect, Schwegmann may be liable under general negligence law for the negligent acts of its employees, through respondeat superior, La. C.C. art. 2320. This argument was not fully considered in the trial court because Plaintiffs did not allege it. See Plaintiffs' petition, VI(a) through (f). (f.n. 1). In this court however, Plaintiffs now argue general negligence, that is, they contend that once Schwegmann assumed the duty to protect it must do so without negligence, meaning that Schwegmann is liable for negligent acts of its employees in performing their assumed duty to protect Mrs. Dye. Plaintiffs once again rely on Hams, supra., this time correctly, because Harris supports Plaintiffs' general proposition that a duty once assumed must be carried out prudently — without negligence. Therefore the question we now consider is whether Schwegmann's employees acted negligently while providing security, and if so, is Schwegmann liable under a duty risk analysis.
Even when considering vague allegations raised in argument of employee negligence, the first question is whether those alleged acts of negligence meet the cause-in-fact test. Did the negligence of Schweg-mann's security guards cause the death of Mrs. Dye? We find that Plaintiffs have not proven that it is more probable than not that if the security guards had acted differently this would have prevented the murder of Mrs. Dye.
Plaintiffs' experts agreed with defense experts — the primary purpose of a security guard is deterrence of crime by a visible presence. Security guards are not policemen. They cannot prevent all harm, nor can they physically keep potential criminals away from the premises.
Willie Jones, who was employed by Norco Construction Company and who was helping remove gasoline storage tanks on the parking lot, was close to the scene. He testified that he saw a Schwegmann security guard in this area four or five minutes before Mrs. Dye opened the trunk of her car. That guard was driving a motor scooter and passed the row of cars where Mrs. Dye's car was parked, turned and headed up another aisle in the direction of the store, to where Schwegmann's tire and battery shop is located. Jones testified that the guard passed Mrs. Dye's car just moments before Kyles committed the brutal murder. Tr. Vol. Ill at pp. 11-13. His testimony is credible and persuasive. He stated that he was working near Chef Menteur Highway when he observed the robbery 50 to 60 feet away. He further said guards had passed the area at 15 minute intervals that day.
Considering Jones's testimony, it is unlikely that more security guards would have deterred a determined criminal like Curtis Kyles from the robbery and ultimately from the murder. Plaintiffs discount this testimony, but he was Plaintiffs witness, and they relied on Jones's testimony to establish other facts. Thus we do not find that cause-in-fact was proven by a preponderance of the evidence.
Even if cause in fact is assumed, the above facts show that there was not a breach of duty. In an effort to deter criminal activity, Schwegmann's security force was highly and regularly visible in these parking lots. It would be impractical to employ a security force so large that every aisle would be insured of safety at every moment. Based on testimony by the Schwegmann personnel, and by the independent eyewitness, it is clear that Schwegmann performed the assumed duty of providing security with due care. At 2:20 p.m., in the middle of the afternoon, in broad daylight, a calculating criminal took advantage of the time he had between the passing of the security guard patrols to commit a robbery, which resulted in a murder. Security cannot protect from every crime, and the performance of a duty with due care will not protect from this type of crime in every case. Our review of the facts lead us to conclude that Schwegmann discharged its duty in a reasonable manner calculated to protect its patrons from criminal assault.
Judgement is hereby rendered in favor of the defendant, Schwegmann Giant Super Markets, Inc. and against Robert Dye, Robert Dye, II, and Lowell Dye, dismissing all claims.
BYRNES, J., concurs with WARD, J.
LANDRIEU, J., concurs with reasons.
KLEES and CIACCIO, JJ., dissent.