Case Name: STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Adam Paul RINEHART, Defendant and Appellant
Court: South Dakota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: South Dakota
Decision Date: 2000-10-18
Citations: 617 N.W.2d 842
Docket Number: No. 20967
Parties: STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Adam Paul RINEHART, Defendant and Appellant.
Judges: [¶ 13.] KONENKAMP, and GILBERTSON, Justices, concur.
Reporter: North Western Reporter 2d
Volume: 617
Pages: 842–848

Head Matter:
2000 SD 135
STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Adam Paul RINEHART, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 20967.
Supreme Court of South Dakota.
Considered on Briefs Oct. 21, 1999.
Decided Oct. 18, 2000.
Mark Barnett, Attorney General, Michele K. Bennett, Assistant Attorney General, Pierre, for plaintiff and appellee.
Timothy W. Bjorkman and Mike C. Fink of Bjorkman Law Offices, Bridgewater, for defendant and appellant.

Opinion:
MILLER, Chief Justice
[¶ 1.] Following a court trial, Adam Paul Rinehart was found guilty of DUI and third offense DUI. We affirm.
FACTS
[¶ 2.] At 1:05 a.m. on July 3, 1998, Officer DeBoer saw Rinehart driving south on Sertoma Avenue near its intersection with 26th Street in southwest Sioux Falls, South Dakota. The posted speed limit was 40 miles per hour.
[¶ 3.] DeBoer followed Rinehart's car and paced its speed for six blocks. He estimated that Rinehart's speed was between 20 and 25 miles per hour. DeBoer did not observe any traffic violations.
[¶ 4.] DeBoer activated his red lights and stopped Rinehart's vehicle. The slow speed of Rinehart's vehicle raised concerns for DeBoer that the driver might have a medical problem such as a stroke. "My whole intention," DeBoer testified, "was to stop him and see if he was all right." Of secondary concern was the fact that in DeBoer's experience, driving under the speed limit "could" be an indicator of a possible drunk driver.
[¶ 5.] When DeBoer approached Rine-hart he detected the odor of alcohol and noted his bloodshot, watery eyes. Following field sobriety tests, DeBoer arrested Rinehart for driving under the influence, a violation of SDCL 32-23-1.
ISSUE
[¶ 6.] Did the trial court err when it denied Rinehart's motion to suppress the evidence obtained following the stop of Rinehart's vehicle?
[¶ 7.] In Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 2528, 37 L.Ed.2d 706, 715 (1973) the United States Supreme Court observed that local police officers "frequently investigate vehicle accidents in which there is no claim of criminal liability and engage in what, for want of a better term, may be described as community caretaking functions, totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute." Consequently "[ujnder appropriate circumstances a law enforcement officer may be justified in stopping a vehicle to provide assistance, without needing any reasonable basis to suspect criminal activity." State v. Brown, 509 N.W.2d 69, 71 (N.D.1993). If a police officer has a demonstrable reason to be lieve that a driver may be unfit to drive for medical or other reasons, a temporary stop is justified for the limited purpose of investigating the person's well-being. McDonald v. State, 759 S.W.2d 784, 785 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988).
[¶ 8.] In this case the trial court did not err in denying Rinehart's suppression motion. Before stopping Rinehart, De-Boer observed his excessively slow speed at 1:09 a.m. which raised, in his experience and knowledge, concerns over the driver's medical condition. As the court in State v. Garbin, 325 N.J.Super. 521, 739 A.2d 1016, 1019 (N.J.Super.A.D.1999) noted:
A police officer's observation of a person operating a motor vehicle in a manner that indicates something may be wrong with the vehicle or its driver is one recognized circumstance in which the police may take appropriate action in the performance of their community care-taking responsibilities. For example, in State v. Martinez, 260 N.J.Super. 75, 78, 615 A.2d 279 (App.Div.1992) we stated that a police officer's observations of a motor vehicle being driven at less than 10 m.p.h. "suggest[ed] a number of objectively reasonable concerns," including that "something might be wrong with the car . [or] its driver." Consequently, we held that these concerns justified "the minimal intrusion involved in a simple inquiry stop." Id. Similarly, in State v. Goetaski, 209 N.J.Super. 362, 507 A.2d 751 (App.Div.1986), we upheld the validity under the community care-taking doctrine of a stop of a person who was driving slowly on the shoulder of a state highway with his left turn directional signal flashing. We concluded that observations of such unusual operation of a vehicle provided a reasonable basis for the police officer to believe that there was something wrong with the vehicle or its driver. Id. at 366, 507 A.2d 751.
[¶ 9.] Here, Rinehart was traveling 20-25 miles per hour late at night on a deserted street with a posted speed limit of 40 miles per hour. There were no extraneous factors such as other traffic or adverse weather conditions attributing to his slow pace in any way. Under these circumstances, Officer DeBoer was justified in assuming that something else, such as a medical emergency or an automotive malfunction, may be occurring. In fact, he indicated that he was initially more concerned that Rinehart might have a possible medical problem, rather than having a suspicion that he might be intoxicated. De-Boer stated that his whole intention in stopping Rinehart was to see if he was all right.
[¶ 10.] We recognize that "[t]he 'community caretaking' exception should be cautiously and narrowly applied in order to minimize the risk that it will be abused or used as a pretext for conducting an investigatory search for criminal evidence." Com. v. Waters, 20 Va.App. 285, 456 S.E.2d 527, 530 (1995). In this case, however, the trial court did not find fault with DeBoer's motives and was able to judge the officer's credibility as he testified. See Geraets v. Halter, 1999 SD 11, ¶ 18, 588 N.W.2d 231, 234 (stating "the trial court is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses, weigh the conflicting evidence and observe the witnesses and evidence first hand.")
[¶ 11.] Based on the circumstances presented, DeBoer, as part of his role in community earetaking, was justified in stopping Rinehart to make sure everything was all right. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Rinehart's motion to suppress.
[¶ 12.] The judgment is affirmed.
[¶ 13.] KONENKAMP, and GILBERTSON, Justices, concur.
[¶ 14.] SABERS and AMUNDSON, Justices, dissent.