Case Name: Brian Edward ROBINSON v. STATE of Arkansas
Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 2008-04-24
Citations: 373 Ark. 305
Docket Number: CR 07-887
Parties: Brian Edward ROBINSON v. STATE of Arkansas
Judges: Brown and Imber, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Arkansas Reports
Volume: 373
Pages: 305–315

Head Matter:
Brian Edward ROBINSON v. STATE of Arkansas
CR 07-887
283 S.W.3d 558
Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered April 24, 2008
[Rehearing denied May 29, 2008. ]
Lilly & Deprow, PLC, by: Grant C. DeProw, for appellant.
Dustin McDaniel, Att’y Gen., by: Brad Newman, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
Glaze and Brown, JJ., would grant rehearing.

Opinion:
Jim Gunter, Justice.
Appellant Brian Robinson was convicted in a jury trial of first-degree murder, a Class Y felony and a violation of Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-102 (Repl. 2006), and vehicular fleeing, a Class A felony and a violation of Ark. Code Ann. § 5-54-125 (Repl. 2005). For these convictions, Robinson was.sentenced by a Randolph County jury to life imprisonment in the Arkansas Department of Correction. Appellant brings his appeal and argues that the circuit court erred in refusing to suppress Robinson's statement to Arkansas State Police. We reverse and remand.
On October 17, 2006, the victim, Brian Wilbanks, and Cheryl Crow arrived at a residence, which she shared with Robinson, on Bucksnort Road near Pocahontas. As Crow and Wilbanks sat in Wilbanks's pickup truck, Robinson confronted the couple. An argument ensued, and Robinson shot Wilbanks. Robinson then fled the scene in his vehicle. Robinson's flight escalated into a police chase. The chase ended when a patrol car was hit by Robinson's car. Robinson ran from his car and was apprehended by Randolph County officers in the woods.
After the pursuit on foot, Sheriff Brent Earley took Robinson into custody and read Robinson his Miranda rights from a pre-printed card. Robinson indicated that he understood his rights. Earley asked, "Why are you running from the police?" Robinson responded, "I don't want to say anything right now." Earley then took him down the hill and asked Robinson why he would "shoot somebody over a woman." Robinson replied that "this goes back a lot further than what you understand." Winded from the chase, Earley turned Robinson over to a couple of deputies and went back into the woods to look for additional evidence. The officers put Robinson in the passenger seat of a patrol vehicle at the scene of Robinson's arrest.
Special Agent Wendall Jines confirmed with Robinson that he had been given his Miranda rights and that he understood those rights. According to Jines's testimony, he approached Robinson and said, "I need to talk to you about what happened. Okay? Do you understand your rights as the sheriff advised you earlier?" Robinson replied "no" at first but added, "Yes, sir. Yes, sir. I have." Jines then taped Robinson's statement while the two individuals sat in the patrol vehicle at the scene. Jines further testified that once Robinson gave his statement, he never requested an attorney and never attempted to end the conversation. Robinson then gave a second statement later that morning at the Randolph County Sheriff s Department.
On November 9, 2006, Robinson filed a motion to suppress. In his motion, he requested a Denno hearing pursuant to Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), and Ark. Code Ann. § 16-89-107 (Repl. 2005). On February 26, 2007, the circuit court held a hearing on Robinson's motion to suppress and denied his motion, ruling that the first statement was to be admitted at his trial. On March 2, 2007, a Randolph County jury convicted Robinson of first-degree murder and vehicular fleeing, and he received a sentence of life imprisonment. He now brings his appeal.
For his first point on appeal, Robinson argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement given after he was apprehended by police on the night of the murder. Specifically, Robinson contends that Sheriff Earley and Special Agent Jines violated Ark. R. Crim. P. 4.5 (2007) by improperly refusing to cease interrogation. In response, the State argues that the circuit court properly denied Robinson's motion to suppress the statement that he gave to police. The State contends that Robinson never invoked his right to remain silent at any time during his interview. Further, the State counters that there was no evidence of any coercive behavior by any officer that suggests that Robinson made a statement against his will.
We clarified the appropriate standard of review for cases involving a trial court's ruling on the voluntariness of a confession in Grillot v. State, 353 Ark. 294, 107 S.W.3d 136 (2003), where we stated: "We make an independent determination based upon the totality of the circumstances, and the ruling will only be reversed if it is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence." Grillot, 353 Ark. at 310, 107 S.W.3d at 145.
A person subject to custodial interrogation must first be informed of his right to remain silent and right to counsel under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). "Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74; see also Ark. R. Crim. P. 4.5 (2007). An indication that a defendant wishes to remain silent is an invocation of his Miranda rights. Once the right to remain silent is invoked, it must be "scrupulously honored." State v. Pittman, 360 Ark. 273, 276, 200 S.W.3d 893, 896 (2005); Whitaker v. State, 348 Ark. 90, 95, 71 S.W.3d 567, 570 (2002) (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479). The meaning of "scrupulously honored" was discussed in James v. Arizona, 469 U.S. 990, 992-93 (1984), where the United States Supreme Court stated:
To ensure that officials scrupulously honor this right, we have established in Edwards v. Arizona, [451 U.S. 477 (1981)], and Oregon v. Bradshaw, supra, the stringent rule that an accused who has invoked his Fifth Amendment right to assistance of counsel cannot be subject to official custodial interrogation unless and until the accused (1) "initiates" further discussions relating to the investigation, and (2) makes a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel under the [waiver] standard of Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938), and its progeny. See Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 104 S.Ct. 1338, 79 L.Ed.2d 579 (1984).
Unwarned statements or statements improperly taken after the invocation of the right to remain silent or the right to counsel must be excluded from the State's case in chief to ensure compliance with Miranda's dictates. See Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344 (1990). In Standridge v. State, 329 Ark. 473, 479, 951 S.W.2d 299, 301 (1997), we noted that "[w]e see no distinction between the right to counsel and the right to remain silent with respect to the manner in which it must be effected." Id. at 479, 951 S.W.2d at 301. "If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475. This high bar on the State's burden of proving waiver of the right to remain silent is best understood as a result of the view that courts are to "indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights." Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 633 (1986) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
With this precedent in mind, we turn to the present appeal. At the outset, we note that this case does not present an issue regarding the right to counsel, but rather, Robinson argues that, pursuant to Rule 4.5, the circuit court should have suppressed his statement to Earley because he invoked his right to remain silent when he indicated, "I don't want to say anything right now." Thus, once a defendant is read his or her Miranda rights, the relevant inquiry is whether a defendant's initial response "indicated in any manner" under Miranda and Rule 4.5 an invocation of the right to remain silent or an invocation of the right to counsel. If so, the interrogation must immediately cease whenever a suspect states that he or she wants counsel, Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474, or when he or she invokes the right to remain silent, pursuant to Miranda and Rule 4.5.
First, we note that neither the record reflects nor the State argues the existence of a waiver. We agree with Robinson's argument that, under the standard set forth in Miranda, he invoked his right to remain silent. Unlike the appellant in Standridge, supra, who said, "I ain't ready to talk," but immediately continued answering questions of the police officers, Appellant in this case indicated, "I don't want to say anything right now," immediately upon being advised of his Miranda rights. Robinson's response was an invocation of his right to remain silent and an initial indication that he did not wish to be questioned. Having invoked his Miranda rights "in any manner" under both Miranda, supra, and our Rule 4.5, law enforcement was obligated to "scrupulously honor" his assertion of his rights and should have refrained from continuing to ask Robinson about the crime. James, supra.
Second, we note that, after a delay of walking down the hill, Earley asked Robinson why he would "shoot somebody over a woman," and Robinson replied that "this goes back a lot further than what you understand." At the suppression hearing, Earley testified that he and Robinson "had had some conversation within that time-frame after we got him down the hill." That conversation, however, was not initiated by Robinson. See Edwards, supra. Moreover, any additional questioning by Jines should have taken place only if Robinson had initiated discussion with the police and had knowingly and intelligently waived his rights. See Otis v. State, 364 Ark. 151, 161, 217 S.W.3d 839, 844 (2005). Therefore, under these circumstances, we hold that, under Miranda and Rule 4.5, the officer should have ceased his interrogation after Robinson stated, "I don't want to say anything right now." Because we conclude that Robinson invoked his right to remain silent during his first statement with Earley and never waived that right, and because his motion to suppress included "[a]ny [admission or [cjonfession," we refuse to delve into the merits of his arguments in his first point regarding his subsequent two statements given to Jines.
Therefore, based upon the foregoing reasons, as well as our standard of review in viewing the totality of the circumstances, we hold that the circuit court erroneously denied Robinson's motion to suppress. Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court's ruling and remand for a new trial, which excludes Robinson's statements to Earley and Jines. Because we dispose of Robinson's case on his first point on appeal, we decline to address his second point on appeal regarding the issue of whether his statement was a product of police intimidation and coercion.
Pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-3(h) (2007), the record in this case has been reviewed for all other objections, motions, and requests made by either party, which were decided adversely to Appellant, and no prejudicial error has been found. See, e.g., Gillard v. State, 372 Ark. 98, 270 S.W.3d 836 (2008).
Reversed and remanded.
Brown and Imber, JJ., concur.
Glaze, J., dissents.