Case Name: Henry Grattan Donnelly, Respondent, v. Blanche M. Donnelly, Appellant
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1900-04
Citations: 50 A.D. 453
Docket Number: 
Parties: Henry Grattan Donnelly, Respondent, v. Blanche M. Donnelly, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 50
Pages: 453–459

Head Matter:
Henry Grattan Donnelly, Respondent, v. Blanche M. Donnelly, Appellant.
Action for divorce —power of the court to set aside a verdict exonerating the wife.
The judge presiding at the trial of an action brought by a husband to obtain an absolute divorce from his wife, has power to set aside a verdict exonerating the wife from the charge of adultery; but such power should not be exercised except under circumstances which demonstrate that the verdict is the result of sympathy or of some other improper influence, or has been reached in flagrant disregard of clear and convincing proof furnished by ttfe uncontradicted testimony of disinterested witnesses.
Goodrich, P. J., and Woodward, J., dissented upon the ground that the evidence warranted the trial court in setting aside the verdict.
Appeal by the defendant, Blanche M. Donnelly, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, made at the Richmond Trial Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Richmond on the 13th day of November, 1899, as orders and directs that the verdict rendered by the jury be set aside and a new trial be granted upon the ground that said verdict was against the weight of evidence.
The action was brought to obtain an absolute divorce, and upon the trial framed issues were submitted to the jury. •
George M. Pinnexj, Jr., for the appellant.
Edward 8. Griffing, for the respondent.

Opinion:
Willard Bartlett, J.:
After reading and re-reading the testimony in this case, I find it impossible to agree with the conclusion of the learned trial judge that the verdict of the jury, which acquitted the defendant of the charge of adultery, was against the weight of evidence. That' her guilt was a natural inference from the circumstances narrated by some of the witnesses must be conceded ; but it seems to me that the statements of these witnesses might well be discredited by the jury in view of their admitted character as amateur detectives. The whole tone and tenor of the fair and impartial charge in which the issues were submitted to the jury for their determination must be regarded as convincing evidence that the judge deemed the proof at that time capable of supporting a verdict either way. Had he then thought otherwise, it is hardly possible that some stronger indication of his views should not be discoverable in his reference to the facts than is disclosed by the language of the charge.
I think he was clearly right in holding that the answers to the questions of fact depended upon the estimate to be formed of the truthfulness of the plaintiff's witnesses; and this matter was one wholly for the determination of the jury. In a case of this character, where an accused wife has been exonerated by a jury from a charge of adultery^ we have not been referred to any previous instance in which the court has set aside the finding; and, though the power to do so doubtless exists, I do not think its exercise should be sanctioned upon this record or except under circumstances which demonstrate that the verdict is the result of sympathy or of some other improper influence, or has been reached in flagrant disregard of clear and convincing proof furnished by the uncontradicted testimony of disinterested witnesses. To uphold the order under review would be virtually to convict the defendant of adultery by judicial decision after a jury, upon conflicting evidence, had pronounced her innocent.
I think the.order appealed from should be reversed.
All concurred, except Goodrich, P. J., who read for affirmance, with whom Woodward, J., concurred.