Case Name: ARROW CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC. v. AMERICAN EMPLOYERS INSURANCE COMPANY et al.
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1973-02-01
Citations: 273 So. 2d 582
Docket Number: No. 9189
Parties: ARROW CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC. v. AMERICAN EMPLOYERS INSURANCE COMPANY et al.
Judges: Before LANDRY, TUCKER and PICKETT, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 273
Pages: 582–588

Head Matter:
ARROW CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC. v. AMERICAN EMPLOYERS INSURANCE COMPANY et al.
No. 9189.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
Feb. 1, 1973.
Rehearing Denied March 14, 1973.
Richard B. Crowell and Michael S. Tudor, Alexandria, for appellant.
W. Leonard Werner, Baton Rouge, for appellees.
Before LANDRY, TUCKER and PICKETT, JJ.

Opinion:
LANDRY, Judge.
Defendants, Mark C. Smith and Sons, Inc. (Owner), Mark C. Smith, Jr., Mark C. Smith, III, and Succession of Bilwood Smith (Contractor), and American Employers Insurance Co. (Surety), (Appellants), appeal a judgment in favor of plaintiff, Arrow Construction Company, Inc. (Appellee), for the rental value of machinery and equipment furnished by Ap-pellee to a subcontractor on a housing project undertaken by Contractor for Owner and bonded by Surety. We reverse.
The contract was for a 250 unit housing complex. Contractor, the alter ego of Owner, subcontracted the entire project to Tudor Construction Company (Tudor). Certain site preparation work required was re-subcontracted by Tudor to Mason Con struction Company (Mason) to whom Ap-pellee furnished manned earth moving equipment. Appellee obtained judgment against Owner, Contractor and Surety in the sum of $1,000.00, plus $100.00 attorney's fees. The trial court rejected Appel-lee's claim for the sum of $52.00 spent in recording a lien against subject property, and also rejected all of Appellee's demands against Tudor who was also named defendant. Notwithstanding rejection of Appel-lee's claims against Tudor, said defendant has joined in the appeal taken by Owner, Contractor and Surety. Plaintiff-Appellee has neither appealed nor answered the appeal taken by Appellants.
ON MOTION TO DISMISS THE APPEAL
Appellee has moved to dismiss this appeal on the ground that while Owner, Contractor, Surety and Tudor have appealed, and their names appear as principals on the appeal bond, the bond was in fact signed as principal only by Tudor against whom no judgment was rendered. Appel-lee contends that since Tudor was exonerated from liability, there is no judgment from which it could appeal, therefore, Tudor was not an appellant since it was a stranger to this appeal. On this premise, Appellee argues there was in effect a failure to file an appeal bond herein by the only parties entitled to appeal consequently this court is without jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
We find Appellee's contention without merit. This is not an instance in which there was a total failure to file an appeal bond, or in which an appeal bond was untimely filed. Here a bond was timely filed. The contention made by Appellee herein addresses itself to the validity of the appeal bond, not the failure to post bond, or the untimely posting of bond. The question posed is whether the bond actually filed meets the requirements of law.
LSA-C.C.P. art. 2088 provides, inter alia, that after an appeal has been perfected, jurisdiction remains in the trial court to ". . . consider objections to the form, substance, and sufficiency of the appeal bond, and permit the curing thereof, as provided in Articles 5123, 5124, and 5126." Article 5123, above, declares that a party wishing to test the validity or sufficiency of an appeal bond shall rule into court the party furnishing the security to show cause why the security should not be ruled insufficient or invalid. Article 5124, above, prescribes in detail the manner and delay during which an Appellant may furnish supplemental security.
Our jurisprudence is well established to the effect that an appeal will not be dismissed because the appeal bond is invalid or insufficient unless the validity or sufficiency of the bond is first contested in the trial court, and Appellant has been afforded opportunity to supply the insufficiency or cure the invalidity. Blaize v. Cazezu, 208 La. 1081, 24 So.2d 147, and cases therein cited. See also, Bertrand v. Home Indemnity Company, 202 So.2d 670 (La.App.).
Prior to the effective date of LSA-C.C.P. arts. 5123 and 5124, Act 112 of 1916 similarly provided for service of notice upon Appellant of an alleged defect in an appeal bond. The statute also required that Appellant be afforded opportunity to correct a defect and furnish new or supplemental bond. The clear import of all the above statutory provisions is that jurisdiction to try an alleged insufficiency or invalidity of an appeal bond is vested and remains exclusively in the trial courts. Our review of the cases interpreting both the old and new statutes discloses that the jurisprudence has in effect confirmed the concept that the issue is jurisdictional, and that jurisdiction in such instances is vested exclusively in the trial court.
We hold, therefore, that jurisdiction to test the sufficiency or validity of a timely filed appeal bond rests exclusively in the trial courts. It follows that appellate courts are without jurisdiction to initially try such an issue. In these cases, the jurisdiction of appellate courts is limited to review of the trial court's action. Blaize v. Cazezu, above.
The motion to dismiss this appeal is denied.