Case Name: Shirley & Holland et al. v. T. H. Conner et al.
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1904-05-19
Citations: 98 Tex. 63
Docket Number: No. 1229
Parties: Shirley & Holland et al. v. T. H. Conner et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 98
Pages: 63–67

Head Matter:
Shirley & Holland et al. v. T. H. Conner et al.
No. 1229.
Decided May 19, 1904.
1.—Certifying Question—Mandamus.
Distinguishing the ruling of the Court of Civil Appeals in this case from Borden & Antill v. De Tulle M. Co., 74 S. W. Rep., 788, it is held that there is no such conflict between them as to justify a mandamus requiring the Court of Civil Appeals to certify to the Supreme Court the -question arising on defendant’s plea of privilege, the contract here sued on being in writing and performable in the precinct where defendant was sued. (Pp. 64, 65.)
ON MOTION EOR REHEARING.
2.—Mandamus—Pleading.
Facts entitling a complainant to writ of mandamus should be directly alleged, and not left to inference, nor to the allegations of a motion for rehearing on refusal of leave to file. (Pp. 65, 66.)
3.—Same—Verification.
Application to the Supreme Court for writ of mandamus should be verified by affidavit. (P. 66.)
Original application to the Supreme Court for leave to file petition for mandamus to require the Court of Civil Appeals to certify a question.
The opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals in this case was as follows:
Speer, Associate Justice.—The assignments presenting the question of the alleged error of the court in refusing to sustain the appellant’s plea of personal privilege to be sued in Denton County, in the precinct of their residence, are overruled, because we arc of opinion that the principles announced in Seley v. Williams, 50 S. W. Rep., 399, 20 Texas Civ. App., 405; Darragh v. O’Connor, 69 S. W. Rep., 644, and Callender, Holder & Co. v. Short, 9 Texas Ct. Rep., 85, are conclusive against appellants upon this issue. It is true these cases are shipper’s -order cases, but the circumstances attending the present transaction indicate to our minds the intention upon the part of the parties to the present controversy that the title to the cotton seed should not pass until actual delivery in Gainesville, as fully as though the seed had been consigned shipper’s order. We think the letters, and espécially the bills of lading with drafts attached, evidence such intention, and are sufficient at least to support the court’s judgment. The language of exception 4, article 1585, Bevised Statutes, and of exception 5, article 1194, is substantially the same, and neither, in our opinion, requires an express promise in writing promising performance in a county or precinct, other than that of the residence of the defendant, to fix the venue against such nonresident. We are also of opinion that the principle announced in Gimbel v. Gomprecht, 35 S. W. Rep., 470, 89 Texas, 497, has no application to the pleadings in this case upon the question of jurisdiction of the subject matter, but that the court rightly retained jurisdiction, and that the judgment should be affirmed.
Opinion delivered March 26, 1904.
Cofer & Thomason, for relator.
The holding and opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals for the Second District in considering the parol evidence and circumstances attending the transaction in fixing venue, when the writings contained no promise as to the mode or place of performance, is in direct conflict with the decision of the Court of Civil Appeals for the Fourth District in the case of Borden & Antill v. Le Tulle Mercantile Co., 74 S. W. Rep., 788, where it is held the venue act requires "that the defendant must so contract by writing executed by himself or by his authority, and excludes consideration of all agreements existing in parol or arising by implication.”

Opinion:
GAINES, Chief Justice.
This is a motion to file a petition for a writ of mandamus, in which it is sought to compel the Chief Justice and associate justices of the Court of Civil Appeals for the Second. Supreme Judicial District to certify a question of law to this court under the Act of May 9, 1899. That act makes it the duty of a court of civil appeals, when its opinion is in conflict with the decision of any other court of civil appeals, to certify the question for the determination of the Supreme Court. The question which the relators seek to have certified arose in the Court of Civil Appeals for the Second District in a cause entitled Shirley & Holland v. Gainesville Cotton Seed Oil, Gin and Mill Company, which was appealed to that court from the "County Court of Cooke County and in which the judgment of the trial court was affirmed. The suit originated in the Justice Court of Gainesville Precinct of Cooke County.
The question was, should the defendants' plea of privilege to be sued in the county and precinct of their residence have been sustained ? The Court of Civil Appeals held that the trial court did not err in overruling that plea. The relators claim that this decision is in conflict with that of the Court of Civil Appeals for the Fourth District in the case of Borden & Antill v. Le Tulle Mercantile Company (74 S. W. Rep., 788); but we are of the opinion that there is no conflict.
In the present case, the facts which gave rise to the cause of action are as follows: The Gainesville Cotton Seed Oil, Gin and Mill Company wrote to Shirley, one of the defendants, offering $17 per ton for cotton seed delivered at Gainesville. Shirley replied by letter: "You can book me for two ears at that price." Hnder that contract Shirley & Holland, as partners, shipped to the oil company at Gainesville a quantity of cotton seed in bulk and drew a draft upon the latter for the price with a bill of lading attached. The draft was paid upon presentation. Two other shipments were made under the contract and were paid for upon drafts drawn in the same manner. In each shipment the quantity of the seed fell short of that drawn for, and for these shortages the oil company brought suit against the sellers in the Justice Court in Gainesville. The defendants being residents of Denton County pleaded that it was their privilege to be sued in that county. That was the question in the present case.
In the ease of Borden v. Mercantile Company the following were the facts: The appellants were residents of Harris County, but had a rice plantation in Matagorda County. It seems the appellees were doing business in the latter county at Bay City. The appellants bought supplies for their farm from appellees, and it also seems that the suit was for a balance on that account. There was no contract in writing about the matter save the orders of the appellants' foreman, which contained no promise to pay in Matagorda County. The only evidence tending to show any promise or any expectation that the goods were to be paid for in that county was the fact thaif the accounts made out by the appellees contained the statement: "Terms thirty days; all accounts payable at Bay City." Clearly this was no promise by appellants to do anything. In that case the court sustained the' plea of privilege and dismissed the suit.
In the present case there was a promise in writing to deliver the cotton seed in Gainesville, and the suit was for a failure to deliver according to the promise.
It is apparent, therefore, that there is a broad distinction between the two cases, and that the decision in the one in no wise conflicts with the ruling in the other.
There being, in our opinion, no conflict between the two decisions, the motion to file the petition .for the writ of mandamus is overruled.
Overruled.