Case Name: George W. Nichols v. John F. Gordon, Executor of Alfred Grinage
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1860-10
Citations: 25 Supp. Tex. 109
Docket Number: 
Parties: George W. Nichols v. John F. Gordon, Executor of Alfred Grinage.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 25 Supp.
Pages: 109–113

Head Matter:
George W. Nichols v. John F. Gordon, Executor of Alfred Grinage.
Where the wife joined her husband in the execution of the mortgage of her separate property, but made no acknowledgment separate and apart from her husband, as required by the act of the 3d February, 1841, and substantially re-enacted 30th April, 1846, (Paschal’s Dig., Art. 1003, Note 427,) it was error to admit the mortgage in evidence upon a mere affidavit of a subscribing witness, made for the purpose of registration. (Paschal’s Dig., ' Art. 4982.)
The statute requiring a separate acknowledgment of the wife cannot be disregarded.
Appeal from Guadaloupe. The case was tried before the Hon. A. W. Terrell, one of the district judges.
Gordon, administrator of Grinage, sued George W. Nichols and his wife, Bachael S. Nichols, upon a covenant of warranty of a tract of land, averring an eviction of one-fourth of the land, and praying for a foreclosure of mortgage upon certain slaves. The deed was signed by Rachael S. Nichols and her husband, the execution proven by a witness, but not acknowledged by the wife, in strict conformity to the statutes for acknowledging conveyances of separate property, and there was the same proof as to the mortgage, but there was no certificate of acknowledgment by the wife whatever. The defendant answered various matters which are not material to be noticed. Verdict in judgment for plaintiff, and a decree of foreclosure. When the mortgage was .offered in evidence, the defendant, Rachael S. Nichols, objected that it had not been acknowledged by her in accordance with the statute, there being no separate acknowledgment by her, which objection was overruled by the court, to which the defendants excepted. The case turned upon this point.
I A. Geo. W. Paschal, for appellant.
—The statutes ■ requiring a married woman to convey in a particular way have been already construed strictly in their favor, and against such conveyances. And where there is a departure from the statute, or a want of that strictness, either in acknowledgment or recording the deed, it is not the deed of the wife. (Philips et ux. v. Greene, 3 A. K. Marshall, 12; State v. Louis, 1 Monroe, 49; Roberts’ Heirs v. Elliott’s heirs, 3 Monroe, 397; Smith v. White, 1 Monroe, 19; Prewitt v. Graves, 5 J. J. Marshall, 124; Applegate v. Gray, 9 Dana, 215; Hunt v. Owings, 4 Monroe, 21; McConnell v. Brown, Littell’s Select Cases, 464; Womack v. Huges, Ib., 292.)
And in Elliott v. Piersol, 1 Peters, 338, it was held, that by the. principles of the common law a married woman can in general do no act to bind her; she is said to be sub potestate viri, and subject to his will and control. Her acts are not like those of infants and some other disabled persons, voidable only, but are, in general, void ab initio.
The Kentucky statutes and cases are then reviewed and affirmed. And see also Davis v. Fairbairn, 3 How., 636, which is cited and approved by this court in Sunberg v. Byron, 3 Tex., 417.
According to the current and strict principles of these decisions, the deed of the wife, being for her separate property, was a nullity; the mortgage to secure the payment was equally so; and therefore no action upon the warranty would lie against her.
The mortgage was subject to the same rule as to the execution of the deed; that is, it was not binding upon the wife without her separate acknowledgment. (Womack v. Womack, 8 Tex., 398.) This conclusion of course proceeds upon the hypothesis, that if the property in the land passed, the negroes, received in consideration of it, became the property of the wife, according to the repeated decisions of this court. But the property in the land did not pass, and therefore the true equity would have been to restore the land with rents, and the negroes with the hire.
Whatever may be said of the reasoning in the Womack case, the precedent is in favor of the defendant, and would favor the recision of the contract, and a mutual surrender of the property.
Some inquiries have been propounded as to the effect of Mrs. Nichols’ holding possession of the negroes. But there is nothing in the record which shows the fact, and the prayer of the petition and the judgment itself disclose an alternative which seems to render that doubtful.
The question as to whether the vendee had a lien upon the property, independently of the mortgage, depends upon the circumstances of the case. If the negroes came into her possession, and she still holds them, she should be required to restore them before she could obtain a recision of the contract.
J. J. Thornton, for the appellee,
argued, that if the acknowledgment of the wife was not in accordance with the statute, or if, as to the mortgage, she made no separate acknowledgment whatever, yet the execution of the deed might be proved by other evidence, for which he relied upon Womack v. Womack, 8 Tex., 397.

Opinion:
Roberts, J.
—If there is a cause of action stated in the petition, the verdict and judgment in this case must stand.
It is a suit against appellant, to recover an amount of money upon a warranty in a deed executed by her while femme covert, and to foreclose a mortgage upon two negroes, executed by her at the same time, to secure a title to the land described in the deed.
The petition alleges, that she and her husband bargained and sold, and conveyed the land by deed, " a copy of which deed of conveyance is hereunto annexed and herewith filed, marked exhibit A, and is prayed to be taken as a part of this petition; which deed was duly acknowledged and delivered by said George W. Nichols and Rachael S. Nichols to the said Grinage," (appellee's intestate.) The deed exhibited has attached to it a certificate of private and separate examination of the wife, which does not state that the deed was explained to her, and that she declared that she did not wish to retract it.
Although this case may be different in its facts from that of Nichols v. Stewart, in 15 Tex., 235, it is not necessary now to consider the questions arising upon the defects of the certificate, or whether or not they are such as may be obviated> by explanatory evidence; because the judgment is rendered foreclosing the mortgage, and that is made an exhibit of in the petition in the same way as the deed, and is no acknowledgment of the mortgage whatever by the wife, nor is there any allegation in the petition -that she acknowledged the mortgage to be her act and deed privately and apart from her husband, or in any manner whatever. There is attached to the mortgage exhibited an affidavit of a witness, proving the execution of it in the usual mode of making such proof, to authenticate the deed for recording it. The facts of this case, therefore, in relation to the mortgage, are materially different from those in the case of Boy v. Bremond, 22 Tex., 626. In that case, it was held that the allegation in the petition, that the mortgage was " duly acknowledged," would, under the circumstances of that case, be understood to mean, that it was acknowledged in the manner prescribed by the statute, so as to be legally binding on her. There is no such averment in this petition of her acknowledgment of the mortgage. The whole averment in reference to the mortgage is as follows, to wit: " That to secure the covenant of warranty of title in the aforesaid deed of conveyance, the said George W. Nichols and Bachael S. Nichols, his wife, on the 25th day of December, A. D. 1843, made, executed, and delivered unto the said Grinage a mortgage on said negro slaves, which mortgage is hereunto attached and herewith filed, marked exhibit B, and is prayed to be taken as a part of this petition." To recognize this as her deed, under such an allegation, would be to disregard altogether the necessity of the acknowledgment by a femme covert, as prescribed by law.
For this manifest defect in the cause of action, as presented in the petition, the judgment is
Beversed and the cause remanded.