Case Name: Diana BRADY, Shannon Sneeden, State of Florida, Department of Transportation and Broward County Expressway Authority, Appellants, v. STATE PAVING CORPORATION, a Pennsylvania corporation, Keith and Schnars, P.A., a Florida corporation, Frederic R. Harris, Inc., Kunde Sprecher and Associates, Inc. and Capeletti Brothers, Inc., Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1997-03-26
Citations: 693 So. 2d 612
Docket Number: Nos. 95-3380, 95-3472
Parties: Diana BRADY, Shannon Sneeden, State of Florida, Department of Transportation and Broward County Expressway Authority, Appellants, v. STATE PAVING CORPORATION, a Pennsylvania corporation, Keith and Schnars, P.A., a Florida corporation, Frederic R. Harris, Inc., Kunde Sprecher and Associates, Inc. and Capeletti Brothers, Inc., Appellees.
Judges: WARNER, J. and BARR, ROBBIE M., Associate Judge, concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 693
Pages: 612–615

Head Matter:
Diana BRADY, Shannon Sneeden, State of Florida, Department of Transportation and Broward County Expressway Authority, Appellants, v. STATE PAVING CORPORATION, a Pennsylvania corporation, Keith and Schnars, P.A., a Florida corporation, Frederic R. Harris, Inc., Kunde Sprecher and Associates, Inc. and Capeletti Brothers, Inc., Appellees.
Nos. 95-3380, 95-3472.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
March 26, 1997.
Rehearing and Clarification Denied May 29, 1997.
Joel S. Perwin of Podhurst, Orseck, Josefs-berg, Eaton, Meadow, Olin & Perwin, P.A., Miami, and the Law Offices of Diana Santa Maria, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for Appellants-Diana Brady and Shannon Sneeden.
Marianne A. Trussel, Assistant General Counsel and Thornton J. Williams, General Counsel, Tallahassee, for Appellant-State of Florida, Department of Transportation.
Richard A. Sherman and Rosemary B. Wilder of the Law Offices of Richard A. Sherman, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, and Lewis N. Jack, Jr. of Haddad, Josephs, Jack, Gaebe & Markarian, Coral Gables, for Appellee-State Paving Corporation.
Clifford Gorman of Peterson, Bernard, Vandenberg, Zei, Geisler & Martin, Fort Lauderdale, for Appellee-Keith and Schnars, P.A.
J. Philip Landsman and Michael A. Trinkler of Landsman & Villella, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for Appellee-Frederic R. Harris, Inc.
Madelyn Simon Lozano of Burd, Downs & Magathan, Miami, for Appellee-Kunde Sprecher and Associates, Inc.
Shelley H. Leinicke of Wicker, Smith, Tu-tan, O’Hara, McCoy, Graham & Ford, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for Appellee-Capeletti Brothers, Inc.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs were injured as a result of an accident on the Sawgrass Expressway when their car went into a puddle of water which caused it to go out of control and roll over. They sued the Department of Transportation (DOT), alleging that it knew or should have known of the dangerous condition. They also sued other defendants, the appellees, who were involved in the construction of the road, alleging that the condition was a latent defect. Plaintiffs and the DOT appeal a summary judgment in favor of those defendants based on Slavin v. Kay, 108 So.2d 462 (Fla.1958). We reverse.
In Slavin a sink fell from a wall in a motel bathroom and injured the plaintiff. The plaintiff sued the plumbing company for improper installation, and the motel for failing to maintain the premises in a safe condition. The trial court directed a verdict for both defendants, but the Florida Supreme Court reversed the directed verdict for the plumbing contractor and adopted a rule that a contractor remains liable for an injury caused by a latent defect after the owner has accepted the completed building. The court affirmed the directed verdict in favor of the owner because the defect was latent, and thus not discoverable by the owner.
Under Slavin, if the defect is not latent, the owner is charged with knowledge of it, and the contractor is relieved of liability because it is the owner's intervening negligence in not correcting it which is the proximate cause of the injury. An example of that situation was presented in Edward M. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Vaughn, 491 So.2d 551, 554 (Fla.1986), in which a road developed a two inch drop in the center of the pavement which caused a one car accident. In holding that the contractor could not be liable for an accident occurring after the DOT had accepted the road, the court explained: "The key to our holding in Slavin is the patentness of the defect or the owner's knowledge of the defect and the failure to remedy the defect...."
Although the trial court in this case did not explain why it granted summary judgment for the appellees involved in the construction, whom we shall refer to as the contractors, it appears to have done so because one of plaintiffs' experts gave an opinion in his deposition that the dangerous condition was open and obvious. The contractors argued that, in light of this testimony, under Slavin they could not be held liable because the DOT had accepted the road prior to the accident and the defect was patent.
The testimony of plaintiffs' expert, however, was contradicted by evidence that the problem was not obvious. A state trooper testified on deposition that he had notified the DOT about the puddling problem, and there was evidence that the DOT had inspected and could not detect a problem. The trooper could not remember whether his advising the DOT about the problem occurred before this accident. Nor can it be determined from this record whether the DOT was notified about, or inspected the problem, before the accident.
There was also evidence that, although the water on the road may. have been obvious, the depth of the water was not obvious, and it was the depth which made the condition dangerous. The test under Slavin would not be whether the water itself was obvious, but rather whether the dangerous nature of the water was obvious. Kala Invs., Inc. v. Sklar, 538 So.2d 909, 913 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 551 So.2d 461 (Fla.1989).
We have considered the other issues raised and find them to be without merit. The summary judgment is reversed.
WARNER, J. and BARR, ROBBIE M., Associate Judge, concur.
KLEIN, J., concurs specially with opinion.