Case Name: THE TERRITORY OF ARIZONA, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. DELINQUENT TAX LIST OF APACHE COUNTY FOR 1887, Defendants and Appellants. Appeal of the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company
Court: Arizona Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arizona
Decision Date: 1889-03-19
Citations: 3 Ariz. 69
Docket Number: Civil No. 251
Parties: THE TERRITORY OF ARIZONA, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. DELINQUENT TAX LIST OF APACHE COUNTY FOR 1887, Defendants and Appellants. Appeal of the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company.
Judges: 
Reporter: Arizona Reports
Volume: 3
Pages: 69–91

Head Matter:
[Civil No. 251.
Filed March 19, 1889.]
[21 Pac. 888.]
THE TERRITORY OF ARIZONA, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. DELINQUENT TAX LIST OF APACHE COUNTY FOR 1887, Defendants and Appellants. Appeal of the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company.
1. Taxation—Delinquent Taxes—Jurisdiction—Special Term—Bev. Stats. Abiz. 1887, Pars. 2685, 628, Cited and Construed.—The Bevenue Act (par. 2685, supra), provides that the tax-collector must publish, with the delinquent list, a notice that he will apply to the district court “at the next ensuing term thereof” for judgment and order of sale of the property described, and also give notice “that on the Monday next succeeding the day fixed by law for the commencement of such term” such property will be sold. Regular terms of the district court commence on the first Monday in July of each year. Paragraph 628, supra, provides that special terms of the district court may be held “whenever in the judgment of the presiding judge of said court public justice demands it,” and that notice be given by the clerk upon the order of the judge by publication. The proceeding contemplated by the revenue law, being special, should be strictly construed and every material provision of the statute complied with. The term “fixed by law” must be the regular term of court as fixed by statute. Special terms cannot embrace special proceedings requiring fixedness of time.
2. Courts—Special Terms—Record.—The record must affirmatively show the authority by which a special term is held.
Wright, C. J., dissents.
On rehearing.
1. Rehearing—Purpose of.—The purpose of a rehearing is not to open the whole case, but to afford an opportunity for the court to correct any misapprehension of the record, or any oversight or omission inadvertently made. Arizona Prince Copper Co. v. Copper Queen Copper Co., 2 Ariz. 169, 11 Pao. 896, cited.
2. Courts—Regularity of Proceedings—Presumptions—Want of Record—Special Term—Convening Order.—While what is recited in the record of a court of general jurisdiction as having been done is presumed to be done, this presumption will not put into the record what is not there. The record of a special term must show that it met according to law and upon due notice.
8. Taxation—Collection by Suit—Special Proceeding in Rem— Jurisdiction of Court Special.—The collection of taxes is a special proceeding in rem. When this special power' is conferred on courts they are treated, in the exercise of it, as courts of special jurisdiction.
APPEAL from a judgment of the District Court of the Third Judicial District in and for the County of Apache. James H. Wright, Judge.
Reversed.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
William C. Hazeldine, Solicitor for Appellant. J. A. Williamson, and E. M. Sanford of Counsel.
As appears on the face of the complaint, it was filed at ‘ ‘ the special April term, 1888.” The judgment and proceedings and all the acts sought to he reviewed by this appeal were also had at a special term.
The notice of the time and place of sale of property mentioned in the delinquent list (including that of defendant) fixes the date of application to District Court, for a judgment against the same, upon the third Monday in April, 1888, and announces that the sale of said property will take place on the Monday succeeding said third Monday in April, 1888.
The regular term of the district court, as fixed by law, to be held in the county of Apache, commences on the first Monday of July of each year. Rev. Stats. Arizona, p. 162, par. 626.
From this it appears that only one term of court is provided for by law to be held in the county of Apache each year, and that the, term at which the judgment complained of was attempted to be rendered, commenced on the third Monday in April, 1888, the same being the sixteenth day of April.
For provisions as to holding special terms of court, see Rev. Stats. Arizona, p. 162, par. 628.
For provisions as to requirements of the delinquent list and when it must be published, see Rev. Stats. Arizona, p. 479, par. 2685.
A judgment, to be in accordance with the statute, must be rendered at a term fixed by law, and the collector’s notice appended to the delinquent list must distinctly state the fact that he will apply for judgment at the next ensuing term after the publication of such delinquent list and for an order to sell the property therein specified on the Monday next succeeding the day fixed by law for the commencement of such term; that is to say, the law specifically declares that special jurisdiction is given to district courts to pass upon the sale of delinquent property for taxes at terms fixed by law. The question to be passed upon herein is, is a special term of court a term fixed by law? If this proposition be answered in the negative, the entire proceedings sought to be had in this case fall to the ground.
The statute providing for the sale of property for taxes being in derogation of the common law, and in effect providing for the confiscation of property for the non-payment of taxes, must be strictly construed, and every act and thing required to be done, must be done at tbe time and in tbe manner prescribed and in strict accordance with the provisions of the act.
The supreme court of the Un ted States has established the rule, which is imperative so far as the territories are concerned, in the opinion delivered by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in the case of Thatcher v. Powell, as follows: “In summary.proceedings where a court exercises extraordinary power under a special statute prescribing its course, we think that course ought to be exactly observed, and those facts especially which give jurisdiction, ought to appear in order to show that its proceedings are coram judice.” Thatcher v. Powell, 6 Wheat. 119.
The jurisdiction of the district court to’ take cognizance of these tax cases is dependent entirely upon the publication of the advertisement heretofore mentioned. Rev. Stats. Arizona, 1887, supra.
As illustrating the strict and technical compliance with the , statute required in tax sales, attention is called to the rule in Missouri, where the law requires the sale to be made before the courthouse door of the county. In several instances the sales were made inside the courthouse, and were held void. The court says: “The law has prescribed the place of sale, and that is the only proper place, and it is so because the law has said so, and there can be no reasoning about it.” Rubey v. Huntsman, 32 Mo. 501.
There is no authority under the common law for a court to order the sale of property for taxes due thereon. This is a special proceeding deriving its validity and authority from statutory law. The jurisdiction conferred is special and limited. It must appear from the recitals of the record itself that the facts existed which authorized the court to act. In this instance the record shows these acts were done at a special term, and the law prescribes that the proceedings must be had at a term fixed by law. Cooley on Taxation, p. 358; Thatcher v. Powell, 6 Wheat. 119; Dakin v. Hudson, 6 Cow. 221; Deming v. Corwin, 11 Wend. 647; Selden v. Wright, 5 N. Y. 497; Bridge v. Ford, 4 Mass. 641; Platt v. Stewart, 10 Mich. 260.
This brings us to the question as to the meaning of the phrases used in the act, “at the next ensuing term” and “the Monday next succeeding the day 'fixed by law for the commencement of such term,” and as to whether or not they could be construed as embracing special terms, or terms called by and at the pleasure of the judge, and not held upon dates fixed and determined by legislative enactment.
Terms of court are defined to be those times or seasons of the year which are set apart for the dispat,ch of business in the superior court of common law. Tidd’s Practice, 105. As is said by the supreme court of Pennsylvania, “Civilization and its attendant, commerce, has in more modern times extended the administration of the law by the courts of justice much beyond the limits of merely leisure periods; but still terms, definite and fixed, are prescribed and are absolutely necessary to the successful administration' of the judicial duties, so far as the public is concerned; and hence they are with us, fixed by positive law. . . . On this point (speaking of the question raised as to the jurisdiction at an adjourned term) the act of the 5th of April is very explicit. It provides that the terms of the court shall commence on the first Mondays in March, June, September, and December, and continue for four weeks at each term. This is the term fixed by and known to the law, and it cannot be supposed 'that the obligors understood that any different or other time was meant.” Horton v. Miller, 38 Pa. St. 270; Butcher v. Brand, 6 Iowa, 235; State v. Posey, 17 La. Ann. 252.
“When the statute speaks of ‘terms,’ the terms constituted by law are meant, not special terms appointed by the court. Commonwealth v. Sessions of Norfolk, 5 Mass. 435; Smith v. Cutler, 10 Wend. 590, 25 Am. Dec. 580.” Tompkins v. Clackamas Co., 11 Or. 364, 4 Pac. 1210. See, also, Dunn v. State, 2 Ark. 229, 35 Am. Dec. 54; Garlick v. Dunn, 42 Ala. 404; Brown v. Hogel, 30 Ill. 119; Marsh v. Chestnut, 14 Ill. 224; Spellman v. Curtenius, 12 Ill. 409.
The rule established by the supreme court -of the United States for the government of this and other courts directly subordinate to it as to the construction to be placed upon statutes providing for the sale of property for the nonpayment of taxes, is as follows: “In an ex parte proceeding, as a sale of land for taxes under a special authority, great strictness is required. To divest an individual of his property against his consent, every substantial requisite of the law must be shown to have been complied with. No presumption can be raised in behalf of a collector who sells real estate for taxes to cover any radical defect in his proceeding.” Ronkendorf v. Taylor’s Lessee, 4 Pet. 349.
A term called by a judge or a special term is not in any sense of the word a term fixed by law, or such a term designated by the legislature as that at which proceedings should be had for the purpose of enforcing the collection of delinquent taxes.
Even if it were possible to place such a construction upon the language “a term fixed by law” as to embrace a special term called by the judge, this special term at which the judgment in this eas'e was attempted to be rendered was coram non judice, because the record does not show, neither does it appear affirmatively in any manner, that this special term was called in manner and form as required by law.
The section authorizing special terms provides that the same may be held upon notice for that purpose to be published in a newspaper, such notice to be given by the clerk upon the order of the judge. Rev. Stats., sec. 628, supra.
This being a special term, the power to convene and the authority under which the same was opened must appear affirmatively of record, as no presumptions are indulged in favor of a special term, thus reversing the usual rule as to courts of general jurisdiction. Clelland v. People, 4 Colo. 244; Dunn v. State, 2 Ark. 229, 35 Am. Dec. 54.
John A. Rush, Attorney-General, and Harris Baldwin and T. W. Johnston, special counsel, for Appellee.
“It is unnecessary that the order calling a special term of the circuit court should be set out in the record. Unless the contrary expressly appears, che presumption is in favor of the regularity of the term.” Teerner v. People, 81 Ill. 412.
“Where a proceeding appears to have been at a special or general term, the presumption of law is in favor of the regularity of said term and of the jurisdiction of the court. This presumption may be rebutted, it is true, by showing affirmatively that there was no order of the judge or court ap pointing the special term, or where the court can see from the public law that the judge was required to be in another place, holding another court.” Cook v. Renick, 19 Ill. 600.
“It is contended that if the court was legally empowered to hold a special term, it was in this instance done without authority of law, because it does not appear by the record that the judge notified the sheriff of the same, or that the sheriff put up at each of the precincts in the county at least three weeks’ notice of the time when the special term was to commence. As decided by this court time and again, we must necessarily presume that the officers of the court performed their duty in such particular, unless the contrary appears.” Harriman v. The State, 2 G. Greene, 277.
‘1 The statute providing for it is merely directory, and such notice is not considered an essential prerequisite to confer jurisdiction.” Harriman v. The State, 2 G. Greene, 277.
See, also, Wright v. Lee, 2 G. Greene, 94; Reynolds v. Stansbury, 20 Ohio, 353; Bosworfh v. Vanderwalker, 53 N. Y. 599; Ferguson v. Crawford, 86 N. Y. 611.

Opinion:
PORTER, J.
This is one of the cases wherein the Atlantic & Pacific Railroad resists the payment of the taxes for the year 1887 in the counties of Mojave, Yavapai, and Apache. There are questions common to each of those counties, but an independent one applies alone to the county of Apache, which question arises as to the jurisdiction of the court in which judgment was obtained against the railroad. A special appearance was made to the jurisdiction, and the contention made that, it being a special term of the court, there was no authority to try the tax cases. The complaint shows its being filed at the special April term, 1888. The judgment was had at the special term. The notice of the time and place of sale of property in the delinquent list fixes the date of the application to the district court for a judgment against the same upon the third Monday in April, A. D. 1888, and that the sale will take place on the Monday succeeding said third Monday in April, A. D. 1888. The regular term of the district court to be held in the county of Apache commences on the first Monday in July of each year. Paragraph 628, Revised Statutes, pro vides that "special terms of the district courts may beheld in any county of this territory for the trial of civil and criminal causes, and the transaction of civil and criminal business, generally, or of either, whenever in the judgment of the presiding judge of said court public justice demands it. Such special terms shall be held upon notice for that purpose, to be published in some newspaper printed in the county where the court is to be held, if there be a newspaper published in said county, and if no paper is published in said county, then by notice published in some newspaper published in the district; said notice to be given by the clerk upon the order of the judge." Chapter 7 of the Revenue Law provides for the publication of the delinquent list, when the same must be published, and what it must contain, and it then prescribes the notice to be given in the following language: ' ' The tax collector must append and publish, with the delinquent list, a notice that he will apply to the district court held in and for said county, at the next ensuing term thereof, for judgment against the lands and real estate and personal property described in said list, for said taxes, costs, and interest, and for an order to sell the same for the satisfaction thereof; and shall also give notice that on the Monday next succeeding the day fixed by law for the commencement of such term of the district court all the lands and real estate and personal property, for the sale of which an order shall be made, will be exposed to public sale at the building where the district court is held in said county, for the amount of tases, interest, and costs due thereon; and the advertisement published according to the provisions of this section, shall be deemed to be sufficient notice," etc. See Rev. Stats. Ariz., p. 479, par. 2685. On publication and advertisement, and the filing of a complaint, the district court acquires jurisdiction over the property described in the delinquent list. But at what term of the court does this jurisdiction obtain? This is a special proceeding, and should be strictly construed. The case of Brown v. Hogle, 30 Ill. 119, cited by counsel, was where the collector was required to apply for judgment at the June term. He applied at July term. The court says: "The term is fixed by law, and the design is that all persons owning lands in the county, looking to the law for their rights, may know, certainly when the application will be made, and make such defense as the law entitles them to make, and show cause, if they can, why judgment should not be rendered against their lands. If this rested in the discretion of the collector, and the people interested are to derive their knowledge of the term at which the application will be made solely from the collector's notice, much embarrassment and loss might occur, as those notices are not so widely diffused as the law itself. ' ' And further on, quoting with approval a former decision of the same court, the learned judge says: "It is a sound and inflexible rule of the law that when special proceedings are authorized by statute, by which the estate of one man may be divested and transferred to another, every material provision of the statute must be complied with. The owner has a right to insist upon a strict performance qf all the material requirements, especially of these designed for his security, and the non-observance of which may operate to his prejudice. See Brown v. Hogle, 30 Ill. 119. See, also, Marsh v. Chestnut, 14 Ill. 224; Spellman v. Curtenius, 12 Ill. 409.
We must conclude that the term "fixed by law" must be the regular term of court as fixed by statute. Special terms are allowed to be held for the trial of civil and criminal causes, and the transaction of civil and criminal business generally. This is certainly not to embrace special proceedings requiring a fixedness of time. The time of sale is on Monday next succeeding the day fixed by law for the commencement of such term. All the tax-payers are presumed to know their regular terms of courts. The holdings of special terms are in the discretion of the judge. A tax-payer, knowing such time, rests easily, believing at the proper time he can come and make his defense. He may temporarily leave the territory, and, while resting in fancied security, an order is made for a special term of court, and he divested of his property without a hearing. It is not thus in other actions, for there the resident litigant has to be personally served with process, and, besides publication in non-resident cases, the summons and complaint have to be mailed to the defendant.
Conceding, though, that "the ensuing term" meant the special April term of this district court, the record must affirmatively show the authority by which the special term was to be held; it being a special proceeding, and therefore no intendment being in its favor. The record does not disclose that the notice to be given by the clerk upon the order of the judge was so given. It commences: "April 16, 1888, present, presiding," etc. The supreme court of Colorado announces that if the judge of that district did, by order, fix a term of the district court to be begun and held for the county of Fremont on the sixteenth day of November, 1876, this fact should affirmatively appear by the record." Clelland v. People, 4 Colo. 244. And also in Dunn v. State, 2 Ark. 254, 35 Am. Dec. 54, it says: "And the most important circumstance upon which the right of power of the judge' to order a special term of the circuit court is made to depend cannot judicially appear otherwise than by being made of record, it being a matter altogether in pais." . . . The judgment for the plaintiff in the county of Apache, as to the defendant the Atlantic & Pacific Railroad Company, is reversed.
Barnes, J., concurs.