Case Name: Carl Alvin WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1993-05-14
Citations: 618 So. 2d 773
Docket Number: No. 92-494
Parties: Carl Alvin WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: DAUKSCH, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 618
Pages: 773–775

Head Matter:
Carl Alvin WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 92-494.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
May 14, 1993.
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and M.A. Lucas, Asst. Public Defender, Dayto-na Beach, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and David G. Mersch, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
HARRIS, Judge.
Carl A. Williams pled guilty to grand theft of a motor vehicle and was sentenced to 30 months probation. Subsequently, Williams violated this probation by failing to notify his probation officer of his change of residence. He pled guilty to the violation with the understanding that he would be sentenced to 4V2 years incarceration which both he and the court believed to be the maximum sentence under the guidelines.
The Court: Has [your attorney] answered all of the questions you have about that plea form and about the plea you're entering here today?
THE DEFENDANT: Well, there's a few questions, but I was concerned about my points for one.
THE COURT: What points are you talking about?
THE DEFENDANT: Points. In other words, I had a 31 probation violation, and now I jump to four and a half. I was curious or how is it that on my first charge I had like 30 points? She said I could bump to another cell. I was curious how I got there. She explained because it's the — my probation officer asking for.
THE COURT: Sir. It's based on the score sheet that was prepared at the time that you were convicted on the grand theft third degree. That it's just based on that.
Clearly, Williams and the court thought the sentence was authorized by the score-sheet. Just as clearly, it was not. It is conceded for the purpose of this appeal that three and a half years was the maximum, non-departure sentence authorized by the guidelines.
There is no indication that Williams intended to plead outside the guidelines or that the court intended to depart from the maximum guideline range in sentencing. This is not a case of departure based on a negotiated plea. This was a mutual mistake resulting in an illegal sentence.
Having so found, we agree with the State that this cause should be remanded to allow Williams to agree to the departure sentence (accept departure as a condition for the plea) or withdraw his plea and proceed to trial.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
DAUKSCH, J., concurs.
GRIFFIN, J., dissents with opinion.
. The State urges that this was a proper departure sentence based on Williams' agreement to accept the greater sentence by his plea. If this were intended as a departure sentence, we believe that such intent would be clear from the record. Although a negotiated plea is a basis for departure, it should, nevertheless, be so stated in writing by the trial court. Calleja v. State, 562 So.2d 395 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990).
While the supreme court has not expressly held that such reason for departure must be stated in writing, it has never held that it is an exception from the general rule. We doubt, however, that the failure to so state in writing this reason for departure would mandate a reversal and the imposition of a guideline sentence on remand because the defendant would be estopped to claim surprise at the sentence.