Case Name: Jan M. SLOTNICK, Appellant, v. Alan J. SLOTNICK, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2004-12-15
Citations: 891 So. 2d 1086
Docket Number: No. 4D03-1248
Parties: Jan M. SLOTNICK, Appellant, v. Alan J. SLOTNICK, Appellee.
Judges: GROSS, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 891
Pages: 1086–1091

Head Matter:
Jan M. SLOTNICK, Appellant, v. Alan J. SLOTNICK, Appellee.
No. 4D03-1248.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Dec. 15, 2004.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 9, 2005.
Robert L. Bogen, Boca Raton, for appellant.
John B. Rogers, Coral Springs, for ap-pellee.

Opinion:
MAY, J.
The former wife appeals an order dissolving her second marriage to the same husband. She raises four issues, two of which we find require a reversal. Those issues concern the trial court's interpretation of the Marital and Property Settlement Agreement and its refusal to allow the former wife to present evidence in support of her claims. We reverse and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The parties married the first time on August 28, 1977, and divorced on August 28, 1997. The 1997 judgment of dissolution incorporated a Marital and Property Settlement Agreement (MSA), which provided for six years of rehabilitative alimony, child support, and equitable distribution of property.
Significantly, the MSA also provided "the parties shall continue to live separate and apart from each other for the rest of their natural lives. Each party shall be free from interference, authority, and control, direct or indirect, by the other, as fully as if he or she were single and unmarried." Section XXII of the MSA provided the agreement "is binding on the parties permanently and irrevocably and shall survive said suit for dissolution of marriage or any law suit involving the parties."
On December 24, 1998, the parties remarried. On March 20, 2000, the wife petitioned for dissolution of marriage. In her petition, she sought child support, temporary, rehabilitative, permanent and/or lump sum alimony, equitable distribution of the parties' property acquired during the course of their marriages, enforcement of the executory portion of the husband's support obligations under the 1997 MSA, and attorney's fees.
The former husband filed a "Motion to Determine Whether a Previous Marital Settlement Agreement is Binding." The original trial judge issued an order, which stated:
1. Cox v. Cox, 659 So.2d 1051 (Fla.1995), controls this issue by virtue of its holding (1) that reconciliation or remarriage abrogates the executory provisions of a prior marital settlement agreement unless there is an explicit statement in the agreement that the parties intended otherwise, and (2) that the executed provisions of a prior marital settlement agreement are not affected by reconciliation or remarriage absent a reconveyance or a new written agreement to the contrary.
2. The language contained in the parties' prior agreement contains that degree of finality as to the provisions thereof such as to constitute a sufficiently explicit statement that reconciliation or remarriage does not abrogate the executory terms of the agreement.
The order further determined the rule pronounced in Cox applied only to property distribution, not support, and the combined length of the parties' two marriages and their separation should be considered in calculating support.
A successor judge heard the petition for dissolution on July 2nd and November 20th, 2002. At the July hearing, each attorney explained their interpretation of the prior court order. The successor judge disagreed with parts of the prior order and indicated it was not only inconsistent, but set the stage for an appeal no matter the outcome of the hearing.
At the November hearing, the successor judge informally questioned the parties' counsel regarding their respective positions. The former wife argued she was entitled to permanent alimony and requested a trial. The court denied her request. Without conducting a trial, the court decided it would incorporate the 1997 MSA into the final order. Thereafter, the former wife filed a motion to disqualify the judge based upon the court's refusal to conduct a trial or receive evidence.
On December 2, 2002, the successor judge entered a final judgment of dissolution.
[T]he Court finds that the Mediated Marital Settlement Agreement that ended the first marriage, and was dated July 16, 1997, should remain in full force and effect. The Honorable Richard D. Eade, the prior Circuit Court Judge on this case, entered an Order on March 9, 2001, indicating that such Mediated Marital Settlement Agreement contained sufficient "explicit statements", to bring it within the holding in the case of Cox v. Cox, 659 So.2d 1051, [sic], (Fla.1995), thus avoiding the abrogation of the Settlement Agreement provisions. This Court concurs in the finding of "explicit statements", after having reviewed the entire Mediated Marital Settlement Agreement.
The court found the former wife was entitled to the benefit of the MSA, bridge-the-gap alimony for threé years, and attorney's fees. The court found no entitlement to equitable distribution for the second marriage.
We disagree with the trial court on two issues. First, the court erred in determining the MSA explicitly addressed the issue of remarriage or reconciliation to allow the executory provisions to survive the remarriage. The words — reconciliation and remarriage — are nowhere to be found in the MSA. In fact, the MSA specifically anticipates the parties will NOT reconcile by indicating the parties shall "live separate and apart from each other for the rest of their natural lives."
As the supreme court noted in Cox, "parties in the throes of a dissolution who enter into a settlement agreement are not contemplating reconciliation or remarriage." Id. at 1054. For this reason, the supreme court held "that reconciliation or remarriage abrogates the executory provisions of a prior marital settlement agreement unless there is an explicit statement in the agreement that the parties intended otherwise." Id.
Explicit means "characterized by full clear expression: being without vagueness or ambiguity:' leaving ' nothing implied. ." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL Dictionary (Unabridged) (3d ed.1993). If neither the parties nor the court can agree that the MSA provides for the executory provisions of the MSA to survive a remarriage, then the agreement cannot, by definition, be explicit.
Cox requires this precision in wording. This is because "it is the presumed intent of the parties at the time of the reconciliation to resume the marital relationship in all respects and abrogate any prior agreements restricting or inhibiting the rights of one of the spouses.... " Cox, 659 So.2d at 1054. (quoting Brazina v. Brazina, 233 N.J.Super. 145, 558 A.2d 69, 72 (Ct. Ch. Div.1989)). Because the court system strives to encourage and strengthen marriage, it cannot favor' the enforcement of executory provisions that would seek to undermine it. For such provisions to survive a remarriage, the intention of the parties must be clear or forever fade into the abyss of the prior divorce. We therefore hold the MSA in this case lacks the requisite "explicit statement" necessary to insure the executory provisions of the agreement survived the remarriage.
The dissent reaches the opposite conclusion on this issue by relying on section XXII of the MSA. We agree the language in this provision suggests the permanent and. irrevocable nature of the agreement. However, it fails to account for the earlier statement revealing the parties never contemplated reconciliation or remarriage. Thus, it fails to provide the "explicit statement" required by Cox. As much as we would prefer to avoid further litigation for the'parties, we must follow the law.
We also find the trial court committed reversible error when it denied the former wife's request to present evidence. "Due process requires that a party be given the opportunity to be heard and to testify and call witnesses on his behalf, . and the denial of this right is fundamental error." Pettry v. Pettry, 706 So.2d 107, 108 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998). The issues to be determined at the final hearing included the former wife's entitlement to permanent, rehabilitative or lump sum alimony, equitable distribution of the parties' property acquired during the course of their marriages, and attorney's fees. The trial court summarily disposed of these issues by informally discussing them with the attorneys. The court did not allow either party to present evidence or cross-examine witnesses. This summary process, while initially appearing efficiént, denied the former wife her due process of law. This error becomes more significant based on our holding that the executory provisions of the MSA did not survive the remarriage.
We therefore reverse the final judgment of dissolution and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
GROSS, J., concurs.
FARMER, C.J., dissents with opinion.
. The successor judge is no longer on the bench. This fact along with our remand for further proceedings, renders this and other issues moot.