Case Name: Sims v. Randal
Court: Constitutional Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1802-04
Citations: 1 Brev. 85
Docket Number: 
Parties: Sims v. Randal.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Carolina Law Reports
Volume: 3
Pages: 85–90

Head Matter:
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT,
COLUMBIA,
APRIL, 1802.
Sims v. Randal.
A plaintiff in trespass to try title, who claims under a sale by the sheriff, must shew a title in the party, under execution against whom the land was sold ; and the judgment, sale, and conveyance by the sheriff, with proof that the party was in possession, and was the reputed owner of the -land, at the time of the salo, are not sufficient to put the defendant to shewing- a better title- But any evidence which would have protected such party, in a suit against him for the recovery of the land, as proof of adverse possession for the time required to perfect a title by the statute oflimitations, will be sufficient to sustain the action.
Interest in the subject matter of the suit is not a ground of objection to a witness who is called to testify against his interest.
The ordinance of 1784, fixing a period for the commencement of the operation of the statute of limitations, which had been suspended for several years, and the several subsequent acts, extending the tim» at which the statute should bar the recovery of lands, did not merely continue the suspension of the statute ; but the ordinance of 1784 extinguished its operation as to all time-, short of the statutory period, prior ■to the date fixed by the ordinance : and a possession prior to that date .pannot be united to a continuing possession after the period of the last extension, to make up the time requisite to complete the bar of the statute. Juicle Hicks’ Executors v. Pouncey, post.]
Motion for a new trial, on the part of the plaintiff, who had brought gn action of trespass to try titles to a trqct of land in Union districts It appeared in evidence, at the trial, that the land in dispute was sold by virtue of a writ of fi. fa, against the executors of one Caleb Edmopson, as the property of their testator. That tiie plaintiff purchased the land at the said sale, and claimed under the sheriff’s deed, &c. The plaintiff, at the trial, produced evidence of a judgment, and execution, against Edmonson, and the sheriff’s deed of conveyance ; and gave evidence of Edmonson’s having been in possession from 1771 to 1792. And he offered as a witness, one Margaret Edmonson, the widow of a certain Isaac Edmonson ; but hor testimony was rejected, because it appeared her husband had once claimed the land in question, and that she had, since his death, sold her right of dower in the said land.
Upon this proof, Bay, J., who presided at the trial in the district court, charged the jury to find for the defendant, who had given no material evidence, saying that the plaintiff had not given sufficient evidence, to entitle him to recover ; and the jury found accordingly.
The following points were made in the argument of this motion, and determined by the court, viz :
1. It was contended by the plaintiff’s counsel, that where a purchaser claims title to land under a sheriff’s sale, it is not incumbent on him to deduce a regular and unbroken chain of title from the original grantee, to the party whose property it is supposed to be at the time of the sale; for this would be impossible in most cases of this sort, and it would be putting it in the power of persons ha. ving lands subject to seizure and sale by the sheriff, to defeat the purchaser’s right, by destroying or concealing the evidence of his title : but that all that is necessary in such case, is, to shew that •the party against whom the judgment was recovered, and execution issued, was the visible and reputed owner of the land seized and sold under that execution. The sale, at any rate, conveys all the right, title, and interest, which the defendant has in,'and to, the land, at the time of the sale, and gives to the purchaser a prima facie right of possession, and a good title to the land, till a better is produced. In support of this position, 1 Morg. Ess. 150, 152, was cited, shewing that where a party has not the custody of a deed, he shall not be required to shew it; and 1 Bay’s Rep. 868, shewing that possession alone is esteemed a good title in some cases, without producing any grant from the State.
On the other side, it was insisted, that the plaintiff ought to have shewn a clear chain of title from the first patentee, down to the person against whom the judgment, warranting the sheriff’s sale, was obtained ; and that no better reason could be assigned, why a a purchaser at sheriff’s sale should be more favored than any other purchaser. The courts have extensive powers to compel the production of deeds, which may be called upon in aid of a party who may stand in need of such assistance when necessary : and it would be productive of mischievous consequence, to allow the production of a sheriff’s deed, under a sale by execution, to be sufficient evidence of a title to land, till a better should appear ; .and by that means put the real ewaer, in many cases, to great trouble and expense to make out ^his • title. In some instances, it would be resorted to as a contrivance to gain a knowledge of men’s titles, and discover defects in them ,- and would have a tendency to disturb and shake many titles, which otherwise never could be molested, with any chance of succeeding against them. At any rate, it was incumbent on the plaintiff to have shewn that the land was granted, and to whom ; and this ivas certainly in the power of the plaintiff, and he should have done it.
Tbezevant, J., was of opinion on this point, that proof of the judgment and execution, and of a sale and conveyance from the sheriff, ought to be deemed in all such cases as this, prima facie evidence of a sufficient title to the land sold and conveyed, as aforesaid, so as to put it on the adverse claimant to shew a better,, and that it would be a convenient rule,-and wise policy, to establish it.
The other judges thought differently. They were of opinion it would be attended with bad consequences to establish such a principle, or rule of evidence, in the latitude that was laid down ; and that a better rule to be observed in such cases, would be, to require the plaintiff, claiming under a sheriff’s sale, to shew that the land was granted by the State in the first instance ; and that the person, as whose property it was sold, had a'title of some sort, not a fictitious or pretended title, but a bona fide title of some kind, whether sufficient in law or not, under which he holds, or did hold, possession or claim, at the time of the sale ; which should bo sufficient to draw from the opposite party the proof of his title. They, therefore, overruled the exception taken to the judge’s charge on this ground.
2. The plaintiff’s counsel insisted, that Margaret Edmonson ought to have been admitted as a witness. That she was interested in the matter in dispute, was admitted, but the facts she was produced to prove, they said, were directly against her interest ; and an interested witness, swearing against his own interest, was not only an admissible, but the most competent, witness, that could be brought..
To this, all the court agreed; and were of opinion, that on this ground, a new trial ought to be granted.
3. The plaintiff’s counsel argued, that Edmonson, the person who was defendant in the suit, by which the sale, judgment, &c., was obtained, and to whom the land was supposed to belong, when sold, had, at the time of the sale, a good title by possession ; and, that by the sale, the purchaser acquired the same right and title which the said defendant had. That the ordinance, passed the 26th March, 1784, P. L. 356, shews, in the preamble, that the statute of limitations had been suspended from the year 1775, to that time ; and that various acts afterwards passed, suspending the operation of the act of limitations. But that by counting the time which the act had run previous to the first suspension, and adding the same to the time it had again run after the last suspension,-i'i would be found to amount to the time specified by the act of lie milations, for barring- the right of any other claimant. And fur^iat ^lerc was pt'oof of Edmonson’s being- in possession five' years antecedent to the 4th of July, 1776, which, if the jury credited it, would be sufficient to entitle hita to the land by possession under the act of 1787. P. E. 428.
i Faust, ss.
E contra.
The statute of limitations was suspended during the-war ; and after the war, by the ordinance of 1784, a period was fixed for the commencement of the operation of the statute, in all suits, actions, process, or proceedings : and the ordinance provided, that no time which had run, in pursuance of the act to limit any suit in law or equity, should be counted ; but that the act should commence its operation from the date of the ordinance, 26th-March, 1784, in all existing causes of action.- in March, 1789,-P. L. 470, another act passed, to extend the time for the limitation of claims, on which the act of limitations had attached, before the 26th March, 1784 ; by which it was enacted, that all claims which-would be barred under the former law, on the 26th of March, 1789, should not be barred on that day, but should he barred on the 26th of March, 1790. On the 26th of March, 1790, another act was passed to extend the period for the limitation of such claims in like manner as before, to the 16th of March, 1791; and by an act of February, 1791, the period was further extended, and finally fixed to the 1st November, 1791. There were no intervals, or portions of time, which the act had run on any such claim to lands, as in the case of personal actions, from 1784, to the 1st of November, 1791; nor could any time before the 26th March, 1784, be counted, because the ordinance of 1784, annuls the operation of the act of limitations on any claim existing then, and establishes a period or point from whence the said act shall begin to operate. Afterwards, and before the respective times, when according to the course of the act of limitations, such claims would have been barred, the legislature, from time to time, interposed, and passed sundry acts to lengthen the period of time when the same should be barred, and remove to a greater distance the limit beyond which these claims eould not exist, without being barred, unless suit should be commenced on them, or the possession of the lands obtained in the-mean time. But the operation of-lhe limitation act is not merely suspended, or stayed for a time, as was done in regard to personal fictions ; in which case the timé which the act had run, was not cxtinguished, and a period fixed for its commencement, but only suspendéd for certain intervals of time, during the running of the act. In the latter case, these intervals, or portions of time, during which the act Was suspended in its operation,' must bé deducted from the whole time which has run,-from the period When the act began tot operate, until it ceased to have any operation upon the claim ; but in the former casé, no portions of timé can be patched together in this manner, but a period is fixed by law for the final operation of the act of limitations,', in regard to old claims of land, to wit, the 1st of November, 1701.'
The court were unanimously of opinion with the defendant, oh' this point, that the acts of assembly relative to the operation of the limitation act in regard to réal actions}' or suits wherein the titles to’ lands ate tried, taken together, intended to extinguish, in the first place, the time which had run against any such existing claims, or titles, and fix a certain period from whence the act should begin to tun, to work a bar ; and in the second place, to extend the time beyond the limitation of five years, and fix a certain .point of time at which every such claim should be barred; unless thé person, having such claim, should bring his action at law, against the person in possession, holding under an adverse title, to try whose title is best, or obtain possession to the same, before that time. And, therefore, in this case, no time could be counted prior to thé 1st day of November, 1791, as having operated by force of;the act of limitations to bar the right of any person who might have had a bet; ter title than Edmonson to this land ; and, of course, could not give Edmonson a good title under the act, by possession.
4. The fourth point, which was involved in the argument on the r 7 0 third point, was this: viz. Whether a purchaser of land at sheriff’s sale, shall not be allowed to maintain his title to the land so lnu'chase(b by such proof as would be sufficient to maintain the title of the person, as whose property the land was taken by the sheriff, andsold, and protect him in his possession under the limitation acts of 1712, and 1787.
Smith,, for plaintiff. Falcoheh, for defendant.
Vide Hicks’ Executors v. Pouncey, post.
[There seems to be an error in the report of this case, which it is difficult to account for. The reasoning of the court leads to the conclusion, that no time should be counted prior (not to the 1st November, 1791, but) to the 16th March, 1784. The statute then began to run, and although the act3 of March, 1789, March, 1790, and February, 1791, successively postponed the period ¿t which the statute shpuld run out; yet if Edmonson w.as in possession from 1771 to 1792; he must, for aught that appears, have acquired a good title under the statute on the 1st November, 1791. His title, it is true, would not then have been perfected, if the acts of 1789, 1790, and 1791, are to be understood, as fixing new periods when the statute should begin to run, and extinguishing the operation of the statute as to all time prior to these several periods, as was done by the ordinance of 1784; but this construction is equally opposed to the language of the acts, and the reasoning of the court. Still without some such construction, it was wholly unnecessary for the plaintiff to connect Edmonson’s possession before 1784, with his possession after 1791; inasmuch as his possession, in the intervening period, was sufficient, of itself, to give him a good title by the- statute. It is not stated that his possession had befen interrupted at any time p hut if it had, it would have raised a different question from that stated, and de-*cided in the text J

Opinion:
The court agreed in opinion on this question, that such evidence as would be sufficient under the limitation acts of 1712, and 1787, to protect a- defendant in possession, against whom an action is brought to try his title to land, on the ground of his having" acquired by length of possession, uninterrupted by any suit at law in behalf of the plaintiff, under a title which might have been defeasible, an indefeasible title, by force of either of those acts' of limitation, would be sufficient to authorise a purchaser, at sheriff's sale, of land, to recover the'land in an action brought for that purpose ; he proving that the person, whose right, title, and interest, to, and in the land, which he had so purchased, had such possessory right and title'of possession, if the same had been disputed' in an action at' law, at the time of such sale. 15'Yin. Abr. 105. Twenty years uninterrupted possession, is a good- title in ejectment, by A. who is-out of possession, against B. who is in possession. 2 Salk. 421. And as the jury Bad received'' evidence of Edmonson's- having occupied, and claimed title to the land, for five years prior to the 4th of July, 1770, which they might have considered as sufficient to entitle him to the land, under the act of 1787, P. L. 428, if the judge, who presided at the trial, had stated to them the law in that respect, and left it to their decision, upon a due consideration of the evidence to that point, they thought the plaintiff, on this ground also,entitled to a new trial.
New trial granted.