Case Name: KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN RY. CO. v. PRUNTY
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1904-10-04
Citations: 133 F. 13
Docket Number: No. 1,320
Parties: KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN RY. CO. v. PRUNTY.
Judges: Before PARDEE, McCORMICK, and SHELBY, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: Federal Reporter
Volume: 133
Pages: 13–23

Head Matter:
KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN RY. CO. v. PRUNTY.
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
October 4, 1904.
On Rehearing, December 3, 1904.)
No. 1,320.
1. Federal Courts — Jurisdiction—Duty to Examine Record.
It is the duty of a Circuit Court of Appeals of its own motion to examine the record in a cause brought before it to test its own jurisdiction and that of the court below.
2. Removal of Causes — Diversity of Citizenship — Sufficiency of Petition.
Where the jurisdiction of a federal court depends upon the citizenship of the parties, such citizenship, and not merely their residence, must be shown by the record; and a right of removal on the ground of diversity of citizenship is not shown by a petition therefor which does not allege the citizenship of the plaintiff, although his petition in the state court alleges him to be a resident of the state in which the action is brought.
3. Same — Improper Removal — Costs.
Where the judgment of a Circuit Court is reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals on the ground that the cause was improperly removed from a state court, costs should be awarded against the removing party.
On Rehearing.
4. Same — Amendment of Petition in Appellate Court — Jurisdictional Averments.
A Circuit Court of Appeals may properly permit tlie amendment in that court of a petition for removal by supplying an averment of citizenship requisite to give jurisdiction, where it appears that its omission was inadvertent and it is shown by stipulation of the parties that the requisite diversity of citizenship in fact existed.
5. Master and Servant — Action for Injury of Servant — Contributory Negligence.
Plaintiff stood on the footboard at the back of an engine to make a coupling to a car toward which the engine was moved slowly. The drawbar on the car was out of repair, and was not in line with that on the engine, and plaintiff attempted to shove the drawbar on the engine to one side with his foot, so as to meet that on the ear, when the engine lurched by reason of a defect in the track, and plaintiff’s foot was caught and crushed between the two drawbars. There was evidence tending to show that such manner of making a coupling was customary and safe under ordinary circumstances, and that plaintiff would not have been injured if it had not been for the defect in the track; also that there was no rule of the railroad company prohibiting brakemen from going between the cars to make a coupling or requiring the engine to be stopped while the drawbars were moved. Held, that under the evidence plaintiff could not be said as matter of law to have been chargeable with contributory negligence. Pardee, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
6. Same — Proximate Cause of Injury.
It is an essential element in contributory negligence to defeat a right of action for an injury that there should be a causal connection between the act charged as negligence and the injury, and when the act and the injury are not known by common experience to be naturally and usually in sequence, and the injury does not according to the ordinary course of events follow from the act, they are not sufficiently connected to make the act a proximate cause of the injury.
7. Instructions — Sufficiency of Exceptions.
A general exception to a charge, or to a portion thereof containing different propositions, is unavailing, if any of such propositions are correct.
In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Louisiana.
Samuel W. Moore and J. D. Wilkinson (T. Alexander, on the brief), for plaintiff in error.
J. A. Thigpen, for defendant in error.
Before PARDEE, McCORMICK, and SHELBY, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
SHELBY, Circuit Judge.
This suit was brought in the First Judicial District Court of Caddo parish, La., by Clark Prunty against the Kansas City Southern Railway Company to recover damages for personal injuries received by the plaintiff, who is defendant in error, while acting as a brakeman in the employ of the defendant, who is plaintiff in error. The case was removed to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Louisiana on the application of the railway company, and was tried before a jury, and verdict and judgment had against the railway company.
There are limits imposed by law to the jurisdiction of the United States courts, and it is an inflexible rule that this court of its own motion should examine the record to test its own jurisdiction and the jurisdic tion of the court below. M., C. & L. M. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U. S. 379, 4 Sup. Ct. 510, 28 L. Ed. 462; Grace v. Amer. Cent. Ins. Co., 109 U. S. 278, 3 Sup. Ct. 207, 27 L. Ed. 932. The ground upon which it was sought to remove this case from the state to the federal court was that it is a case between citizens of different states. No other ground of federal jurisdiction is suggested. The petition for removal was filed by the defendant, the Kansas City Southern Railway Company, and the following is all that the petition contains on the question of the citizenship of the parties:
"While the defendant is now, and was at the date of bringing said action, and long before, and has always been, a resident and domiciled in the state of Missouri, and is not, nor has it ever been, a resident of the state of Louisiana, or domiciled therein, having only an agent, viz., T. Alexander, of your said parish and state, on whom process might be served; but your defendant was at time of filing this suit a citizen of the state of Missouri, and is still a citizen thereof, residing in the city of Kansas Oity, of said state of Missouri, and no other, while said plaintiff is a citizen and resident of the state of-; and your petitioner desires to remove this suit, before the trial thereof, into the next Circuit Court of the United States to be held in the Western District of Louisiana."
A corporation created by and doing business in a state is to be deemed, for the purpose of fixing the jurisdiction, a citizen of such state. It would have been sufficient, therefore, so far as the status of the petitioner was concerned, to have averred that the petitioner was a corporation chartered or organized under the laws of Missouri. But it is not alleged that it is a corporation. It may be a joint-stock company, so far as the averments of the petition are concerned. It is at least doubtful whether the petition is sufficient to show the status of the petitioner so as to affirmatively show federal jurisdiction. In the Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How. 404, 15 L. Ed. 451, it was held that it is not enough, in order to give jurisdiction, to say that the corporation "is a citizen of the state where the suit is brought." See, also, Muller v. Dows, 94 U. S. 444, 24 L. Ed. 207. We do not dwell on this phase of the case, however, because in the petition filed by the plaintiff in the state court declaring his cause of action it is stated that the Kansas City Southern Railway Company is "a corporation organized under the laws of Missouri," and this averment makes the record show the status of the company, and would supply the defect in that regard of the petition to remove.
But the petition entirely fails to show the citizenship of Clark Prunty, the plaintiff suing in the state court. The only averment is that the "plaintiff is a citizen and resident of the state of-." How the petitioner intended to fill the blank left we have no means of telling. If the petition to remove, aided by the other parts of the record, shows that the petitioner was a corporation organized under the laws of Missouri, it does not affirmatively show that Clark Prunty was not a citizen of Missouri; and if he is a citizen of Missouri the federal court has not jurisdiction of the case. We have carefully examined the record to see if any part of it would supply the defect. We find nothing to show that Clark Prunty is a citizen of a state other than Missouri. In the petition filed in the state court by him stating his cause of action he describes himself as a "resident of Caddo parish, Louisiana." But this aver ment does not supply the defect. When the jurisdiction of a court of the United States depends on citizenship of the parties, such citizenship, and not simply their residence, must be shown by the record. Abercrombie v. Dupuis, 1 Cranch, 343, 2 L. Ed. 129; 1 Rose's Notes, 177; Robertson v. Cease, 97 U. S. 647, 24 L. Ed. 1057; Mexican Central Ry. Co. v. Duthie, 189 U. S. 76, 23 Sup. Ct. 610, 47 L. Ed. 715; Horne v. Hammond, 155 U. S. 393, 15 Sup. Ct. 167, 39 L. Ed. 197; Denny v. Pironi, 141 U. S. 121, 11 Sup. Ct. 966, 35 L. Ed. 657. The record failing to affirmatively show the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, that court should have remanded the case to the state court.
The cause was improperly removed to the Circuit Court. The costs should be awarded against the party wrongfully removing the cause. M., C. & Lake M. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U. S. 379, 4 Sup. Ct. 510, 28 L. Ed. 462.
The judgment of the Circuit Court is reversed, with costs against the plaintiff in error, and the case is remanded to the Circuit Court, with directions to proceed according to law and in conformity to the opinion of this court; and it is so ordered.