Case Name: THE STATE ex rel. A. JUDAH v. JAMES L. FORT, Judge
Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1908-03-25
Citations: 210 Mo. 512
Docket Number: 
Parties: THE STATE ex rel. A. JUDAH v. JAMES L. FORT, Judge.
Judges: Fox, Graves and Woodson, JJ., concur — Woodson in separate opinion. Gantt, C. J., Burgess and Valliant, JJ., dissent — Gantt and Valliant, JJ., in opinions filed.j
Reporter: Missouri Reports
Volume: 210
Pages: 512–559

Head Matter:
THE STATE ex rel. A. JUDAH v. JAMES L. FORT, Judge.
In Banc,
March 25, 1908.
In 1907 the Legislature passed an act which in its first section says “an additional division to be known as division two is hereby created in and for the criminal court of Jackson county” and “the additional office of judge of the criminal court is hereby created,” and gave him “all the powers of s£ circuit judge in criminal cases.” By section 2 it was provided that “whenever, in the opinion of the judge of division one of the criminal court, the business of said court shall require the assistance of an additional judge to promptly dispose of the same, said judge shall notify in writing the judge of division seven of the circuit court, and thereupon said judge of division seven shall open said division two of said criminal court and proceed with the business thereof, and continue in the performance of such duties until, in the opinion of the judge of division one, such assistance is no longer needed.” By section 8 it was provided that “change -of venue shall be allowed by said criminal court from one division to the other division for any legal reason now allowed by law, that may be alleged against the judge of the division to which the same is made.” Petitioner, A. Judah, was indicted in the criminal court, and made application for a change of venue, alleging the prejudice of the judge of the division called by the act Division One. It does not appear that the judge of Division One had at that time notified the judge of Division Seven that he needed his assistance. The judge made an order calling Judge Fort, of another circuit, to try the case, and thereupon Judah made application for a writ of prohibition against Judge Fort, on the theory that the act required the case to he sent to Division Two for trial.
1. PROHIBITION: When Granted. The writ of prohibition may go whenever judicial functions are assumed^ not rightfully belonging to the court or person assuming them. Generally speaking, it is available to keep a court within the limits of its power in any particular matter, as well as to prevent the excess of jurisdiction in a cause not given to it by law.
2. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LAW: Presumption. There is a strong presumption in favor of the constitutionality of a legislative act. It will not be declared invalid by the courts unless its uneonstitutionality is so manifest as to leave no room 'for reasonable doubt.
S. -: Title. The title of an act is 'of value in determining the scope and constitutionality of the act itself.
4. -: Special Law: Confined to one County. Legislation authorized by the Constitution cannot be regarded as local or special, though its application is purely local. Whether a legislative act be a local or a general law must be determined by the generality with which it affects the.people as a whole rather . than by the extent of the territory over which it operates; if it affects equally all persons who come within its range it can be neither special nor local within the meaning of the Constitution.
5. -: -: Criminal .Court of Jackson County: Change of Venue. So that the Act of 1907, adding another division to the criminal court of Jackson county,' providing that the judge of Division Seven of the circuit court should preside as the judge of Division Two of the criminal court and that Division Seven should resolve itself into a division of the criminal court whenever the judge of Division One should in writing inform the judge of Division Seven that the business of his court requires the assistance of an additional judge, and further providing that changes of venue, because of the disqualification of the judge, should be from one division of the criminal court to the other, while it includes in its scope but one court and that the criminal court of Jackson county, is not a special law within the meaning of the Constitution, although it denies to the disqualified judge of one division the right to call in any other circuit judge in the State to try the case, but compels him to send the case to the other division of the criminal court or to call in that judge to try it.
6. -:-: Creation of Court. The Act of 1907, in providing that whenever in the opinion of the judge of Division One of the criminal court the business of his court shall require the assistance of an additional judge to promptly dispose of the same, he shall notify in writing the judge of Division Seyen of the circuit court, and thereupon the judge of Division Seven shall proceed to open Division Two of the criminal court and proceed to try the cases sent to it by Division One and so continue until in the opinion of the judge of Division One such assistance is no longer needed, did not make the existence of said Division Two as a criminal court depend upon the whim or opinion or fiat of the judge of Division One. But the act, by section 1, declaring that “an additional division, to be known as division two, is hereby created in and for the criminal court of Jackson county," created a court, and did not leave it optional with the judge of Division One to call Division Two into exist- ' ence; and by section 8, declaring that “change of venue shall be allowed by said criminal court from one division to the other” and that "upon application for a change of venue in proper form, the cause shall be transferred to the other division,” is implied a court already open and every immediate and incidental power necessary to the performance of the main judicial power.
Per WOODSON, J., in a separate concurring opinion. •
1. SPECIAL LAW: Criminal Court. The courts will take judicial notice that Jackson county has a population exceeding fifty thousand, and, therefore, the General Assembly has the power to establish a criminal court in that county.
2. -: -: Jurisdiction of Circuit Judge. Under the ■ Constitution the establishment of a criminal court within a county constituting a part or a whole of a judicial circuit, does not deprive the circuit judge of that circuit of jurisdiction to hear and determine criminal cases in the criminal court of that circuit or in any other criminal or circuit court of the State; but any 'such circuit judge may be called in by the judge of the criminal court of his circuit to try a criminal case in the criminal court. The most that the Legislature has power to do, by establishing a criminal court in a county, is to abate the jurisdiction of the circuit judge of such county to try criminal cases therein until he is called in by the judge of the criminal court.
3. -: -: -: Act of 1907: Special Law: Change of Venue. That being the case the judge of Division One of the criminal court of Jackson county has the power to call in the judge of Division Seven of the circuit court of that county to try a criminal case; and that being true, when such circuit judge is so called in he has jurisdiction to try the criminal case. Likewise, such circuit judge has jurisdiction to try a criminal case sent to him on change of venue by the judge of Division One of the criminal court. Hence, the statute of 1907 which says that criminal cases shall in certain contingencies be tried in Division Seven of the circuit court and designates it when trying criminal cases as Division Two of the criminal court, and requires the changes of venue to be taken to said Division Two, is not a special law.
Per VALL1ANT, J., dissenting.
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Act of 1907: Criminal Court of Jackson County: Change of Venue. The Act of 1907, announcing its purpose to create “an additional division of the criminal court of Jackson county” and creating “an additional office of judge of said criminal court,” is not unconstitutional; but the acts of the judge of. Division One of said criminal court, in refusing to send to Division Two of said court a case on change of venue in which he had been disqualified and in calling in a circuit judge of another circuit to try the case, are not violative of the mandates of that act, said Division Two having never been called into potential existence.
2. -: -:-: Special Law. The circuit and criminal courts named in the Constitution are not local tribunals, but component parts of the judicial system of the State. They are State institutions, and therefore the laws establishing them and prescribing their machinery are general laws, not local or special, although to some of them are given peculiar features rendered necessary by the local considerations in the places where the courts are to sit.
3. -: -: -: Specifying Certain Judge. Nor is the Act of 1907 unconstitutional because it specified that the judge of a particular division of the circuit court of Jackson county (Division Seven) may be called to preside in either one of the divisions of. the criminal court, since he is not designated by name, or referred to as an individual, but is designated only by his-official title, and the act therefore applies, not only to the present judge presiding in Division Seven, but to any judge who at the time he is called may be occupying the office.
4. -s; -: -: -: Arbitrary Selection. In determining the constitutionality of the act, it is not necessary for the court to know why Division Seven of the circuit court was designated as the one which should aid the criminal court in disposing of an overcrowded docket. A reason that is satisfactory to the lawmakers must be sufficient for the courts. But if the Act of. 1907 had to be defended from the charge of arbitrary selec Jon of Division Seven of the circuit court, the act itself suggests good reasons why that extra burden was imposed on one rather than upon all divisions of the circuit court.
5. CREATING OFFICE AND OFFICER: No Election, Etc. The Act of 1907 said: “An additional division to be known as division two is hereby created in and for the criminal court of Jackson county, Missouri. The additional office of judge of the criminal court is hereby created.” Held, that no such additional division was in fact created, for the'reason that no provision whatever was made for the election or appointment of a judge for the said division, no term of office prescribed, no qualifications defined, and no compensation fixed.
6. CIRCUIT JUDGE: Made Criminal Judge. A circuit court has criminal jurisdiction, and the Act of 1907, imposing on one of the circuit judges of Jackson county the new duty to try criminal cases, and announcing that when he does so he shall be known as the judge of Division Two. of the criminal court, invested him with no greater authority than he already had. He was still a circuit judge, and nothing more.
7. -: -: Optional Exercise by Judge. But under the Act of 1907, neither Division Seven of the circuit court of Jackson county nor the judge thereof can exercise any criminal jurisdiction until that judge is called-to do so by the judge of Division One of the criminal court. Besides, Division Two of the criminal court, when thus called into potential existence by the judge or Division One, must close finally when the judge of Division One says he no longer, for the present, needs the aid and assistance of Division Two.
8. -: -:q-: Change of Venue: Discretion: Prohibition. And section 8, which says that when an application for a change of venue is made in either division of the criminal court for a cause disqualifying the judge of that division the cause shall be transferred to the other division, must be read in .connection with the whole act, and when so construed it means that a change of venue from Division One is to be made to Division Two when the judge of Division One has already in conformity with section 1 of the act called Division Seven of the circuit court into potential existence as Division Two of the criminal court and has not notified the judge thereof that his assistance is no longer needed. Section 8 assumes that Division Two is a criminal court open and trying criminal cases when an application for a change of venue is made in Division One; and, therefore, when petitioner seeks by prohibition to prohibit the judge of Division One, when application for change of venue is made, from notifying and requesting the judge of some other circuit to try the cause, and to compel him to send the case to Division Two for trial, te duty is on pe titioner to show that- the judge of Division One has already called the judge of Division Seven of the circuit court to his assistance and has called Division Two of the criminal court into potential existence for the trial of criminal cases, and unless he does that his application for prohibition should be denied* for the act invests the judge of Division One with a discretion, to call or not to call the judge of Division Seven to his assistance when his docket is overcrowded, and that discretion this, court cannot by mandamus or otherwise control.
Per GANTT, C. J., in a separate dissenting opinion with whom* BURGESS, J., concurs.'
1. CRIMINAL COURT OF-JACKSON COUNTY: Act of 1907. If the judge of Division Seven of the circuit court of Jackson county should be called in by the judge of Division One of the criminal court, he would, under the Act of 1907, be only the judge of the circuit court to which he had been lawfully appointed or elected, and not a judge of Division Two of the criminal court, for the act created no' such division.
2. -: -: Change of Venue. If so called in he would still be a judge of the circuit court temporarily called to assist the judge of Division One of the criminal court in the disposition of his over-crowded docket, and section 8 when read in connection with the whole of the act means that, having been so called in as a temporary assistant, a cause might be certified . to him which the judge of Division One was incompetent under the law to try. But until so callea in there would be, under the law, no such thing as Division Two of the criminal court, to which a cause could be sent on change of venue.
3. -: -: Division Two: Temporary Expedient. There is no such thing under the Act of 1907 as a permanent Division Two of the criminal court of Jackson county, but it is at most only a temporary expedient for the disposition of the docket when and only when the judge of the criminal court is of the opinion that he needs assistance to dispose of the business of his court, and in writing so notifies the judge of Division Seven of the circuit court.
4. -: -: -: Change of Venue: Calling in Another Judge. And in the absence of a call upon and notification to.the judge of Division Seven of the circuit court, there is no obstacle to the calling in by the judge of the criminal court of a judge of some other circuit court to try a case, when an application for a change of venue has been made against the judge of the criminal court.
5. -: -: -:-:-: Prohibition. Unless the petition for prohibition, which has for its object to prohibit the judge of the criminal court of Jackson county from calling in a judge of another circuit to try a case, in which an application for a change of venue disqualifying the judge has been filed, shows that at the time it was filed the judge of the criminal court had called to his assistance the judge of Division Seven of the circuit court and that such judge was at the time actually engaged in, and his court was at the time open for, the trial of the docket of said criminal court, the writ should be denied.
6. -: -: Unconstitutional: Delegation of Legislative Power. The Act of 1907, authorizing the judge of the criminal court of Jackson county to call to his assistance, whenever in his opinion the business of his court may require such assistance, the judge of Division Seven of the circuit court, who is then required to put aside all civil business and'engage in the trial of criminal cases, is unconstitutional, not as a special law, but because on its face it delegates legislative power, which by the Constitution is vested exclusively in the General Assembly. The determination of the necessity for an additional judge of the criminal court is a legislative function, and the exercise of judgment and discretion in reference to that necessity can legally and constitutionally be made only by the General Assembly. The Act of 1907 delegated to the judge of the criminal court the judgment and discretion of determining when, in his opinion, the business of his court becomes so congested as to need the assistance of another judge or court to properly dispose of it, and until he so determines the judge of Division Seven of the circuit court can exercise no judicial power to try criminal cases, and the act thereby delegated a legislative function to a judicial officer.
7. -: -: -: Uncertainty. Said act is unconstitutional also for lack of certainty and for failure to prescribe a rule of conduct.
Prohibition.
Peremptory writ awarded.
A. L. Cooper and Frank M. Lowe for relator.
(1) Prohibition is the proper remedy. State ex rel. v. Elkin, 130- Mo. 90; State ex rel. v. Eby, 170 Mo. 497; State ex rel. v. Bradley, 193 Mo. 33; State ex rel. v. Fort, 178 Mo. 518. (2) The act created an additional division to be known as Division Two of the criminal court of Jackson county, Missouri, and under section 8 the duty of Judge Wallace was clear, and the cause should have been transferred to Division Two of the criminal court of Jackson county. State v. Shipman, 93 Mo. 157. (3) The act is valid. State ex rel. v. Dabbs, 118 Mo. App. 663; Coffey v. Carthage, 200 Mo. 616; State v. Etchman, 189 Mo. 648. (4) The citizens and bar of Jackson county have recognized that Division 2 was created to meet a condition in this thriving and populous community; to expedite the transaction of the criminal business of this county; and to save costs and expense to the State incident to numerous defendants'being kept in prison awaiting trial; and the only judicial expression sustaining the order calling in respondent, to which our attention has been called, is that sending this, and some 1200 other misdemeanor cases to Division No. 2, as prayed for in the various applications for changes of venue, would be violative of some “inexorable rule of law that a defendant cannot choose his own forum which he would be doing if the cases were sent to Division No. 2, such choice of the forum being reserved to the judge against whom the applications were filed.” We have been unable to find any authorities sustaining such a position, and believe that none exists. Expressions of this court are all to the contrary, and this court, as well as both courts of appeals, have uniformly held that a change of venue is a pure matter or creation of statute, and is regulated and controlled only by the provisions of the statute applicable.
I. B. Kimbrell and R. H. Field for respondent.
(1) The only possible question on the petition in this case, is, did the Missouri -legislative act approved March 19, 1907, repeal or amend section 2597, Revised Statutes 1899, as to the criminal court of Jackson county? Otherwise, it cannot be doubted that the criminal court of Jackson county had the right under the general statute (section 2597) to select and call in Judge Fort or the judge of any other circuit court in this state to try the case of State v. Judah, for running a theatre on Sunday. State v. Gillham, 174 Mo, 671. This very right as belonging to the Jackson County Criminal Court was affirmed in State v. Hudspeth, 159 Mo. 210. See, also, State v. McCarver, 194 Mo. 737. (2) The Missouri legislative act, approved March 19, 1907, contains no words expressing a repeal of section 2597, Revised Statutes 1899, neither does the said legislative act prohibit the judge of the criminal court from exercising the prerogative conferred by section 2597. Hence, the criminal court of Jackson county has the prerogative, as before the Act of 1907, to call in an outside judge under section 2597. Repeals by implication are not favored, and particularly is this true when it comes to cutting down and taking away the prerogative or jurisdiction of a court. This principle is emphasized in the case of State ex rel. v. County Court, 38 Mo. 403. See, also: Tackett v. Vogler, 85 Mo. 483; St. Louis v. Hollrah, 175 Mo. 845; Locldand v. Walker, 151 Mo. 213. (3) The first observation that may be made on this legislative act is this: While section 1 purports to create an additional division of the criminal court of Jackson, county, section 2 seems to require that the proposed second division of the criminal court shall come into existence and operation only on the requisition of the regular judge of the criminal court; and that the existence and operation of said Division 2 of the criminal court shall finally adjourn and “stand adjourned until the assistance of said judge is again needed.” So that it is not for the trial of change of venue cases- that the regular judge of the criminal court is authorized to call into existence and operation the said Division No. 2 of .the criminal court. It is therefore respectfully submitted that section 8, on which relator bases his right to be tried by the Hon. E. E. Porterfield, applies only when both of the created divisions of the criminal court are in esse and in operation, as provided by section 2 of the act, which is not alleged in the petition herein. This court has characterized it as against the general principles of the law and the administration of justice to allow a defendant in a criminal case to select his own judge. State ex rel. v. Wofford, 119 Mo. 383. (4) A fair construction of section 9' of the act reserves to the judge of the criminal court all of his prerogatives conferred in section 2597, Revised Statutes 1899. (5) Conceding, on the holding of this court in Coffee v. Carthage, 200 Mo. 616, that the Act of 1907 would not be a special law if it applied equally to all of the judges of the circuit court of Jackson county, it does not so apply. This legislative act' is so worded as to give all of the jurisdiction and prerogatives of the regular judge of the criminal court to the judge of Division 7 of the circuit court of Jackson county. This jurisdiction and prerogative is given to him and to none of the other seven circuit court judge's in Jackson county. We respectfully submit that this 1907 legislative act is from that point of view a special law and is prohibited by section 53 of article 4 of the State Constitution, and that it is void both as a substantive en-. actment and as an indirect repeal of the general statute (sec. 2597, R. S. 1899). State v. Hill, 147 Mo. 63; Ashbrook v. Schaub, Í60 Mo. 107; State v. Etchman, 189 Mo. 160; Henderson v. Koenig, 168 Mo. 356. (6) The act contains no provision governing changes of venue in any other county than Jackson county, nor any other court than the criminal court of .Jackson county; hence, to hold this special legislative act as taking away from the criminal court (as here contended by relator) the prerogative to call-in the judge of another circuit necessarily construes the special legislative act as a repeal of section 2597 as to Jackson county only, and to make it violative of the last clause of section 53, article 4 of the State Constitution, which, reads as follows: “Nor shall the General Assembly indirectly enact special or local law by the partial repeal of a general law.” Henderson v. Koenig, 168 Mo. 356. (7) Nor can the act stand as an amendment to section 2597, Revised Statutes 1899. Construed as an amendment to section 2597, the act is unconstitutional and void, because it does not set out -section 2597 or state how it is amended, as is required by the Constitution, article 4, section 34. French v. Woodward, 58 Mo. 66; Copeland v. Pirie, 26 Wash. 481; Board of Fire Com. v. Trenton, 53 N. J. L. 566; 26- Am. and Eng. Etncy. Law (2 Ed.), 706.

Opinion:
LAMM, J. —
This is an original proceeding in prohibition.
Such preliminary and intermediate steps were had in the cause that, when finally submitted, it stood on an implied concession that allegations of fact well pleaded in the petition were true. Respondent's counsel make a statement of the case admirably fair and colorless, full and brief. We borrow and use it for the purposes of this opinion, viz.:
"The relator, A. Judah, was indicted in the criminal court of Jackson county, Missouri, at the September term, 1907, for running a Sunday theater in Kansas City, Missouri. Afterwards, on or about October 24-th, 1907, by affidavit of himself and two witnesses, relator disqualified the Hon. William H. Wallace, the judge of the criminal court to try said cause. After-wards on November 30th, the Jackson County Criminal Court made an order, setting the case down for trial January 7th, 1908, before the Hon. James L. Fort of Stoddard county, Missouri, Judge of the Twenty-second Judicial Circuit in this State, and notified and requested Judge Fort to appear and try the said cause in the Jackson County Criminal Court.
"The relator asks in.the petition for prohibition herein, that Judge Port he prohibited from trying the said cause in the criminal court, on the sole ground that the Hon. William H. Wallace, judge of the criminal court, was by the Missouri legislative act, approved March 19th, 1907, not then allowed to call in Judge Port or any judge of another circuit under the general statute (Sec. 2597) and was not then alldwed to call in any judge to try said cause except the Hon. E. E. Porterfield, judge of Division No. 7 of the circuit court of Jackson county, Missouri, at Kansas City."
Referring to the foregoing statement, we shall assume that counsel mean by "section 2597" of the Revised Statutes, a new section of that number substituted for the old section, repealed in 1905 (Laws 1905, p. 131). We shall assume also that counsel, when they say that Judge Wallace can only call in Judge Porter-field, judge of Division No. 7 of the circuit court of Jackson county, Missouri, mean to say that he can only call in the judge of Division No. 7, whomsoever he may he at the time.
It serves a wholesome purpose — a judicial purpose —to say that whatever fervor or color crept into the ease in any of its preliminaries or in oral argument, has been cast aside, and it is now put to us by briefs presenting merely a serene and dignified legal question relating to a change of venue statute, to be determined dispassionately by the aid of right reason alone — to be settled, moreover, on the theory that vexed questions relating to the "sacredness of the natural right to labor," on the one hand, and the sacredness of the Christian Sabbath of our fathers, on the other, are not in the case at bar at all and, hence, may be safely left to take care of themselves when a concrete case involving questions of law relating to either reaches this court in due course. When such vexed questions reach this court they will receive in the future as they have in the past a judicial consideration suited to their solemn character — such consideration as is due from the highest court of a free and Christian people on questions which (to borrow the animated language of Sir John Culpepper in the Long Parliament) "sup in our cup, dip in our dish and sit by our fire." The ease itself, the parties litigant, the learned counsel on both sides and this court are to be felicitated not a little on this happy statu,s quo; for, in the forum, Reason and Passion are an ill-assorted pair of handmaidens.
It will do to say, also, that the issue here comes close home to the administration of the whole body of the criminal law in Jackson county. This is so, because, until the question shall be settled as to whether a change of venue goes from Judge Wallace of Division One'to Judge Porterfield of Division Two of that court, or vice-versa, there is left a wide open and anxious proposition — a proposition which may be injected by astuteness and desire into the trials of indictments on every grade of offense known to the criminal law in a great city. Therefore, it becomes a question that appeals, sua sponte, to the final and controlling source of judicial power; and,- therefore, it ought to be settled out of hand and not left to be determined this way or that, nisi, subject to the hazard of being determined contrary to our views, and thus lodge reversible error in criminal trials in that county at the beck and call of defendants who seek changes of venue from Division One of that court. This, is no fanciful dilemma. A change of venue is no unusual incident in a case. A change of venue in a criminal case, where the trial judge is basing his ruling on the unconstitutionality of the statute relating to the change of venue, would become an ordinary incident; for such ruling is an implied invitation to inject the question into the record to the end that an exception may be saved and a judgment against defendant be reversed, if, peradventure, an appellate court finally sustains the constitutionality of the law. Such considerations as these have appealed powerfully to us to exercise our discretion in taking-cognizance of this case. A stitch in time saves nine, an ounce of prevention is better than a pound of cure, in law as in everyday life.
I. It cannot be doubted that (subject to a judicial discretion to be exercised in issuing all discretionary writs) the writ of prohibition may go to confine a court within the limits of its jurisdiction whether such court has no jurisdiction at all or is exercising powers in excess of its rightful jurisdiction. So much is elementary. The writ may go whenever judicial functions are assumed, not rightfully belonging to the person or court assuming them. Generally speaking, it is available to keep a court within the limits of its power in any particular matter as well as to prevent the excess of jurisdiction in a cause not given to it by law. [State ex rel. v. Foster, Judge, 187 Mo. 590; State ex rel. v. Elkin et al., County Judges, 130 Mo. 90; State ex rel. v. Eby, Judge, 170 Mo. 497; State ex rel. v. Bradley, Judge, 193 Mo. 33; State ex rel. v. Fort, Judge, 178 Mo. 518.]
II. As presently seen, the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Act of 1907 (Laws 1907, p. 209), creating Division Two of the criminal court of Jackson county and providing for the distribution of cases between the two divisions, for changes of venue from one to the other, etc., is assailed. But before we set out to consider that question, we may profitably remind ourselves of certain fundamental and unbending rules controlling courts in the determination of a question of that grave character. For it must not be forgotten that those judges of solidest parts in wisdom — i. the crowned oracles of the law — have set bounds to them selves and to judicial authority in determining the constitutionality óf a law. Courts will not shrink from the discharge of a constitutional duty in declaring a legislative act unconstitutional in given conditions. But at the same time they should not go out of their way to declare -it unconstitutional. They will not, except under an imperative call, incroach upon legislative power. There is a strong presumption in favor of the constitutionality of an act of the law-maker. Therefore, it is a settled and cardinal principle that an act of the legislature is not to be declared void unless the violation of the Constitution is so palpable, so manifest, as to leave no room for reasonable doubt. The question obviously becomes one of high delicacy and discriminating use of judicial power.
As said by a great judge, Chief Justice Shaw (in Wellington et al., Petitioners, 16 Pick. l. c. - 96): "Courts will approach the question with great caution, examine it in every possible aspect; and ponder upon it as long as deliberation and patient attention can throw any new light on the subject, and never declare a statute void, unless the nullity and invalidity of the act are placed, in their judgment, beyond reasonable doubt." [State ex rel. v. McIntosh, 205 Mo. l. c. 602; State v. Layton, 160 Mo. l. c. 490; State ex rel. v. Warner, 197 Mo. l. c. 656.] It is by such guiding lights, and not otherwise, that we must determine the constitutionality of the provisions of the Act of 1907.
III. In effect, two views aré taken, arguendo, of' the Act of 1907. If we entertain either, the preliminary rule should be quashed and the peremptory writ denied. One is that certain provisions of that act are within the interdiction of those provisions of the Constitution directed against special legislation. The other may be said to be that the act may be held constitutional and yet it may be so construed that the general statute relating to changes of venue is left operative in Jackson county, in spite of the provisions of the law of 1907. It may be conceded that if section 2597, as enacted in 1905, is held operative in Jackson county to the exclusion of the Act of 1907, then the judge of Division One of the criminal court did no more and no less than he was authorized by law to do when he called in Judge Fort to try relator. Under this concession we need hot dwell upon the provisions of section 2597; but (the case requiring it) devote our attention to an analysis of the Act of 1907.
The title of that act is of value in determining the scope and constitutionality of the act itself. [Sedalia ex rel. v. Smith, 206 Mo. 346.] That title is as follows (Laws 1907, p. 209): "An Act to create an additional division of the criminal court of-Jackson county, Missouri ; to provide for a judge to preside over the same; to provide for officers to attend said court; to provide for the apportionment of cases now or hereafter filed in said court; to empower the judges of said court to makes rules for the numbering and distribution and transfer of cases therein, and to make rules for other purposes; to provide for holding court in any division thereof when the judge thereof shall be unable to hold the same; to provide for the transfer of cases between the court at Independence and at Kansas City; to provide for a place to hold said court; to provide for a stenographer to attend said court; and to provide for changes of venue from, said court and from each division thereof, with an emergency clause."
Section 1 of the act is: "An additional division, to be known as division two, is hereby created in and for the criminal court of Jackson county, Missouri. The additional office of judge of the criminal court is hereby created. Tbe judge of said court shall have all the powers of a circuit judge in criminal cases, and all acts now in force, or that may hereafter be passed regulating the practice and proceedings in criminal cases shall apply to and govern the proceedings of said divisions of said court. The present judge of said' criminal court shall preside over division one of said criminal court during the remainder of his term of office, and he shall he known as the judge of division one thereof."
Section 2 reads: "Whenever, in the opinion of the judge of division one of said criminal court, the business of said court shall require the assistance of an additional judge to promptly dispose of the same, said judge of division one of said criminal court shall notify, in writing, the judge of division seven of the circuit court of Jackson county, and it shall thereupon be the duty of said judge of said division seven of said circuit court, with all convenient speed (but not until the conclusion of the case which may then be on trial before him in said circuit court) proceed to open said division two of said criminal court, and to proceed with the business thereof, and to continue in the performance of such duties until, in the opinion of the judge of division one of said court, that such assistance is no longer needed, and the judge of .division two shall thereupon adjourn said division two of said court finally; and said division shall stand adjourned until the assistance of said judge is again needed. All matters pending in said division two at the time of such adjournment shall be transferred to division one, and the judge of division one shall have full power to act in all such matters so transferred to his court. But the judge of division two shall retain authority to. dispose of motions for a new trial, in arrest of judgment, and similar motions, to sign bills of exceptions, to allow appeals and to make such other orders in any cases tried before him as shall be necessary to protect the rights of appeals of the defendants in such cases. If the judge of said division two shall fail to make an order transferring all matters to said division one prior to the adjournment of said court, the adjournment itself shall constitute such transfer."
Section 3 is not material here. It provides that division two shall be attended by the clerk of the criminal court and the marshal of said county or by their deputies.
Section 4 provides that division two shall have and exercise all the power and jurisdiction possessed by division one and that all the laws how in force applying to the criminal court of Jackson county which apply to division one, shall apply to division two, except as modified by the act itself.
Section 5 gives power .to the judge of division two to appoint a stenographer to perform certain duties, who shall be entitled to certain compensation, such compensation to cease as soon as division two adjourns.
Section 6 is: "Whenever said division two of said criminal court is in session, the judge thereof shall try such cases and dispose of such business as may be agreed upon between the judges of division one and division two thereof; and in case they cannot agree thereon, all cases then pending, or hereafter filed, if not already numbered, shall be numbered consecutively according to their dates of filing, and all odd numbered cases shall be assigned to division one and all even numbered cases shall be assigned to division two, while said division two is in session. ' '
Section 7 provides that division two may sit at Independence whenever in the opinion of the judges of both divisions and the prosecuting attorney it is thought that assistance is needed there.
Section 8 reads: "Change of venue shall be allowed by said criminal court from one division to the other division for any legal reason now allowed by law, that may be alleged against the judge of the division to which the same is made. Upon such applica tion for a change of venne in proper form, the cause shall be transferred" to the other division, or the disqualified judge may require the judge of the other division to hold court in the division of the disqualified judge and try said cause. If both divisions of said court are not in session when an application for a change of venue is made, such division not in session may be opened within a reasonable time thereafter and proceed' with the trial of said cause, or the judge not disqualified to hold court may, hold court for the disqualified judge in the court room of the disqualified judge. If application for a change of venue in any division of said court shall be made against more than one judge thereof, the judge before whom the same is made shall determine whether or not the facts exist as charged against the other judge."
Section 9 provides that when either judge is sick or absent or for any cause cannot hold his term or part of term in division, such term or part of term by request of the judge of division may be held by the judge of the other division and if no such request is made, or the judge so requested fails to hold such term or part of term, the judge from some other circuit shall be called in to hold court for such division for the occasion.
Section 10 provides that the judge of' division seven of said circuit court shall receive the same pay when acting as judge of division two of the criminal court as he receives as circuit, judge and from the same source.
Section 11 authorizes the judge of division two to direct where his court shall be held in Kansas City until such time as the county court shall provide a suitable court room. The payment of the cost of preparation and the rent is provided for.
Section 12 is: "The judges of said criminal court in Jackson county are hereby empowered to frame and enter of record in said court rules for the numbering of all cases now pending, or hereafter brought therein, for the proper distribution of cases for trial and disposition among the various divisions of said court, and for the transfer of cases to and from such division and between Independence and Kansas City, which rules may, in like manner, be changed from time to time as may be found necessary. Said judges, or a majority of them, may in like manner make from time to time such other rules for said court as may be agreeable to the usages and principles of íaw and not inconsistent with the code of procedure and the Constitution and laws of this State."
Section 13 reads: "So much of all acts now in force and applying to said criminal court as are not repealed by inconsistency .of this act, are hereby continued and made to apply to the two divisions of said criminal court in said Jackson county."
Section 14 reads: "All acts or parts of acts inconsistent with this act are hereby repealed."
Section 15 reads: "The increase of the criminal business of said criminal court in saidn county being so great that the said criminal court as now constituted is unable to dispose of the same, because said business is in arrears, and is continually and rapidly accumulating and aggravating the delay in the administration of justice, an emergency is created within the meaning of the Constitution, which requires that this act shall go into effect immediately on its approval; therefore this act shall go into and have effect and be in force from and after its approval."
(a) Is the foregoing act bad under the constitutional provisions against special - legislation ?
Plainly it includes in its scope but one court and that is the criminal court of Jackson- county. In one sense, therefore, it might be said to be a local law — a special act. If, now, the question were new, much might he said pro and con, but it is not new. In the particular in hand, the Act of 1907 does not differ in substance from other legislation declared constitutional, over and over again,' upon full argument and mature deliberation in this court. For instance, an act providing among other things for holding a term of the circuit court of Montgomery county at Montgomery City in said county (Laws 1889, p. 68), State ex rel. v. Hughes, 104 Mo. 459, was sustained against the same attack. In 1887 (Laws 1887, p. 53) the Legislature provided for holding terms of court at Piedmont in Wayne county. The act was assailed as unconstitutional,, but was sustained. [State v. Orrick, 106 Mo. 111.] The same point was made in relation to a court established at Higginsville in Lafayette county and the ruling there followed that in the Hughes and Orrick cases. [State ex rel. v. Field, 119 Mo. 611.] The same point was again here in State ex rel. v. Yancy, 123 Mo. 391, and was ruled the same way. - Inferentially it was involved in Ex parte Renfrow, 112 Mo. 591, with a like result. So, in State ex inf. v. Dabbs, 182 Mo. 359. It was directly involved in State v. Etchman, 189 Mo. 648, and in Coffey v. Carthage, 200 Mo. 616, with a like result.
It is not wise to swell the opinion by restating the doctrines and propositions expounded in the cases cited. The general principle underlying all those cases was that legislation authorized by the Constitution (as was this, art. 6, sec. 31, Const.), cannot be regarded as local or special though its application is purely local, and that whether an act of the Legislature be a local or a general law must be determined by the generality with' which it affects the people as a whole rather than by the extent of the territory over which it operates; and if it affects equally all persons who come within its range it can be neither special nor .local within the meaning of the Constitution. That general doctrine applies in the point now under discussion made against the Act of 1907, and saves the law.
In the Coffey ease the assault was made on the provisions of the act dividing the circuit court of Jasper county into two divisions, and a point was raised relating to the procedure in changes of venue. The constitutionality of the provisions of that act relating to changes of venue was sustained. Like provisions relating to changes of venue in the several divisions of the circuit courts of Jackson and Buchanan counties have been enforced by this court. [Guy v. Railroad, 197 Mo. 174; Eudaley v. Railroad, 186 Mo. 399; Leslie v. Chase & Son Merc. Co., 200 Mo. 363.]
The upshot of the whole matter is this: The judicial system of the State is a whole, and therefore acts dealing with the courts have been usually held general though not applicable to every court of like nature in the State. [State ex rel. v. Shields, 4 Mo. App. 259.]
The reasoning of all the foregoing cases may be found crisply stated in the above generalization. [See a learned note to section 53 of article 4 of the Constitution, on page 203, Mo. Ann. Stat. 1906.]
We can add nothing to what was said in the cases cited, and, upon the doctrine there announced, the point is ruled against respondent.
(b) The Act of 1907 was assailed in oral argument from another side. The contention is subtle and somewhat baffles precision of formulation. Stated broadly it seems to be thát Division Two is made a criminal court by legislative flat. The title of the Act of 1907 and the provisions following that title put so much beyond dispute. But it is contended that under the somewhat obscure and involved provisions of section two of the act, though it is a full-fledged court armed with judicial power to try criminal cases in Jackson county, yet, so far as the performance of each and all such duties is concerned in taking cognizance of cases, it comes and goes at the will and pleasure of Division One. Under some sleight of hand in judicial necromancy, hitherto unheard of, it acts a role in the childish play of Now You See It and Now You Don't See It. It is argued that it has nothing whatever to do until the judge of Division One says so. If he never says so, that ends it — it sleeps on until he awakens it into life and action. Being dormant, Division One may leave it in that pickle and go to the General Statutes for power to call in outside help in changes of venue.
If a court, a judicial entity, can be created of that sleepy and novel character it would seem to be under some doctrine more honored in the breach than in the observance. If that contention be sound, then in my opinion the court has no reason to exist and ought to be pruned off as an unconstitutional excrescence. It is but a barren fig tree and should be cut down; for why cumbereth it the ground? The thing is lukewarm, so to speak, and, being neither cold nor hot, should be spewed out of the mouth. If the only question here was Hamlet's old one, To Be, or Not to Be, and if the court could only Be when Division One says "Be," then the law should say, "Not Be," and put a quietus on the court itself. But if the whole act be considered from its four corners and all its intendments sought out, such notion is foreign to its provisions. If section 2 and section 8 be construed together and in the light of the manifest purpose of the law — the need and occasion of it — so as to give effect to all its provisions, it will be found that in so far as Division One may have more cases than it can try, it can dispose of such excess by transferring them (under rules to be adopted by the judges of both divisions) to Division Two. There is nothing unreasonable about that. It is a sensible working-plan, adjusting itself. That is, if two wills exist, there. will be found a tuciy, and when Division Two has performed the assigned labor it stands adjourned so far as that particular work is concerned. But when we turn to section 8 we are confronted with a different condition of things altogether. There is nothing optional in that section-nothing which indicates that the judge of Division One must call Division Two into action or session to receive cases on change of venue. To the contrary the statute assumes it is open as a receptacle into which Division One shall pour the jurisdiction it is parting with; and, therefore, a defendant who takes a change of venue can point to section 1 of-the Act of 1907 which creates Division Two and endows it with all the powers of a court, and say to the judge of Division One: "There is the court, made such by legislative fiat, endowed with every inherent and incidental power necessary to carry cut the purpose of its organization, and to which under section 8 of the act you must transfer my case." We think the clear words of the law point unfalteringly to' the legislative purpose that Division Two should receive and try changes of venue from Division One and vice versa. Division One has no will about it. It loses jurisdiction by the change and its responsibility is at an end. The change going, the law takes care of it. This being true, why should we approach that act with a sour and critical disposition to wrest any other meaning out of it? Why turn a cold countenance on the statute? Accordingly, the language of section 8 being mandatory, what good reason can be given why a change of venue should not he granted to Division Two, precisely as we have held must he the ease in Jackson, Buchanan and Jasper, counties and in the city •of St. Louis in civil eases?
It was argued orally (as we grasped it at the time) that it is wise to leave to the judge of Division One a. certain flexibility of power in changes of venue to call in a circuit judge or a criminal judge from any other part of the State. But that is an argument to be addressed to the Legislature. Not only so, but it proceeds upon either a false or a fanciful premise. It proceeds on the implied theory that the judge of Division Two may be an unsafe judge in upholding the majesty of the law and that the judge of Division One would presumably be aware of that fact, and, so forewarned, he will seek to serve the majesty of the law by bringing in a better judge to uphold it. But what if the judge of Division Two at such crisis (when, if ever, it arises) is not subject to such infirmity? And what if the judge of Division One (when, if ever, the crisis does come) has a mote or a beam in his own eye, causing him to see and move obliquely for by-ends? One judge is as liable to be inefficient as the other. Wherever McG-regor sits may be the head of the table of wisdom, but (alas!) who will point out McGregor¶ Under some circumstances the argument could be made to run precisely the other way, and the supposed sword be two-edged. The truth is that all such reasoning is unsound. The theory of the law is that every judge is a component part of the department of justice, a sound member of a sound body, that each member of the judiciary will seek the law and do it — will strive with might and main, bringing into play every endowed power of mind and heart, to fearlessly uphold the whole body of the law — will act righteously without fear and without favor. Any other theory cannot be tolerated for a moment. If the black evils suggested in argument should unfortunately come, there is a remedy under the policy of our laws. Those evils may be tempered by a wise use of the appointing power in case of vacancies — by a wise use of the elective franchise in case terms of judicial officers expire and, if it comes to the worst — other remedies exist. They cannot he tempered by wresting a change of venue law from the lines chalked out in the statute.
The Act of 1907 .is a crude piece of legislation-diffuse, cumbersome, involved, and, hence, troublesome to interpret — but when we consider that in creating Division Two and giving it full-fledged judicial power there is implied every intermediate or incidental power necessary to the performance of the main power, the trouble vanishes and we can see that Division Two in legal contemplation stands open and ready to receive cases on change of venue, and that it would violate the spirit and letter of the statute not to send such cases to that division.
The grant of power to try changes of venue, carried with it by necessary implication everything necessary to make such grant effectual (State ex rel. v. Perkins, 139 Mo. l. c. 118), including the power to meet, open court, try the case, adjourn and generally live, move and have its being as a court in that behalf.
Accordingly, we so hold.
The premises considered, Judge Fort had no legal right to take jurisdiction of relator's case. It should' go to Division Two where Judge Porterfield by virtue of being judge of Division Seven of the circuit court has jurisdiction ex officio as judge of Division Two of the criminal court of Jackson county.
The preliminary rule is made absolute, and a permanent writ is awarded. We shall not assess the costs against Judge Fort. Let the relator páy them. It is so ordered.
Fox, Graves and Woodson, JJ., concur — Woodson in separate opinion. Gantt, C. J., Burgess and Valliant, JJ., dissent — Gantt and Valliant, JJ., in opinions filed.j