Case Name: Van Publishing Company, Appellant, v. Westinghouse, Church, Kerr & Company, Respondent
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1902
Citations: 72 A.D. 121
Docket Number: 
Parties: Van Publishing Company, Appellant, v. Westinghouse, Church, Kerr & Company, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 72
Pages: 121–128

Head Matter:
Van Publishing Company, Appellant, v. Westinghouse, Church, Kerr & Company, Respondent.
' Action for false representations — knowledge of their falsity must he alleged, — merger of oral representations in a writing—implied warranty that an engine is fit for its intended, use —proof as to its acceptance.
A complaint in an action to recover damages for false representations must allege that the defendant knew of the falsity of the representations.
Oral representations as to the character and advantages of a gas engine, made by the vendor of such engine to the vendee thereof, prior to the execution of the written contract of sale and not alluded to when such contract is made, are merged in the contract and cannot be sued upon as collateral oral warranties. Where it appears that the vendor understood that the vendee wanted the engine for certain work, the sale is accompanied by an implied waranty that the engine is reasonably fit and suitable for that work. Such a warranty will not survive the acceptance of the engine, but before the vendee can be said to have accepted it, he is entitled to an opportunity to observe its efficiency and sufficient time in which to test it.
Evidence that the vendee paid for the engine after using it some six or eight weeks, and that about three months after such payment it exploded while in the vendee’s possession, presents a question for the jury whether there was an acceptance of the engine, where it appears that the engine never worked with entire satisfaction, and that the purchase price was paid in reliance upon the vendor’s promise to remedy the defects contained therein, and that the vendor was engaged in attempting to remedy such defects down to the time when the engine exploded.
Van Brunt, P. J., dissented.
Appeal by the plaintiff, the Van Publishing Company, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in' favor of the defendant, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 17th day of December, 1901, upon the dismissal of the complaint by direction of the court after a trial at the New York Trial Term.
The action was brought upon the following complaint.
“ 1. That at the times hereinafter mentioned said plaintiff was, and • now is, a domestic corporation, organized and existing under the laws of the State of New York.
“ 2. Upon information and belief, that said defendant was at said times hereinafter mentioned, and now is, a foreign corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State o'f New Jersey.
“ 3. That heretofore and prior to March 1st, 1898, said defendant, after examination and inspection of plaintiff’s printing plant and premises at Number 254 West 54th street in the city of New York, • made • certain representations in regard to an engine which said plaintiff, relying upon said representations and believing the same to' be true, purchased from said defendant on or about said last mentioned date and paid the sum Seventeen hundred and twenty-seven dollars and forty-five cents.
" 4. That the said representations sd made as aforesaid were, in substance and effect, that the cost of running said engine to produce the electrical power required for the aforesaid printing plant would be less than the cost of such electrical power if supplied by a direct current from the street lines supplying. the same ; that the power so supplied by said engine would equal'30 Brake Horse Power, and would be more than sufficient to run said plant, and that said engine was well made, reliable and efficient for the purpose for which plaintiff proposed to use the same.
“ 5. That, relying upon said representations, which were material thereto, and believing the same to be true, said plaintiff purchased said engine as aforesaid, together with the electrical machinery and apparatus necessary to use the same, constructed a foundation therefor in accordance with said defendant’s instructions and specifications, ánd installed said engine, machinery and apparatus upon plaintiff’s said premises at a further and additional cost to plaintiff of Fifteen hundred and two dollars and five cents.
“ 6. That the cost of running said engine was more than the. cost of electrical power supplied by a direct current from the said street lines ; that the power supplied by said engine under the most favorable conditions amounted to less than 30 Brake Horse Power ; that said engine was not well made, reliable or efficient for the purposes for which plaintiff proposed and attempted to .use the same; that said engine eventually and after inspection and repairs by defendant, broke down, wrecking the plunger or piston in one of its three compartments and stopping the operation of said plaintiff’s said plant, to plaintiff’s great loss and damage ; that said use or attempt to use said engine caused damage to the adjoining property owners of said plaintiff, amounting to Sixty-five dollars and eighty-seven cents, which damages said plaintiff has paid; that said representations by said defendant were false and untrue.
“ 1. That said plaintiff has heretofore notified said defendant of the falsity of said representations, tendered back to said defendant the engine so purchased as aforesaid and demanded repayment of said purchase price and payment of damages incurred and expended by said plaintiff by and on account of said purchase and attempted use of said engine, machinery and apparatus, which tender and demand have been refused.
“ Wherefore said plaintiff demands judgment against said defendant for the sum of Thirty-five hundred dollars, with'interest thereon from the 1st day of March, 1898,. together with the costs of. this action.”
The answer admitted the sale of the engine, denied other allegations and alleged that there was a written contract of sale, ivliich was duly carried out. The paper thus referred to was in the form of a proposal from the defendant, accepted by plaintiff, as follows :
“New York, Feb'. 2Qth, 1898.
“ To The Van Publishing Company,
“254 West 54th Street, City :
“Gentlemen.— We hereby propose to furnish yo.u, delivered on. foundation which you will supply, the following gas engine : * * * One three-cylinder Westinghouse Vertical Gas Engine. * *' * With it we will supply one cast-iron bed plate, * * * . suitable air starting device, consisting of an air pump and air storage tank, electric ignitors, and battery of six jars for spark ignition, gas regulator, full set of wrenches and fittings and plans for foundation. , This engine when running at its normal speed of 375 r. p. m. and a good quality of gas will develop 30 Brake Horse Power. * * * Our price for the above outfit * * * is eighteen hundred and twenty-five ($1825) Dollars. Terms net cash thirty days ' * " * * or less 2% for cash. * * * -
“ WESTINGHOUSE, CHURCH, KERR & COMPANY,
* * *■ “Jas. W, Wilson.
“ Accepted March 2, 1898,
“VAN PUBLISHING CO,,
“ Dillon Brown,
“ PresP
Mr. Brown, plaintiff’s president, related the statement's made to him by defendant’s agent prior to the execution' of the written proposal and' testified that after the engine was put in it ran fairly well for six weeks, except that the defendant’s men would come up Occasionally as it would get stalled and a check was then sent . in payment as “ they constantly said they would fix it all right for me and of course I supposed it would be all right; ” that the .difficulty* however, increased, it being almost impossible to get the machine started and the defendant’s men were constantly at work upon it because of this trouble down to the time when about three months later it finally exploded.
-At the Close of the plaintiff’s case the defendant "moved to dis-
miss on the ground that an action for false representations was not proved, whereupon plaintiff’s attorney disclaimed that such a cause of action was alleged and asserted that the action was for breach of warranty. The court then said: “ Taking the allegations of the complaint in that view, there is not a cause of action here, because the representations as to these particulars * * * are simply matters of opinion * * * and there is no allegation anywhere of any warranty or any intention to warrant and the written contract is in evidence, which shows what the contract was between the parties and I think that under the circumstances in this case the plaintiff was bound by the contract and the motion to dismiss must be granted.” The plaintiff then asked to go to the jury upon the question of false representation, but the court stated that there was not sufficient proof to raise the question for the jury and granted the motion to dismiss, to which ruling an exception was taken. From the judgment entered dismissing the complaint the plaintiff appeals.
John A. iStmley, for the appellant.
Arthur J. Baldwin, for the respondent.

Opinion:
O'Brien, J. :
The complaint is insufficient in averring a cause of action for false representations because there is no allegation that the defendant knew of the falsity of the representations. (Brackett v. Griswold, 112 N. Y. 467.) Excepting this omission, all the averments of an action in tort for deceit were alleged and there are no formal allegations of breach of warranty. Upon the trial, moreover, the plaintiff expressly disclaimed any intention of recovering upon the theory of deceit or false representations, and insisted that the action is one for breach of warranty.
Considering the action, however, from the standpoint of plaintiff's own construction and in view of the evidence admitted, it still remains to be determined whether at the close of plaintiff's case a dismissal of the complaint was justified. The defendant could have compelled the plaintiff to elect at the beginning of the trial whether he would stand on deceit or breach of warranty. The evidence, however, was received and it was only after the motion to dismiss was made that plaintiff elected to stand upon the breach of war ranty, and if there was sufficient to go to the jury upon that question, it was error to dismiss the complaint.
. 'Without repeating the various representations which plaintiff insists were in the nature of. warranties, it is sufficient to say that all were made prior in point of time to the execution of the written agreement of purchase and sale, and many were mere expressions of opinion and none survived the signing of the contract. As said in Vaughn Machine Co. v. Lighthouse (64 App. Div. 143): "That oral evidence is not admissible to vary the written engagement of the parties to it, where it is their entire agreement, is elementary,'but the exception is apparently as well established.that an independent collateral agreement, not contained in the writing, can be shown by parol." Although it is entirely competent, therefore, where, the written agreement is not. complete and does not embody the entire understanding between the parties to prove an oral collateral agreement not inconsistent with the written, the rule does not go so far as to permit prior oral negotiations to be introduced in evidence for the purpose either of supplementing or contradicting the formal written contract.
Here it is not claimed that at the time the formal proposal to sell the machine was made and accepted, any other or different agreement than that embodied in the writing was made, all that appears being that before that time there had been some conversations between persons respectively repreéenting the plaintiff and defendant as to the character and advantages of the machine, and these it was insisted were collateral oral warranties. To regard these oral negotiations, prior in point of time, as collateral oral agreements which survived the written contract and were not merged therein, would be going further than any reported-decision. These.statements were not cotemporaneous, but were prior in point of time, and as they were not alluded to when the contract in writing was made, they were no part thereof and under the well-settled rules must be regarded as merged in the contract. The evidence moreover as bearing upon the intention of the parties shows that, after the preliminary negotiations were had wherein the alleged representations were made, the defendants stated that they would make a formal proposal in writing, which they , did, and this being accepted, must be regarded as embodying the contract of the parties.
The theory, therefore, of a parol collateral agreement has no basis upon which to rest. With respect,, however, to the written agreement there are two classes of warranty, one implied and the other express, which need to be briefly considered.
The purpose for which the engine. was required was fully understood between the parties, and in describing its component parts and its capacity there was necessarily included the implied warranty that it should be, when delivered, reasonably fit and suitable for the work -in hand. Such implied warranty would not survive acceptance. Here, however, the machine was to be placed in position on a foundation built for it according to plans furnished by the defendant, and then attached to a Bullock electric generator in order to run the motors. Before plaintiff, therefore, could be said to have accepted the engine, it was entitled to have an opportunity to observe its efficiency and a sufficient time to test it and determine whether it was reasonably fit for the purpose for which, as understood by the parties, it was intended. ' ,
It further appears that the machinery was put in position, and with the assistance of the defendant from time to time, for six or eight weeks, it continued to run the motors, but never with entire satisfaction, and it nowhere appears that there was an unconditional acceptance. The payment made at the end of that period was, as expressly testified, upon reliance that in' the respects in which the engine had shown itself to be deficient, it would be fixed and made all right by the defendant. And the defendant's efforts to that end were continued, after the payment, down to the very time when the engine was destroyed as the result of an explosion. We think, therefore, upon the question as to whether or not there was an acceptance of the engine, and if there was not, whether there was a breach of the implied warranty, there was sufficient to require a submission of the case to the jury.
Apart, however, from this question of an implied warranty, we have in the contract. itself the express warranty that the engine should be equipped with a "suitable air starting device." The words " suitable air starting device " necessarily involved the idea that a contrivance was to be provided that would start the engine; and yet we have an accumulation of evidence tending to show that it was difficult and at times impossible, even with the assistance of . the defendant's own men, to start the machine, although, when started it worked fairly well. Hence it would not have been a forced inference had the jury concluded that there was not furnished a "suitable air starting device."
Regarding the complaint, therefore, as one for breach of warranty, there was sufficient evidence to go to the jury, and.it was error to dismiss the complaint.
The judgment, accordingly, should he reversed, .and a new trial • ordered, with costs to the appellant to abide the event.
Ingraham, McLaughlin and Hatch, JJ., concurred; Van Brunt, P. J., dissented.
Judgment reversed and new trial ordered, with costs to appellant to abide event. •