Case Name: The State v. Luke Williams
Court: Constitutional Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1817-11
Citations: 1 Nott & McC. 26
Docket Number: 
Parties: The State v. Luke Williams.
Judges: Cheves, Gantt and Johnson, JJ., concurred.
Reporter: South Carolina Law Reports
Volume: 10
Pages: 17–19

Head Matter:
The State v. Luke Williams.
The Governor has the constitutional right to remit the moiety of the penalty for retailing spirituous liquors (under the Act of 1801), that is given by the Act to the commissioners of the roads. Aliter of the part given to the informer.
The defendant in this ease had been convicted under the act of 1801, of retailing spirituous' liquors without a license. An execution had been issued against him to collect the flue imposed against him by law, in consequence of such conviction.
This was a rule against the sheriff to show cause, why he had not enforced that execution. He showed *for cause that the Governor had remitted the penalty. The solicitor contended, that the Governor had no such power. Indeed, to try that question was the object of the rule. The seventh section of the second article of the constitution declares that the Governor shall have power to remit fines and forfeitures, unless otherwise directed by law. The Act of 1801, 2d Faust, 401, 1 Brev. Dig. 82, after regulating the manner of granting licenses, to keep tavern, retail spirituous liquors, &c., declares that the forfeiture in all cases shall be thus disposed of, “ one half to the informer, and the other half to the board of commissioners, in their respective districts, to be applied by them to the repairs of the roads and bridges,” &c. It was contended on the part of the State, that the word “ directed," in the clause of the constitution, above cited, was synonymous with “ appropriated,” and that the true construction was, that the Governor should have the power to remit fines and forfeitures, except where they were appropriated to some specific use, and that, as the Act of 1801 directs the forfeiture to be paid to the commissioners, for the purpose of repairing the roads and bridges, &c., it was such an appropriation of the fine, as, in contemplation of the constitution, deprived the Governor of the power of remitting it; and that, admitting he could remit that part which is given to the commissioners, he could not, that moiety, which is given to the informer.
The question was decided by Mr. Justice Nott, below, where it was determined that the power of the Governor was not abridged by the Act of 1801, so far as regarded the part of the fine given to the commissioners of the roads ; that, as it regarded the part given to the informer, it had been decided in the case of the State v. Kelly, that it could not be remitted by the Governor. But as no person appeared in the character of informer, to claim the moiety given to him, the rule was ordered to be discharged.
An appeal was made from that decision to the Constitutional Court, where the same questions were *made and endeavored to be supported on the same grounds.
5 Stat. 400, § 6. See other statutes as to retailing, cited 2 vol. 240. See also, as to informer’s rights, 2 vol. 809.
Rowe, sheriff, ads. State, 2 Bay, 565.

Opinion:
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Nott, J.
The people of this State have, by the constitution, assigned to the respective branches of the government, the several powers therein specified, according to the various provisions of that instrument, and in the exercise of those powers, each must necessarily be governed by its own judgment and discretion. The governor, in the discharge of his official duties, must follow what appears to him the most correct construction of the constitution, and wherever he has, by official acts, given a construction to any part of it which relates to his particular department, this Court will not readily interfere to arrest the progress of his measures. The same degree of caution which the Court would use in declaring an act of the Legislature unconstitutional, ought to be observed towards the acts of the executive. The constitution has delegated to him the power "to remit fines and forfeitures, unless otherwise directed by law." The word " directed" obviously relates to the governor; he is the antecedent. It cannot refer to fines and forfeitures. Such a view would not comport with either the legal or grammatical construction of the sentence. The governor is clothed with that high authority by the constitution, and cannot be divested of it by implication. The same sovereign people, from whom he derives that power, have authorised their repretatives to withhold it whenever they may think proper; but they must manifest their will by a plain, direct and unequivocal act. The Act of 1801 is not such a one, a.t least, so far as respects that part which vests the penally in the commissioners of the roads. It is not given to them in their individual capacities, but as agents of the State, and for public purposes. The money as much belongs to the State, as if it had been directed to be paid into the public treasury. The act is only directory to the commissioners *in the application of the money when received; it invests no right, which may not be defeated by the intervention of the governor, between the imposition and the collection of the fine. The part given to the informer, rests on a different foundation. There is a vested-interest, adverse from the State, as soon as the conviction takes place. ' Over that, it has, already been determined, that the governor has no control, and that decision is not now to be questioned. But as it has not been made to appear to the Court, that there was any informer, who was entitled to receive a moiety of this penalty, the motion must be refused. If, however, any individual has a right to a part of it, the way is still open for him to prosecute his claim, and to enforce his right. The Court only determines, that the State has no right or claim, and that the rule was properly discharged.
Cheves, Gantt and Johnson, JJ., concurred.