Case Name: WILLIAMS v. FIRST NAT. BANK OF UTICA
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1907-03-06
Citations: 102 N.Y.S. 1031
Docket Number: 
Parties: WILLIAMS v. FIRST NAT. BANK OF UTICA.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 102
Pages: 1031–1037

Head Matter:
(118 App. Div. 555)
WILLIAMS v. FIRST NAT. BANK OF UTICA.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.
March 6, 1907.)
Master and Servant—Injuries to Servant—Defect in Appliance—Scaffold.
A plank, laid across two wooden horses, eight to ten feet high, on whic-h laborers stood while inside a building engaged in putting a casing into a window frame, was not a scaffold, within Labor Law (Laws 1897, p. 467, c. 415, as amended by Laws 1899, p. 350, c. 192) g 18, providing that a person, employing or directing another to perform labor in repairing or altering a house or building, shall not furnish scaffolding or other mechanical contrivances which are unsafe.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 34, Master and: Servant, § 207.]
Spring, J., dissenting.
Appeal from Trial Term, Oneida County.
Action by William P. Williams against the First National Bank of Utica. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, and from an order denying a new trial upon the minutes, defendant appeals. Reversed-, and new trial granted.
Argued before McLENNAN, P. J., and SPRING, WILLIAMS, KRUSE, and ROBSON, JJ.
Miller, Fincke & Brandegee, for appellant.
Lewis, Watkins & Titus, for respondent.

Opinion:
WILLIAMS, J.
The judgment and order should be reversed, and a new trial granted, with costs to appellant to abide event.
' The action was to recover damages for injuries to the plaintiff, alleged to have resulted from defendant's negligence. The plaintiff was a carpenter, and at the time of the accident was working in the defendant's bank building, which was being reconstructed and repaired. With another carpenter he was standing upon a plank, laid across two wooden horses, engaged in putting a casing into a window frame. The plank was eight to ten feet above the floor. It broke, and the two men fell, and plaintiff received the injuries for which the recovery was had. The action was brought under section 18 of the labor law (chapter 415, p. 467, of Laws of 1897, as amended by chapter 192, p. 350, Laws 1899) and was so tried and submitted to the jury. The recovery must therefore be sustained, if at all, under the statute.
Section 18 of the labor law provides:
"A person employing or directing another to perform labor of any kind in the erection, repairing, altering or painting of a house, building or structure, shall not furnish or erect, or cause to be furnished or erected, for the performance of such labor, scaffolding, hoists, stays, ladders or other mechanical contrivances which are unsafe, unsuitable or improper and which are not constructed, placed or operated so as to give proper protection to the life and limb of a person so employed or engaged."
The court held as matter of law that the relation of master and servant existed between the defendant and plaintiff, and that the structure was a scaffold under section 18 of the statute. It submitted to the jury only the question whether the scaffold was safe, suitable, and proper, charging that, if it was not so, the plaintiff was entitled to recover. The defect complained of was only that the plank was not strong enough for the purposes it was used. There was considerable evidence given bearing upon the relations between the plaintiff and the defendant and the firm of Roberts & Williams, whose general employé plaintiff was. It seems to us the question as to whether the reflation of master and servant existed between the plaintiff and defendant was, at least, a question for the jury, and not for the court; and, if for the court, it must be based solely upon the evidence given in behalf of defendant, and should have been determined in defendant's rather than plaintiff's favor.
Moreover, this structure was not such a scaffold as was within the contemplation of the Legislature in enacting the labor law. Schapp v. Bloomer, 181 N. Y. 135, 73 N. B. 563; Stokes v. N. Y. Life I. Co., 113 App. Div. 77, 98 N. Y. Supp. 135; Sutherland v. Ammon, 113 App. Div. 333, 98 N. Y. Supp. 574. In the Schapp Case the court, among other things, said:
"Tlie limitation to specified, cases shows that it [the statute] was not intended to include scaffolding in all cases. What the Legislature evidently had in mind was scaffolding on buildings and structures, where its use was obviously dangerous to life and limb of an employee thereon in case of a fall. If ordinary staging, put up in a room from four to six feet above the floor, to facilitate the placing of fixtures, was intended to be included as among the specified cases, we should find it difficult to suggest a scaffold that would not fall within the limitation of the statute. To so hold would practically extend it to all cases in which scaffolds are used. This would be an unauthorized departure from, the rule of construction to which we have called attention."
This language goes farther than holding that that case was not covered by the statute, because the scaffold was being used for putting up of shafting, a use not covered by the language of the statute. This same principle was applied in the two Appellate Division cases cited above.
Again, this structure was a movable one, composed of two horses and a plank, and prior to the accident it was moved from place to place by the plaintiff and his co-láborers. The adjustment of the plank upon the horses was within the control of these men, and was made by them before the accident occurred. They had worked upon it safely for some time before it was changed and the plank was readjusted by them, and it had served them properly down to the time the accident occurred. If in, the readjustment the horses had been placed a little nearer together, it would not have broken when it did. There were many other planks about the premises, which could have been used by these men to re-enforce the one they were using. Under these circumstances, certainly, the defendant could not be held liable for the injuries to the plaintiff, for which plaintiff and his co-laborer were alone responsible. Rotondo v. Smyth, 93 App. Div. 153, 86 N. Y. Supp. 1103; Stokes v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 113 App. Div. 77, 98 N. Y. Supp. 135; Hutten v. Holbrook, etc., Cont. Co. (C. C.) 139 Fed. 734.
Judgment and ordered reversed, and new trial ordered, with costs to the appellant to abide the event, upon questions of law and fact.
All concur, except SPRING, J., who dissents, and KRUSE, J., who concurs in result only.