Case Name: ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant, v. L.A. CLINTON, Appellee
Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1998-11-24
Citations: 727 So. 2d 731
Docket Number: No. 95-CA-01337 COA
Parties: ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant, v. L.A. CLINTON, Appellee.
Judges: BRIDGES, C.J., and THOMAS, P.J., and COLEMAN, KING and PAYNE, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 727
Pages: 731–739

Head Matter:
ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant, v. L.A. CLINTON, Appellee.
No. 95-CA-01337 COA.
Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
Nov. 24, 1998.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 26, 1999.
Certiorari Denied March 25, 1999.
Vicki Leggett, Patrick Zachary, Hatties-burg, for Appellant.
Eugene Tullos, Frank Burge, Birmingham, AL, for Appellee.

Opinion:
DIAZ, J.,
for the Court:
¶ 1. Illinois Central Railroad Company appeals the jury's finding of negligence and award of damages to the appellee, L.A. Clinton. On appeal, Illinois Central argues (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict, (2) that the trial court erred in failing to grant a directed verdict, (3) that Illinois Central is entitled to a new trial, and (4) that the cumulative error in this case requires reversal. Finding the appellant's arguments without merit, we affirm.
FACTS
¶ 2. On August 7, 1989, L.A. Clinton, an Illinois Central employee, was assigned the duty of switching out railroad cars at the Georgia-Pacific plant in Taylorsville, Mississippi. His job required him to dismount moving trains, and on the day in question, Clinton stepped down from the train into a washed out area of the walkway and twisted his knee. Clinton testified that the area appeared to be old and that he had previously reported unsafe working conditions in the walkways on numerous occasions. Clinton continued working but notified his employer at the end of his shift that he had suffered an injury. A few weeks later, Clinton began physical therapy, and in October of 1989, he underwent surgery to remove the damaged cartilage from his knee. Although he was still experiencing pain in his knee, Clinton returned to work on January 2, 1990. On March 3, 1992, Clinton filed suit against Illinois Central, pursuant to the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), alleging that his injuries were caused by the railroad's negligence. Following a jury trial, Illinois Central was found to have negligently caused Clinton's injuñes, and Clinton was subsequently awarded $431,000 in damages. It is from this verdict that Illinois Central appeals.
DISCUSSION
I. WAS THE EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT IN FAVOR OF CLINTON AND DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FAILING TO GRANT A JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT OR A DIRECTED VERDICT?
¶ 3. Because the standards of review for the denial of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and a directed verdict are the same, Steele v. Inn of Vicksburg, Inc., 697 So.2d 373, 376 (Miss.1997), we will group the appellant's first two arguments for discussion purposes. Under the applicable standard,
this Court will consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the appellee, giving that party the benefit of all favorable inference[s] that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence. If the facts so considered point so overwhelmingly in favor of the appellant that reasonable men could not have arrived at a contrary verdict, we are required to reverse and render. On the other hand if there is substantial evidence in support of the verdict, that is, evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair minded jurors in the exercise of impartial judgment might have reached different conclusions, affirmance is required.
Id.
¶ 4. The Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) renders a railroad carrier liable for negligently causing an employee's injury while he or she is employed by the railroad. Coats v. Penrod Drilling Corp., 61 F.3d 1113, 1147 (5th Cir.1995). Therefore, in order to prevail, Clinton must show that he was injured, that the railroad was negligent, and that his injury was caused by the railroad's negligence. Wooden v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 862 F.2d 560, 561 (5th Cir.1989). The test of a jury ease is whether "employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury . for which damages are sought." Rogers v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506, 77 S.Ct. 443, 1 L.Ed.2d 493 (1957).
¶ 5. In the present case, Clinton testified before the jury that the washed out area where he was injured was approximately fifteen to twenty feet long, twelve to eighteen inches wide, and six to twelve inches deep. He also testified that he had previously notified his employer of defects in the walkways. "The question of negligence is determined by the jury," Presswood v. Cook, 658 So.2d 859, 862 (Miss.1995), and in the present case, the jury concluded that the railroad was negligent in causing Clinton's injury. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Clinton, it is clear that substantial evidence existed in support of the jury's verdict.
¶ 6. Neither do we agree with the appellant's contention that Clinton's alleged contributory negligence warranted a directed verdict in favor of Illinois Central. The jury was instructed to consider whether Clinton was contributorily negligent in failing to use ordinary and reasonable care in dismounting from the train. The jury rejected the appellant's contention that Clinton was responsible in whole or in part for his injuries. When the facts are in dispute, the jury is given the authority to resolve them, Henson v. Roberts, 679 So.2d 1041, 1045 (Miss.1996), and this jury did so in favor of Clinton. We will not, therefore, reverse the jury's verdict based upon the appellant's challenge of the sufficiency of the evidence.
II. IS THE APPELLANT ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL?
¶ 7. Illinois Central next urges this Court to grant a new trial because (1) the judgment was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, (2) the appellant was not afforded a fair and impartial jury, (3) the trial court erroneously admitted prejudicial photographs into evidence, (4) the trial court erred in allowing portions of Clinton's doctor's deposition testimony into evidence, and (5) the jury was improperly instructed.
a. Weight of the evidence
In determining whether a jury verdict is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, this Court must accept as true the evidence which supports the verdict and will reverse only when convinced that the circuit court has abused its discretion in failing to grant a new trial. Only when the verdict is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice will this Court disturb it on appeal.
Herrington v. Spell, 692 So.2d 93, 103 (Miss.1997) (citations omitted). Clearly, a jury question existed as to whether the railroad was negligent and if so, whether that negligence caused Clinton's injury. The jury answered those questions in the affirmative, and we are not at liberty to overturn their decision absent a finding that their verdict was "clearly erroneous." Id. A careful review of the record reveals no such error; thus, we are not persuaded by the appellant's argument that the jury's verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.
b. Fair and impartial jury
¶8. Illinois Central next argues that it was denied a fair and impartial jury due to the substantial number of potential jurors who had previously been represented by Eugene Tullos, one of Clinton's attorneys. Of the thirty-nine members of the jury panel, fourteen of those jurors and/or their family members had formerly been represented by Tullos. Illinois Central moved to strike the entire panel given the "statistical aberration" in the jury pool. See Toyota Motor Corp. v. McLaurin, 642 So.2d 351 (Miss.1994).
¶ 9. Just as in the case at bar, Toyota originated in the Smith County Circuit Court with Eugene Tullos representing the plaintiff. Id. at 352, 355. Because Tullos had represented a number of the potential jurors in the past, the defendants in Toyota requested that jurors with substantial ties to Tullos be excused for cause and for jurors with less substantial ties to be sequestered and voir dired individually. Id. at 354. In the alternative, the defendants requested more peremptory challenges or a change of venue. Id. The judge partially granted the defendants' motion by excusing all the jurors who had cases presently pending with Tullos, who were related to Tullos, who were financially indebted to Tullos, or who had business dealings with Tullos. Id. Nevertheless, the supreme court found the "statistical aberration" and the potential for undue influence in Toyota to be too great and reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. Before doing so, however, the court cited Mhoon v. State, 464 So.2d 77, 81 (Miss.1985) and Hudson v. Taleff, 546 So.2d 359, 363 (Miss.1989), wherein the court held that given the "statistical aberration" in the jury pool, the trial judge could have done any of the following to alleviate its prejudicial effect: "(1) he could have afforded counsel additional peremptory challenges, (2) he could have increased the size of the available venire as well as affording additional challenges, or (3) he could have sustained at least some of the challenges for cause."
¶ 10. In the present ease, Illinois Central challenged only one juror for cause on the basis that Tullos had represented a member of the juror's family. The court thereafter granted the appellant's challenge. In addition, the trial judge increased each side's peremptory challenges from four to eleven. Clearly, the trial judge in the case at bar recognized the potential for undue influence and corrected it by adhering to the guidelines set forth in Mhoon and Hudson. Accordingly, we refuse to find that the appellant was afforded anything but a fair and impartial jury.
c.Photographs
¶ 11. Illinois Central next assigns error to the trial court's admission of certain photographs depicting the general area of the accident. The appellant especially takes issue with exhibit P-6, the photograph which was taken approximately one hundred and fifty feet down the track from the location of Clinton's accident and which also depicted a culvert filled with water. After recognizing the prejudicial nature of the photograph, the trial judge withdrew it from evidence. Nevertheless, Illinois Central now complains that the judge should have also given the jury a cautionary instruction. However, the appellant failed to request such an instruction during trial. "[T]his Court can only review matters on appeal as were considered by the lower court." Ditto v. Hinds County, Mississippi, 665 So.2d 878, 880 (Miss.1995). Therefore, the railroad's failure to request a cautionary instruction during the trial of this matter precludes appellate review.
¶ 12. Illinois Central also complains that exhibits P-1, P-2, and P-3 failed to depict the specific area of Clinton's accident, and thus the trial court, erred in admitting them. However, it is not required that photographs depict the exact condition of the premises at the time of injury. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Daniels, 252 Miss. 1, 6, 172 So.2d 394, 396 (1965). "They are sufficient if the general layout is unchanged." Id. The supreme court has held that the admission or exclusion of photographs into evidence is within the trial court's discretion and that decision will stand absent a clear abuse of discretion. Walker v. Graham, 582 So.2d 431, 432 (Miss.1991). Finding no such abuse of discretion, we dismiss this assignment of error as lacking in merit.
d.Expert testimony
¶ 13. Illinois Central next argues that the trial court erred in failing to exclude the deposition testimony of Clinton's treating physician, Dr. Edward Turnbull. According to the appellant, Dr. Turnbull failed to state his opinions to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, and thus his testimony should not have been allowed. The supreme court has stated that a doctor's expert opinion as to causation need only be "expressed in terms of medical probability or possibility." Pittman v. Hodges, 462 So.2d 330, 334 (Miss.1984). "[A]bsolute certainty is not required . and whenever facts are in dispute, or the evidence is such that fairminded men may draw different inferences, a measure of speculation and conjecture is allowed." Id. Numerous times on direct examination, counsel for Clinton asked Dr. Turnbull for his opinion based upon a reasonable degree of medical certainty, and the doctor responded accordingly. Defense counsel then asked Dr. Turnbull to essentially predict whether or not Clinton would continue to have a significant problem with his knee in the future. The doctor responded that the potential for Clinton to continue to have problems with his knee was present, but that it was also possible for Clinton to have no significant trouble with his knee in the future. Clearly, we do not expect Dr. Turnbull to predict the future, and therefore his inability to conclude with absolute certainty that Clinton either would or would not continue to suffer from his knee injury will not be held against Clinton
e.Jury instructions
¶ 14. Illinois Central also argues that the trial court erred in allowing jury instructions P-1, P-5, and P-8. According to the appellant, the jury was improperly instructed that Illinois Central had actual knowledge of the defective walkways, and the instructions allowed the jury to consider elements of damages which were not supported by the evidence. Jury instruction P-1 reviewed the claims that Clinton had made against the railroad, including Clinton's assertion that the railroad knew of the dangerous condition of the walkways. However, the instruction did not purport to prove that Illinois Central had actual knowledge that the walkways were dangerous. The appellant also claims that instruction P-1 was misleading in that the language did not define what actions constituted negligence. Yet, on the third page of the instruction, the meaning of negligence was explained in detail to the jury.
¶ 15. Illinois Central further submits that the trial court erred in allowing jury instructions P-5 and P-8. The appellant claims that because Dr. Turnbull could not predict for certain whether Clinton would continue to suffer from his knee injury, that the jury should not have been permitted to consider whether Clinton could recover for future damages. We find no error in the trial court's permitting Dr. Turnbull to testify, and likewise we find no error in the court's permitting the jury to consider future damages. This Court does not examine jury instructions in isolation; "rather, they are read as a whole to determine if the jury was properly instructed." Boone v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 680 So.2d 844, 845 (Miss.1996). A combined reading of the jury instructions presented at the trial in this case reveals that the jurors were provided with the direction they needed in order to render a fair verdict. Accordingly, the trial judge committed no reversible error in allowing Clinton's instructions.
III. DOES CUMULATIVE ERROR IN THIS CASE REQUIRE REVERSAL?
¶ 16. While individual errors, not reversible in themselves, may combine to constitute cumulative error, the supreme court has held that "where there was no reversible error in any part, so there is no reversible error to the whole." Coleman v. State, 697 So.2d 777, 787 (Miss.1997). Since Illinois Central fails to raise any issues which contain actual error on the part of the trial court, we refuse to reverse based upon allegations of cumulative error.
¶ 17. THE JUDGMENT OF THE SMITH COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT IS AFFIRMED. STATUTORY DAMAGES AND INTEREST ARE AWARDED. COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.
BRIDGES, C.J., and THOMAS, P.J., and COLEMAN, KING and PAYNE, JJ., concur.
McMILLIN, P.J., dissents with separate written opinion, joined by HERRING, HINKEBEIN and SOUTHWICK, JJ.