Case Name: Freddie RAYSOR, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2001-09-19
Citations: 795 So. 2d 1071
Docket Number: No. 4D00-3100
Parties: Freddie RAYSOR, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: POLEN, C.J., DELL, GUNTHER, WARNER, FARMER, STEVENSON, GROSS, TAYLOR and HAZOURI, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 795
Pages: 1071–1073

Head Matter:
Freddie RAYSOR, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 4D00-3100.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Sept. 19, 2001.
Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and James W. Mclntire, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Meredith L. Balo, Assistant Attorney General, Fort Lauder-dale, for appellee.

Opinion:
EN BANC
KLEIN, J.
Appellant pled guilty to possession of cocaine and drug paraphernalia after the trial court denied his motion to suppress. We reverse, concluding that when the officer read appellant his Miranda rights during a consensual encounter, the encounter was no longer consensual.
According to the officer, he observed appellant riding his bicycle in a high crime area and waved at him in a friendly manner without beckoning him to come over. Appellant waved back and approached the officer, who observed callouses on appellant's fingers, causing him to suspect that appellant used crack cocaine. At that point the officer read appellant his Miranda rights, which were waived, and asked appellant if he had cocaine or- drug paraphernalia. Appellant responded in the affirmative and revealed a crack pipe.
Appellant moved to suppress, arguing that when the officer read him his Miranda rights a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave, and that he was unlawfully seized at that point. The officer testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress that appellant was at all times free to leave, but that he always reads people their Miranda rights out of an abundance of caution. The trial court concluded that, even after appellant was read his Miranda rights, this was no more than a consensual encounter and appellant had therefore consented to the search.
In United States v. Poitier, 818 F.2d 679, 683 (8th Cir.1987), agents approached two travelers in an Arkansas airport and began to question them. After receiving inconsistent responses, they informed one of them that they suspected her of carrying drugs and read her Miranda rights. Affirming suppression of the contraband produced by the ensuing search, the court explained:
Although the encounter . began as a consensual one, we conclude that when the agents stated that they suspected Poitier of carrying drugs and read her Miranda rights, at that point a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave. The accusation, coupled with the Miranda warnings, created a sufficient show of authority to effectively restrain Poitier's freedom of movement. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 553-54, 100 S.Ct. at 1876-77.
The state cites Moskowitz v. State, 710 So.2d 584 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), arguing that it stands for the proposition that a reasonable'person could still feel free to leave after his Miranda rights were read to him during a consensual encounter. Although Moskowitz could be so interpreted, the case is distinguishable because the facts were sufficient to give the officer a well-founded suspicion to detain Moskowitz when he gave the Miranda warnings. In the present case it is undisputed that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), requires that suspects be warned of their constitutional rights before in-custody police questioning. In this case, the officer testified that he advised appellant:
[of his] right to remain silent; anything he said could and would be used against him; right to an attorney prior to questioning; if he could not afford one, he would be appointed one by the court.
The present case is distinguishable from the cases cited in the dissent because in the present case the officer gave appellant warnings which are legally required only when a person is in custody and not free to leave. Because Miranda rights are not required to be read to suspects unless they are undergoing custodial interrogation, it follows that a person who has been read his Miranda rights would reasonably assume that he is not free to leave. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000)("Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of our national culture").
The dissent relies on California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991), which involved an officer chasing a fleeing suspect, and United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497, in which officers asked defendant to go with them to the airport drug enforcement office. Those cases involve activities other than an explicit warning which is legally required to be given when a person is in custody. The Mendenhall Court recognized that a seizure could occur where "the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled." 446 U.S. at 554, 100 S.Ct. at 1877. In the present case, the officer's language, i.e., the giving of the Miranda warnings, gave the unmistakable message that the appellant was in custody. The only way appellant could have felt free to leave would have been for him to have assumed that the officer was wrong in advising him that he was entitled to court appointed counsel if he could not afford counsel right there and then.
We therefore reverse the order denying the motion to suppress and recede from any language in Moskowitz which could be interpreted contrary to our holding in this case.
POLEN, C.J., DELL, GUNTHER, WARNER, FARMER, STEVENSON, GROSS, TAYLOR and HAZOURI, JJ., concur.
STONE, J., dissents with opinion, in which SHAHOOD, J., concurs.