Case Name: RODAL v. CRAWFORD
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1935-06-03
Citations: 272 Mich. 99
Docket Number: Docket No. 60, Calendar No. 37,949
Parties: RODAL v. CRAWFORD.
Judges: North, Fead, Wiest, Butzel, Bushnell, and Edward M. Sharpe, JJ.; concurred with Nelson Sharpe, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 272
Pages: 99–117

Head Matter:
RODAL v. CRAWFORD.
1. Easements — Way by User — Implied Dedication to Public.
User of drive or passageway over defendant’s land from boat dock to street openly, continuously, notoriously, adversely and hostile to latter’s rights for over 30 years by public constituted implied dedication of the land embraced therein to the extent to which use has been made by the public.
2. Same — Acquisition by Prescription.
The right to the use of a right of way may be acquired by prescription the same as title to the fee of lands.
3. Same — Finding op Court — Other Means op Access.
In suit to establish right of way from boat dock to street across defendant’s land, finding by court that plaintiff had no other means of access held, not error, notwithstanding use of way by permission had been obtained over third person’s land after erection of obstruction by defendant.
i. Appeal and Error — Defenses Not Raised Upon Trial Nor Appearing in Reasons for Appeal.
In suit to establish right of way from boat dock to street, defense that plaintiffs have outlet by use of water of bay in front of their property, not having been raised upon trial nor appearing in reasons for appeal should not be considered.
5. Easements — Land on Bay Shore — Way of Necessity.
Outlet by water of bay which is frozen over and not navigable by small boats for several months of the year held, no defense in suit by owners of shore land and boat dock to establish right of way therefrom to street across defendant’s land as public highway by necessity or user.
Potter, G. J., dissenting.
Appeal from Benzie; Lamb (Fred S.), J.
Submitted April 4, 1935.
(Docket No. 60, Calendar No. 37,949.)
Decided June 3, 1935.
Bill by Louis Rodal and Otto Rodal against Wash Crawford to establish a street or way over land of defendant, for an injunction and other relief. Decree for plaintiffs. Defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Nevius & Kilian (M. G. Paul, of counsel), for plaintiffs.
Campbell & Campbell, for defendant.

Opinion:
Nelson Sharpe, J.
I cannot concur in the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Potter. The opinion of the trial judge so clearly states the facts and the conclusions of law which should be drawn therefrom that I adopt it as my own.
"The bill was filed in the above entitled cause to have the drive or passageway, leading from Main street, in the village of Frankfort, in said county (Benzie), to certain lands and premises, owned, used and occupied by the plaintiffs, declared to be a highway by user or a way of necessity to the extent to which it has been used; to confirm the rights of the plaintiffs to the use of said highway or passageway over and across the lands particularly described in the said bill of complaint; to have the building, erected by the defendant across the said highway, or passageway, decreed to be a public nuisance and abated as such; and to secure a mandatory injunction to compel the said defendant to remove said building and obstruction from said highway or passageway to the end that the plaintiffs and the public at large may have and enjoy the use and benefit of such highway or passageway as it has been used and enjoyed for upwards of 50 years.
"From the proofs submitted it appears and the court accordingly finds the facts to be substantially as follows:
"The plaintiffs, Louis Nodal and Otto Nodal, are residents of said village of Frankfort, Benzie county, Michigan, engaged in the business of commercial fishing, and own, use and occupy that part of lot 3 and the west half of lot 2, block 3, lying south of the Ann Arbor Nailway Company's right of way, in connection with their said business.
"The defendant, Wash Crawford, is likewise a resident of said village of Frankfort, runs a taxi business and is also engaged in a small manufacturing business, using* the building* complained of as the subject matter of this law-suit.
"According* to the recorded plat of the village of Frankfort, block 3 is divided into four lots, numbered 1, 2, 3 and 4. This block extends from Main street on the north to Betsie bay on the south. The westerly boundary of the block is Third street and the easterly boundary thereof .is Fourth street. The Ann Arbor Nailway Company's right of way traverses this block in an easterly and westerly direction a little north of the center line of the block. So far as this record discloses neither Third street nor Fourth street has ever been opened up for traffic, at least south of the railway right of way.
"In 1870, one Henry "Woodward became the owner by purchase of lot 3, and in 1877, he likewise became the owner of the west half of lot 2, in said block 3. He was engaged in the transportation business and made use of the property above described in connection therewith, built and maintained a dock on said Betsie bay, at the south end of said lots. He was agent for one of the transportation companies whose vessels, in the early days, stopped at this dock to load and unload both freight and passengers. Access to this dock was gained by using a drive or passageway over and across the east half of lot 3 in said block 3, running in a direct line north and south from said Main street to the dock. This drive or passageway was used by Mr. Woodward and the public until 1909 or 1910, and by the public from thence hitherto as a means of ing*ress and egress to and from said dock, until blocked by the action of the defendant in this case. No other means of access thereto was ever available and is not now.
"During the time said drive or passageway has been in use as aforesaid, some gravel and cinders have been placed thereon. The drive or passageway is wide enough for two vehicles to pass and has been in such condition during the period in which it has been used as a drive or passageway. The drive is well defined and has continued in one place all these years. A sidewalk has existed along this drive or passageway to facilitate passenger traffic to and from the dock in question.
"At the time of the death of Henry Woodward, his son, George Woodward, became the owner of the lands and premises above described. In the year 1921, George Woodward and his wife conveyed by warranty deed to the plaintiffs all that part of said lot 3 and the west half of lot 2, block 3, lying south of the Ann Arbor Railway right of way. And, in 1927, the said George Woodward and wife conveyed by warranty deed to Gilbert E. Ness all that part of said lot 3, block 3, lying north of the said Ann Arbor Railway right of way. In 1928, Gilbert E. Ness conveyed by warranty deed to the defendant, Wash Crawford, the east 55 feet of said lot 3, block 3, lying north of said railway right of way. It is over and upon this 55 feet that the drive or passageway, the subject matter of this suit, extends.
' ' The defendant has been a resident of Frankfort for many years. His place of business, before he purchased the premises in question, was in plain view of this drive or passageway, and since he purchased this property, his place of business has been right alongside this drive or passageway. He has had actual knowledge for all the years of his residence in the village that this said drive or passageAvay was being used by the plaintiffs and the public in general as the only means of ingress and agress to and from Main street to the dock on Betsie bay and the place of business of the plaintiffs, and; further, that it had been so used long before the purchase of the property by the plaintiffs. He likewise had actual knowledge that this drive or passageway Avas the only means of ingress and egress that the plaintiffs had or now have to their place of business on Betsie bay.
"On or about the month of December, 1932, the said defendant asked for and obtained oral permission from the village council .to remove and place upon his said 55 feet of lot 3, block 3, an old building, 24 feet by 35 feet in dimensions, but with the understanding that said building, when placed upon said lands, was not to encroach upon the said drive or passageway. Notwithstanding said condition, the defendant located said building across said drive or passageAvay, at the rear end of his said property, thus depriving' the plaintiffs and the public of all access to their said business and the dock on the bay. Subsequently, the common council by record action thereof ordered said defendant to remove said building from said drive or passageway within 15 days. Defendant has made no move to comply with said order.
"In the paving of Main street, in the village of Frankfort, the public authorities left an opening in the curb of the pavement along Main street where this drive or passageway intersects, or enters the pavement on Main street.
"For over 30 years, during the lifetime of Henry Woodward and while he was the sole owner of the fee of and to said lands, this drive or passageway Avas in use by the public openly, continuously, notoriously, adversely and hostile to the rights of the owner of the fee. It was recognized and treated as a public way to and from the dock and business places on Betsie bay.
"Under the foregoing setting as to the facts, the, plaintiffs contend that they have made out their case and are entitled to the relief prayed in their bill of complaint. In the judgment of the court, their claims are well founded both in law and fact. That this drive or passageway is a Avay of necessity, at least, can hardly be gainsaid or questioned, under the following authorities: Moore v. White, 159 Mich. 460 (134 Am. St. Rep. 735); Bean v. Bean, 163 Mich. 379; Goodman v. Brenner, 219 Mich. 55.
"Under the facts disclosed by this record, there was an implied dedication of the land embraced in this drive or passageway, to the extent to which use has been made by the public. Such was the foundation of this way or drive and it ripened into a way by user during the lifetime of Henry WoodAvard. The right to the use of a right of way may be acquired by prescription the same as title to the fee of lands. It was so brought to pass in this case within the following authorities: Campau v. City of Detroit, 104 Mich. 560; Bean v. Bean, supra; Murphy Chair Co. v. American Radiator Co., 172 Mich. 14; Douglas v. Jordan, 232 Mich. 283 (41 A. L. R. 1437).
"A decree may be prepared to carry out the prayer of the bill of complaint. ' '
It is insisted that the court was in error in finding that "no other means of access thereto was ever available, and is not now," and that the plaintiffs had an outlet to the street through what is spoken of as the Anderson property. The plaintiff Louis Rodal testified:
"Since this building was constructed across this roadway by the defendant, Crawford, I have no other means of getting out of my property other than over the land of other people. Mr. Anderson is allowing me to get ont over his property because we cannot get out any other way. We never asked any permission, and are just driving across."
There was a roadway across this property and its use was permitted, but no right thereto was ever acquired, nor had it been used-by plaintiffs before the obstruction was placed on the road in question.
The defense that plaintiffs have an outlet by the use of the water in the bay in front of their property was not raised upon the trial, nor does it appear in the reasons for appeal. I think.it should not be considered, but, if it be, it seems apparent that the decisions quoted from by the Chief Justice should not be held to apply to .the use of water which, as is well known, is frozen and may not be navigated except by large vessels during a number of months in each year.
The decree is affirmed, with costs to appellees.
North, Fead, Wiest, Butzel, Bushnell, and Edward M. Sharpe, JJ.; concurred with Nelson Sharpe, J.