Case Name: In the Matter of CAMEO TILE DISTRIBUTORS, INC., Debtor. CAMEO TILE DISTRIBUTORS, INC., Plaintiff, v. THOMPSON & COMPANY, INC. dba Thompson Ceramic Tile Distributors, Defendant
Court: United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1981-07-30
Citations: 17 B.R. 28
Docket Number: Bankruptcy No. 80-742
Parties: In the Matter of CAMEO TILE DISTRIBUTORS, INC., Debtor. CAMEO TILE DISTRIBUTORS, INC., Plaintiff, v. THOMPSON & COMPANY, INC. dba Thompson Ceramic Tile Distributors, Defendant.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's Bankruptcy Reporter
Volume: 17
Pages: 28–31

Head Matter:
In the Matter of CAMEO TILE DISTRIBUTORS, INC., Debtor. CAMEO TILE DISTRIBUTORS, INC., Plaintiff, v. THOMPSON & COMPANY, INC. dba Thompson Ceramic Tile Distributors, Defendant.
Bankruptcy No. 80-742.
United States Bankruptcy Court, M. D. Florida, Tampa Division.
July 30, 1981.
On Motion For Rehearing Sept. 22, 1981.

Opinion:
ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ALEXANDER L. PASKAY, Chief Judge.
THE MATTER under consideration is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Cameo Tile Distributors, Inc. (Cameo), the Plaintiff in the above-captioned adversary proceeding. The Motion for Summary Judgment alleges that there remain no issues of disputed material fact and that Cameo is entitled to judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 as adopted by Bankruptcy Rule 756.
The undisputed facts as revealed by this record are as follows:
On September 18, 1980, pursuant to Cameo's solicitation of sealed bids, Thompson & Company, Inc. (Thompson) submitted a bid of $27,000 for Cameo's ceramic tile inventory. On September 22, 1980, Cameo filed an Application for Court Approval of Sale of Assets. The Application did not identify who the prospective purchaser was and stated that the proposed sale will be to the highest bidder on each particular item. The record further reveals that on September 24, 1980, the Clerk of the Court mailed a "Notice of Intention to Sell Property of the Estate". The Notice was equally silent concerning the identity of the purchaser. It appears, although it is not clear, that the notice was not sent to all creditors or to Thompson. On October 3, 1980, Thompson sent a letter to Cameo stating that it no longer desires to buy the inventory and desires to withdraw its previously submitted bid. Having lost Thompson as a buyer, Cameo negotiated a sale to Gulf Tile Distributors, Inc. for $20,000. Cameo then filed the instant complaint seeking to recover $8,178.95 loss suffered by the estate due to Thompson's alleged breach of contract.
Cameo contends that its act of soliciting bids was an offer which Thompson accepted by submitting its bid to buy the inventory for $27,000. Thus, according to Cameo, Thompson's subsequent attempt to rescind its bid by letter of October 3, 1980 is an invalid attempt to unilaterally rescind its contract with Cameo and its failure to complete the transaction and purchase the inventory was a breach of a valid contract entitling Cameo to recover the difference between the price offered by Thompson and the price actually paid by Gulf Tile or the sum of $7,000.
It should be stated at the outset that an invitation to submit bids cannot legally be considered a legal offer by a party who invites the bids. The offer must be definite in its terms or require such definite terms in the acceptance, that the promises and performances to be rendered by each party are reasonably certain. It is well established that the courts will neither specifically enforce agreements nor award substantive damages for a breach when the agreement is lacking certainty. The indefiniteness may relate to the time of performance or the price to be paid and an absence of which one cannot recognize an invitation to bid as a legal offer that is capable of acceptance.
The invitation to submit bids made by Cameo did not state the terms of the proposed sale, either as to price, as to time and place of j>erformance, as to terms or payment, or to any other condition such as Court approval. Thus, it is clear that Cameo's invitation to submit bids was not ah offer.
The only offer in this instance was the offer submitted by Thompson to purchase the inventory for $27,0Q0 and the acceptance of an offer must be communicated to the offeror prior to the revocation of the offer made. Kendel v. Pontious, 261 So.2d 167 (Fla.1972). The offer was withdrawn by Thompson on October 3, 1980. While it is true that the notice sent by the Clerk did not identify Thompson as a purchaser and stated that the inventory might be sold to the highest bidder which ostensibly permitted Cameo to discard the bid of Thompson if it received a bid higher than the bid of Thompson, the notice itself has no significance since it cannot be binding on the parties.
Having concluded that the offeror was Thompson and not Cameo, the ultimate question is when did Cameo inform Thompson that it accepted its offer. Since this presents a factual question which does not appear to be answered by this record, the Motion of Cameo for Summary Judgment cannot be granted and the matter will have to be resolved by presentation of evidence on this narrow point. Accordingly, the only offer in this instance was the offer made by Thompson to buy the inventory for $27,000.
In accordance with the foregoing, it is
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Cameo Tile Distributors, Inc. be, and the same hereby is, denied. It is further
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the final evidentiary hearing be, and the same hereby is, scheduled to be heard before the undersigned on Sept. 1, 1981 at 2:15 p. m. in Room 703, 700 Twiggs Street, Tampa, Florida.