Case Name: ARKANSAS GAME & FISH COMMISSION v. Thomas E. LINDSEY, Alfred PEITZ, and C.W. ELROD
Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 1987-06-01
Citations: 292 Ark. 314
Docket Number: 86-19
Parties: ARKANSAS GAME & FISH COMMISSION v. Thomas E. LINDSEY, Alfred PEITZ, and C.W. ELROD
Judges: Hickman, Purtle, and Glaze, JJ., dissent.
Reporter: Arkansas Reports
Volume: 292
Pages: 314–329

Head Matter:
ARKANSAS GAME & FISH COMMISSION v. Thomas E. LINDSEY, Alfred PEITZ, and C.W. ELROD
86-19
730 S.W.2d 474
Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered June 1, 1987
[Rehearing denied July 6, 1987.]
Howell, Price, Trice, Basham & Hope, P.A., by: Carey E. Basham and Dale Price; and P. Douglas Mays, Arkansas Game & Fish Commission, for appellant.
Richard B. Adkisson, for appellee.
Justice Purtle’s and Justice Glaze’s opinions can be found at 733 S.W.2d 723.

Opinion:
Robert H. Dudley, Justice.
The appellees purchased two tracts of land on the shore of Lake Conway. They subdivided one of the tracts and started promoting the sale of lots. The most direct route to the subdivision is by use of a road which crosses part of the Camp Robinson Wildlife Demonstration Area which is owned by the appellant, Arkansas Game and Fish Commission. See Ark. Const, amend. 35, § 8. The appellant Commission claims the road as a private road and placed a barricade across it. Appellees filed suit in the Chancery Court of Faulkner County to enjoin the Commission from barricading the road. The Commission responded with an ARCP Rule 12(b)(3) motion alleging that Faulkner County was not the county of proper venue, filed an answer, filed a compulsory counterclaim seeking affirmative relief, and filed a third party complaint also seeking affirmative relief. The third party answered and issues were joined.
The applicable venue statute, Ark. Stat. Ann. § 27-602 (Repl. 1979), provides that all actions against State Boards or Commissions must be filed in Pulaski County. The trial court relied on cases which we decided before the current Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted, and held that the Commission waived the issue of improper venue when it asked affirmative relief against the appellees and against the third party defendant. See Foster v. Arkansas State Highway Comm'n, 258 Ark. 176, 527 S.W.2d 601 (1975); Arkansas State Racing Comm'n v. Southland Racing Corp., 226 Ark. 995, 295 S.W.2d 617 (1956). The appellant Commission argues that the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss appellees' complaint because of improper venue. We affirm the result reached by the trial court on this issue.
Prior to our adoption of the Rules of Civil Procedure, it was necessary for a party to make a special appearance in order to object to venue. If that party proceeded further and made a general appearance by some act, such as the filing of a permissive counterclaim, he waived the issue of venue and entered his appearance in a county other than the one designated by the venue statute. Thompson v. Dunlap, 244 Ark. 178, 424 S.W.2d 360 (1968). ARCP Rule 12(b) has abolished the distinction between special and general appearances. A defendant need no longer appear specially to attack venue. Bituminous, Inc. v. Uerling, 270 Ark. 904, 607 S.W.2d 331 (1980) and ícc Reporter's Notes to Rule 12, Note 7. Thus, the Commission did not waive venue simply by making a general appearance.
Our cases, before the current Rules of Civil Procedure, held that one who came into court and sought affirmative relief against a plaintiff by a permissive counterclaim invoked the court's jurisdiction in the case so that he could not later question the court's authority to pass on all questions between himself and his adversary. Thompson v. Dunlap, 244 Ark. 178, 424 S.W.2d 360 (1968). In Federal Land Bank of St. Louis v. Gladish, 176 Ark. 267, 2 S.W.2d 696 (1928), we explained why a demand for permissive affirmative relief enters one's appearance: "But one cannot come into court, assert a claim, ask the court for affirmative relief, and then, when there is an adverse judgment, claim that the court had no jurisdiction over his person. If this could be done, the appellant would have the opportunity and advantage of prosecuting its claim, and, in case it recovered judgment, it could collect, and at the same time take no chances of a judgment against itself."
The above cases dealt with permissive counterclaims but the case at bar deals with a compulsory counterclaim. In dealing with the doctrine of waiver, there is a significant distinction between the two types of counterclaim. Wright and Miller, in Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 1397 (1969) explain:
Although waiver is a reasonable result when the counterclaim asserted is permissive under Rule 13(b) [the permissive counterclaim rule], it seems improper to apply waiver when the counterclaim is compulsory under Rule 13(a) [the compulsory counterclaim rule]. By interposing a permissive counterclaim, a party voluntarily asks the court for affirmative relief and thus should not be allowed objections based on personal inconvenience. In addition, application of the waiver principle reinforces the policy against piecemeal litigation of claims that is reflected in all of the joinder of claims and multiparty litigation procedures in the rules. But waiver in the case of a compulsory counterclaim does not seem appropriate inasmuch as defendant is obliged by Rule 13(a) to assert his claim and does not have the option afforded by Rule 13(b).
Justice Newbern, in his book Arkansas Civil Practice and Procedure § 11-4, (1985), discusses our cases and the defendant's dilemma with a compulsory counterclaim as follows:
In deciding that a request for affirmative relief waived an objection, previously made, to improper venue, the supreme court recognized but did not answer the problem which might arise when an objection to venue is overruled and the objecting party has a claim which could be characterized as a compulsory counterclaim. The question whether the objecting party must waive either the objection or the counterclaim under those circumstances has not been addressed.
(Emphasis added.)
The language of the Rules of Civil Procedure is of no help on the issues. Rule 12(b), the pertinent part, provides:
(b) How Presented. Every defense, in law or in fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may, at the option of the pleader, be made by motion: . (3) improper venue, . A motion making any of these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other defenses or objections in a
responsive pleading or motion.
As can be seen, the rule allows a defendant to answer to the merits in the same pleading in which he raises the issue of venue, but it does not authorize a defendant to couple a counterclaim with a venue motion. The provision "[n]o defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion" is of no assistance since it is reasonably clear that a counterclaim or third party complaint is not a "defense" within the purview of the quoted passage. D. Newbern, Arkansas Civil Practice and Procedure § 11-1 (1985); C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 1397 (1967).
Similarly, Rule 12(h)(1) does not answer the question. It only provides that the defense of improper venue is waived if not made either by motion or in the original responsive pleading. The rule does not provide that it is exclusive of other waiver situations.
Since the rules do not govern the issue before us, we must look to our common law. As previously stated, we do not find any prior cases involving a compulsory counterclaim, and so, we must choose what we regard as the sounder approach. We hold that the assertion of a compulsory counterclaim does not constitute a waiver of objection to venue because of the non-voluntary character of the compulsory counterclaim. As stated in Dragor Shipping Corp. v. Union Tank Car Co., 378 F.2d 241 (9th Cir. 1967):
Under Rule 13(a) a party who fails to plead a compulsory claim against an opposing party is held to have waived such claim and is precluded by res judicata from bringing suit upon it again. . . . However, since such a party has no alternative but to submit his compulsory claim against an opposing party, or lose it, his act in asserting it does not constitute a waiver of any jurisdictional defense he previously or concurrently asserts.
Accordingly, the appellant Commission did not waive its objection to venue by filing the compulsory counterclaim.
However, the same reasoning does not apply to a defendant who pleads improper venue and who also files a third party complaint. By filing the third party complaint he invokes the jurisdiction of the court, and by invoking it submits to it. Globig v. Greene & Gust Co., 193 F. Supp. 544 (E.D. Wis. 1961); Merz v. Hemmerle, 90 F.R.D. 566 (D.C.N.Y. 1981). Clearly, one should not be allowed to assert voluntarily a claim against a third party defendant, and then, if there is an adverse judgment, claim the court was not the proper venue. Therefore, the appellant Commission waived improper venue by asserting a third party complaint. The trial court reached the correct result on this point.
The Commission next contends that the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss the case because it is a suit against the State and is prohibited by article 5, section 20 of the Constitution of Arkansas. The trial court was also correct on this ruling.
An exception to the prohibition against a suit against the State exists where the act sought to be enjoined is illegal or is causing irreparable injury. Cammack v. Chalmers, 284 Ark. 161, 680 S.W.2d 689 (1984); Arkansas Game and Fish Comm'n v. Eubanks, 256 Ark. 930, 512 S.W.2d 540 (1974). The application of the constitutional prohibition is determined by the pleadings. Here, the allegations of the complaint were that the road had been open as a public road for more than 50 years, was designated as a county road, and that the Commission was obstructing a public road which was causing appellees irreparable injury. In addition, the obstruction of a public road is illegal. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-2915 (Repl. 1977). The trial court correctly ruled that this case fell within the exception.
The merits of this case involve the claim by the appellant Commission that the eastern segment of the Webster's Ridge Road to Lake Conway is its private road while the appellees claim that it is a public road. It is undisputed that an old road was located near the present road, but the old road was clearly in a different location. Around the turn of the century, the old road served as the access to homes, a church, and a cemetery. It was later used as a mail route, a school bus route, and as access to a lake by hunters and fishermen. In 1940, the United States of America acquired title to all the land in the area by condemnation, but that title was subject to existing easements. In 1949, the United States quitclaimed its interest in the 4,205.8 acres to the State of Arkansas for the Commission's Camp Robinson Wildlife Demonstration Area. In the mid-1950's, the Commission built the new segment of the road across its own land. By that time, there were no homes or churches in the area, but some hunters and fishermen began to use the new road. The Chancellor found that the old road was a "county road by operation of law" and that the new road was a "part of the county road system of Faulkner County." The ruling is in error.
County roads, as distinguished from public roads by prescriptive right, may be created in either of three ways.- First, the landowners can dedicate the right-of-way to the county. See Ark. Stat. Ann. § 76-108 and 76-109 (Repl. 1981 and Supp. 1985). There was no dedication of either the old or the new rights-of-way in this case. Second, a county may condemn and pay for the right-of-way. See Ark. Stat. Ann. § 76-901 to -928 (Repl. 1981). There was no condemnation action in this case. Third, the County Judge may enter an order, after notice, declaring a mail route or a school bus route a county road. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 76-105 and 76-106; Johnson v. Wylie, 284 Ark. 76, 679 S.W.2d 198 (1984). No such order was ever entered, and no such proceeding can now be had because the roads no longer serve as either a school bus route or a mail route.
A former County Judge testified that he thought the county owned the road because someone, in 1975, wrote a county road number on a Faulkner County road map which was kept at the county garage. Of course, such non-judicial action by someone without statutory or common law authority, was not sufficient to transfer title to Faulkner County of either the corporeal or incorporeal hereditaments. Of course, the hunters and fishermen could not acquire a prescriptive right to the new road across state land because the limitations period for prescription does not run against the State. Bengel v. City of Cotton Plant, 219 Ark. 510, 243 S.W.2d 370 (1951). Sec also Annot. 55 A.L.R. 2d 554, 578 (1957). Therefore, neither the old road nor the new road was a county road.
The appellant next argues that "the trial court erred in finding that 'by acquiescence between Arkansas Game and Fish Commission and Faulkner County, the road in question was moved and continued as a county road.' " The argument is meritorious for three reasons. First, Faulkner County had no road to exchange with the state; second, no state authority to convey state lands is shown; and third, there simply is no evidence of an exchange agreement. The first two reasons are self-explanatory. The only substantial evidence going to the third reason was given by Robert Pierce, a witness for the Commission, and Robert Adney, a witness for the appellee. Mr. Adney, a former employee of the Commission, testified that the new roadway evolved from a firebreak which the Commission had cut through its land. Mr. Pierce, testified that at the time he was manager of the Wildlife Area for the Commission, he caused the new road to be built with the use of a bulldozer and a roadgrader owned and operated by Commission personnel. He testified that the new road was built for recreational purposes to let hunters and fishermen use the Wildlife Management Area. There simply is no substantial evidence of Faulkner County's participation in the construction of the road or of the county's involvement in any type of exchange agreement. The only evidence involving the county is that sometime in the 1960's it began to occasionally blade the road.
Reversed.
Hickman, Purtle, and Glaze, JJ., dissent.