Case Name: John EASLEY and Dawson Sneed, d/b/a a Partnership, Cemetery Consultants, Easley & Sneed, Appellants, v. THE GARDEN SANCTUARY, INC., a corporation, John O'Brien, Individually, and Maurice Schuh, Individually, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1960-04-20
Citations: 120 So. 2d 59
Docket Number: No. 1177
Parties: John EASLEY and Dawson Sneed, d/b/a a Partnership, Cemetery Consultants, Easley & Sneed, Appellants, v. THE GARDEN SANCTUARY, INC., a corporation, John O’Brien, Individually, and Maurice Schuh, Individually, Appellees.
Judges: SEBRING, HAROLD L., Associate Judge, concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 120
Pages: 59–64

Head Matter:
John EASLEY and Dawson Sneed, d/b/a a Partnership, Cemetery Consultants, Easley & Sneed, Appellants, v. THE GARDEN SANCTUARY, INC., a corporation, John O’Brien, Individually, and Maurice Schuh, Individually, Appellees.
No. 1177.
District Court of Appeal of Florida. Second District
April 20, 1960.
Samuel C. Craven, St. Petersburg, for appellants.
Carey and Harrison, St. Petersburg, for appellees.

Opinion:
KANNER, Acting Chief Judge.
Appellants brought in the circuit court of Pinellas County an action at law for damages grounded upon three counts. The complaint alleged that appellants had entered into an oral agreement with the ap-pellees to handle exclusively a sales program of cemetery crypts to be located in the land of appellees set aside for burial purposes, and that they, the appellants, had! performed everything required of them under the oral agreement but that appel-lees had refused to comply with its terms. Count one of the complaint was for money in the sum of $2,069.00 claimed to have been earned for commissions in the sale of cemetery crypts; count two was in the sum. of $500.00 for consultation services rendered in connection with the cemetery development; and count three was for loss of anticipated profits in the sum of $614,-295.60, had the appellees not breached the-contract.
To the complaint in its entirety appellees, filed a motion to dismiss, and they also' filed a motion to strike the third count of the complaint. The trial court withheld ruling on the motion to dismiss, entered' an order granting the motion to strike the-third count and transferred the cause to- the Civil and Criminal Court of Record of Pinellas County. It is apparent that the motion to strike was granted because the third count stated no basis for recovery. The reason expressed for the transfer was that the amounts involved after granting motion to strike the third count were not within the jurisdiction of the circuit court. The pertinent portions of the order read:
"It Is Therefore Ordered And Adjudged that defendants' motion to strike be, and the same is hereby, granted.
"It Is Further Ordered And Adjudged that the above-styled cause be, and the same is hereby, transferred to the Civil and Criminal Court of Record in and for Pinellas County, Florida, and the Clerk of the above-styled Court is hereby directed to transfer said cause to the said Civil and Criminal Court of Record."
It is the propriety of this ruling, both as to granting the motion to strike the third count and as to transferring the cause, which is questioned here through the route of appeal.
Appellees filed motion to dismiss the appeal on the premise that the order is non-appealable because it is not a final judgment. Argument on this motion, as well as upon the merits of the appeal, were heard at the same time, and briefs were filed comprehending both of these phases.
There has been no final adjudication such as will support an appeal. That part of the order granting the motion to strike the third count does not constitute a final adjudication. Chastain v. Embry, Fla. App.1960, 118 So.2d 33; and Renard v. Kirkeby Hotels, Fla.App.1958, 99 So.2d 719. The part of the order concerning transfer, although in one sense final, is in another sense interlocutory in nature. See Tantillo v. Miliman, Fla.1956, 87 So.2d 413. Appeals at common law may be taken only from final adjudications, except that interlocutory appeals may be prosecuted from orders at common law relating to venue or jurisdiction over the person. Rule 4.2(a), Florida Appellate Rules, 31 F.S.A.
The question then presents itself whether the remedy of common law certiorari is available. It may be observed in the Tantillo v. Miliman case that the circuit judge declared a mistrial and transferred the case to the Civil and Criminal Court of Record of Dade County on the ground that the amount involved was insufficient to vest in the circuit court jurisdiction of the cause. The Supreme Court held that this action was reviewable by certiorari since, although the controversy was concluded so far as the circuit court was concerned, there had been no such adjudication as would support an appeal. The Supreme Court further stated that the order of transfer was not in a true sense interlocutory because, if it had been correctly entered, all future jurisdiction would be exercised by an entirely different court. In effect, the court held in that case that there was a failure to follow essential requirements of law with respect to determination of the jurisdictional amount, and it issued the writ and quashed the order with directions to reinstate the case.
The common law writ of certiorari is a discretionary writ and ordinarily will not be allowed by an appellate court to review an interlocutory order in an action at law since such an order may be corrected through appeal; but it is only in an exceptional case, as where the lower court acts without and in excess of its jurisdiction, or where an interlocutory order does not conform to essential requirements of law and may cause material injury throughout subsequent proceedings for which the remedy of appeal will be inadequate, that an appellate court will exercise discretionary power to issue such writ. Kauffman v. King, Fla.1956, 89 So. 2d 24.
In the very recent case of Kautzman v. Bandler, Fla.App.1960, 118 So.2d 256, an appeal was taken to the third district court of appeal in a negligence action from an order of the circuit court wherein the action was transferred from that court to the civil court of record due to lack of jurisdiction because of the insufficiency of the amount involved. The third district court ruled that the order appealed from was interlocutory and therefore appeal would not lie. However, the court held that certio-rari was the appropriate remedy, and the appeal was treated as a petition for cer-tiorari and upon consideration was denied.
In the instant case the effect of the circuit judge's ruling is to vest all further jurisdiction in another court. Since the order does not possess the attributes of finality as is necessary to support an appeal, and since the trial judge's ruling transfers completely all future jurisdiction to another independent court, appellants will be deprived of any right of review from the circuit judge's ruling unless the remedy of common law certiorari may be utilized. We hold, therefore, that the method of review should not be via appeal, but rather the remedy for review available here is through petition for a writ of common law certiorari. Holding this view, we treat the notice of appeal, together with the record, as such a petition. Upon this determination and having carefully considered the notice of appeal, with the record, as a petition for common law writ of cer-tiorari, we conclude that it should be and it is hereby denied.
SEBRING, HAROLD L., Associate Judge, concurs.
SHANNON, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.