Case Name: SELK v. DETROIT PLASTIC PRODUCTS (ON RESUBMISSION); KELLY v. MUSKEGON COUNTY ROAD COMMISSION (ON RESUBMISSION); FURMAN v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (ON RESUBMISSION)
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1984-03-21
Citations: 419 Mich. 32
Docket Number: Docket Nos. 70397, 70412, 70417, 70421
Parties: SELK v DETROIT PLASTIC PRODUCTS (ON RESUBMISSION) KELLY v MUSKEGON COUNTY ROAD COMMISSION (ON RESUBMISSION) FURMAN v DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (ON RESUBMISSION)
Judges: Williams, C.J., and Ryan, Brickley, and Cav-anagh, JJ., concurred with Boyle, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 419
Pages: 32–47

Head Matter:
SELK v DETROIT PLASTIC PRODUCTS (ON RESUBMISSION) KELLY v MUSKEGON COUNTY ROAD COMMISSION (ON RESUBMISSION) FURMAN v DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS (ON RESUBMISSION)
Docket Nos. 70397, 70412, 70417, 70421.
Argued August 16, 1983
(Calendar Nos. 10-12).
Decided March 21, 1984.
Reported in full ante, p 1.
Decided on resubmission May 24, 1984.
On motions by the defendants for rehearing, the Supreme Court granted the motions and, in lieu of further briefing or oral argument, ordered the cases resubmitted for decision.
In an opinion by Justice Boyle, joined by Chief Justice Williams and Justices Ryan, Brickley, and Cavanagh, the Court said that it was persuaded that its original opinion in this case could be interpreted to mean that the date on which a workers’ compensation award is made is completely determinative of the rate of interest to be applied to payments made pursuant to the award in all circumstances — an interpretation never intended by the Court — and that clarification is required.
The Legislature intended that interest on weekly workers’ compensation paid pursuant to an award is to be paid at the rate of 12% per annum from the date each payment was due. The date of the award is not determinative of the rate of interest to be applied; rather, it is the date on which the payment is made that determines the rate. Where payment is made on or after January 1, 1982, interest on the amount due is computed at 12% per annum from the date the payment was due regardless of the date of the award and the date the payment was due.
The primary purpose of an effective date may be to provide a date certain for the statute’s application. Given the fact that there is often a time lag between the date on which the Governor signs a bill and its applicability, effective dates provide notice to those who must conform their conduct to the law as specified in the enactment.
Reference for Points in Headnotes
[1, 2] 82 Am Jur 2d, Workmen’s Compensation § 579.
Justice Levin, joined by Justice Kavanagh, dissenting, stated that he continued to disagree with the retroactive application before January 1, 1982 of the higher rate of interest to weekly payments that became due before that date. The majority focuses on the word "was” in the phrase "from the date each payment was due”, to the exclusion of the sentence, "this amendatory act shall take effect January 1, 1982”. In stating that the act "shall take effect January 1, 1982”, the Legislature intended that the increase in the rate of interest payable on disputed workers’ compensation benefits, those that become payable following an award by a referee, the board, or a court, should become effective on January 1, 1982. Accordingly, interest accrues at the higher rate on and after, but not before, January 1, 1982. The construction of the majority substitutes "the date each [weekly] payment was due” for "January 1, 1982” as the effective date of the act, resulting in as many effective dates for the increase in the rate of interest as there are days in years yet in dispute.
Opinion of the Court
1. Workers’ Compensation — Interest on Awards.
The date on which a past due workers’ compensation payment is made determines the rate of interest to be applied to the amount of the payment; where payment is made after January 1, 1982, interest on the amount due is computed at 12% per annum from the date the payment was due, regardless of the date of the award and the date the payment was due (1981 PA 194, MCL 418.801[5]; MSA 17.237[801][5]).
Dissenting Opinion by Levin, J.
2. Workers’ Compensation — Interest on Awards.
The increase in the rate of interest payable on disputed workers’ compensation beneñts became effective on January 1, 1982, and applies to weekly payments that would become due on or after January 1, 1982, not to weekly beneñts that became due before January 1, 1982 (1981 PA 194, MCL 418.801[5]; MSA 17,237[801][5]).

Opinion:
On Resubmission
Boyle, J.
On March 21, 1984, this Court issued its opinion in these consolidated workers' compensation appeals. 419 Mich 1; 345 NW2d 184 (1984). Subsequently, defendants-appellants in each case filed timely motions for rehearing. We granted those motions on May 1, 1984, and the cases were resubmitted for decision. 419 Mich 1206.
We are persuaded that our original opinion in these cases requires clarification. Some of the language in the majority opinion, specifically the language found in the conclusion, lends itself to an interpretation never intended by this Court. Both the motions for rehearing and Justice Levin's dissent suggest that under the Court's interpretation, the date of the award is completely determinative of the interest rate applicable to payments made pursuant to such an award under all circumstances.
Such an interpretation is not consistent with our reasoning in the original opinion, and we granted the motions for rehearing in order to clarify any language which could be read to stand for such an application.
We reaffirm the rationale of the original opinion. We remain convinced that the Legislature intended 1981 PA 194 to award interest at 12% from the date each payment "was due". Thus, "[w]hen weekly compensation is paid pursuant to an award interest on the compensation shall be paid at the rate of 12% per annum from the date each payment was due". 1981 PA 194 (emphasis added).
The date of the award is not determinative under this interpretation, and any suggestion to the contrary in our original opinion was inadvertent and should be disregarded. Rather, it is the date of payment which triggers the application of the 12% rate.
Where an employer pays compensation on or after January 1, 1982, pursuant to an award, interest on the award shall be paid at 12% from the date each payment was due. _
To the extent that it is consistent with this clarification, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. We are not persuaded that the other issues raised in the motions for rehearing merit further statement by this Court. We remand these cases to the WCAB for computation of interest in accordance with the rule expressed in this opinion.
Williams, C.J., and Ryan, Brickley, and Cav-anagh, JJ., concurred with Boyle, J.
Specifically, it has been suggested that under our interpretation, where an award was entered before January 1, 1982, interest accrues at 5% on all payments, even those which became due and payable on or after January 1, 1982.
Under this rule, neither the date of the award nor the due date of the payment is determinative of the applicable interest rate. Rather, the focus is on when the compensation is paid. If payment is made on or after January 1, 1982, interest is computed at 12% per annum from the date payment was due, regardless of the date of the award and regardless of when the payment was due.
The dissent in the original submission and on rehearing places great emphasis on the significance of the effective date specified in 1981 PA 194 as the key to a determination of whether the Legislature intended to increase an interest rate to apply retroactively or prospectively. The dissenters chide us for failure to accord proper respect to the significance of the effective date in our construction of the statute.
When one carefully examines how the Legislature utilizes effective dates, however, it is clear that we have accorded that respect which is properly due.
Effective dates are inserted by the Legislature in all kinds of statutes. When it wishes to address the question of retroactivity, the Legislature has specifically done so in addition to providing for an effective date.
For example, when the Legislature passed the new rule for a claim and delivery action, in 1976 PA 79, it provided in enactment § 2 that "[t]his amendatory act shall apply to all actions pending or commenced on or after the effective date of this act". Enactment § 3 of the same statute provided: "This amendatory act shall take effect July 1, 1975". Because the Legislature in connection with other statutes in enactment sections has specifically addressed retroactivity in addition to providing an effective date, we are unable to agree that the mere insertion of an effective date, standing alone, is dispositive of the prospective/retroactive effect of 1981 PA 194.
The primary purpose of an effective date may be to provide a date certain for the statute's application. Given the fact that there is often a time lag between the date on which the Governor signs a bill and its applicability, effective dates provide notice to those who must conform their conduct to the law as specified in the enactment.
The minority suggests that we have ignored the significance of the effective date in 1981 PA 194. However, we have not ignored it, although we disagree with the minority concerning its significance. Properly construed, the effective date indicates that the amendatory statute applies on or after January 1, 1982. It says nothing about retroactivity. Therefore, it is not inconsistent to say that when interest on compensation is paid on or after January 1, 1982, the statute applies and the interest is computed at a rate of 12% per annum.