Case Name: ANTHONY ADAMO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. LLOYD W. McCORKLE, ACTING PRINCIPAL KEEPER OF THE NEW JERSEY STATE PRISON AT TRENTON, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT
Court: New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1953-07-20
Citations: 26 N.J. Super. 562
Docket Number: 
Parties: ANTHONY ADAMO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. LLOYD W. McCORKLE, ACTING PRINCIPAL KEEPER OF THE NEW JERSEY STATE PRISON AT TRENTON, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Superior Court Reports
Volume: 26
Pages: 562–575

Head Matter:
ANTHONY ADAMO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. LLOYD W. McCORKLE, ACTING PRINCIPAL KEEPER OF THE NEW JERSEY STATE PRISON AT TRENTON, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.
Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division
Argued June 22, 1953
Decided July 20, 1953.
Before Judges Freund, Stanton and Francis.
Mr. Dominick F. Pachella argued the cause for plaintiff-appellant (Messrs. Pachella and Chary, attorneys).
Mr. Paul T. Huckin argued the cause for defendant-respondent (Mr. Harry L. Towe, attorney).

Opinion:
Stanton, J. S. C.
(temporarily assigned). This is an appeal from the discharge of a writ of habeas corpus by the Law Division on the complaint of Anthony Adamo then and now confined in the State Prison.
Following his conviction on two indictments charging assault, the plaintiff appeared before the County Court on February 8, 1950 and this pronouncement was made by the court:
"It is the judgment of this Court that this defendant be put on probation for a period of five years. He is to report once a week to the Probation Officer of this County, the time and place to be fixed by the Probation Office. He is to obey all the rules of the Probation Office which generally speaking means that he is to observe the law of this State, of the United States, and of any State where he may be permitted to go. He is not to leave the State of New Jersey without the permission of either the Probation Officer or the Judge of the Court. In addition to this he will be fined $500.00. This fine may be paid in installments."
Following some colloquy between the court and the plaintiff's counsel with respect to the installment payments, the court said further:
"All right. The fine is to be paid at the rate of $10.00 per month. Now, about the reporting once a week, this will, of course, be until the further order' of the Court. Should the defendant's activities convince the Court that he intends to live within the bounds set by the laws of the State of New Jersey and of the United States of America this reporting may be alleviated, or the periods made longer. I am making it once a week to start with because I want the defendant to become acquainted with the Probation Department and the work they are doing and to realize there is a serious side to all activities and that no one is permitted in Bergen County with impunity to break the law. If subsequent events prove that his counsel is correct, that he hasn't broken the law no great harm will have been done. Perhaps he will have learned something to his advantage. If subsequent events show that the Court is right, that he has broken (lie law, then the probation will go on and I hope it lias the desired effect."
In connection with this there appears this entry upon the docket:
"Sentence — February 8, 1950. Report to Probation office once a week for five years, Obey all of the rules of the Probation office as established in this court. Fine $500. Costs $15.00, payable $10. a month thru the Bergen County Probation Office."
On May 16, 1952, the plaintiff was charged with the violation o£ his probation and there were hearings thereon. The following entries on the docket set forth the determination of the charges and the judgment of the court:
"August 13, 1952. Defendant found guilty of violation of probation. Probation revoked. Defendant remanded to the Bergen County Jail to await sentence."
"August 20, 1952. Sentence. Not less than two nor more than three years in State Prison on each indictment. 7 days spent in the Bergen County Jail to be deducted from both the minimum and maximum. These sentences to run concurrently."
The offenses committed by the plaintiff were misdemeanors and at the time of his conviction a misdemeanor was punishable by a fine not exceeding $1,000 or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years, or both. R. S. 2:103-1 and 6.
The question presented here is whether the placing of the plaintiff on probation and the imposition of a fine upon him, where there was no express suspension of the imposition or execution of a prison sentence, exhausted the power of the court to impose a prison sentence upon him because of his violation of the conditions of his probation.
At the times with which we are concerned the following statutory provisions were in force:
"When it shall appear that the best interests of the public as well as of the defendant will be subserved thereby, the courts of this state shall have power to suspend the imposition or execution of sentence, and also to place the defendant on probation under the supervision of the chief probation officer of the county, for a period of not less than 1 year nor more than 5 years. " B. S. 2:199-1 (now N. J. S. 2,1:168-1).
"The court shall determine and may, at any time, modify the conditions of probation, and may, among others, include any of the following: shall pay a fine or the costs of the prosecution, or both, in one or several sums; B. S. 2:199-2 (now N. J. S. 2A: 168-2).
" At any time during the probation period the court may issue a warrant and cause the probationer to be arrested for violating any of the conditions of his probation, or any probation officer - upon the request of the chief probation officer, may arrest the probationer without a warrant; ;S . Such probation officer shall forthwith, report such arrest or detention to the court and submit to the court a report showing the manner in which the probationer has violated his probation. Thereupon the court, after summary hearing, may continue or it may revoke the probation and the suspension of sentence, and may cause the sentence imposed to be executed or impose any sentence which might originally have been imposed B. S. 2:199-4 (now N. J. S. 2A:168-4).
The plaintiff contends that the imposition of a fine was the sentence" in this case, that payment of it executed the sentence, and thereafter the court lacked the power to impose a prison sentence upon its finding that he had violated the conditions of probation.
Upon the argument the State asserted that the fine imposed here was a part of the original sentence and not merely a condition of probation. It argues that in order to put an offender on probation "all or some part of the penalty must be suspended either expressly or by necessary implication so that it may be imposed later as a penalty for breach of probation"; and also that the withholding of a sentence or a part thereof is inherent in placing a man on probation. Citing State v. Pascal, 133 N. J. L. 528 (Sup. Ct. 1946); Ex parte Samber, 13 N. J. Super. 410 (Cty. Ct. 1951).
It was conceded on the argument that the fine imposed upon Adamo was fully paid prior to the proceeding in which he was charged with the violation of the conditions of his probation.
It should be noted that in the pronouncement of the trial court and in the docket entry set forth above not a word was spoken or entered regarding the suspension of the imposition or execution of imprisonment.
At common law following a conviction the imposition or execution of sentence could be suspended. State v. Addy, 43 N. J. L. 113 (Sup. Ct. 1881); State v. Osborne, 79 N. J. Eq. 430 (Ch. 1911); State v. Braunstein, 5 N. J. Misc. 243 (Sup. Ct. 1927). But there could not be sus pension of part of a sentence nor a fragmentary imposition of sentence. State v. Addy, supra; State v. Clifford, 84 N. J. L. 595 (Sup. Ct. 1913); State v. Braunstein, supra.
Probation is not a sentence in itself, but rather is a device that, among other things, designates a period during which the imposition or the execution of sentence is suspended and the convicted person is permitted to continue at large upon stated conditions upon the violation of which he makes himself liable-to imprisonment. It plainly appears from the reading of N. J. S. 2A :168~1 and 4 that the suspension of sentence and the placing of an offender on probation go together. An examination of reported cases in this State dealing with probation shows that the courts expressly suspended the imposition or the execution of imprisonment and then placed the offender on probation. State v. Mungioli, 131 N. J. L. 52 (Sup. Ct. 1943) ; State v. Haber, 132 N. J. L. 507 (Sup. Ct. 1945); State v. Pascal, supra; State v. Pascal, 1 N. J. 261 (1949).
In Adamo's case a fine could have been the complete sentence and it might have been payable forthwith or he might have been placed on probation to liquidate it in installments. It is not necessary to consider here what the determination should be on a hearing on a charge of,probation violation if the court had ordered that the imposition of the prison sentence be suspended and that the offender be placed on probation for five years and that, among other stated conditions of probation, he pay a fine of $500 and costs. Conceivably that might be the disposition that the sentencing court had in mind, but the fact is that there was no express suspension of imprisonment. In connection with this it is interesting to • compare the federal statute, 18 U. 8. O. A., sec.. 3651, with ours. After stating that the court may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place the defendant on probation, this language appears:
"Probation may be granted -whether the offense is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both. If an offense is punishable by both fine and imprisonment, the court may impose a fine and place the defendant on probation as to imprisonment. Probation may be limited to one or more counts or indictments, • but, in the absence of express limitation, shall extend to the entire sentence and judgment."
There is a further provision in this section to the effect that, among the conditions of probation which may be imposed, the probationer may be required to pay a fine in one or several sums.
Assuming the right of the sentencing court here to impose a fine and to place the defendant on probation as to imprisonment, the fact is that not a word was uttered by it with respect to imprisonment or the suspension of its imposition or execution or about placing the plaintiff on probation as to it.
An offender standing before the court after conviction should be apprized exactly of what sentence is imposed upon him, what part of it, if any, has been suspended, and if he be placed on probation what conditions he must ' comply with. It would not be right, proper or fair to hold that a suspension of sentence as to imprisonment is implied or inherent in the placing of an offender upon probation where a fine is simultaneously imposed upon him.
Since there was no suspension of the imposition or execution of a prison sentence here, and as there was a fine imposed which was fully paid prior to the proceeding in which the plaintiff was tried for probation violation,' the sentencing court had no power to sentence the plaintiff to State Prison as a probation violator and such sentence is void. The sentence imposed originally had been executed. Cf. Roberts v. United States, 330 U. S. 364, 64 S. Ct. 113, 88 L. Ed. 41 (1943).
The State questions the right of the plaintiff to seek his release through habeas corpus. It says that the remedy is under Rule 2 :T-13 which provides that the court may correct an illegal sentence at any time. However, the correction of an illegal sentence is not involved here. The plaintiff seeks his release from prison where he is detained by virtue of a void sentence. This entitles him to the remedy of habeas corpus. State v. Osborne, supra; In re Scridlow, 124 N. J. L. 342, 344 (Sup. Ct. 1940); In re Kershner, 9 N. J. 471 (1952).
The order discharging the writ and directing that the plaintiff remain in confinement is reversed. The record shall be remitted with directions to enter an order discharging the plaintiff from confinement.