Case Name: Agnes MASZEWSKI, Appellant, v. John PISKADLO, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1975-07-25
Citations: 318 So. 2d 226
Docket Number: No. 73-1018
Parties: Agnes MASZEWSKI, Appellant, v. John PISKADLO, Appellee.
Judges: HOBSON, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 318
Pages: 226–230

Head Matter:
Agnes MASZEWSKI, Appellant, v. John PISKADLO, Appellee.
No. 73-1018.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
July 25, 1975.
W. K. Zewadski of Zewadski & Smith, St. Petersburg, for appellant.
Joan LoBianco Walker, St. Petersburg, for appellee.

Opinion:
McNULTY, Chief Judge.
Appellant, an 83-year-old married woman, seeks enforcement of a contract under which she claims a right to reside in a house in which appellee, a 79-year-old widower, owns a life estate. The trial judge entered a final judgment on the pleadings in favor of defendant-appellee and this appeal ensued. We affirm.
The question herein is the enforceability of the alleged contract. The trial judge determined that it was unenforceable for three reasons. We need only consider one, however, that relating to the lack of mutuality of obligation.
The facts are these. In 1966 the appellant was "enticed," it is said, by appellee and induced to leave her apartment and move in with him in a house which, at that time, he owned in fee simple. On April 19, 1967 appellee deeded fee simple title to appellant reserving a life estate. That deed was recorded on the same day. The parties continued living together until some time in 1970 when the relationship between them became strained. Sometime during that year appellant allegedly attempted to leave the premises but in a spirit of apparent reconciliation appellee requested that she remain. Illustrative of this reconciliation the "agreement" sued upon herein was entered into on the 4th day of June, 1970. The parties thereafter continued living as they had been until 1973 when appellee changed the locks and dispossessed appellant. This action followed.
The agreement sued on first recites the aforesaid deed of April 19, 1967 and recognizes the respective freehold interests of the parties. The provisions directly pertinent to this action then followed:
"It is mutually agreed by and between the parties hereto that during the remainder of their lifetimes, they shall live together in harmony in the above described residential premises. Neither shall have the right to dispossess the other from these premises.
"However, should either desire to separate, there shall he no inhibition against one of the parties on his or her own volition from separating from the other and leaving said premises." (Italics ours.)
At first blush it might appear that this exchange of promises not to dispossess one another is sufficient consideration; but it's illusory. To begin with, appellee gave up the right to dispossess appellant but appellant gave up nothing since, appellee being a life tenant, appellant couldn't have dispossessed him in the first place. There was nothing, therefore, to support his promise.
Additionally, while appellant alleges in her complaint that in consideration for that promise on appellee's part she forebore leaving the premises when she had a right to leave, she is estopped from establishing that fact under the parol evidence rule because she expressly reserved the right to leave at anytime under the terms of the written agreement she's suing on. The sum total of the agreement, then, is that he can't dispossess her but she is free to go at anytime. He has nothing to enforce.
We are of the opinion, therefore, and so hold, that the contract sued on is void for lack of mutuality of obligation and thus unenforceable. Accordingly, the judgment appealed from should be, and the same is hereby, affirmed.
HOBSON, J., concurs.
SCHWARTZ, ALAN R., Associate Judge, dissents with opinion.
. We footnote here the distinction between establishing consideration by parol and modifying or contradicting the terms of a written instrument by parol. Consideration may be established by parol, of course; but if the written instrument expressly speaks to consideration or any facet of its parol is inadmissible to contravene it. See, e. g., 13 Fla. Jur. Evidence § 395-6.