Case Name: Most Worshipful Prince Hall Grand Lodge, Free and Accepted Masons of Colorado and Jurisdiction v. Most Worshipful Hiram Grand Lodge, Free and Accepted Ancient York Masons of Colorado and Jurisdiction, National Compact Prince Hall Origin et al.
Court: Colorado Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Colorado
Decision Date: 1929-09-16
Citations: 86 Colo. 330
Docket Number: No. 12,434
Parties: Most Worshipful Prince Hall Grand Lodge, Free and Accepted Masons of Colorado and Jurisdiction v. Most Worshipful Hiram Grand Lodge, Free and Accepted Ancient York Masons of Colorado and Jurisdiction, National Compact Prince Hall Origin et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Colorado Reports
Volume: 86
Pages: 330–350

Head Matter:
No. 12,434.
Most Worshipful Prince Hall Grand Lodge, Free and Accepted Masons of Colorado and Jurisdiction v. Most Worshipful Hiram Grand Lodge, Free and Accepted Ancient York Masons of Colorado and Jurisdiction, National Compact Prince Hall Origin et al.
Decided September 16, 1929.
Opinion modified October 21, 1929.
Mr. George H. Ross, for plaintiff in error.
Mr. Max D. Melville, for intervener.
En Banc.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Adams
delivered the opinion of the court.
This case is before us for the second time. In Most Worshipful Prince Hall Grand Lodge v. Most Worshipful Hiram Grand Lodge, 85 Colo. 17, 273 Pac. 648, the cause was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. After it went back to the district court, an intervention was permitted on behalf of the Most Worshipful Grand Lodge of Ancient, Free and Accepted Masons of Colorado, a fraternal, benevolent and social organization. Intervener is a legal entity independent of plaintiff and defendant. Issue was joined, and at the second trial, it was found and adjudged, inter alia, that intervener had had and has lawful claims and rights to Masonic names, emblems and insignia superior and ] ong anterior to the claims of the other parties, whose claims, as between themselves, we passed upon in the other reported case above cited. It was also found and determined at the second trial, that intervener's rights were being infringed by plaintiff and defendant. Injunctive relief and judgment against them in intervener's favor was accordingly entered. .
Issues of fact were presented to, and heard and determined by the trial court. There was no motion for a new trial, nor, any order dispensing with such motion. For this reason, the intervener has moved to dismiss the writ of error. This motion to dismiss the writ is now before us for consideration. It is based on our rule 8, which'reads: "The party claiming error in the-trial of any case must, unless' otherwise ordered by the trial court, move that court for a new) trial, and, without such order, only questions presented'in such motion will be considered on review. ' '
The following are only-some of the numerous decisions of this court in which the above rule has been invoked and sustained: Blackmer v. Blackmer, 84 Colo. 540, 272 Pac. 10; Stotts v. Stotts, 83 Colo. 368, 265 Pac. 911; Parrish's Addition v. Reid, 82 Colo. 419, 260 Pac. 1018; Denver Tramway Corporation v. Gentry, 82 Colo. 51, 256 Pac. 1088; Takamine v. Hirschfeld, 81 Colo. 501, 256 Pac. 312; Colorado State Bank of Durango v. Bird, 79 Colo. 625, 247 Pac. 802; Price v. People, 78 Colo. 223, 240 Pac. 688; Jones v. Dunlap, 78 Colo. 221, 239 Pac. 989; Daugherty v. People, 78 Colo. 43, 239 Pac. 14; Fincher v. Bosworth & Co., 76 Colo. 69, 230 Pac. 596.
We have repeatedly explained that the purpose of rule 8 is to give to the trial court an opportunity to correct its own errors, if any. It is made in fairness to trial courts, the court of review, and primarily, for the benefit bf litigants themselves, to avoid long drawn out and costly litigation. Intervener's motion to dismiss the writ of error is well taken. We cannot deny it without abrogating a valuable rule of practice and repudiating an unbroken line of decisions. Without compliance with the rule by the party claiming error, we have no alternative but to conclude that the alléged errors complained of for the first time' in this''court, did not and do not exist. The motion to dismiss the writ must therefore be sustained.
Writ dismissed.