Case Name: PUFFER v. REEVE
Court: New York Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1885-01
Citations: 15 Abb. N. Cas. 388
Docket Number: 
Parties: PUFFER v. REEVE.
Judges: 
Reporter: Abbott's New Cases
Volume: 15
Pages: 388–396

Head Matter:
PUFFER v. REEVE.
N. Y. Supreme Court, First Department, General Term ;
January, 1885.
Replevin.—Sale ; conditional ; lease of chattel ; title of BONA FIDE PL’BCHASER.
A lease of a chattel for a specified term, at an agreed rent¡ payable in installments, for which notes were given, and further providing that, upon full payment of the notes, the title to the chattel should vest in the lessee, but that upon default ih payment of any note, the lessee’s right to possession should cease, with full power in the lessor to retake possession of the chattel,—Held, to be nothing more than a conditional sale, no title passing to the lessee until payment of all tile rent, so that a purchaser from him for value and without notice of the agreement, acquired no title to the chattel as against the owner.
Appeal from a judgment for the defendant, after trial at special term without a jury.
Alvin D. Puffer sued Walter F. Reeve, to recover possession of a soda-water apparatus delivered to one Bell by plaintiff under an instrument called a lease.
The lease was in the following form : “Know all men by these presents, that 1, A. W. Bell,. . . have hired, leased and received of A. D. Puffer,. „ . for the term, to wit: — years, — months, ending October 1st, 1878, subject to the conditions herein stated, the following described goods and chattels : [describing them] and I do promise and agree with the said A. D. Puffer, his representatives and assigns, to pay him or them for the possession and reasonable use thereof, for said term, the sum of eleven hundred and fifty-two dollars, as rent, to be paid, old apparatus, four hundred and fifty-two dollars, balance in the installments set forth in the several notes given by me therefor, as follows: [enumerating the notes] and it is provided that said property hereby leased is not to be removed from the premises where now located,. . . nor the interest of the lessee under this lease to be transferred without the consent of said A. D. Puffer in writing thereto first obtained.
“ And it is further provided, that upon the full pay-' ment of the several notes aforesaid, all claim and title to said property on part of said Puffer shall cease, and the whole title shall vest in said lessee as owner. But upon any breach of the provisions of this lease, espec-' ially upon failure by the said lessee to pay the several notes or either of them as they become due and pay-; able, then this lease and any and all claim of right on the part of said lessee under the same, or to the further use and possession of said property, shall be thereby terminated, and the said A. D. Puffer may thereafter at any time enter the premises where said property may be and resume possession of the same without process of law or let or hindrance from the lessee; and such of the aforesaid notes as mature after said. Puffer has resumed possession of said property shall be taken and held to be void, and returned to the lessee upon demand.”
Bell made default in payment, and after various mesne transfers, the defendant purchased the soda-water apparatus, and paid a fair price therefor. At the time of the purchase he had no notice of any rights of plaintiff.
The complaint was dismissed at the trial, and from the judgment entered thereon, plaintiff appealed.
Charles De Hart Brower {Alfred Steckler, attorney), for the plaintiff, appellant.
The so called lease was an executory contract of sale. A vendee under such a contract cannot convey a good title even to an innocent purchaser for value (Boon v. Moss, 70 N. Y. 465, 473 ; Ballard v. Burgeth, 40 N. Y. 314 ; Austin v. Dye, 46 N. Y. 500; Story on Sales, § 457 [a]; Benjamin on Sales, § 437; Walker v. Mitchell, 25 Hun, 527 ; Kohler v. Hayes, 41 Cal. 455; Hallowell v. Milne, 16 Kan. 65 ; Price v. Jones, 3 Head [Tenn.) 86 ; Cole v. Berry, 13 Vroom [N. J.] 308; Tibbet v. Towle, 12 Me. 341; Clayton v. Heister, 80 N. C. 275; Singer Co. v. Graham, 8 Oregon, 19; Corse v. Tregent, 11 Mich. 65; Coggill v. N. Y. & N. H. R. R. Co., 3 Gray, 545 ; Bailey v. Harris, 8 Iowa, 331 ; Summer v. Cottey, 71 Mo. 121; Bradshaw v. Warner, 54 Ind. 58 ; Forbes v. Marsh, 15 Conn. 384; Clark v. Wells, 45 Vt. 4; Sanders v. Keber, 28 Ohio St. 630; Sargent v. Gill, 8 N. H. 325 ; Goodell v. Fairbrother, 12 R. I. 233 ; Goodwin v. May, 23 Ga. 205; Ketchum v. Brennan, 53 Miss. 596; Aultman v. Mallory, 5 Neb. 178; Corse v. Patterson, 6 H. & J. 153 ; Walker v. Hyman, 1 Ont. Ap. R. 345). Hintermeister v. Lane, 27 Nun, 497, is not controlling, as the transaction there set forth was not a case of conditional sale.
A Simmis, Jr., for the defendant, respondent.

Opinion:
Daniels, J.
This action was brought to recover possession of a soda-water apparatus, which was designated as the " Druggist's Pride." The plaintiff, by an instrument dated June 27, 1876, delivered it to A. W. Bell, for $1,152, accepting in part payment an old apparatus for which a credit was given of $452, the balance to be paid in installments, by several notes which were stated in the contract.
It was provided in the instrument, that, upon full payment of the several notes, all claim and title to the property on the part of the plaintiff should cease, and the whole title vest in the lessee as owner ; but that upon a breach, the possession of the property should terminate, and that the plaintiff might enter the premises where the property might be, and resume the possession of the same, without process of law and without let or hindrance from the lessee. The amount due upon the notes was stated to be $234.32, with interest, no part of which had been paid.
Mr. Bell sold the apparatus to Mr. Crawford, who paid the plaintiff $150 on account of the debt due upon it. Crawford sold it to William S. Schieffelin & Co., and they sold it to defendant, of all of which the plaintiff had notice. The defendant purchased the apparatus for a valuable consideration, and without any notice of any claim of title to it in the plaintiff. The delivery of the property by the plaintiff was not alone conditional, as it was in Comer v. Cunningham (77 N. Y. 391), but the title itself was conditional on the final and complete payment to be made by the purchaser. The transaction was no more than a conditional sale, the title remaining in the plaintiff until complete payment should extinguish the condition. That never was made, and the default entitled1 the plaintiff to recover the possession of the property under the authority of Ballard v. Burgett (40 N. Y. 314) ; and Austin v. Dye (46 Id. 500).
The judgment should be reversed and a new trial ordered, with costs to abide the event.