Case Name: EGAN v. CHABOT
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1908-03-06
Citations: 109 N.Y.S. 110
Docket Number: 
Parties: EGAN v. CHABOT.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 109
Pages: 110–113

Head Matter:
(124 App. Div. 593.)
EGAN v. CHABOT.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
March 6, 1908.)
Master and Servant—Contract oe Employment—Action for Breach—Evidence.
Evidence held, insufficient to sustain a verdict for plaintiff on the theory that she was employed for the season at a weekly wage.
Patterson, P. J., and Houghton, J., dissenting.
Appeal from Trial Term.
Action by Nora M. Egan against Theodore J. Chabot. From a judgment for plaintiff, and an order denying a new trial, defendant appeals. Reversed, and new trial granted.
Argued before PATTERSON,. P. J., and McLAUGHLIN, LAUGHLIN, HOUGHTON, and SCOTT, JJ.
Louis O. Van Doren, for appellant.
Joseph M. Herzberg, for respondent.

Opinion:
LAUGHLIN, J.
The action is brought to recover damages for a breach of a contract. The plaintiff alleges that on or about the day of February, 1904, she was employed by the defendant as a designer and trimmer of hats for the season to terminate on the 1st day of July, 1904, at the rate of $25 per week, and that, after working pursuant to the contract until the 30th day of April, she was discharged without just cause, to her damage in the sum of $200. The answer was a general denial. Upon the trial the plaintiff testified: That she had been a designer and trimmer of hats for about 15 years, and was conducting a millinery business of her own on Alexander avenue, in the Bronx, at the time of the negotiations resulting in her employment by the defendant. That she came to the defendant's store in the month of February, 1904, and applied to him for the position of trimmer occupied by a former employé who had left the defendant's employ. That she informed the defendant that she was selling out her business. That she had several customers in the Bronx, and that she would start on $25 a week. That the defendant replied that he had made up his mind not to have any "more high-priced trimmers, but that he would think about it and let her know. That a few days thereafter she received a letter from the defendant, asking her to call, and on calling he offered her $20 a week, which she declined, and stated that $25 was very low, whereupon "he said he would give it to me." That she then informed him that she "only wanted a season, until the 1st of July," when she was going to Europe, and he said, "Well, all right," whereupon she remarked, "I suppose you do not have really any business the 1st of July," to which he responded, "Sometimes; if you leave somebody after you for the workroom for July, it will be all right." That the following conversation then took place between them:
"I said I had a very nice young lady in my own employ who was saleslady, and I would recommend her very highly, and take her up there, and he asked me what salary she would get, and I said $8, and he said, 'All right, bring her along,' and that is the way we made arrangements, and I brought Miss O'Neil along with me, and I entered into this employment on the 25th day of February, 1904."
That after being in the defendant's employ for two months she was discharged.
We are of opinion that this conversation constituted a hiring by the week, and that the plaintiff was not employed for the season. The plaintiff's suggestion about the season occurred after the defendant agreed to employ her at $25 per week. It amounted merely to a notification that she could not remain longer than the 1st of July. His assent to that suggestion did not change the agreement, and make it a hiring for the season. Manifestly it was the intention of the defendant to keep the plaintiff in his employ until the end of the season, provided her services were satisfactory and he needed them, but he did not obligate himself to continue the employment throughout the season. Moreover, she had no right to expect that a definite contract of employment for the season had been made. He said nothing about hiring her otherwise than by the week. She did not decline to work by the week, nor did she exact as a condition of entering defendant's employ that he agree to hire.her until the 1st of July. It does not appear that he had any personal knowledge with respect to her ability, and it is manifest that the nature of the work was such that he could not tell without a trial whether her services would be satisfactory. In these circumstances the motive of the defendant in discharging the plaintiff is immaterial. It may be' observed, however, that the discharge was not arbitrary, but was owing to her failure to procure satisfactory references after she had entered upon the employment.
It follows that the judgment and order should be reversed and a new trial granted, with costs to appellant to abide the event.
MCLAUGHLIN and SCOTT, JJ., concur.