Case Name: Alfred Hollingsworth v. The State
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1915-12-16
Citations: 78 Tex. Crim. 489
Docket Number: No. 3614
Parties: Alfred Hollingsworth v. The State.
Judges: DAVIDSON, Judge. — I agree to the reversal.
Reporter: Texas Criminal Reports
Volume: 78
Pages: 489–530

Head Matter:
Alfred Hollingsworth v. The State.
No. 3614.
Decided December 16, 1915.
Rehearing granted January 12, 1916.
1. — Incest—Evidence—Impeaching Own Witness — Surprise.
Where, upon trial of incest, the State introduced the alleged female as a witness and had her to testify that defendant, and no other person, had the opportunity to commit the offense and which had a strong tendency that he did so, without asking her directly whether it was defendant, whereupon the witness on cross-examination testified that another man was the father of her child, and that the defendant was not guilty of improper conduct toward her, it was reversible error to permit the State to impeach its own witness by showing that she had testified differently before the grand jury, and had written a letter to defendant accusing him of the paternity of her child; it appearing that' the State’s counsel was informed before placing the witness on the stand that she would so testify, and that he could not claim surprise. Distinguishing Blake v. State, 38 Texas Crim. Rep., 377. Hollowing Oates v. State, 67 Texas Crim. Rep., 488, and other cases. Prendergast, Presiding Judge, dissenting.
2. — Same—Evidence—Letter—Charge of Court.
Upon «trial of incest, it was reversible error to permit the State to introduce in evidence the letter written by the alleged female to the defendant, some time after the alleged offense, in 'which she accused him as being the father of her child, to which he made no replyj but denied on the trial that he ever received it, and upon which testimony the court 'charged the jury that if defendant received this letter they could consider the same as evidence of defendant’s guilt. Prendergast, Presiding Judge, dissenting.
3. — Same—Evidence—Letter—Eailure to Keply to "Written Communication.
■ Where, upon trial of incest, the State was permitted to introduce in evidence a letter written by the alleged female to the defendant accusing him that he was the father of her .child, to which he made no reply but denied its receipt, and it also appeared that defendant had prior thereto denied that he was the father of said child, such letter being a mere unsworn statement of the witness, would not prove anything and was not admissible in evidence. It is not necessary .to pass on the question as to whether a letter of this character is admissible in evidence under any circumstances, but it is sufficient to say that in the instant case it was inadmissible as original testimony. Pren-dergast, Presiding Judge, dissenting.
4. — Same—Evidence—Letter—Conspiracy—Duress.
Upon trial of incest, where the alleged female testified that certain statements in a certain letter which she had written to the defendant charging him with being the father of her child were untrue and that another man was in fact and truth the father of her child, the said letter which was introduced in evidence by the State could not be used to show the guilt of the defendant, and this although she may have conspired with the defendant to have him acquitted; besides, it appeared from the motion for new trial that she was under duress when she wrote this letter. Prendergast, Presiding Judge, dissenting.
5. — Same—Continuance—Newly Discovered Evidence — Other Assignments of Error — 'Practice on Appeal.
Where the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded upon other grounds, it is unnecessary to consider assignments of error involving the question of admitting evidence, failure to charge on circumstantial evidence, of overruling defendant’s motion for new trial because of newly discovered evidence and overruling his application for continuance, and these matters are not passed upon; although the application for continuance seems to have been sufficient. Pren-dergast, Presiding Judge, dissenting, holding that the cause should be affirmed.
Appeal from the District Court of Coryell. Tried below before the Hon. J. H. Arnold..
Appeal from a conviction of incest; penalty, ten years imprisonment in the penitentiary.
The opinion states the case.
'Sadler & Cobb, D. W. Odell, and Ramsey, Black & Ramsey, for appellant.
On question of continuance: Gilerease v. State, 33 Texas Crim. Bep., 619; Branch’s Crim. Law, see. 267.
On question of court’s charge on letter: Bice v. State, 49 Texas Crim. Bep., 669.
On the trial the State was permitted to introduce in evidence a letter from Cassie Dunn to appellant, written many months after the alleged commission of the offense with which appellant stands charged. There was no correspondence either before or after this letter fromu appellant in respect to the matter to which the letter relates, that is, in respect to that portion oí same wbieb implies a charge of guilt against him. It is clear, too, that there is not in the record any admission by appellant, either verbal or written, of the truthfulness of any statement or charge therein contained. It is also true that this letter was written some eight or nine months after the date of the commission of the alleged offense. That this letter is not admissible is clearly held, as we conceive, by all the authorities, for that the statement was made long after the commission of the alleged offense. The rule seems to be that “the admissions, to be competent against a co-conspirator must have been made pending and in furtherance of the conspiracjr. If made before or afterwards, they are inadmissible unless made at the instance or with the knowledge and consent of the co-conspirator.” Again it is said: “The admissions, to be competent, must not only be made at the time of the conspiracy or its execution, but must relate thereto.” (Ency. of Evidence, vol. 1, pp. 593-4.) This matter we have discussed quite fully in our -original argument, and deem it unnecessary to cite additional authorities on that question.
The main question involved in the case under this assignment is whether or not a letter from an accomplice after the commission of the alleged offense, not replied to, is admissible. On this question we desire to call the attention of the court, first, to the rule laid down in the latest edition of Jones on Evidence, volume 2, section 269, page 493, where he uses this language: “Letters written to a party and received by him may, under some circumstances, be read in evidence against him, but before they can be received as admissions against him there must be some evidence besides mere possession showing acquiescence in their contents as proof of some act or reply or statement; and in such case there must, of course, be proof that the one sought to be charged has received the letter.” Again, the same author, on page 494, says: “A distinction exists between the effect to be given to oral declarations made by one party to another which are in answer to or contradictory of some statement made by the other party and a written statement in a letter written by such party to another. It may well be that under most circumstances what is said to a man to his face which conveys the idea of an obligation on his part to the person addressing him or on whose behalf the statement is made, he is at least in some measure called upon to contradict or explain; but his failure to answer a letter is entirely different and there is no rule of law which requires a person to enter into a correspondence with another in reference to a matter in dispute between them or-which holds that silence should be regarded as an admission against the party to whom the letter is addressed. Such a rule would enable one party to obtain an advantage over another and has no sanction in the law.” Again, the same author, on page 588 of the same volume, uses this language (after having discussed the admissibility of silence under accusations of guilt): “With respect to written communication, however, the rule is different, because the failure of one receiving the letter to answer it may be attributed to many causes besides an acquiescence in the truth of what is written and such a rule would furnish, a dangerous weapon in the hands of ah unscrupulous party to make evidence in his favor against a careless opponent. It can not be said, however, to be an unvarying rule that an unanswered letter may not be evidence against the person addressed, because there are cases in which such letters have been admitted. The better supported rule probably is that on the reasonable grounds above stated unanswered letters are ordinarily no evidence against the person addressed as admissions of the truth of statements contained therein. The true rule to be gathered from the eases is that unanswered statements in letters are seldom to be regarded as admissions by the persons addressed, but that exceptional circumstances may justify the court in submitting them to the jury with the proper caution.” The rule as stated in Cyc., volume 16, page 960, is as follows: “The general rule is that omission to answer a written communication is hot evidence of the truth of the facts therein stated and that .under ordinary circumstances a party is not required to reply to a letter containing false statements of fact. There are circumstances under which unanswered letters are competent evidence of admissions by acquiescence in the statements therein contained, as when the party receiving a letter has in any way .invited the same or when there is any ground to infer that he has acted on the letter by partly answering it or otherwise recognizing it, or when with such letters goods or other articles are forwarded with bills and these are received without return or protest, or where money is sent upon terms and conditions stated in the letters and is not returned and there is no objection to or denial of the statements contained in the enclosing writing.” The rule on this subject is thus cited by Mr. Wharton, in his valuable work on Criminal Evidence (vol. 2, see. 683): “The fact that an unanswered letter or other paper is found in the possession of a party, but not acknowledged by him, is not ground for the admission of the paper as evidence against him. Were it admitted, an innocent man might, by the artifices of others, be charged with a prima facie case of guilt which he might find it difficult to repel. It is otherwise, however, when the party addressed in any way invited the sending to'him of the letter, or when there is ground to infer he acted on the letter. Where such tacit recognition is claimed, the whole conversation or correspondence which constitute a recognition must be given.” This general question is also discussed by Mr. Wigmore, in his work on Evidence, in section 1073m, where very many of the authorities to which we will call attention are cited. This section is so lengthy that we deem it inadvisable to insert it here. It will be noted that Mr. Wigmore probably in his text goes further than any other author towards sustaining unanswered letters. His references to some of the English authorities would, if not carefully analyzed, rather tend to oppose the position which we are seeking to maintain. We think the authorities cited above and the reasons on which the'y'rest must and will support the proposition to which the numerous authorities hereafter noted relate, that in a criminal case letters unanswered containing statements of criminative facts are not to be re- eeived under any circumstances unless possibly where, in prosecution for treason or matters of that sort, it becomes important, in respect to letters written at the time the events were moving, to show his knowledge of the action and conduct of others. Ordinarily, unanswered letters are not admissible even in civil eases, and, as the authorities note, the exception to this rule in civil eases is where, for instance, it is sought to prove demand, where such demand is necessary, letters though unanswered may be given in evidence. Another exception is where the character of one’s possession is in issue and he is holding adversely, it has been permitted to 'make proof of a demand by a letter, though unanswered. Another exception is that, where the letter so received has been acted upon, and again where the person receiving the letter has replied to certain portions of it and his replying letter contains no denial of the other matters with which he is sought to be charged, under some circumstances such letter is admissible. Or, when goods have been sent with a letter and received and appropriated, the letter though unanswered has been admitted, and the same is true where there has been a remittance of money, and as in the Horne-Took case in England, where he was charged with treason, it was held that though unreplied to, letters found in his possession, covering the dates of the treason alleged, were admissible. Such also seems to be the ruling in De Ber-inger’s trial, which was also for treason. These are the only criminal cases which we have found which in any way oppose the doctrine for which we contend, and we think are easily distinguishable from the case at bar. It may be that the ease of Commonwealth v. Waterman, 122 Mass., 43, is in a general way opposed to our view. The statement of facts in that’case is very lengthy, but the opinion is a general abstract-one and does not refer to the many other Massachusetts eases which thoroughly support our position.
We propose now to consider some of the eases which sustain our position. Among these is the case of People v. Colburn, 38 Pac. Bep., page • 1105. In that case Colburn was charged with robbery. There was introduced against him a letter from a friend which contained quite damaging evidence against him. The letter is set out in the opinion. In discussing the letter, the Supreme Court of California say:
“That the letter contained damaging evidence against the defendant is quite apparent. It does not in direct terms state his guilt, but the fact that the writer regarded defendant and A (Alie Knox) as being guilty is plainly inferable from his solicitude and caution to them to avoid discovery of their whereabouts. All this was well calculated to impress a- jury with the belief that defendant was guilty. This letter was clearly hearsay. Were such evidence admissible against a defendant charged with crime, there would be no limit to the power of designing persons to manufacture testimony against their neighbors. It will not do to say that Moore was a friend of the defendant, and hence that the evidence was admissible. It would be quite easy for an enemy, under the guise of friendship, to indict the most damaging epistles to a victim whose destruction he was seeking to encompass. The question of friend ship or enmity does not properly constitute a factor in the problem. The letter was a statement of a third party, in nowise connected with defendant; was not made under the sanction of an oath, and not admissible. The possession of unanswered letters is not such evidence of acquiescence in their contents as to make them admissible in a civil case, and a letter found upon a prisoner when arrested has been held to be no evidence of the facts stated in it. Rap., Cr. Law, sec. 283; Whart., Cr. Ev., see. 682; People v. Green, 1 Parker, Cr. R., 11; Com. v. Edgerly, 10 Allen, 184; Smiths v. Shofemaker, 17 Wall., 630. There are exceptions to* the rule, — as, for instance, it is shown that the defendant has acted upon the information contained in the letter; or where he has answered it, in which case so much of the letter as is-expíanatorjr of his answer is admissible; or where the party receiving the letter has by his acts or conduct invited the sending of it to him. There was no sufficient showing to render the letter admissible under any of these exceptions.”
This case, we think, very clearly states the rule. It also clearly states the exceptions to the rule in criminal cases, and they are as follows: (a) where it is shown that the defendant has acted upon information contained in the letter; or (b) where he had answered it, in which case it is stated so much of the letter as is explanatory of his answer is admissible, or where the party receiving the letter has by his acts or conduct invited the sending of it to him. On this last exception we ask the court to note particularly the case of Packer v. IT. S., 106 Fed. Rep., 906, as to what is meant by the phrase “inviting the sending of the letter to him.”
The next case to which we desire to call attention is the case just noted of Packer v. TJ. S., supra. That case was decided by Judge Wallace, circuit judge of New York. It is, in our judgment, one of the best opinions in the books on this question. We quote practically all that is said by the court in that case:
“The introduction in evidence of the Moody letter was prejudicial to the accused, and we can discover no ground on which the ruling receiving it can be upheld. It was written and sent after the offenses charged-in the indictment had been committed. The correspondence between Moody and the accused while the transactions evidencing the scheme to defraud were taking place was competent, because the letters were verbal acts constituting a part of the res gestae. It was also competent because the letters from the accused were admissions of facts contained in them, and a response to the letters of Moody, and the latter were necessary to a correct understanding of the scope and effect of the admissions. It is urged that the last Moody letter was competent because it was a reply to a letter from the accused soliciting further remittances from Moody. The contention is fallacious unless it can be maintained as a correct legal proposition that a request admits in advance the statements made in response. This would be a very dangerous doctrine, and finds no color of support in the law of evidence. If only that part of the reply refusing to make further remittances had been read, no harm would have been done; but, as has been stated, the letter was, in substance, a narrative of past events, of which there was no other evidence, and an argument to demonstrate that the accused had been guilty of a scheme to. defraud Moody. It is also urged that the letter was admissible as a tacit admission by the accused of the truth of its statements, it having been proved that the accused did not reply to it. Admissions, of course, may be inferred from silence as well as from express statements, but it has been uniformly held by the courts that the failure to reply to a letter is not to be treated in a criminal or in a civil action as an admission of the contents of the letter. In Com. v. Eastman, 1 Cush., 189, the court said:
“ ‘The letters/ however, if properly identified, would not, of themselves, authorize any inference against the defendants. They were only the acts and declarations of others; and unless adopted or sanctioned by the defendants by some reply or statement, or by some act done in pursuance to their suggestion, they ought not to prejudice the dfr-fendants. Letters addressed to an individual, and received by him, are not to have the same effect as verbal communications. Silence in the latter case may authorize the inference of an assent to the statements made, but not equally so in the ease of a letter received, but never answered or acted upon. So far as these letters might be shown by other proof to have been acted upon or sanctioned by the defendants, so far they would be competent evidence.’ In People v. Green, 1 Parker, Cr. R., 17, the court said:
“‘The maxim, “Qui facet consentiré videtur,” has also been applied between the parties to certain mercantile dealings; as where an account current was sent to the party by letter, and no objection made to it within a given time, established by convenience or by commercial usage. But it could not, in principle, be applicable to facts stated in a letter which the party was not bound or interested to answer. It would be placing a man entirely at the mercy of another if he was bound by what others chose to assert in addressing letters to him. In no ease could his silence be considered an admission of such facts.’
“It could not be applicable to any case where the letter only tends to support a charge of guilt, and where it had been followed by no action, and no response on the part of the person receiving the letter. The same principle hás been repeatedly applied in civil actions. Fairlie v. Denton, 3 Car. & P., 103; Learned v. Tillotson, 97 N. Y., 1; Bank v. Delafield, 126 N. Y., 410, 27 N. E. Rep., 797; Gray v. Ice Cream Co., 162 N. Y., 388, 56 N. E. Rep., 903, 49 L. R. A., 580.”
It will be noted that in that case the admissibility of a letter was sought to be sustained on the ground that it was a reply to a letter from the accused soliciting further remittances from Moody. Answering this contention, the court say:
“The contention is fallacious unless it can be maintained as a correct legal proposition that a request admits in advance the statements made in response. This would be a very dangerous doctrine and finds no color of support in the law of evidence. If only that part of the reply refusing to make further remittances bad been read, no harm would have been done; but, as above stated, the letter was, in substance, a narrative of past events of which there was no other evidence, and an argument to demonstrate that the accused had been guilty of a scheme to defraud Moody.”
Our recollection is that there were no letters from appellant to Cassie Dunn read in evidence on the trial. There was, as we recall, probably another letter of hers to appellant introduced in evidence and there was, as we remember, a letter or two from her father to1 appellant. There was proof, as we remember, that appellant and Cassie Dunn had conducted a friendly correspondence after she left appellant’s place, but there is, we are pretty sure, nothing in the evidence .to at all indicate that this letter was in reply to anything written by appellant and especially nothing in anything that appellant had written that had any relation to the grave charge contained in the Cassie Dunn letter.
Another valuable ease is that of Commonwealth v. Eastman, 1 Cush., 189, 48 Am. Dec., 596. So much of the opinion as relates to the matter here discussed will be found on page 599, as follows:
“The letters, however, if properly identified, would not of themselves authorize any inference against the defendants; they were only the acts and declarations of others; and, unless adopted or sanctioned by the defendants, by some reply or statement, or by some act done in pursuance of their suggestions, they ought not to prejudice the defendants. Letters addressed to an individual, and received by him, are not to have the same effect as verbal communications. Silence, in the latter ease, may authorize the inference of an assent to the statement made, but mot equally so in the case of a letter received, but never answered or acted upon. So far as these letters might have been shown by other proof to have been acted upon or sanctioned by the defendants, so far they would have been competent evidence.”
We desire to call special attention to the case of Razor v. Razor, 149 Ill., 621, .36 N. E. Rep., 963. This authority is valuable for the reason that, among others, the letter offered in evidence purported to be in response to a letter from the wife against whom it was sought to be used. We make the following liberal quotation from that opinion, which is practically all the court says on the question here involved:
“It is next insisted that the court erred in excluding from the jury •a certain letter alleged to have been found by appellant in his wife’s trunks, and containing a proposition to meet her in St. Louis for improper and adulterous purposes. It was shown that, while the letter was addressed to ‘Gertie’ (the familiar name of the wife) on the inside it was addressed to ‘Mrs. Bosburg, box 99,’ on the envelope containing it. It is shown, also, that a considerable package of letters was thus found, some entirely innocent, and others more or less incriminating. It is insisted that the letter excluded was one of a series, and in answer to one written by the complainant, and, having been found in the possession of the complainant, was, therefore, competent evidence. To this it must be said that there is, in this record,' no evidence that it was one of a series or that it was in answer to one written by complainant, other than that contained in the letter itself. This letter, if addressed to the wife, and found in her possession, would not be evidence against her, unless the contents had been adopted or sanctioned by some reply or statement 'or act done on her part, shown by proof aliunde the letter itself. While the possession of letters of this character is wholly inconsistent with the duties and obligations of a wife, it can not be said that her silence and retention of the letters necessarily imply assent to their contents. Where verbal communications are made, silence may authorize an inference of assent; but the same rule does not ordinarily apply to letters received, but never answered, or in any way acted upon.. 2 Whart., Ev., sec. 1154; Com. v. Eastman, 1 Cush., 189; Smith v. Shoemaker, 17 Wall., 630. The recital in the letter that it was an answer to one received by the writer, can not*be admitted for the purpose of establishing that fact. We should, in that ease, have the anomaly of a letter, inadmissible in evidence, proving that it was written in reply to one from the complainant, and the fact thus proved rendering the letter admissible. Nor is there any pretense in this record that the letter was ever acted upon, or any attempt made to meet the writer.”
We desire to call further attention to the ease of Commonwealth v. Edgerly, 10 Allen, 184, which we think should be of value. The opinion in that ease is by Chief Justice Bigelow of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts. While the facts in that ease are somewhat different from the facts here, the following clear statement of the law ought to receive acceptance:
“An unanswered letter is inadmissible although the statements contained in it are well known to the parties to whom it is sent, and this is held on the ground that a letter written to a party by a third person to which no reply is made does not show an acquiescence in the facts stated in the letter.”
Another clear statement of the rule is found in the case of Learned v. Tillotson, 97 N. Y., 1. The court there, among other things, say:
“From an examination of the cases we think that a distinction exists between the effect to be given to oral declarations made by one party to another, which are in answer to or contradictory to some statement made by the other party, and a written statement in a letter written by such party to another. It may well be that under most circumstances what is said to a man to his face, which conveys the idea of an obligation upon his part to the person addressing him, or on whose behalf the statement is made, he is at least in some measure called upon to contradict or explain; but a failure to answer a letter is entirely different, and there is no rule of law which requires a person to enter into a correspondence with another in reference to a matter in dispute between them, or which holds that silence should be -regarded as an admission against the party to whom the letter is addressed. Such a rule would enable one party to obtain an advantage over another and has no sanction in the law.”
This case has been approved in express terms in the more recent cases of Thomas v. Gage, 141 N. Y., 506, and particularly in Gray v. Ice Cream Co., 162 N. Y., 397, 56 N. E. Rep., 903. We have examined all the cases cited by Mr. Wigmore, in Jones on Evidence, and Wharton on Evidence and the Encyclopoedia of Evidence, and such other authorities as a fairly industrious search have developed, without finding .anything to contravene the position which we have herein sought to maintain. We have cited the court to the accessible authorities, including those tending to establish the negative of our position as well as those sustaining it. It will be noticed by an examination of Mr. Wharton’s work on Criminal Evidence that the exceptions noted under note 3 are all English cases and that the English authorities cited are opposed to the rule laid down in Commonwealth v. Eastman. We also call attention to section 695 of Mr. Wharton, where he discusses this exception and says: “But it should be remembered that, before the admissions of the agent can be proved, the fact of agency should first be established by other evidence. And it has been questioned whether the admissions of an agent not a co-conspirator, unless a part of the res gestae, can be put in evidence if the agent himself could be called to substantiate the facts admitted.”
Now, applying- these authorities to the question here before us. The court, of course, will remember that appellant stood charged with a serious crime in respect to which he had interposed his plea of not guilty and to meet which he was interposing his strongest denial. It will further be remembered that Cassie Dunn, whose letter was received in evidence, herself denied substantially every criminative fact in the case. It will also be remembered by the court that, in a motion for new trial, there was produced a sworn statement from Cassie Dunn to the effect, in substance, that this particular letter was written by her in fear, under duress and by the compulsion of her father. It will alsd be remembered that this letter was written in a distant county by Cassie Dunn many months after the commission of the alleged offense, If the parties could be treated as co-conspirators, the conspiracy wai accomplished and Cassie Dunn stood in relation to the appellant like any other witness. Clearly the letter was hearsay and it is inconceivable to us on what theory, being a mere hearsay, unsworn statement, it could be 'admitted. We conceded in our original argument, as we here concede, that the State made out at least a prima facie case that the letter had been received by appellant. We think the court below and this court would under the evidence, be justified in assuming that thá proof was sufficient to raise an issue and question that the letter had been received by him. True, he denies its receipt, but that was a question for the jury. It is not contended by anyone that appellant acted on this letter; on the contrary, the proof is, as we believe, conclusive that he did not act on it. It is not contended by anyone that appellant at any time, expressly or impliedly, admitted the truth of the crimina-tive facts contained in such letter; on the contrary, the evidence is absolutely conclusive that with his latest breath he strenuously denied such facts. It is not contended that he made any reply to this letter and its admissibility is not brought within the rule that, replying to a portion of.it and omitting to reply to the criminative part, he could in any sense be held to have admitted the charges therein made. Its admission can not be justified on the ground that it was part of the res gestae, nor can its admission be justified because it was the act of a co-conspirator, because if there had ever been a conspiracy it had long since been accomplished and the crime, if there was a crime, wholly executed. Its admissibility can not be justified upon the ground, as in the Horne-Took ease and others, that it was pertinent as showing knowledge, as might be true perhaps in cases of treason. It can not be admitted on the ground that goods or anything of value was sent with it and received and appropriated, because no such claim is made or can be made in this case. It is not admissible on the ground that it contained a receipt for money which was appropriated by appellant, because no money was sent and none received. Indeed, there is no exception to the rule noted by some of the authors upon which the testimony could be received. It was an unsworn, pure, bald, hearsay statement by an unsworn witness. We further contend, may it please the court, that the fact that this statement was made by Cassie Dunn does not make it any more admissible than if it had been made by her father or by the rankest stranger. If some stranger residing in Callahan County had written appellant a letter, in substance charging him with the commission of the offense for which he is here sought to be convicted, and appellant, conscious of his innocence, had thrown it in the wastebasket, what lawyer or judge would have contended that such letter was admissible ? Does the fact that such a letter was written by Cassie Dunn add to its admissibility? We can not think so. In fact, as it seems to us, based on all the authorities and based on reasons that admit of no denial, the letter was inadmissible and should have been rejected. Of course, if it was not admissible as against the objection not only timely made but made with sufficient clearness and definiteness, it must result in a reversal of the case. This question has never been passed on, so far as we have discovered, and as far as we believe, in this State. Our position is maintained by all the authorities. This court ought not to lend the great weight which will naturally attach to its approval of a doctrine contrary to all law, against all precedent and reason and which might, as in this case it did. result in the conviction of an innocent man.
G. C. McDonald, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.
On question of continuance: Bush v. State, 40 Texas Crim. Bep., 541; Fuler-son v. State, 57 id., 80; Branch’s Crim. Law, see. 257.
On question of statement before grand jury: Clanton v. State, 13 Texas Crim. App., 139; Scott v. State, 23 id., 520; Gibson v. State, 45 Texas Crim. Bep., 312; Gallagos v. State, 48 id., 58; Branch’s Crim. Law, sec. 871.

Opinion:
PRENDERGAST, PeesidiNG Judge.
Appellant was indicted for incest with his niece, Cassie Dunn, the daughter of his sister, was found guilty and assessed the highest punishment.
The State introduced said Cassie Dunn as its first witness. She testified on direct examination to her relationship to appellant as alleged in the indictment; that she was twenty years old June 18, 1914; that for the four or five years preceding this trial, which occurred in February, 1915, she had been living with and making her home with appellant; that when she first went to living with him his family consisted of himself and two sons, then nearly grown; that about two years after she went to live with appellant, her sister Fannie, two years younger than she, also arrived there and thereafter made her home also with her uncle; that both appellant's said sons married, one more than a year before this offense is alleged to have been committed and the other some time before that, and that both of them thereafter ceased to live with their father but had their own homes and lived at their own homes in the same community; that when these two sons of appellant thus married and removed from appellant's and established their own homes, she, appellant and Fannie constituted the family; that after Fannie arrived at appellant's and made that her home, she, Cassie,.did the housekeeping, cooking, washing and milking and that when Fannie was there Fannie assisted her in the discharge of these duties; that she and Fannie had five other uncles living in the same -community of appellant, appellant's brothers, whom Fannie visited from the time of her arrival at appellant's until after this offense was committed; that she would sometimes go and stay a week or two at a time, though not very often, but she would go and stay with them whenever she wanted to.' "When Fannie would go away that would leave Uncle Alfred (appellant) and myself alone. When Fannie was goné I did the milking and cooking; I kept house and made up the beds, etc." That when Fannie was there she assisted Cassie in these duties; that during all that time she, Cassie, had no sweethearts or beaux and kept company with none such; that she occasionally went to parties, gatherings, singings and things of that kind but not often; that she went more before appellant's two sons were married, they taking her; that whenever she went, either appellant or one of the sons would carry her; that appellant carried her to church but did not carry her to parties and occasionally took her to town; that she left appellant's, who lived in Coryell County near Turnersville, and went to. her father's home, who is shown to have lived in Clyde, in Callahan County, on June 19, 1914; that "Uncle Alfred (appellant) treated me just like he would one of his own children all the time I lived there. He treated me right, — just like he would his own girl. Anything I wanted I got it, dresses or anything else. . I love every one of my uncles. Yes, I expect I love Uncle Alfred better than any of the balance of my uncles. I have loved him all the time. . I was pregnant when I went home in June, 1914. I had been home about a month before my people found out that I was pregnant. Dr. Bailey is the man that told them about my being pregnant. I was sick and we called 'in Dr. Bailey to wait on me, and he told them what was the matter with me. I have a child now. It was born the 29th of October."
The above is substantially and fully everything this girl testified on her said direct examination. It will be seen therefrom that unquestionably her testimony was favorable to the State and in no way unfavorable thereto; that it showed practically that appellant had the opportunity and he alone had the opportunity to have had sexual intercourse with this girl; that someone did, about the latter part of January, 1914, is unquestionably established, not only by her testimony, but by all the other testimony in the ease.
Immediately upon her being turned over to the appellant for cross-examination he had her, the very first thing, to testify as follows: "Henry Dollins is the father of my child. My' uncle never did have any illicit intercourse with me in any 'way. Never did ask me to. Never asked me to yield to him in any way. During the entire time that I lived with my uncle he never did undertake or try to get me to do anything that was wrong. I have just told you that Henry Dollins was the first person that ever had. intercourse with me. The first time Henry ever had intercourse with me was at Hazel Ford's. Hazel Ford lived about a mile from where my uncle Alfred lived. I recall the fact that Hazel Ford and his wife went to Meridian in January, 1914."
In view of several questions raised by appellant's bills of exceptions, we deem it proper to here state what the trial judge said, and sometimes repeatedly said, in explanation and qualification of appellant's said several bills.
In one he said: "It is further apparent from the whole testimony that a conspiracy existed between the defendant and the prosecuting witness (Cassie Dunn) not only to commit the crime of incest, but.to go further and suppress knowledge' that the child that was to be and in fact was later born, was the fruits of the crime of incest, and the conspiracy extended even further on the part of the prosecutrix and defendant and looked to a resumption of their unlawful relations with each other as soon as the birth of the child had been accomplished and the public had been quieted, and the relatives of the prosecutrix and defendant satisfied regarding the defendant's connection with prose-cutrix. It is evident also that the conspiracy extended and contemplated that both prosecutrix and defendant would deny that the defendant was the father of the child in question and commit perjury with regard thereto, if necessary, in order to keep secret the fact that said child was the offspring of incestuous intercourse, and in order to carry out their design that such intercourse might be resumed by them. . . ."
In another he said: "The witness (Cassie Dunn), though used by the State, had sworn on the trial that the defendant was not the father of her child and showed to be very friendly toward the defendant and willing to swear anything that she could that would be in his favor."
In another he said: "The witness was extremely unfriendly to the State and sometimes sullen and openly testified to anything that she thought would be beneficial to the defendant."
In another he-said: "The prosecutrix testified adversely and injuriously to the State on the trial of this case. In fact, she was friendly to the defendant, and in his hands dike clay in the potter's hands."'
Bob Hollingsworth, a cousin of appellant, testified that in April or May, 1912, one morning between daylight and sun up he went to appellant's house to see him on some business, and as he walked up to the yard gate, he looked into the house and saw Cassie Dunn sitting in appellant's lap; that at the time neither Cassie nor appellant saw him, but before he could call, a dog barked, which attracted their attention; that they then both looked and saw him, and Cassie at once got up out of his lap and sat in a chair beside him.
Oscar Easter for the State testified that in the spring of 1914 he went, late in the evening from Neel Dollins to Tom Dollins to get some clean clothes, they both living in the same neighborhood of appellant; that appellant lived somewhat between the said two Dollins, and on this occasion he went by appellant's to see him; that in approaching appellant's lot he saw appellant therein feeding or preparing to feed his stock and that said Cassie went out there at that time to milk; that she at once went into the seed house. Appellant immediately followed her and while she was therein he went into the seed house; that he, the witness, then approached the seed house in such a position and close enough that he could see both the parties therein; that he then saw appellant and said Cassie having sexual intercourse.
Appellant testified and both he and said Cassie denied that they had ever at any time or place had sexual intercourse.
Appellant made a motion for a continuance on account of the absence of his mother and his two married daughters, Mrs. Whitley and Mrs. Ford, his two daughters living near to and in his immediate vicinity. The State vigorously contested this motion. The bill and record shows that he was indicted January 19, 1915, arrested on the 22nd, made bond the same day and that day had subpoenas issued for said witnesses, which were executed, returnable January 25th, at which latter time the case was set for trial. It appears that for some reason the case was reset from the 25th to the 27th of January, at which latter date Mrs. Ford was in attendance but the other two were not; that the trial of the case was again postponed for some reason undisclosed until February 3rd; on that date it seems neither of these witnesses attended. The case was again postponed till February 5th, at which time neither of the witnesses were present, though they had been notified by phone on the 3rd to appear on the 5th. Appellant claimed that each of them was too unwell to attend the court.
The court, in allowing and approving the bill, fully explained and qualified it, which was accepted by appellant and he is bound thereby. In tliis explanation and qualification tbe trial judge showed that appellant's mother was an old woman eighty-six years old and was unable to walk without help; that she was both aged and infirm, of which appellant had absolute knowledge all the time, and her absence was no ground for continuance; that he could and should have taken her depositions, citing art. 818, C. C. P. We think there can be no doubt but that the court correctly overruled the application as to this witness. Kirkpatrick v. State, 57 Texas Crim. Rep., 17; Gregory v. State, 39 S. W. Rep., 572; Brittain v. State, 40 S. W. Rep., 297. The trial judge, in further explanation of the bill, clearly shows that what was expected to be testified by these witnesses was amply proved on the trial by other witnesses and was of matters which were not contested but conceded by the State. The bill and qualification of the judge are quite lengthy. We deem it unnecessary to copy either. We have carefully read them and the bill as qualified by the court clearly shows that no error was committed in overruling appellant's motion.
By appellant's bill No. 2 he complains that the State was permitted, on redirect examination of Cassie Dunn, to have her testify that she had a conversation with Dr. Bailey about writing to the child's father for money, his objections being that it was out of his hearing and presence, was hearsay, immaterial and irrelevant, he could not be bound thereby and it would tend to prejudice him before the jury. By his bill No. 7 he complains that while Dr. Bailey was testifying for the State he testified that when he first examined Cassie Dunn and told her she was pregnant that he told her a place where she could go and stay till the baby was born, and if the man who was responsible for her condition was able to pay for it she could go there and stay until the baby was born and they could have someone to adopt the baby and she could return to her home and that noboby would ever know anything about it; that it would take a good deal of money to do that, and that Cassie said she could get plenty of money. Appellant objected to this testimony for the same reasons as to that of Cassie in bill No. 2. The court explained each of these bills and shows that in effect this testimony of Cassie Dunn was brought out on his cross-examination of her and with reference to the writing of a $300 letter introduced in evidence. Besides, as to bill No. 7, the court further states that appellant did not object to Dr. Bailey stating the whole conversation he had with Cassie in explanation of his attitude and that he understood it was agreeable with appellant's attorney for the doctor to make said full statement and that the objection he made was not to its admissibility but went rather to the weight of the testimony. As explained by the judge neither of these bills shows any error.
Appellant has several bills of exceptions as to what the State proved was testified to by -Cassie Dunn before the grand jury and the admission in evidence of her written sworn statement made before it, and of her other testimony and conduct before the grand jury. Said written statement is as follows: "Jan. 11, 1915. Miss Cassie Dunn being duly sworn testified: For about the past four years I have lived with Uncle Alfred Hollingsworth, near Tumersville, in Coryell County. When I went there to live his family consisted of himself, his two boys, Eoy and Joe, and Grandmother H. lived there about half of the time. Eoy and Joe both married about October, 1912, and moved to themselves.' Me and Fanny lived there all the time. My brother William lived the most of his time with the other kinsfolk. I did the cooking, the milking and the general housework, and Fanny helped me. My baby was born October 29, 1914. I never had any intercourse with but one man in my life. The first time I ever had intercourse with this man was when I was about nineteen years old. k I had intercourse several times. I never had any sweethearts. I told Hncle Alfred not to tell who it was. He knows who it is and he is the only one I ever told who it was and he will not tell. I won't tell who it was. Fanny wrote the letter you have shown me dated November 22, 1914. 'She wrote it for Hncle Alfred. Somebody else wrote the one to father, but Uncle Alfred signed it. That is his handwriting. I received that letter through the mails. I wrote the letter you have read me dated November 24th to my uncle. I knew I was doing wrong.. I would not'have yielded my virtue to any man that did not have my respect and confidence. I had intercourse with the man in different places, both night and day. Uncle Alfred knew when I left to go out West that I was pregnant, and I promised him not to tell it. He knows who it is. The things I said in that letter are true. Cassie' Dunn." We will discuss the questions raised by these bills without takingi them up separately. We have given above the substance in full of Cassie Dunn's testimony on direct examination when first introduced by the .State. A careful and thorough consideration of these bills, as qualified by the court, and unquestionably sustained by the record, shows that the State, in no instance and at no time, attacked or attempted to attack the said testimony given on direct examination of said Cassie Dunn. Her said testimony, as stated above, tended, we think, with considerable force, circumstantially, to show appellant's guilt. There is no indication by her testimony on direct examination which shows or tends to show that she failed to remember or refused to testify, or failed to make the State's case. On the contrary, it was shown by her testimony on cross-examination at various times and in its various phases, that her testimony tended, and if believed, would have shown appellant's innocence of the crime with which he is charged. Under such circumstances there can be no question, both by the statute itself (C. 0. P., art. 815) and a long and uniform line of decisions, that the State could impeach and attack her as to such testimony so given by her on cross-examination. The fact, if so, that-the State's counsel knew or had information that this witness Gn cross-examination might give testimony materially injurious to the State's case would not and could not preclude the State from introducing her as its witness to prove as it did material facts against appellant by her. As to these material facts only, the State had her to testify as stated above. The State never at any time sought to impeach her or attack her testimony drawn out by its direct examination, but it was only that which was given by her at appellant's instance on cross-examination. Appellant seeks to apply that well established rule that it is error for the State to impeach its own witness where such witness merely fails to remember or refuses to testify or fails to make out the State's case, that a mere failure to make proof is no ground for impeaching such witness. Mr. Branch in his Criminal .Law, section 866, lays down the abov? rule and cites many decisions of this court to that effect. Appellant cites only some of these cases cited by Mr. Branch. In other words, Mr. Branch cites a larger number of eases establishing this rule than does appellant herein, but they are all on the same line. The true rule applicable in this case is prescribed by our statute. It is (C. C. P., art.- 815): "The rule that a party introducing a witness shall not attack his testimony is so far modified as that any party when facts stated by the witness are injurious to his cause, may attack his testimony in any other manner except by proving the bad character of the witness." That is the rule and the only rule • applicable in this case and was followed by the trial judge.
Appellant has several other bills, one of which was expressly refused by the court. Others so modified by the judge's qualification as to practically refuse them. And as so modified and qualified by the judge none of them present error. • It is unnecessary to state them.
Appellant most vigorously attacked the testimony of said Oscar Easter as false, recently fabricated and corruptly induced by Henry Dollins and his. brothers. Under the circumstances the court committed no error in permitting the two brothers of Henry Dollins, whom Cassie Dunn said was the father of her child, to testify to facts which circumstantially corroborated said Easter, over his objections, that their testimony was immaterial and irrelevant. McGrath v. State, 35 Texas Crim. Rep., 413; Wade v. State, 37 Texas Crim. Rep., 401; Hamblin v. State, 41 Texas Crim. Rep., 135; Ball v. State, 44 Texas Crim. Rep., 185; Lamb v. State, 55 Texas Crim. Rep., 323, and other eases collated in Branch's Crim. Law, sec. 46.
There is no question but that the other bills, as explained and qualified by the trial judge, show such a state of facts as that Cassie Dunn wrote to appellant a certain letter asking for $300. In fact, appellant acknowledged receipt of that letter but claimed to have lost it. That it was written by Cassie Dpnn to him, received by him and lost or destroyed, was clearly established. So that not only did the State have the right to cross-examine him about it, but to introduce secondary evidence of its contents, and none of appellant's bills on that subject, as qualified, show any error.
Other bills, as qualified by the judge, clearly show that Cassie Dunn, soon after the birth of her child, wrote and had mailed to appellant a letter, a copy of which is as follows:
"I don't want to tell you a lie and I will not if the truth kills me. You know what you thought was the matter with me. It was so. It came the 29th1 of last month. It is a boy and all right. Has the bright eyes. I intend' to bring it to Ft. Worth to one of the rescue homes. You know it was nobody else but you, but I will die before I will tell it. I have told Pa a story. Never told you any stories. You may think I am not as good as I was. I know I am to blame for it. So you see what I wanted with the money. It was for Bailey. He charged me fifteen dollars, so you see that would be enough for me to go'to Ft. Worth. I can't help what Pa wrote down there. He has done everything he can to get me to tell him. IT1 die first. I told you I would not tell and I have not yet; do as you like, cast me off if you want to but I'll never tell it. I spent my money for fruit and the rest for the boy some close for the boy and that is why I wanted you to come to meet me. I wanted you to see him. Don't let Fanny read this. (On the back of this page is the following): 'A. M. Hol-lingsworth. Fanny don't you open this. Uncle Alfred, you open it yourself.'" He denied the receipt of this letter, but the State established such a state of facts as would justify the trial judge and the jury to believe that he did receive the letter and his denial of the receipt thereof was false. Cassie Dunn's father, without her knowledge, took a copy of the letter to appellant and the address thereon, and he and Dr. Bailey at the time examined and compared the original with the copy he retained. If the letter was received by appellant, which he denied, he had lost or destroyed it and failed to produce it on this trial. Under the circumstances the copy of the letter and asking the various witnesses thereabout was clearly admissible.
On the theory that he had demonstrated to the jury that said Easter's testimony was false and that where he placed himself he could not have seen the act of incestuous intercourse between appellant and Cassie Dunn, he asked a charge on circumstantial evidence which the court refused. We think it would have been improper for the court to have given a charge on any such assumption. We have studied the record and statement of facts in connection with this matter and we think the lower court would not have been justified in taking that question from the jury by giving such charge. Whether his testimony or whether the testimony of the witnesses from their standpoint testifying that he could not have seen what he testified he did see, was correct or incorrect, was a question for the jury.
Among other things the court charged the jury as follows:
"You are further instructed that if you find from the evidence that the witness Cassie Dunn in her testimony before the grand jury stated facts relating to the defendant's connection with the alleged crime of incest differently from the way she testified on the stand in the trial of this ease, then you can only consider her testimony before the grand jury for the purpose of enabling you, if it does enable you, to do so, in passing upon the credibility of the witness Cassie Dunn, and of determining the weight you will give to her testimony. Her testimony, as she gave it upon the stand in this case, must be regarded as her evidence in your deliberations. Her statements made to the grand jury, if any different to what she testified, can not be considered as evidence of the defendant's guilt, but only for the purpose aforesaid of aiding you in determining the credibility of the said witness, if it does aid you in that regard.
"You are further instructed that if you do not believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant received the letter, a copy of which has been exhibited in evidence before you, you will not consider the same for any purpose, except that of aiding you, if it does aid you, in determining the credibility of the witness Cassie Dunn, but you may consider it for that purpose only. However, if said letter was received by the defendant you will determine the weight you will give to the same under the instructions given you in the last paragraph of this charge." We think appellant's criticism of the last three lines of the second paragraph, claiming that it was on the weight of the evidence, is untenable.. Taking the charge as a whole, it was proper for the court to charge as he did under the evidence. If the jury had not believed beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant received that letter — there was. ample evidence for them to conclude he had, but as he denied it the question had to be submitted to the jury for a finding— then it was necessary for the court to tell them that they could not consider it at all. But, on the contrary, that if they believed he did receive it, then they could consider it only on the question of the credibility of Cassie Dunn, and under the circumstances, adding the latter clause to it and qualifying it with the first paragraph just above quoted, can not be construed to be on the weight of the testimony, but it was merely submitting the question to the jury. It is embraced within the hule about a confession which is denied by an accused. Besides, the court not only required the jury to believe affirmatively all the facts essential to convict appellant, otherwise to acquit him, but told them he was presumed to be innocent until his guilt was established by legal evidence beyond a reasonable doubt and in case they had such doubt to acquit him. And also that they were the exclusive judges of the facts proved, the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony.
Appellant has two bills of exceptions complaining of the argument of the district attorney. As qualified by the judge it is shown that the argument objected to was provoked and in answer to that of appellant's attorney, and neither presents error. Sinclair v. State, 35 Texas Crim. Rep., 130; Baker v. State, 4 Texas Crim. App., 223; Chalk v. State, 35 Texas Crim. Rep., 116; Ray v. State, 35 Texas Crim. Rep., 354; Campbell v. State, 35 Texas Crim. Rep., 160; Martin v. State, 41 Texas Crim. Rep., 242; Pierson v. State, 21 Texas Crim. App., 14; Norris v. State, 32 Texas Crim. Rep., 172; Williams v. State, 24 Texas Crim. App., 32; Vann v. State, 48 Texas Crim. Rep., 11; Hilcher v. State, 60 Texas Crim. Rep., 180, 131 S. W. Rep., 592; Washington v. State, 35 Texas Crim. Rep., 154; Mooney v. State, 76 Texas Crim. Rep., 539, 176 S. W. Rep., 52.
The only other question necessary to mention is appellant's motion for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. The court, as the record shows, heard evidence on this. The motion itself and the affidavits attempting to support it and the statement of facts thereon are quite lengthy. We have carefully studied the question and the record on the subject. We deem it unnecessary to go into any statement of it. Suffice it to say that we think the trial judge correctly held that the appellant was not entitled to a new trial on that ground and we think would not have been justified in. granting a new trial. The judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.