Case Name: SUNTIDE INN OPERATING CORPORATION, Appellant, v. STATE of Oklahoma ex rel. OKLAHOMA STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION, Appellee
Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oklahoma
Decision Date: 1977-11-01
Citations: 571 P.2d 1207
Docket Number: No. 49074
Parties: SUNTIDE INN OPERATING CORPORATION, Appellant, v. STATE of Oklahoma ex rel. OKLAHOMA STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION, Appellee.
Judges: HODGES, C. J., and WILLIAMS, BARNES and DOOLIN, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Pacific Reporter 2d
Volume: 571
Pages: 1207–1216

Head Matter:
SUNTIDE INN OPERATING CORPORATION, Appellant, v. STATE of Oklahoma ex rel. OKLAHOMA STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION, Appellee.
No. 49074.
Supreme Court of Oklahoma.
Nov. 1, 1977.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 21, 1977.
Arnold D. Fagin, Fagin, Hewett, Mathews & Fagin, Oklahoma City, for appellant.
Spencer W. Lynn, Oklahoma City, for appellee.

Opinion:
IRWIN, Justice.
Suntide Inn Operating Corporation (appellant) commenced proceedings to recover damages allegedly sustained when the Oklahoma State Highway Commission (State) caused to be constructed a limited access highway on a right-of-way adjacent to appellant's motel and restaurant property. Trial was had to a jury. The jury returned a verdict in favor of State (denying appellant any recovery) and judgment was rendered accordingly. Appellant appealed. The material facts are not in dispute.
Prior to the construction of the limited access highway, appellant's property abutted a service road which paralleled "N.W. 39th Expressway". Appellant had direct access to and from the expressway via the service road. As a part of its interstate highway construction program, State built an on-off ramp interchange connecting Interstate-240 and the expressway. The expressway was converted into a limited access highway and appellant's property is located in the southeast quadrant where 1-240 and the limited access highway intersect. All of the construction was on previously acquired right-of-way and there was no physical taking of appellant's property. As a consequence of the new construction, appellant no longer has direct access to and from the expressway via the service road but a more circuitous route must be used.
Appellant sought damages on the theory that by converting the N.W. 39th Expressway into a limited access highway, State had deprived it of reasonable access to its property.
The record conclusively shows that appellant does not now have the direct access to the limited access highway that it did have to the N.W. 39th Expressway prior to the construction. However, since the sufficiency of the trial court's instructions is the only issue presented on appeal it is unnecessary to enlarge on the facts.
Appellant contends that two instructions were erroneous and constitute reversible error. Appellant argues the two instructions explained in great length what State could lawfully do in the reasonable exercise of its police power but made only token reference to and practically ignored an explanation of what State could not lawfully do. Appellant argues the Court "failed to explain what constitutes an unreasonable exercise of the police power. That failure left the jury without the central factual issue in the case, i. e., whether or not State deprived appellant of reasonable access to its property." Appellant states in its brief that "it does not contend the Court per se incorrectly stated the law in its instructions" but the trial court failed to fairly present the law.
The question of compensation for loss or limitation of access rights to property has taken on new importance with the development of limited access highways. In 42 A.L.R.3d "Access to Highway-Compensation Limitations" 13, it states that the right of access belonging to the landowner whose property abuts upon a street or highway may not be taken by government authorities without payment of just compensation, but such right of access may be regulated for the public safety or welfare, and such regulation is not compensable. The problem therefore is to determine whether the right of access has been merely regulated for the public safety or welfare by the exercise of the police power, or whether the regulation amounts to a compensable taking.
The Supreme Court of New Mexico in considering a condemnation proceeding in volving its interstate highway system in State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Danfelser, 72 N.M. 361, 384 P.2d 241 (1963) said that the right of access is merely a right to reasonable, but not unlimited, access to and from land. And for clarity, the court said, " . . .we would define the right of access as a right of ingress to and egress from land on an abutting street or highway and therefrom to the system of public roads, subject to reasonable traffic regulations and not affected by diversion of traffic or reasonable circuity of travel."
In Brock v. State Highway Commission, 195 Kan. 361, 404 P.2d 934 (1965), the Court said:
"We adhere to the rule that the owners of abutting lands have a right of access to the public road system but it does not follow that they have a right of direct ingress and egress to and from a controlled access thoroughfare. The right of access, if it can be determined to be a right under such circumstances, is the right to reasonable, but not unlimited, access to and from the abutting lands.
Although an abutting landowner has a right to use a highway he cannot be heard to say that he has been deprived of his right or compensably damaged because he does not have direct access to a certain highway where public judgment dictates that access to and from the highway should be controlled and is subject to control under the police power of the state."
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Circuity of travel, necessarily and newly created, to and from real property, does not of itself result in legal impairment of the right of ingress and egress to and from such property and a controlled access highway.
The common complaint is made here that following reconstructions, the bulk of traffic traveled on the main highway with no direct access to claimants' property from the thoroughfare. As for diversion of traffic, an abutting owner has no right to the continuation of a flow of traffic in front of his property. The state's exercise of its police power in such situations is predominant and controlling. The owner of abutting land has no property right in the traveling public using the highway. The state may abandon or reroute an existing highway without any liability to the owners of abutting lands."
Although Gibbons v. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co., 142 Okl. 146, 285 P. 1040 (1930), involved the validity of an order of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission, language used in that decision is pertinent here. We said:
"acts done in the proper exercise of the police power, which merely impair the use of property, do not constitute a taking within the meaning of the constitutional requirements as to the making of compensation for the taking of property for public use, and accordingly do not entitle the owner of such property to compensation from the state or its agents, or give him any right of action for the injuries sustained. In other words, regulations which the state, in the exercise of its police power, authorizes with respect to the use of property are entirely independent of any question of compensation for such use. The question of compensation has no influence in establishing them. The exercise of the police power, therefore, differs from the exercise of the right of eminent domain, which involves the appropriation of private property to public use, and requires in the lawful exercise, pecuniary compensation for the loss inflicted on the owner."
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It is well settled that the state, or its agents, in the exercise of its police power can extend this power only to such measures as are reasonable under all circumstances. The means adopted must bear some real or substantial relation or be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of a legitimate object falling within the scope of the police power, and the law or regulation must tend toward the preservation of public welfare, health, safety, or morals."
In Brewer v. City of Norman, Okl., 527 P.2d 1134 (1976), we quoted with approval the following language from 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 14, pg. 202:
"The limitation and regulation of street or highway traffic are referable to the police power, and not to the power of eminent domain. Accordingly, in the proper exercise of its police power in the regulation of traffic, a state or municipality may do many things which are not compensable to an abutting property owner, such as the re-routing or diversion of traffic, the use of suitable traffic control devices, prescribing one-way traffic, prohibiting particular types of turns at specified places, and restricting the speed, weight, size and character of vehicles allowed on certain highways. Furthermore, a state or municipality may, in the lawful exercise of the police power, regulate the right of ingress or egress to a street or highway without compensation, as long as there is no unreasonable or absolute denial of ingress, or egress to the street or highway."
Except for minor language change the above statement is almost identical with the third grammatical paragraph of the Court's instruction No. 3. We also note that the second paragraph of the same instruction is almost identical to 69 O.S.1971, sec. 1302.
In Davis v. National Pioneer Insurance Company, Okl.App., 515 P.2d 580 (1973), the Court, in considering a complaint of undue emphasis in an instruction said:
" . . . particular wording or repetition must be left to the discretion of the trial court and we should not reverse unless there is obvious prejudice to one party because of over emphasis on the case of the other shown by the instruction viewed as a whole."
In Gasko v. Gray, Okl., 507 P.2d 1231 (1973) we said instructions must be viewed in light of the evidence upon which they operate and of the instructions as a whole. When thus considered, if it does not appear probably that the rights of the complaining party were prejudiced by alleged error in instructions, a verdict against said party will not be set aside on account thereof.
The trial court sustained appellants "Motion for View by Jury". The instructions did not place upon appellant an undue burden, did not misstate the applicable law and were not misleading. We have examined all the instructions and it does not appear that appellants rights were prejudiced by the instructions.
Judgment Affirmed.
HODGES, C. J., and WILLIAMS, BARNES and DOOLIN, JJ., concur.
LAVENDER, V. C. J., and DAVISON, BERRY and SIMMS, JJ., dissent.
. The alleged erroneous instructions are:
Instruction No. 2
Instruction No. 3
INSTRUCTION No. 2, BURDEN OF PROOF.
In a civil lawsuit, such as this one, there are requirements as to which party is to prove to you certain things. This is called "burden of proof".
When I say that a party has the burden of proof on any proposition, or use the express "if you find", or "if you decide", I mean you must be persuaded, considering all the evidence in the case, that the proposition on which such party has the burden of proof is more probably true than not true.
The Plaintiff has the burden of proving that the highway improvement project is an arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable exercise of the State's police powers insofar as its rights of ingress and egress are concerned.
If you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the Plaintiff has proven that the highway improvement project creating Interstate Highway 240 is an arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable exercise of the State's police powers, then your verdict will be in favor of the Plaintiff.
On the other hand, if you do not so find, or if the Plaintiff has failed to sustain its burden of proof as to this issue, then your verdict shall be in favor of the Defendant.
By a "preponderance of evidence" as the term is used in these instructions, is not necessarily meant the greater number of witnesses testifying to a fact or state of facts, but means that evidence which to your minds is most convincing and seems more probably true than not true.
INSTRUCTION No. 3, ISSUES AND LAW IN THE CASE.
The Plaintiff in this case does not contend that the Defendant State of Oklahoma ex rel. Department of Highways has taken any land belonging to the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff still owns all its land just as it did before the construction of IH-240 began.
You are instructed that the Defendant did have a right to construct IH-240 where old U.S. 66 Highway had been in the form of a limited access interstate highway as the statutes of this State provide.
"Each governing body shall have authority to designate and establish limited access facilities as new and additional highways, or may designate any existing street or highway as a limited access facility. The governing body shall have authority to provide for the elimination of intersections at grade of limited access facilities with any highway, road, street, or alley now or hereafter existing, either by grade separation, or by closing off such other highway, road, street or alley, or by otherwise protecting such limited access facilities."
You are further instructed that the law of this State provides that the limitation and regulation of street or highway traffic are a proper exercise of the police power of the State in the regulation of traffic and the State may do many things which may in fact cause damages to an abutting property owner but which, under the law, do not give such property owner any legal right to recover damages. Included in the proper exercise of the police power of the State in regulation of traffic are such matters as the re-routing or diversion of traffic, the use of suitable traffic control devices, prescribing one-way traffic, prohibiting particular types of turns at specified places and restricting the speed, weight, size and character of vehicles allowed on certain highways. Furthermore, a State may, in the lawful exercise of police power, regulate the right of ingress or egress to a street or highway without incurring any liability to pay compensation to property owners affected as long as there is no unreasonable or absolute denial of ingress or egress to the street or highway.
In this case, there has not been an absolute denial of ingress or egress to Plaintiffs property, and the Plaintiff has alleged that the exercise of the State's police power was unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious in the manner in which the constructions of IH-240 was performed, and that the Plaintiff was injured thereby through such alleged unreasonable or capricious exercise of the State's police power to regulate and accommodate the movement of traffic.
The issue for you to first determine is whether or not the action of the State was arbitrary, capricious and/or unreasonably impaired the ingress or egress to the Plaintiffs property.