Case Name: BUCHAU v. SIMMONS BOILER & MACHINE CO
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1974-08-02
Citations: 392 Mich. 141
Docket Number: No. 6; Docket No. 54,042
Parties: BUCHAU v SIMMONS BOILER & MACHINE CO
Judges: Swainson and Williams, JJ., concurred with T. M. Kavanagh, C. J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 392
Pages: 141–158

Head Matter:
BUCHAU v SIMMONS BOILER & MACHINE CO
Opinion op the Court
1. Workmen’s Compensation — Statutes—Controlling Law — Permanent Disability — Arm—Date of Injury.
The rights of parties in workmen’s compensation cases are normally determined by the law in effect at the date of the injury; however, Clark v Chrysler Corp, 377 Mich 140 (1966), mandates that the 1956 amendments to the Workmen’s Compensation Act shall be controlling in a case where plaintiff alleges permanent and total disability based on industrial loss of use of both arms and the date of injury for the loss of his left arm occurred on March 4, 1955, at which time benefits for such disability were not provided for in the act.
2. Workmen’s Compensation — Second Injury Fund — Permanent Disability.
Two basic requirements must be met before liability is imposed upon the Second Injury Fund by a proviso in a former section of the Workmen’s Compensation Act: (1) the injury must meet the definition of permanent and total disability as such term is defined in either of two other sections of the Workmen’s Compensation Act and (2) the employee must show that on or after June 25, 1955, he is entitled to receive payments of workmen’s compensation under the act in amounts per week of less than was then provided in the act for permanent and total disability (MCLA 412.9[a]).
3. Workmen’s Compensation — Second Injury Fund — Permanent Disability — Date of Injury.
The language of a former section of the Workmen’s Compensation Act which read in pertinent part "[a]ny permanently and totally disabled person as defined in sections 8a and 10 who, on or after June 25, 1955, is entitled to receive payments of workmen’s compensation under this act in amounts per week of less than is presently provided in the workmen’s compensation schedule of benefits for permanent and total disability shall after the effective date of this amendatory act receive weekly, without application, from the second injury fund, an amount equal to the difference between what he is now receiving per week and the amount per week now provided for permanent and total disability with appropriate application of the provisions of paragraphs (b), (c), (d), and (e) of this section since the date of injury” is very clear; the injury which that section refers to is the injury for which the workman is currently receiving workmen’s compensation after June 25, 1955, although the actual injury date was prior to June 25, 1955 (MCLA 412.9[a]).
References for Points in Headnotes
[1] 58 Am Jur, Workmen’s Compensation § 283.
[2, 3, 5, 7-11] 58 Am Jur, Workmen’s Compensation § 296.
[4] 58 Am Jur, Workmen’s Compensation § 197.
[6] No reference.
4. Workmen’s Compensation — Date of Injury.
The words "date of injury”, as used in two former sections of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, refer to the same "date of injury”; this injury date is the one for which the injured workman is currently receiving workmen’s compensation benefits (MCLA 412.9[a], 412.10).
5. Workmen’s Compensation — Permanent Disability — Second Injury.
Under a decision of the Michigan Supreme Court, for an injured workman to be entitled to workmen’s compensation benefits for permanent and total disability, the "second injury” must arise out of and during the course of his employment and the mandate of that decision is satisfied in a case where both injuries were work related.
6. Workmen’s Compensation — Permanent Disability — Retroactive Application.
Clark v Chrysler Corp, 377 Mich 140 (1966), is modified to provide that the 1956 Workmen’s Compensation Act is effective retroactively to those cases in which an injured workman is receiving or entitled to receive workmen’s compensation benefits on or after June 25, 1955, and the injury for which he is receiving or is entitled to receive those benefits occurred between January 31, 1947 and August 1, 1956, and he is otherwise qualified for permanent and total workmen’s compensation benefits.
Concurring Opinion
M. S. Coleman, J.
7. Workmen’s Compensation — Second Injury Fund — Arm.
Plaintiff should be awarded workmen’s compensation from the Second Ipjury Fund where his right arm was injured in 1930 but it remained industrially useful until 1961 and in 1955 his left arm was injured and rendered permanently industrially useless.
8. Workmen’s Compensation — Permanent Disability — Leg—Arm— Injury — Successive Injuries — Single Accident.
Any disability regarded as total and permanent under a section of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, that provided "[tjotal and permanent disability, compensation for which is provided in section 9, means * * * [pjermanent and total loss of industrial use of both legs or both hands or both arms or 1 leg and 1 arm; for the purpose of this subsection (7) such permanency to be determined not less than 30 days before the expiration of 500 weeks from the date of injury”, must result from one injury and not successive injuries; that section should be applied to a disability resulting from a single work-related accident (MCLA 412.10[b][7j).
9. Workmen’s Compensation — Successive Injuries — Permanent Disability — Leg—Arm.
The Legislature, by speciñcally providing payment for the results of successive injuries, indicated that such are not covered by a section of the Workmen’s Compensation Act which provided "[tjotal and permanent disability, compensation for which is provided in section 9, means * * * [pjermanent and total loss of industrial use of both legs or both hands or both arms or 1 leg and 1 arm; for the purpose of this subsection (7) such permanency to be determined not less than 30 days before the expiration of500 weeks from the date of injury” (MCLA 412.10[b] [7], 412.10[cj).
10. Workmen’s Compensation — Permanent Disability — Arm—Foot —Leg—Eye—Hand—Successive Injuries.
The Legislature clearly intended a section of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, which provided that ijf an employee has at the time of injury permanent disability in the form of the loss of a hand or arm or foot or leg or eye and at the time of such injury incurs further permanent disability in the form of the loss of a hand or arm or foot or leg or eye, he shall be deemed to be totally and permanently disabled and shall be paid, from the funds provided in this section, compensation for total and permanent disability after subtracting the amount of compensation received by the employee for both such losses” and that "[tjhe payment of compensation under this section shall begin at the conclusion of the payments made for the second permanent disability” to encompass a case where plaintiff has been twice injured while in the course of his employment where one injury resulted in the loss of the use of his right arm and the other resulted in the loss of the use of his left arm (MCLA 412.8a).
11. Workmen’s Compensation — Arm—Permanent Disability — Second Injury Fund.
Plaintiff, who injured his right arm in 1930. and injured his left arm in 1955 rendering it permanently industrially useless and lost the industrial usefulness of his right arm in 1961, is entitled to workmen’s compensation for his total and permanent disability under a provision of the Workmen’s Compensation Act that "[ijf an employee has at the time of injury permanent disability in the form of the loss of a hand or arm or foot or leg or eye and at the time of such injury incurs further permanent disability in the form of the loss of a hand or arm or foot or leg or eye, he shall be deemed to be totally and permanently disabled and shall be paid, from the funds provided in this section, compensation for total and permanent disability after subtracting the amount of compensation received by the employee for both such losses * * * [tjhe payment of compensation under this section shall begin at the conclusion of the payments made for the second permanent disability” and another section of that act which provided that determinations of permanent and total disability were to be made in accordance with definitions contained in the quoted section; plaintiff was entitled to receive compensation from the Second Injury Fund and, under the facts of the case, payment should be made solely from the fund (MCLA 412.8a, 412.9[aj).
Appeal from Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board.
Submitted April 3, 1973.
(No. 6
April Term 1973,
Docket No. 54,042.)
Decided August 2, 1974.
Claim by Herman Buchau against Simmons Boiler & Machine Company, Employers Mutual Liability Company, and Second Injury Fund for workmen’s compensation. Award granted. Court of Appeals denied Second Injury Fund’s application for leave to appeal. Second Injury Fund appealed to the Supreme Court. (Docket No. 52,379.) Case remanded to the Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board. 384 Mich 784. Award denied. Plaintiff appeals.
Reversed and remanded to the Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board for entry of an award.
Charfoos & Charfoos, P. C, for plaintiff.
John E. Miley (Vincent F. McAuliffe, of counsel), for defendants Simmons Boiler & Machine Company and Employers Mutual Liability Company.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, and A. C. Stoddard and Eileen D. Zielesch, Assistants Attorney General, for defendant Second Injury Fund.

Opinion:
T. M. Kavanagh, C. J.
This case is on appeal by leave granted from a decision of the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, after denial of leave to appeal by the Court of Appeals. Leave was originally granted in 382 Mich 765 (1969). The case was then remanded, 384 Mich 784 (1971) to the Appeal Board for reconsideration in light of Whitt v Ford Motor Co, 383 Mich 726; 178 NW2d 917 (1970), and Belencan v Candler Roofing Co, 383 Mich 732; 178 NW2d 922 (1970). The order of this Court on remand allowed the parties to appeal directly to this Court if either was aggrieved by the decision of the Board on remand. Pursuant to such order, leave to appeal was granted to plaintiff-appellant on June 22, 1972, 387 Mich 795.
The facts of this case are not complicated. In 1930, the plaintiff suffered an injury to his right arm during the course of his employment at Ford Motor Company. Subsequently, on March 4, 1955, Mr. Buchau suffered the industrial loss of his left arm during his employment with defendant Simmons. On August 29, 1966, a workmen's compensa tion hearing referee held that as of April 15, 1961, plaintiff had also lost the industrial use of his right arm, this loss being causally connected with his 1930 injury at Ford Motor Company. The referee held further that as of April 15, 1961 Mr. Buchau was "permanently and totally disabled," as that term is used in § 10(b)(7), former MCLA 412.10; MSA 17.160, of the Workmen's Compensation Act. MCLA 412.9a; MSA 17.159(a) read in pertinent part as follows:
"Any permanently and totally disabled person as defined in sections 8a and 10 who, on or after June 25, 1955, is entitled to receive payments, of workmen's compensation under this act in amounts per week of less than is presently provided in the workmen's compensation schedule of benefits for permanent and total disability and for a lesser number of weeks than the duration of such permanent and total disability shall after the effective date of this amendatory act receive weekly, without application, from the second injury fund, an amount equal to the difference between what he is now receiving per week and the amount per week now provided for permanent and total disability with appropriate application of the provisions of paragraphs (b), (c), (d) and (e) of this section since the date of injury. Payments from this second injury fund shall continue after the period for which any such person is otherwise entitled to compensation under this act for the duration of such permanent and total disability according to the full rate provided in the schedule of benefits."
MCLA 412.10; MSA 17.160 read in pertinent part as follows:
"Total and permanent disability, compensation for which is provided in section 9 hereof, means:
"(7) Permanent and total loss of industrial use of both legs or both hands or both arms or 1 leg and 1 arm; for the purpose of this subsection (7) such permanency to be determined not less than 30 days before the expiration of 500 weeks from the date of injury."
In ruling on this case below, the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board correctly interpreted § 9a, supra, when it stated:
"It will be noted that two basic requirements must be met before liability is imposed upon the Second Injury Fund by the above quoted proviso, i.e., 1) the injury must meet the definition of permanent and total disability as such term is defined in either Sec. 8a or 10b. 2) The employee must show that on or after June 25, 1955, he is entitled to receive payments of Workmen's Compensation under the Act in amounts per week of less than was then provided in the Act for permanent and total disability. In the instant case plaintiff was entitled to weekly compensation from his employer as a result of the 1955 injury in amounts less than was then provided for total and permanent disability. His rights to such compensation flowed from the fact that he had suffered the loss of use of the left arm and continued to be totally disabled. It can therefore be said that he hqs met one of the requirements which would qualify him for additional benefits from the Second Injury Fund. However, plaintiff must also show that his condition meets the definition of permanent and total disability as such term is defined in either Sec. 8a or 10b, Verberg supra. We noted above that the facts of this case do not fall within the specific requirements of the provisions of Sec. 8a to impose liability upon the Second Injury Fund. Plaintiff asserts that the facts do fall within the provisions of Sec. 10b(7) ."
The Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board denied benefits to this claimant based on the following rationale:
"In the matter of Clark v Chrysler Corp, 377 Mich 140 [139n NW2d 714 (1966)], the controlling holding of the Court referred to this requirement found in 10b(7) and held as follows:
" 'The second clause of subsection (7), added to section 10 by the 1956 amendment reads, "for the purpose of this subsection (7) such permanency (of loss of industrial use) to be determined not less than 30 days before the expiration of 500 weeks from the date of injury." That language, applicable only to subsection (7) and not to the other six subsections, effectively limits its application to future injuries and to only those prior injuries which occurred within 30 days less than 500 weeks before the effective date of the act, thus precluding resurrection of ancient claims.'
"30 days less than 500 weeks before the effective date of Act 195, PA 1956 was January 31, 1947. The facts presented in the instant case do not fall within the above interpretation placed upon Sec. 10b(7) by the Supreme Court. The injury suffered by plaintiff at Ford Motor Co occurred many years prior to January 31, 1947, and plaintiff had not suffered the industrial loss of use of his right arm prior to the effective date of Act #195 of 1956, nor prior to the March 4, 1955 injury which was the cause of the first loss which occurred."
In Clark, supra, the issue presented to this Court was whether or not § 10(b)(7) was to have any effect on injuries sustained prior to August 1, 1956, which prior to that date did not fall within the strict statutory definition of permanent and total disability. Mr. Buchau's 1955 injury is one of many such claims which, at the actual time of injury, does not fall within the strict statutory definition of permanent and total disability. In deciding that injured parties who fell within the statutory definition of § 10(b)(7) as of August 1, 1956, or any time thereafter, because of industrial injury suffered prior to August 1, 1956, were entitled to permanent-total benefits as of that date, or any subsequent date, on which they met the requirements of that section, this Court was then asked to determine the amount of retroactivity of that section, which we did. In so doing, it was unnecessary for this Court to decide what effect the language of § 10(b)(7) was to have on claims based upon work related injuries which occurred after August 1, 1956 as that issue was not then before us. As all industrial injuries suffered by the claimant in this case took place prior to the 1956 amendment to the Workmen's Compensation Act, that issue is still not before this Court, and this opinion should not be so construed as to apply to post-1956 industrial injuries.
It is not disputed that Mr. Buchau is permanently and totally disabled as that term is defined by § 10(b)(7). He has lost the industrial use of both arms. It is also not disputed that as of June 25, 1955, Mr. Buchau was currently receiving total disability benefits from his employer, Simmons, as a result of his 1955 injury, or that his employer Simmons did not pay him the statutory maximum of 500 weeks of benefits.
As noted by the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, the parties are in agreement that Mr. Buchau satisfies one-half of the tests set forth by §9a. However, the appellee would have us read the latter part of § 10(b)(7) as follows:
"for the purpose of this subsection (7) such permanency [of industrial use] to be determined not less than 30 days before the expiration of 500 weeks from the date of injury"
as requiring, as did the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board, that not one, but both injuries in cases of this type fall within the confines of our Clark holding.
This Court must now determine, within the confines of our Clark decision, to what date or dates of injury the phrase "date of injury", as contained in § 10(b)(7), refers.
The language of § 9a, quoted supra, is very clear. There is no doubt that the injury which § 9a refers to is the injury for which the workman is currently receiving workmen's compensation after June 25, 1955, although the actual injury date was prior to June 25,1955. Section 10 states:
"Total and permanent disability, compensation for which is provided in section 9 hereof, means:"
Section 10(b)(7) then continues and uses the same words as used in § 9, "date of injury". For this Court to hold that § 9 and § 10 deal with different "dates of injury" would strain the statutory construction. It is quite evident from the language of the statutes that they refer to the same "date of injury". This injury date is the one for which the injured workman is currently receiving workmen's compensation benefits.
In Whitt v Ford Motor Co, supra, this Court held that for an injured workman to be entitled to workmen's compensation benefits for permanent and total disability, the "second injury" must arise out of and during the course of his employment. The parties are in disagreement in this case as to which is the true "second injury". They would like the answer to this question to be determined not by the actual date of injury, but by the date upon which the disability from that injury first made itself known. In this case, however, the answer to the question is irrelevant. Both injuries in this case were work related. The mandate of Whitt, supra, is satisfied.
Our Clark holding is hereby modified to provide that the date of accident, for which an injured workman is receiving or is entitled to receive workmen's compensation benefits after June 25, 1955, must have occurred either on or after January 31, 1947. Mr. Buchau's 1955 injury falls within this time span and he is otherwise qualified for permanent and total workmen's compensation benefits. These benefits are to be paid by the Second Injury Fund.
The Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board is reversed, and the case is remanded to that Board for'entry of an award not inconsistent with this opinion.
Swainson and Williams, JJ., concurred with T. M. Kavanagh, C. J.
The rights of the parties in workmen's compensation cases are determined by the law in effect as of the date of the injury. Tarnow v Railway Express Agency, 331 Mich 558; 50 NW2d 318 (1951). Benefits for "permanent and total disability" for "industrial loss of use of both arms" first came into the act in 1956. Although both injuries in this case were prior to that act, Clark v Chrysler Corp, 377 Mich 140; 139 NW2d 714 (1966) mandates that the 1956 Workmen's Compensation Act shall be controlling in this case. Therefore, statutory references by the Court to the Workmen's Compensation Act will refer to that act as it existed in 1956. These sections have since been repealed by 1969 PA 317, referred to as the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1969. Some of these statutory sections used by this Court in this opinion have been changed drastically in the new act.
The Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board is referring to Verberg v Simplicity Pattern Co, 357 Mich 636; 99 NW2d 508 (1959).