Case Name: Wiley W. Pridgen v. The State
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1868-10
Citations: 31 Tex. 420
Docket Number: 
Parties: Wiley W. Pridgen v. The State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 31
Pages: 420–440

Head Matter:
Wiley W. Pridgen v. The State.
Article 612 of the Penal Code reads as follows: “Where a defendant accused of murder seeks to justify himself on the ground of threats against his own life, he may be permitted to introduce evidence of the threats made, but the same shall not be regarded as affording a justification for the offense, unless it be shown that at the time of the homicide the person killed by some act then done manifested an intention to execute the threat so made. In every instance where proof of threats has been made it shall be competent to introduce evidence of the general character of the deceased. Such evidence shall extend only to an inquiry as to whether the deceased was a man of violent or dangerous character, or a man of kind and inoffensive disposition, or whether he was such a person as might reasonably be expected to execute a threat made.” (Paschal’s Dig., Art. 2270, Note 672.) The court below held, that there must be a predicate proved, which establishes that at the time of the homicide the deceased must have done some act manifesting an intention to carry the supposed threats into execution, and that such acts were questions of law for the court, and not of fact for the jury. This was error.
Whether or not there be any evidence is a question for the judge; its sufficiency for the purpose relied on is for the jury.
The whole object of proving threats is to ascertain the mind of the prisoner at the very moment of the commission of the homicide; every circumstance which tends to prove this is important, because a murder is a matter of intent, and cannot exist without malice.
Whether or not the threats are sufficient to establish reasonable fear is a question for the jury. (Rector v. The People, 19 Wend., 589; Howell v. Georgia, 5 Ga, 54.)
To explain the circumstances which surround the parties it would seem that things antecedent may be proved.
In civil cases the court may review the whole record and affirm the judgment if the whole facts warrant it; but in criminal cases the denial of any legal right is sufficient cause of reversal.
The effect of the ruling in this case was to say that the circumstances surrounding the parties developed on the trial were not sufficient to extenuate or justify notwithstanding the threats. But this was a question of fact for the jury, to be responded to under the charge of the court.
All we decide is, that under the circumstances the appellant was entitled to evidence of threats against himself by the deceased, and whether there were any acts done by the deceased at the time of the killing which extenuate or justify is a question of fact for the jury; and it follows as a sequence that the character of the deceased may be proved. (Paschal’s Dig., Art. 2270.)
Lindsay, J., dissented. He insisted that article 2270 introduced no new rule of evidence, but that if the threats can be established it makes the homicide justifiable, whereas at common law it was manslaughter.
The judge is the exclusive judge as to the admissibility of evidence. In criminal cases the jury are the exclusive judges of the facts, but not of the law. (Paschal’s Dig., Art. 3058.)
Under article 2270 the accused may prove threats. The language is not imperative. When the evidence is admitted, the jury must determine whether the threats were made, and were they communicated to the prisoner. But before they are admitted the court must determine whether, in view of all the acts done at the time of the homicide, there were facts which superinduced the legal necessity or judicial propriety of permitting the accused to introduce proof of threats.
Justification is a deduction of law from the facts. Threats alone cannot constitute it. And there could be no justification, unless the deceased, at the time of the homicide, was manifesting, by a positive act then done, an intention to execute the threats.
This court should not for light cause revise the judicial discretion of the inferior court.
Appeal from Victoria. The case was tried before Hon. Wesley Ogden, one of the district judges.
The value of the precedent in this case must depend upon the facts proved at the trial. Several witnesses were present at the tragedy. Some were sworn for the prisoner and some for the state. Yet there was such near agreement as rarely occurs. The killing was at the store of Henry F. Spear, at the Missouri Valley post office, in Victoria county, on the 12th October, 1867. The deceased, Cornelius Pridgen, and the witness, Daniel Weiseger, were sitting at the store-house door of Spear, when the accused, Pridgen, and Spear rode up and saluted them with usual politeness. Brown did not return the salutation. Pridgen entered the store and sat down in a chair. Brown entered by another door and took a seat upon the counter. Both were armed with six-shooters. Brown asked Pridgen if he had found his horse. Pridgen said that he had not. Brown said, “He is in your brother’s field.” Pridgen then said, “I think it was unkind and ungenerous in you to employ the young man Thompson. He had previously been in my employment, and I was on his bail bond, and could at any time deliver him up.” Brown replied that he supposed Thompson was a free man, and seemed to deny any knowledge of the suretyship. And here Brown, complained that Pridgen had accused him with being concerned with Thompson in stealing the horse. This Pridgen denied, and demanded Brown’s authority for the accusation. Brown pointed to the witness, Weiseger. Weiseger, being appealed to by Pridgen, stated what he had told Brown, and who was his author. Pridgen concluded the conversation by saying, “I do not care for you,” at the same time rising from his chair. To which Brown instantly replied, “Ho, and nobody cares for you,” as he descended from the counter. Ho other words were spoken, except the remark by Pridgen, “Do you draw your six-shooter?” or, “Don’t draw your six-shooter.” About the same moment Pridgen fired, and immediately followed it by another shot. Both shots took effect. Brown fell and died almost immediately., His pistol was found girded on behind him. It had not been removed from the scabbard. One witness saw Brown during the dialogue put his hand behind him, as if to adjust his pistol; another witness thought the pistol impeded Brown’s descent from the counter, though Pridgen did not fire until he had descended to his feet and taken one step forward. Pridgen had the advantage of having Ms pistol drawn when he first got upon his feet, or about the same time. Another witness swore positively that Brown made no attempt to draw his pistol, but had his hands at his side when he got upon his feet and until he was shot.
The whole dialogue was an angry conversation, (though one witness swore to Pridgen’s coolness until he rose from his chair,) and when Pridgen said, “I don’t care for you,” or, “I don’t care who said it,” as others had it, he was much excited. There was evidence that when Brown descended from the counter he took one step forward.
Upon this state of the evidence and at different periods Pridgen offered evidence that Brown had the day previous and two other days before threatened his life, and that he was a dangerous man, likely to execute his threats. The court excluded this evidence, on the ground that no sufficient basis for this proof had been laid. The court added that he was the judge of the circumstances at the time of the killing, and therefore of the admissibility of the evidence. The court charged three degrees of felonious homicide, much in the language of the statute. (Paschal’s Dig., Arts. 2251, 2252, 2266, 2267, Notes 670, 671, 672.) And he refused all charges of excusable homicide in self-defense.
The jury found the defendant guilty of murder in the second degree, and assessed his punishment at five years’ imprisonment. The points were all saved by bills of exception, counter-instructions, and motions for a new trial. The defendant appealed.
James II. Bell, for appellant.
—J. The court below erred in excluding from the jury the testimony offered to prove that the deceased, Brown, had made recent threats against the life of the appellant, which threats were communicated to the appellant; and that the said Brown was a man who might reasonably be expected to execute a threat made. (Paschal’s Dig., Art. 2270; Howell v. The State, 5 Ga., 54; The People v. Rector, 19 Wend., 589.)
H. The court erred in refusing instructions asked by-defendant’s counsel.
B. B, Turner, Attorney General,
relied upon Lander v. The State, 12 Tex., 462.
Three things are necessary to be established, and of those things the court must be the judge before threats can be allowed at all. These things are: 1. Threats against the life of the defendant; 2. Their communication to the defendant; and, 3. That the deceased at the time of the killing did some act showing an intention to carry those threats into execution.
This is substantially the common-law rule, and the statute is nothing more than declaratory of a then existing rule. (Paschal’s Dig., Art. 2270.)
There is nothing to bring the case within any of the provisions of the code as found upon page 450 of Paschal’s Digest. (Hinton v. The State, 24 Tex., 454.)

Opinion:
Caldwell, J.
—This was an indictment for murder in the district court of Victoria county; trial at the spring term, 1868, and a conviction for murder in the second degree.
During the progress of the trial there were several exceptions to the ruling of the court, all embodied in a motion for a new trial, which was overruled, and the prisoner appealed. '
Two errors are relied on for a reversal, all others having been abandoned by counsel for the prisoner in this court.
I. The court erred in its rulings, "in refusing to permit the defendant to make proof of previous threats immediately preceding. the shooting, which were communicated to the defendant."
2. The court erred "in refusing to permit the defendant to introduce proof of the violent and dangerous character of the deceased, and that he was a man likely to carry Ms threats into execution."
The admissibility of "threats" as evidence in justification of homicide has ever been a perplexing question, and it cannot be safely said that there is any fixed rule, assented to by jurists as a uniform one, alike applicable to all cases. Each is impressed with its peculiar surroundings, and must be judged of by them.
The Code of Criminal Procedure [Paschal's Dig., Art. 2270] provides that, "where a defendant accused of murder seeks to justify himself on the ground of threats against Ms own life, he may be permitted to introduce evidence of the threats made; but the same shall not be regarded as affording a justification for the offense, unless it be shown that at the time of the homicide the person killed, by some act then done, manifested an intention to execute the threat so made. In every instance where proof of threats has been made, it shall be competent to introduce evidence of the general character of the deceased. Such evidence shall extend only to an inquiry as to whether the deceased was a man of violent or dangerous character, or a man of kind and inoffensive disposition, or whether he was such a person as might reasonably be expected to execute a threat made." This we do not regard as a new rule, but a statutory declaration of the old.
The judge who presided on the trial in the court below seems to have acted upon the theory that before evidence of threats could be introduced there must have been laid a predicate in the nature of proof disclosing some act at the time of the homicide manifesting an intention to carry the supposed threats into execution, and that such acts were questions of law for the court, and not of fact to be submitted to the jury. Thus viewing the law, it was held that the circumstances surrounding the parties at the time of the killing did not furnish the required predicate.
It is an elementary rule, that if there be any evidence is a question for the judge, but its sufficiency for the purpose relied on is for the jury to determine. (1 Greenl. on Ev., § 49.) If we hold that the defendant must first prove that his antagonist manifested a hostile purpose by acts done at the time of the homicide, it would seem that antecedent threats of violence could be of no avail, because these acts of themselves would excuse, extenuate, or justify, according to their nature or grade. Thus the whole object of the law in acquainting the jury with previous threats would be defeated.
The sole object of introducing threats against a prisoner is to ascertain his frame of mind at the very moment of the commission of the homicide. It follows, then, that every circumstance, however light or trivial, that can furnish any indicia of this frame or condition of the mind becomes highly important, and is relevant to ascertain the intent with which the act was committed, because murder is essentially the creature of intent, and cannot exist without malice. A jury might with perfect propriety conclude that the acts of the deceased at the time of the killing were not sufficient to extenuate or justify, but, when these acts are coupled with the previous threats of violence communicated to the defendant, they may present an entirely new phase; "trifles light as air" then become pregnant with meaning, and completely negative the idea of malice.
In Rector's case, 19 Wend., 589, counsel for the prisoner offered evidence of the rioters breaking in the prisoner's house on the previous Saturday night, and that the rioters threatened to return on another night and break in unless admitted. This was offered to' establish a reasonable ground for the prisoner's apprehending the execution of a similar threat now repeated. Judge Cowan held that the evidence ought to have been received, remarking that real alarm on the part of the prisoner on apparent, though unreal, grounds was pertinent to the issue. The jury might have laid no stress upon the circumstance, hut it should have heen received, because we cannot say they would not. The lightness of a relevant circumstance is no argument for withholding it from the jury.
In Howell's case, 5 Georgia, 54, the distinct proposition is, whether it was competent for the defendant to prove threats by the deceased against the prisoner. Judge Warner, in delivering the opinion of the court, said: " Whether the evidence was sufficient to excite the fears of a reasonable man was a question for the jury. The evidence was competent to show the quo animo of the defendant. All we can say is, that the question propounded to the witness was a legal'and competent question. What effect the answer would have had upon the jury of course we cannot know. All we decide is, that on a trial for murder it is competent, under the provisions of our code, for the defendant to ask a witness if he did not know that the deceased made any threats to drive the prisoner from the place or take his life;" and Rector's case is cited with approbation.
When it is borne in mind that in Howell's case the deceased was approaching the prisoner without being aware of Ms proximity, the defendant discovered himself and fired the fatal shot, it will be seen that it is a much stronger case than the one at bar.
Lander's case, 12 Tex., 462, is relied on by the attorney general in support of the correctness of the ruling of the court below. We think it rather in affirmance of the view we take. In that case, the evidence of threats by deceased against the prisoner was admitted without objection. Hor did this court on appeal intimate that it was improperly done. It will be observed that in this case Lander, the threatened party, went about compassing the destruction of his enemy, waylaid, and shot him, when he was wholly unconscious of his presence. There could be no pretense here of acts done by the deceased at the time of the homi eide, and yet the threats were introduced. Lander acted upon the vulgar notion that he who threatens the life of another is an outlaw as to the person menaced, without the pale of the law, and may be circumvented and slain with impunity. ' The point made was as to the sufficiency of threats, unaccompanied by acts at the time of the killing, to excuse, extenuate, or justify, and it was rightly held that they were not sufficient.
Johnson's case, 27 Tex., 758, is to the same effect. Threats were introduced without objections, but it was assigned as error that the court, in the charge, withdrew from the consideration of the jury the threats as an element of the prisoner's defense. In upholding the sufficiency of the charge and its freedom from the alleged objection, Judge Moore said: "Full two-thirds of the time the court was engaged in the trial of the cause must have been consumed in developing and expounding the evidence touching the alleged threats as the ground of defense." Although "these things (the threats, among others) were antecedent occurrences, is it meant to be said that they were not vital living facts and circumstances surrounding the parties at the time of the killing? How can any facts and circumstances be said to surround parties, save as they connect themselves with, and are explanatory of, their conduct and intention in the particular matter drawn in question? Shall not all those which are legitimately so connected be properly said to surround the parties ?" From this it is plain the court was of the opinion that the threats were circumstances from which legitimate deductions might be drawn, and should be referred to the jury.
If, then, such an important element, in ascertaining the prisoner's frame of mind and the intent with which he committed the act, as previous threats against his life are withheld from the jury, can it be seriously insisted on that he has had a trial under the law of the land? ' -
It was insisted on in argument that this court, upon inspection of the whole records, might affirm the judgment, if, in its opinion, there was sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict. This is not the law. The rule maybe applicable in civil cases, but not in criminal prosecutions when life is involved. A denial of any legal right is sufficient to reverse the judgment. (Phips v. The State, 3 Cold., 344.)
It is the right of the prisoner to have every relevant circumstance from which a conclusion can be drawn consistent with innocence daguerreotyped on the mind of the jury and reflected back in the shape of their verdict.
The effect of the ruling in the court below was, that the circumstances surrounding the parties, developed on the trial, were not sufficient to extenuate or justify, notwithstanding the threats. This was a question of fact for the jury, to be responded to under a proper charge of the court.
As the case must be again referred to a jury, we will only notice the facts to observe, that at the time of the homicide the parties confronted each other. The proof showed there was a present ability on the part of the deceased to execute the supposed threats; that there had been ill feeling between the parties; and an angry conversation, growing out of their differences, was going on at the time of the killing; that there were simultaneous movements by the parties of such a menacing nature as to induce one of the witnesses to seek safety in avoiding the apprehended shots of both.
We think all these circumstances should have been interpreted by the jury through the mirror of the threatened attack. We do not say they ought to have had any weight with the jury. On this point we express no opinion at all.
All we decide is, that a prisoner accused of murder may introduce evidence of threats against himself by the deceased, and whether there are any acts done at the time of the killing by the deceased which will extenuate or justify is a question of fact for the jury. It follows from this that evidence also of the character of the deceased may be introduced, &c., as provided in the code. (Paschal's Dig., Art. 2270.)
It may be said that the policy of permitting the introduction of threats as evidence before a predicate is laid will have the effect of enabling the criminal to screen himself from the consequences of his crime; that the courts should scrutinize with jealous care every avenue by which the criminal might escape. To the former we reply, that courts, as such, can have no policy of their own. To the latter, as men, we may lament the prevalence of crime, and" moreover the decadence of public virtue, evidenced by the reckless disregard of human life; but as jurists we can only expound the law as it has been handed down to us by the fathers, and leave the consequences to G-od and the country.
The judgment of the court below, in overruling the motion for a new trial, is reversed, and the cause remanded for another trial.
Reversed and remanded.