Case Name: BELLMAN & SANFORD v. THACHER
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1912-05-28
Citations: 136 N.Y.S. 730
Docket Number: 
Parties: BELLMAN & SANFORD v. THACHER.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 136
Pages: 730–733

Head Matter:
BELLMAN & SANFORD v. THACHER.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.
May 28, 1912.)
1. Principal and Agent (§ 84*)—Contracts—Advancements—Purpose.
Where a contract whereby a corporation agreed to act as selling agent provided that the other party would “advance" $50 a week for expenses, and that “so much as may have been advanced on the expense account” should he retained out of the commissions earned, the payments to be made were merely advancements to be later accounted for by the agent, and were not payments toward the maintenance of an office for the agency.
[Ed. • Note.—For other' cases, see Principal and Agent, Cent. Dig. § 221; Dec. Dig. § 84.*]
2. Contracts (§ 155*)—Construction.
A contract will be construed most strongly against the party by whom it was drawn.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Contracts, Cent. Dig. § 736; Dec. Dig. § 155.*]
3. Appeal and Error (§ 1050*)—Review—Harmless Error—Evidence.
Where, in an action on a contract of agency providing for weekly advancements to the agent for expenses, the rights of the parties had become fixed by the termination of the contract long before the commencement of the action, and the expenses actually incurred were only a small ' sum and were taken care of by advancements paid, the admission of testimony as to a parol stipulation that the advancements to be paid were intended to cover the salary and expenses of a traveling salesman was harmless error.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Gent. Dig. §§ 4153-4160, 4166; Dec. Dig. § 1050.*]
4. Courts (§ 190*)—City Courts—Appeal—Review—Harmless Error—Stat- . utory Provisions.
And under Law» 1910, c. 603, § 301, relating to the city court of Albany, which provides that the appellate court must render judgment according to the justice of the case without regard to technical errors or defects which do not affect the merits, the parol testimony in question was properly disregarded on an appeal from the City. Court to the County Court, though it may have been erroneously admitted.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Courts, Dec. Dig. § 190;* Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 103, 3379(4.]
Kellogg, J., dissenting.
♦For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes
Appeal from Albany County Court.
Action by Bellman & Sanford against George H. Thacher. From a judgment of the County Court affirming a judgment of the City Court dismissing the complaint, plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
Argued before SMITH, P. J., and KELLOGG, HOUGHTON, BETTS, and LYON, JJ-.
• George R. Donnan, of Troy (Louis E. O’Neil, of Troy, of counsel), for appellant.
John A. Delehanty, of Albany, for respondent.

Opinion:
LYON, J.
In April, 1909, the plaintiff, a domestic corporation, entered into a contract with the defendant, whereby the plaintiff agreed to act as selling agent of the defendant at the compensa tion of 15 per cent, of the gross amount of all sales up to the sum of $17,500, and of 10 per cent, of all sales in excess of that sum, 50 per cent, of the commissions to become due and payable when the orders were accepted by the defendant, and the balance when three-fourths of the contract price had been paid. By the contract the defendant agreed "to advance- the sum of $50 each week on the first day of the week for expenses," the defendant "to retain out of the first $2,650 of commissions so much as may have been advanced on the expense account above specified." On May 4, 1909, defendant advanced to plaintiff $50 for each of the two weeks ending May 3d and 10th, but refused to make any further advances. The contract was duly terminated by the defendant on or about July 10, 1909. This action was brought in December, 1909, to recover $50 per week for each week during the existence of the contract, excepting for the two weeks in May for which the advance of $50 per week was made as above stated.
It is the contention of the plaintiff that the weekly sum was to be sent by defendant to plaintiff for the maintenance of the office and to defray the other expenses of the agency, while it is the claim of the defendant that such weekly sum was merely an advancement to be later accounted for by plaintiff to defendant. I think the defendant's position is correct.
The contract, which was drawn by the plaintiff's president, and hence is to be construed more strongly against him, uses the word "advance," and not the word "payment," and provides for the repayment to defendant out of commissions of "so much as may have been advanced on the expense account above specified." Further proof that these weekly sums were to be considered as mere advancements is found in the letters of plaintiff to defendant of dates April 10 and May 24, 1909. During the whole period of the contract, the plaintiff occupied as an office the single room in the city of New York which it had occupied for years before, and which it was still occupying at the time of the trial. Its office force consisted simply of Bellman, the plaintiff's president, and a young lady stenographer. The catalogues and stationery of the agency were furnished by the defendant. The only sale made by the plaintiff during the term of the agency amounted to $15, and consisted in supplying a superheater to replace one which had been burned out.
It is unnecessary to consider whether it was error to admit the testimony as to the oral stipulation between the parties, as plaintiff under this contract can in any event only recover for the expenses actually incurred, which, while the plaintiff has not seen fit to prove the exact amount thereof, amounted to a very small sum, for which the $100 has been full reimbursement. The rights of the parties became fixed by the termination of the contract long before the commencement of the action, and the plaintiff, having suffered no damages, is entitled to no recovery. B., E. & C. R. R. Co. v. N. Y., L. E. & W. R. R. Co., 123 N. Y. 316, 25 N. E. 499, 11 L. R. A. 116. If, however, the admission of such oral testimony be deemed error, the same was properly disregarded by the County Court. Section 301, c. 603, Laws of 1910, relating to the City Court of Albany, provided! :
"The Appellate Court must render judgment according to the justice of the case without regard to technical errors or defects which do not affect the merits."
This provision is very similar to that of section 3063 of the Cod'e of Civil Procedure, under which the decisions have gone equally far.
For the reasons above stated, I think the decision of the Albany County Court affirming the judgment of the Albany City Court was right, and should be affirmed, with costs.
Judgment affirmed, with costs.