Case Name: MINNESOTA MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY v. LOVE, Administratrix
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1969-09-24
Citations: 120 Ga. App. 502
Docket Number: 44586
Parties: MINNESOTA MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY v. LOVE, Administratrix.
Judges: Jordan, P. J., Hall, P. J., Pannell and Quillian, JJ., concur. Bell, C. J., Eberhardt and Whitman, JJ., dissent. Evans, J., not participating.
Reporter: Georgia Appeals Reports
Volume: 120
Pages: 502–507

Head Matter:
44586.
MINNESOTA MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY v. LOVE, Administratrix.

Opinion:
Deen, Judge.
The petition in this case was filed June 12, 1968, and service by second original effected on July 15. An-answer was filed on August 24. On October 21 a motion to open the default was made, but costs in the case were not paid until November 13. After hearing evidence, the court denied the motion and the defendant appeals.
A private agreement between counsel to extend the time to file pleadings is not binding on the court, except when a written stipulation by counsel is filed in the case. Code Ann. § 81A-106 (b); First National Ins. Co. v. Thain, 107 Ga. App. 100, 104 (129 SE2d 381). In the present case there is a conflict in the recollection of counsel for the opposing parties which illustrates the wisdom of the rule that agreements of this nature, when made, should-always be reduced to writing. Counsel for the defendant might, at the time the defensive pleadings were filed, have opened the then existing default as a matter of right upon payment of costs under Code Ann. § 81A-155 (a) and he now contends that he would have done so but for his understanding that counsel for the plaintiff orally indicated he would waive this requirement. This counsel for the plaintiff denies. Payment of costs is a mandatory condition precedent to opening a default. Miller v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 168 Ga. 321 (3) (147 SE 527). Counsel for the defendant knew that the time for filing defensive pleadings had expired; consequently the burden was upon him to obtain a proper order or stipulation as required by Code Ann. § 81A-106 (b) under his own view of the transaction which was that plaintiff had agreed to extend the time for filing the answer. Under the view expressed by counsel for the plaintiff there would be no fact situation under which the discretion of the court could operate, since if no agreement had been reached, and all the facts were known, there would be no reason not to utilize the method of opening the default during the first 15 days when it might be done as a matter of right by paying the costs. Counsel for both parties undoubtedly testified in accordance with their honest recollection, but the trial court, faced with a conflict in the evidence, had an absolute right to decide either way, depending on which view appeared to him more cogent. Bowman v. Winn, 16 Ga. App. 546 (1) (85 SE 787); Morgan v. Goldstein, 20 Ga. App. 115 (2) (92 SE 777).
"Where the judgment rendered, permitting the opening of a default, is based on conflicting evidence, the discretion vested in the trial court will not be controlled unless manifestly abused." Evans v. Dennis, 203 Ga. 232 (1) (46 SE2d 122).
Georgia cases such as Bowman v. Winn, 16 Ga. App. 546, 548, supra, — "since . . . every presumption is against the abuse of this discretion, and the maxim lex vigilantibus non dormientibus subvenit applies in such cases one who moves to open a default must allege and prove some reason good in law why he failed to make a defense at the time he was required by law to present it. Florida Central R. Co. v. Luke, 11 Ga. App. 293 (75 SE 270). The trial judge having heard evidence upon the only ground of the motion which could have entitled the movant to have the default opened, and having upon consideration of that evidence concluded that he failed to prove this ground, and exercising, as we must assume, his undoubted prerogative to determine the credibility of the witnesses who testified [emphasis supplied], the one in support of, and the other in opposition to the motion to open the default, we can not say that he erred." — should be followed.
Argued July 8, 1969
Decided September 24, 1969
Rehearing denied October 20, 1969
Oliver, Maner & Gray, Joseph M. Oliver, Thomas S. Gray, Jr., for appellant.
Dubberly & Dubberly, Bruce D. Dubberly, B. Daniel Dubberly, Jr., for appellee.
"Two attorneys . . . announced . . . that they had conferred with counsel for the plaintiff and that the understanding had with him was that the case should not be heard until they had been advised. The judge of the county court upon this statement, ordered that the judgment be opened and that the defendant be allowed to plead. Held, that this was error. No agreement of counsel is binding, unless in writing. No such agreement was shown, but the case was reinstated, upon the mere verbal statement of counsel for one side." Exchange Bank of Macon v. Elkan, 72 Ga. 197.
The Act of 1946 amending Code § 110-404 to the extent of providing that a default may be reopened at any time before final judgment did not enlarge the discretion of the trial judge, which must always be exercised in accordance with law. R. H. Macey & Co. v. Chancey, 116 Ga. App. 511 (3) (157 SE2d 758). Code Ann. § 110-404 and Code Ann. § 81A-155 (b) are in identical language.
The situation is not changed by reason of the fact that the plaintiff participated in the taking of depositions on notice given by the defendant. Had the plaintiff been the protagonist in taking the depositions estoppel might perhaps have resulted to insist on the default, but it was the defendant who gave the notice and took the depositions. Plaintiff might, under Code Ann. § 81A-132 have objected to the notice on the ground that the case was in default, but failure to do so would not of itself be sufficient to re-instate the case.
The denial of the motion was without error.
Judgment affirmed.
Jordan, P. J., Hall, P. J., Pannell and Quillian, JJ., concur. Bell, C. J., Eberhardt and Whitman, JJ., dissent. Evans, J., not participating.