Case Name: Tom NELSON and Maria Nelson, Appellants, v. Helen K. WIGGS, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1997-08-13
Citations: 699 So. 2d 258
Docket Number: No. 96-3328
Parties: Tom NELSON and Maria Nelson, Appellants, v. Helen K. WIGGS, Appellee.
Judges: Before FLETCHER, SHEVIN and SORONDO, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 699
Pages: 258–265

Head Matter:
Tom NELSON and Maria Nelson, Appellants, v. Helen K. WIGGS, Appellee.
No. 96-3328.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Aug. 13, 1997.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 8, 1997.
Robert S. Glazier, Miami, for appellants. ,
Ludovici & Ludovici and Michelle C. Fra-ga, Miami, for appellee.
Before FLETCHER, SHEVIN and SORONDO, JJ.

Opinion:
FLETCHER, Judge.
Tom Nelson and Maria Nelson appeal a final judgment following a bench trial, which judgment denied their complaint for rescission of them purchase of a house from appel-lee Helen K. Wiggs. We affirm.
Subsequent to the destruction of their home by Hurricane Andrew in 1992, the Nelsons, who had lived in South Dade County for ten years, began •& search for a "fixer-upper" house that they could afford. They found Mrs. Wiggs' house by noticing a "For Sale By Owner" sign, out front. Mrs. Wiggs, who had resided on the property since 1970, was selling, according to her testimony, because she needed to relocate close to public transportation, having recently been widowed and being unable to drive a car.
The house, accessed only by an unpaved road, is situated on an acre and a quarter of land in the eight and one-half square mile agricultural/residential area known as the East Everglades. This area lies west of the flood control levee, which levee affords most of the flood protection for that part of Dade County east of it. During the rainy season the East Everglades area is often flooded, the water varying in depth from ankle to knee deep. The testimony reveals that small vehicles cannot enter the area during heavier flooding, thus many residents have trucks and other large vehicles. The Nelsons testified that they cannot grow the plants that they wish and that, during the flooding, snakes and even alligators (two at least), have gathered at their property (presumably on an elevated portion) to escape the waters. The house itself, however, like some of the other houses, farm buildings, and structures in the East Everglades area, was constructed at raised elevation, thus assuring that the seasonal, flood waters do not enter the house. As a consequence, the house has not been flooded and has been continuously occupied, by the Nelsons since their purchase from Mrs. Wiggs and, before that, by Mrs. Wiggs since 1970.
The Nelsons testified that before they purchased Mrs. Wiggs' property, they did not have actual knowledge of the seasonal flooding that takes place in the East Everglades. They found the property, negotiated the sale, moved into the house, and closed on the sale during the dry season. They testified that it was not until later that they learned of the flooding, after which they filed their suit for rescission, alleging that Mrs. Wiggs knew of the flooding, but failed to disclose it to them, and that they would not have purchased the property had they been aware of the flooding. [R. 13-15]. Relying principally upon Johnson v. Davis, 480 So.2d 625 (Fla.1985), they contended that prior to the purchase Mrs. Wiggs had the duty to advise them of the seasonal flooding.
In its final judgment, the trial court made the specific findings, thus resolving the somewhat conflicting testimony, that the Nelsons did not ask Mrs. Wiggs about flooding and that Mrs. Wiggs did not make any affirmative statements to the Nelsons regarding flooding. The trial court further found that the Nelsons requested no inspections of the property and did not talk to the neighbors about the flooding. The trial court also observed that the Nelsons had lived in the South Miami area for ten years before their purchase of property in the East Everglades. Based on these facts, the trial court concluded that Johnson v. Davis is inapplicable and denied rescission. We affirm the trial court's conclusion that Mrs. Wiggs had no duty to disclose the seasonal flooding as the information that the property is subject to seasonal flooding was available to the Nelsons through diligent attention.
In Johnson v. Davis, 480 So.2d at 629, the Supreme Court of Florida took a long look at caveat emptor, concluded that changes thereto needed to be made, and approved the salutary rule that:
"[Wjhere the seller of a house knows of facts materially affecting the value of the property which are not readily observable and are not known to the buyer, the seller is under a duty to disclose them to the buyer." [emphasis supplied]
Thus, in order for a seller to have a duty to disclose, the material facts must not only be unknown to the buyer, but also not "readily observable." The supreme court did not define these words. Our concern is whether the supreme court intended that a buyer must be able to discern the relevant facts by simple visual observation of the property, at any and all times, or whether it had a broader meaning in mind. We have concluded that the court's intended meaning is broader. In arriving at this conclusion we have considered that the supreme court, in Johnson, 480 So.2d at 628, cited and quoted with approval Lingsch v. Savage, 213 Cal.App.2d 729, 29 Cal.Rptr. 201 (1963):
"It is now settled in California that where the seller knows of facts materially affecting the value or desirability of the property which are known or accessible only to him and also knows that such facts are not known to, or within the diligent attention and observation of the buyer, the seller is under a duty to disclose them to the buyer." [emphasis supplied]
The supreme court, Johnson, 480 So.2d at 629, concluded that this philosophy (and similar philosophies from additional jurisdictions) should be the law in Florida.
We have also considered Gilchrist Timber Co. v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 696 So.2d 334 (Fla.1997), in which the Florida Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the principles of Johnson. While Gilchrist involved a negligent misrepresentation by the seller, and not inaction by the seller as here, the supreme court, immediately following its reaffirmance of Johnson, stated,
"This does not mean, however, that the recipient of an erroneous representation can hide behind the unintentional negligence of the misrepresenter when the recipient is likewise negligent in failing to discover the error."
696 So.2d at 339.
Thus a buyer would be required to investigate any information furnished by the seller that a reasonable person in the buyer's posi tion would investigate. In Gilchrist the information required to be investigated was the zoning on the property, specifically as it related to the property's developability in accordance with the buyer's plans.
There are distinctions, of course, between cases which involve negligent misrepresentation (Gilchrist) and no representation at all (the instant case). The point is, however, that while reaffirming the principles of Johnson, the supreme court has informed us that, in both types of cases, a buyer must take reasonable steps to ascertain the material facts relating to the property and to discover them — if, of course, they are reasonably ascertainable. As we understand from Gilchrist and Johnson, we need to analyze here whether the flood-prone nature of the property was known only to Mrs. Wiggs and whether, with diligent attention, the Nelsons could have learned of the property's nature-(which is clearly material to their interests as buyers). .
There is nothing concealed about South Florida's rainy season(s), nothing concealed about the fact that low-lying areas of the county flood during the rainy seasons, and nothing concealed about Dade County's regulation's requiring that homes in such areas be built on elevations to avoid interior flooding. That Dade County enacted regulations to protect East Everglades homes from seasonal flooding clearly demonstrates that the flood-prone nature of the area is known to others as well as to Mrs. Wiggs. The regulations' enactment and' availability in the public records also show that the information is within the diligent attention of any buyer.
Specifically as to the Nelsons, we observe that Mr. Nelson is a contractor (air conditioning, heating and refrigeration) who, according to his testimony, "moved to Florida knowing they had the most stringent building code in the United States." [T.41]. Part of his interest in buying the subject property was to rebuild the house himself, in furtherance of which he visited the county building department and reviewed with county employees the original permits and plans for the house. [T.50-51]. Mr. Nelson also testified [T.53]:
"Q. During the time that you lived there prior to closing, did you have the opportunity to check with Dade County?
A. I- did — actually I pulled the permit." [emphasis supplied]
Immediately available from the-building department, open to the Nelsons' diligent attention, were the flood criteria to which the county required the house to be built in order to protect it from the seasonal flooding. We conclude that the trial court correctly denied the Nelsons' rescission complaint as the flood-prone nature of the area was within the diligent attention of the Nelsons, thus Mrs. Wiggs had no duty to disclose it.
Affirmed.
SHEVIN, J., concurs.
SORONDO, J., dissents.
. The Dade County flood criteria elevations require the roads in the area to be above the ten-year statistical flood level and the house "pads" (elevated sites) to be above the hundred-year statistical flood level, according to the Nelsons' expert witness, a hydrologist. Presumably any houses that are not elevated were constructed before the enactment of the flood criteria regulations.
. With Mrs. Wiggs' permission, the Nelsons resided in the house for a month prior to the closing.
. Approving this court's decision in Johnson v. Davis, 449 So.2d 344 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984).
. Owners of real property are deemed to have purchased it with knowledge of the applicable land use regulations. Metropolitan Dade County v. Fontainebleau Gas & Wash., Inc., 570 So.2d 1006 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). We discern no reason why the County's flood criteria would not be included within this rule.