Case Name: STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. JOSEPH P. BRUZZESE, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT
Court: New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1982-08-27
Citations: 187 N.J. Super. 435
Docket Number: 
Parties: STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. JOSEPH P. BRUZZESE, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Superior Court Reports
Volume: 187
Pages: 435–455

Head Matter:
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. JOSEPH P. BRUZZESE, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.
Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division
Argued June 1, 1982
Decided August 27, 1982.
Before Judges MILMED, JOELSON and GAULKIN.
Frank D. DeVito, Assistant Union County Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant (John H. Stamler, Union County Prosecutor, attorney).
Anthony D. Rinaldo, Jr., argued the cause for respondent (Rinaldo & Rinaldo, attorneys; Gerald J. Martin, on the brief).

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
GAULKIN, J.A.D.
The State appeals by leave granted (R. 2:2-4) from an order suppressing a pair of boots seized as evidence upon the arrest of defendant at his home.
The operative facts are not disputed. During the early course of an investigation into an apparent burglary at Madan Plastics, Inc. in Cranford on November 12, 1980, the Cranford, police received information which led them to regard defendant as a suspect in the crime. The investigation had also produced a rear door panel from the property entered, which bore what Cranford Detective Hicks described as the impression of a shoe sole bearing a unique diamond pattern. Armed with that information, Detective Hicks did "some checking on the defendant to check on his past history," which uncovered "an active warrant in Cranford for contempt of court." Since defendant resided in the adjoining municipality of Roselle Park, Hicks called the Roselle Park police and told them that "I'd like to go to his residence . and pick the defendant up on the warrant itself."
On November 14 Hicks, together with another Cranford officer and two Roselle Park officers, went to defendant's home. Two of the officers went to the back door and two presented themselves at the front door, which was opened by defendant's aunt. The officers told her that "we wanted to speak to Joe," whereupon she went upstairs and shortly thereafter defendant came downstairs. Hicks told defendant that he was from the Cranford Police Department and that he "held a contempt warrant out of the Cranford Municipal Court and that I was there to pick him up on that particular warrant." Defendant said he needed to get dressed and proceeded upstairs. Without invitation or request, Hicks and another officer "accompanied him up to his bedroom," where defendant put on a shirt and a pair of shoes. In the bedroom Hicks "noticed a pair of black work boots below the dresser"; he picked up one of the boots and examined it:
And to me at that time I felt that that was the same sole impression that I had seen on the door panel up at Madan Plastics.
I picked the boots up, and I told Joe at the time I was taking the boots with me, and he wanted to know why. And not to aggravate anything at that particular time, I just told him that when we got into our headquarters I would explain to him why I seized the boots.
At the hearing of the suppression motion, Detective Hicks said his intent in proceeding as he did was "two fold; one, that we had a warrant for his arrest, and the other was I wanted to speak to him about the burglary due to the fact that he was a suspect." When later asked whether he went to defendant's house "to see whether or not you could find any shoes to match up with the investigation," Hicks frankly acknowledged "that was in the back of my mind, yes, it was." He continued that "I needed to speak to him" and that making the arrest on the contempt warrant "was the easiest way for us to pick him up and talk to him, yes." But Hicks conceded that his work did not normally entail "contempt followups"; that defendant's criminal record check had shown only "minor disorderlies" and, furthermore, that "normal" procedure in handling contempt warrants is not to arrest but to call the person by telephone and ask him to appear at headquarters.
In the trial court counsel for defendant relied principally on State v. Seiss, 168 N.J.Super. 269 (App.Div.1979), and argued that Hicks resorted to the contempt warrant with the "ulterior motive" to "go in there and look around and perhaps get lucky." The State acknowledged the authority of Seiss, but argued that there was a "substantial police need" to accompany defendant to his bedroom in connection with the arrest. The State also sought to justify the seizure as the product of a search incident to the arrest. The trial judge found Seiss essentially dispositive. Although he accepted that the officers had gone to defendant's home "for the purpose of arresting the defendant," he found that "they were hopeful of finding some evidence to add to whatever they had in connection with the burglary at Madan
Plastics." The trial judge framed the "plain view" issue in terms of "whether this was the result of an inadvertent viewing by the police" or whether "it was a purposeful inspection for investigative purposes." His conclusion was that
. . their entire conduct in entering this house, if limited to what they were there for, which was the contempt, would have and should have begun and ended with the defendant going upstairs, coming downstairs and going with them.
Accordingly, the trial judge ordered the suppression of the boots as evidence.
I
In State v. Seiss, supra, this court suppressed evidence found in "plain view" when police officers entered defendant's home to arrest him for nonpayment of a fine on a motor vehicle charge. Judge Lynch noted that the police may enter a home to effect an arrest, but that such an entry "is to be measured by the rule of reasonableness." 168 N.J.Super. at 273. The rule of reasonableness, it was explained,
. has recently been refined to a dual standard of (1) whether the police acted in good faith in making a search incident to a lawful arrest and (2) whether there existed a ".substantial police need" for the action they have taken. State v. Slockbower, 79 N.J. 1 (1979); State v. Ercolano, 79 N.J. 25 (1979). In other words, if a search is unnecessary for the attainment of a lawful police objective, it is illegal." [Ibid.]
Finding that "the officers had no such reason to believe that he might escape," the court concluded that the "plain view" observation made within the house was improper because "there was no 'substantial necessity' to enter defendant's home in order to arrest him." Id. at 274. "Rather," the court found, "it appears the police invaded defendant's home merely for the purpose of conducting an exploratory search." Id. at 276.
On its face the Seiss holding would be dispositive here, as it was found to be by the trial judge. Here, too, the arrest effected was for a relatively minor offense unrelated to that for which the evidence was seized; defendant was cooperative and there was no showing that the police reasonably apprehended that he would seek to escape or arm himself when he went upstairs to get dressed , and therefore it was unnecessary for the effecting of the arrest to follow defendant through the interior of his home.
The State, however, argues that the holding of Seiss is substantially diluted, if not entirely negated, by the later decision of the United States Supreme Court in Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 102 S.Ct. 812, 70 L.Ed.2d 778 (1982), which held that regardless of "the nature of the offense" for which an arrest is made, an arresting officer has "a right to remain literally at [a defendant's] elbow at all times; nothing in the Fourth Amendment is to the contrary." We recognize and, of course, accept that ruling , but we do not regard it as validating the asserted "plain view" seizure which occurred here.
We must start with the recognition that not every "plain view" observation permits the warrantless seizure of the item observed. See, generally, State v. O'Herron, 153 N.J.Super. 570 (App.Div.1977), cert. den. 439 U.S. 1032, 99 S.Ct. 637, 58 L.Ed.2d 695 (1978). The rule is, rather, that
. a warrantless seizure may be made of items in "plain view" in a location where the officer has a right to be; but that the presence of the items cannot alone supply justification for a police officer's presence at that location. [Id. at 575],
Whether an officer "has a right to be" where the items are observed turns, of course, on the manner in which the intrusion into that location was made. Thus, for example, if the intrusion is itself unlawful, any evidence seized in "plain view" as a result must be suppressed. Id. at 574; State v. Rice, 115 N.J.Super. 128 (App.Div.1971).
In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971), the court identified another kind of intrusion which will not support a seizure of "plain view" items. In his plurality opinion Justice Stewart said that to sustain a warrant-less "plain view" seizure "the discovery of evidence in plain view must be inadvertent." 403 U.S. at 469, 91 S.Ct. at 2040. His stated concern was to deny validity to a "planned warrantless seizure," which he described as one effected by the police "maneuvering themselves within 'plain view' of the object they want." Ibid., n. 26. Observing that "this court has never permitted the legitimation of a planned warrantless seizure on plain view grounds" (Id. at 471, n. 27) 91 S.Ct. at 2041 n. 27, Justice Stewart found that an initial intrusion into a constitutionally protected area may be entirely lawful but will still not extend
. to the seizure of objects—not contraband nor stolen nor dangerous in themselves—which the police know in advance they will find in plain view and intend to seize.... [403 U.S. at 471, 91 S.Ct. at 2040]
The contrary view, Justice Stewart reasoned, would be to conclude that the "warrant requirement should be ignored whenever the seizing officers are able to arrange to make an arrest within sight of the object they are after." Ibid., n. 27.
We read the present record, and the conclusions of the trial judge, to establish that the seizure here was just such a "planned warrantless seizure." The police used a most anomalous procedure to effect an arrest in an adjoining town on a minor charge; an expressed reason for executing the contempt warrant by arrest was that defendant was a suspect in an entirely unrelated burglary and that "we wanted to talk to him"; the officer "had in the back of my mind" that he might find the footgear to match the only physical evidence he had from that burglary; at the time of the arrest there was no suggestion that defendant was angry or exercised, likely to become violent or to escape, and the police, without advising defendant of their plan to "talk to him" concerning the burglary, followed him without invitation into his own bedroom where they made the hoped-for "plain view" observation. Those facts fully support the finding of the trial judge that the arrest and seizure went well beyond what could reasonably be attributed to an intent to arrest defendant on a contempt warrant; in these circumstances the conduct of the police in arresting defendant and remaining at his elbow must realistically be seen as a pretext to obtain a view of the interior of his house and, as it fortuitously worked out, to make a "plain view" seizure. This kind of improper police procedure was specifically envisioned in "The Supreme Court, 1970 Term," 85 Harv.L.Rev. 3 (1971):
. where the police have probable cause to arrest, their best strategy is to defer arrest until the suspect is at home so that they have a chance of discovering evidence in plain view which they would not have had if they made their arrest elsewhere. This use of the arrest power for the ulterior purpose of gaining access to a person's house amounts to a planned warrantless search and seems at the heart of Justice Stewart's concern. [Id. at 245]
Application of these principles is well illustrated in Harding v. State, 301 So.2d 513 (Fla.App.1974), cert. den. 314 So.2d 151 (Fla.Sup.Ct.1975). There deputy sheriffs learned that one, Hardison, could be found at Harding's home, although they were not looking for Hardison, they did know him to be involved in "the local drug scene" and concluded that "it would be a good bet" that there would be drugs in his possession. The deputy sheriffs learned that Hardison had two minor traffic arrest warrants outstanding and, without advising the local police, they went to Harding's home. They announced their purpose to arrest Hardison, gained entry to the house and arrested him; Harding then happened to enter the house carrying in "plain view" the marijuana which was the subject matter of the motion to suppress.
In reversing the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress, the Court of Appeal noted that none of the deputy sheriffs was "normally engaged in executing municipal traffic warrants"; that it was "most unusual" for deputy sheriffs to serve city traffic warrants; that the arrest therefore could not be characterized as one accomplished by a deputy sheriff "routinely acting in reasonable pursuit of his usual and normal duties," and that the arrest and seizure occurred "without any pretense of necessity or without any suggestion of exigent circumstances." Id. at 514-515. Based upon those considerations the Court of Appeal concluded that the arrest warrants
. were used as an excuse to scavenge for contraband and on such a predicate the plain sight seizure from Harding, the owner of the invaded home, was unreasonable, that is to say, fatally pretextual in violation of his rights under the Federal and State Constitutions relating to unreasonable searches and seizures. [Id. at 514]
We find this holding and its reasoning to be fully consistent with Coolidge and persuasive in the present setting. Although our research does not disclose any published New Jersey opinions involving a fact pattern such as presented here, we do note that recent New Jersey cases have recognized, in cognate settings, that the intent of police officers may be determinative of the validity of their arrests and seizures and that the "true facts" must prevail over the "objective facts." See State v. Ercolano, supra 79 N.J. at 39.
In Ercolano the court held invalid what was claimed by the police to be an inventory search of an automobile. Judge Conford, speaking for the court, noted (at 38) that "[t]he intent and purpose of the police in conducting a search has frequently been held material to the validity thereof." He recited with approval the holding of Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 500, 78 S.Ct. 1253, 1257, 2 L.Ed.2d 1514 (1958), that although government agents could lawfully have entered a house with intent to arrest a defendant and thereby legally seize illicit equipment in plain view, nevertheless the seizure there was invalid because the court found "their purpose in entering was to search for distilling equipment and not to arrest petitioner"; therefore, Judge Conford recounted, "[t]he actual intent of the officers was regarded as fatal to the search as a matter of law." 79 N.J. at 39. Based upon that and other authorities, Judge Conford found that "the principle that the intent and purpose of the searching officers may be material, indeed crucial, to the validity of the search, is fully applicable here." Ibid.
Similarly, in State v. Slockbower, supra, our Supreme Court found, as one ground for "condemning" what was sought to be justified as an inventory search upon impoundment of an automobile, that "the purported impoundment was pretextual" and therefore that there was not "substantial necessity" for the impoundment. 79 N.J. at 13. And in State v. Seiss, supra, the conclusion that there was no "substantial necessity" to enter defendant's house was based, as already recited, upon the court's finding that "it appears the police invaded defendant's home merely for the purpose of conducting an exploratory search." 168 N.J.Super. at 274—276. These cases are but exemplars of the broadly accepted view that "bad faith" searches or seizures are unconstitutional even though they may appear to be objectively constitutional. See, generally, Burkoff, "Bad Faith Searches", 57 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 70 (1982); Amsterdam, "Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment," 58 Minn.L.Rev. 349 (1974).
II
Our finding of the invalidity of the alleged "plain view" seizure is equally dispositive of the State's alternate contention that the seizure here was the product of a search incident to arrest. Not only did the officers testify that they did not conduct a search at all, but a search conducted upon the pretex tual arrest would also be invalid under the authorities already cited. See, generally, BurkoiT, "Bad Faith Searches," supra.
Ill
In reaching our conclusions we have not overlooked Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978), reh. den. 438 U.S. 908, 98 S.Ct. 3127, 57 L.Ed.2d 1150 (1978), in which Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the court, described certain earlier precedents as holding that searches are to be evaluated "under a standard of objective reasonableness without regard to the underlying intent or motivation of the officers involved." Id. at 138, 98 S.Ct. at 1723. The accuracy of that recitation, however, as well as the application of the Scott holding, has been the subject of considerable dispute. See, e.g., Burkoff, "Bad Faith Searches," supra, 57 N.Y.U.L.Rev. at 72 84; 1 LaFave, Search and Seizure (Cum.Supp.), § 1.2 at 4-19 (1978). We do not read Scott to overrule Coolidge or to require any retreat from the principles enunciated by our court in State v. Ercolano and State v. Slockbower, both supra.
Moreover, we find that the seizure here would be vulnerable even in the absence of a finding of subjective bad faith or pretext. As Professor LaFave has pointed out (Search and Seizure, supra (Cum.Supp.), § 1.2 at 17), the United States Supreme Court has recognized in a number of settings that "arbitrary action is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment"; therefore it is surely approprite to consider, in a case of this nature, whether the officer deviated from usual police practice, even if we disregard why he did so.
It is the fact of the departure from the accepted way of handling such cases which makes the officer's conduct arbitrary, and it is the arbitrariness which in this context constitutes the Fourth Amendment violation.... [Id. at 16]
LaFave suggests, as an alternative to an examination of "the underlying intent or motivation of the officers involved," that the courts "ascertain in a more direct fashion whether the police in the particular case had departed from their usual practice." Id. at 18. He suggests, in short, "more widespread application of the requirement utilized by the Supreme Court in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976), namely that the Fourth Amendment activity 'was carried out in accordance with standard procedures in the local police department.' " Ibid. Application of that rationale would require suppression of the evidence seized here since it is acknowledged that the arrest, whether or not characterized as subjectively "pretextual," was not effected in accordance with "normal" procedures in the local police department. The seizure can fairly be characterized as the product of arbitrary police activity and thus in violation both of the Fourth Amendment and of N.J. Const. (1947), Art. I, par. 7.
IV
We have carefully considered the contrary views expressed by our dissenting colleague. Our conclusion, however, is that his analysis overlooks the "true facts" realistically perceived by the trial judge and, further, that it fails to give proper recognition to the case law which condemns pretextual or arbitrary police searches. On the record before us and in light of the trial judge's findings and the reasoning and authority above recited, we determine that the observation and seizure of the boots, although ostensibly valid, were in fact pretextual and arbitrary and accordingly were in violation of the Fourth Amendment and the parallel provision of our New Jersey Constitution. The evidence was therefore properly suppressed by the trial court.
The July 10, 1981 order appealed from is affirmed.
Detective Hicks did make a reference to a report that defendant "had tendencies of becoming violent with the police," but the trial judge gave that report no apparent weight.
We need not here determine whether the more stringent standard of Seiss survives, notwithstanding Washington v. Chrisman, as an authoritative interpretation of N.J. Const. (1947), Art. I, par. 7.
Although the discussion of inadvertence in Justice Stewart's plurality opinion was not joined in by a majority of the court, our own Supreme Court has treated the inadvertence requirement as part of the "plain view" doctrine. See, e.g., State v. Ercolano, supra, 79 N.J. at 35.
We are aware of the variant views expressed both in case law and academic discussion concerning the point at which a police officer's expectation or suspicion renders his "plain view" observation no longer "inadvertent." Compare, e.g., United States v. Davis, 461 F.2d 1026, 1034-1035 (3 Cir.1972), with United States v. Liberti, 616 F.2d 34 (2 Cir.1980), cert. den. 446 U.S. 952, 100 S.Ct. 2918, 64 L.Ed.2d 808 (1980); see, generally, "The Supreme Court, 1970 Term," supra, 85 Harv.L.Rev. 244-247; Note, " 'Inadvertence': The Increasingly Vestigial Prong of the Plain View Doctrine," 10 Memphis St.U.L.Rev. 399 (1980). We do not find it necessary to explore those niceties inasmuch as we find, from the totality of the facts recited, that the arrest here was entirely pretextual and the seizure planned.