Case Name: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Walter ABRAMS, Jr., Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1977-10-04
Citations: 350 So. 2d 1104
Docket Number: No. 76-1518
Parties: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Walter ABRAMS, Jr., Appellee.
Judges: ALDERMAN, C. J., concurs specially, with opinion.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 350
Pages: 1104–1106

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Walter ABRAMS, Jr., Appellee.
No. 76-1518.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Oct. 4, 1977.
Rehearing Denied Nov. 9, 1977.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Anthony J. Golden, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellant.
David Roth of Cone, Owen, Wagner, Nu-gent, Johnson & McKeown, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
CROSS, Judge.
Appellant, State of Florida, seeks review of a trial court order granting appellee-de-fendant, Walter Abrams' motion for discharge. We reverse.
Abrams was found guilty after a jury trial and sentenced to ten years imprisonment for robbery. On appeal, Abrams' conviction was reversed by this court and remanded for new trial, as reported at 326 So.2d 211 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). While a private attorney had initially represented Abrams, the public defender was appointed to prosecute the appeal. On remand, private counsel was served notice of Abrams' new trial date, at which time he moved to withdraw from the case, which motion was granted. The minutes of the hearing reflect that the trial judge expressed an intention to enter a written order appointing the public defender, and directed the clerk to notify the public defender's office to represent Abrams. Although the record does not reflect any written order of appointment of the public defender entered at that time, the public defender proceeded to represent Abrams. Trial date was set but due to the fact that Abrams did not arrive in the county for trial shortly before the set date, the public defender requested a continuance on the basis that proper trial preparations required further consultations with Abrams.
Upon the expiration of ninety days after the mandate was forwarded by this court to the trial court directing a new trial 'be granted, Abrams moved to be discharged pursuant to Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(g). At that time, Abrams alleged he had not been afforded a speedy trial, and the public defender's office did not represent him. After a hearing, the trial court determined the public defender's office was without authority to seek a continuance and waive Abrams' right to a speedy trial. Accordingly, the trial court found Abrams was not bound by the public defender's action and granted his motion for discharge. This appeal then followed.
The question presented by this appeal is whether the trial court erred in granting appellee's petition for discharge.
The principle is well established that the right to a speedy trial is waived when the defendant or his attorney request a continuance. The acts of an attorney on behalf of a client will be binding on the client even though done without consulting him and even against the client's wishes. McArthur v. State, 303 So.2d 359 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974); Brown v. State, 328 So.2d 497 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). Rule 3.191 does not require that the accused be present when a waiver is made; nor does it require that waiver be made personally by the accused.
In the instant case, a public defender was appointed to prosecute Abrams' appeal, pursuant to which the conviction was reversed. As a public defender was validly appointed to act as Abrams' attorney, and the benefits of the public defender's representation were accepted by Abrams, an attorney-client relationship was established which did not terminate upon the order for a new trial. The existence of an attorney-client relationship was never questioned until Abrams sought to be discharged for failure to be brought to trial within ninety days after the reversal of his conviction on appeal, contrary to Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.191(g). There was in existence a valid attorney-client relationship at the time the public defender sought a continuance two weeks prior to the expiration of the ninety days. Therefore, Abrams' right to a speedy trial was effectively waived. Abrams cannot accept the benefits of representation by the public defender until it is in his interest to deny the existence of that relationship. The public defender was authorized to act in Abrams' behalf; therefore, Abrams is bound by his attorney's actions.
Accordingly, the order of discharge is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceeding.
Reversed and remanded.
ALDERMAN, C. J., concurs specially, with opinion.
DOWNEY, J., dissents, with opinion.