Case Name: William Glenn EDWARDS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1977-11-09
Citations: 558 S.W.2d 452
Docket Number: No. 53168
Parties: William Glenn EDWARDS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 558
Pages: 452–457

Head Matter:
William Glenn EDWARDS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
No. 53168.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Nov. 9, 1977.
State’s Motion for Rehearing Denied Dec. 14, 1977.
Melvyn Carson Bruder, Dallas, for appellant.
Henry N. Wade, Dist. Atty., Edgar A. Mason and Fred Davis, Asst. Dist. Attys., Dallas, Jim D. Vollers, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

Opinion:
OPINION
DAVIS, Commissioner.
Appeal is taken from a conviction for bookmaking. Punishment was assessed by the jury at five years, probated.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred by communicating orally with the jury after deliberations had begun, in violation of Art. 36.27, V.A.C.C.P.
During the punishment stage of the trial, the jury sent a note to 'the court stating, "We are hung." Appellant promptly moved for a mistrial, which motion was overruled. The record reflects that the following then transpired:
"MR. MERRILL [defense counsel]: Comes now the Defendant, William Glenn Edwards, and after having previously made a motion for mistrial, at 3:15, before the jury is brought back in, respectfully objects to any oral instructions to the jury under the laws of this state and denies him the opportunity to prepare and file written exceptions to any instructions which may be given to the jury. The Defendant has not been given or told what any oral instructions might be. Defendant renews motion for mistrial.
"THE COURT: Anything further?
"MR. MERRILL: No, sir.
"THE COURT: Motion is overruled. Oral instructions will be given, taken down by the Reporter, a copy of such will be furnished to the attorney for the Defendant. Bring the jury in.
"(Whereupon, the jury was returned into open court and the following proceedings were held in the presence and hearing of the jury:)
"THE COURT: I have received a note from the foreman. Now, Mr. Foreman, there are some questions that I want to ask you and I want you to listen closely to the questions and answer the questions I ask and only those questions. I do not want you in your answers to say a designated number favors this, a designated number favors that. I'm not interested in that. I simply want to know what the break down is at this time. By break down, I mean whether there are a certain number, what the numbers are insofar as the difference is concerned. Now, do you understand exactly what I mean?
"THE JURY FOREMAN: All right. I understand.
"THE COURT: All right. What is the break down numberwise, Mr. Foreman? "THE JURY FOREMAN: 10 to 2.
"THE COURT: All right. Then, it's the opinion of the Court that with that break down, that we have not used sufficient time in deliberation to return a verdict. Now, this case has to be settled by some twelve jurors. I regard all of you as honest and intelligent jurors. I do not know of any twelve jurors who can do better than you can. I think you can settle it and you ought to settle it and I want it to be settled. I have no desire to attempt to coerce you into a verdict. This is a matter for each of you to determine for himself or herself, but it is to the interest of society that you should consider your differences and, if you can, agree upon a verdict. You will please return to the jury room and if you can reconcile your differences and agree upon a verdict I hope you will please do so. You will now retire to the jury room."
After the oral instructions were given and the jury was retired, appellant again moved for a mistrial, complaining, "the instructions were not in writing to the jury; . . the Defendant was not allowed to accept [sic] before they were given their instructions; . . . that the instructions put undue duress and pressure upon two jurors to change their votes." The motion was denied.
Article 36.27, V.A.C.C.P., provides as follows:
"When the jury wishes to communicate with the court, it shall notify the sheriff, who shall inform the court thereof. Any communication relative to the cause must be written, prepared by the foreman and shall be submitted to the court through the bailiff. The court shall answer any such communication in writing, and before giving such answer to the jury shall use reasonable diligence to secure the presence of the defendant and his counsel, and shall first submit the question and also submit his answer to the same to the defendant or his counsel or objections and exceptions, in the same manner as any other written instructions are submitted to such counsel, before the court gives such answer to the jury, but if he is unable to secure the presence of the defendant and his counsel, then he shall proceed to answer the same as he deems proper. The written instruction or answer to the communication shall be read in open court unless expressly waived by the defendant.
"All such proceedings in felony cases, shall be a part of the record and recorded by the court reporter."
The Legislature used the word "shall" in directing the court to answer any communication of the jury in writing. In Waythe v. State, 533 S.W.2d 802, 804, this Court quoted with approval from Brinkley v. State, 167 Tex.Cr.R. 472, 320 S.W.2d 855, where it was stated:
" 'Must' and 'shall' are synonymous and are usually mandatory when used in statutes."
This Court has held that oral instructions to the jury are not in compliance with Art. 36.27, supra, but has found that failure of the defendant to object results in waiver of the error. Calicult v. State, Tex. Cr.App., 503 S.W.2d 574; Verret v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 470 S.W.2d 883. In Smith v. State, 513 S.W.2d 823, this Court found that it was error for the trial court not to comply with the requirements of Art. 36.27, supra, but stated further:
"However, it is incumbent upon a defendant to bring the easily correctable error to the judge's attention by objection or formal bill of exception or the acts of the trial court are presumed consistent with the statute. Smith v. State, 474 S.W.2d 486 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Lipscomb v. State, 467 S.W.2d 417 (Tex.Cr.App.1971); Verret v. State, 470 S.W.2d 883 (Tex.Cr. App.1971); Rodriquez v. State, 500 S.W.2d 517 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Hancock v. State, 120 Tex.Cr.R. 162, 47 S.W.2d 299 (1932); McClellan v. State, 118 Tex.Cr.R. 473, 40 S.W.2d 87 (1931)."
The statutory requirement that additional instructions to the jury be made in writing and submitted to the defendant before the same is read to the jury affords the defendant and his counsel an opportunity to examine same and urge objections, if any, to such instructions. Art. 36.27, supra; see concurring opinion in Calicult v. State, supra.
In the instant case appellant timely objected that the court's action in giving oral instruction to the jury denied him the opportunity to prepare and file written exceptions to any instructions given to the jury.
We cannot agree with the State that it was necessary that appellant show harm before the error results in reversal where, as in the instant case, the statutory requirement is mandatory and the appellant timely objected to the court's failure to follow the statute.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
Opinion approved by the Court.
. In light of our holding that it is unnecessary that a showing of harm be made where timely objection is made, we find it unnecessary to consider appellant's contention that he was harmed by the court's instructions in that they placed undue duress and pressure on the jury to reach a unanimous verdict. We do, however, call attention to United States v. Duke, 492 F.2d 693 (5th Cir. 1974) in light of the court's statement to the jury, "I think you can settle it and you ought to settle it and I want it to be settled." In Duke, the jury was admonished by the court, " . . .a decision has to be reached by a jury. You are that jury." As in the instant case, the instructions in Duke concluded with statements which tended to ameliorate the earlier statements. In spite of this fact, the 5th Circuit found that the trial court gave "an erroneous version of the 'Allen ' [Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 17 S.Ct. 154, 41 L.Ed. 528 (1896)] charge."