Case Name: Edward Fletcher EYSTER, Appellant, v. Caroline H. EYSTER, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1987-01-20
Citations: 503 So. 2d 340
Docket Number: No. BO-335
Parties: Edward Fletcher EYSTER, Appellant, v. Caroline H. EYSTER, Appellee.
Judges: SHIVERS, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 503
Pages: 340–346

Head Matter:
Edward Fletcher EYSTER, Appellant, v. Caroline H. EYSTER, Appellee.
No. BO-335.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Jan. 20, 1987.
On Motion for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc March 11, 1987.
David H. Levin and Charles J. Kahn, Jr. of Levin, Warfield, Middlebrooks, Mabie, Thomas, Mayes & Mitchell, Pensacola, for appellant.
T. Sol Johnson of Johnson, Green & Locklin, Milton, for appellee.

Opinion:
SMITH, Judge.
The petitioner (ex-husband) seeks a writ of certiorari, directed to the trial court's order compelling him to answer interrogatories, in an action by the ex-wife seeking a modification of alimony and the payment of substantial medical bills and expenses. The interrogatories request information concerning the ex-husband's income, assets and liabilities. Because the ex-husband has agreed that he is capable of responding to his former wife's petition for modification "in a reasonable amount of alimony determined by the trial court," he contends he should not be compelled to answer these interrogatories. For the reasons expressed below, we find no departure from law sufficient to give us jurisdiction and deny the petition.
Two hearings were held on the wife's motions to compel answers to the interrogatories and after each the trial court entered orders compelling responses to the interrogatories. After the first order, rather than give the financial information requested, the husband replied to each interrogatory that "he is capable of responding to the respondent-former wife in a reasonable amount of alimony determined by the trial court." This necessitated the wife filing a second motion to compel. As noted by the trial judge, no evidence was introduced at either hearing. In the lengthy and detailed order under review, the trial court set forth the history of the litigation between the parties since their divorce, the circumstances of the ex-wife which allegedly demonstrate increased need, and the position of the parties with respect to this discovery request. The trial judge recognized that in this court's decision, Granville v. Granville, 445 So.2d 362 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), this court refused to permit inquiry into the former husband's financial circumstances. He distinguished Gran-ville on the grounds that there, revelation of the husband's financial circumstances would have damaged his career as a financial forecaster, whereas in this case, there was no evidence of any adverse impact or financial disadvantage which would be visited upon the husband should he comply with the discovery obligations ordered by the court. The trial court noted that under section 61.08, Florida Statutes (1985), it was required in determining the proper award of alimony to consider all relevant economic factors including, but not limited to, the financial resources of each party. The court concluded:
It is fundamental under Florida case law and authority that a trial Court in determining the amount of an alimony award must consider not only the needs of the spouse seeking alimony, but also the ability of the responding spouse to pay the alimony.
In order for this Court to determine "what is reasonable" the Court must have available to it, in order to exercise it's [sic] discretion in a sound and reasonable fashion, some knowledge of the financial resources available to the responding party as well as the needs of the party seeking support.
Because the parties have failed to offer any evidence to this Court that would demonstrate any irreparable harm or unique or unusual circumstances which might justify the restrictive discovery process before the First District Court in Granville, it is,
ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the second motion for an order compelling answers to discovery is granted, and the petitioner/husband shall furnish, in reasonable detail, the answers to the twelve interrogatories which were previously propounded....
The husband seeks certiorari review of this order.
We recognize there are many cases in which courts have reviewed, by certiora-ri, errors in granting discovery. Nevertheless, "[i]t is not every error in the court below which creates common law certiorari jurisdiction in this court." Ford Motor Co. v. Edwards, 363 So.2d 867 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978). Before review by certiorari will be granted, the petitioner must demonstrate that the order complained of was rendered by the court in excess of its jurisdiction or does not conform to the essential requirements of the law and may cause material injury through subsequent proceedings for which the remedy by appeal will be inadequate. Id.; Esman v. Board of Regents of the State of Florida, 425 So.2d 156 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
As stated by the Florida Supreme Court in Combs v. State, 436 So.2d 93, 95-96 (Fla.1983):
In granting writs of common-law certio-rari, the district courts of appeal should not be as concerned with the mere existence of legal error as much as with the seriousness of the error. Since it is impossible to list all possible legal errors serious enough to constitute a departure from the essential requirements of law, the district courts must be allowed a large degree of discretion so that they may judge each case individually. The district courts should exercise this discretion only when there has been a violation of a clearly established principle of law resulting in a miscarriage of justice.
It is this discretion which is the essential distinction between review by appeal and review by common law certiorari, [citation omitted] A district court may refuse to grant a petition for common-law certiorari even though there may have been a departure from the essential requirements of law. [citation omitted] The district courts should use this discretion cautiously so as to avert the possibility of common-law certiorari being used as a vehicle to obtain a second appeal.
The comments of Justice Boyd in his concurring opinion in Jones v. State, 477 So.2d 566, 569 (Fla.1985), are instructive:
It is important to distinguish the concept of a "departure from the essential requirements of law" from the concept of legal error. On a petition for the common-law writ of certiorari, the legal correctness of the judgment of which review is sought is immaterial. The required "departure from the essential requirements of law" means something far beyond legal error. It means an inherent illegality or irregularity, an abuse of judicial power, an act of judicial tyranny perpetrated with disregard of procedural requirements, resulting in a gross miscarriage of justice. The writ of certiora-ri properly issues to correct essential illegality but not legal error.
Turning to the issue at hand, we note that the trial court possesses broad discretion in granting or refusing discovery motions and also in protecting the parties against possible abuse of discovery procedures, and only an abuse of this discretion will constitute fatal error. Orlowitz v. Orlowitz, 199 So.2d 97 (Fla.1967).
In this proceeding, the husband did not stipulate that he will pay whatever amount the trial court awards as increased alimony, provided the wife demonstrates need. Instead, he only agreed to pay a "reasonable" amount of alimony. After thoroughly reviewing the dispute between the parties and distinguishing the case relied upon by the ex-husband, the court concluded that it needed the whole factual picture to determine "reasonable" alimony.
In Orlowitz, the issue before the Florida Supreme Court was whether the chancellor had erred in granting the husband's motion for protective order prohibiting the wife from inquiring into the husband's financial worth in the parties' divorce action. In resisting discovery as to his assets, the husband represented to the court that he was ready, willing and able to answer any reasonable order for costs, fees or other allowances. Citing conflict with Parker v. Parker, 182 So.2d 498 (Fla. 4th DCA 1966), in which the district court of appeal had affirmed a trial court order granting a similar discovery motion, despite the fact that the husband had filed a written admission that he was worth $5,000,000 and that he was well able to satisfy the needs of the wife and children as alleged by her, the Supreme Court quoted with approval the following language from the Parker opinion:
We must say, based upon our understanding of the Rules and the philosophy behind them, that we do not look with favor upon the husband's position in not wishing to reveal any of the details of his financial position and his effort to bridle the dependents' discovery rights by substituting his secondary non-verifiable conclusion in lieu of primary detailed facts. The adversary and the court are entitled to the whole factual picture to the end that an independent complete understanding and evaluation may be had.
Orlowitz, 199 So.2d at 98. The Supreme Court concluded that the chancellor had committed fatal error in immunizing the husband from all inquiry concerning his financial worth.
On this record, we cannot say the trial court fatally abused its discretion in determining information concerning the husband's financial condition was relevant to the alimony issue so as to be within the permissible scope of discovery under rule 1.280(b)(1), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. Ford Motor Co. v. Edwards, 363 So.2d at 870. The cases cited by the hus band are distinguishable and do not require a contrary conclusion.
By our ruling, we are not suggesting that the trial court revisit the issues of the needs and abilities of the parties at the time of the divorce proceeding, since these issues were decided in the final divorce decree which is res judicata with respect to the facts then existing. Chastain v. Chastain, 73 So.2d 66 (Fla.1954). Instead, the issues before the trial court, as framed by the wife's pleadings, are limited to the wife's substantial change in financial needs and the ability of the husband to meet these increased needs.
Accordingly, we conclude the ex-husband has failed to demonstrate a departure from the essential requirements of law sufficient to warrant our exercise of certiorari jurisdiction.
SHIVERS, J., concurs.
ZEHMER, J., dissents with opinion.
. The husband has not agreed to forego any appeal as to the trial court's determination of "reasonableness." Further, should the trial court agree that the wife is entitled to a "reasonable" increase in alimony, and the wife contests the trial court's determination of reasonableness, this court would be precluded in the future from reviewing this issue if the ex-husband is protected from discovery of his financial condition.
. Calvo v. Calvo, 489 So.2d 833 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Granville v. Granville, 445 So.2d 362 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Palmar v. Palmar, 402 So.2d 20 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Schottenstein v. Schottenstein, 384 So.2d 933 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); and Alterman v. Alterman, 361 So.2d 773 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).