Case Name: Owen and Bellows agt. Jane F. Cawley and Samuel B. Cawley, her husband
Court: New York Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1861-10
Citations: 22 How. Pr. 10
Docket Number: 
Parties: Owen and Bellows agt. Jane F. Cawley and Samuel B. Cawley, her husband.
Judges: 
Reporter: Howard's Practice Reports
Volume: 22
Pages: 10–14

Head Matter:
SUPREME COURT.
Owen and Bellows agt. Jane F. Cawley and Samuel B. Cawley, her husband.
Where a married woman carrying on business on her own account and with her separate estate, previous to 1860, gave a power of attorney to her husband, who thereupon conducted the business as his wife’s agent, and the husband employed attorneys-at-law to bring certain suits on accounts growing out of that business, or which had been previously assigned to the husband,
Held, in an action by the attorneys to charge the separate estate of the wife for their costs, and to recover them therefrom, that there was not enough in the case to show that the husband was in fact, and with her knowledge, acting as her agent in the employment of the attorneys, and certainly not enough to show that she intended to charge her property, and especially as a portion of the costs could not be considered as resulting for the benefit of her separate estate. Judgment reversed, and new trial ordered before the referee.
The husband in such case held to be a proper witness to prove his agency, and its extent, as well as all facts concerning the employment of the plaintiffs. (Clerke, J., dissenting.)
New York General Term, October, 1861.
Clerke, P. J., Ingraham and Gould, Justices.
The defendant, Jane F. Cawley, carried on the business of ship-chandlery, in the city of New York, and owned some other property, being real estate.
All of this property was held by her separate from her husband.
The latter conducted the business in New York as the wife’s agent.
As such agent, he employed the plaintiffs, who were attorneys-at-law, to bring certain suits on accounts growing out of that business, or which had been previously assigned to Mr. Cawley. In doing so a bill of costs was incurred, and the suit was brought to recover against the wife’s separate estate the amount of these attorneys’ costs.
The defence was, that by special agreement, the husband, and not the wife, was to pay for the services, and at certain special rates.
The cause was referred to Ex-Judge Mitchell as sole referee, and he found the plaintiffs’ claim to be just, and that the services were rendered for the benefit of her separate estate, and as matter of law that the plaintiffs were entitled to judgment against her separate estate therefor. From this judgment Mrs. Cawley appealed to the general term, and the cause was heard in June last before Judges Clerke, Ingraham and Gould. •
Mr. McMahon, who appeared for Mrs. Cawley,
insisted that the debt was that of the husband; that a married woman could not, before the act of 1860, give a power of attorney to her husband to carry on business in her own name without making it the business of the husband; and all contracts arising therefrom were his contracts and debts. He also insisted the husband was a proper witness in the cause.
Mr. Owen, in person, insisted the judgment was correct.

Opinion:
By the court, Ingraham, Justice.
I cannot concur in the opinion that all the charges allowed by the referee were properly chargeable on the separate estate of Mrs. Cawley. The decision in Yale agt. Dederer, (22 N. Y. R., 450) holds that the intention to charge the separate estate must be stated in the contract itself, or the consideration must be one going to the direct benefit of the estate. I am not disposed to extend the rule any further than the court of appeals have laid it down. Applying this rule to the present case, I am at a loss to see how bringing an action for a married woman, which fails, presents a consideration going to the direct benefit of the estate. I suppose the court intended that where the intent to charge the separate estate was not stated in the contract, it might be inferred from a direct benefit to the separate estate. No such inference can be drawn where no benefit, but an injury, results from the service. If there had been but one action, and the married woman had been defeated, with a large bill of costs charged against her, would it in any way be inferred that her separate estate had been benefited by the services rendered ?
I forbear commenting upon the fact that the employment was by the husband, and the doubt which might arise whether, even though his agency in the business was admitted, he had any right to bind the separate estate of the wife without her knowledge and express assent. She could not so charge her real estate except by her acknowledged deed, and yet in this case the husband, without proof of her knowledge or assent, is allowed to make such a charge, which binds the real and personal estate.
Without, however, expressing any opinion now on this point, I am clearly of the opinion that the defendant is not liable for all the services included in this judgment, and think the report should be set aside and the case referred back to the referee.
The present evidence should stand in the cause, and either party be allowed to produce further testimony.
Gould, Justice.
While I think that a suit must be judged to be or not to be for the benefit of an estate by the intent and object of commencing it, rather than by the result, I am not satisfied that in this case the services rendered are a proper charge on the defendant's real estate. All the facts of the case were certainly not in proof before the referee, or else her estate is not chargeable with all these costs. There is not enough in the case to show that the husband was in fact, and with her knowledge, acting as her agent in the employment; certainly not enough to show that she intended any such thing as "charging, her property.
I am disposed to concur in the result of Judge Ingraham's opinion ; and besides, to hold that the husband is a proper witness to prove his agency, and its extent, as well as all facts concerning the employment of the plaintiffs. The act of 1860 (referring to what man and wife as parties, may testify to,) certainly must mean, that the husband or wife may, to some matters, be a witness for or against each other, and I can conceive of no case more proper for admitting such testimony, than one where either has acted as the agent of the other in the business in controversy. With the wisdom of making such a law, we have nothing to do. "But unless we allow it to have effect to this extent, we virtually make it of no effect.
I should reverse the judgment and order a new trial, as suggested by Judge Ingraham.