Case Name: Martin v. District Court of Pueblo County et al.
Court: Colorado Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Colorado
Decision Date: 1954-02-01
Citations: 129 Colo. 27
Docket Number: No. 17,321
Parties: Martin v. District Court of Pueblo County et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Colorado Reports
Volume: 129
Pages: 27–34

Head Matter:
No. 17,321.
Martin v. District Court of Pueblo County et al.
(272 P. [2d] 648)
Decided February 1, 1954.
Mr. Merritt L. Gordon, for plaintiff.
Mr. Duke W. Dunbar, Attorney General, Mr. Frank A. Wachob, Deputy, Mr. Norman H. Comstock, Assistant, Mr. W. C. E. Kettelkamp, Mr. John McGrath, Mr. Charles Keen, for defendants.
En Banc.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Moore
delivered the opinion of the court.
Plaintiff in error, to whom we hereinafter refer as defendant, by information filed in the district court of Pueblo county, was accused of a felony. He entered separate pleas of "not guilty" and "not guilty by reason of insanity at the time of the alleged commission of the crime." Notwithstanding the entry of the latter plea the trial court fixed a day for trial on the substantive offense charged against him without committing him for observation and examination pursuant to the provisions of section 508, chapter 48, '35 C.S.A., as amended by Session Laws of Colorado 1951, chapter 144, section 3. A rule to show cause was issued.
Counsel for defendant objected to the trial of any issues in the case until after the commitment, observation and examination of defendant, and this action, in the nature of prohibition, was instituted to prevent trial on the merits prior to such commitment of defendant for the purpose of observation and report on his mental condition.
Amended section 508, supra, provides in part as follows: "Upon the making of such plea of insanity, the judge shall forthwith commit the defendant to the Colorado Psychopathic Hospital at Denver or to the state hospital at Pueblo, or to such other institution as may be designated hereafter by law, where he shall remain under observation and examination, by physicians who are specialists in mental diseases, for such time as the court may direct, not exceeding one month." Counsel for defendant argues that under the mandatory provisions of this statute the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in fixing a day for trial of the cause.
The trial court apparently acted under amended section 509 of said statute, section 4, chapter 144, Session Laws of Colorado, 1951, which is as follows:
"When a defendant pleads not guilty by reason of insanity at the time of the alleged commission of the crime, and joins with it another plea or pleas not involving insanity, including the plea of not guilty, he shall first be tried as if he had entered such other plea or pleas only, and on such trial he shall be conclusively presumed to have been sane at the time the alleged offense was committed.
"If the jury shall find the defendant guilty, or if the defendant pleads only not guilty by reason of insanity at the time of the alleged commission of the crime, then the question whether the defendant was sane or insane at the time the offense was committed shall be promptly tried, either before the same jury or before a new jury, in the discretion of the court."
It is apparent that the trial court concluded that amended section 509 permitted the trial of all issues, save and except the issue of the mental condition of defendant, before any commitment for observation was required, and in the event of acquittal upon this trial no inquiry into mental condition would be called for.
Question to be Determined.
Where one accused of a felony enters pleas of "not guilty" and "not guilty by reason of insanity " is it permissible under sections 508 and 509, chapter 48, '35 C.S.A., as amended, to try defendant on the issues raised by his not guilty plea prior to any commitment for observation and examination as required by said section 508?
The question is answered in the negative. It is a fundamental rule governing statutory construction that if by reasonable interpretation ambiguities in statutes can be reconciled, it is the duty of courts to give that interpretation which will avoid conflict. Amended section 508 of the Act in question provides that, " the judge shall forthwith commit the defendant ," for examination upon the entry of a plea of insanity. This can have but one meaning — the commitment must follow immediately after the entry of the plea. (Emphasis supplied.)
Amended section 509 necessarily relates to the order in which issues raised by the separate and distinct pleas, which may be entered by an accused, shall be had. No trial of any issues "forthwith" upon the entry of pleas by an accused is contemplated by amended section 509. This section fixes a period of time intervening between the date on which a defendant enters his plea and the date on which the issues thus raised shall be tried. Within this intervening period, and "forthwith" upon the entry of the plea, the commitment for observation and examination must be made.
In the record before us, counsel raises no question whatever other than that now under discussion. While we have considerable doubt as to whether an accused person can be compelled by statute to first stand trial upon the issues framed by a plea of not guilty, and compel withholding of determination of his mental responsibility until after a verdict has been rendered on the not guilty plea, we are not here called upon to determine. The constitutionality of section 509, supra, is not raised in this cause and is not here determined.
We are of the opinion that the trial court erred in refusing to commit accused for observation and examination as to his mental condition, and we hold that such commitment, under the facts presented, is mandatory and must be had before a trial on any issue can be conducted. The rule heretofore issued is made absolute.