Case Name: Pamela SMITH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PRIDE MOBILITY PRODUCTS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2017-10-31
Citations: 700 F. App'x 583
Docket Number: No. 17-15551
Parties: Pamela SMITH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PRIDE MOBILITY PRODUCTS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: Before: McKEOWN, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 700
Pages: 583–584

Head Matter:
Pamela SMITH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PRIDE MOBILITY PRODUCTS CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 17-15551
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted October 23, 2017
OCTOBER 31, 2017
Pamela Smith, Campbell, CA, pro se
Sophia V. Cohn, Esquire, Gregory Brian Thomas, Boornazian, Jensen & Garthe, Oakland, CA, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before: McKEOWN, WATFORD, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument, See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Pamela Smith, an attorney, appeals pro se from the district court's judgment dismissing her diversity action arising from injuries that resulted from a defective wheelchair and lift. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court's dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Skilstaf, Inc. v. CVS Caremark Corp., 669 F.3d 1005, 1014 (9th Cir. 2012). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
The district court .properly dismissed Smith's claim under California's Unruh Civil Rights Act because Smith failed to allege facts sufficient to show, that appellee denied her full and equal accommodations or services. See Cal. Civ. Code § 51(b).
The district court properly dismissed Smith's claim under California Civil Code section 51.7 because Smith failed to allege facts sufficient to show that appellee committed violence or intimidation by threat of violence against her person or property. See Winarto v. Toshiba Am. Elecs. Components, Inc., 274 F.3d 1276, 1289 (9th Cir. 2001) (elements of section 51.7 claim).
To the extent Smith alleged negligence per se claims based on the violation, of federal and state laws, the district court properly dismissed such claims because Smith failed to allege facts sufficient to show how any specific federal or state laws or regulations were violated. See Ramirez v. Nelson, 44 Cal.4th 908, 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 728, 188 P.3d 659, 665 (2008) (elements of negligence per se claim).
However, Smith alleged that her wheelchair deviated from appellee's intended design because 1) the brakes on the wheelchair failed on a hill; and 2) the lift's retraction device caused the lift's control device to retract too far into the vehicle. Liberally construed, these allegations are sufficient to state a manufacturing defect claim. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal.3d 413, 143 Cal.Rptr. 225, 573 P.2d 443, 454 (1978) (elements of manufacturing defect claim).
Smith also alleged that her wheelchair's design resulted in the loss of brakes on a hill as well as the loss of control over the wheelchair, and that the lift's design results in the lift's retraction device causing the lift's control device to retract too far into the vehicle. Liberally construed, these allegations are sufficient to state a design defect claim under both the consumer expectations test and risk benefit test. See id., 143 Cal.Rptr. 225, 573 P.2d at 455-56 (elements of design defect claim under risk benefit test and consumer expectations test).
We reverse the dismissal of Smith's manufacturing defect product liability claims and Smith's design defect product liability claims, and remand for further proceedings as to these claims only.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit.Rule 36-3.