Case Name: Fred P. GILBERT, Appellant, v. The STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee
Court: Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Oklahoma
Decision Date: 1982-07-01
Citations: 648 P.2d 1226
Docket Number: No. M-80-314
Parties: Fred P. GILBERT, Appellant, v. The STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee.
Judges: The Honorable HEZ J. BUSSEY filed his disqualification in the above styled and numbered matter, and the Honorable GORDON R. MELSON, District Judge of the Twenty-Second Judicial District, was appointed to serve in his stead.
Reporter: Pacific Reporter 2d
Volume: 648
Pages: 1226–1239

Head Matter:
Fred P. GILBERT, Appellant, v. The STATE of Oklahoma, Appellee.
No. M-80-314.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma.
July 1, 1982.
Rehearing Denied July 30, 1982.
Mary E. Bane, Oyler, Smith & Bane, Oklahoma City, for appellant.
Jan Eric Cartwright, Atty. Gen., Susan J. Talbot, Asst. Atty. Gen., Oklahoma City, for appellee.

Opinion:
OPINION
GORDON R. MELSON, Assigned Judge:
Fred P. Gilbert, a Tulsa attorney, appeals from an Order Adjudging him guilty of Direct Contempt in Oklahoma County District Court, Case No. CJ-80-259. He was sentenced to serve six (6) months in the County Jail and pay a three thousand dollar ($3,000) fine.
I.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The contempt conviction occurred in the course of proceedings held on an application for post-conviction relief before the Honorable Joe Cannon, Oklahoma County District Judge. On January 10, 1980, the appellant filed (by mail) a Motion to Disqualify Judge Cannon with the Oklahoma County Court Clerk, along with a written request that the Clerk bring a copy of the filing to the Court's attention. The next day, January 11, 1980, the appellant Gilbert and an associate, William McMahon, appeared for the regularly scheduled hearing on the post-conviction relief application. Immediately before the hearing, they handed a copy of the Motion to Disqualify to Judge Cannon in his chambers, indicating they wished to present it. After reading part of it, Judge Cannon ordered the appellant not to leave the courthouse; he then convened in the open courtroom to conduct the post-conviction hearing.
Thereupon the judge asked Mr. Gilbert if he had drafted the Motion to Disqualify which bore his signature. Appellant responded affirmatively. Judge Cannon stated that, in his opinion, the document was absolutely contemptuous, and told appellant he would give him an opportunity to show cause why he should not be held in direct contempt of court.
Appellant responded by requesting that he be allowed to consult with counsel. He was permitted to call counsel, but he was placed in the temporary custody of the Sheriff and ordered not to leave the courthouse.
At the beginning of a rather short and informal hearing on the application for post-conviction relief, Judge Cannon summarily overruled the disputed Motion to Disqualify, apparently believing it to be patently in error — and contemptuous. The contempt proceeding was then resumed, with counsel appearing with appellant Gilbert.
Appellant made the following contentions, all of which are also raised on appeal: First, it was argued that the matter could not properly be considered as direct contempt; second, that the Motion was not wilfully contemptuous but only stated certain inferences he had drawn from documentary evidence after denial of his request for a pre-trial conference to ascertain the truth or falsity of the suspect assertions; third, that Judge Cannon should disqualify himself from presiding further and have the case referred to another judge; fourth, that he be formally arraigned and provided a jury trial; and lastly, that he be permitted to call witnesses in his behalf.
All these remarks and contentions were rejected. After permitting appellant opportunities to explain the Motion to Disqualify if he so desired, Judge Cannon stated the Motion was contemptuous on its face and ruled Gilbert in direct contempt of court, and in contempt of all the judges of the Seventh Judicial District and the entire judicial system. He was sentenced to serve six (6) months in the County Jail and fined three thousand dollars ($3,000).
Gilbert's request that bond be set pending appeal was denied; later, Judge Cannon set a bond hearing for the following Monday, January 14,1980, at 10:00 a. m. The judge further denied requests for bond pending that hearing, and directed the Sheriff to take the appellant into custody. Later that day, this Court released the appellant on bond, pending his appeal.
Thereafter, appellant filed a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Order of Contempt or Alternatively a Motion for New Trial. After a somewhat unusual hearing on January 17, 1980, this Motion was overruled by Judge Cannon. From these orders, Gilbert appeals.
Since there is no evidence that appellant's outward behavior was disorderly or insolent at the hearing, or that he obstructed any on-going judicial proceedings, this Court's decision must focus on the legal significance to be attached to appellant's preparing, filing and presenting the Motion to Disqualify, the relevant portion of which reads as follows:
Episode 5. After the undersigned counsel's discovery of the results of the 'demurrer' conclave referred to under Episode 4, supra, the undersigned sent to each District Judge in Oklahoma County a letter-brief (Appendix E hereto) which detailed the substantive error in the participating judges' 'demurrers', and the procedural error of the 'secret conclave' approach to justice.
The letter-memorandum of April 21, 1979, was replete with extensive legal arguments and research, bore significant fruit in that a number of the Oklahoma County Judges later viewed their Lamb petitioners' pleadings as being essentially proper and acceptable, and from there those Judges' Lamb cases got 'moving.' However, at a third conclave held by at least a majority of the Oklahoma County Judges, in April of 1979, they decided to retaliate personally against the undersigned attorney by filing a complaint against him with the Bar Association. See Appendix F hereto.
Actually, 'complaint' is at best a euphemism for what this majority of District Judges did, or attempted to do, to the undersigned attorney, for the 'complaint' does not contain any actual allegations or accusation of wrongdoing, at least not with such specificity that the judersigned [sic] could answer and rebut, and thereby clear himself. Instead, what these majority of Judges did was to send to the Bar Association that most craven and treacherous of accusations, the insinuation, or the innuendo, which fails to make any specific (and hence answerable) charge at all, but which instead implies some wrongdoing in such a way as to comprise a man's reputation in a way that he really can't [sic] respond, and thereby clear himself.
That any American public official would resort to such an insidious tacic [sic] is bad; that Judges would do it so absolutely unspeakable, although what more, really, should free men expect from 'government behind closed doors,' and where, true to Oklahoma County practice, the undersigned was given absolutely no notice whatsoever that his conduct was being questioned, and no opportunity whatsoever to appear, to be heard, and to confront his accusers and answer the charges (if in fact there even were any charges of misconduct, which is extremely doubtful in view of the fact that Their Honors elected to resort to innuendo rather than plain, manful, direct English). Those majority of Judges, whoever they were, can only be taken to be personally and passionately prejudiced against the undersigned attorney personally. And, since Judge Cannon was a participant in that majority, it inescapably follows that Judge Cannon himself participates and shares in that prejudice against the undersigned attorney individually.

Episode 6. On April 17,1979, Judge Cannon denied post-conviction relief to a Lamb petitioner named Scott Cheatwood, although without notice that the case was set for hearing that day. Okla.Co., Case No. 24114. The basis of the denial was that of 'sustaining a demurrer' to the sufficiency of that petitioner's pleadings, all pursuant to Episode 4, supra. See Appendix G hereto.
It is interesting to note that while Petitioner Cheatwood's 'Lamb' petition was denied on April 17, 1979, that denial was not filed until May 18, 1979 — 31 days later. What a coincidence, that the time for appealing a post-conviction denial is 30 days. Thus, by the clever but corrupt expedient of keeping his denial of relief to Petitioner Cheatwood secret for 31 days, Judge Cannon sought to insulate his denial of relief in Cheatwood from appellate scrutiny, which is another way of saying that Judge Cannon was personally aware that his denial of the Cheatwood 'Lamb' petition was illegal. That is bad enough; but to resort to the tactic employed by Judge Cannon to preclude Cheatwood's appeal goes beyond mere prejudice; it was instead oppression in office, tinged with judicial malice.
In one of five assignments of error, the appellant maintains that if his conduct constituted direct or indirect contempt, he was denied certain guaranteed procedural rights. Obviously, if his conduct amounted to indirect contempt, appellant was entitled to a number of procedural rights that were denied him, such as a written accusation of the charges and a jury trial. See, Art. II, § 25, Oklahoma Constitution, and 21 O.S. 1981, § 567. Furthermore, he contends that direct contempt is a crime, a misdemeanor, under previous rulings of this Court, citing Roselle v. State, 503 P.2d 1293, 1294-5 (Okl.Cr.1972). Therefore, if he committed a direct contempt, a misdemean- or, then appellant contends he was denied certain procedural rights granted every accused misdemeanant in Oklahoma, to-wit: prosecution by written information, right to trial by jury and to call witnesses on his behalf, among others.
This Court disagrees with appellant's contention that contempt should be classified as a crime or criminal prosecution under the Oklahoma Constitution. In doing so, it is worthwhile to consider the sources and nature of the contempt power in Oklahoma.
II.
SOURCES AND NATURE OF CONTEMPT IN OKLAHOMA
Historically, under the common law, contempt of court was generically defined, rather than by enumeration of specific acts that would be adjudged contemptuous. As a consequence, courts had great latitude in determining the conduct to be punished as either direct or indirect contempt. See, Ricketts, Indirect Contempt in Oklahoma, 27 Okla.L.Rev. 213 (1974); Ricketts, Direct Contempt in Oklahoma, 26 Okla.L.Rev. 359 (1973). In Oklahoma, however, the contempt power is derived from and defined by constitutional and statutory provisions.
Article II, Section 25, of the Oklahoma Constitution directs the legislature to "pass laws defining contempts and regulating the proceedings and punishment" therefor, and affords inter alia all contemnors "an opportunity to be heard" before imposition of any penalty or punishment. Pursuant to that authorization, the Oklahoma Legislature passed 21 O.S.1981, § 565 which designated three particular types of conduct as "direct contempt" and defined "indirect contempt" as wilfully disobeying or resisting lawful court process or orders. The statute reads as follows:
Contempts of court shall be divided into direct and indirect contempts. Direct contempts shall consist of disorderly or insolent behavior committed during the session of the court and in its immediate view, and presence, and of the unlawful and wilful refusal of any person to be sworn as a witness, and the refusal to answer any legal or proper question; and any breach of the peace, noise or disturbance, so near to it as to interrupt its proceedings, shall be deemed direct contempt of court, and may be summarily punished as hereinafter provided for. Indirect contempts of court shall consist of wilful disobedience of any process or order lawfully issued or made by court; resistance wilfully offered by any person to the execution of a lawful order or process of a court. 21 O.S.1981, § 565.
Although some earlier cases of both the Oklahoma Supreme Court and this Court have held that the broader common law definitions of contempt were not entirely supplanted by the statutory definitions, later decisions of both courts have conclusively determined that the statutory and constitutional provisions not only provide the court's contempt power but also supercede and exclude the broader common law constructions of contempt. See, Woody v. State ex rel. Allen, 572 P.2d 241 (Okl.Cr.1977); Smith v. State ex rel. Raburn, 536 P.2d 976 (Okl.Cr.1975); Fulreader v. State, 408 P.2d 775 (Okl.1965); Seay v. Howell, 311 P.2d 207 (Okla.1957); Best v. Evans, 297 P.2d 379 (Okl.1956).
This Court and the Oklahoma Supreme Court have not always been in harmony, however, over the true nature and proper classification of contempt as civil, criminal or sui generis. The difference is not merely of academic interest, since the classification of direct contempt as a crime (a misdemeanor), as the appellant urges herein, could require such rights as a right to jury trial, right to call and confront witnesses and right to a written accusation.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has rather consistently held that direct contempt proceedings "are neither civil nor criminal in character but are sui generis... " Fulreader v. State, 408 P.2d 775, 776-7 (Okl.1965). See, also, Bd. of Governors of Registered Dentists of Okla. v. Cryan, 638 P.2d 437 (Okl.Cr.1981); State ex rel. Young v. Woodson, 522 P.2d 1035, 1039 (Okl.1974); State ex rel. Short, Att'y. Gen. v. Owens, 125 Okl. 66, 70, 256 P. 704, 708-9 (1927). These holdings are in accord with an earlier United States Supreme Court decision that such contempts are of a criminal nature — i.e., quasi-criminal — but "they are peculiar in some respects, rightfully styled sui generis." Bessette v. Conkey, 194 U.S. 324, 24 S.Ct. 665, 48 L.Ed. 997 (1904).
This Court, in one line of cases, has classified contempt as a crime. Roselle v. State, 509 P.2d 486, 488 (Okl.Cr.1973); Roselle v. State, 503 P.2d 1293 (Okl.Cr.1972); Young v. State, 275 P.2d 358 (Okl.Cr.1954); Brown v. State, 89 Okl.Cr. 443, 209 P.2d 715 (1949); Deskins v. State, 62 Okl.Cr. 314, 71 P.2d 502 (1937); Ex parte Owens, 37 Okl.Cr. 118, 258 P. 758, 804-10 (1927). However, in another line of opinions, this Court has recognized contempt as sui generis. Roselle v. State, 503 P.2d 1293, 1296 (1972) (Brett, dissenting); Pate v. State, 429 P.2d 542, 547 (Okl.Cr.1967); Sullivan v. State, 419 P.2d 559, 560 (Okl.Cr.1966).
While the Oklahoma Constitution guarantees a trial by jury and a written accusation or information in all criminal prosecutions, a direct contemnor has no such rights unless the sentence exceeds six months in the county jail; therefore, no advantage is gained in continuing to classify contempt as a crime when, procedurally, it is treated so differently. Therefore, direct contempt proceedings are to be considered neither civil nor criminal but sui generis. All prior holdings to the contrary on this point are overruled, including the two Roselle opinions, supra.
Consequently, there is no merit in appellant's contention that he was entitled to a jury trial and written accusation on the basis that direct contempt is a crime. That assignment of error is rejected accordingly.
HI.
DID APPELLANT'S CONDUCT CONSTITUTE DIRECT CONTEMPT?
This is the dispositive question, and appellant maintains that it should be answered in the negative. Since it is settled that common-law definitions of contempt are inapplicable in Oklahoma, the correct answer turns on this Court's interpretation of that part of Title 21 O.S.1981, § 565, which defines direct contempt as, "disorderly or insolent behavior committed during the session of the court and in its immediate view, or presence...." The other provisions of the statute are not pertinent to this case.
The language used by appellant in the Motion to Disqualify is, in our opinion, unprofessional and highly disrespectful. This Court emphatically condemns its use. Nevertheless, it must be determined whether its preparation, filing and submission (of a copy) to Judge Cannon constituted direct contempt under our statutory scheme.
Appellant contends that it does not, relying primarily on this Court's opinion in Cannon v. State, 58 Okl.Cr. 451, 55 P.2d 135 (1936), where it is stated:
The filing of an affidavit of disqualification against a trial judge in a case pending or presenting the same does not come within the purview of 'disorderly or insolent behavior committed during the session of the court, and in its immediate view and presence,' and the Court is without jurisdiction to summarily punish as for a direct contempt. Cannon, at 139.
As in the case at bar, the contemnor in Cannon filed with the Court Clerk a Motion to Disqualify the judge from hearing the case, and admitted in open court that it was his Motion, but went even further and reiterated, under oath, in open court the same allegations. The Motion asserted, inter alia, that plaintiff's attorney was an "advis- or and dictator" to the judge and, therefore, the judge was "biased and prejudiced in favor of plaintiff and against the defendant."
Appellee counters first by citing the following cases for the proposition that scurrilous and disrespectful language contained in Motions to Disqualify or Petitions for Rehearing, filed and presented to the Court by a party and attorney, constitute direct contempt in the presence and view of the court: Sullivan v. State, 419 P.2d 559 (Okl.Cr.1966); State ex rel. Short, Atty. Gen. v. Owens, 125 Okl.Cr. 66, 256 P. 704 (1927); State ex rel. Short, Atty. Gen. v. Martin, 125 Okl.Cr. 51, 256 P. 667 (1927). The persuasiveness of the Owens and Martin decisions is weakened by two factors: (1) they preceded Cannon, supra, by some nine years and thus could be considered as overruled by implication, and (2) they were influenced to some extent by the now abandoned belief that "the statutory definition of direct contempt does not exclude other forms of contempt known as the common law." Owens, supra, 256 P. at 716.
As for the Sullivan decision, supra, it did not even consider the issue of whether the language in the Petition for Rehearing or Motion for New Trial was direct contempt. The sole question in Sullivan was whether the defendant was denied due process by not having "an opportunity to be heard" in his defense. Therefore, appellee's reliance on Sullivan is misplaced.
It is next argued by appellee that handing over a copy of the Motion to Judge Cannon in chambers sufficed to bring appellant's conduct within "the immediate view and presence" of the court. Therefore, Cannon could be distinguished from this case because the pleading there was filed with the Clerk who subsequently gave it to the judge, whereas, here the con-temnor directly handed a copy of the filed motion to the judge. Such reasoning, however, merely creates a distinction without any substantive difference, since in both situations the motions were filed for the purpose of having them brought before the court for consideration. Surely, a decision of this case should not hinge on whether it was the Clerk or counsel who handed Judge Cannon a copy of the filed motion.
Assuming arguendo that the contents of the motion are contemptuous, it must then be determined if the appellant's conduct in preparing, filing and presenting a copy of it occurred, as required by 21 O.S.1981, § 565, within the court's "immediate view and presence..." Generally, the use of the summary power of direct contempt is properly justified only if the judge actually witnesses the misconduct considered contemptuous. There are a few instances, however, where contempt may occur in the court's "immediate view and presence," even though the judge does not actually perceive it himself. See, Woody v. State ex rel. Allen, 572 P.2d 241 (Okl.Cr.1977); Moss v. Arnold, 63 Okl.Cr. 343, 75 P.2d 491 (1938). In those limited situations, due process would undoubtedly require that the alleged contemnor be permitted to call witnesses to rebut the testimony on which the judge was relying but did not personally observe. But that is not the situation here.
Before adjudging Gilbert in direct contempt, Judge Cannon deemed it necessary to bring him into open court and obtain his admission that he drafted the Motion. Apparently, it was not until this subsequent examination of appellant that the judge was satisfied, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant had drafted the Motion. Hence, Gilbert's actual drafting of the instrument — which unquestionably occurred outside the presence of the Court — was crucial in the determination of contempt.
Therefore, the matter of critical importance is whether all the acts, or essential elements, constituting the alleged contempt occurred "in the immediate view and presence" of the court while in session. If only some of the elements of the total contempt occurred in the immediate presence of the court (the so-called "hybrid" situation), then there can be no finding of direct contempt. Johnson v. State, 599 P.2d 416, 418 (Okl.Cr.1979); Roselle v. State, 509 P.2d 486, 488 (Okl.Cr.1973). This test is in accord with Oklahoma's rejection of common-law definitions of contempt, as well as the well-accepted rule that statutes imposing penal sanctions should be strictly construed. See State v. Humphrey, 620 P.2d 408 (Okl.Cr.1980); State ex rel. Thompson v. Ekberg, 613 P.2d 466, 468 (Okla.1980). It is also in keeping with the trend in recent years toward viewing summary contempt with disfavor and narrowly restricting its use.
Applying this test to the case at bar, it is obvious that the Motion in question was not drafted or filed in the immediate presence of the Court. Only the delivery of a copy of the Motion occurred in the Court's view and presence. The drafting, filing and presenting of the Motion to the Court were all required before the alleged contempt was completed. Since the record reflects the delivery of the copy to Judge Cannon did not in itself cause any disruption or disorder in the court's proceedings, or that the appellant displayed any insolent behavior or insulting demeanor at the hearing, the misconduct cannot constitute direct contempt under Oklahoma's statutory and constitutional system. (Okl.Const., Art. II, § 25; and 21 O.S.1981, § 565-568). Therefore, Judge Cannon's order adjudging the defendant guilty of direct contempt must be reversed and the case remanded.
In so holding, this Court in no manner condones the use of such language in pleadings; nor does it lack sympathy for the judge's position. Undoubtedly, Judge Cannon was thoroughly exasperated by what he considered an unjustified and unprofessional attack on him and his colleagues. As any judge with trial court experience realizes, occasionally a case arises when the overzea-lousness and outright disrespect of counsel can cause righteous wrath and anger to overcome normal tolerance and equanimity. But invoking the summary power of direct contempt may not always be the correct response where no clear-cut obstruction of the administration of justice is manifest.
The United States Supreme Court, in In re Little, 404 U.S. 553, 92 S.Ct. 659, 30 L.Ed.2d 708 (1972), found that "Petitioner made statements that the court was biased and had prejudged the case and that petitioner was a political prisoner." The trial court's order recited that the court felt, ". . these remarks were very disrespectful and tended to subvert and prevent justice . that they reflected on the integrity of the Court and tended to subvert and prevent justice." (Id. at p. 554, 92 S.Ct. at p. 660.)
Nevertheless, the high court reversed, and cited Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376, 67 S.Ct. 1249, 1255, 91 L.Ed. 1546 (1947) that the "law of contempt is not made for the protection of judges who may be sensitive . Judges are supposed to be men of fortitude, able to thrive in a hardy climate." The court also recalled the words of caution in Brown v. U. S., 356 U.S. 148, 153, 78 S.Ct. 622, 626, 2 L.Ed.2d 589 (1958), that trial courts "must be on guard against confusing offenses to their sensibilities with obstruction to the administration of justice."
It is the argument of the appellee, and the view of the dissenting Judge herein, that a restrictive reading of the summary contempt power will undermine the respect and dignity needed to ensure solemnity of judicial proceedings. We disagree. As one authority stated, "Where nothing more than disrespect or discourtesy is involved . . the dangers of abuse of contempt power may outweigh the benefits of using that power." Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 Cornell L.Rev. 183, 208 (1971). In addition, one empirical study has shown that the summary contempt power plays little, if any, part in deterring attorney misbehavior. N. Dorsen L. Friedman, DISORDER IN THE COURT, 232-238 (1973).
With respect to the lessening of the dignity of the court, Max Radin wrote: "Judicial dignity is an important element of our system and serves a real legal function." But, he further noted, "It is, however, not a legal duty to be well mannered and it may even be said that it would be unconstitutional to make it one.... there is no reason why the dignity of the court should take such dimensions or assume such a character that it demands awe or veneration. There is no crimen laesae majestatis in the United States...." (quoted in Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, supra, p. 208, footnote 90.)
IV.
PROCEEDINGS ON REMAND
Our decision does not necessarily preclude some other action against the appellant for the use of such language in the pleadings. Certainly, professional discipline for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility is a distinct possibility. In addition, the trial court may wish to consider whether indirect contempt proceedings are a legal possibility. In that connection, however, the pertinent language of 21 O.S.1981, § 565, does not seem to apply:
. Indirect contempts of court shall consist of wilful disobedience of any process or order lawfully issued or made by court; resistance wilfully offered by any person to the execution of a lawful order or process of court.
In view of the abrogation of common-law definitions of contempt in Oklahoma, heretofore referred to, it would be virtually impossible to apply these provisions to the facts of this case, unless — by properly issued court order — the trial court has promulgated a court rule(s) prohibiting the filing of instruments containing insulting, disrespectful or contemptuous language. A number of trial courts, as well as this Court (Rule 3.7), have adopted such rules which are binding on attorneys or other persons filing pleadings before them. Accordingly, if the trial court has such a rule, it will have thirty (30) days to determine if appellant wilfully violated such rule and to institute indirect contempt proceedings thereunder; if not, then the case is ordered dismissed at the end of that period.
Appellant's conviction for Direct Contempt of Court is hereby REVERSED AND REMANDED, to be disposed of in a manner not inconsistent with the above statement.
The Honorable HEZ J. BUSSEY filed his disqualification in the above styled and numbered matter, and the Honorable GORDON R. MELSON, District Judge of the Twenty-Second Judicial District, was appointed to serve in his stead.
BRETT, P. J., concurs.
CORNISH, J., dissents.
. The cover letter was dated January 9, 1980, and included two copies of the Motion to Disqualify plus an extra copy and letter for Judge Parr, the Presiding Judge. The record does not reflect whether or not these copies were delivered as requested.
. Appellant and the District Attorney's office were able to finalize an agreed disposition order that was favorable to appellant's client. The record reflects the Judge's concern that the parties had already reached an agreement before appellant filed the Motion to Disqualify. We cannot say that the record supports the Judge's suspicion, since there was no final agreement until the hearing.
. "... we will observe that this Court has held that direct contempt is a crime...
*
. and therefore, we conclude that the crime of contempt is a misdemeanor."
. Art. II, § 17, of the Oklahoma Constitution provides: "No person shall be prosecuted criminally in courts of record for felony or misdemeanor otherwise than by presentment or indictment or by information.... "
. Art. II, § 20, of the Oklahoma Constitution provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury.... He shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him and have a copy thereof, and be confronted with the witnesses against him, and have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his behalf. He shall have the right to be heard by himself and counsel;
Art. II, § 19, of the Oklahoma Constitution provides that the "right of trial by jury shall be and remain inviolate" except "in criminal cases wherein punishment for the offense is by fine only, not exceeding One Hundred Dollars ($100.00)."
. McKee v. DeGraffenreid, 33 Okl. 136, 124 P. 303 (1912); State ex rel. Short, Att'y. Gen. v. Owens, 125 Okl. 66, 256 P. 704 (1927).
. Hosmer v. State, 24 Okl.Cr. 312, 218 P. 164 (1923).
. Article II, Sections 17, 19 and 20.
. Roselle v. State, 503 P.2d 1293, 1295 (Okl.Cr.1972), and U. S. Supreme Court cases cited therein; Ex Parte Stephenson, 89 Okl.Cr. 427, 209 P.2d 515 (1949).
. See generally, R. Goldfarb, THE CONTEMPT POWER, 180-1. See also, Goldfarb, The Constitution and Contempt of Court, 61 Mich.L.Rev. 283 at 296. ("The contempt power is an extraordinary remedy, an exception to our tradition of fair and complete hearings. Its use should be carefully restricted....") Accord, Fisher v. Pace, 336 U.S. 155, 167, 69 S.Ct. 425, 430, 93 L.Ed.2d 569 (1949) (Murphy, J., dissenting). See also, Farese v. United States, 209 F.2d 312, 315 (1st Cir. 1954) ("The grant of summary contempt power . is to be grudgingly construed so that the instances where there is no right to a jury trial will be narrowly restricted to the bedrock cases where the concession of drastic power to the courts is necessary to enable them to preserve . authority . . order . decorum . "); United States ex rel. Robson, v. Oliver, 470 F.2d 10, 13 (7th Cir. 1972) (where the court indicated that trend has been to limit the summary contempt power vested in courts to the least possible power adequate to prevent actual obstructions of justice.)
. The authority for adoption of such rules is set out in Rule 8, Rules on Administration of Courts, Title 20, O.S.1981, ch. 1, App. 2.