Case Name: Susan JONES, a/k/a Janice Jones, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1984-11-28
Citations: 459 So. 2d 1151
Docket Number: No. AW-148
Parties: Susan JONES, a/k/a Janice Jones, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: BOOTH and WENTWORTH, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 459
Pages: 1151–1154

Head Matter:
Susan JONES, a/k/a Janice Jones, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. AW-148.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Nov. 28, 1984.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 18, 1984.
Michael E. Allen, Public Defender, Michael J. Minerva, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., John W. Tiede-mann, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Appellant seeks review of a sentence imposed, after a guilty plea, for the offense of felony petit theft. Appellant argues that her election to be sentenced pursuant to Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.701 is vitiated by the court's failure to ascertain whether she was aware that she would not be eligible for parole. We conclude that the court is not required to make such an inquiry and we therefore affirm the sentence imposed.
Appellant was charged with the commission of a felony petit theft in September 1983 and entered a guilty plea accompanied by an express election to be sentenced pursuant to the provisions of Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.701. The state recommended that the penalty imposed be in accord with the presumptive guidelines sentence, and appellant indicated that her plea had been entered in return for this recommendation. The court made an extensive inquiry into the voluntariness of appellant's plea and, after informing appellant that she was foregoing various specific constitutional rights, determined that the plea was freely entered with a "full understanding" of both the nature of the plea and its consequences.
The court also informed appellant that it was bound by neither the presumptive guidelines sentence nor the state's recommendation with regard thereto. The court did not inform appellant as to her ineligibility for parole; appellant asserts that such failure vitiates her election to be sentenced pursuant to Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.701. However, application of Rule 3.701 requires only that appellant "affirmatively selects" to be sentenced pursuant to the rule. See § 921.-001(4)(a), Florida Statutes. Such affirmative selection does not require any advisement by the court as to ineligibility for parole. See Moore v. State, 455 So.2d 535 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); also see Kiser v. State, 455 So.2d 1071 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
Unlike Moore, the present case involves a negotiated plea. It is well established that the voluntariness of a guilty plea is dependent upon an awareness of the consequences thereof.- See, e.g., Brady v. U.S., 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970). Thus, a defendant must be aware of the direct sentencing consequences which attend a plea. See State v. Green, 421 So.2d 508 (Fla.1982). However, appellant does not challenge the validity of her guilty plea, but seeks only to have her sentence vacated so that she might reconsider whether to select the application of Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.701. Furthermore, appellant's ineligibility for parole is not a consequence which directly attends the plea itself; rather, it is a consequence which attends appellant's election to be sentenced pursuant to Rule 3.701. And appellant's election to be sentenced pursuant to Rule 3.701 is not impacted by the absence of a showing that appellant was aware of her ineligibility for parole, since such election requires only an affirmative selection without any requirement that the court advise a defendant regarding parole ineligibility. See Moore, supra.
Accordingly, the sentence appealed is affirmed.
BOOTH and WENTWORTH, JJ., concur.
ERVIN, C.J., dissents with written opinion.