Case Name: Miles Avery and Another, Appellants from a Decree of the Probate Court, versus Alexander Pixley, Executor
Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
Jurisdiction: Massachusetts
Decision Date: 1808-09
Citations: 3 Tyng 459
Docket Number: 
Parties: Miles Avery and Another, Appellants from a Decree of the Probate Court, versus Alexander Pixley, Executor
Judges: 
Reporter: Massachusetts Reports
Volume: 4
Pages: 402–404

Head Matter:
Miles Avery and Another, Appellants from a Decree of the Probate Court, versus Alexander Pixley, Executor
The month within which an appeal from the Probate Court must be claimed, is a calendar month.
Of the revocation of a will.
The respondent had presented to the Probate Court in this county, for probate, an instrument purporting to be the last will and testament of William Pixley, and of which will the respondent was named executor. The judge of probate decreed in favor of the will, and from this decree the appellants appealed.
The decree was passed on the eighth day of June last, when the appellants, by parole, claimed an appeal, and on the seventh day of July following, they filed in the probate office their reasons of appeal, with a bond in due form of law to prosecute the same with effect, and afterwards gave due notice to the respondent of the reasons of appeal.
The respondent now objects to the sustaining of the appeal; because it was claimed by parole, and not in writing; * and because the reasons of appeal were not filed within [ * 461 ] the time limited by the statute of 1783, c. 46, § 4.

Opinion:
The Court
observed that the statute of 1783, c. 46, which gave the appeal from the Probate Court, did not require it to be claimed m writing, but only that it be claimed within one month after the passing of the decree; that a bond to prosecute be given and filed in the office within ten days after the claim; and that the reasons of appeal be filed within ten days after the security is given. And the Court were of opinion that the claim of an appeal need not be in writing; but it was sufficient if the reasons for appealing were filed in the office within a month after the decree; for filing the reasons was a claim of an appeal within the statute; that the reasons of appeal were not seasonably filed, if the statute contemplated a lunar month; otherwise if it intended a calendar month. But in this state, as well before as since the revolution, a month mentioned generally in any act had im'memorially been considered as a calendar month; that in the case in Norfolk county upon Draper's will, upon a probate appeal, given by this statute, the time of claiming an appeal was expressly decided by the Court to be a calendar month.
The Court also observed that the time, when extended to a calendar month, was too short, when the party aggrieved was absent, and could have no knowledge of the existence of the suit in the Probate Court until after the passing of the decree; and they expressed a wish that a provision was made, granting, in such cases, a longer time for claiming the appeal. Under the provincial statute, six months, in all cases, were allowed to the party aggrieved to claim his appeal.
The appeal in this case was holden to be regularly prosecuted and pending.
Upon reading the reasons of appeal, it appeared that the appellants objected against the decree, that the instrument originally had a seal, which had been taken off, and they contended that this amounted to a revocation of the will.
The respondents insisted, that this reason, if true, was insufficient, because a seal was not necessary to the execution of a will.
* The Court observed that the statute of 1783, c. 24, [*462 ] which is our statute of wills, requires that a will of lands should be in writing, signed by the testator, or by some person m his presence and by his direction; and that a seal was not required that it was, however, usual to annex a seal, and as a will might be revoked, not only by a subsequent will or codicil, or by burning or cancelling the same, but also by its being torn or obliterated by the testator, or by his direction in his presence, it might happen that a testator might tear off the seal, which he might consider as an essential part of the execution, with the express design thereby to revoke the will.
Bidwell and Whiting for the appellants.
Ives for the respondent.
Upon this point, however, they would reserve their opinion until they heard the evidence. But the appellants failing in their prooí no opinion was expressly given, and the decree was affirmed.