Case Name: Rodney Page WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1995-05-19
Citations: 655 So. 2d 1205
Docket Number: No. 94-01173
Parties: Rodney Page WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: PARKER, A.C.J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 655
Pages: 1205–1207

Head Matter:
Rodney Page WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 94-01173.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
May 19, 1995.
Thomas D. Wilson, Lakeland, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Robert J. Krauss, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

Opinion:
WHATLEY, Judge.
In this appeal brought pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), we have found no error affecting Williams' conviction; however, we strike certain conditions of Williams' probation and cei'tain costs imposed by the trial court.
First, the trial court improperly imposed five special conditions of probation without announcing these conditions at sentencing. This was error. See Nank v. State, 646 So.2d 762 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). We affirm condition three insofar as it prohibits the ownership or possession of a firearm, but strike the portion of condition three relating to weapons and destructive devices. In addition, we strike that portion of condition five relating to excessive use of intoxicants because it was not pronounced at sentencing. We also strike condition eight and condition twenty of the probation order insofar as they require Williams to pay for evaluation and treatment because the trial court did not pronounce this special condition. Furthermore, we affirm condition eighteen insofar as it prohibits the consumption and possession of illegal drugs, but we strike the part of condition eighteen relating to the consumption and possession of alcohol because this condition was not pronounced at sentencing.
Second, the trial court imposed a cost of $2 pursuant to section 943.25(13), Florida Statutes (1991). This cost is discretionary, and since the trial court did not give Williams notice of this cost at sentencing, this cost must be stricken. See Reyes v. State, 655 So.2d 111 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). Furthermore, we strike the imposition of the "cost/fine" in the amount of $33 because it was not announced at sentencing, and there was no statutory authority given for the assessment of such a cost. Reyes. On remand, the state may seek to reimpose appropriate costs in accordance with Reyes.
Third, Williams was assessed $250 in attorney's fees. However, he was not given notice of his right to contest the amount of the assessment. See Drinnon v. State, 598 So.2d 229 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). On remand, Williams shall have 30 days from the date of the mandate to file a written objection to the amount assessed. If an objection is filed with the trial court, the assessment shall be stricken, and a new assessment may be imposed in accordance with Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.720(d)(1). Bourque v. State, 595 So.2d 222 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment and sentence, but strike portions of the probation conditions and portions of the costs assessed.
PARKER, A.C.J., concurs.
ALTENBERND, J., concurs specially.