Case Name: STATE v. KINGSLEY
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1931-07-28
Citations: 137 Or. 305
Docket Number: 
Parties: STATE v. KINGSLEY
Judges: Bean, C. J., Belt and Campbell, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 137
Pages: 305–327

Head Matter:
Argued June 17;
affirmed July 28;
rehearing denied September 15,1931
STATE v. KINGSLEY
(2 P. (2d) 3, 3 P. (2d) 113)
T. J. Enright and E. E. Kelly, both of Medford (H. K. Hanna, of Medford, on the brief), for appellant.
George Godding, District Attorney, of Medford (George Neil son, Deputy District Attorney, of Med-ford, on the brief), for the State.

Opinion:
BROWN, J.
From the record, we gather the following undisputed facts:
At the time Prescott was slain he was a traffic officer of the city of Ashland, engaged in the performance of his duty by taking the defendant into custody. The testimony shows beyond peradventure that the defendant was a fugitive from justice, armed with a deadly weapon, and that he was speeding southward through the state; that when the officer saw the rapidly moving car passing through Ashland he gave chase and overtook the defendant, who finally stopped, and, when informed by the officer that it was necessary to take him back to the station, resisted, drew his gun, and shot the officer dead by firing three shots into his body, killing him almost instantly. Soon, thereafter, the defendant abandoned his car and was arrested. He made what the record shows to be a free and voluntary confession that was reduced to writing and signed by him, in which he freely admitted that he slew the officer by firing three shots into his body. This written confession contained much incompetent matter, and counsel for defendant in the first instance objected to its reception as evidence, but later withdrew their objection and said:
"We would like, if Your Honor please, to have you instruct the jury that we have withdrawn our objection to it (the written confession), and that we voluntarily agree that it may be admitted to the jury."
Furthermore, the defendant, when a witness in his own behalf, related the sordid history of his life, as set down in his written confession, from childhood to the time of the commission of the crime in the case at issue. In his appeal to the jury for mercy, he painted his childhood days with unhappy surroundings, which, in all probability, had a share in shaping the career of this unfortunate young man.
The first alleged error before us for review relates to the denial by the court of the defendant's motion for change of venue. The defendant omitted to allege, as required by subdivision 5 of section 1-404, Oregon Code 1930, that his motion was hot made for the purpose of delay. But, assuming that the motion does meet this requirement, the granting of such motion ordinarily rests in the sound discretion of the court; State v. Pomeroy, 30 Or. 16 (46 P. 797); State v. Humphreys, 43 Or. 44 (70 P. 824); State v. Armstrong, 43 Or. 207 (73 P. 1022); State v. Smith, 47 Or. 485 (83 P. 865); State v. Brumfield, 104 Or. 506 (209 P. 120). Moreover, the examination of the jurors tends to show that there was little or no difficulty in filling the box with twelve unprejudiced triers of facts. As measured by the cases above cited, the court did not err in denying the motion for a change of venue.
Dr. F. G. Swenedberg, whose qualifications as a physician and surgeon were admitted by the defense, and who examined the body after the killing, testified, among other things, as to the direction taken by the leaden balls after entering the body. He testified that one of the bullets struck the officer in the arm, another in the middle of his back producing a terrific hemorrhage and severing large blood vessels within the abdominal cavity, and that the other entered the back of the neck and lodged beneath the right eye. Relating to the admissibility of this testimony, we note the following from Wharton on Homicide (3d Ed.), § 607:
"The condition of the body of the person killed with reference to the number and character of the wounds inflicted, is competent and sometimes cogent evidence in a prosecution for the killing."
There is nothing in the record tending to show that this surgeon testified to any matter that was incompetent, and his testimony was admissible under the indictment.
Nor was error committed in admitting the testimony of the chief of police of the city of Ashland to the effect that the deceased officer was in the performance of his duties at the time he was slain.
In his brief the defendant says:
"The indictment does not charge the defendant with either resisting arrest or having shot an officer when such officer was in discharge of his duty."
It is not necessary that the indictment in a homicide case allege that the deceased was an officer, or that the defendant was resisting arrest. See State v. Lockwood, 126 Or. 118 (268 P. 1016), where we held:
"Subdivision 6, section 1448, Oregon Laws, provides that the indictment is sufficient if 'the act or omission charged as the crime is clearly and distinctly set forth in ordinary and concise language, without repetition, and in such a manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended.' Finally, an indictment drawn in the language of . the statute, which defines the crime, is sufficient to meet the requirements of the Constitution and the Code." (Citing numerous local authorities.)
Counsel for the defendant assert that the reception in evidence of certain articles of clothing and the revolver that was on the person of the defendant at the time of his arrest (known to the record as Plaintiff's Exhibits 5, 6, 7 and 8) was prejudicial to him. We cannot follow counsel. The defendant himself, upon the witness stand, testified as to his ownership and disposition of these exhibits; and, in view of this fact, it is unnecessary to discuss the admissibility thereof. But, in any event, the clothing worn by the person killed or by the accused may be introduced in evidence in a prosecution for the killing, whenever it may in any way aid in explaining or determining any disputed question in connection therewith. Wharton on Homicide (3d Ed.), § 610.
The defendant assigns error of the court in permitting Deputy District Attorney Neilson, in his opening argument on behalf of the state, to refer to the defendant as being "as cold-blooded as a rattlesnake", and to call him a "cold-blooded murderer"; and further, in allowing him to state, in an attempt to explain his use of the foregoing language: "I have a personal hatred against this man." This is not the language that usually characterizes a quasi-judicial officer, particularly in a case where a man is on trial for his life. Personal hatred should neither impair, control, nor affect the administration of justice. However, we do not think these utterances so prejudiced the jury as to require a reversal of this case.
It is alleged that the court erred in sending to the jury room the written confession made by the defendant. This entire statement was read to the trial jury, it was commented upon by opposing counsel, and it was admitted into the record as evidence not only without objection but with the express consent of the defendant. Further, the defendant fully testified to the matter as set down in his written confession. By reason of these facts, error was not committed. In this connection, we direct attention to the ease of State v. Hatcher, 29 Or. 309 (44 P. 584), where this court held that the erroneous ruling of the trial court in admitting into the record a preliminary statement made by the accused on a criminal prosecution for homicide is cured where the defendant subsequently testifies to the same state of facts set forth therein. In support of this view, there is an abundance of authority.
Alleged error No. 6 presents the only difficult situation. By this assignment the defendant asserts that the court erred in permitting the district attorney to travel out of the record in his closing argument to the jury. In this contention we concur. But his departure from the record involved no facts tending to show the guilt of the defendant, and, for this reason, the case presents a different situation from that shown by the facts in the case of State v. Hatcher, 29 Or. 309 (44 P. 584), cited by the defendant. See, also, Tenny v. Mulvaney, 8 Or. 513; Huber v. Miller, 41 Or. 103 (68 P. 400), 54 Cent. L. Jr. 429; Marshall v. Olson, 102 Or. 502 (202 P. 736).
A person on trial for the commission of the crime of murder, however gross his crime, is entitled to a full, fair presentation of his case in all courts where it is considered. As to what constitutes proper argument of counsel in prosecuting a case of homicide, Kerr, in his valued work on the Law of Homicide, thus expresses his view, at section 305:
"The province of counsel in argument is to state to the jury the case and the facts pertaining thereto, and to sum up before them the evidence; and where the prosecuting counsel exceed this, go beyond proof relating to the ease, and the hypothesis upon which the prosecution is based, in order to create a prejudice in the minds of the jury against the defendant, and the court makes no attempt to counteract any effect which such action may have, the defendant does not receive an impartial trial, which is guaranteed to him by constitutional provision."
In 2 Thornton on Attorneys at Law, at section 712, the author treats the subject of "Conduct of Trials" by a prosecutor as follows:
"The prosecuting attorney is a quasi-judicial officer, and he and those associated with him should represent public justice exclusively, and stand indifferent as between the accused and any private interest; indeed, it has been said that it is as much the duty of prosecuting attorneys to see that the accused is not deprived of any constitutional or statutory rights, as it is to prosecute him for the crime with which he is charged. The district attorney represents the state, and the state does not seek victims — it seeks only equal and impartial justice; and the prosecutor should not press upon the jury any deductions from the evidence that are not strictly legitimate. When he exceeds this limit, and' seeks to influence them by appealing to their prejudices, he is no longer an impartial officer, but a partisan."
With relation to the same matter, Weeks on Attorneys at Law (2d Ed.), at section 282a, says:
"The prosecuting attorney is a sworn minister of justice, whose duty it is to see that the innocent are protected, as well as that the guilty are brought to punishment, and who must stand indifferent as between the accused and any private interest."
In 1 New Trial and Appellate Procedure, Spelling, at section 92, the author states that "courts look with disfavor upon assertions by counsel in argument at the trial of facts, material to the issue, but not in evidence." To like effect is 1 Thompson on Trials (2d Ed.), §968. See, also, section 966 of the same work for "Instances of Reversals," and for "A Catalogue of Prejudicial Statements" see section 976 thereof.
Now conceding, as we must, that the prosecuting attorney and his representative went beyond the fair limits of debate in closing the case for the state, does such action warrant a reversal of this cause? In the view of the writer, a determination of this question properly depends upon the strength of the case made by the prosecution. This doctrine is held by Mr. Kerr in his work on Homicide, at section 305, and it is supported by a multitude of authorities cited in note 2 thereof. That section reads:
"The criterion as to the reversal for erroneous remarks of prosecuting counsel is always the question whether such remarks or statements probably had the effect of working to the prejudice of defendant with the jury."
Concerning the same subject, we take the following from 2 Hyatt on Trials, section 1515:
"The court may disregard improper argument and affirm a just judgment on appeal. A verdict amply sustained by unobjectionable evidence should not be reversed because of an improper remark of counsel in argument, however objectionable. There is no presumption that such improper language of counsel entered into the verdict, which was amply sustained by such evidence. It cannot be said that any prejudicial effect flowed from improper argument when the verdict is obviously supported by the evidence. ' '
Continuing, at section 1516, the author writes:
"Actual prejudice is essential to authorize reversal because of improper argument. As stated in the preceding section, a righteous verdict is not disturbed on this ground. "
For further authority, see 1 Thompson on Trials (2d Ed.), § 987, 988, and 2 Michie, Homicide, p. 1795.
Were the instant case one built upon doubtful circumstances, and supported by the testimony of questionable witnesses, our conclusion must, of necessity, be a different one. But, from the strong degree of proof adduced, the writer does not believe that the journey out of the record by the district attorney prejudiced the minds of the jury in this case. The .record clearly indicates that the unfortunate defendant was convicted, not by the prosecuting attorney's excursion beyond the limits of the record but by the strong proofs adduced by the state that established his guilt. The jury had a right to believe from the evidence, and evidently did believe, that the defendant, with deliberate and premeditated malice, killed an officer who was engaged in the performance of his duty. From the defendant's confession, corroborated by ample evidence, he deliberately and maliciously shot to ldll, and did kill.
It has been asserted that to hold it error for the prosecutor to follow the defense out of the record in his closing argument to the jury will hamper the future prosecutor in the presentation of his cause. To this we answer: Every case should be tried upon the facts within the record; and the careful prosecutor will not depart therefrom. In the administration of his duties, tMs important officer is not justified in violating the rules of practice because of the breach thereof by the defendant or his representatives. His case is made on the evidence of record and the law applicable thereto; and the vindication of justice does not require or contemplate an excursion beyond the limitations of the record.
As a fitting conclusion to what we have written, we refer to the case of O'Kelly v. Territory, 1 Or. 51, decided by tMs court, nearly eighty years ago in a masterly opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Williams. It was a case of murder, and in the defense, technicalities arose. In the course of the opinion, the great jurist declared that laws were made to prevent crime, and that their enforcement by the courts was a duty as plain as it was painful. Continuing, he said:
"Time was when the unfortunate accused was dragged to trial without counsel, or a fair chance for self-defense. Then other rules prevailed, and courts tried to make technicalities the means of justice; but, when prisoners come before our courts with more privileges and presumptions in their favor than they otherwise could have, these olden rules cease with the reasons on which they rested, and criminals cannot be allowed to take refuge from the judgments of our liberal laws in the cobwebs of an antiquated practice. ' '
This case should be affirmed. It is so ordered.
Bean, C. J., Belt and Campbell, JJ., concur.
Rand, J., dissents.