Case Name: WILKS v. GREACEN et al.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1907-06-28
Citations: 105 N.Y.S. 246
Docket Number: 
Parties: WILKS v. GREACEN et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 105
Pages: 246–249

Head Matter:
(120 App. Div. 311)
WILKS v. GREACEN et al.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
June 28, 1907.)
Pleading—Bill op Pabticulabs—When Reqtjieed.
Under the rule that, where the allegations of the answer are in effect a denial of a material allegation of the complaint, it is not proper to require the defendants to give a bill of particulars which would limit their proof, where, in an action to set aside alleged fraudulent transfers of property, defendants denied fraudulent intent, and alleged that, when the transfers were made, the grantor owned realty and personalty worth .$25,000 above his indebtedness, it was improper to require a bill of par titulars specifying tlieir property; that they unnecessarily made a part of their denial an affirmative allegation that they had property not justifying the requirement.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent Dig. vol. 39, Pleading, §§ 954r-902.J
Laughlin and McLaughlin, JJ., dissenting.
Appeal from Special Term.
Action by Elizabeth A. Wilks against Rebecca Greacen and another. Defendants appeal separately from orders directing each to serve a bill of particulars. Reversed, and motion denied.
Argued before INGRAHAM, McLAUGHLIN, LAUGHLIN, CLARKE, and SCOTT, JJ.
Lyman A. Spalding, for appellants.
William W. Shaw, for respondent.

Opinion:
INGRAHAM, J.
It seems to me that the rule that, where the allegations of the answer are in effect a denial of a material allegation of the complaint, it is not proper to require the defendants to give a bill of particulars which would limit them as to their proof, applies to this case. The defendants should be at liberty to introduce any evidence that they can to disprove the main facts upon which the plaintiff bases her right to relief. That the defendants unnecessarily made a part of their denial of a material allegation of the complaint an affirmative allegation that they had property does not justify the court in requiring them to specify what property they had, and thus limit them in the proof with which they can meet the plaintiff's allegation upon which her right to relief'depends. I think the case is controlled by Barreto v. Rothschild, 93 App. Div. 211, 87 N. Y. Supp. 553. The principle is the same, and it should be followed. It does not follow, because the court has power to order a bill of particulars, that in this case that power should be exercised. If the plaintiff desires evidence as to the property of the defendants, she can obtain such evidence by any examination of the defendants before trial; but evidence to prove or disprove her allegation should not be sought by a bill of particulars.
I think the order appealed from should be reversed, with $10 costs and disbursements, and the motion denied, with $10 costs. -
CLARKE and SCOTT, JJ., concur.