Case Name: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. MICHAEL WATSON, Appellee
Court: Illinois Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 1999-09-23
Citations: 187 Ill. 2d 448
Docket Number: No. 86059
Parties: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. MICHAEL WATSON, Appellee.
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Reports, Second Series
Volume: 187
Pages: 448–460

Head Matter:
(No. 86059.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. MICHAEL WATSON, Appellee.
Opinion filed September 23, 1999.
FREEMAN, C.J., specially concurring.
RATHJE, J., dissenting.
James E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Michael T. James, State’s Attorney, of Ottawa (Joel D. Bertocchi, Solicitor General, William L. Browers and Stephen F. Potts, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Norbert J. Goetten, John X. Breslin and Gary F. Gnidovec, of the Office of the State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Ottawa, of counsel), for the People.
Robert Agostinelli, Deputy Defender, and Sherry Silvern, Assistant Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Ottawa, for appellee.

Opinion:
JUSTICE HEIPLE
delivered the opinion of the court:
Does the filing of an amended post-conviction petition restart the 90-day period in which the circuit court may dismiss a petition as frivolous or patently without merit? The answer is yes.
Defendant was convicted of first degree murder, aggravated criminal sexual assault, and aggravated kidnaping, and was sentenced to natural life plus 65 years in prison. The appellate court affirmed on direct appeal. People v. Watson, No. 3—93—0444 (1996) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). Defendant then filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief in the circuit court of La Salle County on May 31, 1996. In that petition, he sought leave to file an amended petition, which the circuit court subsequently granted. Defendant's amended petition was filed August 30, 1996. On September 5, 1996, the circuit court dismissed the petition as frivolous or patently without merit.
On appeal of the dismissal of his post-conviction petition, defendant argued that the circuit court erred in finding his petition frivolous or patently without merit. Defendant also argued that the circuit court was not authorized to dismiss the petition because it entered its ruling more than 90 days after the filing of his original petition. The appellate court agreed with this second argument, and reversed and remanded the cause to the circuit court for appointment of counsel to represent defendant on further consideration of the petition. No. 3 — 96—0886 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal and now reverse the appellate court.
Under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122—1 et seq. (West 1996)), the court in which a post-conviction petition is filed must, within 90 days of the filing, examine the petition, and, if the court determines that the petition is frivolous or patently without merit, enter an order dismissing it. 725 ILCS 5/122—2.1(a)(2) (West 1996). If the court does not dismiss the petition in this manner, it must docket the petition for further consideration and, if satisfied that the petitioner desires but has no means to procure counsel, appoint counsel. 725 ILCS 5/122—2.1(b), 122—4 (West 1996). Defendant in the instant case contends that, because the court failed to dismiss the petition within 90 days from the filing of his original petition, the court was required to docket the petition for further consideration and grant his request for appointed counsel. The State responds that the 90-day period restarted when defendant filed his amended petition. We agree with the State.
The General Assembly has authorized a court considering a post-conviction petition to allow amendments to the petition. 725 ILCS 5/122—5 (West 1996). It would be unreasonable to authorize the court to allow amendments to the petition and yet require the court to rule on the petition within the period remaining for consideration of the original petition. The unreasonableness of defendant's position is well illustrated by the instant case. After requesting and receiving leave to amend his original petition, defendant mailed the amended petition on the eighty-eighth day of the original period. Under defendant's suggestion, the circuit court would then have had only two days to consider the merits of the amended petition. Such a truncated time frame to consider the petition would be both inadequate and unfair. Such a rule could work only to the detriment of all, including both defendants and prosecutors.
Accordingly, we hold that, when a defendant who has filed an original post-conviction petition subsequently files an amended petition, the 90-day period in which the court must examine the defendant's petition and enter an order thereon is to be calculated from the filing of the amended petition. We thus reverse the judgment of the appellate court and remand this cause to the appellate court to address defendant's arguments on the merits of his petition.
Appellate court judgment reversed; cause remanded.