Case Name: STEINSON v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF CITY OF NEW YORK
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1900-03-09
Citations: 63 N.Y.S. 128
Docket Number: 
Parties: STEINSON v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF CITY OF NEW YORK.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 63
Pages: 128–142

Head Matter:
(49 App. Div. 143.)
STEINSON v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF CITY OF NEW YORK.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First. Department.
March 9, 1900.)
1. New York City Schools — Employment of Teachers — Power of City Superintendent.
Consol. Act (Laws 1882, c. 410) § 1040, provides for examination for a license to teach by the city superintendent and two inspectors of schools, and requires the license to he signed by the superintendent and the inspectors, who shall certify that they were present at the examination and concurred in the license. The by-laws of the board of education permit the city superintendent to issue a license for six months, hut no permanent license can be issued until the candidate has had six months’ experience as a teacher. Helé, that such city superintendent cannot renew a provisional license at the expiration of six months, but must refuse a further license, or, on a proper examination, grant a permanent license.
2. Same — Employment of Holder of State Certificate — Validity.
Consol. Act (Laws 1882, c. 410) § 1040, requires a teacher in New York City schools to have a license to teach issued by the city superintendent and two supervisors of the hoard of education. Laws 1864, c. 555, § 15, makes a certificate from the state superintendent of public instruction conclusive evidence that the person to whom it is granted is qualified to teach in any schools of the state. Held, that such a state certificate authorizes the employment of the holder as a teacher in the New York City schools, though he has no licence from the city superintendent, since Consol. Act, § 1022, makes the city schools subject to the general state laws.
8. Same — Appeal from Decision of City Superintendent — Conclusiveness.
Consol. Act (Laws 1882, c. 410) § 1039, provides that appeals from the decision of city superintendents may he made to the state superintendent as provided by law. Code Pub. Inst. tit. 12, § 1, provides that any person aggrieved by any decision pertaining to the public schools may appeal to the superintendent of public instruction, whose decision shall be final. Helé, that the state superintendent has jurisdiction of an appeal by a teacher holding a state certificate from the refusal of the superintendent of New York City schools to admit him as a teacher, and the determination of such appeal is conclusive.
A Same — Teachers—Compensation.
A teacher who has offered to perform his contract without being permitted to do so, and who has been improperly removed, is entitled to recover his salary.
6. Same — Public Officers.
A teacher in the employment of the board of education of the city of New York does not hold a public office, requiring him to he reinstated to a position from which he has been removed to recover his compensation, since, if his employer refuses to permit him to work, he need only offer his services from time to time, and then sue for his salary.
6. Same — Judgment—Res Judicata.
A teacher suing for his salary is not precluded by an ordeivdenying him a mandamus to compel the board of education to put him on the pay roll, where the writ was denied because it was not the proper remedy.
Van Brunt, P. J., and Ingraham, J., dissenting.
Appeal from special term.
Action by George Steinson against the board of education of the city of New York. From a judgment at special term (58 N. Y. Supp. 734) dismissing his complaint, plaintiff appeals.
Beversed.
Argued before VAN BRUNT, P. J., and BARRETT, RUMSEY, McLAUGHLIN, and INGRAHAM, JJ.
Thompkins McIlvaine, for appellant.
Theodore Connoly, for respondent.

Opinion:
RUMSEY, J.
The complaint alleges that in September, 1887, the plaintiff, then having a certificate of qualification to teach granted by the state superintendent of public instruction, was employed as a first assistant teacher in one of the common schools of the city of New York at the salary of $1,728 a year, payable monthly; that he had never been removed; that the defendant had refused to pay his salary since the 12th of March, 1890, although he had demanded payment; that his claim for his salary had been duly presented to the comptroller of the city of New York; and that he had brought this action to recover his salary from the 12th of March, 1890, up to the time of the commencement of the action. The defense substantially was that on the 9th of October, 1886, the plaintiff received a provisional license to teach for six months from the city superintendent of schools; that in September, 1887, he had been appointed a teacher, as alleged in the complaint, but that such appointment was not for any fixed time, but remained and continued in force, by renewals of said provisional license for periods of six months each, until the 12th day of March, 1890, when the provisional license expired; that it was not then renewed and extended, and that thereupon the employment of the plaintiff under such appointment terminated; that the action of the city superintendent of schools in refusing to renew his license was a final determination of the matter, and is a bar to this action; and that, further, his rights had been adjudicated in a proceeding brought by the plaintiff as relator to compel the board of education of the city of New York to pay his salary, in which proceeding his demand was denied.
The defendant claims that, as a condition precedent to a valid employment in the schools of the city, plaintiff must have had a license from the city superintendent. The statute provides that an examination for such a license must be conducted by the city superintendent, or such one of his assistants as he may designate, in the presence of at least two inspectors of public schools, who shall be designated for the purpose by the by-laws of the board of education; and it further provides that the license granted after such examination must be signed by the city superintendent and by at least two inspectors designated for that purpose, who shall certify that they were present at the examination and concur in granting the license. The by-laws permit the city superintendent to issue two kinds of licenses, — one called a "provisional license," good for six months, and another called a "permanent license"; and they provide that no permanent license shall be issued until the candidate shall have had six months' experience as a teacher in one of the common schools of the city. The power given to the city superintendent, therefore,'is strictly prescribed by these by-laws, as they are limited by section 1040 of the consolidation act. He may issue a provisional license, good for six months, which must be signed also by the two inspectors. He can issue a permanent license, to be signed in the same way. No power is given to him to renew a provisional license from time to time, or to issue any license whatever, except one signed by two inspectors, and after an examination as prescribed by section 1040 of the consolidation act. There is no pretense that, when the plaintiff was hired by the ward trustee, he had any such license. He had a provisional license, dated in October, 1886, and that had expired; and, though the city superintendent had assumed to renew it, his renewal was invalid for two reasons: In the first place, the statute -gave him no authority to renew a provisional license; and, in the second place, every license, to be valid, must be signed by two inspectors, as well as by himself, and it is testified explicitly in this case that they had not only not signed it, but knew nothing about it. Not only is no power given to the city superintendent to renew these provisional licenses from time to time, but there is every reason why this power should not be lodged in him. The power of removal of a teacher is expressly vested in the ward trustees or the board of education, and the city superintendent has no power whatever in the premises except to make recommendations to the board of education. Consol. Act, § 1038-1042. If a license from the city superintendent were a necessary qualification to teach, and the city superintendent was vested with the power of granting provisional licenses from time to time, and renewing them if he saw fit, the result would be that the teachers would hold their positions purely at the will of the city superintendent, who might oust them by refusing to appoint them after any term of six months had expired. No such power is vested in him. He may undoubtedly grant a provisional license for six months, but at the end of that time he is bound to refuse a further license, or, upon proper examination, to grant a permanent license.
But, although the plaintiff had no city license at the time the city employment began, yet his employment was, in our judgment, valid. He did have a certificate from the state superintendent of public instruction, which by the statute is "conclusive evidence that the person to whom it was granted is qualified by moral character, learning and ability to teach in any school of the state." Laws 1864, c. 555, tit. 1, § 15. That certificate was sufficient to authorize the board of ward trustees to employ him as a teacher, if they saw fit to do so. The schools of the city are subject to the general statutes of the state (Consol. Act, § 1022); and, in the absence of some statutory authority, the city officials have no power to limit the effect of the certificate granted by the state superintendent. When one bearing that certificate presents himself to the board of ward trustees, they alone have the power to employ him (section 1035, subd. 2); and they are at liberty to employ him, if they see fit. It is not intended to say that they are compelled to employ him because he has such a certificate. They may, of course, apply such tests as they wish, and examine him as they see fit; but, if he has such a certificate, the ward trustees have the right to hire him without his securing any other certificate, and such a hiring is good and binding, being within their power to make. The power given to the board of education to issue licenses does not authorize it, in our judgment, to limit the effect given by the statute to the certificate of the state superintendent. The power has the full effect which ought to be given to it, if it is construed to authorize them to grant licenses to persons who have no certificate from the state superintendent of ptiblic instruction, in analogy to the like power given to the school commissioners of the several counties of the state. Laws 1864, c. 555, tit. 2, § 13, subd. 5. It is well known that certificates are granted by the state superintendent only after the strictest examination, and there is every reason why such a certificate should afford the holder of it ample evidence that he is qualified to teach in the common schools, as the law prescribes that it shall.
The fact, therefore, that the so-called "provisional license" expired in March, 1890, had no effect whatever on the status of the plaintiff as a teacher, or upon his contract with the ward trustees. Not only is this so in principle, but it has been so adjudicated by the state superintendent of public instruction. It appears that when the plaintiff presented himself to teach after the 12th of March, 1890, the principal of the school where he was. employed refused to admit him in compliance with the direction of the city superintendent, and from that action he took an appeal to the state superintendent of public instruction, which is set forth at length in the case. That was done in accordance with the express provisions of section 1039 of the consolidation act., which provides that appeals from the acts and decisions of the city superintendent may be made to the state superintendent in the same manner and with the like effect as in cases now provided by law. By the Code of Public Instruction (title 12, § 1) it is provided that:
"Any person considering himself aggrieved in consequence of any decision made by any official act or decision concerning any other matter under this act, or any act pertaining to public schools, may appeal to the superintendent of public instruction, who is hereby authorized and required to examine and decide the same; and his decision shall be final and conclusive, and not subject to question or review in any place or court whatever."
Whenever ahy act has been done as a result of which it is claimed that a teacher has been dismissed from his employment, an appeal lies to the state superintendent. People v. Eckler, 19 Hun, 609. The state superintendent, therefore, had jurisdiction of this appeal, and his determination is final and conclusive. That determination was set forth in the record, and it is to the effect that, although the provisional license was stated to have expired on the 12th of March, 1890, the relator was qualified, by reason of his holding a certificate from the state superintendent, to teach in the common schools, and that he could not be removed by the act of the city superintendent in refusing to renew his provisional license. So far as the city superintendent was concerned, whatever was done had no effect on the status of the plaintiff when he had been employed by the ward trustees. It appears affirmatively that the plaintiff was not removed in any other way. The ward trustees, by a resolution passed, on the 13th of January, 1890, undertook to transfer him from his position of permanent assistant to that of additional teacher, at the same salary which he had before. From that resolution the plaintiff, as he was permitted to do by section 1038 of the consolidation act, appealed to the board of education, and the appeal was sustained by a resolution of the board on the 15th of March, 1890. After that resolution had been passed, the plaintiff remained in his position of permanent assistant at the same salary. It is conceded that he made efforts to perform his part of the contract to teach, but was not permitted to do so; and, when that was made to appear, coupled with the fact that he had not been properly removed, he became entitled to recover his wages. Gillis v. Space, 63 Barb. 177.
But it is said that he occupied a public office, and that, as there was no attempt to remove him which was so far successful that he could not perform the duties which he was hired to perform, he is therefore not entitled to recover until he has been reinstated. The answer to that is quite plain. The plaintiff did not hold a public office. He was a mere employé of the ward trustees, selected by them and removable by them, if for any reason they saw fit to remove him and the board of education concurred. It is hardly necessary to examine into the correctness of this statement, for it has already been adjudicated that a teacher in the employ of a board of education does not hold a public office, but is simply an employé of the board. People v. Board of Education, 3 Hun, 177-179. A school teacher in the common schools of this city occupies no different position than does a teacher in the common schools of the state. The only distinction is that such teachers are hired for a specified time, and, if the contract is not renewed, the employment ceases. In this city it does not seem that they are hired for a fixed time, but they can be removed at any time by the action of the proper authorities, which action is a pure exercise of the discretion vested in them in this regard by the statute. 3 Hun, 177. It would be a strange doctrine, indeed, if it were to be held that every person employed to teach was an incumbent of a public office. He receives no commission. He has no certificate of appointment. He takes no oath of office. He has no public duty to perform, and his position does not in any way resemble the position of one upon whom a public office has been conferred. He is hired. He has precisely the same rights as any one has under his contract of employment; and that is, as stated in the case of Gillis v. Space, supra, if his employer refuses to permit- him to work, he need only offer his services from time to time, and then sue for his salary. This imposed no hardship upon the city, because, if it was not thought best to continue his employment, he could have been removed at any time by the ward trustees of the board of education (Consol. Act, § 1038, 1042); and their action in that behalf is not subject to review (People v. Board of Education, 3 Hun, 177).
The defendant sets up as a defense the final order of this court denying plaintiff's motion for a peremptory writ of mandamus to the board of education to put him on the pay roll. That an application of that nature was made and denied is conceded, but that denial had no effect whatever as to the right of the plaintiff to recover his salary. It simply held that a writ of mandamus was not the proper remedy, and it was so stated in the opinion of the court. People v. Board of Education, 60 Hun, 486, 15 N. Y. Supp. 308. The court held his claim was nothing more than a mere common-law demand, and that "it was quite a novelty to seek to collect a debt by the writ applied for," and for that reason alone his application was denied. New proceedings were subsequently begun, and the court denied them simply on the ground of loches, as appears by the report of the case in 20 App. Div. 452, 46 N. Y. Supp. 782. Nothing that was said by the court of appeals, affirming these determinations of this court, tends in any way to show that the denial of the writ of mandamus had any effect upon the right of the plaintiff to maintain this action.
The answer contains a plea of the statute of limitations as to so much of the claim as accrued before the 6th of July, 1896, which seems to have been the time of the commencement of this action. What may be the effect of that defense, and to what extent, if at all, it is available to the defendant, was not considered by the court below, and no facts are presented to enable us to consider it. In reversing this judgment, as we must, we do not pass upon the plea of the statute of limitations, or suggest what effect that may have.
Judgment reversed, with costs to the appellant to abide the event of the new trial hereby granted. All concur, except VAN BRUNT, P. J., and INGRAHAM, J., who dissent.