Case Name: Bonnie J. DYE Appellant v. H. Harold GAINEY, Respondent
Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1995-10-16
Citations: 320 S.C. 65
Docket Number: 2397
Parties: Bonnie J. DYE Appellant v. H. Harold GAINEY, Respondent.
Judges: Cureton, J., concurs.
Reporter: South Carolina Reports
Volume: 320
Pages: 65–72

Head Matter:
2397
Bonnie J. DYE Appellant v. H. Harold GAINEY, Respondent.
(463 S.E. (2d) 97)
Court of Appeals
David W. Keller, Jr. and S. Porter Stewart, II, both of McGowan, Keller, Eaton & Stewart, Florence, for appellant.
W. Carole Holloway, Darlington, for respondent.
Submitted Sept. 12, 1995.
Decided Oct. 16, 1995.

Opinion:
Hearn, Judge:
Bonnie J. Dye, appellant, appeals an order granting respondent H. Harold Gainey's motion to dismiss three of appellant's causes of action. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
The parties in this action engaged in an illicit relationship from 1989 until December 24, 1993. Both parties were married to other people at the beginning of the relationship, though appellant divorced her husband in 1990. Despite alleged promises to the appellant, respondent never divorced his wife. In November 1990, appellant moved into a mobile home purchased by respondent. Appellant alleges respondent gave her the home unconditionally; however, respondent maintained legal title to the home. Around this same time, appellant quit her job at the manufacturing plant where respondent was her supervisor. Respondent paid all appellant's living expenses during the relationship. On December 24, 1993, at approximately 2:00 a.m., respondent came to the mobile home and demanded appellant vacate the premises by January 24, 1994. When appellant refused to do so, respondent caused eviction papers to be served on her on January 24.
Appellant sought to have a constructive trust place on the home allegedly given to her by respondent. She asserted respondent was equitably estopped from refusing to fulfill his promise to transfer title of the home to appellant. Appellant also sought monetary damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress and "prima facie tort." The trial judge granted respondent's motion to dismiss the first three causes of action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6),'SCRCP. He also granted respondent's motion to direct appellant to make a more definite statement with regards to her "prima facie tort" cause of action pursuant to Rule 12(e), SCRCP.
Appellant contends the trial judge erred when he dismissed her claims for constructive trust, equitable estoppel and intentional infliction of emotional distress for failure to state a cause of action. We reverse the trial judge's decision with respect to dismissal of the constructive trust and equitable estoppel causes of action and affirm his decision to dismiss the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.
A ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss must be based solely upon the allegations set forth on the face of the complaint. The motion cannot be sustained if facts alleged and inferences reasonably deductible therefrom would entitle the plaintiff to any relief on any theory of the case. Toussaint v. Ham, 292 S.C. 415, 357 S.E. (2d) 8 (1987). The question is whether in the light most favorable to plaintiff, and with every doubt resolved in her behalf, the complaint states any valid claim for relief. The complaint should not be dismissed merely because the court doubts the plaintiff will prevail in the action. Id.
A constructive trust will arise whenever the circumstances under which property was acquired make it inequitable that it should be retained by the one holding the legal title. Wolfe v. Wolfe, 215 S.C. 530, 56 S.E. (2d) 343 (1949); Dominick v. Rhodes, 202 S.C. 139, 24 S.E. (2d) 168 (1943); Bank of Williston v. Alderman, 106 S.C. 386, 91 S.E. 296 (1917). A constructive trust results from fraud, bad faith, abuse of confidence, or violation of a fiduciary duty which gives rise to an obligation in equity to make restitution. Fraud is an essential element, although it need not be actual fraud. Lollis v. Lollis, 291 S.C. 525, 354 S.E. (2d) 559 (1987).
The elements of an equitable estoppel as related to the party claiming the estoppel are:
(1) lack of knowledge and of the means of knowledge of the truth as to the facts in question;
(2) justifiable reliance upon the conduct of the party estopped; and
(3) the prejudicial change in position of the party claiming the estoppel.
Walton v. Walton, 282 S.C. 165, 318 S.E. (2d) 14 (1984).
In her complaint, appellant alleged a confidential relationship between respondent and herself. She further alleged respondent "engaged in bad faith and wrongful inducement, with the knowledge of and in keeping with the intent of the [respondent] to cause the [appellant] to change her position in reliance on the [respondent's] conduct, promises and representations." Appellant claims she quit her employment, and moved into a mobile home purchased by respondent as a result of respondent's promises of marriage, that the mobile home was a gift to her, and that respondent stated he would transfer the title to her. Appellant further alleged she did not seek employment for the past four years in reliance on respondent's promises, and is having a difficult time reentering the job market. Based on the aforementioned allegations and the inferences deductible therefrom, we hold appellant pled facts sufficient to state a cause of action for constructive trust and equitable estoppel.
To establish the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, or outrage, the plaintiff must establish the following:
(1) the defendant intentionally or recklessly inflicted severe emotional distress, or knew that distress would probably result from his conduct;
(2) the defendant's conduct was so extreme and outrageous that it exceeded all possible grounds of decency and was furthermore atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community;
(3) the actions of the defendant caused the plaintiff's emotional distress; and
(4) the emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff was so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.
Shupe v. Settle, 315 S.C. 510, 445 S.E. (2d) 651 (Ct. App. 1994). Even viewing the allegations of the complaint in the light most favorable to Dye, as we are required to do in this instance, we agree with the trial judge that she fails to state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Allegations of broken promises made during the course of an adulterous relationship, without more, are not sufficient to state a claim for outrage.
Accordingly, the order of the trial judge is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further development of the facts.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part; and remanded.
Cureton, J., concurs.
Goolsby, J., concurs in part and dissents in part in a separate opinion.
Because oral argument would not aid the court in resolving the issues, we decided this case without oral argument.
No written order was issued in this ease. At one point in his oral ruling from the bench, the trial judge mentioned the unclean hands doctrine. The dissent would affirm based upon the appellant's failure to raise this issue in her brief. Since a decision on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is confined to the four corners of the complaint, the trial judge erred in considering a potential defense.