Case Name: Steven KINFORD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James PINCOCK; et al., Defendants-Appellees
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2018-02-23
Citations: 713 F. App'x 654
Docket Number: No. 16-16331
Parties: Steven KINFORD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James PINCOCK; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: Before: LEAVY, FERNANDEZ, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 713
Pages: 654–655

Head Matter:
Steven KINFORD, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James PINCOCK; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 16-16331
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted February 13, 2018
Filed February 23, 2018
Steven Kinford, Pro Se
Alice Campos Mercado, Lemons, Grundy & Eisenberg, Reno, NV, for Defendant-Appellee
Before: LEAVY, FERNANDEZ, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Nevada state prisoner Steven Kinford appeals pro se from the district court's judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state claims relating to his medical treatment. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Serra v. Lappin, 600 F.3d 1191, 1195 (9th Cir. 2010). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Kinford's medical deliberate indifference claim and medical malpractice claim because they were barred by the statute of limitations. See NRS 11.190(4)(e); Rosales-Martinez v. Palmer, 753 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2014) (explaining that forum state's personal injury statute of limitations applies to § 1983 claims and Nevada's relevant statute of limitations is two years); Libby v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 39, 325 P.3d 1276, 1279-80 (2014) (Nevada law "requires a plaintiff to satisfy both the one-year discovery rule and the three-year limitations period" for medical malpractice claims under NRS 41A.097(2)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Kinford's complaint without leave to amend because amendment would be futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that dismissal without leave to amend is proper when amendment would be futile).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Kinford's motions to appoint counsel because Kinford did not demonstrate exceptional circumstances. See Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991) (setting forth standard of review and requirements for appointment of counsel).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening briefs, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.