Case Name: The Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore Rail Road Company, vs. Zepheniah Bayless
Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland
Jurisdiction: Maryland
Decision Date: 1844-12
Citations: 2 Gill 355
Docket Number: 
Parties: The Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore Rail Road Company, vs. Zepheniah Bayless.
Judges: 
Reporter: Reports of cases argued and determined in the Court of Appeals of Maryland
Volume: 2
Pages: 355–359

Head Matter:
The Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore Rail Road Company, vs. Zepheniah Bayless.
Dec. 1844.
By the act of 1831, eh. 288, the Baltimore and Port Deposite R. R. Co. was chartered, to construct a rail road from B. to P. D. By the act of same year, ch. 296, the Delaware and Maryland R. R. Co. was also chartered, to construct a road from some point at the Delaware and Maryland line to P. D. By the act of 1835, ch. 293, the D. and M. Co, was united to the Wilmington and Susquehanna R. R. Co., a company chartered by Delaware under that name. By the act of 1837, ch. 30, the first named company was united with the W. <y S. R. R. Co., under the name of the Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore R. R. Co. The first named company was located in Baltimore and Harford counties; and as to the second, which lies in Cecil county, Maryland, “ tho shares of the capital stock of the said company shall be deemed and considered personal estate, and shall be exempt from the imposition of any tax or burthen by the State, oxcept that portion of the permanent and fixed works of tho company, within the State of Maryland, and that any tax which shall hereafter be levied upon said section, shall not exceed the rate of any general tax, which may, at the same time, bo imposed upon similar real and pei'sonal estate, within this State, for State purposes.” Helb :
1st. That the shares and stock of the D. cj- M. R. R. Co., its works, improvements, profits, and machinery of transportation, except, &c., were exempted from all taxation or levies, whether for county or State purposes.
2nd. The permanent and fixed works of the Company remained subjects of taxation or assessment, either for county or State purposes, or for both by vii’tue of tho said exception.
3rd, The terms, “ that any tax, which shall hereafter be levied, shall not exceed,” &e., have no inference to taxes or assessments on levies for county purposes ; it relates, exclusively, to taxes laid for State purposes.
4th. The powers, &e., exemptions conferred by the act of 1835, ch. 293, as to county taxes, relate to Cecil county,
5th. A tax laid by tho commissioners of Harford, county, for county purposes, on the rails, bed of the rail road, and other property of the company, connected with its road in Harford county, and not upon tho cars of said Company, was not forbidden by the charters referred to, and is within tho general law relating to taxes.
Appeal from Harford County Court.
This was an action of trespass upon the case, brought on the 25th November 1842, by the appellee against the appellant, who declared, that whereas the defendants, on the 1st January 1842, to wit, at, &c., were indebted to the said plaintiff, as one of the collectors of taxes for Harford county, duly appointed by the board of commissioners of said county, in the sum of $125, for taxes due the plaintiff, as collector as aforesaid, and being so indebted, they, the said, &c.
The parties agreed, that their case be docketted by consent, and submitted on a statement of facts, which admitted, that the claim in this case is for taxes levied and assessed by the commissioners of Harford county, for the year 1841, for the common and ordinary county charges, and not for State purposes. That the same was levied and assessed on the rails, bed of the rail road, and other property of said defendants, connected with its rail road, and absolutely necessary for the use and enjoyment of its rail road. That the plaintiff was regularly authorised, to collect all taxes, legally assessable, on the property of defendant.
That the several acts of Assembly, which relate to the incorporation and charter, are to be regarded as part of this statement, and to save the trouble of transcribing them, either party may read them from the printed statutes, to have the same effect as if they were transcribed info this statement.
It is further agreed, that if the court shall be of opinion on the aforegoing statement, that the said property of the said defendant, is liable to be assessed for ordinary county charges, then judgment to be rendered for plaintiff, for $118 and costs. But if the court shall be of opinion, that the said property of said defendant, is not liable to assessment and taxation for ordinary county charges, but the same is exempted from such assessment and taxation under its charter, then judgment to be for defendant; either party to have the right to appeal.
The county court rendered judgment for the plaintiff below, and the defendant prosecuted this appeal.
In the Court of Appeals, the parties further admitted, that the property assessed in this case, lies in Harford county, and does not include the cars of the defendants; that the principle of valuation, adopted in making the assessment in this case, was to assess the buildings and the rails, as of the value they bore, irrespective of their being portions of the rail road, and the land as land, and not as of increased value, by reason of being used as a rail road; that the rate of county taxation, imposed by the commissioners of Harford county, in the property of said Company, varies from the rate of county taxation, imposed by the commissioners of Baltimore and Cecil counties.
The cause was argued before Dorsey, Chambers and Magruder, J.
By O. Scott, for the appellant, and
By Yellott, for the appellee.

Opinion:
Dorsey, J,,
delivered the opinion of this court.
The only question designed to be raised in the case before us, is, whether that portion of the permanent and fixed works of the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and, Baltimore Rail Road Company, lying within the limits of Harford county, is subject to the payment of county levies or taxes, as they are sometimes called. 'That they are so, in common with all other property in the county, is conceded, unless exempted therefrom, by some legislative enactment upon the subject; and such enactment it is insisted, is to be found in the latter part of the 19th section of the act of the General Assembly of Maryland, passed at December session 1831, chap, 296, entitled, "an act to incorporate the Delaware and Maryland Rail Road Company," which declares, "that the said road or roads, with all their works, improvements and profits, and all the machinery of transportation used on said road, are hereby vested in said Company, incorporated by this act, and their successors forever; and the shares of the capital stock of said Company, shall be deemed and considered personal estate, and shall he exempt from the imposition of any tax or burthen, by the States assenting to this law, except upon that portion of the permanent and fixed works of said Company, which may be within the State of Maryland; and that any tax, which shall hereafter be levied upon said section, shall not exceed the rate of any general tax, which may, at the same time, be imposed upon similar, real or personal property of this State, for State purposes." According to the true construction of this provision of the act of Assembly, we think, that by the first part of it, the shares of the capita] stock of the Company, thereby created, its works, improvements, profits, and machinery of transportation, except its permanent and fixed works, which lay within the State of Maryland, were exempted from all taxation or levies, whether for county or State purposes. And that, as far as regards the said first part of said recited provision, such permanent and fixed works which lay within the State of Maryland, remained subjects of taxation or assessment, either for county or-State purposes, or for both, in the same manner as if no such exemption had been inserted in the aet of Assembly. That as to the succeeding part of the said provision, it has no reference to taxes or assessments on levies, for county purposes; and, therefore, in no wise, impairs the rights asserted by the appellee in the present action. That it relates exclusively to taxes laid for State purposes; and is to be construed in the same manner, as if the words "for State purposes," which now stand at the end of the section, had been inserted after the words "any tax," when it would read, and that any tax, for State purposes, which shall hereafter be levied upon said section, shall not exceed the rate of any general tax, which may, at the same time, be imposed upon similar, real or personal property of this State.
But, suppose we are wrong in the construction we have given to the portion of the act of Assembly referred to, what has that to do with the question now before us. That act of Assembly, related to the Delaware and Maryland Rail Road Company; the southern terminus of which road, was at the river Susquehanna. The powers and exemptions given by its charter to that Company, as regards matters of the character of those now in controversy, apply to Cecil, not Harford county. To determine the question now before us, we must look to the act of 1831, ch. 288, entitled, "an act to incorporate the Baltimore and Port Deposite Rail Road Company not to the act of Assembly, for the incorporation of the Delaware and Maryland Rail Road Company. Under the first of these laws, you will look in vain for any such exemption, as that now claimed by the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore Rail Road Company.
The acts of Assembly of 1835, ch. 93, and 1837, ch. 30, by which the Wilmington and Susquehanna Rail Road Company, and the Delaware and Maryland Rail Road Company, and the Baltimore and Port Deposite Rail Road. Company, were united into one Company, by the name of the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore Rail Road Company, confer no such exemption.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.