Case Name: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania ex rel. Ray K. DRUM, Appellant, v. Gwenn B. DRUM
Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1979-02-08
Citations: 263 Pa. Super. 248
Docket Number: No. 513
Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania ex rel. Ray K. DRUM, Appellant, v. Gwenn B. DRUM.
Judges: Before JACOBS, President Judge, and HOFFMAN, CER-CONE, PRICE, VAN der VOORT, SPAETH and HESTER, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports
Volume: 263
Pages: 248–263

Head Matter:
397 A.2d 1192
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania ex rel. Ray K. DRUM, Appellant, v. Gwenn B. DRUM.
Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
Argued March 15, 1978.
Decided Feb. 8, 1979.
Henry O. Heiser, III, Gettysburg, for appellant.
S. M. Raffensperger, Gettysburg, for appellee.
Before JACOBS, President Judge, and HOFFMAN, CER-CONE, PRICE, VAN der VOORT, SPAETH and HESTER, JJ.

Opinion:
VAN der VOORT, Judge:
This is an appeal by a husband-father from an Order of the lower court providing limitations on his rights to visitations with his three children. The appellant contests that part of the lower court order which provided that when he had temporary custody of his children such visitations should be without the presence of the appellant's female companion.
At the time of proceedings in the lower court and argument before our Court, the appellant was still married to the appellee, the mother of the children. A divorce action brought by the appellant was pending. The children were aged thirteen, eleven and eight. In his brief to our Court, the appellant states an intention to marry the female companion whose presence was prohibited during periods of visitation.
Our scope of review in custody cases is quite broad. Commonwealth ex rel. Morales v. Morales, 222 Pa.Super. 373, 375, 294 A.2d 782, 783 (1972). While we will not nullify the fact-finding function of the hearing judge, we are not bound by deductions or inferences made by the lower court from the facts found. Commonwealth ex rel. Ulmer v. Ulmer, 231 Pa.Super. 144, 147, 331 A.2d 665, 667 (1974). In all cases, the prevailing consideration is the best interests and welfare of the children involved. Gunter v. Gunter, 240 Pa.Super. 382, 361 A.2d 307 (1976). From our thorough review of the record in the instant case, we are convinced that the lower court did not commit error in establishing the conditions upon custody about which the appealing father complains.
It is well established that a parent may not be denied custody or even visitation solely because of an involvement in a meretricious relationship. Commonwealth ex rel. Myers v. Myers, 468 Pa. 134, 360 A.2d 587 (1976); Commonwealth ex rel. Sorace v. Sorace, 236 Pa.Super. 42, 344 A.2d 553 (1975); and Fernald v. Fernald, 224 Pa.Super. 93, 302 A.2d 470 (1973). Here we are not faced with a denial of visitations by a father, but merely a condition placed upon such visitations, at the mother's request. In our review, we find particularly persuasive the following discussion in the opinion of the lower court:
"This is not the first case where such a request has been made of us and we have, on a few occasions, imposed similar conditions upon visitation. In other cases we have denied the request because we felt that the request was motivated more by resentment on the part of the mother than by concern for the welfare of the children. In the case now before us, however, we perceive the situation as being somewhat different because here the mother's concern is something which does bear considerably upon the welfare of the children. Here we have a mother concerned about how her children are going to react to visitations with their father who is still married to their mother but having a close association with another woman in the light of what they have been taught at home and in church regarding such relationships. We do not think that the courts can say with any degree of certainty that such experiences will not adversely affect the children. Even if the children tell us now that it makes no difference to them, we wonder if it is fair to rely upon the judgment of the children in such matters. It is only recently that we have begun to scratch the surface of the long-range traumatic effects upon our children of what happens to them mentally and emotionally during custody disputes and the ultimate dissolution of the marriage of their parents. One thing is certain — there is nothing in the evidence of this case or of any other that says that such relationships enhance the welfare of the children. "Moreover, it seems vital to us that the purpose of visitation for the father is to continue or to stabilize the relationship between the father and his children, and we do not think it is unreasonable for him to set aside his own romantic interests during the period of time while he is still married to the children's mother for the period of time when he has the children with him. In our interviews with the children we tried to determine whether the father's relationship with his girl friend in any way detracts from his attention to his children during their visitations with him. The oldest child was the most responsive. She indicated that her father wouldn't take her out on her last birthday because his girl friend could not be present . . . Interestingly enough, the youngest child was aware of the problem and even she knew that this was wrong .
"Under all of the circumstances of this case, we are of the opinion that the condition we have imposed upon the father's visitation with his children is not unreasonable and that their best welfare will be promoted if the condition is imposed at least until the time when the marriage between the father and mother has been legally resolved (sic)."
We find the condition imposed by the lower court to be reasonable and proper in the circumstances of this case, and further, find that it would serve the best interests of the children. Clearly, the trial court's conclusion, in that regard, is supported by ample evidence of record.
The dissent, in suggesting a remand, relies principally upon the conclusion that the appellee mother was motivated "in large part" by feelings of resentment in seeking the condition upon visitation which the lower court imposed. Curiously, the dissent goes on to state: "Not that the mother is to be blamed; quite to the contrary, it would be astonishing if she were not resentful of someone who, while purportedly her best friend, has, as she must see it, stolen her husband and destroyed her family." While the issue of the mother's motivation is essentially irrelevant to the question of what is in the best interests of the children, it should be noted that the lower court specifically found as a fact that the appellee's request was not motivated by resentment. This finding also has ample support in the record. The dissent also notes that there is no evidence to suggest that the father's female companion represents any threat to the children's welfare. This is simply not true, since the record is replete with references to the religious teachings instilled in the children by their parents, which would certainly run contrary to a situation in which their father, while married to their mother, instead keeps the company of another woman. This discussion is not meant to imply a castigation of the appellant's morals or personal life, but merely to illustrate evidence of record, indicating circumstances which would not be in the best interests of the children, and can reasonably be avoided by the condition imposed.
Affirmed.
SPAETH, J., files a dissenting opinion.
JACOBS, former President Judge and HOFFMAN, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.