Case Name: SULLIVAN v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1921-06-08
Citations: 233 S.W. 986
Docket Number: No. 6284
Parties: SULLIVAN v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 233
Pages: 986–988

Head Matter:
SULLIVAN v. STATE.
(No. 6284.)
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
June 8, 1921.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 19, 1921.)
!. Intoxicating liquors @=3216 — Indictment charging unlawful possession of liquor need not describe liquor as requiring federal tax.
Indictment charging defendant with having possession of intoxicating liquor not for medicinal, scientific, sacramental, or mechanical purposes in violation of the Dean Law, §§ 1. 2, need not describe the liquor as being.such as required a federal tax as a beverage, notwithstanding section 4, providing that the liquor. described in sections 1 and 2 should be construed to include certain named liquors and all liquors requiring a federal tax as a beverage, such statute having reference merely to matters of proof.
2. Criminal law @=>854(9) — That juror remained momentarily behind after jury had been called from its room held not ground for reversal.
That one juror remained momentarily behind in a toilet after jury had been called from its room into court held not ground for reversal, in view of showing that he rejoined other jurors within a minute without having spoken or been spoken to by any person.
3. Criminal law @=>l I66i/2(4) — Admission of evidence in defendant’s! absence reintroduced in his presence not ground for reversal.
The admission of evidence in defendant’s absence held not ground for reversal under Vernon’s Ann. Code Or. Proc. 1916, arts. 755, 756, requiring the defendant’s presence during the trial, where on discovery of defendant’s absence the proceeding was stopped until his return, and where after his return the same evidence was reintroduced in his presence.
4. Criminal law @=3475 — 'Witness experienced in handling intoxicants may testify that whis-ky in defendant’s possession was new whisky.
In prosecution for having possession of liquor in violation of the Dean Law, in which defendant claimed to have had such possession before the law went into effect, witness experienced in handling intoxicating liquor, who testified that he could tell new whisky from old whisky, was properly permitted to testify that the liquor found in defendant’s possession was new whisky.
5. Intoxicating iiquors @=>233(2) — Officers’ testimony that they had searched defendant’s premises' without finding intoxicating liquor admissible.
In prosecution for having possession of intoxicating liquor in which defendant claimed to have had possession of the liquor from a time prior to when the law forbidding the possession took effect, testimony of officers that they had. frequently searched defendant’s premises for intoxicating liquor, since the law had taken effect, without finding such liquor, held admissible to rebut such contention.
6. Criminal law @=>1036(2), 1044, 11701/2(0— Voluntary statement not responsive to question held not ground for reversal.
In prosecution for having possession of intoxicating liquor claimed to have been possessed since before the prohibition law took effect, voluntary statement of witness who had testified to searching defendant’s premises without finding such liquor that he had found a drink or two of liquor in a bottle, which the officers had not considered important, not made in response to the question asked, held not ground for reversal, where the liquor in such bottle was not relied on to convict and there was no separate objection nor motion to exclude the statement.
7. Intoxicating liquors @=3239(1) — Charge held to submit defense that defendant had had possession since before the law prohibiting possession took effect.
In prosecution for having possession of intoxicating liquor, court’s charge held sufficient to submit defense that defendant had had possession of the liquor since before the law prohibiting such possession had taken effect.
Appeal from District Court, Grayson County; Silas Hare, Judge.
Frank Sullivan was convicted of having in his possession intoxicating liquor not for medicinal, scientific, sacramental, or mechanical purposes, and he appeals.
Affirmed.
B. P. Gafford, of Sherman, for appellant.
R. H. Hamilton, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

Opinion:
. LATTIMORE,- J.
Appellant was convicted of having in his possession intoxicating liq uor, not for medicinal, scientific, sacramental, or mechanical purposes, and his punishment fixed at confinement in the penitentiary for one year.
We do not think it necessary that in the indictment the liquor which appellant was charged with possessing should have been further described as being such as required a federal tax as a beverage. The statement in section 4 of what is known as the Dean Law (Acts First and Second Called Session, 36th Legislature, c. 78) that the liquor described in sections 1 and 2 of said act should be construed to include certain named liquors, and "all liquors which require a federal tax as a beverage," has reference to matters of proof. The specific purpose of said- section 4 seems to Be to obviate the necessity for alleging any of the descriptives therein mentioned, and to make it plain that the descriptions of sections 1 and 2 may be met by proof of possessing, manufacturing, etc., the liquors described in said section 4.
We think there was no such separation of the jury during the instant trial as constitutes misconduct. Upon the state's controversy of this part of appellant's motion for new trial evidence was heard, and the facts show that at some stage of said trial, while the jury was in its room, they were called to come into court, and one of the jurors remained momentarily behind in a toilet. This juror testified that within a minute he went into the courtroom and rejoined his. fellows without having spoken to or been spoken to by any person. A deputy sheriff testified that he saw said juror come out of the jury room and rejoin the other jurors in the box, and that he spoke to no one and no one spoke to him. Injury was thus entirely negatived by the state.
During the taking of testimony the appellant absented himself from the courtroom while a witness was testifying. At once, upon the discovery by the court of his absence, the proceeding was stopped until appellant's return. It appears that while he was absent a witness identified certain jars of liquor as being that found in appellant's possession. After appellant returned the same evidence was reintroduced in his presence. The question has been fully discussed by this court before. Cason v. State, 52 Tex. Cr. R. 224, 106 S. W. 337.
A witness who testified that he had had much experience handling intoxicating liquor, and had seen "a right smart liquor" made in Georgia, and that he could tell new whisky from old whisky, was permitted over appellant's objection to state that in his judgment the liquor found in appellant's possession was new whisky. We know of no rule or authority which would exclude such testimony of a witness whose experience appeared to qualify him, even if the matter be such as to require some degree of expertness in order to enable the witness to testify. The objection would seem rather to go to the weight of the testimony than to its admissibility.
Appellant claimed that he had possessed the liquor in question from a time prior to the taking effect of the law forbidding such possession. As tending to refute his claim in this regard, the state was allowed to introduce testimony of pfficers who stated that they had frequently searched his premises for intoxicating liquor, since the taking effect of said law, and that they had found no such liquor as that charged in the instant ease. We think the effect of such testimony was to sustain the state's contention of illegal possession, and to rebut that character of possession relied upon by app'ellant. The fact that one of said witnesses stated that at the time of such search he found a drink or two of liquor in a bottle, which they did not consider to amount to anything, would not seem to be reversible error. The fact that such liquor was in said bottle was not relied on to convict, and there was no separate objection made to such testimony which appeared to be a voluntary statement of said witness, and not in response to the question asked. No motion to exclude was made by appellant, and we think no reversible error appears.
Complaint is made that the charge of the court did not affirmatively state to the jury the theory of appellant's defense on the ground of his possession of said liquor prior to the taking effect of the Dean Act, An examination of the main charge discloses the fact that said theory was subiMtted, and both affirmatively and negatively by tile trial court, in that he instructed the jury that they must believe that appellant's possession was not from a time prior to the taking effect of said law, before they could convict; and also instructed them that, if they had a reasonable doubt as to whether such possession had so extended, they should acquit.
Objection was made to certain statements of the prosecuting attorney in his argument to the jury. The record discloses that no written request was presented asking an instruction that the jury not consider such argument. This has ordinarily been held necessary unless the character of the argument be such as that injury appear probable. We do not think the argument in the instant case such as to make it reversible error in the absence of such request.
Finding no error in the record, the judgment will be affirmed.
@=>Eor other oases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and'Indexes