Case Name: EPSTEIN v. LONGSHOREMEN'S REALTY ASS'N et al.
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1925-03-02
Citations: 158 La. 672
Docket Number: No. 26960
Parties: EPSTEIN v. LONGSHOREMEN’S REALTY ASS’N et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Louisiana Reports
Volume: 158
Pages: 671–673

Head Matter:
(104 So. 612)
No. 26960.
EPSTEIN v. LONGSHOREMEN’S REALTY ASS’N et al.
(March 2, 1925.
Claim for Attorney’s Fees Discontinued by Consent May 5, 1925.)
(Syllabus by Editorial Staff.)
1. Injunction <&wkey;137(l) — Pledgee of stock cannot restrain officers from disposing of corporate assets pending receivership.
In view of Act No. 159 of 1898, § 1, par. 2,. empowering court to appoint receivers only at instance of stockholders or creditors -when officers are mismanaging business, pledgee of nonnegotiable certificate of stock is unauthorized to procure appointment of receiver, and preliminary injunction restraining officers from disposing of assets pending receivership instituted by such pledgee will be dissolved.
2. Injunction <&wkey;186(3) — Allowance (of $100 attorney’s fees for dissolving preliminary injunction held reasonable.
Allowance of $100 attorney’s fees for procuring dissolution of preliminary injunction restraining officers from disposing of assets pending receivership is reasonable.
Appeal from Oivil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Porter Parker, Judge.
Action by Charles Epstein against the Longshoremen’s Realty Association and another. From judgment dissolving a preliminary injunction, plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
Prowell & McBride, of New Orleans, for appellant.
Woodville & Woodville, of New Orleans, for appellees.

Opinion:
ROGERS, J.
Plaintiff appeals from a judgment dissolving a preliminary injunction which he obtained to restrain the defendant corporation and its officers from disposing of the corporate assets pending his application for a receivership.
In his original petition, plaintiff alleges ownership of one share of stock in the defendant corporation,, and charges various acts of mismanagement on the part of its officers and directors. By supplemental peti tion, he avers that he acquired said certificate in pledge, and that he had become the owner thereof by the failure of the pledgor to discharge the debt which it secured.
Plaintiff is a white man, and the defendant corporation was organized by and is composed of negroes. Its charter provisions declare its stock to be nonnegotiable, and limit its ownership to members of the negro race. In the rule taken by defendants to dissolve the preliminary injunction, the nonnegotiability of the stock was alleged, plaintiff's status as a stockholder was denied, and his lack of right or authority to the relief sought was averred.
On the trial of the rule, it developed, in the form of an admission of fact, that plaintiff is not the owner, but merely the pledgee, of the certificate of stock, which has a par value of $10.
Inasmuch as the remedy sought by plaintiff is conferred only upon a stockholder or creditor (Act 159 of 1898, § 1, par. 2), he has no standing to prosecute his main demand, and, the preliminary injunction being incidental thereto, was properly dissolved by the court below.
The judgment appealed from awarded $100 as attorney's fees for the dissolution of the writ. Defendants have answered the appeal, asking for an increase to $250. We think the amount allowed by the court below is reasonable and does full justice between the parties.
Judgment affirmed.
On March 80, 1925, a rehearing was granted only on the question whether an attorney's fee should be allowed — otherwise, rehearing applied for was refused.
On May 5, 1925, on the joint motion of counsel, the claim for attorney's fees was discontinued, and the decree formerly rendered in the case, eliminating the award of attorney's fees, was made the final judgment of the court.