Case Name: Charles A. Burt, App'lt, v. The Oneida Community, Limited, et al., Resp'ts
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1891-02-20
Citations: 36 N.Y. St. Rep. 765
Docket Number: 
Parties: Charles A. Burt, App’lt, v. The Oneida Community. Limited, et al., Resp'ts.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 36
Pages: 765–768

Head Matter:
Charles A. Burt, App’lt, v. The Oneida Community. Limited, et al., Resp'ts.
(Supreme Court, General Term, Fourth Department,
Filed February 20, 1891.)
■Costs—Referee’s fees—Stipulation.
Where the parties to an action have stipulated that the referee might fix his own fees without regard to the provisions of the statute, and the successful party, in reliance thereon, has paid to the referee the amount so fixed by him, he will be protected by an allowance of the sum so paid, in the absence of proof that it was excessive, unreasonable or improper.
(MabtiN) J., dissents.)
Appeal from an order of the Oneida special term sustaining a taxation of $500 for the fees of a referee. Upon the hearing before the referee a stipulation was entered in his minutes to the effect that the referee might fix his own fees; and thereafter a stipulation was signed by the parties in the following language : “ It is hereby stipulated that the referee in this action may fix the ■amount of his fees without regard to the provisions of the statute. Dated July 10,1889.” This stipulation was signed by the parties "to the action and also by their attorneys. The trial was a long •one and some 237 pages of evidence was taken by a stenographer. There is no proof indicating that the amount charged by the referee was excessive, unreasonable or improper in its extent There is proof that the sum has been paid to the referee by the successful party relying upon the stipulation made by the attorneys and by the parties.
J. & Q. Van Voorhis, for app’lt; W. G. Tracy, for resp’ts.

Opinion:
Hardin, P, J.
I think the facts presented upon the motion for taxation are such that this case is distinguishable from those cases cited in the opinion of Brother Martin. Here, in addition to the stipulation entered in the referee's minutes, there is a formal stipulation of the parties confiding the amount to be charged by the referee. The parties acted upon that stipulation; the successful party, having in mind that stipulation when the amount-of fees were stated by the referee, relied upon the stipulation and paid the same to him. It is a familiar principle that a party may waive a constitutional provision or a statutory provision in his own interest or benefit or protection. Evidently the parties intended that the referee should, in his performance of his duties as referee, be paid such sum as he deemed reasonable for his services as a referee. It is not too much to say that the referee performed the services upon the reliance of the stipulation so given. It not too much to say that the party who paid the sum to the referee after he had fixed it, relied upon the stipulation..
The facts and circumstances disclosed are such as to indicate that no public policy was violated either by the referee or by the parties. Under the circumstances disclosed I hesitate to come to a conclusion that shall disregard the action of the parties and the referee. The party who paid the fees of the referee having relied on the stipulation of his adversary, it seems to me ought to be protected by an allowance of the sum so stated, fixed and determined by the referee in accordance with the assent of the defeated party coupled with the approval of his attorney and counsel. I do not, therefore, favor a reversal of the order of the. special term.
Order affirmed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements.
Merwin, J., concurs.