Case Name: K.E., by and through her parents, K.E. and T.E., Appellant, v. INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 15, St. Francis, Minnesota, Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2011-08-03
Citations: 647 F.3d 795
Docket Number: No. 10-2176
Parties: K.E., by and through her parents, K.E. and T.E., Appellant, v. INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 15, St. Francis, Minnesota, Appellee.
Judges: Before LOKEN, ARNOLD, and BYE, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 3d Series
Volume: 647
Pages: 795–822

Head Matter:
K.E., by and through her parents, K.E. and T.E., Appellant, v. INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 15, St. Francis, Minnesota, Appellee.
No. 10-2176.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted: Dec. 14, 2010.
Filed: Aug. 3, 2011.
Margaret O’Sullivan Kane, argued, St. Paul, MN, for appellant.
Nancy Ellen Blumstein, argued, Christian Richard Shafer, on the brief, Minneapolis, MN, for appellee.
Before LOKEN, ARNOLD, and BYE, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.
K.E. is an eleven-year-old special education student who lives in Minnesota Independent School District No. 15 (the District). An administrative law judge for the Minnesota Department of Education determined that the District had denied K.E. a free appropriate public education (FAPE) within the meaning of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400-1482. After K.E. filed an action in federal district court seeking attorney fees and costs, both parties filed cross-motions for judgment on the administrative record. The district court reversed the ALJ's decision and denied KE.'s motion for fees and costs, and K.E. appealed. We affirm.
I.
K.E. attended St. Francis Elementary School in the District during all times relevant to this case. Before K.E. enrolled there as a kindergartner, Dr. Jonathan Miller, a pediatric neuropsychologist, evaluated her based on reports that she had been suffering from severe mood swings and difficulties with hyperactivity, impulsivity, and a decreased attention span. At that time, K.E. had already been diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), fetal alcohol syndrome, and disruptive behavior disorder. (She had also been given a diagnosis of bipolar disorder, but her treating physician, Dr. Gary Gronstedt, was in the process of ruling that diagnosis out.) Following his own evaluation, Dr. Miller confirmed the diagnosis of disruptive-behavior disorder, and further concluded that K.E. had nonspecific forms of cognitive disorder and mood disorder. Testing also revealed that KE.'s IQ was 82, which was low-average in range. Based on these results, Dr. Miller offered a number of recommendations for K.E., many of which were directed at aiding her performance at school.
As K.E. was completing first grade, the District conducted its own evaluation to determine whether she was eligible to receive funds for special education services.. In the resulting report, the District noted K.E. had been diagnosed as having "mood disorder and ADHD" and that her mother (Parent) had reported a diagnosis of bipolar disorder as well. The evaluation then summarized reports that Parent and KE.'s teachers had provided, all of which indicated that K.E. required assistance following directions, staying on task, and keeping organized. The reports also indicated that K.E. performed below grade level in reading, writing, and math, and testing revealed that KE.'s IQ was 78. Despite these difficulties, though, the District determined that K.E. was ineligible for special-education services because her file did not include a current DSM-IV diagnosis of a medical condition that would interfere with her academic performance or progress. Soon thereafter, Parent obtained a DSM-IV diagnosis that her daughter had ADHD, and K.E. was deemed eligible for special education services under the category "other health disabilities." Minn. R. 3525.1335 (2004). (DSM-IV is the fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.)
Upon KE.'s becoming eligible for special education services, the District, by way of an individualized education program (IEP) team — which includes the child's parent, school teachers, and those with relevant expertise — created an initial IEP for K.E. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1). This IEP established goals for K.E. in the areas of reading, writing, spelling, working independently, and social skills, and it specified various adaptations intended to assist her in those targeted areas. The next year, after K.E. had entered the third grade, the IEP team created a second IEP that included new goals for reading, spelling, and math; though it made slight changes to the goals in independent work and social skills, the adaptations remained substantially the same.
At the same time, Parent arranged for Dr. Richard Ziegler, a professor of pediatrics and neurology, to evaluate K.E. The results of this evaluation indicated that K.E. had below-average cognitive abilities, low-to-average skills in reading and math, and a significant impairment in written language. Many of these findings were consistent with the District's earlier evaluation, although Dr. Ziegler did note a significant decline in certain areas of KE.'s cognitive functioning and academic skills for which he could provide no definite explanation. Dr. Ziegler stated that K.E.'s progress should be viewed in the "context of her complex psychiatric concerns": He suggested that any "general slowing or plateauing" of her academic abilities likely resulted from "her difficulty managing her behavior and following the flow of information in the classroom," which, in turn, resulted from "psychiatric issues including mood disorder and ADHD." The doctor also noted that KE.'s medications might be affecting her performance. To address these deficits, Dr. Ziegler recommended speech and language services and additional written language services, as well as small-group instructional time or paraprofessional support in the classroom.
After the District received a copy of Dr. Ziegler's evaluation, K.E.'s IEP team met to discuss its findings and recommendations. A speech and language clinician participated in the meeting specifically to address the recommendation concerning speech and language services. After discussing Dr. Ziegler's report in its entirety, the IEP team concluded that two significant changes to the adaptations section of KE.'s IEP were appropriate: first, K.E. would have access to an educational assistant (EA) in the classroom (the record indicates no distinction between a "paraprofessional" (referred to by Dr. Ziegler) and an EA), and second, she would be allowed to take sensory breaks as needed. The IEP team determined, however, that K.E. did not need speech and language services. At the beginning of KE.'s fourth-grade year, the IEP team made additional changes. Specifically, the team set new goals in the IEP for reading, spelling, and math but made little or no change in areas of independent work or social skills.
Shortly before K.E. finished fourth grade, the District completed a comprehensive three-year reevaluation of her that resulted in an eleven-page report. In the report, the District again referred to KE.'s ADHD diagnosis, and it added that K.E., while hospitalized on an unspecified occasion, had been diagnosed with personality disorder and probable bipolar disorder. The reevaluation report included a finding that K.E.'s academic performance was low-average when compared to her peers, noting particular concern about her language-based learning abilities, and attached reports from her teachers indicated that she struggled with reading comprehension. The teachers' reports also noted that K.E. had difficulty sustaining attention, following directions, remaining quiet, working independently, completing assignments, and staying organized, and that she often acted impulsively and lacked self-control.
As part of the reevaluation process, the District conducted a "sensory profile," which concluded that K.E. had difficulty processing sensory input and regulating her behavior in school due to its increased distractions and demands; to address these difficulties, the profile recommended that K.E. be given additional sensory input throughout the day and be allowed to take movement breaks as necessary. The District also conducted a "functional behavior assessment," which identified two of KE.'s behaviors as requiring increased attention: blurting out and negative interactions with peers. Based on the assessment, the District created a behavioral intervention plan (BIP), which identified common triggers for the two targeted behaviors, as well as strategies that staff could use to reduce the likelihood that K.E. would engage in them. As a result of the reevaluation, the District changed KE.'s listed disability from "other health disabilities" to "emotional or behavioral disorders with secondary other health disabilities." The stated reason for this change was KE.'s diagnosis of personality disorder and probable bipolar disorder.
After the District completed the reevaluation report, the IEP team met to review the results and make changes to KE.'s IEP. At that time, the team rewrote some of the IEP goals with greater specificity and incorporated the newly-created BIP into the IEP by reference. The team also included a variety of new adaptations for K.E. in the IEP, including access to sensory tools, supervision by an EA during lunch and recess, reading aloud of tests, the opportunity to redo assignments and retake tests for an improved grade, and occupational therapy. It was also at this meeting that Parent informed the IEP team that K.E. had recently been evaluated by Dr. Secan Unal, a psychiatric psychologist at the Mayo Clinic, and that Dr. Unal had diagnosed K.E. with bipolar disorder with psychotic traits. K.E. continued to be treated by Dr. Unal throughout the remaining months relevant to this case.
At the beginning of KE.'s fifth-grade school year, Parent contacted the District to inquire about potential day treatment options for KE. Jacqueline Stein, the director of special sendees for the District, discussed the available options with Parent, but Ms. Stein advised that an IEP team meeting would be necessary before any changes in KE.'s placement were made. At Parent's urging, Dr. Unal then contacted the District to discuss the day-treatment issue, and she sent a follow-up letter, describing KE.'s mental illness as a "severe psychopathology [that] presents with mood and thought disturbances" and one that is "episodic . which impacts [KE.'s] cognitive functioning, emotional regulation and behavioral control." Dr. Unal also stated that it was her impression that KE. could "hardly read" and that she did not possess "appropriate skills in mathematics." Dr. Unal concluded the letter by offering a list of recommenda tions for KE.'s fifth-grade year, including a close alliance between KE.'s parents and District staff to monitor changes in KE.'s mood, close observation and guidance to avoid problems in peer relationships, paraprofessional help during the school day, close supervision to monitor KE.'s reaction to academic demands to avoid substantial mood episodes, academic instruction in small steps, additional time to complete assignments, adjustments in homework, assistance in narrowing down homework assignments and accurately translating them to her notebook, transition time for changes in activity or setting, and a method of alternative communication for K.E. to convey that she needed a break.
In late October and again in November of KE.'s fifth-grade year, the District attempted to schedule an IEP team meeting to consider the possibility of day treatment for K.E. and to discuss Dr. Unal's recommendations. Parent cancelled both of these meetings, however, and the team did not meet until January. In the meantime, Parent filed a due process complaint and request for administrative hearing with the Minnesota Department of Education. When the IEP team meeting did take place, Parent and an attorney for K.E. abruptly left following a disagreement on how the meeting would proceed. After they left, the remaining members continued the meeting; they discussed Dr. Unal's recommendations and revised KE.'s IEP to provide more specific goals in the areas of writing, independent work, and social skills and additional adaptations. The team also determined that it would be appropriate to conduct a new evaluation of K.E. to develop current assessments of functional behavior and language. The District then sent KE.'s Parent a proposed IEP, accompanying documentation, and a recording of the meeting, but Parent refused to consent to the changes or evaluation.
Shortly thereafter, prompted by what Dr. Unal described as worsening mood symptoms, K.E. was excused from school temporarily, and Dr. Unal wrote a letter to Ms. Stein providing additional information concerning K.E.'s status. In that letter, Dr. Unal stated that K.E. had suffered a recurrence of her bipolar disorder and was suffering from "pronounced racing of thoughts [and] deficits in sustaining attention," which affected her "working memory, goal directed behavior, emotional self-control, organization, and planning functions." To address these issues, Dr. Unal recommended a reduction in school hours and home-bound instruction, effective immediately, for two months. Ms. Stein immediately sent a written response to Dr. Unal, indicating that an IEP meeting would be necessary because a shortened school day would affect KE.'s academic performance. Ms. Stein invited Dr. Unal to participate in that meeting, but if she could not participate, Ms. Stein asked Dr. Unal to explain her conclusions in more detail and state whether her recommendation for a shortened school day might change if the educators who worked with K.E. had not observed an increase in her symptoms.
After sending this letter to Dr. Unal, Ms. Stein urgently scheduled an IEP team meeting; at the request of Parent and counsel for K.E., the meeting was then rescheduled. But Parent and counsel for K.E. ultimately did not attend the rescheduled meeting, and, due to their absence, Dr. Unal declined to participate via telephone. The IEP team proceeded anyway, and they discussed Dr. Unal's recommendation for a reduction in school hours and KE.'s recent behavior and academic performance. Although the team determined that a shortened school day was not appro priate for K.E. at that time, they revised the IEP to incorporate additional accommodations focused on tracking KE.'s emotional mood and providing her with a variety of sensory breaks. The social worker for the District also agreed to create additional coping strategies to assist staff when working with K.E. The District provided Parent with notes from the meeting, accompanying documentation, and a proposed IEP, but Parent did not consent to the revisions.
Dr. Unal then responded to Ms. Stein's letter and opined that Ms. Stein did not fully understand the severity of K.E.'s problems. Dr. Unal therefore proposed placing K.E. in either a day-care setting or a different school district with more resources and experience dealing with "highly disabled children." Ms. Stein soon wrote back, reiterating that the educators who worked with K.E. had not observed the same changes in mood and academic performance that served as the basis for Dr. Unal's recommendations. Ms. Stein also expressed her disappointment that Dr. Unal had failed to address her specific questions regarding the recommendation of a shortened school day, and she explained that the District could not satisfy its obligations under the IDEA "by simply acceding to a parental request or by blindly accepting another professional's conclusions and/or programming recommendations."
Parent then filed an amended due process complaint and request for administrative hearing that included additional requests for a shortened school day, transportation, and an appropriate therapeutic education. During a due process hearing that lasted nine days, the ALJ received testimony from K.E., Parent, members of the District staff, and Dr. Unal. Three expert witnesses also testified about the complexity of KE.'s mental illness and the adequacy of the District's efforts to provide for K.E.'s education. The ALJ concluded that the District had failed to comply with several procedural requirements of the IDEA, and that the District's failure to conduct appropriate evaluations, to include the results of both outside and its own evaluations in KE.'s IEPs, and to develop an appropriate IEP and BIP and revise them as necessary to address K.E.'s lack of progress, had denied her a FAPE from December of KE.'s second-grade school year until February of her fifth-grade year — the date that Parent filed the amended due process complaint. When the District appealed the ALJ's decision to the district court, the court granted the District's motion for judgment on the administrative record, concluding that the District had indeed provided K.E. with a FAPE. K.E. then filed this appeal.
II.
K.E. contends that the district court failed to apply the correct standard of review because it did not afford the level of deference to the ALJ's findings and conclusion that the IDEA requires. But K.E. does not challenge any specific finding or conclusion made by the district court as erroneous for this reason, only the court's ultimate determination that K.E. had received a FAPE. And with respect to that conclusion, KE.'s sole argument is that the decision was improper because it was "in direct contradiction [to] the opinion of the [ALJ] who heard the same evidence and is entitled to deference regarding credibility determinations and findings of fact." While we certainly agree with K.E. that the IDEA requires some limited deference, we reject her assertion that the district court failed to apply that level of deference here.
Under the IDEA, an aggrieved party may seek judicial review of a state administrative hearing decision in a federal district court. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A). The district court must then review the administrative record, hear additional evidence if requested, and "basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, . grant such relief as [it] determines is appropriate." Id. at § 1415(i)(2)(C). In deciding whether the IDEA has been violated, the district court must "independently determine whether the child [in question] has received a FAPE." CJN v. Minneapolis Pub. Schs., 323 F.3d 630, 636 (8th Cir.2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 984, 124 S.Ct. 478, 157 L.Ed.2d 375 (2003). In doing so, the court must also give "'due weight' to agency decision-making." Id. (quoting Independent Sch. Dist. No. 283 v. S.D. ex rel. J.D., 88 F.3d 556, 561 (8th Cir.1996)). This somewhat "unusual" standard of review is less deferential than the substantial-evidence standard commonly applied in federal administrative law. Dist. No. 283, 88 F.3d at 561. But we have recognized that this limited grant of deference—"due weight"—is appropriate in IDEA cases because the ALJ "had an opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses and because a [district] court should not substitute its own notions of sound educational policy for those of the school authorities that [it] review[s]." CJN, 323 F.3d at 636 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
K.E. argues that the district court failed to give due weight to the results of the administrative hearing because it "impermissibly chose between [the views] of conflicting experts" when coming to its decision that K.E. had received a FAPE. Implicit in this argument, of course, is the premise that the ALJ also "chose" between these experts when making its decision, that is, it made a credibility determination regarding the testimony offered by the expert witnesses, to which the district court failed to defer. This characterization receives no support in the record, however, given that neither the ALJ nor the district court based any of their findings on credibility determinations concerning one expert versus that of another. To the contrary, the ALJ cited approvingly in its opinion to the testimony of all three of the experts who testified at the administrative hearing, and while the district court cited to only one of these three experts in its opinion, there is nothing in the record to indicate that it found any one of them to be more or less credible than did the ALJ.
The same is true with respect to the fact witnesses who testified at the administrative hearing. Both the ALJ and the district court cited selectively throughout their respective opinions to the testimony of these individuals. But again, there is nothing in the district court's opinion to indicate that it based any of its findings on a credibility determination regarding these witnesses that differed from that of the ALJ. In fact, on the two occasions where the ALJ did make an explicit finding that a witness had testified "credibly" regarding a particular issue, the district court either did not address that issue in its opinion (because the issue had not been appealed) or it agreed with the conclusion reached by the ALJ. The ALJ never made an explicit finding that any witness had testified incredibly at the hearing, and the district court likewise gives no indication that it disbelieved any of the witnesses.
Despite K.E.'s assertions to the contrary, the district court was well aware of its limited authority, and in each instance where it disagreed with the ALJ, the court neither failed to defer to the ALJ's observations of the witnesses nor substituted its own notions of educational policy for those of trained educators. Rather, the court thoroughly reviewed the administrative record and determined that a preponderance of the evidence did not support the ALJ's conclusion. The district court did ultimately reach a different conclusion from the ALJ's as to whether the District provided K.E. with a FAPE. But that decision alone is wholly insufficient to show that the court somehow failed to apply the required level of deference. Whether a child has received a FAPE is a mixed question of law and fact. CJN, 323 F.3d at 637. Accordingly, when a district court examines this issue, it is "obligated to determine independently the legal significance of the [applicable] facts." Cf. id. at 636-37. That the district court here sided with the District means neither that it necessarily believed the testimony of the school authorities and its experts more than the ALJ did nor that the court's analysis was incorrect. Rather, it means only that the district court "reached a different conclusion based on [its own] understanding of the law." Cf. id. This was not a failure to give "due weight" to the results of the administrative hearing.
III.
K.E. also maintains that the district court erred by failing to conclude that the District committed a variety of procedural violations of the IDEA. In particular, K.E. contends that the District denied Parent a meaningful opportunity to participate in the IEP process, that it failed to consider the results of outside evaluations, and that it developed IEPs for K.E. that were deficient in many respects.
When reviewing a school district's compliance with the IDEA, a district court must engage in a two-part inquiry: It must first determine whether the school district followed the procedures set forth in the IDEA, and then it must decide whether the resulting IEP was "reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefit." Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206-07, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982). "If these requirements are met, the [school district] has complied with the obligations imposed by Congress and the courts can require no more." Id. at 207, 102 S.Ct. 3034. (Although Rowley was decided under the IDEA'S precursor (the Education of the Handicapped Act), its principles apply to IDEA decisions, see, e.g., Lathrop R-II Sch. Dist. v. Gray, 611 F.3d 419, 424 (8th Cir.2010)). As we have already said, whether a school district has provided a student with a FAPE is a mixed question of law and fact; we review the district court's ultimate determination de novo. See School Bd. of lndep. Sch. Dist. No. 11 v. Renollett, 440 F.3d 1007, 1011 (8th Cir. 2006). But a district court's findings of fact are binding unless they are clearly erroneous. Id.
To satisfy the procedural requirements of the IDEA, a "school district must follow the procedures set forth in the [statute] to formulate an IEP tailored to meet the disabled child's unique needs." Id. at 1011. Congress intended that such procedures would guarantee "parents and guardians a large measure of participation" in the IEP process and would assure that the resulting IEP included "much if not all of what Congress wished in the way of substantive content." Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206-07, 102 S.Ct. 3034. If a school district fails to comply with IDEA procedures, however, the IEPs that result from the violation are not necessarily invalid. Renollett, 440 F.3d at 1011. Rather, "[a]n IEP should be set aside only if [the] procedural inadequacies compromised the pupil's right to an appropriate education, seriously hampered the parent's opportunity to participate in the formulation process, or caused a deprivation of educational benefits." Id. (internal citation omitted).
According to K.E., the District violated IDEA procedures by denying Parent a meaningful opportunity to participate in the IEP process. In particular, she asserts that the District gave inadequate notice to Parent of certain IEP team meetings, which Parent did not attend, see 34 C.F.R. § 300.322(a)(1) and (2), and that it failed to take the necessary action to convince Parent that she should attend those meetings, see id. at § 300.322(d). K.E. also asserts that the District had already "predetermined" what educational programming would be provided to her before many IEP meetings, and that this predetermination denied Parent the opportunity to participate in the IEP process, see § 300.501(b), (c); Deal v. Hamilton County Bd. of Educ., 392 F.3d 840, 857 (6th Cir.2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 936, 126 S.Ct. 422, 163 L.Ed.2d 321 (2005). The ALJ rejected these arguments, however, and we need not reach their merits given that K.E. failed to challenge those determinations before the district court and, in fact, asked that the district court uphold the ALJ's determinations. See Schuldt v. Mankato Indep. Sch. Disk No. 77, 937 F.2d 1357, 1363 (8th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1059, 112 S.Ct. 937, 117 L.Ed.2d 108 (1992). "It is a well settled rule that issues not raised in the trial court will not be considered on appeal except in exceptional cases where the obvious result would be a plain miscarriage of justice . or would be inconsistent with substantial justice." Nolte v. Pearson, 994 F.2d 1311, 1316 (8th Cir.1993) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This is not such an exceptional case.
We similarly decline to address the merits of K.E.'s argument that the District violated her procedural rights because it failed to include assistive technology in her IEPs. The IDEA requires that a school district provide assistive technology if a child's IEP team determines that the child needs access to that technology in order to receive a FAPE. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.105; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3)(B)(v). K.E. contends that the District "never considered assistive technology" or conducted "assessments or evaluations" to determine whether such technology was appropriate, but the ALJ rejected a similar argument and K.E. did not raise the issue before the district court. Accordingly, we will not decide it as part of this appeal.
K.E. next contends that the District violated IDEA procedures by failing to consider outside evaluations when developing her IEPs. She also maintains that the District failed to meet with Parent to discuss the outside evaluations or the recommendations for KE.'s educational programming that they contained. In advancing these claims, K.E. focuses, for the most part, on the evaluation and recommendations offered by Dr. Unal. She also asserts more broadly, however, that the District failed to provide Parent with the opportunity to attend any IEP meeting at which time "all salient requests and recommendations were discussed."
Under the IDEA, an IEP team must "consider" the results of evaluations when developing an IEP. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3)(A)(iii). The district court found that the District satisfied that obligation with respect to the outside evaluations conducted by Dr.'s Miller and Ziegler, and we agree with that conclusion. In particular, we find it persuasive that the District incorporated many of the recommendations offered by Dr.'s Miller and Ziegler into K.E.'s IEPs. See G.D. v. Westmoreland Sch. Disk, 930 F.2d 942, 947 (1st Cir.1991). We also note the testi mony of K.E.'s special education teacher and case manager for third-grade, who stated that the IEP team considered "all" of Dr. Ziegler's recommendations at a March, 2007, IEP team meeting and made the "significant change" to add EA support to KE.'s IEP because "it was one of the recommendations [made] in [that] outside evaluation." KE.'s special education teacher and case manager for the fourth grade testified similarly with respect to an IEP team meeting that took place the next year, and her notes from that meeting, as well, reflect that the team had considered Dr. Ziegler's evaluation. It is true that the District did not incorporate into K.E.'s IEPs all of the recommendations that Dr.'s Miller and Ziegler offered in their respective evaluations. But the IDEA requires only that an IEP team "consider," not "incorporate," such evaluations when developing an IEP, see 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3)(A)(iii), and the record shows that the District satisfied that requirement here.
The record is equally clear that the District also considered the evaluation and recommendations of Dr. Unal. In coming to a similar conclusion, the district court relied heavily on the testimony of IEP team members, who stated that they "considered, took into account, and accommodated the reported mood and bipolar disorders " that Dr. Unal had diagnosed. Meeting notes from an IEP team meeting in February of KE.'s fifth-grade year lend further support to this testimony, as they indicate that the "agenda" for that meeting included reviewing the "request for a shortened school day" and "discussion and consideration" of the "recommendations made by Dr. Unal." The notes also contain a detailed account of the discussions that the IEP team had on those topics, and they show that the team attempted to contact Dr. Unal via telephone during the meeting in the hope that she would agree to participate in those conversations.
That Parent decided not to attend that meeting is not the District's fault. In fact, the record shows that the District attempted to schedule four different IEP team meetings — the first time in September of KE.'s fifth-grade school year and then in the months that followed — to discuss Dr. Unal's recommendations. Parent or counsel for K.E. cancelled two of these meetings, they walked out of the January meeting over a dispute about the agenda, and they decided simply not to attend the meeting in February. Parent also refused to approve two proposed IEPs that the team developed during the January and February meetings, both of which incorporated many of Dr. Unal's recommendations. Where a parent has "truncated [her] own procedural right to contribute to the development of [a child's] IEP," a school district "cannot be faulted for failing to engage in an open discussion." Blackmon v. Springfield R-XII Sch. Dist., 198 F.3d 648, 657 (8th Cir.1999). The record is clear in this case that it was Parent, not the District, who refused to participate in the IEP process, and thus any failure to engage in a more "open discussion" about Dr. Unal's evaluation and recommendations belongs with Parent, and Parent alone. See id.
Finally, K.E. argues that the District violated IDEA procedures by creating IEPs that were deficient in various respects. In so arguing, however, K.E. reasserts many of the arguments that she brought unsuccessfully before the district court. As we agree with the district court's well-reasoned disposition of these issues in all relevant respects, we undertake only a limited discussion of them.
K.E. first maintains that her IEPs were deficient because they failed to set forth her deficits in organizational skills and ex plain how they affected her academic achievement and functional performance. Under the IDEA, an IEP must include a statement of "how the child's disability affects the child's involvement and progress in the general education curriculum." 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I)(aa). KE.'s IEPs addressed her deficits in organizational skills mainly with respect to a goal designed to improve her independent work skills in the areas of "organization, time management, [and] following directions." As part of that goal, KE.'s IEPs explained that she had been diagnosed with both fetal alcohol effect and ADHD, and that those disabilities commonly cause challenges in the areas of "attention, organization, retention of skills/information, generalization, following directions, cause and effect relationships, social interactions, and the ability to refrain from impulsive behavior." The IEPs then stated that K.E. suffered "significant disability" in several of those identified areas, including retaining information day-to-day, rushing through school work, following directions, and being organized and staying on task. The IEPs added that KE.'s difficulties in those areas caused her to require "excessive staff assistance" and one-to-one "repeated directions and guidance." Sections of the IEP that discussed other goals similarly explained how KE.'s deficits in organizational skills affected her performance in other academic subjects as well, including the fact that K.E. struggled with organizing sentences and paragraphs (writing-and-spelling-skills goal) and that she had difficulty determining which steps to follow when solving math story problems (math-skills goal). All of these statements are more than sufficient to explain how KE.'s organizational deficits affected her ability to learn.
K.E. next contends that her IEPs were deficient because they failed to state annual goals intended to meet her needs and permit her to make progress in the general curriculum, and that the District failed to make IEP revisions to allow her to make that progress. Under the IDEA, an IEP must include "a statement of measurable annual goals, including academic and functional goals" that is "designed to" meet the needs resulting from the child's disability so that the child can "be involved in and make progress in the general education curriculum" and "meet each of the child's other educational needs that result from the child's disability." 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(l)(A)(i)(II). A school district also must revise an IEP as is "appropriate to address . any lack of expected progress toward the annual goals and in the general education curriculum," "the results of any reevaluation," or information about the child provided by the parents. Id. at § 1414(d)(4)(A)(ii).
K.E. argues that her annual goals violated these requirements because she made "no demonstrable progress" in the area of organizational skills. As the district court rightly noted, however, to reach that conclusion it would have to ignore completely evidence that K.E. progressed in the areas of reading, spelling, and math. Where "the record indicates that a student's behavioral problems, if unattended, might significantly curtail [her] ability to learn, the fact that [she] is learning is significant evidence that [those] behavioral problems have, at least, in part, been attended to." CJN, 323 F.3d at 642. Here, K.E.'s IEPs stated that her deficits in organizational skills significantly impeded her ability to learn, and thus her progress in other academic areas strongly suggests that the annual goals with respect to organizational skills were more than adequate to meet her needs. See id. Furthermore, the record clearly shows that the District revised KE.'s IEPs when she failed to reach those goals. For example, in the IEP prepared at the end of K.E.'s fourth-grade year, the District added two new objectives to improve KE.'s ability to use sensory tools to increase her focus and attention span, and it incorporated the use of sensory breaks as an adaptation to assist in achieving that result. The District also incorporated into that IEP the newly-created BIP, which included various additional adaptations also intended to assist K.E. with her organizational skills, including preferential seating in the classroom, checking for clarification with respect to academic tasks, and the opportunity to work in an alternative room with fewer distractions. Given these revisions, then, and the progress that K.E. was able to achieve, we do not conclude that the District provided inadequate annual goals for K.E. or that it failed to revise them as necessary.
K.E. asserts that her IEPs were deficient because they failed to provide proper adaptations to address her bipolar disorder. In particular, she contends that the District "completely disregarded this substantial health disorder" in that it developed IEPs that provided "no therapeutic services to address her mental health needs." K.E. does not specify what "therapeutic services" the IEPs failed to provide, but we note that the ALJ found that the District denied K.E. a FAPE, in part, because it did not give her necessary psychological and social work services, including monitoring her sleep patterns, her behaviors observed by Parent, changes in medication, external stressors, and responses to educational programming. Accordingly, since the district court rejected the ALJ's decision on that conclusion, we assume that those are the sorts of services to which K.E. intends to call our attention and which she contends should have been provided because of her bipolar disorder.
An IEP must set out the "special education and related services" that will be provided in order to allow the child to make progress toward the IEPs annual goals and in the general education curriculum. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(l)(A)(i)(IV). Both psychological and social work services that are needed to help a child "benefit from special education" qualify as "related services" under § 1401(26)(A). As the district court correctly noted, however, when the District developed K.E.'s IEPs it had received contradictory information about whether K.E. suffered from bipolar disorder. The District also did not yet have the benefit of Dr. Unal's testimony from the administrative hearing concerning the severity and complexity of K.E.'s mental illness and the psychological and social work services that might be necessary for the District to monitor and address it. For those reasons, while we may agree with K.E. that additional services and adaptations may well be warranted now in light of the information that Dr. Unal has provided, it would be improper for us to judge KE.'s IEPs in hindsight. See Roland M. v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983, 992 (1st Cir.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 912, 111 S.Ct. 1122, 113 L.Ed.2d 230 (1991); see also CJN, 323 F.3d at 638-39. "An IEP is a snapshot, not a retrospective," and we must "take into account what was, and was not, objectively reasonable when the snapshot was taken, that is, at the time the IEP was promulgated." Roland M., 910 F.2d at 992. Using that frame of reference, we do not conclude that KE.'s IEPs were deficient because they lacked the services and adaptations that she now contends are necessary.
K.E. further maintains that her IEPs were deficient because they failed to incorporate many of the adaptations and supports that the District implemented as part of her educational programming. In particular, K.E. contends that her IEPs failed to set forth the "extensive modifications" that her teachers used when they assigned her schoolwork and that they lacked specificity about the District's use of EA staff to assist K.E., including the frequency, location, and duration of that support. Like she did in district court, however, K.E. cites no authority for the proposition that a school district violates the IDEA if it does not set forth every detail about every adaptation that could provide a child with an educational benefit. We have held, moreover, that an IEP must provide only "sufficient specialized services" to enable a student to benefit from her education, and it need not be designed either to "maximize a student's potential or provide the best possible education at public expense." Fort Zumwalt Sch. Dist. v. Clynes, 119 F.3d 607, 612 (8th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1137, 118 S.Ct. 1840, 140 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1998); see also CJN, 323 F.3d at 638-39. Because KE.'s IEPs included specialized services that were sufficient to enable her to achieve academic progress, we conclude that they were not deficient for failing to provide additional specificity regarding the adaptations that the District did provide. See Renollett, 440 F.3d at 1011.
IV.
K.E. also argues that the district court erred by failing to conclude that the District violated the IDEA'S substantive requirement, that is, it denied her a FAPE. To provide a child with a "free appropriate public education," a school district must give her "access to specialized instruction and related services" that are "individually designed" to provide "some educational benefit." Rowley, 458 U.S. at 200-01, 102 S.Ct. 3034. Whether a child can "achieve passing marks and advance from grade to grade" are both "important factorfs]" when determining whether a school district has developed an IEP that is "reasonably calculated" to satisfy the IDEA substantive requirement. Id. at 202-04, 102 S.Ct. 3034; see also CJN, 323 F.3d at 642. But academic progress alone does not mean that a child has received a FAPE, particularly when that child suffers from a behavioral disability. See CJN, 323 F.3d at 642. Rather, we must judge each IEP on whether it is "responsive to the student's specific disabilities, whether academic or behavioral." Id.
K.E. contends that the District failed to provide her with a FAPE because she did not make "adequate progress" academically during the relevant time period. As evidence of this lack of progress, K.E. contends that she failed to meet her IEP goals with respect to writing skills and that she regressed in her ability to read. She also asserts that standardized testing revealed that she was "losing ground" academically in all areas as compared to her peers, and she argues that the District failed to provide her with adequate educational programming to enable her to overcome, or at least reduce, this widening gap.
The record, however, does not support this characterization of K.E.'s academic progress. To the contrary, as the district court explained, KE.'s progress reports between the fall of her third-grade year and the end of fourth grade, show that she made significant progress in reading, spelling, and math. For example, K.E. progressed in reading from decoding only the most basic of consonant-vowel-consonant words to decoding 5-6 letter words containing digraphs — two letters combined to form one sound ("sh" in shout) — and blends — two letters combined with each retaining a sound ("st" in stand). She also advanced in her reading fluency, improving from a second-grade reading level at 34 words per minute to a fourth-grade level at 54 words per minute. KE.'s ability to spell, as reflected in her weekly spelling tests, similarly increased, and in math, she progressed from telling time to the half-hour, reading names on coins, and performing one-digit addition and subtraction problems, to telling time to the minute, counting change up to two dollars, performing 3-digit addition and subtraction problems, and skip-counting by 2, 5, and 10. And standardized test results for K.E. showed her improvement in math, reading, and language usage, as well.
We acknowledge that K.E. did fail to meet some of her IEP goals during the relevant time period. We also recognize that K.E.'s test results do not demonstrate the level of growth that is typical for children of her grade level. But these shortcomings do not in any way negate the substantial progress that she was able to achieve, and furthermore, we have held that an IEP "need not be designed to maximize a student's potential commensurate with the opportunity provided to other children. The requirements are satisfied when a school district provides individualized education and services sufficient to provide disabled children with some educational benefit," and KE.'s academic progress clearly shows that she did receive that required level of educational benefit. M.M. ex rel. L.R. v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 512 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 452, 172 L.Ed.2d 343 (2008).
K.E. also maintains that the District denied her a FAPE because it failed adequately to address her behavioral disabilities. Under the IDEA, an IEP team must, "in the ease of a child whose behavior impedes the child's learning or that of others, consider the use of positive behavioral interventions and supports, and other strategies, to address that behavior." 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3)(B)®. And when a team fails to take this sort of action, that failure can amount to a substantive denial of the child's FAPE. See Neosho R-V Sch. Dist., 315 F.3d at 1028-29. We concluded that a substantive violation occurred in Neosho after the district court conducted an independent review and found that the IEP team failed to adopt or implement anything that would be "sufficient to amount to a cohesive behavioral management plan," and the record showed that the child made only "slight" or "de minimis academic and social progress" and that any educational benefit that the child did receive was then "lost due to [the] behavior problems that went unchecked." Id. at 1029.
These circumstances are not present in this case. For example, the District did create a "cohesive behavioral management plan" for K.E. when it conducted a functional behavioral assessment and, based on that assessment, developed the BIP. The District then adopted and implemented that plan when it incorporated the BIP into KE.'s IEPs. It is true that experts for both K.E. and the District testified at the administrative hearing that the assessment and BIP were deficient in some respects; but given that K.E. enjoyed more than what we would consider "slight" or "de minimis" academic progress, we cannot conclude that those deficiencies denied K.E. the benefit of her educational programming. Rather, we agree with the district court that "[d]espite the severity of her mental illness and the changes in her medical treatment, K.E. made progress with respect to reading, spelling, and math, received passing grades in her classes, advanced from grade to grade, and demonstrated growth on standardized tests" during the time period when the ALJ had concluded that she was denied a FAPE. And for those reasons, we reject KE.'s assertion that her behavioral problems were not sufficiently controlled and prohibited her from receiving a FAPE. See CJN, 323 F.3d at 642-43.
K.E. argues lastly that the District denied her a FAPE because it failed to provide her with EA support in the classroom as two of the IEPs required. Even though the District has never denied this, the district court concluded that this failure did not deny K.E. a FAPE because EA support was not a "significant provision of the IEP." Houston Indep. Sch. Dist. v. V.P. ex reí Juan P., 582 F.3d 576, 587 (5th Cir.2009). In so concluding, the court reasoned that "[wjhether a provision is significant is determined in part based on whether the services provided actually conferred an educational benefit." See id. Since we agree with this reasoning, and we have found that K.E.'s educational programming did provide her with an educational benefit despite the absence of EA support in the classroom during her fourth and fifth grade years, we conclude, as did the district court, that the District's failure to provide this service did not amount to a substantive denial of a FAPE.
V.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
. The Honorable Joan N. Ericksen, United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota.