Case Name: Martin Kieran KIDDER, Appellant, v. Emilio CIRELLI, Kelly E. Scofield, et al., Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2002-06-07
Citations: 821 So. 2d 1106
Docket Number: No. 5D01-3222
Parties: Martin Kieran KIDDER, Appellant, v. Emilio CIRELLI, Kelly E. Scofield, et al., Appellee.
Judges: COBB, J., concurs specially, with opinion.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 821
Pages: 1106–1112

Head Matter:
Martin Kieran KIDDER, Appellant, v. Emilio CIRELLI, Kelly E. Scofield, et al., Appellee.
No. 5D01-3222.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
June 7, 2002.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 2, 2002.
G. Larry Sims, of Black, Sims, Burnett & Birch, LLP, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
Stephen P. Sapienza, Bunnell, for Appel-lees.

Opinion:
GRIFFIN, J.
Appellees, plaintiffs below, filed a complaint against appellant and unknown defendants seeking to quiet title to vacant land located in Volusia County to which appellees held title pursuant to a Volusia County tax deed after sale of the property on December 5, 2000.
Appellant filed his answer, affirmative defenses and claim for declaratory relief, claiming that he had no notice of the application for tax deed. Apparently, the address on the tax roll was that of the subject property, which was vacant. As a result, the clerk's certified mailing to appellant was returned, marked "No Such Number" at such address. The sheriff, likewise, was unable to serve appellant. The trial court entered summary final judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, citing this court's decision in Eurofund Forty-Six, Ltd. v. Terry, 755 So.2d 835 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) and Alwani v. Slocum, 540 So.2d 908 (Fla. 2d DCA), review denied, 548 So.2d 662 (Fla.1989).
Appellant appeals claiming that Florida Statutes Section 197.502(4) is unconstitutional because due process requires the clerk to make a good faith effort to locate and notify a "property owner whose property is about to be sold." Appellant alleged that he was the owner of a homestead parcel in Volusia County and had the tax rolls been searched, another address for him would have been found.
We see no due process violation in the facts of this case. Appellant concedes that the statutory procedure for giving him notice of an application for a tax deed on property he owned was complied with. He contends, however, that the statute has a defect of constitutional dimension because it does not require the clerk to search for an owner whose whereabouts are "easily ascertainable." This question has been repeatedly answered by Florida courts in the negative. See, e.g., Dawson v. Saada, 608 So.2d 806 (Fla.1992); Bullock v. Houston Realty & Inv., Inc., 739 So.2d 1251, 1254 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Alwani, supra.
The only address provided to the tax collector for the owner of this property was that of the property itself. Since it is apparently a vacant lot, the address was invalid for receipt of mail and the notice by certified mail was returned undelivered. Appellant proposes that when the undeliv-erability of the mailed notice to the owner became known to the clerk, due process required that the clerk search for him. He suggests there's a duty to look in the telephone book or search elsewhere in the county's records, presumably because that is where another address for him appeared. But those are not the only places where a person's address might be "readily ascertainable" if the time is taken or the effort is made to inquire. Where does "due process" require the clerk to look? For how long?
The statutory scheme creates a reasonable balance between the public's need to collect taxes and the individual's right to be notified of governmental action taken against his title to the property. A rule that requires a clerk to find a better address for the owner if it is "easily ascertainable" introduces the kind of uncertainty that discourages participation in the tax certificate device for tax collection. Dawson, 608 So.2d at 808-09.
As the high court in Dawson reiterates, the knowledge of a property owner that he owes taxes and has not paid them does not provide notice that a tax sale is pending and does not obviate the requirement of notice, which is the clerk's statutory duty. Dawson, 608 So.2d at 810. That does not mean, however, that the owner does not bear any responsibility for his correct address being on the tax roll so that he may receive notices. This is not a game of hide and seek. The appellant knew he owed taxes and had not paid taxes. Presumably he was also not receiving tax bills. He certainly knew there was no mail delivery to this vacant lot. No claim is made that appellant ever took any steps to provide a correct address to taxing authorities or discover why he was not receiving tax bills. A person in the position of appellant has no right to complain that the clerk did not look hard enough for him.
AFFIRMED.
COBB, J., concurs specially, with opinion.
HARRIS, J., dissents, with opinion.
. The dissent suggests that the trial court "seemed to be in sympathy" with appellant's argument and suggests we should follow the wisdom of the trial court. We read the trial court's order as a rejection of appellant's argument and we have done no more than approve the trial court's decision. We do not rely on the Eurofund decision for our decision in this case because, unlike Eurofund, this case involves a situation where appellant makes no claim that he undertook to provide a proper address to the clerk.