Case Name: HARBOR BEACH SURF CLUB, INC., Appellant, v. WATER TAXI OF FT. LAUDERDALE, INC., a Florida corporation, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1998-05-13
Citations: 711 So. 2d 1230
Docket Number: No. 96-3122
Parties: HARBOR BEACH SURF CLUB, INC., Appellant, v. WATER TAXI OF FT. LAUDERDALE, INC., a Florida corporation, Appellee.
Judges: GLICKSTEIN, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 711
Pages: 1230–1237

Head Matter:
HARBOR BEACH SURF CLUB, INC., Appellant, v. WATER TAXI OF FT. LAUDERDALE, INC., a Florida corporation, Appellee.
No. 96-3122.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
May 13, 1998.
Rehearing, Clarification and Certification Denied July 1, 1998.
Peter G. Herman and Michele K. Feinzig of Tripp, Scott, Conklin & Smith, Fort Laud-erdale, for appellant.
John D. Rallen of Badiak, Will & Rallen, North Miami Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
POLEN, Judge.
Harbor - Beach Surf Club, Inc. (Harbor Beach) appeals a final judgment requiring it to modify its existing footbridge over Lake Mayan to accommodate vessels owned by plaintiff Water Taxi of Fort Lauderdale, Inc. (Water Taxi). Water Taxi filed suit against Harbor Beach seeking abatement of an alleged public nuisance. Water Taxi asserted it was unable to navigate its vessels under Harbor Beach's footbridge and thus unable to provide service to visitors of the Harbor Beach Marriott or residents of the Mayan Marco Apartments, resulting in lost revenue. It was uncontradieted Harbor Beach's footbridge does not obstruct all navigation across Lake Mayan, and only larger boats are obstructed from passing .under the footbridge.
The trial court determined Lake Mayan was a navigable waterway. It found the right to navigate Lake Mayan paramount to Harbor Beach's ownership of land on either side or beneath the lake. It found Harbor Beach's footbridge constituted an unreasonable obstruction and a nuisance, concluding Water Taxi suffered a harm that differed from the harm suffered by the general public, in that Water Taxi suffered a loss of revenue from its inability to navigaté under the footbridge. We affirm the final judgment.
The first two of Harbor Beach's four arguments on appeal concern federal preemption and exhaustion of administrative remedies. We disagree with Harbor Beach's contention that federal law preempts state law as to determinations of navigability, such that the circuit court was without jurisdiction to determine the navigability of Lake Mayan. Florida courts consistently determine the issue of the navigability of waterways in several different contexts: Board of Trustees of Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Florida Public Utilities Co., 599 So.2d 1356 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992) (determining navigability in context of suit to quiet title); Picciolo v. Jones, 534 So.2d 875 (Fla. 3d DCA. 1988) (rejecting a similar federal preemption argument and affirming exclusion of Army Corps of Engineers' testimony "because federal law does not preempt state law on [the issue of regulating navigable waterways]"); Odom v. Deltona Corp., 341 So.2d 977 (Fla.1976) (determining navigability in context of developer's right to drain, dredge, and alter shores, bottoms, and waters of certain lakes); Lopez v. Smith, 145 So.2d 509 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962) (determining navigability in context of suit to quiet title); McDowell v. Trustees of Internal Improvement Fund, 90 So.2d 715 (Fla.1956) (determining navigability in context of suit against owners who dredged lake). In this same regard, we disagree with Harbor Beach's contention that Water Taxi was required to exhaust federal administrative remedies before bringing its action.
Harbor Beach's third argument attacks the trial court's determination Water Taxi established evidence of a special injury sufficient to demonstrate its standing as a private corporation to redress a public nuisance. As was explained in Thomas v. Wade, 48 Fla. 311, 37 So. 743 (1904):
Where the erection of a bridge across a navigable stream obstructs navigation, a suit to abate the obstruction cannot be maintained by an individual who claims only the public right of navigation, unless it is alleged and proven that he suffers some special or particular injury or damage different not only in degree, but in kind, from the injury or damage suffered by the public from such obstruction.
Id.
Water Taxi established a special injury by introducing evidence demonstrating Harbor Beach's footbridge did not obstruct all navigation on Lake Mayan, and further, Water Taxi's inability to navigate under the footbridge resulted in injury to its business opportunities and a loss of income different in kind than that suffered by the public at large. The instant case presents the opposite factual scenario to that present in Thomas, where the court noted: "The proofs show that since the construction of the bridge there is no navigation over Cross creek under said bridge, and that complainant's boat cannot pass thereunder." Id. (emphasis supplied). While each member of the public was prohibited from passing under the subject bridge in Thomas, evidence in the instant case showed some members of the public were able to navigate under Harbor Beach's footbridge across Lake Mayan. We find this distinction significant in light of the purpose underlying the "special injury standing rule" to avoid multiplicity of suits when an individual seeks to abate a public nuisance.
Our application of Thomas to the facts present here is obviously at odds with that of the dissent. We place greater significance on the Thomas court's recognition that the obstructing bridge in Thomas precluded any and all navigation over Cross creek under the bridge. We believe our emphasis is both appropriate and necessary in light of the purpose underlying the special injury standing rule. A multiplicity of suits is avoided in the instant case because Water Taxi stands in a position different from that of the public at large, while a multiplicity of suits would have occurred in Thomas because each member of the navigating public suffered the same injury. We believe the dissent's comparison of the degree of economic damage suffered in Thomas with that suffered by Water Taxi ignores the significance of Water Taxi's ability to demonstrate an injury different both in degree and kind from that suffered by the public.
In Brown v. Florida Chautauqua Ass'n, 59 Fla. 447, 52 So. 802 (1910), the court explained the reasoning underlying the special injury standing rule:
In order to secure an efficient administration of the law for the benefit of the public and to avoid the evil of many suits to accomplish one purpose, public wrongs are redressed at the suit of proper officials, and individuals are not permitted to maintain separate judicial proceedings to re dress a wrong that is public in its nature unless the individual suffers or is threatened with some special, particular, or peculiar injury growing out of the public wrong. If a public nuisance causes special or peculiar injury to an individual different in kind and not merely in degree from the injury-to the public at large, and the injury is substantial in its nature, the individual may have his civil remedy. If the remedy at law is inadequate, equity will afford appropriate relief. Where an unlawful obstruction of a public highway merely affects injuriously an individual's right in common with the public to pass over the highway, the individual suffers no injury different in kind from the public and has no private right of action. Where, however, an unlawful obstruction to a public highway not only injures the right of an individual, in common with the public, to pass over the easement, but causes peculiar and special injury of a substantial nature to an individual, he has his private right of action to redress the special wrong to him; and, where the remedy afforded by an action for damages in a court of law is inadequate, appropriate relief may be sought in a court of equity.
Brown, 52 So. at 804.
Unlike the public at large, a segment of which was able to navigate under Harbor Beach's footbridge, the evidence here showed Water Taxi was unable to navigate under the footbridge in all but one of its vessels, and even that vessel could possibly navigate under the bridge only during certain tide conditions. Further, Water Taxi introduced competent substantia] evidence supporting the trial court's finding that its inability to navigate under the footbridge resulted in a loss of business opportunities and loss of revenues. We will not disturb a trial court's finding when supported by competent substantial evidence.
Examination of the facts in Brown reveals further similarities supporting application of that court's reasoning to the instant case. In Brown a fenced enclosure blocked direct passage from the plaintiffs' hotel to a railroad depot, which caused the public at large to take a circuitous route to the depot. The hotel owners filed suit seeking removal of the obstruction alleging injury to their hotel business and to the value of their property, and their complaint was dismissed. Noting the hotel owners' allegations of special injury were "not very explicit or full and complete," the court nevertheless reversed the dismissal of the owners' complaint. Id., 52 So. at 805. The court held the obstruction was a special and substantial injury to the hotel owners' business in accommodating the traveling public, in light of the proximity and location of the obstruction with reference to the hotel and railroad depot, the character of the hotel business and its natural relation to the railroad depot, and the inconvenience and increased risks of being forced to use a more dangerous and longer route from the hotel to the depot. Id.
Similarly here, the obstruction across Lake Mayan created by Harbor Beach's footbridge is a special and substantial injury to Water Taxi's business of accommodating the travel-ling public on the water, in light of the proximity and location of the footbridge with reference to the location of businesses desiring Water Taxi's services and the natural relation between the character of Water Taxi's business and the hotel and apartment complex Water Taxi is precluded from directly servicing. This is not a case where multiplicity of suits was threatened, because Water Taxi's suit was not '"maintainable by every person passing that, way." Jacksonville, T. & K.W. Ry. Co. v. Thompson, 34 Fla. 346, 350, 16 So. 282, 283 (1894) (denying relief to plaintiff unable to establish special injury different in khid from that suffered by the community at large, each member of which was inconvenienced by railroad's obstruction of a public highway). Accepting the dissent's interpretation of Bozeman v. City of St. Petersburg, 74 Fla. 336, 76 So. 894 (1917), the facts of the instant case including Water Taxi's unique reliance on, and inability to navigate, Lake Mayan for the conduct of its business make the instant case analogous to Brown and distinguishable from Bozeman.
Finally as to Harbor Beach's final argument, we admit the outcome of this case may appear inequitable as against Harbor Beach. However, the result is not inequita ble with reference to the well-recognized rule that a riparian owner's right to use navigable waters and the lands thereunder is concurrent with that of the public, not superior to that of the public. Ferry Pass Inspectors' & Shippers' Ass'n v. White's River Inspectors' & Shippers' Ass'n, 57 Fla. 399, 48 So. 643 (1909).
AFFIRMED.
GLICKSTEIN, J., concurs.
GROSS, J., dissents with opinion.
. We note our disagreement with the dissent's extrapolation of the holdings in Thomas, Ferry Pass, Brown, and Bozeman to arrive at a special injury standing test more severely limiting a private citizen's standing to enjoin a public nuisance than previously enunciated in any case.