Case Name: A. D. LaMoyne v. The State
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1908-03-11
Citations: 53 Tex. Crim. 221
Docket Number: No. 4291
Parties: A. D. LaMoyne v. The State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Criminal Reports
Volume: 53
Pages: 221–239

Head Matter:
A. D. LaMoyne v. The State.
No. 4291.
Decided March 11, 1908.
1.—Swindling—Offense Defined—Statutes Construed—Value.
Under articles 944, 946 and 949 Penal Code, it is not necessary in order to constitute the offense of swindling- that any benefit shall accrue to the person guilty of the fraud, or that any injury shall result to the person intended to be defrauded; and the grade of the offense must be fixed by the value of the property the possession of which is yielded up on such fraudulent representation at the time such representations were made.
2. —Same—Charge of Court—Felony—Misdemeanor.
In a prosecution for swindling where the evidence showed that defendant’s representations with regard to the property upon which he obtained a lien in consideration for some machinery of the value of about $250, were false, and relied upon at the time by the person selling said machinery, the fact that the injured party did not suffer a loss of over $50 by the transaction, did not reduce the offense to a misdemeanor, if by means of false and deceitful pretences on the part of the defendant the injured party was induced thereby at the time they were made to part with $250 of property; however, the court’s charge on misdemeanor inuring to the benefit of the defendant he could not complain.
3. —Same—Marshaling Securities.
Upon trial for swindling where the evidence showed that defendant had falsely represented the condition of his property upon which he obtained a lien in consideration of certain machinery of the value of $250, and that at the time of obtaining such lien other liens to other parties existed upon said property, the question as to whether the party from whom said machinery was obtained could have secured himself subsequently out of other property owned by the defendant after marshalling defendant’s various liens which he had given on said property could not be considered as a defense, and a charge thereon was correctly refused. Overruling Gaskins v. State, 38 S. W. Rep., 470; Perry v. State, 39 Texas Grim. Rep., 495; Lively v. State, 74 S. W. Rep., 321. Davidson, Presiding Judge, dissenting.
Appeal from the District Court of ¡Navarro. Tried below before the Hon. L. B. Cobb.
Appeal from a conviction of swindling; penalty, thirty days confinement in the county jail.
The opinion states the case.
W. W. Ballew, for appellant.—On
question of value of property sought to be acquired: Cases cited in opinion.
The court erred in refusing to give the special instruction requested by the defendant, to the effect, that Drane & Company had the right to require Mrs. Richmond and the People’s ¡National Bank to marshal their securities, and to make their indebtedness out of other securities héld by them, before resorting to their securities upon the hay mortgaged'to Drane & Company; and that if the security given by LaMoyne to Drane & Company, was of greater value than the hay-press he bought from Drane & Company, that the jury should acquit defendant. Willis v. Holland, 36 S. W. Rep., 329; Rogers v. Blum, 56 Texas, 1; Brown v. Thompson, 79 Texas, 58; Henkel v. Bohenke, 26 S. W. Rep., 645; Wohrmund v. The Edgewood Distilling Co., 32 S. W. Rep., 228.
The title to property must pass from the injured party to the accused. This is an .essential element to be alleged and proven in the indictment and by the evidence. (State v. Vickery, 19 Texas, 326; Cline v. State, 43 Texas, 494; May v. State, 15 Texas Crim. App., 430.) The title to the property must pass from the party injured to the party accused. (Sims v. the State, 28 Texas Crim. App., 447.) The grade of the offense whether felony or misdemeanor must be determined by the value of the property fraudulently acquired, (Article 949, Penal Code.) The acquisition of the property must be alleged and proven or there can be no swindle. (Article 943.) In addition to the acquisition of the property, the party acquiring the same, must do so with the intent to appropriate to his own use, and the intent to appropriate is also one of the essential elements of swindling and the indictment must so allege and the State must so prove. (Stringer v. the State, 13 Texas Crim. App., 520.) The ownership of the property must be correctly alleged, and the title thereto, must pass from the owner, to the party seeking to acquire it or there can be no swindle. The indictment must allege and the proof must show that the injured party, was induced to part, not .only with the possession, but also- with the title to his property, and the State must prove these facts; that is, that the accused acquired, first, possession; second, title to property of certain value. (Curtis v. State, 31 Texas Crim. Rep., 39; Pitts v. State, 5 Texas Crim. App., 122; Cline v. State, 43 Texas, 494.) The value of the property acquired must be alleged the same as in theft. (Ellison v. State, 25 Texas Crim. App., 328; Radford v. State, 35 Texas, 15; Boyle v. State, 37 Texas, 359; White v. State, 33 Texas Crim. Rep., 94.) .Everything that is necessary to' be alleged in the indictment must be proven, and the charge of the court in submitting article 946, of the statute, would authorize the conviction of a person upon a mere design or intent to swindle, without the acquisition of, or possession, or title to property, and without any injury to the other party, or benefit to the accused. A person, under the facts alleged in this indictment, cannot be tried solely upon an intention to commit a swindle, but must commit an actual swindle; that is, before he can be adjudged guilty, he must have defrauded a party to whom he makes false representations, out of money, or property of some value; that is, he must have acquired property of some value, both the possession of, and the title to the same, from the possession and the ownership of the party relying on the false representations. This proposition is clearly established, and is now the settled law of Texas, by Lively v. State, 74 S. W. Rep., 321; Gaskins v. State, 38 S. W. Rep., 470; Perry v. State, 39 Texas Crim. Rep., 495; 46 S. W. Rep., 816. We submit that this case should be reversed and remanded.
F. J. McCord, Assistant Attorney-General, for the State.

Opinion:
BROOKS, Judge.
Appellant was convicted of swindling, and his punishment assessed at thirty days confinement in the county jail.
The ind ictment in the case contained three counts, the first for swindling, and the second and third for disposing of mortgaged property. The evidence shows that the appellant gave Drane & Co. a mortgage upon a hay-press and lifting-jack, worth $250, and mower and rake worth $75, and upon hay, which, the evidence showed was 100 tons, worth $5 per ton. At the time of the execution of said mortgage, appellant stated to Drane & Co., that there was no prior lien upon said property, but the facts show there was a lien in favor of the bank for about $300; and Mrs. Richmond, the owner of the land upon which the hay was growing, for about the same amount; that Drane & Co. did not part with their property except upon the statement that appellant owned the farm and the hay, appellant stating at the time that he not only owned the farm, but that all of same was unincumbered, including the hay and other personal property mortgaged. The facts show as stated this was false. The evidence in this case shows nothing in the world but a plain act of swindling, and a swindling for an amount over the value- of $50. The fact that the prosecuting witness, who represented Drane & Co., got the property back from the appellant, and sold same to a third party for $335, was no reason whatever for charging the jury that, if appellant swindled Drane & Co. out of less than $50 it would be a misdemeanor. The learned trial judge seems to have labored under the impression that the fact that the prosecuting witness did not suffer a financial loss of over $50 by the transaction, it would not be a felony. This is not the law. If prosecuting witness by means of false and deceitful pretenses on the part of appellant was induced thereby to part with $350 worth of property the fact that the same was subsequently secured and most of the value of the property obtained, would not be any character or kind of legal defense to the prosecution, and in fact would not be legitimate evidence to be introduced in the trial of the case. It follows, therefore, that the court erred in charging upon misdemeanor theft in favor of appellant, but it is a matter of which appellant cannot complain, since although the evidence conclusively shows that the swindling was for an amount over fifty dollars, and the jury convicted for a misdemeanor swindle: This would not be a reason, according to the statute of this State for a new trial, since appellant was convicted of a less grade of offense than he was charged with. It follows from the above that the court did not err in refusing to give the special charge requested by appellant to the effect that Drane & Co. had the right to compel Mrs. Richmond and the People's Rational Bank to marshal their securities and to make their indebtedness out of the other security held by them, before resorting to their security upon the hay grown upon the Richmond farm, and that the security given by LaMoyne to Drane & Co., was of greater value than the hay-press he bought from Drane &. Co. This is not the law. This question is thoroughly settled by the statute, itself. Article 946 of the Penal Code is, as follows: "It is not necessary, in order to- constitute the offense of swindling that any benefit shall accrue to the person guilty of the fraud or deceit, nor that any injury shall result to the persons intended to be defrauded, if it is sufficiently apparent that there was a willful design to receive benefit or cause an injury."
The indictment in this case is in proper and legal form, and the other questions raised by appellant, in view of the foregoing we do not deem necessary to discuss.
Finding no error in the record, the judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.