Case Name: COOPER TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY, a foreign corporation, Petitioner, v. Sandra RODRIGUEZ, Respondent
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2008-10-29
Citations: 997 So. 2d 1124
Docket Number: No. 3D08-2319
Parties: COOPER TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY, a foreign corporation, Petitioner, v. Sandra RODRIGUEZ, Respondent.
Judges: Before GERSTEN, C.J., and COPE and SALTER, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 997
Pages: 1124–1128

Head Matter:
COOPER TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY, a foreign corporation, Petitioner, v. Sandra RODRIGUEZ, Respondent.
No. 3D08-2319.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Oct. 29, 2008.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Jan. 6, 2009.
Holland & Knight and Rodolfo Sorondo, Jr., Kathleen M. O’Connor, Thornton, Davis & Fein and Frederick J. Fein, Miami, for petitioner.
Ross & Girten and Lauri Waldman Ross, Miami, for respondent.
Before GERSTEN, C.J., and COPE and SALTER, JJ.

Opinion:
SALTER, J.
Cooper Tire & Rubber Company seeks a writ of prohibition after the denial of Cooper Tire's motion to disqualify the circuit court trial judge. We deny the petition.
The disqualification of a presiding trial judge is a serious and disruptive matter. Each petition here must be carefully reviewed to be certain that it is well-founded and not merely an attempt at forum-shopping.
In this case, the underlying personal injury lawsuit has been underway for four years, and a discovery issue has been underway for over six months. Under Florida Rules of Judicial Administration 2.250(a)(1)(B), trial judges are charged with completing most civil jury cases (filing through trial and post-trial motions) in eighteen months.
Here the record reflects that plaintiffs counsel learned that Cooper Tire's counsel had a trial conflict beginning September 15, 2008, and approached the court's judicial assistant about finding other dates for a hearing on a long-pending motion to compel. As the dissent properly notes, the trial judge was not precluded, ethically or otherwise, from discussing the schedule for a pretrial discovery hearing.
In this case, the order moving the hearing to September 11 and 12 was entered on September 4, 2008 and faxed that day to Cooper Tire's counsel. If those dates were not available for counsel, Cooper Tire could and should have immediately identified other available dates, filed its promised written motion for continuance, notified opposing counsel and the court, and requested an immediate telephonic hearing (or a so-called "add on" for the next motion calendar) to resolve the matter. Indeed, ultimately the trial court acceded to Cooper Tire's requests and did not go forward with the hearing on September 11-12 or 16-17.
But instead of identifying other available dates in a promptly-filed motion for continuance of the hearing, Cooper Tire moved to disqualify the trial judge and sought prohibition here when its motion was denied. The assignment of a new trial judge would inevitably delay the ultimate disposition of the pending discovery motions and trial of the ease, and might also afford the defense a second bite at the apple on the discovery orders entered thus far.
The trial court should not be disqualified for attempting to keep the case moving by offering other days for a hearing. Coaxing counsel to get a case to trial, much less a pretrial discovery issue to resolution, is not sufficient to create a "well grounded fear" that a party will not receive a fair trial. Florida Rules of Judicial Administration 2.330(d)(1) specifies that the mov-ant for disqualification must set forth "specifically described bias or prejudice of the judge" (emphasis added). The only bias or prejudice exhibited on this record is one in favor of dispatch and against further delay — not for or against a party, counsel, or particular outcome. There is a difference between "holding the parties' feet to the fire" and creating a well grounded fear warranting disqualification.
Petition denied.
. We agree with the dissent that the better practice would have been for the trial judge to bring defense counsel into the scheduling discussion by telephone, once the trial judge decided to look at his calendar and participate in the rescheduling.
. The order resetting the discovery hearing is characterized by the dissent as one which denied a motion not yet made. But Cooper Tire's counsel had asked opposing counsel to consent to a rescheduling and had indicated that the motion would be filed. The motion should have been filed immediately so that it could be heard as far in advance of the then-scheduled hearing date as possible. Any interlocutory order involving the scheduling for a pretrial discovery matter can be reconsidered or vacated when the circumstances warrant, and Cooper Tire was not precluded from seeking that relief if the alternative dates of September 11 and 12 were unavailable.