Case Name: In the Matter of Rodney Allen White, a Child. STATE ex rel JUVENILE DEPARTMENT OF COLUMBIA COUNTY, Respondent, v. WHITE, Appellant
Court: Oregon Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1986-12-31
Citations: 83 Or. App. 225
Docket Number: 4316; CA A38728
Parties: In the Matter of Rodney Allen White, a Child. STATE ex rel JUVENILE DEPARTMENT OF COLUMBIA COUNTY, Respondent, v. WHITE, Appellant.
Judges: Before Buttler, Presiding Judge, and Warren and Rossman, Judges.
Reporter: Oregon Reports, Court of Appeals
Volume: 83
Pages: 225–230

Head Matter:
Argued and submitted September 11,
affirmed December 31, 1986,
reconsideration denied January 30,
petition for review denied March 3, 1987 (302 Or 658)
In the Matter of Rodney Allen White, a Child. STATE ex rel JUVENILE DEPARTMENT OF COLUMBIA COUNTY, Respondent, v. WHITE, Appellant.
(4316; CA A38728)
730 P2d 1279
Robert P. VanNatta, St. Helens, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was VanNatta & Peterson, St. Helens.
Richard D. Wasserman, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Dave Frohnmayer, Attorney General, James E. Mountain, Jr., Solicitor General, and Nancy Diamond, Certified Law Clerk, Salem.
Before Buttler, Presiding Judge, and Warren and Rossman, Judges.
ROSSMAN, J.
Warren, J., dissenting.

Opinion:
ROSSMAN, J.
The sole issue in this case is whether a juvenile who has passed his 17th birthday but has not yet attained his 18th is "17 years of age or younger."
Defendant was convicted for being a minor in possession on January 21,1986. At that time, he was 17 years, seven months and eight days old. Pursuant to ORS 809.260 (former 482.593), the juvenile court ordered the suspension of his driving privileges.
ORS 809.260 provides, in part:
"(1) Whenever a person who is 17 years of age or younger, but not younger than 13 years of age, is convicted of any offense described in this subsection or determined by a juvenile court to have committed one of the described offenses, the court in which the person is convicted shall prepare and send to the Motor Vehicles Division, within 24 hours of the conviction or determination, an order of denial of driving privileges for the person so convicted. This section applies to any crime, violation, infraction or other offense involving the possession, use or abuse of alcohol or controlled substances." (Emphasis supplied.)
Defendant contends that "17 years of age or younger" does not apply to him, because he had passed his 17th birthday and was living in his 18th year of life when he was convicted. We disagree.
We apply clear, unambiguous statutes according to their plain meaning, unless a literal application would produce an unintended or absurd result. Satterfield v. Satterfield, 292 Or 780, 643 P2d 336 (1982). In common parlance, a juvenile becomes 17 years of age upon reaching his 17th birthday, and remains 17 years of age until he reaches his 18th birthday. Although defendant cites case law from other jurisdictions in support of his view that "17 years of age or younger" does not include persons who have passed their 17th birthdays, we do not find it convincing and refuse to apply such a strained construction to provide an absurd, unintended meaning for an unambiguous statute. Although we do not quarrel with defendant's argument that' this is the 20th century — yet the current year is only 1986 — we do not see how that helps his case.
Affirmed.
ORS 471.430 provides, in part:
"(1) No person under the age of 21 years shall attempt to purchase, purchase or acquire alcoholic liquor. Except when such minor is in a private residence accompanied by the parent or guardian of the minor and with such parent's or guardian's consent, no person under the age of 21 years shall have personal possession of alcoholic liquor."
Former ORS 482.593 was repealed by Or Laws 1985, ch 16, § 475 and replaced by ORS 809.260, Or Laws 1985, ch 16, § 206 (which became effective January 1,1986), Or Laws 1985, ch 16, § 476.
Even if the term "17 years of age or younger" is ambiguous, which we do not think it is, the legislative history clearly indicates that ORS 809.260 was intended to apply to juveniles throughout the year preceding their 18th birthdays. House Committee on Judiciary, May 27, 1983, Tape 379, Side A at 79-301; Senate Committee on Transportation and Tourism, June 29, 1983, Tape 160, Side A at 36. Admittedly, it would have been preferable for the legislature to have used the phrase "under 18 years of age" to include juveniles up to their 18th birthdays. The fact that it chose different terminology to accomplish the same result should not lead us to interpret the phrase in a way that the legislature never intended.