Case Name: The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jerry Victor Clark, Defendant-Appellant
Court: Illinois Appellate Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 1975-10-30
Citations: 32 Ill. App. 3d 898
Docket Number: No. 12662
Parties: The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jerry Victor Clark, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Appellate Court Reports, Third Series
Volume: 32
Pages: 898–904

Head Matter:
The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jerry Victor Clark, Defendant-Appellant.
(No. 12662;
Fourth District —
October 30, 1975.
CRAVEN, J., dissenting.
Richard J. Wilson, Daniel D. Yuhas, and Joshua Sachs, all of State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.
Basil G. Greanias, State’s Attorney, of Decatur (Robert I. Wrigley, Assistant State’s Attorney, of counsel), for the People.

Opinion:
Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE TRAPP
delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendant appeals his conviction of forgery by bench trial and the sentence of one to three years imposed.
Upon appeal defendant contends that certain stolen blank checks were taken from the glove compartment of his car in an illegal search and seizure, and that his written confession to forgery was the product of such unlawful search.
The proceedings upon the motion to suppress evidence disclose that defendant was driving with his codefendant in an automobile which broke down and stopped in the traffic lane of an arterial street. The arresting officer came to the scene as defendant's car was being pushed. Such officer observed open beer cans on the floor of the driving compartment and upon his inquiry neither defendant nor his companion could produce an operator's license. The officer thereupon arrested each for failure to have an operator's license and for illegal transportation of liquor. Such offenses support custodial arrest and defendant and his companion were removed in a police vehicle. Defendant did not request that his automobile be placed in the possession of any other person.
The evidence is clear that the automobile was inoperable as it stood in the street. The arresting officer called a commercial towing service to remove the car and, it appears, to store the car. There was no contention that the city had an impounding lot or police garage. The towing procedure requires that tire operator be able to enter the towed vehicle. After the arrival of the tow truck but prior to the removal of the car the arresting officer examined the interior and discovered several blank checks stolen from a business firm.
There is no contention that the search of the vehicle was incident to an arrest or that there was either a warrant or permission to search, but the prosecution urges that the search procedure was reasonable under the circumstances. The testimony of the arresting officer is that such examination was a regular police procedure under circumstances requiring the removal of a vehicle in the absence of the owner. The stated purpose was to protect items of value which might be left in the car and to avoid spurious claims for articles which might be alleged to have been left in the car-.
The standard for determining the validity of the search of a motor vehicle is whether the search was reasonable under the circumstances. (Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 17 L.Ed.2d 730, 87 S.Ct. 788; Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 11 L.Ed.2d 777, 84 S.Ct. 881.) As stated in Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 19 L.Ed.2d 1067, 88 S.Ct. 992, initial intrusion into a car to protect the owner's property is not unreasonable. The courts of Illinois have had no occasion to consider the issue of the reasonableness of inventory searches of automobiles. Other jurisdictions have reached differing conclusions.
Many have held that an inspection of the contents of the vehicle properly taken under temporary control to be proper and valid. (See cases collected in United States v. Mitchell (9th Cir. 1972), 458 F.2d 960.) In United States v. Pennington (5th Cir. 1971), 441 F.2d 249, the driver was taken into mandatory custody. The city had no municipal towing service and no impoundment area. The inventory search pursuant to police regulation disclosed a pistol in the glove compartment of the car. It was argued that the search was illegal as it was not required to protect the officer, The court affirmed an order denying the dismissal of the complaint saying that the officer cannot send property into the custody of others without knowing what was to be returned. In People v. Sullivan (1971), 29 N.Y.2d 69, 323 N.Y.S.2d 945, 272 N.E.2d 464, the court of appeals reversed an order dismissing the indictment. The vehicle was towed and impounded for a parking violation. Regulations required an inspection for valuable items and the making of an adequate record of the contents. The officer found a loaded pistol in a brief case. The court noted the language of Cooper v. California, that the reason for and the nature of the custody may constitutionally justify the search, and concluded that the examination was not unreasonable. Similar conclusions were reached in State v. Montague (1968), 73 Wash. 2d 381, 438 P.2d 571; State v. Criscola (1968), 21 Utah 2d 272, 444 P.2d 517; St. Clair v. State (1967), 1 Md.App. 605, 232 A.2d 565.
Searches of this quality have been upheld in United States v. Kelehar (5th Cir. 1972), 470 F.2d 176, and United States v. Lipscomb (5th Cir. 1970), 435 F.2d 795, while a contrary conclusion was reached in United States v. Lawson (8th Cir. 1973), 487 F.2d 468.
Defendant urges that this court adopt the views expressed in Mozzetti v. Superior Court (1971), 4 Cal.3d 699, 94 Cal.Rptr. 412, 484 P.2d 84; Boulet v. Arizona (1972), 17 Ariz.App. 64, 495 P.2d 504; State v. Opperman (S.Dak. 1975), 228 N.W.2d 152, and United States v. Lawson (8th Cir. 1973), 487 F.2d 468.
Hie facts in such cases contain clearly distinguishable differences from the facts at issue here. Mozzetti dealt with the examination of a closed suitcase which was contained in the car examined and such examination was the actual issue. (See Burke concurring opinion.) As we read Mozzetti, it would be proper to examine the interior of the vehicle for contents which should properly be secured. Boulet adopts the conclusion of Mozzetti, but in such case the issue was the examination of the contents of a closed shaving kit. That opinion includes the doubtful language that it could not be discerned how it was necessary to open suitcases, brief cases or sealed packages which could be placed in a locked trunk. A particularly notable difference found in Mozzetti is that the vehicle was to be kept in a police garage. In Opperman, a closed and locked vehicle had accumulated several parking tickets as it stood on the street. It was neither a hazard nor a nuisance which required removal. Towed and impounded, an officer procured the opening of the locked car for an examination of the contents and the inventory. Such case contains neither factors of exigency nor protection of the contents for the benefit of either the owner or the police. Similarly, in United States v. Lawson, defendant was arrested. His locked automobile was then parked at a motel. Hie car was impounded and taken to the police station where it was completely searched and items seized were taken from a locked trunk. Adopting the test of balancing of the need to search in a particular case against the scope of a primary intrusion, the court concluded that the search was not reasonable for the police were not required to protect the car or move it as a nuisance, and that there was no reason for impoundment. Upon the facts of this case we conclude that the search was a reasonable and proper search.
The determination that the search was reasonable disposes of defendant's argument made here that the confession was a product of an unlawful search. We note that the motion to suppress the confession filed contemporaneously with the motion to suppress evidence illegally seized, and the evidence which defendant introduced at the hearing on the motion to suppress the confession was directed to a different issue, i.e., that defendant's confession was induced by assertions that an interviewing officer told defendant that the police wished to clear the record of an insignificant offense. There is no issue of the giving of the Miranda warnings. In summary, the State's evidence denies both the making of any promise and the making of any statement that the police merely wished to clear the record of this forgery charge. The evidence of the officer to whom the confession was made is that defendant initially sought to inculpate his codefendant, Standerfer, but that when informed that defendant was to be returned to Missouri on a pending charge he was motivated and desired to exculpate Standerfer. The officer's testimony is corroborated by the last sentence written in the hand of the defendant, "Ray Standerfer did not have anything to do with the cashing of the check it was my idea."
The finding of the trial court that the confession was voluntary and that it was not induced by any promise by the police was not error under the evidence.
Hie judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.
GREEN, J., concurs.