Case Name: Malissa L. ROBLES, a minor, By and Through her General Guardian, Kathleen V. ROBLES v. GOLLOTT AND SONS TRANSFER AND STORAGE, INC.
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1997-06-19
Citations: 697 So. 2d 383
Docket Number: No. 95-CA-00338-SCT
Parties: Malissa L. ROBLES, a minor, By and Through her General Guardian, Kathleen V. ROBLES v. GOLLOTT AND SONS TRANSFER AND STORAGE, INC.
Judges: Before PRATHER, P.J., and JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., and MILLS, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 697
Pages: 383–387

Head Matter:
Malissa L. ROBLES, a minor, By and Through her General Guardian, Kathleen V. ROBLES v. GOLLOTT AND SONS TRANSFER AND STORAGE, INC.
No. 95-CA-00338-SCT.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
June 19, 1997.
E. Foley Ranson, Sadler Ranson & Bordis, Ocean Springs, for Appellant.
John B. Edwards, II, Robert W. Wilkinson, Dogan & Wilkinson, Pascagoula, for Ap-pellee.
Before PRATHER, P.J., and JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., and MILLS, JJ.

Opinion:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., Justice.
This is an appeal from the Jackson County Circuit Court wherein Malissa L. Robles, the plaintiff, alleged Gollott & Sons Transfer & Storage, Inc. unfairly prejudiced the jury by informing the jury of Robles's settlement with a co-defendant prior to trial. Circuit Court Judge Kathy King Jackson overruled Robles's objection. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant. Subsequently, Robles filed a motion for J.N.O.V. or a new trial, which was denied by the trial court.
Aggrieved by the disposition below, the appellant asks that the following issue be considered:
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
I. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE DEFENDANT TO MAKE THE JURY AWARE THAT THE PLAINTIFF HAD SETTLED WITH A CO-DEFENDANT PRIOR TO THE TRIAL?
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On August 3,1989, an automobile, in which Robles was a guest passenger, driven by Katherine Michelle Perkins, collided with a truck owned by Gollott & Sons Transfer and Storage, Inc. Robles sustained injuries and filed suit against Perkins and Gollott & Sons. Perkins also filed suit against Gollott & Sons for her injuries.
Prior to trial, Robles entered into a settlement agreement with Perkins. Also, Robles stated that Perkins and Gollott & Sons settled the day before trial was to begin. Therefore, Gollott & Sons was left as the only defendant at trial.
During opening statement by Gollott & Sons' counsel, Robles objected to the jury being informed that Robles had also sued Perkins and alleged Perkins to have been negligent in causing the accident. The objection was overruled.
During cross-examination, Robles admitted she had sued Perkins and alleged Perkins to have been negligent. However, Robles's counsel did not object at this time.
The jury returned a verdict for Gollott & Sons. Robles filed a motion for J.N.O.V., or in the alternative a new trial, which was denied.
DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE
I. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE DEFENDANT TO MAKE THE JURY AWARE THAT THE PLAINTIFF HAD SETTLED WITH A CO-DEFENDANT PRIOR TO THE TRIAL?
Robles contends the trial court committed reversible error by allowing defense counsel to inform the jury that a co-defendant was no longer subject to the trial proceedings. Although defense counsel did not state Robles and Perkins had settled their lawsuit, Robles contends the jury would infer a settlement had been made and that Robles was now seeking a second recovery for her injuries.
The Mississippi Supreme Court has previously addressed this same issue. In Whitlley v. City of Meridian, 530 So.2d 1341, 1346 (Miss.1988), this Court stated:
Garcia v. Coast Electric Power Association, 493 So.2d 380, 385 (Miss.1986) recognizes that there are two acceptable procedures used to determine the damages due tó a plaintiff where co-defendants are involved and one co-defendant has settled with the plaintiff. The first procedure, similar to the one used at trial in the instant case, allows the defendant to show, either by the plaintiff or proper witnesses or evidence, that a settlement has been made with one or more of the defendants and the amount of that settlement. The jury is then instructed that if it returns a verdict for the plaintiff, the amount returned would be reduced by the amount of the settlement made with the plaintiff by the other defendant. Bogdahn v. Pascagoula Street Railway and Power Co., 118 Miss. 668, 79 So. 844 (1918) and Wood v. Walley, 352 So.2d 1083 (Miss.1977).
The second acceptable procedure allows the parties to stipulate, outside of the presence of the jury, that a settlement has been made by one or more of the defendants and the amount of the settlement. The jury would not be informed of the settlement or the payment, and, if a verdict were returned for the plaintiff, the trial judge would reduce the amount awarded by the jury by the amount of the settlement by the other defendant or defendants.
This Court, in Garcia, recognized the second procedure to be the most preferable but stated that the use of either procedure would not constitute reversible error. Garcia at 385.
We hereby modify Garcia and hold that the first procedure wherein the jury is informed of the amount of settlement is not acceptable. To inform a jury of the amount of a settlement prior to its returning a verdict for a joint tort feasor or co-defendant would certainly unnecessarily influence a jury in its decision. It is unreasonable to believe that a jury which had been informed that a settlement of $2,544,-275 had been entered into by the plaintiff would not be affected in returning its verdict. The tendency to determine that the plaintiff had already been adequately compensated would be too tempting. Such temptation can easily be prevented by use of the procedure wherein the jury is informed of the existence of a settlement but not the amount of settlement (if settlement occurs after trial begins then it will be necessary to inform the jury why the defendants are no longer present). If the jury returns a judgment in excess of the settlement the judge can simply adjust the judgment by the amount of the settlement.
In the case sub judice, defense counsel did not inform the jury of a settlement nor the amount of the settlement between Robles and Perkins. Although the procedure used by the trial court is not the preferred method, it nevertheless has long been acceptable by this Court. Therefore, the trial judge did not err and this issue is without merit.
CONCLUSION
This Court has long recognized two acceptable procedures used to determine the damages due to a plaintiff where co-defendants are involved and one co-defendant has settled with the plaintiff. The trial court followed one of these accepted procedures and therefore, the trial court did not commit reversible error.
JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED.
DAN LEE, C.J., PRATHER, P.J., and PITTMAN, SMITH and MILLS, JJ., concur.
PRATHER, P.J., concurs with separate written opinion joined in part by BANKS, J.
BANKS, J., concurs with separate written opinion.
McRAE, J., dissents with separate written opinion joined by SULLIVAN, P.J.