Case Name: DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, State of Florida, Appellant, v. WINTER PARK GOLF CLUB, INC., et al., Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1997-02-18
Citations: 687 So. 2d 970
Docket Number: No. 95-2897
Parties: DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, State of Florida, Appellant, v. WINTER PARK GOLF CLUB, INC., et al., Appellees.
Judges: PETERSON, C.J., and DAUKSCH, W. SHARP, HARRIS, THOMPSON and ANTOON, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 687
Pages: 970–972

Head Matter:
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, State of Florida, Appellant, v. WINTER PARK GOLF CLUB, INC., et al., Appellees.
No. 95-2897.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Feb. 18, 1997.
Thornton J. Williams, General Counsel, and Marianne A. Trussell, Assistant General Counsel, Department of Transportation, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Michael P. McMahon and Erik E. Hawks of Akerman, Senterfitt & Eidson, P.A., Orlando, for Appellee Winter Park Pines Condominium Association, Inc.
No Appearance for other Appellees.

Opinion:
COBB, Judge.
The Department of Transportation (DOT) appeals the trial court's award of $67,000.00 as an attorney's fee and $27,862.50 as an appraisal fee in an aborted eminent domain action wherein the DOT initially took, and then relinquished, a ten foot easement for a sidewalk in Winter Park, Florida. The strip taken was from the rear of property owned by the Winter Park Pines Condominium (hereinafter the condominium), which is comprised of 38 units. The property partially abuts Semoran Boulevard, a busy traffic thoroughfare, and is already subject to a 75 foot drainage easement taken by Orange County in 1981. The county easement, which is separated from the condominium by a six foot stockade fence, is comprised of a narrow grassy area, a large drainage canal, and an undulating earthen berm with trees and vegetation thereon. The condominium contended that installation of the sidewalk would destroy the berm and vegetative barrier between its rear fence and Semoran Boulevard, thereby exposing it to unsightly traffic and noise. The condominium marshalled evidence that destruction of the berm and vegetative barrier would cause a substantial reduction in the market value of the units.
Subsequent to the quick taking, the DOT decided to relinquish the easement to the condominium. There was evidence that the condominium's substantial claim for severance damages was a motivating factor in the DOT decision to construct the sidewalk elsewhere. A stipulated final judgment was entered, the initial DOT deposit of $1,500.00 was retained by the condominium for the temporary taking, and the order of taking was vacated. The stipulated judgment also provided that DOT would pay the condominium's reasonable costs and attorney's fees.
The parties were unable to agree on the amount of fees for the appraiser and attorney retained by the condominium. At a hearing held on the fee issues, there was conflicting testimony on these amounts. In arriving at the attorney's fee award, the trial court arrived at a lodestar figure of $43,772 and adjusted this amount upward based upon the benefit received by the landowners.
We find error only in respect to the award of that portion of the attorney's fee that was based on time spent in litigating the correct amount of the fee to be awarded. See State Farm, Fire and Casualty Company v. Pal-ma, 629 So.2d 830 (Fla.1993); Seminole County v. Butler, 676 So.2d 451 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). The amount of such time (49.9 hours) subtracted from the total hours found to be reasonable by the trial court (218.2 hours) results in a corrected figure of 168.3 hours. Utilizing this latter figure and the reasonable hourly rate found by the trial court ($225 per hour), results in a $5,854.50 reduction of the attorney's fee award to the corrected figure of $61,145.00.
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.
PETERSON, C.J., and DAUKSCH, W. SHARP, HARRIS, THOMPSON and ANTOON, JJ., concur.
GRIFFIN, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with opinion, with which GOSHORN, J., concurs.
. To the extent that contrary language appears in Seminole County v. Delco Oil, Inc., 669 So.2d 1162 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996), note 2, we hereby recede from that language.