Case Name: Margaret Tompkins at al. v. Horace Prentice et al.
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1857-06
Citations: 12 La. Ann. 465
Docket Number: 
Parties: Margaret Tompkins at al. v. Horace Prentice et al.
Judges: Yoorhies, J., concurred in this opinion.
Reporter: Louisiana Annual Reports
Volume: 12
Pages: 465–471

Head Matter:
Margaret Tompkins at al. v. Horace Prentice et al.
A testator having no descendents living, devised his whole estate to his mother, brother and sister, omitting entirely his father who survived him. The father made a notarial act of renunciation of all his right and interest in the estate of his deceased son. Creditors of the father claimed the right to have the renunciation set aside on the ground that it was made by their debtor in fraud of their rights as jlament creditors, and to have the portion of the estate for which they alleged the father was the forced heir of his son, subjected to the payment of their claims against the father. Reid : That such an action could not be maintained.
There are rights of the debtor which the creditors cannot exercise, even should he refuse to avail himself of them.
The debtor in this case would only have the right to demand the reduction of the donation mortis coma to the disposable portion.
By Art. 1491 Civil Code, this reduction can be sued for only by forced heirs or by their heirs or assigns ; the wurd “ assigns” is defined to mean those whose rights have been transmitted by particular title, such as sale, donation, legacy, transfer and cession. O. C. 8522.
The creditors of the forced heir are not embraced within the definition, and cannot sue for the reduction.
APPEAL from the District Court of Carroll, Fa/rran•, J.
Short & Pao'ham, for plaintiffs and appellants.
L. Selby, for defendants.

Opinion:
Merrick, C. J.
The action of the creditors in avoidance of the contracts of their debtors, is allowed by the Code for the purpose of annulling some fraudulent act of the debtor himself.
But in this case the principal act complained of, is that of Joseph Prentice in making a will, by which he conveyed his whole estate to his mother, brother and sister. Had he given one-sixth of his estate to his father, Horace Prentice, there would have been no pretence for the institution of this action.
But Joseph Prentice was not the debtor of the plaintiffs. He owed them nothing.
By Article 1491 O. C. it is provided that on the death of the donor or testator, the reduction of the donation, whether inter vivos or mortis ecmsa, can be sued for only by forced heirs or by their heirs or assigns.
By Article 3522, the term "assigns" is defined to mean those whose rights have been transmitted by particular title, such as sale, donation legacy, transfer and cession. The French word ay ant-cause is defined in the same language. Moreover, the Article declares that whenever the terms of law employed in the Code have not been particularly defined therein, they shall be understood as defined in said Article. See 8 Toul., No. 245.
Now the law-giver must be understood to have used the word in the sense defined, because in the concluding portion of the Article the word " creditor" is used in contrast with the word " assigns."
Possibly the law-giver may have preferred to give effect to the wishes of the testator and allow his estate to take the direction he had indicated, rather than subject it to the seizure of creditors of an heir who did not feel himsejf aggrieved by the universal legacy to another.
In another place the Code says, that there are rights of the debtor which the creditors cannot exercise, even should he refuse to avail himself of them. They cannot require the separation of property between husband and wife, nor can they oblige their debtor to accept a donation inter vivos made to him, nor accept it in his stead. Neither can they call on a co-heir to collate when such debtor has not exercised that right. C. C. 1986, 1987. Article No. 1491 has but added another case of like nature to the list.
Had this very case been in the mind of the law-giver, it is not unreasonable to suppose that in the controversy to the estate of the testator between the mother, brother and sister of the deceased, and the creditors of the father, that the former would have been preferred. The letter of the law protects them in their possession under the will so long as the father of the deceased does not choose to disturb the dispositions of the will.
In our opinion what was in the mind of the compiler^Df the Napoleon Code, or what has been said by the French commentators, ought not to preponderate against the express definition of a term given by the compilers of our own Oode, and sanctioned by the law-making power.
Judgment affirmed.