Case Name: Dale Robert YATES, Petitioner v. James AIKEN, Warden, CCI, and the Attorney General, South Carolina, Respondents
Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1989-02-06
Citations: 301 S.C. 214
Docket Number: 22962
Parties: Dale Robert YATES, Petitioner v. James AIKEN, Warden, CCI, and the Attorney General, South Carolina, Respondents.
Judges: Harwell and Chandler, JJ., concur.
Reporter: South Carolina Reports
Volume: 301
Pages: 214–223

Head Matter:
22962
Dale Robert YATES, Petitioner v. James AIKEN, Warden, CCI, and the Attorney General, South Carolina, Respondents.
(391 S.E. (2d) 530)
Supreme Court
David I. Bruck and John H. Blume, and S.C. Office of Appellate Defense, Columbia, for petitioner.
Atty. Gen. T. Travis Medlock and Chief Deputy Atty. Gen. Donald J. Zelenka, Columbia, for respondents.
Submitted June 6, 1988.
Decided Feb. 6, 1989.

Opinion:
Gregory, Chief Justice:
This case is before us on a petition for writ of habeas corpus. We deny the petition.
In 1981 petitioner was convicted of murder, armed robbery, assault and battery with intent to kill, and conspiracy. He was sentenced to death. The convictions and sentence were affirmed on appeal to this Court. State v. Yates, 280 S.C. 29, 310 S.E. (2d) 805 (1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1124, 103 S. Ct. 3098, 77 L. Ed. (2d) 1356 (1983).
Petitioner's subsequent application for post-conviction relief was denied by the circuit court in 1984. He then petitioned this Court for review of-that denial by way of writ of certiorari. He simultaneously petitioned for habeas corpus relief on the ground the trial judge's charge on implied malice was improper under state law and under Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S. Ct. 1965, 85 L. Ed. (2d) 344 (1985).
This Court summarily denied the petitions. The United States Supreme Court vacated the denial of the petition for writ of habeas corpus and remanded for reconsideration in light of its decision in Francis v. Franklin. Yates v. Aiken, 474 U.S. 896, 106 S. Ct. 218, 88 L. Ed. (2d) 218 (1985).
On remand this Court clarified the denial of the petition under state law. Yates v. Aiken, 290 S.C. 231, 349 S.E. (2d) 84 (1986). Dissatisfied with this Court's disposition under Francis v. Franklin, however, the United States Supreme Court reversed the denial of the petition for habeas corpus. Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S. 211, 108 S. Ct. 534, 98 L. Ed. (2d) 546 (1988). It held Francis v. Franklin, which condemns a mandatory presumption regarding proof of an element of the crime, applies retroactively to cases pending on collateral review because it merely reiterates the principles announced in the 1979 decision of Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S. Ct. 2450, 61 L. Ed. (2d) 39 (1979). This case was again remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. 484 U.S. at 218, 108 S. Ct. at 538, 98 L. Ed. (2d) at 554.
Acquiescing in the conclusion that the trial judge's charge on implied malice constituted an improper mandatory presumption, we now address whether the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We hold it is.
In Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 106 S. Ct. 3101, 92 L. Ed. (2d) 460 (1986), the United States Supreme Court held jury instructions that violate Francis v. Franklin are subject to a harmless error analysis. The reviewing court must determine whether on the whole record the erroneous mandatory presumption is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 478 U.S. at 583, 106 S. Ct. at 3109, 92 L. Ed. (2d) at 474. The pertinent inquiry is whether the evidence is so dispositive of the element subject to the presumption that the reviewing court can say beyond a reasonable doubt the jury would have found it unnecessary to rely on the invalid presumption. Id. Such an inquiry requires us to review the trial judge's charge and the facts of this case in the context of the malice element of the offenses charged.
We restate the facts as set forth in our earlier opinion in this case. Yates and his compatriot Henry Davis spent two days driving around the Greenville area looking for a store to rob. The two finally agreed upon a rural store operated by Willie Wood and entered the store. Yates, armed with a gun, and Davis, brandishing a knife, confronted Wood who was standing behind the store counter. Yates demanded money. Wood hesitated and Davis repeated the demand. Wood gave Davis approximately $3,000 in cash from the cash register. Davis then ordered Wood to lie across the counter. When Wood refused, Yates pointed his gun at Wood. Wood stepped back and raised his hands in a defensive posture. Yates fired. The bulled passed completely through Wood's hand and tore the flesh on Wood's chest.
Alerted by the noise, Wood's mother, Helen Wood, entered the store from a door leading to the adjoining post office. Wood started from behind the counter with his own gun. Davis lunged at Mrs. Wood with his knife. The three struggled together for a few moments before Wood began shooting Davis. Mrs. Wood fell to the floor from knife wounds in her chest and died within moments. Davis died at the scene from gunshot wounds.
After shooting Wood in the chest, Yates took the money from Davis and fled. Yates was not present in the store when Mrs. Wood and Davis were killed but was waiting in the car for Davis to join him.
The State sought petitioner's conviction for the murder of Mrs. Wood on the theory of accomplice liability. Under state law, if two or more parties combine together to commit an unlawful act, and in the commission of that act one party commits a homicide that is a probable or natural consequence thereof, all present participating in the unlawful act are as guilty as the one who committed the homicide. State v. Johnson, 291 S.C. 127, 352 S.E. (2d) 480 (1987); State v. Crowe, 258 S.C. 258, 188 S.E. (2d) 379 (1972); State v. Gilbert, 107 S. Ct. 443, 93 S.E. 125 (1917). The trial judge thoroughly and properly instructed the jury on the theory of accomplice liability. To accommodate petitioner's defense, the judge further charged that a party is not liable as an accomplice for a murder committed by the slayer as an independent act of private malice, nor is a party liable if he withdraws entirely from the unlawful act before the homicide is committed.
We do not sit as a reviewing court in this case to redetermine factual findings supporting the jury's verdict that petitioner is guilty of murder under a theory of accomplice liability. Contrary to petitioner's assertions in brief, we need not revisit the purported evidence of withdrawal from the commission of the armed robbery, nor must we reexamine the conclusion that Mrs. Wood's murder was a probable or natural consequence of this unlawful act. Our singular inquiry in this case is whether it is beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have found it unnecessary to rely on the erroneous mandatory presumption regarding the element of malice. Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. at 583, 106 S. Ct. at 3109, 92 L. Ed. (2d) at 474.
Our review of the record reveals two erroneous charges regarding implied malice. First, the trial judge charged the "willful, deliberate, and intentional doing of an unlawful act withput any just cause or excuse." Second, he charged: "malice is implied or presumed from the use of a deadly weapon . . [you are to determine] whether malice existed in the mind and heart of the killer at the time the fatal blow was struck."
Under state law, murder is defined as the killing of any person with malice aforethought, either express or implied. S.C. Code Ann. § 16-8-10 (1985). On the facts of this case, as charged by the trial judge, the element of malice relied on by the State is that of the killer, Henry Davis. We therefore focus on the facts surrounding Henry Davis' brutal multiple stabbing of Mrs. Wood. We find beyond a reasonable doubt the jury would have found it unnecessary to rely on either erroneous mandatory presumption in concluding that Davis acted with malice in killing Mrs. Wood.
The only context in which the element of malice relates to petitioner's individual acts is the offense of assault and battery with intent to kill. This offense is defined under state law as an unlawful act of a violent nature to the person of another with malice aforethought, express or implied. State v. Hinson, 253 S.C. 607, 172 S.E. (2d) 548 (1970). We find beyond a reasonable doubt the jury would have found it unnecessary to rely on either erroneous mandatory presumption in concluding that petitioner acted with malice when he shot Willie Wood who was in a defenseless position.
Pursuant to Rose v. Clark and based on our exhaustive review of the record, we hold any error under Francis v. Franklin is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The petition for writ of habeas corpus is therefore
Denied.
Harwell and Chandler, JJ., concur.
Finney and Toal, JJ., dissent in separate opinion.
Petitioner argued that under State v. Woods, 282 S.C. 18, 316 S.E. (2d) 673 (1984), he was entitled to retroactive application of our decision in State v. Elmore, 279 S.C. 417, 308 S.E. (2d) 781 (1983), which barred an implied malice charge creating a mandatory rebuttable presumption rather than a permissive inference.
We held retroactive application of Elmore is limited to cases pending on direct appeal at the time Elmore was decided and does not apply to collateral attacks. See McClary v. State, 287 S.C. 160, 337 S.E. (2d) 218 (1985).
We note that under this analysis petitioner would not be eligible in federal habeas corpus proceedings to raise the mandatory presumption issue because counsel did not raise this issue under Sandstrom on direct appeal in state court. Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 104 S. Ct. 2901, 82 L. Ed. (2d) 1 (1984); cf. Franklin v. State, 245 Ga. 141, 263 S.E. (2d) 666, cert. denied, 447 U.S. 930, 100 S. Ct. 3029, 65 L. Ed. (2d) 1124 (1980) (wherein petitioner in Francis v. Franklin raised mandatory presumption issue under Sandstrom in state court). Of course, we are constrained to accept the high court's mandate that Francis v. Franklin applies here.