Case Name: Gussie L. LIGHTY, Appellant, v. SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Respondent
Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1985-05-22
Citations: 285 S.C. 508
Docket Number: 22332
Parties: Gussie L. LIGHTY, Appellant, v. SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Respondent.
Judges: Gregory, Harwell and Chandler, JJ., concur.
Reporter: South Carolina Reports
Volume: 285
Pages: 508–512

Head Matter:
22332
Gussie L. LIGHTY, Appellant, v. SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Respondent.
(330 S. E. (2d) 529)
Supreme Court
Malcolm K. Johnson, Hartsville, for appellant.
Atty. Gen. T. Travis Medlock, Retired Atty. Gen. Daniel R. McLeod, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen. Nan L. Black, Asst. Atty. Gen. P. Brooks Shealy, Columbia and Asst. Atty. Gen. G. Conrad Derrick, Florence, for respondent.
Heard Oct. 3, 1984.
Decided May 22, 1985.

Opinion:
Moore, Acting Associate Justice:
Respondent, South Carolina Department of Social Services, instituted this action against appellant, Gussie L. Lighty, for past child support furnished to Lighty's alleged child while in the care of her great aunt. Appellant's demurrer to the Petition on the ground the family court lacked subject matter jurisdiction was overruled by the family court judge. We reverse.
Respondent's Petition alleges the appellant is the natural mother of the minor child, Latrina Lighty, who was born on February 23, 1974. It also asserts the appellant failed to support her child and that therefore, the Department of Social Services paid $3,140.46 in Aid to Families with Dependent Children benefits to the child's great aunt, Novella Lighty, who had custody of the child. The Petition prays for an order requiring appellant to make periodic payments in a reasonable amount to reimburse the Department of Social Services for the public assistance it provided for the child. The Petition is based upon an assignment which Novella Lighty executed in favor of the South Carolina Department of Social Services prior to receiving any benefits for the minor.
The issue presented for this Court's review is whether the family courts have subject matter jurisdiction to determine a parent's liability for past support paid by the South Carolina Department of Social Services. We hold this action is one based upon a contract for the payment of a debt; therefore, jurisdiction is vested in the circuit court.
In the past, the issue of family court jurisdiction in the area of separation agreements has caused this Court great consternation. Until recently, words of art such as "incorporated" and "merged" controlled jurisdiction. In Moseley v. Mosier, 279 S. C. 348, 306 S. E. (2d) 624 (1983), the Court recognized that the parties' intent is rarely revealed from the words of art employed in an agreement, and ruled that any agreement approved by the family court remains subject to the court's supervisory and enforcement powers absent an unambiguous provision denying the family court jurisdiction.
Our decision in this case, however, does not turn upon words of art; rather, it is predicated upon the very nature of the action instituted by the respondent. Although the Department argues persuasively that this is an action for child support, it is clearly an action for a debt, not unlike an action against one spouse for necessaries provided to the other spouse. See Richland Memorial Hospital v. Burton, 282 S. C. 159, 318 S. E. (2d) 12 (1984). As such, it is purely contractual in nature and is outside the jurisdiction of the family court. See Zwerling v. Zwerling, 273 S. C. 292, 255 S. E. (2d) 850 (1979); Fielden v. Fielden, 274 S. C. 219, 262 S. E. (2d) 43 (1980). Family courts generally do not have jurisdiction to enforce contractual agreements not incorporated or merged into court orders. Bryant v. Varat, 278 S. C. 77, 292 S. E. (2d) 298 (1982); Kane v. Kane, 280 S. C. 479, 313 S. E. (2d) 327 (S. C. App. 1984).
There is no question that family courts have continuing jurisdiction to modify child support. Moseley v. Mosier, supra. Here, however, there was no prior order of the family court either granting Novella Lighty custody of the minor child or requiring the appellant to provide support. Significantly, no request for present child support was included in respondent's Petition.
The propriety of granting or overruling a demurrer is limited to a consideration of the four corners of the complaint or petition. Preston H. Haskell Company v. Morgan, 274 S. C. 261, 262 S. E. (2d) 737 (1980). We have carefully reviewed the face of the Petition filed by the Department in this case and have discerned no allegations which would vest jurisdiction of this matter in the family court. Therefore, the order overruling the demurrer is reversed and this matter is remanded to the family court with directions to enter judgment in favor of the appellant.
Reversed and remanded.
Gregory, Harwell and Chandler, JJ., concur.
Gregory, J., concurs in separate opinion.
Ness, J., dissents in separate opinion.