Case Name: In the Matter of Director of the Assigned Counsel Plan of the City of New York, Appellant. Hillel Bodek, Respondent; The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. James Townsend, Defendant. (And Other Criminal Actions)
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1995-12-21
Citations: 87 N.Y.2d 191
Docket Number: 
Parties: In the Matter of Director of the Assigned Counsel Plan of the City of New York, Appellant. Hillel Bodek, Respondent. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v James Townsend, Defendant. (And Other Criminal Actions).
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 87
Pages: 191–198

Head Matter:
[661 NE2d 988, 638 NYS2d 415]
In the Matter of Director of the Assigned Counsel Plan of the City of New York, Appellant. Hillel Bodek, Respondent. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v James Townsend, Defendant. (And Other Criminal Actions).
Argued October 17, 1995;
decided December 21, 1995
POINTS OF COUNSEL
Paul A. Crotty, Corporation Counsel of New York City (Julian L. Kalkstein, Leonard Koerner and Larry A. Sonnenshein of counsel), for appellant.
I. County Law § 722-c, which authorizes the provision of expert services necessary for the defense of an indigent defendant, and which sets a limit of $300 per matter except in "extraordinary circumstances” was not enacted to provide a vehicle whereby a particular social worker could perform mental health evaluations at $100 per hour and, in virtually every matter he handled, charge thousands of dollars and thereby secure a yearly remuneration that exceeded the salary of every single other 18-B expert, Judge and elected official in the State of New York when the same services are available at far less cost. (People v Louis, 161 Misc 2d 667; Ake v Oklahoma, 470 US 68; Matter of Werfel v Agresta, 36 NY2d 624; People v Perry, 27 AD2d 154; United States v Durant, 545 F2d 823; People v Gallow, 171 AD2d 1061, 77 NY2d 995; United States v Oliver, 626 F2d 254.) II. The City, as a nonparty to a criminal action, has a right of appeal to an order from the Criminal Court directing it to pay the fee of an expert appointed pursuant to County Law § 722-c. (Matter of Werfel v Agresta, 36 NY2d 624; Brady v Ottaway Newspapers, 97 AD2d 451, 63 NY2d 1031; People v New York Cent R. R. Co., 29 NY 418; Matter of New York City Dept. of Envtl. Protection v New York City Civ. Serv. Commn., 78 NY2d 318; Matter of Abrams [John Anonymous], 62 NY2d 183; People v Schonfeld, 74 NY2d 324; Matter of Byrnes v County of Monroe, 128 Misc 2d 700; Corkum v Bartlett, 46 NY2d 424; Matter of Guardian Life Ins. Co. v Bohlinger, 308 NY 174.)
King & Spalding, New York City (Brian Rosner of counsel), for Hillel Bodek, respondent.
The May 12, 1993 orders directing the City to compensate a defense expert appointed by the trial court pursuant to County Law § 722-c are not reviewable on appeal. (Matter of Werfel v Agresta, 36 NY2d 624; People v Ward, 199 AD2d 683; Matter of Kindlon v County of Rensselaer, 158 AD2d 178; Byrnes v County of Monroe, 129 AD2d 229; People v Elliot, 98 Misc 2d 424; People v Louis, 161 Misc 2d 667.)
Malvina Nathanson, New York City, for New York State Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, amicus curiae.
Under the enabling legislation and the effectuating plans, rules and regulations, the City must pay the section 722-c vouchers as approved by the trial courts. (Matter of Kindlon v County of Rensselaer, 158 AD2d 178; Byrnes v County of Monroe, 129 AD2d 229; People v Perry, 27 AD2d 154; Ake v Oklahoma, 470 US 68; Matter of Werfel v Agresta, 36 NY2d 624.)

Opinion:
OPINION OF THE COURT
Per Curiam.
In Matter of Werfel v Agresta (36 NY2d 624), this Court held that an order issued pursuant to County Law § 722 and 722-b regarding an assigned criminal defense attorney's compensation is not subject to appellate review. This appeal requires us to consider the appealability and reviewability of compensation orders issued pursuant to County Law § 722-c.
The dispute arises out of services that were rendered by respondent Hillel Bodek, a certified social worker, in connection with several criminal cases that were pending before the Supreme Court in New York County. In each instance, Bodek had been appointed by the court to provide professional services to indigent defendants and the court directed that the City of New York pay him at a rate of $100 an hour for those services. In seven of the eight cases, the court also found "extraordinary circumstances" justifying significant departures from the statutory norm of $300 per case (see, County Law § 722-c).
The Director of the Assigned Counsel Plan for New York City asked the two Supreme Court Justices who had issued the compensation orders to reconsider them, particularly in light of contemporary budget constraints and the $45 maximum hourly rate for social workers prescribed by the Chief Administrator of the Courts (see, 22 NYCRR 127.2 [b]). Her requests for relief, which were made through informal letters and a formal motion (see, 22 NYCRR 127.2 [b]), were unsuccessful.
Following the denial of all of her fee reduction requests, the Director attempted to appeal from the Supreme Court's various "orders." The Appellate Division consolidated the appeals and affirmed. Conceding that the challenged orders might technically be appealable by the Director, an aggrieved nonparty, the Court nevertheless declined to consider the appeals' merits, holding that the orders were not reviewable under Matter of Werfel v Agresta (supra). This Court subsequently granted the Director leave to take a further appeal.
Initially, we note that, with respect to the appealability question, there is no meaningful distinction between the County Law '§§ 722 and 722-b assigned-counsel compensation order sought to be appealed in Matter of Werfel v Agresta (supra) and the County Law § 722-c assigned-expert compensation orders sought to be appealed here. Nonetheless, the rationale in Werfel does not pose an impenetrable barrier to appealing these challenged orders, since the analyses in more recent cases such as Matter of Abrams (John Anonymous) (62 NY2d 183), Matter of Hynes v Karassik (47 NY2d 659) and Matter of Cunningham v Nadjari (39 NY2d 314) are fatal to the continuing validity of that rationale in the present context (cf., Matter of Santangello v People, 38 NY2d 536; Matter of Alphonso C., 38 NY2d 923).
Despite the technical appealability of the challenged orders, however, the Appellate Division did not err in refusing to entertain the merits of the Director's challenge. As is indicated in the final paragraphs of Werfel (supra, at 627), trial court orders granting or denying increases in the statutorily recommended fees under County Law § 722, 722-b and 722-c "provide no basis for justiciable review." Such orders are essentially administrative in nature and, accordingly, are not amenable to judicial review on the merits by an appellate panel (cf., Matter of Harvey v County of Rensselaer, 83 NY2d 917 [addressing court's power under County Law § 701 to award compensation for services performed by Special Prosecutor's associates]).
Although the point is not dispositive, we note that formal appellate review of these compensation orders is impractical, since the appeals courts are several steps removed from the circumstances in which the services were rendered and are therefore not well positioned to assess the wisdom of the Trial Judges' discretionary choices. To the extent that the trial courts' unreviewable discretion produces truly anomalous consequences or patterns of abuse in particular situations, the problem can and should be addressed through the available administrative tools.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, without costs.