Case Name: Oscar H. DODSON et al., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Louis A. FONTENOT, Defendant-Appellant
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1973-11-12
Citations: 285 So. 2d 328
Docket Number: No. 4309
Parties: Oscar H. DODSON et al., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Louis A. FONTENOT, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: Before CULPEPPER, MILLER and PONDER, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 285
Pages: 328–332

Head Matter:
Oscar H. DODSON et al., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Louis A. FONTENOT, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 4309.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
Nov. 12, 1973.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 3, 1973.
Frugé & Foret by J. Burton Foret, Ville Platte, for defendant-appellant.
Lewis & Lewis by Seth Lewis, Jr., Opelousas, for plaintiff-appellee.
Before CULPEPPER, MILLER and PONDER, JJ.

Opinion:
MILLER, Judge.
Plaintiffs Oscar H. Dodson and Lula Wharton Van Hoose seek recognition of a judgment of the District Court of Dallas County, Texas. The Louisiana resident defendant, Louis A. Fontenot, contends that the Texas judgment is void for lack of personal jurisdiction of the Texas courts. From an adverse judgment, Fontenot appeals. We affirm.
The issue is whether the Texas court had personal jurisdiction over Fontenot under the Texas Longarm Statute. Could the Texas courts interpret their Longarm stat ute to provide jurisdiction over Fontenot under the facts of this case and, if so, could such an interpretation violate the due process requirements of the U.S. Constitution?
Fontenot has been domiciled in St. Landry Parish, Louisiana since 1962. He is in the business of breeding, buying and selling horses. Fontenot received by mail a cata-logue containing notice of a horse auction in Dallas, Texas. On September 10, 1966, he attended the auction and bid in three mares, two of which had foals at their side and the third having been bred. While in Texas Fontenot paid for the purchase by check drawn on his Louisiana bank. While in Texas Fontenot made arrangements to have the horses delivered to his Louisiana horse farm along with registration papers on the mares and breeding certificates on the foals.
The horses and foals were delivered in good condition to Fontenot's Louisiana horse farm along with registration certificates on the mares, but breeding certificates on the foals were not delivered. Fontenot then stopped payment on his check and notified plaintiffs that payment would be withheld until the missing papers were supplied. Fontenot had telephone conversations with the Dallas vendors on several occasions. He testified that he never did receive the breeding certificates. He made no effort to return the mares and foals or to pay for his purchase. He bred some of the animals, sold some and traded others. He has no records concerning the few that died several years after the purchase.
Fontenot testified that the auction in question is the only one which he attended in Texas, and there is no evidence to show that he brought or sold other horses or did other business in Texas.
Plaintiffs sued Fontenot in the District Court of Dallas County, Texas. Service and citation were made on the Secretary of State of Texas, as statutory agent for Fontenot, and the Texas judgment recites that such service was forwarded to Fonte-not as required by law. Judgment by default was rendered against Fontenot on February 13, 1968 in the total sum of $1,-925.00 plus attorney's fees and costs. Plaintiffs now seek to have recognized this Texas judgment in the courts of Louisiana.
Article 2031b, Sec. 2 of the Texas Long-arm Statute, Vernon's Ann.Civ.St., provides for jurisdiction over nonresident natural persons who "shall engage in business" in Texas, and Sec. 4 provides that persons "shall be deemed doing business in this State by entering into contract by mail or otherwise with a resident of Texas to be performed in whole or in part by either party in this State. . . ."
As is true of the Louisiana Long-arm Statute, LSA-R.S. 13:3201-13:3207, the purpose of the Texas statute is to exploit the fullest permissible reach of state court jurisdiction over nonresidents under International Shoe Company v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945); McGee v. International Life Insurance Company, 355 U.S. 220, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957); and Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958).
In O'Brien v. Lanpar Company, 399 S.W.2d 340 (1966) the Texas Supreme Court (at 399 S.W.2d page 342) listed three basic factors for establishing jurisdiction over non-residents:
(1) The nonresident defendant ór foreign corporation must purposefully do some act or consummate some transaction in the forum state;
(2) the cause of action must arise from, or be connected with, such act or transaction; and
(3) the assumption of jurisdiction by the forum state must not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, consideration being given to the quality, nature, and extent of the activity in the forum state, the relative convenience of the parties, the benefits and protection of the laws of the forum state afforded the respective parties, and the basic equities of the situation.
See also Atwood Hatcheries v. Heisdorf & Nelson Farms, 357 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1966); Custom Textiles, Inc. v. Crown Sample Book Company, 472 S.W.2d 848 (Tex.Civ. App.1971).
We conclude that the Texas courts could find the present judgment valid. Fontenot who is in the business of buying and selling horses, flew to Dallas for the sole purpose of bidding on horses at auction. He successfully bid on several mares and foals. He paid for them by check issued in Texas. While in Texas he contracted for the delivery of the mares and foals to his Louisiana horse farm and arranged to have the proper registration papers delivered to him. Fontenot made several telephone calls to Texas concerning breeding certificates. These are sufficient contacts to confer jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant under the Texas Longarm Statute. See Moore v. Central Louisiana Electric Company, Inc., La., 273 So.2d 284 (1973); Drilling Engineering, Inc. v. Independent Indonesian American Petroleum Company, La., 283 So.2d 687 (1973).
We are required to give the Texas judgment the same full faith and credit in Louisiana as that judgment would receive in Texas. 28 U.S.C. § 1738; U.S. Constitution Article 4, section 1.
The case of Riverland Hardwood Company v. Craftsman Hardwood Lumber Company, 259 La. 635, 251 So.2d 45 (1971) is distinguished. The purchases before the court in Riverland were mail order purchases. See 239 So.2d 465 at 467 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1970). Had Fontenot limited his Texas contacts to mail order transactions, Riverland would be persuasive.
The trial court judgment is affirmed at appellant's costs.
Affirmed.
CULPEPPER, J., dissents and assigns written reasons.