Case Name: Terry HAWKINS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1994-06-22
Citations: 891 S.W.2d 257
Docket Number: No. 954-93
Parties: Terry HAWKINS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
Judges: MALONEY and MEYERS, JJ., joins.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 891
Pages: 257–264

Head Matter:
Terry HAWKINS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
No. 954-93.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, En Banc.
June 22, 1994.
Petition for Discretionary Review Denied Jan. 25, 1995.
Stuart C. Shelton (Court-appointed), Bowie, for appellant.
Barry S. Green, Dist. Atty., Lindy Bor-chardt, Asst. Dist. Atty., Robert Huttash, State’s Atty., and Matthew W. Paul, Asst. State’s Atty., Austin, for State.

Opinion:
OPINION ON STATE'S PETITIONS FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
McCORMICK, Presiding Judge.
Appellant was convicted for the offense of injury to a child. V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 22.04(b)(2). Appellant was sentenced to 20 years in prison. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals reversed appellant's conviction and ordered an acquittal. Hawkins v. State, 855 S.W.2d 881 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1993). We granted discretionary review to determine if the Court of Appeals erred in holding appellant had no legal duty to remove the infant victim from the abusive parent where appellant had no "familial relationship" with the infant, but had exercised care, custody and control over the infant. We will reverse.
Appellant was the live-in boyfriend of Theresa Hutchins, the biological mother of the infant victim. On four different occasions, Hutchins beat the infant in the presence of appellant. Appellant never attempted to prevent these attacks nor remove the infant from the abusive parent during the attacks. During the final attack, Hutchins swung her infant by its feet and struck its head against the arm of a couch causing permanent brain damage. The State accused appellant of injury to a child by failing to remove the child from the abusive mother, and alleged appellant had a duty to remove the child because he had assumed care, custody, and control of the child under Section 22.04(b)(2), supra. See also V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 22.04(a)(1).
The Court of Appeals concluded the State alleged appellant's duty to act under a "familial relationship theory." See V.T.C.A., Family Code, Section 11.03(a)(8); V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 22.04(b)(2). Because appellant was not the infant's biological father, was not Hutchins' husband, and had not lived with the infant for more than six months before the incident occurred, the Court of Appeals ruled appellant had not established, at the time of the incident, a "familial relationship" with the infant and had no legal means to remove the victim. Hawkins v. State, 855 S.W.2d at 882.
The State contends Section 22.04(b)(2) of the Texas Penal Code is not subject to the "familial relationship" requirement of Section 11.03(a)(8) of the Texas Family Code. We agree. Section 22.04 of the Texas Penal Code states in pertinent part:
"(a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence, by act or intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly by omission, causes to a child, elderly individual, or invalid individual:
"(1) serious bodily injury;
"(2) serious physical or mental deficiency or impairment;
"(3) disfigurement or deformity; or
"(4) bodily injury.
"(b) An omission that causes a condition described by Subsections (a)(1) through (a)(4) of this section is conduct constituting an offense under this section if:
"(1) the actor has a legal or statutory duty to act; or
"(2) the actor has assumed care, custody, or control of a child, elderly individual, or invalid individual." (emphasis added)
Section 22.04(b)(1) imposes a duty to act if the actor has a legal or statutory duty to prevent the injury to the child. Such is the case where the actor has a "familial relationship" with the child as provided for in Section 11.03(a)(8) of the Texas Family'Code. Section 22.04(b)(2) creates a duty to act if the actor has assumed care, custody, or control of the child. "The actor has assumed care, custody, or control if he has by act, words, or course of conduct acted so as to cause a reasonable person to conclude that he has accepted responsibility for protection, food, shelter, and medical care for a child, elderly individual, or invalid individual." V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 22.04(d). Under the above definition, no "familial relationship" is necessary to show a legal duty to act. We hold the plain meaning of Section 22.04(b)(2) does not require that the actor possess a duty under the Texas Family Code to protect the child victim. See generally Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782 (Tex.Cr.App.1991).
Here, because appellant was convicted of injury to a child under Section 22.04(b)(2), the State was not required to prove appellant had a duty under the Texas Family Code to protect the child victim. The Court of Appeals' decision is therefore reversed and the case remanded to the Court of Appeals for its further consideration in light of this opinion.