Case Name: DELUDE v. RAASAKKA
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1972-09-26
Citations: 42 Mich. App. 665
Docket Number: Docket No. 10418
Parties: DELUDE v RAASAKKA
Judges: Before: Danhof, P. J., and T. M. Burns and Van Valkenburg, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 42
Pages: 665–678

Head Matter:
DELUDE v RAASAKKA
Opinion op the Court
1. Arrest — Authority—Municipal Corporations — Home-Rule Cities.
The home-rule cities act limits a city police officer’s authority to arrest outside the city limits to the crime for which a person was pursued (MCLA 117.1 et seq.).
2. Arrest — Authority—Municipal Corporations.
City police officers pursuing a defendant beyond the city limits for a traffic violation have no authority to arrest the defendant for either a breach of the peace or for resisting arrest.
3. Arrest — Authority—Police Officers.
Police officers have authority to arrest outside their county, city, or village when they are acting in conjunction with officers regularly employed to enforce the laws outside that county, city, or village (MCLA 764.2a).
4. False Imprisonment — Unlawful Arrest — Police Officers — Civil Liability.
Any policemen who act and assist in an unlawful arrest are responsible for the entire damage caused to the person arrested even if they had no knowledge of the unlawfulness and intended to act in the strict discharge of their duties.
5. False Imprisonment — Unlawful Arrest — Liability.
The argument that a rule of law holding all policemen assisting in an unlawful arrest liable for the entire damage to the plaintiff will force police officers to either neglect their duties or run the risk of incurring liability is not properly addressed to a court but rather to the Legislature.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1-3, 8, 9,11] 5 Am Jur 2d, Arrest §§ 50, 51.
32 Am Jur 2d, False Imprisonment § 18.
32 Am Jur 2d, False Imprisonment §§ 104, 105, 112.
5 Am Jur 2d, Arrest § 94.
Modem status of rules as to right to-forcefully resist illegal arrest, 44 ALR3d 1078.
5 Am Jur 2d, Arrest § 38.
6. Damages — Avoidable Consequences — Instructions to Jury.
The trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury as to the doctrine of avoidable consequences in an action for false arrest where testimony indicated that the plaintiff had exercised reasonable care in mitigating damages by promptly seeking medical attention.
7. Arrest — Unlawful Arrest — Resistance to Arrest.
A person may use such force as is reasonably necessary to resist an unlawful arrest.
Dissent by Van Valkenburg, J.
8. Arrest — Authority—Municipal Corporations — Home-Rule Cities.
The home-rule cities act provides city police officers with the same authority as the sheriff of the county to arrest a person outside the city who has committed a crime within the city, thereby clothing the city officers with authority to arrest a pursued person for crimes other than that for which he was originally pursued beyond the city limits (MCLA 117.34).
9. Arrest — Authority—Police Officers — Assistance.
Police officers summoned to assist other police officers who have pursued beyond city limits a person who has committed a crime within the city are clothed with the same authority as the pursuing officers, i.e., they have statutory authority to act as officers of the county with respect to the person pursued; or even if they be regarded as private citizens, they have been summoned by duly-authorized peace officers to assist in making a valid and proper arrest (MCLA 117.34, 764.2a, 764.16).
10. Arrest — Authority—Private Citizens — Breach of the Peace.
A private person had the power at common law to arrest for breach of the peace committed in his presence, and because this power is not inconsistent with the statute enumerating the powers of a private person to make an arrest, it has not been abrogated by the statute (MCLA 764.16).
11. Arrest — Police Officers — Breach of the Peace.
An arrest for breach of the peace by city police officers beyond the city limits is not necessarily unlawful since private persons may arrest without a warrant a person committing a breach of the peace in their presence.
Appeal from Genesee, Anthony J. Mansour, J. Submitted Division 2 February 1, 1972, at Lansing.
(Docket No. 10418.)
Decided September 26, 1972.
Leave to appeal granted, 388 Micji 803.
Complaint by John C. Delude against Benny Raasakka and John Porn for damages for unlawful arrest and assault and battery. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendants appeal.
Affirmed.
A. Glenn Epps, for plaintiff.
Edward H. Devoe, for defendants.
Before: Danhof, P. J., and T. M. Burns and Van Valkenburg, JJ.
Former circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment pursuant to Const 1963, art 6, § 23 as amended in 1968.

Opinion:
T. M. Burns, J.
On January 27, 1967, plaintiff was allegedly unlawfully assaulted, arrested, and imprisoned by the defendants and others, all members of the Flint Police Department. Plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendants; and after a jury trial on the merits, obtained a judgment in the amount of $10,300. Defendants' timely motion for a new trial was denied July 27, 1970, and they now appeal.
Two officers of the Flint Police Department on the date in question observed the plaintiff driving a vehicle at excessive speeds within the City of Flint. The officers pursued the plaintiff and stopped him at a point beyond the corporate limits of the city. After being stopped, the plaintiff got out of his vehicle and upon request gave his driver's license to one of the officers. A short time later two other police cars from the City of Flint arrived at the scene. One of these cars was manned by the defendants.
At this juncture, there is a substantial dispute in the facts surrounding plaintiffs arrest. Plaintiff contended that he was pushed around and beaten for no apparent reason both at the site where he was originally stopped and later at the police station.
The police account is quite different. The officers who had initially stopped the plaintiff testified that plaintiff became boisterous and used foul language and that additional officers, including the defendants, were summoned to assist in subduing the plaintiff. Plaintiff was arrested for breach of the peace and resisting arrest. In any event, the jury considered all of the evidence in the case and returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.
Defendants raise three issues on appeal. They will be discussed in the order presented below.
1. Did the trial court err by instructing the jury that the arrest of the plaintiff was unlawful and that anyone assisting in the arrest was equally liable?
It is the defendants' position that the plaintiffs arrest was lawful for the reason that the city charter of Flint clothes the city police with the same power as the sheriff of the county for making arrests outside of the city limits. We disagree.
Despite the numerous citations by the defendants with respect to the validity of the Flint charter provision which purportedly gives extra-city effect to the arrest powers of Flint policemen, none of the cases cited can be said to stand for the proposition that a home-rule city's charter can vest such a power in law enforcement officers. The home-rule cities act, MCLA 117.1 et seq.; MSA 5.2071 et seq., contains no such provision. The sole section dealing with the arrest power of policemen for home-rule cities is found at MCLA 117.34; MSA 5.2114, which provides:
"When any person has committed or is suspected of having committed any crime or misdemeanor within a city, or has escaped from any city prison, the police officers of the city shall have the same right to pursue, arrest and detain such person without the city limits as the sheriff of the county."
There is no authority interpreting this section of the home rule cities act to guide us. The clear import of the statute, however, is that a home-rule city police officer's authority to arrest outside of the city is limited to arresting for the crime for which the person was pursued. Therefore, in the present case, the Flint police officers who observed the plaintiff driving at excessive speeds within the city and stopped him outside of the city only had the power to arrest the plaintiff for a traffic violation. They had no authority to arrest the plaintiff for either a breach of the peace or for resisting arrest.
In a further attempt to justify the plaintiff's arrest, defendants rely upon the following statute:
"Any peace officer of any county, city or village of this state may exercise authority and powers outside his own county, city or village, when he shall be enforcing the laws of the state of Michigan in conjunction with the Michigan state police, or in conjunction with any peace officer of the county, city or village in which he may be, the same as if he were in his own county, city or village."
From this, defendants erroneously argue that since the officers who originally stopped the plaintiff for a traffic violation had the same authority as the sheriff of the county, the officers were "enforcing the laws in conjunction with any peace officer of the county".
We can find no authority, nor has any been cited to us, which would support the novel theory advanced by the defendants. After a close reading of the plain language of the statute, we conclude that the statute here in question confers upon the police authority to act outside of their county, city, or village only when they are acting in conjunction with peace officers regularly employed to enforce the laws outside of that county, city, or village.
In the instant case, the Flint police were acting in conjunction with other Flint policemen while all of them were without the corporate limits of the city. No amount of abstract legal reasoning can magically transform the Flint policemen into sheriff's deputies. Flint policemen they were, and Flint policemen they remained.
Therefore, since the Flint officers were not acting in conjunction with peace officers from the area in which the arrests were made, the statute is wholly inapplicable to the instant case.
In view of the foregoing, we hold that the plaintiff's arrest was unlawful.
In addition, defendants assert that it was error for the trial court to instruct the jury that all participating officers in the unlawful arrest were liable. We disagree.
The law governing this issue is well settled. In Cook v Hastings, 150 Mich 289 (1907), the Michigan Supreme Court held that if an arrest by a policeman is unlawful, all of the other policemen who act and assist in that arrest are responsible for the entire damage caused the plaintiff, although they had no knowledge of its unlawfulness and intended to act in the strict discharge of their duties. Accord, King v Herfurth, 306 Mich 444 (1943).
However, the defendants impliedly argue that under this rule a policeman will be forced to either neglect his duty or run the risk of incurring liability for wrongful arrests. In answer to this argument, we quote with approval the following language of the Court in Cook v Hastings, supra, at 291-292, wherein the same argument was asserted.
"If they [policemen] are sued, the court will pass judgment on their conduct in accordance, not with the judge's notion of justice, but in accordance with a law which condemns. It is not for the judge presiding over the court to determine whether or not he will apply that law. He has no choice. He did not make the law, and he cannot change it. That law is as obligatory on him as it is on the humblest suitor who ever appeared in his court. He is bound to apply it in determining controversies. The argument under consideration is in reality an appeal for a change of the law. It should have been addressed, not to a court, but to some other tribunal; a tribunal having authority to change the law."
We hold, therefore, that the trial court's instructions on this issue were not erroneous.
2. Did the trial court err in failing to charge as to the doctrine of avoidable consequences?
The defendants contend that the trial court should have given their requested instruction on the doctrine of avoidable consequences. We cannot agree.
The doctrine of avoidable consequences is applicable where the plaintiff has not exercised reasonable care in mitigating damages after a wrongful act has been committed; e.g., where plaintiff fails to seek proper medical attention when reasonable, and the failure to do so aggravates the injuries and increases the damages. See 22 Am Jur 2d, Damages § 30, 31.
In the instant case, there was no testimony which would show that plaintiff's damages were increased by a failure to seek medical treatment. On the contrary, the record reveals that the plaintiff went to a doctor shortly after being released from jail.
Therefore, the doctrine of avoidable consequences is not applicable to the facts of the present case, and the trial judge properly refused to charge as to this doctrine.
3. Did the trial court err in charging the jury that plaintiff might use reasonable force to resist an unlawful arrest?
Finally, defendants contend that it was error for the trial court to charge the jury that the plaintiff was entitled to use reasonable force in resisting an illegal arrest. Defendants' contention is without merit.
A party may use such force as is reasonably necessary to resist an unlawful arrest. People v Krum, 374 Mich 356 (1965); People v Gray, 23 Mich App 139 (1970); People v Bonello, 25 Mich App 600 (1970).
We hold, therefore, the trial court's instructions on this point were not erroneous.
Affirmed.
Danhof, P. J., concurred.
"Section 35. Powers of Division of Police. The Director of Public Safety and all members of the division of Police shall have the same powers as Sheriffs and Constables in serving civil or criminal process and making arrests within the state, both within and without the city; they shall have power to arrest, without process, any person who in the presence of the arresting officer shall be engaged in the violation of any state law or city ordinance and to detain such person until complaint can be made and process issued for his arrest, which complaint shall be made as speedily as possible after such arrest."
MCLA 764.2a; MSA 28.861(1).