Case Name: ZENNER v. BROOKLYN HEIGHTS R. CO
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1916-06-02
Citations: 159 N.Y.S. 450
Docket Number: 
Parties: ZENNER v. BROOKLYN HEIGHTS R. CO.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 159
Pages: 450–453

Head Matter:
(173 App. Div. 194)
ZENNER v. BROOKLYN HEIGHTS R. CO.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
June 2, 1916.)
1. Street Railroads ©=>98(6)—Injury on Track—Contributory Negli-
gence.
One about to cross a street railroad track must take at least some precaution for his own safety, and has no right to assume that a car will be operated so as to permit him! safely to cross in front of it.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Street Railroads, Cent. Dig. § 207; Dec. Dig. ©=>98(6).]
2. Street Railroads ©=>85(5)—Rights oe Pedestrians.
Between regular street crossings the right of a street railroad to operate its cars upon its tracks is superior to that of a pedestrian.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Street Railroads, Cent. Dig. §§ 193,195; Dec. Dig. ©=>85(5).]
3. Street Railroads ©=>98(7)—Injury at Crossing—Contributory Negli-
gence.
Plaintiff, who, when within 6 feet of where he was struck, stopped and looked, and saw a car approaching about 150 feet away, and who proceed ed, and, looking again, saw it 75 feet away, moving more rapidly than when he had iirst seen it, and then deliberately walked upon the track directly in front of it, was guilty of contributory negligence.
<@=»For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Street Railroads, Gent. Dig. § 207; Dec. Dig. <3=98(7).]
4. Street Railroads <3=93(3)—Injury at Crossing—Negligence.
In such case the motorman, though he saw plaintiff approaching the track, was not required to sound the gong on the car, but might assume that plaintiff would wait until the car passed.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Street Railroads, Gent. Dig. § 199; Dee. Dig. <0=93(3).]
Laughlin and Dowling, JJ., dissenting.
<£^>For other cases sec same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes
Appeal from Trial Term, New York County.
Action by Jacob Zcnner against the Brooklyn Heights Railroad Company. From a judgment entered pursuant to a nonsuit, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.
Argued before CLARKE, P. J„ and McLAUGHLIN, LAUGHLIN, SCOTT, and DOWLING, JJ.
John E. McIntyre, of New York City (L. E. Fish, of New York City, on the brief), for appellant.
D. A. Marsh, of Brooklyn, for respondent.

Opinion:
McLAUGHLIN, J.
I think the complaint was properly dismissed. The evidence, in my opinion, did not establish the negligence of the defendant or plaintiff's freedom from contributory negligence. According to the plaintiff's own testimony, when he was about 6 feet from the point where he was struck by defendant's car, he stopped and looked, and then saw the car approaching about 150 feet away. He proceeded, looked again, and saw the car 75 feet away, moving more rapidly than when he first noticed it. Notwithstanding this fact, he deliberately walked onto the track directly in front of the approaching car. He then looked again, and,.while he attempted to retrace his steps, the car was so close to him he was unable to get out of its way.
The plaintiff at all the times was practically facing the car, and there was nothing between him and it to obstruct his view. There was an obligation resting upon him to take at least some precaution for his own safety. He had no right to assume, as contended, that the car would be operated in such a manner as to permit him safely io cross in front of it. Freeman v. Brooklyn Heights R. R. Co., 82 App. Div. 521, 81 N. Y. Supp. 828.
Nor do I think that the rights of the parties at this point were equal. It was not at a regular crossing, and it has frequently been held that between street crossings—and I think the same rule here applies —the right of a street railroad to operate its cars upon its tracks is superior to that of a pedestrian. Fenton v. Second Avenue R. R. Co., 126 N. Y. 625, 26 N. E. 967; Thompson v. B. R. Co., 145 N. Y. 196, 39 N. E. 709; Barney v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 94 App. Div. 388, 88 N. Y. Supp. 335. The truth is the plaintiff deliberately chose to place himself in a position of danger, and his act in doing so was, in my opinion, negligent. It may be assumed that the motor man saw him approaching the tracks and that he did not sound the gong on the car. But there was no reason why he should do so. The plaintiff had stopped, and saw the car approaching, and the motorman had a right to assume that he would wait until the car passed. As was said in Byrnes v. Brooklyn Heights R. R. Co., 148 App. Div. 794, 133 N. Y. Supp. 243:
"Pedestrians can and do stop just short of the danger line in thousands of instances every day, and unless there is something to indicate to the motorofan that a different result is contemplated, there is no reason why he should not operate his car at title usual rate of speed at points other than street crossings."
When all of the testimony of 'the plaintiff is considered, the only inference which, as it seems to me, can be fairly drawn from it, is that without any regard for his own safety he stepped directly in front of the car, and in this way the accident occurred. In principle the case cannot be distinguished from Lofsten v. Brooklyn Heights R. R. Co., 184 N. Y. 148, 76 N. E. 1035; Byrnes v. Brooklyn Heights R. R. Co., supra; Tully v. New York City Ry. Co., 127 App. Div. 688, 111 N. Y. Supp. 919; Freeman v. Brooklyn Heights R. R. Co., supra; Weiss v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 33 App. Div. 221, 53 N. Y. Supp. 449, affirmed 165 N. Y. 665, 59 N. E. 1132.
I think the judgment should be affirmed, with costs. Order filed.
CLARKE, P. J., and SCOTT, J., concur.