Case Name: Case, Respondent, vs. Hoffman and others, imp., Appellants
Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Wisconsin
Decision Date: 1898-06-23
Citations: 100 Wis. 314
Docket Number: 
Parties: Case, Respondent, vs. Hoffman and others, imp., Appellants.
Judges: 
Reporter: Wisconsin Reports
Volume: 100
Pages: 314–368

Head Matter:
Case, Respondent, vs. Hoffman and others, imp., Appellants.
May 27, 1897
June 23, 1898.
(1-4) Appeal: Disqualification of judge who previously determined the same matter: Void judgment: Waiver: Reargument, when ordered. (5) Res ad judicata: Decision on demurrer. (6-11) Watercourses: Evidence: Substitution of canal: Right to water therefrom: Parol contract: Statute of frauds: Notice: Diversion of water: Injunction: Duty to maintain canal: Covenants.
1. In an action to restrain the diversion of water from a ditch or canal on the grounds that it was a watercourse and that the right to have the water flow therein had been acquired under a fully executed oral contract with defendants’ grantors, an order of the circuit court sustaining a general demurrer to the complaint was reversed on appeal on the ground that the facts alleged showed the existence of a natural watercourse, but it was not decided whether plaintiff had any rights under the alleged contract. On the trial before another circuit judge he found that an ancient watercourse flowed in the ditch and that the oral contract had been made and executed as alleged, and gave judgment for the plaintiff. On appeal from that judgment it was reversed on the grounds that the •evidence did not show a natural watercourse and that the contract proved (which was the same as that alleged in the complaint) was of no validity. Held, that in respect to the contract this was a decision of a matter which had been determined by the circuit judge who sustained the demurrer, and hence that he — having since become a justice of the supreme court — was disqualified, under sec. 2580, R. S. 1878, to participate in the decision involving that matter. Cassoday, C. J., and Marshall, J., are of the opinion that as to the existence of the watercourse, also, the question presented on the appeal from the judgment was the same as that presented on the earlier appeal, and hence that the judge from whom that appeal was taken was disqualified to take part in the decision of the supreme court upon any branch of the case upon the later appeal.
■2. Where a judge disqualified by statute to take part in the decision of a cause participates in the decision thereof — even though he acts simply as one of a bench composed of several judges — the judgment rendered is coram nonjudice and void, especially when, as in this case, the disqualified judge gave the casting vote and decided the causa
3. The disqualification of the judge in such a case cannot be waived or removed even by the express consent of the parties. Walker v. Sagan, 1 Wis. 597, distinguished and limited.
4. Where, upon an appeal, the justices of the supreme court who were qualified to sit were equally divided, and the deciding vote for reversal was cast by a justice disqualified to take part in the decision, the court, upon vacating the void judgment of reversal, may either enter judgment of affirmance or order a reargument. If a reargument is ordered, the case stands as if no judgment had in fact been entered.
5. The decision by the supreme court of questions arising upon a general demurrer to a complaint, so far as it is applicable to the facts subsequently established on a trial, is the law of the case by which the court must be governed upon an appeal from the judgment rendered on such trial. Thus, in this case, the facts alleged in the complaint having been held, on appeal from an order sustaining a demurrer, to describe a watercourse, and the trial court having thereafter found such facts to exist, following closely the language of the complaint and of the decision thereon, the sufficiency of such findings, if supported by the evidence, to establish the existence of the watercourse is res adjudieata upon an appeal from the judgment entered thereon.
fi. The evidence in this case is held to sustain findings by the trial court of the facts showing the existence of a watercourse through a marsh, within the former decision (84 Wis. 438). Winslow and Pinney, JJ., dissent.
7. Defendants’ grantors dug a ditch or canal across plaintiff’s land without his consent, which became a substitute for a natural watercourse, and diverted from such land a great amount of water which naturally came thereto. In times of high water large quantities of logs and débris escaped from the canal and were deposited upon plaintiff’s land. Plaintiff made a claim for damages, and then entered into a parol agreement with said grantors by which he agreed to permit the canal to remain as constructed and to forego his claim for damages, and they agreed to build a lateral waste-water ditch from which plaintiff was to receive so much water as was reasonably necessary for cranberry culture on his land; and the lateral ditch was build accordingly. Held, that as between the parties thereto this was a valid and binding contract, enforceable in equity.
8. The location of the canal and plaintiff’s open enjoyment of the rights and privileges appurtenant thereto at the time when defendants acquired their grantors’ interests therein was notice to defendants of his rights, and they were also chargeable with no tice that the waters of a natural stream had been diverted and could not be restored to their former course. Their rights under such purchase were therefore subject to the duties and obligations imposed upon their grantors, so far as the same were disclosed by the situation, and they had no right to alter the conditions, by changing the location and course of the ditch above plaintiff’s land, so as to divert the flow of water entirely therefrom. Winslow and Pinney, JJ., are of the opinion that the parol contract with defendants’ grantors did not fasten a perpetual servitude upon their lands, in whosesoever hands they might come, to furnish water to the plaintiff through the artificial canal.
9.The canal having become a substitute for a natural watercourse, and the plaintiff being entitled to receive therefrom so much water as was reasonably necessary for cranberry culture on his land, defendants should be required to restore the canal to the condition in which it was before their unlawful interference with it, and be restrained from diverting water from the canal or lessening its flow, and should be required also to build a bulkhead to hold back the water to which plaintiff was entitled, made necessary by their use of the water below plaintiff’s land, and to maintain such bulkhead so long as they continued such use of the water.
10. But, the delivery of water to plaintiff through the canal instead of as it came in a state of nature being an advantage to him, and there being nothing in his contract with defendants’ grantors requiring them to maintain the canal perpetually, and it not appearing that defendants are the owners of all the lands through which ■|ihe canal passes before reaching plaintiff’s land, and the ten years having expired during which, under the franchise acquired from their grantors (ch. 271, Laws of 1883), defendants had power to handle, own, and control the canal, defendants cannot be charged with any obligation to maintain the canal above plaintiff’s land; and, in case defendants should abandon their privileges and their use of the water in the canal below plaintiff’s land, they should be freed from any obligation to maintain the canal at any point.
11. An agreement by defendants, in the instrument of assignment by which they acquired their grantors’ rights and franchises in respect to the canal, to keep and maintain the canal in proper repair, was a covenant personal to said grantors and cannot be invoked in favor of plaintiff to compel the perpetual maintenance of the canal by defendants. ,
Appeal from a judgment of the circuit court for Jackson county: W. F. Bailey, Circuit Judge.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part.
The following statement of the facts was prepared by Mr. Justice NewMAN in connection with the opinion filed by him on September 28, 1898:
This is an action in equity to restrain the defendants from diverting the course of a ditch or alleged watercourse from the plaintiff’s lands, and to enforce the performance by the defendants of an alleged contract to maintain the ditch in its present location on plaintiff’s land, for the benefit of plaintiff’s cranberry marsh.
The parties are all owners of land on a large marsh, many miles in extent and covering the greater part of a government township of land. The marsh is generally nearly level, but dips to the east and to the south, but more to the east than to the south. The land is adapted to the culture of cranberries, and is valuable for that purpose, but is of little worth for any other purpose. The surface of the marsh is principally covered by a growth of moss, several inches in depth, with some grass and other vegetation, above a layer of peat of considerable but varying thickness, and all resting on a substratum of sand. The marsh is, in considerable part, made and fed by springs which arise towards the northeastern part of the township, and flow in channels into and form .a small lake of some forty acres in area, called “ Big Lake.” The waters of the lake flow out, through depressions in its low banks, to the east and to tile south. One such depression to the southeast bears some resemblance to a natural channel of a watercourse, for a short distance from the lake, where the apparent banks subside into and are lost in the general surface of the marsh. The plaintiff’s lands lie to the southeast of the lake, a distance of something over two miles. This depression, or natural channel from the lake, is lost and disappears about two miles above plaintiff’s land. The waters disappear from sight beneath the moss and vegetation, if not beneath the surface of the marsh, to reappear at a distance of a mile or more below the plaintiff’s land, where they are gathered together and form a distinct watercourse, which is known as the “West Branch of Beaver Creek.” In this distance of three miles or more intervening the points where the supposed channel from Big Lake disappears and the point where the “West Branch” becomes a definite stream, there is nothing which resembles the “ well-defined and substantial existence ” of a watercourse. There is no channel, with bed and banks. At most seasons of the year, there is no appearance of water above the vegetation. At times of melting snow and great rains, water spreads over a great part of the marsh for several miles in breadth, not only over the plaintiff’s land, but over the lands of adjoining proprietors, to the north and to the south of him. This water does not flow from or across the marsh in any defined current or channel, but stands in depressions until it disappears by evaporation or percolation. In such places the vegetation is killed, but the surface of the marsh is not broken by a water channel, nor do these places have, in any respect, the appearance of the continuous channel of a watercourse. They are widely dispersed over the surface of the marsh, and not in such relation to each other as to indicate a continuous channel across the marsh. They were designated by some of the surveyors as “pot holes.” Some of these “pot holes ” were upon the plaintiff’s land, some were to the north of it, some were to the south of it. There were no more distinct evidences of the existence of a watercourse across the plaintiff’s land than upon the lands of adjoining proprietors to the north or to the south, while the general dip of the marsh would seem to indicate that the larger part of the water would, in natural conditions, pass to the north.
In the years 1880 and 1881, Messrs. D. A. and C. A. Goodyear dug a ditch through a part of this marsh, above the plaintiff’s lands, extending to Big Lake. The primary object of this ditch was to enable the Goodyears to float'pine saw-logs to their sawmill, which was situated near the southeast- era. part of tbe marsh. In 1883, the legislature, by chapter 211 of that year, sanctioned the digging of the ditch, and gave a franchise to maintain it for a period of ten years. The ditch was of sufficient magnitude to successfully float logs to the mill. In its course the ditch ran through a corner of land belonging to the plaintiff. In times of freshet it gathered more water than would be contained by its banks. It would then overflow, to the damage of adjoining owners of the marsh. It became convenient to the Goodyears to accommodate this overflow by a lateral ditch across the land of the plaintiff. In October, 1885, they made an oral agreement with the plaintiff, whereby they agreed to permit the plaintiff to take water for his cranberry culture from the principal ditch, in consideration of his permission to dig the-lateral ditch upon his land. This agreement was not reduced to writing until February 21, 1891, when the Good-years gave the plaintiff a statement, in writing, that such an agreement had been made, and the substance of its provisions. The plaintiff’s privilege and the consideration are stated as follows: “Bussell Case was to be permitted to have the privilege of using such amount of water from the said logging ditch as might be necessary for his use upon his said premises in the cultivating and raising of cranberries, whenever the same might be needed for such purpose. The consideration for the said privilege of using such water was the permission granted by said Bussell Oase to said D. A. and O. A. Goodyear, to enter upon his said land, and to construct a ditch through and over the same; the said ditch to be used as an outlet in times of high water, for the safety of certain dams, . . . and to prevent overflow on the adjacent cranberry marshes.”
The Goodyears constructed the contemplated ditch, and the plaintiff used water from the logging ditch until near the time of the commencement of the action. The Good-years used the ditch for the floating of logs to their mill until the supply of logs was exhausted, in 1888. In October, 1889, they sold the ditch to the defendant Hoffmcm, who bought it with the design to use it to supply water for the irrigation of cranberry lands on the marsh belonging to him ■and the other defendants. The other defendants had some interest in the purchase of the ditch. Hoffmcm agreed with the Goodyears to keep the ditch in repair, to furnish water ■to irrigate Goodyears’ cranberry lands, and to save and keep the Goodyears “ free and harmless from all cost, liability, or damage on account of said ditch, or the construction, maintenance, and repair thereof, or for any want of repair thereof. ” There was a succession of dry seasons, which made a supply of water for the irrigation of cranberry lands in that neighborhood very desirable. The defendants deemed it to be to the advantage of their cranberry interests on the marsh to change the course of the ditch where it crossed the plaintiff’s land. There was some claim that he took more water from the ditch than he was entitled to. ,In 1891 they commenced the digging of a new ditch across the lands of the defendant Büelmey, above the plaintiff’s land, with the intention to divert the ditch entirely from the plaintiff’s land. This action was then brought to restrain the defendants from making the proposed change in the course and location of the ditch, and to compel the defendants to maintain and keep it in repair in its old location, so as to furnish the plaintiff with so much water as should be needed for the use of his cranberry marsh.
The trial court gave judgment, whereby it permanently enjoined the defendants from changing the course and location of the ditch, and directed them to maintain and keep the ditch in repair, so that the plaintiff could perpetually draw therefrom a supply of water for his cranberry land. From this judgment the defendants appeal.
For the appellants there were briefs by Bushnell, Rogers & Hall, and oral argument by A. R. Bushnell and F. W. Hall.
For the respondent there was a brief by La Follette, Harper, Roe & Zimmerman, and oral argument by R. M. La Follette and G. E. Roe.
They argued, among other things, that the facts disclosed in the record establish a natural watercourse. Hinlele v. Avery, 88 Iowa, 47; Rummell v. Lamb, 100 Mich. 424; Lmx v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255; Bunting v. Hides, 7 Reports, 293; 4 Lead. Gas. Am. Law of Real Prop. 309 and notes. Even if the water in question does not technically constitute a watercourse, the plaintiff could still enjoin the defendants from diverting the same from his land. Courts have refused to apply the ruie applicable to surface water where the water was a benefit and not an injury. Abbott v. K. O., St. J. c& G. B. R. Go. 83 Mo. 272; O'Brien v. St. Paul, 25 Minn. 335; Ghesley v. Fung, 74 Me. 174; Washb. Easements, 49; Swett v. Gutts, 50 N. H. 439; McGlure v. RedWing, 28 Minn. 186; Pettigrew v. Evansville, 25 Wis. 229; Hoyt v. Hudson, 27 id. 659. The Goodyear contract was one that a court of equity will enforce. Morse v. Gopeland, 2 Gray, 302; Vcm Ohlen v. Vcm Ohlen, 56 Ill. 529; Reride v. Kern, 14 Serg. & R. 267; Goffmcm v. Robbins, 8 Oreg. 278; Veghte v. Raritan W. P. Go. 19 N. J. Eq. 142; Olmstead v. Abbott, 61 Yt. 281; Wewcomb v. Royce, 42 Neb. 323; Bunting v. Hides, 7 Reports, 293.

Opinion:
The following opinions were filed September 28, 1898:
Newman, J.
The main inquiry on this appeal is whether the evidence establishes the existence of an ancient watercourse across the plaintiff's land, which was diverted into the logging ditch which was dug by the Goodyears, or whether the water which was gathered into and conducted by that ditch was mere surface and percolating water; for, although the plaintiff does not now complain of the digging of the ditch, but, on the contrary, finds it to be to his advantage and desires it to be maintained and kept in repair in its present location upon his land, still the question whether the ditch diverted an ancient watercourse, or is a mere conduit of surface water, has an important bearing, and may be controlling, upon the question of the right of the defendants to change the course and location of the ditch so as that it shall not cross the plaintiff's land. If it was, in truth, an ancient watercourse, it is the right of the plaintiff that it be-allowed to flow through his land as it was accustomed afore-time to flow, or, at least, in the substituted channel which the defendants have provided for it. While, on the other hand, if it be mere surface water which is gathered into and conducted by the ditch, its diversion from his land is not such a wrong as affords him ground for an action. If he is damaged by it, it is dartvnvm absque vnjwria. So, the question whether it was an ancient watercourse which was diverted by the Goodyear ditch is the question upon which the case turns, and it is a question of no inconsiderable practical importance to the parties to the present action, not only, but to all that portion of the public which is interested in the culture of cranberries.
Cranberry marshes are improved in various ways, — if too wet, by the drainage of the surface and percolating water; if too dry, by the storage of the surface and percolating water by means of dams, to be used, at the proper time, in irrigation, or to protect the crop from untimely frosts by inundation. If it shall be deemed that a marsh, through which a considerable volume of water is strained by jaereolation, and on the surface of which surface water at times stands or flows, is, in its entire breadth, a natural watercourse and subject to the rules of use and diversion applicable to watercourses, the decision will have an important effect on the improvement of cranberry marshes. It will greatly restrict the mode and possibility of such improvement. This marsh is not, practically, unlike cranberry marshes in general. Such marshes are usually formed and fed by springs which flow in along the margin, or from higher ground, as rills or small watercourses. Tbe water is strained, by percolation, through tbe marsh, supplying moisture as it passes, and, at tbe lower end, assembles, to constitute again a watercourse. Tbe practical question seems to be, Is this water, in its entire course through tbe marsh, to be deemed to be within tbe channel of an ancient watercourse, and is the entire marsh to be deemed to be within the banks of that channel ?
What is essential to constitute a watercourse is well settled and defined by the decisions of this court: "It must be a stream usually flowing in a particular direction, though it need not flow continually. It may sometimes be dry. It must flow in a definite channel, having a bed, with sides or banks, and usually discharge itself into some other stream or body of water. It must be something more than a mere surface drainage over a tract of land, occasioned by unusual freshets or other extraordinary causes." Hoyt v. Hudson, 27 Wis. 656; Fryer v. Warne, 29 Wis. 511; Eulrich v. Richter, 37 Wis. 226; Lessard v. Stram, 62 Wis. 112. The bed is the characteristic which distinguishes a watercourse from mere surface drainage, and from percolating water. Gould, Waters, § 41. "'In general, in order to constitute a watercourse, the channel and banks formed by the flowing water must present to the eye, on a casual glance, the unmistakable evidences of the frequent action of running water." Id. § 264. " It must have a well-defined and substantial existence." Eulrich v. Richter, supra.
Nothing which is said in the opinion on the former appeal in this case (84 Wis. 438) is necessarily out of harmony with this definition of a watercourse. The question there decided arose on a demurrer to the complaint. It was whether the complaint stated facts which showed the existence of an ancient watercourse across the plaintiff's land. The complaint did not, in terms, allege the existence of such a watercourse, but stated facts from which it was claimed the court should infer its existence. The only question presented by that appeal was whether the court could infer the existence of such watercourse from the facts pleaded. On this point, after quoting from the complaint, the court say (page 450): "Would it not be idle and hypercritical to say: 'But this description does not use the words " bed and banks " and " current," — the language of the books in describing a watercourse ' ? These waters in such volume could not flow continuously, always in a distinct and plainly marked channel, well defined and established, without making for themselves a bed and banks or sides to the stream in the places mentioned, one of which is on the land of the plaintiff. It is a most reasonable, necessary, and inevitable consequence by the laws of nature. Such a body of water, gathered into a stream and flowing in one channel continuously, could not help from cutting for itself in suitable soil or high ground a watercourse, with banks, bed, and current, any more than it could help from running down an inclined plane." The ground upon which the decision went is evident from this language. It is that the complaint does, in effect, allege that a considerable stream of water had been accustomed to flow continuously, always in a distinct and plañnly marked chamnel, well defined and established, across the plaintiff's land, and that such continuous flowing in one channel had inevitably made a channel, with bed and banks; hence that the complaint by irresistible inference alleged facts which would establish the existence of a watercourse. The law of this case, as established by that decision, is that upon proof of the facts deemed to be alleged, the plaintiff will be entitled to judgment.
It is not here questioned that such a volume of water, flowing continuously across the plaintiff's land, in a distinct and plainly marked channel, well defined and established, would constitute a watercourse. The question now presented is whether the evidence given on the trial did estab- list the .existence of such a stream, flowing continuously or usually across the plaintiff's land, in a distinct and well-defined channel. There is no conflict or uncertainty in the-evidence bearing upon this question, nor are the facts as found by the trial court difficult to reconcile with the evidence. The court finds, that the water from Big Lake was discharged by a channel or outlet to the southeast, and thence, " though not by a continuous surface channel, but with a definite and clearly marked flow, in a southeasterly direction," across the intervening lands, into Beaver Creek; " that though, under natural conditions, the water spreads out in places and flows over and through the peat and moss, . . . it in many places made for itself channels, with bed and banks, some of which channels still exist" The evidence shows that this condition of the marsh was more than three miles long, and more than two miles wide. Some of these supposed channels were upon the plaintiff's land, some were upon the lands to the north, and some to the south, of plaintiff's land. They were not continuous in any particular direction, as being parts of the same continuous channel. The evidence shows with satisfactory clearness that these supposed channels were in truth no channels at all. They were mere depressions in the surface of the marsh, into Avhich surface water gathered and stood until it evaporated or found way through the soil by percolation. The moss and vegetation were killed by the standing water; but there was no evidence of erosion by running water. These pseudo and discontinuous channels were widely dispersed over the marsh, and bore no such relation to each other as to indicate that they had constituted together one continuous channel of a watercourse across the marsh. Nor are they more numerous on the plaintiff's land than they are upon the lands to the north and to the south of his. If these are to be deemed channels of streams, then this marsh is the seat of many watercourses, and it would be difficult to iden tify and locate one as tbe plaintiff's watercourse. It is inconceivable that, if even a considerable part of tbe water wbicb was gathered into tbe logging ditch bad been accustomed to flow continuously or usually across tbe plaintiff's land in a definite channel, it should not have made for itself, through that soft and easily eroded soil, a distinct and plainly marked channel, such as would present to the eye, upon a casual glance, the appearance of a continuous watercourse. One would suppose that it would at least have killed the vegetation in the line of its flow. As said by the court in the former opinion, the making of a distinct mid plainly marleed chawnel for itself was an inevitable consequence of such a flow of such a volume of water across the plaintiff's land. The inference is irresistible that there has been no such accustomed and continuous flow of any appreciable current of water, either across the plaintiff's land or across any part of the marsh., In ordinary conditions, there is no appearance of running water upon the surface of the marsh, yet in many places the foot sinks into water beneath the vegetation; but it is not running water and has no appreciable current.
Clearly, this falls far short of establishing such a "well-defined and substantial existence " as is essential to constitute a surface watercourse. If so, which one of all these pseudo and discontinuous channels is the true, definite, and manifest watercourse ? Nor is there evidence of the existence of such a subsurface stream as is recognized to be a watercourse. To be such, a subsurface stream must follow a definite and Imown channel. Subsurface currents or per-colations which do not follow definite and known channels are not governed by the rules respecting the use and diversion of watercourses, but, although of considerable volume, are treated in law the same as surface water. The water is deemed to be a part of the soil itself, and, to the same extent, subject to whatever disposition the owner of the land may choose to make; and, if some damage happens to an adjacent proprietor by the interception of some subterranean current, that is dammub absque injuria. This is established by the great weight of authority. Goodale v. Tuttle, 29 N. Y. 459-466; Delhi v. Youmans, 45 N. Y. 362; Phelps v. Nowlen, 72 N. Y. 39; Barkley v. Wilcox, 86 N. Y. 140-147; Bloodgood v. Ayers, 108 N. Y. 400; Greenleaf v. Francis, 18 Pick. 117; Davis v. Spaulding, 157 Mass. 431; Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co. 43 N. H. 569; Swett v. Cutts, 50 N. H. 439; Chatfield v. Wilson, 28 Vt. 49; Roath v. Driscoll, 20 Conn. 533; Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294; Hanson v. McCue, 42 Cal. 303; Southern P. R. Co. v. Dufour, 95 Cal. 615; Gould v. Eaton, 111 Cal. 639; Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. St. 528; Haldeman v. Bruckhart, 45 Pa. St. 514; Coleman v. Chadwick, 80 Pa. St. 81; Mosier v. Caldwell, 7 Nev. 363; Taylor v. Welch, 6 Oreg. 198; Chesley v. King, 74 Me. 164; Ocean Grove Camp-Meeting Asso. v. Comm'rs of Asbury Park, 40 N. J. Eq. 447; Acton v. Blundell, 12 Mees. & W. 324; Rawstron v. Taylor, 11 Exch. 369; Chasemore v. Richards, 7 H. L. Cas. 349.
There is one passage in the former opinion which may seem on first view to be at variance with this statement of the rule of percolating waters, as applicable to this case; but it is believed that, on analysis, it will appear that there is no necessary conflict. The passage immediately follows the portion above quoted. It is: "Admit that the complaint shows that this stream spreads over wide reaches of marsh and swamp lands, and percolates the soil in many and most places between Big Lake and Beaver Creek, or in all places except those mentioned, where the ground was suitable for cutting a well-defined channel, as above described; according to the above authorities, such spreading of a stream through marshes and swamps, on or below the surface, does not militate against its being a watercourse in every essential particular, if it can be traced or identified as the same stream." This is plainly ambiguous. "What is intended by the phrase " can be traced or identified as the same stream" ? Did the court intend to decide that, if the water which passed through the marsh in invisible and unknown channels could be traced or identified as the same water which flows through Big Lake, then it can be deemed a watercourse throughout that long and wide interval where the stream is lost to vision, and subject to the rules applicable to surface watercourses ? Or did it mean that, if the water which forms and flows through the west branch of Beaver Creek can be traced or identified as the same water which flows through Big Lake, it should be deemed to be the same stream, with the consequences which flow from such identity. If the former was intended, it is absurd; if the latter, it is inconsequential. The authorities referred to by the court as " the above authorities " seem to make it reasonably clear that the court intended the latter proposition. The authorities cited are Gould, Waters, § 264 (evidently a miscitation for section 263); Munkres v. K. C., St. J. & C. B. R. Co. 72 Mo. 514; Hebron Gravel Road Co. v. Harvey, 90 Ind. 192;. Robinson v. Shanks, 118 Ind. 125. The passage cited from Gould on Waters is: " But if a well-defined natural stream empties into a swamp or lake, where all definite channel is lost, and emerges again into a well-defined channel below, it is a question of fact, dependent upon the extent of the swamp or lake, whether it is the same stream; and if it is, the owners of land upon the lower stream have riparian rights, and the owner of land on the stream above the swamp or lake is not entitled to divert water therefrom to their injury." The cases cited are not in point. No one of them is a case of a stream lost in a swamp. The rule stated is not, by its terms, of universal application. Whether it is to be applied in a particular case depends, it seems, upon the extent of the particular swamp. It seems to be implied that, it is inapplicable in the case of a swamp which is of large extent. It seems that a swamp which is several miles in length, and of equal breadth, would properly be classified as a large swamp. So, it would seem that the rule is not properly applicable to the marsh exhibited in the proofs, but, if it be deemed applicable, it brings us no nearer to a solution of the question in controversy; for it is entirely irrelevant to that controversy if the stream which issues from the marsh below is the same stream which enters it from Big Lake, for neither is the plaintiff a riparian owner on the lower stream, nor does the defendants' ditch divert water from the lower stream. It simply leads the water which it collects to the defendants' cranberry lands or other parts of the marsh, where, after use, it is left to find its way through the marsh, to contribute to the lower stream.
The court was considering a complaint which it deemed to allege, by necessary inference, a stream of water continuously flowing across the marsh, in a definite and plainly marked channel, except in certain places where the soil was. unfavorable to the cutting of a channel, which could be traced and identified with both the upper and the lower stream. It was not considering the actual stream as it appears in the proofs, so utterly lost in the marsh as not to have left a vestige of a true channel to mark the line of its onward course. No such case was presented by the complaint, no such case was decided. It would be unwarranted to assume that, in that situation, the court had decided that the lost stream was a watercourse throughout the interval in which it remained lost to sight, between the points of its disappearance in the marsh and its reappearance as the west branch of Beaver Creek. A decision of the question was uncalled for by the pleadings. Such a decision would be absurd in law, and disastrous in its consequences. It would be, in effect, to hold that the entire marsh, in its whole area, is the single bed of a watercourse; for it cannot be known how widely through the marsh the percolating water is dispersed,, and no true channel can be definitely located. Every part of the marsli is the cbannel, as mucb as any part. This is .an absurd, result. The effect of such a decision would be disastrous, for it would greatly embarrass and limit the possibility of the improvement of such lands. Diligent search has failed to discover even one case which gives support to that proposition.
So, it is considered that the court did not intend, in that decision, to announce any doctrine which is not in harmony with the view which the court now takes on the proofs of the actual situation. The opinion is not, at least necessarily, out of harmony with the present decision. How the court would have decided the question if it had been presented as in the proofs taken on the trial can be properly inferred only from the standpoint of the law itself. Even if, by dubious inference or specious argument, it could be m-ade to seem plausible that the court intended to embrace such a proposition within the scope of its decision, its judgment would not be, to that extent, res judioatco. A judgment makes only that which was in issue and decided res judicata. The reasons given by the judges, whether few or many, are not res judicata. Nor is the effect of the judgment as an estoppel either restrained or enlarged by the reasons given, nor can its effect as res judicata extend to any matter only incidentally cognizable, or which. is to be inferred by argument from the judgment. Freeman, Judgments (4th ed.), § 249-258; Williams v. Williams, 63 Wis. 58-71; Braun v. Wis. Rendering Co. 92 Wis. 245. Whatever may have been intended by that passage, it clearly is not here binding on the court as res judñcata. So, it is considered that the defendants might lawfully dig and maintain their ditch on their own land, and are not liable to the plaintiff, even if the ditch does collect and divert from his land surface and subsurface water which would have come there, whether by surface drainage or by percolation through the soil, but for the ditch. If such diversion caused him damage, it gives him no ground of action. It is not caused by an unlawful act. It is damnum absque vnyu/ria..
But, as before stated, the right to construct and maintain the ditch is not the essential point in controversy in the action. It was, nevertheless, needful to be determined, because upon it the point directly in controversy seems necessarily, in great measure, to turn. The plaintiff is willing and desires the ditch to be maintained, as at present located, across his land. It is to his advantage that it be so maintained. It brings to his land a supply of water, which is useful in the prosecution of his cranberry industry, and at the cost of the defendants. The defendants propose to remove the ditch from plaintiff's land, by changing its course so that it shall not cross his land but shall cross the land of the defendant Stickney, above the plaintiff's line. This is partly to be relieved of the burden of furnishing water to the plaintiff's cranberry marsh, and partly to better serve their own interests. The action is to prevent the proposed change in the course of the ditch, and to require the defendants to maintain and keep it in repair, in its present location, for plaintiff's benefit. The trial court held and adjudged that the ditch diverted a watercourse, and had bécome a legal watercourse in its present location, and could not lawfully be diverted to another course, away from the plaintiff's land, without the plaintiff's consent, and that the plaintiff was entitled to have it maintained and kept in repair forever, so that the plaintiff may perpetually receive therefrom water to irrigate his cranberry marsh; and the defendants are forbidden to change the course of the ditch, or to divert its current from the plaintiff's land, and are enjoined to keep the ditch in repair, so that the plaintiff may receive his needed supply of water from it perpetually. This right is claimed for the plaintiff on two principal grounds. (1) That by the diversion of an ancient watercourse the defendants have established a legal watercourse in the present location of the ditch, which they may not divert to the plaintiff's injury; and (2) that by the Goodyear contract and the assumption of the performance of its stipulations by the defendants, the defendants are under contract obligation to the plaintiff to maintain the ditch and keep it in repair in its present location forever, for the benefit of his cranberry industry.
To determine the first ground on which this claim is founded, it became necessary to ascertain and determine whether it was, in truth and in law, an ancient watercourse which had been diverted into the ditch, and whether it continued to be a legal watercourse in its new course and location, or whether it was the mere diversion and leading away of mere surface or percolating waters; for it may well be that parties who divert a watercourse into and through a new and artificial channel should, be deemed only to have established a new course and channel for the same watercourse, which is subject to the same rules, as to its use and diversion, as applied to it in its ancient channel (Gould, Waters, § 225; Wood, Nuisances, § 399; Stevens Point Boom Co. v. Reilly, 44 Wis. 295-298); while mere surface water does not become a watercourse by being gathered into a ditch and led away (Wood, Nuisances, § 401; Fryer v. Warne, 29 Wis. 511; Stanchfield v. Newton, 142 Mass. 110). Since it is considered that it was mere surface and percolating water which was gathered into this ditch, it follows that it was still subject to be used and disposed of, for his own purposes, by the proprietor of land upon which it came. Wood, Nuisances, § 402 et seq.; Curtiss v. Ayrault, 47 N. Y. 73-82. The proposed new ditch upon the land of the defendant Siiehney, above the plaintiff's land, was not a violation of any right of the plaintiff. Stielmey had the right to dispose of such surface and percolating water as came to his land for his own purposes, and in such manner as best suited his inter ests or choice. The other defendants might well stand on his right, for they are in privity with him. So, the first ground of this claim is untenable.
It remains to be considered in what measure, if at all, the plaintiff's rights in this ditch, and to the use of its water, have been strengthened by the Goodyear contract. It cannot, of course, be claimed that the defendants are under any greater or different obligation to the plaintiff in respect of the maintenance and repair of the ditch than rested upon the Goodyears at the time of the sale to Hoffman; for the defendants, at most, have agreed only to save the Goodyears harmless against their obligations to the plaintiff at that time. At that time the contract still rested in parol. The defendants could not be made liable on a contract subsequently made. The contract is noticeable for what it omits. It does not specify that the Goodyears shall maintain the ditch, nor that they shall keep it in repair. They promise nothing, except that the plaintiff may get water from the ditch. Nor does the contract specify for how long the plaintiff shall be permitted to take the water. It might be a question of some difficulty to determine how far it was intended to bind the Goodyears. Yet it may be fairly assumed that the parties contemplated some benefit to the plaintiff from it. But it is not necessary to inquire what the precise measure of the obligation was which the Goodyears intended to assume, for it seems clear, in any aspect, that the contract was void under the statute of frauds, and not binding at all on the Goodyears. If it was intended to give the plaintiff some interest in, and control over, the ditch, it was invalid for that purpose because not made in writing. R. S. 1878, sec. 2302. The ditch is land within the meaning of the statute. R. S. 1878, sec. 4971; 3 Kent, Comm. 401; 1 Washb. Real Prop. 4. If the contract could not, according to its terms and the intention of the parties, be completely performed within one year from its making, it is void because not in writing. R. S. 1818, sec. 2307; White v. Hanchett, 21 Wis. 415; Jilson v. Gilbert, 26 Wis. 637; Doyle v. Dixon, 97 Mass. 208. Whichever horn of this dilemma the plaintiff may choose to take, the result is the same to him. If the contract was to be completely performed within one year and so was valid, then it had been fully performed and discharged before Hoffman bought the ditch. If it was not intended that it should be completely performed within a year, but that its performance should be continuous through a series of years, then it was void, and not binding upon Goodyear, at the time when Hoffman bought. In neither case is the plaintiff's case made stronger by reason of the contract.
On the whole case, it is considered that the evidence fails to show an. ancient watercourse across the plaintiff's land; that the ditch diverted no ancient watercourse, but intercepted and collected only surface and percolating water; that this was not a wrong of which plaintiff can complain; that the ditch did not become a legal watercourse; that the water conveyed by the ditch did not cease, in legal contemplation, to be surface water, subject to be used or disclosed of by the owners of the land upon which it came; and that the defendants are under no contract obligation to maintain the ditch or keep it in repair for the plaintiff's benefit.
By the Oowrt.— The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause is remanded with direction to dismiss the complaint. The printed case is needlessly large. The cost of printing the case, to be taxed, is limited to 500 pages.