Case Name: Frank W. BRUNER, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Mavis Smith BRUNER, Defendant-Appellee; Mavis Smith BRUNER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Frank W. BRUNER, Jr., Defendant-Appellee
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1979-06-12
Citations: 373 So. 2d 971
Docket Number: Nos. 13864, 13865 and 13835
Parties: Frank W. BRUNER, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Mavis Smith BRUNER, Defendant-Appellee. Mavis Smith BRUNER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Frank W. BRUNER, Jr., Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: Before PRICE, MARVIN and JONES, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 373
Pages: 971–979

Head Matter:
Frank W. BRUNER, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Mavis Smith BRUNER, Defendant-Appellee. Mavis Smith BRUNER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Frank W. BRUNER, Jr., Defendant-Appellee.
Nos. 13864, 13865 and 13835.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
June 12, 1979.
Francis M. Gowen, Jr., Shreveport, for plaintiff-appellant.
Sockrider & Bolin by H. F. Sockrider, Jr., Shreveport, for defendant-appellee.
Before PRICE, MARVIN and JONES, JJ.

Opinion:
JONES, Judge.
Frank Bruner, former husband of Mavis Bruner, appeals a judgment in favor of Mavis Bruner for alimony pendente lite and permanent alimony, which accrued subsequent to February 15, 1978. The judgment found Frank in contempt of court for failure to pay the accrued alimony. Mavis appealed complaining that the trial judge incorrectly reduced the amount of monthly alimony due subsequent to July 15, 1978 and that the award of attorney's fees of $1,000 was inadequate. Mavis also seeks legal interest on the attorney's fee award from date of judicial demand.
Frank Bruner was awarded a separation from his wife on April 7, 1976 because of her habitual intemperance. Mavis Bruner was awarded alimony pendente lite in the amount of $350 per month in cash and Frank was ordered to pay the monthly house payment on the community house wherein Mavis resided and her utility bills.
On March 15, 1977, Mavis sued Frank for a divorce on the grounds of adultery and for permanent alimony. She also sought a clarification of the alimony pendente lite judgment based primarily on the grounds that she had sold the house which she had received in the community property settlement, on which Frank had been paying the monthly mortgage notes and utility bills as part of her pendente lite alimony. Judgment was rendered in this suit on June 30, 1977 awarding her a divorce based upon Frank's adultery, alimony pendente lite in the amount of $622.72 monthly based upon an interpretation of the earlier alimony pendente lite award, and awarded permanent alimony in the amount of $689.25 to commence when the judgment of divorce became final.
Prank appealed and this court on February 20, 1978 in Bruner v. Bruner, 356 So.2d 1101 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1978) affirmed the divorce, reduced the trial court's alimony pendente lite award to $350 and reversed the permanent alimony award, finding Mavis Bruner not free from fault within the contemplation of Civil Code Article 160. Mavis applied for a rehearing complaining of that portion of the court of appeal's judgment decided adverse to her. Prank did not file an application for rehearing and therefore, the divorce became final March 21,1978. The court of appeal denied Mavis' application for rehearing, she applied to the supreme court for writs, they were granted, and the supreme court affirmed the decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeal on November 13, 1978 and denied Mavis' application for rehearing on December 14, 1978. Bruner v. Bruner, 364 So.2d 1015 (La.1978).
Frank paid the alimony pendente lite ordered by the June 30, 1977 judgment in the amount of $622.72 each month through February 15, 1978 and paid no further alimony because he believed he was relieved from this obligation by the court of appeal's judgment rendered February 20, 1978. On June 8, 1978 Mavis filed a rule seeking a judgment for all alimony which became due subsequent to February 15, 1978 and for attorney's fees.
Mavis secured her first job following her separation from Frank on March 11, 1978. On June 13, 1978 Frank filed a rule seeking a termination or reduction of alimony retroactive to the time Mavis obtained employment. Frank urges he is entitled to a credit against any alimony owed Mavis for that portion of the $622.72 per month payments made by him subsequent to the June 30, 1977 divorce judgment in excess of the $350 which the court of appeal found to be the correct amount of his monthly obligation. Frank further contends that the United States Supreme Court decision of Orr v. Orr, # 77-1119, 440 U.S. 268, 99 S.Ct. 1102, 59 L.Ed.2d 306 (1979), construing an alimony statute which provided alimony only for wives as invalid because it denied husbands constitutionally mandated equal protection, has the effect of invalidating the Louisiana wife only alimony law, Civil Code Article 160, and all awards made pursuant to it.
Mavis' rule to accrue and Frank's rule to terminate or reduce were consolidated for trial and it is the judgment rendered in these consolidated cases which is here appealed.
On December 11, 1978, the trial court awarded Mavis pendente lite alimony in the amount of $622.72 for the month of March, 1978; permanent alimony in the amount of $689.25 per month for April, May and June, 1978; and $472 per month for July, August, September, October and November, 1978 (this reflecting a reduction in permanent alimony as demanded in Frank's rule filed June 13, 1978) with interest on each alimony installment in the amount of seven percent (7%) from due date until paid. The judgment awarded Mavis $1,000 as attorney's fees. The judgment appealed from ordered Frank to continue to pay permanent alimony in the amount of $472 monthly until his obligation had been definitively terminated. (This occurred' on December 14, 1978 when the supreme court denied Mavis' rehearing application.) The judgment found Frank in contempt of court for failure to pay his alimony obligations as set forth in the judgment of June 30, 1977. It sentenced him to twenty (20) days in jail, suspended his sentence and placed him on unsupervised probation conditioned upon his paying the alimony, attorney's fees, interests and costs prior to December 29, 1978. Frank appealed the judgment and also applied for and obtained a writ of certiorari for review of the trial court's judgment of December 11, 1978 and a stay order prohibiting further proceedings in connection with it pending disposition of the writ application.
The principal issues are: (1) when did Frank's alimony obligations contained in the judgment of June 80, 1977 terminate? (2) was Frank entitled to any credit on accrued alimony for payments made by him on the trial court's judgment in excess of the amount to which it was later reduced by the Court of Appeal? (8) was Frank entitled to a reduction in alimony because of the change of circumstances created by Mavis' going to work, and if so, was he entitled to this reduction retroactive to the date she commenced employment? (4) is Mavis entitled to an increase in attorney's fees and to judicial interest on the amount of the award? (5) does the US Supreme Court decision invalidating wives' only alimony statutes, because of denial of equal protection, have the effect of eliminating Frank's alimony obligations incurred prior to the Supreme Court's decision of Orr v. Orr, supra, and (6) is the contempt adjudication of Frank Bruner valid?
WHEN DID FRANK'S ALIMONY OBLIGATIONS CONTAINED IN THE JUDGMENT OF JUNE 30, 1977 TERMINATE?
There is no suspensive appeal from an alimony award. This article has been construed to provide when a judgment awarding alimony is reversed on appeal the alimony obligation continues until the judgment reversing the alimony award has become final. In the decision of Frederic v. Frederic, 302 So.2d 903 (La.1974) the supreme court held that alimony awarded by a trial court did not terminate until a rehearing was denied upon the supreme court's decision affirming a court of appeal judgment reversing the award:
"Inasmuch as an appeal from a judgment awarding alimony does not suspend the execution of the judgment, La.Code Civ.P. Art. 3943, the husband was not authorized to discontinue alimony payments upon the strength of the Court of Appeal judgment of February 6, 1974 revoking alimony payments. The effect of the Court of Appeal judgment was itself suspended when this Court granted writs to review its correctness. The effective date of the revocation of the alimony due by the husband to the wife is the date the judgment of this Court in these consolidated matters becomes final. Therefore, our order staying execution of the judgment of the trial judge of June 28, 1974 cumulating past due alimony is recalled and set aside.
For the reasons assigned, the judgments complained of awarding alimony to the wife is reversed and the alimony decreed to be due the wife is revoked. It is further ordered and decreed that our order of July 3, 1974 staying execution of the judgment of the trial court cumulat-ing alimony payments is recalled." (Main Opinion, Id. at p. 908).
* # # #
"I concur with that part of the opinion which holds that the devolutive appeal by the husband did not stay the wife's right to receive alimony (and collect it by contempt and other proceedings, if necessary), As the majority correctly points out, the court of appeal reversal of the continued-alimony award did not become final until action by this court.
However, I am not certain, from the majority opinion, whether the majority intends to affirm an award of alimony to the wife up to the date of finality of this decree, or instead to decree that no alimony is due effective as to the date of the original divorce decree. If the latter is the intent, then of course the holding described in the first paragraph is meaningless, because the wife collects nothing. I assume the former is the majority's intent." (Concurring Opinion, Tate, J., Id. at p. 908).
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. C.C.P. Art. 3943 — "An appeal from a judgment awarding custody of a person or alimony can be taken only within the delay provided in Article 3942. Such an appeal shall not suspend the execution of the judgment in so far as the judgment relates to custody or alimony."