Case Name: ROBERT MAGLIES, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. ESTATE OF BERTHA GUY, DEFENDANT, AND SHERRI JENNINGS, INTERVENOR-APPELLANT
Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 2007-12-12
Citations: 193 N.J. 108
Docket Number: 
Parties: ROBERT MAGLIES, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. ESTATE OF BERTHA GUY, DEFENDANT, AND SHERRI JENNINGS, INTERVENOR-APPELLANT.
Judges: Justice ALBIN joins in this opinion.
Reporter: New Jersey Reports
Volume: 193
Pages: 108–148

Head Matter:
936 A.2d 414
ROBERT MAGLIES, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. ESTATE OF BERTHA GUY, DEFENDANT, AND SHERRI JENNINGS, INTERVENOR-APPELLANT.
Argued February 13, 2007
Decided December 12, 2007.
Michael E. Gildenberg argued the cause for intervenor-appellant (Paul V. Mullin, Executive Director, Central Jersey Legal Services, Inc., attorney). Christopher J. Hanlon argued the cause for respondent (Hanlon & Niemann, attorneys; Mr. Hanlon and Robert Maglies, pro se, on the briefs).
Connie M. Pascale argued the cause for amicus curiae Legal Services of New Jersey (Melville D. Miller, Jr., President, attorney; Mr. Pascale and Mr. Miller, on the briefs).
Tracey Goldstein argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey Apartment Association (Feinstein, Raiss, Kelin & Booker, attorneys; Ms. Goldstein and Gary D. Gordon, on the brief).

Opinion:
Justice LaVECCHIA
delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this appeal, we address whether New Jersey's Anti-Eviction Act (Act), N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1 to -61.12, allows the causeless eviction of a daughter, after the death of her mother, where the landlord consented to the daughter's residence and where the daughter's income factored into the family contribution and federal voucher subsidy paid to the landlord. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(o) (Section 8 program). The Section 8 program enables surviving family members of low-income households to be re-qualified for ongoing assistance quickly so that personal dislocations do not result from the oft-sudden and devastating loss occasioned by the death of a household family member. In this particular matter, Section 8 rental assistance will continue to support the daughter, who before had been denominated by the landlord and by the Section 8 program as a "member" of this voucher-supported tenancy. However, because the daughter was not the "tenant," the landlord has refused to accept either rent or the Section 8 voucher presently payable in the daughter's name.
Federal law governing the Section 8 program does not answer whether a surviving resident in a Section 8 household has any continued entitlement to possession of the premises. Rather, this is a matter controlled by state law and state policies. We conclude that New Jersey's anti-eviction law protects the surviving resident of this household from eviction without cause, notwithstanding her label as a family-member occupant, provided she can show that she was the functional equivalent of a co-tenant. The record at present suggests that she continuously lived in the apartment for years with the landlord's consent and that her income provided financial support toward the household's satisfaction of the rental obligation. If, in fact, she bore a substantial portion of responsibility for the rental obligation of this tenancy, in which the landlord acknowledged and accepted her residence, then she is a tenant-equivalent and is entitled to the protections of the Anti-Eviction Act.
I.
Prior to her death in 2005, Bertha Guy resided for approximately thirty years in a New Brunswick apartment owned by Robert Maglies. In 1991, she qualified for a voucher issued through the federal Section 8 program. Maglies entered into a Housing Assistance Payment (HAP) contract with the State Department of Community Affairs, pursuant to which the program paid a portion of the monthly rent directly to Maglies, and Guy paid the remainder. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(c)(3); 24 C.F.R. § 982.311, 982.514 (2007).
In 2001, Guy's adult daughter, Sherri Jennings, moved into her mother's apartment. Jennings has a mental disability for which she receives Social Security benefits. Maglies consented to a new lease agreement that continued to list Guy as the tenant and recognized Jennings only under the designation, "Members of Household." The agreement contained a provision prohibiting anyone other than Guy and Jennings from "resid[ing] in the unit without prior written approval by the owner and the [Housing Authority]." The lease also stated that its initial term was for one year, after which, "the lease term shall renew automatically as follows: The term of this lease will continue [on] indefinite extension until terminated in accordance with this lease and in compliance with New Jersey law."
Concurrently, Maglies also entered into a new HAP contract that, as required under the Section 8 program, took into account Jennings's social security income as contributing to the household's income. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437a(b)(4) (defining "income"); 24 C.F.R. § 982.516(e) (2007) (same). The new HAP contract also listed Guy as the tenant and Jennings under the heading of "Household." The HAP contract stated that no other persons could reside in the apartment without written approval. The agreed-upon monthly rent totaled $674, of which the government paid $441 and the household paid $233. After the initial one-year term of the lease expired on March 31, 2002, and a month-to-month tenancy commenced, Guy and Jennings continued to live in the apartment for three more years.
Guy died on March 30, 2005. Jennings sought and received independent qualification for a Section 8 voucher based solely on her available income. Maglies nevertheless refused to accept the Section 8 voucher and Jennings's contribution to April's rent (which was tendered late) because she was not the named tenant to whom he had rented the apartment. In addition, Maglies asserted other reasons for refusing to accept rent from Jennings. According to Maglies, Jennings, at times, could be a disturbance and he believed that she was not capable of handling the responsibilities expected of a head of household. Maglies also objected to the presence of Jennings's daughter in the apartment after Guy's death. Despite those reservations, Maglies provided Jennings with an application for a new tenancy, which requires the applicant to consent to a credit check. Jennings refused to apply as a new tenant.
When Maglies attempted to lock Guy's apartment, Jennings obtained a restraining order enjoining her removal until an order for possession issued. Accordingly, Maglies initiated a summary dispossess action against the Estate of Bertha Guy based on nonpayment of rent. Jennings intervened in the action, claiming that she had a right to possession of the premises and that Maglies could not refuse to accept her rental payments.
Before the trial court, Jennings contended that a surviving family member in a recognized Section 8 household is entitled to continued occupancy after the named tenant's death. Jennings argued that her right to continue in the tenancy did not terminate at her mother's death, that she had a right to possession of the premises, and that she was entitled to the protections of the Anti- Eviction Act. Magües maintained that the death of a Section 8 tenant does not create a lifetime interest in the property that is transferable to adult family members. Furthermore, he argued that the Anti-Eviction Act does not apply to Jennings because Guy was the only tenant and Jennings did not succeed to her mother's tenancy.
The trial court held that Jennings could remain in possession of the apartment and ordered Magües to accept rental payments from her. The court stated:
I find that since the lease agreement entered into between the plaintiff and Bertha Guy expired on March [31, 2002,] the relationship between the parties at the time of Ms. Guy's death was a month-to-month tenancy. Ms. Jennings was listed as a member of the household on the HAP contract. Plaintiff was accepting Section 8 subsidies based on her occupancy of the unit. Ms. Jennings had been living in the unit with plaintiffs knowledge and acceptance for over four years.
I therefore find that Ms. Jennings was a bona fide remaining member of the tenant family at the time Ms. Guy died____I find that as a remaining member of the . tenant's family Ms. Jennings shall enjoy all occupancy rights to which she was entitled prior to her mother's death, since a remaining family member's occupancy rights are not terminated by the death of any member.
The Appellate Division reversed. Maglies v. Estate of Guy, 386 N.J.Super. 449, 901 A.2d 971 (App.Div.2006). The court's decision began by noting that federal law governing the Section 8 program allows landlords to choose their tenants and contains no authorization for occupants to succeed to the tenancy of another. Id. at 454-55, 457, 901 A.2d 971. The panel rejected the argument that, as a "remaining member of a tenant family" under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437a(b)(3), Jennings would be entitled to succeed to her mother's tenancy, although the panel noted that she may receive her mother's subsidy voucher. Id. at 455-57, 901 A.2d 971 (relying on Carter v. Meadowgreen Assocs., 268 Va. 215, 597 S.E.2d 82 (2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 963, 125 S.Ct. 1727, 161 L.Ed.2d 606 (2005), as support for distinguishing between right to voucher and right to tenancy). According to the panel, after Guy's death, Magües was entitled to screen Jennings for creditworthiness and fitness as a tenant in order to determine whether he was willing to enter into a new lease with her as the named tenant. Id. at 457, 901 A.2d 971 (citing Franklin Tower One, L.L.C. v. N.M., 157 N.J. 602, 725 A.2d 1104 (1999); Pasquince v. Brighton Arms Apts., 378 N.J.Super. 588, 876 A.2d 834 (App.Div.2005)).
The panel further determined that the protections of New Jersey's Anti-Eviction Act did not apply to Jennings because she was not an assignee, under-tenant, or legal representative of her mother. Id. at 460, 901 A.2d 971. Thus, the panel concluded that Jennings could be evicted without cause, but recognized nonetheless that "policy arguments [may] support[] the view that the protections of the Anti-Eviction Act should be extended to occupant family members of a deceased tenant in some circumstances." Id. at 461, 901 A.2d 971.
We granted Jennings's petition for certification seeking reversal of the Appellate Division's judgment and reinstatement of the trial court's order. 188 N.J. 492, 909 A.2d 726 (2006). We also permitted Legal Services of New Jersey and the New Jersey Apartment Association to participate as amici curiae.
II.
This case presents two issues of first impression for this Court. The parties are at loggerheads over whether either the federal law governing the Section 8 program or the Anti-Eviction Act should prevent Jennings's landlord from successfully evicting her through a summary dispossess action. Because the issues raised herein require the interpretation of law, the lower courts' "interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference." Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378, 658 A.2d 1230 (1995). We consider first whether Section 8 provides the answer to this dispute.
A. Section 8 Voucher Program
Congress created the Section 8 housing assistance program "[f]or the purpose of aiding low-income families in obtaining a decent place to live." 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(a); see also 24 C.F.R. § 982.1 (2007); Franklin Tower One, L.L.C. v. N.M., 157 N.J. 602, 608, 725 A.2d 1104 (1999). Through the United States Department of Housing and the New Jersey Department of Community Affairs, Division of Housing and Community Resources, eligible families may "select suitable housing," 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(f)(7), and receive rental assistance for that housing based on the "income of the family." 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(o)(2)(A); see also 24 C.F.R. § 982.1, 982.201 (2007); Pasquince v. Brighton Arms Apts., 378 N.J.Super. 588, 591 n. 1, 876 A.2d 834 (App.Div.2005). Generally stated, the tenant's contribution toward monthly rent is no more than thirty percent of his or her household income. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(o)(2)(A), 1437f(o)(12)(B)(ii); 24 C.F.R. § 982.1, 982.503(d) (2007). Recertification of a family's income and makeup occurs annually for purposes of determining entitlement to and the amount of the subsidy. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(c)(3); 24 C.F.R. § 982.516 (2007).
When a landlord enters into a HAP contract with the government for an eligible family, the landlord directly receives Section 8 rental assistance (the subsidy) from the government in an amount equaling the difference between the market rental rate of the premises and the family's contribution, which is derived from the family's income. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(c)(3), 1437f(o)(2)(A), 1437f(o)(10)(D); 24 C.F.R. § 982.514. As the Appellate Division noted, the HAP contract specifically provides that "the screening and selection of families for [the] units shall be the function of the [landlord]." 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(o)(6)(B); see also 24 C.F.R. § 982.307 (2007). When screening a prospective renter, a landlord may consider the potential tenant's housekeeping habits and tendency to respect other tenants. See Franklin Tower One, supra, 157 N.J. at 611, 725 A.2d 1104; see also Pasquince, supra, 378 N.J.Super. at 597, 876 A.2d 834 (recognizing that "landlords [also] may take into account the creditworthiness of Section 8 applicants" prior to entering into HAP contract).
The issue here is not quite one of a landlord considering the inception of a rental relationship with a potential Section 8 recipient. Rather, this landlord has consented to the addition of a financially contributing family member to the Section 8 household already leasing one of his units. The issue is whether a consented-to financially contributing family-member occupant of a Section 8 household has any right to the continued possession of the leased premises after the death of the named tenant. At least two other states' courts have concluded that because the federal law governing the Section 8 program does not answer the question, state law is dispositive of the issue.
In Morrisania II Associates v. Harvey, 139 Misc. 2d 651, 527 N.Y.S.2d 954, 956 (Civ.Ct.1988), a New York civil trial court faced with such a circumstance initially framed the question as whether "the Federal section 8 housing assistance law . preempts] or supersede^] New York landlord-tenant law," and further whether "relatives of section 8 tenants have succession rights regardless of New York law." According to the Morrisania II court, "the section 8 program recognizes the entire family as the tenant, entitled to occupancy and assistance," and "encourages family cohesion and the care of the elderly and disabled in the home." Id. at 957. The court noted that the Section 8 statute uses the term, "family," and broadly includes in that reference a "remaining member of a tenant family." Ibid, (quoting 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437a(b)(3)). The court concluded, therefore, that "all family members have occupancy rights which are not terminated by the death of any member." Ibid. Having held that "section 8 guarantees continued protection to every legitimate member of the family unit in occupancy," and that "no such family member should suffer eviction, dislocation and homelessness upon the death of the tenant of record," the court ordered a hearing to determine whether the party in issue was a bona fide occupant. Id. at 958, 961-62. Subsequently, however, the trial court's analysis was called into question.
Eleven years later, the New York Court of Appeals clarified that "whether [a person] is entitled to continued possession of the premises" is distinct from "whether [a person] is entitled to the continuation of a subsidy." Evans v. Franco, 93 N.Y.2d 823, 687 N.Y.S.2d 615, 710 N.E.2d 261, 262 (1999). The Court of Appeals held that the former was governed by state law, while the latter was governed by federal law. *8Ibid. That holding is in keeping with the view of the Supreme Court of Virginia, which similarly determined that the question of a Section 8 household member's continued right to possession of premises upon the death of the named tenant is not a matter of federal law, but rather of state law. See Carter v. Meadowgreen Assocs., 268 Va. 215, 597 S.E.2d 82, 84 (2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 963, 125 S.Ct. 1727, 161 L.Ed.2d 606 (2005).
In Carter, an occupant son in a Section 8 household asserted that Section 8 allowed him to succeed to the tenancy of his mother because the definition of "families" for purposes of the federal housing assistance program included a "remaining member of a tenant family." Id. at 83-84. Rejecting that argument, the Virginia Supreme Court explained that Section 8's "definition of 'families' sets forth the classes of persons intended to be benefited by the statutory scheme." Id. at 84. It noted that, with that definition, "Congress did not, however, undertake a total rewriting of state landlord-tenant law as it may apply to 'Section 8 housing.' " Ibid. Rather, the court concluded that "where the federal law is silent, the intent of Congress was to leave the applicable state law undisturbed." Ibid, (citing three-part test for federal preemption of state law set forth in Ayers v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 908 F.2d 1184, 1189 (3d Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1103, 111 S.Ct. 1003, 112 L.Ed.2d 1086 (1991)). The court therefore applied Virginia landlord-tenant law to the controversy. Ibid.
Like the decisions of the highest courts in New York and Virginia that came before, we do not read Section 8's broad definition of "families" to compel a state to reject application of the policies and principles of its landlord-tenant law. The program's purpose is to provide funds and a mechanism to facilitate the disbursement of that funding to low-income families in search of housing. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(a); 24 C.F.R. § 982.1. The Section 8 statute contains no language requiring a state to permit a family household member to succeed to the premises in which he or she resides when that family member is not the named tenant on the lease and HAP contract and state law would not provide such protection. The preemption analysis performed by the Virginia Supreme Court persuasively reasoned to the conclusion that the federal statute did not intend to displace state law expectations. See Carter, supra, 597 S.E.2d at 84. Thus, once a Section 8 tenant and family enter into a lease with a landlord, state law generally determines any issue about a continued right to possession. Accordingly, we must turn to our state law to determine whether Jennings has a right to continued possession of the apartment she shared with her mother.
B. New Jersey Anti-Eviction Act
Under New Jersey's common law, upon a tenant's death, the tenancy passes to her estate. See Gross v. Peskin, 101 N.J.Super. 468, 469, 244 A.2d 692 (App.Div.1968). If it was a month-to-month tenancy, as in this ease, then the landlord could terminate the lease by giving one month's notice to the estate's legal representatives. See Ctr. Ave. Realty, Inc. v. Smith, 264 N.J.Super. 344, 350, 624 A.2d 996 (App.Div.1993).
New Jersey's Legislature, however, substantially altered landlord-tenant common law and prior statutory law in respect of residential tenants with the enactment of the Anti-Eviction Act. See Chase Manhattan Bank v. Josephson, 135 N.J. 209, 219, 638 A.2d 1301 (1994) (finding that "[t]he Anti-Eviction Act . dramatically changed the rights of landlords and owners by prohibit ing the ejectment of residential tenants or lessees simply because their tenancies or leases had expired"). The Act states that "[n]o lessee or tenant or the assigns, under-tenants or legal representatives of such lessee or tenant may be removed by the Superior Court . except upon establishment of one of the following grounds as good cause." N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1. Seventeen grounds for eviction are enumerated, including nonpayment of rent, destruction of peace and quiet, breach of rules and regulations, breach of covenant, and others. Ibid. At this stage of the development of case law surrounding the Act, it is well recognized that "[t]he legislation was designed to protect residential tenants against unfair and arbitrary evictions by limiting the bases for their removal." 447 Assocs. v. Miranda, 115 N.J. 522, 528, 559 A.2d 1362 (1989). When a person is protected by the Act, "the effective term of the lease is for as long as the tenant wishes to remain, provided he pays the rent . and provided there is no other statutory cause for eviction under [the Act]." Ctr. Ave. Realty, supra, 264 N.J.Super. at 350, 624 A.2d 996.
Our Court never before has addressed whether, when the named tenant of a Section 8 household dies, the Anti-Eviction Act's protections extend to a financially contributing household member, who has been in continuous residence in the tenancy with the landlord's acquiescence and consent. The instant case has forced the issue.
III.
As the Appellate Division below recognized, the Anti-Eviction Act does not expressly address whether household members listed on a lease and HAP contract would be included in the broad group of protected persons, including "lesseefs] or tenant[s] or the assigns, under-tenants or legal representatives of such lessee[s] or tenant[s]." N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1. Magües relies on the fact that the Act does not explicitly include "occupants" in that list. From that, he reasons that landlords are free to evict, without good cause required, the surviving family member occupant who has lived continuously on the premises with the landlord's consent and identification on the lease and who has contributed to the household's tenancy obligations, aided by a Section 8 voucher.
Although it is true that the Act does not explicitly include occupant family members in the broad group of lessees, tenants, assigns, under-tenants, and legal representatives that may not be evicted without good cause, we are not persuaded that the landlord's self-serving labeling of Jennings as an "occupant" is controlling in this analysis. A label imposed by the landlord cannot and should not control our analysis of the law. The courts of this state long have recognized the need to look beyond labels in order to explore the true character of a transaction or relationship. See, e.g., Vreeland v. Dawson, 55 N.J.Super. 456, 465, 151 A.2d 62 (Ch.Div.1959) (noting rule that courts will "look beyond [a] written instrument and explore the character of [a] transaction"). For example, courts have refused to recognize installment, or "conditional sales," of real property and have called such transactions what they are, namely mortgages with completed conveyances of property, thereby preventing undue advantage from occurring based on a label attached. See Welsh v. Griffith-Prideaux, Inc., 60 N.J.Super. 199, 208-09, 158 A.2d 529 (App.Div.1960) (discussing seminal case of J.W. Pierson Co. v. Freeman, 113 N.J. Eq. 268, 270-71, 166 A. 121 (E. & A.1933)). The question here is whether Maglies's labeling of Jennings must control her entitlement to the Act's protection, with all the potentially devastating consequences that flow from exclusion from the Act's application. In this instance, where Jennings may be able to show that she was the functional equivalent of a co-tenant, we must turn to settled rules of statutory construction to determine whether the Legislature's use of the term "tenant" should be applied to encompass tenants-in-fact and thereby extend to such individuals the Act's protections.
This Court has long recognized that
[i]t is an established rule in the exposition of statutes that the intention of the legislature is to be derived from a view of the whole and of every part of the statute, taken and compared together. The real intention, when ascertained, will prevail over the literal sense of terms. When words are not explicit the intention is to be collected from the context and the occasion and necessity of the law and from the mischief felt, and the remedy in view; and the intention is to be taken or presumed according to what is consonant to reason and good discretion.
[Schierstead v. Brigantine, 29 N.J. 220, 231, 148 A.2d 591 (1959) (quoting May v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 111 N.J.L. 166, 167-68, 168 A. 140 (Sup.Ct.1933)).]
Specifically, in respect of the Anti-Eviction Act, we have said that "[i]n establishing tenants' rights to continued occupancy of their rental dwellings[,] the Anti-Eviction Act is remedial legislation deserving of liberal construction." 447 Assocs., supra, 115 N.J. at 529, 559 A.2d 1362; see also 3 Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 60:1 at 183 (6th ed. 2001) ("Remedial statutes are liberally construed to suppress the evil and advance the remedy."). Therefore, "[t]he reason and spirit of the statute controls in its interpretations." Schierstead, supra, 29 N.J. at 231, 148 A.2d 591 (citing May, supra, 111 N.J.L. at 168, 168 A. 140); see also State v. State Troopers Fraternal Ass'n., 134 N.J. 393, 418, 634 A.2d 478 (1993).
In 1974, when the Legislature first enacted the Anti-Eviction Act as a comprehensive bill to revise landlord-tenant laws, it recognized that
[a]t present, there are no limitations imposed by statute upon the reasons a landlord may utilize to evict a tenant. As a result, residential tenants frequently have been unfairly and arbitrarily ousted from housing quarters in which they have been comfortable and where they have not caused any problems. This is a serious matter, particularly now that there is a critical shortage of rental housing space in New Jersey. This act shall limit the eviction of tenants by landlords to reasonable grounds and provide that suitable notice shall be given to tenants when an action for eviction is instituted by the landlord.
[Introduction Statement to Assembly Bill No. 1586, at 4 (Apr. 16, 1974), enacted by L. 1974, c. 49.]
In 1986, the Legislature amended the Anti-Eviction Act and added its findings that
[i]t is in the public interest of the State to maintain for citizens the broadest protections available under State eviction laws to avoid such displacement and resultant loss of affordable housing, which, due to housing's uniqueness as the most costly and difficult to change necessity of life, causes overcrowding, unsafe and unsanitary conditions, blight, burdens on community services, wasted resources, homelessness, emigration from the State and personal hardship, which is particularly severe for vulnerable seniors, the disabled, the frail, minorities, large families and single parents.
[N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1a(d) (emphasis added).]
The Legislature thus included "homelessness," and family and social disruption among the ills the Act was designed to prevent. See Taylor v. Cisneros, 102 F.3d 1334, 1337 (3d Cir.1996) (noting that New Jersey is "quite protective" of residential tenants). The Legislature's statements and findings demonstrate that the Legislature intended the Anti-Eviction Act to protect blameless residential tenants, especially those vulnerable to homelessness, family disruption, and becoming a strain on the community's resources.
The Section 8 program was created "[f]or the purpose of aiding low-income families in obtaining a decent place to live." 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(a); see also 24 C.F.R. § 982.1. To qualify for a Section 8 voucher families must be either "very low-income fam- il[ies]" or "low-income families]" who meet certain specifications. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437f(o)(4); 24 C.F.R. § 982.201. A family's income includes "income from all sources of each member of the household." 42 U.S.C.A § 1437a(b)(4); see also 24 C.F.R. § 982.516(e). For an entire family to be eligible for a Section 8 voucher, each household member must be low income or very low income. As such, each member of a Section 8 household is vulnerable to homelessness and family disruption if he or she cannot obtain affordable housing. It would not be consistent with the Act's purposes to treat differently a surviving Section 8 family member, who may be — in substance if not in form — the functional equivalent of a co-tenant. See Singer, supra, at 189 ("When there is an ambiguity in a remedial statute, it should be construed to meet the cases which are clearly within the spirit or reason of the law, or within the evil which it was designed to remedy, providing the interpretation is not inconsistent with the language used, resolving all reasonable doubts in favor of applicability of the statute to the particular case.").
The Act's chief purpose is to keep residential tenants in intact homes and avoid the imposition of personal dislocation so long as the tenancy's financial and other responsibilities are met. Such purposes must be sensibly advanced, particularly when it is an eviction from publicly supported housing that is at stake. Jennings's situation calls for a more fact-sensitive analysis of her rights under the Act. If she indeed presents a circumstance where she was the substantial equivalent of a contributing residential co-tenant in this publicly supported unit, then we hold that the Act will not countenance her eviction merely because her mother passed away, which is the reason that her landlord presently advances. Some valid for-cause reason will be required in order to terminate her continued tenancy. In short, in such circumstances she would receive the Act's protections. It certainly would contravene the spirit of the law to interpret the Anti-Eviction Act to protect Jennings from causeless eviction while she lived in a two-member low-income household with her mother, but to subject her to causeless eviction when she became the sole surviving member of a low-income household.
Our conclusion that a functional co-tenant — one who can show that she has been continuously in residence; that she has been a substantial contributor toward satisfaction of the tenancy's financial obligations; and that her contribution has been acknowledged and acquiesced to by her landlord — is entitled to invoke the protections of the Anti-Eviction Act does not upset the delicate balance of tenants' and landlords' rights. See N.J.S.A 2A:18-61.1a(b) (stating Legislature's finding that State eviction laws were "designated to fairly balance and protect rights of tenants and landlords"). In tendering her rent and seeking recognition that she, in fact, had co-tenant equivalent status, Jennings is placing herself in the position of taking on all of a tenant's reciprocal obligations in this tenancy with Maglies, including responsibility for past arrearages, if any.
Moreover, our decision does not force a landlord to retain someone who otherwise is disqualified from residence in the unit based on, for example, a past conviction or other illegal or impermissible activities (i.e., Megan's Law restriction based on prior sexual offense, or drug dealing). Indeed, in this instance, Maglies was "responsible for screening and selection of the family to occupy [his] unit." 24 C.F.R. § 982.307. The "family" he chose included all "person[s] or group[s] of persons . approved to reside in a unit with assistance under the program." 24 C.F.R. § 982.4 (2007). That included Jennings, who has lived in the unit with the landlord's knowledge and express acquiescence for years. That said, we do not harbor any misperception that when a landlord allows in an additional family member, he does so for purely altruistic purposes. When that occurs, as here, he may have obtained another financially contributing member of the household who strengthens the fiscal health of the family. As a result, he keeps in place a trusted and good tenant, and he becomes essentially more secure in the tenancy as a whole. Notwithstanding the concerns some fear about repercussions from our decision working to the detriment of persons who may seek in the future to become occupants of a family member's leasehold, post at 146-47, 936 A.2d at 437, we think it unlikely that landlords will respond by prohibiting such family consolidation.
Our decision addresses not all occupants but the specific factual circumstances of this Section 8 household in which the daughter apparently brought substantial resources to the family's finances, and whose continuous presence in the leasehold was acknowledged and acquiesced in for years by this landlord. It bears repeating that our conclusion is premised on Jennings's ability to show that she was continuously in residence; that she was a contributor to the financial obligations of the tenancy; and that Maglies knew about her role and acquiesced. Moreover, we note that some lease contracts specifically inform the signatories thereto that the lease will terminate upon the named tenant's death. See Riverview Realty, Inc., supra, 284 N.J.Super. at 568, 665 A.2d 1150 (discussing lease provision calling for lease to terminate "upon the death of the named TENANT within ten (10) days"). Our holding today is not intended to undermine the enforceability of such clauses.
To summarize, we conclude that the Act may protect Jennings from eviction without cause, notwithstanding her "occupant" label. She may be entitled under the Act to continue to live in the apartment and pay her rent in accordance with the continuation of the HAP contract, provided she satisfies her burden of proof on remand. She must develop in the record that she was in continuous residence, that she substantially contributed to the financial obligations of the tenancy that she and her mother enjoyed, and that Maglies acquiesced in that tenancy arrangement. Based on that showing, the court may determine that she was the functional equivalent of a co-tenant in the Section 8 household she shared with her mother. Nothing in this opinion should be viewed as a commentary on how Jennings's case should turn out. Our point is only that nothing in the Anti-Eviction Act, fairly read, denies her the right to try to show that she was the functional equivalent of a co-tenant.
We further note that, even if Jennings can make such a showing on remand, Maglies would not be foreclosed of the right to evict in accordance with the Anti-Eviction Act, such as for non-payment of rent or for other good cause. Any eviction, however, must be for cause.
rv.
The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed and the matter remanded to the Law Division for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The persons named in the HAP contract included Guy, Jennings, and Mag-lies, as well as the State Department of Community Affairs.
The record does not reveal what amount of rent Guy previously had been paying.
That said. New York City apparently does provide succession rights to occupants in certain settings. That policy has been held to be not inconsistent with Section 8 law. See Manhattan Plaza Assoc. v. Dep't of Hous. Pres. & Dev., 8 A.D.3d 111, 778 N.Y.S.2d 164, 164-65 (2004) (finding that New York regulation, "which permits an applicant to establish that he or she is a bona fide family member entitled to succession rightsL] does not frustrate the purpose of Section 8 law, which, by recognizing the entire family as the tenant (see 42 U.S.C.[A.] § 1437a), seeks to encourage family cohesion").
The issue whether the Act permits the eviction of a surviving family member (but not the named tenant) in a tenancy has been raised, but not squarely confronted, by the Appellate Division, on two prior occasions. In Center Avenue Realty, supra, a mother died and left her son as the sole occupant of an apartment that had been rented by the family for over twenty-five years. 264 N.J.Super. at 346-47, 624 A.2d 996. The son, who also was the executor of her estate, wished to remain in the apartment. Id. at 347, 624 A.2d 996. The trial court ordered him to vacate and he did. Ibid. Because he complied, the Appellate Division determined that "his right to remain in the premises as a successor tenant under the terms of the original lease and subject to removal only under the Anti-Eviction Law . [was] a moot question that we need not decide." Ibid. Rather, the panel found that the Act permitted the son, as executor, some time to remain in possession to wind up the estate. Id. at 351- 52, 624 A.2d 996. The court added, "we leave, however, for another day, the question of the scope of our Anti-Eviction Act vis-a-vis occupant family members of deceased tenants." Id. at 353, 624 A.2d 996. Similarly, in Riverview Realty, Inc. v. Williamson, 284 N.J.Super. 566, 570, 665 A.2d 1150 (App.Div.1995), the Appellate Division again left for another day the question whether the Anti-Eviction Act protected resident family members of deceased tenants from eviction. But see WG Assocs. v. Estate of Roman, 332 N.J.Super. 555, 557, 562, 753 A.2d 1236 (App.Div.2000) (addressing Senior Citizens and Disabled Protected Tenancy Act (SCDPTA), N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.22 to -61.39, and concluding that, under SCDPTA, tenancy terminates upon tenant's death, thereby preventing daughter from remaining in family's rental unit).
"Very low-income families" are "low-income families whose incomes do not exceed 50 per centum of the median family income for the area." 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437a(b)(2); see also 24 C.F.R. § 5.603 (2007).
"Low-income families" are "those families whose incomes do not exceed 80 per centum of the median income for the area." 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437a(b)(2); see also 24 C.F.R. § 5.603.