Case Name: FIRST NAT. BANK OF UNION v. WEGENER. (HALL, Intervener.); WRIGHT v. WEGENER. (LA GRANDE NAT. BANK, Intervener.)
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1919-06-24
Citations: 94 Or. 318
Docket Number: 
Parties: FIRST NAT. BANK OF UNION v. WEGENER. (HALL, Intervener.) WRIGHT v. WEGENER. (LA GRANDE NAT. BANK, Intervener.)
Judges: Bennett, J., concurs in the result.
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 94
Pages: 318–348

Head Matter:
Motion to dismiss appeal submitted at Pendleton May 5,
denied June 24,
argued on the merits at Pendleton October 27, modified and affirmed December 16, 1919.
FIRST NAT. BANK OF UNION v. WEGENER. (HALL, Intervener.) WRIGHT v. WEGENER. (LA GRANDE NAT. BANK, Intervener.)
(181 Pac. 990; 186 Pac. 41.)
Appeal and. Error — Notice of Appeal — Sufficiency.
1. Where two eases were virtually, if not formally, consolidated for trial, a single notice of appeal, describing both deerees, held a sufficient notice for both cases.
Appeal and Error — Notice of Appeal — Service.
2. Under Section 550, L. O. L., providing that notiee of appeal may be served on adverse party or his attorney, and Section 540, authorizing service by mail where person to 'be served resides in a different place, a notice of appeal may be served by mail on attorney residing in another county, though parties themselves reside in same place.
ON THE MERITS.
Chattel Mortgages — Right of Possession in Mortgagor Until Breach of Conditions.
3. Under a chattel mortgage the right of possession remains in mortgagor until there is a breach of the conditions after which the mortgagee has the qualified title giving him possession.
Chattel Mortgages — Bill of Sale in Substance Chattel Mortgage. '
4. An instrument in form of bill of sale, providing that upon compliance with certain conditions by selleT the sale should become null and void, held, in substance, a chattel mortgage.
Chattel Mortgages — Valid as Between Mortgagor and Mortgagee Though not Recorded.
5. A chattel mortgage is valid as between the parties, though not of record.
Bankruptcy — Trustee as Against Chattel Mortgagee Under Unfiled Mortgage Stands in Position of Attaching Creditor.
6. Under Bankruptcy Act as amended in 1910 (U. S. Comp. Stats., §9631), a trustee in 'bankruptcy, as against the rights of a chattel mortgagee under an unfiled chattel mortgage, stands in the position of an attaching creditor, and his rights are determined as of the date the petition in bankruptcy was filed.
Bankruptcy — Chattel Mortgage, Recorded as Bill of Sale Against Trustee in Bankruptcy, Valid Pending Foreclosure.
7. Where instrument in form of bill of sale, but in substance a chattel mortgage, was filed and recorded as bill of sale at the time of th© filing of bankruptcy proceedings against mortgagor, and mortgagee at time thereof had possession of the property covered, by the mortgage, and action was then pending by mortgagee to foreclose the mortgage, the mortgage lien was good as against trustee in bankruptcy, though the instrument wias recorded as a bill of sale instead of as a chattel mortgage.
Bankruptcy — Notice to Trustee in Bankruptcy of Chattel Mortgage on Bankrupt’s Property Sufficient.
8. Where at the time of thie filing of bankruptcy proceedings against mortgagor, an action to foreclose labor liens against the lumber covered by the mortgage was pending, wherein an affidavit had been filed referring to chattel mortgage on the property, and where the bankrupt’s petition referred to such mortgage, the trustee in bankruptcy upon adjudication of bankruptcy had legal notice of such mortgage, though it was not of record.
Chattel Mortgages — No Attorney’s Fees Allowed on Foreclosure.
9. In foreclosing chattel mortgage no attorney’s fees should have been allowed, where there was no provision for payment thereof in either note or mortgage.
Logs and Logging — Eight to Laborers’ Liens is Statutory.
10. The right to a laborer’s lien on lumber is statutory, and in the absence of a specific law such a right would not exist.
Logs and Logging — Statute Giving Labor Lien Liberally Construed.
11. Section 7462, L. O. L., giving lien for labor performed in the manufacture of lumber, is remedial, and should be liberally construed in favor of the lien.
Logs and Logging — Laborers’ Lien Lost by Removal of Lumber.
12. Under Section 7462, L. O. L., giving lien for services performed in the manufacture of lumber while the same remains at the yard wherein manufactured, laborers had no lien upon lumber which had been hauled 12 miles from the yard wherein it was manufactured, in view of Sections 7464-7467.
Logs and Logging — Liens for Cutting Logs and Manufacturing Lumber Distinct.
13. Section 7461, L. O. L., giving laborer lien for labor in the cutting of logs, and Section 7462, providing for laborers’ lien for labor performed in the manufacture of lumber, though parts of the same act are separate and distinct from each other; the former being intended for security to the logger and the latter to the operators in the mill.
Logs and Logging — Lien Statement must Specify Labor Cutting Logs and Manufacturing Lumber.
14. Even if laborer could make and enforce a joint or dual lien for services in cutting logs under Section 7461, L. O. L., and in manufacturing lumber under Section 7462, he would be required to specify in his statement the amount and value of his labor -for cutting logs, and the amount and value thereof in manufacturing lumber.
Logs and Logging — Lien for Cutting Logs Covers Lumber Manufactured Therefrom.
15. Under Section 7461, L. O. L., a logger has a lien, not only upon the logs cut, but upon the lumber manufactured therefrom, so long as it can be followed and identified.
Logs and Logging — Enforcement of Lien Notwithstanding Surplusage in Lien Statement.
16. Where the laborers were paid in full at the time of the removal of sawmill to a ne<w site, the lien for labor will be enforced as to the lumber at the new site, though the claim was for a lien on all of the lumber, including that on the old site.
Logs and Logging — Attorney's Fee Granted on Foreclosure of Lien Reasonable.
17. Under the evidence, held, that $250 is a reasonable attorney’s fee for foreclosing of -14 laborers’ liens on lumber.
Bean, J., dissenting in part.
From Union: John W. Knowles, Judge.
In Banc.
The foregoing causes .arise out of the insolvency of the White Pine Lumber Company, a partnership engaged in the lumbering business in Union County, Oregon. The Lumber Company, evidently being in straightened circumstances in the conduct of its business, secured a loan from the respondent, First National Bank of Union, Oregon, and gave a promissory note and a chattel mortgage upon certain of its lumber product to secure the payment of the note. It also secured a like loan from the La Grande National Bank of La Grande, Oregon, and gave another mortgage upon certain other lumber not covered by the mortgage to the Union Bank.
The appellant, P. C. Wright, is the holder of .the lien claim of a large number of the employees of the Lumber Company, and as such claims loggers’ and lumbermen’s lien upon the lumber covered by the mortgages of each of the banks. The appellant Hall is the trustee in bankruptcy of the lumber company, and as such trustee claims possession and the right to administer on all of the property in dispute.
The respondent, First National Bank 'of Union, commenced a suit against the Lumber Company to foreclose its mortgage and made "Wright, as representing the lien claimants, a party defendant. After-wards, Wright commenced a suit to- foreclose his loggers’ and lumbermen’s liens and made the First National Bank of Union a party defendant. It was stipulated that the complaint in this case should stand as an answer to the complaint of the First National Bank of Union. Afterwards the La Grande National Bank intervened and asked for the foreclosure of its mortgage upon the lumber covered thereby.
The appellant Hall also intervened as a defendant and, as trustee in bankruptcy, claimed possession of all the property. By stipulation of the parties and an order of the court based thereon the cases were tried together upon the same evidence but separate decrees were entered.
In the Wright case the court found against the plaintiffs and in favor of the La Grande National Bank, decreeing the foreclosure of its mortgage upon the lumber covered thereby, and that the balance of the same, if there was any, should be turned over to the defendant, G-eo. F. Hall, as trustee in bankruptcy. In the case of the First National Bank of Union, the court also found against the lien claimants and in favor of the bank, and decreed the foreclosure of its mortgage upon the lumber covered by it. Wright, the plaintiff in one case and defendant in the other, is attempting to appeal from both decrees; and the defendant Hall, as trustee in bankruptcy, has also filed a similar notice of appeal. This case comes up now solely upon motions to dismiss the different appeals.
The appellant Wright served a single notice of appeal, in which he appeals severally from each of the decrees entered in the two suits, describing each of them fully and separately in the notice. He served the notice of appeal on the intervening defendant Hall, by mailing a copy of the same to John L. Band, his attorney in Baker City. It is claimed that Wright’s notice of appeal is fatally defective because there was only one notice covering both decrees; and also because, as is claimed, a notice of appeal cannot be served by mail where the parties reside in the same place, even if the attorneys for one of them reside in another county.
The notice of appeal filed by Hall is also a double notice, and the first ground of the motion as to the Wright notice applies equally to that of Hall.
Motion Denied.
Messrs. Crawford (& Eakin, Messrs. Cochran & Eberhard and Mr. B. E. Wilson, for the motion.
Mr. John L. Band, Mr. J. E. Nichols, Mr. B. J. Green and Mr. E. E. Dixon, contra.

Opinion:
BENNETT, J.
We are of the opinion that the motion to dismiss in the Wright case is not well taken. There seems to have been a virtual, if not a formal, consolidation of the cases for trial.
It is very plain from the notice that Wright intends to appeal and does appeal from both decrees; and indeed each decree is separately and fully described. It is impossible that the adverse party should have been in any way misled. Perhaps it might have been more appropriate to have served an entirely distinct and separate notice in each case, but we cannot say under the circumstances and conditions of the record that the notice was fatally defective as to either one. Certainly it would not be defective as to both, and it would be impossible to distinguish and say that it would be defective in one and not in the other.
It is urged that the effect of this duplicate appeal would be to save a filing fee in one case or the other. Whether or not this is true, we do not think it would justify us in dismissing an appeal where the notice sufficiently describes each of the decrees, and fully notifies the adverse parties that it is the intention to appeal from each of them.
As to the service by mail, we are of the opinion that that also is sufficient. Section 550, L. O. L., as amended, provides that the notice of appeal shall be served upon the adverse party, "or upon his or their attorney at any place in the state." Section 540, L. O. L., in regard to service by mail, provides:
"Service by mail may be made when the person for whom the service is made, and the person upon whom it is to be made, resides in different places."
Under these sections the appellant Wright had the option to serve his notice of appeal either upon the party individually, or upon his attorney, at any place in the state; and having selected that option in favor of the attorney, such attorney became the "person" who was being served and he living at a different place, to wit: the town of Baker, the service upon him could be properly made by mail. This seems the natural construction of the language, but besides this, it is the usual and we think the appropriate practice, where there is an attorney of record to serve the notice of appeal upon him, even although such attor ney does reside out of the county. This being a proper and usual thing to do, the service can unquestionably be made by mail.
What is said above in regard to the Wright appeal, also disposes of the motion to dismiss the appeal of the intervener, Hall. The double notice of appeal in his case was somewhat more general than in the Wright case, but we think it was sufficient under the holding in Robinson v. Phegley, 93 Or. 299 (177 Pac. 942, 178 Pac. 799, 182 Pac. 373); Fraley v. Hoban, 69 Or. 180.(133 Pac. 1190, 137 Pac. 751), and Tucker v. Nuding, 92 Or. 319 (180 Pac. 903).
The motion to dismiss the appeal in both cases is denied. Denied.