Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. Bernard HAYES, Jr.
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1983-06-01
Citations: 446 So. 2d 1233
Docket Number: No. KA-0371
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Bernard HAYES, Jr.
Judges: Before WARD, WILLIAMS and LOBRA-NO, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 446
Pages: 1233–1239

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. Bernard HAYES, Jr.
No. KA-0371.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
June 1, 1983.
On Rehearing Sept. 20, 1983.
On Rehearing Feb. 6, 1984.
On Rehearing March 1, 1984.
Harry F. Connick, Dist. Atty., John H. Craft, William R. Campbell, Asst. Dist. At-tys., New Orleans, for State, appellee.
Daniel S. Foley, New Orleans, for Bernard Hayes, appellant.
Before WARD, WILLIAMS and LOBRA-NO, JJ.

Opinion:
WARD, Judge.
The defendant, Bernard Hayes, was indicted by an Orleans Parish Grand Jury for the second degree murder of his son, Bernard Dennis. La.R.S. 14:30.1. Hayes waived his right to a trial by jury and was tried by a judge. Hayes was found guilty of manslaughter and was sentenced to 21 years imprisonment. La.R.S. 14:31. On appeal, Hayes requests the Court to review the record for errors patent, and he argues five assignments of error. We do not reach the issues raised by his various specific assignments of error because our review of the record reveals that the Trial Judge may have erroneously decided the defendant's guilt on the basis of an incorrect appreciation of the applicable legal principles. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.
The State's case- against Hayes rests al-. most exclusively on circumstantial evidence. La.R.S. 15:438 provides that in order to base a conviction on circumstantial evidence, assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove, it must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The Trial Judge's pre-sentencing monologue indicates that this standard may not have been applied by the Trial Judge in assessing the circumstantial evidence against Hayes.
A brief summary of the facts revealed at trial will show the importance of circumstantial evidence in this case. The two year old victim, Bernard Dennis, was the son of Bernard Hayes and Elizabeth Dennis. On March 6, 1981, the child was unable to attend nursery school because he had chicken pox. His mother asked Hayes, who did not live with the mother, to babysit the child while she went to school and to work. Hayes picked the child up from Ms. Dennis early in the morning and Hayes and the child spent the day visiting one of Hayes' friends, Joe Wilson, at Wilson's apartment. Wilson left Hayes and the child alone briefly twice during the day. When Hayes returned the child to Ms. Dennis around five that afternoon, the child was unconscious and had several bruises on his head. He never regained consciousness and died two days later.
The State sought to prove that the child died of child abuse, specifically, forceful blows to the head, and they presented much medical evidence in support of their theory. The State presented no direct evidence that Hayes .purposeful injured the child, however, and Hayes denies striking the child. He admits to administering minimal physical discipline on two occasions; once when the child spilled his milk and once when the child used profanity.
As a reasonable hypothesis of innocence, the defense sought to show by evidence during the trial that the child received the head injuries in an accident when the defendant accidentally slammed a door and struck the child. According to the defense's theory, the child fell off a bed while alone in a bedroom and struck his head either on a mantle or on a protruding capped gas pipe. The child then attempted to leave the bedroom, possibly searching for his father, who was at that time trying to open a jammed bedroom door. While Hayes was pushing and pulling the door to jar it loose, the child allegedly wandered partially through the slightly opened door and was caught between the door and the door frame when Hayes unknowingly forced the door closed, injuring the child. The defense produced several medical experts who testified that the child's head injuries could have been caused in such a manner. Additionally, the defense sought to show through expert medical testimony that the child's death could have resulted from Reyes Syndrome, Infantile Diabetes, or Viral Encephalitis.
On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict, either under the Constitutional standards of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), or State v. Shapiro, 431 So.2d 372 (La.1983), but we do not reach that issue because our examination of the record leaves us with a serious doubt as to whether the fact finder applied the appropriate legal standard in assessing the sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence against Hayes. At the close of the trial, the Judge indicated for the record that he would charge himself on the law of circumstantial evidence. In order to base a conviction on circumstantial evidence, assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence variously offered by both sides tends to prove, it must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. La. R.S. 15:438, State v. Shapiro, 431 So.2d 372 (La.1983). In his pre-sentence monologue, however, the Judge did not discuss his decision in terms of whether the evidence had excluded every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Rather, he explained his decision in terms of "reasonable doubt":
This Court . ultimately determined that the appropriate verdict, beyond a reasonable doubt in this case, was guilty of manslaughter.
. The Court realizes that circumstantial evidence played a significant part in this case. But, the Court ultimately resolved in its mind beyond a reasonable doubt, that this defendant was actively responsible . for the trauma that was inflicted upon that little child. (Emphasis ours).
Although application of the appropriate standard for sufficiency of circumstantial evidence may have yielded the same result, it appears that the Trial Court did not base its determination of guilt on that standard, and we are not at liberty to presume what the fact finder's assessment of evidence would be under the appropriate standard.
Accordingly, we reverse for trial error,, as distinguished from evidentiary insufficiency. Thus, our reversal does not constitute a decision that the government has failed to prove its case. Because our reversal is based on trial error, it would not violate double jeopardy principles to retry the defendant. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978).
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
WILLIAMS, J., dissents with written reasons.