Case Name: THE POWELTON COAL CO. v. McSHANE
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1874-05-18
Citations: 2 Foster 177
Docket Number: 
Parties: THE POWELTON COAL CO. v. McSHANE.
Judges: 
Reporter: Legal Chronicle reports of Cases decided in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (Foster)
Volume: 2
Pages: 177–178

Head Matter:
In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
THE POWELTON COAL CO. v. McSHANE.
It is permissible to give evidence of a verbal promise made by one of the parties, at. the time of making of a written contract, where such promise was used as an inducement to obtain the execution thereof.
Error to District Court of Philadelphia.

Opinion:
Opinion delivered May 18, 1874, by
Gordon, J.
It is certainly permissible to give evidence of a verbal promise made by one of the parties, at the time of the making of a written contract where such promise was used as an inducement to obtain the execution thereof. Campbell v. McClenachen, 6 & Sr R. 171 This rule is put upon the ground that' the attempt afterwards to take advantage of the omission from the contract, of such promise, is a fraud upon the party who was induced to execute it upon such promise, and he' ce he will be permitted to show the truth of the matter. Clark v. Partrage, 2 Barr, 13; Renshaw v. Gans, 7 Barr, 117; Dutton v. Tilden, 1 Har. 49.
Now, in the case in hand, McShane testified that the absolute condition upon which he signed the agreement was, that the company should furnish the coal by the first of October, He says, after speaking of their previous parol arrangement, "Mr. Berwin showed me the paper. I was in a great hurry. I picked it up. I glanced over it and said, Mr. Berwin this is one sided; it don't mention that you will furnish the coal by the first of October. He said that is understood ; we will not only furnish that, but expect to furnish five or ten thousand more by that time. I made answer, if that is understood, I will sign it." This piece of evidence showed a distinct and material condition by which McShane was induced to sign the contract. To say, then, that this contract might be enforced without regard to the express parol stipulation, under which it was signed, would be to disregard long and well established legal principles, as well as the plainest demands of common honesty. The exceptions, therefore, to the charge and admissions of evidence are not sustained The case was properly submitted, and though in fact the weight of the evidence may have been with the defendant, the resulting error lay with the jury, not with the court, and hence comes not within 'our power of correction
These observations dispose of the main points in controversy. We may.observe, however, with reference to the point made, that indebitatus assmnfisit will not lie upon a special contract, except where there has been a full performance on part of the plaintiff, it is conceded that this proposition is correct. But the plaintiff did not only rety upon the special contract; that was set up by the defendant for the purpose of defeating the plaintiff's claim, and as the jury found that it was not operative by rea son of the defendant's fraud, we cannot see why the plaintiff's recovery under the indebitatus counts may not be sustained. So we cannot see that there was anything in the question raised by the defendants, as to the relation McShane's employees sustained to him. It was not alleged that the company had contracted with any one but the plaintiff, or that there had been a joint undertaking by him and some one else to transport the merchandise in .question. That he had employed his own firm to assist him in the performance of his undertaking could, therefore, by no possibility affect his right to recover. Judgment affirmed.