Case Name: RUSSELL v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1920-03-10
Citations: 228 S.W. 566
Docket Number: No. 5702
Parties: RUSSELL v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 228
Pages: 566–569

Head Matter:
RUSSELL v. STATE.
(No. 5702.)
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
March 10, 1920.
Rehearing Granted Feb. 23, 1921.)
On Motion for Rehearing.
1. Criminal law &wkey;> 13 — Statute relating to careful driving held insufficient to describe crime.
Yernon’s Ann. Pen. Code Supp. 1918, art. 820k, (a), providing that vehicles shall be operated in a careful manner, with due regard for the safety and convenience of pedestrians and all other vehicles, is obnoxious to the rule which requires some degree of certainty in informing one accused of crime of the nature of the accusation against him, and such provision is inoperative and unenforceable in so far as it undertakes to define an offense, in view of Pen. Code 1911, arts. 1, 3.
2. Highways <&wkey;-l86 — Information charging failure to give signal on overtaking vehicle sufficient.
An information stating that accused “did then and there, while driving a motor vehicle upon a public highway in said state and county, attempt to pass another vehicle by overtaking said vehicle, without then and there sounding audible and suitable signal before passing said vehicle going in the same direction,” helll to sufficiently charge the offense of failing to give signal on passing another vehicle, under Vernon’s Ann. Pen. Code Supp. 1918, art. 820k, (f).
3. Highways &wkey;>!86 — Not offense to fail to give signal, where other vehicle was not seen.
If operator of an automobile, who collided with a buggy, did not see the buggy by reason of his lights suddenly going out, and did not know that the buggy was in front of him, and was going slow and about to stop to fix his lights, he could not be held liable for not having given the passing or approaching signal required by Vernon’s Ann. Pen. Code Supp. 1918, art. 820k, (f).
Appeal from Johnson County Court; O. O. Chrisman, Judge.
P. R. Russell was convicted of careless driving, and appeals.
Reversed and remanded.
F. E. Johnson, of Cleburne, for appellant. Alvin M. Owsley, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

Opinion:
MORROW, J.
The prosecution is under article 820k, Vernon's Texas Criminal Statutes, Supplement 1918, being section 16 of the Act of April 9, 1917, c. 207. The penalty attached to this statute is in the Act of May 19, 1917, First Called Session, c. 31, § 45, and of the Act of October 10, 1917, Third Called Session, c. 13, § 45, (Vernon's Ann. Pen. Code Supp. 1918, art. • 820yy); the penalty prescribed being for the first offense not exceeding $100. Subdivision (f) of article 820k is as follows:
"It shall be the duty of the person operating or in charge of an overtaking vehicle to sound audible and suitable signal before passing a vehicle proceeding in the same direction.".
In the count in the information under this phase of the statute the following is charged:
" Did then and there while driving a motor vehicle upon a public highway in said state and county attempt to pass another vehicle by overtaking said vehicle without then and there sounding audible and suitable signal before passing said vehicle going in the same direction."
We do not think the information is subject to the criticism addressed to it, that it charges no offense, in that the statute does not denounce an attempt to pass a vehicle. The apparent purpose of the statute is to prevent accidents or injuries by requiring that the person in charge of an approaching vehicle shall give warning before passing one which he is overtaking. The facts in the instant case show that the appellant, while in the act of passing a vehicle which he overtook, caused his car to strike the vehicle and injure both it and some of its occupants. It occurs to us that the statute made it his duty to sound a warning before he was in a position to collide with the vehicle he was passing, and that the fact that the passing was prevented by the collision would not take the act out of the terms of the statute. The pleading might well have been made more specific by an allegation identifying the vehicle unlawfully passed. The omission, however, we think would not have been available, except upon special exception.
The appellant, it seems, at the time of the collision, was driving his car at nighttime without lights. The absence of lights is explained by the fact that the lights were defective, and went out a number of times upon the trip which the appellant was making. The fact that he chose to drive his ear at night, when it was in a condition that the lights'would not burn, would not, as a matter of law, excuse him for the failure to give the signal required by the statute.
The judgment is affirmed.
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