Case Name: OLGA KASZUBOWSKI et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO et al., Defendants-Appellees
Court: Illinois Appellate Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 1993-06-11
Citations: 248 Ill. App. 3d 451
Docket Number: No. 1 — 91—3494
Parties: OLGA KASZUBOWSKI et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO et al., Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Appellate Court Reports, Third Series
Volume: 248
Pages: 451–472

Head Matter:
OLGA KASZUBOWSKI et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO et al., Defendants-Appellees.
First District (5th Division)
No. 1 — 91—3494
Opinion filed June 11, 1993.
COUSINS, J., dissenting.
James D. Montgomery and Jean M. Templeton, both of James D. Montgomery & Associates, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellants.
Michael J. Hernandez and Iris E. Sholder, both of Board of Education of City of Chicago, of Chicago, for appellees.

Opinion:
JUSTICE MURRAY
delivered the opinion of the court:
The plaintiffs appeal from an order of the trial court dismissing the plaintiffs' claims to recover money damages and injunctive relief against the Interim Board of Education of the City of Chicago (Interim Board or Board) based on contract rights allegedly created by operation of law pursuant to the Illinois School Code. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 122, par. 34 — 1 et seq.) Plaintiffs and defendants filed cross-motions for summary judgment. In a memorandum opinion, the trial court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, holding that no contract rights were created by operation of law.
The facts are as follows.
In approximately 1985 the Board, pursuant to its statutory authority, had divided the Chicago public school district into 23 subdistricts. The Board employed a "superintendent" for each of these 23 subdistricts. As of July 1989 plaintiffs-appellants Olga Kaszubowski, Aracelis Figueroa, Eleanor Pick, Howard J. Sloan, Frank Venutra, Herbert Schiff, Edith Dervin, Blaine Dene, Carol Wooley, Bernarr E. Dawson, James F. Moore, Norman Silber, and Reginald Brown occupied 13 of those 23 superintendent positions.
After the adoption of the School Reform Act (Act) and prior to the commencement of the school year in September of 1989, the Interim Board announced its intention to "combine" certain "subdistricts." As a result of this "combination," the 23 existing subdistricts were reduced to 11; of the 23 superintendents, 13 had their positions deleted (the plaintiffs in the present case). Three new individuals, who had not previously served as superintendents, were appointed to 3 of the 11 new districts.
On August 22, 1989, plaintiffs filed a complaint challenging the reduction in the number of subdistricts on three grounds. First, the superintendent-plaintiffs alleged that the reduction breached a purported employment contract between themselves and the Board. Second, the superintendent-plaintiffs alleged that the reduction deprived them of their "property" in those positions without due process of law. Finally, the. parent-plaintiffs alleged that the reduction violated their rights as parents by reducing the number of elected parent representatives on the school board nominating commission, in alleged violation of the School Reform Act.
Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief to forestall the implementation of this proposal. The trial court granted the defendants' motion to strike plaintiffs' práyers for injunctive relief on August 30, 1989. Count III requested solely injunctive relief and was the only count which related to the parent-plaintiffs (who are not parties to this appeal). As a result, the only matters that remained pending before the trial court were the superintendent-plaintiffs' claims for declaratory relief and damages.
On June 29, 1990, plaintiffs-appellants moved for summary judgment, contending that no material facts were in dispute and that they were entitled to a judgment, as a matter of law. Plaintiffs alleged: (1) the School Reform Act established a contract between the superintendent-plaintiffs and defendants; (2) the Interim Board breached that contract by eliminating their former positions; and (3) the Interim Board lacked the authority to eliminate those positions. Plaintiffs asserted that section 34 — 8.3(g) of the School Reform Act established their purported contract. Section 34 — 8.3(g) provides:
"All persons serving as subdistrict superintendent on [May 1, 1989], and all persons appointed as subdistrict superintendent after [May 1, 1989,] and prior to July 1, 1991 in a manner other than as provided by Section 34 — 2.5, shall be deemed by operation of law to be serving under a performance contract which expires on June 30, 1991; and unless such performance contract of any such subdistrict superintendent is renewed (or such person is again appointed to serve as subdistrict superintendent) in the manner provided by Section 34 — 2.5. the employment of such person as subdistrict superintendent shall terminate on June 30, 1991." (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 122, par. 34 — 8.3(g) (added by Pub. Act 85 — 1418, §1, eff. July 1, 1989; amended by Pub. Act 86 — 124, §1, eff. July 28, 1989; reenacted by Pub. Act 86-1477, §2, eff. Jan. 11, 1991).)
Defendants filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. The motions were briefed and oral argument was heard on October 16, 1990.
Before the trial court could render a written opinion, the Illinois Supreme Court released its opinion in Fumarolo v. Chicago Board of Education (1990), 142 Ill. 2d 54, 566 N.E.2d 1283. The Fumarolo decision held unconstitutional the School Reform Act on the basis that the election procedure for the local school councils did not meet the strict scrutiny of the one person, one vote rule of law. Although the legislation contained a severability clause, the supreme court held that this constitutional flaw tainted the whole enactment because the local school counsel was the building block upon which school reform was based. Following the action of the supreme court and prior to a decision on the motion for rehearing on February 4, 1991, Public Act 86— 1477 was enacted and became effective January 11, 1991. Public Act 86 — 1477 was enacted to remedy the constitutionally objectionable provision of the School Reform Act by providing for the appointment of all local school council members, subdistrict members, school board nominating commission members and Board of Education members by the mayor of Chicago. Except for the foregoing change, the legislature readopted verbatim the remaining provisions of the former act, including section 34 — 8.3(g).
The trial court subsequently required supplemental briefs describing both the impact of the Fumarolo decision and subsequent reenactment of the School Reform Act by the legislature (Pub. Act 86 — 1477, eff. January 11, 1991) to determine if the decision had bearing on the issues before the trial court in the present case. Both sides submitted supplemental memoranda, and argument was heard on the supplemental issues on August 6, 1991.
On September 25, 1991, the trial court issued its memorandum of opinion. The trial court's opinion made the following findings: In May of 1989, plaintiffs acted as superintendents of subdistricts within the City of Chicago school district. The Interim Board reduced the 23 existing subdistricts within the Chicago public school district to 11, and in doing so, eliminated the previously existing subdistricts. Therefore, plaintiffs' positions as subdistrict superintendents were likewise eliminated. Considering the issue of whether section 34 — 8.3(g) could be construed as creating an enforceable contractual right on behalf of the plaintiffs for the period specified in the statute, the trial court indicated, "The question is whether the legislature intended to give the Interim Board the power to reduce or abolish subdistricts, but yet inhibit its ability to do so by giving vested contractual rights to subdistrict superintendents in office on the effective date of the Act." After citing section 34 — 21.3, the opinion stated:
"It would seem unlikely, in light of the above language, that the legislature intended to award performance contracts in Section 34 — 8.3(g), but yet allowed the Interim School Board to nevertheless abolish existing subdistricts which would have the effect of cancelling the very performance contracts that the legislature gave to subdistrict superintendents.

If the Court were to interpret Section 34 — 8.3(g) as creating vested contractual rights on behalf of subdistrict superintendents, the Court would be required to totally disregard the specific language in Section [34 — 18(7)]. Had the legislature intended Section 34 — 8.3(g) to provide for vested contractual rights in subdistrict superintendents, it would not have empowered the Interim School Board to immediately reduce the number of subdistricts under Section [34 — 18(7)].
The Court finds that a more logical interpretation of Section 34 — 8.3(g) is that that Section is merely a statement of policy to be pursued subject to the Interim Board's powers under Section 34 — 21.3(a) to implement an annual school budget."
The trial court held that the mere reference to "performance contract" does not suggest a legislative intent to create vested contractual rights. Finding its analysis compatible with the legislative intent of the statute, the trial court's opinion noted that Representative Levin, a sponsor of the Act, left no doubt as to the intent behind section 34 — 8.3(g). During the House of Representatives' debates on the 1989 amendment to the School Reform Act, Representative Levin stated:
"[T]hat Section 34 — 8.3(g), the provision we put in last year that provides that performance contracts established by operation of law * that provision, was not intended to preclude the interim board from reorganizing the number of districts superintendent positions or does it require the interim board, having reorganized the number of districts, to pay the previous occupants of the districts superintendent positions the salaries that they would have gotten if they would have continued in their positions." 86th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, June 30, 1989, at 170.
Judgment was entered in favor of defendants on September 30, 1991. This timely appeal was filed.
The plaintiffs raise two issues on appeal: (1) Whether the provisions of section 34 — 8.3(g) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 122, par. 34— 8.3(g)) created a performance contract by operation of law under which plaintiffs could claim damages, and (2) whether the trial court properly entered summary judgment in favor of defendants and denied summary judgment to the plaintiffs.
For the following reasons, we reverse the decision of the trial court.
As the facts are undisputed in the present case, and the decision rests on the proper interpretation of the statute, we review the trial court's ruling as a matter of law. Village of Spring Grove v. Doss (1990), 202 Ill. App. 3d 858, 563 N.E.2d 793; see also People v. 1946 Buick, VIN 34423520 (1989), 127 Ill. 2d 374, 378, 537 N.E.2d 748.
One of the basic rules of statutory construction is that where the intent of a statute can be ascertained from the statutory language itself, it must be given effect without resort to extrinsic aids for construction. (Whiteco Metrocom Division v. Village of Downers Grove (1990), 197 Ill. App. 3d 174, 181, 553 N.E.2d 1145; see also People v. Wittenmyer (1992), 151 Ill. 2d 175, 195, 601 N.E.2d 735.) A primary rule of statutory construction is that a court is required to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. (Fumarolo v. Chicago Board of Education (1990), 142 Ill. 2d 54, 96, 566 N.E.2d 1283.) Courts should first look to the statutory language, as the best indication of the intent of the drafters (County of Du Page v. Graham, Anderson, Probst & White, Inc. (1985), 109 Ill. 2d 143, 151, 485 N.E.2d 1076), and such intent is best determined by the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language. People v. Pettit (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 309, 313, 461 N.E.2d 991; see also People v. Wittenmyer (1992), 151 Ill. 2d 175, 195, 601 N.E.2d 735.
We must assume that the legislature intended to enact a statute that was consistent with the constitution, giving effect to as much of a statute as is possible, consistent with the constitution, and construing the Act in light of the subject it addresses and its apparent objective. Dornfeld v. Julian (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 261, 266, 472 N.E.2d 431.
As the court in Morrison v. Chicago Board of Education (1989), 188 Ill. App. 3d 588, 594, 544 N.E.2d 1099, stated:
"Statutes must be construed so as to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature as expressed in the statute, and absent some clear legislative intent to the contrary, terms are to be given their ordinary and commonly understood meaning. The language used in a statute is the primary source for determining legislative intent, and where that language is certain and unambiguous, the proper function of the courts is to enforce the statute as enacted. [Citation.] * [A]nd the court must choose a construction which gives the statute a clear, logical meaning, rather than a meaning that renders the statute illogical, useless or unreasonable."
Where the language of a statute admits of two constructions, one of which would render the enactment absurd and illogical, while the other would render it reasonable and sensible, the former construction must be avoided. (Mulligan v. Joliet Regional Port District (1988), 123 Ill. 2d 303, 312-13, 527 N.E.2d 1264.) Statutes must be construed in the most beneficial way which their language will permit, so as to prevent hardship or injustice, and to oppose prejudice to public interests. (See Illinois National Bank v. Chegin (1966), 35 Ill. 2d 375, 220 N.E.2d 226.) The court must look at the statute as a whole, taking into consideration its nature, its purposes and the evil the statute was intended to remedy; each word, clause, or sentence of a statute must not be rendered superfluous but must if possible, be given some rea sonable meaning. Whiteco Metrocom Division v. Village of Downers Grove (1990), 197 Ill. App. 3d 174, 181, 553 N.E.2d 1145.
The plaintiffs contend that the plain language of the statute creates a contractual right where none had previously existed. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 122, par. 34 — 8.3(g).) Moreover, the plaintiffs maintain the legislative history of the act also supports the conclusion that the statute was intended to create a contract. Contrary to the plaintiffs' contentions, defendants argue that neither the plain language of the statute nor the legislative history of the Illinois School Code supports the conclusion that the statute was intended to afford the plaintiffs contract rights as a matter of law. Consequently, defendants maintain that the trial court properly granted their motion for summary judgment.
Defendants maintain section 34 — 8.3(g) must be considered in the overall context of the School Reform Act, and argue that when the School Reform Act is read as a whole, it clearly authorized the Interim Board to order the administrative reorganization that plaintiffs claim breached their "contract." Defendants argue a provision of the School Code left unaltered by the School Reform Act expressly confers on the Board of Education of the City of Chicago the power to "divide the city into subdistricts." (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 122, par. 34 — 18(7).) In addition defendants note, "subdistrict," as acknowledged in the plaintiffs' complaint and defined in the School Reform Act, means:
"[A] geographic area of the school district formed by boundaries which are coterminous with the boundaries of any one of the elementary or high school administrative subdistricts into which the city is divided, as those elementary or high school administrative subdistrict boundaries existed on January 1, 1988, or as those subdistrict boundaries hereafter are changed by the board as provided in paragraph 7 of Section 34 — 18." (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 122, par. 34 — 1.1.)
Section 34 — 18(7) gives the Board the power "[t]o divide the city into subdistricts." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 122, par. 34 — 18(7).
A reading of the entire reenacted School Reform Act does not indicate any intent to throw plaintiffs to the wolves when their subdistricts were eliminated. Actually, taken as a whole, the express language of section 34 — 8.3(g) indicates an intention to give the subdistrict superintendents a golden parachute, much like private corporations give executives.
We find the words in the statute are not ambiguous. The class of persons serving as subdistrict superintendents on May 1, 1989, can be readily ascertained. The plaintiffs were clearly members of that class. Black's Law Dictionary defines "deem" as "[t]o hold; consider; adjudge; believe; condemn; determine; treat as if; construe." (Black's Law Dictionary 374 (5th ed. 1979).) The definition of "operation of law" states: "This term expresses the manner in which rights, and sometimes liabilities, devolve upon a person by the mere application to the particular transaction of the established rules of law, without the act or co-operation of the party himself." (Black's Law Dictionary 985 (5th ed. 1979).) Therefore, section 34 — 8.3(g) indicates that by the mere application of the School Reform Act, the persons employed as subdistrict superintendents on May 1, 1989, would be adjudged to be serving under a performance contract which expires on June 30, 1991.
In terms of what the performance contract would entail, the School Reform Act sets forth various duties of the subdistrict superintendents. (See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 122, par. 34 — 1 et seq.) Section 34 — 2.1(k) provides that the subdistrict superintendent shall resolve any disputes concerning election procedure of the local school councils or the results. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 122, par. 34 — 2.1(k).) Section 34 — 2.5(a) gives the subdistrict superintendents the power to declare a vacancy on a subdistrict council if a subdistrict council fails to maintain qualifications as a member of the local school council. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 122, par. 34 — 2.5(a).) Section 34 — 8.3 provides in relevant part:
"Subdistrict superintendents, (a) Each subdistrict superintendent shall monitor the performance of the attendance centers within the subdistrict boundaries and shall identify the attendance centers that have:
(1) failed to develop or implement a school improvement plan;
(2) failed to make adequate progress toward complying with a school improvement plan;
(3) failed or refused to comply with its school improvement plan; or
(4) otherwise failed or refused to comply with the provisions of this Act *.
(b) If the subdistrict superintendent identifies a nonperforming school as described herein, he shall (1) notify the subdistrict council and (2) obtain the council's approval to place the attendance center on remediation by developing a remediation plan for the center. The purpose of the remediation plan shall be to correct the deficiencies in the performance of the attendance center by one or more of the following methods:
(1) drafting a new school improvement plan;
(2) applying to the board for additional funding for training for the local school council;
(3) directing implementation of a school improvement plan;
(4) mediating disputes or other obstacles to reform or improvement at the attendance center.
If, however, the subdistrict superintendent determines that the problems are serious or not able to be remediated by these methods, or where a remediation plan has been developed by the subdistrict superintendent and the superintendent determines that remediation has not been successful, the subdistrict superintendent shall notify the subdistrict council and shall obtain the council's approval to place the attendance center on probation.

(h) Each subdistrict superintendent shall, in consultation with local school councils, conduct an annual evaluation of each principal under his or her jurisdiction pursuant to guidelines promulgated by the Board of Education." (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 122, par. 34 — 8.3.)
In addition, the subdistrict council is to evaluate the performance of the subdistrict superintendent and to establish additional criteria to be included as part of the performance contracts of its subdistrict superintendent. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 122, pars. 34 — 2.5(e)(1), (e)(3).
In its memorandum opinion, the trial court indicated that if the legislature intended section 34 — 8.3(g) to provide for vested contractual rights in subdistrict superintendents, it would not have empowered the Interim School Board to immediately reduce the number of subdistricts. The trial court found "that a more logical interpretation of Section 34 — 8.3(g) is that that Section is merely a statement of policy to be pursued subject to the Interim Board's powers under Section 34 — 21.3(a) to implement an annual school budget."
Section 34 — 21.3(a) provides:
"Limitation on powers of board and Interim Board. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act or Article, during and throughout the 1989-1990 fiscal year of the board or Interim Board, the board or Interim Board shall limit its activities and the exercise of its powers (other than its taxing and bonding powers and its responsibilities with respect to the adoption of the annual school budget for the 1989-1990 fiscal year of the board or Interim Board) to dealing with issues which will not impede or be detrimental to, and shall address those issues which will assist in, the implementation of the provisions of this amendatory Act of 1988; and during and throughout the 1989-1990 fiscal year of the board or Interim Board, neither the board nor Interim Board nor the general superintendent of schools shall enter into, renew, extend or renegotiate any contracts with any 'exclusive representative' * or other collective bargaining representatives of any school district employees, nor enter into any new or other contracts or agreements which would conflict with any of the provisions of this amendatory Act of 1988." (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 122, par. 34— 21.3a.)
The only policy this court can discern from the language of section 34 — 8.3(g) is an intention to employ the subdistrict superintendents until June 30, 1991.
The court must look at the statute as a whole, taking into consideration its nature, its purposes and the evil the statute was intended to remedy; each word, clause, or sentence of a statute must not be rendered superfluous but must, if possible, be given some reasonable meaning. (Whiteco Metrocom Division v. Village of Downers Grove (1990), 197 Ill. App. 3d 174, 181, 553 N.E.2d 1145.) It is the position of the plaintiffs that since the language of section 34 — 8.3(g) clearly and unambiguously granted them a contract by operation of law, the subsequent actions of the Interim Board which resulted in their termination or reassignment violated those contractual rights. We agree. Following the rules of statutory construction and utilizing the plain meaning of section 34 — 8.3(g), we believe the legislature intended to create a contract with the subdistrict superintendents effective until June 30, 1991.
Defendants cite to Fitzsimmons v. O'Neill (1905), 214 Ill. 494, and Woolfolk v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners (1979), 79 Ill. App. 3d 27, 31, 398 N.E.2d 226 in support of the proposition that governmental units have inherent authority to economize through reorganization, even at the expense of employees protected against discharge except "for cause." However, we find those cases distinguishable from the present case where we find that the language of the statute specifically created a contract right.
Defendants also argue, assuming, arguendo, that the School Reform Act established a contract between the superintendent-plaintiffs and the Interim Board, that that contract necessarily includes the Interim Board's authority to reduce the number of subdistricts and, hence, the number of district superintendents. Defendants cite to the comments made by Representative Levin and argue that since the plaintiffs specifically relied on the 1989 amendment as creating part of their "contract" and treat it as a piece with the original enactment, this legislative history of the amendment is highly relevant.
Representative Levin's comments were made in support of the adoption of the conference committee report; This was after the Fumarolo decision and prior to the reenactment of section 34 — 8.3(g). Prior to his comments regarding the subdistrict superintendents, he acknowledged that the legislation was a compromise and that there were some provisions that were very good as well as some provisions that he would probably rather not have. We find no other comments regarding the subdistrict superintendents. We do not believe that Representative Levin's isolated comments standing alone indicate the intent of the entire legislature. Nevertheless, since the intent of the legislature is best determined by the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language, and we have found that the plain meaning indicates an intent to give the subdistrict superintendents a contract until June 30, 1991, we need not consider the comments of Representative Levin.
We find that the defendants had the power to change the subdistricts; however, regardless of any decision regarding such subdistricts, the plaintiffs had contracts that did not expire until June 30, 1991. By the plain meaning of the statute, the subdistrict superintendents had contracts that expired on June 30, 1991. As far as the court can see, the Board had several options: (1) wait to implement the redistricting until June 30, 1991; (2) redistrict while retaining all the subdistrict superintendents until June 30, 1991; or (3) redistrict, eliminate the excess superintendents, but yet remain liable to compensate the superintendents for their damages in contract through June 30, 1991. Thus, we believe that section 34 — 8.3(g) is not rendered superfluous by conceding that the defendants had the power to reduce the number of subdistricts.
Although the intent of this legislation clearly was the improvement of the school system, the legislation has not wanted for lack of controversy. In looking at the legislative history of the Illinois School Code and the School Reform Act, we find it unfortunate that Representative Turner's statements prior to the first enactment of this legislation appear to have come true. He stated:
"I think the people who are going to benefit most are the lawyers, are those who are involved with the contracts, * because this Bill certainly is unconstitutional and yes, it has a lot of flaws. But the constitutionality is going to be tested before we can correct the flaws on this particular Bill." (85th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, December 1, 1988, at 82.)
Representative Turner further stated that significant legal bills would be incurred in "trying to determine what is said and what is what in this particular Bill." 85th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, December 1, 1988, at 83.
Accordingly, for all the reasons set forth above, we reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Interim Board and remand with directions to grant the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the issue of the existence of a contract expiring on June 30, 1991, as expressly provided in the aforecited legislation and to conduct further proceedings as to the plaintiffs' damages, if any, in contract.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
GORDON, P.J., concurs.
The tenure of the Interim Board of Education, the named defendants-appellees in this matter, has been completed pursuant to the Illinois School Code. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 122, par. 34 — 3(a).) Pursuant to Illinois law, the Board of Education of the City of Chicago, which presently operates the Chicago public schools, has the capacity to sue and be sued. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 122, par. 34 — 2.) On March 15, 1991, the trial court granted the present Board of Education of the City of Chicago leave to substitute as defendants in this case. During oral argument in this court, an oral motion was made to amend the caption to reflect the change in parties.
The plaintiffs have described their titles as "subdistrict superintendent" throughout this litigation, while the defendants have referred to the plaintiffs as "district superintendents." Defendants' answer asserts that these plaintiffs were never employed as subdistrict superintendents within the meaning of the School Reform Act, Public Act 85 — 1418, but rather held the position of district superintendent appointed pursuant to section 34 — 8 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1961, ch. 122, par. 34 — 8). Nevertheless, plaintiffs maintain that there is no dispute that the plaintiffs were all employed in an administrative capacity prior to the implementation of the district reduction.
Section 34 — 2.5 provides for the future selection of subdistrict superintendents or the renewal of contracts of existing subdistrict superintendents by the elected subdistrict council. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 122, par. 34 — 2.5.