Case Name: PEOPLE v. McGINNIS (ON REHEARING)
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1977-06-20
Citations: 76 Mich. App. 268
Docket Number: Docket No. 22997
Parties: PEOPLE v McGINNIS (ON REHEARING)
Judges: Before: M. J. Kelly, P. J., and J. H. Gillis and R. M. Maher, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 76
Pages: 268–277

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v McGINNIS (ON REHEARING)
Opinion of the Court
1. Criminal Law — Defendant’s Testimony — Alibi Testimony.
A defendant’s testimony that he was someplace other than the scene of a crime at the time the crime was committed is not alibi testimony per se.
2. Criminal Law — Alibi—Defendant’s Testimony — Notice of Alibi —Instructions to Jury.
A defendant may give testimony to the effect that he was in a different place at the time of the commission of a crime without having filed a notice of an alibi defense; however, this rule should not be expanded to a rule of law that a defendant who gives uncorroborated, self-serving testimony about his whereabouts other than at the scene of the crime at the time of the commission of the crime is entitled to an instruction to the jury on alibi defense.
Dissent by R. M. Maher, J.
3. Criminal Law — Instructions to Jury — Alibi.
An alibi instruction must be given to the jury, if requested, where there has been sufficient testimony regarding an alibi to raise an alibi defense.
4. Criminal Law — Evidence—Alibi—Alibi Testimony.
Alibi testimony is testimony offered for the sole purpose of placing a defendant elsewhere than at the scene of the crime.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1, 8] 30 Am Jur 2d, Evidence §§ 1162, 1178.
[2] 29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence §§ 157, 440.
[3, 7] 75 Am Jur 2d, Trial §§ 729-731.
[4, 5] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 136.
29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 440.
[6] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 137.
Validity and construction of statute requiring defendant in criminal case to disclose matter as to alibi defense. 45 ALR3d 958.
5. Criminal Law — Evidence—Alibi—Specific Testimony — Witnesses — Defendant’s Testimony.
A defendant’s general denial of charges against him does not constitute an alibi defense; however, if a defendant gives specific testimony regarding his whereabouts other than at the scene of the crime at the time in question, it is alibi testimony the same as if another witness had given the testimony.
6. Criminal Law — Notice of Alibi — Withdrawal of Notice — Evidence — Witnesses.
Notice of an alibi is statutorily required for the protection of the public and the withdrawal of or the failure to give such notice precludes witnesses other than the defendant from giving alibi testimony.
7. Criminal Law — Evidence—Alibi—Instructions to Jury — Notice of Alibi.
A defendant’s testimony regarding his whereabouts other than at the scene of the crime at the time of the commission of the crime entitled him to an alibi instruction to the jury even though his notice of alibi had been withdrawn.
8. Criminal Law — Defenses—Misidentification—Alibi.
The criminal defenses of misidentification and alibi are not mutually exclusive.
Appeal from Wayne, Theodore R. Bohn, J.
Submitted February 11, 1977, at Detroit.
(Docket No. 22997.)
Decided June 20, 1977.
Leave to appeal applied for.
Leslie W. McGinnis was convicted of carnal knowledge of a female over 16 and larceny in a building. Defendant appealed. Reversed and remanded. The people’s application for rehearing granted.
On rehearing the trial court is affirmed.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William L. Cahalan, Prosecuting Attorney, Edward R. Wilson, Research, Training and Appeals, and Timothy A. Baughman, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Kenneth Lerner, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for defendant.
Before: M. J. Kelly, P. J., and J. H. Gillis and R. M. Maher, JJ.

Opinion:
On Rehearing
M. J. Kelly, P. J.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of carnal knowledge of a female over 16, MCLA 750.520; MSA 28.788 (now repealed), and larceny in a building, MCLA 750.360; MSA 28.592. He was sentenced to serve 15 to 30 years in prison, and appeals as of right.
The complainant testified to the circumstances surrounding her rape which took place on January 21, 1974. She identified the defendant from three views of him. She said that he came to the door of her home and that before she opened it she peered through a window, then went to the door and saw him through the front glass, that after she opened the door and told him he had the wrong house he forced his way in and physically subdued her. After she had been assaulted and raped, a blindfold he had put on her slipped and she was able to see his profile again.
After the assailant left her home the complainant called the police. She gave a description of her attacker to the police, and also reported various items that were missing from the house.
The following day the complainant went to the police station and looked at photographs contained in "mug books". No identification was made. Sometime in March, the police received property belonging to complainant along with a photograph of defendant. Six hundred photographs were then taken to the complainant's home including the one of the defendant. At this viewing, the complainant identified defendant as her attacker and again identified him at a showup with counsel present.
Defendant testified on his own behalf. He denied committing the oifense, claiming that he had spent the day in question at a Clock Restaurant and Coney Island. He further stated that while at the restaurant he spoke with a waitress named Ms. Maranucci and offered to fix her car windshield.
Prior to trial, defendant filed notice of alibi listing Ms. Maranucci as an alibi witness. She was never called as a witness and the defense was withdrawn. A half-hearted attempt to resurrect the defense was made in later colloquy but the decision not to charge the jury on the defense of alibi was, at least arguably, consented to by defense counsel. Whether the issue was saved for review is doubtful; since the dissent says it was, we will discuss it.
Defendant's testimony was uncorroborated because trial counsel thought Ms. Maranucci would not help. He refused to put her on the stand because it was his judgment that she would have contradicted defendant's testimony, or at least been unable to corroborate it. The trial attorney's judgment was vindicated by appellate counsel when a motion for evidentiary hearing was withdrawn for the reason that:
"Appellant also wishes to withdraw his Motion to Remand for an Evidentiary Hearing on the issue of ineffective assistance of Appellant's counsel in failing to call the sole alibi witness at trial. Investigation done by the State Appellate Defender Office has revealed that the testimony which this witness could offer at a hearing would not substantiate Appellant's defense of alibi."
This trial took place in September of 1974. People v Merritt, 396 Mich 67; 238 NW2d 31 (1976), relied upon by appellant, was decided Janu ary 29, 1976. In August of 1974 this Court released People v Watkins, 54 Mich App 576; 221 NW2d 437 (1974), which held that a defendant's testimony that he was someplace else is not alibi testimony per se.
There is no question but that Merritt, supra, stands for the proposition that a defendant can give testimony to the effect that he was in a different place at the time of the commission of the crime without having filed an alibi notice. Why that should expand to a rule of law that a defendant who gives uncorroborated, self-serving testimony about his whereabouts is entitled to an alibi instruction or it constitutes reversible error is beyond us. The defendant is protected amply by the instructions concerning the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the credibility of the witnesses and all other pertinent instructions. An alibi instruction repeating that "the people have the duty of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the offense charged; the defendant has no burden of proving that he was someplace else", seems to us to be redundant. If Merritt stands for the proposition that every time a defendant gives uncorroborated testimony that he was not at the scene of the crime the jury must be instructed on alibi, we would hold that it states a new rule of law in Michigan. We would not hold it retroactive. We find any error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt on this issue. There was no manifest injustice.
Defendant raises several other issues which we have examined and find do not warrant discussion.
Affirmed.
J. H. Gillis, J., concurred.
The colloquy taken from the transcript is as follows:
"/Mr. Siegrist, defense counsel]: What we are going to show is going toward alibi. I think it's been proven that somebody can't be two different places at once, so, at the same time, we will show where my client was; where this house was located in Garden City was some distance in miles.
"Again, this defense does not rise to the dignity of alibi; the alibi defense per se. We don't have a witness who'll say for sure.
"The Court: May I see the attorneys for a moment."
Whereupon the attorneys conferred with the court out of the hearing of the jury and without the discussion being transcribed. We pick it up later, when, after both sides had rested, the court was going over the requests to charge with counsel:
"Mr. Siegrist: We don't have a case of alibi here. In a way, the Court and the prosecutor brought to my attention that in a way we do, but I did withdraw the alibi defense under the mistake that if I didn't have an alibi witness per se, then I couldn't do it. I later found out that it was not necessarily so.
"The Prosecutor, in chambers has stipulated and agreed in going along the line of alibi. He certainly had a chance to examine the only witness, which was the Defendant.
"Mr. McMahon [assistant prosecutor]: I'm not going to object to that instruction unless the Court has an objection. It may be confusing because of the way that the case has been presented so far, but I'm not going to object.
"The Court: We don't have a defensive [sic] alibi. I realize the court has an obligation to give a correct charge and all I'm saying is that I'm not going to play.
"Mr. Siegrist: I don't understand. The client was someplace else that's why he didn't know about it. It's semantics.
"The Court: I don't think so. He either has an alibi defense or he doesn't have an alibi defense.
"You withdrew the defense of alibi.
"Mr. Siegrist: The Prosecutor said it wasn't necessary. I wonder what the Court thinks, the Court brought that to my attention when I was making my opening statement.
"Mr. McMahon: The assertion that he didn't do it, does not necessarily contend that hé was somewhere else.
"A defense of alibi requires certain specific requisites, one of which is notice, a list of names of witnesses to be called, opportunity for the prosecution to interview those witnesses and any rebuttal witnesses.
'T understand that he was somewhere else, but it's not an alibi in the technical sense.
"Mr. Siegrist: If the Court feels that it was not a true alibi defense, then properly and [sic] instruction as to alibi would be [more] harmful than help in not confusing the Jury."
This case should be reviewed on the state of the law as it was at the time of the trial.