Case Name: Matter of the Estate of George Geisler, Deceased
Court: New York Surrogate's Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1902-01
Citations: 36 Misc. 750
Docket Number: 
Parties: Matter of the Estate of George Geisler, Deceased.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Miscellaneous Reports
Volume: 36
Pages: 750–752

Head Matter:
Matter of the Estate of George Geisler, Deceased.
(Surrogate’s Court, New York County,
January, 1902.)
Legacy — Vesting — Absolute ownership subject to be cut down to a-life estate by legatee’s death before her child.
The rule, that, where there is an absolute bequest to one person, and in case of his death to another, the contingency referred to is the death of the primary legatee during the lifetime of the testator and? that the legatee takes complete title if he survives the testator, does not apply if any language of the will is indicative of a different intention.
Accordingly, held, that a gift of all a testator’s property to his wife, followed by the words “ And in case my wife should die before my child then I desire to have all the property go to the surviving child ”, gave the wife absolute title to and custody of the fund, upon her giving security therefor, but that her estate therein was subject to be reduced to a life interest if she died before the child — who in such case would take.
Proceedings upon the judicial settlement of the accounts of an executor.
Hirsch & Ehrhorn, for executor.
Hays & Hershfield, for widow.
Charles E. F. McCann, special guardian.

Opinion:
Thomas, S.
The rule of construction that where there is an absolute bequest to one person, and in case of his death to another, the contingency referred to is the death of the first named legatee in the lifetime of the testator, and if he survives the testator he takes complete title to the legacy, has no application if there is any language in the will indicative of a different intention on the part of the testator. The reason assigned for the rule has been that, as death is a certain event, and the time only is contingent, the words in a devise or bequest of this description can only be satisfied by referring them to a death before some particular period, and, no other being mentioned, the time referred to must be presumed to have been the testator's own death. Matter of New York, L. & W. R. Co., 105 N. Y. 89. In the will of the decedent, after the words giving all of his property to his wife, he says: " And in case my wife should die before my child then I desire to have all the property go to the surviving child." The particular period within which the wife is to die in order to vest an estate in the child is mentioned by the testator. If she should die before his (my) child, then the child is to take. The rule is, therefore, without application, and no reason for imputing an intent to the testator radically different from that asserted by him can be framed. The will must be construed to vest an absolute title to the legacy in the widow, subject to be reduced to a life interest on the contingency of her dying before the child, upon which contingency the child will take. The proposed decree submitted by the executor provides for the retention of the fund by him as trustee. This is not correct, for no trust has been created by the will. The widow is entitled to the custody of the entire fund on giving security (Scott v. Scott, 6 Misc. Rep. 174, and cases cited), and until such security has been furnished the executor, as such, will retain the capital and pay her the income as it accrues. He can be allowed commissions for receiving but not for paying out the entire fund, until the widow gives the security and the fund is paid to her. Submit amended, decree on notice.
Decreed accordingly.