Case Name: Jimmy L. DUNCAN, Appellee, v. WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Jurisdiction: District of Columbia
Decision Date: 2000-01-28
Citations: 340 U.S. App. D.C. 32
Docket Number: No. 99-7073
Parties: Jimmy L. DUNCAN, Appellee, v. WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Appellant.
Judges: Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, SILBERMAN and HENDERSON, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Volume: 340
Pages: 32–47

Head Matter:
201 F.3d 482
Jimmy L. DUNCAN, Appellee, v. WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Appellant.
No. 99-7073.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued Nov. 16, 1999.
Decided Jan. 28, 2000.
Order Granting Rehearing En Banc and Vacating Judgment March 31, 2000.
Bruce P. Heppen argued the cause for the appellant. Cheryl C. Burke and Robert J. Kniaz were on brief for the appellant.
Bruce M. Bender argued the cause for the appellee. Suzanne L. Lawrence entered an appearance.
Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, SILBERMAN and HENDERSON, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.
Dissenting opinion filed by Chief Judge EDWARDS.
KAREN LeCRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge:
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) challenges the district court's denial of judgment as a matter of law on the claims Jimmy Duncan brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (1994), and for which a jury returned a verdict awarding Duncan $250,000 in compensatory damages: $125,000 for the "decision not to reasonably accommodate [him]" and $125,000 "as a result of [WMA-TA's] decision to terminate [him]." Judgment on the Verdict, ¶ ¶ 7, 8. WMATA also challenges two post-trial orders granting attorney's fees and costs and one post-trial order granting backpay and prejudgment interest.
We conclude that Duncan failed to establish he was disabled and thus protected under the ADA and, therefore, reverse the district court's order denying judgment as a matter of law. We also vacate the jury verdict and the posttrial orders noted above.
I.
Duncan, forty-seven years old at the time of trial, attended high school and trade school in electronics but completed neither. He has an employment history of unskilled labor positions, many requiring heavy lifting. He began working for WMATA in May 1986 as a custodian, a position that required him to lift between 75 and 100 pounds. Duncan then became an Automated Fare Collector (AFC) parts runner in November 1991. He testified that 30 pounds was the heaviest lifting required and his testimony was corroborated by that of a co-worker. In early December 1992, as a result of another employee's grievance, Duncan was transferred involuntarily to the Elevator/Escalator branch (ELES) into a position requiring heavy lifting.
From 1989 to 1992 Duncan sustained several back injuries including an off-duty automobile accident in February 1992. Some of the injuries required a number of weeks away from work or on light duty but in each instance Duncan was able to return to work without restriction. On December 16, 1992, working his third night in ELES, Duncan re-injured his back. Duncan reported the injury to his supervisor, John Weston, who referred him to WMATA's Associate Medical Director, Dr. Mary O'Donnell. Duncan also saw his orthopaedist, Dr. Harvey N. Mininberg. At that time, Dr. Mininberg limited Duncan's lifting to no more than 20 pounds. See Joint Appendix (JA) 60. After another visit in late January 1993, Dr. Mininberg confirmed the restriction. See id. 61.
The medical restriction precluded Duncan from returning to his job in ELES. Weston told Duncan that no light duty position was available in ELES and Duncan was placed on leave without pay. Between December 1992 and August 1993 Duncan periodically contacted Weston and Weston's supervisor to inquire about light-duty work. Duncan also applied for two vacancies in his former AFC position, one in March and the other in July. Apparently Duncan's first application was not forwarded to the decisionmaker, Charles Beuttner, but the second was. Beuttner declined to interview Duncan for the second position after learning that Duncan was in the process of being terminated, see infra, and was "physically disqualified." JA 307-08.
In mid-August 1993 Duncan received a letter from Weston requesting that he schedule an appointment with Dr. O'Donnell and take with him all medical records dating from February 1993 relevant to restrictions on duty as a parts runner, including a statement from his treating physician regarding his current condition. Duncan returned to Dr. Mininberg who referred him to a neurologist he had seen before, Dr. Najmaldin Karim. Dr. Karim was out of town until September 1993. At his August 23 appointment with Dr. O'Donnell, she was annoyed by his failure to bring the requested information, told him to leave and said that he likely would lose his job. Ultimately, Dr. Karim issued the requested letter of evaluation on September 10, 1993. The letter stated that Duncan could not perform heavy lifting but could work in the AFC position. Believing WMATA already had decided to fire him, however, Duncan never submitted the letter to WMATA. Weston had drafted a letter of termination on August 31, citing failure to respond to requests from WMATA's medical office but the letter was not sent until October 7, 1993.
Due to his impairment, Duncan could not perform any of the jobs he had had before being employed by WMATA. He inquired about some truck driving positions and eventually acquired a light-duty, part-time position at Hertz Corporation where he earned less money than he had earned with WMATA.
II.
We review de novo the trial court's denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, for a new trial. See Curry v. District of Columbia, 195 F.8d 654, 658-59 (D.C.Cir.1999). We will not disturb a jury verdict "unless the evidence and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are so one-sided that reasonable men and women could not disagree on the verdict." Id. at 659 (quoting Smith v. Washington Sheraton Corp., 135 F.3d 779, 782 (D.C.Cir.1998)). Evidence supporting the verdict, however, must be "more than merely colorable; it must be significantly probative." Id. (quoting Smith, 135 F.3d at 782).
In an ADA case with no direct evidence of discrimination and where the defendant denies that its decisions were motivated by the plaintiffs disability, this court uses the familiar burden-shifting framework set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See Marshall v. Federal Express Corp., 130 F.3d 1095, 1099 (D.C.Cir.1997). Under that framework, an ADA plaintiff must prove that "he had a disability within the meaning of the ADA, that he was 'qualified' for the position with or without a reasonable accommodation, and that he suffered an adverse employment action because of his disability." Swanks v. WMATA, 179 F.3d 929, 934 (D.C.Cir.1999). Thus "the threshold issue is whether plaintiff had a 'disability.' " E.g., Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 912 (8th Cir.1999); accord Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1161 (10th Cir.1999).
The ADA defines a "disability" as "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of [an] individual." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). In analyzing whether a plaintiff has established a disability under this provision, the United States Supreme Court follows three steps: (1) it considers whether the plaintiffs condition was a physical impairment; (2) it identifies the life activity upon which plaintiff relies and determines whether it constitutes a major life activity under the ADA; and (3) it decides whether the impairment substantially limited the major life activity. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631, 118 S.Ct. 2196, 141 L.Ed.2d 540 (1998). The parties to this appeal agree that Duncan's degenerative disc disease was a physical impairment and that "working" is the activity involved and that it is a major life activity under the ADA. See, e.g., Brief of Appellant, at 16; Brief of Appellee, at 15-19. Therefore, the issue is whether Dun can's back impairment substantially limited his ability to work. The Supreme Court recently considered what "substantially limits" means in the context of one's ability to work in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, -, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 2150-51, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999). The Court first noted that the term "substantial ]" suggests "considerable" or "specified to a large degree." 527 U.S. at -, 119 S.Ct. at 2150. It noted the definition of "substantially limits" as "unable to perform" or "significantly restricted" contained in the regulations of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Id. at 2150-51 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(l)(i), (ii) (1998)). The Court then clarified what a plaintiff must show to demonstrate that an impairment substantially limited his ability to work:
When the major life activity under consideration is that of working, the statutory phrase "substantially limits" requires, at a minimum, that plaintiffs allege they are unable to work in a broad class of jobs.... To be substantially limited in the major life activity of working, then, one must be •precluded from more than one type of job, a specialized job, or a particular job of choice. If jobs utilizing an individual's skills (but perhaps not his or her unique talents) are available, one is not precluded from a substantial class of jobs. Similarly, if a host of different types of jobs are available, one is not precluded from a broad range of jobs.
Id. at 2151 (emphasis added). The Sutton Court stressed that "whether a person has a disability under the ADA is an individualized inquiry," id. at 2147 (citing Bragdon, 524 U.S. 624, 118 S.Ct. 2196, 141 L.Ed.2d 540), and noted several factors courts "should consider" when making this determination, including the accessible geographical area and the number of similar jobs within that area from which the individual also is disqualified. Id. at 2151. Ultimately in Sutton, the Court held that the plaintiffs' disqualifications from their current jobs due to impairment did not establish that they were substantially limited in their ability to work, particularly where other jobs utilizing their skills were available to them. See id.
Claiming he presented evidence sufficient to sustain the jury verdict, Duncan points to the testimony of Drs. Mininberg and Karim that his degenerative disc disease was a permanent condition necessitating a permanent restriction on lifting, as well as his educational background, lack of skills, lack of experience outside heavy labor and inability to find similar employment. Duncan also cites the EEOC's interpretive guidelines which the Supreme Court noted in Sutton and which provide in part:
[A]n individual does not have to be totally unable to work in order to be considered substantially limited in the major life activity of working. An individual is substantially limited in working if the individual is significantly restricted in the ability to perform a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes, when compared with the ability of the average person with comparable qualifications to perform those same jobs. For example, an individual who has a back condition that prevents the individual from performing any heavy labor job would be substantially limited in the major life activity of working because the individual's impairment eliminates his or her ability to perform a class of jobs. This would be so even if the individual were able to perform jobs in another class, e.g., the class of semi-skilled jobs.
29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630.2(j), App. (emphasis added).
WMATA insists that Duncan failed to prove his degenerative disc disease substantially impaired his ability to work. While conceding that Duncan, through medical testimony, established a lifting re strietion of approximately 20 pounds, WMATA argues he did not establish, as he must, that he was thereby disqualified from a "broad class of jobs" as Sutton instructs. WMATA cites Duncan's failure to proffer expert testimony from a vocational rehabilitation specialist and testimony or statistical evidence regarding the numbers of jobs from which he was disqualified. Other than relying on his limited educational background and work experience, Duncan offers only his testimony that he inquired about some truck driving positions.
Other circuits have addressed claims involving arguments similar to Duncan's and have found the claims faulty for lack of evidence regarding the jobs the plaintiffs' impairments preclude them from performing. In Colwell v. Suffolk County Police Department, 158 F.3d 635, 644-45 (2d Cir.1998), the Second Circuit held that the plaintiffs, who complained of limitations resulting from back injuries, failed to show they were significantly restricted from working in a class or broad range of jobs. With regard to one plaintiff, the court said that "[without specific evidence about the kinds of jobs from which [an] impaired individual is disqualified, the jury could not perform the careful analysis that is necessary to determine that [plaintiff] was substantially limited in his ability to work." 158 F.3d at 645 (internal quotation marks omitted). Accord Snow v. Ridgeview Med. Ctr., 128 F.3d 1201, 1207 (8th Cir.1997). Similarly, in Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc., 36 F.3d 939 (10th Cir.1994), the court examined the medical evidence tending to establish that the plaintiff suffered from a permanent partial disability but held it insufficient. Noting that such evidence "does not address [plaintiffs] vocational training, the geographical area to which he has access, or the number and type of jobs demanding similar training from which [he] would also be disqualified," the Tenth Circuit found the medical evidence relevant to the nature, severity, duration and impact of the injury but insufficient to show how plaintiffs ability to perform a class or broad range of jobs was affected. Bolton, 36 F.3d at 944. See also Muller v. Costello, 187 F.3d 298, 313 (2d Cir.1999) (plaintiffs failure to present evidence that he was precluded from jobs other than correctional officer in his geographic area and plaintiffs insistence that his class of jobs be limited to correctional officer "compelled" holding of insufficient evidence of substantial limitation on major life activity of working).
Several cases involve a plaintiff with a limitation similar to Duncan's. In Thompson v. Holy Family Hospital, 121 F.3d 537 (9th Cir.1997), the Ninth Circuit addressed a lifting restriction of no more than 25 pounds on a regular basis and more only rarely. The court found the plaintiff failed to prove a substantial limitation despite having established the lifting restriction: "[Plaintiff] points to no evidence that the restrictions . preclude her from engaging in an entire class of jobs. Nor does she offer the information relevant to this particularized determination." 121 F.3d at 540. The Thompson court also cited decisions from other circuits finding similar lifting restrictions not substantially limiting. See id. (citing Williams v. Channel Master Satellite Sys., Inc., 101 F.3d 346, 349 (4th Cir.1996) (25-pound lifting limitation, as matter of law, "does not constitute a significant restriction on one's ability to lift, work, or perform any other major life activity"); Aucutt v. Six Flags Over Mid-America, Inc., 85 F.3d 1311, 1319 (8th Cir.1996) (25-pound lifting restriction did not substantially limit any major life activities); Ray v. Glidden Co., 85 F.3d 227, 229 (5th Cir.1996) (plaintiff not substantially impaired by limitation on heavy lifting where he otherwise could lift and reach)); see also Snow, 128 F.3d at 1207 ("[A] general lifting restriction imposed by a physician, without more, is insufficient to constitute a disability within the meaning of the ADA.").
Duncan attempts to distinguish himself from the plaintiffs in the cases above with the claim that he established substantial limitation by showing he has a limited educational background, is unskilled and has performed only jobs requiring heavy lifting. Duncan's third distinguishing factor deserves little credence in light of his experience as an AFC parts runner, a position that requires no heavy lifting (and that he claims he is able to perform without assistance). On the whole, however, Duncan simply offers no evidence we can weigh in using the factors the Supreme Court tells us to use. The evidence he does offer is his testimony that he inquired about some truck driving positions, see JA 136-38, but he could name no other kind of job he investigated as part of his effort to find employment. See id. 138; see also Sutton, 527 U.S. at -, 119 S.Ct. at 2151 ("If jobs utilizing an individual's skills (but perhaps not his or her unique talents) are available, one is not precluded from a substantial class of jobs.").
In short, Duncan completed only half of the puzzle. He established that he had an impairment that may have substantially limited his ability to work but he failed to show that his impairment in fact did substantially limit his ability to work. Duncan relied on his limited educational background and the fact that most of his earlier unskilled work involved heavy lifting which he could no longer perform. Duncan, however, did not demonstrate what jobs were available to unskilled workers in his geographical area and thus could not show that his impairment precluded him from performing those jobs. Duncan's limited "search" for another job hardly informs us what positions were generally available in his geographic area for unskilled workers, much less for workers with a lifting restriction like his. Not only have our sister circuits required this type of evidence but the Supreme Court has told lower courts to consider these factors when making individualized determinations of disability. See Sutton, 119 S.Ct. at 2151. The evidence Duncan offered to establish that his impairment substantially limited his ability to work is no more than "merely colorable" and it is not significantly probative. Curry v. District of Columbia, 195 F.3d 654, 659 (D.C.Cir.1999). Therefore, we find the evidence insufficient to support the jury's necessary finding that Duncan was a person with a disability under the ADA. Accordingly, Duncan's claim fails as a matter of law.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of March 26, 1998 denying WMATA's motion for judgment as a matter of law is reversed. The judgment on the jury verdict entered May 29, 1997 is vacated, as are the district court's post-trial orders awarding attorney's fees and costs and granting Duncan backpay and prejudgment interest.
So ordered.
. The ADA also protects individuals who have "a record of such an impairment" and those whose employers "regard[ ] as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). Duncan makes no claim under either alternative approach.
. Dr. Karim's September 1993 evaluation, which Duncan did not submit to WMATA, and the testimony of both doctors at trial indicated that the previous 20-pound restriction was a good guideline but that Duncan could also lift somewhat heavier objects.
. The dissent cites cases from other circuits finding triable issues of fact on records arguably similar to the record here. Most of those cases predate Sutton, however. See Diss. Op. at 43-45. The one case the dissent cites which was decided after Sutton, Wellington v. Lyon County School District, 187 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir.1999), did not cite Sutton. A later opinion from that circuit, Broussard v. University of California, 192 F.3d 1252 (9th Cir.1999), does cite Sutton and is consistent with our resolution here. In Broussard the court stated that surviving a motion for summary judgment "require[s] at least some evidence from which one might infer that [plaintiff] faced 'significant restrictions' in her ability to meet the requirements of other jobs." Id. at 1259 (quoting Davidson v. Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., 133 F.3d 499, 507 (7th Cir.1998)). Accordingly, the court declared that the existence of a genuine issue of fact turned on its evaluation of the declaration of a vocational rehabilitation specialist, which was "the only evidence which might show that [plaintiff] is barred from significant percentages of available employment in the [geographical] area" because of her impairment. 192 F.3d at 1257. In the end, the court found that the declaration lacked a medical foundation and affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendant.
. We reject the example included in the EEOC interpretive guidelines regarding an individual with a back condition preventing him from performing heavy labor because it is at odds with Sutton. Guiding our consideration — and rejection — of the interpretive guidelines found at 29 C.F.R. Ft. 1630.2(j), App., is the Supreme Court's acknowledgment that "[n]o agency . has been given authority to issue regulations implementing the generally applicable provisions of the ADA," Sutton, 527 U.S. at -, 119 S.Ct. at 2145 (citations omitted), coupled with its decision not to reach the issue of what deference, if any, courts owe the EEOC regulations. See id. ("Because both parties accept these regulations as valid, and determining their validity is not necessary to decide this case, we have no occasion to consider what deference they are due, if any."). Although we defer to EEOC regulations where appropriate, see, e.g., Bell v. Brown, 557 F.2d 849, 855 (D.C.Cir.1977) ("[A]n administrative interpretation of a statute by an agency entrusted with its administration commands great deference in the courts."), we decline to do so with its interpretive guidelines where, as here, they lead to a result contrary to the one Supreme Court precedent leads to. See Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 70 n. 6, 107 S.Ct. 367, 93 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) ("EEOC guidelines are properly accorded less weight than administrative regulations declared by Congress to have the force of law."); see generally Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944) (weight of agency's interpretation of statute "will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with . later pronouncements") (emphasis added). We therefore decline to follow the EEOC's guidelines here.