Case Name: Michael MAHONEY, Appellant, v. SEARS, ROEBUCK & COMPANY and Crawford & Company, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1982-09-22
Citations: 419 So. 2d 754
Docket Number: No. AF-84
Parties: Michael MAHONEY, Appellant, v. SEARS, ROEBUCK & COMPANY and Crawford & Company, Appellees.
Judges: ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., C. J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 419
Pages: 754–756

Head Matter:
Michael MAHONEY, Appellant, v. SEARS, ROEBUCK & COMPANY and Crawford & Company, Appellees.
No. AF-84.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Sept. 22, 1982.
Alex P. Lancaster, Sarasota, for appellant.
Keith A. Mann of Dickinson, O’Riorden, Gibbons, Quale, Shields & Carlton, P.A., Sarasota, for appellees.

Opinion:
McCORD, Judge.
On January 8, 1981, Michael Mahoney, an 18-year-old man, was working part-time for extra money to help him through school when he was struck in the eye by a tire iron thrown by a fellow employee. As a result, he has suffered at least an 80% loss of vision in his eye, rendering it, for all practical purposes, useless. He now argues that Section 440.15(3)(a)l, Florida Statutes (1980), which limits his compensation award to $1,200 for the loss of the eye, violates the equal access provision of Article I, Section 21, of the Florida Constitution. We affirm.
We observe that, prior to the 1979 amendments to the Workers' Compensation Act, Mahoney's monetary award would have been significantly greater. § 440.-15(3)(e) and (p), Fla.Stat. (1978). Nevertheless, "even if we might believe the statute fraught with unfairness, wrong in its intent, and failing to accomplish any of the goals as a reason for passage," [McKee v. City of Jacksonville, 395 So.2d 222, 224-5 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981)] we cannot conclude that the statute violates the provisions of the equal access clause to the Florida Constitution. To be sure, the 1979 Act drastically limits the amount of compensation one may receive for such an injury. However, the statute still expresses the fundamental purpose of workers' compensation acts to provide for employees a remedy that is both expeditious and independent of proof of fault and for employers a liability that is limited and determinate. See Clenney v. Walker Hauling Co., 217 So.2d 114 Fla. 1968); McLean v. Mundy, 81 So.2d 501 (Fla.1955). In other words, the certain remedy afforded by the Act is deemed to be a sufficient substitute for the doubtful right accorded by the common law. In return, the employer "may not plead as a defense that the injury was caused by negligence of a fellow servant, that the employee assumed the risk of employment, or that the injury was due to the comparative negligence of the employee." § 440.11, Fla.Stat. Moreover, it is presumed that the claim comes within the provisions of the Act, that sufficient notice of the claim has been given, and that the injury was not occasioned by the willful intention of the injured employee to injure or kill himself or another. § 440.26(1), (2), and (3), Fla.Stat.
The mere fact that an employee's recovery has been limited by the imposition of a dollar cap is not, in and of itself, a constitutional bar. Cf. Abdin v. Fischer, 374 So.2d 1379 (Fla.1979) (limiting liability of owners of public recreation areas).
Further, while Section 440.15(3)(a)l has significantly diminished Mahoney's recovery, it has not totally eliminated the previously recognized cause of action and, as such, does not offend Article I, Section 21, of the Florida Constitution. See Jetton v. Jacksonville Electrical Authority, 399 So.2d 396 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
AFFIRMED.
ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., C. J., concurs.
BOOTH, J., dissents with opinion.
. In case of permanent impairment due to amputation, loss of 80 percent or more of vision, after correction, or serious facial or head disfigurement resulting from an injury other than an injury entitling the injured worker to permanent total disability benefits pursuant to subsection (1), there shall be paid to the injured worker the following:
a. Fifty dollars for each percent of permanent impairment of the body as a whole from 1 percent through 50 percent; and
b. One hundred dollars for each percent of permanent impairment of the body as a whole for that portion in excess of 50 percent.