Case Name: Louis J. L'Etourneau and Henry A. Harmon, Administrator of the Estate of Sarah L'Etourneau, Deceased, v. August Henquenet et al.
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1891-12-23
Citations: 89 Mich. 428
Docket Number: 
Parties: Louis J. L'Etourneau and Henry A. Harmon, Administrator of the Estate of Sarah L’Etourneau, Deceased, v. August Henquenet et al.
Judges: McGrath and Long, JJ., concurred with Champlin, 0. J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 89
Pages: 428–453

Head Matter:
Louis J. L'Etourneau and Henry A. Harmon, Administrator of the Estate of Sarah L’Etourneau, Deceased, v. August Henquenet et al.
Will — Vested future estate — Contingent remainder — Mortgage of precedent estate.
A testator devised to his wife, for and during her natural life, all of his real estate, which was particularly described in the will, and all that he might be seised of or possess at his decease, and all of his personal estate of every kind, with remainder over, after the determination of such life-estate, to his daughters Emily, Sarah, and Eleanor, to have and to hold the same to the said Emily, Sarah, and Eleanor, their heirs and assigns, forever. He made other dispositions of the remainder of other portions of his property; and by the eighth clause of his will he said:
“And whereas, one or more of my said children may not survive me or my said wife, I hereby order, direct, and devise the share of such devisee or devisees in such case to be equally divided amongst the remaining children herein named, and to their heirs, share and share alike.”
And it is held:
1. That the will created a vested future estate in Sarah, Emily, and Eleanor. How. Stat. §§ 5528, 5525-5527.
2. That such future estate was contingent under the eighth clause of the will, and subject to be defeated by the death of Sarah, Emily, or Eleanor before the decease of the testator or of his wife.
3. As to such the precedent estates in remainder terminated on the death of such child, and a contingent remainder was created in thó surviving children and the heirs of any deceased child.
4. Such contingent remainder .did not vest until the death of the wife.
5. By the statutes of Michigan, contingent estates are made to depend upon two conditions, — one is while the person to whom the estate is given remains uncertain, the other when the event upon which such estates are limited to take effect remains uncertain.
Held, that the event upon which the estate was limited to take effect was uncertain, namely, the event of one or more children dying before the wife.
6. It is the event, and not the time, that controls in determining the question as to whether the remainder is contingent or vested.
7. Under the eighth clause the contingency depended upon the death of either one or more of the devisees before the death of the wife, and, such person being unknown until the event happened, the testator therefore made the contingency to happen, not on time of distribution, but the contingency was annexed to the gift itself, and therefore was a' contingent, and not a vested, remainder.
8. Where there is a substituted devise, to take effect in case any of the class die during the precedent estate, the remainder is then vested in the existing members, subject to open to let in new members, and to be wholly divested in favor of the sub- • stituted devisee as to the share of the member dying.
9. Emily executed a mortgage, and died childless before her mother, the testator’s wife.
Held, that her estate under the will was subject to be defeated by her death before that of her mother, by which the estate then vested in her was cast upon her surviving brother and sisters, share ■ and share alike; and of this the purchaser or mortgagee must take notice.
Held, further, that the mortgagees have no claim upon Emily’s share, which by the eighth clause passed to her brother and sisters, who, upon the mother’s death, were seised in fee of the remainder, and entitled to the immediate possession of the lands devised.
Appeal from Wayne. (Beillv, J.)
Argued October 15 and 16, 1891.
Decided December 23, 1891.
Bill to construe a will and remove a cloud upon title. Complainants appeal.
Decree reversed, and one entered in accordance with the majority opinion.
The facts are stated in the opinions.
Eldredge & Spier, for complainants.
Edgar Weeks, for defendant Henquenet.
T. M. Crocker, of counsel, for defendant Henquenet, contended:
1. The will should be so construed as to carry out the intentions of the man who made it. All instruments are understood with more clearness and certainty when the mind which is called upon to construe them knows the circumstances which called forth the words and phrases to be construed. Judge Cooley, in delivering the opinion of the Court in Eberts v. Eberts, 42 Mich. 406, said: “We concede that the surrounding circumstances may be shown, and that sometimes they are very conclusive that the intent was different from what might be inferred from the language of the will interpreted without the aid of any extrinsic evidence.” See, also, Tuxbury v. French, 41 Mich. 7.
2. The second clause in the will in question gave a life-estate in the property to the widow, and this was determined by her death, August 29, 1888.
3. On the part of defendant Henquenet, it' is insisted that upon the death of the testator the title to the property devised under the third clause of the will vested in the widow, Clotilde, and the three daughters, Emily, Sarah, and Eleanor. There was a particular estate in the widow, Clotilde, to continue during her life, and the daughters were seised of the remainder immediately on the death of the father; their title was immediate, though the occupation and enjoyment were to be in the future. Before the death of the testator the title was perfect in him, and when he ’ died that title was by the will immediately perfected in the widow and-the three daughters in this case, as in Wimple v. Fonda, 2 Johns. 288, 289, where Judge Thompson, in delivering the opinion of the court, said: “The particular estate during life, and the remainder, are but one and the same estate in the law, the whole of which passed at once on the death of the testator, and the remainder-man was seised of his remainder at the same time the particular tenant was possessed of her estate. The possession of the particular tenant is the possession of the remainder- man, so as to enable him to dispose of his estate by deed or will.” This Court has at all times favored the vesting of estates; citing Porter v. Porter, 50 Mich. 456, 460; Rood v. Hovey, Id. 395.
4. The theory of the bill of complaint is that the two mortgages and the will executed by Mrs. Henquenet are without legal force or effect, and that they create a cloud upon the land in question. Complainants say, in effect, that the eighth paragraph of the will created a condition. Conditions are not favored in law when they defeat estates; citing Calkins v. Smith, 41 Mich. 409, 412. In Rood v. Hovey, 50 Mich. 399, Mr. Justice Campbell, in delivering the opinion of the Court, said: “There can be no doubt that the policy of our statutes is to favor vested estates in preference to contingent, and that estates given to particular devisees shall always go their heirs unless a different purpose is apparent.”
5. If the theory of the complainants in this case is correct, had Mrs. Paquette died before her mother, her children would have taken nothing by the will. Emily, Eleanor, and Sarah were each, at the time the father's will- was made, young ladies of marriageable age. Had either married and had children, and then died while their mother still lived, the children so borne by them would have been disinherited by the will of their grandfather. Neither our statutes nor the decisions of this Court favor such construction of wills; citing Rivenett v. Bourquin, 53 Mich. 10, 14; Letchworth’s Appeal, 30 Penn. St. 175; and rules of law must be vigorously applied when an attempt is made to disinherit heirs; citing Graham v. Graham, 34 Penn. St. 475.
Edward E. Kane, for defendants Duchaineau and the Congregation des Freres de la Charite.
James J. Atkinson and William F. Atkinson, for defendant DeBroux.
Head-notes prepared by Chaiiplih, C. J.

Opinion:
Chahplin, C. J.
The bill is filed to remove a cloud upon title, and to obtain a construction of a will, which is quite fully set out in the opinion of my Brother Morse.
But two questions are involved, and they relate to the construction to be given to the third and eighth clauses of the will:
First. Does the fee of the real estate devised by the third clause vest in the devisees therein named, upon the death of the testator?
Second. If it did vest under the third clause, was it subject to be divested under the eighth clause, in case of the death of either of the devisees before the termination of the precedent estate devised to the widow?
The answer to these questions must depend upon the intention of the testator, either as expressed or inferred or assumed, in accordance with the well-established canons of construction. The fundamental rule of construction is that the intention of the testator must be gathered from a consideration of the whole instrument together, giving to each part or clause due weight, as expressing some idea of the testator in the disposition of his property. The first and dominant idea of the testator, as manifested in this will, is that his wife, Clotilde, shall have a life-estate in possession of all of his property, real and personal, with remainder over to his children, as therein set forth. The time of enjoyment of the remainder was postponed until the death of his wife. Section 5523 of Howell's Statutes enacts that—
"Estates, as respects the time of their enjoyment, are divided into estates in possession and estates in expectancy."
Section 5525 enacts that—
"Estates in expectancy are divided into—
"1. Estates commencing at a future day, denominated 'future estates;' and
"2. Keversions."
Section 5526 defines a "future estate" as—
"An estate limited to commence in possession at a future day, either without the intervention of a precedent estate, or on the determination, by lapse of time or otherwise, of a precedent estate created at the same time."
Section 5527 provides that — -
"When a future estate is dependent upon a precedent estate, it may be termed a 'remainder,' and may be created and transferred by that name."
We have here, then, under the third clause of this will, a vested future estate, within the very terms of the statute, devised to Sarah, Emily, and Eleanor.
The question now arises,'was it the intention of the testator to make this vested future estate subject to be defeated by the contingency- mentioned' in the eighth clause? In the first place, it will be noticed that the habendum clause does 'not devise the estate absolutely to Sarah, Emily, and Eleanor, and their heirs and assigns forever, unqualifiedly, but adds this significant qualification: "After the determination of the life-estate aforesaid." He made no such qualification in the habendum to his devise to Josephine, nor in the habendum to his two sons, in the fifth clause. After disposing of the remainder to certain of his children named, excluding Margaret, the daughter of' his deceased son, Charles, he then makes such remainder subject to the following contingency:
"And whereas, one or more of my said children may not survive me or my said wife, I hereby order, direct, and devise the share of such devisee or devisees in such case to be equally divided amongst the remaining children herein named, and to their • heirs, share and share alike."
It is claimed that this clause is obscure, and open to two constructions. I do not so regard it. The testator was looking to the future. The question with him was, what provisions should be made with reference to these remainders in case either of his children named to whom he had devised the lands in remainder should die before he did, or before his wife, to whom he had granted the life-estate in possession? If such con tingency should happen, he devises the share of such devisee or devisees to the surviving children named, to whom the share or shares had been given, and to their heirs, share and share alike, The obvious sense and meaning is that " one or more of my children may die before my will can take effect by my death," and he provided for that contingency should it happen; and it also occurred to him that one or more might die before they could come into possession by the death of his wife; and in either case he provided what should be done with the share of such children named, — it should go to the heirs of any such deceased child, share and share alike. He disinherited no child of his children named as devisees. He did not inteñd that Margaret should, in any event, share in the " worldly effects " left by him. He gave explicit reasons for that, and provided that, if she should survive him, she should be paid $10 by his executors out.of his personal estate. Can it be supposed that, after making this declaration of his intent not to have Margaret share in his estate, he, by the next clause, admitted her to a share in the devises he had given to his children in case one or more died before he or his wife died? It seems to me that such a construction would be a forced one, and quite contrary to the intention expressed.
Neither can I construe the language to mean that " my said wife may not survive me." This construction destroys the whole scheme of the will. The will can have no force unless there be an intermediate estate in his widow, and the legacies would all lapse. He did not intend that any of his property should be administered as intestate property. He disposed of the whole, and yet, to give this clause the construction contended for by the counsel for defendants, causes these shares to be administered the same, as intestate- estates, and admits Margaret to share in the real estate, contrary to the will of the testator.
The remainder to his children was 'subject to the limitation of the eighth- clause. The devise to his children created a vested estate, subject to be defeated by the subsequent contingency stated in the eighth clause. As to the shares of any child or children dying before the death of Clotilde, they became a contingent remainder to the surviving children, and the heirs of any deceased child, at the termination of the precedent estate of Clotilde. ' As to such the precedent estates in remainder terminated on the 'death of such child, and a contingent remainder was created in the surviving children and the heirs of any deceased child. Such contingent remainder could not vest until the death of Clotilde, for u,ntil then it could not be known who would be entitled to it as heirs or survivors. In the language of the statute, it was contingent while the person to whom it was limited to take effect remained uncertain.
By the statute, contingent estates are made to depend upon two conditions, — one is while the person to whom the estate is given remains uncertain, and the other when the event upon which such estates are limited to take effect remains uncertain. In this case the event upon which they are limited to take effect must be uncertain, for the reason that one or more of the children, if the contingency happened, must die before his wife, Clotilde, - — events which must happen, if at all, within a certain time; and it is the event, and not the time, that controls in determining the question as to whether the remainder is contingent or vested. But they are contingent also while the person to whom they are limited to take effect remains uncertain, and that is the contin gency in this case; for it. was not known, at the time the testator made his will, or at the time when he died, that Timothy and Eleanor and Emily would each die before his wife, Clotilde, should die. And by the eighth clause he made the contingency to happen, not upon the time of distribution, but the contingency was annexed to the gift itself, and in such cases they have been regarded as contingent, and not vested, remainders.
A vested estate, whether present or future, may be absolutely or defeasibly vested. In the latter case, it is said to be vested, subject to being divested on the happening of a contingency subsequent. Chapl. Suspen. § 57; Manice v. Manice, 43 N. Y. 303; Howell v. Mills, 7 Lans. 193; Kelso v. Lorillard, 85 N. Y. 177; Baker v. McLeod's Estate, 79 Wis. 534 (48 N. W. Rep. 657); Burnham v. Burnham, Id. 557 (48 N. W. Rep. 661), And where there is a substituted [devise, to take effect in case any of the class die during the precedent estate, the remainder is then vested in the .existing members, subject to open to let in new members, and to be wholly divested in favor of the substituted devisee as.to the share of the member dying. Chapl. Suspen. § 59; Smith v. Scholtz, 68 N. Y. 41; Baker v. Lorillard, 4 Id. 257; Du Bois v. Ray, 35 Id. 162. In Carmichael v. Carmichael, 1 Abb. N. Y. App. 309, there was a devise to the testator's wife for life, and from and after her decease to the testator's children who might then be living. The court held that "the estate does not vest in remainder until her [the widow's] death, and then it vests only in those children who shall be living at the time of her death." See, also, Hennessy v. Patterson, 85 N. Y. 91.
It remains to be considered what effect shall be given to the mortgages executed by Emily upon the property described in the third clause of the will. These were executed after Eleanor's death, and purported to be upon the undivided five-twelfths of the real estate described in the third clause of the will. Emily was at that time vested with the undivided third interest in remainder in the land. Timothy had died in 1861, leaving four of the six children at the time the mortgages were executed. Both Eleanor and Timothy died childless, without heirs. Emily evidently supposed that the one-third interest in the remainder of Eleanor was to be divided among the four surviving children, and she would on that basis be entitled to the undivided one-third of one-fourth, as she considered, equal to one-twelfth, which, together with her four-twelfths, would equal five-twelfths; and upon this share she executed the two mortgages set out in the '.bill. The property is said to be worth $25,000.
Section 5551, How. Stat., provides that "expectant estates are descendible, devisable, and alienable in the same manner as estates in possession." Contingent estates, although not vested, are within the provisions -of the section; but when alienated, if they are defeasible, they are subject to the contingency by which they may be'defeated. Emily's estate was subject to be defeated by her death before that of her mother, by which the1 estate then vested in her was cast upon her surviving brother and sisters, share and share alike; and of this .the purchaser or mortgagee must take notice. She could not defeat the remainder-from vesting in her brother and sisters upon the contingency of her death before she was entitled to come into the possession, for the statute, (How. Stat. § 5548) declares that—
"No expectant estate can be defeated or barred by any alienation or other act of the owner of the intermediate or precedent estate, nor by any destruction of such precedent estate by disseisin, forfeiture, surrender, merger, or otherwise."
Neither can these expectant estates of her brother and sisters be defeated by the manner of dealing with the estate by the devisees of the testator. I find no evidence in the record that the devisees ever dealt upon the basis now contended for by defendants, who divide the estate jnto 54 shares, giving Emily 21 and Margaret 3 fifty-fourths; nor, in my opinion, does the will executed by Timothy lend any aid to defendant's counsel. That will was dated the 4th day of February, 1861. He died on the next day. His father was already dead. The will shows that- he did not at that time suppose that he had any vested estate in the remainder left to him and his brother, Louis. This is the language he makes use of in disposing of his estate:
"Second. I give, grant, and devise all and every my interest, right, and estate, after the payment of said debts and expenses aforesaid, whether real or personal, and whether present or in remainder (being chiefly my interest and estate in the personal property and real estate left by my deceased father, Francis TEtourneau, by his last will), to my sisters, Emily, Sarah, and Eleanor TEtourneau, and to my sister, Josephine Paquette, and my brother, the Rev. Louis J. TEtourneau, equally, to be divided between them, share and share alike; subject, nevertheless, to and under the limitation hereinafter mentioned:
"1. In case of the death of my said sister, Mrs. Josephine Paquette, and of the heirs of her body, before said estate so left by my father in remainder shall become vested, I direct that her share shall descend, and hereby devise her share of said estate, to my surviving brother and sisters equally, to be divided amongst such survivors, share and share alike.
" 2. In case of the death of either of my said sisters or brother before said estate so as aforesaid devised by me shall become vested in them, I direct and devise that the share of said deceased sister or brother go to the survivor or survivors equally, to be divided share and share alike."
It is apparent that he did not regard the remainder left by his father as yet having vested in him, and it will be further noted that he giv.es the property in the same manner and to the same persons mentioned in the eighth clause of his father's will. He provides for the contingency of either of his sisters or brother dying before the estate given by himself becomes vested in them, and directs that such share shall be equally divided between the survivors, share and share alike; thus treating his estate as a contingent remainder, and not to vest in his devisees until the death of his mother. Emily made her will May 2, 1868, she only assuming to devise "such property, either real or personal, as I have or may hereafter during my. life inherit at any time." This will throws no light upon the construction to he placed upon that executed by her father. Moreover, I consider it would be an unsafe doctrine, to hold that the intention of a testator should be ascertained from the claims made by devisees who are anxious to obtain the property which they think they are entitled to under their construction of the will.
In my opinion, the mortgagees have no claim upon Emily's share, which by the eighth clause passed to 'the surviving brother and sisters. Whether the eighth clause constituted a contingent remainder or not. in such as should take under it, it can make no difference in the result in this case, because Emily having died without, heirs, before the death of her mother, her interests and. estate, whether vested or contingent, were defeated, and', passed to the surviving children, and the heirs of any-deceased children, who upon Clotilde's death becameseised in fee of the remainder, and entitled to the immediate possession of the lands devised.
It is my opinion that the decree of the circuit court is erroneous, and should be reversed, and a decree entered herein in accordance with these views.
McGrath and Long, JJ., concurred with Champlin, 0. J.