Case Name: Glen R. DEASON, Petitioner, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, and Florida Parole Commission, Respondents
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1998-01-15
Citations: 705 So. 2d 1374
Docket Number: No. 90218
Parties: Glen R. DEASON, Petitioner, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, and Florida Parole Commission, Respondents.
Judges: OVERTON, SHAW and WELLS, JJ., and GRIMES, Senior Justice, concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 705
Pages: 1374–1376

Head Matter:
Glen R. DEASON, Petitioner, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, and Florida Parole Commission, Respondents.
No. 90218.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Jan. 15, 1998.
Glen R. Deason, pro se, Petitioner.
William L. Camper, General Counsel, and Bradley R. Bischoff, Assistant General Counsel, Florida Parole Commission, Tallahassee, for Respondent;

Opinion:
HARDING, Justice.
We have for review a decision ruling on the following question certified to be of great public importance:
DOES AN INMATE WHO HAS BEEN SENTENCED AS A HABITUAL OR VIOLENT HABITUAL OFFENDER BUT WHO IS NOT CONVICTED OF A CATEGORY 1, CATEGORY 2, CATEGORY 3 OR CATEGORY 4 CRIME QUALIFY FOR CONDITIONAL RELEASE PURSUANT TO SECTION 947.1405(2), FLORIDA STATUTES (1989)?
Deason v. State, 688 So.2d 988, 990 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). We have jurisdiction, and answer the certified question in the affirmative.
At issue here is the 1989 version of the conditional release statute, which provides in pertinent part:
Any inmate who is convicted of a crime committed on or after October 1, 1988, which crime is contained in category 1, category 2, category 3, or category 4 of rule 3.701 and Rule 3.988, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, and who has served at least one prior felony commitment at a state or federal correctional institution or is sentenced as a habitual or violent habitual offender pursuant to s. 775.084 shall, upon reaching the tentative release date or provisional release date, whichever is earlier, as established by the Department of Corrections, be released under supervision subject to specified terms and conditions .
§ 947.1405(2), Fla. Stat. (1989)(emphasis added). We find that the legislature's use of the conjunctive "and" and the disjunctive "or" in the same sentence, without enumeration or other decisive demarcation, renders this statute ambiguous — it is not clear whether habitualization is a separate, freestanding criterion for conditional release. Thus, the majority below was correct in turning to accepted aids of statutory construction (i.e., legislative history, related statutes, and subsequent statutory amendments) to con- elude that the legislature indeed intended habitualization to be a separate, free-standing criterion for conditional release. We agree with and adopt the majority opinion below and reach the same conclusion.
Assuming, without deciding, that the subject statute is penal in nature, we are of course cognizant of the legal maxim that ambiguity in penal statutes should generally be resolved in favor of the defendant. Significantly, however,
the primary and overriding consideration in statutory interpretation is that a statute should be construed and applied so as to give effect to the evident intent of the legislature regardless of whether such construction varies from the statute's literal meaning. In other words, criminal statutes are not to be so strictly construed as to emasculate the statute and defeat the obvious intention of the legislature.
State v. Nunez, 368 So.2d 422, 423-24 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (citations omitted); see also, e.g., Lincoln v. Florida Parole Comm'n, 643 So.2d 668, 671 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)("Although strict construction of penal statutes is appropriate, no statute should be construed so as to defeat the intention of the Legislature."); State ex rel. Washington v. Rivkind, 350 So.2d 575, 577 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)("[S]trict construction [of penal statutes] is subordinate to the rule that the intention of the lawmakers must be given effect.").
Finding such evident legislative intent in the present case, we hold that habitualization is a separate, free-standing criterion for conditional release under section 947.1405(2), Florida Statutes (1989). We accordingly answer the certified question in the affirmative and approve the decision under review.
It is so ordered.
OVERTON, SHAW and WELLS, JJ., and GRIMES, Senior Justice, concur.
ANSTEAD, J., dissents with an opinion in which KOGAN, C.J., concurs.
. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.