Case Name: Michelle ORTIZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, John D'Agostino, Swaren Jatindranath, John Berlingieri, Karen Taylor, Rosalie Grascia, Gary Hoysradt, Gilbert Machado, Elizabeth Broderick, John Lester, Michael Pizzo, Mary O'Brien, Hank Loeffel, Diane Nash, Robert Terrett, and Joseph Martelli, Defendants-Appellees
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2015-09-11
Citations: 615 F. App'x 702
Docket Number: No. 14-3992
Parties: Michelle ORTIZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, John D’Agostino, Swaren Jatindranath, John Berlingieri, Karen Taylor, Rosalie Grascia, Gary Hoysradt, Gilbert Machado, Elizabeth Broderick, John Lester, Michael Pizzo, Mary O’Brien, Hank Loeffel, Diane Nash, Robert Terrett, and Joseph Martelli, Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: PRESENT: JON O. NEWMAN, WALKER, and DENNIS JACOBS, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 615
Pages: 702–704

Head Matter:
Michelle ORTIZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, John D’Agostino, Swaren Jatindranath, John Berlingieri, Karen Taylor, Rosalie Grascia, Gary Hoysradt, Gilbert Machado, Elizabeth Broderick, John Lester, Michael Pizzo, Mary O’Brien, Hank Loeffel, Diane Nash, Robert Terrett, and Joseph Martelli, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 14-3992.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Sept. 11, 2015.
Alan E. Wolin, Wolin & Wolin, Jericho, NY, for Appellant.
Helene R. Hechtkopf (Ira J. Lipton, on the brief), Hoguet Newman Regal & Ken-ney, LLP, New York, NY, for Appellees.
PRESENT: JON O. NEWMAN, WALKER, and DENNIS JACOBS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
SUMMARY ORDER
Michelle Ortiz appeals from the judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Broderick, /.), granting summary judgment in favor of defendants-appellees. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.
We affirm for substantially the reasons stated by the district court in its thorough Memorandum and Order of September 30, 2014.
1.Most of Ortiz's claims are time-barred, including: (1) the Title VII claims that arise from events taking place before March 26, 2011; (2) the § 1983 claims that arise from events taking place before February 14, 2010 and the § 1981 claims that arise from events taking place before February 14, 2009; and (3) the state-law claims that arise from events taking place before April 15,2009.
With a single exception (discussed below), Ortiz's argument that the "continuing violation" doctrine excuses her untimely filing is unavailing: "multiple incidents of discrimination, even similar ones, that are not the result of a discriminatory policy or mechanism do not amount to a continuing violation." Lambert v. Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d 46, 53 (2d Cir.1993), overruled in part on other grounds by Greathouse v. JHS Sec. Inc., 784 F.3d 105, 117 (2d Cir.2015).
Ortiz's hostile-work environment claims, however, are timely under the "continuing violation" doctrine, and conduct outside the limitations period may be considered. See Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 105, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002) '("[Consideration of the entire scope of a hostile work environment claim, including behavior alleged outside the statutory time period, is permissible for purposes of assessing liability, so long as an act contributing to that hostile environment takes place within the statutory time period.").
2. On the merits, the district court properly granted summary judgment on the hostile work environment claims. Any workplace misconduct here was insufficiently "severe or pervasive" to create & hostile work environment. Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 113 (2d Cir.2007). Moreover, most of the complained-of conduct bears no apparent connection to Ortiz's sex, race, or national origin.
3. As to the remaining discrimination claims — including but not limited to Ortiz's claims relating to assignment to a hazardous post, excessive scrutiny and "micro management" of Ortiz's work by her supervisors, and denial of a non-monetary award — the district court correctly held that none qualified as adverse employment actions. Some of the instances of alleged discrimination could, theoretically, have qualified as adverse employment actions on different facts — if, say, there were evidence that a nonmonetary award is critical to career advancement in this particular workplace. But there is insufficient evidence in the summary judgment record for a reasonable jury to find for Ortiz on any of these claims.
4. Ortiz's remaining retaliation claims all fail. Among other reasons, there is no evidence that any of the alleged retaliatory acts had any causal connection to protected activity.
5. Ortiz's (timely) discrimination claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and under the New York State (and New York City) Human Rights Laws, allege (1) excessive supervision and (2) rejection of her application to work in a K-9 unit. Both of these claims fail on the merits, for the reasons stated by the district court. Although the standards applicable to the New York City Human Rights Law are not the same as those applicable to federal law, the record is insufficient to create a triable issue under the standards of the City's law.
For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in Ortiz's other arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.