Case Name: Michael GIGANTI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. POLSTEAM SHIPPING CO., Defendant-Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2015-01-07
Citations: 588 F. App'x 74
Docket Number: No. 14-217-CV
Parties: Michael GIGANTI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. POLSTEAM SHIPPING CO., Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: Present: ROSEMARY S. POOLER, GERARD E. LYNCH, CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 588
Pages: 74–75

Head Matter:
Michael GIGANTI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. POLSTEAM SHIPPING CO., Defendant-Appellee.
No. 14-217-CV.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Jan. 7, 2015.
Nicholas Dell’Anno, Krentsel & Guzman, LLP, New York, NY, for Appellant.
Robert A. Suarez, Ropers Majeski Kohn Bentley P.C., New York, NY, for Appellee.
Present: ROSEMARY S. POOLER, GERARD E. LYNCH, CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY, Circuit Judges.
. The Clerk of the Court is directed to amend the caption as above.

Opinion:
SUMMARY ORDER
ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the or der of said District Court be and it hereby is AFFIRMED.
Michael Giganti appeals from the December IB, 2013 memorandum and order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Chen, J.) dismissing his negligence action against Polsteam Shipping Co., the owner pro hac vice of the M/S Pilica, brought pursuant to the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act ("LHCWA"). We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and specification of issues for review.
On appeal, Giganti challenges only the district court's finding that he failed to raise a material question of fact as to whether Polsteam breached its duty to intervene. The duty to intervene is "an exception to the generally limited duties imposed on the vessel once operations have begun." Gravatt v. City of New York, 226 F.3d 108, 121 (2d Cir.2000). Under the duty to intervene, the "vessel owner must intervene if it acquires actual knowledge that (1) a condition of the vessel or its equipment poses an unreasonable risk of harm and (2) the stevedore is not exercising reasonable car to protect its employees from that risk." Id. citing Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156, 101 S.Ct. 1614, 68 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981). The "basic thrust" of Scindia was to place "the primary burden on the stevedore for avoiding injuries caused by obvious hazards." Scindia, 451 U.S. at 180, 101 S.Ct. 1614 (Powell, J. concurring).
We affirm for substantially the reasons set forth in the district court's opinion. As we have observed, the "sine qua non of a ship's liability for an obviously dangerous condition arising during the process of loading or unloading is reasonable anticipation that the longshoremen will not be able to avoid it." Moore v. M.P. Howlett, Inc., 704 F.2d 39, 42 (2d Cir.1983) (internal quotation marks omitted.). "Indeed, the very fact that the discharging of cargo is carried out by expert and experienced stevedore[s] implies that certain dangers that may be hazardous to unskilled persons need not be remedied if an expert and experienced stevedore could safely work around them." Sinagra v. Atl. Ocean Shipping, Ltd., 182 F.Supp.2d 294, 299 (E.D.N.Y.2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, there is no question of fact that a stevedore experienced in unloading sugar would be aware that sugar regularly falls on deck during the offloading process, and that sugar mixed with water is slippery.
We have considered the remainder of Giganti's arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, the order of the district court hereby is AFFIRMED. Each side to bear its own costs.