Case Name: Henry Middleton vs. W. Thompson
Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1842-11
Citations: 1 Speers 67
Docket Number: 
Parties: Henry Middleton vs. W. Thompson.
Judges: Earle, J., concurred.
Reporter: South Carolina Law Reports
Volume: 28
Pages: 67–79

Head Matter:
Henry Middleton vs. W. Thompson.
1. In this State there is no such thing in practice as a voucher, technically so called, and as practised in England. A notice to the -warrantor, to come in and support the title of the warrantee, is used in its place.
2. Reasonable notice to the warrantor to come in and defend his title, is sufficient. In cases within the summary jurisdiction, notice from the warrantee to the warrantor should be given at or before the return of the process; but if service of the notice be impracticable before the return, notice within a reasonable time afterwards, would be all that could be expected.
3. In cases within the general jurisdiction, notice at any time before the expiration of the rule to plead, would seem to be in time. Where the warrantee has entered an appearance, and put in his plea to the merits, notice even after the continuance would be sufficient, if the warrantor had sufficient time to prepare evidence for the trial. Vide Davis vs. Wiliowrne, 1 Hill, 28, 29.
4. Although a record is not admissible in evidence against others than parties and privies, it may yet be offered as against stangers, to prove the fact that such a suit and recovery existed, and the quantum of damages thereby sustained by die plaintiff; but when thus received, it does not conclude and estop the defendant in any of the matters which were in issue between the parties. Vide Waldo vs. Long, 7 J. R. 174. In an action by the warrantee against the warrantor, the record of a former recovery against the warrantee, in which his warrantor had notice to come in and defend his tide, concludes him of every thing then necessarily in issue.
5. A. conveyed and warranted a tract of land to B. B. afterwards conveyed the same land to O. D. entered upon the land, and in an action against him by C., he failed to recover, or, in other words, D held a certain portion of the tract in question. C. then brought his action against B. upon his deed and covenant of warranty, and recovered. B., upon being sued, vouched A., his warrantor, to come in and defend his title. A. failed to do so. B. then instituted his action of covenant against A., upon his covenant of seisen, quiet enjoyment, and general warranty. Held,, that the record of C. against D. was admissible in evidence, in the action by B. against A., to show the quantum of damages sustained by B., and of eviction by title paramount to B’s., but that A. had a right to show that, notwithstanding the eviction was by title paramount to B’s, yet it was not paramount to his title, and failing to do so, the verdict was conclusive against him. Per O’Neall and Earle, Justices.
Before O’Neall, J., at Greenville, Extra Term, August, 1842.
This was an action of covenant on a deed, whereby the defendant conveyed and warranted a tract of land to the plaintiff, on the 18th November, 1814. The plaintiff afterwards conveyed the same land to George Washington Earle. After his death, Gen. Waddy Thompson, the son of the defendant, entered upon the land. The heirs of Earle sued him, and failed to recover one hundred and thirty one acres of the land, conveyed first by the defendant to the plaintiff, and by the plaintiff to the heirs of Earle,
The heirs of Earle sued Middleton on his deed and covenant of warranty to G. W. Earle ; pending the suit against him in Charleston, in March preceding the May term at which the case was tried, he vouched the defendant to come in and defend him. The heirs of Earle recovered against him. The recovery in the case of the heirs of Earle, vs. Waddy Thompson was admitted in evidence; 1st, as prima facie evidence of the eviction by paramount title ; and 2d, to show the extent of the loss sustained by the plaintiff, in consequence of that eviction. His Honor thought the recovery in the case of Earle vs. Middleton, in which the defendant was vouched, enough to entitle the plaintiff to recover,, unless the defendant could shew that he was well seized in law of the land when he conveyed to the plaintiff. The presiding Judge was also of opinion that the voucher was given in reasonable time before the trial, and, therefore, sufficient. The defendant attempted to prove a title in his grantors by possession, but in this he failed entirely. He proved no possession within the lines of the land recovered by Gen. Thompson, except a small tobacco patch, which had been cultivated from two to four years, and that by a man not claiming the land, forty years ago, and then abandoned. The jury found for the plaintiff. The defendant renewed his motion for a non-suit, and failing that, for a new trial, on the following grounds :
1st. Because the plaintiff gave no evidence of a title paramount, out of the defendant.
2d. Because the judgment between Earle and Thompson was improperly received in evidence.
3d. Because the judgment of Earle vs. Middleton was improperly held by the presiding Judge as prima facie conclusive.
4th. Because the voucher on defendant by Middleton was not in time, and ought to have been rejected by the court.
5th. Because the defendant’s possession by his grantors, was a goood title by the statute of limitations.
6th, Because the verdict is contrary ■ to law and evidence.
Henry & Irby, for the motion. Perry, contra,

Opinion:
Curia, per
O'Neall, J.
I will consider and first dispose of the defendant's 4th ground. In this State, we have no such thing in practice as a voucher, technically so called, and as practised in England. A notice to the warrantor to come in and support the title of the warrantee, is used in its place. In Davis vs. Wilbourne, 1 Hill, 28-29, Judge Johnson, with the concurrence of the whole Court of Appeals, undertook to lay down the rules by which it ought to be regulated. He said: " In cases within the summary jurisdiction, it (the notice from the warrantee to the warrantor,) ought, if practicable, to be given at or before the return of the process. In cases within the general jurisdiction, notice at any time before the expiration of the rule to plead, would seem to be in time. The object is to enable the warrantor to come in and defend his title. He ought, therefore, to have a reasonable time to prepare for it, and the time which the law allows to a defendant, furnishes, perhaps, the safest rule. In the first class of cases, however, the process might be served on the last hour of the last day, before the return, so as to render the service of the notice impracticable before the return. In those cases, notice within a reasonable time afterwards, would be all that could be expected. So, where the warrantee had entered an appearance, and put in his plea to the merits, I should think that notice even after the continuance, if the warrantor had sufficient time to prepare evidence for the trial, would be sufficient." It is under this last rule that the case before us must be adjudged; for the plaintiff in this case, in the case of the heirs of Earle vs. him, did enter an appearance, and plead to the merits. If the notice given to this defendant were in sufficient time to enable him "to prepare evidence for the trial," it would surely be " in reasonable time." Two months, and probably more, were given to the defendant before the case was tried. He lived in Greenville, the case was to be tried in Charleston. The time, it seems to me, was ample for all purposes of defence, and therefore the notice was in reasonable time.
2d. The defendant's second ground will be next considered. The record in the case of the heirs of Earle vs. Gen. Thompson, was received in evidence. Its admissibility is now to be examined. Generally, a record is not to be received in evidence against others than parties and privies. But to this rule there are some exceptions, as where it is offered to prove the fact that such a suit and recovery-existed, and the quantum of damages thereby sustained by the plaintiff; for such purposes it is admissible against stangers. When thus received, it concludes and estops the defendant in none of the matters which were in issue between the parties. The case of Waldo vs. Long, 7 J. R. 174, is full to this point. In that case, which was an action of covenant brought by the warrantee against the warrantor, on a covenant against incumbrances, the plaintiff gave in evidence a mortgage, executed by his warrantor prior to the deed to him, to Wm. Porter, and then offered in evidence the postea in the cause of Jackson ex dem. Wm. Porter and others against him, brought on the mortgage, and the bill of costs which had accrued, and which he was liable to pay, in consequence of the recovery. No notice of the suit had been given to the warrantor. It was held by the court, that the postea was admissible, inasmuch as it was evidence of the existence of the ejectment suit upon the mortgage, and of the fact of a verdict in such a cause, and that the bill of costs was thereby a proper item of the damages which the jury might find. So, if a judgment come in collaterally to furnish evidence oí a fact not directly in issue, it may be received, as in Koogler ads. Huffman, 1 M'C. 495, where a record in the court of equity was received in evidence in a court of law, against a stanger, to prove that a person executing a deed as attorney, had power to do so from his principal. In that case Judge Colcock stated the true view when he said, " All that is meant b.y the rule is, that the rights of a party cannot be determined on, conclusively, unless he be a party." These authorities sufficiently vindicate the reception of the evidence; and when it was connected with the recovery in the case of Earle vs. Middleton, oí which the defendant had notice, there can be no doubt that it was properly in evidence for every purpose for which it was received below; for in that case the whole of those proceedings are set out and referred to, and even without giving them in evidence, they would have been fully proved by that case.
3d. This brings up the question, whether the evidence given in the cause shewed a breach of the covenants of seizen and quiet enjoyment on the part of the defendant. The record of Earle vs. Middleton, in which the defendant had regular notice to come in and defend, concludes him of every thing which was then necessarily in issue. In that case, the plaintiffs were bound to shew that they were evicted by a title paramount to that which they derived from Middleton. So far there can be no doubt. When the defendant was made a party by notice, the same legal result followed against him; for then, the conclusion is, that the title by which the heirs of Earle were evicted, was also paramount to the title conveyed by Thompson to Middleton; and this conclusion is much strengthened by the fact that the title stated in the record as that by which the heirs of Earle were evicted, is laid to be paramount to Middleton's, and as existing in a stranger to his title. If the defendant be concluded by notice, and failure to come in and defend, by every thing stated in the record, then he is concluded in this case, and the other evidence on the part of the plaintiff was unnecessary, and that on the part of the defendant ought not to have been received. But I think that recovery only concluded him so far that he could not dispute the facts put in issue by it; that is, that the eviction took place by title paramount to Middleton's ; and until the contrary appears, that is understood to be the title which he derived from Thompson, the defendant. This cast upon the defendant the burden of shewing that, notwithstanding the eviction was by title paramount to Middleton's title, conveyed to Earle, that yet it was not paramount to his, as that Middleton had conveyed to another before he conveyed to Earle; or that after he (the defendant,) had conveyed to Middleton, he had permitted a stranger to intrude on the land, and remain in possession until the statute of limitations had defeated his title. This opportunity of defending himself was given to the defendant, and he was even permitted to shew, if he could, that notwithstanding the recoveries, the title which he conveyed to Middleton was good and legal. In this he signally failed, and ought not now to complain. The motion is dismissed.
Earle, J., concurred.