Case Name: Ronald COTE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2000-03-17
Citations: 760 So. 2d 162
Docket Number: No. 2D98-4438
Parties: Ronald COTE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: WHATLEY, J., Concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 760
Pages: 162–167

Head Matter:
Ronald COTE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 2D98-4438.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
March 17, 2000.
Rehearing Denied May 8, 2000.
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Richard P. Albertine, Jr., Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Timothy A. Freeland, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

Opinion:
CASANUEVA, Judge.
Mr. Cote appeals the denial of his motion to dismiss a petition alleging that he violated the terms of his community control. He contends that his sentence violated his constitutional right to be protected against double jeopardy. We affirm.
While a juvenile, Mr. Cote entered a plea to a felony in case number 97-670, a case in which he was exposed to adult sanctions. Rather than imposing adult penalties, the trial court opted for the juvenile sanction of commitment to a Level 8 facility to be followed by community control that was'not to extend beyond his 19th birthday. After Mr. Cote's sentencing hearing on August 26, 1997, a written order of commitment to the Department of Juvenile Justice (to be followed by aftercare probation) was entered in the felony case on September 18,1997. Erroneously, the juvenile commitment order indicated that it was entered in the juvenile division and reflected that Mr. Cote had entered a plea to a juvenile petition rather than to a felony information in felony division.
Subsequently, Mr. Cote was brought before the juvenile court judge for a contempt citation • arising out of violations of his community control order. The juvenile judge indicated that the enforcement of Mr. Cote's juvenile sentence had been referred to the juvenile division of circuit court. Thus, upon a.plea to the violations, Mr. Cote was held in indirect criminal contempt and was sentenced to serve a period of time in juvenile detention. Later, in this unique factual scenario, Mr. Cote was brought, before the original felony division sentencing judge for violations of his community control order. The violations, cited by the State were identical to those considered by the juvenile court judge. Mr. Cote argued that the violation hearing was prohibited by double jeopardy. The motion was denied and, upon plea, the court revoked the juvenile community control, withheld adjudication of guilt, and imposed a downward departure sentence of six years in prison, which was suspended on the condition that he successfully complete two years of community control followed by five years on probation.
Despite the "juvenile division" misnomer appearing on the order of commitment, the felony case remained in feL ony division. No court order transferring divisions or consolidating the felony case with other pending juvenile cases was entered. We conclude that the juvenile division was without divisional authority jurisdiction to act upon Mr. Cote's alleged violations. Jurisdiction of a court is fre quently invoked by statutory law. Section 985.201, Florida Statutes (1997),- confers in the circuit courts exclusive original jurisdiction of proceedings "in which a child is alleged to have committed a delinquent act or violation of law." As stated by our supreme court in State v. Griffith, 675 So.2d 911, 913 (Fla.1996), "[t]he Juvenile Justice Act vests the juvenile division with exclusive jurisdiction over all proceedings in which a child allegedly violates the law unless . juvenile jurisdiction is waived." Here, juvenile jurisdiction was waived because the information against Mr. Cote was directly filed in the felony division. Accordingly, the juvenile proceeding did not come within the specified -grant of jurisdictional authority awarded by section 985.201, Florida Statutes (1997), see Williams v. State, 737 So.2d 1141 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), nor could the parties confer jurisdiction upon the court by stipulation or by failure to object to its action, see Worley v. State, 396 So.2d 1153 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981). Although juvenile court and criminal court are divisions of the circuit'court, defense counsel cannot fail to object to the juvenile court judge's exercise of authority and then, when the client is convicted, seek a remedy later. The trial court's resources are not to be consumed in such a manner. See Griffith, 675 So.2d at 913-914. Here, in fairness, we must also point out that the error went unnoticed by the State.
We conclude that the juvenile , division was without divisional authority jurisdiction to act upon Mr. Cote's alleged violations. Therefore, the juvenile court judge could not legally impose sanctions, and the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy was not implicated when the felony division judge imposed sentence.
The double jeopardy clause provides three basic rights: protection against a1 second prosecution for the same offense after an acquittal; protection against a second prosecution after a conviction; and preclusion of the imposition of multiple punishments for the same offense. See Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376, 380-382, 109 S.Ct. 2522, 105 L.Ed.2d 322 (1989); State v. Wilson, 680 So.2d 411 (Fla.1996). Because Mr. Cote's felony sentence exposes him to the possibility of further punishment by incarceration, we hold that Mr. Cote is entitled to an accounting of the time spent in detention pursuant to the improper juvenile court order, and that time must be credited against a subsequent term of incarceration, if any. See Thomas, 491 U.S. at 382, 109 S.Ct. 2522.
In conclusion, we point out that section 985.233(4)(e), Florida Statutes (1997), enacted subsequent to the filing of the information against Mr. Cote but prior to the invalid sentencing by the juvenile judge, prohibits the transfer to juvenile court of felony proceedings where a juvenile sanction is imposed. This procedural statute should preclude a similar situation from occurring in the future.
Affirmed.
WHATLEY, J., Concurs.
FULMER, A.C.J., Dissents with opinion.