Case Name: Betty HARMON, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. MERCY HOSPITAL, Defendant and Appellant
Court: North Dakota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: North Dakota
Decision Date: 1990-09-05
Citations: 460 N.W.2d 404
Docket Number: Civ. No. 890383
Parties: Betty HARMON, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. MERCY HOSPITAL, Defendant and Appellant.
Judges: ERICKSTAD, C.J., and VANDE WALLE and GIERKE, JJ., concur.
Reporter: North Western Reporter 2d
Volume: 460
Pages: 404–411

Head Matter:
Betty HARMON, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. MERCY HOSPITAL, Defendant and Appellant.
Civ. No. 890383.
Supreme Court of North Dakota.
Sept. 5, 1990.
Betty Harmon, Williston, pro se. No appearance.
Mclntee & Whisenand, P.C., Williston, for defendant and appellant; argued by Terry R. Lorenz.

Opinion:
LEVINE, Justice.
Mercy Hospital appeals from a district court order granting Betty Harmon's Rule 27, N.D.R.Civ.P., petition requesting that the Hospital turn over to Harmon her personnel file. Because Harmon failed to satisfy the requirements for relief under Rule 27, we reverse.
Harmon was employed as a nurse at the Hospital. An employment dispute arose between Harmon and her supervisors and she was placed on probation. Harmon hired an attorney to represent her in the employment dispute and to assist in obtaining her personnel file from the Hospital. Apparently, the Hospital was willing to allow Harmon to review her personnel file by herself, but would not allow Harmon to make a copy of the file or to review it in the presence of her attorney because of Hospital policy and procedure.
Although no legal action had been commenced, Harmon's attorney sent a subpoena to the Hospital demanding Harmon's personnel file. The Hospital did not respond to the subpoena. Harmon moved for a contempt order, but subsequently served the Hospital with documents dismissing the contempt motion and commencing a Rule 27, N.D.R.Civ.P., special proceeding to obtain production of her personnel file. After Harmon petitioned the court for a Rule 27 order, the Hospital terminated her from employment. Following a hearing, the trial court granted Harmon's request and ordered that the Hospital turn over Harmon's personnel file to her. The Hospital has appealed.
Rule 27(a), N.D.R.Civ.P., provides in pertinent part:
"(a) Before Action.
"(1) Petition. A person who desires to perpetuate testimony regarding any matter may file a verified petition in the district court of the county of the residence of any expected adverse party. The petition must be entitled in the name of the petitioner and show: (i) that the petitioner expects to be a party to an action but is presently unable to bring it or cause it to be brought, (ii) the subject matter of the expected action and the petitioner's interest therein, (iii) the facts the petitioner desires to establish by the proposed testimony and the reasons for desiring to perpetuate it, (iv) the names or a description of the persons the petitioner expects will be adverse parties and their addresses so far as known, and (v) the names and addresses of the persons to be examined and the substance of the testimony the petitioner expects to elicit from each, and shall ask for an order authorizing the petitioner to take the depositions of the persons to be examined named in the petition, for the purpose of perpetuating their testimony.

"(3) Order and Examination. If the court is satisfied that the perpetuation of the testimony may prevent a failure or delay of justice, it shall make an order designating or describing the persons whose depositions may be taken and specifying the subject matter of the examination and whether the depositions shall be taken upon oral examination or written interrogatories. The depositions may then be taken in accordance with these rules; and the court may make orders of the character provided for by Rules 34 and 35. For the purpose of applying these rules to depositions for perpetuating testimony, each reference therein to the court in which the action is pending shall be deemed to refer to the court in which the petition for such deposition was filed."
Rule 27 allows for the perpetuation of testimony and the preservation of evidence to "prevent a failure or delay of justice." Although this court has not interpreted the provisions of Rule 27, the rule is patterned after Rule 27, F.R.Civ.P., and we therefore may look to interpretations of the federal rule for guidance in construing our rule. Land Office Co. v. Clapp-Thomssen Co., 442 N.W.2d 401, 403 (N.D.1989).
In construing the rule, the federal courts have uniformly recognized that "Rule 27 properly applies only in that special category of cases where it is necessary to prevent testimony from being lost." Ash v. Cort, 512 F.2d 909, 911 (3d Cir. 1975). See, e.g., Petition of Rosario, 109 F.R.D. 368, 370 (D.Mass.1986); In re Wolfson, 453 F.Supp. 1087, 1096 (S.D.N.Y.1978); Petition of Ferkauf 3 F.R.D. 89, 91 (S.D.N.Y.1943). Although most of the cases address perpetuation of testimony through the use of pre-complaint depositions, it is clear that the rule can also be used to obtain pre-complaint production of documents when "the only thing likely to be lost or concealed is a paper or object that should be subject to inspection, etc., under Rule 34...." Martin v. Reynolds Metals Corporation, 297 F.2d 49, 56 (9th Cir. 1961). The moving party is required to show "some verification" for a claim that the evidence sought to be preserved will be lost before a complaint could be filed [Ash v. Cort, supra, 512 F.2d at 913 n. 16], and conclusory allegations to that effect will not satisfy the rule's verification requirement. Petition of Rosario, supra, 109 F.R.D. at 371.
The federal courts have also made it clear that where there is no showing of a substantial danger of loss of the evidence, "a person cannot take advantage of Rule 27 merely for the purpose of obtaining facts on which to base a complaint." 4 Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 27.07[4], at p. 27-29 (1989). See also Annotation, Right to Perpetuation of Testimony under Rule 27 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 A.L.R.Fed. 924, 937-939 (1982). In other words, Rule 27 " 'is not a method of discovery to determine whether a cause of action exists; and, if so, against whom action should be instituted.' " In re Boland, 79 F.R.D. 665, 668 (D.D.C.1978) [quoting Petition of Gumsey, 223 F.Supp. 359, 360 (D.D.C.1963) ]. See also Petition of Gary Construction, Inc., 96 F.R.D. 432, 433 (D.Colo.1983). To allow Rule 27 to be used for the purpose of enabling "a person to fish for some ground for bringing suit" would be an " 'abuse of the rule.' " 8 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2071, at pp. 332, 333 (1970). [Footnote omitted.] Several state courts, construing statutes and rules similar to Rule 27, have also held that they are not intended as a means of discovery to ascertain facts for use in framing a complaint. See Worley v. Worley, 161 Ga.App. 44, 288 S.E.2d 854, 856 (1982); In re Vermilion Parish School Bd., 357 So.2d 1295, 1297-1298 (La.Ct.App.1978); Sandmann v. Petron, 404 N.W.2d 800, 802 (Minn.1987).
On appeal, we must determine whether on the facts of this case the trial court abused its discretion in granting Harmon's petition. Shore v. Acands, Inc., 644 F.2d 386, 388 (5th Cir.1981). The only evidence presented by Harmon relating to the requirements of Rule 27 was her affidavit, in which she stated:
"1. That the Petitioner expects to be a party to an action but is presently unable to bring it or cause it to be brought.
"2. That the subject of the expected action is to prevent wrongful termination by Mercy Hospital of Williston, North Dakota.
"3. The personnel file requested is necessary to perpetuate the action, if filed by Mercy Hospital (sic).
"4. Possible adverse parties include Mercy Hospital, Bob Fale, Gloria Marcy, Kathy Wray, and Char Behrman.
"5. An order is requested to require Mercy Hospital to respond to the Rule 45 Subpoena."
Harmon has failed to allege or verify in any manner that the evidence here sought to be preserved is in danger of being lost or altered. Rather, the only evidence in this record pertaining to potential loss of the evidence was submitted by a Hospital official, who stated in an affidavit that
"[t]he personnel file remains in the personnel department of Mercy Hospital and will continue to remain there as part of the permanent records of Mercy Hospital. The record will not be altered, destroyed, or removed and is always available should an appropriate request for the examination of that record be made."
An examination of the hearing transcript reveals that counsel for Harmon misper-ceived the purpose of Rule 27. Harmon's counsel candidly admitted to the trial court that "we would like to do some discovery prior to filing the action and that's why we have filed this Rule 27 proceeding." It is evident that Harmon sought to do precisely what Rule 27 does not permit.
Harmon did allege, in conclusory fashion and without verification, that she "expects to be a party to an action but is presently unable to bring it or cause it to be brought." We recognize that the prohibition against general pre-complaint discovery under Rule 27 and the possibility of sanctions for violations of Rule 11, N.D.R. Civ.P., may appear somewhat inconsistent. In In re Boland, supra, 79 F.R.D. at 667, the petitioner asserted that she was unable to file a complaint because of a lack of knowledge of facts necessary to "prepare a complaint sufficient to withstand motions under Rules 11 and 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." The court said:
"Petitioner has suggested that she does not know whether her dismissal was legal or illegal, and that is why she should be granted Rule 27 relief. But there is nothing in the Rule or the cases construing it that would lead to the conclusion that a person may require others to submit to depositions in order that such person may ascertain whether, under law, she has a cause of action." In re Boland, supra, 79 F.R.D. at 668 n. 3.
In rejecting the petitioner's claim, the court reasoned:
"Under the liberal pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure a complaint need contain only the most basic grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction is based and a short statement of the claim and the relief sought. Rule 8(a), F.R.Civ.P. Concomitantly liberal discovery rules permit parties to flesh out their respective claims, defenses, and counterclaims, in due course after issue has been joined. Petitioner has not demonstrated that, under these rules, she is unable to frame an adequate complaint." In re Boland, supra, 79 F.R.D. at 668.
See also Petitioner of Ferkauf, supra, 3 F.R.D. at 91 ["under the Federal rules the method of pleading has been so simplified that there are few situations wherein a prospective litigant, who has a meritorious cause of action, would not be in possession of sufficient facts upon which to frame a complaint."]
Likewise, in this case, Harmon has failed to show that, under our liberal pleading rules [see Rule 8(a), N.D.R.Civ.P.; Jablonsky v. Klemm, 377 N.W.2d 560, 565 (N.D.1985) ], she is unable to frame an adequate complaint. The argument made by Harmon's counsel during the hearing suggests that the only need for the personnel file was for purposes of specificity:
"We want to use the file in order to file the action, to get the specifics exactly correct, and they terminated her for requesting the file after this was filed. So we feel that we very likely will be filing a lawsuit. We need that personnel file in order to file it. They won't give it to us. That's why we're here. It's her personnel file we want, not somebody else's; not a fishing expedition.
"We've got all kinds of grounds and the lawsuit probably will be brought. We want to do it correctly. We want the file in order to perpetuate the action. That's all she's asking for is her own file and they won't give it to her." [Emphasis added.]
Harmon has not demonstrated that she is unable to frame an adequate complaint. Nor did she provide the trial court with any evidence that a substantial danger exists that her personnel file would be altered or otherwise become unavailable before the complaint could be filed. In these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in granting Harmon's Rule 27 petition.
Accordingly, the trial court order requiring the Hospital to turn over to Harmon her personnel file is reversed.
ERICKSTAD, C.J., and VANDE WALLE and GIERKE, JJ., concur.