Case Name: THE STATE v. WEST
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1999-03-19
Citations: 237 Ga. App. 185
Docket Number: A98A2333
Parties: THE STATE v. WEST.
Judges: McMurray, P. J., Andrews and Blackburn, JJ, concur. Pope, P. J., concurs specially. Beasley, P. J., and Ruffin, J., dissent.
Reporter: Georgia Appeals Reports
Volume: 237
Pages: 185–193

Head Matter:
A98A2333.
THE STATE v. WEST.
(514 SE2d 257)

Opinion:
Eldridge, Judge.
Nineteen-year-old Jamie West lived rent-free with his mother and stepfather in his mother and stepfather's house. Based on a tip from a concerned citizen that West had marijuana plants in his bedroom, the police went to the house without a warrant to ask for consent to search the room. West was not at the house when the police arrived, but his mother and stepfather were there. When informed of the purpose for the. officers' visit, West's mother stated "[s]he didn't want nothing in her home and if we found anything, she wanted it out." West's mother signed a consent-to-search form: "I understood it to be that it would be okay for them to search my house. . I didn't have any intention of him [officer] not searching." West's bedroom door was locked, so West's stepfather got the key to unlock the door. The police found marijuana plants inside the bedroom.
West was charged with possessing and manufacturing marijuana. He filed a motion to suppress the evidence of marijuana found in his room. The trial court granted the motion, finding that West's mother did not have authority to consent to a search of a locked bedroom:
I am going to grant the motion [.] . In that Mr. West by locking his door had expectation of privacy and that the officer should have, after getting the consent to search the house, either waited until Mr. West appeared or gone and got a search warrant in order to search a room which had been locked by the person residing in that room.
The State appeals from the ruling. Held:
Permission to search may be obtained from one who "possess [es] [(a)] common authority over or [(b)] other sufficient relationship to the premises . . . sought to be inspected." United States v. Matlock, 415 U. S. 164, 171-172 (94 SC 988, 39 LE2d 242) (1974) ("Matlock"). The Matlock analysis, then, is two-pronged, i.e., a "common authority" prong, or a "sufficient relationship to the premises" prong.
Matlock, itself, involved a co-habitating couple in a bedroom rented from a third party. The Matlock Court examined the "common authority" of the one whose name was not on the lease to consent to a search of the rented bedroom. Such "common authority" analysis nec essarily involved aspects of each individual's expectation of privacy in the bedroom. Thus, factors such as "access" to and "mutual use" of the bedroom were relevant.
However, the application of Matlock's prong-one "common authority" analysis to the facts of this case would be inappropriate. Instead, in this case, we examine a resident homeowner's authority to permit a search of her own home, including an adult child's bedroom which the homeowner permits the child to use for free.
An examination of cases from other jurisdictions convinces us that it is the general rule that the voluntary consent of the head of a household to the search of premises owned or controlled by such head of the household is sufficient to authorize a search of the premises without a search warrant [.]
Tolbert v. State, 224 Ga. 291, 293 (161 SE2d 279) (1968). To that end:
[E]ven if the son, living in the bosom of a family, may think of a room as "his," the overall dominance will be in his parents. . . . Given the nature of the home as a family dwelling and the fact that the mother, as owner and head of the single-family household, designated what use, if any, could be made of the premises including the bedroom in question, we think it was reasonable to recognize that the mother had the authority to permit the inspection in her own right.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) United States v. Peterson, 524 F2d 167, 180-181 (4th Cir. 1975), cert, denied, 423 U. S. 1088 (96 SC 881, 47 LE2d 99) (1976).
As a resident homeowner granting consent to a search of her own home, including her adult son's rent-free bedroom, West's mother satisfies the second prong of the Matlock analysis in that she possesses a "sufficient relationship to the premises" sought to be inspected. Accordingly, factors such as "access" to the bedroom and "mutual use" of the bedroom are not relevant inquiries. Thus, regardless of whether West locks his bedroom door and regardless of his mother's reluctance to enter the bedroom, she has the right to enter and she may assign that right, as she did in this case:
[The mother] had control of the premises, undiminished by any kind of less-than-fee interest possessed by [West]. This fact stands in contrast to the hotel or rental situations. [ ] The situation strikes us as being no different, factually, than if [the mother] herself had brought the seized item, it being properly in her possession, to the authorities. They came to the home, it is true, but they obtained it by freely allowed access to the house.
(Punctuation omitted.) United States v. Peterson, supra at 180, citing Maxwell v. Stephens, 348 F2d 325 (8th Cir. 1965), cert, denied, 382 U. S. 944 (86 SC 387,15 LE2d 353) (1965), reh. denied, 382 U. S. 1000 (86 SC 532, 15 LE2d 490) (1966).
Because West's mother had the authority to consent to a search of her home, including the bedroom she permitted her son to use for free, such consent was valid. The trial court's ruling to the contrary is erroneous.
Judgment reversed.
McMurray, P. J., Andrews and Blackburn, JJ, concur. Pope, P. J., concurs specially. Beasley, P. J., and Ruffin, J., dissent.
See also Howard v. State, 207 Ga. App. 125, 126 (1) (427 SE2d 96) (1993); Williams v. State, 166 Ga. App. 798, 800 (2) (305 SE2d 489) (1983).
Compare Chapman v. United States, 365 U. S. 610 (81 SC 776, 5 LE2d 828) (1961) (landlord cannot consent to search of house he has rented to another); Stoner v. California, 376 U. S. 483 (84 SC 889, 11 LE2d 856) (1964) (hotel clerk cannot consent to search of customer's room).