Case Name: Kirk Lector HILL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1989-06-07
Citations: 547 So. 2d 175
Docket Number: No. 87-2765
Parties: Kirk Lector HILL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: GUNTHER and STONE, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 547
Pages: 175–178

Head Matter:
Kirk Lector HILL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 87-2765.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
June 7, 1989.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied July 19, 1989.
Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, Karen Ehrlich and Gary Caldwell, Asst. Public Defenders, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee and Richard G. Bartmon, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Appellee, the state, exercised a peremptory challenge to excuse a black juror, Mrs. Mosley, from the panel. When appellant, the defendant, raised an objection arguing that the challenge was racially motivated, the state claimed that it excused Mrs. Mosley because she "yawned through the whole [voir dire] and didn't seem interested." The trial court permitted the state to excuse the juror. We reverse.
In the instant case, the defendant objected to the state's exercise of a peremptory challenge by raising a timely objection and demonstrating on the record that the challenged person was a member of a distinct racial group and that there was a strong likelihood that she was challenged solely because of her race. See State v. Neil, 457 So.2d 481 (Fla.1984); Sampson v. State, 542 So.2d 434 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). Furthermore, any doubt as to whether the defendant satisfied his burden of showing that the juror was challenged solely because of her race should be resolved in his favor. See State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18, 22 (Fla.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 2873, 101 L.Ed.2d 909 (1988). Since the defendant's objection was proper and not frivolous, the burden of proof shifted to the state to rebut the inference that its peremptory challenge was motivated by bias. Id. at 22.
To demonstrate that its peremptory challenge was racially neutral, the state was required to show that its reason for excusing the juror was reasonable, supported by the record, and not a pretext. Id. at 22, 23. The trial court apparently found, and we agree, that the state's explanation of not wanting to keep a juror who was "bored or inattentive" was reasonable, and not a pretext. Therefore, the remaining question raised by this appeal is whether the state's reason for excusing Mrs. Mosley was supported by the record.
In addressing this question, we are guided by our supreme court's recent decision in Slappy. In Slappy, the state exercised a peremptory challenge to excuse a black juror. Slappy, 522 So.2d at 19. In responding to the court's inquiry, the state explained that it excused the juror in part because "[h]er health doesn't seem to be very good. I just didn't want someone like that on the jury." Id. Although the trial court permitted the state to excuse the juror, that decision was reversed on appeal. The supreme court noted that "the record was far from clear that any such [illness] existed. A single question posed to the juror could have established the existence or nonexistence of illness." Id. at 23 n. 3. The court held that
the state must be prepared to support its explanations with neutral reasons based on answers provided at voir dire or otherwise disclosed on the record itself.
Id. at 23.
In the instant case, the record is "far from clear" that the juror was yawning during voir dire. Neither the judge nor defense counsel acknowledged that he observed such behavior, and the juror was not questioned to substantiate the state's allegation. Therefore, the state could not show that its reason for excusing the juror was either "based on answers provided at voir dire or otherwise disclosed on the record itself." Id. Accordingly, the trial court erred in permitting the state to excuse the juror.
Finally, we find no error in the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress the evidence discovered in the automobile inventory search. See Robinson v. State, 526 So.2d 164 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988), aff'd, 537 So.2d 95 (Fla.1989).
REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR A NEW TRIAL.
GUNTHER and STONE, JJ., concur.
HERSEY, C.J., dissents with opinion.