Case Name: Kolojeski, Appellant, v. John Deisher, Inc.
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1968-03-15
Citations: 429 Pa. 191
Docket Number: Appeal, No. 164
Parties: Kolojeski, Appellant, v. John Deisher, Inc.
Judges: Before Bell, C. J., Musmanno, Jones, Cohen, Eagen, O’Brien and Roberts, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania State Reports
Volume: 429
Pages: 191–198

Head Matter:
Kolojeski, Appellant, v. John Deisher, Inc.
Argued November 27, 1967.
Before Bell, C. J., Musmanno, Jones, Cohen, Eagen, O’Brien and Roberts, JJ.
Sheldon R. Portner, with him Norman Shigon, for appellants.
William B. Freilich, with him Joseph G. Manta, James M. Marsh, and LaBrum and Doah, for appellee.
Lester J. Schaffer, with him James W. Brown, Jr., and Zinh, Shinehouse & Holmes, for appellees.
March 15, 1968:

Opinion:
Opinion by
Mr. Justice O'Brien,
Madeline Kolojeski, a two-year old child, died, allegedly as the result of lead poisoning caused by the ingestion of lead base paint which had chipped and peeled from tlie woodwork of the living room of the apartment occupied by the minor decedent and her parents. The decedent's mother, as administratrix of the decedent's estate, and the decedent's mother and father in their own right, commenced wrongful death and survival actions against appellee, John Deisher, Inc., the rental agent of the owners of the building in which the apartment was situate, and the owners themselves, Nazareno Pomponi and Virginia Pomponi. The defendants-appellees filed preliminary objections to the complaint in the nature of a demurrer. The court below sustained the demurrer and dismissed the complaint. This appeal followed.
Appellants' occupancy of the premises commenced on or about April 22, 1964, when they entered into a month to month lease with appellee, Deisher. The complaint alleges that on or about January 4, 1966, some 20 months after appellants had gone into occupancy of the premises, the minor decedent consumed pieces of paint which had peeled from the living room woodwork, thereby sustaining injuries which resulted in her death on January 6, 1966. Appellants alleged that appellees were negligent in failing to maintain the premises in proper living condition; failing to inspect the premises adequately to insure the safety of the tenants; failing to notify the tenants of the dangerous substance with which the living room woodwork had been painted; having caused the living room woodwork to be painted with a toxic substance; and failing to remove and remedy the condition of the woodwork, and permitting the paint to become decayed, chipped, and peeling. Reduced to its essentials, the complaint alleges that appellees were negligent in allowing the living room woodwork paint job to deteriorate to the point where paint peeled and fell therefrom; and in using lead base paint, which is poisonous if consumed. We are in agreement with the court below that no cause of action has been stated.
In Lopez v. Gukenback, 391 Pa. 359, 137 A. 2d 771 (1958), this court summarized the general liability of a landlord to his tenant for injuries received by the tenant on the premises. We there said: "(1) In the absence of any provision in the lease, a landlord is under no obligation to repair the leased premises, to see to it that they are fit for rental or to keep the premises in repair: [citing eases] (2) a tenant takes the premises as he finds them and the landlord is not liable for existing defects of which the tenant knows or can ascertain by a reasonable inspection: [citing cases] (3) a landlord out of possession, however, may be liable (a) where he conceals a dangerous condition of which he has knowledge and of which the tenant has no knowledge or cannot be expected to discover and (b) where he knows or should know of a dangerous condition and leases the premises for a purpose involving a 'public use' and has reason to believe the tenant will not first correct the condition: [citing cases] . . ." There is nothing in the complaint to indicate that the landlord was under any duty to make repairs. Without such a duty, we have no option but to agree with the court below that "no liability on the part of defendants can be predicated upon their failure to repair the premises or in allowing the paint to peel."
In their brief, appellants argue that there is a question in the case as to whether there had been a promise to repair which induced them to remain in possession. They contend that the sustaining of the demurrer foreclosed proof on this subject. It must be pointed out that the complaint makes no allegation of any such promise or inducement; nor was any amendment to the complaint offered subsequent to the filing of the preliminary objections. Moreover, as tbe Superior Court stated in Keiper v. Marquart, 192 Pa. Superior Ct. 88, 91, 159 A. 2d 33 (1960) : "It is also settled law that an agreement to repair does not impose upon tbe owner a liability in tort at tbe suit of tbe tenant; and that occupation and control are not reserved to the owner by his agreement to repair; Harris v. Lewistown Trust Co., 326 Pa. 145, 191 A. 2d 34."
Appellants' only possible basis for recovery must arise from the use by appellees of lead base paint. Such use would support liability only if such use constituted the creation of a dangerous condition of which appellees had knowledge and of which appellants had no knowledge. In this connection, appellants cite a New York decision which we, as did the court below, find to be inapposite. The decision in that case was bottomed on the violation of a law requiring the landlord to make repairs. No such situation exists here. Although the situation is tragic, we cannot help but agree that the use of lead base paint in these circumstances cannot constitute actionable negligence. The court below aptly stated: "Plaintiffs have cited no judicial decisions in this jurisdiction or any statute or ordinance which would justify a conclusion that the use of a lead base paint constitutes negligence. . In the absence of compelling authority we cannot find that the use of lead base paint constitutes negligence, as we take judicial notice that the use of such paint is common and widespread." Were we to conclude otherwise, we would be required to ascribe to appellees a knowledge and expertise not ascribable, at least at the time of this incident, to people without special training or experience.
Since we have determined that the complaint does not state a cause of action, it is unnecessary for us to pass upon any questions involving the status of Deisher as agent for an undisclosed principal, or on any exculpatory clauses contained in the lease.
Judgment affirmed.