Case Name: Rita STROCHAK, Appellant, v. FEDERAL INSURANCE CO., etc., et al., Appellees
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1998-03-19
Citations: 717 So. 2d 453
Docket Number: No. 90298
Parties: Rita STROCHAK, Appellant, v. FEDERAL INSURANCE CO., etc., et al., Appellees.
Judges: KOGAN, C.J., and ANSTEAD, J., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 717
Pages: 453–459

Head Matter:
Rita STROCHAK, Appellant, v. FEDERAL INSURANCE CO., etc., et al., Appellees.
No. 90298.
Supreme Court of Florida.
March 19, 1998.
Rehearing Denied July 13, 1998.
Philip M. Burlington of Caruso, Burlington, Bohn & Company, P.A., West Palm Beach; and David E. French of David & French, P.A., Boca Raton, for Appellant.
George A. Vaka and Tracy Raffles Gunn of Fowler, White, Gillen, Boggs, Villareal & Banker, P.A., Tampa, for Appellees.

Opinion:
SHAW, Justice.
We have for review the following question certified to this Court by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Strochak v. Federal Insurance Co., 109 F.3d 717 (11th Cir.1997):
WHETHER AN EXCESS CARRIER HAS A DUTY TO MAKE AVAILABLE THE UNINSURED MOTORISTS COVERAGE REQUIRED BY FLORIDA STATUTE § 627.727(2) TO AN INSURED UNDER AN EXISTING POLICY ON VEHICLES WHICH HAD NEVER BEEN REGISTERED OR PRINCIPALLY GARAGED IN FLORIDA WHENEVER ANY VEHICLE, COVERED OR SUBSEQUENTLY ADDED, FIRST BECOMES REGISTERED OR PRINCIPALLY GARAGED IN FLORIDA.
We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(6), Fla. Const.
We restate the certified question to conform to the plain language of section 627.727(2), which applies to policies "delivered or issued for delivery" in Florida:
Whether an excess carrier has a duty to' make available the uninsured motorists (UM) coverage required by section 627.727(2), Florida Statutes (Supp.1990), to an insured under an existing policy on vehicles which had never been registered or principally garaged in Florida when any vehicle, covered or subsequently added, first becomes registered or principally garaged in Florida and when the policy is delivered or issued for delivery in Florida.
We answer the restated question in the affirmative.
The relevant facts are set out in the opinion of the Court of Appeals:
This case arises out of an automobile accident that occurred on November 14, 1992, in Broward County, Florida, in which Rita Strochak sustained serious injuries when she was struck by a phantom vehicle. At the time of the accident, Strochak was the named insured under a "Masterpiece" personal excess liability policy with FIC. Strochak filed suit against FIC seeking excess uninsured motorists benefits in the amount of $5,000,000 under the excess policy claiming entitlement under Florida Statute § 627.727(2) which requires insurers of excess policies to "make available as part of the application for such policy" excess uninsured motorist coverage in an amount equal to the liability limits of the excess policy....
In 1985, Appellant's husband Donald Strochak applied for a primary liability policy and an excess liability policy in New Jersey.... During this application process in New York, Donald Strochak executed a written rejection of excess uninsured motorists ("UM") coverage. FIC issued the excess policy, number 1051832901-01, effective June 17, 1985. This policy covered the two residences maintained by the Strochaks, a co-op in New Jersey, listed as the primary residence, and a house in Florida. The policy also covered three vehicles, including the 1984 Lincoln which was involved in the accident. No vehicle was registered or principally garaged in Florida at the time the excess policy was issued. The 1984 Lincoln was registered in New York and principally garaged in New Jersey.
. Shortly after Donald Strochak's death, in October of 1987, Rita Strochak purchased the vehicle from [their] business and had it shipped to Florida. In March of 1989, she registered the Lincoln in Florida. At this time, Rita Strochak obtained a primary automobile liability policy from FIC for the Lincoln, listing Delray Beach, Florida as her address. This primary policy was issued and delivered in Florida.
For the 1989 renewal of the excess policy, FIC mailed a Masterpiece policy addressed to Donald Strochak to the New Jersey residence along with a letter explaining the newly created Masterpiece program.... The Masterpiece policy sent to Donald Strochak in 1989, number 1051832-01, replaced all excess policies held by Donald Strochak....
On June 17,1990, the Lincoln, which was now registered and principally garaged in Florida, was added to the Masterpiece policy....
Effective June 17,1992, the Masterpiece was renewed, listing the 1984 Lincoln as garaged in Florida. This policy was in effect at the time of the November 1992 accident.
In granting summary judgment in favor of FIC, the district court assumed, without deciding, that Florida law applied. The court then determined that FIC had complied with Florida law based on Donald Strochak's written rejection of excess UM coverage in 1985 in New Jersey.
Strochak, 109 F.3d at 718-19. The Court of Appeals determined that Florida law applied and certified the above question.
FIC argues that Florida law does not apply because under Florida choice of law rules, a contract for automobile insurance is controlled by the law of the jurisdiction where the contract was executed, and Stroc-hak's policy was executed in New Jersey. FIC relies on Sturiano v. Brooks, 523 So.2d 1126 (Fla.1988), wherein we stated:
When parties come to terms in an agreement, they do so with the implied acknowl edgment that the laws of that jurisdiction will control absent some provision to the contrary. This benefits both parties, not merely an insurance company....
. There can be no doubt that the parties to insurance contracts bargained and paid for the provisions in the agreement, including those provisions that apply the statutory law of that state.
. In the case of an insurance contract, the parties enter into the contract with the acknowledgment that the laws of that jurisdiction control their actions. In essence, that jurisdiction's laws are incorporated by implication into the agreement.
Id. at 1129-30. In Sturiano, this Court concluded that New York law applied because the insurance contract was executed there, but we noted that the insurance company did not know of the insured's move or connection to Florida.
In the instant case, FIC knew of Rita Stroehak's move and connection to Florida: the Lincoln was registered in Florida, principally garaged in Florida, and added to the Masterpiece policy in June 1990; the 1990 Masterpiece policy contained Florida policy terms and Florida signatures and was mailed to Strochak's Florida residence. Further, when compared to the 1985 policy, the 1990 policy was issued in the name of a different insured, contained a different policy number and provided different coverage. We therefore conclude that the 1990 Masterpiece policy that provided excess liability coverage for the 1984 Lincoln was not the same policy that was issued and delivered in New Jersey in 1985. The 1990 policy was issued and delivered in Florida, renewed in June 1992, and was in effect at the time of the accident. Under these circumstances, we must presume that the parties to this contract bargained for, or at least expected, Florida law to apply. See Sturiano, 523 So.2d at 1130.
The Court of Appeals asks whether section 627.727(2) requires insurers of excess policies to offer excess UM coverage to their insureds when a vehicle, covered or subsequently added, first becomes registered or principally garaged in Florida. FIC argues against such a requirement based on the plain language of section 627.727(2), which requires an insurer issuing an excess policy to make excess UM benefits available only as part of the application for such policy and thereafter only at the written request of the insured:
The limits set forth in this subsection, and the provisions of subsection (1) which require uninsured motorist coverage to be provided in every motor vehicle policy delivered or issued for delivery in this state, do not apply to any policy which does not provide primary liability insurance that includes coverage for liabilities arising from the maintenance, operation, or use of a specifically insured motor vehicle. However, an insurer issuing such a policy shall make available as a part of the application for such policy, and at the written request of an insured, limits up to the bodily injury liability limits contained in such a policy.
§ 627.727(2), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1990)(emphasis added). FIC maintains that it had no obligation to offer excess UM coverage to Rita Strochak because no application was generated after 1985. We disagree.
The duty to offer excess UM coverage was created in June 1990, when the excess motor vehicle liability policy was first delivered in Florida and included coverage for the 1984 Lincoln. The fact that this new coverage may have been added via a "worksheet" rath-. er than an "application" is a distinction without a difference. FIC was aware at that point of the location of the risk and had a duty under the statute to offer Rita Strochak UM coverage in an amount equal to the liability limits of the 1990 Masterpiece excess policy. Accordingly, we answer the restated certified question in the affirmative and return this case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
It is so ordered.
KOGAN, C.J., and ANSTEAD, J., concur.
WELLS, J., concurs with an opinion.
GRIMES, Senior Justice, dissents with an opinion, in which OVERTON and HARDING, JJ., concur.
. Rita Strochak was the named insured on the 1990 excess liability policy; Donald Strochak was the named insured on the 1985 policy.
. FIC's representative, Patricia Harris, testified that the Masterpiece policy was a "different policy providing broader coverage."
. It is undisputed that Rita Strochak made no such written request.
.Patricia Harris testified that prior to utilization of the Masterpiece policies, FIC required an application any time a new coverage was requested. Subsequent to the adoption of the Masterpiece policies, coverages were changed through the use of a worksheet.
. See generally Decker v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 392 So.2d 965, 968 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). The UM statute imposes a heavy burden upon insurance companies to offer or obtain rejections of UM coverage:
The purpose of the [UM] statute is not to protect the insurance carrier or the uninsured motorist, but is to extend protection to persons who are insured under a policy covering a motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in Florida and who are impaired or damaged in Florida by motorists who are uninsured or underinsured and cannot thereby make whole the impaired party.
Id. (citing Brown v. Progressive Mut. Ins. Co., 249 So.2d 429 (Fla.1971)).