Case Name: Duff v. McDonough, Appellant
Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1896-07-16
Citations: 2 Pa. Super. 373
Docket Number: Appeal, No. 17
Parties: Duff v. McDonough, Appellant.
Judges: Before Rice, P. J., Wickham, Reeder, Orlady and Smith, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports
Volume: 2
Pages: 373–384

Head Matter:
Duff v. McDonough, Appellant.
Equity — Attachment for costs — Imprisonment for debt — Act of July 12, 1842, P. L. 339.
Where a hill in equity was brought, not on or because of any contract between the parties thereto, but to prevent the defendant from consummating a fraud on the plaintiff through the dishonest use of a deed which the defendant had obtained and asking for the cancellation of the same, the court may commit the defendant as for contempt for the nonpayment of costs. The case is not within the provisions of the act of July 12, 1842, P. L. 339, abolishing imprisonment for debt.
The defendant’s indebtedness for costs partakes of the nature of the transaction which required the suit to be brought and can be collected in the same way that performance of the rest of the decree can be enforced.
Record — Ground of suit.
In ascertaining the grounds of suit and the decree in such a case the court must look at the whole record; this includes the pleadings, the master’s report, opinion of the court, if any be filed, and the decree.
Argued April 6, 1896.
Appeal, No. 17, April T., 1896, by defendant, T. M. McDonough, from judgment of. C. P. No. 1, Allegheny Co., No. 323, Dee. T., 1888, committing defendant for contempt for nonpayment of costs in equity suit by W. H. Duff, plaintiff.
Before Rice, P. J., Wickham, Reeder, Orlady and Smith, JJ.
Affirmed.
Reeder, J., dissents.
This was a bill in equity for the conveyance of real estate and a cancellation of deeds. The case was referred to John D.. Shafer as master, whose report appears on former appeal in this case in Duff v. McDonough, 155 Pa. 10.
Other facts are stated in the opinion of the Superior Court as follows:
The facts necessary to a proper understanding and decision of this case may be briefly stated as follows: William H. Duff,for a number of years prior to January 12, 1878, held a mortgage for $5,000 against a tract of land in the county of Allegheny. Joseph Ross owned the equity of redemption. In the. fall of 1877 Ross employed T. M. McDonough, the appellant, to make sale of the land. McDonough’s efforts to sell were unsuccessful, and Ross being unable to pay the mortgage (which had been given by one of his predecessors in title) induced Duff to accept the land in payment. This arrangement was made on or about January 12, 1878. The parties being ignorant of the legal requisites of conveyancing, supposed that all that was needed to give Duff title was for Ross to hand over to him the deed he had received from his vendors. This was accordingly done and before April, 1878, Duff went into possession of the property and has remained in possession ever since.
On April 29,1878, McDonough obtained from Ross a deed, for the same premises, the consideration mentioned therein being $12,000. On May 23,1882, this deed was recorded. In September, 1888, Duff, who had previously satisfied his mortgage, accidentally and for the first time learned of the existence, of the conveyance to McDonough, and at the same time found, out that it was necessary that he should have a deed from Ross. The latter had removed to Tennessee, and when found by Duff, asserted, although mistakenly, that he had never given McDonough a deed, and conveyed to Duff whatever interest he had left in the premises, by deed dated October 6, 1888. On October 11, 1888, Duff requested McDonough to convey to him the title to the land. McDonough refused to do so, and on the following day conveyed the property to a confederate, one Charles T. Mapes, for a pretended consideration of $4,000. This conveyance was made two days after that on which Duff’s bill was filed, but before its service, and it necessitated an amendment, in order to bring Mapes in as a codefendant.
The learned master in the court below found in substance, as an examination of his report will show, that the conveyance from Ross to McDonough was obtained in bad faith, so far as Duff’s rights were concerned; that the same was without consideration ; and that the essential averments of McDonough’s answer were false, and recommended a decree in favor of the plaintiff, and also that the defendants should pay the costs. Speaking of the transfer to Mapes, the master says, “ In view of all the circumstances, the master has no hesitation in characterizing the whole account given by McDonough and Mapes of the sale to Mapes, as incredible.”
On October 1, 1891, the report was confirmed by the court below, and it was further decreed that McDonough and Mapes should release to Duff their pretended title to the land, deliver up to him for cancellation the deed from Ross to McDonough and pay the costs of suit, including the fees of the examiner and master. The case was taken by appeal to the Supreme Court and the decree of the court below was there affirmed. See report thereof in 155 Pa. 10.
Errors assigned were:
1. The court erred in issuing an attachment against said T. Milner McDonough to compel him to pay the costs of record in this case, no costs being fixed as to amount by said decree.
2. The court erred in directing T. Milner McDonough to pay the costs of record in the above case, said McDonough having complied with the decree in every respect except as to the costs, and he on account of poverty being unable to pay the same.
8. The court erred in holding that the costs of record in this case, being a civil debt of record, were such costs as an attach ment would lie against said T. Milner McDonough, as a compulsory process to compel said T. Milner McDonough to pay said costs, notwithstanding his poverty, or to be committed by the court until he should pay the same.
July 16, 1896
4. The court erred in holding, as a matter of law, that under the pleadings and proof and decree in said case the payment of said costs could be enforced by an attachment by said court for contempt and an arrest and imprisonment of said McDonough, who was unable to pay the same on account of poverty.
5. The issuing of said attachment in order to compel the payment of said costs and to imprison the said McDonough is illegal and void, and the payment of said costs, they being a civil debt of record, cannot be enforced by an attachment but can only be enforced by an execution.
James Fitzsimmons, for appellant.
— An attachment will not lie for costs: Welliver’s App., 4 Penny. 176; Pierce v. Scott, 40 Leg. Int. 320; Ex rel. Scott v. The Jailor, 1 Grant, 238; Hugg’s Est., 1 Clark, 237.
W. S. Dalzell, for appellee.
— -A court of equity can enforce its decrees by attachment even for the payment of costs, provided the defendant be guilty of fraud or be decreed to do some specified things in addition to the payment of costs: Wilson v. Wilson, 142 Pa. 247; Church’s App., 103 Pa. 263; Tome’s App., 50 Pa. 285; Chew’s App., 44 Pa. 247.
An attachment will also issue to enforce payment of the master’s fee which is costs as against the party compelled to pay them: Janes’s App., 87 Pa. 428; Pierce’s App., 103 Pa. 27; Bradley v. Railway, 160 Pa. 72.
The party in whose favor the master makes the report must pay the master’s fee in the first instance, but having so paid it may be recovered from the party upon whom the costs are ultimately placed: Thompson’s App., 11 W. N. 414; Large v. Davis, 12 W. N. 33; Lowenstein v. Biernbaum, 8 W. N. 301.

Opinion:
Opinion by
Wickham, J.,
(after stating the facts as above):
Not until after proceedings for contempt had been instituted against him, did McDonough comply with any part of the de cree — then he executed and delivered the release and turned over the Ross deed. He refused however to pay the costs, alleging poverty, and was therefore ordered to be committed for contempt. From this order he has appealed, alleging for error, first, that no attachment could legally issue, as the amount of the costs were not fixed in the decree; and in four other specifications of error, that the court was powerless to compel the payment of the costs by attachment.
As to the first assignment it is enough to say that the amount of the costs could not well appear in the decree, since they could not be fully taxed until after it was made. The other assignments all rest on the supposed protection, afforded the appellant, by the act of July 12, 1842, P. L. 339, abolishing imprisonment for debt. That act provides that, " No person shall be arrested or imprisoned on any civil process issuing out of any court of this commonwealth in any suit or proceeding instituted for the recovery of any money due upon any judgment or decree founded upon contract, or due upon any contract express or implied, or for the recovery of any damages for the nonperformance of any contract, excepting in proceedings as fo,r contempt to enforce civil remedies," etc.
Manifestly, the present case is not within the meaning of the act. The suit was brought not on or because of any contract between thé parties thereto, but to prevent the appellant from consummating a fraud on the appellee through the dishonest use of the deed, obtained from Ross by the appellant, and which, to quote from one of the learned master's findings, "was not a bona fide conveyance for a valuable consideration." The case must be decided as though the act of 1842 had never been passed, and is governed by the rule enforced in Church's Appeal, 103 Pa. 263.
If, as has been more than once held (Church's Appeal, supra; Wilson v. Wilson, 142 Pa. 247), a trustee, created in the ordinary way, can be compelled by attachment to pay the costs in a suit wherein he has been convicted of unfaithfulness in discharging his duties, for a stronger reason should a trustee ex maleficio guilty of actual fraud persisted in to the end, as was the case here, be liable to a like process. The appellant's indebtedness for the costs partakes of the nature of the transactions which required the suit to be brought and carried through, and it can therefore be collected in the same way that performance of the rest of the decree can be enforced. The suit was necessitated by the appellant's fraud, and at the very threshold of the litigation he made its conduct more expensive and complicated by his fraudulent conveyance to Mapes.
In ascertaining the grounds of the suit and the decree, we must look at the whole record, which includes the pleadings, master's report, opinion of the court, if any be filed (Miller's Estate, 136 Pa. 349), and the decree. Anciently the decree recited the pleadings and facts at length, so much so, indeed, that the practice, by reason of its expense, became an abuse. Rule 14, section 78 of our equity rules, following the rule of the federal courts in this respect, forbids the practice and indicates a short form of decree, but, as Stort, J., said in Dexter v. Arnold, 5 Mason, 311, "For the purpose of examining all errors of law, the bill, answers and other proceedings are, in our practice, as much a part of the record before the court as the decree itself."
The motion made by the appellee that this cause should be certified to the Supreme Court is overruled, as the record clearly shows that the amount involved is less than $1,000.
In view of the decision herein given on the merits of the case, we need not further consider the appellee's application for the setting aside of the order, discharging the appellant on habeas corpus, made after he had given bail on his appeal. The application is therefore dismissed.
The specifications of error are overruled and the decree of the court below is affirmed.