Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. Ronald RITCHIE
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1991-01-22
Citations: 590 So. 2d 1139
Docket Number: No. 90-K-0478
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Ronald RITCHIE.
Judges: DENNIS and WATSON, JJ., dissent with reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 590
Pages: 1139–1154

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. Ronald RITCHIE.
No. 90-K-0478.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Jan. 22, 1991.
Dissenting Opinion by Justice Watson Feb. 28, 1991.
On Rehearing Dec. 12, 1991.
Richard C. Goorley, Shreveport, for Ronald L. Ritchie defendant-applicant.
William Guste, Atty. Gen., Henry N. Brown, Dist. Atty., James M. Bullers, Asst. Dist. Atty., for State of La. plaintiff-respondent.
John S. Baker, Jr., for John S. Baker, Jr. amicus curiae.

Opinion:
PHILIP C. CIACCIO, Judge Pro Temp.
Relator Ronald Ritchie was found guilty as charged of three counts of negligent homicide, violations of LSA-R.S. 34:851.6. He was sentenced to serve the maximum term of one year in jail and to pay a fine of $1,000 on each of the three counts with the sentences to run consecutively. His convictions and sentences were affirmed by the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal. State v. Ritchie, 556 So.2d 651 (La.App. 2nd Cir.1990). This Court granted the relator's application for certiorari for consideration of Assignment of Error Number Three: Whether the trial court erred in instructing the jurors that "ordinary negligence" was the standard of proof under LSA-R.S. 34:851.6. State v. Ritchie, 563 So.2d 888 (La.1990).
On May 17, 1989, Ronald Ritchie was operating his boat in an area known as Bossier Slough in Lake Bistineau. The Bossier Slough intersects with a body of water known as Miller's Cut. The relator was travelling approximately 45 m.p.h. as he entered the intersection of the two bodies of water. Relator, who was alone in his boat, had just passed on his port side a pleasure boat in which four people were riding. Testimony at trial indicated that the defendant was travelling "excessively fast" and, rather than watching in front of his boat, he continued to stare back at the pleasure boat for "an inordinate period of time."
A boat carrying three passengers was being driven by Albert Dupree on the right, tree-lined bank of Bossier Slough. The relator's boat headed into the path of Du-pree's boat and struck Dupree's boat on the port side, causing it to run into a grove of trees. The three passengers in Dupree's boat were killed.
Testimony at trial revealed that the relator's blood alcohol concentration was approximately .06 to .08 percent at the time of the accident. Urinanalysis also indicated that the relator had a substance in his system indicating significant use of marijuana over a long period of time and possibly recent use. A quantity of marijuana was seized from the relator's boat following the accident.
Certiorari was granted in this case to consider whether the trial court correctly instructed the jury that negligence under LSA-R.S. 34:851.6 is defined as "the omission on the part of a person to do some act which an ordinary, careful and prudent man would do under like circumstances or the doing of some act which an ordinary, careful and prudent man under like circumstances wouldn't do by reason of which another person is endangered in life or bodily safely." (Tr. 401). The relator argues that the level of negligence necessary to convict under LSA-R.S. 34:851.6 is "criminal negligence" as defined by LSA-R.S. 14:12 .
The relator contends that the term "negligent", used in R.S. 34:851.6, must be interpreted in conjunction with Title 14 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes. LSA-R.S. 14:7 describes a crime as "that conduct which is defined in this Code, or in other Acts of the Legislature, or in the Constitution of this State." LSA-R.S. 14:8 defines criminal conduct as "criminal negligence that produces criminal consequences." Criminal negligence is defined in LSA-R.S. 14:12 as set forth in footnote 2, below. The defendant argues that "criminal negligence" is a necessary element of criminal conduct and, therefore, the proper standard to be applied in this case. The relator alternatively argues that "gross negligence" as provided in 46 U.S.C.A. § 2302 is the correct standard of proof.
Finding that the trial court correctly instructed the jury as to the level of negligence required by R.S. 34:851.6, we affirm the defendant's convictions and sentences.
Although this is the first occasion for this Court to define the term "negligent" as it is used in a statute which provides for criminal penalties, several courts from other states have interpreted similar language. In State v. Stevens, 150 Vt. 251, 552 A.2d 410 (Vt.1988), the Supreme Court of Vermont construed the following statute: "No person shall operate a motor vehicle on a public highway in a careless or negligent manner . or in any manner to endanger or jeopardize the safety, life or property of a person." 23 V.S.A. § 1091(a). The court held "the requisite level of culpability under the section is 'ordinary negligence such as would impose civil liability and . to support a conviction . there is no necessity for the State to produce evidence tending to show criminal negligence . '. State v. LaBonte, 120 Vt. 465, 468-69, 144 A.2d 792, 794-95 (1958)." Stevens, 552 A.2d at 411. The court in LaBonte, disapproved some courts' interpretation of the term "negligence" as implying criminal negligence. The court held "it is now well settled that it is within the power of the legislature to declare an act criminal irrespective of the intent of knowledge of the doer of the act [citations omitted]. Furthermore, the power of a legislature to define a crime based upon ordinary negligence has been recognized in numerous jurisdictions." [citations omitted]. La-Bonte, 144 A.2d at 794.
The negligent homicide statute in Michigan contained language very similar to the negligent homicide statute at issue in the present case. The negligent homicide statute in Michigan provided;
Any person who, by the operation of any vehicle upon any highway or upon any other property, public or private, at an immoderate rate of speed or in a careless, reckless or negligent manner, but not willfully or wantonly, shall cause the death of another, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not more than two years or by a fine of not more than $2,000, or by both such fine and imprisonment. M.C.L. § 750.324; M.S.A. § 28.-556.
The court in People v. Abramczyk, 163 Mich.App. 473, 415 N.W.2d 249 (Mich.App.1987) interpreted this statute to require only proof of ordinary negligence. "Because the offense is a statutory crime, the legislature has the power to define it without regard to the presence or absence of criminal intent or culpability in its commission." Abramczyk, 415 N.W.2d at 251. The court referred to an earlier Michigan Supreme Court opinion which noted "the number of deaths resulting from automobile accidents" and concluded that the legislature was "prompted to pass a law to curb reckless, careless, and negligent driving which caused death, in cases where the negligence was less than gross." People v. McMurchy, 249 Mich. 147, 228 N.W. 723 (Mich.1930). The court in McMurchy held:
The law is well settled that the legislature, in the exercise of its police power in order to preserve the health, morals, and safety, may constitute something to be a crime that theretofore was not criminal. It may impose a criminal responsibility to a tort that theretofore carried with it only civil liability. 249 Mich, at 162, 228 N.W. at 723.
In People v. Pociask, 14 Cal.2d 679, 96 P.2d 788 (1939), the defendant was found guilty of negligent homicide. The negligent homicide statute in California provided that any person operating a vehicle in a negligent manner or in the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to a felony which resulted in the death of another person would be found guilty of negligent homicide. The trial court instructed the jury that a finding of guilty as charged may be returned if the jury found that the defendant was guilty of "negligence resulting from a failure to exercise ordinary care under all the facts and circumstances." The defendant in that case argued, as the relator in the present case does, that the term "negligent" must be read in conjunction with the penal code to mean "criminal negligence." The court in Pociask, responded:
But, in answering the question of what constitutes criminal negligence, the court is bound to apply an appropriate definition enacted by the legislature. Only when the legislature has not properly defined a term is it necessary for the courts to look to the meaning thereof as understood in the common law . It is within the function of the legislature to make laws defining what breaches of the public peace shall be made punishable. Accordingly it may specify various degrees of the same crime and require a different measure of punishment for each. It is apparent that by the enactment of Section 500 of the Vehicle Code [the negligent homicide statute] the legislature has specified a lesser degree of punishment when the homicide is committed in the doing of an unlawful act not amounting to a felony while operating any vehicle, or while driving in a negligent manner, than is meted out in the cases of homicides otherwise committed in the doing of an unlawful act not amounting to felony or without due caution and circumspection . When the legislature has so spoken and the court has stated the law to the jury in the language of the applicable statutes, it is not required to do more. Pociask, at 791-792.
The Court concluded that the trial court did not err by refusing the requested instruction which contained a definition of "criminal negligence."
In Commonwealth v. Berggren, 398 Mass. 338, 496 N.E.2d 660 (Mass.1986), the defendant was convicted of motor vehicle homicide by negligent operation of a motor vehicle so as to endanger public safety. The court found that a finding of ordinary negligence sufficed to establish the violation of the statute. The court stated "a showing of ordinary negligence has generally been held or recognized as sufficient to convict an accused under a 'vehicular negligent homicide statute' where [as in Massachusetts] the term 'negligence' appears without qualification or modification." Berggren, 496 N.E.2d at 661.
In State v. Smith, 90 N.C.App. 161, 368 S.E.2d 33 (N.C.App.1988), the Court of Appeals of North Carolina interpreted the "misdemeanor death by vehicle" statute. That statute provides:
A person commits the offense misdemeanor death by vehicle if he unintentionally causes the death of another person while engagéd in the violation of any State law or local ordinance applying to the operation or use of a vehicle or to the regulation of traffic, other than impaired driving under G.S. 20-138.1, and commission of that violation is the proximate cause of the death. General Statute 20-141.4(a2)
The court narrowed the issue before it to whether a conviction under this statute may be based upon a finding of ordinary negligence. The court stated, "Several other jurisdictions permit convictions under vehicular homicide statutes based upon a showing of ordinary negligence . other states courts that have considered the question have ruled that it is constitutionally permissible to base a vehicular homicide conviction on ordinary negligence." [citations omitted] Smith, 368 S.E.2d at 37. The court held that "ordinary negligence" was the proper standard.
Likewise, in Egle v. People, 159 Colo. 217, 411 P.2d 325 (Colo.1966), the Supreme Court of Colorado upheld the conviction of a person charged with causing the death of another person by driving in a careless manner while operating an automobile while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The statute under which the defendant was charged read, in pertinent part, "[a]ny person while under the influence of intoxicating liquor . who causes the death of another by operating or driving any automobile . in a reckless, negligent or careless manner, or with a wanton or reckless disregard of human life or safety, shall be deemed guilty of a felony . ". C.R.S. '53, 40-2-10. The defendant argued in that case that the trial court erred in instructing the jury as follows:
Criminal negligence is the failure to exercise for the protection of others, the care and caution that would be exercised by an ordinarily prudent person under the same circumstances. The failure to do what an ordinarily careful and prudent person would have done under all of the circumstances of the case, or the doing of something that an ordinarily prudent person would not have done under all the circumstances of the case is criminal negligence. Egle, 411 P.2d at 327.
The court concluded that a showing of simple negligence was sufficient to support the conviction and that a trial judge's jury charge was, therefore, a correct statement of the law.
The State of Utah adopted a automobile homicide statute "almost bodily and verbatim from the Colorado statute." In State v. Johnson, 12 Utah 2d 220, 364 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1961), the court interpreted the phrase "reckless, negligent or careless" to require proof only of ordinary negligence. The court concluded:
It seems evident that our legislature has concluded that the time has now come when we must recognize that any kind of vehicular negligence, mingled with gas and booze, produces a lethal mixture that, if it caused death, should penalize to a greater degree than before, the mobile, tipsy vehicle-operating brew-master, in order to bring to a screeching halt the mounting holocaust daily dedicated to traffic fatalities. Johnson, 364 P.2d at 1020.
In United States v. McHugh, 103 F.Supp. 740 (W.D.Pa.1952), the court interpreted the Motorboat Act of 1940 to require only a showing of mere negligent operation rather than criminal negligence. The Act provided "[a]ny person who shall operate any motorboat or any vessel in a reckless or negligent manner so as to endanger the life, limb, or property of any person shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor .". 46 U.S.C.A. § 526m. The court held that the act specifically provided for criminal penalties for any person who operated a motorboat in a reckless or negligent manner so as to endanger the life limb or property of any person. The court found that the plain language of the act would allow a conviction based on mere negligent operation.
In State v. Russo, 38 Conn.Supp. 426, 450 A.2d 857 (Conn.Supp.1982), the defendant was convicted, after a jury trial, of negligent homicide with a motor vehicle. That statute provided, "A person is guilty of negligent homicide with a motor vehicle when in consequence of the negligent operation of a motor vehicle he causes the death of another person." G.S. 53a-58a. The court held that this crime has three elements, "(1) the death of a person; (2) by the instrumentality of a motor vehicle; (3) which is operated in a negligent manner." Russo, 450 A.2d at 863. The court defined negligence as "the failure to use that degree of care for the protection of another that the ordinarily reasonably careful and prudent man would use under like circumstances." Russo, 450 A.2d at 862. The court rejected the defendant's challenges to the constitutionality of the statute on the grounds that the statute created an unreasonable and arbitrary classification and was void for vagueness.
The defendant in State v. Woodington, 31 Wis.2d 151, 142 N.W.2d 810 (Wis.1966), was convicted of filing a false or misleading statement with the Wisconsin Department of Securities. The statute under which the defendant was convicted provided for criminal penalties for "any person who directly or indirectly: . (d) File or cause to be filed with the department any statement or representation of a material fact, which statement or representation he knows or in the exercise of reasonable care should know to be false or misleading." Sec. 189.19(2)(d). The court interpreted this language to require only a finding of ordinary negligence to convict under this statute. The court stated:
Because of the legislative concern for the welfare of the public, the burden imposed-to exercise ordinary care — is neither ambiguous, uncertain, nor unfair. Where the substantial protection of the public welfare is concerned the legislature can, in the proper exercise of the police power, constitutionally prohibit, by criminal statute, negligent conduct which would be detrimental to this public interest. Woodington, 142 N.W.2d at 826
Likewise, in State v. Miles, 203 Kan. 707, 457 P.2d 166 (Kan.1969), the defendant was convicted of negligent homicide. Negligent homicide was defined in Kansas as "when the death of any person ensues within one year as a proximate result of injury received by the driving of any vehicle in negligent disregard of the safety of others, the person so operating such vehicle shall be guilty of negligent homicide." K.S.A. 8-529. The court concluded that the legislature intended to provide criminal penalties when ordinary negligence on the part of a driver in the operation of his vehicle proximately results in death to another person. The court quoted extensively from a earlier opinion in State v. Ashton, 175 Kan. 164, 262 P.2d 123 (Kan.1953):
[it] prohibits the negligent driving of a vehicle (a) when the negligence is such as to be in the disregard of the safety of others and (b) where such conduct is the proximate cause of death which ensues within one year. It is clear the legislature did not attempt to specify in detail the innumerable and variable circumstances, conditions, acts and omissions from which death might result from vehicular traffic. It undertook to enact a statute sufficiently broad to encompass negligent acts and omissions of all kinds and character from which death ensued when committed in disregard of the safety of others. It is a police measure designed to protect the public from the constantly mounting death toll resulting from vehicular traffic. In order to prevent or decrease these direful results the law, of necessity, had to be broad and general in its reach . Manifestly, no legislature could accurately anticipate every possible circumstance or contingency which might arise and legislate specifically concerning it. That would be true concerning speed and all other factors which might become involved in highly dissimilar circumstances.
Ashton, 175 Kan. at 170-172, 262 P.2d at 128-129. See also State v. Randol, 226 Kan. 347, 597 P.2d 672 (Kan.1979).
Several other state courts have interpreted language in a penal statute to require only ordinary negligence. In State v. Arena, 46 Haw. 315, 379 P.2d 594 (Hawaii 1963), the Supreme Court of Hawaii interpreted the negligent homicide statute as requiring a showing of only ordinary negligence on the part of the offending operator. In Owens v. Commonwealth, 487 S.W.2d 897, 900 (Ky.1972), the court delineated the essential elements of negligent homicide, stating that negligent operation of a motor vehicle was defined as "failure to use ordinary care." In Sanderson v. United States, 125 A.2d 70 (D.C.Mun.App.1956), the court stated that prosecutions under the negligent homicide statute require three elements: "(1) the death of a human being, (2) by instrumentality of a motor vehicle, (3) operated at an immoderate speed or in a careless, reckless or negligent manner, but not willfully or wantonly." Sanderson, 125 A.2d at 73.
Our research of this question revealed only one case where a court held that such a statute was unconstitutional because it imposed criminal liability for negligent conduct. In Commonwealth v. Heck, 341 Pa.Super. 183, 491 A.2d 212 (Pa.Super.1985), the court interpreted 75 Pa.C.S. 3732 which defines the offense of vehicular homicide:
Any person who unintentionally causes the death of another person while engaged in the violation of any law of this Commonwealth or municipal ordinance applying to the operation or use of a vehicle or to the regulation of traffic is guilty of homicide by vehicle, a misdemeanor of the first degree, when the violation is the cause of death.
The court held:
We are led to the inevitable conclusion that a conviction for violating the vehicular homicide law carries with it the stamp of criminality and the kind of opprobrium that under the common law was reserved for true crimes of moral turpitude . In a fundamental sense the harshness of criminal punishment is fitting only for these types of consciously inflicted wrongs, and so traditionally the criminal law has concerned itself exclusively with conscious wrongdoing . [citations omitted] Of course, when someone is killed through inadvertence or negligence, monetary recovery can never make up for the loss. But even though there may be an unreasoning desire for retribution on the part of the victim's heirs, it can serve no rational purpose of the criminal law to subject the merely negligent actor to the additional punitive sanctions of the criminal law. [citations omitted] Heck, 491 A.2d at 223-224.
The court concluded that this statute requires a showing of criminal negligence rather than ordinary negligence.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the Superior Court's decision in Heck. Commonwealth v. Heck, 517 Pa. 192, 535 A.2d 575 (Pa.1987). The court held that ordinary negligence was insufficient to sustain a conviction of homicide by vehicle. The court stated, "The Legislature clearly did not intend the phrase 'negligently' to encompass the tort liability concept of negligence." Heck, 535 A.2d at 580. The court defined the term negligently as "a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation." Heck, 535 A.2d at 580. According to the court, a conviction may be sustained only if the Commonwealth's evidence established that the actor was reckless or criminally negligent.
The relator in the instant case argues that criminal negligence is an essential element of criminal conduct and, therefore, is the correct standard to apply in the present case. However, this contention requires this Court to interpret the word "negligence" to mean "criminal negligence," a meaning clearly inconsistent with the unambiguous terms of the statute. LSA-R.S. 14:3 requires that all provisions of the criminal code "shall be given a genuine construction, according to the fair import of their words, taken in their usual sense, in connection with the contents, and with reference to the purpose of the provisions."
We agree with the well-reasoned opinion of the Second Circuit, where the court stated
In defining the crime charged here in broader terms and in using the term "negligence" rather than "criminal negligence", the legislature obviously intended a different standard for negligent homicide in the statutes dealing with boating than for negligent homicide as included in the criminal code, LSA-R.S. 14:32, which defines negligent homicide as the killing of a human being by criminal negligence. The maximum penalty under the boating statute is substantially less than under the criminal code, one year without hard labor and/or a fine of $1,000 as compared to five years with or with (sic) hard labor and/or a fine of $5,000. The lesser penalty is strongly indicative of a legislative intent to proscribe less egregious conduct under the boating statute. State v. Ritchie, at 657.
The relator further argues that 46 U.S.C.A. § 2302, the federal statute setting forth penalties for negligent operation, should guide this Court in determining the proper standard of negligence. However, that statute does not punish conduct which results in the death of another person. Such a crime is set forth in 18 U.S.C.A. § 1115. That statute provides a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not longer than ten years, or both for "every captain, engineer, pilot, or other person employed on any steamboat or vessel, by whose misconduct, negligence, or inattention to his duties on such vessel the life of any person is destroyed . ". Cases interpreting this statute have generally not required a showing of criminal negligence in order to convict a defendant. See U.S. v. Keller, 19 F. 633 (C.C.W.Va.1884).
The Louisiana Legislature enacted R.S. 34:851.6 which clearly provides that the negligent operation of a watercraft which results in the death of a person is sufficient to constitute negligent homicide. In using the term "negligence" rather than "criminal negligence," as is used in R.S. 14:32, the legislature obviously intended a different standard for negligent homicide under Title 34. A review of similar legislation enacted in other states, as discussed above, indicates that the term "negligence" is often interpreted as "ordinary negligence" even if criminal penalties are involved. Furthermore, the lesser penalty for a conviction of R.S. 34:851.6 (a maximum of one year imprisonment) compared with a maximum of five years imprisonment for a violation of R.S. 14:32 is further evidence of the legislature's intent to proscribe ordinary negligence by an operator of a watercraft which results in the death of another person. Cf. State v. Grover, 437 N.W.2d 60 (Minn.1989).
Accordingly, we conclude that the term "negligence," as used in R.S. 34:851.6, should be interpreted as ordinary negligence, as that term is commonly understood. The trial judge's instruction to the jury, therefore, was a correct statement of the applicable law.
THE CONVICTION AND SENTENCE ARE AFFIRMED.
DENNIS and WATSON, JJ., dissent with reasons.
LEMMON, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
Judge Philip C. Ciaccio of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, participated in this decision as Associate Justice pro tempore, sitting for Associate Justice Pike Hall, Jr., recused.
. LSA-R.S. 34:851.6 provides:
Section 851.6 Negligent Homicide
Any person who by the operation of any water craft at an immoderate rate of speed or in a careless, reckless, or negligent manner shall cause the death of another, shall be guilty of the crime of negligent homicide, punishable by imprisonment of not more than one year, or by a fine of more than $1,000, or both.
. LSA-R.S. 14:12 provides:
Section 12 — Criminal Negligence
Criminal negligence exists when, although neither specific or general criminal intent is present, there is such disregard of the interest of others that the offender's conduct amounts to a gross deviation below the standard of care expected to be maintained by a reasonably careful man under like circumstances.
.46 U.S.C.A. § 2302 provides, in pertinent part: § 2302. Penalties for negligent operations
(a) A person operating a vessel in a negligent manner that endangers the life, limb, or property of a person is liable to the United States Government for a civil penalty of not more than $1,000.
(b) A person operating a vessel in a grossly negligent manner that endangers the life, limb, or property of a person shall be fined not more than $5,000, imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.