Case Name: Lee NEWMAN v. ZURICH GENERAL ACCIDENT & LIABILITY INSURANCE CO.
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1956-03-20
Citations: 87 So. 2d 230
Docket Number: No. 4148
Parties: Lee NEWMAN v. ZURICH GENERAL ACCIDENT & LIABILITY INSURANCE CO.
Judges: 
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 87
Pages: 230–241

Head Matter:
Lee NEWMAN v. ZURICH GENERAL ACCIDENT & LIABILITY INSURANCE CO.
No. 4148.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana. First Circuit.
March 20, 1956.
On Application for Rehearing April 27, 1956.
King, Anderson & Swift, Thos. C. Hall, Lake Charles, for appellant.
Carmouche & Martin, Ernest G. La-Fleur, Jr., Lake Charles, for appellee.

Opinion:
ELLIS, Judge.
Plaintiff filed this suit in which he is seeking workmen's compensation benefits at the rate of $30 per week beginning January 2, 1954, not to exceed 400 weeks; less compensation previously paid, together with the usual interest and' reasonable medical expenses as a result of an alleged accidental injury on January 2, 1954 while employed by Anderson Brothers Corporation as a laborer. The" suit was filed against the employer's insurer.
The accident, the compensable nature of the injuries, the disability, the rate of-pay and compensation if any, the amount of compensation previously paid, viz., from January 2, 1954 through September 5, 1954, and that no payments, have been made since the latter date, were all stipulated and admitted. The only contested issues were (1) duration of disability and (2) whether or not plaintiff should be denied compensation for alleged failure to cooperate.
The case was duly tried and with written reasons which contained a detailed discussion of the testimony, the learned judge of the District Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff for an additional five months period "commencing January 2, 1954, and ending January 7, 1956, or 105 weeks, at $30.00 per week; with interest at the rate of 5% per annum on each overdue payment from its due date until paid subject to a credit for the period, January 2, 1954, to September 5, 1954, inclusive.
"It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that there be judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendant in the full and true sum of $641.00 with interest at the rate of 5% per annum from judicial demand until paid.
"The fees of the experts Drs. Edmond C. Campbell, George P. Schneider, and George B. Briel, are fixed at $35.00 each and taxed as costs.
"All costs to be paid by defendant."
A motion for rehearing- was filed based upon the interpretation by plaintiff's counsel of the case of Whiddon v. Concrete Pipe Products Company, 78 So.2d 439, 440, decided by this court. Counsel argues that this case "stands for the proposition that when it is established that an employee is disabled on the date of trial and moreover that it cannot be definitely stated when he will be able to return to work it is more in keeping with the Legislative intent of the compensation act to place the burden of reopening the case for amendment of judgment, in the event of full recovery, squarely upon the insurer or employer's shoulders. The whole purpose of the compensation act, we submit, is to remove the losses and expenses incident to industrial accidents from the shoulders of the hapless employee and to place that burden on the - employer who is in a better position to spread the costs of disabling accidents over the general public as one of his expenses of production."
On rehearing the District Judge granted the motion with the following written reasons : , ,
"This matter is before the Court on an application by plaintiff for a re-hearing from a judgment of this Court granting him compensation for 105 weeks under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act of this state. Plaintiff complains that the judgment is erroneous in that it did not award him compensation for temporary total disability for the duration of his disability not to exceed 300 weeks. Plaintiff cites the case of Whiddon v. Concrete Pipe Products Company, 78 So.2d 439 (decided by Court of Appeal, 1st Circuit, January 28, 1955) as sustaining his position. On the other hand defendant takes the position that the court is' correct in its judgment citing Delahoussaye v. D. M. Glazer & Co. [La.App.], 185 So. 644 and Perry v. Louisiana Central Lumber Co. et al., 16 So.2d 136 decided by the Court of Appeal, first and second circuits respectively.
"The Court, in its original decree, made the award of 105 weeks under LSA-R.S. 23:1222 which provides that in cases of injury producing temporary total or tempo* rary partial disability the Court may in its discretion award compensation for a fixed number of weeks based on the probable duration of said disability.
"The Court has read the Whiddon case supra and cannot distinguish it from the case at bar. The Delahoussaye case supra was brushed aside by the Court in the Whiddon case and the Perry case supra was decided by the Second Circuit Court of Appeal.
"We feel that the Whiddon decision has the effect of rendering inoperative the provisions of LSA-R.S. 23:1222. However, since it is the last expression of the First Circuit Court of Appeal we feel bound by it,
"Accordingly, the application for rehearing is hereby granted herein and the original judgment of court in the above numbered and entitled case is amended to read as follows:
"For the written reasons assigned judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendant, in the sum of $30.00 per week, beginning January 2, 1954, during disability, not to exceed 300 weeks, with interest at the rate of 5% per annum on each overdue payment from its due date until paid, subject to a credit for the period, January 2, 1954 to September 5, 1954, inclusive.
"In all other respects the original decree in this case to remain in full force and effect."
From the above judgment the defendant has appealed and the plaintiff has answered asking that he be awarded compensation not to exceed 400 weeks instead of -not to. exceed 300 weeks.-
The only question on the appeal is the duration of plaintiff's , disability which counsel for defendant in argument and brief s'tates "is a medical one, involving the interpretation and • application of the case of Whiddon v. Concrete Pipe Products Company, Inc. [La.App.], 78 So.2d 439, decided by this Honorable Court on January 28, 1955".
In the Whiddon case, supra, the lower court had awarded judgment under LSA-R.S. 23:1222 "for a fixed number of weeks to be based upon the probable duration of such disability." (Emphasis added.) We found as a fact from the testimony that the disability was of indefinite duration, meaning that the testimony did not establish the probable duration of disability required by LSA-R.S. 23:1222.
The lower court also stated that we had brushed aside the case of Delahoussaye v. D. M. Glazer & Co., La.App., 185 So. 644, 645, decided by this court. There was no such intention but only a comparison of the definite nature of the medical testimony adduced as to the probable duration of plaintiff's disability in the Delahoussaye case as compared to the indefinite duration shown by the testimony in the Whiddon case.
This court could not render inoperative LSA-R.S. 23:1222 as such action would only be in the power of the Legislature. Further, this court has consistently recognized the provisions of LSA-R.S. 23.:1222 and specifically approved and interpreted this act in the Delahoussaye. case, supra, in the following language. .
"The preponderance of the testimony however is 'that' with proper treatment the stiffness in the fingers should disappear and the disability should not continue longer than six months thereafter. One of plaintiff's own witnesses, Dr. H. B. White, testified to that effect. Dr. Walter Moss, who has had an unusual number of such cases under observation during his several years' experience at the Charity Hospital in New Orleans, is of the opinion that under proper direction by a physician as how to manipulate his hand he 'should recover its full use in from one to three months time. . •
"Under the facts found we think that the district judge was correct in ordering treatment and limiting compensation for an additional six months. In the present case, on the facts presented, we think that the provisions of Subsection 8 of Section 8 of the Act, p. 362, which gives the court a certain amount of discretion in fixing the period of compensation are applicable. The Subsection reads as follows: 'For injury producing temporary total or temporary partial disability the Court, may in its discretion, award compensation for a fixed number of weeks to be based upon the probable duration of such disability.'
"We take that provision to mean that where the court can reasonably satisfy itself of the probable period of time during which the disability will continue, whether total or partial, it can exercise its discretion as ,did the lower court in this case, in awarding compensation for a specified number of weeks." (Emphasis added.)
Furthermore, this court, in the same session in which the Whiddon case was argued as well as decided, heard argument on and decided the case of Ebarb v. Southern Industries Company, 78 So.2d 553, 554, in which the third question therein involved. LSA-R.S. 23:1222. A - perusal of this case will show that we gave full recognition to the Statute in question. We held that from the facts ip the.case we could not definitely fix the probable duration of plaintiff's disability although the testimony was strongly in favor of the finding of the district court. It will be noted that the word "possible" was inadvertently used by the organ of.the court, who is the same in this case, rather .than the word "probable." It is self-evident that where two cases, were heard in the same session and decided at the same time by the same court on the -same question that we did not intend by one to render inoperative a 'certain law and by the other give it full recognition and validity.'.
It might he well at this point to reach a definite . understanding as to the meaning of' the word "probable" as it refers to the duration of plaintiff's disability which will he. dependent upon the medical testimony in this case.
We find in Black's Law Dictionary that the word "probable" has been interpreted to mean the following:
"Having the appearance of truth; having the character of probability; appearing to be founded in reason or experience. State v. Thiele, 119 Iowa 659, 94 N.W. 256. Having more evidence for than against; supported by evidence which inclines the mind to believe, but leaves some room for doubt; likely. Barrett v. Green River & Rock Springs Live Stock Co., 28 Wyo. 379, 205 P. 742, 743. Apparently true, yet possibly false. Spadra Creek Coal Co. v. Harger, 130 Ark. 374, 197 S.W. 705."
We thus see that the word "probable" does not mean that,all doubt is eliminated. An opinion upon any future happening or event is, of course, subject to doubt but may be probable if founded in reason or experience or supported by evidence or apparently true.
Our learned brother below in his written reasons for his original judgment gave a far and sufficient summation of the medical testimony and we quote:
"The evidence discloses that plaintiff suffered a back sprain while working for Anderson Brothers Corporation on January 2nd, 1954. The insurance company adjuster sent plaintiff to Dr. W. C. Fisher, general practitioner at Lake Charles, Louisiana. Dr.' Fisher in turn sent plaintiff to Dr. George B. Briel, orthopedic physician and surgeon. Dr. Briel had plaintiff's back x-rayed and the findings were negative. Dr. Briel concluded that plaintiff was suffering from a back strain or torn ligament. He prescribed certain exercises to. be taken by plaintiff but plaintiff did not return to Dr. Briel, but went to Dr. George P. Schneider where he has been going -for treatment ever since.
"Dr. George P. Schneider, orthopedic specialist, had plaintiff under treatment for a long period of time arid stated that plaintiff was progressing well.
"In answer to a.question propounded by attorney for defendant on cross examination as to the extent of duration of disability of Newman, Dr. Schneider answered:
"'A. In view of Mr. Newman's status at this time I would prognosticate that in three to five months he should recover with no residual disability.'
' "Dr. George B. Briel has examined plaintiff on several occasions since the first examination, specifically during May and July, 1955. He estimated that plaintiff should be well in from two to three months. He found no pathology in plaintiff's back, bones or joints.
"Dr. Edmond C. Campbell, orthopedic physician, examined plaintiff on four .occasions on behalf of defendant. He felt that plaintiff suffered from a back strain but had recovered and was able to go to work on his last examination.
"Taking all of the expert testimony together it is evident that plaintiff has suffered a sprained back with no bone injury. Even plaintiff's doctor, Dr, Schneider, is of the opinion that plaintiff is recovering satisfactorily and that he should be well in from three to five months.
"Plaintiff was injured on January 2nd, 1954, and received compensation until September 5, 1954, inclusive.
"The Court is of the opinion that an award of compensation to plaintiff for an additional five month period would be fair and equitable."
In addition to the medical testimony, plaintiff testified that although his condition had improved that he felt he was unable to return to his former duties.
Counsel for plaintiff admitted the correctness of the findings of the. lower court as to the conclusions of the doctors who testified in the case with regard to the probable duration of plaintiff's disability but contend that it is "the same type of speculative estimate of future disability" as was found to exist in the- Whiddon case. They argue that Dr. Briel stated that when he first saw the plaintiff he estimated he would be well in two months from the accident. Dr. Briel, when questioned as to what the length of plaintiff's disability would be from the time of his initial examination and assuming that plaintiff had followed his prescribed exercises, stated:
"Well, I usually give them about two months. If they have very much tightness of the back I usually give -them .about two months following the time I put them on the exercises in order to recover enough strength in their back to be able to return to their work."
Dr. Briel further stated that he did not know how much of the exercises the plaintiff took as the latter had told him that they hurt his back and shortly after placing him on such exercises the plaintiff developed an attack of influenza which laid him up. On his examination of May 9, 1955 he stated in his report: "I believe that if he would conscientiously help that within a period of three months he should be able to cure his disability." On July 29, 1955 Dr. Briel reexamined the plaintiff and from that examination testified as follows on the trial of the case: " I feel that if he continues with this (meaning exercise and receiving heat treatments) within a period of two or three months he ought to be well able to do-any type of work."
We interpret Dr. Briel's testimony to mean that' had the plaintiff followed the prescribed exercises when he first examined him it was his opinion that he would have been well within two months, but it is clear from the testimony that plaintiff did not follow the exercises as he stated they caused him pain and he had developed a case of influenza. Bearing in mind the meaning of the word "probable," all of Dr. Briel's testimony, as well as the testimony of the other doctors in this case, goes into detail insofar as giving their reasons for the conclusion upon which the. Trial Judge- based his award of five months-additional compensation. We do not interpret their testimony as being any more-speculative than any event which logic and reason tells us will occur but which is, of course, not certain to occur.
It is therefore, ordered that the judgment of the District Court be set aside and annulled and that the original judgment rendered herein be reinstated, to-wit: that judgment is hereby rendered in favor of Lee Newman and against Zurich General Accident & Liability Insurance Co. commencing January 2, 1954, and ending January 7,-1956 of 105 weeks, at $30 per week; with interest at the rate of 5% per annum on each overdue payment from its due date until paid subject to a credit for the period, January 2, 1954, to September 5, 1954, inclusive. •
It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that there be judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendant" in the full and true sum of $641 with interest "at the rate of 5% per annum from judicial "demand until paid.
The fees of the experts, Drs.. Edmond C. Campbell, George P. Schneider, and George B. Briel are fixed at $35 each and taxed as costs, all costs to be" paid by defendant.
It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that at the end of the five-month period the plaintiff's right to reopen this proceeding be reserved, even' though the six-month period of LSA-R.S. -23:1331 has not expired.