Case Name: Mike SMILOFF, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee
Court: Alaska Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Alaska
Decision Date: 1968-04-19
Citations: 439 P.2d 772
Docket Number: No. 859
Parties: Mike SMILOFF, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee
Judges: Before NESBETT, C. J., DIMOND and RABINOWITZ, JJ.
Reporter: Pacific Reporter 2d
Volume: 439
Pages: 772–783

Head Matter:
Mike SMILOFF, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Appellee
No. 859.
Supreme Court of Alaska.
April 19, 1968.
Brian J. Brundin, of Hughes, Thorsness & Lowe, Anchorage, for appellant
Edmund W. Burke, Asst. Dist. Atty., and Robert N. Opland, Dist. Atty., Anchorage, for appellee.
Before NESBETT, C. J., DIMOND and RABINOWITZ, JJ.

Opinion:
OPINION
RABINOWITZ, Justice.
Appellant questions the lower court's administration of Criminal Rule 17(b) which provides for the issuance, at state expense, of subpoenas in behalf of indigent defendants. We hold that the superior court's rejection of appellant's request for the issuance of subpoenas pursuant to Criminal Rule 17(b) was error. We further hold that the court's ruling affected appellant's substantial rights and, therefore, the judgment and commitment which was entered below should be set aside and a new trial held.
Appellant was tried in the lower court upon a three-count indictment in which he was charged with the separate crimes of assault with a dangerous weapon, assault with intent to rape, and attempted rape. Some three weeks prior to trial, appellant's court-appointed ' counsel moved under Criminal Rule 17(b) that subpoenas be issued for the attendance of five witnesses, all of whom resided at Sand Point, Alaska, at the time of the motion. Our Criminal Rule 17(b) provides in part that:
The court or a judge thereof may order at any time that a subpoena be issued upon motion or request of an indigent defendant. The motion or request shall be supported by affidavit in which the defendant shall state the name and address of each witness and the testimony which he is expected by the defendant to give if subpoenaed, and shall show that the evidence of the witness is material to the defense, that the defendant cannot safely go to trial without the witness and that the defendant does not have sufficient means and is actually unable to pay the fees of the witness.
The grounds stated in appellant's motion were "that defendant is indigent and that said witnesses are necessary to the defense In his affidavit in support of the motion, appellant asserted that the five potential witnesses would provide "testimony necessary to [his] defense," and that his indigency prevented him from paying "the travel expense, witness fees, or service fees to require and enable the listed witnesses to appear for the defense."
Appellant's motion then came before the superior court. At the outset of the hearing the trial judge indicated to appellant's counsel that Criminal Rule 17(h) contemplated that counsel had "to give the nature of the testimony." The court then asked whether counsel was in a position to indicate what the witnesses "might testify to." After appellant's counsel had outlined the expected testimony of four of the five witnesses, the trial judge suggested to the State's attorney that perhaps the matter could he put in writing and an agreement reached between counsel as to the witnesses' testimony. The district attorney then informed the court that if appellant's counsel would furnish him with a brief written statement as to the witnesses' expected testimony, his office would "see if we'll stipulate to it, or indicate that we feel they won't testify to that, and then leave the witnesses in question for you to decide." The court then inquired of appellant's counsel whether he would furnish such a written outline of the witnesses' anticipated testimony. Appellant's .counsel answered affirmatively and the court.t,hen stated that it would rule on the merits of appellant's motion after the written statement had been furnished and 'counsel had had the opportunity to explore the possibility of agreement along the lines suggested by the district attorney. Later that same day, appellant's counsel filed a memorandum containing a brief summary of the testimony of the persons sought to be subpoenaed.
The matter was then again argued and at the conclusion of this second hearing, the court denied appellant's request for subpoenas as to Peterson, Osterback, and Mo-beck but offered appellant the choice of Bjornstad or Rudolph. Counsel for appellant selected Bjornstad. At the conclusion of the trial which was held a short time thereafter, appellant was found guilty of the crime of assault with intent to rape and was sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment.
Before discussing the merits of the trial court's rulings under Criminal Rule 17(b), we consider it appropriate to dispose, of appellee's argument that "The court's ruling should be tested only on the basis of the averments made by [appellant] in his sworn affidavit." In light of the portions of the record we have set out heretofore, we find no merit in the state's position. At no time during the two hearings, which were held in regard to appellant's Criminal Rule 17(b) motion, did the prosecution object to counsel for appellant's oral or written statements as to what testimony the witnesses would give. Here the initial requests, both for oral and written statements from defense counsel, came from the court, and it is clearly demonstrated that the state acquiesced in the court's suggestion that these statements be furnished. In view of such circumstances we consider the state's argument unfortunate. Further, Criminal Rule 53 provides that any of our rules of criminal procedure may be relaxed or dispensed with by the trial court where it is apparent to the court that strict adherence thereto would result in injustice. In the case at bar we believe that the trial judge correctly dispensed with Criminal Rule 17(b)'s requirement that the showing in support of the motion must be made by affidavit. This ruling was particularly appropriate in the case at bar where it appears that appellant was illiterate and that linguistic and cultural barriers existed between appellant and his counsel.
This is the first occasion we have had to decide issues involving application of Criminal Rule 17(b). Until 1966 our rule and Fed.R.Crim.P. 17(b) were virtually identical. Representative of the federal authorities decided under the original text of Rule 17(b), Fed.R.Crim.P., is the follow ing language from United States v. Zuideveld :
It is well settled that Rule 17(b) does not vest an absolute right to the issuance of such subpoenas and that the trial court is granted a wide latitude in order to prevent abuses. We will not disturb the exercise of such discretion unless exceptional circumstances compel it. There was no such abuse of discretion here. Reistroffer v. United States, 8 Cir., 258 F.2d 379, 396 (1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 927, 79 S.Ct. 313, 3 L.Ed.2d 301.
We adopt the federal rule and hold that the right to have a witness subpoenaed at state expense is not absolute. In administering Criminal Rule 17(b), the trial court is vested with discretion in order to prevent abuses. Our review of the record has left us with the firm conviction that the trial judge abused his discretion in the case at bar. Appellant's showing (which properly-encompassed not only his affidavit but also the memorandum and oral statements of his counsel in support of the rule 17 (b) motion) warranted issuance of the subpoenas. We believe it of significance that at the time the motions were made seeking issuance of the subpoenas appellant stood charged with three serious felony offenses, each of which carried potentially severe separate penalties. Also of importance is that appellant was brought to trial in a community some five hundred air miles from his home — the situs of the alleged crimes; that appellant was uneducated; and that linguistic and cultural differences were present between appellant and his attorney. Any judgment with respect to whether the showing made by appellant's counsel that a prospective witness' testimony was material- to the defense should have taken into account the barriers to effective communication which here existed between appellant and his- attorney. The degree of precision-with which defense counsel was able to allege facts--in' support of his motion for rule 17(b) sub-poenaes must necessarily have been-affected by quality and clarity of the communications ' from client to attorney.
Of further importance is the circumstance that the original counts of the indictment focused on the crime of attempted,. rape. In crimes of this nature the prosecutrix's testimony is usually crucial. Measured against these basic circumstánces,, we believe that appellant's showing, ¡ finder Criminal Rule 17(b) warranted''!the;- issuance of subpoenas at govefhhient expense. ,
In his brief appellant argues that the trial judge applied "too rigid .a standard" in ruling on his motion. Nowhere did the trial judge articulate precisely what criterion had been employed in deciding whether or not to allow the subpoenas. Although at one point during the hearings on the motion, it appears that the trial judge stated he would issue a subpoena only if the witness could show that he was with appellant during the entire time in question, and thus prove that appellant had not committed the crimes charged. The foregoing indicates that the trial judge applied too rigid a standard in administering Criminal Rule 17(b) in view of the significant circumstances appearing in this record.
As we have indicated previously, we believe that appellant's showing was sufficient as to prospective witnesses Mo-beck, Peterson, and Osterback to justify the issuance of Criminal Rule 17(b) subpoenas. As to George Osterback, it was expected that he would testify he was with appellant at a bar in Sand Point until just.before the alleged crimes took place. Appellant's counsel further asserted that he believed that the state had a witness who would testify that he observed two men at the spot where the victim was lying on the ground, and "It was probable that Mr. Osterback is this mysterious person who ran." From a reading of the record, it appears that the trial judge denied appellant's request as to Osterback because he would have had to advise the witness of his privilege against self-incrimination. We are of the opinion that Osterback's possible eyewitness testimony was relevant, and that a subpoena should not have been denied on the speculative ground that the witness might have exercised his privilege against self-incrimination if called to testify. We are also of the opinion that appellant's showing was sufficient in regard to prospective witness Agness Mobeck in that her testimony was relevant and material for purposes of impeachment of the prosecution's chief witness, Mrs. Kalmakoff.
Regarding prospective witness Johnny Peterson, appellant contemplated that the witness would testify he was his roommate and would offer character testimony in appellant's behalf. It was further anticipated that the witness would impeach the credibility of Mrs. Kalmakoff who had testified at the preliminary hearing that she did not like appellant because he had raped her once before. As to this event, appellant anticipated that Peterson would testify that what occurred was an act of consensual intercourse. We hold that appellant's showing was sufficient as to this witness on both grounds. In light of the nature of the crimes charged in the indictment, evidence as to appellant's character was undoubtedly relevant and material. Further, evidence of a prior act of consensual sexual intercourse between the prosecutrix and appellant was relevant and! material in regard to the issue of appellant's intent concerning the charges of rape and assault to commit rape, and was also relevant and material regarding the issue of the prosecutrix's consent.
We hold that the superior court's denial of subpoenas for the attendance of these witnesses deprived appellant of the opportunity adequately to defend against the serious crimes with which he was charged and was therefore prejudicial error.
The judgment and commitment entered below is set aside and the case remanded for a new trial.
. As to eaeli count it was alleged that the offense was committed on November 5, 1966, at Sand Point, Alaska, and that the victim in each instance was Elizabeth Kalmakoff.
. All pertinent proceedings prior to trial, and the trial itself, took place at Anchorage, Alaska. Sand Point, Alaska is located in the Slmmagin Islands off the Alaska Peninsula (about 500 nautical air miles from Anchorage).
. The five Sand Point residents listed were Jolmny Peterson, George Osterback, Ralph Bjornstad (incorrectly spelled "Junestert" in some portions of the record), Agnes Mobeck, and Kenneth Rudolph.
. As to the prospective witness Kenneth Rudolph, appellant's counsel stated that he had "forgotten at the moment what he will say."
. Appellant's counsel answered, "Yes, Your Honor. It's a matter of approximately wliat I outlined to the Court already today.' ' [W]e have already — I guess there's been a ruling that Mr. [Peterson] ⅜." The record does show that earlier in the hearing, after counsel had outlined the testimony he anticipated Johnny Peterson would give, the trial judge ruled that he would not issue a subpoena for Peterson's attendance at the trial.
. Subsequently, the court entered a formal order denying appellant's motion in regard to Osterback, Mobeck, Rudolph, and Peterson.
. Appellee's argument here is that Criminal'Rule 17(b) requires the defendant to support the motion by affidavit in which the expected testimony of the witness must be set forth.
.Effective July 1, 1966, the federal rule was amended to read as follows:
Defendants Unadle to Pay. The court shall order at any time that a subpoena be issued for service on a named witness upon an ex parte application of a defendant upon a satisfactory showing that the defendant is financially unable to pay the fees of the witness and that the presence of the witness is necessary to an adequate defense. If the court orders the subpoena to be issued the costs incurred by the process and the fees of the witness so subpoenaed shall be paid in the same manner in which similar costs and fees are paid in case of a witness subpoenaed in behalf of the government
. 316 F.2d 873, 881 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 916, 84 S.Ct. 671, 11 L.Ed.2d 612 (1964).
. To the same effect, see United States v. Woodard, 376 F.2d 136, 143 (7th Cir. 1967); Thompson v. United States, 372 F.2d 826, 828 (5th Cir. 1967); Barnes v. United States, 374 F.2d 126, 128 (5th Cir. 1967); Murdock v. United States, 283 F.2d 585, 587 (10th Cir. 1960).
. At one point in tlie hearings the court said in part, "[I]f you could show that some of these men claimed they -were with him the entire time, the entire evening."
. Later in the hearings the trial judge asked whether a person financially able would "spend this ($2,000.00) of his own money to bring witnesses that he doesn't know any more about than this?" The trial judge further stated, "I'm wondering if a rich man would throw away Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00) to bring in some prospective witnesses like this?" During argument the State's attorney estimated that an individual round-trip ticket from Sand Point to Anchorage was $300, and that including per diem allowances, the total cost for the five witnesses sought by appellant would amount to $2,000. As to the costs involved, counsel for appellant stated in part:
The fact that lie's in Anchorage in trial is just, I think, a condition of our court system,, that wo don't have a setup in Sand Point; it's a very small place. [S]o the — this cost is not so much as — a matter to do with * ⅜ :|! justice as it is a matter to do with the facts of life as to the geography of our State and the court system that wo can support. I believe that if this defendant were an Anchorage resident, and * ⅜ * these witnesses were readily available as if wo were in Sand Point, that it would be quite difficult to say that the defendant should always disclose what his witnesses will say as a matter of tactics.
. The trial court's discretion in administering Crim.it. 17 (b) can be upheld in regard to the denial as to witness Rudolph on the ground that his testimony was cumulative of Bjornstad's prospective testimony.
. On this subject the memorandum furnished by appellant's counsel reads:
The defendant has reason to believe that — Mr. Osterback may have further testimony extremely relevant to the ease. Defendant believes that tile State has a witness, one Thomas Joseph Tates, who will testify he saw Mrs. Kalmakoff lying on the ground with two men, one of which ran whom he cannot identify and the second of which was the Defendant. It is probable that Mr. Osterback is this mysterious person wlio ran. Further, Mr. Osterback was carrying a hunting knife in his belt on the night of the alleged crime.
. As to this prospective witness, the court stated;
[A]s to whether or not Mr. Osterback may have been one of the men seen, I can't see it has any relevancy licro at all so far as his testimony, because I'd have advised him of his right not to incriminate himself. For that reason, lie will be denied. Later the trial judge further stated: [B]ut I'm ruling him out on the basis that what you're attempting to prove hero — you're going to prove that be did it, and I think ⅜ * ⅜ if the Court warns of bis rights, that he wouldn't testify, wouldn't be of any help to you. And I think I'd be obligated to warn him of bis rights. For that reason I'm not allowing him.
. As to the interesting question of whether any inference could be drawn by the jurors from Osterbaek's claim of the privilege at trial, see generally VIII J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2272(b), at 437 n. 9 (McNaughton rev. 1901).
. We have previously mentioned the crucial role the prosecutrix's testimony normally plays in rape and related offenses. Mobeclc's testimony was of importance because of its possible value for impeachment of the prosecutrix.
Appellant's presentation in regard to this potential witness was as follows:
Agnes Mobeek, Sand Point, Alaska, will testify that she came into the bar earlier that evening with Mrs. Kalma-koff and that they were both later joined by Mr. Kalmakoff. She should also be able to testify as to what was said between Mr. Osterbaek and Mrs. Kalmakoff. Mrs. Kalmakoff testified at the preliminary hearing that she was not in the company of any other person in the bar other than her husband and Mr. Osterbaek.
. In denying appellant's request as to Peterson, the trial judge stated:
I'm not going to let him come here for the purpose of testifying that an earlier act of rape never occurred,., and I'm going to enter an order now directing the District Attorney to tell her not to testify in regard to any previous * ⅜ * rape that did or did not occur .
. 1 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 200 (3d ed. 1940).
. The disposition we have reached has made unnecessary the resolution of the constitutional objections appellant has raised as to the application of Crim.R. 17 (b) in this case. The gist of appellant's constitutional argument is that application of the rule here denied him equal protection, resulted in a denial of due process, and loss of his privilege against self-incrimination.
In regard to this contention, see the-text of Rule 17(b), Fed.R.Crim.P., as amended in 19GG. In the notes of the Advisory Committee to this amendment at 8 J. Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 17.01 [3]] (2d ed.1907), it is stated:
Criticism has been directed' at the requirement that an indigent defendant disclose in advance the theory of his defense in order to obtain the issuance of a subpoena at government expense while the government and defendants able to pay may have subpoenas issued, in blank without any disclosure- See Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Poverty and the- Administration of Criminal Justice- (1963) p. 27. The Attorney General's Committee also-urged that the standard of financial inability to pay be substituted for that of indigency. Id. at 40-41- Irr one ease it was hold tha,t the affidavit filed by an indigent defendant under this- subdivision could be used by the government at his trial for purposes of impeachment. Smith v. United States, [114 U.S.App.D.C. 140], 312 F.2d 867 (1962).' There has also been doubt as to whether the defendant need make a showing beyond the face of his affidavit in order to secure issuance of a subpoena. Greenwell v. United States, [115 U.S.App.D.C. 44], 317 F.2d 108 (1963).
The amendment makes several changes. The references to a judge are deleted since applications should be made to the court. An ex parte application followed by a satisfactory showing is substituted for the requirement of a request or motion supported by affidavit. The court es required to order the issuance of a subpoena upon finding that the defendant is unable to pay tbe witness fee and that the presence of the witness is necessary to an adequate defense.