Case Name: Wendy TRAVER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TUCSON UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant-Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2010-04-20
Citations: 376 F. App'x 799
Docket Number: No. 08-15707
Parties: Wendy TRAVER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TUCSON UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: Before: RYMER, McKEOWN, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 376
Pages: 799–800

Head Matter:
Wendy TRAVER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TUCSON UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 08-15707.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted April 5, 2010.
Filed April 20, 2010.
Wendy Traver, Jupiter, FL, pro se. Kevin Miniat, Esquire, Jerald R. Wilson, Esquire, Miniat & Wilson, P.C., Tucson, AZ, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before: RYMER, McKEOWN, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Wendy Traver appeals pro se from the district court's summary judgment in favor of the Tucson Unified School District in her employment action alleging retaliation in violation of Title VII, the Equal Pay Act ("EPA"), and the First Amendment. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 639 (9th Cir.2003), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on the Title VII and EPA claims because Traver's request for additional pay was not a protected activity under either statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, -3 (prohibiting retaliation for opposing employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin); 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), 215(a)(3) (prohibiting retaliation for complaints regarding unlawful pay practices such as paying different wages to employees on the basis of sex); Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1007 (9th Cir.1999) (en banc) ("[N]ot all amorphous expressions of discontent related to wages and hours constitute complaints filed within the meaning of § 215(a)(3).").
Similarly, the district court properly granted summary judgment on the First Amendment claim because Traver's request for additional pay was not constitutionally protected as it did not touch on a matter of public concern. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983) ("When employee expression cannot be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community, government officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment.").
The district court also properly granted summary judgment on these claims because Traver failed to raise a triable issue as to whether her termination was causally connected to filing her prior lawsuit. See Cohen v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 686 F.2d 793, 797 (9th Cir.1982) (stating that the decision maker's unawareness of the protected activity "breaks the requisite causal link").
Traver's remaining contentions are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.