Case Name: Peter Delaney and Wife vs. A. Rochereau & Co.
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1882-11
Citations: 34 La. 1123
Docket Number: No. 7867
Parties: Peter Delaney and Wife vs. A. Rochereau & Co.
Judges: Poci-ié, J. I concur in the dissenting opinion of the Chief Justice.
Reporter: Louisiana Annual Reports
Volume: 34
Pages: 1123–1131

Head Matter:
No. 7867.
Peter Delaney and Wife vs. A. Rochereau & Co.
The appellant, on the day the appeal was returnable, applied for and obtained an extension of thirty days to file the transcript: Meld, that the additional delay granted by the Court, only commenced to run from the three judicial days allowed by the law after the return day.
Agents are not liable to third persons for non-fpasance, or mere omissions of duty. They are responsible to such parties only for the actual commission of those positive wrongs, for which they would be otherwise accountable in their individual capacity, under obligations common to all other men. The doctrine, under the common and civil law, does not differ on that subject. Judgment affirmed.
APPEAL from tlie Pifth District Court for the Parish of Orleans. Sogers, J.
• Jos. P. Mornor and F. W. Baker, for Plaintiffs and Appellants:
On Motion to Dismiss.
1. The law grants three judicial days after the return day within which the transcript of appeal may be filed. C. P. 589 and 883; 1 Hennen Dig. Appeal YHI (d.) No. 3, p. 82.
2. The court may grant further time to file the transcript, hut the time granted by the court are not judicial but running days, which begin only after the expiration of the delay granted by law. 33 An. 119.
3. An order of court granting further time to file a transcript, which reads, “ that the delay for filing the transcript of appeal heiein he extended for thirty days,” excludes the three judicial days allowed by law. If it had been intended to include them the language would have been “ extended to thirty days.”
On the Merits.
1. Every one is bound to keep his buildings in repair, and is answerable for all damage occasioned by their fall, when caused by neglect to repair. C. C. Arts. 670, 2322; 7 An. 321; 14 An. 806 ; L. B. 10 ; C. P 658; 5 B. & S., 78; 10 Allen, 368 ; 9 Cent. B. J. 385.
"2. An agent is liable under the civil law to third persons for damages resulting from his non-feasance, as well as inis-feasanco. O. C. Art. 3003; Code Napoleon, 1992; Domat, P. 1, B. 1, T. 15, Sec. 3, Arts. 1 and 4; Story on Bailments, § 165; Story on Agency § 309 ; Shearman & B. on Negligence §§ 112 and 115; Evans Principal and Agent, p. 328; Wharton’s Daw on Negligence § 533; 12 Mod. 488; 28 Me. 463 ; 5 Gilm. 425; 30 Conn. 329 ; 98 Mass. 77; 30 N. X. 78; 8 Barb. 358 ; 3 E. D. Smith, 591; 19 Wend. 343.
3. Whenever the agent’s negligence directly injures a stranger, the agent having liberty of action in respect to such iüjury, then such stranger can recover from the agent damages for such injury. Wharton on Negligence, § 535; Harriman vs. Stowe, 57 Mo. 93; Beaugillot vs. Callemor, 33 Sirey, 322; C. C. 2315, 23L6, 2317; Boston Beef Packing Co. vs. Stevens, 12 Bed. Bep. 279 ; 9 Com. Bench, 377.
4. It was not of contributing negligence in plaintiff’s child to entera building where a public dance and entertainment were being given, where such entertainments had been given before, and where an admission fee was charged, when invited by an older companion who paid his entrance fee.
5. A person entering a building under such circumstances, which is quietly in the possession of other persons, who have the apparent right to so use the building, and which has been so used before, is not a trespasser. 51N. X. 476.
6. It is the duty of owners of buildings to keep them in repair, and when vacant to keep them securely fastened or guarded.
7. A trespasser can recover for injuries wantonly inflicted, as by the fall of building from neglect to repair it.
8. Where the injured person is a child .recovery can be had, because a child cannot be considered as appreciating the danger, or bound to inquire by what authority the house is open and used. ’83 Penn. 332; 80Penn.74; 17 Wall. 660; 4Bing.628; -1 Addison on Torts, §260, p. 282; Shearman & Rodtield on Negligence, § 504; 102 Mass. 572; 19 Conn. 507; 1 Q. B. 29; 2 Thompson on Negligence, § 39, p. 1192.
(7. 28. Schmidt) for Defendants and Appellees;
Ox Motion to Dismiss.
The appeal in this oase was made returnable on Monday, the 1st of March, 1880. .On that day an extension of thirty days was granted for filing the transcript. This delay or extension expired on the 31st of March, 1880. The transcript was not filed until the 2d of April, 1880. This was too late. 32 An. 28; 28 An. 901; 24 An- 333. etc.
The motion to dismiss for such a cause is not required to be made witbin three days of the filing of the transciipt. It maybe made at anytime, at least before the case has been fixed for trial. 4 An. 359; 9 An. 21; 10 An. 75.
On the Merits.
The line of a man’s private domain, like the boundary line between nations, is not to be crossed without permission. Cooley on Torts, p 302.
There is no duty owing to a trespasser from the owner of the property upon which he intrudes. Cooley on Torts, p 660; Wharton on Negl., $ 351; Sourdat, de la Responsibility, Yol. 2, p. 21.
At common law the general rule is, that an infant is responsible for bistorts, as any other person would he. Cooley, p. 103. ' And, in respect to trespasses, there is no exception in the law in favor of minors. Sikes vs. Johnson, 16 Mass., 389;
Our Code expressly declares that “ the obligation arising from an offense or quasi offense is binding on the minor.” Rev. C. C., Art. 1785; and faith er provides that ” he (the minor) is not restdtuable (cannot he relieved) against the obligations resulting from his offenses or quasi offenses.” Rev. C. C. Art. 2226.
As said by Rogron, under Art. 1310 O. N., offenses and quasi offenses are all those unlawful acts which cause damageto others. Offense (délit), when there was the intent to injure j quasi offense (quasi-délit), when no such intent existed.
A trespass may be intentional or unintentional. Cooley, p 438.
If intention al, it is an offense; if unintentional, a quasi offense. In neither case is the minor reliovable there against.
Even if the plaintiffs’ son had beeu a licensee, no right of action would have accrued against defendants; for, no duty is owed to amere licensee, and he has no cause of action for negligence in the place he is permitted to enter. Parker vs- Portland Publishing Co., Cent'l Law J., Yol 9, p. 108. •
In an action like this, for negligence, the evidence must be confined to the lime and place and circumstances of the injury, and the negligence then and there; but what occurred to
. others, at other times, more or less remote,- is collateral and inadmissible. Ibid.
It was clearly not the mere alleged stare of decay of the gallery, but the act of the trespasses, that caused its fall, and therefore plaintiff's cannot recover, for, causa próxima, non remota spectator. Cooley, pp. 68 to 70; Wharton on Agency, §380; Wharton on Negl., §§ 134,137.
The evidence tends to show that the gallery was sufficiently strong for usual and ordinary purposes, but tbat, both on the night of this accident and a week before, it had been subjected by trespassers, to such extraordinary pressure by their rushing out in great numbers to its front railing, as eventually to wrench out of their sockets in the brick wall the iron bars which formed its chief support.
At common law, the doctrine is well settled that no agent, except the master of a ship, is oxer liable to third persons for his own non-feasances or omissions of duty in the course of his employment, or, in other words, for his failure to perform the obligations of his principal. Story on Agency, §§ 308, 309; Ewell’s Evans on Agency, pp. 437, 438, and the latter portion of Chapt. IY; Shearman & Redf. on Negl., 3d cd., §§ 111, 112.
And the same doctrine seems to obtain in the civil law, which holds that agreements have effect only on the contracting* parties; they do not prejudice third persons. La. Code of 1808, p. $70, Seo. 6 of Chap.'3d of title III, Art. 65. See, also, p. 264 of Amendments to that Code by the framers of the Code of 1825 ; C. hT. Art. 1165. Accordingly, the Court of Cassation, in the case of Thomassin vs- G-atouillat, decided on the 27th July, 1869, (Dal- . loz, J. G-. 1809, p. 1, p. 350). that the responsibility of the mandatory for the consequences . of his neglect in the course of his employment, could only be invoked by the mandator, and not by third persons.

Opinion:
On Motion to Dismiss.
The opinion of the Court .was delivered by
Todd, J.
This motion is on the ground that the transcript was not filed in time.
The appeal was made returnable on the first Monday in March, 1880, being the first day of that month.
On that day the appellant applied for further time to complete the transcript, and on this application an order was made "that the delay for filing the transcript of appeal herein be extended for thirty days."
The delay granted by law for the filing of the transcript was the time intervening between the date of the order and the return day and three days added thereto; C. P. 589, 883; that is, three days after the return day; and within these three additional days, the delay could not have expired and the transcript could have been filed without any extension by order of Court.
Under the order of extension made, the transcript could have been filed at any time within thirty days, beginning from the last point of time within the original delay, that is, within thirty days running from the last day of grace, determinable by the original order. Tlie transcript was filed on the 2d of April, witlvin less than thirty days from such point of time, and was, therefore, seasonably filed. The 6th of March was the first day of the additional delay granted by the order, and the 4th of April was the last day. The law gave the appellant the first delay mentioned, and the thirty days additional were granted him by the Court.
The motion to dismiss is, therefore, denied.