Case Name: Richard FARRALL, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Dora B. SCHRIRO, Director, Respondent-Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2007-05-01
Citations: 231 F. App'x 586
Docket Number: No. 05-15152
Parties: Richard FARRALL, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Dora B. SCHRIRO, Director, Respondent-Appellee.
Judges: Before: HAWKINS, THOMAS, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 231
Pages: 586–587

Head Matter:
Richard FARRALL, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Dora B. SCHRIRO, Director, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 05-15152.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submission deferred March 8, 2007.
Submitted for Decision April 27, 2007.
Filed May 1, 2007.
Tara K. Allen, Esq., Law Office of Tara K. Allen, Bigfork, MT, for Petitioner-Appellant.
Richard Farrall, Pecos, TX, pro se.
Katia Mehu, Esq., AGAZ-Office of the Arizona Attorney General, Phoenix, AZ, for Respondent-Appellee.
Before: HAWKINS, THOMAS, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Richard Farrall appeals the district court's order denying as untimely his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. After the briefs in this case were filed, we held that "Arizona's Rule 32 of-right proceeding for plea-convicted defendants is a form of direct review within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)." Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710, 716-17 (9th Cir. 2007). Thus, the one-year statute of limitations provided by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") "did not begin to run until 90 days after the Arizona Supreme Court denied [Summers'] petition for review...." Id.
Applying Summers to this case, AED-PA's one-year statute of limitations did not begin to run until 90 days after February 20, 2003, when the Arizona Supreme Court denied Farrall's petition for review of his Rule 32 proceedings. Therefore, under Summers, Farrall's habeas petition, filed in the district court on February 4, 2004, was timely.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.