Case Name: QUINTON LEE MORRIS v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
Court: Court of Appeals of Virginia
Jurisdiction: Virginia
Decision Date: 1992-04-07
Citations: 14 Va. App. 283
Docket Number: No. 0822-90-2
Parties: QUINTON LEE MORRIS v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
Judges: 
Reporter: Virginia Court of Appeals Courts
Volume: 14
Pages: 283–293

Head Matter:
Richmond
QUINTON LEE MORRIS v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
No. 0822-90-2
Decided April 7, 1992
Counsel
Charles D. Bennett, Jr., for appellant.
Janet F. Rosser, Assistant Attorney General (Mary Sue Terry, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Opinion:
UPON REHEARING EN BANC
Opinion
ELDER, J.
This Court granted an en banc hearing to the Commonwealth after Quinton Lee Morris's conviction for possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute had been reversed by the panel. The issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in admitting a series of photographs into evidence and permitting the prosecutor to state, during closing argument, that the jury could infer from the photographs that Morris and Terence Bright were Albert Bensusan's suppliers of cocaine. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
On September 15, 1989, Investigator W. B. Upshaw and Detective E. L. Peck of the Spotsylvania Sheriffs Department were executing a search warrant for cocaine at a trailer occupied by Albert Bensusan, Denise Light and their children. Bensusan and Light were arrested for possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute. Upshaw saw a red car approaching on the driveway leading to the trailer. The car stopped approximately fifteen yards from the home. Upshaw saw a white object thrown from the passenger side window of the car, but he did not see which occupant of the car threw the object. Upshaw motioned for the vehicle to move forward and the driver complied. The car was a 1986 Pontiac Fiero, a two-seated sports car with a very small passenger compartment. Morris was driving the car, which was registered to his parents. The passenger in the car was Terence Bright, who was also arrested for possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute.
Upshaw directed Peck to search the area where he saw the white object land. Peck discovered a white paper napkin and thirty-two small packages of crack cocaine.
When Upshaw first looked in the car, he found a knife sticking out of the glove compartment. The car was subsequently impounded and searched. One additional package of cocaine, similar to those located near the napkin, was found under the floor mat on the passenger side.
At trial, the Commonwealth offered a series of photographs which were found in Bensusan's home. These photographs showed: (1) Bensusan, a child, and Morris; (2) Bright, a child and Morris; (3) two pictures of Bright alone; (4) a child and Morris; and (5) Morris alone. Each of these photographs also showed the red Fiero. These photographs were admitted over Morris's objection that the photographs had no probative value.
In closing argument, the prosecutor mentioned the photographs and stated, "[Tjhey had been to the residence before. You are entitled to infer that Morris and Bright were Bensusan's supplier of cocaine, and that they were making a delivery of cocaine when they had the bad fortune —." The defense objected, stating, "I don't think any inference can be made of that." The court overruled the objection. Morris did not request a cautionary instruction or move for a mistrial.
This Court has stated:
"The admission of photographs is a matter resting within the sound discretion of a trial court," and the court's decision will be upheld unless an abuse of discretion is shown. But it is always essential to the right to introduce a photograph in evidence that it have a relevant and material bearing upon some matter in controversy at the trial, and the party offering such evidence should give proof of its relevancy to the issue before the jury.
Cook v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 225, 231, 372 S.E.2d 780, 784 (1988)(citations omitted).
At trial, Morris objected to the admission of the photographs on the ground that they had no "probative value in this case." "Evidence is relevant in the trial of a case if it has any tendency to establish a fact which is properly at issue. When the probative value of evidence sought to be admitted outweighs any prejudicial effect, and no other objection is pertinent, the evidence is admissible." Wise v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 178, 187-88, 367 S.E.2d 197, 202-03 (1988) (citations omitted). "The test establishing relevance is not whether the proposed evidence conclusively proves a fact, but whether it has any tendency to establish a fact at issue." Id. at 188, 367 S.E.2d at 203 (citation omitted).
Here, Morris, the passenger in his car and the two adult occupants of the trailer being searched were charged with possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute. "Where an offense consists of an act combined with a particular intent, proof of intent is essential to the conviction. Because direct proof of intent is often impossible, it must be shown by circumstantial evidence." Servis v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 507, 524, 371 S.E.2d 156, 165 (1988)(citation omitted). Under the facts of this case, prior acquaintance is a circumstance that can legitimately be considered in determining intent. The photographs of Morris and Bensusan proved that the two were acquainted. When taken with the other evidence in the case, including the evidence that Morris was approaching Bensusan's home (for which a warrant had been issued to search for cocaine) when he was observed by police and the evidence that an occupant of the car discarded thirty-two packages of cocaine at this time, the jury could infer that Morris jointly possessed the cocaine with the intent to distribute.
Although the Commonwealth is not required to prove to whom Morris intended to distribute the cocaine, nothing precludes the Commonwealth from presenting evidence that tends to establish the identity of the intended distributee.
The probative value of the photographs outweighed any prejudicial effect. The photographs do not depict Morris engaged in any illegal activity. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the photographs.
Morris also asserts that the court erred in overruling his objection to the prosecutor's statement to the jury during closing argument that, "[y]ou are entitled to infer that Morris and Bright were Bensusan's supplier of cocaine." However, the Supreme Court "has repeatedly held that errors assigned because of a pros ecutor's improper comments or conduct during closing argument will not be considered on appeal unless the accused timely moves for a cautionary instruction or for a mistrial." Martinez v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 557, 559 n.2, 403 S.E.2d 358, 359 n.2 (1991). A timely motion for a mistrial or a cautionary instruction is required to preserve the issue for appeal even if an objection was properly made to the conduct or comments and improperly overruled by the trial judge. See Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 38, 393 S.E.2d 599, 605-06 (1990). Here, Morris did not move for such an instruction or for a mistrial, so the argument is barred.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Baker, J., Bray, J., Coleman, J., Moon, J., and Willis, J., concurred.
This decision was reported at 13 Va. App. 134, 409 S.E.2d 629 (1991).