Case Name: Linda Jean WILKINS and Pamela Cay Strack, as Adminstratrixes of the Estate of Norman Mitchell and Betty Mitchell, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. FIREMAN'S FUND AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant
Court: Idaho Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Idaho
Decision Date: 1985-01-31
Citations: 107 Idaho 1006
Docket Number: No. 15206
Parties: Linda Jean WILKINS and Pamela Cay Strack, as Adminstratrixes of the Estate of Norman Mitchell and Betty Mitchell, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. FIREMAN'S FUND AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: BAKES, J., and McFADDEN, J., Pro Tern, concur.
Reporter: Idaho Reports
Volume: 107
Pages: 1006–1014

Head Matter:
695 P.2d 391
Linda Jean WILKINS and Pamela Cay Strack, as Adminstratrixes of the Estate of Norman Mitchell and Betty Mitchell, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. FIREMAN'S FUND AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 15206.
Supreme Court of Idaho.
Jan. 31, 1985.
David H. Maguire, Pocatello, for defendant-appellant Fireman’s Fund American Life Ins. Co.
Randall C. Budge, Pocatello, for plaintiffs-respondents Linda Jean Wilkins and Pamela Cay Strack.
Gus Carr Anderson, Pocatello, for plaintiff-respondent Betty J. Mitchell.

Opinion:
DONALDSON, Chief Justice.
On January 23,1978, Norman G. Mitchell was strangled to death. His wife, Betty Jane Mitchell, was subsequently convicted of first degree murder. Her conviction was upheld in State v. Mitchell, 104 Idaho 493, 660 P.2d 1336 (1983), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 934, 103 S.Ct. 2101, 77 L.Ed.2d 308 (1983).
At the time of his death, Mr. Mitchell had an account at Idaho Bank & Trust. Through the bank, Mr. Mitchell had a membership in an organization known as Ban-club. Banclub is part of a marketing program utilized by banks to obtain customers. Bank services are provided at free or reduced rates including: free cheeking, reduced charges for traveler's checks, and accidental death insurance. As an incident of membership in Banclub, Mr. Mitchell was insured with a policy of accidental death benefits of $10,000.
The policy is a group policy issued by Fireman's Fund American Life Insurance Company to Banclub Association of Nashville, Tennessee. The policy provides payment of $10,000 to the named beneficiary, or if there is no surviving designated beneficiary, then to certain persons listed in the insurance contract in descending order. Under Mr. Mitchell's policy, Betty Mitchell was named the primary beneficiary and no contingent beneficiary was designated.
There is an exclusion in the policy which provides as follows:
"Exclusions: This policy does not cover loss caused by, or resulting from, any one or more of the following:
(F) any intentional act by a beneficiary or member of the member's household to commit, or threaten to commit, bodily injury to the member."
I.C. § 15-2-803, the Idaho "Slayer Statute" was also in existence at the time the policy was issued. I.C. § 15-2-803 provides:
Ҥ 15-2-803. Effect of homicide on distribution at death:
"(a)(1) "Slayer" shall mean any person who participates, either as principal or as an accessory before the fact, in the willful and unlawful killing of any other person____
"(b) No slayer shall in any way acquire any property or receive any benefit as a result of the death of the decedent, but such property shall pass as provided in the sections following.
"(c) The slayer shall be deemed to have predeceased the decedent as to property which would have passed from the decedent or his estate to the slayer under the statutes of descent and distribution or have been acquired by statutory right as surviving spouse or under any agreement made with the decedent.
"(j)(l) Insurance proceeds payable to the slayer as the beneficiary or assignee of any policy or certificate of insurance on the life of the decedent, or as the surviv- or of a joint life policy, shall be paid instead to the estate of the decedent, unless the policy or certificate designate some person other than the slayer or his estate as secondary beneficiary to him in which case such proceeds shall be paid to such secondary beneficiary in accordance with the applicable terms of this policy.
"(n) This section shall not be considered penal in nature, but shall be construed broadly in order to effect the policy of this state that no person shall be allowed to profit by his own wrong, wherever committed."
Since, under I.C. § 15-2-803, Betty Mitchell was disqualified from receiving the proceeds from the policy, Mr. Mitchell's two daughters, Pamela Cay Strack and Linda Jean Wilkins, respondents, sought to recover the benefits from the policy as heirs of Mr. Mitchell. Fireman's Fund refused to pay any of the policy proceeds to either Betty Mitchell or respondents, relying upon exclusion (F) in the policy.
Respondents then brought suit to recover the proceeds of the policy. After motions by both parties for summary judgment, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of respondents. The trial court found that exclusion (F) and I.C. § 15-2-803 conflicted, and, therefore, the statute controlled disposition of the insurance proceeds. Fireman's Fund appeals that decision.
The single issue in this case is whether I.C. § 15-2-803, supersedes exclusion (F) in Norman Mitchell's accidental death policy. Appellant contends that the statute and the exclusion do not conflict and therefore the exclusion controls disposition.
We agree with appellant that I.C. § 15-2-803 and exclusion (F) do not conflict. Therefore, exclusion (F) is not superseded by I.C. § 15-2-803. Other courts and commentators that have considered the applicability of "slayer statutes" have held that the statutes apply only when there is no provision whatever in the insurance policy as to the disposition of proceeds when the beneficiary kills the insured. National Aid Life Ass'n. v. May, 201 Okla. 450, 207 P.2d 292 (1949); Sovereign Camp, W. O. W. v. Clark, 184 Ark. 1035, 44 S.W,2d 336 (1931); McDade v. Mystic Workers of the World, 196 Iowa 857, 195 N.W. 603 (1923); Grand Circle Women of Woodcraft v. Rausch, 24 Colo.App. 304, 134 P. 141 (1913). See also 4 G. Couch, Couch on Insurance 2d, § 27:159 (1984). Where the insurance policy expressly provides for such contingency by relieving itself of all liability, these same courts have held such provisions valid and not superseded by statute.
I.C. § 15-2-803 similarly contemplates the situation where there is no policy exclusion to prevent the wrongdoer from gaining the insurance proceeds. The references in section (c) to "property which would have passed . to the slayer" and in section (j)(l) to "[ijnsurance proceeds payble to the slayer" presume that under the policy the wrongdoer is entitled to the proceeds. However, since exclusion (F) expressly precludes Betty Mitchell from recovery and relieves Fireman's Fund from all liability, the provisions of I.C. § 15-2-803 do not come into operation.
Moreover, statutory amendment by implication is disfavored and will not be inferred, absent clear legislative intent. Sunshine Mining Co. v. Allendale Mutual Insurance Co., 107 Idaho 25, 684 P.2d 1002 (1984). The sole purpose of I.C. § 15-2-803 is to prevent a wrongdoer from profiting from his or her own wrong. I.C. § 15-2-803(n) states that the statute is to "effect the policy of this state that no person shall be allowed to profit by his own wrong____" The comment to the official text also states:
"At first it may appear that the matter dealt with is criminal in nature and not a proper matter for probate courts. However, the concept that a wrongdoer may not profit by his own wrong is a civil concept, and the probate court is the proper forum to determine the effect of killing on succession to property of the decedent."
For this reason, I.C. § 15-2-803 appears in the intestacy section of the Idaho Probate Code and not in the insurance section of the Idaho Code. Further, there is nothing in the title of the statute expressing a change in insurance law which would invalidate such exclusions, nor does the statute purport to be a limitation upon the power of an insurance company to avoid liability when a beneficiary kills the insured. Therefore, I.C. § 15-2-803 should not be read to limit the right of insurance companies to contract in this matter.
The decision of the trial court is therefore reversed. Costs to appellants.
No attorney fees on appeal.
BAKES, J., and McFADDEN, J., Pro Tern, concur.