Case Name: Victor Raymond JORY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1994-06-03
Citations: 647 So. 2d 152
Docket Number: No. 92-1737
Parties: Victor Raymond JORY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: PETERSON, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 647
Pages: 152–159

Head Matter:
Victor Raymond JORY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 92-1737.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
June 3, 1994.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 6, 1995.
Jeffrey G. Thompson of Lovering, Vance & Thompson, Cocoa, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Mark S. Dunn, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
GOSHORN, Judge.
Jory appeals from the sentences imposed after he was convicted of ten counts of lewd_ and lascivious assault on a child under the age of 16 years, one count of promoting a sexual performance by a child under the age of 18 years, and one count of using a child under the age of 18 years in a sexual performance. For the ten counts of lewd and lascivious assault, he received the maximum possible statutory sentence of 15 years each, to run consecutively, followed by two consecutive 15 year terms on probation for the two promoting and using counts. The total is thus 150 years in prison followed by 30 years of probation. Jory argues on appeal that the trial court's written reasons for departing upwards from the sentencing guidelines recommended sentence of 17 to 22 years, and the permitted bracket of 12 to 27 years, are either improper or not supported by the record. We disagree and affirm.
The crimes for which Jory was charged and convicted arose out of a single episode during which Jory had sex with a 15 year old boy. The sexual encounter was videotaped by an unknown third person. The police later seized the tape after a citizen complained that Jory was selling child-pornographic tapes and materials. The tape formed the sole basis for this prosecution.
The trial court gave a number of reasons for departing upwards from the sentencing guidelines, one of which we find is supported by a preponderance of the evidence and provides a valid basis for the departure sentence. The trial court wrote:
4) THE DEFENDANT IS NOT AMENABLE TO REHABILITATION AND POSES A DANGER TO SOCIETY.
This ground is found to exist beyond every reasonable doubt, without regard to the defendant's prior record. See Louissa[i]nt v. State, 576 So.2d 316 (5th DCA 1990). The defendant's comments before this Court clearly show that the defendant sees nothing wrong with his conduct in this case. He is unable to perceive any reason to change. The defendant views his conduct to be lawful and blames a system that is "prejudicial against homosexuals" for his plight.
The facts show that the defendant preys upon young boys from broken homes, who lack a father figure in their lives. Somehow, the defendant is able to induce these children to participate in his world of perversion and crime.
This defendant is not amenable to reasonable rehabilitation. See Bushy v. State, 556 So.2d 1208 (1st DCA 1990); Mendenhall v. State, 511 So.2d 342 (5th DCA 1987).
Jory is unequivocal in his stance that he has done nothing illegal and that the State's pursuit of the case stems from a "life-style persecution, a classic example of homophobia. ." Jorjas recorded statements make clear his belief that because the minor male does not feel victimized, there was no victim and thus no crime. Unfortunately for Jory, the victim's feelings or consent to the acts are not affirmative defenses to the criminal offenses of which Jory was convicted, at least under the current law in this state. Jorjas persecution argument also misses the point. It is his illegal sexual involvement with a minor that is targeted, nothing more. While it is true that Jory would have been acquitted of violating section 800.04 had the jury believed the victim's testimony that he was 16 when he had sex with Jory, the fact remains that the jury determined otherwise and the evidence supports its finding.
In Whitehead v. State, 498 So.2d 863 (Fla. 1986), the supreme court held that evidence indicating that a defendant poses a future danger to society "can clearly be considered justification for a departure from the recommended sentence," where that evidence is not already scored on the guidelines score-sheet. Id. at 865. Here, Jory's statements clearly indicate that he does pose a real future danger to society. No other conclusion can be reached after considering Jory's own philosophy that oral and anal intercourse with a minor is not "wrong" and should not be prosecuted as a criminal offense as long as the minor does not come away from the encounter feeling victimized.
Jory's own comments allow a distinction to be made between this case and those cases holding that departure is invalid if based on the mere speculation or conjecture that the defendant will again engage in criminal conduct. See, e.g., Odom v. State, 561 So.2d 443, 445 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (holding that potential for reoccurrence is not an adequate basis for departure); Dixon v. State, 492 So.2d 410, 411 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986) (holding that judge's belief that defendant would strike again was an invalid departure reason because it was based solely on speculation). Jory is clearly a threat to our young people as he has an avowed intention not to be rehabilitated because he perceives his actions , to be proper and legal.
AFFIRM.
PETERSON, J., concurs.
W. SHARP, J., dissents, with opinion.
. § 800.04(2), Fla.Stat. (1987).
. § 827.071(3), Fla.Stat. (1987).
. § 827.071(2), Fla.Stat. (1987).
. § 775.082(3)(c), Fla.Stat. (1987).
. He also contends that the punishment imposed for his crimes is so extremely harsh and grossly disproportionate as to violate Florida's constitutional prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment. Art. I, § 17, Fla. Const. However, Jory failed to lay a sufficient predicate for this argument and thus we will not consider it on appeal. See Kendry v. State, 517 So.2d 78 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).
.The victim testified at trial that he was actually 16 when the tape was made, and that he consented to the sex acts which were filmed. Had he proved to be 16 years old, consent would have been a complete defense to the ten sexual assault counts. See § 800.04(2), Fla.Stat. (1987).