Case Name: William VAN POYCK, Petitioner, v. Harry K. SINGLETARY, Jr., etc., Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1998-05-14
Citations: 715 So. 2d 930
Docket Number: No. 89870
Parties: William VAN POYCK, Petitioner, v. Harry K. SINGLETARY, Jr., etc., Respondent.
Judges: OVERTON, HARDING and WELLS, JJ., and GRIMES, Senior Justice, concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 715
Pages: 930–940

Head Matter:
William VAN POYCK, Petitioner, v. Harry K. SINGLETARY, Jr., etc., Respondent.
No. 89870.
Supreme Court of Florida.
May 14, 1998.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 7, 1998.
Gerald S. Bettman, Jacksonville, and Jeffrey O. Davis and Mitchell S. Moser of Quarles & Brady, Milwaukee, WI, for Petitioner.
Robert A.. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Celia A. Terenzio, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for Respondent.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
William Van Poyck, a prisoner under sentence of death, petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(9), Florida Constitution, and find that Van Poyck is not entitled to relief.
On June 24, 1987, Van Poyck was arrested following an attempt to free prison inmate James O'Brien from the custody of two corrections officers. Officer Fred Griffis was shot and killed during the commission of the crime. Van Poyck was found guilty of first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, six counts of attempted manslaughter, armed robbery with a firearm, aggravated assault, and aiding in an attempted escape. The jury recommended death by a vote of eleven to one and the trial judge sentenced Van Poyck to death. The facts of the case are set forth in greater detail in Van Poyck v. State, 564 So.2d 1066 (Fla.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 932, 111 S.Ct. 1339, 113 L.Ed.2d 270 (1991), in which this Court affirmed the convictions and death sentence. Van Poyck subsequently filed a motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. The trial court denied relief after a substantial evidentiary hearing. This Court recently affirmed the trial court's ruling on the rule 3.850 motion in Van Poyck v. State, 694 So.2d 686 (Fla.1997). Van Poyck now files this petition for a writ of habeas corpus claiming that: (1) his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to properly raise the issue of the trial court's wrongfully forcing him to exhaust his peremptory challenges; (2) his death sentence is unconstitutional because the judge and jury weighed the invalid aggravators that the murder was premeditated or that Van Poyck was the shooter; and (3) he was charged with and convicted of criminal offenses that did not exist as a matter of law. Issues one and three warrant discussion. Issue two is pro-eedurally barred.
As to his first issue, Van Poyck claims the trial judge wrongfully forced him to exhaust his peremptory challenges on seven venire-persons who should have been dismissed for cause, then erroneously denied his request for an additional peremptory challenge. Van Poyck asserts that as a result of the trial judge's error, two challenged jurors served on the jury. Van Poyck contends that his appellate counsel on direct appeal compounded the error by failing to properly present the issue because he identified the wrong jurors seated on the jury, and then failed to argue the issue in any depth or cite relevant legal authority. Van Poyck states that this Court appropriately rejected the argument because the jurors identified by his appellate counsel, although unsuccessfully challenged for cause, were subsequently dismissed for personal reasons, and thus it was unnecessary for Van Poyck to exercise'peremptory challenges. Van Poyck claims that his appellate counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial because this Court would have granted a new trial had the issue been properly presented. We do not .agree that the trial court wrongfully forced Van Poyck to exhaust his peremptory challenges or that Van Poyck's appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance.
If a reasonable doubt exists as to whether a juror can possess an impartial state of mind in the discharge of his or her duties, that juror is incompetent to serve and must be excused for cause. Hill v. State, 477 So.2d 553, 556 (Fla.1985). A trial judge has great discretion in ruling on challenges for cause based on juror incompetency, Gore v. State, 706 So.2d 1328, 1332-33 (Fla.1997), and we will not overturn the trial judge's determination in the absence of "manifest error." Smith v. State, 699 So.2d 629, 636 (Fla.1997). The denial of a challenge for cause will be upheld if there is competent record support for the decision. Gore, 706 So.2d at 1332-33; Johnson v. State, 660 So.2d 637, 644 (Fla.1995). On the other hand, it is reversible error when a challenge for cause is improperly denied, and the defendant then exhausts his peremptory challenges on venirepersons who should have been dismissed for cause and a request for additional peremptory challenges is denied. Trotter v. State, 576 So.2d 691, 693 (Fla.1990); Moore v. State, 525 So.2d 870, 873 (Fla.1988); Hill v. State, 477 So.2d 553, 556 (Fla.1985).
Based on our examination of the record, we find that the trial judge was clearly within his discretionary authority in denying the challenges for cause to the seven venire-persons now claimed by Van Poyck to have been biased or prejudiced. During individual voir dire, each of the seven persons repeatedly and unequivocally stated that he or she could render a verdict based solely on the evidence and the instructions given by the trial judge. We find nothing in this record that mandates that any of these venireper-sons should have been excused for cause.
Van Poyck notes that this Court decided in his direct appeal that the two jurors incorrectly named by his appellate counsel had a pro-death bias and should have been struck for cause. Van Poyck, 564 So.2d at 1071. He claims that because the voir dire testimonies of these jurors are indistinguishable in content from the voir dire of various venire-persons whom his appellate counsel should have named, this Court would have found reversible error in the denial of the for-cause challenges and in the denial of his request for an additional peremptory challenge had he received effective assistance of counsel on appeal. We have reexamined the voir dire of the jurors who were challenged for cause and were the subject of a claim in the initial appeal. In their voir dire, they each unequivocally indicated that they would abide by the trial court's instructions and would recommend a life sentence if the mitigating circumstances outweighed the aggravating circumstances. Since they were excused for personal reasons and Van Poyck did not have to exercise a peremptory challenge, the grounds for their excusal for cause was a non-issue in the initial appeal. On a reexamination of the record, we also find that the trial judge properly exercised his discretion in denying the challenge for cause to each of these jurors.
In conclusion, we find that Van Poyck's appellate counsel did not render ineffective assistance for failing to pursue and argue Van Poyck's claim that the other seven veni-repersons were biased or prejudiced. See Williamson v. Dugger, 651 So.2d 84, 86 (Fla.1994); Chandler v. Dugger, 634 So.2d 1066, 1068 (Fla.1994).
In his third issue, Van Poyck claims that he was charged with and convicted of crimes that do not exist as a matter of law. Specifically, Van Poyck contends that his convictions for attempted first-degree murder and attempted manslaughter were based on a felony murder theory, and that attempted felony murder was determined in State v. Gray, 654 So.2d 552 (Fla.1995), to be a legal impossibility. This claim is also without merit. In State v. Woodley, 695 So.2d 297 (Fla.1997), this Court clarified that the Gray decision should not be applied retroactively to overturn a conviction of attempted felony murder that has become final on appeal. Because the crime of attempted felony murder was a valid offense when Van Poyck's convictions became final, he is not entitled to the relief requested.
Accordingly, the petition for a writ of ha-beas corpus is denied.
It is so ordered.
OVERTON, HARDING and WELLS, JJ., and GRIMES, Senior Justice, concur.
ANSTEAD, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which KOGAN, C.J. and SHAW, J., concur.
. This claim was raised and rejected on direct appeal, Van Poyck, 564 So.2d at 1070-71, and also rejected as procedurally barred on the rule 3.850 appeal. Van Poyck, 694 So.2d at 698.
. The trial judge offered to grant defense counsel's request for an additional peremptory challenge on the condition that Van Poyck waive his right to examine a venireman that the judge wanted to excuse for cause. Apparently, the judge wanted this juror excused because he was concerned about the juror's competency. The trial judge admitted "that the Appellate Court won't like [the proposed bargain]." Defense counsel refused the offer and the trial judge denied his request for an additional peremptory challenge. We do not condone the trial judge's proposed "bargain." Counsel for both the prosecution and the defense have a due process right and a right under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.300(b) to examine venirepersons. O'Connell v. State, 480 So.2d 1284 (Fla.1985).
.The issue was not preserved for direct appeal as to one of these jurors because Van Poyck's trial counsel did not identify her as a venireper-son whom he wanted to excuse through an additional peremptory challenge. Kearse v. State, 662 So.2d 677, 683 (Fla.1995). Thus, Van Poyck's appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise this procedurally barred claim.
. The following are excerpts from voir dire of the seven venirepersons:
Q [The Court]: Would you say . that you could sit on a jury and if a person is found guilty or first degree murder, listen to the evidence in the penalty phase, listen to the instructions in the law and make a recommendation to me and follow the instructions and the law, make a recommendation about either life in prison or death or do you think you would always recommend death?
A [Juror A]: I don't think I would always recommend death. It would depend on the facts and the law.
Q: [W]ould [you] be willing and able to recommend life if the law [sic] met the requirements of the law?
A: Yes, sir.
Q [The State]: And it would not be fair to the Defendant if a jury were to automatically recommend death in every case?
A: I agree.
Q: So, even in a case where there is an intentional killing of a prison guard, could you still look at all the surrounding facts and circumstances such as this person's involvement, any aggravating factors, any mitigating factors that you are instructed to by the Court before making that recommendation?
A: I would be willing to listen to all the factors.
Q: Would you make up your decision of guilt or innocence based upon the evidence that you hear in the courtroom where you get an opportunity to see the witnesses, hear what they have to say, hear the cross examination, see if the evidence conflicts or is consistent with the other evidence in the case?
A: I would have to do that.
Q: That's where a person's guilt or innocence should be based upon, the actual witnesses with confrontation and cross examination, you agree with that?
A: Yes.
Q: That's what you would do in this case?
A: Yes.
Q [The Court]: If I instructed you that under the laws of our country, that under the constitution Mr. Van Poyck as he sits here right at this moment is presumed innocent and that presumption stays with him until the time the State presents evidence sufficient for you to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, would you be able to follow that instruction?
A: I would hope that I could.
Q: Okay. If I told you right now the ball is in your court, is Mr. Van Poyck guilty or not guilty, what would you say in light of what I just told you?
A: I would have to say not guilty.
Q [The Court]: Under the law of Florida the death penalty is an appropriate sentence only in very special cases. And I am going to instruct you on the law as to, basically, what those aggravating circumstances and what mitigating circumstances are. Would you follow those instructions?
A [Juror B]: (Nods in the affirmative.)
Q: And disregard your personal opinion on the matter?
A: (Nods in the affirmative.)
Q: Would you follow my instructions and agree that not in all cases a person should get a death penalty?
A: I will follow your instructions.
Q: No matter what they are?
A: No matter what they are.
Q: [Van Poyck] has no burden of proof under the law.'. He is not required to prove anything in a criminal case, only the State is required to prove anything; okay?
A: (Nods in the affirmative.)
Q: You understand that?
A: (Nods in the affirmative.)
Q: Do you agree with that one principle of law?
A: Yes.
Q [The Court]: Under the law of Florida, sir, the death penalty is a penalty that is appropriate only in very specific and limited cases. And you will be instructed in the law as to what to consider in regards to the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. You must follow the law. Do you understand that?
A [Juror CJ: Yes.
Q: Could you follow that law irregardless of your personal feelings?
A: Yes.
Q: Could you perceive a case where an individual would be on a jury and you would hear the aggravating, mitigating circumstances and you would vote a recommendation of life in prison?
A: Yes.
Q: All right, would you agree, sir, that the matter, matter of employment of the alleged dead person being a . law enforcement officer . would not affect your ability to render a fair recommendation as to life or death?
A: It would not.
Q: Sir, would you say even though you feel [death] is the appropriate penalty [in cases of premeditated first-degree murder] . does that mean that it is a penalty that you would vote for in every first degree murder case regardless, you would not pay attention to the evidence or the instructions or would you follow them?
A: I would listen and think about it and weigh all the evidence and make my decision on that. I would not go in straight looking at: Well, it's premeditated.
Q: It's not a closed issue then, to you?
A: Right. I am not — I would have to have an open mind about it.
Q: You will follow my instructions that I tell you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q [The Court]: Could you, sir, sit on the jury, listen to the instructions of the law and the evidence and render a verdict based on the instructions on the law and the evidence and disregard your personal feelings?
A [Juror. F.]: I, gee, I would have to.
Q: Okay. In other words, if you sat on the jury you could conceive where you would sit on the jury, listen to the evidence and the instructions on the law and come back and say based on everything I have heard there should be a recommendation of life. You could do that?
A: I can do that.
Q: The death penalty should not be imposed in all cases; is that a fair statement?
A: Yes.
Q [The State]: Sir, even though it's a police officer that was, or a prison guard that was killed in this case, would you listen to the mitigating factors?
A: I would listen to the mitigating factors.
Q: [W]ould you listen to the instructions of the Court?
A: Yes.
Q: Would you weigh any mitigating factors against the legal aggravating factors the Court would instruct you?
A: That would be my job.
Q: Concerning that [pretrial] publicity, even though you have read the papers, you formed an opinion from that, could you set that aside and reach a decision based upon the law and the evidence?
A: I feel that I would, yes. I am intelligent enough to go on what is said, what is done in the courtroom.
Q [The Court]: Could you perceive of a situation, excuse me, where you could be on a jury and hear the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and the instructions on the law and you could return a recommendation of, personally, of life in prison?
A [Juror M.]: Yes, if it was explained or, you know, like I said, it was the law.
Q: Okay, what you're telling me then, what I believe is you would be willing to listen to the evidence and aggravating factors, evidence of mitigating factors, you would follow the law that I give you or instructions, make your recommendation based on those factors?
A: Yes.
Q: You would follow that law whether you personally agreed with it or not?
A: Yes.
Q [The State]: If there are aggravating factors that exist outweighing the mitigating factors, then you should make a recommendation of life. Could you follow those instructions of the Court and be fair to both sides?
A: Yes.
Q: So, you would not automatically just because a person is convicted of first degree murder, you would not automatically recommend death. You would look at the circumstances and the Defendant's background or what have you and look at all the circumstances?
A: The facts and the circumstances.
Q: Listen to the judge and make a reasoned decision?
A: Yes.
Q [The Defense]: Suppose the judge should instruct you premeditated murder, even though it's no question but that the person did it, that it is not the end. There are other things that need to be considered. Would you have a problem putting aside your feelings about the death penalty and about those people, you know, living off the public coffers, for the rest of their lives, would you have a problem putting that stuff aside and considering the other things that would need to be considered?
A: No, because the judge, if he says that's the law or that's the way it should be, then, you know, that's his decision, you know. I can live with it.
Q: Would you have any problems going home and telling your family members or your friends that you returned a life recommendation in a premeditated murder case?
A: No.
Q [The Court]: [C]ould you personally sit on a jury where a person was convicted of first degree murder, hearing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and instructions on the law and follow those instructions on the law whether you personally agree with them or not?
A [Juror M.]: Yes, I believe I could.
Q: Could you vote a recommendation of life if the law warranted that, whether you personally agreed or not?
A: Yes, I would, sir.
Q: Ma'am, let me ask you one question. If you were on a jury and you went to the penalty phase and I gave you an instruction in the law as to what concerns the penalty phase and your recommendation, would you follow that instruction in the law?
A: Yes.
Q: Whether you personally agree with it or not?
A: Yes, I would follow the instructions of the law.
Q: Say it involved a police officer or a prison guard and you have those strong feelings about them that you mentioned. Would you still follow those instructions in the law?
A: If I took the oath and all that, yes, I would follow the instructions. I would put my own emotions aside, try not to make up my mind until after I have heard the instructions. But I would follow the instructions. That's the way it would be. That's the way it would have to be because I believe in the law.
Q [The Court]: Will you be willing, sir, to look at [the case] from an objective viewpoint? You understand that under our law the death penalty is only a sentence imposed in specific cases? Would you be willing to follow our law when it was given to you in regards to that extent?
A [Juror N.]: Yes.
Q: And you have specific instructions on the law as to when you make a recommendation as to death or life. Would you be willing to follow those?
A: Yes.
Q [The State]: Could you make a decision if you're chosen as a member of this panel based upon what the judge tells you, do you think you could give that Defendant a fair trial?
A: Yes, I would have to follow the law, yes.
. The following are excerpts from the voir dire of these venirepersons:
Q [The Court]: Will you follow my instructions on the law if they were to tell you that the death penalty is limited and a recommendation only of death can only be given in specific instances where certain aggravating factors outweigh any mitigating circumstances?
A [Juror AA]: Uh-huh.
Q: Would you say that it's not fair for a jury to always recommend the death penalty, would you agree with that, a jury should not always recommend death?
A: Yes, I think I do.
Q [Defense Counsel]: [D]o you still feel, however, that whatever instructions there are that in all cases where there is an intentional killing you believe that the death penalty should be given?
A: No, not all cases.
Q [The Court]: [U]nder our system of justice Mr. Van Poyck, as he is seated here, is presumed innocent.... Do you agree with that?
A [Juror DB]: Yes, I do.
Q: Would you agree that you could sit as a juror in a case of this nature of first degree murder and if you listened to the aggravating and mitigating circumstances that you would follow my instructions on the law disregarding your personal feelings?
A: Yes, I would.