Case Name: Edward Miller, Executor, &c., of John G. Warren, deceased, Respondent, v. The President, &c., of Junction Canal Company, Appellant
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1869-09-23
Citations: 41 N.Y. 98
Docket Number: 
Parties: Edward Miller, Executor, &c., of John G. Warren, deceased, Respondent, v. The President, &c., of Junction Canal Company, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 41
Pages: 98–106

Head Matter:
Edward Miller, Executor, &c., of John G. Warren, deceased, Respondent, v. The President, &c., of Junction Canal Company, Appellant.
By a statute authorizing the defendant (a corporation) to take land, and to erect dams abutting on land of others, it was provided that where there was any disagreement between the company and the owner, as to the amount to be paid therefor, “ it should he lawful for the parties to appoint three persons impartially to estimate and determine the price to be paid for the same* * * “ but if a majority of the persons appointed should not, within thirty days after receiving notice of their appointment, file a report of their estimate, either party may apply to the court for a venire to the sheriff to summon a jury.
A dam having been erected by the defendants, abutting on the plaintiff’s land, and a small strip of the land being taken by them, and the parties not being able to agree upon the compensation, entered into an agreement in writing, appointing three persons to determine the amount to be paid the plaintiff. After several hearings before these persons, attended by the counsel and witnesses of both parties, the defendant served upon them, and upon the plaintiff, a written notice, revoking the powers of the referees. The referees failing and refusing to proceed, in consequence of such revocation, their fees were paid by the plaintiff. In an action brought by him against the' defendants, for the amount so paid, and, also, witness and counsel fees paid by him, on saidhearings,—Held (Woodruff, Mason and Lott, JJ., dissenting), that he could recover them.
Whether or not the defendants had any power to revoke such appointment or submission, it was too late for them to deny its existence in this action, after they had not only previously asserted it, but by such assertion effected their object, and rendered the plaintiff’s disbursements useless.
(Cause argued June 16th, 1869,
and decided September 23d, 1869.)
Appeal from judgment for the plaintiff upon the decision of a judge without jury, affirmed in General Term of the Supreme Court in the sixth district.
The action is brought to recover the expenses incurred by John G. Warren (the testator), in certain proceedings had pursuant to the provisions of the charter of the defendant, for the determination of the price to be paid to him for cer tain lands, required for the use of the defendants, for the construction, maintenance, &c., of their canal and the works connected therewith.
The ground upon which the recovery was had is, that those proceedings constituted an arbitration; that after expenses had been incurred, and witnesses examined, the defendants revoked the powers of the persons appointed to estimate and determine such price, in violation of their alleged agreement.
The facts are fully stated in the dissenting opinion of Woodruff, J.
George F. Danforth, for the appellant.
Daniel W. Gillett (Samuel Hand with him), for the respondent.

Opinion:
Daniels, J.
By the agreement which was made, selecting the three persons named in it to assess and determine the compensation to be paid by the defendant to the testator, it was clearly implied that the dispute existing between the parties on that subject, should be submitted to them for their decision; and even though no power was reserved in it, and created by the statute, for its revocation, it was too late for the defendant to deny its existence, after it had not only asserted the existence of that power, but, in addition to that, had accomplished the object for which that assertion had been made. By the notice, which, the defendant gave to the persons who were to assess the compensation, and to the testator, they were prohibited from proceeding with them examination and assessment, and acquiesced in that prohibition. The notice had the exact effect that the defendant designed it should have, which was to prevent the assessment from being made. And after securing that result by means of it, justice requires that it should not now be permitted to avail itself of the objection, that it did not have lawful authority for doing what it actually 'accomplished. If the act was unlawful, because it was unauthorized, it was none the less the cause of the damages sustained by the testator. It was clearly unwarranted by the legal tenor of the agreement made; and as the defendant has enjoyed its expected advantages, it should bear the burden of the expenses unjustly imposed by means of it upon, the testator. Good morals as well as the law, which prohibits every person from taking advantage of his own wrong, concur in maintaining this result.
The recovery was for the expenses necessarily incurred by the testator, in preparing for the hearing of the matter in controversy between himself and the defendant. These expenses constituted a legal demand against the defendant, because they were rendered unavailable to the testator, by the unlawful act performed by it, as well as by means of the breach of the agreement it had, entered into ; and upon the faith of the performance of which they were legitimately incurred.
The judgment should be affirmed.