Case Name: GRAHAM v. STANDARD FIRE INS. CO.
Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1922-04-26
Citations: 119 S.C. 218
Docket Number: 10880
Parties: GRAHAM v. STANDARD FIRE INS. CO.
Judges: Mr. Citiee Justice Gary and Mr. Justice Watts concur.
Reporter: South Carolina Reports
Volume: 119
Pages: 218–237

Head Matter:
10880
GRAHAM v. STANDARD FIRE INS. CO.
(112 S. E. 88)
1. Insurance — .Evidence of Knowledge of Agents That Insured Automobile Was Mortgaged and Used in Public Service Sufficient to go to the Jury; — In action on an automobile fire insurance policy defended on the ground that the car was mortgaged and used in public service, contrary to the policy, evidence of knowledge thereof by agents of the insurance company held sufficient to go to the jury.
Note: The question as to insurance against damage to automobile by fire is discussed in a note in 14 A. L. R. 199.
2. Insurance — Agency Once Proven Presumably Continues.— Where the agency of the company’s local agent is proven, it is presumed to have continued, in the absence of proof of change.
3. Insurance — Policy on Automobile Not in Public Service When Destroyed Was Not Forfeited Because Automobile Had Been in Public Service. — Under automobile fire insurance policy providing that the automobile must not be used in public service, if the automobile was not in public service when destroyed, the policy was not forfeited because it had been in public service.
4. Trial — Instruction Held Not Erroneous as Being on Facts; “Where.’' — In an action on an automobile fire policy, an instruction, “Where they (insurers) knew the plaintiff was using his car in a manner not permitted by the terms of the policy, it wouldn’t do for them to keep quiet, say nothing, keep the plaintiff’s money, and not let him know they would forfeit his policy,” was not erroneous as being a charge on the facts, since the word “where” is used in the sense of “if,” meaning in case the insurers knew, etc.
5. Trial — Instruction Held Not Erroneous as Being on Facts.-— In an action on an automobile fire policy, an instruction as to the knowledge of the insurers or their agent that the automobile was used in public service contrary to the policy: “Did the company know it, or did its agent know it? Knowledge of the agent is knowledge of the company. If you are satisfied it did, make the company pay. And if you are satisfied that the public service business had nothing to do with causing the loss, why let the company pay” — was not erroneous as being a charge on the facts.
Before Prince, J., Anderson.. June, 1921.
Affirmed.
Action by A. K. Graham against Standard Fire Insurance Co. From judgment for plaintiff defendant appeals.
Messrs. Bonham & Allen, for appellant,
cite: Waiver: 27 R. C. L. 908; 54 S. C. 37.
Messrs. Greene & Barle, for respondent,
cite: What may he taken as evidence of intention to waive forfeiture: 57 S. C. 358; 70 S. C. 295; 97 S. C. 375; 102 S. C. 115; 104 S. C. 403; 54 S. C. 509. Agent may waive provisions of policy: 80 S. C. 395; 97 S. C. 375; 1 Civ. Code 1912, Sec. 2712. Violation of provision of policy, if not responsible for loss is not ground for forfeiture: 76 S. C. 76. No forfeiture for violation of which agent has knowledge where no return of premium was offered: 97 S. C. 375; 102 S. C. 315; 74 S. C. 246.
April 26, 1922.

Opinion:
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Mr. Justice Fraser.
This is an action on a policy insuring an automobile. The automobile was burned, and the company refused to pay. The evidence, or so much as is proper, will be given under the decision of the various assignments of error. The judgment was for the plaintiff.
I. There was a motion made for a directed verdict; this was refused. His Honor could not have directed a verdict. There were three provisions in the policy for forfeiture:
(a) The insured must be sole and unconditional owner.
(b) The property insured must not be under mortgage.
(c) The property insured must not be used in public service.
There was evidence undisputed that there was a mortgage on the machine, but there was also evidence that the agent of the defendant knew it was under mortgage. The car had been used as a public service oar, but had been withdrawn from public service before: the fire. There was evidence from which the jury might have inferred that the person who wrote the policy for the defendant knew this fact also — that the car was bought to be used in public service before the policy was issued. See Gandy v. Ins. Co., 52 S. C. 224, 29 S. E. 655. The defendant claimed that the policy was void ab initio, and although the premium had been paid, yet the record does not show any offer to return the premium. There was also evidence that Mr. Johnson, who wrote the policy, gave the plaintiff proofs of loss and told him to make them out and the claim would be paid.
It is true that the adjuster told the plaintiff that the company denied obligation, and it would do no good to put in a proof of loss, and this the plaintiff admitted, but said the local agent told him to put in the proof of loss, and it would be paid. The appellant claims that agency had been revoked, and the plaintiff did not show that the local agent was agent at the time. This overlooks the fact that the local agent was agent at the time the policy was issued, and, the relation once having been proven, it is presumed to have continued' until there is prdof of a change. The defendant's witness said he did not know when the relationship had ended. A verdict could not have been directed.
II.The second assignment of error is that his Honor charged the jury that the provision as to public service has no application if they believed that the car was not in public service at the time of the loss. The appellant in argument assigns reasons for the forfeiture, stating that a car on account of accumulation of oil in the machinery would be more liable to burn. If the policy had excluded cars that had been used in public service, then the point would be well taken. The forfeiture is manifestly for the increased perils incident to public service. The provision as to chattel mortgages clearly refers to the perils of an intentional burning, while covered by a chattel mortgage. This assignment of error cannot be sustained.
III.As to sole and unconditional ownership: The record does not show that the chattel mortgage was due. The policy was taken out only a day or two after the purchase, and, if it was due, the record should have shown it.
IV.The next assignments of error are that his Honor charged on the facts when he said:
(a) "Where they knew the plaintiff was using his oar in a manner not permitted by the terms of the policy, it wouldn't do for them to keep quiet, say nothing, keep the plaintiff's money, and not let him know they would forfeit his policy."
This is not a charge on the facts. The word "where" is used in the sense of "if." That is, where they know, or in a case where they know. '
(b) Again: "Did the company know it, or did its agents know it? Knowledge of the agent is knowledge of the company. If you are satisfied it did, make the company pay. And if you are satisfied that the public service business had nothing to do with causing the loss, why let the company pay." This is also said to be a charge of facts. This is not a charge on the facts, and the judgment is affirmed.
Mr. Citiee Justice Gary and Mr. Justice Watts concur.