Case Name: MERCANTILE TRUST COMPANY, a Corporation, as Executor of the Last Will and Testament of Harriet Elizabeth Russell, deceased; and as Testamentary Trustee Under the Last Will and Testament of Harriet Elizabeth Russell, deceased, and Senter M. Jones, Jr., as Successor Co-Trustee of said Last Will and Testament, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Mrs. Ingram C. SOWELL, Mrs. James A. Crutchfield, Sr., Defendants-Appellants, Mrs. Burt M. Jack, Sr., Defendant, Harriet Elizabeth Jack, a Minor, Defendant-Appellant, Russell Minton Jack, Burt Maskill Jack, Frank Ellsworth Jack, II, Defendants, Harry Ellsworth Jack, Defendant-Appellant, Webster Groves Presbyterian Church, a Corporate Body, Defendant-Respondent, Washington University, a Missouri Corporation, Defendant-Respondent, Mercantile Trust Company and Senter M. Jones, Jr., Executors of the Estate of Reuben James Russell, Defendants-Appellants
Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1962-07-16
Citations: 359 S.W.2d 719
Docket Number: No. 48001
Parties: MERCANTILE TRUST COMPANY, a Corporation, as Executor of the Last Will and Testament of Harriet Elizabeth Russell, deceased; and as Testamentary Trustee Under the Last Will and Testament of Harriet Elizabeth Russell, deceased, and Senter M. Jones, Jr., as Successor Co-Trustee of said Last Will and Testament, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Mrs. Ingram C. SOWELL, Mrs. James A. Crutchfield, Sr., Defendants-Appellants, Mrs. Burt M. Jack, Sr., Defendant, Harriet Elizabeth Jack, a Minor, Defendant-Appellant, Russell Minton Jack, Burt Maskill Jack, Frank Ellsworth Jack, II, Defendants, Harry Ellsworth Jack, Defendant-Appellant, Webster Groves Presbyterian Church, a Corporate Body, Defendant-Respondent, Washington University, a Missouri Corporation, Defendant-Respondent, Mercantile Trust Company and Senter M. Jones, Jr., Executors of the Estate of Reuben James Russell, Defendants-Appellants.
Judges: STORCKMAN, LEEDY and DALTON, JJ., concur.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 359
Pages: 719–730

Head Matter:
MERCANTILE TRUST COMPANY, a Corporation, as Executor of the Last Will and Testament of Harriet Elizabeth Russell, deceased; and as Testamentary Trustee Under the Last Will and Testament of Harriet Elizabeth Russell, deceased, and Senter M. Jones, Jr., as Successor Co-Trustee of said Last Will and Testament, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Mrs. Ingram C. SOWELL, Mrs. James A. Crutchfield, Sr., Defendants-Appellants, Mrs. Burt M. Jack, Sr., Defendant, Harriet Elizabeth Jack, a Minor, Defendant-Appellant, Russell Minton Jack, Burt Maskill Jack, Frank Ellsworth Jack, II, Defendants, Harry Ellsworth Jack, Defendant-Appellant, Webster Groves Presbyterian Church, a Corporate Body, Defendant-Respondent, Washington University, a Missouri Corporation, Defendant-Respondent, Mercantile Trust Company and Senter M. Jones, Jr., Executors of the Estate of Reuben James Russell, Defendants-Appellants.
No. 48001.
Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.
July 16, 1962.
Dissenting Opinion July 20, 1962.
Motion for Rehearing Denied Sept. 10, 1962.
Harold A. Thomas, Jr., and Fordyce, Mayne, Hartman, Renard & Stribling, St. Louis, for Mercantile Trust Company and Senter M. Jones, Jr., Executors, Estate of Reuben James Russell, Dec’d.
Forrest C. Donnell, St. Louis, for defendant-appellant, Harry Ellsworth Jack.
David Y. Campbell, St. Louis, for appellant, Harriet Elizabeth Jack.
Richard S. Bull and Carter, Bull & Baer, St. Louis, for respondent, Washington University.
John A. Arnold, St. Louis, for respondent, Webster Groves Presbyterian Church.
Lloyd E. Boas, St. Louis, for appellants, Mrs. Ingram C. Sowell and Mrs. James A. Crutchfield; Musick, Peeler & Garrett and E. Leroy Tolies, Los Angeles, of counsel.

Opinion:
WESTFIUES, Chief Justice.
Plaintiffs Mercantile Trust Company, a corporation, as executor of the last will and testament of Harriet Elizabeth Russell, deceased, and as testamentary trustee under her will, and Senter M. Jones, Jr., as successor co-trustee of said will, filed this, ai declaratory judgment, action in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County, Missouri, seeking the construction of the will.
The principal question involved is whether by the terms of the will the testatrix made a disposition of her entire estate or whether she died intestate in case certain beneficiaries under a trust created by the will were living at the expiration of the trust.
The trial court entered a decree to the effect that the testatrix by her will made a disposition of her entire estate. From this, judgment, certain defendants appealed.
The appealing defendants are Mrs. Ingram C. Sowell, Mrs. James A. Crutchfield, Sr., Harriet Elizabeth Jack, a minor by her guardian ad litem, and Harry Ellsworth Jack. Defendants Mercantile Trust Company and Senter M. Jones, Jr., appealed as. executors of the estate of Reuben James Russell, deceased, who was the husband of the testatrix. Defendants who did not appeal are Mrs. Burt M. Jack, Sr., Russell' Minton Jack, Burt Maskill Jack, and Frank Ellsworth Jack II. The other defendants, Webster Groves Presbyterian Church and! Washington University, a Missouri corporation, are respondents.
The testatrix' maiden name was Harriet Elizabeth Jack. She was horn on January 14, 1876. She married Reuben James Russell on May 25, 1898. No children were born of this marriage. She died on April 15, 1955. Her husband died on February 11, 1957. At the time she executed the will in question, March 17, 1949, her father, her mother, and all six of her brothers were deceased. Testatrix had no sisters. Her heirs at law were her husband and two nieces and four nephews. The defendants Mrs. Ingram C. Sowell and Mrs. James A. Crutchfield, Sr., were her nieces. Defendants Russell Minton Jack, Burt Maskill Jack, Frank Ellsworth Jack II, and Harry Ellsworth Jack were her nephews.
Respondents Webster Groves Presbyterian Church and Washington University contend that they are the residuary legatees and entitled to the entire estate after the termination of the trust created by the will. Appellants, on the other hand, contend that the above-named respondents are the residuary legatees only in the event that the four persons named as beneficiaries die prior to ten years after the death of Reuben James Russell. If respondents are correct in their position, other questions presented by appellants automatically drop out of the case. We are of the opinion that respondents' position is well taken.
(It should be noted here that the Mercantile Trust Company, a corporation, is the same Trust Company named in the will as the Mercantile Commerce Bank & Trust Company, a Missouri corporation. The change in name occurred after the will was executed and before this action was filed. It should be further noted that the parties, during the trial, agreed that the correct spelling of testatrix' name is "Harriett" and not "Harriet" as it sometimes appears in the record.)
Directing our attention to the will, we shall state the substance thereof except that we shall set forth in full those provisions which we deem to have a bearing on the questions under consideration. By the first article, testatrix revoked all prior wills made by her. By the second and third articles, testatrix provided for the payment of all her obligations, such as debts, taxes of all kinds, and any promises she had made, such as contributions or gifts to charities. Whatever disposition testatrix made of her estate, it was done by articles four and five which we set forth in full as follows:
"FOURTH: I give and bequeath absolutely and forever all of my household furniture and equipment, rugs, books, pictures, silver, glass, china and other household goods, jewelry, clothing and other personal effects and all automobiles and automobile equipment owned by me at the time of my death to my husband REUBEN JAMES RUSSELL, if he shall survive me; if he shall not survive me or if he shall die at or about tha same time by reason of any common accident, calamity or other disaster then the above articles shall be sold by my Executors and the proceeds thereof shall become a part of my residuary estate to be disposed of as hereinafter provided.
"FIFTH: All the rest, residue and remainder of my estate of every name, nature and description and wherever situated, I give, devise and bequeath to my Trustees, in trust nevertheless, to invest and from time to time reinvest the same, and to collect the rents, income, issues and profits thereof and therefrom, and after first deducting all expenses attendant upon the execution of the trust to hold, pay over or apply the principal and income thereof and therefrom as follows :
"(a) To hold such principal during a trust term to be measured by the life of my husband, REUBEN JAMES RUSSELL, if he shall survive me.
"(b) Until the expiration of such trust term to pay over or apply the entire net income thereof as nearly as possible in equal quarterly installments to my husband, REUBEN JAMES RUSSELL, as long as he shall live.
"(c) Upon the death of the survivor of my said husband and me to divide the principal or so much thereof as shall then remain, into five (5) equal shares and to set apart and hold in trust one such equal share for each of the following:
"(1) The Webster Groves Presbyterian Church, Webster Groves, Missouri, or its successors.
"(2) MRS. INGRAM C. SOWELL (nee FRANCIS JACK), 1369 Hyde Street, San Francisco, California.
"(3) MRS. JAMES A. CRUTCH-FIELD, SR. (nee HELEN JACK), 935 Olive Avenue, Coronado, California.
"(4) MRS. BURT M. JACK (nee ROXANA B. MINTON), 30 North lola Drive, Webster Groves, Missouri.
"(5) MISS HARRIETT ELIZABETH JACK, daughter of RUSSELL M. JACK, 835 Pine Tree Lane, Webster Groves, Missouri.
"(d) To hold the equal shares so set apart for each of the above named for a trust term extending for a period of ten (10) full years after the death of my husband, REUBEN JAMES RUSSELL, or ten (10) full years after my death if he shall predecease me.
"(e) During each such trust term to pay over or apply the net income accruing on each such share to the beneficiary for whom such share is held in trust in as nearly equal quarterly installments as practicable.
"(f) In the event any of the individual beneficiaries above named shall predecease me, or shall die after the creation of the trust for her benefit, the allocation of income to such person or persons shall cease; the total number of beneficiaries shall be deemed to have been reduced and the income and principal allocated to said deceased beneficiary or beneficiaries shall be prorated and added to the principal of the trusts for the then surviving beneficiaries; and the other provisions and limitations with relation to the remaining beneficiaries shall remain in force and effect; except that if all of the individual beneficiaries above named shall predecease me or shall die within the ten (10) year period and if my husband shall then be dead, the trust shall cease and terminate and my Trustees shall pay over the property then constituting such trust absolutely and forever and free from any trust, as follows :
"(1) Ninety (90) per cent to Washington University of St. Louis, Missouri, to be used by the Corporation of the University (the Board of Directors) as they shall deem best, but it is my wish that the principal of the fund be kept intact to be known as the 'Reuben James and Harriett Elizabeth Russell Fund' and the income used only for the support and maintenance of the University and primarily for the Medical Research Department. This is not an absolute limitation on the use of this fund nor on the income thereof but is simply an expression of my wishes.
"(2) The remaining ten (10) per cent to the Endowment Fund of the Webster Groves Presbyterian Church.
"(3) In making the division between the two residual beneficiaries above named, my Trustees shall divide the principal and accumulated income of the trust estate, insofar as is practicable, in kind."
By articles six, seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven, and twelve, testatrix instructed the trustees as to the manner of dealing with the trust property. The instructions were very detailed. The principal of the estate was to be kept inviolate except for the needs of her husband. We quote in full article eleven because we deem it has a bearing on the question of the intention of testatrix. It reads:
"ELEVENTH: I hereby nominate and appoint my husband, REUBEN JAMES RUSSELL and the MERCANTILE COMMERCE BANK & TRUST COMPANY, a Missouri Corporation, of St. Louis, Missouri, to be the Executors and Trustees under this, my Last Will and Testament. If my said husband should predecease me or if he should not at any time be able or willing to serve as Co-Executor or Co-Trustee, I nominate and appoint SENTER M. JONES, JR. to act as Co-Executor and Co-Trustee. If I am predeceased by my husband, REUBEN JAMES RUSSELL, and by SENTER M. JONES, JR., I will and direct that the MERCANTILE COMMERCE BANK & TRUST COMPANY shall act as sole Executor and I will and direct that a Co-Trustee to act with the MERCANTILE COMMERCE BANK & TRUST COMPANY shall be appointed, in writing, by the then Chancellor of Washington University. Such successor Executor or Trustee shall have all the rights and powers herein granted to the Executor and Trustee originally named, and I will and direct that none of my Executors or Trustees shall be required to give any bond or security as such."
The duty of the courts in construing wills is well stated in 95 C.J.S. Wills § 590, pp. 737-743, to be: "The chief object and purpose of construction of a will is to discover and carry out the intent of the testator as expressed in the will, and this is the prime duty of the court, and its sole function or province. In other words, the intention of the testator is the prime consideration, controlling factor or element, or pole star to guide the court to which the problem is presented in the construction of every will." A rule which may aid us further in this case may be found in 95 C.J.S. Wills § 593, pp. 779, 780. It reads: "In construing a will, the general testamentary scheme may be considered as bearing on testator's intention, and the will should always be interpreted to carry out as far as possible the general scheme or intention as shown by the entire document. The dominant idea pervading a will must control, and in case of doubt a will should be construed in favor of a general or primary intention."
All of the above statements of the law taken from 95 C.J.S. are supported by numerous citations of cases from many states including Missouri.
Looking at the will and giving due consideration to all parts thereof, the question before us is, did the testatrix by her will intend to dispose of all of her property? We are of the opinion that she did. To hold otherwise would mean that testatrix did not intend that the Webster Groves Presbyterian Church and Washington University should be residuary legatees unless a most unlikely event was to occur, that is, that all four of the individual beneficiaries named in (c) of the fifth article should die within ten years after the death of her husband. That time would be February 11, 1967, the husband having died on February 11, 1957. That these four individuals, all younger than testatrix or her husband (and one not yet 21 years of age), may die prior to 1967 is a possibility but highly improbable. That testatrix should have provided for such an unlikely event evidences an intent on the part of testatrix not to overlook any eventuality.
Let us now closely scrutinize the provisions of the will. We note that in article four testatrix bequeathed her personal effects, such as household goods, to her husband absolutely. However, in the event he should not survive testatrix, then the property was to be converted into cash and "become a part of my residuary estate to be disposed of as hereinafter provided." (Emphasis supplied.) Looking at the fifth article, we note subparagraph (f) (3) where the testatrix instructed her trustees to the effect that "(3) In making the division between the two residual beneficiaries above named, my Trustees shall divide the principal and accumulated income of the trust estate, insofar as is practicable, in kind." (Emphasis supplied.)
The "two residual beneficiaries above named" could only be Washington University and the Webster Groves Presbyterian Church. What property were the trustees directed to distribute to the two named beneficiaries? The answer is "the principal and accumulated income of the trust estate." (Emphasis supplied.) When were the trustees to make this distribution ? It is our opinion that this should be done at the termination of the trust created by the fifth article of the will and that the termination date was to be ten years after the death of the testatrix or the death of her husband, in case he survived the testatrix, except and unless all individual beneficiaries of the trust should die prior to the expiration of ten years, in which event, the trust should then immediately cease and the trust estate be divided between the two residuary legatees.
By a provision in article eleven, supra, the testatrix directed that in the event her husband and Senter M. Jones, Jr., predeceased her a successor co-trustee should be appointed by the then Chancellor of Washington University. Would the testatrix have made that provision if she had intended by her will that Washington University would be a beneficiary only upon the happening of an event most likely not to occur ? We think not. In our opinion, the testatrix had in mind that Washington University would eventually get title to 90% of the trust property and therefore the University should have some control of the management of the property in case her husband and Senter M. Jones, Jr., predeceased her. It may be further noted that in (f) (1) of article five, whereby 90% of testatrix' property was given to Washington University, the testatrix expressed the wish that such property should be used "primarily for the Medical Research Department." We think that this direction indicates that in the mind of the testatrix she had given the University the bulk of her estate.
So far, we have found that testatrix clearly indicated in the fourth article, in fact she stated, that her residuary estate would be disposed of by her will. In the last paragraph of article five, she directed that the trustees should divide her estate between "the two residual beneficiaries above named." Then, in the eleventh article, she directed that under certain circumstances Washington University should have the right to name a co-trustee to manage the property of her estate. All of these expressions are consistent with but one conclusion, that is, that the testatrix fully intended to bequeath to the Webster Groves Presbyterian Church and to Washington University her entire estate after the trust ended. In reaching this conclusion, we have considered the meaning of such terms as "residuary estate," "residual beneficiaries," "residuary legatee," etc. 77 C.J.S. p. 308; 96 C.J.S. Wills § 1097, p. 818. Further, in determining the intent of the author of a will, parts of the will may be considered to explain other parts. 95 C.J.S. Wills § 620 b, p. 864.
There were two opinions written in this case in Division Two of this Court. Neither received a carrying vote. In one of these opinions a portion of (f) of article five of the will was transposed and set in with (d) of article five. Transposition of sentences and words may be made in arriving at the intention of the author of a will. See 95 C.J.S. Wills § 607, p. 808, where we find the rule to be: "In order to preserve a testator's expressed intention the court may transpose words, expressions, or sentences in his will; but not where the language is plain and unequivocal and where to do so would give it a different meaning, or create an intention which the testator had not expressed. There must be something in the will which makes it certain that the expressed intention of the testator necessitates alteration of the language used." See also Mercantile Commerce Bank & Trust Co. v. Binowitz, Mo.App., 238 S.W.2d 893, l. c. 899(11).
We adopt, without quotation marks and with some modification in language, the following portion of one of the opinions prepared in Division Two dealing with the transposition of a part of paragraph (f) into paragraph (d). It reads as follows: Standing alone, paragraph (d) of Article Fifth establishes ten years as the duration of the trust in question. Nevertheless, all parties seem to agree that the term of the trust may he shortened by virtue of the clause in the latter part of paragraph (f), which reads as follows: "except that if all of the individual beneficiaries above named shall predecease me or shall die within the ten (10) year period and if my husband shall then be dead, the trust shall cease and terminate." This clause dealing with the termination of the trust and modifying the ten-year period is found in a paragraph otherwise dealing with the allocation and distribution of income to the four individual beneficiaries. While it is proper to limit the ten-year term by the clause quoted, it is not proper to lift out this clause alone to qualify and modify paragraph (d) without taking with it the remainder of paragraph (f) which deals with the disposition of the corpus upon the termination of the trust. All of the provisions on termination of the trust and distribution of the principal must be read together.
It can be demonstrated that the ambiguity which causes the present controversy results primarily from the arrangement of the subject matter of the will and particularly the separation of the provisions dealing with the duration of the trust and the disposition of the residue upon its termination. By transposing and combining the last portion of Article Fifth (f) and repunctuating in two instances, we have the following result (the portion transposed is placed in italics in order to make the transposition more readily apparent) :
"(d) To hold the equal shares so set apart for each of the above named for a trust term extending for a period of ten (10) full years after the death of my husband REUBEN JAMES RUSSELL, or ten (10) full years after my death if he shall predecease me, except that if all of the individual beneficiaries above named shall predecease me or shall die within the ten (10) year period and if my husband shall then be dead, the trust shall cease and terminate and my Trustees shall pay over the property then constituting such trust absolutely and forever amd free from any trust, as follows:
"(1) Ninety (90) per cent to Washington University of St. Louis, Missouri, to be used by the Corporation of the University (the Board of Directors) as they shall deem best, but it is my wish that the principal of the fund be kept intact to be known as the 'Reuben James and Harriett Elizabeth Russell Fund' and the income used only for the support and maintenance of the University and primarily for the Medical Research Department. This is not an absolute limitation on the use of this fund nor on the income thereof but is simply an expression of my wishes.
"(2) The remaining ten (10) per cent to the Endowment Fund of the Webster Groves Presbyterian Church.
"(3) In making the division between the two residual beneficiaries above named, my Triestees shall divide the principal and accumulated income of the trust estate, insofar as is practicable, in kind.
"(e) During each such trust term to pay over or apply the net income accruing on each such share to the beneficiary for whom such share is held in trust in as nearly equal quarterly installments as practicable.
"(f) In the event any of the individual beneficiaries above named shall predecease me, or shall die after the creation of the trust for her benefit, the allocation of income to such person or persons shall cease; the total number of beneficiaries shall be deemed to have been reduced and the income and principal allocated to said deceased beneficiary or beneficiaries shall be prorated and added to the principal of the trusts for the then surviving beneficiaries ; and the other provisions and limitations with relation to the remaining beneficiaries shall remain in force and effect."
The will could be read in the same way without transposition, but in the form set out above there would be little room for argument that the testatrix did not intend the residue to go to the University and the Church regardless of when the trust terminated. Granted that a very cautious draftsman, in order to avoid any possible chance of ambiguity, would even in this transposed form insert some such phrase as "then upon termination of the trust whenever and however caused," my Trustees shall pay over, etc. But not all legal drafstmen are of the same capacity and then, too, "Homer himself hath been observed to nod." Such human shortcomings are what give rise to the rules of construction noted here, as well as Sec. 474.430, RSMo 1959, V.A.M.S., requiring the courts to give effect to "the true intent and meaning of the testator."
Not many authorities are cited in this opinion. It has been well stated that "precedents are of less value in the construction of wills than in any other field of inquiry." Thompson v. Smith, Mo., 300 S.W.2d 404, l. c. 406(2). However, we have read quite a number of authorities, including 57 Am.Jur., Wills, in particular Secs. 1153, 1158, and 1159, as well as the sections of C.J.S. pertaining to the interpretation of wills and many cases, including the following Missouri cases: Gehring v. Henry, 332 S.W.2d 873; Ussher v. Mercantile Trust Co., 328 S.W.2d 699; Lang v. Estorge, 242 S.W.2d 50; Mercantile Commerce Bank & Trust Co. v. Binowitz, Mo.App., 238 S.W.2d 893; Lutheran Altenheim Society of St. Louis v. Younghouse, 365 Mo. 39, 275 S.W.2d 361.
In construing the will of the testatrix in this case, we have not rendered the will unnatural in its result. In fact, the opposite is true. Furthermore, by such an interpretation, effect is given to all parts of the will. In other words, it renders the will and all of its provisions a harmonious whole. No clause is rendered meaningless nor one inconsistent with another. Most important, such a construction reflects the true intention of the testatrix which after all is said and done should be the primary object to be attained.
We are of the opinion that the trial court decided the issues presented to him correctly.
The judgment is affirmed.
STORCKMAN, LEEDY and DALTON, JJ., concur.
EAGER, J., dissents in separate opinion filed.
HOLLINGSWORTH, J., dissents.
HYDE, J., dissents and concurs in separate dissenting opinion of EAGER, J.