Case Name: Owings v. Tucker
Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Kentucky
Decision Date: 1890-06-19
Citations: 90 Ky. 297
Docket Number: 
Parties: Owings v. Tucker.
Judges: Judge Holt not sitting.
Reporter: Kentucky Reports
Volume: 90
Pages: 297–299

Head Matter:
Case 48 — PETITION EQUITY
June 19.
Owings v. Tucker.
APPEAL FROM MONTGOMERY CIRCUIT COURT.
1. Acceptance of Deed. — If a grant is beneficial to tbe grantee, it may be presumid that he has accepted it; but if, from the nature of the grant, this presumption does not arise, an acceptance must be otherwise shown.
2. Same. — If a grant is made to an adult without his knowledge or consent, it is no grant, because he can not be made a grantee without his knowledge and consent; and when the knowledge is brought home to him, he may reject the grant.
3. Same. — If a deed made to an infant is beneficial to him, equity will imply an acceptance; but he may reject the grant upon his arrival at-age if he has not done any act which will estop him.
WOOD & DAY, TURIN ER & SON for appellant.
The presumption is that a deed beneficial to the grantee has been accepted by him. (Davenport v. Prewitt, 9 B. M., 94; Eisher’s Adm’r v. Hess, 9 B. M., 617-18.)
WM. H. HOLT, HENRY L. STONE for appellee.
1. It is essential to the validity of a deed that there should be an actual acceptance by the grantee, or something equivalent to it. The presumption that a party will accept a deed because it is beneficial to him will not be carried so far as to consider him as having accepted it. (Davenport v. Prewett’s Adm’r, 9 B. M., 94; Commonwealth, Thompson’s Heirs v. Jackson, &c., 10 Bush, 424; Tuttle v. Turner, 28 Texas, 773; 2 Washburn on Real Property, side page 581; Bell v. Farmers’ Bank, 11 Bush, 35; Alexander v. DeKermel, 81 Ky., 345; Skillman v. Hamilton, 1 Bush, 248.)
2. The deed of an infant is not void, but voidable only. Slight acknowledgments after full age are sufficient to determine the election in the infant to affirm or avoid his voidable deed. (Phillips v. Green, 5 Mon., 350,)

Opinion:
JUDGE BENNETT
delivered the opinion op the court.
In 1853 David L. Jones deeded jointly to his children as a gift his home tract of land, containing four hundred and seventy-five acres, reserving the right of maintenance out of the land. H. L. Jones was an infant son of the donor, and was one of the donees. In 1859 David L. Jones divided this land between said children, and made each a deed to his part, deducting previous advancement's from his interest. David L. Jones conveyed by deed the part designed for H. L. Jones to him for life, remainder to his children. Several years thereafter the appellant caused the life interest of H. L. Jones in this land to be sold by the sheriff, and he purchased it, and received a deed for it, and took the possession of it under said deed, and so held the possession for several years, when he discovered, as he says, that David L. Jones had, in 1853, conveyed to H. L. Jones an undivided fifth interest in said tract of land in fee, which he had sold under another execution to satisfy the remainder of the debt existing after the sale of said life interest.
Did H. L. Jones acquire title under the deed of 1853 ? Certainly not. The case of Davenport v. Prewitt, &c., 9 B. M., 98, upon which the appellant relies, says that, in order to make a valid conveyance, there must be both a grantor and grantee, and if the grant is beneficial to tfie grantee, it may be presumed that lie fias accepted it; and if, from tfie nature of tfie grant, tfiis presumption does not arise, an acceptance of tfie grant must be otherwise shown, else there is no grant. And if a grant is made to an adult without his knowledge or consent, it is no grant, because fie can not be made a grantee without his knowledge and consent, and when tfie knowledge is brought home to him fie may reject tfie grant. Also, equity will imply an acceptance of a grant made to an infant, if beneficial to him, but fie may reject tfie grant upon his arrival at age, if fie has not done some act which will estop him.
Here there is no proof whatever that H. L. Jones ever accepted tfie deed of 1853. On tfie contrary, it is expressly proven that fie did not accept said deed, but accepted the deed of 1859, and took possession of tfie land under it, and field tfie possession under it until it was sold by tfie appellant. Tfie old suit, upon which tfie appellant relies as evidencing that H. L. Jones accepted tfie deed of 1853, explicitly shows tfie reverse of that fact. It shows that H. L. Jones accepted tfie deed of-1859. Also, it is shown beyond all cavil that tfie deed of 1853 was, prior to tfie deed of 1859, canceled by a reconveyance of' the land. Tfiis is shown not only by tfie decided weight of evidence in tfiis case, but by tfie answer of J. M. Jones in tfie old suit referred to, which is not denied in tfie particular that it alleges tfie reconveyance.
Tfie judgment is affirmed.
Judge Holt not sitting.