Case Name: JOHN W. SHARP, Respondent, v. Q., O. & K. C. RY. CO., Appellant
Court: Kansas City Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1909-12-06
Citations: 139 Mo. App. 525
Docket Number: 
Parties: JOHN W. SHARP, Respondent, v. Q., O. & K. C. RY. CO., Appellant.
Judges: All concur.
Reporter: Missouri Appeal Reports
Volume: 139
Pages: 525–538

Head Matter:
JOHN W. SHARP, Respondent, v. Q., O. & K. C. RY. CO., Appellant.
Kansas City Court of Appeals,
December 6, 1909.
,1. RAILROADS: Fence: Notice: When Not Required. In an action to recover the cost of building a new fence along defendant’s right of way through plaintiff’s premises, under Revised Statutes 1899, section 1105, where defendant had erected a fence which was not a “lawful” fence as required hy the statute, no notice to defendant is necessary.
2. -: -: Character Of. The fence constructed hy the landowner must he of the character which the railroad is required to build, and the statute (R. S. 1899, sec. 3295) authorizing fences four feet high with posts sixteen feet apart in counties which have adopted the law preventing swine from running at large, has no application to fences along the right of way of a railroad as required hy Revised Statutes 1899, section 1105.
3. PRACTICE: Appellate: Change of Theory. Where the case was tried in the circuit court and presented in the appellate court on the theory that a fence of the character prescribed in section 3295, Revised Statutes 1899, is proper along the right of way in counties where the law against swine running at large is in force, it will he determined in this court on that theory.
4. -: Justice Court: Evidence: Admissibility Under Pleading. When, plaintiff filed a statement before a justice of the peace sufficiently disclosing the cause of action claimed, and the statute on which it was based, it was not necessary to directly aver that the law restraining swine was in force in the county in order to render proof of such fact admissible.
5. -: -: Pleading Sufficiency. In actions instituted before justices of the peace, strictness is not required and great informality in pleading is allowed.
On Rehearing.
6. RAILROADS: Fence: Adjoining Owner: Compliance With Statute, Substantial compliance with the statute is all that is required, not mathematical accuracy, and the fa^t that two panels of the fence in a distance of half a mile were slightly more than 16 feet apart will not bar a recovery.
7. -: Appellate: Theory at Trial. The objections made and instructions asked in the trial court for a specific purpose will be considered in the appellate court for the same purpose only.
8. -: -: Rehearing: Supplying: Assignment of Error. When appellant on first hearing presents the case on one theory, and fails to assign error on certain rulings of the trial court as required by the rules and, as a result, the case is affirmed it cannot when a rehearing is granted supply the omission and thereby procure a consideration thereof.
Appeal from the Sullivan Circuit Court. — Eon. John P. Butler, Judge.
Affirmed.
J. G-. Trimble and Wilson & Clapp for appellant.
(T) The statute is penal and a strict compliance With all of its provisions must he shown in order to sustain a recovery. R. S. 1899, sec. 1105; Barnett v. Railroad, 68 M'o. 56; Railroad v. Ziegler, 108 111. 304. (2) The giving of notice of an intention to build a fence is not required by the statute. McNear v. Railroad, 42 Mo. App. 14. (3) A notice to repair is the only notice required or allowed by the statute where there is an existing fence. R. S. 1899, sec. 1105; McNear v. Rail road, supra. (4) Notice to repair must be given and in the manner the statute prescribes. Such notice is a jurisdictional fact. If no notice be given, or an illegal notice, or one not such as the statute contemplates, there can be no recovery. R. S. 1899, sec. 1105; State v. Railroad, 75 Mo. 526; Timmerman v. Snowden, 88 Mo. 218. (5) In actions on penal statutes every fact essential to a'recovery must be affirmatively pleaded, and the rule applies equally to a statement filed before a justice of the peace. Wood v. Telegraph Co., 59 Mo. App. 236. (6) In this case as the posts were at least sixteen feet apart, there can be no recovery unless it was proved that the stock law was in force. But of this essential fact, there was no allegation in the statement. The admission of this evidence over defendant’s objection was reversible error. (7) The setting of posts seventeen feet and ten inches apart is not á substantial compliance with the statute. The refusal of defendant’s second instruction Avas error. R. S. 1899, sec. 3295; McNear v. Railroad, supra. (8) All fences composed of posts and wire must be at least four and one-half feet high with posts set firmly in the ground not more than eight .feet apart. R. S. 1899, sec. 3295. (9) The obligation of a railroad to fence is not changed or altered by the adoption of the law restraining swine from running at large. Stanley v. Railroad, 84 Mo. 625; Morrow v. Railroad, 17 Mo. App. 103; Kingsbury v. Railroad, 1'56 Mo. 379; Growney v. Railroad, 102 Mo. App. 442.
B. B. Fields for respondent.
(1) The appellant did not have a statutory fence where its road run along and over plaintiff’s land. R. S. 1899, sec. 3295, page 1871, hence, in law, no fence at all. Where there is no fence, notice is not required. McNear v. Railroad, 42 Mo. App. 14. And a defective notice would work no harm to defendant. McNear v. Railroad, 42 Mo. App. 14. But the notice was not defective, and was read to the jury without objection, hence defendant cannot now complain. (2) A notice “to repair” would only mean to replace the old fence as it was. As it would not turn hogs it did not comply with the law yet the company could have fully complied Avith a notice to repair by replacing, that is restoring a five wire fence, which would have been wholly inadequate to turn plaintiff’s hogs, and would not have been a laAvful fence. “To repair” means to restore to a sound or good state after decay, injury, dilapidation or partial destruction.” Verdin v. St. Louis, 131 Mo. 26. This definition is found on page 87 of same volume. Prom this definition it will be seen that to repair does not mean to build a different kind of fence such as would have to be built in this instance to comply with the law, but to “restore” the old fence. (3) This suit was commenced before a justice of the peace. No formal pleadings were required. R. S. 1899, sec. 3852. Any statement of the cause of action sufficient to bar another suit and to apprise the defendant of the nature of the claim is sufficient in suit before a justice of the peace. Iba v. Railroad, 45 Mo. 469; Razor v. Railroad, 73 Mo. 471; Key v. Railroad, 73 Mo. 475; Kansas City v. Johnson, 78 Mo. 661; Gibbs v. Railroad, 11 Mo. App. 459; Lewis v. Baker, 24 Mo. App. 682; Witting v. Railroad, 28 Mo. App. 103; Damhorst v. Railroad, 32 Mo. App. 350; Hill a7. Scott, 38 Mo. App. 370; Boefer v. Sheridan, 42 Mo. App. 226; Dahlgren v. Yocum, 44 Mo. App: 227; Polham v. Railroad, 45 Mo. App. 153; Lee v. Telegraph Co., 51 Mo. App. 375; Wilkinson v. Insurance Co., 54 Mo. App. 661; Darby v. Jorndt, 85 Mo. App. 274; Cunningham v. Dickerson, 104 Mo. App: 410; Johnston v. O’Shea, 118 Mo. App. 287; Phares v. Lumber Co., 118 Mo. App. 546; Redel v. Stone Co., 126 Mo. App. 163. . (4) The technical rules applied in the case of pleadings in the circuit court will not be enforced as to pleadings in justices’ courts. Holland v. The R. H, Winslow, 25 Mo. 57; Quinn v. Stout, 31 Mo. 160; Mayer v. McCabe, 73 Mo. 236; Bradley v. SAveiger, 61 Mo. App. 419; Terti v. Insurance Co., 76 M'o. App. 42; Adams v. Ellis, 86 Mr. App. 343; Gunther v. Aylor 92 Mo. App. 161. (5) If the stock law was in force, the fence was sufficient. No other or different fence is required of a railroad company than of any one else, in counties under the stock law, except as hereinafter noted. The difference is that a railroad company must fence and others need not fence against swine and other like stock where the law restraining such stock from running at large is in force and in addition to the lawful fence prescribed by the statute, to-wit: — -posts not more than sixteen feet apart with not less than three wires, the top one substantially four feet from the ground, a railroad company must, under the proviso at the end of section 3295, Revised Statutes 1899, fence against hogs, sheep, etc. R. S. 1899, sec. 3295. Nothing in this section indicates any other distinction and this is the view of the law held by appellant in its original brief and argument. All the cases cited by appellant in its last brief were cases Avhere the railroad company either had no fence at all or had not fenced against swine. The court rightly held that the company was not relieved of the obligation to fence because of the stock law, without, so far as we can ascertain, passing on the question as to the kind of fence, except that it must be a lawful fence. (6) In counties where the law restraining swine and like animals from running at large is in force a lawful fence may be built of posts and wire, the posts set firmly in the ground not more than sixteen feet apart, with-three wares tensely stretched thereon, the top wire substantially four feet from the ground, the other two placed at proper distances below so as to turn horses and cattle, and in case of railroads must be constructed so as to turn hogs, sheep, etc. Acts 1885, p. 166; Acts 1887, p. 194; r! S. 1899, sec. 3295.

Opinion:
ELLISON, J. —
Plaintiff instituted this action before a justice of the peace to recover the cost of a fence which, he built on the line of defendant's right of way along or through plaintiff's premises. There was a judgment in plaintiff's favor before the justice and also on appeal to the circuit court.
The action is founded on section 1105, Revised Statutes 1899. Plaintiff served defendant with a written notice "to build me a hog tight fence along the north side of your railroad." The evidence disclosed that the railway company had a fence already constructed but that it was not a proper or legal fence from the start. It was composed of only five wires and was not constructed so as to prevent smaller domestic animals, such as hogs, from going through. It could not have been intended as a fence against hogs. The statute requires that the railroad must in the first instance build "lawful fences" on the sides of its road. And if it fails for three months after completion of the road, to build a fence "as herein required," the owner may build it and recover the cost, etc. If the fence thus required is once built and becomes out of repair, the owner may give five days' notice of such non-repair, naming the places where the defects are, and if the company fails to make the repairs the owner may do so and recover costs, etc.
We held in McNear v. Railroad, 42 Mo. App. 14, that notice need not be given in cases where a fence had not been built. That the notice was only required when repairs were wanted on a fence already existing. But it was, of course, meant that the fence already existing must be the lawful fence, sufficient to turn stock of all kinds, as required by the statute. When that kind of a fence is built by the railroad, then if it becomes out of repair, notice must be given to the road as a prerequisite to the owner's right to do the repairing himself and recover the cost. But if the fence required by the statute has not been built, though some other kind has been, it is not a question of repair, but is rather one' of original construction and hence no notice to repair is required. To "repair" means to restore to a sound or good state after decay, injury, dilapidation or partial destruction (Virden v. St. Louis, 131 Mo. l. c. 87), that is, as applied to this case, to restore to original condition as near as may he.
In this case the fence built by the railroad was not the one contemplated by the statute. It was a mere makeshift so far as practical use by a farmer was concerned. A notice to repair would have meant a maintenance of the worthless fence.
The foregoing observations show the notice given by plaintiff was unnecessary and it may therefore be left out of consideration.
This brings us to a point which, but for a consideration mentioned further on, would be fatal to plaintiff's case. The fence erected by the land-owner must be the lawful fence which the railroad was required to erect. The fence built by plaintiff was as far from being such lawful fence as the original one. The posts were set sixteen feet apart and the top wire was only four feet from the ground. This description of fence was sought to be defended on the ground that Sullivan county had adopted the law preventing swine from running at large; the statute (Sec. 3295, R. S. 1899) being that in such-counties fences composed of wire and posts need only be four feet high and the posts sixteen 'feet apart. But that part of that statute refers to outside fences, other than those required of railroads. The idea of the Legislature being that where cattle and horses were permitted to run at large and hogs were not, a fence of three wires on posts sixteen feet apart was sufficient. But that does not apply to the fence of a railway company running along or through one's land. The fence there required is to keep the land owner's stock from getting out of his enclosure, while the fence mentioned in the statute is to keep stock at large from getting into such enclosure. The railroad is required to erect and maintain lawful fences just as it would if there were no stock law in force. The stock law does not relieve them and has no hearing on the question. [Stanley v. Railroad, 84 Mo. 625; Morrow v. Railroad, 17 Mo. App. 103; Kingsbury v. Railroad, 156 Mo. 379.] In .order to hold the railroad liable plaintiff should have built a fence such as the law required the road to build, which, as we have just seen, would be a lawful fence if there were no stock law.
But the case was tried on the theory that if the law restraining swine were in force in Sullivan county, the fence plaintiff built would be a proper fence, and that is the point as urged here both in brief and argument. Defendant's contention, both at the trial and here, was, and is, that plaintiff had no right to prove the adoption of that law by the people of the county for the reason that he had not pleaded that fact, and therefore his fence must be one with posts not more than eight feet apart, instead of sixteen. The brief and argument is a concession that if that was not error, plaintiff could recover so far as that branch of the case vas concerned. Therefore, considering and deciding the case as tried and as it is presented here, we find that while there is no direct and affirmative averment of the adoption of the law restraining swine, yet the face of the entire statement filed with the justice discloses, clearly enough, the cause of action claimed and the statute upon which it is based. It would manifestly bar any other action for the same cause. It is scarcely necessary to say that in actions before justices, strictness is not required and great informality in pleading is allowed.
The judgment is affirmed.
All concur.