Case Name: GUNN v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1922-02-22
Citations: 252 S.W. 172
Docket Number: No. 6459
Parties: GUNN v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 252
Pages: 172–185

Head Matter:
GUNN v. STATE.
(No. 6459.)
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Feb. 22, 1922.
On Motion for Rehearing, May 23, 1923.
Dissenting Opinion May 23, 1923.
On Application for Leave to File Second Motion for Rehearing, June 29, 1923.)
1. Criminal law &wkey;> 1166'/2 (8) — Refusal to grant additional challenge must be erroneous and material to be ground for reversal.
In order that an alleged error in the refusal of the court to grant an additional challenge may be available on appeal, it must appear under Vernon’s Ann. Code Cr. Proc. 1916, art. 837, subd.’ 2, that the refusal to grant the request was not only erroneous but also was such material error as wgs calculated to injure rights of accused.
2. Criminal law <&wkey;822(l) — Whole charge must be considered in determining correctness of portion.
The whole charge must be looked to in determining the correctness of any given portion thereof.
3. Criminal law <@=>823(6) — Instruction relative to seif-defense against real or apparent danger held not error when taken in connection with whole charge.
In a prosecution for murder of wife, in which the theory of defense was that, if accused did shoot and kill his wife, the shot was intended for his stepson, and the shot was fired in self-defense against an attack by the stepson and accused’s wife, an instruction urged as error in failing to tell the jury that a reasonable fear or expectation of death must be determined alone from the standpoint of accused, and that it limited his right of self-defense to an attack by wife alone, fteM.not ground for reversal where subsequent instructions told the jury to view the matter from accused’s standpoint, and, if so viewed, they believed he was being attacked by either the stepson or the wife, and believed the danger from such attack was real or apparent, and that such danger caused him to commit the homicide, he must be acquitted.
4. Criminal law <&wkey;829(5) — Refusal of instruction as to accused's right to eject stepson, in shooting at whom he killed wife, held not error in- view of evidence and charge given.
In a murder prosecution, in which the theory of the defense was that, if accused did shoot and kill his wife, the shot was intended for his stepson, and that it was fired in self-defense against an unlawful attack by the stepson, refusal to charge that, if the stepson was over 21 years of age and accused was in possession of the premises, he could request the stepson to leave and use the necessary force to eject ¡held not ground for error in view of charge given, and there was no question as to who owned the premises, and that the stepson was over 21 years of age.
5. Homicide <&wkey;300(3) — Charge held not open to objection that it limited right of self-defense to existence of actual danger.
In a murder prosecution, a charge held not open to the objection that it limited accused’s right of self-defense to the existence of actual danger where in one instruction the jury were told accused might defend against apparent danger, and in another against reasonable appearance of danger.
6. Homicide <&wkey;l45 — To warrant legal presumption that deceased intended! to kill, weapon used must be calculated to produce death. '
To warrant the presumption, as a matter of law as provided in Vernon’s Ann. Pen. Code 1916, art. 1106, that the design of deceased was to kill, the facts must show the weapon used by him to be one calculated to produce that result.
7. Homicide &wkey;s269 — Whether deceased designed to kill not determinable, as matter of law, from character of weapon used by deceased.
The question whether it may be presumed, as a matter of law, as provided in Vernon’s Ann. Pen. Code 1916, art. 1106, that deceased designed to kill cannot be determined in any individual case from the sole viewpoint of the inherent character of the weapon claimed to be in the hands of deceased.
8-. Homicide &wkey;>300(9), 341 — Act of deceased in drawing pistol held not ground for basing legal presumption of intent to kill accused, and refusal to instruct not reversible error.
Where deceased drew a pistol and threw it down on accused when forced to retreat, pointed at accused, but did not fire it, held that it could not be inferred that deceased made an attack on accused with a weapon which, as a matter of law, was calculated to produce death, so that it was not error to refuse to .instruct the jury as to the legal presumption of deceased’s intent to kill accused, as provided in Vernon’s Ann. Pen. Code 1916, art. 1106, but, if refusal was erroneous, it was not error requiring reversal. • Code Cr. Proc. 1911, art. 743.
9.Homicide <&wkey;300 (7) — Submission of accused’s guilt in killing wife in attempt to shoot stepson predicated on offense had he killed stepson not error.
Where accused first killed his wife and then his stepson in one transaction, and, in a prosecution for the miirder of hm wife, his defense was that, if he did shoot and kill his wife, the shot was intended for the stepson, and that it was fired in self-defense against an unlawful attack by the stepson upon him, there was no error in the court’s charge submitting the law of guilt vel non of accused, predicated on the kind and degree of offense which would have existed had the stepson been killed by the shot that killed the wife.
10. Witnesses <&wkey;370(I) — Inquiry of accused’s witnesses as to their political affiliations with accused held legitimate.
In a murder prosecution inquiry of accused witnesses relative to their political affiliations with accused, or that of other persons interested in accused’s behalf, and members of the same political party or candidates for office, held to fall within rule allowing legitimate exploration of those matters indicating the friendship or leaning of witnesses, and those associated with them, toward any party or issue involved.
11. Homicide <&wkey;300(3) — Accused’s right to act upen theory of threatened attack held guarded by charge as given.
Eights of accused in a murder prosecution to act upon the theory that a threatened attack had begun held fully guarded by charge, and that the charge was as applicable when some or all of the threats were made to accused direct as when some or all of them were shown to have been merely reported.
12. Homicide <&wkey;l 16(6) — Accused would have same right to act in self-defense whether he heard threats of attack or heard of them and believed them.
If accused charged with murder heard threatened attacks, or if he heard of them and believed what he heard., he would have the same right, and no greater, to act in self-defense in either instance.
13. Homicide <3=»171 (3) — Where double murder was one transaction evidence as to each successive step therein held admissible.
Where the killing of accused’s wife and stepson was so closely related in point of time and continuity of action as to make it one transaction all the evidence was admissible to show in what manner each successive step of the transaction took place.
On Motion for Kehearing.
14._Homicide <&wkey;>145 — What issues of fact must be found by jury before presumption of law of intent to kill arises.
Before the presumption of law of intent to kill or maim, etc., may arise under Vernon’s Ann. Pen. Code 1916, art. 1106, the jury must find that deceased had a weapon, that such weapon in the manner of its use was calculated to cause death, and that with such weapon deceased was making an attack upon accused reasonably indicating an intention to kill.
15. Homicide <&wkey;348 — Unless giving charge, regarding presumption of intent to kill, would produce different verdict, refusal to give harmless.
Unless it appears in a murder prosecution that, by giving the charge that presumption of intent to kill arises from the use of a deadly weapon, under Vernon’s Ann. Pen. Code 1916, art. 1106, a different verdict might have resulted, refusal to give such instruction is not reversible error under Code Cr. Proc. 1911, art. 743, forbidding a reversal unless error was calculated to injure rights of accused.
16. Homicide &wkey;300(7> — Only that law of self-defense giving parties their rights should be given.
Not all the law of self-defense should be given in every case, but only that which is apt, and which gives to the parties their rights under the facts in that particular case.
On Application for Leave to Eile Second ■Motion for Rehearing.
17. Homicide <&wkey;300(14) —Instruction held not to limit jury’s consideration to threats communicated! to. accused by third parties.
A charge in, a murder prosecution which told the jury that if either S. or K., shot by defendant, had made threats against the life of defendant and “the same came to the ears of defendant or he was informed thereof,” etc., held not subject to criticism that it limited the jury’s consideration to threats which had been communicated to defendant by other parties, and that it was calculated to cause the jury not to' regard threats claimed to have been made directly to defendant by K.
18. Homicide &wkey;295(3) — Instruction' held not to> have limited jury’s consideration in determining cause of killing.
Contention that a charge of manslaughter in a murder prosecution was defective, held not tenable where the charge expressly authorized the jury to consider, in addition to what occurred at the homicide, the past conduct of deceased and another, killed at the same time, or either of them, toward defendant and to consider all facts in the case.
Morrow, P. J., dissenting.
Appeal from District Court,. Bell County; M. B. Blair, Judge.
J. N. Gunn was convicted of homicide and appeals.
Affirmed..
Evetts & White and W. W. Hair, all of Temple, for appellant.
R. G. Storey, Asst. At’ty. Gen., for the State.

Opinion:
LATTIMORE, J.
Appellant was convicted in the district court of Bell county of murder, and his punishment fixed at 99 years in the penitentiary.
The facts in this case constitute a tragic history. Appellant, the father of several children, married deceased, who was the mother of six children and there were born to them five more. The children of each prior marriage seemed to have grown up and left the common home, except that some of the younger sons of decease.d would occasionally return and cause much feeling in the family. The killing took place at the home of appellant and deceased. No one was present at the time save the husband, his wife, and the youngest son of the wife by her former marriage. This young man, whose name was Hobart Keaton was also killed by appellant at the same time, and apparently in the same transaction. •
The theory of the defense was that, if appellant did shoot and kill his wife, the shot was intended for Keaton, and that said shot was fired in self-defense against an unlawful attack by 'Keaton upon him. Treating the various objections in the order in which they appeared on the trial, we observe a number of bills of exception taken to events occurring in the formation of the jury. In our opinion none of said bills show any arbitrary and unauthorized refusal to sustain any challenge for cause to any particular juror, and the only question raised by any of said bills of exception, calling for discussion on our part, is that complaining of the court's refusal to grant to appellant an additional peremptory challenge, in order that he might exercise same upon the juror Swope. Eleven jurors had already'been obtained. Appellant had exhausted the peremptory challenges allowed him by statute. He requested the privilege of exercising such challenge upon the juror Swope, which was denied. This bill of exceptions is very lengthy and sets out in extenso the matters transpiring in the selection of each of the jurors down to, and including, those relating immediately to the selection of Mr. Swope. The apparent purpose is to inform us of the reasons calling for the exercise of the prior challenges allowed by statute as peremptory. We think nothing in the voir dire examination of Juror Swope shows him to be unfair or prejudiced, or in any way disqualified to give to appellant that fair and impartial trial guaranteed by the Constitution and laws. Unless we so believed, those things complained of in this and appellant's other bills of exception relating to the formation of the jury, would be of no, moment. It must be shown in some way that in declining to grant him this addi-. tional. challenge, an objectionable juror was forced upon appellant, else nothing would be shown to us upon which we could base a conclusion of any injury. The matter is complained of in appellant's motion for new trial. To avail him, upon such hearing or on appeal to this court, it must not only be made to appear that the refusal of the trial court to grant such request was erroneous, but also that it was such' material error as was calculated to injure the rights of appellant. Article 837, Vernon's C. C. P., subd. 2; Leeper et al. v. State, 29 Tex. App. 72, 14 S. W. 398.
Appellant urges what he thinks to be error in paragraph 8 of the court's charge, same being raised by bills of exception Nos. 7 and 8. (Said paragraph is as follows:
"Now, if you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant, J. N. Gunn, in the county of Bell and state of Texas, on or about the time alleged in the in-' dictment, with a deadly weapon, or instrument reasonably calculated and likely to produce death by the mode and manner of its use, and not in defense of himself against an unlawful attack, real or apparent, reasonably producing a rational fear or expectation of death or serious bodily injury, and not under circumstances reducing same to manslaughter as herein defined, with intent to kill, did unlawfully and with malice aforethought shoot and thereby kill the said Sarah Gunn, as charged in the indictment, you will find him guilty of murder, as charged, and assess his punishment at death, or by confinement in the penitentiary for life, or for any term of years not less than five."
It is insisted that this is too restrictive, in that it fails to tell the jury that the reasonable fear or expectation of death must be determined alone from the standpoint of the accused; and that it limits his right of self-defense to an attack by Mrs. Gunn alone, it being his contention that Hobart Keaton was making the main attack upon him, and that his right of self-defense should have been stated to exist against danger, real or apparent, from an attack by Keaton, or both Keaton and Mrs. Gunn. The rule is uniform that the whole charge must be looked to in determining the correctness of any given portion thereof. Paragraphs 15 and 16 of said charge are as follows:
"Now, if you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, J. N. Gunn, killed the said Sarah Gunn by shooting her with a pistol, but if you believe from the evidence, or have a reasonable doubt thereof, that, when the said Sarah Gunn was so shot, Hobart Keaton was making, or was about to make, an unlawful attack upon the defendant, which, viewed from his standpoint, and from the manner and character of it, caused him to have a reasonable expectation or fear of death or serious bodily injury, real or apparent, and that, acting under such reasonable ' expectation, or fear, the defendant shot at the said Hobart Keaton, and, while so shooting, accidentally killed Sarah Gunn without intent to kill the said Sarah Gunn, you will acquit the defendant.
"Or, if you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, J. N. Gunn, killed Sarah Gunn by shooting her with a pistol, but if you believe from the evidence, or have a reasonable doubt thereof, that, when the said Sarah Gunn was so killed, she was making, or about to make, an unlawful attack upon the defendant, which, viewed from his standpoint and from the manner and character of it, caused him, the defendant, to have a reasonable expectation or fear of death or serious bodily injury, real or apparent, and that, acting under such reasonable expectation or fear, the defendant shot and killed the said Sarah Gunn, you will acquit the defendant."
An examination of these paragraphs discloses that both of the objections of appellant to paragraph 8 are here obviated. The jury are told in each paragraph to view the matter from the standpoint of the appellant, and, if so viewed, it appeared that he was being attacked by either of said parties and if the jury believed the danger from such attack was real or apparent, and that this caused him to commit the homicide, that he must be acquitted.
Appellant asked the court to give the following special instruction:
"Gentlemen of the Jury: You are charged that if, from the evidence, you find that J. N. Gunn was the husband of Sarah Gunn, and was in possession of the house and premises where the homicide occurred, and if you further find, from the evidence, that Hobart Keaton was over 21 years of age at the time of the homicide, then you are instructed that the defendant had the right to request Hobart Keaton to leave his house and premises, and if Hobart Keaton refused to leave defendant's home and premises, after, such request, if same was made by defendant then the defendant would'have the right, under the law, to use such force as was reasonably necessary to eject him therefrom."
The refusal of this is made the subject of a bill of exceptions. In the main charge we find the following:
"You are charged that, if the defendant- forbade Hobart Keaton from entering his, 'the defendant's home or premises, or forbade the said Hobart Keaton from remaining on the same, or ordered him to leave the same, then the defendant would have the right to use such force as would be necessary to put the said Hobart Keaton off the said premises."
There was no question but that it was shown without dispute that the premises where the killing occurred belonged to appellant, and also that Keaton was over 21 years of age, and in our opinion the giving of said special charge was rendered unnecessary in view of the last-quoted part of the main charge.
We find ourselves unable to assent to appellant's contention that the law of self-defense, as applicable to the facts, was not given to the jury. In addition to paragraphs 15 and 16, supra, the court charged the jury in paragraphs 18 and 19 of the charge as follows:
"So in this case, if you find from the evidence that the deceased, Sarah Gunn, or Hobart Keaton, had made threats against the life of the defendant, or to do serious bodily injury, and that the same came to the ears of the defendant, or he was informed thereof, and that he believed the said threats, if any •were made, and if you find from the evidence, or have a reasonable doubt thereof, that at the time of the shooting of Sarah Gunn by the defendant, if he did shoot her, she or Hobart Keaton made any gesture, or act, or both, indicating to the defendant that she and Hobart Keaton, or either of them, were then and there in the act of making an attack upon the defendant, or putting into execution any threats that might have been so made, which, from the manner and character of it, and the defendant's knowledge of the character and disposition of the said Sarah Gunn or Hobart Keaton, caused him to • have a reasonable expectation or fear of death or serious bodily injury to him-at the hands of Sarah Gunn and Hobart Keaton, or either of them, viewed from the defendant's standpoint at the time, then the defendant had a right to act on appearance of danger, and if, under such circumstances, he shot at Hobart Keaton and that he accidentally, and without intent to kill Sarah Gunn, did kill her by the shot fired at Hobart Keaton, under such circumstances, then such killing of Sarah Gunn would be justified, and you should acquit the defendant, and say by your verdict, 'not guilty.'
"Or, if in this case you find from the evidence that the deceased, Sarah Gunn, bad made threats against the life of the defendant, or to do him serious bodily injury, and that the same came to the ears of the defendant, or he was informed thereof, and that he believed said threats, if any were made, and if you find from the evidence, or have a reasonable doubt thereof, that at the time of the shooting of Sarah Gunn by the defendant, if he did shoot her, the said Sarah Gunn made any gesture, or act, or both, indicating to the defendant that she was then/and there in the act of making an attack upon the defendant, or putting into execution any threats that she might have made, which, from the manner and character of it, and defendant's knowledge of the character and disposition of said Sarah Gunn, caused him to have a reasonable expectation or fear of death, or serious bodily injury, to him, at the hands of Sarah Gunn, viewed from the standpoint of the defendant at the time, then the defendant had a right to act upon such appearance of danger, and if, under such circumstances, he shot and killed Sarah Gunn, then such killing of Sarah Gunn would be justified and you should acquit the defendant, and say by your verdict, 'not guilty.' "
Nor do we think the charge open to the objection that it limits appellant's right of self-defense to the existence of actual danger. We have set out paragraphs 15 and 16, in which the court, in terms, told the jury that he might defend against apparent danger and it will appear from paragraphs 18 and 19, last quoted, that the jury were told that he might defend against the reasonable appearance of danger.
By his bill of exceptions No. 3, appellant complains that the court did not charge the presumption arising from the use of a deadly weapon as set forth in article 1106, Vernon's P.- C. Exception- was taken to the main charge for failing to set forth said presumption. The contention that this should have been given in the charge' is based on appellant's testimony. He swore that, just prior to the homicide, his wife and Hobert Keaton were standing at a woodpile, and that he told Hobart he wanted him to leave the premises, and the latter said he had come for some money owed him by the appellant and one Wooley, and was not going until he got it; that, when he came back presently from the toilet in the yard to his kitchen, Hobart was standing there, and after some conversation Hobart pulled á pistol and. threw it down on him, and. that he pulled out his pistol and shot at Hobart. He said that Hobart began to back, and backed through the kitchen and dining room and across the back porch, appellant following him, and that, as Hobart was in the act of backing through the outside door of the porch appellant fired at him, and when he did so he saw his wife fall, and that Hobart continued to back, appellant following him, and that in this relative position they went some 200 feet or yards, Hobart going forward part of the time and backward part of the time, and that Hobart picked up a stick and started toward appellant, and that he shot and killed ¡him. Appellant said he did not observe Hobart's pistol after he got past the woodpile. In one place in his cross-examination appellant used the following language:
"He backed out through the dining room and then on the screened porch, and when we got out on the porch he was still backing, and he still had that pistol in his hand, and it wouldn't work."
Article 1106, Vernon's P. 0., is ás follows:
i'When the homicide takes place to prevent murder, maiming, disfiguring, or castration, if the weapons or means used by the party attempting or committing such murder, maiming, disfiguring, or castration are such as would have been calculated to produce that result, it is to be presumed that the person so using them designed to inflict the injury."
Our analysis of the facts above stated does not lead us to conclude that article 1106 should have been given in charge. To warrant the assumption, ás a matter of law, that the design of deceased was to kill, the facts must show the weapon used by him .to be one calculated to produce that result. This question cannot be determined in any individual case from the sole viewpoint of the inherent character of the weapon claimed to be in the hands of the deceased. This court has often said that certain weapons used in cases then before the court, were not deadly per se. Branch's Ann. P. C., pp. 934, 935. These include an axe, a knife,.a chair, a loaded walking cane, a fence pole, a rock, an iron pipe, a stick of cordwood, and firearms when used other than as firearms. Let us go further. One. who draws a weapon on another may be convicted of some grade of assault. If such weapon be shown to be a deadly weapon, and it appear that the intent of the accused was to injure, but not to kill or maim, he might be convicted of aggravated assault under the eighth subdivision of article 1022, Vernon's P. C. Though the weapon be one with which death-might be inflicted, yet if the intent of the accused be -only to alarm, his guilt would be but simple assault under the third subdivision of article 1013, Vernon's P. C. Jackson v. State, 90 Tex. Cr. R. 369, 235 S. W. 882. In McCutcheon v. State, 49 Tex. Cr. R. 607, 95, S. W. 525. the accused pointed a gun at prosecutor, threatening to shoot. The facts showing only an intent to alarm, we held the case one of simple assault. In Ray v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 21 S. W. 540, the accused had a Winchester rifle, and demanded a retraction from prosecutor, and not being satisfied with the speed with which the retraction was made he threw a shell into his rifle. He was held guilty of simple assault. In Hall v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 105 S. W. 816, we held that the use of a loaded Winchester riflé was but a simple assault when the purpose of such use was to alarm. In Shuffield v. State, 62 Tex. Cr. R. 556, 138 S. W. 402, the accused presented a shotgun at prosecutor, but did not fire same. We reversed an aggravated assault conviction holding guilt to be but of simple assault. The lamented Judge Pavid-son said in the opinion:
"As used by appellant, the gun was not a deadly weapon; it was not fired, nor was it used to strike with; no injury was inflicted. In fact, all that was done by the accused was to present the gun in a threatening manner under the circumstances already detailed. Under this character of evidence, and under our statute.and decisions, we are of opinion this would not be more than a simple assault from the state's standpoint."
This language is applicable in the instant case. Taking the situation as most strongly stated by appellant, and it appears that deceased drew a pistol and threw it down on him. The pistol was not fired, nor is there evidence to justify the conclusion of any effort on the part of deceased to fire same. If the weapon was snapped, it is not disclosed; if the trigger was pulled by deceased, that fact is not stated. We quote more fully from appellant's statement of what occurred when he came into the kitchen of his house, immediately before the shooting began, as follows :
"And he said, 'By God, he come after that money,' and he pulled his pistol out'; this pistol is the one you show me. We were in the kitchen at the start, and I was facing him, and he was facing me, and he got out his pistol first and threw it down on me. I don't know whether it would shoot or not. He did not run, but he backed. He wasn't the running kind, but he backed.' I reckon his gun wouldn't shoot. I shot at him, but I don't know where the bullet went. I haven't been back in the house since. I don't know whether I shot at his head and shot a little high or not. He didn't run even after I had shot, but he backed. I couldn't tell you how fast he backed. I don't know how many times I shot; he kept backing and looking at me, and he backing through the kitchen and I following him. I don't know whether I shot any more or not at Mm. I don't know how many times I shot, and I don't know why I shot, and why I didn't shoot again. I shot as fast as I could get my gun to work, and he backed out through the dining room, and then on the screened porch, and when we got out on the porch he was still backing, and he still had that pistol in his hand, and it wouldn't work. He is an expert with a pistol, but he might have got excited. I don't think he was the kind that generally got seared though, but he backed all the way out through the kitchen, and through the dining room, and across the porch, and backed out there and opened the screen door and never turned his back to me even then, and just as he went out the screen door I shot at him. I don't know whether I shot more than twice or not. I don't know how many times I shot. The first thing I saw after I had shot at him, as he went through the screen door, was my wife falling backward."
True, in one place, appellant spoke of deceased as "trying to shoot me," but nowhere did he disclose any facts justifying this statement further than that deceased pointed the pistol at him. The trial court, as set out above, rightly gave the jury the law of self-defense against an attack on the part of Hobart Keaton, or of deceased, or both, as well as of a threatened attack by either or both, and this gave to appellant every opportunity for acquittal which is supported by the facts in evidence. From the fact of the drawing of a pistol by deceased which was not fired while its possessor was backing through two rooms and across the porch, for this court to assume as a matter of law that the design of deceased was to kill, would be' wholly unwarranted, and seemingly in direct contravention of the holdings in the cases above mentioned. Said authorities seem to demonstrate that, from the mere having in his hand a pistol or a gun, the design to inflict death cannot be inferred as a matter of law.
Our conclusion is that the facts fail to demonstrate that deceased was making an attack on appellant with a weapon which, as a matter of law, was calculated to produce death at the time appellant shot and killed his wife, and that the law applicable to his defense, as supported hy the facts, was fully given.
We are unable to see just how the trial court could have fairly submitted the law applicable to the issues of fact arising in this case, without submitting all the law relating to the killing of Hobart Keaton in the event he had received the bullet which killed Mrs. Gunn. Appellant swore that he did not intend to kill his wife, and that he shot at Keaton, when he saw his wife fall. His whole defense was that he was acting in self-defense against Keaton. His entire conduct, according to his own statement, from the beginning of the fatal difficulty in the kitchen until young Keaton fell dead in the field, was the result of his attitude toward, and difficulty with, Keaton, and that of Keaton with him. We see no error in the charge of the court submitting the law of guilt vel non of appellant herein, predicated on the kind and degree of offense which would have existed had Keaton been killed by the shot that took the life of his mother.
The inquiry of witnesses for appellant relative'to political affiliation of such witnesses with appellant, or that other persons, whose interest in his behalf appears, were also members of the same political party or candidates of said party for office, would not seem susceptible of harmful effect,' but rather to fall within that rule allowing legitimate exploration of those matters indicating the friendship or leaning of witnesses, and those associated with them, toward any party or issue involved. We find nothing in the cases cited, under this contention of appellant, holding a contrary view.
We believe that the rights of the appellant, to act upon the theory that a threatened attack had begun, were fully guarded by the charge on that issue as above set out, and that same was as applicable when some or all of the threats were made to the accused direct as when some or all of them were shown to have been merely reported to him. If he heard 'them, or if he heard of them, and believed what he heard, he would have the same right, and no greater, to act in self-defense in either instance. We have examined the authorities cited by appellant, and find in none of them any distinction between the right of the accused when the threat is made to him, and such right when the threat has been reported to him.
We dó not think the charge open to the objection that it is too restrictive, in telling the jury what they may consider in determining the sufficiency of the provocation to produce passion which would reduce the killing to manslaughter. While it is true that the court mentioned the past conduct of both Hobart Keaton and Mrs. Gunn in referring to such matters, we find in the same paragraph of the charge the jury were told to consider in that connection all the facts and circumstances in the. case. We find nothing, in comparing the charge given in ihis case with those in the authorities cited, which would lead us to conclude that before us to be erroneous. We do not think any error appears in refusing any of the special charges in this regard.
The state was allowed to show the position and surroundings of the body of Hobart Keaton when found after the homicide. Objection to this testimony appears in various bills of exception. The state's contention, and indeed the testimony of appellant himself, was that there was a continuous transaction, without let or stop, from the inception to the end of the tragic affair. Appellant testified that, from the time he went into his kitchen and the pistols were drawn, he pursued Hobart Keaton without any apparent change in the attitude of the parties until Keaton was shot and killed, and that the death of his wife resulted from a shot fired at Keaton during their continued movement. The state's theory seems to be that appellant killed his wife, and then pursued and slew the witness to such'killing, and that the transactions were so closely related from every standpoint as to become res gestse of each other. We believe, under any theory of the evidence, that the entire circumstance was so closely related in point of time and continuity of action as to make it but one transaction, and that all evidence was admissible to show how, or in what manner, each successive step of said transaction did in fact take,place. The beginning and ending of the unfortunate affair were but a few moments apart. Appellant swore that he acted throughout with but a single purpose, to save his own life; and the state's claim was that he did, in fact, act throughout with but a single purpose, but that it was murder.
There are other matters presented in various bills of exception .which have been examined by us, and in none of which we find anything to lead us to conclude that this case should be reversed. An extended narration of the facts would serve no useful purpose. The unfortunate history of the marital troubles of appellant and his wife, and the growing feeling of irritation between them leading to their separation; the matters connected with the settlement of the divorce case brought by the wife, and the various difficulties between the parties, would seem to shed no light upon the real issues involved in the decision of this case. There was evidence before the court of ill-feeling on the part of appellant toward his wife, and of statements which might be taken as thr'eats on his part against her. A narration of these matters would not clarify any point discussed by us, and we omit same.
Finding no reversible error in the record, the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.
<@=>For other oases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in ail Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
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&wkey;}For other oases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes