Case Name: In re ADVISORY OPINION TO THE GOVERNOR REQUEST OF JULY 12, 1976
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1976-07-30
Citations: 336 So. 2d 97
Docket Number: No. 49811
Parties: In re ADVISORY OPINION TO THE GOVERNOR REQUEST OF JULY 12, 1976.
Judges: ENGLAND, J., took no part in the consideration of this case.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 336
Pages: 97–103

Head Matter:
In re ADVISORY OPINION TO THE GOVERNOR REQUEST OF JULY 12, 1976.
No. 49811.
Supreme Court of Florida.
July 30, 1976.
Donald M. Middlebrooks, Gen. Counsel, Orlando, and Algia R. Cooper, Asst. General Counsel, Tallahassee, for Reubin O’D. Askew, Governor.
William L. Durden and Lacy Mahon, Jr., Jacksonville, for Hans G. Tanzler, Jr.
Dawson A. McQuaig, Gen. Counsel, and William Lee Allen, Asst. Counsel, Jacksonville, for City of Jacksonville.
Edward P. Vieira, in pro. per.

Opinion:
The Honorable Reubin O'D. Askew
Governor
State of Florida
The Capitol
Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Dear Governor Askew:
We have the honor to acknowledge your communication of July 12, 1976, requesting our advice pursuant to Section 1(c), Article IV, Florida Constitution, 1968 Revision, and Rule 2.1(h), Florida Appellate Rules, relating to certain executive powers and duties.
Your letter reads in part as follows:
"I have been advised that the Duval County Grand Jury has returned indictments alleging commission of a felony and two misdemeanor offenses by the Mayor of the City of Jacksonville, Hans G. Tanzler, Jr.
"Jacksonville operates under a charter form of government which vests certain powers in local officials. Questions have arisen in my mind concerning my constitutional duties relating to the suspension of local elected officials under consolidated government in Jacksonville as well as my authority to appoint an interim May- or should my decision be to suspend May or Tanzler.
*
"In view of the above circumstances affecting my executive powers and duties, I therefore submit the following questions for your consideration:
"1. Should the Mayor of Jacksonville be regarded as a municipal officer or a county officer for purpose of Article IV, Section 7 suspension and appointment or can the Mayor be suspended under both § 7(a) and (c)?
"2. If Article IV, Section 7(c) which authorizes suspension of a municipal official indicted for a crime is controlling, must the indictment be a result of actions arising directly or indirectly out of or pertaining to official conduct or duties or is § 112.51(1) an unconstitutional limitation on the constitutional duties of the governor under Article IV, Section 7(c)?
"3. Does § 112.42, F.S. represent an invalid limitation upon the governor's authority to suspend under Article IV, Section 7 or may the governor suspend for conduct which takes place in prior terms but which may affect the officers [sic] capacity to conduct his office?
"4. If the Mayor of Jacksonville should be suspended pursuant to either section of Article IV, Section 7, what procedure should be utilized to fill the vacancy which would be created by such suspension?"
Upon receipt of your communication, an Interlocutory Order was entered, announcing that the questions propounded were answerable and setting dates for filing of briefs and oral argument.
We will respond to your questions in order of their submission.
Question 1: "Should the Mayor of Jacksonville be regarded as a municipal officer or a county officer for purpose of Article IV, Section 7 suspension and appointment or can the Mayor be suspended under both § 7(a) and (c)?"
It is our opinion that you as Governor have authority to suspend the mayor of the consolidated government of the City of Jacksonville under the provisions of Article IV, Section 7(a), of the Florida Constitution, 1968 Revision, provided you find the existence of a ground for removal as set forth in Section 7(a), which are limited to:
1. Malfeasance,
2. Misfeasance,
3. Neglect of duty,
4. Drunkenness,
5. Incompetence,
6. Permanent inability to perform his official duties, or
7. Commission of a felony.
By virtue of this conclusion we are of the opinion that you are without authority to suspend the mayor of Jacksonville as a municipal official under the provisions of Article IV, Section 7(c).
Some officers of the consolidated government carry out both county and municipal functions. Article IV, Section 7(a), relates to the suspension of county officers and provides:
"By executive order stating the grounds and filed with the secretary of state, the governor may suspend from office any state officer not subject to impeachment, any officer of the militia not in the active service of the United States, or any county officer, for malfeasance, misfeasance, neglect of duty, drunkenness, incompetence, permanent inability to perform his official duties, or commission of a felony, and may fill the office by appointment for the period of suspension. The suspended officer may at any time before removal be reinstated by the governor."
Article IV, Section 7(c), relates to the suspension of municipal officials and provides:
"By order of the governor any elected municipal officer indicted for crime may be suspended from office until acquitted and the office filled by appointment for the period of suspension, not to extend beyond the term, unless these powers are vested elsewhere by law or the municipal charter." [Emphasis supplied]
This provision grants to the Legislature the authority to vest elsewhere by legislative act the suspension power over municipal officials. The Legislature recognized the unique nature of consolidated governments and the fact that some officials of such governments function as both county and municipal officials by enacting Section 112.-49, Florida Statutes, which provides:
"In the administration of any city-county merger or city-county charter, or any such form of government which provides for the merging of the powers, duties and functions of any municipal and county governments, any officer, official or employee of such merged government who exercises the powers and duties of a county officer, whether he shall be elected or appointed, shall be deemed to be a county officer and therefore subject to the power of the governor under the state constitution to suspend officers. If the charter or other authority under which any city-county merger is accomplished shall provide means for the suspension or removal of such officers, then the power to suspend shall be concurrent in the city-county government and in the governor."
Inasmuch as the Legislature has power to create, alter, and abolish both counties and municipalities, we believe it was well within the legislative power to enact Section 112.49, defining what a municipality is and what a county is, for suspension purposes. An examination of Jacksonville's charter leads us to conclude that the mayor of the consolidated City of Jacksonville has "the powers and duties of a county officer," Section 112.49, supra, and should be treated as a county officer, if he is to be suspended. The grounds for suspension of county officers are set forth in Article IV, Section 7(a), of the Florida Constitution. Section 7(c), pertaining to municipal officers, is not applicable.
Question 2: "If Article IV, Section 7(c) which authorizes suspension of a municipal official indicted for a crime is controlling, must the indictment be a result of actions arising directly or indirectly out of or pertaining to official conduct or duties or is § 112.51(1) an unconstitutional limitation on the constitutional duties of the governor under Article IV, Section 7(c)?"
We need not answer this question in view of our answer to question one.
Question 3: "Does § 112.42, F. S. represent an invalid limitation upon the governor's authority to suspend under Article IV, Section 7 or may the governor suspend for conduct which takes place in prior terms but which may affect the officers [sic] capacity to conduct his office?",
To answer this question would require this Court to pass on the legal sufficiency of the individual charges contained in the indictments in this cause. It is our opinion that such a determination should not be made an advisory opinion but should be resolved in regular trial and appellate proceedings where appropriate factual issues can be developed.
We, therefore, decline to answer question three.
Question 4: "If the Mayor of Jacksonville should be suspended pursuant to either section of Article IV, Section 7, what procedure should be utilized to fill the vacancy which would be created by such suspension?"
In our opinion, you may appoint an interim replacement in the same manner as you would any other county official in accordance with the provisions of Article IV, Section 7(a).
Respectfully,
(s) BEN F. OVERTON_ Chief Justice
(s) JOSEPH A. BOYD. Jr. Justice
(s) ALAN C. SUNDBERG Justice
(s) JOSEPH W. HATCHETT Justice
ENGLAND, J., took no part in the consideration of this case.