Case Name: PEOPLE v. HARDY
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1986-05-19
Citations: 151 Mich. App. 605
Docket Number: Docket No. 75214
Parties: PEOPLE v HARDY
Judges: Before: Shepherd, P.J., and V. J. Brennan and C. Jobes, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 151
Pages: 605–621

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v HARDY
Docket No. 75214.
Submitted March 13, 1985, at Lansing.
Decided May 19, 1986.
Defendant, Duane Hardy, was convicted following a jury trial in Oakland Circuit Court of two counts of armed robbery. The trial court, Francis X. O’Brien, J., sentenced defendant to concurrent prison terms of from fifteen to fifty years on the convictions. Defendant appeals, alleging error in the admission in evidence of two incriminating statements which the defendant gave to the police on March 8,1982, and May 20,1982. Held:
1. The trial court did not err in finding that defendant did not request the presence of an attorney and knowingly, voluntarily and understandably waived his right to counsel in regard to the March 8, 1982, confession. The defendant’s March 8, 1982, confession was properly admitted at trial.
2. The trial court properly determined that the May 20,1982, confession was not involuntary and was thus admissible. No physical compulsion was imposed by the police upon defendant’s desire to speak. Defendant was not in any way fearful of the police officers who questioned him and knew that he could stop the questioning at any time. The inducements offered by the officers did not overcome the defendant’s ability to make a voluntary decision to make the statement.
Affirmed.
C. Jobes, J., agreed with the majority that defendant did not request the presence of an attorney prior to his March 8, 1982, confession, that defendant knowingly, voluntarily and understandably waived his right to counsel in regard to that confession, and that the March 8, 1982, confession was properly _admitted at defendant’s trial. However, she disagrees with the majority in regard to its decision that a mistake was not committed by the trial court in its finding of voluntariness in regard to the May 20, 1982, confession. She would conclude that the inducements offered by the police officers overcame defendant’s ability to make a voluntary statement. She believes that such error was not harmless and that, although evidence of defendant’s guilt was very strong, the confession might well have convinced an otherwise undecided juror of defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. She would reverse and remand for a new trial.
References
Am Jur 2d, Evidence §§ 526-554, 555 et seq.
Necessity that Miranda warnings include express reference to right to have attorney present during interrogation. 77 ALR Fed 123.
Admissibility of party’s own statement under Rule 801(d)(2)(A) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 48 ALR Fed 922.
Necessity of informing suspect of rights under privilege against self-incrimination prior to police interrogation. 10 ALR3d 1054.
Opinion op the Court
1. Criminal Law — Confessions — Evidence — Appeal.
The totality of the circumstances are examined by the Court of Appeals in determining whether a trial court erred in holding that a defendant’s confession was made voluntarily; a determination that a confession was voluntary may be upheld where, after considering all the relevant factors, the Court of Appeals agrees with the trial court’s finding that the inducements offered to the defendant did not overcome the defendant’s ability to make a voluntary decision to make a statement.
Dissent by C. Jobes, J.
2. Criminal Law — Confessions — Evidence — Appeal.
The Court of Appeals will examine the entire record and reach an independent determination of voluntariness when reviewing a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of a confession; the trial court’s decision will be affirmed absent a definite and firm conviction that the trial court erred.
3. Criminal Law — Confessions — Evidence — Appeal.
The Court of Appeals should defer to the trial court’s findings regarding the voluntariness of a defendant’s confession where the determination of voluntariness is largely dependent on the credibility of witnesses.
4. Criminal Law — Custodial Interrogations — Presence of
Counsel — Constitutional Law.
An accused has the right to the presence of counsel during a custodial interrogation to protect his right against self-incrimination; once an accused requests counsel, the police must refrain from further interrogation until counsel is made available or the accused initiates further communication with the police (US Const, Am V).
5. Criminal Law — Confessions — Evidence — Presence of Counsel — Waiver.
It must be found that the accused knowingly, voluntarily, and understandably waived his right to counsel before a confession taken in the absence of counsel may be admitted as evidence against the accused.
6. Criminal Law — Confessions — Evidence — Voluntariness — Totality of Circumstances Test.
The totality of the circumstances test for determining the voluntariness of a defendant’s confession requires the consideration of a multiplicity of factors including: (a) the nature of the inducement, (b) the length and conditions of detention, (c) the physical and mental state of the defendant including his age, mentality, and prior criminal experience, (d) the conduct of the police, and (e) the adequacy and frequency of advice of rights; the burden is on the prosecution in all such cases to demonstrate voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence.
7. Criminal Law — Appeal — Harmless Error.
Appropriate considerations in determining whether an error may be determined to be harmless are: (1) was the error so offensive to the maintenance of a sound judicial process that it could never be regarded as harmless,, and (2) if not so basic, was the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; the second inquiry focuses on whether the error might have aided in convincing an otherwise undecided juror of defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
8. Criminal Law — Appeal — Harmless Error — Fundamental Rights.
The harmless error doctrine does not apply under circumstances involving the violation of a fundamental right guaranteed by the United States and Michigan Constitutions.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Louis J. Caruso, Solicitor General, L. Brooks Patterson, Prosecuting Attorney, Robert C. Williams, Chief Appellate Counsel, and John L. Kroneman, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
James A. Carlin, for defendant on appeal.
Before: Shepherd, P.J., and V. J. Brennan and C. Jobes, JJ.
Recorder’s Court judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
V. J. Brennan, J.
We adopt the facts as set forth in Judge Jobes's dissenting opinion and we adopt the portions of her opinion holding that the trial court correctly found that defendant did not request the presence of an attorney, that the trial court did not err in finding that defendant knowingly, voluntarily and understandably waived his right to counsel and that defendant's March 8, 1982, confession was properly admitted at trial.
However, we depart from Judge Jobe's conclusion that the May 20, 1982, confession was inadmissible. In our opinion, the confession was admissible. The interruptions made by the defendant clearly show that no physical compulsion was imposed by the police upon defendant's desire to speak. Also, defendant's strong assertions and replies show that he was not in any way fearful of the officers. In fact, his responses show that he could have stopped making the statement at any time.
The record overwhelmingly shows that there is no mistake about the fact that he committed the crimes.
We find that the May 20, 1982, confession was not involuntary. People v Conte, 421 Mich 704; 365 NW2d 648 (1984), holds that we must examine the totality of the circumstances. Here we have two confessions. We have the tapes revealing no fear of physical abuse by the officers on defendant's part as well as an indication that he felt and knew that he could stop making the statement at any time. Further, we have the trial court's clear observations of the officers' and the defendant's demeanor and credibility._
We find, after considering all the relevant factors, that the inducements offered did not overcome the defendant's ability to make a voluntary decision to make a statement. The trial court did not err in so finding.
Convictions affirmed.
Shepherd, P.J., concurred.