Case Name: Freddie Laverne GILLIAM and Robert Leo Bradley, Petitioners, v. J. Parks STEWART, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Jane R. Stewart, Deceased, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1974-01-10
Citations: 291 So. 2d 593
Docket Number: No. 43363
Parties: Freddie Laverne GILLIAM and Robert Leo Bradley, Petitioners, v. J. Parks STEWART, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Jane R. Stewart, Deceased, Respondent.
Judges: CARLTON, C. J., and BOYD and DE-KLE, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 291
Pages: 593–603

Head Matter:
Freddie Laverne GILLIAM and Robert Leo Bradley, Petitioners, v. J. Parks STEWART, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Jane R. Stewart, Deceased, Respondent.
No. 43363.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Jan. 10, 1974.
Rehearing Denied April 9, 1974.
R. James Stroker of Gurney, Gurney & Handley, Orlando, for petitioner Gilliam.
Monroe E. McDonald of Sanders, Mc-Ewan, Mims & McDonald, Orlando, for petitioner Bradley.
W. Ford Duane of Robertson, Williams & Duane, Orlando, for respondent.

Opinion:
DREW, Justice,
Retired:
This cause is here by virtue of a certificate of the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, that the decision below passes upon a question of great public interest, viz:
"Where a person suffers a definite and objective physical injury, i. e. heart attack, as a result of emotional stress, i. e., fright, induced by a defendant's alleged negligent conduct may such person maintain an action against the defendant even though no physical impact from an external force was imposed upon the injured person?"
The undisputed facts out of which this action arose are set forth at length in the decision of the District Court of Appeal and will not be restated here.
The District Court decision concedes the correctness of the action of the trial judge under the established and long standing law of this State in the following language :
"The trial court's entry of the summary judgment is consistent with the judicially established precedent heretofore in effect, namely, that no recovery can be had for mental pain and suffering unaccompanied by any physical injuries in the absence of wantonness, wilfulness or malice. . . ."
While/one question is certified here, viz. whether Florida should recede from the long standing rule of negligence in this area, the greater question — and the one more basically involving the constitutional language "great public interest" — is the action of the majority below in openly overruling previous decisions of this Court. The constitiutional system of courts in this State contemplates that only the Supreme Court may overrule its own decisions. This does not necessarily infer that the decisions of this Court are always correct but it does provide a system for the uniform operation of the laws of this State throughout its borders. One of the reasons for allowing certiorari here from the district courts is that a decision of one of the district courts is in conflict with a decision of this Court — or another district court — on the same point of law.
We recognize that in this fast changing world the general welfare requires from time to time reconsideration of old concepts. When the district courts decide that ancient precedents should be overruled, we welcome their views and such should be unhesitatingly rendered but, in cases such as this, it is the duty of the district courts under the plain constitutional language to adhere to the former precedents and then certify the decision to us. This will assure uniformity. A certificate of the district court of appeal that its decision involves a question of great public interest does not vest jurisdiction here. It affords the basis to seek review but it is the petition for certiorari that gives us jurisdiction. In this case, for instance, had the parties elected not to take certiorari here, the decision of the district court would have become final and would have created in that district a decision contrary to others within the State. Judge Reed clearly perceived the error of his brethren in his observation concluding his dissent, viz.
"Finally, if the impact doctrine is to be dispatched in a judicial forum, I would think it better for this court to affirm the trial court on the basis of established precedent and certify the question to the Florida Supreme Court so that it may wield the axe. See Lunney v. Post, Fla.App.1971, 248 So.2d 504, dissent."
Now, on the merits of the question certified—
Judge Mager's opinion for the majority below ably presents the case for receding from the impact doctrine. No useful purpose will be served by repeating here what he has so ably set forth there. We do not agree that, especially under the facts in this case, there is any valid justification to recede from the long standing decisions of this Court in this area. There may be circumstances under which one may recover for emotional or mental injuries, as when there has been a physical impact or when they are produced as a result of a deliberate and calculated act performed with the intention of producing such an injury by one knowing that such act would probably — and most likely — produce such an injury, but those are not the facts in this case.
The views expressed by Mr. Judge Reed in his dissenting opinion in the lower court, with one exception, are the present views of the majority of this Court and adopted as ours. We do not agree with Judge Reed that the power to change the impact rule is vested exclusively in the Legislature. The impact rule is a judicial creation just as are many other substantive rules of tort law and, since it was judicially created, we are of the view that if this Court should reach the conclusion that such rule was inequitable, impractical or no longer necessary, it may be, judicially, altered or abolished.
The decision below is quashed with directions to reinstate the trial court's summary judgment.
It is so ordered.
CARLTON, C. J., and BOYD and DE-KLE, JJ., concur.
McCAIN, J., dissents.
ERVIN and ADKINS, JJ., dissent with opinions.
. The decision below appears in 271 So.2d 466.
. Florida Constitution, Article V, Section 4(2) F.S.A. Rule 4.6(c)(6), 32 F.S.A., F.A.R.
. The cause was terminated in the trial court by summary judgment in favor of defendants.