Case Name: Nader E. SOLIMAN, Petitioner, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1991-06-05
Citations: 935 F.2d 52
Docket Number: No. 90-1807
Parties: Nader E. SOLIMAN, Petitioner, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.
Judges: Before PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge, CHAPMAN, Senior Circuit Judge, and WILLIAMS, District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 935
Pages: 52–57

Head Matter:
Nader E. SOLIMAN, Petitioner, v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent.
No. 90-1807.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Argued Feb. 5, 1991.
Decided June 5, 1991.
Teresa Ellen McLaughlin, argued (Shirley D. Petersen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Gary R. Allen and Richard Farber, on brief), Tax Div., U.S. Dept, of Justice, Washington, D.C., for respondent.
David Michael Sokolow, McGuffie, Greif, Whitney & Handal, Washington, D.C., for petitioner.
Before PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge, CHAPMAN, Senior Circuit Judge, and WILLIAMS, District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation.

Opinion:
CHAPMAN, Senior Circuit Judge:
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue ("Commissioner") appeals the decision of the United States Tax Court in favor of plaintiff-appellee Nader E. Solimán ("Soli-mán"). This appeal presents the single issue of how a taxpayer's "principal place of business" is established for the purpose of expenses for business use of an office in the home as a deduction for income tax determinations. The Tax Court concluded that Soliman's office in his residence was his principal place of business within the meaning of section 280A of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 280A, and that expenses attributable to the office were deductible. We affirm.
I.
Solimán, a self-employed anesthesiologist, operated his medical practice as a sole proprietor until September 1, 1983. Beginning on September 1, 1983, Solimán began operating his practice as a professional services corporation, Nader Solimán, M.D., P.C.
During 1983, Solimán worked as an anesthesiologist at three hospitals: Suburban Hospital in Bethesda, Maryland, Shady Grove Hospital in Rockville, Maryland, and Loudon Memorial Hospital in Leesburg, Virginia. He spent approximately thirty (30) to thirty-five (35) hours per week at the hospitals with the majority of such time at Suburban Hospital. None of the hospitals provided an office for Solimán.
Solimán lived in a three-bedroom apartment in McLean, Virginia. He used a spare bedroom as an office, which he furnished with a chair, desk, couch, telephone, answering machine, copier and filing cabinet. In the office he kept patient records, billing records, correspondence with patients, names of surgeons and insurance companies, medical journals, medical texts, collections agency records, and insurance code books. In addition to storing these records and materials, Solimán used his office to contact surgeons and patients, and also hospitals to arrange admission of his patients. He performed all of his record keeping in the office, maintaining detailed accounts of billing records and patient logs. He also used the office for reading medical journals to keep abreast of advances in anesthesiology and to prepare for specific patients. Solimán used the office to prepare for his monthly presentations to post-anesthesia care nurses at Suburban Hospital and to study the materials necessary to satisfy his own continuing medical education requirements. In all, Solimán spent two to three hours a day in his home office.
On his 1983 income tax return, Solimán claimed deductions of approximately $2,500 for expenses and depreciation for the home office. On audit, the Commissioner disallowed the deductions finding that they were precluded under section 280A, because his "home office" was not Soliman's "principal place of business" within the meaning of the statute. The tax court disagreed and found that Soliman's home office was his principal place of business.
H.
The sole issue presented in this appeal is how a taxpayer's "principal place of business" is determined under Section 280A. Section 162(a) of the IRC (26 U.S.C. § 162(a)) allows a deduction for "all the ordinary and necessary expenses incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business.... " Before the enactment of section 280A, a taxpayer could abuse the section 162(a) deduction by deducting expenses incurred in the maintenance of a "home office," because the Code only required that the home office be "appropriate and helpful."
To close this "loophole," Congress enacted section 280A, which provides that no deduction is allowable "with respect to the use of a dwelling unit which is used by a taxpayer . as a residence." However, section 280A(c)(l) allows a home office deduction "to the extent that such item is allocable to a portion of the dwelling unit which is exclusively used on a regular basis" (1) as the "principal place of business for any trade or business of the taxpayer," (2) "as a place of business which is used by patients, clients, or customers in meeting or dealing with the taxpayer in the normal course of his trade or business," or (3) in the case of "a separate structure . not attached to the dwelling unit, in connection with the taxpayer's trade or business."
Section 280A does not define "principal place of business," and the tax court formulated a judicial definition by adopting the "focal point" test to evaluate a taxpayer's "principal place of business." The "focal point" is the place where goods and services are provided to customers and revenues are generated. Baie v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 105 (1980). Applying this test, the tax court concluded that Soliman's home could not be his "principal place of business," because the business activities performed at home were "ancillary to the primary income-generating services [Soli-mán] performed as an anesthesiologist at the hospitals."
Then the Tax Court found that the "focal point" test had been questioned in the past and, it decided to discard the "focal point" test. In its place, the tax court adopted the "facts and circumstances" test which provides that where management or administrative activities are essential to the taxpayer's trade or business and the only available office space is in the taxpayer's home, the "home office" can be his "principal place of business," with the existence of the following factors weighing heavily in favor of a finding that the taxpayer's "home office" is his "principal place of business:" (1) the office in the home is essential to the taxpayer's business; (2) he spends a substantial amount of time there; and (3) there is no other location available for performance of the office functions of the business. Applying this test, the tax court concluded that Soliman's "home office" was his "principal place of business" and that expenses of his office were deductible under section 280A(c)(l).
The Commissioner urges reversal, claiming that the tax court's new test renders section 280A meaningless. The Commissioner contends that the tax court's interpretation of section 280A creates a loophole that every taxpayer, who engages in work related activities at home, will abuse. We find the Commissioner's concern is unfounded.
The tax court's "facts and circumstances" test reflects the same policy that undergirds the IRS's proposed regulation allowing salespersons to deduct home office expenses. The regulation provides that salespersons can deduct expenses from a home office even though they spend most of their time on the road as long as they spend "a substantial amount of time on paperwork at home." Proposed Income Tax Reg. § 1.280A-2(b)(3), 45 Fed.Reg. 52,-399 (Aug. 7, 1980), as amended, 48 Fed. Reg. 33,320 (July 21, 1983). The tax court found that the proposed regulation represented the spirit of section 280A and justified adopting the new test. While it is true that the proposed regulation was not bind ing on the tax court or this court, the regulation does evince a policy to allow "home office" deductions for taxpayers who maintain "legitimate" home offices, even if the taxpayer does not spend a majority of his time in the office.
We find that the tax court's new "facts and circumstances" test does not eviscerate the requirements of section 280A, but simply replaces the inflexible and potentially unjust "focal point" test. Under the new test, a taxpayer's "principal place of business" will not be determined by only considering which location generates income or client contact, but which location is the true headquarters of the business, as determined by the factors enumerated by the tax court. This test more accurately reflects the purposes and requirements of section 280A, and we affirm it as the law of this circuit.
III.
For the above reasons, the decision of the tax court is
AFFIRMED.
. The Commissioner also alleged that Solimán under-reported his income by improperly deducting several "tax seminar" trips to the Virgin Islands and Orlando, Florida. The Tax Court held Solimán liable for these actions, and he did not appeal these findings.
. Three circuit court opinions have criticized the "focal point" test. See Drucker v. Commissioner, 715 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1983); Weissman v. Commissioner, 751 F.2d 512 (2d Cir.1984); and Meiers v. Commissioner, 782 F.2d 75 (7th Cir.1986). In each case, the circuit court reversed the tax court's decision against the taxpayer on the taxpayer's claim of a part of his residence as his "principal place of business." Although the courts did not repudiate the "focal point" test, they recognized the potential injustice that the test could create.
. Although the regulation was initially proposed in 1980, it is still awaiting final approval by the Commissioner. Under the Commissioner's regulation promulgation procedures, a proposed regulation can lay dormant indefinitely until the Commissioner either withdraws the proposal or adopts a final draft of a proposal as a regulation.
. We note that the new test has been applied in four recent cases, and in at least one of these cases, the court has found against the taxpayer. See In re James R. Shore, T.C. Memo 1990272, ¶ 90,272 P-H Memo TC (finding against the taxpayer).