Case Name: STATE v. HARRY WILSON
Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Minnesota
Decision Date: 1953-02-27
Citations: 238 Minn. 447
Docket Number: No. 35,741
Parties: STATE v. HARRY WILSON.
Judges: Mr. Justice Roger L. Dell, not having been a member of the court at the time of the argument and submission, took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Reporter: Minnesota Reports
Volume: 238
Pages: 447–459

Head Matter:
STATE v. HARRY WILSON.
February 27, 1953.
No. 35,741.
See, 235 Minn. 571, 50 N. W. (2d) 706.
Roy E. Redetzlce and G. L. Doslcmd, for appellant.
J. A. A. Burnquist, Attorney General, and Vance N. Thyseil, County Attorney, for the State.
Reported in 57 N. W. (2d) 412.

Opinion:
Knutson, Justice.
Defendant was convicted of the crime of rape. He appeals from an order denying his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial.
The complaining witness is a young girl, 17 years of age at the time of trial, who, up to August 10, 1951, had lived with her mother and grandparents on a farm near Barnesville. On that date she went to Moorhead and obtained employment as a waitress in a restaurant known as the Gopher Grill. On August 20, 1951, she worked from noon until 2 p. m. and again from 5:30 until midnight. When she had finished working she changed her clothes and started walking on Center avenue, which is the main street in Moorhead, intending to go to the place where she roomed. When she had walked about two blocks, an automobile stopped near her at the intersection of Center avenue and Seventh street. The man in the car asked her if she wanted a ride home. She at first declined but later, stating that she was tired, accepted the offer and entered the car. She told the driver where she lived, and he proceeded to that destination but, instead of stopping, kept on driving. She testified that he drove south until he hit highway No. 52 and that while driving he had hold of her wrist and pulled her toward him. He drove onto a side road near a night club seven miles south and east of Moorhead, and her testimony is that he parked his car and, after pushing her down in the seat, committed the act complained of. She said that she struggled as much as she could and tried to push him away and that when she screamed he threatened to kill her if she did not "shut up." She said that after some time he let up and she opened the door and "scooted out." She ran down the road for some distance and then cut across .a field. She observed a large house about a quarter of a mile away and, after running through a beet field, knocked on the door of the big house but was unable to get any response. She then saw a smaller house nearby and went there and aroused the residents who are named Nitzkorski. Mr. and Mrs. Nitzkorski, together with their small child, took complaining witness to her mother's home near Barnesville. They arrived there about 1 a. m. She and her mother told her boy friend, who was rooming there, what had happened, and he took her to Moorhead, where she obtained some of her clothing from the room where she had been staying, and then they returned home. The next morning the mother took her to see Dr. G. Wilson Hunter at Fargo, where she was examined. He found evidence of blood on parts of her body, indications of lacerations, tearing, and bleeding, and other evidence of force, from which he formed the opinion that the injuries resulted from involuntary sexual intercourse. After being examined by tbe doctor, she and ber mother talked to tbe county attorney, and tbe mother signed a complaint.
Tbe complaining witness identified tbe automobile in which sbe was riding as a Buick convertible having a black top. Sbe described tbe man who bad committed tbe act as having thick lips, curly hair, quite a round face, and large eyes and weighing about 180 pounds. On direct examination, sbe said that be was wearing "sort of a jacket" and light tan trousers. Sbe said that be was wearing a tie. On cross-examination, sbe stated that sbe could not say definitely whether be was wearing a jacket or a suit coat.
Defendant is a young man, 22 years of age at tbe time of trial. He is married and lives with bis wife in Fargo, North Dakota, where be is employed by Russ Buick Company as assistant service manager. On tbe evening in question be worked until 6:15 or 6:30. He then went home for supper, and bis testimony, and that of bis wife, is that be stayed home until about 7:30. He then asked bis wife if it would be all right if be went to bis place of work, and sbe said that it would be if be were back by 11 o'clock. He said that be went to bis place of employment and later left there with one Howard Kraglund and thereafter they played sbuffleboard together at several taverns. About 11:10 p. m. they were joined by a friend .of defendant's family, Mrs. Beverly Ames, who bad been to a show. Defendant offered to take ber home, and bis testimony, as well as hers, is that they arrived at ber home about 11:30, after which defendant went directly to bis home, arriving there about 11:40. He and bis wife both testified that be stayed home tbe balance of tbe night. In regard to defendant's testimony with reference to bis activities until be left tbe Ames home, be is corroborated by those with whom be spent tbe evening. Defendant and bis wife further testified that be was wearing an old leather jacket and tbe clothes be customarily wore to work. They testified also that be was not wearing a necktie. Howard Kraglund identified a leather jacket introduced in evidence as tbe one worn by defendant while they were together, as did defendant's wife.
There are other facts and details which could be mentioned, but the above is sufficient to present the issues involved in this appeal.
Complaining witness was given an opportunity to observe people who owned automobiles such as the one she had described. She eliminated three such suspects, and on September 11 defendant was brought to the Clay county jail. After observing him through a peephole in the wall for some seven minutes, she positively identified him as her assailant. He was thereafter arrested and brought to trial.
While defendant assigns a number of errors, we believe those relating to certain instructions of the court, hereinafter mentioned, are decisive of this appeal. The evidence amply establishes the commission of the crime. As may be seen from the above, the conviction must stand or fall on the identification of defendant by the complaining witness. On the other hand, defendant depends entirely upon an alibi for a defense. Were it not for the errors hereinafter discussed, we would be compelled to say that the identification by complaining witness would have to stand. She had a better opportunity to observe defendant during their ride together than is usual in these cases. She also testified that she had seen defendant "a couple of times" in the Gopher Grill on prior occasions. She stated that on one occasion she had given him a check and that then another girl, who had charge of the booth in which he was sitting, took over. The other girl was not called as a witness nor was anyone else in the Gopher Grill, in spite of the fact that defendant denied having been in this restaurant during the time that the complaining witness worked there. The jury, however, could believe that she had sufficient opportunity to observe defendant so that she was able to identify him.
Defendant assigns as error several statements of the court in its instructions to the jury. We need consider only two. The first of these relates to defendant's defense of alibi. With respect to this defense, the court charged the jury:
"The defense in this case is what we call an alibi. In other words, the defendant alleges that he could not be guilty of this offense be cause he was not present at the time in question. If he was not there at the time and place in question he could not commit the act, so an alibi has been offered as a defense in this case. The defense is easily claimed and hard to disprove. It is for you to determine what weight is to be given to that evidence, and you will consider all of the evidence with caution and subject it to rigid scrutiny. That rule applies to all of the evidence in the case. If the evidence with reference to an alibi raises a reasonable doubt in your minds as to the guilt of the defendant, then your verdict will be not guilty, the defendant being entitled to the benefit of any reasonable doubt. If you find such evidence entitled to no weight or credit, then you will, of course, treat it accordingly."
The authorities are irreconcilably divided on the question of whether an instruction which tends to disparage or belittle a defense of alibi is or is not reversible error. The weight of authority appears to be that any instruction which tends to belittle or disparage a defense of an alibi is reversible error. No good purpose could be served by attempting to distinguish or reconcile the many cases on this subject. The cases are collected in Annotations, 14 A. L. R. 1426, 67 A. L. R. 122, and 146 A. L. R. 1377. See, also, 53 Am. Jur., Trial, § 655. There is a respectable minority of cases holding that all cautionary instructions regarding an alibi are not reversible error. Among these is our case of State v. Duddy, 152 Minn. 179, 181, 188 N. W. 261, 262, where the court instructed the jury with respect to an alibi that—
it wiE be remembered always that an aEbi is a defense that is easily fabricated and hard to disprove; but if it is proved, it is a good defense. I say that merely to caution the jury to consider the evidence on both sides and weigh it carefully."
With respect to the instruction, we said (152 Minn. 181, 188 N. W. 262):
" We find no reversible error in this instruction. In point of substance what the court said about the defense is supported by the remark found in the opinion in State v. Minot, 79 Minn. 118, 81 N. W. 753. It did not have the effect of casting upon defendant the burden of establishing the alibi as a defense, nor in any proper view of impairing or negativing the general presumption of innocence. The court was quite clear in placing the burden of proof on the state, and instructed the jury that no verdict of guilty could be returned except they found from all the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was a party to the commission of the crime. While the remark might well enough have been omitted from the charge, it is clear that the jury was not misled or confused thereby."
In State v. Minot, 79 Minn. 118, 124, 81 N. W. 753, 756, referred to in the Duddy case, in considering the evidence relating to alibi we said:
" As to the alibi, it was for the jury to say whether any credit should be given to the evidence. While this line of defense is competent, such evidence is generally subject to searching scrutiny. It is easy to prepare for it in advance, and, after reading the record, we are satisfied that the jury would have been justified in rejecting it entirely."
What we said in that case had nothing to do with the trial court's instruction; we were simply referring to an examination of the evidence on appeal. The two cases illustrate the danger of using as instructions to a jury statements from opinions of this court which were made regarding the sufficiency of evidence to sustain a finding of court or jury.
While it may not be necessary to lay down an ironclad rule that any cautionary instruction regarding evidence tending to prove an alibi is always reversible error, such instruction, if given at all, must be given with extreme care to the end that evidence tending to prove an alibi is given proper consideration by the jury. Such defense, if proved, is as valid as any other defense. In many cases it is the only defense available to a defendant. It is particularly true that great care must be exercised in giving such instruction where a crime is involved which is naturally so revolting by its very nature that it is easy for the jury to become prejudiced. However, were it not for other instructions given to the jury in this case, we would be inclined to hold, along with State v. Duddy, 152 Minn. 179, 188 N. W. 261, supra, that the instruction regarding alibi, standing alone, would not justify a reversal.
Following the above instruction and as the final charge on the law given by the court to the jury, the court said:
"In considering the evidence in this case you will consider what evidence corroborates other evidence, and you may ask what corroboration there is of the testimony of [the complaining witness] that she was raped. You will ask yourselves what evidence there is by way of corroboration of defendant's alibi. You will have in mind, of course, that neither defendant's parents, Mr. Kraglund nor Mrs. Ames professed to know anything about the whereabouts of defendant after midnight of the day in question. That hrkigs you to the question of whether Mrs. Wilson, the defendant's wife, was mistaken or whether [the complaining witness] was wrong." (Italics supplied.)
While we have said many times that the instructions of the court must be read as a whole, it is obvious that as a parting instruction the above statement might well lead the jury to believe that the whole case hinged on accepting either the testimony of defendant's wife or that of the complaining witness. Balanced against the testimony of the complaining witness, there was the testimony of several witnesses. Defendant, having taken the stand himself, was entitled to have his testimony considered the same as any other witness. The instruction ignores the testimony of people with whom defendant spent the evening particularly respecting the clothes he wore. The jury was not permitted to disregard the testimony of defendant or of any of his witnesses where such testimony was in conflict with that of the complaining witness. The jury might well have concluded that Mrs. Wilson was mistaken about the time of defendant's return, but it would still be required to consider whether discrepancies between the testimony of other witnesses, including that of defendant himself, and the testimony of the complaining witness were sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. We believe that the instruction was prejudicial and might well have misled the jury. There must be a new trial accordingly.
We cannot agree that the statement of the court was an inadvertent error or omission. In no sense can it be called an omission. To the contrary, it was a definite statement, which we believe was fundamental. Neither can it be said to have beep inadvertent. The court commented quite freely on the evidence — probably more freely than would have been necessary. While the trial court may comment fairly on the evidence, if he does so, care must be exercised to see that all credible evidence is given fair treatment. It seems to us that, after summing up the evidence, the court stated a positive instruction that the jury should base its decision on the determination of which of the two witnesses they believed. We believe that the court was in error in so doing, in that it may well have led the jury to disregard other evidence which they should have considered. This was not an error at all in the sense that the court misspoke itself. It was a fundamental error in the sense that the trial court was mistaken as to what it conceived the evidence to be upon which the verdict should be based.
Our rule is now embodied in Eule 51 of the Eules of Civil Procedure. While these rules do not apply to criminal trials and this case was tried prior to the effective date of the new rules, Rule 51 states the law as it existed prior to its adoption. See, 2 Youngquist & Blacik, Minnesota Eules Practice, 555. Rule 51 of the Eules of Civil Procedure, as far as here material, reads:
« No party may assign as error unintentional misstatements and verbal errors, or omissions in the charge, unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objections. An error in the instructions with respect to fundamental law or controlling principle may be assigned in á motion for a new trial though it was not otherwise called to the attention of the court."
The statement to which we have reference, as has been pointed out, was neither an unintentional misstatement, a verbal error, or an omission. Rather, it was an error on the controlling principle, hence such error as could be assigned on a motion for a new trial. We have no way of determining from the cold record what tone of voice the court used. We can only review the statement as it appears in the record.
In the note attached to the order denying defendant's motion, the court said:
"The closing argument of defense counsel in this matter was improper, although not objected to by counsel for the state, and it together with the issues in the case made it necessary that the jury be instructed in manner shown of record."
We have no way of knowing to what statements of defendant's counsel the trial court alludes. The entire argument of both counsel is in the record, and it appears that whenever counsel for the state objected to statements made by defendant's counsel the court took care of the matter. Be that as it may, no statement of counsel in their argument to the jury can justify an instruction which will deprive a defendant of the protection afforded him by the presumption of innocence and the burden resting upon the state of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If improper argument is made to the jury, it is permissible and proper for the court to instruct the jury thereon, but we cannot construe the objectionable instructions in this case as relating to anything said by defendant's counsel.
Reversed and new trial granted.