Case Name: State of Kansas, ex rel. Steven L. Cranford, Deputy County Attorney of Cowley County, Kansas, Petitioner, v. The Honorable Robert L. Bishop, Associate District Judge, Position 2, District Court of Cowley County, Respondent
Court: Kansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Kansas
Decision Date: 1982-02-27
Citations: 230 Kan. 799
Docket Number: No. 53,741
Parties: State of Kansas, ex rel. Steven L. Cranford, Deputy County Attorney of Cowley County, Kansas, Petitioner, v. The Honorable Robert L. Bishop, Associate District Judge, Position 2, District Court of Cowley County, Respondent.
Judges: Prager and McFarland, JJ., join the foregoing concurring opinion.
Reporter: Kansas Reports
Volume: 230
Pages: 799–803

Head Matter:
No. 53,741
State of Kansas, ex rel. Steven L. Cranford, Deputy County Attorney of Cowley County, Kansas, Petitioner, v. The Honorable Robert L. Bishop, Associate District Judge, Position 2, District Court of Cowley County, Respondent.
(640 P.2d 1271)
Opinion filed February 27, 1982.
Steven L. Cranford, deputy county attorney, for petitioner.
T. L. Green, special assistant attorney general, for respondent.

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Herd, J.:
This is an original mandamus action wherein Steven L. Cranford, deputy county attorney- of Cowley County, petitions this court for an order of mandamus directing Robert L. Bishop, associate district judge, to issue subpoenas for witnesses in an inquisition being conducted by the petitioner involving the entry into the Struthers Thermo-Flood Corporation in Cowley County by four individuals associated with a competitor of that company. The petitioner obtained information from the law firm which represents Struthers Thermo-Flood that the competitors gained access to the plant by deception and obtained trade secrets or tangible personal property. In June, 1981, Cranford made application to conduct an inquisition. Judge Bishop issued subpoenas pursuant to a praecipe filed in connection with the inquisition. The initial part of the inquisition was conducted. Mr. Cranford directed his inquiry primarily toward the appropriation of trade secrets. Only one question was posed about the possible taking of personal property. A copy of the transcript of the initial inquisition was sent to the law firm representing Struthers on June 26, 1981, only seven days after the testimony. That law firm would be interested in any information the inquisition would disclose about purloined trade secrets for use in a civil suit.
In September, 1981, petitioner filed a praecipe for more subpoenas which resulted in the present action. Judge Bishop became convinced no public interest was involved and that Struthers' remedy was a civil action. He believed the object of inquisition was the appropriation of trade secrets or manufacturing processes and not tangible personal property. In his opinion further subpoenas would constitute an abuse of the inquisition process. He refused to issue the subpoenas. This action followed.
The question presented is: Does a district judge have authority to refuse to issue subpoenas under K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 22-3101 after an application for an inquisition has been filed? That statute states:
"(1) If the attorney general, an assistant attorney general, or the county attorney of any county is informed or has knowledge of any alleged violation of the laws of Kansas, such person may apply to a district judge to conduct an inquisition. An application for an inquisition shall be in writing, verified under oath, setting forth the alleged violation of law. Upon the filing of the application, the judge with whom it is filed shall, on the written praecipe of the attorney general, assistant attorney general or county attorney, issue a subpoena for the witnesses named in such praecipe commanding them to appear and testify concerning the matters under investigation. Such subpoenas shall be served and returned as subpoenas for witnesses in criminal cases in the district court.
"(2) If the attorney general, assistant attorney general or county attorney of any county is informed or has knowledge of any alleged violation of [in] this state pertaining to gambling, intoxicating liquors, criminal syndicalism, racketeering, bribery, tampering with a sports contest, narcotic or dangerous drugs or any violation of any law where the accused is a fugitive from justice, he or she shall be authorized to issue subpoenas .for such persons as he or she shall have any reason to believe have any information relating thereto or knowledge thereof, to appear before him or her at a time and place to be designated in the subpoena and testify concerning any such violation. For such purposes, any prosecuting attorney shall be authorized to administer oaths."
Paragraph (1) is applicable to this case. Petitioner contends after the application for an inquisition is properly filed, the judge has a statutorily imposed duty to issue subpoenas to whomever the petitioner requests in his praecipe, without discretion. Respondent argues that a judge has inherent discretionary power under the statute. For example, he notes a judge has the power to determine if an application for inquisition meets the requirements of K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 22-3101(1), and if it does not, the judge can properly refuse to issue subpoenas. He further contends a judge has discretion to refuse to issue subpoenas when he determines the inquisition would amount to an abuse of judicial process.
In Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Miller, 2 Kan. App. 2d 558, 561, 583 P.2d 1042 (1978), the court stated:
"There can be no doubt that the county prosecutors of this state, along with the attorney general, have a duty to investigate all criminal activity which comes to their attention, and that the inquisition statute is a primary tool entrusted to them by the legislature to assist in that function. [Citations omitted.] If information about criminal activity is in the hands of an individual, it can clearly be acquired by compelling that individual's testimony. If, as here, the information is in the hands of a corporation in the form of corporate records, the construction adopted below would mean it is beyond the reach of the official charged with the duty of investigating and prosecuting. We find it hard to believe the legislature intended the forces of law enforcement to go into the battle against crime with half their guns spiked."
In State, ex rel. v. Rohleder, 208 Kan. 193, 195, 490 P.2d 374 (1971), the court held:
"The district courts of this state cannot prevent . . . the County Attorney from performing the duties required of them by statute. To hold otherwise would create chaos in the criminal enforcement laws. To extend such a rule to absurdity would mean that the district court could prevent any person charged with crime from being prosecuted in his jurisdiction and could by the same process prevent any appeal from a decision of his court."
On the other hand, at page 566 of the Southwestern Bell case, the court noted "the courts are always open to prevent abuse in suits such as this one, if the need arises."
Inevitably, then, the court must perform a balancing act. Maintenance of public order and effective administration of the criminal law require effective methods for the discovery of crime. At the same time, however, the public interest demands that individual rights be adequately protected and those methods not be abused. See Comment, The Inquisition in Kansas — Its Use, Disuse and Abuse, 6 Kan. L. Rev. 452, 453 (1958). Under K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 22-3101(1) the district judge must possess some inherent discretion to prevent abuse of the inquisition power. Here, unlike the Southwestern Bell case, there is a claim of abuse. Judge Bishop acted within his discretionary power.
We hold a district court has the inherent power to refuse to issue subpoenas under K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 22-3101 to avoid abuse of judicial process and the court did not abuse its discretion in this case.
The petition for writ of mandamus is denied.