Case Name: Ronnie NEWMAN, Petitioner, v. Paul OBERSTELLER and Susan D. Obersteller as Next of Friend of Kurt Obersteller, Respondents
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1997-04-18
Citations: 960 S.W.2d 621
Docket Number: No. 96-0374
Parties: Ronnie NEWMAN, Petitioner, v. Paul OBERSTELLER and Susan D. Obersteller as Next of Friend of Kurt Obersteller, Respondents.
Judges: in which PHILLIPS, Chief Justice, GONZALEZ, HECHT, CORNYN, SPECTOR, OWEN and BAKER, Justices, join.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 960
Pages: 621–625

Head Matter:
Ronnie NEWMAN, Petitioner, v. Paul OBERSTELLER and Susan D. Obersteller as Next of Friend of Kurt Obersteller, Respondents.
No. 96-0374.
Supreme Court of Texas.
April 18, 1997.
William S. Helfand, Lisa C. Bingham, Houston, for petitioner.
William J. Kelly, Corpus Christi, for respondents.

Opinion:
ENOCH, Justice,
delivered the opinion of the Court,
in which PHILLIPS, Chief Justice, GONZALEZ, HECHT, CORNYN, SPECTOR, OWEN and BAKER, Justices, join.
The issue in this case is whether section 101.106 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code confers immunity on government officials once a suit against a governmental unit arising out of the same facts has proceeded to judgment. The court of appeals held that it had no jurisdiction to consider the interlocutory appeal under section 51.014(5) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code because section 101.106 is not an immunity statute. 915 S.W.2d 198, 201. We disagree. We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and render judgment for the official.
Kurt Obersteller, a student at Flour Bluff High School, participated in several sports under the supervision of Ronnie Newman, the Flour Bluff Independent School District's head coach and athletic director. Obersteller alleges that Newman mistreated him, causing him emotional damage. He and his parents sued the school district and Newman for intentional infliction of emotional distress and conspiracy to intentionally inflict emotional distress.
The school district sought summary judgment claiming governmental immunity. Tex. Civ. Prac. & RemCode § 101.001-101.109. Newman also sought summary judgment claiming immunity. Tex. Edu.Code § 21.912, repealed by Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 260, § 58(a)(1), eff. May 30, 1995. The trial court granted summary judgments for both Newman and the school district. The trial court later vacated the summary judgment for Newman upon the Oberstellers' motion to reconsider. The trial court severed the ease against the school district from the case against Newman. Thus, the summary judgment for the school district is a final judgment. The Oberstellers did not challenge the summary judgment for the school district.
Newman then appealed under section 51.014(5) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. The court of appeals held the appeal was premature because it was an appeal from the grant of the motion to reconsider rather than a denial of a motion for summary judgment. 915 S.W.2d at 199. The court of appeals abated the appeal on Newman's motion. Id. at 199-200. Newman then filed a second motion for summary judgment which asserted an affirmative defense of immunity under section 101.106 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code and section 21.912 of the Education Code. Id. at 200. That motion was denied, and Newman appealed. Id.
Section 101.106 reads as follows:
A judgment in an action or settlement of a claim under this chapter bars any action involving the same subject matter by the claimant against the employee of the governmental unit whose act or omission gave rise to the claim.
Tex. Civ. Prao. & Rem.Code § 101.106. The court of appeals interpreted section 101.106 as a limitation and bar statute, not an immunity statute. 915 S.W.2d at 201. Other courts of appeals have held that section 101.106 is an immunity statute. See City of Galveston v. Whitman, 919 S.W.2d 929, 932 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ denied); Davis v. Mathis, 846 S.W.2d 84, 88 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1992, no writ). We have jurisdiction to resolve this conflict. See Tex. Gov't Code § 22.001 (a)(2) and 22.225(c).
Section 101.106 provides that a judgment in an action against a governmental unit bars any action against an employee. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 101.106; Thomas v. Oldham, 895 S.W.2d 352, 355 (Tex.1995). The Texas Tort Claims Act is a waiver of governmental immunity by the state for certain actions. Tex. Civ. Prao. & Rem.Code § 101.025. However, the Legislature has provided some exceptions to this waiver, one of which is an action against an individual employee when a suit against a governmental entity involving the same subject matter has proceeded to judgment. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 101.106. The language "bars any action" is an unequivocal grant of immunity in this context. That section 101.106 does not use the word "immunity" is of no consequence. Our reading of section 101.106 is consistent with the structure and intent of the Tort Claims Act. It is also consistent with section 51.014(5), which protects public officials asserting an immunity defense from the litigation process. See Gonzalez v. Avalos, 866 S.W.2d 346, 353 n. 1 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1993) (Larsen, J., concurring), writ dism'd w.o.j. per curiam, 907 S.W.2d 443 (Tex.1995). The unchallenged summary judgment for the school district renders Newman immune from any further action in this matter.
The Oberstellers argue that the court of appeals had no jurisdiction to consider Newman's appeal because Newman, when he first appealed, was late in filing the statement of facts, the transcript, and the brief. We disagree. Rule 42 of the Texas Rules of Appel late Procedure provides that although late filing of the record or the appellant's brief in an accelerated appeal is a ground for dismissal or affirmance, it affects neither the court of appeals' jurisdiction nor its authority to consider the documents. Tex. R.App. P. 42(a)(3).
The Oberstellers also claim that Newman did not properly perfect his appeal from the denial of the summary judgment because he did not again bring forward the record or post a second bond. Newman's original appeal was premature and subject to dismissal for want of jurisdiction had it not been abated. Under Rule 58(a) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, all documents presented to the court of appeals in the premature appeal may be considered in the subsequent appeal. Tex.R.App. P. 58(a). Thus, Newman's appeal was properly perfected.
We conclude that section 101.106 is an immunity statute. Therefore, the court of appeals erred by not exercising jurisdiction over Newman's interlocutory appeal under section 51.014(5). We hold that section 101.106 renders Newman immune from further action in this matter. Pursuant to Rule 170 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, this Court grants Newman's application for writ of error and, without hearing oral argument, reverses the court of appeals' judgment declining jurisdiction. Tex.R.App. P. 170. Further, under Rule 180 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, this Court renders judgment that the Oberstel-lers take nothing. Tex.R.App. P. 180.
ABBOTT, J., filed dissenting opinion.