Case Name: Concepcion L. RIVERA, Administratrix of the Estate of Frederick L. Rivera, Deceased, v. The PHILADELPHIA THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY OF ST. CHARLES BORROMEO, INC. a/k/a St. Charles Seminary and Our Lady of Lourdes Catholic Church. Appeal of the PHILADELPHIA THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY OF ST. CHARLES BORROMEO, INC. a/k/a St. Charles Seminary
Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1990-08-30
Citations: 398 Pa. Super. 264
Docket Number: Nos. 157, 158 Eastern District Appeal Dockets, 1984
Parties: Concepcion L. RIVERA, Administratrix of the Estate of Frederick L. Rivera, Deceased, v. The PHILADELPHIA THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY OF ST. CHARLES BORROMEO, INC. a/k/a St. Charles Seminary and Our Lady of Lourdes Catholic Church. Appeal of the PHILADELPHIA THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY OF ST. CHARLES BORROMEO, INC. a/k/a St. Charles Seminary.
Judges: Before GRILLO, President Judge, and WIEAND and BROSKY, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports
Volume: 398
Pages: 264–284

Head Matter:
580 A.2d 1341
Concepcion L. RIVERA, Administratrix of the Estate of Frederick L. Rivera, Deceased, v. The PHILADELPHIA THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY OF ST. CHARLES BORROMEO, INC. a/k/a St. Charles Seminary and Our Lady of Lourdes Catholic Church. Appeal of the PHILADELPHIA THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY OF ST. CHARLES BORROMEO, INC. a/k/a St. Charles Seminary.
Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
Argued Jan. 23, 1990.
Filed Aug. 30, 1990.
Reargument Denied Oct. 15, 1990.
Joseph T. Bodell, Jr., Philadelphia, for appellant.
Jeffrey M. Stopford, Media, for Rivera, appellee.
Alan R. Kutner and Glenn F. Rosenblum, Korn, Kline & Kutner, P.C., Philadelphia, for Our Lady, appellee.
Before GRILLO, President Judge, and WIEAND and BROSKY, JJ.

Opinion:
WIEAND, Judge:
Frederick L. Rivera, age 12, drowned on December 17, 1976, in a pool owned by The Philadelphia Theological Seminary of St. Charles Borromeo, Inc. (the Seminary) while swimming with a group of altar boys from Our Lady of Lourdes Catholic Church (the Church). His mother, Concepcion L. Rivera, who was also the administratrix of his estate, instituted wrongful death and survival actions to recover damages for his death. On May 4, 1981, a jury attributed causal fault as follows: the Church—65%; the Seminary—30%; and the decedent—5%. On appeal, the Superior Court reversed and remanded for a new trial generally. See: Rivera v. Philadelphia Theological Seminary, 326 Pa.Super. 509, 474 A.2d 605 (1984). The Supreme Court, however, modified the award of a new trial by limiting the new trial to the "Seminary's proportionate liability, if any, in the damage judgment Common Pleas has entered on the jury verdict for plaintiff and the Seminary's right to indemnity from the Church for any payment it may be required to make." Rivera v. Philadelphia Theological Seminary, 510 Pa. 1, 26, 507 A.2d 1, 14 (1986). The judgment as to the amount of damages was affirmed and reinstated. Thus, upon retrial, the Seminary's liability could not exceed 31.6 percent of the amount of damages awarded in the first trial (30% divided by the 95% causal negligence of both defendants). As to the new trial between the Church and the Seminary, the Court said, the Church "will have the burden of proving the Seminary's causal negligence, if any. The plaintiff may participate in the new trial if she so chooses to protect any interest she may have in preserving her right to collect her judgment from the Seminary."
Following a second trial in 1988, a jury again found the Seminary guilty of causal negligence in the death of Frederick Rivera and determined its portion of the fault to be in excess of the fault found by the first jury. In accordance with the Supreme Court's direction, however, the trial court molded the verdict according to the Seminary's degree of fault as found in the first trial. The trial court denied post-trial motions and added damages for delay.
On appeal, the Seminary argues that the evidence failed to show that it had breached a duty owed to the decedent or that any act or failure to act on its part had contributed causally to his death. It also contends that it is entitled to a new trial because of errors occurring during the trial. These alleged errors include: (1) an improper instruction regarding the duty of care owed by the Seminary; (2) excessive participation in the trial by the plaintiff-administratrix; and (3) improper remarks by plaintiff's counsel during closing argument to the jury. Finally, the Seminary argues that the trial court erred in molding the verdict and in calculating delay damages.
When the evidence is considered in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, as we are required to do, see: Mancini v. Morrow, 312 Pa.Super. 192, 197, 458 A.2d 580, 582 (1983), it is clear that it was sufficient to support the jury's finding that the Seminary had breached a duty owed to the minor decedent. The Seminary, as owner of the pool, had a duty to exercise those precautions which a reasonably prudent owner would have taken to prevent injury to those persons whom it knew or should have known were using its pool. Rivera v. Philadelphia Theological Seminary, 510 Pa. 1, 18-19, 507 A.2d 1, 9-10 (1986). Whether the Seminary breached this duty and whether its negligence, if any, was a substantial factor in causing the decedent's death were issues for the jury. The jury's determination can be set aside only if it is clear as a matter of law that reasonable minds could not differ. Alumni Association of Delta Zeta Zeta of Lambda Chi Alpha Fraternity v. Sullivan, 369 Pa.Super. 596, 602, 535 A.2d 1095, 1098 (1987); Vernon v. Stash, 367 Pa.Super. 36, 46, 532 A.2d 441, 446 (1987). Here, the Seminary's alleged freedom from fault was not clear. A jury could have found, in view of the evidence, that the Seminary knew or should have known that its pool was being used by children and that it failed to exercise reasonable care to prevent injury to them.
The trial court did not err when it refused to charge the jury, as requested by the Seminary, that it had no duty to provide a lifeguard. The issue, rather, was whether the Seminary had exercised reasonable care to prevent injury to persons whom it knew or should have known to be using the pool.
The primary duty of a trial judge in charging the jury is to clarify the issues so that the jury may comprehend the questions that they are to decide. Easton Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Union Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Souderton, 237 Pa.Super. 316, 352 A.2d 544 (1975). As long as the trial judge chooses a form of expression which adequately and clearly covers the subject, the judge is not required to use the exact language of a requested point. McGowan v. Devonshire Hall Apartments, 278 Pa.Super. 229, 420 A.2d 514 (1980).
Brandimarti v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 364 Pa.Super. 26, 29, 527 A.2d 134, 136 allocatur denied, 517 Pa. 629, 539 A.2d 810 (1987). Instantly, the trial court properly instructed the jury on common law principles of negligence. It was for the jury to determine whether the Seminary had been negligent in failing to take reasonable precautions to prevent access to its pool when a competent lifeguard was not present and whether the Seminary could reasonably rely upon Father Flynn to supervise the activities of the boys while they were using the pool.
The plaintiff-administratrix's participation in the second trial did not exceed the directions of the Supreme Court or constitute an improper retrial of her claim. The issue, upon retrial, was whether the Seminary had been negligent in causing the decedent's death and, if so, the degree of such negligence in relation to the negligence of the Church. Under Pennsylvania law, if the Seminary were found guilty of causal negligence, it would become liable jointly and severally with the Church. As such, the plaintiff could proceed against either defendant for the full amount of a judgment recovered against both defendants. It was in recognition of this right that the Supreme Court expressly allowed the decedent's administratrix to participate in the new trial. When the Supreme Court further stated that the burden of proving the Seminary's causal negligence would be on the Church, the Court did not limit the plaintiff's participation in the trial in any way. It did no more than recognize that the Church's liability had been established finally in the first trial and that it had the burden of shifting a portion of that liability to the Seminary. The evidence to accomplish this was evidence necessary to establish the Seminary's liability to the decedent's administratrix. Whether the evidence was produced by the plaintiff or the Church at the second trial, therefore, was of no consequence. So long as the evidence was competent, it was immaterial whether the same was presented by the Church or by the plaintiff-administratrix. The Seminary is not entitled to a new trial merely because the plaintiff-administratrix participated fully in the second trial.
A more troublesome issue is that pertaining to a statement made by counsel for the plaintiff-administratrix during closing argument which told the jury that the jury in the first trial had found the Seminary responsible with the Church for the boy's death. Not only was there no evidence of this fact, but counsel and the trial judge had agreed pre-trial that no reference would be made to the prior verdict during the second trial. For plaintiffs counsel to violate this agreement and to place before the jury information which was irrelevant and prejudicial and about which no evidence had been produced was indefensible.
Appellees contend that counsel's remark was a proper, response to a statement by appellant's counsel that a witness "believes what the first jury in this case concluded, that Fred Rivera drowned because Father Flynn did not perform his job as the lifeguard in a safe and competent manner." We reject this argument. The statement by appellant's counsel was consistent with information which had been given to the jury by the court, i.e., that the prior jury had found the Church liable to the plaintiff. The purpose of the action then being tried by the jury was to determine whether the Seminary was jointly and severally liable with the Church for Frederick Rivera's death, and the jury was so instructed. For counsel to tell the jury that a prior jury had already made this determination was clearly improper.
It appears, however, that counsel's remark was cured by a careful and thorough cautionary instruction delivered by the learned trial judge. The judge said:
There was, during closing argument, some discussion between counsel concerning what happened at the prior trial with respect to the seminary. This is unfortunate, it's not something that was supposed to be placed before you, because your decision on this is supposed to be an entirely independent decision. You go on what you heard here, how you sized it up and what you believe the truth of the matter is. You don't go on what you think someone else might have done. That's not at all important. It's quite unusual for a jury at a second trial—and we don't get that many second trials, by the way. I've been a Judge here ten years in the Common Pleas Court, and in another Court before that. This is only about the third or fourth one I've had, so they don't come down for trial that often, back down. Rarely when they do is the same thing done precisely as it was done the first time.
Furthermore, in this case I must tell you that the jury at the first trial was given totally erroneous instructions by the Judge, the Trial Judge at that time who is now a retired Judge, but was a highly respected Judge and an outstanding lawyer before that and very well thought of, but he did have a lapse in instructing the jury on the question of the seminary's negligence in this matter. Both the Superior Court and the Supreme Court characterized his instructions on that point as incomprehensible and of very little use to the jury. It's really hard to tell what the jury would have done in that case had they been given a proper charge. Their decision on that point is best dismissed as guesswork because of the inadequate jury charge they received.
So again, that's another reason why you shouldn't worry about what was done before. That's not your mandate, you're not supposed to worry about that in this case. This case is before you, it's entirely within your discretion to do whatever you think is proper in the case, provided you do follow the guidelines which I'm going to give you.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that "the matter of withdrawing a juror because of [a] line of argument pursued by counsel in addressing a jury or at any stage of the proceeding is subject largely to the discretion of the trial court." Martin v. Philadelphia Suburban Transportation Co., 435 Pa. 391, 394, 257 A.2d 535, 537 (1969). "Whether a court abuses its discretion in refusing to [declare a mistrial] because of improper remarks of counsel must be determined by the circumstances under which the statement was made and by the precautions taken by the court and counsel to prevent its having a prejudicial effect." Id. In this case, the trial court denied a motion for mistrial after the improper remark had been made and carefully instructed the jury that the prior jury had been given incorrect instructions on the law and that its finding was not reliable and did not relieve the jury in this case of its duty to make an independent determination of the Seminary's fault based on the evidence which it had heard. This was adequate to cure the improper statement by plaintiff's counsel. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing also to declare a mistrial.
The trial court did err, however, in awarding delay damages against the Seminary at the rate of ten (10%) percent per annum. The original verdict had been returned on May 4, 1981. Delay damages were thereafter added, and judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants in the amount of $1,035,393.40. This judgment bore interest at the legal rate of six (6%) percent. The amount of the judgment was thereafter affirmed by the Supreme Court. A new trial was granted to the Seminary only to determine the portion of the judgment, if any, which the Seminary was required to pay. The burden of proving such liability was placed on the Church and not on the plaintiff. When it was subsequently determined in a second trial that the Seminary's proportionate part of the liability was to be 31.6% of the judgment previously entered, that part of the judgment should have borne interest at the same rate which was already accumulating against the Church, i.e., six (6%) percent. The amount of the judgment hád been determined—it was not subject to negotiation prior to the second trial—and it was then accumulating interest at the statutory rate of six (6%) percent. The Seminary's liability was a portion of this amount. The amount of plaintiff's recovery could not be enhanced by the verdict in the second trial. This amount had been determined; judgment had been entered therefor; and it bore interest at the legal rate.
The purpose of Pa.R.C.P. 238 is, inter alia, to expedite the handling of cases by promoting early settlements. Its applicability must be determined according to whether a pre-trial offer of settlement, if any, was reasonable in light of the verdict subsequently returned by the jury. After a verdict has been returned, it bears interest at the legal rate of six (6%) percent This rate of interest has been established by statute. See: 42 Pa.C.S. § 8101 and Act of January 30, 1974, P.L. 13, No. 6, § 202, 41 P.S. § 202. Here, the amount of the plaintiff's recovery had been determined on May 4, 1981; judgment had been entered; and the judgment had been affirmed by the Supreme Court. This judgment earned interest at the legal rate of six (6%) percent. When it was subsequently determined that the Seminary's proportionate part of the liability was 31.6%, the Seminary was required by statute to pay, in addition, interest at the rate of six (6%) percent so long as the judgment remained unpaid. To assess delay damages at the rate of ten (10%) percent was not authorized by statute or by the terms of R.C.P. 238. Not only was it unauthorized, but such an assessment served only to punish the Seminary because it was a defendant which had won a new trial because of error committed by the court during the first trial. Such a result would be unconscionable.
The judgment entered by the trial court is modified by eliminating the award of delay damages at the rate of ten (10%) percent and substituting therefor post-judgment interest at the legal rate of six (6%) percent. As so modified, the judgment entered by the trial court is affirmed.
CIRILLO, President Judge, filed a concurring statement.
BROSKY, J., filed a concurring and dissenting opinion.
. The trial court charged the jury as follows:
In determining whether the Seminary was negligent in this case, you may exercise some or all of the following questions .
1. Did the Seminary act in a reasonably prudent manner in failing to adequately bar the access of Fred Rivera and the other boys to the pool . because it did not have a competent lifeguard in its own employ available to supervise those boys in the pool at that time?
2. In fact did the Seminary adequately bar this access?
3. In the absence of a competent lifeguard of its own present at the pool, if that's what you find happened, present at the pool to supervise these boys, did the seminary satisfy its duty to act in a reasonably prudent manner by relying on Father Flynn as a person competent to supervise the boys at the pool?
4. Was Father Flynn a competent lifeguard? . If Father Flynn was a competent lifeguard, did the Seminary act in a reasonably prudent manner in failing to anticipate that he might have a lapse in his vigilance, and therefore, should the Seminary, in order to have acted in a reasonably prudent manner, have required that Father Flynn have additional competent assistance? In the absence of such assistance, should the Seminary have closed the pool to the boys?
4. In order to find the Seminary negligent . it is only necessary for you to determine that someone at St. Charles Seminary failed to act as a reasonably prudent person would have acted under the circumstances.
8. Reasonable care requires that a pool owner such as the St. Charles Seminary take all precautions and actions that a reasonably prudent pool owner would have taken under the same or similar circumstances to guard against the danger of drowning in its pool. If you find that the St. Charles Seminary did not exercise such reasonable care in this regard, then you may find that it was negligent.
9. In determining whether the seminary was negligent, you should consider the extent of possible harm that users of the pool could suffer. A defendant's conduct must be measured against the relative severity of a potential injury. In other words, if you find that there was a risk of a very serious injury or death to those using the pool, you may find that reasonable care required greater precautions than if there was only the risk of a minor injury.
If you find that the seminary failed to provide a lifeguard at the time of the accident in question . you may find that the seminary was negligent on that basis. That's for you to decide.
No. 5. The seminary did have the legal obligation to exercise reasonable care in the operation and maintenance of its swimming pool.