Case Name: BROOKS v. FIELDS
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1965-06-07
Citations: 375 Mich. 667
Docket Number: Calendar Nos. 2, 3, Docket Nos. 50,552, 50,553
Parties: BROOKS v. FIELDS.
Judges: T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., and Smith and Adams, JJ., concurred with Souris, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 375
Pages: 667–675

Head Matter:
BROOKS v. FIELDS.
Opinion of the Court.
1. Action — Injuries on Employer’s Parking Lot — Presumption— Time.
Presumption that injuries sustained by plaintiff while on employer’s parking lot occurred in the course of employment did not arise, when, on motion for summary judgment, neither pleadings nor proofs indicated when her working hours had begun or ended, a time necessary to know since the presumption arises only for injury occurring within a reasonable time before or after working hours (CLS 1961, § 412.1).
2. Workmen’s Compensation — Injuries on Employer’s Parking Lot.
Action of tort for plaintiff’s injuries sustained while on employer’s parking lot would not be barred by the workmen’s compensation act unless defendants also were in the course of their employment with the same employer (CLS 1961, §§ 412.1, 413.15).
3. Judgment — Summary Judgment — Injuries on Employer’s Parking Lot — Questions of Fact.
Summary judgment for defendants was improperly entered in action for injuries plaintiff sustained while on her employer’s parking lot, where her complaint does not state the time her employment commenced or ended, and pleading raises issues of faet as to whether defendants were in the course of their employment when plaintiff was injured and also whether they were employed by the same employer as plaintiff (CLS 1961, §§ 412.1, 413.15; GCR 1963, 117.2 [3]).
References for Points in Headnotes
58 Am Jur, Workmen’s Compensation §§ 214, 217.
Workmen’s Compensation: injury to employee while in automobile parking lot. 159 ALR 1395.
58 Am Jur, Workmen’s Compensation §§ 50, 51.
41 Am Jur, Pleading § 342.
58 Am Jur, Workmen’s Compensation §§ 50, 51.
'4] 58 Am Jur, Workmen’s Compensation § 217.
5] 58 Am Jur, Workmen’s Compensation §§ 50, 64.
;6] 58 Am Jur, Workmen’s Compensation §§ 50, 209, 210.
^7] 58 Am Jur; Workmen’s Compensation §§ 50f 61.
Dissenting Opinion.
Dethmers, Kelly, and O’Hara, JJ.
4. Action — Fellow Employees — Parking Lot — Workmen’s Compensation — Remedy.
Injury to plaintiff employee on parking lot provided by employer for the employees, alleged to be negligently inflicted by one fellow employee upon plaintiff wife at the conclusion of the working day while a passenger in another fellow employee’s car, arose out of the employment and is compensable, if at all, under the workmen’s compensation act (GLS 1961, §§413.1, 418.15).
5. Workmen’s Compensation — Election op Remedies — Remedy.
There is no election of remedies under the workmen’s compensation act as to fellow employees subject thereto, the act providing the exclusive remedy (GLS 1961, § 413.15).
6. Same — Fellow Employees — Injury In Course op Employment.
A fellow employee, as well as an employer, is involved in the compromise of rights affected by the workmen’s compensation act, since the employee gives up his right to common-law verdicts and is relieved of financial responsibility for his negligence, but such status is limited to action in the course of employment (GLS 1961, § 413.15).
7. Action — Derivative Action — Husband and Wipe Injured by Fellow Employees — Remedy—Workmen’s Compensation.
Husband’s derivative common-law action for medical expenses, loss of wife’s services and consortium, brought against fellow employees of wife who was injured on premises of employer while en route home from work is barred, the workmen’s compensation act providing the exclusive remedy for recovery of compensation for her injuries so occasioned (GLS 1961, §§ 413.1, 413.15).
Appeal from Genesee; Baker (John W.), J.
Submitted January 5, 1965.
(Calendar Nos. 2, 3, Docket Nos. 50,552, 50,553).
Decided June 7, 1965.
Rehearing denied July 13, 1965.
Complaint by Ernest Brooks against Oscar Fields and John McDill for damages arising from injuries to his wife in automobile collision on their employer’s parking lot. Similar action by Dolores Brooks for personal injuries, Cases consolidated for motion and on appeal. Summary judgments for defendants. Plaintiffs appeal.
Reversed and remanded.
James Turnage and Leitson, Bean, Bean & Abram (Robert Abram, of counsel), for plaintiffs.
Burroughs, Buck, Stalker & Chapman (Bouglas I. Buck, of counsel), for defendant Fields.
Gault, Bavison <& Bowers (Mathew Bavison, Jr., of counsel), for defendant McDill.

Opinion:
Souris, J.
Defendants asked the trial court to grant summary judgment in their favor, alleging as the sole basis for such grant the provisions of section 1 of part 2 and section 15 of part 3 of the workmen's compensation act, CDS 1961, § 412.1, 413.15 (Stat Ann 1960 Rev §17.151, 17.189). Section 1 pertinently provides:
"Every employee going to or from his work while on the premises where his work is to be performed, and within a reasonable time before and after his working hours, shall be presumed to be in the course of his employment."
Section 15 pertinently provides:
"Where the injury for which compensation is payable under this act was caused under circumstances creating a legal liability in some person other than a natural person in the same employ or the employer to pay damages in respect thereof, the acceptance of compensation benefits or the taking of proceedings to enforce compensation payments shall not act as an élection of remedies".
The trial judge in his decision granting summary judgment stated that since plaintiff Dolores Brooks had alleged in her complaint all of the facts necessary to bring into play the presumption of section 1 she could not on trial be permitted to rebut that presumption, and if the presumption were unre -butted lier suit could not succeed. We need not consider this reasoning process in its entirety simply because the trial judge's basic premise was wrong.
The fact is that the complaint of Dolores Brooks did not allege all facts necessary to give rise to .section l's presumption. For example, nothing appears in the complaint, or in any of the nonconclusionary pleadings before the trial court, to indicate when or whether Mrs. Brooks' working hours had begun or ended. Without such information, it is impossible to say that the presumption has arisen, since it arises only within a "reasonable time" before or after working hours. Thus the judgment of the trial judge, based as it was upon a major misconception of the record, cannot be permitted to stand.
Furthermore, even if Mrs. Brooks were in the course of her employment by virtue of section l's presumption, she would not be barred from suit by section 15 unless the defendants also were in the course of their employment by the same employer. Aside from pleading such conclusion as an affirmative defense, denied by plaintiffs, there was nothing before the trial court, not even an affidavit, from which such a finding could be made even if it were then appropriately the function of the judge to make such findings. Under such circumstances, summary judgment as provided for by GrCR 1963, 117, should not have been entered. See Durant v. Stahlin (Appeal in re Van Dusen, Elliott, Romney), 375 Mich 628, 640, also decided this day.
Reversed and remanded. Costs to plaintiffs.
T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., and Smith and Adams, JJ., concurred with Souris, J.