Case Name: The STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Bernard SHAKTMAN, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1980-10-14
Citations: 389 So. 2d 1045
Docket Number: No. 79-1339
Parties: The STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Bernard SHAKTMAN, Appellee.
Judges: Before HUBBART, C. J., and NESBITT and PEARSON, DANIEL S., JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 389
Pages: 1045–1054

Head Matter:
The STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Bernard SHAKTMAN, Appellee.
No. 79-1339.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Oct. 14, 1980.
Rehearing Denied Nov. 14, 1980.
See also, Fla.App., 389 So.2d 1054, 389 So.2d 1043.
Janet Reno, State’s Atty., for appellant.
Melvin S. Black, Miami, for appellee.
Before HUBBART, C. J., and NESBITT and PEARSON, DANIEL S., JJ.

Opinion:
PEARSON, DANIEL S., Judge.
This is an appeal by the state from an order suppressing evidence obtained by the tape recording of telephone conversations between Shaktman and an undercover police officer.
The parties stipulated to the facts pertinent to the defendant's motion to suppress. The police, suspecting that the defendant was engaged in illegal betting, set the stage to obtain tape recorded evidence of the defendant placing bets with them. They had a telephone (to which they attached recording equipment) installed in an apartment rented and paid for by them. The undercover police officer then personally arranged with Shaktman that Shaktman would call him at the apartment number for the purpose of placing bets. Shaktman did exactly that, and his incriminating conversations were recorded with the consent of the police officer receiving the call. The police did not obtain any court order or warrant authorizing the recording of these conversations. There were no exigent circumstances which would have excused the failure to obtain a court order or warrant if one were required.
The rub, of course, is that no court order or warrant authorizing the police to tape record Shaktman's telephone conversations was required. The undercover officer's consent was enough to validate the recording. It is for that reason that we must reverse the trial court's order.
The trial court based its ruling on Tollett v. State, 272 So.2d 490 (Fla.1973); Sarmiento v. State, 371 So.2d 1047 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); and State v. Muscara, 339 So.2d 167 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). Its reliance on those decisions was misplaced. Tollett merely announces the evidentiary rule that as a predicate to the admission of the tape recording or a seized conversation, the consenting party must testify that he consented to the recording. As we later explained in Franco v. State, 376 So.2d 1168 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), once that predicate requirement for admissibility is met, the tape recording between the consenting party and the accused may be introduced into evidence, and the absence of a warrant or order, the lack of probable cause, and the nonexistence of exigent circumstances are all without significance.
To the extent that Sarmiento v. State, supra, retains , life after Franco, but see State v. Scott, 385 So.2d 1044 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), it is clearly limited to its discreet setting-that is, the monitoring by two police officers stationed outside of the defendant's home of a conversation between the defendant and another within the defendant's home, about which the monitoring officers, not the officer engaged in the conversation with the defendant, testified.
As to Muscara v. State, supra, there is no life after Franco. Muscara's holding that a recording made by undercover police officers of a conversation they had with the defendant was inadmissible because of the failure of the officers to secure an intercept warrant where there was ample time to do so was dealt-a death blow by Franco.
The present case is controlled by Franco, and upon its authority we reverse. See also Jacobs v. State, 389 So.2d 1054 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); State v. Steinbrecher, 389 So.2d 1043 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980); State v. Scott, supra.
Reversed.
. These issues are relevant only in the absence of consent. Section 934.03(2)(c), Florida Statutes (Supplement 1978), provides: "It is lawful under this chapter for a law enforcement officer . to intercept a wire or oral communication when . . . one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception and the purpose of such interception is to obtain evidence of a criminal act." See also State v. Napoli, 373 So.2d 933 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979) (holding that the custody and seal provisions of Section 934.09 do not apply to consent interceptions which require no judicial authorization).
. The Franco court expressly receded from Mascara to the extent its holding was in conflict.