Case Name: The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Freddie Lopez, Appellant; The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Hector Mendez, Appellant
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1989-02-23
Citations: 73 N.Y.2d 214
Docket Number: 
Parties: The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Freddie Lopez, Appellant. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Hector Mendez, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 73
Pages: 214–227

Head Matter:
The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Freddie Lopez, Appellant. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Hector Mendez, Appellant.
Argued January 11, 1989;
decided February 23, 1989
POINTS OF COUNSEL
Lawrence K. Marks and Philip L. Weinstein for appellant in the first above-entitled action.
I. The complainant’s testimony that appellant stated "this is a stickup” and placed his hands inside his vest jacket, without any other evidence that an object was in fact displayed, was insufficient to prove the display element of first degree robbery. (People v Baskerville, 60 NY2d 374; People v Copeland, 124 AD2d 669; People v Bynum, 125 AD2d 207, 70 NY2d 858; People v Lyde, 98 AD2d 650; People v Cassidy, 109 AD2d 747; People v Carrington, 127 AD2d 677.) II. Appellant was denied his due process right to a fair trial by the prosecutor’s summation comment that appellant had listened to the prosecution’s evidence and then had "tailored” his testimony. (People v Rosa, 108 AD2d 531; People v Bolden, 82 AD2d 757; Brooks v Tennessee, 406 US 605; People v Ashwal, 39 NY2d 105; Doyle v Ohio, 426 US 610; People v Al-Kanani, 26 NY2d 473; People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230.)
Robert M. Morgenthau, District Attorney of New York County (Michael Schwartz and Norman Barclay of counsel), for respondent in the first above-entitled action.
I. The People proved defendant’s guilt of first degree robbery, including the "display” element, beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v Baskerville, 60 NY2d 374; People v Scarborough, 49 NY2d 364; People v Saez, 69 NY2d 802; People v Bynum, 125 AD2d 207, 70 NY2d 858; People v Jenkins, 118 Misc 2d 530; People v Knowles, 79 AD2d 116; People v Hazel, 133 AD2d 847; People v Carrington, 127 AD2d 677; People v Pena, 50 NY2d 400, 449 US 1087; People v Di Girolamo, 108 AD2d 755.) II. Defendant’s claim that he was denied a fair trial by a single remark in the prosecutor’s summation has not been preserved for appellate review. In any event, the remark was wholly proper. (People v Gonzalez, 55 NY2d 720, 456 US 1010; People v Nuccie, 57 NY2d 818; People v Balls, 69 NY2d 641; People v Rodriguez, 38 NY2d 95; People v Conyers, 49 NY2d 174; Doyle v Ohio, 426 US 610; People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230.)
Richard Ware Levitt for appellant in the second above-entitled action.
I. The People failed to prove appellant’s guilt of robbery in the first or second degrees, as a matter of law, since (a) the court instructed that defendant’s accomplice must himself have "displayed” the gun, which he did not, and (b) even if defendant’s statement to his alleged accomplice, "don’t show him the gun”, were considered together with the evidence that the accomplice’s hand was beneath his shirt, the evidence of display was still insufficient. (People v Malagon, 50 NY2d 954; People v Bell, 48 NY2d 913; People v Baskerville, 60 NY2d 374; People v Carrington, 127 AD2d 677; People v Bynum, 125 AD2d 207, 70 NY2d 858; People v Lyde, 98 AD2d 650; People v Neal, 118 AD2d 815; People v Knowles, 79 AD2d 116; People v York, 134 AD2d 637; People v Jenkins, 118 Misc 2d 530.) II. The trial court erred in permitting the police officers to testify that appellant began walking away when they approached him, and that they thereafter had to "corner” appellant to arrest him. (People v Howard, 50 NY2d 583; People v McLean, 107 AD2d 167.) III. Reversible error was committed when Officer Garcia bolstered the complainant’s identification by testifying that he arrested appellant after having had a conversation with the complainant. (People v Holt, 67 NY2d 819.)
Paul T. Gentile, District Attorney of Bronx County (Lynn M. Talutis and Michael R. Gordon of counsel), for respondent in the second above-entitled action.
I. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, any rational trier of fact could have found appellant’s guilt of robbery in the first degree proven beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490; People v Malizia, 62 NY2d 755, 469 US 932; People v Kennedy, 47 NY2d 196; People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620; Jackson v Virginia, 443 US 307; Matter of Anthony M., 63 NY2d 270; People v Baskerville, 60 NY2d 374; Matter of Wade F., 49 NY2d 730; People v Bynum, 125 AD2d 207, 70 NY2d 858; People v Cassidy, 109 AD2d 747.) II. This court is barred from considering whether the People properly admitted evidence of appellant’s flight. (People v Fleming, 70 NY2d 947; People v Yazum, 13 NY2d 302, 15 NY2d 679; People v Yaghnam, 135 AD2d 763; People v Snyder, 124 AD2d 394; People v Bryant, 60 AD2d 810, 44 NY2d 790.) III. This court cannot pass upon the fact that the prosecutor fairly and properly elicited testimony from Officer Garcia concerning appellant’s arrest. (People v Fleming, 70 NY2d 947; People v Love, 57 NY2d 1023; People v West, 56 NY2d 662; People v Gonzalez, 55 NY2d 720, 456 US 1010; People v Ross, 21 NY2d 258; People v Trowbridge, 305 NY 471; People v Holt, 67 NY2d 819; People v Jackson, 70 NY2d 884; People v Johnson, 57 NY2d 969; People v Mobley, 56 NY2d 584.)

Opinion:
OPINION OF THE COURT
Chief Judge Wachtler
In these two cases the defendants have been convicted of robbery in the first degree. The question common to the appeals is whether the evidence in each case is sufficient to prove that, during the course of the robbery, the defendant displayed what appears to be a firearm, the element necessary to elevate the crime to the first degree (Penal Law § 160.15 [4]). In each case the Appellate Division found the proof sufficient and the defendant appeals.
In People v Lopez, the robbery took place on a Manhattan street in October 1984. The victim and two female companions were approached by the defendant and another man. The defendant said "this is a stick up" and demanded that the victim hand over the radio he was carrying. The victim testified that as the defendant announced the robbery he put his hand in the right side of his vest "as if he had a gun". When the victim surrendered his radio, the defendant and the other man entered a car driven by a third man and fled the scene.
The victim was acquainted with the defendant because they had played basketball together several years earlier. The day after the robbery the victim saw the defendant on the street and identified him to the police as the person who had held him up. The defendant was indicted for robbery in the first degree for displaying what appeared to be a firearm during the course of the robbery (Penal Law § 160.15 [4]), as well as robbery in the second degree on the theory that he had been aided by another person actually present (Penal Law § 160.10 [1]). After a jury trial the defendant was found guilty on both counts. However, on the defendant's motion, the court set aside the verdict on the robbery first degree count, concluding that there was "absolutely no evidence of displaying". The court noted that there was no proof that when the defendant placed his hand inside his vest he "made the shape of any object or that the victim saw any object displayed".
On cross appeals by the People and the defendant, the Appellate Division restored the conviction for robbery in the first degree and otherwise affirmed. The court held: "While the display of 'what appears to be' a firearm test requires a 'display [of] something that could reasonably be perceived as a firearm' (People v Baskerville, 60 NY2d 374, 381), there is no requirement that the object need be anything other than the defendant's hand" (135 AD2d 443, 443-444).
In People v Mendez, the robbery occurred in The Bronx in June of 1985. The victim testified that he was walking toward the Hunt's Point subway station when he saw the defendant standing near a stoop where another man was sitting. As the victim passed, the defendant grabbed him from behind, pushed him against a wall and demanded that he give the defendant everything he had. The defendant then took the victim's watch, ripped a chain from his neck and removed $80 from his back pocket. The other man sat on the stoop watching the robbery with his right hand under his shirt. According to the victim, at one point during the robbery the defendant said to the man on the stoop "don't show him the gun" or "[don't] take out the gun". When the robbery was complete, both men fled.
The victim had seen the defendant on several occasions before the robbery, near a store where the victim was employed. He recognized him by his distinctive tattoos, including a set of lips tattooed on the defendant's neck. A few days after the robbery, while the victim was at work, he saw the defendant pass on the street outside the store and reported him to the police, who arrested him.
A jury found the defendant guilty of robbery in the first degree, and the Appellate Division affirmed, without opinion. On this appeal the defendant contends, as he did at the close of the People's case, that the evidence is insufficient to prove that he or his accomplice displayed what appeared to be a firearm. He therefore urges that the robbery conviction be reduced from first degree to third degree.
I.
The core requirement for all three degrees of robbery under the Penal Law is proof that the defendant forcibly stole property from another (Penal Law § 160.05, 160.10, 160.15). If, in addition, the defendant or another participant in the crime "[displays what appears to be a pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other firearm", the offense is elevated to robbery in the first degree (Penal Law § 160.15 [4]). However, if the defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the object displayed "was not a loaded weapon from which a shot, readily capable of producing death or other serious physical injury," the crime is reduced to robbery in the second degree (Penal Law § 160.15 [4]). Of course, if the evidence would not warrant a finding that the defendant or a confederate made such a display, and no other aggravating factor has been charged or proven, the forceable taking constitutes robbery in the third degree, the lowest robbery offense (Penal Law § 160.05).
The statutory scheme serves two primary purposes. First, it recognizes that the additional fear suffered by a robbery victim confronted by what appears to be a firearm aggravates the nature of the offense and warrants additional punishment (People v Baskerville, 60 NY2d 374, 381, supra). Secondly, it recognizes the difficulty of proving that an object displayed during a robbery, which appears to be a firearm capable of causing death or serious injury, was in fact a loaded, operable gun when it was not fired at the scene or recovered afterwards (People v Baskerville, supra, at 381). The statute assumes that the object consciously displayed as a firearm was what it appeared to be and places on the defendant the burden of showing that it was not, in which case he could only be convicted of the lesser, second degree offense (People v Lockwood, 52 NY2d 790).
Although the display element focuses on the fearful impression made on the victim, it is not primarily subjective. The People must show that the defendant consciously displayed something that could reasonably be perceived as a firearm, with the intent of forcibly taking property, and that the victim actually perceived the display (People v Baskerville, supra, at 381).
However, the object displayed need not closely resemble a firearm or bear a distinctive shape. In light of the purpose of the statutory scheme, the broad wording of the display element, and the obligation to construe the Penal Law fairly to carry out the legislative intent (Penal Law § 5.00), we have held that "the display of anything that appears to be such [i.e., a firearm], though held inside a coat or otherwise obscured, is covered by sections 160.10 and 160.15" (People v Baskerville, supra, at 381). A towel wrapped around a black object (People v Baskerville, supra), a toothbrush held in a pocket (People v Lockwood, supra) or even a hand consciously concealed in clothing may suffice (People v Knowles, 79 AD2d 116; cf., People v Gilliard, 72 NY2d 877), if under all the circumstances the defendant's conduct could reasonably lead the victim to believe that a gun is being used during the robbery. Indeed, the victim's perception need not be visual, but may be limited to touch or sound (People v Baskerville, supra, at 381), as when the defendant approaches in the dark or from behind so that the victim may only feel or hear what appears to be a gun (see, e.g., People v Jenkins, 118 Misc 2d 530).
Thus the display requirement has been construed broadly to cover a wide range of actions which might reasonably create the impression in the mind of the victim that the robber is armed with a firearm (People v Baskerville, supra, at 382), but cannot be read so broadly as to include mere statements that a robber is armed with a gun. Informing a robbery victim that a gun is present or even threatening to shoot may be as frightening as displaying a firearm, but under these statutes it is the "display" of what appears to be a firearm, and not the mere threat to use one, which is required (compare, People v Dodt, 61 NY2d 408 [defendant's statement to victim that he had a gun in pocket sufficient under statute requiring threat of deadly physical force, Penal Law § 135.20, 135.25]). The defendant's statements may give meaning to the actions (People v Baskerville, supra, at 381), but words alone will not constitute a display of what appears to be a firearm within the meaning of the first and second degree robbery statutes (see, People v York, 134 AD2d 637; see also, People v Jennings, supra, at 534 ["mere use of words without some other affirmative action appealing simultaneously to one or another of the victim's actual senses" would be insufficient]).
II.
In People v Lopez, where the defendant confronted the victim on the street, announced a "stickup" and placed his hand in his vest jacket as he demanded the victim's radio, there was sufficient evidence that the defendant displayed what appeared to be a weapon within the meaning of the statutes. The defendant's sole contention is that the evidence is deficient because the victim "only saw appellant move his hand inside the jacket, and [did not see] a gun or any other object or bulge that could reasonably have been perceived as a gun".
The argument basically is that a hand cannot reasonably be perceived as a firearm; thus, unless the vest appears to conceal some other object or the hand is positioned under the vest in such a way as to suggest a firearm, the defendant cannot be said to have "consciously display[ed] something that could reasonably be perceived as a firearm" (People v Baskerville, supra, at 381). As noted, however, an object can be "displayed" without actually being seen by the victim even in outline (People v Baskerville, supra, at 381; People v Jenkins, supra). All that is required is that the defendant, by his actions, consciously manifest the presence of an object to the victim in such a way that the victim reasonably perceives that the defendant has a gun. Here, the victim testified that he heard the defendant announce a "stickup" and saw him place his hand in his vest "as if he had a gun". By his gesture the defendant conspicuously and consciously conveyed the impression that he was reaching for something which, under the circumstances, the victim could reasonably conclude was a firearm. Thus, in this case, the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction for robbery in the first degree.
III.
In People v Mendez, on the other hand, the conviction for first degree robbery cannot be sustained. Concededly, this defendant made no display during the robbery indicating that he had a firearm. What the People rely on is the fact that the man on the stoop had his hand under his shirt and that the defendant told him not to take out the gun.
A defendant may be held liable for the acts of "another participant" who displays what appears to be a firearm during the robbery (Penal Law § 160.10 [2]; § 160.15 [4]). Here, however, the man on the stoop did not actively participate in the robbery, nor did he display a weapon or take any action indicating that he had one. On the contrary, throughout the robbery he simply sat on the stoop with his hand under his shirt, literally on the sidelines, immobile, inconspicuous and indifferent. Although his actions, more accurately viewed as inaction, indicate that he had no intention of interfering with the defendant, something more is required before he can be said to have also participated in the robbery and displayed what appeared to be a weapon, conspicuously and consciously. It is obvious that the defendant intended his reference to the man on the stoop to create the impression in the mind of the victim that the man was armed, and that the victim interpreted this as a threat. However, as noted, a mere threat without some display is insufficient to establish robbery in the first degree. Thus, the evidence only establishes that the defendant committed a forceable taking, and the conviction should be reduced to robbery in the third degree (Penal Law § 160.05) as the defendant contends.
Accordingly, in People v Lopez, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed. In People v Mendez, the order of the Appellate Division should be modified by reducing the conviction from robbery in the first degree to robbery in the third degree and the defendant should be resentenced (CPL 470.15 [2] [a]; 470.20 [4]; 470.40 [1]).
. In response to the dissenters' discussion of subdivision (3), which is not in issue here, we would simply note that it is an open question in this court as to whether a gun would have to be loaded and operable to be considered a dangerous instrument under that subdivision. In People v Pena (50 NY2d 400), we affirmed a conviction where the defendant gestured and threatened to shoot, but the only dangerous instrument he was found to possess was a knife. In People v Holmes, (71 AD2d 904, affd 52 NY2d 976), where the defendant threatened to shoot but there was no proof that the gun was operable, the Appellate Division reversed the conviction and the only issue considered on the appeal to this court was the corrective action. In People v Colavito (126 AD2d 554, affd 70 NY2d 996), the Appellate Division affirmed a conviction where there was no proof that the gun was operable noting that the gun could have been used as a club, and we affirmed after concluding that the issue had not been preserved for our review.
. We note that robbery in the second degree is the appropriate offense when, in fact, the defendant has simply used his hand to create the impression he is armed with a gun (see, People v Knowles, 79 AD2d 116; cf., People v Gilliard, 72 NY2d 877). However, the burden is on the defendant to prove this as an affirmative defense at trial (People v Gilliard, supra).