Case Name: THE STATE ex rel. ARTHUR V. LASHLY v. CHARLES U. BECKER, Secretary of State
Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1921-12-07
Citations: 290 Mo. 560
Docket Number: 
Parties: THE STATE ex rel. ARTHUR V. LASHLY v CHARLES U. BECKER, Secretary of State.
Judges: James T. Blair, C. J., Woodson and Walker, JJ., concur; Higbee, and D. E. Blair, JJ., dissent in separate opinions to be filed; Elder, J., files separate opinion.
Reporter: Missouri Reports
Volume: 290
Pages: 560–650

Head Matter:
THE STATE ex rel. ARTHUR V. LASHLY v CHARLES U. BECKER, Secretary of State.
In Banc,
December 7, 1921.
1. ORIGINAL PROCEEDING: Things Considered. An original proceeding in mandamus involving practically the whole organic law of the State calls for all legal information possessed by either court or counsel, and if necessary to a right conclusion the court will consider points outside of the briefs.
2. SENATORIAL DISTRICTS: Legislative Action. A division of the State into senatorial districts by the Governor, Secretary of State and Attorney-General is an act legislative in its character, made so by the Constitution, which first grants the power .to the General Assembly, and upon its failure or refusal to act grants the same power to these three state officials, who but for such grgmt would possess no legislative duties or functions. [Following State ex rel. Barrett v. Hitchcock, 241 Mo. 433.]
3. -: Power of Executive Officers Since Initiative Amendment: Stare Decisis. The question involved in this case, namely, the power of the Governor, Secretary of State and Attorney-General, in view of the initiative-and-referendum amendment of the Constitution, to divide the State into senatorial districts upon the refusal or failure of the General Assembly to do so, has never been before the Supreme Court for decision, nor can the ease of State ex rel. Halliburton v. Roach, 230 Mo. 408, nor the ease of State ex rel. v. Patterson, 229 Mo. 373, be held to be stare decisis of the question, for it was not involved in the questions decided by those eases, and besides it is doubtful if the Halliburton ease has any further binding force in view of the later decision in State ex rel. Stokes v. Roach, 190 S. W. 1. e. 279. In the Halliburton case the question decided was that an initiative petition demanding that an amendment to the Constitution dividing the State into senatorial districts be submitted to the people for their approval or rejection does not in fact ask for an amendment to the Constitution, but for a statutory enactment by popular vote, and that a temporary statute could not be enacted under the guise of a constitutional amendment; and the question whether the conditional grant of power to said three executive officers to redistrict the State senatorially upon the failure of the General Assembly to do so had been withdrawn by the initiative-and-referendum amendment of 1908 was not an issue, and consequently could not have been decided.
Held, by ELDER, J., in a separate opinion, and by DAVID E. BLAIR and HIGBEE, JJ., in separate dissenting opinions, that it was squarely decided in the Halliburton case that the power to re district the State into senatorial districts was and is, by Section 7 of Article IV of the Constitution, specifically and exclusively delegated in the first instance to the General Assembly, and, in the event of its failure to perform the duty, to the Governor, Secretary of State and Attorney-General, and that this power being still specifically so delegated was not withdrawn by the initiative-and-referendum amendment of 1908, nor its exercise changed, modified or affected by the adoption of said amendment, and that it could not thereafter be exercised by any authority other than those to whom it had thus been delegated by said Section 7.
Held, by JAMES T. BLAIR, C. X, in response, that the language of a former decision is to be construed with reference to the circumstances of the particular ease and the question actually under consideration and decided; that the language, arguments and illustrations used by a judge in his opinion are to be interpreted in the light of the facts and issues held in judgment in the concrete ease, and that general language cannot be mechanically or automatically applied to different issues and different facts in another case; .that the question whether the conditional grant of legislative power to the Governor, Secretary of State and Attorney-General to divide the State into senatorial districts was withdrawn by the initiative-and-referendum amendment was not an issue in the Halliburton ease, as is shown by the clear statement in the opinion therein of the two questions up for decision; that the real question decided by that case was that the amendment gave the people no power by initiative petition to propose a constitutional amendment which the Legislature could not have proposed; and that the decision of this question was in no wise affected by the question whether the power of the three executive officers remained or had been abrogated.
4. CONSTITUTION: Amendment: Inconsistency. An amendment will prevail over an inconsistent provision in the original constitution, and its operation or effect cannot be controlled or limited by prior constitutional provisions in conflict with it.
5. -: -: Construction. A fair interpretation of the language used, having in view the fundamental purpose to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the framers of the Constitution, including the amendment, if such there has been, is a rule of construction. The construction should not be technical, strict or liberal, but a fair interpretation, having in full view the intent of the framers.
6. -: Amendment of 1908: Annullment of Other Provisions: Senatorial Districts: Construction: Repeal By Implication. The initiative-and-referendum amendment of 1908 of the Constitution practically wiped out Section 36 of Article IV, giving to the General Assembly power over emergency clauses, and the word "only” in Section 1 of Article XV declaring that "this Constitution may'be amended and revised only in pursuance of the provisions of this chapter,” and the proviso or# last clause of Section 7 of Article IV, declaring that "if at any time, or from any cause, the General Assembly shall fail or refuse to district the State for senators, as required by this section, it shall be the duty of the Governor, Secretary of State and Attorney-General, within thirty days after the adjournment of the General Assembly on which such duty devolved, to perform such duty; ’ ’ and all legislative power was by said amendment vested in the General Assembly, with the reserved power in the people to propose laws and amendments to the Constitution, and to enact or reject the same at the polls, and by referendum to approve or rejeet at the polls any act of the General Assembly.
Held, by ELDER, DAVID E. BLAIR and HIGBEE, JJ., dissenting, in separate opinions, that if so much of said Section 7 as empowers the Governor, Secretary .of State and. Attorney-General to divide the State into senatorial districts, upon the failure of the General Assembly to do so, was repealed by said amendment, it was repealed by implication; that it is a cardinal rule of both constitutional and statutory construction that repeal by implication is not favored; that to establish a repeal the said amendment and said provision in Section 7 must be plainly and irreconcilably repugnant to each other; that there is no such repugnancy; that said amendment spent its force on the provisions for the initiative and referendum, and did not expressly or by intendment, re-invest, or change or alter the investment of, legislative power; that said amendment was intended and designed to afford the people (a) a means of enacting desired legislation which the General Assembly would not enact, and (b) to override an objectional "act of the legislative assembly,” to which the referendum alone applies; and that said amendment should not be extended by construction to embrace a withdrawal from said executive officers of the conditional grant of power with which they had been previously invested.
7. -: -: Restrictions Upon Legislative Power. The subject of the initiative-and-referendum amendment of 1908 was the grant of legislative power, not restrictions upon legislative action. It did not deal with restrictions upon the right, power or authority ' of the General Assembly, but it embraced its acts of omission and commission. The Bill of Bights' withholds certain subjects from legislative aetioh, and there are reservations or restrictions upon legislative action found in other articles, none of which are impaired by the amendment; it withdrew no legislative power; it simply centralized the legislative power or authority in the General Assembly, excluding its exercise by other independent department or officers of the government, and reserving the right to refer, if the General Assembly acted, and to initiate, if it did not act. The “legislative authority” mentioned in the amendment must be construed as meaning such legislative power or authority as was not reserved or restricted by the amendment itself and by such provisions of the existing Constitution as are not in conflict with it. The purpose of the amendment was to secure to the people the rights of referendum and initiative upon all legislative subjects, and things reserved to them or restricted by them are not legislative subjects.
Held, by ELDER, J., in a separate opinion, and by DAVID E. BLAIR and HIGBEE, JJ., in separate dissenting opinions, that if said amendment withdrew all legislative power from the General Assembly and re-invested it in a legislative assembly, subject to the, right of popular referendum and initiative, it struck out of the Constitution all limitations and restrictions upon the authority of the Legislature, and withdrew all prior constitutional grants of legislative authority to cities and agencies other than the General Assembly, and all prior delegation of legislative power made by the General Assembly itself; that such conclusion and revolutionary result is compelled, if the amendment withdrew the conditional grant of legislative power to the three executive officers to divide the State into senatorial districts theretofore invested in them by . Section 7; that all the amendment attempted or accomplished was a reservation of power to require approval by the people of certain enactments of the General Assembly, and to initiate and enact laws that the General Assembly might fail to pass and to amend the Constitution; and, hence,, restrictions and limitations upon and grants of legislative power provided elsewhere in the Constitution were not affected, and the grant to the three executive officers to divide the State into senatorial districts upon the failure of the Legislature to do so was not therefore withdrawn or affected by it.
3.'eld, by JAMBS T. BLAIR, O. J., concurring, that unless it be true that the power exercised by a city council in enacting ordinances, and the delegated power exercised by a legislative agent, such as the Public Service Commission, is a part of the legislative power in a constitutional sense, the delegations of power to municipal corporations and legislative agents are not invalid or unconstitutional; that there is .no conflict between that clause of the amendment which declares that “the legislative authority of the State shall be vested in a legislative assembly” and the authority conferred by the General Assembly upon a city council to enact ordinances for the city, for the conferring of such authority upon cities is not a delegation of the law-making power of the government; that the General Assembly cannot delegate its law-making power or its legislative authority, but the city’s authority to enact ordinances is not an exercise of legislative power in the constitutional sense; the power to authorize municipalities to act in matters of local concern,' and the power to ''establish a public service commission or other board for the better administration of the law regulating public utilities, are consistent parts of “the legislative authority” expressed in the amendment, but it no more repeals or affects those powers, or acts passed in pursuance to them, than it repeals or affects acts passed under any other part of the legislative power as it existed under the Constitution at the time the amendment was adopted; that the amendment invested all legislative power in the General Assembly, subject to referendum and initiative, but it did not affect any existing constitutional restrictions or reservations; that by declaring that “the legislative authority of the State shall be vested in a legislative assembly,” subject to the right of the initiative and referendum, the amendment withdrew from the three executive officers the legislative power to form senatorial districts, but it did not thereby withdraw, or destroy or affect existing restrictions upon the legislative power of ' the General Assembly.
8. -: -: Veto Bower of Governor. The initiative-and-referendum amendment of the Constitution did not destroy the veto power of the Governor. Whether the veto power be considered as legislative or executive, the amendment confines legislative action in a single forum, so that the people would have the full power of initiative and referendum, and this single forum includes all officers whose aets are required to complete -or defeat a law; if the Governor is a part of the legislative power, it includes him; if he is not, his veto power is preserved by the amendment itself, which declares that "the veto power of the Governor shall- not extend to measures referred to the people.” If an act passed by the General Assembly is vetoed by the Governor, it can still be referred to the people, if again passed by the General Assembly in spite of his veto, but if referred to and approved by the people he cannot again veto it; as to laws enaeted by the initiative process his veto power cannot be exercised. .
Held, by DAVID 35. BLAIR and HIGBEE, JJ., in separate dissenting opinions, that said amendment did not concentrate all legislative power in a single forum, but left such power, except as to the right of referendum and initiative, where it had previously existed.
P -: — -: All Legislative Authority: Senatorial Districts. The amendment of 1908 in declaring that "the legislative authority of the State shall be vested in a legislative assembly consisting of a senate and a house of representatives,” followed by provisions reserving to the people the right to refer legislative acts and to initiate laws, vested,in one single forum all legislative authority, and took away from the three executive officers the conditional grant of legislative power to divide the State into senatorial districts. [ELDER, DAVID E. BLAIR and HIGBEE, JJ., dissenting, in separate opinions.]
10. -:-: Investment of Legislative Power: Conditional Grant to Executive Officers Withdrawn. The initiative-and-referendum amendment of 1908 declaring that "the legislative authority of the State shall be vested in a legislative assembly, consisting of a senate and a house of representatives,” and reserving to the people both the right to refer and to initiate, precludes any conclusion that any portion of legislative authority belongs elsewhere. It annulled the conditional grant of legislative power theretofore vested in the Governor, Secretary of State and Attorney-General to divide the State into senatorial districts upon the failure or refusal of the General Assembly to do so. It gave to the people the right to initiate legislation dividing the State into such districts, and it gave the right to have referred to them any act of the General Assembly making such division, and it thus took away from these three executive officers the conditional grant of legislative power theretofore vested in them. [ELDER, DAVID E. BLAIR and HIGBEE, JJ., dissenting, in separate opinions.]
11. -: Formation of Senatorial Districts: Act of 1901: Invalidity. If it be conceded that the Act of 1901 by which the Governor, Secretary of State and Attorney-General divided the State into senatorial districts was invalid, that concession does not avail a respondent who does not attack the validity of the Aet of 1891, by which the same counties were placed in the senatorial district in which relator resides ás were placed therein by the said Aet of 1901 and have ever since constituted said district; for if it be conceded that the division made by the three executive officers in 1901 was invalid, respondent would be relegated to the division made in 1891, which is not questioned.
12. -: -: -:-: Timely Attack: Laches. The division of the State into senatorial districts in 1901 by the three executive officers 'having remained unchallenged for more than twenty years, and being in its nature largely political and administrative and involving no individual rights other than pertain to the whole electorate, and to hold it invalid would result in the utmost confusion, a litigant will not be heard at this late date to question its validity. In such ease the question whether laches can give validity, to a void act will not be decided, but the aet being purely administrative or political, individuals who have seen it in operation and unchallenged for a long series of years will not be heard to question its validity.
Mandamus.
Writ Granted.
Wilfley, Williams, McIntyre., Hensley & Nelson, A. T. Durum, Henry L. Jost, John T. Barlcer, T. B. R. Ely, Wayne Ely and John I. Williamson for relator.
(1) Section 7 of Article 4 of the Missouri Constitution is repealed by Section 57 of Article 4, and the redistricting by the Governor, the Secretary of State and Attorney-General is void. 8 Cyc. 749; People v. Angle, 109 N. Y. 564,17 N. E. 413; 12 Corpus Juris, 724; Board v. County, 58 Fla. 391, 50 So. 574; 36 Cyc. 1073; Pool v. Brown, 98 Mo. 675; Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 602; State ex rel. v. Hitchcock, 241 Mo. 433; State ex rel. Westhues v. Sullivan, 224 S. W. 327; Sears v. Mult-nomah Co., 49 Ore. 43; Arksansas Tax Comm. v. Moore, 103 Ark. 53; In re Interrogatories by Governor, 181 Pac. (Colo.) 197. (2) This attempt at redistricting is so unfair, both as to equality of population and compactness of territory, as to make it void. State ex rel. v. Hitchcock, 241 Mo. 433; Secs. 5, 6, 9, Art. 4, Mo. Constitution; 36 Cyc. 846-848; Donovan v. Comrs., 225 Mass. 55, 2 L. R. A. 1344; State ex rel. v. Cunningham, 81 "Wis. 440, 15 L. R. A. 561; Denny v. State, 144 Ind. 403, 31 L. R. A. 726; People v. Thompson, 155 Ill. 451; Brooks v. State, 162 Ind. 568; Ragland v. Anderson, 125 Ky. 141, 100 S. W. 865; Atty. Gen. v. Comrs., 224 Mass. 598; Giddings v. Blacker, 93 Mich. 1, 16 L. R. A.-402; Williams v. State, 145 Mich. 447; Stevens v. State, 181 Mich. 199; State ex rel. v. Stoddard, 25 Nev. 452, 51 L. R. A. 229; Baird v. County, 138 N. Y. 95, 20 L. R. A. 81; Re Timmerman, 100 N. Y. Supp. 57; Moore v. New York, 160 N. Y. Supp. 471; Williams v. Woods, 162 S. W. 1031; State ex rel. v. Cunningham, 83 Wis. 90, 17 L. R. A. 145; Re Dolling, 219 N. Y. 44; Sherrill v. O’Brien, 188 N. Y. 185; Re Livingston, 160 N. Y. Supp. 462. (3) Respondent is estopped to question the validity of the apportionment of 1901. Adams- v. Bosworth, 126 Ky. 61; Ragland v. Anderson, 125 Ky. 141; In re Reynolds, 202 N. Y. 439; State ex rel. v. Howell, 92 Wash. 540.
Jesse W. Barrett, Attorney-General, and Merrill E. Otis, Assistant Attorney-General, for respondent.
(1) The initiative-and-referendum amendment did not repeal Section 7 of Article IV of the Constitution. State ex rel. Halliburton v. Roach, 230 Mo. 408. (2) Repeatedly since the adoption of the initiative-and-referendum amendment the Supreme Court has recognized that Section 7 of Article IV is still in force. State ex rel. Halliburton v. Roach, 230 Mo.-408; State ex rel. v. Hitchcock, 241 Mo. 457; State ex rel. v. Patterson, 229 Mo. 388. (3) To say, as relator does, that the initiative-and-referendum amendment removed from the Constitution all limitations on and exceptions to the legislative authority of the General Assembly leads to an absurdity, namely, the elimination from the Constitution of the multitude of important limitations on the power of the Legislature, including the' Ihirty-three set out in Section 53 of Article IY, and the Governor’s veto power, which is an essential part of the legislative authority of the State. (4) The initiative-and-referendmn amendment must be read in the light of the great rules of constitutional and statutory construction: (a) All parts of the Constitution are to be read together; (b) when of two possible constructions of a particular provision one is in harmony with and the other repugnant to another provision, dealing with the same subject, the first must be adopted; (c) the presumption is against repeal by implication. When so read, the language of the amendment —“the legislative authority of the state” — can only be construed to mean the legislative authority as elsewhere in the Constitution delegated to the General Assembly, subject to all the limitations and exceptions in the Constitution stated. (5) If there is a doubt as to whether the amendment repeals Section 7 of Article IV (and ,at least that such -a doubt exists appears from the decision of the Supreme Court and the numerous declarations of the judges thereof that Section 7 of Article IY was not repealed by the amendment), then we may look to the history of the amendment to ascertain the actual intent of the people in adopting it. That history shows that the repeal of Section 7 of Article IY was never contemplated or suggested. (6) The redistricting of 1921, being a legislative act, is presumed to be constitutional. (7) The redistricting of 1921, both as to compactness and equality of population is greatly superior to' those of 1881, 1891, 1901 and the 1911 attempted redistricting. The fact that a redistricting is superior to any ever before laid out by reasonable men shows that it is at least a reasonable approach to the standards fixed in the Constitution. (8) The redistricting of 1921, both as to compactness and equality of’ population, is greatly superior to that of the Constitution of 1875 itself as that redistricting appears in Section 11 of Article IY. That redistricting is a proper measuring rod. That redistricting must be presumed to have satisfied the constitutional standards. A fortiori a better redistricting is constitu tional. (9) The redistricting of 1921 is tlie best that can be made. The districts thereof are as nearly compact and equal in population as may be. (10) To set aside the 1921 redistricting is to continue that of 1901, which grossly departs from the constitutional standards. The Supreme Court will not exercise jurisdiction when that is the inevitable result. State ex rel. v. Hitchcock, 241 Mo. 516. (11) As a necessary element in his cause of action relator alleg’es the validity of the 1901 redistricting. The return puts that in issue. The 1901 redistricting patently departs from the constitutional requirements. In no event, therefore, is relator entitled to a mandamus.
Jesse W. Barrett, Attorney-General, and Merrill E. Otis, Assistant Attorney-General, for respondent, in supplemental brief:
(1) Section 10 of Article X of the Constitution directs the vesting of most important legislative authority (that of levying taxes), in the corporate authorities of counties, cities and towns. Elsewhere in the Constitution like legislative authority is required to be delegated to school districts. If the initiative-and-referendum amendment constituted a revesting of all legislative authority, with no provision for the delegation of any part thereof (and there is none), then Section 10 of Article X has been repealed by implication. (2) If, as relator says, the people in 1908 first resumed all of the legislative authority they had originally conferred on the General Assembly and others and then vested that legislative authority but this time only in the General Assembly, then the amendment unquestionably supersedes, not only the proviso in Section 7, but all of Section 1 of Article IV. Why leave in the Constitution the section which contained the original vesting of legislative authority, when that original vesting* has been withdrawn? Then Section 1 also has been repealed, including the clause, “subject to the limitations herein contained,” for that clause was but a qualification of the power bestowed and with the withdrawal of the power, the qualification, of course, ceases to have meaning. The result is that the relator is forced back to his original and discarded theory, namely that when the people, as he says, having resumed the power theretofore bestowed, again vested it, they vested it without any limitation whatsoever. (3) If the amendment is read (as it should be if we obey the great rules of constitutional and statutory construction) in connection with the rest of the Constitution there is no difficulty.. Then the meaning of “the legislative authority of the State” will be seen to be the legislative authority of the State not otherwise delegated in the Constitution and subject to all the limitations and exceptions in the Constitution stated. Moreover, the true purpose of the initial language of the amendment becomes then apparent. It is merely a conjunction joining the substance of the amendment -to the original constitution, equivalent to saying “while the legislative authority shall remain as hitherto, the people now provide a method for direct legislation on their own part and for the referendum.” It is perfectly plain from the whole amendment that there was no intention to recast the old Constitution, but merely to add something to it. If there had been any intention whatever of subjecting the redistricting authority of the three executive officials to the referendum, it could have been accomplished by simply saying that every “legislative act” shall be subject to the referendum, instead of applying it only to every “act of the Legislature.” How absurd to attempt to accomplish an end, which could have been reached so easily, by the cumbrous, vague, indirect and obscure method of first resuming all legislative authority and then revesting it!
Wilfley, Williams, McIntyre, Hensley & Nelson, A. T. Dumm, Henry L. Jost, John T. Barker, T. R. R. Ely, Wayne Ely and John I. Williamson for relator, in reply.
(1) We have corrected Point I of our original brief, so as to limit its application to the power formerly pos sessed by the Governor and his associates as to district-ing the State. Of course, as the body of the brief clearly shows, we never contended that Section 57 repealed all of Section 7. (2) We have never contended that Section 57 repealed any prohibition contained in the Constitution whereby the Legislature is forbidden to exercise certain legislative power. We claim that all of those prohibitions are absolutely unaffected by Section 57. We restate our position solely because of the statement made in respondent’s brief that we did claim that these limitations were repealed. (3) Respondent has in his brief an oral argument virtually confessed that our Point One is right. He admits that so much of Section 7 as confers any power upon the Governor and his associates is a grant and not a limitation. But since Section 57 reassigns and relocates all of “the legislative authority of the State, ’ ’ and does not bestow any part of it upon the Governor and his associates, they have no legislative power or authority, and hence cannot perform the legislative act of redistricting the State. Even on the theory that the phrase “the legislative power” in Section One is the exact equivalent or is used in the Constitution as synonymous with “the legislative authority of the State,” as used in Section 57, we are still entitled to judgment, for these reasons: No one can for an instant contend that all legislative power was, by the Constitution of 1875, vested in the General Assembly and in the Governor or his associates. All of the large number of legislative powers the use of which is prohibited to any one by the Constitution are excluded from the grant of power to the General Assembly and to the Governor and his associates. This exclusion is effected by the clause “subject to the limitations herein contained” in Section 1. It follows beyond doubt, then, that only so much legislative power was granted as remained after the excluded or prohibited legislative powers were deducted or subtracted from all legislative power, using that phrase in its broadest sense. Clearly this remainder of legislative power is all that ever was vested by the Constitution of 1875 in the Gen eral Assembly and in the Governor and his associates. If, then, the phrase “legislative power” as nsed in Section 1 is held to embrace only this remainder, then, even if the phrase “legislative power” as used in Section 1, be construed as the exact equivalent of the phrase “the legislative authority of the State” as used in Section 57, it necessarily follows that the constitutional prohibitions upon the use of certain legislative powers remain absolutely untouched, notwithstanding Section 57, as we insist they do. But since Section 57 vests all of this remainder of legislative power, or authority, in the Senate and House of Representatives (subject to the reservation of the rights of initiative and referendum to the people), there is still no legislative power in the Governor and his associates, and they cannot redistrict the State. Respondent may take whichever horn of this dilemma he chooses. Relator should prevail in either event, (b) The words “the legislative authority of the State” in Section 57 embrace all legislative power theretofore granted by Article 4 to the General Assembly and to the Governor and his associates, and they do not confer any other or additional legislative power or authority, and hence the legislative powers excluded by the Constitution of 1875 are still excluded. Since the grant in Section 57 does not include the Governor and his associates, the power theretofore granted them by Section 7 is taken away. (4) Respondent’s contention cannot be true, for it leads to absurd results. If his contention is true, the people, by the right of initiative, can redistriet the State; the General Assembly can redistrict the State, and (if it fails to act) the Governor and his associates can redistrict the State. Three separate legislative bodies thus have power to do the same act, to-wit, the people, the General Assembly and the miniature legislature. (5) Another absurd result of respondent’s contention is this: By Section 57, the people undoubtedly have power to refer for their owu approval or rejection, a redistricting made by the General Assembly. This is an evidence of popular distrust of the General Assembly. But the people cannot refer a redistricting made by the “miniature legislature” because the power to refer contained in Section 57 applies only to “any act of the legislative assembly” and in Section 57 the legislative assembly is defined as “consisting of a senate and house of representatives.” But the senate and house of representatives are given the power first to act in redistricting. Under respondent’s theory, the people reserved the power to review the acts of representatives and 34 senators, but reserve no such right as to the act of the Governor, Secretary of State and Attorney-General. That no such absurdity was intended by the people is evidenced by the fact that by Section 57 all legislative power is taken away from the three officials named. Another reason for that deprivation of power may be found in the fact — if it be a fact — that, according to respondent’s distinguished counsel, every exercise of this power by every Governor, Secretary of State and Attorney-General had been a glaring abuse of power.
NOTE: — Majority opinion by Graves, J., and separate opinion by Elder, J., filed December 3, 1921; motion for rehearing filed December 6th; motion overruled December 7th; dissenting opinion by David B. Blair, J., filed December 8th; dissenting opinion by Higbee, J., filed December 9th; concurring opinion, in response, by James T. Blair, C. J., filed December 16, 1921.

Opinion:
GRAVES, J.
Original case in mandamus. The relator, according to both petition and return, is duly qualified to be elected as a member of the proposed and approaching constitutional convention. He has been duly nominated for such delegate by the Democratic party as a candidate for such place by the Democrats of the 25th State Senatorial District of the State, as such district has existed from 1901 up until the present Governor, Attorney-General, and Secretary of State, since the adjournment of the last regular session of the Missouri General Assembly (session beginning in January, 1921) subdivided the State into 34 State Senatorial Districts. The return attacks the legality of the redistricting in 1901, but does not attack.the one of 1891. The 25th State Senatorial District was the same, both under the action taken in 1891 and that of 1901. By both actions the 25th State Senatorial District was made up of the counties of Franklin, Gasconade and St. Louis. In fact, the counties of Franklin, Gasconade, and St. Louis were placed in the 25th Senatorial District by the- Constitution of 1875, and remained there nntil 1881, when Franklin was cnt out, and Jefferson inserted. [Mo. Constitution (1875), Art. IV. sec. 11.] In 1891 the constitutional district was re-established and has since remained until the action in 1921.
By the action of the present Governor, Secretary of State and Attorney-General, on April 16, 1921, the 25th State Senatorial District was so made as to include only the counties of Dunklin, Mississippi, New Madrid, Pemiscot and Scott. If this apportionment and redistricting is valid, the relator is not even a resident of such district. He lives in the County of St. Louis, in the old 25th District. After receiving his nomination from the 25th District Democrats, as such district has existed since 1891, he offered to file his certificate of nomination with Hon. Charles U. Becker, the present Secretary of State and respondent herein, who refused to file the same. For such action no personal or official blame can attach to the action of this officer. The legality or illegality of the redistricting in 1921 was a court question, and by his act he properly left it to a court decision. The pleadings bespeak the utmost fairness of distinguished counsel upon both sides. They have sheared the case of all rubbish, so that the questions of decision are few and simple. They are: (1) were the present three state officials above mentioned authorized or empowered to redistrict the State in 1921 under the Constitution as it now stands; (2) if they were so authorized and empowered, have they followed the mandate of the Constitution in so doing; and, as contended by respondent, (3) was the action taken in 1901 (in redistricting the State) pursuant to the constitutional mandate? Other details can best be considered in the opinion.
I. Simplicity and candor should mark every statement in this case. This, because of the settings which surround it. The real picture should not be dimmed by mere abstruse statements or unwarranted assertions. The case is of too much importance for such things. The law, and the law only, should prevail. That law should be stated with such directness and simplicity that he who runs may read, and, in addition, could understand. The responsibility rests upon the court, and not upon counsel, who have, with marked ability, presented their views of the case. The case practically involves the whole organic law of the State, under the suggestion made in some of the briefs. This has occasioned a reading and several re-readings of the historic document of 1875. This has been a work of pleasure, as well as of profit to the writer. If, therefore, we step beyond the argued points of briefs upon either side, we will be pardoned. The argued points are limited, but the side suggestions are varied. But be that as it may, this is an original case in this court, and it calls for all the legal information possessed by either court or counsel. So much in advance of the opinion.
II. We need not debate the character, of the act performed by the three state officers. It is legislative in character, pure and simple. Section 7 of Article IV of the Constitution so classifies it, because this section first grants the power to the General Assembly. Upon its failure to act, it grants the same power to three officials, who, but for this grant of power, would possess no legislative duties or functions. This court has so ruled. [State ex rel. Barrett v. Hitchcock, 241 Mo. 433.] All three opinions in that case so rule. Counsel for respondent here have undertaken to press argumentative excerpts from the views of Valliant, C. J., and Graves, J., in that case in support of his claims here. Suffice it to say that when*those opinions are carefully read it will be discovered that .they rule but one single question. Valliant, C. J., at the very outset carefully worded the question for solution, and the question solved by the two concurring opinions. At page 511 of 241 Missouri Report lie said:
"The question on the threshold is, has this court jurisdiction of the case stated in the pleadings? Counsel for respondents in their brief say: ' This is a proceeding by mandamus to test the validity of an apportionment of the State into senatorial districts contained in a certain statement of the districts filed in the office of the Secretary of State on April 18,1911. ' That is doubtless the purpose of the suit, but if this court has no jurisdiction of the case it cannot pronounce judgment on the point in dispute and therefore anything that we might say on the subject would be simply the opinion of individuals."
Later these two opinions announce the reason that we had no jurisdiction. The reason was that the circuit judges sought to be mandamused were acting in a legislative capacity and not in a judicial capacity; that this court had no power to act in such a case. The writer, following the views of Valliant, C. J., used this language :
"The legislative function cannot be regulated by judicial action. We cannot compel legislative bodies to act, nor can we enjoin them from acting. This is a subject-matter beyond the jurisdiction and power of this court. When we are asked to either mandamus or enjoin a legislative body, the only reply we can make, is, that, under the Constitution, the subject-matter is beyond our jurisdiction. That is what should be done in this case and what is done by both opinions. Then why discuss a lot of questions in a case over which we have no jurisdiction? Why say the case is one over which we have no jurisdiction, and yet proceed to pass upon the alleged merits? Such discussion decides nothing, because it is mere obiter. Especially should it not be done in this case, where the parties in actual interest have never been heard in this court. ' '
Whilst all opinions agreed that we had no jurisdiction to mandamus the judges of St. Louis, because they were acting in a legislative capacity, it is clear that the two separate concurrences went no further than to simply rule upon our jurisdiction. The majority opinion, concurred in by five eminent jurists, including the writer of the opinion, and Lamm, Kennish, Ferris and Brown, JJ., went much further, and passed upon the merits of the case. So far as we know, that is the last announcement upon the matter, although we, personally, expressed no opinion upon that matter, and have none to express now, in the view which we have reached.
III. In addition to State ex rel. Barrett v. Hitchcock, 241 Mo. 433, we are cited to State ex rel. Halliburton v. Roach, 230 Mo. 408. The question in that case is not the question in this case. No suggestion was raftde in that case as to the fact of Section 57 (Initiative and Referendum) modifying legislative power or authority. In that case the petitions were for redistricting the State through a constitutional amendment. The real questions involved are tersely stated by Fox, C. J., on page 426, thus:
"First: Were the petitions as presented to the respondent, Secretary of State, legally sufficient to authorize the submission to the voters of this State of an amendment to or change in the organic law (the Constitution) of this State? Or, in other words, do the petitions embrace in fact a demand for the submission of a constitutional amendment within the contemplation and purview of the initiative amendment adopted in this State in November, 1908, as well as the legislation approved June 12, 1909, providing^or the carrying out of such initiative amendment to the Constitution?
"Second: Under the provisions of the initiative amendment to the Constitution and the legislation enacted by the General Assembly' of this State, approved June 12,1909, can the respondent, the Secretary of State, if the subject-matter as embraced in the petition does not fall within the purview of the initiative and referendum amendment to the Constitution, as well as the legis lation enacted for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of such constitutional amendment, decline to accept and file the petitions as presented by Messrs. Dickey and Lake? In other words, has the Secretary of State a discretion where the subject-matter of the petitions is foreign to what was contemplated by the initiative and referendum amendment to decline to file such petitions?
"These are the propositions with which this court' is confronted."
The question is thus answered by the learned Chief Justice:
"As heretofore stated, the measure proposed is entirely foreign to an amendment to the Constitution which deals with the subject embraced in the petitions- presented. The initiative-and-referendum amendment to the Constitution speaks of laws and amendments to the Constitution. Manifestly those terms are used in their plain and ordinary sense, and in our opinion the petitioners have no right to undertake to put in the Constitution, which is regarded as the organic and permanent law of the State, mere legislative acts providing for the exercise of certain powers."
In other words, the majority holding was that the proposed amendment to the Constitution was not in effect organic law, but a legislative act, and should not be submitted under the false cognomen of an amendment. "Whilst the Constitution of 1875 fixed senatorial districts, it is evident that they made them for only temporary purposes, and fixed it as a legislative act and duty thereafter. [Sec. 5, Art. IV, Const. 1875.]
It should further be considered that it is a doubtful question as to whether or not State ex rel. Halliburton v. Roach, supra, has any further binding effect in Missouri. See State ex rel. Stokes v. Roach, 190 S. W. l. c. 279, first column, wherein the majority opinion pointed out the vice of the opinion in Halliburton's case. The present writer combatted this overruling of the Halliburton case, with all the vigor he possessed, but the two opinions and their concurrences will have to speak for themselves. It at least leaves the Halliburton case as questionable authority. But if an authority, what was written therein did not discuss or have in view the question presented in the present ease. Courts usually discuss the questions raised by counsel, without reference to questions which might have been raised. Until raised and passed upon they do not rise to the position of stare decisis, now urged by the learned Attorney-General. All the cases he cites as stare decisis are upon the"same plane. So too, on the theory of stare decisis upon the question here involved, no authority can be drawn from the case of State ex rel. v. Patterson, 229 Mo. 373. Bead the case. The fact is that the question now before the court is a new one not heretofore urged to or considered by this court, and must be so treated. We discuss these cases purely in the view of stare decisis. Upon that, nor upon any other principle, can it be said that they shed light upon the question now urged here for the first time.
IY. The vital question which we have in mind, and which we desire to discuss, is whether or not the amendment of 1908 so conflicts with that portion of Section 7 of Article IV of the original Constitution, which confers conditionally legislative pow4er or authority upon the three named executive officers, as to render the former provision nugatory. A few rules of construction are not inappropriate here. "A clause in a constitutional amendment will prevail over a provision of the original instrument inconsistent with the amendment, for an amendment to the Constitution becomes a. part of the fundamental law, and its operation and effect cannot be limited or controlled by previous constitutions or laws that may be in conflict with it." [12 C. J. p. 709; Hardage v. Grant, 106 Ark. l. c. 509.] We applied this rule in the Westhues case, 283 Mo. 547, 224 S. W. l. c. 334, and held that the original Constitution had been modified by Secton 57. A fair interpretation of the language used, having in view the fundamental purpose to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the fram ers of the instrument, including the amendments if such there have been, is a rule of construction. The construction should not be technical, nor should it be liberal or strict, but should be a. fair interpretation having in full view the intent of the framers of the organic law. [12 C. J. 700.]
Some authors, however, urge a rather liberal construction. [Black on Interpretation of Laws, secs. 7 to 11 inclusive; 1 Story, sec. 412; 6 R. C. L. sec. 44.] They all agree that the intent of the framers is the corner stone for the construction. In this case it matters not just which view of the rule you take. If the amendment of 1908, on any given subject, conflicts with portions of the instrument as it stood before the amendment, those portions must fall in obedience to the later expressions found in the amendment. We found that there was conflict as between the amendment and Section 36 of Article IV, and that such conflict practically wiped out the power of the Legislature over emergency clauses. [State ex rel. v. Sullivan, 283 Mo. 547, 224 S. W. l. c. 334.] So too Section 1 of Article XV, which reads: ' ' This Constitution may be amended and revised only in pursuance of the provisions of this chapter. ' ' The amendment authorizes a constitutional amendment by the initiative, and this modifies Section 1, and the whole of Article XV. It wiped out the word "only." No sort'of sophistry can hide the two conflicts mentioned, supra. The conflict between the proviso, or last clause of Section 7 of Article IV, and the amendment of 1908, in our judgment is just as clear as we shall try to demonstrate in the succeeding paragraphs, having in mind the divers thoughts and rules of constitutional and statutory construction. If the conflict is apparent rules of construction can lend little or no aid. We shall simply point out the conflict, and declare that the intent of the amendment of 1908 must prevail, because the last expression of the people upon the same subject. The subject is the grant of legislative poAver, not restrictions upon legislative action. Much is said in the briefs about restric tions upon legislative action, which counsel contend would be wiped out if the contention of relator prevail. Tbe idea is far fetched. The amendment was not dealing with restrictions upon the right, power or authority of the General Assembly. It deals with the course of legislation, rather than the subject-matter of legislation. It so deals with the course of legislation as to make the people the ultimate arbiters, either by referendum or by the initiative. It therefore was intended to cover both acts of commission and omission upon the part of the legislative body. We shall not discuss the shades of difference between "legislative power" and "legislative authority." In Article IV of the original Oregon Constitution they used the terms, ' ' The legislative authority of the state shall be vested in a legislative assembly," etc. [Oregon General Laws by Deady in 1864.] When they adopted the initiative and referendum later, they used the same words as used in the original constitution of 1857. We borrowed the amendment of 1908, from Oregon, or some state which copied from Oregon, and hence the use of the word "authority" instead of power. Oregon used it as an equivalent term. The power or the authority of the General Assembly to act, is what power or authority is left, after the reservations and restrictions as declared by the people through the organic law. There is nothing upon the face of this amendment to indicate an intention of the framers to wipe out all restrictions or reservations in our Constitution. They will be found in Articles II, IV, X and XII, and perhaps elsewhere. Those in Article II (our Bill of Rights) are really declarations of things necessary to a republican form of government, and are borrowed largely from the Federal Constitution. They are really reservation of rights in the people, and a withdrawal of such subjects from legislative action. Only in this limited sense can they be called restrictions upon legislative power or authority. They are in fact reservations of rights, over which there was no grant of power to the legislative department. But there are numerous restrictions in the other sections named, in which the law-making body is met with the injunction, ".Thou shall not," and two of such (Sections 14 and 15) are found in Article II. These are restrictions in the true sense of the term. But be this as it may, there is no evident intent to be drawn from the amendment of 1908 which would justify the conclusion that it was the purpose of the people to so tear asunder the previous organic law, as to withdraw any restriction upon legislative authority or power. If this amendment withdrew one restriction, it withdrew all, and it is unthinkable to say that such was the intent of the people. On the contrary they were undertaking to secure the rights of referendum and initiative upon all legislative subjects. Things reserved to the people, and restricted by the people, were not legislative subjects. They were undertaking to so fix the grants of legislative power or authority as to subject all legislative action to the referendum and the initiative. The best way to do this was to place the legislative power, as then recognized, in a single forum, and reserve the right to refer, if this forum acted, or to initiate, if it did not act. The then legislative power was limited by reservations and restrictions, and tliey were dealing with it as it then existed, and not otherwise. So that reservations and restrictions drop out of the case. [Kadderly v. Portland, 44 Ore. 146; State ex rel. v. Richardson, 48 Ore. l. c. 319.]
This amendment authorizes the people to initiate laws, yet no court would hold that they could initiate a valid law if such law was opposed to any reservation of power, or restriction of legislative power, contained in the Constitution at the adoption of the amendment. See the Oregon eases supra, both of which were before we adopted our amendment. The framers of the amendment had no such intent, and their intent must clearly appear from the document. If they initiated and voted a law lending the State's credit "to any person, association or corporation" we would have to hold such law void, as violative of Section 45 of Article IV. So throughout the restrictions upon legislative power or authority. The sole idea was to centralize legislative authority or power in a given and single forum-, so that the referendum and initiative rights of the people would he preserved. They did not intend, nor do thoughtful people think, that they intended to utterly destroy the reservations and restrictions of the document that they were amending. As said their purpose was to center all legislative power or authority (as we have defined it supra) in one single legislative forum, so that they could invoke either the referendum or the initiative. That forum they made the general assembly. This excludes legislative power or authority from other independent branches, or officers, of the government, and the thing before us in a constitutional grant of legislative powers to three executive officers.
Y. It is further urged that if relator's contention is good, then the amendment of 1908 wipes out the veto power of the Governor. This is not true. [State v. Kline, 50 Oregon, l. c. 431; Oregon v. Tel. & Tel. Co., 53 Oregon, l. c. 164.] This, it is said, is a legislative act, by an executive officer, and if the idea was to husband in the General Assembly all legislative authority or power then this power was swept away from the Governor. The cases are not uniform upon the question as to whether the signing of bills, and the vetoing of bills, is legislative or executive — whether it is a grant of legislative power, or a restriction placed upon legislative power and authority. In some states, where the grant o.f this power is in that portion of the constitution relating to the executive department, it is ruled that these acts are not legislative but executive, and therefore but another restriction upon legislative action. [State v. Mounts, 36 W. Va. 179.] In our State the power is granted by Sections 12 and 13 of Article V, which refers solely to the executive functions of the government. In many states where this power of the Governor is vested in him by that portion of the state constitution which pertains to the legislative power or authority, these acts of the Governor are held to he legislative. We do not deem this distinction very material in this case, if we are right in holding that the purpose of the amendment was to confine legislative action to a single forum, so that the people should have the full power of initiative and referendum. That single forum would include all officers whose acts were required either to complete a law or defeat a law. In other words, it would include the Governor, if he be a part of the legislative power, and if not, it is yet preserved by the very amendment itself. In fact, it is preserved, whether the acts be either legislative or executive, in the matter of enacting or defeating laws. Bearing in mind that the pole star of construction is the intent of the framers of a constitution, or of ah amendment thereto, let us turn to the amendment itself. In it we find the sentence, "The veto power of the Governor shall not extend to measures referred to the people." This shows the clear intent of the framers. This is a withdrawal of the veto power from the Governor as to all bills referred and voted upon by the people. It, in every reasonable sense, refers not only to measures under the referendum, but to initiated laws. As to them the veto could not be exercised. To illustrate, a law might pass through the usual channel of the General Assembly, and be vetoed. It might then be passed over the veto, and later referred to the people. In such case the veto power was taken away, provided the people voted to sustain the law. If a law was initiated by the people and voted by the people, then the law is enacted. There is no veto power there. [See Oregon cases, supra.] So that it is clear, that by this amendment the framers thereof did not intend or undertake to absolutely destroy the veto power. The fair readings of it, considering the exception incorporated therein, as we have quoted, supra, shows that as to all matters referred to the Governor by the General Assembly his veto power was left intact. If the intent was to destroy the veto power, why the exception quoted, supra? There would be no need for it, and the fact that it was placed in the amendment is proof positive that the -intent was to preserve the veto power, whether it he legislative or executive in character. There could he no strong-er evidence of this intent than this clause excepting certain measures from the veto. Such act meant that as to all others the veto was left in force. Whilst this thought is in mind, may we say that this hut emphasizes the fact that the intent of this amendment was to so center the law-making power-in one forum (including the General Assembly and the Governor) so that all acts from that forum should be subject to either the referendum or the initiative. But of this later. Suffice it to say that the amendment itself destroys respondent's contention as to the veto power of the Governor.
VI. We now reach the question of conflict between the proviso, or last clause of Section 7 of Article IV, and the amendment of 1908. Amendments to constitutions are usually made to either add to or correct previous provisions of the organic law. In either case eqnflicts might arise. If they do arise, the real intent of the framers of the amendment prevails over the provisions of the original. This rule is so universal, as indicated by the authorities, supra, that we need not add here. We have, supra, pointed out two distinct conflicts, and indicated a third. The purpose now is to point out in plain terms the conflict between the proviso to Section 7 of Article IV, and the amendment of 1908. We shall not mince words, having in previous paragraphs eliminated all underbrush so as to preclude camouflaging of thought or views upon the vital question of conflict.
By the amendment of 1908 (which prevails if it conflicts with previous parts of the original organic law) it is said: ' ' The legislative authority of the State shall be vested in a legislative assembly, consisting of a senate and house of representatives. ' ' Then follows the reserved rights of the people to refer legislative acts, and to initiate laws. The legislative acts so referred to, include the approval and veto power of the Governor, as we have indicated above, and as the authorities held. Legislative power or authority as here used must be construed as meaning such as was not reserved or restricted, as we have just discussed. That the framers so meant is clear from what they did, and from the very purpose of the referendum and initiative. Their purpose, and their intent was to gather together and lodge in one legislative forum all legislative power or authority. If this was the intent and purpose of the amendment, then it gathered to the legislative forum the conditional grant of legislative power to those three executive officers. ' ' The legislative authority of the state" includes all legislative authority, existing at the time. If all legislative authority was vested in a given legislative i#>rum (including the General Assembly and the Governor) the legislative authority of these three executive officers was gathered unto the fathers, and must be for naught held. "The legislative authority" needs no defining. It is in substance all legislative authority. All legislative authority must be construed in the light of the reservations and restrictions upon legislative action. As to reservations and restrictions the intent of the framers was to preserve them, but it is as clear that their intent was to so concentrate legislation or legislative acts, as to give them power to supervise them either by the referendum or the initiative. This was the very reason for the amendment. All concede, and if not, the cases and the Constitution so hold, that the redistricting of the State is a legislative act. If the framers of the amendment had not thought that they had gathered into one bunch all legislative authority or power, and placed it in one channel, so that they could review the same, if dissatisfied, they might have extended both the referendum and initiative. They thought, and they intended to place "the legislative authority" in such position as to enable them to review by referendum all acts of a legislative character. If this be the intent of the amendment, then it conflicts with the proviso, or last clause, of Section 7 of Article IV.
To say that this was not the intent of the framers of the amendment and of the people in adopting it would be to say that they had more confidence in these three executive officers than they had in the General Assembly, or even in themselves. This too, in the face of the historical fact that for thirty years or more there was continous complaints from the people and the press about the manner in which these executive officers performed this legislative function. By use of "the legislative authority" the people meant to so place the legislative function of redistricting the State in a position where they could review it by referendum. But this is not all. They reserve the right to initiate laws, and after the Legislature refused to act (or even before) the people had the right to initiate a law (not a constitutional amendment) redistricting the State. Their power to initiate laws is unrestricted, provided such laws violate no reserved rights or legislative restrictions. As legislators, the people are under the same restrictions as the General Assembly. Whether such initiated laws violate the Constitution is a matter for the courts after the legislative process is over, and the law (the finished products) is presented to the courts. One illustration to demonstrate a conflict in the matter before us. Suppose that after the General Assembly of 1921 had failed to redistrict the State the people by proper petitions had initiated such a law. Suppose further that the initiated law received the required vote, and was thereby adopted. Suppose further that in the interim these three executive officers had made a law redistricting the State. Which would stand? There can be no question that the initiated law would have to be sustained. If so then the very fact that the people have the unrestricted right to initiate laws (within constitutional restrictions) demonstrates that these officers were shorn of legislative authority by this amendment. We have read the Missouri Constitution until in our mental vision (both by day and by night) we can see it as we see the pictures upon the sitting room wall. The best thought we have has been given to the question involved. The question is a new one in this State, and elsewhere, so far as our diligent research has gone. In no preceding Missouri case has this question been presented or argued by counsel. Isolated language in previous cases is of no value, where the question was not urged. At most such language is obiter, and not stare decisis. We conclude by saying, that, in our judgment there is a fatal conflict between the amendment of 1908, and the proviso or last clause of Section 7 of Article IV. That by reason of such conflict the latter must fall, and the state officers were without power to redistrict.
VII. Before discussing the question of the redistricting done in 1901 may we be permitted to add one more thought to the matters discussed in the last previous paragraphs? Under the amendment of 1908 all legislation must be (1) through the ordinary channel (the General Assembly and Governor), (2) through the acts of the people by the referendum, or (3) through the reserved right to initiate any and all laws that the people desire enacted. In the latter case, as well as in the first, such laws must be within the reservations and restrictions contained in the Constitution. [State ex rel. v. Richardson, 48 Ore. l. c. 319.] This case construed the Oregon initiative-and-referendum amendment, and this construction was in April, 1906. We borrowed the amendment in 1908, or two years after the Supreme Court of Oregon had announced the opinion in Richardson's case. The whole fallacy of respondent's position is that they argue a& if the constitutional grant of this legislative power to these three officers was a restriction upon, rather than a grant of, legislative authority. As a grant of legislative power, it was gathered up and placed solely in the General Assembly and the people by the amendment of 1908. You cannot say "the legislative authority of the State shall be vested in a legislative assembly, consisting of a senate and house of representatives," and reserve to the people both the right to refer and initiate, and yet say that any portion of legislative authority belongs elsewhere. The very language precludes such a conclusion.
In the return it is urged that the redistricting of the State in 1901 was violative of constitutional provisions and void. This and previous redistricting acts have been objected to the charge of partisanship and unfairness, and even as violative of the Constitution, and we have but little doubt that this in a measure influenced the wording of the amendment of 1908, by which the people by reserved rights were placed in position to take the matter in their own hands.. But even if it be granted (which we do not do) that the redistricting of 1901 was invalid, it does not help respondent. Should' we take up and rule the question in respondent's favor, it would only relegate us to the redistricting of 1891, and by it the 25th Senatorial District is composed of the identical counties as by the Act of 1901. This Act of 1891 stands unchallenged in the pleadings. So, if we concede the invalidity of the Act of 1901, relator would be in the 25th District, composed of the counties which now present his name as their choice as a candidate for delegate to the coming Constitutional Convention. The facts that he lives in a district which has existed in the same form from the 1891 redistricting act, which act is not questioned here, entitles relator to his writ of mandamus, whatever be the status of the Act of 1901 as to senatorial districts.
The petition attacks the act of the three officers in 1921, and none other. It is no defense to this attack to say some other previous acts by other officers were also void. [Adams v. Bosworth, 126 Ky. l. c. 63 and 64; Ragland v. Anderson, 125 Ky. l. c. 161.] With this we might stop. However, the situation is such (there being hut short time left to. select delegates to the coming Constitutional Convention) we feel that something further should be said as to the redistricting of 1901. This redistricting act has stood unchallenged for more than twenty years. The first court attack appears in the return in this case. Of course there were mutterings among the people (or some of them) and in the public press, known as state history. In State ex rel. Warson v. Howell, 92 Wash. l. c. 545, the Supreme Court of Washington in discussing their redistricting Act of 1901, said:
"But even if it were concluded that the Act of 1901 was such a departure from the requirements of the Constitution as to disclose a wilful disregard of its provisions, we think it now too late for the relator to raise the question. The act complained of has stood unquestioned for more than fifteen years. Seven legislatures have been elected under it. Laws have been passed which so far affect the rights of the electors that a return to the old districts marked out by the Constitution would result in the utmost confusion, if not chaos, requiring perhaps a session of the Legislature before an election could be held. No court is required, on a complaint made after this lapse of years, to subject the people of the State to the turmoil such a course would cause. This form of legislation is to a great extent political and administrative in its nature, and involves no individual rights other than such as pertain to the electorate as a whole. Persons who conceive that the Legislature has acted in disregard of the mandates of the Constitution must, therefore, act promptly else they will be held to have waived their right to act at all.
"The argument that, if an act is invalid when passed, the vice continued to live in it as long as it remains on the statutes, and therefore may be annulled at any time, is not sound when attempted to be applied to legislation that is political or administrative in its nature. It may be true the laches cannot give validity to a void act, but when no property right is involved, and the question is purely political and administrative, individuals or parties that have seen the act in operation for years, and the affairs of State carried on under it, without offering objection or making protest, will not be heard at a late day to question its validity. They must act in seasonable time and not delay until the conditions they have acquiesced in and assented to have become firmly established as a part of the system of government. ' '
In Adams v. Bosworth, 126 Ky. l. c. 65, the court said:
"If the enactment complained of was invalid because it violated the constitutional requirements, the party complaining knew this fact thirteen years before this suit was commenced. Persons who believe that their political rights are injuriously affected by unconstitutional legislation cannot condone the wrong for a long period of years by passively consenting to it, and defer taking action until confusion, if not chaos, would result from the long delay. The courts were open to them in 1893 as well as 1906, and political parties, no more than individuals, can sleep on their rights. When it is sought to vacate enactments involving the life of one of the great co-ordinate departments of the government the public interest and the orderly administration of affairs demand that action should be taken as soon as practicable after the condition objected to becomes known and effective. The argument that, if an act is invalid when passed, the vice continues to live in it as long as it remains on the statutes, and therefore it may be annulled at any time, is not sound when attempted to be applied to the legislation that is political or administrative in its nature. It may be true that laches cannot give validity to a void act; but when no property right is involved, and the question is purely political and administrative, individuals or parties that have seen the act in operation for years, and the affairs of State carried on under it, without offering objection or making protest, will not be heard at a late day to question its validity."
In the case of Matter of Reynolds, 202 N. Y. l. c. 438 it is said:
"After the census of 1905 the Legislature at its session in 1906 passed an apportionment act. [Ch. 431.] The validity of that act was attacked by an application for a mandamus to the Secretary of State to issue the election notices in accordance with the old apportion ment oil the ground that the new apportionment was a nullity. This application was denied by the Supreme Court in both branches and the elections of 1906 were held under the apportionment act of that year. On appeal to this court, however, the orders of the Supreme Court were, in April, 1907, reversed and the apportionment under review declared invalid. [Matter of Sherrill v. O'Brien, 188 N. Y. 185.] Thereupon, at an extraordinary session of the Legislature held in that year, the present apportionment was enacted. Under it have been held the general elections of 1907, 1908, 1909 and 1910, during which period the petitioners have taken no steps to have the validity of that apportionment reviewed. There are few things in the world in which stability and order are more requisite than in government. It could not have been the constitutional intent that at any time during the decennial period for which an apportionment is to continue — even up to the last moment — it should be subject to attack."
To like effect is Ragland v. Alexander, 125 Ky. l. c. 161. These authorities seem to be founded upon reason, and if so it is too late to question the Act of 1901, at this time, and we so rule. From it all, we conclude that the alternative writ of mandamus in this case should be made permanent. It is so ordered.
James T. Blair, C. J., Woodson and Walker, JJ., concur; Higbee, and D. E. Blair, JJ., dissent in separate opinions to be filed; Elder, J., files separate opinion.
ELDER, J.
(separate opinion). — In view of the importance of this case, I have thought it not unbecoming' to state my individual views thereon, although somewhat hurriedly expressed. No other opinion being before me at the time of the preparation hereof, nothing said herein is intended as a comment upon or answer to anything contained in any opinion which may be filed by any of my associates.
I. The primary issue in this proceeding involves the construction to be placed upon two of the provisions of our Constitution. Learned counsel for relator, in their original brief, contend that so much of Section 7 of Article IV of the Constitution as vests power to district the State for Senators in the Governor, the gecretary of State and the Attorney-General is repealed by Section 57 of said Article IV, and that the redistricting made by the said officials under date of April 16, 1921, is void. Section 7 of Article IV is as follows:
"Senators and Representatives shall be chosen according to the rule of apportionment established in this Constitution, until the next decennial census by the United States shall have been taken, and the result thereof as to this State ascertained, when the apportionment shall be revised and adjusted on the basis of that census, and every ten years thereafter upon the basis of the United States census; or.if such census be not taken, or is delayed, then, on the basis of a State census; such apportionment to be made at the first session of the General Assembly after each such census: Provided, That if at any time, or from any cause, the General Assembly shall fail or refuse to district the State for Senators, as required in this Section, it shall be the duty of the Governor, Secretary of State and Attorney-General, within thirty days after the adjournment of the General Assembly ,on which such duty devolved, to perform said duty, and to file in the office of the Secretary of State a full statement of the districts formed by them, including the names of the counties embraced in each district, and the numbers thereof; said statement to be signed by them, and attested by the Great Seal of the State, and upon the proclamation of the Governor, the same shall be as binding and effectual as if done by the General Assembly. ' '
That portion of Section 57 which is pertinent hereto is as follows:
"The legislative authority' of the State shall be vested in a legislative assembly, consisting of a senate and house of representatives, but the people reserve to themselves power to propose laws and amendments to the Constitution, and to enact or reject the same at the polls, independent of the legislative assembly, and also reserve power at their own option to approve or reject at the polls any act of the legislative assembly."
In support of their contention counsel argue substantially thus: That by the Constitution adopted in 1875 the people "made full disposition of all the legislative power of the State, reserving none whatever to themselves, except, of course, the power to amend the Constitution or to write a new one; ' ' that in the Constitution as originally adopted it was provided by Section 1 of Article IV that, " The. legislative power, subject to the limitations herein contained, shall be vested in a Senate and House of Representatives, to be styled ' The General Assembly of the State of Missouri'" (Italics ours); that one of the limitations mentioned in Section 1 was embodied in Section 7, being that portion hereinbefore set out, giving the Governor, Secretary of State and Attorney-General, in a certain contingency, the power to district the State for Senators; that in 1908 the people "had become dissatisfied with this arrangement and desired to change it," and adopted an amendment to the Constitution, being Section 57 of Article IV, partly here-inbefore set forth; that by Section 57 all of the legislative power of the State was disposed of find vested in a Senate and House of Representatives, with but one reservation, to-wit, the power of the people themselves "to propose laws and amendments and to. enact or reject the same at the polls, independent of the legislative assembly;" that such disposition of all of the legislative power left no part of it elsewhere; and that accordingly the former limitation in favor of the Governor, Secretary of State and Attorney General, being in irreconcilable conflict with Section 57, was in effect thereby stricken out and the Governor and his associates "shorn of all legislative authority theretofore vested in them."
To have followed this reasoning to its logical conclusion, the inevitable result reached would have been that Section 57 also struck out of the Constitution all of the limitations on the authority of the Legislature, such as the prohibitions against enacting any law impairing the freedom of speech or the obligation of contracts, against permitting money to be drawn from the treasury except in pursuance of regular appropriations made by law, against giving, or loaning the credit of the State, against contracting debts except in certain instances, against granting public money, against subscribing for stock on behalf of the State, against the enactment of the thirty-three special and local laws inhibited by Section 53 of Article IV, and against the exercise of the taxing power contrary to the restrictions prescribed by Article X, together with the many other restraints imposed by the Constitution, all comprehended by the words "the limitations herein contained," appearing in Section 1.
The utter fallacy of this startling reasoning must have become apparent to counsel for relator for, upon oral argument, they abandoned the theory thus initially advanced, and bottomed relator's case upon an attenuated hair line distinction between the meaning of legislative "power" as used in Section 1 of Article IV, and legislative "authority" as used in Section 57 of Article IV. (Italics ours.) In their reply brief they endeavor to differentiate between power and authority (which in our judgment are used in the Constitution as equivalent terms), substantially thus: That all legislative power is originally in the people; that by the Constitution only so much power was bestowed upon the State as the people saw fit to bestow; that the power not bestowed either remains in the people or is held in abeyance; that the legislative power bestowed upon the State is the "measure and extent;'.' of the legislative authority of the State; that when ray Section 1 of Article IV the "legislative power, subject to the limitations herein contained," was vested in a Senate and House of Representatives, all of the power or the people was so vested; that under Section 7 of Article IV, embracing one of the, limitations contemplated by Section 1, the Governor and his as sociates, as a part of the State, thus become empowered to act in the contingency named; that when Section 57 of Article IV was adopted, said section made a re-assignment of the legislative authority of the State, which had theretofore been vested in the Senate and House of Representatives, exclusively, except such as was reserved to the people themselves; and that, accordingly, the Governor and his associates have neither power nor authority to redistrict the State for Senators. If this conclusion be true, then, when the people by Section 57 resumed all of the legislative authority originally given to the General Assembly and the Governor and his associates and re-vested the same in the General Assembly alone, Section 57 superseded not only the limitation embraced in Section 7 but all of the limitations contemplated by Section 1 as well, being the numerous limitations adverted to by us supra. Palpably, therefore, relator is driven hack to his abandoned theory, which is so revolutionary and so contrary to the principles of constitutional construction as to require but slight reflection to compel us to decide adversely thereto.
The real sum and substance of what relator urges is that so much of Section 7 as is relevant hereto was repealed by Section 57 by implication, and this in the face of the cardinal rules of both constitutional and statutory construction, that repeal by implication is not favored, that to establish a repeal the two provisions in question must be plainly and irreconcilably repugnant to each other, and that if, by any reasonable construction, both provisions can be construed together, both will be sustained.
However, our disposition of relator's insistence does not depend upon an analysis of the principles of construction, for this court has heretofore in effect r.Jed upon the point now made, in a case involving facts sufficiently analogous to those at bar to be controlling. In State ex rel. Halliburton v. Roach, 230 Mo. 408, a proceeding to have.fhis court issue its peremptory writ of mandamus agahist the Secretary of State to compel him to file certain petitions presented to him by citizens acting under a right assumed to have been conferred by the initiative and referendum amendment (being Section 57 of Article IY), -which petitions submitted an amendment to the Constitution redistricting the State senatorially, it was held that Section 7, notwithstanding the adoption of Section 57, continued to control the matter of altering the senatorial districts of the State, Fox, J., in an opinion fully concurred in by our learned brother Graves, said, l. c. 431: "Manifestly before the senatorial districts can-he divided in the manner as suggested in the so-called proposed constitutional amendment, Section 7 of Article 4 of the Constitution of this State must he amended and so changed as to authorize, by the initiative, the people at the polls to divide the senatorial districts. . In other words, the .exercise of the power by the initiative to alter and divide the senatorial districts by a legislative enactment cannot have the force and effect of dislodging the power vested by the Constitution under Section 7 of Article 4, providing for the apportionment of senatorial districts. Before the power to alter and divide the senatorial districts can be exercised there must be an appropriate amendment to the Constitution dislodging the power to so divide and alter such districts under the present Constitution and laws of this State." This ruling was tantamount to holding that Section 57 (the Initiative-and-Referendum Amendment) did not repeal Section 7, but that said section remained the' sole repository of authority for redistricting the State.
That Section 7 of Article IV is still extant and governing in the matter of a senatorial re-apportionment was further recognized by this court on June 21, 1910, later than the adoption of Section 57, in State ex rel. Major v. Patterson, 229 Mo. 373, a certiorari proceeding to quash an order made by the County Court of Jackson County subdividing said county into new legislative districts, wherein it was said by Graves, J., l. c. 388; "Of course, as to the senatorial districts, if the Legislature fails to apportion, tlie apportionment may be made by' other officers mentioned in Section 7 of Article 4 of the Constitution, which action upon their part stands in lieu of legislative action." And further, at page 389: "It is clear that as to all senatorial districts save and except-those within a single county, the power to fix the- lines thereof lies with the Legislature, or in the event of its failure to act, with the Governor, Secretary of State and Attorney-General. ' '
Again, that Section 7 is still controlling in the matter of re-apportioning the State for Senators, was conceded on March 28, 1912, also later than the adoption of Section 57, in State ex rel. Barrett v. Hitchcock, 241 Mo. 433, wherein said section was construed and applied.
These three pronouncements are decisive of the question here presented. It follows, therefore, that unless we are now desirous of departing from the precedent thus established, the contention of relator must be ruled against him.
II. Relator also insists that the "attempt" made by the Governor, Secretary of State and Attorney-General "at redistricting is so unfair as to convenience, equality of population and compactness of territory, as to make it void." The matter of convenience is not stressed by relator and we shall not dwell thereon.
The constitutional requirements with respect to senatorial districts are that they shall be "convenient;" that they shall be "as nearly equal in population as may be," and that Avhen composed of two or more counties, "they shall be continguous, such districts to be as compact as may be, and in the formation of the same no county shall be divided. ' ' [Secs. 5 and 9, Art. IV.] Under the Constitution the duty imposed upon the Governor and his associates is not that they shall so district the State as to have every district exactly equal in population and perfectly compact in territory. Exact mathematical precision is not a requirement, and, when it is considered that county lines must be adhered to, unless a county is equitably entitled to more than one senator, and that indivisible counties vary in size, shape and population, it is obvious that such precision cannot be attained. The real duty enjoined upon the officials acting is that they shall lay out the districts so that they are "as nearly equal" in population 'as may be," and "as compact" in territory "as may be." Such is the language of the Constitution. And it is by that yardstick that the action taken must be measured. The expression "as nearly as may be" does not mean as nearly as a mathematical process can be followed. It is but a direction addressed to the body charged with the duty prescribed, expressive of the general principles upon which the apportionment shall in good faith be made..
Applying this standard to the districts before us, we are convinced by an examination thereof, that the same, when considered as a whole, as is essential, fairly comply with the constitutional requirements. Having in mind the several separate commands of the Constitution, no argument is required to show that absolute numerical equality in districts cannot be obtained. If county lines cannot be broken, disparity in population is unavoidable. It is also evident that if the'requirement as to compactness is to be given effect, there must be a latitude of action in regard to population. Therefore, when but four districts out of thirty-four are attacked as being non-compact, with room for question as to the merit of such attack, and when the average variation in population from the true ratio of equality, as shown by respondent's brief, is but five and four-tenths per cent, we are not prepared to hold that the judgment and discretion of the Governor and his associates was not exercised in a reasonable, practicable manner, and within the contemplation of the Constitution. And, when compared with the districts created in 1901, the validity of which is attacked by respondent in his return filed herein, it is patent that the 1921 districts are infinitely superior, in every respect, in conforming to the constitutional mandate.
Prom what has been said, it follows that relator's insistence as to the invalidity of the 1921 redistricting should- be ruled against him.
Entertaining the views herein indicated, I respectfully submit that' the writ of mandamus should be denied.