Case Name: Edna SENEGAL (Sam MULLER, Jr., Substituted as Plaintiff) v. Guy A. THOMPSON, Trustee of Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. et al.
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1956-11-26
Citations: 91 So. 2d 865
Docket Number: No. 4136
Parties: Edna SENEGAL (Sam MULLER, Jr., Substituted as Plaintiff) v. Guy A. THOMPSON, Trustee of Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 91
Pages: 865–896

Head Matter:
Edna SENEGAL (Sam MULLER, Jr., Substituted as Plaintiff) v. Guy A. THOMPSON, Trustee of Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. et al.
No. 4136.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana. First Circuit.
Nov. 26, 1956.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 22, 1957.
Writ of Certiorari Denied Feb. 27, 1957.
Hudson, Potts, Bernstein & Davenport, Monroe, Kaufman, Anderson, Leithead & Scott, Lake Charles, for appellant.
Plauche & Stockwell, J. R. St. Dizier, Lake Charles, for appellees.

Opinion:
ELLIS, Justice.
On October 24, 1951, at about 11:30 P.M. a car, stolen or at least being used without the consent of the owner, was being driven by Burwick Harris, with Joseph Senegal, Jr., as a passenger on the front seat, and Sam Muller, Jr., as a passenger on the rear seat, ran into the side of a red box car which formed one of forty-nine freight cars and a switch engine that had been stopped with the designated car across Louisiana Highway 42. This crossing is on the eastern edge of the city limits of Lake Charles, Louisiana.
As a result of the collision Harris, the driver of the car, and Senegal, the passenger on the front seat, were killed and Muller was seriously injured. Three separate actions were filed against the Trustee of the railroad and the train engineer as co-defendant. The suit against the train engineer was dismissed en a holding that there was a lack of control as well as responsibility for the negligent conduct of the railroad. There was no appeal taken from this ruling.
The cases were consolidated for trial as well as for argument in this court, with separate decrees having been rendered by the District Court and to be rendered by this Court. The District Court rendered judgment in favor of Sam Muller, Jr., in the principal sum of $8,651.50, and the railroad has appealed. Judgment was rendered against the mother of Burwick Harris dismissing her suit at her cost on the ground of the contributory negligence of Harris as the driver of the car, and she has appealed. The suit by the father of Joseph Senegal, Jr., passenger on the front seat and who was also killed in the accident, was dismissed at his cost on the ground of contributory negligence, and hence an appeal.
While the record contains some thirteen hundred pages, the legal and factual issues are not complicated. The main question at issue in this case is whether the crossing in question under the facts and settled jurisprudence was of such a hazardous nature as to require the railroad to station a flagman, lighted flares, fusees or other special warning devices at the crossing immediately prior to the time the accident occurred.
Our learned brother of the Lower Court in his written opinion has correctly found from the evidence the basic facts necessary, when considered in the light of the established jurisprudence to arrive at a correct conclusion with regard to the hazardous or non-hazardous nature of the crossing at the time of the accident. We take the liberty of quoting that portion of the Lower Court's opinion dealing with the basic facts surrounding the actual con ditions at the crossing at the time of the accident, together with a statement of the established jurisprudence laying down the rule by which the courts are to he guided. We quote:
"The evidence indicates that at about 11:30 P.M. on October 24, 1951, Burwick Harris, Joseph Senegal, Jr., and Sam Muller, Jr., were riding in a 1947 model Chevrolet sedan in a northerly direction on Louisiana Highway 42 in Calcasieu Parish. The automobile was being driven by Plarris. Senegal was seated in the front seat to the right of the driver, and Muller was in the rear seat. An accident occurred at the point where the tracks of the main line of the Missouri Pacific Railroad, owned and maintained by defendant Guy A. Thompson as Trustee of the Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, cross Louisiana Highway 42 on the eastern edge of the city limits of Lake Charles.
"The highway at the scene-of the accident is a blacktop highway approximately 20 feed in width, running north and south, and it is fairly straight for a considerable distance on either side of the railroad crossing. The railroad track runs approximately east and west at that point, and it crosses the highway at about a 90-degree angle. The surface of the track at the site of the crossing is higher than the surface of Highway 42 South of such crossing. According to an actual survey, it appears that the surface of the highway is 1.3 feet lower than the railroad track at a point 100 feet south of the crossing, is 1.6 feet lower at a point 200 feet south of the crossing, and is two feet lower than the surface of the crossing at a point 400 feet south of such crossing.
"There were two signs located south of the track designed to give notice to a motorist approaching from the south that such crossing existed. One of those signs was the usual yellow highway marker, located on the east side of the highway approximately 350 feet south of the railroad track. The other sign was the regular Louisiana stop law sign located along the east side of the highway approximately 30 feet south of the track. There were no flashing signals or lighted signs of any kind giving notice to approaching motorists of this crossing, and no additional warning devices other than the two signs herein-above described existed at that point. At the time the accident occurred it was dark, but the weather was clear and the highway was dry.
"The only building in the immediate vicinity of the railroad crossing was one located east of the highway and south of the railroad track, which building was used for the bulk distribution of Pan Am gasoline products. The center of the railroad crossing was approximately 75 feet from the nearest corner of the building. At the time the accident occurred there were five 100-watt light bulbs burning on or in the vicinity of that structure, one on each of the four corners and another on the south side of the building. Only the two lights located on the southwest and northwest corners of the building, however, were in such a position that they might have illuminated trains on the crossing. After reviewing the evidence, this Court is convinced that, because of the location and low wattage of these lights, the slight illumination which they provided of that crossing was effective only at very close ranges, and thus the lights on the Pan Am building were of little or no assistance to motorists approaching from the south in detecting the presence of a standing box car on that crossing.
"The railroad yards of the Missouri Pacific Railroad, consisting of a number of switch tracks, a car repair shed, a yard office and other necessary improvements, was located immediately west of this crossing. The car repair shed was located a little less than 800 feet west of Highway 42, it being the nearest building west of the crossing. Numerous 'switching' operations were conducted daily in the railroad yard, and this crossing was used frequently during' all hours of the day and night for the' purpose, of switching or making up trains, as well as for the passage of freight and passenger trains to and from Lake Charles.
"Several minutes prior to the time of the accident a freight train operated by defendant railroad company, consisting- of a switch engine and a cut of 49 cars, occupied this crossing. The locomotive was being operated by defendant McDermott, the engineer,'and ;by J.-L. Fordham, the fireman. McDermott was stationed in and on the right side of the cab of the locomotive, and Fordham was on the left side of the cab.
"This train was travelling in an easterly direction at the time it first occupied the crossing, and it was brought to a stop when the switch engine or locomotive reached a point approximately 2,000 feet east of Highway 42.' While the train was standing after being brought to such a stop, the 44th car, a red boxcar, completely blocked the highway, the center of said car being approximately over the center of the highway. This box car was about 44 feet in length, and since the hard surfaced portion of the highway was only 20 feet wide, it is apparent that while the car was standing in that position its wheels were located on either side of the hard surfaced portion of the road, on or beyond the shoulders of the highway. The train was in that position at the time the accident occurred. The point of impact was approximately in the center of the highway, and the automobile involved in the accident struck the 44th car of the train almost in the center of that car.
"Between the time the train was brought to a stop and the time of the accident, R. E. Harris, an employee of defendant railroad, was standing near the west end of the 49th car, or approximately 200 feet West of the crossing, and two other employees of defendant, D. L. Moss and J. V. Duhon, were standing near the railroad track approximately 600 feet west of the crossing. All of these employees, carried lighted lanterns, but they were . too far from the highway to enable them to warn the approaching vehicle of the fact that the crossing was occupied. No other employee of defendant company or any other person was stationed at or near the crossing for the purpose of warning approaching vehicles.
"The train remained stationary, with the 44th car completely occupying the crossing, for a period of from three to five minutes immediately prior to the time of the accident. A few seconds before the collision- occurred one of defendant's employees gave a back-up signal with his lantern to engineer McDermott. The engineer, in response to this signal, blew the whistle of the train signifying that it was to back up, and he immediately caused the train to begin moving in a westerly direction. The accident occurred at or about the instant the back-up signal was given, 'arid thereafter the railroad employees stationed west of the highway promptly signaled for an emergency stop. As soon as this signal was given, engineer McDermott blew the emergency stop whistle and brought his train to a stop. The 44th car, however, moved in a westerly direction a distance of approximately 18 feet after the accident occurred before it was brought to a stop.
. "The evidence indicates that the automobile was being driven at a speed of between 50 and 60 miles per hour immediately before and at the time of the accident. It apparently was in good mechanical condition, and the headlights and brakes functioned properly.
"The engineer rang the bell of the locomotive just prior to and at the time he entered the intersection, but he discontinued ringing it immediately after the train occupied the crossing. The bell was not rung, the whistle was not blown, and no other audible signal was given to warn approaching motorists of the fact that the highway was obstructed from the time the train first entered the intersection until the back-up whistle was blown almost simultaneously with the occurrence of the accident. There is a dispute as to whether the bell or whistle signals could have constituted adequate warning to approaching motorists of the fact that the highway was obstructed since the locomotive, while standing, was approximately 2,000 feet east of the highway. This court is convinced that, because of the distance between the locomotive and the crossing, bell or whistle signals would not have been effective as a warning to approaching motorists while the train was standing.
"Plaintiffs contend that defendants were negligent in failing to station flagmen, to place lighted signals or to install other effective warning devices at the crossing to warn approaching vehicles, and particularly the vehicle involved in this accident, of the fact that the crossing was blocked.
"The general rule, as established by the jurisprudence of this State, is that in the absence of special'statutes or ordinances a railroad company is .not, required to station a flagman at a crossing to warn approaching motorists of the fact that the crossing has been blocked or occupied by a train, nor to place lights or other signals at such crossing for that purpose, unless there are such unusual and dangerous conditions at the crossing as to make such precautions necessary. Plummer v. Gulf M. and N. R. Co., La.App., 153 So. 322; Aaron v. Martin, La.App., 167 So. 106; Domite v. Thompson, La.App., 9 So.2d 55; Ramsey v. La. and A. R. R. Co., La.App., 70 So.2d 171; Smith v. Texas & N. O. R. Co., La.App., 70 So.2d 175.
"Plaintiffs contend, however, that the facts presented in the cases now being considered bring each of • said cases within the exception to that general rule; that "the unusual circumstances existing at that crossing were such that defendant railroad company was under a duty to station flagmen or guards, or to provide lighted signals or other adequate warning devices to warn motorists approaching that crossing of the fact that the highway was obstructed, and that the failure of the railroad to provide that type of warning constitutes negligence.
"A number of authorities have been cited by counsel for both parties in support of their opposing arguments on the issue of whether this crossing was unusually hazardous. In most of the cases cited where a motor vehicle ran into a standing train or boxcar, the courts have ' applied the general rule, which is to the effect that the presence of the train itself is sufficient warning to motorists that the highway is obstructed. In some cases, however, the courts have held that because of the hazardous nature of the crossing the presence of the train or boxcar did not constitute sufficient warning to approaching motorists, and that the railroad company was under a duty to station flagmen or to use lighted signals, fusees, or other warping devices to warn the drivers of approaching vehicles of the fact, that the highway was obstructed."
The District Court then discussed some of the jurisprudence and then. concluded:
"The elevation of the track above the surface of the road is one of the circumstances or conditions which plaintiffs contend causes that crossing to be particularly hazardous. It is argued that a motorist approaching this crossing from the south at night is not able to see a standing boxcar on the crossing unless the boxcar is silhouetted by the lights of automobiles, approaching from the opposite direction and, even then, the boxcar cannot be seen unless the wheels of such car move across the lighted background. The evidence indicates that the lights of an automobile approaching this crossing from the south would reveal the presence of a boxcar blocking this crossing if the lights were on 'bright' and the beam is raised for ordinary highway driving. This Court is convinced, however, that if the lights were deflected downward, as is customarily dotíe for .town driving or while meeting other vehicles, the lights would not illuminate a standing boxcar at this crossing until the automobile reached a point very close to the crossing. Since Highway 42 is a heavily travelled thoroughfare and this crossing is located on the outskirts of the City of Lake Charles, the driver of a vehicle along that highway might reasonably be expected to drive with the beams of his headlights deflected. This Court concludes that the elevation of the track above the surface of the road and the fact that the blacktop highway reflects very little light are conditions which render the crossing more hazardous than it would be if these two conditions did not exist."
In addition, the District Court accepted the testimony of Mr. H. A. Flanakin, Civil Engineer, who was at that time employed as highway engineer for the American Trucking Associations, Inc., and who was on a year's leave of absence' as Associate Professor of Highway Engineering at Louisiana State University. This' witness' testimony was based upon a formula commonly known as the "Peabody-Dimmick" formula which will be discussed hereafter. The District Judge also commented upon the testimony of other witnesses with regard. to their opinion of the formula and the crossing, as well as a resolution of Traffic and Safety Committee of the Lake Charles Association of Commerce requesting the railroad prior to the time of this accident to install lighted signals and control devices at the crossing.
. After thoroughly discussing the law and the evidence, the Court concluded:
" In view of the large number of exposures which occur daily at this crossing, the fact that the highway at that point is a heavily travelled ' suburban thoroughfare, the absence of any effective lighting or illumination of the crossing, the lack of more adequate' warning devices or procedures, the opinion expressed by Mr. Flanakin and the results obtáined from applying the scientific formula described by him, the elevation of the track above the surface of the road, and the fact that the blacktop highway reflects little light, this Court concludes that the crossing is unusually hazardous. Defendant Guy A. Thompson, as Trustee, through his agents, was formally notified of this condition prior to the time of the accident, and the evidence indicates that the railroad at least could have stationed flagmen or fusees at the crossing. Under those circumstances defendant Thompson, as Trustee of the Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, was negligent in failing to station flagmen, lighted signals, fusees or other proper warning devices at that crossing immediately prior to the time the accident giving rise to these suits occurred."
It is clear that the District Judge relied heavily upon the testimony of Mr. Flanakin who in turn relied heavily upon the "Peabody-Dimmick" formula; secondly, elevation of the track above the surface of the road, and thirdly, the fact that the blacktopped highway reflects little light, in order to reach the conclusion that the crossing was unusually hazardous and that the railroad, therefore, was negligent in failing to station flagmen, lighted signals, fusees or other proper warning devices at the crossing prior to the time of the accident.
From the record as well as from the facts found by the District Court the elevation at this crossing is of no consequence in that the surface of the highway is two feet lower than the surface of the crossing at a point 400 feet south of the crossing, and 1.6 feet lower at a point 200 feet south of the crossing, and 1.3 feet lower at a point 100 feet south of the crossing. This slight and gradual elevation of the highway should be of no consequence insofar as obstructing the view of a boxcar across the intersection of the highway and, in fact, according to the finding of fact on the plea of contributory negligence under dismissal of the suit filed on behalf of the father of Burwick Harris, Driver of the car, and of the father of Joseph Senegal, Jr., the passenger on the front seat, and of the suit by Sam Muller, Jr., on his own behalf there is no merit in a conclusion that this slight elevation obstructed the view of the box car by the occupants of the automobile. The District Court in dealing with the question of contributory negligence of the occupants of the car, correctly found the following:
"The evidence establishes to the satisfaction of this Court that Burwick Harris, driver of the automobile, was negligent in driving at an excessive rate of speed, in failing to keep the vehicle under such control that he could bring it to a stop within the range of his vision, and in failing to maintain a proper lookout. His negligence contributed to and constituted a proximate cause of the accident, and for that reason the demands of plaintiff in the case entitled 'Beulah Harris vs. C. R. McDermott et al.,' bearing No. 31,399, must be rejected.
"The evidence also establishes that Joseph Senegal, Jr., who was in the front seat immediately to the right of the driver, voiced no protest and made no effort to warn Burwick Harris of the danger or to persuade him to exercise caution. Although he may not have seen the train, and the Court is convinced that it was difficult to do so, his attention was called to the fact that it occupied the crossing by Muller, one of the other occupants of the car. As a guest or passenger in the automobile, it was his duty to warn the driver of the danger and otherwise exercise ordinary care to protect himself. His neglect to do so constituted a contributory or proximate cause of the accident. The demands of plaintiff in the case entitled 'Joseph Senegal v. Guy A. Thompson, Trustee,' bearing No. 31,116, also must be' rejected.
"The evidence also establishes that Joseph Senegal, Jr., who was in the front seat immediately to-the right of the driver, voiced no protest and made no effort to-warn Burwick Harris of the danger or to persuade him to exercise caution. Although he may not have seen the train, and the Court is- convinced that it was difficult to do so, his attention was called to the fact that it occupied the crossing by Muller, one of the other occupants of the car. As a guest or passenger in the automobile, it was his duty to warn the driver of the danger, and otherwise exercise ordinary care to protect himself. His neglect to do so constituted a contributory or proximate cause of the accident. The demands of plaintiff in the case entitled 'Joseph Senegal v. Guy A. Thompson, Trustee,' bearing No. 31,116, also must be rej ected.
"Sam Muller, Jr., testified that he saw the boxcar at the crossing some time before the collision occurred, and that he told Harris, the driver, that 'he better slow up before he hit that train.' The driver replied, however, that Muller 'could not teach him how to drive.' He testified that he asked the driver to slow down 'about three or four times,' but that his requests were ignored. The only available evidence as to what occurred in the automobile immediately prior to the time of the collision is the. testimony of the only surviving occupant of the car, Sam Muller, Jr., who is also one of the plaintiffs in the suits now before the Court. Although, this witness has an interest in the outcome, of the case, this Court believes that he has endeavored to give an accurate account of what occurred.
"It, of course, is the duty of a guest or passenger in a motor vehicle to exercise ordinary care for his own safety, and where reasonably necessary to warn the driver of impending danger and to take such other reasonable steps as are necessary for his own protection. This Court concludes that the action of Sam Muller, Jr., in warning the driver of the danger and requesting him to slow down three or four times immediately prior to the timé of the collision was all that he reasonably could be expected to do under the circumstances, and thus he was not con-' tributorily negligent." (Emphasis added.)
The District Court reached the conclusion that the lights on the automobile would not illuminate a standing box car at this crossing until the automobile reached a point very close to the crossing. There is no testimony to this effect other than the evidence of the slight elevation of six inches to one hundred feet, approximately, upon which to base this conclusion. Acknowledging the elevation of the crossing as shown by the record, it is plain that at a distance of' 400 feet, if the lights illuminated that far, and which was possible if they were on bright, the lights at the 400 foot point would be two feet .higher than they would have been if the road was level. There is no testimony as to the distance from the bottom of the box car to the ground, but it is certain that due to the height of the box car it would have been illuminated by the lights of the approaching automobile. At 200 feet according to the testimony the occupants of the car were only derived of 1.6 feet of illumination, and only 1.3 feet at 100 feet.
The District Court also found that due to the heavily travelled thoroughfare and the fact that, this crossing is located on the outskirts of the City of Lake Charles that the driver "might reasonably be expected to drive with' the beams of his headlights deflected." The testimony fails to reveal that the highway in question at the time of the accident was heavily traveled or that there were any cars approaching the automobile involved in the accident due to the fact that it happened at approximate-, ly 11:30 at night on the eastern outskirts of the City of Lake Charles. It might be. just as reasonable or logical to conclude, and 'it would certainly have been safer under the circumstances as well as proper, that the light were on bright rather than dim, however, the burden of proof was upon the plaintiffs, and if it was-a matter, of necessity to the plaintiff's case to establish that the lights were on. dim, he bore the burden of proof and should have done so,- otherwise such a conclusion is not justified.
Above all, however, may we emphasize again that the District Court found as a matter of fact that the testimony of Muller was truthful to the effect that he saw the box car' and the train and called it to the attention of the driver and front seat passenger more than once, and under these facts and circumstances and the absence, of any unusual weather conditions, it was a clear' dark night, the lights on the automobile were apparently in "good condition, the train was seen, as shown by Muller's testimony, the sole and proximate cause of this accident was the negligence of the driver Harris, and of Senegal, Jr., who voiced no protest and made no effort to warn Harris, although, as specifically found by the District Court "his attention was called to the fact that it occupied the crossing by Muller
The "Peabody-Dimmick" formula advanced by the witness Flanakin is valueless when viewed in the light of the jurisprudence and of the basis of the formula as shown by the' testimony. This formula is used by the United States Bureau of Public Roads as a basis of determining which crossings should be given priority in the allocation of .Federal funds, and is based upon two factors insofar as the selection of the-crossings for the spending of Federal funds on warning protection was concerned. These two factors are the amount of railroad traffic over the crossing and the amount of motor vehicular traffic over the crossing. In other words, a railroad crossing with no admitted hazards in itself, due to elevations or obstructions to view or any other imaginable condition, which would make the crossing per se hazardous, would be considered a hazardous crossing under the "Peabody-Dimmick" formula if it had a certain amount of railroad traffic and a certain amount of motor vehicular traffic. For example, a crossing could be hazardous per se, but unless the railroad traffic and motor vehicular- traffic reached a certain amount or number, under the "Peabody-Dimmick" formula it would not be haz ardous' crossing. From a legal standpoint and the jurisprudence, if one person uses the crossing per day and the crossing is per se hazardous by virtue of obstructions or a heavy fog or sleet or snow or elevations or other hindrances to view, and the railroad under such conditions places a box car across the crossing without any flagman or lights or other warning, under the jurisprudence this would be negligence. The "Peabody-Dimmick" formula, according to the record, does not consider any negligence on the part of those running into the train even though the crossing is not rendered hazardous by virtue of its location or any outside facts or circumstances.
The testimony of the originators of the "Peabody-Dimmick" formula was that it was not devised to test the negligence of a railroad with reference to the facts necessary to render a crossing hazardous under our jurisprudence.
With regard to the particular crossing in question, Mr. I. L. Thomas, Jr., Traffic and Planning Engineer of the Louisiana Department of Plighways, testified that he was familiar with the "Peabody-Dimmick" formula but that in his opinion many factors in addition to the main ones, used in working out that formula must be considered in determining whether a crossing is unusually hazardous, and that any ratings made in . accordance with the formula in Louisiana were used solely for the purpose of determining how the public funds should be spent. He did' not think the formula could be used with any degree of reliability in determining whether a crossing is hazardous.
Charles F. Middleton, train and traffic officer of the Louisiana State Police, testi-. fied that -he had had considerable experience in law enforcement and accident prevention, that he had .examined this crossing in question on many occasions and that-, in his opinion it was no more hazardous, than any other railroad crossing.; In: .other words, there was nothing that would render this crossing hazardous per se.
It is true that, as commented upon by the District Judge, the Traffic and Safety Committee of the Lake Qrarles Association of Cqmmerce had requested warning signals because they thought that the number of accidents rendered the crossing hazardous. The Railroad company acknowledged the receipt of this letter or resolution and a portion of their answer is as follows:
"In our investigation of the need of crossing protection at this location it developed that there have been three serious accidents on this crossing where vehicles ran into the side of train. Route.42 is a straight north and south black top highway, crossing the main track at .about 90 degree angle, while a yard track crosses this highway at an angle of about 21 degrees. The accidents that have, happened have been mostly when there were' heavy fogs which roll in from the Gulf at-night."
The District Court correctly evaluated the resolution and letters with regar,d to this crossing when it said: "Although the resolutions and letters above described do not constitute proof of the ;fact that a hazardous condition actually existed at this crossing, ."
Let us now examine some of the cases with a view of determining what facts are., necessary to abrogate the general rule recognized and stated by the District Court that a railroad company is not required to station a flagman at a crossing to warn approaching motorists of the fact' that the crossing has -been blocked or occupied by a train, nor to place lights or other signals at such crossings, for that purpose, unless there are such unusual and dangerous conditions at the crossing as to make such precautions necessary.
In Plummer v. Gulf M. & N. R. R. Co., La.App., 153 So. 322, 323, this Court stated:
" 'It has not been shown from the situation of the switch - track -across the highway at this point and the conditions confronting the drivers of motor cars along the highway were such as would require the railroad company to station a flagman with the usual lantern, signal on both sides of the approach to the switch track to warn approa.ching motorists. As stated above, there were no obstructions to cut off the view of a motorist traveling the highway going either direction some distance from the crossing, which would make it possible for the driver of a car to see a train standing across the track in ample time to stop his car if the headlights on the car were burning properly. The evidence shows that in this case there was no such flagman placed to warn approaching motorists on the highway, but as a matter of law the defendant railroad company was under no such duty to place such flagman to give warning to approaching motorists. Sweeney v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., La.App., 149 So. 147. Therefore it follows that plaintiff has not shown negligence against the railroad' company on this ground.
" However, as held in the case of Gulf M. & N. Railroad Co. v. Kennard, [164 Miss. 380, 145 So. 110] supra, and cases there cited, a railroad company is not required as a matter of law to have a light on a coach or box car placed across a highway or street in its switching operations unless there is some peculiar and special danger, and unless there is some obstruction to prevent an approaching motorist from seeing the car or coach across the track on approaching it along the highway with the lights on the automobile burning in the usual manner. '

"The evidence shows that the coach' had been placed across the highway only for two or three minutes before George Rouse ran against it with his truck. The traveling public can expect that the switches in the yards of railroad companies may be so occupied temporarily by their coaches in operating their trains.
"A case of this character is entirely different from one where a highway is blocked 'by an. auto, truck, or other obstacle. In such a case, the party blocking the highway must warn approaching travelers of the danger ahead for the reason that they do not anticipate that they will meet such obstacles on public roadways or highways. The warning usually given by one thus blocking a highway is by means of a lantern, moving light, or other equally safe method.
"In the instant case no such warning was necessary as the travelers on that highway could expect that the crossing would be temporarily occupied or blocked in the operation of the defendant's trains while carrying on its, legitimate business. * . "
The holding in the case of Squyres v. Baldwin, 191 La. 249, 185 So. 14, 17, with Chief Justice Fournet as organ of the Court, gave an exhaustive review of the law with full recognition of the general rule as well as the exception thereto. The court stated:
" 'The view generally taken is that the presence of a train of cars at a Crossing is sufficient notice of obstruction and of danger, that the railroad company is not bound to give any further warning as to the presence of such obstruction, and that the trainmen have a right to assume that the operator of the vehicle will act in a reasonable way to avoid a collision. There is, however, authority for the view that conditions may' he such as to require a warning where, in the darkness, a car obstructs a crossing.' 52 Corpus Juris, sec. 1782, pp. 190, 191. (Italics ours.)
"On the same subject matter we find, in Huddy's Ency. of Automobile Law (9th Ed.) Vols. 7-8, pp. 129, 130, that ' in the absence of statutory requirement, the mere leaving of a train across the highway without lights or other signals to disclose its presence there is not per se negligence; as to injuries received by running into the train, the obstruction of the highway is not to be considered as the efficient cause of such injuries but merely as a condition which in and of itself furnishes no cause of action. In order to charge the railroad with negligence in such case it must he shown that defendcmfs employees in cltarge of the train, in the exercise of reasonable care, ought to have known that on account of darkness the cars upon the crossing were such am, obstruction that people traveling upon the highway in automobiles properly equipped with lights and carefully operated at a reasonable rate of speed would. be likely to come into collision with them.' (Italics ours.) See also, Dobrowolski v. Holloway Gravel Co. Inc., La.App.1937, 173 So. 474; Plummer v. Gulf, M. & N. R. Co. (Hampton v. Gulf, M. & N. R. Co.), La. App., 153 So. 322; Trask v. Boston & M. R. R., 219 Mass. 410, 106 N.E. 1022; Miller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 140 S.C. 123, 138 S.E. 675, certiorari denied Camp Mfg. Co. v. Miller, 275 U.S. 556, 48 S.Ct. 117, 72 L.Ed. 424; Aymond v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 151 La. 184, 91 So. 671; Maher v. Louisiana Ry. & Nav. Co., 145 La. 733, 82 So. 872.
"In A.L.R., Vol. 99, p. 1455, the exception is stated as follows:
" ' the railroad company's duty is not necessarily discharged under all circumstances if it fails to give warning in some form of the presence of the obstruction. The atmospheric conditions, obscurity, and darkness of the crossing, the length of time it is obstructed, and the nature of the highway, may require the warning be given if the company is to be found m the exercise of due care.' (Italics ours.)
• '
"In the case at bar the falling snow was unusually heavy and dense, the ground and concrete pavement were covered with it and the night was as dark as Erebus itself. U. S. Highway No. 165 accommodates a heavy stream of traffic, as it is a main artery of travel in the state highway system, connecting central Louisiana with numerous points south and southwest thereof. The spur track is level with the pavement and used only occasionally for the benefit of the Alexandria Gravel Company and usually at night, while the railroad signs there located were, when the collision occurred, concealed by the falling snow. The low, black gravel cars were rendered a dull grey color in appearance, by reason of the snow which blanketed them, and blended perfectly with the full, leadened background.
"It is true that the engine's bell and whistle were sounded at times during the switching, but Johnson (the driver) and the plaintiff both testified that they heard no such signals and their testimony' is supported by the fact that a strong northerly wind was blowing, which, according to the direction they were travelling, carried the sounds from them.
"We are therefore of the opinion that defendant's employees in charge of the train, exercising reasonable care, ought to have known, on account of the darkness, the falling snow, and the cross-switching, that the train was such an obstruction that people traveling upon Highway No. 165 in automobiles properly equipped with lights and carefully driven at a reasonable rate of speed might have come into colli sion with therii, and it was their duty to protect the traveling- public against this peril, created by them, by giving such warning as the conditions warranted. Having failed to do so, they were negligent."
In Domite v. Thompson, 2 Cir., La.App., 9 So.2d 55, 57. The court stated the following :
"The accident alleged upon happened at the same crossing as that involved in Squyres v. Baldwin et al., decided by this court, 181 So. 584, and affirmed by the Supreme Court under writ of review 191 La. 249, 185 So. 14. In that case a heavy snow storm created unusual and Extraordinary atmospheric conditions at and about the locus of the' crossing whereas a.heavy fog is •alleged to have done so in the present case.
. iji * -sis # * . ♦
" There are 'no trees, buildings or other view obstructing agencies on either side of the road near' the crossing. The customary 'Louisiana Law Stop' signs and smaller highway markers are properly located to warn motorists of the presence of the spur track.
£ *
"Deceased was well acquainted with the' physicial conditions where the accident occurred and well knew that the spur track was there and that it was regularly used to transport cars across the highway to the gravel pit. Bailey also knew, that.the track crossed the road there.
" The train was then stopped for a brief time to enable the brakeman to couple these two cars to the train. While this was being done, the accident' occurred. The train had been stopped not more than three or four minutes.
"Plaintiff contends that the fog which enveloped the . area about the crossing was so dense and' the traffic over the highway so heavy that this case falls. within the court's holding in the Squyres case, supra.- It was held in that case, as reflected from the syllabus:
" 'That motorist and guest were on public highway on a dark night when heavy snow was falling which limited motorist's visibility to 25. feet did not constitute negligence on the part of motorist and guest, as respects guest's •right to recover for injuries sustained when automobile collided with train.
*
" 'Where railroad, without stationing trainman with visible warning signal at crossing, permitted gravel cars to obstruct crossing on seldom used spur track on dark night during heavy snowstorm, and visibility was so poor as to conceal railroad crossing signs, railroad was liable for injuries to guest in automobile which collided with train, since railroad was guilty of negligence which proximately caused collision.'
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"But they argue that the - facts of this case bring it within the exception to that general rule also appearing on the same 'page of that work, to-wit: 'However, • the railroad company's duty is not necessarily discharged under all circumstances if it "fails to give warning in some form of the presence of the obstruction. The atmospheric conditions, obscurity, and darkness of the crossing, ,th.e .length of time it is obstructed, and the nature of the highway, may require that warning be given if the company is to be found in the exercise of due café. The recent decisions support these general propositions.' " •
*• . .
"Counsels' position, of course, becomes untenable when the conclusion is reached that the crossing was free of atmospheric conditions at the time of the accident, of such character as to materially interfere with visibility. This conclusion brings the case squarely within the general rule that the presence of a train across a highway is adequate notice and warning to motorists that the road is blocked. The rule is also well established-that a motorist is required for his own safety and protection, if for' no other reason, to maintain such rate of speed and lookout as will enable him to stop his vehicle within the distance illumined by its lights. This rule, a safe and sane one, when observed, serves to avert hundreds of accidents which would certainly occur but for such observance. Had the decedent observed the rule, he would doubtless be living today.
"The Squyres case typifies the exception to the general rule above stated. Comment on the, case because of its exceptional features, has not been, confined to this state. To clearly show that the basic facts of that case are wholly different from those of the case at bar, we quote from comment thereon appearing in Louisiana Law Review, Volume 2, page 93, viz.: 'Here the defendant's train of fifteen cars was being shunted across a highway upon which plaintiff was riding by automobile during a heavy snowstorm at night. The cars were being shifted along a little-used private spur line. Visibility was exceedingly poor and the defendant's cars were cloaked in snow so as to present a dull gray appearance which harmonized with the surrounding countryside. The automobile in which the plaintiff rode as a guest was progressing at a rate of speed not in excess of 15 miles per hour. ,.Although ,plaintiff!s host was. driving - with his head protruding through the side window so as to aid his vision, he did not, perceive the freight cars until it was too late to avoid a collision. The defendant contended, inter alia, that no negligence on its part had been alleged and proved.' "
The recent case of Ramsey v. Louisiana & A. Ry. Co., La.App., 2 Cir., 70 So.2d 171, 172, is one wherein the court reviewed and reaffirmed the jurisprudence concerning the general rule and the facts and. circumstances necessary to bring a case under the exception thereto. In this case the following facts were found and conclusions reached:
"The evidence shows that the train involved was -a freight train of the defendant on a regular run from Greenville, Texas, to .Shreveport, Louisiana, consisting of the locomotive, 82 cars, and a caboose. The train, upon arriving in the City of Shreveport and in approaching the freight yards, crossed the Jewella road and came to a standstill at a point on said train about 17.or 18 car lengths behind the locomotive. An employee alighted from the train and telephoned the railroad yard office to ascertain if the track was clear for the train to proceed. Information was given that a switch engine was proceeding in that direction, which necessitated, the incoming freight to back to a switch in order to permit the meeting of the two. This operation consumed only a few moments' time, possibly not more than five minutes. No. flagman was stationed at the' street crossing to warn traffic of the presence of the train. There were no unusual atmospheric conditions or interferences,' such as fog, dust, mist, snow or rain to prevent or obstruct normal, night vision.
. *.
"Th.e. general rule relative ;to negligence, of a railroad, in .a factual, sitúa-. tíon such as we find here has been stated in 44 Am.Jur., p. 741, 'Railroads', Section 501, as follows:
*
"The same authority states an exception to the general rule in this language:
" 'However, the railroad company s duty is not necessarily discharged under all circumstances if it fails to give warning in some form of the presence of the obstruction. The atmospheric condition, obscurity and darkness of the crossing, the length of time it is obstructed, and the nature of the highway, may require that warning be given if the company is to be found in the exercise of due care, but in order to charge a railroad company with negligence in leaving an unlighted train across the highway in the night so as to make it liable for injury to an automobilist traveling on the highway running against it, the employees in charge of the train must, in the exercise of reasonable care, have knowledge that on account of the particular facts or situation involved people traveling along the highway in automobiles properly equipped with lights, and carefully operated at reasonable speed, would be likely to come into collision with the cars unless lights are placed on them to warn of their presence.' [Emphasis added.]

"It is clear, in our opinion, that no negligence of the defendant or of its agents and employees, contributed to plaintiff's driving into and colliding with the side of the train. There are no unusual or extraordinarily dangerous conditions, facts or circumstances at the crossing. The train was stopped in order for a member of the crew to telephone the yard office and would have continued on in a few minutes' time after stopping. There were no obstructions or conditions to keep plaintiff from seeing the train had he been driving a car with proper lights and at a careful and reasonable rate of speed and keeping a proper lookout, and it was due to plaintiff's fault and negligence that the accident occurred."
In the present case there are but two facts upon which it is contended that the case at bar comes under the exception to the general rule and those are the slight incline of approximately six inches to one hundred feet, which in all probability prevented the lights of the automobile from being wasted underneath the box car and caused them to cover a greater surface of the side of the red box car and, secondly, the "Peabody-Dimmick" formula, which is based solely upon the amount of railroad and motor vehicular traffic. Other than these two factors, the railroad company had the usual crossing warnings which were really unnecessary in the present case due to the fact that the three occupants of the car had just some 30 minutes previous to the accident crossed this track going to the night club where it is shown they had some wine and beer, and they were, therefore, familiar with the railroad crossing and its location, and utterly failed to stop or slow down or observe the warning of Muller to the effect that the train was blocking the crossing. Much is made of the fact of the testimony that Muller was a moron, however, he was of sufficient intelligence to be placed upon the stand and his testimony is apparently clear and intelligible. The District Court depended upon it to convict the driver and front seat passenger of contributory negligence upon their failure to see the train and to heed the warning given by Muller. The accident did not happen immediately upon Muller's warning as the car was traveling 50 or 60 miles an hour, and upon the warning given by Muller the driver then retorted something to the effect that he didn't need to teach him how to drive which, of course, took some time, possibly sufficient time to have saved his own life. Eliminating the • slight incline as an unusual condition leaves only a contention that because of the heavy traffic in trains and vehicles using and going over this crossing that such a fact rendered the crossing unusually hazardous. It is true that the greater volume of traffic that uses a crossing, it follows that the greater percentage of people will be injured or killed, but unless, in addition to the crossing itself, there are unusual conditions such as a fog or snow, which affect visibility or obstructs the view, the general rule applies and the general rule is that the railroad is not negligent in failing to supply a warning by way of flagman, brakeman or warning devices.
It is also to be noted that, as shown by the jurisprudence cited in order to charge the railroad company with negligence in leaving an unlighted train across the highway in the night, the employees in charge of the train must in the exercise of reasonable care have knowledge that on account of the particular facts or situation involved people traveling along the highway in automobiles properly equipped with lights and carefully operated at reasonable speeds would be likely to come into collision with the cars, unless such warning precautions are taken. In the present case, there are no particular facts or situation involved as revealed by the record by which the employees in charge of the train in question could have known that anyone would run into the train whére the automobile was properly equipped with lights and being carefully operated at a reasonable speed. The automobile involved in this accident was properly equipped with lights but it was not being carefully operated at a reasonable speed under the facts and circumstances. There was no reason why this train should not have been observed by the occupants of the car and it was observed by one whose warning went unheeded.
Now let us examine a few of the cases in which the railroad was held guilty of negligence. In Martin v. Yazoo & M. R. Co., La.App. 2 Cir., 181 So. 571, 577, it was stated:
"The first questions to determine are the alleged negligences of the defendant company. The defendant's railroad traverses in an easterly and westerly direction the main part of the city of Monroe. From its passenger station to the bridge crossing the Oua-chita river, there is a street crossing every block, — five in all. The distance is approximately one-half a mile. The crossing where this accident occurred is a very dangerous one and, as alleged, is extremely hazardous. The engineer on duty at the time was asked if he knew there was a' City ordinance limiting the speed of trains over this section of the city to 6 miles per hour, and he answered that he understood that to be the law. $ ifi *
"Regardless, however, of there being no specific law or ordinance fixing •the speed limit of defendant's trains while operating in the city of Monroe, there is a duty upon the defendant not to run its trains at a speed which will endanger the lives of those who make use of the streets of the city. What is excessive speed must be determined by a consideration of the hazardous conditions existing at the crossing where the accident occurred. Natal v. Louisiana & A. Ry. Co., 18 La.App. 50, 137 So. 600. And when this is done, we are convinced a speed in excess of 6 miles per hour was excessive at this particular crossing, due to the obstructions, the nearness of the two crossings to each other at Grand and Walnut streets, and the lack of mechanical devices or sufficient flagmen to properly take care of the public at the two crossings. *
"In the language of counsel for plaintiff, the allegations of negligence are as follows:
"'That the said passenger train, leaving defendant's depot in Monroe at about 7 o'clock P.M., November 4, 1935¿ and traveling west about half a mile came to. Walnut street of said city, "at a dangerous, excessive and illegal rate'of speed;" that the said collision occurred in the "center and heart of the business section and heavily traveled portion of the city of Monroe at a time of day and night when noises from automobiles, trucks, newsboys, hotel criers and porters, steam whistles, radios, taxicab drivers and peddlers were all making great noise at and near the point where the said accident and collision occurred, sufficient to drown out and render of no use or service any- whistle or ring of bell from the said train made at anytime before said train was practically in the act of striking the said truck."
" 'That Walnut street and Grand street at DeSirard are 200 feet apart; that both,, running north from that street a distance of about 150 yards, come to the defendant's railroad tracks; that in that distance, they run slightly diagonal toward each other so that there is only about 40 feet between- them immediately before they reach the said railroad tracks; that there are high brick buildings on either side of each of the said streets in said block extending to close proximity to the tracks; that there is a brick building 40 feet wide on its west and between said streets, and 30 feet high, immediately south of the said railroad trades; that there was and is a brick building immediately south of the said crossing three stories high, abutting on the east side of Walnut street a width of fully 100 feet, the north wall of said brick building and the said west wall of same extending to within 20 feet of the said main line track of the. said defendant upon which the said passenger train was traveling; that there is and was then a side track, being between this said last named brick building, the said side track extending to within a few feet of the west end of the said brick building, back east some three of four hundred yards, upon which side track there are constantly left box cars standing, some within -IS 'feet of said Walnut street,- and sufficiently near to cut off the view to the east of a man. operating a motor truck on Walnut' street in approaching the said main' line; that the said intersection is paved in and between each of the streets at said railroad crossing, a distance' of over 100 feet north and south and 200 feet east and west; and that about 60 yards north of the said intersection, the two , streets converge and become one.
" 'That a very steep incline in the paving and grade of said Walnut street-begins about 90 feet south of the said main line track and extends to within 15 feet of said main line track; and that said incline was so steep that it required either second or low gear of the said loaded truck to climb same.'

"The physical conditions surrounding the crossing in the case at bar made it extraordinarily hazardous and it was the duty of defendant to maintain at said crossing 'flagmen to warn the public using said crossing of the approach of the trains.' ? "
It is self-evidence that the above case is not similar from a factual standpoint to the case under consideration. However, the cited case does not depart from the settled jurisprudence which recognizes the general rule and adheres to the settled jurisprudence with regard to the necessity for the existence of unusual facts and circumstances which can reasonably be charged to the' knowledge' of the employees of the railroad that under such unusual conditions or circumstances drivers might be. expected to collide with the stationary or moving train, which ever might be the case.
Hebert v. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co., 28 So.2d 151, 152, was another case decided by this court in which a passenger was allowed to recover. The facts and basis of the decision are shown by the following:
"On the question of personal liability, the trial judge states that he was left with no doubt in his mind from the testimony of the witnesses,' that while the truck driver might have been guilty of contributory negligence, the deceased boy, who was riding on the rear of the'truck, which truck was enclosed, could not conceivably be charged with direct or independent negligence. He states that the negligence of the railroad company consisted in its creating an extremely dangerous situation and thereafter taking no precautions against the occurrence of just such an accident; that McCall Crossing is subject to very heavy vehicle traffic during the cane season, to the knowledge of the railroad; and that on the morning of the accident freight cars were spotted on both the east and west sides of this crossing' at a distance of less than 60 feet from the crossing, although the railroad witnesses testified that the. closest freight car on the west side was 65 feet to 70 feet from the road.- The-trial judge calls attention to the fact that one of the railroad company brakemen admitted that it was the practice of the railroad for a brakeman to act as flagman if freight cars were spotted closer than 60 feet to a railroad crossing. The trial judge was .convinced from the evidence that there was - a failure to give a- timely warning signal.
"In other words, -we can find no . error in the finding of fact of the trial judge that the railroad was guilty of gross negligence in spotting cars on this heavily travelled'crossing, entire- ' ly for its own convenience, at a distance of from 40 feet to 45 feet thereof, without taking the precaution . of having a flagman to warn approaching traffic of the dangerous situation existing, and that the engineer, well knowing that this was a heavily trav-elled crossing, and well' knowing that these cars-were spotted on both sides, was guilty of gross negligence in proceeding at a rapid-pace, without stopping, or even' slowing down, at said crossing, and as a result, crashing into the rear of the truck wherein the decedent was present." -
In the last cited case we see that the railroad had spotted cars close to the crossing, thereby creating a dangerous situation to the knowledge of the engineer, and when he disregarded the existence of'this obstruction to the view of the traveling public and proceeded at a rapid pace without stopping or even slowing down at the crossing, the court very properly found the railroad guilty of'such negligence that a passenger in the rear of an enclosed truck could recover, although it did find the driver guilty of contributory negligence. This case is not apposite to the case át bar because of the difference in the facts. There was no obstruction, nothing unusual in' 'the atmospheric conditions or weather or otherwise, ill the case at bar, and we have noth-' ing other than the fact that it was a heavily traveled highway which alone is not sufficient under the jurisprudence to convict the railroad of negligence.
Again in Arnold v. Illinois Central Railroad Company, La.App., 32 So.2d 76, 78, the railroad was held to .be negligent and the passenger-allowed recovery. The facts and conclusions of the court are as follows:
'The principal question to determine is' whether or not on account 'of the darkness and fog it was the duty of the railroad to take any extra precautions to 'protect- traffic on-the high-way, other than the signs above' mentioned. - - • '
"The evidence shows that there was a heavy fog in the area of this crossing at the time of the accident, but the density of the fog and the extent of visibility varies in the testimony. Some of the witnesses testified that the fog was so dense that a person could see only a few feet, while others stated that, while there was a fog, it was not unusually heavy and visibility was not seriously impaired. The preponderance of the evidence shows that the darkness and fog seriously affected visibility and rendered driving an automobile rather hazardous.

"The evidence in the present case shows that the fog was so dense that the driver of a car could not see more than 35 or 40 feet, and if we are to apply the reasoning employed in the Squyres case, it was the duty of the railroad to protect the crossing by having a flagman stationed there with a lantern to warn approaching traffic while the crossing was being blocked by the train, or at least provide some warning signal more than the signs which it was difficult for a motorist to see. The railroad employees knew .this crossing to be used frequently as it is on one of the main thoroughfares of the State. They also knew that the fog was heavy and visibility poor, but seem to have remained content to stay in their respective places in the engine and caboose while their'train was blocking the highway a quarter of a mile away for at least a few minutes— probably two or three minutes — during which time they should have reasonably expected several automobiles and trucks to approach the crossing."
The unusual circumstance in the Arnold case was a heavy fog which seriously affected visibility, knowledge of which was, of course, chargeable to the employees of the railroad company. In this particular case as well as in a great many of the other cases involved with similar kinds of accidents, they occurred-at a crossing on a heavily traveled highway. The court comments upon this fact for the reason that on these heavily traveled highways, if a crossing is blocked two, three or five minutes, the train crew is bound to realize and is charged with the knowledge that there will be some traffic over these heavily traveled routes, and on such highways the likelihood of an accident is greatly increased because of that fact and where, in addition, visibility on account of fog, snow, sleet, rain or obstructions which hide the oncoming or stationary train. However, there is no case which has held that a railroad was negligent because of the fact that a highway is heavily traveled. There must be in addition unusual circumstances as shown by the many cases cited.
There were no unusual facts or circumstances shown in the present case by which it could be decided under the exception to the general rule, and therefore there was no negligence on the part of the railroad company and the sole and proximate cause of the accident, deaths and injuries resulting therefrom was the negligence of Harris, the driver of the automobile.
For the above and foregoing reasons the judgment of the District Court is reversed, set aside and annulled and the plaintiff's suit dismissed at his cost.
A passenger.
. This is not the allegation of plaintiffs' petitions in this lawsuit; this is the actual language of resolutions adopted by civic clubs just a few weeks before the present tragic accident.