Case Name: THOMAS GRAVES v. JOHN T. ALSAP
Court: Arizona Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arizona
Decision Date: 1876-01
Citations: 1 Ariz. 274
Docket Number: 
Parties: THOMAS GRAVES v. JOHN T. ALSAP.
Judges: 
Reporter: Arizona Reports
Volume: 1
Pages: 274–319

Head Matter:
THOMAS GRAVES v. JOHN T. ALSAP.
Parties to Action can not Stipulate What the Law is that is to govern their case; nor can they stipulate what the action of a law-making body was in a given case, and from the stipulation thus made ask the court to determine whether a general law is or is not in force.
Journals of Legislative Body are not Evidence to the Courts as to what laws were enacted by such body, and, in the absence of other evidence, a court is not warranted in finding that a general act has been passed by such legislative body, where such act has not been published amongst the laws, and no copy of it can he found enrolled in the office of the secretary of the territory, who is the lawful custodian of all original hills that have been properly passed.
Appeal from the district court of the third judicial district, Maricopa county. The facts are stated in the opinion.
G. Ii- Oury, for the appellant.
All the facts upon which this action is based are stipulated, and come up in the transcript. The law relied on in support of and applicable to this case is as follows: By a law of congress in force on the first day of December, 1873, and which continued in force until the eighteenth day of February, 1875, the power or right was conferred on the legislature of Arizona to pass any act or law over the veto power of the governor, by means of a vote of two thirds of the members of each house. B. S., sec. 1842, p. 327; Id., sec. 5595, p. 1091.
The legislature of the territory of Arizona, on the twelfth day of February, 1875, passed a law making the office of judge of the probate court in' the several counties in the territory of Arizona elective, which said law was passed over the veto power of the governor by a vote of two thirds of the members of each house of the legislative assembly. Certified copy of act of twelfth of February, 1875.
No inference or presumption of a legislative construction is to be drawn by reason of the title under which any particular act is placed. B. S., sec. 5600, p. 1091.
The grant of the power or right of the legislature of Arizona to pass any act over the veto power of the governor was accepted and acted upon prior to the eighteenth day of February, 1875, and the right of the people of the territory to elect judges of the probate courts became vested, and can not be disturbed. Ogden v. Blackedge, 2 Cranch, 272.
The act of congress of the eighteenth of February, 1875, is not retrospective in terms, and can not be so construed. B. S., p. 1435. A statute, when no other time is fixed, takes effect from date. 1 Kent’s Com. 455, 458. The title of an act and the preamble to an act are no parts of it. Id. 461.
Every statute which takes away or impairs a vested right acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability in. respect of transactions or considerations already past, must be deemed retrospective in its operations, and opposed to sound principles of jurisprudence. Broom’s Leg. Max. 34. A statute shall not be construed retrospectively to affect a vested right, unless it specifically refer to a particular case, or is clothed in words that can have no other meaning unless such a construction is adopted. Id. 36, 37. "Whenever it is possible to construe an act not retrospective, the courts will always adopt that construction. Id. 40.
Every law that takes away or impairs rights vested agreeably to existing laws is retrospective and unjust. Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386. It is a general rule that a statute affecting rights and liabilities should not be so construed as to act upon those already existing; to give tliat effect, the statute should declare in terms an intention so to act. Statutes should be construed prospectively. Thorne v. San Francisco, 4 Cal. 133, 139; Quackenbush v. Danks, 1 Denio, 130. Even with regard to statutes affecting only political regulation or convenience, the rule of construction does not vary. McIlvaine v. Coxe, 2 Cranch, 280.
There is no doubt at this day, that the established rule of construction adopted in the United States and in England is that statutes shall operate prospectively; t,he spirit and genius of our institutions imperatively demand this construction. Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns. 477; S. C., 5 Am. Dec. 291.
Prior to the first day of December, 1873, the governor of Arizona was vested with absolute veto. Comp. Laws, p. 15, sec. 3. The laws of Arizona are in force until disapproved by congress. Id., p. 16, sec. 7.
J. T. Alsap, for the respondent.
The first error assigned by appellant is the conclusion of law by the court, as follows: “Theaction of the legislature upon the bill mentioned, subsequent to its return by the governor without his approval, was without authority of law and was void.” The action of the legislature referred to was that of again considering the bill after its return by the governor without his approval.
The respondent contends that section 1842 of the revised statutes of the United States, which is relied upon by the appellant, was amended, and was controlled by the amendment of said section as found in section 1 of an act entitled “ An act to correct errors and to supply omissions in the revised statutes of the United States.” Both the original act and the amendment purport to show what the laws of the United States, of a general nature, were on the first day of December, 1873. If the law of the revised statutes, as amended by the amending act, was the law on the first day of December, 1873, then the action of the legislature of Arizona on the twelfth day of February, 1875, in again considering a bill after the governor had returned it without his approval, was void. That it was the intention of congress to make both the original act and the amendment take effect from the first day of December, 1873, see section 5595 of the revised statutes of the United States on page 1091, and the first paragraph of section 1 of the appendix or amending act on page 1433 of revised statutes, and also the title of the original act.
That it was the intention of congress to make both acts take effect at the same time, see section 2 of the amendment on page 1437, revised statutes.
On the twentieth of June, 1874, congress passed an act entitled. “An act providing for the publication of the revised statutes and laws of the United States” (18 Stat. at Large, 113), by which the secretary of state was directed to prepare certain “head-notes, marginal notes, references,’ etc., and when so prepared to certify the law, and when so certified and printed and promulgated, it should be legal evidence of such law. The secretary of state completed the work on the twenty-second day of February, 1875. See certificate of secretary of state on page next to title-page, revised statutes. This was ten days after the legislature of Arizona adjourned.
The election held in the county of Maricopa for the election of a probate judge on the first Monday in May, 1S75, was void. No law authorizing an election to be held on that day is to be found in the printed statutes of the territory, nor is there such a law on file among the enrolled laws of the territory in the secretary’s office. “The official printed volumes of the acts are the usual and authentic evidence to the court of the statute law.” Dwarris on Stat. L. 135. In Bolander v. Stevens, 23 Wend. 132, the chancellor says he has very little doubt that the court is not authorized to look beyond the printed statutes to ascertain whether the law was passed by a two-thirds vote.
In People v. Purdy, 2 Hill, 34, Justice Bronson says that, for the purpose of giving effect to a constitutional provision, he felt called upon to look beyond the printed statute book and examine the statute roll. There is no intimation that it would be admissible to carry the investigation further, and he regarded it as a matter of doubt whether it should be carried to this extent.
The case went to the court for the correction of errors, and the chancellor (Walworth) took the same view of the question as did Justice Bronson, but he gave no intimation that it was admissible to go beyond the statute roll, but says “it [the statute roll] is to be considered the only legal evidence that the bill has in fact passed.” In considering the matter, there was no question relating to the journals of the legislature.
“A record or enrollment is a monument of so high a matter, and' importeth in itself such absolute verity, that if it be pleaded there is no such record it shall not receive any trial by witness, jury, or otherwise, but only by itself.” 2 Bla. Com. 330; Sherman v. Story, 30 Cal. 253.
“If the journal were every way full and perfect, yet it hath no power to satisfy, destroy, or weaken the act which, being a high record, must be tried only by itself.” Pacific Railroad v. Governor of Missouri, 23 Mo. 353. “ So it appears by the common law the statute roll was the absolute and conclusive proof of a statute. This record could not be contradicted. It implied absolute verity.” Id. 364.
‘ ‘Neither the journals of the legislature, nor the bill as originally introduced, nor the amendments attached to them, nor parol evidence, can be received in order to show that an act of the legislature, properly enrolled, authenticated, and deposited with the secretary of state, either did not become a law in accordance with prescribed forms, or did not become a law as enrolled. * * * If the fact of the passage of a law be denied, the question is to be tried and determined by the court as one of law, and can not be put in issue and tried as one of fact.” Sherman v. Story, 30 Cal. 253.
“ The plain answer is, that we can not look into the jour nals of the legislature to see when a bill was introduced, or how it passed through the two houses. If an act is properly enrolled, authenticated, and deposited with the secretary of state, it is conclusive evidence.” People v. Burt, 43 Cal. 560.
If the enrollment, authentication, and depositing with the secretary of state are conclusive that a law has passed, the want of all these things is conclusive that there is no such law. If the journals of the legislature be referred to, it will be found that after passing the bill the second time it was by special committee (not in the ordinary manner) returned to the governor. The governor is not the custodian of the laws of the territory, nor is he required to care for their preservation more than any other citizen of the territory. His connection with the bill ceased when he returned it to the house in which it originated, with his objection.
There is no statute requiring of him any other duty as to the bill save to approve or disapprove. The secretary of the territory is required by law to “ secure and safely keep in his office all original acts and joint resolutions of the legislature.” Comp. Laws, sec. 2, c. 15, p. 185. To say that there is such a law as is claimed by the appellant, when the same is not found either in the printed statutes or on file among the enrolled laws, is putting on trial for official misconduct the secretary of the territory and the legislative council in a merely collateral proceeding, in which they are not parties and are wholly unheard, and “is a violation of their constitutional rights and the plainest dictates of justice.” The legislature evidently did not intend that the act should become a law, for it can not be supposed that the legislative council were ignorant that the secretary was the custodian of the laws of the territory, and that in his office was the proper place to deposit the act to make it effective.

Opinion:
By Court,
Pobtee, J.:
This is an action in the nature of a quo warranto, in which the plaintiff seeks to obtain possession of the office of probate judge of Maricopa county. The complaint alleges that the plaintiff is probate judge of Maricopa county; that on the first Monday in May, 1875, an election was held for the office of prohate judge therein, for the term of two years from the first Monday in June, 1875, and that at such election the plaintiff was duly elected; that he received a certificate of such election from the proper officers and in due form; that he gave bond and qualified as required by law, and that he demanded of the defendant and was entitled to the possession of said office of probate judge, further alleging that the defendant had on the first Monday in June, 1875, usurped said office, and has ever since withheld the same from plaintiff, demanding judgment against the defendant that he be ousted from such office and plaintiff put in possession of the same.
The defendant, in his answer, denies that the plaintiff is probate judge of Maricopa county; denies that the plaintiff was elected to such office at any lawfully authorized election therefor—that the election pretended to have been held in said county on the first Monday of May, 1875, was not authorized to be held by any statute law of the territory of Arizona.
He further alleges, that the defendant was probate judge of Maricopa county; that he held said office by appointment of the governor' of the territory of Arizona, under a commission from him dated the twenty-third day of February, 1875; that said commission by its terms appointed him such judge, to have and to hold the same until the thirty-first day of December, 1876; that he had executed the official bond, taken the oath as required by law, and was in the lawful possession of the office of probate judge.
On the trial of the cause no evidence was given by either party, but the case was submitted on stipulations between the parties as follows: That on or about the twenty-fifth day of January, 1875, a bill was introduced in the legislature of the territory of Arizona, then in lawful session, authorizing and directing that a general judicial election be held throughout the territory on the first Monday in May, 1875, and every two years thereafter, and that at such election a probate judge for each of the counties should be elected; that said bill passed both houses of said legislature, was duly enrolled and presented to the governor for his approval; that the governor returned said bill to the house where it originated—to wit, the council—on the twelfth day of February, 1875, without his approval; that on the same clay the council again passed the said bill by a vote of two thirds of the members thereof, the vote being taken by yeas and nays; that the said bill was then in the regular manner transmitted to the house of representatives for its action, and on the same day the said house passed the said bill by a vote of two thirds of its members, the vote having been taken by yeas and nays, and the said bill was then regularly returned to the council. The council returned the bill to the governor.
It is further stipulated that the election, or pretended election, mentioned in plaintiff's complaint was held as therein stated; that the plaintiff received the greater number of votes; that he received a certificate of election from the board of supervisors; that he executed an official bond, and demanded and was refused possession of the office, as alleged in the complaint; that defendant held said office by commission of the governor, in maimer and form as set forth in defendant's answer.
The stipulations in this case do not appear to relate to any questions of fact between the parties that are personal and private in their nature, the determination of which might affect only the interest or conduct of the parties to this action; but they relate almost wholly to what transpired on certain days in a legislative body when having under consideration the question of the passage of a law to provide for the election of a probate judge in every county of the territory—a law general in its character, of interest to the living, and affecting the estates of the dead.
The issue raised by the pleadings clearly is, whether at the time stated in the complaint there was a law of the territory in force authorizing the election of a probate judge in Maricopa county. If there was such a law authorizing such an election in Maricopa county on the first Monday in May, 1875, the same law authorized a similar election in each county in the territory. If the law was then in force, it is still in force, and will by its terms authorize a similar election in May, 1877.
The court was asked to decide the issue, the determination of which reached far beyond the parties of record—to every county of the territory; to decide this not by taking judicial knowledge of suck a law, by examining tke printed statutes, or tke office of tke properly appointed custodian of tke original copies of laws passed—not even from tke proved action of tke legislature in considering suck a law, but solely from tke stipulations of tke parties.
We kold tkat parties to an action can not properly stipulate wkat tke law is tkat is to govern tkeir case, and tkat courts should not regard suck stipulations wken made, and we are equally of tke opinion tkat tkey can not stipulate wkat tke action of a law-making body Avas in a given case, and from tke stipulations thus made ask tke court to determine whether a general law is or is not in force.
Tke agreement of parties tkat a statute with certain provisions is in force does not make it in force. Tke agreement of parties tkat a law-making body did certain things wken considering a bill, even though tke things tkey agree between them to have been done were all tkat were necessary in tke opinion of a court to constitute its passage, does not constitute tke bill a law. In deciding tke issue raised, which we think would have been better raised by demurrer than by ansAver, Ave shall not regard tke stipulation.
Was there, then, a law of the territory of Arizona authorizing the election of probate judge in Maricopa county, as alleged in tke complaint ? There is no suck laAV among tke published laAvs of tke territory. There is no copy of suck law in tke office of tke secretary of tke territory, tke officer who is tke lawful custodian of tke original bills tkat have been properly passed. Not finding any evidence of the existence of suck a Law in tke published laws or in tke office of the secretary, is it competent for tke court to examine tke journals of tke two houses of tke legislature, and seek there to find evidence of suck law having been enacted and still in force ?
Tke language of tke authorities as marshaled in a leading case, Sherman v. Story, 30 Cal. 253, is stated tkat " the result of the authorities clearly is, tkat whenever a general statute is misrecited, or its existence denied, tke question is to be tried and determined by the court as a question of law. There is no plea by which its existence can be put in issue and tried as a question of fact." In the same case it was held, " tkat tke court, upon passing upon tke validity of a law that appeared among the published laws, would not examine the journal or the enrolled bill to see if it was published as passed."
If it is not competent in such a case to examine the journal or enrolled bill, to verify or alter the published law, it appears to us still more certain that the same rule should govern in a ease like the present, where there is a total absence of any evidence of legislative action upon the law in question. If the enrollment, authentication, and depositing with the secretary of state is conclusive that a law has passed, the want of all these things may be conclusive that there is no such law. It appears to the court that it was never intended that the journals of a legislative body were to be regarded as evidence to the courts as to what laws were enacted by it, and that a court, in a merely collateral issue, would not be warranted in declaring a general law in force on such evidence alone.
The presumptions of law all are, that if the legislature had passed the law under consideration the same would have appeared among the published laws, or at least they would have seen that the secretary of the territory was provided with an enrolled copy thereof.
We are therefore of the opinion that on the first Monday in May, 1875, there was no law of the territory authorizing the election of a probate judge in Maricopa county, and that the election so held was without [authority of law, and void. It follows from these conclusions that the judgment of the district court must be affirmed, but upon views in some respects different from those which seem to have prevailed in the court below.
Judgment affirmed.
Tweed, J., concurred.