Case Name: Amy TUCK, Lieutenant Governor, State of Mississippi v. Senators Barbara BLACKMON, Robert Johnson, John Horhn, Willie Simmons, Johnnie Walls, David Jordan and Sampson Jackson
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2001-03-08
Citations: 798 So. 2d 402
Docket Number: No. 2000-CA-00759-SCT
Parties: Amy TUCK, Lieutenant Governor, State of Mississippi v. Senators Barbara BLACKMON, Robert Johnson, John Horhn, Willie Simmons, Johnnie Walls, David Jordan and Sampson Jackson.
Judges: SMITH, MILLS, WALLER and COBB, JJ., concur. DIAZ, J., specially concurs with separate written opinion. BANKS, P.J., dissents with separate written opinion. McRAE, P.J., and EASLEY, J., not participating.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 798
Pages: 402–416

Head Matter:
Amy TUCK, Lieutenant Governor, State of Mississippi v. Senators Barbara BLACKMON, Robert Johnson, John Horhn, Willie Simmons, Johnnie Walls, David Jordan and Sampson Jackson.
No. 2000-CA-00759-SCT.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
March 8, 2001.
Office of the Attorney General by T. Hunt Cole, Jr., Attorney for Appellant.
Trent Walker, Canton, Attorney for Ap-pellees.

Opinion:
PITTMAN, Chief Justice,
for the Court:
¶ 1. This matter comes to the Court on appeal from an order of the Chancery Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County wherein the chancellor declared that Lieutenant Governor Amy Tuck, in failing to order the reading in full of a conference report presented to the Mississippi Senate during the 2000 legislative session, upon the demand of a member of the Senate, violated Article 4, Section 59 of the Mississippi Constitution. The powers of government in our state, as in our nation, are vested in the citizens. Through our Constitution, certain of these powers are distributed by the citizens among three separate branches of government under a tripartite constitutional structure which grants to each branch broad but nevertheless limited and often exclusive powers beyond the scope of each of the other branches. Today we hold as we have held throughout our history that only after heightened consideration and under exigent circumstances will judicial authority to regulate the internal actions of the Legislature be exercised.. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the chancery court and stay the hand of the court in attempting to regulate the legislative process.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
¶ 2. During the closing days of the 2000 legislative session, the Senate was considering conference committee reports when Senator Barbara Blackmon rose on a point of order and asked that "whatever that is going to be passed into law, whatever is going to pass into the state statute, or whatever the Governor is going to sign, be read in full before final passage." The request was made pursuant to Article 4, Section 59 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890, and the Lieutenant Governor, then presiding, ruled that the Senator was not entitled to have House Bill 1609 read because the matter before the Senate was not a bill, but was a conference report, not subject to the requirements of Section 59. Senate Rule 112 allows an appeal from a ruling of the presiding officer to the whole Senate; however, Senator Blackmon and six other senators aggrieved by the ruling chose not to seek such redress, but rather filed their complaint in the chancery court seeking injunctive relief to compel the enforcement of Section 59 as they understood it.
¶ 3. On Sunday afternoon, April 30, 2000, as the 2000 legislative session was drawing to an end, the seven members of the Senate filed in the chancery court a Complaint for Temporary Restraining Order, Writ of Mandamus and Injunctive Relief, seeking judicial action to prevent the Lieutenant Governor in her capacity as President of the Senate from enforcing her ruling denying the request that House Bill 1609 be read in full after it had passed and the conference committee report had been filed. On the following evening, the chancellor entered a temporary restraining order granting the relief sought, apparently with no formal notice to the Lieutenant Governor, and set the matter down for hearing on the merits of the complaint on the following day, May 1, at 1:30 p.m. At the conclusion of that hearing, the chancellor entered her order granting the requested injunction and further declaratory relief which required that, on the request of any Senator, full conference reports must be read immediately before a vote on final passage. The legislative deadline for action on appropriations and revenue bills during that session of the Legislature was 2:00 p.m. of the same day. Appropriation conference reports were required to be passed and filed by 6:00 p.m. and bond conference reports by 12:00 midnight of the same day. In less than forty-eight hours, the proceeding in the chancery court had gone from the filing of the complaint to a final declaratory judgment. At risk were over one hundred appropriation bills and over $170,000,000 in appropriation and bond measures.
¶ 4. After the chancellor's order was entered, on motion of the Lieutenant Governor, this Court stayed the chancery court's order, and this appeal was filed.
¶ 5. On appeal, the Lieutenant Governor challenges the chancery court's authority to issue its restraining order and declaratory judgment and the procedures followed in that court.
ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES
I. Separation of Powers
¶ 6. With respect to the separate powers of each branch of governments, the courts will generally refrain from interfering with the Legislature's interpretation and application of its procedural rules and with its internal operations. In Dye v. State ex rel. Hale, 507 So.2d 332 (Miss.1987), this Court was presented with a challenge to the delegation of powers by the Senate to the Lieutenant Governor, in his capacity as President of the Senate. In Dye, the issue was a fundamental one of the unique position of the Lieutenant Governor as an executive officer with specific legislative duties as President of the Senate, presenting a crucial question of the interplay between the executive and legislative branches. This Court explained its role with regard to the workings of the Legislature in these words:
Without doubt, we will as a general rule decline adjudication of controversies arising within the Legislative Department of government where those controversies relate solely to the internal affairs of that department. On the other hand, legislators nor the bodies in which they serve are above the law, and in those rare instances where a claim is presented that the actions of a legislative body contravene rights secured by the constitutions of the United States or of this state, it is the responsibility of the judiciary to act, notwithstanding that political considerations may motivate the assertion of the claims nor that our final judgment may have practical political consequences. Where, as here, it is alleged that one arguably a member of the Executive Department of government is exercising powers properly belonging to the Legislative Department, - we are of necessity called upon to decide whether the encroachment exists in fact and, if so, whether it contravenes the mandate of Sections 1 and 2 of our Constitution that the powers of government be separate. .
Id. at 338-39 (citations omitted). After making clear that it had before it something more than mere rules for internal operations of the Senate, but rather questions basic to the separation of powers among the great branches of government, this Court spoke to its authority to declare Senate rules unconstitutional:
While this Court certainly has the authority to declare Senate rules unconstitutional, the Court should not do so unless those rules are "manifestly" beyond the Senate's constitutional authority. Indeed, the Court has zealously defended its authority to make rules regulating proceedings within the Judicial Department free of any restrictions found in statutes. Considerations of comity militate in favor of this Court's restraint in the face of a challenge to the Senate's similar prerogative to adopt its own rules, absent manifest unconstitutionality of a type not present here.
Id. at 345-46 (citations & footnote omitted). An interpretation by the Senate of the extent of its power under the Constitution, while not binding on the courts, should be accepted unless manifestly wrong. Witherspoon v. State ex rel. West, 138 Miss. 310, 326, 103 So. 134, 138-39 (1925), cited with approval in Dye, 507 So.2d at 345.
¶ 7. Our policy of restraint in venturing into the internal operations of the Legislature as expressed in Dye is rooted in longstanding recognition of the wisdom of such restraint as expressed in Ex parte Wren, 63 Miss. 512 (1886) and Hunt v. Wright, 70 Miss. 298, 11 So. 608 (1892). In Wren, the appellant who challenged the efficacy of a statute as signed by the Governor, tried to delve into the legislative process, specifically to offer journals to show that amendments had been adopted but dropped from the bill when it was submitted to the Governor. The Court disallowed this saying:
The fundamental error of any view which permits an appeal to the journals to see if the constitution has been observed in the passage by both houses of their enactments, is the assumed right of the judicial department to revise and supervise the legislative as to the manner of its performance of its appointed constitutional functions. It is the admitted province of the courts to judge and declare if an act of the legislature violates the constitution, but this duty of the courts begins with the completed act of the legislature. It does not antedate it. The legislature is one of the three co-ordinate and co-equal departments into which the powers of government are divided by the constitution, possessing all legislative power and not subject to supervision and control during its performance of its constitutional functions, nor to judicial revision afterward of the manner in which it obeyed the constitution its members are sworn to support. From necessity the judicial department must judge of the conformity of legislative acts to the constitution, but what are legislative acts must be determined by what are authenticated as such according to the constitution.
That instrument [the constitution] contains many provisions as to the passage of bills which are admitted to be addressed to legislators exclusively, and for non-observance of which there is confessedly no remedy which courts can apply. Why should a distinction be drawn between the different provisions of the constitution, and some be held mandatory and others directory? There is no reason for such a distinction, and it is the offspring of a necessity borri of the error of regarding any of the provisions of the constitution addressed to and obligatory on the legislature as enforceable by the courts as supervisors of the legislature. The sound view, and that which avoids the inconsistency of the distinction mentioned, is to regard all of the provisions of the constitution as mandatory, and those regulating the legislative department as addressed to and mandatory to that body, and with which the courts have nothing to do in the way of revision of how the legislature has performed its duty in the matters confided exclusively to it by the constitution.
Wren, 63 Miss. at 533-34 (emphasis supplied). In Hunt, decided under the Constitution of 1890, the appellant argued that the dramshop and privilege tax chapters of the Code of 1892 were void, saying that they were not constitutionally adopted. This argument was based on several assertions including assertions of violation of the provision of Art. 4, § 68 of the 1890 Constitution mandating that no appropriation or revenue bill shall be passed during the last five days of the session. The Court, relying on Wren, held:
the legislature, as a co-ordinate department of the state government, invested by the constitution with legislative power, is not subject to supervision and revision by the courts as to those rules of procedure prescribed by the constitution for its observance, because, while those rules are all authoritative and mandatory to legislators, who are sworn to note and observe them, they exhaust themselves upon legislators, and are not for the consideration of courts....
Hunt, 70 Miss. at 303-04, 11 So. at 609 (emphasis in original). Thus, Hunt, as well as Wren, recognizes that procedural provisions for the operation of the Legislature — whether created by constitution, statute or rule adopted by the houses— should be left to the Legislature to apply and interpret, without judicial review. See also Barnes v. Ladner, 241 Miss. 606, 616, 131 So.2d 458, 461 (1961) ( wherein the Court, relying on Hunt, pointed out that Section 65, appearing in that part of the Constitution entitled "Rules of Procedure," Article 4, entitled "Legislative Department," is not for consideration of the courts).
¶ 8. The rule annunciated in these cases and refined by Dye is a statement of the well precedented and respected political question doctrine itself grounded in prudent judicial restraint. To stop the ongoing legislative process while seeking court decisions on the propriety of internal practices will do service to neither branch of government. As demonstrated by these cases, it is a mistake to draw distinctions, for present purposes, between rules adopted by the Senate itself and those which may be found in the Constitution for its management. Section 59 appears in the "Rules of Procedure" of Article 4 of the Constitution, and the rules of the Senate, whether internally generated or found in the Constitution, are addressed to the Senate where they must be interpreted and applied. Only where that body (or in this case, the President of the Senate who is, by its rules, vested with authority to make rulings on points of order) exercises the responsibility in a manifestly wrong manner which does critical harm to the legislative process is judicial intervention justified.
¶ 9. It is not necessary for the Court today to determine whether conference reports should be read at the request of a senator. Rather, our question is whether the ruling of the Lieutenant Governor was a grossly unreasonable interpretation of Section 59, and, if so, whether the legislative process suffered substantial harm from that ruling. Section 59 declares that "every bill shall be read in full immediately before the vote on its final passage upon the demand of any member." The Lieutenant Governor ruled Section 59 inapplicable to conference reports and here argues that this is so because, as used in the Constitution, bills , and conference reports are distinct.
¶ 10. Few words are necessary in addressing the question of whether, even if incorrect, the ruling resulted in damage to the legislative process. The senators have argued no such harm. They do not suggest that they or other senators were uninformed as to the text of either the bill or the conference report or that they had not been distributed; nor do they argue that there was confusion or misunderstanding of those texts or their import. Furthermore, as will be explained below, the Senate Rules themselves provide for reading of the final legislation at a later time, but prior to submission to the Governor.
¶ 11. The Mississippi Constitution of 1817 made no reference to joint conference committees or conference reports. Nevertheless, in 1817, the Legislature adopted Joint Rule 1 allowing the appointment of such committees as appropriate. Miss. Senate Journal 35-39 (1817). After the adoption of the 1890 Constitution, the two houses made use of conference committees and began taking action on conference reports. The Rules of Procedure appearing in Article 4 of the 1890 Constitution recognize conference reports as one of five distinct items upon which either house may act. These are bills, e.g., Miss. Const, art. 4, § 59; amendments to bills by one house when acted upon by the other house, id. § 62; reports of committees of conference, id. § 62; orders, votes and resolutions of both houses relating to matters not requiring the signature of the governor, id. § 60; and' measures, id. § 71. The rules establish a variety of different procedures applicable to each of the five, recognizing their different characters. The rules address matters such as the style, format and content of a bill, id. § 59, 67; where bills must be referred, id. § 74; amendments to bills, id. § 59-60; and the reading of bills, id. § 59. Significantly, none of those sections are made applicable to conference reports. They also prescribe practices for recording different types of votes separately and distinctly. Section 55 addresses recording votes on bills, while Section 62 addresses recording votes on conference reports.
¶ 12. A textual analysis of Section 59 also supports the conclusion that it is not applicable to conference reports. The section reads:
[b]ills may originate in either house, and be amended or rejected in the other, and every bill shall be read by its title on three (3) different days in each house, unless two-thirds 0é) of the house where the same is pending shall dispense with the rules; and every bill shall be read in full immediately before the vote on its final passage upon the demand of any member; and every bill, having passed both houses, shall be signed by the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives during the legislative session.
Miss, Const, art. 4, § 59 (1890) (emphasis supplied.) The references to "its title" and "its final passage," indicate that references are to a bill's title and passage — not to any other item brought before a house of the Legislature. Furthermore, the terms "passage" and "passed" are words of art applicable to bills, but not to conference reports which are not passed, but are rather "concurred in," "adopted," or "rejected." Id. § 62.
¶ 13. It is important to a proper understanding of Section 59 and its limited application to bills and not to conference reports to note' that the section allows a member of the house to insist on a reading in full "immediately before the vote on its [the bill's] final passage." The adoption of a conference report is not the final passage of the bill which was presented to conference and reported back to the houses. The conference report does not go directly to the Governor for signature. Rather, the house where the bill originated engrosses a final version of the bill based on reconciling the different provisions passed by the separate houses and the conference report. The bill is then certified and sent to the Joint Committee on Enrolled Bills. See Joint Rules of the Senate and the House, Rule 30. The Lieutenant Governor and the Speaker notify their members of the bill's enrollment, and the title to the bill is read. At that time, immediately before final passage, a member may have the bill read in full. Id. R. 31
¶ 14. With this background and understanding of the Rules of Procedure set out in the Constitution and the rules and practices adopted and current in the Senate, the Lieutenant Governor ruled on Senator Blackmon's point of order. It is impossible for us to say that her ruling was arbitrary or manifestly wrong.
II. Other errors occurred in the Chancery Court Proceedings.
¶ 15. Lieutenant Governor Tuck also argues that the proceedings in the chancery court were irregular and contrary to law. We agree. Although there are provisions to be found in our statutes and rules for expediting court proceedings as necessary to do justice, each of those shortcuts is in derogation of the general policy of allowing parties an opportunity to prepare and present their cases and is to be administered within strict limits. Between April 29 and May 1, 2000, when the Legislature was concluding its business for the session, the members of the legislative bodies and those presiding faced the greatest demands on their time and attention. Nevertheless, upon receiving the complaint in this action, the chancellor immediately issued a restraining order and set the matter for a hearing on merits for the following day at 1:30 p.m., and by 4:00 p.m. she issued a final declaratory judgment.
¶ 16. Under Rule 65(b) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, a temporary restraining order may be issued without notice, but only if "it clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit or verified complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss or damage will result to the applicant before the adverse party can be heard" and the applicant's attorney certifies "in writing the efforts, if any, which have been made to give the notice and the reason that notice should not be required." The complaint, although sworn to, merely asserts the violation of Section 59 as a violation of the plaintiffs' right and that they have no other remedies at law, and, in general terms that they will be irreparably injured unless the Lieutenant Governor is restrained from enforcing her rulings. Such a statement is not a clear and specific statement of irreparable injury. Nor does the complaint indicate any efforts to notify the Lieutenant Governor. While it does appear that, at the chancellor's direction, after the complaint was filed, the plaintiffs were directed to send word to the Lieutenant Governor of the proceedings, it is not clear that given the session-ending activities in the Senate she could reasonably be expected to respond quickly enough to present her side effectively.
¶ 17. In her temporary restraining order, issued at 7:40 p.m. on April 30, the chancellor set the matter for hearing on the merits at 1:30 p.m. the following day. The complaint asked for a writ of mandamus, temporary restraining order and a permanent injunction. The time span did not allow for an answer to the complaint, and upon the conclusion of the May 1 hearing of the merits, the chancellor issued her final order in which she declared that "[t]he Court does not deem it necessary to issue an injunction ., but instead will issue a declaratory judgment pursuant to Rule 57 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure." By this extraordinary action, a judgment was issued interpreting Section 59 contrary to the ruling of the Lieutenant Governor, without regard to M.R.C.P. 4 which requires the issuance of a summons by the clerk and service of process, or M.R.C.P. 12 which allows thirty days for service of an answer, and a timely hearing on the merits. The senators neither sought, nor could the Lieutenant Governor have reasonably expected that such relief would be granted pursuant to a restraining order setting the complaint for "hearing on the merits" eighteen hours after its issuance. Recognizing that the chancery court under M.R.C.P. 54(c) may grant relief not requested in the complaint, and that Rule 57(a) makes provision for expediting proceedings on declaratory judgment relief, in doing so the chancellor must keep in mind principles of fundamental fairness consistent with the relief granted. Here, if given such an opportunity to present her case in an orderly manner, the Lieutenant Governor might have saved the chancellor from error.
CONCLUSION
¶ 18. Our law recognizes the pernicious consequences of unwarranted intrusion by the judiciary into the legislative process, and we will in the absence of compelling justification leave disputes within the deliberative bodies as to their practices and procedures to be decided by those bodies. Here, the aggrieved senators should have followed their own procedures by appealing the ruling to the floor of the Senate for a prompt, efficient and informed decision. The abandonment of normal judicial processes, which the chancellor no doubt thought compelled by the rush of time and pressures of legislative deadlines, only confirms the wisdom of judicial restraint in cases such as this. The judgment of the chancery court is reversed, and judgment is rendered here for the Lieutenant Governor finally dismissing the senators' complaint and this civil action with prejudice.
¶ 19. REVERSED AND RENDERED.
SMITH, MILLS, WALLER and COBB, JJ., concur. DIAZ, J., specially concurs with separate written opinion. BANKS, P.J., dissents with separate written opinion. McRAE, P.J., and EASLEY, J., not participating.
. Recognizing the demands on our legislators, our Constitution exempts them from arrest, except as to serious crimes, during legislative sessions. Miss. Const, art. 4, § 48 (1890). We provide for continuance of litigation during legislative sessions if counsel in the case is a member of the Mississippi Legislature. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-9 (1991).