Case Name: Kenneth LEVET and Carol Ann Levet Lassere v. CALAIS & SONS, INC. and Acceptance Insurance Company
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1987-09-18
Citations: 514 So. 2d 153
Docket Number: No. 86-CA-724
Parties: Kenneth LEVET and Carol Ann Levet Lassere v. CALAIS & SONS, INC. and Acceptance Insurance Company.
Judges: Before KLIEBERT, BOWES, GAUDIN, WICKER and GOTHARD, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 514
Pages: 153–171

Head Matter:
Kenneth LEVET and Carol Ann Levet Lassere v. CALAIS & SONS, INC. and Acceptance Insurance Company.
No. 86-CA-724.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit.
Sept. 18, 1987.
Opinion Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part Sept. 24, 1987.
Rehearing Denied Nov. 17, 1987.
J.J. McKernan, McKeman & Taylor, Baton Rouge, for plaintiffs/appellees.
Dermot S. McGlinchey, Frederick R. Campbell, Lisa J. Miley, McGlinchey, Stafford, Mintz, Cellini & Lang, New Orleans, for defendants/appellants.
Thomas J. Grace, Beverly M. Klundt, Courtenay, Forstall, Grace & Hebert, New Orleans, for defendant/appellant, Calais & Sons, Inc.
Before KLIEBERT, BOWES, GAUDIN, WICKER and GOTHARD, JJ.

Opinion:
GOTHARD, Judge.
Defendants, Calais & Sons, Inc. (Calais) and its insurer, Acceptance Insurance Company (Acceptance) brought this suspensive appeal from a judgment rendered on a jury verdict. The judgment awarded to Kenneth Levet and Carol Ann Levet Lassere, plaintiffs, each $450,000 in general compensatory damages and $100,000 in exem plary damages for the wrongful death of their parents, Mr. and Mrs. Carroll Levet, together with reimbursement of $9,187.66 in funeral expenses. Defendants-appellants contend the general damage award is excessive and the exemplary damage award is improper. Additionally, Acceptance, over Calais' objections made in a brief filed in this court, urges an amendment to the judgment to restrict its liability to the policy limits of $500,000 per occurrence. For the reasons which follow we revise the judgment to correct mathematical errors, to reduce the compensatory damage awards, and to limit Acceptance's liability to its policy provisions and, as revised, affirm the judgment.
This wrongful death action arises out of an automobile accident which occurred in Vacherie, Louisiana on June 27,1985, when a vehicle driven southbound on La. Highway 3127 by Darryl Richoux, an employee of Calais, proceeded into the wrong lane of traffic, through a stop sign and flashing red warning light at the intersection of La. Highway 20, a favored street, and struck a westbound vehicle broadside occupied by Mr. and Mrs. Carroll Levet. Richoux and the Levets died instantly. Two passengers in the Richoux vehicle, Jimmy LaFont and Kelly St. Amant, employees of Calais, were injured. At trial, due to the defendants' failure to file an answer to plaintiffs' request for admissions of fact, the funeral expenses of Mr. and Mrs. Levet were fixed at $9,182.66 and the following facts were deemed admitted: At the time of the accident, Richoux was acting within the course and scope of his employment and the vehicle he was operating was owned by Calais and covered under a policy of liability insurance issued by Acceptance. Further, Richoux had been instructed to use the vehicle to bring employees from the job location of that day to their homes and Calais had not employed independent drivers to perform this function even though Richoux had discussed with company supervisors the desirability of doing so because on a previous occasion he had almost fallen asleep while driving a vehicle after long hours of work.
Further, at the commencement of the trial the following stipulation was entered into:
"MR. McKERNAN: It's my understanding, Your Honor, that the Defendants have stipulated to liability in this case and fault, as the Defendant, Calais & Sons, Inc., and that the sole and approximate cause of the accident was caused through the negligence of Darryl Richeux and also as to Calais & Sons, Inc.
JUDGE MIRE: Is that your understanding of the stipulation, Mr. Rossi?
MR. GROSSEL-ROSSI: Your Honor, we talked about it—
MR. McKERNAN: We talked about it last night.
JUDGE MIRE: We talked about it last night and—
MR. GROSSEL-ROSSI: If we allowed them to agree to this, all I'm saying is we simply would have to go back to the jury charges against Calais and Sons. We don't need for them to testify here.
JUDGE MIRE: That's the stipulation, admitting liability as to Calais & Sons, and also that the approximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the driver.
MR. GROSSELr-ROSSI: Yes, sir. Will you stipulate to that?
MR. McKERNAN: As to Acceptance Insurance Company's policy is the policy of five hundred thousand dollar limits, single coverage? Yes. Yes, I'll stipulate to that. I'm going to introduce it into evidence, anyway,—
MR. GROSSEL-ROSSI: I thought you would. I just wanted to make sure.
MR. McKERNAN: —because—yes, I'll stipulate to that, yes.
MR. GROSSEL-ROSSI: I didn't want to—
JUDGE MIRE: Let's show he stipulates to that fact.
MR. McKERNAN: And we also — it was part of the Admissions, also; it's stipulated that the policy was in full force and effect at the time of the accident; is that correct?
JUDGE MIRE: That's also stipulated to? MR. GROSSEL-ROSSI: Yes."
The plaintiffs' suit sought a recovery of $9,182.66 for funeral expenses, $300,000 for each plaintiff in general damages for the loss of love and affection, paternal com-pansionship, grief, mental anguish and suffering for each parent, and $1,000,000 in exemplary damages under the provisions of La.C.C. art. 2315.4. In light of the stipulations as to liability and causation, and the amount of funeral expenses, the only issues submitted to the jury were the amount of compensatory damages, and the sufficiency of evidence for an award of exemplary damages, plus the amount of same. The jury returned a verdict on the interrogatories set up by the court and accepted by the litigants' counsel as follows:
"I. In terms of dollars, how much in total damages did the plaintiffs sustain as a result of this accident? You may or may not find that the plaintiffs suffered damages in one or more of the following categories, but each blank must be filled in, either with a dollar amount, or with a '0' if you find no damage for a particular category.
KENNETH LEVET for the death of his father, Carroll Levet:
Loss of love and affection Past and fu-ta) ture $75,000.00
Loss of parental compansionship, Past
(b) and future $75,000.00
(c) Grief, mental anguish and suffering $75,000.00
(d) Funeral expenses $ 9,185.66
CAROLE ANN LEVET LASSERE for the death of her father, Carroll Joseph Levet:
(a) Loss of love and affection Past and fu-
ture $75,000.00
(b) Loss of parental compansionship Past
and future $75,000.00
(c) Grief, mental anguish and suffering $75,000.00
(d) Funeral expenses $ —
KENNETH LEV.ET for the death of his mother, Pearl Levet:
(a)Loss of love and affection Past and future $75,000.00
(b) Loss of parental compansionship, Past and future $75,000.00
(c) Grief, mental anguish and suffering $75,000.00
(d) Funeral expenses $ —
CAROLE ANN LEVET LASSERE for the death of her mother, Pearl Levet:
(a) Loss of love and affection, Past and future $75,000.00
(b) Loss of parental companionship Past and future $75,000.00
(c) Grief, mental anguish and suffering $75,000.00
(d) Funeral expenses $ —
II. Was Darryl A. Richoux, at the time of the accident operating the defendant, Calais and Son's, Inc. vehicle while under the influence of alcohol?
✓ YES _NO
III. Was Darryl A. Richoux's intoxication a legal cause of plaintiffs' damages?
✓ YES _NO
IV. What are the amounts of exemplary damages to be awarded?
(a) Kenneth Levet $100,000.00
(b) Carole Ann Levet Lassere $100,000.00"
On appeal the' defendants contend the compensatory damage award was clearly excessive and influenced by improper instructions and interrogatories submitted to the jury. The jury instruction to which defendants object was as follows:
"In estimating the damages of Kenneth Levet and Carol Ann Levet Lassere, you may take into consideration the following elements; Number One, loss of love and affection, past and future; [Number Two], loss of parental companionship, past and future; Number Three, funeral and burial expenses; Number Four, grief, mental anguish and suffering; Number Five, exemplary damages."
Since the jury interrogatories listed each of the above enumerated elements of damages, and the jury awarded each plaintiff $75,000 each of elements one, two, and four for a total of $225,000 for each parent, defendants argue that the "fragmentation" of the award for a single damage, i.e., loss of society, into three separate categories resulted in triple recovery.
We first note that defendants failed to object to the jury instructions despite being asked if there were any objections thereto, and the record does not reflect any objections to the form of the interrogate- ríes. La.C.C.P. art. 1793 provides, inter alia, that a party may not assign as error the giving or failure to give an instruction unless he objects thereto before the jury retires and states the grounds of his objection. In Lilly v. Conoco, Inc., 463 So.2d 28 (La.App. 6th Cir.1985) writ denied 464 So.2d 1382, this court refused to consider alleged errors concerning assertedly incorrect and confusing charges where the defendant failed to object at trial, noting that to do otherwise would contravene the law and jurisprudence of this state and allow a party "two bites at the apple." The requirement that an objection be lodged before the jury retires has been extended to interrogatories, and the failure to do so constitutes a waiver of objections provided the parties were given an opportunity to object. See St. Pierre v. General Am. Transp. Corp., 360 So.2d 695 (La.App. 4th Cir.1978) writ denied 362 So.2d 1386.
Moreover, plaintiffs were entitled to be compensated for the mental pain, suffering and distress, and loss of love, affection and companionship as a result of the death of their parents. See Duvemay v. St., Through Dept, of Pub. Safety, 433 So.2d 254 (La.App. 1st Cir.1983) writ denied 440 So.2d 150 and Meche v. Gulf States Utilities Co., 444 So.2d 137 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1983). Thus, even though itemization of compensatory damages into its segregate elements rather than an in globo award is not required and here may have caused overlapping and hence duplication, as defendants contend, such itemization was not a mistake which by itself would make the total award excessive. See Guillory v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 448 So.2d 1281 (La.1984) and Bishop v. Shelter Ins. Co., 461 So.2d 1170 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1984) writ denied 465 So.2d 737.
Having found no error in defendants' assigned error as to the jury instructions and interrogatories which requires our appellate review, we turn to the matter of quantum.
In wrongful death cases involving a parent, awards to minor children have traditionally been greater than awards to major children. For example, awards to minor children range from $25,000 to $225,-000, with most of these awards being at $40,000 and $100,000; awards to major children range from $20,000 to $75,000 with no specific concentration. The $225,000 awarded here greatly exceeds the highest prior award approved by a Louisiana appellate court for the loss of a major child's parent. Even when we take into account the trauma sustained by plaintiffs as a result of the double loss they suffered in a single disaster, we consider that the award is so disproportionately high as to be an abuse of the discretion of the jury and is clearly wrong. Under Louisiana jurisprudence, where the appellate court has found an award to be clearly erroneous, it may lower the award to the highest point which is reasonably within its discretion. Coco v. Winston Industries, Inc., 341 So.2d 332 (La.1977). However, we point out that there is no recent case for comparison with ours where the children, though adults and married with children, were living in such a close relationship with their parents. It can truly be said that these major children were not only close to their parents, but also that the family was still intact, living together as a single family unit.
Mr. Levet was 67 and Mrs. Levet was 66 years of age at the time of their deaths. Their children, Kenneth and Carol Ann, were 33 and 40 years of age, respectively. The testimony adduced at trial established that an exceptionally close relationship existed within the family throughout their lives. A videotape of photographs from the early years depicted family outings and special events. Early in their marriage Carol Ann and her husband lived with her parents until her father built them a home next door. Carol Ann spoke with her mother daily. Mrs. Levet helped Carol Ann around her home and beauty shop, and Carol Ann cut, styled and fashioned both her mother's and father's hair. Kenneth likewise after marriage moved next door to his parents' home and continued to see them every day. He and his father habitually helped each other on projects around their respective homes and with yard work and gardening. Kenneth frequently sought advice and guidance from his father in dealing with the everyday problems of life. The entire family ate many meals together and socialized together. All holidays were spent together, and weekends were frequently highlighted by barbeques and seafood boils with close friends. Kenneth and Carol Ann lost not only their parents but a way of life to which they had been accustomed since childhood.
The sudden and untimely deaths of both parents had a dramatic impact on the mental state of both Kenneth and Carol Ann. Both became withdrawn and lost interest in social activities which they had previously enjoyed. Both suffered from depression and grief, Carol Ann to the point of telling her husband several times that life was no longer worth living. Close friends and family members who consoled Kenneth and Carol Ann noted an improvement over their immediate conditions but felt it would be a long time before they recovered from the grief and anguish associated with the loss of their parents.
After consideration of all of these factors and prior awards for the loss of a parent where the family was intact, we revise the judgment and reduce the awards to plaintiffs for the loss of both parents to $200,-000 per child.
We next turn our attention to the exemplary damage award, which defendants contend was erroneous for the following reasons: (1) plaintiffs failed to prove Ri-choux was intoxicated at the time of the accident; (2) the policies .of deterrence and retribution which support Civil Code article 2315.4 are not furthered by the imposition of punitive damages against a deceased driver or an employer who is merely vicariously liable for the plaintiffs' injuries; and (3) there is no factual basis to support the amount of the award as plaintiffs presented no evidence of defendant Calais' wealth and invited the jury to speculate on the range of punitive damages. In response to defendants' arguments, plaintiffs contend: (1) the unrestricted stipulation to vicarious liability and proximate cause of the accident was a judicial confession which precludes defendants from questioning their liability for exemplary damages, or, in the alternative, the evidence supports the jury's determination -that Richoux was intoxicated; (2) the circumstances of the case warrant the imposition of exemplary damages against Calais; and (3) the evidence was sufficient for the trier of facts to determine the amount of exemplary damages which should be awarded.
As we view our duty in the present case, it is not to judge, as we are urged by the defendants, the philosophical pros and cons of assessing exemplary damages against one whose only liability for the injuries sustained is vicarious. We find Calais' liability was justified on the basis of its own culpable behavior, which we believe contributed to this accident: Richoux's supervisor bought the alcohol for their consumption on the drive home from work. In addition, Richoux had previously requested that defendant hire independent drivers to bring employees from the job location to their homes. He had reported to his supervisor that he feared that his fatigue would cause an accident. See, Bolin, "Enter Exemplary Damages," 32 La.Bar Journal 216 (1984).
Without objection by defendants the court first instructed the jury that defendant Calais had admitted to fault and liability for the injuries. The court thereafter instructed the jury as to the standard of proof required before the jury could make an exemplary damage award. Finally, the jury was instructed as to the factors to consider on the amount of the award if they found the evidence was sufficient for an award of exemplary damages.
In R.J. D'Hemecourt Petroleum v. McNamara, 444 So.2d 600 (La.1983) the Supreme Court at page 601 stated the legal effect of a stipulation as follows:
"A stipulation has the effect of a judicial admission or confession, which binds all parties and the court. Placid Oil Company v. A.M. Dupont Corporation, 244 La. 1075, 156 So.2d 44 (1963). Stipulations between the parties in a specific case are binding on the trial court when not in derogation of law. Wickliffe v. Cooper and Sperrier, 161 La. 417, 108 So. 791 (1926)."
As defendants admitted to vicarious liability without distinguishing between compensatory and exemplary damages, they are now precluded from raising the issue. The only questions before us are whether the plaintiffs have proven the facts necessary for the jury to award exemplary damages and, if so, whether the award made by the jury is excessive under the circumstances of the case.
La.C.C. art. 2315.4 provides:
"In addition to general and special damages, exemplary damages may be awarded upon proof that the injuries on which the action is based were caused by a wanton or reckless disregard for the rights and safety of others by a defendant whose intoxication while operating a motor vehicle was a cause in fact of the resulting injuries."
In order to prove that a person is incapable of operating a motor vehicle by reason of intoxication, it need not be shown that he was drunk, but only that he had a sufficient quantity of intoxicants to make him lose normal control of his mental and physical faculties. Jones v. Continental Casualty Co. of Chicago, III., 246 La. 921, 169 So.2d 50 (1964); Richard v. American Home Assurance Co., 318 So.2d 613 (La. App. 3rd Cir.1975) writ denied 322 So.2d 779; Matthews v. All American Assurance Co., 226 So.2d 181 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1969) writ denied 228 So.2d 483.
The evidence showed Richoux was familiar with Highway 3127 and its intersection with Highway 20 in Vacherie. It was a clear day, and the intersection had a flashing red light and a stop sign for traffic traveling south on Highway 3127. Ri-choux was driving about 60 miles per hour immediately prior to the collision. However, he inexplicably entered into the opposite lane of traffic of La. 3127 and paid no heed to the stop sign or flashing red light as he continued through the intersection and hit the Levet vehicle broadside. The evidence also established, that the three occupants of the Calais vehicle had consumed all of one six pack of beer; that by the time of the collision at least one occupant had consumed two beers from the second six pack and Richoux had consumed "some" of the beer from the second six pack; and that the beer was consumed during the trip from Port Allen to Vacher-ie, approximately one hour in duration.
Based on this evidence the jury concluded that Richoux's actions of driving in the wrong lane of traffic and of disregarding the stop sign and light constituted a "wanton or reckless disregard for the rights and safety of others", and that the actions were attributable to Richoux's intoxication while operating the motor vehicle. A review of the record evidence convinces us that the jury's conclusion that Richoux was intoxicated at the time of the accident is not clearly wrong, and therefore we will not disturb it. See Arceneaux v. Domingue, 365 So.2d 1330 (La.1978). Likewise, we find no "clear abuse" of discretion by the jury in setting the amount of the award at $100,000 per child. Accordingly, the award of $100,000 per child in exemplary damages is affirmed.
The final issue to be addressed arises out of Acceptance's request that the judgment be amended to reflect that it is liable in solido with Calais only to the extent of the policy limits, i.e., $500,000, and to cast Calais individually liable for the excess. Calais is joined by plaintiffs in opposing the request on the grounds that:
(1) Acceptance failed to expressly plead its policy limits and nonliability in solido;
(2) Acceptance failed to object in the trial court by seeking a new trial, an amendment of the judgment, a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or a remit-titur and hence waived the right to raise the issue on appeal;
(3) Under the terms of the policy Acceptance is liable for all post-trial interest on the entire judgment even should the applicable policy limits be recognized;
(4) Acceptance failed to notify Calais that it was subject to uninsured liability exposure for which it had the right to retain separate counsel, and therefore Acceptance is estopped from denying coverage for the entirety of Calais' exposure.
In a joint answer to the plaintiffs' petition counsel representing both Acceptance and Calais stated:
"Acceptance admits that it had issued one certain policy of liability insurance to Calais, but avers that said policy is a written contract, and as such is the best proof of its own terms, coverages, limitations, liabilities, warrantees and exclusions, and therefore pleads said policy as if copied in extenso."
One of the enumerated facts deemed admitted because defendants failed to respond to the request for admissions of facts was that the limit of the Acceptance policy was $500,000. Additionally, the policy itself, which reflects the $500,000 limit, was stipulated to and admitted into evidence. Thus, the contention that Acceptance failed to expressly plead its policy limits is eontra-dieted by the record evidence and hence is meritless. Acceptance is solidarity liable with Calais but subject to the limits of the policy. See Fertitta v. Allstate Insurance Co., 462 So.2d 159 (La.1985), particularly fn. 4; Addison v. Travelers Insurance Co., 281 So.2d 805 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1973), writ denied 283 So.2d 499.
Since the error is not in the verdict but rather in the judgment entered on the verdict, neither a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, nor a remittitur are proper vehicles to correct it. As the error is substantive in nature, the trial court could not amend the judgment to correct it after passage of time to apply for a new trial, and a motion for a new trial is discretionary rather than mandatory. Thus, the failure of Acceptance to raise this issue in the trial court does not preclude consideration of the issue on appeal.
The contention that Acceptance is liable for all post-judgment interest is well founded. LSA-R.S. 13:4203 provides that legal interest on all judgments "sounding in damages 'ex delicto' " shall be due from date of judicial demand. The liability policy issued by Acceptance included the following clause:
"II. SUPPLEMENTARY PAYMENTS The company will pay, in addition to the applicable limit of liability:
(a) All expenses incurred by the company, all costs taxed against the insured in any suit defended by the company and all interest on the entire amount of any judgment therein which accrues after entry of the judgment and before the company had paid or tendered or deposited in court that part of the judgment which does not exceed the limit of the company's liability thereon;"
The Supreme Court has determined that such policy provisions do not insulate an insurance company from the payment of judicial interest on judgments within its policy limits. See Soprano v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 246 La. 524,165 So.2d 308 (1964). And in Doty v. Central Mutual Insurance Co., 186 So.2d 328 (1st Cir.1966) writ denied 187 So.2d 451, the court, in interpreting a policy provision identical to that quoted above, held the insurer responsible for interest on the amount in excess of its policy limits only from entry of the judgment. The court found that the purpose of the provision was to protect the insured from interest expense resulting from the insurer's decision to appeal the judgment, which would effectively preclude the insured from immediately satisfying the judgment. See also Glazer v. Louisiana Trailer Sales, Inc., 313 So.2d 266 (La.App. 4th Cir.1975) writ not considered 318 So.2d 47. Accordingly, we hold that Acceptance is responsible for all post-judgment interest on the entire judgment.
We decline to address the issue raised as concerns any breach of duties owed by Acceptance to Calais as arguments on the issue are based on facts which the parties readily admit are outside the record. These issues are properly raised in separate proceedings between the insurer and the insured.
Finally, we note that both the judgment and the verdict reflect an award for funeral expenses in the amount of $9,187.66; whereas, it was admitted that the expense was $9,182.66. Accordingly, we revise the judgment to reflect the proper sum.
In conclusion and recapitulation we revise the judgment to provide that: (1) the joint and in solido liability of the defendants Calais & Sons, Inc. and Acceptance Insurance Company is subject to the limits of coverage contained in the policy with post-judgment interest on the entire judgment to be paid by Acceptance Insurance Company; (2) the award for funeral expenses is revised to $9,182.66 as per the admissions of the parties; and (3) the compensatory damage awards in favor of plaintiffs for the death of both parents is reduced to $200,000 per child and, as thus revised, the judgment is affirmed. All costs are to be borne by the defendants.
REVISED AND, AS REVISED, AFFIRMED.
KLIEBERT, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
BOWES, J., concurs in part and dissents in part and assigns written reasons.
GAUDIN, J., affirming in part and dissenting in part.
. The award to Carol Levet Lassere is stated in the judgment to be $255,000. This is an apparent typing error.
. See La.C.C.P. arts. 1467 and 1468; Larkin v. First Georgia Underwriters, 466 So.2d 655 (La. 514 So.2d — 6 App. 5th Cir.1985).
. See, Hellmers v. Dept, of Transp. & Development, 503 So.2d 174 (La.App. 4 Cir.1987); Thomas v. State Farm Ins. Co., 499 So.2d 562 (La.App. 2 Cir.1986), and cases cited therein; McQuarters v. Zegar, 466 So.2d 579 (La.App. 5 Cir.1985).
. The defendants stipulated to liability for all damages proven by plaintiffs (plaintiffs' petition requested and itemized compensatory and exemplary damages) without distinction between exemplary and compensatory damages.
. In his charge to the jury the trial judge: (1) read Civil Code article 2315.4; (2) informed the jury that the purpose of exemplary damages is to punish the wrongdoer and deter the kind of conduct involved; and (3) informed the jury that the factors to be considered in setting the amount of the award were the nature and extent of harm to the plaintiff, the wealth or financial situation of the defendant, and the extent to which the defendant's conduct offends a sense of justice and propriety.
. We specifically do not address the issue whether Acceptance should be held liable in solido for that portion of plaintiffs' recovery against defendant Calais attributable to punitive damages, since Acceptance did not raise this issue in the trial court or on appeal. Compare, Northwestern National Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (1962).