Case Name: Charles E. Hadcock, as Executor, etc., of Emmanuel Hadcock, Deceased, Respondent, v. Luman Osmer, Appellant
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1896-04
Citations: 4 A.D. 435
Docket Number: 
Parties: Charles E. Hadcock, as Executor, etc., of Emmanuel Hadcock, Deceased, Respondent, v. Luman Osmer, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 4
Pages: 435–439

Head Matter:
Charles E. Hadcock, as Executor, etc., of Emmanuel Hadcock, Deceased, Respondent, v. Luman Osmer, Appellant.
Deceit — a writing stating that proposed borrowers tin fact insolvent) are solvent — it presents a question, of fraudulent intent or of mere opinion — sucha paper addressed generally to any one of a family protects the one loaning the money — survival of the cause of action.
Upon, the trial of . an action brought to recover damages for deceit, it appeared that Delos and Joseph Brown desired to borrow some money of parties named Hadcock, and that, after negotiations, they communicated the fact to the defendant, who, to induce the Hadcocks to make the loan, signed an instrument, of which the following is a copy: “ Mr. Hadcock: The Browns are good for what money you let them have. L. Osmer.” One of the Haddocks, relying on these representations, loaned the money to the Browns upon their promissory note, which was not paid at maturity, and an execution issued upon a judgment recovered thereon was returned unsatisfied. The Browns were insolvent when the representations were made by the defendant and when the loan was made by Emmanuel Hadcock, whose executor brought the action.
The jury were instructed that, if the instrument signed by the defendant contained a mere expression of opinion, the plaintiff could not recover.
Meld, that the instruction was proper, and that the verdict should be sustained;
That, as the cause of action was one arising out of an attempt to cheat or defraud the deceased, it was for an injury to a property right and survived to the estate of the testator;
That it was not erroneous to admit in evidence the judgment recovered against the Browns and the execution issued upon it and the return of the sheriff nulla bona, as they showed the efforts made by the testator to collect his debt, and were competent to establish the insolvency of the Browns;
'That, as the paper was merely addressed to “Mr. Hadcock,” it was proper for the court to leave it to the jury to say whether it was not intended to be deliv ered to any. one of the Hadcock family who was willing to loan the money to the Browns;
That if the jury found that to be the case, and that the paper was not a mere' expression of opinion, and found that Emmanuel Hadcock loaned the money upon the strength of the paper, his executor was entitled to recover;
That, while there must have been an intent upon the part of the defendant to cheat and defraud the person to whom the paper was delivered, it Was immaterial of the fact to which particular member of the Hadcock family it was delivered.
' Appeal by the defendant, Luman Osmer, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Jefferson oil the 18th day of October,, 1895, upon the verdict of a jury rendered after a trial at the Jefferson Circuit, and also from an order entered in said clerk’s office on the 29fh day of October, 1895, denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial made upon the minutes.
The verdict of the .jury was for $569.80 damages.
On' the 15th of September, 1888, Delos and Joseph Brown desired to borrow some money of the Hadcocks, Benjamin and-Emmanuel, or either of them, and after a negotiation for the money they communicated their negotiation to the defendant; and the complaint alleges that the defendant, to induce Hadcock to make the loan sought for by the Browns, “ falsely and fraudulently made and delivered to said Hadcock, in writing, an instrument of which the following is a copy :■ ‘ Hr. Hadcock : The Browns are good for what money you let them have. L. Osmer.’ ”. That instrumént. was taken to Hr. Hadcock, and it is alleged that lie,. “ relying on said representations, loaned to the. said Delos. Brown and Joseph Brown, the persons named in said instrument signed by the said defendant, the sum of $400, and took their promissory note, therefor, bearing date on'the day last aforesaid, payable in-one year from' date, with interest.” It was. alleged in the complaint and proven on the trial that Hadcock recovered a judgment on the note and issued an execution thereon against the Browns, which was returned by the sheriff of Jefferson county wholly unsatisfied. If is also alleged that the Browns were insolvent “ at the time the said Hadcock made the said loan as aforesaid, and at the time the said representations Were made by the said defendant!”
The answer consists of denials and an admission of' the death of Emmanuel Hadcock, and an admission of the execution of the instrument set out in the complaint.
W. M. Rogers, for the appellant.
Henry Purcell, for the respondent.

Opinion:
Hardin, P. J.:
After the .defendant executed the instrument wherein he stated that " the Browns are good for what money you let them have " it was taken by the Browns to Emmanuel Hadcock, one of the three brothers, and the loan obtained from him mentioned in the complaint. The evidence given at the trial sustains the essential allegations of fact found by the jury. The jury were instructed that, if the instrument contained a mere expression of opinion, the plaintiff could not recover. And they were instructed in respect'to the law relating to fraudulent misrepresentations, and we see no occasion to disturb their verdict on the ground that the same is not sustained by the evidence.
The charge, when considered in all its features, together with the requests of the defendant assented to, stated the law substantially as it is laid down in Kountze v. Kennedy (147 N. Y. 124) and Marsh v. Falker (40 id. 567).
(2) There is no force in the objection that the cause of action did not survive to the estate of the testator. At the close of the opinion in Brackett v. Griswold (103 N. Y. 428) Finch, J., said : " So far as the cause of action was for a conspiracy to cheat or defraud the intestate, it was for an injury to a property right, and did not die with its owner." A similar doctrine was laid down by the General Term of the fifth department in Moore v. McKinstry (37 Hun, 194).
(3) It was not error to receive the judgment recovered against the Browns and the execution issued thereon, and the return of the sheriff nulla bona. They were competent evidence to show the efforts made by the creditor to collect the debt of the Browns and also to establish their insolvency. (Hatch v. Spooner, 1 App. Div. 408.)
(4) We think there is no force in the contention of the defendant that the instrument executed by him and addressed to Hr. Hadcock, was presented to and acted upon by Emmanuel Hadcock instead of Benjamin. When the conversation..was held with the defendant there was a reference made to the Hadcocks without a clear specification as to which one would be able to loan the money. The defendant had suggested that perhaps the money might be borrowed, of Benjamin Hadcock. It is inferable from the evidence that the Hadcocks belonging to the same family, resided' together, and the, conversation was to the effect that" one of the Hadcocks would' be able to loan the money, .and the judge in the course of his charge said.: "If it was understood by-the defendant that there was a proposition to borrow of one or more Hadcocks, apd lie set out, a general, paper, addressed to Mr. Hadcock, why then you can say whether it was not fairly intended to. ' be delivered to such person • of the family as would loan the money; and, if that is true, it is not essential that it should appear to you that it had been determined, at the time the paper was drawn, that the loan should be from one or the other. If yon find that fairly the meaning, intention and design of the parties was that whoever loaned the money should have this paper presented to him,, then.it may be fairly said that the representation was made to' whoever did loan the money of those persons." The charge in that regard was as favorable as the defendant was entitled to.
Upon a careful inspection of the other exceptions found in the appeal book the conclusion is reached that they present no error calling for an'interference with the verdict of the jury.
Hear the close of the requests to charge the judge yielded to one,; which instructed the jury that there can be no recovery " unless it, be proven or be found that there was ail actual purpose or intent om the part "of the defendant on the 15th day of" September, 188.8, to defraud Emmanuel Hadcock of" his property.' To that request the judge replied, "Tes, I charge. that;and. then he added, "Of course that is in connection with what ,1 have already charged,, that it was not necessary it should have been determined when he made the paper, before they got the money, as to which of the Hadcocks it was to go to,, but there must have been an intention to cheat and defraud the person to whom this, paper should be delivered, the one, or the ótheh" ' We think the exception to the charge as given, and to the refusal of certain requests, do not present any error.
The judge seems to have delivered in the body of his charge, and. in his qualifications made subsequent to the delivery of the principal part of his charge, the law as favorable as the defendant was entb tied to have the" same delivered to the jury.
The foregoing views lead to the conclusion that the verdict should, be sustained.
All concurred, except Ward, J., not sitting.
Judgment and order affirmed, with costs.