Case Name: P. J. STOFFELS v. GEORGE J. BROWN, as Sheriff of Stark County, North Dakota
Court: North Dakota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: North Dakota
Decision Date: 1917-03-03
Citations: 37 N.D. 272
Docket Number: 
Parties: P. J. STOFFELS v. GEORGE J. BROWN, as Sheriff of Stark County, North Dakota.
Judges: Bruce, Oh. J., and Grace, J. I concur in the above opinion.
Reporter: North Dakota Reports
Volume: 37
Pages: 272–283

Head Matter:
P. J. STOFFELS v. GEORGE J. BROWN, as Sheriff of Stark County, North Dakota.
(163 N. W. 834.)
Personal property — mortgage on — bill of sale —estoppel —waiver— agency — jurisprudence — maxim of — act of third person — one of two innocent persons — negligent one must suffer.
It is a maxim of jurisprudence, when one of two innocent persons must suffer by the act of a third, he by whose negligence it happened must be the sufferer.
Opinion filed March 3, 1917.
Rehearing denied July 10, 1917.
Appeal from the District Court of Stark County, Honorable W. C. ■Crawford, Judge.
Affirmed.
Linde & Murphy and M. L McBride, for appellant.
A mortgagee can no doubt waive the mortgage by his conduct, but in this case there is not the slightest legal or other evidence to show a waiver, by acts or conduct, and in addition there is the direct and positive evidence of the mortgagee that he did not waive his mortgage, but expected it to be paid out of the proceeds of the sale to be consummated in his office. New England Mortg. Seeur. Co. v. Great Western Elevator Co. 6 N. D. 407, 71 N. W. 130.
There must be a showing of either direct or implied consent to waive the mortgage. Peterson v. St. Anthony & D. Elevator Co. 9 N. D. 55, 81 Am. St. Rep. 528, 81 N. W. 59; Driscoll v. Murphy, 59 Neb. 210, 80 N. W. 813; Seymour v. Cargill Elevator Co. 6 N. D. 444, 71 N. W. 132; Trabuc v. Wade, — Tex. Civ. App. —, 95 S. W. 616; Bowman v. Eppinger, 1 N. D. 21, 44 N. W. 1000.
There being no evidence of waiver or release of the mortgage in this ease, there was question of fact in such connection to be submitted to the jury; and the court should have directed a verdict for defendant, or defendant’s motion for a new trial should have been granted. State Bank v. Bismarck Elevator & Invest. Co. 31 N. D. 102, 153 N. W. 459; Jones, Ev. p. 906; Star Wagon Co. v. Matthiessen, 3 Dak. 233, 14 N. W. 107; Dickinson v. Ilahn, 23 S. D. 65, 119 N. W. 1034; Lowry v. Piper, 20 N. D. 637, 127 N. W. 1046.
F. E. McGurdy and H. E. Haney, for respondent.
A mortgagee may waive his mortgage by his silence, his acts and conduct, or by oral declarations. Whether or not he does so in any contested case, and where this is a material and disputed matter, is very properly a question for the jury, and the trial court committed no error in submitting such question to the jury, and there being substantial evidence to sustain the verdict, it should not be disturbed. Simmons v. McConville, 19 N. D. 793, 125 N. W. 304.
Plaintiff had actual notice of the mortgage when he purchased the property of the mortgagor, but he insisted that this be cared for, and was told by the mortgagor that he had authority from the mortgagee to sell and would procure and execute a bill of sale, which he thereafter did, and it appears that the bill of sale was drawn and witnessed by the mortgagee. New England Mortg. Co. v. Great Western Elevator Co. 6 N. D. 407, 71 N. W. 130; Peterson v. St. Anthony & D. Elevator Co. 9 N. D. 55, 81 Am. Sti Hep. 528, 81 N. W. 59; Seymour v. Cargill Elevator Co. 6 N. D. 444, 71 N. W. 132; 2 C. J. 594; Equitable Loan & Secur. Co. v. Lewman, 3 L.B.A.(N.S.) 879 and note, 124 Ga. 190, 52 S. E. 599; Golding v. Brennan, 183 Mass. 286, 67 N. E. 239.
An agent has implied authority to do whatever is usual and necessary in the particular transaction in which he is engaged, and where one has authority to sell and deliver property, he has authority to collect the purchase money. 2 C. J. pp. 595, 600, §§ 231, 234.

Opinion:
Robinson, J.
This is a suit against Mr. Brown, the sheriff of Stark county, to recover possession of personal property — a gray mare and colt — taken by him under a mortgage made by one Kramehuck.
As the complaint and the evidence shows, the plaintiff purchased the property in good faith for the sum of $175, receiving a bill of sale made by the mortgagor and owner of the property, and written, witnessed, and acknowledged by M. L. McBride, who now claims the property under a chattel mortgage. The bill of sale shows payment by P. J. Stoffels; it conveys the property to P. J. Stoffels; it grants title to P. J. Stoffels; it delivers the property to P. J. Stoffels. Four times, his name is written in the bill of sale by the same McBride who now seeks to avoid the bill of sale by him written, witnessed, and acknowledged as a notary public. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff and against McBride, and he appeals, claiming that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the verdict. It is claimed there is no testimony showing that McBride had waived his mortgage lien or consented to a sale of the property without payment of the purchase price to him, but on this point the bill of sale was sufficient evidence to justify the verdict of the jury. It is in the usual form. It is signed by the mortgagor of McBride; it is in the handwriting of McBride; it discloses property included in his mortgage; it is witnessed by M. L. McBride; it is acknowledged by him as a notary public and given under his official seal. In the bill of sale the name of P. J. Stoffels is written four times by the hand and pen of McBride, and the writing appears to be that of a competent business man. If he did not trust his mortgagor to deliver the bill of sale and to receive the purchase price of the mare and colt, it were easy for him to have written in the bill of sale: "The purchase price must be paid to M. L. McBride." It is a maxim of jurisprudence that where one of two innocent parties must suffer for the act of a third, he by whose negligence it happened must be the sufferer. The bill of sale was a power of attorney to the mortgagor to deliver the bill of sale and to receive the purchase money. The judgment of the District Court is clearly correct, and it is affirmed.