Case Name: STATE of Louisiana, Appellee v. Melvin Dewayne PUGH, Appellant
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 2005-11-02
Citations: 914 So. 2d 1183
Docket Number: No. 40,287-KA
Parties: STATE of Louisiana, Appellee v. Melvin Dewayne PUGH, Appellant.
Judges: Before BROWN, GASKINS and MOORE, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 914
Pages: 1183–1186

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana, Appellee v. Melvin Dewayne PUGH, Appellant.
No. 40,287-KA.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
Nov. 2, 2005.
Mary Constance Hanes, Louisiana Appellate Project, for Appellant.
J. Schuyler Marvin, District Attorney, Matthew Altimus Assistant District Attorney, for Appellee.
Before BROWN, GASKINS and MOORE, JJ.

Opinion:
GASKINS, J.
b The defendant, Melvin Dewayne Pugh, was originally indicted for first degree murder in the beating death of his infant daughter. However, he entered an Alford plea to the lesser offense of manslaughter. For this offense, he was sentenced to 22 years at hard labor. The defendant appeals his sentence for manslaughter as excessive. We affirm.
On September 29, 2002, the defendant went to the crib of his crying six-week-old daughter. He struck the baby several times about the head and then threw her to the floor. The victim lapsed into a coma and died of a subdural hematoma several days later.
Following imposition of sentence, the defendant filed a motion to reconsider. He argued that the sentence was excessive because he was a youthful offender, he had no significant criminal history, and the circumstances warranted a lesser sentence. The motion was denied.
On appeal, the defendant contends that the 22-year sentence for manslaughter is excessive under the circumstances of this case. He asserts that he did not intentionally harm his daughter and that he is "profoundly remorseful."
The test imposed by the reviewing court in determining the excessiveness of a sentence is two-pronged. First, the record must show | {¡that the trial court took cognizance of the criteria set forth in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. The important elements which should be considered are the defendant's personal history (age, family ties, marital status, health, employment record), prior criminal record, seriousness of offense and the likelihood of rehabilitation. The second prong of the test is whether the sentence imposed is too severe depending on the circumstances of the case.'and the background of the defendant. A sentence violates La. Const, art. 1, § 20 if it is grossly out of proportion to the seriousness of the offense or nothing more than a purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. State v. Haley, 38,258 (La.App.2d Cir.4/22/04), 873 So.2d 747, writ denied, 2004-2606 (La.6/24/05), 904 So.2d 728.
A trial court has broad discretion to sentence within the statutory limits. Absent a showing of manifest abuse'of that discretion, we may not set aside'a sentence as excessive. State v. Guzman, 99-1528, 99-1753 (La.5/16/00), 769 So.2d 1158; State v. June, 38,440 (La.App.2d Cir.5/12/04), 873 So.2d 939.
Where a defendant has pled guilty to an offense which does not adequately describe his conduct or has received a significant reduction in potential exposure to confinement through a plea bargain, the trial court has great discretion in imposing even the maximum sentence possible for the pled offense. State v. Hardy, 39,233 (La.App.2d Cird/26/05), 892 So.2d 710.
A review of the record shows that the trial court adequately considered the factors set forth in La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1. The court noted |sthat it had reviewed the presentence investigation report, as well as a mental health evaluation performed on the defendant. In considering the defendant's criminal history of second degree battery and simple battery, the court also reviewed documents submitted by defense counsel detailing'the mitigating factors associated with those convictions.
. The maximum sentence for manslaughter is 40 years .at hard labor. La. R.S. 14:31. The 22-year sentence imposed by the trial 'court was well within the statutory range for this brutal crime in which a helpless infant was beaten and killed by her own father. The defendant, who was 25 years old at the time of the offense, was not a youthful offender.
Furthermore, the defendant received substantial benefit from the plea bargain by which he received a significant reduction in potential sentencing exposure. In addition to reducing the charge from first degree murder to manslaughter, the state also agreed to not file a habitual offender bill against the defendant.
On this record, we find no showing of abuse by the trial court in its imposition of sentence. Accordingly, this assignment of error is meritless.
The defendant's conviction and sentence are affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
BROWN, C.J., concurs with written reasons.
. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970).
. The defendant also entered an Alford plea to a charge of obstruction of justice for moving items at the crime scene; he received a concurrent sentence of two years at hard labor for this offense. However, the present appeal arises only from the defendant's manslaughter conviction.
.The court specified that since the case involved a crime of violence, the defendant was not eligible for parole, probation or suspension of sentence until he served 85 percent of his sentence, pursuant to La. R.S. 14:2(13) and La. R.S. 15:574.4(B). We note that La. R.S. 15:574.4(B) addresses only parole eligibility. However, under La. R.S. 14:31(B), the defendant was not eligible for probation or suspension of sentence.