Case Name: Robert Dean HOOVER v. Anne Marie Olivier HOOVER
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 2001-06-22
Citations: 798 So. 2d 165
Docket Number: No. 1999 CA 3055
Parties: Robert Dean HOOVER v. Anne Marie Olivier HOOVER.
Judges: BEFORE: CARTER, C.J., FOIL, WEIMER, PETTIGREW, and CLAIBORNE, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 798
Pages: 165–176

Head Matter:
Robert Dean HOOVER v. Anne Marie Olivier HOOVER.
No. 1999 CA 3055.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
June 22, 2001.
Writ Granted Nov. 16, 2001.
James Don Thomas, II, Baton Rouge, LA, for plaintiff/appellee, Robert Dean Hoover.
Gregory S. Johnson, Metairie, LA, for defendant/appellant, Anne Marie Olivier Hoover.
BEFORE: CARTER, C.J., FOIL, WEIMER, PETTIGREW, and CLAIBORNE, JJ.
. Hon. Ian W. Claiborne, retired, is serving as judge pro tempore by special appointment of the Louisiana Supreme Court.

Opinion:
| ¡.FOIL, Judge.
This is an appeal from a judgment granting plaintiffs motion for summary judgment and dismissing defendant's motion to partition an alleged recently discovered community asset or, in the alternative, to set aside the community property partition based on fraud and/or lesion. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
FACTS
Robert Dean Hoover (Robert) and Anne Marie Olivier Hoover (Anne) were married on August 30, 1980. On November 16, 1994, Robert filed a petition for divorce under LSA-C.C. art. 102. Robert filed a new petition for divorce under LSA-C.C. art. 103 on June 5, 1995. A judgment of divorce was signed on July 18, 1995. A resolution of the property issues was included in a community property partition (the partition) executed by Anne on June 23, 1995, and by Robert on July 11, 1995. The partition was not made a judgment of the court. Both parties were represented by counsel throughout the divorce proceedings.
Robert is an attorney practicing law through his legal corporation, "Robert D. Hoover, A Professional Law Corporation." On December 7, 1994, Robert, through his corporation, entered into a contingency fee contract with Robert Lynn Mizell (Mizell). The contract provided that after trial, if an appeal was necessary to obtain a final judgment, the client agreed to pay 40% of any amount recovered as the legal fee. Robert filed suit on behalf of Mizell on March 6, 1995. According to Anne, Mizell received a judgment for over three million dollars at trial, and the matter settled while the appeal of the Mizell case was pending.
In the partition, under section A, "Conveyance by Robert Dean Hoover," Anne received, among other things, ten percent of the community-owned portion of any net legal fees realized in connection with the Malloy and Favron cases. She also received fifty percent of the community-owned portion of any net legal fees realized in connection with the Passman case. The Mizell case is not mentioned. Under section B, "Conveyance by Anne Marie Olivier Hoover," Anne conveyed to Robert, among other things, any and all community-owned stock and assets in the corporation designated as Robert D. Hoover, A Professional Law Corporation.
|3On September 4, 1998, Anne filed a motion to partition an alleged recently discovered community asset or, alternatively, to set aside the community property partition based on fraud and/or lesion. Anne alleged that the newfound community as set is the contingency fee contract Robert had as attorney for the plaintiffs in the Mizell case. In the alternative, she alleged that Robert fraudulently concealed the asset from her and her attorney, and therefore the partition should be rescinded and/or the Mizell suit partitioned. In the second alternative, she alleged that she received less by more than one-fourth of the fair market value of her portion of the partition, and thus the agreement should be rescinded on the basis of lesion.
Robert filed an answer to the motion to partition and, on June 17, 1999, filed a motion for summary judgment. On the same date, Robert filed peremptory exceptions raising the objections of prescription and no cause of action.
After a hearing, the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment and dismissed the matter with prejudice. The trial court did not reach the exceptions filed by Robert.
Anne appealed and alleges that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment as to her claims of fraud and lesion. She further argues that this Court should deny Robert's exception raising the objection of prescription. Robert answered the appeal and seeks damages, including attorneys fees and costs for frivolous appeal.
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A motion for summary judgment should be granted only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with any affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. LSA-C.C.P. art. 966 B. Appellate courts are to review summary judgments de novo under the same criteria that govern the district court's consideration of whether summary judgment is appropriate. Because it is the applicable substantive law that determines materiality, whether a particular fact in dispute is material can be seen only in light of the substantive law applicable to the case. Calhoun v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 98-2770, p. 4 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/18/2000), 768 So.2d 57, 60-61, writ denied, 00-1223 (La.6/23/2000), 765 So.2d 1041.
LFRAUD
Anne alleged in her motion to partition or set aside the community property partition that Robert fraudulently concealed an asset (the Mizell suit) from her and her attorney. In support of his motion for summary judgment, Robert argues that he informed Anne's attorney that there were other contingency fee cases besides Malloy, Favron, and Passman, but that she would have to conduct formal discovery to obtain information on those additional cases. Anne's decision not to seek that information, he argues, does not constitute fraud.
Fraud is defined as, "a misrepresentation or a suppression of the truth made with the intention either to obtain an unjust advantage for one party or to cause a loss or inconvenience to the other." LSA-C.C. art. 1953. Silence or inaction may also constitute fraud. LSA-C.C. art. 1953.
In support of his motion for summary judgment, Robert attached his own affidavit and that of Nancy Sue Gregorie, the attorney who represented Anne in the divorce proceeding. Robert attests that he advised Ms. Gregorie that there were other contingent fee cases in which he was involved, but that she would have to conduct formal discovery to obtain information on those cases. He attests that he was not served with any discovery regarding information about his law corporation's contingent fee cases.
Ms. Gregorie attests that on June 26, 1995, Robert advised her that there were other contingent fee cases in which the law corporation represented the plaintiffs, but that she would have to conduct formal discovery to obtain specific information on those cases. Ms. Gregorie attests that she discussed this with Anne on June 29, 1995, and Anne decided to accept the proposed settlement she had previously signed that was being held in trust pending Ms. Greg-orie's review of the personal injury cases at Robert's law office.
We find that Robert has demonstrated a lack of factual support for Anne's claim that Robert fraudulently concealed the Mi-zell case. The sworn testimony shows that Robert disclosed the existence of other contingent fee cases and informed Anne's attorney she would have to seek information on those cases through formal discovery.
| sHaving demonstrated lack of factual support for an essential element of Anne's claim, in accordance with LSA-C.C.P. art. 966C(2), the burden shifted to Anne to come forth with evidence (affidavits or discovery responses) that demonstrates that she would be able to meet the evidentiary burden of proof on the allegation of fraud at trial. See Babin v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc., 2000-0078, p. 4 (La.6/30/2000), 764 So.2d 37, 39. In opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Anne submitted a copy of a request for production of documents certified by her counsel to have been mailed to Robert on September 30, 1998. She also attached Robert's response to the request wherein he objected to her request for a complete copy of the file in the Mizell matter. Robert's response is dated March 31, 1999.
In her memorandum in opposition to summary judgment, Anne asserted that she was not in a position to state with specificity what exact facts were withheld by Robert, but maintained that his silence on certain issues was specifically intended to defraud her in contravention of his duty to disclose. At the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, Anne's counsel argued that he had not had a chance to conduct discovery and that he would be filing a motion to compel discovery of the Mizell file. Then, he stated, he would depose Robert and Ms. Gregorie.
The mere contention by an opponent to a motion for summary judgment that he does not have the information necessary to defend against the motion because of the movant's failure to comply with discovery is insufficient to defeat the motion. Crocker v. Levy, 615 So.2d 918, 920 (La.App. 1st Cir.1993). Robert's discovery responses were sent to Anne's counsel in March of 1999. The hearing on the motion for summary judgment was originally scheduled for July 20, 1999, and was held on August 10, 1999. The record does not reflect any effort by Anne to compel discovery. The only motion for continuance filed by Anne states that the reason for the request was because her counsel would be out of town the week of the originally scheduled hearing, and makes no mention of the need for additional discovery. Further, Anne did not file an affidavit ^stating that she could not present by affidavit facts essential to justify her opposition to summary judgment as provided in LSA-C.C.P. art. 967.
We find that Anne had adequate time to conduct sufficient discovery to oppose the motion for summary judgment or to file motions to compel or continue the hearing. We further find that Robert met his burden of showing an absence of factual support for an essential element of Anne's claim of fraud. Anne failed to produce factual support to establish that she would be able to satisfy her evidentiary burden of proof at trial. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted summary judgment on the issue of fraud in favor of Robert.
LESION
Anne alleged in her motion to partition or set aside the community property partition that the partition should be rescinded because it is lesionary in that she received less by more than one-fourth of the fair market value of her portion. If Anne did not receive three-fourths of her one-half of the divided community property, the partition agreement is lesionary. LSA-C.C. art. 814. Article 814 provides, "[a]n extrajudicial partition may be rescinded on account of lesion if the value of the part received by a co-owner is less by more than one-fourth of the fair market value of the portion he should have received." To establish a claim of lesion, the community property's true value (net value) must be ascertained, and it must be determined from the property acquired whether a party received value less than three-fourths of one-half share of the true value of the divided community property. McCarroll v. McCarroll, 96-2700, p. 10 (La.10/21/97), 701 So.2d 1280, 1285. The value of the property exchanged is determined as of the date the exchange was executed. Id.
While recognizing the elements of a cause of action for lesion as set forth in McCarroll, we believe the partition agreement entered into by the parties in this case constitutes a valid compromise. A transaction or compromise is defined as "an |7agreement between two or more persons, who, for preventing or putting an end to a lawsuit, adjust their differences by mutual consent, in the manner which they agree on, and which every one of them prefers to the hope of gaining, balanced by the danger of losing." LSA-C.C. art. 3071. Under the law, a transaction or compromise, having between the interested parties a force equal to res judicata, may not be attacked on the basis of lesion. LSA-C.C. art. 3078; Dornier v. Live Oak Arabians, Inc., 602 So.2d 743, 746 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 608 So.2d 177 (La.1992).
The record is clear in this matter that both parties were fully aware of the consequences of their actions in approving the community property partition. In his affidavit submitted in support of summary judgment, Robert attested that he and Anne "voluntarily partitioned and settled all matters" concerning their former community. The partition agreement states that, subject to the provisions of the partition, the parties released and discharged the other from any and all claims the parties had against each other. In his affidavit, Robert attested that he advised Anne's counsel, Ms. Gregorie, that he was involved in other contingent fee cases, but that she would have to conduct formal discovery to obtain information on those cases. Ms. Gregorie attested that she discussed this with Anne, but Anne decided to accept the proposed settlement. At the time of the settlement agreement, the Mi-zell case was in its very early stages and the value of the case was purely speculative. A value could have been assigned to this speculative asset by agreement of the parties at the time of the partition. This was not done in this case. Anne chose to accept the proposed settlement with the knowledge that Robert was involved in other contingency fee cases besides those specifically mentioned in the agreement. We find that the partition agreement constitutes a valid compromise and cannot be attacked on the basis of lesion simply because the Mizell case, a speculative asset to which no value was assigned, later turned out to be a very valuable asset.
Accordingly, we find that the trial court correctly granted Robert's motion for summary judgment on the issue of lesion. Although we find no merit in Anne's [^assignments of error, we deny Robert's request for damages, including attorneys fees and costs based on frivolous appeal.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, the judgment of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of Robert and dismissing Anne's motion to partition a discovered community asset or, in the alternative, to set aside the community property partition based on fraud and/or lesion is affirmed. Robert's request for damages including attorneys fees and costs based on frivolous appeal is denied. Costs of this appeal are assessed to appellant, Anne Marie Olivier Hoover.
AFFIRMED.
CARTER, C.J., and WEIMER, J. concur in part and dissent in part with reasons.
. Article 967 allows, but does not require, a trial court to refuse a motion for summary judgment or order a continuance to permit additional discovery if it appears from the opponent's affidavit that a party cannot present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition. Clark v. Favalora, 98-1802, p. 9 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/24/99), 745 So.2d 666, 672-673.
. In light of our disposition on the issues of fraud and lesion, we need not address the issue of prescription raised by Anne in her third assignment of error.