Case Name: STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. Clarence Andre GLADNEY, Appellant
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1993-10-27
Citations: 626 So. 2d 778
Docket Number: No. 25335-KA
Parties: STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. Clarence Andre GLADNEY, Appellant.
Judges: Before LINDSAY, HIGHTOWER and BROWN, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 626
Pages: 778–780

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. Clarence Andre GLADNEY, Appellant.
No. 25335-KA.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
Oct. 27, 1993.
Indigent Defender Bd. by Ford E. Stinson, Jr., Shreveport, for appellant.
Richard Ieyoub, Atty. Gen., Baton Rouge, James M. Bullers, Dist. Atty., J. Spencer Hays, Asst. Dist. Atty., Benton, for appellee.
Before LINDSAY, HIGHTOWER and BROWN, JJ.

Opinion:
LINDSAY, Judge.
The defendant, Clarence Andre Gladney, pled guilty to one count of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of LSA-R.S. 40:967. He was sentenced to serve 140 months at hard labor. The defendant appeals his sentence as excessive. We affirm.
FACTS
On January 28, 1991, the defendant was apprehended by Bossier City police officers with 77 small zip-lock baggies of cocaine in his possession. Additionally, he was carrying $550 in cash, a beeper, and a razor. The defendant was arrested and charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.
On September 21,1992, the defendant pled guilty as charged. On February 23,1993, he was sentenced under the Louisiana Sentencing Guidelines to 140 months at hard labor, to be served consecutively with any other sentence. Defense counsel made an oral motion for reconsideration of the sentence on the grounds that it was excessive. The motion was denied.
The defendant appealed his sentence as excessive.
EXCESSIVE SENTENCE
The pre-sentence investigation (PSI) report indicated that the 22-year-old defendant had a juvenile record. Additionally, he had two felony convictions for aggravated battery as an adult; both offenses involved shootings. Consequently, the trial court found that the defendant fell into grid cell classification 3A, which recommends 120 to 144 months of incarceration. The sentence imposed, 140 months at hard labor, was within the range recommended by the sentencing guidelines.
By merely alleging the excessiveness of his sentence in his motion for reconsideration, the defendant is "simply relegated to having the appellate court consider the bare claim of excessiveness." State v. Mims, 619 So.2d 1059 (La.1993). This bare claim preserves only a claim of unconstitutional exces-siveness. Mims, supra.
We note that Mims was a case involving a substantial upward departure from the sentencing guidelines grid for the applicable crime. The defendant had filed a motion for reconsideration under LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 881.1 which simply alleged ex-cessiveness; the Supreme Court ruled that such an allegation in a motion for reconsideration preserved the defendant's right to have his upward-departure sentence reviewed for excessiveness. However, when a sentence has been imposed within the designated sentence range of the appropriate grid cell, nothing is presented for review because the sentence is appropriate for an offender with that criminal history and it will not be deemed excessive under the Louisiana Constitution. See State v. Barnes, 607 So.2d 872 (La.App. 2d Cir.1992); State v. Essex, 618 So.2d 574 (La.App. 2d Cir.1993); State v. McEachern, 624 So.2d 43 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1993); La.S.G. § 201(C).
ERROR PATENT
An error patent review disclosed that the trial court failed to inform the defendant of the prescriptive period for post-conviction relief, as required by LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 930.8. (Although the minutes stated that the defendant was so informed, the transcript of the sentencing demonstrated that he was not.) However, this defect has no bearing on whether the sentence is excessive and thus is not grounds to reverse the sentence or to remand the case for resentencing. State v. Mock, 602 So.2d 776 (La.App. 2d Cir.1992); State v. Cox, 604 So.2d 189 (La. App. 2d Cir.1992); State v. Barnes, supra. We note that the three-year prescriptive period does not begin to run until the judgment is final under LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 914 or 922; thus, prescription has not yet begun to run in the present case. Mock, supra; Cox, supra.
CONCLUSION
The defendant's conviction and sentence are affirmed. The trial court is ordered to send written notice to defendant of the prescriptive period for post-conviction relief, within 10 days of the rendition of this opinion, and to file written proof in the record that the defendant received such notice.
AFFIRMED.
BROWN, J., concurs with written reasons.