Case Name: THE SARATOGA COUNTY BANK, Respondent, v. AMOS LEACH, Appellant
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1885-09
Citations: 44 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 336
Docket Number: 
Parties: THE SARATOGA COUNTY BANK, Respondent, v. AMOS LEACH, Appellant.
Judges: LaNdoN, J., concurred.
Reporter: Supreme Court Reports (Hun)
Volume: 44
Pages: 336–340

Head Matter:
THE SARATOGA COUNTY BANK, Respondent, v. AMOS LEACH, Appellant.
Mvidence — transaction with a deceased person — what testimony does not relate thereto within the meaning of section 829 of the Code of Givil Procedure.
This action was brought upon a promissory note purporting to be made by the defendant to the order of one Leach, by whom it was indorsed and transferred to the plaintiff. The defense was that the signature of the defendant was forged. Upon the trial the defendant, having been sworn in his own behalf, was shown the note and asked, “ Is the signature to this paper, marked ‘ A.’ (the note in suit), your signature?” An objection interposed by the plaintiff that the question was inadmissible, under section 829 of the Oode of Civil Procedure, as calling for a personal transaction with the payee, .who was then dead, was sustained by the court.
Held, that it erred in so doing. (Bocees, J., dissenting.)
Appeal from a judgment- of the Saratoga County Court, affirming a judgment in favor of the plaintiff rendered by a justice of the peace.
This action was brought to recover the amount due on a promissory note, purporting to have been made by the defendant to Abram C. Leach, and indorsed by the latter to the plaintiff. The defense was that the name of the defendant was a forgery.
The plaintiff proved that the note was received by the bank from the payee named in it, by whom it was indorsed, and for whom it was discounted ; he also gave evidence to the effect that the signature to the note was that of the defendant; also that the payee was dead. The defendant was then sworn in his own behalf and was asked this question : “ Is the signature to this paper, marked ‘A’ (the note in suit), your signature 1 ” The objection was interposed that the question was inadmissible under section 829 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it appearing that the payee, from and through whom the plaintiff derived title to the note, was dead. The objection was sustained. The defendant then offered to show, by his own testimony, that his signature to the note was a forgery ; that he never saw the note until that day and never signed it. It was thereupon stated in behalf of the plaintiff that no objection would be made to any offers made by the defendant, but that objections to questions would be interposed when put. No ruling was made on the offer, and the case was submitted without further proof or offer of proof. The plaintiff had judgment for the amount of the note which on appeal was affirmed by the County Court.
■W. B. French, for the appellant.
G. A. Wald/ron, for the respondent.

Opinion:
Learhed, P. J.:
As a general rule at this day every person is a competent witness. In order to give a proper construction to the exception contained in section 829, we must understand the reason. That plainly is the unfairness of permitting one person to testify to a personal transaction or communication with another, when the mouth of the latter is closed by death, so that he cannot give his version of the transaction or communication.
Now applying that reason to the present case we see that for a person to testify in regard to a name at the bottom of a note, " that is not my signature," has no element of unfairness. The genuineness of a signature is a matter which may be shown by evidence not in the least connected with any personal transaction between the alleged maker and the payee. It is not a transaction personal between maker and payee.
"When there is an attempt to prove a verbal contract or a conversation between a witness and a deceased party, the only possible evidence may be that of the two persons. But the genuinensss of a signature is shown by comparison and by the testimony of those familiar with handwriting. Indeed to a great extent the testimony of the person whose the signature is claimed to be, is based only on familiarity with his own signature, and is, therefore, of the same character with that of other witnesses to handwriting.
There is another difficulty. The plaintiff insists that because he has given prima faoie evidence of the genuineness of the signature, the defendant cannot testify in his own behalf to the contrary. Suppose then that the defendant by other evidence had overwhelmed this prima facie evidence, could the plaintiff still insist that the testimony which the defendant offered to give by himself as a witness was " concerning a personal transaction." According to the supposition, the " personal transaction " would have been practically disproved by competent evidence. It will be found, very generally if not always, that the point whether or not the testimony is concerning a personal transaction appears by the testimony itself which is offered, and is not dependent upon some other matter which is in dispute.
The plaintiff urges that as he had proved prima facie the signature, the law presumed from that fact the delivery, and that the delivery must have been a personal transaction, and hence the defendant cannot himself testify that the signature is not his because that testimony inferentially denies the delivery, which must be a personal transaction. It is not quite accurate to say that the genuineness of the signature is the presumptive evidence of delivery. Rather it is the plaintiff's possession, which is presumptive evidence of delivery. Proof of the genuineness of the signature of a note which is in the maker's possession, affords not the least presumption that the note has been delivered. The possession by the maker affords a presumption to the contrary. On the other hand, the possession by the payee, or one claiming under him, does afford a presumption of delivery. Therefore the argument fails that for the alleged maker to testify that the signature is not his, is to give evidence touching the fact of delivery, and hence of a personal transaction with the payee. The personal transaction, if any, must have been the delivery of the note (by whomever signed) to the deceased by or for the defendant. On this point the defendant was not questioned. In illustration of these views we refer to Pinney v. Orth (88 N. Y., 447, at 451) ; Lewis v. Merritt (98 id., 206).
.Judgment reversed, with costs of all courts.
LaNdoN, J., concurred.