Case Name: BROWN v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1923-04-11
Citations: 254 S.W. 495
Docket Number: No. 7147
Parties: BROWN v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 254
Pages: 495–497

Head Matter:
BROWN v. STATE.
(No. 7147.)
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
April 11, 1923.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 3, 1923.)
1. Criminal law <&wkey;l 1701/2(1) — Question, though leading, held not reversible error.
In a prosecution for keeping a room in which to gamble, permitting question by prosecuting attorney whether accused’s place “was known as a gambling house, wasn’t it?” though leading, held not reversible error.
2. Criminal law <&wkey;l 144(16) — Appellate court will conclude that verdict referred to charge in indictment to which it was restricted by instructions.
Where a part of a count was not submitted to the jury, the appellate court will not assume that the verdict had reference to the omitted part, but that it referred to the charge in the indictment to which it was restricted by the court’s instruction.
3. Gaming <&wkey;97( I) — Admission of evidence that accused, charged with keeping gaming house, played games, held not error.
In a prosecution for keeping 'a room in which to gamble, admission of evidence over objection that accused played and bet in a card game held not error.
4. Gaming <&wkey;63(3) — Vagrancy statute held not to have repealed statute prohibiting gambling.
Pen. Code 1911, art. 634, subd. (k), the vagrancy statute, did not repeal Pen. Code 1911, art. 559, prohibiting the keeping of a place to gamble.
On Motion for Rehearing.
5. Indictment and information <&wkey;lll(t) — In prosecution for keeping gambling place, indictment need not allege place was not private residence.
An indictment, under Pen. Code 1911, art. 559, charging accused with keeping a room and premises as a place to gamble, held-not bad for failure to negative the fact that such premises were a private residence, betting in which, under article 557, is not unlawful, unless the residence is commonly resorted to for gaming.
Appeal from District Court, Brazoria County; M. S. Munson,' Judge.
\ W. W. Brown was convicted of keeping a room in which to gamble, and appeals.
Affirmed.
A. E. & Carlos Masterson, of Angleton, and E. T. Branch, of Houston, for appellant.
R. G. Storey, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

Opinion:
HAWKINS, J.
Conviction is for keeping, and permitting the keeping, of a building and room for the purpose of being used as a place in which to gamble. Punishment is assessed at two years in the penitentiary. The evidence is amply sufficient to support the verdict and judgment, and will not be discussed, unless necessary in considering some bill of exception.
The indictment contained two counts. The court' sustained a motion to quash the first, but overruled it as to the second, and as to this ruling appellant's first complaint is urged'. The second count is an exact counterpart of the one upheld in Harvey v. State, 92 Tex. Cr. R. 645, 244 S. W. 1004. See, also, Francis v. State, 90 Tex. Cr. R. 67, 233 S. W. 974; Deisher v. State. 89 Tex. Cr. R. 467, 233 S. W. 978; Fridge v. State, 90 Tex. Cr. R. 75, 233 S. W. 979.
State's counsel propounded to his witness Letz the following question:
"This place here of Brown's [appellant], which he was running mighty near all the time, it was known as a gambling house, wasn't it?"
Objection was interposed, because (a) there was no allegation in the indictment to that effect; and (b) because the question was leading. The objection being overruled, the witness answered:
"Well, if we wanted to play a little poker, we would go up there. Some of them called it a bedroom, and some of them called it a gambling room. Yes, sir; I have been in that room more than one time; several times."
The first ground of objection was not tenable, but the question was leading. The answer, however, in the light of the other evidence, does not call for a reversal.
Complaint is made that, the jury having found appellant "guilty as charged in the indictment," no judgment could properly be entered thereon, notwithstanding the court submitted only one count for the jury's consideration. Appellant bases this contention upon that part of the second count which alleges that appellant — "did then and there knowingly permit said property and premises to be used as a place where people resorted to gamble, bet and wager upon games then and there played with cards"; his point being that, although the court did not submit the first count, there is no way to determine whether the verdict relates to the allegation in the second count, which charges him with keeping a building and room for the purpose of being used for gambling, or whether it relates to that portion of the second count above quoted. Again the similarity of the Harvey Case, supra, appears. The part of the count quoted was not submitted to the jury, either in that case or the instant one, and, it not being before the jury, we could scarcely assume that the verdict had reference to it, but more logically conclude that the verdict referred to the charge in the indictment to which they were restricted by the instructions of the court. The case of Wood v. State, 47 Tex. Cr. 543, 84 S. W. 1058, to which we are cited by appellant is not in point. The decision there turned upon a duplicitous indictment. We have no duplicity here. The averments quoted charge neither a felony nor misdemeanor, as is apparent from the Harvey Case, supra, and may be properly treated as surplusage.
Complaint is made because the state was permitted to prove, over his objection, that he played and bet at a card game, he not being charged therewith. This exact point is decided adversely to the contention in Sanchez v. State, 90 Tex. Cr. R. 156, 233 S. W. 983.
The vagrancy statute (article 634, subd. [k], of the Criminal Code; Acts 1909, p. Ill) did not repeal, article 559, Penal Code, under which the prosecution in the present case proceeded. Harvey v. State, 92 Tex. Cr. R. 645, 244 S. W. 1004; Fridge v. State, 90 Tex. Cr. R. 76, 233 S. W. 979; Parshall v. State, 62 Tex. Cr. R. 177, 138 S. W. 759; Ex parte Oates, 91 Tex. Cr. R. 79, 238. S. W. 930.
Other questions are presented, all of which we have examined. We find no merit in them, and do not deem them of sufficient importance to discuss.
The judgment is afiirmed.