Case Name: Jose L. ZAPATA et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Preston SMITH, Governor of the State of Texas, et al., Defendants-Appellees
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1971-02-02
Citations: 437 F.2d 1024
Docket Number: No. 28456
Parties: Jose L. ZAPATA et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Preston SMITH, Governor of the State of Texas, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: 
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 437
Pages: 1024–1033

Head Matter:
Jose L. ZAPATA et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Preston SMITH, Governor of the State of Texas, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 28456.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Feb. 2, 1971.
Pete Tijerina, Mario G. Obledo, Alan Exelrod, San Antonio, Tex., Mike Gonsa-lez, Del Rio, Tex., for plaintiffs-appellants.
Crawford C. Martin, Atty. Gen. of Tex., Ñola White, First Asst. Atty. Gen., Pat Bailey, Executive Asst. Atty. Gen., Robert C. Flowers, Monroe Clayton, Asst. Attys. Gen., Austin, Tex., William D. Ruckelshaus, Asst. Atty. Gen., Seagal V. Wheatley, U. S. Atty., Jeremiah Handy, Asst. U. S. Atty., Robert V. Zener, Raymond D. Battocchi, Attys., Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. C., for defendants-appellees.
Before WISDOM, GOLDBERG, and INGRAHAM, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
GOLDBERG, Circuit Judge:
Though we are asked to engage in the esoterics of constitutional and statutory construction, we find it unnecessary because our decision here can be rested on more mundane grounds.
Plaintiffs brought this suit against the Governor of Texas and the Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity, alleging that they had been illegally and unconstitutionally removed from participation in the Val Verde County VISTA project. Suing under 42 U.S.C.A § 1983 and § 1985(3), plaintiffs sought (1) a declaratory judgment that the Governor either had no power to remove certain volunteers, or, even if the power to remove existed, the manner of its exercise violated standards of due process; and (2) damages for the back pay they would have received if they had not been illegally removed. We need not investigate the details or the merits of plaintiff's arguments save to note that the relief requested was in part a money judgment for back pay and all parties now appear to agree that all claims save that for the back pay are moot. Finding that in such a case the United States is an indispensable party, we must dismiss since the United States has not been joined as a party defendant.
It is well settled that when an administrative official is sued individually, the suit is in fact one against the United States
"if 'the judgment sought would expend itself on the public treasury or domain or interfere, with the public administration.' " Dugan v. Rank, 1963, 372 U.S. 609, 620, 83 S.Ct. 999, 1006, 10 L.Ed.2d 15, 23.
Accord: Land v. Dollar, 1947, 330 U.S. 731, 67 S.Ct. 1009, 91 L.Ed. 1209; Morrison v. Work, 1925, 266 U.S. 481, 45 S.Ct. 149, 69 L.Ed. 394; Simons v. Vinson, 5 Cir. 1968, 394 F.2d 732; American Guaranty Corp. v. Burton, 1 Cir. 1967, 380 F.2d 789.
There is, however, a line of cases, usually spoken of as an exception to this rule, which hold that a suit against an official is not one against the United States if it is alleged either that the official acted beyond the statutory limitations of his power or, even though within the scope of his authority, the powers themselves are constitutionally void. See Dugan v. Rank, supra; Malone v. Bowdoin, 1962, 369 U.S. 643, 82 S.Ct. 980, 8 L.Ed.2d 168; Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp., 1949, 337 U.S. 682, 69 S.Ct. 1457, 93 L.Ed. 1628, 1631. Suit is justified on the theory that the official's conduct cannot be attributed to the sovereign because the official had no power in fact to do the challenged act. Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp., supra.
At first glance our case would appear to come within this exception since the plaintiffs have pled that the dismissal of the VISTA volunteers was both unauthorized by statute, or, if authorized, was an unconstitutional deprivation of due process. However, there is a well recognized exception to the exception which applies to this case and which makes it clear that, despite the statutory and constitutional allegations of the plaintiffs, the suit is nevertheless one against the United States. In Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp., supra, the majority explained:
"Of course, a suit may fail, as one against the sovereign, even if it is claimed that the officer being sued has acted unconstitutionally or beyond his statutory powers, if the relief requested cannot be granted by merely ordering the cessation of the conduct complained of but will require affirmative action by the sovereign or the disposition of unquestionably sovereign property. North Carolina v. Temple, 134 U.S. 22, 10 S.Ct. 509, 33 L.Ed. 849 (1890)." 337 U.S. at 691, n. 11, 69 S.Ct. at 1462.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter explained further in his dissenting opinion:
"To the second category belong the cases where an official asserts the authority of a statute for his action but the injured plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of the statute. Threatened injury will then be enjoined if the plaintiff otherwise satisfies the requirements for equitable intervention. Allen v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 114 U.S. 311, 5 S.Ct. 925, 962, 29 L.Ed. 200; Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co., 154 U.S. 362, 14 S.Ct. 1047, 38 L.Ed. 1014, 4 Inters Com 560; Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714, 13 L.R.A.,N.S., 932, 14 Ann.Cas. 764; Rickert Rice Mills v. Fontenot, 297 U.S. 110, 56 S.Ct. 374, 80 L.Ed. 513. So also recovery may be had of property in an action against an official when the statute under which the seizure of the property was made is unconstitutional. Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 5 S.Ct. 903, 962, 29 L.Ed. 185. In these cases the suit against one holding office is deemed "a suit against him personally as a wrongdoer, and not against the State." Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 151, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714, 725, 13 L.R.A.,N.S., 932, 14 Ann.Cas. 764, supra.
These cases likewise apply a principle that is clear. There is an appearance of inconsistency in some of the cases only because opinions also are prey to the frailties of composition. Familiar phrases are not always used with critical precision or with due relevance to the circumstances of a particular case.
Specifically, there are instances where the unconstitutionality of a statute was conceded and yet the language of sovereign immunity was invoked to bar suit. See, e. g., North Carolina v. Temple, 134 U.S. 22, 10 S.Ct. 509, 33 L.Ed. 849; Christian v. Atlantic & N. C. R. Co., 133 U.S. 233, 10 S.Ct. 260, 33 L.Ed. 589; Louisiana ex rel. New York Guaranty & I. Co. v. Steele, 134 U.S. 230, 10 S.Ct. 511, 33 L.Ed. 891. These cases do not qualify the principle of the eases in category two. Regard for the facts of these cases brings them within the first category because the nature of the relief requested makes them either cases in which Government property would have to be transferred, or cases where the person sued could satisfy the court decree only by acting in an official capacity. The tortfeasor, that is, is not immunized because he happened to hold office, but because the tort cannot be redressed, or if threatened, averted, without bringing into operation governmental machinery." 337 U.S. at 712, 713, 69 S.Ct. at 1473.
The same principle was recognized earlier in Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Forrestal, 1945, 326 U.S. 371, 66 S.Ct. 219, 90 L.Ed. 140, where the Court said:
"The sole purpose of this proceeding is to prevent the Secretary from taking certain action which would stop payment by the government of money lawfully in the United States Treasury to satisfy the government's and not the Secretary's debt to the appellant. The assumption underlying this action is that if the relief prayed for is granted, the government will pay and thus relinquish ownership and possession of the money. In effect, therefore, this is an indirect effort to collect a debt allegedly owed by the government in a proceeding to which the government has not consented. The underlying basis for the relief asked is the alleged unconstitu tionality of the Renegotiation Act and the sole purpose of the proceeding is to fix the government's and not the Secretary's liability. Thus, though appellant denies it, the conclusion is inescapable that the suit is essentially one designed to reach money which the government owns. Under these circumstances the government is an indispensable party, Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382, 388, 59 S.Ct. 292, 83 L.Ed. 235, 241, even, though the Renegotiation Act under which the Secretary proposed to act might be held unconstitutional." 326 U.S. at 374-375, 66 S.Ct. at 221 (citations and footnotes omitted).
In the instant ease it is clear beyond peradventure that the suit is one against the United States since the remedy sought is back pay which can be satisfied only out of the public treasury. It follows, therefore, that the corollary is clear — the United States is an indispensable party to the action. Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Forrestal, supra; Morrison v. Work, supra; Simons v. Vinson, supra.
The usual result of a determination that the United States is an indispensable party is dismissal because the United States is protected by sovereign immunity and has not consented to the suit. See, e. g., Dugan v. Rank, supra; Malone v. Bowdoin, supra; Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp., supra; Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. For-restal, supra; Morrison v. Work, supra.
In the present case such a result was not at the onset necessary since the United States apparently has waived its immunity in cases of this sort. Suits against the United States for back pay may be brought in the Court of Claims, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1491, or after 1964 in the district court, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346.
The fact remains, however, that the United States was not made a party to this action and was not served pursuant to Rule 4(d) (4) Fed.Rules Civ. Proc. We have no choice, therefore, but to dismiss this action. The United States may not be sued behind its back. Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Forrestal, supra.
Affirmed.