Case Name: Dan Ray WARREN, et al., Petitioners, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2005-03-31
Citations: 899 So. 2d 1090
Docket Number: No. SC02-285
Parties: Dan Ray WARREN, et al., Petitioners, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondent.
Judges: PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD and BELL, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 899
Pages: 1090–1105

Head Matter:
Dan Ray WARREN, et al., Petitioners, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondent.
No. SC02-285.
Supreme Court of Florida.
March 31, 2005.
Larry Mark Polsky, Daytona Beach, FL, for Appellant.
Karen A. Barnett and Deborah L. Appel of Barnett and Associates, P.A., Tampa, FL, for Appellee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
We have for review a challenge to the constitutionality of section 627.736(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1999), contained in Florida's Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law, which requires providers of non-emergency medical services and medical services not provided in and billed by a hospital to submit a statement of charges to insurers within thirty days of service. The Fifth District Court of Appeal expressly declared the statute valid in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Warren, 805 So.2d 1074 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). Accordingly, we have jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution. For the reasons discussed below, we approve the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal and uphold the constitutionality of the statute.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Warren, 805 So.2d 1074 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002), the Fifth District summarized the facts as follows:
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (State Farm), appeals a final judgment awarded to Dan Ray Warren, State Farm's insured, and Dr. Jack Rot-stein, M.D., Warren's physician. The county court entered the judgment after holding section 627.736(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1999), unconstitutional as viola-tive of Dr. Rotstein's rights to equal protection, due process and access to the courts.
Section 627.736(5)(b) provides that "the insurer is not required to pay [for] charges for treatment or services rendered more than 30 days before the postmark date of the statement [of charges].... " The statute also provides that, "[t]he injured party is not hable for, and the provider shall not bill the injured party for, charges that are unpaid because of the provider's failure to comply with this paragraph."
Warren was injured in a motor vehicle accident on March 22,1999, and received treatment from Dr. Jack Rotstein on May 27, June 16, and July 6, 1999. Dr. Rotstein, failed to submit statements for his medical services to State Farm until August 9, 1999, more than thirty days after the services were rendered. Because the statements were statutorily delinquent, State Farm denied payment to Dr. Rotstein.
Although Warren incurred no liability for the treatments because he enjoyed immunity under the statute for Dr. Rot-stein's tardy statements, he initiated an action for non-payment against State Farm and eventually joined Dr. Rotstein as a party plaintiff.
The county court agreed with Dr. Rot-stein's allegations that the thirty-day billing requirement of section 627.736(5)(b) is an "irrational legal hoop" and should be declared unconstitutional. The court found that "it [the statute] denies equal protection under the Florida Constitution to health care providers such as Dr. Rotstein by differentiating his bills from hospital and ambulance bills," that the statute "is not reasonably related to a legitimate legislative object [sic]", "violates the due process provisions of the Florida Constitution," and that it "denies medical providers who are not hospitals and ambulance companies access to the courts." The court then entered judgment for $1,640.25 plus interest to Dr. Rotstein and awarded attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $12,699.26 pursuant to section 627.736(8), Florida Statutes (1999).
Id. at 1076 (footnotes omitted) (alterations in original). State Farm appealed the county court's decision to the Fifth District Court of Appeal, which reversed the county court's ruling and held that section 627.736(5)(b) is constitutional under the federal and state constitutional provisions cited by petitioners. Warren and Rotstein now seek review of the Fifth District's decision in this Court. They assert that the thirty-day provision violates the rights of equal protection and due process and the right of access to the courts.
Florida's No-Fault Law
Before Florida enacted no-fault legislation, the only form of recovery available for automobile damages was found in traditional theories of tort, which dictated that recovery could only be had if a party proved that the other party was at fault. In response to perceived concerns with this process, Florida's Legislature enacted the Florida Motor Vehicle No-Fault Law, intended to provide prompt compensation for certain categories of harm stemming from motor vehicle accidents under a statutorily mandated form of insurance. Enacted in 1971, the No-Fault Law was intended to provide a minimum level of insurance benefits, including medical benefits, without regard to fault. See United Auto. Ins. Co. v. Rodriguez, 808 So.2d 82, 85 (Fla.2001). As a result, each motor vehicle owner or registrant required to be licensed in Florida is required to carry a minimum amount of personal injury protection, or PIP insurance, for the benefit of the owner and other designees. Section 627.736, Florida Statutes (1999), sets forth required PIP benefits, which are triggered if a loss is reasonable, necessary, and related to a motor vehicle accident. See Rodriguez, 808 So.2d at 85.
Also included in the no-fault statute is a provision for a procedure through which medical providers may file claims and receive payment for services provided. See § 627.736(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (1999). Section 627.736(5)(b) sets forth the procedures with which treating medical providers must comply in order to receive payment from the no-fault insurer for services rendered. Prior to 1998, the only limitation placed on the timely submission of medical provider claims to insurance companies was the five-year statute of limitations for a breach of contract claim. As a result, medical providers could potentially allow charges to mount, and submit charges for services rendered over a long period of time and distant from the time of the original accident.
In 1998, pursuant to chapter 98-270, section 2, Laws of Florida, the Legislature amended section 627.736(5) to expressly provide a thirty-day limitation on medical provider billing. Section 627.736(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1999), requires medical providers to postmark claims no later than thirty days following the date of treatment, or be subject to automatic claim denial by the insurer. The statute also states, however, that a provider who submits a notice of initiation of treatment within twenty-one days of the first examination or treatment of the patient may then have up to sixty days to submit claims to the insurer.
ANALYSIS
Before addressing the constitutional issues, we must assess the terms of the legislation at issue and the Legislature's purpose in adopting those terms. "Legislative intent, as always, is the polestar that guides a court's inquiry under the Florida No-Fault Law ." Rodriguez, 808 So.2d at 85. "Where the wording of the Law is clear and amenable to a logical and reasonable interpretation, a court is without power to diverge from the intent of the Legislature as expressed in the plain language of the Law." Id. It is apparent by its plain language that the intent of the statutory provision at issue was to impose statutory time limits on the submission of medical bills under the no-fault scheme rather than adherence to the statutory limitations period provided for court actions for breach of contract.
We now turn to the particular constitutional provisions that the petitioners assert are violated by the express thirty-day limitation: equal protection, due process, and access to the courts.
Equal Protection
A constitutional equal protection challenge to a statute that does not involve a fundamental right or suspect classification is evaluated by the rational relationship test. See State Dep't of Ins. v. Keys Title & Abstract Co., 741 So.2d 599, 602 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (citing Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 101 S.Ct. 2376, 69 L.Ed.2d 40 (1981)). Under this test, a court must uphold a statute if the classification bears a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental objective. See Keys Title, 741 So.2d at 602. Our analysis in this case is governed by the rational relationship test because section 627.736(5)(b) does not implicate a fundamental right, nor do the petitioners claim to constitute a suspect class or claim that a fundamental right is at stake. See id.
Here, petitioners claim there was no rational basis for the Legislature to distinguish between the various kinds of medical providers in providing for a limited period for submitting claims.
Proper application of the rational relationship test requires this Court to determine: (1) whether the challenged statute serves a legitimate governmental purpose, and (2) whether it was reasonable for the Legislature to believe that the challenged classification would promote that purpose. See id.
Agreeing that the Legislature had a reasonable basis for distinguishing between certain medical providers for the purpose of placing a time limitation on billing, the Fifth District explained:
There is a logical explanation for placing a statutory time limit upon medical providers and not hospital emergency departments and ambulance providers. Medical providers frequently provide ongoing medical treatment involving regular office visits for chiropractic treatment, physical therapy, orthopedic care, and the like. Conversely, services provided by a hospital emergency room or ambulance provider usually occur only once, immediately following the motor vehicle accident. Unlike ongoing medical and chiropractic treatment, determining whether services provided by a hospital emergency room department or an ambulance provider were necessary and related to the motor vehicle accident is usually a straightforward process. We find that the different billing requirements are calculated to reduce un necessary medical costs which in turn lowers the costs upon which insurers base PIP premiums and ultimately benefits consumers. Section 627.736(5)(b) is rationally related to this legitimate state purpose, and the classifications within the statute are reasonably designed to achieve that purpose.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Warren, 805 So.2d 1074, 1078 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). We find no error in the Fifth District's reasoning.
The district court engaged in a thorough analysis of the reasonableness of the statutory classification, having found that not only did the Legislature announce legitimate objectives, but that the classification at issue here served those objectives. The fact that there may be differing views as to the reasonableness of the Legislature's action is simply not sufficient to void the legislation. Because the no-fault statute provides for a statutorily mandated form of insurance, the Legislature would ordinarily be entitled to also enact specific requirements and procedures to carry out the legislative schemes, such as a requirement for the timely submission of medical provider statements. Accordingly, as required by the applicable equal protection analysis, in a light deferential to the Legislature's action, we uphold the district court's determination that section 627.736(5)(b) does not offend equal protection.
Due Process
In Lasky v. State Farm Insurance Co., 296 So.2d 9 (Fla.1974), this Court held that the test used to determine whether a statute violates due process "is whether the statute bears a reasonable relation to a permissible legislative objective and is not discriminatory, arbitrary or oppressive." Id. at 15. The analysis involved in the due process determination closely resembles that of the equal protection analysis. For that reason we find no due process violation.
We agree with the Fifth District that the Legislature's objectives of reducing bulk billing and ensuring that charges covered under no-fault insurance are reasonable, necessary, and related to the motor vehicle accident are permissible legislative objectives, and that those objectives are reasonably related to the thirty-day requirement imposed upon certain medical providers. We also agree that the statute is not discriminatory, arbitrary, or oppressive. First, the provision is designed to relieve a specific problem perceived by the Legislature to be caused by the conduct of some individuals in a given class of medical providers. Additionally, the potentially oppressive aspect of the statute (from the petitioners' viewpoint), an inability to recover payment for services rendered, may be avoided by merely complying with the thirty-day requirement, of which the statute places medical providers on notice. Therefore, we hold that section 627.736(5)(b) does not violate due process.
Access to the Courts
The petitioners also argue that the impact of the thirty-day provision is such that medical providers are denied their day in court to recover payment for services provided, and thus the statute violates the right of access to the courts as guaranteed by Florida's Constitution. On the other hand, State Farm argues that the thirty-day requirement does not unconstitutionally prohibit access to the courts but, rather, is a reasonable condi tion precedent to filing a claim under the statutorily mandated insurance coverage.
In Kluger v. White, 281 So.2d 1 (Fla.1973), this Court set forth the following test for analyzing access to the courts claims:
[WJhere a right of access to the courts for redress for a particular injury has been provided by statutory law predating the adoption of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the State of Florida, or where such right has become a part of the common law of the State pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 2.01, F.S.A., the Legislature is without power to abolish such a right without providing a reasonable alternative to protect the rights of the people of the State to redress for injuries, unless the Legislature can show an overpowering public necessity for the abolishment of such right, and no alternative method of meeting such public necessity can be shown.
Id. at 4. We do not find that Kluger is offended by the thirty-day requirement because the thirty-day requirement does not abolish medical providers' access to the courts. Rather, we agree with the Fifth District that the statute imposes a reasonable condition precedent to filing a claim for certain insurance benefits. The statute places medical providers on notice of the thirty-day requirement, and compliance with the thirty-day requirement preserves access to the courts. Thus, we find the petitioners' argument to be without merit.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, we conclude that the statute in this case reflects a valid use of legislative authority that does not interfere with the petitioners' equal protection or due process rights, nor does the statute violate the petitioners' rights of access to the courts. Therefore, we uphold the constitutionality of section 627.736(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1999), and approve the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal.
It is so ordered.
PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD and BELL, JJ., concur.
PARIENTE, C.J., specially concurs with an opinion, in which ANSTEAD, J. concurs.
LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ., dissent with opinions.
CANTERO, J., recused.
. Section 627.736(5)(b) of Florida's No-Fault Law reads as follows:
With respect to any treatment or service, other than medical services billed by a hospital for services rendered at a hospital-owned facility, the statement of charges must be furnished to the insurer by the provider and may not include, and the insurer is not required to pay, charges for treatment or services rendered more than thirty days before the postmark date of the statement, except for past due amounts previously billed on a timely basis under this paragraph, and except that, if the provider submits to the insurer a notice of initiation of treatment within 21 days after its first examination or treatment of the claimant, the statement may include charges for treatment or services rendered up to, but not more than, 60 days before the postmark date of the statement. The injured party is not liable for, and the provider shall not bill the injured party for, charges that are unpaid because of the provider's failure to comply with this paragraph. Any agreement requiring the injured person or insured to pay for such charges is unenforceable. For emergency services and care as defined in s. 395.002 rendered in a hospital emergency department or for transport and treatment rendered by an ambulance provider licensed pursuant to part III of chapter 401, the provider is not required to furnish the statement of charges within the time periods established by this paragraph; and the insurer shall not be considered to have been furnished with notice of the amount of covered loss for purposes of paragraph (4)(b) until it receives a statement complying with paragraph (5)(d), or copy thereof, which specifically identifies the place of service to be a hospital emergency department or an ambulance in accordance with billing standards recognized by the Health Care Finance Administration. Each notice of insured's rights under s. 627.7401 must include the following statement in type no smaller than 12 points: BILLING REQUIREMENTS. — Florida
Statutes provide that with respect to any treatment or services, other than certain hospital and emergency services, the statement of charges furnished to the insurer by the provider may not include, and the insurer and the injured party are not required to pay, charges for treatment or services rendered more than 30 days before the postmark date of the statement, except for past due amounts previously billed on a timely basis, and except that, if the provider submits to the insurer a notice of initiation of treatment within 21 days after its first examination or treatment of the claimant, the statement may include charges for treatment or services rendered up to, but not more than, 60 days before the postmark date of the statement.
. The equal protection right set forth in article I, section 2 of the Florida Constitution states:
All natural persons, female and male alike, are equal before the law and have inalienable rights, among which are the right to enjoy and defend life and liberty, to pursue happiness, to be rewarded for industry, and to acquire, possess and protect property; except that the ownership, inheritance, disposition and possession of real property by aliens ineligible for citizenship may be regulated or prohibited by law. No person shall be deprived of any right because of race, religion, national origin, or physical disability.
The right to due process set forth in article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution states: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, or be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense, or be compelled in any criminal matter to be a witness against oneself."
. The right of access to the courts, contained in article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution, states: "The courts shall be open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay."
. Although the applicable statute in this case is the statute as it existed in 1999, we note that the statute has undergone amendments since that time. The current version of the applicable statute is codified at section 627.736(5)(c), Florida Statutes (2004).
. On separate issues, this Court has confronted the constitutionality of section 627.736(5) in Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Pinnacle Medical, Inc., 753 So.2d 55 (Fla. 2000). In Pinnacle, this Court held: (1) that the statutory provision allowing prevailing party attorney fees arbitrarily distinguished between medical providers and insureds and therefore violated medical providers' due process rights, and (2) that the provision requiring mandatory arbitration was an unconstitutional violation of the petitioner's right of access to the courts. Id. at 59.
. We are not presented here with the rejection of a medical provider's claim against a patient-insured.