Case Name: William Russell PROCTOR, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1985-12-17
Citations: 480 So. 2d 160
Docket Number: No. BC-475
Parties: William Russell PROCTOR, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: BOOTH, C.J., concurs in majority opinion and in specially concurring opinion.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 480
Pages: 160–163

Head Matter:
William Russell PROCTOR, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. BC-475.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Dec. 17, 1985.
Glenna Joyce Reeves, Asst. Public Defender, Tallahassee, for appellant.
Mark C. Menser, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.

Opinion:
ZEHMER, Judge.
William Proctor appeals a final judgment of the trial court revoking his probation and sentencing him to five years imprisonment for grand theft. In view of our construction of rule 3.701(d)(14), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, we reverse and remand because the trial court has failed to state sufficient clear and convincing reasons for departure from the recommended sentence under the sentencing guidelines.
On June 21, 1983, appellant was charged with grand theft. He pled guilty and elected to be sentenced under the sentencing guidelines. On October 21 the trial court sentenced appellant to five years probation pursuant to the guidelines, which recommended "any nonstate prison sanction."
On June 28, 1984, an arrest warrant was issued for appellant, alleging he violated probation by committing the offense of burglary of a structure and grand theft on January 31, 1984. On September 10 a probation revocation hearing was held and appellant admitted the violation of probation. On September 14 a sentencing hearing was held, at which the trial judge sentenced appellant to five years imprisonment for the 1983 grand theft offense. The recommended sentence under the sentencing guidelines was "community control or 12 to 30 months incarceration." The court set forth the following reasons for departing from the guidelines:
The Court has gone outside sentencing guidelines because you violated conditions of probation. The Court deems that in itself to be sufficient aggravating circumstances to go outside sentencing guidelines. Also, the extreme warning given to him as to what would happen if he violated any conditions of probation, violations of that warning and failure to take heed is a showing, an unconcern and a failure to abide by the law and that, the Court deems to be sufficient aggravating circumstances.
Appellant's five-year sentence on the grand theft charge was imposed after the effective date of rule 3.701(d)(14), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. Both parties have agreed on appeal that this rule is applicable to appellant. Rule 3.701(d)(14) provides:
Sentences imposed after revocation of probation or community control must be in accordance with the guidelines. The sentence imposed after revocation of probation may be included within the original cell (guidelines range) or may be increased to the next higher cell (guide lines range) without requiring a reason for departure.
We hold that rule 3.701(d)(14) authorizes the trial court upon revocation of probation to increase a defendant's sentence to the next higher guidelines cell without explanation, but precludes an increase of the sentence beyond one guidelines cell unless the court states clear and convincing reasons for such departure other than the fact that the defendant violated probation. Pentaude v. State, 478 So.2d 1147 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Ehrenshaft v. State, 478 So.2d 842 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). In the present case the recommended sentence under the guidelines was "community control or 12 to 30 months incarceration." The next higher cell under the guidelines recommends a sentence of "three years incarceration." The trial court could have sentenced appellant to three years incarceration without any statement of clear and convincing reasons. The court chose, however, to sentence appellant to five years imprisonment. Because the sentence exceeded three years, the court erred in failing to set forth clear and convincing reasons for such departure other than the fact of violation of probation. Although the court failed to set forth sufficient reasons for departure, we do not mean to imply that permissible clear and convincing reasons for departure do not exist, especially in view of the facts underlying appellant's extensive criminal record.
We recognize that some courts in this state have in the past followed a practice of placing a defendant on probation, say for five years, and upon revocation of probation sentenced him to imprisonment for the same number of years. The construction of rule 3.701(d)(14) approved herein will effectively render this practice impermissible absent other clear and convincing reasons. Therefore, we certify to the Supreme Court the following as a question of great public importance:
WHETHER, UNDER RULE 3.701(d)(14), A PERSON FOUND GUILTY OF VIOLATING PROBATION MAY NOT BE SENTENCED TO MORE THAN THE NEXT HIGHER GUIDELINES CELL UNLESS WRITTEN REASONS OTHER THAN THE VIOLATION OF PROBATION ARE GIVEN FOR DEPARTURE FROM THE GUIDELINES?
Appellant's sentence is reversed and the case is remanded for resentencing. If the court desires to sentence appellant to five years incarceration, it must state clear and convincing reasons for such departure other than the fact that appellant violated his probation.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
BOOTH, C.J., concurs in majority opinion and in specially concurring opinion.
NIMMONS, J., concurs specially.