Case Name: JOHN PRATICO, ALEX LUSKY, AND MICHAEL GALLIONE, PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS, v. RAYMOND L. RHODES, COUNTY TREASURER OF THE COUNTY OF PASSAIC, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
Court: New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1954-09-21
Citations: 32 N.J. Super. 178
Docket Number: 
Parties: JOHN PRATICO, ALEX LUSKY, AND MICHAEL GALLIONE, PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS, v. RAYMOND L. RHODES, COUNTY TREASURER OF THE COUNTY OF PASSAIC, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Superior Court Reports
Volume: 32
Pages: 178–191

Head Matter:
JOHN PRATICO, ALEX LUSKY, AND MICHAEL GALLIONE, PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS, v. RAYMOND L. RHODES, COUNTY TREASURER OF THE COUNTY OF PASSAIC, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division
Argued August 2, 1954
Decided September 21, 1954.
Before Judges Hall, Tomasllo and Mariano.
Mr. Saul M. Mann, attorney for and of counsel with plaintiffs-respondents, argued the cause.
Mr. Nicholas Martini, attorney for and of counsel with the defendant-appellant, argued the cause.

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Mariano, J. S. C.
(temporarily assigned). Plaintiffs instituted suit in the Passaic County District Court against Raymond L. Rhodes, as Treasurer of the County of Passaic, for the return and recovery of monies which they claim were unlawfully taken from them by members of the staff of the Prosecutor's Office of Passaic County during a raid conducted in the early morning hours of December 6, 1953, at 43 West Broadway, in the City of Paterson, New Jersey.
All three plaintiffs admit going to the premises in question to gamble and participate as players, in an illegal gambling operation which was then and there being conducted. They had no connection whatsoever with the illegal operation other than as players.
The front entrance of the building was barricaded with a steel door and the members of the raiding party were finally compelled to force entry through a side door. By the time entrance was made bjr the police the game had ceased and there was no money in view on the table upon which the so-called "crap game" or "dice game" had been conducted. Fifty-two persons were found on the premises, all of whom were subjected to a search, and the monies now sought to be recovered by the plaintiffs were taken from their person by direction of the said prosecutor.
Four individuals other than the plaintiffs were subsequently indicted and plead "guilty" to the operation of a "dice game" in violation of N. J. S. 2A :112-3. The three plaintiffs and others were charged with the violation of an ordinance of the City of Paterson which provided that no person shall be present in any room within the City of Paterson wherein gaming is carried on, to which they entered a plea of "guilty" and were each fined the sum of $200.
The prosecutor thereafter, and in accordance with N. J. S. 2A :152-8 et seq., delivered the monies taken from the plaintiffs to the defendant, the County Treasurer of Passaic, who refused, upon demand, to return the sums of money in question to the respective plaintiffs.
The district court judge, sitting as judge and jury, pursuant to R. R. 4:53-1, found the facts specialty and stated separately its conclusions of law thereon, and directed the entry of judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and the defendant appeals. Defendant argues that the monies on the persons of the plaintiffs at the time of their arrest, which are used or are available for use in the illegal operation, become contraband at law, thus forfeitable to the State under N. J. S. 2A :152-7 et seq., and that there was insufficient evidence to support the findings of the trial court, and that the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence.
Ordinarily money is not in itself an instrument of gambling, but is merely the stake for which men gamble; and as a general rule money is not subject to confiscation or destruction as a gambling device but should be returned to the owner. 38 C. J. S., Gaming, § 78c, p. 136; Krug v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Hudson County, 3 N. J. Super. 22 (App. Div. 1949); Kenny v. Wachenfeld, 14 N. J. Misc. 322 (Sup. Ct. 1936); Rosen v. Superintendent of Police, 120 Pa. Super. 59, 181 A. 797 (Super. Ct. 1935); Fairmount Engine Co. v. Montgomery County, 135 Pa. Super. 367, 5 A. 2d 419 (Super. Ct. 1939); People v. Moore, 410 Ill. 241, 102 N. E. 2d 146 (Sup. Ct. 1951); Albright v. Karston, 209 Ark. 348, 190 S. W. 2d 433 (Sup. Ct. 1945); Boyle v. State, 47 So. 2d 693 (Sup. Ct. Fla. 1950).
Money may, however, under some circumstances be used as a gambling device, as where men gamble on the toss of a coin, and money may become subject to seizure along with regular gambling apparatus where it has become an integral part of the illegal gambling operation. 38 C. J. S., Gaming, § 78c, p. 136, supra; Krug v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Hudson County, supra; Kenny v. Wachenfeld, supra; Rosen v. Superintendent of Police, supra; Becker v. Farley, 137 N. J. L. 191 (E. & A. 1948); Fairmount Engine Co. v. Montgomery County, supra; People v. Moore, supra; People v. Del Mar Corp., 65 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 854, 150 P. 2d 826 (Super. Ct. 1944); People v. Wrest, 345 Ill. App. 186, 103 N. E. 2d 171 (App. Ct. 1952); Gilley v. Commonwealth, 312 Ky. 584, 229 S. W. 2d 60, 19 A. L. R. 2d 1224 (Sup. Ct. 1950); Commonwealth v. Certain Gaming Implements and Personal Property, 313 Mass. 409, 47 N. E. 2d 939 (Sup. Jud. Ct. 1943); People v. Krol, 304 Mich. 623, 8 N. W. 2d 662 (Sup. Ct. 1943); Pannulla v. Rosenberg, 171 Pa. Super. 233, 90 A. 2d 267 (Super. Ct. 1952).
Where money is earmarked and segregated as part of an illegal gambling operation, it then constitutes a gambling device subject to seizure. Kenny v. Wachenfeld, supra; State v. Link, 14 N. J. 446 (1954); Farley v. Manning, 4 N. J. 571 (1950); Krug v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Hudson County, supra.
Where money is not found in a gambling device, but was used per se in connection with the illegal gambling operation, it has been held that such money after seizure is earmarked and segregated, and becomes contraband as in itself a gambling device which may not be recovered by the person from w'hom it was taken. Kenny v. Wachenfeld, supra; Krug v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Hudson County, supra; Farley v. Manning, supra.
For collection of cases see Gilley v. Commonwealth, supra, annotated in 19 A. L. R. 2d 1224.
From the evidence produced during the course of the trial it became a question of fact for the trial court, sitting as the trier of the facts, to decide in the light of all of the evidence and circumstances if the money in question taken from the persons of the plaintiffs was received and held for use in an unlawful gambling operation. State v. Morano, 134 N. J. L. 295 (E. & A. 1946); Stale v. Link, supra. Whether the currency in question was earmarked and segregated for gambling operations has also been held to be a factual issue. Becker v. Farley, supra.
In Kenny v. Wachenfeld, supra, the plaintiff admitted that part of the money represented his collection during the day of his arrest while in pursuit of his business as a bookmaker, and thus the money was an integral part of the illegal gambling operation and was thus earmarked and segregated and became contraband.
In Krug v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Hudson County, supra, the money in quesetion was found in a locked closet immediately adjacent to one of the rooms used by the plaintiff for the conduct of his illegal gambling operation, to wit, the numbers game.
In State v. Link, supra, plaintiff's sole occupation was that of a bookmaker and the court found that the money in question was used either as the proceeds of or in connection with, set apart and segregated as part of his gambling operation in various counties in New Jersey.
The facts in Kenny v. Wachenfeld, supra, Krug v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Hudson County, supra, and State v. Link, supra, are clearly distinguishable from the case sub judice in that the present plaintiffs were not the operators of the illegal gambling operation but merely so-called players, and that the monies in question were taken from the persons of the respective plaintiffs at the direction of the Prosecutor of Passaic County after the entry into the building of the law enforcing authorities. The monies taken from the plaintiffs was not lying on the dice table upon which the illegal gambling operation had been conducted. Also, the monies in question were not being held awaiting the outcome or determination of the throw of the dice. Therefore, there is presented an entirely different factual situation in the present case.
The lower court found as a fact that prior to seizure the monies in question had been reduced to the exclusive control and possession of the plaintiffs and was jiot then and there being used as an integral part of the gambling operation and therefor was not subject to seizure.
Although the Superior Court, Appellate Division, is empowered to review the evidence relating to facts in cases, particularly where controversial issues are essentially factual, and make its own independent findings, the court is not disposed on appeal to overthrow conclusions of the trier of facts unless it is the court's conviction that such conclusions are so manifestly unsupported by or discordant with competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interest of justice. Koolvent Aluminum Awning Co. of New Jersey v. Sperling, 16 N. J. Super. 444 (App. Div. 1951).
"While under provision R. R. 1:5-3, made applicable to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, by R. R. 2-5, it may review issues of fact not determined by a finding of a jury and new and amended findings of fact may be made, due regard should be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of witnesses. Lehmann v. Lehmann, 7 N. J. Super. 232 (App. Div. 1950), petition for certification denied 5 N. J. 349 (1950) ; In re Perrone's Estate, 5 N. J. 514, 523 (1950).
This power is permissive and should be exercised sparingly. Vandenberg v. John De Kuyper & Son, 5 N. J. Super. 440 (App. Div. 1949). The findings of the trial judge on issues of fact, although not controlling, are by reason of his opportunity to determine the credibility of witnesses entitled to great weight. In re Fleming's Estate, 19 N. J. Super. 565 (App. Div. 1952).
The credibility of witnesses is an important consideration in the determination of factual issues. Gellert v. Livingston, 5 N. J. 65, 78 (1950); De Vries v. Evening Journal Ass'n, 9 N. J. 117 (1952).
Despite the fact that we might have reached a different factual conclusion, we are of the opinion that the trial judge's findings of fact are supported by competent, relevant and reasonabty credible evidence and are not inclined to make new and amended findings of fact.
We have considered the other points raised by the appellant and find no merit in the same.
The judgment of the court below is affirmed.
Hall, J., concurs in this opinion.