Case Name: David RAMSEY III v. STATE of Arkansas
Court: Arkansas Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 1998-02-04
Citations: 60 Ark. App. 206
Docket Number: CA CR 96-1227
Parties: David RAMSEY III v. STATE of Arkansas
Judges: Arey and Stroud, JJ., agree.
Reporter: Arkansas Appellate Reports
Volume: 60
Pages: 206–214

Head Matter:
David RAMSEY III v. STATE of Arkansas
CA CR 96-1227
959 S.W.2d 765
Court of Appeals of Arkansas Divisions III and IV
Opinion delivered February 4, 1998
Jo Ellen Carson, for appellant.
Winston Bryant, Att’y Gen., by: Kelly Terry, Asst. Att’y Gen., for appellee.

Opinion:
Sam Bird, Judge.
On June 5, 1995, David Ramsey, the appellant, entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge of robbery and was given a suspended imposition of sentence for five years, conditioned upon appellant's making a good-faith effort to complete his high-school education or earn a GED and not possessing any controlled substances. Due to his incarceration on unrelated charges, appellant did not enroll in school until the spring semester of 1996. On January 25, 1996, after being involved in what appeared to be a gang-related incident at school, appellant was suspended from school. Two days later, the car in which appellant was riding with two minors was pulled over at 2 a.m. for violation of curfew. The officers conducted a search of the car, finding marijuana. On January 31, 1996, the State filed a petition to revoke appellant's suspended sentence, alleging that he was suspended from school as a result of improper activity. The petition was later amended to include charges that appellant had committed the offenses of possession of marijuana and contributing to the delinquency of a minor.
A revocation hearing was held, and the judge revoked appellant's suspended sentence. Afterward, the State declined to prosecute the charges of contributing to the delinquency of a minor and possession of marijuana for lack of evidence. Appellant then filed a motion requesting the court to reconsider its revocation because the State had failed to prosecute the marijuana and contributing charges. Following another hearing, the court denied the motion and affirmed the earlier ruling revoking appellant's suspended sentence. Appellant brings this appeal contending that his improper activity, which resulted in his suspension from school, was not sufficient evidence to prove that he failed to make a good-faith effort to obtain his high-school diploma or GED.
When appealing a revocation, the appellant has the burden of showing that the trial court's findings are against the preponderance of the evidence. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-309(d) (Repl. 1993); Tipton v. State, 47 Ark. App. 187, 887 S.W.2d 540 (1994). On appellate review, the trial court's findings are upheld unless they are clearly against a preponderance of the evidence. Tipton v. State, supra; Russell v. State, 25 Ark. App. 181, 753 S.W.2d 298 (1988). Evidence that is insufficient to support a criminal conviction may be sufficient to support a revocation. Lemons v. State, 310 Ark. 381, 836 S.W.2d 861 (1992).
From a reading of the briefs, it appears that the conditions of the suspended sentence that the State alleges were violated are that the appellant did not make a good-faith effort to obtain his high-school diploma or GED, that he possessed controlled substances, and that he contributed to the delinquency of a minor.
First, the appellant argues that he did not violate the conditions of his suspended sentence by failing to make a good-faith effort to obtain his high-school diploma or his GED. He argues that he was suspended from school for only ten days for a gang-related incident and that he was eligible to return to school after the suspension. He argues further that he did not return to the school after the ten-day suspension because he had enrolled in the Adult Education Center in an effort to get his GED. A good-faith effort is defined in Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-323 (Supp. 1995) as meaning "the person has been enrolled in a program of instruction and is attending school or adult education." The State argues that the suspension, coupled with evidence that the appellant had been truant once and tardy twice during only a one-month period of enrollment, is enough to show that the appellant was not making a good-faith effort to obtain his high-school education.
Second, the appellant contends that his sentence should not be revoked because the State failed to prove that he was in possession of marijuana and the State did not prosecute the marijuana and contributing charges due to lack of evidence. The appellant argues that the State did not prove, nor is there any evidence to establish, that he knew the marijuana was in the car. The State argues that evidence that specifically links defendant to the controlled substance is not needed in a revocation hearing.
However, even without the consideration of the charges of contributing to the delinquency of a minor and possession of marijuana, the court did not err in revoking the appellant's suspended sentence. In order for appellant's suspended sentence to be revoked, the State need only prove that the appellant committed one violation of the conditions. Ross v. State, 22 Ark. App. 232, 738 S.W.2d 112 (1987). The fact that the appellant had been truant once, tardy twice and suspended for ten days from school, all within a period of less than a month, are sufficient proof of his lack of a good-faith effort to obtain his high-school diploma or GED.
The dissenting opinion implies that appellant is merely a school child who is being imprisoned for being tardy, cutting classes, and being suspended from school, just like "thousands, if not tens of thousands," of other citizens. The dissent has apparently overlooked the fact that appellant is an eighteen-year-old convicted felon serving a suspended sentence for robbery, subject to revocation if, among other conditions, he fails to make a good-faith effort to obtain his high-school diploma or GED. Notwithstanding the tenuous position this condition of his suspended sentence put him in at school, within a period of less than one month appellant was tardy to school twice, absent without excuse once, and suspended from school for ten days. As a result of the accumulation of these offenses, the trial court made a factual determination that appellant had violated the "good-faith effort" condition of his suspension, and sentenced appellant to serve the five-year term of imprisonment that had been earlier suspended following his conviction for robbery. Nothing in the record suggests that appellant was sentenced to serve a term in prison for being tardy, truant, and suspended from school. Plainly put, this is not a case about a school child who is being too harshly punished for violating a school rule. This case is about a convicted robber serving a five-year suspended sentence who lacked the discipline to obey the simple condition of his suspension that he attend and behave at school.
The dissenting opinion also suggests that before the trial court may revoke the appellant's suspended sentence, the State must present proof that appellant was tardy or absent a sufficient number of times to subject himself to expulsion from school, the failure to be promoted, or failure to graduate. Of course, no authority is cited in support of this suggestion because none exists.
The dissent suggests that the purpose of Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-323 (c) may be thwarted if people are sent to prison when they violate the "good-faith effort" condition of their suspended sentences, because in prison they cannot be compelled to go to school. And it is suggested that, by enforcing strict compliance with this condition of appellant's suspended sentence, the court is increasing the prison population at the expense of encouraging education. This distorted reasoning is contrary to the language of section 5-4-323 (b), which requires that the court "shall revoke a suspension of sentence or probation if the person fails to make a good-faith effort to achieve the degree or certificate." (Emphasis added.) Whether a good-faith effort has been made is a question of fact to be determined by the trial judge that we will not reverse unless clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. We do not find that the trial court's decision is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.
Affirmed.
Arey and Stroud, JJ., agree.
Crabtree, J., concurs.
Griffen and Roaf, JJ., dissent.