Case Name: Albrecht v. Erie City, Appellant
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1920-01-05
Citations: 265 Pa. 453
Docket Number: Appeal, No. 68
Parties: Albrecht v. Erie City, Appellant.
Judges: Before Brown, C. J., Frazer, Walling, Simpson and Kephart, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania State Reports
Volume: 265
Pages: 453–456

Head Matter:
Albrecht v. Erie City, Appellant.
Negligence — Municipalities—Slipping on sidewalk — Contributory negligence — Cross-examination—Bight to cross-examine plaintiff— Evidence.
1. In a negligence case against a city to recover damages for injuries sustained by a fall on a slippery sidewalk, where tbe plaintiff testifies that when he fell it was dark, and snow, which covered the sidewalk, prevented his seeing the ice, it is reversible error for the trial court to refuse to permit the cross-examination of the plaintiff for the purpose of developing from him the fact that he had been guilty of contributory negligence.
2. In such a case the plaintiff could keep nothing back within his own knowledge that barred his right to recover. If he did so, either voluntarily or by the failure of his counsel to develop it on direct examination, tbe defendant’s right was to call it forth on cross-examination, not as a matter of defense, but as part of the plaintiff’s case, for the consideration of the court and jury, relieving the defendant from making any defense.
3. A plaintiff seeking'to recover damages for injuries alleged to have been sustained through the negligence of the defendant, must make out a case clear of contributory negligence.
Argued April 28, 1919.
Appeal, No. 68, Jan. T., 1919, by defendant, from judgment of C. P. Erie Co., Sept. T., 1917, No. 151, on verdict for plaintiff in case of Frederick W. Albrecht v. City of Erie.
Before Brown, C. J., Frazer, Walling, Simpson and Kephart, JJ.
Reversed.
Trespass to recover damages for personal injuries. Before Whittelsey, J.
Verdict and judgment for plaintiff for $2,317.50. Defendant appealed.
Errors assigned were (1, 2) in refusing to permit the cross-examination of the plaintiff.
S. L. Gilson, for appellant.
The court erred in refusing to permit cross-examination of the plaintiff: Bohan v. Avoca Borough, 154 Pa. 404; Kuhn v. Ligonier Valley R. R. Co., 261 Pa. 147; Heiss v. Lancaster, 203 Pa. 260; Smith v. Traction Co., 202 Pa. 54; McNeal v. Pittsburgh & W. Ry. Co., 131 Pa. 184; Matteson v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 218 Pa. 527; Glenn v. Phila. & West Chester Traction Co., 206 Pa. 135; American Car & Foundry Co. v. Alexandria Water Co., 218 Pa. 542.
S. Y. Rossiter, for appellee.
The order of examination and cross-examination is much within the discretion of the judge at trial, but the latitude should not extend to give an undue advantage to one party: Helser v. McGrath, 52 Pa. 531; Jackson v. Litch, 62 Pa. 451; Hughes v. Westmoreland Coal Co., 104 Pa. 207.
January 5, 1920:

Opinion:
Opinion by
Mr. Chief Justice Brown,
The recovery by the plaintiff in the court below was for injuries sustained in falling on an icy sidewalk on Parade street, in the City of Erie. Under the testimony submitted, the negligence of the city and the contributory negligence of the plaintiff were for the jury; but the case must be retried for the refusal of the learned trial judge to permit counsel for defendant to cross-examine the plaintiff for the purpose of developing from him the fact that he had been guilty of contributory negligence.
A plaintiff seeking to recover damages for injuries alleged to have been sustained through the negligence of the defendant must make out a case clear of contributory negligence: Heiss v. Lancaster, 203 Pa. 260; Kuhn v. Ligonier Valley R. R. Co., 261 Pa. 147. In the case under consideration the plaintiff testified that when he fell it was dark, and snow, which covered the sidewalk, prevented his seeing the ice. Conceding that this testimony absolved him from the charge of contributory negligence, he may have withheld facts which he ought to have disclosed and which might have shown that he had not exercised proper care in attempting to pass over the sidewalk. It was, therefore, clearly competent for counsel for defendant to develop such facts on cross-examination: Smith v. Phila. Traction Co., 202 Pa. 54; Quigley v. Thompson, 211 Pa. 107; Reibstein v. Abbott's Alderney Dairies, 264 Pa. 447.
The plaintiff lived on Parade street, only a block from where he fell. He had lived there for three years, and, to develop from him not only his familiarity with the sidewalk, but his actual knowledge of its icy condition on the day he slipped and fell upon it, he was asked by counsel for defendant how he had gone to the point of the accident and how long he had been in the habit of traveling over the street. His answers to these questions, if they had been allowed, might have shown such knowledge by him of the dangerous condition of the street as made it inexcusable for Mm to attempt to walk over it at tbe time he fell. Tbe questions were disallowed, because tbe trial judge was of opinion that they related to matters upon which tbe witness bad not been interrogated on bis direct examination, and were attempts to introduce tbe defense by way of cross-examination. This ruling overlooked tbe fact that tbe city was not called upon to make any defense until tbe plaintiff bad presented a case clear of contributory negligence; and on bis direct examination be could not withhold any evidence tending to show that be bad contributed to tbe accident by bis own lack of care under tbe circumstances. Whatever, as to this, be failed to disclose, or was not developed on direct examination, it was tbe right of tbe defendant to elicit on cross-examination. He could keep nothing back within bis own knowledge that barred bis right to recover. If be did so, either voluntarily or by tbe failure of bis counsel to develop it on direct examination, the defendant's right was to call it forth on cross-examination, not as a matter of defense, but as part of tbe plaintiff's case, for tbe consideration of tbe court and jury, relieving tbe defendant from making any defense.
Tbe first and second assignments of error are sustained and tbe judgment is reversed with a venire facias de novo.