Case Name: The PEOPLE OF the TERRITORY OF GUAM, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. Jae Hung YANG, Defendant/Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1986-09-25
Citations: 800 F.2d 945
Docket Number: No. 85-1252
Parties: The PEOPLE OF the TERRITORY OF GUAM, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. Jae Hung YANG, Defendant/Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 800
Pages: 945–953

Head Matter:
The PEOPLE OF the TERRITORY OF GUAM, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. Jae Hung YANG, Defendant/Appellant.
No. 85-1252.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted March 24, 1986.
Decided Sept. 25, 1986.
Vance J.I. Guerena, Asst. Atty. Gen., Agana, Guam, for plaintiff/appellee.
Howard Trapp, Trapp & Untalan, Agana, Guam, for defendant/appellant.
Before FERGUSON, CANBY and HALL, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. Fed.R. App.P. 34(a) and Ninth Circuit Rule 3(f).

Opinion:
CANBY, Circuit Judge:
Jae Hung Yang appeals the decision of the Appellate Division of the District Court of Guam affirming his conviction for kidnapping and first degree criminal sexual conduct. Yang challenges the trial court's jury instructions. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 48 U.S.C.A. § 1424-3(c) (Supp. 1985). We affirm.
FACTS
On July 12, 1982, Jae Hung Yang was indicted for kidnapping and first degree criminal sexual conduct in violation of 9 Guam Code Ann. § 22.20(a)(2) and 9 Guam Code Ann. § 25.15(a)(6) & (b). Yang was tried by jury in the Superior Court of Guam. At the conclusion of trial, the trial court gave the jury the following instruction concerning the nature of reasonable doubt:
The test is one of reasonable doubt. And reasonable doubt is a doubt that's based upon common sense and reason and it's a kind of doubt that would make a reasonable person hesitate to do a certain act. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt, therefore, is prove [sic] of such a convincing character that would make a reasonable person, without hesitation, rely and act upon it in the most important of his or her own affairs.
The trial court also gave the following instruction concerning the weighing of conflicting evidence:
As jurors you are not bound to decide in conforming [sic] with the number of witnesses [sic] which doesn't produce a conviction in your mind as against the testimony of lesser number. There are [sic] other evidence which appeals to your mind with more convincing force. This doesn't mean you're at liberty to disregard the testimony of the greater number of witnesses merely from caprice or prejudices or from a desire to favor one side or the other, as against the other. But it does not mean that you're not to decide an issue by a simple process of counting the number of witnesses who have testified on the opposing side. It simply means that the final test is not in the relative number of witnesses, but in the relative convincing force of the evidence.
(Emphasis added.) Yang did not object contemporaneously to either instruction.
Following conviction on both kidnapping and criminal sexual conduct counts, Yang appealed to the Appellate Division of the District Court of Guam. Yang alleged that the trial court's jury instructions were erroneous under Guam law. The District Court affirmed Yang's conviction relying on, inter alia, this court's decision in Guam v. Ignacio, 673 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir.1982). Yang now appeals.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
When reviewing the District Court of Guam's constructions of local law, we must affirm the District Court's determinations "if they are based upon a tenable theory and are not manifestly erroneous." La-guana v. Guam Vistors Bureau, 725 F.2d 519, 520 (9th Cir.1984) (quoting Chase Manhattan Bank v. Gems-by-Gordon, 649 F.2d 710, 712 (9th Cir.1981)). See also Electrical Construction & Maintenance Co. v. Maeda Pacific Corp., 764 F.2d 619, 620 & n. 1 (9th Cir.1985).
II. Reasonable Doubt Instruction
Yang contends that the district court erred in finding that the instructions on reasonable doubt given by the trial court did not constitute plain error. He argues that because the Guam provision defining reasonable doubt, 8 Guam Code Ann. § 90.23 (1980) is modeled on Cal. Penal Code § 1096 (West 1977), California case law strictly interpreting Cal. Penal Code § 1096 controls the construction of 8 Guam Code Ann. § 90.23. We reject this argument.
Although "[ajbsent controlling Guam authority . it [is] appropriate to look to California law for guidance," Smith v. Lujan, 588 F.2d 1304, 1306 (9th Cir. 1979), there is no need in the present case to look beyond the decisions of the Guam courts. In Guam v. Hilton, Cr.App. No. 82-00055A (D.Guam App.Div.1984), aff'd, 760 F.2d 276 (9th Cir.1985) (unpublished memorandum), the Appellate Division of the District Court of Guam held that section 90.23 permitted trial judges to vary from the reasonable doubt instruction set forth in subsection (a). In Guam v. Ignacio, Cr.App. No. 79-00036A (D.Guam App. Div.1980), aff'd, 673 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1982), the District Court approved a reasonable doubt instruction nearly identical with the one given by the trial court in this case. Yang does not attempt to distinguish these cases. They control.
III. Weighing of Conflicting Evidence Instruction
Yang next asserts that the trial court's instruction on the weighing of conflicting evidence was plain error. Yang argues that by directing the jury that "the final test is . the relative convincing force of the evidence," the trial court contradicted its earlier instruction concerning the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Contradictory or confusing instructions, Yang concludes, are grounds for reversal.
We disagree. The trial court's latter statement did not contradict its earlier instruction.
First, the trial court clearly established that the challenged statement was made in a context distinct from its earlier discussion of reasonable doubt. Having concluded its definition of reasonable doubt, the trial court declared, "And now we come to the question of credibility." Thus, we find it is unlikely that the jury misinterpreted the trial court's latter statement as redefining the nature of reasonable doubt.
Second, considered in context, the challenged statement merely asserted a truism about the importance of credibility. Rath er than instructing the jury on the proper degree of belief — beyond a reasonable doubt — the challenged statement instructed the jury on the proper basis of belief— "convincing force." Having remarked "you're not to decide an issue by a simple process of counting the number of witnesses on the opposing side," the trial court stated the correct basis for deciding an issue: " . the final test is not in the relative number of witnesses, but in the relative convincing force of the evidence." The point of the challenged statement is simply that beliefs should be based on the convincing force of the evidence, not the number of witnesses. We find this statement neither confusing nor objectionable.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's earlier instruction on the nature of reasonable doubt was a permissible formulation of the government's burden of proof, at least in the absence of objections. This instruction was neither contradicted nor obfuscated by the trial court's later statement concerning the weighing of conflicting evidence. Thus, the District Court did not err in finding that the trial court's instructions did not constitute plain error.
AFFIRMED.
. Yang does not contend that the trial court's instructions violated the federal due process requirement that guilt be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970).
. Although neither has been published, we are satisfied that Hilton and Ignacio constitute authoritative statements of Guam law to which we must defer. Unlike this circuit, the Guam courts afford the same respect to published and unpublished decisions. Hilton and Ignacio are both designated "Opinion" and lack any indication that they may not be cited in the courts of Guam. Furthermore, the rules of the District Court of Guam Appellate Division contain no provision analogous to 9th Cir.R. 21 which prohibits the citing of unpublished decisions in the courts of this circuit. Indeed, the Appellate Division's rules, insofar as they address the issue, suggest that simple filing is sufficient to make an opinion citable. See Dist.Ct.R.App.P. 22 (opinions shall be filed with the clerk of the district court "for preservation" and when filed, "shall be deemed to be recorded"). Absent a provision like 9th Cir.R. 21 mandating the contrary,' we conclude that a court's decision, whether published or not, states the law of its jurisdiction.
Finally, we note that just as we must defer to the Guam courts' interpretations of their substantive law, so we must defer to their understandings of what constitutes their decisional law. The Appellate Division relied on both Hilton and Ignacio. Its reliance on unpublished opinions was both tenable under its rules and consistent with the practice of Guam courts. See Lewis v. Lewis, 1 Gaum 235, 241 (D.Guam App.Div.1974) (Benson J., concurring) (describing unpublished case as "decisional restraint''); Guam Music, Inc. v. Manibusan, 1 Gaum 591, 592 (Sup.Ct.Guam 1979) (citing unpublished Guam decision); Guam v. Rico, 1 Guam 586, 588. (Sup.Ct.Guam 1979) (same); Guam v. Aguon, 1 Guam 306, 306 (Sup.Ct.Guam 1976) (noting that "courts of lower rank cannot deviate from precedents established by courts which possess appellate jurisdiction over same," court relies on unpublished decision). We defer to the Appellate Division's treatment of its unpublished decisions as authoritative.