Case Name: Charles Dexheimer, administrator, plaintiff and respondent agt. Conrad Gautier, defendant and appellant
Court: New York Superior Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1867-01
Citations: 34 How. Pr. 472
Docket Number: 
Parties: Charles Dexheimer, administrator, plaintiff and respondent agt. Conrad Gautier, defendant and appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Howard's Practice Reports
Volume: 34
Pages: 472–477

Head Matter:
N. Y. SUPERIOR COURT.
Charles Dexheimer, administrator, plaintiff and respondent agt. Conrad Gautier, defendant and appellant.
A delivery as a free and voluntary gift of money by a soldier, at or about the time of Ills enlistment into the army, constituting a portion of his bounty money, to a friend, with directions to keep the same as a gift, in case of his decease, does not constitute it a donatio mortis causa. (Barbour, J., dissenting.)
General Term, January, 1867.
Robertson, Ch. J., and S. B. Garvin and j. M. Barbour, Justices.
Appeal by the defendant from-a judgment for plaintiff at special term.
Stallknecht & Hall, for defendant, appellant.
John J. Freedman, for plaintiff, respondent.
I. The defendant and appellant, at the trial, waiving all other points, proposed to rest his defense exclusively upon the ground that the gift set up in the answer was a donatio mortis eatisa; but his offer of proof was insufficient, in not showing that the gift was made by the donor:
1. In peril of death at the time it was made; and
2. With relation to his decease by illness affecting him at the time of the gift; and
3. That it was conditioned to take effect on the death of the donor by his disorder then existing.
These are essential to constitute a donatio mortis causa, and unless they all concur, there is no valid gift. (Dayton on Surrog. 3d. ed. pp. 262 and 263, and cases there cited.)
Courts do not uphold such gifts unless they are attended by all the requisites which the law requires. The policy of the law is against the encouragement of such gifts. (Dayton on Surrog. 3d ed. p. 266.)
The proof offered, on the contrary, showed that the money was bounty money, and was delivered by an able-bodied man to the appellant, at the time of his enlistment into the army of the United States, in 1864, after having auccessfully passed the examination made by the surgeon with regard to his health and bodily fitness, as prescribed by the United States laws.
H. The answer does not set up facts sufficients to consti tute a valid donatio mortis causa, and the appellant having' failed at the trial to move for leave to amend Ms answer by setting up the necessary facts in this respect, he could not be permitted to give any evidence of them.
For the foregoing reasons, the order denying the motion for a new trial, and the judgment entered in this action, should be affirmed.

Opinion:
By the court, Robertson, Ch. J.
The only defense which the answer in. this case sets up is, that the intestate (Jacob Dexheimer), of whose estate the plaintiff is administrator, gave the sum sued for to the defendant, in case of the death of the former at any time, without reference to any specific imminent peril. The defendant's counsel offered on the trial to prove that the. gift was one " mortis causa," and made "about the time the intestate went to the war," and that he was "killed in the war" without having revoked it.
Thereupon, it being admitted that the money claimed was delivered to the defendant by the intestate, when he enlisted in the army, and was part of his bounty money, the court refused to receive such facts in evidence, and held that the facts stated in the answer did not constitute any defense, and directed a verdict for the plaintiff. To which refusal, decision and direction, exceptions were duly taken by the defendant.
Such a gift as that alleged in the answer was clearly either an absolute one, or void. Death by any casualty, at any time, did not render it a "donatio mortis causa," because it. was inevitable. No case is to be found of a donatio mortis causa, unless by some imminent peril, and when that has passed away, the giver has a right to revoke it. It is immaterial whether such a gift be a conditional one, dependent upon the escape of the donor from impending peril, or a revocable one, dependent upon his death thereby, without any revocation, or whether the peril be confined to sickness, or may include the dangers of traveling, navigation or battle. (Just. Inst. Lib. 2, 7; 2 Kent's Com. 444; Dayton on Sur. 3d ed. 262, 263.)
The evidence subsequently introduced by way of admission did not establish a gift at all. The answer, therefore, .either did not contain a defense, or was unproved, and the direction to find a verdict for plaintiff was proper.
.The judgment and order denying a new trial should be affirmed, with costs,
Garvin, J., concurred.