Case Name: BISHOP et ux. v. WILLIAMS et al.
Court: Texas Courts of Civil Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1920-01-15
Citations: 223 S.W. 512
Docket Number: No. 6127
Parties: BISHOP et ux. v. WILLIAMS et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 223
Pages: 512–527

Head Matter:
BISHOP et ux. v. WILLIAMS et al.
(No. 6127.)
(Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Austin.
Jan. 15, 1920.
On Appellees’ Motion for Rehearing, April 1, 1920.
Dissenting Opinion, April 8, 1920.
On Appellants’ Motion for Rehearing, June 29, 1920.)
On Appellees’ 'Motion for Rehearing.
1. Husband and wife <§=>249 — Land conveyed to husband held his separate property.
Where a part of the consideration for mother’s deed to married son was services rendered mother by son prior to his marriage, pursuant to mother’s contract to convey the land in consideration for such services, the land was son’s separate property, though community funds may subsequently have been used to pay for it.
2. Homestead <&wkey;8l— May be of separate as well as community property.
A homestead right attaches to' separate as well as community property.
3. Homestead <§=>124 — Husband’s deed to separate property constituting homestead becomes operative on abandonment.
Husband’s deed to his separate property, constituting the homestead, without wife’s signature, is inoperative as long as the property remains the homestead, but on subsequent abandonment of the homestead the deed be-, comes operative, and vests title in grantee.
4. Homestead <&wkey;>154 — Husband may abandon homestead rights on. either separate or community property.
The husband, as head of the family, has the right to abandon homestead rights on either separate or community property, while acting in good faith.
5. Homestead &wkey;>l64 — Rule as to abandonment stated.
When wife voluntarily leaves homestead, and goes with husband elsewhere, and the husband believing that he is doing what is best for himself and family, without any intention to defraud his wife, forms the intention in his own mind never to return and use. the property as a homestead, the property ceases to be a homestead as soon as such removal and intention concur, though no other homestead has been acquired.
6. Homestead <§=>161 — Husband may abandon homestead in good faith without wife’s consent.
Husband’s right to abandon homestead without wife’s consent, when in so doing he acts in good faith, is not dependent on wife voluntarily leaving the property and ceasing to use it as her home.
7. Deeds <§=>190 — Want of consideration must be pleaded.
In action to recover land conveyed to plaintiff by defendant, the defense that the deed was without any consideration, to be available, must have been pleaded;
8. Deeds <&wkey;>!5 — Deed between parent and child need not be based on valuable consideration.
A deed from parent to child, or from child to parent, need not be supported by a valuable consideration.
9. Husband and wife <§=>6(2) — Husband could convey separate property by deed of gift.
Husband could convey his separate property by deed of gift, if conveyance did not impair homestead rights or rights of creditors.
10. Adverse possession <&wkey;(4 — No title to [and by limitations without possession, except through a tenant.
Plaintiff could not acquire by limitations title to land of which she had never been in possession, unless person in possession had possession as her tenant.
11. Homestead <§=>f8f(3) — Evidence held to show abandonment.
In action to recover land conveyed’to plaintiff by defendant, where defense was that the deed was void as a conveyance of a homestead without wife joining therein, evidence held to warrant finding that removal of defendant and his family from the property was with the intention on defendant’s part never to return and use it again as a homestead, and that in so removing with such intention he was not actuated by any desire or purpose to defraud his wife concerning homestead rights.
12. Homestead <§=>162(1) — Husband may abandon homestead in his separate property.
Husband could abandon homestead rights in his separate property by removal, without wife having notice of his intention to so do.
13. Homestead <§=>163 — May be abandoned without ceasing to use land.
Cultivation of land does not disprove previous abandonment of the land as a homestead, and owner may, without intending to niake it his home again, cultivate, rent, or otherwise utilize the property after removal; abandon ment of homestead not signifying abandonment of claim to ownership.
14. Homestead <&wkey;!8l(3) — Husband’s conveyance without consideration does not show that abandonment was in fraud of wife.
That husband, after abandonment of homestead, deeded it to his mother without any pecuniary consideration, does not necessarily show that his prior abandonment of the property was for the purpose of defrauding his wife.
On Appellants’ Motion for Rehearing.
15. Frauds, statute of «&wkey;l28 — Deed executed pursuant to parol contract not void.
That contract to convey was in parol did not render deed executed pursuant thereto invalid under the statute of frauds; the parol contract not being void, but merely unenforceable, apd vendor having waived benefit of the statute by complying with the contract and executing the deed.
16. Appeal and error &wkey;>854(l) — Judgment should be upheld, if it can be sustained on any issue.
Where the judgment of the trial court may be sustained on any issue raised’by the pleadings and the evidence, it should be upheld by the appellate court.
Jenkins, J., dissenting.
Appeal from District Court, Coleman County; J. O. Woodward, Judge.
Suit by Mrs. Mary C. Williams and others against Berry Bishop and wife. Judgment for • plaintiffs, and defendants appeal.
Affirmed.
W. Marcus Weatherred,' of Coleman, for appellants.
Critz & Woodward, of Coleman, for ap-pellees.

Opinion:
Findings of Fact.
JENKINS, J.
.This suit was brought by Mary C. Williams and her children by her second marriage, against Berry Bishop, her son by a former marriage, and his wife, Mep-pie Bishop, to recover 80 acres of land.
Mrs. Williams bought 275 acres of land soon after the death of her second husband, paying therefor $2,000, the community property of herself and her second husband, and executing her three promissory vendor's lien notes, for $250 each, payable in one, two, and three years, respectively, after December 11, 1901.
Berry Bishop was not married at that time, and .was not living with his mother, but at her request he came home, under an agreement with her that he would work the farm on the 275-acre tract, support her and her family, and pay the notes as they fell due, in consideration of which she agreed to deed him the 80 acres of land in controversy, which adjoined the 275-acre tract. It does not appear how she obtained this 80-acre tract. This agreement was complied with by Bishop, and on December 11, 1903, Mrs. Williams executed a deed to him for the land in controversy, reciting the fulfillment by Bishop of the contract above referred to.
Bishop married his coappellant May 24, 1903, and they occupied the land in controversy as their homestead until the fall of 1917, at which time they moved to the town of Coleman, Bishop obtaining work as a section hand, and they lived in a rented house to the time of the trial hereof.
On November 5, 1904, Bishop executed a deed to his mother for the land in controversy, reciting as a consideration her promissory vendor's lien note for $700. In fact, no such note was given, nor intended to be given. No consideration was paid, nor promised, for the execution of such deed. At the time of the execution of such deed, Bishop promised his mother to pay her, annually, the usual crop rents on this land, and he did so to the time of the trial. Mrs. Bishop did not join in the execution of this deed, and it is not made to appear that she knew of same, or of the agreement to pay rent, or of the payment thereof.
Bishop's explanation as to why he executed this deed to his mother is that her other children were complaining to his mother about her having deeded this land to him, and that he executed the deed to prevent her being annoyed, and that he agreed to pay her rent as a contribution to her support. This explanation was not denied by Mrs. Williams.
On August 9, 1918, Bishop executed a deed to the land in controversy to his mother. Mrs. Bishop refused to join in this deed.
The case was tried by the court without a jury, and judgment was rendered for appel-lees.
Such other facts as are material will be stated in our opinion herein.
Opinion.
The trial court did not file its findings of fact or conclusions of law, and hence we do not know upon what theory the judgment was rendered. Under the pleadings and the evidence, it could have been rendered only upon the plea of limitation by appellees, or upon the theory that the homestead had been abandoned when the deed of August 9, 1918, was executed.
The plea of limitation finds no support in the evidence. Mrs. Williams was never in possession of the land, unless she held same through Berry Bishop as her tenant. The deed to her of November 5, 1904, was void, for the reason that the land was then the homestead of Bishop and wife, and the wife did not join in the execution of the same. A husband cannot change the homestead character of land, upon which he and his wife continue to reside, by attorning to one who has no title to same. Dykes v. O'Conner, 83 Tex. 161, 18 S. W. 490; Dotson v. Barnett, 41 S. W. 100; Williams v. Galveston, 58 S. W. 552; Lumpkin v. Woods, 135 S. W. 1141.
If the land had not been abandoned as a homestead by appellants at the time of the execution of the deed of August 9, 1918, it of course conveyed no title to Mrs. Williams. Abandonment of a homestead consists in removal from the same, combined with the intention not to again return and occupy it. Mr. Woodward, who drew the deed last above referred to, testified that Bishop, at that time, told him that when he left the place he never intended to go back to it, and had abandoned it as his homestead. This, though denied by Bishop, must be, for the purposes of this appeal, taken as true.
Proof of an intention to abandon a homestead must be clear and conclusive. Gouhenant v. Cockrell, 20 Tex. 98; Cross v. Everts, 28 Tex. 534; Wynne v. Hudson, 66 Tex. 9, 17 S. W. 110; Ayers v. Shackey, 2 Posey, Unrep. Cas. 275.
A husband cannot deprive a wife of her homestead by abandoning the same, where such abandonment is not in good faith and is in fraud of the rights of the wife. Smith v. Uzzell, 56 Tex. 318; Gray v. Fussell, 48 Tex. Civ. App. 261, 106 S. W. 455; Brewery Association v. Walker, 23 Tex. Civ. App. 6, 54 S. W. 361; Myers v. Evans, 81 Tex. 319, 16 S. W. 1061; Huss v. Wells, 17 Tex. Civ. App. 195, 44 S. W. 34-35; Medlenka v. Downing, 59 Tex. 40. In Smith v. Uzzell, supra, as quoted with approval in Hudgins v. Thompson, 211 S. W. 587, the court said:
"If, however, the husband, in fraud of the rights of the wife, and without her consent, should seek by an abandonment to withdraw the homestead from the pale of its exemption given for the benefit of the family, he could have no power to do so."
We are of the opinion that the evidence is insufficient to support a finding, if any was made, that Bishop abandoned his home in good faith, and without the intent to defraud his wife of her right to her homestead. The evidence upon which we base this conclusion is: (1) Tf Bishop had any intention to abandon his homestead, it does not appear that he made such fact known to his wife, who had no such intention. (2) The circumstances under which they left their home did not put her upon notice of such intention. (3) Bishop left home for the purpose of employment, rendered necessary by the drouth, in order to support his family. (4) Mrs. Bishop moved with her husband to the town of Coleman, in order to school her children and to be with her husband. (5) They moved into a rented house, and never acquired or attempted to acquire any other homestead. (6) Bishop attempted to cultivate the farm in 1918 (which was also a year of drouth in that country), by breaking all of the land, renting a part of it to tenants, and hiring a hand to cultivate a part of it. (7) He received no consideration for the deed to his mother. (8) Mrs. Williams is not shown to have taken possession of the land. (9) The deed to Mrs. Williams, if allowed to take effect, constitutes a gift of the community property of Bishop and his wife, which she was claiming as a homestead, she having done no act inconsistent with such claim.
Bad faith on the part of the husband was not an issue in Hudgins v. Thompson, supra. It does not appear that the wife objected to the contract to sell the homestead to Hudgins, but only that she was not consulted as to such transaction. It appears that she went with her husband, and willingly resided upon a rented place until another homestead was obtained, and that she joined, in' statutory form, in a deed to the former homestead to another party. There is nothing in the case to show that Thompson did not in fact act for the best interest of his family, or that his wife ever doubted that he was doing so.
In Smith v. Uzzell, supra, the court said:
"In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it ought to be presumed, when a removal from a homestead is made, that it was made in good faith and with the consent of the wife."
For the reasons stated, judgment of the trial court is reversed, and this cause is remanded for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.
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