Case Name: Kenneth Allen STEWART, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2001-09-20
Citations: 801 So. 2d 59
Docket Number: No. SC96177
Parties: Kenneth Allen STEWART, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: WELLS, C.J., HARDING and LEWIS, JJ., and PADOVANO, Associate Justice, concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 801
Pages: 59–78

Head Matter:
Kenneth Allen STEWART, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. SC96177.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Sept. 20, 2001.
Rehearing Denied Nov. 26, 2001.
Harry P. Brody, Assistant CCRC-Mid-dle, and Jeffrey M. Hazen, CCRC-Middle Attorney, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel-Middle, Tampa, FL, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Carol M. Dittmar, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, FL, for Appellee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Kenneth Allen Stewart, an inmate under sentence of death, appeals an order entered by the trial court denying his motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court's order denying post-conviction relief.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 1986, Stewart was convicted of first-degree felony murder, attempted second-degree murder with a firearm, robbery with a firearm, and arson. In brief, the evidence established the following:
In April 1985, Michele Acosta and Mark Harris picked up appellant, Kenneth Stewart, while he was hitchhiking. When Acosta stopped to drop Stewart off, he struck her on the head with the butt of a gun and fired three shots, hitting Acosta in the shoulder and Harris in the spine. Stewart then forced Acosta and Harris from the car before driving off and picking up a friend, Terry Smith. The two removed items from the car's trunk and Stewart burned the car after telling Smith that the car belonged to a woman and a man whom he had shot. Acosta recovered from her injuries; Harris later died.
Stewart v. State, 549 So.2d 171, 172 (Fla.1989).
Following the penalty phase of the trial, the jury recommended death and the trial court imposed the death penalty. The trial court found two aggravating factors: (1) that Stewart had prior violent felony convictions (attempted first-degree murder, attempted second-degree murder with a firearm, and armed robbery); and (2) that the murder was committed during the course of a robbery. In mitigation the trial court found: (1) that the murder was committed under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance; (2) Stewart's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substan tially impaired; (3) Stewart's age at the time of the offense was twenty-one. The court accorded these mitigating factors little or slight weight.
On appeal, this Court affirmed Stewart's convictions, but remanded the case so that the trial court could provide written findings in support of its imposition of the death penalty and its departure from the sentencing guidelines in imposing a life sentence for the attempted second-degree murder conviction. See Stewart, 549 So.2d at 177. On remand, the trial court reduced to writing its findings on aggravation and mitigation in support of the death sentence, which this Court affirmed on appeal. See Stewart v. State, 588 So.2d 972 (Fla.1991).
On August 2, 1993, Stewart filed his initial motion for postconviction relief. Stewart subsequently amended that motion, filing the present version on September 17, 1996, raising twenty-four claims. The trial court summarily denied the bulk of Stewart's claims as procedurally barred or insufficiently pled. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on Stewart's remaining claims: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel during the pretrial and guilt phases; (2) State's failure to produce jail records in violation of Brady; (3) inadequate mental health assistance; and (4) ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase. Following the evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied Stewart relief.
II. APPEAL
Stewart raises the following ten issues in this appeal: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel during the guilt and penalty phases; (2) State faded to produce jail records in violation of Brady; (3) penalty phase jury instructions diminished the jury's sense of responsibility in violation of Caldwell; (4) penalty phase jury instructions shifted burden to Stewart to prove that death sentence was inappropriate in violation of Caldwell; (5) death sentence rests on unconstitutional automatic aggravating circumstance; (6) statute setting forth aggravating factors is vague and overbroad; (7) vague and overbroad prosecutorial argument on aggravating circumstances and ineffectiveness of counsel for failing to object to the same; (8) shackling during trial and penalty phase denied Stewart fair trial; (9) capital sentencing statute is unconstitutional on its face and as applied; and (10) cumulative error.
III. ANALYSIS
At the outset, we dispose of several claims because they are procedurally barred or clearly without merit as a matter of law. We now turn to address the remainder of the claims.
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Stewart alleges trial counsel was ineffective in: (1) failing to employ voluntary intoxication as a defense and as mitigation; (2) failing to investigate and present evidence of Stewart's alleged childhood abuse; (3) failing to obtain Stewart's jail records; and (4) failing to adequately prepare Stewart's mental health expert.
For Stewart to succeed in his ineffectiveness claims he must satisfy two elements:
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); see also State v. Riechmann, 777 So.2d 342, 349 (Fla.2000); Downs v. State, 740 So.2d 506, 515 (Fla.1999); Rutherford v. State, 727 So.2d 216, 219 (Fla.1998). Additionally, and because the Strickland standard requires establishment of both prongs, when a defendant fails to make a showing as to one prong, it is not necessary to delve into whether he has made a showing as to the other prong. See 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ("[Tjhere is no reason for a court deciding an effective assistance claim . to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one."); see, e.g., Downs v. State, 740 So.2d 506, 518 n. 19 (Fla.1999) (finding no need to address prejudice prong where defendant failed to establish deficient performance prong).
Failure to Employ Voluntary Intoxication Defense
First, Stewart claims that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to employ a voluntary intoxication defense or request a jury instruction on the defense. We disagree. Claims expressing mere disagreement with trial counsel's strategy are insufficient: "Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective merely because current counsel disagrees with trial counsel's strategic decisions. Moreover, strategic decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if alternative courses have been considered and rejected and counsel's decision was reasonable under the norms of professional conduct." Occhicone v. State, 768 So.2d 1037, 1048 (Fla.2000) (citations omitted). The record of both the eviden-tiary hearing and trial demonstrates that trial counsel considered a voluntary intoxication defense but rejected it for strategic reasons.
During the evidentiary hearing, Stewart's trial counsel, Rex Barbas, testified that he considered the defense of voluntary intoxication given the fact that some of the evidence in the case indicated that Stewart had been drinking on the day of the offense, but opted against it after determining it was not a viable defense for Stewart. Specifically, Barbas testified that his conversations with Stewart persuaded him that voluntary intoxication defense would be inappropriate given Stewart's detailed account of the crime, which included a statement to Barbas that he planned to shoot and rob the victims.
Moreover, Barbas testified that further militating against the employment of a voluntary intoxication defense was the State's potential use of the experts who examined Stewart to determine his competency to stand trial. Drs. Mussenden and Gonzalez would have been available to testify about Stewart's detailed account of the circumstances of the crime. Barbas concluded that such testimony would more than negate any potential benefit of a voluntary intoxication defense.
In sum, the record demonstrates that counsel made an informed and reasoned decision not to pursue a voluntary intoxication defense. See Occhicone, 768 So.2d at 1048 (affirming denial of petitioner's ineffectiveness claim for counsel's failure to present additional evidence in support of voluntary intoxication defense where defense counsel testified that they chose against presenting the additional evidence because of taped statements made by the petitioner to a psychologist which demonstrated that the defendant "had a good recall of what transpired the night of the murders and therefore was not intoxicated to the level of not being able to premeditate the murders"); Johnson v. State, 593 So.2d 206, 209 (Fla.1992) (holding that counsel's decision not to pursue voluntary intoxication defense was a strategic decision, not deficient performance, where defense counsel testified that he rejected the defense because the defendant "recounted the incident with 'great detail and particularity' in his confession").
Failure to Investigate
Stewart next contends that trial counsel was deficient for failing to investigate and present evidence of Stewart's alleged childhood abuse at the hands of his stepfather, Bruce Scarpo. We disagree.
In further explaining the "deficiency" prong of the ineffectiveness of counsel test, we have recognized that "the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" based on "prevailing professional norms." Cherry v. State, 781 So.2d 1040, 1048 (Fla.2000) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052). "In evaluating this prong, courts are required to . make every effort to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight by evaluating the performance from counsel's perspective at the time." Blanco v. State, 507 So.2d 1377, 1381 (Fla.1987). Moreover, "[t]here is a 'strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.'- " Asay v. State, 769 So.2d 974, 984 (Fla.2000) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052).
"[A]n attorney has a strict duty to conduct a reasonable investigation of a defendant's background for possible mitigating evidence." Riechmann, 777 So.2d at 350 (emphasis added) (citing Rose v. State, 675 So.2d 567, 571 (Fla.1996)). We have also said, "The failure to investigate and present available mitigating evidence is a relevant concern along with the reasons for not doing so." Rose, 675 So.2d at 570 (citing Hildwin v. Dugger, 654 So.2d 107, 109-10 (Fla.1995)).
In this instance, the record clearly establishes that defense counsel Barbas' actions in preparation for Stewart's penalty phase were nothing short of reasonable. Barbas hired two investigators, Sonny and Diane Fernandez (both, as the trial court noted in its order, "very experienced in researching and investigating mitigation issues for capital cases") to investigate Stewart's case in both the guilt and penalty phases. Sonny Fernandez indicated he interviewed both of Stewart's stepsisters prior to the penalty phase hearing. At no time did either one of them mention any abuse of Stewart at the hands of his stepfather. Fernandez indicated he would normally seek such information during the penalty phase and that his notes would reflect any affirmative responses by either of the stepsisters with regards to abuse by Scarpo; however, Fernandez's witness information sheets contained no indication that either of them stated that Scarpo abused them or Stewart.
In addition, Barbas testified that he personally interviewed potential witnesses, including Stewart's stepsisters, his aunt, his grandparents, and Lasha LaRue (a family friend). Barbas specifically indicated that he talked with both of Stewart's stepsisters prior to the penalty phase, but neither one ever mentioned that Scarpo had abused them or Stewart. Scarpo, himself, never led Barbas to believe anything other than that Scarpo was a loving and caring father to Stewart.
Furthermore, this Court has recognized, "the reasonableness of counsel's actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the defendant's own statements or actions." Cherry, 781 So.2d at 1050 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052). Barbas testified that, in his discussions with Stewart, Stewart generally described a happy childhood in his time with Scarpo and that Stewart never told him that he suffered any type of abuse by Scarpo. Nor did Stewart ever contradict Searpo's accounts that Stewart had a very happy home life with him. Moreover, the defense psychiatrist, Dr. Afield, met with Stewart three times prior to the penalty phase, and Stewart mentioned nothing about abuse in the Scarpo household, nor was there any information about it in any of the other doctor's reports examined by Afield. Therefore, by failing to communicate to defense counsel (or the defense psychiatrist) regarding any instances of childhood abuse, Stewart may not now complain that trial counsel's failure to pursue such mitigation was unreasonable. See Cherry, 781 So.2d at 1050.
Additionally, defense counsel's alleged inaction in the instant case, i.e., "failing to pursue the potential evidence of Scarpo's abuse of Stewart," is in stark contrast to the inactions by defense counsels in those cases where this Court found counsel's representation deficient. In these cases, and in contrast to the instant case, defense counsel failed to investigate or present any mitigation.
In this instance, trial counsel conducted a reasonable investigation, presented appropriate penalty phase evidence, and forcefully argued for the jury to recommend sparing Stewart's life. Thus, the investigation and presentation of mitigating evidence in this case was well within the realm of constitutionally adequate assistance of counsel.
Failure to Obtain Records
Stewart also alleges that his attorney was ineffective for failing to obtain and present jail records detailing several suicide attempts by Stewart. During the ev-identiary hearing, however, Barbas testified that he had seen all the jail records indicating that Stewart had attempted suicide and recalled having reviewed associated medical treatment records. Furthermore, Stewart's mental health expert testified at the evidentiary hearing that he was aware of the suicide attempts and considered that fact in his diagnosis that Stewart was suffering from major depression. Accordingly, we find no merit to Stewart's claim.
Failure to Prepare Mental Health Expert
Stewart next argues that attorney Barbas inadequately prepared Stewart's mental health expert to testify at the penalty phase of Stewart's trial. As to this claim, we agree with the trial court, which found that counsel's preparation of the defense's mental health expert, Dr. Afield, was not deficient:
In this ground, Defendant alleges that Dr. Afield was called in at the last minute as the defense's mental health expert and was not properly prepared. Dr. Afield testified that he had previously been certified as an expert in the fields of psychiatry, neuropsychology, and neurology several hundred times. According to Dr. Afield's bills, he testified that he interviewed Defendant three or four times prior to trial. On cross-examination, Mr. Chalu refreshed Mr. Barbas's recollection regarding the number of times Dr. Afield had seen Defendant prior to trial. Mr. Chalu reviewed Dr. Afield's testimony in the penalty phase transcript as to when Dr. Afield first met Defendant. Dr. Afield stated that he met Defendant the week of August 11th, and saw him three times prior to trial. Dr. Afield also reviewed numerous medical records and documents prior to trial.
Mr. Barbas testified that Dr. Afield got his information about Defendant from his interviews with Defendant himself, from Mr. Barbas' interviews with friends and family members, and from the court testimony that Dr. Afield heard. Mr. Barbas also met with Dr. Afield before the [sic] testified at trial. In addition to his interviews of Defendant, he also did psychological and neurological testing of Defendant. Although he found Defendant to be disturbed, he found no evidence of brain damage or psychosis. He diagnosed Defendant as having major depression. He also testified that he was aware of Defendant's alcoholism and drug abuse, as well as Defendant's suicide attempts, major depression, and anti-social behavior. He testified that he was aware of the abuse and deprived childhood Defendant had suffered from birth to age 5, but Defendant never told him of the Scarpo abuse. Dr. Afield stated that his testimony to the jury was emphatic that Defendant's disturbed behavior and anti-social traits were caused by the years of abuse and were beyond his control. When asked if he had known about the years of the Scarpo abuse, whether it would have changed or modified his opinion or testimony at trial, Dr. Afield replied that he did not think so, it would have only served to confirm his opinion.
Mr. Barbas testified that Dr. Afield stated in his trial testimony that Defendant was a sociopath and could not be rehabilitated. Mr. Barbas stated that Dr. Afield explained to him that Defendant's problems were due to Defendant finding out at age thirteen: that Mr. Scarpo was not his real father, his mother was a lesbian and committed suicide, the form of his uncle's death, and his real father was killed in a bar fight, along with all of the abuse that occurred prior to age five.
Dr. Afield testified that when he stated that Defendant could not be rehabilitated, he meant that Defendant did not deserve the death penalty because he was a victim of some bad circumstances that were not his fault.
After reviewing Defendant's Motion, the court files, and the trial and eviden-tiary hearing transcripts, the Court finds that Dr. Afield, after interviewing and testing Defendant and reviewing all available documentation concerning Defendant's psycho-social history, rendered adequate assistance on Defendant's behalf. Therefore, this ground is denied.
Order Denying Defendant's Third Amended Motion to Vacate Judgments of Conviction and Sentence with Special Request for Leave to Amend at 21-23, State v. Stewart, Nos. 85-4025, 85-4825 (Fla. 13th Cir.Ct. Jun. 25, 1999).
B. Brady Violation
Stewart next argues the trial court erred in denying Stewart's claim that the State failed to provide jail records to his attorney prior to trial in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). To be entitled to relief under Brady, a defendant must satisfy three elements: "[1] The evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; [2] that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and [3] prejudice must have ensued." Way v. State, 760 So.2d 903, 910 (Fla.2000) (quoting Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999)). The evidence at the evidentiary hearing supports the trial court's conclusion that Stewart failed to carry his burden as to the second prong of his Brady claim:
On cross-examination, Mr. Brody asked Mr. Skye if the State had ever obtained the Hillsborough County jail records. Mr. Skye stated that since there was no discovery for the penalty phase in 1985 or 1986, his recollection was that the State never obtained, thought about, or cared about those records. When asked if he thought the State had no Brady obligation to provide the jail records to the defense, Mr. Skye stated, "I would say that's true because my understanding of the Brady [sic] is that the state attorney or the prosecutor doesn't have an obligation to go out and seek out exculpatory things [that] are equally available to the defendant."
In view of the fact that the Hillsbor-ough county jail records were equally available to [the] Defendant or anyone who subpoenaed them, the court finds that the State did not suppress or withhold those records.
Accordingly, the trial court was correct to deny Stewart's Brady claim. See Provenzano v. State, 616 So.2d 428, 430 (Fla.1993) ("There is no Brady violation where the information is equally accessible to the defense and the prosecution, or where the defense either had the information or could have obtained it through the exercise of reasonable diligence.") (citing Hegwood v. State, 575 So.2d 170, 172 (Fla.1991), and James v. State, 453 So.2d 786, 790 (Fla.1984)).
C. Shackling
In Stewart's remaining claim, he argues that the trial court erred in summarily denying his claim that his equal protection and due process rights were violated by his being shackled in front of the jury. On Stewart's direct appeal we determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to remove Stewart's shackles following a defense objection:
Later, on Stewart's motion for a new trial, the court after hearing argument from both sides, ruled that the shackles were both unobtrusive and necessary. The judge pointed out that Stewart had remained stationary during the trial, thus giving the jury no opportunity to see him walk in shackles, and that the shackles were barely visible under the table. The judge was also aware that Stewart had on a previous occasion slipped off his manacles, and was facing charges of escape and attempted escape. The judge therefore had reason to believe that Stewart was a high risk prisoner who had previously tried to escape and thus presented a security risk. Though we recognize that shackling is an "inherently prejudicial practice," the trial court, in this instance, properly exercised its discretion to ensure the security and safety of the proceeding.
Stewart, 549 So.2d at 174 (citation omitted). Accordingly, the trial court was correct in summarily denying this claim as it was procedurally barred. Medina v. State, 573 So.2d 293, 295 (Fla.1990).
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's denial of Stewart's 3.850 motion.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., HARDING and LEWIS, JJ., and PADOVANO, Associate Justice, concur.
SHAW, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which ANSTEAD and PARIENTE, JJ., concur.
QUINCE, J., recused.
. The State's case focused on the testimony of Acosta, the eyewitness and surviving victim, describing the events surrounding Harris's murder and on Smith, who testified that Stewart had admitted the shootings and provided details about the offense. The State also presented testimony about a telephone conversation Stewart had with his grandmother, overheard by a police detective, wherein Stewart admitted that he shot the victims in order to rob them. Finally, the State offered forensic testimony that the bullets recovered from the scene matched a gun and ammunition found in Stewart's possession at the time of his arrest. Stewart did not present any evidence in defense; instead, Stewart's defense argued that the shooting was accidental based primarily on Acosta's testimony that Stewart struck her and fired three shots from the back seat immediately after she stepped on the car's accelerator in an effort to throw Stewart off balance.
. This Court reversed Stewart's life sentence for the armed robbery conviction and remanded the case for imposition of a guidelines sentence. See Stewart, 588 So.2d at 974.
. In his motion, Stewart incorrectly numbered his claims as though he had raised twenty-six claims. Consistent with the trial court's disposition of. these claims, Stewart's claims are numbered as they appeared in his 3.850 motion. Stewart's twenty-four claims were: (1) public records were withheld; (2) he was innocent of first-degree murder and was denied an adversarial testing; (3) counsel was ineffective at sentencing phase; (4) counsel was ineffective during voir dire; (5) the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963); (6) counsel was ineffective before trial and during the guilt phase; (7) the competency hearing was unreliable; (8) counsel was ineffective in failing to properly prepare mental health experts to make their competency evaluations; (9) Stewart was incompetent to proceed at all material stages; (10) he was provided inadequate mental health assistance due to inadequate time and documentation; (11) the penalty phase jury instructions diminished the juiy's sense of responsibility in violation of Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985); (12) the penalty phase jury instructions shifted the burden to the defense to prove that death sentence was not the appropriate punishment; (13) the finding that the murder was committed in the course of a felony constituted an unconstitutional automatic aggravating factor; (14) the statute providing aggravating circumstances is facially vague and over-broad; (17)[sic] the prosecutor made improper argument on aggravating circumstances in violation of Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079, 112 S.Ct. 2926, 120 L.Ed.2d 854 (1992), defense counsel was ineffective in not objecting to same; (18)[sic] the trial court erroneously refused to find mitigation based on evidence presented and excluded hearsay evidence in the penalty phase; (19) [sic] the mental health evaluation was inadequate as to mitigating factors involving voluntary intoxication; (20)[sic] the prosecutor engaged in misconduct and defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object; (21)[sic] Stewart was denied a proper direct appeal due to an incomplete record and counsel was ineffective in failing to ensure the preparation of the complete record; (22)[sic] the trial was unreliable due to ineffective assistance of counsel and Brady violations and because of newly discovered evidence; (23)[sic] there is newly discovered evidence; (24)[sic] Stewart was improperly shackled during the guilt and penalty phases of the trial; (25)[sic] the death penalty statute is unconstitutional; and (26)[sic] Stewart is entitled to relief due to cumulative error.
.The trial court summarily denied claims (7), (9), (11), (12), (13), (14), (17), (18), (20), (24), (25), and (26) as procedurally barred. Claims (2), (4), (8), (22), and (23) were summarily denied as insufficiently pled. The trial court denied claim (1) because, at the hearing held on April 2, 1997, pursuant to Huff v. State, 622 So.2d 982 (Fla.1993), the State relayed that all public records had been provided and Stewart made no allegations to the contrary. Moreover, the trial court noted that both parties agreed that all public records requests had been complied with up until the point of the trial court's denial of this claim. The trial court also summarily denied claim (19) as an abbreviated restatement of claim (10), without any specific factual support. Claim (21), alleging ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel in failing to ensure a complete record on appeal, was summarily denied as procedurally barred with respect to the claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and as inappropriate for treatment in a 3.850 motion with regards to the claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.
. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).
. Claims (3), (6), (7), and (9) are procedurally barred because they should have been raised on direct appeal. See Teffeteller v. Dugger, 734 So.2d 1009, 1026 (Fla.1999); Ragsdale v. State, 720 So.2d 203 (Fla.1998). Claims (4) and (5) are also procedurally barred because they were previously raised in Stewart's direct appeal and found to be without merit. See Garcia v. State, 622 So.2d 1325 (Fla.1993). Finally, Stewart asserts in claim (10) that he was denied a fundamentally fair trial due to the cumulative effect of the errors which occurred below. Because we determine that no errors occurred, we necessarily must conclude that this claim is also without merit. See, e.g., Downs v. State, 740 So.2d 506, 509 (Fla.1999) (concluding that where allegations of individual error do not warrant relief, a cumulative error argument based thereon is without merit).
. Stewart's claim of ineffectiveness for counsel's failure to request a jury instruction on voluntary intoxication is similarly without merit. At the evidentiary hearing, Barbas testified that he did not request the instruction because, in addition to the reasons detailed above, he did not believe he was entitled to an instruction on the evidence produced at trial. Trial counsel's conclusion in this regard was reasonable.
Furthermore, Barbas' decision to focus on mitigation portraying Stewart as a victim of circumstances beyond his control rather than emphasizing his drinking and chronic substance abuse was entirely reasonable, and the record contradicts Stewart's assertion that Stewart's mental health expert was not aware of this potential mitigating evidence. As such, Stewart's argument that counsel was ineffective for failing to present additional penalty phase evidence about Stewart's intoxication on the night of the murder is also without merit.
. Barbas noted the standard practice in Hills.borough County in 1986 was to only appoint one defense attorney for capital cases. Although he did not have co-counsel, Barbas testified that he had the assistance of other experienced attorneys in his office as well as the assistance of the investigative firm he hired to pursue penalty phase issues. It should also be noted that Barbas was not without capital trial experience. Barbas prosecuted capital cases while working at the State Attorney's Office from 1975 to 1979, and had defended ten capital defendants prior to Stewart. Stewart is the only one of Bar-bas' capital defendants to have ever received the death penalty.
.It should also be noted that, at the time of the evidentiary hearing, Linda Arnold, one of Stewart's stepsisters, never told anyone (including her husband) about the alleged abuse at the hands of Scarpo. In addition, Fernandez testified that he asked both stepsisters about coming to testify at the penalty phase, but both declined to do so. Moreover, at the time of the evidentiary hearing, Scarpo and his wife were no longer alive and, therefore, unable to rebut any of the stepdaughter's claims of abuse.
. During the evidentiary hearing, Dr. Afield confirmed that his new knowledge about possible abuse by Scarpo would not "in any manner" change or modify his opinion or any of his testimony from trial. Also, given the similarity between the evidence presented at trial (abuse of Stewart by his mother) and the evidence of abuse presented at the evidentiary hearing, the trial court's finding that the new evidence of abuse would not make a difference is reasonable and, therefore, should not be disturbed on appeal.
. See State v. Riechmann, 777 So.2d 342, 347-51 (Fla.2000) (finding representation deficient where counsel conducted "no investigation and presented no evidence of mitigation"); Rose v. State, 675 So.2d 567, 571-73 (Fla.1996) (finding representation deficient where "counsel made practically no investigation of mitigation"); Heiney v. State, 620 So.2d 171, 173-74 (Fla.1993) (remanding for new sentencing hearing because "counsel did not attempt to develop a case in mitigation . nor did he make any arguments on the defendant's behalf to the trial judge"); Phillips v. State, 608 So.2d 778, 782-83 (Fla.1992) (remanding for new sentencing proceeding where trial counsel did "virtually no preparation for the penalty phase"); Mitchell v. State, 595 So.2d 938, 941 (Fla.1992) (holding that penalty phase representation was ineffective where defense counsel presented no evidence of mitigation); State v. Lara, 581 So.2d 1288, 1289 (Fla.1991) (finding representation deficient where counsel "virtually ignored" preparation for penalty phase); Stevens v. State, 552 So.2d 1082, 1087-88 (Fla.1989) (remanding for new sentencing where trial counsel never interviewed defendant regarding his background and "made no attempt to offer evidence of a single mitigating factor").
.Barbas apparently provided sufficient evidence for the trial court to at least find the existence of three mitigating circumstances in favor of Stewart: (1) murder committed while under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance; (2) substantially impaired capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law; and (3) age at the time of the offense (twenty-one). The trial court also found "catch-all" mitigation related to "some sort of trauma" Stewart suffered at age 13, but gave it no weight.
. This case is analogous to Asay v. State, 769 So.2d 974, 987-88 (Fla.2000), where this Court rejected the defendant's argument that his counsel rendered deficient performance for failing to investigate and present certain nonstatutory mitigation, i.e., abusive and poverty-stricken childhood and history of alcohol and drug abuse. In Asay, collateral counsel presented evidence of a childhood where the defendant "suffered severe beatings at the hands of his parents, was deprived of food, and at age twelve provided sexual favors to men in exchange for money." Asay, 769 So.2d at 987. During the evidentiary hearing, penalty phase counsel testified that "he interviewed the defendant and his mother concerning the existence of mitigating circumstances and his investigator contacted additional potential witnesses regarding mitigation," but said he was not aware of the extent of abuse alleged in the 3.850 motion. Id. Nonetheless, this Court affirmed the trial court's finding that the penalty phase counsel conducted a reasonable investigation, "especially when coupled with penalty phase counsel's testimony as to the difficulty in obtaining information from Asay's mother." See id. at 988.
. Dr. Afield's testimony is borne out by the record of his penalty phase testimony:
A.... We then have a boy who runs away, winds up in a variety of institutions, essentially, gets in [sic] postgraduate course in how to be a psychopath. Tries to kill himself a few times. Winds up in the hospital.
ci Has he, in fact, attempted suicide since all this occurred?
A. Yes, it's my understanding he has. I think he will, again, at some point.
. Furthermore, both Barbas and Dr. Afield testified that they were at the very least aware of the content of those records, namely, that the defendant attempted to commit suicide in jail on several occasions and was subsequently hospitalized.