Case Name: Oscar Antonio LOPEZ-SANCHEZ v. STATE of Maryland and Deshawn C.
Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland
Jurisdiction: Maryland
Decision Date: 2005-07-28
Citations: 388 Md. 214
Docket Number: No. 43
Parties: Oscar Antonio LOPEZ-SANCHEZ v. STATE of Maryland and Deshawn C.
Judges: 
Reporter: Maryland Reports
Volume: 388
Pages: 214–251

Head Matter:
879 A.2d 695
Oscar Antonio LOPEZ-SANCHEZ v. STATE of Maryland and Deshawn C.
No. 43,
Sept. Term, 2004.
Court of Appeals of Maryland.
July 28, 2005.
Neil F. Quinter (McDermott Will & Emery LLP, Washington, DC, Russell P. Butler, Upper Marlboro, on brief), for petitioner/cross-respondent.
Julia Doyle Bernhardt, Asst. Public Defender (Nancy S. Forster, Public Defender, Eve L. Brensike, Asst. Public Defender, on brief), for respondents/cross-petitioners.
Keith S. Franz, Azrael, Gann & Franz, LLP, Towson, amicus curiae.
Argued before BELL, C.J., RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL, BATTAGLIA, and LAWRENCE F. RODOWSKY, (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.

Opinion:
RAKER, J.
Petitioner, the victim of a delinquent act, sought reconsideration of a Consent Order for Restitution that the Circuit Court for Howard County had approved without affording petitioner notice or opportunity to be heard. The Circuit Court, sitting as the Juvenile Court, denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. The Court of Special Appeals dismissed petitioner's appeal. We shall affirm.
I.
On February 29, 2000, respondent DeShawn C. shot petitioner, Oscar Antonio Lopez-Sanchez, in the back as petitioner was on his way home from work. The bullet fractured petitioner's spine and right rib, with bullet fragments and bone fragments remaining in the spinal canal. As a result of the shooting, petitioner is paralyzed permanently from the chest down.
The State filed a Petition for Delinquency in the Circuit Court for Howard County, sitting as a Juvenile Court, against DeShawn C. Following an adjudicatory hearing on October 27, 2000, a Juvenile Master found DeShawn C. to be involved as to attempted murder, first degree assault, second degree assault, and reckless endangerment. He was adjudicated a delinquent child and committed to the custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice (currently known as the Department of Juvenile Services).
On May 16, 2001, the State's Attorney's Office for Howard County certified that the crime victim notification request form described in Md.Code (2001, 2004 Cum.Supp.), § 11— 104(c) of the Criminal Procedure Article had been mailed or otheiwise delivered to petitioner. On May 25, 2001, petitioner filed the completed Crime Victim Notification Request Form.
The Circuit Court held a disposition review hearing on July 24, 2001. The primary subject of this hearing was the future placement of DeShawn C., who was scheduled to complete a program at Bowling Brook Academy on July 28. Petitioner was present at the hearing, and his written victim impact statement was submitted to the court. In the statement, petitioner recounted how he had come to the United States in order to send money home to his impoverished father and siblings in rural El Salvador, and how he had done so for two years by working at a Wendy's restaurant. He described himself as "a prisoner in my own body," dependant on others for "everything." He stated that "[t]his young man has robbed me of the dreams I had until only God knows when." The statement concluded with the words "[f]inally, Your Hon- or, I believe the law gives me the right to ask that this young man eventually make restitution to me for the harm he has done. I ask you to order him to pay restitution."
The following colloquy took place with respect to restitution:
"THE COURT: Well, one of the things that he said in his statement was about some type of restitution, was that adjudicated in front of the Master?
[PROSECUTOR:] No, Your Honor, it was not.
THE COURT: Is that still an open possibility, or is that — I mean, is that at this stage? Is that not available or what? I'm asking out of ignorance here.
[PROSECUTOR:] Your Honor, I don't know that it is. I don't believe that it is. My understanding is the initial — all the hospital bills and medical bills have been taken care of, that is still an attempt for Criminal Injury's Compensation Board that requires certain documents] that Mr. Lopez does not have at this particular point in time. It did not cover the continuing medications, and I take full responsibility for that, Your Honor."
On July 26, 2001, the Circuit Court entered an order committing DeShawn C. to the custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice until the age of 21, with the specifics of DeShawn C's placement to be at the Department's discretion. The order did not address restitution.
On July 28, 2001, petitioner submitted a written request for restitution pursuant to § 11-603 of the Criminal Procedure Article, together with a request for a restitution hearing. Included in this request was documentation of petitioner's economic losses, including pay stubs demonstrating lost wages exceeding $21,000. DeShawn C. filed a motion to dismiss the request, which the State opposed. The Court scheduled a restitution hearing, but postponed the hearing at the joint request of the DeShawn C. and the State, who were then attempting to negotiate an agreed-upon amount of restitution.
In June, 2002, DeShawn C. and the State submitted a proposed "Consent Order for Restitution." DeShawn C. was to pay petitioner $4,427.50 as restitution, reflecting only medical expenses, and not including petitioner's lost wages. The proposed order was not sent to petitioner, nor was petitioner notified that it had been submitted to the court. Without a hearing, the Court signed and filed the Consent Order for Restitution on June 20, 2002.
Petitioner was contacted on June 27, 2002 by an assistant state's attorney, who informed him that the Consent Order had been filed. Petitioner filed a Motion to Reconsider Order or, Alternatively, to Alter or Amend Judgment, asserting that he had been denied his right to receive notice of court proceedings under § ll-104(e) of the Criminal Procedure Article , and his presumptive right to restitution under § 11— 603(b) of the Criminal Procedure Article. He filed a Motion for Access to Court Records, asserting that he had good cause to access the records of the juvenile proceeding, as required under § 3-8A-27(b)(l) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. He requested that the restitution be increased from $4,427.50 to $10,000, the statutory limit in delinquency proceedings under § ll-604(b) of the Criminal Procedure Article. Both DeShawn C. and the State opposed the reconsideration motion on the grounds that petitioner was not a party to the delinquency proceeding and did not have standing to seek reconsideration of the order of restitution.
The Circuit Court held a hearing on April 16, 2003, and on May 1, 2003, denied the motion on the ground that "the victim in this case cannot be found to be a party, and therefore does not have standing before this court." The court stated as follows:
"The victim here does have a compelling case that he has not been compensated in any way that is commensurate with the severe injuries he has suffered and will suffer for the rest of his life. He remains confined to a wheelchair as a result of Respondent's actions and he likely will not soon be able to be fully employed because of language barriers and his low educational attainment as well as his disability. Mr. Lopez-Sanchez's situation is one that would merit attention if the Court had the power to address it. However, it appears that the current statutes and rules do not allow the Court to entertain a request for relief of the nature filed here where the State does not join in the request."
On June 2, 2003, petitioner filed both an Application for Leave to Appeal and a Notice of Appeal. The State and DeShawn C. filed motions to dismiss petitioner's appeal. The Court of Special Appeals granted the Application for Leave to Appeal. In a reported opinion, the intermediate court dismissed the appeal. Lopez-Sanchez v. State, 155 Md.App. 580, 843 A.2d 915 (2004). The court held that petitioner had no right to bring a direct appeal under Md.Code (1973, 2002 Repl.Vol, 2004 Cum.Supp.), § 12-301 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, because petitioner was not a party to the delinquency proceeding, and did not have a sufficiently direct interest in the outcome to fall within the narrow range of case law permitting technical non-parties to bring appeals. The court further held that petitioner had no right to file an Application for Leave to Appeal under § 11-103 of the Criminal Procedure Article, because he was not a "victim of a violent crime" within the meaning of the statute, and that the court was without power to grant leave to appeal.
We granted Oscar Antonio Lopez-Sanchez's petition for writ of certiorari to consider the following questions:
1. Can the victim of an act of juvenile delinquency appeal the denial of statutory rights granted to the victim in juvenile proceedings by the General Assembly?
2. Does a victim have standing to assert his statutorily-granted rights in the trial court?
3. Whether the petitioner has been denied due process of law under the United States and Maryland Constitutions?
Lopez-Sanchez v. State, 381 Md. 677, 851 A.2d 596 (2004).
II.
Before this Court, petitioner argues that he enjoys a right of direct appeal under Md.Code (1973, 2002 Repl.Vol., 2004 Cum.Supp.), § 12-301 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. He argues that, as the victim of a delinquent act, he has a uniquely strong interest in the determination of restitution in this matter, in notice of proceedings, and in his opportunity to be heard. He points to Article 47 of the Declaration of Rights and to numerous Maryland statutes addressing victims' rights as indicia of the strength of the interest that Maryland has recognized in victims of crimes and delinquent acts. He relies heavily on Md.Code (1973, 2002 Repl.Vol., 2004 Cum.Supp.), § 3-8A-02 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, which provides, in pertinent part:
"The purposes of this subtitle [Juvenile Causes — Children Other Than CINAs and Adults] are:
(1) To ensure that the Juvenile Justice System balances the following objectives for children who have committed delinquent acts:
(i) Public safety and the protection of the community;
(ii) Accountability of the child to the victim, and the community for offenses committed; and
(iii) Competency and character development to assist children in becoming responsible and productive members of society."
The State argues that the right to appeal in Maryland is a creature of statute entirely. The State contends that § 12-301 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, providing for the general right to appeal from final judgments, applies only to parties, and that petitioner is not a party to the delinquency proceeding.
III.
The right to appeal in Maryland is wholly statutory. See Pack Shack v. Howard County, 371 Md. 243, 247, 808 A.2d 795, 797 (2002). Parties to civil and criminal actions enjoy a right to appeal from final judgments under Md.Code (1973, 2002 Repl.Vol., 2004 Cum.Supp.), § 12-301 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. That statute provides as follows:
"Except as provided in § 12-302 of this subtitle [enumerating various exceptions not relevant here], a party may appeal from a final judgment entered in a civil or criminal case by a circuit court. The right of appeal exists from a final judgment entered by a court in the exercise of original, special, limited, statutory jurisdiction, unless in a particular case the right of appeal is expressly denied by law. In a criminal case, the defendant may appeal even though imposition or execution of sentence has been suspended. In a civil case, a plaintiff who has accepted a remittitur may cross-appeal from the final judgment."
Section 12-303 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article also provides parties to civil actions the right to appeal from certain interlocutory orders not at issue in this case. A salient feature of both statutes is that the grant of appellate rights extends only to parties.
A victim is not a party to a criminal prosecution. See Cianos v. State, 338 Md. 406, 410-11, 659 A.2d 291, 293 (1995). The non-party status of crime victims has been a central precept of Maryland criminal jurisprudence ever since public prosecution became the sole method of enforcing this State's criminal law.
Delinquency proceedings — while civil in nature — are too similar to criminal prosecutions to warrant different treatment vis-a-vis victim status. Under § 3-8A-03(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, a juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction over a child alleged to be delinquent. The jurisdiction of the juvenile court is initiated by a representative of the State filing a petition alleging delinquency. See § 3-8A-13 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.
A delinquent act is defined by § 3-8A-01(k) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article as "an act which would be a crime if committed by an adult." A child may not be adjudicated delinquent unless the State proves each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Juveniles enjoy due process protections and many rights enjoyed by adult criminal defendants. In fact, so many rights enjoyed by criminal defendants have been held to apply in juvenile proceedings that many of the procedural distinctions between the two types of proceedings, (with the notable exception of jury trials and indictment proceedings), have all but disappeared. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (proof beyond reasonable doubt standard in adjudicatory phase); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27-59, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1444-60, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967) (rights to due process, notice of charges, assistance of counsel, confrontation, transcript of proceedings, appellate review, and privilege against self-incrimination); In re Thomas J., 372 Md. 50, 57-58, 811 A.2d 310, 314-15 (2002) (right to speedy trial); In re Michael W., 367 Md. 181, 185, 786 A.2d 684, 687 (2001) (prohibition against double jeopardy); In re Parris W., 363 Md. 717, 724, 770 A.2d 202, 206 (2001) (right to effective assistance of counsel); In re Anthony R., 362 Md. 51, 76, 763 A.2d 136, 150 (2000) (statute of limitations equivalent to that for criminal misdemeanor offenses); In re Montrail M., 325 Md. 527, 532-538, 601 A.2d 1102, 1103-07 (1992) (doctrine of merger); In re William, A., 313 Md. 690, 698, 548 A.2d 130, 133-134 (1988) (infancy defense).
A criminal act is an offense against the sovereign, a wrong injurious not only to the victim but to the public at large, and, as such, is brought in the name of the State of Maryland. A delinquency proceeding is also brought in the name of the State of Maryland. The right, and duty, to proceed with a delinquency action and to accept a plea or disposition in a delinquency proceeding lies solely with the State's Attorney, not the victim, and the prosecutor's decision may not be "vetoed" or appealed by the victim. A juvenile proceeding furthers the interests of the State and the public as a whole, although the prosecutor may, and as a matter of policy should, confer with and consider the wishes of the victim. But that is not to say that the victim is a party to the case, or that a dissatisfied victim has the right to appeal.
The Court of Special Appeals explained the limitations as follows:
"Delinquency proceedings only can be initiated by the filing of a petition by the State's Attorney. A private person cannot file a delinquency petition, and, if a delinquency petition has not been filed, the juvenile court lacks jurisdiction to make a restitution award. Although the decision to file a delinquency petition can be generated by a complaint by a private person, the decision rests with the prosecutor, and must be made based on the best interests of the public or the child. In making the decision, the prosecutor can consider as 'one factor in the public interest ' the need of the victim of the alleged delinquent act.' "
Lopez-Sanchez, 155 Md.App. at 600-01, 843 A.2d at 927 (citations omitted). The State, in a delinquency proceeding, just as the State, in a criminal proceeding, is the party in the proceeding, represented by the State's Attorney. The victim is not a party to the proceeding and acts only as a witness, although vested with statutory and constitutional rights to restitution. Because the victim is not a "party," he or she does not enjoy the general right of appeal found at § 12-301 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.
Petitioner relies on cases where this Court has recognized a non-party's right to bring a limited appeal from decisions affecting the party's direct and substantial interests. In particular, most of these appeals were direct appeals from trial court orders denying media organizations access to proceedings. See Baltimore Sun v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 359 Md. 653, 665, 755 A.2d 1130, 1137 (2000); Baltimore Sun Co. v. State, 340 Md. 437, 447, 667 A.2d 166, 171 (1995); Baltimore Sun v. Colbert, 323 Md. 290, 297-98, 593 A.2d 224, 227 (1991); Buzbee v. Journal Newspapers, 297 Md. 68, 76, 465 A.2d 426, 431 (1983); News American v. Stale, 294 Md. 30, 40-41, 447 A.2d 1264, 1269-70 (1982). See also Matter of Anderson, 272 Md. 85, 91-92, 321 A.2d 516, 519-20 (1974) (State permitted to appeal juvenile proceeding before enactment of statute making State party to juvenile causes), appeal dismissed, Epps v. Maryland, 419 U.S. 809, 95 S.Ct. 21, 42 L.Ed.2d 35 (1974), cert. denied, Anderson v. Maryland, 421 U.S. 1000, 95 S.Ct. 2399, 44 L.Ed.2d 667 (1975); Karr v. Shirk, 142 Md. 118, 121, 120 A. 248, 249 (1923) (recognizing that non-parties with direct interest may be entitled to appeal but finding appellant law firm to hold no such interest); Preston v. Poe, 116 Md. 1, 6, 81 A. 178, 179 (1911) (recognizing same but finding appellant stockholder to hold no such interest); Hall v. Jack, 32 Md. 253, 263 (1870) (assignee of notes permitted to appeal but denied relief on merits).
Petitioner has not identified any case in which we have afforded a right to appeal in the light of a clearly contrary legislative intent. The General Assembly has addressed the appellate rights of crime victims, and in so doing has considered and rejected legislation that would have granted appellate rights to victims in delinquency proceedings. Md.Code (2001, 2004 Cum.Supp.), § 11-103 of the Criminal Procedure Article provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
"(a) 'Violent, crime ' defined.—
(1) In this section, 'violent crime' means:
(i) a crime of violence; or
(ii) except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection [governing certain transportation and natural resources offenses], a crime involving, causing, or resulting in death or serious bodily injury.
(b) Right to file for leave to appeal. — Although not a party to a criminal proceeding, a victim of a violent crime for which the defendant is charged may file an application for leave to appeal to the Court of Special Appeals from an interlocutory or final order that denies or fails to consider a right secured to the victim by § ll-302(c), § 11-402, § 11-403, or § 11-404 of this title or § 6-112 of the Correctional Services Article.[ ]
(c) Stay of other proceedings. — The filing of an application for leave to appeal under this section does not stay other proceedings in a criminal case unless all parties consent."
The Court of Special Appeals held that this statute does not apply to victims of delinquent acts, stating as follows:
"A delinquent act, being one 'which would be a crime if committed by an adult[,]' CJ 3-8A-01(k) (emphasis added), is not a crime; and it is for that reason that a juvenile who has been found to have committed a delinquent act has not been found guilty of a crime.
The language of section [11-103] not only requires that the victim be a victim of a crime but also expressly contemplates, by the use of the word 'defendant' . and the phrases 'criminal proceeding' and 'criminal case' ., that the proceeding giving rise to the application for leave to appeal be for or in connection with the prosecution of a crime."
Petitioner does not now challenge this holding, that § 11-103 grants limited appellate rights to the victims of certain crimes, but no appellate rights to the victims of delinquent acts.
As the intermediate appellate court noted, prior to enacting the Victims' Rights Act of 1997, 1997 Md. Laws Ch. 312, the Legislature had considered and rejected an amendment to § 11-103 (then codified as Art. 27, § 776) that would have replaced the current definition of "victim" with, inter alia, "a victim of . . . a crime as defined under § 770 of this article." See Senate Bill 173 (1997). At that time, Art. 27, § 770(a)(2) defined "victim" as "an individual who suffers direct or threatened physical, emotional, or financial harm as a direct result of a crime or delinquent act...." (Emphasis added.) Thus, not only is § 11-103 silent as to a right of appeal for victims of delinquent acts, but the plain language of the statute reflects a rejection of language that would have created this right. Although the cases cited by petitioner indicate a narrow judicial enlargement of the general right to appeal under § 12-301 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, it would be illogical to extend this enlargement to victims of delinquent acts. The Legislature has enacted a statute, § 11-103 of the Criminal Procedure Article, addressing the appellate rights of victims. The rights granted by that statute do not extend to the victims of delinquent acts. When later amending § 11-103, the Legislature considered and rejected granting appellate rights to these litigants.
IV.
Victims' rights have received considerable attention in recent years, and rightfully so. On both the federal and state levels, legislatures have expressed the strong public policy that victims should have more rights and should be informed of the proceedings, that they should be treated fairly, and in certain cases, that they should be heard. These rights, pro vided by the Maryland Legislature and the Maryland Constitution, are to be followed and respected. If, however, the prosecutor or the trial court does not follow the law with respect to a victim's rights in a juvenile proceeding, the Legislature has not given to the victim the general right to appeal that decision.
In the instant case, the victim is not a party to the delinquency proceeding and therefore cannot appeal. The General Assembly considered and rejected legislation that would have conferred such a right on the victims of delinquent acts. Any right of the victim to appeal, or to file an application for leave to appeal, must originate from the General Assembly, not from this Court.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY PETITIONER.
WILNER and HARRELL, JJ. concur.
. A1 the time of the events in question, § 11-104 was codified at former Art. 27, § 841(9). All statutory reference shall be to the current codification unless otherwise noted.
Section 11-104(c) provides as follows:
"(1) Within 10 days after the filing or the unsealing of an indictment or information in circuit court, whichever is later, the prosecuting attorney shall:
(1) mail or deliver to the victim or victim's representative the pamphlet described in § 11 — 914(9)(ii) of this title and the notification request form described in § 11-914(10) of this title; and
(ii) certify to the clerk of the court that the prosecuting attorney has complied with this paragraph or is unable to identify the victim or victim's representative.
(2) If the prosecuting attorney files a petition alleging that a child is delinquent for committing an act that could only be tried in the circuit court if committed by an adult, the prosecuting attorney shall:
(i) inform the victim or victim's representative of the right to request restitution under § 11-606 of this title;
(ii) mail or deliver to the victim or victim's representative the notification request form described in § 11-914(10) of this title; and
(iii) certify to the clerk of the juvenile court that the prosecuting attorney has complied with this paragraph or is unable to identify the victim or victim's representative.
(3) For cases described under this subsection, the prosecuting attorney may provide a State's witness in the case with the guidelines for victims, victims' representatives, and witnesses available under § 11-1001 through 11-1004 of this title."
. That section provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
"(a) Conditions for judgment of restitution. — A court may enter a judgment of restitution that orders a defendant or child respondent to make restitution in addition to any other penalty for the commission of a crime or delinquent act, if:
(2) as a direct result of the crime or delinquent act, the victim suffered:
(i) actual medical, dental, hospital, counseling, funeral, or burial expenses;
(iii) loss of earnings;
(5) the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board paid benefits to a victim;
(b) Right of victims to restitution. — A victim is presumed to have a right to restitution under subsection (a) of this section if:
(1) the victim or the State requests restitution; and
(2) the court is presented with competent evidence of any item listed in subsection (a) of this section."
. Section 1 l-104(e) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
"(1) The prosecuting attorney shall send a victim or victim's representative prior notice of each court proceeding in the case, of the terms of any plea agreement, and of the right of the victim or victim's representative to submit a victim impact statement to the court under § 11-402 of this title if:
(i) prior notice is practicable; and
(ii) the victim or victim's representative has filed a notification request form under subsection (d) of this section.
(3) As soon after a proceeding as practicable, the prosecuting attorney shall tell the victim or victim's representative of the terms of any plea agreement, judicial action, and proceeding that affects the interests of the victim or victim's representative, including a bail hearing, change in the defendant's pretrial release order, dismissal, nolle prosequi, stetting of charges, trial, disposition, and postsentencing court proceeding if:
(i) the victim or victim's representative has filed a notification request form under subsection (d) of this section and prior notice to the victim or victim's representative is not practicable; or
(ii) the victim or victim's representative is not present at the proceeding."
. Section 3-8A-27(b)(l) provides: "A court record pertaining to a child is confidential and its contents may not be divulged, by subpoena or otherwise, except by order of the court upon good cause shown or as provided in § 7-303 of the Education Article."
. We also granted DeShawn C.'s conditional cross-petition for certiorari to consider the following questions:
1. In light of the provisions of [Md.Code (2001, 2004 Cum. Supp.), § 11-811 of the Criminal Procedure Article], requiring the reduction of any award by the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board in the amount of any payments received or to be received from the offender, and the award by the board of $25,000 to petitioner, any increase in an award to petitioner will require a set-off from his award by the Board. As petitioner's total monetaiy award cannot, therefore, increase if he succeeds in this Court, he has no financial stake in the litigation. Under these circumstances, does he lack standing to prosecute this appeal, does this case fail to present a cognizable appellate issue, or is it moot?
2. Assuming a non-party victim of a delinquent act has the right to prosecute an appeal from an order entered in a juvenile delinquency case, is this appeal cognizable or does petitioner lack standing where the appeal does not involve the denial of any of the rights secured by [Md.Code (2001, 2004 Cum.Supp.), § ll-302(c), 11-402, 11-403, or 11-404 of the Criminal Procedure Article] or § 6-112 of the Correctional Services Article?
3. Would an increase in the amount of restitution ordered as part of respondent DeShawn C.'s disposition in juvenile delinquency proceedings violate the provision against double jeopardy?
Because we conclude that petitioner has no right to appeal, we reach only the first question presented in the petition for certiorari, and none of the questions presented in tire cross-petition.
. The Court of Special Appeals held that petitioner was neither a "party" entitled to appeal under Md.Code (1973, 2002 Repl. Vol, 2004 Cum.Supp.), § 12-301 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, nor a "victim of a violent crime" entitled to seek leave to appeal under Md.Code (2001, 2004 Cum.Supp.), § 11-103 of the Criminal Procedure Article. Petitioner has abandoned his contention that he has the right to seek leave to appeal under § 11-103 of the Criminal Procedure Article. See Petition for Certiorari No. 97, 2004 Term, at 6 n. 4 (stating "At this time, Antonio only pursues the relief sought under his notice of appeal and not the relief sought under his application for leave to appeal.")
. Article 47 of the Declaration of Rights, ratified November 8, 1994, provides as follows:
"(a) A victim of crime shall be treated by agents of the State with dignity, respect, and sensilivity during all phases of the criminal justice process.
(b) In a case originating by indictment or information filed in a circuit court, a victim of crime shall have the right to be informed of the rights established in this Article and, upon request and if practicable, to be notified of, to attend, and to be heard at a criminal jttstice proceeding, as these rights are implemented and the terms "crime", "criminal justice proceeding", and "victim" are specified by law.
(c) Nothing in this Article permits any civil cause of action for monetary damages for violation of any of its provisions or authorizes a victim of crime to take any action to stay a criminal justice proceeding."
. Section 1 l-302(c) of the Criminal Procedure Article governs the right of victims to be present at trial. Section 11-402 governs the right of victims to submit victim impact statements for use in presentence investigations. Section 11-403 governs the right of victims and victims' representatives to address the court during sentencing and disposition hearings. Section 11-404 governs the right of victims' representatives to address the jury during the sentencing phase in death penalty trials. Md.Code (1999, 2004 Cum.Supp.), § 6-112 of the Correctional Services Article mandates that the Division of Parole and Probation include a victim impact statement, if submitted, in presentence investigation reports.
. Petitioner is not without a legal remedy for the injuries he has suffered. He has been greatly wronged and has suffered enormously because of DeShawn C.'s delinquent act. The conduct that caused appellant's injuries is a tort as well as a delinquent act, and DeShawn C. may be liable in a civil action.