Case Name: John Boggs and others v. Thomas F. Taylor and others
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio
Jurisdiction: Ohio
Decision Date: 1875-12
Citations: 26 Ohio St. 604
Docket Number: 
Parties: John Boggs and others v. Thomas F. Taylor and others.
Judges: Gilmore and McIlvaine, JJ., concurred.
Reporter: Ohio State Reports, New Service
Volume: 26
Pages: 604–618

Head Matter:
John Boggs and others v. Thomas F. Taylor and others.
1. Where words in a will are fairly and. legitimately applicable to one thing as its name, and are equally applicable to another thing as words of description, parol evidence is admissible to show in which of the two senses the testator was in the habit of using the words.
2 Where a testator owned two adjoining farms, which had been for many years cultivated and managed as separate and distinct farms, and were known and designated by him by different names, the farm on which he resided, and which was cultivated by him, being called by him the “ Home Farm,” and the other, which was cultivated by tenants, the “Jo. Boyd Farm; ” hut for several years next preceding the date of his will these farms had béen managed and cultivated by an agent of the testator, as one farm, without regard to the division line between them; and the testator, by his will, devised his “home farm” to his wife. Held: That parol evidence was admissible to prove that the testator was in the habit, as well after the two farms had become so united in their management, as before, and down to the time of making his will, of calling the two farms by their former names, designating the one on which ho resided as the “ Home Farm,” and the other as the “Jo. Boyd Farm.”
5. Seld, also: That it was not error in the Court to instruct the jury that it was for them to decide in which of the two senses the testator used the words “ home farm,” whether as designating the old home farm, or the entire tract composed of the two thus united.
Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Muskingum ■County. Reserved in the District Court.
In 1842, James Taylor, being seized of a tract of land containing about 490 acres, on which he then resided, and also of several other tracts of land, on one of which he had formerly resided, made his last will and testament, containing, among others, the following devise :
“ First. I give and bequeath mito my beloved wife, Jane Taylor, the whole of my home farm, where I now reside, as an estate in fee simple.”
After devising several other parcels of real estate to different parties, the testator directs that all his real estate, ■except the “ home farm ” (and other lots and parcels so specifically devised), be equally divided between tbe children of Grondo Taylor.
The action below was brought by the defendants in error,, who are the children of Grondo Taylor, or their representatives, against the grantees of the widow, to recover possession of about 340 acres, the north part of said tract of' 490 acres, on the ground that said 340 acres constitute no part of the “ home farm,” which it is claimed consisted of only 150 acres, the south part of the 490 acre tract. The-defendants claimed that the “ home farm,” within the true meaning of the will, consisted of the entire tract of 490-acres. "What was the “ home farm ” of the testator, within the meaning of the will, was, therefore, the only question involved in the action. If it consisted of the 150 acres only, then the 340 acres passed to the children of Grondo Taylor. If it consisted of the 490 acres, the whole, of course, vested-in the widow, and passed, by her conveyance, to the defendants.
The history of this tract of 490 acres, as disclosed by the-evidence admitted on the trial, is substantially as follows: The south part of the tract, containing some 225 acres, was purchased by the testator in 1806, and he resided upon and cultivated it till 1817, having cleared and fenced the south 150 acres, now claimed by the plaintiffs in error to be the home farm, the north fence of the 150 acres being identical with the line now claimed to be the north line of the home farm, and that part of the 225 acres lying north of the fence being wood land. In 1817, the testator purchased 730 acres of wild land lying north of the 225 acres, and then conveyed the entire tract of 961 acres to John Boyd and Joseph Boyd. The Boyds made partition of the land, John taking the 150 acres south of this fence, and about 138 acres in the south-west part of the remainder. All of this 138 acres, however, except about 38 acres, was laid out by John into village lots, and sold by him, leaving John in possession of the 150 acres south of the fence, and some 38 acres north of the fence, but disconnected with the 150 acres south of the fence. The Boyds resided upon and farmed their re spective portions of the land until 1826, when they reconveyed to the testator the 490 acres in controversy, being the entire tract of 961 acres, except the village lots and about 371 acres on the north end of the entire tract. So that, at. the time of the reconveyance to the testator, the two farms of the Boyds constituted a single body of land, the division line between them being this north fence of the 150 acres, -except that the 38 acres north of the fence disconnected from the 150 acres, belonged to John. In 1826, the testator, who then resided on another farm, resumed his old resi•dence on the 150 acres, where he continued to reside until the time of his death, which took place in 1843. From 1826 to 1833, the testator cultivated the 150 acres as a separate farm, and the 340 acres north of the line fence was cultivated as a separate farm by tenants of the testator. From 1833 to the time of his death, the entire 490 acres were cultivated as a single farm, under the management of said Grondo Taylor, who occupied the old “ Jo. Boyd house,” on the 340 acres, and acted as agent and superintendent for the testator. During all this time, from 1826 to 1842, the testator was in the habit of calling the 150 acres where he resided his “home farm,” and the 340 acres the “ Jo. Boyd farm.” Soon alter Grondo Taylor took charge of the premises, it seems, the testator objected to the removal or change of this line fence, insisting that it should remain as a line fence, but he afterward seems to have acquiesced in its removal or change, and the fields were ultimately changed and shaped in disregard of this line, and were in that condition at the date of the will.
This testimony, that the testator was in the habit of calling the 150 acres his “home farm,” and the 340 acres the “ Jo. Boyd farm,” was admitted by the court against the objection of counsel for defendants, and they took exception to the ruling of the court.
"When the evidence had closed, the court instructed the jury, among other things, as follows :
“ If the lands in controversy did not form a part of the Rome farm of Captain Taylor at the date of the will, then the plaintiffs are entitled to recover as devisees of the residue of the testator’s estate.
“ The operation of the will is to be determined by the language it contains, but parol evidence is admissible to show what it is that corresponds with the description.
“ The testator admittedly had hut one home farm, and the question for you to determine is as to its extent or boundaries.
“ You will bear in mind that the question for you to decide is what it is that corresponds with the words ‘ home farm’ at the time these words were written in his will, and approved by him when he placed his signature to his will.
“ What lands did he mean when he used the words * the whole of my home farm where I now reside?’ When he used these words he evidently supposed they were sufficiently definite in meaning to enable all parties concerned to determine what land he intended to give his wife.
“If Captain Taylor regarded and treated these lands as two distinct farms, one of which he regarded as his home farm up to the time when Grondo came to live on them, the fact that Grondo took charge of both farms (if you find there were two farms) and worked them both for Captain Taylor until he died, would not necessarily destroy the identity of the two farms and make them thereafter one farm in the mind, of Captain Taylor.
“ Captain Taylor might have two farms, and consider them two farms, and have them both worked together for him by one man, and all the time regard them as two farms, one of which he might regard as his home farm, and so devise it, and, also, he might have two farms and consolidate them, and regard them, and devise them as one. And it is for you to say from the evidence and all the facts and circumstances in this ease how the fact was.
“ But the fact, if you find it to be a fact, that the land was farmed as one body for a series of years prior to, and up to the time of, making the will, is a matter to be considered by you in determining whether, at the time the will was made, Captain Taylor considered the tract as one or more than one farm.”
To these instructions the counsel for defendants excepted; and they asked the court to charge the jury, that the question for them to decide was not what the testator considered to be his “ home farm,” or what he intended by those words, but what in fact, at the date of the will, was his home farm. But the court refused to modify its charge, and the counsel excepted.
Under this evidence and these instructions, the jury found a verdict for the plaintiff', and the court, after overruling a motion by the defendants for a new trial, rendered judgment upon the verdict; and it is now claimed that the court erred in admitting this testimony,in its instructions to the j'i’~. and in refusing a new trial on the ground that the verdict was against the evidence.
Moses M. Granger and A. W. Train, for plaintiffs in error :
The court erred in its charge to the jury by in substance telling them that their verdict was to be controlled, not. by tlieir.finding that there was in fact but one farm when the will was made, but by their finding on the question, “Bid Captain Taylor in his mind regard or consider the land as one farm, or as two farms ?”
In a certain sense it is true that what Captain Taylor meant must control.
The law gave him the right to put his meaning into the form of a will. He exercised that right, and that will having been admitted to probate, the inquiry changes its form, and reads: “ What lands passed to Mrs. Jane Taylor in fee-simple by virtue of the language used in the first clause of the will ?”
Until it is made to appear that, under the rules of the law, this question can not be answered without looking to Captain Taylor’s conversations, no evidence of such conversations is admissible. The words of the will must first be éxamined.
If it then becomes necessary to introduce parol evidence to explain the will, such evidence must be of facts, not thoughts ; evidence showing what land was the farm on which the testator resided—not what he “ in Ms mind” considered that farm. 20 Ohio St. 537 ; Beaumont v. Fell, 2 Peere "Williams, 141; Doe v. Taylor, 1 Allen (N. B.) 425; 1 Greenl. Ev. secs. 290, 291, and cases there cited. And as to what evidence is admissible in the construction of a will, see "Wigram, 8-11, 13; 5 B. & Adol. 129 ; lb. 663 ; Colins v. Hope, 20 Ohio, 500; 5 Scott (N. R.) 1037; 70 Eng. Com. Law, 544; 30 lb. 266; 2 Ohio St. 382; 2 Starkie on Ev. 768-770; 3 lb. 1269; 4 M. & S. 550; 3 Taunton, 147; 2 Ves., Sr., 216; 1 .Ves., Jr., 412 ; 18 How. 385 ; 1 Greenl. 290 ; 11 How. 329 ; Jannau (2 Am. ed.) 351; 11 East, 441; 3 M. & S. 171; 5 Hev. & M. 391; Mann v. Mann, 1 Johns. Oh. 231; Torbert v. Twining, 1 Yates, 432; McGlay ,v. Hugers, 6 Watts, 345 ; Ccesar v. Chew, 7 Gill. & John. 127; Bicharás v. Dutch, 8 Mass. 506 ; Crocker v. Crocker, 11 Pick. 252 ; 4 B. & A. 57; 7 Met. 188; Hiscocks v. Hiscocks, 5 M. & W. 363; 12 Grattan, 196; Long v. Duvall, 6B. Mon. 219 ; Jackson v. Sill, 11 John. 201; Guy v. Sharp, 1 My. & K. 589 ; 1 Nev. & M. 524 ; Thompsons. Hempenstall, 13 Jur. 815; King v. Ackerman, 2 Black. (N. S.) 408; 2 Binn. 238; Plowd. 195 ; Touch. 93 ; 1 Tho. C. Litt. 208.
The court, in substance, directed the jury to ascertain from the evidence—
1. What the testator meant, instead of what do the words in the will mean.
2. What lands did the testator intend to pass by the words employed, instead of what lands does the will convey.
3. That the jury should find whether there were twe farms in the mind of Captain Taylor, instead .of whether there were two farms in fact.
These directions to the jury, we submit, were clearly erroneous.
The word farm has a definite and legal signification; and when used in a will, must be construed in its strict and primary sense, unless the context of the will shows it to have been used in a secondary sense.
The word farm having a definite and legal meaning, to allow the jury to look to parol testimony to ascertain what Captain Taylor meant or intended, is not to give effect to the written will, but to make a will by parol; and this is what the law does not permit.
A. G. Thurman, John O’Neil, and Ball Train, also for plaintiffs in error.
Lucius P. Marsh, of Marsh ¡f Blackson, for defendants in error:
I. The words “ hotne farm,” found in this devise, are not of such definite and uniform significance that we can ascertain what is the “ farm,” by any standard of physical facts. We may therefore prove, by the declarations of the testator, how he used these words in his lifetime ; what it was to which he applied the terms; and thus learn what he understood to be signified by the same terms found in his will. Byers, v. Wheeler, 22 Wend. 148; Luke of Leeds v. Amherst, .9 Jur. 359; Carnoys v. Blundell, 1 H. L. C. 778; Bichardson v. Watson, 4 B. & Adol. 800.
II. Where the terms used to designate the subject of a devise are, in themselves, equivocal, or are made in view of the circumstances under which they are used, and when there are two or more subjects to which the terms are equally applicable, the declarations of the testator may be looked to in determining to what or to which he applied such terms.
We have, in the will under consideration, an equivocal description. Of course, there was but one “ home farm ; ” but that home farm might be one body of land, or it might be more than that body. That description is equivocal, “ where one name and appellation doth denominate divers things.” Bac. Max. 23.
There were two farms when Captain Taylor returned to the land: one of them had theretofore been his home farm; the other had not. The home farm he lived on; the other Grondo lived on. We find him qualifying—circumscribing—his designation by “ where I now reside.” If he applied these terms to one body of land or to the other, no violence is done to language. Reynolds v. Whelan, 16 L. J. N. S. Ch. 434; Hampshire v. Pierce, 2 Ves. sen. 216; Wigram, VII, Prop.; Hawkins on Wills, 9; Thomas v. Thomas, 6 Tenn. 671; 4 Ves. jun. 680; 2 Vern. 593; Beaumont v. Fell, 2 P. Will. 140; 10 Leigh, 199; 20 Ohio, 157; 1 Paige, 270 ; Hiscocks v. Hiscoeks, 5 M. & W. 363 : 2 Parsons on Con. 560, et seq.; 1 Redfield, 591, see. 22; lb. 650.
III. As between devisees under the same will, the declarations of the testator may be given in evidence, to fix a division line which may not be ascertained by means afforded ■by the will itself. Doolittle v. Blakely, 4 Day, 265.
“ Home farm ” had the same significance to Captain Taylor that the words have to us. How large that home farm was, Captain Taylor had the right to determine; and the jury were to ascertain how he had determined it.
The jury were told to ascertain the understanding of ■'Captain Taylor as to the land described, in view of the circumstances, and which is identical with our understanding of the land described, under the same circumstances. Here are words of a will, and here are circumstances attending the use of those words. The circumstances fix a meaning to the words to us and to the mind of Captain Taylor, and these are identical.

Opinion:
Welch, C. J.
It seems to me there is really but one question in this case—namely, the question whether the court erred in admitting the parol testimony objected to. If this testimony was competent, I think it follows that the charge of the court was proper, and that the verdict, to say the least, is not so clearly against the evidence as to justify a court in setting it aside. The real question is whether the language of the will, when applied to its subject-matter, is legitimately and fairly applicable as well to one of two several subjects as to tbe other. If it is, then parol evidence was competent to show in which of the two senses the language was used by the testator; and this becomes, as the court substantially instructed the jury, the real question for them to decide.
Is the language of the will, " the whole of my home farm, where I now reside," legitimately and fairly applicable as well to the 150 acres as to the whole 490 acres. . The words, "the whole of" may be eliminated as having no significance, for the reason that they are the initial words in the description of every other parcel of real estate mentioned in the will, and are therefore mere words of form. So also of the words " where I now reside ; " prima facie they are but a repetition of the idea contained in the word " home." My " home " farm, prima facie, is the farm " where I now reside." So that the simple question is, are the words " my home farm" legally and reasonably applicable, in the light of all the circumstances, as well to the 150-acre tract alone as to the whole 490 acres ?
As words of mere description, they are not, but as a name of the thing intended, I think they are. The fact that they may be understood equally as words of description, or as a mere name, is the real ambiguity. The parol evidence tends to show that they were used in the latter sense, and this not by showing in which of the two senses the testator actually used the words at the time of making the will, but by showing how he had formerly and habitually used them. It is said that all names were originally descriptions. In some cases they continue to be used both as names • and as descriptions, but in most cases the use of them as names is continued long after they have ceased to be accurate descriptions. This parol evidence tended to show that such was the case here. Indeed the words themselves strongly indicate thÍ3. The words " where I now reside " seexn to show that the testator understood the word "home" as designating a, former, equally as a present residence. If this be so, it is but natural to conclude that he might have used the word " farm " as designating what was formerly a farm, although now in strictness constituting only part of a farm. , There had been, admittedly, two farms, and, if this oral evidence is to be believed, they had acquired names—the "Home farm" and the "Jo. Boyd farm"— and by these names they had long been known and designated by the testator, both before and after they were managed as one, and down to the time of his death. Under such circumstances, it seems to a majority of us that the court was right in admitting the testimony, and leaving it to the jury, as the court substantially did, to say whether the words "home farm" were used in their old sense,as a mere name of the old homestead, or were used as words pf .strict technical description. In 1833, when the two farms came under one management, having acquired distinctive names, by which they were designated and known for many years, it was quite natural, and we think a legitimate use of the terms, to continue to designate them by those names after they became united. We believe that people ordinarily would do so under similar circumstances. It is true that when a man comes to making his will, he is presumed to use language-with more caution, and better to weigh his words than when in the ordinary transactions of life; but when we reflect that this disposition of the testator's property was made to those who resided upon it, and must have been familiar with the names by which it was called and known, we are unable to say, with any degree of certainty, that the jury were not right in their conclusion.
Judgment affirmed.
Gilmore and McIlvaine, JJ., concurred.