Case Name: Nichols et al. v. Lee
Court: Colorado Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Colorado
Decision Date: 1891-01
Citations: 16 Colo. 147
Docket Number: 
Parties: Nichols et al. v. Lee.
Judges: 
Reporter: Colorado Reports
Volume: 16
Pages: 147–159

Head Matter:
Nichols et al. v. Lee.
1. Intestate Estates — Rights of Surviving Husband Subject to Payment of Wife’s Debts. — Though, under the Colorado statutes, the surviving husband inherits half of the estate of his wife, he takes it subject to the payment of her debts, and where the estate is insolvent the purchaser of land belonging thereto under an execution against the husband acquires no title as against a creditor of the wife who purchases at the administrator’s sale.
2. Sale of Land to Pay Debts — Appraisement of Personalty.— Where the only personal estate left by a wife is $100 in money, appraisement thereof, as required by the laws of Colorado, is not essential to the validity of proceedings to sell her land for the payment of debts.
3. Necessary Parties — Creditors of Heirs Are Not.— The creditors of- the husband, in such case, are not necessary parties to the proceedings for sale of wife’s land for payment of her debts, although they may intervene if they so desire.
4. Jurisdiction of Court to Decree Sale of Realty. — The statute which authorizes the administrator to resort to the re'al estate “whenever, after inventory and appraisement, * * * it shall appear that the personal estate of any decedent is insufficient to discharge the just debts allowed,” does not make an inventory and appraisement a condition precedent to the right to resort to the realty. -If the petition shows the amount and value of the personalty, the existence of debts, the lack of funds for their payment, and thát deceased died seized of real estate, setting forth the condition of the title, it will, with service of process, confer jurisdiction to decree a sale. Formal defects are cured by .the proceedings.
Appeal from District Oourt of Weld Ootmty.
An action in ejectment to recover the undivided one-half of certain property in the town of Greeley.
In January, 1819, Henry W. Lee,'appellee, recovered a judgment against Edward T. and 'William A. Nichols in the county court of Weld county for the sum of $93.50. Execution issued and returned, with indorsement of $18 and some cents, as having been made, and no further property' found. The transcript of the judgment was filed in the office of the county clerk, and by proper proceedings the judgment was kept alive and operative, but remained un satisfied. On the 15th of November, 1883, Sarah A., wife of Edward T. Nichols, died intestate, owning in fee a lot with a dwelling-house upon it in the town of Greeley, which was incumbered by mortgage to the extent of $1,000, drawing interest at twelve per cent, per annum, being a balance of a larger sum formerly obtained on the property. Sarah A. left as heirs her husband, Edward T. Nichols, Lottie Nichols (appellant), Edward T. Nichols, Jr., and two married daughters, Laura N. Hill and Sarah M. Gumaer. On the death of Sarah A., appellee, assuming that Edward T., under the statute, became, as heir oE his wife, entitled to one-half'of the estate, and that his judgment was alien upon it, sued.out aplwries writ of execution, had it levied upon the undivided one-half of the property in controversy, caused it to be advertised, and at the sale bought it for the sum ■ of $149, and afterwards received a sheriff’s deed for the same.
On the 26th of March, 1884, Edward T. was appointed administrator of the estate of his deceased wife, qualified, and entered upon the duties of the office. An inventory of the property of the deceased was made and filed by the administrator, stating that there were no personal assets of any kind whatever, except $100 in money. Claims were filed against the estate for debts of deceased, and on the 5th of May, 1884, established by proper proofs, and allowed by the court as follows: To appellant, $2,322.69; to Wilbur H. Hill, $720.04; and to Laura N. Hill, $561.37; all as •claims of the fourth class, aggregating $3,604.10. On the 14th of June following the administrator filed a petition duly verified naming the heirs, stating that he had filed an inventory of the estate, which had been approved; that there were no personal assets, except $100; that no appraisement of the personal assets had been made or ordered; stating the aggregate amount of claims proved and allowed to be $3,604.10, the personal assets to be of the value of $100, the deficit $3,504.10; asking that the premises be appraised; and he be ordered to sell at public or private sale so much of the real property as was necessary to pay the deficiency. Writs of summons were issued, returnable to the term to be held on the first Monday of July, 1884, which were returned unserved. A warrant for the appraisement of the estate was issued and an appraisement had on the 19th of June, in which the personal estate was valued at $100, and the real estate at $1,980 over the incumbrance. On the 19th of June an affidavit was filed with the clerk of the court, and an order prayed that publication of summons be made as to appellant and the two other non-resident sisters, and copies of summons be mailed to them at their places of abode, and that an alias summons be sent to the sheriff of Lake county in this state to be served upon Edward T., Jr., all of which writs were served and the acceptance of service indorsed upon each, which writs were properly returned. On the 18th of November following, judgments by default were entered, and a decree of sale of the real estate made. At the sale appellant became the purchaser at the appraised price, and on the 5th of January, 1885, the sale was approved and confirmed by the court, and on the 21st of January a conveyance of the property was made. She entered into the possession, retaining the same, making payments upon and largely reducing the incumbrance, paying taxes, and for' necessary repairs, and receiving the rental and income of the property up to the time of the institution of this suit.
Upon the trial appellant verified an account, showing that during the time she had been in possession her expenditures, including payment on the principal and interest of the mortgage, exceeded the amount received by her by $643. A cross-complaint was filed in this" case by appellant, setting up the proceedings to subject the real estate to sale for the payment of the debts; the insufficiency of the property to discharge the indebtedness; and the title of' appellant by the purchase at the sale, etc. The case was tried to the court without a jury, resulting in a judgment for appellee “ that he have and recover the undivided one- half of the property upon payment of $321.54, being one-half of the excess of money paid by appellant over the amount received by her, and that the costs be equally divided,” etc. The cross-complaint was adjudged “ wanting in equity and insufficient, except as to the excess of expenditures' above rents and profits.” A large number of errors were assigned by appellant and cross-errors by the appellee.
Mr. J. E. G-arrigues and Messrs. Wells, McNeal & Taylor, for appellants.
Messrs. Haynes, Dunntng & Annis, for appellee.

Opinion:
Heed, C.
There is no troublesome conflict of testimony. All important facts are established by undisputed evidence, and seem to have been conceded. There are no charges of fraud or circumvention. The established facts are:
' First, that at the time of the death of Sarah A. Nichols, appellee had a valid existing judgment against the husband Edward T., and another, amounting to something over $100; second, that Sarah A. died intestate, seized in fee of •the property in controversy subject to the incumbrance; third, that the value of the real estate over the incumbrance was $1,980, and the personal assets $100, making the aggregate value $2,080; fourth, that at the time of her'death she was indebted in various sums, amounting in the aggregate to $3,604.10, and exceeding the value of the estate $1,524.10; -consequently, that the estate was insolvent.
These facts having been established or conceded without question, the issues to be determined were not issues of fact, hut questions of law applicable to the facts; the theory of appellee being that there was an inheritance; that the husband, under the statute, immediately upon the death of the wife became the heir to one-half of the estate in gross, and that one-half of the estate at once vested in him regardless of the financial condition of the estate as to solvency; and that the inheritance cast at once became available for the satisfaction of the judgment, and took precedence to the exclusion of creditors of the estate. .This theory is erroneous and cannqt be maintained. In our view of the case, all supposed errors assigned may be disregarded except the general one that " the court erred in finding that the plaintiff [appellee] was the owner of the undivided half of the premises, and had been since July, 1884, and that defendant [appellant] unlawfully detained the premises, and that the matters in the cross-complaint of defendant are wanting in equity and insufficient to afford relief, except as to the excess of expenditures paid above the rents by her received." We think the entire case can be satisfactorily disposed of by the application of primary and fundamental principles of law to the admitted and established facts.
1. That during the life of the intestate the husband had no interest in the estate in controversy that he could make available for the payment of appellee's judgment or that appellee could reach under execution. Upon her death the judgment creditor could only take the distributive share of the estate going to the husband; in other words, the creditor could take no greater interest in the estate than the husband took by inheritance in the estate of the wife upon her death. These propositions are so self-evident and elementary that no authorities are needed in their support.
2. Both in England and in this country lands held in fee are subject to the debts of the owner while living and after .death, and this is the case whether the debt be due upon matter of record, by specialty or by simple contract; and, if the lands descend to the heir, or go to a devisee, he holds them subject to be taken for the,'payment of the debts of the ancestor, according to the laws of the state in which they are situated. 1 Washb. Beal Prop. (4th ed.) 87; Watkins v. Holman, 16 Pet: 63; 1 Greenl. Cruise, 60, note.
3. The only title or interest in the estate that could be taken at the sale under execution was the distributive share of the husband in the estate of the wife after the payment of all debts. -The regularity and legality of the appointment of the administrator, and the validity of the claims against the estate and' the legality of their allowance by the court, having been unquestioned, and no objection made to the valuation of the estate and aggregate value found, and these proceedings being cohceded to have been regular, the appellee to that extent is concluded by them. Under our statutes, as at common law, the lands of the intestate descend to the heir subject to the payment of debts, if the personal estate be insufficient; and when there is a deficiency of personal estate, neither the heir nor one holding under him by deed or by operation of law can retain the estate as against creditors, except by the payment of the debts. "Heirs, devisees and distributees are liable to creditors * -x- * -fcpg fup amount of the property received by them, whether real or personal." 2 Woerner, Adm'n, 1265. In Borer v. Chapman, 119 U. S. 587, it was held that, after the settlement and distribution of the estate and discharge of the administrator, a creditor of the estate could proceed in equitjr in the state of the domicile to which the assets had been removed, and subject such assets in the hands of an heir or devisee to the payment of the debt.
The estate being insufficient to pay the debts, it follows that an action could not be maintained by appellee without paying or contributing to their payment to the value of the property claimed.
Many questions, technical and of minor importance, are raised in regard to-the proceedings in subjecting the property to the payment of the debts. The first, and one of the most important, is that there was no appraisement of the personal estate. The object of appraisement is to inform the court of the value of personal property as a guide and aid in the adjustment of the affairs. It is not contended that the petition did not contain and set forth the amount and value of the personal property, nor that the inventory was not correct; it showed the only personal property to be $100 in money. The contention is that the proceedings were irregular and illegal because three disinterested persons had not duly appraised the value of $100 in money. The value of that item being known, and it being the only one, there was no personal estate to be appraised. The law does not require unreasonable, unnecessary, nor superfluous acts to be performed. The failure to cause such appraisement under the circumstances cannot avail to vitiate the proceedings.
It is urged that the service of summons was defective. We do not so regard it. The proceedings appear to have been regular; service was acknowledged by all'to whom the writs were directed, and they were properly before the court. If they had not been, it was a defense that could only be interposed by the parties, or some of them; it was personal to them, and could not avail appellee.
It is also contended that the proceedings were faulty in not making appellee a party. Whatever title or supposed title appellee had was not by virtue of descent cast, but was derivative. As already shown, if he had any interest it was that coming through the heir. The proceedings were to settle the estate. Appellee was neither heir nor creditor, and was not an indispensable party,— if he had wished to intervene, he could have done so. His failure to do so should not prejudice the result. It follows that the general assignment of error should be sustained. The finding and judgment were erroneous: First, in finding the title in appellee, and that appellant unlawfully detained the premises; second, in finding that the averments in the cross-complaint were insufficient. The title of appellant was shown to be that acquired by purchase as creditor,— the only title that could prevail. The minor irregularities supposed to have existed in the proceedings could in no way affect appellee when the insolvency was established and conceded. There being no allegations of fraud, and it being obvious that under no possible manipulation could the estate have shown a residue for distribution, it becomes apparent.that the only interested parties who would have a legal right to complain of such irregularities, if they existed, were the creditors who had not been and could not be fully paid.
We advise that the judgment be reversed and the cause remanded.
Richmond and Bissell, 00., concur.