Case Name: Smith Brothers, Inc., a Corporation, Appellant, v. W. A. Williams, et al., Appellees
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1930-08-06
Citations: 100 Fla. 660
Docket Number: 
Parties: Smith Brothers, Inc., a Corporation, Appellant, v. W. A. Williams, et al., Appellees.
Judges: Terrell, C. J., and Whitfield, Ellis, Strum, Brown and Buford, J. J., concur.
Reporter: Florida Reports
Volume: 100
Pages: 660–667

Head Matter:
Smith Brothers, Inc., a Corporation, Appellant, v. W. A. Williams, et al., Appellees.
En Banc.
Opinion filed August 6, 1930.
Sutton, Tillman & Reeves, Frank P. Ingram and EdwinBrdbston, for Appellants;
Mabry, Reaves & White and H. D. Wentworth and 17.. F. Hines, for Appellees;
Henry E. Williams, C. W. Lawrence, Jr., Inicien H. Boggs, Herbert 8. Phillips, and Shackleford, Ivy, Warrior <& Shannon, as Amici Curiae.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
— Upon rehearing Mr. Chief Justice Terrell, Mr. Justice Whitfield and Mr. Justice Strum are of opinion that the decree in this cause should be reversed, while Mr. Justice Ellis, Mr. Justice Buford and Mr. Justice Brown are of opinion that the decree should be affirmed. When the members of the Supreme Court, sitting six members in a body, and after full consultation, it appears that the members of the Court are permanently and equally divided in opinion as to whether the decree should, be affirmed or reversed, and there is no prospect of an immediate change in the personnel of the Court, the decree should be affirmed; therefore it is considered, ordered and adjudged under the authority of State ex rel. Hampton v. McClung, 47 Fla. 224, 37 So. R. 51, that the decree of the circuit court in this cause be and the same is hereby affirmed.
Affirmed.
Terrell, C. J., and Whitfield, Ellis, Strum, Brown and Buford, J. J., concur.
Whitfield, J.
— Where legislation is invalid because in its enactment or in its terms it violates organic law, such invalid legislation may not be rendered valid by a subsequent legislative act. State ex rel. Nuveen v. Greer, 88 Fla. 249, text 271, 102 So. R. 739. If the validating act violates; the Constitution it is inoperative. Town of Enterprise v. State, 29 Fla. 128, 10 So. R. 740. See also City of Orlando v. Giles, 51 Fla. 422, 40 So. R. 834; Weinberger v. Board, 93 Fla. 470, 112 So. R. 253. But a statute may validate illegal or unauthorized administrative assessments or other administrative acts done under an illegal or inoperative statute, provided the assessment or other act is within the power of the legislature to do itself as by a duly enacted statute, and the illegal administrative act could have been directly done by statute when it was done and when the validating statute was enacted. See Sudberry v. Graves, 83 Ark. 344, 103 So. W. R. 728; State v. Fla. In. Nav. Dist., 97 Fla. 839, 122 So. R. 249; C. H. & N. R. Co. v. Willis, 260 U. S. 8; Peterson v. Town of Davenport, 90 Fla. 71, 105 So. R. 265.
In Horton v. Kyle, 81 Fla. 274, 288, 88 So. R. 757, the subsequent statute was held to be inoperative on the theory that it was an attempt to validate the prior invalid enactment relating to administrative special assessments. The dissenting opinion in Horton v. Kyle contains a copy of the validating act, in support of the view that the subsequent statute did not attempt to validate the invalid legislation, but ratified and confirmed the administrative action taken under the prior act, thereby making a permissible direct statutory assessment in a drainage district, the reference to the prior invalid enactment being, the means of identifying the administrative "assessments made and the taxes levied" that were "invalidated, ratified, approved and confirmed." See Sudberry v. Graves, 83 Ark. 344, 103 So. W. R. 728, quoted from in the main opinion in Horton v. Kyle, supra. See also Davies v. Chicot County Drainage Dist., 112 Ark. 357, 166 So. W. R. 170; Thompson v. Mitchell, 133 Iowa 527, 110 N. W. R. 901; State ex rel. Latimer v. Henry, 28 Wash. 38, 68 Pac. R. 368; State ex rel. v. Board of Com'rs of Pacific County, 48 Wash. 230, 93 Pac. R. 326.
It was competent for the legislature to authorize special assessments for public road improvements to be made by the means stated in Chapter 10145, Acts of 1925, provided the statute required appropriate notice and an opportunity to be heard, to be given to the property owners affected by the special assessments, so as to comply with the requirements of due process of law under the organic law. Browning v. Hooper, 269 U. S. 396, 46 Sup. Ct. R. 141, 70 L. Ed. 330; Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112, 17 Sup. Ct. R. 56, 41 L. Ed. 369. Chapter 10145 failed to provide for the necessary notice and hearing before the special assessments became effective, and for this reason the act is held to be inoperative. While such a special assessment cannot be imposed by individual petitioners unless appropriate notice and opportunity to be heard be given to owners of the property so specially assessed, to afford due process of law, yet the legislature by statute may make such a special assessment without giving notice or opportunity to be heard; and the validating act, Chapter 12208, Acts 1927, does not purport to validate Chapter 10145; but by Chapter-12208, the special assessments were validated, ratified and confirmed, which in effect made them statutory assessments, Road Imp. Dist. No. 1 v. P. R. Co., 274 U. S. 188, 47 Sup. Ct. R. 563, 71 L. Ed. 992. See also State ex rel. v. Bass, 96 Fla. 478, 118 So. R. 212.
Terrell, C. J., and Strum, J., concur.
Ellis, Brown and Buford, J. J., dissent.
Brown, J., dissents for reasons stated in previous opinion.
Buford, J.
— My view is that although a district created and assessments made to provide funds to pay for improvements in such districts under the provisions of Chapter 10145 might be adopted and confirmed by appropriate subsequent legislation, yet I think that the provisions of Chapter 12208 (which must be construed as a special and local act) fails to accomplish that purpose because of the inadequacy of its language.