Case Name: Ellis County v. T. F. Thompson
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1901-11-04
Citations: 95 Tex. 22
Docket Number: No. 1033
Parties: Ellis County v. T. F. Thompson.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 95
Pages: 22–34

Head Matter:
Ellis County v. T. F. Thompson.
No. 1033.
Decided November 4, 1901.
1. —Jurisdiction—Amount—Fraud.
The fact that less than the amount necessary to give the court jurisdiction was, upon the construction of a difficult statute, held to be legally recoverable, does not tend to prove fraudulent claim of a larger amount by plaintiff in order to give the court jurisdiction. (P. 26.)
2. —Fees of Office—Construction of Statute.
A county cleric in a county where more than 7500 votes were east was entitled to retain out of fees of office collected, in addition to his maximum salary of $2500 and the amount paid to his deputies, one-fourth of the excess of such fees over the pay of himself and deputies,—not one-fourth of the excess over his own salary. Act, June 16 and 19, 1897, secs. 10, 11, 12—Batts’1 Dig., arts. 2495c, 2495d, 2495e—construed. (Pp. 26-34.)
3. —Fees of Office—Collection—Commissions.
The “officer to whose office the fees accrued,” authorized by the statute’ (Batts’ Rev. Stats., art. 2495d) to collect same, is the incumbent at the time of their collection, not the ex-officer during whose term of office the fees accrued; and the latter is not entitled to the commission allowed by law, for collecting them after going out of office. (P. 29.)
4. —Same. .
The “fees of all kinds” (Batts’ Rev. Stats., art. 2495c), out of which only a maximum amount is to be retained by the officer, embrace everything not specially excepted by the statute; compensation for ex-officio services allowed by the commissioners court and fees in suits to collect taxes are SO' excepted,—but not commissions on fees collected. (P. 29.)
5. —Statutory Construction.
Effect of the general intention on the face of an act to restrict rather than enlarge the rights of officers, upon the construction of the language of a particular part, considered; also the effect of one section on the construction of the language of another. (Pp. 31-33.)
Error to the Court of Civil Appeals for the Fifth District, in an appeal from Ellis County.
Ellis County sued Thompson and appealed from a judgment for defendant, on affirmance of which the county obtained writ of error.
Jack Beall and T. B. Williams, for plaintiff in error.
Section 10 of the act says, that in a certain class of counties the county clerk shall receive $2500 as a maximum salary and “in addition thereto one-fourth of the excess of the fees” collected by him. “Excess” over what? The' statute itself does not say. The statute elsewhere provides for the hire-of deputies and their pay. It further provides that the clerk shall pay to the county treasurer all fees collected by him in excess of the maximum salary allowed and one-fourth of the excess of the maximum amount allowed for their services and for the services of their deputies- or assistants hereinafter provided for.
We submit that from the language used the interpretation contended for by appellant is the proper one. But if this be denied, then how should the interpretation be reached ? Evidently by regarding the rules- laid down in the books, viz., look to the old law, the evil and the remedy for the purpose of arriving at the intent of the legislature, and give to it that interpretation which will effect that purpose rather than which would defeat it.
We invoke the pardon of the court in saying that the writer of this,, while the original Wayland fee bill was before the committee, first put upon it an amendment giving to the officer an interest in the “excess” of fees collected. It will be readily seen that this served a double purpose.. It added to the salary of the officer, it is true, but it also was a guaranty to the county that the officer would be vigilant in the exercise of his duty as an officer and in charging and collecting fees. Without some such provision after the receipts of office amounted to a sufficient sum to pay the maximum salary and the expenses of the office there would be danger that the officer would become negligent in the performance of his duties to the public or indifferent to the necessity of diligently charging and collecting the fees of his office, and we venture the suggestion that the latter consideration was the one responsible for the presence of this provision in the law * rather than a desire to add to the fees of the officers, and we also opine that the construction given by the Court of Appeals was never remotely hinted at by anyone during the consideration of this measure by the Legislature.
The construction given to this law by the Court of Civil Appeals involves a contradiction. It says that the appellee herein is entitled to $1072.32 in addition to his maximum salary of $2500, because the first amount is one-fourth of the “excess.” It further says the county is entitled to nothing because there is a deficit, by calculation amounting to $641.06. These are contradictory terms, and can not well exist together. There can not be both an “excess” and a “deficit.”
Templeton & Harding and Finley, Etheridge & Knight, for defendant in error. (Prom argument on motion for rehearing).
This court, in its opinion has subordinated the plain language of section 10 to language contained in section 11. The language used in section 11 is by the court treated as an interpretation of language used .in section 10. Inasmuch as the language used in section 10 is plain, and needs no interpretation so far as its own terms be concerned, it is suggested that nothing short of an absolute inconsistency between the two provisions and a clear intention that the provision of section 11 should limit and control the effect to be given the language in section 10, would justify the court, in forcing the expression of section 10 to yield to section 11. It is a, canon of construction that there exists a presumption against inconsistency. Black on Interp. of Laws, p. 98, see. 44.
It should be remembered that section 11 of the act is subsidiary in character; it deals with neither of the^objects embraced in the title of the act, but relates to the matter of excess in fees, and the duty of officers, in relation thereto. The particular clause in question, and to which the court has given controlling effect, simply gives direction as to the payment of the excess into the county treasury, and manifestly in so far as it touches the question of the amount of compensation allowed to ■officers, does • so only by incidentally reiterating the compensation allowed under section 10, by way of pointing to the excess to be paid into the treasury. t
The clause is clumsy and more or less involved, but it is patent that the effort was to state that the pay allowed officers and the pay allowed deputies was to he taken out of the whole sum of fees collected and the excess of such fees turned into the county treasury. The whole question of doubt arises out of the attempt to restate the amount allowed officers so as to get at, by a process of elimination, the excess to be paid into the county treasury. The" court seems to attach much importance to the fact that the term "maximum amount,” as used in this section, refers to the stated amount of $2500. In our judgment, this fact does not lead necessarily, nor even fairly, to the construction which the court has given the statute. Treating the clause as directing the officer to pay into the county treasury an excess of the fees collected, and as pointing out the method of determining the excess by reason of the fact that the element of deputies’ pay has just been introduced, we have no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the sentence means, that the excess which is to be paid into the county treasury was the sum remaining after taking from the total sum of all the fees collected the several items in the order named in said section, viz: 1. The $2500. 2. The one-fourth of the remaining sum. 3. The sum of the deputies’ salaries; the balance to constitute the excess to be paid into the county treasury.
We think the construction given to this particular clause by the court may have been in some degree led to- by the fact that the court treats this part of section 11 as directing the officers to retain a certain portion of the fees collected, while the fact is, that it is a direction to pay into the county treasury a certain sum as an excess which is to be arrived at by a process of reduction and elimination.
To make our contention clear and simple, we think the clause intended to mention three sums by which the total sum of fees collected is to he reduced before the excess is determined which is required to be paid into the county treasury. Naturally the Legislature would place these sums in the order in which they are provided for in the act. Already in section 10 it has been provided that the clerks should receive a stated sum of $2500, and the further sum of one-fourth of the excess of the fees collected over this $2500. In the eleventh section, for the first time, the further element of deputies’ fees to be provided for in the next section, is introduced and is necessary to be noticed, and it is mentioned as the third element to reduce the total sum of the fees collected before the excess could be created to which the county would be entitled. While the language'is^not clear, it seems to us that this construction of it accords with the expression of the section itself, and places this section in entire harmony with section 10, under its literal construction.
It is a canon of construction that where one portion of a section of a statute is clear and definite, and another doubtful and susceptible of more than one construction, the latter must yield and be made to conform to the former. Suth. on Stat. Const., p. 313, sec. 337.
From still another view we think it can be clearly demonstrated that this court’s construction should not obtain. Section 10 of the act allows designated officers in certain counties “an amount not exceeding $3500 per annum; and in addition thereto one-fourth of the excess of the fees collected by the officers respectively.” Section 11 (first sentence) provides that “the amounts allowed to each officer mentioned in section 10 •of this act may be retained out of the said sums of money,” but out of all the fees collected by him there might be an excess over the amounts allowed the officer and the amounts allowed for their deputies, and it is natural that the law should provide for the disposition to be made of such excess.
In section 11 that excess is attempted to be defined and the officers directed to pay such excess “to the county treasurer of the county where the excess occurs.” We now invite the court’s attention to the clause of section 11, the proper construction of which is in dispute, and ask that such clause be considered in the light of other sections of the act heretofore quoted. The clause reads: “And all fees collected by the officers named in section 10 of this act during the fiscal year, in excess of the maximum amount allowed and one-fourth of the excess of the maximum allowed for their services, and for the services of their deputies and assistants hereinafter provided for, shall be paid to the county treasurer of the county where the excess occurs.” Under any construction given this clause the words “the amount allowed,” or their equivalent, is to be understood before the phrase “for the services of their deputies or assistants hereinafter provided for.”

Opinion:
BROWN, Associate Justice.
From the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals we copy the following findings of fact:
"T. F. Thompson was county clerk of Ellis County from December 1, 1897, to November 23, 1898. Ellis County east as many as 7500 votes at the presidential election held in 1896. Thompson collected in cash from all sources as fees earned by said office during the time he was clerk $6886.70, less a credit of $136.10 for error and stamps allowed, leaving $6750.60. He also collected commission on fines, $190.55. There were delinquent fees at the time he went out of office, $1294.61, of which he has since collected $239.55, and there is in the hands of the present clerk $167.50 not yet paid over to Thompson. Thompson paid out for assistants and deputies appointed as required by law, $4151.59."
In accordance with the requirements of the statute, Thompson made a report to the District Court of Ellis County of fees collected by him during the year from the 1st day of December, 1897, to the 23d day of November, 1898, at which time his term of office expired. By this report, he showed that nothing remained in his hands of the fees col lected, after deducting those sums which, according to his construction of the statute, he was authorized to retain. Ellis County instituted this-suit in the District Court of that county against Thompson to recover-of him the sum of $1030.11, claimed to have been collected by him as. fees during the year aforesaid and which was in excess of all the different amounts to which he was entitled under the law. The trial court gave judgment that Ellis County take nothing by its suit and for all costs, which judgment was affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals.
Defendant in error filed in this court a motion and plea by which he-seeks to have this writ of error dismissed because he alleges that the sum sued for by the plaintiff in error was alleged in its petition in the.District Court at a sum greater than $1000, fraudulently and for the purpose of giving to the Supreme Court jurisdiction of the case upon, writ of error. The attorney for Ellis County who prepared and filed the petition in the District Court and has prosecuted the case since, filed in this court an answer to the motion and plea in which the allegations. of fraud are specifically denied. The affidavits presented by the defendant in error to sustain his motion do not evidence any intent on the-part of Ellis County or its counsel to fraudulently give jurisdiction to this court of the suit then instituted. They simply establish a state of facts from which the counsel for Ellis County, if he had considered them in the light they are presented here, might have determined that, his client was not entitled to recover as much as the sum he sued for;, but these facts do not tend to establish the proposition that there was. a fraudulent intent in putting the sum over $1000. The plea and motion are therefore overruled.
The contention in this case arises over the construction of the follow- • ing language employed in the act of the Legislature approved June-16, 1897, known as the fee bill, as amended by an act approved June 19,. 1897:
"See. 10. That hereafter the maximum amount of fees of all kinds-that may be retained by any officer mentioned in this section as compensation for services shall be as follows: In counties in. which there were east at the last presidential election as many as 7500-votes, clerk of the county court, an amount not exceeding $2500 per annum; in addition thereto, one-fourth of the-excess of the fees collected by [him] the officers respectively." Batts5' Digest, art. 2495c.
"Sec. 11. The.amounts allowed to each officer mentioned in section 10 of this act may be retained out of the fees collected by him under-existing -laws, but in no case shall the State or the county be responsible-for the payment of any sum when the fees collected by any officer are less than the maximum compensation allowed by this act, or be responsible for the pay of any deputy or assistant. Each officer mentioned in. the preceding section, and also the sheriff, shall, at the close of each fiscal year, make to the district court of the county in which he resides-a sworn statement, showing the amount of fees collected by him during; the fiscal year and the amount of fees charged and not collected, and by whom due, and the number of deputies and assistants employed by him during the year, and the amount paid or to be paid each; and all fees collected by officers named in section 10 of this act during the fiscal year-in- excess of the maximum amount allowed, and of the one-fourth of the-excess of the maximum allowed for their services, and for the services, of their deputies or assistants hereinafter provided for, shall be paid to-the county treasurer of the county where the excess accrued." Section 12 provides that when any officer desires deputies or assistants in the-performance of his duties, he shall make application to the county-judge for authority to make such appointments, stating the mimber-required and showing the necessity for their appointment. When the county judge has given the authority, the officers may appoint'them with salaries not to exceed, to the first assistant, $1300 per annum, and to all others, not to exceed $900 per annum; and it is provided that "the-amount to be paid each and the compensation allowed shall be paid out of the fees of office to which said deputies or assistants may be-appointed, and shall not be included in estimating the maximum salaries of officers named in section 10 of this act."
The defendant in error contends that under this statute he was. entitled to retain in his possession one-fourth of all the fees collected by him in excess of $3500, and this view of the law was adopted by the trial court and the Court of Civil Appeals; that is, from the whole sum collected $3500 was deducted, and then the one-fourth of the remaining sum was deducted as the compensation of the clerk. The plaintiff in error insists that the $3500 maximum salary provided for the clerk by law and the $4151.59 paid for the service of deputies, should have-been first deducted and the excess of fees collected should have been divided, one-fourth to the defendant in error and three-fourths to Ellis. County.
The law made it the duty of Thompson, as county clerk of Ellis County, at the end of the financial year, to make a report showing the total amount of fees collected by him and the sum paid to his deputies, which would furnish all the data necessary for a settlement, with the county. Article 3495d prescribes the rule -by which the contention in this case may be decided, and its proper application to the-facts can be best illustrated by stating the account between Thompson and Ellis County as the statute directs. Thompson should be charged with 'the fees collected during the year, $7348.34, and should be credited with- $3500, the "maximum amount allowed for his services," and with the amount paid to deputies, $4151.59, aggregating $6651.59;. which, being deducted from the whole' amount of costs collected, leaves $696.65, the excess "of the maximum amount allowed for his services and for the services of his deputies." He is _ entitled to credit for $174.16, the one-fourth of the last named amount, which makes $6835.75, the total credits. The difference between the credits and the sum collected, $533.49, is the excess of the collection over all law ful credits and should have been paid into the county treasury. This •solution fulfills every requirement of the law and is in harmony with The scheme inaugurated by the statute.
The defendant in error claims that the language "the maximum amount of fees of all kinds that may be retained by any officer mentioned in this article as compensation for services shall be as follows," includes the $2500 and the "one-fourth of the excess of fees collected by said officers;" and that the phrase "maximum amount allowed for his services," when used in the statute, means the specified sum. and the one-fourth of the excess of the fees collected. It is contended that this construction is supported by article 2495e (Batts' Digest), which provides that the fees paid deputies "shall not be included in •estimatffig the maximum salaries of officers named in section 10 of this act," but we think that the Legislature intended to express that the pay of deputies should not be deducted from the specified -maximum salary. All doubt as to the proper construction of the language used in article 2495c is certainly removed by article 2495d, which .authorized Thompson to retain out of the fees collected by him the amounts allowed by the preceding section, which is defined by the language "in excess of the maximum amount allowed and of the.one-fourth of the excess of the maximum amount allowed for -their services and for the services of their deputies." This clearly expresses two '"excess" amounts to be ascertained; first, that sum which is in "excess" of the maximum amount allowed, and second, the "excess" over and above the maximum allowed to the officer and the sum paid to his deputies. The maximum amount allowed the clerk $2500 and $4151.59 paid to the deputies must be deducted to arrive at the "excess" of fees collected, of which Thompson was entitled to retain -one-fourth. The "one-fourth of the excess" could not be a part of "the maximum amount allowed," and at the same time be part of the remainder after deducting the maximum and another sum. This language defines the term "maximum" to mean the specified sum, $2500, and the phrase "the excess of the fees collected by the said •officers" signifies that sum which remains after taking from the whole the maximum and the amount paid .to the deputies.
The District Court and the Court of Civil Appeals erred in their -construction of the statute and the judgment entered against Ellis County and the said judgments are hereby reversed and judgment is -entered against the defendant in error, T. F. Thompson, in favor of Ellis County for the sum of $522.49, with 6 per cent interest thereon from the 23d day of November, 1898, together with all costs accruing in all of the courts.