Case Name: Joseph Haberstro, Resp't, v. John Bedford and Henry H. Phillips, Appl'ts
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1887-01
Citations: 5 N.Y. St. Rep. 399
Docket Number: 
Parties: Joseph Haberstro, Resp’t, v. John Bedford and Henry H. Phillips, Appl’ts.
Judges: Smith, P. J., concurs; Babkeb, J., dissents.
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 5
Pages: 399–410

Head Matter:
Joseph Haberstro, Resp’t, v. John Bedford and Henry H. Phillips, Appl’ts.
(Supreme Court, General Term, Fifth Department,
Filed January, 1887.)
1. Arrest — Undertaking on release of prisoner — What to contain— Code, § 187 — Code Civ.Pro.,§575, Sub.3 — 2 Rev. Stat., p. 286, § 59.
Where the undertaking taken by a sheriff on the release of a prisoner held under an order of arrest in a civil action, was in the form prescribed by section 187 of the old Code, but was made after the Code of Civil Procedure went into effect, and contained a provision that the arrested defendant should “ at all times render himself amenable to the process of the court during the pendency of the action ” in which the order of arrest issued, which words were not properly embraced in the undertaking under Code Civ. Pro., § 575, sub. 3. Held, that the said phrase added nothing to the statutory obligation assumed, and was therefore mere surplusage, and did not vitiate the legal quality of the instrument under 2 Rev. Stat., page 286, § 59. That the undertaking was not taken colore officii, and was valid.
Barker, J., dissenting.
2. Same — Bailbond — When liable to sheriff — Rights of bail who FAIL TO JUSTIFY — CODE ClV. PRO., §§ 587, 589.
• A civil action was brought against one W., in which an order of arrest was issued, and W. was arrested by the then sheriff of Erie County, and the present defendants became W’s bail, and made the undertaking to the sheriff, but upon the bail being excepted to, they failed to justify. A judgment was recovered in said action against W., who had been discharged on said undertaking, and an execution against his property was returned unsatisfied, and one against his person not .found.” An action was then brought by the plaintiff in the said action against W., which resulted in a recovery of a judgment against the sheriff, on the ground that there had been an escape of W., which judgment the sheriff paid, and then brought an action against these defendants, on their undertaking. Held, that the defendants, when they refused or neglected to justify, denied to themselves the rights and privileges of bail. That they could not make a surrender of W. so as to relieve themselves from liability (see Code Civ. Pro., §§ 5S7, 589. That the sheriff owed them good faitli but no active duty to protect them against the consequences of such omission on' their part. That it is not a defense for said defendants that the sheriff might, by a different course of proceedings from that taken by him, have protected himself and them against liability.
Appeal from judgment entered on verdict in the Superior Court of Buffalo, and from an order denying motion for a new trial. Transferred to this court for review pursuant to Code Civ. Pro., § 278.
Truman C. White, for appl’ts; Adelbert Moot, for resp’t.

Opinion:
Bradley, J.
The question is presented whether the undertaking, taken by the plaintiff as sheriff in the action of Douglas vs. Warren was colore officii and void within the statute which provides, tbat no sheriff or other officer shall take any bond, obligation or security by color of his office in any other case or manner than such as are provided by law, and any such bond, obligation, or security taken otherwise than as herein directed, shall be void — 2 R. S., 286, § 59.
This undertaking was in the form prescribed by section 187 of the old Code, but was made after the Code of Civil Procedure went into effect, by which the terms of the undertaking required in a case like that in which this one was taken, was so changed as to omit the provision that the arrested defendant should " at all times render himself amenable to the process of the court during the pendency of the action "in which the order of arrest issued. (§ 575, sub. 3.) Those words were not properly embraced in the undertaking in question. Andif in any view which canlegit-imately be taken of those words in such a case, they in terms impose any burden upon the person arrested, for the protection of his sureties, not within the authorized provision of the instrument, it was wholly void, and can furnish no support for the relief of the plaintiff in this action. Cook v. Freidenthal, 80 N. Y., 202. Toles v. Adee, 84 N. Y., 222.
This undertaking contains the terms provided by the statute for it. And in such case if the additional words employed may be treated as surplusage merely, the instrument will not be void.
And that depends upon the question whether any use, if valid, could be made of the extra provision in any event as against the principal named in it, or to charge his sureties to any extent otherwise than the omission of such provision would permit. The provision that the .principal would " at all times render himself amenable to the process of the court" as directed by the old Code, was what was required as equitable bail, of a party taken in custody on writ of ne exeat. The legal and practical effect of this was, that the arrested defendant would render himself amenable to process to enforce performances of any decree that might be rendered against him. Gleason v. Bisby; Clarke, 551; Dunham v. Jackson, 1 Paige, 629; Mitchell v. Bunch, 2 id., 606; McNamara v. Dwyer, 7 id., 239.
It is difficult to see in this extra phrase any legitimate import, as implied to the action at law in which the undertaking was made, not embraced within the provisions required by the statute. Code Civ. Pro. § 575, sub. 3.
It was evidently inserted in the old code in view of the purpose of the commissioners to abolish the writ of ne exeat, and in their expectation and belief that such would be the effect of the legislative adoption of their work. And that they therefore designed to make the provisions for arrest and bail, applicable to actions for both legal and equitable relief. The weight of authority upon the conflict of decisions, is that the writ was not abolished by that code. And it may in that view be' said that the particular provision in question in its purpose and effect was nugatory. It is not apparent, nor am I able to see that the use of these unauthorized words of the undertaking can have any possible import in an action at law, other than such as would be furnished by their exclusion from the instrument. No requirement within the provisions of the undertaking other than that arising out of the liability established by the judgment seems to have been possible in the action in which it was taken. That was an action for the recovery of money only, and the order of arrest was supported by the charge of fraudulent appropriation of money by Warren, the defendant therein.
The provision of the undertaking that he would render himself amenable to such process as might be issued to enforce the judgment, was all that was applicable in that action, or which to any extent characterized the nature of the obligation assumed by the instrument executed by the sureties.
It would have been otherwise if it had contained the provision usually inserted in bonds on discharge from arrest on ne exeat, that the defendant would " not depart from or leave this State without the permission of the court," but nothing in this undertaking imports any such obligation. It has been suggested that the failure of the defendant to obey a subpoena to appear as a witness in the action, might result in a breach of the terms of the undertaking, but the expression used in it has been one of practical use, and construction in proceedings in courts of equity, and it has not been deemed applicable to any such use, or effectual for any such purpose. It relates only to the process of the court to enforce some decree or judgment in the action, and not to any proceeding taken to compel the- attendance of the defendant as a witness in it for the plaintiff.
The statute rendering void unauthorized securities taken by public officers, is applied with much strictness. And in Barnard v. Viele (21 Wendell, 88), NelsON, Ch. J., remarked that a bond was void, although the legal effect of that there in question, and that authorized seemed to be substantially the same ; but it will be observed that there the bond differed in its terms from that prescribed by law, while here, the required terms are adopted; and the only question arises upon the effect of the additional provision inserted in the undertaking. It seems to add nothing to the statutory obligation assumed, and is therefore mere surplusage, and does not vitiate the legal quality of the instrument.
The contention to the like effect in Cook v. Freudenthal, supra, was overcome by the fact that there was a possible con-, tingency in an action of the character of that one, that an execution might issue against the body of the defendant upon the judgment; hence the unauthorized provision of the undertaking rendered it void. But there was no suggestion by the court in that case that its provision to the effect that the defendant would be amenable to the process of the court, added anything in terms to its effect, other than its relation to the enforcement of the judgment of the court. My conclusion is that the undertaking in question was not taken colore officii; and that it was valid.
The proceedings which preceded and led to this action so far as material are, that Alice Douglas brought an action against William T. Warren, in which an order of arrest was issued, and Warren was arrested by the plaintiff, then sheriff of Erie county. And the defendants made the undertaking before mentioned which was received by the plaintiff, and Warren was .discharged. The bail was accepted to, and they failed to justify. A judgment was recovered against Warren in that action. And an execution against his property having been returned -unsatisfied, and one against his person returned not found, an action was brought by Douglas against this plaintiff, in which a .recovery was had, and sustained after a long litigation, which is isomewhat represented by the report of it in 25 Hun, 262; reversed 88 N. Y., 611; 30 Hun, 649; affirmed 96 N. Y., 626. The liability of the plaintiff was as bail, which relation he assumed when the sureties in the undertaking failed to justify. Code Civil Procedure, 587. And they became liable to him for all the damages he should sustain by reason of such omission. Id., § 589.
The purpose of this action is to recover such damages. It is .contended on the part of the defense that the liability of the plaintiff as bail, was occasioned by his own fault, or neglect to protect himself, which his duty to the defendants required him to do in their behalf; and that for his failure to do so they were -relieved from liability to him. It appears that the reason why Warren was not found and taken in the execution issued against his person, was because he had been taken to the Inebriate Asylum at Binghamton, by virtue of an order to that effect, -.made by the county judge of Erie county.
That order seems to have been void, and was so treated by the trial court. The action against the plaintiff was commenced April 10th, 1879, and on the 14th of that month, the plaintiff as .such sheriff, caused the return of Warren into his custody, and might have retained him in his custody, and exoneration have .been obtained by the sheriff as such bail, prior to April 80th, 1879, as his time t'o answer the complaint did not until then expire. Id., § 591-595.
On the 15th of April, and while Warren was in such custody, the defendants sought to make a formal surrender of him to the sheriff. .And if it was in their power to do so, it would have been ;au effectual relief for them; but their relation as bail,by reason of tbeir failure to justify had terminated, and did not exist at the time of such attempted surrender, and it was therefore ineffectual as such. Clapp v. Schutt, 44 N. Y., 104. The plaintiff did not continue the retention of Warren in his custody, but on the 24th of April, he accepted an undertaking in behalf of the judgment debtor, and discharged him, caused his re-arrest on the 28th of the month by the coroner, and on the next day he was again set at liberty on giving with sureties another undertaking, both of which were in the form of that first before mentioned. This arrest was evidently caused with a view to the exoneration of the sheriff as bail; and an application was by him made to the court, and the order granting it was reversed. 19 Hun, 1. And after the plaintiff's term of office expired, and in February 1880, he surrendered Warren to the sheriff, by whom he was taken into custody, and again moved for his exoneration as bail, and the order then granting his application was also reversed. 21 Hun, 320, 82 N. Y., 572. The opportunity of the plaintiff to obtain as matter of right his exoneration as bail, was lost by the discharge of Warren from custody after he was placed there in April, 1879.
The taking of the undertakings thereafter received, was without authority of law, and the discharge of the judgment debtor thereupon permitted, is treated as an escape. And of this defendants complain, and allege such release from custody as matter of defense. It cannot well be claimed that the failure of the plaintiff to keep the debtor in custody was caused by any bad faith on the part of the plaintiff, or with any view to charge the defendants with liability. They denied to themselves the right and privileges of'bail, when they refused or neglected to justify.
The plaintiff owed to them good faith, but no active duty to protect them against the consequences of such omission on their part. It is not therefore a defense for them that he may, by a different course of proceeding than that taken by him, have protected himself and them against liability. When the defendants made the undertaking and he accepted it, the judgment debtor was entitled to his discharge from custody. Code Civ. Pro., § 573; Arteaga v. Conner, 88 N. Y., 403.
And it was only after he by force, of the statute, became bail, that the sheriff was permitted to surrender or take him into custody. At the time he became such the defendants ceased to have any rights or privileges as bail. And their liability became his indemnity for the damages that he might legitimately sustain as the consequence of the relation imposed upon him. The fact that the plaintiff misjudged or was illy advised of his legal rights, and therefore failed to observe and resort to the remedies which may have been available to relieve him from his liability as bail, does not constitute a defense for the defendant without tbe support of bad faitb on bis part toward tbem, which does not appear to be a feature in the case.
As the case is now viewed, the plaintiff was entitled to recover. The amount of damages was a question of some controversy upon the evidence, and in the contention of the parties. None of the exceptions having relation to the measure and amount of the damages, or raising any other question on the trial, seem to have been well taken.
The judgment and order should be affirmed.
Smith, P. J., concurs; Babkeb, J., dissents.