Case Name: PIERCE v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1993-08-03
Citations: 443 Mich. 137
Docket Number: Docket No. 91687
Parties: PIERCE v GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION
Judges: Brickley, Boyle, and Griffin, JJ., concurred with Riley, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 443
Pages: 137–175

Head Matter:
PIERCE v GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION
Docket No. 91687.
Argued October 14, 1992
(Calendar No. 9).
Decided August 3, 1993.
Separate opinion by Levin, J., filed August 4, 1993.
Rehearing denied 444 Mich 1201.
Paul E. Pierce sought workers’ compensation, claiming nervous disability and related alcoholism as a result of employment with the General Motors Corporation. A hearing referee found total disability, and the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board affirmed. The Court of Appeals, Hood, P.J., and Weaver and Marilyn J. Kelly, JJ., affirmed in an unpublished opinion per curiam (Docket No. 125457). The defendant appeals.
In an opinion by Justice Riley, joined by Justices Brickley, Boyle, and Griffin, the Supreme Court held:
Alcoholism is not a compensable personal injury under chapter three of the Workers’ Disability Compensation Act. The wcab erroneously included the plaintiff’s personal addiction to alcohol as a variable in its decision to award disability benefits.
1. It is unclear from the factual findings of the wcab whether the plaintiff’s alcoholism was the result of an underlying psychiatric disorder or whether the psychiatric disorder arose out of an increase in the plaintiff’s alcoholic condition. In order to be awarded benefits for personal injury, a claimant must show injury arising out of and in the course of employment. Although compensation is not awarded for a disability caused by an ordinary disease of life, benefits may be recovered where the employment aggravates, accelerates, or combines with a preexisting condition to produce the injury.
2. It is not work and its attendant stresses that aggravate alcoholism; it is alcohol. It is not a job or occupation that compels alcoholics to consume alcohol; it is the disease from which they suffer. Alcoholism is a progressive disease, aggravation of which is caused by the alcohol itself rather than by employment.
3. Alcoholism is not a personal injury that arises out of and in the course of employment for purposes of a workers’ compensation disability. The wcab found that the plaintiff’s disability resulted from emotional problems and alcoholism. Because the plaintiff’s alcoholism was a significant factor in the board’s finding of disability, vacation of the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand to the board is required for a determination whether the plaintiff suffered a disabling personal injury separate and apart from his alcoholism.
Vacated and remanded.
Chief Justice Cavanagh, joined by Justice Mallett, dissenting, stated that the constitution provides that findings of fact in workers’ compensation proceedings are conclusive absent fraud unless otherwise provided by law. In this case, there was evidence supporting the findings of the wcab regarding the injury that disabled the plaintiff from working, which, as a matter of law, supports the wcab’s award of benefits for the injury.
Justice Levin, writing separately, stated that the workers’ compensation definition of "personal injury” enumerates exceptions to coverage — different rules for mental disabilities, diseases of the aging process, heart and cardiovascular conditions. It enumerates no exception for alcoholism and there is nothing to indicate legislative intent to exclude disabilities involving alcoholism from coverage. Unless a worker intentionally causes an injury, benefits may not be recovered even though the worker is at fault, and even if the work or stress of work is not the sole cause. Where an injury or disability arises from a preexisting physical or mental condition and events at work, the worker need not establish that the work connection is primary.
In this case, the wcab found that the plaintiff’s disability is not the result of addiction, but was the result of aggravation of preexisting alcoholism coupled with emotional disorders caused by work stress. There was evidence to support the findings of the wcab, and those findings, as a matter of law, support an award of benefits for the injury found by the wcab to have disabled the plaintiff from working. Findings of facts in workers’ compensation proceedings are conclusive in the absence of fraud unless otherwise provided by law. The wcab found a personal injury that was not simply the result of the progression of the plaintiff’s alcoholism, and thus found a personal injury independent of the progression of his alcoholism by reviewing the actual work events. It further found that those work events triggered mental or emotional disequilibrium and were personal injuries. There was a specific finding of fact that the plaintiff was not just imagining that work stress caused his problems, but that work stress was the problem, or at least a problem causing his disability.
Sachs, Waldman, O’Hare, Helveston, Hodges & Barnes, P.C. (by Granner S. Ries), for the plaintiff.
Braun, Kendrick & Finkbeiner (by Bruce L. Dalrymple and Scott C. Strattard) for the defendant.

Opinion:
Riley, J.
In this case we are asked to review the award of workers' compensation benefits granted on the basis of alcoholism and a related nervous condition suffered by plaintiff. We find that the wcab erroneously included the plaintiff's personal addiction to alcohol as a' variable in its decision to award disability benefits. Thus, we vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand to the board to determine whether plaintiff sustained any disabling personal injury that is separate and apart from any disability caused by his alcoholism.
I
Plaintiff, born January 11, 1942, began his em ployment with defendant in May 1963. In his petition for hearing, plaintiff claimed disability in the form of personal injury or disablement from occupational disease resulting from repeated and injurious harassment in the course of employment. The nature of the disability was indicated as nerves and a nervous disability. Before the hearing referee, plaintiff testified that when he began working for defendant he drank moderately and experienced no nervous problems. Plaintiff testified further, however, that he developed a nervous condition in 1967 or 1968.
During his employment, plaintiff took several sick leaves, citing "nerves" as his complaint. The record establishes that he was hospitalized several times for acute alcoholism and associated nervous problems, including once, in September 1981, after he discontinued working for defendant. Plaintiff alleged several general incidents of harassment, such as being given work outside his job assignment, being blamed for the malfunction of defective machines, and not being properly trained to operate the larger trucks. Plaintiff alleges that this harassment provoked him to drink and caused him to develop a nervous disorder. He testified that until the last year of his employment, he was able to drink, control his nervous condition, and still function at work.
Plaintiff asserts that his last year at work with defendant was the most devastating, and was the cause of the ultimate permanent disability that precludes him from working. In January 1981, just before his final disability leave, plaintiff was involved in a mishap while operating a plant truck. The truck tipped over because of improper loading and unloading. Plaintiff blamed his supervisor for the mishap, alleging a failure to instruct him regarding the proper loading of a truck. Plaintiff's last day of work was January 9, 1981. The hearing referee determined the date of the disability to be January 19, 1981. Plaintiff retired with permanent disability effective September 1, 1981. At the time of the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board decision, plaintiff was still a drinking alcoholic.
The hearing referee granted plaintiff's claim for an open award on the basis of a nervous disability. The wcab, in a two to one decision, affirmed the hearing referee's decision. The wcab majority found that "plaintiff's disability stems from emotional problems and drinking, such that we cannot extract one from the other." Slip op at 1. The board majority further found that plaintiff's father was an alcoholic, that plaintiff began drinking at age thirteen or fourteen, that he is presently unable to control his drinking, id. at 9, and then proceeded to analyze the facts under Deziel v Difco Laboratories, Inc (After Remand), 403 Mich 1; 268 NW2d 1 (1978):
[I]f plaintiff's emotional problems are linked to his work and were caused or aggravated by his work, contributing to his disability, in our view, plaintiff is entitled to compensation . [Id. at 9.][ ]
The board majority concluded that 1) plaintiff is totally disabled; 2) although plaintiff's testimony is vague with respect to dates, his testimony regarding job transfers, consultations with his union, and a work mishap establish the existence of work incidents triggering his emotional condition, and constitute personal injuries; and 3) that plaintiff honestly believes that work caused his disability. The wcab majority refused to utilize the analysis of Gacioch v Stroh Brewery Co, 426 Mich 612; 396 NW2d 1 (1986), finding the circumstances in Gacioch to be so unique as to limit the decision to its facts.
In a separate opinion, the dissenting board member stated that she would find that plaintiff failed to establish a sufficient causal nexus between his employment and his chronic alcoholism. WCAB, slip op at 13. The dissent concluded that a work nexus was not established because plaintiff's nervous condition began in 1967, but plaintiff continued to work until 1981, and by plaintiff's own admission, he could drink alcohol and still work.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings and decision of the wcab. The Court identified plaintiff's illness as a psychiatric disability that caused or aggravated plaintiff's alcoholism. It distinguished Gacioch on the basis of the plaintiff's allegation in Gacioch of a disability due solely to alcoholism, while in the present case plaintiff alleges a psychiatric disability that is only partially linked to alcoholism. The Court then opined that the test established in Deziel was applicable, and that there was sufficient, competent evidence to support the board's findings. We then granted defendant's application for leave to appeal.
II
It is unclear from the findings of the wcab whether plaintiff's alcoholism stemmed from an underlying psychiatric disorder or whether the psychiatric disorder arose out of an increase in plaintiff's alcoholic condition. Hence, we disagree with the Court of Appeals identification of plaintiff's illness as a psychiatric illness that caused plaintiff's alcoholism. We also disagree with plaintiff's assertion on appeal that it has been established that plaintiff's alcoholism is a sequela of his nervous disorder.
The deposition testimony of the medical experts produced by both defendant and plaintiff demonstrates the ambiguity of plaintiff's disability. From their testimony, it is not evident which disorder precipitated the other, or if either could have existed independently. Plaintiff was a moderate drinker before beginning work in 1963 for defendant, and before 1963, he did not suffer from any nervous condition. Plaintiff testified that his nervous condition developed about 1967 or 1968, and his drinking became progressively heavier during his employment with defendant. Plaintiff further testified that until his last year he could function at work despite his drinking and nervous condition. Although ambiguous with regard to the exact etiology of plaintiff's disability, the factual findings made by the board and other evidence in the record clearly demonstrate that alcoholism played a primary role in plaintiff's claimed injury.
We reject the invitation by plaintiff to expand the chapter three personal injury analysis of workers' compensation claims to cover diseases of addiction. In order to be awarded benefits under a chapter three personal injury analysis, the claimant must show that he suffered a personal injury arising out of and in the course of his employment. Although no compensation is awarded for a disability caused by an ordinary disease of life, a claimant may recover workers' compensation benefits when his employment aggravates, accelerates, or combines with a preexisting condition to produce a personal injury.
Alcoholism is a progressive disease. The compulsion and the consumption will accelerate until it is interrupted. It is in the nature of the disease that its victims will find conditions and circumstances at home, at work, and in between to justify the increased need for alcohol. It is not work and its attendant stresses that aggravate alcoholism; it is alcohol. It is not a job or occupation that compels alcoholics to consume alcohol; it is the disease from which they suffer. Individuals who suffer from alcoholism hold the most essential key to their recovery. It defies logic and what is now known about the nature of alcoholism to declare that a job or occupation is responsible for accelerating or aggravating a worker's alcoholism when alcoholism is a progressive disease, and aggravation of which is caused by the alcohol itself rather than by employment.
In Gacioch, we recognized that chronic alcoholism is a disease. Id. at 618. We remanded that case to the wcab for a determination whether the plaintiff satisfied his burden of proving his claim: that the claimant, as a brewery worker, was more prone to develop alcoholism than the general public because of conditions characteristic of and peculiar to the business of the defendant. The Gacioch analysis confined compensation for diseases of addiction into a chapter four occupational disease analysis. Justice Brickley, writing separately, favored denial of compensation for aggravation of preexisting diseases where the "aggravating conditions are not required by the job and the disease is one from which recovery primarily depends upon personal motivation." Id. at 629. Where a personal addiction plays a significant role in a claimed mental or emotional injury, a finding that such an injury is work related should be precluded. Justice Boyle, in a concurring opinion joined by Justice Riley, indicated that she was not convinced that "alcoholism or a predisposition thereto, whether or not aggravated or accelerated by the conditions of employment, was contemplated as a compensable injury." Id. at 621.
Because there is no indication that the Legislature intended to include alcoholism as a chapter three personal injury or a preexisting condition that is aggravated, accelerated, or combined with conditions of employment resulting in disability or death, and because there exists persuasive evi dence to the contrary, we adhere to the view that alcoholism is not a "personal injury" that arises out of and in the course of employment for purposes of a workers' compensation disability. In this case, we conclude that alcoholism is not a compensable personal injury under chapter three of the Workers' Disability Compensation Act.
In the present case, the wcab found that plaintiff's disability resulted from emotional problems and alcoholism. Because the plaintiff's alcoholism was a significant factor in the board's decision that the plaintiff was disabled, we vacate the Court of Appeals decision and remand to the board to determine whether the plaintiff suffered a disabling personal injury that is separate and apart from his alcoholism. If there is insufficient evidence of an independent disabling personal injury, plaintiff has failed to carry his burden of proof, and compensation should therefore be denied.
Brickley, Boyle, and Griffin, JJ., concurred with Riley, J.
The workers' compensation statutes applicable at the time this claim was filed are: MCL 418.301(1); MSA 17.237(301X1) which provided:
An employee, who receives a personal injury arising out of and in the course of his employment by an employer who is subject to the provisions of this act, at the time of such injury, shall be paid compensation in the manner and to the extent provided in this act, or in case of his death resulting from such injuries the compensation shall be paid to his dependents as defined in this act. Time of injury or date of injury as used in this act in the case of a disease or in the case of an injury not attributable to a single event shall be the last day of work in the employment in which the employee was last subjected to the conditions resulting in disability or death.
And, MCL 418.401(c); MSA 17.237(401)(c) which provided:
"Personal injury" shall include a disease or disability which is due to causes and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to the business of the employer and which arises out of and in the course of the employment. Ordinary diseases of life to which the public is generally exposed outside of the employment shall not be compensable.
Plaintiff testified that this nervous condition began about ten years after he began working with defendant, which would be about 1973. He then added that the condition began in 1967 or 1968.
The board did not directly address plaintiff's disability with respect to alcoholism.
Unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, decided May 10, 1991 (Docket No. 125457).
Id. at 1.
Id. at 2.
439 Mich 1012 (1992).
This Court has the responsibility to review questions of law involved in the final order of the appeal board, determine whether there was fraud associated with the findings of fact, and decide whether there is any competent evidence to support the findings of fact made by the board. Const 1963, art 6, § 28; MCL 418.861; MSA 17.237(861). Aquilina v General Motors Corp, 403 Mich 206, 213; 267 NW2d 923 (1978). The wcab found that plaintiff is an alcoholic, and that he has "emotional problems [that] are inextricably connected to his drinking problems, which, together, disable plaintiff." WCAB, slip op at 9.
Alcoholism and major depression appear to be independent entities, but symptoms of depression may develop during the course of alcoholism, and some patients with affective disorders may drink more when they are ill. Substance abuse also may increase the intensity of symptoms of preexisting primary psychiatric disorders. However, research studies indicate that 70 to 80 percent of patients with severe depression do not increase their drinking, and that only 5 to 10 percent of patients with primary major depressive disorders actually develop secondary alcoholism . [United States Department of Health and Human Services, Seventh Special Report to the US Congress on Alcohol and Health from the Secretary of Health and Human Services (Maryland: National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, 1990), p 421. Citations omitted.]
In the present case, plaintiff does not argue that he has established an occupational disease. Rather, he argues that under a chapter three personal injury analysis he has established that the employment aggravated, accelerated, or combined with his preexisting condition to produce a personal injury.
Contrary to the dissent's assertion (post, p 174), we do not "blame" the alcoholic for his addiction. But we do assert what is now conventional wisdom in the treatment of addictions that one of the symptoms of the disease is the need for the alcoholic to find and fix blame for his drinking.
Once the alcoholic begins to drink, he may be no more able to control the compulsion to continue drinking than the tuberculosis patient can voluntarily control his coughing. [Hammond, ed, Almost All You Ever Wanted to Know* About Alcohol *But Didn't Know Who to Ask (Michigan: Alcohol Research Information Service, vol 11, no 2, 1991), p 92.]
The National Council on Alcoholism and Drug Dependence, Inc., and the American Society of Addiction Medicine, in 1990, defined alcoholism as follows:
"Alcoholism is a primary, chronic disease with genetic, psychosocial and environmental factors influencing its development and manifestations. The disease is often progressive and fatal. It is characterized by continuous or periodic: impaired control over drinking, preoccupation with the drug alcohol, use of alcohol despite adverse consequences, and distortions in thinking, most notably denial." [National Council on Alcoholism and Drug Dependence, Inc., pamphlet, "The Disease of Alcoholism" (1993).]
The Supreme Court of North Dakota has acknowledged that "providing an excuse for voluntarily drinking [work environment and unfavorable work appraisal] cannot be a substantial contributing factor to the alcoholism." Darnell v North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau, 450 NW2d 721, 726 (ND, 1990).
Alcoholics can always give a reason why they drink: Our team won, or our team lost; it's too hot, it's too cold, women alcoholics drink because they have nothing to do at home, or because they have too much to do in a career. [Alcohol Problems and Alcoholism: A Comprehensive Survey, James E. Royce (The Free Press, Macmillan, New York, 1989), p 98.]
[Generally speaking, alcoholism is repeated drinking that causes trouble in the drinker's personal, professional, family or school life. ["The Disease of Alcoholism," n 12 supra.]
Counseling often includes a confrontational focus, based on the rationale that alcoholics must be confronted with the reality of their problem before behavior change can take place.
[Seventh Special Report, n 9 supra, p 409.]
One of the problems with the disease concept of alcoholism is that those who are alcoholic may find it difficult to understand their personal responsibility, not only in developing alcoholism, but in recovery as well. Alcoholism is the kind of disease in which the patient has an active role in development of the condition, and the patient must also play an active role in the recovery process. [Almost All You Ever Wanted to Know, supra, p 92.]
The counselor expects the client to assume responsibility for his actions. You do not buy into the client's view of himself as either a pawn of fate or helpless victim. . . .You make it clear that you see the client as an adult who is accountable for his choices. Simultaneously, you are aware that an alcoholic, when he consumes alcohol, is abdicating control of his life to a drug. [Kinney & Leaton, Loosening the Grip: A Handbook of Alcohol Information (Missouri: The C. V. Mosby Company, 1978), p 150.]
Any alcoholic who seeks assistance and is willing to actively participate in rehabilitation efforts can realistically expect to lead a happy, productive life. [Loosening the Grip, n 16 supra, p 133.]
The only cure for alcoholism is within the alcoholic. When he makes up his mind to stop, the cure starts. It follows, then, that he has the control. If he chooses not to exercise the control, others should not be burdened. [Arnoto v Bd of Review, Ohio Bureau of Employment Services, 19 Ohio App 3d 308, 310; 484 NE2d 245 (1984) (O'Neill, P.J., dissenting).]
In Gacioch, this Court assessed the validity of the plaintiff's claim of disability due to alcoholism under a chapter four analysis. An occupational disease analysis requires the claimant to prove that his disease or disability is due to causes and conditions that are characteristic of and peculiar to the employer and arises out of and in the course of employment.
Florida has reached a similar conclusion in its workers' compensation law, Fla Stat Ann 440.02(1), precluding workers' compensation benefits for disability due to alcoholism. Two reasons behind this statute are that (1) the problem of alcoholism is self-inflicted rather than industry related, hence industry should not be required to bear the consequences of the problem; and (2) workers' compensation is not a general health insurance system. See Milmir Construction v Smith, 582 So 2d 52, 53, n 1 (Fla App, 1991). See also Dan River, Inc v Shinall, 186 Ga App 572, 573; 367 SE2d 846 (1988) (Ga Code Ann 34-9-l[4] establishes that alcoholism is not deemed a personal injury arising out of and in the course of employment).