Case Name: ROSS v. OKLAHOMA
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1988-06-22
Citations: 487 U.S. 81
Docket Number: No. 86-5309
Parties: ROSS v. OKLAHOMA
Judges: Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White, O’Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ., joined. Marshall, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., joined, post, p. 91.
Reporter: United States Reports
Volume: 487
Pages: 81–98

Head Matter:
ROSS v. OKLAHOMA
No. 86-5309.
Argued January 19, 1988
Reargued April 18, 1988—
Decided June 22, 1988
Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White, O’Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ., joined. Marshall, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., joined, post, p. 91.
Gary Peterson reargued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs was Thomas G. Smith, Jr.
Robert A. Nance, Assistant Attorney General of Oklahoma, reargued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Robert H. Henry, Attorney General.
Moses Silverman, John A. Powell, Steven R. Shapiro, and Mandy Welch filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. as amici curiae urging reversal.

Opinion:
Chief Justice Rehnquist
delivered the opinion of the Court.
During the selection of the jury in his capital murder trial, petitioner Bobby Lynn Ross resorted to one of his peremptory challenges to remove a juror whom the trial court should have excused for cause under Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 510 (1968). He claims that because of that fact the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution require reversal of his conviction and sentence of death. We conclude they do not.
In the course of robbing a motel in Elk City, Oklahoma, petitioner killed a police officer. Petitioner was charged with first-degree murder, Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, §701.7 (Supp. 1987), a capital offense, Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, § 701.9(A) (Supp. 1987). By statute, Oklahoma provides nine peremptory challenges to both parties in capital trials. Okla. Stat., Tit. 22, §655 (1981).
The jury selection began with the drawing of 12 names from the 150-person venire. Each of the 12 was examined individually by the court and counsel. Prospective jurors not excused for cause after the voir dire were provisionally seated. If a prospective juror was excused for cause, a replacement juror was called and examined. After 12 jurors had been provisionally seated, the parties exercised their peremptory challenges alternately beginning with the prosecution. When a juror was struck, a replacement juror was immediately selected and examined in the manner described above. Once a replacement was provisionally seated, the trial court called for the exercise of a challenge by the party whose turn it was. This procedure was repeated until each side had exercised or waived its nine peremptory challenges.
Darrell Huling's name was drawn to replace the juror excused by the defense with its fifth peremptory challenge. During voir dire, Huling initially indicated that he could vote to recommend a life sentence if the circumstances were appropriate. On further examination by defense counsel, Hul- ing declared that if the jury found petitioner guilty, he would vote to impose death automatically. Defense counsel moved to have Huling removed for cause, arguing that Huling would not be able to follow the law at the penalty phase. The trial court denied the motion and Huling was provisionally seated. The defense then exercised its sixth peremptory challenge to remove Huling. The defense ultimately used all nine of its challenges. The prosecution used only five, waiving the remaining four.
None of the 12 jurors who actually sat and decided petitioner's fate was challenged for cause by defense counsel. Petitioner is black; the victim was white. At the close of jury selection, the defense objected "to the composition of the twelve people, in that there were no black people called as jurymen in this case and the defendant feels he's denied a fair and impartial trial by his peers." App. 25. The trial court overruled the objection, and the trial commenced.
After two days of evidence, the parties gave closing arguments, the trial court instructed the jury, and deliberations began. The jury found petitioner guilty of first-degree murder. Following the presentation of evidence and arguments at a separate sentencing proceeding, the same jury found five aggravating circumstances and sentenced petitioner to death.
On appeal, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals rejected petitioner's argument that the trial court had committed reversible error in failing to excuse Huling for cause:
"The failure of the trial court to remove a prospective juror who unequivocally states that he is unwilling to follow the law during the penalty phase by considering a life sentence is error. The record reflects that defense counsel challenged the prospective juror for cause, and when the court denied the challenge, defense counsel used a peremptory challenge. All of [petitioner's] peremptory challenges were subsequently used; but as there is nothing in the record to show that any juror who sat on the trial was objectionable, we are unable to discover any grounds for reversal." 717 P. 2d 117, 120 (1986) (citations omitted).
We granted certiorari, 482 U. S. 926 (1987), to consider the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment implications of the trial court's failure to remove Huling for cause and petitioner's subsequent use of a peremptory challenge to strike Huling. We now affirm.
In Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U. S. 412 (1985), the Court held that "the proper standard for determining when a prospective juror may be excused for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment... is whether the juror's views would 'prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' " Id., at 424 (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U. S. 38, 45 (1980)). The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals found, 717 P. 2d, at 120, and the State concedes, Tr. of Oral Rearg. 30, that Huling should have been excused for cause and that the trial court erred in failing to do so. Petitioner contends that this error abridged both his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to an impartial jury, and his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. We reject both grounds offered by petitioner.
It is well settled that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee a defendant on trial for his life the right to an impartial jury. Witt, supra; Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U. S. 717, 722 (1961). Had Huling sat on the jury that ultimately sentenced petitioner to death, and had petitioner properly preserved his right to challenge the trial court's failure to remove Huling for cause, the sentence would have to be overturned. Adams, supra. But Huling did not sit. Petitioner exercised a peremptory challenge to remove him, and Huling was thereby removed from the jury as effectively as if the trial court had excused him for cause.
Any claim that the jury was not impartial, therefore, must focus not on Huling, but on the jurors who ultimately sat. None of those 12 jurors, however, was challenged for cause by petitioner, and he has never suggested that any of the 12 was not impartial. "[T]he Constitution presupposes that a jury selected from a fair cross section of the community is impartial, regardless of the mix of individual viewpoints actually represented on the jury, so long as the jurors can conscientiously and properly carry out their sworn duty to apply the law to the facts of the particular case." Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U. S. 162, 184 (1986). Although at the close of jury selection petitioner did assert that the jury was not fair and impartial, this claim was based on the absence of blacks from the jury panel. Petitioner neither presses that claim before this Court nor suggests that the absence of blacks was in any way related to the failure to remove Huling for cause. We conclude that petitioner has failed to establish that the jury was not impartial.
In arguing that the trial court's error abridged his right to an impartial jury, petitioner relies heavily upon Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U. S. 648 (1987), but we think that case affords him no help. During the jury selection in Gray, the State used several of its 12 peremptory challenges to remove jurors opposed to the death penalty whom the trial court should have excluded for cause under Witherspoon. See 481 U. S., at 669 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); id., at 673 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C. J., and White and O'Connor, JJ.). After the State had exhausted all of its peremptory challenges, a prospective juror, Mrs. H. C. Bounds, stated during voir dire that although she was opposed to the death penalty she could vote to impose it in appropriate circumstances. Arguing that the previous "for cause" rulings had been erroneous, the State asked the trial court to restore one of its peremptory challenges so that it might remove Bounds. In an apparent attempt to correct the earlier rulings, the trial court instead excused Bounds for cause. The jury ultimately seated sentenced Gray to death. A closely divided Court reversed Gray's sentence, concluding that the removal of Bounds was erroneous under Adams, supra, and Witt, supra, and that the error could not be considered harmless. Gray, supra.
Petitioner relies heavily upon the Gray Court's statement that "the relevant inquiry is 'whether the composition of the jury panel as a whole could possibly have been affected by the trial court's error.'" 481 U. S., at 665 (emphasis in original) (quoting Moore v. Estelle, 670 F. 2d 56, 58 (CA5) (specially concurring opinion), cert. denied, 458 U. S. 1111 (1982)). Petitioner points out that had he not used his sixth peremptory challenge to remove Huling, he could have removed another juror, including one who ultimately sat on the jury. Petitioner asserts, moreover, that had he used his sixth peremptory challenge differently, the prosecution may have exercised its remaining peremptory challenges differently in response, and consequently, the composition of the jury panel might have changed significantly.
Although we agree that the failure to remove Huling may have resulted in a jury panel different from that which would otherwise have decided the case, we do not accept the argument that this possibility mandates reversal. We decline to extend the rule of Gray beyond its context: the erroneous "Witherspoon exclusion" of a qualified juror in a capital case. We think the broad language used by the Gray Court is too sweeping to be applied literally, and is best understood in the context of the facts there involved. One of the principal concerns animating the decision in Gray was the inability to know to a certainty whether the prosecution could and would have used a peremptory challenge to remove the erroneously excused juror. See Gray, 481 U. S., at 665; id., at 669-670, and n. 2 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). In the instant case, there is no need to speculate whether Huling would have been removed absent the erroneous ruling by the trial court; Huling was in fact removed and did not sit.
Petitioner was undoubtedly required to exercise a peremptory challenge to cure the trial court's error. But we reject the notion that the loss of a peremptory challenge constitutes a violation of the constitutional right to an impartial jury. We have long recognized that peremptory challenges are not of constitutional dimension. Gray, supra, at 663; Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202, 219 (1965); Stilson v. United States, 250 U. S. 583, 586 (1919). They are a means to achieve the end of an impartial jury. So long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve that result does not mean the Sixth Amendment was violated. See Hopt v. Utah, 120 U. S. 430, 436 (1887); Spies v. Illinois, 123 U. S. 131 (1887). We conclude that no violation of petitioner's right to an impartial jury occurred.
Relying largely on Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U. S. 422 (1982), and Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U. S. 343 (1980), petitioner also argues that the trial court's failure to remove Huling for cause violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process by arbitrarily depriving him of the full complement of nine peremptory challenges allowed under Oklahoma law. We disagree. It is true that we have previously stated that the right to exercise peremptory challenges is " 'one of the most important of the rights secured to the accused.'" Swain, supra, at 219 (quoting Pointer v. United States, 151 U. S. 396, 408 (1894)). Indeed, the Swain Court cited a number of federal cases and observed: "The denial or impairment of the right is reversible error without a showing of prejudice." 380 U. S., at 219. But even assuming that the Constitution were to impose this same rule in state criminal proceedings, petitioner's due process challenge would nonetheless fail. Because peremptory challenges are a creature of statute and are not required by the Constitution, Gray, supra, at 663; Swain, supra, at 219, it is for the State to determine the number of peremptory challenges allowed and to define their purpose and the manner of their exercise. Cf. Stilson, supra, at 587; Frazier v. United States, 335 U. S. 497, 505, n. 11 (1948). As such, the "right" to peremptory challenges is "denied or impaired" only if the defendant does not receive that which state law provides.
It is a long settled principle of Oklahoma law that a defendant who disagrees with the trial court's ruling on a for-cause challenge must, in order to preserve the claim that the ruling deprived him of a fair trial, exercise a peremptory challenge to remove the juror. Even then, the error is grounds for reversal only if the defendant exhausts all peremptory challenges and an incompetent juror is forced upon him. Ferrell v. State, 475 P. 2d 825, 828 (Okla. Crim. App. 1970); Stott v. State, 538 P. 2d 1061, 1064-1065 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975). In McDonald v. State, 54 Okla. Crim. 161, 164-165, 15 P. 2d 1092, 1094 (1932), the court declared:
"If counsel believed any juror was pledged to return a verdict imposing the death penalty, under the circumstances named, he should have purged the jury by chai- lenge. He cannot speculate on the result of the jury's verdict by consenting that the juror sit on the panel, and, if the verdict is adverse, then assert he is disqualified."
Thus, although Oklahoma provides a capital defendant with nine peremptory challenges, this grant is qualified by the requirement that the defendant must use those challenges to cure erroneous refusals by the trial court to excuse jurors for cause. We think there is nothing arbitrary or irrational about such a requirement, which subordinates the absolute freedom to use a peremptory challenge as one wishes to the goal of empaneling an impartial jury. Indeed, the concept of a peremptory challenge as a totally freewheeling right unconstrained by any procedural requirement is difficult to imagine. As pointed out by the dissenters in Swain, supra, at 243-244:
"This Court has sanctioned numerous incursions upon the right to challenge peremptorily. Defendants may be tried together even though the exercise by one of his right to challenge peremptorily may deprive his codefen-dant of a juror he desires or may require that codefen-dant to use his challenges in a way other than he wishes. United States v. Marchant, [12 Wheat. 480 (1827)]. A defendant may be required to exercise his challenges prior to the State, so that some may be wasted on jurors whom the State would have challenged. Pointer v. United States, 151 U. S. 396 [(1894)]. Congress may regulate the number of peremptory challenges available to defendants by statute and may require codefendants to be treated as a single defendant so that each has only a small portion of the number of peremptories he would have if tried separately. Stilson v. United States, [250 U. S. 583 (1919)]."
As required by Oklahoma law, petitioner exercised one of his peremptory challenges to rectify the trial court's error, and consequently he retained only eight peremptory chai- lenges to use in his unfettered discretion. But he received all that Oklahoma law allowed him, and therefore his due process challenge fails.
Petitioner relies on Logan, 455 U. S. 422 (1982), and Hicks, 447 U. S. 343 (1980), to support his claim of a denial of due process. The Logan Court held that because of the arbitrary application of a limitations period, Logan had been deprived of a state-provided cause of action in violation of due process. In Hicks, the Court overturned on due process grounds the sentence imposed on Hicks because the sentence had not been determined by the jury as required by Oklahoma law. Here, however, the requirement that the defendant use peremptory challenges to cure trial court errors is established by Oklahoma law, and petitioner received all that was due under Oklahoma law.
Although the trial court erred in failing to dismiss prospective juror Huling for cause, the error did not deprive petitioner of an impartial jury or of any interest provided by the State. "[T]he Constitution entitles a criminal defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect one." Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U. S. 673, 681 (1986).
Affirmed.
Petitioner was also convicted of robbery with a firearm, Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, §801 (Supp. 1987), and sentenced to 99 years' imprisonment on that charge.
As the dissent in Gray pointed out, the statement that any error which affects the composition of the jury must result in reversal defies literal application. 481 U. S., at 678 (Scalia, J., dissenting). If, after realizing its error, the trial court in Gray had dismissed the entire venire and started anew, the composition of the jury would undoubtedly have been affected by the original error. But the Gray majority concedes that the trial court could have followed that course without risking reversal. Id., at 663-664, n. 13.
In Spies, the petitioners were sentenced to death for their participation in the killing of several police officers at the Haymarket riot. Using a number of their peremptory challenges to excuse jurors unsuccessfully challenged for cause, petitioners eventually exhausted all of their peremptory challenges. See Spies v. People, 122 Ill. 1, 256-257, 12 N. E. 865, 989 (1887). Before this Court, petitioners argued they had been deprived of a fair trial because numerous biased jurors had not been excused for cause. The Court declined to examine the "for cause" rulings as to the jurors who had been removed by petitioners. 123 U. S., at 168.
We need not decide the broader question whether, in the absence of Oklahoma's limitation on the "right" to exercise peremptory challenges, "a denial or impairment" of the exercise of peremptory challenges occurs if the defendant uses one or more challenges to remove jurors who should have been excused for cause. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U. S. 202, 219 (1965); cf. Spies v. Illinois, 123 U. S. 131 (1887); Stroud v. United States, 251 U. S. 380, 382 (1920), denying rehearing to 251 U. S. 15 (1919).
No claim is made here that the trial court repeatedly and deliberately misapplied the law in order to force petitioner to use his peremptory challenges to correct these errors.