Case Name: Medford Turnpike Corporation versus Melzer Torrey
Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
Jurisdiction: Massachusetts
Decision Date: 1824-10
Citations: 2 Pick. 538
Docket Number: 
Parties: Medford Turnpike Corporation versus Melzer Torrey.
Judges: 
Reporter: Massachusetts Reports
Volume: 19
Pages: 571–573

Head Matter:
Medford Turnpike Corporation versus Melzer Torrey.
A provision exempting a person from paying toll, when passing on a turnpike road with his horse, team or cattle, to or from the common labors of his farm, does not exempt him when carting wood to his farm for the purpose of burning bricks made there by him for sale.
Assumpsit to recover toll. The parties agreed that the defendant, who was a farmer, owned, among other lands, a lot situated upon one side of the Medford Turnpike road, which he used for mowing, gardening, pasturing and tillage ; that in the years 1822 and 1823, in addition to such cultivation, he made bricks for sale, on a part of it, from clay dug in the lot; and that the toll demanded of him was for carting loads of wood from a wharf in Charlestown over part of the turnpike road, passing through the toll gate, to the lot mentioned, for the purpose of burning his bricks. If upon these facts, and the statute of 1802, c. 100, incorporating the plaintiffs, the Court should be of opinion that the defendant was liable to toll for thus carting wood, judgment was to be rendered for the plaintiffs.
Bartlett for the plaintiffs.
The question in this case arises out of the following clause in the 3d section of the statute referred to : — “ Provided that nothing in this act shall authorize said corporation to demand toll of any person who shall be passing with his horse or carriage to or from his usual place of public worship, or with his horse, team or cattle to or from the common labors of his farm.” It will probably be contended, that the bricks being made on the defendant’s own land, this case comes within the proviso ; but brickmaking cannot properly be called farming. By the statute of bankruptcy farmers cannot be bankrupts, but brick-makers may. Port v. Turton, 2 Wils. 169 ; Wells v. Parker, 1 T. R. 34, 783 ; Com. Dig. Bankrupt, B. But even if brickmaking could be included in the expression, “ common labors of his farm,” the exemption extends only to passing between the defendant’s house and his land, or from one parcel of his land to another.
Tufts, for the defendant,
said that tolls being against common right, the law will presume nothing in their favor ; 3 Dane’s Abr. 175 ; and if the language of this statute will admit of two constructions, the one extending the exemption will be adopted. The word farm has undergone many changes of signification, and in this country it now means land. The expression in the statute therefore is equivalent to common labors of his land, and at the time of demanding the toll in question the making of bricks was among the common labors of the defendant’s land. In England a man who hires land with a mine open, may work the mine, and he is not the less a farmer on that account. 2 Bl. Comm. 282 ; Co. Lit. 53 b, and Harg. note 351. It is said the exemption must be confined to passing between the defendant’s house and his land, or between different parts of his farm ; but the statute contains no such limitation.
See Sutton v. Weeley, 7 East. 446

Opinion:
Parker C. J.
delivered the opinion of the Court. The only question is, whether the making of bricks for sale on a lot of land principally and usually occupied for purposes of farming, comes within the terms, " common labors of his farm " ; and we think that the question thus distinctly put answers itself in the mind of every one. The legislature meant to restrict this exemption to such passing as should be necessary or convenient for the purposes of husbandry, and they used the most fit words for the expression of such intention. Common labors of a farm no farmer would apply to the working of a brick-kiln, a distillery, or any other manufacturing establishment, which may be erected on the land owned by the defendant. A general exemption certainly was not intended, and perhaps no form of words could have been better chosen to exclude the particular business for which the toll is demanded in this action.
Defendant defaulted.
See Newburgh &c. Co. v. Belknap, 17 Johns. R. 33 ; Bates v. Sutherland 15 Johns. R. 510 ; Wooster v. Van Vechten, 10 Johns. R. 467 ; Stratton v. Herrick, 9 Johns. R. 356 ; Stratton v. Hubbel, ibid. 357 ; Hearsay v. Boyd, 7 Johns. R. 183 ; Chestney v. Coon, 8 Johns. R. 116.