Case Name: In re Michael BAER
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1975-03-31
Citations: 310 So. 2d 537
Docket Number: No. 55409
Parties: In re Michael BAER.
Judges: SUMMERS, J., dissents and will assign reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 310
Pages: 537–544

Head Matter:
In re Michael BAER.
No. 55409.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
March 31, 1975.
Harry F. Connick, Dist. Atty., William F. Wessel, First Asst. Dist. Atty., for relator, Parish of Orleans.
Devan D. Daggett, Jerry J. Guillot, Baton Rouge, William J. Wegmann, Jr., New Orleans, for respondent, Legislative Committee.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Julian R. Murray, Jr., Barbara B. Rutledge, Asst. Attys. Gen., George T. Mustakas, II, Staff Attorney, New Orleans, for State of La., Intervenor.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM
The respondent, Michael Baer, a legislative aide, was subpoenaed by the Orleans Parish Grand Jury. The intention was to secure from Baer information as to criminal activity in Orleans Parish which he had obtained while serving as staff member to a legislative committee conducting an investigation.
The trial court modified the subpoena to exclude questioning the respondent Baer concerning all information he had obtained in his official legislative capacity. We granted certiorari, 301 So.2d 50 (1974), to review the district attorney's contention that no legislative privilege extends so as to prevent the grand jury from obtaining evidence of crime committed in the parish.
Since certiorari was granted, the legislative investigation has been completed. All information possessed by Baer (except the names of confidential informants) has been made available to the district attorney.
As to the confidential informers, the evidence indicates that Baer had learned of their identity solely through his work as legislative aide — either from legislators or in attending executive meetings of the legislative committee or in representing the committee at interviews between police officers and such informants. The informer privilege — based on the need of assuring a free disclosure of information to a governmental source through assuring against unnecessary disclosure of the informer's identity — is generally recognized in Louisiana, although the promised secrecy may be required to yield to competing interests of other constitutional or governmental interests where circumstances show the overriding weight of the latter. Pugh, Louisiana Evidence Law 187-88 (1974); also, 31 La.L.Rev. 384 (1971). See McCormick on Evidence, Section 111 (2d ed. 1972); Comment, 63 Yale L.J. 206 (1963). The ruling whether exceptional circumstances justify disclosure clearly cannot and should not be made in the abstract.
No practical result, therefore, can be effectuated by our ruling in the abstract on the sensitive and delicate question of the separation of powers between executive (district attorney), judicial (grand jury), and legislative (privilege of aides against testifying) branches of government. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039 (1974); Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 93 S.Ct. 2018, 36 L.Ed.2d 912 (1973); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 92 S.Ct. 2614, 33 L. Ed.2d 583 (1972). The difficulty of making a determinative or useful ruling, moreover, is compounded by the absence of concrete question specifically illustrating the type of information sought from Baer and the factual circumstances by which he learned it. Any attempt by this court to enunciate principle in this shadowy area of constitutional law would be in the nature of an abstract advisory opinion rather than an actual adjudication of a controverted issue.
This court will not ordinarily rule upon abstract questions where no practical results can be effectuated by its ruling. Verdun v. Scallan Brothers Contractors, 263 La. 1073, 270 So.2d 512 (1972); Navarre v. Lafayette Parish School Board, 226 La. 876, 77 So.2d 520 (1955); Edwards v. Hayes, 203 La. 433, 14 So.2d 48 (1943).
For the reasons assigned, therefore, the subpoena and the ruling modifying it are both annulled and set aside, and the supervisory writs issued in connection with the present proceeding are rescinded and recalled, and the relator's application is dismissed.
SUMMERS, J., dissents and will assign reasons.