Case Name: Dave Coleman v. The State
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1908-05-27
Citations: 53 Tex. Crim. 578
Docket Number: No. 3640
Parties: Dave Coleman v. The State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Criminal Reports
Volume: 53
Pages: 578–589

Head Matter:
Dave Coleman v. The State.
No. 3640.
Decided May 27, 1908.
1. —Local Option—Loan—Charge of Court.
Where upon trial of a violation of the local option, law the evidence showed that prosecutor borrowed a quart of whisky from a member of defendant’s clubroom for a quart of whisky that he had ordered from defendant and for which he had paid him, and that the defendant had never delivered to prosecutor the whisky which he had ordered, the same constituted a sale and the court correctly so charged. Following Tombeaug'h v. State, 50 Texas Crim Rep., 286. Davidson, Presiding Judge, dissenting.
2. —Same—Evidence—Venue—Internal Revenue License.
Upon trial of a violation of the local option law there was no error in admitting testimony that the town in which the whisky was alleged to have been sold was in the alleged local option territory; that defendant was a tenant pf prosecuting witness, and had internal revenue license for the sale of malt liquors.
3. —Same—Bill of Exceptions.
Where the bill of exceptions with reference to the court’s refusal to permit defendant to introduce a certain order, was not approved by the court, the same could not be considered on appeal.
4. —Same—Evidence—Harmless Error.
Where upon trial of a violation of the local option law the court erroneously admitted testimony as to other clubrooms, but the defendant received the minimum punishment, the error was harmless.
5. —Same—Evidence—Orders of Commissioners Court.
Where upon trial of a violation of the local option law the court admitted in evidence orders of the commissioners court which were a part and parcel of the minutes of the court pertaining to the local option election in question, there was no error.
6. —Same—Order of Judge—County Clerk.
Upon trial of a violation of the local option law the court correctly admitted in evidence the order of the county judge upon the minutes showing that the local option election had been published for four consecutive weeks, although it was in tho handwriting of the county clerk. Following Walker v. State, 52 Texas Grim. Rep. 293.
7. —Same—Evidence—Defendant as Witness.
Upon trial of a violation of the local option law there was no error in forcing defendant on cross-examination to testify that he received commissions on orders for whisky, and that he had a retailer’s liquor license.
8. —Same—Evidence—Rebuttal—Harmless Error.
Where upon trial of a violation of tho local option law the defendant introduced in evidence a judgment of acquittal of his co-defendant, there was no error to permit the State to show why said co-defendant was acquitted; besides the defendant receiving the minimum punishment such testimony if error was harmless.
9. —Same—Charge of Court—Local Option in Force.
Where upon trial of a violation of the local option law the orders of the court pertaining to the local option election were in all things regular, the court correctly charged that local option was in force in the alleged territory.
10. —Same—Indictment.
Where upon trial of a violation of the local option law the indictment followed approved precedent, there was no error.
11. —Same—Charge of Court—Requested Charges.
Where upon trial of a violation of the local option law the court’s main charge properly presented the law of the case, there was no error in refusing special charges.
Appeal from the County Court of Coleman. Tried below before the Hon. F. M. Bowen.
Appeal from a conviction of a violation of the local option law; penalty, a fine of $25 and twenty days confinement in the county jail.
The opinion states the case.
Woodward & Baker, for appellant.
F. J. McCord, Assistant Attorney-General, for the State.

Opinion:
BROOKS, Judge.
This conviction was for violating the local option law, the punishment assessed being a fine of $25 and twenty days imprisonment in the county jail.
The facts in this case show that Mack Bennett, the prosecuting wit ness, about Christman, 1906, in the town of Santa Anna, Coleman County, went into appellant's clubroom and told appellant he wanted some whisky. Appellant replied he had no whisky, but he could order some for witness, and witness could get it to-morrow. "I told him I wanted it now; he said may be you can borrow some. Mr. Riley there might loan it to you. I then asked the party whom the defendant called Riley if he would loan me some whisky; that I had ordered some from Mr. Coleman, and he said yes, and he told the defendant to let me have a quart of his whisky. The defendant then handed me a quart of Riley's whisky. I don't know what became of the whisky I ordered. The defendant has never delivered it to me." The witness gave at the time of making the order $1.25 to the defendant. The defendant in his own behalf testified that he took prosecuting witness' order, at which time he received the $1.25 and he subsequently delivered the whisky. •
Under the above state-of facts the court charged the jury as follows: "You are therefore instructed that if you believe from the evidence in this case beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged prosecuting witness Mack Bennett on or about the 22nd day of December, 1906, or within two years anterior to the presentment of this indictment, did in justice precinct Flo. 7 in Coleman County, Texas, borrow a quart of whisky and that same was intoxicating, from any person with the understanding and agreement that the said witness Mack Bennett had ordered whisky or would order whisky and when his, the said Mack Bennett's whisky came, the person so loaning said whisky, if any, was to have whisky returned to him for the whisky so loaned, if any, and you further believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant Dave Coleman was present at the time and with the knowledge of such agreement, if any, to the said Mack Bennett, said quart of whisky so loaned, if any, at the instance and request of the person loaning same, if any, then you are instructed that the said loan of said whisky, if any, under such circumstances, if any, would be an unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor within the meaning of the local option statute, and the defendant Dave Coleman under such circumstances, if any, would be a principal in the said sale and would be guilty of a violation of the local option law, and if you so believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt it would be your duty to find the defendant guilty, and assess his punish ment at a fine of not less than $25 and mot more than $100 and by imprisonment in the county jail for a period of not less than twenty days and not more than sixty days.' And in this connection you are charged that it would be necessary to constitute a sale for the State to prove that the witness actually returned the whisky if any borrowed.
"Fourth. Although you may believe there was no loan of whisky under above instructions, still you are further instructed that if you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant Dave Coleman on or about the 22nd day of December, 1906, or within two years anterior to the presentment of the indictment herein did in justice precinct No. 7, Coleman County, sell to Mack Bennett one quart of whisky and that same was intoxicating liquor, then it would be your duty to find the defendant guilty and assess his punishment at a fine of not less than $25 and not more than $100 and by imprisonment in the county jail for a period of not less than twenty days and not more than sixty days." Paragraph No. 3 is in strict consonance and accord with the principle of law laid down by this court in the case of Tombeaugh v. State, 50 Texas Crim. Rep., 286; 17 Texas Ct. Rep., 472. For authorities to support the latter case see Taggart v. State, 97 S. W. Rep., 95; Treadway v. State, 42 Texas Crim. Rep., 466; Stanley v. State, 43 Texas Crim. Rep., 270, and Barnes v. State, 88 S. W. Rep., 804. We think the charge of the court is, as suggested, correct.
Appellant insists the court erred in permitting over his objection the witness to testify that Santa Anna was located in justice precinct No. 7 of Coleman County, Texas. The prosecution was instituted for violating the local option law of precinct No. 7, and it was proper to prove that the town of Santa Anna was in said precinct. Nor do we think that the court erred in permitting the witness Biley to testify that defendant was a tenant of his, and was occupying the witness' house at the time of the sale. This is a circumstance to show familiarity of the witness with appellant, and is corroborative of the State's theory of a sale. Nor was there any error in permitting the witness to testify that defendant had internal revenue license for the sale of malt liquors in his place of business.
Appellant insists the court erred in refusing to permit the defendant to introduce in evidence the order dated October 6, 1906, given by the witness Bennett to the defendant for whisky. The court refused to approve the bill presenting this matter.
Appellant further complains that the court erred in permitting the State to prove by the witness Simmons, and interrogate him relative thereto, about there being other clubrooms in the town of Santa Anna. This testimony was not admissible. See Efird v. State, 44 Texas Crim. Rep., 447. However, the bare fact in this instance was proved, and in view of the fact that appellant received the minimum fine it is not such error as could have injured appellant.
Appellant insists that the court erred in permitting the State to read in evidence other orders of the commissioners court not pertaining to the local option law in question, because same could not prove any issue in the case, and that the order certifying the correctness of the minutes of the commissioners court threw no light on whether the county judge had published the order declaring the result of the local option election in question, and had written and signed same, or that the county clerk had made and signed said order. This testimony was admissible because it was part and parcel of the minutes of the court.
Appellant insists that the order of the county judge upon the minutes showing that local option election had been published for four consecn tive weeks was in the handwriting of the county clerk. In the case of Walker v. State, 52 Texas Crim. Rep., 293; 106 S. W. Rep., 376, we held tliat the county judge was not required to act as his own amanuensis, but that if he authorized the clerk to enter the order the same was valid. Here the record before us shows the county judge signed the minutes with an order declaring the result, as having been published by him in the minutes. We think this is sufficient.
We further hold that the court did not err in forcing appellant to testify that he received commissions on orders for whisky, or in making him admit that he had retailers' liquor license.
On the trial of the case appellant introduced a judgment of acquittal of a man named Riley, above spoken of, who assisted in the sale in this case, thereupon the State, over objection of appellant, proved by the county judge that he found the witness Riley innocent because the testimony of the prosecuting witness did not identify Riley as the man who let him have the whisky. We do not think this was erroneous, and if so, it was not such error as was calculated to injure appellant in view of the minimum punishment.
The court did not err in charging that local option was in force in precinct No. 7. The orders were in all things regular.
The indictment is in proper form, and has been approved by this court several times during the present sitting.
We have examined appellant's special charges in the light of the main charge, and we do not find any error of the court in refusing same, but think the charge of the court properly presented the law of this case.
Finding no error in the record, the judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.
RAMSEY, Judge.
If it were an original question I should be strongly inclined to hold that while the transaction disclosed by the testimony in this case might, under appropriate instructions, support a finding that same constituted a sale, the court was not authorized, as a matter of law, to instruct the jury that it was a sale. I think the rule laid down in the case of Ray v. State, 46 Texas Crim. Rep., 176; 79 S. W. Rep., 535, is the correct one and that while such a transaction may cloak and hide the true nature of the contract so that the jury could be authorized to find that the real facts show a sale, that the court is' not authorized to say that a gift or loan made in good faith and not considered by the parties to be of any other character or quality than that which on its face it appears to be, is nevertheless, and under all circumstances a sale. This is not, however, a new question in this State. It was first decided adversely to appellant's contention in Keaton v. State, 36 Texas Crim. Rep., 259, rendered on June 26, 1896, where the point here in question was directly involved. Another opinion to the same effect was delivered by Judge Henderson in another case against the same defendant on the same day. (Keaton v. State, 36 Texas Crim. Rep., 259; 36 S. W. Rep., 440), where this conclusion is reached: "Where defendant delivered liquor to another to be paid for in other liquor at some future time, the transaction was a sale within the law prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors within a local option district." This rule was followed in effect in Treadway v. State, 42 Texas Crim. Rep., 466, and Stanley v. State, 43 Texas Crim. Rep., 270. In 1904, in the case of Ray v. State, 46 Texas Crim. Rep., 176; 79 S. W. Rep., 535, the court held that "One who loaned another a bottle of whisky, to be returned when the other whisky came by express, the transaction not being intended as a subterfuge to cover a sale, is not guilty of an illegal sale under the local option law." This decision and the sentence above quoted expressly and clearly states my personal view. In the case of Tombeaugh v. State, 50 Texas Crim. Rep., 286; 17 Texas Ct. Rep., 472, the Kay case, supra, is in terms overruled, and it was there, on a full review of all the authorities, beginning with Keaton v. State, 36 Texas Crim. Rep., 259, held that "Where the prosecuting witness ordered a pint of whisky at a cold storage establishment known as the Farmers' club, and paid the money to the person in charge, and the defendant, a bystander, loaned him a pint of whisky to be returned when the whisky ordered was received, there was a sale by him within the meaning of the local option law, and that it was immaterial whether the, defendant was a member of such club." In the still later case of Taggart v. State, 97 S. W. Rep., 95, decided on October 24, 1906, the same line of decisions is maintained and the rule originally announced in the Keaton case was reaffirmed. In this case there is no note of any dissent and the case may be accepted as laying down finally the rule which Judge Brooks applies in the case now being considered.
It does not need to be said that the question has had a strange and unsettled history and treatment. That the rule as finally and apparently firmly adopted in this court has been correctly applied by Judge Brooks in this case, cannot be questioned, and unless I am prepared to break away from and overturn the settled rule of a decision of this tribunal, adopted after full discussion and consideration, I am committed to an affirmance of the judgment. I do not believe the rule correct or well supported in legal reason. However, to now reverse it is to "make confusion worse confounded." I owe some respect to the settled decisions and opinions of this court and out of respect to its former holdings, with reluctance I agree to the judgment of affirmance.