Case Name: Blevins et al. v. Smith, Appellant
Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1891-04
Citations: 104 Mo. 583
Docket Number: 
Parties: Blevins et al. v. Smith, Appellant.
Judges: Judge Macearlane concurs in this opinion. Judge Thomas files his separate opinion, holding a different view.
Reporter: Missouri Reports
Volume: 104
Pages: 583–619

Head Matter:
Blevins et al. v. Smith, Appellant.
DIVISION ONE.
1. Covenant of Warranty: dower ; nominal damages. Only-nominal damages are recoverable for breach of warranty of title by reason of an outstanding inchoate right of dower.
2. Back Taxes : dower. A sale under a judgment for delinquent taxes does not bar a widow’s right of dower where she was not made a party to the tax suit, and this is true although such right of dower is only inchoate.
Appeal from Johnson Circuit Court. — Hon. C. W. Sloan, Judge.
Reversed and remanded.
8. P. Sparks for appellant,
(1) The existence of an inchoate right of dower in Mrs. Collier, at the time appellant entered into the covenants, at most constituted only a technical breach of the covenants against incumbrances, and only nominal damages were recoverable. Sedgwick on -Damages [4 Ed.] 195, note; 4 Kent, Com., art. 4; Rawle on Cov. for Title, 541, 571 ; Collier vf Gamble, 10 Mo. 466; Walker v. Beaver, 79 Mo. 664; Priest v. Beaver, 22 Mo. App. 376; Bickson v. Besire, 23 Mo. 151; Wyatt v. Bunn, 93 Mo. 459; Bunnells v. Weber, 59 Me. 488; 2 Suth. on Dam. [1 Ed.] p. 327; Hazelrigv. Huston, 18 Ind. 481; Lewis v. Lewis, 5 Rich. L. 12; Nyce v. Obertz, 17Ohio, 71; Bender v. Fromberger, 4 Dali. (Pa.) 440; Burrett v. Piper, 58 Mo. 551. First. The only covenant (if any were) broken by appellant in his deed was that against incumbrances done or suffered by him, or those under whom he claimed, implied in the words “grant, bargain and sell.” Burrett v. Piper, supra; R. S. 1879, sec. 675. Second. The existence of this inchoate right of dower was not an act “done or suffered by appellant, nor those under whom he claimed.” R. S. 1879, sec. 675; Walker ». Deaver, 79 Mo. 664 ; 4 Kent, Com., sec.440 ; Armstrong v. Darby, 29 Mo.; Bender v. Formberger, supra; Rawle, Cov. Title, pp. 541, 575; Alexander v. Schrieber, 10 Mo. 460. Third. But conceding that the inchoate right of dower of Mrs. Collier constituted an incumbrance done or suffered by defendant or those under whom he claims — while this covenant was broken as soon as made, for which an action would instantly lie until there had not been an actual loss, eviction or its equivalent consequent thereon, and only nominal damages could be recovered. Walker v. Deaver, supra ; Fuñí v. Marsh, 80 Mo. 396 ; Morgan v. Railroad, 63 Mo-. 129; Matheny v. Mason, 73 Mo. 677. Fourth. Mrs. Collier’s inchoate right of dower was not title paramount capable of enforcement; it was merely contingent, and possessed no value — a mere possibility — an expectancy. Durrett v. Piper, supra. Fifth. The covenant sued on was not that the title conveyed should be merchantable, i. e., such as might be acceptable to a purchaser, but that plaintiff should not be damaged in the possession by being evicted or disturbed. Her inability to find a purchaser who would buy the land with this inchoate right of dower outstanding was not a substantial breach of this covenant, and nominal damages only are recoverable; for only on the dower interest becoming consummate by the death of the husband can any paramount title arise, or any eviction become possible. By what standard can the right of an inchoate right of dower be measured? Willetts v. Burgess, 34 111. 494. Sixth. When a grantee seeks to recover damages for a breach of the covenant against incumbrances, it devolves on him to show that the incumbrance discharged was such that the grantor was bound to pay off. Bland v. Thomas, 3 S. W. Rep. (Ky.) 595. Seventh. At the time of the institution of this suit, plaintiff had parted with her title and possession, and she could not maintain this action on covenants which run with the land that had inured to another by virtue of her deed. Chambers v. Smith, 28 Mo. 174. (2) The sale for taxes barred the inchoate right of dower of Mrs. Collier. First. It was within the power of the legislature to pass laws which would defeat; an inchoate right of dower. Cooley on Const. Lint., p. 445; Morrison v. Rice, 29 N. W. Rep. (Mich.) 168; Tiedeman, Lim. Police Powers, sec. 117, pp. 341, '351. Second. The proceeding to enforce taxes by the state is always analogous to the exercise by it of the right of eminent domain, which it has always been held bars dower. Brown v. Austin, 41 Yt. 262; Tiedeman, Real Prop., sec. 132; Robbins v. Barrow, 32 Mich. 36; 1 Wash. Real Prop. [Ed. 1868 ] 220 ; Moore v. City, 8 N. Y. App. 110; Finch v. Brown, 3 Gilm. 448; Jones v. Devore, 8 Ohio St. 430. Third. The supreme court of Missouri has decided that a wife is not a necessary party to a partition proceeding when the husband is the owner, and that, notwithstanding she is not a party, her inchoate right of dower is barred. Lee v. Linclell, 22 Mo. 202. Fourth. A tax sale is clearly not within the saving provisions of section 2197. Fifth. The amount paid by Mrs. Blevins for attorneys’ fees in negotiating the purchase was not a proper element of the damages. No suit had been brought, and the court erred in admitting evidence to establish it, and refusing appellant’s instruction to the court sitting as a jury to disregard it in arriving at their verdict, numbered 3.
A. B. Logan and W. W. Wood for respondents.
(1) When respondent discharged the incumbrance created by the inchoate right of dower, the breach of warranty became substantial and she was entitled to recover the reasonable amount paid. Durrett v. Piper, 58 Mo. 551 ; Ward v. Ashbrook, 78 Mo. 515; 1 Scribner on Dower, secs. 2, 4; Prescott v. Truman, 4 Mass. 627; Shearer v. Ranger, 22 Pick. 447; Bigelow v. Hubbard, 97 Mass. 195; Harrington v. Murphy, 109 Mass. 299. (2) The existence of the inchoate right of dower is an incumbrance covenanted against by the use of the words “grant, bargain and sell.” Ward v. Ashbrook, 78 Mo. 515; Williamson v. Hall, 62 Mo. 405. It will be noted that the authorities cited by appellant are all cases arising under the statute, as it existed prior to the revision of 1879. The statute was amended, however, in 1879, so as to make the grantor liable for incumbrances “ done or suffered” by any person under whom he claims. Rev. Code, 1845, p. 221, sec. 24; R. S. 1855, chap. 32, sec. 14; G. S. 1865, p. 444, sec. 8; R. S. 1879, sec. 675. (3) The real point at issue, as we conceive it, is whether the mere fact of the incumbrance not being-capable of present enforcement would debar the plaintiff from removing it, and recovering the reasonable amount paid. That it would not, is, we think, abundantly established by the authorities cited. Sedgwick on Dam. 195 [4 Ed.] top and note; Collier v. Cambie, 10 Mo. 472; Dickson v. Desire, 23 Mo. 163. (4) Under a strict covenant of seizin it is necessary to prove an eviction, but under the covenant of indefeasible seizin or the covenant against incumbrances implied by the statute as amended in 1879, it is not necessary to prove an eviction. It is only necessary to prove that the estate conveyed has been defeated, or the right to defeat it has been extinguished, or the incumbrance removed. Collier v. Cambie, 10 Mo. 467; Shelton v. Pease, 10 Mo. 473; Mosely v. Hunter, 15 Mo. 322; Dickson v. Desire, 23 Mo. 151; Walker v. Deaver, 79 Mo. 664. (5) The damages for the breach of a covenant against incumbrances depends upon the value of the incumbrance without.reference to the value of the land or the purchase money. The covenantee is entitled to recover what he has paid to extinguish the incumbrance if he has paid a reasonable and fair price. Si-Louis v. Bissell, 46 Mo. 157; Kellogg v. Molin, 62 Mo. 429 ; Henderson v. Henderson, 13 Mo. 151. (6) The fact that plaintiff had parted with her title, at the time of the commencement of her suit, is immaterial as affecting her right to recover on the covenants. She was the owner at the time she removed the incumbrance. (7) The tax sale did not convey the dower. There are two theories upon that subject. The one is, that it is a proceeding against the land itself, and has nothing to do with the previous chain of title; that it is a breaking up of all previous titles. Jones v. Devore, 8 Oh. St. 431. The other, that it is a derivative title, the purchaser taking only such title as the party to the proceedings had. This court in construing the statutes has adopted the latter theory. GLlchell v. Kreidler, 84 Mo. 472; Granby v. Casey, 93 Mo. 595. Under a statute in almost the precise words of section 2197, Revised Statutes, 1879, it has been held by two eminent text-writers, that the laches of the husband in permitting his land to sell for taxes would not debar the wife of her dower. Black, on Tax Titles [2 Ed.] 549 j Scrib. on Bower [2 Ed.] 809, 820.

Opinion:
Uantt, P. J.
— This is an action on a covenant of warranty, made by appellant to the respondent, Mrs. Sarah C. Blevins. The land conveyed is the south half of the southeast quarter, section 6, township 46, range 25, Johnson county, Missouri.
The evidence showed title in appellant Smith, at the date of conveyance to respondent, except an outstanding inchoate right of dower in Mrs. Mary E. Collier, the wife of Daniel Collier. Appellant deduced his title from Daniel Collier, by virtue of a tax sale and deed under the act of 1877. It was admitted that Daniel Collier was still alive at the time of the com-, mencement of the suit. After respondent obtained her deed from appellant, she attempted to mortgage the land and failed because of this outstanding inchoate dower right in Mrs. Collier. She thereupon purchased this right for $150, and brought this suit against appellant for that amount.
Appellant assigns two grounds for reversal. One that the court erred in permitting respondent to recover more than nominal damages for the breach of the covenant by reason of the inchoate dower of Mrs. Collier remaining outstanding, and, secondly, that the court erred in not holding that the tax sale and deed conveyed the land absolutely, and by it Mrs. Collier's inchoate right of dower was entirely barred, and, of course, could constitute no incumbrance.
We all agree that the first contention of appellant must be sustained. While an inchoate right of dower is an incumbrance, as it is a contingency founded upon a contingency, it is not susceptible of computation by any definite rule ; hence the practice has been adopted in this state to allow only nominal damages until the dower becomes consummate. Walker v. Deaver, 79 Mo. 664.
II. In regard to the second assignment, we think the court committed no error in holding that the tax proceedings did not divest Mrs. Collier's dower right. We shall not attempt to discuss the power of the legislature to collect taxes. We think it sufficient for the case in hand to ascertain, if we can, what the legislature has determined shall be the policy of the state.
In the first place, we have by statute adopted the common law in regard to dower. Lord Coke says: "There be three things highly favored in law, life, liberty and dower." Chief Justice McKean, in Kennedy v. Nedrow, 1 Dallas, 438, asserts that "dower is a legal, an equitable and moral right. It is favored in a high degree by the law, and next to life and liberty held sacred."
Strong as these terms are, they are strengthened by our statute. Section 4525. "No act, deed or conveyance executed or performed by the husband without the assent of the wife, evidenced by her acknowledgment thereof, in the manner required by law toj pass the estate of married women, and no judgment or decree confessed by or recovered against him, and no laches, default, covin or crime of the husband, shall prejudice the right and interest of the wife, provided in the foregoing sections of this chapter," that is to say, the sections securing the widow her common-law and statutory dower. Now at common law, and by our statute reaffirming it, "the right of dower attaches whenever there is a seizin by the husband, during the marriage, of an estate of inheritance, and, unless it is relinquished by the wife in the manner prescribed by law, it becomes absolute at the husband's death."
"It is a right in law fixed from the moment the facts of marriage and seizin concur, and becomes a title paramount to that of any person claiming under the husband by subsequent act." Grady v. McCorkle, 57 Mo. 172. This then is the character of the estate that is to be divested by this new construction of the statute.
It is conceded that our statute requires "the owner " to be made a party before his or her interest in the lands can be affected by a tax proceeding under our act of 1877, and this section has been uniformly construed, so that cestuis que trust, mortgagees, remainder-men and incumbrancers, who are not made parties, are not affected by these suits. Stafford v. Fizer, 82 Mo. 393 ; Corrigan v. Bell, 73 Mo. 53; Graves v. Ewart, 99 Mo. 13. No lawyer will question that inchoate dower is an incumbrance. But it is sought to sustain this new doctrine on the ground that our tax proceedings, beginning with the assessment, is a proceeding strictly " in remf and we may remark here, that, only by sustaining this position, can this new rule be maintained.
Beginning with Abbott v. Lindenbower, 42 Mo. 162, under a statute requiring the lands in all cases to be assessed to the person appearing to be the owner at the time of assessment, this court said: ' ' It is unnecessary for us to say further here, what might be the effect of this last clause in any case, but we may go so far as to declare now that an assessment in the name of a person who neither was nor ever had been the owner of the property would be an utterly void assessment." Our present statute requires the land to be listed and assessed in the name of the owner, if known. Under this statute in Gitchell v. Kreidler, 84 Mo. 472, Judge Black, speaking for the whole court, says: " While the judgment is against the property and not personal, still the tax is assessed against the owner, if known. The law loolcs to him for payment of the tax. Such a proceeding cannot be said to be strictly in «" Blackwell on Tax Titles, 630.
It will serve' no good purpose to cite authorities to the same effect. This has been the accepted construction of our tax laws for many years. Were it a proceeding strictly " inremf there would be no such thing as collecting the tax on real estate out of personal property, which it is conceded may be done. Indeed, the whole system is based on the idea that it is the duty of the husband to pay the taxes on his land. And a failure to pay the taxes is a default on his part. The wife is under no obligation to pay the tax. She does not own the fee; she does not reap the usufruct; certainly no system based upon justice would exact of her a tribute on property she might never enjoy, and rob her of her dower for failure to pay a tax she did not owe. If then taxes become delinquent, whose default is it? Not the wife's, certainly.
But it is said, that because there can be no personal judgment for taxes, therefore, section 2197, Revised Statutes, 1879 (R. S. 1889, sec. 4525), cannot be invoked. It would be difficult to conceive of a statute that would protect a wife's dower if this is not sufficient. But we think this construction of this section too narrow. The injury is not confined to "judgments." The statute says in addition to " judgments or decrees, confessed or suffered," "no laches, default, covin or crime of the husband shall prejudice the rights of the wife." Is it not laches in a citizen to neglect or refuse to pay his taxes? Is not the word "delinquent," used throughout the statute, a synonym for laches and default ? And could there be a sale of the land and a divestiture of the wife's dower but for this delinquency on his part? The proposition is too clear for argument.
But, if it is held that this section does not protect the wife's dower against the laches and default of the husband, we will have an anomalous state of affairs. A husband cannot, by deed or mortgage, the most solemn and praiseworthy, for the most valuable consideration, alien or destroy her dower right. No judgment against him, willing or unwilling, can affect her dower; no fraud, covin or crime, and yet he can suffer this new "fine and recovery," and successfully bar her dower, by simply refusing to pay his taxes and let the land sell, and thus a result is reached, by this simple device, that could not be compassed by the most skilful conveyancer. We cannot believe the legislature intended such result.
On the contrary, the whole scope of the tax act clearly shows that the tax law of 1877 was designed to furnish a method for collecting taxes, in which notice was given to the delinquent of the amount of his taxes, and a day in court, if erroneous, to show the error. When the judgment is entered, an execution issues, just as on other judgments, and it is intended to convey the right, title and interest of the defendant who owned the land, and whose duty it was to pay the taxes. Says Judge Black: "We have repeatedly held that the purchaser at these sales acquires, and acquires only, the title and interest of the parties who are made defendants." Graves v. Ewart, 99 Mo. 13; Powell v. Greenstreet, 95 Mo. 14.
An ordinary execution sale conveys to the purchaser all the right, title and interest oí the defendant in execution, but it has no effect upon the inchoate dower of the wife. It was clearly the intention of the legislature to give the same effect to a tax deed, under regular and valid proceedings, that a deed under a general judgment would have ; "no more, no less " "A tax title is a derivative title." Gitchell v. Kreidler, 84 Mo. 477. Says Judge Black again: "It must be taken as settled law that purchasers at these sheriff's sales, made on executions in tax suits, acquire only ihe right, title and interest of the defendant in the tax suits." Powell v. Greenstreet, 95 Mo. 13; Evans v. Robberson, 92 Mo. 192.
No inconvenience has been felt in Missouri because in ordinary execution sales the wife's inchoate dower was not conveyed. Creditors and purchasers know her interest is fixed, and all business transactions are based upon that understanding. The state has adopted a most stringent policy in passing the fee-simple estate to the tax purchasers for the insignificant sum of the tax; a bagatelle, usually, compared to the value of the lands sold. While the state has a right to its revenue, no reason appears why it should take the dower of the unoffending wife and vest it in the tax speculator, thus giving him a vantage over all creditors and purchasers at all other execution sales.
We do not so read the statute. We regard the dower right as of inestimable value to the homes of this state. The trend of public opinion is rather to enlarge, as our homestead laws clearly indicate, than to cut off this sustenance of the widow. Instead of being a "shadow" it has proved a "pearl of great price" in thousands of ruined homes. Between the tax speculator and the defenseless widow, section 4525 of our statute of 1889 stands as a monument to the wisdom and humanity of our commonwealth.
Judge Macearlane concurs in this opinion. Judge Thomas files his separate opinion, holding a different view.