Case Name: THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DAVID JAMES CASPER, Defendant and Appellant
Court: Supreme Court of California
Jurisdiction: California
Decision Date: 2004-06-03
Citations: 33 Cal. 4th 38
Docket Number: No. S114285
Parties: THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DAVID JAMES CASPER, Defendant and Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: California Reports
Volume: 33
Pages: 38–48

Head Matter:
[No. S114285.
June 3, 2004.]
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DAVID JAMES CASPER, Defendant and Appellant.
Counsel
Michael B. McPartland, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Pamela A. Ratner Sobeck, Steven T. Getting, Anthony Da Silva, Arlene Aquintey Sevidal and Kevin R. Vienna, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Opinion:
Opinion
BROWN, J.
In this case involving the three strikes law, the trial court dismissed the strike allegation as to 34 of 35 counts. (Pen. Code, § 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12; People v. Garcia (1999) 20 Cal.4th 490, 499, 503-504 [85 Cal.Rptr.2d 280, 976 P.2d 831] (Garcia).) The issue here is whether the trial court had discretion to sentence defendant concurrently on those counts for which the strike allegation had been dismissed, and which did not arise on the same occasion or under the same set of operative facts, or whether it was required to sentence all such counts consecutively under section 667, subdivision (c). We conclude the trial court must impose consecutive sentences under these circumstances pursuant to the clear language of the three strikes law. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
The underlying facts are not important to the issue in this case. Suffice it to say that beginning in October 1999 with the burglary of his parents' home, defendant David James Casper embarked on a month-long crime spree. He was ultimately apprehended and charged with 35 felony counts, including carjacking, residential burglary, 25 robbery counts, four attempted robbery counts, numerous personal-use-of-a-firearm enhancements, two prior prison term allegations, and one prior serious or violent felony strike allegation.
Defendant pled guilty and admitted all allegations. The trial court dismissed the strike allegation as to all counts except the carjacking count. (§ 1385.) It sentenced defendant to 104 years eight months in state prison. In particular, the trial court selected the carjacking as the principal term, imposing the low term of three years to be doubled (§ 667, subd. (e)(1)), consecutive to a 10-year term for use of a firearm and a five-year term for the prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)), for a total of 21 years. For the remaining 34 counts, the trial court grouped the counts essentially by the separately occurring crimes and sentenced without reference to section 667, subdivision (e).
As for those crimes arising on different occasions, the trial court stated that a "consecutive sentence is required . I am not able to allow concurrent. sentences. I do want the record to reflect that if I had the ability to exercise my discretion it would be my attempt to fashion a sentence that would give Mr. Casper the chance of maybe some day getting out of prison, not to say he definitely would but would give him the chance and that would be talking about an age . . . somewhere between the age of 68 or 70, now being 29. . . . However, I cannot give him that opportunity under the law because Garcia says I cannot."
The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for resentencing. Relying on our opinion in Garcia, supra, 20 Cal.4th 490, it held the consecutive sentencing requirements of the three strikes law did not apply to those counts on which the strike allegation had been dismissed, and hence consecutive sentencing was not required under that law even if the counts were not committed on the same occasion and did not arise under the same set of operative facts.
We granted the Attorney General's petition for review.
II. Discussion
The three strikes law is a comprehensive, integrated sentencing scheme that applies to all cases coming within its terms. (See § 667, subd. (f)(1) ["Notwithstanding any other law, subdivisions (b) to (i), inclusive, shall be applied in every case in which a defendant has a prior felony conviction as defined in subdivision (d)"]; People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161 [69 Cal.Rptr.2d 917, 948 P.2d 429] [in determining whether to strike a prior serious or violent felony conviction pursuant to section 1385, courts "must consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of his present felonies and prior [strike] convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the [three strikes] scheme's spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted"; "bare antipathy to the consequences for any given defendant" should play no part in the determination]; see also People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 980 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 93, 928 P.2d 1171].)
As we delineated at length in People v. Hendrix (1997) 16 Cal.4th 508 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 431, 941 P.2d 64] (Hendrix), by its terms, section 667, subdivision (c)(6) and (7) requires consecutive sentences whenever a defendant with one or more qualifying prior convictions is convicted, as here, of multiple serious or violent felonies "not committed on the same occasion, and not arising from the same set of operative facts." (§ 667, subd. (c)(6); Hendrix, at pp. 512-513; People v. Deloza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 585, 594 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 255, 957 P.2d 945] ["Making mandatory consecutive sentences for those current crimes committed on different occasions is consistent with the focus of the three strikes law, which is recidivism"].) Consecutive sentencing is discretionary under section 667, subdivision (c) only if the current felony convictions are "committed on the same occasion" or "aris[e] from the same set of operative facts." (§ 667, subd. (c)(6) & (7); Hendrix, at pp. 512-513; see People v. Woodhead (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1002, 1007-1008 [239 Cal.Rptr. 656, 741 P.2d 154] [when the statutory "language is clear and unambiguous, there is no need for construction"].)
In addition, section 667, subdivision (c)(6) and (7) applies to "a current conviction" for more than one "felony." As the Attorney General notes, the "term 'felony' is not modified, explicitly or implicitly, by any requirement that these multiple felonies be ones to which strike allegations attach." Here, while the strike allegation was dismissed as to 34 of the 35 counts, defendant nevertheless remained subject to the consecutive sentencing requirements of section 667, subdivision (c) by virtue of the one count that retained the strike allegation.
Defendant asserts that a contrary conclusion is compelled by our decision in Garcia, supra, 20 Cal.4th 490. In Garcia, this court held that the trial court was not bound by the length of sentence provisions of section 667, subdivision (e) for those current convictions as to which the strike allegations had been dismissed. (Garcia, at pp. 495, 499-500.) In that case the trial court had imposed consecutive sentences for the two burglary counts that arose on different occasions, and thus we did not directly address whether such consecutive sentencing was required under the three strikes law. (Id. at pp. 495, 500.) It is axiomatic that cases are not authority for propositions not considered. (People v. Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th 236, 243 [9 Cal.Rptr.3d 76, 83 P.3d 480].)
Moreover, in Garcia, in response to an argument by the Attorney General, we stated, "The Attorney General . . . points to the requirement in the Three Strikes law that sentencing on distinct current offenses be consecutive (§§ 667, subd. (c)(6)-(8), 1170.12, subd. (a)(6)-(8)) and without any aggregate term limitation (§§ 667, subd. (c)(1), 1170.12, subd. (a)(1)). The Attorney General argues that striking prior conviction allegations with respect to one count, but not with respect to another, undermines this principle of consecutive Three Strikes sentences. Again, we disagree. A requirement that a defendant serve the individual sentences for different current felonies consecutively does not indicate how the trial court should determine the lengths of those individual sentences. Here, for example, the trial court conformed to the consecutive sentencing requirement by ordering that the 16-month sentence for the Gantt burglary be served consecutively to the 30-year-to-life sentence for the Kobel burglary. Therefore, we see nothing in the trial court's action that is inconsistent with the consecutive sentencing requirement in the Three Strikes law. Rather, the court expressly applied that requirement." (Garcia, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 500.) Thus, Garcia did not anticipate that its holding regarding section 667, subdivision (e) would have any effect on the consecutive sentencing requirements of section 667, subdivision (c).
In sum, there can be no doubt after examining the language of section 667, subdivision (c) but that consecutive sentences are required for all current felony convictions, regardless of whether a strike allegation attaches to them, if the crimes did not arise on the same occasion or under the same set of operative facts. Reaching a different conclusion here as to this requirement would distort the statutory language, eviscerate the three strikes law, and return to trial judges a discretion in sentencing that both the Legislature and the electorate sought to severely curtail.
Disposition
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed, and the case remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
George, C. J., Baxter, J., Chin, J., and Moreno, J., concurred.
All further statutory references are to this code unless otherwise indicated.
The relevant portions of the initiative version of the three strikes law adopted by the voters in November 1994 (§ 1170.12) and the March 1994 legislative version (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)) are virtually identical. For convenience, we refer to section 667, subdivisions (b)—(i).
Defendant's sentence was later recalled. After further briefing and argument regarding the issue of consecutive sentencing, the trial court declined to alter the earlier imposed sentence.
Section 667, subdivision (c) provides in relevant part:
"(c) Notwithstanding any other law, if a defendant has been convicted of a felony and it has been pled and proved that the defendant has one or more prior felony convictions as defined in subdivision (d), the court shall adhere to each of the following: Q] . fit]
"(6) If there is a current conviction for more than one felony count not committed on the same occasion, and not arising from the same set of operative facts, the court shall sentence the defendant consecutively on each count pursuant to subdivision (e).
"(7) If there is a current conviction for more than one serious or violent felony as described in paragraph (6), the court shall impose the sentence for each conviction consecutive to the sentence for any other conviction for which the defendant may be consecutively sentenced in the manner prescribed by law."
Given our resolution of this issue, we need not address the Attorney General's further argument that it would be an abuse of discretion to impose concurrent sentences in this case for those crimes that were not committed on the same occasion and did not arise from the same set of operative facts.