Case Name: In re the Marriage of CAROL LYNN and WALTER RONALD BAILEY. WALTER RONALD BAILEY, Appellant, v. CAROL LYNN BAILEY, Respondent
Court: Court of Appeal of the State of California
Jurisdiction: California
Decision Date: 1988-02-10
Citations: 198 Cal. App. 3d 505
Docket Number: No. C001897
Parties: In re the Marriage of CAROL LYNN and WALTER RONALD BAILEY. WALTER RONALD BAILEY, Appellant, v. CAROL LYNN BAILEY, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: California Appellate Reports, Third Series
Volume: 198
Pages: 505–518

Head Matter:
[No. C001897.
Third Dist.
Feb. 10, 1988.]
In re the Marriage of CAROL LYNN and WALTER RONALD BAILEY. WALTER RONALD BAILEY, Appellant, v. CAROL LYNN BAILEY, Respondent.
Counsel
John Phillips, District Attorney, and Donald H. Cully, Deputy District Attorney, for Appellant.
John Kappos for Respondent.

Opinion:
Opinion
MARLER, J.
Walter Ronald Bailey (father) appeals from an order requiring Carol Lynn Bailey (mother) to pay one-half of the minor's dental expenses but otherwise denying father's request for child support. Father contends that under the circumstances of this case the trial court had no discretion to refuse to award child support pursuant to the Agnos Child Support Standards Act of 1984. We agree and shall reverse the order.
Facts and Procedural History
Todd William Bailey, born July 13, 1970, is the minor child of the parties. On November 22, 1982, the parties entered into a stipulation providing for joint legal custody of Todd, with physical custody in the father. No provision for child support was made.
On October 20, 1986, father filed an order to show cause seeking child support for the minor. Mother filed a responsive declaration requesting that she not be ordered to pay child support.
After hearing, the court ordered existing orders to remain in effect, and ordered mother to pay one-half of the minor's dental expenses not covered by insurance, to a maximum of $50 per month. From this order, father appeals.
Discussion
Father contends the trial court had no discretion under the Agnos Act to refuse to order wife to pay child support. The stated legislative purpose of the Agnos Act is that "a system of standards and procedures shall be established which provide for a uniform determination of child support awards throughout the state,. . ." (§ 4720, subd. (d).) The formula set out in the Agnos Act requires that a certain minimum award be ordered in recognition of the stated policy that a parent's first and principal obligation is to support his or her minor children according to the parent's circumstances and station in life. (§ 4720, subds. (d) and (e).) The Agnos Act also takes into consideration the financial abilities of each parent to provide support in excess of the mandatory minimum level of support. (Ibid.) "[T]he Legislature recognizes that a parent's circumstances and station in life are dependent upon a variety of factors, including his or her earned and unearned income; earning capacity; assets; and the income of his or her subsequent spouse or nonmarital partner, to the extent that the obligated parent's basic living expenses are met by the spouse or other person, thus increasing the parent's disposable income and therefore his or her ability to pay more than the mandatory minimum child support award established by this chapter. The court shall take into consideration the needs of the supported child or children in determining whether circumstances give rise to an increase or decrease in a child support award." (§ 4720, subd. (e).)
In determining the mandatory minimum award, the court looks first to the standard established under the aid to families with dependent children program (AFDC) for the minimum family support level based on the number of eligible needy persons in the family. (§ 4720, subd. (d).) Prior to the computation of each parent's support liability, the AFDC standard is compared to a percentage of the net disposable income of both parents. (§§ 4722, subds. (b)(1) & (2), 4725.)
The amount each parent is required to contribute to the mandatory minimum award is determined by multiplying the minimum award by the proportionate share of each parent's contribution to their combined net disposable income. (§ 4722, subd. (d).)
Consistent with the idea that child support awards be based on a parent's financial ability to pay, section 4725 provides for additional income deductions, upon the request of a party, separate from the standard deductions, to account for times when a parent suffers "extreme financial hardship." Neither party in this case requested additional deductions. While section 4725 requires the court to remember the underlying goals of the Agnos Act, it also provides that a court shall not order a child support award that would have the effect of reducing a parent's net income to an amount less than that established as the minimum necessary for a person under the AFDC Program. (§ 4725, subd. (e).) Such effect is not apparent here, nor is it claimed.
In this case father submitted an income and expense declaration showing his gross monthly income to be $2,603.04 with a net monthly disposable income of $1,986.39. Mother submitted an income and expense declaration showing her gross monthly income to be $1,119 with a net monthly disposable income of $973.
To apply the mandatory formula we first calculate the required minimum support based upon the declared net incomes of the father and mother as set forth in their respective income and expense declarations. This calculation results in a mandatory minimum award of $303 per month. Mother's share of the mandatory minimum award is then calculated to be $99.69 per month.
Mother argues that the court's order is justified by a consideration of father's income and that of his current spouse. Mother asserts that if the court had considered only those two figures it could have set the support requirements of father at more than the mandatory minimum and not required any contribution from her. Mother misreads the statutory authority for considering a spouse's income in arriving at this proposition.
Section 4720, subdivision (e), states the policy of allowing consideration of the income of a spouse or nonmarital partner "to the extent that the obligated parent's basic living expenses are met by the spouse or other person, thus increasing the parent's disposable income and therefore his or her ability to pay more than the mandatory minimum child support award . . . ." (Italics added; see In re Marriage of Nolte (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 966, 974 [236 Cal.Rptr. 706].) The "obligated" parent referred to in that section is the noncustodial parent from whom support is sought. Applica tion of that policy here authorizes the court to consider whether mother's basic living expenses are being met by a spouse or nonmarital partner in setting support at more than the minimum level. It does not authorize the court to consider father's spouse's income and thereby relieve mother of the duty to support her child.
Further, the trial court is specifically prohibited from including the income of a current spouse in determining annual gross income for purposes of calculating the mandatory minimum award. Section 4721 provides: "In determining the ability of parents to pay the mandatory minimum child support award and to calculate the actual monthly payments to be made by each parent, all of the following provisions apply: . . . []j] (e) For the purpose of determining the parent's annual gross income, in calculating the mandatory minimum child support award, the court shall not include any portion of the earned income and income derived from the separate property of the current spouse or the nonmarital partner of either parent. This requirement does not apply to a child support obligation arising from the marriage between the obligated parents."
Our holding should not be construed to mean the Agnos Act mandates a minimum sum of child support payable directly to the custodial parent. We find nothing in the act that would so require. It would not be an abuse of discretion in and of itself if the trial court orders a portion of the child support be payable directly to the dentist for dental care of the child, so long as this sum be considered as a credit, for amounts actually paid, toward the child support ordered in accordance with this decision.
Finally, mother contends father's representation by the District Attorney of San Joaquin County is improper. Mother relies on In re Marriage of Brown (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 491 [234 Cal.Rptr. 535] in which the court held that the district attorney was not authorized to represent spouses in proceedings to modify spousal support which do not involve enforcement. (Id., at p. 496.) The court, however, expressed no opinion on the authority of the district attorney to represent a spouse in an action for child support. (See Marriage of Brown, supra, (mod.) 189 Cal.App.3d 1653b.) Mother cites no other authority for this proposition, and we will not undertake a review of the matter on our own. In any event, whether or not the representation is proper is irrelevant to the substantive issue of the case.
The judgment is reversed and remanded. The trial court is directed to vacate the existing order re dental expenses and reconsider the order to show cause of father in a manner consistent with this opinion.
Evans, Acting P. J., concurred.
Hereinafter the Agnos Act (Civ. Code, div. 4, pt. 5, tit. 5, ch. 2, § 4720 et seq.).
All further references are to the Civil Code unless otherwise noted.
The formula is represented algebraically as follows:
Then calculation of the minimum support is as follows:
Step 1: F X (CN + NCN) = Y Step 2: If Y > S, MB = S If Y < S, MB = Y Step 3: MB X P = portion of award to be paid by noncustodial spouse. (§ 4722, subd. (g).)
At the time of the application for support under consideration, the minimum family support level for one person was $303. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 11452 and 11453 and State Department of Social Services Manual of Policies and Procedures, § 44-207.112.) The calculation of the mandatory minimum award is then as follows:
To determine mother's share:
At oral argument counsel for father stated he relied on Civil Code section 4801.7 and Welfare and Institutions Code section 11475 (more properly section 11475.1) for the authority to represent father in this action. Since the issue does not relate to the disposition of the case, any discussion is not a part of the holding of the case and appears in the concurring opinions.