Case Name: MARTIN v. BAUER
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1910-04-22
Citations: 122 N.Y.S. 595
Docket Number: 
Parties: MARTIN v. BAUER.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 122
Pages: 595–598

Head Matter:
MARTIN v. BAUER.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.
April 22, 1910.)
1. Vendor and Purchaser (§ 182 )—Contracts—Construction.
One agreeing by contract dated June 28, 1906, to pay for real estate in installments of $20 each month in advance, subject to the condition that, if default is made in two month’s installments, his rights shall be changed from a purchaser in possession to those of a tenant by the month, must make payments on the first day of each month in advance, and on February 1, 1908, 20 monthly payments had matured, so that the making of only 18 payments before that date amounted to a default.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Vendor and Purchaser, Dec. Dig. § 182.' ]
2. Contracts (§ 303 )—Nonperformance—Excuse.
Where a party to a contract has so disabled himself as to make performance impossible, his conduct is equivalent to a breach of the contract, though the time for performance has not arrived, and such disability excuses further performance by the adverse party, who may treat it as an entire breach and recover accordingly.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Contracts, Cent. Dig. §§ 142Í-1433; Dec. Dig. § 303. ]
3. Vendor and Purchaser (§ 186 )—Nonperformance—Excuse.
A vendor contracted to convey real estate on the payment of a specified sum in monthly installments by deed conveying the fee subject to two existing mortgages which the purchaser assumed. Before the payment of all the installments, an action to foreclose one of the mortgages was begun. Held, that the bringing of the action did not so disable the vendor as to make performance by him impossible, and the purchaser could not justify a failure to make payments of installments subsequently maturing, on the ground that the vendor could not perform.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Vendor and Purchaser, Cent. Dig. $ 373; Dec. Dig. § 186. ]
Burr, J., dissenting.
Appeal from Municipal Court, Borough of Queens, Third District.
Action by Elizabeth Martin against William H. Bauer to recover payments made by' plaintiff to defendant under the provisions of a conditional contract for the purchase of real estate. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.
Reversed, and new trial ordered.
See, also, 133 App. Div. 893, 118 N. Y. Supp. 1123.
Argued before WOODWARD, JENKS, BURR, THOMAS, and RICH, JJ.
Robert McC. Robinson, for appellant.
James A. Gray, for respondent.
For other cases see same topic & § number in Deo. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
RICH, J.
The appellant having a contract for the sale to him of several lots in Dunton Park, on June 28, 1906, entered into an agreement with the respondent by which he undertook, upon the payment of $1,895, with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per centum per annum, payable "one hundred dollars at the time of the ensealing and delivery of this agreement and twenty dollars each and every month in advance," to deliver or cause to be delivered to her a deed conveying the fee of said lots, subject to two existing mortgages thereon which she agreed to assume. The monthly payments included principal and interest, and the taxes and insurance were to be paid by the appellant. The respondent entered into possession of the lots under said agreement on July 9th following its execution. She paid the $100 when the contract was executed, and commenced making the monthly payments on August 4th following. Each month thereafter she paid $20, down to and including the month of January, 1908. On February 5, 1908, she was served with a summons and complaint in an action brought to foreclose one of the mortgages upon the property, since which time she has not paid anything. She remained in possession of the property until September 28, 1908, when the purchaser at the sale in foreclosure ejected her therefrom. She has recovered in this action a judgment for all of the money so paid by her to the appellant. The record does not disclose the theory upon which the Municipal Court justice acted in rendering the judgment appealed from, and it is clearly apparent that it cannot be sustained.
By the terms of the agreement between the parties, $20 was to be paid each month in advance. This necessarily required such payments to be made on the first day of each month. The agreement is dated Juné 28, 1906. There had become due and payable under its provisions, on February 1, 1908, 20 monthly payments of $20 each, amounting to $400. Concededly the plaintiff had made only 18 payments, amounting to $360. The contract provided that if default was made in the payment of the monthly installments for two months the rights of the plaintiff were thereby changed from those of a vendee in possession to those of a tenant by the month only. The plaintiff had suffered such default before the foreclosure papers were served upon her, and at that time had lost her right of action against her vendor for the repayment > of the money she had paid upon the contract. But if she had not been in default at that time she was not justified in thereafter refusing to make the monthly payments, yet she continued her default for six months thereafter before the sale in the foreclosure action was made.
Counsel for the respondent seeks to sustain this judgment under the familiar rule that, where a party to a contract has so disabled himself as to make performance impossible, his conduct is equivalent to a breach of the contract, although the time for performance has not arrived, and such disability excuses further performance by the other party, who may treat it as an entire breach, and recover accordingly. The difficulty with this contention lies in the fact that the record discloses no basis for the application of the rule. The commencement of a foreclosure action does not affect such result, for it does not disable a vendor to the extent of making performance by him impossible. At any time after the commencement of such action the defendant might have paid the mortgage and costs of the action, or he might have bid in the property at the sale. It was not until the title had vested in some other person through a deed given pursuant to the judgment in such action that the defendant was absolutely or legally disabled, and performance on his part rendered impossible; and until that time the duty devolved upon the plaintiff to continue the payment of her monthly installments if she wished to retain her right of action against her vendor, to recover the payments she had made upon her contract to him.
She was eight months in default when the property was sold, and the judgment of the Municipal Court must therefore be reversed, and a new trial ordered; costs to abide the event. All concur, except BURR, J., who reads for affirmance.