Case Name: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Clarence JEFFERIES, Defendant-Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2011-09-15
Citations: 456 F. App'x 6
Docket Number: No. 10-3712-cr
Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Clarence JEFFERIES, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: PRESENT: GUIDO CALABRESI, RICHARD C. WESLEY, GERARD E. LYNCH, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 456
Pages: 6–8

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Clarence JEFFERIES, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 10-3712-cr.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Sept. 15, 2011.
Eyal Dror (Tai Park, on the brief), Park & Jensen, LLP, New York, NY, for Appellant.
Rebecca G. Mermelstein, Assistant United States Attorney (Michael E. Levy, Assistant United States Attorney, on the brief), for Preet Bharara, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, NY, for Appellee.
PRESENT: GUIDO CALABRESI, RICHARD C. WESLEY, GERARD E. LYNCH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
SUMMARY ORDER
We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history. Appellant raises two primary issues: (1) that the district court abused its discretion by relying on hearsay to find that he violated Specifications One and Two; and (2) that the district court lacked jurisdiction over Specification Three because the court issued the arrest warrant after Appellant's term of supervised release had expired.
We conclude: (a) that the district court did not rely on hearsay to find that Appellant violated Specification One; and (b) that the district court had good cause to rely on hearsay for Specification Two, pursuant to United States v. Williams, 443 F.3d 85, 45-47 (2d Cir.2006). With respect to Specification One, the alleged hearsay statements were probative only for the identification of the victim's assailant. Appellant freely conceded that he struck the victim (his nephew). Thus, the district court did not rely on any hearsay to conclude that Appellant committed the violation.
The only dispute related to Specification One was whether Appellant intended to strike his nephew with a frozen water jug or accidentally struck his nephew in response to being touched with a hot spoon. The Government established the severity of the nephew's injury not by hearsay, but through medical records, photographs, and the testimony of Appellant's probation officer. The district court found:
The circumstances make it clear . that [the incident] was intentional. This [was] not a glancing blow. This [was] a heavy water bottle, either totally or partially frozen that was brought to bear upon the head of the eight-year-old, causing a deep laceration that required . more than seven stitches to close. It wasn't a superficial wound that one would expect form a glancing blow. It was a deep wound, a deep wound brought to bear, I think, and reflecting a purposeful blow.... [I]t was uncontrolled rage by a 43-year old man to an eight-year-old child.
United States v. Jefferies, No. 03-cr-1436, Hr'g Tr. 157:10-19 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2010). Clearly, the district court did not rely on hearsay when it found that Appellant violated Specification One.
Turning to Specification Two, we do not reach the question of whether the statements in the medical records that identified Appellant as the victim's assailant qualify as an exception to the hearsay rule. See Fed.R.Evid. 803(4). Rather, we find that pursuant to Williams, 443 F.3d at 45-47, the district court had good cause to admit the statements. In state court, the district attorney dropped the charges against Appellant for Specification Two because the victim and the victim's mother (Appellant's sister) refused to cooperate with the district attorney. These facts are sufficient to allow the Government to introduce the nephew's statements identifying Appellant (his uncle) as his attacker. The only witnesses with first hand knowledge were the victim and his mother; they had refused to cooperate.
Finally, the district court had jurisdiction over Specification Three because: (a) Jefferies was not punished more than once for his conduct, see United States v. Amer, 110 F.3d 873, 884 (2d Cir.1997); United States v. Meeks, 25 F.3d 1117, 1122 (2d Cir.1994), abrogated on other grounds by Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 120 S.Ct. 1795, 146 L.Ed.2d 727 (2000); and (b) estoppel did not preclude the tolling of Jefferies's period of supervised release, see 18 U.S.C. § 3583®, 3624(e).
We have considered Jefferies's other arguments and find them to be without merit. Thus, we AFFIRM the district court's judgment.