Case Name: In the Matter of the Estate of Anna H. Price et al., Deceased. Howard S. Price, Jr., et al., as Guardian, Appellants, v. Frederick M. Price, as Executor, Respondent
Court: Washington Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Washington
Decision Date: 1969-05-08
Citations: 75 Wash. 2d 884
Docket Number: No. 38429
Parties: In the Matter of the Estate of Anna H. Price et al., Deceased. Howard S. Price, Jr., et al., as Guardian, Appellants, v. Frederick M. Price, as Executor, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: Washington Reports
Volume: 75
Pages: 884–893

Head Matter:
[No. 38429.
En Banc.
May 8, 1969.]
In the Matter of the Estate of Anna H. Price et al., Deceased. Howard S. Price, Jr., et al., as Guardian, Appellants, v. Frederick M. Price, as Executor, Respondent.
W. L. Minnick (of Minnick, Hahner & Hubbard), and R. Michael Kight, for appellants.
Betty Taylor Howard, for respondent.
Reported in 454 P.2d 411.

Opinion:
Rosellini, J.
The court is asked to construe the disposi-tive provisions of a will.
W. Montelius Price and his wife, Anna Howard, executed mutual wills in April 1957. At that time they had four surviving children, a fifth child having died about 25 years previously. Their son, Howard S. Price, died April 24, 1961, leaving surviving him five children. Anna Howard Price died February 6, 1962, and W. Montelius Price died January 26, 1964. No new wills or codicils were made by the senior Prices after the death of Howard.
The respondent is the executor of the estate of W. Mon-telius Price, representing himself and the other surviving children. The appellants are the children of Howard, and it is their contention that they are entitled to inherit their deceased father's share of the estate.
The significant portions of the will are as follows:
Second
I hereby declare that I have four surviving children, Elizabeth Price Morgan, Howard M. Price, Henry S. Price, and Frederick M. Price, and no other child or children of any deceased child.
Fourth
In the event that my said wife should predecease me, then I give, devise and bequeath my entire estate, consisting of all my property, real, personal or mixedj wheresoever situated, to my four children equally, taking into consideration all advancements made heretofore or hereafter to any of them, to be distributed as follows: •
1. To. my son Frederick, usually known as Jerry, the sum of $10,000, free of any tax which may be payable on that amount, and also the right to purchase my business, denominated the W. Montelius Price Co., a sole proprietorship, as hereinafter provided. ' •
2. To my son Henry, a like sum of $10,000, free of any tax which may be payable on that amount;
3. All the rest and residue of my said estate to my then surviving children, equally, to be distributed to them as hereinafter set forth, after expenses of administration and taxes.
Fifth
I direct my executrix, or executor, to employ my son Frederick to manage and wind up the affairs of my business . . . and prior to the distribution of my estate to offer the said business to my said son Frederick at the appraised value therof, the terms of the sale to be determined by the mutual agreement of my surviving children.
In the further event, however, that my son Frederick . . . should not survive me, then the said business shall be offered to my son Henry S. Price . . .
The trial court found that the will was unambiguous and that it was the testator's intention to leave his estate to his surviving children. The appellants contend that it was his intention to leave it to his surviving children and to the children of any deceased child, by right of representation.
In approaching the question thus broached, we bear in mind that the right to dispose of one's property by will is a valuable right and is protected by statute. In re Meagher's Estate, 60 Wn.2d 691, 375 P.2d 148 (1962); In re Gordon's Estate, 52 Wn.2d 470, 326 P.2d 340 (1958). The court, in construing a will, is faced with the situation as it existed when the will was drawn, and must consider all the surrounding circumstances, the objects sought to be obtained, and endeavor to determine what was in the testator's mind when he made the bequests, and the court must not make a new will for him, or warp his language in order to obtain a result which the court might feel to be just. In re Quick's Estate, 33 Wn.2d 568, 206 P.2d 489 (1949). Accord: Holmes v. Holmes, 65 Wn.2d 230, 396 P.2d 633 (1964). Words used in a will are understood in their ordinary sense if there is nothing to indicate a contrary intent. In re Levas' Estate, 33 Wn.2d 530, 206 P.2d 482 (1949).
The ambiguity which the appellants claim exists in the will and which they say should be resolved by finding that the testator intended his property to descend by the laws of intestacy if his wife predeceased him is found in the alleged inconsistency between the following two provisions in the fourth paragraph:
I give . all my property . to my four children equally, . . . to be distributed as follows:
3. All the rest and residue of my said estate to my then surviving children, equally, to be distributed to them as hereinafter set forth, after expenses of administration and taxes.
According to the appellants' reading of these, two provisions, it was the testator's intent, as expressed in the first quoted provision, to give his estate to all four of his children, whether or not they survived him. In adopting this interpretation, they run immediately into the difficulty presented by the fact that the testator provided that the actual distribution should be made to his then surviving children. They attempt to explain away this inconsistency by pointing to the second paragraph, in which the testator said that he had tour surviving children. In this paragraph, they say, he defined what he meant by "surviving"—namely, his four children.
Granting to this argument whatever logical merit it might have, it nevertheless overlooks the fact that in the fourth paragraph the testator does not speak merely of "surviving children" but rather of his "then surviving children." In short, the appellants would ignore the very significant word "then" and read it out of the will.
Viewing this situation as it existed at the time the will was executed, and examining the will from its four corners, there is no reason to suppose that the testator did not know the meaning of the word "surviving." He was aware that one of his five children had died, and that there were at that time only four surviving. He used the word several times in the will, and each time he used it in harmony with the context. He provided that one of his sons should be given the. option of purchasing the. business if he survived him, and that if he did not do so, another son might have the option. He also provided that the terms of the sale should be determined by his surviving children. This provision obviously can mean only those children surviving at the time of the sale, since a deceased child could hardly participate. His primary beneficiary was his wife, if she survived 'him. There is simply no reason to suppose that the testator, when he used the words "then surviving" meant "now surviving."
Although the testator had grandchildren living at the time he executed the will, he made no reference whatsoever to them in the will. Nowhere can there be found any expression of intent to benefit them. For whatever reasons he may have had, the testator expressed only an intent to benefit his children. This will was drawn by an attorney, who presumably advised the testator of the law of intestacy. If the testator had wanted to provide for grandchildren, it would have been easy to do so in the customary way, providing that the children of any deceased child should take his share, per stirpes, or any language to that effect. It would be strange indeed if a testator, wishing to provide for his grandchildren in the event of the death of his child prior to his own death, should feel that the end could best be accomplished by omitting to mention such grandchildren in his will and relying upon a court to find his will ambiguous and contrive a way to let those grandchildren take by virtue of a statute.
Similarly, if the testator had desired to benefit the estate of any deceased child, he need only have provided that the residue of his estate should be divided equally among his four children, omitting the words "then surviving."
It is therefore plain that, in the dispositive portion of his will, the testator designated as his beneficiaries (after providing specific bequests to his two younger sons to compensate them for advancements made to the other children) his children who should survive him. It is true that in the preceding paragraph the testator mentioned his four children as his intended beneficiaries. Of course, it was his intention to provide for all four of his children, but there is no expressed intent to provide for any grandchildren. The word "children," as used in a will, in its ordinarily accepted meaning, does not include grandchildren. In re Hutton's Estate, 106 Wash. 578, 180 Pac. 882, 3 A.L.R. 1673 (1919). 4 Page on Wills, § 34.19, at 438 (rev. 1961). Where the will unambiguously designates "children" as devisees or legatees, extrinsic evidence is generally not admissible to show the testator's intention to designate or include grandchildren. 57 Am. Jur. Wills § 1071, at 692 (1948). See 94 A.L.R. 108 (1935).
If the words of this will are given their ordinary meaning, it is unambiguous. The second article of the will does not purport to dispose of the testator's property or to name his beneficiaries. See 7 Page on Wills, § 62.18, at 118 (rev. 1963). It simply describes the status of his family and it describes it correctly. He had, at the time he made the will, four surviving children.
Surviving means remaining alive. See any dictionary. See also 4 Page on Wills, § 34.32, at 467 (rev. 1961).
The alleged ambiguity can be resolved if the first paragraph is regarded as defining the class who can take under the will (my four children) and the succeeding paragraphs state the conditions under which they will take and the manner of distribution. The $10,000 specific bequests to the two sons are evidently intended to offset advancements previously made or. to be made in the future to other children. The only condition placed upon the right of each child to receive his share of the residue is that the child should survive him. Otherwise, the deceased child's share is to be divided among the surviving children.
The rule is that provisions in a will should be reconciled if possible. This interpretation of -the will does in fact reconcile the provisions. It also accords with the rule that that construction should be adopted which makes' the instrument .clear and understandable in preference to a construction which renders the instrument strained and unnatural. In re Torando's Estate, 38 Wn.2d 642, 228 P.2d 142, 236 P.2d 552 (1951).
The judgment is affirmed.
Hill, Weaver, Hamilton, Hale, and McGovern, JJ., concur.