Case Name: Betty NEWTON, Petitioner, v. McCOTTER MOTORS, INC., and Corporate Group Service, Respondents
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1985-08-30
Citations: 475 So. 2d 230
Docket Number: No. 65764
Parties: Betty NEWTON, Petitioner, v. McCOTTER MOTORS, INC., and Corporate Group Service, Respondents.
Judges: BOYD, C.J., and OVERTON and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 475
Pages: 230–234

Head Matter:
Betty NEWTON, Petitioner, v. McCOTTER MOTORS, INC., and Corporate Group Service, Respondents.
No. 65764.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Aug. 30, 1985.
Richard A. Sicking of Kaplan, Sicking, Hessen, Sugarman, Rosenthal, Susskind, Bloom & DeCastro, Miami, for petitioner.
B.C. Pyle, Orlando, for respondents.

Opinion:
ALDERMAN, Justice.
We review the decision of the District Court of Appeal, First District, in McCotter Motors, Inc. v. Newton, 453 So.2d 117 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), wherein the First District upheld the constitutional validity of section 440.16(1), Florida Statutes which requires, in order for death to be compensa-ble under the Workers' Compensation Law, that death must result within one year of the accident or must follow continuous disability and must result from the accident within five years of the accident. We approve the district court's holding which declares section 440.16(1) constitutional.
Betty Newton's husband, Leslie, sustained a compensable industrial accident on April 30, 1973, while in the employment of McCotter Motors, Inc. As a result of this accident, he underwent multiple back surgeries which required bed rest. Because of the bed rest, he developed thrombophlebitis of his legs for which condition he was treated with anticoagulation therapy to thin his blood and to prevent clotting. Resulting from this therapy, he sustained several episodes of internal bleeding. His condition was further complicated by back pain, depression, and reactive hypertension. He was continuously disabled from the date of his accident until his death on May 5, 1982, which resulted from cerebral hemorrhage. Betty Newton applied for dependency death benefits under the Work ers' Compensation Law as the widow of Leslie. The employer/carrier contested the claim on the basis that Leslie's death occurred more than five years following the accident and that her claim was therefore barred by section 440.16(1).
Refusing to enforce section 440.16 because he determined that application of this statute to this case would produce an unconstitutional result, the deputy commissioner awarded benefits to Betty Newton.
The First District reversed and upheld the constitutionality of section 440.16(1) against challenges that it denied due process of the law, to-wit: access to the courts, and denied equal protection of the law. We agree. The district court correctly reasoned:
In the past, this Court and the Florida Supreme Court have upheld similar attacks on other sections and subsections of chapter 440. In light of the precedent set by those cases, we find that appellee has not sustained her burden of showing that section 440.16(1) is unconstitutional. Compare Acton v. Ft. Lauderdale Hospital, 418 So.2d 1099 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (the fact that the 1979 amendments to chapter 440 eliminated most of the "scheduled injury" benefits did not render those amendments violative of the equal protection or access to the courts guarantees of the state or federal constitutions); Sasso v. Ram Property Management, 431 So.2d 204 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (the provision of section 440.-15(3)(b)3.d., Florida Statutes (1979), which terminates the right to wage loss benefits when the injured employee reaches age sixty-five and becomes eligible for social security benefits, does not violate constitutional guarantees); Morrow v. Amcon Concrete, Inc. 433 So.2d 1230 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (the 440.-15(3)(b)4, Florida Statutes (1979) reduction by up to 50 percent of wage loss benefits at age sixty-two when the employee is receiving social security benefits was held constitutional). See also Mahoney v. Sears, Roebuck & Company, 419 So.2d 754 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); and Beauregard v. Commonwealth Electric, 440 So.2d 460 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (upholding section 440.15(3)(a)l (1980) and (1981), which placed a dollar cap on eye injuries to the extent that, the claimants argued, the benefits provided were so paltry as to deny them redress for their injuries, as provided in article I, section 21, Florida Constitution).
453 So.2d at 119. See also Sasso v. Ram Property Management, 452 So.2d 932 (Fla), appeal dismissed, — U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 498, 83 L.Ed.2d 391 (1984); O'Neil v. Department of Transportation, 468 So.2d 904 (Fla.1985); Iglesia v. Floran, 394 So.2d 994 (Fla.1981); Mullarkey v. Florida Feed Mills, Inc., 268 So.2d 363 (Fla.1972).
Accordingly, we hold section 440.16(1) constitutional and approve the decision of the district court.
It is so ordered.
BOYD, C.J., and OVERTON and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.
EHRLICH, J., dissents with an opinion, in which ADKINS and SHAW, JJ., concur.
Section 440.16(1) expressly provides:
(1) If death results from the accident within 1 year thereafter or follows continuous disability and results from the accident within 5 years thereafter, the employer shall pay: .