Case Name: Thalimer against Brinkerhoff
Court: New York Supreme Court of Judicature
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1823-01
Citations: 20 Johns. 386
Docket Number: 
Parties: Thalimer against Brinkerhoff.
Judges: 
Reporter: Johnson's Reports
Volume: 20
Pages: 386–404

Head Matter:
Thalimer against Brinkerhoff.
H. T.as^heii-1 at'iaw of his father, and who was about to com-™cove/UltSthe lt°Entered into an agreement who^h'ad listev,6^ by whichhecovesideration of tl to convey th 1 q6 plf inttf part of the pro-should bef'rethe "pialntiff'in consideration nant“&c”propay^ear^nd sustain, the one half of all the expenses occur in^the prosecution^ of suits, &c. The drewdant,'the agreement, and subscribed it as a witness, as attorney of H 71., and the H. T., who plaintiff, brought actions of ejectment against the persons in possession of the land; and, afterwards, by virtue of a power of attorney from H tZ1., foy that purpose, but without the knowledge of the plaintiff, compromised with the tenants, and received from them a large sum of money.
In an action of assumpsit for money had and received to the use of the plaintiff, brought by him to recover the one fourtl] part of the money so received by the defendant: Held, that the agreement between the plaintiff and H. T., was illegal and void, under the first section of the act to prevent and punish'ckampérty and maintenance ; (sess. 24. ch. 87. N. R. L. 172.) and that the plaintiff could not, therefore, recover against the defendant.
To make such a contract illegal and void, for champerty, it is not necessary that the land should be held adversely.
THIS was an action of assumpsit. The declaration contained the common counts, for money had and received (0 the plaintiff’s use, money lent, &c., and an insimul computassent. Plea, non-assumpsit. The cause, was tried at the New-Yorh sittings, in June, 1821, before Mr. Chief Justice Spencer. At the trial, the plaintiff gave in evidence an agreement between him and Henry R. Teller, to which the defendant was a witness, and was drawn by him, or under his direction, dated April 10, 1807. This agreement recited, that whereas H. R. Teller is the heir at law of his father, Isaac Teller, deceased, and as such, laid claim to certain property situate in the city of New-Yorh, fronting on Broadway-> formerly known by the name of the “ negro burying ground,” and possessed by J. Teller in his lifetime; and whereas it was the intention of the said II. R. T., to insthute a suit, or suits, for the recovery of the whole, or part of the said property; and whereas P. T., the plaintiff, intermarried with the sister of the said H. R. Teller, and in conseciuence °f that connexion, became justly, though not legally, entitled to a portion of the said property; the agreement, therefore, witnessed, that Jtl. K. 1\, m consideration ^le Prenjises and covenants therein after contained, for himself, his heirs, fee., covenanted, promised, and agreed, with P. T., the plaintiff, his heirs, 8sc., that on the recovery °f the whole, or any part of the said property, he would execute to the plaintiff a good and lawful conveyance for one fourth part of the property recovered; and the plaintiff, in consideration of the said promise, covenanted and agreed with H. R. Teller, that he, the plaintiff, would pay, hear, and sustain the one half of all the expenses that might occur in the prosecution of the suit or suits, to be instituted by H. R. T., for the recovery of the property, if such suit or suits should prove unfortunate; but in case the suit or suits should prove successful, then to pay, bear, and sustain, one fourth of all the expenses; and it was agreed, that the expenses should be mutually advanced and borne by and between the parties, in the proportions above mentioned.
The plaintiff proved, that the defendant, as the attorney of the plaintiff, and Henry R. Teller, in June, 1809, commenced a number of ejectment suits against persons occupying different parts of the property mentioned in the agreement ; and that the defendant, afterwards, without the knowledge of the plaintiff, by virtue of a power of attorney from H. R. Teller, compromised the suits with the respective tenants ; and on such compromise, received 54,000 dollars, besides the costs of suit. The power of attorney, which was set forth in the bill of exceptions taken at the trial, was dated November 22d, 1813, and fully authorized the defendant to make compromises, and to sell and convey all such parts of the land claimed, and upon such terms as the defendant might think fit and proper. The plaintiff claimed one fourth part of the money thus received by the defendant, as so much money had and received to the use of the plaintiff, under and by virtue of the agreement between him and H. R. T., and the retainer of the defendant, as their attorney, under it. The plaintiff having rested his cause, the defendant’s counsel moved for a nonsuit, on the ground, that the agreement between the plaintiff and H. R. T. was unlawful, as being against the statute to prevent and punish champerty and maintenance, and, therefore, void. The Chief Justice was of opinion, that the agreement was unlaw'ful and void, and could not, therefore, be the foundation of an action; and, accordingly, directed the plaintiff to be called and nonsuited. The plaintiff’s counsel tendered a bill of exceptions to the opinion of the Chief Justice.
8. Jones, for the plaintiff,
contended, 1, That the agree ment between the plaintiff and H. R. Teller was not unlawful, nor against the statute to prevent and punish champerty and maintenance. Maintenance is an officious inter-meddling in a suit that no way belongs to one, by maintaining or assisting either party with money or otherwise, to prosecute or defend it. (4 Bl. Com. 134, 135.) It is an interference by one who is a perfect stranger, having no interest whatever in the subject of controversy, to the disturbance of the community, by stirring up suits. Champerty is merely a species of maintenance, for the consideration of having some part of the thing in dispute, or some profit out of it. The strictness and severity of the law, as found in the ancient cases, has, in later times, for very obvious reasons, been much relaxed ; so, that if the person accused of this offence can show that he has any affinity or relationship to a party, he may lawfully advise and aid him in his suit, by money, or otherwise. So, if he has any interest whatever, legal or equitable, in the land in controversy, however contingent or remote it may be, he may maintain the party in the suit. (2 Hawk. P. C. B. 1. ch. 83. s. 1—13. 17, 18. 21, 22. Wickham v. Conklin, 8 Johns. Rep. 220. 227. 3 Burns’ Justice, 117.) Then, had not the plaintiff, in right of his wife, the sister of H. R. Teller, a possible or contingent interest in this land ? She might become heir to her brother, in case he died without issue.
2. This is not champerty, unless the party is in adverse possession. (8 Johns. Rep. 227, 228.) The agreement recites, that the ancestor of II. R. T. had a title to the land, and that H. R. T. was the owner. He, or the defendant, as his attorney, cannot be allowed any intendment as to an adverse title. (9 Johns. Rep. 102. 163. 174. 1 Johns. Rep. 156. 8 Johns. Rep. 220. 3 Johns. Cases, 124. 16 Johns. Rep. 293.) There is no evidence of an adverse possession ; and if there was none, it was a valid agreement to pass one third of the property to the plaintiff, or his wife, in consideration of blood.
3. But even, if this agreement was unlawful, neither H. R. Teller, nor the defendant, could take advantage of it. Teller has received the full benefit of the agreement. It is good as between parties to it; and is void only as against strangers, or third persons having right. But the tenants have compromised, without taking any advantage of this objec= fion to the agreement. (Co. Litt. 369. a. Cro. Eliz. 445. Hawk. P. C. B. 1. ch. 86. s. 3. 9 Johns. Rep. 55. 2 Roll. Abr. 155. Bro, Abr. Feoff. pl. 19.) On what principle can Teller, or the defendant, be allowed to set up this defence ? The ground of the plaintiff’s action is, that the defendant has received money as Ms attorney; and the agreement was introduced collaterally, to show the amount to which the plaintiff was entitled.
E. Williams and W. W. Van Ness, contra.
1. The plaintiff cannot recover in this form of action. The owners of aliquot shares of the money cannot maintain separate suits for their respective proportions. The action is against the defendant as attorney, retained by Teller and the plaintiff jointly. There is but one assumpsit, and only one suit can lie. Teller, therefore, ought to have been Joined with the plaintiff in the action. This objection might have been made at the trial, for the defendant is not obliged to plead the misjoinder of plaintiffs in assumpsit: And though the objection was not, in fact, made at the trial, it may be raised here, for it is not a matter which, had it been stated, could have been supplied by the plaintiff at the trial. (Beekman v. Frost, 18 Johns. Rep. 544.)
2. Assumpsit for money had and received does not lie; for by the agreement between Teller and the plaintiff, the latter was to have one fourth of the land, if recovered. Nothing is said, by which it would appear that he was entitled to demand any money. The plaintiff, therefore, should have brought an action against Teller for a breach of the contract.
3. The agreement was void, as against the statute to prevent champerty and maintenance. Our statute provides for the prevention of the various offences of this nature to be found in the English statutes. Champerty and maintenance are distinct offences. A conveyance of a right of entry may be good, as between the parties, though void as to third persons; but it is different as to champerty ; and the case of Wickham v. Conklin, (8 Johns. Rep. 227.) proceeds on the distinction. The first section of the statute provides against champerty, and the eighth and ninth sections against buying pretended titles, and maintenance. A father may support his son in a suit to recover his right; but he cannot buy of his son a portion of the subject matter of dispute, without violating the first section of the statute. No case can be found to show that such an agreement is lawful and valid between the parties. It is not necessary to prove an adverse possession in such a case ; but if it were necessary, we contend, that the agreement expressly admits the fact of an adverse possession. The contract is, by the statute, illegal, corrupt, and void. The consideration of relationship, or affinity, cannot avail. No consanguinity can justify the buying of a part of the subject matter of a suit. The plaintiff, in right of his wife, had no interest whatever in the land, antecedent to, or independent of the agreement. Any supposed natural right in Mrs. Thdlimer, cannot be recognised in a Court of law or equity, contrary to the law of descents, established by the legislature.
But it is said, that the defendant cannot set up this objection to the agreement, as a defence. He is not called upon for a defence, until the plaintiff brings a proper suit.—• Though under the 8th and 9th sections of the statute, the defendant might not be entitled to make the objection, yet he may, under the first section, which makes the agreement, as between the parties, void. The defendant stands in the place of TI. R. Teller, in regard to this suit. Admitting the agreement to be valid, the casus foederis between the parties to it has not occurred. The defendant received the money under the power of attorney from Teller alone,- and to him only is he accountable for it.
D. B. Ogden, in reply,
said, that the objection as to the form of the action, was not made at the trial, and could not, therefore, be raised here. Had it been made at the trial, the plaintiff might have shown a settlement among the parties, by which the defendant was to retain one fourth of the money in his hands for the use of the plaintiff. True, this is an action for money. A compromise was made with the tenants under a power from H. R. Teller, who was the enly person who could give such a power; but it was, lie vertheless, as to one fourth, money received to the use of the plaintiff.
Suppose, all the children of Isaac Teller, the ancestor, should agree together, notwithstanding a devise of the whole estate to one of them, to divide it equally between them, and that a suit should he brought to recover any part of it, in. the possession of another, the expenses of which suit should be borne by them all rateably, would such an agreement be unlawful and void under the statute ? Whatever may have been the ancient law on the subject; yet, “ that such a doctrine,” says Mr. Justice Buller, (4 Term Rep. 340.) speaking of some of the early decisions, as to maintenance, “ repugnant to every honest feeling of the human heart, should be soon laid aside, was to be expected. Accordingly, a variety of exceptions were soon made.” And we may add, that if such an agreement between a brother and sister, or blood relations, as to the estate of their common ancestor, should be declared to be an offence, under this statute, it would be a disgrace to our law. Consanguinity or blood is a good consideration. If a feoffment would not be void, as between the parties, can a mere agreement for a conveyance be void ?

Opinion:
Spencer, Ch" J.
It has been insisted, on the argument, that the agreement is not unlawful: 1. Because, it does not appear, that the lands, for which suits were to be instituted, were held adversely. 2. Because, although H. R, Tetter was the heir at law of his father, and the legal owner, the agreement carried into effect an equitable right, on the part of his sister, to have a proportion of the property, and that it was competent for the heir at law to waive his legal right, so far as to admit her to participate in the division of the estate. 3. Because, the defendant, having drawn the agreement, and acted under it, is concluded from making the objection, that it was illegal.
Other objections have been made to the plaintiff's right to maintain this action, besides the one on which the nonsuit was granted: 1. That the action, being founded on a joint retainer, by Tetter and the plaintiff, the suit ought to have been brought by them jointly* 2. That the plaintiff, under the agreement, was entitled to a co^eyanee of a portion of the land recovered, and is not entitled to any portion of the money received on the sale of the lands; and, 3. That the plaintiff ought to have proved notice to the defendant, to retain the proportion of the money he claims. As these objections were not made at the trial, and, as it is possible, had they been made then, that they might have been answered and refuted, by evidence in the power of the plaintiff, I shall dismiss them from any further consideration, on the present motion»
Champerty and maintenance are distinct offences. Champerty is one species of maintenance; but, the statute, and elementary writers, regard it as a different offence, although subject to some of the same rules. . The first section of the statute, (1 N. R. L. 172. sess. 24. ch. 87.) enacts, " that no officer, or other person, shall take upon him any business, that is or may be in suit in any Court, for to have part of the thing in plea or demand; and no person, upon any such agreement, shall give up his right to another; and every such convej'ance or agreement shall be void; and every person, who shall maintain any plea or suit, in any Court, for lands, tenements, or other things, for to have part or profit thereof, shall be punished by fine and imprisonment; but this act shall not prohibit any person to have counsel of persons duly licensed for that purpose, or to take counsel of his parents and next friends." The eighth section of the statute, prohibits the buying or selling any pretended right or title to lands, unless the person selling, or his ancestors, or those by whom he claims the same, have been in possession of the same, or of the reversion or remainder, or taken the rents and profits for one year next before the sale, upon the pain of forfeiting the value of the lands, and subjecting the buyer, knowing the same, to the same forfeiture. The ninth section, -prohibits any person from unlawfully maintaining another, in any matter or cause, in suit or variance, concerning lands, or goods, or debts, &c., upon the pain of forfeiting 250 dollars. • These are all the provisions of the statute, having any relation to the question to be decided; and, it is only necessary to state the different provisions, to perceive the difference in the of- fences, and the different punishments denounced against them. The question, then, arises, whether the agreement between the plaintiff and H. R. Teller, is within the prohibitions of the statute ; and whether it falls within the ex-eeptions. The statutes of West. 1. ch. 25. and West. 2. ch. 49. related merely to officers; but the 28 Edw. I. extended to other persons, as well as officers; and our statute is nearly a transcript of the latter, with this addition, that it declares every such agreement and conveyance- to be void. In Jackson v. Ketchum, (8 Johns. Rep. 479.) the question was, whether a purchase of land, during the pendency of a suit for the recovery of the same land, was an infraction of the statute, and the conveyance void. The Court decided, that such a purchase was against the statute $ and that even a bona fide purchase, pending the suit, was within the statute, and would be champerty.. It was urged, on the part of the plaintiff, that the agreement here is not unlawful, because it does not appear, that the lands are held adversely to the title of H. R. Teller. The statute does not make an adverse holding the test of illegality. It forbids any one taking upon himself any business, that is or may be in suit, in any Court, for to have part of the thing in plea or demand; and it prohibits any one from giving up bis right to another, with respect to the thing in plea or demand. But it clearly appears, by the recitals to the agreement, and the whole scope of the contract, that H. R. Teller did not possess, and never had possessed the land referred to in the agreement; but that it was to be recovered, if recovered at all, after severe litigation, and with heavy expense. The agreement recites, that Isaac Teller was possessed of the lands, in his lifetime 5 that H. R. Teller was his heir at law, and laid claim to them, and that suits were to be instituted for the recovery of a part or the whole of them. From all this, the inference is irresistible, that H. R. Teller never wqs in possession of any of these lands, and that his right consisted of a claim to them, founded on his father's possession; and that they were possessed in such a manner, that he was driven to his remedy by suits at law ; thus refuting and repelling any idea, that they were held in subserviency to his title or claim. The plaintiff, by becoming a party to the agreement, is concluded as to the facts recited and admittg£j. an(j ^hg factSj taken collectively, leave no doubt, that H. R. Teller's claim, was founded in a right of action merely. This, then, is a case within the very terms, spirit, and intent, of the first section of the statute. The plaintiff, by stipulating to contribute one half of all the expenses that might accrue, in the prosecution of the suits to be instituted by Teller, for the recovery of the property, if the suits should prove unfortunate, did take upon himself business, that was to be put in suit, for to have part of the thing in plea or demand; and the statute declares every such agreement to be void. If the agreement between the parties did not speak the truth, with respect to Teller's claim to the land, and if it could have been shown, that the possessions of the tenants or holders of the lands, were not adverse to Teller's claim, when the motion for a nonsuit was made, the plaintiff was bound to show the fact, that the possessions were not hostile to that claim. This was not offered to be done. The plaintiff rested his right of recovery on the validity of the agreement; and I, then, thought, and continue to think, that the agreement, unexplained, was susceptible of but one construction; and that it was a case manifestly within the statute.
To take the case out of the operation of the statute, it was contended, on the argument, that the plaintiff's wife, as the sister of H. R. Teller, and as one of the children of Isaac Teller, had such an equitable interest in the land, as to render it lawful for her husband to make the agreement. It was decided in this Court, in Wickham v. Conklin, (8 Johns. Rep. 227.) that where a party had any interest, legal or equitable, in the land which was the subject of the suit, there was no foundation for the charge of maintenance. In that case, which was a suit for the penalty inflicted by the 9th section of the statute for unlawful maintenance of a suit, Conklin had a resulting trust in the land in controversy, and had, therefore, a right to assist in the prosecution of the suit. Here, the only right which the plaintiff had, grew out of the very agreement prohibited by the statute. His wife had neither a legal nor equitable interest jn the land, of which a Court of law or equity could take notice, or en force. The descent of property, on the death of its owner, is matter of positive regulation, by the municipal laws of the country where it is situated; and when such laws have ordained, that where a person dies seised of land, it shall descend to his eldest son, in exclusion of his sister, no Court can notice the claim of the sister, to have part of the inheritance, as an equitable claim, against the express and positive provision of the law, which totally excludes her. When, therefore, it is said, in such a case, that the sister has an equitable claim, it is only the undefined and vague opinion of individuals, that the law is wrong, and that the sister ought to be admitted to an equal participation with the brother, of the property of the ancestor. The recital to the agreement admits that H. R. Teller was the heir at law of his father Isaac Teller, and as such laid claim to the property which was the subject of the agreement; and it admits, that the plaintiff though he had married the sister of the heir at law, was not legally entitled to any part of the property, though it states, that in consequence of that marriage, he was justly entitled to a portion of it; but I am clearly of opinion, that the notion of the parties in this respect, does not authorize them to contravene the statute, by stipulating to carry on the suits to be instituted, at their joint expense, and for the ultimate division of the property among them, if the suits terminated successfully. But it has been insisted, that this case comes within the exception of the statute, and the adjudged cases thereon ; the words of the exception are ; " but this act shall not prohibit any person to have counsel of persons duly licensed for that purpose, or to take counsel of his parents and next friends."
It is laid down by Hawkins, (ch. 84. s. 18.) " that no conveyance, or promise thereof, relating to lands in suit, made by a father to his son, or by any ancestor to his heir apparent, is within this statute, since it only gives them the greater encouragement to do what, by nature, they are bound to do." Coke, (2 Inst. 563, 564.) in commenting on the statute of 28 Edw. I., and upon the exception,and of allowing counsel to be taken of parents and next friends, says, there is a diversity of signification between taking counsel of serjeants at law, and attorneys, and of the prochem amyes; that if a serjeant, apprentice, or attorney, take a feoffment hanging the plea, or the like, to maintain the tenant, though it be in lieu of his fee, yet this is champerty, within the purview of the statute; that to take an estate in the land, hanging the writ,, for maintenance, is to become a party; but if a father be impleaded, he may infeoff his son, for his assistance, maintenance, and comfort; for this is nature's profession, for the son assistere, manutenere, et consolari, et e converso, et sic de similibus; et sic .alia estprofessio legis, et, alia natures; so it is, that the son may, of his own money, and in his own name, give fees to his father's counsel or attorney, without any expectation of repayment, and so may the father to his son's counsel.--In like manner, and by the like reason, if the father be demandant in a precipe, he may promise and contract with the son, to assure him the land after the recovery, and it is not champerty within the act; and so of any other ancestor, and his heir apparent. There are prochein amyes not only in blood, but in estate also: and, therefore, as the next of blood is a prochein amy, in respect to the expectancy of descent, (and yet it may be, it shall never descend to him,) so they that have reversions, or remainders expectant, upon estates in tail, life or lives, are prochein amyes, in estate, and are excepted out of this law. With these positions, Fitzherb.N. B., 563. fully agrees. It is, at least, doubtful, whether Lord Coke means to say, that the son and heir may take a conveyance, in consideration of aid and assistance in maintaining the suit; or whether he means only, that the father .is not restrained from making provision for his son and lleir, notwithstanding the pendency of the suit. I understand him to mean the latter. But it is immaterial whether he means the one or the other ; the exception does not extend to such a case as this. If the plaintiff would take the benefit of this exception, in favour of an heir apparent, it' was incumbent on him to show, that his wife was such heir apparent. This does not appear, and is not to be intended. But, again; what puts at rest this pretence is, that the agreement secures nothing to the sister of Teller; it stipulates, that on the recovery of the whole,- or any part of the property, Teller should execute to the plaintiff, his heirs and assigns, conveyances for one fourth part of the property recovered; thus entirely excluding his wife, and putting the property, when conveyed, under his own dominion and control. Indeed, it is impossible for me to consider this transaction between the plaintiff and Teller, in any other light, than a mere colourable pretext, to avoid the effect of the statute.
The defendant is not precluded from making the objection, that the agreement is void. He is chargeable with knowledge of the contents of the agreement; but he is not a party to it, nor a particeps criminis. He took no interest under the agreement, and assumed no responsibility in consequence of it.
It is insisted, that the defendant, having been retained by the plaintiff and Teller, is bound to pay the plaintiff his proportion of the money received. No money was received rader the joint retainer, but it was received under the compromises made by the defendant with the possessors of the land, under authority derived from Teller alone, in virtue of the power he gave to the defendant. It may well be questioned whether the defendant has received any money to which the plaintiff had a legal title, even admitting the agreement to be valid; but it being void, surely the plaintiff has no foundation to stand on. It is a fundamental rule, that all contracts which have for their object any thing repugnant to the general policy of the law, or contrary to the provisions of a statute, are void; for it is a rule as well in law as equity, ex turpi contractu actio non oritur. Thus, in Whitaker v. Cone, (2 Johns. Cases, 58.) notes had been given, as the consideration for the conveyance of Susquehannah lands, under a claim derived from the state of Connecticut, but which lands lay within the state of Pennsylvania ; the sale was held to be illegal, and the consideration void, on the ground, that it was buying and selling a pretended title, and was a species of maintenance. Again; in Belding v. Pitkin, (2 Caines' Rep. 147.) the plaintiff, as the agent of the defendant's testator, had sold lands situated as in the last case, and under the same circumstances, upon an agreement that he should have half the proceeds ; and the defendant's testator had received moneys arising from such sale; it was adjudged, that the contract being illegal, no action was suS" tamable. In Hunt v. Knickerbacker, (5 Johns. Rep. 327.) the defendant had received tickets in a lottery instituted in Connecticut, for the purpose of selling them in this state, in contravention of our statute; it was held, that no action could be sustained for the tickets, or the money received. The late Chief Justice Thompson said, that he believed no case could be found where an action has been sustained, which goes in affirmance of an illegal contract, and where its object is to enforce the performance of an engagement prohibited by law; and that "wherever an action has been sustained against a party, to prevent him from retaining the benefit derived from an unlawful act, the action proceeded in disaffirmance of the contract, and instead of endeavouring to enforce it, presumes it to be void. When it is considered that, in this case, the plaintiff's only title to demand any thing, depends on the validity of the agreement entered into between him and Teller, if that agreement be void, he stands without any pretence of right. I have thought it unnecessary to cite more cases, in support of a doctrine deemed so plain and salutary.
We have no concern with the policy of the statute, to prevent and punish champerty and maintenance. It is enough for us, that the law forbids these offences; and it may well be doubted, whether the cases to which I have referred, allowing a conveyance pending a suit, from a father to his son and heir, is not an extension of Jhe exception beyond its natural bearing and import.To allow the exception to be extended to collaterals, because, possibly, they may inherit the estate; and to permit it, even to be extended to connexions of such collaterals, having no consanguinity or relationship with the party claiming title, would, in my judgment, amount to a virtual repeal of the act. , Mr. Justice Blackstone, (4 Bl. Com. 134, 135.) speaking of maintenance, says, it is an offence against public justice, as it keeps alive strife and contention, and perverts the remedial process of the law into an engine of oppression. Of champertors he says, " these pests of civil society, that are perpetually endeavouring to disturb the repose of their neighbours, and officiously interfering in other men's quarrels, even at the hazard of their own fortunes, were severely ani madverted upon by the common law, and were punished by the forfeiture of a third part of their goods, and perpetual infamy." The motion to set aside the nonsuit, and for a new trial, must be denied.
Platt, J. concurred,
i