Case Name: FRANCIS B. BREWER, Respondent, v. JAMES E. FORD, Appellant
Court: New York Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1891-01
Citations: 66 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 17
Docket Number: 
Parties: FRANCIS B. BREWER, Respondent, v. JAMES E. FORD, Appellant.
Judges: Dwight, P. J., concurred in the result.
Reporter: Supreme Court Reports (Hun)
Volume: 66
Pages: 17–29

Head Matter:
FRANCIS B. BREWER, Respondent, v. JAMES E. FORD, Appellant.
Gontract of sale — provision that it should be conditional and that the title to a certain pa/rt of the property should not pass until paid for, when applied to all the property — election of remedies.
In an action of trover to recover from an assignee for tbe benefit of creditors of a firm, known as Tbe Clark Manufacturing Company, tbe value of certain property wbicb bad come into bis bands, it appeared that one, Brewer, tbe plaintiff in tbe action and Tbe Clark Manufacturing Company had entered into an agreement prior to tbe assignment, by wbicb certain machinery, patterns and merchandise were transferred from the plaintiff to tbe company to be paid for in installments, represented by certain promissory notes of the latter. Tbe agreement provided that “ said machinery shall be tbe property of said Brewer, in care and custody of said Mix Brothers until paid for.”
When this action was begun three of tbe promissory notes, of $1,000 each, remained unpaid, of which only one was due at that time.
It was claimed that the word “machinery” did not include the patterns, which wore valued at $8,400 of the original purchase-price. The contract provided that the plaintiff agreed to sell to the defendant’s assignor “ a certain amount of machinery and all patterns pertaining to lock business; * * * said machinery shall be the property of said Brewer, in care and custody of said Mix Brothers until paid for, * * * and The said Clark Manufacturing Company agree to make the above-described purchase upon the conditions therein set forth and recited.”
Meld, that the obvious intention of the contract was that -the sale should be conditional, and that the tide should be retained by the seller to the whole of the property transferred, and that this would bring the patterns within the scope of the word “machinery,” even though they might not be properly machinery(Corlett, J., dissenting.)
The right of the plaintiff to bring an action for the conversion of the articles sold, and to sue on the notes given on the making of such contract and the question of election of remedies, considered.
Appeal by tbe defendant James E. Ford from a judgment of tbe Supreme Court, entered in tbe office of tbe clerk of tbe county of Erie on tbe 17th day of April, 1890, in favor of tbe plaintiff, and from an order denying tbe defendant’s motion for a new trial, made on the minutes of tbe court and entered in tbe office of tbe clerk of tbe county of Erie on tbe 25th day of February, 1890, after a trial before tbe court and a jury at tbe Erie Circuit, at which a verdict was rendered in favor of the plaintiff for $3,515.
Frank O. Ferguson, for tbe appellant.
William G. Fitch, for tbe respondent.

Opinion:
Macomber, J.:
This action is. trover to recover of tbe defendant, who is tbe assignee for tbe benefit of creditors of a firm known as Tbe Clark Manufacturing Company, tbe value of certain property which came into bis hands as such assignee. The plaintiff and tbe defendant's assignors entered into an agreement January 29, 1880, by which a given quantity of personal property, consisting of machinery, patterns and merchandise, was transferred from tbe former to tbe latter, to be paid for in installments represented in amount by promissory notes ranging in times of payment between April 1, 1881, and April 1, 1889. When this action was begun (April 17,1887) three of such notes of $1,000 each remained unpaid, but only one of them was due at that time. By the terms of the contract between the original parties it was agreed that " said machinery shall be the property of the said Brewer, in care and custody of said Mix Brothers until paid for."
Upon the first trial objection was made by the defendant that no recovery could be had except upon a surrender of such outstanding notes. The justice presiding made a ruling to that effect and .afforded the plaintiff an opportunity to surrender the notes, which was declined by counsel who had the notes in court, and who claimed the right to collect upon the notes any sum over and above the amount of the verdict which the jury might render in this action. A verdict for the defendant was accordingly directed. On appeal to this court the judgment entered thereon and an order denying a motion for a new trial were reversed and a new trial granted. (Brewer v. Ford, 26 N. Y. St. Rep., 888; 7 N. Y. Supp., 244.) The prevailing opinion placed the decision upon the ground that the action might be maintained without tendering the unpaid notes, because, as was there decided, the seller was confined in his remedy neither to a repossession of the property nor to the notes, but could avail him.self of both. The dissenting opinion was, in substance that, by holding on to the commercial paper, the plaintiff assumed an attitude in this forum so inconsistent with the claim made in the complaint that the court could not properly permit him to proceed, for otherwise the rescission of the original contract, which the beginning of this action necessarily made, would not be a real but a sham rescission, and an action might still be maintained upon each of the outstanding notes; and that the active duty rested upon the plaintiff .to restore, before recovering a verdict in this action, the unpaid paper still held by him. But, as stated above, a majority of the court decided otherwise, and held that the plaintiff had his cumulative remedy of recovering the property or its value on the ground that no sale of it had been made, and prosecuting the outstanding notes to judgment, or proving them for payment or dividends .against the defendant as assignee of the estate of The Clark Manufacturing Company, upon the ground that the property had been sold to the defendant's assignors and that a debt existed therefor. The case was treated as though the plaintiff held a chattel mortgage as collateral security for the unpaid purchase-money.
The new trial has been conducted in accordance with the prevailing opinion of this court on the former appeal. The same persistent purpose to affirm and disaffirm the original contract prevails throughout the case. The counsel for the plaintiff, in the course of the trial, said: "Now, if the court please, I have here the three notes in question; I offer to place them in the possession of the court, or with such person or persons as the court may direct for the purpose, and with authority to indorse upon these notes whatever recovery may be obtained in this action; and if the recovery is equal to the amount of the notes, then that the notes may be surrendered to such person or persons as the court may direct; if the recovery is less than the amount of the notes, then the amount of such recovery to be indorsed upon the notes as so much payment."
It was this attitude of counsel which induced the direction of the verdict at the first trial, which decision, on appeal, a minority of the court held to be correct. But the court held otherwise. Except for the authority of that decision, adherence to precedent, as well as legal principle, would, in my judgment, lead to a different result. But that judgment was given in this case on facts in no wise materially different from those now before us. It stands, therefore, res adjudieata. It is binding and conclusive on this and all courts of concurrent power. The present case is identical with the former appeal in the parties, in the cause of action, and in the thing sued for. It was manifestly tried in accordance with the decision of this court previously rendered. We are not, consequently, at liberty to revise the former adjudication, though the present majority of the court are committed against it.
There remain, therefore, to be considered by us only such subsidiary questions, if any, arising on the second trial, as were not in the former case.
It is contended by the appellant that even though there may be a recovery for certain articles, there can be none for the patterns, for the reason, as is stated, that they are not " machinery," and, consequently, the clause of the agreement ^retaining title in the vendor does not apply to them. By the terms of the contract the plaintiff agreed to sell to the defendant's assignors " a certain amount of machinery and all patterns pertaining to lock business. Said machinery shall be the property of said Brewer in care and custody of said Mix Brothers until paid for. And the said Clark Manufacturing Company agree to make the above described purchase upon the conditions therein set forth and recited."
It is now argued that the word " machinery " does not include the patterns which were valued at $3,400 of the original purchase. An attentive perusal, however, of the contract leads quite irresistibly to the conclusion that if the sale was conditioned in any part and the title retained by the seller to any of the property until paid for, such condition and retention of title related to the whole of the property transferred. This obvious intention of the parties would overcome the restricted meaning given by the appellant to the word " machinery," and bring the patterns within its scope even though, except in a metaphorical sense, the patterns may not be machinery. But they clearly are a part of the machinery. The word was here used in its most comprehensive sense, and included all the devices, tools and implements used in the manufacturing business for which they were bought. (Buchanan v. Exchange Fire Ins. Co., 61 N. Y., 33.)
It is also claimed by the appellant that a written certificate, signed by the plaintiff on the 21st day of October, 1887, six months after this action was begun, to the effect that the payments which had been made by the purchasers had been applied, first, on the merchandise ; and, secondly, on the patterns, the surplus to apply on the residue of the indebtedness, shows that the patterns have been paid for, and that, consequently, title to them passed absolutely to The Clark Manufacturing Company. But such certificate, in the absence of some agreement that title to certain classes of the property should become absolute when a given amount of the purchase-money had been paid, which is nowhere shown, is meaningless and has no bearing upon the question.
The case is not materially different from the record of the former appeal. It follows, therefore, in pursuance of such previous decision, that the judgment and order appealed from should be affirmed.
Dwight, P. J., concurred in the result.