Case Name: City of Burlington v. Donald D. Davis
Court: Vermont Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Vermont
Decision Date: 1993-03-26
Citations: 160 Vt. 183
Docket Number: No. 92-190
Parties: City of Burlington v. Donald D. Davis
Judges: Present: Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ., and Peck, J. (Ret.) and Martin, Supr. J., Specially Assigned
Reporter: Vermont Reports
Volume: 160
Pages: 183–187

Head Matter:
City of Burlington v. Donald D. Davis
[624 A.2d 872]
No. 92-190
Present: Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ., and Peck, J. (Ret.) and Martin, Supr. J., Specially Assigned
Opinion Filed March 26, 1993
Lawrence Miller, Sarah M. Powell, and Andrew Morse of Miller & Faignant, P.C., Rutland, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Keith J. Kasper of McNamara, Fitzpatrick, McCormick & Mertz, P.C., Burlington, for Defendant-Appellant.

Opinion:
Morse, J.
Claimant, a former police officer for the City of Burlington, appeals from a superior court ruling that he did not suffer a compensable injury pursuant to Vermont Workers' Compensation Act. The sole issue is whether the court's finding on causation is clearly erroneous. We affirm.
In the early 1980's, claimant suffered several seizures as a manifestation of a brain tumor. One of these seizures occurred on September 19, 1984, after claimant testified at an executive session of the Burlington Police Commission about a series of charges made against him. Thereafter he was unable to continue in his employment. Hearing was held on his claim in 1988, where the Commissioner of Labor and Industry ruled in claimant's favor. In 1989, claimant died as a result of the brain tumor.
The City appealed to the superior court for de novo review. The court, relying on the testimony of claimant's physician, found that claimant suffered no ongoing injury as a result of the 1984 seizure and that claimant "probably would be in a similar condition" even if he had not experienced work-related stress. Claimant's expert testified that the seizures did not affect the underlying brain tumor. According to the court, although "the work-related incident led to a new treatment regime, with higher dosages, in turn barring return to work, this was not caused by the work-related incident. That incident must be characterized as evanescent. It is the brain tumor which required the new dosages, not the particular seizure or any aftereffects of the seizure." Because the court decided the case as the trier of fact, findings shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. V.R.C.P. 52. The court's conclusions, which addressed mixed questions of law and fact, will be upheld if supported by the findings. Cameron v. Double A. Services, Inc., 156 Vt. 577, 581, 595 A.2d 259, 261-62 (1991).
If claimant's condition was aggravated or accelerated by the stressful work situation, he would have been entitled to benefits. Jackson v. True Temper Corp., 151 Vt. 592, 595, 563 A.2d 621, 623 (1989). The proper inquiry is whether "'the disability came upon the claimant earlier than otherwise would have occurred.'" Id. at 596, 563 A.2d at 623 (quoting Gillespie v. Vermont Hosiery & Machinery Co., 109 Vt. 409, 415, 199 A. 564, 566 (1938)).
In Jackson, the jury found causation sufficient where the employee's underlying condition, alcoholism, worsened after the employee was injured by a rip saw at work. Id. at 597, 563 A.2d at 624. Thereafter, he developed seizures as a result of the resurgence of his drinking and was unable to retain his employment.
Here, however, the evidence was that claimant suffered seizures as early as 1980 as a result of a brain tumor, and again suffered a stress-related seizure in 1984, after which he was unable to work. Contrary to Jackson, the fact finder here found no acceleration of a preexisting condition entitling claimant to benefits. His seizure at work did not cause him to have the seizures that followed. The symptoms did not cause more symptoms; the abnormal physical condition caused the symptoms. Contrary to the dissent's view, the only "coincidence" was that the seizure that marked the beginning of the debilitating treatment regime occurred at work instead of somewhere else.
The evidence amply supported the court's view that claimant would have been just as disabled had he not gone to work that day. Claimant's expert testified that it was "a reasonable assumption" that without the stressful situation at work in 1984, claimant would still have had seizures, and that "reasoned judgment" would put claimant "in a similar condition" regardless of whether or not the stressful situation had occurred. Moreover, although stress might hasten the occurrence of seizures, "the progression of the underlying condition" made it reasonable that more seizures would occur. In other words, the incident when the seizure occurred merely "led to," in the sense of "was followed by," the disability. The court made clear that it was the brain tumor that caused the disability, "not the particular seizure or any after-effects of the seizure."
Having found, based on the evidence before it, that the required nexus was lacking, the court concluded that claimant was not entitled to benefits under the Workers' Compensation statute. The dissent's quarrel is that the standard of review does not permit the result it would prefer. The superior court's findings, not being clearly erroneous, must stand regardless of how we might have viewed the evidence. Hurwitz v. Camp Derry, Inc., 134 Vt. 306, 307, 360 A.2d 53, 55 (1976).
Affirmed.