Case Name: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Armande MILHOUSE, aka Sealed Defendant 16, aka Beatlejuice, aka Milly, Defendant-Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2016-07-08
Citations: 655 F. App'x 20
Docket Number: 15-1339-cr
Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Armande MILHOUSE, aka Sealed Defendant 16, aka Beatlejuice, aka Milly, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: PRESENT: José A. Cabranes, Christopher F. Droney, Circuit Judges, Jeffrey Alker Meyer, District Judge.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 655
Pages: 20–23

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Armande MILHOUSE, aka Sealed Defendant 16, aka Beatlejuice, aka Milly, Defendant-Appellant.
15-1339-cr
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
July 8, 2016
For Defendant-Appellant: Armande Milhouse, pro se, Ayer, MA.
For Appellee: Steven D. Clymer, Geoffrey J.L. Brown, Assistant United States Attorneys, for Richard S. Hartunian, United States Attorney for the Northern District of New York, Syracuse, NY.
PRESENT: José A. Cabranes, Christopher F. Droney, Circuit Judges, Jeffrey Alker Meyer, District Judge.
The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the caption as set forth above.
The Honorable Jeffrey Alker Meyer of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, sitting by designation.

Opinion:
SUMMARY ORDER
Defendant-appellant Armande Milhouse ("Milhouse"), proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court's denial of his motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and Amendment 782 to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which lowered the base offense levels applicable to most drug crimes under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.
Section 3582(c)(2) provides that a sentencing court may reduce a defendant's term of imprisonment if his sentence was based on a sentencing range subsequently lowered by the Sentencing Commission. We review de novo a defendant's eligibility for § 3582(c)(2) relief. United States v. Christie, 736 F.3d 191, 195 (2d Cir. 2013).
We agree with the District Court that Milhouse is ineligible for a reduction pursuant to § 3582(c)(2). Milhouse pleaded guilty to violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) and 846 (conspiracy "to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute more than 50 kilograms of marihuana"). The presentence investigation report, which the District Court adopted, stated that Milhouse was a career offender as defined by U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, and that his guideline sentencing range was therefore 188 to 235 months. The District Court chose to impose a "non-guideline sentence" including 82 months' imprisonment.
A district court may not reduce a sentence pursuant to § 3582(c)(2) if "the amendment does not have the effect of lowering the defendant's applicable guideline range because of the operation of another guideline," as is the case here. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 Application Note 1(A); see U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B). Because Milhouse's guideline range was based on his career-offender status, Amendment 782 did not lower his applicable guideline. See, e.g., United States v. Mock, 612 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2010). The District Court thus lacked the authority to reduce Milhouse's sentence.
Milhouse's principal argument on appeal is that, pursuant to Christie, 736 F.3d at 197, vacatur and remand are required because the District Court failed to offer any explanation for its denial of his motion. That argument misunderstands Christie's holding. Under Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 826, 130 S.Ct. 2683, 177 L.Ed.2d 271 (2010), district courts must follow a "two-step inquiry" when deciding motions for a sentence reduction. The court must first determine whether the prisoner is eligible for a reduction. If the prisoner is eligible, the court must then determine, in its discretion, whether a reduction is warranted.
Christie concerned only the second of these steps. We held'that vacatur, and remand are required when "the reasons for the district court's exercise of discretion are not apparent from the record." Christie, 736 F.3d at 196; see also id. at 194 ("We cannot uphold a discretionary decision unless we have confidence that -the district court exercised its discretion and did so on the basis of reasons that survive our limited review." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
This case, in contrast, concerns the first Dillon step, and the record permits us to determine that Milhouse was ineligible for a sentence reduction as a matter of law. Accordingly, while it would have been helpful for the District Court to have provided its reasons when it denied Milhouse's motion, we need not remand. Cf. Christie, 736 F.3d at 196 ("The failure to state reasons will not always require a remand."). Moreover, the District Court eventually explained its reasoning when it .denied reconsideration of its previous decision. See United States v. Nichols, 56 F.3d 403, 411 (2d Cir. 1995) (observing that, although' a notice of appeal generally di vests the district court of jurisdiction, the court can still "act in aid of [the] appeal" by clarifying a previous order (internal quotation marks omitted)).
CONCLUSION
We have reviewed the remaining arguments raised by Milhouse on appeal and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the order of the District Court. Milhouse's request for a stay or an immediate dismissal of this appeal, so that he may file a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in district court, is DENIED as moot.
. As Milhouse points out, the 82-month sentence he actually received was within the range provided by § 2D 1.1. We once held that in such situations a district court has authority to reduce a sentence pursuant to Amendment 782. See United States v. Rivera, 662 F.3d 166, 181 (2d Cir. 2011). Rivera, however, has been abrogated by Amendment 759. See United States v. Steele, 714 F.3d 751, 756 (2d Cir. 2013).