Case Name: Jemima MOBLEY, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. WINTER PARK MEMORIAL HOSPITAL and All Risk Corporation, Appellees/Cross-Appellants
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1985-06-12
Citations: 471 So. 2d 591
Docket Number: No. BA-362
Parties: Jemima MOBLEY, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. WINTER PARK MEMORIAL HOSPITAL and All Risk Corporation, Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
Judges: JOANOS, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 471
Pages: 591–595

Head Matter:
Jemima MOBLEY, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. WINTER PARK MEMORIAL HOSPITAL and All Risk Corporation, Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
No. BA-362.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
June 12, 1985.
Rehearing Denied July 16, 1985.
J. David Parrish, of Hurt & Parrish, and Bill McCabe, of Shepherd, McCabe & Cooley, Orlando, for appellant/cross-appellee.
C. Thomas Ferrara, P.A., Altamonte Springs, for appellees/cross-appellants.

Opinion:
ZEHMER, Judge.
Claimant, Jemima Mobley, appeals from an order of the deputy commissioner determining average weekly wage. She contends it was error to value her terminated group health insurance coverage on the basis of the premium cost to the employer rather than on the basis of the premium cost to claimant when she converted that plan to an individual health plan with the same insurance carrier. We agree and reverse.
Claimant sustained a compensable injury in 1981. Prior to the injury she had worked as a nursing assistant for the employer hospital. She continued working a short time after the injury, but was thereafter paid temporary disability benefits for various periods through January 1984, when her status was changed to permanent total disability and accepted by the employer. During the period of temporary disability she remained in the hospital's employ on medical leave, and the employer continued to pay health insurance premiums on her behalf. The employer's pro rata cost of this premium was approximately $15 per week. In February 1984, after the claimant was accepted as permanently and totally disabled, the hospital terminated her employment, and her eligibility for continuing coverage under the hospital's group insurance plan was likewise terminated. The policy contained a conversion privilege, and claimant converted the coverage to personal insurance with the same carrier at a cost to her of $49 per week.
When claimant's employment was terminated the employer recognized a slight increase in her average weekly wage based on the $15 per week premium cost previously paid by it. Claimant contended the premium should be valued at her cost, not the employer's, and filed the claim which is the subject of this appeal.
The deputy erred in valuing the health insurance premium based on the cost to the employer rather than the cost to claimant on the record made in this case. Wages are defined in section 440.02(12), Florida Statutes (1981):
'Wages' means the money rate at which the service rendered is recompensed under the contract of hiring in force at the time of the injury, including the reasonable value of board, rent, housing, lodging, or similar advantage received from the employer_ In employment in which an employee receives consideration other than cash as a portion of this compensation, the value of such compensation shall be subject to the determination of the deputy commissioner.
The employer does not dispute that the value of group insurance must be included in the amount of wages defined by the statute. Constanzer v. Sta Rite, 432 So.2d 775 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Lavin v. Alton Box Board Co., 431 So.2d 202 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Jess Parrish Memorial Hospital v. Ansell, 390 So.2d 1201 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).
The cited statute places responsibility squarely on the deputy commissioner to determine the value of noncash consideration paid the employee. When the evidence establishes that the cost of such consideration to the employer is equivalent to the fair market value of the benefit to the employee, then obviously that cost is a competent measure of the consideration that must be included in computing average weekly wage by the deputy commissioner. It is also well established, however, that where the cost of the benefit to the employer is substantially less than the fair market value to the employee, as evidenced by the cost that the employee has to pay to obtain the same or a similar benefit no longer being furnished by the employer, the employer's cost is a legally insufficient measure of the amount to be included in the wage determination. See, e.g., Fair-Way Restaurant v. Fair, 425 So.2d 115 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Rhaney v. Dobbs House, Inc., 415 So.2d 1277 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Spencer v. Chai Convalescent Home, Inc., IRC Order 2-2768 (1975). The cited decisions involve disputes over the value of meals provided by the employer, but the legal principle involved is applicable to the determination of any noncash consideration falling within the statutory definition of wages.
Any benefit which helps an employee meet his personal expenses should be included in the calculation of average weekly wage. Layne Atlantic Co. v. Scott, 415 So.2d 837 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). The ultimate test for determining whether a fringe benefit, such as meals, must be included is whether the employee receives a tangible benefit of a real, present-day value. State of Florida, Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Ryan, 381 So.2d 269 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). This court has held that the value of included meals must be based on their fair market value, determined in accordance with Internal Revenue Service regulations. Rhaney v. Dobbs House, Inc., 415 So.2d 1277 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
Fair-Way Restaurant v. Fair, 425 So.2d at 116.
In the instant case the evidence is undisputed that claimant exercised her privilege to convert the group health insurance plan and continued the same coverage with the same carrier at a cost to her of $49 per week. This constitutes a prima facie showing of the fair market value of that benefit to her. The employer did not present any evidence that comparable health insurance coverage could have been obtained by claimant at any lesser amount. Indeed, the carrier having accepted claimant as permanently and totally disabled, it is highly unlikely that claimant could have obtained any other health insurance coverage (for medical expenses unrelated to her compensable injury) absent her right to convert under the employer's group plan. The deputy applied the wrong rule of law in deciding this issue, and should have determined the fair market value of the benefit to claimant.
The employer has also cross-appealed, contending the deputy erred in determining claimant's average weekly wage based upon the wages of a similar employee. The record fully supports the deputy's determination of this issue. The carrier's argument on this point is completely without merit, and the order is affirmed on this issue.
We reverse and remand for recalculation of average weekly wage in accordance with this opinion.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.
JOANOS, J., concurs.
THOMPSON, J., dissents with written opinion.
. The average weekly wage determined in the appealed order is $178.78, resulting in a compensation rate of $119.19 per week. If claimant is to be permitted to maintain her medical insurance coverage, she will have only $70.19 per week to meet her other living expenses.
. We need not be concerned in this case with whether the fair market value of this benefit should be determined in accordance with Internal Revenue Service regulations. See Rhaney v. Dobbs House, Inc., 415 So.2d 1279. Medical insurance premiums are generally tax-exempt income and are not ordinarily imputed to the employee under the Internal Revenue Code and Regulations. Certainly this record contains no evidence to this effect. Whether the value of benefits imputed as income to an employee under the Internal Revenue Code and Regulations might be decisive of value in the face of uncon-tradicted evidence that the employee's fair and reasonable cost of the benefit exceeds such imputed amount is a question we need not reach in this case.