Case Name: William G. BARR, Appellant, v. Linda A. MATTEO, Appellee; William G. BARR, Appellant, v. John J. MADIGAN, Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1957-05-02
Citations: 244 F.2d 767
Docket Number: Nos. 13217, 13218
Parties: William G. BARR, Appellant, v. Linda A. MATTEO, Appellee. William G. BARR, Appellant, v. John J. MADIGAN, Appellee.
Judges: 
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 244
Pages: 767–771

Head Matter:
William G. BARR, Appellant, v. Linda A. MATTEO, Appellee. William G. BARR, Appellant, v. John J. MADIGAN, Appellee.
Nos. 13217, 13218.
United States Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued Oct. 12, 1956.
Decided May 2, 1957.
Danaher, Circuit Judge, dissented.
Mr. Paul A. Sweeney, Atty., Dept, of Justice, with whom Asst. Atty. Gen. George C. Doub and Messrs. Oliver Gasch, U. S. Atty., and Joseph Langbart, Atty., Dept, of Justice, were on the brief, for appellant.
Mr. Byron N. Scott, Washington, D. C., with whom Mr. Richard A. Mehler, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellees.
Before EDGERTON, Chief Judge, and FAHY and DANAHER, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
EDGERTON, Chief Judge.
In 1953 the defendant Barr was Acting Director of the Office of Rent Stabilization, a branch of the Economic Stabilization Agency. The head of the Agency was the Director of Economic Stabilization. The plaintiffs Madigan and Matteo were employees in the Office of which the defendant was Acting Director. A terminal-leave plan which the plaintiffs had sponsored in 1950 was under criticism in Congress in 1953. The defendant had disapproved of the plan. Without his knowledge, his secretary signed the defendant's name to a letter to a Senator defending the plan. The plaintiff Madigan had drafted the letter. When the defendant learned that the letter had gone out over his signature, he issued a press release in which he said his first act of duty would be to suspend the plaintiffs, the officials responsible for the terminal-leave plan, and that although he "was advised" the plan was legal, he thought it "violated the spirit of the Thomas Amendment [64 Stat. 768]" and he "violently opposed it".
The plaintiffs sued the defendant for libel. The verdict and judgment were for the plaintiffs. The defendant appeals on the ground that he had an "absolute immunity or privilege" in publishing the press release.
We agree with the District Court in overruling that contention. The defendant's decision to suspend the plaintiffs for what he thought, mistakenly or not, Was sufficient cause, and his execution of any documents appropriate to that end, were probably within his general line of duty. If so, a letter to his official superiors explaining his decision would also have been within his general line of duty. Cf. Farr v. Valentine, 38 App.D.C. 413. So would an explanation addressed to the plaintiffs or to their representative. Newbury v. Love, 1957, 100 U.S.App.D.C. -, 242 F.2d 372. But in explaining his decision to the general public, the defendant went entirely outside his line of duty. If such an officer were to do such a thing in bad faith or with a bad motive, no sufficient public interest would require that he be protected. If the defendant had been a Cabinet officer, his public explanation might have been absolutely privileged. "It has been held that a Cabinet officer is absolutely privileged to publish defamation, not only in doing his duty but also in discussing it; his defamation, to be protected, need only have 'more or less connection with the general matters committed by law to his control or supervision'." But this is because "Cabinet officers have political functions, and public interest is thought to require that they be not restrained by fear of libel suits from publicly explaining their acts and policies." Colpoys v. Gates, 73 App.D.C. 193, 194, 118 F.2d 16, 17. We do not suggest that this principle is limited to Cabinet officers. We have no present occasion to consider whether it would apply, e. g., to the Director of Economic Stabilization, who was appellant's official superior, or to the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, or to other officers whose positions are comparable to those of Cabinet officers. Appellant's position was not of that sort. We held in Colpoys that a United States Marshal was not absolutely privileged to defame his subordinates in publicly explaining his reasons for dismissing them. Neither, we think, was an Acting Director of the Office of Rent Stabilization.
In general, "When the author of a libel writes under the compulsion of a legal or moral duty, or for the protection of his own rights or interests, that which he writes is a privileged communication unless the writer be actuated by malice." Dickins v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers, 84 U.S.App.D.C. 51, 54, 171 F.2d 21, 24. In the District Court the defendant Barr claimed that if his press release was not absolutely privileged, it was qualifiedly privileged by reason of this principle. However, on this appeal he has waived this claim. His brief states the "Question Presented" as follows: "Whether the Acting Director of the Office of Rent Stabilization should be accorded absolute immunity in a suit for libel for allegedly defamatory statements made by him in a press release, issued on Thursday, February 5, 1953, announcing his intention to suspend two named employees of the agency on Monday, February 9, 1953, and setting forth his reasons for taking that action." The entire "Statement of Points" in his brief is as follows: "The District Court erred in denying the defendant's respective motions to dismiss and for a directed verdict which were based on the defense of absolute immunity or privilege."
The waiver of the claim of qualified privilege was informed and deliberate. The appellant was represented by eminent counsel. An Assistant Attorney General of the United States, the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia, and two attorneys of the Department of Justice, all signed appellant's brief. All have now filed a memorandum which contains this summary of the matter: "Appellant's brief, in conformity with Rule 17(c) (7), set forth in the Statement of Points only the contention that the District Court erred in denying appellant's respective motions based on the defense of absolute immunity or privilege. Similarly, the Question Presented posed only this question, and the brief discusses this case only in terms of the applicability of absolute immunity as a defense. Finally, counsel for appellant, on October 12, 1956, disclaimed in open court any intent to urge any error on the part of the District Court other than its failure to accord to appellant the defense of absolute immunity or privilege."
This court's Rule 17(c) (7), [28 U.S.C.A.] requires that appellant's brief state "the points on which appellant intends to rely". Rule 17(i) provides that "Points not presented according to the rules of the coui't, will be disregarded, though the court, at its option, may notice and pass upon a plain error not pointed out or relied upon." This exception for "plain error" protects our authority to deal, in the interest of justice, with a point counsel have overlooked. In the absence of extraordinary circumstances the exception should not be applied, in a civil case, to a point that eminent counsel, for strategic or other reasons, have deliberately chosen to waive. Accordingly we do not consider whether there was plain error in the District Court's rejection of the claim of qualified privilege.
Affirmed.