Case Name: Melvee TUCKER, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1982-06-22
Citations: 417 So. 2d 1006
Docket Number: No. 78-2075
Parties: Melvee TUCKER, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: Before DANIEL S. PEARSON, FERGUSON and JORGENSON, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 417
Pages: 1006–1020

Head Matter:
Melvee TUCKER, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 78-2075.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
June 22, 1982.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 25, 1982.
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Michael Zelman, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen. and Steven R. Jacob, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Before DANIEL S. PEARSON, FERGUSON and JORGENSON, JJ.

Opinion:
FERGUSON, Judge.
On December 14, 1977, appellant Melvee Tucker was indicted by grand jury for the first-degree murder of a convenience store employee killed more than three years earlier on June 11, 1974 during a robbery attempt. After a jury trial, Tucker was adjudicated guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. He appeals, raising six points as error: (1) failure to dismiss the indictment because it contained no allegation of venue, (2) failure to dismiss the indictment because delay in prosecution violated appellant's rights to due process, (3) failure to dismiss the indictment because of underrepresentation on the grand jury of Blacks, Latins, and females, (4) failure to suppress his confession as the product of an illegal arrest or as not voluntarily given, (5) failure to grant a mistrial for prejudicial presecutorial comment, and (6) refusal to instruct on a lesser-included offense to which the statute of limitations had run. We affirm.
I
As to the first point on appeal we hold that Tucker may not now challenge his conviction and sentence on the grounds that indictment fails to allege venue because he failed to raise the issue by pre-trial motion. See, e.g., Fuller v. State, 159 Fla. 200, 31 So.2d 259 (Fla.1947); Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.190(c). The defect of failure to allege venue is one of substance rendering the indictment fundamentally defective, State v. Black, 385 So.2d 1372 (Fla.1980), however, a substantive defect in an indictment or information may be waived unless challenged timely by motion to dismiss. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.190(b) and (c). In State v. Black, supra, and Rimes v. State, 101 Fla. 1322, 133 So. 550 (1931), upon which Black relies, the defective indictment was attacked by pretrial motion. We interpret the statement of the supreme court that "Allegations as to the place of the alleged offense also fixes the jurisdiction of the grand jury and court," State v. Black, supra, at 1375, as referring to "venue," consistent with Rimes v. State, supra. See also Annot. 59 A.L.R.2d 906, § 4 (1956) cited by the court in State v. Black, supra, (requirement for statement of place where offense committed is to establish venue and avoid prejudice to defendant in preparation of case). Venue is not the same as jurisdiction though the terms are sometimes used interchangeably. Jurisdiction means the inherent power to decide a case. Venue designates the geographical subdivision in which a court of competent jurisdiction may determine the case. 15 Fla.Jur.2d, Criminal Law § 566. Venue, unlike subject matter jurisdiction, may be waived.
The court in State v. Black, supra, also stated, at p. 1375, "Venue is an essential element in any criminal charge," citing Art. I, § 16, Fla.Const. Florida law is clear that in cases involving informations, failure to allege an essential element of an offense does not alone render the charge void as wholly failing to state a crime, the exception under Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4) does not apply, and failure to timely object to this defect, constitutes waiver, Tracey v. State, 130 So.2d 605 (Fla.1961); Sinclair v. State, 46 So.2d 453 (Fla.1950); Kane v. State, 392 So.2d 1012, (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Selley v. State, 403 So.2d 427 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); Hasel-den v. State, 386 So.2d 624 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). See also Ray v. State, 403 So.2d 956, 961, n.8 (Fla.1981). On the question of waiver of defect in the charging document we see no rational basis for distinguishing between an information and an indictment. But see Murphy v. State, 407 So.2d 296 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). The indictment otherwise states a crime against Tucker, evidence of venue was produced at trial, and Tucker was not prejudiced in preparation or presentation of his defense, therefore he waived any objection to defect in the indictment by failing to file a pre-trial motion to dismiss.
We briefly dispose of the next four points on appeal, finding them to be without merit. Tucker has also failed to demonstrate that delay in indictment either prejudiced his defense or that the state delayed for the purpose of prejudicing or harassing the defendant. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977); United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971). We find no error on due process or equal protection grounds in denying Tucker's motion to dismiss the indictment because of underrepresentation of Blacks, Latins, and women on the grand jury or among presiding forepersons of grand juries. Bryant v. State, 386 So.2d 237 (Fla.1980). The issue of whether Tucker's confessions should have been suppressed as fruit of an illegal arrest involves a fundamental right under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, see Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979), which may be raised for the first time on appeal. Here, the issue was also raised and considered in the pre-trial motion to suppress. We find no error in denying the motion to suppress the confession either on the grounds that the arrest warrant was valid and the confession was not the fruit of an illegal arrest or on the grounds that the confession was given knowingly and voluntarily. See, e.g., Ponder v. State, 323 So.2d 296 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975). We have reviewed the entire record and find the evidence against Tucker overwhelming. It is impossible to differ with the trial court's implicit determination that either Tucker was not prejudiced by the prosecutor's argument appealing to sympathy for the victim, see, e.g., Menendez v. State, 368 So.2d 1278 (Fla.1979), or that the argument was a permissible response to arguments of defense counsel, Francis v. State, 343 So.2d 932, 933 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
II
As to Tucker's remaining point on appeal that the trial court erred in refusing his request for a jury instruction on the lesser-included offenses of first-degree murder because the statute of limitations had run as to those lesser-included offenses, we find no reversible error. In Holloway v. State, 362 So.2d 333 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), cert. denied, 379 So.2d 953 (Fla.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 905, 101 S.Ct. 281, 66 L.Ed.2d 137 (1980), this court held that it was not error to refuse to charge lesser degrees of homicide when such offenses were barred by the statute of limitations. Tucker acknowledges this holding, but suggests the following three reasons why Holloway, supra, should not be determinative of this case: (a) subsequent authority of the Supreme Court of the United States in Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980) makes it appropriate to reexamine the rule in Holloway, supra, on due process considerations, (b) the equal protection clause requires instructions on lesser degrees be given to all defendants charged with first-degree murder, and (c) the court in Holloway, supra, did not resolve the question of whether an accused can waive the benefit of the statute of limitations.
In Beck v. Alabama, supra, the United States Supreme Court held that the death penalty may not be imposed if the jury is not permitted to consider a verdict of guilt of a lesser-included non-capital offense when the evidence would have supported such a verdict. The Court's rationale is based on the belief that due process requires an opportunity for a jury pardon in death cases. Nothing in this due-process jury-pardon rationale commands a reexamination of our holding in Holloway v. State, supra. The Court's holding in Beck v. Alabama is specifically limited to death cases. The Court reasoned that because there is a significant constitutional difference between the death penalty and lesser punishments, the constitutional guarantee of due process requires special safeguards in capital cases. The court expressly declined to decide whether the due process clause would require the giving of such an instruction in a non-capital case. Id 447 U.S. 638, n. 14, 100 S.Ct. 2390, n. 14, 65 L.Ed.2d 403, n. 14. Not only did the United States Supreme Court limit its holding to death cases in Beck v. Alabama, supra, it was not concerned with and did not address the separate issue of whether the instruction on a lesser-included offense is still required when the statute of limitations has run as to the lesser-included offense.
Florida courts have addressed both issues. Florida law requires that an instruction be given on the lesser-included offense in a murder case even in non-capital cases. Brown v. State, 206 So.2d 377 (Fla.1968); Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.510. This instruction is not required, however, when the statute of limitations has run on the lesser-included offense. Keenan v. State, 379 So.2d 147 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); Holloway v. State, supra. By dismissing the petition for conflict certiorari, Holloway v. State, 379 So.2d 953 (Fla.1980), the Florida Supreme Court implicitly rejected the argument that the Brown requirement for an instruction on lesser-included offenses in murder cases should apply where the statute of limitations has run on the lesser-included offenses. The dismissal of the petition for conflict certiorari was also clearly a rejection of the equal protection argument. See id., Justice Boyd, dissenting.
While we have never held that a defendant is entitled to a lesser included offense instruction as a matter of due process, the nearly universal acceptance of the rule in state and federal courts establishes the value to the defendant of this procedural safeguard.
Tucker makes a good argument that a defendant should be permitted to waive the statute of limitations for purposes of an instruction on a lesser-included offense. We agree that this issue was not fully resolved by the court in Holloway v. State, supra, which merely considered the question of whether the trial court is required to instruct the jury on a lesser-included offense for which the statute of limitations has run. The court did not consider whether by requesting an instruction on the lesser-included offenses, a defendant could waive the statute of limitations thereby causing the lesser-included offense to become a viable charge permitting conviction and sentencing and entitling the defendant to an instruction in that offense. See, e.g., Holloway v. Florida, 449 U.S. 905, 101 S.Ct. 281, 66 L.Ed.2d 137 (1980), Justice Black-mun dissenting to denial of petition for writ of certiorari.
Though the issue of whether a defendant may waive the statute of limitations for purposes of conviction appears never to have been directly addressed in Florida, we find compelling the logic of those jurisdictions which have permitted such waiver. In People v. Lohnes, 76 Misc.2d 507, 351 N.Y. S.2d 279 (S.Ct.1973), the court noting that the right of a defendant to waive his statute of limitations defense to a charge of a lesser-included offense was established in 1902 in New York in People v. Austin, 63 App.Div. 382, 71 N.Y.S. 601, affirmed, 170 N.Y. 585, 63 N.E. 1120 (N.Y.1902), reasoned:
Criminal defendants in general . . would suffer marked injustice from being denied this option. It would have the practical effect, in case after case, of forcing convictions in a higher degree where guilt is plain, but where, if given the choice . a jury might convict for the lesser-included degree of a given crime. The right and option must be preserved to all defendants to waive the statute of limitations so as to avail themselves of the protection of this statute.
In United States v. Wild, 551 F.2d 418, 424 (D.C.Cir.1977), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 916, 97 S.Ct. 2178, 53 L.Ed.2d 226 (1977), the court determined that the statute of limitations did not constitute a jurisdictional bar to waiver and reasoned that "if a defendant may waive certain constitutional rights, he should certainly be capable . of waiving a statutory right such as the statute of limitations." Accord United States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715, 719, n.3 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied 382 U.S. 843, 86 S.Ct. 89, 15 L.Ed.2d 84 (1965) (waiver of guilty plea); United States v. Parrino, 212 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 840, 75 S.Ct. 46, 99 L.Ed. 663 (1954); People v. Williams, 79 Ill.App.3d 806, 35 Ill.Dec. 63, 398 N.E.2d 1013 (Ill.App.1979) (waiver by failure to raise defense prior to trial); Padie v. State, 594 P.2d 50 (Alaska 1979) (waiver for plea of nolo contendere).
Generally courts which have found the statute a "jurisdictional" bar to waiver have done so in terms of waiver by the state, not the defendant, and have done so only in the sense that a criminal statute of limitations goes not to the remedy of an action but creates a substantive right which prevents prosecution and conviction of an individual after the statute has run. In this sense "jurisdictional" refers to the legality of the actions of the state in prosecuting an individual for an offense determined legislatively to be stale. A court may not convict a defendant of a crime for which the state has no statutory right to prosecute. Because a prosecutor may not avoid the statute of limitations by charging a higher offense in the expectation of conviction on a lesser-included offense and thereby deprive a defendant of a substantive right, the courts have permitted a defendant who has failed to raise the defense of the statute of limitations by pre-trial motion to raise it at trial, by post-trial motion, or for the first time on appeal. See Lane v. State, 337 So.2d 976 (Fla.1976) (statute of limitations substantive right); State ex rel. Manucy v. Wadsworth, 293 So.2d 345 (Fla.1974) (protection from prosecution under statute of limitations is a substantive right); State v. King, 282 So.2d 162 (Fla.1973) (time within which offense is committed is jurisdictional fact controlling ability of state to prosecute particular defendant); Mead v. State, 101 So.2d 373 (Fla.1958) (appellant not required to raise question of statute of limitations which must be construed liberally in favor of defendants; burden on the state to prove appellant perpetrated crime within two years of filing of information); Mitchell v. State, 157 Fla. 121, 25 So.2d 73 (1946) (time within which offense was committed is jurisdictional fact which must be proved by state; state may not deprive defendant of benefit of statute of limitations); Nelson v. State, 17 Fla. 195 (1879) (conviction for murder in third degree cannot stand when not prosecuted within period fixed by statute). For cases in other jurisdictions see Chaifetz v. United States, 109 U.S.App.D.C. 349, 288 F.2d 133 (1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 209, 81 S.Ct. 1051, 6 L.Ed.2d 233 (1961) (rule adopted as response to efforts of zealous prosecutors to avoid statute of limitations against lesser offenses); State v. Fogel, 16 Ariz.App. 246, 492 P.2d 742 (Ariz.App.1972) (statute of limitations limits state's power to act against accused); People v. Zamora, 18 Cal.3d 538, 134 Cal.Rptr. 784, 557 P.2d 75 (1976) (substantive right not waived by failure to assert at pleading stage; government cannot overcome bar of statute of limitations by demonstrating lack of prejudice to defendant); Duncan v. State, 282 Md. 385, 384 A.2d 456 (App.1978) (statute forbids commencement of prosecution for crime not within statutory period); State v. Civella, 364 S.W.2d 624 (Mo.App. 1963) (statute of limitations may be raised for first time on appeal because goes to legality of prosecution); State v. Stillwell, 175 N.J.Super. 244, 418 A.2d 267 (N.J.App. 1980) (statute of limitations absolute bar; creates substantive right not waived by failure to raise at pleadings); City of Cleveland v. Hirsch, 26 Ohio.App.2d 6, 268 N.E.2d 600 (Ohio.App.1971) (same); Washington v. Glover, 25 Wash.App. 58, 604 P.2d 1015 (Ct.App.1979) (indictment based on offense barred by statute of limitations must be dismissed); John v. State, 89 Wis.2d 214, 278 N.W.2d 235 (Wis.App.1979) (Wisconsin courts lack personal jurisdiction to try defendant subsequent to running of statute of limitation).
Whether a defendant may waive the statute of limitations for purposes of jury instruction and possible conviction of a lesser-included offense is an issue separate from that of the legality of prosecution of an offense barred by the statute. See, e.g., Holloway v. Florida, 449 U.S. 905, 101 S.Ct. 281, 66 L.Ed.2d 137, supra. A defendant who believes that a criminal statute of limitations no longer works to his advantage, should be permitted to waive that statute either before trial or before the jury retires. See, e.g., Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.190(b) and (c).
The right not to be eonvicted of an offense for which prosecution is barred by limiting statute is substantive and fundamental. Waiver of that right must meet the same strict standards which courts have applied in determining whether there has been an effective waiver as to other fundamental rights. Waiver of any fundamental right must be express and certain, not implied or equivocal. With respect to waiver of the statute of limitations there should be a waiver in writing made part of the record or at least an express oral waiver of the statute preventing prosecution and conviction made in open court on the record by the defendant personally or by his counsel in his presence. See, e.g., United States v. Wild, supra, (written waiver after full consultation with attorney effective); United States v. Sindona, 473 F.Supp. 764 (S.D.N. Y.1979) (same).
We believe that a mere request for an instruction on the lesser-included offense is not an express waiver of the right not to be prosecuted and convicted for an offense for which the statute of limitations has run. Absent an effective waiver, this case comes on for review in the same posture as the case of Holloway, supra, and we are bound by its rule. We find no error in refusing to instruct on the lesser-included offenses of first-degree murder.
Affirmed.
We certify to the Supreme Court of Florida as of great public interest the question set out in footnote 16 to Judge Jorgenson's dissenting opinion.
. A "jury-pardon" permits a jury to convict a defendant of a lesser offense than the offense charged if there is sufficient evidence either as to the higher offense or the lesser offense. See Beck v. Alabama, supra, 447 U.S. 636 n. 12,100 S.Ct. 2388, n. 12, 65 L.Ed.2d 402, n. 12. In revising the Florida Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, October 1, 1981, the Florida Supreme Court has limited use of the "jury pardon" concept in Florida by requiring an instruction on a lesser-included offense only where the proof of the lesser-included offense inheres in the higher offense as is the case in a necessarily-included offense, or where the lesser offense is not necessarily-included in the greater but is covered by the charging document and proof. The Court has also removed second-degree murder as a necessarily-included offense of a first-degree felony-murder and third-degree felony-murder as a necessarily-included offense of first or second-degree murder.
.See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 652 F.2d 760 (8th Cir. 1981) (cites Beck v. Alabama for rule that "a lesser-included offense instruction is not required unless the evidence warrants it."); United States ex rel. Brodie v. Hilton, 496 F.Supp. 619 (D.N.J.1980) (Beck v. Alabama turned on existence of evidence that could have supported a verdict of guilt or the lesser-included non-capital offense); State v. Vickers, 129 Ariz. 506, 633 P.2d 315 (1981) (Beck v. Alabama, supra, does not require instruction on lesser-included offenses in death cases when there is no evidence to support conviction). The Supreme Court stated in Beck v. Alabama, supra, at 447 U.S. 637, 100 S.Ct. 2389, 65 L.Ed.2d 402, that:
. But see note 1, supra, for limitations after October 1, 1981.
. See, e.g., Oliver v. State, 379 So.2d 143 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) where a defendant charged with first-degree murder was convicted of second-degree murder based on a plea of nolo conten-dere even though the statute of limitations had run as to that offense. On appeal, this court applied theories of estoppel and initiated error in holding that Oliver could not, for the first time on appeal, raise the statute of limitations . as a bar to conviction. The issue of waiver was not addressed.
. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (waiver of fundamental right must be knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made); Groomes v. State, 401 So.2d 1139 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (stipulation in writing that state would not seek death penalty if defendant agreed to be tried by six jurors waiving right to trial by twelve jurors, effective where stipulation executed by defendant, his mother, defense counsel, state attorney and approved by the court); Sessums v. State, 404 So.2d 1074 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) (waiver of jury trial effective where written waiver signed by defendant, and his counsel in open court in defendant's presence again announces waiver).