Case Name: Pauline BROGAN, Personal Representative of the Estate of Jimmy Kenneth Rainey, Deceased, Petitioner, v. Terri Joyce Rainey MULLINS, Jimmy Kenneth Rainey, Jr., and Margaret Dell Rainey-Moore, Respondents
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1984-05-24
Citations: 452 So. 2d 940
Docket Number: No. 84-243
Parties: Pauline BROGAN, Personal Representative of the Estate of Jimmy Kenneth Rainey, Deceased, Petitioner, v. Terri Joyce Rainey MULLINS, Jimmy Kenneth Rainey, Jr., and Margaret Dell Rainey-Moore, Respondents.
Judges: DAUKSCH, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 452
Pages: 940–945

Head Matter:
Pauline BROGAN, Personal Representative of the Estate of Jimmy Kenneth Rainey, Deceased, Petitioner, v. Terri Joyce Rainey MULLINS, Jimmy Kenneth Rainey, Jr., and Margaret Dell Rainey-Moore, Respondents.
No. 84-243.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
May 24, 1984.
As Modified on Motion for Clarification July 12, 1984.
Rehearing Denied July 12, 1984.
Edwin D. Davis, II, South Daytona, for petitioner.
William N. Gambert, Daytona Beach, for respondents.

Opinion:
COBB, Judge.
The petitioner, Pauline Brogan, as personal representative of the Estate of Jimmy Kenneth Rainey, deceased, seeks a writ of certiorari (alternatively, a writ of prohibition) to review an order of the trial court rendered on January 18, 1984. The record before us shows that the respondents, children of the decedent by a prior marriage, filed separate statements of claim against his estate on November 1, 1982. They failed to file an action on these claims against the estate until December 5, 1983, thereby running afoul of the applicable statute of limitations, section 733.709, Florida Statutes (1981).
The estate raised the issue of the statute of limitations and the trial court conducted a hearing thereon on January 10, 1984. At that hearing the attorney for the claimants, respondents herein, contended that there had been continuing negotiations with counsel for the estate but not fraudulent misrepresentations. The evidence was un-controverted that the personal representative did not authorize or negotiate a settlement at any time. Counsel for the claimants merely asserted that, in good faith, he expected the claims to be settled and that was why no court action had been filed within the limitation of one year. At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss and set the case for trial on the merits of the claims.
The respondents relied primarily on three cases in their argument to the trial court relating to the statute of limitations: State ex rel. Watson v. Gray, 48 So.2d 84 (Fla.1950); Capital Bank v. Schuler, 421 So.2d 633 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); and Fletcher v. Dozier, 314 So.2d 241 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975). These cases clearly do not support the respondents' position that mere negotiations, absent fraud or misrepresentation inducing reliance, toll the running of a statute of limitations. More to the point is Kelley v. School Board of Seminole County, 435 So.2d 804 (Fla.1983), which rejected the continuing treatment doctrine (analogous to continuing negotiations).
This petitioner, understandably uncertain of his procedural remedy for review, has sought alternative relief via cer-tiorari or prohibition. Since the former is discretionary, we first consider the latter. The petitioner cites to no authority in civil case law to support invocation of the remedy of prohibition where the trial court erroneously rejects an affirmative defense based on an applicable statute of limitations. Previously, we have held that prohibition is a proper appellate remedy when the state seeks to prosecute a criminal case after the statute of limitations has expired. Carcaise v. Durden, 382 So.2d 1236 (Fla. 5th DCA), review denied, 389 So.2d 1108 (Fla.1980). Prior Florida Supreme Court cases support that conclusion. See Reino v. State, 352 So.2d 853 (Fla.1977) and State ex rel. Manucy v. Wadsworth, 293 So.2d 345 (Fla.1974).
Justice Alderman, in his special concurrence in Sherrod v. Franza, 427 So.2d 161 (Fla.1983), persuasively sets forth the rationale for rejecting prohibition as an available remedy in cases wherein the trial judge rules on a factual issue; in that case, whether or not the speedy trial rule entitled the defendant to discharge. Nevertheless, the majority held otherwise. There is no logical distinction in regard to jurisdiction (hence, prohibition) between a civil court and a criminal court after expiration of an applicable statute of limitations. If prohibition lies in one case, it must lie in the other.
We therefore issue the writ of prohibition and direct the dismissal of the Respondents' various petitions for payment of claim.
WRIT GRANTED.
DAUKSCH, J., concurs.
COWART, J., dissents with opinion.
. Section 733.709, Florida Statutes (1983), states:
Claims undisposed of after 1 year. — When a person has filed a claim against an estate and the claim has not been paid, settled, or otherwise disposed of and no proceeding is pending for the enforcement or compulsory payment of it at the expiration of 1 year from the date the claim was filed, the claim shall be forever barred. No action shall thereafter be brought to enforce it. This section shall not affect the lien of any duly recorded mortgage or security interest or the lien of any person in possession of personal property or the right to foreclose and enforce the mortgage or lien.
. Technically, as the dissent notes, this cause should show the respondent circuit judge as a respondent in the style for purposes of prohibition. We do not choose to pick this nit as a basis to deny relief, nor do the appellate rules so contemplate. See Fla.R.App.P. 9.040(c).
. Combs v. State, 436 So.2d 93 (Fla. 1983).
. Even if we were to determine that prohibition is an improper procedural remedy herein, we would exercise our discretionary review power and grant certiorari. See Combs.