Case Name: PEOPLE v. COATES
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1971-03-29
Citations: 32 Mich. App. 52
Docket Number: Docket No. 6160
Parties: PEOPLE v. COATES
Judges: Before: Levin, P. J., and T. M. Burns and Danhof, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 32
Pages: 52–72

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v. COATES
Opinion op the Court
1. Criminal Law — Plea op Guilty — Dependant’s Participation— Dependant’s Eecital.
A guilty plea is not always improperly accepted even though there is an absence in the record of a recital by the defendant of the events of the charged offense and his participation in them.
2. Criminal Law — Plea op Guilty — Factual Basis — Preliminary Examination — Appeal and Error.
Preliminary examination testimony may be properly reviewed in considering a claim that no factual basis existed justifying the acceptance of a defendant’s plea of guilty.
3. Criminal Law — Plea op Guilty — Factual Basis.
Even though he was not directly questioned about the events of the crime and the defendant’s participation in them, where there was eyewitness testimony at the preliminary examination, the information which was read to defendant at his arraignment was specifically worded, the elements of the crime of armed robbery, the crime charged, are uncomplicated, and the court questioned the defendant about his guilt, a substantial factual basis for the acceptance of the defendant’s guilty plea existed.
4. Criminal Law — Sentencing—Eight to Counsel — Effect.
The denial of the right to counsel at the time of sentencing is a ground only for remanding for resentencing with counsel present.
Dissent by Levin, J.
5. Criminal Law — Plea of Guilty — Factual Basis — Direct Questioning.
Failure of trial judge to question a guilty-pleading defendant' directly regarding the crime charged and the defendant’s participation in the crime requires reversal of the defendant’s conviction and remandment for trial.
Eeferences for Points in Headnotes
[1-3,5-12] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§484, 485, 492.
[4] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 529.
6. Criminal Law — Plea op Guilty — Factual Basis — Direct Questioning — Preliminary Examination.
A trial judge must directly question a guilty-pleading defendant regarding the crime and the defendant’s participation in its commission and ascertain the truth of the guilty plea, the fact that a preliminary examination was held or that a preliminary examination transcript exists does not adequately substitute for direct questioning of a guilty-pleading defendant by the trial court.
7. Criminal Law — Plea op Guilty — Factual Basis — Preliminary Examination Transcript — Limited Use.
The preliminary examination transcript and other information not a part of the plea-talcing proceeding may be used to establish the necessary factual basis for the acceptance of a guilty plea only in cases of long-delayed appeals or in cases where the trial judge made a conscientious effort to comply with the rule requiring direct questioning of a defendant to establish the crime and the defendant’s participation in it, but has overloolced establishing a necessary element of the crime.
8. Criminal Law — Plea op Guilty — Factual Basis — Direct Questioning — Preliminary Examination Transcript.
A preliminary examination transcript is not an adequate substitute for the direct questioning of a defendant to establish the truthfulness of the plea, because in many cases the transcript will not be typed before the guilty plea is talcen and, even if it is, it is most unlilcely that the trial judge will read it; a trial judge unwilling to devote a few minutes to direct questioning of an accused is unlilcely to find time to read a transcript which, however short, will usually talce longer to read than the questioning would talce.
9. Criminal Law — Plea op Guilty — Direct Questioning — Purpose.
Direct questioning of a guilty-pleading defendant is required as a precaution against involuntary or induced false pleas of guilty, and against subsequent false claims of innocence.
10. Criminal Law — Plea op Guilty — Truthfulness—Court’s Duty.
The trial judge, before a judgment of conviction based on a plea of guilty may be entered, must determine whether he has reason to doubt the truth of the plea; if judge doubts the truth of the plea, he has a duty to set aside the plea.
11. Criminal Law — Plea of Guilty — Direct Questioning — Preliminary Examination Transcript — Appeal and Error.
Beliance by appellate courts on a preliminary examination trans-script as evidence that the trial judge did in fact ascertain the truth of the defendant’s guilty plea is illusory where it is apparent that the trial judge never looked at the transcript.
12. Criminal Law — Plea of Guilty — Factual Basis.
A plea of guilty may be accepted even though the defendant is unsure of his guilt and even though the defendant denies his guilt where, after eareful inquiry, the trial judge satisfies himself there is a substantial factual basis for the plea and that the plea represents a well-considered and well-advised choice by the defendant.
Appeal from Oakland, William John Beer, J.
Submitted Division 2 November 10,1969, at Lansing.
(Docket No. 6160.)
Decided March 29, 1971.
Marshall Coates was convicted, on his plea of guilty, of armed robbery. Defendant appeals.
Affirmed and remanded for resentencing.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, Thomas G. Plunkett, Prosecuting Attorney, Dennis Donohue, Chief Appellate Counsel, and Bruce T. Leitman, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Milton B. Henry, for defendant on appeal.
Before: Levin, P. J., and T. M. Burns and Danhof, JJ.

Opinion:
Danhof, J.
Defendant was charged with armed robbery, CLS 1961, § 750.529 (Stat Ann 1969 Cum Supp § 28.797). A plea of guilty to the charge was accepted by the trial court and defendant was sentenced to a term of 4 to 16 years in prison. Defend ant has appealed as of right praying for a new trial on two grounds:
(1) That the trial judge did not comply with the requirements of CL 1948, § 768.35 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28.1058), and GCR 1963, 785.3 in that, before accepting the defendant's guilty plea and sentencing, he did not, by direct questioning of the defendant, ascertain the truth of the plea by establishing the crime and the defendant's participation in its commission as required by People v. Barrows (1959), 358 Mich 267, and People v. Perine (1967), 7 Mich App 292;
(2) That the defendant was denied his right to be represented by counsel at the time of his sentencing.
The record shows that an armed robbery occurred on October 16,1967, for which defendant and a man named Greenblatt were subsequently arrested. On November 9, 1967, a preliminary examination was held at which the victim, night clerk in a motel, unequivocally identified the defendant as one of the two men who robbed him and as the one who shot him with a small gun that looked like a Beretta. The victim testified that the two robbers were in the office area two or three minutes and that he took a good look at both of them. On cross-examination by defendant's counsel, the victim testified that he also worked as a full-time animal keeper at the Detroit zoo, that guns were a hobby of his, and that he was quite positive that one of the weapons used was a Beretta.
On November 22, 1967, defendant was arraigned. The information was read to him. It stated in part:
"Marshall Coates late of the city of Ferndale in said county, heretofore to-wit, on or about the 17th day of October A.D. 1967 at the said city of Fern-dale in said county, while armed with dangerous weapons or articles used or fashioned in a manner to lead the person so assaulted to reasonably believe them to be dangerous weapons, to wit: a .32-caliber automatic and a .22-caliber revolver, did assault one Thomas J. Watson and did feloniously rob, steal and take from the person of Thomas J. Watson or in the presence of said Thomas J. Watson certain property which may be the subject of larceny, to-wit: United States currency in the amount of $60, contrary to Section 750.529, of the Compiled Laws of 1948 as amended: M.S.A. section 28.797 as amended. (Maximum penalty — Life)"
The following colloquy then occurred:
"The Court: How do you plead?
"Mr. Coates: I stand mute.
"And I would like to ask for an adjournment because my lawyer is not here.
"The Court: Who is your lawyer?
"Mr. Coates: Arnold Fink.
"The Court: Is his appearance in the file?
"Mr. Pantel (Assistant Prosecuting Attorney): No.
"Your Honor, it is my understanding that he did represent the defendant at the examination level, but we do not have an appearance at the circuit court level.
"The Court: The court must direct the plea of not guilty, under the law, for you."
On January 16, 1968, defendant with his attorney present pleaded guilty to armed robbery. The transcript reads in part:
"Mr. Fink: Your Honor, at this time, we wish to change our plea — the plea being standing mute, or not guilty at the arraignment on the information— we wish to plead guilty as charged.
"The Court: Is Mr. Arnold Fink your lawyer?
"Mr. Coates: Yes, he is, your Honor.
"The Court: And did you hear what he said, that you wished to plead guilty to this charge of robbery armed?
"Mr. Coates: Yes, I did.
"The Court: Has he explained to you that if I accept this plea, that it is possible that I could send you to state prison for any number of years up to life? Has he explained that to you?
"Mr. Coates: Yes, he has.
"The Court: Now, has anybody hurt you or
harmed you in any way since you have been taken into custody and then released on bond, and been charged, to induce you to make this plea?
"Mr. Coates: No, they haven't.
"The Court: Did anybody tell you that if you plead guilty that you might get off easy in some way or get a reward?
"Mr. Coates: No, they haven't.
"The Court: Now, do you plead guilty, then, because you are guilty of the charge of armed robbery? Is that correct?
"Mr. Coates: Yes, I do, your Honor.
"The Court: Do you understand that you do not have to plead guilty, that you can have a trial by jury and that Mr. Arnold Fink stands ready to represent you? And if you do not wish a jury trial, you can be tried by the court alone ? Do you understand that?
"Mr. Coates: Yes, I do.
"The Court: You understand that if I accept the plea of guilty, there will be no trial?
"Mr. Coates: Yes, I do.
"The Court: Have you fully advised him of all his constitutional rights, Mr. Fink?
"Mr. Fink: Yes, I have, your Honor.
"I would also like to state for the record, I have conferred with Mr. Coates last night, this morning, and this afternoon. I believe I have fully advised him of all his constitutional rights and may state emphatically that Mr. Coates is pleading guilty as charged for the sole reason that he is in fact guilty, so being advised of all his constitutional rights.
"The Court: Well, of course, Mr. Coates, if a person is charged with crime and if the person knows in their mind and heart that they are guilty of that crime, the first step in the right direction then, after having conferred with your counsel, is to plead guilty. I emphasize that the first step in the right direction is to do what you are trying to do at this time.
"I am going to accept your plea of guilty.
"And I am going to refer your case to the presentence investigating department called the Probation Department, for sentence February 26, at 2 o'clock in the afternoon.
"Do you understand that?
"Mr. Coates: Yes, sir."
On February 26, 1968, the defendant failed to appear for sentencing and his bond was forfeited and a bench warrant issued. He was arrested on June 13, 1968, in Detroit, Michigan.
On July 3, 1968, defendant was sentenced. He was apparently in the process of changing lawyers and neither his trial counsel nor his appellate counsel was present.
Defendant admits in his brief to this Court that the trial judge "made every effort to establish the free and voluntary nature of appellant's plea below". Defendant does not even now claim that he was innocent of the charge to which he pleaded guilty. Nor is this a case of plea bargaining where defendant pleaded guilty to a lesser crime than that with which he was charged. Rather, defendant seeks a new trial based on omissions in the trial judge's questioning of him which defendant thinks the appellate courts of this state require. Specifically, defendant contends that the trial judge did not establish a factual basis in support of the truth of the guilty plea hy direct questionng of the defendant.
The major case relied on in support of the position that a trial judge must question the defendant regarding the acts constituting the crime before accepting the guilty plea is People v. Barrows, supra. However, it is doubtful that that is what the Barrows case actually held. In that case the defendant was young, only 19, it was his first experience with a criminal court, his guilty plea was entered by his attorney, and the defendant was not directly questioned with regard to it by the judge. Further, he protested his innocence at every point when given an opportunity to do so and also protested his innocence on appeal.
On the authority of the Barrows decision, more is required than that the defendant agree with his attorney that it is expedient to plead guilty. There must be a reasonable ascertainment of the truth of the guilty plea. This is accomplished by the direct questioning of the defendant by the trial judge. The purpose of this direct questioning is to establish the crime and the participation therein of the defendant as a precaution against involuntary or induced false pleas of guilty and against subsequent false claims of innocence.
However, it is arguable that a trial judge has met the requirement of the Barrows case concerning direct questioning of a defendant for the purpose of establishing his participation in the crime when the trial court asks the defendant if he is pleading guilty because he is in fact guilty of the crime with which he is charged and the defendant answers yes. A decision on the merit of that argument is not essential to the disposition of the appeal before us.
Certainly the recent trilogy of Michigan Supreme Court cases, People v. Dunn (1968), 380 Mich 693, People v. Stearns (1968), 380 Mich 704, and People v. Winegar (1968), 380 Mich 719, make it clear that reviewing courts should be concerned with substance, not form, and the fundamental inquiry is whether there has been a miscarriage of justice. Specifically, we note that in the Stearns case use was made of the information which was read to defendant and the presentence investigation at which defendant cooperated to establish a factual basis in support of the truth of the guilty plea. Similarly, in the Winegar case, the Court held that there was no miscarriage of justice where the record showed that the court had conferred with the defendant in chambers and was convinced that he committed the crime, but there was no verbatim transcript of the colloquy between the court and the defendant regarding the circumstances of the crime.
The Perine case, supra, relied on by defendant was decided before the Dunn, Stearns, and Winegar cases. Additionally, it may be distinguishable factually since the opinion states that defendant's attorney waived a reading of the information.
Since Perine, this Court has held that the absence of a recital on the record of the events in the defendant's own words is not always fatal. People v. Seifert (1969), 17 Mich App 187. It has also held that we may properly look at the preliminary examination testimony in considering a claim that there was not a factual basis justifying acceptance of a plea of guilty. People v. Bartlett (1969), 17 Mich App 205.
In the case before us, after considering the eyewitness testimony at the preliminary examination, the specific wording of the information which was read to defendant at his arraignment, the essentially uncomplicated elements of the crime of armed robbery, and the direct questioning of the defendant by the court at the time defendant entered his plea of guilty, it is our opinion that the trial court had a substantial factual basis for accepting the proffered plea of guilty, and that defendant might well have been convicted upon a trial. Therefore, defendant is not entitled to a new trial.
Regarding defendant's second issue, the right to counsel at the time of sentencing, this is grounds only for remanding for resentencing with counsel present, People v. Dye (1967), 6 Mich App 217, People v. Jones (1967), 6 Mich App 221. Therefore, we remand this case for resentencing with counsel for defendant present.
T. M. Burns, J., concurred.