Case Name: Dennis Scott KAPLAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1984-06-13
Citations: 451 So. 2d 1386
Docket Number: No. 82-867
Parties: Dennis Scott KAPLAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: GLICKSTEIN, J., concurs specially with opinion.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 451
Pages: 1386–1391

Head Matter:
Dennis Scott KAPLAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 82-867.
District Court of Appeal of Florida Fourth District.
June 13, 1984.
William Snow Frates and Lauri B. Wald-man of Frates, Beinstock & Sheehe, Miami, and Windsor, Bernstein & Byrne, Plantation, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Lydia M. Valenti, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
HURLEY, Judge.
Dennis Kaplan was convicted of sexual battery. The trial court withheld imposition of sentence and placed the defendant on three years' probation with the special condition that he serve 120 days in the county jail. On appeal, the defendant complains that the trial court erred in applying Florida's rape victim shield statute to limit cross-examination of the victim. We disagree.
The victim in this case accompanied her boyfriend to a bar. While there, she became upset with her boyfriend for paying attention to other female patrons and, in response, she struck up a conversation with the defendant. After a short time, she agreed to leave with the defendant to go to another bar. When they found that the second bar was closed, the victim asked to be driven back to the first bar. The defendant, however, drove in the opposite direction and eventually pulled into an open field. There he beat the victim about the head and chest and committed vaginal and anal penetration. The defendant then drove off, leaving the victim in the field. She immediately walked to the nearest house and asked the occupant to call the police.
The examining physician testified that the victim had a bleeding abrasion in her anus. In addition, the doctor observed dried blood on her right temple and left elbow. Her lip was swollen, her breasts had black and blue marks and, on the inner part of her arms, there were three-inch marks. Both of her knees were scraped and reddened.
During a proffer outside the jury's presence, the defense elicited from the victim that, in addition to her boyfriend with whom she had resided for three years, she had engaged in sexual intercourse with three men. She knew two of the men for substantial periods of time before engaging in sexual intercourse. She met the third man in a bar and had sex on their second date. The trial court ruled the foregoing evidence inadmissible because it did not constitute a pattern of similar conduct.
Section 794.022(2), Florida Statutes (1983), provides in pertinent part:
Specific instances of prior consensual sexual activity between the victim and any person other than the offender shall not be admitted into evidence in a prosecution under s. 794.011. However, . when consent by the victim is at issue, such evidence may be admitted if it is first established to the court in a proceeding in camera that such evidence tends to establish a pattern of conduct or behavior on the part of the victim which is so similar to the conduct or behavior in the case that it is relevant to the issue of consent.
To fulfill the requirements of the statute, it must be established that the victim engaged in a pattern of conduct or behavior extremely similar to the defendant's version of the encounter. The term "pattern" denotes repetitive or frequent conduct. McElveen v. State, 415 So.2d 746 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). One episode is not sufficient. Hodges v. State, 386 So.2d 888 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). Moreover, the pattern must be so distinctive and so closely resemble the defendant's version of the encounter that it tends to prove that the complainant consented to the acts charged or behaved in such a manner as to lead the defendant reasonably to believe that the complainant consented. Cf. State v. Wilhite, 58 N.C.App. 654, 294 S.E.2d 396 (1982), cert. denied, 307 N.C. 129, 297 S.E.2d 403 (1982), remanded for resentencing, 308 N.C. 798, 303 S.E.2d 788 (1983). Only when these statutory requirements are met does the probative value of the evidence outweigh its prejudicial impact.
An analysis of the proffered evidence in this case shows that one incident remotely resembled the defendant's account. But, as indicated in Hodges, supra, "one episode of sexual intercourse . hardly establishes a 'pattern of conduct or behavior' on the part of the victim . " Id. at 889. Thus, we conclude that the trial court properly excluded the evidence because it was devoid of any logical tendency to prove or disprove the defense of consent.
It is important to note that Florida's rape victim shield statute does not exclude evidence that is otherwise admissible. Section 794.022(2), Florida Statutes (1983), is merely a codification of this jurisdiction's rule of relevance as it applies to the sexual behavior of a sexually battered victim. We recognize, however, that the defendant's right to full and fair cross-examination, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, may limit the statute's application when evidence of the victim's prior sexual conduct is relevant to show bias or motive to lie. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Joyce, 382 Mass. 222, 415 N.E.2d 181 (1981); State v. Jalo, 27 Or.App. 845, 557 P.2d 1359 (1976); see also Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). In this respect, we have carefully examined the defendant's contention that the excluded evidence was relevant to establish the victim's motive. We find, however, that his claim is without merit. Thus, we hold that the trial court properly excluded the evidence under the rape victim shield statute. Accordingly, the defendant's conviction and sentence are
AFFIRMED.
GLICKSTEIN, J., concurs specially with opinion.
WALDEN, J., dissents with opinion.
. Section 794.011(5), Fla.Stat. (1983).
. Section 794.022(2), Fla.Stat. (1983).