Case Name: Continental Southern Lines, Inc., et al. v. Klaas, et al.
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1953-06-08
Citations: 217 Miss. 795
Docket Number: No. 38493
Parties: Continental Southern Lines, Inc., et al. v. Klaas, et al.
Judges: Hall, Arrington and Ethridge, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Mississippi Reports
Volume: 217
Pages: 795–853

Head Matter:
Continental Southern Lines, Inc., et al. v. Klaas, et al.
June 8, 1953
No. 38493
34 Adv. S. 36
65 So. 2d 575
March 9,1953
July 3, 1953
October 5, 1953
23 Adv. S. 3
35 Adv. S. 1
65 So. 2d 833
37 Adv. S. 8
67 So. 2d 256
Sermon Dean, Hedgepeth & Norsworthy and Stevens &' Cavmada, for appellants.
Brief of appellant, Continental Southern Lines, Inc.
Ray, Spivey & Gain and Nelson Gauthen, for appellees.

Opinion:
Kyle, J.
This case is before us on appeal by the Continental Southern Lines, Incorporated, M. S. Cox, Jr., and Lawyer Partee, defendants in the court below, from a judgment rendered against them by the circuit court of Madison County in favor of Mrs. Ida Mary Klaas, surviving widow, and Lawrence J. Klaas, Jr., and Joyce Anne Klaas, minor children of Lawrence J. Klaas, Sr., deceased, for damages for the wrongful death of the said Lawrence J. Klaas, Sr.
Lawrence J. Klaas, Sr., was killed in an automobile accident which occurred on U. S. Highway No. 51, about five miles north of the City of Canton, on September 16, 1950, when the new Studebaker automobile which he was driving collided with a cattle truck owned by M. S. Cox, Jr., and being operated at the time of the accident by Lawyer Partee, Cox's employee. Klaas at the time of the accident was driving his Studebaker automobile northwardly along the east traffic lane of the highway, and his cousin, Clarence Klaas, was riding in the car with him. The Klaas car was running at a rate of speed of about fifty miles per hour, and there is nothing in the record to indicate that Klaas was negligent in any manner in the operation of his automobile at the time of the accident. Lawrence J. Klaas, Sr., died almost immediately after the accident as a result of the injuries which he had sustained. He was 27 years of age at the time of his death, and he left surviving him a wife and two children. Clarence Klaas was also fatally injured in the accident and died before reaching the hospital. He was 28 years of age, and left surviving him a wife, but no children.
Prom the testimony of the eye witnesses it appears that as the Klaas car was approaching the point on the highway where the accident occurred a Continental Southern Lines passenger bus, proceeding southwardly and closely followed by a heavily loaded cottonseed truck owned and operated by Howard Smithson, Jr., and the cattle truck driven by Lawyer Partee, slowed down and came to a stop for the purpose of picking up' two passengers who were standing on the west side of the highway. There was a conflict in the testimony as to whether the passenger bus was still moving or had come to a complete stop when the Klaas car passed it; but just as or immediately after the Klaas car passed the passenger bus the cattle truck swung from behind the seed truck into the path of the Klaas car, and the wreck occurred about 200 feet north of the point on the highway where the passenger bus had stopped.
It is clear from the testimony of the witnesses that the passenger bus and the two trucks were proceeding southwardly in close formation at the time the passenger bus was brought to a stop. The passenger bus had a load of forty passengers. The seed truck was heavily loaded with cottonseed, and the cattle truck was carrying 25 head of cattle. J. C. Welch, the driver of the passenger bus, testified that he was driving at a rate of speed of approximately 45 miles per hour before he began to slow down to pick up the passengers. Howard Smithson, Jr., the driver of the seed truck, who was named as a code-fendant in the plaintiffs' declaration, testified that, when the bus regained its speed after leaving Larson's store about one-half mile north of the place where the wreck occurred, he was about 300 feet behind the bus, and that he was driving about 45 miles per hour. Lawyer Partee testified that he had been following the seed truck at a distance of approximately 68 feet for about a mile when the bus and seed truck slowed down abruptly just before the wreck occurred.
The plaintiffs alleged in their declaration that Klaas' death was proximately caused by the concurrent negligence of the bus company, Howard Smithson, Jr., and Lawyer Partee.
The plaintiffs alleged that the bus company was negligent in that, at the time when the automobile which Klaas was driving was approaching the passenger bus and was about to meet the same, and when the cottonseed truck and the cattle truck were following closely behind the passenger bus, the driver of the passenger bus, without exercising due regard for the safety of the plaintiffs' decedent and other persons using the highway, negligently brought the passenger bus to a stop partially on the paved and main traveled portion of the highway, without leaving 20 feet in width of the highway or a sufficiency thereof open for the free passage of other vehicles. The plaintiffs also alleged that the bus company was negligent in bringing its bus to a stop and failing to exercise due care and caution for the safety of the plaintiffs' decedent and other persons using the highway-at that time, in that the driver of the passenger bns knew, or by the exercise of reasonable care and caution should have known, that the automobile which Klaas was driving was approaching him from the south, and that the passenger bus which he was driving was being closely followed by the heavily loaded trucks of the defendants Smithson and Cox, and that if he stopped his passenger bus on the main traveled portion of the highway under the traffic conditions then existing, without leaving a sufficient part of the highway open for the safe passage of other vehicles, there was danger and probability that the drivers of the seed truck and the cattle truck would be unable to bring their vehicles to a stop in time to avoid a collision, or to avoid entering the traffic lane in which the plaintiff's decedent was traveling, yet the driver of the passenger bus brought his bus to a stop partly on the main traveled portion of the highway and without leaving sufficient space open on the highway for the safe passage of other vehicles thereon, and thereby created a condition of great, immediate and imminent danger to the occupants of all of said vehicles, which resulted in the injury and death of the plaintiffs' decedent.
The plaintiffs alleged that Howard Smithson, Jr., was negligent in that he operated his truck at a greater rate of speed than was reasonable and prudent under the traffic conditions then existing; that he followed too closely behind the passenger bus; and that he failed to keep a proper lookout for other vehicles then using the highway. The plaintiffs also alleged that Smithson was negligent in stopping his truck too suddenly in front of the cattle truck and without giving sufficient warning to the driver of the cattle truck, thereby creating a traffic hazard which contributed to the injury and death of the plaintiffs' decedent.
The plaintiffs alleged that Lawyer Partee was negligent in failing to keep a proper lookout for other vehicles on the highway, in driving his truck at an exces sive rate of speed in view of the traffic conditions then existing, and in following too closely behind the seed truck. And the plaintiffs alleged that Partee was grossly negligent in attempting to pass the seed truck at a time when it was coming to a stop, and in driving his cattle truck across the center line of the highway and into the path of the oncoming Studebaker car.
Howard Smithson, Jr., was called to testify as an adverse witness for the plaintiffs. Smithson testified that he was about 300 feet behind the passenger bus when the bus regained its speed south of Larson's store; that the stop light on the bus came on several hundred feet before the bus came to a stop; and the bus slowed down gradually. He did not know where the cattle truck was at that time. He stated that the bus started pulling off on the shoulder about 150 or 200 feet before it came to a stop, and that the bus slowed down hard at that time. Smithson stated later that he had to stand on his brakes to keep from running into the bus, Smithson said that when the bus had come to a complete stop the left dual wheel was close to the edge of the pavement, approximately two feet on the pavement. He stated that, when the Klaas car passed the bus, the bus had not been brought to a complete stop; that his seed truck was only about 20 or 30 feet behind the bus; and that his seed truck was still moving as the Klaas car passed the seed truck and the cattle truck pulled into the lane of travel of the northbound vehicle. Smithson stated that he saw the collision, which occurred about 20 feet behind his seed truck, through his rear view mirror.
Lawyer Partee was also called to testify as an adverse witness for the plaintiffs. Partee testified that he never saw the passenger bus until after the wreck had occurred. He stated that when the seed truck came to a stop he was about 68 feet behind the seed truck; that he applied his brakes as hard as he could; and that the heavy load that he was carrying caused his truck to swerve across the center line of the highway into the path of the oncoming Studebaker.
R.. O. -Stringer, who was president of the Northeast Mississippi Junior College and the owner of farm lands in Madison County, testified that he was driving south-wardly on the highway when the accident occurred, and that he was the first person to arrive at the scene of the accident. He pdrked his automobile immediately behind the bus on the west side of the highway, and while he was doing that he observed the position of the bus on the highway. He stated that the rear end of the bus was approximately fifty per cent on the highway and fifty per cent off the highway, that is to say, half of the bus was on the pavement and half of the bus was off the pavement. He went immediately to the place where the wreck had occurred. The cattle truck was headed almost directly into the east bank of the highway right of way, and the front end of the Studebaker appeared to be partially under the hood of the truck. One of the injured men was still alive.
W. D. R. Stovall, state supervisor of audio-visual education, testified that he and M. P. Ewing were driving northwardly on the highway behind the Studebaker car at the time the wreck occurred. He stated that he saw the bus come to a stop just before the Studebaker car passed the bus. He stated that when he was about 200 or 300 feet in front of the bus he saw the cattle truck pull around the seed truck and cross over into the east lane of traffic and across the center line of travel, and that he saw the crash that occurred immediately thereafter. He stated that he and Ewing parked their car about 75 or 100 feet south of the point on the highway where the wreck had occurred, and went immediately to the aid of the injured men, but that they left soon thereafter to summons medical assistance. On cross-examination Stovall again stated that the bus had come to a complete stop when the accident occurred, and he also stated that the bus was half on and half off the pavement at that time.
Dr. Margaret Wilson Johnson testified that she was traveling southwardly on the highway at the time the accident occurred; that she arrived at the scene of the accident only a few minutes after it had happened, and that she stopped to render such assistance to the injured men as she was able to render. She stated that Lawrence J. Klaas, Sr., was obviously in a dying condition when she arrived, but was still breathing. Clarence Klaas was conscious, but had a fracture of the left femur and several lacerations on his skull. She testified that Clarence Klaas was suffering, and was conscious of his suffering. Harry Baldwin, the funeral director who prepared Clarence Klaas' body for burial, brought the injured men to the hospital in an ambulance. Both were dead when they arrived at the hospital. Bob Scott, the funeral director who prepared the body of Lawrence J. Klaas, Sr., for burial, testified that the skull of the deceased was crushed, and that the bony structure of his chest was crushed in. Harry Baldwin testified that Clarence Klaas ' skull was crushed, his nose and left eye torn away, his chest crushed, and his neck apparently broken.
The testimony of the defendants' witnesses may be summarized as follows: M. S. Cox testified that Lawyer Partee had been working for him about five years, and had rendered excellent service. Cox did not testify concerning the accident itself. Lawyer Partee was recalled and testified that the truck he was driving was in good condition; that he had left Jackson Thursday afternoon with a truck load of cattle for Clinton, Kentucky, and had arrived in Clinton Friday night; that he unloaded his cattle in Clinton, took on another load of cattle, and started back almost immediately. He stated that he was about 68 feet behind the seed truck when he passed Larson's store, and that he maintained that distance behind the seed truck until the driver of the seed truck suddenly brought his truck to a stop at the point on the highway where the accident occurred. Partee stated that the driver of the seed truck slowed down suddenly, and that he jumped on his brakes immediately; that the cattle truck leaped across the highway and turned over, and that he got out of the truck after it had turned over. He stated that the bed of the seed truck was eight feet high; that he saw no stop lights on the seed truck; and that he did not know that the passenger bus was in front of the seed truck. He stated that he never intended to try to pass the seed truck.
The Continental Southern Lines, Incorporated, introduced several witnesses who testified concerning the position of the passenger bus on the highway after the bus had been brought to a stop. M. P. Ewing who was driving the automobile in which the plaintiffs' witness Stovall was riding, testified that the cattle truck pulled out very abruptly into the northbound lane of traffic just as the Studebaker car was passing the two vehicles in front of the cattle truck, and that the collision occurred immediately thereafter. Ewing stated that he was about 500 yards from the point where the two vehicles collided. He did not notice the bus at that time, and could not say whether the bus was still moving or not. He stopped his car about 75 yards from the scene of the accident, and he and Stovall went immediately, to the aid of the injured men and helped lift them out of the wrecked car. Ewing stated that, when he came back to his own car, he noticed the bus, and that the bus occupied about two feet of the paved portion of the highway. Several passengers on the bus testified that the bus was brought to a smooth stop, and that it was pulled as far to the right as it could get. Mike Erickson, who had boarded the bus just north of Larson's store, testified that ££it was pretty steep getting off the bus," after the bus had been brought to a stop. He estimated that the shoulder of the highway at the point where the bus stopped was approximately five feet, and that the bns was five feet off the pavement.
J. C. Welch, the bns driver, testified that when he saw the prospective passengers flagging him he was running at a rate of speed of about 40 or 45 miles per hour. He looked into his rear view mirror to see whether there were other motor vehicles coming. He did not see anything "in the immediate vicinity." He removed his foot from the accelerator and let the bns coast to a smooth stop. His mind was on the passengers, and he pulled over to take them up. He hit the shoulder approximately 40 or 45 feet from the point on the highway where the passengers were waiting to board the bus. Welch stated that as the bus came to a complete stop he reached for his cash fare book to cut cash fares for two passengers, and about that time a lady sitting behind him said, "There has been an accident." He then looked through his rear view mirror and saw the Studebaker car and the cattle truck. He also saw the seed truck about 25 feet behind him in the west lane of travel. Welch stated that he did not know whether he had stopped at that time or was still rolling. Welch stated that, when his bus came to a stop, it was tilted slightly, and he could not have gotten any farther over on the shoulder with safety.
On cross-examination Welch stated that he did not remember seeing the seed truck when he pulled off from Larson's store. He was unwilling to say whether he saw either of the trucks when he looked in his rear view mirror after the passengers flagged him. He said that he saw the passengers when he was about halfway between Larson's store and the place where'he stopped to pick them up. He said that he did not remember whether the passengers had gotten on the bus or not.before the crash occurred. Welch said that he did not remember having seen the seed truck or the cattle truck at any time after he left Larson's store until he stopped to pick up the passengers. He stated that he traveled approximately 40 to 50 feet after lie got Ms right wheels off the pavement. He said, that he did not know exactly when he applied his brakes, and he did not remember giving any hand signal or mechanical signal to show that he intended to stop. He stated that his bns was eight feet wide, and that at the time he stopped from seven to ten inches of the bus was on the pavement. He stated that he did not know where the Studebaker car was at the time that he came to a stop, and that he could not say definitely that he saw the Studebaker coming up the highway.
Charles S. Smith, an employee of the bus company, who was driving another bus at the time the accident occurred, arrived at the scene of the accident a few minutes after it had happened. He testified that he stopped his bus on the "right side of the highway and went immediately to the place where the injured men were lying. He found the cattle truck turned over and the Studebaker car partially under the cab of the truck. He stepped the distance from the place where the wreck occurred to the place where Welch's bus was parked and found that the distance was 225 feet. He stated that Welch's bus was on the shoulder of the road with the left dual wheel on the pavement, and that there was no shoulder left on the west side of the bus. He observed the stop lights on Welch's bus and found that they were working.
T. C. Temple, superintendent of operations of the Continental Southern Lines, Incorporated, testified that the rules and regulations of the bus company required the bus driver to pull completely off the highway and pick up and discharge passengers wherever possible. He testified that Welch's bus weighed 16,500 pounds unloaded; that it was equipped with Westinghouse brakes; and that it would require a distance of 260 feet to make an emergency stop, if the bus were traveling at the rate of 45 miles per hour.
The first point argued by the attorneys for the bus company on this appeal is that under the pleadings the sole issue presented for consideration by the jury in this ease was whether or not the location of the bus, after it came to a stop, constituted negligence on the part of the bus company, and that the court erred in permitting the jury to consider the manner in which the bus was brought to a stop. The bus company's attorneys contend that the testimony relating to the bus driver's failure to keep a proper lookout, and the bus driver's failure to give an appropriate signal of his intention to stop for a reasonable distance before stopping, and the bus driver's action in bringing his bus to a stop too suddenly and without allowing sufficient time for the vehicles behind him to reduce their speed and come to a stop with safety, was improperly admitted.
But we think that there is no merit in these contentions. The facts alleged in the plaintiffs' declaration and the negligence charged in the declaration do not admit of such narrow interpretation. The declaration clearly charged that the driver of the bus negligently brought his bus to a stop partly on the paved and main traveled portion of the highway when he knew, or by the exercise of reasonable care and caution should have known, that the automobile which the plaintiffs' decedent was driving was meeting and approaching him from the south, and that the passenger bus which he was driving was being closely followed by the heavily loaded seed truck and cattle truck, and when he knew, or by the exercise of reasonable care and caution should have known, that if he stopped his passenger bus on the main traveled portion of the highway without leaving a sufficient part of the highway open for the safe passage of other vehicles, there was danger and probability that the operators of the seed truck and the cattle truck would be unable to bring their trucks to a stop in time to avoid a collision, or to avoid entering the traffic lane in which the plaintiffs' decedent was approaching.
It may be conceded that the plaintiffs should have been more specific in stating the particular acts of neg ligence on tbe part of the bus driver which they expected to rely upon to establish the charge of negligence in the manner in which he brought his bus to a stop. But there was no real variance in the allegations of the declaration and the proof. The declaration charged that the bus driver negligently brought his bus to a stop partly on the paved and main traveled portion of the highway under traffic conditions, fully described in the declaration, which were extremely perilous. The words "negligently brought his bus to a stop," as those words are used in the declaration, cannot be interpreted to mean only that the bus driver selected an improper parking-place for his bus. The words "negligently brought his bus to a stop" are broad enough in their meaning to cover all the actions taken by the bus driver in bringing his bus to a stop. For the purpose of enabling the jury to determine whether the bus driver did negligently bring his bus to a stop, it was competent for the plaintiffs to show the condition of traffic on the highway at the time and the actions of the bus driver.in reducing his speed suddenly, without maintaining a.proper lookout, and pulling his bus to the right, and finally stopping the bus partially on the paved and main traveled portion of the highway, without giving sufficient notice of his intention to do so for a reasonable distance before stopping.
The evidence which the bus company sought to exclude from the consideration of the jury after both sides had rested had been admitted without objection. Much of the evidence relating to • the actions of the bus driver in bringing his bus to a stop was brought out by the attorneys for the bus company themselves in the examination of the bus driver and in the cross-examination of other witnesses. If there was a variance in the charges alleged in the declaration and the proof, and we think there was no real variance, under the facts in this case the variance was not material, because there was no surprise. If the evidence had been objected to at the time it was offered, tlie plaintiffs would have been permitted to amend their declaration, as provided in Section 1512, Code of 1942, and the trial would have proceeded without interruption.
In the case of Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Price, 72 Miss. 862, 18 So. 415, the Court held that, although in an action for personal injuries, the declaration failed to allege as a ground of complaint the particular act or omission which constituted the defendant's negligence in respect to the injury complained of, if the evidence of such act was admitted without objection, it was too late, after verdict, to object because of variance.
In the case of McLean v. Culpepper, 170 Miss. 239, 155 So. 344, the main ground assigned by the appellant for reversal of the judgment of the lower court on appeal was that the Court admitted evidence that no horn or signal was sounded as the automobile approached the appellee, and that the declaration contained no count of negligence under which such evidence could be admitted. The court rejected the contention'made by the appellant, and held that the evidence was properly admitted under the allegation of the declaration alleging reckless, dangerous and careless operation of the automobile.
In the case of Gower v. Strain, 169 Miss. 344, 145 So. 244, the Court held that a party could not avail himself of a variance between a pleading and proof where he did not object to the testimony on that ground when it was offered.
The record in the case that we have here shows that, after both sides had rested, the appellant bus company made a motion for a peremptory instruction, which the court overruled. The plaintiffs then moved that they be permitted to amend their declaration, so as to charge specifically that the bus driver turned his bus from a direct course and suddenly decreased its speed and stopped the bus partially on the highway without giving a proper signal of his intention to do so for a reasonable distance before stopping and without exercising dne care. The attorneys for the bns company objected to the amendment, and the court sustained the objection on the ground that the evidence had been properly admitted under the charge of general negligence, and that the matters embraced in the proposed amendment were already sufficiently alleged in the declaration. We think that, although the amendment was perhaps not necessary, it should have been allowed. But the bus company is not now in a position to take advantage of the error of the court in refusing to allow the amendment, if there was in fact any such error, for the reason that a party will not be allowed, on appeal, to take advantage of an error which he himself committed or induced or invited the trial court to commit. 5 0. J. S., p. 173, Appeal and Error, par. 1501. An appellant cannot rely upon defects in his adversary's pleadings when he has refused to permit an amendment which would have cured the defects. 5 C. J. S., p. 187, Appeal and Error, par. 1505; Federal Compress Co. v. Craig, 192 Miss. 689, 7 So. 2d 532.
The next point argued on behalf of the bus company is that the judgment of the lower court should be reversed and a new trial granted as to the bus company, for the reasons, first, that the location of the bus after it had been brought to a stop complied with the requirements of the statute, and, second, that the evidence fails to show that the bus driver was negligent in the manner in which he brought his bus to a stop.
In support of their argument on this point the attorneys for the bus company say that under our statute, Section 8215, Code of 1942, all that is required of passenger buses stopping to pick up or discharge passengers on the highway is that ' ' they must pull as far to the right as practicable, including sound and safe shoulders, and must have at least 200 feet clear view in each direction." But that is not all that is required. The driver of a passenger bus, like the operator of any other motor vehicle on the public highway, must not only observe the statutory requirements in bringing his vehicle to a stop, but he must also exercise due care not to endanger the safety of other persons using the highway. This duty to exercise due care exists independently of any statutory regulations, and where the driver of a motor vehicle is actually ' negligent in bringing his motor vehicle to a stop partially on the paved and main traveled portion of the highway, the fact that he may have pulled his motor vehicle as far to the right as practicable, including sound and safe shoulders, and that there may have been a clear view of his stopped vehicle for a distance of 200 feet in each direction does not relieve him from liability for injuries proximately caused by his negligence.
' ' The operator of an automobile has the right to slow down and come to a stop, to back, or to turn his ear in the street or highway, but in so doing must exercise reasonable care with respect to other vehicles and pedestrians. The duty to exercise care in this respect exists independently of any regulations on the subject, and, where the driver of an automobile is actually negligent, the fact that he is violating no statute or ordinance does not relieve him of liability." 60 C. J. S., pp. 708-709, Motor Vehicles, par. 300 b.
But it is said that the prospective passengers had a right to board the passenger bus at any place along the highway that suited their convenience, and that it was the duty of the bus driver to stop and pick them up, and that in order for them to get on the bus sufficient standing room had to be left for them on the shoulder. And the bus company cites in support of this contention the cases of Mississippi City Lines, Inc. v. Bullock, et al., 194 Miss. 630, 13 So. 2d 34, and Teche Lines, Inc. v. Danforth, et al., 195 Miss. 226, 12 So. 2d 784. In the Bullock case the plaintiffs sued for damages for the death of a passenger who had alighted from the bus, and the opinion of the Court dealt only with the duty of the bus company to provide a safe place for the passenger to alight from the bus. In the Danforth case the plaintiffs sued for damages for the death of a motorist whose car had collided with the bus while the bus was standing on the highway waiting for a passenger to alight. At the time the accident occurred the bus had been brought to a complete stop and had been standing about two minutes waiting for the passenger to get off. The Court held that the question to be decided in that case was whether the bus driver had been guilty of negligence in stopping his bus on the paved and main traveled portion of the highway without turning as far to the right as practicable, including sound and safe shoulders, and that question was for the determination of the jury. In neither of those cases did the Court discuss the effect of the bus driver's failure to maintain a proper lookout while bringing his bus to a stop or to exercise reasonable care with respect to other vehicles in the immediate vicinity whose movements might be affected by the sudden slowing down and stopping of the bus.
In the case that we have here Welch brought his bus to a stop under traffic conditions which were peculiarly hazardous, and those traffic conditions were plainly visible to him at the time that he undertook to bring his bus to a stop. The Klaas car was only a few hundred feet in front of him and was approaching him at a rate of speed of approximately 50 miles per hour. Smithson's seed truck was closing in on him from the rear and was being closely followed by Partee's cattle truck. Welch admitted that there was a constant flow of traffic on the highway. Welch knew, or by the exercise of reasonable care should have known, that the slowing down and stopping of the passenger bus partially on the paved and main traveled portion of the highway, under the traffic conditions then existing, would increase the danger of traffic accidents while the bus was being brought to a stop, and it was Welch's duty to exercise care commensurate with the hazards involved in the slowing down and stopping of the bus under those conditions. It was "Welch's duty to maintain a proper lookout and to exercise reasonable care with respect to the other vehicles on the highway, including the vehicles approaching from the rear. Collins Baking Co. v. Wicker, 166 Miss. 264, 142 So. 8. Yet Welch testified that, although he looked into his rear view mirror, he did not remember having seen the seed truck or the cattle truck from the time he left Larson's store until he stopped to pick up the passengers. Welch stated that he applied his brakes when he was only 75 yards north of the point where the passengers were standing. Smithson testified that the bus slowed down hard, and that he had to stand on his brakes to keep from running into the bus.
Whether Welch was negligent in bringing his bus to a stop was a question for the jury to determine. Collins Baking Co. v. Wicker, supra; Savery, et al. v. Cray (Miss.), 51 So. 2d 922.
There is a conflict in the testimony as to the exact location of the bus on the highway after it was brought to a stop. The shoulder on the west side of the highway for a distance of 200 feet south of the point where the wreck occurred was from 5 to 7 feet in width. Two of the plaintiffs' witnesses testified that the bus was half off the pavement and half on the pavement. Welch testified that only about 7 to 10 inches of the bus was on the pavement after it had been brought to a stop. Smithson and Ewing estimated that the bus occupied about 2 feet of the pavement. Mike Erickson testified that the bus was probably 5 feet off the pavement. The bus was approximately 8 feet in width, and according to his testimony the bus probably occupied three feet of the pavement. Several witnesses for the bus company testified that the bus was as far over on the shoulders as it could get. Howard Smithson, however, said that it was not as far over on the shoulder as it could get.
Whether Welch was guilty of negligence in the manner in which he brought his bus to a stop, whether he was negligent in failing to keep a proper lookout for other motor vehicles using the highway, and whether he was negligent in failing to give an appropriate signal to indicate his intention to stop for a reasonable distance before stopping, whether he was negligent in stopping his bus too suddenly and without allowing sufficient time for the vehicles behind him to reduce their speed and come to a stop with safety, and whether he was negligent in failing to turn as far to the right as practicable, including sound and safe shoulders, when he brought his bus to a stop, were questions for the jury to decide. Mississippi City Lines, Inc. v. Bullock, et al., supra; Teche Lines v. Dan-forth, et al., supra; Gulf Refining Company, et al. v. Brown, 196 Miss. 131, 16 So. 2d 765; Missouri Pacific Transportation Co. v. Sacker, et al., 200 Ark. 92, 138 S. W. 2d 371; Hill v. Hill, 170 Kan. 721, 228 P. 2d 713; Matthews v. Mound City Cab Co., et al. (Mo. Ct. App.), 205 S. W. 243; Donahue v. Mazzoli, et al., 27 Cal. App. 2d 102, 80 P. 2d 743; Wallace v. Brende, et al., 67 S. D. 326, 292 N. W. 870; Landeen v. DeJung, et al., 219 Minn. 287, 17 N. W. 2d 648. And we think that there was ample evidence to support the findings of the jury that Welch was negligent.
It is next argued by the bus company that, even if it be true that Welch was negligent in the manner in which he brought the bus to a stop, or in failing to maintain a proper lookout, or in failing to give proper warning of his intention to stop, or in bringing his bus to a stop too suddenly, still Welch's negligence was not the proximate cause of the collision, but that the sole proximate cause of the collision was the negligence of Lawyer Partee in driving his truck too fast, and in following too closely behind the seed truck, and in turning his vehicle abruptly into the traffic lane of the oncoming Studebaker.
But this too was a question that was properly submitted to the jury. And it was not necessary, in order to hold the bus company liable, that the jury should find that the negligence of the bus company was the sole proximate cause of the injury. There may be more than one proximate cause of an accident or injury, and where there is more than one proximate cause each of the concurrent efficient causes contributing directly to the accident or injury is a proximate cause thereof.
"As a general rule, it may be said that negligence, in order to render a person liable, need not be the sole cause of an injury. It is sufficient that his negligence, concurring with one or more efficient causes, other than plaintiff's fault, is the proximate cause of the injury. Accordingly, where several causes combine to produce injuries, a person is not relieved from liability because he is responsible for only one of them, it being sufficient that his negligence is an efficient cause, without which the injury would not have resulted, to as great an extent, and that such other cause is not attributable to the person injured. It is no defense to one of the concurrent tort feasors that the injury would not have resulted from his negligence alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent tort feasor. " 65 C. J. S., p. 675, Negligence, par. 110a; Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Woodham, et al., 99 Miss. 318, 54 So. 890, 891; Lee County Grin Co. v. Middlebrooks, 161 Miss. 422, 137 So. 108; Keith v. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co., 168 Miss. 519, 151 So. 916; Brewer v. Town of Lucedale, 189 Miss. 374, 198 So. 42; Gulf Refining Co., et al. v. Brown, 196 Miss. 131, 16 So. 2d 765.
In the case of Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Woodham, supra, the Court said: "Without attempting to define proximate cause in such terms as will be applicable to all states of fact — for to do so is practically impossible — it will be sufficient to say that the negligent act of a person, resulting in injury, is the proximate cause thereof, and creates liability therefor, -when the act is of such character that, by,the usual course of events, some injury, not necessarily the particular injury, or injury received in the particular manner complained of, would result therefrom, • provided the attendant circumstances are such that an ordinarily prudent man ought reasonably to have anticipated that some injury would probably result from the act done. In order that a person may be liable for damages resulting from his negligence, it is not necessary that his negligence should have been the sole cause of the injury. His negligence may be the proximate cause, where it concurs with one or more causes in producing an injury, and, although the author or authors of such cause or causes may also be liable therefor. 29 Cyc. 492-496, inclusive, and authorities there cited. ' '
The Court in its opinion in that case quoted with approval the following statement from Harrison v. Kansas City Electric Light Company, 195 Mo. 606, 93 S. W. 951, 7 L.R.A. (N.S.) 293: "If a defendant is negligent, and his negligence combines with that of another or with any other independent intervening cause, he is liable, although his negligence was not the sole negligence, or the sole proximate cause, and although his negligence, without such other independent intervening cause, would not have produced the injury."
In Solomon, et al. v. Continental Baking Company, 172 Miss. 388, 160 So. 732, the appellants sued the appellee for damages resulting from an automobile driven by one of the appellants ' servants at night running into the rear of a truck owned by the appellee, which was without a rear red light and was parked on the right-hand side of the road. In discussing the question of proximate cause the Court in its opinion in that case said:
"We will assume, but merely for the purpose of the argument, that the appellants' driver approached the truck without observing pertinent 'laws of the road' in so doing. Nevertheless, such negligence did not supersede the prior negligence of the appellee's driver. First. it does not appear from the evidence that this negligence of the appellants' driver, assuming that such there was, was of such character that the collision would have resulted therefrom even if the truck had been equipped with a rear red light. Second, where an act of negligence is a substantial factor in bringing about an injury, it does not cease to be a legal and proximate cause thereof because of the intervention of a subsequent act of negligence of another which contributed to the injury, if the prior act of negligence is still operating, and the injury inflicted is not different in kind from that which would have resulted from the prior act. 2 Restatement, Torts, Secs. 440-447; Cumberland Tel. Co. v. Woodham, 99 Miss. 318, 54 So. 899; Public Service Corp. v. Watts, 168 Miss. 235, 150 So. 192."
It may be conceded that the failure of Lawyer Partee, the driver of the cattle truck, to observe the requirement of Section 8188, Code of 1942, and to keep his vehicle under proper control, largely contributed to the accident which resulted in the death of the plaintiffs' decedent. Yet, the negligence of Lawyer Partee cannot be regarded as the sole proximate cause of the accident, since it was clearly shown that the action of Lawyer Partee in suddenly pulling his truck across the north bound lane of traffic was taken in an effort to avoid the danger created by the action of the bus driver in bringing his bus to a stop under the conditions testified to by the witnesses. The action of the bus driver in bringing his bus to a stop partly on the paved and main traveled portion of the highway under the conditions testified to by the witnesses represented an active and unseen force which set in motion the acts of Smithson and Lawyer Partee which finally resulted in the negligent injury and wrongful death of the plaintiffs' decedent.
"The doer of an original wrongful act that should reasonably cause one to anticipate an injury therefrom is not relieved from liability for an injury immedi ately brought about by ail intervening cause, -wrongful or otherwise, that is set into operation by such original wrongful act, and that alone would not have caused the injury, but which with the aid of the original wrong does cause such injury," Johnson v. Mallory, 123 Neb. 706, 243 N. W. 872, 875. See also Gulf Refining Co. v. Brown, 196 Miss. 131, 16 So. 2d 765.
In the case of Gulf Refining Company v. Brown, supra, the suit was brought by Brown to recover of the Gulf Refining Company and S. W. Stewart, the value of a tractor and oil tank trailer and approximately 3,500 gallons of gasoline being transported by the truck, when the same was destroyed as a result of a traffic accident caused by the alleged negligence of Stewart, an employee of the Gulf Refining Company, when he stopped his automobile in the entrance to and extending partly on Tallahala Creek Bridge on U. S. Highway 84, approximately one mile east of Laurel, Mississippi.
In discussing the question of proximate cause, the Court in its opinion in that case said:
"The position of the Stewart car on the bridge did not cease to be a legal and proximate cause of the accident because of the intervention of the Chevrolet car, for the reason that when the driver of the Chevrolet got to where Stewart's car was, he had to turn to his left to go around. He turned to his left because Stewart's ear was stopped on the right. Then too, the Stewart car was still there when the appellee's oil truck arrived at the scene. It was the Stewart car that was struck at its left rear end by the oil truck when the latter was evidently trying to turn to the left and avoid the impending tragedy. How then can it be said that this car only provided the condition for and not a contributing proximate cause of the accident?
"Without regard to the position of the Chevrolet car immediately before and at the moment of the accident, the legal principle here applicable is clearly stated in the case of Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Company v. Woodham, 99 Miss. 318, 54 So. 890, 891, where it was said in quoting with approval from 29 Cyc. 492-496 that 'If a defendant is negligent and this negligence combines with that of another, or with any other independent intervening canse, he is liable, although his negligence was not the sole negligence, or the sole proximate cause, and'although his negligence, without such other independent intervening cause, would not have produced the injury.' Of course, Stewart could not have anticipated that the particular injury complained of would have resulted from his negligent act, or that an injury would have occurred in the particular manner in which it did on that occasion, but he should have reasonably anticipated the happening of the intervening event which transpired to cause an injury in the instant case, since he was required under the law to anticipate the approach of other vehicles from the rear at any moment.
"Conceding that the failure of the driver of the ap-pellee's oil truck to have the same under control, and that his action in failing to observe other requirements of the said Chapter 200, Laws of 1938, known as 'The Uniform Highway Traffic Regulation Act, ' largely contributed to the accident in question, nevertheless it cannot be regarded as the sole proximate cause of the oil truck being-wrecked and burned on the occasion complained of, it being clearly shown that the presence of the Stewart car continued to be a factor in bringing about this needless tragedy. ' '
It is next argued on behalf of the bus company that the court erred in granting certain instructions to the plaintiff.
In the first instruction complained of the court instructed the jury as follows:
"If you believe from the evidence in this case that the defendant bus company stopped its bus on, or partially on the paved and main traveled portion of the highway without turning it as far to the right as was practical, including sound and safe shoulders, or stopped its bus partially on the paved and main traveled part of the highway'without leaving as near 20 feet of the paved part of the highway as was practical open and unobstructed for the free passage of other vehicles, or brought its bus to a stop partially on the paved and main traveled portion of said highway without exercising ordinary care for the safety of other persons using said highway by keeping a proper lookout for following and oncoming traffic and by giving an appropriate signal of his purpose to stop for a reasonable distance before stopping and that either of such acts by the said defendant, if you believe from the evidence it was guilty of any of them, was a proximate and contributing cause of the injury and death of plaintiffs' decedent, it would be your duty under your oaths to return a verdict against the defendant bus company notwithstanding the fact that other persons may have contributed to such injury and death."
The errors complained of are (1) that the instruction incorrectly describes the duty of the bus company with reference to leaving 20 feet of the paved part of the open highway for traffic; (2) that the instruction contains theories upon which liability can be based which are not-alleged in the declaration; (3) that the instruction does not furnish a definite guide to the jury as to the specific negligence of which the bus company must be guilty before the jury would be warranted in returning a verdict against the bus company; and (4) that the instruction contains theories upon which liability can be predicated which are not based upon the evidence. We do not think that the criticism made of the instruction is a valid criticism. It was certainly the duty of the bus driver, under the facts in this case, to turn his bus as far to the right as practicable in bringing his bus to a stop. The Klaas automobile was approaching rapidly in plain view of the bus driver, and the two heavily loaded trucks were closing in on tlie bus from tbe rear. Under these conditions which were clearly shown there was no error in that part of the instruction relating to the duty of the bus driver to turn his bus to the right as far as practicable. The other criticisms made have been answered in other parts of this opinion.
In the next instruction complained of the court instructed the jury as follows:
"The court instructs the jury for the plaintiffs that it is the duty of persons about to stop vehicles on or partially on the paved or main traveled portion of a highway to exercise ordinary care for the safety of other persons using such highway, and even if you should believe from the evidence that the driver of defendant's bus gave appropriate signals for a reasonable distance of his purpose to decrease his speed and stop, if you further believe from the evidence that he did not exercise ordinary care for the safety of other persons then using the highway in bringing his bus to a stop at the place and in the manner and under the circumstances shown by the evidence, and that his failure to exercise such ordinary care was a proximate cause of the injury and death of plaintiffs' decedents, it is your duty under your oaths to return a verdict in favor of plaintiffs and against the defendant bus company."
Complaint is made of this instruction on the ground that the instruction failed to furnish the jury a definite guide as to what might constitute negligence on the part of the bus company in bringing its bus to a stop. But this instruction must be considered along with the other instructions which the court granted, and when so considered, we do not think that the instruction is subject to the criticism made of it.
The next instruction granted to the plaintiffs, to which objection is made, relates to the action of the bus driver in turning his bus from a direct course upon the highway and bringing his bus to a stop, without giving an appropriate signal of bis intention to do so for a reasonable distance before doing so. We think that there was no error in the giving of that instruction.
Complaint'is also made of an instruction granted to the plaintiff defining the meaning of proximate cause. The attorneys for the bus company admit that the instruction which the court granted was correct as far as it went. But they contend that the instruction should have included a statement that the bus company was not bound to a prevision or anticipation which would include an unusual, improbable or extraordinary occurrence. But if the bus company wanted an instruction of that kind, it should have requested such instruction.
Complaint is also made that the court refused to grant instructions to the bus company to the effect: (1) That if the jury believed that the accident occurred prior to the time that the appellants' bus came to a stop, then it must find for the appellant; (2) that if the jury believed that the accident would have occurred just as it did, even though the bus had been run completely on to the shoulder of the highway, then the jury should find for the appellant; (3) that if the jury believed that the bus was pulled as far off on the shoulder as was practical, including and taking into consideration sound and safe shoulders and the care of the passengers, it should find for the appellant; and (4) that it was the duty of the driver of the bus to stop and pick up the passengers where he had a clear view of 200 feet in each direction, even though it were not possible to get the bus off of the paved or main traveled section of the highway. For the reasons stated above there was no error in the refusal of the court to' grant the above mentioned instructions.
Finally, the argument is made on behalf of the bus company that the amount of the verdict is excessive. The jury returned a verdict for $50,000.00. The trial judge ordered a remittitur, and entered judgment for the sum of $40,000.00. The record shows that the plaintiffs ' dece dent was 27 years of age at the time of Ms death. His life expectancy was 40.36 years. He was mentally active and in excellent health at the time of his death. He was engaged in the plumbing business and in the sale of electrical and plumbing supplies. He was earning at the time of his death $300.00 per month. The plaintiffs were entirely dependent upon him for financial support. By his death they have been deprived of his financial support and his companionship and protection. We cannot say that the amount of the judgment is excessive.
The appellants, M. S. Cox and Lawyer Partee argue three points as grounds for reversal of the judgment against them: (1) That the verdict of the jury is contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence; (2) that the negligence of Welch, the bus driver, was the proximate cause of the accident; and (3) that the verdict is excessive.
The appellants say that the sole proximate cause of the accident was the negligent manner in which the Continental Southern Lines ' bus was brought to a stop; that Partee, when the cottonseed truck was brought to a sudden stop in front of him was confronted by a sudden emergency, which made it necessary for him to act immediately to avoid bodily harm to himself; and that he chose the course of action which any reasonably prudent person situated as he was would have chosen under similar circumstances. The appellants say that the emergency with which Partee was confronted was not due to Partee's negligence, and that Partee exercised reasonable care to avoid injury to himself and others when the emergency arose, and was not guilty of negligence when his truck collided with the oncoming Studebaker car.
But the rule relating to sudden emergencies cannot be invoked by Lawyer Partee and his employer, for the reason that the testimony of the witnesses and the testimony of Partee himself showed that the emergency was proximately caused by the fault of Partee himself, which contributed to the injury and death of the plaintiffs' decedent. Jones v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc., 211 Miss. 34, 50 So. 2d 902.
Section 8188, Code of 1942, provides that "The driver of a motor vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of such vehicles and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway." The statute also provides that "The driver of any motor truck or motor truck drawing another vehicle, when traveling upon a roadway outside of a business or residence district, shall not follow within 150 feet of another motor truck or motor truck drawing another vehicle."
According to Partee's own testimony, when Smithson applied his brakes, Partee was only 68 feet behind him, and Partee had been following the seed truck at a distance of about 68 feet for at least a mile. Thus it appears from Partee's own testimony the emergency which required immediate action by Partee to avoid a collision with the seed truck was proximately caused by Partee's failure to comply with the requirements of the above mentioned statute. "'Where the situation of peril arises because of the driver's own negligence, the emergency rule cannot be invoked in his behalf." 5 Am. Jur., p. 601, Automobiles, par. 171.
The jury was amply justified in finding that Partee was negligent, and that Partee's negligence proximately contributed to the injury and death of the plaintiffs ' decedent. The'judgment of the lower court is therefore affirmed.
Affirmed.
Hall, Arrington and Ethridge, JJ., concur.
Lee, J., took no part.