Case Name: Edward Herrington v. George T. Holman
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1860-10
Citations: 25 Supp. Tex. 256
Docket Number: 
Parties: Edward Herrington v. George T. Holman.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 25 Supp.
Pages: 256–260

Head Matter:
Edward Herrington v. George T. Holman.
A charge of the court which mistook the purport of the contract, and was not warranted by the evidence, is erroneous; and, as it misled the jury, the judgment will be reversed.
Where the contract was to give mules in exchange for a jack, and the plaintiff complied, the defendant cannot refuse because his mules were lost.
Where the jack answered the description given at the sale, his delivery was a compliance on the part of the vendor.
Appeal from McLennan. The case was tried before Hon. U. "W. Battle, one of the district judges.
Herrington sued Holman “ for ten good mules, of the value of $500,” upon a contract of the plaintiff, agreeing to give the defendant a jack for ten "mules. He averred that he delivered the jack, but the defendant refused to deliver the mules. The defendant answered by the general issue, plead that the jack was warranted to be sound, young, and able to jierform the duties of such an animal, but that he was wanting in the qualities of his vocation. The defendant replied a ratification of the contract, but denied the warranty. The first verdict was for the defendant; at the next two terms the jury disagreed. On the fourth trial, the jury found for the defendant.
The verbal contract was proven by a witness, as follows : “ That about the 1st of March, 1857, the parties called on him to witness a trade, as follows: Plaintiff let defendant have his large brown jack, then in the possession of Bennett, in Limestone county, for ten two-year-old mules, valued at $50 each, the price of the jack being $500. The jack was to be delivered to Holman at his house, in Mc-Lennan county, by the 1st day of June following, and plaintiff was to pay the price of the season to another jack of the jennet of defendant. At the time of the delivery of the jacks, Holman was to deliver to Herrington ten two-year-old mules, worth $50 each. When the trade was being made, Holman asked Herrington in what order the jack was; to which Herrington replied, he did not know; that he expected he was in good order, as Bennett took good care of him; and Herrington asked Holman if he wished to see the jack, and he said not. The following were the conditions agreed upon by the parties: If the
jack died, it was to be no trade; and if thé mules were lost from being altered, it was no trade. Something was said about the jack being in good condition, but witness could not say what it was, as the points aforesaid were foremost. Before the institution of this suit, witness saw plaintiff tender defendant a $ 20-gold piece for the season of his jennet, which is as much, or more than the usual price.”
There was proof that Herrington sent the jack to Holman; that Holman was pleased with him, and “ bragged” on him; that he used him with success as to- his qualities, and invited the patronage of his neighbors. But there was contradictory proof as to whether Holman was pleased when he received the jack. Some of the witnesses swore that he took him to keep him until he could see Herring-ton, because some of his mules were lost, and he did not feel able to pay for him. It was proven that this descendant of Balaam’s saddle-animal was about twelve years old, and the sire of a sufficient progeny to refute the imputation upon his reputation, apd that he maintained his character after Holman received him. “But 1857 was a hard year.” From a thriving condition (some of the witnesses said “thin,” others said “not too thin for use”) he fell off, and in the fall sickened, and died on Holman’s hands. And so the long controversy was as to who was to lose his value. Hpon the facts, Judge Battle instructed the jury as follows: “If the jury believe from the evidence that, if the jack was sold and delivered as alleged by plaintiff and by defendant received, and if the plaintiff practised no imposition or fraud on defendant, and the trade was fully and fairly understood by the parties, the jury will find for plaintiff; but if there was only a tender of the jack to defendant, and the defendant refused to receive the jack as his property because the jack tendered was not in good condition, and the mules to be given in exchange could'not be found, they will find for defendant.”
Nowlin §" Herring, for the appellant.
—The first bill of exceptions questions the admissibility in evidence of the declarations of appellee made at the time of the delivery of the jack to, and in the presence of, McGee, who was simply hired by appellant to carry the jack and deliver him to appellee, with a single message as to the mules. "When he did this, his authority was at an end. Beyond this he could not bind his principal, with whom and himself there was no further legal identity than the scope of his authority extended. (See Greenl. on Ev., §§ 114, 434; Story on Agency, §§ 134, 87, 126, 133, and 134.)
“ To charge upon a hypothesis which has no foundation in the evidence is error, for which the judgment will be reversed, unless it appear that the jury were not misled thereby.” (McGreal v. Wilson, 9 Tex., 426; Lee v. Ham ilton, 12 Tex., 413; Earle v. Thomas, 14 Tex., 583; see also, same vol., Yarborough v. Tate, 483; Hatch v. Garza, 22 Tex., 187.)
If it be true that the mules could not be found, and there is no evidence that such was the case, except the ex parte statement of appellee, which is expressly contradicted by his stock-keeper, a disinterested witness, then, it is submitted that this fact .did not release appellee from the trade, and that appellant alone had the right to complain.
There can be no doubt that the evidence and the issues submitted by the pleadings warranted the instructions numbered one and two asked by appellant and refused by the court.
The main issue was, that appellee never received the jack as his property. The evidence as to his delivery, or as to the manner in -which he was received, conflicted. Should not, then, the subsequent acts and declarations of the appellee have been taken into consideration by the jury in determining how, and as whose property, he was received by appellee? Case in point, Horwood v. Boon, 21 Tex., 592.
Chandler $ Tamer, for appellee,
reviewed the record, and insisted that the judgment was not before the court; that the instruction was substantially correct; and that, the evidence being contradictory, the verdict would not be disturbed.

Opinion:
Wheeler, C. J.
—We think there is error in the charge of the court, by which the jury may have been misled in their finding. The charge supposes that the defendant might rightfully refuse to receive the jack if he were not in good condition, and the mules he was to give in exchange for him could not be found; for the jury are instructed that if the jack was tendered to the defendant, and he refused to receive him for these causes, they should find for the defendant.'
This was not according to the terms of the contract. The defendant had no right, under his contract, to refuse to receive the jack for either of the causes mentioned in the charge. There were contingencies in the contemplation of the contracting parties, upon the happening of which the contract would have been defeated. But these contingencies did not happen. And it does not appear by the evidence that any state of case existed upon which the defendant was at liberty to refuse to receive the animal when tendered to him. The evidence does not establish any positive stipulation as to the condition the animal should be in when delivered. It was supposed he was in good order. Of course it was not contenrplated that he would be in so bad order as materially to affect his value. This may be. supposed to be the tacit understanding of the parties. And the evidence would scarcely warrant the conclusion that the condition of the animal was not such as to fulfill this understanding.' We see nothing in the evidence to warrant the belief that there was any express stipulation 'or tacit implication that the animal was to be delivered in any better condition than the evidence shows him to have been in when delivered. The plaintiff appears to have fulfilled his part of the contract according to its terms and intention, and the defendant does not appear to have shown any sufficient excuse for refusing performance on his part; at least, it does not appear that he was relieved from the duty to perform for the causes supposed by the 'charge of the court.
For the error in the charge, we are of opinion that the judgment must be •
Reversed and the cause remanded.