Case Name: HARRIS v. CITY OF DETROIT
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1981-01-22
Citations: 103 Mich. App. 136
Docket Number: Docket No. 48132
Parties: HARRIS v CITY OF DETROIT
Judges: Before: J. H. Gillis, P.J., and V. J. Brennan and A. C. Miller, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 103
Pages: 136–142

Head Matter:
HARRIS v CITY OF DETROIT
Docket No. 48132.
Submitted June 23, 1980, at Detroit. —
Decided January 22, 1981.
Leave to appeal applied for.
James Harris injured his back on February 1, 1965, during the course of his employment as a rubbish collector with the City of Detroit. Following an operation for a herniated disc, plaintiff returned to work for one day, but found that he could not perform his duties. Plaintiff received workers’ disability compensation benefits for the statutory 500-week period, the last payment being September 2,1974.
On October 8, 1974, plaintiff petitioned the Bureau of Workmen’s Compensation alleging total and permanent disability arising out of the 1965 injury. Plaintiff sought permanent and total disability benefits from the City of Detroit with differential benefits to be paid by the Second Injury Fund. The hearing referee found that plaintiff was totally and permanently disabled by reason of the 1965 injury, ordered the City of Detroit to pay benefits from October 8, 1972, with credit for benefits already paid, and ordered the Second Injury Fund to pay differential benefits from the date of the doctor’s examination establishing the total and permanent disability, the same beginning January 24, 1975. On appeal to the Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board, defendants argued that permanent and total disability had not been shown, while plaintiff argued that the differential benefits should be payable from the date of injury in 1965. The Appeal Board affirmed the referee’s finding of permanent and total disability but ordered that the City of Detroit pay the permanent and total disability benefits from September 3, 1974, the day after the expiration of the prior benefits, and ordered that the Second Injury Fund pay differential benefits from August 1, 1974, that date being 30 days prior to the termination of the prior benefits.
Plaintiff and both defendants sought leave to appeal in the Court of Appeals by separate applications for leave to appeal. The Court of Appeals vacated the order of the Appeal Board and remanded the matter by reason of a failure of a majority of the Appeal Board to join the controlling opinion. (Docket Nos. 78-2943, 78-2944, 78-3304, unpublished order of October 20, 1978). On remand, a majority of the Appeal Board adopted the prior controlling opinion. Plaintiff sought leave to appeal from the redetermination. The Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal (Docket No. 43930, unpublished order of May 31, 1979). Plaintiff sought leave to appeal in the Supreme Court which, in lieu of leave to appeal, remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted. See 407 Mich 906 (1979). On appeal, plaintiff argues that the Appeal Board should have found February 1, 1965, as being the date on which he became permanently and totally disabled and should have ordered differential benefits from that date rather than from August 1, 1974. Defendant Second Injury Fund argues that, since there was evidence supporting the Appeal Board’s determination as to the date of total and permanent disability, that factual determination of the Appeal Board is not subject to review by the Court of Apepals. Held:
References for Points in Headnotes
5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error §§ 609, 820.
82 Am Jur 2d, Workmen’s Compensation § 631.
5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 548.
82 Am Jur 2d, Workmen’s Compensation § 597.
The findings of fact by the Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board are not subject to review by the Court of Appeals except to determine whether there is any evidence to support those findings.
Affirmed.
A. C. Miller, J., dissented. He would hold that the opinion of the Appeal Board indicates that arbitrary decisions were made by the Appeal Board in a transparent attempt by the majority of that body to avoid coming to grips with the real issue presented to it. He would hold that under such circumstances the Court of Appeals need not accept the findings of the Appeal Board even though there is some evidence to support those findings of fact. He would remand.
Opinion of the Court
1. Workers’ Compensation — Appeal — Findings of Fact.
Findings of fact by the Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board are not subject to review by the Court of Appeals except to determine whether there is any evidence to support the board’s findings.
Dissent by A. C. Miller, J.
2. Workers’ Compensation — Appeal — Findings of Fact — Fraud.
Findings of fact by the Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board, while normally not reviewable by the Court of Appeals if there is evidence to support those ñndings, may be reviewed where the Court ñnds an apparent breakdown in the system which is tantamount to fraud; arbitrary determinations by the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board made in a transparent attempt to avoid coming to grips with the issue presented to the board mandate remand to the Appeal Board for further proceedings.
Marston, Sachs, Nunn, Kates, Kadushin & O’Hare, P.C. (by Jeanne Nunn and Granner S. Ries), for plaintiff.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, and Caleb B. Martin, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for defendant Second Injury Fund.
Before: J. H. Gillis, P.J., and V. J. Brennan and A. C. Miller, JJ.
Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
J. H. Gillis, P.J.
We agree with many of the comments made by our colleague. Nevertheless, we are mindful of the following statement taken from Thornton v Luria-Dumes Co-Venture, 347 Mich 160, 162-163; 79 NW2d 457 (1956):
" 'It may not be necessary to repeat what we have so frequently said that this Court does not review the findings of fact of the board, except to determine whether there is any evidence to support the award. The evidence may not be direct; it may be circumstantial. The board not only passes on the credibility of witnesses, but draws its inferences from the circumstances and the facts which it finds established. We may reverse awards for a failure of evidence to support them, but we are not the triers of the facts. With this view in mind, we approach the consideration of this case.' [Meyers v Michigan Central R Co, 199 Mich 134, 137-138; 165 NW 703 (1917)].
"Our jurisdiction, invoked upon issuance and return of certiorari to the workmen's compensation department, is markedly limited. The writ brings us questions of law only. It does not permit scale-weight of evidence and inference here, as on appeals from circuit court judgments, to determine whether administrative findings of fact offend rules governing clear weight and preponderance. Our obligation is to accept, without question, findings that are certified here if there be any evidence whatever to sustain those findings, regardless of thought or suggestion addressed to improbability thereof. Furthermore, and when we employ as above the word 'evidence,' synonymity with the word 'facts' is not intended. 'Evidence' is really the means by which inferences may logically be drawn as to the existence of facts (Tjernstrom v Ford Motor Co, 285 Mich 450, 456 [280 NW 823 (1938)])."
With this in mind, we affirm.
V. J. Brennan, J., concurred.