Case Name: Runyan vs. Stewart
Court: New York Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1850-09-02
Citations: 12 Barb. 537
Docket Number: 
Parties: Runyan vs. Stewart.
Judges: 
Reporter: Barbour's Supreme Court Reports
Volume: 12
Pages: 537–546

Head Matter:
Runyan vs. Stewart.
A mortgage given by husband and wife to secure the purchase money of the mortgaged premises, can not, after having been satisfied and discharged of record, be set up by the assignee of the husband as a bar to his widow’s right of dower.
P. E. R., the plaintiff’s husband, during coverture, conveyed lands to B., subject to a mortgage thereon, executed by P. E. R. and his wife, to the former owner, to secure the purchase money, $1000. At the time of the conveyance, P. E. R. had paid $400 on the mortgage. B. subsequently paid $1200, the balance due upon the mortgage, and the mortgage was satisfied and discharged of record. The defendant was in possession of the premises as a purchaser from a person deriving title from B. Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to dower in the premises; and that she could recover the same in an action at law. Johnson, J. dissented.
This was an action of ejectment, brought by the plaintiff to recover dower, as widow of Philip E. Runyan, deceased, in certain real estate situated in the town of Gorham, Ontario county. Issue being joined, the cause was broughjt to trial at the circuit court held before Welles, justice, in tl>e county of Ontario, in July, 1848. .Upon the trial, the plajntiff gave in evidence a deed from William Gamber and wife to Philip E. Runyan, dated March 31st, 1828, conveying, for the consideration of $1600, one hundred and ten acres of land, being the same premises described in the declaration. The said'Philip E. Runyan was proved to have been the husband of the plaintiff at the date of this deed. It was also proved that he died June 24th, 1845. That he took possession- of the said premises under said deed, and remained in possession over a year. That demand of dower in the premises was made by the plaintiff’s agent, in July, 1847. That the defendant was in possession of said premises, at the time of the commencement of the action. The plaintiff then rested. The defendant then gave in evidence a mortgage executed by the said Philip E. Runyan and Priscilla his wife, dated March 31st, 1828, upon the same premises described in the said deed from Gamber and wife to Philip E. Runyan, of the same date, consideration $1600; conditioned to pay $1600, as follows: $400, April 1st, 1828, and $200 the first day of April, every year thereafter, until the whole amount should be paid. The mortgage referred to a bond bearing even date therewith, conditioned the same as the mortgage, which was also given in evidence, and proved to have been paid April 7th, 1832. P. E. Bunyan paid $400, on the 29th of March, 1828. Satisfaction was entered, and the mortgage discharged of record, April 7th, 1832. Also, a deed from said Philip E. Bunyan to Hozial H. Baker, dated April 21st, 1829, conveying the same premises mentioned in the deed from Gamber and wife to Bunyan, for the consideration, as expressed, of $1600. Also, a deed from Hozial H. Baker and wife, to Philip B. Bunyan, dated April 21st, 1829, conveying a certain five acres of land, part of lot number five, town of Gorham, for the consideration, as expressed, of $650. Also a deed from said Philip E. Bunyan and Priscilla his wife, to Vinson Bunyan, dated December 4th, 1830, conveying- the last mentioned five acres of land, for the consideration, as expressed, of $650.
It was admitted that at the time of the trial Charles Seymour held the title of the premises in question through mesne conveyances under Baker, and that David G. Stewart, the defendant, was in possession under a contract to purchase of Seymour. The said Hoziel H. Baker was then introduced and examined as a witness on behalf of the defendant, and testified as follows : “ In 1829, when the second payment was due upon the bond and mortgage to Gamber, Philip Bunyan was embarrassed, and could not meet it. He and I entered into an arrangement by which we agreed to exchange lands, he to take my five acre lot, valued at $650, and I to take his Gamber lot, valued at $1600 ; I assuming to pay off the balance due on the bond and mortgage to Gamber, for the purchase money, he having paid $400 on them. The consideration in his deed to me, stated to be $1600, was my five acre lot, and the amount due on the bond and mortgage which I had assumed to pay. The consideration stated in my deed to him to be $650, was made by allowing the $400, he had paid on the bond and mortgage to Gamber. He let me have a horse, valued at $100, and a bond against Matthew Eippey, for $333, upon which there had been $40 paid.” The defendant’s counsel then asked the witness the following question, viz. “The $400, paid by Eunyan upon the bond and mortgage to Gamber, the horse and the Eippey bond, amounted to more than the $650, stated in your deed to Eunyan. How was the difference adjusted1?” Answer—“ Philip Eunyan was owing me at the time ; he also remained on the Gamber farm for some time, so that the rent and the amount he owed me squared up every thing. I can not state the items. The whole transaction was an exchange of lands. He took my five acre lot and I his Gamber lot, and I was to pay off the mortgage. I do not remember how long he remained on the farm after the exchange.” Here the evidence closed. The defendant’s counsel requested the justice to instruct the jury, 1st. That at the time Philip E. Eunyan conveyed the premises in which the plaintiff seeks to recover dower, she had no dowable estate or interest in the land thus conveyed, her husband having only an equity of redemption; and the plaintiff having joined in the execution of the mortgage, her dower interest and estate passed to the mortgagee. 2d. That the plaintiff could not set up the payment of the mortgage by her husband’s grantees for the purpose of restoring her right of dower, and that such payment did not restore her legal right of dower. 3d. That after having joined in the execution of the mortgage to Gamber, the plaintiff had no interest or estate in the equity of redemption, which remained in her husband alone, and which was all he conveyed to Baker. And the payment of the mortgage by his grantees, by operation of law, vested the legal title derived through the mortgage, in such grantees, and all the estate which the plaintiff had conveyed by the mortgage to the mortgagee. 4th. That the two transfers of land were mere exchanges; and that the plaintiff, having united with her husband in the conveyance of the land deeded to him by Baker, she had by that act barred herself of the right to make an election after her husband’s death, and had virtually elected to take her dower in that land, and she could not now claim dower in the premises in question. 5th. That if she could claim dower in both, she had not elected to take it in the premises in question, within one year after her husband’s death; she was therefore precluded from electing to take dower in said premises.
The said justice refused so to charge the jury, and directed a verdict for the plaintiff, to vfhich the defendant’s counsel duly excepted. A motion was now made on behalf of the defendant to set aside the verdict, and for a new trial. The case was argued by
Gideon Granger, for the defendant.
Geo. Willson, 2d, for the plaintiff.

Opinion:
Welles, P. J.
In this case I am unable to go with my brother Johnson the length he has gone. If Baker had taken an assignment of the mortgage given by the plaintiff and her husband to Gamber for the purchase money, then I think he might be regarded as holding under it. But instead of doing so, he procured it to be discharged and satisfied of record. There can be no doubt that the husband of the plaintiff acquired an estate in fee by the deed from Gamber, subject to be defeated by the mortgage to the latter. (Runyan v. Mersereau, 11 John. 534, 2d ed. 593. Jackson v. Bronson, 19 Id. 325.) These cases, as well as many others that might be cited, hold that at law as Avell as in equity, a mortgage is merely a security, and the mortgagee has but a chattel interest, and that the freehold is in the mortgagor.
Ho one Avould deny that the plaintiff could maintain this action if the mortgage was still unpaid and in the hands of Gamber the mortgagee, or any assignee of him, other than Baker or his grantees. And it seems to me it would be going beyond any decided case in this state or elseAvhere, with one exception, to hold that a mortgage satisfied and discharged of record can be set up by the assignee of the husband as a bar to his widow's dower. That exception is the case of Popkin v. Bumstead, (8 Mass. Rep. 491,) which I admit goes the length of the doctrine contended for. I have examined it with care, and feel constrained to dissent from the reasoning and conclusion of the court by which it was decided. I think it should be classed among those hard cases which make bad precedents. It is hard, and apparently unjust, in most cases, to allow a widow to recover dotver against the conveyance of the husband. But such hardship ought not to weigh with courts to induce them to overrule settled principles, or to make law for parties. Where a mortgage is paid and satisfied of record, it is destroyed and blotted out of existence. The payment and discharge of record of the mortgage in this case had the effect to remove it as a cloud and incumbrance of Baker's title, and that I think was its only effect upon his title. If he intended to keep it alive and operative for any purpose, he should have procured it to be assigned to him. Possibly Gamber would not have assigned it. And I know of no process by which he could be compelled to'do it. If it should never be enforced, he, Baker, or his assigns, would not be injured by it in fact. If the mortgagee should foreclose, in equity, the plaintiff would have to be a party, and then by paying a share as between her and Baker or his assigns she would be protected in her dowrer. By paying it off voluntarily it becomes extinguished.
I incline to think that Baker might, after he had paid the mortgage, have filed his bill to be subrogated in place of the mortgagee, and have a decree that the plaintiff contribute or be barred. But that, it seems to me, was his only remedy after the mortgage was discharged. The doctrine of subrogation, however, prevails only in a court of equity, and is never enforced in a court of law. A defendant in a judgment, who is merely surety for his co-defendants, and who is compelled to pay the judgment, can not at law enforce the lien of the judgment against his principals, but must resort to a court of equity, to be subrogated to the rights of the plaintiff. This, too, looks hard; nevertheless, the forms of law require it. If Gamber was willing to assign the mortgage, it was Baker's folly that he did not take it. If he had done so, the plaintiff would have been put to her suit in equity for her dower. As it is. I think Baker or his assigns must go there for whatever remedy he or they may be entitled to.
There is nothing, in my judgment, in the other points raised by the defendant's counsel. The evidence does not, I think, show an exchange of lands within the meaning of the statute. (2 R. ¡3. 740, § 3.) The conveyance by Eunyan to Baker of the premises in question was in the nature of a bargain and sale, and the conveyance of the five acres by the latter to the former was in part payment. The amount Baker was to pay Eunyan for the premises was $1600. This was made up by Baker's assumption to pay the balance due on the mortgage, $1200, and the conveyance of the five acre lot at $650. This, however, overpaid the first amount of $1600. To meet such overplus, Eunyan let Baker have a horse at $100, and a bond against one Eippey upon which was due about $300. This again brought Baker in debt upon this trade, and the matter was arranged between them by applying another indebtedness of Eunyan to Baker, and allowing Eunyan to remain in possession of the premises in question, long enough to make all matters even between them. We all agree that this would not amount to an exchange of lands, under the statute.
My opinion is, that a new trial should be denied.
Selden, J. concurred.