Case Name: DICKERSON v. THE STATE
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1999-12-03
Citations: 241 Ga. App. 593
Docket Number: A99A1432
Parties: DICKERSON v. THE STATE.
Judges: Ellington, J., concurs. Blackburn, P. J, concurs fully and specially.
Reporter: Georgia Appeals Reports
Volume: 241
Pages: 593–601

Head Matter:
A99A1432.
DICKERSON v. THE STATE.
(526 SE2d 443)

Opinion:
Barnes, Judge.
Following a jury trial, Rufus Dickerson was convicted of rape and sentenced to 18 years. He appeals, alleging the trial court erred in denying his motions to suppress DNA evidence, to compel a witness's criminal history, for mistrial, and for recusal. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Construed to support the verdict, the evidence presented at trial showed that Anthony Penix hosted a party one evening to watch the Holyfield-Tyson fight. Approximately 15 people attended the party, including Rufus Dickerson. Around midnight, Penix's fiancee, A. H., returned home from work. The party ended around 1:30 or 2:00 a.m., and Penix invited Dickerson to stay on the couch since he had been drinking. A. H. testified that around 2:25 a.m., she went to sleep in her son's bedroom, leaving Penix and Dickerson on the couches in the den.
A. H. further testified that she awoke to find Dickerson on top of her with his penis in her vagina. She asked "what the hell he was doing" and punched him in the face, but "his motions got continually faster." After A. H. screamed for her fiancé, Dickerson slid off the bed, pulled up his pants, and ran out the door. Penix, who was awakened by A. H.'s screams, yelled after Dickerson, who was getting into his car, but Dickerson did not stop.
A. H. called the police, and after they arrived she gave a description of Dickerson and his vehicle. A police officer picked up Dickerson and brought him back to the house, where A. H. identified him. A. H. went to the Rape Crisis Center, where nurses performed a physical examination that uncovered no signs of physical or sexual trauma.
The police took A. H.'s bed sheets for testing. After receiving a lab report verifying that the sheets contained DNA, the investigating officer secured a search warrant to obtain Dickerson's blood for comparison DNA testing. A DNA analyst at the State Crime Lab testified that the DNA in Dickerson's blood matched DNA in the sperm found on the bed sheets. The DNA section manager testified that the odds the sperm came from someone other than Dickerson were one in one hundred billion for the African-American population.
1. In his first assertion of error, Dickerson contends the trial court erred in not suppressing the DNA evidence because the search warrant affidavit did not contain sufficient probable cause to show Dickerson had committed the rape, did not state that relevant material evidence would be found in the search, and did not state that the method used to secure the evidence was safe and reliable. He further contends that the magistrate violated his right to counsel by issuing the search warrant ex parte.
"On appeal of the denial of a motion to suppress, the evidence is to be construed most favorably to the upholding of the findings and judgments made. The trial court's findings must be adopted unless determined to be clearly erroneous." (Punctuation omitted.) Culver v. State, 230 Ga. App. 224, 227 (1) (496 SE2d 292) (1998), citing Bickley v. State, 227 Ga. App. 413, 414 (1) (a) (489 SE2d 167) (1997).
In determining whether sufficient probable cause existed for a magistrate to issue a search warrant, we apply the "totality of the circumstances" analysis set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213 (103 SC 2317, 76 LE2d 527) (1983). Quoting Gates, the Supreme Court of Georgia held:
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. And the duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.
(Punctuation omitted.) State v. Stephens, 252 Ga. 181, 182 (311 SE2d 823) (1984). "Before a warrant may issue, the issuing magistrate must have sufficient reasons to believe that a crime was committed, that the items sought are connected with the crime, and that the items sought will be found in the place to be searched." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) State v. Toney, 215 Ga. App. 64, 65 (449 SE2d 892) (1994).
Here, the investigating officer presented to the magistrate a search warrant affidavit that included A. H.'s description of the alleged rape and of her attacker and statements by A. H. and Penix identifying Dickerson as the attacker. The affidavit specifically stated that "the person of Rufus Joe Dickerson, Jr." was to be searched for "blood as evidence in the crime of rape." Thus, contrary to Dickerson's argument, the facts presented in the officer's affidavit were sufficient to establish probable cause that Dickerson committed the crime and also specified the material evidence to be collected.
Finally, Dickerson argues the trial court erred in not suppressing the DNA evidence because he was denied his right to counsel when his blood was drawn. He argues that, because the search warrant was issued post-indictment, it constituted a critical stage in his criminal prosecution that triggered his right to counsel. However, we have held that "neither the presence of appellant's counsel nor appellant's consent is required for the execution of a warrant calling for the seizure of hair, blood or other body fluids." Johnson v. State, 179 Ga. App. 467, 468 (4) (346 SE2d 903) (1986). Thus, the trial court did not err in denying Dickerson's motion to suppress.
2. Dickerson also contends the trial court erred by denying his motion to compel and thus allowing into evidence the unimpeached testimony of a State witness. Dickerson maintains that under OCGA § 17-16-8 (a), the State must provide to defense counsel the birth dates of all its witnesses. Dickerson argues that, because he did not receive the birth date of a witness until shortly before trial, he could not retrieve her criminal records until after the trial ended. Those records revealed the witness was previously convicted of a crime of moral turpitude, and therefore her testimony would have been impeachable. The prosecuting attorney stated that he gave Dickerson all the witness information the State had in its possession. After much consideration, the trial court held the State could not be compelled to produce information not within its possession and denied Dickerson's motion to compel.
Because Dickerson did not request a continuance at that point, he has waived his right to argue that the trial court erred in allowing the State's witness to testify. See Day v. State, 188 Ga. App. 648, 650-651 (8) (374 SE2d 87) (1988). But for that waiver, we would reverse this conviction, as discussed by the special concurrence, based on the State's failure to meet its mandatory discovery obligations with the resulting harm to the defendant.
3. Dickerson further contends that the trial court erred by denying the motion for mistrial he made after the judge commented on a witness's statement. During Dickerson's cross-examination of a State witness, the State objected to the hypothetical posed, on the ground that the assumptions given were not in evidence. In response to the State's objection, the trial judge said:
The jury heard the testimony, and the jury recognized whatever the testimony was. I don't think there is any testimony before this court that there were ten-ounces of Cognac consumed, I don't — or alcohol. I don't think that's what he said. I think he said probably a ten ounce glass. . As mixed drinks, but he thought. . . .
Dickerson objected and moved for a mistrial under OCGA § 17-8-57, which provides: "It is error for any judge in any criminal case, during its progress or in his charge to the jury, to express or intimate his opinion as to what has or has not been proved or as to the guilt of the accused." The trial court denied the motion, explaining that its statement did "not amount to improper judicial comment which goes to the guilt or innocence of the accused. It merely represented the Court's recollection of the evidence with regard to a hypothetical."
The trial court then offered to give a curative instruction, which Dickerson declined. At the end of trial, the court charged the jury that they were the sole determiners of the evidence, and that no ruling or comment by the court during the trial was intended "to express any opinion upon the facts of this case, upon the credibility of the witnesses, upon the evidence, or upon the guilt or innocence of the defendant."
"Remarks of a judge assigning a reason for his ruling are neither an expression of opinion nor a comment on the evidence." (Punctuation omitted.) Johnson v. State, 234 Ga. App. 58, 59 (1) (506 SE2d 212) (1998), citing McGinnis v. State, 258 Ga. 673, 675 (4) (372 SE2d 804) (1988). Here, the trial judge properly ruled on the State's objection to a hypothetical on the ground that the assumptions given were not in evidence. Even assuming the trial judge's comments were opinions as to what had been proven in the case, OCGA § 17-8-57 does not extend to colloquies between the judge and counsel regarding the admissibility of evidence. Rowe v. State, 266 Ga. 136, 139 (2) (464 SE2d 811) (1996); Johnson v. State, supra, 234 Ga. App. at 59. We find no error in the trial court's denial of Dickerson's motion for mistrial.
4. In his fourth assertion of error, Dickerson argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for disqualification and recusal of the trial judge, followed by his motion for mistrial. Before the director of counseling services at the Gwinnett Sexual Assault Center testified for the State, the trial judge excused the jury and informed counsel he had made charitable contributions to the Center, including a $500 donation for their new building. The trial judge said he had never been to the building nor did he know anyone working at the Center. In response, Dickerson moved to recuse the judge, asserting that the contributions made the judge's impartiality questionable. The trial court denied the motion.
Under former Rule 25.2 (current Rule 25.3) of the Uniform Rules for the Superior Courts,
[wjhen a judge is presented with a motion to recuse, or disqualify, accompanied by an affidavit, he shall temporarily cease to act upon the merits of the matter and shall immediately determine the timeliness of the motion and the legal sufficiency of the affidavit, and make a determination, assuming any of the facts alleged in the affidavit to be true, whether recusal would be warranted. If it is found that the motion is timely, the affidavit sufficient and that recusal would be authorized if some or all of the facts set forth in the affidavit are true, another judge shall be assigned to hear the motion to recuse.
(Punctuation and emphasis omitted.) Birt v. State, 256 Ga. 483, 484 (1) (350 SE2d 241) (1986).
Here, the trial court considered the timeliness and legal sufficiency of the affidavit accompanying the motion to recuse and held that the facts alleged did not show bias or prejudice toward an involved party. The Center employed two of the witnesses and was not a party directly involved in the criminal proceedings, and the judge voluntarily told the parties of his charitable contributions.
USCR 25.2 states that "[a]llegations consisting of bare conclusions and opinions shall not be legally sufficient to support the motion or warrant further proceedings." The conclusory allegations in Dickerson's affidavit, assuming them to be true, failed to show the alleged bias was "of such a nature and intensity to prevent the defendant from obtaining a trial uninfluenced by the court's prejudice." (Punctuation omitted.) Birt v. State, supra, 256 Ga. at 486. Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court's determination that no further hearing was necessary on Dickerson's recusal motion.
5. Finally, Dickerson argues the trial judge erred in denying a second motion to recuse, filed after the judge commented publicly on the previous recusal motion. A newspaper article published during the trial began: "Superior Court Judge James Oxendine rejected a defense motion to recuse himself from a rape trial Monday, saying donations he made to the Gwinnett Rape Crisis Center do not affect his impartiality." The article quoted the judge as follows:
Oxendine said there was no basis for the accusation. "You've got to have more connection than that, and I don't know a single person who works for the rape crisis center," he said in an interview. "I simply gave money when they were out trying to build a new building. I have absolutely no contact with them. . . . I've always felt like one ought to try to support your community, and they're not a political organization or anything."
(Ellipsis in original.)
Dickerson asserts these comments reflected adversely on the judge's impartiality. As in Division 4, the trial court's comment concerning the first motion to recuse demonstrated neither bias nor prejudice that would influence him and impede or prevent impartiality in the case. Birt v. State, supra, 256 Ga. at 486. We find no error in the trial court's denial of the second motion to recuse.
Judgment affirmed.
Ellington, J., concurs. Blackburn, P. J, concurs fully and specially.