Case Name: W.W., the father, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2002-03-13
Citations: 811 So. 2d 791
Docket Number: No. 4D01-3182
Parties: W.W., the father, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Appellee.
Judges: WARNER, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 811
Pages: 791–796

Head Matter:
W.W., the father, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Appellee.
No. 4D01-3182.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
March 13, 2002.
T. Charles Shafer, Fort Pierce, for appellant.
Lorraine Smith of Guardian Ad Litem Program, Fort Pierce, and Crystal Y. Yates-Hammond, Fort Pierce, for appel-lee.

Opinion:
KLEIN, J.
Appellant's parental rights were terminated on two grounds: (1) because he had been incarcerated for a substantial portion of his children's minority, and (2) because he was a sexual predator. We reverse.
Appellant pled guilty to a lewd and lascivious act arising out of his having had sex with a fourteen year old girl. He was sentenced to fifty-four months followed by two years probation, with a condition that he not have unsupervised contact with minor children other than his own children. At the time of his incarceration, appellant's children were one, four and five years old. They are now four, seven and eight years old. Appellant was released in November, 2001, apparently having served forty-eight months of his sentence.
Prior to this incarceration, appellant served twenty months for arson and burglary before any of the children were born, and six months for violation of parole when the first and second children were under two years old.
The Department of Children and Families ("DCF") asserted a number of grounds for terminating appellant's parental rights, including abandonment; however, the trial court found that the state proved only two grounds. The first is section 39.806(l)(d)l, Florida Statutes (2001), which provides in part:
The department . may petition for the termination of parental rights under any of the following circumstances:
(d) When the parent of a child is incarcerated in a state or federal correctional institution and .
1. The period of time for which the parent is expected to be incarcerated will constitute a substantial portion of the period of time before the child will attain the age of 18 years;
The trial court interpreted this statute to authorize termination where a parent is incarcerated for a substantial portion of the children's minority to date. That, however, is contrary to the language that the parent's "expected" incarceration "will constitute a substantial portion of the period of time before the child will attain the age of eighteen years." In the present case, appellant's incarceration was to end within several months after entry of the judgment. Fifty-four months, which is the total appellant will have served after the birth of the first child, is not a "substantial portion" of eighteen years. In addition, the language used in the statute speaks to the future, not the past.
The trial court also concluded that appellant's parental rights could be terminated under section 39.806(l)(d)2 which provides as a ground for termination that the parent is incarcerated and has been determined to be a sexual predator as defined in section 775.21. The trial court found that appellant was a sexual predator under section 775.21(4)(a)l.b; however, DCF concedes that this section is not applicable because it requires prior convictions which do not exist in this case.
DCF argues, however, that appellant meets the definition of a sexual predator found in section 775.21(4)(a)l.a. That statute is inapplicable because it requires a current conviction of a capital, life or first degree felony. Appellant's conviction was of a felony of a lesser degree.
A more basic problem with DCF's assertion that appellant is a sexual predator is that section 39.806(l)(d)2, Florida Statutes (2001), on which DCF relies, provides that parental rights may be terminated when "[t]he incarcerated parent has been determined by the court to be . a sexual predator as defined in s. 775.21." The term "sexual predator" as defined in section 775.21 is a legal classification which results from written findings made by the sentencing court in the criminal case. § 775.21(5), Fla. Stat. (2001). In the present case, appellant was not designated a sexual predator by the criminal court nor were any of the other procedures set forth in section 775.21 followed.
In order to terminate parental rights, which constitute a fundamental liberty interest, the state must show by clear and convincing evidence that there will be a substantial risk of significant harm to the children such as abuse, neglect or abandonment. Padgett v. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 577 So.2d 565 (Fla.1991). Although appellant has had difficulty living within the lawj he did live with the family and provide for the children at times when he was not incarcerated. The trial court found that appellant did not abandon his children and, in the absence of proof of any other statutory reasons for termination, we are compelled to reverse.
WARNER, J., concurs.
FARMER, J., concurs specially with opinion.
. We cannot agree with Judge Farmer that the trial court could now grant relief under section 39.806(l)(d)3, which applies only to an "incarcerated parent." Appellant is no longer incarcerated.