Case Name: ALEXANDER McFADDEN, Appellant, v. VAN BUREN ALLEN and Others, Respondents
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1888-11
Citations: 57 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 361
Docket Number: 
Parties: ALEXANDER McFADDEN, Appellant, v. VAN BUREN ALLEN and Others, Respondents.
Judges: Learned, P. L, concurred.
Reporter: Supreme Court Reports (Hun)
Volume: 57
Pages: 361–366

Head Matter:
ALEXANDER McFADDEN, Appellant, v. VAN BUREN ALLEN and Others, Respondents.
Removing a portion of the machinery of a saw-mill and substituting other machinery for it by a person entering under a parol contract of purchase — when the substituted machinery becomes a part of the realty as to a purchaser under a foreclosure of a prior mortgage of which the contract vendee had notice.
Upon the trial of an action, brought by the plaintiff to recover the value of certain structures, machinery and other articles described in the complaint which the plaintiff had placed upon a parcel of land, to which his father, Jeremiah McFadden, held the legal title, the evidence showed that the plaintiff entered upon the said premises by virtue of a parol agreement between himself and his father, by the terms of which, upon performing certain conditions, he was to become owner thereof; that when the plaintiff entered upon the said premises there was standing thereon a saw-mill, in which there were machinery and fixtures for sawing lumber, and that he removed a portion thereof and substituted other machinery in its place, and that he added to and repaired the building. At the time the arrangement was made "between the plaintiff and his father the premises were subject to a mortgage which had been executed by Jeremiah McFadden to Austin Wallace to secure the payment of $400, of which the plaintiff had notice; which mortgage was subsequently foreclosed by action, the present plaintiff being made a party defendant thereto but not appearing or interposing any defense therein. The premises were sold at public auction and bid in by a subsequent mortgagee, who thereafter conveyed them to the defendants in this action, who went into possession thereof as purchasers in good faith.
The present plaintiff undertook by force to remove the machinery and other improvements which he had placed upon the premises, and partially succeeded in doing so, but was interrupted before he had fully accomplished his purpose,' he then brought this actioh to recover the value of the articles which he was prevented from removing.
Held, that whatever might be the rights of the plaintiff, as against his father under their agreement, it was clear that, as against the defendants, who derived their title through the foreclosure of the Wallace mortgage, and the conveyance to them by the mortgagee, who purchased at the foreclosure sale, that such machinery and other improvements must be regarded, in view of all the facts and circumstances of this case, as a part of the realty, and as such belonged to the defendants. (Landon, J., dissenting.)
McRea v. Central National Bank (66 N. Y., 501); Snedeker v. Warring (12 id., 171) followed.
Appeal from a judgment of nonsuit rendered upon the trial of this action at the St. Lawrence Circuit, and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of St. Lawrence on October 25, 1887.
Horace JD. Ellsworth, for the appellant.
John G. Keeler, for the respondents.

Opinion:
Ingalls, J.:
¥e think the nonsuit directed at the circuit was proper under the facts developed at the trial. The action-was brought by the plaintiff to recover the value of certain structures, machinery and other articles described in the complaint, and which the plaintiff placed upon a parcel of land, of which his father, Jeremiah MeFadden, held the legal title. The plaintiff claims that the defendants wrongfully detained said property vand converted the same to then-use. The evidence shows that when the plaintiff entered upon said premises there was standing thereon a saw-mill, in which there were machinery and fixtures for sawing lumber, and that he removed a portion thereof and substituted other machinery in its place, and that he added to and repaired the building. Such entry upon the premises seems to have been by virtue of a parol agreement between the plaintiff and his father, by the terms of which the plaintiff, upon performing certain conditions, was to become the owner thereof. It seems quite apparent from the evidence that there was no intention on the part of either the plaintiff or his father to create the relation of landlord and tenant between them, and seemingly the improvements were placed upon the premises by the plaintiff without any expectation on his part to be at liberty to remove the same in the character of a tenant, but rather with the purpose of becoming the owner of the premises and thereby reaping the benefit of such improvements. Such we deem the reasonable inference •to be drawn from the evidence, and upon such state of facts the law would regard the plaintiff as standing, in equity, in the light of a pui-chaser of the premises. (Freeman v. Freeman, 48 N. Y., 34; Martin v. Rector, 30 Hun, 139; affirmed in 101 N. Y., 77.) At the time the arrangement was made between the plaintiff and his father the premises were subject to a mortgage which had been executed by Jeremiah 'McFadden to Orson Wallace to secure the payment of $400, of which the plaintiff had notice. Such mortgage was subsequently foreclosed by action, and the plaintiff herein was made a party defendant thereto, but interposed no defense, nor did he even appear in such action. The premises were sold at pub- lie auction and bid in by the Misses Harrison, who held a subsequent mortgage upon said premises; and after such sale had became confirmed they conveyed the premises to the defendants in this action, who went into the possession thereof as purchasers in good faith. The plaintiff undertook, by foi-ce, to remove the machinery and other improvements which he had 'placed upon the premises, and partially succeeded, but was interrupted before he had fully accomplished his purpose, and now seeks in this action to recover the value of the articles which he was prevented from removing. Whatever may be the rights of the plaintiff, as against his father under their arrangement, we are clearly of the opinion that as against these defendants, who derive their title through the foreclosure of the Wallace mortgage and the conveyance to them by the Misses Harrison, who purchased at the foreclosure sale, that such machinery and other improvements must be regarded, in view of all the facts and circumstances of this case, as part of the realty, aud as such to belong to the defendants. (McRea v. Cent. N. Bank, 66 N. Y., 501; Snedeker v. Warring, 12 id., 171.) The removal by the plaintiff of the machinery and other articles from the mill after he went into possession, could but have the effect to impair the security under the mortgage, provided he should be allowed to appropriate to his own use the substituted machinery and fixtures. The plaintiff assumed control of the premises, with full knowledge of the mortgage, and we think that his version of the transaction in regard to his right to remove the improvements is inconsistent with the other facts of the case. The letters which he addressed to Mr. Harrison, and which are found at folio 175 of the case, are strongly at variance with the theory upon which he seeks to sustain this action. In those letters he states, in unequivocal terms, that he was the owuer in fee simple of the premises upon which the improvements were placed. The letter, exhibit No. 3, contains the following: " I have paid father for land, and have deed of same subject to mortgage. By placing the wood lot and mill lot in mortgage, can give you mortgage on same. Mr. Harrison, will you help me ? If so, I can swing ; if not, I stand a chance to lose what I have paid on engine and land." It further appears that the plaintiff united with his father in a mortgage which embraced the premises in question, on the 16th day of June, 1885. It would seem, from all the facts of the case, that the pretense of the plaintiff that he was at liberty to remove the improvements from the premises, was, an after-thought, prompted by a desire to save something from the wreck, after his failure to secure money by mortgage, and certainly his conduct does not savor of honesty. If the view which we have taken of the case is sound, it follows that the court properly overruled the offer of plaintiff's counsel to prove the facts stated at folio 170 of this case, as such proposed evidence was immaterial and incompetent, in view of the facts established when the offer was made and the law applicable thereto.
We conclude that the cause was properly decided at the circuit and that the judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
Learned, P. L, concurred.