Case Name: James C. Lynch v. State of Indiana
Court: Supreme Court of Indiana
Jurisdiction: Indiana
Decision Date: 1972-04-05
Citations: 258 Ind. 284
Docket Number: No. 970S226
Parties: James C. Lynch v. State of Indiana.
Judges: 
Reporter: Indiana Reports
Volume: 258
Pages: 284–295

Head Matter:
James C. Lynch v. State of Indiana.
[No. 970S226.
Filed April 5, 1972.]
James H. Douglas, Douglas, Douglas & Dottglas, of Valparaiso, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Robert A. Zaban, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.

Opinion:
Givan, J.
Appellant was charged with the crime of second degree burglary. Trial by court resulted in a finding of guilty. Appellant was sentenced to the Indiana State Reformatory for not less than two nor more than five years.
The record reveals the following facts:
Indiana State Police Trooper Richard E. Pinnell was patrolling Highway 12 near the town of Pines in Porter County, Indiana, in the early morning hours of January 12, 1970. As the trooper drove east on the highway he observed the appellant's car headed in the same direction moving at a slower than normal rate of speed. As the trooper approached, appellant's car drove from the highway into a trucking company lot and stopped approximately 75 yards from the company building. This action aroused the suspicion of the officer who proceeded down the highway a short distance, then turned around to investigate. As the officer traveled west on the highway he saw appellant's car again enter the highway also traveling in a westward direction but without headlights or taillights. After following appellant's vehicle a short distance, the officer turned on his red lights and spotlight and stopped appellant's vehicle. When the officer turned on his spotlight he observed the passenger in appellant's car remove his coat apd lay it in the back seat of the car. The officer testified:
"This got me curious and worried at the same time as to why they would be doing this because it was chilly that night."
The officer approached the appellant's vehicle with both the appellant and his passenger still in the front seat. The officer asked the appellant for his driver's license and registration. At the same time he observed beer and cigarettes laying in the back seat where the passenger had placed his jacket. The passenger appeared to be under 21 years of age and the officer first suspected this might be the reason they were trying to hide the presence of beer in the car.
The officer then asked the occupants to get out of the vehicle. When the driver's door was opened, the officer discovered a hunting knife laying on the floor beside the driver's seat. The officer required the two men to go to the rear of their car, placing them between the two vehicles. At this time the officer observed a money order machine on the back seat of the car.
Identification papers established that James Lynch, the appellant, was the driver of the vehicle and Gerald Lynch was the passenger.
The officer asked them what they were doing with a money order machine. Gerald Lynch stated that it was his company's machine. Upon closer examination the officer saw money order blanks in the name of the "Pines Grocery." At this time the officer notified the State Police Post that he had two suspects who he believed had committed a burglary in the area; that he was not sure where the burglary had been committed, but he suspected that it was the Pines Grocery.
After securing the prisoners, Tropper Pinnell, accompanied by Trooper Bonfield, who had answered Pinnell's call for assistance, proceeded to the Pines Grocery where they discovered a burglary had been committed. Several of the items found in the back seat of appellant's car were identified by the owner of the Pines Grocery as items taken from the store that evening.
Prior to the trial the appellant had filed a motion to suppress the evidence which had been in the back seat of his automobile and was seized at the time of his arrest. The motion to suppress was overruled and appellant's oral objection to the introduction of such evidence was overruled during the trial. It is appellant's contention the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress. It is appellant's contention that the evidence was obtained as a result of an illegal search. He claims the search was illegal because there was no arrest for any crime prior to the searching of the automobile. We observe the appellant to be wrong in two respects. First, there was no search conducted by the arresting officer. The items of evidence which the appellant claims were obtained by a "search" were in open view in the back seat of the car at the time the officer made a lawful arrest for operating a motor vehicle on the highway at night without lights. The fact that one of the men in the automobile placed a coat over some of the items which had been taken in an earlier burglary did not in our opinion constitute a sufficient covering of the items to necessitate a search to determine their presence. The police officer testified that when he turned on his spotlight and red light he observed one of the men in the car place the coat in the back seat. After stopping the car, when the officer shined his light into the back seat the coat was obviously covering objects which were plainly there. Alcorn v. State (1970), 255 Ind. 491, 265 N. E. 2d 413, 24 Ind. Dec. 268.
Appellant is also mistaken in his claim that no arrest occurred prior to the discovery of the items in the vehicle. From the time the officer first observed the vehicle the occupants acted in a suspicious and furtive manner and obviously took evasive action in an attempt to escape the officer's observation, even to the point of violating the law in driving on a public highway in darkness without any lights. At the time the officer turned on his red light and spotlight stopping the appellant and his companion a valid arrest was made. Peterson v. State (1968), 250 Ind. 269, 234 N. E. 2d 488, 13 Ind. Dec. 321.
If we would assume for the sake of argument that a search was conducted by the officer to determine the presence of the stolen goods, there was ample evidence from which the trier of fact could determine that the officer had probable cause to conduct such a search.
From these facts the trial court could find that the officer had probable cause to suspect that a felony had been committed. The fact that the officer did not know that the particular burglary during which the property had been taken had been committed is of no moment in the instant case.
This Court has previously stated in Stearsman et al. v. State (1957), 237 Ind. 149, 167, 143 N. E. 2d 81:
"Appellants appear to contend that since the arresting officer did not know of the burglary which had been committed in Evansville, Indiana, at the time of the arrest, they could not have had reasonable cause to believe then that the appellants were guilty of the burglary for which they were convicted. In our opinion the above quotation from the Pearman Case is not subject to any such construction.
"It has long been the settled rule in Indiana that evidence obtained incidental to an arrest upon reasonable cause to believe that the person arrested has committed a felony, not necessarily the one for which such person might eventually be tried and convicted, is admissible in the trial for an offense other than that for which the arrest is made. Haverstick v. State (1925), 196 Ind. 145, 150, 147 N. E. 625; Smith v. State (1939), 215 Ind. 629, 634, 21 N. E. 2d 709; Rucker v. State (1948), 225 Ind. 636, 639, 77 N. E. 2d 355; Arthur v. State, supra (1949), 227 Ind. 493, 499, 86 N. E. 2d 698. Hence, the evidence obtained as an incident to the arrest of appellants, even though the probable cause for their arrest was the belief that another felony had been committed, was admissible on their trial for the commission of another felony — the burglary in Evansville, Indiana."
The very use of the words "probable cause" or "reasonable grounds to believe" when used in conjunction with arrest by a peace officer for a felony indicates that the officer is not in possession of all the information which may be necessary to support a conviction. If the officer was in possession of such information, then we would have an arrest of a person for the commission of a felony in the presence of an officer, and the question of "probable cause" or "reasonable grounds for belief" would not exist. This is well recognized in this and many other jurisdictions. See Bays v. State (1959), 240 Ind. 37, 49, 159 N. E. 2d 393. In a footnote at page 49 in the Bays case this Court cited 4 Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure, § 1596, p. 244, as follows:
" 'He (an officer) may arrest any person who he, upon reasonable grounds, believes has committed a felony, even though it afterward appears that no felony was actually perpetrated.' "
Were we to hold in situations such as in the case at bar that an alert and observing police officer, who observes conduct such as that above described, cannot follow through on reasonable deductions from these observations, even to the extent of looking into the back seat of the vehicle which he has lawfully stopped for a traffic violation, then we are making a mockery of good police work. This Court previously stated in Capps v. State (1967), 248 Ind. 472, 479, 229 N. E. 2d 794, 11 Ind. Dec. 287:
"In our modern mass society, in which a felon can quickly escape to the safety of his residence or disappear into the crowd after breaking the law, fast action by law enforcement agencies which might result in apprehension of the criminal within minutes of the crime is of great importance. Where the police demonstrate an ability to accomplish an almost instantaneous arrest of the wrongdoer, as was done in this case, public confidence in law enforcement agencies grows, the public sense of security is strengthened, and po tential felons may be moved to reconsider the magnitude of the risk they would take by laying their freedom on the line in committing a serious crime.
"It would be neither wise nor judicious for this Court to penalize the police for their efficiency and alertness where their action, has not resulted in the infringement of a citizen's substantial rights. For this Court to say that the information possessed by the arresting officers in this case was not sufficient or trustworthy enough to give them probable cause to arrest the defendant would be to take the handcuffs off the criminal and put them on the police."
To emphasize the urgency of the need for the officer to make an investigation such as that made in this case, let us suppose that instead of stolen merchandise the appellant had covered a small child, who had been kidnapped and bound and gagged, would it be reasonable to say that the police officer before being permitted to lift the coat to discover the child, would have to have the vehicle towed to a garage, go before a magistrate, obtain a warrant, return to the vehicle and then discover the child. We do not perceive this to be the law in Indiana.
The trial court is affirmed.
Arterburn, C. J. and Hunter and Prentice, JJ., concur; De-Bruler, J., dissents with opinion.