Case Name: Booker T. BOLTON, Jr., Appellant, v. John DOE, Respondent
Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1976-03-11
Citations: 266 S.C. 344
Docket Number: 20189
Parties: Booker T. BOLTON, Jr., Appellant, v. John DOE, Respondent.
Judges: Lewis, C. J., and Rhodes and Gregory, JJ., concur.
Reporter: South Carolina Reports
Volume: 266
Pages: 344–352

Head Matter:
20189
Booker T. BOLTON, Jr., Appellant, v. John DOE, Respondent.
(223 S. E. (2d) 187)
J. Frank Hartman, Esq., of Columbia, for Appellant,
Messrs. Rogers, McDonald, McKenzie & Fuller, of Columbia, for Respondent,
March 11, 1976.

Opinion:
Ness, Justice:
Appellant seeks review of summary judgment entered in favor of the respondent. The lower court ruled that appellant was not entitled to coverage under the uninsured motorist provision of an automobile insurance policy due to his failure to comply with South Carolina Code § 46-750.34 (1975 -Cum. Supp.). We believe the appellant substantially met the requirements of the statute. Accordingly, the judgment is reversed and remanded.
On March 10, 1972, the appellant was allegedly a passenger in a vehicle which was involved in a collision in the city of Columbia with an unknown vehicle. Two- days later the appellant consulted an attorney and, on that day, the attorney mailed a South Carolina Traffic Collision Report to the Safety Responsibility Section of the State Highway Department. No other police authorities were notified, nor were any extenuating circumstances advanced by affidavit for the failure to inform other police authorities of the accident.
The lower court found the mailing of the report was insufficient compliance with South Carolina Code § 46-750.34 (1975 Cum. Supp.) which provides:
"If the owner or operator of any motor vehicle which causes bodily injury or property damage to the insured be unknown, there shall be no right of action or recovery under the uninsured motorist provision, unless (1) The insured or someone in his behalf shall have reported the accident to some appropriate police authority within a reasonable time . . ." (Emphasis supplied).
The sole -issue in this appeal is whether mailing the report to the Highway Department satisfied the statutory provision relating to "some appropriate police authority."
Appellant contends that the South Carolina Highway Department has police authority over all the streets and high ways of the State pursuant to South Carolina Code § 33-21 and, therefore, it should be considered a "police authority" under the terms of § 46-750.34. Respondent asserts that police authority refers to the police officials at police headquarters in a municipality where the collision occurred, or the sheriff's office, or the South Carolina Highway Patrol, rather than the Highway Department.
The statute, read in conjunction with the uninsured motorist insurance statute, South Carolina Code § 46-750.33, attempts to balance the need for providing coverage for victims of hit and run accidents, while protecting the insurer from fraudulent claims. Cf. Coker v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 251 S. C. 175, 161 S. E. (2d) 175 (1968). See McKay v. Highlands Ins. Co., 287 So. (2d) 393 (Fla. App. 1973). The reporting requirement may inflict a hardship upon the victim of a hit and run accident who has paid for coverage, but is unaware of the need to report the accident, however, the legislature has determined some prompt reporting is necessary to facilitate investigation and to adequately protect the insurer. It is the province of the legislature to create a right of action and declare the procedure for collecting from an insurance carrier for loss caused by hit and run driving. Criterion Ins. Co. v. Hoffman, 258 S. C. 282, 188 S. E. (2d) 459 (1972).
While the legislative intention is easy to discern, its application to the facts of this case is more difficult. Accordingly, we shall review the genealogy of the statute.
Section 46-750.34 was enacted in 1963. It replaced South Carolina Code § 46-750.15 (1962) which incorporated by reference South Carolina Code § 46-326 — 328 (1962). Those sections imposed a dual notice requirement as a condition precedent to maintenance of an action under the uninsured motorist coverage. Section 46-326 required:
"The driver of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any person shall immediately by the quickest means of communication, whether oral or written, give notice of such accident to the local police department if such accident occurs within a municipality, otherwise to the office of the county sheriff or the nearest office of the South Carolina Highway Patrol." (Emphasis supplied).
Section 46-327 required a written report to the South Carolina Highway Department within five days. It was this report which the appellant mailed two days after the accident.
The present statute imposes no definitive burden of an immediate notice, nor does it specify who must be notified. The current statute is adaptable to the exigencies of each claim. It substitutes an elastic requirement of notice within a "reasonable time" to "some appropriate police authority." Hence, it is apparent that the legislature has infused a degree of flexibility into a previously rigid statute. Apparently, the legislature thought the balance 'between extending coverage for legitimate claims and protecting the insurer from fraudulent claims needed to be modified in favor of the claimant.
Respondent does not argue the two days delay was unreasonable. His sole contention is that the report was not sent to "some appropriate police authority." It is argued that the Safety Responsibility Section of the Highway Department is entirely administrative and that no investigation would ensue by virtue of filing the report with it. Consequently, respondent argues that if the appellant prevails, one of the primary purposes of the notice provision would be defeated.
South Carolina Code § 46-327 authorizes the Department to "require any driver of a vehicle involved in an accident of which report must be made as provided in this section to file supplemental reports whenever the original report is insufficient in the opinion of the De partment and may require witnesses of accidents to render reports to the Department." Accordingly, although in practice the Highway Department may not investigate when a report is filed, it is authorized by statute to do so. The hapless victim of an accident has no way to know what follow up measures will be taken by the Highway Department.
A statute is not to be read in an atmosphere of sterility, but in the context of what actually happens when human beings go about the fulfillment of its purposes. One who reports an accident to the Highway Department reports the occurrence, and not in terms of the legal consequences which may follow. Actually, all that happens is that report of an accident to police probably will trigger an investigation but not necessarily. In similar circumstances, courts have held statutory reporting requirements were honored. Rodrigues v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp., 54 Misc. (2d) 361, 282 N. Y. S. (2d) 625 (1967) (report to a uniformed hospital security guard who was not technically a "police officer" held adequate); Boxill v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp., 33 A. D. (2d) 13, 304 N. Y. S. (2d) 633 (1969) (policeman notified of accident, but not that it was a hit and run accident, held adequate under the circumstances); Walsh v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 91 Ill. App. (2d) 156, 234 N. E. (2d) 394 (Ill. 1968) (insured telephoned police but made no formal report because police informed insured an investigation would not be practical, held adequate).
We think the statute was complied with to the same end as though reported to the local police officer. The statute only requires reporting of the accident to "some" appropriate police authority, not necessarily the most appropriate police authority. The word "some" grants discretion to the appellant-claimant. See Hotsel v. Simmons, 258 Wis. 234, 45 N. W. (2d) 683 (Wis. 1951). In light of the amendatory changes to the statute, the appellant's exercise of that discretion in promptly filing a report with the Highway Department should not bar his action.
Reversed and Remanded.
Lewis, C. J., and Rhodes and Gregory, JJ., concur.
Littlejohn, J., dissents.