Case Name: Hall Caldwell RODGERS v. Oral Mae RODGERS
Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 1981-01-26
Citations: 271 Ark. 762
Docket Number: 80-203
Parties: Hall Caldwell RODGERS v. Oral Mae RODGERS
Judges: Hickman, J., concurs.
Reporter: Arkansas Reports
Volume: 271
Pages: 762–768

Head Matter:
Hall Caldwell RODGERS v. Oral Mae RODGERS
80-203
611 S.W. 2d 175
Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered January 26, 1981
[Rehearing denied March 2, 1981.]
John W. Hockett, for appellant.
Frederick S. “Rick” Spencer, for appellee.

Opinion:
Frank Holt, Justice.
Following a valid Texas divorce, appellee filed an action for partition of their real property in Arkansas which was held by her and appellant during their marriage as tenants by the entirety. After an evidentiary hearing, the chancellor found that the divorce obtained by appellee in Texas converted the tenancy by the entirety to a tenancy in common, the property is subject to partition, and should be sold and divided equally between them. Appellant urges that the court erred in finding that the Texas divorce decree altered the title of the real property from one of tenancy by the entirety to one of tenancy in common and in not finding he was entitled to claim the estate by the entirety as his homestead under Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-1801 (Supp. 1979) since he occupies it.
The parties retired and moved to Arkansas from Texas in 1970 and built their home here. In January, 1975, appellee left appellant and returned to Texas to live with her married daughter. In December of that year she filed for divorce in Texas, which was granted in May, 1976. In the meantime appellee had filed an action in Arkansas to enforce a temporary order of the Texas court regarding the couple's property. However, this action was dismissed in September, 1976, after the Texas divorce was granted. The chancellor in the Arkansas proceeding declined to give full faith and credit to the Texas decree, stating that the Texas court did not have in rem jurisdiction of the property and, therefore, the decree was unenforceable inasmuch as it attempted to divide the couple's property. He did not reach the question whether the Arkansas court had jurisdiction to order sale of the property and stated another action needed to be filed. No appeal was taken from this decision. Subsequently, the present partition action was filed.
Appellant argues that a foreign divorce decree cannot affect title to land in Arkansas, citing Tolley v. Tolley, 210 Ark. 144, 194 S.W. 2d 687 (1946). We agree. Even so, a study of two enactments of our legislature clearly indicates the intent of that body that an estate by the entirety should be dissolved by an Arkansas court when the marital status is terminated by divorce. Prior to 1947 an estate by the entirety could not be dissolved by the court pursuant to a divorce decree. However, the legislature in that year passed Act No. 340, § 1, Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-1215 (Repl. 1962), which provided that chancery courts within Arkansas had the power to dissolve estates by the entirety upon the rendition of a final decree of divorce and treat the parties as tenants in common in the division and partition of this property. The emergency clause stated the necessity of this enactment because of "injustices" resulting from the lack of power in the courts of equity to dissolve such estates upon dissolution of the marital status. That statute was amended in 1975, Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-1215 (Supp. 1979), to provide that when any chancery court of Arkansas renders a final divorce decree, an estate by the entirety is automatically dissolved unless the court specifically provides otherwise.
Although we adhere to our long-standing rule that a foreign court's decree cannot, ipso facto, affect title to land in Arkansas, here an Arkansas court held an evidentiary hearing on a partition action following a Texas divorce decrree which was stipulated by both parties to be valid. Evidence was adduced that the appellant's and appellee's marriage spanned a period of 25 or 26 years except for a brief time in which they were divorced and remarried. They had lived and worked together in Texas before their retirement in Arkansas in 1970. She is 72 and he is 71 years of age now. They have no children from their marriage. Since the divorce, he has remarried and has continued to occupy the property, claiming it as his homestead. He acknowledged that, when he decided to sell the property, he would give appellee one-half of the proceeds. However, he desired to continue living there indefinitely.
Under our present statutes, which reflect public policy, dissolution of estates by the entirety should be permitted to avoid "injustices." Upon an Arkansas divorce the estate is automatically dissolved, unless the court provides otherwise, converting it into a tenancy in common in the division and partition of the property. The chancellor's hearing in the partition action here, in effect, amounted to a relitigation in an Arkansas court of the equitable interests of the parties.
In the circumstances, the chancellor correctly held the estate by the entirety should be converted to a tenancy in common, the property sold, the proceeds divided equally, and the appellant is not entitled to claim the property as his homestead.
As contended by the appellee, she is entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee, pursuant to Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-1825 (Supp. 1979), from the proceeds of the sale of the property.
Affirmed.
Hickman, J., concurs.