Case Name: Blacksmith v. Fellows and another
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1852-10
Citations: 7 N.Y.3d 401
Docket Number: 
Parties: Blacksmith v. Fellows and another.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 7
Pages: 401–428d

Head Matter:
Blacksmith v. Fellows and another.
Indian Reservations. — Trespass.
Under the treaty with the Seneca Nation (7 U. S. Stat. 586), an Indian of, that tribe, in the actual and separate occupation of lands upon the Tonawanda reservation, had a right of occupancy until the amount which he was entitled to receive for his improvements was determined and awarded, in pursuance of the treaty; and he could maintain trespass for a forcible entry upon the lands so separately occupied.
Where the non-performance of a condition precedent is prevented by others than the parties to the contract, it is not equivalent to a perfoianance, so as to vest a right in the grantee ; especially, where there was another mode of performance than that attempted.
Appeal from the general term of the Supreme Court, in the eighth district, where a judgment entered upon a verdict in favor of the plaintiff had been affirmed.
This was an action of trespass quare clausum fregit, brought by John Blacksmith, a Seneca Indian, belonging to the Tonawanda band, against the defendants, Joseph Fellows and Bobert Kendle, for entering, with force and arms, into the close of the plaintiff, commonly known as an Indian saw-mill and yard, in the town of Pembroke, in the county of Genesee, and then and there expelling and dispossessing the plaintiff. The defendants pleaded “ not guiltyand that the close, &c., was the soil and freehold of the defendant, Fellows, and that he, and the defendant, Kendle, as his servant, and by his command, broke and entered the said close, &c., as they lawfully might, for the cause aforesaid. To the latter plea, there was a replication, averring that the close, soil and freehold were not the close of the defendant Fellows.
On the trial, it was proved by the plaintiff, that the close mentioned in the declaration was situate in the town of Pembroke, in the county of Genesee, upon a tract of 12,800 acres of land, known as the Tonawanda reservation, and was, at the time of the entry complained of, an Indian improvement upon the same; that said improvement was made about twenty years before the treaty of 1838, by the plaintiff and seven other Tonawanda Indians; that the plaintiff was a native Indian, belonging to the Tonawanda band of the Seneca Indians, who resided on that reservation, and were a part of the Seneca Nation, and had been so known for at least 36 years; that he had resided on this reservation from his birth, and was in the actual possession of the said improvement, at the time of the entry complained of; and that, on the 13th July 1846, the defendants entered into, and took possession of, the said close, and turned the plaintiff out, and in doing so committed the trespass for which suit was brought.
It was admitted, that a treaty had been made between the United States and the Six Nations of Indians, on the 11th November 1794 (7 U. S. Stat. 44), by which certain lands in western New York, including the Tonawanda reservation, were declared “to be the property of the Seneca Nation, and the United States will never claim the same, nor disturb the Seneca Nation, nor any of the Six Nations, or their Indian friends residing thereon, and united with them, in the free use and enjoyment thereof; but it shall remain theirs, until they choose to sell the same to the people of the United States, who have the right to purchase.”
The plaintiff having closed, the defendants’ counsel moved for a nonsuit, on the ground, that the plaintiff, an individual Indian, could not maintain an action for oreach of close; the court, however, denied the motion, and the defendants excepted.
*The defendants then gave in evidence certain documents and acts of the legislatures of the states *- of New York and Massachusetts, showing that a dispute had arisen, at an early day, between the two states, in respect to the title to a large tract of land, within the limits of New York, of which the locus in quo was a part. In 1786, this dispute was amicably settled, by a cession from Massachusetts to New York of the sovereignty and jurisdiction over the tract, and by a cession from New York to Massachusetts of the right of pre-emption to the soil from the Indians. This right of pre-emption subsequently became duly vested in Thomas S. Ogden and Joseph Fellows, by proper conveyances from the state of Massachusetts, and on the death of Ogden, in December 1844, survived to the defendant Fellows.
On the 15tb January 1798, an agreement was entered into between the chiefs and headmen of the Seneca Nation of Indians, and Thomas S. Ogden and Joseph Fellows, whereby the Seneca Nation, in consideration of $202,000, granted to Ogden and Fellows, the Buffalo Creek reservation, containing 49,920 acres; the Cattaraugus reservation, containing 21,680 acres; the Allegeny reservation, containing 30,469 acres; and the Tonawanda reservation, containing 12,800 acres. This conveyance was recognised and affirmed by a treaty between the New York Indians of the same date; and was recited in, and annexed to, a treaty between the United States and the Seneca Nation, bearing date the 15th January 1838. (7 U. S. Stat. 551.)
By the last-mentioned treaty of 1838, there was set apart, as a permanent home for all the New York Indians, a tract of country, west of the state of Missouri, containing 1,000,824 acres of land, being, as therein expressed, “three hundred and twenty acres for each soul of said Indians, as their numbers are at present computed.” The Seneca tribe, including their friends, the Onondagas and Cayugas then numbered a population of 2633.
By the 10th section of this treaty special provision was made concerning this tribe and their friends. They were to have assigned to them the easterly part of the tract set apart to the New York Indians, and to extend so far as to include one half section of land for each soul. The tribe agreed to remove from New York to their new home, within five years, and continue to reside there. It then recited the purchase of the title of the Seneca Nation to certain lands, described in a deed of conveyance, by Ogden and Fellows, assignees of the state of Massachusetts, for the consideration of $202,000; that the Nation, had agreed that this money should be paid to the United States; and that, thereout, the sum of $102,000 should be paid to the owners of the improvements on the lands so conveyed — the residue to be invested by the government, and the income thereof to be paid to the Nation, annually, at their new homes. The improvements were to be appraised, and a distribution of the $102,000 made among the owners, and “ to be paid by the United States, to the individuals who were entitled to the same, <fcc., on their relinquishing their respective possessions to Ogden and Fellows.”
Some difficulty having occurred in carrying this treaty into execution, a second treaty was made on the 20th May 1842 (7 U. S. Stat. 586), modifying the former one, which, after referring to the differences that had arisen between the parties, provided, that Ogden and Fellows, for the consideration therein mentioned, stipulated that the Seneca Nation might continue in the occupation and enjoyment of the Cattaraugus and Allegeny reservations, and that the Nation released and confirmed to Ogden and Fellows, the Buffalo Creek and Tonawanda reservations.'
*Tke 3d article of this treaty provided for a reduction of the amount to be paid by Ogden and Fellows, to correspond with the relative value of the reservations released and retained. The 4th article provided for an appraisal of the land and improvements in the Buffalo Creek and Tonawanda reservations, by appraisers (one to be appointed by the secretary of war and the other by Ogden and Fellows), and for a report of their proceedings to the secretary and the grantees.
[ *404 *The 5th article provided for a surrender of the possession of the two tracts confirmed to Ogden and Fellows, as follows: “The forest or unimproved lands on the said tracts, within one month after the report of the said arbitrators, shall be filed in the office of the department of war, and the improved lands, within two years after the said report shall have been so filed; provided, always, that the amount to be so ascertained and awarded as the proportionate value of the said improvements, shall, on the surrender thereof, be paid to the president of the United States, to be distributed among the owners of the said improvements, according to the determination and award of the said arbitrators in this behalf, and provided further, that the consideration for the release and conveyance of the said lands shall, at the time of the surrender thereof, be paid or secured to the satisfaction of the said secretary of the war department, the income of which is to be paid to the said Seneca Indians annually. But any Indian having improvements may surrender the same, and the land occupied by him and his family, at any time prior to the expiration of the said two years, upon the amount ^awarded to him for such improvements being ^ paid to the president of the United States, or any *- agent designated by him for that purpose by the said Ogden and Fellows, which amount shall be paid over to the Indian entitled to the same, under the directions of the war department.”
The defendants further showed the approval of the last-mentioned treaty, by the state-of Massachusetts; the appointment of appraisers in pursuance thereof; and their inability to perform the duties enjoined upon them, in consequence of the determined hostility of the Seneca Indians, residing upon the Tonawanda reservation. * 4061 *^iey reP0I4ed to the secretary of war, in March -* 1844, that they had been unable to determine the amount to be paid to individual Indians, but made a general estimate of the aggregate value of the improvements from the best information they could obtain.
The defendants having rested, the plaintiff insisted that their proof of title and right of possession was insufficient in the following particulars :
1. There is no proof that the Tonawanda Indians, or chiefs or headmen, ever signed either the deeds or treaties offered in evidence by defendants, or that the persons who signed them had any power or authority to grant away the Indian title to the Tonawanda reservation, or that such persons had any possession of, or right to, said reservation.
*2. There is no proof offered of any custom, *407] or usage, or law, by which the persons who executed the deeds or treaties offered in evidence by defendants, had any power to grant away the lands described in them, and particularly the Tonawanda reservation.
3. There is no proof that either of the said deeds or treaties were made under the authority, and with the consent, of the legislature of this state.
4. The defendants have not shown that, at the time of the execution of said deeds and treaties, said Ogden and Fellows, or either of them, were the grantees of Massachusetts, directly or by mesne conveyances.
5. They have not shown that Thomas C. Love was ever appointed an appraiser or arbitrator by the secretary of war, the letters and other documents given in 'evidence, signed by Th. H. Crawford, are not competent to show the appointment of Mr. Love as such arbitrator.
6. These letters and documents, even though competent, are not properly proved; the originals should be produced.
7. There is no evidence that the arbitrators have awarded and determined the amount to be paid to the owners of the individual improvements on the Tonawanda reservation, agreeable to the 4th article of the deed of May 20th, 1842.
8. The report of the arbitrators given in evidence is not competent testimony to show what occurred at the Tonawanda reservation, as an excuse for not making such award.
9. The evidence of the witness, Ira Cook, does not show that it was impracticable to make an award.
10. The Tonawanda Indians who objected to the appraisal by Love and Cook, at the councils described by Cook, had no authority or power, of themselves, to dispense with or excuse the determination and award required by said 4th article,
11. There is no proof of the payment of the improvement money, so called, for the Tonawanda reservation, to the president of the United States, pursuant to article 5th of said deed of May 20th, 1842, or of any payment of said money.
12. There is no proof that the award and determination ^required by the 4th article of said deed of May 20th, 1842, has been filed in the office of the *- department of war, as required by the 5th article of said deed.
The learned judge (Sill, J.) without passing upon the objections in detail, ruled that the defendants had failed to establish any title or right of possession to the premises in question; to which the defendants’ counsel excepted.
The defendants then requested the court to charge the jury, that the action of the Indians on the Tonawanda reservation, and of the plaintiff himself, in interfering and preventing the arbitrators from performing the duties imposed on them, could not prejudice the rights of the grantees under the treaty of May 20th, 1842, and that in consequence thereof, Fellows, the surviving grantee, was entitled to the possession of the close in question, at the expiration of two years from the filing of the award in the office of the war department, notwithstanding the omission of the arbitrators to award and determine the amount to be paid to the plaintiff, or any other individual Indian, for improvements on the Tonawanda reservation, out of the said sum of $58,768.96, awarded for improvements on the Buffalo Creek and Tonawanda reservations. This instruction was refused, and another exception taken.
The court was also requested to instruct the jury, that for the purpose of making an award for the distribution of the improvement-fund among the individual Indians, the arbitrators should be deemed to be the agents of the Indians themselves, and that no failure of the arbitrators to perform that part of their duty, could prejudice the rights of the grantees, Ogden and Fellows, unless such failure had been caused or procured by them. This was also refused, and an exception taken.
The defendants’ counsel also requested the court to charge, that even if the defendants had shown no title to the close in question in the defendant Fellows, still * aaq i Pontiff) *an individual Indian, could not J maintain the action of trespass for breaking and entering the premises. The learned judge, however, decided, that the plaintiff being in possession could maintain the action, and, therefore, refused so to charge; to which the defendants took another exception.
There was a verdict for the plaintiff for $825 damages ; and the court, at general term, having rendered judgment thereon, the defendants took this appeal.
Spencer, for the appellants.
Martindale, for the respondent.
The supreme court of the United States, in affirming this case, put it on the ground that a removal of a tribe of Indians could only be made, by authority and under the care of the federal government. 19 How. 366.

Opinion:
Edmonds, J.
There was originally a dispute between the states of New York and Massachusetts as to a large tract of land of which the locas in quo was a part. In 1786, that dispute was settled, by a cession from Massachusetts to New York of the government, sovereignty and jurisdiction of the lands in controversy, and by a cession from New York to Massachusetts of "the right of pre-emption of the soil from the native Indians, and all other right or title of New York" to the same. The lands were then in the independent occupancy of a nation of Indians, and were owned by them, and all that Massachusetts acquired by the cession to her, was the exclusive right of buying from the Indians, when they should be disposed to sell. This right was duly vested in "Ogden and Fellows, by proper conveyances from the state of Massachusetts, and they thus became seised of all the white man's right over these lands, except that of sovereignty, which still remains in the state of New York.
The Indian title, however, was not yet extinguished, and the Indians were in the actual possession of the land, and before Ogden and Fellows could enjoy any benefit from this grant from the state of Massachusetts, it was necessary for them to acquire the Indian right. Various steps were taken for that purpose; it is unnecessary here to enumerate them. It is enough, for the purposes of the question now before us, to know, that in May 1842, a conveyance from what purported to be the chiefs and headmen of the Seneca nation of Indians was executed to Ogden and Fellows, with the assent of an officer of the state of Massachusetts and a commissioner on the part of the United States, by which * 412 1 * waS a§ree<^ *Indian title to four dif- -* ferent tracts of land, known as the Buffalo, the Cattaraugus, the Allegeny and the Tonawanda reservations was valued at $202,000, that the Indians should retain the occupation and enjoyment of the Allegény and Cattaraugus reservations, and they thereby conveyed to Ogden and Fellows the whole of the Buffalo and Tonawanda reservations; that the Indians should be paid the consideration for that grant, as follows: $100,000 should be regarded as the value of their title to the whole four tracts, and $102,000 as the value of their improvements on the same four tracts, and so much of those sums should be paid by Ogden and Fellows, as."the value of the title and improvements on the Buffalo and Tonawanda tracts should bear to the value of the title and improvements on all the tracts; such amount to be determined by arbitrators to be chosen as therein mentioned.
Those arbitrators were to employ suitable surveyors, to explore and examine to ascertain the entire quantity in all the tracts, and award and determine the amount to be paid to each Indian, for his improvements on the two tracts conveyed. And Ogden and Fellows were to have possession of the forest lands, within one month, and of the improved lands, within two years, after the report of the arbitrators should be filed in the war office, provided that the amounts awarded for improvements should, on the surrender of the possession, be paid to the president of the United States, to be distributed among the owners of the improvements, in the sums awarded to each by the arbitrators. This indenture was incorporated into and formed part of a treaty made at the same time between the United States and the same chiefs and headmen.
Afterwards, arbitrators were appointed agreeable to the terms of the treaty and indenture, and they executed their duty as to all the four tracts, except the Tonawanda (in which are the premises in question). They awarded that $75,000 was the proportion which the value of the two tracts conveyed, bore to the whole four tracts, and $58,768.96 was the proportion which the value of tjae improvements on those two tracts bore to the improvements on all the tracts. But they " ^ were unable to award as to the amount to be ^ paid to each individual for his improvements on the Tonawanda tract, for the reason, that that portion of the nation which was in possession of that tract refused to let them perform their duty in this respect, and removed them by force from the tract, when they went there, as they did twice, for the purpose of making their examinations and award. Such award has never yet been made, but at the end of the two years, after filing the report in the war-office and upon the payment to the president of the United States of the aggregate sum awarded by the arbitrators, Fellows, as the survivor of his joint-tenant, Ogden, entered by force,'and ejected the plaintiff from the improvements possessed by him. Those improvements, which consisted of a dam and saw-mill had been made by the plaintiff and seven other native Indians, twenty years before, and were in the actual occupation of him, at the time the defendants entered into and took possession of the close and turned the plaintiff out.
Upon this state of facts, the jury, under the charge of the court, found a verdict for the plaintiff. On the trial below, the court ruled, that the defendants had failed to .make out any title or right of possession, and refused to charge that Fellows had made out a title to the close in question; that Fellows, at the end of the two years, was entitled to the possession, notwithstanding the omission of the arbitrators to award as to the amount to be paid to the plaintiff as the value of his improvements; that such failure of the arbitrators could not prejudice Fellows, unless it had been caused by him; and that the plaintiff, as an individual Indian, could not maintain the action. The supreme court, at general term, denied the motion for a new trial, on the ground, that the award of the arbitrators in full, as required'by the indenture of conveyance and the treaty, was a condition precedent to the grantee's right of possession. '
The first point taken on the argument was, that the plaintiff could not maintain an action, individually, for trespass on lands belonging to the whole nation. * 414 1 ^-^is ™ight be true, if the action was founded -* only upon title. So, it might be true, if it was founded upon the occupancy in common, which, we know, is usual with the Indian tribes. But this action is not founded upon either basis, but upon the separate possession of the plaintiff. The bill of exceptions shows that he was, alone .and separately from all others, in possession of the locus in quo, when the trespass was committed, and that was enough, to enable him to maintain an action for a wrong done to that possession.
The chief question, however, is, whether Fellows had a right to the possession, before the arbitrators awarded in full. His claim to the possession rests upon the conveyance which was in prsesenti, and absolutely, of the fee in the premises. That of itself might confer upon him the right of possession, if there was nothing else in the case; but the conveyance under which he claims, so far from carrying with it this as a necessary incident to the title, expressly reserves the possession from him, until the happening of a certain event, namely, the filing in the war-office of the award which the conveyance required.
It is very clear, that he was not entitled to possession, by virtue merely of the conveyance in prmsenti of the absolute title, but only upon the happening of a contingency, and it was necessary for him, in making out his defence, to show that the contingency had happened. He, accordingly, attempted to do so, and-proved that an award had been filed as required. But was that all that was necessary? Was it not also necessary for him to show, that it was such an award as the conveyance and treaty required ? Instead, however, of showing that it was such an award, his evidence showed that it was not; he then proved an excuse why it was not, and sought to give to that excuse for non-performance the same force and effect that properly belonged to performance. Whether he could do that, is the question now before us.
There is no particular form of words necessary to constitute a condition precedent; the true test is the intention of the parties. And it is very evident to me, that it was the intention *of the parties, that f the occupiers of the land should not be com- *- pelled to give up .the possession of them, until two conditions had been complied with; one, that such an award should be obtained and filed in the war-office; and the other, that the value of the improvements should be paid to the president, and the consideration for the conveyance be paid or secured to the satisfaction of the secretary of war. The language in which that particular stipulation is clothed, conveys that impression to my mind, and there is another provision that carries the same idea. I mean, the provision that " any Indian having improvements may surrender them, prior to the expiration of the two years, upon the amount awarded to him for such improvements being paid to .the president, or any agent designated by him for that purpose." I regard the parties to the conveyance, then, as having stipulated, that the occupiers of the land shall not be compelled to surrender their possessions, until there shall have been obtained and filed in the war-office an award, which shall determine the amount to be paid to each individual Indian for his improvements.
The parties had a perfect right to make such a stipulation ; there is nothing unreasonable or unconscionable in it; nothing, indeed, to make it void; though, as it stipulates as to the action of third persons, there may be something to make it difficult to perform. That difficulty, however great it may be, is not enough to make the stipulation nugatory, or authorize its being dispensed with. It is like the familiar case of insurance, where the conditions provide, that before the insurers shall be compelled to pay the loss, the insured shall procure a certificate from a neighboring magistrate, minister or churchwarden, and where, it is well settled, that however unreasonable the refusal to give such certificate may be, the insured cannot recover without it. In that case, the court have said — " If there be a condition precedent, to do an impossible thing, the obligation becomes single, but however improbable the thing may be, it must be complied with, or the right which was to attach on its being performed does not vest. If the condition . " _ be that A. shall enfeoff B., and *A. do all in his v "J ^ | e power to perform the condition, and B. will not receive livery of seisin, yet, from the time of Lord Coke to the present moment, it has not been doubted, but that the right which was to depend on the performance of that condition did not a-rise." (Worstly v. Wood, 6 T. R. 710.)
I know of but one mode of avoiding the compliance with the condition, in such a case, and that is, where the party exacting the condition prevents its performance; in that event, his act of prevention is tantamount to a performance. But to produce that effect, such prevention must come from the party exacting the condition, and not from him in whose behalf or to whom it is to be performed. As, in the case put in 6 T. R, if C. exacted as a condition, that A. should enfeoff B., B.'s preventing the enfeoffment, by refusing to receive livery of seisin, would not be tantamount to a performance; though.if C. prevented it, if would; for C. had, in fact, stipulated for the acts of both A. and B., as the acts of both were necessary to the feoffment created.. Thus, in a covenant in a charter-party, to pay the value of reshipping, in case of capture, &c., provided it should appear to a court-martial, that the captain had made the best defence, the holding of a court-martial was held to be indispensable as a condition precedent. (Davidson v. More, 3 Doug. 28.) So, in case of an agreement to pay for repairs, on an architect's certifying they are done, &c., such certificate is essential. (Morgan v. Birnie, 3 M. & S. 76; s. c. 9 Bing. 672.) So, if a party stipulate that a horse shall trot eighteen miles within an hour, to the satisfaction of K, N.'s satisfaction must be obtained, before there can be a recovery. (Brogden v. Marriott, 2 Bing. N. C. 473.) So, if a man covenant that his son shall marry the covenantee's daughter, her refusal will not discharge the covenantor. And so, where goods were bought, subject to.the valuation of A. and B., and A. refuse to value. (Chitty on Cont. 572-3; Cook v. Jennings, 7 T. R. 384; McNeill v. Reed, 9 Bing. 68).
In all these cases, which were stipulations for the acts of other parties, the language of the courts has always been, in answer to complaints about the difficulty of performance — "You have so agreed, and you must so perform; you ought to *have protected yourself in your agreement against the consequences; having omitted to do so, the court cannot do it for you." These principles seem to be directly applicable to and decisive of the case before us. [ *417
Ogden and Fellows say fit to stipulate that they should have no right to the possession of the lands conveyed to them, and that the individual Indians in possession should not be disturbed, until a particular award, determining certain specified matters, should first be obtained and filed in the war-office. To effect that purpose, the acts of several persons, strangers to the contract, were necessary; those, namely, of the secretary of war, of the arbitrators, and their surveyors, agents and witnesses. They chose so to agree, and it is not in the power of any one, except the chiefs and headmen with whom they contracted, to release them from the stipulation. Those chiefs and headmen have not released them, nor have they done anything to prevent or waive a strict performance. The plaintiff and those who were associated with him in preventing the arbitrators from going on to the premises, were not parties to the contract; they were not of those chiefs or headmen; and their acts can no more be regarded as waiving performance, than that of the secretary of war, if he had refused to appoint an arbitrator, or, if no person could be procured to act as arbitrator, nor than the refusal of the churchwardens, in the case of the insurance.
And besides, it does not anywhere appear, that the arbitrators could not have made the individual valuation required. They were, it is true, prevented by the plaintiff and others from going on to the premises, but did it necessarily follow that, therefore, they could not make such valuation; that they could not take testimony off the tract, and from that testimony perform their duty, as well as from a personal examination? There does not seem to have been any such absolute necessity for their making a personal examination as they seem to have supposed; for they seem to have readily arrived at the aggregate of such valuation, without such view, and * 418 1 ^ *s n°* easy *f°r us conceive, why the parts -* which went to make up that aggregate could not have been stated.
In this view of the case, it becomes unnecessary to examine another point agitated on the argument, whether the conveyance to Ogden and Fellows vested a good title in them. Because, if it did, they were not, by -the express language of the conveyance, entitled to the possession, until the performance of a condition which has been neither performed nor waived.
And I put my opinion solely upon the ground that the condition precedent to the right of possession has not been performed. Fellows was, therefore, a trespasser, and the judgment of the supreme court ought to be affirmed.