Case Name: Joseph Ruppert and Leonard J. Bandel, vs. The Mayor & City Council of Baltimore
Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland
Jurisdiction: Maryland
Decision Date: 1865-06-09
Citations: 23 Md. 184
Docket Number: 
Parties: Joseph Ruppert and Leonard J. Bandel, vs. The Mayor & City Council of Baltimore.
Judges: The cause was argued before Bowie, C. J., and Baiitol, GoldsboRotjgti, Cochear and Wheel, J.
Reporter: Maryland Reports
Volume: 23
Pages: 184–201

Head Matter:
Joseph Ruppert and Leonard J. Bandel, vs. The Mayor & City Council of Baltimore.
Baltimore City — Construction- oí Ordinances oí 1850, No. 40, and 1855,4No. 11, Relating- To the Sinking of Artesian Wells. — The Ordinance of 1855, No. 11, providing for stating Artesian wells in the city of Baltimore, on the application of sixteen owners of property in the immediate neighborhood, contains the following provision: “The petitioners to he responsible for all expenses that may occur in stating said Arte-sian wells, if a failure should tate place in the attempt to procure water. ” Held:
That in case of a failure to procure water, the petitioners who have applied for the stating of the Artesian well, are to be responsible for the expenses which may be incurred in the attempt to sink the ’said well, and not the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore.
Appeal from the Superior Court of Baltimore city.
The action in this case was instituted to recof er a sum of money alleged to he due to the appellants from the appel-lee, for digging an Artesian well in Baltimore city. The declaration contains a special count and the common counts, and to these the usual pleas were put in,, denying the contract in said declaration. A trial was had, and the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the defendant.
At the trial of the cause, the appellants proved an application to the City Commissioner, from sundry owners of houses and lots in the neighborhood of the proposed well, asking that an Artesián well he sunk, and a pump erected, under the direction of the Commissioner, and agreeably to the ordinances of the Mayor and City Council. In conformity with said application, the City Commissioner advertised for sealed proposals for digging or sinking the well,- and erecting a pump therein, “including a copper or composition cylinder, and that the contractor will he required to keep the pump in repair for one year after completion.”
The appellants, under said advertisement,- made the fol-fowing proposal:
“BALTIMORE, July 4, 1855. “Joseph P. Shannon, Esq., City Commissioner:
“Sin: — We beg leave to offer this proposal for sinking an Artesian well, on Castle alley, near Pratt street, for .the sum of $4.50 per foot, through sand, clay or gravel, an'd finish the same according to city requirements, and keep the same in repair for one year. Hoping that this may secure the work, we remain, &c., Bawdel & RüppeRT.”
On the hack of this was written — “The within proposal accepted. W. H. Quincy, Clerk.”
The appellants proceeded to dig the well, under the directions of the Assistant City Commissioner. They obtained wafer at two successive depths of digging, but not of a quality or quantity satisfactory to the Commissioner,, and finally abandoned the same, but without being directed so to do by tbe Commissioner, or any party authorized to' act on behalf of the Mayor and City Council.
The plaintiffs asked the Court to instruct the jury as follows :
1st. If the jury find from the evidence that the contract given in evidence was made by plaintiffs with the defendant, by its authorized agent, acting in its behalf, and shall find that in the digging, to perform said contract, the said plaintiffs penetrated at the point indicated by the agent of said defendant for such digging, if they shall find that any such point was so indicated, through all the sand, clay and gravel encountered in such digging; and shall further fiud that the further process of such digging was obstructed by rock, or other hard substance, not clay, sand or gravel, that then plaintiffs are entitled to recover.
2nd. If the jury find from the evidence that the contract given in evidence was made by plaintiffs with the defendant by its authorized agent, acting in its behalf, and shall find that the plaintiffs performed said contract, that then said plaintiffs are entitled to recover.
These prayers were rejected, and the Court granted the following, offered by the defendant:
1st. That under the Ordinance No. 40, of the Revised Ordinances of 1850, and Ordinance No. 11, approved Ifth March 1855, the City Commissioner is authorized to sink an Artesian well, upon the terms and in the manner therein specified, and the contract which, by force of such ordinances, he is empowered to make, must he one authorized by the said ordinances, and if not, no responsibility can thereby be imposed on the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore.
2nd. That under the true construction of the said ordinances, the work contracted for must he paid for as therein mentioned and set forth; and that the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore became responsible for the payment of such work in the manner and to the extent declared in the said ordinances; and that the payment therefor and the expenses thereof must he apportioned on all the assessable property that in the judgment of the City Commissioner is thereby benefited, and until such assessment shall have been made, there is no responsibility on the part of the Mayor and City Council; and that in case when there is a failure to procure a supply of water, the petitioners who have applied for the sinking of the Artesian well, are to bo responsible for the expenses which may be incurred in the attempt to sink the said well, and not the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore.
The plaintiffs excepted to the refusal of the prayers offered hy them, and to the granting of those of the defendant, and this constitutes the first bill of exceptions.
The defendant having offered in evidence the ordinances mentioned herein, then produced three of the signers to said application to testify to the non-fulfillment of the contract, who being excluded by the Court upon the objection of the plaintiffs, the defendant’s counsel, to restore their competency, produced a release of their liability, accrued hy reason of their so signing, executed hy the Mayor of tho city, George W. Brown, Esq., in the exercise of an assumed official power, and who had put the seal of the city thereto, without any special ordinance of the City Council enabling him so to do, hut by and with the advice of the City Coun-sellor; the plaintiffs still objecting to their competency, and denying the power of the Mayor to execute any such release, the Court overruled the objection and admitted said witnesses to testify; to which the plaintiffs excepted, and this constitutes the second bill of exceptions.
The cause was argued before Bowie, C. J., and Baiitol, GoldsboRotjgti, Cochear and Wheel, J.
George, H. Williams and Orville Honvitz, for appellant:
The plaintiffs submit that the verdict should be reversed, for the following reasons :
1st. By Ordinance No. 40, of Revised Ordinances of 1850, it is enacted, that “Whenever the inhabitants of any neighborhood desire a well to be sunk, and sixteen or more persons, owners of houses and lots, and interested, shall make application to the City Commissioner in writing, describing the place,” &c., “the said Commissioner, if in his judgment the said well and pump is required for the public good, shall forthwith cause the work to be done by contract,” &c., after due notice for proposals.
In this case every provision of the above has been complied with — the application was in writing by seventeen of the requisite and proper parties, the Commissioner determined it for the public good, and entered into the contract in the mode prescribed, and the work has been done. Now why is the city not responsible? Because, according to defendant’s-seeond prayer, the defendant’s officer, the City Commissioner, has not complied with certain mandatory regulations prescribed by the ordinance, and with which the contractor has nothing to do. Now the city is to be reimbursed for the outlay, and what remedies she reserves to herself to effect such reimbursement, is one thing, the responsibility to the contractor quite another. . This is not like the “paving and grading of streets regulated by Ordinance No. 15, in the same book; in those cases, sections 5 qnd 35 of the ordinance expressly stipulate, after creating a privity of contract between the property holders and the contractors, and reserving liens and remedies, ‘ ‘that in no case whatever shall the eity be made responsible for the paving done,” &c., and payment to contractors is only authorized after the tax is collected from the property; and the provisions of this ordinance are required to be incorporated into every contract made under it.
The ordinance under which this was done, not only does not contato any such provisions, but section 2 of it looks to the payment of the contractor when the work is done, without any reference to whether the tax imposed for it shall have been received or not from the owners of the property benefited.
By Ordinance No. 11, approved Mareh 1⅞, A. D. 1855, the provisions of the above ordinance as to wells, are made applicable to the construction of Artesian wells, with the proviso, that the sixteen signers shall he owners of property in the immediate neighborhood, and the further proviso, that the petitioners were to be liable “if a failure should take place in the attempt to procure water.’ Now if the city, at the instance of its property holders, engages in enterprises at their bidding, for the public good, who is, and ought to be responsible, but the party contracting ? In grading and paving, the city refuses to bo liable, and expressly incorporates the non-liability into the contract, but at the same time gives rights to the contractors, and not only provided the remedy by distress, by lien, &c., but section 9 of Ordinance No. 15, referred to, gives to the contractors the control over the bringing of suits, &c.
There are no such provisions in the ordinances relating to wells; when the jurisdictional facts exist, viz : the signing by a sufficient number of the proper persons, the judgment of the City Oommissioner that the well is required, the advertised proposals, the accepted bid, and the work done, then it is submitted, the liability of the city is fixed; and whether the city officials thereafter perform the duties imposed upon them by the ordinance, is a matter over which the contractors have no control, and should have no concern; and as the city has not stipulated for its non-liability, and as the privity of the contract alone exists with it and plaintiffs, they, the plaintiffs, should have no difficulty in recovering the value of their services as measured by their contract, fully performed.
John L. Thomas, for appellee :
The appellee will rely upon the following points:
The Court below properly rejected the first and second prayers of the appellants, for the following reasons:
1st. Both of the prayers assume the fact of the contract having been made, and take the ascertainment of the fact away from the jury. They assume the existence of the contract, when it is the sole province of the jury to find it. Brown vs. ElUcott,. 2 Md. Rep., 15. Gaither vs. Martin, 3 Md. Rep., 146. Lewis vs. Kramer <fc Balm, 3 Md. Rep., 265. Ohislco Co. vs. Matthews, 3 Md. Rep., 168. Balto. <& Susqua. R. R. Co. vs. Woodruff, 4 Md. Rep., 242. Buriles vs. The State, 4 Md. Rep., 213. ElUcott vs. Peterson, 4 Md, Rep., 416. Balto <$ Ohio R. R. Co. vs. Res-ley, 1 Md. Rep., 291 Canby vs. Erich, 8 Md. Rep., 163. Haney vs. Marshall, 9 Md. Rep., 194. Boyd vs. McCann, 10 Md. Rep., 118. Cropper vs. Pittman, 13 Md. Rep., 190. Denmead vs. Coburn, 15 Md. Rep., 29. Maltby vs. North-western Va. R. R. Co., 16 Md. Rep., 422.
2nd. Because they authorized the jury to believe that the contract given in evidence was such a contract, upon which, if the jury found the other facts mentioned in the prayers, the plaintiffs are entitled to recover. Whereas, the interpretation and the sufficiency of a contract, is a question of law, not for the jury, but the Court; and a prayer which submits this to a jury, is had. Emory & Gault vs. Owings, 6 Gill, 199. Balto. & Ohio R. R. Co. vs. Resley, 1 Md. Rep., 291. Hatch vs. Pendergast, 15 Md. Rep., 251. Osceola Tribe vs. Rosts’ Admx., 15 Md. Rep., 295. Ewalt & Myers vs. Harding & HopTcins, 16 Md. Rep., 160. Williams vs. Woods & Bridges, 16 Md. Rep., 220. Whiteford vs. Munroe, 11 Md. Rep., 135.
3rd. Because the appellants’ first prayer left the jury to infer, that “digging to the point indicated by the agent of the defendant,” was a performance of the contract by the plaintiffs, which was a mixed question of law and fact, and was calculated to mislead the jury. Long vs. Eaclde, 4 Md. Rep., 454. Handy & Tull vs. Johnson, 5 Md. Rep., 450. Atwell vs. Miller & Mayhew, 6 Md. Rep., 10. Clarice’s Adm’r vs. Marriott’s Admr., 9 Gill, 334. Clements vs. Smith’s Admr., 9 Gill, 160.
4th. The first prayer of the defendant was properly granted, because it contains a true exposition of the rights of the plaintiffs, in relation to the contract made with the City Commissioner. Mayor & City Council, P8. Eschbach, 18 Md. liep., 216.
5th. The second prayer of the defendant was properly granted, because, by the terms of the first prayer, when the plaintiff made the contract with the City Commissioner, he was bound to know all the requirements of the ordinances of the city, and the extent of the authority of the City Commissioner, and the contract so made must be in compliance with the ordinances of the city, and by these, in case of a failure to procure a supply of water, those applying for the sinking of the well, and not the city, are the responsible parties, if any are liable. Ordinance No. 40, 1850. Ordinance No. 11, 3855.
6th. Because, by the terms of the contract, the work was to be done according to the city requirements, and the City Commissioner being the only proper party acting under the ordinances of the city to accept or reject the work, and the work not having been completed in accordance with the ordinances, the plaintiff had no right to recover. Ordinance No. 40, 1850, secs. 1, 2, 3. Ordinance No. 11, 1855. 2 Story on Contracts, secs. 915, 911.
1th. Because the contract made by the plaintiff and the City Commissioner, was not performed according to the terms thereof, and a substantial compliance even is not sufficient, and where the manner and the details are agreed upon, they are essential, and must be complied with. Hill vs. School, 11 Me. Rep,, 316. Martin vs. Schoenhergcr, 8 Watts & Serg., 361. Allen vs. Cooper, 22 Me. Rep., 133.
8th. Because by Ordinance No. 40, of 1850, it is on the application of sixteen or more persons to the City Commissioner, that he can cause a contract to be made for the sinking of a well or pump, and this can only be done in accordance with the terms of said ordinance, which are :
1st. To award the contract for the work to the lowest responsible bidder.
2nd. When the work is completed, and not before, to apportion the expenses on all the assessable property benefited by the erection of the pump or well.
3rd. To collect said assessments- by the aid of the City Collector, and, when collected, to pay the same over to the contractor, when the work is completed.
9th, The release, for the purpose' of restoring the competency of the witnesses, Hunt, Harley and Maxwell, was properly considered as sufficient, because the same was given by the executive head of the city, in the exercise of his official power, and with the advice of the legal adviser of the city, and needed no special ordinance of the city to enable him to do it, 3 Phillips on- Ev.-, 122, Note 663. Seymour’s Admr,, vs. Beach, 4 Ver., 49'3. 3 Md. Hep., 305. 1 Teates, 28. 4 Md. Rep,,- 231. 1 Md, Rep., 582. 5 Md. Rep., 152.

Opinion:
Bartol, J.,
delivered the opinion of the majority of the Court:
The decision of this case depends upon the' true, construction of Ordinances 1850, No, 40, and 1355, No. 11. The former relates to ordinary wells and pumps, and the latter to Artesian wells. They are to be construed together; the provisions of Ordinance No. 40, of 1850, being expressly made "applicableto the construction of Artesian wells as fully as to ordinary wells and pumps."
This ordinance, (1850, No. 40,) after prescribing the preliminary steps to be taken to authorize the City Commissioner to contract for having a well or pump made, directs that when it is completed, " he shall apportion the expense on all the assessable property that, in his judgment,, is benefited by the erection of said pump or well;" and then goes on to provide for the collection of the amount so assessed, and for the payment of the contractors during the work. No provision is made- in this ordinance for the case of a failure to obtain water fit for useprobably such a contingency was considered too remote to be provided against; if it should happen, however, while it is very clear no assessment could he made hy the commissioner under the ordinance, because in such case no property would he benefited thereby, we see no reason why the city would not he responsible to the contractor for the work done, unless there should be something in the terms of the contract to exempt it from liability. The samo principle would apply where the contract is for an Artesian well, if it. were not for the terms of the Ordinance of 1855, No. 11, by which the case of a failure is expressly provided for, in these words: "The petitioners to he responsible for all expenses that may occur in sinking said Artesian wells, if a failure should take place in the attempt to procure water."
Upon the true construction of this clause, the whole case turns; here there was a failure to procure water, and the work was abandoned.
The appellants contend that the city is liable to them for' the work done, and that the responsibility fixed Upon the petitioners is to the city. If so, in what manner is the city to enforce that responsibility? Not, certainly, hy an assessment upon their property, to be made by the Commissioner ; he has no authority to make such assessment, except for benefits resulting from the completion of the well; besides, by the terms of the ordinance, the responsibility of the petitioners is a personal responsibility, not one imposed upon their property, to be enforced by assessment, and collected as a tax; there is no power to make such assessment under the ordinance.
If, then, the city be liable to the contractors for the work, the effect would be to compel the city first to pay the expenses, and then to collect the money by a suit against the petitioners. This, in our opinion, is not the meaning of the ordinance. When it declares that the petitioners shall be responsible, this is equivalent to saying that the city shall not be responsible.' In passing it, the Mayor and City Council seemed to have considered that, unlike sinking an ordinary well, the attempt to construct an Artesian well was an enterprise attended .with great risk and uncertainty;, this risk they were nnwilling to assume, and put it upon the petitioners, the persons at whose instance the work is undertaken, and, in case of failure, make them responsible for alh expenses that may occur.
When the well is completed, that is, when success has been achieved, the expense is to be apportioned and assessed by the City Commissioner on the property benefited,, and collected as a tax thereon; but if a failure take place in the attempt to procure water, the petitioners are responsible, not td the city, but directly to the contractors. They sign the petition with the knowledge of the risk and responsibility so cast upon them; the privity between them and the contractors is created by the words of the ordinance, for every contract made by the City Commissioner under the Ordinance of 1855, must be construed as if this clause were inserted in it.
It follows, from these views, .that in our opinion there was no error in the ruling of the Superior Court upon the prayers, and that the judgment ought to be affirmed. It is unnecessary to express any opinion upon the construction of the contract sued on; assuming that it was fully performed on the part of the appellants, without meaning, however, so to decide, still, according to our construction of the ordinances, this action could not be maintained; and for the same reason it is immaterial to decide the second bill of exceptions; even if there was error in admitting the evidence objected to, it would not be ground for reversal.