Case Name: ACME ROAD MACHINERY CO. v. TOWN OF BRIDGEWATER
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1905-05-03
Citations: 93 N.Y.S. 494
Docket Number: 
Parties: ACME ROAD MACHINERY CO. v. TOWN OF BRIDGEWATER.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 93
Pages: 494–505

Head Matter:
ACME ROAD MACHINERY CO. v. TOWN OF BRIDGEWATER.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.
May 3, 1905.)
Towns—Highway Commissioner—Purchase of Road Machine—Liability oe Town.
Highway Law (Laws 1890, p. 1179, c. 568) § 6, as amended by Laws 1896, p. 1120, c. 987, provides that the commissioners of highways may, with the approval of the town board, purchase a road machine, and pay for it with money set apart for highway purposes. A commissioner purchased a machine subject to the approval of the town board. The board thereafter approved the purchase. At the time of the making of the contract and of the delivery of the machine the commissioner had sufficient money in his hands set apart for highway purposes to pay for it. Held, that the seller was entitled to maintain an action against the town for the price.
McLennan, P. J., and Stover, J., dissenting.
Appeal from Judgment on Report of Referee.
Action by the Acme Road Machinery Company against the town of Bridgewater. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.
Argued before McLENNAN, P. J., and SPRING, WILLIAMS, HISCOCK, and STOVER, JJ.
L. D. Edwards, for appellant.
Joseph J. Dudleston, for respondent.

Opinion:
SPRING, J.
Section 6 of the highway law (chapter 568, p. 1179, Laws 1890) was amended by chapter 987, p. 1120, Laws 1896, as follows:
"The commissioner or commissioners of highways may, also, with the approval of the town board, purchase and hold for the use of the town at large, one or more road machines, and pay for the same with money appropriated and set apart for highway purposes."
In 1902 Milton Tripp was the commissioner of highways of the defendant. In March of that year the said commissioner purchased of the plaintiff, a manufacturing corporation, a Ft. Wayne road machine for $225, subject to the approval of the town board of said town. The board early in April approved of this purchase, and so advised the plaintiff. About the 20th of April the plaintiff, pursuant to this approved contract of sale, delivered said machine to the defendant at the place agreed upon, informing the said commissioner, who declined to pay for the same. At the time of the making of said agreement and also of the delivery of said machine the commissioner had more than sufficient moneys in his hands "set apart for highway purposes" to pay for said machine. Another machine, shortly after, was purchased on behalf of said town for $200, and paid for by said commissioner out of the town funds. Upon the refusal of the commissioner to pay for said machine this action was commenced, and one of the defenses interposed and the chief one litigated is that no contract in fact was made by said commissioner of highways or approved by the town board. This question of fact was determined in favor of the plaintiff, and the evidence supports the findings of the referee. In the record before us, therefore, we have a valid agreement to purchase made by the commissioner of highways of the defendant, with the plaintiff, its approval by the town board, fortified by the further fact that the highway commissioner had ample funds in his hands with which to meet the purchase made.
The first objection is that the act contemplates a cash payment, not a sale upon credit. The act implies a contract of purchase, for it is to be approved by the town board. That body does not pass a general resolution permitting the commissioner to purchase a road machine. The commissioner has already acted, and reports to the town board the agreement he has made. If sanctioned by the board, the agreement becomes a valid contract of sale. When the machine is delivered, payment is due, and the sale is not upon credit, and there is no extension of time simply because the defendant has defaulted in payment. If there is a refusal to pay, certainly the seller has a remedy to enforce his contract. It would be an anomalous condition if the statute permitted a valid agreement of purchase and sale of a road machine to be made, but prevented the recovery of the purchase price upon delivery because the commissioner declines to pay. In the present case it was delivered as agreed and payment was demanded, and more than that the plaintiff could not do. It was not obliged to return the machine to its manufactory, cancel its agreement, and abandon its claim.
But it is urged that the town is not liable. The commissioner is authorized to make the purchase, and the machinery belongs to the town. The money in the custody of the highway commissioner was the property of the town. It was not misappropriated, but was used presumably for the benefit of the town. If the town has the machine, and the money which should have been used for its payment has been applied to other town expenses, it would seem that the town must stand sponsor for this valid agreement. Section 182 of the town law (chapter '569, p. 1237, Laws 1890) provides that any action on behalf of the town "upon a contract lawfully made by any of its town officers shall be in the name of the town." Also, if the action is to enforce any liability or contract against the town, it shall be named the defendant. Further: "And all contracts made by such officers for and in behalf of their towns shall be in the name of the town. When such contracts are otherwise lawfully made, they shall be deemed the contracts of the town, notwithstanding it is omitted to be stated therein that they are in the name of thé town." The essential element to give validity to the contract of the highway commissioner is its approval by the town board, and when that has been obtained the contract becomes a binding liability against the town. The contract is made in the name of the town, approved by the town board, and the article purchased becomes the property of the town, so that the town cannot escape payment upon the ground that its highway commissioner does not represent it. Section 10 of the highway law, as amended by chapter 84, p. 108, Laws 1899, requires the commissioner, when a bridge or any highway has been damaged or destroyed, and the repair or rebuilding will cost to exceed $500, tq enter into a written contract therefor, which must be approved by the town board. When the contract has been so approved, the town becomes charged with the liability created. People ex rel. Groton Bridge Co. v. Town Board, 92 Hun, 585, 36 N. Y. Supp. 1062; Town of Saranac v. Groton Bridge Co., 55 App. Div. 134, 67 N. Y. Supp. 118. Prior to 1881 no liability attached to a town for injuries resulting from a defective highway. There was no common-law liability imposed upon a town for the care of it's highways, so that the commissioner alone was responsible for injuries accruing through his negligence. He was not, therefore, the agent of the town. He received moneys to be devoted to the maintenance of the highways. Lack of funds was a defense available to him. Hover v. Barkhoff, 44 N. Y. 113. In 1881 (Laws 1881, p. 935, c. 700) the law was changed, and a statutory liability was imposed upon the town, and it became in a measure responsible for the acts of its commissioner in the care and maintenance of its highways. Bush v. D. L. & W. R. R. Co., 166 N. Y. 210, 220, 221, 59 N. E. 838. The "care of the highways became of vital concern to the town. The commissioner was not in terms made its agent, but by reason of the liability which might be imposed upon it because of his negligence the acts already noted were placed upon the statute books, giving him in certain cases specific authority subject to the approval of the town board. The effect of this legislation in the light of the new liability chargeable to the town must have been to constitute the commissioner the representative of the town within the compass of the statutory authority committed to him. He is not the general agent of the town, but where he is charged with the making of an agreement for the benefit of the town that contract is the contract of the town, and he its representative in creating the liability which the agreement fixes. The commissioner of the defendant made an agreement strictly within the purview of the statute authorizing the purchase of the road scraper. By section 182 of the town law that agreement was the contract of the town. The defendant resisted payment, claiming that the commissioner did not make any agreement at all. With that issue settled' against the defendant, it cannot escape liability on the plea that the contract was that of the commissioner instead of the town.
Nor do I think the claim of the plaintiff should have been presented for audit to the town board at its annual meeting. It, of course, is the general policy of the law that accounts against a town shall be passed upon by the town board at its annual meeting. But I find no authority requiring that course where there is a fixed liability against the town, except when the section authorizing the expenditure in terms makes the audit necessary, as in the case of extraordinary repairs of highways or bridges. Section 10, Highway Law, c. 84, p. 108, Laws 1899. In the event of an expenditure for emergency repairs it is not expected that the commissioner will have funds to meet an outlay in excess of $500, so an audit is required, and the expense is to be "collected in the same manner as amounts voted at town meetings." Section 10, supra. The unexpected stress requires prompt action, and, as the tpwn is not pre pared to meet the expenditure, an audit is provided for, and the town ii thus given an opportunity to raise the money. The fact that the Legislature provided for an audit indicates that an action could have been maintained on the written agreement without any audit had no statute required that the claims be run through the ordinary auditing channel.
Section 161 of the town law (chapter 569, p. 1233, Laws 1890) requires the accounts of town officers to be audited by the board. This claim is not within that category, for it is a demand against the town, not an account of a town officer. If the commissioner had paid the purchase price for the machine, he would need include it in his statement of expenditures. The town board is the auditing body, and its sanction is essential to give vitality to the agreement.- When the liability has become fixed by ratification, the town board has acted, and a subsequent audit by the same body is unnecessary. The rule apparently is that, when the demand is unliquidated and unadjusted, it must be audited by the board. When it has become a settled and established liability, an action will lie without any further audit, unless the statute in terms provides otherwise. Bennett v. Town of Ogden, 81 App. Div. 455, 81 N. Y. Supp. 56; Marsh v. Town of Little Valley, 64 N. Y. 112. The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
Judgment affirmed, with costs.
HISCOCK, J., concurs. WILLIAMS, J., concurs in result.