Case Name: The People of the State of Illinois, ex relatione Charles R. Matheny appellants v. Mordecai Mobley, appellee
Court: Illinois Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 1835-12
Citations: 1 Scam. 215
Docket Number: 
Parties: The People of the State of Illinois, ex relatione Charles R. Matheny appellants v. Mordecai Mobley, appellee.
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Reports
Volume: 2
Pages: 215–229

Head Matter:
The People of the State of Illinois, ex relatione Charles R. Matheny appellants v. Mordecai Mobley, appellee.
Appeal from, Sangamon.
The fair interpretation of the provision of the Constitution of this State, that “ The Supreme Court, or a majority of the justices thereof, the Circuit Courts, or the justices thereof, shall, respectively, appoint their own clerks,” is that the Court, in contradistinction to a personal authority, is the repository of the trust conferred by the Constitution, and that whenever a clerk has been appointed, the trust is thereby executed, and cannot be resumed or again exercised until a vacancy shall occur in one of the several ways provided by law.
The terms, “ the justices thereof,” are used only to confer an authority to make an appointment in vacation, as well as in term.
The Constitution gives to the Court the authority to appoint its clerk; but when thus appointed, it fixes no limit to the duration of his office.
A clerk of the Circuit holds his office under the constitution ad libitum, until the legislature shall think proper lo prescribe the tenure of the office. This it is certainly competent for the legislature to do.
A judge of a Circuit Court cannot remove a clerk, except for some of the causes pointed out in the statute.
The office of clerk of the Circuit Court is created by the Constitution, and its duration is left undefined; and, unless its tenure be limited bylaw', it would be of indefinite duration.
This cause was tried at the July special term, 1835, of the Sangamon Circuit Court, before the Hon. Richard M. Young.
The following proceeds were had in the Court below:
On the 11th day of July, 1835, Stephen A. Douglass, Attorney for the People of the State of Illinois, came into Court and filed the affidavit of Charles R. Matheney, in the words and figures following, to wit:
“ State of Illinois, Sangamon County, set.,
Charles R. Matheny states on oath, that heretofore, and long prior to the fourth day of May, 1835, he was legally and properly appointed clerk of the Circuit Court of Sangamon county, by the Circuit Court thereof, and was duly sworn, entered into the necessary and proper official bonds required by law to be taken, and was legally possessed and exercised the powers of said office, receiving the emoluments and enjoying the immunities and privileges appertaining to said office, from the time of his said appointment and induction therein, until the 4th day of May, 1835; that from and after his said investment of said office, he never abandoned or forfeited the same, nor was he ever removed or displaced from said office by the judgment of any court, nor has the said Circuit Court, since his said investment of the office aforesaid, as he is advised, (and believes to be true,) been abolished. He further states, that on the 4th day of May, 1835, a certain Mordecai Mobley, illegally claiming the said office as clerk, under color of a void and illegal appointment as clerk of said Circuit Court, (as he is advised and believes,) made áfter the 13th of February, 1835, unlawfully usurped, intruded into, and unlawfully held and executed said office of clerk of said Circuit Court, and from and since the 4th day of May, 1835, hath, and still unlawfully held and executed said office of clerk aforesaid, and from and since the 4th day of May, 1835, hath, and still doth unlawfully receive, take, and enjo}r the emoluments, rights, and privileges of the office aforesaid, and from and since the 4th day of May, 1835, the said Mobley illegally hath and still doth refuse to allow the said Matheny to hold and execute the said office, or to receive the emoluments, or to enjoy the rights, privileges, and emoluments thereof; and that he is desirous that a rule may be made upon the facts stated herein, on motion of the Attorney for the People of the State of Illinois, in the First Judicial Circuit, upon the said Mobley, to show cause why leave should not be given to file an information in behalf of the People of the State of Illinois, in the nature of a quo warranto, upon the relation of the said Matheny against said Mobley, for usurping, intruding, and unlawfully holding and executing said office as aforesaid. C. R. Matheny.
Sworn to and subscribed, this 11th day I of July, A. D. 1835," before me, t Thomas Mofebtt, Jus. Peace.” )
And moved the Court for a rule to be made on Mordecia Mobley, to show cause, if any he could, why the said Attorney should not have leave to file an information in the nature of a quo warranto, in this Court, in behalf of said People, on the relation of Charles R. Matheny, against said Mobley, for having illegally usurped, intruded into, and unlawfully executed, and still unlawfully executing and holding the office of clerk of the Sangamon Circuit Court; on consideration whereof, it is ordered that said motion be continued till the second day of the next term of this Court.
And afterwards, to wit, on the 14th day of July, 1835, being the regular time of the Circuit Court for Sangamon county, the following motion came on to be heard, viz:
The People, on the relation of) Charles R. Matheny v. > Motion. Mordecai Mobley. )
This day, Stephen A. Douglass, Attorney for the People of the State of Illinois, in and for the First Judicial Circuit, and on motion grounded upon an affidavit of Charles R. Matheney, filed on the last day of the last special term of this Court, and now here produced,
It is ordered that a rule be made on Mordecai Mobley, now acting as clerk of this Court, returnable to the fourth day of the present term, to show cause, if any he can, why the said Attorney for the People of the said State, should not have leave from this Court to file an information, in the nature of a quo warranto, against the said Mobley, (upon the relation of Charles R. Matheny,) for having usurped, intruded into, and illegally holding and execuing the office of clerk of the Circuit Court of Sangamon county, and that a copy of this rule be served upon said Mobley by the sheriff, and returnable to the fourth day of the present term.
And afterwards, to wit, on the 16th day of July, 1835, the said Mobley being in Court, by his attorney, says, That he has no reason to urge why the State’s Attorney shall not have leave to file the information as prayed for by him.
Whereupon it is ordered, That the rule heretofore entered in this matter be made absolute, and that leave be given to file the information aforesaid. And the said State’s Attorney thereupon exhibited the information which is ordered to be filed, and is in the words and figures following, to wit: /
“ State of Illinois, Sangamon County, ss.,
In the Circuit Court of said county, July term, 1835, Stephen A. Douglass, State’s Attorney of the First Judicial Circuit of the State of Illinois, who prosecutes in behalf of the People of the State of Illinois, on the relation of Charles R. Matheny, of the county of Sangamon aforesaid, comes here into Court and gives the Court to understand and be informed, that on the 14th day of February, in the year one thousand eight hundred and twenty-seven, the said Charles R. Matheny, relator as aforesaid, was regularly and legally appointed clerk of the Circuit Court for the county of Sangamon aforesaid, by the judge of said Court; that the said Charles R. Matheny took the several oaths required by the statute in such case made and provided, and executed bond with security for the faithful discharge of the duties required of him by law, and thereupon entered into and upon the duties of the said office, and was legally possessed thereof and exercised the powers, received the emoluments, enjoyed the immunities and privileges appertaining to the same, and continued to have, hold, and enjoy the said office, and exercise the powers, perform the duties, and receive the emoluments and immunities thereof, from the time of his said appointment and induction therein until the 4th day of May, 1835; that from and after the said appointment, he never resigned, abandoned, or forfeited the said office, nor has the said Circuit Court of Sangamon county, or the office of clerk of said Court, ever been abolished ; nor has he, the said Matheny, ever been removed or displaced from said office by the judgment of any court. And on the said 4th day of May, 1835, at the Circuit aforesaid, one Mordecai Mobley, of said county, well knowing the premises aforesaid, did unlawfully usurp the said office of clerk of the Circuit Court of Sangamon county, and enter into and upon the exercise of all the powers and duties of the office of such clerk, and by such unlawful usurpation did, then and there, become possessed of the said office, and of the emoluments, immunities, and privileges appertaining to the said office, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the same people of the State of Illinois.
And the said State’s Attorney, on the relation of the said Charles R. Matheny, further gives the Court here to understand and be informed that the said Mordecai Mobley, on the 4th day of May, 1835, at the Circuit aforesaid, did then and there unlawfully hold the office of clerk of the Circuit Court of Sangamon county, and from and since the said 4th day of May, 1835, hath, and still doth unlawfully hold the said office of clerk of the Circuit Court of Sangamon county, and exercise the powers, and receive the emoluments of said office, the said Charles R. Matheny, the relator, being during all the time aforesaid the legal and lawfully appointed clerk of said Court, as stated in the first count in this information, contrary to the form of the statute in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the same People of the State of Illinois.
And the said State’s Attorney, upon the relation of the said Charles R. Matheny, further gives the Court here to understand and be informed, that on the 10th day of May, 1835, at the Cir cuit aforesaid, the said Mordecai Mobley did unlawfully execute the office of clerk of the Circuit Court of Sangamon county; and from and since the said 10th day of May, 1835, hath, and still doth execute the office aforesaid, without any lawful authority, one Charles R. Matheny being on the said 10th day of May, 1835, the clerk of said Court, and still continuing to be and remain such clerk, as stated and alleged in the first count of this information, contrary to the form of the statute in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the same People of the State of Illinois.
And the said State’s Attorney, upon the relation of the said Charles R. Matheny, further gives the Court here to understand and be informed, that on the 10th day of May, 1835, at the Circuit aforesaid, the said Mordecai Mobley did unlawfully intrude into the office of clerk of the Circuit Court of Sangamon county, and by such unlawful intrusion, did, then and there, become possessed of the said office of clerk of the Circuit Court of Sangamon county, and of the emoluments and immunities of said office, and hath hitherto continued to have and to hold, and exercise the powers and duties of such clerk, and to receive the emoluments of said office, the said Charles R. Matheny being at the time of the intrusion aforesaid, and still continuing to be, the clerk of said Court, as stated in the first count of this information, contrary to the form of the statute in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the same People of the State of Illinois.
Stephen A. Douglass, State’s Attorney.
And afterwards, to wit, on the 18th day of July, 1835, the following cause came on to be heard, viz.
The People, on the relation of) , Charles R. Matheny v. > On Information. Mordecai Mobley. )
This day came, as well the People aforesaid, by their attorney, as the defendant; and the said defendant filed his plea herein, in the words following:
And the said defendant, by Stone, his counsel, comes and defends the wrong and injury, when and where, &c., and says the People, their information aforesaid to have and maintain, ought not, because, he says, that under the provisions of an act of the General Assembly of the State of Illinois, entitled “ An act to provide a uniform mode of holding Circuit Courts,” approved 7th January, 1835, Stephen T. Logan was elected judge of the Circuit Court of Sangamon county, and was regularly commissioned and sworn into office; that according to the laws of the land, the said Stephen T. Logan, as such judge, had full power and lawful authority to appoint a clerk of the Circuit Court of said county, and having such power and authority, he, the said Logan, on the 25th day of April, 1835, appointed the said defendant clerk of the Circuit Court of Sangamon county, which appointment is in the words following :
Know all men, by these presents, That I, Stephen T. Logan, Judge of the First Judicial Circuit, in the State of Illinois, do, by these presents, constitute and appoint Mordecai Mobley clerk of' the Circuit Court for the bounty of Sangamon, being one of the counties comprised within the said Judicial Circuit. In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and seal, at Springfield, in the county of Sangamon, this 25th day of April, 1835.
Stephen T. Logan, [l.s.]
By virtue of which said appointment, he, the said defendant, entered into the office aforesaid, (having taken the oaths and executed the bond as required by law,) as he lawfully might do, that he hath, and doth hold the said office, exercised the powers, performed the duties, and received the emoluments and immunities of the office aforesaid, under and by virtue of the appointment aforesaid, as by the laws of the land he has a right to do, all which he is ready to verify, &c., wherefore, &c.
Stone, Deft.’s Counsel.
To which the attorney for the People filed a demurrer.
And the judge of this Court having stated that he had formed an opinion upon the case, which was unfavorable to the defendant, and that he was therefore unwilling to decide the case, it is agreed between the parties, that judgment be entered against the right of the relator, subject to the right of appeal. Whereupon, by consent of the .parties, as aforesaid, it is considered and adjudged by the Court, that the demurrer to the defendant’s plea be overruled; and neither the People or the said relator making any other or further answer to the plea aforesaid, it is considered and agreed by the Court that the defendant be, and he is hereby acquitted of the charges alleged against him in the information, and that the said relator take nothing thereby; whereupon, by leave of the Court, the said Charles R. Matheny is permitted to prosecute an appeal from this judgment to the Supreme Court of the State, upon his executing a bond to the defendant, in the penalty of one hundred dollars, with Wharton Ransdall, Edward Mitchell, Francis Philips, Archer G. Herndon, and Janus F. Reed, or either of them, as surety, conditioned that lie will well and truly prosecute the appeal; and in case the judgment of this Court is affirmed, that he will pay all costs which may be adjudged against him. The bond to be executed before the clerk of this Court, within forty days, and which bond was executed and filed on the 10th August, 1835.”
Stephen A. Douglass, State’s Attorney, William Thomas and Cyrus Walker, for the appellants.
Henry Eddy and Jesse B. Thomas, jr., for the appellee.

Opinion:
Wilson, Chief Justice,
delivered the opinion of the Court:
The pleadings in this case show that Matheny was clerk of the Circuit Court of Sangamon county, on the 3d day of May, 1835; and that in pursuance of an act of the legislature entitled " An act to establish a uniform mode of holding Circuit Courts," passed on the 7th of January, 1835, S. T. Logan was elected judge of the Circuit Court of Sangamon county, and in virtue of said office, appointed M. Mobley, the appellee, clerk of the Circuit Court of said county.
It becomes necessary in this case, to enquire what powers in relation to the appointment of clerks, are delegated to Circuit Courts, or the judges thereof, by the Constitution and laws of this State; and, also, by what tenure the clerks of the Circuit Court appointed by virtue of such authority, hold their office.
By the 4th Article and 6th section of the Constitution of this State, if is provided that " The Supreme Court, or a majority of the justices thereof, the Circuit Courts, or the justices thereof, shall, respectively, appoint their own clerks." Is the power of appointment conferred by this provision of the Constitution, a personal trust or authority, which may be exercised by every new incumbent upon entering into the office of judge ? or, Is it not a power of appointment confided to the Court, or the judge as the organ or minister of the Court, and if so, has it in the present instance been exercised in such a case, and in such a manner, as is warranted by the Constitution and laws of this State? From a fair interpretation of this provision of the Constitution, it is clear that the Court, in contradistinction to a personal authority, is the repository of the trust conferred by the Constitution; and that whenever a clerk has been appointed, that the trust or authority is thereby executed, and cannot be resumed, or again exercised, until a vacancy shall occur in one of the several ways provided by law. The terms of the Constitution " the justices thereof" are used in connexion with the Circuit Court, only to confer an authority to make an appointment in vacation as well as in term time, in order that the administration of justice might not be delayed for the want of so important an officer of the Court as a clerk. In either case the judge acts as the minister of the law. If a different construction should prevail, and the power of appointment should be regarded as personal to the judge, it would necessarily attach to every judge immediately upon his appointment, and upon the happening of a vacancy in the office of judge, the clerkships in all the counties of his Circuit, would also become vacant; and upon the same principle, when Circuit judges should exchange Circuits, as by law they are authorized to do, the office of clerk would become vacant by such exchange, in all the counties in their respective Circuits, because the judge presiding in the Circuit Court of a county, is for the time being the judge of that Court; and if the clerk is the officer of the judge, and not of the Court or law, he would have to be appointed upon every such exchange, and until the appointment was made, the administration of justice would be suspended. Such a construction of the Constitution, it is believed, is not warranted either by its language or spirit, and would in its consequences be fraught with great inconvenience to the public.
The act of 1835 is relied upon as vesting in the judges elected under it, an authority to appoint the clerks in their respective counties. This is undoubtedly true wherever the offices were vacant; but to sustain the position with respect to the case before the Court, it must be shown that by this act, the present Circuit Courts were created, and that the law which created those in existence at the time of its passage, was repealed, and the Courts thereby abolished. From an examination of that statute, it will be apparent that great caution has been used to avoid such a result. The first section of the act provides for the election of five Circuit judges in addition to the one then in existence, whose duty it should be to preside in the several Circuit Courts now or hereafter authorized and required to be held in the several counties in this State. The third section repeals so much of the law then in force, as required the judges of the Supreme Court to hold Circuit Courts. It will be perceived that the existence of Circuit Courts is expressly recognised by the language of this act, and the requisition to hold as well the Circuit Courts which might hereafter be created, as those then in existence, was intended to apply to, and provide for, the administration of justice in such new counties as might thereafter be created and organized. No part of the act repeals the law of 1829, by which the Circuit Courts then in existence were created. It goes no farther than to assign to the judges elected under it, the duties before that time performed by the judges of the Supreme Court. The Circuit Court- remained the same in name, jurisdiction, and character. It is contended by counsel that Matheny's appointment to the office of clerk is invalid, as not having been made by the Circuit Court of Sangamon county, because the judge who at the time of his appointment presided in that Court, was a judge of the Supreme Court. This argument is refuted by a reference to that provision in the Constitution which enjoins upon him the performance of Circuit duties when required by the legislature, and the law of 1829 making the requisition, which gives him the name, and clothes him with the authority, of a Circuit judge. It has also been attempted to assimilate the powers of the judges appointed under the act of 1835, to those of the judges of the Supreme Court under the law of 1827, by which they were required to perform Circuit duties, and under which they reappointed their clerks. The cases, however, are essentially different. The act of 1827 abolished the Circuit Courts then in existence, by repealing the law which created and brought them into being, and with the- expiration of that oEce, the oEcial character and existence of the judge, together with that of the clerk of the Court, also expired at the same time;—and when, by the authority of the legislature, Circuit Courts were again called into, being, those Courts were authorized by the provision of the Constitution referred to, to appoint their clerks to the newly created oEces. The act of 1835, I have attempted to show, did not abolish or change the character of the Circuit Courts; it only substituted for the discharge of the duties of the oEce, one set of judges in place of another. No inference, then, in favor of the legality of the appointment of Mobley under the law of 1835, can be drawn from the practice of the Courts under the law of 1827. But, on the contrary, if any conclusion is to be drawn from the practice of the Courts, and if such practice is to be regarded as having given a construction to the Constitution, and the powers and duties of the judges in relation to the appointment of clerks, it will settle the question in favor of the relator. By the Constitution, the commissions of the judges appointed prior to the year 1824, expired at that period, and when the judges elected to succeed them, came into oEce, they were of opinion that inasmuch as the Court remained the same, the oEce of clerk was not vacated by a change of judges, and consequently no new appointment was necessary to continue in oEce the present incumbent, nor has anjr such been made.
This view of the subject is strengthened by an enquiry into the tenure by which a clerk of the Circuit Court holds his oEce. The Constitution gives to the Court the authority to appoint its clerk, but when thus appointed, it fixes no limit to the duration of the oEce. The clerk, then, is to be considered as holding his oEce under the Constitution ad libitum, until the legislature shall think proper to prescribe the tenure. This it is certainly competent for it to do, and under a like provision of the Constitution with respect to the Auditor and Attorney General, it has exercised this authority by fixing the term of service of those oEcers. It has also legislated upon the subject of clerk, and though it has not defined the tenure of the office specifically, it has done so to some extent, by prescribing the tenure upon which its duration is to depend. Those tenures are the renewal of the bond at stated periods, his residence at the county seat, and various others. But a vacancy in the office of Judge of the Court, is not one of the causes enumerated, which will vacate the office of clerk, or for which he may, by application to the Court, be removed from office. It is not competent, then, when the Constitution has left the tenure of an office without limit, for the Court to prescribe limits nor is it their province when the legislature has specified the causes of forfeiture of, or removal from, office, to say that other causes than those enumerated, shall have that effect. The consequence of such a latitude of construction, would be to change the tenure of an office, and make its duration depend not only upon the limits fixed by law, but upon such others as the Court might think it good policy to superadd. From a review of all the points involved in this case, I am of opinion that the order of the Circuit Court of Sangamon county, appointing M. Mobley clerk of that Court, was without authority and erroneous; because the power of appointment is delegated to the Court, and the exercise of that power limited to the filling of offices which may be created, or which may become vacant by any of the various ways known to the law; and because the relator had been legally appointed to the office which he claims, and the appointment had not expired by operation of any law of this State, nor has he been removed for any omission or act in violation of the law prescribing his duties, and defining the tenure of his office.
It is therefore ordered by the Court, that the judgment of the Court below be reversed, and that the relator, Charles R. Matheny, be restored to his office of clerk of the Circuit Court of Sangamon county.
Acts of 1835, 150; Gale's Stat. 182.
R. L. 147; Gale's Stat. 158.
R. L. of 1827, 119-124.