Case Name: Courtney MITCHELL, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Cross-Appellant
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2002-11-22
Citations: 830 So. 2d 944
Docket Number: No. 5D01-957
Parties: Courtney MITCHELL, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Judges: THOMPSON, C.J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 830
Pages: 944–949

Head Matter:
Courtney MITCHELL, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
No. 5D01-957.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Nov. 22, 2002.
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Noel A. Pelella, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant/Cross-Ap-pellee.
Richard E. Doran, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Denise O. Simpson, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

Opinion:
PETERSON, J.
Courtney D. Mitchell appeals his convictions for Attempted Second Degree Murder, Attempted Felony Murder, Attempted Armed Robbery, and Conspiracy to Commit Robbery . He received 30-year concurrent sentences for the first three crimes and a 15-year sentence for the fourth along with a 25-year minimum mandatory sentence for the use of a firearm.
Mitchell and two others planned and participated in a robbery on July 23, 1999. The victims, a couple in a parking lot, were randomly selected by the trio as they passed by the site. Mitchell simply walked up to the woman and immediately shot her below her chin at close range with a .22 caliber pistol, without making a demand for her property or uttering a word. The bullet lodged behind her ear, damaged her cranial nerves and left her with lifelong painful injuries affecting her ability to speak and swallow. The use of her left shoulder and neck are also impaired. Mitchell then turned toward the wounded woman's companion and demanded his wallet. When the demand was refused, Mitchell ran away. Only emergency treatment and 15 days in the hospital saved the life of the wounded victim from the potentially fatal gunshot.
Mitchell contends that his dual convictions for attempted second degree murder and attempted felony murder are barred by double jeopardy principles. He relies primarily on Gordon v. State, 780 So.2d 17 (Fla.2001) for his conclusion that the trial court impermissibly entered judgments finding him guilty of both attempted second degree murder and attempted felony murder. Although the two specific homicide attempts involved in the instant case were not charged against the defendant in Gordon, the opinion is instructive and the principles discussed are dispositive of the issues in the instant case.
Gordon instructs us that in order to determine whether dual convictions constitute a double jeopardy violation, an analysis requires more than a simple application of the Blockburger test. This requirement exists because dual convictions meeting the Blockburger test may still be impermissible when the offenses are considered "degree variants of the same core offense." Id. at 22. A two step inquiry is required to determine whether the second exception of the Blockburger test found in section 775.021(4)(b), Florida Statutes (2001) would allow a dual conviction in the instant case. The two step analysis requires inquiry to determine: (1) whether the crimes constitute separate offenses under Blockburger as codified in section 775.021(4)(a); and, if so, (2) whether the crimes are "degree variants" or aggravated forms of the same core offense. Id. at 21.
The crimes constitute separate offenses under Blockburger because each crime contains an element that the other does not. Attempted second degree murder requires that the perpetrator's act was imminently dangerous to another and demonstrated a depraved mind without regard for human life. Attempted felony murder requires that the act be committed during the course of committing a felony and that it could have resulted in the unlawful death of another.
Finding that the initial inquiry results in the conclusion that each crime constitutes a separate offense, we must next deter mine whether the two offenses are degree variants or aggravated forms of core offenses. We must first determine whether the two offenses share the same core offenses categorized as theft, battery, possession of contraband or homicide.
Both of the offenses, murder in the second degree and attempted felony murder, are included in Chapter 782 of the Florida Statutes entitled Homicide and are addressed to the same primary evil, the perpetration of an act that may inflict death. Although the two types of crimes differ in that the former requires an act evincing a depraved mind and the latter omits that requirement in lieu of the act being an intentional act perpetrated during the commission of a felony, both punish for the act that may inflict death. Because both crimes are included within the core offense of homicide and address the same evil, we must conclude that convictions for both crimes for the same act committed during a criminal event constitute a double jeopardy violation.
We also reach this conclusion greatly influenced by the strong language employed in the Gordon opinion:
We have held repeatedly that section 775.021 did not abrogate our previous pronouncements concerning punishments for singular homicides. See Goodwin v. State, 634 So.2d at 157-58 (Grimes, J., concurring) ("I believe that the Legislature could not have intended that a defendant could be convicted of two crimes of homicide for killing a single person.") State v. Chapman, 625 So.2d 888, 839 (Fla.1993); Houser v. State, 474 So.2d 1193, 1196 (Fla.1985) (noting that "only one homicide conviction and sentence may be imposed for a single death"); Campbell-Eley, 718 So.2d at 329; Laines v. State, 662 So.2d at 1250; Goss v. State, 398 So.2d at 999. Indeed, this principle is based on notions of fundamental fairness which recognize the inequity that inheres in multiple punishments for a singular killing.
Having found that the dual homicide convictions are impermissible under Gordon, we vacate only the conviction and sentence for the category 9 crime of attempted second degree murder. We affirm the conviction for the primary offense of attempted felony murder, a category 10 offense together with the convictions for attempted armed robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery. We remand for preparation of a new scoresheet and re-sentencing.
In view of the legislative requirement of section 775.021 to punish each offense that passes the Blockburger test, the requirements of Gordon and the conviction under the relatively new crime created by section 782.051(1), we certify the following question to be one of great public importance pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(a)(2)(A)(v):
DO DUAL CONVICTIONS FOR ATTEMPTED SECOND DEGREE MURDER AND ATTEMPTED FELONY MURDER, PURSUANT TO SECTION 782.051, FLORIDA STATUTES (2001), FOR A SINGLE ACT CONSTITUTE A DOUBLE JEOPARDY VIOLATION?
THOMPSON, C.J., concurs.
PLEUS, J., dissents with opinion.
. Fla. Stat. § 782.04(2) (2001).
. Fla. Stat. § 782.051(1), 775.087(1) and (2)(a)3 (2001).
. Fla. Stat. § 812.13(2)(a), 777.04, 777.011 and 775.087(2)(a)3 (2001).
. Fla. Stat. § 812.13(2)(a), 777.04(3) and 777.011 (2001).
. We recognize that the crime of attempted felony murder discussed in Gordon was found not to exist in State v. Gray, 654 So.2d 552 (Fla.1995). The crime of attempted felony murder involved in the instant case was enacted subsequent to the Gray decision.
. Blockburger v. U.S., 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932).
. The term "degree variants" describes Justice Kogan's interpretation of the second statutory exception of the Blockburger test. The interpretation was announced in a concurring opinion in Sirmons v. State, 634 So.2d 153 (Fla.1994) and prohibits multiple convictions for certain core offenses which are distinguishable only by degree. Review of this concept indicates that the core offenses are basically theft, battery, possession of contraband, or homicide. Id. at 155. The "degree" referred to is not the degrees defined by statute such as first, second or third degree murder, but all crimes prescribed by Florida's Criminal Code that are "variants" of a particular "core offense." Justice Grimes commented on the confusion that the concept generates in his dissent in Sirmons: "The majority seems to rely on the second exception (of the Block-burger test) to conclude that both theft of a motor vehicle and robbery with a weapon are degrees of the same offense but ignored the fact that these crimes are not degrees of the same offense "as provided by statute" (referring again to the statutory Blockburger test). Notwithstanding, Justice Grimes's dissent was somewhat weakened in Goodwin v. State 634 So.2d 157, 158 (Fla.1994) when in a concurring opinion he wrote that the "Legislature could not have intended that a defendant could be convicted of two crimes of homicide for killing a single person."
.Judge Pleus's accompanying dissent has a detailed Blockburger analysis which we find to be correct. We differ only in the conclusion because it omits the Gordon "core analysis."
. The "evil" concept involved in attempted homicide is discussed in Gordon citing to the dissent in Carawan v. State, 515 So.2d 161, 173 (Fla.1987).