Case Name: D. M. Willson et al. v. J. L. Crawford et al.
Court: Texas Courts of Civil Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1910-06-16
Citations: 61 Tex. Civ. App. 580
Docket Number: 
Parties: D. M. Willson et al. v. J. L. Crawford et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Civil Appeals Reports
Volume: 61
Pages: 580–587

Head Matter:
D. M. Willson et al. v. J. L. Crawford et al.
Decided May 26,
June 16, 1910.
1. —Land Agent — Commissions—Sale—Performance.
Agents for the sale of land were entitled to the commissions agreed upon when they procured a purchaser able and willing to buy on the owner’s terms, but who, after agreeing to take the land, refused to carry out the purchase because the seller could not give possession by reason of having made a lease of the premises to another.
2. —Same—Commissions Out of Defined Payment — Rescission of Sale.
A land agent having negotiated a sale for part cash and notes secured by vendor’s lien, agreed that his commission might be paid out of the first purchase money note (or, as he claimed, on its maturity). The purchaser was unable to meet the note when due and reconveyed the land to the vendor on the latter’s agreement to a rescission and surrender of his notes. Held that the vendor became liable thereby to the land agent for his commission.
ON MOTION FOB BEHEABING.
3. —Pleading—Variance.
Where the evidence establishes the substantive facts forming the basis of the cause of action alleged, a departure from the allegations in merely subsidiary or evidentiary facts does not constitute a fatal variance.
4. —Pleading—Defects Supplied by Answer.
Omissions in plaintiff’s pleadings may be supplied by the allegations of the answer.
5. —Pleading—Case Stated.
Plaintiffs seeking to recover commissions for negotiating a sale of land for defendant alleged that they had procured a purchaser ready, willing and able to take the land at defendant’s price, but that the latter had refused to execute the deed and to pay their commission. Defendants answered that the sale was not consummated because the purchaser refused to carry it out on the ground that he could not get possession. It was proven that the sale miscarried because the purchaser refused to accept the deed and pay the price by reason of the existence of an outstanding lease of the property to another which prevented his getting immediate possession. Held, that there was no fatal variance between the allegations and proof of plaintiffs; that the substance of their cause of action alleged was proven, in that they found a purchaser and were denied their commissions; and that the answer showing why the sale failed showed no defense.
6. —Contract to Sell Land — Outstanding Lease.
One agreeing to buy land was under no obligation to take and pay for it when he could not get immediate possession because of an existing lease of part thereof for another year, of which he was ignorant when he contracted to buy; and the trade not being consummated for that reason, the land agent who had negotiated it for the owner without knowledge of the outstanding lease was entitled to hi.i commissions.
7. —Notice—Possession of Tenant.
A land agent negotiating for the owner a sale of land with knowledge that an outstanding lease would prevent immediate possession by the purchaser, would not earn his commission except by presenting a buyer willing to take it subject to such lease. But possession of the land by a tenant of the owner would, it seems, be constructive notice to such agent only of the tenant’s rights for the current year, not of an unrecorded lease for a year in addition. At least the burden of proving notice, and possession by the tenant as constructive notice, was on the defendant resisting the action for recovery of commissions, he having authorized the negotiation of a sale without qualifications.
Appeal from the County Court of Wise County. Tried below before Hon. C. V. Terrell.
McMurray & Gettys, for appellants.
— The proof wholly fails to show that Powers was ready and willing to buy the land and pay defendant’s price therefor; but shows, on the contrary, that he, on learning all the fácts concerning the place, refused to purchase same at the price defendants had agreed to sell it for. Moss & Raley v. Wren, 120 S. W., 847; Duval v. Moody, 60 S. W., 269; Burch v. Hester & Lawhorn, 109 S. W., 399.
The contract between plaintiffs and defendants was that plaintiffs were to have $1 per acre commission for the “sale” of the land; and, as the prospective purchaser refused to execute any written contract or memorandum to purchase the land, there was no valid sale, and plaintiffs could not have earned any commissions under their contract with defendants until a sale was made. Morris v. Gaines, 82 Texas, 255; Moore v. Powell, 25 S. W., 472; Brock v. Jones, 8 Texas, 78.
As a portion of the land was occupied by a renter, which fact was known to the purchaser, who lived right by it, and he was informed of the extent of the rental term before the trade was closed, such occupancy of the tenant would not be a breach of right of possession in a deed; since the occupant, under those circumstances, becomes the vendee’s tenant from the delivery of the deed, in the absence of any other agreement. Baldwin v. Smith, 119 S. W., 111; 11 Cyc., 1119-20; Lindley v. Dakin, 13 Ind., 388.
R. E. Carswell and Robert Carswell, for appellees.
— Plaintiffs had complied with their undertaking to find a purchaser, and were not responsible for defendants’ inability to give possession. Brackenridge v. Claridge, 91 Texas, 527; Gibson v. Gray, 43 S. W., 925; Smye v. Groesbeck, 73 S. W., 927; 19 Cyc., 246.
The existence of the lease and consequent inability to give possession was a material impairment of the marketable character of the title. Roberts v. McFadden, 74 S. W., 109; Baldwin v. Smith, 119 S. W., 111.
Plaintiffs were entitled to their commissions on the sale cancelled by defendants. Nunez v. Dautel, 19 Wall., 560; Crokers v. Holmes, 65 Me., 195; Randall v. Johnson, 59 Miss., 317.

Opinion:
HODGES, Associate Justice.
— Appellants were the owners of a tract of 1,300 acres of land situated in Cooke County, Texas. The appellees were real estate brokers, with whom the land had been listed for sale. This suit is by appellees to recover commissions on three different sales made of different portions of this tract of land. A trial in the court below resulted in a judgment for the appellees for $568.00 as commissions on one sale of 568 acres made to D. L. Powers, and in favor of the appellants as to the other two claims.
With reference to the sale made to Powers, the evidence shows that through the efforts of the appellees the owners and the purchaser were brought together, and that they agreed upon the price and terms of payment, but that Powers, upon learning that about 35 acres' of the land had been rented to a tenant for the succeeding year, declined to complete the purchase. A majority of the court is of the opinion that the appellees were nevertheless entitled to their commissions of $1 per acre, the amount previously agreed upon, and that this portion of the judgment should be affirmed.
Appellees have filed a cross-assignment of error attacking that portion of the judgment denying a recovery for a sale made to J. A. Adams & Sons. As to this transaction the evidence shows the following facts: About December 3, 1906, appellees negotiated the sale of a portion of the 1,300 acres tract to J. A. Adams & Sons for $5,368.00, of which $500 was to be paid in cash and the remainder in ten equal annual installments. When the sale was consummated and the deed passed there was an agreement between the parties to this suit that appellees should wait for their commissions till the first note matured. There is some conflict in the testimony as to what the details of that agreement were. According to the testimony of the appellants, appellees agreed to take their commissions out of the first note when it was paid. This is disputed by the version given by the appellees, their contention being that they only agreed to wait until that note matured for their commissions. However this may be, we do not think the difference in the two versions is material as affecting the right of appellees to recover. It seems that when the first note did mature the Adams people were not able to pay it, and by an agreement entered into between them and the appellants, the latter took a conveyance of the land back and cancelled all the notes which had theretofore been given. Upon this being done appellees were clearly entitled to their commissions for having made the sale. That the first note might have been collected by an enforcement of the vendor's lien retained is not disputed. That it was not so collected on account of -the election of the appellants to rescind the sale and resume ownership of the land is equally as certain. Appellants could not in this way defeat the claim of the appellees to commissions after having availed themselves of the services of the latter in bringing about a satisfactory sale of their land. Under this state of facts the court should have rendered judgment for the appellees for the amount of their commissions, $568.00. That portion of the judgment denying this recovery is reversed, and judgment will here he rendered in favor of appellees accordingly.
The judgment of the County Court is therefore affirmed in part and reversed and rendered in part.