Case Name: Dianne TURNER, as Natural Tutrix of the Minor Child Cietra Jenal Stroughter (Onterio McWright) v. Thomas R. BUSBY and Zurich American Insurance Company
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 2004-09-09
Citations: 883 So. 2d 412
Docket Number: No. 2003-C-3444
Parties: Dianne TURNER, as Natural Tutrix of the Minor Child Cietra Jenal Stroughter (Onterio McWright) v. Thomas R. BUSBY and Zurich American Insurance Company.
Judges: CALOGERO, C.J., dissents and assigns reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 883
Pages: 412–425

Head Matter:
Dianne TURNER, as Natural Tutrix of the Minor Child Cietra Jenal Stroughter (Onterio McWright) v. Thomas R. BUSBY and Zurich American Insurance Company.
No. 2003-C-3444.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Sept. 9, 2004.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 29, 2004.
Bobby Ray Manning, for applicant.
Samuel Henry Thomas, James Edward Paxton, Tallulah, for respondent.

Opinion:
| t TRAYLOR, Justice.
We granted this writ application to determine whether Onterio McWright, the plaintiff, is a child of the decedent for the purposes of a wrongful death and survival action where McWright has no biological connection to the decedent, but decedent executed a formal acknowledgment of paternity. For the following reasons, we affirm the court of appeal and find that McWright is not a child who may recover damages under a wrongful death and survival claim.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On November 11, 1999, Andrew Stroughter ("Stroughter") was killed in a collision with a tractor trailer driven by Thomas Busby ("Busby"). Following the accident, multiple parties filed suit against Busby and his insurance carrier, Zurich American Insurance Company ("Zurich") for the wrongful death of Stroughter. The plaintiffs in this action include Alversia Stroughter, Stroughter's ex-wife; Onterio McWright, his formally acknowledged son; LeShun Singleton, his daughter; and Dianne | ¿Turner, Stroughter's girlfriend, as natural tutrix for their minor child, Cietra Jenal Stroughter. This appeal focuses specifically on McWright's claims.
McWright was born to Gladysteen Harris ("Harris") on June 8, 1970. Harris and Stroughter were never married. However, in child support proceedings on March 3,1982, Stroughter signed a notarized stipulation that was made an order of the court under La.Rev.Stat. 14:75.2 wherein he agreed to pay child support. Stroughter subsequently stipulated that he was McWright's "lawful parent" in an order and judgment fixing child support entered in the Superior Court of the State of Washington, King County, on May 6, 1983, where he was cast in judgment for back child support. The March 1982 stipulation was amended on May 4, 1984, and Stroughter again signed another notarized stipulation and judgment admitting that he was MeWright's father and agreed to pay child support.
After this wrongful death and survival action ensued, the defendants filed an Exception of No Right of Action arguing that McWright was neither legitimate at birth, nor subsequently legitimized by Stroughter; therefore, McWright is not within the class of persons who may assert a wrongful death and survival action under La. Code Civ. Proc. arts. 2315.1 and 2315.2. In addition, the defendants submitted and were granted |3a motion to have a DNA test performed on McWright to determine if Stroughter was in fact his father. The Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, denied writs on the showing made. McWright then submitted to the DNA testing which revealed a 0% probability that McWright was Stroughter's son. Thereafter, the trial court granted the defendant's Exception of No Right of Action, and McWright was dismissed from the lawsuit with prejudice.
On appeal, McWright asserted that, as a matter of law, the 1982, 1983, and 1984 final judgments fixing child support settled the issue of paternity. Consequently, any attack on the validity of the assertions in those judgments should have been made within one year of the discovery of the alleged defect or nullity under La.Code of Civ. Proc. art.2004. As a result, McWright argued that the defendants are preempted by operation of law from collaterally attacking that judgment in this wrongful death action. McWright also asserted that the defendants lack standing to attack the formal acknowledgments executed pursuant to the 1982 and 1984 criminal stipulations. On rehearing, the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, affirmed, finding that the defendants had standing to contest the validity of the formal acknowledgments and that McWright could not recover wrongful death and survival damages because he is not Stroughter's child.
|40n the application of McWright, we granted certiorari to review the correctness of the lower courts' judgments granting the peremptory exception of no right of action. Turner v. Busby, 03-3444 (La.3/19/04), 869 So.2d 834.
DISCUSSION
The function of an exception of no right of action is to determine whether the plaintiff belongs to the class of persons to whom the law grants the cause of action asserted in the suit. La.Code Civ. Proc. art. 927; Reese v. State, Dept. of Public Safety & Corrections, et al, 03-1615 (La.2/20/04), 866 So.2d 244, 247. In examining an exception of no right of action, a court should focus on whether the particular plaintiff has a right to bring the suit, but assume that the petition states a valid cause of action for some person. Id. The exception of no right of action questions whether the plaintiff in the particular case is a member of the class of persons that has a legal interest in the subject matter of the litigation. Id.
To recover under a claim for wrongful death and survival, a plaintiff must fall within the class of persons designated as a beneficiary as prescribed by La. Civ.Code arts. 2315.1 and 2315.2. The primary category under both wrongful death and survival actions includes "children" of the decedent. Reese, 866 So.2d at 247.
McWright argues that a judgment of paternity existed between himself and Stroughter based on the 1982, 1983, and 1984 final judgments fixing child support. He asserts that the defendants cannot collaterally attack this final judgments twenty years later in this proceeding because they have not challenged the acknowledgment within |fithe one-year peremptive period provided in La.Code Civ. Proc. art.2004. We disagree, and find that Article 2004 is inapplicable to the instant case.
La.Code Civ. Proc. art.2004 provides for a one-year peremptive period for the annulment of a civil judgment obtained by fraud or ill practices. By contrast, La. Rev.Stat. 14:75.2, located in Title 14 which deals exclusively with criminal law, is criminal in nature. State v. Broussard, 490 So.2d 273 (La.1986). Moreover, the jurisprudence has held that a proceeding for criminal neglect of family must be converted into a paternity proceeding in order to establish a civil judgment of paternity. State v. Foss, 449 So.2d 159, 161 (La.App. 4 Cir.1984). The stipulation and the judgment are separate. State v. Braxton, 238 La. 13, 113 So.2d 292, 294 (1959). Thus, the jurisprudence and the subject matter of the statute establish that these judgments are criminal in nature, and do not constitute a civil paternity judgment.
Based on the jurisprudence and the subject matter of La.Rev.Stat. 14:72.5, this case clearly involves a stipulation made pursuant to a criminal statute. By its very nature, the prescriptive periods set forth in the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure are inapplicable to the annulment of a stipulation made pursuant to a criminal statute. For these reasons, we find that La.Code Civ. Proc. art.2004 is inapplicable to the instant case.
Having established that the prescriptive periods set out in the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure are inapplicable to a criminal judgment, we must next determine whether | fithese judgments constitute final judgments as to these parties pursuant to other law. La.Rev.Stat. 13:4231 provides:
Except as otherwise provided by law, a valid and final judgment is conclusive between the same parties, except on an appeal or other direct review, to the following extent:
(3) A judgment in favor of either the plaintiff or the defendant is conclusive, in any subsequent action between them, with respect to any issue actually litigated and determined if its determination was essential to that judgment.
This statute adopts the principle of issue preclusion, which is designed to promote judicial economy by preventing relitigation of the same issue between the same parties. La.Rev.Stat. 13:4231, Comment (B).
In the instant case, the defendants were not parties to the criminal child support proceeding, nor did the defendants have an opportunity to intervene in such an action at the time it arose. The defendants' interest in the plaintiffs claim arose when McWright filed suit for wrongful death and survival damages based on his claim that he is Stroughter's illegitimate child and named the defendants as parties therein. Therefore, the stipulation of paternity in the 1982, 1983, and 1984 judgments could not have conclusive effect between McWright and these particular defendants because the same parties are not attempting to relitigate the paternity issue.
McWright next argues that the defendants do not have standing to contest the formal acknowledgment executed by Stroughter pursuant to the child support proceedings. We disagree and find that the defendants have standing to contest McWright's claims as an illegitimate child pursuant to La. Civ.Code art. 207.
La. Civ.Code art. 207 states, "Every claim, set up by illegitimate children, may be contested by those who have any interest therein." In Succession of Robinson, 94 2229 (La.5/22/95), 654 So.2d 682, 685, this court clearly and unequivocally held that the right to challenge an acknowledgment is granted by La. Civ.Code art. 207. In Robinson, Hardie Robinson, Jr. formally acknowledged three children born to his wife during her previous marriage in a 1971 will executed before a notary public and two witnesses. In 1988, Robinson executed a new will without mention of his wife's daughters. After Robinson died in 1992, the acknowledged women intervened in the succession seeking to be recognized by the court as Robinson's children and thus be allowed to participate in the succession. When the administrator and forced heir, Melvin Robinson, subsequently sought DNA testing, the women claimed that the formal acknowledgment could not be attacked. This court found that Melvin Robinson, had standing under Article 207 to contest the formal acknowledgment and the women's claims to participate as forced heirs in the succession due to his own interest as administrator of the succession and as a forced heir.
Defendants herein also have an interest in contesting McWright's claim that he is entitled to recover under the wrongful death and survival actions as a child of the decedent. Here, McWright has filed a wrongful death and survival action alleging that he falls within the primary class of beneficiaries who may recover damages. The defendant insurance company and Busby, as potentially liable parties named in this lawsuit, have an interest in this suit based on McWright's claim that he is Stroughter's illegitimate child and thus falls within the primary class of beneficiaries who may recover under a wrongful death and survival action.
As the defendants argue, our holding is supported by jurisprudence which establishes the necessity of a biological connection between a child and the tort victim in wrongful death and survival actions. This court in Warren v. Richard, 296 So.2d 813, 817 (La.1974), determined that the critical requirement for classification of ajjperson as a child in a wrongful death and survival action is the biological relationship between the tort victim and the child. In Warren, Iris Blackburns, the legitimate child of Albert Gray, alleged that she was entitled to wrongful death and survival damages for the death of her biological father, David Lee Blackburns. This court reversed the trial court and denied the defendants' exception of no right of action, reasoning that to find a child had no right to recover for her biological father's wrongful death because the law presumed her to be the legitimate child of another man would run counter to the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Consti tution. As the Warren court stated, "it is the biological relationship and dependency which is determinative of the child's rights in these cases, and not the classification into which the child is placed by the statutory law of the State." Id. Thus, it is imperative that we uphold the critical requirement that the tort victim and the child have a biological relationship.
McWright also attempts to construe the lower courts holdings as contrary to public policy because it "bastardizes" children. However, to contest a claim under Article 207, the child making the claim must be illegitimate. Children may either be legitimate, illegitimate, or .legitimated. La. Civ. Code. arts. 178 and 181. La. Civ.Code art. 207, located in Chapter 3, Section 2, entitled "Of the Acknowledgment of Illegitimate Children," provides in pertinent part for the formal acknowledgment of illegitimate children:
A. The acknowledgment of an illegitimate child shall be made by a declaration executed before a notary public, in the presence of two witnesses, by the father and mother or either of them, or it may be made in the registering of the birth or baptism of such child.
Although Article 203 may serve as proof of paternity, it does not legitimate the child. Davenport v. Davenport, 116 La. 1009, 41 So. 240, 240-241 (1906). By contrast, a parent 18wishing to legitimize a child may do so by notarial act provided that the parent makes a declaration of his intent to legitimate the child. See, La. Civ.Code art. 200.
The record reveals that the 1982 and 1984 criminal stipulations conform with the requirement that a parent must execute a formal acknowledgment before a notary and two witnesses; but does not reveal an intent to legitimize McWright by notarial act. The 1982 and 1984 criminal stipulations executed in Madison Parish, Louisiana, contained identical language which reveals an absence of intent to legitimize McWright:
I agree to pay to the Department of Health and Human Resources the amount of . for the support of the child born to me and Gladysteen Harris named herein as follows: Onterio J. McWright .
Moreover, the 1983 judgment executed in King County, Washington stated that "[Stroughter] is the lawful parent of On-terio J. McWright ." Although all three stipulations were executed before a notary and two witnesses, Stroughter did not declare his intention to make McWright his legitimate child. Without this declaration, the execution of the criminal stipulation did not legitimize McWright. Because McWright was not a legitimate child at the time this wrongful death and survival action commenced, but rather a formally acknowledged illegitimate child under Article 203, his claim as an illegitimate child may be subject to scrutiny provided the defendants have proved all other requirements of Article 207. Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeal and find that the defendants have standing to contest McWright's claim that he is Stroughter's illegitimate child.
McWright next asserts that the defendants have not used the appropriate procedural device to challenge a formal acknowledgment, asserting that the defendants must file an action to annul. We disagree.
We initially note that McWright is attempting to use a formal acknowledgment to prove that he is the illegitimate child of Stroughter for the purposes of the wrongful | indeath and survival action. This court explained the effects of a formal acknowledgment in Rousseve v. Jones, 97-1149 (La.12/2/97), 704 So.2d 229, 232-233:
An acknowledgment of an illegitimate child by authentic act effectively creates a presumption of biological parentage. Conversely, the acknowledgment is premised on a biological relationship, which is the reason for the acknowledgment. An authentic act of acknowledgment is a solemn statement by the ack-nowledger that he believes a child is his. The acknowledgment does not cause the child to be his; it merely acknowledges that he believes it is. When the acknowledged fact is ultimately untrue, the acknowledgment may be null, absent some overriding concern.
Thus, McWright is offering the acknowledgment as proof of Stroughter's belief that McWright was his illegitimate child. As evinced by Succession of Robinson, however, this presumption of parentage is open to contestation under Article 207. Robinson, 654 So.2d at 685. To read Article 207 to require those who may contest the claims of an illegitimate child to bring an entirely new action would be time consuming and unnecessarily burden the judicial system. We thus find that the defendants may contest Stroughter's claim that he is an illegitimate child in this proceeding.
Having determined that the defendants may contest the validity of Stroughter's formal acknowledgment in the instant proceeding, we next review the correctness of the lower courts' decision to grant the defendants' Exception of No Right of Action.
In discussing acknowledgment of a child in the context of successions, the Robinson court concluded that the validity of an acknowledgment depends on the existence of a biological relationship:
Although [the Civil Code] does not expressly preclude executing an acknowledgment where no biological relationship exits, this conclusion is self-evident and definitional of an acknowledgment. An acknowledgment is an avowal emanating from the "mother" or "father" to establish maternal or paternal filiation. The word "filiation" describes the fact of biological parentage. Thus, through the acknowledgment, the "mother" or "father" provides proof of maternal or paternal filiation, that is, biological parentage. Absent a biological relationship, the avowal is null. A fact l^cannot be avowed when it has never existed. If the acknowledgment is null, it produces no effects. (Citations omitted)
Robinson, 654 So.2d at 684. Thus, an Article 203 formal acknowledgment absent a biological relationship is a nullity.
The paternity test results revealed a 0% probability that McWright was Stroughter's child. Based on the principles adopted in Robinson, Stroughter's formal acknowledgment is null because McWright is not Stroughter's biological child. Therefore, the defendants have rebutted the presumption of parentage due to the absence of a biological relationship between the tort victim and McWright. Accordingly, the lower courts properly granted the defendants' exception of no cause of action because McWright does not belong to the class of persons who may recover wrongful death and survival damages as he is not the decedent's biological child.
CONCLUSION
Pursuant to La.Rev.Stat. 13:4231, we find that the 1982, 1983, and 1984 criminal stipulations of paternity are not binding on a defendant who was not a party to the criminal child support proceedings and that a defendant with standing to contest the paternity of an illegitimate child may relitigate the issue. Moreover, based on Article 207, we find that the defendants in this action, as named parties in a wrongful death and survival action in which the plaintiff has claimed that he falls within the primary class of beneficiaries who may recover damages, has standing to contest the plaintiffs claim that he is the illegitimate child of the decedent. Accordingly, we affirm the lower courts and hold that the plaintiff, who was formally acknowledged as an illegitimate child, is not a child for the purposes of a wrongful death and survival action where he is not the biological child of the decedent.
AFFIRMED.
CALOGERO, C.J., dissents and assigns reasons.
KIMBALL, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
JOHNSON, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
VICTORY, J., concurs.
WEIMER, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons.
. La.Rev.Stat. 14:75.2, which was repealed by Acts 1993, No. 442, § 4, effective June 9, 1993, stated:
In cases in which the responsible parent or other persons owing a duty of support and the district attorney stipulate to an order of support, the court shall have the power to issue an order of support under the provisions of R.S. 14:75 without the necessity of instituting criminal proceedings.
. Civ.Code art. 2315.1, which provides for a survival action, states in pertinent part:
A. If a person who has been injured by an offense or quasi-offense dies, the right to recover all damages for injury to that person, his property, or otherwise, caused by the offense or quasi-offense, shall survive for a period of one year from the death of the deceased in favor of:
(1) The surviving spouse and child or children of the deceased, or either the spouse or the child or children.
In addition, Civ.Code art. 2315.2, which provides for a wrongful death action, states in pertinent part:
A. If a person dies due to the fault of another, suit may be brought by the following persons to recover damages which they sustained as a result of the death:
(1) The surviving spouse and child or children of the deceased, or either the spouse or the child or children.
. La.Code Civ. Proc. art.2004 provides:
A. A final judgment obtained by fraud or ill practices may be annulled.
B. An action to annul a judgment on these grounds must be brought within one year of the discovery by the plaintiffs in the nullity action of the fraud or ill practices.