Case Name: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Richard A. LEAVITT, Defendant-Appellant
Court: Idaho Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Idaho
Decision Date: 1991-11-27
Citations: 121 Idaho 4
Docket Number: No. 18533
Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Richard A. LEAVITT, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: BAKES, C.J., and McDEVITT, J., concur.
Reporter: Idaho Reports
Volume: 121
Pages: 4–14

Head Matter:
822 P.2d 523
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Richard A. LEAVITT, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 18533.
Supreme Court of Idaho, Twin Falls, March 1991 Term.
Nov. 27, 1991.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 23, 1992.
David N. Parmenter, Blackfoot, for defendant-appellant.
Larry J. EchoHawk, Idaho Atty. Gen., Lynn E. Thomas, Sol. Gen., Boise, for plaintiff-respondent. Lynn E. Thomas argued.

Opinion:
BOYLE, Justice.
In this criminal case we are called upon to determine whether the death penalty was properly imposed upon Richard A. Leavitt. In 1985, Leavitt was convicted of the first degree murder of Danette Elg in Blackfoot, Idaho, and the district court imposed the death penalty. In State v. Leavitt, 116 Idaho 285, 775 P.2d 599 (1989) (Leavitt I), this Court affirmed the conviction, the finding of a statutorily defined aggravating circumstance, and that the sentence was not disproportionate or excessive. However, the death penalty sentence was reversed because the district court had failed to adequately weigh the cumulative mitigating circumstances against each aggravating circumstance and, because of circumstances unique to this case, failed to consider alternative sentences. Id., 116 Idaho 285, 294, 775 P.2d 599, 608 (1989).
In Leavitt I, we held:
Pursuant to I.C. § 19-2827, we determine that the sentence herein was not imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or other arbitrary factors; that the evidence supports the finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance (I.C. § 19-2515); and that the sentence of death is not excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases.
For all of the above considerations, we affirm the judgment of conviction of first degree murder, but we reverse the trial court's imposition of the death penalty and remand to the trial court for further consideration in light of this opinion. The trial court is, in its discretion, authorized to convene additional hearings and obtain additional information and/or testimony.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
116 Idaho at 294, 775 P.2d at 608 (emphasis original).
Upon remand, the district court conducted a sentencing hearing wherein additional evidence was presented. Following the hearing, the district court weighed all the mitigating factors against the single I.C. § 19-2515(g)(5) aggravating circumstance, contemplated alternative sentencing possibilities and, for a second time, sentenced Leavitt to death. After thoroughly considering the record, we affirm.
I.
Leavitt argues that the aggravating circumstance set forth in I.C. § 19-2515(g)(5), and found to exist by the district court and by this Court in Leavitt I, is unconstitutionally vague and violates his Eighth Amendment rights. Specifically, Leavitt asserts the language "exceptional depravity" does not provide sufficient direction to the sentencing court as required by Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988), and Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980). We disagree. An Eighth Amendment claim based qpon vagueness examines whether the challenged aggravating circumstance, together with any limiting instruction, adequately channels the discretion of the sentencing body in order to prevent the imposition of an arbitrary and capricious sentence. See Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972). This Court has previously addressed and upheld the constitutionality of I.C. § 19-2515(g)(5), including the Eighth Amendment vagueness claim presently asserted by Leavitt. State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742, 810 P.2d 680 (1991); State v. Lankford, 116 Idaho 860, 781 P.2d 197 (1989); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 774 P.2d 299 (1989); State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 631 P.2d 187 (1981). In Osborn, we adopted and applied limiting language applicable to the "exceptional depravity" language in I.C. § 19-2515(g)(5) to ensure this particular aggravating circumstance would be "sufficiently definite and limited to guide the sentencing court's discretion in imposing the death penalty." 102 Idaho at 418, 631 P.2d at 200. This language was thereafter upheld as constitutional in Charboneau, 116 Idaho at 152, 774 P.2d at 322, and Pizzuto, 119 Idaho at 771, 810 P.2d at 709.
In addition, given the Idaho legislature's statutory directive that a defendant be sentenced by a district judge rather than by a jury, Leavitt's reliance upon Godfrey and Maynard is misplaced. In addressing a similar claim, the United States Supreme Court in Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511, (1990), recently stated:
Maynard v. Cartwright and Godfrey v. Georgia, however, are distinguishable in two constitutionally significant respects. First, in both Maynard and Godfrey the defendant was sentenced by a jury and the jury either was instructed only in the bare terms of the relevant statute or in terms nearly as vague. Neither jury was given a constitutional limiting definition of the challenged aggravating factor. Second, in neither case did the State appellate court, in reviewing the propriety of the death sentence, purport to affirm the death sentence by applying a limiting definition of the aggravating circumstances to the facts presented____
When a jury is the final sentencer, it is essential that the jurors be properly instructed regarding all facets of the sentencing process. It is not enough to instruct the jury in the bare terms of an aggravating circumstance that is unconstitutionally vague on its face. That is the import of our holdings in Maynard and Godfrey. But the logic of those cases has no place in the context of sentencing by a trial judge. Trial judges are presumed to know the law and to apply it in making their decisions. If the Arizona Supreme Court has narrowed the definition of the . aggravating circumstance, we presume that Arizona trial judges are applying the narrower definition. al of which could have been the cause of death.
497 U.S. at-, 110 S.Ct. at 3057 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
In Idaho a defendant in a capital case is sentenced by a district judge presumed to know the law. Therefore, Leavitt's reliance on Godfrey and Maynard is misplaced. We reaffirm our prior decisions and hold that the language of the aggravating circumstance in I.C. § 19-2515(g)(5) is not unconstitutionally vague. State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742, 810 p.2d 680 (1991); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 774 P.2d 299 (1989); State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 631 P.2d 187 (1981).
II.
Our decision in State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 774 P.2d 299 (1989), and as recently reaffirmed in State v. Rhoades (Baldwin), 120 Idaho 795, 820 P.2d 665 (1991), and State v. Card, S.Ct. No. 18313, slip op. # 130, 1991 WL 183162 (filed Sept. 20, 1991), explain the procedure whereby the sentencing judge must weigh the mitigating factors against each individual aggravating circumstance as required by I.C. § 19-2515. In Charboneau we concluded that a plain reading of I.C. § 19-2515 requires that all mitigating circumstances be weighed against each individual aggravating circumstance and held that a "trial court may sentence the defendant to death, only if the trial court finds that all the mitigating circumstances do not outweigh the gravity of each of the aggravating circumstances found and make imposition of death unjust." 116 Idaho at 153, 774 P.2d at 323; see also State v. Rhoades (Baldwin), 120 Idaho at 810, 820 P.2d at 680.
In Leavitt I, this Court affirmed, as we do today, the district court's finding that the crime was "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity," as described in I.C. § 19-2515(g)(5). 116 Idaho at 294, 775 P.2d at 608. At the sentencing hearing on remand, the district court relied solely on I.C. § 19-2515(g)(5) as the only aggravating circumstance in reliance on our holding in Leavitt I. The facts in support of the finding that the crime was "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity" were summarized by the district court in the original sentencing as follows:
1. There were multiple stab wounds inflicted upon the body of the victim, sever-
2. There were multiple slashes which appeared to be wounds inflicted upon a person under attack attempting to ward off the thrust of the knife.
3. As part of the death dealing attack or as a grisly aftermath, there was an anal cutting and removal of certain sexual organs from the nude body of the victim.
R., at 21.
At the sentencing hearing on remand, the district court heard additional evidence and considered the following as possible mitigating factors: 1) the State's case against Leavitt was circumstantial; 2) Leavitt suffered or suffers from an intermittent explosive disorder; 3) Leavitt comes from a law abiding family; 4) Leavitt is a father, a husband and a son; 5) Leavitt had been steadily employed; 6) Leavitt has no record of prior felony convictions; 7) there was evidence that Leavitt was a model prisoner; 8) Leavitt was using his time constructively while incarcerated by expressing himself through artistry and poetry. After examining each circumstance, the district court concluded:
The Court has weighed all of the evidence in mitigation of defendant's culpability or blameworthiness in this case and weighed it against the aggravating circumstance which exhibited a heinous, atrocious and cruel murder manifesting exceptional depravity. The mitigating circumstances combined do not outweigh the aggravating circumstance to make the imposition of death unjust.
Leavitt asserts that the sentencing court improperly "whittled away" at the mitigating factors so as to render them insignificant and thus failed to properly weigh the mitigating factors and the sole aggravating circumstance. We disagree. As with any test that weighs and balances the merits of opposing considerations, it is paramount that the respective strengths and weaknesses be considered. Here, the record clearly demonstrates that the district court examined potential mitigating factors proffered by Leavitt and noted apparent weaknesses and inconsistencies. We find no error in this process and hold that the trial court properly applied the weighing test as required by our decisions in State v. Charboneau, State v. Rhoades (Baldwin), State v. Card, and I.C. § 19-2515(g)(5). Our review of the nineteen-page written sentencing memorandum filed in the instant case satisfies us that the trial court properly weighed all mitigating circumstances against the single I.C. § 19-2515(g)(5) aggravating circumstance.
III.
In Leavitt I, we directed the district court on remand to consider alternative sentences available to the sentencing court. 116 Idaho at 294, 775 P.2d at 608. Our directive that the district court consider alternative sentences was limited to the unique circumstances of this case only and does not represent an additional element to be considered by the district courts as part of the analysis in death penalty cases. On remand, the sentencing memorandum clearly demonstrates that the district court considered alternative sentences including lifetime confinement, and the sentencing objectives of society such as rehabilitation, protection of society and deterrence. Our review of the record satisfies us that in re-sentencing Leavitt the district court properly considered sentencing alternatives and did not err nor abuse its discretion in imposing the death penalty.
IV.
Idaho Code § 19—2827(c)(3) requires this Court to determine "whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar eases, considering both the crime and the defendant." In Leavitt I, we previously made that determination and expressly held "the sentence of death is not excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases." 116 Idaho at 294, 775 P.2d at 608. Although we reaffirm our prior holdings in Leavitt I, a new death penalty sentence has been imposed and we must examine anew the issue of proportionality on this appeal.
In State v. Rhoades (Baldwin), 120 Idaho 795, 820 P.2d 665 (1991), the Court recently reviewed the purpose of the proportionality analysis required by I.C. § 19-2827(c)(3), and our responsibility in that process.
Our perusal of the legislative history regarding the proportionality of sentences does not offer much guidance. The Statement of Purpose and the committee minutes for the bill that was eventually passed and codified as I.C. § 19-2827 expressed only a concern that the Idaho statute be updated to reflect recent ruling by the United States Supreme Court:
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE
Only a few years ago, the United States Supreme Court made new "rules" concerning imposition of the death penalty for serious crimes. So that we conformed with this U.S. Supreme Court interpretation of the federal Constitution, the Idaho Legislature enacted in 1973 our present death penalty Sections 18-4003 and 18-4004, Idaho Code. Then, last year, the United States Supreme Court again changed the rules relating to capital punishment—after many states, like Idaho, had acted in response to its previous decision. The Court, in five cases, set forth new, more definitive rules concerning sentencing where the death penalty was sought to be imposed. The purpose of this bill is to codify into Idaho law these present requirements imposed on the states by these most recent United States Supreme Court decisions on capital punishment so that we will conform with this latest expression of the law.
There is no mention of proportionality, or any expression by the legislature that we are required to review the proportionality of sentences with a special standard or test. The requirement that the death sentence not be disproportionate to "the penalty imposed in similar cases," is one of several considerations this Court must examine in each death penalty case. The legislature did not see fit to establish a separate standard for proportionality review of sentences when I.C. § 19-2827 was enacted.
This Court looked at the proportionality of death sentences in State v. Creech, 105 Idaho 362, 670 P.2d 463 (1983), and reviewed several cases in which the death penalty had been imposed or could have been imposed. The Court compared the facts of the crimes with the facts of the case they were reviewing to determine whether or not the sentence was disproportionate. This is the procedure that has been followed by this Court. We must do likewise.
Rhoades (Baldwin), 120 Idaho at 812, 820 P.2d at 682.
In this case, Richard Leavitt killed Danette Elg by inflicting multiple knife wounds several of which could have been the cause of her death. In addition, there were multiple slashes on part of her body which the trial court found to be wounds inflicted while Elg was under attack attempting to ward off the thrust of Leavitt's knife. Finally, as part of the attack or following her death, Leavitt made an anal cutting and removed certain of her organs. In comparing this crime and this defendant to similar crimes by other similar defendants, the record in this case and the district court's findings and conclusions, we hold that the death sentence is not excessive or disproportionate.
v.
Leavitt asserts the weighing of the mitigating and aggravating circumstances was influenced by the passion and prejudice of the sentencing court. In support of this argument, Leavitt asserts the sentencing court improperly referred to photographs of the crime scene more than once, and that this repeated reference shows the sentencing judge was unable to properly balance the mitigating and aggravating circumstances. Leavitt does not argue that it was improper for the sentencing court to view the crime scene photographs. Rather, Leavitt claims the written sentencing decision made several references to the photographs and that this necessarily indicates impermissible passion and prejudice in the sentencing process. In effect, Leavitt claims the sentencing court weighed the mitigating factors with the photographs rather than the statutory aggravating circumstance. We disagree.
We have carefully reviewed the sentencing court's memorandum decision and are satisfied that the sentence imposed was not the product of passion and prejudice, nor was it arbitrarily imposed. The sentencing judge was the same judge who had presided over the trial and original sentencing hearing. He was familiar with the facts of the case which led him, and this Court in Leavitt I, to conclude that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity. I.C. § 19-2515(g)(5). Although it is possible in some circumstances that graphic photographs could lead to prejudice and passion in the sentencing process, we find no such error in the instant case. The photographs were admitted into evidence at trial and their use at trial was upheld by this Court in Leavitt I, 116 Idaho at 290, 775 P.2d at 604. To make reference at sentencing to the evidence shown in the crime scene photographs and photographs of the victim's body was not error. We have reviewed the record and hold the sentence of death was not imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor.
VI.
We have independently reviewed the record and conclude an adequate basis for the imposition of the death penalty exists. The sentencing court considered alternative sentences and properly weighed the mitigating factors against the sole aggravating circumstance. The imposition of the death sentence was not influenced by passion, prejudice or other arbitrary consideration, and the sentence is not disproportionate or excessive when compared to similar cases.
The imposition of the death sentence is affirmed. Upon issuance of the remittitur, the district court shall set a new execution date.
BAKES, C.J., and McDEVITT, J., concur.
JOHNSON, J., concurs in parts I, II, III, V and VI, and specially concurs in part IV.
. I.C. § 19-2515(g)(5) provides "[t]he murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity."
. In Osborn, we adopted the language set forth by the Nebraska Supreme Court in State v. Simants, 197 Neb. 549, 250 N.W.2d 881 (1977) cert. denied, 434 U.S. 878, 98 S.Ct. 231, 54 L.Ed.2d 158, reh. denied, 434 U.S. 961, 98 S.Ct. 496, 54 L.Ed.2d 322 (1977). The court stated:
In interpreting this portion of the statute, the key word is "exceptional." It might be argued that every murder involves depravity. The use of the word "exceptional," however, confínes it only to those situations where depravity is apparent to such an extent as to obviously offend all standards of morality and intelligence. Id., 197 Neb. at 566, 250 N.W.2d at 891.
. State v. Card, Idaho S.Ct. # 18313, slip op. # 130, 1991 WL 183162 (filed Sept. 20, 1991); State v. Rhoades (Baldwin), 120 Idaho 795, 820 P.2d 665 (1991); State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742, 810 P.2d 680 (1991); State v. Paz, 118 Idaho 542, 798 P.2d 1 (1990); State v. Lankford, 116 Idaho 860, 781 P.2d 197 (1989), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 3295, 111 L.Ed.2d 803 (1990); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 774 P.2d 299 (1989); McKinney v. State, 115 Idaho 1125, 772 P.2d 1219 (1989); State v. Fetterly, 115 Idaho 231, 766 P.2d 701 (1988); State v. Windsor, 110 Idaho 410, 716 P.2d 1182 (1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 964, 107 S.Ct. 463, 93 L.Ed.2d 408 (1986); State v. Scroggins, 110 Idaho 380, 716 P.2d 1152 (1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 989, 107 S.Ct. 582, 93 L.Ed.2d 585 (1986); State v. Stuart, 110 Idaho 163, 715 P.2d 833 (1985); State v. Fetterly, 109 Idaho 766, 710 P.2d 1202 (1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 870, 107 S.Ct. 239, 93 L.Ed.2d 164 (1986); State v. Beam, 109 Idaho 616, 710 P.2d 526 (1985); State v. Bainbridge, 108 Idaho 273, 698 P.2d 335 (1985); State v. Aragon, 107 Idaho 358, 690 P.2d 293 (1984); State v. McKinney, 107 Idaho 180, 687 P.2d 570 (1984); State v. Paradis, 106 Idaho 117, 676 P.2d 31 (1983), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1220, 104 S.Ct. 3592, 82 L.Ed.2d 888 (1984); State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 54, 675 P.2d 33 (1983), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1220, 104 S.Ct. 3592, 82 L.Ed.2d 888 (1984); State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 674 P.2d 396 (1983), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1220, 104 S.Ct. 3591, 82 L.Ed.2d 887 (1984); State v. Creech, 105 Idaho 362, 670 P.2d 463 (1983); State v. Major, 105 Idaho 4, 665 P.2d 703 (1983); State v. Mitchell, 104 Idaho 493, 660 P.2d 1336, cert. denied, 461 U.S. 934, 103 S.Ct. 2101, 77 L.Ed.2d 308 (1983); State v. Olin, 103 Idaho 391, 648 P.2d 203 (1982); State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 631 P.2d 187 (1981); State v. Needs, 99 Idaho 883, 591 P.2d 130 (1979); State v. Lindquist, 99 Idaho 766, 589 P.2d 101 (1979).