Case Name: Joseph & Daniel Blake vs. F. G. De Liesseline, Sheriff Charleston District
Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1828-04
Citations: 4 McCord 496
Docket Number: 
Parties: Joseph & Daniel Blake vs. F. G. De Liesseline, Sheriff Charleston District.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Carolina Law Reports
Volume: 15
Pages: 496–501

Head Matter:
Joseph & Daniel Blake vs. F. G. De Liesseline, Sheriff Charleston District.
Every ground of appeal ought to bo so distinctly stated, that the Court may' at once see the point which it is cailed upori to decide, otherwise the Co.urt does not feel itself hound to decide any question raised under sucli indefinito specifications,
if the tenant consents to the landlords impounding goods distrain-ed on the promises, a person' who rescues them cannot make that objection when sued for the rescue.
There is no fixed period, after which a person may not distrain goods on the premises for rent in arreár; nor will a prior dormant execution, take the money in preference to the distress.
If the execution had been levied before the distress, or even if it had been issued before, and' had been in active operation, it ■ might have been otherwise.
In fin action for a rdscuo by the landlord who has distrained the goods, though lie cannot recover interest, as a matter of course, yef tíio jury may make the rate of interest the measure of damages.
The Court having; allowed interest by its judgment on special verdict, judgment ordered to be sot aside unless the plaintiff release the interest.
The facts in this case were stated by the following special verdict of the jury.'
“ We find that Humphrey Courteney was tenant to William Blake, of a certain bouse and lot in meeting street, in the City of Charleston, for several years prior to the 9th June 1823; that the said William Blake duly made and executed bis last will and testament, wherein be devised the said premises to the plaintiffs, as tenants in common, and on the 9th June aforesaid, departed this life, leaving tbe said will in full force, and unrevoked; that the said H. Courtenay continued on the said premises as tenant %o the plaintiffs under demise from the Said Win. Blake, at the yearly rent of £120, payable quarterly, of which said rent the sum $-principal, and of ‡-for interest, (according to the agreement between the said H. Courtenay and the plaintiffs,) making a total of $7027 77, on the 1 st April, 1824, was due and in arrear from the said H. Courtenay to the plaintiffs. And the Jury further find that on the 13th day of April, 1821, Thomas Parker, the legally constituted attorney for the plaintiffs, duly executed a warrant of distress, and duly appointed John Bonner, a deputy of the sheriff, the bailiff of the plaintiffs in that behalf, on the 14th April, dis-trained on all the goods and chattels, stock in trade, and fu‘r-iiiture of the said H. Courtenay on the demised premises, which were duly appraised, and with the consent of the said H. Courtenay impounded on the premises, being the dwelling house of the said H. Courtenay, And the Jury further find, that on the 16th April, in the year last aforesaid, William Wightman entered up a judgment in the office of the Clerk oí the Court of Common Pleas for Charleston District, for the sum of $38,258, and on the same day took out am execution', and lodged the samé in the office of the deféndant, then being sheriff of Charles, ton District, and that the said goods and chattels, stock in trade, &c. so being impounded and in the- custody of the bailiff aforesaid, the said defendant notwithstanding he was notified that the said goods were seized and impounded under a warrant of distress, and was warned if he did take the said goods and chattels, stock and furniture out oí the possession of the said bailiff, he would do so. against the assent of the plaintiffs, and only by force of his official power and at his peril, did nevertheless on the 19th April, levy on the said goods, stock and furniture, and took the same out of the custody of the said bailiff, and on tbe 8th day of’May ensuing, did sell the said goods,' stock in trade, and furniture, under the execution and levy aforesaid, the nett proceeds of which sale amounted, to the sum of $3276 77. And the jury further find that previous to the levy aforesaid, the amount of one year’s rent was tendered to-the agent of the plaintiffs, as a full satisfaction of their claim for rent, which was. refused, but the said sum has never been paid into C ourt. And the Jury also find, that the said defendant having been served-with a rule to shew cause why an attachment should no# issue against him for not having’paid the said sum of $3276 77 into Court, shewed no. sufficient-cause against jhe said rule, and on the-day of--182-, and order for an attachment to issue was made, but the said defendant confessing, that he had otherwise ‘appropriated the money, and had not the means to raise the, Sum, the attachment was not enforced against him. And the jurors further find, that evidence was .produced (subject however,'to legal exceptions,,) by which it appears there were other judgments and executions than that of Wm. Wight-man remaining on record,, apparently" unsatisfied, to a much larger amount than the whole proceeds of the property levied on Under the distress; which said judgments and executions were prior to, the distress warrant and judgment of Wm. Wightman, but of these prior executions, there were none which .had been renewed and lodged in the offiee.of the.sheriff of the said district •within a year'and a day previous to the distress warrant and levy aforesaid. Under this statement of facts, if the Court shall he of opinion that the plaintiffs had no right to distrain for more than one year’s rent, or having a right to distrain for the whole amount of rent in arrear, if the Court shall'be of opinion that the executions offered in evidence were legally admissible, and that they have .a prior'lied on-the said goods, then we find for the plain- .rift's five hundred and fourteen dollars twenty eight cents, being the amount of *>ne year’s rent, with interest from ■the date of the sale under the execution. If the Court shall decide that the plaintiffs are entitled thereto. Or ,from the date of the order for the attachment, or without -interest as the Court shall determine. But if the Court shall be of opinion that the plaintiffs’ distress for the • whole amount of rent in arrear, is legal, and that the executions offered in evidence, either were inadmissible, or being.admissible have no prior lien or right against the plaintiffs distress,'then we find for the plaintiffs three thousand two hundred ’ and seventy six dollars and seventy seven cents, the nett sales of the goods distrained upon and sold by the defendant, as single damages, with dr without interest, as in the case of the one year’s rent, is above found by the Jury.”
On motion of Grimke, judgment was entered up for the plaintiffs on the special verdict for the sum of $2276 77, with interest thereon from 21st April, 1821, and costs of suit; and judgments under the statute against the defendant for triple' damages and costs.
From the judgment of the Circuit Court, the defendant appealed on the grounds,
1. That under the facts found by the special verdict, the plaintiffs ought to have been nonsuited.
2. That at all events the plaintiffs were entitled only to one year’s rent, which was tendered to them.
3. That as one year’s rent was tendered to them, they were not entitled'to interest thereon,
4. That the plaintiffs were not entitled to triple damages.

Opinion:
Curia, per
Nott, J.
The first ground relied on in this case is too general to afford the party any prospect of success. Every ground of appeal ought to be so distinctly stated, that the Court may at once see the point which they are called upon to decide, and without such specification we do not consider ourselves bound to decide any question which may be raised out of so general and undefined a charge. In the argument it has been contended that the bailiff had no right to impound the goods on the premises and therefore tl^e defendant could not be guilty of a reseous in taking them away, but to that it is sufficient to say, that if the tenant consented, it does not lie in the mouth of the defendant to raise the objection.
With regard to the second-question, there does not appear to be any fixed; period, after which a person may not distrain for rent in arrear. In the case of Braithwaitc vs. Cooksey, it was held that a person might distrain for all the rent dpe for six years; 1 H. Black, 465. In the case ex parte Grove 1 Atk. 104, the party distrained for twelve years rent, although, it was disallowed on another ground, it did not appear that the length of time would have been a bar. Numerous other cases mightbe adduced to the same effect. If the execution had been levied before the distress, it might have been otherwise, or even if it had been issued before, and had then beep in active operation; but a dormant execution, though it might be entitled to money properly received on a junior executions,, cannot sanctify a levy otherwise illegal.
If the rent of one year had been allto which the plaintiffs wére entitled, they would not have been entitled to, interest after having refused to accept the principal when tendered to them, but as they were authorized to distrain for all the rent ip arrear,'which was more than the whole value of the goods distrained, they were entitled toa full remuneration for the damages which they sustained by the reseous, And although strictly they arc not entitled to interest, yet the-Jury might make the rate of interest the measure of damages. And if they had done so, I think it must have been allowed by the Court; but I ¡do not think that interest follows as a matter of course, and therefore cannot be allowed on this verdict. 1 am also of opinion that under the statute the plaintiff is entitled to treble damages. But as the plaintiff has entered up his judgment on the opinion of the Judge below, for the interest allowed on the damages, the judgment must be set aside unless the plaintiff will remit that part of it; in which case it may remain undisturbed.
Judgment reversed nisi.