Case Name: PEOPLE v. RIAL; PEOPLE v. BEENE
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1976-12-31
Citations: 399 Mich. 431
Docket Number: Docket Nos. 57094, 57095
Parties: PEOPLE v RIAL PEOPLE v BEENE
Judges: Kavanagh, C. J., and Williams, Coleman, Fitzgerald, Lindemer, and Ryan, JJ., concurred.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 399
Pages: 431–448

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v RIAL PEOPLE v BEENE
Docket Nos. 57094, 57095.
Argued May 6, 1976
(Calendar Nos. 4, 5).
Decided December 31, 1976.
Peggy Rial was convicted, on her plea of guilty, of possession of marijuana in Kalamazoo Circuit Court, Luden F. Sweet, J., and sentenced to two years probation. George Beene was convicted, on his plea of guilty, of attempted larceny in a building in Kalamazoo Circuit Court, Raymond W. Fox, J., and sentenced to two years probation. The defendants were charged with violating probation and at their hearings they waived counsel, admitted the violations and were sentenced on the original convictions. Defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals (Docket Nos. 20249, 20250) and the Supreme Court sua sponte granted leave to appeal with other Guilty Plea Cases. 394 Mich 776 (1975). Held:
The court rule on the procedure for accepting a plea of guilty does not apply to probation violation proceedings. Probation revocation is not a stage of a criminal prosecution and the probationer as a convicted person is entitled to more limited rights of due process than one who is accused of a crime. Each defendant was adequately informed of his procedural and constitutional rights: that if he wished to contest the allegations of violations, a hearing would be held, and he would be entitled to counsel. There is no basis to believe that the defendants were unaware of the possible penalties before waiving their rights.
Justice Levin concurred in a separate opinion. He agreed that the statute and court rule governing acceptance of a plea of guilty to an information do not prescribe the advice to be given before acceptance of a plea of guilty to a charge of probation violation, and wrote separately of the need for rules for probation violation proceedings. He also wrote that in the case of Rial the revocation of probation is not adequately supported by evidence in the record, an issue not raised on her appeal. While the procedures followed are more informal than at a trial, court decisions have established minimum procedural requirements, and the record should reflect that a defendant desiring to plead guilty of probation violation was so informed of his constitutional rights and of the incidents of a probation violation hearing as reasonably to warrant the conclusion that he understands what such a hearing is and that in pleading guilty he is knowingly and voluntarily giving up his right to a hearing and those rights and incidents. A court rule stating the procedure to be followed in probation violation hearings and the nature of the advice to be given would provide an objective basis for evaluating claims that a plea of guilty of violation was not understandingly, knowingly, and voluntarily made.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 487, 492-495, 567, 568.
[2 — 7] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 568.
[8] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 565, 568.
[9] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 566, 571.
[10] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 567, 568.
Affirmed.
Opinion of the Court
1. Criminal Law — Plea of Guilty — Probation Revocation.
The court rule on the procedure for accepting a plea of guilty does not apply to probation revocation proceedings (GCR 1963, 785.7).
2. Criminal Law — Probation Revocation — Due Process.
Probation revocation is not a stage of a criminal prosecution; revocation proceedings deal not with the procedural rights of an accused in a criminal prosecution but with the more limited due process rights of a probationer who has been convicted of a crime.
3. Criminal Law — Probation Revocation — Plea of Guilty — Constitutional Rights.
A probationer was adequately informed of his procedural and constitutional rights in proceedings to revoke probation where he was advised that if he wished to contest the allegations of violations of the conditions of probation, a hearing would be held and he would be entitled to counsel; he need not be again advised of the possible maximum and minimum sentence on conviction of the charge to which he originally pled guilty.
Concurring Opinion
Levin, J.
4. Criminal Law — Probation—Revocation—Constitutional Rights.
The full panoply of rights constitutionally guaranteed in a crimi nal trial does not attach to probation violation proceedings, but a person accused of violating his probation has the right to counsel, the right to produce witnesses, the right to notice of the charges against him, and the right to an opportunity to explain away the charges Sled against him, which indicates as a minimum requirement that the hearing must be conducted in a meaningful way.
5. Criminal Law — Probation—Revocation—Constitutional Rights —Appeal.
A probationer is entitled to an appeal of right following determination of a probation violation on those matters relating to the probation violation and the hearing on it.
6. Criminal Law — Probation—Revocation—Constitutional Rights.
A person charged with violation of probation is entitled to advice regarding his constitutional and statutory right to a hearing and the nature of that right; the very informality of the hearing makes it especially important that there be advice and that it be transmitted in a meaningful manner.
7. Criminal Law — Probation—Revocation—Constitutional Rights —Plea of Guilty.
The record of a probation revocation proceeding should reñect that a probationer desiring to plead guilty to a charge of probation violation has been so informed of his constitutional rights and of the incidents of a probation violation hearing as reasonably to warrant the conclusion that he understands what such a hearing is and that in pleading guilty he is knowingly and voluntarily giving up his right to a hearing and such rights and incidents.
8. Criminal Law — Probation—Revocation—Plea of Guilty — Advice of Rights.
A court rule stating the procedure to be followed in probation violation hearings and the nature of the advice to be given a probationer pleading guilty should be promulgated to provide an objective basis for evaluating claims that a plea of guilty of violation was not understandingly, knowingly, and voluntarily made.
9. Criminal Law — Probation—Revocation—Plea of Guilty.
Absent a court rule requiring advice regarding any minimum and the maximum sentence the judge may impose if probation is revoked or a factual predicate for a ñnding that a probationer pleading guilty of violation of probation was unaware of the sentence that might be imposed so that the plea was not understandingly, knowingly, and voluntarily made, there is no basis for reversal for failure to give such advice.
10. Criminal Law — Probation—Revocation—Association.
Absent a showing that a probationer’s association with a person having a criminal record resulted or will result in the probationer becoming involved in further criminal activity, association alone does not tend to justify revocation of probation and imposition of a jail sentence.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, Donald A. Burge, Prosecuting Attorney, and Stephen M. Wheeler, Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Robert L. Adams for defendants.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
Defendants' appeals were among the 114 transferred to our Court on May 28, 1975. 394 Mich 776 (1975). After our decision in Guilty Plea Cases, 395 Mich 96; 235 NW2d 132 (1975), we ordered that the defendants' appeals be jointly submitted and argued to consider the applicability of GCR 1963, 785.7 to probation violation proceedings. We conclude that subrule does not apply.
Defendant Rial pled guilty to possession of marijuana in 1973 and was placed on probation for two years. Defendant Beene pled guilty to attempted larceny in a building in 1972 and was also placed on probation for two years.
Bench warrants were subsequently issued for the arrest of both defendants for having violated the terms of their probations. At their initial hearings, both defendants waived their rights to appointed counsel and to a formal hearing on the charges. Both admitted that they had violated the terms of their probations. In each case, the trial judge revoked probation and subsequently sentenced the defendant pursuant to the original conviction.
Defendants argue that, prior to the court's acceptance of a waiver of the right to a formal probation violation hearing and to an attorney, the court must advise a defendant of his rights at such a hearing and also of the possible penalty involved if probation were revoked. Defendants urge this Court to equate a formal probation violation hearing with a trial by imposing restrictions and standards on a defendant's admission of probation violation which are similar to those imposed upon a plea of guilty under Rule 785.7.
In Gagnon v Scarpelli, 411 US 778, 782; 93 S Ct 1756; 36 L Ed 2d 656 (1973), the United States Supreme Court stated:
"Probation revocation, like parole revocation, is not a stage of a criminal prosecution, but does result in a loss of liberty. Accordingly, we hold that a probationer, like a parolee, is entitled to a preliminary and a final revocation hearing, under the conditions specified in Morrissey v Brewer, supra."
Defendants' analogy to a trial and a guilty plea is unsound. Probation revocation is not a stage of a criminal prosecution. In these proceedings we deal not with the procedural rights of an accused in a criminal prosecution, but with the more limited due process rights of one who is a probationer because he has been convicted of a crime. Gagnon, supra, at 789. See also, People v Pickett, 391 Mich 305; 215 NW2d 695 (1974).
Defendants' reliance on MCLA 768.35; MSA 28.1058 is also misplaced. We are not concerned with a plea of guilty in these proceedings. The guilt of the defendants had already been determined. The scope of a probation violation hearing is limited. The procedure is summary and informal, not subject to the rules of evidence or pleadings applicable in criminal trials. MCLA 771.4; MSA 28.1134; Morrissey, supra. The hearing is designed to lead "to a final evaluation of any contested relevant facts and consideration of whether the facts as determined warrant revocation". Morrissey, supra, at 488. (Emphasis added.) A formal hearing is not required if the probationer admits at a preliminary hearing the alleged violations, and those violations are found by the court to be reasonable grounds for revoking probation under the law. Morrissey, supra, at 490.
Each defendant was advised by the court that if he wished to contest the alleged violations of his probation, a hearing would be held to determine the truthfulness of the charges, and he would be entitled to counsel at the hearing. Given the limited nature of these hearings, we hold that both defendants were adequately informed of their procedural and constitutional rights.
Defendants also contend that they were not advised of the possible penalty before waiving their rights to an attorney and to a formal hearing. Each defendant was aware that his probation could be revoked as a result of these proceedings. This "penalty" is the direct result of a probation revocation hearing. What defendants actually argue is that the court should have again advised them of the possible minimum and maximum sentence which might be imposed following conviction for the crime to which they had originally pled. They ask this Court to rule that a waiver of their constitutional rights should not be accepted by the trial court until they again have been advised that if they have failed to comply with the terms of their probations, the court will sentence them for the crimes of which they were convicted. To adopt such a ruling would be to exalt form over substance.
Defendants do not allege that they were unaware of the penalty for the crime to which they pled guilty, nor do they allege that they were unaware that probation, in lieu of sentencing, was purély a matter of grace, and not of right. MCLA 771.4; MSA 28.1134. They do not allege that, at the time they entered onto probation, they were unaware of all the terms and conditions thereof, including the penalty for violation. It would be unrealistic for this Court to believe that a probationer willingly complies with all the strict terms and conditions of his probation, including regular meetings with his probation officer, without being aware of what might happen should he refuse to comply with those terms and conditions.
Under these circumstances, and particularly in light of the nature of probation violation hearings, defendants' arguments must fail.
Affirmed.
Kavanagh, C. J., and Williams, Coleman, Fitzgerald, Lindemer, and Ryan, JJ., concurred.
Footnotes omitted. Morrissey v Brewer, 408 US 471; 92 S Ct 2593; 33 L Ed 2d 484 (1972).
"Whenever any person shall plead guilty to an information filed against him in any court, it shall be the duty oí the judge of such court, before pronouncing judgment or sentence upon such plea, to become satisfied after such investigation as he may deem necessary for that purpose respecting the nature of the case, and the circumstances of such plea, that said plea was made freely, with full knowledge of the nature of the accusation, and without undue influence. And whenever said judge shall have reason to doubt the truth of such plea of guilty, it shall be his duty to vacate the same, direct a plea of not guilty to be entered and order a trial of the issue thus formed."