Case Name: Barton T. McLEAN, Appellant, v. Beverly A. McLEAN, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1976-12-03
Citations: 340 So. 2d 493
Docket Number: Nos. Z-187, Z-245
Parties: Barton T. McLEAN, Appellant, v. Beverly A. McLEAN, Appellee.
Judges: MILLS, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 340
Pages: 493–498

Head Matter:
Barton T. McLEAN, Appellant, v. Beverly A. McLEAN, Appellee.
Nos. Z-187, Z-245.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Dec. 3, 1976.
Richard O. Donovan, Coral Gables, and Susan Goldman, Miami, for appellant.
Fred W. Baggett, and Sam Spector, Tallahassee, for appellee.

Opinion:
SMITH, Judge.
By these consolidated appeals, Barton McLean complains of (1) the trial court's interlocutory order denying continuance of the final hearing on his petition for modification of the judgment awarding appellee, his former wife, custody of their young daughter, and (2) the trial court's final order, entered while the interlocutory appeal was pending, denying appellant's petition for modification of custody.
Following dissolution of the marriage in May 1973, the court entered a supplemental judgment August 20, 1973, awarding primary custody and control of the child to the appellee. More than a year later, on September 30, 1974, the appellant father petitioned for modification of the judgment to award him primary custody of the child on the ground that continued custody by ap-pellee was inimical to the child's welfare. Then followed discovery on the issue and at least five successive schedulings of the hearing on the merits which was finally reset on June 17,1975, for June 30. At that hearing, appellant sought yet another continuance on the ground that the deposition of an essential witness had not been obtained, due allegedly to the intervention of ap- pellee.- The chancellor denied that motion and called on appellant to proceed with evidence on the merits of his modification petition. Appellant's counsel announced a purpose to seek interlocutory review of the order denying continuance and declined to go forward with proof. On July 24, appel-lee filed a motion to dismiss the modification petition, with a notice of hearing, and after hearing argument on July 31 the court denied the petition for modification nunc pro tunc June 30,1975, for appellant's refusal to proceed on the merits.
The trial court acted well within the proper limits of his discretion in denying the continuance sought on the day of the final hearing. Appellant made no substantial showing that appellee had caused any witness to resist or evade service of process. The assertion that appellee had instructed witnesses not to cooperate was based largely on double hearsay. Appellant made no showing that his unavailing effort to subpoena the needed witness was all that could reasonably be required of him. He made no showing that the witness would or could testify to matters which could not otherwise be established. In fact, the deposition of that witness, obtained after the interlocutory appeal was taken but before the modification petition was denied, gave no significant corroboration of appellant's contentions on the merits. The court did not err in denying a further postponement of a final hearing already postponed several times over a period of nine months. Rule 1.460, R.C.P.; In re Gregory, 313 So.2d 735 (Fla.1975); Williams v. Gunn, 279 So.2d 69 (Fla.App. 1st, 1973). The interlocutory appeal will therefore be dismissed for want of substantial merit. Rule 4.2 c, F.A.R.
When appellant's last motion for continuance was denied at the final hearing, appellant effectively elected to take his chances on interlocutory appeal rather than proceed on the merits. The question therefore arises whether his interlocutory appeal deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to deny his petition for his refusal to proceed with the proof. We are of the view that the trial court had authority to deny the petition on the ground stated notwithstanding the pendency of the interlocutory appeal. The interlocutory appeal did not operate as a supersedeas. Rather, it vested jurisdiction in this court in respect to the matter under review and prevented the trial court from taking any action in the case which would deprive this court of its review power. Willey v. W. J. Hoggson Corp., 89 Fla. 446, 105 So. 126 (1925). The trial court's final order on July 31 denying the modification petition did not affect this court's power to review the interlocutory order denying continuance on June 30. The effect of the order entered July 31 was simply to deny the petition subject to this court's determination of the prior and pending interlocutory appeal.
If we were now to hold that the continuance was improperly denied, the trial court's final order would of course fall. But if as we conceive the continuance was properly denied in the trial court's discretion, the chancellor's subsequent denial of the petition now becomes unqualifiedly effective by our dismissal of the interlocutory appeal. Although labelling the July 31 order as entered "nunc pro tunc" June 30 was ineffective, for the reasons stated in Chief Judge Boyer's dissent, that did not deprive the order of efficacy on July 31. If we were to hold otherwise, we would effectively grant appellant the continuance he groundlessly sought; and appellant, though he failed to demonstrate error in the chancellor's decision that the merits would be determined on June 30, 1975, would be restored 16 months later to a trial on the merits that he once abjured and now is ready for at long last. See Hirsch v. Hirsch, 309 So.2d 47, 50 (Fla.App. 3d, 1975):
"To permit a party to willfully ignore or violate a court order by interlocutory appeal without supersedeas would strip the trial court of its ability and power to enforce its orders pendente lite."
It has been held in other contexts that, pending an interlocutory appeal taken without supersedeas, the trial court is without jurisdiction finally to dispose of a case on the merits. De La Portilla v. De La Portil- la, 304 So.2d 116, 118 (Fla.1974). Whatever may be the precise meaning of that doctrine in contexts not before us now, the mischief attending its mechanical application in the present situation is, we think, evident. The true rule was stated most meaningfully for present purposes in the Willey decision, supra, on which De La Portilla was predicated:
"[E]ven though in the absence of a supersedeas the trial court had the power to permit or require other proceedings in the cause that would not tend to impair or interfere with the appellate jurisdiction and power of the Supreme Court, or to defeat the efficacy of the appellate proceedings already duly taken, yet the dismissal of the bill of complaint by the lower court was subject to the result of the interlocutory appeal theretofore duly taken, otherwise the trial court would by such dismissal finally determine the merits of the cause which is the only matter involved in the appeal taken and then pending in the Supreme Court.
"When the appellate court acquires jurisdiction of a cause, no order of the trial court can legally impair or interfere with the power of the appellate court to make its jurisdiction in the premises effective. An order of the trial court dismissing a bill of complaint, made after the appeal was duly taken, does not affect the jurisdiction of the appellate court. See Holland v. State, 15 Fla. 549. Should an interlocutory order appealed from be reversed, the decree and mandate of the appellate court is effectual to restore the dismissed case to the docket of the trial court. If an interlocutory order appealed from is affirmed, the dismissal of the cause in the trial court is not of material consequence." 89 Fla. at 452, 105 So. at 129.
The interlocutory appeal is DISMISSED. The final order denying appellant's petition for custody modification is AFFIRMED.
MILLS, J., concurs.
BOYER, C. J., dissents.