Case Name: LOWE v. ESTATE MOTORS LIMITED
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1985-12-16
Citations: 147 Mich. App. 523
Docket Number: Docket No. 73531
Parties: LOWE v ESTATE MOTORS LIMITED
Judges: Before: V. J. Brennan, P.J., and Cynar and C. W. Simon, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 147
Pages: 523–533

Head Matter:
LOWE v ESTATE MOTORS LIMITED
Docket No. 73531.
Submitted December 17, 1984, at Detroit.
Decided December 16, 1985.
Leave to appeal applied for.
Ethel Lowe was seriously injured when she fell out of a rear passenger door of a 1979 Mercedes Benz automobile. Plaintiff, by her conservator, Frank F. Gazley, filed a products liability suit against Estate Motors Limited, the vendor of the automobile, Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc, the American outlet for the manufacturer of the automobile, and Newark Auto Products, a division of Newark Auto Top Co, the manufacturer of the floor mats used in the automobile. She alleged that a defective floor mat caused the accident by interfering with the driver’s ability to apply the brakes and that her injuries were caused by a defective door and door locking mechanism on the automobile. The Oakland Circuit Court, Steven N. Andrews, J., by an interlocutory order, denied plaintiff’s motion to strike an affirmative defense pled by defendants and motion in limine to preclude defendants from introducing evidence of plaintiffs failure to use a seat belt. Plaintiff appealed by leave granted. Held:
1. Under the doctrine of comparative negligence the trier of fact must first find that the plaintiff was negligent. A finding of negligence can only be sustained if the plaintiff breached some statutory or common law duty. Proof that the plaintiff engaged in an injury-producing act, without more, is not a sufficient basis for establishing that plaintiff was negligent.
2. At the time that the accident occurred, the Michigan Legislature had not enacted the mandatory seat belt use law. Hence, plaintiffs failure to wear a seat belt did not constitute negligence per se.
References
Am Jur 2d New Topic Service, Comparative Negligence §§ 1 et seq.
Am Jur 2d, Automobiles and Highway Traffic §§ 397 et seq., 567, 602.
Nonuse of automobile seatbelts as evidence of comparative negligence. 95 ALR3d 239.
Automobile occupant’s failure to use seatbelt as contributory negligence. 92 ALR3d 9.
Nonuse of seatbelt as failure to mitigate damages. 80 ALR3d 1033.
Modern developement of comparative negligence doctrine having applicability to negligence actions generally. 78 ALR3d 339.
3. There is no common law basis for concluding that plaintiffs failure to use a seat belt was a breach of her duty to use ordinary care.
4. Under Michigan’s system of comparative negligence, evidence of plaintiffs failure to use a seat belt is not admissible as evidence of plaintiffs contributory negligence or of plaintiffs failure to mitigate damages.
Reversed.
C. W. Simon, J., dissented. He would recognize the defense of failure to use a seat belt. He would hold that the Supreme Court adopted comparative negligence with the intent to hold every person responsible for his or her acts to the full extent to which they cause injury and that the Legislature had a similar intent when it adopted comparative negligence in products liability actions. The seat belt defense would be consistent with the principle on which comparative negligence is based. He would affirm.
Opinion op the Court
1. Negligence — Comparative Negligence — Duty.
A trier of fact must first find that a plaintiff was negligent in order to invoke the doctrine of comparative negligence; a finding of negligence can only be sustained if the plaintiff breached some statutory or common law duty; proof that a plaintiff engaged in an injury-producing act, without more, is not a sufficient basis for establishing that the plaintiff was negligent.
2. Negligence — Negligence Per Se — Automobiles — Seat Belts.
Absent a legislative mandate for seat belt use, a plaintiffs failure to wear a seat belt does not constitute negligence per se.
3. Common Law — Negligence — Automobiles — Seat Belts.
The common law does not provide a basis for a conclusion that the failure to wear a seat belt by an occupant of an automobile is a breach of the occupant’s duty to use ordinary care.
4. Negligence — Comparative Negligence — Automobiles — Seat Belts — Contributory Negligence — Mitigation op Damages.
Evidence of a plaintiffs failure to use a seat belt is not admissible under Michigan’s system of comparative negligence as evidence of the plaintiffs contributory negligence or of the plaintiffs failure to mitigate damages.
Dissent by C. W. Simon, J.
5. Negligence — Comparative Negligence — Automobiles — Seat Belts — Contributory Negligence.
Evidence of a plaintiff’s failure to use a seat belt would be consistent with the principle on which comparative negligence is based, i.e., that every person should be responsible for his or her acts to the full extent to which they cause injury.
Gerald Tuchow Law Offices, P.C. (by Stephen J. Trahey), for plaintiff.
Davidson, Gotshall, Kohl, Secrest, Wardle, Lynch & Clark (by Daniel P. King), for Estate Motors Limited.
Fitzgerald, Young, Peters, Dakmar & Bruno (by Lisa Sewell DeMoss and Neil T. Peters, for Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc.
Kitch, Suhrheinrich, Smith, Saurbier & Drutchas, P.C. (by Mark Willmarth), for Newark Auto Products.
Before: V. J. Brennan, P.J., and Cynar and C. W. Simon, JJ.
Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
Cynar, J.
In this products liability action, plaintiff appeals by leave granted from an interlocutory order denying her motion to strike an affirmative defense pled by defendants and a motion in limine to preclude defendants from introducing evidence of plaintiff's failure to use a seat belt. Plaintiff claims that she was seriously injured on April 18, 1979, when she fell out of a rear passenger door of a 1979 Mercedes-Benz automobile following a collision with a truck. Defendants are the vendor of the automobile, the American outlet for the German manufacturer of the automobile, and the manufacturers of the floor mats used in the automobile. Plaintiff claimed that a defective floor mat caused the accident by interfering with the driver's ability to apply the brakes and that her injuries were caused by a defective door and door locking mechanism on the automobile. Defendants pled that plaintiffs injuries were proximately caused by her own negligence, including her failure to wear a seat belt.
In Romankewiz v Black, 16 Mich App 119, 125; 167 NW2d 606 (1969), the Court rejected claims that a plaintiffs failure to use a seat belt could amount to contributory negligence or a failure to mitigate injuries. The Court adopted the reasoning of Miller v Miller, 273 NC 228, 233-234; 160 SE2d 65 (1968):
"So far as our research discloses, no court has yet held an occupant's failure to buckle his seat belt to be negligence per se. If the failure to buckle a seat belt is not negligence per se, it could be contributory negligence only when a plaintiffs omission to use the belt amounted to a failure to exercise the ordinary care which a reasonably prudent person would have used under the circumstances preceding that particular accident. Since the fact and circumstances preceding any accident will vary, so must conduct constituting due care. Under what circumstances would a plaintiffs failure to buckle his seat belt constitute negligence? If a motorist begins his journey without buckling his belt, ordinarily he will not have time to fasten it when the danger of accident becomes apparent; so the duty to 'buckle up' — if any — must have existed prior to the injury. Furthermore, it must be remembered that until one has, or should have, notice of another's negligence, he is not required to anticipate it. On the contrary, he is entitled to assume that others will use due care for his safety and their own." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original.)
Romankewiz was followed in Selmo v Baratono, 28 Mich App 217; 184 NW2d 367 (1970); Placek v Sterling Heights, 52 Mich App 619; 217 NW2d 900 (1974), rev'd 405 Mich 638; 275 NW2d 511 (1979); De Graaf v General Motors Corp, 135 Mich App 141; 352 NW2d 719 (1984), lv den 422 Mich 852 (1985), and Schmitzer v Misener-Bennett Ford, Inc, 135 Mich App 350; 354 NW2d 336 (1984), lv den 422 Mich 852 (1985).
We first considered the admissibility of a plaintiff's nonuse of a seat belt as evidence of comparative negligence in Schmitzer. The Court held that under Michigan's system of comparative negligence, evidence of a plaintiff's failure to use a seat belt is not admissible as evidence of plaintiff's contributory negligence or of plaintiffs failure to mitigate damages. 135 Mich App 359-360. Our holding in Schmitzer is controlling in this case.
As the Schmitzer Court stated, under the doctrine of comparative negligence the trier of fact must first find that the plaintiff was negligent. A finding of negligence can only be sustained if the plaintiff breached some statutory or common law duty. Proof that the plaintiff engaged in an injury-producing act, without more, is not a sufficient basis for establishing that plaintiff was negligent.
At the time the accident complained of occurred, the Michigan Legislature had not enacted the mandatory seat belt use law, MCL 257.710e; MSA 9.24NX5). Hence, plaintiff's failure to wear a seat belt did not constitute negligence per se.
The common law does not provide a basis for concluding that plaintiffs failure to use a seat belt was a breach of her duty to use ordinary care. Schmitzer, supra, p 359. Plaintiffs failure to wear a seat belt was therefore not admissible as evidence of her comparative negligence.
The trial court's interlocutory order denying plaintiffs motion is reversed.
V. J. Brennan, P.J., concurred.
We note that the mandatory seat belt use law does not apply to rear seat passengers of motor vehicles, like plaintiff herein. See MCL 257.710e(3); MSA 9.2410(5).