Case Name: GLADYS MILLER, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. JAY MILLER, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1984-07-19
Citations: 97 N.J. 154
Docket Number: 
Parties: GLADYS MILLER, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. JAY MILLER, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Reports
Volume: 97
Pages: 154–178

Head Matter:
GLADYS MILLER, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. JAY MILLER, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Argued January 24, 1984
Decided July 19, 1984.
Vincent L. Stripto argued the cause for appellant (Drazin & Warshaw, attorneys).
David Noah Dubrow argued the .cause for respondent (Stern, Dubrow, Marcus & Cooper, attorneys).

Opinion:
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
GARIBALDI, J.
Today we must decide whether a stepparent can be equitably estopped from denying the duty to provide child support for minor stepchildren after divorcing their natural parent. If equitable estoppel does apply to stepparents' situation, we must also decide what evidence must be presented to establish a cause of action for child support.
Gladys Miller married Jay Miller on December 16, 1972. No children were born of their marriage. During the couple's marriage Gladys' two daughters by her prior marriage lived with the Millers. Gladys and Jay separated on December 12, 1979. In February, 1980, Gladys filed a Verified Complaint seeking dissolution of the Millers' marriage. Although Jay was not the natural or adoptive father of Gladys' daughters, Gladys sought child support from Jay for her children. In her complaint, she alleged that by his actions, Jay had induced the girls to rely on him as their natural father, to their emotional and financial detriment. By so doing, he had prevented and cut off the girls' relationship with their natural father. Therefore, she claimed he was equitably estopped from denying a duty to pay child support. Jay claimed that although he stood in loco parentis to the children during his marriage, he was merely their stepfather and any legal relationship he had with the children terminated with his divorce from their mother.
The trial court agreed with Gladys. It held that Jay was equitably estopped from denying his duty to support the girls, and required him to pay child support of $75 per week per child. The trial court based its holding primarily on the concept of "emotional bonding." Jay, by his actions, had knowingly and intentionally fostered a bona fide parental relationship with the girls, so that in their minds he became their father. Therefore, he could not avoid the financial obligations flowing from that relationship.
The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's judgment, primarily because it found that Jay had actively interfered with the normal relationship between the girls and their natural father to the girls' emotional and financial detriment. We granted certification, 94 N.J. 614 (1983).
We conclude that in appropriate cases pendente lite and permanent support obligations may be imposed on a stepparent on the basis of equitable estoppel. In this ease, we hold that the facts established at trial are sufficient to impose a pendente lite award but are not sufficient to indicate whether a permanent support obligation should be imposed. We therefore reverse and remand this case to the trial court for further findings of fact and a determination consistent with this opinion.
I
Prior to her marriage to Jay, Gladys was married to Ralph Febre. Two children were born of that marriage: Michelle, born July, 1963, and Suzette, born July, 1966. Shortly after Suzette's birth in 1966, Gladys separated from • Ralph; she divorced him in 1969.
The essential facts concerning Ralph's support of his children are undisputed. Although there was no support provision in the divorce agreement, Ralph continued to support Gladys and the children after the couple's separation until he went to prison on a narcotics charge in 1968. Immediately before going to prison, Ralph gave Gladys $5,000 for the support of his daughters. While he was in prison and after he was released, he continued to express his concern for his children.
Gladys married Jay while Ralph was in prison. After his release, Ralph told Gladys that he wanted to support his daughters. However, when he did send a check to the girls, Jay tore it up. Jay testified that he refused Ralph's money because he was concerned that he and Gladys "would be tied to his illegal activities," presumably meaning Ralph's narcotics activities. Faced with Jay's opposition, Ralph eventually stopped attempting to send money to the children. Thus, during the period of his marriage to Gladys, Jay supported the children and even claimed them as dependents on his 1979 tax return, which he filed after he separated from their mother. During all this time, Ralph did not support the children.
It is also undisputed that throughout the seven years that Jay and Gladys lived together, Jay developed a loving relationship with the two girls. The children came to refer to him as "daddy" and to his mother and father as "grandma" and "grandpa." As the Appellate Division found,
he was an affectionate father and took the girls everywhere. He held the girls out as his own children. He even became a Girl Scout Troop leader, so he could be with them. He enjoyed sports with them and they came to love defendant as a father.
At the trial both children testified separately in camera that they knew Ralph was their natural father, but that they considered Jay their "father" and loved him very much.
Although the Millers discussed the possibility of Jay's adopting the girls, Ralph refused to consent to the adoption. Therefore, the girls' names could not be changed legally to Miller. Nevertheless, although it is disputed who initiated the change, it is uncontroverted that during the time the girls lived with Jay, they began using the surname Miller at school, and their school records were changed to reflect that their name was Miller. At the time of the Millers' .divorce, in contrast, Michelle, a student at the University of South Florida, was registered under the name of Febre, which she also used on her driving license. Since the divorce, both girls have been using the surname Febre.
The Millers disagree as to the extent of the children's contact with their father over the years. Gladys testified that she took the children to visit Ralph once while he was in prison and that he visited the children once at their maternal grandmother's house. This latter visit provoked such opposition from Jay that although Ralph often sought to see the girls thereafter, their mother did not allow them to have any further meetings with him until the summer of 1979. At that time, she realized that her marriage to Jay was over, and she allowed the girls to visit their father in California for six weeks. Jay disputed this testimony; he claimed that the children visited their father several times while he was in prison, and upon his release they had regular contact with him, seeing him during the summers and over Christmas holidays, as well as speaking to him over the telephone and receiving letters from him.
The Appellate Division found from the testimony, and for the purpose of this appeal we find, that
upon Ralph's release from jail he attempted to visit his children but defendant [Jay] strenously opposed any visitation and, in fact, prohibited it. He rejected all offers of Ralph to contribute to the support of his children and tore up a check tendered for that purpose. Ralph desisted from further attempts at visitation or payment of support.
II
Jay contends that the loving relationship he developed with the girls was not sufficient to impose a financial obligation on him to continue to support the girls after his separation from their mother. He claims that upon the termination of his marriage to their mother, his financial obligation to the girls ceased.
New Jersey has no statutory requirement imposing a duty of support on a stepparent for his or her spouse's children by a former marriage. Nor did the common law impose a legal obligation on a stepparent to support the children of his or her spouse by another party. Such an obligation arises by a voluntary assumption on the part of the stepparent to support the children. This in loco parentis relationship exists when a stepparent receives a child into the family home under circumstances giving rise to a presumption that he or she will assume responsibility to maintain, rear, and educate the child. A.S. v. B.S., 139 N.J.Super. 366, 369 (Ch.Div.1976), aff'd, 150 N.J.Super. 122 (App.Div.1977). The relationship, however,
exists only so long as the parties thereto, namely the surrogate parent and/or the child, desire that it exist. In that regard, the in loco parentis status differs from natural parenthood or adoption. The latter two permanently affix rights and duties, while the former affixed rights and duties temporary in nature. Schneider v. Schneider, 25 N.J.Misc. 180, 52 A2d 564 (Ch.1947); D. v. D., 56 N.J.Super. 357 (App.Div.1959). [Id. at 369-70.]
Thus, in most cases, when a stepparent who stands in loco parentis to a stepchild divorces that child's natural parent, the in loco parentis relationship is deemed terminated and any obligation of support the stepparent has assumed terminates. See 59 Am.Jur. 2d "Parent and Child" § 91 at 190 (1971); see also Amadeo v. Amadeo, 64 N.J.Super. 417, 425 (App.Div.1960) (until stepfather disclaims in loco parentis status, he is responsible for child support of stepchild); D. v. D., 56 N.J.Super. 357, 361-62 (App.Div.1959) (in loco parentis relationship lies within will of stepfather).
Ill
Despite the general rule that an in loco parentis relationship terminates upon the intent of the stepparent, courts in certain cases have held that a stepparent's duty to support a spouse's children extends beyond the dissolution of their marriage. In most of these cases the courts have relied on principles of equitable estoppel or implied contract to impose a continuing obligation of child support on a stepparent after he or she divorces the children's natural parent.
The burden of proof of a claim based on principles of equitable estoppel is clearly on the party asserting estoppel. Virginia Constr. Corp. v. Fairman, 39 N.J. 61, 72 (1962); see also Lawes v. Lynch, 7 N.J.Super. 584, 593 (Ch.Div.), aff'd, 6 N.J. 1, 11 (1950) (estoppel must be proved by the party who asserts it). To establish a claim of equitable estoppel, the claiming party must show that the alleged conduct was done, or representation was made, intentionally or under such circumstances that it was both natural and probable that it would induce action. Further, the conduct must be relied on, and the relying party must act so as to change his or her position to his or her detriment. Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Essex Cty. Mortgage Co., 130 N.J.Eq. 351, 353 (E. & A.1941); see Carlsen v. Masters, Mates & Pilots Pension Plan Trust, 80 N.J. 334, 339 (1979); Clark v. Judge, 84 N.J.Super. 35, 54 (Ch.Div.1964), aff'd, 44 N.J. 550 (1965); Feldman v. Urban Commercial, Inc., 70 N.J.Super. 463, 474 (Ch.Div.1961); Lawes v. Lynch, supra, 7 N.J.Super. at 593.
Two New Jersey courts have invoked the principle of equitable estoppel to enforce a continuing duty of support. A.S. v. B.S., supra, 139 N.J.Super. 366, aff'd, 150 N.J.Super. 122; Ross v. Ross, 126 N.J.Super. 394 (J. & D.R.Ct.1973), aff'd, 135 N.J.Super. 35 (App.Div.1975).
In Ross, supra, the husband married the child's mother eighteen months after the birth of her child. After the marriage, the parties and the child lived together for four years, during which time the husband filed a certification of admission of paternity with the Bureau of Vital Statistics and treated the child as his own. During the support hearing, it became clear that the child, then seven years old, believed that the husband was his natural father. The court rejected the husband's argument that he was not obligated to support the child. In applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel to prevent the husband from denying his paternity, the court looked to cases in which the child would be illegitimized by the husband's denial of paternity and found Ross to be such a case. Within this context, the court found that:
(1) the child sincerely believes that defendant-husband is his father; (2) defendant-husband did by his conduct represent himself to the child as his father, and (3) the mother and her husband are estopped to deny that they are the parents of this child. [126 N.J.Super. at 400.]
To find otherwise, the court held, would do irreparable harm and inflict deep injury on the child, the true party in interest.
In A.S. v. B.S., supra, 139 N.J.Super. 366, aff'd, 150 N.J.Super. 122, the child involved was delivered to the parties, a husband and wife, by his natural parents when he was one month old. The natural parents executed a document entitled "Power of Attorney-Consent," but the parties did not officially adopt the child. The parties separated nine years later. In a proceeding by the wife against the husband for support of this child, all the facts were stipulated. The child bore the parties' surname and was registered in school under that name, and the natural parents had neither contributed to the child's support nor attempted to communicate with the child.
The court found that the husband was estopped from denying his duty to support the child. To hold otherwise would do irreparable harm to the child, for as in this case,
he [the child] is the real party in interest in this proceeding. To permit defendant to repudiate his intent to support the child and no longer stand in loco parentis to him would cause irreparable harm to the boy. He would be without familial roots, without a known heritage. Equitable estoppel must be applied in this instance to prevent that result. [Id. at 371-72.]
In its holding, the court took care to distinguish the typical "stepfather" case, where the child has one natural parent, from the case before it, where the child had no natural parents.
The cases cited may be designated generally as "stepfather" cases wherein the child commenced residing in the home of the stepfather upon the latter's marriage to the child's mother. During the course of that marital relationship the stepfather intended to and did support his wife and her child of a prior marriage. However, upon a dissolution of that familial unit the stepfather's intent to support the child ended. The child then depends solely on its mother, the natural parent, who is obligated to provide for the child. See 11 N.J. Practice (Herr Marriage, Divorce and Separation) (3d ed. Lodge), § 981, at 283, and cases therein cited. After the severance of that marriage the relationship between the child and his or her natural mother is no different from what it was before that marriage. [Id. at 370.]
Other courts throughout the country have also applied the doctrine of equitable estoppel to extend a stepparent's duty to support his or her spouse's children beyond dissolution of their marriage. In almost all of these cases, the facts were substantially similar to the facts in one of the two prior New Jersey cases, Ross, supra, 126 N.J.Super. 394, aff'd, 135 N.J.Super. 35 and A.S. v. B.S., supra, 139 N.J.Super. 366, aff'd, 150 N.J.Super. 122.
Several rationales for these decisions are advanced. In cases such as Ross, supra, in which the husband marries a woman who is either pregnant by another man or has recently given birth to another man's child and the husband thereafter represents himself to both the child and the community as the natural father, equitable estoppel is often applied because of the general policy against allowing parents to testify to the illegitimacy of children whom they have previously treated as their own. This policy was explained in Clevenger v. Clevenger, 189 Cal.App.2d 658, 11 Cal.Rptr. 707, 710 (Dist.Ct.App.1961), in which it was said: See also Hall v. Rosen, 50 Ohio St.2d 135, 363 N.E.2d 725 (1977) (Ohio law has irrebutable presumption that when a man marries a woman he knows is pregnant with another man's child, the child, when born, is the legitimate offspring of the marriage).
There is an innate immorality in the conduct of an adult who for over a decade accepts and proclaims a child as his own, but then, in order to be relieved of the child's support, announces, and relies upon his bastardy. This is a cruel weapon, which works a lasting injury to the child and can bring in its aftermath social harm. The weapon should garner no profit to the wielder; the putative father should earn no premium by the assertion of the illegitimacy of the child. If any legal hypothesis can prevent such an inducement to publication of illegitimacy, we should adopt that theory.
In cases such as A.S. v. B.S., supra, 139 N.J.Super. 366, aff'd 150 N.J.Super. 122, in which the child never knows its natural parents, the courts reason that the child has no place to turn if its new parents decide that they no longer wish to support it. Children in these situations have relied to their detriment, since they have been cut off from the love and support of their natural parents or, as is more likely, of others who might have adopted them. To protect children from the whims of those who, for several years, treated them as their own, courts have held that both "adoptive" parents must be estopped from denying their duty to support the child. Under any other result, the child would be irreparably harmed. Accord In re Marriage of Valle, 53 Cal.App.3d 837, 126 Cal.Rptr. 38 (Ct.App.1975) (husband estopped to deny duty to support nephew brought to the United States as infant and raised as his son); Wener v. Wener, 35 A.D.2d 50, 312 N.Y.S.2d 815 (App.Div.1970) (child brought from Florida raised as parties' daughter — husband who agreed to adopt her has duty to support under either implied contract or equitable estoppel theories). These cases are easily distinguishable from the present case since, of course, here there are two natural parents, at least one of whom is present and another, while absent, may still be available.
Courts also have relied on the doctrine of implied or express contract to hold that when the stepfather expressly promises to care for the children and the wife relies on this promise, the husband's promise and the wife's reliance thereon are sufficient consideration to create a continuing obligation to support the children after a divorce. See L. v. L., 497 S.W.2d 840 (Mo.Ct.App.1973); T. v. T, 216 Va. 867, 224 S.E.2d 148 (1976). No evidence was presented that Gladys married Jay on his repre sentation that he would support her daughters. Thus, Gladys did not rely on the theory of implied contract; she relied instead on the doctrine of equitable estoppel.
IV
Today, we decide that in appropriate cases, a permanent support obligation may be imposed on a stepparent on the basis of equitable estoppel, but that this doctrine should be applied with caution. Voluntary support by a stepparent should not be discouraged.
It is essential, however, that, in the interim period between the spouses separation and the trial court's decision on permanent child support, the children have a source of support. We therefore find that if, in a motion for pendente lite child support, the natural parent demonstrates that he or she is not receiving support for the children from their other natural parent and establishes by affidavit that the stepparent's conduct actively interfered with the children's support by their natural parent, so that pendente lite support may not be obtained from the natural parent, the children should be awarded pendente lite support from the stepparent. By permitting a spouse to get interim support for the children, we alleviate any immediate hardship to the children caused by the breakup of a marriage in which a stepparent is the sole or major source of support for the family. Such interim support order should remain in force until circumstances justify a modification of the Order or the court makes its final determination.
To be entitled to permanent child support, Gladys, as the party alleging equitable estoppel, has the burden to prove that Jay's conduct established the three prerequisites to equitable estoppel — representation, reliance, and detriment. We recognize that there can be many forms of misrepresentation. We do not agree with those courts that have held that for equitable estoppel to apply the children must believe that the stepparent is their natural parent. Such a requirement would unduly limit this cause of action to those cases in which the stepparent appeared on the scene when the children were infants. We do believe, however, that for equitable estoppel to apply the stepparent must have made some representation of support to either the children or the natural parent as to his or her responsibilities in his or her relationship with them.
With respect to the reliance element of equitable estoppel Gladys contends that Jay's actions induced the girls to rely on him emotionally and financially, while he deliberately alienated the children from their natural father's emotional and financial support. It is undisputed that Jay, while living with Gladys, developed a loving relationship with the girls, and that the girls relied on him for emotional support. However, no court has ever applied equitable estoppel to force a husband to support the children of his divorced spouse merely because he developed a close relationship with the children, nurtured them into a family unit with himself as the father, and had the children call him "daddy." We decline to be the first to set such a precedent.
We specifically determine that the development of "emotional bonding" as set forth by the trial court is not sufficient to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel in stepparent cases. To hold otherwise would create enormous policy difficulties. A stepparent who tried to create a warm family atmosphere with his or her stepchildren would be penalized by being forced to pay support for them in the event of a divorce. At the same time, a stepparent who refused to have anything to do with his or her stepchildren beyond supporting them would be rewarded by not having to pay support in the event of a divorce.
To prove equitable estoppel, the custodial parent has the burden to establish not only representation of support and reliance but also detriment, i.e., that the children will suffer future financial detriment as a result of the stepparent's representation or conduct that caused the children to be cut off from their natural parent's financial support. Matrimonial cases are extremely fact-sensitive because each case involves a unique set of interpersonal relationships. The burden of establishing economic detriment depends on the facts of the particular case.
For example, at the final hearing if the custodial parent demonstrates that he or she (1) does not know the whereabouts of the natural parent; (2) cannot locate the other natural parent; or (3) cannot secure jurisdiction over the natural parent for valid legal reasons, and that the natural parent's unavailability is due to the actions of the stepparent, a trial court could hold that the stepparent is equitably estopped from denying his or her duty to support the children.
If, as in the present case, the wife knows where the natural father is, she has the burden to bring him before the court and to seek child support from him. Once in court the burden is on the natural father to show why he should not, in equity, be required to pay child support for his children. If the court finds that the natural father should not be required to pay child support due to the stepfather's conduct, the natural father having relied thereon and having placed himself in such a position that he is unable to meet that obligation, the stepparent should be responsible for the children's continued support. This, of course, is subject to modification or change whenever the natural father can meet his obligation. We have, in countless situations, recognized that changed circumstances should be reflected in changed obligations regardless of earlier commitments.
We emphasize, however, that the natural parent should always be considered the primary recourse for child support because society and its current laws assume that the natural parent will support his or her child. It is only when a stepparent by his or her conduct actively interferes with the children's support from their natural parent that he or she may be equitably estopped from denying his or her duty to support the children. Collection of child support from recalcitrant spouses is a persistent problem throughout this country. See C. Jones, N. Gordon & I. Sawhill, Child Support Payments in the United States (Working Paper 992-03, The Urban Institute, Oct. 1976). If a stepparent marries a divorced parent who is not receiving any child support, or if during their marriage the natural parent stops paying child support without interference from the stepparent, the stepparent does not thereby inherit the permanent support obligations of the nonpaying natural parent. The stepparent must take positive action interfering with the natural parent's support obligation to be bound. Further, if the stepparent paid pendente lite or permanent support, he or she may have a claim for reimbursement against the natural parent.
In applying this rule to the present case, the trial court must decide whether the two girls, both of whom were in their late teens when this action arose, incurred any detriment as to their future support by their previous reliance on their stepfather for support. To decide that the girls have incurred such detriment, the court must find that Jay's conduct interfered with Ralph's present duty to support them.
In concluding this issue, we hold that in appropriate cases, the doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked to impose on a stepparent the duty to support a stepchild after a divorce from the child's natural parent. But we admonish that the doctrine be invoked cautiously. Here, Jay should be required to pay child support during the pendency of this litigation since Gladys has satisfied the requirements that we have set down for a motion for pendente lite child support. However, to obtain permanent support Gladys must prove at the trial that the facts support the application of the equitable estoppel doctrine. We therefore reverse the Appellate Division's judgment and remand to the trial court for a determination of the facts necessary to decide this issue in accordance with this opinion.
Y
The subordinate issue presented on this appeal is whether the trial court's award of sole possession of the marital home, minus the set-off of certain marital debts of Jay to Gladys, constituted an equitable distribution of the marital assets. Based on the facts of this case, we disagree with Jay's argument that this award was per se error by the trial court. However, equitable distribution is intimately tied to child support and alimony. Smith v. Smith, 72 N.J. 350, 359 (1977). Upon remand, the trial court should reconsider the entire financial arrangements between the parties, including the equitable distribution of marital assets.
in Clevenger the court found no evidence that the stepfather ever represented himself to the child as his natural parent, and therefore held that the stepfather was not equitably estopped to deny his duty to support his stepson.