Case Name: E. Adelle SIMMONS v. Dr. Charles M. BERRY, Dr. William G. Black and Louisiana Medical Mutual Insurance Co.
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1999-09-03
Citations: 748 So. 2d 473
Docket Number: No. 98 CA 0660
Parties: E. Adelle SIMMONS v. Dr. Charles M. BERRY, Dr. William G. Black and Louisiana Medical Mutual Insurance Co.
Judges: Before: CARTER, SHORTESS, LeBLANC, FOIL, GONZALES, WHIPPLE, FOGG, PARRO, FITZSIMMONS, KUHN, GUIDRY, WEIMER, and PETTIGREW, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 748
Pages: 473–484

Head Matter:
E. Adelle SIMMONS v. Dr. Charles M. BERRY, Dr. William G. Black and Louisiana Medical Mutual Insurance Co.
No. 98 CA 0660.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
Sept. 3, 1999.
Rehearing Denied Nov. 30, 1999.
John Calmes, Jr., Harry Shoemaker, III, Baton Rouge, for Plaintiff-Appellant E. Adelle Simmons.
Vance A. Gibbs, Bradley C. Myers, Baton Rouge, for Defendants-Appellees Dr. Charles M. Berry, Dr. William G. Black and Louisiana Medical Mutual Ins. Co.
Before: CARTER, SHORTESS, LeBLANC, FOIL, GONZALES, WHIPPLE, FOGG, PARRO, FITZSIMMONS, KUHN, GUIDRY, WEIMER, and PETTIGREW, JJ.

Opinion:
l,FOGG, J.
In this medical malpractice case, at issue on appeal is whether or not various types of evidence were properly before the court on a motion for summary judgment. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court's granting of summary judgment and the dismissal of the plaintiffs suit.
In 1985, E. Adelle Simmons experienced abdominal pain in the left lower quadrant and sought the medical care of Dr. Rick Staggers. Dr. Staggers determined that the pain was most likely due to a problem with one of her ovaries. Medication prescribed by Dr. Staggers resolved the pain for approximately two years. In May or June of 1987, Ms. Simmons again began to experience the same type of pain she had experienced in 1985. She consulted Dr. Charles M. Berry. After conservative measures were unsuccessful in controlling Ms. Simmons' pain, she agreed to corrective surgery.
On July 20, 1987, Ms. Simmons underwent a left salpingo-oophorectomy with excision of varicosities in the left infundi-bulopelvic ligament and right ovarian cys-tectomy (the removal of the left fallopian tube and ovary and the removal of a cyst of the right ovary). Dr. Berry performed the surgery, with Dr. William G. Black assisting. The next day, July 21, 1987, a pathological examination revealed that a section of Ms. Simmons' left ureter, approximately 1.5 centimeters in length, had been removed during surgery. Ms. Simmons underwent corrective surgery on July 21, 1987, and was discharged from the hospital on July 28, 1987.
Ms. Simmons filed a medical malpractice claim pursuant to LSA-R.S. 40:1299.47 on July 18, 1988, alleging that Drs. Berry and Black were negligent and their actions vio lated the applicable standard of medical care during the surgery by inflicting the ureteral injury, by failing to recognize that the | ¡injury had occurred, and by failing to have it corrected. The medical review panel rendered its opinion, that neither Dr. Berry nor Dr. Black deviated from the standard of care, on December 12, 1989. Thereafter, on March 8, 1990, Ms. Simmons filed suit against Drs. Berry and Black and their insurer, Louisiana Medical Mutual Insurance Company.
In April of 1990, the defendants propounded interrogatories and requests for production of documents to the plaintiff seeking, among other information, the name(s) of any experts who would be relied on by the plaintiff to establish that the defendant doctors had deviated from the appropriate standard of care. In her answers to the interrogatories, Ms. Simmons identified Dr. Ruary C. O'Connell as her only expert. In March of 1992, the defendants deposed Dr. O'Connell. No other discovery was conducted.
On August 14, 1997, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. A hearing was scheduled for October 20, 1997. After> hearing the arguments and reviewing the exhibits submitted by the parties, the district court granted the motion for summary judgment, dismissing the plaintiffs claim. Ms. Simmons appeals that judgment.
An appellate court's review of a summary judgment is a de novo review based upon the evidence presented at the trial court level and using the same criteria used by the trial court in deciding whether a summary judgment should be granted. J. Ray McDermott, Inc. v. Morrison, 96-2337 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/7/97), 705 So.2d 195, units denied, 97-3055, 97-3062 (La.2/13/98), 709 So.2d 753, 754. Appellate review of questions of law is simply to determine whether the trial court was legally correct or legally incorrect. See Minor v. Casualty Reciprocal Exchange, 96-2096 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/19/97), 700 So.2d 951, unit denied, 97-2585 (La.12/19/97), 706 So.2d 463.
|4A motion for summary judgment is properly granted when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(B). The initial burden is on the mover to show that no genuine issue of material fact exists. If the moving party points out that there is an absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party's claim, action or defense, then the nonmoving party must produce factual support sufficient to satisfy his evidentiary burden at trial. LSA-C.C.P. art. 966(C)(2). If the nonmoving party fails to do so, there is no genuine issue of material fact, and summary judgment should be granted. LSA-C.C.P. arts. 966 and 967; Foreman v. Danos and Curole Marine Contractors, Inc., 97-2038 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/25/98), 722 So.2d 1, writ denied, 98-2703 (La.12/18/98), 734 So.2d 637.
The applicable substantive law determines the materiality of facts in a summary judgment setting. See Colver v. Travelers Ins. Companies, 95-1696 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/8/96), 685 So.2d 179, unit denied, 96-2928 (La.2/21/97), 688 So.2d 516. To prevail in a medical malpractice case, the plaintiff must establish the standard of care applicable to the charged physician, a violation by the physician of that standard of care, and a causal connection between the physician's alleged negligence and the plaintiffs injuries resulting therefrom. LSA-R.S. 9:2794(A). Generally, a plaintiff must introduce an expert witness to testify with regard to a violation of the standard of care unless the "defendant/physician or a defense expert testifies regarding the standard of care, and the objective evidence at trial is such that a lay jury can infer negligence from the facts." Pfiffner v. Correa, 94-0924, 94-0963, 94-0992, p.8 (La.10/17/94), 643 So.2d 1228, 1230. Considering the complexity of the surgical procedure utilized in this case, it would have been impossible for a lay jury to infer negligence from the facts. Therefore, expert testimony was necessary for the plaintiff to carry her burden of proof.
In support of their motion for summary judgment, the defendants placed into evidence an.uncertified copy of the opinion of the medical review panel. In the case of Robertson v. Northshore Regional Medical Center, 97-2068 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/25/98), 723 So.2d 460, this court determined that such evidence is inadmissible in summary judgment litigation because it is not certified, is not an affidavit or sworn to in any way, and is not attached to an affidavit as required by LSA-C.C.P. art. 967.
The defendants assert LSA-R.S. 40:1299.47(H) constitutes an exception to the requirements of LSA-C.C.P. art. 967 and extends the admissibility of a report by a medical review panel to use in summary judgment proceedings in medical malpractice cases. LSA-R.S. 40:1299.47(H) provides as follows:
H. Any report of the expert opinion reached by the medical review panel shall be admissible as evidence in any action subsequently brought by the claimant in a court of law, but such expert opinion shall not be conclusive and either party shall have the right to call, at his cost, any member of the medical review panel as a witness. If called, the witness shall be required to appear and testify. A panelist shall have absolute immunity from civil liability for all communications, findings, opinions and conclusions made in the course and scope of duties prescribed by this Part. (Emphasis ours).
LSA-C.C. art. 13 provides that laws on the same subject matter must be interpreted in reference to each other and requires courts to harmonize and reconcile statutes, if possible. In re First Columbia Life Ins. Co., 97-1083 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/29/98), 724 So.2d 790, writ denied, 98-2789 (La.1/8/99), 734 So.2d 1222. However, when two statutes do |ficonflict, the statute that is more specifically directed to the matter at issue prevails as an exception to the statute that is more general. Smith v. Cajun Insulation, Inc., 392 So.2d 398 (La.1980).
We find no conflict between Code of Civil Procedure articles 966 and 967 and LSA-R.S. 40:1299.47(H). The language contained in Title 40 simply allows the use of the expert opinion reached by a medical review panel in any action brought before a court of law, but provides that such evidence will not be conclusive. Either party has the right to call any member of the medical review panel as a witness. Accordingly, when read together, Code of Civil Procedure articles 966 and 967, and LSA-R.S. 40:1299.47(H) provide that the opinions of the medical review panels are admissible in court proceedings where there is live testimony. LSA-R.S. 40:1299.47(H) does not in any way broaden the avenues available to medical malpractice litigants utilizing summary judgment proceedings, where there is no opportunity for cross examination. If presented in affidavit form or by attachment to an affidavit, article 967 precludes their use in support of or opposition to a motion for summary judgment, because they are not based on personal knowledge. The opinion of a member of the medical review panel could be introduced in a summary judgment proceeding if it was presented in the form of a deposition.
In sum, the opinion of the medical review panel submitted in this case cannot be relied on in support of the defendants' motion for summary judgment. It does not fall within any of the categories listed in LSA-C.C.P. art. 966 as evidence properly considered on a motion for summary judgment. If presented in the form of an affidavit, the opinion of the medical review panel would still not be admissible as it is not based on personal knowledge.
|7The movers also placed into evidence the deposition of a physician identified by the plaintiff as her expert, Dr. Ruary O'Connell. Article 966 provides for the consideration of "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file" in summary judgment litigation. Article 967 does not require that these types of evidence be based on personal knowledge. Therefore, the use of opinion testimony in the form of deposition testimony is not precluded by Article 967. Such is admissible in all summary judgment litigation and was properly considered on the defendants^ motion for summary judgment.
In his deposition testimony, Dr. O'Con-nell testified that he could not state , that either defendant doctor had breached the standard of care. Therefore, Dr. O'Con-nell's testimony did not support the plaintiffs assertion that the doctors deviated from the standard of care, With this evidence, the movers successfully showed an absence of factual support for one of the essential elements of the plaintiffs case and the burden shifted to the plaintiff to produce factual support sufficient to establish that she would be able to satisfy her evidentiary burden of proof at trial.
In opposition to the motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff placed into evidence the affidavit of Dr. Michael T. Valley. Therein, he testified that he is licensed to practice medicine in the State of Florida and is certified by the American Board of Obstetrics and Gynecology. His affidavit, however, was based on a review of Ms. Simmons' medical records. As discussed fully above, affidavits not based on personal knowledge are not properly before the court on a motion for summary judgment. See LSA-C.C.P. art. 967. Therefore, the plaintiff failed to show that she could satisfy her evidentiary |sburden at trial and summary judgment was properly granted in favor of the defendants.
In reaching this result, we overrule the cases of Harris v. Landry, 97-0525 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/8/98), 784 So.2d 1 and Miceli v. Armstrong World Industries, 96-1134 (La.App. 1 Cir. 3/27/97), 691 So.2d 283, units denied, 97-1110, 97-1090 (La.6/13/97), 695 So.2d 980, 985, to the extent they conflict with the above analysis.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs are assessed to the appellant, E. Adelle Simmons.
AFFIRMED.
LeBLANC, GONZALES and WEIMER, JJ., concur and assign reasons.
FITZSIMMONS, J., concurs in the result, and assigns reasons.
KUHN, J., dissents and concurs in the dissent of SHORTESS, J.
SHORTESS, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
GUIDRY, J., dissents and subscribes to and adopts the reasons assigned by SHORTESS, J.
PETTIGREW, J., dissents for reasons assigned by SHORTESS, J., and assigns additional reasons.
WHIPPLE, J., dissents for the reasons assigned by SHORTESS and PETTIGREW, JJ.
FOIL, J., dissents with statement.