Case Name: Glyn Thomas Stapleton, Jr. v. District Court of the Twentieth Judicial District, State of Colorado, and the Honorable Rex H. Scott, one of the Judges thereof
Court: Colorado Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Colorado
Decision Date: 1972-07-24
Citations: 179 Colo. 187
Docket Number: No. 25544
Parties: Glyn Thomas Stapleton, Jr. v. District Court of the Twentieth Judicial District, State of Colorado, and the Honorable Rex H. Scott, one of the Judges thereof
Judges: 
Reporter: Colorado Reports
Volume: 179
Pages: 187–197

Head Matter:
No. 25544
Glyn Thomas Stapleton, Jr. v. District Court of the Twentieth Judicial District, State of Colorado, and the Honorable Rex H. Scott, one of the Judges thereof
(499 P.2d 310)
Decided July 24, 1972.
Rollie R. Rogers, State Public Defender, J. D. MacFarlane, Chief Deputy, John A. Purvis, Deputy, William R. Gray, Deputy, for petitioner.
Stanley F. Johnson, District Attorney, Twentieth Judicial District, Robert M. Jenkins, Chief Deputy, for respondent.
En Banc.

Opinion:
MR. JUSTICE LEE
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner seeks relief in the nature of mandamus under Article VI, Section 3, of the Colorado Constitution, and C.A.R. 21. Because of the public importance of the matter here involved, we issued a rule to show cause why the relief requested in the petition should not be granted. The matter is now at issue.
Petitioner is charged in the respondent district court with first-degree murder and kidnapping. He filed pretrial motions to suppress statements and evidence seized, and sought to have a hearing on these motions, in camera, closed to the public and representatives of the news media. The district attorney resisted the private hearing and, after consideration, the trial court denied the motion. Petitioner seeks an order of this Court requiring the respondent district court to hold the hearing on such motions in camera, closed to the public and representatives of the news media. -Upon consideration of the merits, we decline to to so and we discharge the rule.
The grounds for petitioner's motion for an in camera, closed hearing relate to protection of petitioner's constitutional right to a fair trial by an impartial jury and to due process of law as guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article II, Sections 15 and 25, of the Colorado Constitution. His basic argument is that, by reason of the nature of the evidence which he sought to have suppressed and which he contends is incompetent and inadmissible, publicity concerning such matters would be disseminated through the news media, which would result in prejudice to him and his right to a fair trial before an impartial jury. In order that he be afforded a full and complete presentation of his suppression motions, it would be necessary to have a closed hearing so that all aspects might be explored relating to the obtaining of statements and to the discovery and seizure of other evidence'sought to be suppressed. Otherwise, petitioner argues, he could not make a full presentation of his suppression motions without also sacrificing his fundamental right to a fair trial because of potential public dissemination of incompetent, inadmissible and prejudicial evidence.
Petitioner's argument is framed around the American Bar Association Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice Relating to Fair Trial and Free Press, § 3.1, which provides:
"3.1 Pretrial hearings.

"Motion to exclude public from all or part of pretrial hearing.
"In any preliminary hearing, bail hearing, or other pretrial hearing in a criminal case, including a motion to suppress evidence, the defendant may move that all or part of the hearing be held in chambers or otherwise closed to the public, including representatives of the news media, on the ground that dissemination of evidence or argument adduced at the hearing may disclose matters that will be inadmissible in evidence at the trial and is therefore likely to interfere with his right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. The motion shall be granted unless the presiding officer determines that there is no substantial likelihood of such interference. With the consent of the defendant, the presiding officer may take such action on his own motion or at the suggestion of the prosecution. Whenever under this rule all or part of any pretrial hearing is held in chambers or otherwise closed to the public, a complete record of the proceedings shall be kept and shall be made available to the public following the completion of trial or disposition of the case without trial. Nothing in this rule is intended to interfere with the power of the presiding officer in any pretrial hearing to caution those present that dissemination of certain information may jeopardize the right to a fair trial by an impartial jury." (Emphasis added.)
The trial court, without commenting on the foregoing standard as a guideline for its ruling, held that the granting of the motion for a private pretrial suppression hearing was discretionary with the court, to be determined upon a consideration of the nature of the pending charges and the attendant circumstances of the case. It observed that, while in the instant case it had previously granted, upon petitioner's motion, a private, in camera hearing and sequestered and suppressed certain documents relating to other matters, it believed that sufficient control by the court could be exercised as the occasion might demand to prevent prejudice to the accused because of improper publicity resulting from matters that might be revealed by petitioner's pursuit of his suppression motions.
Petitioner urges that we adopt the foregoing American Bar Association standard as an aid to the trial courts in the resolution of publicity problems inherent in public pretrial hearings. We now do so, believing that reconciliation of what may appear to be inevitable conflicts between the constitutional right of freedom of speech and of the press, vis-a-vis the right to a fair trial before an impartial jury and to due process, may be more readily accomplished.
We recognize that constitutional guarantees are not always absolute and that full exercise thereof is not always entirely possible. Anderson v. People, 176 Colo. 224, 490 P.2d 47; Hampton v. People, 171 Colo. 153, 465 P.2d 394; Thompson v. People, 156 Colo. 416, 399 P.2d 776. On occasion, one right must necessarily be subordinated to another. The interest of the accused, whose life and liberty are in jeopardy, to a fair trial by an impartial jury is paramount, and may require, depending on the circumstances of the case, limitations upon the exercise of the right of free speech and of the press. The problem is one of balancing of interests so that irreconcilable conflict need not necessarily result from the simultaneous exercise of those constitutional rights. Whether in a particular case there has been an actual accommodation in the simultaneous exercise of the two rights, depends upon the circumstances of the case.
In the context of the factual setting of the present case, the trial court acknowledged the seriousness of the charges against petitioner and the unusual public interest in the trial of the case, as evidenced by the coverage by members of the news media attending previous court hearings. The court concluded, however, that adequate controls could be imposed during the hearing on the suppression motions so as to safeguard against potential prejudice that might flow from the publication of matters revealed at the public suppression hearing. In exercising its discretion, the court in effect ruled there was no substantial likelihood that petitioner's right to a fair trial by an impartial jury would be interfered with as a result of a public hearing on petitioner's suppression motions.
Although we might have ruled differently had we been ruling upon this issue as a trial court, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion. Our function is not to preempt the trial court by directing the course of judicial proceedings before it. That is the primary burden of the trial judge who, by the nature of our judicial process, is in the best position to assure that a defendant's right to a fair trial, as well as the public's right to know the course of the trial proceedings, will be substantially protected. In carrying out its function, the trial court has considerable discretion and, as suggested in the court's findings, it is permissible and eminently proper to convene closed pretrial hearings when there is a substantial likelihood of prejudicial interference with a defendant's right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. Although the court here denied petitioner's motion, nevertheless, should intervening circumstances have developed, which lend further support to petitioner's position, the matter may always be reconsidered by the trial court.
The rule is discharged.
MR. JUSTICE GROVES añd MR. JUSTICE ERICKSON dissenting.
MR. JUSTICE HODGES not participating.