Case Name: John GARNETT, d/b/a Empire Cash Store, v. Leon ANCAR
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1967-11-06
Citations: 203 So. 2d 812
Docket Number: No. 2730
Parties: John GARNETT, d/b/a Empire Cash Store, v. Leon ANCAR.
Judges: Before YARRUT, SAMUEL and HALL, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 203
Pages: 812–816

Head Matter:
John GARNETT, d/b/a Empire Cash Store, v. Leon ANCAR.
No. 2730.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Fourth Circuit.
Nov. 6, 1967.
Morphy, Freeman & Batt, A. D. Freeman, Jr., New Orleans, for plaintiff-appellant.
Emile E. Martin, III, Belle Chasse, for defendant-appellee.
Before YARRUT, SAMUEL and HALL, JJ.

Opinion:
HALL, Judge.
On May 18, 1964 John Garnett d/b/a Empire Cash Store brought suit against Leon Anear for $1,040.21 on an open account for groceries and other items.
Anear was personally served with process on May 22, 1964. On May 29, 1964 Ancar's attorney filed a prayer for oyer of the sales slips evidencing the account and obtained an order commanding plaintiff under penalty of dismissal of his suit as of non suit to produce and file the sales slips within ten days from service of the order and relieved defendant from pleading or answering until the documents were filed. This order was served on plaintiff's attorney on June 5, 1964.
On June 24, 1964 plaintiff filed a return on the prayer for oyer stating that the sales slips had been lost and that he was unable to produce them and prayed that the prayer for oyer be deemed satisfied and that defendant be ordered to file his answer or other pleadings within ten days. According to the certificate of counsel appearing at the bottom of the return a copy thereof had been mailed to defendant's counsel on June 22, 1964. The District Judge, in accordance with plaintiff's prayer rendered and signed an ex parte order on June 24, 1964 ordering that his former order for oyer be deemed satisfied and that the defendant file his answer or other pleading to the suit "within ten days from date hereof." It does not appear that a copy of this order was ever served on defendant or his counsel.
Two years later, viz., on July 8, 1966, defendant having failed to answer plaintiff's suit or otherwise plead, plaintiff obtained a preliminary default which was confirmed on July 14, 1966 and judgment was rendered in plaintiff's favor as prayed for.
On December 6, 1966 defendant, Anear, was served with a "Rule to Examine Judgment Debtor" which rule was made returnable on December 12, 1966.
On December 19, 1966 defendant filed a rule to show cause why the default judgment rendered on July 14, 1966 should not be declared a nullity and why it should not be set aside and voided on the ground that defendant had received no notice of the Court's order of June 24, 1964 that the prayer for oyer be deemed satisfied and that defendant file his answer or otherwise plead within ten days.
Plaintiff filed a return to this rule excepting thereto on the ground that a final judgment cannot be annulled,by rule but can be annulled only by an action of nullity under the provisions of LSA-C.C.P. Art. 2001 et seq.
Following a hearing on the rule the District Judge rendered judgment on January 5, 1967 declaring the default judgment of July 14, 1966 to be a nullity and vacating and setting it aside.
Plaintiff prosecutes this appeal from .that judgment.
The question presented to this Court is whether a final judgment may be annulled by rule.
Under the law and the jurisprudence prior to the adoption of the Code of Civil Procedure the nullity of a final judgment could not be pronounced except in a direct suit preceded by petition and citation. Article.610 of the Code of Practice reads as follows:
"610. Petition to nullify in Court rendering judgment—Citation of adverse party.—The party praying for the nullity of a judgment, before the court which has rendered the same, must bring his action by means of a petition; and the adverse party must be cited to appear, as in ordinary suits."
The only exception recognized by the jurisprudence was that the validity of a final judgment might be collaterally attacked provided its invalidity was absolute and-patent on the face of the record.
Code of Practice Art. 610 is not repeated in the Code of Civil Procedure in so many words. However the Articles of the Code of Civil Procedure (LSA-C.C.P. Articles 2001-2006) which relate to the nullity of judgments are found in Section 3 of Title VI of Book II thereof. Book II is entitled "Ordinary Proceedings" and Section 3 of Title VÍ thereof is entitled "Action of Nullity" (emphasis supplied). The Articles 2001-2006 themselves speak of the "action to annul." Although we do not find in the Code of Civil Procedure any specific definition of the word "action" we do find Article 1201 (LSA-C.C.P. Art. 1201) which reads in part as follows:
"Art. 1201. Citation; Waiver.
"Citation and service thereof are essential in all civil actions except summary and executory proceedings. Without them all proceedings are absolutely null. " (emphasis supplied)
Since the action of nullity is neither a summary (See LSA-C.C.P. Art. 2592) nor an executory proceeding (See LSA-C.C.P. Art. 2631) but an ordinary proceeding citation and service are essential to it and without them all proceedings are absolutely null (LSA-C.C.P. Art. 1201).
We are of the opinion that the Code of Civil Procedure has not effected any substantial change in the provisions of Article 610 of the Code of Practice or the jurisprudence interpreting that article.
As we have previously stated the jurisprudence interpreting C.P. Article 610 has uniformly permitted a judgment to be collaterally attacked when it is absolutely void for defects patent on the face of the record. See Decuir v. Decuir, 105 La. 481, 29 So. 932; Nottingham v. Hoss, 19 La.App. 643, 141 So. 391; In re New Orleans Butchers' Co-operative, Abattoir, Inc., La.App., 193 So.2d 309; Folse v. St. Bernard Parish Police Jury, 201 La. 1048, 10 So.2d 892; Gele v. Cotonio, 3 Orl.App. 165.
Conversely the Supreme Court in Allen v. Commercial National Bank of Shreveport, 243 La. 840, 147 So.2d 865 said:
"No principle of law has received greater and more frequent sanction, or is more deeply bedded in our jurisprudence, than that which forbids a collateral attack on a judgment or order of a competent tribunal, not void on its face ab initio % ‡ 5}C
The question to be decided here is whether the default judgment of July 14, 1964 is an absolute nullity for defects patent on the face of the proceedings leading up to it. If so it may be attacked at any time, at any place, by rule or by any other method. If not it cannot be attacked except by a direct action of nullity preceded by petition and citation.
Defendant's contention as we understand it is that the default judgment rendered against him is an absolute nullity, not being "a valid judgment by default" (See LSA-C.C.P. Art. 2002(2)) for the reason that he was not served with a copy of the order of June 24, 1964 declaring the prayer for oyer satisfied.
We know of no provision of law which requires defendant to be served with notice that the documents called for in a prayer for oyer have been filed or that he be served with notice that the prayer for oyer has been otherwise satisfied. We observe parenthetically that "oyer" eo nomine is not included in the provision of the Code of Civil Procedure, Article 175 of the Code of Practice having been replaced therein by Article 1311. (LSA-C.C.P. Art. 1311)
Defendant was personally served with citation which required an answer to plaintiffs suit within fifteen days. Subsequently the order for oyer extended the time for answering until the documents called for were filed. The order of June 24, 1964 declaring the oyer satisfied .did not in effect require the defendant to do anything. Its effect was to grant defendant an additional delay of ten days from the date thereof within which to answer.
Defendant had full knowledge of the contents of plaintiff's return to the prayer for oyer, a copy thereof having been mailed to defendant's attorney prior to its filing. Since the return required no appearance or answer by defendant such service fully met the requirements of LSA-C.C.P. Arts. 1312 and 1313.
In spite of his knowledge of the contents of plaintiff's return, defendant, as far as disclosed by the record, made no inquiries as to the Court's disposition of the return until after the default judgment was rendered against him two years later.
In our opinion there is nothing on the face of the record which discloses the default judgment of July 14, 1966 to be an absolute nullity; consequently its nullity vel non can be determined only in a direct action of nullity preceded by petition and citation. It cannot be attacked by rule.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is annulled and set aside, and judgment is now rendered dismissing defendant's rule of December 19, 1966; all costs of both Courts to be borne by Leon Anear, defendant-appellee.
Judgment annulled and rule dismissed.