Case Name: STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. JEROME BENDER, R. P., DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT
Court: New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1978-05-09
Citations: 159 N.J. Super. 465
Docket Number: 
Parties: STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. JEROME BENDER, R. P., DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Superior Court Reports
Volume: 159
Pages: 465–472

Head Matter:
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. JEROME BENDER, R. P., DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.
Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division
Submitted April 17, 1978
Decided May 9, 1978.
Before Judges Allcorn, Horn and Eurman.
Mr. John J. Degnan, Attorney General, attorney for appellant {Mr. William F. Hyland, former Attorney General; Mr. Allan J. Nodes, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief).
Mr. Raymond R. Trombadore & Mrs. Ann W. Trombadore, attorneys for respondent (Mr. Trombadore on the brief).

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
This is an appeal by the State from an order entered by the trial judge admitting defendant to the Somerset County Pretrial Intervention Program (P.T.I. Program) on a finding following a hearing that the objection by the State was "patently and grossly arbitrary, unreasonable and capricious."
A state grand jury indictment charged defendant Jerome Bender with stealing narcotic drugs ,(cocaine), in violation of N. J. S. A. 2A:119-8.1 (count 1); possession of a controlled dangerous substance (cocaine), in violation of N. J. S. A. 24:21-20a(1) (Count 2); possession of a controlled, dangerous substance (marijuana), in violation of N. J. S. A. 24:21-21a(3) (count 3); possession of a controlled dangerous substance (hashish), in violation of N. J. S. A. 24:21— 20a(3) (count 4); possession of controlled dangerous substances (valium, ritalin, fiorinal, pentobarbital, phenobarbital and emperin with codeine), in violation of N. J. S. A. 24:21-20a(1) (count 5); possession of controlled dangerous substances not in the original container (valium, ritalin, fiorinal, pentobarbital and emperin with codeine), contrary to N. J. S. A. 24:21-18 (count 6), and refusal and failnre to keep records under the Controlled Substances Act, contrary to N. J. S. A. 24 :21-21a(4). 24:21-13 and 24:21-9 (count 7). Pursuant to an agreement between defendant and the State, and before Somerset County had a P.T.I. Program, defendant entered a plea of guilty on November 15, 1976 to count 1, charging stealing of a narcotic drug, to wit, cocaine, between January 1, 1972 and on or about December 10, 1975. Counts 2 through 7 subsequently were dismissed. Additionally, the State recommended a noncustodial sentence.
On or about January 14, 1977, after the P.T.I. Program was adopted for the county, defendant applied for admission into it. The Attorney General opposed the application. On or about March 30, 1977 the Program Coordinator notified defendant of his rejection as a participant in the Program. Defendant then filed a motion in the Somerset County Court seeking review of the denial of his application for admission to the Program. The judge made the challenged ruling following a hearing on the motion.
This is indeed a sorry case and invokes great sympathy. Defendant presently is 42 years old. He was licensed to practice pharmacy in 1960, from which time he was employed as pharmacist-in-charge at a drugstore in Somer- ville. He was married in 1960 and is the father of two children, ages 10 and 13. Until the episodes in question he had no criminal record. Commencing in 1972 he began to use cocaine diverted from the stocks of the store of his employer where he was working, and he became dependent upon its use. In addition, he commenced to consume large quantities of alcohol daily. His use of cocaine by inhalation caused physical damages to him — a perforation of his palate as well as destruction of tissue in his nasal passages. When confronted with charges that he was using drugs, he readily admitted his drug and alcohol abuse, and immediately sought medical and rehabilitory assistance. He resided in a drug clinic for approximately six weeks and, when discharged, he cooperated in out-patient drug programs. Thereafter he participated as a member of the advisory board of an addiction-recovery unit of an organization of the county.
He has since been divorced and has been able to make restitution for the cocaine which he had misappropriated. He voluntarily ceased practicing pharmacy and has not been suspended. His rehabilitation is attested by numerous letters from those who have been in a position to observe him socially, professionally and through business relationships. Counsel advised the court that his former employer has offered to restore him to his prior position as a pharmacist in their store, but that he has advised defendant against accepting that offer pending disposition of this and certain other problems.
The State opposed defendant's application for the following reasons:
A. The course of conduct described in Count I was a continuing criminal business or enterprise. [P. T. I. Guideline 3 (i) (2)] The defendant systematically used Schedule II order forms to obtain narcotics over a four year period.
B. The conduct pursued by the Defendant-Bender, a licensed pharf macist, is a breach of public trust where admission to a P. T. I. program would depreciate [«ic, deprecate] the seriousness of the "defendant's crime. [P. T. I. Guideline 3(i) (4)] Admission to " P. T. I. may result in the return' of his pharmacy license.
In concluding that the Attorney General had abused his discretion in opposing intervention, the trial judge commented on the apparently successful efforts of defendant in rehabilitating himself. He rejected the above-stated reason, A, as being erroneous because he did not consider that defendant's course of conduct was a "continuing criminal business or enterprise" since he stole the drugs for his personal use. He rejected the above-stated reason, B, on the ground that as a pharmacist defendant was not a public officer and did not breach a public trust. Further, he expressed his feeling "that to allow this rejection to continue would be a violation of the whole purpose of pretrial intervention."
Notwithstanding the fact that we share the trial judge's obvious sympathy for defendant, and also that we recognize that defendant has made great strides in restoring himself, we are constrained to disagree with his decision, primarily because we do not share his view as to the governing legal principles.
We need not assess the judge's view of the Attorney General's reason, A, as being correct or not, because we are satisfied that the judge erred in declaring that defendant's conduct in purloining the cocaine was not a breach of a public trust. In issuing a license the State entrusts a pharmacist to dispense controlled dangerous substances. N. J. S. A. 24:21-1 et seq. In effect, the State relies upon him to do so only pursuant to law. Cf. N. J. S. A. 45:1-13. See also, N. J. S. A. 45:14-7. In a broad sense, it entrusts pharmacists with furthering public health and welfare in their professional obligations. See Supermarkets Gen'l Corp. v. Sills, 93 N. J. Super. 326 (Ch. Div. 1966). Guideline 3(i) provides that a defendant's application to participate in a Program should generally be rejected if the crime was "(4) a breach of the public trust where admission to a PTI program would deprecate the seriousness of defendant's crime >y
As enunciated in State v. Leonardis, 73 V. J. 360, 381 (1977) (Leonardis II), "great" deference should he given to the prosecutor's determination not to consent to diversion and his determination not to consent should be sustained unless there is a showing of "patent and gross abuse of discretion." Here there was a violation of the public trust by defendant, which violation was in the form of a series of misappropriations of a controlled dangerous substance over an interval of four years. Cf. State v. Markt, 156 N. J. Super. 486 (App. Div. 1978). Its termination and defendant's criminal activities came to light only at the instance of a third party or parties. Surely within that four years defendant must have realized the import of his activities, but nonetheless he failed to act upon such realization. We must uphold the Attorney General's decision in such a case as this, where he fears that if defendant is permitted to receive the benefits of the Program it will deprecate the seriousness of the crime. This consideration leads us to conclude that this is not one of the rare eases where the Attorney General's decision should be overturned. Leonardis II, supra, 73 N. J. at 380, n. 10. See also State v. Barrett, 157 N. J. Super. 96 (App. Div. 1978); State v. Markt, supra; State v. Litton, 155 N. J. Super. 207 (App. Div. 1977).
As noted in State v. Litton, supra, at 212, judicial review of the prosecutor's, or as in the case at bar, the Attorney General's decision is narrowly limited. The purpose of the review is to allow a defendant to demonstrate an abuse of discretion by the prosecutor. We are constrained to hold that in this case defendant did not sustain the heavy burden of demonstrating clearly and convincingly that the Attorney General's refusal to consent was patently and grossly an abuse of discretion. State v. Litton, supra at 212. Accordingly, the order under appeal is reversed.
The State moved before us for leave to appeal. We granted it primarily because we conceived that the order was a final one and was appealable as of right. R. 2:2-3(a) (1).