Case Name: W. D. SESSUMS MOTOR CO. v. WHITE
Court: Texas Courts of Civil Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1922-02-13
Citations: 239 S.W. 329
Docket Number: No. 2478
Parties: W. D. SESSUMS MOTOR CO. v. WHITE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 239
Pages: 329–331

Head Matter:
W. D. SESSUMS MOTOR CO. v. WHITE.
(No. 2478.)
(Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Texarkana.
Feb. 13, 1922.
Rehearing Denied March 9, 1922.)
1. Sales <@=>120— In absence of actual fraud or agreement to return, buyer cannot rescind for breach of warranty.
Where warranty is breached, there is no actual fraud, and no agreement to return the goods, the buyer cannot rescind the contract, but has only an action on the warranty.
On Motion for Rehearing.
2. Sales @=>441 (I)— Evidence heíd to show that buyer relied on warranty on purchase of automobile.
In an action for breach of warranty of an automobile, plaintiff’s testimony held to show that he relied, not on defendant’s knowledge of the ear, and the truth of his statements concerning it, but on his warranty or guaranty that it was as represented.
3. Sales @=>38(2) — Buyer’s right to relief for fraud not affected by seller’^ good faith.
A buyer’s right to relief for fraud, if he was induced to buy by his reliance on the truth of the seller’s representations, is not affected by the fact that such representations were made in good faith.
Appeal from District Court, Smith County; J. R. Warren, Judge.
Suit by Jo. J. White against the W. D. Sessums Motor Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.
Reversed and remanded.
Appellants, W. D. Sessums and B. W. Crane, both of whom resided in Longview, Gregg county, as partners under the name “W. D. Sessums Motor Company,” engaged in the business of selling automobiles at Tyler, Smith county. H. D. Boone, as their agent, had charge of their business at Tyler, but about once a week one of the appellants would go to that place and go over the business transacted there. About March 15, 1920, Boone, acting as such agent, sold a car to appellee for $1,065, $637.60 of which was paid at that time, and $427.40 of which was to be paid June 18, 1920, as provided in a promissory note in appellant’s favor which appellee at the time executed and delivered to Boone. Alleging that he was induced to .buy the car by representations made to him by appellants that it was “a first-class, substantial, automobile in every respect, that it was a high-grade ear, that all parts were first-class material, well made and put together in the best of workmanlike manner, and that said car was one of the best cars on the market, and was in every way a first-class, high-grade, substantial, automobile,” and further alleging that the representations were false and were fraudulently made, ap-pellee sought by this suit to cancel the note he gave, and recover of appellants the money he paid on the car.
Testifying as a witness at the trial, which was to the court without a jury, appellee said, “The car was an excellent one; that is, it run excellently up to a thousand miles;” that he learned two or three weeks after he purchased the car, when he had driven it about a thousand miles, that it “did not come up to the guaranties and representations” made by Boone, but that he did not “entirely lose confidence” in it until several weeks later; that he drove the car altogether about 4,000 miles, 2,000 of which were driven in an effort “to make it run”; that he “knew all the time that the' car was never able to run”; that he “tried! to trade it on two different ears,” and used! it from early in April, when he found it to be defective in respects covered by the warranties, until June 20, when he tendered it to appellants. The reason he gave for using the car for more than two months after he found it to be defective before he sought to rescind the contract was that he relied on Boone’s promise to make it satisfactory.
The trial court found as facts: (1) That in purchasing the car as he did appellee.re-lied on representations made to him by Boone, and on a promise Boone made “to keep the car in repair for a period of six months from the date of the sale.” (2) That the representations were substantially as-charged in appellee’s petition, and “were in; substance and effect” those, made by the manufacturers of the car in printed matter they furnished dealers for use in selling the-ears, and were made by Boone in good faith,, and not to deceive appellee, but that “important parts of the car were concealed, and’ could not be seen, and the class of material and kind of workmanship determined by looking at the car.” (3) That in less than 30 days after appellee purchased it “the car-developed defects in the material and character of work in its make-up,” and that appellant repeatedly “undertook to remedy the defects but failed to do so.” '(4) That ap-pellee quit using the car the latter part of June, and stored it in a garage until some time in August, when it was turned over to appellants, who “again had it worked over, and claimed It to be then in first-class condition, and tendered it” to appellee, who declined to receive it, “claiming that it was not as represented and that the contract of sale was breached.” (5) That during the time appellants were “trying to make the car good by work and repairs” appellee “told them he would not keep it unless they made the car come up to representations.” (6)' That the car “was not as represented, ei ther as to class or material or workmanship,” and that appellant had failed to remedy the defects in it “up to the time it took possession of the car in August.”
On facts as specified, and others made by him, the trial court rendered judgment in appellee’s favor for the $637.60 he paid when he purchased the car, and canceling the note he made for $427.40.
Brooks & Johnson, of Tyler, and Young & Stinchcomb, of Longview, for appellant.
Simpson, Lasseter & Simpson, of Tyler, for appellee.

Opinion:
WILLSON, O. J.
(after stating the facts as above). So far as the representations were actionable, they were express warranties, and as such became a part of the contract between the parties; and we think the suit should have been predicated on them as warranties, and not as misrepresentations of fact constituting fraud. But if it had been appellee would not have been entitled to a rescission on the case made by the testimony, for there was no provision in the contract authorizing appellee to rescind it if the car was found to be defective in respects covered by the warranties. The representations having been made in good faith, and not fraudulently, and the parties having failed in their contract to provide for a rescission thereof if the warranties were breached, the case in its facts was within the rule adopted by the Supreme Court in Wright v. Davenport, 44 Tex. 164. In that case the buyer of an engine sought a rescission of the contract on the ground that the seller had guaranteed the engine to saw 4,-000 feet of lumber a day, whereas it was not capable of sawing more than 2,000 feet a day, and for that reason was wholly useless to the purchaser. -In reversing a judgment rescinding the contract as prayed for by the buyer, the Supreme Court approved, as correctly announcing the rule it adopted, the statement in Sedgwick on Damages, 286, that:
"Where there is no fraud and no agreement to return the vendee cannot, at his own option, rescind the contract, but has only an action on the warranty"
—the statement in Stovey on Contracts, §' 850, that:
"If the warranty goes to the degree of fitness or to quality, and it proves to be of an inferior quality or fitness, the goods cannot be returned, and the remedy is by action for damages, the measure of which is the difference between the value of the article as it is and as it was represented to be. Thus, if a machine is sold for a particular purpose, and it will perform none of the functions, it may be returned; but if it only perform them badly 'the remedy is by action for damages"
—and the statement in 2 Smith's Leading Cases, 276, that:
A "mere breach of warranty, unattended by fraud, does not entitle the vendee to rescind the contract or return the goods."
And see Organ Co. v. Thomas, 36 Tex. Civ. App. 78, 80 S. W. 1063; Fetzer v. Haralson (Tex. Civ. App.) 147 S. W. 290; Silo Co. v. Alley (Tex. Civ. App.) 180 S. W. 621; 1 Black on Rescission and Cancellation, § 23, 185, 212; 5 Elliott on Contracts, § 5110.
Other questions presented by assignments are not likely to arise on another trial, and need not be determined.
The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded for a new trial.
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