Case Name: CLIFFORD v. CACTUS DRILLING CORPORATION
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1984-08-27
Citations: 419 Mich. 356
Docket Number: Docket No. 67917
Parties: CLIFFORD v CACTUS DRILLING CORPORATION
Judges: Levin, Ryan, Brickley, Cavanagh, and Boyle, JJ., concurred with Kavanagh, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 419
Pages: 356–375

Head Matter:
CLIFFORD v CACTUS DRILLING CORPORATION
Docket No. 67917.
Argued December 6, 1983
(Calendar No. 3).
Decided August 27, 1984.
Kevin L. Clifford was injured while working for Cactus Drilling Corporation and received workers’ compensation benefits. Shortly after his return to work he missed a day’s work allegedly because of a recurrence of pain caused by the injury and was discharged the next day. He brought an action in the Kalkaska Circuit Court, ■ asserting that his employer had no right to terminate his employment solely because he missed work as a result of a work-related injury. The court, William A. Porter, J., granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Court of Appeals, T. M. Burns and Cynar, JJ. (R. B. Burns, P.J., dissenting), reversed in an opinion per curiam (Docket No. 51868). The defendant appeals.
In an opinion by Justice Kavanagh, joined by Justices Levin, Ryan, Brickley, Cavanagh, and Boyle, the Supreme Court held:
The plaintiff did not plead a public policy exception to the rule that either party to an employment contract for an indefinite term may terminate it at any time for any, or no, reason. Certainly an employer’s power to discharge an employee at will should not prevail when that power is exercised to prevent an employee from asserting his statutory rights under the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act, but there is no evidence or reason to infer that the plaintiffs right to claim benefits was chilled in any way. The plaintiff did not allege that he was discharged in retaliation for filing a workers’ compensation rather, he alleged that he was fired because he missed work because of a work-related injury for which he had already received workers’ compensation benefits, and he has stated that he has no further claim.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1, 2] 73 Am Jur 2d, Summary Judgment § 26.
[1-4] 53 Am Jur 2d, Master and Servant §§ 34, 43, 48, 48.7.
[1-4] Modern status of rule that employer may discharge at-will, employee for any reason. 12 ALR4th 544.
Recovery for discharge in retaliation for filing workmen’s compensation claim. 63 ALR3d 979.
[2-4] 81 Am Jur 2d, Workmen’s Compensation § 55.
Reversed.
Chief Justice Williams dissented. He would hold that an allegation by an employee that he has been discharged solely because of absence from work resulting from a work-related injury states a cause of action sufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment. The cause of action is an exception on public policy grounds to the employment-at-will rule and is not barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the workers’ compensation act.
1. Generally, a contract for permanent employment or for an indefinite term is terminable by either party for any or no reason. Where specific grounds for termination have been identified by legislatures and courts as being repugnant to a clearly expressed public policy, however, an employer’s absolute freedom to discharge an employee has been curtailed. In addition to statutory restrictions, public policy exceptions to the employment-at-will rule have been recognized by the courts where the discharge was in retaliation for exercising constitutional or statutory rights or where the employee refused to follow an employer’s direction to act in violation of the law.
2. In this case, the plaintiff alleged that he was discharged because of an absence from work resulting from a work-related injury. Under the workers’ compensation act, an employer may not discharge an employee in retaliation for exercising rights provided by the act, nor may the employer create an atmosphere of reprisal that chills the employee’s exercise of such rights. Discharge of an employee because of absence resulting from a work-related injury is a subtle infringement on rights provided by the act against which employees must be protected. Recognition of a cause of action for such a wrongful discharge does not curtail the employer’s ability to assert as an affirmative defense the existence of a just cause for dismissal.
3. An action for wrongful discharge for absence from work resulting from a work-related injury is not barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the workers’ compensation act, because it does not attempt to bypass benefits as a remedy for a work-related injury, but seeks damages for the employer’s attempt to avoid a statutory duty by intentional retaliation for the exercise of statutory rights.
109 Mich App 776; 312 NW2d 380 (1981) reversed.
1. Master and Servant — Employment at Will — Summary Judgment.
An allegation by a worker that he was discharged as a result of an absence from work because of a work-related injury did not state a cause of action that was an exception, on public policy grounds, to the rule that either party to an employment contract for an indefinite term may terminate it at any time for any, or no, reason.
Dissenting Opinion by Williams, C.J.
2. Master and Servant — Workers’ Compensation — Employment at Will — Summary Judgment.
An allegation by an employee that he has been discharged because of absence from work resulting from a work-related injury states a cause of action sufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment; the cause of action is an exception on public policy grounds to the employment-at-will rule and is not barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the workers’ compensation act (MCL 418.131; MSA 17.237[131]; GCR 1963, 117.2[1J).
3. Master and Servant — Employment at Will — Termination op Employment — Public Policy.
In addition to statutory restrictions on the general rule that a contract for permanent employment or for an indefinite term is terminable at the will of either party for any or no reason, the courts have recognized public policy exceptions where an employee was discharged in retaliation for the exercise of constitutional or statutory rights, or for refusal to act at the instruction of the employer in violation of the law.
4. Master and Servant — Workers’ Compensation — Employment at Will — Termination op Employment.
Discharge of an employee because of absence from work resulting from a work-related injury is a subtle infringement on the employee’s right against discharge for filing a workers’ compensation claim, giving rise to a cause of action for wrongful discharge subject to the affirmative defense that the employee was discharged for a just cause.
Shanahan & Scheid (by Clark Shanahan) for the plaintiff.
Cholette, Perkins & Buchanan (by Edward D. Wells) for the defendant.
Amicus Curiae:
Clark, Klein & Beaumont (by Dwight H. Vincent, John F. Burns, and Fred W. Batten) for Michigan Manufacturers Association.

Opinion:
Kavanagh, J.
The issue in this case is whether plaintiff-employee's allegation that he was discharged as a result of an absence from work because of a work-related injury constitutes a cause of action as a public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine.
We hold that plaintiff has not pleaded a public policy exception to the employment-at-will doc-, trine and we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, Clifford v Cactus Drilling Corp, 109 Mich App 776; 312 NW2d 380 (1981), and reinstate the trial court's order of summary judgment in favor of defendant. Accordingly, it is unnecessary to address the question whether this action is barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Worker's Disability Compensation Act, MCL 418.131; MSA 17.237(131).
The facts of this case are adequately stated in the dissenting opinion of Judge R. B. Burns in the Court of Appeals:
"Plaintiff alleged that defendant fired him for missing work. Plaintiff further alleged that defendant had no right to so fire him since his absence from work was due to a disability arising from a work-related injury for which he had received workers' compensation benefits.
"The record reveals that plaintiff was injured on the job on December 20, 1977. He received workers' compensation benefits for a period of five weeks. He returned to work, but a recurrence of the pain caused by the injury forced him to call in sick on February 14, 1978. He was fired the next day. Plaintiff commenced suit, and defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The motion was granted by the trial court."
The employment-at-will doctrine was recently restated by this Court in Suchodolski v Michigan Consolidated Gas Co, 412 Mich 692, 694-695; 316 NW2d 710 (1982): "In general, in the absence of a contractual basis for holding otherwise, either party to an employment contract for an indefinite term may terminate it at any time for any, or no, reason". The Court went on to explain that exceptions have been engrafted onto the rule on the basis of "the principle that some grounds for discharging an employee are so contrary to public policy as to be actionable". One such exception was established by the Court of Appeals in Sventko v Kroger Co, 69 Mich App 644; 245 NW2d 151 (1976). In Sventko, the plaintiff alleged that she was discharged solely in retaliation for her filing of a workers' compensation claim. The Court held that a retaliatory discharge for the filing of a workers' compensation claim is in contravention of public policy and as such constitutes an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine.
We cannot agree, however, that an employee's protection from discharge in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim necessarily includes protection from discharge because of an absence from work because of a work-related injury.
Certainly an employer's power to discharge an employee at will should not prevail when that power is exercised to prevent an employee from asserting his statutory rights under the Worker's Disability Compensation Act. The case before us presented no evidence or reason to infer that plaintiff's statutorily conferred right to. claim workers' disability compensation benefits was chilled in any way. Plaintiff made no claim that he was deprived of his legal rights under the Worker's Disability Compensation Act. Plaintiff did not allege that he was discharged in retaliation for filing a claim for compensation. Plaintiff alleged that he was fired because he missed work because of a work-related injury for which he had already received workers' disability compensation benefits. Plaintiff has stated that he has no further claim.
Reversed.
Levin, Ryan, Brickley, Cavanagh, and Boyle, JJ., concurred with Kavanagh, J.