Case Name: THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF THE COUNTY OF KINGS, Respondent, v. ANTHONY WALTER, Appellant
Court: New York Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1875-03
Citations: 11 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 87
Docket Number: 
Parties: THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF THE COUNTY OF KINGS, Respondent, v. ANTHONY WALTER, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Supreme Court Reports (Hun)
Volume: 11
Pages: 87–90

Head Matter:
THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF THE COUNTY OF KINGS, Respondent, v. ANTHONY WALTER, Appellant.
Sheriff— statute of limitations— section 2, cha/pter 733 of 1871.
The statute of limitations (one year) for acts done hy a sheriff in his official capacity, and in virtue of his office, or by the omission of an official duty, is not applicable to a cause of action against the sheriff for procuring payment, by means of a sworn bill and false vouchers, for board of fictitious persons who were never confined in the county jail.
Appeal from an order sustaining a demurrer to the defendant’s answer, which alleged that the cause of action did not accrue within one year before the commencement of the action.
The action was brought to recover $24,122.25, alleged to have been obtained from the county by the sheriff thereof, by means of fraudulent accounts and vouchers for the board and confinement of fictitious persons in the county jail.
N. H. Clement, for the appellant.
Section 2, chapter 733, Laws of 1871, applies when recourse can be had to the official bond. (Cumming v. Brown, 43 N. Y., 514.) Its object was to relieve the sheriff’s sureties. (Morris v. Van Voast, 19 Wend., 283; see particularly the revisers’ notes referred to in the above case; Dennison v. Plumb, 18 Barb., 99.) The question then arises on this demurrer: In case the plaintiff recovers judgment against Walter, could recourse be had to the official bond % The form of the bond given by sheriffs is set forth in 2 Revised Statutes, 476, section 1. The bond is given against fraud, deceit or oppression, in those words. A sheriff’s bond has been held liable for moneys collected for militia fines, and not paid over; for. embezzlement of county moneys. (People v. Brush, 6 Wend., 454.) The moneys claimed are the excess of bills alleged to be fraudulent. The portion of bills paid which are admitted to be correct were paid to the sheriff virtute officii. They are paid to the sheriff as such by virtue of the statute, and not to him individually. “Acts done virtute officii are where they are within the authority of the officer, but in doing which he exercises that authority improperly or abuses the confi dence which the law reposes in him ; while acts done colore ,officii are where they are of such a nature that his office gives him no authority to do them.” (The People v. Schuyler, 4 Comst., 187; Seely v. Birdsall, 15 Johns., 267.) The case of Elliott v. Cronk’s Administrators (13 Wend., 35), has no application to this suit. That decision was on the express ground that the sheriff had done no affirmative act. Another test: Will the defendant, if successful in this case, be entitled to double costs ? (2 R. S., 617, § 24.) If these acts charged are acts virtute officii, he would be. (Burhans’ Executors v. Blanchard, 1 Denio, 626.) A justice, sued for malicious prosecution: held, that he was sued for an act done by virtue of his office. (Row v. Sherwood, 6 Johns., 107.) If a malicious act is committed vvrtwte officiÁ, is not a fraudulent one also committed by virtue of office %
Winchester Britton, for the respondent.
This statute was passed with a view of fixing a limit of time to the liability of sheriffs’ official bail, and has been construed to include acts of the sheriff for which such bail are liable, and such acts only. (Dennison v. Plumb, 18 Barb., 89-98; Cumming v. Brown, 43 N. Y., 514; Parton v. Williams, 3 B. & A., 330; Morris v. Van Voast, 19 Wend., 283.) The bail are liable for acts virtute officii, not colore officii. (18 Barb., 89, ante ; Alcock v. Andrews, 2 Espinasse, 542, note; Golden v. Elphinck, 4 Exch., 445; 3 Fisher’s Digest, 5494.) Where levy is made without process, it is colore officii, not virtute officii, which former is defined to be when his office gives him no authority to do an act. (People v. Schuyler, 4 Comst., 180 ; Seeley v. Birdsall, 15 Johns., 267.) Vvrtwte officii is defined to be when the officer is acting under color of his office, intending in good faith to perform a proper official act. (Straight v. Gee, 2 Starkie, 445.) The words of the bond cannot be extended beyond nonfeasance or misfeasance in respect to acts which by law he is required to perform as sheriff. (Ex parte Reed, 4 Hill, 573 ; approved, 4 Comst., 179.) Where the duty exists, and it is neglected or performed in an improper manner, the sureties are liable, otherwise not. (4 Comst., 180; 1 R. S., 876, § 162; 1 Crocker on Sheriffs, § 884; Governor v. Hancock, 2 Ala., 728, cited 4 Comst, 177.) In short, the statute under discussion applies to such acts of the sheriff as are performed in the discharge of his duty as a public officer, or to the omission of some act required of him by his duty as such officer.

Opinion:
Barnard, P. J.:
I do not think that the liability sought to be enforced in this action, is the result of an act done by the defendant as sheriff in his official capacity, and by virtue of his office. The defendant was sheriff, and, as such, had the official duty to board the prisoners in the jail; but the allegation is,- that the defendant, by means of a sworn bill and false vouchers, procured payment for boarding fictitious prisoners, " persons who were never committed to, received, or confined in, boarded at, or discharged from said jail." It is a fraud of the gravest description, and one which procured a large sum of money, $24,122.25, from the public treasury. The short statute of limitation (one year) for acts honestly done by sheriffs by virtue of their office, could not have been intended to cover up such a case. Order affirmed, with costs.