Case Name: Staley Eugene BARRENTINE, Appellant, v. John Joseph MAKELY and Nationwide Insurance Company, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1981-12-04
Citations: 406 So. 2d 1237
Docket Number: No. 80-1746
Parties: Staley Eugene BARRENTINE, Appellant, v. John Joseph MAKELY and Nationwide Insurance Company, Appellees.
Judges: SCHEB, C. J., and BOARDMAN, J., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 406
Pages: 1237–1238

Head Matter:
Staley Eugene BARRENTINE, Appellant, v. John Joseph MAKELY and Nationwide Insurance Company, Appellees.
No. 80-1746.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Dec. 4, 1981.
J. Bert Grandoff and Victor J. Pellegrino of Yado, Keel, Nelson, Grandoff, Casper, Bergmann & Newcomer, P. A., Tampa, for appellant.
Barbara J. Paulson and Larry I. Gramo-vot of Fowler, White, Gillen, Boggs, Villareal & Banker, P. A., Tampa, for appellees.

Opinion:
OTT, Judge.
It is now settled in this state that the results of a chemical test for the pres ence of alcohol in the blood of a suspect, administered under section 322.261(l)(a), Florida Statutes (1975), are admissible into evidence if the suspect consented to the test. Such consent may be express or implied, but an implied consent affirmatively withdrawn before the test is administered is insufficient. Sambrine v. State, 386 So.2d 546 (Fla.1980).
In the instant case appellee freely consented to a blood test following a vehicle accident. The results of that test were therefore admissible in this personal injury action unless barred by section 316.066(4), Florida Statutes (1971) (formerly section 317.171). Under that statute the results of a lawful blood alcohol test are inadmissible only if the test was ordered for the purpose of preparing, and the results thereof formed a basis for, the traffic accident report required by section 316.066(3). State v. Mitchell, 245 So.2d 618, 623[3, 4] (Fla.1971).
Under the evidence presented to the trial court it is quite clear that the blood alcohol test was made and its results obtained solely in connection with possible criminal charges. The investigating officer affirmatively testified that neither the test nor its results were necessary to his accident report, albeit they were appended thereto as a subsequent supplement.
We therefore REVERSE the summary judgment of the trial court and REMAND for further proceedings.
SCHEB, C. J., and BOARDMAN, J., concur.