Case Name: White v. Evansville American Legion Home Association
Court: Supreme Court of Indiana
Jurisdiction: Indiana
Decision Date: 1965-10-15
Citations: 247 Ind. 69
Docket Number: No. 30,852
Parties: White v. Evansville American Legion Home Association.
Judges: 
Reporter: Indiana Reports
Volume: 247
Pages: 69–77

Head Matter:
White v. Evansville American Legion Home Association.
[No. 30,852.
Filed October 15, 1965.
Rehearing denied November 22, 1965.]
John H. Jennings and Harold M. Wilson, Jr., of Evansville, for appellant.
Bamberger, Foreman, Osioald and Hahn, of Evansville, for appellee.

Opinion:
Landis, J.
This cause reaches us on petition to transfer from the Appellate Court pursuant to Rule 2-23, the Appellate Court's opinion appearing in 207 N. E. 2d 820.
Appellant brought suit in the trial court for damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained as a result of appellee's negligence in furnishing appellant a defective chair in ap-pellee's amusement hall.
The questions presented on this appeal grow out of the trial before a jury upon the second paragraph of appellant's complaint and the answers thereto filed, which resulted in a verdict and judgment for appellee-defendant.
Among the errors urged in the motion for new trial, the overruling of which is assigned as error on this appeal, are the giving of numerous instructions, two of which will have our particular attention on this appeal.
Appellant contends error was committed in the giving over objection of instruction No. 5 which was as follows:
"The law recognizes the possibility of a mere accident, that is, an occurrence which is no way due to the negligence of any one. Therefore, if you find from the evidence that the injuries complained of by the plaintiff in this case were the result of a mere accident, there can be no recovery by the plaintiff Anna Mary White."
In our recent opinion in the case of Miller v. Alvey (1965), 246 Ind. page 560, 207 N. E. 2d 633, we had before us an instruction on pure accident, the giving of which we held to be reversible error.
It has been argued we held in Miller v. Alvey, supra, that an instruction on "pure accident" or "unavoidable accident" was proper if there was evidence to support such an instruction. That construction is completely at variance with a careful reading of our opinion in which we pointed out that the expressions "pure accident" or "unavoidable accident" had no particular connotation in modern pleading of negligence cases, that such expressions were ambiguous and confusing to lay jurors, their use in instruc tions was undesirable and unwise, and we disapproved any statements in prior decisions which could be construed to the contrary. Consistent with Miller v. Alvey, we must hold it was error for the court to give instruction No. 5.
Appellant has further contended on this appeal the court erred in giving instruction No. 35, which stated as follows, viz:
"You are instructed .that Anna Mary White is the only plaintiff and Evansville American Legion Home Association is the only defendant in this case, and that there is no evidence in this case that there is any other party, plaintiff or defendant, interested in its outcome."
As we further pointed out in Miller v. Alvey, supra, (at p. 568 of 246 Ind., and pp. 637, 638 of 207 N. E. 2d):
'Decisions of this state recognize the rule that in an action for damages growing out,of an automobile accident evidence as to insurance carried by the defendant is ordinarily inadmissible not only because it is irrelevant but because it tends to prejudice the jury against the defendant. See: Martin v. Lilly (1919), 188 Ind. 139, 146, 121 N. E. 443, 445; Flamion v. Dawes (1929), 91 Ind. App. 394, 400, 169 N. E. 60, 62; See also: City of Terre Haute v. Deckard (1962), 243 Ind. 289, 295, 183 N. E. 2d 815, 818.
"Conversely, evidence as to the failure of the defendant to carry insurance is likewise generally inadmissible on the ground of irrelevancy and as improperly tending to arouse sympathy for a defendant that he would personally have to pay the amount of any verdict the jury might return.
"Similarly, instructions which call to the jury's attention these improper matters are likewise objectionable. Instruction No. 9 given at defendant-appellee's request telling the jury that the plaintiff and the defendant were the only parties and that no one but such parties were interested in the outcome of the case is not to be commended as it was an apparent attempt to indicate to the jury that the defendant did not carry liability insurance, or the fact of insurance would have been proved by evidence introduced, when this matter was certainly not a proper or relevant issue for their consideration."
It follows therefore that it was error for the court to give instruction No. 35.
The appellant has further argued strenuously that the additional forty-three instructions tendered by appellee were so numerous and voluminous that appellant's attorney could not carefully study each of them with sufficient detail to detect all the errors therein and that it was physically impossible for the court to do so without unduly delaying and impeding the trial of the cause. The court gave in all thirty-nine instructions. We must concede that there comes a time in the tendering of instructions when their mere magnitude reaches a point beyond reason. Without fixing a limitation as to what is reasonable, we must point out that sheer numbers of tendered instructions will at times make it physically impossible for opposing attorneys or the court to perform their duty in the examination of such instructions. When that point is reached, the answer may be that this Court will not require, under such a situation, that specific objections be made to each of such tendered instructions because of the impossibility, and hold that the trial court may refuse to give such tendered instructions in its discretion when they become so numerous.
We refer to Emry v. Beaver (1922), 192 Ind. 471, 475, 137 N. E. 55, 56, wherein it was stated:
"Appellants claim other errors in instructions than the one to which we have referred. We are reversing on the first and most apparent error in these instructions and have not investigated the other claimed errors, because the mistakes, if there are any, will probably not occur on retrial. The instructions are too voluminous and should be limited. The court gave in all forty-five instructions, which covered twenty-seven pages of printed brief. It is hardly possible to avoid error where instructions are so prolix. Such extended instructions lead to needless repetition. This has been repeatedly condemned. Robbins, Exr., v. Fugit, supra, and cases there cited.
"The judgment is reversed, with instructions to sustain appellants' motion for a new trial."
Appellant further claims that the jury was "brain-washed" by the giving of a large number of mandatory instructions to return a verdict for the appellee. In this case the court told the jury eighteen different times, in substance, that the plaintiff could not recover or that their verdict should be for the defendant in certain events.
Mandatory instructions are not the best type of instructions to give to- a jury. The jury can very easily conclude that the trial judge, for whom a jury has a great deal of respect, is urging them repeatedly to return a verdict for one of the parties. It has been said in Baker v. Thompson (1949), 337 Ill. App. 327, 335, 85 N. E. 2d 924, 927:
" When the court tells them repeatedly that 'the plaintiff cannot recover' or that 'they must find the defendant not guilty,' the jury may believe that the court is of the opinion that the verdict should be for the defendant. No one coming into our courts for redress of wrongs done them should be required to bear the onus of this disadvantage.
"In view of the foregoing, it is our opinion that the plaintiff-appellant is entitled to a new trial.
"Judgment reversed and remanded." (Our emphasis.)
See also: Bean v. Gorby (1956), 80 Ariz. 25, 28, 292 P. 2d 199, 201; Alexander v. Sullivan (1948), 334 Ill. App. 42, 45, 78 N. E. 2d 333, 335; Vance v. Wells (1959), 129 Ind. App. 659, 666, 159 N. E. 2d 586, 589.
It is our opinion that a court should reluctantly give a mandatory instruction and the tendering of such instructions by a party should be avoided. Where an instruction may be framed to state or cover the principle of law without the mandatory language therein to return a verdict for one or the other of the parties, it is not error for a trial court to refuse such a tendered mandatory instruction. We need not pass specifically upon these instructions in this case for the reason that this appeal is reversed upon the points stated previously. However, we make the foregoing observations for the guidance of the trial court and the litigants in the hope that these questions may to a large extent be eliminated by the use of discretion in the trial below.
It is not necessary to discuss the remaining contentions of error, as they are not likely to arise on a retrial.
Judgment reversed with instructions to sustain the motion for new trial.
Myers, and Arterburn, JJ., concur. Achor, J., concurs in result. Jackson, C. J., dissents with opinion following.