Case Name: PEOPLE ex rel. WHITMAN, Dist. Atty., v. WOODWARD, Justice of Supreme Court, et al.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1912-04-04
Citations: 134 N.Y.S. 910
Docket Number: 
Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. WHITMAN, Dist. Atty., v. WOODWARD, Justice of Supreme Court, et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 134
Pages: 910–912

Head Matter:
PEOPLE ex rel. WHITMAN, Dist. Atty., v. WOODWARD, Justice of Supreme Court, et al.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
April 4, 1912.)
Prohibition (§ 16 )—Jurisdiction—“Term ox the Appellate Division”— “In Session.”
An alternative writ of prohibition was issued March 29, 1912, by the Appellate Division for the First Department on application to enjoin a special proceeding pending in the Second Department, on which day the Appellate Division for that department, before adjournment of the March term, but in recess, handed down decisions, and on which day its judges were in attendance at the courthouse and ready to assemble as a court to attend to any business presented. Code Civ. Proc. § 2093, provides that a writ of prohibition issued by an Appellate Division can be granted only at a “term of the Appellate Division” of the judicial department embracing the county wherein the special proceeding is brought, in which the matter to be prohibited originated, unless a term of the Appellate Division of said department is not “in session,” when it may be granted by the Appellate Division in an adjoining judicial department. Held, that the Appellate Division for the Second Department was “in session” when the alternative writ was issued, and that the Appellate Division of the First Department was without jurisdiction.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Prohibition, Cent. Dig. §§ 64, 65; Dec. Dig. § 16.»
For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 4, p. 3484.]
Laughlin, J., dissenting in part.
Application by Charles S. Whitman, District Attorney for the County of New York, for an absolute writ of prohibition to restrain further hearing upon a writ of habeas corpus issued in the County of Kings and returnable in that county, to inquire into the cause of the restraint of Charles H. Hyde, imprisoned and restrained of his liberty in the county jail of the County of New York on an indictment for a felony. Writ dismissed.
Argued before INGRAHAM, P. J., and LAUGHLIN, MILLER, SCOTT, and DOWLING, JJ.
Robert S. Johnstone, for relator.
Frederic R. Coudert, for defendant Woodward.
Max D. Steuer, for defendant Hyde.
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
This is an application for an absolute writ of prohibition to restrain Mr. Justice Woodward, a Justice of the Supreme Court, from proceeding further with the hearing upon a writ of habeas corpus issued by him in the county of Kings, and made returnable in said county, to inquire into the cause of the restraint of Charles H. Hyde, imprisoned and restrained of his liberty in the county jail of the county of New York upon an indictment for a felony.
The Code of Civil Procedure (section 2093) provides that a writ of prohibition issued by an Appellate Division can be granted only at a term of the Appellate Division of the judicial department embracing the county wherein the action is triable or the special proceed ing is brought, in the course of which the matter sought to be prohibited by the writ priginated, unless a term of the Appellate Division of said department is not in session, in which case it may be granted at a term of an Appellate Division in an adjoining judicial department.
The special proceeding sought to be enjoined is that arising upon a writ of habeas corpus issued by Justice Woodward, and it originated and is pending in the county of Kings, which is in the Second Department. The jurisdiction of the Appellate Division in this department is therefore dependent upon the question whether or not a term of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court for the Second Department was in session when the alternative writ was granted herein.
The petition upon which the alternative writ was granted stated upon information derived from a publication in the New York Law Journal that the Appellate Division in the Second Department was not then in session. Mr. Justice Woodward files a return and states as a matter of fact:
"That at the time the alternative writ of prohibition herein was ordered and issued, to wit, on the 29th day of March, 1912, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court for the Second Judicial Department was in session."
This statement is confirmed by a stipulation signed and submitted by the district attorney and Mr. Justice Woodward, to the effect that the March term of said Appellate Division had not been closed or adjourned, but was in existence as a term on March 29, 1912; that on March 21, 1912, the court ordered a recess; that on March 29, 1912, the court handed down decisions; that on March 29th five justices of said Appellate Division were present together in the chambers adjoining the courtroom, but did not go upon the bench, although they were at all times in readiness as a court to attend to any application or other court business presented. The, jurisdiction of this court depends upon the fact that a "term of the Appellate Division" of the Second Department was not in session on the 29th day of March. It is conceded that the March term of the court had not adjourned; but the court had taken a recess, and the justices of the court were in attendance at the courthouse in "readiness as a court to attend to any application or other court business presented." We think that the "term of the court" was in session, and that this application should have been made to that court.
For this reason, and without expressing an opinion upon any other question which has been argued at the bar, the writ must be dismissed.