Case Name: Samuel M. TUZ, Petitioner, v. EDWARD M. CHADBOURNE, INC., a Florida Corporation, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1975-02-12
Citations: 310 So. 2d 8
Docket Number: No. 45216
Parties: Samuel M. TUZ, Petitioner, v. EDWARD M. CHADBOURNE, INC., a Florida Corporation, Respondent.
Judges: ADKINS, C. J., and ROBERTS, BOYD, McCAIN and OVERTON, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 310
Pages: 8–12

Head Matter:
Samuel M. TUZ, Petitioner, v. EDWARD M. CHADBOURNE, INC., a Florida Corporation, Respondent.
No. 45216.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Feb. 12, 1975.
Rehearing Denied April 17, 1975.
R. P. Warfield of Levin, Warfield, Mid-dlebrooks, Graff, Mabie, Rosenbloum & Magie, Pensacola, for petitioner.
Robert P. Gaines of Beggs, Lane, Daniel, Gaines & Davis, Pensacola, for respondent.

Opinion:
COE, HARRY LEE, III, Circuit Judge:
This cause arose in March of 1969 when petitioner's automobile collided with a caterpillar road grader which was parked on the edge of a dead-end street which was owned and maintained by respondent. As a result of the collision, petitioner was injured, and his guest passenger, Burmeister, was killed. In the trial court, Burmeister's widow brought an action against both petitioner and respondent to recover damages for the wrongful death of Burmeister. The jury returned a verdict against both defendants in the trial court. Both defendants appealed to the First District Court of Appeal, Tuz v. Burmeister, 254 So.2d 569 (Fla.App. 1st 1971). The First District affirmed the finding of gross negligence as to petitioner Tuz, but reversed that part of the verdict finding respondent Chadbourne liable for damages. It found, as a matter of law, respondent Chadbourne was not guilty of negligence that was a proximate cause of the collision. The First District further held that there was no reason for Chadbourne to anticipate that anyone would drive in the manner that Tuz drove and that serious injury or death would have resulted even had the road grading equipment not been where it was.
Subsequent to Burmeister's widow's action against petitioner and respondent, petitioner Tuz instituted a suit against respondent Chadbourne seeking money damages for personal injuries received by Tuz as a result of the collision. It was alleged by Tuz that Chadbourne was negligent in leaving the road grader unlighted and unattended and failing to erect barricades and provide adequate warnings for dangerous conditions on the roadway. Respondent Chadbourne moved for summary judgment alleging estoppel by judgment as grounds therefor. The trial court enters its final summary judgment in favor of re spondent Chadbourne finding that Tuz was estopped by the judgment entered in the Tuz v. Burmeister case. Tuz appealed the judgment to the First District which in turn affirmed the trial court ruling. Tuz v. Edward M. Chadbourne, Inc., 290 So.2d 547 (Fla.App. 1st 1974). Petitioner Tuz sought a writ of certiorari in this Court alleging that the instant case was in direct conflict with the decision of this Court in the case of Youngblood v. Taylor, 89 So.2d 503 (Fla.1956). This Court granted tenta-. tive certiorari.
In Youngblood, Marvin Youngblood, the son of appellant Youngblood, while riding his bicycle was struck by a motor car driven by appellee Taylor. Initially, appellant brought suit as father and next friend of his minor son for his son's injuries which action resulted in judgment for the defendant, appellee. The father then brought an action on his own behalf for damages which he sustained from his son's injuries.
This Court determined that the parties for the first suit were not the same as the parties for the second suit in view of the fact that the first action was brought by the father on behalf of the son as a next friend and this Court stated that a next friend is not a party to an action but rather an officer of the court specially appearing to look after the interests of the minor whom he represents.
In Tuz, the petitioner Tuz was a party to the original suit filed in the trial court, while in Youngblood the appellant was not a party to the original suit filed in the trial court. In Youngblood this Court specifically held that the parties were not identical and the First District properly held in the case of Tuz that the parties were identical.
The cases cited by petitioner are factually distinguishable. Therefore we find no conflict and consequently have no jurisdiction. Even though we are without jurisdiction, this Court's position regarding this important question should be discussed.
In Gordon v. Gordon, 59 So.2d 40 (Fla.1952), we stated that in estoppel by judgment two causes of action might be different and the judgment or decree in the first would only estop the "parties from litigating in the second suit issues— that is to say points and questions — common to both causes of action and which were actually adjudicated in the prior litigation." 59 So.2d at 44. The instant suit is just such a situation.
The First District correctly held that the issue of respondent Chadbourne's negligence, having been litigated and determined in a prior case, not be litigated again, that the doctrine of estoppel by judgment operated to preclude petitioner Tuz from doing so.
Nothing we have said in this decision alters our stated opinion in Youngblood which follows:
"To illustrate, if two persons wholly unrelated are passengers in a motorcar that becomes involved in an accident, only one set of circumstances arises as a basis for recovery. But it does not follow that there is but one cause of action for each of the injured persons has the right to sue and the action of one is not determined by the adjudication ¿of the action of the other."
We should add to the above taken from Youngblood, "so long as. the person was not a party to an earlier action that involved points and questions common to both causes of action and which were actually adjudicated."
Accordingly, the writ of certiorari was improvidently issued and is therefore
Discharged.
ADKINS, C. J., and ROBERTS, BOYD, McCAIN and OVERTON, JJ., concur.
ERVIN (Retired), J., dissents with opinion.