Case Name: WESTSIDE LUMBER AND SUPPLY CO., INC. v. PARISH OF JEFFERSON and the Parish Council of Jefferson Parish
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1978-04-11
Citations: 357 So. 2d 1384
Docket Number: No. 9424
Parties: WESTSIDE LUMBER AND SUPPLY CO., INC. v. PARISH OF JEFFERSON and the Parish Council of Jefferson Parish.
Judges: Before REDMANN, BEER and BAILES, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 357
Pages: 1384–1386

Head Matter:
WESTSIDE LUMBER AND SUPPLY CO., INC. v. PARISH OF JEFFERSON and the Parish Council of Jefferson Parish.
No. 9424.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
April 11, 1978.
Rehearing Denied May 10, 1978.
Lester J. Waldmann, New Orleans, for relator.
Craig J. Cimo, Gretna, for respondent.
Before REDMANN, BEER and BAILES, JJ.

Opinion:
REDMANN, Judge.
We granted certiorari to review, and we now reverse, a ruling that evidence to show arbitrariness of a parish zoning ordinance (and its consequent unenforceability) is inadmissible in a district court proceeding unless the evidence was presented' before the parochial legislative authority in an effort to have that authority amend the ordinance to cure the arbitrary provision.
The trial judge reasoned that:
the function of . the District Court, in reviewing the decision of the Parish Council . . . and in reviewing the decision of any board — administrative board or boards of adjustment — is simply to determine whether or not the board acted arbitrarily . . ., and whether or not the decision of the board is supported by substantial and competent evidence adduced in proceedings which are regular and orderly.
That reasoning does not distinguish between legislative and quasi-judicial decisions.
In a different factual context, the question before us has been impliedly decided by Meyers v. City of Baton Rouge, La.App. 1 Cir. 1966, 185 So.2d 278. There opponents of a zoning change enacted by a city council argued that the trial court erred in admitting evidence that supported the change but had not been presented to the council. The argument was that the zoning was arbitrary because evidence before the council was insufficient to support the council's decision to enact the zoning change. Meyers held the evidence properly admitted, reasoning that the question is whether the legislative action is arbitrary, and that accordingly any evidence tending to answer that question is admissible.
Here the offer of evidence is to show arbitrariness, while in Meyers it was to show non-arbitrariness, but the issue is the same in both cases: is the governing authority's legislation arbitrary, and therefore a taking of property without due process of law? Whether a litigant opposes or supports the legislative action, he must in either case be allowed to submit evidence of the correctness of his position. The offered evidence is admissible insofar as relevant.
Reversed.
. In any case, when the court does review a Jefferson parish board of adjustment decision, the enabling statute expressly provides for the hearing of additional evidence; La.Acts 1954, No. 537, § 7.