Case Name: Ernest Lee MILLER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1982-03-25
Citations: 415 So. 2d 1262
Docket Number: No. 58795
Parties: Ernest Lee MILLER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: SUNDBERG, C. J., and ADKINS, BOYD and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 415
Pages: 1262–1264

Head Matter:
Ernest Lee MILLER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 58795.
Supreme Court of Florida.
March 25, 1982.
Rehearing Denied July 22, 1982.
Larry S. Hersch of Waller & Hersch, Dade City, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Michael J. Kotler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appel-lee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Ernest Miller appeals his conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death. We have jurisdiction and affirm both the conviction and sentence.
A grand jury indicted Miller and his stepbrother William Jent for the death of a young woman known only as "Tammy." The trial court severed their cases for trial, but all their pre- and post-trial proceedings were combined. Their respective juries convicted each defendant of first-degree murder as charged, but Miller's jury recommended life imprisonment while Jent's recommended a sentence of death. In a combined sentencing order the trial court im posed the death penalty on both Miller and Jent.
Miller urges nine points on appeal; six of these points are identical to points raised in Jent v. State, 408 So.2d 1024 (Fla.1981), and have been decided adversely to Miller's contentions in Jent. Even though Miller and Jent had separate trials, Jent disposes of Miller's arguments regarding the evidence presented at his trial. With the exception of two witnesses who testified at only one trial each, the same persons testified substantially the same at both trials. On reviewing the instant record, we find Miller's conviction supported by competent substantial evidence.
Miller urges that the trial court erred in failing to suppress a statement which Miller made to Jent while in jail awaiting trial. While listening to a radio newscast about a man who had confessed to several murders, Miller asked Jent if he thought that person had "confessed to the one we did." A cellmate, lying on his bunk reading a book, overheard Miller's question and, after a suppression hearing, testified to this episode at trial.
The cellmate had acted as an informant for the sheriff's department in several drug cases and had spoken with the lead investigator of the instant homicide sometime before Miller made his incriminating statement. This, claims Miller, made the cellmate an agent of the state, requiring reversal of his conviction under United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 100 S.Ct. 2183, 65 L.Ed.2d 115 (1980), and Malone v. State, 390 So.2d 338 (Fla.1980). We disagree.
Both the cellmate and the detectives who interviewed him testified that he was instructed not to draw Miller or Jent into talking about the charges against them. There is no evidence in the record to show that the cellmate occupied a position of trust regarding Miller. Likewise, there is no evidence that the cellmate "deliberately used his position to secure incriminating information." 447 U.S. at 270, 100 S.Ct. at 2186. Unlike in Malone, Miller's comment was not "directly elicited by the State's stratagem deliberately designed to elicit an incriminating statement." 390 So.2d at 339. We find that the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress and properly allowed the cellmate's testimony into evidence.
Miller's final arguments are that the trial court improperly limited the consideration of mitigating evidence and that the court erred in overriding the jury's recommendation of life imprisonment. The trial court gave the standard instruction on aggravating and mitigating circumstances, which this Court recently upheld against the same claim of unconstitutionality as made in this appeal. Peek v. State, 395 So.2d 492 (Fla.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 964, 101 S.Ct. 2036, 68 L.Ed.2d 342 (1981). We therefore find no merit to Miller's claim of impropriety regarding the sentencing instructions. Additionally, we do not find reversible error in the trial court's failing to allow Miller's psychologist to testify as to Miller's rehabilitative capacity. The effectiveness of the psychologist's testimony, even without the complained-of omission, is evidenced by the jury's recommendation of life imprisonment.
In his sentencing order the trial court found no substantive difference between Miller and Jent in their participation in the crime. Notwithstanding the jury's recommendation, he found that Miller clearly deserved the death penalty. Mindful of the constitutional demand that the death penalty must be imposed in a regular, rational, consistent manner, the court also found that following the recommendation of Miller's jury would result in an unwarranted disparity in sentences. He therefore sentenced both defendants to death, finding that the mitigating evidence did not outweigh the evidence proved in aggravation.
The standard set out in Tedder v. State, 322 So.2d 908, 910 (Fla.1975), has been met in this case. On the totality of the circumstances virtually no reasonable person could differ on the appropriateness of the death penalty. See Johnson v. State, 393 So.2d 1069 (Fla.1980). We agree that the disparity in the recommended sentences is not warranted. See Barclay v. State, 343 So.2d 1266 (Fla.1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 892, 99 S.Ct. 249, 58 L.Ed.2d 237 (1978).
Finding no error, we affirm both the conviction and sentence.
It is so ordered.
SUNDBERG, C. J., and ADKINS, BOYD and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur.
McDONALD, J., concurs with conviction and dissents with sentence with an opinion, in which OVERTON, J., concurs.
. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla.Const.
. The facts are set out more fuly in Jent v. State, 408 So.2d 1024 (Fla.1981).
. (1) Denial of access to grand jury testimony; (2) sufficiency of the evidence; (3) failure to grant new trial; (4) "weakness" of the evidence in mitigation; (5) constitutionality of § 921.-141(5)(i); (6) victim's identity.