Case Name: PEOPLE v. STARR
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1996-07-23
Citations: 217 Mich. App. 646
Docket Number: Docket No. 180089
Parties: PEOPLE v STARR
Judges: Before: Doctoroff, C.J., and Michael J. Kelly and Markey, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 217
Pages: 646–652

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v STARR
Docket No. 180089.
Submitted November 14, 1995, at Grand Rapids.
Decided July 23, 1996, at 9:10 A.M.
Leave to appeal sought.
Malcolm R. Starr was convicted by a jury in the Washtenaw Circuit Court, William E Ager, Jr., J., of two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and one count of second-degree criminal sexual conduct. He was sentenced to concurrent sentences of fifteen to thirty-five years for each conviction of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and ten to fifteen years for the conviction of second-degree criminal sexual conduct. He appealed, alleging, in part, that the trial court erred in allowing his half sister to testily regarding uncharged prior criminal sexual conducted the defendant perpetrated on her involving acts similar to those charged in this prosecution.
The Court of Appeals held:
The allegations of similar acts were so horrendously prejudicial as to require their suppression as being more prejudicial than probative. The trial court abused its discretion in permitting the testimony.
Reversed.
Markey, J., dissenting, stated that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the disputed testimony The testimony did not violate MRE 404(b) because it was relevant; it was not offered solely to show the defendant’s criminal propensity or to establish that he acted in conformity with that propensity; it was offered to show scheme, plan, or system in doing an act as well as absence of mistake or accident; and in light of the limiting instruction that the court presented to the jury, the danger of unfair prejudice did not substantially outweigh the probative value of the testimony. The admission of the disputed testimony was not substantially outweighed by a potential for unfair prejudice.
Evidence — Other Acts.
Other acts evidence that is so inflammatory and so prejudicial that its probative value is clearly outweighed should not be admitted under MRE 404(b).
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Brian L. Mackie, Prosecuting Attorney, and David A. King, Senior Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Daniel J. Rust, for the defendant.
Before: Doctoroff, C.J., and Michael J. Kelly and Markey, JJ.

Opinion:
Michael J. Kelly, J.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b; MSA 28.788(2), and one count of second-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520c; MSA 28.788(3). Defendant received concurrent sentences of fifteen to thirty-five years for each conviction of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and ten to fifteen years for the conviction of second-degree criminal sexual conduct. Defendant appeals as of right and we reverse.
The prosecution made a pretrial motion to admit testimony by defendant's half sister regarding uncharged prior criminal sexual conduct perpetrated upon her involving acts similar to those charged in this prosecution. The victim here was defendant's stepdaughter, nine years old at trial, and less than seven when the sexual abuse took place. The accusations were not made until two years after the events. The motion revealed that the half sister would testify about innumerable sexual acts including "rape" having been inflicted upon her by defendant over a period when she was age four to age thirteen (according to defendant-appellant's brief), or when she was age three to adult (according to the prosecutor's brief). We conclude that these allegations of similar acts were so horrendously prejudicial as to require their suppression as being more prejudicial than probative. This was not a skunk in the jury box. It was a pig farm. No trier of fact could have been unswayed by the depiction of this depravity in assessing discrete claims of the "bad man's" guilt. We decry permitting the effect of this testimony under any rubric, including an instruction by the court that the prior acts were introduced in accordance with MRE 404(b)(1) for purposes of establishing a scheme or plan, or absence of accident or mistake.
Due process is the constitutional guarantee of federal and state government that crimes charged against the most hateful among us are entitled to be indicted, examined, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Otherwise we have given in to prosecutorial tyranny. The effect here was to try the defendant for uncharged criminal acts of monstrous repugnance without the bother of due process. The trial court abused its discretion in permitting the testimony. People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52; 508 NW2d 114 (1993). The prosecution's argument that because of defendant's general denial all elements of the offenses were at issue is correct under VanderVliet, but the situation surrounding the alleged contacts was so inflammatory and so prejudicial that the probative value was clearly outweighed.
Reversed.
Doctoroff, C.J., concurred.