Case Name: Christi VEAZEY v. ELMWOOD PLANTATION ASSOCIATES, LTD. and Southmark Management Corporation
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1994-11-30
Citations: 650 So. 2d 712
Docket Number: No. 93-C-2818
Parties: Christi VEAZEY v. ELMWOOD PLANTATION ASSOCIATES, LTD. and Southmark Management Corporation.
Judges: WATSON, J., joins the opinion and adds additional reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 650
Pages: 712–737

Head Matter:
Christi VEAZEY v. ELMWOOD PLANTATION ASSOCIATES, LTD. and Southmark Management Corporation.
No. 93-C-2818.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Nov. 30, 1994.
Rehearing Denied March 24, 1995.
Opinions Concurring in Denial of Rehearing filed March 24, 1995.
Wanda T. Anderson-Tate, Metairie, for applicant.
Jacob J. Amato, Jr., Lisa A. Dunn, Amato & Creely, Gretna, for respondent.
Lawrence S. Kullman, New Orleans, J.J. McKeman, Baton Rouge, for amicus curiae La. Trial Lawyers Ass’n.

Opinion:
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
| iKIMBALL, Justice.
In June, 1988, Christi Veazey leased an apartment in the Elmwood Plantation Apartments complex in Metairie, Louisiana, from Tonti Management Corporation ("Tonti"). About two weeks later, the complex was sold and Southmark Management Corporation ("Southmark") assumed management of the complex. At approximately 1:45 a.m., on October 3, 1988, an intruder entered plaintiffs second-story apartment through her bedroom window and raped her. Plaintiff was unable to identify the rapist, and the rapist's identity remains unknown.
In November, 1988, Christi Veazey commenced the instant action in negligence against Southmark. Plaintiffs allegations regarding Southmark's negligence can be grouped into two categories: (1) misrepresenting the amount of security at the complex and the number of past criminal acts occurring on the complex premises, and (2) furnishing inadequate security. As to the misrepresentations, plaintiff alleged that management represented to her and to her mother that Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office deputies lived on the premises and provided security and that, with the exception of a burglary that occurred a few years earlier, no criminal offenses had been reported to management as having been committed on the complex premises. The truth, |2plaintiff alleged, was the security officers were only convenience officers who had no responsibility for protecting the residents, and management was aware that other rapes or attempted rapes had been committed on the complex premises over the past year. As to the inadequacy of security, plaintiff alleged that Southmark failed to provide adequate locks on the windows, failed to maintain the premises so as to discourage potential intruders, and failed to provide adequate lighting. With regard to the latter, plaintiff further alleged that she had complained to management about the lighting in general, and about the non-functioning pool lights, in particular.
Southmark answered plaintiff's complaint generally denying all of plaintiff's allegations. Southmark also filed a third-party demand against Tonti, who had leased the apartment to plaintiff. Tonti responded by filing a motion for summary judgment. While the trial court denied Tonti's motion, the court of appeal granted writs, finding that Tonti was entitled to summary judgment. Tonti was thus dismissed from the suit, and the case proceeded to trial solely against Southmark. At the close of the four-day jury trial, South-mark requested, pursuant to La.Code Civ. Pro. art. 1812(C)(2), that the trial court sub mit a special interrogatory so as to permit the allocation of fault to the nonparty rapist. The trial court denied Southmark's request as well as its motion for a continuance to seek emergency writs on the issue.
The jury returned a verdict itemizing plaintiffs damages as follows: $150,000 in general damages and $30,000 in special damages, for a total damage award of $180,000. The jury, however, returned an inconsistent verdict on liability. Specifically, the jury responded to interrogatory # 1 that defendant Southmark was at fault, to interrogatory # 2 that plaintiff Christi Veazey was free from fault, and to interrogatory #3 that Southmark was 60% at fault and ^plaintiff was 40% at fault. The trial court, nonetheless, entered judgment adopting the verdict of the jury as the judgment of the court, assessing 40% fault to plaintiff and 60% fault to defendant. Plaintiff filed a motion for clarification and, in the alternative, motions for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict ("JNOV") and new trial. The trial court granted both the motions for clarification and JNOV, reallocating all of the fault to Southmark and finding it liable for the entire $180,000 damage award.
Affirming, the court of appeal found that while the trial court's granting of the motion for clarification was improper, its granting of the JNOV was proper. Veazey v. Elmwood Plantation Associates, Ltd. and Southmark Management Corp., 625 So.2d 675 (La.App. 5th Cir.1993). No error exists, the court of appeal reasoned, simply because the judgment was styled a clarification and a JNOV, as in substance "the judgment [took] on the legal posture of a JNOV and nothing more." Id. at 681. The court of appeal further reasoned that because "the record [was] devoid of any facts that would support finding Christi Veazey at fault for her own rape," the granting of the JNOV, which reallocated all of the fault to Southmark, was not manifestly erroneous. Id. at 680-81.
hThe court of appeal also found no reversible error in the trial court's refusal to submit a special interrogatory to the jury for allocation of fault to the nonparty rapist. In support of its finding, the court of appeal cited the following two rationales: (1) the wide discretion La.Code Civ.Pro. art. 1812 affords the trial court in determining whether to submit such an interrogatory; and (2) the jurisprudential "mandates" that denying a requested jury charge is reversible error only if it results in the jury being misled to such an extent as to prevent it from doing justice. Applying both rationales, the court of appeal concluded that "after careful review, we can only say the trial court did not commit reversible error because of the wide discretion granted by our statutory scheme, and, more importantly, we conclude the trial court's action did not cause the jury to be misled to such an extent as to prevent it from doing justice." Id. at 679. In reaching that result, however, the court of appeal also concluded, based on its "exhaustive search of suggested guidelines," that "it is permissible to assess fault between intentional and negligent tortfeasors." Id.
On Southmark's application, we granted certiorari to consider the correctness of the court of appeal's decision. Christi Veazey v. Elmwood Plantation Associates, Ltd. and Southmark Management Corporation, 93-2818 (La. 2/4/94), 633 So.2d 168.
ISSUE
While Southmark contends that the lower courts erred in finding it at fault and in holding it liable for plaintiffs damages which resulted from the rapist's intentional criminal acts, we have reviewed the record and find substantial evidence supporting the finding that the management of the apartment complex misrepresented to plaintiff the security afforded at the complex, that window locks were inadequate, that lighting was poor and that security provided by the complex was substandard. Therefore, the finding of fault on the part of Southmark, which was a contributing cause of plaintiffs damages, is not manifestly erroneous.
As such, the only issues we consider herein are whether the fault of an intentional tort-feasor and a negligent tortfeasor: (1) can; and (2) should, be compared by the finder of fact.
JsLAW
The issues of whether Louisiana comparative fault principles can and, if so, should apply when the fault of both an intentional tortfeasor and a negligent tortfeasor contributes to the same damages are significant issues of first impression in this Court. The Louisiana comparative fault law was enacted by Act 431 of 1979 (effective August 1,1980), and thus governs the instant ease. Act 431 ushered into Louisiana a comparative fault system by amending and re-enacting La.C.C. articles 2103, 2323 and 2324. To adjust procedurally for those substantive changes in the Civil Code provisions, Act 431 also amended and re-enacted La.Code Civ.Pro. arts. 1811 and 1917. These provisions of the comparative fault law all share a common characteristic; "[they all] use the term 'fault' when referring to tortfeasor conduct and 'negligence' when referring to victim conduct." D. Robertson, Ruminations on Comparative Fault, Duty-Risk Analysis, Affirmative Defenses, and Defensive Doctrines in Negligence and Strict Liability Litigation in Louisiana, 44 La.L.Rev. 1341, 1344 n. 18 (1984) (hereinafter "Ruminations "); Turner v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 476 So.2d 800 (La.1985); M. Plant, Comparative Negligence and Strict Tort Liability, 40 La. L.Rev. 403, 413 (1980) (hereinafter "Plant ").
The significant effects of the comparative fault law on Louisiana tort law were two-fold. First, the comparative fault law eliminated the harsh all-or-nothing doctrine of contributory negligence, which Louisiana had borrowed from the common law. "Consequently, a plaintiff's claim for damages no longer can be barred totally because of his negligence. At most his claim may be reduced in proportion to his fault." Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast, Div. of Ervin Ind., 462 So.2d 166, 170 (La.1985); La.C.C. art. 2323. Second, the comparative fault law altered the rules regarding the relationship between joint tort-feasors, changing the basis for contribution | ¡among them from virile share defined as per head to virile share defined in terms of proportionate fault, La.C.C. arts. 1804, and, by later amendment, limiting solidary liability between them. La.C.C. art. 2324, as amended in 1987. In short, the comparative fault law " 'provide[d] the framework for a comprehensive scheme of loss apportionment in multiple party litigation.' Chamallas, Comparative Fault and the Multiple Party Litigation in Louisiana: A Sampling of the Problems, 40 La.L.Rev. 373 (1981)." Cole v. Celotex Corp., 599 So.2d 1058, 1062 n. 13 (La.1992).
The comprehensive framework provided by the comparative fault law, however, left several major questions unanswered. See Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc., 521 So.2d 1123, 1133 (La.1988) (citing Turner, supra). One of the questions left unanswered is the basic question presented here, i.e., whether comparative fault principles should apply when one tortfeasor acts negligently and another tortfeasor acts intentionally to produce the same damages. D. Robertson, 1 Louisiana Practice Series: The Louisiana Law of Comparative Fault: A Decade of Progress 5 (1991) (hereinafter "Decade of Progress") (noting that this is one of the " 'tough details [the legislature has] left for the courts to decide'; the comparative fault statutes are opaque on this question"). Forecasting this as a "multiparty difficulty" sure to arise for the courts to decide, the same commentator framed the question before us as follows: whether (and, if so, how) "comparative fault assessment [should] work in a case against defendant A in intentional tort and defendant B in negligence." Ruminations, supra at 1343-44 n. 14.
Construing La.C.C. art. 2323, we have held that it adopted the substantive principle of comparative fault and that it left the particulars of its application for the courts to decide. Bell, supra; Turner, supra; Howard, supra. One such particular is the scope of the |7Comparative fault law's application. Speaking to this issue, La.C.C. art. 2323 simply states that comparative fault applies "[w]hen contributory negligence is applicable to a claim for damages." While that limiting language could conceivably be construed as confining comparative fault to negligence eases, we have declined to read it so narrowly. Bell, supra; Turner, supra.
Rejecting such a narrow reading, we reasoned in Turner, supra, that if the legislature had intended to confine the comparative fault law, it could have easily done so; "[o]ne word would have done the job, i.e., 'only when contributory negligence is applicable.' " Turner, 476 So.2d at 804 (emphasis added). Likewise, we reasoned in Bell, supra, that La.C.C. art. 2323 neither "state[s] when the courts shall permit a defense of contributory or comparative negligence to affect a plaintiffs recovery, nor does it prohibit the courts from applying comparative negligence to a claim previously insusceptible to the bar of contributory negligence." Bell, 462 So.2d at 170. In sum, rather than reading La.C.C. art. 2323 as restricting judicial expansion of comparative fault to other contexts, we have read that article as leaving it to the court's discretion to determine in what contexts the judicially crafted doctrine of contributory negligence should be invoked and, in turn, mandating that in such contexts the court apply, in its place, comparative fault. Turner, 476 So.2d at 806 (Dennis, J., assigning additional reasons); Bell, supra; Howard v. Allstate Ins. Co., 520 So.2d 715, 718 (La.1988). Consequently, it is settled that La. C.C. art. 2323 neither prohibits nor mandates the contexts in which the comparative fault law applies.
That the comparative fault doctrine extends beyond the negligence arena into other areas of tort law is likewise settled. Bell, supra (applying comparative fault to some strict products liability cases); Landry v. State, 495 So.2d 1284 (La.1986) (applying comparative fault to case arising under La. C.C. art. 2317); Howard v. Allstate Insurance Co., 520 So.2d 715 (La.1988) (applying comparative fault to cases arising under La. C.C. art. 2321); Turner v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 471 So.2d 709 (La.1985) (applying comparative fault to motorist-pedestrian case); see also Pelt v. City of DeRidder, 553 So.2d 1097 (La.App. 3d Cir.1989) (applying comparative fault to case under La.C.C. art. 667 and collecting eases); Decade of Progress, supra (collecting cases). Indeed, a long line of jurisprudence, which we sampled in Landry, supra, establishes that the comparative fault concept applies to a wide array of strict |8liability cases, despite the conceptual and semantical difficulties in applying the doctrine to such non-negligence based liability. Landry, 495 So.2d at 1290.
The issue before us, here, of course, is whether the comparative fault law extends to wrongful conduct at the opposite end of the spectrum — intentional torts. See 3 Comparative Negligence § 19.10[l][iii] (noting that "[a]t the opposite extreme from strict liability lies eases in which defendant has injured plaintiff intentionally"). Recently, several Louisiana appellate courts have concluded that comparative fault principles under La.C.C. art. 2323 apply to intentional torts, some with, and some without, offering reasons or comments for doing so. In so holding, these cases, explicitly or implicitly, have construed the term "fault" contained in the various provisions of the comparative fault law as encompassing both unintentional and intentional conduct that causes injury. Thompson v. Hodge, 577 So.2d 1172, 1177 (La.App. 2d Cir.1991); Peacock's, Inc. v. Shreveport Alarm Co., 510 So.2d 387, 405 (La.App.2d Cir.), writ denied, 513 So.2d 826 (La.1987) (citing F. Stone, Tort Doctrine, 12 La.Civil Law Treatise § 61 (1977)); see also Morris v. Yogi Bear's Jellystone Park Camp Resort, 539 So.2d 70 (La.App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 542 So.2d 1378 (La.1989) (applying comparative fault to quantify intentional fault of rapist without reasons or comments); McCullom v. Regional Transit Authority, 616 So.2d 239 (La.App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 620 So.2d 852 (La.1993). Likewise, commentators have suggested that comparative fault law is broad enough to encompass intentional torts. J. Dear and S. Zipperstein, Comparative Fault and Intentional Torts: Doctrinal Barriers and Policy Considerations, 24 Santa Clara L.Rev. 1, 37 (1984) (hereinafter "Dear & Zipperstein")', Decade of Progress, supra.
A contrary view, however, has been voiced by some Louisiana appellate courts and a commentator. See Broussard v. Lovelace, 610 So.2d 159 (La.App. 3d Cir.1992), writ denied, 615 So.2d 343 (La.1993) (declining to apply comparative fault to conversion case); Bradford v. Pias, 525 So.2d 134 (La.App. 3d Cir.1988) (declining to apply comparative fault to battery case); Hebert v. First Guaranty Bank, 493 So.2d 150 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1986) (declining to apply comparative fault to conversion case); F. Stone, Tort Doctrine, 12 La.Civil Law Treatise § 61 (1994 Supp.) (hereinafter "Tort Doctrine ") (citing holding in Yogi Bear's Jelly Stone Park, supra, and noting caveat that it is "[c]learly an erroneous holding since contributory negligence is inapplicable to intentional torts").
IsAlso significant is the legislature's selection of the dynamic, all-encompassing civilian concept of "fault" as the standard for the tortfeasor's conduct. As noted, the provisions of the comparative fault law all share a common characteristic; they all speak in terms of plaintiffs "negligence" and defendant's or tortfeasor's "fault." Fault, historically, has been the basis for tort liability in Louisiana, being the key word used in La. C.C. art. 2315, the "fountainhead" of tort responsibility in Louisiana. Langlois v. Allied Chemical Corp., 258 La. 1067, 249 So.2d 133,136-37 (1971). The Civil Code, however, does not define "fault," and this Court has described attempts at defining fault as a "logomachy," noting in Langlois that "[b]ecause of the difficulty in defining fault for all times and purposes and instead of defining fault by listing numerous activities which constitute fault (much as we enumerate the activities which constitute criminal conduct in our Criminal Code), our law has left this determination to our courts." Langlois, 249 So.2d at 137; Tort Doctrine, supra, at § 60 (noting that "fault is the mirror of our times:
. fault is a fluid term definable only with respect to its surroundings").
However, certain definitions of the word have been judicially articulated and are instructive in our analysis. One such articulation is that "fault is a broad concept embracing all conduct falling below a proper standard." Weiland v. King, 281 So.2d 688, 690 (La.1973) (citing Langlois, supra, and Tort Doctrine, supra). As this definition reflects, "fault" under civilian theory clearly includes more than just negligence; it extends the gamut from strict liability to intentional torts. Tort Doctrine, supra at § 61 (describing fault as including "intentional harm caused to another without consent or privilege"); see Plant, supra at 413-15.
Given the existing statutory scheme and this Court's prior case law, we find that comparative fault law as it exists in Louisiana is broad enough in an appropriate factual setting to encompass the comparison of negligent and intentional torts. However, our conclusion that such a comparison can be made does not end the inquiry; instead, it simply raises the more | ipdifficult question of whether such a comparison should be made in general and, more specifically, whether such a comparison should be made in this particular case.
As we have previously explained herein, this Court has heretofore read La.C.C. art. 2323 as leaving it to the Court's discretion to determine in what contexts the doctrine of comparative negligence should be applied. See Sistler v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 558 So.2d 1106, 1113 (La.1990); Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc., 521 So.2d 1123, 1133 (La.1988); Howard v. Allstate Ins. Co., 520 So.2d 715, 718 (La.1988); Landry v. State, 495 So.2d 1284 (La.1986); Turner v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 471 So.2d 709 (La.1985); Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast, Div. of Ervin Ind., 462 So.2d 166 (La.1985). As this Court stated in Bell, supra:
For example, the question of whether other classes of cases fall within the category to which comparative fault may apply must be decided on a case-by-case basis.
Bell, 462 So.2d at 172.
Though the accident at issue in Bell occurred before the effective date of comparative fault, we have adhered to the line of reasoning expressed in that case, i.e., that application of comparative fault principles in certain types of eases requires a case-by-case analysis. For instance, in the area of strict liability, though we have repeatedly held that comparative fault principles generally apply in strict liability cases involving victim fault, we have also consistently maintained that application of comparative fault principles to allocate fault between an injured plaintiff and the party with garde or custody of the property or object producing the harm in a particular case depends in part upon the court's determination of whether reducing the injured party's recovery through a comparative fault allocation will serve as an incentive for a similarly situated person to exercise care or, in contrast, operate to reduce the incentive of the owner of the thing at issue to remove the risk of harm. See Sistler, supra; Landry, supra ("The courts Inare applying the comparative fault principles to strict liability cases on a case by case basis and as the facts and circumstances lead the courts to do so."). This case-by-case approach is also reflected in our appellate courts' decisions to alternatively either apply, or decline to apply, comparative fault principles in intentional tort cases involving battery and conversion, depending upon the facts and circumstances presented in the particular cases at issue. See supra.
Given the fact that we have held herein that the concept of comparative fault as it exists in Louisiana is broad enough to encompass the comparison of intentional acts and negligence in appropriate factual circumstances, we see no reason why the same sort of case-by-ease analysis as that employed by the courts in a strict liability setting should not be employed by the courts in determining whether to apply comparative fault principles in cases where it is alleged that comparative fault exists among intentional tort-feasors and negligent tortfeasors. That being said, public policy considerations inherent in the question of whether such a comparison should be made compel us to find, as did the trial court, that such a comparison should not be made in this particular case.
First, and foremost, the scope of Southmark's duty to the plaintiff in this case clearly encompassed the exact risk of the occurrence which caused damage to plaintiff. As a general rule, we find that negligent tortfeasors should not be allowed to reduce their fault by the intentional fault of another that they had a duty to prevent. See Kansas State Bank & Trust Co. v. Specialized Transportation Services, Inc., 249 Kan. 348, 819 P.2d 587, 606 (1991).
Second, Southmark, who by definition acted unreasonably under the circumstances in breaching their duty to plaintiff, should not be allowed to benefit at the innocent plaintiffs expense by an allocation of fault to the intentional tortfeasor under comparative fault principles. Given the fact that any rational juror will apportion the lion's share of the fault to the intentional tortfeasor when instructed to compare the fault of a negligent tortfeasor and an intentional tortfeasor, application of comparative fault principles in the circumstances presented in this | ^particular case would operate to reduce the incentive of the lessor to protect against the same type of situation occurring again in the future. Such a result is clearly contrary to public policy.
Third, as Dean Prosser has explained it, intentional wrongdoing "differs from negligence not only in degree but in kind, and in the social condemnation attached to it." Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 65, at p. 462 (5th Ed.1984). In our view, this is a correct assessment of the character and nature of the conduct which defendant herein seeks to have the courts compare. Because we believe that intentional torts are of a fundamentally different nature than negligent torts, we find that a true comparison of fault based on an intentional act and fault
based on negligence is, in many circumstances, not possible.
|18In sum, we hold that while Louisiana law is broad enough to allow comparison of fault between intentional tortfeasors and negligent tortfeasors, determination of whether such a comparison should be made must be determined by the trial court on a case by case basis, bearing in mind the public policy concerns discussed herein. We further hold, for the reasons stated herein, that comparison of Southmark's negligence and the rapist's fault in this particular case is not appropriate. As such, it was not error for the trial judge in this case to refuse to | i4submit a special interrogatory to the jury for comparison of Southmark's and the rapist's respective fault.
DECREE
AFFIRMED.
WATSON, J., joins the opinion and adds additional reasons.
LEMMON and HALL, JJ., dissent and assign reasons.
MARVIN, J., dissents for the reasons assigned by HALL, J.
Justice Revius 0. Ortique, Jr., retired, participating in the decision by assignment, the case having been argued prior to his retirement.
Justice Marcus not on the panel. Rule IV, Part 2, § 3. Judge Charles A. Marvin, Chief Judge, Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, sitting in place of Dennis, J.
. La.Code Civ.Pro. art. 1812(C)(2), provides:
C. In cases to recover damages for injury, death, or loss, the court may submit to the jury special written questions inquiring as to:
(2) If appropriate, whether another person, whether party or not, other than the person suffering injury, death, or loss, was at fault, and, if so:
(a) Whether such fault was a legal cause of the damages, and, if so:
(b) The degree of such fault, expressed in percentage.
. The relevant interrogatories and the jury's responses are follows:
INTERROGATORY NO. 1:
With respect to the defendant, Southmark Management Corporation: Was Southmark Management Corporation at fault with respect to the incident and did the fault produce or substantially contribute to the incident?
Yes [9] No [3]
INTERROGATORY NO. 2:
With respect to the plaintiff, Christi Veazey: Was the plaintiff, Christi Veazey, at fault with respect to the incident and did that fault produce or substantially contribute to the incident?
Yes [0] No [12]
INTERROGATORY NO. 3:
What percentage of Ms. Veazey's damages do you find were caused by Southmark Management Corporation, if any? What percentage of Ms. Veazey's damages should be reduced by the fault of Ms. Veazey, if any? Southmark Management Corporation [60%] Ms. Christi Veazey [40%]
(Percentage must total 100%)
. Act 331 of 1984 (effective January 1, 1985), which rewrote the Civil Code provisions on obligations, moved the rules regarding contribution contained in former La.C.C. art. 2103 to La.C.C. arts. 1804 and 1805. The official revision comments to those articles indicate that the revision did not change the law. Cole v. Celotex, 599 So.2d 1058, 1068 n. 31 (La.1992).
. Act 534 of 1983 moved the contents of former La.Code Civ.Pro. art. 1811 to La.Code Civ.Pro. art. 1812(C) and added the phrase "whether party or not" to Article 1812(C)(2) to clarify that nonparties' fault may be considered. See Official Revision Comments to La.Code Civ.Pro. art. 1812. La.Code Civ.Pro. art. 1917, which deals with nonjury cases, cross references La.Code Civ. Pro. art. 1812(C), providing that "the court shall make specific findings that shall include those matters to which reference is made in Paragraph C of Article 1812 of the Code."
.La.C.C. art. 1804 provides that "among soli-dary obligors, each is liable for his virile share" and when that "obligation arises from an offense or quasi-offense, a virile portion is proportionate to the fault of each obligor." The comments note that this approach is consistent with the theory of comparative negligence.
. La.C.C. art. 2323 provides:
When contributory negligence is applicable to a claim for damages, its effect shall be as follows: If a person suffers injury, death or loss as the result partly of his own negligence and partly as a result of the fault of another person or persons, the claim for damages shall not thereby be defeated, but the amount of damages recoverable shall be reduced in proportion to the degree or percentage of negligence attributable to the person suffering the injury, death or loss.
. La.C.C. art. 2315 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it. (Emphasis supplied).
. A "logomachy" is "a dispute over or about words." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1990).
. As noted in Hebert, supra, the majority view among courts in other jurisdictions that have addressed this issue is that comparative fault is inapplicable to intentional torts. See A. Schwartz, Applicability of Comparative Negligence Principles to Intentional Torts, 18 A.L.R.5th 525, 532 (1994); H. Woods, Comparative Fault § 7.1 (2d Ed. 1987); V. Schwartz, Comparative Negligence § 5.1 and 5.2 (2d Ed.1986). Speaking on this issue, the Uniform Comparative Fault Act generally follows the majority position, stating in the comments that "[t]he Act does not include intentional torts [because] statutes and decisions have not applied the comparative fault principle to them. But a court determining that the general principle should apply at common law to a case before it of an intentional tort is not precluded from that holding by the Act." Appendix, Uniform Comparative Fault Act (1979), 40 La.L.Rev. 419, 422 (1980).
. The lower courts correctly determined that the plaintiff herein was free from fault. We therefore need not, and do not, express any opinion in this case as to whether, or in what situations, if any, victim fault should be compared to the fault of an intentional tortfeasor.
. See, e.g., Pamela B. v. Hayden, et al., 25 Cal.App.4th 785, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 147 (Cal.App.2d Dist.) writ granted, 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 568, 880 P.2d 112 (Cal.1994). In Pamela B., the plaintiff was raped in the garage of her apartment building. Plaintiff sued her landlord and the properly management company in charge of her building, contending their inadequate attempts to provide a secure garage caused her rape. California law requires comparison of intentional torts and negligence, and the jury in this case awarded $1.2 million to plaintiff, attributing 95% of the fault to the landlord and management company, 4% to the man who raped her, and 1% to the rapist's accomplice who aided and abetted the rapist!
The appellate court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial on apportionment of damages, noting that "it is reasonable to assume the jury will apportion fault so that the one who acted intentionally should bear 'most if not all the blame'." (Citing Knott v. State of California, (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 210, 234, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 514). This proposition prompted one of the appellate court judges to note in his concurrence:
. But what allocation could be upheld on appeal? Is it not per se unreasonable to assess negligence at a higher rate than intentional, wanton criminal activity? Although the result would not be as shocking as what we have here, could we justify holding the owner and manager even 51 percent responsible?
It is ironic that plaintiff suffers reversal because her extremely able counsel was able to get such a result from the jury. Had the jury, for example, assessed the criminals at any higher percentage than the tortfeasors, the verdict would be easier to uphold. What is a trial lawyer to do? The more persuasive one is, the less likely the result will survive appeal. This turns the concept of advocacy on its ear. What kind of credibility does all this lend to the justice system?
Pamela B., 25 Cal.App.4th at 806, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d at 161 (Ortega, J., concurring).
The questions raised by the concurring judge in the Pamela B. case highlight the inherent difficulties advocates of comparing the fault of an intentional tortfeasor and a negligent tortfeasor have in addressing the common sense question: "in such a comparison, how can a rapist (or virtually any intentional tortfeasor) not be 100% liable for his actions?" The common sense answer, i.e., that the intentional tortfeasor is, by definition, always 100% liable for his intentional acts which have caused damages, simply serves to reinforce Dean Prosser's assessment that intentional wrongdoing "differs from negligence not only in degree but in kind...."
. While we are aware of the argument which has been advanced by at least one court and several commentators that the application of comparative fault principles in the context of strict liability is conceptually more difficult than application of such principles where fault is based on intentional wrongdoing and negligence, see Blazovic, supra; Dear & Zipperstein, supra at 2, this argument is based on the premise that strict liability torts are premised on a tortfeasor's status or relationship to the property or thing, and not on actual fault. Hence, the argument goes, if it is possible to compare the "fault" of one who has no actual fault (the strictly liable party) and one who does have actual fault (the negligent party), it certainly is possible to compare the "fault" of two parties (the intentional tortfeasor and a negligent tortfeasor) whose liability is based entirely on their actual fault.
This line of reasoning ignores the fact that while strict liability is based on the tortfeasor's status or relationship to the property or thing which caused the harm, determinations as to both liability and comparative fault are made on the basis of the strictly liable defendant's imputed knowledge of the of the risk, which in turn, is based on the party's status or relationship to the property or object which produced the harm. See Kent v. Gulf States Utilities Co., 418 So.2d 493, 497-98 (La. 1982) ("Accordingly, in a strict liability case . the standard for determining liability is to presume the owner's knowledge of the risk presented . and then to determine the reasonableness (according to traditional notions of blameworthiness) of the owner's conduct, in light of that presumed knowledge." [Emphasis in original]). As was stated in a concurring opinion in Kent, supra: "In strict liability, however, knowledge of the condition of the product is imputed to the defendant before the balancing test or negligence test is applied." Id. at 501 (Dennis J., concurring) (Emphasis added). See also T. Galligan, Jr., Strict Liability in Action: The Truncated Learned Hand Formula, 52 La. L.Rev. 323, 329 (1991) ("Lemmon's approach [in Kent, supra] reminds us that strict liability is negligence without knowledge." [Emphasis added]).
Therefore, in a case where comparative fault principles are being applied between the defendant whose liability is based on negligence and the defendant whose liability is based on strict liability, after the imputation of the knowledge element to the strictly liable defendant the determination being made as to the defendants' comparative fault is effectively one of negligence versus negligence. Such a comparison, in our view, is conceptually much simpler than a comparison of negligence based fault and fault based on an intentional act.
. As occurred in the instant case, the procedural mechanism by which a party may request submission to the jury of a special interrogatory regarding phantom tortfeasor fault is set forth in La.Code Civ.Pro. art. 1812(C)(2). See supra, note 1. Though we are aware of our prior holdings construing La.Code Civ.Pro. art. 1812(C), see, e.g., Gauthier v. O'Brien, 618 So.2d 825, 831 (La.1993) (holding that "[fjailure to submit a special jury interrogatory to the jury to determine the fault, if any, of a third party constitutes error"); Lemire v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 458 So.2d 1308, 1309 (La.1984) (holding that "[w]hile La.C.C.P. art. 1812C provides that the court may (unless waived by all parties) submit special written questions to the jury, the apparent intent is that the court in such circumstances is required to submit the questions"), those cases involved comparisons of negligence. Hence, Gauthier and Lemire mandate the submission of such special interrogatory, when appropriate.
Submission of such a special interrogatory becomes appropriate in a negligence case when evidence supporting a finding of fault on the part of a phantom tortfeasor is presented. Brock v. Winn Dixie Louisiana, Inc., 617 So.2d 1234, 1238 (La.App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 620 So.2d 848 (La.1993) (citing Devereux v. Allstate Ins. Co., 557 So.2d 1091 (La.App.2d Cir.1990)). When such evidence exists, the trial court's refusal to submit such special interrogatory to the jury to permit the allocation of fault to the phantom tortfeasor is erroneous. Gauthier, 618 So.2d at 831. However, submission of such an interrogatory in a strict liability case or an intentional tort case only becomes appropriate where the trial court has determined that the public policy bases discussed herein are not present.