Case Name: GRIFFEN v. MANICE
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1902-07-08
Citations: 77 N.Y.S. 626
Docket Number: 
Parties: GRIFFEN v. MANICE.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 77
Pages: 626–633

Head Matter:
(74 App. Div. 371.)
GRIFFEN v. MANICE.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
July 8, 1902.)
1. Appeal—Law op the Case.
A decision of the court of appeals is the law of the case in a subsequent trial of the cause, in so far as the facts are the same as on the appeal.
2. Carriers—Elevator—Personal Injury—Liability.
Where an elevator installed by a reputable firm has all the appliances known to stop the machinery when the car reaches the bottom of the shaft, even if the operator is remiss in his duties, and the machinery is in perfect order, as shown by various inspections by the person installing the elevator, insurance companies, and the city,—one inspection being made only a few hours before an accident occurring by reason of the unexplained failure of the machinery to so stop, though the car is properly operated,—there is no liability for the accident, though there has been an occasional bumping of the car on the springs, which was shown not to be uncommon or to have been the cause of the accident.
& Same—Evidence—Burden of Proof.
The plaintiff in an action for injuries received by a passenger through the defective working of an elevator has the burden of showing that the injury resulted from defendant’s negligence.
O’Brien and Hatch, JJ., dissenting.
Appeal from trial term, New York county.
Action by Anna S. Griffen, as administratrix, against William De Forest Manice. From a judgment dismissing the complaint, entered on an order setting aside a verdict for plaint® (73 N. Y. Supp. 559), she appeals. Affirmed.
Argued before VAN BRUNT, P. J„ and HATCH, McLAUGH-LIN, O’BRIEN, and INGRAHAM, JJ.
Robert M. Boyd, Jr., for appellant.
Albert Stickney, for respondent.

Opinion:
McLAUGHLIN, J.
This appeal is from the judgment in favor of the defendant dismissing the complaint entered upon an order setting aside a general verdict in favor of the plaintiff, and special findings of the jury rendered in connection therewith. The facts, so far as the same are material to the plaintiff's alleged cause of action, were fully stated on the former appeal to this court (47 App. Div. 70, 62 N. Y. Supp. 364), and on appeal therefrom to the court of appeals (166 N. Y. 188, 59 N. E. 925, 52 L. R. A. 922, 82 Am. St. Rep. 630), and it is therefore unnecessary to restate them in this opinion.
The law as laid down by the court of appeals is the law of the case, and binding upon this court, in so far as the facts are the same as upon the former appeal. The court of appeals, in reversing the judgment of this court, held that the defendant owed the plaintiff's intestate the duty of using reasonable care to guard him against and protect him from injury. We are therefore to determine whether the judgment appealed from is right, when the rule as thus declared is applied to the facts as developed upon the trial. Upon the former trial the defendant offered no evidence, and we held that the trial court correctly instructed the jury that the doctrine of res ipso loquitur applied, and whether or not the defendant had offered a sufficient explanation of the cause of the plaintiff's injuries was a question for the jury, when subjected to the rule that the defendant was obligated "to use the utmost care and diligence" with reference to the appliances used in connection with and in the operation of the elevator in which the intestate was at the time he was killed. This instruction was held to be erroneous, in that the defendant was only obligated to exercise ordinary care. The sole question presented, therefore, on this appeal, is whether or not the evidence justified a finding that the defendant was remiss in his duty in exercising that degree of care which the law imposed upon him, viz., ordinary care for the intestate's protection. And in this connection it appeared that the elevator and all the appliances used in connection therewith were installed by a reputable dealer; that there had been provided all of the means then known for the prevention of accidents similar to or caused by the one that here occurred. To that end, there had been provided the automatic stop and the slack cable device, either one of which was sufficient, in and of itself, in case the operator was remiss in his duty, to cut off the power to stop the car. The evidence offered on the part of the plaintiff, as well as that offered on the part of the defendant, established beyond contradiction that the machinery used for operating the elevator was in perfect order at the time the accident occurred ; that the operator had performed his duty; that each of the devices referred to had played the part designed for it; that notwithstanding these facts the power had continued to work after the car had reached the bottom of the shaft, -and by reason thereof the counterbalance weights were forced from the frame in which they were placed, causing the injury complained of. The continuance of the power by which the drum was operated under such circumstances, none of the witnesses were able to explain. But the defendant established, not only by the cross-examination of the experts offered on the part of the plaintiff, but also by its own witnesses, the fact that the machinery was in perfect order; that nothing was broken, out of repair, or that its servant had failed to perform the duty assigned to him; and the plaintiff's witness Thorpe testified upon cross-examinatian that he had never' known or heard of an accident of this kind;. that he did not know, and was then unable to state, how any precaution could have been taken, in the shape of improvements to the machinery, which would have prevented it. In addition to this it appeared that frequent inspections had been provided for, not only by the dealers who originally installed the elevator, but also by two different insurance companies and by the authorities of the city, and that an inspection was made by one of them on the very day and only a few hours before the accident occurred, the result of which was to the effect that the elevator, including the appliances used to operate it, was in good order. Under such circumstances, how could the trial court do otherwise, if defendant's duty was to be measured by ordinary care, than set aside the verdict and special findings of the jury and dismiss the complaint ? There was no proof, either actual or constructive, of any defect in the machinery, or of a threatened or apprehended danger by reason of its operation. It is true, there was some proof to the effect of an occasional bumping of the car upon the-springs, but in this connection it appeared (and the fact was not contradicted) that this was not an uncommon thing, where an elevator was operated as this one was; nor was there any proof that it was an indication of danger, or that the machinery was not properly adjusted. One of plaintiff's witnesses testified that the bumping was due to the-setting of the automatic stop, but this manifestly could not be changed at every trip which the car made; nor was there any satisfactory proof that there was any bumping intermediate the last setting of the-automatic stop and the accident, and, if there had been, it would not have established liability on the part of the defendant, because, as-already said, it was not an uncommon thing, and, so far as appears, no accident had ever occurred by reason of it. McGrell v. Building-Co., 153 N. Y. 265, 47 N. E. 305; Burke v. Witherbee, 98 N. Y_ 562. Nor was there any proof which would have justified a finding that the accident was due to the oiling of the brake band.
The defendant, under the rule laid down by the court of appeals, was bound to exercise such a degree of care as a man of ordinary prudence would have exercised under similar circumstances. The plaintiff, before she could recover, was bound to show that the intestate's death was due to, and resulted from, some neglect on the part of the defendant,—in other words, that the defendant failed to exercise ordinary care for the protection of her intestate. This she failed to do. • Upon the facts developed upon the trial, a man of ordinary prudence could not have foreseen that injury was liable to be sustained as it was here. It must therefore be held, in view of the care used by the defendant in the selection, inspection, and maintenance of the elevator, under the rule laid down by the court of appeals, that he did all that an ordinary man could be required to do under the same conditions and circumstances.
The judgment appealed from, therefore, must be affirmed, with costs.
VAN BRUNT, P. J., and INGRAHAM, J., concur.