Case Name: Margaret McCullen, as Administratrix, etc., of John Wigmore, Deceased, Respondent, v. New York and North Shore Railway Company, Appellant
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1902-01
Citations: 68 A.D. 269
Docket Number: 
Parties: Margaret McCullen, as Administratrix, etc., of John Wigmore, Deceased, Respondent, v. New York and North Shore Railway Company, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 68
Pages: 269–272

Head Matter:
Margaret McCullen, as Administratrix, etc., of John Wigmore, Deceased, Respondent, v. New York and North Shore Railway Company, Appellant.
Negligence—a refusal to charge that if a passenger refuses to pay his fme and refuses to leave the cm “ and an injury happens,” the company is not liable, held to require a reversal.
In an action to recover damages resulting from the death of the plaintiff’s intestate, who, while a passenger on the defendant’s railroad, was ejected by the conductor for refusing to pay his fare, and received injuries which resulted in his death, the defendant’s counsel asked the court to charge the following propositions:
“ I ask your Honor to charge the jury that an individual within the car of a street surface railroad who refuses to pay his fare is a wrongdoer and has no legal right to remain in the car, and it is right he should be requested to leave the car when he has manifestly no right to remain.”
“I ask your Honor to charge that if he refuses the conductor may then employ so much force as may be necessary in order to effect his removal, using no violence and committing no unnecessary injury.”
“ I ask your Honor to charge that if, however, the passenger refuses to comply and resists and an injury happens, it is an injury for which the company is not responsible, for it is a result attributable to his own wrongful conduct.”
The court charged the first two propositions, but refused to charge the third.
Held, that the refusal to charge the third request constituted an error which required the reversal of a judgment entered upon a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, as the probable effect of such refusal to charge was to convey to the jury the idea that a recovery might be had for an injury which resulted from the passenger’s resistance to the act of lawfully ejecting him, although such ejection was accompanied by no unnecessary violence.
Goodrich, P. J., dissented.
Appeal by the defendant, the New York and North Shore Railway Company, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Queens on the 4th day of February, 1901, upon the verdict of a jury for $5,000, and also from an order bearing date the 30th day of January, 1901, and entered in said clerk’s office, denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial made upon the minutes.
George F. Hickey [ William B. Stewart with him on the brief], for the appellant.
J. Brownson Her \_M. P. O' Oonnor with him on the brief], for the respondent.

Opinion:
Hirschberg, J.:
Wigmore, the plaintiff's intestate, while a passenger on defendant's railroad, was asked by the conductor for his fare, and refusing to pay the same was ejected by the conductor and received injuries which resulted in his death.
We think the judgment and order must be reversed for the error contained in the refusal to charge the third request mentioned in the dissenting opinion of the presiding justice, the probable effect of which was to convey-.to the jury the idea that a recovery might be had for an injury which resulted from resistance on the part of the passenger to the act of lawfully ejecting him from the car accompanied by no unnecessary violence, It is true the court had previously charged correctly upon the general question of the •right of the defendant to eject the passenger under certain circumstances' and conditions, using no unnecessary force. That no recovery could be had for an injury resulting from such resistance might be possibly inferred, but was not expressly stated. The defendant was entitled to have the jury informed that if the injury resulted from such resistance no recovery could be had; and had the court, upon the request being made, instructed the jury that the plaintiff could not recover within the spirit and meaning of what he had already charged, a different question would be presented. ' The express refusal to so charge when requested, in the absence of any previous direct information conveyed to the jury upon that subject, may have misled them into the belief that a recovery could be had for such injury, and we, therefore, think a new trial necessary.
• All concurred (Bartlett, J., in result), except Goodrich, P. J., who read for affirmance, and Jenks, J., taking no part.