Case Name: Greenwood Lake & P. J. R. Co. v. New York & G. L. R. Co.
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1889-12-10
Citations: 8 N.Y.S. 26
Docket Number: 
Parties: Greenwood Lake & P. J. R. Co. v. New York & G. L. R. Co.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 8
Pages: 26–30

Head Matter:
Greenwood Lake & P. J. R. Co. v. New York & G. L. R. Co.
(Supreme Court, General Term, Second Department.
December 10, 1889.)
1. Easements—By Grant—Right of Way—License.
A grant of the right to use a strip of land for the purposes of “ ingress, egress, and regress, ” and on which the grantee, an ice company, could pass and repass railroad cars containing ice and materials, the only limitation in the grant being that it was not exclusive, and that the right could not be assigned except to the successors of the grantee in the ice business, is not a mere license, but an irrevocable grant.
3. Same—Extent of Right.
The grantee is not restricted to the track as at first constructed, but may change its location to any part of the strip specified in the grant.
8. Railroad Companies—Duty to Begin Construction—Deed.
Since a corporation organized under the general railroad act (8 Rev. St. N. Y. 7th Ed., 1569) ceases to exist within five years after its articles of association are filed, unless it begins the construction of its road, a grant to such a corporation 10 years after its organization, and before it had constructed any road, conveys no title.
Cullen, J., dissenting.
Appeal from special term, Orange county.
Trespass by the Greenwood Lake & Port Jervis Bailroad Company against the New York & Greenwood Lake Bailroad Company. The plaintiff claimed to be the owner of a strip of land 75 feet wide, commencing at the line between the states of New York and New Jersey, at the termination of defendant’s railroad, and running up through a tract of land known as the “Storms Farm.” The trespasses complained of were in the use defendant made of a railroad on this strip of land, and in changing the location of railroad tracks thereon. On the trial plaintiff rested its case on the following facts: On March 15, 1877, the title to the Storms farm was in James W. Weston and Mary E. Burt, who on that day conveyed to Michael A. Myers, trustee, the strip of land in dispute, to be used only for railroad purposes, and on condition that a railroad should be constructed thereon, and a freight and passen ger depot erected within six months. The title to this strip passed in December, 1877, to William C. Traphagen, who, in June, 1886, conveyed it to William O. McDowell. In September, 1886, McDowell conveyed to the New England, New York So Pennsylvania Railroad Company, a corporation organized under the New York railroad act; and this company, in May, 1888, conveyed to plaintiff, which is also a corporation organized under the New York railroad act. The defendant claimed a permanent right of way over the land, under the following facts: On March 20, 1877, James W. Weston conveyed to the Greenwood Lake Ice Company 15 acres of the Storms farm, designated as the “Ice-House Lot, ” subject to the conveyance of the 75-foot strip he had previously made to Myers. The same year the ice company built an ice-house, and a railroad track was constructed on this 75-foot strip to the main branch of defendant’s road. In 1878, after the building of the track, Traphagen made the following conveyance, covering the land in dispute, to the Greenwood Lake Ice Company: “I do hereby grant to the said ice company, and to their assigns and successors in said ice business, the right to use said property for the purpose of a way of ingress, egress, and regress over and upon which they may pass and repass railroad cars containing ice and materials, said s'upplies for use in said ice business, together with themselves, their employes and servants; but it is expressly understood that this license to use said railroad is not an exclusive right to said company. And it is further agreed that the right hereby conveyed is not tó be assigned by the said company, except to the successors in and assigns of said ice business, and only for the purpose of said business.” This conveyance by Traphagen was about nine years before his conveyance to McDowell, mentioned above. The ice company subsequently conveyed the “Ice-House Lot” to Edward Cooper and Abram-S. Hewitt, who continued the ice business. They afterwards entered into a contract with defendant, by which it agreed to transport the ice from the ice-house, receiving a certain portion of the proceeds for its freight. Defendant relied chiefly on the conveyance from Traphagen to the ice company. The following opinion was filed at the special term:
“Barnard, J. The paper proven on the trial accompanying the site of the ice-house property evidenced a grant of a right of way, and not a mere license. The paper states that it grants a right of way. The only limitation is that it is incident to the ice-house property, and cannot be sold except to the successor in the ice business, and it is not an exclusive right to the land over which the way is constructed. The surrounding circumstances favor this construction: A valuable property is sold, surrounded by lands of the grantor, which was already established as an ice business by the erection of large ice-houses thereon. The ice was designed for a foreign market, and this was a piece of railroad leading from defendant’s road to the ice-houses then made. The railroad follows within a strip of seventy-five feet wide, which was in the future to be a railroad. The right of way proper did not, in terms, restrict the right to this strip, but that that was the design of the parties is the best inference. This is especially the inference as the deeds, or some of them, are subject to the right of way, as the right of way is subject to the real owner, except so far as the right of way is permanent.
“The right of way is not restricted to the road, as now built. The paper does not say so, and the absolute right given carries with it the right to make the way useful for railroad ears. Cooper & Hewitt had, under it, a right to make a good grade and good curves, so that the ice could be drawn out over the right of way in cars. The cut was, therefore, properly made for this purpose; and, assuming the plaintiff’s right as owner of the seventy-five foot strip, no action will lie for this cut inside of the strip. The right of way was never designed to be attached to the main track of the to be built railroad. The ice-house had its right of track, and the prospective railroad company had all that was left within the strip.
“After the new way was made, it left a new piece of road on the strip, which belonged to the owner of the strip; and the defendant has used this piece to land passengers at a pavilion erected by the owner of the land outside. If the plaintiff owns this strip, it is entitled to recover for the use of this piece of railroad. The plaintiff derives title to the strip through a railroad company which was never really organized, and never authorized to commence the construction of a railroad under it. When the title to the strip was conveyed to it by McDowell, it was some ten years after its proper organization; and, by our general railroad act, it ceased to exist after five years, unless a beginning was made within that period. This company could not therefore take a title, and, on conveyance, could convey none. The original grant was for railroad purposes, and it was limited, as a condition of the grant, that the road should be built within ten years; and it is doubtful whether the grantees under the grant, who had never taken possession, and had never even attempted to commence the construction of the road, had any title to give to this defunct corporation. If there is any claim for the use of this piece of railroad extending beyond the pavilion, itisin VanVleek; and he consented to the use of it, and it was used for his benefit. The complaint should therefore be dismissed, with costs.”
From a judgment in accordance with this opinion, plaintiff appeals.
Argued before Dykman, Pratt, and Cullen, JJ.
Charles S. Noyes, for appellant. Lewis E. Carr, for respondent.
2 Rev. St. N. Y. (7th Ed.) 1569.

Opinion:
Dykman, J.
The judgment from which the appeal in this action is taken should be affirmed on the opinion of the trial judge, printed in the case..