Case Name: Jennifer Clarise JOHNSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1991-04-18
Citations: 578 So. 2d 419
Docket Number: No. 89-1765
Parties: Jennifer Clarise JOHNSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: COBB, J., concurs specially with opinion.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 578
Pages: 419–427

Head Matter:
Jennifer Clarise JOHNSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 89-1765.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
April 18, 1991.
James Sweeting, III, Orlando, Lynn Pal-trow and Louise Melling, New York City, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Belle B. Turner, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
DAUKSCH, Judge.
This is an appeal from two convictions for delivery of a controlled substance to minors.
It was established by the evidence that appellant consumed cocaine knowing that the cocaine would pass to her soon-to-be-born fetus. Upon the birth of her children it was medically determined that each of them had received some of the cocaine into their bodies. A qualified witness testified that some of the cocaine left the mother and was received by the child after birth but before the umbilical cord was cut. Under Florida law a person comes into being upon birth. Duncan v. Flynn, 342 So.2d 123 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), adopted, 358 So.2d 178 (Fla.1978). Appellant was over eighteen and each of appellant's children obviously were persons under the age of eighteen.
Section 893.13(l)(c), Florida Statutes (1989) says:
(c) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person 18 years of age or Older to deliver any controlled substance to a person under the age of 18 years, or to use or hire a person under the age of 18 years as an agent or employee in the sale or delivery of such a substance, or to use such per son to assist in avoiding detection or apprehension for a violation of this chapter.
The question is whether the acts of appellant violate the statute. Logic leads us to say that appellant violated the statute.
Appellant voluntarily took cocaine into her body, knowing it would pass to her fetus and knowing (or should have known) that birth was imminent. She is deemed to know that an infant at birth is a person, and a minor, and that delivery of cocaine to the infant is illegal. We can reach no other conclusion logically.
We have spent the necessary time and effort considering the many arguments of appellant and her supporters who argue the mother's rights to her body and the analogies to the abortion cases. We have also considered appellant's assertion that the Florida legislature declined to pass a child abuse statute which forbade similar conduct. We have considered other arguments, such as what pregnant mothers might resort to if they know they may be charged with this crime; we were singularly unimpressed with those latter arguments.
This appellant on two occasions took cocaine into her pregnant body and caused the passage of that cocaine to each of her children through the umbilical cord after birth of the child, then an infant person. The statute was twice violated.
We certify to the Supreme Court of Florida that the question resolved by this opinion is of great public importance and suggest that court answer:
WHETHER THE INGESTION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE BY A MOTHER WHO KNOWS THE SUBSTANCE WILL PASS TO HER CHILD AFTER BIRTH IS A VIOLATION OF FLORIDA LAW?
CONVICTIONS AFFIRMED.
COBB, J., concurs specially with opinion.
W. SHARP, J., dissents with opinion.