Case Name: HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY COMPANY, a corporation, Regina Marie Heitman Angley and Janies Angley, Appellants, v. Edna R. MYERS and Dale E. Myers, her husband, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1971-04-07
Citations: 247 So. 2d 83
Docket Number: No. 70-366
Parties: HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY COMPANY, a corporation, Regina Marie Heitman Angley and Janies Angley, Appellants, v. Edna R. MYERS and Dale E. Myers, her husband, Appellees.
Judges: LILES, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 247
Pages: 83–86

Head Matter:
HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY COMPANY, a corporation, Regina Marie Heitman Angley and Janies Angley, Appellants, v. Edna R. MYERS and Dale E. Myers, her husband, Appellees.
No. 70-366.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
April 7, 1971.
Rehearing Denied May 5, 1971.
Ray Ulmer, Jr., of Roney, Ulmer, Wood-worth & Jacobs, St. Petersburg, for appellants.
William R. Hapner, Jr., of Rood & Hap-ner, Tampa, for appellees.

Opinion:
HOBSON, Judge.
Appellants above named, defendants in the trial court, appeal from a final judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of appellees, plaintiffs in the trial court, awarding them $20,800.00 and $2,500.00 respectively. The parties will be referred to as they were in the trial court.
The Myerses filed suit against the Ang-leys in the Pinellas County Circuit Court seeking damages for injuries sustained by Mrs. Myers in a rear-end automobile collision when the car in which she was a passenger was struck from behind, alleging among other things that her earning capacity had been permanently impaired. However, there was no specific allegation of loss of wages. By amendment Hartford, the insurance carrier, was added as a party defendant. All defendants answered, denying liability. The case was set for trial on February 24, 1970, and on February 12, 1970, the Angleys filed motion for separate trial from Hartford, which the court denied. Defendants' motion for new trial after verdict was also denied.
Appellants raise here essentially three questions: (1) that appellees failed to allege loss of wages as being specific damages, and that while "impairment of earning capacity" was alleged as specific damages such is not strictly synonymous with "loss of wages"; (2) that the evidence did not establish that the neck injury on Mrs. Myers was caused by a blow from the rear, but that it was in fact more consistent with an injury caused by a vehicle stopping sharp, thus throwing the passenger's neck forward; and (3) that the trial court was in error in not granting a separate trial for Hartford. We will discuss these three propositions in the order stated.
(1)Loss of Wages or Impairment of Earning Capacity.
From a study of the entire record there does not appear to us to be any substantial ground for defendants' apprehension as to the essential nature of the damages asserted. To contend otherwise would be to make a play on words. The damages contended for by appellees consisted of the loss or impairment of income from work or employment. A lay jury could not have been reasonably misled as to the character of such damages relied upon.
(2) The Neck Injury.
This was a question for the jury. Even if the theory of appellants was correct as to the cause of the neck injury and even if such theory was comprehensible and was reasonable, yet it would still be an ultimate fact which could only be settled and determined by the jury as the trier of the facts. There is no error here.
(3) Was Hartford Entitled to a Separate Trial?
We believe that whether or not Hartford was entitled to a separate trial was within the discretion of the trial court. An insurer does not have an absolute right to severance. On a proper motion, the trial judge may or may not sever. It is within his discretion. Under the severance rule 1.270(b), 30 F.S.A., the trial judge could under all the facts and circumstances of the particular case determine whether there should be a severance and his ruling subject to review. See Durrett v. Davidson, Fla.App.1970, 239 So.2d 46; Stecher v. Pomeroy, Fla.App.1971, 244 So.2d 488.
In this case, we do not believe that the trial judge committed reversible error in denying severance. For these reasons we would affirm.
LILES, J., concurs.
PIERCE, C. J., dissents with opinion.