Case Name: DAVID PORTER v. BENJAMIN S. BROOKS
Court: Supreme Court of California
Jurisdiction: California
Decision Date: 1868
Citations: 35 Cal. 199
Docket Number: 
Parties: DAVID PORTER v. BENJAMIN S. BROOKS.
Judges: 
Reporter: California Reports
Volume: 35
Pages: 199–212

Head Matter:
DAVID PORTER v. BENJAMIN S. BROOKS.
Writ op Attachment,—When Proper to Issue.—The policy of the law is, that a creditor holding a security by way of “mortgage, lien, or pledge, upon real or personal property,” shall not resort to the summary process of attachment until ho has exhausted his security. But such lien or pledge must be of a fixed, determinate character, capable of being enforced with certainty, and depending on no conditions.
Idem—Vendor's Lien.—A vendor's lien for the unpaid purchase price of a tract of land, where the land had been conveyed by the vendee to a third party before action brought against the former by the vendor to recover said purchase price, is not of such fixed and determinate character as to bar the plaintiff in such action the right to a writ of attachment against the property of the defendant therein.
Per Sawyer, C. J., concurring specially :
Idem.—A vendor's claim to have the purchase money charged upon the land conveyed, before a complaint is filed to enforce it, is not a lien securing the debt, within the meaning of the terms used in the one hundred and twentieth section of the Practice Act.
Appeal from the District Court, Twelfth Judicial District, City and County of San Francisco.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
B. S. Brooks, propria persona.
The plaintiff had a vendor’s lien. (2 Story’s Eq. Jur. Sec. 1,218; Sparks v. Hess, 15 Cal. 186; Bayley v. Greenleaf, 6 Wheat. 46; Bostwick v. McKorkle, 22 Cal. 670; Kittridge v. Stevens, 16 Cal. 382; Salmon v. Hoffman, 2 Cal. 138; Truebody v. Jacobson, 2 Cal. 286; Goulden v. Buckalew, 4 Cal. 111; Ellis v. Jeans, 7 Cal. 415; Allen v. Phelps, 7 Cal. 257; Bryan v. Sharp, 4 Cal. 350; Cahoon v. Robinson, 6 Cal. 227; Walker v. Sedgwick, 8 Cal. 403; Taylor v. McKenney, 20 Cal. 618; Hunt v. Waterman, 12 Cal. 305; McHenry v. Reilly, 13 Cal. 75; Baum v. Grigsby, 21 Cal. 177; Williams v. Young, 17 Cal. 406; Willis v. Wozencraft, 22 Cal. 607; 5 Cow. 232; Lewis v. Covillaud, 21 Cal. 179; Burt v. Wilson, 28 Cal. 633.)
This is such a lien as under the provisions of the Practice Act denied him the benefit of an attachment. (Practice Act, Sec. 120; Stats. 1860, p. 300, Sec. 13—p. 303, Sec. 23; Payne v. Bensley, 8 Cal. 266; Hill v. Grigsby, 32 Cal. 55.)
George & Cary, for Respondent.
Conceding that Porter did have a vendor’s lien on the sale, and a lien within the inhibition of the Attachment Law—he waived or lost it by taking the note of Brooks as security for the purchase money. According to the statement of Brooks, Judson was really the purchaser of the claim, and paid a portion of the purchase money, and Brooks gave his note for the balance. Porter, by accepting the note, elected to abandon, and did abandon, whatever lien he had upon the land. It is true that the mere taking of the note of the vendee is no waiver, but taking the note of a third party is. In fact, the vendee waives his lien if he manifests an intention to look to other security than the land itself. (4 Kent Com., 10th Ed., top p. 173, p. *152; Vail v. Porter, 4 Comst. 313; Hunt v. Waterman, 12 Cal. 303; Griffin v. Blanchard, 17 Cal. 70; Baum v. Grigsby, 21 Cal. 175.) By bringing this action on the note, plaintiff has manifested his intention to abandon his vendor’s lien, if ever he had any.
A party may always waive a right created by statute for his benefit, and why may he not waive a right created for his benefit by a Court of equity ? (Brown v. Aubrey, 22 Cal. 571; Tombs v. Rochester Railroad, 18 S. C. 583; Buel v. Trustees of Lockport, 3 Comst. 197.)
The right of a vendor to charge the land sold for the purchase price, does not become a lien thereon until his bill is filed to assert it, but is a mere equity or capacity of acquiring a lien. (White & Tud. Lead. Cas., Am. Ed. 241; 1 Wash, on Real Property, 537; Sparks v. Hess, 15 Cal. 193; Baum v. Grigsby, 21 Cal. 172; Ellis v. Jeans, 7 Cal. 415; Goulden v. Buckalew, 4 Cal. 107.)
In this cáse there is a bare right—a floating equity—liable to be defeated by the creditors of the vendee or by the vendee himself should he sell or mortgage the land to a bona fide purchaser, or mortgage without notice of the equity. (1 Wash. on Real Property, 538; Taylor v. Baldwin, 10 Barb. 626; Aldridge v. Dunn, 7 Blackf. 249; Bayley v. Greenleaf, 7 Wheat. 46; Webb v. Robinson, 14 Ga. 216; Gann v. Chester, 6 Yerg. 205; Roberts v. Rose, 2 Humph. 145.)

Opinion:
By the Court, Crockett, J.:
This is an appeal from an order denying a motion to dissolve an attachment. The action is founded, in part, on a promissory note, and partly on a small book account. The defendant moved to dissolve the attachment on the ground that, after action brought, he had tendered to the plaintiff and his attorneys payment of the book account, which tenr der was refused; and he avers his readiness to pay at any time. In respect to the promissory note, he avers that the consideration of it was the following, to wit: That he procured from the plaintiff a conveyance for an undivided interest in Yerba Buena Island, and the note in contest was made to secure a part of the purchase money; that, though the conveyance was made to the defendant, and he executed his own promissory notes for the purchase money, the purchase was, in fact, made by him for the benefit of one Judson, to whom he immediately conveyed the property, without receiving any consideration therefor, and the title still remains in Judson; that Judson furnished the money to make a cash payment, which was made at the time of the purchase, and paid one of the promissory notes given for the purchase money, hut refuses to pay the note in contest. He claims that, upon these facts, the plaintiff has a vendor's lien on the land, and therefore was not entitled to an attachment. The plaintiff filed an affidavit on the hearing of the motion, in which he alleges that he knew no one hut the defendant in the transaction relative to the island; that if Judson had any interest in the matter he was ignorant of it; but, on inquiring of Judson, since the filing of the plaintiff's affidavit, he was informed that he only loaned the money to the defendant for the purchase of the island, on his promise to secure the loan; but, failing to obtain other security, he took the conveyance from the defendant, and was ready to reconvey at any time, on payment of the amount advanced.
On this showing the Court refused to discharge the attachment, and the defendant has appealed.
The statute authorizes an attachment in the event that the debt "is not secured by a mortgage, lien, or pledge upon real or personal property; or if so secured, that such security has been rendered nugatory by the act of the defendant." (Practice Act, Sec. 120.) The appellant claims that the plaintiff has a vendor's lien on the land, and for that reason was not entitled to an attachment on the promissory note. If it he conceded that the plaintiff had a vendor's lien of a fixed and determinate character, the case would fall strictly within Hill v. Grigsby, 32 Cal. 55, in which this Court held that a person entitled to a vendor's lien of that character as security for the debt could not maintain an attachment for the purchase money. But in that case the vendor had made no conveyance, and had withheld the title as his security, the contract being executory. In this case the title of the' plaintiff, whether good or bad, was conveyed to the defendant, and by him to Judson. If the plaintiff retained a vendor's lien, under the circumstances, it was only an equitable right to resort to the land for payment, which right was liable to be defeated by an alienation or incumbrance, made by the vendee to a bona fide purchaser, for value, without notice. Is the vendor bound to follow the land with this equitable lien into the hands of a purchaser from the vendee, and thus test the purchaser's rights, before he can resort to an attachment against the vendor? Is this such a lien as the statute contemplates ? Is it such a lien as secures the debt in the sense of the statute ? We think not.
The policy of the law is, that a creditor, holding a security by way of " mortgage, lien, or pledge upon real or personal property," shall not resort to the summary process of attachment until he has exhausted his security. But it must be a lien of a fixed, determinate character, capable of being enforced with certainty, and depending on no conditions. If the land has been alienated by the vendee, it is not incumbent on the vendor to go through a litigation with the purchaser, in order to ascertain whether he is a purchaser for value, without notice, before resorting to his attachment. The vendee, by alienating the land, has not only interposed an obstacle in the way of enforcing the lien, but has rendered it doubtful whether the lien is not wholly defeated. He cannot compel the vendor to solve this doubt by proceedings against the purchaser before suing out his attachment.
The purchaser (Judson) is no party to this action, and will not be bound by the judgment therein. If the attachment be dissolved, it may be that in a proceeding against Judson to enforce the vendor's lion it will be proved that he holds the title by way of mortgage, taken in good faith and without notice, to secure an indebtedness from Brooks. This would defeat the vendor's lien pro tanto. "Until that question is tried in a direct proceeding against Judson, it cannot be known with certainty whether or not the plaintiff has an available lien. We cannot try that question'in this cause on ex parte affidavits, and, as the case is now presented, the defendant has failed to show that the plaintiff has such a vendor's lien as will defeat the attachment.
Order denying motion affirmed.