Case Name: Julius MEYER, Petitioner, v. AUTO CLUB INSURANCE ASSOCIATION, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1986-07-17
Citations: 492 So. 2d 1314
Docket Number: No. 66262
Parties: Julius MEYER, Petitioner, v. AUTO CLUB INSURANCE ASSOCIATION, Respondent.
Judges: McDonald, C.J., and OVERTON and SHAW, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 492
Pages: 1314–1317

Head Matter:
Julius MEYER, Petitioner, v. AUTO CLUB INSURANCE ASSOCIATION, Respondent.
No. 66262.
Supreme Court of Florida.
July 17, 1986.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 16, 1986.
C. Samuel Newman of L.D. Beltz & Associates, St. Petersburg, for petitioner.
William Rutger of Fowler, White, Gillen, Boggs, Villareal & Banker, Clearwater, for respondent.

Opinion:
EHRLICH, Justice.
We have for review Auto Club Insurance Association v. Meyer, 458 So.2d 425 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984), which directly conflicts with National Grange Mutual Insurance Co. v. Fondren, 433 So.2d 1276 (Fla. 4th DCA), review denied, 443 So.2d 980 (Fla.1983). We have jurisdiction, article V, section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution, and approve the decision below.
In April 1983, the petitioner, then a Michigan resident, was involved in an automobile accident while visiting Pinellas County, Florida. At the time of the accident, petitioner was insured by respondent, a foreign corporation based in Michigan. Subsequent to the accident, petitioner became a Florida resident.
Petitioner sued respondent in the circuit court in and for Pinellas County, seeking recovery under his insurance policy for medical and lost wage benefits. Respondent's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Florida's long-arm statute, section 48.193, Florida Statutes (1983), was denied by the trial court. The district court reversed, reasoning that the trial court could not exercise personal jurisdiction over respondent because the requirements, of section 48.193(l)(d) were not met. We agree.
Section 48.193(1)(d) grants Florida courts jurisdiction over persons who contract "to insure any person, property, or risk located within this state at the time of contracting." (emphasis supplied). The insurance policy in question contains a provision that limits its coverage to the fifty states and between their ports. Petitioner argues that issuance of the policy with this territorial coverage brings respondent within the purview of section 48.193(l)(d), as the risk insured against under his policy included the possibility of an accident occurring within any of the states, including Florida. This fact might well be of significance were we deciding petitioner's entitlement to coverage under his insurance policy. Coverage vel non is not the issue here. The sole issue before us is whether Florida courts have the power to entertain petitioner's claim.
The relevant facts for deciding this jurisdictional issue are undisputed. Petitioner was a Michigan resident who contracted for automobile insurance with respondent, a Michigan insurance company. At the time this contract was entered into, both parties were located in Michigan, not Florida. The property covered under the policy and the risk insured against were likewise in Michigan, not Florida. These facts clearly negate the applicability of section 48.193(l)(d).
Accepting petitioner's interpretation of section 48.193(l)(d), that the "risk located within this state at the time of contracting" is coterminus with the policy's territorial coverage, would violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. In order to subject a party to personal jurisdiction in Florida courts, that party must have certain "minimum contacts" with Florida so that maintenance of the suit does not "offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). The record before us shows that respondent was a foreign corporation, authorized and licensed to do business in Michigan. Respondent neither maintained an office in Florida nor solicited business in Florida. In short, respondent had no contacts with Florida. That petitioner, while a Michigan resident, was involved in an automobile accident in Florida, or that he eventually moved to Florida, are mere unilateral acts by petitioner and cannot, in and of themselves, provide respondent with the requisite minimum contacts mandated by the fourteenth amendment. The United States Supreme Court has stated:
The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State. The application of that rule will vary with the quality and nature of the defendant's activity, but it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 1239-40, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958). See also Kulko v. Superior Court of California, 436 U.S. 84, 98 S.Ct. 1690, 56 L.Ed.2d 132 (1978).
Petitioner further argues that the risk of loss occurring in Florida was a foreseeable consequence of respondent's issuing the policy with the covered territory defined as the fifty states, and relies on National Grange, wherein the court stated:
National Grange's policy territory encompassed the entire United States. The company was aware that the risk of loss was coextensive with the policy territory and that a loss could occur anywhere in the country. The fact that the loss occurred in Florida was a foreseeable consequence of issuing the policy with the unrestricted territory language. Thus, the Florida long arm statute, section 48.-193(l)(d), should apply to National Grange.
Id. at 1277.
The Supreme Court has rejected an identical theory that this type of "foreseeability" may be used as a basis for establishing in personam jurisdiction. In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980), the Court held:
[T]he foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis . is that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.
Id. at 297, 100 S.Ct. at 567. (emphasis supplied).
The respondent, having no contacts with Florida, therefore had no reasonable anticipation of being subjected to defending a suit in Florida courts.
We approve the decision below and disapprove the decision reached in National Grange.
It is so ordered.
McDonald, C.J., and OVERTON and SHAW, JJ., concur.
ADKINS, J., dissents with an opinion, in which BOYD, J., concurs.