Case Name: Russell Edward JONES, Appellant, v. Loretta Lillian JONES, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1988-05-31
Citations: 527 So. 2d 244
Docket Number: Nos. 86-1515, 86-2254
Parties: Russell Edward JONES, Appellant, v. Loretta Lillian JONES, Appellee.
Judges: Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and NESBITT and JORGENSON, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 527
Pages: 244–245

Head Matter:
Russell Edward JONES, Appellant, v. Loretta Lillian JONES, Appellee.
Nos. 86-1515, 86-2254.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
May 31, 1988.
Rehearing Denied July 20, 1988.
Charles L. Neustein, Miami Beach, for appellant.
Horton, Perse, & Ginsberg and Mallory H. Horton, Miami, for appellee.
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and NESBITT and JORGENSON, JJ.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
This appeal involves the final judgment of dissolution of a thirty-nine-year marriage between a retired airline pilot, age seventy-two, and a housewife not employed outside the home, age fifty-nine. At the dissolution hearing, the husband testified that he had assets of $40,000, as well as a monthly income of $2,000 including his pension and social security. The trial judge awarded the husband's one-half interest in the marital home, which had been appraised at $274,000 and which had a mortgage of approximately $5,000, to the wife. She received $25,000 in lump sum alimony and $1,000 per month permanent periodic alimony. He also ordered that a lot owned by the couple be sold and that the proceeds be equally divided. This award resulted in the wife receiving fifty per cent of the husband's income and over sixty per cent of his assets, in addition to all his interest in the marital home, which amounted to over $130,000. The husband appeals.
We hold that it was error to award the marital home to the wife where, as here, the award was not necessary for the maintenance of the wife, for the rearing of the couple's children, or for any other compelling reason because the effect was not to equitably distribute assets but to deprive the husband of the benefit of the proceeds of this marriage's primary asset: the marital home. See Lynch v. Lynch, 437 So.2d 234, 237 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983); Lyons v. Lyons, 436 So.2d 156 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Fraser v. Fraser, 368 So.2d 97 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). Moreover, experience, as well as common sense, indicates that a home as commodious and expensive as the one at issue may well require substantial maintenance and repair costs which a person who has no independent means of livelihood would find difficult to meet. The spouse to whom such a house is awarded may find it expeditious to sell the residence and move to a more maintainable and economical abode. The result of the sale could well be the reaping of a windfall for that spouse at the expense of the other whose interest the court took away.
Finally, we observe that there is no substantial merit to the claim that the husband has secreted undisclosed assets. Although this ploy may have been attempted, it appears that the assets were substantially accounted for; this record, therefore, is insufficient to have awarded the marital home to the wife on that basis.
For these reasons, that portion of the final judgment of dissolution which awarded the marital home to the wife is vacated. We direct that the home be sold and that proceeds from the sale be distributed equally between the two parties. In all other respects, the judgment under review is affirmed in that the award otherwise left the parties in substantially similar positions. See Dewberry v. Dewberry, 455 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Mahaffey v. Mahaffey, 401 So.2d 1372 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).
Affirmed as modified.
SCHWARTZ, C.J., and NESBITT, J., concur.