Case Name: May A. Thompson, Respondent, v. John R. Thompson, Appellant
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1902-03
Citations: 70 A.D. 242
Docket Number: 
Parties: May A. Thompson, Respondent, v. John R. Thompson, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 70
Pages: 242–247

Head Matter:
May A. Thompson, Respondent, v. John R. Thompson, Appellant.
Party—an administrator, withholding on a settlement of the estate-a sum to pay a tax — he cannot, after he has been released as administrator by the next of kin and a decree entered settling the estate, be sued therefor in his individual capacity.
The administrator of an intestate’s estate, with the consent of all the next of kin, set apart §600 of the assets of the estate in order to meet a possible demand, for an inheritance tax and agreed to return-it to the next of. kin if it should not be needed for that purpose. The balance of the estate was then distributed among the next of kin, each of whom executed to the administrator a written release, under seal, acknowledging the receipt of his or her full distributive share and releasing and discharging the administrator arid the estate from any ■ further liability. Pursuant to a provision contained in the releases such releases were filed in the .Surrogate’s Court and a decree was entered thereon judicially settling the administrator’s account and discharging him from all liability. No inheritance tax was ever assessed against the estate.
Held, that one of the next of kin of the intestate, who was entitled to a one-tenth share of the estate, could not maintain an action against the administrator to recover §60, being, her share of the §600 retained by him;
That the administrator still retained such §600 as administrator and that his liability, therefore, was as administrator only. •
Pürsman and Kellogg, JJ., dissented.
Appeal by the defendant, John E. Thompson, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Delaware on the 16th day of September, 1901, upon the verdict of a jury, and also from an order entered in said clerk’s office on the 16th day of September, 1901, denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial made upon the minutes.
The defendant was the administrator of the estate of John Thompson, deceased. The plaintiff, as one of his next of kin, was entitled upon distribution to a one-tenth share thereof. In- May, 1893, the parties interested got together and mutually agreed upon the total sum which was in the defendant’s hands as administrator to be distributed. Each of such parties thereupon executed to the defendant a written release, under seal, acknowledging the receipt of the full distributive share due to each, respectively, and of all moneys due, or to become due, from said estate, and in full payment and satisfaction of all claims held against such estate or the administrator thereof, and releasing and discharging him and the estate from any further liability. Such release also contained an agreement that the same might be filed in the Surrogate’s Court, and that upon it a decree might be entered, without citation and without filing any further account, judicially settling the defendant’s accounts as such administrator and discharging him from all further liability as such. It also contained a covenant to save the said defendant harmless and to indemnify him from all cost, trouble and expense on account of the payment therein acknowledged. Such releases were duly acknowledged and filed with the surrogate, and a decree was thereupon entered declaring his accounts settled and discharging him from further liability as such administrator.
The plaintiff was present at such settlement and executed one of such releases. Subsequently in November, 1899, she brought this action to recover from the defendant the further sum of sixty dollars, which she claims the defendant on the occasion of the settlement promised to pay to her in the event that no collateral inheritance tax was thereafter assessed against it; that the defendant’s promise then made was a personal one, and that the release then executed by her runs to him as administrator only ; and, therefore, does not at all affect this claim. The trial court so held, and the jury rendered a verdict in her favor for such amount and interest. .From the judgment entered thereon, and from the order denying a new trial upon the minutes, this appeal is takem
Charles L. Andrus, for the appellant.
Andrew J. McNaught, Jr., and John P. Grant, for the, respondent.

Opinion:
Parker, P. J.:
If the balance which at the time of the settlement was found to be due from the defendant as administrator included the $600 which the complaint claims was then " entrusted " by the next of kin to the defendant to meet a possible demand for an inheritance tax against the estate, then it might perhaps.be argued.that a retention of the same by the defendant, and- a release therefor, was equivalent to a receipt by him of their money, advanced by them to protect him personally against such a claim; and his promise to repay the plaintiff sixty dollars thereof as the amount so deposited by her, in the event that he did not have to use the same, might be considered a promise made by the defendant, in his individual character, under an arrangement made subsequent to the transaction to which the . release referred. It might then be considered that she had received the sixty dollars and receipted for it, and had thereafter returned it to the defendant for the purpose aforesaid. Such a subsequent arrangement would not be affected by the release.
But the fact, as it appears from the evidence introduced in her behalf, is, that, the defendant deducted the sum of $600 from the assets before the balance for distribution was agreed upon. The share then agreed to be due her, and upon the payment of which to her she executed the release, was ascertained upon the theory that it did not include any part of the $600. He deducted that as a possible necessary expenditure, before he struck the balance for distribution, and so such $600 was no more nor less than assets of the estate left in his hands for subsequent distribution. ' He retained it solely as administrator, and I am at a loss to understand why he does not still hold it as such. He received it from the estate as part of its assets.' According to her claim, as it appears, upon the trial, he has never yet distributed it, and, therefore, his liability to. account for and pay it over is that of an administrator only.
From this view of the transaction — and which is the one stated by the respondent in her points—it is manifest that the plaintiff is not entitled to maintain this action.
Her claim is squarely in conflict with the release which she then executed. Such release and the surrogate's decree subsequently entered is a flat bar to her recovery here, and on the evidence before it the jury was not warranted in rendering the verdict which it did render. Alb objections and exceptions necessary to raise this question were taken by the defendant upon the trial. The judgment and order, therefore, must be reversed and a new trial granted.
All concurred, except Fursman, J., dissenting in an opinion in which Kellogg, J., concurred.