Case Name: JAEGER v. KOENIG
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1900-11-21
Citations: 67 N.Y.S. 172
Docket Number: 
Parties: JAEGER v. KOENIG.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 67
Pages: 172–175

Head Matter:
(33 Misc. Rep. 82.)
JAEGER v. KOENIG.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Term.
November 21, 1900.)
1. Cross Judgments—Assignment—Equitable Set-Off.
Where a judgment debtor recovered a judgment against his judgment creditor in a separate action in another court, after the latter had assigned his judgment to his attorneys, there was no right of equitable set-off between the judgments.
2. Same—Judgment for Costs—Ownership—Attorneys.
A judgment for costs belongs to the attorney of the judgment creditor, and the judgment debtor cannot set off the same with a judgment recovered by him against such judgment creditor in a different action in another court.
Giegerich, J., dissenting.
Appeal from city court of New York, general term.
Suit by Marie Louise Jaeger against John H. Koenig for equitable set-off of judgments. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff (65 N. Y. Supp. 795), defendant appeals.
Reversed.
Argued before BEEKMAN, P. J., and GIEGERICH and O’GORMAN, JJ.
Samuel Scoville, for appellant.
George H. Hart, for respondent.

Opinion:
O'GORMAN, J.
The right to set-off on the part of the defendant did not accrue until the dismissal of the complaint in the supreme court action. Roberts v. Carter, 38 N. Y. 110; Zogbaum v. Parker, 66 Barb. 344. Three days before, however, the plaintiff's judgment in the city court case had been assigned to her attorney; but it is contended that this assignment was taken by the attorney subject to the existing equities, and that, therefore, the assignment should not be permitted to impair the defendant's right to set-off. The rule, however, goes no further than that the assignee of a judgment takes it subject to rights of set-off which have already attached. 27 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 456. The equitable right to offset judgments, therefore, never existed between these parties; for, when the defendant's judgment for costs was obtained in the supreme court case, the plaintiff did not own the city court judgment. Perry v. Chester, 53 N. Y. 240. Littlefield v. Bank, 97 N. Y. 581, and Davidson v. Alfaro, 80 N. Y. 660, are not opposed to these views. In Davidson v. Alfaro the plaintiff had an existing claim, although unliquidated, at the time of the defendant's assignment to his attorneys. So, also, in the Littlefield Case plaintiff's claim against defendant's assignor existed and was due before the execution of the assignment, but in the case before us the defendant had no claim or demand until he became entitled to the judgment for costs on the dismissal of the complaint. Hoyt v. Godfrey, 3 Civ. Proc. R. 118, is not in point. There the court merely held that the assignment of plaintiff's costs did not prevent the court from offsetting the defendant's costs in the same action. Here the costs sought to be set off arose in an independent action and in another court. As to the two judgments for costs in the city court action, it is sufficient to say that they belonged to the plaintiff's attorney, and his claim thereto was superior to the rights of the adverse party. Husted v. Thomson (Sup.) 57 N. Y. Supp. 558.
The order of the general term of the city court should therefore be reversed, with costs, and the order of the special term, denying defendant's motion, affirmed, with costs.