Case Name: Jackson, ex dem. Coe and others, against Kniffen
Court: New York Supreme Court of Judicature
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1806-11
Citations: 2 Johns. 31
Docket Number: 
Parties: Jackson, ex dem. Coe and others, against Kniffen.
Judges: Kent, Ch. J. declared himself to be of the same opinion.
Reporter: Johnson's Reports
Volume: 2
Pages: 31–36

Head Matter:
Jackson, ex dem. Coe and others, against Kniffen.
This was an action of ejectment, for land, in New-burgh, in the county of Orange. The cause was tried at the Orange circuit, in May, 1805,'before Mr. Justice Thompson.
The lessors of the plaintiff claimed title to the premises in question, as heirs at law, and by conveyance from the heirs at law, of David Kniffen, who died in January, 1804. The plaintiff proved title, prima facie. The defendant then offered the will of David Kniffen, in evidence. It was dated February 1,1801, and executed in presence of three w'itnessess. The testator gave to his son $3, and to each of his daughters $5, and his grand children $3 each', and to the daughter of Undrell Merrit, $125, and directed the legacies to be paid out of his personal estate; and then devised all the remainder of his real and personal estate, (after paying the debts and the legacies) to his wife, the defendant, in fee. The. will was then proved by one of the subscribing witnesses. The plaintiff then called several witnesses to prove, that the will was obtained by duress. It appeared that the testator was possessed of considerable real and personal estate, in’ his lifetime; and had advanced to some of his children small sums of money; that the defendant was his second wife, by whom he had*1 no issue; and that they had been married for 20 yeare before his death. The testator wa's about 80 years of age, at the time of his decease, During the time, between the 1st February, 1804, and his death, hcwas guarded and watched by his wife, and Undrill Merrii, who lived in the house, and his children were debarred from having free access to him, with a view, as the witnesses supposed, to prevent bim a]terjng, or making any other will. The plaintiff then offered to prove* by one of the subscribing witnesses to the will, and four other persons, that the testator, on many occasions, in conversation with them, whom he considered as his friends, since the making of the same will, had uniformly, and in the most earnest manner, declared that instrument not to be his will; and that he had been forced to execute it, for he should have been murdered, if he had not, and called on these persons to bear witness to what he declared, and particularly requested the subscribing witnesses not to prove the execution of the will, which had been kept in the custody of Joseph Morey, one of the executors, ever since its execution. The plaintiff offered to prove further, that the testator, during his last illness, and within an hour before his death, while expecting immediate dissolution, in a solemn manner called on one of the persons then present, to bear witness that the said instrument was not his will, but that it had been extorted from him, through fear of being murdered, and that his desire was, to make an equal distribution of his estate, among his children ; the testator also then declared, as he had often done before, that he had requested Joseph Morey to return to him the said instrument, for the purpose of can-celling it; but that Morey always refused to return it.
Parol evidence of the revocation of a will is inadmsisible. Parol evidence to show that the testator executed . a will under duress, may be received; but not of the subsequent declarations of the testator himself.
The judge overruled this testimony, and the plaintiff submitted to a nonsuit.
A motion was now made to set aside the nonsuit, and for a new trial on a case made, in which the above facts were stated.
The case was submitted to the court without argument.

Opinion:
Thompson, J.
This case was submitted to the court without argument. It appears, that the right of the re spective parties to the premises in question, depends on the validity of the will of Daniel Kniffen, under which the defendant claims. The lessors of the plaintiff contend, that the will is void. To establish this, they offered, upon the trial, to prove certain parol declarations, by the testator, after the due execution of his will, some of which were made a few hours before his death, purporting that he had executed his will through fear and compulsion, and that he revoked the same. This testimony was overruled, and the question now presented is? whether it was competent evidence, and ought to have been admitted. The other circumstances given in evidence, tending to show that the testator, when he executed the will in question was under improper restraint might have been submitted to the jury; but on the rejection of the parol declaration of the testator, the .plaintiff submitted to a nonsuit. In whatever point of view the testimony offered is considered, I cannot but think that it was properly overruled. It could not, if placed in the strongest possible terms, amount to a revocation, without a direct violation of the statute, which declares that no will (of land) shall be revoked, or altered, except by writing, executed with all the requisites of a will, or by cancelling the same. If these declarations were not to operate as a revocation, I am at a loss to see in what manner they could affect the will. To say that they were proper, in order to show that the instrument in question was not duly executed, by reason of its having been signed under duress, is assuming the very point which was to be proved. If they were legal evidence, they must be so, when standing alone, unaided by any of the circumstances previously proved. That th.e declarations were made a few hours before the d,eath the testator, can add nothing to their efficacy ; for, Surely, he could not be considered as standing in the
c^arac(:er of a witness, even admitting the declaration# of a witness in extremis, to be admissible in any case. This will might have been executed under circumstances which ought to invalidate it; but to allow it to be impeached, by the parol declarations of the testator himself, would, in my judgment, be eluding the statute, and an infringement upon well settled and established principles of law. (1 Vezey, 440. 5 Co. 69. 2 P. Wms. 136.) The only case that has fallen under my observation, which looks like countenancing, in any measure, testimony of this kind, is that of Nelson v. Oldfield, reported in 3 Vernon, 76. We have, however, but a very imperfect statement of the case there givén; and the point before the court to be decided, was whether a will of personal estate, which had been proved in the spiritual court, could be controverted in the court of chancery. It is true, the reporter observes, that by the depositions of witnesses examined in the cause, the complaints of" the testatrix, during her last sickness, respecting the means by which she had been induced to execute her will, were stated; but no objection appears to have been made to the evidence.- The defence relied upon, was the conclusiveness of the probate. The admissibility of the testimony not being the point before the court, this cannot, in my opinion, be considered an authority to control the present case. To permit wills to be defeated, or in any manner whatsoever impeached, by the parol declarations of the testator, appears to me repugnant to the very genious and spirit of the statute, and not to be allowed.
My opinion, therefore is, that the motion must be denied.
Kent, Ch. J. declared himself to be of the same opinion.