Case Name: The State ex rel. Walbridge, Mayor, v. Valliant, Judge
Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1894-06-25
Citations: 123 Mo. 524
Docket Number: 
Parties: The State ex rel. Walbridge, Mayor, v. Valliant, Judge.
Judges: Black, O. J., and Brace, Gantt and Burgess, JJ., concur; Barclay and Sherwood, JJ., dissent.
Reporter: Missouri Reports
Volume: 123
Pages: 524–545

Head Matter:
The State ex rel. Walbridge, Mayor, v. Valliant, Judge.
In Banc,
June 25, 1894.
Certiorari: interlocutory order. Certiorari will not lie, to review an interlocutory order of the circuit court, made in a proceeding in which it has jurisdiction, before its final determination. And in such circumstances the writ will be quashed on motion, although no return has been made thereto.
Certiorari.
Writ quashed.
W. C. Marshall for relator.
(1) The writ of certiorari was properly issued in this case. It is a writ issuing from the supreme court to an inferior court, or officer exercising judicial powers, whose proceedings are summary, commanding the latter to return the records of a cause depending before it to the superior court. 3 Am. and Eng. Encyclopedia of Law, p. 60. It usually issues in cases only where the proceedings of the inferior court are summary and not according to the course of the common law. Tidd’s Pr., 379; Farmington River, etc., v. Gou/nty Commissioners, 112 Mass. 206; Lynch v. Crosby, 134 Mass. 290. (2) A writ of certiorari may be issued either before or after the inferior court has entered judgment. It was issued before judgment in the following cases. State v. Hunt, 46 N. J. L. 59; Rector v. Price, 1 Mo. 198; Railroad v. Morton, 27 Mo. 198;. Owens v. Co. Court, 49 Mo. 294; Harris on Certiorari, secs. 1, 2, 3, 4, 10, 16. (3) At common law there were two writs known as writs of certiorari. The first taking up proceedings at any stage of the case prior to-final judgment; in other words, for trial in the superior court; the second for taking up the record after final judgment in the lower court, which was a writ in the nature of a writ of review and only issued in cases where no appeal or writ of error lies1. Harris on Certiorari, section 3, page 5; sections 2, 3, 4, 10; Laurence v. Rickey, 12 N. J. L. 368; Mackaboy v. Com., 2 Ya. Oases, 268; Railroad v. Morton, 27 Mo. 317; State v. Foster, 41 Mo. 61. It issues under supervisory power over-inferior courts at any time. Fdgar v. Greer, 14 Iowa, 212; Laioton v. Com., 2 Caines, 182; Rex v. Glamorganshire, 1 Ld. Raym. 580. (4) Certiorari has been awarded as an original writ and the cause heard and considered by this court in the following cases: Rector v. Price, 1 Mo. 198; Railroad v. Morton, 27 Mo. 317; State v. Foster, 41 Mo. 61; Owens v. Comity Court, 49 Mo. 372; Railroad v. Board, 64 Mo. 294; and these cases have been cited approvingly in State exrel. v. Holladay, 67 Mo. 70; State exrel. v" Kansas City, 89 Mo. 38. (5) Under the provision of the constitution, above quoted (section 3, art. 6), and under section 3243, Revised Statutes, 1889, which gives all courts power to issue all writs which may be necessary in the exercise of their respective jurisdiction, according to the principles and usages of law, this court, has, from time to time, issued original writs in extra ordinary eases. Ex parte MarmaduJce 91 Mo. 228; State ex rel. v. Rombauer, 104 Mo. 619; State ex rel. v. Rombauer, 105 Mo. 103. And in mandamus cases and cases in the nature of mandamus, too frequently to need reference. (6) An appeal leaves the judgment in full force and effect, without any interference or interruption by reason of the appeal. T Freeman on Executions [2 Ed.], sec. 32; Railroad v. Atkinson, 17 Mo. App. 484; Hoganv. Rose, 52 U. S. (11 How.) 294-297; Railroad v'. Harris, 74 U. S. (7 Wall.) 574; Sagev. Railroad, 93 U. S. (3 Otto) 412; Williams v. Bruffy, 102 U. S. (12 Otto) 248. (7) An appeal with a bond operates as a supersedeas in no case except those specified in section 2249, Revised Statutes of Missouri. State ex rel. v. Lewis, 76 Mo. 370; Railroad v. Evans & Howard, 85 Mo. 307; State ex rel. v. Ransom, 86 Mo. 326; Teas dale v. Jones, 40 Mo. App. 243; Neiser v. Thomas, 46 Mo. App. 47; Elliott on Appellate Procedure, sees. 362-374. (8) A writ of certiorari issued after judgment does not supersede the judgment nor stay the same. Johnson v. The State, 1 Ala. 97; Burshaw v. City Couneil, 39 N. J. Law, 416; *McQuaid v. Emmons, 38 N. J. Law, 397; Mayor v. Shaw, 14 Gra. 162; Taylor v. Gay, 28 G-a. 80; Patchinv. Mayor, 13 Wend. 664; Board v. Wonderly, 55 Ga. 570; Ewing v. Thompson, 43 Pa. St. 372; State v. Niel, 1 Charlt. (Ga.) 42; Shaw v. Macon, 19 G-a. 468; Commissioners v. People, 99 111. 587; People v. Hill, 65 Barb. 170. (9) This court can only review such matters as are matters of record in the case before the mayor. It can not, and will not, undertake to look into or decide questions of fact, nor to reverse the action of the mayor, even though the court, upon those facts, would have reached a different conclusion. The evidence which was returned to the circuit court in obedience to the writ issued by that court is no part of the record and was never made part of the record by a bill of exceptions. State ex rel. v. Hochaclay, 64 Mo. 294; State v. Foster, 41 Mo. 61; State ex rel. v. Holladay, 67 Mo. 70; State ex rel. v. Kansas City, 89 Mo. 38; State v. Johnson, 18 Lawyer’s Reports Ann. 410; Ex parte Childs, 12 Pick. 358; Richardson v. Smitt, 59 N. H. 517; Mollett v. Keenan, 22 Ala. 484; People v. Betts, 55 N. Y. 60Ó; State v. Boherty, 25 La. Ann. 119. (10) It is proper to inquire whether there was any evidence to establish some essential fact, but the finding can not be disturbed if supported by any competent evidence. The supreme courtis “not'to determine whether the probabilities preponderate one way or the other, but simply to determine whether the evidence is such that it will justify the finding as a legitimate inference from the facts proved, whether that inference would or would not have been drawn by the superior tribunal.” Jackson v. People, 10 Mich. Ill; Ex parte Madison Turnpike Co. 62 Ala. 93; Camden v. Clock, 65 Ala. 236; Ransom ' v. McElvaine, 49 Mich. 194; Hyde v. Nelson, 11 Mich. 357; People v. Board, 72 N. Yí 415; People v.Board, 69 N. Y. 408; People v. Weigant, 14 Hun (N. Y.), 546; Moreland v. Whitford, 54 Wis. 150; Fore v. Fore, 44 Ala. 478; Miller v. McCullough, 21 Ark. 426; Deputy v. Betts, 4 Har. (Del.) 352; Burton v. Ferguson, 69 Ind. 486; MenJonv. Commissioners, 5 Allen, 13.
Deverett Bell for respondent, Reid.
(1) The motion to quash the writ of certiorari should be sustained. This court will not hear indirectly by resort to certiorari a case which by the state constitution it has not jurisdiction of by writ of error or appeal. Britton v. Steber, 62 Mo. 370. The rule as to certiorari is not modified by State v. Tracy, 94 Mo. 217. (2) If this court possessed jurisdiction of the controversy in the Reid case, the practice act provides for the removal of the same from the circuit to the supreme court by writ of error or appeal, and in such case certiorari does not lie. The writ of certiorari will issue where no adequate mode of review is provided by writ of error, appeal or otherwise from the decisions of inferior courts or tribunals. Harris’ Certiorari, sec. 1 ; Ennis v. Ennis, 110 111. 78. (3) If the court, upon a hearing, is satisfied that the writ was improvidently issued, or that justice and equity so require, it will dismiss the,same. Curtis v. TJtica, 45 How. Pr. 289; People v. Mayor, 2 Hill (N. Y.) 9; Gager v. Board, 47 Mich. 167. (4) It is now the universal practice to refuse the writ of certiorari while the proceedings below are still pending and undetermined. 2 Spelling Extr. Relief, sec. 1894; People v. Peabody, 26 Barb. (N. Y.) 437. It does not go to inferior courts, etc., until the proceedings before them are completed, and a final determination or adjudication had. 2 Spelling Extr. Relief, sec. 1894; Cuyler v. Trustees, 5 Thomp. & O. (N. Y.) 609. (5) It does not appear that the relator in this writ has any personal interest in the subject-matter of the original case. The party applying must show that he has a personal interest in the subject-matter, and not a mere public interest, etc. Harris’ Certiorari, sec. 2; Golden v. Botts, 12 Wend. 234.
W. B. Thompson also for respondent, Reid.
This court has recently decided, in the ease of the State ex rel. Beid v. Walbridge, 119 Mo. 383, that the mayor has full authority to hear and determine the charges made against Reid, and this court has also held in that case that the courts of law will review any decision made by the mayor in this case. The courts of law have power to review, and the decision supra is in harmony with all the authorities; it affirms the ease of the State ex rel. v. St. Louis, 90 Mo. 19, and the doctrine of which case is sustained by the following authorities: People v. Board, 72 N. Y. 415; People v. Board, 72 N. Y. 445; Stockwell v. Board, 22 Mich. 341; Kennardv. Lousiana, 92 U. S. 480. The following eases have held that a writ of certiorari will not issue for a mere defect of form: Elmendorf v. Mayor, 25 Wendell, 693; Monterey v. Berkshire, 7 Cushing (Mass.), 394; Smith v. Commissioners, 42 Me. 395; Crisioellv. Richter, 12 Tex. 18. The courts will not-issue a certiorari where substantial justice has been already done, or where mischievious consequences will result from its 1 issue, or where the parties can not be placed in statu quo by its issue. Hancock v. Boston, 1 Metcalf (Mass.) 122; Rutlandtv. Worcester, 20 Pickering (Mass.), 71; Gleason v. Sloper, 24 Pickering, 181; People v. Supervisors, 15 Wendell, 198; People v. Rochester, 21 Barber, 656.

Opinion:
Macfarlane, J.
— A writ of certiorari was issued from this court to respondent, as judge of the circuit court of the city of St. Louis, requiring him to send up the records and proceedings in the case of State ex rel. Reid v. Walbridge then pending before him. In obedience to said writ the records have been filed in this court.
It appears from the records that charges had been preferred before Walbridge, as mayor, against Greorge B. Reid, as commissioner of public buildings of the city of St. Louis, which had been heard and determined by him on the thirty-first day of January, 1894. That proceeding resulted in an order removing the said Reid from office.
On the first day of February, 1894, upon the application of the said Reid a writ of certiorari was issued by the circuit court of the city of St. Louis directed to the said Walbridge, as mayor, upon which the records and proceedings of the mayor in said matter was brought before said court for review. Upon granting the writ the circuit court made the further order that "no further steps or proceedings shall be had, in the matter of the removal of said Ried from said office, or the appointment or election of a successor thereto, until the judgment of this court is had in the premises."
To the writ the mayor made return and on the twelfth day of February, 1894, the relator Reid filed a motion, in said eircuit court to quash the proceedings had before the mayor.
Pending the motion, this writ was issued by two of the judges of this court in vacation on the twentieth day of February, 1894.
Amotion was filed to quash and dismiss the writ, on the ground, among others, that the cause was still pending and undetermined in said circuit court, and no final judgment had been rendered therein. This motion, and the ease on its merits, were argued orally together, and briefs have also been furnished on both. The view we take of the law renders it necessary to consider only the motion.
It is said by relator, that the order of the circuit court, in the nature of a supersedeas, was beyond its power and jurisdiction, and, though merely interlocutory in its character, afforded sufficient authority for the issuance of the writ; that the writ can properly issue at any stage of the proceedings, if necessary, in order to keep the court within its jurisdiction. On the other hand respondent argues -that the writ only operates as a means of securing a review of the proceedings of an inferior court or tribunal and can only issue after a' final determination of the case.
According to the ancient common law, a writ of certiorari issued out of chancery or the King's Bench, to the judges of inferior courts, commanding them to return the records of a cause depending before them, to the end that the party might have the more sure and speedy justice before the court issuing the writ, or before stich court as might be assigned to determine the cause. Bacon's Abridg., title, Certiorari.
The writ was thus issued, not only for the purpose of reviewing the proceedings of the lower court, as a writ of review after final judgment, but as a means for removing the entire cause for hearing and determination in another court. But it is said by Judge Napton in Railroad v. Morton, 27 Mo. 320: "A reference to the English commentators and judicial decisions will readily show that the writ is much more extensively used in that country than it could be here, and under such circumstances which would totally exclude any resort to such a proceeding in this state."
The writ, at common law, was not one of right, but was allowed or refused in the discretion of the judge or chancellor. Harris on Certiorari, sec. 4.
Unless the use of the writ is regulated by statute, which is the case in some of the states when directed to an inferior court or tribunal, it is only used as a writ of review. In such case its use is that of a remedy and not of an action. The application is still addressed to the sound discretion of the judge authorized to issue the writ. It does not issue as a matter of right, unless under some mandatory statute. The courts of each jurisdiction can, and do, adopt their own rules of practice in respect to such discretionary matters, and are not bound by the rules of the common law or courts of other states.
While, according to the ancient common law, now much modified by statute in England, the writ appears sometimes to have issued at any stage of the proceedings, for the purpose of removing the entire cause from one court to another for trial, and to keep the inferior court within its jurisdiction, such has never been the practice in this state. Unless the statute provides, as in case of unlawful detainer (sec. 5126), or unless, as ancillary to an appeal or writ of error upon a suggestion of a diminution of the record, the writ is only used as one of review, and only in case no appeal or writ of error or other plain and adequate remedy is provided.
It has been the uniform practice in this state, and generally in other states of the Union, in the absence of statutory regulation, only to issue the writ for the purpose of reviewing the final determination and adjudications of inferior courts and other tribunals when acting judicially. Harris on Certiorari, sec. 194; 2 Spelling's Extraordinary Relief, sec. 1894; State ex rel. v. Edwards, 104 Mo. 125.
Whatever may be the power of the superior court, according to the rules of the common law, to keep its hand upon those over which it has supervisory control, and guide them in each of their rulings in the progress of the cause, this court has ever refused, by writs of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari to exercise it; but, when the court or tribunal has jurisdiction to proceed correctly, the right to commit errors, and the opportunity to make corrections themselves has never been denied. State ex rel. v. Court of Appeals, 99 Mo. 221; State ex rel. v. Burckhartt, 87 Mo. 533; State ex rel. v. Scott, 104 Mo. 419; State ex rel. v. Withrow, 108 Mo. 1; State ex rel. v. Edwards, supra.
The circuit courts of the state are, under the constitution and laws of the state, possessed of original common law jurisdiction, and have inherent authority, in all proper cases, to issue the writ of certiorari. This authority has ever been recognized, and, so far as we find, has never been questioned. State ex rel. v. Dowling, 50 Mo. 134; State ex rel. v. City of Kansas, 89 Mo. 37; Owens v. Andrew Co., 49 Mo. 375; State ex rel. v. Walbridge, 116 Mo. 656.
The circuit court having jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter before it, this court will not undertake to direct what rulings it shall make or what judgment it shall render.
We think the writ prematurely issued and order the same quashed and the records returned to said circuit court for the hearing and disposition of the cause.
Black, O. J., and Brace, Gantt and Burgess, JJ., concur; Barclay and Sherwood, JJ., dissent.