Case Name: Terry Wayne MARTIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. David JOHNSON, Doctor, Surgeon at Mountain Vista Hospital, Mesa, Arizona; et al., Defendants-Appellees
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2013-12-11
Citations: 549 F. App'x 667
Docket Number: No. 12-17672
Parties: Terry Wayne MARTIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. David JOHNSON, Doctor, Surgeon at Mountain Vista Hospital, Mesa, Arizona; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: Before: CANBY, TROTT, and THOMAS, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 549
Pages: 667–668

Head Matter:
Terry Wayne MARTIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. David JOHNSON, Doctor, Surgeon at Mountain Vista Hospital, Mesa, Arizona; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 12-17672.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted Nov. 19, 2013.
Filed Dec. 11, 2013.
Terry Wayne Martin, Florence, AZ, pro se.
Before: CANBY, TROTT, and THOMAS, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Arizona state prisoner Terry Wayne Martin appeals pro se from the district court's judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1988 action alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court's dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Weilburg v. Shapiro, 488 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir.2007). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record, Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir.2008), and we affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Martin's claim against defendants Johnson, Phan, and Glassey because Martin failed to allege facts showing that these defendants acted with deliberate indifference in treating his cellulitis and other related medical issues. See Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057-58, 1060 (9th Cir.2004) (providing the standard for deliberate indifference, including where a claim involves choices between alternative courses of treatment, and explaining that a showing of negligence or medical malpractice is insufficient to establish a constitutional deprivation). Dismissal of Martin's claims against defendants Barr, Waker, Ryan, and Herr was proper for the same reason. See id.
The district court properly dismissed Martin's claim against defendant P.N.A./ C.H.C. because a defendant cannot be held liable under § 1983 solely because it employs individuals who may have violated the plaintiffs constitutional rights, and Martin alleged only that P.N.A./C.H.C. "allowed their staff to operate below standards." See Chudacoff v. Univ. Med. Ctr. of S. Nev., 649 F.3d 1143, 1152 (9th Cir.2011) ("[Tjhere is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983."); see also Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nev., 290 F.3d 1175, 1194 (9th Cir.2002) (municipal liability requires showing that a policy, custom, or failure to train amounted to deliberate indifference).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n. 2 (9th Cir.2009) (per curiam).
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.