Case Name: The People, ex. rel. Giles B. Kellogg, administrator of William A. Batchellor deceased, vs. Cornelius Schuyler, sheriff, &c. George R. Davis and others
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1850-12
Citations: 4 N.Y. 173
Docket Number: 
Parties: The People, ex. rel. Giles B. Kellogg, administrator of William A. Batchellor deceased, vs. Cornelius Schuyler, sheriff, &c. George R. Davis and others.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 4
Pages: 173–195

Head Matter:
The People, ex. rel. Giles B. Kellogg, administrator of William A. Batchellor deceased, vs. Cornelius Schuyler, sheriff, &c. George R. Davis and others.
Where a sheriff, having in his hands a process against the property of the defendant therein, seizes by virtue thereof the goods of another person, he is guilty of official misconduct, and he and his sureties thereby become liable upon his official bond.
Accordingly, where an attachment against the property of an absconding or concealed debtor was duly issued to a sheriff, who, acting under such process, seized the goods of another person, and detained the same on being indemnified, after a jury called to try the claim interposed by the owner had decided in his favor, and the owner thereupon sued the sheriff in trespass for seizing the goods and recovered judgment against him, on which execution was issued and returned nulla bona; held that the facts constituted a breach of the official bond of the sheriff, given for the faithful performance of the duties of his office, and that an action on the bond would lie against him and his sureties in behalf of such owner.
The case of Ex parte Reed, (4 Hill, 573,) commented upon, and, it seems, overruled.
If a trespass is committed by a deputy sheriff in enforcing legal process, his act, it seems, is deemed official so as to charge the sheriff for his misconduct.
Where a sheriff, under legal process, seizes property claimed by a stranger, and [174] requires and receives indemnity before proceeding to the final execution of the writ, his sureties, on payment of the judgment recovered against him for the erroneous seizure, are entitled to be subrogated to the indemnity
This was an action of debt brought in the supreme court, upon the official bond executed by Schuyler as sheriff of the county of Eensselaer, and by the other defendants as his sureties, to the people of the state of blew-York. The declaration set forth the bond iii the penalty of $10,000, and conditioned that the said Schuyler should “ well and faithfully in all things perform and execute the office of sheriff of said county of Eensselaer, during his continuance in said office by virtue of his election thereto, without fraud, deceit or oppression.” It was alledged for a breach, that on the 11th of June, 1840, an attachment was duly issued at the suit of one Thomas McVity against the property of one Dexter M. Fay, as an absconding or concealed debtor, according to the statute, and was delivered to Schuyler as such sheriff, to be executed ; that Schuyler, by virtue of that process, claimed to seize and did seize the property of William A. Batchellor; that upon said property being claimed by Batchellor, the said sheriff, in pursuance of the statute, summoned a jury to try the claim, and that the jury found the property to belong to the claimant; that thereupon the attaching creditor, by bond with sureties, indemnified the sheriff for the detention of the goods so seized, whereby the sheriff was required te detain and did detain such goods ; that thereupon Batchellor sued the sheriff in trespass for seizing the goods, and recovered judgment against him for the sum of $2290,05, damages and costs, on which execution was issued and returned nulla bona. Batchellor having died, Giles B. Kellogg, the relator, as his administrator, obtained an order of the supreme court for leave to prosecute the sheriff and his sureties on the said official bond.
The defendants appeared by different attorneys and severally demurred to the declaration, assigning for cause, that the facts stated in the declaration did not show that the said Schuyler, at any time or in any manner, had failed or omitted faithfully in all things to perform and execute the office of sheriff, without fraud, deceit or oppression. The supreme • court sitting in the third district held the demurrers well taken, and gave judg- [175] ment for the defendants. The plaintiffs appealed to this court.
J. Pierson, for appellants.
I. The breach of the sheriff’s bond is set forth in the recitals and averments in the declaration, and is well assigned. It was necessary to detail all the facts and proceedings to show the nature of the wrong, and that the sheriff committed it in the discharge of his official duty as a public officer. (Peoplo v. Brush, 6 Wend. 454; Hughes v. Smith, 5 John. 173; Smith v. Jansen, 8 id. 114; 2 R. S. p. 4, §§ 10, 11; id. 9, § 42; id. 476, §§ 1, 3.)
II. The sheriff in this case committed a trespass by virtue of his office, a wrong, an act of oppression, for which he and his official sureties are liable. (2 R. S. 4, §§ 10, 11; Ex parte Reed, 4 Hill, 572; Batchellor v. Schuyler, 3 id. 388; People v. Brush, 6 Wend. 454-6 ; People v. Ring, 15 id. 623; Carmack v. Commonwealth, 5 Binney, 184; Satterwhite v. Carson, 3 Iredell, 549; Archer v. Noble, 3 Greenl. 418; Harris v. Hansan, 2 Fair. 241; Bosley v. Smith, 3 Humphrey, 406 ; 4 Bac. Ab. 452, tit. Sheriff; Curtis v. Patterson, 8 Cowen, 65 ; Phillips v. Harris, 3 J. J. Marshall, 122; Commonwealth v. Herndon, 2 Dana, 429; Potts v. Commonwealth, 4 J. J. Marshall, 202; Watson on Sheriffs, 198-203, 204; 7 Law Library, 142-147; 2 R. S. p. 433, § 40; id. p. 476, §§ 1, 3, 5 ; 1 R. L. 1813, 419, §§ 2, 6; R. S. 378, § 67; Ex parte Chester, 5 Hill, 555 : Shepherd v. Hoit, 7 id. 198.)
III. The sheriff was indemnified for committing this trespass, and the sheriff’s bail, who can avail, or have availed themselves of his indemnity, ought to make reparation. (Davis v. Tibbats, 7 J. J. Marshall, 264; Jessop v. Brown, 2 Gill & John. 404; Watson on Sheriffs, 205 ; 7 Law Lib. 148.)
IY. Schuyler was sued as sheriff and defended as such, and judgment recovered against him, and the judgment of the court settles his liability as sheriff. If he had succeeded in his defence, he would have been entitled to double costs, which shows that he committed the act by virtue of his office. He could not under the general issue have justified had he not seized the property by virtue, of his office. (1 Saund. Pl, and Ev. [176] 479, 480; 2 id. 522, 791; Davis v. Cooper, 6 Missouri R. 148; Brewster v. Vail, 1 Spencer, 56 ; Armstrong v. Garrow, 6 Cowen, 465 ; Stillman v. Squire, 1 Denio, 327; 2 R. S. 617, § 24; id. p. 353, §§ 14, 15.)
/& Stevens, for respondents.
I. Ho breach of the condition of the bond is alledged or shown. The facts stated in the declaration, as a breach of the condition, do not show that Schuyler in any manner or at any time failed or omitted in any respect, faithfully, in all things, to perform and execute the office of sheriff, without fraud, deceit or oppression. The official bond of the sheriff can only be sued, where- he has been guilty of some default or misconduct in his office. (2 R. S. 390, § 1, 2d ed.) A default of a sheriff in his office, is a neglect or omission to do some act, which the due execution of the office authorized and required him to do. Misconduct in his office, is the doing of some act, which the due execution of the office authorized and required to be done, but in an improper manner. The act for which Batch ellor recovered in trespass against Schuyler, was not an official act. It was not an act authorized or required by the due execution of the office of sheriff. The process, delivered to him for execution, did not direct or authorize him to seize the goods of any person but Fay. It was, therefore, a mere personal trespass, as much so as if he had acted without process. The suit in favor of Batchellor against Schuyler was for a personal trespass.
A trespass of this description, committed by the person who holds the office of sheriff, is not a breach of the condition of his official bond; and his sureties are not liable for any acts or omissions of his, which are not within the very terms of their undertaking. (1 R. L. 1813, p. 419, § 2, p. 421, § 6; The People v. Spraker et al. 18 John. Rep. 390, 395-6.) And the re-, covery against Schuyler, as appears by the record, was not against him in his official capacity, nor was it for any default or misconduct in his office; and yet it is sought by this action to make his sureties liable for the amount of that judgment. In [177] Ex parte Reed, (4 Hill, 572,) it was held that the condition of a sheriff’s bond does not extend beyond nonfeasance or misfeasance, in respect to acts which he is required to perform officially ; that it only extended to acts done virtute officii, and not to those committed colore officii; and that the sureties of the sheriff were not liable for a recovery in trespass against him, for seizing the goods of the plaintiff upon an execution against another person. In the case of The Governor v. Hancock et al. (2 Alab. Rep. 728, new series,) it was held that the nonfeasance or malfeasance of a sheriff, unless ‘it necessarily included an omission to perform some duty imposed by law, was not a breach of his official bond, which was conditioned that he should “ faithfully discharge all the duties which are, or may be required of him by law,” and that consequently his sureties were not liable for his fraudulently inducing the plaintiff in an attachment to sell him a large debt, for -which the attachment was issued, for a small sum, when he had in fact seized property sufficient to pay the whole demand.
• II. The fact that the sheriff is required by statute to retain the property attached, if indemnified, notwithstanding it may have been found by the jury to be the property of the claimant, does not distinguish this case from those decided in the cases referred to. (1 R. S. 767, § 11,2c? ed.) At common law, when a third person claimed property seized on a fi. fa. the sheriff was bound to obtain the inquisition of a jury deproprietate probandi, to protect him in relinquishing the property and returning the fi. fa. nulla bona; and if the jury found the property in the claimant, the sheriff was notwithstanding bound to sell it, if the plaintiff in the execution offered him an adequate indemnity. (.Bayley v. Bates, 8 John. Rep. 185; Williams v. Lowndes, 1 Hall, 595-6; Curtis v. Patterson, 8 Cowen, 67.) Therefore the duty, and consequently the breach of duty of the sheriff upon a fi. fa. is, at common law, precisely the same as that declared by statute in the case of attachments against absconding debtors. The sheriff would not have faithfully executed the office of sheriff, if he had not detained the property seized, upon being indemnified. The refusal or omission [178] to detain the property, upon a sufficient indemnity given or ten- "' dered, would have been a breach of the condition of his official bond. It would have been a default in the discharge of the duties of his office. Can his not being guilty of that default, be alledged as a.breach of his official bond?
The person whose property is thus seized, is not without remedy, independent of the personal responsibility of the sheriff. (1.) He is entitled to the benefit of the indemnity given to the sheriff. (2.) The trustees appointed under the proceedings against absent or absconding debtors, are bound to-retain a sufficient sum from the moneys in their hands, to satisfy any such indemnity that may have been given by the attaching creditor. The claimant is entitled to the benefit of that security. (1 B. S. 802, §§ 30, 31.) But if the person whose property is thus seized, had no security beyond the personal responsibility of the sheriff, that would not authorize the court to extend the liability of the sureties to the sheriff’s official bond, beyond the very terms of its condition. If the official bonds of sheriffs are not sufficiently extensive, the legislature and not the courts, must supply the defect.

Opinion:
Gardiner, J.
The only question presented by the pleadings is, whether the sheriff and his sureties are liable upon his official bond, for a trespass committed by the former in taking the goods.of the relator, in an attempt to execute regular and valid process, issued against the property of another.
The bond was in form to the people of the state ; it was in effect a security, not only to suitors, who might have a direct interest in the action of the sheriff, but .to every citizen who might be injured by his official misconduct. Before and at the time of the alledged trespass, Schuyler was sheriff of the county of Rensselaer. As a public officer, the attachment in question was necessarily and lawfully delivered to and received by him. He assumes to levy and draw up his inventory as sheriff; as sheriff he rightfully summoned a jury, to determine the title to the property seized, and subsequently, in his official character,. [179] received an indemnity and detained the goods, in opposition to the verdict. He received the. attachment, therefore, not colore officii, but in virtue of his office. His sureties undertook " that he should faithfully execute" the process. If he had " in all things" performed his duty, he would have seized the goods of Fay or returned the writ, instead of which he levied upon the goods of Batchellor, as the property of the defendant in the attachment. Upon principle, and upon grounds of public policy, it seems to me, that the responsibility of his sureties should be different from those they would incur, if the sheriff had entered upon the premises of the relator; and removed his goods without any process whatever. In the last case supposed, the sheriff would act in his own right, and might be resisted as any other wrongdoer. In the one before us, he was put in motion by legal authority, invoked in behalf of others, and could command the power of the county to aid him in its execution. liespect for the process of our courts, and for the official character of the sheriff, if it did not forbid forcible opposition, (which must have been unavailing,) is incompatible with the notion of making resistance indispensable as a means of protection. This must be the alternative, if those who are thus aggrieved are driven to rely exclusively upon the responsibility of the officer, who, as in this case, may be wholly insolvent.
It was, however, assumed by Judge Cowen, in Ex parte Reed, (4 Hill, 573,) that no such distinction was recognized by our law, and that in neither case would the sheriff or his sureties be liable upon his official bond. He remarks, " that the words of the obligation can not be extended beyond nonfeasance or misfeasance, in respect to acts which by law he is required to perform as sheriff." This may be admitted: but in the case then before the court, and in the present, the sheriff as the executive officer of his county, received a regular process issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, by which he was commanded to act as sheriff. If he had neglected to act without some legal excuse, it would have been a nonfeasance; if he had acted wrongfully in attempting to obey the mandate, it would have been a misfeasance " in respect to acts which he was required to perform [180] as sheriff." The distinction is between a case in which a duty is imposed at law upon an officer as such, which he is bound by his peril faithfully to discharge, and one in which there is no such obligation. Where the duty exists, and it is neglected, or performed in an improper manner, the sureties upon principle should be liable, otherwise not.
. The learned judge, in the case referred to says: " that the words of the obligation are operative for the purpose of obliging the sheriff to act properly, in all those things which come within the scopq of his power or duty." The answer to this suggestion is, that it is within the power of every officer receiving process, to execute it or to abstain from its execution, for reasons which he can assign, and which the law will recognize; and with this power it is within " the scope of his duty to act properly, if he elects to act under it at all." It is true, as Judge Cowen remarks, " that a trespass is not the faithful performance of the office, or any performance at all." It is, however, equally true, that the faithful performance of the office was the duty imposed by law upon the sheriff, and guarantied by his sureties. They now insist, in bar of the action, not that the sheriff fulfilled this obligation, but that in violating it he committed a trespass. Again, the learned judge remarks, " there being no authority, there is no office, nothing official." If by this we are to understand, that there being no authority for the act complained of as a breach of official duty, there was no office and nothing official, the argument, if sound, would preclude a recovery in any case against the sureties. If an authority could be shown, their defence would be complete ; if there was none, the act would be extra official, and not within the scope of their undertaking.
In Ex parte Chester, (5 Hill, 555,) the, court directed the prosecution of the official bond of a sheriff and his sureties, in consequence of a false return by the former. This was a misfeasance, for which the sheriff was liable in an action of tort. It might have been argued upon the authority of Me parte Reed, " that the commission of a tort was not the faithful perform-[181] anee of his office as sheriff, or any performance at all." The objection was as applicable in one case as the other. It is no answer to say that in Ex parte Chester, a return of the. execution was authorized and required by law, and the misconduct consisted in doing the required act in an improper manner. The fi. fa. in Ex parte Reed, and the attachment in this case, authorized and required the sheriff to levy upon property; in both cases the seizure of the property of third persons was doing the required service in an improper manner. In each of the above cases, the specific acts, which gave the right of action against the officer, were unauthorized. Otherwise there could have been no misfeasance. In each, however, the sheriff was directed by legal process to perform an official act of the same character, of that which was the subject of complaint. In each he assumed to discharge a duty pertaining to his office, by means which the law did not authorize or permit.
That irregularities of the kind mentioned do not wholly deprive the proceeding of an official character, is manifest from the construction which, in this country and abroad, has been given to statutes framed for the protection of public officers, in reference to pleading, notice and venue. The English statutes and our own refer to acts done " virtute officii," and yet they have uniformly been held to extend to acts of misfeasance, whether the remedy against the officer was in case or trespass. (Straight v. Gee, 2 Stark. Rep. 448 ; Reed v. Thompson ; Weller v Toke, 9 East 3664; Morgan v. Palmer, 2 Barn. & Cres. 729 : Seely v. Birdsall, 15 John. 268; 1 Mass. Rep. 530.)
Again, by the common law a sheriff is liable in trespass for the acts of his deputy committed in the attempt to execute process, although without his direct! ,n or recognition. (Grinnell v. Phillips, 1 Mass. R. 530; Armenthe v. Kempe, Douglass, 42; 3 Greenl. 420; Jentry v. Hunt, 2 McCord. Rep. 410.) But according to the doctrine of Ex parte Reed, there being in the given case, " no authority, there was no office, nothing official." And yet the principal is, notwithstanding, held responsible, in consequence of the relation existing between him and his subordinate, a relation that is purely official and nothing [182] else. (7 Mass. Rep. 128.) If a trespass committed by a deputy, in enforcing legal process, is deemed so far official as to charge his principal, no satisfactory reason can he given why the same proceeding, by the sheriff in person, should not be held of the same character in order to charge his sureties.
But we are not without direct authority on this question. In Skinner v. Phillips, (4 Mass. Rep. 69,) the suit was scire facias against a sheriff and his sureties, reciting the official bond oí the former, the condition of which was, " that he should faithfully execute the duties of his office." The declaration set forth a judgment against the sheriff in favor of the plaintiff, for damages by and through the misfeasance and malfeasance of the sheriff. On demurrer to the declaration it was determined by the court, C. J. Parsons delivering the opinion, " that any party injured by the malfeasance of the sheriff or his deputy, was entitled to relief upon the bond."
In Archer v. Noble, (3 Greenl. 418,) a constable had given a bond with sureties " for the faithful performance of his duties and trust, as to all processes by him served or executed." It was held, that if he seized the goods of A. under an execution against B. it was not merely a private trespass but a breach of his bond. In Harris v. Hanson, (11 Maine, 241,) it was decided, that the taking of the property of one, by a coroner, upon a suit against another, was a malfeasance in office, constituting a breach of his bond given " for the faithful performance of the duties of his office." In Cormack v. Commonwealth, (5 Binney, 184,) the sureties of the sheriff were held liable on a similar bond, where the goods of A. were taken upon a fi. fa. against B. In Forsyth v. Ellis, (4 J. J. Marshall, 299,) the precise question was determined the same way in Kentucky ; and in Commonwealth v. Stockton, (5 Monroe, 192.) In this state the decision in Ex parte Chester can not upon principle be reconciled with the previous one in Ex parte Reed. The question must have been deemed an open one, or permission would not have been granted to the plaintiff to prosecute this suit, by the same court who refused it in Ex parte Reed. The point was presented [183] in each case upon motion, and the decisions are directly opposed to each other. We are not, therefore, concluded by the action of our own courts. The adjudications of the highest courts, in at least three of the neighboring states, sustain the action. The defendants have referred to no case beyond this state, to the contrary. The weight of authority, and as it seems to me, a fair construction of the obligation of the defendants, are both in favor of the plaintiff.
There is another consideration which is deserving of attention. The action of trespass against sheriffs for the seizure of property in the execution of legal process, is sui generis. It is regarded by the law in many instances, as a means of determining the title to property, rather than in the light of an ordinary trespass. Good faith upon the part of the officer is presumed, and he may consequently require and receive indemnity before proceeding to the final execution of the writ. (8 John R. 185 ; 8 Cowen, 67.) The form of the indemnity in this case was prescribed by statute, and the sheriff made the sole judge of its sufficiency. (2 R. S. 4 § 10,11.) His sureties on payment of the judgment against their principal, would be entitled to subrogation, and to the benefit of his security ; while no provision is made for its assignment to those who have been deprived of their property. The omission, I grant, will not enlarge the undertaking of the sureties. But it shows, what indeed is manifest from the whole structure of the statute, that its framers supposed that in all his proceedings under it, the sheriff was in an important sense acting officially ; that the idea did not occur to them, that in making an erroneous seizure under the attachment, the sheriff divested himself of all the insignia of his office, to be resumed when he took a bond and detained the property. This is the view of the defendants. We are inclined to regard the original taking as a misapplication by the sheriff of the authority of his office, for which his sureties are responsible.
The judgment of the supreme court must be reversed.
Bronson, Ch. J. and Jewett, Harris and Taylor, Justices, concurred.