Case Name: George Danforth et al. versus James Woodward
Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
Jurisdiction: Massachusetts
Decision Date: 1830-10
Citations: 10 Pick. 423
Docket Number: 
Parties: George Danforth et al. versus James Woodward.
Judges: 
Reporter: Massachusetts Reports
Volume: 27
Pages: 431–436

Head Matter:
George Danforth et al. versus James Woodward.
Printing types and forms are not tools necessary for the trade or occupation of a printer, within the meaning of St. 1805, c. 100, and therefore are not exempted from attachment and execution.
At the Court of Common Pleas held within the county of Bristol, in September 1830, this case was submitted to that court, with a reservation of the right to appeal, upon the following statement of facts agreed by the parties.
The defendant, who was a deputy-sheriff, on May 31st, 1830, attached all the printing types and forms of the plaintiffs, who were the printers and publishers of a newspaper in Taunton, by virtue of a writ of attachment sued out against them. The types and forms were afterwards sold, in due form of law, on the execution, by the defendant, and were bought by Thurber, one of the plaintiffs, for $147. The property has since remained in the possession of the plaintiffs, and no money has been paid on the execution.
If in the opinion of the Court, the property so attached and sold, was not tools necessary for the trade and occupation of the plaintiffs, within the meaning of St. 1805, c. 100, which provides, “ that the tools of any debtor necessary for his trade or occupation, shall be altogether exempted from attachment and execution,” the plaintiffs were to be nonsuited ; otherwise, &c.
The case was afterwards removed to this Court, and was argued in writing, on the same statement of facts.
Cobb, for the plaintiff.
Tool is defined by Johnson, “ any instrument of manual operation.” Instrument, he defines, “ a tool used for any work or purpose.” According to Tooke (Diversions of Purley,) tool is (any instrument) lifted up or taken up to work with So that even upon the authority of lexicographers and etymologists, types may without impro priety be denominated tools. But the words of a statute are t0 be construed in their popular sense ; and in that sense the term tool is frequently applied to things of a much more immovable character than types and forms, such as nail-machines, &c. In Simpson v. Hartopp, Willes, 512, a stocking-frame was considered to be the implement or instrument of the trade of a stocking-weaver. So in Gorton v. Falkner, 4 T. R. 565, looms for weaving small wares, were considered to be the implements of a man’s trade. Now the word implements is defined in dictionaries to be the “ tools of a trade,” “ the tools or implements of a man’s labor ; ” and in common parlance it is synonymous with tools. In the form of the assessors’ warrant, in St. 1785, c. 50, § 6, the delinquent’s tools or implements necessary for his trade, are, among other things, exempted from distress. The word tools therefore should receive the same construction that has been given to implements, and under that construction would clearly include printing types and forms.
The design of this provision of St. 1805, c. 100, as stated in Howard v. Williams, 2 Pick. 81, [2d ed. 84, note 1,] is “to secure to haridicrafismen the means by which they are accustomed to obtain subsistence in their respective occupations.” Now the types of a printer are the means of his subsistence ; and if the exemption does not include them, he is deprived of that protection which is extended to all other mechanics, and can receive no benefit from the provision of the statute.
It may be said that the case of Buckingham v. Billings, 13 Mass. R. 82, is decisive of this case ; but that case was decided principally on the ground, that the printing apparatus taken was not necessary to the plaintiff’s occupation, and that other property of the like kind was left, by means of which he could carry on his business, though not so extensively as before. It is true that it is intimated by the Court, that the articles attached in that case were not tools ; but a decision upon that point was unnecessary for the determination of the case, and is to be considered as a mere obiter dictum. In the present case all the types of the plaintiffs were taken, and they are entitled to recover, if types are under any circumstances exempted from attachment.
If it is objected, that under our construction of the statute, it would be impossible to draw the precise line between tools and machinery, we answer, that the only rule by which the character and amount of the tools which are exempted can be ascertained and restricted is, in the words of the Court in Howard v. Williams, “ that of good sense and discretion in reference to the circumstances of each particular case.” Nor can any objection be made to this construction of the statute on the ground that large quantities of tools and machinery may be fraudulently secured from attachment; for, in the language of the Court in the same case, “ it will be in the power of thr creditor to defeat the object, by successfully submitting the question of their necessity to the decision of the court and jury.”
C. G. Loring and Russell, for the defendant.
The burden is on the plaintiffs, to show that a printing apparatus is a tool, either in the philological or popular meaning of the words, and this they have not done. Types, the principal article in question here, are not “instruments of manual operation,” nor are they “ instruments lifted up or taken up to work with” ; for they require to be placed in combination with a large and fixed machinery, to enable them to accomplish the purpose of instruments ; and in order to bring the case within these definitions, it should be made to appear that the whole apparatus is taken up by the hand to print with. The only instance referred to where the term tool is applied, in a popular sense, to machinery of a fixed and ponderous character, is that of nail-machines ; but there it is applied only to a' particular kind of machine as contradistinguished from all the rest used in nail-factories, called technically a nail-tool. Such a use of the word oes not warrant the inference, that it is used in a popular sense, as applicable to any machinery of equal bulk or complexity of construction. As to stocking-frames and looms for weaving small wares, they are small simple instruments entirely worked by the hand and easily moved by the hand, and each of itself is a perfect instrument. But a printing apparatus consists of a great variety of distinct articles incapable of being connected together, one of which only can be said to be worked by the hand.
The several articles of which a printing apparatus consists, the types, for instance, are of no use to the printer unless combined with the rest; no separation of them can be made, therefore ; the whole apparatus must be exempted from attachment, in order to enable him to carry on his business. Nor, if a printing apparatus is a tool, can any line be drawn between the simplest form of press and the power-press or steam-press ; they must be all equally exempted. The object of the statute was to prevent the laborer in humble circumstances, from being deprived of the means of gaining a subsistence by manual labor ; it was not designed for men who can earn a livelihood by intellectual ability ; nor was it intended to protect men in the possession of a large capital invested in a lucrative business, where the principal part of the labor is performed by hired workmen. If a printing apparatus is exempted from attachment, such an apparent capital would procure for the owner of it further credit; and he could mortgage or sell the apparatus, and thus obtain money for his own dishonest purposes, whilst his creditors would be without remedy.
By the statute, the household furniture of a debtor exempted from attachment, is limited to the value of fifty dollars, and it may well be inferred, that the tools intended to be thus protected, are such only as are suitable to the condition of a man, who is reduced to that style of housekeeping,

Opinion:
Wilde J.
drew up the opinion of the Court. The exemption from attachment and'execution, claimed by the plaintiffs, depends on the statute of 1805, c. 100 ; and it is admitted that this claim cannot be sustained consistently with the construction put upon the first section, in the opinion delivered by the chief justice, in the case of Buckingham v. Billings. But it is contended that a more liberal and just interpretation of the statute is suggested in the case of Howard v. Williams, which is supposed by the plaintiffs' counsel, to impugn the authority of the former case. This, however, was certainly not intended by the Court, nor can such an inference be fairly drawn, as we think, from any thing laid down in the case of Howard v. Williams. There was no difference of opinion in the former case ; it was considered with deliberation, and all the Court concurred in the opinion as delivered by the chief justice. The case, it is true, depended on two points, either of which being decided for the defendant, was sufficient to justify the judgment in his favor; but both points were considered and decided ; and I am not aware that there was any greater difficulty in one than in" the other. I take it, therefore, to be decided in that case, that a printing apparatus is not exempted from attachment and execution as the tools of trade of a printer ; nothing is to be found impeaching that decision in the case of Howard v. Williams ; nor have we been led to doubt its correctness, after the able arguments of counsel in the present case.
The word tool is not understood, either in its, strict meaning or popular use, as designating complicated machinery which, in order to produce any useful effect, must be worked by combining several distinct parts or separate pieces, the aid of more hands than one being necessary to perform the operation ; all which is required in the use of a printing apparatus Nor can the several parts be denominated tools, as they cannot be used separately, but like the axe and its handle, must be united to accomplish any work. The press and forms may with as much propriety be denominated tools, as the types. All are the necessary component parts of the machinery for printing. Besides, types cannot be used as tools of trade by a printer after he is stripped of the other parts of his printing,apparatus, so that the exemption from attachment of the types alone would not enable him to pursue his trade and thereby to gain his subsistence, which was the object of the statute. Such a partial exemption would be as useless as the exemption of a single tool, or part of a tool only, among many other tools essentially necessary in a man's trade or occupation. And we are clearly of opinion that the statute cannot be so construed as to allow any such partial exemption or protection. We are equally well satisfied that property so valuable as a complete printing apparatus, cannot be protected under the statute, the object and intention of which was, to make a humane, provision for the poor ; but not to enable a person in embarrassed or insolvent circumstances, to withhold a large "amount of property from the just claims of his creditors. Now it is well known that a complete printing apparatus, including types sufficient to carry on a profitable business, may be exceedingly valuable, and the least valuable would no doubt cost a considerable sum. But if the statute protects this species of property, it will protect a new and very valuable apparatus, as well as one which is old and of less value. The most valuable, if necessary to carry on the debtor's trade, would be protected, unless a superabundance of types were included, as was the case in Buckingham v. Billings. It is impossible to imagine that the legislature could have any reference to valuable property of this descrip- • tion, in a provision manifestly made for the relief and benefit of the poor. We have no doubt, therefore, of the construction of the statute as it was settled in the case of Buckingham v. Billings.
Plaintiffs nonsuited.
See Revised Stat. c. 97, § 22; Spooner v. Fletcher, 3 Vermont R. 133