Case Name: BETA ETA HOUSE CORPORATION, INC. OF TALLAHASSEE, Florida, a nonprofit Florida corporation, and General Accident Fire and Life Insurance Company, Limited, a foreign corporation, Petitioners, Cross-Respondents, v. William E. GREGORY, a minor, by his mother and next friend, Lucy A. Gregory, and Lucy A. Gregory, individually, Respondents, Cross-Petitioners
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1970-07-01
Citations: 237 So. 2d 163
Docket Number: No. 39388
Parties: BETA ETA HOUSE CORPORATION, INC. OF TALLAHASSEE, Florida, a nonprofit Florida corporation, and General Accident Fire and Life Insurance Company, Limited, a foreign corporation, Petitioners, Cross-Respondents, v. William E. GREGORY, a minor, by his mother and next friend, Lucy A. Gregory, and Lucy A. Gregory, individually, Respondents, Cross-Petitioners.
Judges: DREW, THORNAL and CARLTON, JJ-, concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 237
Pages: 163–169

Head Matter:
BETA ETA HOUSE CORPORATION, INC. OF TALLAHASSEE, Florida, a nonprofit Florida corporation, and General Accident Fire and Life Insurance Company, Limited, a foreign corporation, Petitioners, Cross-Respondents, v. William E. GREGORY, a minor, by his mother and next friend, Lucy A. Gregory, and Lucy A. Gregory, individually, Respondents, Cross-Petitioners.
No. 39388.
Supreme Court of Florida.
July 1, 1970.
H. O. Pemberton, E. Harper Field, and Helen C. Ellis, of Keen, O’Kelley & Spitz, Tallahassee, for petitioners, cross-respondents.
Spence, Payne & Masington, Miami, Henderson, Buchanan & Phipps, Tallahassee, and Robert Orseck, Miami, for respondents, cross-petitioners.
Bert Lane, Pensacola, amicus curiae.

Opinion:
ADKINS, Justice.
This cause is here on petition for writ of certiorari supported by certificate of the District Court of Appeal, First District, that its decision reported in 230 So.2d 495, is one which involves a question of great public interest. See Fla. Const. art. V, § 4(2), F.S.A.
The opinion of the District Court of Appeal contains the following language:
"In order that the Bench and Bar may have the benefit of an authoritative decision of statewide application, it shall be our purpose to certify this decision to the Supreme Court as one involving a question of great public interest in order that the purpose and effect of the decisions rendered in the Bussey-Shingleton case may be evaluated and a pronouncement made as to whether (a) the principles announced therein are applicable not only to automobile liability insurance but also to other forms of liability insurance; and, (b) whether the suggested procedure for preserving the substantive law of Florida- by ordering separate trials pursuant to Rule 1.270(b), Rules of Civil Procedure, in those cases where the liability insurance carrier is joined as a defendant in a tort action against its insured should be followed by the trial courts of this state." 230 So.2d 500.
A minor sued Beta Eta House and its liability insurance carrier for damages because of the alleged negligence by Beta Eta House in the maintenance of its premises, resulting in personal injuries to the minor plaintiff who was proceeding to the fraternity house for the purpose of attending a Chapter meeting. The insurance carrier was joined as a party defendant under the doctrine of Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So.2d 713 (Fla.1969).
The insurance carrier moved for dismissal and the motion was denied. When the motion to dismiss was denied, the carrier filed a petition for common law writ of certiorari with the District Court of Appeal. The petition was denied in the decision and opinion now before this Court for review.
Answering the questions certified to us, we hold as follows :
(a) The principles announced in Shin-gleton v. Bussey, supra, are applicable not only to automobile liability insurance but also to other forms of liability insurance; and
(b) Th,e trial court may on motion of either party order separate trials pursuant to Rule 1.270(b), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure [30 F.S. A.], in those cases where the liability insurance carrier is joined as a defendant in a tort action against its insured.
The District Court of Appeal in its opinion stated (230 So.2d S00) :
"Pursuant to the provisions of this rule the trial court should on the motion of a party order that the issues relating to the cause of action sued upon be first tried under circumstances which exclude any reference to insurance, insurance coverage or joinder in the suit of the insurer as a codefendant. After this trial has been concluded and a verdict rendered for the plaintiff, a second trial confined solely to the issue of insurance coverage should be held if such an issue has been raised. If no such issue is present, judgment against the insurer within policy limits would follow the verdict rendered in the first trial on the merits."
The purpose of Shingleton v. Bus-sey, supra, was to require the parties to "lay their cards on the table" in discovery proceedings, settlement negotiations, and pre-trial hearings. The existence or amount of insurance coverage has no bearing on the issues of liability and damages, and such evidence should not be considered by the jury.
In the event the carrier denies coverage, this issue may be determined by a separate trial before, as well as after, the trial on the merits. Where the issue of coverage is raised by the carrier and a separate trial is granted on this issue, a question arises as to whether the provisions of Fla.Stat. § 627.0127, F.S.A., relating to attorneys' fees in an action on an insurance policy, are applicable. This question is not before us in the case subjudice.
If coverage is admitted or determined by a prior trial, the carrier is bound by the ultimate judgment in the trial on the merits to the extent of such elements as the validity of the insurance policy and the amount of the judgment. Following the verdict on the merits, judgment against the insurer within the policy limits may be entered.
The separate trial is not necessarily limited to the issue of coverage. The question of whether or not the carrier exercised good faith in the settlement of a claim against the insured could also be determined by a separate trial after the determination of the case on the merits.
The opinion of the District Court of Appeal, First District, as modified, is approved and the writ of certiorari heretofore issued is discharged.
DREW, THORNAL and CARLTON, JJ-, concur.
BOYD, J., dissents in part and concurs in part with opinion.
ERVIN, C. J., concurs with BOYD, J., and also dissents in part with opinion.