Case Name: R. C. GREER, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1978-02-07
Citations: 354 So. 2d 952
Docket Number: No. 76-1772
Parties: R. C. GREER, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: Before PEARSON, HENDRY and NATHAN, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 354
Pages: 952–954

Head Matter:
R. C. GREER, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 76-1772.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Feb. 7, 1978.
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender and Paul Morris, Asst. Public Defender and Thomas Wills, Sp. Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen. and Joel D. Rosenblatt, Asst. Atty. Gen. and Lonworth Butler, Legal Intern, for appellee.
Before PEARSON, HENDRY and NATHAN, JJ.

Opinion:
HENDRY, Judge.
Appellant was charged with and convicted of burglary, in violation of Section 810.-02, Florida Statutes (1975). He appeals his conviction and sentence.
The evidence showed that appellant was seen as he climbed over a six-foot wall into the enclosed parking area which surrounds the business structure in which Courtesy Ford, Inc. conducts its operations. Upon arrival, police found appellant hiding under a van in the parking area. There was no evidence of actual entry into the building itself.
The primary point for our consideration is whether the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal in light of Sections 810.02 and 810.-011(1), Florida Statutes (1975). More specifically, appellant contends that the term "curtilage" has meaningful applications when associated only with a dwelling and can not be applied sub judice, where the information charged and the evidence showed only that appellant had unlawfully entered the parking area of a commercial establishment with the intent to commit an offense therein.
In light of the clear language of Sections 810.02 and 810.011, Florida Statutes (1975), we must reject appellant's contention. Section 810.02 provides:
"(1) 'Burglary' means entering or remaining in a structure or a conveyance with the intent to commit an offense therein, unless the premises are at the time open to the public or the defendant is licensed or invited to enter or remain." [Emphasis added.]
Pursuant to Section 810.011, "structure" is defined as:
"any building of any kind, either temporary or permanent, which has a roof over it, together with the curtilage thereof." [Emphasis added.]
Accordingly, the unlawful entry of appellant into the parking lot (curtilage) surrounding the business structure with intent to commit an offense (larceny) was a burglary, notwithstanding the fact that appellant did not enter the structure and the curtilage was of a business property and not a dwelling.
The other point raised by appellant is addressed to an alleged "fatal variance" between the charge stated in the information and the proof adduced at trial. After considering this point, we find it to be without merit. Fitzgerald v. State, 227 So.2d 45 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969).
Therefore, the judgment and sentence are affirmed.
Affirmed.