Case Name: Brenda CLAY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1992-03-11
Citations: 595 So. 2d 1052
Docket Number: No. 91-1071
Parties: Brenda CLAY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: LETTS, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 595
Pages: 1052–1055

Head Matter:
Brenda CLAY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 91-1071.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
March 11, 1992.
Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Anthony Calvello, Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Joan Fowler, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
DELL, Judge.
The state charged appellant with armed robbery and resisting a merchant. The jury found her guilty of the lesser included offense of petit theft and resisting a merchant. The trial court adjudicated her guilty of the two misdemeanors. At sentencing, however, the court reclassified her conviction pursuant to section 812.014(2)(c), based on her prior theft convictions.
Appellant stipulated at pretrial that she had nine prior misdemeanor convictions. The information, however, did not make reference to the prior convictions, nor did it charge her with a felony petit theft. On that ground, appellant contends that the trial court erred when it reclassified her petit theft conviction to felony petit theft. We agree and reverse.
In State v. Rodriguez, 575 So.2d 1262 (Fla. 1991), the court stated:
A charging document must provide adequate notice of the alleged essential facts the defendant must defend against. Art. I, § 9, 16, Fla. Const. In recognition of this concern, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.140(b) provides that an "indictment or information upon which the defendant is to be tried shall be a plain, concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged." (Emphasis original).
Id. at 1264. The Rodriguez Court then referred to its prior opinion in State v. Harris, 356 So.2d 315 (Fla.1978):
Justice Hatchett concluded for the Court that the felony petit larceny statute "creates a substantive offense and is thus distinguishable from [sjection 775.084, the habitual criminal offender statute." Harris, 356 So.2d at 316. The felony DUI statute is indistinguishable in this regard_ As in Harris, we conclude that the existence of three or more prior DUI convictions is an essential fact constituting the substantive offense of felony DUI.
Having established that the existence of prior DUI convictions is an essential element of felony DUI, it necessarily follows that the requisite notice of prior DUI convictions must be given in the charging document....
Id. at 1265.
The state cites State v. Crocker, 519 So.2d 32 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) in support of its argument that because it charged appellant with grand theft and the jury convicted her of a lesser included offense of petit theft, the charging document need not allege the prior thefts before an accused may be found guilty of felony petit theft. In Crocker, the court said:
We also agree that when felony petit theft is the only felony with which an accused is charged, the charging document must make clear that felony petit theft is being charged in order to invoke the jurisdiction of the circuit court. State v. Phillips, 463 So.2d 1136 (Fla. 1985). We do not agree, however, that prior thefts must be alleged in the charging document and proved in all instances before an accused may be found guilty of felony petit theft. Rather, we agree with our sister court's statement in Peek v. Wainwright, 393 So.2d 1175 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), that if such a procedure were required, the state would have to charge the crime of felony petit theft, in the alternative, in every case that a jury could find the defendant guilty of petit theft as a lesser included offense of the crime actually charged.
Id. at 33. We find the reasoning in Crock-er persuasive, but note that Crocker preceded the supreme court's Rodriguez opinion and its discussion therein of Harris. Based on Rodriguez, we conclude that the state must allege the elements of the felony petit larceny statute in its charging document if it intends to proceed under section 812.014(2)(c).
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred when it reclassified appellant's conviction to felony petit theft. We reverse appellant's felony petit theft conviction and and remand this cause to the trial court with instructions to enter a judgment of conviction for petit theft and to sentence appellant consistent therewith.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
LETTS, J., concurs.
FARMER, J., concurs specially with opinion.