Case Name: Katherine Huffaker, Claimant, v. RED LION MOTOR INN-RIVERSIDE, Employer; and Birmingham Fire Insurance Company, Surety, Defendant-appellants, v. State of Idaho, INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND, Defendant-respondent
Court: Idaho Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Idaho
Decision Date: 1992-06-29
Citations: 122 Idaho 464
Docket Number: No. 18258
Parties: Katherine Huffaker, Claimant, v. RED LION MOTOR INN-RIVERSIDE, Employer; and Birmingham Fire Insurance Company, Surety, Defendant-appellants, v. State of Idaho, INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND, Defendant-respondent.
Judges: JOHNSON and McDEVITT, JJ., and TROUT, J. Pro Tem., concur.
Reporter: Idaho Reports
Volume: 122
Pages: 464–470

Head Matter:
835 P.2d 1275
Katherine Huffaker, Claimant, v. RED LION MOTOR INN-RIVERSIDE, Employer; and Birmingham Fire Insurance Company, Surety, Defendant-appellants, v. State of Idaho, INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND, Defendant-respondent.
No. 18258.
Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise
Term, April 1992.
June 29, 1992.
Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett, Rock & Fields, Boise, for appellants. Thomas V. Munson argued.
Mallea & Scrivner, Boise, for respondent. Wesley L. Scrivner argued.

Opinion:
BAKES, Chief Justice.
Appellants Red Lion Motor Inn-Riverside and Birmingham Fire Insurance Co. appeal from an order of the Idaho Industrial Commission dismissing the Idaho Industrial Special Indemnity Fund (I.S.I.F.) as a party defendant. The Commission found that the claimant, Katherine Huffaker, was totally and permanently disabled for work, but that she did not have a pre-existing permanent physical impairment which would trigger the liability of the I.S.I.F., and therefore the entire liability was imposed on the employer and its surety.
On September 9, 1985, claimant Katherine Huffaker injured her back while working for the Red Lion Motor Inn-Riverside. Huffaker underwent surgery on December 11,1985, and was subsequently given a 20% physical impairment rating of the whole person. On March 17, 1987, the Industrial Commission entered an order finding that Huffaker's injury arose out of and in the course of her employment. The Commission retained jurisdiction to determine the extent of Huffaker's permanent physical impairment and disability.
Throughout the summer of 1987, Huffaker made several efforts to obtain suitable employment, but she was unable to keep a job because of physical limitations and lack of intellectual ability to handle her tasks. Dr. Craig Beaver, a Boise clinical psychologist, and Dr. Eric Holt, a Boise psychiatrist, evaluated Huffaker. Dr. Beaver concluded that Huffaker had an IQ of 83, representing borderline intellectual functioning. He also testified that she had very poor spelling and reading skills, her verbal reasoning and problem-solving skills were in the impaired range, and her memory skills were inefficient. Dr. Beaver testified that her longstanding cognitive difficulties were directly attributable to an organic brain syndrome. Dr. Holt agreed that the claimant suffered from borderline intellectual functioning, but he concluded that her dysfunction was not the result of a specific organic brain syndrome.
On September 20th and 27th, 1987, an Industrial Commission referee conducted hearings to determine the extent of Huffaker's permanent disability resulting from her accident. On June 19,1989, the referee determined that Huffaker was totally and permanently disabled for work when consideration was given "to both the medical condition resulting from her industrial accident, and the claimant's level of intellectual functioning and work experience." However, the referee concluded that Huffaker did not have "any identifiable or provable brain impairment or organic brain syndrome or dysfunction which would constitute a permanent physical impairment" triggering liability on the part of the 1.5.1.F. The Commission approved and adopted the referee's decision. The Employer appealed the Commission's decision. Huffaker did not join in this appeal.
After this appeal was filed, the Employer and the claimant entered into a settlement agreement which the Commission approved. The I.S.I.F. then filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, arguing that the settlement agreement effectively mooted the controversy between it and the Employer. The I.S.I.F. argued that since the claimant did not appeal the Commission's decision to dismiss the I.S.I.F., she is not a party to the present appeal, and the appeal should be dismissed. We disagree.
In this case, the claimant was awarded full disability payments and thus had no reason to appeal the Commission's decision. Under the I.S.I.F.'s argument, unless the claimant also appealed, an employer would have no opportunity for judicial review of the Commission's decision that no portion of the claimant's total disability payments should be allocated to the 1.5.1.F. Such a result would be contrary to 1.C. § 72-718, which provides that "[f]inal decisions [of the Idaho Industrial Commission] may be appealed to the Supreme Court," and I.C. § 72-724, which provides that "[a]n appeal may be made to the Supreme Court by such parties from such decisions and orders . as prescribed by Rule of the Supreme Court." Accordingly, we conclude that an employer is entitled to judicial review of a decision by the Commission that no portion of the claimant's total disability payments should be allocated to the I.S.I.F., regardless of whether the claimant joins in the appeal. I.C. § 72-718, 72-724.
The I.S.I.F. argues that, pursuant to I.C. § 72-332, if it were found to be liable, it is liable only to the claimant, not the Employer. Since the claimant and the Employer have entered into a settlement agreement through which the claimant has been completely compensated, the I.S.I.F. argues that the controversy between it and the Employer is now moot. However, as we have just held, the Employer is entitled to judicial review of the Commission's decision. Furthermore, the Employer's agreement with the claimant will not affect any potential liability of the I.S.I.F. to the claimant. If this Court were to find that the I.S.I.F. is liable to the claimant, the I.S.I.F. would pay its proportionate share of the claimant's benefits directly to her; the claimant would then reimburse the Employer the amount she had been paid by the I.S.I.F., pursuant to the agreement approved by the Commission.
We next consider whether the Commission's holding, that the claimant's borderline intellectual functioning is not a permanent physical impairment under I.C. § 72-332, was supported by substantial, competent evidence. We hold that it was.
When hearing an appeal from a decision of the Idaho Industrial Commission, this court "must view the facts and all inferences therefrom most favorably to the party who prevailed before the Commission." Garcia v. J.R. Simplot Co., 115 Idaho 966, 969, 772 P.2d 173, 176 (1989). When this Court reviews the Commission's factual findings, we must affirm if those findings are supported by substantial and competent evidence. Mapusaga v. Red Lion Riverside Inn, 113 Idaho 842, 748 P.2d 1372 (1987).
In this case, the Commission heard expert testimony presented by both sides, and each expert came to a different conclusion regarding the claimant's cognitive dysfunction. As the Commission explained:
Dr. Eric Holt, Psychiatrist, evaluated the Claimant and found no evidence of an organic brain syndrome. Furthermore, he did not feel that there was evidence of sufficient malnutrition that the Claimant's reduced intellectual function could be attributable to malnutrition. The Employer and Surety rely on the evaluations of Dr. Craig Beaver, Neuropsychologist, who concluded that the Claimant did suffer from an organic brain syndrome. An organic brain syndrome means there must be some brain tissue impairment, or disfunction.
Based on his observation of the testimony of these experts, as well as all the additional testimony and evidence presented by both sides, the referee concluded that:
[T]there is no physical manifestation of the Claimant's reduced intellectual functioning. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that for a mental condition to constitute a preexisting permanent physical impairment in order to trigger liability of the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund under Section 72-332 there must be a physical manifestation of the mental disorder. Mapusaga vs. Red Lion Inn Riverside, 113 Idaho 842 [748 P.2d 1372], Hartly vs. Miller Stephen, [sic] 107 Idaho 688 [692 P.2d 332]. The Referee finds that there is insufficient evidence of malnutrition during the Claimant's childhood to establish that the Claimant's reduced intellectual function is the result of malnutrition. Furthermore, the Referee concludes that the Claimant does not suffer any identifiable or provable brain impairment or organic brain syndrome or disfunction which would constitute a permanent physical impairment within the meaning of Section 72-332. The Referee therefor concludes that the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund would not be responsible for any contribution to the Claimant's total permanent disability and the entire responsibility must rest with the Employer and Surety.
The referee's findings of fact and conclusions of law were clearly based upon substantial evidence. As we stated in Garcia, "[I]t is the function of the Commission, not of this Court, to weigh the evidence." 115 Idaho at 968, 772 P.2d at 175. Although the evidence was conflicting regarding whether the claimant's cognitive difficulties were a "physical impairment," the referee was in the best position to evaluate that conflicting testimony.
Previous Idaho caselaw supports the Commission's decision. In Hartley v. Miller-Stephan, 107 Idaho 688, 690, 692 P.2d 332, 334 (1984), we held that a personality disorder, "lacking any bodily symptoms whatsoever, is simply too tenuous to fall within the legislature's language of I.C. § 72-332." See also, Bruce v. Clear Springs Trout Farm, 109 Idaho 311, 707 P.2d 422 (1985); Mapusaga v. Red Lion Riverside Inn, 113 Idaho 842, 748 P.2d 1372 (1987).
Accordingly, we affirm the Commission's decision to dismiss the Idaho Special Indemnity Fund as a party defendant.
JOHNSON and McDEVITT, JJ., and TROUT, J. Pro Tem., concur.
. Defendants Red Lion Motor-Inn Riverside and Birmingham Fire Insurance Company will be referred to as "the Employer" throughout this opinion.
. In numerous Idaho cases in which the claimant was awarded total disability benefits, either the I.S.I.F. or the employer appealed the Commission's decision without the claimant joining in the appeal. See, e.g., Garcia v. J.R. Simplot Co., 115 Idaho 966, 772 P.2d 173 (1989); Mapusaga v. Red Lion Riverside Inn, 113 Idaho 842, 748 P.2d 1372 (1987); Waltman v. Associated Food Stores, Inc., 109 Idaho 273, 707 P.2d 384 (1985); Carey v. Clearwater County Road Department, 107 Idaho 109, 686 P.2d 54 (1984); Hartley v. Miller-Stephan, 107 Idaho 688, 692 P.2d 332 (1984).
. The settlement agreement provides:
The parties acknowledge that defendant surety and defendant employer have a claim against the State of Idaho, Special Indemnity Fund with respect to the Fund's liability, if any, relative to claimant's adjudicated total permanent disability which is pending before this Commission and before the Idaho Supreme Court____ The parties further acknowledge that this lump sum settlement and agreement is between claimant and defendants employer and surety and is exclusive of the State of Idaho, Special Indemnity Fund. It is further acknowledged by the parties hereto that the claim of defendant surety and defendant employer continues against the Fund before this Commission and the Idaho Supreme Court and is unaffected by the terms of the lump sum settlement and agreement____ By accepting this lump sum settlement and agreement, claimant agrees that any funds, monies, or benefits received by claimant from the State of Idaho, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund will be remitted to defendants.