Case Name: COMMONWEALTH v. R. G. OELLERS
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1891-06-12
Citations: 140 Pa. 457
Docket Number: No. 86
Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. R. G. OELLERS.
Judges: Before Paxson, C. J., Sterrett, Green, Clark, Williams, McCollum and Mitchell, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania State Reports
Volume: 140
Pages: 457–475

Head Matter:
COMMONWEALTH v. R. G. OELLERS.
APPEAL BY THE COMMONWEALTH FROM THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS NO. 4 OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY.
Argued June 4, 1891
Decided June 12, 1891.
[To be reported.]
1. By § 1, ai'ticle XIY. of the constitution, and § 17, act of March 81, 1876, P. L. 13, the office known and designated as that of city treasurer in Philadelphia, was changed from a mere city or municipal office to a county office, resting upon the organic law and beyond the power of the legislature to abolish: Taggart v. Commonwealth, 102 Pa. 354.
2. By such change, the provisions of § 10, act of February 2, 1854, P. L. 21, conferring upon the city councils of Philadelphia power to fill vacancies in the office of “ city treasurer,” have been superseded, and the authority to fill such vacancy is now vested in the governor of the state, under the act of May 15, 1874, P. L. 205: Taggart v. Commonwealth, supra.
Before Paxson, C. J., Sterrett, Green, Clark, Williams, McCollum and Mitchell, JJ.
No. 86 July Term 1891, Sup. Ct.; court below, No. 338 June Term 1891, C. P. No. 4.
On June 2, 1891, upon the relation of Mr. William U. Hensel, Attorney General, a writ of quo warranto was issued from the court below, returnable forthwith, commanding the sheriff to summon Richard G. Oellers, to show by what warrant he claimed to hold and exercise the office of county treasurer, designated as city treasurer within the city and county of Philadelphia.
The information filed averred, in substance, that by the legal effect of §§ 1, 2, article XIV. of the constitution; act of February 2, 1854, P. L. 21; and § 17, act of March 31, 1876, P. L. 13, the officer, known in the city of Philadelphia as the city treasurer, was a county officer to whose office were attached the qualifications and attributes to be found in article XIV. of the constitution; that at the general elections held in November in the years 1876, 1879, 1882, and 1885, respectively, certain persons named were elected by tbe qualified voters of Philadelphia county to fill the office of county treasurer, designated by them as city treasurer; that in November, 1888, John Bardsley was elected by said voters to fill said office from January 1, 1889, to January 1, 1892, and he entered upon and assumed the duties of said office, but the same had become vacant in consequence of his resignation; that, in discharge of the duty of filling such vacancies, imposed upon him by the constitution and laws of this commonwealth, the governor had appointed William Redwood Wright to fill such office, but Richard G. Oellers had unlawfully intruded into and usurped the same, and was exercising the duties thereof without right, contrary to law.
On the same day, June 2, 1891, the defendant appeared and filed a plea averring that, by virtue of the laws of this commonwealth, the right to fill a vacancy in the office designated as that of city treasurer within the city and county of Philadelphia, was vested, not in the governor, but in a joint meeting of the select and common councils of the city of Philadelphia; and that on May 28, 1891, the defendant was elected by a viva-voce vote, at such a joint meeting, to fill a vacancy existing in said office, and he had duly entered security and taken the oath of office, etc.
Thereupon, the commonwealth filed a general demurrer to the plea of the defendant, and the following agreement, signed by the respective counsel of the commonwealth and the defendant, was put on file :
“ It is hereby agreed between the relator and the defendant in the above case that, on the argument, the sole questions of record to be disposed of by the court are:
“1. Has the governor of the commonwealth the right to fill the vacancy existing from the cause stated in the suggestion, in the office designated city treasurer within the city and county of Philadelphia ?
“ 2. Have the councils of the city of Philadelphia the right to fill the vacancy existing from the cause stated in the suggestion, in the office designated city treasurer within the city and county of Philadelphia ? ”
The court, on the same day, without opinion filed, overruled the demurrer, and entered judgment for the defendant; where upon the commonwealth took this appeal, specifying that the court erred:
1. In sustaining the demurrer.
2. In entering judgment for the defendant.
3. In not entering judgment for the commonwealth.
Mr. William U. Hensel, Attorney General, and Mr. Furman Sheppard (with them Mr. S. S. Hollingsworth), for the commonwealth:
1. At the time the consolidation act of February 2, 1854, P. L. 21, went into effect, there was a county treasurer for the county of Philadelphia, who was elected at the general election in October, every second year, and vacancies occurring in his office were filled by the appointment of the county commissioners : act of May 27, 1841, P. L. 400; and there was a city treasurer elected every year by the select and common councils of the city: acts of March 11, 1789, 2 Sm. L. 462; January 7, 1802, 3 Sm. L. 477. By § 6 of the consolidation act of 1854, the office of county treasurer was terminated, and thereafter, down to 1876, there was no county treasurer in Philadelphia county. By § 10 of the same act, it was provided that a city treasurer should be elected by the qualified voters on the first Tuesday in May of every second year, and vacancies in the office of city treasurer should be filled by the councils. By act of March 21, 1861, P. L. 165, the time of this election w'as changed to the date of the general election in October of each year, and by act of August 12, 1873, P. L. (1874) 432, the term of the city treasurer was lengthened to three years.
2. Such was the legislation prior to the adoption of the present constitution. By article XIV. of that instrument, the constitutional office of county treasurer was created; and since the constitution went into effect, wherever a county exists or is created the county offices named in article XIV., among which is that of county treasurer, spring at once into existence: Walsh v. Commonwealth, 89 Pa. 419. The officer known in Philadelphia as city treasurer, is the constitutional county treasurer. He is elected at the time prescribed for the election of county officers by § 2, article VIII. of the constitution. There has never been any person voted for as city treasurer at the time prescribed by § 3 of the same article for the holding of municipal elections. The officer elected at the general elections has discharged all the duties and exercised all the powers imposed upon county treasurers by the constitution and laws of the state. It is extremely difficult, therefore, to escape the conclusion that he is such constitutional officer; but, if there is any doubt as to this, looking merely at the provisions of the constitution and the election held under it, such doubt is resolved on reference to § 17, act of March 81, 1876, P. L. 13, and this point seems to be settled by Taggart v. Commonwealth, 102 Pa. 354.
3. The law for the filling of vacancies is found in § 1, act of May 15, 1874, P. L. 205, which provides that the governor shall appoint “ where provision is not already made by said constitution and laws to fill said vacancies.” The only law referred to by the defendant as making any other provision, is the consolidation act of 1854, which directs, in § 10, that vacancies in the office of city treasurer shall be filled by councils. This is not a provision of law for filling a vacancy in the new office of county treasurer, existing under the constitution, though the incumbent is designated in Philadelphia as “ city treasurer; ” it cannot apply to such vacancy if the decision in Taggart v. Commonwealth, supra, is to stand, and it should not be extended thereto unless the legislative intent is clear beyond any doubt. Nor does the provision in § 5, act of May 27, 1841, P. L. 400, for the filling of vacancies in the of-, fice of county treasurer by the county commissioners, apply, as that act was dealing with the legislative office of county treasurer afterwards abolished by the consolidation act. If the act of 1841 does apply, the decisions in Taggart v. Commonwealth, 102 Pa. 354, and Commonwealth v. Gaige, 94 Pa. 193, were wrong. As to the weight of the consideration that, according to our position, the people themselves will sooner have an opportunity of filling the office than they would under § 46, act of February 2, 1854, as construed by act of April 18, 1867, P. L. 1299, see Commonwealth v. Evans, 102 Pa. 394.
Mr. Mayer Sulzberger and Mr. John G. Johnson (with them Mr. Ovid F. Johnson), for the appellee Oellers, and Mr. Charles F. Warwick, City Solicitor, for the city of Philadelphia:
1. Councils are expressly authorized to fill the vacancy in the office of city treasurer by § 10, act of February 2, 1854, P. L. 21, known as the consolidation act. Their power does not rest, as was the case with reference to the office of controller, considered in Taggart v. Commonwealth, 102 Pa. 354, upon § 46 of that act, providing that councils shall fill vacancies in any elective office of the city “ except where other provision is made for filling the vacancy,” but upon language specifically conferring the authority with reference to this particular office. No change has ever been made, since the passage of the act of 1854, in the office of city treasurer or in the functions of that officer, and nothing appears in § 1, article XIY. of the constitution, relative to county officers, indicating an intention to work any change in the office of city treasurer. The object of the act of March 31, 1876, P. L. 13, as clearly disclosed in its title, was simply to enforce the directions of the constitution with reference to official compensation and fees ; and it was in the line of the legislative power and in pursuance of good policy, to subject the city treasurer of Philadelphia to the provisions of the act. But no intention to change the term of that office, or to provide for the manner of his election, is disclosed either by the title or by the body of the act. And by act of June 1, 1885, P. L. 37, known as the Bullitt Bill, the city treasurer is made the head of one of the departments of the city government, and his qualifications and duties as such are prescribed.
2. The present constitution cannot be expounded intelligently without taking heed of the fact that its main feature is the assault upon special and local legislation, and of the rule that every presumption is against such legislation. In view of this, it is impossible to believe that the convention intended to pass a special law for Philadelphia county opposed to the general law of the state. It is true that Philadelphia then had its city charter, in the act of February 2,1854, P. L. 21, which was allowed to stand; but the convention went as far as it could in restricting special and local legislation, and repudiated for the future the principle on which the existing local legislation rested. In every other county than Philadelphia, vacancies in the office of county treasurer are filled by the county commissioners, under the act of May 27, 1841, P. L. 400. In the whole history of Pennsylvania, treasurers have always been appointed, in cases of vacancy, by officers elected by the people of the locality. It is unreasonable, and impossible to' believe, that the constitution was intended to repeal the consolidation act, in order to substitute for it a law different from that applicable to the rest of the state, by taking away the right of local self-government from Philadelphia and vesting the governor with the appointment of the treasurer. At all events, such a change, if made either by the constitution or by a statute, would be made directly and in unmistakable language. An attentive examination fails to find the provision effecting such a change.
8. The constitution itself gives the governor no power to fill this vacancy; and, until the passage of the act of May 15, 1874, P. L. 205, it could not even be claimed that he had any such power. If we do not find it in that act, it does not exist. The act provides that the governor shall appoint, in case of a vacancy, only “ where provision is not already made by said constitution and laws to fill said vacancy.” It is very doubtful if the words, “ already made,” can be construed so as to cover the case of a vacancy for which provision was made at the date of the act, but which, by virtue of subsequent legislation, is now unprovided for; but, be that as it may, there is no subsequent legislation taking away from councils the power which they possessed in 1874. The act of March 31, 1876, P. L. 13, under which the city treasurer is to be regarded as a county officer for the purposes of its provisions respecting salary and fees, does not do so, either expressly or by necessary implication. Without negative words, a subsequent general statute does not repeal a prior special statute: Smith’s Est., L. R. 35 Ch. Div. 595; Bounty Accounts, 70 Pa. 92; Rounds v. Waymart Bor., 81 Pa. 395; Seifried v. Commonwealth, 101 Pa. 200; Townsend v. Little, 109 U. S. 512.
4. In order to discern in the constitution, or in the acts of 1874 and 1876, any power of the governor to fill this vacancy, we must ignore § 10 of the consolidation act, or we must attribute to the case of Taggart v. Commonwealth, 102 Pa. 354, a meaning not to be found in it, to wit, that the consolidation act was repealed, at least in part, by the constitution. This is a total misconception of the decision in that case. Not a word was said about such a repeal, and there was no question of repeal in it. The decision was rather an affirmance of the doctrine that the consolidation act is still in force; and its only effect was to declare that the office of city controller, there being no special provision for the filling of vacancies and having dropped out of the class provided for in § 46 of the consolidation act, came within the act of May 15, 1874, P. L. 205, as presenting a case in which there was no other provision to fill the vacancy. This being so, the interpretation of § 10 is easy. This specific vacancy, by name, is to be filled by the councils, without regard to the intrinsic character of its functions. Even in the act of 1854, the name of city treasurer was but a label to indicate a man invested with the triple functions of. city treasurer, county treasurer, and deputy state treasurer. See in this connection Philadelphia v. Martin, 125 Pa. 583. A consideration of the duties of this officer will indicate, we think, that it is eminently proper that vacancies should be filled by the city councils, rather than by the governor; and in view of the fact that the power was expressly conferred upon them, and no legislation has taken it away, we press upon the court the importance of sustaining the validity, of the defendant’s appointment.
Argued in the Middle District and the report advanced by direction.

Opinion:
Opinion,
Mr. Chief Justice Paxson:
The commonwealth, through her attorney general, demands to know by what authority the defendant, Richard G. Oellers, claims to hold the office of county treasurer, designated as city treasurer, of Philadelphia, and to exercise the functions thereof.
It appears by the defendant's plea that he claims title to said office by virtue of his election thereto by a viva-voce vote of the councils of said city, at a joint meeting thereof, on May 28, 1891, to fill a vacancy occasioned by the resignation of Jolm Bardsley. It is contended by the attorney general that, by the constitution and laws of this commonwealth, it was the duty of the governor to appoint a suitable person to fill such vacancy, and that, in the performance of that duty, he had appointed William Redwood Wright as such suitable person. We have thus the issue, sharply defined, whether the power to fill the vacancy in question is lodged in the city councils or in the governor.
If this were a new question, or one involving a new principle, we might feel it necessary to discuss it at some length. As, however, it is a mere threshing of old straw, an elaboration of it is not requisite. Every question now presented was raised and decided in Taggart v. Commonwealth, 102 Pa. 354. It is true, that contention was over the office of controller, while this is over the office of treasurer; but this makes no essential difference, as the same law applies to each. Both offices have been changed by § 1, article XIV. of the constitution, and by tiie act of March 31, 1876, P. L. 13, from a mere city or municipal office, which the legislature may destroy at will, to a county office, resting upon the organic law, and beyond the power of the legislature to abolish. We do not propose to re-open the discussion of the case upon this point. Taggart's case was carefully considered and properly decided. We were aided by a very clear and able opinion by the late Judge Ludlow, who decided that case below, and subsequent reflection has but confirmed us in the correctness of that decision. It is not needed, therefore, to discuss this point again. It is sufficient to say, that, for the purposes of this case, we must regard the office designated as city treasurer, as a county and not a city office. The treasurer, by whatever name he may be called, is a county officer, exercising his functions over the entire territory of the city of Philadelphia, which is coextensive with that of the county, just as the sheriff, recorder of deeds, and other county officers exercise their functions over the same territory.
Assuming then, as we are bound to do, that the treasurer is a county officer, we come directly to the only question in the case, in whom is the authority lodged to fill a vacancy in said office ?
The law is not even doubtful upon this point. It is declared by § 2 of article XIV. of the constitution, that " all vacancies, not otherwise provided for, shall be filled in such manner as may be provided by law." The law which provides for the filling of such vacancies is the act of May 15, 1874, P. L. 205, which declares: " That in case of a vacancy, happening by death, resignation or otherwise, in any office created by the constitution or laws of this commonwealth, and where provision is not already made by said constitution and laws to fill said vacancy, it shall be the duty of the governor to appoint a suitable person to fill such office," etc.
Just here the point comes in which the defendant contends distinguishes this from Taggart's case. His allegation is that the governor cannot fill this vacancy, because another mode of doing so is provided by the constitution and laws; and he points us to the tenth section of the act of February 2, 1854 (consolidation act), P. L. 21, which provides, inter alia, that " any vacancy in said office (city treasurer) shall be filled by the city councils, by viva-voce vote in joint meeting." This very point was made in Taggart's case. It was raised by the pleadings, argued by counsel, and decided by the court. It is true, no reference was made to it in the opinion of Chief Justice Merche. It was fully discussed in the court below, and the case having been decided here upon the broad ground that the controller was a county officer, the point in question became of no practical importance. It»is too plain for argument that city councils cannot fill a vacancy in a county office. They might as well attempt to fill a vacancy in the office of sheriff. In view, however, of the peculiar circumstances of this case, and the zeal with which this point has been again pressed upon us by the able counsel representing the defendant, a brief reference to it may not be inappropriate.
As before observed, the tenth section of the act of 1854 provided for the filling of a vacancy in the office of city treasurer by a viva-voce vote of city councils. The forty-sixth section of said act contains the further provision that:
" Whenever any elective officer of said city shall die, or become incapable of fulfilling the duties of his office, his place, except where other provision is made for filling the vacancy, shall be filled by a joint vote of city councils, until the next city election and the qualification of the successor in office: Provided, That such vacancy shall exist at least thirty days before the next city election, otherwise such vacancy shall be filled at the next election thereafter."
The controller was "an elective officer of said city," and came directly within this provision. A vacancy in his office was as fully provided for in the act of 1854 as was a vacancy in the office of treasurer. It was contended in Taggart's case, just as it was in this, that because of such provision, the gover nor had no power to fill the vacancy. We had precisely the same arguments then that we have now.
It will be observed that the tenth section of the act of 1854 does not fix the term during which a treasurer elected by councils to fill a vacancy shall hold said office. It was contended that, as the term was not designated, he would be entitled to hold for the balance of the unexpired term, whatever that may be. This position cannot be sustained. It is in direct conflict with our whole system and policy in filling vacancies. In all our legislation upon this subject, it is plain to see that in filling vacancies in elective offices the policy of the law has uniformly been to return to the people, as soon as reasonably practicable, the election of a successor. Hence, in nearly if not quite all elective offices from the governor down, if a vacancy occurs more than three calendar months prior to the next election, it can only be filled until said election and the qualification of the successor. That a departure from this rule was not intended by the tenth section of the act of 1854, is manifest by an examination of the forty-sixth section thereof, which, as before observed, provides that vacancies in all elective offices of said city shall be filled only until the next city election. The tenth and the forty-sixth sections of the act of 1854 must be construed together. They are a part of the same act and the same system. Thus considered, we find that in case of a vacancy in the office of treasurer, his successor is to be elected by a viva-voce vote of councils, while in the case of every other elective officer the vacancy shall be filled by a joint vote of city councils ; in both cases the person so elected shall hold until "the next city election." It follows, necessarily, that if the election by councils in this case has the authority of law, the defendant would hold the office until the next city election in February, 1892 (except for the accident that his term expires in January next), at which time it would not be possible to elect his successor. Being a county officer, his election can only take place at the general election, and this has been the uniform practice under the constitution and the act of 1876. The next election for county treasurer will be held in November next, and the term of the person then elected will commence on the first Monday of the following January. This would be several weeks prior to the expiration of defendant's term -under his election by councils, except for the accident above stated. The principle contended for would go to this extent.
This incongruous, if not absurd result would necessarily follow any attempt to force the constitution into harmony with legislation existing at the time of its adoption.
It is proper to^say, in justice to the learned judges of the court below, that their judgment was practically pro forma and entered for the sole purpose of sending the case up for an early decision. Under the circumstances, we decided to hear and dispose of it in that shape at the earnest request of both parties.
The judgment is reversed and judgment is now entered for the commonwealth upon the demurrer. It is further considered and adjudged by the court that the defendant, Richard G. Oellers, be, and he hereby is ousted from the office of county treasurer, designated as city treasurer, of Philadelphia, and from the fees and emoluments thereof.