Case Name: The People of the State of New York ex rel. David Stevenson Brewing Company, Appellant, v. Henry H. Lyman, State Commissioner of Excise, Respondent
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1902-01
Citations: 2 Liquor Tax Rep. 621
Docket Number: 
Parties: The People of the State of New York ex rel. David Stevenson Brewing Company, Appellant, v. Henry H. Lyman, State Commissioner of Excise, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: Liquor Tax Law Reports
Volume: 2
Pages: 621–631

Head Matter:
First Appellate Department,
January, Term, 1902.
Reported. 67 App. Div. 446.
The People of the State of New York ex rel. David Stevenson Brewing Company, Appellant, v. Henry H. Lyman, State Commissioner of Excise, Respondent.
Surrender of a liquor tax certificate—The burden of proving the facts required to be stated in the application therefor rests on the person seeking to surrender it.
Section 25 of the Liquor Tax Law (Laws of 1896, chap. 112, as amended by Laws of 1897, chap. 312), which provides that if the holder of a liquor tax certificate shall surrender the certificate to the officer who executed the same and shall present to such officer a verified petition setting forth certain facts, inter alia that the holder has voluntarily ceased to traffic in liquors, such officer shall execute duplicate receipts for the pro rata rebate on the certificate, does not operate to make the execution of the duplicate receipts an adjudication of the truth of the allegations contained in the petition, which will be binding upon the State Commissioner of Excise, who is charged with the duty of paying the rebate.
Where,- upon the'refusal of the State Commissioner of Excise to pay the amount called for .by the duplicate receipts, issued to an assignee of the original holder of the license, the assignee procures an alternative writ of mandamus addressed to the State Commissioner of Excise, which alleges, among other things, that the holder had voluntarily ceased to traffic in liquors prior to the surrender of the said certificate, and that since such surrender he had not been arrested or indicted for any violation of the Liquor Tax Law, and the State Commissioner of Excise serves a return containing a denial of such allegations, it is incumbent upon the assignee to establish the truth of the allegations.
' Laughlot, X, dissented.
Appeal by the relator, the David Stevenson Brewing Company, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the defendant, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 2d day of February, 1901, upon an order of the Supreme Court, made at the New York Special Term and entered in tho office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 22d day of January, 1901, dismissing an alternative writ of mandamus after a trial at the New York Trial Term.
On or about the 29th day of April, 1898, the Special Deputy Commissioner of Excise for the boroughs of Manhattan and the Bronx, upon payment to him of the sum of $800, issued liquor tax certificate No. 3,563 to one John Michels, permitting the trafile in liquors at No. 2068 Amsterdam avenue, in the borough of Manhattan, city of'New York, for the year ending April 30, 1899. Thereafter, and prior to the 1st of March, 1899, the said John Michels duly assigned and transferred to the relator all his right, title and interest in and to the rebate for -the unearned portion of the- said liquor tax certificate and authorized the relator to surrender the' said certificate for cancellation at any time at its option, and created it his attorney to execute all papers necessary for the purpose of effecting such surrender, and to take such proceedings to recover the amount of such rebate as might be required. On or about the said 1st day of March, 1899, the said Special Deputy Commissioner of Excise was presented with said certificate and with a petition duly verified by relator, as the attorney in-fact of the said John Michels, setting forth all the facts required to be shown upon a surrender of a certificaté.' Thereupon, the said Special Deputy Commissioner of Excise duly executed duplicate receipts showing the amount of the rebate and[ the ¡other facts required by section 25 of chapter 112 of the Laws of 1896, as amended by chapter 312 of the Laws of, .1897, and delivered the same as required by said , act . After-thirty days had elapsed since such surrender, the relator demanded from the State Commissioner of Excise the amount of such rebate, but he refused to pay the same.
The relator thereupon moved upon affidavits for a peremptory writ of .mandamus. This motion was denied, but an alternative writ was allowed to issue. This writ contained allegations setting forth all the above facts, and also alleged that Michels had voluntarily ceased to traffic in liquors prior to the surrender of the said certificate, and that since the surrender he had not been arrested or indicted for any violation of the Liquor Tax Law, etc.
The return denied that Michels had voluntarily ceased to traffic in liquors at the time said surrender of his certificate was made, and denied that he had not been arrested or indicted for a violation of the Liquor Tax Law since the surrender of the certificate, as alleged in the alternative writ. The return made also the positive allegation that he had been indicted for such an offense.
The issues thus formed by the alternative writ of mandamus and the return thereto were then duly sent.to the Trial Term for trial. When the trial was brought on, the defendant claimed that the burden of showing that Michels had ceased "to traffic in liquor rested with the relator. The relator claimed that the burden of showing that it was not entitled to the rebate was with the defendant. The court held that the burden was on the relator to show that Michels had voluntarily ceased to traffic in" liquors for the term for which said certificate was issued. To this ruling the relator duly excepted, and put in evidence formal proof to show that it had taken all the steps to entitle it to rebate, and rested.
The court thereupon directed the jury to find certain facts, among Avhich was one to the effect that Michels had not voluntarily ceased to traffic in liquors under said certificate for the term for which said certificate was issued. Said verdict being certified to the Special Term, such proceedings were thereupon had that the alternative writ of mandamus was dismissed upon the merits, and from such dismissal this- appeal is taken.
William G. McCrea, for the appellant.
N. N. Stranahan, for the respondent.

Opinion:
Van Brunt, P. J.
It does not seem that there was necessarily any question involved upon the trial of the issues raised by the alternative writ and the return as to upon whom the burden of proof rested as to events occurring after the surrender of the certificate. The right of the relator to the rebate having been denied by the return it was bound to show by proof or admissions upon the record that the holder of the liquor license and his attorney had done all that the law required as conditions precedent to the right to claim such rebate.
It was admitted upon the record that the license had been surrendered and the proper petition filed with the Deputy Commissioner of Excise, and that such Deputy Commissioner had issued the receipt required by law, but the return denied, as it was alleged in the alternative writ, that the holder of the license had voluntarily ceased to traffic in liquors before the surrender of the certificate, and, therefore, claimed that the relator was not entitled to recover the rebate.
It is to be observed that to entitle the holder of a liquor license to surrender the same he must, prior to such tender of surrender, voluntarily have ceased to traffic in liquors.
The existence of this fact is a condition precedent to the right to a rebate, and we cannot find any provision of the statute which makes any action upon the part of the Deputy Commissioner an adjudication upon that subject. According to the statute when a petition is presented to the Deputy Commissioner showing all the facts required to be shown upon such application, he is directed by the statute to issue the receipts required by law. He is not given any power to pass upon the question of the truth of the facts set forth in the petition, and his action in issuing the receipt cannot have that effect. This would seem to be apparent from a reading of the statute. Leaving out those provisions that have no relevancy to the present case, it reads as follows:
" § 25. If a person holding a liquor tax certificate and authorized to sell liquors under the provisions of this act, shall voluntarily * - cease to traffic in liquors during the term for which the tax is paid under such certificate, such person or their * duly authorized attorney may surrender such tax certificate to the officer who issued the same , and at the same time shall present to such officer a verified petition setting forth all facts required to be shown upon such application. Said officer shall thereupon compute the amount of pro rata rebate then due on said certificate for the unexpired term thereof, and shall execute duplicate receipts therefor. One of such receipts said officer shall deliver to the person entitled thereto, and the other of such receipts he shall immediately transmit, with the surrendered certificate and the petition for the cancellation thereof, to the state commissioner of excise."
There is evidently no judicial duty imposed by the foregoing provision of the law upon the deputy commissioner. When the certificate is presented to him with a petition setting forth all the required facts he must issue his receipts. There is no power given to him to pass upon the truth of the allegations in the petition, and although undoubtedly if he refused to issue a receipt, he could not be compelled to do so unless the applicant showed that the conditions precedent to the issuance of a receipt had been fulfilled, yet we cannot find anywhere in the statute any authority upon his part to pass upon that question, or to make any admissions relating thereto which will be binding upon the State Commissioner. The State Commissioner is the only one who is empowered to act finally in the matter. When the claimant of a rebate comes to him and demands his rebate, he certainly has the right to demand proof of the fact that the requirements of the law have been complied with. Until they are shown to have existed, no right to a rebate is given by the statute.
The whole foundation of the claimant's demand is based upon the fact that he has, prior to the tender for surrender of his license, voluntarily ceased to traffic in liquors. If he has not, then he has no claim. The statute giving the Deputy Commissioner no power to pass upon this question or even to demand proof upon the subject, it certainly must have been intended that the officer who is to pay the rebate claimed should have the power to demand proof of the right to such rebate. It seems to me that the right to the rebate is to be construed as resting upon a contract between the licensee and the State. If such is the case, clearly the party claiming must show compliance with all conditions precedent.
There is no question of imputing to a man a crime in requiring Mm to show compliance with the conditions precedent found in a statute any more than there would be in requiring a man to prove the execution oí a contract which nas been denieu in an answer to a sworn complaint. The claimant comes into court and demands his róbate, alleging that he has done everything to entitle him to such rebate. The State Commissioner says: " You are not entitled to it because you did not cease to traffic in liquors before you presented your certificate for surrender, which is one of the conditions precedent to your being allowed any rebate." Upon whom does the burden of proof lie? Clearly the claimant must prove his case, as in the case of any other contract.
The case of People ex rel. Brewing Co. v. Lyman (53 App. Div. 470) may seem upon a cursory examination to be contrary to our view, but no such question was raised in that case, and the remark of the learned justice who wrote the opinion in that case was clearly not considered material.
The order should be affirmed, with costs.
Patterson, O'Brien and McLaughlin, JJ., concurred;' Laughlin, J., dissented.