Case Name: Reginald TAYLOR and Angelica R. Taylor-Dean, Appellants, v. UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION, etc., Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1996-12-20
Citations: 684 So. 2d 890
Docket Number: No. 94-1097
Parties: Reginald TAYLOR and Angelica R. Taylor-Dean, Appellants, v. UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION, etc., Appellee.
Judges: PETERSON, C.J., and COBB, HARRIS and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 684
Pages: 890–897

Head Matter:
Reginald TAYLOR and Angelica R. Taylor-Dean, Appellants, v. UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION, etc., Appellee.
No. 94-1097.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Dec. 20, 1996.
Stephen P. Kanar, Orlando, for Appellants.
Lora A. Dunlap, of Fisher, Rushmer, Wer-renrath, Keiner, Wack & Dickson, P.A., Orlando, for Appellee.

Opinion:
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING EN BANC
PER CURIAM.
We grant en banc review withdrawing our prior opinion in this case and replacing it with this opinion.
The issue in this case is whether the "kids in the military" exception to the general rule that an individual must physically occupy a "household" in order to be a member of it should be applied in this case in order to find that Mrs. Taylor-Dean, a married woman in the military who had established a separate household with her spouse and child, was also a member of her mother's household at the time her brother was injured in an accident. The trial court refused to extend the "kids in the military" exception to cover a married woman with a child of her own. We agree and affirm.
Mrs. Taylor-Dean and her husband, both members of the military, established a marital household in Germany in 1989. They shared that residence for three years until just before the accident involved herein when Mrs. Taylor-Dean received a military assignment back to Fort Sam Houston, Texas. She was living in Texas with their child only because of this military assignment when this accident occurred.
Reginald Taylor, Mrs. Taylor-Dean's adult brother, resided with their mother in the mother's home at 1640 Trumbo Street in Winter Garden, Florida, when he was struck by an uninsured motorist. Reginald Taylor claimed coverage under Mrs. Taylor-Dean's automobile insurance policy claiming he was a member of her household.
The uninsured motorist provision in Mrs. Taylor-Dean's policy covered "a family member" which was defined as "a person related to you by blood, marriage or adoption who is a resident of your household." The dispositive question is, therefore, whether Reginald Taylor was a member of Mrs. Taylor-Dean's household at the time of the accident. Obviously he was not (nor has he been for several years) physically residing with Mrs. Taylor-Dean at the time of the accident. The only way that Mr. Taylor can claim under his sister's policy is for this court to hold that the mother's household is, in fact, the household of Mrs. Taylor-Dean because she was in the military service. We are thus urged to apply the "kids in the military" exception to the general rule. The "kids in the military" exception is based on the proposition that entering the military does not necessarily indicate that one intends to permanently change his or her residence. Therefore, if a permanent home is not intended, the "kid" may have two residences in fact — one on the military base and the other one continuing at his or her original home. See Wiley v. Great American Insurance Co., 1995 WL 548777 (Conn.Super.Ct. Sept.7, 1995).
But it is not the fact that Mrs. Taylor-Dean is in the military that we should focus on. That is almost irrelevant. Certainly, if she weren't in the military (or in college), appellants would have no argument at all. But an even more important fact is that Mrs. Taylor-Dean was a member of another household composed of her husband and her child at the time of the accident. Her family relationship would be the same whether she was in the military, teaching school or working in a factory. She simply no longer qualified as a "kid" in the "kids in the military" exception. She did not intend to ever return to her mother's household as a "kid" to live within her mother's family unit. She testified at trial:
Q. Now assuming your mother is in good health and is alive when you retire, she's going to stay at 1640 Trumbo Street, isn't she?
A. Yes.
Q. And you will live in another house nearby, correct?
A. There's not another house for me to live in. We have to build another house. Q. You would build another house, wouldn't you? So if you continue as the circumstances are today with your mother still living and you were to retire, you would build a house next door or nearby your mother on her property and move into that house and retire, correct?
A. Correct.
This testimony reflects Mrs. Taylor-Dean's intent to return to Florida as a member of a separate household consisting of herself, her husband and her child and not as a "kid" returning home.
The fact that Mrs. Taylor-Dean assisted her mother in purchasing her mother's home and visited her frequently, while admirable, is of no import in resolving the issue of which household includes Mrs. Taylor-Dean. Nor does the fact that Mrs. Taylor-Dean retained her Florida driver's license and continued to vote in Florida reflect anything other than her intent to continue to claim Florida residency. It does not establish a "household" in Florida.
AFFIRM.
PETERSON, C.J., and COBB, HARRIS and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.
ANTOON, J., concurs and concurs specially with opinion in which COBB, GOSHORN and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur.
W. SHARP, J., dissents, with opinion, in which DAUKSCH, J., concurs.