Case Name: Susan Gail HESTER v. William Ewing HESTER, III
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1994-09-15
Citations: 643 So. 2d 216
Docket Number: No. 93-CA-1665
Parties: Susan Gail HESTER v. William Ewing HESTER, III.
Judges: Before KLEES, LOBRANO, ARMSTRONG, PLOTKIN and WALTZER, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 643
Pages: 216–229

Head Matter:
Susan Gail HESTER v. William Ewing HESTER, III.
No. 93-CA-1665.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
Sept. 15, 1994.
Robert C. Lowe, Ellen Widen Kessler, Lowe, Stein, Hoffman, Allweis & Hauver, New Orleans, for plaintiff-appellee.
Nancy J. Marshall, Deutsch, Kerrigan & Stiles, New Orleans, for defendant-appellant.
Before KLEES, LOBRANO, ARMSTRONG, PLOTKIN and WALTZER, JJ.

Opinion:
| iKLEES, Judge.
Defendant William Ewing Hester appeals a trial court judgment awarding permanent alimony to plaintiff Susan Gail Hester. We amend the judgment and affirm as amended.
1. Facts
Mr. and Mrs. Hester were married in Jackson, Mississippi, in October of 1969. After Mr. Hester was discharged from military service, he became a lawyer and Mrs. Hester obtained a masters of education degree. The couple moved to New Orleans, where Mr. Hester joined a prominent law firm and Mrs. Hester taught school. The couple had three children during the next thirteen years of their marriage.
The Hesters were separated in August of 1988 when Mr. Hester left the matrimonial domicile. At the time of the trial for permanent alimony, Mrs. Hester was 45 years old and held a masters degree in education. Mrs. Hester was residing in the matrimonial domicile with the couple's three children— Amanda, 15, who is autistic and suffers from both ftTourette's syndrome and from an obsessive-compulsive disorder; Sara, 12, who is dyslexic; and William, 8⅜, who is also dyslexic. Mrs. Hester was employed at Trinity Episcopal School, where both Sara and William are enrolled in classes.
Mrs. Hester filed a petition for legal separation in November of 1988. Following a trial on the merits, the trial court granted the petition for separation, finding Mrs. Hester free from fault and awarding her alimony pendente lite of $750 per month plus 25 percent of a yearly bonus Mr. Hester receives as a member of the law firm. Additionally, the court awarded Mrs. Hester child support of $1,650 per month plus 30 percent of Mr. Hester's yearly bonus. That judgment was affirmed by this court. Hester v. Hester, No. 90-CA-0930 (La.App. 4th Cir., January 16, 1992), 592 So.2d 13 (Plotkin, J., dissenting in part). The Louisiana Supreme Court denied writs.
Mr. Hester then filed a rule to set permanent alimony. A final divorce was granted by the trial court on May 21, 1992. At that time, the trial court maintained the original child support decree and set permanent alimony at $2,100 a month plus 20 percent of Mr. Hester's yearly bonus, a substantial increase from the alimony pendente lite award of $750 per month plus 25 percent of the yearly bonus. Mr. Hester appeals, making two arguments: (1) that Mrs. Hester has sufficient means for her own support and thus is not entitled to any permanent alimony, and (2) alternatively, that the permanent alimony award is excessive.
2. Entitlement to permanent alimony
La.C.C. art. 112(A)(2) sets out the following factors, which must be considered by trial courts in setting permanent alimony awards:
(a) The income, means, and assets of the spouses;
(b) The liquidity of such assets;
(c) The financial obligations of the spouses, including their earning capacity;
(d) The effect of custody of children of the marriage upon the spouse's earning capacity;
(e) The time necessary for the recipient to acquire appropriate education, training, or employment;
(f) The health and age of the parties and their obligation to support or care for dependent children; and
(g) Any other circumstances that the court deems relevant.
A party seeking alimony is under a burden to show either that he or she is in necessitous circumstances or that he or she has insufficient means for support. Musselman v. Musselman, 524 So.2d 90, 92 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988). An alimony award set by a trial court may not be reversed except on a finding of abuse of discretion. Hogan v. Hogan, 549 So.2d 267, 271 (La.1989).
On appeal, Mr. Hester argues that Mrs. Hester should be precluded from receiving permanent alimony because she has "sufficient means for support," implying that Mrs. Hester failed to carry her burden of proof.
The record shows that Mrs. Hester is 45 years old, that she has a master's degree in education, and that she teaches at Trinity Episcopal School, where her yearly salary is $22,500. Further, Mrs. Hester presented a monthly expense sheet indicating that her expenses total almost $2300 per month. Consideration of her expenses in light of her salary therefore reveals that Mrs. Hester did establish a prima facie case of entitlement to permanent alimony.
Mr. Hester claims, however, that Mrs. Hester has the ability to earn a higher salary, but that she has not made "any attempt to find a higher-paying position at another school." Nor has she made any attempt to secure a second job, Mr. Hester claims. Mrs. Hester counters by asserting that her decision to remain at Trinity is based on the fact that two of her children, both of whom have serious learning problems, are enrolled at Trinity. Further, she claims that she is unable to obtain a second job because of the challenging demands of her obligations as custodial parent of the couple's three children. On this issue, she points especially to the fact that the couple's oldest child, Amanda, who is 15, has autistic symptoms, as well as an obsessive/compulsive disorder, which frequently requires that she be restrained to prevent her from physically harming her younger brother and sister.
In Massengill v. Massengill, 564 So.2d 770 (La.App. 2d Cir.1990), the appellate court affirmed a trial court permanent alimony award which required the payor husband to work weekends in order to meet his alimony obligation, despite his complaints that the same demands were not placed on his wife. The appellate court found that the payee wife should not be required to work overtime because of her "position as custodial parent." Id. at 774.
Under the circumstances presented by this case, we find no abuse of the trial court's discretion in awarding Mrs. Hester permanent alimony. Thus, Mr. Hester's first argument on appeal has no merit.
|⅜3. Excessiveness of the award
The trial court awarded Mrs. Hester $2,100 a month plus 20 percent of Mr. Hes ter's yearly bonus, apparently based on the trial court's acceptance of all of Mrs. Hester's figures concerning her needs listed on the expense sheet. Mr. Hester'S arguments for modification of this award are based primarily on the fact that the award greatly exceeds the alimony pendente lite award of $750 per month plus 25 percent of the yearly bonus.
Initially, we note that a permanent alimony award is not controlled by, and may exceed, a former award of alimony pendente lite if the circumstances require a higher award. The guidelines for determining permanent alimony are different from those for determining alimony pendente lite; the initial setting of a permanent alimony award following a divorce decree is a new award, requiring a new evaluation. Guillory v. Guillory, 626 So.2d 826, 831 (La.App. 2d Cir.1993). The difference between the two types of awards has been explained by the Louisiana Supreme Court as follows:
Alimony after divorce is quite different from alimony pendente lite. Under Louisiana Civil Code Article 160, alimony after divorce is in the nature of a pension, obtainable by the former wife only when she has not been at fault and when she has not sufficient means for her support. This alimony after divorce is not awarded in an amount sufficient to support the former wife in the manner in which she is accustomed to live; rather, it is awarded in an amount sufficient to provide for her maintenance, which includes food, clothing, shelter, and other basic necessities; and the wife has the burden of establishing her necessitous circumstances.
Ward v. Ward, 339 So.2d 839 (La.1976). Although the award of permanent alimony is now controlled by La.C.C. art. 112 rather than La.C.C. art. 160 and the Ward case has been legislatively overruled in part by La. C.C. art. 112(A)(3) which allows consideration of a claimant spouse's earning capacity in determining the amount of alimony, the principles enunciated by the above quotation still apply. The amount of alimony pendente lite has no bearing on the amount of permanent alimony.
Moreover, the awards in this case are not as disparate as they seem at first glance. The alimony pendente lite award also required that Mr. Hester directly pay some of Mrs. Hester's other expenses, including auto insurance, medical expenses, auto repair and maintenance, gasoline, and life insurance premiums, in addition to the $750 per month.
Isa. Monthly award
The above discussion notwithstanding, we find that the trial court did abuse its discretion in setting the permanent alimony award at $2,100 per month. As noted previously, that award was apparently based on the trial court's finding that all of the figures listed on Mrs. Hester's expense sheet were "necessary" expenses. Our consideration of that list of expenses reveals however that the trial court obviously included non-necessitous expenses in setting the award.
Mrs. Hester's list of expenses included many types of expenses which this court has previously determined should not be considered in setting permanent alimony. Permanent alimony may cover such expenses as food, clothing, shelter, reasonable and necessary expenses for transportation, medical care, drugs, utilities, household maintenance, and income tax liability arising from the alimony payments. Guillory v. Guillory, 626 So.2d 826, 832 (La.App. 2d Cir.1993). However, this court has previously held that permanent alimony should not cover such expenses as newspapers, gifts, recreation, vacations, and church tithes. Shenk v. Shenk, 563 So.2d 1000, 1004 (La.App. 4th Cir.1990); Volker v. Volker, 398 So.2d 134 (La.App. 3d Cir.1981).
In the instant case, Mrs. Hester listed the following non-necessitous expenses which fall under the categories disallowed by the established jurisprudence in this circuit: clubs, $10; newspapers, $13; entertainment, $35; gifts, $20; church and charities, $13; Cox Cable, $10, and pool expenses, $10. Thus, we find that the trial judge abused his discretion by considering the $111 worth of monthly expenses listed above.
Further, Mrs. Hester's expense list included $385 for psychological counseling. Although this court has previously allowed an alimony award to cover expenses for neces sary psychological counseling, proof of the necessity of such treatment, in the form of testimony from a treating physician, is required. Gottsegen v. Gottsegen, 503 So.2d 588, 590 (La.App. 4th Cir.1987), writ denied 503 So.2d 1019 (La.1987). The record in the instant case contains no proof that Mrs. Hester requires psychological counseling other than her simple statement that her counseling cost $385 per month. Thus, we find that Mrs. Hester failed to carry her burden of proving entitlement to alimony to cover expenses for psychological counseling.
| sSince the $2,100 monthly alimony award in this case included awards for nonneeessi-tous expense and for psychological counseling which Mrs. Hester failed to prove were necessary, we find that the trial court was manifestly erroneous in setting the award. The proper amount of the alimony award is the total amount of necessary expenses proven by Mrs. Hester. Since Mr. Hester did not attempt to contradict the amount of any of the expenses listed by Mrs. Hester on her expense sheet other than those discussed above, we find that the award should cover the total of all the necessary expense she proved. The simplest way to calculate that amount is to subtract the amount of the expenses listed which we have disallowed— $496 — from the total amount of expenses claimed on Mrs. Hester's expense sheet— $2,298 — for a total of $1,802. Thus, the trial court judgment is amended to set Mrs. Hester's permanent monthly alimony award at $1,802.
b. Percentage of bonus
We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's award to Mrs. Hester of twenty percent of Mr. Hester's annual bonus. Mr. Hester claims that this award was improper because his bonus is not guaranteed and is not a part of his monthly salary. These same arguments were advanced in Zatzkis v. Zaztkis, 632 So.2d 307 (La.App. 4th Cir.1993), in which we held that the trial court properly considered Mr. Zatzkis' bonus as a part of his income. In that ease, we found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's award to Mrs. Zatzkis of permanent alimony in a specified amount per month plus ten percent of Mr. Zatzkis' net bonus. Id. at 319.
In light of this precedent, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by including in the award to Mrs. Hester a percentage of Mr. Hester's bonus.
Conclusion
Accordingly, the trial court judgment is amended to reduce the permanent alimony award from $2,100 per month to $1,802 per month. In all other respects, the award is affirmed.
AMENDED; AS AMENDED, AFFIRMED.
ARMSTRONG, J., concurs in part and dissents in part.
PLOTKIN and WALTZER, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part with reasons.