Case Name: GORDON v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1920-11-24
Citations: 228 S.W. 1095
Docket Number: No. 5980
Parties: GORDON v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 228
Pages: 1095–1096

Head Matter:
GORDON v. STATE.
(No. 5980.)
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Nov. 24, 1920.
Rehearing Denied March 23, 1921.)
1. Infants <@=>16 — Counts charging felony without specifying age ineffective under juvenile acts.
Counts in information and complaint charging a felony were ineffective under the Juvenile Act where they did not specify that the party against whom they were filed was under 17 years of age.
2. Criminal law <@=>974(2), 1144(13) — Motion in arrest made after judgment too late; evidence presumed to support valid count.
'Where information and complaint under the Juvenile Act charged seven distinct felonies in as many counts without specifying in six of them that defendant was under 17 years of age, but there was no motion to quash and no steps taken in regard thereto until after judgment convietfag defendant as a juvenile was rendered, a motion in arrest of judgment was too late, and, in aid of the presumption that the court below is correct, the judgment will be sustained on the theory that the evidence supported the count which charged that defendant was under 17 years of age and that the court acted correctly in applying the facts to such count.
On Motion for Rehearing.
3. Criminal law <@=>13 — Statute defining delinquent and incorrigible children not unintelligible.
The law defining delinquent and incorrigible children is not in its terms so vague, incongruous, and unintelligible and so indefinitely framed that it is doubtful of construction and cannot be understood.
4. Infants <@=>68 — Jury <@=>21 (6) — Delinquent Child Law does npt deprive accused of trial by jury and right to counsel.
The Delinquent Child Daw does not violate the fundamental rights guaranteed to an accused and the right to be heard by counsel in view of Yernon’s Ann. Code Cr. Proe. 1916, arts. 1198 and 1200.
5. Criminal law <@=>1090(11), 1144(10) — Matters presumed in aid of judgment convicting one as a juvenile; no review in absence of bill of exceptions.
A claim on appeal from a conviction as a juvenile that (1) there was no notice given to his parents or those in legal custody of the infant, (2) and the court did not appoint a legal representative to act for the infant in the trial of the cause, (3) and the infant had no voice in defense of himself, (4) and was denied the right of the provision of law in reference to his suspension of sentence, (5) and was denied right of trial by jury to hear testimony and consider it, (6) that his application and suspension of sentence was wholly ignored, present questions of fact incident to procedure on the trial, and the appellate court is bound to determine them from the record and upon the presumptions as to the legality of judgments, and cannot consider them in the absence of bill of exception; record not affirmatively showing that court erred.
6. Criminal law <@=>982 — Application for suspended sentence may be waived.
An application for suspended sentence may be waived.
7. Jufy <@=>29(2) — Trial by jury under Juvenile Delinquent Act may be waived.
A trial by jury may be waived by infant prosecuted under Juvenile Delinquent Act.
Appeal from Criminal District Court, Bowie County; P. A. Turner, Judge.
Morris Gordon was convicted as a juvenile, and appeals.
Affirmed.
. Sid Crumpton, of Texarkana, for appellant.
C. M. Cureton, Atty. Gen., and Walace Hawkins and Alvin M. Owsley, Asst. Attys. Gen., for the State.

Opinion:
DAVIDSON, P. J.
Appellant was convicted as a juvenile and sent to the reformatory at Gatesville.
The record is before us without a statement of facts or bills of exception. The information and complaint contain seven counts. The first count seems to be in proper form, charging appellant with being under 17 years of age. The other six counts do not show nor allege that he is under 17 years of age. Each count charges a felony. They were therefore ineffective under the Juvenile Act (Vernon's Ann. Code Cr. Proc. 1916, arts. 1197-1207) in charging felonies in. a complaint and information without specifying that the party against whom these charges were filed was under 17 years of age. There was no motion to quash, and no steps taken in regard to this matter until after the judgment was rendered, when a motion in arrest of judgment was filed. This was overruled. We are of opinion that this comes too late. The court was without jurisdiction to try felonies on a complaint and information, and under the juvenile law the exception to the above statement is found in the fact that the boy was under 17 years of age, and therefore he could be charged and convicted as a juvenile for that reason; otherwise only the district court would have jurisdiction to try the case as in ordinary felony cases. It seems that each count in the complaint and information charges a separate and distinct offense, so far as the pleadings are concerned, not growing out of the same transaction. Felonies and misdemeanors cannot be joined in the same count, but under the decisions a motion in arrest of judgment would come too late, and in passing upon this case, in aid of the presumption that the court was correct in his judgment, it will be sustained on the theory that the evidence supported the first count in the information, which charges that appellant was under 17 years of age, and the presumption would be that the court acted correctly in applying the facts to the proper count under which a conviction could be obtained.
As the record presents the case, we are of opinion the judgment should be affirmed, and it is accordingly so ordered.
<@=>For other oases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes