Case Name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard Glen BLOUNT, III, Defendant-Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2005-12-23
Citations: 161 F. App'x 652
Docket Number: No. 05-30170
Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. Richard Glen BLOUNT, III, Defendant—Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 161
Pages: 652–653

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. Richard Glen BLOUNT, III, Defendant—Appellant.
No. 05-30170.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted Dec. 5, 2005.
Decided Dec. 23, 2005.
Baron C. Sheldahl, Esq., Office of the U.S. Attorney, Portland, OR, for Plaintiff — Appellee.
Ellen Pitcher, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Portland, OR, for Defendant — Appellant.
Before: BROWNING, D.W. NELSON, and O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judges.
This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Richard Blount appeals his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and sentence under § 924(e), arguing that his state burglary convictions were not proper predicate offenses "punishable . for a term exceeding one year." 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), 924(e). An Oregon state burglary conviction under Or.Rev.Stat. § 164.215 is punishable by five years imprisonment, Or.Rev.Stat. § 161.605(3), though under the relevant state sentencing guidelines, the defendant could not have been imprisoned more than one year.
Nevertheless, these state convictions satisfy the predicate offense requirements for a conviction under § 922(g)(1) and imprisonment under § 924(e) because the statutory maximum, five years, is "a term exceeding one year." See United States v. Murillo, 422 F.3d 1152 (9th Cir.2005) (holding that a "crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year," as such crimes are defined by statute, is referencing the statutory maximum, not the guidelines maximum).
State v. Dilts, 337 Or. 645, 103 P.3d 95 (Or.2004), concerned a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights as construed by Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). As such, Dilts has no bearing on categorizing predicate offenses under § 922(g)(1). See Murillo, 422 F.3d at 1155 ("The categorization of predicate offenses for purposes of section 922(g)(1) faces none of the Sixth Amendment concerns that prompted the . Blakely decision[.]").
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.