Case Name: Erick RICHARDSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2003-07-23
Citations: 884 So. 2d 950
Docket Number: No. 4D02-4985
Parties: Erick RICHARDSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: STEVENSON, SHAHOOD and HAZOURI, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 884
Pages: 950–954

Head Matter:
Erick RICHARDSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 4D02-4985.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
July 23, 2003.
Opinion Granting Rehearing in Part Jan. 14, 2004.
Erick Richardson, Raiford, pro se.
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Daniel P. Hyndman, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Erick Richardson appeals the summary denial of his motion for postconviction relief, which raised three claims. Richardson was convicted of robbery and sentenced as a habitual felony offender to twenty years in prison. Richardson's claim that the predicate convictions used to declare him a habitual felony offender were not sequential has merit. We reverse.
To establish Richardson as a habitual felony offender, the State relied on prior convictions in case number 98-4322, for possession of cocaine, and 93-15462, for grand theft. The record shows that, although a conviction in the possession case was entered on April 14, 1993, sentencing was stayed and withheld, and Richardson was placed on probation. Richardson was convicted on the grand theft charge on September 23, 1993. On that same day, the court found Richardson in violation of probation on the possession case and sentences were entered- on both charges.
The sequential conviction requirement found in the habitual offender statute requires that prior felonies must have "resulted in a conviction sentenced separately prior to the current offense and sentenced separately from, any other felony conviction that is to be counted as a prior felony." § 775.084(5), Fla. Stat. (2002)(empha-sis- added). The supreme court, in Bover v. State, 797 So.2d 1246, 1250 (Fla.2001), reviewed the sequential conviction requirement and held that:
The habitual offender statute, section 775.084(5), specifically provides that the court must have imposed sentence for the two prior convictions separately from each other. Thus, although the sentencing for separate convictions arising out of unrelated crimes can take place on the same day, the sentences cannot be part of the same sentencing proceeding.
Thus, a more accurate term for the requirement would be the sequential sentencing proceeding requirement.
In this case, the State argues that Richardson was originally "sentenced to probation" on the possession charge and subsequently "resentenced" after a finding that probation had been violated. This argument is expressly contrary to the law.
A sentence and probation are distinct concepts. See Landeverde v. State, 769 So.2d 457, 462 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). When a defendant is placed on probation, the court must stay and withhold the imposition of sentence regardless of whether adjudication of guilt is' withheld. See § 948.01(2), Fla. Stat.; Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.790(a). Richardson was sentenced on the possession charge for the first time after the finding of a violation of probation. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 566 So.2d 299, 302 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). Thus, the sen tences for the predicate convictions used to classify Richardson as a habitual felony-offender were entered on the same day. If entered in the same proceeding, the sequential conviction requirement, as interpreted by. our supreme court in Bover, would be violated.
The record attached to the order of denial does not demonstrate that the sentences for the predicate offenses were entered in separate proceedings. Accordingly, the order summarily denying this claim is reversed and the matter is remanded for further proceedings. See Ford v. State, 814 So.2d 1121, 1122 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)(holding remand for resen-tencing was required on ground that appellate court could not discern from the record whether predicate convictions were truly sequential as resulting from separate sentencing proceedings).
On remand, because Richardson failed to object to his classification as a habitual felony offender at the time of sentencing, the State shall be permitted to introduce evidence of other qualifying convictions should any exist. See Cameron v. State, 807 So.2d 746, 747 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).
REVERSED and REMANDED.
STEVENSON, SHAHOOD and HAZOURI, JJ., concur.