Case Name: MORSE v. SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1897-08-07
Citations: 102 Ga. 302
Docket Number: 
Parties: MORSE v. SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY.
Judges: All the Justices concurring.
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 102
Pages: 302–313

Head Matter:
MORSE v. SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY.
.According to the principle laid down in the case of Head v. Georgia Pacific Railway Co., 79 Ga. 358, and in view of the evidence disclosed by the record, this court, without intimating what the verdict should be, is of the opinion that the present case should have been submitted to the jury and not disposed of by the grant of a nonsuit.
Lumpkiñ, P. J. 1 concur in the judgment, because bound by the decision in the Head case, supra; but the same being under review, I think It should be overruled.
Argued April 17, Reargued May 31,
Decided August 7, 1897.
Action for damages. Before Judge Kimsey. Hall superior court. July term, 1896.
Charles Morse sued the railway company for expelling him from its passenger-train. A nonsuit was granted, and he excepted.
It appears that on September 17, 1895, he purchased of the agent of defendant in New York a special excursion ticket, at a reduced rate, for going to, and returning from Atlanta, Ga., and that within the time limited by the ticket, having used the same for going to Atlanta, he entered defendant’s train for the purpose of making the return journey on the balance of the ticket, but on his presenting the same the train-conductor refused to receive it, upon the ground that it had not been officially stamped as required by one of the terms of the contract printed thereon, and ordered him to leave the train at the next station. Plaintiff did not do this, and at the second station where the train stopped the conductor ejected him therefrom. The conditions printed upon the ticket, so far as material, were, that the same was not transferable' and should be void and taken up if presented by any person other than the purchaser; that it was not good for return passage unless the holder identified himself as the original purchaser to the satisfaction of the joint agent of terminal lines at Atlanta, Ga., and when officially signed and dated in ink and duly stamped; that unless all the conditions on this ticket were fully complied with, it should be void; and “that I, the original purchaser, hereby agree to sign my name and otherwise identify myself as such .whenever called upon to do so by the conductor or agent of any of the lines over which this ticket reads, and on my failure or refusal, this ticket shall become thereafter void.” In its caption was a caution that any one attempting to use this ticket by imitating the signature of the original purchaser would render himself liable to prosecution for forgery; and upon its face was a notice to the purchaser to read the contract and take notice that it must be stamped and his signature witnessed by the joint agent of the terminal lines at Atlanta, before it would be honored for return passage. The name of Charles Morse was signed as that of the original purchaser of the ticket, and this name was written in ink both on the front and back of the ticket introduced in evidence. Plaintiff testified that he stayed in Atlanta from September 18 to October 10, 1895, at two named hotels, giving their street numbers. He signed his name to the ticket because he was requested to do so by the New York agent, who witnessed his signature. Before taking the train on his attempt to return, he presented the ticket at the office of the joint terminal, a ticket-office located near the union depot in Atlanta, to have it officially stamped. The agent requested him to sign the ticket, and he did so. The agent then said that the signature did not correspond with the one signed in New York, and asked him if he had any other way of identification. He replied he was a' stranger in Atlanta but had some letters received that morn-, ing, which he produced and showed to the agent, even showing him the contents of one. The agent still refused to stamp the "ticket, and upon being asked what plaintiff could do, told him to take it back to the man he bought it from and make him give him back his money. Plaintiff stated that the man who sold it to him was in New York, to which the agent replied, “O, I guess you can take it over to the Gridiron all right,” referring to a cut-rate ticket-office near by. Plaintiff then left, but soon returned and again requested the agent to stamp the ticket, but he decidedly refused to do so. Plaintiff used .all the means within his power to identify himself .as the original purchaser, and when on the train, informed the conductor of the agent’s refusal to stamp the ticket. He did not become acquainted with the landlords of either of the hotels he stopped at in Atlanta, except to speak to them on business matters. He did not know any one in Atlanta, and there was no one that knew him. He did not know that the ticket was worthless unless stamped and signed; did not know that the conductor would have refused it for passage. The conductor did not take it up. The ticket introduced in evidence is the one he purchased and attempted to use on his return.
W. B. Hammond, L. P. Slceen and Prior & Thompson, for plaintiff.
Dorsey, Brewster & Howell, J. B. Estes and Sanders McDaniel, for defendant.

Opinion:
Simmons, 0. J.
This case has been twice argued; once before the first division of the court, and subsequently before the court as a whole. In the latter argument, leave was asked and permission given by the court to review the case of Head v. Georgia Pacific Ry. Co., 79 Ga. 358. After a full consideration of that case, five members of the court think that it is a sound exposition of the law of this State, and decline, therefore, to overrule it. Presiding Justice Lumpkin differs with us, and thinks that it should be overruled.
The Head case is so well reasoned by Bleckley, C. J., that I shall not attempt further to elaborate it. Under the principles of that case, Morse, the plaintiff in this case, was entitled to recover from the railroad company, if he had fully complied with the conditions of his contract with the company. Whether he did fully comply therewith was, in our opinion, a question for the jury, on which we now express no opinion. On the next trial, on that branch of the case the question will be whether Morse identified himself to the satisfaction of the agent. If he did so, and the agent arbitrarily refused to validate the ticket, and Morse notwithstanding this fact got upon the train and was ejected therefrom by the conductor, he would be entitled to recover. If, upon the other hand, he did not comply with the conditions of his contract and failed to furnish such proof of his identity as would satisfy the agent, then he can not recover. In his contract he agreed to do this. Pie agreed to furnish such proof of his identity as would satisfy a reasonable man—a man who was seeking to do justice between his company and the other party. No rule can be laid down as to the amount of proof such a person should furnish in order to satisfy the agent. I should think it would depend largely upon the circumstances and upon the person who Avas seeking to identify himself. The agent may be acquainted with one person and his character, and might deem that person's signature and • his own knowledge of him sufficient; while, upon the other hand, if the applicant were an utter stranger, the agent might require more proof. At all events, the ticket-holder must furnish such proof of his identity as would satisfy a reasonable man. We think that under the terms of this contract the agent can not disregard reasonable proof of identity and arbitrarily decline to validate the ticket. For these reasons we think the court erred in granting the nonsuit, and that he should, instead, have submitted the question to the jury.
Judgment reversed.
All the Justices concurring.