Case Name: Richardson & Martin, plaintiffs in error, vs. Simeon A. Smith, defendant in error
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1864-03
Citations: 33 Ga. Supp. 95
Docket Number: 
Parties: Richardson & Martin, plaintiffs in error, vs. Simeon A. Smith, defendant in error.
Judges: 
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 33 Suppl.
Pages: 95–99

Head Matter:
Richardson & Martin, plaintiffs in error, vs. Simeon A. Smith, defendant in error.
1. Where property is delivered to a common carrier or other bailee, tobe carried to a designated place, and deposited in a warehouse, the fact that the bailee takes a receipt for the property from the warehouseman, in his own name, and hypothecates the receipt as security for his own debt, does not affect or change the title of the bailor.
2. Asale of property in “ market overt ” does not change the title of the rightful owner, if made without his authority.
Trover and conversion. Tried before Judge O. A. Lociirane, at December Term, 1863, of Dougherty Superior Court.
Simeon A. Smith brought an action of trover, in Dougherty Superior Court, against Sims & Rust, to recover damages for the alleged conversion of fourteen bales of wool.
On the trial of the case the following evidence was adduced, to-wit:
In behalf of the plaintiff it was shown, that one William Davis, the agent of the plaintiff, did, in July 1859, deliver to one Robert Marrow, thirteen bales of wool, and about one hundred and thirty pounds of loose wool, which Marrow was to carry to the city of Albany and deposit in Smith’s name, in a warehouse. The wool was the property of Smith, and was simply to be transported to Albany, and deposited in a warehouse by said Marrow, who, at the time, was engaged in the business of hauling from place to place with wagons and teams. Marrow did carry the wool to Albany, and deposited the same with Sims & Rust, who owned and kept a warehouse. The plaintiff also proved the value of the wool, and that a demand therefor had been made upon Sims & Rust.
In behalf of defendants it was shown, that Marrow, when he deposited the wool with Sims & Rust, took their receipts for the same in his own name, which recited that the wool was, “subject to the receipts,” or to Marrow’s order on paying customary charges and all advances. The defendants also proved by a witness that had been in the warehouse business over fifteen years, and who was familiar with the usages and customs of warehousemen in reference to receipts given for goods in store, that it was the universal custom, to require the receipts to be produced and given up before the goods were shipped out, that cotton receipts, and receipts like those given for the wool in this case, were according to custom, transferable by delivery, and when produce in store is drawn upon, the receipts accompany the draft. The defendants also proved, that Marrow drew a draft on Richardson & Martin, of Savannah, at ninety days from August 10th, 3 859, for $3,000 00, and delivered the receipts for the wool, to Lewis S. McGuire, agent of Richardson & Martin, as collateral security to indemnify them as acceptors of said draft.
For the plaintiff-it was shown, in rebuttal, that Richardson & Martin were commission merchants in the city of Savannah, and one of them was president of a bank, and that McGuire was the agent at Albany, of the same bank, and represented Richardson & Martin; that Marrow was indebted to the bank in a large sum, and that when he failed in business in January, 1860, his stock of goods on hand, worth $12,000, or $15,000, was turned over to McGuire, and shipped to Richardson & Martin, at Savannah.- This rebutting testimony was objected to but admitted by the Court over the objections.
As Richardson & Martin claimed the wool in controversy, it was agreed by all the parties that they should take the place of adverse litigants in the case, to Simeon A. Smith, the plaintiff.
The testimony having closed, the presiding Judge charged the jury, that if they believed the wool in controversy was the property of the plaintiff Smith, it was then necessary to ascertain the legal title which Richardson & Martin acquired to it, if any. The Court then explained the law of customs and charged the jury, that if they believed the receipt taken for the wool was received by the agent of Richardson & Martin as collateral to the payment of a draft, and such contract was in writing, then no matter what was the custom of warehousemen, or what title the transfer of cotton receipts, or warehouse receipts gave to parties holding them, the taking such receipts as collaterals, was a contract between the parties, and the law of customs does not apply. If Marrow used the property of Smith fraudulently, and deceived Richardson & Martin, and obtained credit without notice to them of Smith's claim, and they took the receipts under the law custom of transfer of such receipts conveying title, they acquired title to the wool in controversy, without proof that they had paid the draft given for the receipts, and if the jury believe this to be the state of facts from the evidence, they might find for Richardson & Martin. But if the jury believe the receipts ’were taken as collateral for a draft of Marrow, and the wool was not Marrow’s, but was the property of Smith, then to make the wool liable to the draft, it was incumbent on Richardson & Martin to show that Marrow was agent of Smith, and that he bad deceived them, and that thSy had paid the draft. If the jury believed that Marrow was a common carrier and bailee for a special purpose, and that purpose was to deposit the goods entrusted to him for the use of the bailor, at a particular place, then such bailee or common carrier had no legal right to divest the true owner of his title to his property by fraudulent use of it.
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, Smith, and the charge hereinbefore stated, and the admission of the testimony for the plaintiff in rebuttal, are the errors complained of by Richardson & Martin.
Samuel Hall and S. D. Irvin, for plaintiffs in error.
Strozier & Smith, contra.

Opinion:
By the Court
Jenkins, J.,
delivering the opinion.
This case must turn upon the question of title in the wool sued for, and the nature and extent of Marrow's agency regarding it. We are of the opinion that the evidence clearly establishes title in Smith, at the time of the delivery of the wool to Sims & Rust, the warehousemen. It is also clearly proven that Marrow was a common carrier, and received the wool from Smith for no other purpose than to transfer it to Albany, and deposit it in a warehouse; when this was done, his agency was at an end, and the special property which the law recognised in him, simply to enable him to effect the purpose of the bailment, ceased. This taking receipts from the warehousemen in his own name, and his hypothecation of those receipts as security for his own debt, were wholly without the scope of his agency, and can in no manner affect the title of the bailor. It is a principle of the common law of England, of force here, that a sale in market overt does not change the title of the rightful owner, if made without his authority: 1 Wilson Rep., 8; Wheelright vs. Depeyster, 1 Johnson R., 472; Story on Bailments, p., 326. See also, Patterson vs. Gush, 2 Strange, 1178; Daubigny vs. Duval, 5 T. R., 604; Snaith vs. Burridge, 4 Taunton, 684; Kinder vs. Shaw, 2 Mass., 398; 2 Kent's Com., 625-28, 3d edition.
The law as here affirmed was given in charge to the jury, and no doubt controlled their verdict. With that verdict we are perfectly satisfied, and deem it unnecessary to consider exceptions taken to the charge of the Court below, in regard to the negotiable character of the warehouse receipts issued in this case, under the custom of merchants. Errors, if any there were, in that charge, would not induce a reversal, the charge having been correctly given upon the controlling question, and the verdict being correct under the evidence and the law of the case.
There was an exception to the decision of the Court, upon the admissibility of evidence, but we deem, it unnecessary to consider it, because error in admitting it would be no ground for reversal, the evidence appertaining to an immaterial point.
Let the judgment be affirmed.