Case Name: Donna H. HUNT, Appellant, v. Jack R. HUNT, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1981-03-04
Citations: 394 So. 2d 564
Docket Number: No. 00-145/T1-104
Parties: Donna H. HUNT, Appellant, v. Jack R. HUNT, Appellee.
Judges: DAUKSCH, C. J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 394
Pages: 564–567

Head Matter:
Donna H. HUNT, Appellant, v. Jack R. HUNT, Appellee.
No. 00-145/T1-104.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
March 4, 1981.
Selig I. Goldin, Gainesville, for appellant.
H. Charles Woerner, Jr., South Daytona, for appellee.

Opinion:
FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., Judge.
Donna H. Hunt, the former wife, appeals a judgment of the Circuit Court for Volusia County modifying a final judgment in a dissolution case. The lower court terminated the wife's permanent alimony rights, denied her petition for an increase in alimony, and on rehearing, terminated any jurisdiction to award her alimony after June 1, 1980. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
The Hunts were married in 1956. The 1973 judgment of dissolution awarded the wife $700.00 per month permanent alimony and no other assets. At the time of the petition for modification, Mrs. Hunt was sixty years of age, and claimed to be in poor health. At the time of the dissolution, she had a masters degree in education. Immediately prior to the dissolution, her teaching certificate had lapsed. Her earnings at that time are unknown though she did make almost $8,000.00 in 1964. At the time of the petition, she claimed she had no income other than the alimony.
While the trial court's action may seem harsh at first glance and we might not have reached this result, it is not the function of this court to substitute its judgment for that of the lower court. The trial court is the trier of fact and its findings will not be disturbed on appeal if supported by competent substantial evidence. Shaw v. Shaw, 334 So.2d 13 (Fla.1976). The trial court undoubtedly determined that some of Mrs. Hunt's uncorroborated proof was unreliable or unbelievable. There is ample support in the record to question Mrs. Hunt's credibility-
The testimony of Mrs. Hunt conflicted with that of Mr. Hunt. The trial court could have concluded that Mrs. Hunt deliberately undervalued her assets and overstated her needs. For example, Mrs. Hunt claimed a need for an increase in alimony from $700.00 to $2,000.00 per month minimum. She claimed a need for $65,000.00 per year. She valued property she acquired in 1974 at $35,000.00 which a M.A.I. appraiser valued at $53,000.00. Another parcel she valued at $12,000.00 was appraised at $26,000.00. Mrs. Hunt permitted her teaching certificate to lapse, which the trial judge could have concluded was premeditated. While complaining of her precarious finances and health, she has found strength and funds to attend a seaweed symposium in Santa Barbara, California and to observe unique life forms in the Galapagos Islands. She was also able to visit for a two week conference in Athens, Georgia and to make several trips around the state, but was unable to devote more than two hours per day to her studies because she had to be with her mother. Property which had been bringing in $500.00 per month in rent the year before was unrented at the time her financial affidavit was filed.
While Mrs. Hunt had a master's degree in education after the divorce, she pursued an entirely new field, marine biology, in which to obtain her doctorate even though her future employment prospects were very poor. A professor testified that in the field of marine biology the prospects of employment were poor, less than 50% for a young person, but for Mrs. Hunt even upon an award of a doctorate her chances were "nil." She attributed her lack of progress to poor health and needs of her mother. She played and taught tennis, but contended that because of severe arthritis she had difficulty with the controls of a microscope.
The trial court specifically found:
The wife has a master's degree in education. She taught school for ten years and allowed her teacher's certificate to lapse the year the dissolution action was filed. After the dissolution of her marriage, she was accepted in a doctoral program at the University of Florida. She has pursued that course for five years. Her testimony leaves serious doubt as to whether she will ever complete the program and obtain her degree in her chosen field of marine biology. There was even some suggestion she might change her field. It is abundantly clear to the court that wife is a qualified and experienced teacher. In addition to teaching before the dissolution, she taught college classes af ter the dissolution as a duty of her assist-antship while pursuing her degree. At that time, she was conducting research in the laboratory and doing her course work. Wife is capable of supporting herself. She was unemployed at the time of the dissolution and required some period to obtain employment and re-establish her life. Wife does not have a vested right in husband's earnings forever nor is husband obligated to maintain her as a student forever. Although wife claims poor health, her low blood sugar condition has not impeded her ability to meet the demands of her doctoral program nor has it affected her ability to teach or play tennis.
Since the dissolution, wife has acquired assets even though she has not held a full time job. She owns two homes. One in Gainesville and one in Daytona Beach. She does not use the home in Daytona Beach but indicated she intends to retain it. The broker testified the value of the Daytona Beach property was $26,000.00.
These findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record and should not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of an abuse of discretion by the trial court. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197 (Fla.1980). However, the court should have retained jurisdiction to award alimony in the future. See Davis v. Davis, 358 So.2d 126 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978); Mumm v. Mumm, 353 So.2d 134 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Hyatt v. Hyatt, 315 So.2d 11 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975). Mrs. Hunt was sixty years old and while her health at this time does not affect her ability to support herself, it may in the future.
The order of the trial court dated March 28, 1979 suspending the alimony award is affirmed but the order of May 14, 1979, as amended by the order of May 19, 1979 which terminated the jurisdiction of the court to award alimony in the future, is reversed.
DAUKSCH, C. J., concurs.
SHARP, J., dissents with opinion.