Case Name: Gail C. McBRIDE, Appellant, v. Douglas B. McBRIDE, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1977-12-15
Citations: 352 So. 2d 1254
Docket Number: No. FF-310
Parties: Gail C. McBRIDE, Appellant, v. Douglas B. McBRIDE, Appellee.
Judges: McCORD, C. J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 352
Pages: 1254–1259

Head Matter:
Gail C. McBRIDE, Appellant, v. Douglas B. McBRIDE, Appellee.
No. FF-310.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Dec. 15, 1977.
Isham W. Adams, Daytona Beach, for appellant.
James L. Padgett, Crescent City, for ap-pellee.

Opinion:
RAWLS, Judge.
By this interlocutory appeal, appellant-wife seeks review of an order entered by a successor judge modifying the final judgment of dissolution of marriage by changing nunc pro tunc the form of alimony from permanent to rehabilitative.
The parties were married June 11, 1966, approximately ten days after the wife graduated from high school. The wife was 17 years old and the husband was 21 years old. During their marriage, the parties had two sons. The wife was never employed in the marketplace during the marriage.
In May of 1975, the husband filed a petition for dissolution of marriage accompanied by an offer of judgment. The parties entered into a stipulation by which they settled provisions for child support, visitation, and property settlement. The husband further agreed to pay $500.00 per month alimony; however, the parties were unable to agree whether the alimony payments would be made on a permanent or rehabilitative basis.
On October 17,1975, Judge Leon F. Stewart entered his order dissolving the marriage, incorporating the stipulation provisions into the order, and directing that the $500.00 per month alimony be permanent. The husband filed a petition for rehearing which was denied on December 19, 1975. No appeal was taken.
On February 10,1976, the husband filed a petition for modification alleging a mistake of fact as to his financial status at the time of entry of the final judgment; the ability of his ex-wife to work; and financial losses that were leading to his bankruptcy. (A financial statement dated December 31, 1975, was filed with the trial court which listed the husband's net worth as $202,-179.38. Also, a statement of cash receipts and disbursements was filed listing a cash balance of $75,425.17.) Following a hearing, Judge Stewart denied the petition for modification on April 2, 1976. Such denial constituted an affirmance of the previous order as to permanent alimony.
On September 24, 1976, the husband filed a petition for modification alleging material changes in the circumstances of the parties. An amended and second amended petition were filed. The second amended petition alleged that the income of the husband had materially changed and substantially decreased, that the circumstances of the wife had changed in that the minor children had both attained school age, and that subsequent to January 17,1977, freezing weather had destroyed a vast majority of the husband's fern crop which was the source of his income. The husband prayed that the court "reduce his child support payments, and substantially reduce or eliminate entirely alimony payments." (A financial statement dated December 31,1976, was filed showing a net worth of $94,308.66.)
On March 10, 1977, Judge Upchurch, Judge Stewart's successor, entered his order denying any modification in the child support or the amount of alimony but amending nunc pro tunc the final judgment of October 17, 1975, so as to provide that the alimony be rehabilitative, rather than permanent, payable for four consecutive years commencing October 1, 1975.
As grounds for reversal, appellant urges that the successor trial judge was without jurisdiction or authority to modify the final order of his predecessor.
Generally, in the absence of mistake or fraud, a successor judge cannot review, modify or reverse, upon the merits on the same facts, the final orders of his predecessor. Bailey v. Bailey, 204 So.2d 531 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1967).
Section 61.14, Florida Statutes, provides that the circuit courts have jurisdiction to make orders as equity requires to decrease or increase the amount of alimony with due regard to the changed circumstances or the financial ability of the parties. The jurisdiction of a successor judge is limited, for it has been held that while a successor judge could modify prospectively pursuant to Section 61.14, he could not "clarify" a final judgment of dissolution so that additional obligations would relate back to the time of the entry of the original judgment. Floyd v. Floyd, 281 So.2d 63 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1973). Thus, that portion of the trial court's order making the four-year period of rehabilitative alimony effective the date of the original decree was error because of its retroactive nature.
As to the form of alimony, rehabilitative vs. permanent, it should be noted that the husband petitioned for a reduction or elimination of alimony. The primary criteria to be used in establishing the amount of alimony is still the husband's ability to pay and the needs of the wife, taking into consideration the standard of living by the parties to the marriage. Sharpe v. Sharpe, 267 So.2d 665 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1972); and Firestone v. Firestone, 263 So.2d 223 (Fla. 1972).
In Herbert v. Herbert, 304 So.2d 465 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974), the Fourth District Court of Appeal stated:
" . . . the husband's petition for modification alleging matters bearing upon a substantial change in his financial circumstances and resulting in the order under review merely prayed for 'an order reducing child support and alimony'. The pleadings do not reflect any suggestion or intimation that the husband's obligation to pay alimony should cease because of a [sic] substantial changes in his circumstances or those of his wife.
"Nevertheless, the trial court proceeded to terminate the husband's alimony obligation rather than reduce the same during his period of financial inability as prayed for in his petition. The trial court predicated this cessation upon its finding that there was 'no justification in extending the husband's obligation for alimony to a woman who is well capable of supporting herself'. This gratuitous determination was inconsistent with the husband's petition for modification and for that matter with every other plead-and prayer for relief filed by the husband in the dissolution proceedings."
In the instant case, the husband petitioned for a reduction or elimination of alimony. The trial court declined to reduce the alimony; however, it changed the form of alimony from permanent to rehabilitative. This was error. The evidence presented established nothing more than the husband was undergoing a temporary reduction in income due to a winter freeze with resulting damage to his fern acreage. There was no evidence presented that the wife's financial circumstances had changed nor was there any evidence that the wife's ability for self support would occur at the end of the four-year period.
The judgment appealed is REVERSED.
McCORD, C. J., concurs.
BOYER, J., dissents.
. We construe Judge Stewart's language in the final judgment to the effect that "the alimony payable by Petitioner to Respondent shall continue until the death of the Petitioner, the death or remarriage of Respondent or the further order of this Court modifying the same due to change in circumstances" to constitute an award of permanent as opposed to rehabilitative alimony.