Case Name: John DiPAOLO, Appellant, v. ROLLINS LEASING CORPORATION, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1997-08-29
Citations: 700 So. 2d 31
Docket Number: No. 96-3367
Parties: John DiPAOLO, Appellant, v. ROLLINS LEASING CORPORATION, Appellee.
Judges: DAUKSCH, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 700
Pages: 31–33

Head Matter:
John DiPAOLO, Appellant, v. ROLLINS LEASING CORPORATION, Appellee.
No. 96-3367.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Aug. 29, 1997.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 6, 1997.
Donald D. Hockman, of Hockman & Hock-man, Winter Park, for Appellant.
Robert D. Keough and Timothy W. Weber, of Woolfolk, Keough & DuBose, P.A., Orlando, for Appellee.

Opinion:
HARRIS, Judge.
John DiPaolo filed his initial complaint against Rollins Leasing Corporation in 1994. It contained a single count sounding in negligence. Some two years later, after discovery was completed and just before a hearing on defendant's motion for summary judgment, DiPaolo moved to amend his complaint to add additional counts. His motion was not noticed for hearing at the time of the hearing on summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion as it related to the negligence count and entered summary final, judgment on that count, but reserved ruling on the motion to amend until it was properly scheduled.
The ten-day time for a motion for a rej' hearing expired, as well as the thirty-day period for an appeal, without DiPaolo seeking any action on his motion to amend the complaint or filing a notice of appeal of the summary judgment. Some months later there was a hearing on his motion to amend, and the court denied the motion; DiPaolo has filed this appeal contesting both the granting of the summary final judgment and the denial of his motion to amend.
We dismiss the appeal. Once the summary judgment was entered disposing of the only action properly before the court as to Rollins, and the time for filing a petition for rehearing or a motion for new trial and the appeal period has run, there was no action remaining before the trial court on which to base an amendment even if the court had seen fit to permit one. A pending motion to amend does not extend the trial court's jurisdiction after entry of final judgment, and the court's reserving consideration of that issue until a later time does not change that fact. We agree with the Fourth District's holding in City of Boca Raton v. Ross Hofmann Associates, Inc., 501 So.2d 72 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987):
After entry of summary final judgment for appellant and denial of appellee's motion for rehearing, the trial court granted ap-pellee's previously filed motion to amend its complaint. We reverse on the ground that the court lost jurisdiction and had no authority to permit an amendment to the complaint after denial of rehearing. Florida National Bank v. Domanska, 486 So.2d 1384 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). See also Shelby Mutual Insurance Co. v. Pearson, 236 So.2d 1 (Fla.1970). A contrary rule, that finality awaits ruling upon a previously-filed motion to amend the pleadings, would introduce into judicial proceedings an element of uncertainty that would be detrimental to litigants and disruptive of the judicial process. Neither procedural nor substantive due process requires such a result.
As we stated in Seddon v. Harpster, 438 So.2d 165, 168 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983):
Once a final judgment has been rendered and the time for filing a petition for rehearing or motion for new trial has passed the court loses all jurisdiction over the cause other than to see that proper entry of the judgment or decree is made and that the rights determined and fixed by it are properly enforced.
DISMISSED.
DAUKSCH, J., concurs.
W. SHARP, J., dissents, with opinion.