Case Name: Benjamin B. MATHEWS v. Vicki Fisk MATHEWS
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1984-01-10
Citations: 459 So. 2d 546
Docket Number: No. 83-CA-518
Parties: Benjamin B. MATHEWS v. Vicki Fisk MATHEWS.
Judges: Before KLIEBERT, BOWES and GAU-DIN, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 459
Pages: 546–554

Head Matter:
Benjamin B. MATHEWS v. Vicki Fisk MATHEWS.
No. 83-CA-518.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit.
Jan. 10, 1984.
On Rehearing Nov. 13, 1984.
Robert C. Lowe, Sessions, Fishman, Ro-senson, Boisfontaine & Nathan, New Orleans, for plaintiff/appellee.
Michael A. McNulty, Jr., John A. Hollis-ter, McNulty, O’Connor, Stakelum & Anderson; John M. Standridge, and Dennis J. Krystek, New Orleans, for defendant/appellant.
Before KLIEBERT, BOWES and GAU-DIN, JJ.

Opinion:
BOWES, Judge.
Defendant has appealed from a judgment of the District Court: (1) finding mutual fault in granting a separation a mensa et thoro; (2) decreeing a divorce a vinculo matrimonii; and (3) awarding custody of the minor child of the marriage to both parents jointly, making them co-tutors. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and amend in part the trial court's judgment for the reasons set forth hereinafter.
Plaintiff Benjamin Matthews filed a petition for separation from bed and board in March, 1981, alleging cruel treatment by the defendant but specifying no particular acts by his wife. Mrs. Matthews reconvened, also alleging cruelty on the part of her husband in various particulars. Custody of the minor child was granted to the defendant, with enumerated visitation rights given to plaintiff. Various rules and motions were filed, but the allegations in the separation were not tried. In April, 1982, plaintiff filed a petition for divorce, based on living separate and apart; defendant filed a denial and re-alleged fault as in the separation.
Trial was held over a period of several days. At the conclusion, the court held that a preponderance of the evidence showed that Mrs. Mathews was guilty of adultery with two named men and probably so with a third man. The Court also held that Mr. Mathews' fault consisted of indifference and inattention toward defendant and lack of interest in her career, amounting to mental cruelty. Joint custody of Robin was granted as the trial judge found that "Mrs. Mathews' extra-marital affairs did not have a deleterious effect on Robin." A joint custody planning guide was ordered by the court.
Defendant's appeal alleges three errors: that the finding that appellant was guilty of adultery was clearly erroneous and an abuse of discretion; that the award of joint custody was reversible error; and that the support award was inadequate and the Court was erroneous in not granting alimony. Plaintiff-appellee did not appeal, so the finding of fault of the trial court is final as to him.
We note at the outset that the trial judge erred in granting a separation a mensa et thoro and a divorce a vinculo matrimonii in the same judgment. Plaintiff initially filed suit for separation alleging cruelty; he subsequently filed another suit for divorce based on having lived separate and apart from his wife. The two actions, separation and divorce, carry distinctly different effects. Divorce dissolves matrimonial bonds; separation only serves to end conjugal cohabitation, the community of ac-quests and gains, and common concerns which previously existed. La.C.C. art. 136. By filing a new petition for divorce on different grounds and praying for different relief, plaintiff abandoned his first cause of action. See Pepe v. Drouant, 311 So.2d 582 (La.App. 1st Cir.1975). By alleging fault on the part of defendant, plaintiff preserved his right to litigate fault for the purpose of barring post-divorce alimony.
The defendant did not reconvene for divorce but answered, praying that the divorce petition be dismissed; in the alternative, she prayed that the divorce judgment declare her to be free from fault. She re-alleged cruel treatment as initially stated in her separation suit, but did not pray for a judgment of separation in her answer.
It is evident that the issue before the trial court was the divorce, and the issues to be decided were (1) whether grounds for the divorce existed based on the parties living separate and apart and (2) whether either party was at fault so as to bar permanent alimony. The trial court obviously intended this result in its judgment. However, since the separation action was no longer before the court as of the filing of the action for divorce (which was based on different grounds), it was error to grant a separation.
The evidence offered by appellee to prove adultery was basically in three parts. The testimony of Roy Mouras was clear and unambiguous in that he claimed to have had sexual relations with the defendant many times at her home, her mother's house, and several other places during 1979-1980. Mrs. Mathews denied the same. However, Mouras' testimony was bolstered, so to speak, by his accurate memory which allowed him to diagram at the trial, some two years later, and apparently with very substantial correctness, the layout of the bedroom of Mrs. Mathews in her home, a feat we deem impossible to someone who had not been there often. Certainly his testimony was believable and convincing and the astute trial judge cannot be found erroneous if he chose to believe him.
Mrs. Melka ("Didi") Walker, a friend (or, at least, a former friend) of Mrs. Mathews, testified that the defendant admitted to having had sexual intercourse with Doug Jennings during the period of her marriage. Mrs. Mathews denied both the affair itself and having admitted it to Mrs. Walker. Further testimony by Mrs. Walker revealed that she and the defendant had been very close friends, conversing with and apparently confiding in each other on many, many occasions. Taken as a whole, the testimony of "Didi" Walker literally smoked from the fire of many incriminating statements and inculpatory innuendos confided to her by Mrs. Mathews. Again, we cannot find error on the part of the trial judge who evaluated the live witnesses, if he found guilt of adultery in this testimony. Finally, the plaintiff presented two private detectives who testified relative to their surveillance of the defendant, and of several "dates" or meetings that she had with Doug Jennings and James Olsen at various places (and with Olsen in his home). Although this testimony contained some flaws, it offered additional proof of Mrs. Mathews' remaining alone "behind closed doors" with other men, for hours at a time, late at night and in the early morning. These habitual clandestine rendevous, combined with the other evidence outlined above, establish a pattern of behavior which, taken in its entirety, tend to negate any other reasonable conclusion but that defendant was committing adultery.
We are aware of the cases which hold that being alone with a person of the opposite sex, even overnight, does not give rise to a presumption of adultery. However, we have not based our finding only on Mrs. Mathews' "keeping company" with other men, but on the plethora of evidence which clusters together to form the picture which the trial judge saw, that of an unfaithful wife.
While the evidence as to the defendant's adultery may not be completely overwhelming, it is not necessary to prove adultery beyond the shadow of a doubt. To do so would require photographs of the parties in the sexual act. A party must establish by circumstantial evidence facts which lead reasonably to the conclusion that adultery has been committed and exclude all other reasonable hypothesis of innocence. See Morrison v. Morrison, 316 So.2d 453 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1975), Writ denied 322 So.2d 772 (La.1975), which we quote as follows:
The appellant argues that the trial judge did not apply the proper standard of proof in this case . The appellee argues that a standard of proof requiring overwhelming evidence of the commission of adultery is a far greater burden than that presently placed on the plaintiff in an adultery case by the jurisprudence. He submits that the only proof of adultery which would be overwhelming would be photographs of the parties in the act of intercourse.
. The jurisprudence of this state is to the effect that when circumstantial evidence is used to establish adultery, a prima facie ease may be made out by showing facts or circumstances that lead fairly and necessarily to the conclusion that adultery has been committed as alleged in the petition. Coston v. Coston, 196 La. 1095, 200 So. 474 (1941). The proof must be so convincing as to exclude all other reasonable hypothesis but that of guilt of adultery. Daigle v. Daigle, 222 So.2d 318 (La.App. 1st Cir.1969).
In connection with the discussion of this issue, we note the great weight which is given to the trial judge's findings of fact in Louisiana. The language found in the opinion of Justice Tate in Canter v. Koehring Co., et al, 283 So.2d 716 (La.1973) is pertinent at this point.
'When there is evidence before the trier of fact which, upon its reasonable evaluation of credibility, furnishes a reasonable factual basis for the trial court's findings, on review the appellate court should not disturb this factual finding in the absence of manifest error.'
Applying Canter to the present case we must give great weight to the factual conclusions of the trial judge as to the commission of adultery. There was a conflict in the testimony in this case. Furthermore, we find that the evaluations of credibility and the inferences of fact on the part of the trial judge were entirely reasonable. Finding no manifest error on the part of the trial judge, we affirm his finding that adultery was committed by the appellant_ Id. at 457.
We agree with and adopt the rationale set out above in Morrison. Applying that rationale to the conflict of evidence in this case, it is evident that the trial judge decided that the husband did introduce circumstantial evidence of facts leading reasonably to the conclusion that adultery had been committed and excluding all other rea sonable hypothesis of innocence. Following the rationale of Morrison, supra, we cannot say that he erred.
We, therefore, affirm the finding of the trial court that Mrs. Matthews was guilty of adultery for the purpose of denying permanent alimony.
In determining the right to post-divorce alimony, our courts have held:
Fault for purposes of permanent alimony preclusion is synonymous with the fault grounds for separation and divorce under LSA-C.C. Articles 138 and 139_
The wife bears the burden of proving her freedom from fault in order to be entitled to alimony following divorce. Boudreaux v. Boudreaux, 407 So.2d 1363 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1981).
We find that Mrs. Mathews did not carry the burden of proof thus imposed upon her. Further, since Mr. Matthews did not appeal and the finding of fault is final as to him, it is clear that both parties were at fault in the separation and continuous living apart, and the resultant divorce. Consequently, both parties are precluded from receiving permanent alimony.
In our determinations above, we have not considered the taped telephone conversations between Mrs. Mathews and Didi Walker for any purpose other than impeachment of Mrs. Mathews. Tape recordings may be admissible as prior inconsistent statements, and their admission into evidence for this limited purpose was not error. Arseneaux v. Arseneaux, 417 So.2d 856 (La.App. 4th Cir.1982).
Further, we hold that the joint custody provisions of Civil Code article 146 are applicable in the present case. Defendant argues that since the separation took place prior to the effective date of Article 146, as amended, (the effective date is January 1, 1983), that the prior article should apply and she should be granted sole custody. Article 146 addresses itself to suits "yet pending and undecided." The last date of this trial was January 19, 1983. The judgment was rendered and signed on February 2, 1983. Therefore, article 146, as amended, is applicable, and we affirm the award of joint custody.
With regard to the award of $400.00 for child support, the comprehensive household expense list submitted by Mrs. Mathews seems reasonable to this Court. Allowing only for Robin's pro rata share of rent, utilities, etc., we have calculated an expense of approximately $700.00 per month for the child's living expenses. Civil Code articles 227 and 231 state that both parents have the obligation of supporting their children in proportion to their means. The degree of support is determined by the need of the child and the ability of those who are to pay it. Ducote v. Ducote, 339 So.2d 835 (La.1976). In the present case, Mr. Mathews testified that his salary is $2,000.00 per month. Mr. Mathews' counsel indicated his client's earnings were $30,000.00 per year; Mrs. Mathews testified he had earned $36,000.00 annually. We are convinced his real annual income substantially exceeds the $30,-000.00 that he admitted to. Whichever figure is correct, Mr. Mathews does evidently have supplemental benefits from his family-owned corporation, such as interest-free "loans". The home in which he lives is owned by his family's corporation and is rent-free to him. Mrs. Mathews earns, generally, $125.00 monthly, and sometimes slightly more. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, and under our jurisprudence, we find that an award of $600.00 per month for the support of the minor child, for the nine months that she has physical custody, is equitable and supported by the evidence in the record. During the three months when the plaintiff has custody (during summer vacation), $300.00 per month is fair.
For the above and foregoing reasons, we annul the finding of the trial court granting a separation a mensa et thoro based on mutual fault, and affirm that portion of the judgment which granted the divorce on grounds of the parties having lived separate and apart for over one year without reconciliation. We amend the judgment to reflect post-separation fault on the part of the defendant wife sufficient to preclude permanent alimony; the finding of fault as to Mr. Mathews remains unaffected. We affirm the judgment insofar as it awards joint custody to both parents on the terms set by the trial court and we amend and increase the child support award to $600.00 per month, during the time when defendant has physical custody, and $300.00 per month when plaintiff has custody.
Each party is taxed his own costs of this appeal.
AFFIRMED IN PART, ANNULLED IN PART, AMENDED AND RENDERED.
Before KLIEBERT, BOWES, GAUDIN, GRISBAUM and DUFRESNE, JJ.