Case Name: PEOPLE v. SANCHEZ
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1994-05-02
Citations: 205 Mich. App. 63
Docket Number: Docket Nos. 151766, 151767
Parties: PEOPLE v SANCHEZ
Judges: Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Brennan and R. A. Benson, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 205
Pages: 63–68

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v SANCHEZ
Docket Nos. 151766, 151767.
Submitted December 7, 1993, at Detroit.
Decided May 2,1994, at 9:50 a.m.
Leave to appeal sought.
Julio M. Sanchez, also known as Julio O. Martinez, pleaded guilty in each of two proceedings in the Detroit Recorder’s Court, Michael F. Sapala, J., of one count of delivering less than fifty grams of cocaine and was sentenced to consecutive terms of imprisonment of two to twenty years. The defendant appealed from each judgment of sentence, claiming that the trial court had labored under a mistaken belief at sentencing that it could impose an alternative sentence of probation for life only where such sentence is supported by substantial and compelling reasons. The appeals were consolidated.
The Court of Appeals held:
There must be substantial and compelling reasons to impose a sentence of lifetime probation pursuant to MCL 333.7401(2)(a) (iv); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(aXiv). In this case, the trial court did not err in finding no substantial and compelling reasons for a sentence of lifetime probation.
Affirmed.
R. A. Benson, J., dissenting, stated that the case should be remanded for resentencing because the departure allowed by MCL 333.7401(4); MSA 14.15(7401X4) upon findings of substantial and compelling reasons applies only to sentences of imprisonment of less than one year and not to sentences of probation for life.
Sentences — Controlled Substances — Manufacture, Delivery, or Possession of Less Than Fifty Grams of Cocaine — Probation.
A sentence of probation for life may be imposed upon conviction for the manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to deliver less than fifty grams of cocaine only where there are substantial and compelling reasons for such sentence (MCL 333,7401[2][a][iv],[3], [4]; MSA 14.15[7401][2][a][iv],[3], [4]).
References
Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 567, 568.
State court’s power to place defendant on probation without imposition of sentence. 56 ALR3d 932.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, John D. O’Hair, Prosecuting Attorney, Timothy A. Baughman, Chief of Research, Training, and Appeals, and Christine A. Kowal, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
State Appellate Defender (by James Krogsrud), for the defendant on appeal.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Brennan and R. A. Benson, JJ.
Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
Cavanagh, P.J.
Defendant pleaded guilty in two separate cases, which have been consolidated on appeal, of delivery of less than fifty grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv); MSA 14.15(7401)(2) (a) (iv), and was sentenced to consecutive terms of two to twenty years' imprisonment. He appeals as of right from the judgments of sentence. We affirm.
In explaining the sentencing options to defendant before accepting his pleas, the trial court correctly stated that there must be substantial and compelling reasons to impose sentences of lifetime probation. MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv); MSA 14.15(7401) (2)(a)(iv) mandates a prison term of not less than one year nor more than twenty years. People v Perez, 417 Mich 1100.21 (1983). However, pursuant to MCL 333.7401(3) and (4); MSA 14.15(7401)(3) and (4), the alternative sentence of lifetime probation, which constitutes a departure from the mandatory sentence, may be imposed if supported by substantial and compelling reasons. See People v Holmes, 192 Mich App 409, 410; 481 NW2d 742 (1991); People v Story, 191 Mich App 476, 478; 478 NW2d 710 (1991). The trial court did not err in finding no substantial and compelling reasons in this case. See People v Hill, 192 Mich App 102; 480 NW2d 913 (1991).
The record does not support defendant's contention that the trial court failed to recognize that it had some discretion in setting the maximum sentence. Perez, supra.
Affirmed.
Brennan, J., concurred.