Case Name: Beulah Webb, wife, et al. vs. Amelia Keller et al.
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1887-01
Citations: 39 La. Ann. 55
Docket Number: No. 9785
Parties: Beulah Webb, wife, et al. vs. Amelia Keller et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Louisiana Annual Reports
Volume: 39
Pages: 55–70

Head Matter:
No. 9785.
Beulah Webb, wife, et al. vs. Amelia Keller et al.
1. The fact that only one of tbe parties defendant, cited in an action to annul a probate sale of real estate — portions of which are in possession of various other defendants cited— has prosecuted his appeal, from an order obtained in open court, by him, at the same terra at which final judgment was rendered against him, cannot be treated as invalidating his appeal. Those who are not appellants are appellees; and such individual appellant has the right to prosecute Ms appeal, which is regularly taken, notwithstanding bis co-defendants — against whom judgments have been previously rendered — have not been formally cited, and have acquiesced therein.
2. A motion to dismiss an appeal on account of informality in tbe bond, or order of appeal, or even the want of tbe latter, must be made at tbe term at which the appeal is made returnable, and within three judicial days after the record is filed.
One filed within the time specified, and not disposed at that term, cannot be supplemented, at a subsequent term, by another motion to dismiss upon other grounds not enumerated in the one first filed.
OK THE MERITS.
1. If an universal legatee shall marry a second time, having children of a preceding marriage, he or she cannot, in any manner dispose of the property given or bequeathed to him or her by the deceased spouse.
The property becomes, by the second marriage, the property of the children of the preceding marriage and such legatee only retains its usufruct.
2. The rulings of this Court in Bird vs. Succession of Jones, 5 Ann. 644 ; Wells vs. Wells, 30 Ann 936; Succession of Frazier, 35 Ann. 382; Succession of Townsend, 37 Ann. 408, and Succession of Townsend vs. Sykes, 38 Ann. 859, ate unreservedly affirmed.
3. Mere illegality in the appointment of an administrator, executrix or undertutor will not vitiate the acts done under it. The acts of an officer, in such case, are valid, although he should have been illegally appointed.
4. It was discretionary with the probate judge, on the application of the executrix to cause the property ordered to be sold to be re-examined and re appraised; as it may well bo that a former appraisement was excesivo, or the value of it had diminished since it was made.
5. The purchaser at a sale, made at public auction, under an order made by a judge having jurisdiction of the succession, is not bound to look beyond such decree, in order to ascertain its necessity.
He is bound only to ascertain that the judge had jurisdiction; and finding that he had, the truth of the reGoid, in other respects, maybe assumed.
C. Informalities in the appointment of an undertutor, in the composition of a family meeting recommending a sale of succession property to pay the ancestor’s debts, and in which minors have a residuary interest; in the method of proving the existence of debts of deceased to the judge granting the order of sale — and all other irregularities in proceedings antecedent to and resulting in the probate sale, are prescribed by five years. R. O. C. 3543.
APPEAL from the. Thirteenth District Court, Parish of St. Landry. Hudspeth, J.
Kenneth Ballio for Plaintiffs and Appellees :
1 A party who accepts the quality of universal legatee and that of executor conferred by will, probates the will, and enters into possession of the property, and “uses and treats it as his own;” ho cannot long afterwards retract such acceptance, or set up the nullity of the will or its probate or the proceedings carried thereunder. 28 Ann. 697; 31 Ann. 552; 18 Ann. 141; 7 Ann. 617; 4 L. 61; 15 Ann. 529; 24 Ann. 301.
2.Parties who claim title from such a person, or who set up such proceedings as a shield or protection to their title, are likewise estopped from setting up the nullity of the will or the proceedings carried thereunder. Louque p. 223, no. 20; 15 Ann. 684; 15 Ann. 531; 24 Ann. 301; Bigelow p. 244 et seq.; 5 B. 523; Bigelow p. 473.
3.A will is revoked by the birth of a child subsequent to its date. C. O. 1705. But the nullity is relative and can be waived, and the will ratified by heirs of age.
4.Where the husband, by his will, makes his wife universal legatee, and she accepts and goes into possession of the property under the will, her paraphernal claims, if any she have against her husband's estate, will be lost by confusion. 13 Ann. 52; C. O. 2217; 3 L. 552; 4 B. 416.
5.Where a husband dies, leaving minor children and a widow, and a will making the widow universal legatee, if the widow marries, the property devised to her by the will reverts and belongs to the children of the first marriage, and she will merely have the usufruct of it. 12 Ann. 465; C, C. 1753; 10 Ann. 679.
6.The validity of a will and its probate cannot be collaterally questioned. 4. H S. 411; 8 N. S. 178, 13 Ann. 117, 5 L. 337; 6 Ann. 446.
7.The capacity of an executor or administrator, or other fiduciary cannot he questioned under a general denial or collaterally. 15 Ann. 27, 505; 5 Ann. 128, 598; 14 Ann. 706; 9 D. 113; 13 Ann. 380; 25 Ann. 54; 30 Ann. 268; 32 Ann. 897; 28 Ann. 807 ; 26 Ann. 330 ; 10 Ann. 496; 8 Ann. 35; Hen. p. 1152, no. 1.
8. A party cannot do an act which he is at liberty to abstain from, and by a mere reservation screen himself from the legal consequences of his own act; nor can he shift his position so as to defeat the action of the law upon it. 18 Ann. 141; 2 Ann. 617; 4 L. 61; To Ann. 520: 24 Ann. 301.
9. When the community is dissolved by the death of one of the spouses, the heirs succeeding immediately to the right of their ancestor are necessary parties to any decree affecting their interest. They have the seizin and a proprietary interest in the community, and in case of a partition, must he duly made parties or represented in the partition proceedings. If not so represented or made parties, the proceedings are null as to them, 32 Ann. 849; 33 Ann. 585; Hen. p. 743, no. 2, p. 744, no. 1; C. C. 2405-6.
10. Heirs have this seizin, even where a universal legatee is named by the will. C. C. 1607.
11. The sale of the property of another is void. C. O, 2452.
12. There can be no family meeting without an uuder tutor. Family meetings carried on without an under tutor are void. C. G. 275; C. C. 276,277. He represents the minors in all cases where their interests are opposed to those of their tutor. C. C. 275.
13. An under tutor cannot bind the minors by any approval of debts or claims due by them. He has no such powers. G. C. 273 et seq.
14. A re-appraisement of property in which minors aré interested can only be ordered and made under the provisions of art. 342, C. C. When otherwise made it is null.
15. Property in which minors are interested cannot be sold for less than two-thirds of its appraised value. 33 Ann. 466.
16. It is essential that a dative tutrix should only be appointed on the advice and recommendation of a family meeting. G. C. 254, 263, 270.
17. Parties interested have the right to sue to annul a sale for non-payment of the price. G. C. 2045; 24 Ann. 537: 28 Ann. 739. This action is only prescribed by ten years. 24 Ann. 537; 28 Ann. 739.
18. Ho prescription runs during minority except in special cases. These special cases are the exception to the general rule. Stare decisis,
19. Where the surviving widow and the heirs are the owners of property in indivisión, the action for partition must be brought in the district court. In 1869 the parish court had no jurisdiction of a suit of that kind. 33 Ann. 585; 30 Ann. 93,177; 31 Ann. 572; 34 Ann. 288.
20. What is not alleged cannot he proved. Hen. p. 1155, no. 3 and cases cited.
21. A general denial merely traverses the law and facts of plaintiff’s case. 14 Ann. 120.
22. A special defense requires a special plea. Hen. p. 1153, no. 10 and cases cited.
23. Where a special defense depends upon the proof of a particular fact, the fact must be specially alleged. Hen. p. 1144, do. 1 and cases cited.
24. A dative tutrix cannot administer whore there is a will — a fortiori, where an executrix has been appointed under the will. In such cases she represents only the minors. Hen. D. p. 1476, no. 11; 4 K. 42; 7R. 242 ; 2 L. 299.
23. An order of a probate court, decreeing a sale of the property as a general rule, protects the purchaser. But it is subject to be attacked and set aside, as are other judgments, for instance: 1st. Where the court had no jurisdiction ratione matcrice. 2d. Where the parties affected were not cited or represented, and therefore not parties to the decree 3d. Where the property belongs to a third person, a stranger to the.proceedings; and many other examples might be oited. The sound rule in this regard is that that the order for the sale cures all relative nullities, but not absolute nullities. 14 Ann. 662; 11 L 149, 156; 13 L. 431; 16 L. 440 ; 3 K. 122; 10 K. 398; 15 Ann. 520; Gross on Pleadings, par. 305-C-7-8.
26. An order of a probate court decreeing a sale does not protect the purchaser where fraud is charged and proved. 14 Ann. 662, and cases just cited.
27. The plea of res judicata will not be sustained unless all the issues are the same. 14 Ann. 362; 24 Ann. 332; Bigelow on Est. p. 67. Intro.
28. An imperfect usufructuary must return articles or property of the same quality and quantity, or their estimated value, on the termination of the usufruct. C. C. 549.
29. Tender not necessary in this case. 34 Ann. 288.
30. Only forced heirs can sue for a reduction of a will. C. O. 1504 ; 12 Ann. 465.
31. A consent judgment has no force as such, except as to the parties thereto. 3 Ann. 34; 2 Ann. 483; 4 Ann. 65; 6 Ann. 790; 10 Ann. 18; 11 Ann. 696; 15 Ann. 225; 8 N. S. 347; 2L. 148; 6 L. 354,
Henry L. Garland for Defendants and Appellants.
Harry H. Hall on the same side.

Opinion:
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Watkins, J.
Plaintiffs seek to dismiss the appeals taken by Mrs. Nannie M. Morris, J. U. Payne, II. M. Payne, Mary I. Garrard and William Curley, on the grounds that they were co-defendants with Amelia E. Keller and others, against whom judgments were rendered on the 14th of April, 1883., and 20th of February, 1885, respectively, and who were not in court when appellants obtained their orders of appeal in open court on the 28th of May, 1885, and were not cited as appellees.
In the alternative, they urge that the value of the property claimed by appellants respectively, is less than $2000, and this Court is without j urisdiction ratione materia}.
The motion including these objections was filed at the term of court at Opelousas, in July, 1885, but which was not passed upon by the court, and subsequently the record was destroyed by fire. This record having been substituted for the one destroyed, the motion to dismiss was supplemented in July, 1886.
In addition, a supplemental motion to dismiss was filed in July, 1886, in which are assigned the additional grounds, viz: First, that no legal order of appeal was granted Wm. Curley in his fiduciary capacity a,s curator; second, that neither Mary I. Garrard nor Nannie M. Morris were authorized by their husbands to execute their appeal bonds.
I
Prior to the enactment of Act 125 of 1868, amending C. P. 575, requiring appeal bonds to bo made payable to the clerk of the court which rendered the judgment appealed from, the uniform current of our jurisprudence was to the effect that, when an appeal was taken from a judgment in an action on a joint contract or in a revocatory action, all who were required to be parties below must be made parties to the appeal, though a part only have appealed, else the appeal was dismissed.
Since the passage of that act, our predecessors have constantly held, and we think correctly, that when an appeal is granted in open court, and the bond is made payable to the clerk of the court, all persons homing an Merest are by law parties to the appeal — those who are not appellants are appellees.
In Walton vs. Police Jury, 26 Ann. 356, the court said : " The fact that only one of the non-resident parties executed an appeal bond, under an order in favor of all, cannot invalidate the appeal taken by him. Those who are not appellants are appellees, and the appellant has the right to prosecute his appeal, which is regularly taken, although his co-defendants may acquiesce in the judgment." 28 Ann. 370, Succession of McKenna; 26 Ann. 220, Baker vs. Thompson; 26 Ann. 312, Frances vs. Lavine.
The appellants have fully complied with the law, and all other parties having an admerse Merest are appellees necessarily.
Appellants are clearly entitled to prosecute their appeals, although plaintiffs and appellees had obtained judgments against other defendants at antecedent terms of the court, who have acquiesced in them.
Whatever may be the effect of such an-apparent severance thiough plaintiffs' instrumentality, in respect to such other defendants, it cannot, in any way, prejudice the rights of appellants.
On the alternative part of the motion, in respect to this Court's want of jurisdiction, it is sufficient to say that while the defendants against whom judgments were first rendered, have no interest in common with appellants claiming separate and distinct tracts of land, yet, in respect to plaintiffs claim of title as heirs of their father and the revocation of the probate sale of January' 5,1870, the appellants' claims are identical. They are inseparably blended, and plaintiffs have so treated them; and it would be against equity to permit them to gain any advantage of the appellants by reason of their having taken judgments by piece-meals against other defendants, and in some instances by default.
In addition to this, plaintiffs, in their petition, show that the lands which Amelia Keller bought at probate sale were valued at $39,000, and they fail to show what the separate value of the different tracts were which she subsequently conveyed to the defendants; and, as there is doubt with respect to the value of the several properties held by the appellants, we think it our duty, under the circumstances, to favor the right of appeal.
With respect to the remaining grounds, and which are contained in the. supplemental motion, filed in July, 1886— more than twelve months after the filing of the record — it is only necessary to observe that it came too late.
"A motion to dismiss, on account of informality in the appeal bond, or order of appeal, or even the want of the latter, must be made within three judicial days after the .record is filed." 2 Ann. 138; 3 Ann. 326; 4 Ann. 514; 6 Ann. 115; 11 Ann. 613; 12 Ann. 745; 22 Ann. 327; 23 Ann. 467; 21 Ann. 30.
If these objections were not.waived by their omission from the motion first filed, they certainly cannot be entertained at this time.
The motion is therefore refused.