Case Name: Glen BRANCH, Sr., Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1979-06-06
Citations: 599 S.W.2d 324
Docket Number: No. 57874
Parties: Glen BRANCH, Sr., Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
Judges: Before DOUGLAS, W. C. DAVIS and DALLY, JJ.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 599
Pages: 324–328

Head Matter:
Glen BRANCH, Sr., Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
No. 57874.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas, Panel No. 2.
June 6, 1979.
On Rehearing Jan. 16, 1980.
Rehearing Denied June 11, 1980.
Walter M. Sekaly, Harold J. Laine, Jr., Beaumont, for appellant.
Tom Hanna, Dist. Atty., William G. Ogle-tree, Asst. Dist. Atty., Beaumont, and Robert Huttash, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.
Before DOUGLAS, W. C. DAVIS and DALLY, JJ.

Opinion:
OPINION
DOUGLAS, Judge.
Glen Branch appeals his conviction for possession with intent to deliver heroin under Vernon's Annotated Civil Statute, Article 4476-15, Section 403. Punishment was assessed by the jury at life.
Branch contends that heroin seized from his car was the product of an illegal search. If the heroin is admissible, he contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove his intent to deliver the heroin.
Officers Terry Dunahoe and Steve Con-roy of the Port Arthur Police Department were on patrol during the afternoon of August 7,1976. They observed a car driven by Branch traveling at an excessive rate of speed. They followed Branch until they were able to determine he was traveling at over forty miles per hour in a thirty mile zone. At this point, Dunahoe thought the driver might be Glen Branch who was suspected of selling heroin. Branch was thought to be armed. Dunahoe beeped his horn at Branch's car but Branch did not pull over. Dunahoe turned the sirens on. Branch then "rolled" through a stop sign and stopped his car. Dunahoe and Conroy observed Branch bend over towards the passenger seat or glove compartment area. Dunahoe approached Branch, ordered him out of the car and had him place his hands on the back of the car. Dunahoe then searched Branch's glove compartment and the area under the passenger seat. He found nothing and exited the vehicle. After he shut the driver's door, he noticed a tin foil packet that appeared to be heroin. He seized the packet and attempted to place Branch under arrest for possession of heroin. Branch struggled but was soon subdued. A subsequent search of Branch's vehicle revealed a large quantity of heroin hidden in various places including under the hood near the battery and under the front fender. Five packets were found in a glove on the floor. Also, the search revealed a syringe and a bag containing $5,725.14 in small bills. Branch had another $2,034.30 on his person. The total amount of heroin seized was enough for 2,864 doses.
Branch contends that the search of his car was unlawful. Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes, Article 6701d, Section 153, provides that an officer may arrest a motorist for a traffic violation. Once an arrest is made, a search may be made of the area within the arrestee's immediate control. Taylor v. State, 421 S.W.2d 403 (Tex.Cr. App.1967). Thus, in Imhoff v. State, 494 S.W.2d 919 (Tex.Cr.App.1973), after officers observed Imhoff make movements as if he were concealing something under the front seat, they ordered all of the passengers from the car. We held that their subsequent search of the area under the seat was a lawful search incident to the arrest.
In the instant case, the officers observed Branch speeding and running a stop sign. This gave them the authority to arrest pursuant to Section 153. Upon arresting Branch, Officer Conroy conducted a search of the area under appellant's immediate control; the search revealed nothing. After completing the search, Conroy exited the car and closed the door. It was then that he observed a small packet of heroin, in plain view, on the front seat. Given the circumstances of the case, the officers' actions were reasonable and the heroin was lawfully seized.
Branch next contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove his intent to deliver the heroin. There is no statutory presumption regarding the evidence to prove possession with intent to deliver. We have not previously considered what constitutes sufficient evidence to prove the intent to deliver.
Other jurisdictions have generally concluded that evidence of large quantities of a controlled substance or evidence of large quantities coupled with other factors such as packaging material is sufficient to support an inference that the possession was with intent to deliver. E. g., United States v. Johnson, 469 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1973); State v. Boyd, 224 N.W.2d 609 (Iowa, 1974). Thus, other courts have upheld convictions for possession with intent to deliver based on the following factors: 133 pounds of marihuana, United States v. Johnson, supra; 33 pounds of marihuana, two scales, and testimony that marihuana was packaged in a manner in which it was normally sold, State v. Boyd, supra; enough marihuana to make 600 cigarettes, State v. Sibley, 310 So.2d 100 (La.1975); 15 pounds of marihuana, two scales and plastic baggies, Daygee v. State, 514 P.2d 1159 (Alaska, 1973); and slightly less than one pound of marihuana packaged in "lid" quantities, State v. Sullivan, 190 Neb. 621, 211 N.W.2d 125 (1975).
In the instant case, Branch was in possession of enough heroin to make 2,864 "hits." The heroin was secreted in various places through his vehicle. Some of it was packaged in small quantities. Branch, both on his person and in a paper bag, had nearly $8,000 in small bills. The only reasonable explanation for these facts is that Branch was actively engaged in the business of selling heroin. The evidence is sufficient.
There is no reversible error; the judgment is affirmed.