Case Name: Melinda Houghtaling, App'lt, v. Benjamin S. Shelly, Resp't
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1889-02-11
Citations: 22 N.Y. St. Rep. 17
Docket Number: 
Parties: Melinda Houghtaling, App’lt, v. Benjamin S. Shelly, Resp’t.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 22
Pages: 17–19

Head Matter:
Melinda Houghtaling, App’lt, v. Benjamin S. Shelly, Resp’t.
(Supreme Court, General Term, Second Department,
Filed February 11, 1889.)
1. Highways—Liability fob obstructing same—When proof of negligence UNNECESSARY.
Whoever obstructs a public highway or renders its use hazardous by placing any object upon the surface of the ground becomes responsible-for injuries to individuals resulting from its unsafety for their appropriate use, and it is unnecessary to prove either negligence of the defendant or want of it in the plaintiff to justify a recovery in the first instance.
2. Same—Accident—Approximate cause.
Where several approximate causes contribute to an accident, and each-, is an efficient cause without the operation of which the accident would not have occurred, it may be attributed to any or all of the causes, but it cannot be attributed to a cause unless without its operation the accident, would never have happened,
3. Same—Approximate cause question for the jury.
Where, in an action for negligence, the plaintiff was riding over a public highway which ran through land belonging to the defendant on both sides. There were heaps of stones on the side of the road which had been placed there by the defendant. There were also sacks filled with apples, placed in the road by a person who was gathering apples from the defendant’s lands; there were barrels also. The plaintiff’s horse became frightened and jumped sidewise; the wheel struck one of the heaps of stones, and tipped over, displacing the driver. While the horses were running at. high speed the plaintiff attempted to escape by leaping out, and broke her-leg. Held, that the question of fact as to the approximate cause of the-injury should have been submitted under proper instructions to the jury, and should they find that the heap of stones was the approximate cause the plaintiff would be entitled to recover.
Action for personal injuries caused by negligence of defendant.
Appeal from a judgment dismissing the plaintiffs complaint.
W. L. Thorn, for app’lt; Essetstyn & McCarty, for resp't.

Opinion:
Dykman, J.
—The plaintiff was riding over a public highway in Dutchess county which ran through land belonging to the defendant on both sides.
There were heaps of stones on the side of the road which had been placed there by the defendant a number of years before the accident of which the plaintiff complains in this action, and some of the stones were within a foot of the traveled track of the highway.
There were also, at the same time, placed in the road, sacks filled with apples, which had been placed there by a person who was gathering apples from the defendant's land; there were barrels there also.
The plaintiff was riding in a one horse wagon with another person, who was driving, and the horse became frightened and jumped sideways, and the wagon wheel «truck one of the stone heaps and tipped over sufficiently to displace the driver, who then-fell out and carried the reins with him.
The horse thus left without control, started to run, and while he was running at high speed the plaintiff attempted to escape by leaping from the wagon, and broke her leg. 'This action was brought to recover the damage she thus .sustained, and at the trial the complaint was dismissed at the close of the plaintiff's case, and she has appealed.
Public highways in the rural districts, like streets and avenues in cities and villages, are constructed for the use -of the public, and whoever obstructs them or impairs their usefulness, or renders their use hazardous by placing any object upon the surface of the ground, becomes responsible for injuries to individuals resulting from their unsafety for-their appropriate use. Such actions are not based upon negligence, but upon a wrongful act, and' it is, therefore, unnecessary to prove either negligence of the defendant, or want of it in the plaintiff, to justify a recovery in the first instance. The following cases are authority for what has been said: Dygert v. Schenck, 23 Wendle, 446; Congreve v. Smith, 18 N. Y., 79; Clifford v. Dam, 81 id., 56; Jennings v. Van Schaick, 108 id., 530; 13 N. Y. State Rep., 686.
Placing the stone heaps in the highway, and permitting them to remain there in a position likely to cause accident or injuries, was a wrong which imposed liability upon the defendant for the damages which were likely to result to .individuals by reason of their presence upon the surface in that place.
It seems very likely that the trial judge felt some difficulty about the cause of the accident, and while the first fright of the horse came from the apple sack, yet he was well in hand until the wheel of the wagon struck the stone heaps and overthrew the driver; and we think, therefore, the stone heap was the approximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff.
"Where several approximate causes contribute to an. accident, and each is an efficient cause, without the operation of which the accident would not have happened, it may be attributed to all or any of the causes, but it cannot be attributed to a cause, unless without its operation the accident would not have happened." Ring v. City of Cohoes, 77 N. Y., 90.
In any view, however, the question of fact involved in the action should have been submitted to the jury under proper instructions, and if the jury should find that the-heap of stones was the approximate cause of the injury, the plaintiff would be entitled to recover.
The judgment should be reversed and á new trial granted, with costs to abide the event.
All concur.