Case Name: Joseph P. SEMASEK v. Theresa A. SEMASEK, Appellant
Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1984-07-20
Citations: 331 Pa. Super. 1
Docket Number: No. 1964
Parties: Joseph P. SEMASEK v. Theresa A. SEMASEK, Appellant.
Judges: Before SPAETH, President Judge, and CAVANAUGH and CIRILLO, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports
Volume: 331
Pages: 1–26

Head Matter:
479 A.2d 1047
Joseph P. SEMASEK v. Theresa A. SEMASEK, Appellant.
Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
Argued Feb. 15, 1984.
Filed July 20, 1984.
Petition for Allowance of Appeal Granted Nov. 28, 1984.
Clayton T. Hyman, Allentown, for appellant.
Anthony J. Urban, Assistant Public Defender, Mahanoy City, for appellee.
Before SPAETH, President Judge, and CAVANAUGH and CIRILLO, JJ.

Opinion:
CIRILLO, Judge:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County, entered June 7, 1982, awarding rehabilitative alimony and the partial payment of counsel fees to appellant and granting the equitable distribution of all marital property between the parties. The court dismissed the appellant's application for alimony pendente lite. The appellant Theresa A. Semasek requests either modification or remanding of the order, claiming that the hearing court abused its discretion in its findings. We disagree with the appellant's position and affirm the order of the hearing court.
On August 5, 1980, the appellee Joseph P. Semasek instituted an action under the New Divorce Code, alleging that his marriage was irretrievably broken and that he and his wife had lived separate and apart for a period exceeding three years. The appellant filed an answer and a counterclaim seeking child support, custody, counsel fees, alimony, alimony pendente lite and equitable distribution of marital property.
The matter was assigned to a master, who, after having conducted extensive hearings, recommended that a divorce be granted. The master filed a supplemental report addressing the economic issues.
On May 5, 1981, the divorce decree was entered, to which there was no appeal. Both parties, however, filed exceptions to the additional report of the master. The court subsequently reviewed the record, and on June 7, 1982, the Honorable James E. Lavelle issued an order, equitably distributing marital property and awarding alimony. Marital property was distributed by allocating 56 percent to the appellee and 44 percent to the appellant. The court awarded alimony to the appellant in an amount equal to any money expended by her for education, not to exceed $2,750 annually for three years. Additionally, the appellee was directed to pay one half of the appellant's counsel and expert witness fees. The court dismissed the appellant's application for alimony pendente lite. This appeal followed.
In determining the propriety of property distribution and of alimony, we use the abuse of discretion standard of review. Ruth v. Ruth, 316 Pa.Super. 282, 462 A.2d 1351 (1983); Remick v. Remick, 310 Pa.Super. 23, 456 A.2d 163 (1983). Under this standard, we do not usurp the hearing court's duty as fact finder. Rather we apply the legislative guidelines of the Divorce Code to the record to determine whether or not the hearing court has abused its discretion.
The appellant's first contention on appeal is that the court erred in classifying three diamond rings given to her by her husband during the marriage as marital property to be equitably distributed. The appellant asserts that such property falls within the "gift" exception of the Divorce Code. We disagree.
Section 401(e) defines marital property as "all property acquired by either party during the marriage". The "gift" exception excludes:
Property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent except for the increase in value during the marriage.
The hearing court, in the instant matter, determined that the jewelry was not a "gift" within the meaning of the statute as intended by the legislature.
In reviewing these provisions, we note that the hearing court should evaluate the facts of the case, giving consideration to the source of funds with which the gift was purchased, the intent of the donor as to the use of the property, the status of the marriage at the time of the transfer, and any agreements regarding the exclusion of the item from marital property. See O'Neill v. O'Neill, 600 S.W.2d 493 (Ky.App.1980). In this case, the hearing court found that the jewelry had been purchased by the appellee with money from his salary, which is certainly a marital asset. When the money was exchanged for the purchased items, the marital property assumed a different form, but remained marital property to be included in equitable distribution. This reasoning in classifying the jewelry as marital property does not constitute an abuse of discretion, and will not be disturbed on appeal.
The appellant next contends that several factual findings, specifically the valuation of the appellant's diamond rings and of two parcels of realty, were arbitrary and unsupported by the record. The appellant additionally asserts that the court made conflicting findings as to her banking transactions and an erroneous finding that the appellant still holds assets in excess of $75,000 which she appropriated in 1979.
Section 401(d)(8) of the Divorce Code requires that the court consider the value of property set apart to each party in making a determination as to equitable distribution. Since there is no specific method of valuing assets, the court must exercise its discretion, relying upon the estimates and inventories submitted by both parties, records of purchase prices, and appraisals. From evaluating this evidence, the court makes its findings of fact. Gee v. Gee, 314 Pa.Super. 31, 460 A.2d 358 (1983). See Jost v. Jost, 89 Wis.2d 533, 279 N.W.2d 202 (1979).
The appellant submitted her diamond rings to the master, indicating that she would accept $35,000 credit in exchange for returning the rings to the appellee. The appellee testified that the purchase price of the rings was $35,000. Both parties agreed to an appraisal to be arranged by the master, who discovered that the rings were costume jewelry. Upon close examination of the jewelry, the appellee asserted that the rings held by the master were not the ones he had purchased. In resolving this issue that had become one of credibility, the master made a specific finding that this jewelry had a value of $15,000 based upon an estimate of carat worth. Thereafter, this finding was accepted by the hearing court.
Similarly, the court placed values upon real property of the parties by considering testimony, records of purchase prices and, in some instances, expert appraisal reports. These valuations amply supported by the record will not be disturbed on appeal.
As to appellant's banking transactions, we find that the hearing court scrutinized the numerous bank statements to ascertain as accurately as possible the funds remaining in the accounts. Since the appellant herself conducted these transactions, any conflicts in the court's findings spring from her failure to fully disclose all necessary information. Further, the appellant's allegation that the court should not have considered the funds appropriated by her from joint accounts is without merit. The intentional dissipation of marital assets by one party does not preclude its status as marital property in equitable distribution. It is the duty of the court to "issue other orders which are necessary to protect the interest of the parties and may grant such other relief or remedy as equity and justice require ." 23 P.S. § 401(c). It is undisputed that the appellant appropriated funds of over $75,000 from the joint banks accounts. Since these funds are marital property to be equitably distributed, the court is warranted in having included them as such in its calculations.
The appellant additionally contends that the division of marital property is inequitable. Guidelines for the equitable distribution of marital property are set forth in Section 401(d) of the New Divorce Code which provides:
In a proceeding for divorce or annulment, the court shall, upon request of either party, equitably divide, distribute or assign the marital property between the parties without regard to marital misconduct in such proportions as the court deems just after considering all relevant factors including:
(1) The length of the marriage.
(2) Any prior marriage of either party.
(3) The age, health, station, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties.
(4) The contribution by one party to the education, training, or increased earning power of the other party.
(5) The opportunity of each party for future acquisitions of capital assets and income.
(6) The sources of income of both parties, including but not limited to medical, retirement, insurance or other benefits.
(7) The contribution or dissipation of each party in the acquisition, preservation, depreciation or appreciation of the marital property, including the contribution of a party as homemaker.
(8) The value of the property set apart to each party.
(9) The standard of living of the parties established during the marriage.
(10) The economic circumstances of each party at the time the division of property is to become effective.
As the record indicates, the hearing court found that the parties were married for eighteen years and that neither had been previously married. Two boys born of the marriage are each over eighteen years and are not pursuing higher education.
At the time of the hearing, the appellant was 44 years of age and in good health. The appellant, a high school graduate, had been employed as a bookkeeper and clerk until 1960, at which time she forfeited her employment to become a housewife, mother, and homemaker. In doing so, the appellant made substantial non-monetary contributions to the marriage and to the purchase and accumulation of jointly held assets. She also assisted in a secretarial and clerical capacity in her husband's law practice, which attests to her employability and future earning potential.
The appellee, 45 years of age, is a self-employed attorney in private practice, a part-time member of the Schuylkill County Public Defender's Office and the operator of a private detective agency. His gross earnings from his practice have declined from $53,525.76 in 1977 to $37,314.84 in 1980.
The appellee obtained his law degree from the University of Maryland prior to his marriage, but was required to return one year to complete his Bachelor's Degree to qualify for admission into the Pennsylvania Bar. During that year, both parties were employed.
In reviewing the record as found by the hearing court in light of the provisions of the Divorce Code, we find that the distribution of marital property was indeed equitable. The hearing court painstakingly applied the relevant factors enumerated in section 401(d) to the facts at hand, ultimately granting 56 percent of the property to the appellee and 44 percent to the appellant.
We note that there is no simple formula by which to divide marital property. The method of distribution derives from the facts of the individual case. The list of factors of 401(d) serves as a guideline for consideration, although the list is neither exhaustive nor specific as to the weight to be given the various factors. Thus, the court has flexibility of method and concomitantly assumes responsibility in rendering its decisions. The concept of equitable distribution is not an equal division of marital property. In Platek v. Platek, this court stated:
[T]he essence of the concept of an equitable division is that "after considering all relevant factors" the court may "deem just" a division that awards one of the parties more than half, perhaps the lion's share of the property.
309 Pa.Super. 16, 454 A.2d 1059 (1982).
Accordingly, the order of equitable distribution in this case is not an abuse of discretion.
The appellant also alleges that the hearing court abused its discretion in framing its award for rehabilitative alimony, basing its decision upon dissipated assets and failing to consider the factors enumerated in Section 501(b) of the Divorce Code. We disagree with this contention.
In determining whether an award of alimony is to be granted, the hearing court must apply the facts of the case to the threshold requirements set forth in section 501(a):
(a) The court may allow alimony, as it deems reasonable, to either party, only if it finds that the party seeking alimony:
(1) lacks sufficient property, including but not limited to any property distributed pursuant to Chapter 4, to provide for his or her reasonable needs; and
(2) is unable to support himself or herself through appropriate employment.
Subsection (b) provides guidelines by which the court may determine along with any other relevant considerations, the necessity, nature, amount, duration, and manner of payment of alimony. The relevant factors are:
(1) The relative earnings and earning capacities of the parties.
(2) The ages, and the physical, mental and emotional conditions of the parties.
(3) The sources of income of both parties including but not limited to medical, retirement, insurance or other benefits.
(4) The expectancies and inheritances of the parties.
(5) The duration of the marriage.
(6) The contribution by one party to the education, training or increased earning power of the other party.
(7) The extent to which it would be inappropriate for a party, because said party will be custodian of a minor child, to seek employment outside the home.
(8) The standard of living of the parties established during the marriage.
(9) The relative education of the parties and the time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party seeking alimony to find appropriate employment.
(10) The relative assets and liabilities of the parties.
(11) The property brought to the marriage by either party.
(12) The contribution of a spouse as homemaker.
(13) The relative needs of the parties.
(14) The marital misconduct of either of the parties during the marriage; however, the marital misconduct of either of the parties during separation subsequent to the filing of a divorce complaint shall not be considered by the court in its determinations relative to alimony.
To construe this statute so as to effectuate economic justice between the parties, 23 P.S. § 102(a)(6), the hearing court must apply it in a nonmechanical fashion. Geyer v. Geyer, 310 Pa.Super. 456, 456 A.2d 1025 (1983). The provisions are to be read in conjunction with each other and with the intent and purposes of the Divorce Act as a whole. Bickley v. Bickley, 301 Pa.Super. 396, 447 A.2d 1025 (1982). An award of alimony is not to reward one party and to punish the other, but rather to insure that the reasonable needs of the person who is unable to support himself or herself through appropriate employment are met. While there is a right to alimony in some instances, there is a responsibility on the part of the person requesting and accepting alimony to contribute to his or her own economic well-being. Accordingly, the Divorce Code includes a provision addressing the duration of such an award.
Subsection (c) provides:
(c) Unless the ability of the party seeking the alimony to provide for his or her reasonable needs through employment is substantially diminished by reason of age, physical, mental or emotional condition, custody of minor children, or other compelling impediment to gainful employment, the court in ordering alimony shall limit the duration of the order to a period of time which is reasonable for the purpose of allowing the party seeking alimony to meet his or her reasonable needs by:
(1) obtaining appropriate employment; or
(2) developing an appropriate employable skill.
In light of the aforementioned considerations, it becomes the duty of the hearing court to grant or to deny an award of alimony and to set forth the reasons for having so ruled. 23 P.S. § 501(d).
In the instant matter, the court granted alimony to the appellant limited to educational expenses incurred by her for a period of three years, not to exceed $2750 yearly. The court reasoned that such an award was appropriate in light of the appellant's expressed desire to resume her education, the substantial marital assets in her possession, and her clerical skills and overall employability. Although the court did not numerically proceed through the fourteen factors of 501(b) which the appellant alleged as an abuse of discretion, the court did grant due consideration to those appropriate to the facts. Additionally, the court noted that the appellant failed to submit any plan of training which might have been implemented to assist her in her employment, and that the appellant had neither sought employment nor academic training from the date of separation in 1977. We find that the hearing court did not abuse its discretion in awarding limited alimony, but implemented an award that demonstrates statutory compliance as well as perception of human tendencies.
The appellant further contends that the hearing court should have awarded her alimony pendente lite and full payment of counsel fees. Section 401(b) of the Code provides in pertinent part:
. The court may order alimony, reasonable counsel fees and expenses pending final disposition of the matters provided for in this subsection and upon final disposition, the court may award costs to the party in whose favor the order or decree shall be entered, or may order that each party shall pay his or her own costs, or may order that costs be divided equitably as it shall appear just and reasonable.
The court is, therefore, permitted to make such awards in its discretion, whenever it deems that the awards are necessary for either spouse to maintain or to defend a divorce action. Remick v. Remick, supra; Hoover v. Hoover, 288 Pa.Super. 159, 431 A.2d 337 (1981); Wechsler v. Wechsler, 242 Pa.Super. 356, 363 A.2d 1307 (1976). The court makes this determination by examining the size of the moving party's estate, the value of counsel's services, and the ability to pay. In situations in which the spouse is financial ly independent, the purpose of the award is not served and should not be granted.
In the instant matter, both the master and the hearing court concluded that the appellant's claim for alimony pendente lite was inappropriate. During the period pending the divorce, the appellant had the principal and the income from marital assets in excess of $94,000 and rental income from jointly held properties. The appellee paid the heat, electric, telephone, and taxes on her residence and further contributed $100 weekly. Accordingly, we find that the award of partial counsel fees and the denial of alimony pendente lite do not constitute an abuse of discretion on the part of the hearing court.
For all of the above reasons, we affirm the order of the hearing court.
Order affirmed.
SPAETH, President Judge, filed a dissenting opinion.
. Act of April 2, 1980, P.L. 63, No. 26, § 201; 23 P.S. § 201(d).
. At the time the order was entered, both children born of the marriage were emancipated adults. Therefore, the issues of child custody and support are moot.
. The court notes that this decline is resultant from the appellant's deliberate interference with the law practice. The appellant contends that this misconduct is inappropriately stated within the opinion under the equitable distribution heading, citing Gordon v. Gordon, 293 Pa.Super. 491, 439 A.2d 683 (1981), aff'd, 498 Pa. 570, 449 A.2d 1378 (1982). We find its inclusion to be informational to account for the decline in appellee's salary and to indicate the intentional dissipation of marital property by the appellant as set forth in Section 401(d)(7).
. Hearings before the Pennsylvania House of Representatives 1979 Pa.Leg.J. 1959-1960.