Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. James R. BLAND
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1982-09-07
Citations: 419 So. 2d 1227
Docket Number: No. 81-KA-3085
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. James R. BLAND.
Judges: NORRIS, J., dissents with reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 419
Pages: 1227–1237

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. James R. BLAND.
No. 81-KA-3085.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Sept. 7, 1982.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., James L. Davis, Dist. Atty., Herman L. Lawson, Abbott J. Reeves, Asst. Dist. Attys., for plaintiff-ap-pellee.
Ted Brett Brunson, Lowther & Boone, Many, for defendant-appellant.

Opinion:
FRED C. SEXTON, Justice Ad Hoc.
Defendant James R. Bland was originally charged in a four-count indictment with attempted aggravated rape, LSA-R.S. 14:27; 14:42; aggravated crime against nature, LSA-R.S. 14:89.1; indecent behavior with a juvenile, LSA-R.S. 14:81 and contributing to the delinquency of a juvenile, LSA-R.S. 14:92(A)(8). These charges were subsequently severed by the filing of three bills of information which joined the attempted aggravated rape and the aggravated crime against nature in one bill and charged indecent behavior and contributing to the delinquency of a juvenile in separate bills. Subsequent to pleas of not guilty on all charges the defendant came up for trial on May 20, 1981, on the bill of information jointly charging attempted aggravated rape and aggravated crime against nature. He was found not guilty of attempted aggravated rape but guilty of aggravated crime against nature.
Defendant's motion for new trial was denied and charges were filed under the habitual offender statute on August 6, 1981. On September 2, 1981, the trial court found Bland to be a habitual offender on the basis of a previous plea of guilty to the offense of simple burglary.
Bland was sentenced on September 15, 1981, to serve ten years at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentence. He now appeals his conviction, originally asserting fifteen assignments of error, of which numbers 1, 3, 4,12, 13 and 15 were set forth in brief. Those not argued before us are considered abandoned. State v. Edwards, 261 La. 1014, 261 So.2d 649 (1972).
FACTS
The state's theory of the case can be seen by the testimony of the 12 year old victim, a cousin of the defendant. She contended that during the course of a motorcycle ride with the defendant, her 34 year old cousin, a wreck occurred as a result of the way he was driving. They were thrown into a mud hole, soaking their clothes. She stated she began walking home after the accident but that her cousin caught up with her pulling down her shorts and performing oral sex upon her. She contended that she escaped from the defendant but he caught up with her and told her he would take her home on the motorcycle. However after traveling some distance he stopped and took her from the motorcycle, disrobed both himself and her, carried her to the side of the road and attempted to rape her. The record is not clear as to whether or not he actually penetrated the victim. In any case, he stopped and dressed, as she did. The defendant then took her to an abandoned house where he again disrobed her against resistance, once again performing oral sex and again attempting rape, which went on "all night." She concluded by testifying that after both parties dressed in the morning they got on the motorcycle to return home. However the bike ran out of gas and they walked to a friend's home.
The defendant, on the other hand, admitted giving the ride to his cousin and the fact of the accident. However he stated that the cause of the accident was her "goosing" him and putting her hands over his eyes while he was driving. He stated that while he was attempting to restart the bike she removed her shirt, wringing water out of it. She apparently then began walking off. He restarted the bike and picked her up some two miles down the road. He stated that this process of restarting took an hour and one-half to two hours during which time he did not see the victim. He denied performing oral sex on the victim and stated that when he caught up with her he advised her they needed to get some gas at a nearby house in order to get home. He contended he did not know that the house was abandoned. He suggested they return but she did not want to until daylight because of the need to walk back. He specifically denied ever attempting to have sex with her or that he threatened her in any fashion. He did state that when he woke up he removed his clothes in order to shake off the dried mud. He also said they rode the motorcycle until it ran out of gas, walking the rest of the way.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1
By this assignment Bland contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash the jury venire because the panel was prejudiced by viewing a film or videotape entitled "Jury Duty". It is defendant's position that the film was "pro-prosecution propaganda."
Defendant, in timely fashion, raised a motion to quash the jury venire on the grounds that it was improperly drawn, selected, and constituted in that it had viewed the offending film. LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 532(9). The trial court found that the film was not, when viewed in its entirety, prejudicial per se to the function of the jury. Nor did it find the film to be inaccurate or misleading. The trial court additionally noted the right of defense counsel to question jurors on voir dire as to the effect of the film on their role at trial.
Our jurisprudence does not readily provide guidance on this issue. Certainly defense counsel could have excluded those members of the potential jury on voir dire who impartiality may have been influenced by the film. See generally, State v. Charles, 350 So.2d 595, 597, (La.1977).
The knowledge of criminal law and procedure that a lay person brings with him when called for jury duty is the amalgama-tive result of exposure to sources of information as diverse as high school civics classes, fictional television programming, and perhaps their own interaction with the judicial system. To quash the entire venire on the basis of exposure to one more source of information, albeit one with the official blessing of the trial court, would seem a meaningless gesture particularly when the voir dire process remains available.
Barring a showing of actual bias or impartiality (which does not seem to be the case here given the not guilty verdict on one charge) the defendant's motion was properly denied and the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
This assignment of error lacks merit.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 3
By this assignment Bland asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to sever the two joined counts for trial. In his motion to quash defendant argued that trial on more than one count of the indictment would substantially prejudice his right to a fair trial. Bland asserts, in his brief, that while both counts involve sexual offenses the evidence necessary to prove the crimes is different. Under this theory defendant contends that the jury may have been confused and assumed that the oral sex act must have occurred since there were no signs of actual intercourse.
Bland further contends that the trial court should have severed the counts because they were not mutually admissible as legitimate "other crimes" evidence under State v. Prieur, 277 So.2d 126 (La.1973) or as similar acts within the contemplation of LSA-R.S. 15:445 and 14:446. Bland claims that the counts should have been tried separately since the proof of each count does not relate to the other. It is his assertion that since the only proof of the crimes presented by the state was the testimony of the victim it would only be logical for the jury to have disbelieved the victim's entire testimony rather than only her testimony concerning the rape.
Finally defendant asserts that the trial court erred in failing to sever the counts pursuant to LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 495.1 and that he was thereby denied a fair trial in that the testimony as to the attempted rape would not have been admissible to bolster the case as to the act of oral sex.
At the outset it should be noted that two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment under LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 493 if the offenses charged:
". . are of the same or similar character or are based on the same act or transaction or on two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan; provided that the offenses joined must be triable by the same mode of trial."
The facts of the instant case indicate that the crimes charged were part of a continuous criminal transaction which would render evidence of each crime admissible at trial of the other as part of res gestae. LSA-R.S. 15:447 ; State v. Webb, 364 So.2d 984 (La.1978). In the instant case, the offenses complete meeting the test set forth in the above article as the punishment for each offense is necessarily con finement at hard labor and the mode of trial (jury composed of twelve jurors, ten of whom must concur to render a verdict) is the same. LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 782. Hence, the offenses were properly joined in the same indictment. LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 493.
This assignment of error lacks merit.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 4
By this assignment defendant contends that LSA-R.S. 14:89.1 is constitutionally vague and overbroad and that its application violates due process in that the statute does not adequately inform the public of the behavior prohibited.
The jurisprudence of this state has rejected this proposition where the state's theory of the case is that the act was not consensual or between married couples, as here between this 34 year old defendant and 12 year old girl. State v. Lindsey, 310 So.2d 89 (La.1975); State v. Langendorfer, 389 So.2d 1271 (La.1980).
Accordingly, this assignment of error lacks merit.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NOS. 12 AND 13
By these assignments Bland contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial because there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction and because the state failed to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Bland claims that the testimony of the victim was not credible or sufficient to prove his guilt and that crime was uncorroborated beyond her testimony. He further contends that he was prejudiced by the fact that the examining physician could not conduct the proper tests to determine if oral sex had taken place.
The victim testified that Bland committed oral sex upon her twice during the incident that night. It is not clear which act was the basis for defendant's conviction. Defendant's brief only addresses the initial act.
Defendant denies the victim's accusations and asserts that her testimony is not credible, and that the physical act, as described, would have been "difficult" given the positions of the parties.
The standard used in reviewing the sufficiency of evidence is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt the essential elements of the crime. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Campuzano, 404 So.2d 1217 (La.1981).
Considering the victim's testimony, the circumstances of the victim's departure and return as testified to by other witnesses, the respective ages of the defendant and the victim, as well as his version of the events (including the points of mutual agreement in his version and that of the victim) a rational trier of fact could have easily reached the result here rendered.
These assignments of error lack merit.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 15
By this assignment Bland contends that the trial court erred in enhancing his sentence as a habitual offender because the state failed to prove that his plea of guilty to a 1975 simple burglary charge had been given after a proper waiver of his full Boy-kin rights. At defendant's habitual offender hearing the state introduced, over defendant's objection, the minute entry corresponding to Bland's earlier guilty plea hearing. These minutes clearly reflect a full Boykin inquiry and the assistance of counsel.
The defendant did not contend in the trial court that the minute entry was in error. There and now, he contends that such a minute entry is insufficient proof in the face of a defense objection. He contends that when defendant objects the state must introduce a transcript of the plea of guilty to sustain its burden, citing State v. Martin, 379 So.2d 1092 (La.1980) and State v. Williams, 384 So.2d 779 (La.1980). The defendant takes this position in spite of the fact that he made no contention, even perfunctorily either in the trial court or in this court, that the minutes in question were in error.
The position of the defendant is in error. In order to enhance a penalty under the multiple offender statute, the jurisprudence is that the state may affirmatively prove that the defendant had the benefit of counsel and that he was fully Boykinized by either the transcript of the plea of guilty or by the minute entry. State v. Lewis, 367 So.2d 1155 (La.1979).
The rule prior to Lewis was that the state did not have to affirmatively prove that the judge himself had made the defendant aware of his Boykin rights. That proof could be obtáined through an evidentiary hearing showing that the defendant was otherwise aware of these rights. State ex rel Jackson v. Henderson, 255 So.2d 85 (La.1971). But in Lewis, Chief Justice Dixon, speaking for the court, stated:
"In a multiple offender hearing, only those previous pleas of guilty may be used to enhance a sentence which are supported by a contemporaneous record of a Boykin examination demonstrating the free and voluntary nature of a plea of guilty with an articulated waiver of the constitutional rights required by Boykin v. Alabama." Lewis, supra, at p. 1160. (Emphasis added).
The court through Justice Tate in State v. Holden, 375 So.2d 1372 (La.1979), in discussing whether Lewis applied to non-Louisiana convictions, noted that the "contemporaneous record" of Lewis meant either the minutes or a transcript:
"The issue as thus posed is an aftermath of our decision in State v. Lewis, 367 So.2d 1155 (La.1979). There, we held that a 1970 guilty plea in a Louisiana court could not be used 'over objection' to enhance punishment as a multiple offender unless the minutes or transcript of the plea of guilty affirmatively disclosed..." State v. Holden, supra, at p. 1373. (Emphasis added).
In State v. Martin, supra, relied on by the defense, this court disallowed the use of a 1974 conviction because the "guilty plea record" showed only that the defendant waived his right to a trial but did not affirmatively disclose the waiver of the other Boykin rights. It is not clear from the opinion whether the trial record referred to was the minutes or the transcript of the guilty plea. Whichever, it is apparent that the state did not "produce a contemporaneous record of the defendant's guilty plea affirmatively showing a waiver of his right to jury trial, his right to confront his accusers, and his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination." Martin, supra, at p. 1094.
In State v. Williams, supra, the other authority of the defendant; the defendant's guilty plea was overturned on appeal because at the plea "the judge did not affirmatively and independently establish that Williams made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his constitutional rights." Williams, supra, at p. 780. The transcript itself of the plea was introduced. It showed only that the defendant waived his right to trial, but no mention was found therein of either the right to face his accusers or his right against compulsory self-incrimination.
In this case, recall that the defendant did not contend that the minutes were in error. He simply asserted that they were an insufficient record. But the state did show through a contemporaneous record that in the conviction relied upon the defendant was represented by counsel and affirmatively waived his Boykin rights. We find nothing in the jurisprudence which would preclude the state from making pri-ma facie case through the official court minutes as to counsel, voluntariness and knowing waiver of Boykin rights with respect to a previous conviction used for enhancement. Lewis-Holden, and their progeny, do not provide an exclusive method of establishing the voluntary and knowing standards of a previous conviction particularly where the defendant does not assert any error in that record. Under these circumstances the state complied with its burden by the introduction of the minute entry.
This assignment of error lacks merit.
For the reasons assigned, the defendant's conviction and sentence are affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
NORRIS, J., dissents with reasons.
CALOGERO, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
DENNIS, J., dissents for reasons assigned by NORRIS, J.
Judges Fred C. Sexton, Jr., and William Norris, III, of the Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, and Judge Robert L. Lobrano of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, participated in this decision as Associate Justices pro tempore, joined by Associate Justices Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., James L. Dennis, Jack C. Watson, and Harry T. Lemmon.
. The film was made available to the trial court by the Louisiana Judicial Administrator's Office.
. The charges were apparently combined as being offenses arising out of the same transaction. LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 493.
. The coroner, after examining the victim, found the victim's hymen to be intact and no evidence of abrasions, scrapes or bruises that were attributable to the attempted rape. There was no evidence beyond the victim's testimony to corroborate the assertion that Bland committed oral sex upon the victim.
. This assertion overlooks the subsequent coroner's finding that the victim's hymen was intact. While it is unclear from the testimony whether defendant actually penetrated the victim it would seem logical that the jury could have found neither rape nor attempted rape upon the evidence presented.
. LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 495.1. Severance of offenses
If it appears that a defendant or the state is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses in an indictment or bill of information or by such joinder for trial together, the court may order separate trials, grant a severance of offenses, or provide whatever other relief justice requires.
Added by Acts 1975, No. 528, § 3. Amended by Acts 1978, No. 466, § 1.
. LSA-R.S. 15:447. Res gestae defined; admissibility
Res gestae are events speaking for themselves under the immediate pressure of the occurrence, through the instructive, impulsive and spontaneous words and acts of the participants, and not the words of the participants when narrating the events. What forms any part of the res gestae is always admissible in evidence.
. The victim had bathed before being examined thus denying the examining physician the opportunity to obtain results from tests which would have determined the presence of sperm, foreign pubic hair, or saliva.
. The text of the minutes states:
Many, Louisiana
January 17th, 1975
The Honorable Eleventh Judicial District Court, Parish of Sabine, Louisiana, met this day pursuant to adjournment, His Honor Jack E. Burgess, Judge, presiding and all other officers present, whereupon the following proceedings were had and ordered entered.
State of Louisiana
Vs. #21,996 : Charge: Simple Burglary.
James Bland :
The defendant was present in open Court with Court appointed attorney Mr. Thomas Joe Cassell. The defendant was formally arraigned, personally and through counsel Plead Guilty. Before accept ing the plea of guilty to Simple Burglary the Court inquired of the defendant if he understood that by entering this plea he as waiving his right to trial by jury, waiving his rights against compulsory self-incrimination and waiving the right to be confronted by the witnesses against him. The defendant replied affirmatively. The District Attorney made a statement of the facts and the defendant confirmed their correctness. The Court then inquired of the defendant if he was aware of the nature of the charge to which he was pleading and the maximum possible penalty therefor and whether the plea of guilty to Simple Burglary was freely and voluntarily made. The defendant again replied affirmatively. Whereupon, the Court accepted the plea of guilty to Simple Burglary and ordered the plea of guilty to Simple Burglary recorded in the minutes of the Court. The Court ordered a presentence investigation to be made before sentencing.
. See additional concurring reasons by the author.