Case Name: William A. MADDRY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1991-08-08
Citations: 585 So. 2d 359
Docket Number: No. 90-1859
Parties: William A. MADDRY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: NIMMONS, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 585
Pages: 359–364

Head Matter:
William A. MADDRY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 90-1859.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Aug. 8, 1991.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 2, 1991.
William R. Slaughter, II, of Slaughter and Slaughter, Live Oak, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Laura Rush, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.

Opinion:
MINER, Judge.
Arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting so-called Williams rule testimony, appellant challenges his convictions on three counts of sexual battery of his 13 year old daughter while in a position of familial authority. Finding that this issue was not preserved for appellate review, we affirm appellant's convictions.
Prior to appellant's trial, the state filed notice that it intended to introduce evidence that while in a position of familial authority over her, appellant engaged in sexual activity with one K.S., his 17 year old illegitimate daughter. Defense counsel filed a motion in limine to exclude such testimony. At a hearing on the motion, counsel argued that there was no competent evidence to show that appellant was in fact the biological father of K.S., without which showing such testimony would be inadmissible as demonstrating only propensity and bad character and, further, that there was no evidence to show that the sexual conduct described by K.S. was illegal under the laws of New York or Pennsylvania, the states where such conduct was alleged to have taken place. Counsel concluded:
The bottom line is, we don't believe that there's been a sufficient showing of family, nor has there been a sufficient showing that this man was in a position of familial or custodial authority during the relevant period of time testified to by [K.S.].
The trial court rejected counsel's "family" arguments and, on the record, ruled that such testimony would be admitted and spelled out its reasoning for the ruling. K.S. testified at trial in accordance with the state's notice.
On appeal, Maddry's appellate counsel argues that K.S.'s testimony was "not relevant to any material issue, nor did the testimony reveal any factual or characteristic similarity between [K.S.'s] sexual encounter with the Appellant and the alleged sexual activity of the Appellant with the victim, nor did the testimony serve to corroborate the testimony of the victim."
Appellant's arguments on appeal are wholly different than those made by defense counsel below. Indeed, the arguments advanced below are not urged before us. An appellate court will consider the grounds or objections to the admissibility of evidence as were specifically made in the trial court and cannot consider those objections to admissibility of evidence which are raised for the first time on appeal. See Hoodless v. Jernigan, 46 Fla. 213, 35 So. 656 (1903); Lineberger v. Domino Canning Co., 68 So.2d 357 (1953); Chaudoin v. State, 118 So.2d 569 (Fla. 2d DCA 1960); Jennings v. Stewart, 308 So.2d 611 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); and Tabasky v. Dreyfuss, 350 So.2d 520 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). Here, the record clearly reflects that appellant's only arguments below against the admissibility of the challenged evidence are arguments going to what he must have believed to be the proper predicate for its admission, i.e. failure to show as a condition precedent to its admission that appellant was K.S.'s biological father and that the conduct K.S. described was against the law in New York and/or Pennsylvania. Counsel did not argue lack of relevance to prove or disprove a material fact or lack of similarity or that such evidence was not corroborative of the victim's testimony. Such objections as counsel did make were properly overruled by the court and the fact that the court grounded its pre-trial ruling on bases not argued by counsel does not relieve appellant of the consequence of his failure to state the proper grounds for his objection below.
Thus, having failed to raise the proper grounds for his objection to the challenged evidence below, he is precluded from raising any new grounds or objections for the first time on appeal. Accordingly, his convictions are affirmed.
NIMMONS, J., concurs.
BARFIELD, J., dissents with opinion.