Case Name: HUGHES v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1912-01-24
Citations: 149 S.W. 173
Docket Number: 
Parties: HUGHES v. STATE.
Judges: DAVIDSON, P. J., dissents.
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 149
Pages: 173–186

Head Matter:
HUGHES v. STATE.
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Jan. 24, 1912.
On Motion for Rehearing, June 26, 1912.)
1. Indictment and Information (§ 110 )— SUFFICIENCY— STATUTORY OFFENSES — 'VIOLATION of Liqttob Law.
Acts 31st Leg. (3d Called Sess.) c. 15, made it the duty of express companies to enter in a book all shipments of intoxicating liquors to be delivered in prohibition territory, and made it the duty of agents of such companies to open such books at “reasonable” hours for inspection by any officer of the law, or member of the grand jury. Code Cr. Proe. 1895, art. 448, declares that an indictment is sufficient which charges an offense in ordinary and concise language and with that certainty which will give the defendant notice of the particular offense charged. Article 449 declares that, when a statute creating any offense uses special or particular terms, the indictment may use the general term which in common language embraces the special term, and article 462 declares that words used in a statute to define an offense need not be strictly pursued in the indictment. Eeld, that an indictment which charged that defendant about *3 o’clock in the afternoon of a certain day, the same being within the office hours of his express company, refused to permit the sheriff to inspect such books was sufficient, though it did not allege that the hour was “reasonable,” especially where that ground was not given for the refusal.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Indictment and Information, Cent. Dig. §§ 289-294; Dec. Dig. § 110. ]
2. Obiminal Law (§§ 1064, 1090 ) — Appeal-Motion for New Trial.
' Where no bill of exceptions was taken to the court’s refusal to give certain requested charges, and the only mention of them in the motion for new trial was that the court erred in refusing to give special charges Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, any error in their refusal was insufficiently presented to warrant review.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2676-2684, 2653, 2789, 2803-2827, 2927, 2928, 2948, 3204; Doc. Dig. ss 1064, 1090. ]
3. Criminal Law (§§ 1056, 1090 ) — Appeal— Bill op Exceptions.
The Court of Criminal Appeals will not revise alleged error in the refusal of instructions, unless the action of the lower court is excepted to by defendant at the time and additional instructions asked and a bill of exceptions saved to their refusal.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2668, 2670, 2653, 2789] 2803-2827, 2927, 2928, 29-18, 3204; Dec. Dig. §§ 1056, 1090. ]
4. Criminal Law (§ 711 ) — Trial—Time pob Argument.
Code Cr. Proe. 1895, art. 704, provides that the order of argument in a criminal case may be regulated by the presiding judge, but that in all cases state’s counsel shall have the right to make the concluding address. Defendant on trial for a statutory offense used all of Ms time in arguing the law, and the court refused to hear him further on the law, but offered additional time to argue to the jury, which right he expressly waived, and the court then overruled his objection to the closing argument to the jury by the county attorney. Eeld, that the action of the court showed no injury to defendant, and was not reviewable.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 1657; Dec. Dig. § 711. ]
5. Criminal Law (§ 32 ) — Defenses—Ignorance of Law.
Under the express provision of Pen. Code 1895, art. 14, the fact that defendant was ignorant of the law under which he was prosecuted, at the time of his violation of it, is no defense.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 37; Dec. Dig. § 32. ]
0. Criminal Law (§ 20 ) — Elements of Crime — Intent.
Under a statute which does not make an intent to violate it a necessary ingredient, defendant would be guilty if he violated it, whether he intended to do so or not.
[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 21, 24, 25; Dec. Dig. § 20. ]
7. Criminal Law (§ 1091 ) — Bill of Exceptions — Sufficiency.
A bill of exceptions showing that the only thing that occurred in the absence of the judge was a disagreement as to whether the state’s attorney’s argument was within the record, without showing whether defendant had testified as the state’s attorney stated or not, was defective.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2S15, 2816, 2818, 2819, 2823, 2824, 2828-2833, 2843, 2931-2933, 2943; Dec. Dig. § 1091. ]
8. Criminal Law (§ 1166% )— Conduct of Tria!l — Absence of Judge.
The temporary absence of the judge from the courtroom during the trial is not ground for reversal unless during his absence something occurs prejudicial to accused.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3114-3123; Dec. Dig. § 1166%. ]
9. CriminaIl Law (§ 1166% ) — Harmless Error — Conduct of Trial — Absence of Judge.
The trial judge during the prosecution of defendant for a statutory offense, after all the evidence was introduced, retired by agreement of counsel to prepare his charge, and on his return at their request defendant requested him to remain, but he again left the courtroom, and during his absence defendant objected to the argument of counsel for the state as being outside the record, but the state’s attorney insisted that he was right and proceeded. Though the bill of exceptions did not show whether defendant had testified as stated by the state’s attorney or not, yet the statement of facts showed the position of the state’s attorney to be correct. Defendant’s own testimony was conclusive of his guilt, and he received the minimum penalty. Held that, under the circumstances, the absence of the judge was not reversible error.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3114-3123; Dec. Dig. § 1166%. ]
10. Criminal Law (§ 634 ) — Conduct of Trial — Absence of Judge — Suspension of Proceedings.
The court should be present at all times while a case is being tried, and, if it becomes necessary for him to be temporarily absent, he should suspend the proceedings until his return.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1461-1464; Dec. Dig. § 034. ]
11. Criminal Law (§ 413 ) — Evidence—Relevancy.
In a prosecution for refusing to allow the sheriff to examine books kept by defendant as an express agent, showing; shipments of intoxicating liquor into dry territory, a letter written by defendant to the county attorney the day after the refusal, offering to permit the examination of his books and stating that he did not intend to violate the law, was inadmissible.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 928-935; Dec. Dig. § 413. ]
12. CriminaIl Law (§ 1170 ) — Appeal and Error — Harmless Error — Exclusion of Evidence.
The exclusion of a letter offered by defendant was harmless, where he testified substantially without objection as to its contents.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 3145-3153; Dec. Dig. § 1170. ]
13. Criminal Law (§ 390 ) — Evidence—Competency.
In a prosecution for refusing to permit inspection of books kept by defendant as an express agent, evidence by defendant that, if the officers entitled to examine the books had told’ him their rights under the law, he would have permitted their inspection, was inadmissible.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 858; Dec. Dig. § 390. ]
On Motion for Rehearing.
14. Intoxicating Liquors (§ 15 )— Police Power — Refusal of Express Agent to ■ Exhibit Books — Offense.
Acts 31st Leg. (3d Called Sess.) c. 15, which requires express companies receiving shipments of intoxicating liquors to be delivered in prohibition territory to enter in a book the names of the consignor, the consignee, the exact time of the arrival of such package, the place from and to which shipped, the exact time of delivery,, and the signature of the consignee, and that’any agent of an express company having the custody of such book of entries shall, at the request of any person at any reasonable time during office hours, produce it for inspection by any officer of the law, or member of the grand jury, is a valid exercise of the .police power.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Intoxicating-Liquors, Cent. Dig. §§ 17, 18; Dee. Dig. § 15. ]
15. Constitutional Law (§ 48 )— Determination of Constitutional Question.— Doubt.
No act of the Legislature is to be declared unconstitutional unless it is so clearly and without doubt.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Constitu- > tional Law, Cent. Dig. § 46; Dec. Dig. § 48. ]
16. Searches and Seizures (§ 7 ) — Constitutional and Statutory Provisions.
Acts 31st Leg. (3d Called Sess.) c. 15, making it an offense for any express agent to refuse to permit examination of his books showing entries as to intoxicating liquors shipped into dry territory, does not violate Bill of' Rights, § 9, which provides that the people shall be secure in their persons, houses, and papers from all unreasonable searches and seizures.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Searches and Seizures, Cent. Dig. § 5; Dec. Dig. § 7. ]
17. Criminal Law (§ 413 )— Declarations— Self-Serving Declarations.
Self-serving declarations or letters by an-accused are never admissible when not res gestos.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 928-935; Dec. Dig. § 413. J
18. Criminal Law (§ 31 )— Defenses — Statutory Offense — Subsequent Willingness to Comply with Statute.
After the unquestioned commission of a. statutory offense, the fact that defendant on the next day was willing to comply with the law and not commit the offense again was no defense.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 35, 36, 50; Dec. Dig. § 31. ]
Davidson, P. J., dissenting.
Appeal from Montague County Court; A. W. Ritchie, Judge.
J. H. Hughes was convicted of the statutory offense of refusing to allow the sheriff of a prohibition county to examine the records of the express company of which he was agent, pertaining to the shipment of intoxicating liquors, and he appeals.
Affirmed.
Speer & Weldon, of Bowie, for appellant. C. E. Lane, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Deo. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Rep’r Indexes
For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Rep’r Indexes •
For other cases see same topic and section. NUMBER in Deo. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
PRENDERGAST, J.
On December 1, 1910, appellant was prosecuted under the act' approved August 19, 1910, for refusing on November 24, 1910, to let the sheriff of Montague county examine the express records, pertaining to the shipment of intoxicating liquors, of the Adams Express Company at the town of Sunset in said county; he being agent of said express company at that time and place, and prohibition being in force in said county at the time. Said act of the Legislature was passed at the third called session of the Thirty-First Legislature (chapter 15) which convened on July 19 and adjourned on August 17, 1910. The act became effective November 15, 1910.
The evidence is very brief and is without contradiction. It shows that on November 24, 1910, W. G. Bralley, the sheriff, and W. W. Alcorn, the county attorney, of Montague county, together went to the office of said express company in said town at 3 .o'clock p. m., during office hours of said express company at that time and place. The appellant was therein in charge of the said books and records of said express company at that time. 'The sheriff then requested appellant to show him the books and records of the express company showing the shipment of intoxicating liquors into Sunset. The appellant refused to let him see them because he had instructions from the express company to let no one examine the books unless they had an order from the court to do so, and appellant stated that he would have to do him just like he had done all others. The sheriff then took the appellant's name, the name of the express company, and he and the county attorney left. The appellant was .the agent of the express company at said time and place, and had the books of the company at that point in his possession. The appellant himself substantially testified to all of the above facts. He further testified he did not know the law had been changed from what it was prior to November 14, 1910; that, after the officers left his office, he called an agent of the Rock Island Railroad who told him that he thought the officers had the right to examine his books which they had demanded to see. He thereupon the next day wrote to the county attorney that he had since then been advised that the sheriff had the right to examine his books, and that, if he desired, he could then examine them. That he did not intend to violate the law. He also stated that at that time he had a pamphlet from his express company instructing him about the new law, telling him that his books were subject to inspection by the officers at all reasonable hours, but he claimed that at that time he had not seen the orders. That the auditor of the company, shortly before then, had taken his file or binder out of his office and placed the instructions from his company therein, and then returned the file or binder to him, but that he had not actually seen and read it before the officers were there and left. He also admitted that in December thereafter, in a conversation with the sheriff, he had told him that, at the time he demanded the inspection of his books, he had a copy of said law in question pasted in the back of one of his books or binders; that neither the sheriff nor county attorney after November 24th, had requested him to be permitted to inspect his books. They testified that after appellant refused to let them see his books they secured the information they wanted from some other source. No complaint by motion, bill, or otherwise was made in the lower court to quash the complaint or information.
However, appellant now complains that the complaint and information are fatally defective in that they do not allege that the request to him to examine his books was made "at any reasonable time during office hours." The complaint and information both are very full and explicit, and fully allege all of the requisites in section 1 of said act except that they do not use the word "reasonable" in the allegations. The particular allegation covering the point is "that on and about 3 o'clock in the afternoon of the said 24th day of November, 1910, the same being within the office hours of said express company at .its said office in the town of Sunset, in Montague county, Tex., the said J. H. Hughes did then and there unlawfully refuse to permit W. G. Bralley to inspect .the said books above mentioned, etc." Article 448, C. C. P. 1895, expressly enacts that an indictment "shall be deemed sufficient which charges the commission of the offense in ordinary and concise language in such a manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is meant, and with that degree of certainty that will give the defendant notice of the particular offense with which he is charged, and enable the court, on conviction, to pronounce the proper judgment." Article 449 is that, "when a statute creating or defining any offense uses special or particular terms, an indictment on it.may use the general which in common language embraces the special term." Article 462 is: "Words used in a statute to define an offense need not be strictly pursued in the indictment; it is sufficient to use other words conveying the same meaning, or which include the sense of the statutory words."
While it might have been better to have charged that the request to examine appellant's books was' at a reasonable time during office hours, yet, when it was alleged that the time the request was made was at 3 o'clock p. m. during office hours, and that the request was made of the defendant then and there, and the evidence shows that he refused, not because it was not reasonable time, but because his instructions were to refuse such request, the said information and complaint are sufficient.
Appellant asked four special charges: First, that as the evidence was insufficient to warrant a conviction, to find the appellant not guilty. The second that the law, under which he was prosecuted was an infringement of the Constitution and Bill- of Rights and therefore void, and to acquit the appellant. The third that, if appellant had reasonable ground to believe he had a right to decline to permit the sheriff to inspect his books, to acquit him. And the fourth that it was not the policy of the law to punish a person when the circumstances surrounding a transaction show it was not his intention to violate the law, and therefore, if they believed he had no intention to violate the law in this case and had reasonable grounds to believe his acts were not in violation of the law, or if they had a reasonable doubt of it, to acquit him. Neither one of these charges should have been given. Besides, no bill of exceptions was taken to the refusal of the court to give either of them. The only mention of them in the motion for new trial is the court erred in refusing to give defendant's special charge No. 1 by him, and then No. 2, and then No. 3, and then No. 4. This was entirely insufficient even in a felony case. Ryan v. State, 142 S. W. 878, and Berg v. State, 142 S. W. 884, recently decided but not yet officially reported.
In misdemeanor cases, ever since the establishment of this court, and even before, it was so held by the Supreme Court, as shown by Goode v. State, 2 Tex. App. 522, that, "If he (appellant) is not satisfied with the charge of the court, he should except to the charge and ask such additional instructions as he may desire, and, when his instructions are refused, should also save a bill of exceptions to their refusal," citing several cases. Again in Campbell v. State, 3 Tex. App. 34, this court said: "The rule is well settled that in misdemeanors this court will not revise the action of the lower court unless it is excepted to by the defendant at the time of the trial, and in such cases, if he is not satisfied with the charge of the court, he should except to the charge and ask such additional instructions as he may desire, and, when his instructions are refused, should also save a bill of exceptions to their refusal." See, also, Hobbs v. State, 7 Tex. App. 118; Downey v. State, 33 Tex. Cr. R. 380, 26 S. W. 627; Cole v. State, 28 Tex. App. 536, 13 S. W. 859, 19 Am. St. Rep. 856; Loyd v. State, 19 Tex. App. 322, and many other cases to the same effect by this court.
Appellant has some bills of exceptions complaining of the action of the court in limiting the argument on each side to 30 minutes. He shows that the case went to trial at 1:30 p. m. on March 6, 1911; that the testimony was closed by 4:30 p. m. Appellant took up all of his 30 minutes in arguing the law to the court. We understand his contention in the lower court was that the act under which appellant was prosecuted was unconstitutional. It is not made very clear why he took up his 30 minutes in argument to the court on the law of the case. The bills do show, however, that, when his 30 minutes had been taken up by him, the court declined to hear him further on the law; he contending for more time and the court declining to give it to him for that purpose. The court did, however, offer to give him additional time to argue to the jury, but, as he was trying to get the court to give peremptory instructions to the jury to acquit, he did not desire to argue to them, but expressly waived his right thereto. Another bill shows that, after he had concluded his argument, the court permitted the county attorney to again address the jury in his closing argument, or rather his bill shows that he exceptéd to the county attorney so doing, and the court overruled his objections. His bill does not state whether the county attorney then argued the case before the jury or not.
Article 704, O. O. P. 1895, provides that, when a criminal case is to be argued, the order of argument may be regulated by'the presiding judge, but in all cases state's counsel shall have the right to make the concluding address to the jury. This court has always held that this matter was in the sound discretion of the trial court, and that, unless injury is shown to the appellant, this court will not revise the discretion of the lower court. No injury is shown to the appellant by the action of the court in these respects in this case.
Article 14, P. C. 1895, is: "After a law has taken effect no person shall be excused for its violation upon the ground that he was ignorant of its provisions." The fact that appellant was ignorant of the law under which he was prosecuted at the time he violated it is therefore no defense whatever, and, as the act under which he was prosecuted does not make his intent to violate it a necessary ingredient, he would be guilty if he violated it, whether he intended to do so or not. The appellant himself testified that he did not intend to violate the law. The only possible advantage this would be to the appellant, if it were admissible at all, would be that the jury would give him a lower penalty. In this case the jury inflicted the lowest penalty under the law. So that he has no cause of complaint as to these matters.
Appellant complains by his second bill of exceptions to the effect that, after all the evidence was introduced, the court asked counsel for both sides to excuse him and he would retire from the courtroom, go down into his office, and prepare a charge. This was agreed to by both of them, and it was further agreed that, in the event he was needed, they would send for him; that soon after he had thus retired they did need him and sent for him. He at once returned to the courtroom. The matter then between the attorneys was passed upon by him, and he again started to leave the room. Appellant's counsel reguested him not to do so, and stated that he desired to change his former agreement, and requested the court to then remain in the courtroom. The court replied: "You have already agreed to it, and I am going to hold you to it." Appellant's attorney again requested him to remain, which he declined to do, and went down in the courthouse to his office to continue the preparation of his charge to the jury. That, at one time "when the court was absent and state's counsel was arguing to the jury, in his closing argument he stated the defendant had admitted on the stand that he told Mr. Bralley last December that, at the time of the alleged offense, he had the law pasted in the ba.ck of a book or ledger in his office. Whereupon the defendant's counsel remonstrated with him that he was outside of the record, and asked him not to argue outside the record, and the state's attorney insisted that he was right and not outside of the record, and continued his argument. That this took place at a time when the court was out of the courtroom and after the defendant's counsel had insisted upon his staying in the room and objected to his going out, to all of which said proceedings the defendant then and there in open court excepted and tenders this his second bill of exceptions, and asks that the same be approved and ordered filed as a part of the record herein." This bill was approved by the court
It will be seen by this bill that the only thing that occurred while the court was out of the courtroom preparing his charge was as to whether or not the state's attorney's argument was based upon the testimony of the defendant. The bill does not show whether the appellant had so testified or not. It is therefore defective to that extent. If we could look to the statement of facts, it would be seen that the state's attorney was fully correct, not out of the record, and that the appellant had testified as he argued at the time. So that the bill does not show that the appellant was in any way injured. Besides this, the statement of facts, without contradiction, and by the appellant's own testimony, was that he was guilty beyond the shadow of a doubt, and he could not have been injured by the court's temporary absence as shown. The jury gave him the lowest penalty under the law.
The appellant cites us to Bateson v. State, 46 Tex. Cr. B. 34, 80 S. W. 88; Evans v. State, 46 Tex. Cr. B. 476, 80 S. W. 1017; Goodman v. State, 47 Tex. Cr. B. 388, 83 S. W. 196; Carney v. State, 47 Tex. Cr. R. 566, 85 S. W. 7, 122 Am. St. Rep. 715; Anderson v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. R. 134, 95 S. W. 1037; Williams v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. R. 361, 102 S. W. 1134, 123 Am. St. Rep. 884; and French v. State, 55 Tex. Cr. R. 538, 117 S. W. 848. In the last case cited, the court expressly did not pass upon the question. The Bateson Case, supra, is the leading case on the subject, holding, in that particular ease because of the facts thereof, it was reversible error for the court to be absent under the circumstances therein shown.
This court in the recent case of White v. State, 61 Tex. Cr. B. 500, 135 S. W. 563, in discussing this question and the said Bateson Case, said: "It is also insisted that it was reversible error for the judge of the court, during the argument of the case by the attorneys for appellant, to absent himself from the courtroom, and this without in any way showing that anything occurred during his absence to the detriment of the appellant. We are cited to the case of Bateson v. State, 46 Tex. Cr. R. 34, 80 S. W. 88. In that case it was clearly shown that many things occurred during the absence of the court from the room that were objectionable, and that, if the court had been present, exception would have been made thereto at the time, but that they were prevented from making such objection because of the absence of the judge, and to have gone and hunted him up would have unduly interrupted the case, and that of itself, and the calling attention thereof to the jury, would have been detrimental to the appellant. What was said with reference to the absence of the judge during the trial in 'that case must be construed in connection with what was shown to have therein transpired. We do not understand that in this case the temporary and short absence of the judge from the courtroom, when he is in easy access in an adjoining room, would, without any prejudice or injury to the appellant, authorize or justify a reversal on that account alone. The judge should, of course, remain in the courtroom, or in such proximity and view of the jury and parties engaged in the trial that he can at all times be approached and control the proceedings, and we cannot understand why a judge should absent himself from the courtroom and permit the trial to continue. If necessity compels his retire ment for any purpose, he should suspend the proceedings until his return. What we say on this point is that, as no injury whatever was shown to the appellant by the judge .absenting himself at this time, a reversal of this case would not be authorized on that account alone. Hence there was-no error in refusing to grant a new trial on that ground" —which we understand to be the correct rule, even in felony cases. See, also, Scott v. State, 47 Tex. Cr. R. 568, 85 S. W. 1060, 122 Am. St. Rep. 717, and Lewis v. State, 15 Tex. App. 647.
The Bateson Case expressly recognizes the difference on this doctrine between a misdemeanor and a felony case, and cites 17 A. 6 E. Ency. p. 720, on felony cases. On the same page of the same work as to misdemeanors, it is said: "In order for such absence to become reversible error, it must appear not only that objection was made to the judge's failure to suspend the trial (during his absence), but that his absence resulted in some harm to the losing party." To the same effect is 12 Cyc. 522, citing in note 7 Rowe v. People, 26 Colo. 542, 59 Pac. 57; State v. Smith, 49 Conn. 376; Pritchett v. State, 92 Ga. 65, 18 S. E. 536; Schintz v. People, 178 Ill. 320, 52 N. E. 903; Murphy v. People, 19 Ill. App. 125; State v. Porter, 105 Iowa, 677, 75 N. W. 519; Ermlick v. State (Miss.) 28 South. 847; Turbeville v. State, 56 Miss. 793; Ouidas v. State, 78 Miss. 622, 29 South. 525; Rutter v. Territory, 11 Okl. 454, 68 Pac. 507.
In our opinion, under the circumstances and facts of this case and the way the matter is presented to us, no reversible error is shown because of the absence of the judge in this case.
We would not have it understood, by implication even, that we approve the absence of the judge from the presence of the jury, counsel, and witnesses at any time pending the trial of a case. On the contrary, if error were shown prejudicial to the appellant by the absence of the judge, we would not hesitate to reverse the case. It is the duty of the court to be present at all times while the case is being tried. If it becomes necessary for him to be even temporarily absent, he should stop the proceedings and prevent anything from being done until he returns, takes the bench and charge of the case.
The court did not err in excluding in evidence to the jury the said letter written by appellant to the county attorney the next day after the offense was committed.
Besides, he testified, without objection, the substantial contents of the letter.
Neither did the court err in sustaining the county attorney's motion or objection to this testimony by the appellant: "If either of them had told me they had a right under the law to inspect the books, I would have permitted them to have examined the books. All of these matters, if admissible at all, could have had no proper effect on the trial. Appellant was given the lowest penalty. There are no other matters so presented as to require any further discussion of the case.
There being no reversible error shown in this case, the judgment will be affirmed.
DAVIDSON, P. J., dissents.