Case Name: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. David Earl OUSLEY, Appellant
Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1990-04-18
Citations: 392 Pa. Super. 549
Docket Number: No. 177
Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. David Earl OUSLEY, Appellant.
Judges: Before CERILLO, President Judge, and ROWLEY and MONTEMURO, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports
Volume: 392
Pages: 549–563

Head Matter:
573 A.2d 599
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. David Earl OUSLEY, Appellant.
Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
Submitted May 30, 1989.
Filed April 18, 1990.
James E. Goodwin, Asst. Public Defender, Sharon, for appellant.
Lorinda L. Hinch, Asst. Dist. Atty., Mercer, for Com., appellee.
Before CERILLO, President Judge, and ROWLEY and MONTEMURO, JJ.

Opinion:
ROWLEY, Judge:
This is an appeal by David Ousley from a judgment of sentence of two to ten years imprisonment imposed following appellant's guilty plea to attempted burglary. The only issue raised on appeal concerns the discretionary aspects of sentencing. We deny appellant's petition for permission to appeal.
Appellant's Rule 2119(f) Statement asserts that there is a substantial question that his two to ten year sentence contravenes the Sentencing Code 1) because the court relied upon matters (unspecified) not properly before it at sentencing, and 2) because "said sentence is not only beyond the standard range of the sentence guidelines, but is also well beyond the aggravated range of the guidelines applicable for appellant and is not specifically tailored to the nature of the offense, the ends of justice and society and the rehabilitative needs of the appellant." (Appellant's brief at 5.)
The first of these reasons cannot be relied upon to support the petition for permission to appeal because it was not raised in appellant's motion to modify sentence and therefore has been waived. Pa.R.Crim.P. 1410; Commonwealth v. Dorman, 377 Pa.Super. 419, 547 A.2d 757 (1988). Even if the issue were not waived, however, it would warrant no relief because appellant has totally failed to articulate in his 2119(f) statement any factors which the trial court relied upon which allegedly were not before it. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 386 Pa.Super. 322, 562 A.2d 1385 (1989).
The second reason advanced by appellant to support his petition for permission to appeal fails to raise a substantial question. To determine whether or not to grant permission to appeal from the discretionary aspects of sentencing, there must be a substantial question that the sentence is not appropriate under the "entire Sentencing Code." 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(b); Commonwealth v. Tuladziecki, 513 Pa. 508, 522 A.2d 17 (1987). Although it is correct that the sentencing court must consider the applicable guidelines, Commonwealth v. Sessoms, 516 Pa. 365, 532 A.2d 775 (1987), they are only one factor of many which the sentencing court must consider. To determine whether there is a substantial question warranting permission to appeal from the discretionary aspects of sentencing, we must ascertain if the Sentencing Code as a whole has been compromised.
In Williams, supra, the court found that appellant had failed to raise a substantial question in her 2119(f) statement where the statement did not include any "specific, articulable reasons why her sentence raises doubts that the sentencing scheme as a whole has been compromised." Id., 386 Pa.Super. at 326, 562 A.2d at 1388.
In the instant case, appellant's statement asserts no specific, articulable reasons why his sentence compromises the sentencing code. On the contrary, appellant's statement includes only the bald averment that the sentence exceeds the guidelines and the conclusion which he would like us to reach: that the sentence "is not specifically tailored to the nature of the offense, the ends of justice and society and the rehabilitative needs of the appellant." Appellant has failed to advise us, either in his 2119(f) statement or anywhere else in his brief on appeal, what the applicable guideline range is, and he has articulated absolutely no facts to support the conclusion that the sentence is not appropriately tailored to the crime, his needs, and society's needs. The Supreme Court in Tuladziecki, and the Superior Court in the cases decided thereafter, e.g., Commonwealth v. Losch, 369 Pa.Super. 192, 535 A.2d 115 (1987), Williams, supra, have made it clear that appeals from the discretionary aspects of sentencing are not to be granted as a matter of course, but are to be granted only in exceptional cases where it can be shown in the 2119(f) statement that despite the "multitude of factors impinging on the sentencing decision," the sentence imposed contravenes the sentencing code. Tuladziecki, supra, 513 Pa. at 513, 522 A.2d at 20. Because appellant has failed to articulate any specific reasons why his case is one of those extraordinary ones in which we should grant review, we find that he has failed to raise a substantial question.
In addition, Appellant's conclusory assertion in the 2119(f) statement that the sentence exceeded the guidelines, without more, does not raise a substantial question. The statute provides that although the trial court must consider the guidelines, the trial court is free to sentence a defendant outside the guidelines, and the only limitation on such an exercise of the sentencing court's discretion is that the court include a statement of reasons why it is deviating from the guidelines. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b). Thus, the mere fact that a person is sentenced outside the guidelines, without any suggestion of how much the sentence imposed exceeded the guidelines, without any averment that the trial court failed to state any reasons for going outside the guidelines, and without any assertion that the court relied upon any inappropriate reasons for sentencing outside the guidelines, does not raise a substantial question that the sentencing code has been compromised because the sentencing court is authorized to sentence outside the guidelines.
The Dissent's assertion that "[t]he contention that the judge exceeded the applicable guideline recommendation raises a substantial question justifying the use of our discretionary appellate jurisdiction" appears to create a bright line test for determining when a substantial question has been asserted. No authority which has been cited to us establishes such a clear bench mark for establishing a substantial question, and the cases relied upon by the dissent do not support the conclusion that the mere averment of a sentence outside the guidelines, without more, raises a substantial question.
In Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 372 Pa.Super. 369, 539 A.2d 840 (1988) (en banc), aff'd. per curiam, 522 Pa. 153, 560 A.2d 148 (1989), relied upon by the Dissent, appellant received a total sentence of ten to twenty-five years imprisonment. He sought review of the discretionary aspects of his sentence because the trial court had failed to state appropriate reasons for deviating from the guidelines and because the sentence allegedly was so harsh inasmuch as it was nearly twice as long as the maximum minimum sentence under the guidelines (five years, seven months). The Court concluded that "under these circumstances," appellant had raised a substantial question. Id., 372 Pa.Superior Ct. at 372, 539 A.2d at 841.
Commonwealth v. Burdge, 386 Pa.Super. 194, 562 A.2d 864 (1989), which the Dissent also relies upon, fails to support the conclusion that the mere "contention that the judge exceeded the applicable guideline recommendation raises a substantial question." In Burdge, the appellant was sentenced to a total of 13V2 to 27 years imprisonment, and challenged the discretionary aspects of sentencing by questioning, inter alia, whether the sentence imposed was excessive in light of the underlying crimes. Upon considering the question of whether this raised a substantial question, the Court cited Sanchez, noted that the guidelines were inapplicable to appellant, and stated: "the sentence imposed considerably exceeded the recommendation of both the prior and pending sentencing guidelines. Therefore, we find that the propriety of the sentence presents a substantial question." Id., 386 Pa.Superior Ct. at 198, 562 A.2d at 866 (emphasis added). The only other reference made by the Court in Burdge regarding the relationship of the prior and proposed guidelines to the sentence which was imposed was that "the trial court sentenced him significantly in excess of prior and pending sentencing guidelines." Id., 386 Pa.Superior Ct. at 196, 562 A.2d 865 (emphasis added).
In the instant case, appellant's sentence exceeds the guidelines by six months. We find this differential to be significantly different than the almost four and one-half year differential in Sanchez. Also, applying the language of the Court in Burdge, we do not find the 24 month minimum sentence actually imposed in the instant case to be either "significantly" or "considerably" in excess of the maximum guideline recommendation of 18 months imprisonment. Because the finding of a substantial question in both Sanchez and Burdge was premised on the amount by which the sentence imposed exceeded the maximum guideline recommendation, and in neither case was a substantial question found simply because appellant had asserted that the sentence exceeded the guidelines, we conclude that the Court has not established a per se rule that the bald assertion that one's sentence is outside the guideline recommendation raises a substantial question that the sentence imposed contravenes the sentencing code.
The Commonwealth argues that we should deny the petition for permission to appeal based on Commonwealth v. Ziegler, 379 Pa.Super. 515, 550 A.2d 567 (1988), (petition for permission to appeal denied for failure to include in the Statement of Reasons the identity of the crime of which appellant was convicted) because appellant has failed to include in his 2119(f) statement the identity of the crime for which he was sentenced. However, we find it more appropriate instead to follow the analysis adopted by the Court en banc in Williams, which was also a case in which the identity of the crime was not mentioned in the 2119(f) Statement.
The Dissent faults us as being "disingenuous" for following Williams and avoiding what it perceives to be the "exceedingly simplistic" resolution of the instant appeal. Yet to reach that "exceedingly simplistic" resolution would require us to reach out and resolve an issue unnecessary for the disposition of the case before us, would require us to infer from Williams that which was not decided therein, and would require deviating from the analysis that was used by the Court in Williams.
In Williams, despite the fact that the Court ordered the parties to address Ziegler and Commonwealth v. Cummings, 368 Pa.Super. 341, 534 A.2d 114 (1987), upon which Ziegler relied, in their briefs before the Court en banc, neither party did so. In addition, at oral argument before the Court en banc, the issue of Ziegler and Cummings was never addressed by either the Court or the parties. Because it was possible to decide Williams without reference to either Ziegler or Cummings, the Court en banc did not address the continuing viability of either of those cases. Considering this history of Williams, as well as the fact that the instant case is factually similar to Williams insofar as appellant's statement of reasons is woefully inadequate to assert a substantial question because it fails to articulate any specific facts, because it asserts as reasons for granting permission to appeal only the conclusions which appellant wants us to reach, and because it does not identify why this is one of the exceptional cases in which an appeal should be granted, we will neither infer from Williams that Ziegler or Cummings has been overruled sub silentio, nor will we undertake to address those cases here where it is unnecessary to do so in order to dispose of the appeal.
Petition for permission to appeal denied.
MONTEMURO, J., files a dissenting opinion.
. The opinion in Burdge is silent as to what the prior or proposed guideline recommendation applicable to appellant would have been. In addition, the opinion does not indicate what appellant's prior record score was, although the opinion recites that the presentence investigation provided information about appellant's "criminal record." Without precise information concerning appellant's prior record score, we cannot calculate what the applicable prior and prospective guideline ranges were in Burdge, and therefore we also cannot determine precisely how much in excess of the prior and proposed guidelines appellant's actual sentence was.