Case Name: STATE of Arkansas v. Jerry POST, David Wyatt, Independence County Judge; Orville Arms, Paul Buchanan, Bill Cash, Jim Darmstaedter, Bobby Galloway, Sue Hurley, Jim Kemp, Conway Lawrence, Earvin Moser, Joe Walls, Tom Ed Woodruff, Quorum Court Members Comprising the Quorum Court of Independence County
Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 1993-01-19
Citations: 311 Ark. 510
Docket Number: 92-787
Parties: STATE of Arkansas v. Jerry POST, David Wyatt, Independence County Judge; Orville Arms, Paul Buchanan, Bill Cash, Jim Darmstaedter, Bobby Galloway, Sue Hurley, Jim Kemp, Conway Lawrence, Earvin Moser, Joe Walls, Tom Ed Woodruff, Quorum Court Members Comprising the Quorum Court of Independence County
Judges: Holt, C.J. and Brown, J., concur.
Reporter: Arkansas Reports
Volume: 311
Pages: 510–529

Head Matter:
STATE of Arkansas v. Jerry POST, David Wyatt, Independence County Judge; Orville Arms, Paul Buchanan, Bill Cash, Jim Darmstaedter, Bobby Galloway, Sue Hurley, Jim Kemp, Conway Lawrence, Earvin Moser, Joe Walls, Tom Ed Woodruff, Quorum Court Members Comprising the Quorum Court of Independence County
92-787
845 S.W.2d 487
Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered January 19, 1993
[Rehearing denied February 22, 1993.]
Winston Bryant, Att’y Gen., by: Kyle R. Wilson, Asst. Att’y Gen., for appellant.
Adams & Nichols, by: Donald J. Adams and Tom Allen, for appellee Oscar Jones.
Skokos, Coleman, & Rainwater, P.A., by: Michael R. Rainwater, for appellee Independence County.

Opinion:
Donald L. Corbin, Justice.
Oscar Jones and Jerry Post were appointed counsel for William Thomas Reager, an indigent charged with capital murder. As a result of their representation, Mr. Reager was found not guilty and the charges were dismissed. This appeal concerns the allocation of responsibility for Mr. Jones' fees and expenses between the state and Independence County. Mr. Post's fees and expenses are not before us because the county failed to appeal in a timely manner. In response to Mr. Jones' Motion for Certification of Attorney's Fees and Expenses, Special Judge Watson Villines certified an award to Mr. Jones of $22,986.00 in attorney's fees as just compensation and $602.85 for reimbursable expenses. The propriety of the award has not been challenged. Judge Villines also determined that the county was liable for payment of $450.00 of Mr. Jones' award and the state was liable for the remainder under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-92-108 (1987) and § 14-20-102 (Supp. 1991). On appeal, the state argues that under Ark. Code Ann. § 14-20-102, the county is responsible for payment of all indigent defense fees. Alternatively, the state argues that the state should, at most, be required to pay six hundred and fifty dollars ($650.00) under Ark. Code Ann. § 16-92-108. According to the state, our decision in Arnold v. Kemp, 306 Ark. 294, 813 S.W.2d 770 (1991), made the meaning and application of section 16-92-108(c) ambiguous and we should therefore interpret section 16-92-108 in accordance with the intent of the legislature. The state contends that it has been the longstanding practice of the legislature to require the counties to bear the burden of financing the administration of criminal justice in the state. According to the state, by enacting section 16-92-108 the legislative intent was for the state to assist the counties, leaving primary financial responsibility with the counties, in cases where the indigent was charged with capital murder or murder in the first degree, but even then the intent was not for the state to ever pay more than six hundred and fifty dollars ($650.00) in any one case.
This case requires us to interpret section 16-92-108, and section 14-20-102. Our jurisdiction is therefore proper pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 29(1)(c).
Section 16-92-108 provides:
(a) Whenever legal counsel is appointed by any court of this state to represent indigent persons accused of crimes, whether misdemeanors or felonies, the court shall determine the amount of the fee to be paid to the attorney and an amount for a reasonable and adequate investigation of the charges made against the indigent and shall issue an order for the payment thereof.
(b) (1) The amount allowed for investigation expenses shall not exceed one hundred dollars ($100), and the amount of the attorney's fee shall be not less than twenty-five dollars ($25.00) nor more than three hundred fifty dollars ($350.00).
(2) The amount of attorney's fees for attorneys who defend indigents accused of capital murder or murder in the first degree shall be not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000).
(3) The attorney's fees provided for by this section shall be based upon the experience of the attorney and the time and effort devoted by him in the preparation and trial of the indigent, commensurate with fees paid other attorneys in the community for similar services.
(c) (1) Upon being furnished an order of the court fixing the fees, the quorum court of the county in which the indigent was charged shall appropriate from the county general fund adequate funds to pay the fees, not to exceed the amount of three hundred fifty dollars ($350) for the attorney's fees nor one hundred dollars ($100) for investí gation expenses, and the county treasurer shall disburse the fees to the appointed attorney.
(2) The balance not paid by the counties shall be paid by the state from the Trial Expense Assistance Fund created by § 16-92-109.
(d) An attorney shall not be so appointed by a court if the attorney certifies to the court, in writing, that he or she has not attended or taken a prescribed course in criminal law in an accredited school of law within twenty-five (25) years prior to the date of appointment, that the attorney does not hold himself or herself out to the public as a criminal lawyer, and that he or she does not regularly engage in the practice of criminal law.
Section 14-20-102 provides:
(a)(1) The quorum court of any county included within the judicial districts of the State of Arkansas, by appropriate county legislation, may provide for the creation of a fund to be used for the purpose of paying reasonable and necessary costs incurred in the defense of indigent persons accused of criminal offenses and in the defense of indigent persons against whom involuntary commitment procedures for insanity or alcoholism have been brought, and for representation in civil and criminal matters of persons deemed incompetent by the court due to minority or mental incapacity, which have been brought in any circuit courts, chancery courts, juvenile courts, probate courts, city or county division of municipal courts including, but not limited to, investigative expenses, expert witness fees, and legal fees.
(2) Any municipal body in a county where the quorum court has not created such a fund applicable to the city division of the municipal court may provide for the creation of a fund to be used in the city division of the municipal court.
(3) Where there are adequate unappropriated moneys in this fund, the quorum court may also provide for the use of the funds for the purpose of defraying the cost of the juvenile division of chancery court.
(4) Where there are adequate unappropriated moneys in this fund, the quorum court may also provide for the use of the funds for the purpose of defraying the cost of the medical and dental costs incurred by the county for indigent defendants incarcerated in the county jail.
(b) (1) [As amended by Acts 1991, No. 1003, § 1.] Any quorum court desiring to establish such a fund shall have the authority to provide for the payment of a fee, not to exceed the sum of five dollars ($5.00), to be taxed as costs in each matter, civil or criminal, filed in any circuit, chancery, probate, city or county division municipal court within the county. However, no such fees shall be taxed as costs in any action filed in any small claims court.
(2) The quorum court is authorized to supplement the fund by additional appropriations from the county general fund, and expenditures from such fund shall be made in the manner and amounts prescribed by the quorum court desiring to enact such legislation.
(c) The provisions of § 16-92-108 and other laws relating to the amount of attorney fees and costs that may be paid in the defense of indigents charged with criminal offenses and in the defense of persons against whom involuntary commitment proceedings are sought for insanity or alcoholism shall not be applicable in any county in which the quorum court establishes a fund under this section and levies additional costs or fees to finance such fund.
(d) In any county where a public defender commission has been established under § 16-87-101 — 16-87-111, the amount to be paid for attorney fees, investigative costs, and other costs under subdivision (a)(1) of this section shall be determined in a manner prescribed by the quorum court acting with the advisory resolution of the public defender commission.
(e) The provisions of this section and § 16-92-108 relating to the amount or payment of attorney fees and costs that may be paid in the defense of persons against whom involuntary commitment proceedings are sought for insanity or alcoholism shall not be applicable in any instance in which the State of Arkansas, acting through its administrative agencies, departments, or divisions, provides for payment of attorney fees or costs which would otherwise be paid by the county.
We find that we must first address the effect of our decision in Arnold v. Kemp on section 16-92-108 before we can decide whether Independence County is liable for payment of the attorney fees since it has established an Indigent Defense Fund pursuant to section 14-20-102.
In Kemp, we declared the fee caps contained in section 16-92-108 unconstitutional. Prior to Kemp, section 16-92-108(b) provided that investigation expenses could "not exceed one hundred dollars ($100)" and attorney's fees were limited to "not less than twenty-five dollars ($25.00) nor more than three hundred fifty dollars ($350)", except in cases where the defendant was accused of capital murder or murder in the first degree, where the attorney's fees was limited to "not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000)." We did not address the provisions of section 16-92-108 concerning responsibility for payment of the fees in Kemp. Under section 16-92-108(c)(l), the county is required to pay up to three hundred and fifty dollars ($350.00) for attorneys fees and one hundred dollars ($100.00) for investigation expenses out of its county general fund. The balance is paid by the state from the Trial Expense Assistance Fund. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-92-108(c)(2). "[I]t is well settled that where a statute or code provision is unconstitutional in part, the valid portion of the act will be sustained if complete in itself and capable of execution in accordance with apparent legislative intent." Hutton v. Savage, 298 Ark. 256, 266, 769 S.W.2d 394, 399 (1989). In Kemp, we indicated that only the fee cap sections of section 16-92-108 were unconstitutional. The other sections were not affected by our decision. After further consideration, we find that our decision in Kemp that the fee caps contained in section 16-92-108 are unconstitutional requires us to invalidate the entire statute because the sections of the statute are not severable. It was clearly the intent of the legislature to enact the statute as a whole. The sections of the statute are interwoven and the entire statute revolved around the fee caps. Wenderoth v. City of Ft. Smith, 251 Ark. 342, 472 S.W.2d 74 (1971). Our decision in Kemp eliminat ing the fee caps contained in the statute requires us to invalidate the entire statute because the fee caps were an integral part of the system set out by the legislature in the statute to allocate responsibility between the county and the state for payment of defense attorney fees.
Since we find that section 16-92-108 must be invalidated, we next turn to section 14-20-102 to see whether it provides any guidance. Independence County has established a fund pursuant to section 14-20-102 to help pay for the costs incurred in the defense of indigent persons. Because Independence County has established a fund, the state contends it is not responsible for payment of any of the attorney's fees or investigation costs at issue in this case. Section 14-20-102(a) authorizes a county to establish an Indigents' Defense Fund. Section 14-20- 102(b) governs how an Indigents' Defense Fund is to be funded and how expenditures are to be made once such a fund is established. Section 14-20-102(b) provides:
(b)(1) Any quorum court desiring to establish such a fund shall have the authority to provide for the payment of a fee, not to exceed the sum of five dollars ($5.00), to be taxed as costs in each matter, civil or criminal, filed in any circuit, chancery, probate, city or county division municipal court within the county. However, no such fees shall be taxed as costs in any action filed in any small claims court.
(2) The quorum court is authorized to supplement the fund by additional appropriations from the county general fund, and expenditures from such fund shall be made in the manner and amounts prescribed by the quorum court desiring to enact such legislation.
Therefore, according to section 14-20-102(b)(2), we look to see what procedure the Quorum Court of Independence County has established for making expenditures from its funds to determine if Independence County must pay the fees and expenses at issue. The Quorum Court of Independence County enacted Ordinance No. 419-86, which established Independence County's Indigents' Defense Costs Fund. This Ordinance contains the funding and expenditure procedures for the Indigents' Defense Fund. This Ordinance provides:
SECTION 1. Under the provisions of Act 695 of the 1983 Arkansas Legislative Session, there is hereby authorized an Indi gent s' Defense Costs Fund which will be used to defray the allowable costs incurred in the defense and trial of indigents in this county and for indigents in this County against whom involuntary commitments for insanity or alcoholism are sought.
SECTION 2. A. Effective on passage and approval of this Ordinance, the Chancery, Circuit and Probate Clerks are hereby authorized and directed to add the sum of Five Dollars ($5.00) to the filing fees and costs for all cases, civil or criminal, filed in these Courts.
B. Fees so collected are to be paid to the Independence County Treasurer by the twenty-fifth day of the following month and the Treasurer will create and maintain an account with these fees which will be entitled the Indigents' Defense Costs Fund.
C. All payments out of the Indigents' Defense Costs Fund will be for the payment of indigent expenses to include, but not limited to, attorney's fees, expert witnesses fees, investigation and other reasonably necessary costs incurred in the defense and trial of indigent persons in any Court in which the fees listed above are collectable.
SECTION 3. A. Attorneys appointed to represent indigents are required to keep an accurate, detailed accounting of the amount of time and nature of their services and their expenses for each case with expenses being defined as meaning any expenditure other than witness fees and investigator fees.
B. Prior to obtaining the services of any investigator or expert witness, the attorney will secure the written approval of their services and fees from the Court in which the matter is pending.
C. At the conclusion of the case involving the indigent, or at such other times as shall be appropriate, the attorney will submit his time and expense schedule along with the expenses incurred by any expert witness or investigator to the Court hearing the matter.
SECTION 4. A. The amount allowed for investigation expenses and for expert witness fees together shall not exceed One Hundred Dollars ($100.00) and the amount of the attorney's fees and expenses shall not be less than Twenty-Five Dollars ($25.00) nor more than Three Hundred and Fifty Dollars ($350.00), based upon the experience of the attorney and the time and effort devoted and the expenses incurred by him in the preparation and trial of the indigent.
B. In any event, no more than Four Hundred and Fifty Dollars ($450.00) for all fees and expenses and costs shall be paid from the Indigents' Defense Costs Fund, for any single indigent on any one (1) case pending against such indigent person.
C. No costs incurred prior to the passage of this ordinance shall be paid from the Indigents' Defense Costs Fund.
SECTION 5. Upon being presented with such schedule as set out in Section 3(C) above, the Court shall determine the amount of fee and expenses to be paid to the attorney and an amount for a reasonable and adequate investigation of charges made against the indigent and a reasonable amount for expert witness fee, and issue' an order for the payment thereof.
SECTION 6. Upon being furnished with copy of the Court's order for payment of the aforementioned fees and expenses, the County Judge shall review the order and, subject to his approval, the County Treasurer shall disburse such fees to the appropriate parties.
The provisions of the fund limit the amounts that may be paid for any single indigent on any one (1) case to four hundred and fifty dollars ($450.00). This limitation is invalid under our decision in Kemp. The provisions of Independence County Ordinance No. 419-86 concerning the payment of attorney's fees and costs for indigent defendants are substantially similar to the provisions providing for payment of indigent defense fees and costs contained in section 16-92-108. The fee caps contained in Independence County Ordinance No. 419-86 are an integral part of the Ordinance just as the fees caps contained in Ark. Code Ann. § 16-92-108 were an integral part of that statute. Having previously determined that the invalidation of the fee caps in section 16-92-108 by Kemp required that we invalidate the entire statute since the fee caps were an integral part of the statute and were not severable, we must similarly determine that our invalidation of the fee caps contained in Independence County Ordinance No. 419-86 requires us to invalidate the entire ordinance.
This leaves us with no provisions requiring the county to pay defense attorney fees of counsel appointed to defend indigent defendants. In the absence of statutory requirements we must look to the Constitution of the United States and the State of Arkansas to determine who is responsible for payment of indigent defense fees in Arkansas. The United States Constitution mandates that states appoint counsel for indigent defendants. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). The Constitution of the State of Arkansas requires the court to appoint counsel for indigent defendants. Therman v. State, 205 Ark. 376, 168 S.W.2d 833 (1943); Ark. Const, art. II, § 10. While attorneys in Arkansas have been appointed to defend indigent defendants since our current constitution was adopted in 1874, they were not compensated for their services to indigent defendants until 1953. Mears v. Hall, 263 Ark. 827, 569 S.W.2d 91 (1978). At that time, the legislature delegated the responsibility of payment of indigent defense fees to the counties by statute. See Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-2415, -2416 (Repl. 1964). Since that time, several statutes have been enacted by the legislature requiring the counties to pay indigent defense fees. It was not until 1985 that the legislature placed partial responsibility for payment of indigent defense fees on the state. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-92-108. But, now that we have determined that our decision in Kemp requires us to invalidate section 16-92-108 and Independence County's Indigents' Defense Costs Fund, there remains no statutory authority for placing the payment of Mr. Jones' fees on the county. However, we have recently held that appointment of counsel in criminal cases results in a taking of the appointed counsel's property for which he must be justly compensated, so even though there exists no statutory authority for awarding attorneys fees and expenses to counsel who represent indigent defendants, it is constitutionally required. Kemp, 306 Ark. 294, 813 S.W.2d 770. As we have recognized before, the "statute imposes a burden upon the count [y] to pay fees to attorneys representing indigents which the count [y] would not be responsible for otherwise." State v. Conley, 270 Ark. 139, 141, 603 S.W.2d 415, 416 (1980). Payment of fees to attorneys representing indigents is a responsibility of the state which the legislature had delegated to the counties by statute. Since there no longer is a statute delegating this duty to Independence County, the state is responsible for payment of Mr. Jones' fees and expenses.
The portion of the trial court's order assessing responsibility for the payment of $450.00 of Mr. Jones' award to the county and the remainder to the state is modified to place full responsibility for payment of the award to Mr. Jones on the state.
Affirmed as modified and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Holt, C.J. and Brown, J., concur.
Dudley, Hays, and Newbern, JJ., dissent.