Case Name: Tanya REYNOLDS, Appellant, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY and Allstate Insurance Company, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1992-12-30
Citations: 611 So. 2d 1294
Docket Number: No. 91-2427
Parties: Tanya REYNOLDS, Appellant, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY and Allstate Insurance Company, Appellees.
Judges: HERSEY, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 611
Pages: 1294–1300

Head Matter:
Tanya REYNOLDS, Appellant, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY and Allstate Insurance Company, Appellees.
No. 91-2427.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Dec. 30, 1992.
Rehearing and Certification Denied Feb. 8, 1993.
David J. Glatthorn, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Eugene H. Brandt of Peterson and Bernard, West Palm Beach, for appellees.

Opinion:
FASTRACK APPEAL
GUNTHER, Judge.
In this fastrack appeal, Tanya Reynolds seeks reversal of a summary final judgment entered in favor of State Farm. The only issue on appeal is whether Tanya is entitled to recover for her "psychic injury, emotional pain and suffering and grief" due to the death of John Oswald, her boyfriend/fiance.
Both parties agree that since State Farm sought a partial summary judgment on only one issue, the trial court erred in entering the summary final judgment on all issues. Thus, the parties acknowledge that on remand, issues remain as to the amount of damages Tanya suffered for her physical injuries and her pain and suffering which were not associated with John Oswald's death.
Tanya sued State Farm, her uninsured motorist carrier, after an uninsured motorist struck an automobile she was driving. Tanya's passenger, Oswald, her steady boyfriend for over six years, was killed in the accident. Tanya was knocked unconscious in the impact, and was told of Oswald's death several hours later in the hospital when she awoke. She is amnesic for the events preceding, during and after the accident. Thus, she has no recollection of the collision or the injuries Oswald sustained.
As a result of the accident, Tanya suffered a concussion and a fractured clavicle, as well as numerous contusions on her legs. In addition, for almost a year after the accident, she did not have any menstrual periods.- Approximately eleven months after the accident, she told her doctor of this problem and he prescribed medication for her.
In his deposition, the doctor testified that the emotional distress of physical injuries and the loss of a loved one can cause an interruption in a young woman's menstrual cycle. He concluded that the emotional distress associated with the accident was the cause of Tanya's suppressed menstrual cycle. The doctor also stated that her monthly cycle had resumed and that he did not think she was actually physically injured as a result of her suppressed menstrual cycle.
Oswald's mother testified that Tanya and her son had had a close relationship for more than five years. She added that Tanya had spent considerable time with the Oswald family and that she was as close to her as if Tanya was already a member of the family. The mother stated that Tanya and John undoubtedly would have married if the accident had not occurred.
Tanya referred to Oswald as her fiance. However, she. admitted that they had not exchanged rings, that they had not actually set a date for the wedding, that they had not established any joint accounts or made any financial commitments together, and that they had not become married by the time of the accident.
Tanya sued for damages arising from her physical injuries, as well as damages for her "psychic injury, emotional pain and suffering and grief" due to Oswald's death. State Farm moved for summary judgment on the claim based on Oswald's death and argued that Tanya was not entitled to recover any damages for Oswald's death. It was stipulated that the driver of the other vehicle was negligent, that Tanya was not negligent, that she was using her seat belt, and that she had sustained injury from the accident. In granting the motion, the trial court agreed with State Farm that Tanya cannot recover damages for her "psychic injury, emotional pain and suffering and grief" due to Oswald's death. Tanya disagrees with the ruling and argues that the trial court reversibly erred in granting the summary final judgment.
The resolution of this case involves examining Florida's "impact rule." The impact rule is the long-standing rule that a plaintiff must suffer a physical impact before recovering for emotional distress caused by the negligence of another. Champion v. Gray, 478 So.2d 17 (Fla. 1985). In essence, thé impact rule stands for the proposition that before a plaintiff can recover damages for emotional distress caused by the negligence of another, the emotional distress suffered must flow from physical injuries the plaintiff sustained in an impact. Thus, the impact rule precludes the recovery of damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress unless the emotional distress arises directly from the physical injuries sustained by the plaintiff in the impact. As discussed below, Champion modifies this rule to a very limited extent.
In addressing the "impact rule," Tanya offers several arguments in support of her contention that she can recover for her "psychic injury, emotional pain and suffering and grief" due to Oswald's death. First, Tanya argues that her claim for psychological damages due to Oswald's death is not barred by the "impact rule." She maintains that since she did suffer a physical impact (she was injured in the accident), she is thus entitled to recover for the emotional distress due to Oswald's death. However, she fails to cite any case law that supports her argument on this point. Her second argument is that even if the impact rule does apply, a question of fact remains as to whether she presented a claim cognizable under Champion.
State Farm counters-that Tanya's claim for damages due to Oswald's death is barred for the reasons that the impact rule is applicable and Tanya's claim does not fall within the exception created by Champion. We agree and find that Champion and Ferretti v. Weber, 513 So.2d 1333 (Fla. 3d DCA), cause dismissed, 519 So.2d 986 (Fla.1987), clearly support the trial court's ruling that Tanya cannot recover for her "psychic injury, emotional pain and suffering and grief" due to Oswald's death.
Tanya's first argument, that since she suffered an impact in the accident which killed Oswald, she can recover damages for emotional distress due to Oswald's death, is not supported by the law. To agree with her reasoning would create for every injured accident victim a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress due to the death or injury of any other person involved in the accident. Because we reject Tanya's argument on this point, we conclude that the impact rule is applicable to the facts of the instant case.
Tanya contends that even if the impact rule is applicable, the trial court erred in granting the summary judgment because a jury question remains concerning the closeness of her emotional attachment to Oswald. She argues that Champion modifies the impact rule and that she meets the requirements set forth in Champion. According to Tanya, there is evidence that she (1) suffered a significant discernible physical impairment (interruption of menstrual cycle), (2) was involved in the event causing the original injury (as driver of the motor vehicle involved in the accident in which Oswald was killed), and (3) had an especially close emotional attachment to the directly injured person (Oswald, her steady boyfriend/fiance).
Champion, which modifies the "impact rule" to a very limited extent, defines the circumstances that must first exist before a plaintiff can recover-damages for emotional distress caused by the negligent death or injury of another person. In Champion, the supreme court allowed, with expressed limits, recovery for the physical consequences resulting from the mental or emotional stress the defendant's negligence caused even though the plaintiff experienced no physical impact. The supreme court stated that "we now conclude that the price of death or significant discernible physical injury, when caused by psychological trauma resulting from a negligent injury imposed upon a close family member within the sensory perception of the physically injured person, is too great a harm to require direct physical contact before a cause of action exists." 478 So.2d at 18-19, (emphasis added). Champion specifically held "a claim exists for damages flowing from a significant discernible physical injury when such injury is caused by psychic trauma resulting from negligent injury imposed on another who, because of his relationship to the injured party and his involvement in the event causing that inju--ry, is foreseeably injured." Id. at 20. In a footnote to the holding, the supreme court stated that "we reiterate that a claim for psychic trauma unaccompanied by discernible bodily injury, when caused by injuries to another and not otherwise specifically provided for by statute, remains nonexistent." Id.
We interpret Champion as requiring the existence of a familial relationship between the plaintiff and the injured person before the plaintiff can recover damages for any psychic trauma resulting from the negligent injury of that person by another. In our view, any recovery is further limited to those instances where the deceased or injured person is not only a close family member but is one with whom the plaintiff has a relationship with an especially close emotional attachment. In other words, simply being related is not enough to permit a claim for emotional distress; the plaintiff and the injured person must be related and the plaintiff must have an especially close emotional attachment to the injured or deceased person. Likewise, in interpreting Champion, our sister court held that if no legal relationship existed between the plaintiff and the directly injured person, then no cause of action for emotional distress could be maintained. Ferretti.
In the instant case, Oswald is clearly not a close family member. Thus, Champion and Ferretti preclude Tanya from recovering damages for "psychic injury, emotional pain and suffering and grief" due to Oswald's death. Accordingly, since Tanya cannot satisfy the Champion relationship requirement that Oswald be a close family member, no jury question arises or remains about the extent of Tanya's emotional attachment to Oswald. Therefore, we conclude that Tanya has no claim cognizable under Champion.
In summary, we affirm the trial court's ruling because Tanya has no claim cognizable under Champion and thus, the "impact rule" bars her claim for "psychic injury, emotional pain and suffering and grief" due to John Oswald's death. We remand for the trial court to determine the amount of damages Tanya suffered for her physical injuries and her pain and suffering which were not associated with John Oswald's death.
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
HERSEY, J., concurs.
FARMER, J., dissents with opinion.