Case Name: Mulazim M. YASIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2005-02-25
Citations: 896 So. 2d 875
Docket Number: No. 5D04-3600
Parties: Mulazim M. YASIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: MONACO, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 896
Pages: 875–878

Head Matter:
Mulazim M. YASIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 5D04-3600.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Feb. 25, 2005.
Mulazim Yasin, Bonifay, pro se.
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Lamya A. Henry, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

Opinion:
PLEUS, J.
Appellant, Mulazim M. Yasin, was sentenced to a minimum mandatory term of 25 years in prison, followed by 20 years probation, for the first degree felony of attempted second degree murder with a firearm. He filed a rule 3.800(a) motion, arguing that his sentence exceeds the 30 year statutory maximum for a first degree felony. However, the trial court held that the sentence was authorized under section 775.087(2)(a)3, Florida Statutes, because the jury found that appellant had discharged a firearm, causing great bodily harm.
Section 775.087(2)(a)3;i Florida Statutes, provides that any person convicted of a designated felony who discharged a firearm, Resulting in death or great bodily harm, "shall be sentenced to a minimum term of imprisonment of not less than 25 years and not more than a term of imprisonment of life in prison." The trial court reasoned that the statute created a new statutory maximum of life and concluded that appellant's combined sentence of 45 years did not exceed that statutory maximum.
However, section 775.087(2)(b), Florida Statutes, explains that the quoted provision does not prevent a court from imposing a longer sentence of incarceration "as authorized by law in addition to the minimum mandatory sentence." Also, section 775.087(2)(e), Florida Statutes, states that if the minimum mandatory term under this section exceeds the maximum sentence authorized by sections 775.082, 775.084 or the Criminal Punishment Code, then the mandatory minimum sentence must be imposed, but if the minimum mandatory term under this section is less than the sentence authorized under sections 775.082, 775.084 or the Criminal Punishment Code, then the sentence imposed "must include the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment as required in this section."
Therefore, the statute reaffirms that the statutory maximum is the greater of either the minimum mandatory term under this section, which is 25 years, or the statutory maximum under section 775.082, which is 30 years in this case, or the maximum authorized by the habitual offender statute or the Criminal Punishment Code. Accordingly, section 775.087 clearly establishes a minimum mandatory term of 25 years. It does not change the statutory maximum for all of the affected offenses to life when a weapon is discharged and causes death or great bodily harm.
The state relies on Brazill v. State, 845 So.2d 282 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), which affirmed a 28 year sentence under section 775.087(2)(a)3 for second degree murder. Although the court in Brazill stated that the section established a range of 25 years to life, the court also explained that the minimum term under the statute was 25 years. The statutory maximum sentence for second degree murder is life, so the sentence imposed in Brazill was clearly legal and the case does not support the state's position that the statutory maximum term in this case was life.
Although in State v. Parker, 812 So.2d 495 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), the defendant was convicted of attempted second degree murder and sentenced to a minimum mandatory term of 25 years under this statute, to-be followed by 15 years probation, there was no discussion in that case of the applicable statutory maximum and the court did not address the legality of the sentence. Without further facts, it is impossible to determine whether the sentence in that case was a legal sentence on other grounds, such as under the habitual felony offender statute.
The combined sentence imposed by the trial court in this case exceeds the statutory maximum under section 775.082, Florida Statutes, and therefore it is illegal. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order and remand the case for imposition of a legal sentence.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
MONACO, J., concurs.
GRIFFIN, J., concurs specially, with opinion.