Case Name: SOUTHSIDE CIVIC ASSOCIATION, INC. v. GUARANTY SAVINGS ASSURANCE COMPANY et al.
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1976-03-01
Citations: 329 So. 2d 767
Docket Number: No. 10589
Parties: SOUTHSIDE CIVIC ASSOCIATION, INC. v. GUARANTY SAVINGS ASSURANCE COMPANY et al.
Judges: Before LANDRY, COVINGTON and PONDER, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 329
Pages: 767–773

Head Matter:
SOUTHSIDE CIVIC ASSOCIATION, INC. v. GUARANTY SAVINGS ASSURANCE COMPANY et al.
No. 10589.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
March 1, 1976.
Rehearing Denied April 12, 1976.
Writ Granted June 4, 1976.
Felix R. Weill, Baton Rouge, for appellant.
Floyd J. Falcon, Jr., and F. D. de la-Barre, Baton Rouge, for Guaranty Sav;
Thomas H. Hudson and Michael A. Patterson, Baton Rouge, for John Prevost.
Joseph F. Keogh, Parish Atty., and Edwin C. Bankston, Asst. Parish Atty., for Robert C. Groht.
Before LANDRY, COVINGTON and PONDER, JJ.

Opinion:
COVINGTON, Judge:
This suit involves the proper zoning and use of a certain tract of land in East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana, and the building located on the tract of land. The subject property consists of Lots 3 through 7 of the subdivision of the W. B. Kennard Tract and an unnumbered lot northeast of the numbered lots.
Plaintiff-appellants, Southside Civic Association, Inc., is composed of residential property owners in the southern portion of the City of Baton Rouge and includes owners in University Gardens, Stanford Place and in the immediate vicinity and adjacent to the subject property. Defendants-appel-lees are Guaranty Savings Assurance Company, the owner of the subject property, John E. Prevost, the lessee of the subject property, and Robert C. Groht, in his capacity as a building official of the City of Baton Rouge. Defendant, Prevost, had leased a portion of the subject property and was operating an automobile dealership known as Prevost Volvo.
In its petition, the plaintiff alleges that the subject property is zoned A-l, single-family residential, for the unnumbered lot and A — 4, multiple-dwelling residential, for the numbered lots, under the City's comprehensive zoning ordinance. The plaintiff, claiming that the defendant Prevost's use of the subject property as an automobile dealership violated said zoning ordinance, asked for a writ of mandamus, in-junctive relief and a declaratory judgment decreeing that the subject property was properly zoned as alleged. By agreement of all of the parties, the trial court heard the matter only on the declaratory judgment issue with the parties reserving all rights as to the other demands.
After hearing, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the defendants declaring the subject property, except for the unnumbered lot, to be unzoned. As to the unnumbered lot, the court declared defendant Prevost's use of said lot to be contrary to "its present A-l Single Family Classification." Plaintiff-appellant, Southside Civic Association, Inc., has suspensively appealed the adverse judgment. Defendant Prevost and the other defendants have not appealed the court's ruling that the use of the unnumbered lot violated the zoning ordinance and that aspect of the judgment is now final. Moreover, defendant Prevost has acquiesced in that part of the judgment, by asserting in his brief that ". . . Prevost has complied in every respect with the judgment of the trial court in this regard and is not presently using that tract for any purpose."
The plaintiff-appellant first argues that the validity of the zoning ordinances was not properly before the trial court because the defendants did not affirmatively assert this issue in their answers. There is no merit in this contention. The basis of the declaratory judgment action was the validity vel non of the zoning ordinances. See Villa Del Rey v. City of Baton Rouge, 233 So.2d 566 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1970), noted in 31 La.L.Rev. 549 (1971). The plaintiff's prayer, in part, reads:
"Wherefore, petitioner prays: I. For judgment declaring lots' 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the Subdivision of the W. B. Kennard property to be subject'to A-4 zoning and the unnumbered lot being used by defendant Prevost for parking, display and storage to be subject to A-l zoning and further declaring that any pre-existing non-conforming use of the subject property has been lost by nonuse, thereby requiring any owner, tenant, or other occupant of the subject property to conform to the applicable use regulations as set forth in the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance."
The plaintiff's prayer thus squarely presents the validity of the zoning ordinances as an issue.
The plaintiff next argues that there is no showing that the zoning ordinances were invalid. The evidence shows that the property in question was originally zoned by the City of Baton Rouge in 1950, when the first comprehensive zoning ordinances were enacted by the City. The pertinent ordinance, purporting to zone the property as A-l, single-family residential, was challenged by a real estate developer in the case of State ex rel. Loraine, Inc. v. Adjustment Board of City of Baton Rouge, 220 La. 708, 57 So.2d 409 (1952). The Supreme Court in the Loraine case held the ordinance unconstitutional and ineffective in classifying the property as A-l. The effect of this decision was that the property remained "unzoned" as it had been prior to the enactment of the 1950 ordinance.
Despite the decision of the Supreme Court, the Planning Commission of the Parish of East Baton Rouge continued to deal with the property as having an A-l classification. Subsequently, the City-Parish zoning authority enacted, in 1955, a zoning ordinance which purported to change the classification of the property in question from A-l to C, multiple-dwelling classification. In 1958, a new Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance purported to change the property classification from C to A-4, a letter-change in classification only.
While several factual and legal issues are presented in this appeal, we consider that the pivotal issue is whether the zoning authority gave adequate public notice of the proposed zoning ordinances here involved so that it would have jurisdiction to consider such zoning ordinances. The trial judge found, and we agree with his finding, that the public notices involved indicated that there would be zoning changes from A-l classification, single-family residential, to C (now A-4), multiple-dwelling residential. The public notice did not advertise that unzoned property was to be zoned to a C (A-4) classification. As advertised, the purpose of the 1955 ordinance appeared to be a rezoning so as to permit an increased or less restrictive use of the property in question (being reclassified from A-l to C), whereas it was in fact imposing a more restrictive use of the property (from unzoned to C). The 1958 ordinance purported to change the zoning of the property in question from C, multiple-dwelling residential, to A-4, also multiple-dwelling residential, and thus, apparently no change was proposed in the permitted use of the property, only a letter-classification change being contemplated.
The trial court, after considering the notice, stated in his written reasons:
"The above ordinance can be given no effect and is null and void. The notice was so grossly misleading as to deprive the public, the Zoning Commission, and the Council of an opportunity to apply the applicable criteria to the proposed change.
"The Court is well aware of and has considered plaintiff's argument, that exactness in the manner of enactment of an ordinance may not be required so long as the mandatory requirements have been substantially observed, and that the ordinance should not be voided because of an irregularity in its passage, particularly where it has stood unchallenged for a long period of time.
"A notice which indicates proposed action which would increase use is tantamount to no notice when in truth and fact, the effect of the proposed action is to drastically restrict usage."
Zoning ordinances are in derogation of the rights to private ownership by restricting the use of property and must be strictly construed in favor of the property owner. See Time-Saver Stores, Inc. v. Board of Zoning Adjustment of City of New Orleans, 261 So.2d 273 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1973), writ refused, 262 La. 311, 263 So.2d 47; East Baton Rouge Parish v. Bratcher, 244 So.2d 915 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1971), writ refused, 258 La. 364, 246 So.2d 684 (1971). Zoning is the deprivation, for the public good, of certain uses of property to which such property might otherwise be put. Therefore, before a property owner may be thus deprived of his property, he is entitled to proper notice and hearing-. See 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 703, page 1186.
The requirement of notice imposes upon the zoning authority a mandatory duty to give proper notice, in default of which the zoning authority has no jurisdiction to enact a valid zoning ordinance. See 96 A.L.R.2d 449, 455. Since proper notice is required, an ambiguous or misleading notice will be considered so defective as to destroy the jurisdiction of the zoning authority. See 1 Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law, sec. 797, page 490.-113. The rule making notice a mandatory and jurisdictional prerequisite to the enactment of zoning ordinances is also applicable to amendments or revisions of an original zoning ordinance and to reclassifica-tions of property theretofore unzoned; 96 A.L.R.2d 449, 466. Thus, a notice which does not present the true nature of the proposed amendment or revision must be treated as no notice at all; see The Law of Zoning and Planning, Vol. 1, chapter 8, page 7. That is to say, a zoning ordinance which does not comply with notice requirements is void; State ex rel. Holcombe v. City of Lake Charles, 175 La. 803, 144 So. 502 (1932) ; Beauvais v. D. C. Hall Transport, 49 So.2d 44 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 1950).
In the instant case, as the trial court pointed out, the notice of the zoning ordinances in question not only failed to warn of the true nature of the proposed zoning change, but in effect deceived or misled the public into believing that the permitted use would be less restrictive under the proposed ordinance when in fact it would be more restrictive. Such a notice can only be construed as inadequate, and the zoning ordinances in question must be held to be invalid. Hence, Lots 3 through 7 of the subdivision of the W. B. Kennard Tract must be declared to be unzoned.
The trial judge did not rule on the question of nonconforming use, and did not make any factual finding on this issue, because he considered it unnecessary in view of the holding that the zoning ordinances were invalid. We, therefore, pretermit discussion of the question of non-conforming use.
We find no error in the trial court's decision in this matter. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed at plaintiff-appellant's costs.
AFFIRMED.