Case Name: PEOPLE v. GODSEY
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1974-07-22
Citations: 54 Mich. App. 316
Docket Number: Docket No. 16438
Parties: PEOPLE v GODSEY
Judges: Before: McGregor, P. J., and R. B. Burns and R. L. Smith, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 54
Pages: 316–327

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v GODSEY
Opinion of the Court
1. Homicide—Defenses—Self-Defense—Retreat.
The general rule which requires retreat where practicable prior to utilization of deadly force in order to invoke a plea of self-defense to a charge of homicide is subject to the exception that deadly force may be utilized, with no retreat necessary, when one is assaulted in his dwelling.
2. Homicide—Defenses—Self-Defense—Retreat—Instructions to Jury.
A defendant charged with homicide, who invoked the defense of self-defense, was not entitled to an instruction sua sponte from the trial court with respect to the rule that no retreat is necessary when the defendant is assaulted in his own dwelling where the homicide did not take place within the defendant’s home but near the lot line separating the defendant’s property from that of the deceased.
Dissent by R. L. Smith, J.
3. Homicide—Defenses—Self-Defense—Retreat—Instructions to Jury.
Failure to instruct the jury that no retreat was necessary where a defendant was assaulted in his dwelling in an instruction on self-defense in a trial for homicide was reversible error where the fatal blow was struck near the lot line dividing the property of the defendant from that of the deceased, and where the jury could have found from the evidence that the defendant was ñrst assaulted on the front porch of his home.
References for Points in Headnotes
40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide §§ 160, 162-169.
40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide § 520.
40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide § 274.
58 Am Jur, Witnesses § 723.
4. Homicide—Evidence—Prior Relations of Parties—Aggressors —Instructions to Jury.
Evidence of a prior altercation between a defendant and the deceased, in a trial for homicide, was properly admitted, because a showing of the prior relations between the parties is permissible on the issue of who is the aggressor; a cautionary instruction would assist the jury in giving such evidence its proper perspective in relation to the circumstances.
5. Criminal Law—Evidence—Witnesses—Impeachment of Witness —Rebuttal Witnesses—Attempt to Influence Testimony.
Testimony by the mother of a witness that the defendant and his wife attempted to influence the testimony of the witness, which was offered in rebuttal to the wife’s denial of such attempt, was properly admitted; the mother’s testimony was not impeachment of a witness on a collateral issue because there was evidence of the defendant’s direct involvement.
Appeal from Macomb, Frank E. Jeannette, J.
Submitted Division 2 March 5, 1974, at Lansing.
(Docket No. 16438.)
Decided July 22, 1974.
Fred L. Godsey was convicted of manslaughter. Defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, George N. Parris, Prosecuting Attorney, Thaddeus F. Hamera, Chief Appellate Lawyer, and Don L. Milbourn, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
James R. McMaster, for defendant on appeal.
Before: McGregor, P. J., and R. B. Burns and R. L. Smith, JJ.
Former circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment pursuant to Const 1963, art 6, § 23 as amended in 1968.

Opinion:
McGregor, P. J.
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Smith has accurately set forth the operative facts and, in our view, correctly resolved all issues raised by defendant save one. We will, therefore, limit our discussion to the one point with respect to which our views differ from those expressed by Judge Smith, to wit:
Whether the trial court erred in failing sua spon te to instruct the jury that the defendant was not obligated to retreat if in his own dwelling at the time of the fatal confrontation.
Viewing the facts most favorably to the defendant, the testimony adduced at trial indicates that defendant was in his home when he noticed the decedent was throwing rocks and pieces of concrete against his (defendant's) house and car; the defendant went to his front porch and was struck on the leg by a piece of concrete hurled by the decedent; that defendant came off the porch, grabbed a baseball bat and approached the decedent who was holding another piece of concrete at the time; and that defendant struck the decedent with the bat twice, whereupon the decedent fell to the ground. Although the decedent's body was found on his property, there was conflicting testimony presented regarding on which side of the lot line the fatal confrontation occurred.
The plea of self-defense is based on necessity; the law will condone a defendant's act of killing only where that act was, under the particular circumstances, the only available avenue by which the defendant could escape from a reasonably perceived threat of death or great bodily harm. As Justice Campbell noted in a leading case of Pond v People, 8 Mich 150, 173 (1860):
"Human life is not to be lightly disregarded, and the law will not permit it to be destroyed unless upon urgent occasion."
The general rule requiring retreat where practicable prior to utilization of deadly force is thus simply one facet of this overriding premise, that necessity is the basis of any plea of self-defense.
To this retreat requirement there has been en-grafted a well established exception—which is beyond our power as an intermediate level appellate court to disturb—that a "man is not, however, obliged to retreat if assaulted in his dwelling, but may use such means as are absolutely necessary to repel the assailant from his house, or to prevent his forcible entry, even to the taking of life". Pond v People, supra, 177.
The justification for this exception to the general rule is difficult to pinpoint. Justice Cardozo, in People v Tomlins, 213 NY 240, 243; 107 NE 496, 497 (1914), observed:
"It is not now, and never has been the law that a man assailed in his own dwelling, is bound to retreat. If assailed there, he may stand his ground, and resist the attack. He is under no duty to take to the fields and the highways, a fugitive from his own home." See People v McGrandy, 9 Mich App 187; 156 NW2d 48; 26 ALR3d 1292 (1967).
Dean Prosser has suggested that the no retreat rule is based on " 'an instinctive feeling that a home is sacred, and that it is improper to require a man to submit to pursuit from room to room in his own house.' " Prosser, Torts (4th ed), § 19, p 111, quoting from Restatement of Torts, Tentative Draft, Commentary to § 84.
On a more pragmatic level it can be argued that one's own dwelling is presumptively the safest haven from attack and retreat therefrom would correspondingly increase the risk of harm and thus be impractical and unnecessary.
Whatever may be the present-day validity of these suggested justifications for the "no retreat in dwelling" rule, the rule itself is well established in Michigan. Our only legitimate function, therefore, is to consider its applicability here in light of the facts outlined above.
Was the defendant in his dwelling at the time of the fatal assault? If so, the trial court was obliged to sua spopte instruct the jury with respect to the no retreat rule. People v Paxton, 47 Mich App 144; 209 NW2d 251 (1973). If not, the trial court's failure to so instruct was, of course, not reversible error.
Michigan case law provides no precise definition of "dwelling" for purposes of the no retreat rule. Pond, supra, is frequently cited for the proposition that the term "dwelling" embraces the curtilage of a house and correspondingly extends the area within which one is not obliged to retreat beyond the mere physical structure utilized as an abode. See, for example, 52 ALR2d 1458, Annotation, Homicide: Extent of Premises Which May Be Defended Without Retreat Under Right of Self-Defense, § 2, and 40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide, § 168, p 455, footnote 4. In our judgment, however, such a reading of Pond is unjustifiably expansive. In that case the killing took place in a net house, located on defendant's property, but approximately 36 feet from his actual home. The court noted:
"A question was raised whether the net-house was a dwelling or a part of the dwelling of Pond. We think it was. It was near the other building, and was used not only for preserving the nets which were used in the ordinary occupation of Pond, as a fisherman, but also as a permanent dormitory for his servants." (Emphasis added.) 8 Mich 150, 181.
The fact that the net house was utilized "as a permanent dormitory for [the defendant's] servants," serves to undermine the argument that Pond extends the right of self defense without retreat to any portion of the curtilage of a defendant's home. We read Pond as extending that right only to inhabited outbuildings located within the curtilage of the home. Indeed, in this day of small city and suburban residential lots, the contrary rule—that a man may utilize deadly force without retreat whenever attacked in the curtilage of his home—would effectively limit the applicability of the prevailing retreat requirement to situations in which the defendant was on another's property. Such a result, to us, is both an unwarranted extension of Michigan law and inconsistent with the high value placed on human life by any enlightened society.
In this case, all the testimony adduced at trial indicated that the fatal blows were inflicted by the defendant on or near the lot line separating his property from that of the deceased. Further, the police officer investigating the homicide testified that the decedent's body was found one foot on his side of the lot line. In these circumstances and in light of our discussion above, we are of the opinion that the defendant was not, as a matter of law, in his dwelling at the time of the killing and, therefore, the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury with respect to the "no retreat in dwelling" rule.
Affirmed.
R. B. Burns, J., concurred.