Case Name: Ross Cromeans v. The State
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1909-10-27
Citations: 59 Tex. Crim. 611
Docket Number: No. 4008
Parties: Ross Cromeans v. The State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Criminal Reports
Volume: 59
Pages: 611–622

Head Matter:
Ross Cromeans v. The State.
No. 4008.
Decided October 27, 1909.
Rehearing granted June 15, 1910.
1. —Assault with Intent to Rape—Consent—Female under Age.
Solicitation accompanied by the expectation of consent, and laying on of hands without the use of such force as indicates a purpose to obtain intercourse at the very time, does not amount to assault with intent to commit rape on a girl under fifteen years of age.
2. —Same—Definition of Offense.
Since it is rape to have carnal knowledge of a woman by force, and of a girl under fifteen years of age by or without force, and since the word woman includes all females, a child must be embraced in the definition of an assault with intent to commit rape under article 608, Penal Code.
3. —Same—Other Definitions of Offense—Assault.
Though an assault is an offense against the person, and so denominated in our Code, it is none the less an offense against the State, and the person can not waive the right of the State, and the consent of the person assaulted is not one of the exceptions to the statutory rule that violence upon the person is unlawful.
4. —Same—Force—Statutes Construed.
That portion of article 528, Penal Code, relating to rape on a child, is not referred to in article 634, Penal Code, defining force; a child being embraced in the word woman in article 608, and unlawful violence and injury being done upon her in making the assault, her consent can not take away the wrong.
5. —Same—Law Stated.
If a man puts his hand upon a girl under age of consent and at the time intends instantly to have sexual intercourse, and without suspension of action and without waiting to ascertain whether' or not she would consent, then and there places her in such attitude as that the final act could be performed upon her, whether the purpose is to put her in such attitude by his force alone or by her free cooperation and consent, he has gone far enough to render him guilty of the ofi’en,se of assault to commit rape.
6. —Same—Case Stated—Insufficiency of Evidence.
Where, upon trial of assault with intent to commit rape, the evidence showed that the defendant was a boy of sixteen years of age and the prosecutrix under fifteen years of age and had known each other for years, and that at the time of the alleged offense he asked prosecutrix to show him her privates and invited her to sexual intercourse; that she refused in succession both of his proposals; that he then placed his hand -on hers, and when she jerked it away he put his hand upon her arm, and she jerked that away and departed from him after which defendant desisted, the same was insufficient to support a conviction of assault with intent to rape. Approving Croomes v. State, 40 Texas Crim. Rep., 672. Qualifying McAvoy v. State, 41 Texas Crim. Rep., 56; Hardin v. State, 39 Texas Crim. Rep., 426.
Appeal from the District Court of Edwards. Tried below before the Hon. R. H. Burney.
Appeal from a conviction of assault with intent to rape of female under fifteen years of age; penalty, two years imprisonment in the penitentiary.
The opinion states the case.
J. W. Hill and Will A. Morriss, for appellant.
Before a conviction of assault with intent to rape is warranted, it must have ’been shown beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant assaulted prosecutrix with the specific intent at the time of the assault to then and there have carnal intercourse with her. Croomes v. State, 40 Texas Crim. Rep., 672, 51 S. W. Rep., 924; id., 53 S. W. Rep., 882; House v. State, 9 Texas Crim. App., 567; Carter v. State, 44 Texas Crim. Rep., 312, 70 S. W. Rep., 971; Fewox v. State, 49 Texas Crim. Rep., 172, 90 S. W. Rep., 178; Eiley v. State, 55 Texas Crim. Rep., 1, 114 S. W. Rep., 793; Warren v. State, 51 Texas Crim. Rep., 598, 103 S. W. Rep., 888; Sanders v. State, 54 Texas Crim. Rep., 171, 112 S. W. Rep., 938; 33 Cyc., p. 1435; Kenney v. State, 79 S. W. Rep., 817; State v. Pickett, 21 Am. Rep., 754; Smith v. State, 80 Am. Dec., 355, and cases cited in opinion.
John A. Mobley, Assistant Attorney-General, for the State.

Opinion:
BROOKS, Judge.
Appellant was convicted of an assault with intent to rape on a female under fifteen years of age, his punishment being assessed at two years confinement in the penitentiary.
Appellant's main insistence in this record is that the verdict is contrary to the law and unsupported by the evidence. The testi many shows that prosecutrix was fourteen years of age, and appellant sixteen years of age. They lived in the country below Barksdale, and had known each other for years, having gone to school together. Prosecutrix lived farther from town than appellant. Prosecutrix had gone to town on the morning of the alleged assault, and was coming home alone on foot about 12 o'clock. The circumstances of the assault are related by her as follows: "After I left Sort's house and passed Cromeans' place, and had gone through the gate near Cromeans' place, known as the Rhodes gate, and had gotten about half way from there to the Sweeten gate, which is about one mile from Ross Cromeans' house, Ross Cromeans passed me on horseback, going the same way I was going. When I reached the Swepten gate Ross Cromeans was there and had gotten off his horse and was standing at the gate kicking it. I asked him three times to get out of the way and let me pass. He then said to me: 'Let me see your cock.' I told him I would not do it, and for him to let me through, and then he said: 'Let me fuck you.' I said I would not and then tried to get through and he caught me by my hand, and I jerked loose from him, and then he caught me by my arm, and I jerked loose from him again and ran away back down the road towards Barksdale. I did not see him any more that day. He did not follow me." ' Appellant denied' meeting the prosecutrix at the Sweeten gate. He introduced a number of witnesses to show he did not see her at said gate, which was nearly a mile from his house, but he testified to having a conversation with her at a gate hearer his father's house, in which he made an indecent proposal to her. He testified that he never did have intercourse nor attempt to have intercourse with Bertha Bradley at any time. "I have never had intercourse with any woman. I did not try to have intercourse nor expect to have intercourse with her. I just said what I did to her to see what she would say. I do not know what made me do it." Nothing further is shown to have occurred between the parties than that above detailed. In addition to the above, the statement of facts shows that appellant testified to the following: "It is not true that I accosted her or caught hold of her or made any remarks to her on the 8tli day of last June at the Sweeten gate, but I just remarked to her at the Rhodes' gate that she had better give me some before she left and she got very mad, and said she would not do it and picked up a rock. I told her she need not get mad, I was not going to do anything to her, and I turned and walked away and she started on down the road. I did not catch her by the hand nor arm; I did not touch her, and that is all I said to her." Hnder the authorities of this court this evidence makes out an assault with intent to rape on a child under fifteen years of age. See McAvoy v. State, 41 Texas Crim. Rep., 56; Carter v. State, 44 Texas Crim. Rep., 312; Hudson v. State, 49 Texas Crim. Rep., 24. The jury saw fit to believe the prosecutrix's testi many to the effect that appellant did take hold of the prosecutrix. This is an assault, the elements of consent vel non not entering into a prosecution for assault with intent to rape upon a child under fifteen years of age. Appellant having the specific intent to rape where he takes hold of the prosecutrix, makes out the offense under the authorities of this court. Appellant in his brief insists this court should review the authorities on this question anew. We have done so, and hold that the case of Croomes v. State, 40 Texas Crim. Rep., 672, lays down the correct rule, which has been followed uniformly since by the majority of this court. When appellant seized hold of the prosecutrix, according to her testimony, clearly in the light of his offensive suggestion made to prosecutrix above detailed, this showed a specific intent to have carnal intercourse with prosecutrix with her consent. The charge of the court admirably presented the law applicable to the facts of this case, and in clear consonance with the decisions of this court, and there is no error in this record authorizing a reversal of this case. The judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.
RAMSEY, Judge.
If the case of McAvoy v. State, 41 Texas Crim. Rep., 56 (and many later cases), is to be followed, the decision in this case is correct. My own judgment is that the correct rule is laid down in the dissenting opinion in Hardin v. State, 39 Texas Crim. Rep., 426, and in the opinion on rehearing in Croomes v. State, 40 Texas Crim. Rep., 672, both by Judge Henderson. The rule laid down in the McAvoy case has since been uniformly followed and has been treated as the settled rule of the court. It does not occur to me that it is a correct rule. I reluctantly agree to an affirmance of the judgment out of respect to the former holding of this court, and because of my indisposition to break down public confidence in the uniformity of our decisions. Besides, the rule enforced by the decision of my brother Brooks does make for the protection and safety of the young girls of our country.
DAVIDSON, Presiding Judge.
As Judge Bamsey's views affirm the judgment I do not dissent, though I am still of opinion the decision in the Hardin case is the law.
ON REHEARING.
June 15, 1910. '