Case Name: Rory L. WALLACE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The State of MARYLAND; Peter Franchot, Comptroller, The State of Maryland Office of Comptroller; Steve Barzal, Director, Office of Personnel Services Office Comptroller; John and Jane Doe 1-99; XYZ Corporations 1-10, County or Government entities and their supervisors, agents and employees, Defendants-Appellees
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2014-10-22
Citations: 585 F. App'x 30
Docket Number: No. 14-1551
Parties: Rory L. WALLACE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The State of MARYLAND; Peter Franchot, Comptroller, The State of Maryland Office of Comptroller; Steve Barzal, Director, Office of Personnel Services Office Comptroller; John and Jane Doe 1-99; XYZ Corporations 1-10, County or Government entities and their supervisors, agents and employees, Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: Before NIEMEYER and KING, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 585
Pages: 30–31

Head Matter:
Rory L. WALLACE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The State of MARYLAND; Peter Franchot, Comptroller, The State of Maryland Office of Comptroller; Steve Barzal, Director, Office of Personnel Services Office Comptroller; John and Jane Doe 1-99; XYZ Corporations 1-10, County or Government entities and their supervisors, agents and employees, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 14-1551.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Submitted: Oct. 14, 2014.
Decided: Oct. 22, 2014.
Rory L. Wallace, Appellant Pro Se. Brian L. Oliner, Office of the Attorney General of Maryland, Annapolis, Maryland, for Appellees.
Before NIEMEYER and KING, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion:
Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Rory L. Wallace appeals from the district court's order granting Defendants' Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion and dismissing her civil action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012) ("Title VTI"), and Md.Code Ann., State Gov't § 20-606(a) (LexisNexis Supp.2014), for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We affirm.
We review a district court's dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim de novo, "focus[ing] only on the legal sufficiency of the complaint." Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir.2008). In determining whether the district court's dismissal was proper, we "aecept[ ] as true all of the well-pleaded allegations and view[] the complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Le-Sueur-Richmond, Slate Corp. v. Fehrer, 666 F.3d 261, 264 (4th Cir.2012). We then determine whether a "plausible claim for relief' has been made. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-80, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). This plausibility standard requires a plaintiff to articulate facts that, when accepted as true, demonstrate she has stated a claim that makes it plausible she is entitled to relief. Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir.2009).
We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error in the district court's dismissal decision. Wallace's complaint does not articulate facts that, when accept ed as true, demonstrate she has stated plausible claims for relief under Title VII and Maryland law for discrimination based on race and under Title VII for a hostile work environment based on race and retaliation. See Coleman v. Md. Ct. of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir.2010); Holland v. Wash. Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 218-19 (4th Cir.2007); Price v. Thompson, 380 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir.2004); Bass v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir.2003); Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 959-60 (4th Cir.1996); Dobkin v. Univ. of Baltimore Sch. of Law, 210 Md.App. 580, 63 A.3d 692, 699-700 (2013). Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order. Wallace v. Maryland, No. 1:14-cv-00276-CCB, 2014 WL 2175275 (D.Md. May 23, 2014).
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED.
We reject as unsupported by the record Wallace's assertion on appeal that the district court treated Defendants' motion to dismiss her action as a motion for summary judgment.