Case Name: PHILIP W. CLOYES, ADMINISTRATOR AD PROSEQUENDUM OF THE ESTATE OF PHILIP COLIN CLOYES, DECEASED, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. THE TOWNSHIP OF DELAWARE, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF THE COUNTY OF CAMDEN AND STATE OF NEW JERSEY, CHRISTIAN M. WEBER, THOMAS WALTON AND SAMUEL McGILL, DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS
Court: New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1956-07-02
Citations: 41 N.J. Super. 27
Docket Number: 
Parties: PHILIP W. CLOYES, ADMINISTRATOR AD PROSEQUENDUM OF THE ESTATE OF PHILIP COLIN CLOYES, DECEASED, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. THE TOWNSHIP OF DELAWARE, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF THE COUNTY OF CAMDEN AND STATE OF NEW JERSEY, CHRISTIAN M. WEBER, THOMAS WALTON AND SAMUEL McGILL, DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Superior Court Reports
Volume: 41
Pages: 27–47

Head Matter:
PHILIP W. CLOYES, ADMINISTRATOR AD PROSEQUENDUM OF THE ESTATE OF PHILIP COLIN CLOYES, DECEASED, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. THE TOWNSHIP OF DELAWARE, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF THE COUNTY OF CAMDEN AND STATE OF NEW JERSEY, CHRISTIAN M. WEBER, THOMAS WALTON AND SAMUEL McGILL, DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.
Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division
Argued June 18, 1956
Decided July 2, 1956.
Before Judges Goldmann, Freund and Conford.
Mr. Thomas M. Farr argued the cause for the plaintiff-appellant (Messrs. Norcross and Farr, attorneys).
Mr. Warren G. Douglas argued the cause for the defendants-respondents (Mr. Warren G. Douglas, attorney for the defendant-respondent Samuel McGill; Mr. John F. Yeomans, attorney for the defendants-respondents The Township of Delaware, Christian M. Weber and Thomas Walton).

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Freund, J. A. D.
The plaintiff, Philip W. Cloyes, is the father of the decedent, Philip Colin Cloyes, and sues under the Death Act, N. J. S. 2A :31-1 et seq., as administrator ad prosequendum, of his estate. The Cloyes family moved to the defendant Township of Delaware in 1953. Their home abutted the land where the township had constructed and maintained its Colwick sewage disposal plant, which included an open sedimentation tank. A small ravine and creek separated the rear of the Cloyes' plot from the plant area.
On June 23, 1954 at about 6 p. m the decedent, a boy about three years of age, was observed by his mother playing with two other children in the back yard of the adjoining house. Within eight minutes of the last time she observed him the boy had disappeared. Apparently he crossed over onto the township land, entered the immediate area of the sewage plant and fell into the open sedimentation tank. When found in the tank a short time after his absence was discovered, he was dead from drowning. There was no eye witness of how the boy gained access to the plant grounds which admittedly were enclosed by a fence erected in 1952 in accordance with accepted standards. However, there was an opening of between 16 and. 18 inches under a gate in the fence, and it is reasonably inferable that the boy crawled through the opening under the gate.
There is testimony by the decedent's father, supported by that of neighbors, that the children of the area frequently played in and around the plant grounds. The father testified that about a month before his son's death he had complained to the defendant Thomas Walton, the Township Director of Public Affairs, that the odors emanating from the sewage plant were obnoxious, and that for children to play in such close proximity to the open sedimentation tank was dangerous, particularly since small children could crawl through the opening under the fence. He also testified that to safeguard his son he had constructed a fence around his own property, which fence was about 150 feet distant from the plant fence. However, he admitted that the gate was not kept locked.
Since 1949 the disposal plant in question had not been supported by general taxation of all the members of the community, but had been operated as a self-liquidating utility, financially supported by rental fees paid solely by homeowners who received sewerage disposal service. The plant in question was operated in conjunction with two others, and over the years had shown both profit and loss. Its income was used to pay operating expenses, as well as principal and interest charges on its outstanding indebtedness. Excess revenues, if any, were kept in a separate utility account and not commingled with general municipal funds.
At the conclusion of the evidence the trial court charged the jury that, as a matter of law, the defendants' operation of the sewage disposal plant was a governmental function and, hence, to be held accountable for the death of the plaintiff's decedent it must have been guilty of "active wrongdoing" which proximately caused the infant's death. It also charged in effect that the jury might properly take into consideration the failure of the decedent's father to take adequate precautions to protect the decedent from harm as an intervening responsible cause which would absolve the defendant from liability on the theory that there was no proximate causal connection between the defendant's negligent act and the death of the child.
The jury returned a verdict of no cause of action. The plaintiff appeals, alleging as error the above-stated portions of the trial court's charge.
It is now unquestioned that a municipal corporation in the performance of a governmental function carries out a public duty and, in the absence of statutory authority directing otherwise, is immune from responsibility for negligence in the performance of such public duty except upon proof of active wrongdoing or positive misfeasance chargeable to it. Kress v. City of Newark, 8 N. J. 562, 573 (1952). See Board of Chosen Freeholders of Sussex County v. Strader, 18 N. J. L. 108 (Sup. Ct. 1840) and Hart v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Union County, 57 N. J. L. 90 (Sup. Ct. 1894). As to what constitutes active wrongdoing, see Allas v. Borough of Rumson, 115 N. J. L. 593 (E. & A. 1935) or positive misfeasance, see Milstrey v. Hackensack, 6 N. J. 400, 408 (1951).
It is also firmly settled that where a municipality is engaged in a proprietary function, as distinguished from a governmental one, it is answerable for its negligent acts or those of its agents, as would an individual or a private corporation. Tomlin v. Hildreth, 65 N. J. L. 438 (Sup. Ct. 1900); Valentine v. Englewood, 76 N. J. L. 509, 512 (E. & A. 1908); Olesiewicz v. City of Camden, 100 N. J. L. 336, 340 (E. & A. 1924); Martin v. City of Asbury Park, 111 N. J. L. 364 (E. & A. 1933). See generally Kelley v. Curtiss, 29 N. J. Super. 291 (App. Div. 1954), reversed on other grounds, 16 A. J. 265 (1954). For a collection of similar cases in other jurisdictions see 18 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d ed.), § 53.01, p. 132 et seq.; Borchard, "Government Liability in Tort, Municipal Corporations 34 Yale L. J. 129.
The factors which have been considered in determining whether a particular function is proprietary have been: whether the function could be performed as well by a private corporation, Karpenski v. Incorporated Borough of South River, 83 N. J. L. 149 (Sup. Ct. 1912), reversed on other grounds 85 N. J. L. 208 (E. & A. 1913); whether the municipality derives a profit or merely some benefit or advantage from operation of the enterprise, Olesiewicz v. City of Camden, supra; whether the function concerns the sale of a commodity or service, establishing the relationship of seller and purchaser as between the municipality and the consumer, Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Jersey City, 103 A. J. L. 574 (Sup. Ct. 1927), affirmed 104 N. J. L. 437 (E. & A. 1928); Martin v. City of Asbury Park, supra. In the absence of these factors, the function is considered governmental, Callan v. City of Passaic, 104 N. J. L. 643 (E. & A. 1928); Vickers v. City of Camden, 122 N. J. L. 14 (E. & A. 1938); Bengivenga v. City of Plainfield, 128 N. J. L. 418 (E. & A. 1942); Kress v. City of Newark, supra.
Thus, it has been held to be a proprietary function where the municipality operated a bathing pavilion, Marlin v. City of Asbury Park, supra; supplied water to its inhabitants, Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Jersey City, supra; Harper v. City of East Orange, 105 N. J. L. 193 (E. & A. 1928); Fay v. City of Trenton, 126 N. J. L. 52 (E. & A. 1940); where it operated an asphalt plant and performed asphalt work for private persons and corporations, Olesiewicz v. City of Camden, supra; where it engaged in the furnishing of electricity to its inhabitants, Karpenski v. Incorporated Borough of South River, supra.
Ordinarily, governmental functions of a municipality are available to all taxpayers, and whether or not the specific function is utilized is not a determinant. Schools are conceded to be a municipal function devolving from a public duty, supported by all taxpayers of the municipality, whether or not they have children to avail themselves of the educational facilities provided. That is the idea of public duty, duty to all, whether or not utilized, and the situation is similar as to police and fire protection, whether or not an individual property owner ever calls the police or .the fire department. However, here only those who actually use the service pay for it; it is not general and available to the municipal public at large' — a consideration to be weighed in determining whether the function is proprietary rather than governmental, particularly when coupled with the fact that a service of this nature could just as well be performed by a private corporation and that it results in a seller-consumer relationship between the municipality and those using the service.
McQuillin indicates that other jurisdictions are in conflict as to whether the operation of a sewage disposal plant is a governmental or proprietary function. He states that "the prevailing view seems to be that a municipality may be held liable for death or injury resulting from neglect or other tort in the operation of such a plant." 18 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d ed.), § 53.131, p. 512. This precise question has been adjudicated in Hew Jersey in Morgenweck v. Egg Harbor City, 106 N. J. L. 141 (E. & A. 1929). There, the defendant municipality was alleged to be liable to the plaintiffs for injuries resulting from one of the defendant's trucks used in the operation of its sewage disposal plant. Mr. Justice Kaliscli speaking for the Court of Errors and Appeals held:
" it is quite clear that the defendant was engaged in conducting the business of operating a sewerage plant for profit, and it is unimportant whether or not the business yielded a profit to the defendant the potent factor which must control is the uncontroverted fact that the municipality was engaged in business, and hence answerable for the negligent act or acts of its servants in the conduct of such business, as an individual would be."
We deem it significant that in the Morgenweck case, although the sewage plant might have been intended to be operated for profit, that factor was held not to be determinative of whether the function was proprietary or governmental, relying in great measure upon the decision in the Olesiewicz v. City of Camden case, supra, that "some special benefit or advantage" inuring to the municipality is an essential ingredient in the decision.
In Ennever v. Borough of Bergenfield, 105 N. J. L. 419 (E. & A. 1928), there is dictum to the effect that the operation of a sewage disposal plant is a governmental function, but that case is not controlling here. Its essential facts differ from both the Morgenweck case and the instant one. There the case turned on the question of the amount of depreciation in value of adjacent lands resulting from the construction of the plant. There was no proof that any charge for service was made or that any special benefit accrued to the municipality, nor of any of the other factors usually considered essential to a proprietary function.
It is true that many municipalities furnish sewage disposal service. Where it is available to all and its cost of operation paid out of general taxes, it may well be a governmental or public function. However, here the service of the sewage disposal units is available only to those who pay the rental fee. The municipality operates its sewage disposal facilities as a self-liquidating utility, the income of which is used to pay current operating expenses and charges on its outstanding indebtedness. It is inconceivable that any private corporation would take on the operation of such a service without a profit motive, so that the members of the community who use the service would probably pay a higher charge. Moreover, aside from this current benefit to the users of the service, the plant will, since it is a self-liquidating utility, eventually become the property of the municipality, wholly owned, free and clear of such indebtedness as was necessary for its construction, a valuable capital asset cleared of debt at no cost to the municipality as a whole. Certainly, it cannot be argued that in such circumstances the municipality is not the recipient of "some special benefit or advantage." Olesiewicz v. City of Camden, supra.
The distinction between governmental and proprietary functions has persisted and been preserved in our highest courts, as exemplified by Tomlin v. Hildreth, 65 N. J. L. 438 (Sup. Ct. 1900), and the Allas, Milstrey, Kress and Kelley cases cited above; and see Weintraub and Conford, "Tort Liability of Municipalities in New Jersey," 3 Mercer Beasley L. Rev. 142 (1934). We are bound by this higher judicial authority, Osback v. Lyndhurst Township, 7 N. J. 371, 376 (1951).
We cannot, however, pass by the matter without voicing our own doubt as to the necessity or advisability of pursuing such a distinction under the social and economic conditions that obtain today. The validity of the distinction has been questioned by legal authority. See Prosser, Law of Torts (2d ed.), § 109 et seq., p. 770 et seq., and particularly at p. 775, n. 42. The modern trend is to broaden the base of tort liability of municipal government for negligence instead of narrowly cribbing and confining it within the bounds of artificial distinctions, and this on the theory that injury to the person or property of the individual citizen because of the tortious conduct of municipal agents or employees should be compensated for by the municipality, and not borne by the injured party, municipal government being better able to bear the loss and to spread its cost through taxation. However, since the distinction between governmental and proprietary functions is embedded in our law, we must perforce proceed to our decision on that basis.
Here, we are satisfied from a consideration of the circumstances under which the disposal plant is operated that its function is proprietary rather than governmental. This conclusion is based on a number of reasons: that a
private corporation might supply the service equally as well, that the municipality derives a special benefit from the operation, that it concerns the sale of a service, that it is not supported by taxation and operates only for the limited segment of the community which subscribes to it on a rental basis. Accordingly, we hold to be error the trial court's charge that as a matter of law the operation of a sewage disposal plant by the defendants herein was a governmental function. Had the court charged the proper rule, the jury might properly have found as negligence defendants' failure to close the 18-ineh opening under the gate, especially in view of the fact that it had notice that children played in and around the plant area. Thus, the charge was prejudicial to the plaintiff's cause and warrants reversal.
The charge is subject to further objection to that portion whereby the jury was permitted to take into consideration on the question of the defendants' liability the alleged failure of the plaintiff, the decedent's father, to take adequate precautions to guard against a mishap to his child, it is settled that contributory negligence on the part of the surviving next-of-kin of a decedent is not imputable to the decedent and will not defeat an action under the Death Act. Basledo v. Frailey, 109 N. J. L. 390 (E. & A. 1932). The effect of the trial court's instruction was to impute to the father as representative of the decedent's next-of-kin any contributory negligence which might be attributable to him as an individual. This was error.
For Ihe reasons herein stated the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial on all issues.