Case Name: G. A. C. Commercial Corp., Appellant, v. Aurora Trucking Co., Inc., et al., Appellees
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1968-12-09
Citations: 18 Ohio Misc. 125
Docket Number: No. 18130
Parties: G. A. C. Commercial Corp., Appellant, v. Aurora Trucking Co., Inc., et al., Appellees.
Judges: Before Edwards, MoCree and Combs, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: Ohio Miscellaneous Reports
Volume: 18
Pages: 125–129

Head Matter:
G. A. C. Commercial Corp., Appellant, v. Aurora Trucking Co., Inc., et al., Appellees.
(No. 18130
Decided December 9, 1968.)
Appeal: United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
Mr. Lee D. Powar, Mr. Samuel G. Wellman, and Messrs. Hahn, Loeser, Freedheim, Deem é Wellman, for appellant.
Mr. Edward M. Esber and Mr. Marry A. Hanna, for appellees.
Before Edwards, MoCree and Combs, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
Combs, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff-appellant, G. A. C. Commercial Corp., recovered a judgment of $102,758.37 in the District Court on a promissory note against Aurora Trucking Company and several individual defendants. In execution of this judgment, the United States Marshal levied on five of Aurora's trueks. Four of the five trucks were offered for sale at public auction on January 30,1967. No mention was made of the fifth truck. The high bid at the auction was made by an entity known as Amati Trucking Company, one of the appellees here, represented at the sale by one of the individual defendants and his father.
Pursuant to the terms of the sale, $4,820 was deposited with the marshal, this amount representing ten percent of the high bid of $48,200. The balance of the purchase price was to be paid within forty-eight hours. The balance was not paid and, on February 13, 1967, the District Court set aside the public sale and directed the marshal to offer the trucks at private sale. The court reserved judgment on a motion that Amati's deposit be forfeited.
On February 16, 1967, the four trucks, as well as the fifth truck previously seized, were sold for a total price of $51,280. The District Court later denied the motion for forfeiture. Appellant contends on this appeal that the motion to forfeit the deposit should have been granted.
Our determination of the appeal is not made easier by the failure of Amati Trucking Company and other appel-lees to file a brief in this court. In these somewhat unusual circumstances, we requested supplemental briefs by appellant and have made a careful review of the entire record. This review has convinced us that the District Court's judgment should be affirmed.
The complicating factor in the case is the fifth truck. In its original brief and in argument in this court, appellant mentioned only the four trucks offered at the first sale. From appellant's supplemental brief and the original record, these facts appear: The fifth truck was seized by the marshal prior to the first sale but at a different time and in a different location than the other four trucks. Apparently, it had been "stripped." It was minus a seat, wheels, tires, and mirrors. Even though this truck was then in the marshal's constructive possession, there was no explanation why it was not offered for bids at the first sale. The reason proffered by appellant in supplemental brief is that it would have required a large expenditure to repair the truck and move it to the sale location.
All five trucks were sold at the private sale to the representative of a joint venture but payment was made separately for the four trucks and the fifth truck. The four trucks were sold for $43,280 and the fifth for $8,000. The representative of the joint venture had bid $48,100 for the four trucks at the first sale. Appellant argues that, since the bid on the four trucks at the second sale was $4,920 less than the bid on the same trucks at the first sale, it has been damaged by Amati's default and the deposit therefore should be forfeited.
There is little authority on remedies against defaulting purchasers at execution sales. It would seem that considerations of general contract law should be applicable. A defaulting purchaser is generally liable for the difference between the amount of his bid and the lesser amount received at a subsequent sale, assuming the price at the subsequent sale is a fair one. Davis v. Yellow Mfg. Acceptance Corp. (6th Cir. 1957), 242 P. 2d 503; 5 Corbin, Contracts, Section 1100 (1964). See also Section 1302.80, Revised Code (1964). The burden of proving damages rests upon the plaintiff. 22 American Jurisprudence 2d, Damages, Section 296. Giving specific application of this rule to this case, appellant has the burden of proving damage by reason of a second sale which brought more money than was bid at the abortive first sale. If we could forget the fifth truck, the question of damages could easily be resolved. The bid price on the other four trucks at the first sale was $4,920 more than they brought at the second sale. However, the fifth truck in the marshal's custody at the time of the first sale cannot be ignored.
We are unwilling to accept as conclusive appellant's statement that the second sale involved two separate procedures: one for the sale of four trucks and one for the sale of the fifth truck. The fact that payment for the fifth truck was made by separate cheek is not controlling. The crux of the matter is $48,200 was bid on four trucks at the first sale and $51,280 was received for the same four trucks and an additional vehicle at the second sale. No appraisal was made of the value of the fifth truck at the first sale — it was appraised at $8,000 prior to the second sale — and the record is silent as to what it might have brought had it been offered. It is stated in supplemental brief that the fifth truck could not be driven at the time of the first sale. We are left to speculate whether this truck was repaired before the second sale and, if so, the cost of repairs. We can only speculate, too, whether the successful bidder at the second sale would have bid on the fifth truck except that the other four could also be purchased as part of the package. In the absence of more information about the fifth truck, appellant has not sustained the burden of proving it was damaged by reason of Amati's default. It would appear from the record before us that appellant could well have been benefited by reason of Amati's default and the resulting second sale. Private judicial sales and ex parte proceedings are not encouraged and will be closely scrutinized by the courts. The parties involved have the unilateral burden of establishing their position by a clear and convincing record.
Judgment affirmed.
The few reported cases, most of which deal with judicial sales of real property, would seem to favor the rule here adopted. See Bovay v. Townsend (8th Cir. 1935), 78 F. 2d 343, 105 A. L. R. 359.