Case Name: J. B. Vinet, Dative Testamentary Executor of the Succession of Alexander Weems, vs. Joseph R. Bres and James G. Richardson
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1896-03-23
Citations: 48 La. Ann. 1254
Docket Number: No. 11,954
Parties: J. B. Vinet, Dative Testamentary Executor of the Succession of Alexander Weems, vs. Joseph R. Bres and James G. Richardson.
Judges: 
Reporter: Louisiana Annual Reports
Volume: 48
Pages: 1254–1273

Head Matter:
No. 11,954.
J. B. Vinet, Dative Testamentary Executor of the Succession of Alexander Weems, vs. Joseph R. Bres and James G. Richardson.
Motion to Dismiss.
Whore a vendor holding eight notes o£ $600 each, secured by special mortgage and vendor’s privilege, claiming that a third possessor of the property had assumed payment of the notes, proceeds directly against him, praying for a personal judgment for the amount of two matured notes, ashing for reóogntion of the mortgage as securing all the notes and for a sale for cash ¿o satisfy the amount due, and on terms of credit to correspond with the unmatured instal- ■ ments, defendants against whom judgment has been rendered in conformity to the prayer, is entitled to an appeal to the Supreme Court,when he denied in the lower court the existence o£ the assumpsit declared on.
A judgment in favor of plaintiff on the issue raised would be res judicata against the defendants as to the existence of the whole assumpsit.
On the Merits.
Unless the appointment of an executor or curator is absolutely void, acts done by him in such capacity are binding and valid. Mere illegality of such an appointment will not vitiate acts done under it.
Whether a stipulation pour autrui has been availed of by the third person for whose advantage same has been made is a question of fact which must be ascertained from contemporaneous and surrounding circumstances, and are not confined to the recitals of the act in which the obligations of the contracting parties are to be found.
APPEAL from the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans. Monroe, J.
Chretien & Suthon and J. C. Gilmore for Plaintiff, Appellee.
R. G. Cobb for Defendants, Appellants.
Argued'and submitted on the merits February 27, 1896.
Opinion handed down March 23, 1896.
Behearing refused June 25, 1896.
On Motion to Dismiss.
Plaintiff alleged that Alexander W. Weems was the owner of a certain body of land in St. Tammany parish; that on the 28th of'August, 1890, he sold the same to William L. Wooten for six thousand dollars, the price evidenced by ten notes of the purchaser to his own order, and by him endorsed in blank, each for six hundred dollars, maturing at different dates, which notes were secured by special mortgage and vendor’s privilege on the property sold.
That on the 12th of January, 1893, Wooten sold the property to the defendants, Bres and Richardson, by act under private signature duly recorded in the parish of St. Tammany; that the consideration of this last sale was part cash and part the assumption by the purchasers of the last nine notes given by Wooten (the first note having been paid), and the assumption of all the obligations of Wooten as purchaser in the act of sale to himself from Weems; that defendants had paid the first maturing of the nine notes assumed by them, and that the remaining eight notes (which he annexed to his petition and made part thereof) were in petitioner’s hands and belonging bo the succession of Weems, all of which notes defendants had assumed and promised to pay and discharge to Weems and plaintiff; that two more of the notes had matured; that defendants neglected and refused to pay the same.
Judgment was against the defendants, in solido, in the sum of twelve hundred dollars, with six per cent, interest from August 28, 1890, until paid, and ten per cent, attorney’s fees allowed by the act; recognizing the two notes sued on as bearing vendor’s privilege and special mortgage on the property described concurrently with the mortgage notes not yet due; reserving the right of plaintiff, or any or all holders of the unmatured notes therein, and recognizing the vendor’s privilege and special mortgage on the said property.
At a later date defendants alleged by way of exception, first, that plaintiffs had shown no cause of action against them in his petition, and secondly they alleged that if the property, of which they admit possession, be bound for the payment of the notes attached to the petition, they denied any responsibility for the payment of the same to plaintiff.
They averred that as third possessors of said property (the mortgaged property), they could not be sued by direct action, but plaintiff must proceed by the hypothecary action; that no notice had been given to Wooten, r.orto his representatives, demanding payment; nor had any notice or demand been made upon defendants prior to the institution of the suit, for which reason no cause of action had been shown, and the suit should be dismissed.
They admitted in answer the sale by Weems to Wooten, and that Wooten and his heirs and representatives were bound by the terms of the sale and mortgage, but they denied that there had been at any time before, or was then, existing any contract or agreement between Weems and themselves, and denied that they were then, or-ever had been, under any obligation to pay Weems or his heirs or representatives the notes signed by Wooten on the 28th of August, 1890; that there has been any novation of the debt contracted by Wooten on that day by the substitution of themselves for the original debtor. They averred that at the time of the contract between Wooten and themselves, Weems refused to novate the debt due him by Wooten, and he never during his lifetime accepted any stipulation for his benefit in any contract between themselves and Wooten; that, on the contrary, knowing the existence of such stipulation at the time it was made, as well as the contemplation of making it, prior to its being made, he failed, neglected and refused to acknowledge or accept the same; they averred that a reasonable time for deliberation upon and acceptance of the terms of whatever stipulation made for his benefit had expired long before his death, and that his legal representatives had no longer any right to claim the benefit of the same as against respondents, except as to the extent of the value of the property held by them, subject to the mortgage executed by Wooten in favor of Weems; they denied any privity between themselves and Weems arising from any contract or obligation entered into between themselves and Wooten, or that any obligation had arisen from any such contract from themselves to Weems, or his representatives, and they further denied any solidarity of obligation in any contract that they may have heretofore made with Wooten.
The District Judge rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff and against the defendants, in solido, in the sum of twelve hundred dol - lars, with six per cent, per annum interest from the 28th of August, 1890, until paid, ten per cent, on the aggregate amount of principal and interest for attorney’s fees and all costs of suit, the whole with vendor’s lien, privilege and right of pledge on the property described in plaintiff’s petition. The judgment further recognized that the two notes sued on, and for which the judgment was given, were secured by vendor’s mortgage lien and- privilege and right of pledge, con currently with the other notes given for the credit portion of the purchase price of said property and not yet due; decreed that the rights of any holder or holders of said notes not yet due be recognized as fully secured by said vendor’s lien, privilege and right of pledge as granted by the act of sale, and that said property be sold for cash, in the manner prescribed by law, to a sufficient amount to cover and pay the notes past due, with interest, attorney’s fees and costs, and for the balance on such terms of credit as were granted in the original act of sale and secured by all the security clauses and conditions recited in said act as to principal, interest, attorney’s fees fixed at ten per cent and costs.
Defendants moved for and obtained an order for a suspensive or devolutive appeal.
Defendants furnished a bond for $2600 as being for a suspensive appeal. The appeal was dismissed by the District Oourt as a suspensive appeal on the ground that the appeal bond was too small for that character of appeal.
Plaintiff moved the Supreme Oourt to dismiss the devolutive ap - peal on the ground that the matter in dispute is, as to amount, below the appellate jurisdiction of that court.
Appellants urge that “no question is raised by appellants as to the validity of the obligation of Wooten to Weems, the note or mortgage and vendor’s privilege securing their payment, nor is there any dispute by appellants of the right of plaintiff to proceed against his obligor personally, or against the property mortgaged via executiva for any part or the whole of the debt, and, of course, the amount claimed in such proceeding would fix the jurisdiction, but appellants do dispute and put at issue the right claimed by plaintiff in this case to sue them on a contract to which plaintiff’s testator was no party, and finally fixed by a judgment in this case their liability and indebtedness for the sum of four thousand eight hundred dollars, with six per cent, interest thereon from 28th August, 1890, whether the whole be due or part.
“ Deciding judicially that they owe and are bound to plaintiff for a part of the debt alleged to have been assumed by the contract of 12th January, 1898, between themselves and Wooten, ex necessitate rei, would decide and adjudge them debtors personally to plaintiff for the whole amount of the alleged assumed indebtedness due and to become due, and this fact of appellants’ liability for the entire indebtedness of Wooten to Weems, established by the judgment appealed from, would, if sustained, become res judicata on this matter.
“ It is appellee’s right to site and stand in judgment against appellants on a contract by the terms of which more than two thousand dollars is involved, which is denied by appellants, and this constitutes the matter in dispute and not the amount of the notes, either due or to become due, incident of the judgment determining the rights of the parties under the contract.”

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Nicholls, C. J.
Defendants prayed that plaintiff's demand be rejected, and that they be dismissed. They asked no affirmative relief; their prayer was purely defensive. There was no reconventional demand.
Only one judgment was rendered in the case.
It has been sometimes stated that the jurisdiction governing'a plaintiff's demand is to be tested by that demand, and not by the defendant's position before the court. Buisson vs. Staats, 9 An. 236; Gustine vs. N. O. Oil Co., 13 An. 510; Flood vs. Shamburgb, 3 N. S. 626; Succession of Hoover vs. York, 30 An. 754.
But defendants maintain that this doctrine has to be taken with limitations. They assert that though plaintiff's present claim may be for a smaller amount than would properly fall under the jurisdiction of this court, yet it is dependent upon the existence and proof of the existence of a contract, which, as to its amount in its entirety, and as to its unpaid instalments, is within our jurisdiction.
That defendant in the lower court put at issue the existence and validity of that contract; that, therefore, the " matter in dispute " for the purpose of appellate jurisdiction, is the amount involved in that of the entire contract, whose existence or validity is so denied, and the unpaid instalments. That although the plaintiff may not (in form) present as a matter for investigation by the court, the existence and validity of the contract, yet he, in fact, tenders that issue as part of his case, and that wheri defendants' defence is visceral to the attack, the whole matter is thrown open for the court's action.
'We have examined the following authorities bearing upon this point:
Peychaud vs. Weber, 25 An. 133; Lartigue vs. White, 25 An. 291 and 325; State ex rel. School Board vs. Cousin, 31 An. 298; Ellis vs. Silverstein, 26 An. 47; State ex rel. Holbrook vs. Judge, 24 An. 601; State ex rel. Lyons vs. Judge, 21 An. 66; Beirne vs. Gill, 34 An. 7; O'Hara vs. Succession of Davidson, 26 An. 76; State ex rel. Bobet vs. Judge, 42 An. 1084; Ready vs. New Orleans, 27 An. 170; Citizens Bank vs. Webre, 44 An. 335.
In the case at bar the plaintiff presented himself as the holder and owner of all the notes remaining unpaid, given by Wooten to Weems. He attached them to his petition; he asserted that defendants had personally bound themselves for the payment of all these notes due and not due through an assumpsit of the same, thought they only asked a present personal judgment for twelve hundred dollars.
In spite of defendant's denial of the existence and binding force of this assumpsit, they were, by reason of the court's holding it to be valid and binding, condemned personally to pay the partial amount now claimed.
We think the judgment rendered in this case, so far as the question of the assumpsit is concerned, would be res adjudieata in any future suit between the parties upon the remaining notes amounting to over three thousand dollars. Louisiana State Bank vs. Orleans Navigation Company, 3 An. 294.
The mere division of the purchase price, which defendants are claimed to have assumed, into instalments, did not break the unity or singleness of their own contract, considered from the standpoint of its.existence and validity. Nesom vs. D'Armond, 13 An. 294.
Defendants are not parties to the notes; quoad them the suit ia upon the assumpsit.
Should this motion for the dismissal of appeal be sustained, all issues raised below would be withdrawn from our consideration.. Should the appeal be maintained and there be any issue in our opinion not cognizable by us, we can so announce on the final decree.
We are of the opinion that the appeal should stand; the motion to dismiss is therefore overruled.