Case Name: Alethia JONES, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2002-01-24
Citations: 813 So. 2d 22
Docket Number: No. SC00-2127
Parties: Alethia JONES, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
Judges: SHAW, ANSTEAD, and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 813
Pages: 22–31

Head Matter:
Alethia JONES, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
No. SC00-2127.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Jan. 24, 2002.
Rehearing Denied March 22, 2002.
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Kevin Briggs, Assistant Public Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, FL, for Petitioner.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Robert J. Krauss, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Chief of Criminal Law, and Ronald Napolitano, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, FL, for Respondent.

Opinion:
PARIENTE, J.
We have for review the opinion in State v. Jones, 772 So.2d 40 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), which the Second District Court of Appeal certified to be in conflict with the Fourth District Court of Appeal's opinion in State v. Williams, 759 So.2d 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), on the question of whether section 948.01(13), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), which provides for the sanction of drug offender probation, is an alternative sentencing scheme independent of the sentencing guidelines. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. Based on the express language of section 948.01(13), we hold that this statute provides an alternative sentencing scheme for drug offenders that is outside of the sentencing guidelines.
FACTS
The St. Petersburg Police Department arrested Alethia Jones on February 21, 1999, for possession of one rock of crack cocaine. Subsequently, Jones was charged by information with possession of cocaine in violation of section 893.13, Florida Statutes (Supp.1998). After conducting a hearing in which a psychiatrist testified, the trial court found Jones to be a chronic substance abuser pursuant to section 948.01(13), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998).
Although the sentencing guidelines mandated prison time, Jones argued that the trial court could place her on drug offender probation pursuant to section 948.01(13). The State argued that the sentencing guidelines applied to Jones' case and mandated that the trial court sentence Jones to prison.
The trial court agreed with Jones and entered a written order finding that it had the discretion under section 948.01(18) to impose drug offender probation. Based on Jones' written plea of nolo contendere, the trial court adjudicated Jones guilty and placed her on two years of drug offender probation pursuant to section 948.01(13). The State appealed the imposition of probation.
The Second District reversed, holding that the imposition of probation was an improper downward departure from the guidelines. See Jones, 772 So.2d at 41. In doing so, the Second District relied on our decision in Disbrow v. State, 642 So.2d 740, 741 (Fla.1994), stating that "the supreme court, in dicta, discussed the fact that sentencing under section 948.01 falls within the sentencing guidelines." Jones, 772 So.2d at 41. However, the Second District observed that in State v. Williams, 759 So.2d 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), the Fourth District held that drug treatment options pursuant to section 948.01(13) were not departure sentences. See Jones, 772 So.2d at 41. The Second District certified conflict with Williams. See Jones, 772 So.2d at 41.
ANALYSIS
Section 948.01(13) provides in pertinent part:
If it appears to the court upon a hearing that the defendant is a chronic substance abuser whose criminal conduct is a violation of chapter 893, the court may either adjudge the defendant guilty or stay and withhold the adjudication of guilt; and, in either case, it may stay and withhold the imposition of sentence and place the defendant on drug offender probation.
Pursuant to this statute, drug offender probation is governed by a program run by the Department of Corrections which must emphasize "a combination of treatment and intensive community supervision approaches." § 948.01(13)(a). The program may include graduated sanctions and "shall include surveillance and random drug testing." Id. In addition, treatment and intensive surveillance, rather than incarceration, is available to defendants who qualify based on the nonviolent nature of the crime with which they are charged and their status as chronic substance abusers. Nevertheless, a violation of drug offender probation subjects the defendant to revocation of probation and may lead to incarceration. See § 948.01(13)(b) ("Offenders placed on drug offender probation are subject to revocation of probation as provided in s. 948.06.").
"This Court has repeatedly held that the plain meaning of statutory language is the first consideration of statutory construction." State v. Bradford, 787 So.2d 811, 817 (Fla.2001). The plain language of section 948.01(13) is designed to vest discretion in a trial court to impose drug offender probation on chronic substance abusers who are charged with drug offenses under chapter 893, Florida Statutes. Accordingly, in our view, section 948.01(13) by its express terms provides an alternative sentencing scheme for drug abusers that is outside the sentencing guidelines.
The State argues, however, that the Legislature implicitly repealed section 948.01(13) through changes made in 1997 to Florida's sentencing guidelines. See ch. 97-194, Laws of Fla. Specifically, the State points to section 921.0026(3), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), which prohibits the use of a defendant's substance abuse or addiction as a reason for downward departure from the sentencing guidelines. According to the State, this prohibition either repeals section 948.01(13), or, at the very least, requires that section 948.01(13) not be exempt from the guidelines.
As we have stated, "[i]t is well settled in Florida that the courts will disfavor construing a statute as repealed by implication unless that is the only reasonable construction." Palm Harbor Special Fire Control Dist. v. Kelly, 516 So.2d 249, 250 (Fla.1987). Instead, we are obligated "to adopt an interpretation that harmonizes two related, if conflicting, statutes while giving effect to both." Id. The sentencing guidelines and section 948.01(13) may be so harmonized by recognizing that one is general, whereas the other is specific.
The sentencing guidelines as set forth in section 921.0026 apply broadly to all felonies and provide for general sentencing guidelines. Section 948.01(13), on the other hand, applies only to violations of chapter 893, which defines nonviolent drug crimes. See § 948.01(13), Fla. Stat. Thus, the one statute prohibits using drug addiction as a general means for departing from a guidelines sentence, and the other statute provides for a specific treatment alternative to incarceration for specific drug-related crimes. Because a specific statute controls over a general statute and provides an exception to the general rule, see M.W. v. Davis, 756 So.2d 90, 106 n. 31 (Fla.2000), the specific language of section 948.01(13) controls over the more general sentencing guidelines.
The 1998 changes to the sentencing guidelines established the Florida Criminal Punishment Code and made substantial changes in the application of the sentencing guidelines. See, e.g., Fla. H.R. Comm, on Crime and Punishment CS/HB 241 (1997) Final Bill Research and Economic Impact Statement (June 4, 1997). However, the legislative analysis for the 1998 changes to the sentencing guidelines does not list section 948.01(13) as one of the statutes affected by the enacting bill. See id. Although the enactment of section 921.0026(3) may indicate that the Legislature intended to limit the ability of trial courts to impose a downward departure from the sentencing guidelines solely on the basis of drug addiction, there is no question that section 948.01(13), as well as the other specific statutes dealing with treatment for substance abusers, indicate a strong policy in favor of treatment over incarceration for certain nonviolent drug-related crimes.
Indeed, in enacting section 948.01(13) and the sanction of drug offender probation, the Legislature's stated purpose was "to provide alternative punishments to fill the void between probation and prison, and to divert offenders from the state prison system." Fla. H.R. Comm, on Corrections, HB 2373 (1991) Staff Analysis (May 2. 1991). The text of section 948.01(13)(a) calls for a Department of Corrections program that includes a specific treatment plan, intensive community supervision, surveillance, and random drug testing. The Legislature has never repealed section 948.01(13), nor has it ever even modified the statute in any material way. See § 948.01(13), Florida Statutes (2000). In fact, even as recently as the 2001 regular legislative session, the Legislature reaffirmed its commitment to treatment-based alternatives as opposed to incarceration by enacting chapter 2001-48, Laws of Florida, a comprehensive statute codifying criteria for treatment-based drug courts and expanding the availability of treatment-based drug courts. Section 1 of that provision states in part:
It is the intent of the Legislature to implement treatment-based drug court programs in each judicial circuit in an effort to reduce crime and recidivism, abuse and neglect cases, and family dysfunction by breaking the cycle of addiction which is the most predominant cause of cases entering the justice system. The Legislature recognizes that the integration of judicial supervision, treatment, accountability, and sanctions greatly increases the effectiveness of substance abuse treatment.
Ch.2001-48, § 1, Laws of Fla.
In its decision below, the Second District relied on Disbrow for the contention that sentencing under section 948.01 was within the guidelines. See Jones, 772 So.2d at 41. However, the Second District correctly characterized that statement as dicta. See id. Disbrow's plain holding is simply that section 948.01(11), Florida Statutes (1991) is not exempt from the guidelines, and that case makes no binding statement regarding section 948.01(13). See Disbrow, 642 So.2d at 741. Disbrow's reasoning is also revealing. The Court stated that "[wjhen the legislature wants to exempt a sentence from the guidelines, it knows how to do it," and then went on to discuss the fact that section 948.01(11) has no language that could be construed as an exemption. See id. This is not true of section 948.01(13), which authorizes a trial court to "stay and withhold the imposition of sentence and place the defendant on drug offender probation." § 948.01(13), Fla. Stat (Supp. 1998). If a court may withhold a sentence for a specific crime based on specific criteria, guidelines as to what form and duration that sentence may take do not apply. The Legislature does know how to exempt a sentence from the guidelines, and did so in section 948.01(13).
Accordingly, we hold that the Fourth District correctly recognized that section 948.01(13) was an alternative to the sentencing guidelines and could be imposed completely outside of the guidelines. See Williams, 759 So.2d at 2. We therefore quash the Second District's opinion and approve Jones' section 948.01(13) drug offender probation as imposed by the trial court. This interpretation will result in Jones being treated under drug offender probation, instead of being incarcerated. This result is consistent with the actual statutory language and the strong policy considerations that treatment, not incarceration, is the most effective and most cost-efficient way to break the cycle of drugs and crime.
It is so ordered.
SHAW, ANSTEAD, and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
WELLS, C.J., dissents with an opinion, in which HARDING and LEWIS, JJ., concur.
. In contrast, the legislative analysis indicates that the bill specifically amended sections 397.705 and 893.15, Florida Statutes "to prevent a judge from dismissing a drug related case after a defendant successfully completes a drug rehabilitation program. A judge will still have the ability to dismiss offenses for the possession of controlled substances through 'drug court' which is authorized under a separate chapter." See Fla. H.R. Comm, on Crime and Punishment CS/HB 241 (1997) Final Bill Research and Economic Impact Statement (June 4, 1997) at 5 (citations omitted).
. Apparently, in this case Jones also would have qualified for treatment under section 948.034, Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), which the State concedes is a sentencing option outside of the guidelines. Section 948.034 is another alternative to the sentencing guidelines concerning certain chapter 893 drug-related offenses, which includes as a condition that the offender "reside at a community residential drug punishment center." § 948.034(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998). "Placement of an offender at a community residential drug punishment center is subject to budgetary considerations and availability of bed space." Id. Section 948.001(6), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), defines a "community residential drug punishment center" as a "residential drug punishment center designated by the Department of Corrections." The record in this case reflects that the probation and parole official advised the trial court that it had a drug offender probation program with special conditions for Jones, but it did not have a residential facility for that purposes. Thus, it appears that the lack of an available residential treatment center was the sole reason that option was not available to Jones.
. Chapter 2001-48 deals with pretrial intervention programs where, if the defendant successfully completes the program, the charges are dismissed. See, e.g., § 948.08, 948.16, Fla. Stat. (2001). In contrast, sections 948.01(13) and 948.034 are sentencing options.
. Section 948.01(11), Florida Statutes (1991), concerning split sentences, provided:
(11) The court may also impose a split sentence whereby the defendant is sentenced to a term of probation which may be followed by a period of incarceration or, with respect to a felony, into community control, as follows:
(a) If the offender meets the terms and conditions of probation or community control, any term of incarceration may be modified by court order to eliminate the term of incarceration.
(b) If the offender does not meet the terms and conditions of probation or community control, the court shall impose a term of incarceration equal to the remaining portion of the order of probation or community control. Such term of incarceration shall be served under applicable law or county ordinance governing service of sentences in state or county jurisdiction. This paragraph does not prohibit any other sanction provided by law.
. According to Florida Drug Control Strategy, promulgated by the Florida Office of Drug Control, Executive Office of the Governor, illicit drug activity in Florida "accounts for as much as 80% of the over 1.2 million personal and property crimes reported annually in the state." Florida Drug Control Strategy at 2-11 (Fla. Office of Drug Control 1999). Drug addicts have the highest rates of recidivism, see id. at 4-16, and untreated or inadequately treated offenders typically commit up to one hundred offenses annually even after incarceration and release, see id. at 4-25.
Experience has shown that closely supervised treatment of nonviolent drug offenders is an effective method of reducing drug-related crime and recidivism. See id. at 1-8. The absolute cost of treatment is significantly less than incarceration; a prisoner costs the State $19,000 per year, but a person in outpatient drug treatment costs the State only $900 per year. See id. at 4-25. In other words, treatment with close supervision costs less than 5% of the cost of incarceration and significantly reduces the likelihood of recidivism.
All three branches of government in this State have recognized that drug abuse is a serious problem that directly exacerbates crime. The drug courts of this state, begun in Dade County over a decade ago, are one example of a cooperative long-term approach to breaking the revolving door cycle of drugs and crime.