Case Name: CURRIE v. FITING
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1965-05-10
Citations: 375 Mich. 440
Docket Number: Calendar No. 76, Docket No. 50,112
Parties: CURRIE v. FITING.
Judges: T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., and Souris and Smith, JJ., concurred with Adams, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 375
Pages: 440–489

Head Matter:
CURRIE v. FITING.
Decision of the Court.
1. Death — Damages—Loss of Companionship of Adult Daughter.
Damages for loss of society and companionship of adult daughter were properly awarded in action under death aet, the pecuniary value of a human life being a compound of many elements (CL 1948, §§ 691.581-691.583).
References for Points in Headnotes
[1, 5] 16 Am Jur, Death § 199.
“Sentimental” losses, ineluding mental anguish, loss of society, and loss of marital, filial, or parental care and guidance, as elements of damages in action for wrongful death. 74 ALR 11.
16 Am Jur, Death § 57.
16 Am Jur, Death §§ 176, 177, 182, 190-200.
39 Am Jur, Parent and Child §§ 68, 70.
'6] 16 Am Jur, Death § 258.
7] 16 Am Jur, Death §§ 202, 203.
'8,14] 16 Am Jur, Death § 384.
Recovery of pre-judgment interest on wrongful death damages. 96 ALR2d 1104.
16 Am Jur, Death §§ 190-200.
16 Am Jur, Death § 185.
Exemplary or punitive damages as recoverable in action for death. 94 ALR 384.
16 Am Jur, Death § 385.
14 Am Jur, Costs § 11.
16 Am Jur, Death § 182.
50 Am Jur, Statutes § 321.
16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law §§ 210-213.
16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law § 221.
50 Am Jur, Statutes § 236.
16 Am Jur, Death §§ 196, 199.
16 Am Jur, Death §§ 89, 247, 251.
50 Am Jur, Statutes § 228.
50 Am Jur, Statutes §§ 44, 45.
50 Am Jur, Statutes § 350.
20 Am Jur, Evidence § § 120, 122.
50 Am Jur, Statutes §§ 217, 221, 318, 323.
14 Am Jur, Courts § 79.
14 Am Jur, Courts §§ 59, 64.
16 Am Jur, Death § 304.
16 Am Jur, Death §§ 89, 182.
16 Am Jur, Death §§ 247, 251, 252.
Separate Opinion.
T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., and Souris, Smith, and Adams, JJ.
2. Death — Construction op Statutes.
The wrongful death act is remedial in character and is to be construed liberally in favor of the beneficiaries (CL 1948, § 691-.582).
3. Same — Elements op Pecuniary Value op a Human Lipe.
The pecuniary value of a human life is a compound of many elements, such as expenses of birth, food, clothing, medicines, instruction, nurture, and shelter, of value to others of the deceased as part of a functioning social and economic unit, of companionship, when construing the measure of damages allowable under the death act (CL 1948, § 691.582).
4. Parent and Child — Majority.
The obligations of a son or daughter to his or her parents do not terminate at age 21 in the eyes of the law (PA 1925, No 146, as amended).
5. Death — Damages—Adult Child — Loss op Society and Companionship.
Damages for loss of society and companionship were properly awarded parents of deceased who was nearly 21 years and 11 months of age at time she was hilled (CL 1948, §§ 691.581-691.583).
6. Same — Recovery Permitted — Probate Code — Questions Reviewable.
Secovery in action brought under the wrongful death act is not governed by the probate code, especially where the issue is not before the Supreme Court for determination (CL 1948, §§ 691.582, 702.115).
7.,Same — Prospective Damages — Present Worth.
Prospective damages, awarded under the death act, must be reduced by computation of present worth (CL 1948, §§ 691.581-691.583).
References por Points in Headnotes
50 Am Jur, Statutes § 228.
52 Am Jur, Trespass on the Case §§ 3, 4.
30A Am Jur, Judges §§ 27, 37.
14 Am Jur, Costs § 91.
16 Am Jur, Death § 385.
16 Am Jur, Death §§ 202, 203, 384.
16 Am Jur, Death § 384.
16 Am Jur, Death §§ 202, 203.
16 Am Jur, Death §§ 182, 199.
8. Same — Damages—Interest.
Interest should be imposed by the trier of the facts upon the amount awarded under the death act from the date of death to the date of the verdict (CL 1948, § 691.582).
9. Same — Damages.
Damages under the death aet are not limited to the funeral expenses which had been incurred together with the loss of the future society and companionship of the deceased, since human life is a compound of many elements, such as dependency, expenses of birth, food, clothing, medicines, instruction, nurture, and shelter, of value to others of the deceased as part of a functioning social and economic unit, of companionship, and other elements (CL 1948, §691.582).
10. Same — Punitive Damages.
No exemplary or punitive damages may be awarded under the death act, since there is no express provision therefor in the statute (CL 1948, § 691.582).
11. Costs — Both Parties Prevailing in Part.
No costs are awarded on appeal, where both parties have prevailed in part.
Separate Opinion.
O’Hara, J.
12. Death — Damages—Pecuniary Value op Human Life — Companionship.
The pecuniary value of a human life is a compound of many elements, including mutual society and protection, companionship, and such is now properly considered an element of damage recoverable in an action under the wrongful death aet (CL 1948, §§ 691.581-691.58S).
13. Courts — Construction op Statutes — Notice to Legislature.
The presumption of legislative notice of interpretation of statutes by the Supreme Court applies to changes of interpretations which may have been of many years’ standing.
14. Death — Damages—Interest—Judgment.
Interest should not be allowed on judgment in an automobile negligence case from date of death by being added to the judgment.
Dissenting Opinion.
Black, J.
15. Constitutional Law- — Separation op Powers.
No department of government shall exercise or usurp the powers belonging properly to another (Const 1963, art 3, §3).
16. Same — Separation op Powers.
Pursuant to the separation of powers provision of the Constitution the judiciary is responsible for the protection of the executive and legislative departments from judicial appropriation of their respective powers to no less degree than fending off their attempts to invade or control the judicial department (Const 1963, art 3, §3).
17. Statutes — Construction.
A statute must be construed in the light of circumstances existing at the time of its enactment, not in the light of subsequent developments.
18. Death — Damages—Adult Daughter — Loss op Companionship.
Damages for loss of companionship of adult unmarried daughter
may not be recovered under the death act by nondependent parents who have made no claim of contributions from her (CL 1918, §§691.581-691.583).
19. Same — Damages—Dependents.
Damages for pecuniary injury, if and when recovered under the death act, should be distributed only to those persons who were dependents of the decedent (CL 1948, §§ 691.583, 703.115).
20. Same — Damages—Dependents—Loss op Companionship.
Loss of companionship suffered by nondependents of a decedent
is not a pecuniary injury for which damages may be recovered under the wrongful death act (CL 1918, § 691.583).
21. Statutes — Amendment by Judiciary.
The fact that a statute is cruel in specific applications provides no ground for judicial amendment of the statute.
22. Same — Constitutional Law.
The legislature may be as barbarous as it wishes in the enactment and re-enactment of statutes so long as it infringes no constitutional provision.
23. Same — Construction—In Pari Materia — Intent.
Portions of 3 different acts that were enacted to a common purpose by the same legislative assembly are properly looked upon as unitary, and are to be considered as in pari materia in determining legislative intent.
24. Evidence — Judicial Notice —■ Education oe Children — Pecuniary Service.
The Supreme Court talces judicial notice of the fact that Michigan’s agricultural society has shifted to an industrial and technical economy requiring more and more graduate as well as undergraduate learning, and that parents as a rule no longer command the pecuniary or pecuniarily measurable service of their children during minority, obliging parents to spend more on the child during and usually beyond minority.
25. Statutes — Construction.
Statutes when called into application are construed in accordance with construction of terms used therein as had theretofore been adopted by courts from other States and as thereafter construed by contemporary jurists.
26. Courts — Construction oe Opinions.
The opinion and decision of a court mtcst be read and examined as a whole in the light of the facts upon which it is based.
27. Same — Construction oe Opinions.
General expressions in opinions of a court are to be idlcen in connection with the case in which those expressions are used.
28. Same — Precedents—Parent and Child — Adult Children.
A decision in a case wherein the Supreme Court was divided as to whether verdict for death of a minor under the death act was or was not excessive does not constitute a precedent for case where the deceased was an adult daughter of the plaintiff administrator and latter and his wife had not been pecuniarily dependent upon her, there being a difference in legal relationship between parent and minor child on one hand and parent and adult child on the other (CL 1948, § 691.58%).
29. Death — Damages—Presumptions—Parent and Child — Adult Child.
The presumption that the wrongful death of a minor child results in a pecuniary loss to the parents does not obtain when there is the wrongful death of an adult child (CL 1948, §§ 691.581-691.583).
30. Same — Damages—Evidence—Presumptions.
Pecuniary injury to the surviving parents of a deceased adult daughter must be proved in an action under the death act, since presumption of pecuniary loss does not obtain (CL 1948, §§ 691.581-691.583).
31. Same — Dependents—Statutes.
The statutory emphasis on dependency in the provision of the probate code relative to the distribution of proceeds of an action brought under the amended death act limited the recovery to such surviving spouse and next of Tcin as were dependent in fact upon the deceased (CL 1948, §§ 691.580, 700.115).
32. Same — Pecuniary Injury — Dependents.
Pecuniary injury, as the term is used in the wrongful death act, is limited to monetary injury suffered by eligible survivors of the one wrongfully talcen, in view of the provisions of the unitarily-enacted amendment of the death act and the probate code limiting distribution of death action recoveries to dependents (CL 1948, §§ 691.580, 700.115).
S3. Same — Damages—Dependents—Statutes.
The amendment of the wrongful death act whereby recovery thereunder was limited to those who would inherit personalty of the deceased had he died intestate and limiting distribution to surviving spouse and next of loin who suffered pecuniary injury and unitarily-enacted probate code provisions that further limited distribution to dependents of the deceased control recovery and distribution, either by probate-approved settlement or circuit court judgment, of the pecuniary loss, the statutes being loolced upon and applied as one (CL 1948, §§ 691.580, 700.115).
34. Constitutional Law — Separation op Powers — Judges.
Judges may not properly usurp legislative powers, especially where there is an important public interest not represented before the court.
35. Common Law — Remedy—Action on the Case.
Justice may impel the creation of the common-law remedy of the special action on the case to accommodate a common-law right, where there is no other remedy,
36. Judges — Statutes.
Judges who have the power, though not the right, to ignore the mandate of a statute, and render a judgment in despite of it, do, by abuse of the power, violate the law.
37. Costs — Public Question — Loss op Companionship op Adult Daughter.
No costs are allowed on appeal in action under the death act to recover damages for loss of companionship of adult daughter upon whom the parents were not ftnanciallfy dependent, where issue is of general public concern (CL 1948, §§ 691.581-691-.583, 708.115).
38. Death — Damages—Present Value.
Interest is rightfully allowed by the jury in an action under the wrongful death act upon due instruction that damages for pecuniary injury must be assessed and reported by a lump-sum verdict constituting the present value as of the time of verdict of the damages found as having been suffered and tobe suffered by such beneficiaries as there may be under the act (CL 1948, §§ 691.588, 708.115).
39. Same — Damages—Interest to Time of Verdict.
The personal representative who is found entitled to damages for pecuniary injury suffered by the beneficiaries in an action under the death act is entitled to have added, by the jury, legal interest calculated upon the amount of damages suffered by the beneficiaries between the death and the verdict (CL 1948, §§ 691.581-691.583).
40. Same — Future Damages — Instruction.
The lump-sum amount the jury must ascertain in assessing damages under the death act is subject to instructed reduction of the included amount representing future damages pursuant to the customarily instmcted formula for division (CL 1948, §§ 691.581-691.583).
41. Same — Damages—Jury—Judges.
The same rules of damages and assessment thereof under the death act should be made to apply whether the issue is tried to the court or to a jury (CL 1948, §§ 691.581-691.583).
Dissenting Opinion.
Dethmers and Kelly, JJ.
42. Death — Damages—Loss of Society and Companionship of Adult Daughter — Evidence.
Damages for loss of society and companionship of 81-year and 11-month old daughter may not be awarded under death act, in the absence of evidenee showing pecuniary loss or a reasonable expectancy of same (CL 1948, §§ 691.581-691.583).
Appeal from Saginaw; O’Neill (James E.), J.
Submitted May 8, 1964.
(Calendar No. 76, Docket No. 50,112.)
Decided May 10, 1965.
Rebearing denied June 7, 1965.
Case by Gilbert A. Currie, Jr., administrator of the estate of Linda Kay Hopkins, deceased, against Fred E. Fiting for damages arising from death in automobile collision July 20, 1960. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals. Plaintiff cross-appeals.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Peter F. Cicinelli and Eugene D. Mossner, for plaintiff.
Smith, Brooker & Harvey (Webster Cook, of counsel), for defendant.

Opinion:
Adams, J.
This case involves a wrongful death action brought for the death of Linda Kay Hopkins, a 21-year-old girl, who was killed in a two-car collision. The trial judge awarded $3,147.14 for funeral and burial expenses, $1,000 per year for loss of society and companionship of decedent for the average life expectancy of the surviving parents, and $3,131-.18 interest from the date of the accident, for a total of $32,778.32.
I.
The first question is the right of the administrator to recover more than funeral expenses, there being no evidence of financial dependency by the parents of Linda, her sole heirs. CL 1948, § 691.582 (Stat Ann 1959 Cum Supp § 27.712).
It is the contention of appellant that the test for recovery of damages for the death of a person over 21 years of age is either financial dependency (MacDonald v. Quimby, 350 Mich 21) or assumption by deceased of an obligation to support a surviving next- of-kin (Judis v. Borg-Warner Corporation, 339 Mich 313; Rytkonen v. City of Wakefield, 364 Mich 86; Mooney v. Hill, 367 Mich 138).
Beginning with the dissent of Justice Talbot Smith in Courtney v. Apple, 345 Mich 223, 237, this Court has steadily moved away from the proposition —from which Justice Talbot Smith recoiled in that case — that the value of the life of a child or of any human being is such that there can be a recovery for funeral expenses and nothing more.
With Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich 331, a majority of this Court clearly recognized an expanded view of pecuniary damage as stated by Justice Talbot Smith (pp 338-340):
"What, then, is the pecuniary loss suffered because of the taking of the child's life? It is the pecuniary value of the life. We are aware, of course, that there are those who say that the life of a human being is impossible to value, that although we will grapple mightily with the value of the life of a horse, of a team of mules, we will stand aloof where a human is concerned and assign it no value whatever. This kind of delicacy would prevent the distribution of food to the starving because the sight of hunger is so sickening. But we cannot shirk this difficult problem of valuation. In the case coming to us a life has been taken and it is our duty, as best we .can, to put a fair valuation on it. In so doing, we will keep in mind that the act is remedial in its character and our duty is to construe it liberally in favor of the beneficiaries.
"The pecuniary value of a human life is a compound of many elements. The use of material analogies may be helpful and inoffensive. Just as with respect to a manufacturing plant, or industrial machine, value involves the cost of acquisition emplacement, upkeep, maintenance service, repair, and renovation, so, in our context, we must consider the expenses of birth, of food, of clothing, of medicines,' of instruction, of nurture and shelter. Moreover, just as an item of machinery forming part of a functioning industrial plant has a value over and above that of a similar item in a showroom, awaiting purchase, so an individual member of a family has a value to others as part of a functioning social and economic unit. This value is the value of mutual society and protection, in a word, companionship. The human companionship thus afforded has a definite, substantial, and ascertainable pecuniary value and its loss forms a part of the 'value' of the life we seek to ascertain."
The human companionship of which Justice Talbot Smith spoke was testified to most eloquently in this case by the mother and father of Linda Kay Hopkins:
"Q. And are you the mother of the deceased Linda Kay Hopkins?
"A. Yes.
"Q. Could you tell us what the age of Linda was on July 20, 1960?
"A. She was 21 years old at that time.
"Q. And when had she become 21?
"A. August 24th, the year before. She would have been 22 in August.
"Q. The month following?
"A. Yes, following her death.
"Q. At the time of her death, Mrs. Hopkins, what was her occupation?
"A. She was a student at Michigan State, working on her business administration degree.
"Q. How long did she have yet to obtain her business administration degree at Michigan State?
"A. It would have been about 2 weeks. She would have been through as soon as the first summer term was over. She would have been through then and had her degree.
"Q. Up to that point, Mrs. Hopkins, had she qualified?
"A, She had qualified as a graduate and had graduated in the spring as a graduate, but she did not have her degree yet. It was because she had changed her course from retailing to business administration.
"Q. Was there a degree for business administration awarded to her at any time?
"A. Yes, it was awarded posthumously to her.
"Q. On July 20, 1960, Mrs. Hopkins, did you have any other children?
"A. No, we did not.
"Q. She was the only child?
"A. Yes. I was unable to have any other children.
"Q. At the time of Linda Kay Hopkins' death, other than when she was attending school, where did she live?
"A. Well, she always lived home with us, Mr. Cicinelli, when she wasn't in school.
"Q. At the time of her death, Mrs. Hopkins, was she a single or married person at that time?
"A. She was single and she was not engaged to anyone.
"Q. Was she going steady with any boy friend?
"A. No, she wasn't at that time.
"Q. And what type of student would you say generally she was?
"A. She was a very good student.
"Q. And how would you describe the type of daughter, type of individual, type of person that she was?
"A. We thought that she was pretty wonderful. While we were very sad that we couldn't have any other children, I just thanked God every day that I had her, because I thought she was just about everything you would want.
"Q. Was she obedient?
"A. Yes (Crying). I'm sorry. (Pause.)
"Q. What was her health generally at the time of her death?
"A. Her health was very good at the time of her death. She had had allergies from the time she was a little girl, asthma. We spent a good many years trying to find out what caused it, the allergies. By the time she was 18, by that time we had things under control and from then on she was a very healthy girl. As a matter of fact, she was cheer leader at Michigan State, one of them, and she would have to be healthy to do that.
"Q. That would be in reference to her athletic activities ?
"A. Yes, at football games.
"Q. Was that during all the time she was there?
"A. During 3 years that she was there, yes. She was a very good girl. We never had any trouble with her at all.
"Q. Did she engage in any church activities?
_ "A. She went to church every Sunday. She even did at college, which a lot of youngsters don't do. She was very much a Christian. She didn't drink or smoke, which a lot of girls of her age do. In fact, I thought we did a pretty good job of raising her.
"Q. No further questions.
"The Court: Do you have any cross-examination, Mr. Smith?
"Mr. Smith: I think not."
The relationship was testified to by the father as follows:
"My daughter has been engaged in — was engaged in our business. She was graduating in the business administration school at Michigan State College. I had hoped she would come into the business and I had had every indication from her that she would. When you have one child and, — such as we had, my wife and I don't have too much of a family, all we had was her, all that we were accumulating we hoped she would take over, and we hoped she would be able to run the business successfully, and she had worked in the business from the time that she — oh, probably from the time she was around 12 years old. She had worked in various capacities in my business as to what a child could do, partly because we thought it was good training for a child and partly because I wanted her to see all of our operations and to grow up with all of the various operations in my business preparatory to eventually taking it over.
"Q. Generally, so the record will show it, what type of business were you operating and had been operating at that time?
"A. We had 3 businesses we were operating at that time. There was the printing business, there was a corporation engaged in the rental of properties and there was a retail store."
In Thompson v. Ogemaw County Board of Road Commissioners, 357 Mich 482, Justice Edwards writing the majority opinion stated as to consideration of pecuniary injury after the 21st birthday (p 489):
"A large majority of State courts hold that recovery may be had for the loss of benefits reasonably to be expected after the majority of the deceased. Inspiration Consolidated Copper Co. v. Bryan, 35 Ariz 285 (276 P 846); Bohrman v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 23 NJ Super 399 (93 A2d 190); Foerster v. Direito, 75 Cal App 2d 323 (170 P2d 986). See, also, Van-Cleave v. Lynch, 109 Utah 149 (166 P2d 244); annotation, 14 ALR2d 485, Measure and elements of damages for personal injury resulting in death of infant.
"We do not believe that the age of the child at death (whether before or after majority) is decisive as to consideration of loss of possible future support after the 21st birthday. Nothing in the Michigan statute pertaining to wrongful death suggests such a distinction."
Why age 21 should set up a magic barrier baffles understanding in view of the total omission from the statute of any statement of limitation as to age. The appellant, significantly, speaks of "the death of an adult child." Linda Kay Hopkins, born August 24, 1938, was killed July 20, 1960. The defendant drove past a stop sign and struck her automobile while it was traveling on a through road. To say that her parents' loss from her death would cease after August 24, 1959, is all that is needed to expose the falsity of that proposition.
In view of Wycho and Thompson, the court did not err in its award of damages for loss of society and companionship.
II.
But, it is argued, even if the wrongful death statute permits recovery, the probate code, PA 1939, No 288, ch 2, § 115 (CL 1948, § 702.115 [Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27.3178(185) ]), does not, and the probate code, it is contended, is controlling. We do not regard this action, brought under the wrongful death statute, as being governed by the probate code. In any event, that question is not before us in this case and we decline to pass upon it at this time.
III.
The third question presented is whether the award of $26,500 should have been reduced to its present worth. The finding of the court reads as follows:
"In addition to the reimbursement for expenses, this court holds that the compensation for loss of society and companionship should be $1,000 per year for the average expectancy of the deceased's parents. In other words, $26,500."
The parents had an average life expectancy of 26.5 years. The finding of the court that the award should be at the rate of $1,000 per year and the total award of $26,500 oblige us to conclude that the trial court failed to reduce the award to present worth. It was held error in Nagi v. Detroit United Railway, 231 Mich 452, to instruct a jury to give prospective damages, not reduced by computation of present worth. Here, it was error on the part of the judge to fail to make such reduction.
IV.
The final question raised by the appellant is whether the court erred in awarding interest from the date of death. It is the claim of the appellant that, since this is an action founding in tort, interest does not run on the unliquidated claim. Such is not the rule. The problem has recently been analyzed in the case of Wilson v. Doehler-Jarvis Division of National Lead Company, 358 Mich 510, 519, wherein an award of interest was allowed "from the date compensation would have been due had it been paid voluntarily." Where a claim accrues as of a certain date and can be ascertained or computed as of that date, we think the better rule is to award interest upon the claim from that date forward. Larsen v. Home Telephone Co., 164 Mich 295. In this case the total injury and whatever award was to be made therefor accrued with the death of Linda Kay Hopkins. From that date forward, it is proper that the defendant should pay interest in order that there may be a full award of damages. Certainly, if prospective damages are to be reduced to present worth, it is equally just that damages which have accrued should carry interest from the date of accrual, whether that date be death or otherwise.
In this case, tried to the court, it did not err in awarding interest from date of death on those damages which accrued at death. While unnecessary to this decision, it follows that, in the event of a jury trial, a jury should he instructed to ascertain the date when damages accrued and to add interest on same from date of accrual to date of its verdict, even as, in the reverse situation, a jury is instructed 'to reduce future damages to present worth.
V.
Appellee, by cross appeal, contends that, since the trial judge allowed only the funeral bill and an amount to compensate the parents for the loss of the society and companionship of their daughter, it is clear he did not include in his award as an element of damages any sums for loss of investment in the deceased, loss of services, or exemplary or punitive damages. As Justice Talbot Smith observed in Wycko v. Gnodtke, supra, (p 339), a human life is a compound of many elements. In the search for the elements of a particular life a jury might consider "expenses of birth, of food, of clothing, of medicines, of instruction, of nurture and shelter", and "value to others as part of a functioning social and economic unit. This value is the value of mutual society and protection, in a word, companionship." We would not necessarily limit the elements to those mentioned by Justice Talbot Smith, but, where applicable, certainly all should be included in the verdict. The trial judge's award appears to have left out of consideration any element other than future companionship of the daughter of which the parents were deprived. If this be true, as can readily be determined upon remand, then such additional damages should be assessed as were not considered by him.
VI.
With regard to the matter of exemplary or punitive damages, as was noted by Justice Black in Burns v. Van Laan, 367 Mich 485, 493, this is a statutory action. There is no provision in the statute for an award of exemplary or punitive damages. None should he awarded.
The case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. Both parties having prevailed in part, no award of costs shall be made to either party.
T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., and Souris and Smith, JJ., concurred with Adams, J.
See, currently, OLS 1961, § 600,2022 (Stat Ann 1962 Rey § 27A-.2922),
PA 1925, No 146, as amended (CL 1948 and CLS 1961, § 401.1 et seq. [Stat Ann 1960 Rev §16.121 et seg\]).