Case Name: JOHN F. ENGEMANN v. DELAWARE, LACKAWANNA AND WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY
Court: New Jersey Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1916-03-06
Citations: 88 N.J.L. 451
Docket Number: 
Parties: JOHN F. ENGEMANN v. DELAWARE, LACKAWANNA AND WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Law Reports
Volume: 88
Pages: 451–452

Head Matter:
JOHN F. ENGEMANN v. DELAWARE, LACKAWANNA AND WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY.
Submitted December 2, 1915
Decided March 6, 1916.
1. Where there is a conflict in the evidence as to where goods were to be delivered by vendor to vendee, the question must be submitted to the jury in order to determine whether title has passed to the vendee.
2. The time required by a common carrier other than the defendant to transport goods between two points is evidence of the time that ought to be taken by the defendant.
•1. A jury may infer without further proof that eight days is an unreasonable time for the transportation, of goods by rail a distance of less than one hundred miles.
On appeal from the Warren Pleas.
Before Gummere, Chief Justice, and Justices Swayze and Bergen'.
For the plaintiff, John H. Dahlke.
For the defendant-appellant, Frederic B. Scott.

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Swayze, J.
This was an action for damages caused by failure to deliver promptly a carload of onions. It was brought by the consignor. Both consignor and consignee testified that the goods were to be delivered to the- consignee at Brooklyn, the point of destination. But there was evidence that the contract was for a delivery at Alp-hano, the point of shipment, and that the consignees were to pay the freight. This presented an issue which should have been submitted to the jury. Sale of Goods act Oomp. Stai., p. 4652, § 19, rule 5; Willis. Sales, § 280. The trial judge seems to have thought that the title did not pass as between vendor and vendee until the carrier ceased to be liable as such and that the case was controlled by Burr v. Adams Express Co., 71 N. J. L. 263. This was error, and if the defendants had excepted to the ruling or requested that the question of fact be submitted to the jury, there would have been ground for reversal. But the defendant relied, and now relies, upon a request to direct a verdict. The trial judge was not required to do this; to do so would have been error. We cannot, therefore, reverse on the first ground alleged.
The second ground is that there was no proof of such delay as would malee the carrier liable. The argument is that proof of the time taken for a shipment by the Pennsylvania railroad is no'evidence of the time that ought to be taken by the Lackawanna railroad. With this we cannot agree. It is surely some evidence, and we think that a jury would be justified in finding even without evidence that eight days was an unreasonable time to transport goods by rail a distance of less than one hundred miles.
We find no legal error that requires reversal.. The judgment is affirmed, with costs.