Case Name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Louis Johnnie B. REED, Defendant-Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1969-08-01
Citations: 414 F.2d 435
Docket Number: No. 26640
Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Louis Johnnie B. REED, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 414
Pages: 435–443

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Louis Johnnie B. REED, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 26640.
United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.
Aug. 1, 1969.
Swep S. Taylor, Jr., Jackson, Miss. (Ct. Apptd.), for appellant.
Robert E. Hauberg, U. S. Atty., Joseph E. Brown, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., Jackson, Miss., for appellee.
Before COLEMAN and SIMPSON, Circuit Judges, and MEHRTENS, District Judge.

Opinion:
COLEMAN, Circuit Judge:
Johnnie B. Reed was tried to a jury on an indictment charging a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2312, the interstate transportation of a motor vehicle from Hammond, Indiana, to Forest, Mississippi, knowing it to have been stolen. We affirm.
On January 3, 1967, Reed was arrested and charged. The automobile was found at the home of his parents near Forest and was identified as the same automobile taken from the used-car lot of Pierce Ford, Inc. in Hammond, Indiana, on or before December 6, 1966.
At trial, the defense did not dispute the theft or the transportation. Its defense was that Reed had no knowledge that the vehicle was stolen.
Reed, a native of Mississippi, had moved to Hammond, Indiana, less than a year before the events in question. While there, he became acquainted with Raymond Eugene Williams. On December 6,1966, Reed met with Williams, who was then in possession of two automobiles, a 1966 yellow Mustang convertible and a 1965 red Mustang. Reed, desiring to get to Mississippi to see his parents for Christmas, was asked by Williams to drive the yellow Mustang down there, while he would follow in the red Mustang. Williams told him that if he were stopped and asked who owned the automobile, to reply that he (Reed) owned it. Before leaving Hammond, Reed' and Williams took the license tags from two of Reed's automobiles and attached them to the two Mustangs. They then proceeded to drive to Mississippi in the separate vehicles, arriving there December 8 and returning to Indiana December 16, leaving the yellow Mustang at the home of Reed's parents. While in Mississippi, Reed told several friends that he owned the yellow Mustang. Both Reed and Williams returned to Mississippi December 18 in the red Mustang. Some time after their arrival, the vehicle was wrecked and sold to a junk dealer for $100.
A Mississippi Highway Patrol officer first inquired as to the ownership of the yellow Mustang at Reed's parents' home after it had been determined that the red Mustang had been stolen. Reed told him that he owned the yellow automobile. He was taken to the Forest Courthouse, advised of his rights, and questioned by an F.B.I. agent. At that time, Reed told the agent he had bought the car at a used-car lot in Hammond, that Williams had co-signed the note, and that he had left the bill of sale back in Indiana. But during questioning on January 4, Reed stated that he purchased the automobile at a junk yard.
At still a later interview and in response to a disclosure that it had been determined the car was stolen, Reed stated that he had borrowed it from Williams, used a tag from his own car, and drove it to Mississippi. When Reed was questioned January 11, he told the agents that he learned the yellow Mustang was stolen soon after the red Mustang was wrecked, when he overheard the man who bought it tell Williams to drive the yellow Mustang around awhile to "cool it off".
At the trial, Reed took the stand in his own behalf and admitted that he changed his story as to the ownership of the yellow Mustang during the course of the interviews. He stated that he earlier admitted owning the car because Williams told him to do so. He also stated that he knew the car was stolen even before he was questioned by the officers, but that he did not know if it was stolen when he drove it to Mississippi.
Williams also testified, admitting that he had stolen the yellow Mustang, but contending that Reed knew nothing about the theft or the fact that he planned to sell it in Mississippi. He stated that he had told Reed to admit ownership of the car if questioned about it. When the red Mustang was wrecked, Williams disclosed, he removed the license tag and threw it away because "I didn't want to get Reed in any trouble just in case I got busted, because he didn't know anything about it". On cross-examination, he admitted that when questioned by the F.B.I., he told them that since he had broken probation in Texas and would have to serve time, he was not going to say anything to get Reed in trouble.
On the basis of this evidence, Reed was convicted of transporting the yellow Mustang in interstate commerce, knowing it to be stolen, and was sentenced to five years imprisonment.
Appellant here contends that he is entitled to a reversal because (1) the evidence failed to show guilty knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of every hypothesis consistent with innocence and (2) statements of the trial judge at the time the defendant took the witness stand were so prejudicial that he was deprived of a fair trial.
In a Dyer Act case, the government must prove (1) that the car was stolen, (2) that the defendant transported it in interstate commerce, and (3) with knowledge that the automobile was stolen. Moody v. United States, 5 Cir., 1967, 377 F.2d 175. The duty of the appellate court is to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government to determine if a jury could reasonably accept the evidence as adequate to support a conclusion of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Montoya v. United States, 5 Cir., 1968, 402 F.2d 847, 850. In other words, "The verdict of a jury must be sustained if there is substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to the Government, to support it". Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 469, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1941). Here, the only element in dispute is whether the defendant possessed the requisite knowledge that the vehicle was stolen. Since this knowledge, or lack of it, was based on circumstantial evidence, the inferences reasonably to be drawn from the evidence must be consistent with guilt and inconsistent with every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Odom v. United States, 5 Cir., 1967, 377 F.2d 853.
Little would be accomplished by citing the numerous cases dealing with the question of whether a defendant had knowledge that the vehicle transported in interstate commerce had been stolen, since each turns on its own facts. But it should be noted that this and other Circuits have long recognized that the unexplained possession of a recently stolen automobile warrants the inference that the person in possession had knowledge of the theft of the vehicle. Pilgrim v. United States, 5 Cir., 1959, 266 F.2d 486; Barfield v. United States, 5 Cir., 1956, 229 F.2d 936; see, also, Williams v. United States, 10 Cir., 1967, 371 F.2d 141. And it is a question for the jury whether the inference of guilty possession is overcome by the defendant's explanation. Beufve v. United States, 5 Cir., 1967, 374 F.2d 123; United States v. Angel, 7 Cir., 1953, 201 F.2d 531. As the Court in Moody v. United States, 5 Cir., 1967, 377 F.2d 175, 177, remarked:
"[Appellant] seems to contend that her explanation and protestations of innocence coupled with her husband's testimony at trial that she did not have the requisite knowledge had the effect of overriding the effects of possession. However, inconsistent statements made by her and her husband cast doubt upon their explanations and their credibility; and it is particularly within the province of the jury to believe or disbelieve her claims of innocence. There was substantial evidence from which the jury could and obviously did infer that she transported the vehicle with knowledge of its stolen character."
Measured by these standards the proof obviously was sufficient to go to the jury and adequately supports the verdict.
As the' defendant took the witness stand the following discussion occurred in the presence of the jury:
"THE COURT: Let me tell you something before you take the witness stand. You know what perjury is?
"THE DEFENDANT: Perjury?
"THE COURT: That's false swearing under oath and I want to caution you about that, that you are sworn here to tell the truth and the whole truth and nothing but the truth, and when you answer material questions here, if you make a false answer, that's perjury, and the penalty for that is at least ten years.
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
"THE COURT: In the penitentiary, so don't make the mistake of violating that law now.
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Sir.
"THE COURT: All right."
Appellant contends that such action on behalf of the Court created an impression on the minds of the jury that the defendant would not tell the truth, thereby prejudicing him and depriving him of a fair and impartial trial. At the time of this colloquy, defense counsel made no objection. Therefore, unless the comments constituted plain error, the alleged error was waived. Rule 52 (a), F.R.Crim.P.
If this were a matter of first impression we would be inclined to agree that this was error and very likely amounted to plain error. We so stated from the Bench during oral argument.
We find the point foreclosed, however, by the decision of this Court in Heilman v. United States, 1964, 339 F.2d 36. In Heilman the defendant was being tried for a wilful failure to file federal income tax returns. During the course of his testimony the following transpired between the witness and the Court:
"THE COURT: Did you pay your income tax for each of those years?
"THE WITNESS: From the New York office, yes.
"THE COURT: You paid by check?
"THE WITNESS: No, I didn't pay it myself.
"THE COURT: You swear your brother paid the income tax returns for those years for you ?
"THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
"THE COURT: And your sister?
"THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
"THE COURT: Mind you, you are under oath, and you are swearing that you know that they were paid by him.
"THE WITNESS: Yes, and I have proof in writing to show that, too, sir.
"THE COURT: The income tax people have proof whether you paid it or not.
"THE WITNESS: I showed this to them, sir. They saw that. I wasn't trying to hide anything.
"THE COURT: You are sure you are telling the truth?
"THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
"THE COURT: It is a very serious penalty if you are not."
This Court held that in the context of the trial this interrogation, alluding to the penalties for perjury, and asking the witness-defendant if he was sure he was telling the truth, failed to demonstrate "the clear showing of prejudice which is necessary to establish an abuse of the trial judge's discretion in examining the defendant".
The context, by comparison, was not materially different to that in the case sub judice. The reported case speaks for itself and we see no necessity for repeating the details here. Suffice it to say, Heilman was floundering from improbability to improbability, in a rather incoherent, disconnected way. Moreover, he was a heart patient and it was reported that jurors had seen him lying down in a corridor, evidently suffering a paroxysm of some kind.
In our present case the inconsistent statements made by Reed to the F.B.I. agents had already been introduced in the Government's proof. He had not begun any testimony. The Court asked him if he knew the penalty for perjury, told him what it was, and told him not to make the mistake of violating that law.
If Counsel had objected it would at least have given the Court an opportunity to caution the jury that he intended no reflection on testimony not yet heard and was making no comment on its veracity. If, however, an objection had been made, the Court would have been at least technically justified in overruling it on the authority of Heilman, supra. This eliminates any room for plain error.
Moreover, in the context of this trial, the record reveals that the jury had already heard the detailed testimony of the warnings given Reed when the agents took statements from him. If the jurors attributed any significance to what the Judge said, and assuming that they did, it is as likely that they thought the warning was required by law as that testimony was being impugned in advance. From vast publicity, and considerable controversy, the lay juror may be expected to believe that criminal procedure in this day and time is replete with warnings.
We, therefore, cannot allow this occurrence to reverse conviction.
We take occasion to emphasize, however, a warning of our own, so many times given, that trial judges should, they must, be careful to refrain from going out of bounds in this critical area of the criminal trial. In this we imply no criticism, for judges not only wish to be fair and impartial, they generally do their best to observe the standard.
Affirmed.