Case Name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James Lee EARLY, Defendant-Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2012-07-11
Citations: 686 F.3d 1219
Docket Number: Nos. 10-15537, 10-15538
Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James Lee EARLY, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: Before TJOFLAT, MARTIN and HILL, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 3d Series
Volume: 686
Pages: 1219–1225

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James Lee EARLY, Defendant-Appellant.
Nos. 10-15537, 10-15538.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
July 11, 2012.
Patricia D. Barksdale, Jay Carl Taylor, U.S. Attys., Jacksonville, FL, Robert E. O’Neill (Court-Appointed), Tampa, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Thomas M. Bell (CourL-Appointed), Thomas M. Bell, PA, Jacksonville, FL, for Defendanb-Appellant.
Before TJOFLAT, MARTIN and HILL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
HILL, Circuit Judge:
James Lee Early appeals his 210-month sentence imposed after he plead guilty to robbing two banks using what turned out to be fake bombs. Finding no reversible error, we shall affirm.
I.
James Lee Early plead guilty to two counts of robbing a bank by violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d) charged against him in two different, consolidated cases brought in the Middle and Northern Districts of Florida. In exchange for his plea, the United States agreed to dismiss all remaining charges in the two cases and to recommend a sentence at the "low end" of whatever sentencing guidelines range the district court determined.
At the sentencing hearing, the district court determined an undisputed sentencing guidelines range of 78-97 months' imprisonment. The court also heard testimony from two of Early's victims, a statement from Early, and argument from Early's counsel. The United States recommended a sentence at the low end of the guidelines range. The court discussed the relevant sentencing factors located in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and then sentenced him to 210 months' imprisonment. Early objected to the sentence, asserting that it was both procedurally and substantively unreasonable.
On appeal, Early claims only that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. We review this claim under a deferential abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). The party challenging the sentence bears the burden of establishing that the sentence is unreasonable in light of the record and the § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir.2005). While the district court making such an upward variance must have a justification compelling enough to support the degree of the variance and complete enough to allow meaningful appellate review, we will vacate such a sentence only if "we are left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case." United States v. Shaw, 560 F.3d 1230, 1238 (11th Cir.2009).
II.
Early's robbery spree, for which he received the sentence challenged in this appeal, began when he threatened a bank teller with a "bomb" and robbed the bank of $4760. Six days later, Early used another fake bomb in robbing a second bank. Three days later, he robbed yet another bank with a fake bomb. Finally, five days later, Early tried to enter yet another bank but was spotted by bank employees who recognized him as the suspect in the previous robberies and who refused to let him in the bank. Early fled but was chased and arrested.
Early has spent his adult life — except for eight months — in prison. His crimes include forgery, petit theft, grand theft, grand theft auto, uttering forged checks, trafficking in stolen property, smuggling, tampering with evidence, obstructing an officer without violence, attempted aggravated battery, aggravated assault, battery on a law enforcement officer, kidnapping, burglary of an unoccupied structure, armed burglary of a dwelling (with a shotgun when the residents were home), armed robbery (while holding a hostage at gunpoint), possession of a handgun as a felon, possession of marijuana, possession of cocaine, and sale/purchase of cocaine. Several of these offenses were committed multiple times. Many were committed while Early was on probation. The bank robberies at issue in this case were committed while he was on bond pending sentencing in an unrelated case. Both of Early's victims who testified in this case reported the lingering effects of their terror during the robberies.
In imposing an above-guidelines sentence on Early, the district court specifically acknowledged the recommendation of the United States to a sentence at the low end of the guidelines range of 78-97 months. But the district court rejected this recommendation, stating that the guidelines did not adequately account for Early's criminal history because some of the older convictions were not scored and the criminal history score did not reflect the sustained nature of Early's criminal conduct. The court also opined that the range did not adequately account for the number of bank robberies that Early had committed, since the range for one robbery would have been 57-71 months and only increased to 79-97 as the result of three bank robberies.
The court found that Early's use of fake bombs in his bank robberies was "extremely serious," creating terror in the tellers, customers, and inducing the use of bomb squads and causing commerce to shut down. The court observed the need to impose a sentence that reflected the seriousness of Early's crimes, promotes respect for the law, provides just punishment, provides deterrence, and protects the public. The court concluded that "It's obvious that Mr. Early, by his own conduct, has demonstrated that the public needs protecting from him, that — -that he — the only way he's deterred is when he's in custody. And I think those are factors which heavily weigh in my evaluation." The court also addressed the need to avoid unwarranted disparities in sentences, but stated that "[i]n this case it's hard to be too concerned about unwarranted sentencing disparity, because . this is a situation in which on a repeated basis, over the space of about a week or so, a person robbed banks in a way that put people's lives — put people in fear for their lives." The court concluded by stating:
the court now being fully advised, and recognizing that the court is going to substantially vary from the recommended advisory guideline range, but doing so advisedly, and for the reasons that I have tried to articulate on this record, and being primarily motivated by the nature and circumstance of the charged offense, the history and characteristics of Mr. Early, and the need to afford both deterrence to criminal conduct and protect the public from further crimes of this defendant, as again I've tried to articulate on this record — those are the primary motivators of my sentence in this case, although I've taken all the 8553(a) factors in to account, including the advisory guidelines.
III.
On this record, we do not find that the sentence imposed by the district court was substantively unreasonable. Although the upward variance was substantial, it was still well below the maximum 900 months that he could have received under the statute. See United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir.2008) (comparison between statutory maximum and sentence imposed an indicator of reasonableness).
In addition, many of the § 3553(a) factors militate in favor of an upward variance in this case. Early has shown that, for the past 36 years, he has been unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. His criminal history is so extensive that he has been incarcerated virtually all of his adult life. When he is out of prison, he commits more crimes — many of them very violent. The upward variance is also supported by Early's disrespect for the law reflected in his recidivism; the need for deterrence; the need to protect society from him; and, the need to promote respect for the law.
Early argues that the district court abused its discretion in finding that the sentencing guidelines range did not adequately account for his criminal history and the number of bank robberies that he committed. This amounts to an argument that the district court gave too little weight to the guidelines range as a relevant sentencing factor under § 3553(a). But we do not substitute our judgment for that of the district court in weighing the relevant sentencing factors absent a clear error of judgment, which Early has not shown. The district court gave great weight to Early's three bank robberies within a week, and to his substantial criminal history. This is not a clear error in judgment. See Shaw, 560 F.3d at 1240 (affirming statutory-maximum sentence well above sentencing guidelines range based upon defendant's substantial criminal history).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in fashioning a sentence that it believed was warranted in view of all the relevant sentencing factors. The record supports the sentence and we are not left with the firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing these factors and arriving at a sentence of 210 months. Therefore, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.