Case Name: F. H. Clark, Appellee, v. Eliza J. Conrad, Appellant
Court: Illinois Appellate Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 1916-10-18
Citations: 201 Ill. App. 549
Docket Number: Gen. No. 21,329
Parties: F. H. Clark, Appellee, v. Eliza J. Conrad, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Appellate Court Reports
Volume: 201
Pages: 549–550

Head Matter:
F. H. Clark, Appellee, v. Eliza J. Conrad, Appellant.
Gen. No. 21,329.
(Not to he reported in full.)
Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Denis E. Sullivan, Judge, presiding. Heard in the Branch Appellate Court at the March term, 1915.
Affirmed.
Opinion filed October 18, 1916.
Statement of the Case.
Bill for an injunction by F. H. Clark, complainant, against Eliza J. Conrad, defendant, to enjoin the prosecution of a suit by a creditor’s bill, based on a judgment entered against the complainant by the defendant, on the ground of the existence of an agreement between the parties to the effect that on payment of a certain amount by the complainant to the defendant the latter would authorize satisfaction of the judgment and that the complainant had made a tender to various persons of the amount due. From a decree for complainant, defendant appeals.
Sumner C. Palmer and Charles Daniels, for appellant.
E. F. Thompson, for appellee.
See Illinois Notes Digest, Vols. XI to XV, and Cumulative Quarterly, same topic and section number.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Taylor
delivered the opinion of the court.
Abstract of the Decision.
Compromise and settlement, § 11 —when rights of judgment debtor under settlement agreement not forfeited. A judgment debtor held not to have forfeited his right under an escrow agreement with the judgment creditor, whereby on payment of certain sums at certain times the judgment was to be canceled, where, though in default, he had made tender to the party in whose hands the escrow agreement had been placed, which payment was however refused because of lack of authority to receive it, and made tender to other parties which was also refused, he not having been able to locate the former attorney for the creditor, who drew the agreement, though he could, by the exercise of diligence, have found out the residence of the creditor or the party who was acting as her agent to receive payrhent, time not being of the essence of such agreement.