Case Name: Mark Steven PARKER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Unknown ROWE, Dr., FHA in his individual and official capacity, Defendant-Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2014-08-21
Citations: 584 F. App'x 635
Docket Number: No. 13-15870
Parties: Mark Steven PARKER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Unknown ROWE, Dr., FHA in his individual and official capacity, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: Before: SCHROEDER, THOMAS, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 584
Pages: 635–636

Head Matter:
Mark Steven PARKER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Unknown ROWE, Dr., FHA in his individual and official capacity, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 13-15870.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted Aug. 13, 2014.
Filed Aug. 21, 2014.
Mark Steven Parker, Buckeye, AZ, pro se.
Paul Edward Carter, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Arizona Attorney General, Tucson, AZ, for Defendant-Ap-pellee.
Before: SCHROEDER, THOMAS, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Arizona state prisoner Mark Steven Parker appeals pro se from the district court's summary judgment in Parker's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir.2004). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment because Parker failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Dr. Rowe provided treatment for Parker's gout that was medically unacceptable under the circumstances and was chosen in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to his health. See id. at 1058 (explaining requirements to prevail on a medical deliberate indifference claim involving choices between alternative courses of treatment).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Parker's "Motion to Put Court on Notice of Due Process Violations" because Parker did not seek specific relief, but rather attempted to raise issues that he had not addressed in any previous filings. See Preminger v. Peake, 552 F.3d 757, 769 n. 11 (9th Cir.2008) (reviewing for an abuse of discretion the district court's decision regarding management of litigation).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n. 2 (9th Cir.2009) (per curiam).
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.