Case Name: In the Matter of Lendall B. Terry, Judge of the Ripley Circuit Court, 80th Judicial Circuit
Court: Supreme Court of Indiana
Jurisdiction: Indiana
Decision Date: 1975-02-20
Citations: 262 Ind. 667
Docket Number: No. 374S68
Parties: In the Matter of Lendall B. Terry, Judge of the Ripley Circuit Court, 80th Judicial Circuit.
Judges: Givan, C.J., Arterburn, J., concur; DeBruler, J., concurs in Parts I and II of the Majority Opinion and dissents to Part III with opinion and votes to enter judgment for respondent. In light of the judgment of the majority, DeBruler J., concurs in the selection of Joseph L. Hensley as Judge Pro Tempore; Prentice, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with opinion.
Reporter: Indiana Reports
Volume: 262
Pages: 667–709

Head Matter:
In the Matter of Lendall B. Terry, Judge of the Ripley Circuit Court, 80th Judicial Circuit.
[No. 374S68.
Filed February 20, 1975.
Rehearing denied June 10, 1075.]
John C. Ruekelhaus, Arch N. Bobbitt, of Indianapolis, for respondent.
Richard H. Grabham, Executive Secretary, Mark W. Gray, Assistant Counsel, for Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission.

Opinion:
Hunter, J.
This is a disciplinary proceeding initiated by the Disciplinary Commission against respondent Lendall B. Terry in his capacity as a judicial officer and as a member of the bar. The verified complaint of the Disciplinary Commission alleged that certain conduct of the respondent violated the Code of Judicial Conduct and Ethics, the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Oath of Attorneys (Admission and Discipline Rule 22), and the Judicial Oath for Ripley County Circuit Court. A hearing officer was appointed to hear evidence in this matter.
Respondent requested a public hearing which was conducted over a period of four and one-half days. After hearing and observing the witnesses presented by the Disciplinary Commission and by the respondent, the hearing officer filed his Findings of Fact and Conclusions. These Findings and Conclusions were generally adverse to the respondent. Respondent then filed his Petition for Review of Hearing Officer's Findings and Conclusions.
Respondent's petition, upon which this Court heard oral argument, frames three issues for review:
I. Whether the Supreme Court of Indiana is without jurisdiction to discipline respondent in his capacity as a circuit judge, except as provided by Article 7, section 13 of the Indiana Constitution.
II. Whether the Disciplinary Commission is without authority to bring a disciplinary action against a circuit judge.
III. Whether there is sufficient evidence to support the findings of the hearing officer.
I.
Respondent's jurisdictional attack is based upon the misconception that this is an action for removal (impeachment) pursuant to section 13 of Article 7 of the Indiana Constitution, rather than an action for discipline pursuant to section 4 of the same Article. Since we have recently written at length upon the relationship of these sections to the disciplining of all judges, including those of the circuit court, it is sufficient to note that the findings of the hearing officer in this matter correctly identify the jurisdictional base as section 4 of Article 7. For the reasons stated in In Re Evrard (1974), Ind., 317 N.E.2d 841, this matter is properly before this Court.
II.
An analysis of respondent's contention that the Disciplinary Commission lacked authority to maintain this action begins with the constitutional cornerstone of Article 7, section 4. Section 4 invests this Court with original jurisdiction in matters of ". . . discipline, removal and retirement of justices and judges...." (Emphasis added.) In the exercise of this jurisdiction, respondent does not suggest any constitutional, statutory, or other legal basis which prohibits this Court from placing upon the Disciplinary Commission the task of investigating and prosecuting disciplinary actions involving judicial officers. Indeed, the interest of the public in the efficient resolution of disciplinary matters, as well as requirements of fundamental fairness for the respondent, suggest the propriety of delegating those functions to an independent body.
III.
On review of the evidence presented, we conclude that the findings of the hearing officer are supported by sufficient evidence. While those findings relate to respondent's conduct as a judicial officer and as a member of the bar, we review the evidence herein only as it sustains the hearing officer's conclusion that respondent violated Rules 1, 2, 3, 8 and 10 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Ethics.
Before reviewing the evidence, it is helpful to briefly sketch the development of the rules which govern the conduct of the judiciary. Rules of judicial conduct inhere in the unique role which society assigns to the judicial officer. That role requires unblemished behavior both on and off the bench. As stated by Chief Judge John S. Hastings, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit:
"The assumption of office by a judge casts upon him a standard of personal conduct higher than that charged to most of his neighbors. His actions are subject to the criticism of the litigants, their relatives, friends and associates; their lawyers and the bar associations to which they belong; the legislative branches of the government which created certain parts of the judiciary; the communications media; his fellow judges and the general public."
The standards of judicial conduct have not always been formalized in codes such as our Code of Judicial Conduct and Ethics. Nor have formal disciplinary mechanisms, such as the one employed in this proceeding, long existed. Nevertheless, an informal code of judicial responsibility has long governed the actions of the bench. The enforcement of any unwritten code necessarily depends largely upon judicial self-restraint, but the factors mentioned by Chief Judge Hastings would, undoubtedly, come into play at some point to temper the behavior of errant judges.
Judicial ethics have been increasingly formalized during the twentieth century. This formalization is in part attributable to intensified public interest in the efficient and orderly administration of justice. At the same time, the recent expansion of due process rights of an accused has given impetus to formalization. In 1921, the late Benjamin Cardozo, Justice of the United States Supreme Court, implicitly recognized the centrality of such a code to the judicial process. Justice Cardozo stated that a judge "ought . in order to escape the dangers of arbitrary action, to disengage himself, so far as possible, of every influence that is personal. . . ." B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, 120-21, (1928). In 1924, a committee of the American Bar Association, chaired by William Howard Taft, adopted the first Canons of Judicial Ethics. In November, 1970, the people of this state approved the new Judicial Article to the Indiana Constitution. In so doing the citizens of Indiana squarely placed the responsibility for disciplining judges upon this Court. Pursuant to this mandate, we adopted on March 8, 1971, the Code of Judicial Conduct and Ethics under which respondent is charged.
Rule 1. Avoidance of Impropriety
Rule 1 provides:
A judge's official conduct should be free from impropriety and the appearance of impropriety; he should avoid infractions of law; and in his personal behavior, not only upon the Bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, he should strive to be beyond reproach.
In the summer of 1973, respondent visited the residence of a Ripley County Welfare Board member to solicit his vote in an upcoming matter. The board member failed to vote as solicited. Respondent summarily removed the board member, although he made a false entry showing that a hearing had been conducted in the matter. The board member brought an action in mandamus to require the respondent to expunge the removal from the record and to grant a change of venue. The relief prayed for was granted, but respondent failed to comply with this Court's order. Respondent was held in contempt and fined $500. Thereafter, the change of venue was granted and a special judge was appointed to hear the matter. Respondent failed to appear at the removal hearing in his own court, and the action was dismissed for want of prosecution. Respondent's unexplained failure to appear at the hearing leads to but one conclusion: respondent knew of no legal basis for removal of the board member.
The dissent herein finds this conclusion unwarranted, since the record does not affirmatively demonstrate that respondent received notice of the hearing. We hasten to add that the record contains no denial by respondent that he received notice. Moreover, we do not view the lack of formal notice, in this instance, as fatal. Undoubtedly, a special judge must consult .either the regular judge or his clerk prior to setting any hearing in the regular judge's court. Ordinarily, judicial courtesy will, result in the necessary arrangements being made between the special judge and the regular judge. Even assuming the instant arrangements were made only through the clerk of respondent's court, we are not hesitant in charging respondent with knowledge of his dockets, particularly in a matter of such great importance to him.
Respondent sought retribution against the attorney (Johnson) who had successfully represented the welfare board member in the removal action. Respondent attempted to persuade the prosecutor to bring perjury charges against Johnson because of a sworn statement in Johnson's "Petition for Contempt Proceedings" against respondent. The statement averred that the attorney for the welfare board was also "attorney of record for respondent in this cause [i.e., the removal hearing to be set before the special judge]." Respondent's representation or lack thereof in the removal proceeding is not probative of the sole issue of the contempt proceeding: i.e., whether respondent had complied with the earlier orders of this Court. .Moreover, the evidence indicates that Johnson's allegation was based upon.his good faith belief that the attorney was in fact representing respondent. Without evidence that Johnson's •statement was made with the requisite intent and that it was material to his petition for contempt proceeding, the retributive nature of respondent's actions becomes apparent.
In an estate matter respondent properly sought to determine the validity of the executrix's signature on a petition for allowance of attorney's fees. Respondent contacted the prosecutor, informed him of his belief that a forgery had been committed, and requested that criminal charges be filed against the estate's attorney. The prosecutor submitted the petition containing the alleged forgery, together with other handwriting specimens of the executrix, to the State Police for expert analysis. When the report indicated that the signature appeared genuine, the prosecutor informed respondent of his intention not to prosecute. Respondent, however, was not satisfied. He held an ex parte inquisition of the executrix, after placing her under oath and reading her the perjury statute. Respondent then called a grand jury to investigate the matter, but the grand jury failed to return an indictment. Respondent made public his charge against the attorney for the estate. Respondent also publicly charged the prosecutor with misconduct in failing to file an affidavit or to secure an indictment. Respondent's public comments on the refusal of the grand jury to indict insinuated that the grand jury did not have all the information before it for deliberation. When the grand jury reconvened, respondent was summoned, but he failed to appear, and the grand jury again refused to return an indictment. Respondent introduced no evidence at the hearing that he had been professionally trained in the science of handwriting analysis or even that he was familiar with the handwriting of the executrix.
In a divorce proceeding, respondent refused to accept -a property settlement upon which the parties agreed, because it did not provide for child support payments. The wife testified that her attorney had advised her to request support, but she rejected such advice because of her own belief that if the husband did not pay support, he would not come to visit the children. In spite of this testimony, respondent stated that such an agreement was a fraud upon the court and accused her attorney of failing to adequately represent his client.
Respondent threatened to hold an attorney in direct contempt for filing a verified petition for continuance and for a change of judge. On another occasion respondent examined a jail matron about her alleged refusal to obey the judge's order on visiting hours. Undoubtedly, this action was proper. However, during this examination respondent stated that he was not convinced that direct contempt had taken place, but that in the slow progress of an appeal, the sentence, if imposed, would be served before the determination of the appeal. This statement indicates an irresponsible and nonjudicial attitude toward the exercise of the contempt powers.
After members of the Ripley County bar initiated a request for investigation of respondent by the Disciplinary Commission, respondent and his agents began a massive publicity campaign to abort the disciplinary proceedings. Petitions were prepared in support of respondent. On February 23, 1974, respondent, in response to a question from the pulpit during a worship service, stated that he had extra petitions in his car for anyone wishing to distribute them. Respondent knew, or should have known, that requests for disciplinary action are not terminated at the outset by publicity campaigns. Disciplinary proceedings will be terminated after initial investigation only if no substantial question of misconduct exists. Admission and Discipline Rule 23. One result of respondent's misguided attempt to circumvent the law was the further denial of equal justice to the citizens of Ripley County. Because of respondent's publicity campaign, opinion became polarized in Ripley County, so as to make the selection of a fair and impartial jury virtually impossible. Thus, citizens of Ripley County, who were clients of attorneys who had signed the disciplinary petition, were chilled in the exercise of their right to trial by jury. As one attorney-signer stated, ". . . unless I have the list of the 1,200 or 1,300 people who signed . . . I'm not going to take that chance."
From the foregoing evidence it is apparent that respondent's official conduct has not been free from impropriety. Nor has respondent sought to avoid the appearance of impropriety. Specifically, we find the following conduct of respondent improper under Rule 1:
(1) Soliciting the vote of the welfare board member.
(2) Removal of the board member in an unlawful manner.
(3) Making false entries of record.
(4) Failure to appear at the lawful hearing for removal of the board member.
(5) Attempting to cause false criminal charges to be filed against the welfare board member's attorney in pursuit of respondent's personal vendetta.
(6) Public harassment of a prosecutor who refused to violate his oath by filing criminal charges where no probable cause existed.
(7) Failure to appear before the grand jury after leading the public to believe that he possessed information that a crime had been committed.
(8) Charging an attorney with failing to adequately represent his client, in the client's presence, merely because respondent did not agree with the desired settlement.
(9) Threatened abuse of contempt powers in response to an attorney's motion for continuance and change of judge.
(10) Participating in a public campaign to circumvent disciplinary action.
Rule 2. Court Organization
Rule 2 provides:
A judge should organize the court with a view to the prompt and convenient dispatch of its business and he should not tolerate abuses and neglect by clerks, and other assistants who. are sometimes prone to presume too much upon his good natured acquiescence by reason of friendly association with him.
it is desirable, where the judicial system permits, that he should cooperate with other judges of the same court, and in other courts, as members of a single judicial system, to . promote the more satisfactory administration of justice.
Rule 2 requires that a judge "organize the court with a view to the prompt and convenient dispatch of its business." The evidence indicates that respondent deliberately organized his court in a manner designed to delay the business of Ripley County attorneys who. had signed the disciplinary grievance.
Viewed in the context of the actual delays encountered, we cannot say that all similar delays constitute a violation of Rule 2. But where the evidence is clear that the delay interposed is attributable to the retaliatory motives of the respondent, any delay is excessive. Here, respondent presented the testimony of non-Ripley County attorneys who were uniform in praising the fair and expeditious treatment they received in respondent's court. Respondent's differential response to court business is a clear violátion of Rule 2. Respondent's conduct in this matter is also a violation of Rule 1 and Rule 10.
We note that respondent's attempt to punish Ripley County attorneys, in at least one instance, had far-reaching effects. On February 28, 1974, a client appeared at the office of a Ripley County attorney. The client stated that she had just been released from the hospital after recuperating from a beating administered by her husband. The attorney prepared a petition for dissolution of the marriage and for an emergency restraining order. Respondent granted the emergency order that same day. On March 6, the client returned stating that she had again been beaten by her husband, after being picked up and driven about at gun point. Furthermore, the husband had threatened to kill her and the children. The attorney contacted the prosecutor and a warrant was issued for the husband's arrest on the charge of carrying an unlicensed pistol. Thereafter, the husband was arrested and subsequently released on bond. On the day of his release, he again violated the restraining order and renewed his threats to kill his wife and children. On March 27, the attorney prepared a petition for contempt against the husband. Respondent issued an order to show cause on March 29 and set hearing for April 8. On that date, the attorney and his client arrived at the courthouse only to be advised for the first time that the hearing had been continued. On April 9, the attorney prepared new orders and took them to the courthouse. On April 24, the wife was again accosted. On April 26, the attorney asked respondent either to enforce the restraining order or grant a change of judge motion which had been pending since March 21. A few hours after respondent granted the latter motion, the attorney received notice that his client had been stabbed by her husband.
We find that respondent has violated Rule 2 by organizing his court in manner which denies prompt and convenient dispatch to all litigants, regardless of his personal idiosyncrasies.
Rule 3. Courtesy
Rule 3 provides:
A judge should be courteous to counsel, especially to those who are young and inexperienced, and also to all others appearing or concerned in the administration of justice in the court.
Respondent was duly admitted to the bar of this Court in 1952. He ascended the bench of the Ripley Circuit Court on January 1, 1973. Respondent's relations with the bar of Ripley County were initially courteous and looked toward efficient administration of justice in the Ripley Circuit Court. Similarly, the record demonstrates the courtesy of the bar toward the new judge. Testimony was presented that many of the members of the bar initially observed a self-imposed moratorium on setting causes for trial. The purpose of the moratorium was to lighten the burden upon the judge as he disposed of pending matters and became acclimated to his new position. Slowly, the wheels of justice began to turn in Ripley County.
After his unsuccessful attempt to unseat the welfare board member, respondent's relationship with the Ripley County bar began to change. Business which had previously been conducted expeditiously was conducted only after delay and petty questioning of counsel. Respondent's conduct on the bench became more oppressive when the disciplinary complaint was filed. An attorney called as an expert witness to testify on the value of services submitted in an estate matter summarized his questioning by respondent:
"I have never seen any lawyer hung out like I was on that cross-examination in open court before the public, or like Mr. Kellerman on his cross-examination."
Another member of the Ripley County bar testified:
"After the filing of the request for investigation early in February, I think on every occasion when I was in the court, probably five, six or seven times after that, either in chambers or in open court, Judge Terry would make comments to me to whomever was present in the courtroom concerning the matter, questioning the motives of the attorneys who filed, indicating that it was an attempt to; I don't know, he referred to cover up."
The record indicates that on several occasions respondent sought to demean counsel in open court in the presence of their clients by charging them with inadequate representation of their clients. Such charges, if unfounded, tend to undermine the attorney-client relationship. To discourage the making of such charges lightly or for personal ends, the Code of Professional Responsibility, which is applicable to respondent, requires one possessing unprivileged knowledge of any conduct adversely reflecting upon the fitness of counsel to practice law, to present such information to the proper investigative body. DR 1-103 (A). Hence, it was respondent's duty, if he believed such charges to be well founded, to bring them to the attention of the Disciplinary Commission. Respondent's failure to bring such charges indicated that his conduct was malicious and discourteous, in violation of Rule 3.
The evidence demonstrates that respondent has also transgressed Rule 3 insofar as it relates to non-attorneys. Respondent's behavior in the jail matron contempt matter, (see Rule 1, supra), was not in accord with Rule 3. Likewise, respondent's questioning in a divorce proceeding of the husband's mental competence and the motives of his employer re certain of the husband's parents was improper and discourteous.
We find that respondent has violated Rule 3 in his treatment of attorneys and clients appearing before the court.
Rule 8. Intervention in Conduct of Trial
Rule 8 provides:
A judge may properly intervene in a trial of a case to promote expedition, and prevent unnecessary waste of time, or to clear some obscurity, but he should bear in mind that his undue interference, impatience, or participation in the examination of witnesses, or a severe attitude on his part toward witnesses may tend to prevent the proper presentation of the cause or the ascertainment of the truth in respect thereto.
He should avoid interruptions of counsel in their arguments except to clarify his mind as to their positions or to prevent improper argument or conduct of counsel. He should not be tempted to the unnecessary display of learning or a premature judgment. (Emphasis added.)
In a paternity action, in open court and with witnesses present, respondent questioned an attorney at length concerning his participation and motives in filing a petition for investigation of respondent by the Disciplinary Commission. Such conduct was grossly irrelevant and constituted a violation of Rule 8.
Respondent's questioning of the husband in the divorce proceeding, (see Rule 3, supra), was also violative of Rule 8.
In an estate matter, on petition for allowance of fees, respondent quizzed the attorneys in open court about their involvement in the disciplinary proceedings against respondent.
The record shows that respondent on several occasions held lengthy in camera inquisitions of attorneys appearing on official business, prior to, during, or after the conduct of such business. As one attorney stated:
"When I go to the Judge's office, I have to undergo an interrogation type process where he attempts to elicit the facts of this case, which I am sworn by the Disciplinary rules not to disclose, and I keep telling him I am not supposed to disclose them."
The latter conduct of respondent, while deplorable, did not violate Rule 8, since it did not occur at trial. However, such conduct, under the circumstances of this case, violated Rules 1 and 10.
We find that respondent's questioning of witnesses and attorneys exceeded the narrow limits of judicial propriety in violation of Rule 8.
Rule 10. Idiosyncrasies
Rule 10 provides:
A judge should adopt the usual and expected method of doing justice and not seek to be extreme or peculiar in his judgments or spectacular or sensational in the conduct of the court. In imposing sentence, he should endeavor to con form to a reasonable standard of punishment and should not seek popularity or publicity either by exceptional severity or undue leniency. Justice should not be moulded by the individual idiosyncrasies of those who administer it.
The evidence set forth above reveals that respondent has been guided in the administration of justice by personal idiosyncrasies. To paraphrase a statement from In Re Littell (1973), 260 Ind. 187, 294 N.E.2d 126, respondent has too often permitted the man that he is to overpower the judge that he undertook to be.
Respondent has often approached the problems before him with a predetermined judgment in mind. We have considered in this regard:
Respondent's illegal and extralegal attempts to remove a welfare board member;
Respondent's attempt to publicly disparage a prosecutor who failed to file charges when no probable cause existed; Respondent's attempts to discredit the finding of a grand jury and his failure to appear before that body to present any evidence of the commission of a crime; and Respondent's attempts to retaliate against those attorneys who initiated this proceeding by charging them with wrongdoing in the presence of their clients, while failing to bring any charges of misconduct to the attention of the Disciplinary Commission.
From the record, it is evident that respondent has allowed his personal motives to govern his questioning of witnesses and attorneys. Such motives led respondent far from the path of justice.
Respondent's idiosyncrasies are further demonstrated by his ill-conceived notions of the court's contempt powers as discussed above.
We find that respondent has violated Rule 10.
IV.
It is with reluctance that we accept the grave constitutional responsibility of disciplining a fellow judge; however, duty demands it. From the record we must conclude there is a breakdown in the impartial administration of justice in the Ripley Circuit Court. The evidence affirmatively demonstrates respondent's lack of judicial temperament and his unfitness to occupy judicial office.
We therefore find that the responent shall be suspended without pay from the office of the Judge of the Ripley Circuit Court. We further find that a Judge Pro Tempore should be appointed in his stead to carry out all duties incumbent upon the Judge of the Ripley Circuit Court.
It is hereby ordered that the respondent be suspended instanter without pay until the further order of this Court.
This Court appoints The Honorable Joseph L. Hensley of Madison, Indiana, to serve as Judge Pro Tempore of the Ripley Circuit Court, and he shall be paid on the same salary basis as Judge of the Ripley Circuit Court as provided by statute.
It is further ordered by this Court that the respondent shall in no way, directly or indirectly, interfere with the assumption of duties of the Ripley Circuit Court by The Honorable Joseph L. Hensley.
We hereby affirm the findings and conclusions of the hearing officer as modified herein.
Givan, C.J., Arterburn, J., concur; DeBruler, J., concurs in Parts I and II of the Majority Opinion and dissents to Part III with opinion and votes to enter judgment for respondent. In light of the judgment of the majority, DeBruler J., concurs in the selection of Joseph L. Hensley as Judge Pro Tempore; Prentice, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with opinion.
. The hearing officer found certain political activity engaged in by respondent did not violate Rule 17 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Ethics. Neither the Disciplinary Commission, nor the respondent, objects to this finding, and we do not consider it here.
. The standard of review applied in this matter is the same as the one applied in review of disciplinary proceedings against attorneys. The standard is set forth in Admission and Discipline Rule 23, section 15 (c) which provides:
"In the event that this Court grants a petition under this Section 15, briefs may be filed and oral arguments heard, as the Court shall determine. Such briefs need not conform to the rules of this Court. Upon review the Court shall determine whether the findings and recommendations of the hearing officer or officers are supported by sufficient evidence and shall enter its judgment, with or without opinion as the Court shall determine." (Emphasis added.)
In reviewing the evidence before us, we are mindful of the serious nature of disciplinary actions, particularly those involving members of the judiciary. However, upon reviewing all pleadings and memoranda filed in support thereof, a transcript of one thousand pages and numerous exhibits, we conclude that sufficient evidence has been presented to support the findings and conclusions of the hearing officer.
The dissenting opinion urges that the gravity of this case requires that we conduct further inquiry into this matter by means of a trial de novo. We believe that the ends of justice, in this particular matter, would not be aided by resort to such procedure. Respondent has not asserted any infringement of his due process rights arising from the procedure employed herein. Nor has respondent sought a trial de novo. Indeed, respondent explicity recognized the standard herein applied in his Petition for Review of Hearing Officer's Findings and Conclusions. Paragraph three of respondent's petition stated:
"The Hearing Officer did not find that his Findings and Conclusions were supported and proven by a preponderance of the evidence as required by Admission and Discipline Rule 23, Sec. 14(d), as amended effective March 14, 1973."
Section 14(d) provides:
"Within thirty (30) days after the conclusion of the hearing, the hearing officer shall determine whether misconduct has been proven by preponderance of the evidence and shall submit to the Supreme Court written findings of fact deduced by him from the evidence. The hearing officer may submit recommendations concerning the disposition of the case with his findings of fact, but such recommendations shall be given only such weight by the court as it believes to be consistent with a paramount consideration of uniformity of discipline throughout the state. A copy of said findings and recommendations, if any, shall be served by the hearing officer on the respondent and the executive secretary of the Disciplinary Commission, at the time of filing the same with the Supreme Court. This rule shall be effective on or after its adoption." (Emphasis added.)
Under these circumstances a trial de novo is not warranted.
. In view of the disposition of this matter, we believe that the public interest does not at this time require further disciplinary action against respondent as a member of the bar, although the hearing officer found violations of Disciplinary Rules 1-102 (A) (4), (5) and (6) of the Code of Professional Responsibility. We expressly reject respondent's contention that he is subject neither to the Code of Judicial Conduct and Ethics nor the Code of Professioal Responsibility. He is subject to both. As the Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility of the American Bar Association recently stated, ". . . a lawyer must comply at all times with all applicable disciplinary rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility whether or not he is acting in his professional capacity. The provisions of DR 1-102 (A) (3) and (4) are not limited to a lawyer's conduct while he is acting in his professional capacity as a lawyer. They are applicable to all conduct of the nature specified in those provisions without regard to the capacity in which the lawyer may be acting." ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL, ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 336 (1974). See also In Re Littell (1973), 260 Ind. 187, 294 N.E.2d 126.
. CONFERENCE ON JUDICIAL ETHICS, Univ. of Chicago Law School, Conf. Ser. 19, at 1, (1965).
. The evolution of formal rules of judicial conduct traced in the body of this opinion continues with the recent adoption of the Indiana Code of Judicial Conduct, which became effective January 1, 1975.
. IC 1971, 12-1-3-2, Ind. Ann. Stat. § 52-1118 provides in pertinent part:
"All members shall thereafter serve at the pleasure of the respective appointing authority: Provided, That no member shall be removed from such board except for misconduct, incapacity or neglect of duty after due notice in writing and hearing thereon before the appointing authority."
In State ex rel. Sedam v. Ripley Cir. Ct. (1973), 262 Ind. 19, 301 N.E.2d 185, 187, we held the above language required written notice of .specific allegations and a meaningful opportunity to be heard prior to removal.
. State ex rel. Sedam v. Ripley Cir. Ct. (1973), 262 Ind. 19, 301 N.E. 2d 185.
. State ex rel. Sedam v. Ripley Cir. Ct. (1973), 262 Ind. 25, 302 N.E.2d 761.
. IC 1971, 35-1-90-1, Ind. Ann. Stat. § 10-3801 provides:
"Whoever, having taken a lawful oath or affirmation in any matter in which, by law, an oath or affirmation may be required, shall, upon such oath or affirmation, swear or affirm wilfully, corruptly and falsely touching a matter material to the point in question, shall be deemed guilty of perjury, and, on conviction, shall be imprisoned in the state prison for not less than one [1] nor more than ten [10] years."
. Compare the ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE FUNCTION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE, approved Draft (1972), Standard 6.4, which provides:
"The trial judge he the exemplar of dignity and impartiality. He should exercise restraint over his conduct and utterances. He should suppress his personal predilections, and control his temper and emotions. He should not permit any person in the courtroom to embroil him in conflict, and he should otherwise avoid conduct on his part which tends to demean the proceedings or to undermine his authority in the courtroom. When it becomes necessary during the trial for him to comment upon the conduct of witnesses, spectators, counsel, or others, or upon the testimony, he should do so in a firm, dignified and restrained manner, avoiding repartee, limiting his comments and rulings to what is reasonably required for the orderly progress of the trial, and refraining from unnecessary disparagement of persons or issues."
. "Our disciplinary power . . . includes suspension . . . without pay, . . . ." In Re Evrard (1974), Ind., 317 N.E. 2d 841.