Case Name: REESE v. AULT
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1972-11-09
Citations: 229 Ga. 694
Docket Number: 27461
Parties: REESE v. AULT.
Judges: All the Justices concur, except Hawes and Gunter, JJ., who dissent.
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 229
Pages: 694–698

Head Matter:
27461.
REESE v. AULT.

Opinion:
Jordan, Justice.
Reese, petitioner in habeas corpus, appeals an order denying the writ and remanding him to custody.
In his petition he alleged that he was held under concurrent life sentences for two convictions of robbery in Thomas Superior Court in violation of his constitutional rights as follows: 1. The juries for indictment and trial were from lists compiled from a racially designated tax digest. 2. He was forced to participate in a pre-trial lineup without counsel. 3. He was subjected to continuous police interrogation and held incommunicado without benefit of counsel for over 48 hours "by the Monticello Sheriff Department of Jefferson County Florida." 4. He was subjected to an illegal arrest and search of his person, car, and suitcase. 5. He was returned to Georgia from Florida by Thomas County law enforcement officers without legal extradition. 6. He was forced and intimidated into making an illegal plea of nolo contendere to a capital offense by his appointed attorney without knowing the meaning of the plea. He sought, among other things, the assistance of an appointed counsel in the prosecution of his petition, and a subpoena of the jury clerk and jury commissioners of Thomas County, requiring them to appear with the 1966 Thomas County tax digest.
Before the scheduled hearing the respondent moved to dismiss, citing Code Ann. § 50-127 (10), and at the hearing submitted evidence of previous habeas corpus proceedings. An order dated April 3, 1969, in Case No. 5672, Tattnall Superior Court, discloses a determination that none of the constitutional rights of the petitioner had been violated, and that he was then serving concurrent life sentences imposed on October 27, 1966, and November 3, 1966. The hearing judge in that case also specifically determined that the petitioner was legally extradited from Florida, and that his rights were not violated in respect to interrogation. An order dated Novem ber 21, 1969, in Civil Action No. 880, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia, Thomasville Division, discloses a complete review of the record and transcript of the proceedings in Tattnall Superior Court, and a conclusion that the merits were resolved in the Tattnall Superior Court hearing, and that the action taken by that court was authorized. In his petition before the district court he alleged that he was illegally extradited, that he was held in custody in Thomas County without benefit of counsel or bail, that he was held incommunicado in Monticello, Florida, for over 48 hours and subjected to continuous interrogation without benefit of requested counsel, that his arrest and the search of his person and car were illegal, that the material seized was illegally used as evidence against him, that he was not provided with counsel who had adequate time to prepare a defense and advise him of his rights, and that he was placed in a pre-trial line-up without benefit of counsel. On April 19, 1971, his motion for leave to file a petition of habeas corpus was denied by the United States Supreme Court. Reese v. Smith, 402 U. S. 904 (91 SC 1397, 28 LE2d 663).
From a comparison of the contentions in the present proceeding with that of the other proceedings, it is clear that the only contention which is novel in the present proceeding is with respect to jury selection from a racially designated tax digest. The 1967 statute (Ga. L. 1967, pp. 835, 838; Code Ann. §50-127 (10)), provides specifically that "a subsequent application for a writ of habeas corpus . . . need not be entertained . . . unless the application alleges and is predicated upon a ground not adjudicated on the hearing of the earlier application . . . and unless the court is satisfied that the applicant has not on the earlier application deliberately withheld the newly asserted ground." It has been ruled time and again that a petitioner in habeas corpus attacking the illegality of detention pursuant to sentence for a crime is not entitled to appointed counsel. The petitioner appeared pro se in the court below at the hearing and it is clear from the transcript of the hearing that he conceded that his only new contention was his purported attack on jury selection. It also appears that he was fully apprised of the provisions of Code Ann. § 50-127 (10), but there is a total absence of any explanation on his part to afford the trial judge any basis for a determination that he had not previously deliberately withheld this newly asserted ground.
Submitted September 12, 1972
Decided November 9, 1972.
James X. Reese, pro se.
Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General, Harold N. Hill, Jr., Executive Assistant Attorney General, Courtney Wilder Stanton, William F. Bartee, Jr., Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.
Under the circumstances here shown the pleadings and record authorize the action of the trial judge and the appeal is without merit.
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur, except Hawes and Gunter, JJ., who dissent.