Case Name: MARGARET G. CLEGHORN, Appellant, v. PETER M. CLEGHORN, Respondent
Court: Supreme Court of California
Jurisdiction: California
Decision Date: 1885-01-10
Citations: 66 Cal. 309
Docket Number: No. 9,295
Parties: MARGARET G. CLEGHORN, Appellant, v. PETER M. CLEGHORN, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: California Reports
Volume: 66
Pages: 309–310

Head Matter:
[No. 9,295.
In Bank.
January 10, 1885.]
MARGARET G. CLEGHORN, Appellant, v. PETER M. CLEGHORN, Respondent.
Judge—Disqualification—Attorney for Party.—A judge is not disqualified from sitting at the trial of a cause, because, before bis election to the bench, he had been attorney for one of the parties in another action involving one of the issues in the case on trial.
Practice—Special Issues—Divorce.—In an action for divorce, it is optional with the judge to submit special issues to the jury or not. His refusal to submit them will not be reviewed on appeal.
Id.—Alimony—Discretion.—Pending an action for divorce, the court may, in its discretion, require the husband to pay to the wife any money necessary to enable her to prosecute or defend the action; and the appellate court will not interfere with such order, except in case of a clear abuse of discretion.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of the county of Tehama, and from an order refusing a new trial.
The facts sufficiently appear in the opinion of the court, and the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Myrick.
Chipman & Garter, for Appellant.
Joliet & Ellison, for Respondent.

Opinion:
The Court.
It happens that the judge before whom this cause was tried had been, before his election to the bench, the attorney of the defendant in an action which involved one of the issues in this case. But that did not disqualify him to sit in the trial of this action, in which he had not been the attorney of either party. (Code Civil Proc., § 170.) It was optional with the judge to submit special issues to the jury or not; and his refusal to submit them cannot be reviewed here. " While an action for divorce is pending, the court may, in its discretion, require the husband to pay any money necessary to enable the wife to prosecute or defend the action." (Civil Code, § 129.) It would only be in cases of a clear abuse of that discretion, that this court would be justified in interfering. This case is not within that category. We find no substantial errors in the ruling excepted to, and the evidence is conflicting on every material issue. Judgment and order affirmed.