Case Name: Phillip Martin COTITA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1980-02-22
Citations: 381 So. 2d 1146
Docket Number: No. II-224
Parties: Phillip Martin COTITA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: MELVIN, WOODROW M., Associate Judge, concurs; ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., J., dissents with an opinion.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 381
Pages: 1146–1154

Head Matter:
Phillip Martin COTITA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. II-224.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Feb. 22, 1980.
Rehearing Denied April 16, 1980.
John Peter Kirtz, Jr., and Owen E. Adams, Sr., Pensacola, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Michael H. Davidson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Opinion:
BOOTH, Judge.
This cause is before us on appeal from the final judgment of the Circuit Court, Escambia County, entered on a jury verdict finding defendant guilty of committing a lewd or lascivious act in violation of Florida Statute § 800.04 and sentencing him to fifteen years imprisonment. The victim of the offense was defendant's daughter, age five. The sole issue presented is whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of defendant's commission of similar offenses. The test of admissibility of such evidence is the rule of Williams v. State, [The Williams Case] that evidence is admissible "If found to be relevant for any purpose save that of showing bad character or propensity" of the accused and, evidence is relevant "if it bears a certain relation to the crime charged to the extent that it is relevant to a fact in issue . . . " Defendant contends that the evidence here was only relevant to show his bad character or propensity and should not have been admitted.
The testimony showed that defendant, his wife, a son age ten and a daughter age five, resided in a mobile home in a trailer park owned and managed by defendant's mother and father. Also residing in the trailer park in a nearby mobile home was the Bolton family who had two daughters, ages nine and eleven. The Bolton girls visited in defendant's trailer and watched television with the defendant, the victim and her brother.
At trial, the victim and her brother, who was present at the time of the commission of the offense charged, testified that appellant committed the offense on the day in question. Appellant's wife testified and, though not a witness to the commission of the offense, corroborated her children's testimony as to the events occurring prior to and immediately thereafter. In the course of their testimony, the victim's mother, referring to the illicit sex act committed on the daughter, used the word "again" and the victim's brother testified that he had seen it "before." On appeal, defendant contends there was error in admitting the testimony which referred, however briefly, to prior similar conduct of the accused with the victim.
Over defendant's objection, the State presented the testimony of Lisa Diane Bolton, a nine-year-old child, and her mother, Carolyn Bolton. The neighborhood child testified that defendant had committed the same type of sex act on her and her young sister in a shed in the trailer park and also in defendant's trailer within the preceding year.
Mrs. Bolton, mother of the two girls, testified that she became aware of several incidents between defendant arid her children; that she reported the incidents to defendant's wife and to his mother; that defendant's mother first asked her to move out of the trailer park and then offered to give her free rent if she would agree not to press charges against defendant. Defendant's mother denied negotiating with the neighbor to prevent charges being filed against her son but admitted that Mrs. Bolton told her "something . . . about Phillip's bothering the children" and admitted a "gift" of one. month's rent.
Defendant presented an alibi defense supported primarily by the testimony of his mother that defendant and his family had been in her home on the day and at the time of the commission of the offense charged. The testimony of defendant's mother, the most lengthy of any witness, was that her son's children were controlled by his wife and that she had overheard them being coached to testify against him. The testimony of defendant's mother, and to so,me extent that of his father, was directly in conflict with the testimony of the defendant's wife and children as to the alibi defense. The jury was required to resolve the conflict. Mrs. Bolton's testimony mitigated against crediting the testimony of defendant's mother both as to the alibi and as to the "coaching" charge. The Bolton incident indicated the lengths to which appellant's mother would go to protect her son against charges similar to the one on trial.
The evidence here was relevant to the alibi defense and in addition to establish "a pattern of criminality," a category of admissibility recognized by the Florida Supreme Court in The Williams Case and in Ashley v. State, 265 So.2d 685, 693 (Fla.1972). Evidence of prior illicit sex acts with the same children involved in the assault and rape prosecution was held properly admitted "to show a pattern of criminality" in Gossett v. State, 191 So.2d 281, 283 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1966), the court holding (191 So.2d at 283):
"We conclude that the trial judge had authority under Williams v. State, . and Talley v. State to permit the evidence of former acts of the two defendants in connection with the children involved in the instant case to show a pattern of criminality that makes the prior act relevant to the commission of the acts in question."
Closely related is Cantrell v. State, 193 So.2d 444 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1966), a prosecution for lewd and lascivious assault on an eight-year-old girl. Therein, evidence was admitted that defendant had previously committed similar acts against two other little girls who, like the victim, had been guests at defendant's backyard swimming pool. The court held the evidence admissible because it "established a course of conduct in the commission of the crime charged in the instant case." (193 So.2d 445)
Florida courts have stated other bases of relevancy in similar cases. In Summit v. State, 285 So.2d 670 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1973), evidence of prior similar lewd and lascivious acts against the victim of the offense charged and against her sistér was. held properly admitted, the court holding (285 So.2d at 670):
"[W]e find the testimony of the victim and her sister regarding prior similar conduct on the part of the defendant with 'them to show the character of the deed as to motive and intent to be relevant and admissible."
In Ross v. State, 112 So.2d 69 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1959), the court affirmed a conviction of lewd and lascivious assault against an eleven-year-old girl, and the admissibility of testimony that defendant had committed a similar offense against a similar victim, holding (112 So.2d at 70):
"We hold against the contentions of appellant regarding the testimony of the other girl who at the time or times in- ' volved was 10 or 11 years old. Testimony of the latter to the effect that appellant had fondled her in a lewd and lascivious manner was presented by the state to show the character of the deed as to motive, intent and absence of mistake, for which it was relevant and admissible
In Andrews v. State, 172 So.2d 505 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965), evidence that defendant had committed similar illicit sex acts against one other than the victim of the offense charged was held admissible, this court holding (172 So.2d at 507):
"The testimony concerning the subsequent offense is to the effect that it was committed against a person in an age group comparable to that of the victim named in the charge, at the same place, and under circumstances almost identical to those connected with the offense charged. The similar fact evidence in this cause was clearly relevant in its bearing on defendant's identity, intent, plan and design, as well as to show lack of inadvertence; and it meets the test of admissibility."
More recently, in Owens v. State, 361 So.2d 224 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), this court affirmed a conviction under the same statute here involved for a lewd and lascivious assault by a father on his stepdaughter, a child under the age of fourteen years. In that case, the trial court admitted testimony of the stepdaughter and her mother as to a similar incident of fondling which had occurred six days before the offense charged. This court held (361 So.2d at 225):
"The testimony objected to tended to prove motive, 'which inquires into the accused's reason for acting as charged and suggests that because he had a specific reason to commit the offense he did so.' . . . The trial judge acted within sound discretion in deciding that the legitimate purpose of the evidence outweighed its inherent prejudice . . . " (citations omitted)
Here, we note a close similarity in victims, locale, sex act and a similar parental or custodial relationship between the accused and the victims. We find no merit in defendant's contention that The Williams Rule precludes collateral crime or similar fact evidence except where the defendant's identity is at issue. In The Williams Case itself, identity was not contested. There, the defendant took the stand, admitted sexual relations with the victim, but claimed consent and testified that the ice pick wound to the victim's chest was accidental. Evidence that six months earlier the defendant had been apprehended in connection with an aborted assault on another similar victim was held properly admissible, inter alia, "to meet the anticipated defense of consent."
The Williams Case holds that logic, common sense and "the infinite variety of human activities" precludes a listing of all categories of relevancy. The Supreme Court in Williams disapproves prior opinions which required relevant evidence be fitted into some previously recognized exception in order to be admissible, stating (110 So.2d at 659):
"The objectionable feature of this approach is that seemingly the fundamental principle of logical relevancy is abandoned. In its place is substituted a search for an exception under which the evidence becomes admissible but which will be discovered only if out of the infinite variety of human activities a case has arisen in which some court has held it so."
The above quote states the rationale of Williams in rejecting what is termed by a leading and much cited authority, Julius Stone, as the "spurious rule", to wit:
"A much broader spurious rule excluding all similar facts except those falling within a few closed categories settled by earlier decisions."
The proper or "original rule," as termed by Stone, is a narrower rule which excludes "only evidence that is relevant merely to propensity," and is contrasted as follows:
"The original rule admits evidence relevant to any of the innumerable issues which can arise out of the infinitely variable circumstances of men's behavior. The spurious rule only admits relevant evidence when it is within one of the list of exceptions to the general rule of exclusion. If not within those categories it is inadmissible however relevant it be, for it is caught by the residual rule excluding all evidence of other offenses. A court which is applying the spurious rule will exclude evidence clearly, even overwhelmingly, relevant to an issue other than propensity, because it finds difficulty in fitting the case into the rigid category."
Stone further notes that in sex crime cases where identity is not at issue, the spurious rule "becomes little short of an absolute unqualified rule of exclusion," a result avoided in spurious rule jurisdictions by recognition of a special exception for sex crimes.
Florida under the Williams Case follows the original and better reasoned rule, which makes no special exception for any type of crime. The familiar categories stated as the basis of admissibility of similar fact evidence "are given by way of example and not by way of limitation." In sex crimes cases the courts of this State have allowed relevant similar fact evidence involving the same victim and involving a different victim. The evidence has been held admissible for a variety of reasons depending on the facts and issues involved, as in trial of other crimes.
Similar fact evidence has been properly disallowed where its probative value was slight or where its effect was unduly prejudicial. In Knox v. State, 361 So.2d 799 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), this court correctly reversed a conviction under Florida Statute § 800.04. In that case the defendant was charged with a specific sex offense against his thirteen-year-old stepdaughter, stated to have occurred on May 21. The State's evidence at trial was that the offense charged, as described by the prosecutor in his opening remarks, was committed the night of May 22, but another offense against the daughter had occurred on May 21, within the time specified by the statement of particulars. In reversing and remanding for a new trial this court held (361 So.2d at 800):
"Appellant claims first that it was a violation of the ' Williams Rule' for the State to present evidence of the May 22 incident throughout his trial on the May 21 incident. We agree. It is obvious on this record that the State's confusion about the date of the incident witnessed by the mother led to the admission of the evidence on the subsequent incident which was highly prejudicial to the appellant in defending against the charge on the May 21 [incident]."
The admission of evidence of other offenses against the same victim in Knox combined with the variance between the offense charged and the offense proved to nullify defendant's alibi and to deprive him of a fair trial. Other language in the opinion, beyond the holding of the case, to the extent inconsistent herewith, is disapproved.
Great care has been exercised by the courts of this State following the mandates of The Williams Case to "cautiously scrutinize" such evidence, and of the subsequent Williams v. State case that the collateral offense not become a feature at the trial. The record here establishes that the trial court conscientiously followed both man-' dates.
Accordingly, the judgment below is AFFIRMED.
MELVIN, WOODROW M., Associate Judge, concurs; ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., J., dissents with an opinion.
. Information dated May 23, 1977:
. . did unlawfully and knowingly commit a lewd or lascivious act on Valerie Cotita, a child of the age of five years, by fondling and/or placing his mouth upon her vagina, but without the intent to commit Involuntary Sexual Battery, in violation of Florida Statute 800.04."
. 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.1959), cert. denied 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959).
. Id. at 661, 662:
"[T]he rule is consistently announced that whether the evidence tends to exculpate or convict, if it is relevant; that is, if it bears a certain relation to the crime charged to the t extent that it is relevant to a fact in issue, such evidence is admissible.
# S(!
"If found to be relevant for any purpose save - that of showing bad character or propensity, then it should be admitted." (emphasis theirs)
. Transcript of Record, pp. 67, 78.
. Although there is no clear objection to this testimony on the record, defendant contends it was covered by a standing,' but unreported, objection made at the beginning of trial, which was referred to on page 115 of the transcript.
. The State proffered a receipt of the transaction with defendant's mother wherein Mrs. Bolton agreed she "will not in the future press any charges against Phillip Cotita."
In an abundance of caution, to prevent the Bolton incident from becoming a "feature" of the trial, the trial court disallowed this evidence.
.Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654, 662 (Fla.1959).
. 160 Fla. 593, 36 So.2d 201 (1948).
. 110 So.2d at 659.
. Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: America, 51 Harv.L.Rev. 988, 989 (1938).
. Id. at 1004.
. Id. at 1006.
. Id. at 1012.
. Id. at 1016.
. Franklin v. State, 229 So.2d 892, 894 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969); McCormick, Evidence § 190 at 447 (1972 Ed.): "[T]he range of relevancy outside the ban is almost infinite."
.SAME VICTIM: Clark v. State, 266 So.2d 687 (Fla. 1st DCA 1972), cert. denied 270 So.2d 21 (Fla.1972), incest conviction affirmed and evidence of prior sexual relations between father and daughter properly allowed; Newsome v. State, 355 So.2d 483 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1978), evidence of prior rape of same victim properly admitted in trial for burglary and assault with intent to commit a felony, as relevant to show intent to commit sexual battery; Whiteman v. State, 343 So.2d 1340 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1977), cert. denied 353 So.2d 681 (Fla.1977), convic tion of sexual battery by uncle/guardian against niece/ward, age 17, upheld where evidence showed sexual relations beginning when victim was age 9; Summit v. State, 285 So.2d 670 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973), prior lewd assaults against victim and her sister held properly admitted and conviction affirmed; Gossett v. State, 191 So.2d 281 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1966), convictions of assault and rape of children affirmed where evidence admitted of former sex acts on same victim showing pattern of criminality.
.DIFFERENT VICTIM: Wilson v. State, 330 So.2d 457 (Fla.1976), conviction of rape affirmed where extensive testimony allowed of separate collateral crime showing pattern of similar conduct; Alford v. State, 307 So.2d 433 (Fla.1975), cert. denied 429 U.S. 873, 97 S.Ct. 191, 50 L.Ed.2d 155 (1976), affirming conviction of rape and murder and holding evidence of defendant's attempted homosexual act shortly prior to commission of rape was properly admitted; Dean v. State, 277 So.2d 13 (Fla.1973), affirming rape conviction and upholding admission of testimony of four other rape victims showing system or general pattern of criminality; Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.1959), cert. denied 361 U.S. 847 (1959), rape conviction affirmed and evidence of prior aborted attempt on another similar victim properly allowed; Talley v. State, 160 Fla. 593, 36 So.2d 201 (1948), rape conviction affirmed where five other women testified as to defendant's approach which was similar to that of victim of the crime charged; Nathey v. State, 275 So.2d 589 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973), cert. denied 279 So.2d 881 (Fla.1973), conviction of rape of defendant's 11-year-old daughter upheld despite admission of evidence of sex offenses by defendant against three other daughters; Pendleton v. State, 348 So.2d 1206 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), conviction of sexual battery affirmed and testimony of two other women similarly attacked by defendant properly admitted to "corroborate" testimony of victim; Summit v. State, 285 So.2d 670 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973), prior lewd assaults against both the victim and her sister held properly admitted in trial under Florida Statute § 800.04; Cantrell v. State, 193 So.2d 444 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1966), prior lewd assaults against two similar victims properly admitted; Ross v. State, 112 So.2d 69 (Fla. 3d DCA 1959), conviction of lewd and lascivious assault against 11-year-old girl upheld and evidence of prior similar acts against another similar victim properly admitted.
. In general, evidence of prior sex offenses against the same victim of the sex offense charged is permitted by "nearly all courts.". Underhill, Criminal Evidence, § 212 at 647, and cases cited therein; 22A CJS, Criminal Law, § 691(29), (31) at 876, 879.
. 117 So.2d 473 (Fla.1960).
. Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of Similar Fact Evidence: England, 46 Harv.L.Rev. 954, 984 (1933):
"This wide divergence [in circumstances of each case] explains the failure of all attempts to create categories of admissibility. Mitigation of the evil must be sought in other directions .
*
"[T]he trial judge should be recognized to have a discretion to decide whether the probative weight of the proffered evidence outweighs its mere prejudice . Appellate courts should hesitate to establish rules pertaining to discretion of the tribunal which really has the situation before it."