Case Name: CITY OF NEWARK, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. JOHN DALY, AGENT, AND N. J. AUTOMATIC DAIRY SERVICE, INC., DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
Court: New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1964-12-10
Citations: 85 N.J. Super. 555
Docket Number: 
Parties: CITY OF NEWARK, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. JOHN DALY, AGENT, AND N. J. AUTOMATIC DAIRY SERVICE, INC., DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Superior Court Reports
Volume: 85
Pages: 555–566

Head Matter:
CITY OF NEWARK, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. JOHN DALY, AGENT, AND N. J. AUTOMATIC DAIRY SERVICE, INC., DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.
Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division
Argued November 9, 1964
Decided December 10, 1964.
Conford, S. J. A. D., dissented.
Before Judges Coneokd, Kilkenny and Lewis.
Mr. Allen Bavin argued the cause for appellants (Messrs. Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer, attorneys; Mr. David M. Pindar, of counsel).
Mr. Joseph 8. Pécora argued the cause for respondent (Mr. Norman N. Schiff, attorney).

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Kilkenny, J. A. D.
Is a single coin-operated milk vending machine in the basement of a 400-family, high-rise modern apartment house, for the use of the tenants therein, a violation of the city zoning ordinance which limits the use of property in this residential district to multiple dwellings and hotels ? That is the legal question before us in this appeal.
Both the Municipal Court of Newark and the Essex County Court, on appeal, found defendants guilty of violating the ordinance by reason of their placing such a machine in each of five multiple dwellings, housing a total of 2,038 tenants in this large apartment house complex known as "Ivy ITill." They were each fined a total of $500, or $100 for each milk vending machine so installed without having obtained a variance or certificate of occupancy. Defendant Daly, acting as agent of the owner of the apartment houses, permitted installation of the machines by the codefendant. Each machine had the required board of health license.
Defendants appeal from the County Court judgment of conviction. They contend that the maintenance of a coin-operated milk vending machine at the locations involved in this case is an accessory use under a proper application of zoning law and, accordingly, not a violation of the zoning ordinance.
The precise question herein has not been previously answered in any reported decision in our State or, so far as we know, in any unpublished opinion of our appellate courts. The issue was presented to the Law Division several years ago in the form of a proceeding in lieu of prerogative writs to review a determination of the Board of Adjustment of Newark, denying an application by the owner of these apartment houses for a variance to permit the placing of such machines in these multiple dwellings. The action of the board of adjustment was affirmed by the Law Division and no appeal was taken from that judgment. In an unpublished letter opinion, dated January 23, 1957, Judge Colie then ruled that "the placing of these vending machines in the basement of the premises in question constitutes a business operation" prohibited under the ordinance. The judge relied upon a statement in Gilbert v. Town of Irvington, 20 N. J. 432, 438 (1956), in which the Supreme Court, in declaring invalid a local ordinance which required payment of an annual license fee of $100 for each milk vending machine in the municipality, held that the fee was excessive and discriminatory, noting that the operators of such machines "are in direct competition with other vendors of milk."
The Court of Appeals of New York was faced with the question before us in Dellwood Dairy Co. v. City of New Rochelle, 7 N. Y. 2d 374, 197 N. Y. S. 2d 719, 165 N. E. 2d 566 (1960), and decided that a milk vending machine was a proper accessory use of an apartment house located in a residential zone. In doing so, it reversed an earlier decision of the Appellate Division to the contrary. 7 A. D. 2d 1026, 184 N. Y. S. 2d 656 (1959). The reasoning of the New York Court of Appeals is summed up in the following excerpt from its opinion:
"[T]he use of a milk vending machine is but a different method of doing a traditional service for a householder. It is a common experience that new times bring not only new problems but new ways and means of dealing with old ones. The presence of a milk vending machine in the basement of an apartment building which is not accessible to the general public, can have little, if any, adverse application to the character of the residential neighborhood. It is not commercialism such as ordinarily disturbs the quiet and peaceful enjoyment of the home but, rather, the convenient substitute for the route man. It is a device designed to perform 'a use customarily incidental and subordinate' to the normal enjoyment of an apartment house." (197 N. Y. S. 2d, at p. 720, 165 N. E. 2d, at p. 567).
We are persuaded that this rationale represents a reasonable common-sense approach to the problem.
Another earlier New York case, also upholding the right to have a milk vending machine in an apartment house, is Tarr v. City of New York, 12 Misc. 2d 796, 177 N. Y. S. 2d 466 (Sup. Ct. 1957). See, too, People v. Page, 36 Misc. 2d 840, 234 N. Y. S. 2d 518 (N. Y. City Crim. Ct. 1962), which relied upon Dellwood in extending the doctrine to machines for the vending of soda and bakery products.
In finding defendants guilty, the County Court relied principally upon our decision in Zahn v. Newark Board of Adjust- merit, 4.5 N. J. Super. 516 (App. Div. 1954), in which we held that a dry-cleaning pickup depot in the basement of these same Ivy Hill apartments contravened the zoning ordinance as an unwarranted business use in this residential district. But in Zahn the objective evidence of a business use of a portion of these residential buildings was much more manifest than in the instant situation. In that case, not only was a portion of the basement allocated for this business purpose, but also there was an employee of the business operator in attendance to receive the tenants' clothing for off-site cleaning and there were racks, a counter, a cash register, person-to-person money transactions, and all the indicia of a dry-cleaning establishment being conducted on the premises, except the actual dry-cleaning work itself.
In the instant case there is, to be true, a business use of the premises in the sense that milk is sold and bought through the means of this automatic mechanical device. But the machine herein is not such an objectively obvious business operation as in Zahn. It is an unobtrusive business instrumentality, serving solely the needs and convenience of the tenants and supplementing the door-to-door delivery of milk by the route man in the same building, in the same residential neighborhood. As the New York court aptly phrased it in Dellwood, as noted above, "It is not commercialism such as ordinarily disturbs the quiet and peaceful enjoyment of the home but, rather the convenient substitute for the route man."
To refer to a particular use in a residential district as a "business use" is not per se sufficient to stamp it as a violation of the zoning ordinance. There are many business uses in buildings limited by the zoning ordinance to a residential use which nobody regards as in contravention of the zoning limitation. Operation of an apartment house is in itself a business. Many modern apartment houses are equipped with up-to-date basement laundries where automatic, coin-operated washing machines and dryers are used by the tenants to fulfill that necessary household chore. The utility companies sell their water, gas, electrical energy and telephone service in residential buildings. A basement telephone pay booth for the use of tenants who have no telephone in their own apartments would not be regarded as a zoning violation. And how about postage vending machines? The hired baby-sitters carry on their business within the building, as do the various tradesmen who cater to the wants of the occupants. The most recent high-rise luxurious apartment houses are equipped with swimming pools and skating rinks, with all the dressing room and locker facilities incidental thereto. Presumably, these entail some fees or charges. If and when "Pay T-V" comes into common use in New Jersey, as it already exists in other-parts of the country, we would hardly treat such a commercial venture in a residential building as a zoning violation.
We find no useful purpose herein in an extended analysis of the meaning of "accessory use." That subject has received full development in many prior decisions. See Zalin v. Newark Board of Adjustment, supra; 1 Rathkopf, Law of Zoning and Planning (3d ed. I960), pp. 23-1 et seq. and his reference to milk vending machines at pp. 23-41, 42. Each ease must be determined on the basis of its own particular facts. Decisions such as Skinner v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, Cherry Hill Tp., 80 N. J. Super. 380 (App. Div. 1963) and Wright v. Vogt, 7 N. J. 1 (1951), reiterate general principles but they are of no particular help here, dealing as they do with the pursuit of a hobby as an accessory use in a residential district. As we said recently in Borough of Northvale v. Blundo, 85 N. J. Super. 56, 59 (App. Div. 1964), even where the ordinance, as here, does not speak in terms of a use accessory to the residence use, "[A]n accessory use must ordinarily be implied—as a matter of law—as a right which accompanies the principal use." In the words of the Zalin case, supra, 45 N. J. Super., at p. 521, the allowance of a primary use "generally authorizes all uses normally accessory, auxiliary or incidental thereto."
The use of the word "customarily," when applied to "incidental," may be helpful to establish affirmatively the existence of a use as "accessory." But the fact that a use is not "customarily" indulged in is not conclusive. Thus, private garages are customarily used in connection with residences and are deemed to be an accessory use in a residential zone. But private swimming pools also are an accessory use in a residential zone, even though very few residents in many residential areas customarily have them. In the instant case there was evidence that less than 5% of the apartment houses in the general area of Newark have milk vending machines. The small percentage may be due to various factors—doubt as to the legality of the use, the newness of the idea, or the lack of economic feasibility except in large multiple dwellings. Proof of a greater percentage would have tended to establish affirmatively that these machines were customarily incidental to apartment house operation. But the fact of a relatively small percentage of milk vending machine use in apartment houses does not per se preclude a holding that, at least in those multiple dwellings where they are in actual use, such machines are reasonably accessory, incidental and subordinate to the principal use of the residents in such dwellings.
There may be some fear that our allowance of a milk vending machine in a large apartment house will open the door to an unlimited use of similar mechanical devices in residential buildings, so that the basements of such multiple dwellings may be turned into coin-operated markets and department stores. We would not go as far, under the existing ordinance, as the Illinois court did in Kushner v. Lawton, 351 Ill. App. 422, 115 N. E. 2d 581 (App. Ct. 1953), which authorized a retail food store in a large apartment building housing almost 2,000 tenants. To allay such fear, we emphasize that our decision herein is limited to a milk vending machine, a matter sui generis, and is based on the rationale of Dellwood, supra. It is not our function herein to decide anything more than the precise question first noted above. Secondly, any expanded use of apartment house basements through the medium of coin-operated machines may be curbed or regulated by the municipal authorities by the adoption of suitable ordinances. Third, it is to be presumed that the owners of multiple dwellings will not destroy the residential character of their buildings by saturating them with a commercial atmosphere.
For the reasons above stated, the judgments of conviction are reversed.