Case Name: John Leppla vs. Frank J. Mackey and another, impleaded, etc.
Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Minnesota
Decision Date: 1883-07-25
Citations: 31 Minn. 75
Docket Number: 
Parties: John Leppla vs. Frank J. Mackey and another, impleaded, etc.
Judges: 
Reporter: Minnesota Reports
Volume: 31
Pages: 75–77

Head Matter:
John Leppla vs. Frank J. Mackey and another, impleaded, etc.
July 25, 1883.
Lease — Covenant with Condition in favor of Lessor’s Assigns. — A covenant in a lease for a renewal of the term, unless the party of the ñrst part (lessor) wishes the land for building purposes, construed as a condition in favor, not only of the lessor, but of his assigns. The grantee of the reversion from the lessor might decline to renew the lease if ho desired to use the land for building purposes.
The plaintiff brought this action in the district court for Hennepin county, to compel the execution by defendants of a lease of certain land, in accordance with the terms of a prior lease mentioned in the opinion. The action was tried by Shaw, J., without a jury, and judgment ordered and entered for defendants, from which the plaintiff appeals.
Canty & Johnson, for appellant.
Covenants for renewal in a lease run with the land, whether assignees are named or not. Wood’s Landlord & Tenant, 505, 666; 1 Smith, Lead. Cas. 122; 1 Washburn on Real Prop. 500; Piggot v. Mason, 1 Paige, 412; Vernon v. Smith, 5 B. & Ald. 1.
At common law, only the benefit, and not the burden, of covenants ran with the land, and the covenants did not run with the reversion. 1 Smith, Lead. Cas. 110-113, 120, 123-133; 1 Washburn on Real Prop. 455, 475; 2 Id. 13, 14; Cronin v. Watkins, 1 Tenn. Ch. 119. The common law was changed by Stat. 32 Hen. 8, c. 34, which will be found in 1 Smith, Lead. Cas. 120. This statute was construed in Spencer's Case, 1 Smith, Lead. Cas. 115, and the construction then put on the statute has ever since been followed. Under this decision, the condition in this case, “unless the party of the first part wishes the land for building purposes,” relates to something not in esse, and will not run with the reversion unless the assigns of the lessor are named. Wood’s Landlord & Tenant, 500, 501; 1 Washburn on Real Prop. 501; Hansen v. Meyer, 81 Ill. 321; Tallman v. Coffin, 4 N. Y. 134; Coffin v. Tallman, 8 N. Y. 465; Masury v. South worth, 9 Ohio St. 340; Cronin v. Watkins, 1 Tenn. Ch. 119; Bream v. Dickerson, 21 Tenn. 126; Stevens v. Copp, L. R. 4 Ex. 20; Lucas v. How, Raymond, 250; Griffith v. Pritchard, 5 B. & Ad. 765.
Every doubtful grant is construed most strongly against the grantor. Wood’s Landlord & Tenant, 109; Webb v. Dixon, 9 East, 15. Conditions are strictly construed, and the condition in this case can only be satisfied by the original lessor, and if he, by transferring his interest in the property, has deprived himself of the right to fulfil and enforce it, it becomes of no account.
Koon & Keith and Shaw & Cray, for respondents.

Opinion:
Dickinson, J.
Harmon leased land, of which he was the owner, to Slosson, for the term of three years, "with the right," as expressed in the lease, "to the said second party to a renewal of this lease at the same yearly rental, and subject to the same conditions as herein, for the further term of two years, unless the party of the first part wishes the piece of land for building purposes." During the term of the lease, the lessee assigned his interest to the plaintiff. The lessor conveyed the land to the defendant Mackey, who, desiring to use the land' for building purposes, declined to renew the lease. The case only calls for a determination of the legal rights and obligations of the parties respecting a renewal of the lease.
Although the covenant for a renewal of the lease was made in terms merely in favor of the lessee, it is well settled that such a covenant runs with the land to one who, by assignment, comes to stand in the place of the covenantee. And, since the covenant runs with the land, it is obligatory, not only upon the covenantor, but upon his grantee. The legal effect of the covenant is hence clearly the same as if it read, "with the right to the said second party or his assigns to a renewal of this lease from the party of the first part or his assigns, unless the party of the first part wishes the piece of land for building purposes." Neither by the assignment to the plaintiff, nor by the grant to the defendant Mackey, was the covenant for renewal discharged of the condition which was a part of it.
The only question in the case is as to the construction to be placed upon the terms of the condition. We seek to arrive at the intention of the contracting parties from a consideration of the terms in which their agreement is expressed. They are to be deemed to have understood that this covenant would be binding upon, and its performance might be enforced against, not only the then owner of the land, the lessor, but as well his heirs or grantees. In the light of this fact, we cannot reasonably construe the contract either as expressing the intention that the right to a renewal of the lease, in the event of a sale of the property by tlip^essor, or in the event of his death, should be still dejiendent upon his election to use the land, nor that, by such death or alienation, the substantial terms of the covenant should be so changed as to be no longer subject to any condition, and that the-succeeding owner of the property should have no option, but must grant a renewal of the lease, although he might wish to build upon the land. We construe the clause as a condition inseparable from the covenant of which it is an integral part, and that it has the effect to reserve to the grantee of the reversion the same right of election-that his grantor, the plaintiff's lessor, had.
Judgment affirmed.
Mitchell, J., did not hear the argument or take part in the decision of this case.