Case Name: SUMMERS v. GEER
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1907-12-19
Citations: 50 Or. 249
Docket Number: 
Parties: SUMMERS v. GEER.
Judges: 
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 50
Pages: 249–259

Head Matter:
Argued 10 October,
decided 19 December, 1907.
SUMMERS v. GEER.
85 Pac. 513, 93 Pac. 133.
Appeal—Notice—Sufficiency—Judgment—Surplusage.
1. A reference in a notice of appeal from a j udgment to the entry of the judgment in the “judgment docket,” while Section 196, B. & 0. Oomp., requires the recording of judgments in the journal, which is, by section 583, a book in which the clerk must enter the proceedings of the court in term time, is a misdescription of the record intended, and may be disregarded as surplusage in determining the sufficiency of the notice.
Same—Description op Party—Sufficiency.
2. A defect in a notice of appeal, arising from the failure to state that the person named in the notice as appealing is the defeated party in the action, is not fatal, identity of the person being established under Section 788, subd. 25, B. & O. Oomp., from the identity of name.
Same—Requisites of Notice.
3. A notice of appeal from a judgment containing the name of the court and the parties, and reciting that the defeated party appeals from a judgment rendered and “entered of record in the above-entitled court, wherein and whereby it was ordered and adjudged substantially as follows,” followed by the judgment appealed from, is sufficient under Section 549, B. & O. Oomp., providing that a notice of appeal shall be sufficient if it contains the title of the cause, the name of the parties, and notifies the adverse party that an appeal is taken from the judgment, though the omission from the notice of the words “and cause” after the phrase “in the above-entitled court,” creates a doubt as to whether the judgment complained of was rendered in the case at bar, and though the word “ substantially ” qualifying the words “ordered and adjudged ” makes uncertain what purports to be the judgment attempted to be reviewed.
Public Lands—Disposal—Offices of Commissioner and Agent.
4. The Governor was made land commissioner in 1878, by Hill’s Ann. Laws 1892, section 3595, with power to locate all lands to which the State was entitled. Subsequently, by Act February 18,1899 (Laws 1899, p. 156), which repealed section 8597 and its amendments of 1895 (Laws 1895, p. 7) and 1899 (Laws 1899, p. 94), providing for an agent’s appointment and fixing his duties, the Governor was made land commissioner, with authority to appoint such agents as might be necessary in the performance of his duties, the agents thus having no specified duties other than to aid the commissioner in locating the lands. Held, that the commissioner and agents were not agents of the State for the sale of state lands, and, in an action against them for defrauding a person desiring to buy state lands, allegations that they neglected to prepare and keep for public use a list of base land, and that they refused to receive applications for the purchase of indemnity land, etc., are immaterial, since those matters were not within their duties.
Authority to Sell Land—Selling Lieu Land Not Yet Selected.
5. Hill’s Ann. Laws 1892, section 3597, as amended in 1895 (Laws 1895, p. 7), makes it a duty of the State Land Board to proceed immediately to select lieu lands and perfect title thereto in the State, and keep a list of such as are for sale, etc. Section 3296, B. & 0. Comp, (amendment of 1899), provides that applications to purchase state lands can be made only to the State Land Board by filing the application with its clerk. Hill’s Ann. Laws 1892, section 3619, authorizing a prospective purchaser to ascertain lands lost to the State, and have the land board select other lands desired by him in lieu thereof, was repealed in 1895, since which time the law has not contemplated sales of indemnity lands or applications for their purchase until they have been selected and title perfected in the State. Held, that the land agent or board has no authority to make contracts for the State to sell lieu land not yet selected and to which title has not been perfected, and, if it were optional with the state land agent or board to select such lieu land as a prospective purchaser suggests, upon base to be established by the purchaser, board or agent, the approval by the United States Land Department of the selection would be at the applicant’s risk.
Fraud—Action—Complaint—Sufficiency.
6. In an action for fraud against a state land commissioner and agents, a count of a complaint which alleges that plaintiff was led by two of the defendants to buy information of the other that certain school sections lost to the State were mineral in character, when, in fact, they were not mineral in character, and the information was false, and that having selected lieu land thereon, his application was not approved by the United States Land Department, but does not allege that the defendants by whom he was induced to purchase the information, knew the kind of information possessed by the one selling it, nor in any way became liable as guarantors of or parties to the representations made him, does not state a cause of action against them.
Pleading—Duplicity.
7. A count of a complaint in an action for fraud alleged that one of the defendants, a state land agent, with intent to defraud plaintiff, falsely represented himself to be in possession of private records and Information as to mineral lands for which the State was entitled to indemnity selections, which information he offered to sell to plaintiff, and pretended that for a certain sum he would furnish to the other land agent for plaintiff’s information as to the whereabouts of certain available mineral base land for which indemnity lands were due the State, and which would be approved by the Land Department and Secretary of the Interior, all of which was done with knowledge of its falsity, and that he thereby fraudulently obtained plaintiff’s money. Held, that, though the terms of a contract are set up as constituting part of the means by which the fraud was consummated, the count was not duplicitous, since recovery was sought only upon the fraud and deceit, while to render a pleading duplicitous it must appear that two or more causes of action are relied upon for a single recovery.
Decided 29 May, 1906.
85 Pac. 513.
From Marion: George H. Burnett, Judge.
Action bjr George Summers against T. T. Geer, L. B. Geer and W. H. Odell, to recover money obtained from plaintiff by fraud and deceit. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiff a.ppeals.
A motion to dismiss the appeal was denied.
Motion Overruled: Affirmed as to T. T. Geer and L. B. Geer: Beversed and Bemanded as to W. H. Odell.
Mr. George G. Bingham and Mr. John W. Reynolds, for the motion.
Mr. Myron E. Pogue, contra.

Opinion:
On Motion to Dismiss the Appeal.
Per Curiam:
This is a motion to dismiss an appeal. The notice of appeal, by referring to the first page of the transcript for the title and names of the parties, is as follows:
"In the Circuit Court of the State of Oregon for the County of Marion. Department No. 1. George Summers, Plaintiff, v. T. T. Geer, L. B. Geer, and W. H. Odell, Defendants. To T. T. Geer and to George G. Bingham, Your Attorney of Becord, and to L. B. Geer and to George G. Bingham, Your Attorney, and to W. H. Odell and to A. 0. Condit and John W. Beynolds, Your Attorneys of Becord, in the Above-Entitled Action:» You and each of you are hereby notified, and you will hereby please take notice that the plaintiff, George Summers, hereby appeals to the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon from that certain judgment made, rendered and entered of record in the above-entitled court on the 10th day of July, 1905, at page 405, of Book 24, Judgment Docket for Marion County, Or., wherein and whereby it was ordered and adjudged substantially as follows:
Now on this 10th day of July, 1905, this cause coming on to be heard, plaintiff appearing by M. E. Pogue, his attorney, and the defendant T. T. Geer appearing by George G. Bingham, his attorney, and the defendant L. B. Geer appearing by George G. Bingham, his attorney, and the defendant W. H. Odell appearing by A. O. Condit and John W. Beynolds, his attorneys, and now at this time the plaintiff, by M. E. Pogue, his attorney, announcing to the court that he did not desire to file a second amended complaint, and that lie was satisfied with and could stand'on his first amended complaint, and the defendants by their attorneys now move the court for a judgment of dismissal for the failure on the part of plaintiff to file a second amended complaint, and it appearing to the court that the defendants' motion should be allowed, it is therefore ordered and adjudged that plaintiff's action be, and the same is, hereby dismissed, and that the defendants each recover of and from the plaintiff their costs and disbursements herein expended and taxed and allowed at $46.00'—and from the whole and every part of said judgment. M. B. Pogue, Attorney for Plaintiff."
1. When the notice of appeal is not given in open court, its adequacy is tested by the following rule: "Such notice shall be sufficient if it contains the 'title of the cause, the names of the parties, and notifies the adverse party or his attorney that an appeal is taken to the supreme or circuit court, as the case may be, from the judgment, order, or decree, or some specified part thereof": Section 549, JB. & C. Comp. As all judgments of the circuit court are required to be recorded in the journal (Id. Section 196), which is a book in which the clerk must enter the proceedings of the court in term time (Id. Section 583), the reference in the notice of appeal to the entry o'f the judgment in the "Judgment Docket" is probably a misdescription of the record intended and all allusion to it may be disregarded as surplusage.
'2. It is not stated that the George Summers mentioned in the notice of appeal is the plaintiff in this 'action. This defect is not fatal for certainty to a common intent in general (5 Am. & Eng. Ene. Law, 2 ed., 799) is the degree of indubitableness required which permits invoking the presumption, that the identity of a person may be established from the identity of name; Section 788, subd. 25, B. & C. Comp.
, 3. The omission from the notice of the words "and cause" after the phrase "in the above-entitled court" creates a doubt as to whether the judgment complained of was rendered in the case at bar. So, too, the word "substantially," used to qualify the verbs "ordered" and "adjudged," makes uncertain what purports to be the judgment attempted to be reviewed, although the language employed is designated by quotation marks. "The punctuation of an instrument," says Mr. Tiffany (17 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 2 ed., 20), "may be considered when the meaning is doubtful." By rejecting the repugnant words mentioned and applying the rules of construction specified, the notice of appeal assailed comes within the very liberal provisions of the statute regulating its sufficiency.
Decided 17 December, 1907.
93 Pac. 133.
For appellant there was a brief and an oral argument by Mr. Myron E. Rogue.
For respondent there was a brief over the names of Mr. George G. Bingham, Mr. John W. Reynolds and Mr. Alva 0. Gondit, with oral arguments by Mr. Bingham and Mr. Reynolds.
The motion should therefore be denied, and it is so ordered.
Motion Overruled.