Case Name: Succession of Patricia Gay MYDLAND a/k/a Emma Gay Wood Gaddis
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1995-03-03
Citations: 653 So. 2d 8
Docket Number: No. 94 CA 0501
Parties: Succession of Patricia Gay MYDLAND a/k/a Emma Gay Wood Gaddis.
Judges: Before GONZALES, PARRO and REDMANN, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 653
Pages: 8–14

Head Matter:
Succession of Patricia Gay MYDLAND a/k/a Emma Gay Wood Gaddis.
No. 94 CA 0501.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
March 3, 1995.
Rehearing Denied May 2, 1995.
Richard L. Greenland, Covington, for legatees-appellants Heirs of Juanita Guess Gay, et al.
Nita R. Gorrell, Hammond, for succession-appellee Executor of the Succession of Patricia G. Mydland.
Catherine S. Nobile, Seale, Smith, Zuber, & Barnette, Baton Rouge, for legatee-appel-lee Bobbye M. Hall.
Before GONZALES, PARRO and REDMANN, JJ.
. Judge William V. Redmann, retired, is serving as judge pro tempore by special appointment of the Louisiana Supreme Court.

Opinion:
I2PARRO, Judge.
Certain legatees named in the statutory will of Patricia Gay Mydland, as well as other legal heirs, appeal from that portion of the trial court's declaratory judgment holding that a particular legacy pertaining to the testatrix's interest in L & P Enterprises, Inc. had lapsed due to the dissolution of the corporation after the making of the will but prior to the testatrix's death. We affirm.
Facts
Patricia Gay Mydland ("Mydland") died on November 12, 1990 and left a last will and testament dated September 24, 1985. The will was in statutory form and the disposition in question provided as follows:
I give and bequeath the following property of which I die possessed, as follows:
4). All of my interest in L & P Enterprise[s], Inc. to Austin Gay, Jr., Dallas Gay, Donnie Gay, Austina Gay, Virginia Patricia ("Ginger") Gay, and Ray Allen Gay, in equal shares.
Mydland was the sole shareholder of L & P Enterprises, Inc. ("L & P"), whose sole asset on September 24,1985 was a motel. In 1988, L & P sold this motel in a credit sale, and a promissory note in the sum of $265,000 made payable to L & P was given in conjunction with this transaction. Thereafter, L & P was dissolved, at which time the promissory note (the only asset) was transferred to Myd-land.
After Mydland died in 1990, the testamentary executor filed a petition for declaratory judgment seeking judicial interpretation of certain provisions of the will. Among those provisions was the bequest of "[a]ll of my interest in L & P Enterprise^], Inc." referred to above. The executor alleged that the promissory note became purely the personal property of Mydland upon the dissolution of the corporation. However, the executor's position was opposed by the particular legatees of this bequest, who contended that the testatrix's intent was that they receive her interest in the promissory note that was transferred to her upon the dissolution of the corporation.
| a After a hearing, the trial court found, among other things, that the legacy had lapsed due to the dissolution of the corporation. In other words, the named legatees were not entitled to inherit the promissory note pursuant to this bequest. Thereafter, these named legatees and certain legal heirs filed a motion for new trial as to the trial court's ruling on the legacy and argued that new evidence had surfaced after the trial that could not have been obtained with due diligence prior to trial. Believing that the evidence was cumulative, the trial court denied the motion for new trial.
Disagreeing with the trial court's judgment and its ruling on the motion for new trial, the particular legatees, namely, Austin Gay, Jr., Dallas Gay, Donnie Gay, Austina Gay, Virginia Patricia Gay, and Ray Allen Gay, as well as the legal heirs of William H. Gay and his wife, Juanita Guess Gay (collectively referred to as "appellants"), appealed and assigned as error the trial court's finding that the bequest had lapsed and its denial of the motion for new trial.
Standard of Review
A court of appeal may not overturn a judgment of a trial court absent an error of law or a factual finding which is manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. See Stobart v. State, Through Department of Transportation and Development, 617 So.2d 880, 882, n. 2 (La.1993). Before an appellate court may reverse a factfinder's determinations, it must find from the record that a reasonable factual basis does not exist for the findings and that the record establishes that the findings are clearly wrong (manifestly erroneous). Id. at 882; see Mart v. Hill, 505 So.2d 1120, 1127 (La.1987).
Appellate review of questions of law is simply review of whether the trial court was legally correct or legally incorrect. O'Niell v. Louisiana Power & Light Company, 558 So.2d 1235, 1238 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1990).
Discussion
The primary issue in this ease is whether the testatrix's bequest, made prior to dissolution of the corporation, of "[a]ll of my interest in L & P Enterprise^], Inc." included the testatrix's personal ownership of corporate assets transferred to her upon the corporation's dissolution. To resolve this issue, this court must determine what effect the ^dissolution of the corporation (after the execution of the will but prior to the testatrix's death) had on this bequest.
A testamentary disposition, the terms of which express no time, neither past nor future, refers to the time of making of the will. LSA-C.C. art. 1722. Since Mydland simply bequeathed her interest in L & P without reference to time, the legatees would simply be entitled to any interest that Myd-land had at the time of the making of her will (September 24, 1985). Therefore, our inquiry for purposes of this issue is to determine what interest Mydland held in L & P on September 24, 1985.
At the outset, we note that a corporation is a separate and distinct legal entity. LSA-C.C. art. 24; Richard v. Morgan, 433 So.2d 263, 264 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 438 So.2d 1108 (La.1983). It has the power to buy and sell property, make contracts, incur debt, sue and be sued. LSA-R.S. 12:41(B). The property of the corporation is not the property of the individual shareholders. LSA-C.C. art. 24, comment (d); Levert v. Shirley Planting Co., 135 La. 929, 66 So. 301 (1914). Nor does a shareholder have a pecuniary interest in the property owned by the corporation. Id. Although shareholders have certain rights as provided by law and in the corporation's articles of incorporation or by-laws, such shareholder rights do not entitle them to any direct ownership interest in property owned by the corporation. LSA-R.S. 12:1 et seq. A shareholder's ownership interest in the corporation is in the stock issued by the corporation and not the corporate assets.
Regarding the dissolution of the corporation, the parties do not dispute that L & P was dissolved prior to Mydland's death. Shareholders, subject to any applicable liquidation preferences and other rights, share proportionately in the net assets remaining after satisfaction of corporate creditors when the corporation is dissolved. LSA-R.S. 12:145(F); Levy v. Billeaud, 443 So.2d 539, 543 (La.1983). Upon dissolution of L & P, Mydland, as sole shareholder, obtained all of the assets remaining after satisfaction of corporate debts, if any existed. Accordingly, the promissory note, the only remaining asset, was transferred to Mydland.
IsWith these principles in mind, we must next determine what the testatrix intended by her bequest of "[a]ll of my interest in L & P Enterprise[s], Inc." In making this determination, we are guided by the following rules for interpreting wills found in the Louisiana Civil Code:
Art. 1712. Intention of testator
In the interpretation of acts of last will, the intention of the testator must principally be endeavored to be ascertained, without departing, however, from the proper signification of the terms of the testament.
Art. 1713. Sense which gives effect
A disposition must be understood in the sense in which it can have effect, rather than that in which it can have none.
Art. 1715. Interpretation to ascertain intent
When, from the terms made use of by the testator, his intention can not be ascertained, recourse must be had to all circumstances which may aid in the discovery of his intention.
The function of the court is to determine and carry out the intention of the testator if it can be ascertained from the language of the will. Succession of Hurst v. Gremillion, 552 So.2d 799, 801 (La.App. 1st Cir.1989). Although it is incumbent upon the court to interpret the will so that it may be given effect, the court must interpret the will as written. Succession of Merritt, 581 So.2d 728, 730 (La.App. 1st Cir.) writ denied, 584 So.2d 1165 (La.1991); Succession of Flowers, 532 So.2d 470, 472 (La.App. 1st Cir.), unit denied, 534 So.2d 446 (La.1988). The first and natural impression conveyed to the mind on reading the will as a whole is entitled to great weight. Succession of Merritt, 581 So.2d at 730. The testator is assumed to be conveying his ideas to the best of his ability so as to be correctly understood at first view. Id. When a will is free from ambiguity, the will must be carried out according to its written terms, without reference to information outside the will. Succession of Williams, 608 So.2d 973, 975 (La.1992).
Considering these rules of interpretation and the rights and interests that Myd-land held at the time of the execution of her will, there is no obvious ambiguity in the provision |6leaving all of her interest in L & P. At the time of the making of this bequest, Mydland's interest in L & P was confined to her ownership of shares of stock in L & P and the rights derived therefrom. L & P, as a separate legal entity created under the laws of Louisiana, was the owner of its assets, not Mydland. In fact, Mydland (even as sole shareholder) did not have a pecuniary interest in the property owned by L & P. Under the circumstances of this ease, the term "all of my interest," when given its usual and ordinary meaning, would not include assets of the corporation. To hold otherwise would be to give the appellants greater rights than Mydland held as a shareholder and would ignore the separateness of the corporate entity.
It was not until the dissolution of this corporation that Mydland's entitlement to the remaining assets (after payment of all creditors, if any) arose, at which time the promissory note was distributed to her as part of the liquidation process. As a result of this transfer, the promissory note became a personal asset of Mydland. Furthermore, in light of the dissolution of L & P prior to Mydland's death, we find that Mydland did not have an "interest" in L & P at the time of her death. Thus, the legacy in question fell upon the dissolution of the corporation. See LSA-C.C. art. 1700.
If Mydland desired that the designated legatees receive the promissory note that was transferred to her upon dissolution of the corporation, she could have executed a codicil to her will or redrafted her will making a provision for such a disposition. See Succession of Cage, 393 So.2d 220, 221 (La.App. 1st Cir.1980). In the absence of a valid codicil or a subsequent testament, we conclude that the trial court's finding that the appellants were not entitled to the promissory note under the terms of this bequest was reasonable and was neither clearly wrong nor an error of law. Furthermore, in light Rof the evidence presented and considering the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying the appellants' motion for new trial.
Decree
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed at appellants' costs.
AFFIRMED.
. Extrinsic evidence is used to determine what the words of the testator, as written, actually mean. That evidence must be used only to resolve ambiguity, and not used to rewrite the will or do violence to its terms. Succession of Hurst v. Gremillion, 552 So.2d at 801.
. To be a valid codicil or subsequent testament, the act must be made in one of the forms prescribed for the validity of a testament, and clothed with the same formalities. See LSA-C.C. arts. 1570 et seq. and 1692 et seq.
. Testamentary dispositions cannot be established, as such, by any amount of parol evidence as to the verbally declared intentions of the deceased. Succession of Faggard, 152 So.2d 627, 630 (La.App. 2nd Cir.1963).