Case Name: NORWOOD v. LAKE BISTENEAU OIL CO.
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1918-05-27
Citations: 145 La. 823
Docket Number: No. 22982
Parties: NORWOOD v. LAKE BISTENEAU OIL CO.
Judges: 
Reporter: Louisiana Reports
Volume: 145
Pages: 823–831

Head Matter:
(83 South. 25)
No. 22982.
NORWOOD v. LAKE BISTENEAU OIL CO.
(May 27, 1918.
On the Merits, June 30, 1919. Rehearing Denied Oct. 14, 1919.)
(Syllabus by Editorial Staff.)
1. Appeal and error <&wkey;62 — Courts <&wkey; 224(11) — Appellate jurisdiction determined BY AMOUNT IN CONTROVERSY AT ENTRY OE JUDGMENT.
Appellate jurisdiction must be determined by the amount in contest at the time the judgment appealed from was rendered, and appellee, by abandoning part of his demand, or acquiescing in that part of the judgment which went against him, cannot destroy appellant’s right to appeal, or change the appellate forum.'
On the Merits.
2. Time <&wkey;9(2) — Last day allowed in RECKONING PRESCRIPTION.
Under Employers’ Liability Act, § 31, providing that all claims for compensation shall be forever barred unless proceedings have been begun within a year, where the accident occurred March 23d, and the petition was filed on March 22d of the following year, and citation served on the 23d, the action was commenced in time, in view of Civ. Code, art. 3467, declaring time required for prescription shall be reckoned by days, not hours.
3. Master and servant (@=401 — Injured SERVANT MAY BRING ORDINARY ACTION OR IN ALTERNATIVE UNDER EMPLOYERS’ LIABILITY ACT.
An injured servant may proceed for damages under Civ. Code, art. 2315, by an ordinary suit, and in the alternative for compensation under the Employers’ Liability Act, and defendant cannot complain of being allowed 10 days to answer, instead of 7, as under summary proceedings under sections 17 and 18 of such act.
4. Appeal and error <&wkey;843(2) — Unnecessary QUESTIONS NOT DETERMINED.
Having determined that the service of citation by an injured servant was in time to interrupt the prescription or limitation of Employers’ Liability Act, § 31, it becomes unnecessary to consider defendant’s contention that Act No. 267 of 1914, § 27, declaring that the mere filing of suit against a corporation shall have the effect of interrupting prescription, does not apply to the case.
5. Master and servant (&wkey;385(13) — Amount oe compensation under Employers’ Liability Act.
For a case to come within one of the provisions for personal injuries specified in Employers’ Liability Act, § 8, subsec. (c), for the loss of a finger, thumb, etc., the member must have been severed or amputated; but where permanently disabled, partly or totally, but not severed, the compensation is measured by the general provisions of the first paragraph of subsection (c).
6. Master and servant ¡&wkey;385(12) — Compensation FOR LOSS OF MEMBER UNDER EMPLOYERS’ Liability Act.
Employers’ Liability Act, § 8, subsec. (c), providing payment shall not be made “under more than one clause of such subsection,” nor after the “employé is able to earn as much as before the accident,” does not limit compensation for the loss of three fingers to that for loss of one, nor preclude payments to one who went to his work and was paid the same wages as before, and was discharged after eight months, but was not at such time able to do his work without help of other servants.
7. Costs <@=234 — Cost of modifying judg-.. MENT FOR PLAINTIFF.
Judgment for plaintiff for personal injuries may be reduced on appeal, and costs taxed to defendant, in view of Act No. 229 of 1910, vesting discretion as to costs in appellate courts.
Appeal from Eleventh Judicial District Court, Parish of Red River; W. T. Cunningham, Judge.
Action by T. T. Norwood against the Lake Bisteneau Oil Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. On motion to dismiss because amount in dispute was less than jurisdictional amount in the Supreme Court.
Motion overruled, judgment amended, and affirmed.
Wise, Randolph, Rendall & Freyer, of Shreveport, for appellant.
Nettles & O’Quin, of Coushatta, for appellee.

Opinion:
On Motion to Dismiss.
LECHE, J.
Plaintiff, alleging that personal injury was inflicted upon himself by the negligence of defendant, sues for damages in the sum of $5,SQ0. He further alleges that the Employers' Liability Act, adopted by the General Assembly of this state and designated as Act No. 20 of 1914, has no application to his demand for the reasons: (1) That although he was, at the time of his injury, in the employ of defendant, his injury was not received while performing any service incidental to or arising out of his employment. (2) That said act is unconstitutional for various reasons which he proceeds to specify. He then alleges in the alternative, in case said act is decreed constitutional and applicable to his demand, that he is entitled to be paid the sum of $1,125 in accordance with the provisions of said act. He accordingly prays for judgment in the sum of $5,-800, and in the alternative for $1,125.
Defendant pleaded several exceptions, which were overruled, and, after answer filed, the case was tried on its merits. Erom a judgment in favor of plaintiff for $750, defendant took the present appeal.
Plaintiff now moves to dismiss on the grounds: (1) That the amount in dispute is less than $2,000; and (2) that the Employers' Liability Act, under which he recovered, was upheld by the court and declared constitutional.
Opinion.
Plaintiff, in his motion to dismiss, seems to have abandoned that part of his cause of action upon which he based his demand for damages in the sum of $5,800, for that is the only theory upon which he can assort that the amount in dispute is less than $2,000, and, if we are correct in that assumption, this abandonment and his acquiescence in the judgment rendered is not shown by the record and has only taken place after defendant took the present appeal. The record does show an admission on the part of plaintiff that the particular service which he was rendering at the time he was injured was being performed in the course of his employment, and that admission debars him on appeal from claiming that the Employers' Liability Act does not apply to his demand for that particular reason; but there is nothing in the record that would debar him from urging on appeal that the Employers' Liability Act does not apply to his demand for the second reason pleaded- by him, viz. its uneonstitutionality. So that at the time the judgment was rendered the matter still subject to be contested between the parties was whether plaintiff was entitled to damages ex delicto in the sum of $5,800, or whether he was entitled to compensation in the sum of $1,125, and such a matter, being exclusively within the appellate jurisdiction of this court, could be appealed to no other court.
Appellate jurisdiction must be determined by the amount in contest at the time the judgment appealed from was rendered by the lower court. See Wolf v. Thomas, 137 La. 833, 69 South. 269, and authorities therein cited. It would be illogical and contrary to law and equity to hold that, after an appeal has been taken, an appellee may, by abandoning part of his demand, or by acquiescing in that part of the judgment which went against him, either deprive the appellant of his right of appeal or change the forum to which the appeal should be carried. The rights of an appellant to an appeal cannot thus be made to depend upon the will of the appellee. That is the reason why we held in the case of Alexander v. Morgan, 130 La.- 381, 58 South. 13, that a defendant, who has "been sued for an amount within the jurisdiction of this court, cannot be deprived of his appeal by the acquiescence of the plaintiff in a judgment for an amount below that required to confer jurisdiction."
The motion to dismiss is overruled.