Case Name: Pitman v. The Commonwealth; Wright v. Same
Court: General Court of Virginia
Jurisdiction: Virginia
Decision Date: 1843-06
Citations: 2 Rob. 800
Docket Number: 
Parties: Pitman v. The Commonwealth.
Judges: 
Reporter: Virginia Reports
Volume: 41
Pages: 808–814

Head Matter:
Pitman v. The Commonwealth.
Wright v. Same.
June, 1843.
Gaming — Construction of Statute. — The statute of March 26, 1842, (Acts of 1841-2, ch. 69, § 4, p. 44,) enacting “that in all recoveries hereafter had for violations of the gaming laws, the fee recovered shall he ten dollars for the commonwealth’s attorney, and the sum of thirty dollars shall he paid to the literary fund in lieu of the sum as at present provided,” had no application whatever to offences committed before its passage, but such offences remained liable to prosecution and punishment under the preexisting law, in the same manner as if the said statute had never been passed.
Same — Process — Capias — Reversal of Judgment.— A party being Indicted for playing at an unlawful game, the court immediately awards a capias against him, returnable the next day; at the return day, he moves to quash the capias as improper process, which motion the court overrules, and compels him to plead forthwith : Held, the irregularity (if any) in this proceeding is no sufficient ground to'reverse judgment against the defendant.
John W. Pitman was indicted in the court of hustings for the town gi Fredericksburg, on the 13th of May 1842, "for unlawful gaming by p.laying at cards at the Eagle tavern, a place of public resort in said corporation, within six months then last past. On the ISth of July 1842, the defendant, having been duly summoned to answer the indictment, appeared and pleaded not guilty; and a trial being thereupon had, the jury found him guilty in manner and form as in the indictment alleged, and the court rendered judgment against him for a fine of 20 dollars and the costs of the prosecution. By a bill of exceptions filed by the defendant, it appeared, that on the trial of the issue, the commonwealth proved that the said defendant, within six months before' the finding of the indictment, and prior to the first of March 1842, did game by playing at a game played with cards, at the Eagle tavern, a place of public resort in Fred-ericksburg; which being all the facts 801 proved on the *trial, the defendant, after the verdict was rendered, moved the court to set it aside and grant him a new trial, upon the ground that the said verdict was against the law and the evidence of the case; and this motion being overruled by the court, he excepted to its opinion. To the judgment of the court of hustings a writ of error was awarded by the judge of the circuit superior court of Spot-sylvania, upon a petition of the defendant, in which he insisted that the act of March 26, 1842, (Acts of 1841-2, ch. 69, § 4, p. 44,) enacting “that in all recoveries hereafter had for violations of the gaming laws, the fee recovered shall be ten dollars for the commonwealth’s attorney, and the sum of thirty dollars shall be paid to the literary fund in lieu of the sum as at present provided,” had the effect to repeal the preexisting statute for punishing this class of offences; and as it contained no provision for the prosecution of offences committed before its passage, and the only act of gaming proved against this defendant w.as committed before that date, this prosecution could not be sustained, and consequently the court of hustings erred in overruling the motion for a new trial. The cause was heard in the circuit court of Spotsylvania at October term 1842; when that court was of opinion, that the statute of March 26, 1842 did not operate to discharge the punishment of offences committed prior to its passage, but that the court of hustings nevertheless erred in giving judgment for the sum of 20 dollars fine, instead of 30 dollars. The circuit court, therefore, proceeding to give such judgment as the court of hustings ought to have given, considered that the plaintiff in error, for the offence alleged against him in the indictment, forfeit and pay to the commonwealth 30 dollars, and that he pay the costs of the prosecution in ,the said court of hustings, including a fee of ten dollars to the attorney for the commonwealth, and also the costs expended about the defence in the circuit court.
802 ^Thomas Wright was also indicted in the said court of hustings, on the same 13th of May 1842, for unlawful gaming by playing at cards at the tavern of R. L. Blackburn, a place of public resort in said corporation, within six months then last past. On the motion of the attorney for the commonwealth, the court, immediately upon the finding of the indictment, awarded a writ of capias against the defendant, returnable the next day. On the return day (the 14th) the defendant moved the court to quash the capias, as irregular and improper process; but the court overruled the motion, and required him to plead forthwith to the indictment; to which opinion and decision of the court he excepted. He thereupon pleaded not guilty, and a jury was impaneled for his trial. At the' trial, thq, commonwealth having offered in evidence the testimony of a witness, who deposed that in December 1841 the defendant played a game with cards at R. B. Blackburn’s tavern, a place of public resort in Fredericksburg, and this being all the evidence offered on the part of the commonwealth, the defendant moved the court to instruct the jury, .that, upon the evidence aforesaid, the prosecution in this case could not be maintained, and that the jury ought to find a verdict for the defendant. The court refused to give such instruction, and the defendant excepted to its opinion. The jury having found him guilty in manner and form as alleged in the indictment, the court rendered judgment against him for a fine of thirty dollars, and the costs of the prosecution. He then applied to the circuit, court of Spotsylvania for a writ of error; alleging in his petition (among other objections which it is unnecessary to notice), 1. that the writ of capias was not the proper process upon the indictment, but unlawful, injurious and oppressive, and the court of hustings erred in overruling the motion to quash the same; 2. that this prosecution, being instituted since the passage of the act of March 26, 1842, for 803 an offence * committed ? before, could not be maintained ; 3. that even if the prosecution could be maintained, yet the judgment was wrong in imposing a fine of thirty dollars, instead of twenty. The circuit court awarded the writ of error; but afterwards, at October term 1842, upon the hearing of the cause, affirmed the judgment ■of the court of hustings, with costs.
On the several petitions of Pitman and Wright, the general court, at December term 1842, awarded writs of error to the judgments of the circuit court against them respectively. Both of them, in their petitions, relied upon the act of March 26, 1842, as operating to discharge them from prosecution : and Wright also insisted that the issuing of the capias against him, and the refusal of the court to quash it, were erroneous.
The cases were argued by Morson, Seddon and Archer for the plaintiffs in error, and by the attorney general for the commonwealth.
Gaming — Construction, of Statute. — The principal case is cited in 2 Va. Law Reg. 458. See mono-graphic note on “Gaming” appended to Neal v. Com. 2 Gratt. 917.

Opinion:
PRY, J.,
delivered the opinion of the majority of the court.—These cases present judgments under the gaming laws, for the offences committed before the passage of the act of March 26, 1842.
It is contended that the judgments are erroneous, because the laws existing previous to the said act were repealed by it, and of consequence all previous offences were thereby remitted or discharged.
The question depends, therefore, on the true construction of the act of the 26th of March 1842. The act is in these -words: "That in all recoveries hereafter had for violations of the gaming laws, the fee recovered shall be ten dollars for the commonwealth's attorney, and the sum of thirty dollars shall be paid to the literary fund in lieu of the sum as at present provided."
* These are brief words, and, we must confess, not free from difficulty. What construction shall we give them? Do they repeal the previous offences?
There is no repealing clause; and the words do not import any repeal. So far from it, they imply the continuance of the previous laws. "In all recoveries hereafter had for violations of the gaming laws" &c. What recoveries can be had, or violations occur, under laws that have no existence? The act manifestly contemplates that the previous laws shall continue in force, and recoveries continue to be had under them.
It is said, however, that though there is no express repeal of the previous laws, there is an implied one: that the act prescribes a new punishment -for past offences,'—an aggravated punishment,—by increasing the fine from twenty to thirty dollars: that it is inconsistent with the former laws, and, being the last expression of the legislative will, must abrogate them, upon the principle, leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant.
The authorities cited at the bar shew, that implied repeals are not favoured; that two affirmative statutes shall coexist if they can, and this notwithstanding the use of general words, whose grammatical construction might imply the contrary. 6 Bac. Abr. 439.
* Let us then enquire why we are obliged to imply a repeal of the previous laws, and discharge of previous offences? Did the legislature intend such repeal and discharge? For we admit that in this act, as in all others, we must en-quire into the legislative intent, and give effect to it if we can.
Admitting, then, (though some of the judges deny it) that the act varied and increased the punishment prescribed by former laws, the question occurs, to what offences does it apply? Does it apply to violations committed before its passage, or only to those committed afterwards? If it applies only to offences committed after its passage, it does not conflict with the former law, and consequently both will stand. If it applies, or can be legally applied, to previous offences, then the conflict will arise, and the last law only will have effect.
Before pursuing this question, we advert to a few general rules of construction.
1. The laws against gaming are to be construed as remedial laws. 2. Such construction shall be made as will give effect to the legislative intent, and - not defeat it. Magis valeat quam pereat. 3. The construction shall be, as nearly as possible, in conformity with the principles of the common law. 4. If it be possible, a reasonable construction shall be made, and a reasonable and lawful intent imputed, rather than one unreasonable and unlawful. S. All laws are, or ought to be, prospective in their action. Retrospective laws are odious, and never presumed to be intended, unless by inevitable construction. And ex post facto laws are void. 6. All laws in pari materia should be considered together.
Let us pursue the enquiry with the aid of these principles'.
Does the law mean to embrace violations before its passage, and to vary and enlarge the punishment?
*To suppose that the legislature so intended is to suppose, first, that it intended what was unjust in design, and vain and idle in effect. It is to suppose the legislature intended what was wrong in itself, and what it had no power to inflict. Shall we impute his unrighteous and idle purpose to it? And to what end? In order that we may give effect to it? By no means —the plaintiffs in error contend not for that —but in order that we may both deny effect to this new purpose of the assembly, and, whilst we refuse to give it effect, make it abrogate the former law, which it was intended to supply: in other words, that we may make it something, and nothing; give it the power to kill, but onlj', like the insect, to lose its life in the wound. If the legislature intended to apply the law to former cases, then it cannot take effect; it is a dead letter. If such was not the legislative intent, the question is at an end. And in either case there is no conflict with the old law, and that law remains in full force.
Secondly, to apply the law to former cases makes it ex post facto. It imputes an unreasonable and unlawful purpose to the legislature. It defeats the purpose itself; or, worse than useless, as the plaintiffs contend, abolishes the former punishment, while it fails to inflict the new. It violates the principle that the laws should be prospective. It fails (contrarjr to the declaration that the laws shall be deemed remedial) to advance the remedy .and suppress the mischief contemplated by the laws against gaming, by giving impunity to offenders against them.
Por the foregoing reasons, we think the legislature did not intend to apply their enactment to previous offences; and if general words are used that admit of such construction, we are bound to limit their application, and to give them a reasonable and constitutional interpretation. We may even interpolate words for such purpose. Abundant cases, we believe, may be
*found to this effect. (See cases cited in preceding note.) And to illustrate the subject by an example, suppose the legislature should enact "that in all convictions hereafter had for any violations of the laws against larceny, the party shall be hanged;" what construction would we give it? Would we not say it applied to future violations only, and was even so intended by the legislature, notwithstanding the general words used? And if we even supposed they intended to apply it to past offences, would we turn such abortive intent into an implied legislative pardon for all such offenders?
If we limit the act of March 26,, 1842 to future offences, then it is to be construed as if it read thus — "That in all recoveries hereafter had for violations of the gaming laws hereafter committed," &c. Supply these words, or apply the act to future offences only, and the cases before us fall precisely within the principle of Pegram-s case, 1 Leigh 569. In 1825, Pegram had been presented for keeping a faro bank table. At this time, the offence was punishable by imprisonment in the common jail, and by stripes at the discretion of the court. By the act of 1827-8 it was enacted, that whoever should thereafter be guilty of any of the offences &c. should be punished by imprisonment and fine, &c. — changing the punishment. Pegram, who was not arrested until after this act went into effect, insisted that he was entitled to be discharged. But the court said: "In the case of Attoo v. The Commonwealth, 2 Virg. Ca. p. 382, it was decided, that where a new statute prescribes a new punishment for an offence which had been previously punishable otherwise, and the new statute repeals all laws which come within its purview, but does not provide that offences committed before the operation of the new law, shall be punished under the old, such repeal operates as a discharge of all such offenders. But that case is very different from *this. There the law repealed and annulled the punishment enacted before that time against the offenders: here the act of 1827-8 does not, either expressly or impliedly, repeal the previous punishment prescribed by the act of 1822-3, except in the case of future offences. There is no repealing clause in. the act of 1827-8; and although the principle is correct that leges posteriores priores abrogant, yet they only abrogate them from the time that the latter law is passed, or goes into effect. The principle on which this rule prevails is, that the latter statute being incompatible with the former, they cannot exist together, and the latest expression of the will of the legislature is the law. But there is no incompatibility in the statutes now under consideration. A punishment affixed to an offence prior to the 1st May 1828, is not incompatible with a different punishment, either lighter or more severe, affixed to the same offence subsequent to that date. They may both well stand together."
The reasoning in the above case of Pegram, under the construction which we give to the act of 1842, answers all the cases which have been cited before us on the effect of the repeal of statutes.
We think the conclusion we have come to, best effects the intention of the legislature. It puts a reasonable and just construction upon the act, by making it provide punishment for future cases only, without attempting to provide one for past offences. If the legislature intended to apply it to past offences, and to punish them higher than before, the attempt is abortive; and an abortive attempt to punish more severely, should not be converted into an implied or intended dispensation from all punishment whatsoever. We think that we best sub-serve the legislative intent to punish, by leaving in force the punishment lawfully inflicted, though we deny that unlawfully devised.
*The judges are not unanimous in this opinion. Some of them think
'that the court below committed no error, because the act does not vary or increase the punishment. Some of them are for reversing the judgments and discharging the offenders altogether; and one of them thinks that the act was intended to apply to former cases, but is void as to the fine, and can affect only the taxation of costs.
As to the question arising on the process in one of the cases, a majority of the judges think there is no error which should affect the judgment of the court. Some of the judges think it was competent to the court to award the process; some, that if any error was committed in that respect, it is not now material; while two of them think there was error in that respect, and that, for such error, the judgment should be reversed. and the cause remanded for a summons to issue, &c.
Note by the judge. The statute of 29 Car. 2, ch. 8, enacted, "that from and after the 24th day of June 1677, no action shall he brought to charge any person upon any agreement made upon consideration of marriage, unless the agreement upon which such action shall he brought &c. shall be in writing and signed." After this statute, an action was brought upon a promise in consideration of marriage, not in writing, made before the act passed, upon special verdict found, it was adjudged for the plaintiff And by the court: "It cannot be presumed that the statute was to have a retrospect, so as to take away a right of action which the plaintiff was entitled to before the time of its commencement." Gilmore v. Shnter, 2 Lev. 227. And see Wader v. Arell, 2 Wash. 282; Wallace & ux. v. Taliaferro & ux., 2 Call 447; Elliott's ex'or v. Lyell, 8 Call 268; Commonwealth v. Hewitt, 2 Hen. & Munf. 181.