Case Name: Croney v. State of Indiana
Court: Supreme Court of Indiana
Jurisdiction: Indiana
Decision Date: 1969-05-20
Citations: 252 Ind. 319
Docket Number: No. 1067-S-105
Parties: Croney v. State of Indiana.
Judges: 
Reporter: Indiana Reports
Volume: 252
Pages: 319–326

Head Matter:
Croney v. State of Indiana.
[No. 1067-S-105.
Filed May 20, 1969.
No petition for rehearing filed.]
Don R. Money, Indianapolis, for appellant.
John J. Dillon, Attorney General, Richard V. Bennett, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.

Opinion:
Givan, J.
Appellant was charged, by affidavit filed June 22, 1967, with the crime of First Degree Burglary. Appellant waived arraignment, entered a plea of not guilty to the charge embraced in the affidavit on June 23, 1967. Thereafter, on June 28, 1967, the cause was set for trial July 14, 1967. On the day of trial, July 14, 1967, appellant, in open court, waived trial by jury and the cause was submitted to the court for trial. At the trial the State introduced evidence and rested, appellant introduced no evidence in his behalf. The court found appellant guilty, ordered pre-sentence investigation to be filed by July 21, 1967. The pre-sentence investigation was filed July 20, 1967, and appellant was sentenced July 21, 1967, to the Indiana Reformatory for not less than ten (10) nor more than twenty (20) years and was disfranchised and rendered incapable of holding any office of trust or profit for a period of one (1) year.
Appellant assigns as error the overruling of his motion for new trial which stated that the finding of the Court was not sustained by sufficient evidence, and that it was contrary to law.
From the evidence adduced at trial it appears that appellant had been living with the prosecuting witness in her apartment for some time. However, several days prior to May 15, 1967, she became angry with appellant and ordered him to leave. On May 14, 1967, the complainant went out of town and returned on May 15th. She testified that when she entered the apartment the door was unlocked, and upon looking around she discovered that her record player and a small bank with money in it were missing. Further testimony established that she had locked the door when she left on her trip, and that her new boyfriend, who supplanted appellant had a key to her apartment, told her that he had locked the door when he left the apartment.
The following day, May 16, 1967, the appellant went to the apartment. The witness stated that she was angry with him and asked him why he took the record player. She testified that appellant told her that he did not take it. She then told him: "I know you did it because my neighbor upstairs seen you when you had the fellow pull the red Buick in the back and carry it off." The witness then stated that appellant admitted pawning the record player for twenty dollars, but promised to get it back for her. After waiting for several weeks for appellant to return the record player, and after requesting him to return it, she went to the police department in order to bring charges against the appellant.
Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. He places great stress on the fact that the testimony of the prosecuting wit-ness was uncorroborated. We know of no rule, nor has appellant cited us to any, which holds that an accused may not be convicted on the basis of the uncorroborated testimony of a witness whose credibility has not been impeached. The witness in this case is not an accomplice whose testimony would require the utmost scrutiny and evaluation. Moreover, on appeal we consider only that evidence most favorable to the State, together with all reasonable and logical inferences which may legally drawn therefrom. Fisher v. State (1966), 247 Ind. 529, 219 N. E. 2d 818; Myles v. State (1955), 234 Ind. 129, 124 N. E. 2d 205; Kallas v. State (1949), 227 Ind. 103, 83 N. E. 2d 769. Furthermore, we will not weigh the evidence or determine the credibility of the witnesses. This is a function which properly rests in the trier of fact. Stock v. State (1966), 247 Ind. 532, 219 N. E. 2d 809; Barnes v. State (1965), 246 Ind. 485, 205 N. E. 2d 539.
In looking at the evidence as presented by the record we cannot say, as a matter of law, that the evidence presented in the case at bar was insufficient to establish appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. True, the prosecuting witness did not see appellant enter the apartment and leave with the record player. She did, however, confront him with the accusation that a neighbor saw him carry off the property, and she testified that appellant then told her that he pawned the record player for twenty dollars. The statement made to the witness by the appellant clearly constitutes an admission by the appellant that he did, in fact, take the complainant's property. As has been said before, the weight to be given to this testimony is a matter for determination by the trier of the facts.
We also point out that the complainant's testimony was not totally uncorroborated. A police officer in charge of the pawn shop detail identified State's exhibit number one as a pawn ticket sent to the Indianapolis Police Department by North Side Loan Company. The ticket was for the record player in question, and there was evidence that it was signed by the appellant. The value of the record player listed on the ticket was one hundred and forty-nine dollars. This evidence clearly supports the complainant's testimony that appellant was the one who pawned the property. As a matter of fact, appellant in his motion for a new trial calls attention to the fact that the "prosecuting witness then confronted the defendant and he admitted taking the record player and promised to return it."
It is also appellant's contention that the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the necessary element of intent. However, the evidence is uncontradicted that appellant took the record player from the apartment of the prosecuting witness while she was not there and without her consent; that he pawned the property for twenty dollars; and that he did not return the property to its rightful owner. Thus, all the external elements of the crime of burglary in the first degree are present. Intent, being a state of mind of the accused at the time of the alleged offense, is not a tangible item that can be viewed. However, the law has long recognized the rule that intent to commit a specific criminal act may be presumed from the voluntary commission of the act. Whitsell v. State (1965), 246 Ind. 175, 203 N. E. 2d 832; Wojcik v. State (1965), 246 Ind. 257, 204 N. E. 2d 866; Tait v. State (1963), 244 Ind. 35, 188 N. E. 2d 537; Coffer v. State (1958), 239 Ind. 22, 154 N. E. 2d 371. In the case at bar it was within the province of the trier of fact to find the requisite element of intent from the evidence presented at the trial. On the basis of the evidence adduced we cannot say it was insufficient to establish the element of intent. The determination as to whether the element of intent was proved beyond a reasonable doubt was a determination to be made by the trier of fact, and we will not interfere with that determination where, as here, the trial court's finding was supported by reliable and substantial evidence of probative value.
The judgment of the trial court is, therefore, affirmed.
DeBruler, C. J., Arterburn and Hunter, JJ., concur; Jackson, J., dissents with opinion.