Case Name: PEOPLE v. EARL JONES
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1979-12-06
Citations: 94 Mich. App. 232
Docket Number: Docket No. 44306
Parties: PEOPLE v EARL JONES
Judges: Before: Cynar, P.J., and Mackenzie and L. W. Corkin, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 94
Pages: 232–241

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v EARL JONES
Docket No. 44306.
Submitted June 18, 1979, at Lansing.
Decided December 6, 1979.
Leave to appeal applied for.
Earl Jones pled guilty to a charge of second-degree murder in exchange for the prosecutor’s agreement to dismiss charges of first-degree murder, assault with intent to murder and felony firearm, Saginaw Circuit Court, Fred J. Borchard, J. In the plea proceeding the trial court advised defendant of the maximum sentence but failed to advise him of any mandatory minimum sentence for second-degree murder and that second-degree murder is a nonprobationable offense. Defendant appeals. On appeal defendant claims the court’s failure to properly advise him on the minimum sentence and his ineligibility for probation is reversible error. Held:
1. Second-degree murder carries no mandatory minimum sentence; therefore, a court at a guilty plea proceeding is not required to advise a defendant of a mandatory minimum prison sentence.
2. A court rule requires a court to tell a defendant that if he pleads guilty to murder, armed robbery or treason, he cannot be placed on probation. Noncompliance with this rule does not necessarily require reversal, especially where a defendant was informed that the maximum sentence was life and he stated that he understood the maximum penalty, he was a previous felony offender and was familiar with the criminal justice system, he was in violation of his parole and was aware of the consequences therefor, and the crime was a grievous one and he had no expectation of being placed on parole.
Affirmed.
L. W. Corkin, J., dissented. He would hold that, except where a defendant knew prior to his plea that he would be sentenced to prison or had stated on the record that he understood the possible punishment for the crime, failure to follow the court rule which requires the court to inform a defendant that he cannot be placed on probation if he pleads guilty to murder, armed robbery or treason, constitutes reversible error.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1-4] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 487, 489.
Court’s duty to advise or admonish accused as to consequences of plea of guilty, or to determine that he is advised thereof. 97 ALR2d 549.
Opinion of the Court
1. Homicide — Plea of Guilty — Minimum Sentence — Statutes — Court Rules.
There is no mandatory minimum sentence for second-degree murder; therefore, a court at a guilty plea proceeding need not advise a defendant of a mandatory minimum prison sentence for second-degree murder (MCL 750.317; MSA 28.549; GCR 1963, 785.7[l][d]).
2. Criminal Law — Plea of Guilty — Acceptance of Plea — Sentence — Probation — Appeal and Error — Court Rules.
A court rule requires the court, speaking directly to the defendant at a plea proceeding, to tell him that if he pleads guilty to murder, armed robbery or treason, he cannot be placed on probation; however, noncompliance with this rule does not necessarily require reversal; the court rule does not mandate reversal where the defendant was informed that the rhaximum sentence was life and stated that he understood the maximum penalty, he was a previous felony offender and was familiar with the criminal justice system, he was in violation of his parole and was aware of the consequences therefor, and the crime was a grievous one and he had no expectation of being placed on probation (GCR 1963, 785.7[l][f]).
Dissent by L. W. Corkin, J.
3. Criminal Law — Plea of Guilty —• Acceptance of Plea — Sentence — Probation — Appeal and Error — Court Rules.
A court rule requires the court to inform a defendant that he cannot be placed on probation if he pleads guilty to murder, armed robbery or treason; where a defendant knew prior to his plea that he would be sentenced to prison or where a defendant stated on the record that he understood the possible punishment for the crime there could be noncompliance, but other than these limited exceptions, failure to follow the court rule constitutes reversible error (GCR 1963, 785.7[l][f]).
4. Criminal Law — Plea of Guilty —• Acceptance of Plea — Sentence — Minimum Sentence — Court Rules.
The court rule which requires a court at a plea proceeding to inform a defendant of the mandatory minimum prison sentence, if any, for an offense, is satisñed where the court informs the defendant that his punishment is for life or for any term of years; it is not necessary for the court to name some period as a mandatory minimum sentence, but to advise a defendant that the maximum penalty is life, without more, is insufficient compliance with the rule (GCR 1963, 785.7[l][d]).
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, Robert L. Kaczmarek, Prosecuting Attorney, and Linda Berns Wright, Appellate Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
John A. Lydick, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for defendant on appeal.
Before: Cynar, P.J., and Mackenzie and L. W. Corkin, JJ.
Former circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment pursuant to Const Í963, art 6, § 23 as amended in 1968.

Opinion:
Cynar, P.J.
On October 23, 1978, in Saginaw County Circuit Court, defendant pled guilty to a charge of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317; MSA 28.549. Defendant pled guilty in exchange for the prosecutor's agreement to dismiss the original charges of first-degree murder, MCL 750.316; MSA 28.548, assault with intent to murder, MCL 750.83; MSA 28.278, and felony firearm, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). When the offense to which defendant pled was committed he was on parole from a sentence to prison for armed robbery.
In the plea proceeding the trial court advised defendant of the maximum sentence but failed to advise him of any mandatory minimum sentence for second-degree murder. Also the trial court failed to advise the defendant that second-degree murder is a nonprobationable offense.
Defendant was sentenced on January 19, 1979, to life imprisonment. He has filed a timely appeal as of right citing as reversible error the court's failure to properly advise in the plea-taking process as set forth in the preceding paragraph. We disagree, as we conclude that neither error necessitates reversal.
With regard to defendant's first assignment of error, other panels have found that a criminal statute which carries a punishment of imprisonment "for life or any term of years" has no mandatory minimum sentence vis-á-vis the dictates of GCR 1963, 785.7. People v Freeman, 73 Mich App 568; 252 NW2d 518 (1977), People v McKnight, 72 Mich App 282; 249 NW2d 392 (1976), People v Landis, 91 Mich App 345; 283 NW2d 647 (1979), cf., Guilty Plea Cases, 395 Mich 96, 118; 235 NW2d 132 (1975). Those cases, although speaking to the armed robbery statute, are equally persuasive here, as the punishment provision in MCL 750.317 is identical. Thus, since the offense of second-degree murder carries no mandatory minimum sentence, it cannot be error to fail to advise a defendant of a negative.
Nor do we find the failure to inform defendant that second-degree murder is a nonprobationable offense reversible error. Under a prior version of GCR 1963, 785.7, a trial court was not required to tell a defendant that if his plea is to murder, he cannot be placed on probation. Under that rule, the failure to so inform a defendant was not reversible error. Guilty Plea Cases, supra, 118. However, the day that Guilty Plea Cases was decided, the Supreme Court promulgated an amendment to GCR 785.7, which in newly added subpart (l)(f) required a trial court to advise a defendant regarding nonprobationable offenses. This the trial court failed to do in the instant case.
However, noncompliance with GCR 785.7 does not necessarily require reversal. Guilty Plea Cases, supra, 113. In People v Lendzian, 80 Mich App 323; 263 NW2d 360 (1977), this Court declined to reverse a plea-based conviction for armed robbery, even where the defendant was not told that he could not be placed on probation. The Court noted that defendant was read the armed robbery statute, including the punishment provision, i.e., life or any term of years, and acknowledged that he understood the possible punishment for armed robbery. People v Lendzian, supra, 325.
Similarly, in this case defendant was informed that the maximum sentence was life, and stated that he understood the maximum penalty. As a previous felony offender, defendant was also familiar with the criminal justice system. Further, he was also in violation of the terms of his parole and was apprised of the possible consequences therefor. Finally, the crime with which defendant was charged was a grievous one. Defendant had no expectation of being placed on probation. We find that, on these facts, the noncompliance with GCR 1963, 785.7(l)(f) does not mandate reversal.
As no error requiring reversal has been established, we hereby affirm.
Affirmed.
Mackenzie, J., concurred.