Case Name: McFARLAND v. ELMIRA WATER, LIGHT & R. CO.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1909-12-30
Citations: 120 N.Y.S. 292
Docket Number: 
Parties: McFARLAND v. ELMIRA WATER, LIGHT & R. CO.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 120
Pages: 292–295

Head Matter:
McFARLAND v. ELMIRA WATER, LIGHT & R. CO.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.
December 30, 1909.)
1. ' Street Railroads (§ 117 )—Injuries to Persons on' Track—Evidence-Question for Jury.
In an action against a- street railroad for the death of a child, who was run over while crossing the track, the question of defendant’s negligence held one for the jury.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Street Railroads, Dec. Dig. § 117. ]
2. Street Railroads (§ 95 )—Care As to Persons Near Track.
It was the duty of a motorman, on approaching a crowd of boys playing tag near the track, to check the speed of the car, so as to have it under control, or at least to drop the fender and to give the usual signals.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Street Railroads, Cent. Dig. § 202; Dec. Dig. § 95. ]
3. Street Railroads (§ 117 )—Injuries to Persons on Track—Contributory
Negligence of Child.
A boy 8% years of age, playing tag near a street railroad track, is not, as a matter of law, guilty of contributory negligence in failing to avoid an approaching car.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Street Railroads, Cent. Dig. § 255; Dec. Dig. § 117. ]
Sewell and Chester, JJ., dissenting.
Appeal from Trial Term, Chemung County.
Action by William H. McFarland, as administrator of Wills McFarland, deceased, against the Elmira Water, Eight & Railroad Company. From a judgment in favor of defendant, plaintiff appeals.
Reversed, and new trial ordered.
Argued before SMITH, P. J., and CHESTER, KELLOGG, SE-WELL, and COCHRANE, JJ.
Knapp & Sebring (James O. Sebring, of counsel), 'for appellant.
Reynolds, Stanchfield & Collins (Halsey Sayles, of counsel), for respondent.
For other caaes see same topic b § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
COCHRANE, J.
The plaintiff's intestate, a boy about 8% years of age, was run over and killed by one of the defendant's trolley cars, and this action' is based on the alleged negligence of the defendant in causing his death. The defendant operates a street railroad extending easterly and westerly through West Second street in the city of Elmira. The deceased was attending school in a school building on the northerly side of West Second street and' about opposite where the accident occurred. He, with a number of other children, had just been dismissed from school. There is evidence that as the car approached there were about a dozen boys engaged in what was known as a game of "tag," which consisted in running after and trying to catch each other; that some of the boys had run across from the schoolhouse, or northerly side of the street, to the ~southerly side; and' that the deceased was running after them, and endeavoring to overtake them in their game of "tag," as the car approached and struck him. The jury might properly1 have found that as the motorman of the car approached he saw or should have seen the boys playing on either side of the street, and some of them running across the street, and that he should have known that, engrossed as they were in their sport, they might not be alert or sensitive to the danger of the approaching car. The car was equipped with a fender, which was caused to drop by a pressure of the motorman's foot in the event of danger or an emergency. That was its purpose. It was the duty of a prudent man as he approached the boys to check the speed of the car, so as to have it under control, or at least to drop the fender and to give the usual signal. The evidence tends to show that he took none of those precautions. There is evidence that the car did not stop at the last street crossing before the accident. It had recently snowed, and it appears that the body of the boy was pushed along, leaving its mark in the snow, for 25 or 30 feet behind the car before it stopped. The car was about 25 feet long, and when it stopped the body of the boy was under it, arid 5 or 6 feet forward from its rear end, so that he must have been pushed or rolled along in the snow 30 or 35 feet, and the car must have traveled 50 feet or more after striking him. A former motorman on this same line testified that a car such as the one in question, going at the rate of 15 miles an hour, could be stopped in 35 feet. It also appears that the mark in the snow majle by the body of the boy was near the southerly rail of the track, indicating that he had almost made the crossing in front of the car, and was struck about as he was clearing the southerly rail and getting out of danger. Hence the inference is proper, either that this motorman at the time of the accident was operating the car at an unduly rapid rate of speed, or that he was not watchful and attentive to his duty; for, had he been, he would not have traveled 50 feet after striking the boy. It may be that the evidence in its entirety presents a case where conflicting inferences might be drawn; but on this appeal the plaintiff is entitled to the most favorable inferences, and, judged from that standpoint, it cannot be said as matter of law that the defendant was not negligent. The inference is proper that the motorman should have anticipated that these boys playing in the street were in danger, and should have realized that his car was traveling too rapidly in the presence of such danger. The jury might properly have found negligence on his part in operating the car too rapidly, and in not giving any signal of its approach, having in view the possible danger of the boys getting in front of the car, engaged as they were in their sporf, and having their minds diverted thereby. Had the speed of the car been checked, the boy might have crossed in safety, as he almost succeeded in doing; and had the proper signal been given, it might have attracted his attention, and prevented him from attempting to cross in front of the car.
On the question of contributory negligence I do not think it can be said as matter of law that a boy 8% years old is thus guilty under the circumstances here appearing. A boy of that age has not the judgment or mental development which an adult has to make him alert to the danger of a situation. There is evidence that when this boy was engaged in playing his mind was very intense, and not active respecting other things. He may have been so absorbed in his pastime as to make him forgetful or unmindful of danger, or he may have thought that he could cross in safety the track in front of this car, as he might have done if the car had not been traveling at an excessive rate of speed. These considerations were for the jury. See Stone v. Dry Dock, etc., R. R. Co., 115 N. Y. 104, 21 N. E. 712; Sullivan v. Union Railway Company, 81 App. Div. 596, 81 N. Y. Supp. 449, affirmed 177 N. Y. 525, 69 N. E. 1131; and Finkelstein v. Brooklyn Heights Railroad Company, 51 App. Div. 287, 64 N. Y. Supp. 915.
The judgment must be reversed, and a new trial granted, with costs to the appellant to abide the event.
KELLOGG, J., concurs. SMITH, P. J., concurs in result.