Case Name: Baldwin & Jaycox vs. The Mayor, &c, of the City of New York
Court: New York Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1865-11-06
Citations: 45 Barb. 359
Docket Number: 
Parties: Baldwin & Jaycox vs. The Mayor, &c, of the City of New York.
Judges: 
Reporter: Barbour's Supreme Court Reports
Volume: 45
Pages: 359–382

Head Matter:
Baldwin & Jaycox vs. The Mayor, &c, of the City of New York.
The legislature has no power, where a claim is made by individuals upon a municipal corporation for damages on account of the failure of the corporation to award a contract to them, to direct that the damages the claimants have Sustained shall he ascertained by arbitrators to he appointed as prescribed in the act, without requiring the assent of the corporation, instead of a trial by jury. Welles, J. dissented.
APPEAL from an order made at special term. The order appealed from vacates and sets aside a judgment in the action, entered June 13th, 1863, and all proceedings thereunder, together with the order of reference entered in said action on the 27th day of February of that year, and all proceedings thereunder, with $10 costs of the motion. This order (the one appealed from) was made in pursuance of an order at special term, held in the first district on the 24th day of August, 1864, before Mr. Justice J. P. Barnard, founded upon certain affidavits and other papers referred to, on motion of counsel employed by the comptroller of the city of Hew York, under the fifth section of the act of the legislature, entitled “An act to enable the supervisors of the city and county of Hew York to raise money by tax,” passed April 19, 1859, (chap. 489, pp. 1123-1127,) and required the plaintiffs to show cause at a special term to be held at the city hall of said city, on the first Monday of September then next, at 11 o'clock A. M., or as soon thereafter as counsel could be heard, why the judgment in the action and the execution theretofore issued thereon, and all proceedings thereunder, and the report of the referee and the order of reference therein should not be vacated and set aside, and why the defendants should not be permitted to come in and defend said action, and why the defendants should not have such other or further relief as to the court might seem meet, with costs of the motion. The order to show cause directed that in the mean time, and until the decision and entry of the order of the coitrt upon the motion, and all proceedings on the judgment and execution, and the levy thereunder, be and the same were thereby stayed. The decision upon this order to show cause was postponed from time to time, until November, 30, 1864, when the order appealed from was made.
The action was brought to recover from the defendants the amount of an award of three arbitrators alleged to have been chosen under and in pursuance of the fourth section of the act of the legislature, passed April 16, 1860, entitled “An act to facilitate the acquisition of land for a junction gate house, and to connect the same with the new reservoir and the city mains in the city of New York, and to provide for the settlement of claims for damages connected therewith.” (Laws of 1860, ch. 449, pp. 772-774.)-
Luther R. Marsh, for the appellants.
William Fullerton, for the respondents.

Opinion:
Ingraham, P. J.
The question raised in this case as to the power of the legislature to pass the act directing the arbitration therein has been fully examined by Clerke, justice, at special term, in this case, (42 Barb. 549,) and by myself in The People, ex rel. Baldwin & Jaycox v. Haws, (37 id. 440.) It is unnecessary to reiterate in an opinion here the views then expressed. The conclusions arrived at in those decisions have not been changed, and we refer to those decisions as containing our opinions on the questions now under discussion.
The opinion of Denio, Ch. J. in Darlington v. The Mayor, (28 How. 352,) contains much not at all necessary to the decision of that case, and the unlimited power claimed in that opinion for the legislature over the property of municipal corporations should be authoritatively declared in a case which would make it binding as an authority before it is adopted as law, removing, as in this case, all the protection which" the constitution has given to rights to private property, and to a trial by jury in cases of disputed claims.
I can not concur in the views expressed by Judge Welles in this case, without abandoning all the rules heretofore adopted for the protection of municipal corporations in their franchises and property, until a direct decision on these points shall have been made by á higher tribunal.
The order appealed from should be affirmed.
Clerke, J. concurred.