Case Name: Robert Ford, Respondent, v. Ed Logan et al., Respondents, Overtaxed, Inc., Petitioner
Court: Washington Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Washington
Decision Date: 1971-04-15
Citations: 79 Wash. 2d 147
Docket Number: No. 41722
Parties: Robert Ford, Respondent, v. Ed Logan et al., Respondents, Overtaxed, Inc., Petitioner.
Judges: 
Reporter: Washington Reports
Volume: 79
Pages: 147–173

Head Matter:
[No. 41722.
En Banc.
April 15, 1971.]
Robert Ford, Respondent, v. Ed Logan et al., Respondents, Overtaxed, Inc., Petitioner.
James S. Munn (of Caplinger & Munn), for petitioner.
Houger, Garvey & Schubert, by John R. Allison, for respondent Ford.

Opinion:
Neill, J.
This is a taxpayer's declaratory judgment action in which he seeks to enjoin King County election officials from placing on the ballot a measure entitled: "Initiative No. 3 A Repeal of King County Charter." This initiative was proposed by a local group known as Overtaxed, Inc. Overtaxed was not an original party to this action.
The requisite number of signatures under the county charter was obtained and all charter procedural steps for placing the initiative on the .ballot have been completed. Plaintiff asserts that the measure should not be placed on the ballot because (1) the King County Charter cannot be amended or repealed by initiative, and (2) the content of the proposed initiative is confusing, misleading, and fails to adequately apprise the voters of the consequences of their vote.
The trial court entered an oral decision in favor of plaintiff on each of the above grounds. Thereafter, Overtaxed learned that defendants of record had no plans to appeal. Overtaxed then petitioned to intervene as a defendant. The trial court allowed intervention on the understanding that it was solely for purposes of appeal and that Overtaxed would not contest the trial court's discretion as to super-sedeas bond. That Same day, the trial court entered formal findings of fact, conclusions of law, judgment and decree in favor of plaintiff. We granted Overtaxed'® petition for a writ of certiorari.
At the outset, plaintiff, Mr.. Ford, challenges the trial court's action in permitting Overtaxed to intervene after oral decision, but prior to formal disposition of the cause. Intervention was granted under CR 24(b) (2) which states:
(b) Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application, anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action:
(2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common. When a party to an action relies for ground of claim or defense upon any statute or executive order administered by a federal or state governmental officer or agency or upon any regulation, order, requirements, or agreement issued or made pursuant to the statute or executive order, the officer or agency upon timely application may be permitted to intervene in the action. In exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.
The trial court's decision under this rule is discretionary, and the question on review is whether that discretion has been abused. Plaintiff Ford contends that the application to intervene was not timely made and that the granting thereof unduly prejudices him.
Plaintiff cites our holding that a complaint in intervention cannot be filed after final judgment (Portland Ass'n of Credit Men, Inc. v. Earley, 42 Wn.2d 273, 254 P.2d 758 (1953)), and analogizes that the underlying policy of that case should bar "judgment speculation" by potential parties by awaiting oral decision, thus prohibiting intervention by Overtaxed. Portland Ass'n of Credit Men, Inc. v. Earley, supra, was decided under RCW 4.08.190 which expressly provided that intervention must have been before trial. That statute has been superseded by CR 24(b) which eliminates the "before trial" requirement of the statute and injects the discretion of the trial court on the issue of a "timely application." The trial court noted that intervention at this stage of the case would have the effect only of allowing an appeal, and would not impose further trial litigation. The undue prejudice asserted by plaintiff is the suggested necessity of submitting additional evidence as to the appropriate amount for a supersedeas bond. However, the grant of intervention virtually eliminated this possibility, in that it was partially premised on an agreement by intervenor to accept the court's discretion as to supersedeas bond. Moreover, the trial court was presented with a situation in which intervention by Overtaxed was the only available means by which the petition signatories would have the benefit of an appeal, a situation that did not manifest itself until after the oral decision. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the intervention.
The initiative aspires to "amend" the King County Charter by deleting all of its sections, thus repealing it. For all realistic purposes, the measure seeks a repeal of the King County Charter, and we will so treat it. The facts present three basic issues: (1) Do our courts have jurisdiction to determine whether the subject matter of a proposed initiative is within the scope of the initiative power before the proposal is enacted by the electorate? We conclude that they do. (2) Do the electorate of King County have the power to directly repeal their charter by initiative? We conclude that they do not. (3) Is this proposed initiative invalid as confusing in content or misleading in ballot title? In view of our conclusions as to the other issues, we do not reach this question.
We first meet the contention that courts lack jurisdiction at this stage of the initiative process. In support of this contention, intervenor cites cases where, in various contexts, we have stated that courts will not determine the validity of contemplated legislation prior to its enactment and that courts have no jurisdiction to intervene in the legislative process. State ex rel. Griffiths v. Superior Court, 92 Wash. 44, 159 P. 101, 162 P. 360 (1916); State ex rel. Donohue v. Coe, 49 Wn.2d 410, 302 P.2d 202 (1956); State ex rel. O'Connell v. Kramer, 73 Wn.2d 85, 436 P.2d 786 (1968). A reading of these cases discloses that in each instance we either were considering subject matter clearly legislative in nature or were not confronted with the threshold question of what is legislative.
In Griffiths v. Superior Court, supra, the subject matter of the proposed initiative was an amendment to existing workman's compensation law. We intervened in the legislative process to the extent of excising portions of the preamble to the proposed initiative which were argumentative, rather than legislative, in nature and therefore beyond the proper exercise of the initiative power. Accord, State ex rel. Berry v. Superior Court, 92 Wash. 16, 159 P. 92 (1916).
In State ex rel. Donohue v. Coe, supra, the proposed initiative was reapportionment of the legislature. We refused to enjoin the secretary of state from placing the measure on the ballot. The subject matter there was clearly a legislative matter.
In State ex rel. O'Connell v. Kramer, supra, we intervened to require the secretary of state to file a proposed initiative on the ground that 'his refusal to do so exceeded his authority. Our holding in that case related solely to the scope of the secretary's authority prior to the circulation of petitions for signatures and not to the ground asserted by the secretary for his refusal to file the proposal, which was that a constitutional convention cannot be called or established by initiative. For our purposes in meeting the issues presented to us in O'Connell, we assumed the legislative nature of the subject matter.
The foregoing cases do not derogate from the numerous instances in which this court has, prior to enactment, determined the threshold question of whether a given proposal was "legislative" in nature so as to be the proper subject of initiative. The courts of this state possess and have long exercised jurisdiction to adjudicate that question. E.g., Paget v. Logan, 78 Wn.2d 349, 474 P.2d 247 (1970); State ex rel. Close v. Meehan, 49 Wn.2d 426, 302 P.2d 194 (1956); State ex rel. Payne v. Spokane, 17 Wn.2d 22, 134 P.2d 950 (1943); State ex rel. Miller v. Hinkle, 156 Wash. 289, 286 P. 839 (1930). Accordingly, we proceed to determine whether repeal of the King County Charter is within the initiative power.
We are mindful of the fact that the initiative and referendum provisions of the King County Charter grant "liberal and comprehensive legislative authority to the voters, excluding only initiative ordinances providing Tor the compensation or working conditions of county em ployees'." Paget v. Logan, supra at 351. We are further cognizant of the basic limitation contained in Const, art. 11, § 4 (amendment 21) under which "home rule" charters are authorized in this state: "Any county may frame a 'Home Rule' charter for its own government subject to the Constitution and laws of this state . . Thus, while the initiative powers under the King County Charter are quite broad, they are not unlimited, but must be consistent with the constitution and laws of the state. We early recognized this limitation in State ex rel. Berry v. Superior Court, 92 Wash. 16, 26, 159 P. 92 (1916):
The people in their legislative capacity are not, however, superior to the written and fixed constitution. Nor is the individual who proceeds to initiate any legislation. His act in initiating a measure is but a voluntary one, and is permitted and defined, limited and circumscribed, by the constitution and the laws passed in obedience to and compliance with the constitution as amended.
A fundamental limit on the initiative power inheres in its nature as a legislative function reserved to the people. In Washington, that power derives from our Const, art. 2, § 1 (amendment 7) . It is clear from the constitutional pro vision that the initiative process, as a means by which the people can exercise directly the legislative authority to enact bills and laws, is limited in scope to subject matter which is legislative in nature.
The question before us is whether repeal of a "home rule" charter is a legislative act. In proceeding to answer this question, we first note that, once validly established, a "home rule" charter is the "organic law" of the county. Const. art. 11, § 4 (amendment 21).
We find nothing in the provisions of Const, art. 2, § 1 (amendment 7) which places within the legislative authority the power to amend or repeal the very organic law which allocates that authority. To the contrary, our constitutional provisions for amendment are distinct and apart from article 2, relating to the legislative authority.
The method by which our constitution may be amended is set forth in Const, art. 23, § 1, and involves two distinct phases. First, two-thirds of each house of the legislature must agree to submit the proposed amendment. Then it must be approved and ratified by the majority of the electors acting in their capacity as the ultimate sovereign. The process is manifestly distinct from that involved in the enactment of ordinary bills or laws. The legislature can only propose, it cannot effectuate, amendments. Such complete action is not legislative in nature under the general provisions of our constitution. Rather, this act of amending or repealing the basic organic instrument of government is of a higher order than the mere enactment of laws within the framework of that organic structure. This distinction has been prudently and thoughtfully included in the structure of American constitutional government, for to permit direct action by a majority to change a basic form of government would enable any given majority to remove all protections contained within constitutional frameworks. It is agreed, of course, that amendment or repeal of organic law is ultimately ratified or rejected by the electorate which also selects the members of the legislature who propose the change. However, the safeguards against hasty or emotional action are of fundamental importance. Under article 23, these safeguards consist of the deliberative nature of a legislative assembly, the public scrutiny and debate made possible during the legislative process, the requirement of a two-thirds vote in each independent house of a bicameral body, and the tempering element of time. These safeguards are not to be lightly cast aside in an understandable zeal for the right of the people to act directly on matters of common legislation. Amendment of our constitution is not a legislative act and thus is not within the initiative power reserved to the voters. It necessarily follows that that which cannot be amended by legislation cannot be abolished thereby. By its nature, then, the initiative power set forth in Const, art. 2 does not include the power to directly amend or repeal the constitution itself.
If the initiative power at the county level under a "home rule" charter is to be expanded beyond its article 2 limits, such expansion must find support in some other constitutional provision, for such charters are "subject to the Constitution."
Intervenor urges that such support is established by State ex rel. Linn v. Superior Court, 20 Wn.2d 138, 146 P.2d 543 (1944), where we held that, by the terms of Const, art. 11, § 10, amendment of certain city charters was rendered a legislative act which could be accomplished by initiative. We need not here decide whether a similar conclusion is dictated by the language of Const, art. 11, § 4 (amendment 21), for, as we noted at the outset, the initiative now before us proposes repeal, not amendment, of the King County Charter.. We find nothing in the constitutional provisions relating to home rule charters by which the initiative power is expanded to include repeal of the organic law which such charters constitute.
The provisions of Const, art. 11, § 4 (arbendment 21), set forth a 3-step method for establishing a new charter. An election of freeholders is called by the legislative authority or by petition of a specified number of the county's registered voters. The freeholders then adopt a proposed charter which must be submitted for ratification by a majority of the voting electors. Although article 11 makes provision for amendments to the charter, it contains no express method for repeal.
By reason of the inherent limitation on the power of initiative, and by reason of the fact that "home rule" charters are subject to the constitution, we hold that "home rule" charters cannot be repealed by initiative. To hold otherwise would be to say that the initiative power at the local level is broader than, and inconsistent with, the initiative power reserved under our constitution. That result is precluded by the "subject to" clause of Const, 'art. 11, § 4 (amendment 21).
It may be suggested that, since a majority of the voting electorate has the final voice in ratifying or rejecting a proposal to repeal the charter, the proposal can just as well be placed initially before the people, and that the intervening freeholder procedure is surplusage and useless. Even if this suggestion appealed to us as the better wisdom, it is not our prerogative to "amend" the constitution by judicially injecting this additional method. See Burns v. Alderson, 51 Wn.2d 810, 322 P.2d 359 (1958).
Affirmed.
McGovern and Stafford, JJ., concur.
Hamilton, C.J., and Finley, J., concur in the result.
The text and ballot title of the proposed initiative read:
"Repeal of King County Charter
"A Charter Amendment repealing the King County Charter and providing for a return to the statutory and constitution 'commission' form of county government to be effective December 1, 1970.
"Be it enacted by the people of King County, State of Washington:
"Section 1. The King County Charter enacted by the people of King County on November 5, 1968, is hereby amended by deleting Article 1 through Article 9 inclusive, thereby repealing said Charter.
"Section 2. King County shall operate according to the constitution and laws of the State of Washington relating to county government.
"Section 3. The amendment shall become effective 12/1/70."
Section 230.50 of the charter provides: "Ordinances except ordinances providing for the compensation or working conditions of county employees may be proposed by filing with the county council petitions bearing signatures of registered voters of the county equal in number to not less than ten percent of the votes cast in the county for the office of county executive at the last preceding election for county executive. Each petition shall contain the full text of the proposed ordinance.
"The county council shall consider the proposed ordinance. If the proposed ordinance is not enacted within ninety days after the petitions are presented, it shall be placed on the ballot at the next regular or special election occurring more than one hundred thirty-five days after the petitions are filed or at an earlier election designated by the county council. However, if the proposed ordinance is enacted at any time prior to the election, it shall not be placed on the ballot or be voted on unless it is subjected to referendum.
"If the county council rejects the proposed ordinance and adopts a substitute ordinance concerning the same subject matter, the substitute ordinance shall be placed on the same ballot with the proposed ordinance; and the voters shall first be given the choice of accepting either or rejecting both and shall then be given the choice of accepting one and rejecting the other. If a majority of the voters voting on the first issue is for either, then the ordinance receiving the majority of the votes cast on the second issue shall be deemed approved. If a majority of those voting on the first issue is for rejecting both, then neither ordinance shall be approved regardless of the vote on the second issue."
"Art. 2 § 1 Legislative Powers, Where Vested. The legislative authority of the state of Washington shall be vested in the legislature, consisting of a senate and house of representatives, which shall be called the legislature of the state of Washington, but the people reserve to themselves the power to propose bills, laws, and to enact or reject the same at the polls, independent of the legislature, and also reserve power, at their own option, to approve or reject at the polls any act, item, section or part of any bill, act or law passed by the legislature.
"(a) Initiative: The first power reserved by the people is the initiative. Ten per centum, but in no case more than fifty thousand, of the legal voters shall be required to propose any measure by such petition, and every such petition shall include the full text of the measure so proposed. Initiative petitions shall be filed with the secretary of state not less than four months before the election at which they are to be voted upon, or not less than ten days before any regular session of the legislature. If filed at least four months before the election at which they are to be voted upon, he shall submit the same to the vote of the people at the said election. If such petitions are filed not less than ten days before any regular session of the legislature, he shall transmit the same to the legislature as soon as it convenes and organizes. Such initiative measure shall take precedence over all other measures in the legislature except appropriation bills and shall be either enacted or rejected without change or amendment by the legislature before the end of such regular session. If any such initiative measure shall be enacted by the legislature it shall be subject to the referendum petition, or it may be enacted and referred by the legislature to the people for approval or rejection at the next regular election. If it is rejected or if no action is taken upon it by the legislature before the end of such regular session, the secretary of state shall submit it to the people for approval or rejection at the next ensuing regular general election. The legislature may reject any measure so proposed by initiative petition and propose a different one dealing with the same subject, and in such event both measures shall be submitted by the secretary of state to the people for approval or rejection at the next ensuing regular general election. When conflicting measures are submitted to the people the ballots shall be so printed that a voter can express separately by making one cross (X) for each, two preferences, first, as between either measure and neither, and secondly, as between one and the other. If the majority of those voting on the first issue is for neither, both fail, but in that case the votes on the second issue shall nevertheless be carefully counted and made public. If a majority voting on the first issue is for either, then the measure receiving a majority of the votes on the second issue shall be law."
However, repeal can be effected by use of the same procedure set forth in amendment 21 for creating the charter. The electors may "at any time" call a freeholders election by petition. The freeholders may propose a new charter which simply states that the government of the county shall be returned to that provided under general laws with provision for the orderly transfer of offices, officers, and duties. In such manner, the right of the ultimate power of the electorate, acting in its sovereign (as distinct from its legislative) capacity, is preserved within the safeguards provided in the constitution for original change to a "home rule charter."