Case Name: CITY OF LAUDERDALE LAKES, a Florida municipal corporation; Howard Craft, Mayor of the City of Lauderdale Lakes; Alfonso Gereffi, Jerome J. Cohan, Morris Klein, Lyman L. Allen, Louis Greenwald, Harry Kaufman, City Councilmen; and Ben Eigner, Building Official, Petitioners, v. Herman CORN, Trustee, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1982-06-17
Citations: 415 So. 2d 1270
Docket Number: No. 57247
Parties: CITY OF LAUDERDALE LAKES, a Florida municipal corporation; Howard Craft, Mayor of the City of Lauderdale Lakes; Alfonso Gereffi, Jerome J. Cohan, Morris Klein, Lyman L. Allen, Louis Greenwald, Harry Kaufman, City Councilmen; and Ben Eigner, Building Official, Petitioners, v. Herman CORN, Trustee, Respondent.
Judges: BOYD, ALDERMAN and McDONALD, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 415
Pages: 1270–1274

Head Matter:
CITY OF LAUDERDALE LAKES, a Florida municipal corporation; Howard Craft, Mayor of the City of Lauderdale Lakes; Alfonso Gereffi, Jerome J. Cohan, Morris Klein, Lyman L. Allen, Louis Greenwald, Harry Kaufman, City Councilmen; and Ben Eigner, Building Official, Petitioners, v. Herman CORN, Trustee, Respondent.
No. 57247.
Supreme Court of Florida.
June 17, 1982.
James C. Brady, Fort Lauderdale, and Mallory H. Horton of Horton, Perse & Ginsberg, Miami, for petitioners.
Gary M. Farmer of Abrams, Anton, Robbins, Resnick, Schneider & Mager, Hollywood, for respondent.
Terrence J. Russell and Kathleen V. McCarthy of Ruden, Barnett, McClosky & Schuster, Fort Lauderdale, for Gulf + Eastern Development Corp., amicus curiae.
Stephen W. Metz, Tallahassee, for Florida Home Builders Association; and Duane Searles, Washington, D.C., for Nat. Ass’n. of Home Builders, amicus curiae.

Opinion:
OVERTON, Justice.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal has certified to us, as a question of great public interest, the following:
May a city be required to post a bond for damages for delay in order to secure a stay of a final judgment that requires the public body to permit the construction of a development project?
City of Lauderdale Lakes v. Corn, 371 So.2d 1111, 1112 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979). We answer the question in the negative because the city's action is in performance of a legislative "planning-level" function.
In the trial court, respondent, a land developer, succeeded in having a municipal zoning ordinance declared invalid. Petitioner city appealed the adverse ruling. Respondent thereafter moved the trial court to compel the city to post supersedeas bond as a condition of the automatic stay of the trial court's ruling, afforded by Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.310(b)(2), pending the city's appeal. The trial court granted the motion and required the city to post a $1.14 million bond for potential damages for delay. The district court affirmed. We reverse.
Rule 9.310(bX2) provides:
Public Bodies; Public Officers. The timely filing of a notice shall automatically operate as a stay pending review, except in criminal cases, when the State, any public officer in an official capacity, board, commission or other public body seeks review; provided that on motion the lower tribunal or the court may impose any lawful conditions or vacate the stay.
Subsection (c)(2) of the same rule states:
Conditions. The conditions of a bond shall include a condition to pay or comply with the order in full, including costs, interest, fees, damages for delay, use, detention and depreciation of property, if the review is dismissed or order affirmed; and may include such other conditions as may be required by the lower tribunal.
The district court concluded that a court could require a public body to post superse- deas reasoning that "[u]nder Fla.R.App.P. 9.310(b)(2) a public body is automatically granted a stay upon filing a notice of appeal. The rule further provides that the trial court may impose conditions on the stay or even vacate the stay. Hence, while the stay is automatic, it is not a matter of absolute right . " 371 So.2d at 1112.
The district court held that because subsection (c)(2) provided as a condition "damages for delay," supersedeas bond was justified in the instant case.
While we agree that the court may require a bond of a public body under many circumstances, we cannot agree that super-sedeas bond is proper for appellate review of legislative planning-level determinations. Requiring a bond in this situation would clearly chill the right of a governmental body to appeal an adverse trial court decision declaring invalid a legislative act. We distinguished between "operational-level" and "planning-level" governmental functions in Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So.2d 1010 (Fla.1979). We find that the distinction also applies in supersedeas bond proceedings under Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.310(b)(2). To rule otherwise would make cities liable for damages resulting from legislative planning-level decisions. This is clearly contrary to existing law. We, thus, construe rule 9.310(b)(2) as allowing trial and appellate courts the discretion to require governmental entities to post supersedeas bonds in suits where the judgment concerns operational-level functions but find that no authority exists to lawfully require such bonds in planning-level governmental functions.
We can conceive no justification for this Court to require the government to pay for judicial review of legislative actions. A contrary decision would prove catastrophic for small municipalities and counties. Even larger governmental entities would be adversely affected. Consider, for example, the situation that was presented in this Court's recent decision in Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So.2d 1374 (Fla.1981). The cost of delaying a proposed project with "26,500 dwelling units with an estimated eventual population of 73,500, eleven commercial centers, four marinas, five boat basins, three golf courses, and twenty-eight acres of tennis facilities" would be immense. Id. at 1376. Under respondent's contention, if the Estuary developers had prevailed in the trial court, Lee County could have been required to post a substantial supersedeas bond. That being the case, the ultimate effect could have deprived Lee County of the ability to appeal. This Court, in turn, would not have had the opportunity to review the decision and establish clear guidelines in an essential area of the law.
It is paramount for governmental bodies to have unrestricted appellate court review of their authority to act in a legislative capacity. Requiring the payment of damages for such review is not justified in other circumstances and cannot be here. The only exception is when no justiciable issue is present and when the record establishes that the governmental body is seeking review in bad faith solely as a delaying tactic. The decision of the Fourth District Court of Appeal is quashed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.
It is so ordered.
BOYD, ALDERMAN and McDONALD, JJ., concur.
ADKINS, J., dissents with an opinion in which SUNDBERG, C. J., concurs.
Jurisdiction vests under article V, section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution (1972).