Case Name: Annette Y. MILLER, Appellant, v. Claude W. MILLER, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1991-10-03
Citations: 586 So. 2d 1315
Docket Number: No. 91-398
Parties: Annette Y. MILLER, Appellant, v. Claude W. MILLER, Appellee.
Judges: COBB, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 586
Pages: 1315–1320

Head Matter:
Annette Y. MILLER, Appellant, v. Claude W. MILLER, Appellee.
No. 91-398.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Oct. 3, 1991.
Susan K.W. Erlenbach of Erlenbach & Erlenbach, P.A., Titusville, for appellant.
Dwight W. Severs of Holland, Starling, Severs, Stadler & Friedland, P.A., Titus-ville, for appellee.

Opinion:
ON MOTION FOR COSTS AND FEES PENDING APPEAL
GRIFFIN, Judge.
This matter is before the court on appellant's Motion for Costs and Fees Pending Appeal. The subject of the appeal is an order of the lower court on appellant's petition for modification of alimony. Appellant has been declared indigent for purposes of appeal and contends that on the alimony of $1,050 she receives she is unable to pay the estimated $1,327.50 for the transcript of the trial below and is unable to pay the estimated $4,625 in attorney's fees necessary to prosecute her appeal. Appellant apparently sought an award of appellate costs and fees below, which the trial court denied on the ground that an order for interim fees and transcript costs was viola-tive of Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.400.
Appellant now seeks relief in this court, relying on the language of section 61.16, Florida Statutes (1989) which provides:
The court may from time to time, after considering the financial resources of both parties, order a party to pay a reasonable amount for attorney's fees, suit money and the cost to the other party of maintaining or defending any proceeding under this chapter, including enforcement and modification proceedings.
Section 61.16 is the authority for an appellate court to award fees for appeal of a chapter 61 proceeding. Thornton v. Thornton, 433 So.2d 682 (Fla. 5th DCA), rev. denied, 443 So.2d 980 (Fla.1983). Under section 61.16, it is irrelevant whether the amounts sought are temporary or final. Nichols v. Nichols, 519 So.2d 620, 622 (Fla.1988). Appellee contends this court is without the power to enter orders for temporary suit money or attorneys fees, relying principally on Mullins v. Mullins, 342 So.2d 83 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). However, because Mullins v. Mullins dealt with a trial court's attempted award of interim costs and because section 61.16 was not discussed in Mullins, we conclude it is inapposite to the issue presented in this case. Cf. Horn v. Horn, 73 So.2d 905, 906 (Fla.1954). Florida appellate courts historically have had the power to make such interim orders, the broad language of section 61.16 appears to authorize such orders, and we can find nothing in the appellate rules to the contrary.
Although Florida appellate courts have the power to make such orders, it has long been held that when such interim awards of costs and fees on appeal are sought by the appellant, it is appropriate for the appellate court initially to determine whether the appeal is brought in good faith and whether there are reasonable grounds to believe the appeal may be successful. Phifer v. Phifer, 124 Fla. 223, 168 So. 9 (1936); Troeger v. Troeger, 127 Fla. 53, 172 So. 473 (1937). This seems a reasonable limitation and, in the present case, a showing has been made that is adequate to convince this court to authorize an interim award to pay the cost of preparing the transcript so that appellant may obtain review of the lower court's order. We conclude an adequate showing has not been made to warrant an interim award of attorney's fees. In our view, the showing required for an award of the cost of the transcript is far less than would be necessary for a temporary award of fees because the transcript is essential to judicial review.
Since this court is not well equipped to make factual findings concerning the current relative financial condition of these parties, we will follow the same procedure utilized by this court in determining fee applications after appeal, and refer this matter to the trial court for a determination of appellant's request for costs of the transcript in accordance with Nichols v. Nichols.
REMANDED for further proceedings.
COBB, J., concurs.
W. SHARP, J., dissents in part with opinion.
. The request is alluded to in the order on rehearing but is not part of the record before this court.
. The holding in Vinson v. Vinson, 139 Fla. 146, 190 So. 454 (1939) denying alimony and suit money incident to the appeal of a modification proceeding, appears to have been superseded by statutory amendment. When Vinson was decided, the only statutory authority for an award of suit money was contained in section 4986 C.G.L. (1927) and it authorized fees and suit money only for the divorce. Thereafter, and prior to 1971, the statutory authority for an award of suit money and attorney's fees for proceedings after divorce was contained in section 61.15, Florida Statutes (1969) and was limited to enforcement proceedings. The inclusion of modification proceedings in the present statute occurred in 1971, when the prior sections 61.15 and 61.16 were combined, substantially rewritten and renumbered as section 61.16, Florida Statutes.
.We have identified no Florida case that permits an award of fees or suit money to an impecunious appellant without this "good faith" showing. The dissent relies on Dresser v. Dresser, 350 So.2d 1152 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); however, in Dresser the appellate court had decided the merits of the appeal (in favor of the impecunious spouse). The Dresser court's use of the phrase "provisional attorneys fees" referred to the appellate court's post decision determination of entitlement based on the trial court's fees award decision, not, as we are facing here, a decision to order an appellee to pay fees and costs before the merits of the appeal are decided. Also, in Dresser the impecunious spouse was the appellee. The same Florida decisions that require a good faith showing by an appellant recognize the appellate court's power to award interim fees and costs to an appellee without a good faith showing; the fact that appellee prevailed below serves that purpose.
. It is not uncommon in this court that a judgment of the lower court in a divorce case is summarily affirmed because the appellant, claiming financial impossibility, has failed to bring a record for this court to review.
. Unless the financial status of the parties has changed since the entry of the order appealed, appellee may conclude that requiring the trial court to go through this exercise would be wasteful.