Case Name: MANN v. FERDINAND MUNCH BREWERY
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1916-07-10
Citations: 160 N.Y.S. 314
Docket Number: 
Parties: MANN v. FERDINAND MUNCH BREWERY.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 160
Pages: 314–317

Head Matter:
(173 App. Div. 746)
MANN v. FERDINAND MUNCH BREWERY.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
July 10, 1916.)
1. Landlord and Tenant @=190(1)—Liability for Rent—Future Rent After Eviction by Summary Proceedings.
An eviction by summary proceedings terminates a tenant’s liability for rent accruing in the future.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Landlord and Tenant, Cent. Dig. §§ 765, 767-769; Dec. Dig. @=190(1).]
2. Landlord and Tenant @=190(1)—Damages for Breach of Covenant-Liability of Tenant After Eviction.
After eviction by summary proceedings, the tenant is not thereafter liable in damages for failure to perform covenants, unless the lease contains an express provision permitting the landlord to re-enter, lease the property, and hold the tenant liable for deficiency of rental.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Landlord and Tenant, Cent. Dig. §§ 765, 767-769; Dec. Dig. @=190(1).]
3. Landlord and Tenant @=190(1)—Rent—Liability After Eviction.
A letter from defendant, in possession of premises with consent of lessee, informing the lessor that he would “assume the lease,” in answer to her query as to who would pay rent, and his subsequent payment of rent for a time, did not render him liable for rent after eviction in summary proceedings for breach of covenant.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Landlord and Tenant, Cent. Dig. §§ 765, 767-769; Dec. Dig. @=190(1).]
Smith and Scott, JJ., dissenting.
tg^For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes
Appeal from Trial Term, New York County.
Action by Sarah Ruth Mann against the Ferdinand Munch Brewery. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, and an order denying a motion for a new trial, defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded.
Argued before CLARICE, P. J., and McLAUGHLIN, SCOTT, SMITH, and PAGE, JJ.
Victor E. Whitlock, of New York City, for appellant.
Leon Sanders, of New York City, for respondent.

Opinion:
McLAUGHLIN, J.
When the defendant was dispossessed, its relation with the plaintiff as tenant ceased. An eviction by summary proceedings terminates the liability of the tenant to pay rent accruing in the future. Section 2253, Code of Civil Procedure; McCready v. Lindenborn, 172 N. Y. 440, 65 N. E. 208; Michaels v. Fishel, 169 N. Y. 381, 62 N. E. 425. Nor is the tenant thereafter liable in damages for failure to perform the covenants contained in the lease, unless there is an express provision permitting the landlord to re-enter, lease the property, and hold the tenant liable for the difference between the amount received and the amount agreed to be paid. Slater v. Von Chorus, 120 App. Div. 16, 104 N. Y. Supp. 996.
In the present case there is no proof that the lease was ever assigned to the defendant, or that it ever agreed to perform any of the covenants contained in it, other than to pay rent. The letter set out in the dissenting opinion, in which defendant said it would "assume the lease," was in answer to one from the plaintiff asking who was going to pay the rent. Obviously, it refers only to the payment of rent while defendant was in possession. There are several covenants by the original tenant in the lease: (a) To use the premises only for a saloon; (b) to keep the premises in repair during the term; (c) to comply with all the requirements of the municipal authorities (d) to exempt the landlord from liability for accidents; and (e) to pay for insurance of the plate glass in that portion of the premises covered by the lease. It can no more be said that the defendant, after being dispossessed, was liable for damages under the covenant to pay rent, than it can that it was liable for failure to carry out the other covenants, which had been made impossible by the plaintiff herself. Before the defendant can be made liable in damages, something more must be shown than that it was in possession, with the consent of a tenant to whom the plaintiff leased her property.
The judgment and order appealed from should therefore be reversed, and a new trial ordered, with costs to appellant to abide the event.
CLARKE, P. J., and PAGE, J., concur.