Case Name: STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. George M. MITCHELL, Appellant
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1978-06-30
Citations: 360 So. 2d 189
Docket Number: No. 61445
Parties: STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. George M. MITCHELL, Appellant.
Judges: SANDERS, C. J., and MARCUS, J., dissent.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 360
Pages: 189–193

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana, Appellee, v. George M. MITCHELL, Appellant.
No. 61445.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
June 30, 1978.
William B. Lynch, Bossier City, for defendant-appellant.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara A. Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Henry N. Brown, Jr., Dist. Atty., Roland McKneely, Asst. Dist. Atty., Bossier City, for plaintiff-appellee.

Opinion:
TATE, Justice.
The defendant was convicted of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, La.R.S. 40:966 A, and sentenced to eleven months imprisonment at hard labor, suspended.
The single assignment of error urged by his appeal alleges that the district court erred in overruling his motion to suppress the marijuana seized from his residence.
The issue so raised concerns whether the defendant's "consent" to a warrantless search of his residence, without probable cause, was invalid as coerced by the governmental agents' exploitation of a prior illegal arrest (itself based upon an illegal search of his automobile).
The uncontradicted evidence of the defendant shows: While on the way to work from his home, the defendant's vehicle was stopped by two police officers. The officers told him that he was suspected of having marijuana in his vehicle. The defendant asked to see their search warrant.
Despite this objection to the search, the officers searched the vehicle without his consent. They found two marijuana roaches in it. They then read the accused his Miranda rights and placed him under arrest.
After the defendant was arrested, the officers told him, "You might as well take us to your house so we can find the other stuff we are looking for." The defendant then (again) asked them to show him their search warrant. They told him, "Well, it wouldn't take us no time to get a search warrant. We can get a search warrant within twenty minutes."
The defendant testified that he then signed a form consenting to the search of his home, since the officers had already searched his vehicle without a warrant and without his consent, had already arrested him, and had already impounded his vehicle and called some office to remove it from the scene.
The trial court sustained the motion to suppress the roaches seized from the vehicle, holding they were the product of an illegal warrantless search. However, the court denied the defendant's motion to suppress the marijuana seized from his residence. It held that the accused had consented to that search (following his arrest) and that the burden was upon him to prove the illegality of the residence search.
Initially, we note that the trial court was in error in allocating the burden of proof in the instant case to the defendant. In State v. Franklin, 353 So.2d 1315, 1318-19 (La.1978), this court held that "once the defendant makes the initial showing at a motiop to suppress hearing that a warrantless search occurred, the burden of proof shifts to the State to affirmatively show that the search is justified under one of the narrow exceptions to the rule requiring a search warrant."
In this case, both the initial search of the defendant's automobile and the later search of his apartment to which he purportedly consented were made without a warrant. The burden was thus on the state to prove that the search came within an exception to the general constitutional prohibition against warrantless searches.
As we recently stated in State v. Angel, 356 So.2d 986, 988-89 (La.1978): "A valid consent to search is a well recognized exception to the requirement of a valid search warrant; a search pursuant to a voluntary consent need not be based on probable cause. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). We have heretofore determined that a voluntary consent to search, given after an illegal detention, is valid under circumstances which show no exploitation of the illegality. State v. Baker, La., 338 So.2d 1372 (1976); State v. Cox, La., 330 So.2d 284 (1976)."
Here, admittedly, the consent was obtained from the defendant immediately subsequent to an illegal arrest — illegal since based solely upon a warrantless search of his vehicle, without probable cause and over his objection.
In these circumstances, in determining whether evidence should be suppressed, the issue is whether the defendant's post-arrest act (here, his consent) was the product of his free will rather than the result of an exploitation of his illegal arrest. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975). In deciding this issue, the court should take into account not only whether the governmental officers adequately informed the accused that he need not comply with their request, but also the temporal proximity between the arrest and the act (consent) alleged to be coerced, the presence of intervening circumstances, and the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. Brown v. Illinois, at 422 U.S. 603-04, 95 S.Ct. 2261-62.
By virtually all these tests, the present "consent" to the residence search was coerced from the accused by the arresting officers' exploitation of the illegal arrest immediately preceding. The arrest itself was based upon a warrantless search of his .vehicle without probable cause and in flagrant violation of constitutional prohibitions against such searches or seizures of an individual's person or property.
So far as the record shows, the state had no more probable cause to search the accused's house than it did to search his vehicle. Yet the officers informed the accused, immediately after his arrest, that he might as well consent because they could secure a search warrant anyway within twenty minutes.
Considering also that the defendant had just a minute or so earlier been arrested and subjected to a flagrantly unconstitutional search-of his vehicle by these same officers, we think that the uncontradicted evidence clearly shows that the defendant's "consent" for the officers to search his residence was coerced through their exploitation of the immediately preceding illegal arrest and unconstitutional search of his vehicle.
In holding the consent valid, the trial court erred by failing to consider the factors relating to the exploitation of the illegal arrest, as well as by incorrectly placing upon the accused the burden of showing the illegality of the warrantless search. This is thus not an instance where the question of consent is an issue of fact primarily depending upon an evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, in review of which the trial court's determination is entitled to great weight upon review. State v. Dunbar, 356 So.2d 956 (La.1978). Rather, it is an instance where the trial court committed an error of law by not applying the appropriate legal principles to essentially uncon-tradicted testimony.
Accordingly, the conviction and sentence are reversed, and the case is remanded for a new trial in accordance with law.
CONVICTION REVERSED, CASE REMANDED FOR A NEW TRIAL.
SANDERS, C. J., and MARCUS, J., dissent.
SUMMERS, J., dissents and assigns reasons.