Case Name: The Steamboat Ocean v. Seth Marshall
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio
Jurisdiction: Ohio
Decision Date: 1860-12
Citations: 11 Ohio St. 379
Docket Number: 
Parties: The Steamboat Ocean v. Seth Marshall.
Judges: Scott, O.J., and Peck and Bbinkebhopp, JJ., concurred.
Reporter: Ohio State Reports, New Service
Volume: 11
Pages: 379–386

Head Matter:
The Steamboat Ocean v. Seth Marshall.
1. A plaintiff who sues a steamboat, under the watercraft law, for an act of personal violence inflicted on him, at a place out of the territorial limits of the State, by a person at the time an officer of the boat, should show that for such act of violence the owners of the boat would have been personally liable.
2. The case of Steamboat Ohio ®. Stunt, 10 Ohio St. Rep. 582, approved and followed.
Error to the district court of Cuyahoga county.
This was an action brought under the watercraft law, by Seth Marshall, against the steamboat Ocean. The declaration stated that the steamboat Ocean was a watercraft, navigating the waters bordering on the State of Ohio, of and upon which one G. L. Heaton was an officer, to wit, the clerk thereof, and upon which steamboat the plaintiff was a passenger; “ and also for that the said G. L. Heaton, so then being clerk of said steamboat, then and there, to wit, on said 6th day of- September, 1854, upon said boat, with force and arms, in and upon the said plaintiff made an assault, and him, the said plaintiff, the said G. L. Heaton then and there beat, pushed, dragged and pulled about, and illtreated, and othei enormities to the said plaintiff, the said G. L. Heaton then and there did, against the peace and to the damage of the said plaintiff of one thousand dollars.”
The defendant pleaded not guilty.
Upon an appeal, after verdict and judgment for the plaintiff in the common pleas, the case was again tried before a jury in the district court, and a verdict and judgment again rendered for the plaintiff.
During the progress of the trial in the district court, a bill of exceptions was allowed, from which it appeared that “ the plaintiff, to maintain the issue on his part, offered evidence to the jury tending to prove the trespass complained of in the declaration, and thereupon rested his case. And thereupon the defendant, to maintain the issue on its pai-t, offered to the jury testimony tending to prove that at the time of the injury, if any there was, the defendant, the steamboat Ocean, was a watercraft of over ten hundred tuns burden, owned, registered and enrolled in Detroit, in the State of Michigan, and running in a line between Detroit and Cleveland, in the State of Ohio. That at the identical time of the alleged injury, said boat was on its way from Detroit to Cleveland, in the territorial limits of Canada, and not elsewhere. That for the last eight miles before that navigated by said boat, she had been in the Detroit River, entirely within the limits of Canada, a British province, and that for the next eight miles her route in the same river was entirely within the British province of Canada; that said river was bounded on one side by the State of Michigan, and on the other by Canada, and no part of said river within, or bordering on, the State of Ohio.”
The defendant asked the court to charge the jury, “ that if the testimony satisfied them that at the time the injury complained of in the declaration was committed, the defendant was owned, registered and enrolled in the State of Michigan, and at the time in and navigating waters entirely out of and not bordering on the State of Ohio, the plaintiff could not recover.”
This charge the court refused, and among other things charged the jury, that “ for any assault and battery com mitted against the person of the plaintiff by the clerk of the boat, and for which an action .might be maintained personally against the clerk, the law permits suit to be brought directly against the boat itself, which, for the purposes of such action, is treated as a person, and held responsible for the tortious or wrongful acts of its officers.”
To the refusal of the instruction asked, and to the instruction given, an exception was taken.
A petition in error to reverse the judgment was filed in this court.
John C. Grannis and Robert F. Paine for plaintiff in error.
Reuben Hitchcock and S. B. Axtell for defendant in error.

Opinion:
Gholson, J.
It has been held in the case of the Steamboat Ohio v. Stunt (10 Ohio St. 582), "that a'steamboat is not liable to seizure under the watercraft law of this state, for a willful assault and battery committed by the engineer of the boat on a passenger, while the boat was on its passage in the-Ohio river beyond the territorial limits of the State, with which trespass the owners of the boat were in no wise connected." And, " that it was not within the competency of the legislative power, upon grounds of public policy, to create-personal liabilities, and impose them on persons and property out of the jurisdiction of Ohio, and on account of transactions occurring beyond the territorial limits of the State."' We are satisfied to abide by the principle decided in that case, and proceed to inquire as to its application to the present; a point contested by the defendant in error.
It is not intimated in that case, but the inference is excluded, that the principle of the case applies to the tortious acts of the officers and agents of the owners of boats, in matters within the scope of their employment or agency. It may be, notwithstanding anything decided in that case, that if the officer of a boat, in the conduct of the business of the boat, inflicts an injury upon the person of a passenger, the boat- may be sued in this State, though, at the time the injury was inflicted, out of the territorial limits of the State.
The difficulty with the defendant in error is, that the record does not present the point which he asks us to decide.
The declaration charges an assault and battery by a named person, who is alleged at the time to have been clerk of the boat, but it is not charged or stated that the assault and battery was in any manner connected with the discharge of any of the duties of a clerk. The bill o"f exceptions states, that the evidence tended to prove the assault and battery fhus generally alleged. Now, assuming the law to be that the owners of a boat are not liable generally for assaults and batteries which are committed by a person who happens to be in their employment as clerk, but for those only which occur in the conduct of some matter within the scope of the employment, we think it more reasonable, that the allegation and proof of an assault and battery, for which the owners would be liable should come from the plaintiff. It is difficult to escape the conviction that the case was tried and disposed of without reference to any such distinction as to liability. In this view, the plaintiff in error was prejudiced by the refusal to charge, and by the charge given.
The evidence offered by the defendant in the action was competent, under the general issue of not guilty, as showing no liability.
The judgment must be reversed, and the case remanded for another trial, previous to which, if so advised, the plaintiff may properly have leave granted to amend his declaration.
Judgment reversed.
Scott, O.J., and Peck and Bbinkebhopp, JJ., concurred.