Case Name: FREEMAN v. FREEMAN
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1908-05-22
Citations: 110 N.Y.S. 686
Docket Number: 
Parties: FREEMAN v. FREEMAN.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 110
Pages: 686–690

Head Matter:
FREEMAN v. FREEMAN.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.
May 22, 1908.)
1. Divorce—Process—Service—Defects—Cube by Subsequent Appearance.
Under Code Civ. Proc. § 424, providing that “the voluntary general appearance of the defendant is equivalent to personal service of the summons upon him,” such an appearance in an action is equivalent to personal service of process, and confers jurisdiction of the person on the court; and, no different rule obtaining in an action for divorce, the appearance of defendant’s attorney by serving an answer and proceeding in such action was sufficient to excuse the illegal service of the summons and complaint.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 17, Divorce, § 267.]
2. Same—Trial—Reference.
General Rules of Practice, rule 72, providing that, in an action for divorce, the court shall not order a reference without proof by affidavit of the service of the summons and complaint, and that notice of appearance and retainer shall not be sufficient to excuse such proof, only applies to cases of defendant’s default, and does not confine plaintiff in case of a default to “proof by affidavit”; so that in an action for divorce, on which defendant answered, where the parties consented -to a reference, and thereupon the court referred the issues without the consent or agreement of the parties as to the referee, such reference was not in violation of rule 72, though there was no proof by affidavit of the service of, the summons.
•3. Statutes—Construction—Giving Effect to Entire Statute.
The construction of statutes requires that effect must be given, if possible, to all the language employed, and every part must be viewed in connection with the whole so as to make all its parts harmonious, if practicable, and give a sensible and intelligent effect to each.
[Ed. Note.-—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 44, Statutes, § 283.]
John M. Kellogg, J., dissenting.
Appeal from Special Term, Saratoga County.
Action for divorce by Nellie M. Freeman against Nelson G. Freeman. From an order (109 N. Y. Supp. 705) denying an application for an interlocutory judgment and setting aside all the proceedings in the action after issuance of the summons, plaintiff appeals.
Reversed, and ■case remitted.
Argued before SMITH, P. J., and CHESTER, KELLOGG, COCHRANE, and SEWELL, JJ.
Charles M. Davison, for appellant.
Walter H. Cogan, for respondent.

Opinion:
SEWELL, J.
It appears from the record that this action was brought to obtain a divorce on the ground of adultery. The summons and complaint were not legally served, but the defendant employed an attorney who appeared and served upon the plaintiff's attorney a copy of the answer, duly subscribed by him, which put in issue the allegation of adultery. Thereafter a notice of trial was served by him for a Special Term for trials. The attorneys for the plaintiff and defendant consented to a reference, whereupon the court designated a referee, and an order was entered referring the issues without the consent or agreement of the attorneys or the parties as to the person named. The action was brought to a hearing before the referee; the plaintiff appearing in person and by his attorney, and the defendant by his said attorney. Evidence in support of the allegations of the complaint was taken, and the referee found in favor of the plaintiff. Upon the application for an interlocutory judgment, the court denied the motion, and set aside all the proceedings since the issuance of the summons, upon the ground that the appearance of the attorney for the defendant by serving an answer and proceeding in the action was not sufficient to excuse proof by affidavit of the service of the summons.
It is the settled law of this state that a voluntary general appearance in an action is equivalent to personal service of process, and confers jurisdiction of the person on the court. Code Civ. Proc. § 424; Olcott v. McLean, 73 N. Y. 223; Matter of McLean, 138 N. Y. 158, 33 N. E. 821, 20 L. R. A. 389; Reed v. Chilson, 142 N. Y. 152, 36 N. E. 884. No different rule obtains in an action for a divorce. Lynde v. Lynde, 41 App. Div. 280, 58 N. Y. Supp. 567; Jones v. Jones, 108 N. Y. 415, 15 N. E. 707, 2 Am. St. Rep. 447; Strauss v. Strauss, 122 App. Div. 729, 107 N. Y. Supp. 842. The determination of the appeal also requires a consideration of the question whether the order of reference was- in violation of that part of rule 72 of the General Rules of Practice which provides that, in an action for a divorce, the court shall not order a reference without proof by affidavit of the service of the summons and complaint and that notice of appearance and retainer shall not be sufficient to excuse such proof. It was held in McCarthy v. McCarthy, 143 N. Y. 235, 38 N. E. 288, and Lowenthal v. Lowenthal, 157 N. Y. 236, 51 N. E. 995, that where the case is litigated it is not necessary to produce an affidavit stating that the adultery charged was committed without the consent, connivance, privity, or procurement of the plaintiff, etc., as provided in another clause of this rule; that this provision was made for cases of default only. It is obvious from reading the provision in question that it was only intended to apply in case of the defendant'^ default. It is also plainly infer-able from the language used that, in case of a default, the plaintiff is not confined to "proof by affidavit." The words, "Notice of appearance and retainer shall not be sufficient to excuse such proof," which follow the general provision, clearly indicate that other evidence, showing jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, may be received, and may be sufficient to excuse proof by affidavit. This' construction is necessary to give any meaning or effect- to these words. One of the most familiar rules for the construction of statutes requires that effect must be given, if possible, to all the language employed. Matter of New York & Brooklyn Bridge, 72 N. Y. 527; People ex rel. Freligh v. Matsell, 94 N. Y. 179. Every part must be viewed in connection with the whole so as to make all its parts harmonious, if practicable, and give a sensible and intelligent effect to each. People ex rel. Gilmour v. Hyde, 89 N. Y. 18.
I do not .think the case of Ives v. Ives, 80 Hun, 136, 29 N. Y. Supp. 1053, is in point. In that case the order of reference designated as referee a person agreed upon by the counsel for the respective parties, and the court held that the reference was in violation of a provision of rule 73, now 72, which forbids a reference of a matrimonial action to a referee nominated by either party or to a referee agreed upon by the parties. It is too clear for argument that this provision was only intended to apply to contested cases. The words, "a referee agreed upon by the parties," admits of no other reasonable construction.
It follows that the order appealed from should be reversed, and the case remitted to the Special Term for rehearing, with $10 costs and disbursements. All concur, except KELLOGG, J., who dissents.