Case Name: Margaret De Matteis, Appellant, v. Village of Peekskill et al., Respondents
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1940-01-25
Citations: 282 N.Y. 98
Docket Number: 
Parties: Margaret De Matteis, Appellant, v. Village of Peekskill et al., Respondents.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 282
Pages: 98–104

Head Matter:
Margaret De Matteis, Appellant, v. Village of Peekskill et al., Respondents.
Submitted January 12, 1940;
decided January 25, 1940.
Harold J. Drescher, Robert F. Barrett and Jacob Katz for appellant.
The franchise granted is illegal, null and void in that the village board did not comply with the village ordinance. (Colonial Motor Coach Corp. v. City of Oswego, 126 Misc. Rep. 829; Mayor v. Dry Dock, E. B. & Battery R. R. Co., 133 N. Y. 104; Matter of Ballard v. Roth, 141 Misc. Rep. 319; Parsons Const. Corp. v. City of New York, 163 Misc. Rep. 932; McCabe v. City of New York, 213 N. Y. 468; Village of Carthage v. Frederick, 122 N. Y. 268; Jones v. Foster, 43 App. Div. 33; Blanshard v. City of New York, 262 N. Y. 5; Crayton v. Larabee, 220 N. Y. 493; People v. Reicherter, 128 App. Div. 675; Cunningham v. City of Niagara Falls, 242 App. Div. 39; Borst v. Town of Sharon, 24 App. Div. 599.) The franchise granted became null and void by its terms in that the acceptance of the franchise was not approved as to form by the village of Peekskill as required by the franchise. (Deshong v. City of New York, 176 N. Y. 475; Colonial Motor Coach Corp. v. City of Oswego, 126 Misc. Rep. 829; Fisher v. City of Mechanicville, 94 Misc. Rep. 134; Matter of Ulster County v. State Dept. of Public Works, 211 App. Div. 629; 240 N. Y. 648; Old Colony Trust Co. v. City of Wichita, 123 Fed. Rep. 762; Pacific T. & T. Co. v. City of Seattle, 14 Fed. Rep. [2d] 877; People ex rel. Schieffelin v. Walker, 247 N. Y. 320.) The franchise was illegally granted in that the village board failed to comply with section 90 of the Village Law (Cons. Laws, ch. 64) in granting the same. (Matter of City of Long Beach v. Public Service Comm., 249 N. Y. 480; Greenberg v. City of New York, 152 Misc. Rep. 488; Yonkers R. R. Co. v. Hume, 225 App. Div. 313; Holst v. Savannah Electric Co., 131 Fed. Rep. 931; City of Paterson v. Barnet, 46 N. J. L. 62; Newman v. City of Emporia, 32 Kan. 456.)
Edward G. Halsey, Jr., for Village of Peekskill, respondent.
Arthur Carter Hume for Mayflower Transit Lines, Inc., respondent.
It was unnecessary that the procedural part of the provisions of the village ordinance be complied with. (Reycroft v. City of Binghamton, 138 Misc. Rep. 257; Mills v. Sweeney, 219 N. Y. 213; Matter of McCabe v. Voorhis, 243 N. Y. 401; People ex rel. Casler v. Eysaman, 126 Misc. Rep. 853; Greenberg v. City of New York, 152 Misc. Rep. 488; Blanshard v. City of New York, 262 N. Y. 5; Village of Carthage v. Central New York T. & T. Co., 185 N. Y. 448; Mayor v. D. D., E. B. & B. R. R. Co., 133 N. Y. 104; Browne v. City of New York, 213 App. Div. 206; County Securities, Inc., v. Seacord, 278 N. Y. 34.) There was no implied power in the village to add additional requirements. (Ottawa v. Carey, 108 U. S. 110; N. Y., O. & W. Ry. Co. v. Griffin, 235 N. Y. 174.)

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
The plaintiff attacks the validity of a consent to the operation of the omnibus line of the defendant Mayflower Transit Lines, Inc., given by the trustees of the defendant, the Village of Peekskill. It is the contention of the plaintiff that in giving the consent there was a failure to comply with the terms of an ordinance of the village which purports to impose certain conditions upon the power of the village trustees to act in such a matter. The ordinance in question provides that certain details of proposed operation should be stated in the application and that the application, itself, should be published in a daily newspaper. In the present case the application was not published and otherwise did not fully meet the requirements of the ordinance.
The right to operate an omnibus line over the public highways comes from the State. Section 66 of the Transportation Corporations Law (Cons. Laws, ch. 63), made applicable to this village by the provision of section 67 and a resolution of the village trustees, requires the consent of the local authorities to be procured after public notice and a hearing as a prerequisite to operation and to the issuance of the necessary certificate of public convenience and necessity. Section 89, subdivision 39, of the Village Law (Cons. Laws, ch. 64) further specifies the manner in which the notice is to be given.
It has been found in this case that notice of the hearing was published in the official newspapers of the village in accordance with a resolution of the trustees and in compliance with the provisions of the Village Law, and that pursuant thereto a hearing was held. The terms of section 66 of the Transportation Corporations Law were thus fully complied with. These were the only prerequisites fixed by statute to the giving of the consent. They assured to the citizens and property owners information that a consent was sought and when and where objection or criticism, if any, might be interposed. The interests of property owners and citizens were thereby fully protected. No authority was vested by the State in the trustees permitting them to impose other or different conditions.
The other points upon which the plaintiff attacks the consent have been examined and found without foundation.
We have, therefore, reached the conclusion that the consent of the village authorities to the operation of the omnibus line is valid.
The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.