Case Name: MUTUAL FILM CORP. v. MORRIS & DANIEL
Court: Texas Courts of Civil Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1916-01-15
Citations: 184 S.W. 1060
Docket Number: No. 8303
Parties: MUTUAL FILM CORP. v. MORRIS & DANIEL.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 184
Pages: 1060–1063

Head Matter:
MUTUAL FILM CORP. v. MORRIS & DANIEL.
(No. 8303.)
(Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Ft. Worth.
Jan. 15, 1916.
On Motion for Rehearing, Feb. 26, 1916.)
1. Contracts <&wkey;10(4) — Unilateral Contract.
The contract is unilateral, and so terminable at the will of either party, where, though defendant agreed to furnish films so long as plaintiffs continued in business, plaintiffs did not agree to take them for such, or any, definite period.
[E!d. Note. — For other cases, see Contracts, Cent. Dig. § 37; Dec. Dig. &wkey;10(4).]
On Motion for Rehearing.
2. Statutes <&wkey;276(l) — Repeal—Eeeect.
Act March 3, 1913 (Acts 33d. Leg. c. 127) § 4, amending Rev. St. 1911, art. 1902 (Vernon’s Sayles’ Ann. Civ. St. 1914, art. 1902), to provide that a fact alleged in the petition, not being denied by the answer, shall be taken as confessed, being remedial, is not available on appeal, where repealed after the trial.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. § 371; Dec. Dig. &wkey;276(l)J
3. Pleading <&wkey;>412 — Matters of Complaint Not Denied — Request to Court.
That plaintiffs may avail of Act March 3, 1913, § 4, amending Rev. iSt. 1911, art. 1902, to provide that a fact alleged in the petition, not being denied, by the answer,, shall be taken as confessed, the court’s attention must be called to the fact, and .request be made that the allegation be taken as confessed.
[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Pleading, Cent. Dig. §§ 1387-1394; Dee. Dig. &wkey;412.j
4. Contracts <&wkey;28(3) — Unilateral Contract-Evidence.
Evidence, in an action for breach of defendant’s agreement to furnish films to plaintiffs so long as they remained in business, held to fail to show that plaintiffs agreed to take and pay for them for such period, so as to prevent the contract being unilateral.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Contracts, Cent. Dig. §§ 133-140, 1820, 1821; Dec. Dig. &wkey;28(3).]
6. Appeal and Error &wkey;>1175(5) — Reversal —Rendering or Remanding.
Where though the necessity of proof by plaintiffs of the material allegation of the complaint, of agreement on their part, could not well have escaped their attention, and they offered the testimony of the only persons by whom it seems the necessary proof could be made, and they testified, apparently, fully, without making the proof, and plaintiffs in their motion for rehearing set forth no fact or circumstance tending to show that full opportunity was not afforded for a full development of the case, the provision of Vernon’s Sayles’ Ann. Civ. St. 1914, art. 1626, that, when judgment is reversed, the court shall render such judgment as the court below should have rendered, and not the exception, that when it is necessary that some matter of fact be ascertained the cause shall be remanded for a new trial, is applicable.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. § 4579; Dec. Dig. <5&wkey;1175(5).]
6. Appeal and Error <&wkey;768 —Briefs — Statement — Failure to Contest.
By express provision of Court of Civil Appeals rule 41 (142 S. W. xiv), whatever of the; statements in appellant’s brief is not contested will be considered as acquiesced in.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. § 3103; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;768.]
Appeal from District Court, Taylor County; Thomas L. Blanton, Judge.
Action by Morris & Daniel against the Mutual Film Corporation. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant appeals.
Reversed and rendered.
Smith, Robertson & Robertson, of Dallas, for appellant. Eugene De Bogory, of Abilene and W. L. Morris, of Albany, for appellees.
Application £or writ o£ error pending in Supreme Court.

Opinion:
CONNER, O. J.
This appeal is from a judgment for $1,750 in appellees' favor as damages for breach of an alleged contract made with the appellant corporation.
Pretermitting as immaterial a discussion of a number of assignments presented, we go at once to the vital question in the case. The appellees alleged that they were engaged in exhibiting moving picture films in the city of Abilene; that upon the date stated the appellant corporation agreed to furnish appellees with moving picture films delivered in Abilene weekly at a rental of $28. 50 per week, "so long as the plaintiffs continued in the picture show business in Abilene.'' it was alleged that the appellees agreed to take and use the films at the price and upon the terms stated "as long as the plaintiffs continued in the picture show business in Abilene." The evidence possibly supports the finding of the jury to the effect that the appellant corporation agreed to furnish films as alleged, but, as presented, we find the evidence wholly wanting to support the allegation of an agreement on appellees' part to take the films at the price and for the period specified. The contract, therefore, is so plainly unilateral, and terminable at the will of either party that it seems only necessary to cite some of the authorities. See H. & T. C. Ry. Co. v. Mitchell, 38 Tex. 86; Kraft Holmes & Co. v. Sims, 1 White & W. Civ. Cas. Ct. App. § 404; Richardson v. Hardwicke. 106 U. S. 252, 1 Sup. Ct. 213, 27 L. Ed. 145; Dorsey v. Packwood, 12 How (U. S.) 126, 13 L. Ed. 921; Oil & Pipe Line Co. v. Teel, 95 Tex. 591, 68 S. W. 979; Tyler Ice Co. v. Coupland, 44 Tex. Civ. App. 383, 99 S. W. 133; Campbell v. Lambert, 36 La. Ann. 35, 51 Am. Rep. 1; E. L. & R. R. R. R. Co. v. Scott, 72 Tex. 70, 10 S. W. 99, 13 Am. St. Rep. 758; A. Santaella & Co. v. Otto F. Lange Co., 155 Fed. 719, 84 C. C. A. 145; American Cotton Oil Co. v. Kirk, 68 Fed. 791, 15 C. C. A. 540; Fowler Utilities Co. v. Gray, 167 Ind. 1, 79 N. E. 897, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 726, 120 Am. St. Rep. 344; Bradshaw v. Terrell Foundry & Mach. Co., 104 S. W. 509.
The contract, under the circumstances proven being terminable at the will of either party, was unenforceable, and appellant's failure to continue furnishing films, as charged in the appellees' petition, furnishes no legal ground for redress. We, accordingly, sustain appellant's assignments attacking the action of the court in submitting the issue, the verdict of the jury thereon, and the judgment in appellees' favor.
The conclusions so announced require of us a reversal of the judgment and a rendition of the judgment in appellant's favor, and it is accordingly so ordered.
other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and'Indexes'
<gzs>For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes