Case Name: KITTREDGE et al. v. GRAU et al.
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1924-03-17
Citations: 158 La. 154
Docket Number: No. 24451
Parties: KITTREDGE et al. v. GRAU et al.
Judges: By Division B, composed of Justices O’NIELL, LAND, and BAKER.
Reporter: Louisiana Reports
Volume: 158
Pages: 153–175

Head Matter:
(103 So. 723)
No. 24451.
KITTREDGE et al. v. GRAU et al.
(On Motion to Dismiss Appeal, June 22, 1922.
On the Merits, March 17, 1924.
On Rehearing, March 30, 1925.)
(Syllabus by Editorial Staff.)
On Motion to Dismiss Appeal.
1. Appeal and error &wkey;>460 (2) — Appeal by plaintiff from judgment rejecting his demand does not stay execution of judgment.
An appeal taken by plaintiff from judgment rejecting his demand does not stay execution of judgment, as such judgment is not executory, except perhaps for costs incurred.
2. Appeal and error <&wkey;460(2) — Defendants’ answer to plaintiffs’ appeal from portion of judgment rejecting their demand does not stay execution of judgment.
The only method by which defendants might have stayed execution of judgment in favor of plaintiffs for part of amount sued for would be by taking a suspensive appeal, and their answer to appeal by plaintiffs from portion of judgment rejecting plaintiff’s demand did not give defendants a stay of execution.
3. Appeal and error &wkey;>l55 — Recording of judgment granting plaintiffs partial relief not acquiescence in judgment rejecting demand in part, precluding appeal.
Where judgment was rendered for plaintiffs for amount less than that claimed, recording of judgment in plaintiffs’ favor was not an acquiescence in judgment that rejected part of their demand, depriving plaintiff, under Code Prac. art. 567, of right to appeal therefrom.
On Rehearing.
4. Husband and wife <&wkey;254 — Property acquired by husband by sale becomes community property.
Under Civ. Code, art. 2402, if transaction whereby husband acquired stock of a corporation was a sale, stock would be community property.
5. Husband and wife <&wkey;255 — Real property purchased by husband with separate funds becomes community property, unless deed recites purchase with separate funds.
Where married man buys real property with his separate funds, and takes title in his name, unless deed contains statement that purchase is made with separate funds, property will belong to community.
6. Husband and wife <&wkey;>'256 — Married woman purchasing real property may thereafter show that it was bought with her separate funds.
When married woman buys real property in her own name, deed need not declare that it was bought with her separate funds, but she may assert and prove fact whenever it is questioned.
7. Husband and wife &wkey;»254 — Husband’s payment of purchase price with negotiable and transferable instrument instead of cash does not make transaction an act of exchange.
Civ. Code, art. 2402, declaring that property bought during marriage in name of either spouse becomes community property, does not restrict rule to contract of sale, but applies to acquisitions by purchase or any other similar way, and payment by a married man under a contract purporting to be an act of sale, with a negotiable or transferable instrument instead of cash, does not make transaction an act of exchange.
8. Husband and wife <&wkey;249 — Real estate received in exchange for separate property becomes separate property.
Where separate real estate of husband or wife is given in exchange for other real estate, property received in exchange is separate property, though deed does not state property was bought with separate funds.
9. Husband and wife <&wkey;249 — Conversion of partnership into corporation and issuance of stock in return for partnership interest held not to make stock community property.
Where partnership was converted into a corporation, and each partner received a portion of capital stock in exchange for his partnership interest, held that stock of one partner, whose interest in partnership was separate property did not become community property, since he did not acquire it by transfer to him of something which he did not already own, but by transformation of his interest in the partnership into interest in corporation.
Appeal from Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans; Hugh C. Cage, Judge.
Action by Mrs. Lilly Julia Kittredge and others against Edward G. Grau and others. From an insufficient judgment in their favor, plaintiffs appeal.
Judgment annulled and set aside, and judgment rendered for plaintiffs.
J. C. Henriques, of New Orleans, for appellants.
St. Clair Adams and Francis P. Burns, both of New Orleans, for appellees.
By Division B, composed of Justices O’NIELL, LAND, and BAKER.

Opinion:
On Motion to Dismiss Appeal.
O'NIELL, J.
Appellants sued to be de-
clared the owners of certain shares of stock claimed by defendants, and, in the alternative, prayed for a judgment for the value of the stock. Judgment was rendered in their favor for $2,860.50, which was less than they claimed. They took an appeal, which they characterized as both' a suspensive and a devolutive appeal. After the time allowed for taking a suspensive appeal had expired, defendants filed an answer to plaintiffs' appeal, praying that the judgment should be amended by reducing the amount from $2,860.50'to $1,610.50. Thereafter plaintiffs' attorney had the judgment for $2,860.50 recorded in the mortgage office. Whereupon defendants' attorneys moved to dismiss this appeal upon the theory that the recording of the judgment, being, to that extent, an execution of the judgment, was an acquiescence in the decree, or an acknowledgment' of its correctness, on the plaintiffs' part.
The motion to dismiss the appeal is founded upon article 567 of the Code of Practice, declaring that a person against whom a judgment has been rendered cannot appeal if he has acquiesced in the judgment by executing it voluntarily. The language of the Code merely deprives of the right to appeal a person who has voluntarily executed, or complied with, a judgment that has been rendered against him. In other words, it means — in fact it says — that a person cannot appeal from a judgment that has been rendered against him if he has voluntarily executed it, or complied with it. The plaintiffs in this case appealed from the judgment only in so far as it had rejected their demand. The judgment in their favor, for $2,860.50, or the judgment to that extent, is the judgment that they partially executed by having it recorded in- the mortgage office. Their appeal from the judgment that rejected their demand in part was not a suspensive appeal, whatever they may have called it. An appeal taken by a plaintiff, from a judgment rejecting his demand, does not stay execution of the judgment, because such a judgment is not executory, except perhaps for the costs incurred.
The only method by which the defendants in this case might have stayed execution of the judgment for $2,860.50 was by taking a suspensive appeal. Their answer to the appeal did not give them a stay of execution.
The rule stated in article 567 of the Code of Practice is'founded, expressly, upon the theory of acquiescence, or voluntary compliance with the judgment. The recording of the judgment in plaintiffs' favor was not an acquiescence in the judgment that rejected a part of their demand.
The motion to dismiss the appeal is overruled.