Case Name: The County of Erie, Respondent, v. George Baltz and Others, Defendants, Impleaded with Caroline Houck and Others, as Surviving Executors, etc., of Philip Houck, Deceased, and Jacob Dold, Appellants
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1908-03-04
Citations: 125 A.D. 144
Docket Number: 
Parties: The County of Erie, Respondent, v. George Baltz and Others, Defendants, Impleaded with Caroline Houck and Others, as Surviving Executors, etc., of Philip Houck, Deceased, and Jacob Dold, Appellants.
Judges: 
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 125
Pages: 144–152

Head Matter:
The County of Erie, Respondent, v. George Baltz and Others, Defendants, Impleaded with Caroline Houck and Others, as Surviving Executors, etc., of Philip Houck, Deceased, and Jacob Dold, Appellants.
Fourth Department,
March 4, 1908.
Guaranty and suretyship — obligation joint and several — liability of estate of deceased surety—joinder of actions against survivors and estate of decedents — pleading — complaint not joining actions under sections 147 and 148 of the County Daw.
Where the obligations of an undertaking given for the faithful discharge of duty by a county treasurer are, several as well as joint, the personal representatives of a deceased surety may bo joined as defendants with surviving sureties in an action on the undertaking.
By virtue of section 758 of the Code of Civil Procedure the estate of a joint obligor is not discharged by his death, but the court may bring in his personal representatives in an action against the surviving obligors when it is shown that the latter are insolvent.
Said section changed the common-law rule by which the estate of an obligor was discharged by his death if the obligation were joint only.
But even at common law the estate of an obligor was not discharged if the • obligation were joint and several.
The complaint in an action against surviving obligors and the representatives of deceased obligors on an undertaking which is joint and several does not join two separate causes of action, but a single cause against all.
Where a joint and several obligation in form binds the representatives of the sureties the estate of a deceased surety is liable for the default of the principal occurring during his tenure of office but subsequent to the surety’s death.
Although the complaint in an action brought in the name of a county against the sureties of its treasurer sets out many separate statements of fact showing failures of the treasurer to pay over to his successor moneys held by virtue or his trust, and all the separate allegations close with the statement that by reason of the facts aforesaid, in addition to the obligations set forth, the treasurer incurred the penalty of §1,200 provided by statute, which the plaintiff is entitled to recover from the sureties in addition to the amounts of money actually lost as alleged, it states but one cause of action in each of the separate counts and seeks a recovery of the penalty provided by section 147 of the County Law. There is no cause of action stated for a penalty for failure to file reports as required by section 148 of the County Law, although there are unnecessary allegations that the treasurer failed to report.
Williams and Robson, JJ., dissented as to last proposition, with opinion.
Appeal by the defendants, Caroline Houck and others, as surviving executors, etc., and another, from an interlocutory judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Erie on the 9th day of October, 1907, upon the decision of the court, rendered after a trial at the Erie Special Term, overruling the said defendants’ demurrers to the complaint.
Arthur W. Hickman, for the appellants.
Philip A. Laing and George H. Kennedy, for the respondent.

Opinion:
Kruse, J.:
The undertaking given for the faithful discharge of the duties of the defendant Baltz, as county treasurer of Erie county, is a several as well as joint obligation. The rule, therefore, that in actions against the personal representatives of a deceased joint debtor, it must be alleged and proved that the debt cannot be collected against the surviving joint debtors, has no application to this case. That and the other questions in this case are fully discussed in the opinion of Mr. Justice Williams, and with the views expressed therein we all agree save in one respect. We differ over the conclusion there reached, that causes of action to recover penalties, under section 148 of the County Law (Laws of 1892, chap. 686) are pleaded in the complaint. If such conclusion is correct, then manifestly the complaint is objectionable in improperly uniting such causes of action with others therein set forth. It seems to me, however, that there is but one cause of action stated in each of the ten separate statements of facts, and that is for the failure by the defendant, the county treasurer, to pay over to- his successor money and property held in trust' by him, and to recover the value thereof, with interest, and the penalty, as provided by section 147 of the County Law (as amd. by Laws of 1901, chap. 112.) The statement interjected therein that the defendant county treasurer failed to report does not, it seems to me, make a separate cause.of action to recover an additional penalty under section 148 of the County Law. That, and the other allegations showing that the county treasurer failed in his duty, in respect to this money and property, may not have been necessary, or even proper, in the complaint. The evident purpose of these allegations was to show that the defendant county treasurer misappropriated the money and property so held by him in trust, and converted the same to his own use, thus putting it out of his power to deliver the same over to his successor in office.
Very true, the mere failure to pay over makes a cause of action, but his allegation of a failure to report, and other like allegations, should not be taken out of their connection with the statement of facts as a whole, to spell out a separate and independent cause of action thereon, when it seems evident that it was not so intended. When read in connection with the other allegations, I think there is but one cause of action alleged, or attempted to be stated. This view is fortified by the fact that each statement of the ten statements of facts is designated as but one cause of action, and the nature of the cause of action is characterized by the fact that it is brought by a successor of the defendant county treasurer, in the name of the county, and is authorized and directed by the State Comptroller, as is provided by said section 147 of the County Law, while the action for a penalty for a failure to report, under section 148 of the same law, must be brought by the district attorney.
I think the demurrer was properly overruled, and that the interlocutory judgment entered thereon should be affirmed, with costs, with leave to plead over upon the usual terms.
All concurred, except Williams and Hobson, JJ., who dissented in an opinion by Williams, J.