Case Name: The Trustees of Farmington Academy versus William Allen
Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
Jurisdiction: Massachusetts
Decision Date: 1817-06
Citations: 13 Tyng 172
Docket Number: 
Parties: The Trustees of Farmington Academy versus William Allen.
Judges: 
Reporter: Massachusetts Reports
Volume: 14
Pages: 150–154

Head Matter:
The Trustees of Farmington Academy versus William Allen.
One subscribed a paper with others, each engaging to pay a certain sum of money for raising a fund for the establishment of an academy; and trustees were afterwards incorporated: the said subscriber, on application of the trustees for payment of a portion of his subscription, furnished some materials towards the finishing of the building which the trustees had erected; and he was held liable to the trustees for the remainder of his subscription, on the ground of money laid out by them for his use.
This was a special assumpsit upon the following paper, viz., “ Town of Farmington, county of Kennebeck, December, 1805. Whereas the establishment of an'academy in this part of the county for instruction in the different branches of useful learning is rendered necessary by our distance from any literary institution of this kind, and will meet the approbation of all friends to the public good, by affording the means of diffusing knowledge to the rising generation ; and whereas the raising of a suitable fund by the voluntary donations of individuals is requisite, before the necessary assistance of the legislature can be obtained; — we, the subscribers, hereby engage to be accountable for the payment of the respective sums set against our respective names, as a fund for and to be applied to the purpose aforesaid; to be payable to such persons as shall or may be by the legislature appointed trustees to any academy situated near the centre of the town of Farmington, as may be granted by virtue of the funds hereby raised; and also to pay the interest yearly on such respective sums, to commence from the time of the grant of such academy.”
The declaration was amended at a prior stage of the action, by adding a count for money laid out and expended, and also a count for money had and received.
The action was submitted to the decision of the Court upon the following facts, viz.: The defendant signed the paper declared on, and subscribed fifty dollars. * After the act establishing the academy and incorporating the trustees was passed, the trustees appointed a committee to erect a building for their use ; who afterwards applied to the defendant and tire other subscribers for payment of a proportionate part of the sums by them subscribed. The defendant told the committee that he had no money ; but he delivered to them, in part of his subscription, a quantity of shingles, to be used on the said buildings and the same were in fact so used.
Upon these facts it was agreed that if the Court should be of opinion that the plaintiffs were entitled to maintain their action, the defendant should be defaulted; and if otherwise, the plaintiff was to become nonsuit.
F. Allen, for the defendant.
The case furnishes no evidence oí an express promise. The payment of a small part is the only fact from which a promise can be drawn; and payment of a part, when of full age, has been held, in the case of a promise by an infant, to be no evidence of an engagement to pay the residue.
There being no express promise, the next inquiry is, whether there be any evidence in the case, of such a consideration as will support an implied one; it being well established that nothing short of a legal obligation is a sufficient consideration for such a promise; although a moral obligation is a sufficient consideration to support an action on an express promise. Here was neither a personal benefit to the defendant, nor a damage to the plaintiffs.
In the case of Stiles vs. The Attorney-General, the duke of Wharton had given to Dr. Young a bond for £600, in consideration of his having incurred great expenses in order to be chosen a mem ber of the House of Commons, at the duke’s desire; and Lord Hardwicks decided that it was not supported by any valuable con sideration, for Dr. Young could not be supposed to be a candidate for a seat in the House of Commons with any other view but that qf serving his country. * So, in the case at bar, it is apparent, from the writing on which the action is brought, and from the nature of the thing, that the general interest was the only motive with the defendant for subscribing it.
In the case of The Limerick Academy vs. Davis, the facts are very similar to those in the present case. There the court held that the defendant was not bound by his original subscription. Certain cases are put by the court by way of supposition, such as the “ subscriber’s actual acceptance of the legislative grant, as if named or descriptively included in the incorporation, he has been concerned in the subsequent proceedings,” &c., which would form the foundation of an implied promise.
But the present defendant comes within none of those supposed cases, no one of the circumstances there enumerated, as furnishing grounds for a promise, existing in this case. From the case agreed it does not appear that the defendant was a petitioner, that he accepted ' the grant, that he was a member of the corporation, or that he in any manner renewed his original promise, otherwise than by the payment of a small part of his subscription, the effect of which has been before considered.
Cutler, for the plaintiffs,
insisted that here was a good and legal consideration for the defendant’s promise. The plaintiffs have laid out their own money wholly on the ground of tíre engagement of the defendant and the other subscribers to reimburse them. The payment of a part ‘of the sum subscribed was tantamount to a recognition and renewal of the promise.
What was said by the court in the case of Homes & Al., Admrs., vs. Dana, applies very strongly to the case at bar: “The true ground of the action is, that, by reason of the contract, Larkin (the plaintiff’s intestate) was led to confide in the engagement of the defendant, so far as to advance his own money for him ; and the defendant and the other subscribers, having made Larkin the trustee, to receive and appropriate *the money, for objects of importance to them, were bound in equity and good conscience to restore it.”
The reasoning of the court also in the case of The Worcester Turnpike Corporation vs. Willard goes strongly to support the principles of the present action.
Slot. 1806, c. 47.
2 Esp. Rep. 628, Thrupp vs. Fielder.
6 Mass. Rep. 43, Andover Turnpike vs. Gown.
2 Atk. 152.
11 Mass. Rep. 113.
12 Mass. Rep. 192.
5 Mass. Rep. 80

Opinion:
Parker, C. J.,
delivered the opinion of the Court. According to the decision of the case of The Trustees of Limerick Academy vs. Davis, cited in the present argument, this action cannot be supported upon the original promise, of which the subscription paper is the evidence; for it appears, by that decision, that a promise of this sort, made to no particular person, and having only a public benefit for its consideration, is no more binding in law than it is upon the consciences of men who are base enough to refuse to perform them. That case was well decided ; and we conform to it now, as far as a strict analogy holds between that case and this ; so that upon the counts which are supported only by the subscription paper, the plaintiffs in this case cannot recover.
But having lately decided, in an action brought by the present plaintiffs vs. Flint, that a recovery might be had on a count for money paid, laid out, and expended, the same principles will apply to this case, unless there be a material difference in the facts. That case not having been reported, it is proper now to state briefly the reasons on which the decision rests, that other subscribers to this institution may see how far they can be justified in resisting payment.
In the case alluded to, the trustees, after being incorporated, and becoming seised in trust of the land which the legislature had granted on the faith of the private funds raised by subscription, proceeded to erect a building for the use of the institution. Flint being one of the trustees, never having dissented from any of their acts, and having, when called upon for payment, sent a man, who was a debtor of his, to work out a part of his subscription, it was thought that the recognition of * his promise, accompanied by a knowledge, on his part, that the expense was going on, authorized a recovery against him to the amount of his subscription, on the ground of money paid, laid out, and expended, to his use and at his request. It was also thought to be like the case of a man working upon the house of another, who had knowledge of his proceedings, in which case, although he could prove no express request or promise, he would undoubtedly recover for his labor.
The present case differs from the case of Flint only in the circumstance that the defendant was not a trustee. But he was an inhabitant of the town, and must have known of the erection of the building ; and he actually advanced some part of the materials, excusing himself from paying the whole subscription only on the ground of his inability at the time. This was sufficient to justify the trustees in proceeding to incur expense, on the faith of the defendant's subscription ; and having so done, they have expended money for him on his implied request; and so the case is brought within the principles of the decision of Homes & Al., Admrs., vs Dana, referred to at the bar.
The case of an infant, which has been put, whose promise cannot be made valid by implication, but only by an express new promise after he comes of age, we do not think in any degree analogous,
Defendant defaulted.
[Thomson vs. Page, 1 Met. 565; and see note to Phillips Limerick Academy vs. Davis, 11 Mass. Rep. 119. — Ed.]