Case Name: LANGLEY v. SOUTHERN RY. CO. ET AL.
Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1919-11-11
Citations: 113 S.C. 45
Docket Number: 10287
Parties: LANGLEY v. SOUTHERN RY. CO. ET AL.
Judges: Before Moore, J., York, Summer term.
Reporter: South Carolina Reports
Volume: 113
Pages: 45–64

Head Matter:
10287
LANGLEY v. SOUTHERN RY. CO. ET AL.
(101 S. E. 286.)
1. Negligence — Instruction on Imputed Negligence Relevant. — In action against railroad for injuries to occupant of automobile at crossing, evidence which was susceptible of inference that plaintiff and other occupants agreed to and acquiesced in purpose suggested by plaintiff of arriving at depot before certain train, making it necessary to operate automobile at great speed,, and that plaintiff was responsible for speed at which it was being run, instruction as to negligence of driver being imputed to occupant, when engaged in a common purpose, was relevant.
2. Trial — Necessity op Request por Instructions.- — If plaintiff had desired instructions as to any other view of the case than that suggested by defendants’ pleading and the evidence adduced in support thereof, and the defendants’ request to charge, she should have requested them, and, having failed to do so, Court’s failure to give such instructions was not reversible error. (Per Hydrick and Fraser, JJ.)
3. Negligence — Automobile Driver’s Negligence Imputed to Occupant. — Where automobile driver in driving automobile to a depot heeded the directions of occupants who wanted to board a train, the management of automobile was the concurrent act of driver and the occupants and the negligence of driver in driving at excessive speed was imputed to an occupant precluding recovery from railroad for injuries at crossing. (Per Gage, J.)
Before Moore, J., York, Summer term.
Affirmed.
Action by Fannie B. Bangley against the Southern Railway Company and another. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals.
Following is the complaint and answer and exceptions referred to in the opinion:
Complaint. The following is the complaint, omitting formal parts:
The plaintiff alleged that on April 8, 1917, while in an automobile, the property of her husband, accompanied by her husband, Will Wingate, and two young ladies, coming from Charlotte, N. C., en route to Lancaster, S. C., just above Pineville, N. C., the car' was struck by the defendant’s train at a public crossing, and the car demolished, and the plaintiff was seriously and permanently damaged. It is charged in the complaint that the train was obstructed for some distance approaching the crossing by a cut, curve, and trees,’ and that towards the public crossing it was down grade. It was charged as negligence that no signals were given, and no warning at all of the approach of the train, and that this was negligent and wilful. It was also alleged that the rate of the speed of the train, under the circumstances, was dangerous, and that this crossing was dangerous, and much used by the public.
The plaintiff demanded $20,000 damages.
Answer. The following is the answer of the defendants:
The defendants above named, answering the complaint herein, allege:
For a first defense: That they deny the truth of each and every allegation contained in the plaintiff’s complaint.
For a second defense. (1) That, as the defendants are informed and believe, on or about the date mentioned in the complaint, the plaintiff, together with W. S. Langley, Annie Caskey, Carrie Caskey, and Will Wingate, were riding in an automobile between the station of Hebron and the station of Pineville, both in the State of North Carolina, and that the automobile in which the plaintiff and said parties were riding was struck on a public crossing between the two stations mentioned, whereby the plaintiff and said parties received some minor injuries, which are neither of a serious nor permanent nature, as the defendants are informed and believe.
(2) That the statute law of North Carolina provides that no person shall operate a motor vehicle upon the public highways of that State recklessly or at a rate of speed greater than is reasonable and proper, having regard for the width, traffic, and use of the highway, life or limb of any person; provided, that in residence portions of cities, the speed shall not be in excess of 15 miles per hour; in business sections of the towns or cities not exceeding 10 miles per hour, and outside of the corporate limits of any incorporated city or town the rate of speed shall not exceed 25 miles per hour on any public highway in said State, and any rate of speed in excess thereof shall be deemed in violation of said statute, and the said statute expressly makes its provisions applicable to nonresident owners or operators of motor vehicles while traveling over the roads in said State of North Carolina.
(3) That there is no statute in the State of North Carolina, requiring railroads operated in the said State of North Carolina to ring a bell or blow a whistle upon approaching a public highway or other crossing, and the matter of signals, lookout, and speed of trains is governed entirely by the common law of North Carolina, as applied by the Courts of that State.
(4) That, at the time of the collision above mentioned, the car in which the plaintiff was riding was being run by W. S. Langley and Will Wingate, with the knowledge and approval of the plaintiff, and all-the parties in said car were engaged in the common purpose of running said car for pleasure or otherwise; and while defendant’s train was at the station of Hebron, the plaintiff and other parties in said automobile passed in a very short distance, and in plain view of defendant’s train, and saw, or by the exercise of ordinary care could have seen, that said train was going in the same direction that they were traveling in their automobile, and the crossing where the collision occurred is not exceeding one-half a mile south of the station of Hebron, in the State of North Carolina.
(5) That between the said station of Hebron and the said railroad crossing and up to the time of the actual collision, the said car was being run at a reckless rate of speed, and in flagrant violation of the statute of the State of North Carolina, aforesaid, and approached the said crossing at a dangerous and reckless rate of speed, with the purpose of getting over said crossing ahead of defendant’s train, the plaintiff being fully aware of said purpose, and concurring therein, and she well knew at the time that said train was approaching, as it could have been easily seen if any precautions whatsoever had been taken, and there were no obstructions that could have prevented the plaintiff from seeing said train, or hearing the same, if she had looked or listened, or exercised even ordinary care to observe its approach; and any injuries that the plaintiff sustained were due entirely to her own gross carelessness and negligence in failing to take any precautions to observe the train approaching, in allowing said automobile to be run at a dangerous and reckless rate of speed, as aforesaid, and in utterly failing to exercise any care, or to take any precautions whatsoever for her own safety by having the said car checked up, she well knowing that the said train was approaching said crossing, or, by the exercise of care could have known thereof, all of which carelessness and negligence on the part of the plaintiff was the proximate cause of heir injuries, or contributed as a proximate cause thereto.
(6)' That prior to approaching said crossing, the defendant’s agent and servant, J. M. Crow, who was in charge of the engine pulling said train, gave timely notice of its approach by blowing its whistle and ringing the bell of said engine.
Wherefore, the defendants pray that' the complaint may be dismissed, with costs.
Exceptions. The following are the exceptions:
(1) The Court erred in charging the jury as follows:
Now, as to the matter of giving signals or warning of the approach of a train to a public crossing: Under the laws of North Carolina, I charge you that there is no statute of the State of North Carolina, requiring the ringing of the bell or the blowing of the whistle. As to whether or not the failure to ring the bell or blow the whistle, upon approaching such crossing is negligence, is a question of fact for your determination in this case from the evidence.
The error being that the failure to ring the bell or sound the whistle upon approaching a public crossing, under the common law of North Carolina, is negligence.
(2) That it was error for the Court to have charged the jury as follows :
There is no statute or other law in North Carolina requiring the ringing of the bell or the blowing of a whistle at a public crossing.
The error being that the charge was on the facts.
(3) That it was error for the Court to have charged the jury as follows:
There is no statute or other law in North Carolina requiring the ringing of the bell or the blowing of a whistle at a public crossing.
The error being that, under the laws of North Carolina, a railroad is required to give a reasonable notice or warning of its approach and intention to use a public crossing, and the failure to give such warning is negligence.
(4) That it was error for the Court to have charged the jury:
The mere fact that the railroad company failed to give signals there does not constitute negligence in itself of the railway company; also, the question whether any such fail ure, if it has been shown, constitutes negligence, are facts for your determination under the evidence.
The error being that the failure to give signals upon approaching a crossing is negligence.
(5) That it was error for the Court to have charged the jury:
Now, by the statute of North Carolina, which has been introduced in evidence, it is provided that upon approaching an intersecting highway, sharp curve, or steep descent, and also in traversing such -intersecting highway, a person operating a motor vehicle, that is to say, the driver, shall have such motor vehicle under control and operated at such speed, not exceeding seven miles an hour, as shall be reasonable, having regard to the traffic then on such highway and the safety of the public. Under the law of the State of North Carolina, which is the law governing this case, a railroad is a public highway. * * *
The error being that the charge was on the facts.
(6) That it was error for the Court to have charged the jury as follows:
Where several persons are engaged in a common enterprise, where they are traveling in an automobile for pleasure, or otherwise, each would be the agent of the other in carrying out such proposition. Where one of them, by common consent of all, is engaged in driving such automobile, the person so driving would be the agent of the others engaged in such common enterprise or purpose, and each of the travelers so participating would be liable for the negligence of the driver of the automobile, if there was any such negligence.
The error being that the charge was not applicable to any view of the case, and confusing and misleading.
(7) That the negligence of the driver of an automobile is not imputed to an occupant thereof, and it was error for
the Court to have charged that the negligence of the driver of the said automobile could be imputed to the plaintiff, and bar a recovery.
(8) That the statute purporting to regulate the speed of a motor vehicle in approaching a public crossing or an intersecting highway is not applicable to a highway intersected by a railroad, and it was error for the Court to so have construed said alleged statute.
The error being that the act of North Carolina conflicted with the laws of South Carolina, as construed in Dobbins v. Ry., 108 S. C. 254 (93 S. E. 932).
(9) That the statute purporting to regulate the speed of an automobile not to exceed seven miles an hour is inapplicable under the pleadings, and the Court erred in not withdrawing the same from the consideration of the jury on motion of the plaintiff’s attorney.
(10) That it was error for the Court to have refused to charge the jury, as requested by the plaintiff’s attorney, that the purported statute regulating the speed of a motor vehicle upon approaching an intersecting highway was inapplicable under the pleadings.
(11) That the Court erred in charging as follows:.
It is the duty of the engineer and fireman in charge of a railroad train to use due care, upon approaching such crossing, to keep a reasonable lookout for travelers upon such crossing, so far as is practicable and consistent with the discharge of the other duties of such fireman and engineer in firing and operating such engine.
The error being that it is the unqualified duty of the engineer and fireman to keep a vigilant lookout ahead for the sake of passengers, as well as those who may be helpless upon the track, and such duty is urgent, and it was error for the Court to have so qualified the rule.
Mr. J. Harry Poster, for appellant,
cites: As to exceptions i, 2 and 4: 132 N. C.; 43 S. E. Rep. 585; 109 N. C. 423; 13 S. E. Rep. 884; 26 Am. St. Rep. 581; 109 N. C. 474; 26 Am. St. Rep. 581; 153 N. C. 59; 69 S. E. Rep. 251; 71 S. E. Rep. 213; 106 N. C. 431; 79 S. E. 690; 25 S. C. 61; 87 S. C. 328; 52 S. C. 328; 58 S. C. 74; 25 S. C. 61. As to exceptions 2 and 5: Code 1912, vol. I, sec. 3991. As to exceptions 6 and 7: 29 Cyc. 543; 549 Thompson on Meg.,' vol. VII, 499-502; 117 Iowa 271; 88 N. W. Rep. 379; Thompson on Neg., vol. VII, secs. 504-506; 101 Am. St. Rep. 842; 172 N. C. 853; 84 N. Y. 247; 38 Am. Rep. 510; 89 Ga. 601; 16 S. E. 118; 57 ICans. 57; Am. St. Rep. 309; 64 N. H. 631; 10 Am. St. Rep. 410; 5 N. Dale. 281; 35 N. W. 676; (Ohio) 1st N. E. Rep. 519; 57 Am. Rep. 483; (Penn.) 66 Md. 149; 59 Am. Rep. 159; 79 Md. 335; 47 Am. St. Rep. 415; 35 Min. 522; 59 Am. Rep. 340; 29 N. W. 317; 2d Jaggard on Torts, sec. 276, p. 982; Bishop on Contract Daw, sec. 1070; 108 S. C. 254. Exception 8: 108 S. C. 254; 90 S. E. 756; 51 Am. St. Rep. 654; 52 Am. St. Rep. 780; 146 U. S. 657; 55 S. C. 120-122; 1 Rich. Eq. 211; 2 Kent 461; 19 S. C. 590; 14 Enc. of PI. and Pr. 248; 30 Cyc. 1347; 48 Am. Rep. 616; 96 N. Y. 248; 96 Am. St. Rep. 631; 175 N. Y. 315; 3 Enc. of E., 1st Ed. 536; 90 S. E. Rep. 756; 39 R. R. A. 835; 56 S. C. 296-297; 10 R. Ed. 274; 28 R. R. A. 568; 2 Kent. Com. 458; 45 S. C. 396; 3d Enc. of R. 554; 38 N. J. Eq! 219; 39 R. R. A. 834; 122 N. C. 270; 29 S. E. Rep. 362; 1 Am. St. Rep. 159; 70 Am. Die. 62; 48 Am. Rep. 312; 38 N. J. Eq. 219. Exception 11: 95 S. C. 314; 93 S. C. 17; 66 S. C. 98; 26 S. C. 415; 39 R. R. A. 835 ;'6 Enc. of R., 2d Ed. 284.
Messrs. McDonald & McDonald, for respondents,
cite: As to alleged error in charging the North Carolina law, as lo giving signals in approaching public crossing: 109 N. C. 473; 132 N. C. 100. As to alleged error on the part of the Circuit Judge in charging the law of North Carolina — the error specified that in so charging the jury, he charged upon the facts: 107 S. C. 222. As to alleged error on the part of the Circuit Judge in charging the jury in accordance with subdivision 15 of the Automobile Statute of North Carolina — the error pointed out in exception 8 is that such charge was inconsistent with the case of Dobbins v. Ry. Co.: 108 S. C. 254; 90 S. E. R. (N. C.) 756; Civil Code of S. C. 1912, vol. I, sec. 3994; 52 S.' C. 196-97; 65 S. C. 134; 70 S. C. 380; 70 S. C. 324.
November 11, 1919.

Opinion:
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Mr. Justice Hydrick.
Besides being unable to concur in all the conclusions stated by the Chief Justice as to imputing the negligence of the driver of an automobile to one riding therein, some of which I deem unnecessary to the decision of this case, I am constrained to dissent from the view that there was error in the charge complained of in the sixth and seventh exceptions. The Chief Justice holds the charge erroneous, not because the statement of the law was incorrect, but merely because it was inapplicable to the facts of the case, and, therefore, misleading.
By reference to the fourth and fifth paragraphs of the answer, it will be seen that defendant specially alleged that plaintiff and the other occupants of the automobile were •engaged in a common purpose, and that the automobile was being run at a negligent and reckless rate of speed at the •time of the accident with the knowledge and approval of plaintiff to accomplish their purpose, to wit, to get to Pine-ville ahead of the train to put the young ladies on it.
The testimony quoted by the Chief Justice as being relied upon by the defendant to sustain that view of the case is •clearly susceptible of the inference contended for by defendant, to wit, that plaintiff and the other occupants of the automobile agreed to and acquiesced in the purpose suggested by plaintiff to get to Pineville in time •to put the young ladies on the train, after she had been told by her husband that the train was then about due and that they would have to speed, if they got to Pineville in time. She asked him to look back and see if he could see the train. The circumstances, therefore, made it apparent that, to accomplish the purpose suggested by her, it would be necessary to run at great speed; and there was abundant testimony that they were so running. Some of the witnesses testified that they were going at the rate of 30 or 40 miles an hour. The evidence is undisputed that plaintiff's wishes as to the speed were respected and obeyed. Clearly, therefore, the evidence was susceptible of the inference that she was responsible for the rate of speed at which the automobile was being run. It matters not whether she had the "right" to control the driver, since it is not disputed that she did in fact control him. Clearly, therefore, the evidence warranted the finding that the negligence, if any, in the rate of speed of the automobile, was imputable to her. I think the charge was clearly relevant to the case made by the evidence.
Plaintiff has been advised by defendant's answer and by the testimony adduced that defendant would rely upon that view of the case. The trial Judge says that was the only view suggested to him. We have held in many cases that the failure of the trial Judge to charge the law applicable to every phase or view of the case is not reversible error. If plaintiff had desired instructions as to any other view of the case than that suggested by defendant's pleading and the evidence adduced in support thereof, and the defendant's request to charge, she should have requested them. Having failed to do so, the failure of the Judge to give such instructions was not reversible error.
I concur in overruling the other exceptions, and, for the reasons above stated, I think the sixth and seventh exceptions should also be overruled, and the judgment'should be affirmed; and, the majority being of the same opinion, the judgment is affirmed.
Mr. Justice Fraser concurs.