Case Name: Delmas H. BOSARGE, Jr. v. NEW ORLEANS STREET DEPARTMENT
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1984-11-14
Citations: 459 So. 2d 693
Docket Number: No. CA-1806
Parties: Delmas H. BOSARGE, Jr. v. NEW ORLEANS STREET DEPARTMENT.
Judges: Before REDMANN, C.J., and KLEES and WILLIAMS, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 459
Pages: 693–699

Head Matter:
Delmas H. BOSARGE, Jr. v. NEW ORLEANS STREET DEPARTMENT.
No. CA-1806.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
Nov. 14, 1984.
George R. Simno, III, Gertler & Gertler, New Orleans, for plaintiff-appellee (Delmas H. Bosarge, Jr.).
Salvador Anzelmo, City Atty., Douglas P. Wilson, Chief Deputy City Atty., Bernette J. Johnson, Deputy City Atty., New Orleans, for defendant-appellant (Department of Streets, City of New Orleans).
Before REDMANN, C.J., and KLEES and WILLIAMS, JJ.

Opinion:
KLEES, Judge.
The Department of Streets appeals the decision of the Civil Service Commission reinstating Delmas H. Bosarge, Jr. to his position of Traffic Engineer II in the Department with back pay subject to a suspension of 120 days. Bosarge appeals that part of the decision of the Commission to suspend him for 120 days for misuse of a city vehicle and o£her minor violations. We affirm the decision of the Civil Service Commission.
FACTS
Delmas H. Bosarge, Jr. was employed by the Department of Streets, City of New Orleans, as a Traffic Engineer II. On December 15, 1982, he was dismissed from the Department for violation of departmental policies involving the use of a city vehicle and other minor infractions between May, 1982 and December, 1982.
In addition to being a Traffic Engineer II for the Department of Streets, City of New Orleans, Bosarge was a co-owner with his wife, of a corporation that operated a school in Jefferson Parish named "Academy de Chateau". In response to an anonymous letter stating that Bosarge was misusing the city vehicle, Agent Robert Mehrt-ens of the Office of Municipal Investigations (O.M.I.) conducted an investigation into the allegations contained in the letter. Agent Mehrtens drove to the Academy de Chateau, which was named in the letter, on May 11, 1982, and observed the city vehicle parked at the school. On that day, Bo-sarge was observed by Agent Mehrtens driving two children from the school to their home in the Lakeview area of New Orleans in the city vehicle.
In December, 1982, Agent Mehrtens observed the vehicle parked at the school on three separate occasions. He reported these observations to Joseph Womble, Ray Kaufman and Harold Gorman, Bosarge's superiors, on December 15, 1982. At that time, he requested an interview with Bo-sarge. During the course of the interview, Bosarge's superiors met and composed a letter of termination. Bosarge was given the letter of termination.
There can be no question that conduct which impairs the orderly operation of a public service in which an employee is engaged can be grounds for disciplinary action, such as dismissal. Sanders v. Department of Health and Human Resources, 394 So.2d 629 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1980), writ denied 399 So.2d 602 (La.1981). Dent v. Department of Corrections, 413 So.2d 920 (La.App. 1st Cir.1982).
While "sufficient cause" is the key for disciplinary action, the jurisprudence indicates that the conduct of employees of a department is a crucial factor in maintaining an office that can properly serve the public. Leggett v. Northwestern State College, 242 La. 927, 140 So.2d 5 (La.1962); Dent v. Department of Corrections, supra. For this reason, a supervisor is given much latitude in exercising control of the employees over whom he has jurisdiction. Sanders v. Department of Health and Human Resources, supra.
The Court in Branighan v. Department of Police, 362 So.2d 1221,1223 (La.App. 4th Cir.1978), said:
"The superintendent of police is charged with the operation of his department, and the Civil Service Commission is not his supervisor. The superintendent is the one who must run his department and exercise discretion in relation to disciplining his officers, and the Commission is not charged with exercising that discretion."
Nonetheless, Branighan, supra, also held that:
"... [t]he Civil Service Commission's authority 'to hear and decide' disciplinary cases, Const, art. 10 § 12, includes authority to modify (reduce) as well as to reverse or affirm a penalty."
The scope of appellate review in these matters was established in Canter v. Koehring Co., 283 So.2d 716 (La.1973) and elaborated on in Arceneaux v. Domingue, 365 So.2d 1330, 1333 (La.1978):
"... appellate review of facts is not completed by reading so much of the record as will reveal a reasonable factual basis for the finding in the trial court; there must be further determination that the record established that the finding is not clearly wrong (manifestly erroneous)."
Although this is the general rule of appellate review regarding rulings of the Civil Service Commission, in Merchant v. Department of Finance, 391 So.2d 587 (La.App. 4th Cir.1980), the court held that the usual guidelines for appellate review, i.e., the manifest error rule, are not applicable where the evidence was taken before a hearing examiner and the record thus compiled was filed with the Commission without comment or recommendation. The court explained its reasoning as follows:
"The great weight accorded conclusions and determinations made by the trier of fact under Canter and Arceneaux is based on the advantage derived from personal observation of the witnesses, their demeanor on the stand, and the manner in which they responded to examination. Here, the Commission enjoyed no such advantage. Under these circumstances the standard of review by an appellate court is not unlike that of judicial review in other administrative matters, that is, whether the conclusion reached by the Commission is arbitrary or capricious or manifestly wrong."
The holding in Merchant was followed in McGee v. Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans, 396 So.2d 430 (La.App. 4th Cir.1981). In both cases the court made an independent review of the record to determine whether the conclusion reached by the Commission was arbitrary or capricious or manifestly wrong. The procedure followed in Merchant and McGee was also used in the instant case, thus the standard pronounced in those cases should apply.
Our review of the Civil Service Commission's hearing revealed the following facts: O.M.I. Agent Robert Mehrtens, as the Appointing Authority's first witness, testified that pursuant to an anonymous letter complaining that Bosarge was using a city vehicle for other than City business, he conducted an investigation on May 11, 1982, by driving out to the Academy de Chateau. He observed a city vehicle parked in front of the school. Then he saw a man and two children get into the car which he followed to the children's home in Lakeview. Photographs were taken at the time and he subsequently identified Bo-sarge as the' driver and the children as William and Robert Long.
Since other pressing business prevented further surveillance, the investigation was delayed until December, 1982, when Agent Mehrtens conducted three separate surveil-lances wherein he observed the car at the school. On two of the three occasions, he saw Bosarge drive to a nearby K-Mart and return to the school where he did some menial chores, i.e., picking up litter and getting the mail. On December 15, 1982, Agent Mehrtens reported his suspicions to Joseph Womble, Ray Kaufman and Harold Gorman of the Department of Streets. Bo-sarge was called into Kaufman's Office and told that Agent Mehrtens wanted to interview him.
Bosarge went to Agent Mehrtens' office and pursuant to La.R.S. 33:2426, was interviewed from 11:10 a.m. to 12:24 p.m. concerning his activities. After the interview, Agent Mehrtens left the office and returned about ten minutes later with a sealed envelope which he handed to Bo-sarge. Bosarge read the letter and told Agent Mehrtens he had been terminated from his position with the Department of Streets.
In connection with the investigation, Agent Mehrtens interviewed the parents of the two children. William Long testified before the hearing examiner that Agent Mehrtens interviewed him in July or August, 1982, although Agent Mehrtens testified it was in December. He testified that the children were brought home in the afternoon by Bosarge in the city vehicle since he was home to greet the children every day. Occasionally, another man would bring the children home. He said he paid fifty dollars a month for morning and afternoon transportation. Although the only proof of payment were two checks with notations on them for registration and tuition for the children. There were several inconsistencies between testimony before the commission and the statement given by Long to Agent Mehrtens.
Joseph Womble, City Traffic Engineer for the Department of Streets, testified that he was present at the meeting on December 15, 1982, when Agent Mehrtens advised him of the allegations. He said that when Bosarge came into the meeting he was told of the allegations and that Bosarge said nothing. Womble stated that Agent Mehrtens told him what was said in the interview with Bosarge and, as a result of what was said, it was decided to terminate Bosarge. He admitted that at the meeting between Kaufman, Gorman and himself, no other disciplinary actions were discussed but he later changed his testimony by saying suspension for activities was discussed in detail for an hour or two. He said he did not review the statement given by Bosarge to Agent Mehrtens. Womble testified that he reviewed Bosarge's twelve year record with the city and interviewed fellow workers while Bosarge was interviewed by Mehrtens and before the letter to terminate was written.
At the request of Harold Gorman, Director of Department of Streets, Womble testified that he had conversations with Bosarge's previous supervisor concerning Bosarge's activities in November, 1982. He claimed that the previous supervisor said there was a problem with the hours Bosarge kept and that he suspected Bo-sarge was involved with the school, but could never prove it. He felt that because of the severity and flagrance of the violation and its apparent long standing nature, there were grounds for termination.
At the meeting on December 15, 1982, Harold Gorman ruled out suspension because of the severity of the offense and the long standing behavior of Bosarge. He relied on what was told to him by Womble. He personally did not make an investigation nor did he speak to Bosarge before or after the interview and subsequent termination.
Delmas H. Bosarge, Jr. testified that he had worked for the City for twelve years and had use of a city vehicle for six years. He believed the only restriction on the use of the car was that it was not to be taken to and from home since he lived outside of Orleans Parish. On occasion, he would take the car to the school where he ate lunch and one time he transported children (in the city vehicle) from the school in Me-tairie.
Bosarge testified he was a diabetic and, because of the difficulty in finding food for his special diet, his wife fixed lunch for him at the school. Usually, he would take the city vehicle to his Aunt's house in Lake-view where he would switch to his personal car for the drive to the school. Then he would return to Lakeview, switch cars, and go back to City Hall. However, on a few occasions, he would not switch cars.
He stated that he would on occasion take the Long children home and if no one was home he would go switch cars to save time. Then when someone was home he would go back to the house and leave the children. Steve Watsky, a teacher at the school, testified that he regularly brought the children home on his way to his house. The children walked in an open door and he rarely saw anyone greet them.
As a part of his job, Bosarge would have occasion to take the car across parish lines during business hours. Bosarge believed that since he was paid on a professional level it was not necessary for him to take his lunch at a specific time everyday or that he had to work strictly between the normal hours of 8:30 and 4:30. As long as he did his job, the variances in his hours did not matter. Additionally, in the twelve years with the city he had not ever been disciplined for any of his actions.
On December 15, 1982, Ray Kaufman called him to his office, informed him that Agent Mehrtens wanted to interview him, and told him to turn in the keys to the car since he would not use it that day. One-half hour later, he reported to the O.M.I. Office, where, before the interview, he requested legal assistance which he was told was unnecessary. Agent Mehrtens showed him a piece of paper that said, in essence, if he didn't speak during the interview, he would lose his job and not be able to work for City or State Government for ten years. Bosarge then submitted to the interview. He testified Agent Mehrtens left the office for five to ten minutes and returned with the letter of termination. At no time was Bosarge given a chance to talk with either Gorman, Kaufman or Womble.
While this Court agrees that Delmas H. Bosarge, Jr. certainly has some culpability for his actions, we conclude as did the Commission that the record does not support termination from City employment. Reinstatement to his former position with back pay subject to a suspension of one hundred twenty days was deemed reasonable by the Commission. We can not find that this was clearly wrong.
Accordingly, the ruling appealed from is hereby Affirmed. All costs to be borne by Appellant.
AFFIRMED.
REDMANN, C.J., dissents.