Case Name: PEOPLE v. CHATFIELD
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1985-06-18
Citations: 143 Mich. App. 542
Docket Number: Docket No. 62979
Parties: PEOPLE v CHATFIELD
Judges: Before: D. E. Holbrook, Jr., P.J., and R. M. Maher and P. R. Joslyn, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 143
Pages: 542–555

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v CHATFIELD
Docket No. 62979.
Submitted May 3, 1983, at Grand Rapids.
Decided June 18, 1985.
Robert L. Chatfield was convicted of resisting and obstructing an arrest and malicious destruction of police property, Branch Circuit Court, Thomas C. Megargle, J. Defendant initially had been placed under arrest for disorderly conduct under an ordinance of the City of Coldwater and had kicked the door of a police car while struggling with police officers who were attempting to restrain him. Defendant appealed, alleging that the convictions of both offenses constituted double jeopardy, that the jury was not properly instructed regarding resisting arrest, and that the city ordinance under which he was arrested was unconstitutional. Held:
1. Defendant was not punished twice for the same offense. The statutes prohibiting resisting arrest and malicious destruction of police property protect different interests and are intended to prevent different types of harm. Conviction under both statutes was proper.
_2. Resisting and obstructing an arrest is not a specific intent crime and the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury that it is.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 243 et seq.
Contempt finding as precluding substantive criminal charges relating to same transaction. 26 ALR4th 950.
5 Am Jur 2d, Arrest § 80 et seq.
Modern status of rules as to right to forcefully resist illegal arrest. 44 ALR3d 1078.
12 Am Jur 2d, Breach of Peace and Disorderly Conduct §§ 8-13.
Validity and construction of statutes or ordinances prohibiting profanity or profane swearing or cursing. 5 ALR4th 938.
5 Am Jur 2d, Arrest § 2.
Lawfulness of warrantless search of purse or wallet of person arrested or suspected of crime. 29 ALR4th 771.
12 Am Jur 2d, Breach of Peace and Disorderly Conduct § 13.
Vagueness as invalidating statutes or ordinances dealing with disorderly persons or conduct. 12 ALR3d 1448.
5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 574.
5 Am Jur 2d, Arrest § 49.
3. Defendant alleges that the trial court erred by refusing to give a curative instruction after the prosecutor, in closing argument, stated that the defendant’s having called the police officer a bastard was sufficient for defendant to be arrested under the city ordinance. The error was harmless. The police had probable cause to make an arrest and the city ordinance was not unconstitutional. The jury instructions, in their entirety, were not incorrect.
Affirmed.
R. M. Maher, J., dissented. He would hold that the jury was not properly instructed on the defendant’s right to resist an arrest. If the defendant’s version of the incident were to be believed the police officers would not have had probable cause to believe that defendant violated the ordinance, because merely calling the police officer a bastard would be speech protected by the First Amendment. The Coldwater ordinance should be narrowly interpreted to prohibit only the use of "fighting words” and, as such, cannot prohibit the defendant’s conduct as described by the defendant. Defendant could, therefore, have been entitled to resist the arrest. Judge Maher would hold that the jury should have been so instructed, that the error was not harmless, and that defendant’s conviction of resisting and obstructing an arrest should be reversed.
Opinion of the Court
1. Criminal Law — Double Jeopardy — Resisting Arrest — Malicious Destruction of Police Property.
A defendant is not placed twice in jeopardy by convictions of both resisting arrest and malicious destruction of police property, resulting from one criminal episode, because the statutes under which he is convicted were each intended to prevent a different type of harm and protect two different interests (MCL 750.337b, 750.479; MSA 28.609[2], 28.747).
2. Criminal Law — Resisting Arrest.
Resisting and obstructing an arrest is not a specific intent crime (MCL 750.479; MSA 28.747).
3. Constitutional Law — Protected Speech — Offensive Coarse Language.
A city ordinance which prohibits harassment, harming another, or use of "offensive coarse language” is not unconstitutional as, using the common meaning of the words of the ordinance, the only offensive coarse language prohibited is that which by its very utterance inflicts injury or tends to incite an immediate breach of the peace.
Dissent by R. M. Maher, J.
4. Arrest — Ordinances — Constitutional Law — Lawful Arrest.
An arrest or search and seizure is not rendered unlawful because of a subsequent judicial determination that the ordinance pursuant to which the arrest or search is made is unconstitutional where the arrest or search was otherwise lawful.
5. Statutes — Speech — Constitutional Law — Judicial Construction.
A statute or ordinance regulating speech must either facially comply with the requirements of the First Amendment or be amenable to interpretation so as to comply with those requirements in order to withstand constitutional scrutiny under either a vagueness or an overbreadth analysis.
6. Appeal — Judicial Construction.
The Court of Appeals has the duty to interpret statutes and ordinances so as to preserve their constitutionality.
7. Criminal Law — Resisting Arrest — Jury Instructions.
It is error requiring reversal of a conviction for resisting arrest for a trial court to have refused to instruct the jury that if they believed defendant’s version of the incident he was entitled to resist the arrest because of Us unlawfulness where there was a factual question of whether the police had probable cause to believe the defendant had violated the ordinance under which he was arrested.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Louis J. Caruso, Solicitor General, John L. Livesay, Prosecuting Attorney, and Leonard J. Malinowsky, Assistant Attorney General, for the people.
J. Richard Colbeck, for defendant on appeal.
Before: D. E. Holbrook, Jr., P.J., and R. M. Maher and P. R. Joslyn, JJ.
Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
D. E. Holbrook, Jr., P.J.
Defendant appeals as of right from his convictions following a jury trial for resisting and obstructing an arrest, MCL 750.479; MSA 28.747, and malicious destruction of police property, MCL 750.337b; MSA 28.609(2). He was sentenced to two concurrent 6-month terms of imprisonment.
Both convictions arose from an incident that occurred on May 20, 1981. Sergeant Sturgeon of the Coldwater police was dispatched to investigate a disturbance. When he arrived at the scene he discovered a number of people on the property, many of whom were pushing and shoving each other. Sturgeon testified that, while he was attempting to investigate, defendant ran up to him and began yelling and screaming obscenities at him, demanding that he leave the property. Sturgeon repeatedly told defendant not to interfere, but defendant continued his yelling and shook his finger in Sturgeon's face. During much of his tirade defendant had his face within two inches of Sturgeon's. Finally, defendant was arrested for disorderly conduct under Coldwater City Ordinance, § 9. Sturgeon by that time was assisted by another police officer. There was a struggle to get defendant in the police car and once in the auto defendant continued to struggle. Defendant kicked the car door twice, resulting first in the door's flying into Sturgeon's midsection, and then shattering the window.
Defendant's testimony alleged that he had calmly called the officer a bastard and that the window shattered because the car door was closed on his feet._
On appeal defendant contends that being convicted on both counts violated his right to be protected against double jeopardy, that the ordinance he was arrested under was unconstitutional, and that reversible error occurred in that the jury was not instructed that resisting an arrest is a specific intent crime. We do not agree and defendant's convictions are affirmed.
Defendant argues that as both convictions arose from the same transaction he is receiving multiple punishments for the same offense. North Carolina v Pearce, 395 US 711; 89 S Ct 2072; 23 L Ed 2d 656 (1969). The prosecution contends that there were two acts: one wherein defendant kicked the door in an attempt to resist arrest, and a second wherein defendant was angered and kicked to vent his anger. When the convictions are based on two separate acts, there is no double jeopardy problem. People v Haynes, 100 Mich App 306; 298 NW2d 732 (1980). Even if both convictions are based on one instance of kicking, defendant's rights still have not been violated. Each statute under which defendant was convicted was intended to prevent a different type of harm. The resisting arrest statute is intended to prevent interference with an arrest. People v Gleisner, 115 Mich App 196; 320 NW2d 340 (1982), lv den 417 Mich 1095 (1983). The malicious destruction of police property statute is intended to protect property. People v Richardson, 118 Mich App 492; 325 NW2d 419 (1982), lv den 417 Mich 949 (1983) . Accordingly, as two different interests are protected, there is no double jeopardy violation. People v Robideau, 419 Mich 458; 355 NW2d 592 (1984) .
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that resisting and obstructing an arrest is a specific intent crime. This argument is without merit. People v Landrie, 124 Mich App 480, 483; 335 NW2d 11 (1983); People v Van Wasshenova, 121 Mich App 672, 680; 329 NW2d 452 (1982); People v Gleisner, supra.
Defendant reasons that because the prosecutor, in his closing argument, stated that the use of the word "bastard" was sufficient in and of itself to arrest defendant, and since the trial judge refused to give an instruction on this, his conviction must be reversed.
While we do agree that the use of the term "bastard" is constitutionally protected, we do not find the people's one reference to the contrary in closing argument to constitute reversible error. Defense counsel corrected the prosecution's error in his closing argument, elaborating on it for several pages, saying in part:
"Why was he arresting him? What was he arresting him for? Counsel says it's the use of the word 'bastard5. He called them a bastard. Therefore he arrested him. In and of itself that should be sufficient, counsel says. Well, that isn't what the city ordinance says. The Judge is going to read that to you."
The trial judge did read the city ordinance under which defendant was arrested, as set forth in footnote 1, supra. Our review of this ordinance reveals that it is constitutional. Harass as defined by Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary, means: "to worry and impede by repeated raids to annoy continually Harm requires "physical or mental damage". Reckless disregard is to be indifferent to the consequences, wanton and willful or careless, inattentive or negligent. Black's Law Dictionary, Revised 4th ed, 1968, p 1435. Using the common, everyday meaning of the words, R & T Sheet Metal, Inc v Hospitality Motor Inns, Inc, 139 Mich App 249; 361 NW2d 785 (1984), we believe that the only offensive coarse language prohibited is that which by its very utterance inflicts injury or tends to incite an immediate breach of the peace. Chaplinsky v New Hampshire, 315 US 568, 572; 62 S Ct 766, 769; 86 L Ed 1031, 1035 (1942).
"The existence of probable cause to arrest depends in every case upon the peculiar circumstances confronting the arresting officer." People v Mitchell, 138 Mich App 163, 167; 360 NW2d 158 (1984).
We have carefully reviewed the facts and find the evidence sufficient to sustain defendant's convictions. We believe the officer had probable cause to make a lawful arrest. A rational trier of fact could have found all the necessary elements present. People v Richardson, 139 Mich App 622; 362 NW2d 853 (1984).
We hold the prosecution's one improper comment during its closing argument to be harmless error. GCR 1963, 529.1. The jury instructions, when viewed in their entirety, were not incorrect. People v Seabrooks, 135 Mich App 442, 452; 354 NW2d 374 (1984).
Accordingly, defendant's convictions are affirmed.
P. R. Joslyn, J., concurred.
"That no person shall with the purpose to harass or harm another or with reckless disregard of the sensibility of another make a communication anonymously or at extremely inconvenient hours or in offensive coarse language. And no person shall make or assist in making any noise, disturbance, trouble, or improper diversion or any rout, or riot by which the peace and good order of the city of Coldwater will be disturbed."
Defendant requested an instruction that he could not have been legally arrested for the use of the word bastard due to First Amendment protections.