Case Name: Joseph and Renee VAN INWAGEN, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Wayne G. SANSTEAD, North Dakota Superintendent of Public Instruction, Alice Husfloen, Mercer County Superintendent of Schools, and Hazen Board of Education, Defendants and Appellees
Court: North Dakota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: North Dakota
Decision Date: 1989-05-17
Citations: 440 N.W.2d 513
Docket Number: Civ. No. 880318
Parties: Joseph and Renee VAN INWAGEN, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Wayne G. SANSTEAD, North Dakota Superintendent of Public Instruction, Alice Husfloen, Mercer County Superintendent of Schools, and Hazen Board of Education, Defendants and Appellees.
Judges: GIERKE, VANDE WALLE and LEVINE, JJ., concur.
Reporter: North Western Reporter 2d
Volume: 440
Pages: 513–518

Head Matter:
Joseph and Renee VAN INWAGEN, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Wayne G. SANSTEAD, North Dakota Superintendent of Public Instruction, Alice Husfloen, Mercer County Superintendent of Schools, and Hazen Board of Education, Defendants and Appellees.
Civ. No. 880318.
Supreme Court of North Dakota.
May 17, 1989.
Michael P. Farris (argued), Home School Legal Defense Ass’n, Paeonian Springs, Va., and Mahoney & Mahoney, Center, for plaintiffs and appellants. Appearance by Ann C. Mahoney.
James M. Vukelic (argued), Sol. Gen., Atty. General’s Office, Bismarck, and Richardson, Isakson & Lange, Hazen, for defendants and appellees; argued by Charles R. Isakson.

Opinion:
ERICKSTAD, Chief Justice.
Joseph and Renee Van Inwagen appealed to the district court from a decision of the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, Wayne Sanstead, denying the Van Inwag-ens' request that their children be exempted from compulsory school attendance. The district court, concluding that there was no statutory authority for the appeal, dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We affirm.
The Van Inwagens initially requested the chairman of the Hazen School Board to exempt their children from compulsory school attendance under Section 15-34.1-03(4), N.D.C.C.:
"15-34.1-03. Compulsory attendance — Exceptions. The parent, guardian, or other person having control of a child required to attend school by the provisions of this chapter shall be excused by the school board from causing the child to attend school whenever it shall be shown to the satisfaction of the board, subject to appeal as provided by law, that one of the following reasons exists:

"4. That the child is in such physical or mental condition as to render attendance or participation in the regular or special education program inexpedient or impracticable. Such condition shall be shown by a declaration of a multidisciplinary team which includes the director of special education of the special education unit of which the school district of residence is a member, the school superintendent of the child's district of residence, the child's classroom teacher, the child's physician, and the child's parent or guardian."
In their letter requesting an exemption the Van Inwagens stated that they have been given "a sacred God-given responsibility to protect, nurture, and instruct" their children and that it would be "a violation of principle and our conscience" to send their children to a public school.
A multidisciplinary team was assembled, as required by Section 15-34.1-03(4), N.D. C.C., and on a three-to-three split vote, it sent the Van Inwagens' request to the Hazen School Board with no recommendation to grant or deny the request. The School Board denied the request for exemption. Pursuant to Section 15-22-17, N.D.C.C., the Van Inwagens appealed the school board decision to Alice Husfloen, Mercer County Superintendent of Schools. Their request for exemption was denied by County Superintendent Husfloen, and the Van Inwagens then appealed, under Section 15-21-07, N.D.C.C., to the State Superintendent, who ultimately denied their request. The Van Inwagens attempt to appeal the State Superintendent's decision to the district court was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that there is no statutory right to appeal that decision.
An appeal is a creature of statute, and accordingly, no right of appeal exists unless authorized by statute. Investment Rarities, Inc. v. Bottineau County Water Resource District, 396 N.W.2d 746 (N.D. 1986).
The Van Inwagens assert that the right to appeal the decision of the State Superintendent in this case arises under the following statutory provisions, which we quote in relevant part:
"15-21-07. Duties — To advise with county superintendents of schools and school boards — Appeals. The superintendent of public instruction shall . decide all appeals from decisions of county superintendents of schools, and, for the consideration of such appeals, he may require affidavits, verified statements, or testimony under oath as to the facts in issue, as provided in chapter 28-32. As an administrative agency under chapter 28-32 and following provisions thereof, he shall prescribe, and cause to be enforced, rules of practice and regulations pertaining to the hearing and determination of appeals and such rules and regulations as may be necessary to render effective the school laws of the state."
"15-22-17. To decide school controversies — Appeal from decisions of county superintendent. The county superintendent of schools shall decide all matters in controversy arising in his county in the administration of the school laws or appealed to him from decisions of school officers or boards. An appeal may be taken from his decision to the superintendent of public instruction. In such ease, a full written statement of the facts, together with the testimony and the decision of the county superintendent in the case, shall be certified to the superintendent of public instruction for his decision, and such decision shall be final, subject to appropriate remedies in the courts."
"28-32-15. Appeal from determination of agency — Time to appeal — How appeal taken. Any party to any proceeding heard by an administrative agency, except in cases where the decision of the administrative agency is declared final by any other statute, may appeal from such decision...."
We disagree with the Van Inwagens' assertion that the foregoing statutes authorize their appeal in this case from the State Superintendent's decision.
Pursuant to Section 28-32-01(l)(q), the Superintendent of Public Instruction is not an administrative agency except with respect to rules prescribed under Section 15-21-07, N.D.C.C., and rules relating to teacher certification or professional codes and standards. This is not an appeal from the rulemaking function of the State Superintendent, but rather an appeal from the State Superintendent's review of a decision made by a county superintendent. Consequently, Section 28-32-15, N.D.C.C., which authorizes appeals from administrative agency decisions, is not applicable to these proceedings. Even if applicable, however, Section 28-32-15, N.D.C.C., would not authorize an appeal in this case, because the State Superintendent's decision, upon reviewing a decision of a County Superintendent, is declared "final" under Section 15-22-17, N.D.C.C. Pursuant to Section 28-32-15, N.D.C.C., administrative agency decisions which are statutorily declared to be final decisions are not appealable. Investment Rarities, Inc., supra, 396 N.W.2d at 748.
The language under Section 15-22-17, N.D.C.C., which provides that the State Superintendent's decision is "subject to appropriate remedies in the courts" does not authorize an appeal from the State Superintendent's decision. That language merely declares that separate proceedings may be brought in the courts for an appropriate remedy. See Kessler v. Board of Education, 87 N.W.2d 743 (N.D.1958); Zenith School District No. 32 v. Peterson, 81 N.W.2d 764 (N.D.1957). When the Legislature intends to create a right of appeal from a decision of a governmental body to the district court it is capable of doing so in a clear and unequivocal manner. See, e.g., Section 15-27.2-04(11), N.D.C.C. ("...A decision of the state board [of public school education] with respect to a proposed annexation may in turn be appealed to the district court of the judicial district in which the territory proposed is located in accordance with chapter 28-32.")
We agree with the conclusion of the district court that there is no statutory authorization for an appeal in this case. Accordingly, the district court's judgment dismissing the appeal is affirmed.
GIERKE, VANDE WALLE and LEVINE, JJ., concur.