Case Name: Victor FREDERICKSON, Appellant, v. Donald COCHRAN et al., Appellees
Court: Texas Courts of Civil Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1969-12-31
Citations: 449 S.W.2d 329
Docket Number: No. 7112
Parties: Victor FREDERICKSON, Appellant, v. Donald COCHRAN et al., Appellees.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 449
Pages: 329–335

Head Matter:
Victor FREDERICKSON, Appellant, v. Donald COCHRAN et al., Appellees.
No. 7112.
Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Beaumont.
Dec. 31, 1969.
G. F. Steger, Columbus, for appellant.
Gerald H. Fortney, Houston, Hodges, Moore & Gates, Columbus, for appellees.

Opinion:
STEPHENSON, Justice.
Defendant appeals from a money judgment rendered against him in a suit brought by his landlords upon a farming and grazing lease. We will designate the parties as they appeared in the trial court. The written contract involved, obviously prepared by a layman, was attached to the pleadings of both parties and covered 480 acres of land, was for a period of five years, and contained a renewal clause. The pertinent portion of this agreement contained this language.
"Victor Frederickson [Tenant] is to farm every year 140 acres in Rice Rental $12.50 per acre $1750.00 Also Pasture rent on 480 acres at $1.00 per acre 480.00 $2230.00
"This is a Five Year contract beginning January 1st 1964 through the year of 1968. Rental paid in advance by January 15th of each year."
Plaintiffs sought to declare the lease forfeited because defendant sub-leased the premises to a third party without the consent of the plaintiffs. They also alleged that defendant had "over-planted" the land in each of the several years involved, for which plaintiffs sought a money judgment against the defendant at the rate of $12.50 for each acre "over-planted," aggregating $3,100.25. By "over-planting," it is clear that the plaintiffs contended that defendant was entitled to plant rice on only 140 acres out of the whole tract each year, but actually had planted rice on a greater number of acres for which plaintiffs sought payment at the rate of $12.50 per acre for each year when more than 140 acres were planted to rice.
Trial was to the court and judgment was rendered for plaintiffs declaring the lease to be cancelled and terminated (with no complaint being made of this action) and for personal judgment against defendant for $2,964.62, which defendant now assails. There is no statement of facts in our record. Neither party requested the court to file findings of fact and conclusions of law and none were filed.
Numerous special exceptions were addressed to the pleadings of the plaintiffs, all of which were overruled, but no challenge is made of such ruling in the appeal. Nevertheless, in the order on the exceptions, the court included a paragraph reading:
"In addition, the Court is of the opinion and finds that under the terms and provisions of the lease in controversy, which is made a part of Plaintiffs' petition herein, Lessee therein, Victor L. Frederickson, is obligated to pay to Lessor the sum of $12.50 per acre each year for every acre farmed to rice under such lease agreement during that particular year."
To this action, defendant excepted, and the order recites that defendant "further stated in open Court that any subsequent proceedings in this cause were specifically subject to his said exceptions to the Court's rulings on said special exceptions of said Defendant."
Plaintiffs object to our consideration of defendant's points of error, contending that the same are merely abstract statements of law which are not relevant to this appeal. The points upon which defendant predicates his appeal are in fact, subject to the criticism addressed thereto. Rule 418 (b), Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. We adopt this language from Fambrough v. Wagley, 140 Tex. 577, 169 S.W. 2d 478, 482 (1943):
" If a 'point' is sufficient to direct the Court's attention to the matter complained of, the Court will look to the 'point' and the statement and argument thereunder to determine the question of reversible error. Simply stated, the Court will pass on both the sufficiency and the merits of the 'point' in the light of the statement and argument thereunder."
Following this rule, we are of the opinion that the "points" are sufficient to present the contentions so advanced and proceed to a consideration thereof. We interpret the three points of error as set forth in defendant's brief to raise the single question in this court, that the trial court did not properly construe the contract.
The principal attack of plaintiffs upon the brief filed is that we must assume that the trial court's implied findings support the judgment since no findings of fact were requested. Cited in support thereof, and the only authorities cited at any place in plaintiffs' brief are these cases: Chambless v. J. J. Fritch, General Contractor, Inc., 336 S.W.2d 200, 203 (Dallas Civ.App., 1960, error ref. n. r. e.); Gomez v. Riddle, 334 S.W.2d 197, 198 (San Antonio Civ.App., 1960, no writ); and Jones v. Alvin State Bank, 332 S.W.2d 124, 125 (Eastland Civ. App., 1960, no writ).
We readily accept the rule of law enunciated in the cited cases and could add thereto some of even more authoritative value, e. g., Quinn v. Dupree, 157 Tex. 441, 303 S.W.2d 769, 773 (1957), and Bishop v. Bishop, 359 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Tex.Sup., 1962). Indeed, we are willing to go even further: when there is no statement of facts in the record, it must be presumed that sufficient evidence was introduced to support the judgment. Lane v. Fair Stores, 150 Tex. 566, 243 S.W.2d 683, 685 (1951) ; Grayson Enterprises, Inc. v. Texas Key Broadcasters, 388 S.W.2d 204, 208 (Eastland Civ.App., 1965, no writ).
In construing the brief contract before us, we are controlled by the restatement of the law as contained in the opinion by the Supreme Court of Texas in Spence & Howe Construction Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 365 S.W.2d 631, 637 (Tex.Sup., 1963), as follows:
" 'In construing contracts we must seek the intention of the parties from the language used in the contract. All of the language used is to be considered. Too, consideration may be given to the subject matter of the contract and the surrounding facts and circumstances, not for the purposes of varying or adding to the contract but in order to find out the intention with which words are used.' "
We have concluded that a reasonable construction of the contract before us is that defendant leased from plaintiffs a 480 acre tract of land and was entitled to use the entire tract for pasturage, and not more than 140 acres out of the entire tract, to plant rice. Defendant breached this contract by planting more than 140 acres of land as specifically alleged in plaintiffs' petition during the term of the contract. Because of this breach of contract, defend ant must respond in damages. Not having a statement of facts, we must assume, as stated above, that the evidence supports the trial court's judgment, and that plaintiffs offered evidence relating to the customs and usage of contracts covering pasturage and rice, and the amount of damages they were entitled to recover. There does not have to be a provision in a contract as to liquidated damages, in order for plaintiffs to recover. The measure of recovery for a breach of contract is the pecuniary loss shown to have been within the contemplation of the parties. Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Wood, 292 S.W. 200 (Tex. Comm.App., 1927). We must assume the evidence showed the amount of damages allowed by the trial court was within the contemplation of the parties. All of the facts surrounding the execution of this contract, known to the parties, could have properly been considered by the trial court in determining what may have reasonably been within the contemplation of the parties as a natural consequence of the breach of this contract. See 17 Tex.Jur.2d, § 231, at p. 293.
If the parties to this contract had intended to lease the entire 480 acres of land for rice, as well as for pasturage purposes, for an annual rental of $2,230.00, that could have been easily done by so providing. That is not the contract we are called upon to construe. That portion of the contract providing "140 acres in Rice Rental $12.50 per acre" and "Pasture rent on 480 acres at $1.00 per acre" must be given some significance. The logical explanation for the use of those particular words is that the parties intended to limit the rice acreage to 140 acres per year and to indicate that these parties agreed it was worth $12.-50 per acre to the tenant to have the right to plant rice on that limited number of acres.
Affirmed.