Case Name: BOHANNON v. THE STATE
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1992-03-13
Citations: 203 Ga. App. 783
Docket Number: A91A1862
Parties: BOHANNON v. THE STATE.
Judges: Sognier, C. J., Birdsong, P. J., Pope, Andrews and Johnson, JJ., concur. McMurray, P. J., Beasley and Cooper, JJ., dissent.
Reporter: Georgia Appeals Reports
Volume: 203
Pages: 783–788

Head Matter:
A91A1862.
BOHANNON v. THE STATE.
(417 SE2d 679)

Opinion:
Carley, Presiding Judge.
Appellant was tried before a jury and found guilty of burglary and kidnapping with bodily harm. Thereafter, no timely motion for new trial or notice of appeal was ever filed. Appellant brings this direct appeal from the denial of his extraordinary motion for new trial.
"Extraordinary motions for new trial are not favored. [Cit.] Such motions are contemplated for events that do not ordinarily occur in the transaction of human affairs. [Cit.]" Cade v. State, 107 Ga. App. 30 (1) (129 SE2d 405) (1962). " 'And such an extraordinary state of facts must have been unknown to the movant or his counsel at the time when an ordinary motion for a new trial could have been filed, and must have been impossible to ascertain by the exercise of proper diligence for that purpose.' [Cits.]" Patterson v. State, 228 Ga. 389, 390-391 (2) (185 SE2d 762) (1971). Appellant's extraordinary motion for new trial was based only on the general grounds and various evidentiary rulings made during the course of the trial. Obviously, these are matters which, in the exercise of proper diligence, appellant or his counsel could and should have discovered and raised in a timely filed ordinary motion for new trial. Gaddis v. State, 245 Ga. 200 (265 SE2d 275) (1980); Goodwin v. State, 240 Ga. 605 (242 SE2d 119) (1978); Bishop v. State, 117 Ga. App. 93 (2) (159 SE2d 477) (1968); Cade v. State, supra. Accordingly, assuming, without deciding, that we have jurisdiction over this direct appeal (but see Davis v. State, 182 Ga. App. 736 (356 SE2d 762) (1987)), the judgment must be affirmed. If appellant is to secure a direct review of those issues that could and should have been raised in a timely motion for new trial, he must secure a proper written order from the trial court granting him the right to file an out-of-time appeal. Cannon v. State, 175 Ga. App. 741 (334 SE2d 342) (1985).
If the dissent's analysis were correct, neither a civil nor a criminal appellant would ever have to comply with the jurisdictional 30-day limitation established by OCGA § 5-6-38 (a). A civil or criminal appellant could simply file an extraordinary motion for new trial, asserting therein only issues that could and should have been raised in a timely motion for new trial, and then secure a direct appeal by filing a notice of appeal within 30 days of the denial of the extraordinary motion for new trial. Whatever else OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (7) means, it does not purport to confer direct appellate jurisdiction to consider the merits of issues that could and should have been raised in a timely motion for new trial. The law is otherwise clear that an extraordinary motion for new trial is properly denied and will be affirmed on appeal if the motion raises only issues that could and should have been raised in a timely motion for new trial. Gaddis v. State, supra. The law is also otherwise clear as to the proper method by which a criminal appellant can secure a direct appellate review of issues that could and should have been raised in a timely motion for new trial. That method is to secure leave to file an out-of-time appeal by demonstrating that the lack of diligence was attributable to his counsel and not to himself. Cannon v. State, supra. It is that proper method which appellant in the instant case must follow. To hold, as the dissent suggests, would penalize neither civil nor criminal appellants for their own lack of diligence in pursuing their appellate rights and would effectively repeal the jurisdictional 30-day limitation established by OCGA § 5-6-38 (a).
Judgment affirmed.
Sognier, C. J., Birdsong, P. J., Pope, Andrews and Johnson, JJ., concur. McMurray, P. J., Beasley and Cooper, JJ., dissent.