Case Name: Greenesville Justices at the Relation of Robinson's Adm'r v. Williamson & Others
Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
Jurisdiction: Virginia
Decision Date: 1841-03
Citations: 12 Leigh 93
Docket Number: 
Parties: Greenesville Justices at the Relation of Robinson’s Adm’r v. Williamson & Others.
Judges: BROOKE, CABEND and STANARD, J., concurred with the president, that the judgment should be reversed, and judgment entered for the plaintiffs.
Reporter: Virginia Reports
Volume: 39
Pages: 825–831

Head Matter:
Greenesville Justices at the Relation of Robinson’s Adm’r v. Williamson & Others.
March, 1841,
Richmond.
Administration Bond — Sureties—notion tor Counter Security — New Bond — Nul Tiei Record — Variance between Pleading anti Proof. -In debt on an administration bond against the adm'r and his sureties, defendants plead in bar (upon the statute 1 Rev. Code, ch. 104, § 38, SO.) that upon petition of G. one of sureties to the county court, setting forth that he was bound as one of the sureties of the adm'r and conceived himself in danger of suffering thereby, and praying the court for relief, the adm'r was required by order of court to give a new bond, and did so accordingly with another person as his surety, which new bond was executed in open court on the same day of the order requiring such bond, was in a penalty equal to thatofthe first bond, was made payable to the justices then sitting, and was duly executed and conditioned as the law directs; whereby, and by force of the statute, all the sureties in former bond were discharged. Plaintiffs reply nul tiel record. And defendants shew an entry on minute-book of the county court, stating, that on motion of G. against the adm’r, for counter security, the defendant appeared in court, acknowledged summons, and tended J. M. as security, whereupon it was ordered that said G. be dismissed from further suretyship; and shew also a new bond, executed by the adm’r and J. M. his surety, bearing even date with the entry on minute book, made payable to justices then sitting, in proper penalty and with proper condition required by the statute in a new bond in such case, with an endorsement thereon made by the clerk, that It was acknowledged on the day of its date; Hifinn, 1. that the entries on the minute book of a county court, and such papers only as are therein distinctly referred to, can alone be inspected to ascertain the record; that therefore, in this case, the new bond, not being mentioned in the minute, to have been required, executed or accepted, cannot be regarded as part of the record; and so the minute itself is the true and the only record of the proceeding; and 2. that the record appearing by the minute, being variant, in several substantial particulars, from the record pleaded by the defendants, the plaintiffs were entitled to judgment, that there was no such record. Dissentiente, Aij.kn, J.
Jesse Williamson took administration of the estate of George M. Williamson, on the 2d November 1829, in the county court of Greenesville, with Benjamin Gowing and nine others, his sureties, and executed a bond to the justices of the county court, then sitting, in the penalty of 50,000 dollars, with condition, in usual and proper form, for the due and faithful administration of the intestate’s estate.
On the 6th June 1831, there was a proceeding had in the county court, at the instance of the surety Gowing, of the short entry of which in the minute book, the following is a literal copy : “Benjamin Gowing vs. G. M. W’mson’s ad’r. Mot’n for c’r sec’y ; sum’d ack’d in name of s’d Gowing; and the def’t appeared in court and tendered Joel Mayes as security ; whereupon ord’ the s’d Gowing be dismissed from further securityship.” No mention was made on the minute book of *the execution and delivery of a new bond by Williamson the administrator and Mayes his surety: but, in fact, a new bond was executed by them (whether in open court or not, did not appear by the record), dated the 6th June 1831, payable to the then sitting justices, in the penalty of 50,000 dollars, with the following condition : “The condition of the above obligation is, that whereas the above bound Jesse Williamson administrator of George M. Williamson deceased hath heretofore executed a bond payable to John Robinson” and others (naming them), “and conditioned for the discharge of his duties as administrator as aforesaid, which said bond bears date the 2d day of November 1829; and whereas by an order of court made on the 6th day of June, other bond and security have been required of the said executor ; now, therefore, if the said executor shall well and truly have kept and performed, and shall well and truly keep and perform the condition of the bond aforesaid, and shall in all respects have performed, and shall continue to perform the duties of his office aforesaid, then this obligation to be void” &c. And *upon this bond (which it seems was filed with the clerk) there was the following endorsement: “Acknowledged 6th June 1831 by the obligors ; Teste E. Mason,” who was the clerk of the county court.
In 1837, an action of debt was brought, in the circuit superior court of Greenesville, on the first administration bond of the 2nd November 1829, in the name of the justices of the county court to whom it was made payable, at the relation of Braxton Robinson’s administrator, against the surviving obligors therein bound, namely, Jesse Williamson the administrator and Benjamin Gowing and six others of the sureties, the other three sureties being dead. The declaration set out the bond, and recited the condition in haec'verba, and then assigned the following breach — ■ That in April 1835, Robinson’s administrator recovered a judgment in the circuit superior court of Greenesville, against Jesse Williamson administrator of George M. Williamson, for 100 dollars, with interest &c. and costs, to be levied de bonis testatoris, *sued out a writ of fieri facias thereon, and delivered the same to the sheriff, who returned “ No effects found and the plaintiffs averred, that ample assets of his intestate’s estate, to pay and satisfy the judgment and execution, came into the hands of Jesse Williamson the administrator to be administered, and that he wasted them &c.
The defendants took oyer of the bond and condition, and then pleaded in bar, “ that before any action on said bond was depending against the sureties thereto, or their representatives, or against any of them, or prosecuted to a judgment or decree, to wit, on the 6th day of June 1831, at the county court of Greenesville aforesaid, upon the petition of Benjamin Gowing, one of the sureties to the said bond, to the said county court, setting forth that he was bound in the said court as one of the sureties of Jesse Williamson for the due and faithful administration of the estate of George M. Williamson deceased, and that he considered himself in danger of suffering thereby, and praying the court for relief, the said Jesse Williamson was required by order of the said court to enter into a new bond, which he accordingly did with a certain Joel Mayes surety thereto, to wit, on the said 6th day of June 1831, at the county of Greenesville, in open court, payable to John Robinson” and others (naming them) “ justices of the said court then sitting ; which bond was duly executed and conditioned as the law directs; wherefore and whereupon the defendants say, that all the sureties to the former bond, and their legal representatives, were forthwith, by force of the statute in such case made and provided, discharged from the obligation of the former bond &c.” (that on which this action was brought) concluding with a verification.
To this plea the plaintiff replied, “that there was no such record of the said supposed order of the county court of Greenesville, by which the said Jesse Williamson *was required to enter into a new bond ; nor was there any such record, as was supposed by the defendants, shewing that the said Jesse Williamson did with a certain Joel Mayes surety enter into a new bond as in the plea mentioned, remaining in the said county court of Greenesville, in manner and form as the defendants had in their plea alleged. And this they were ready to verify, when, where and in such manner as the court should direct &c. Wherefore &c.”
The defendants rejoined, that there was such a record of the proceedings and orders set forth in their plea; which they were ready to verify by the record &c. concluding to the court.
The defendants produced and shewed the entry in the minute book of the county court of Greenesville of the 6th June 1831 (the same above literally transcribed). And in support of their plea, they also offered as part of the record of the county court, the bond executed by Jesse Williamson and Joel Mayes, dated the 6th June 1831, and the clerk’s endorsement thereon. The plaintiffs objected to the reading of this bond, and the endorsement thereon, as part or in support of the record ; but the court overruled the objection, and the bond and endorsement were read ; to which the plaintiffs excepted. And this being all the evidence and the only record produced, the court, “upon inspection of the record and the bond and endorsement thereon,” held, that there was such a record as that set forth in the defendants’ plea, and gave judgment for the defendants.
The relator, in the name of the plaintiffs, applied to this court for a supersedeas to the judgment; which was allowed.
May, for the plaintiffs, maintained, that the judgment was erroneous. He said, the record, namely, the entry on the minute book of the county court, of the 6th June 1831, was so imperfect, that it was utterly insufficient to ^sustain the allegations of the defendants’ plea. So far as anything could be understood from that entry, it was obvious, that of ten sureties in Williamson’s administration bond, Gowing alone had asked for relief, and that he asked for counter security for his own personal relief and indemnification, not for a new bond for the relief of all the sureties. It could not be supposed, that the county court intended to relieve ten sureties to an administration bond, of which the penalty was $50,000 dollars, and take Mayes alone as surety for the administrator, whose circumstances were regarded as doubtful, and thus to make themselves personally liable for taking inadequate security ; and this, upon a motion for counter security made by only one of the ten co-sureties. Nor did the record shew, as the plea alleged it did, that the county court required a new bond : it only shewed, that the administrator tendered Mayes as security, and that thereupon, namely, upon such tender of security, the court discharged Gowing, and Gowing alone, not his nine co-sureties.; an act which the county court could not lawfully do. And certainly, it did not appear by the record, that the new bond was given : the bond did not prove itself ; it was not a record, or a part of a record ; much less was the endorsement upon the bond, a matter of record. The circuit superior court erred in inspecting the bond and the endorsement.
Robinson, for the defendants, said, the distinction had long Since been established between the orders of a county court, which are drawn up in form by the clerk in his office, from short minutes of the proceedings taken in court, and those of a superior court, which are drawn up in due form during the term, read in open court, and signed next day by the judge : he referred to the opinion of Roane, J., in Cogbill v. Cogbill, 2 Hen. & Munf. 478. Thus, in Eubank v. Rail’s ex’or, 4 Heigh 317, the entry of the judgment of the county court on the minute book, was in these few words — “ Plea waived, *and judgment for specialty and costs yet the clerk, in extending the minutes and making up the record from them, was justified in entering judgment for the penalty of the specialty and. costs, to be discharged by the payment of the principal sum due with interest and costs. If, in such a case, an action of debt should be brought on the judgment, and the defendant should plead no such record, no one could imagine, that the brief entry on the minute book would be all that the court could look at, to ascertain what was the record : the court would inspect the declaration and the specialty in connexion with the entry on the minute book, and regard that as the judgment, which might have been properly extended as the judgment in the order book. The minute of a trial by jury and verdict, was often briefly thus — “A. B. v. C. D.— Jury, to wit, E. P. and others (naming them all): Verdict for plaintiff and judgment.” But this short entry was made complete, by taking the pleadings and verdict in connexion with the minute ; and, upon a plea of no such record, the court always ascertained from the whole taken together, what the record was. The minutes of the county courts never set out the proceedings in form or at large, and the papers to which each minute related must be referred to to ascertain the record ; otherwise, hardly any judgment of the county courts could be successfully pleaded as a record. So here, the court could only ascertain what the record was, by inspecting the entry of the 6th June 1831, and the bond of the same date, and viewing the bond in con-nexion with the entry. Whatever the clerk, taking this entry on the minute book and the bond for his guide, might have properly entered in his order book, that must be regarded by the court as the record of the proceeding. And from the minute and the bond, the clerk might and ought to have made a full and formal entry on his order book, to this effect — “Benjamin Gowing, one of the sureties for Jesse Williamson administrator *of G. M. Williamson, conceiving himself in danger of suffering thereby and petitioning the court for relief, and the said administrator appearing in court, and acknowledging that he has been duly summoned, the court, after hearing the parties, doth order, that the said administrator execute a new bond with good security, for the faithful discharge of his duties : whereupon the said Jesse Williamson executed a new bond accordingly, with Joel Mayes his surety, conditioned as the law directs.” And taking such to be the record, there is no difficulty in the case. He said, the statute did not require, that all the sureties must petition for relief, in order to authorize the court to order a new bond, or provide that in case one of several sureties asked relief, the court should only order counter security : whether all the sureties apprehended danger, or only one, the character of the petition, and the summons, were exactly the same ; and it was only when the court made its order, that the case took one direction or the other. The court was authorized, upon the petition of one, as well as upon that of all, the sureties, to order the administrator, either to give counter security, or to give a new bond, as in its discretion the one or the other should be deemed most proper. The only question, then, is whether the court did, in this case, order the administrator to execute a new bond ? That it did so, was ascertained from the bond itself (which is in form the new bond prescribed by the statute) taken in pursuance of the order entered on the minute book. Even the minute, brief as it was, expressly “dismissed Gowing' from further securityshipwhich he could not have been, unless a new bond had been required and taken ; for if counter security only had been directed, Gowing’s suretyship must still have continued, though he would have been indemnified against it. But a new bond having been ordered and executed, the statute provided, that it should have the effect of discharging, not only the surety *Gow-ing, but all the sureties in the former administration bond. The fact that Mayes alone was taken as surety to the new bond, afforded no argument, that a new bond was not intended, and the ten sureties in the former bond discharged : for it must be supposed, that the county court was satisfied with Mayes’s sufficiency, and for ought that appeared, he might have been equal to the whole ten sureties for whom he was substituted.
May, in reply, said, that if anything could be understood, with certainty, from the entry on the minute book, it was that Gow-ing’s motion was for counter security ; and it could not be presumed, that the administrator Williamson tendered, or that the court ordered, more than was asked. The cases cited for the defendants shewed, that the minutes of the county court, which the law required to be read and signed in open court, were the true record. The entries on the minute book need not be written out at large and in form ; yet they must be full enough, either in themselves or in connexion. with something expressly referred to in them, to leave no doubt as to the meaning and extent of the judgment or order to be entered in the order book. In this case, no summons was exhibited, no petition appeared, (and, doubtless, there were none in fact,) from which it might be inferred, that Gowing called for, or Williamson consented to give, or the court ordered, a new bond. On the contrary, all that could be inferred from this singular entry, was that Gowing wanted counter security and Williamson consented to give it; and the mode of effecting the object was left to an unskilful clerk. The court made no order whatever, except that Gowing should be dismissed from his suretyship ; it did not order, that any bond should be taken ; nor did it appear by the record, that any bond was in fact taken: a ne.w administration bond, or a bond for 'counter security, or any other form of bond whatever, would have equally satisfied every description and requisition contained in this entry : nay, *the veriest forgery might as well have been exhibited as part of the record, as the bond which was produced. In Cogbill v. Cogbill, the court said that the orders signed by the judge are the records of a superior court, and could not be corrected by the minutes of the proceedings taken by the clerk ; but it was intimated, that the rule in respect to the records of a county court would be different. Accordingly, in Eubank v. Rail’s ex’or, it was held, that the minutes of the county court, signed by the presiding justice, were the true record ; and that an order entered on the order book otherwise than in conformity with the entry on the minute book, was naught. There, the judgment entered on the minute book, was for “ the specialty and costs and the clerk, in extending this judgment in the order book, entered a judgment different from the legal construction and effect of “ the specialty:” and this was held to be a clerical mistake, which, therefore, might be amended by the court at a subsequent term ; amended by the entry on the minute book, which was the record of the judgment. In, that case, “ the specialty ” was referred to in the minute, and so furnished a certain guide for entering up the judgment at length in the order book : here nothing was referred to, nothing of the nature of a bond was mentioned, in the minute : nothing of that kind was or could be entered in the order book, or could now be intended.
Administration Bond — New Bond — Principal Case Distinguished. — In Beery v. Homan, 8 Gratt. 53, the court said: “By the condition of the bond it appears that the said Rader was required to execute a new bond, and in pursuance thereof executed the bond in the bill and proceedings mentioned, and this distinguishes the present from the case of Greenesville Justices v. Williamson, 12 Leigh, 93."
See monographic note, on “executors and Administrators" appended to Rosser v. Depriest, 5 Gratt. 6.
The statute 1 Rev. Code, ch. 104, § 38, provides, that “when securities for executors, or administrators, or their representatives, conceive themselves in dangrer of suffering thereby, and petition the court for relief, the court shall summon the executor or administrator, and shall have full power to order, either that the said executor or administrator shall give good counter security, or that he shall execute a new bond with good security, in a penalty not less than the penalty of the first bond executed by him, for the faithful discharge of his duties, and payable in like manner to the judge or judges or the sitting justices. Such new bond shall have relation back to the time of granting probat or letters of administration, and shall be as effectual in every respect as if it had been executed before such letters of probat had been granted. The condition thereof shall be as follows” — and then the statute prescribes the form of the condition of the new bond, when such shall be required; which form was followed in the condition of the new bond taken in this case, except only that Williamson was twice styled executor instead of administrator.
§ 39 provides that “upon the execution of such new bond with security payable and conditioned as aforesaid, all the securities to the former bond, and their legal representatives, shall be forthwith discharged from the obligation thereof, except only as to such matters for which an action on the said bond may then be depending against such securities, or their representatives, or against any of them, and may be prosecuted to a judgment or decree.” — “If the court shall order counter security to be given, the bond shall be in a penalty equal to the penalty of the first bond, shall be made payable to the person petitioning for relief, and shall be conditioned for his entire indemnity against any loss or injury already sustained, or which may hereafter be sustained, in consequence of the execution of the first bond.” The bond in the present case, was not a bond for counter security made payable to Gowing the surety who petitioned or moved for relief, and conditioned for his indemnity, but a new bond made payable to the justices of the county court sitting at the time the new bond was taken. — Note in Original Edition.

Opinion:
TUCKER, P.
I am of opinion, that this judgment is erroneous.
The plea to the action was of a matter of record, and the plaintiffs' replication was nul tiel record. The matter pleaded was an order of Greenesville county court ; and it would seem that the record itself and not an exemplification of it was produced in support of the plea. The entry in the minute book of the county court, was in this form [here the judge stated the entry of the 6th June '1831]. A bond was also produced, executed by *Williamson the administrator and Joel Mayes, which is in the form prescribed by the statute, where, instead of counter security, a new bond is required to be given. But it no wise appears, that this bond was part of the record, nor does the minute state that the bond was entered into at all, much more, that it was entered into before the court, as is usual in such cases. Such being the state of the case, it devolves upon us to enquire, whether this minute could be extended into the form set forth in the plea ? Eor such is the character of the proceedings of the county courts and such often the looseness of their entries, that we are, on the one hand, compelled to look to the short entry or minute as the true record, and, on the other, to consider it as if expanded into that form which the minute will justify. In this case, then, there must be enough in the minute itself, aided by the papers in the cause, if there were any, to authorize its expansion into the form set forth in the plea ; or the replication of nul tiel record must be sustained. We are not at liberty to guess or infer ourselves, nor would the clerk have been at liberty to have supplied any thing by his recollection ; for if this werq permitted, then upon his death or removal, his successor would be disabled to make up the record rightly.
If this proposition be true, the evidence produced shews no such record of Greenes-ville county court as is described in the plea. The minute was of a motion ; the plea sets forth a petition'alleging various matters. The motion was for counter security ; the plea sets forth a petition, in general terms, for relief. The motion was against George M. Williamson's administrator (without naming him); the plea recites a petition setting forth, that the petition was hound for Jesse Williamson, administrator &c. The record states, that the defendant appeared and tendered security, but does not set forth any bond either required or given ; the plea states, that Williamson was required to give a new bond, which he '*did accordingly with Mayes as surety, in open court, and which bond was executed and conditioned as the law directs. The record states, that it was ordered that Cowing be dismissed from farther securityship ; the plea states no such thing, as forming part of the judgment, but alleges the discharge of all the sureties, as arising from operation of law. These variances are, X think, fatal to the plea.
If there was a petition, why was it not produced? If there was none, was there any thing in the minute, to justify the allegation of the plea that there was one? If there was an order requiring a new bond, where is it? If there was none, is there any thing in the minute from whence it can be seen that a new bond, and not a counter bond, was required? If it was a counter bond, then the plaintiffs' action is not affected by it. Now, can we infer from the entry, that the "defendant appeared and tendered security," that the bond, if given, was not a counter bond ? Nay more: Are we justified in inferring, that any bond was given, merely because security was tendered? Do we see, that it was even accepted? It was said, this might fairly have been inferred from the entry, that Gowing should be dismissed from further securityship. But, besides that this is no part of the record as set forth in the plea, and that it was moreover unnecessary, it seems to me to be going too far to infer the execution of a bond from this loose expression. It was argued, however, that the bond of June 6, 1831 is part of the record, and that from that all else may be inferred. I cannot think the bond a part of the record. Nothing is said of a bond in the minute; and whether there was one or not, could only be supplied by the recollection of the clerk, or the testimony of witnesses; neither of which could make it a record.
I am therefore of opinion that the plaintiffs should have had judgment. Nor will the defendants be without redress; since they may, I presume, seek indemnity *by a suit on the bond of the 6th June 1831, in which Mayes was bound as surety for Williamson's faithful administration of his intestate's estate.
BROOKE, CABEND and STANARD, J., concurred with the president, that the judgment should be reversed, and judgment entered for the plaintiffs.