Case Name: Dorothy BAIONE, as Personal Representative for the Estate of Nickolas Baione, Deceased, Appellant, v. OWENS-ILLINOIS, INC., an Ohio Corporation, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1992-05-20
Citations: 599 So. 2d 1377
Docket Number: No. 90-00959
Parties: Dorothy BAIONE, as Personal Representative for the Estate of Nickolas Baione, Deceased, Appellant, v. OWENS-ILLINOIS, INC., an Ohio Corporation, Appellee.
Judges: ALTENBERND, J., concurs specially with an opinion, in which HALL, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 599
Pages: 1377–1380

Head Matter:
Dorothy BAIONE, as Personal Representative for the Estate of Nickolas Baione, Deceased, Appellant, v. OWENS-ILLINOIS, INC., an Ohio Corporation, Appellee.
No. 90-00959.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
May 20, 1992.
Rehearing Denied June 23, 1992.
John F. Venable, Tampa, for appellant.
Henry W. Jewett, II, and Robert A. Hannah of Hannah, Marsee, Beik & Voght, P.A., Orlando, for appellee.

Opinion:
PATTERSON, Judge.
This appeal concerning asbestos litigation arises from a defense verdict in favor of the appellee. The appellant argues that the trial court erred in dismissing her causes of action sounding in strict liability and in striking her claim for punitive damages. We agree and reverse.
The appellee is the manufacturer of Kay-lo, a product containing asbestos. The decedent, Nickolas Baione, was a boiler tender on United States Navy ships between 1946 and 1953 and, in this capacity, was exposed to products containing asbestos. He thereafter contracted mesothelio-ma, an asbestos-induced form of cancer, and died.
This case began as a personal injury action instituted by Baione and his wife, Dorothy. Baione's death occurred during the course of litigation and the action was amended to one of wrongful death brought by Dorothy as the personal representative of Baione's estate. The appellant's first amended complaint sought recovery on three theories: negligence, breach of implied warranty of merchantability, and strict liability. Strict liability was pled in two counts, one asserting that the product was "deleterious, poisonous, and highly harmful" and the other additionally asserting that the product failed to carry an adequate warning of its dangerous nature. On pretrial motion of the ap-pellee, the trial court dismissed the counts of breach of warranty and strict liability. In regard to the strict liability counts, the trial judge apparently concluded that those theories were a duplication of the negligent failure-to-warn count and were therefore improper.
The doctrine of strict liability is a recognized cause of action in this state. West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So.2d 80 (Fla.1976). When a set of facts will support both a theory of common láw negligence and strict liability, a plaintiff is entitled to proceed on either theory or both. Ford Motor Co. v. Hill, 404 So.2d 1049 (Fla.1981). Injury or death from exposure to a product containing asbestos clearly falls within this category of cases. See Carlson v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 693 F.Supp. 1073 (S.D.Fla.1987). Thus, it was error to dismiss the counts of the first amended complaint sounding in strict liability during the pleading stage of this case.
On the issue of punitive damages, the trial court granted the appellee's motion to strike punitive damages for the reason "that the defendant, Owens-Illinois, Inc., has previously had punitive damages assessed against them in other cases." We know of no authority which would support the striking of a claim for punitive damages, as a matter of law, for this sole-stated reason. To the contrary, punitive damages are appropriate in asbestos litigation and the trial court's reason, if relevant at all, would be an issue of mitigation to be considered by the trier of fact. See Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. Janssens, 463 So.2d 242 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), review denied, 467 So.2d 999 (Fla.1985).
We, therefore, reverse the final judgment, reinstate counts three and four of the first amended complaint, together with the claim for punitive damages, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
In that the appellant suffered an adverse verdict on the theory of common law negligence and has not appealed that determination, the appellant is not entitled to retrial on the negligence count of the amended complaint.
ALTENBERND, J., concurs specially with an opinion, in which HALL, J., concurs.
. The appellant does not contest the dismissal of the breach of warranty count.