Case Name: WILLIE THOMASON v. BALLARD & BALLARD COMPANY
Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
Jurisdiction: North Carolina
Decision Date: 1935-03-20
Citations: 208 N.C. 1
Docket Number: 
Parties: WILLIE THOMASON v. BALLARD & BALLARD COMPANY.
Judges: 
Reporter: North Carolina Reports
Volume: 208
Pages: 1–7

Head Matter:
WILLIE THOMASON v. BALLARD & BALLARD COMPANY.
(Filed 20 March, 1935.)
1. Trial D e — Voluntary nonsuit on cause of action based on negligence held admission for purpose of trial that defendant was not negligent.
Plaintiff sued the manufacturer for alleged negligence in the preparation of a sack of flour sold by the manufacturer to a retailer and purchased from the retailer by plaintiff, and for breach of implied warranty that the flour was wholesome and fit for human consumption, plaintiff alleging damage from a foreign and deleterious substance in the flour. Upon the trial plaintiff took a voluntary nonsuit on his first cause of action. Held,: The voluntary nonsuit was an admission, at least for the purpose of trial, that defendant'was not guilty of negligence in the manufacture or packing of the flour.
2. Food A a — There is no implied warranty on part of manufacturer to consumer that food is wholesome and fit for human consumption.
As between the manufacturer and the ultimate consumer, there is no implied warranty that food prepared and sold by the manufacturer to a retailer and purchased from the retailer by the consumer, is wholesome and fit for human consumption, there being no contractual relation between the manufacturer and the ultimate consumer to which such warranty could attach, and in an action by the ultimate consumer against the manufacturer, based upon such implied warranty, the manufacturer’s motion to nonsuit should be allowed.
ClaeksoN, J., dissenting.
Appeal by defendant from Clamant, J., at May Term, 1934, of DavidsoN.
Reversed.
This is an action to recover damages for personal injuries suffered by the plaintiff, and resulting from sickness caused by his eating bread made from flour which he had purchased from the City Grocery Company, at Lexington, N. C., on 22 July, 1933.
It is alleged in the complaint that the flour, from which the bread which the plaintiff ate was made, was manufactured by the defendant at Louisville, Kentucky, and was packed by the defendant in a sack, which was fastened at its top by a wire, before it was sold and shipped to the City Grocery Company at Lexington, N. O.; that after the flour was purchased by the plaintiff from the City Grocery Company, it was delivered at plaintiff’s home in Davidson County, North Carolina, in the sack in which it was packed by the defendant in Louisville, Ky.; that the flour was poured from the sack by the plaintiff’s wife into a bin in his kitchen cabinet and was used by her in making bread for plaintiff and his family; that after he had eaten the bread made from the flour, the plaintiff became sick, and that this sickness was caused by the unwholesome condition of the flour; and that when about half the flour in the bin had been used for making bread, the decomposed and putrid body of a dead rat was discovered in the flour, and that because of the presence of the body of the rat in the flour, the flour was unwholesome and unfit for use as a food.
Two causes of action are alleged in the complaint.
As his first cause of a,ction, the plaintiff alleges that at the time the sack of flour which he purchased from the City Grocery Company was sold and shipped by the defendant to said grocery company, the body of the rat was in said flour, and that its presence in the flour was the result of the negligence of the defendant, as alleged in the complaint.
As his second cause of action, the plaintiff alleges that when the defendant sold and delivered the sack of flour to the City Grocery Company, for resale to its customers, it impliedly warranted that the flour in said sack was wholesome, and fit for human consumption; that this implied warranty was made by the defendant to customers of the City Grocery Company; and that there was a breach of said implied warranty, which caused plaintiff personal injuries for which he is entitled to recover of the defendant damages for the injuries which he suffered from eating bread made of said flour.
There was evidence at the trial tending to show that the dead body of the rat was in the sack of flour at the time it was sold by the defendant to the City Grocery Company; that the flour in the sack was unwholesome and not fit for human consumption, because of the presence in the flour of the dead body of the rat; and that plaintiff suffered personal injuries caused by his eating bread made from this flour.
At tbe close of tbe evidence for tbe plaintiff, tbe plaintiff took a voluntary nonsuit on bis first cause of action, and resisted tbe motion of tbe defendant for judgment as of nonsuit on bis second cause of action. Tbe motion was denied, and defendant excepted.
Tbe defendant tben offered evidence tending to sbow tbat tbe body of tbe rat was not in tbe sack of flour at tbe time tbe flour was shipped by tbe defendant from Louisville, Ely., to tbe City Grocery Company at Lexington, N. C., and tbat tbe flour in tbe sack at said time was wholesome and fit for human consumption.
At tbe close of all tbe evidence tbe defendant again moved for judgment as of nonsuit. Tbe motion was denied, and defendant excepted.
Issues were submitted to tbe jury, and answered as follows:
“1. Was tbe flour purchased by tbe plaintiff of tbe City Grocery Company on or about 22 July, 1933, manufactured by tbe defendant, as alleged in tbe complaint? Answer: 'Yes.’
“2. Was there an implied warranty by tbe defendant tbat tbe flour manufactured by it was fit for human consumption, as alleged in tbe complaint? Answer: 'Yes.’
“3. If so, was there a breach of said warranty? Answer: 'Yes.’
“4. What damages, if any, has tbe plaintiff sustained because of tbe breach of tbe said warranty? Answer: '$175.00.’ ”
From judgment tbat plaintiff recover of tbe defendant tbe sum of $175.00, and tbe costs of tbe action, tbe defendant appealed to tbe Supreme Court. •
Don A. Walser and Phillips & Bower for plaintiff.
Sapp & Sapp for defendant.

Opinion:
CoNNOR, J.
Tbe only question presented by this appeal is whether there was error in tbe refusal of tbe trial court to allow defendant's motion, at tbe close of all tbe evidence, for judgment as of nonsuit.
During tbe progress of tbe trial tbe plaintiff took a voluntary nonsuit on bis first cause of action. He thereby abandoned bis contention tbat tbe defendant was negligent with respect to tbe manufacture or packing of tbe flour which be bad purchased from tbe City Grocery Company. His contention thereafter was tbat tbe defendant was liable to him, as tbe consumer of the flour, on an implied warranty tbat tbe flour was wholesome and fit for consumption as a food, at tbe time tbe defendant sold and delivered tbe flour to tbe City Grocery Company. This was, in effect, an admission by tbe plaintiff, at least for tbe purposes of tbe trial of this action, tbat tbe presence of tbe rat in tbe sack of flour was not tbe result of any failure on tbe part of tbe defendant to exercise due care in tbe manufacture or packing of tbe flour from which tbe bread which be ate was made.
There are decisions in this jurisdiction to the effect that as between a vendor and his vendee there is an implied warranty that the personal property sold by the vendor and purchased by his vendee was fit for the use for which it was sold and purchased, and that the vendor is liable to his vendee for a breach of this warranty. Swift v. Aydlett, 192 N. C., 330, 135 S. E., 141; Poovey v. Sugar Co., 191 N. C., 122, 133 S. E., 12; Swift v. Etheridge, 190 N. C., 162, 129 S. E., 453.
There are no decisions, however, in this jurisdiction to the effect that there is any implied warranty as between a manufacturer and an ultimate consumer of a food product, which was purchased by the consumer from a retail merchant to whom the manufacturer had sold the food, for resale. It is true that in Ward v. Sea Food Co., 171 N. C., 33, 87 S. E., 958, it is said that the authorities are numerous, that there is an implied warranty that runs with the sale of food for human consumption, that it is fit for food and is not dangerous and deleterious. In that case, however, the defendant was held liable to the plaintiff upon the finding by the jury that the death of plaintiff's intestate was brought about by the negligence of the defendant with respect to food which the defendant had sold to the retail merchant from whom plaintiff's intestate had bought the food.
In Corum v. Tobacco Co., 205 N. C., 213, 171 S. E., 78, it is said:
"There are many decisions to the effect that one who prepares in bottles or packages foods, medicines, drugs, or beverages and puts them on the market is charged with the duty of exercising due care in the preparation'of these commodities, and under certain circumstances may be liable in damages to the ultimate consumer. Broadway v. Grimes, 204 N. C., 623, 169 S. E., 194; Broom v. Bottling Co., 200 N. C., 55, 156 S. E., 152; Harper v. Bullock, 198 N. C., 448, 152 S. E., 405; Grant v. Bottling Co., 176 N. C., 256, 97 S. E., 27; Cashwell v. Bottling Works, 174 N. C., 324, 93 S. E., 901."
In the absence of allegation and proof of negligence on his part with respect to the manufacture or preparation of a food product, the manufacturer is not liable as upon an implied warranty to an ultimate consumer for damages resulting from injuries caused by the condition of the food, which the consumer has purchased from a retail merchant to whom the manufacturer sold the food for resale. There is no contractual relation between the manufacturer and the consumer to which an implied warranty with respect to the food can attach. The manufacturer owes the duty of exercising a high degree of care in the manufacture and preparation of food for human consumption, and for a breach of this duty he may and should be held liable to the consumer. The law does not, however, make him an insurer of his products, or hold him liable solely upon an implied warranty to one with whom he had no contractual relation.
There was error in the refusal of the trial court to allow defendant's motion for judgment as of nonsuit.
The judgment is
Reversed.