Case Name: Larry E. WRIGHT, Appellee, v. ARKANSAS ACTIVITIES ASSOCIATION (AAA), Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1974-07-16
Citations: 501 F.2d 25
Docket Number: No. 73-1655
Parties: Larry E. WRIGHT, Appellee, v. ARKANSAS ACTIVITIES ASSOCIATION (AAA), Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 501
Pages: 25–31

Head Matter:
Larry E. WRIGHT, Appellee, v. ARKANSAS ACTIVITIES ASSOCIATION (AAA), Appellant.
No. 73-1655.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted Jan. 17, 1974.
Decided July 16, 1974.
Eugene R. Warren, Little Rock, Ark., for appellant.
Robert M. Ford, Killough & Ford, Wynne, Ark., for appellee.
Before MEHAFFY, Chief Judge, and LAY and ROSS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
LAY, Circuit Judge.
Larry E. Wright, a teacher and coach at the Blytheville, Arkansas, Senior High School, brought this action against the Arkansas Activities Association (AAA), challenging a disciplinary ruling of the Executive Committee of the AAA.
The AAA is a voluntary association, the membership of which consists of public and parochial schools in Arkansas which maintain competitive athletic programs. The disciplinary ruling grew out of "off-season" football practices conducted at Blytheville in violation of AAA regulations. The challenged ruling placed Blytheville High School on probation for one year conditioned upon the school's not employing Wright as head football coach for the 1973-74 school year. Blytheville was notified that if it failed to accept the terms of the probation, it would not be allowed to participate in football games with other member schools. Wright was accordingly requested to resign from his $11,994.-93 per year coaching and teaching position with the school.
The district court held that the AAA's "off-season" football practice regulation did not give Wright fair notice of the possible sanction for its violation, i. e., the impairment of his employment contract as a teacher and coach. In view of Wright's property interest, the district court held the particular regulation upon which the penalty was based overly broad and unconstitutional. Jurisdiction was found to exist under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We affirm the judgment of the district court.
At oral argument before this court, the AAA challenged the finding of jurisdiction under § 1983 in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Ke-nosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 93 S.Ct. 2222, 37 L.Ed.2d 109 (1973). In reliance on the holding of Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), that municipalities are not "persons" under § 1983 for purposes of damage suits, the Court in Bruno concluded that the generic word "person" was not "intended to have a bifurcated application to municipal corporations depending on the nature of the relief sought against them." Bruno, supra at 513, 93 S.Ct. at 2226. Thus, the Court held that municipal corporations are not "persons" for purposes of equitable relief under § 1983.
It is now urged by the Activities Association that it should enjoy the same immunity granted to municipal corporations and other political subdivisions, and therefore that it is not amenable to suit under § 1983. The district court recognized that the State of Arkansas and its regularly constituted agencies are not subject to suit. It concluded, however, that the AAA is not a "regularly constituted agency." The trial judge wrote:
The Court finds that the Association was not created by the Constitution or by any statute of the State of Arkansas, and that it is not "the State" or an '(agency of the State" as are agencies like the Arkansas State Highway Department, or the Arkansas Game & Fish Commission, or other administrative or regulatory agencies of a similar nature. Rather, the Association is a regulatory agency established and supported by local school systems in the State on a voluntary basis. Thus, it is not immune from suit, and any decree that may be entered against it will operate upon its Executive Committee and Executive Director.
We find the district court's characterization of the AAA correct and therefore conclude that the Association does qualify as a "person" under § 1983 and jurisdiction is vested under § 1343(3) as alleged. However, assuming this conclusion wrong and that the AAA is a political subdivision of the state as it is urged, nevertheless, under the complaint filed, the defendant would still be subject to the equitable decree of the federal court since jurisdiction can be found under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a).
The AAA's original ruling specifically directed that Blytheville High School suspend Wright from his coaching position for one year. It later revised its order and gave the school district the choice of suspension or probation conditioned on Wright's dismissal. Regardless of the formal phraseology of its order, it is clear that the AAA's action was directed against Wright personally and sought his dismissal from the position of teacher-coach at Blythe-ville High School. The charges were directed against Wright; notice was given to him personally and he was accorded a hearing before the Committee. There can be little argument that the Executive Committee's main purpose was to take punitive action against Wright. Whether the AAA acted directly or indirectly against Wright, has little rele-vanee under the circumstances. Its stranglehold over the school district caused the latter to terminate Wright's contract. If that termination was the result of coercion improperly applied by the AAA, the AAA is guilty of a wrongful interference with Wright's coaching contract and the latter has standing to sue for vindication of his injury.
This brings us to the fundamental question of whether the conduct of the AAA denied Wright due process of law. Wright was found to have violated the "off-season" practice rule, found in Article VII of the Association By-Laws. Article VII prescribes no penalty or sanction for a violation of its terms. The AAA relied, however, on § 22 of Article I to impose the penalty against Wright. The difficulty posed is that Article I deals exclusively with the subject of player eligibility. Under the circumstances, the district court found that Wright could not know that the sanctions existing under § 22 of Article I could be invoked against him for a violation of Article VII.
One of the fundamental requirements of fairness implicit within due process is "warning . in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed." McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27, 51 S.Ct. 340, 75 L.Ed. 816 (1931) (per Justice Holmes). Legal notice to those affected has always been a prerequisite to lawful punitive action. Cf. Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 375, 93 S.Ct. 1652, 36 L.Ed.2d 318 (1973); Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 353 n. 4, 84 S.Ct. 1697, 12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964).
In the present case Wright was given notice by the AAA rules that a member school was prohibited from engaging in football practice before a specific date each year. However, there was no warning that the AAA could decree punitive sanctions directly affecting his contract of employment if that rule was broken. We agree with the district court that the attempt by the Association's Executive Committee to punish Wright without fair notice that his employment contract could be coercively terminated if he violated the AAA's rules was fundamentally wrong. Wright's employment was and must continue to be a matter of concern solely between him and his school. Even though it might be argued that Wright had fair notice that certain conduct was prohibited and that it might subject the school to punitive sanctions, there has been no showing that he had notice the AAA could directly or indirectly punish him personally. The regulation itself must provide specific notice; its scope cannot depend upon the subjective appraisals of those involved. Bouie v. City of Columbia, supra at 355-356 n. 5, 84 S.Ct. 1697.
To require the AAA to specify that it will seek suspension and punishment, not only of the school, but of those personally involved in rule violations, is not an undue burden. Without such specificity the possibilities of arbitrary action are enhanced and harm to individual interests would undoubtedly follow. To allow the AAA the power to invoke such penalties against whomever it chooses is contrary to our basic sense of justice.
We affirm the judgment of the district court.
. Although no tenure is afforded a teacher in the Arkansas school systems, at the time of the sanction in question Wright had already been awarded his 1973-74 contract with the Blytheville school district.
. Although the AAA does not enjoy immunity, the district court found the requisite state action under § 1983, observing:
While the Association is not a State agency that is immune from suit, it ap pears to be established, nevertheless, that the actions of athletic associations like the one before the Court in regulating public school athletic activities and imposing sanctions for rule violations are State actions and fall within section 1983 where they violate federally protected rights.
We agree. See generally Brenden v. Independent School Dist. 742, 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973).
. Although § 1331(a) was not specifically pleaded in the complaint, a review of the operative facts reveals that a federal constitutional question exists and that the amount in controversy exceeds $10,000. As we held in State Highway Commission v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1973) :
[T]here is no need for this court to remand in order to amend the pleadings to specifically allege 1331(a) as a basis of jurisdiction. See Norton v. Larney, 266 U.S. 511, 516, 45 S.Ct. 145, 69 L.Ed. 413 (1925). We can assume that the complaint has been amended to conform to this fact and proceed to review the district court's judgment on the merits. See also National Farmers Union Property & Casualty Co. v. Fisher, 284 F.2d 421, 423 (8 Cir. 1960) ; Parker v. Gordon, 178 F.2d 888, 890 n. 2 (1 Cir. 1949).
State Highway Commission, supra at 1105-1106.
. Section 22 provides:
Penalties. If the rules and regulations of this Association are violated, the Executive Director shall make careful investigation of the violation and shall take action in accordance with the Constitution and By-Laws of the Association. Where no penalty is specifically provided, he may fix a penalty subject to the approval of the Executive Committee.
. The district court in Kelley v. Metropolitan County Bd. of Education, 293 F.Supp. 485 (M.D.Tenn.1968), recognized the same principle on facts somewhat similar to those presented here. Students in a Nashville high school challenged the suspension of that school's athletic program for one year by the board of education. Several students had created disturbances at a basketball game in which their school had been a participant. In response to this misconduct, the board suspended that school from all athletic competition. The court found that the suspension violated due process since neither the standard of conduct expected nor the punishment to be imposed for a violation were specified.
. Even in the absence of state action, it has long been held that a member in a voluntary association cannot be suspended or subjected to expulsion unless the by-laws specifically give him notice that certain conduct will subject him to punitive sanctions. See, e. g., Allen v. Office Employees International Union, 53 Wash.2d 1, 329 P.2d 205 (1958) ; Jackson v. American Yorkshire Club, 340 F.Supp. 628 (N.D.Iowa 1971) ; Robinson v. Lull, 145 F.Supp. 134 (N.D.Ill.1956). When the association attempts without notice to inflict coercive sanctions on a non-member of the group, the arbitrariness of the punishment is plain.
. Without warning to those against whom its sanctions will run, the AAA would have power to suspend not only those who participate in the wrongful conduct, but others who might be blameless as well, i. e., students, teachers, principals and other school officials.