Case Name: STRIBLING, Appellant, v. ROGUE AIR APPLICATORS, INC., et al, Respondents
Court: Oregon Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1990-03-14
Citations: 100 Or. App. 747
Docket Number: 87-2658-J-1; CA A50322
Parties: STRIBLING, Appellant, v. ROGUE AIR APPLICATORS, INC., et al, Respondents.
Judges: Before Graber, Presiding Judge, and Riggs and Edmonds, Judges.
Reporter: Oregon Reports, Court of Appeals
Volume: 100
Pages: 747–748

Head Matter:
Argued and submitted February 5,
reversed and remanded March 14, 1990
STRIBLING, Appellant, v. ROGUE AIR APPLICATORS, INC., et al, Respondents.
(87-2658-J-1; CA A50322)
788 P2d 495
William S. Dames, Medford, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was Dames & Dames, Med-ford.
Robert J. Ericsson, Portland, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Timothy J. Zimmerman, Portland, and Martin, Bischoff, Templeton, Ericsson & Langslet, Portland.
Before Graber, Presiding Judge, and Riggs and Edmonds, Judges.
PER CURIAM

Opinion:
PER CURIAM
In the process of crop dusting a neighboring farm in 1987, defendants flew near plaintiffs property, allegedly causing plaintiffs foxes to eat their young. Plaintiff filed this action, alleging that defendants were negligent. Plaintiff appeals from a summary judgment granted to defendants Rogue Air Applicators, Inc., and Conner. ORCP 47C. Plaintiff argues that a material issue of fact exists as to whether defendants had notice of the harm that could result from flying their airplane too near plaintiffs farm.
In opposition to defendants' motion for summary judgment, plaintiff averred that phone calls were made to defendants from 1982 to 1985, warning them of the danger to plaintiffs foxes. Plaintiff testified in a deposition that, when Conner was notified of the loss, he told plaintiff that he knew that plaintiff was raising foxes and had experienced a similar problem involving mink in Idaho.
There was evidence that the harm was foreseeable and there is a genuine issue of material fact whether defendants were negligent. See Docken v. Ciba-Geigy, 86 Or App 277, 281, 739 P2d 591, rev den 304 Or 405 (1987). The trial court erred in granting the summary judgment.
Reversed and remanded.
Melrose Orchards, Inc., was dismissed as a party to the appeal by stipulated motion.