Case Name: UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTY COMPANY, Appellant, v. Peggy CASCIO, Appellee
Court: Texas Courts of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1986-12-05
Citations: 723 S.W.2d 209
Docket Number: No. 05-85-01405-CV
Parties: UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTY COMPANY, Appellant, v. Peggy CASCIO, Appellee.
Judges: Before AKIN, DEVANY and McCLUNG, JJ.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 723
Pages: 209–212

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTY COMPANY, Appellant, v. Peggy CASCIO, Appellee.
No. 05-85-01405-CV.
Court of Appeals of Texas, Dallas.
Dec. 5, 1986.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 14, 1987.
Kevin J. Keith, Dallas, for appellant.
Alan Loewinsohn, Dallas, for appellee.
Before AKIN, DEVANY and McCLUNG, JJ.

Opinion:
DEVANY, Justice.
Peggy Cascio, appellee, sued Mary Neal, the alleged tortfeasor in this cause, for injuries sustained in an automobile collision. Cascio joined the United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company (USF & G), appellant, her insurance company, under the underinsured motorist provision of her policy. USF & G did not file an answer, allegedly because of improper service of citation. In the meantime, Cascio dismissed Mary Neal from the cause with prejudice in an order which reads in pertinent part:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED, that the Plaintiffs cause of action against Defendant MARY NEAL, is hereby dismissed with prejudice to the right to refile the same;
A default judgment was subsequently taken by Cascio against USF & G for $90,-000 by reason of USF & G's failure to file an answer. USF & G asserts five points of error, including one concerning improper service. However, its third point is disposi-tive of this appeal. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.
In its third point, USF & G contends that the trial court erred in granting the default judgment since the prior dismissal of the underinsured motorist, Mary Neal, precluded any recovery under the underinsured-motorist provision. We agree. By dismissing Mary Neal with prejudice, Cascio prevented herself from establishing that Mary Neal was liable and that Mary Neal was underinsured. Because Cascio failed to prove these facts at trial, she did not establish liability under her policy against USF & G.
The record does not indicate that dismissal of Mary Neal was with the consent of USF & G. The dismissal of Mary Neal destroyed the subrogation right that USF & G was entitled to under its insurance coverage of Cascio. Texas courts have consistently upheld the validity of the standard consent clause as a means of protecting the insurer's subrogation right against the uninsured and underinsured motorist or any other person legally responsible for the insured's injuries. Ford v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 550 S.W.2d 663, 665 (Tex.1977); McClelland v. United Services Automobile Association, 525 S.W.2d 271, 272 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1975, writ ref'd); Jessie v. Security Mutual Casualty Company, 488 S.W.2d 140, 142 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Grissom v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company, 476 S.W.2d 448, 453 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The subrogation right of the insurer would be waived only if the insurer unconditionally denied liability, but such a denial was not alleged or shown in this case. Ford v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 550 S.W.2d 663, 666 (Tex.1977).
Furthermore, the dismissal with prejudice of Mary Neal removes the predicate for recovery under the provisions of article 5.06-1 of the underinsured motorist coverage provisions of the Texas Insurance Code. That statute defines the term "underinsured motor vehicle" as an "insured motor vehicle on which there is valid and collectible liability insurance coverage" and specifically provides that:
The underinsured motorist coverage shall provide for payment to the insured of all sums which he shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from owners or operators of underinsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury or property damage in an amount up to the limit specified in the policy, reduced by the amount recovered or recoverable from the insurer of the underinsured motor vehicle.
TEX.INS.CODE ANN. art. 5.06-1 (Vernon 1981) (emphasis added).
Consequently, the prior dismissal with prejudice of Mary Neal removed any legal entitlement that Cascio had to recover against Mary Neal. Thus, any judgment against USF & G, for any sums Cascio "shall be legally entitled to recover" from the underinsured motorist, is no longer legally possible. Therefore, the default judgment was granted in error.
The dissent makes the error of treating this case as one of insufficiency of evidence. As we have pointed out, this is not an evidence insufficiency case. The facts alleged in the petition, together with the dismissal of the co-defendant, affirmatively show that there is no legal theory supporting recovery against USF & G. Further proceedings in this cause appear to be fruitless. Justice does not demand another trial, Cf. Kennedy v. American Nat. Ins. Co., 130 Tex. 155, 107 S.W.2d 364, 368 (1937), since there is no question of fact remaining. "When the judgment . of the court below shall be reversed, the court shall proceed to render such judgment . as the court below should have rendered, except when it is necessary to remand to the court below for further proceedings." TEX.R.APP.P. 81(c). No further proceedings being necessary, the judgment is reversed and rendered in favor of USF & G.
AKIN, J., dissents.