Case Name: Joseph Ricky BABINEAUX, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Divernia DOMINGUE, Neil Domingue, Wallace LeJeune d/b/a Wallace Le-Jeune Trucking Company, Shelter Insurance Company and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Defendants-Appellants
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1988-06-22
Citations: 529 So. 2d 45
Docket Number: No. 87-552
Parties: Joseph Ricky BABINEAUX, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Divernia DOMINGUE, Neil Domingue, Wallace LeJeune d/b/a Wallace Le-Jeune Trucking Company, Shelter Insurance Company and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Defendants-Appellants.
Judges: Before DOMENGEAUX, STOKER and KING, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 529
Pages: 45–52

Head Matter:
Joseph Ricky BABINEAUX, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Divernia DOMINGUE, Neil Domingue, Wallace LeJeune d/b/a Wallace Le-Jeune Trucking Company, Shelter Insurance Company and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Defendants-Appellants.
No. 87-552.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
June 22, 1988.
Ashy & Colvin, D. Warren Ashy, Lafayette, for plaintiff-appellee.
Cooper, Ortego & Woodruff, Calvin E. Woodruff, Jr., Abbeville, for defendants-appellants.
Before DOMENGEAUX, STOKER and KING, JJ.

Opinion:
DOMENGEAUX, Judge.
Joseph Ricky Babineaux commenced these proceedings to recover damages for the injuries he sustained as the result of an automobile accident which occurred on March 8, 1985. Babineaux named as the defendants: (1) Divemia Domingue, the uninsured driver of the automobile in which he was a guest passenger; (2) Neil Do-mingue, alleged to be the owner of the automobile which Divemia Domingue was driving; (3) Wallace LeJeune d/b/a Wallace LeJeune Tracking Company, (Le-Jeune), the driver of the vehicle which collided with the Domingue automobile; (4) Shelter Insurance Company, (Shelter), the liability insurer of LeJeune; and (5) State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm), the uninsured motorist insurer of Babineaux's father under which the plaintiff was also insured.
Prior to trial on the merits, this case was consolidated with: (1) Divernia Domingue, Et al. v. Wallace LeJeune d/b/a Wallace LeJeune Trucking, Et al., numbered by the Clerk of Court for the Fifteenth Judicial District: 55,350-D; and (2) Antoinette Boutee v. Wallace LeJeune d/b/a Wallace LeJeune Trucking Co., Et al., numbered: 55,357-G. The two above referenced cases have not, however, been appealed.
Babineaux, while riding as a guest passenger in a 1981 Pontiac automobile driven by Domingue, was injured when the Do-mingue vehicle collided with a 1972 International tractor trailer owned and driven by LeJeune. Subsequent to a trial by jury, a verdict was rendered finding substandard conduct on the part of Domingue and Le-Jeune and assessing their fault at ninety percent and ten percent, respectively. The jury determined the parties had been damaged in the following amounts: (1) Babi-neaux, $355,000.00; (2) Boutee, a plaintiff in one of the consolidated cases and also a guest passenger, $132,000.00; (3) Do-mingue, $22,500.00; and (4) LeJeune, $7,452.21.
Judgment was rendered in accordance with the decision of the jury reflecting the percentage of fault attributed to the defendants, and as pertains to the instant appeal, in favor of Babineaux and against LeJeune, Shelter, Divemia Domingue and State Farm, in solido. State Farm's liability was limited to $25,000.00, the extent of its uninsured motorist policy.
State Farm sought this appeal and contends that as an uninsured motorist insurer it should not be held solidarty liable with Domingue and LeJeune, the tortfeasors, and LeJeune's liability insurer, Shelter. State Farm maintains that Shelter provided LeJeune with $500,000.00 in liability insurance and, although Domingue was uninsured, the total liability exposure only amounts to $489,250.00, $10,750.00 less than the limits of the Shelter policy. The appellant further suggests that this Court's decision in Farnsworth v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 442 So.2d 1340 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1983), writ denied, 445 So.2d 452 (La.1984) should be reversed. We concluded, in Farnsworth, relying on the Louisiana Supreme Court decision of Hoefly v. Government Employees Insurance Company, 418 So.2d 575 (La.1982), that uninsured motorist carriers, tortfeasors and tortfeasors' liability insurers were solidary obligors in relation to plaintiffs and that as a result uninsured motorist carriers were "solidarily bound to recompense for the claims of an injured party just as though [they] were the tort-feasor's insurer" Farnsworth, supra, at 1345, quoting, Stroud v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 429 So.2d 492, 501 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1983), writ denied, 437 So.2d 1147 (La.1983). Subsequent to considerable deliberations on this matter, we believe we are constrained by Hoefly and must, therefore, permit the decision of the District Court to stand. The effect of the Hoefly decision may only be changed by resort to the Supreme Court or the Legislature.
The issue in Hoefly was "whether an automobile accident victim's uninsured motorist carrier [was] solidarily obligated with the tortfeasor so that the victim's timely suit against the latter interrupt[ed] prescription with regard to the insurer." Hoefly, supra, at 576. The Court held that since the tortfeasor and the uninsured motorist carrier were obligated for the same thing, the repair of the innocent automobile accident victim, they were solidary obligors and the Court, to quote Justice Blanche who dissented in Hoefly, thereby, "salvaged a particular plaintiff's claim from prescription." Carona v. State Farm Insurance Company, 458 So.2d 1275, 1280 (La.1984) (Blanche, J., concurring in the Carona result only). The Hoefly Court, although concluding that the object of La. R.S. 22:1406 (1950) (as amended), the uninsured motorist statute, was to promote full recovery by innocent automobile accident victims "by making uninsured motorist coverage available for their benefit as primary protection when the tortfeasor is without insurance and as additional or excess coverage when he is inadequately insured", held that the uninsured motorist statute should be liberally construed and that uninsured motorist carriers and tort-feasors were solidarily obligors. Hoefly, supra, at 578 (emphasis added). The Court was of the opinion that:
The uninsured motorist carrier [was] bound by the combined effect of the tort-feasor's wrongful act, the uninsured motorist statute, and the carrier's delivery or issuance for delivery of automobile liability insurance, while the tortfeasor [was] obligated merely because of his delict. Hoefly, supra, at 579.
Uninsured motorist insurance suggests by its very name that it was intended to protect innocent automobile accident victims only when tortfeasors are uninsured or inadequately insured. The statute has, however, been interpreted otherwise by Hoefly and its progeny. Carona, supra; Johnson v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Company, 425 So.2d 224 (La.1982); Harris v. Guitterez, 469 So.2d 1135 (La. App. 4th Cir.1985); Perrilloux v. Bowser, 483 So.2d 1135 (La.App. 5th Cir.1986). Accordingly, following the Hoefly decision, the judgment of the District Court must be affirmed. But see, W. McKenzie and H. Johnson, 15 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise § 134 (1986); McKenzie and Johnson, Insurance Law, 46 La.L.Rev. 475 (1986); Note, Obligations Uninsured Motorist And Insurer As Obligors In Solido, 58 Tul.R. Rev. 642 (1983).
For the above and foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
All costs of this appeal are assessed against State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company.
AFFIRMED.
STOKER, and KING, JJ., concur and assign written reasons.
. Although not cited as authority by either party on appeal, thoroughness mandates that we acknowledge and distinguish the case of Clement v. Trinity Universal Insurance Company of Kansas, Inc., 515 So.2d 651 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1987), writ denied, 519 So.2d 216 (La.1988). The issue in Clement was whether a UM carrier was entitled to a credit for sums paid the victim by a fully insured joint tortfeasor subsequent to receipt of compensation by the victims in excess of their stipulated damages. Clement is distinguishable from the instant case principally by the fact that the victims had been fully compensated. The risk that the victims would not have been fully compensated, had one or more of the solidarily bound tortfeasors proven to be insolvent, did not exist.
Keller v. Amedeo, 512 So.2d 385 (La.1987) cited by Clement as authority also merits our attention. Dicta in Keller suggets that a UM carrier might be entitled to a credit against a judgment in favor of its insured prior to the insured/victim being fully compensated. The credit in issue was for the full limits of a liability insurance policy against which the victim unknowingly relinquished her right to proceed. Keller is distinguishable from the instant case by the fact that the victim released the obligor in question. It is interesting to note and, we believe, nurtures unsettled questions that Hoefly and its progeny were not discussed.