Case Name: STATE of Florida ex rel. Hyman MARTIN, Petitioner, v. Allen B. MICHELL, Sheriff in and for Brow ard County, Florida, Respondent;Hyman MARTIN, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1966-07-13
Citations: 188 So. 2d 684
Docket Number: Nos. 642, 671
Parties: STATE of Florida ex rel. Hyman MARTIN, Petitioner, v. Allen B. MICHELL, Sheriff in and for Brow ard County, Florida, Respondent. Hyman MARTIN, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
Judges: ANDREWS, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 188
Pages: 684–690

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida ex rel. Hyman MARTIN, Petitioner, v. Allen B. MICHELL, Sheriff in and for Brow ard County, Florida, Respondent. Hyman MARTIN, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
Nos. 642, 671.
District Court of Appeal of Florida. Fourth District.
July 13, 1966.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 2, 1966.
Harold Ungerleider, Miami, for petitioner.
Earl Faircloth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and James T. Carlisle, Asst. Atty. Gen., Vero Beach, for respondent.

Opinion:
SMITH, Chief Judge.
In case No. 642, a petition for writ of habeas corpus, we issued an order to show cause. The respondent replied by a return suggesting to the court that the cause is now moot. The purpose of a habeas corpus proceeding is to inquire into the legality of the petitioner's present detention. Sneed v. Mayo, Fla.1953, 66 So. 2d 865, Fla.1954, 69 So.2d 653. Since the respondent no longer claims the right to detain the petitioner in his custody this cause is now moot. An appropriate order will be entered dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus. This leaves pending only the certiorari proceedings in case No. 671.
By his petition for writ of certiorari Hy-man Martin seeks an order of this court quashing an order of the circuit court denying Martin's motion to quash a subpoena directed to and served upon Martin.
Pursuant to a praecipe made and filed by the state attorney the clerk of the circuit court issued a grand jury subpoena in the name of the state directing the sheriffs of the state to summon Hyman Martin to appear before the Judge of the Circuit Court at the Courthouse in Fort Lauderdale on Wednesday, the 23d day of March, 1966, at 11 o'clock A.M., to testify and in truth to speak in behalf of the State of Florida in a certain matter before the grand jury impaneled and sworn to inquire in and for the body of Broward County. After service of the subpoena Martin moved the court to quash the subpoena upon many grounds all to the ultimate effect that the subpoena directed him to appear before some undesig-nated judge of the circuit court; that there was no presently existing grand jury organized, convened, impaneled or sworn, either when the subpoena was issued or when the subpoena was served or at the time of the filing of the motion to quash; and that the subpoena was procured to be issued by the state attorney without legal authority and contrary to law. The court denied the motion to quash.
At the hearing on the motion to quash it was established that the fall term of the Circuit Court for Broward County ended on March 7, 1966, at which time the grand jury for that term was discharged. The spring term of that court was attended by a judge of that court on the first day of that term on March 8, 1966, at which time the spring term began. A grand jury for the spring term was drawn and summoned but the grand jury had not been impaneled and the grand jurors had not been sworn. For convenience in terminology we will hereafter refer to this status as a grand jury not yet in existence. Such a grand jury may not, of course, perform any of the duties nor exercise any of the powers of a grand jury. It cannot be said therefore that the state attorney caused this subpoena to be issued to secure this witness to appear before that grand jury not yet in existence, as he is directed to do when "so required by the grand jury" pursuant to F.S.A. § 932.17. In the second part of F.S.A. § 27.04 the state's attorney is allowed the process of the circuit court to summon witnesses to appear before him to testify as to any violation of the criminal law. The subpoena here was not such a command to Martin.
A grand jury has a specially valued place in our system of jurisprudence. It is a common law institution which has no independent existence but is a part of and an adjunct to the court. It is one of the common law institutions specifically retained in our constitution. It occupies the rare status of being one of the few subjects on which the legislature is prohibited from passing local or special laws. The statutory law pertaining to a grand jury is scant, and it does not purport to limit or re strict the historic common law powers of a grand jury.
A state attorney is a constitutional officer. He has certain duties specifically prescribed by law. Among these are a mandatory duty of appearing in the circuit court within his judicial circuit and prosecuting or defending on behalf of the state all suits, applications or motions, civil or criminal, in which the state is a party. Whenever required by the grand jury the state attorney must attend them for the purpose of examining witnesses in their presence or of giving legal advice in any matter before them including preparation of bills of indictment. In addition, when required by the grand jury, he must issue subpoenas and other processes to secure witnesses. The state attorney is the prosecuting attorney in the circuit court within his judicial circuit and with respect to offenses tried in that court other than for a capital crime an information of the state attorney has the effect of an indictment by a grand jury. In addition to the statutory authority of the state attorney to summon witnesses to testify before him contained in the second part of F.S.A. § 27.04, that section provides: "The state attorney shall have summoned all witnesses required on behalf of the state; At common law it was the duty of the public prosecutor to prepare indictments and submit them together with the witnesses to the grand jury when organized. It was his duty to see that all supposed violations of law were punished, and the beginning of that process was the prosecutor preparing and bringing before the grand jury criminal charges that they might determine whether an indictment should be found or not. It was his duty prior to the organization of the grand jury to have a bill prepared and engrossed and to have the witnesses present to support it.
Both the grand jury and the state attorney are a vital part of the processes for the administration of justice. Their duties are closely interrelated. The statutes in prescribing some of the duties of grand jurors provide that they shall inquire into all indictable offenses triable within the county which are presented to them by the prosecuting attorney. The clerk of the court is required to issue a writ of subpoena directed to any person whose attendance is required as a witness in the court. The vigor .of the state attorney in the use of the processes of the court should be sustained and commended in all instances except where the rights of others are impaired or denied.
It is apparent from all of the foregoing that the constitution and statutes impose a duty upon the state attorney to prosecute in the circuit court any and all violations of the criminal laws of which that court has jurisdiction either upon his own information or upon indictment by the grand jury. If any indictment has not been found or any information filed for such an offense, then all indictable offenses triable within the county should be presented to the grand jury by the state attorney. Obviously, the state attorney can only present to the grand jury indictable offenses triable within the county through the process of subpoenaing and presenting witnesses before the grand jury, and it is therefore his duty. If the law imposes a duty upon an 'officer to accomplish a stated governmental purpose then the law also confers by implication every particular power necessary or proper for complete exercise or performance of the duty that is not in violation of law or public policy. In re Ad visory Opinion to the Governor, Fla. 1952, 60 So.2d 285. We know that if the subpoena process of a court commanding the appearance of a witness before a grand jury cannot be lawfully issued until after the grand jury has been impaneled and sworn there will be needless expense and waste of time. The grand jury would be ready for business but there would be no business because there would be no witnesses. We also judicially know that many of the circuit courts of this state have for a period of many years issued subpoenas at the request of the state attorney directed to witnesses to appear before a grand jury which is to be impaneled and sworn at the time the witness is directed to appear. While there is no statute that specifically provides by expressed terms that this may be done, nevertheless, the constitution and statutes imposing the various duties upon the courts, the grand jury and the state attorney also confer by implication the power to have such a subpoena issued and served. The power exists by the common law. None of the provisions of the constitution or statutes of this state or of the United States are inconsistent with that common law. Since there are no statutes specifically authorizing or prohibiting such a subpoena as was issued here, the statutes heretofore noted will not be construed to have changed the common law by implication because such a change by implication is neither necessary nor clearly required to give the expressed provisions of the statutes and the public policy thus established their full force. The issuance and service of the subpoena did not violate any of Martin's rights or any law or public policy. While the question appears to be one of first impression in this state we find comforting precedent for our position in O'Hair v. The People, 1889, 32 Ill.App. 277, the only decision that we find exactly on point. Other decisions on analogous or closely related points are United States v. Culver, D.C. Md. 1963, 224 F.Supp. 419, and United States v. Morton Salt Company, D.C. Minn. 1962, 216 F.Supp. 250.
In support of his contention that the subpoena was issued without authority of law and was therefore invalid and in rebuttal of the state's argument of implied power Martin relies primarily upon the decision in Ex parte Peart, 1935, 5 Cal.App.2d 469, 43 P.2d 334. That case was concerned with a statute very similar to F.S.A. § 932.-17; however, the court there noted that under the laws of California the duties of the prosecuting attorney were merely to attend upon and give advice to the grand jury and not to institute proceedings before it. As we have previously noted, the duties of a state attorney in Florida are not so limited.
Certiorari is denied.
ANDREWS, J., concurs.
WALDEN, J., concurs in Case No. 642 and dissents with opinion in Case No. 671.
. Section 10, Declaration of Rights, Constitution of Florida, F.S.A.
. Article III, Section 20, Constitution of Florida.
. State v. Clemmons, Fla.1963, 150 So.2d 231.
. Article Y, Section 6(6), Constitution of Florida.
. F.S.A. § 27.02.
. F.S.A. § 27.03.
. F.S.A. § 932.17.
. Section 10, Declaration of Rights, Constitution of Florida.
. F.S.A. § 905.16.
. F.S.A. § 90.11.
. F.S.A. § 2.01 specifically adopts the common and statute laws of England not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States and the laws of this state. Unless the statute is clear and explicit that it changes the common law, it will not be intended to change the law. Ellis v. Brown, Fla.1955, 77 So.2d 845.
. Dudley v. Harrison, McCready & Co., 1937, 127 Fla. 687, 173 So. 820 (rehearing denied, 128 Fla. 338, 174 So. 729).