Case Name: PEOPLE v. REID; PEOPLE v. JORDAN
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1984-12-28
Citations: 420 Mich. 326
Docket Number: Docket Nos. 67451, 68939
Parties: PEOPLE v REID PEOPLE v JORDAN
Judges: Williams, C.J., and Kavanagh and Brickley, JJ., concurred with Levin, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 420
Pages: 326–354

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v REID PEOPLE v JORDAN
Docket Nos. 67451, 68939.
Argued May 5, 1983
(Calendar Nos. 22, 23).
Decided December 28, 1984.
Released January 15, 1985.
Gregory Jordan and Allen Reid pled guilty in the Oakland Circuit Court, George H. LaPlata, J., of kidnapping, armed robbery, and first-degree criminal sexual conduct as part of an agreement reducing the number of charges against them and reserving their right to appeal the denial of their motion to suppress certain evidence. The Court of Appeals, M. F. Cavanagh, P.J., and Allen and J. H. Gillis, JJ., affirmed in a memorandum opinion in Jordan, holding that a conditional guilty plea is valid (Docket No. 49970). The Court of Appeals, Danhof, C.J., and Freeman, J. (M. F. Cavanagh, J., dissenting), reversed and remanded in Reid, ruling that a conditional guilty plea is invalid and that a defendant may not plead guilty and challenge the validity of a search warrant on appeal (Docket No. 51387). The defendant appeals in Jordan, and the people appeal in Reid. Both defendants assert that the trial court did not have the authority to accept conditional pleas and that their pleas were therefore not understanding and voluntary.
In an opinion by Justice Levin, joined by Chief Justice Williams and Justices Kavanagh and Brickley, the Supreme Court held:
A defendant in a criminal case who pleads guilty may appeal a decision denying a motion to suppress evidence where the defendant could not be prosecuted if his claim that a constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure was vio lated is sustained and the defendant, the prosecutor, and the judge have agreed to the conditional plea.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1-3] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 481, 490.
[1, 2, 4] 29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence §§ 425, 426.
Plea of guilty as waiver of claim of unlawful search and seizure. 20 ALR3d 724.
Modern status of rule governing admissibility of evidence obtained by unlawful search and seizure. 50 ALR2d 531.
[3] 4 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 76.
[5] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 481.
1. A defendant who conditionally pleads guilty may appeal from a denial of a federal or state constitutional challenge of a search or seizure where the defendant could not be prosecuted if the claim were sustained, and the defendant, the prosecutor, and the judge have agreed to the plea. A plea of guilty does not insulate all claims from review. A defendant may challenge the trial court’s jurisdiction, or assert that a conviction violated the right against being placed twice in jeopardy, that the statute underlying a charge is unconstitutional, that an indictment or information does not state an offense, that the procedure for taking a plea of guilty was not followed, that no opportunity to obtain counsel was provided, or that the plea was not understanding and voluntary. A claim of failure to suppress illegally obtained evidence without which the prosecution could not proceed, like an alleged jurisdictional defect, is not waived by a plea of guilty because in such circumstances there should have been no trial at all.
2. The state has no legitimate interest in discouraging appeals from adverse rulings in order to reduce the appellate caseload. Interlocutory review, when granted, presents no less a strain on appellate resources than an appeal following a plea of guilty. Requiring a defendant to go to trial to preserve the right of appeal, in addition, would not achieve any greater finality than permitting an appeal following a plea of guilty. In a case where the defendant chooses to go to trial to preserve the right to appeal, a successful appeal could result in additional trials and appeals.
3. The decision of the trial court that the defendants had not sustained the burden of proving that the affidavit on which the search warrant was based contained false statements and that evidence obtained as a result of the warrant need not be suppressed was not clearly erroneous. Evidence may be suppressed only upon a showing that false material essential to probable cause was knowingly or recklessly included in the affidavit. The convictions are affirmed.
Jordan, affirmed.
Reid, reversed.
Justice Ryan, joined by Justice Boyle, dissenting, stated that because conditional guilty pleas are not authorized by statute, court rule, or the common law, the concept should not be sanctioned by the Court on the basis of the facts in these cases. Rather, any amendment of the Court Rules to provide for conditional guilty pleas should be preceded by publication of a proposed . rule and an invitation for comment by interested members of the bar and the public.
113 Mich App 262; 317 NW2d 589 (1982) reversed.
Opinion of the Court
1. Searches and Seizures — Constitutional Law — Guilty Pleas —Appeal — Suppression of Evidence.
A defendant in a criminal case who conditionally pleads guilty may appeal a denial of a federal or state constitutional challenge of a search or seizure where the defendant could not be prosecuted if his claim were sustained, and the defendant, the prosecutor, and the judge have agreed to the plea (Const 1963, art 1, § 20).
2. Searches and Seizures — Constitutional Law — Guilty Pleas —Appeal — Suppression of Evidence.
A claim of failure to suppress illegally obtained evidence without which the prosecution could not proceed, like an alleged jurisdictional defect, is not waived by a plea of guilty because in such circumstances there should have been no trial at all (Const 1963, art 1, § 20).
3. Criminal Law — Guilty Pleas — Appeal.
The state has no legitimate interest in discouraging appeals, following pleas of guilty, of pretrial rulings in favor of the people on the ground that reduction of the appellate caseload is necessary; interlocutory review presents no less a strain on the appellate docket, and successful appeals following trial could result in additional trials and appeals.
4. Searches and Seizures — Warrants — Affidavits — Suppression of Evidence.
Suppression of evidence on the ground that the affidavit which supported a search warrant contained false statements may be obtained only upon a showing that the false material was knowingly or recklessly included in the affidavit.
Dissenting Opinion by Ryan, J.
5. Criminal Law — Guilty Pleas — Amendment of Court Rules.
Conditional guilty pleas are not authorized by statute, court rule, or the common law and should not be sanctioned by the Supreme Court without publication of a proposed amendment of the court rule and an invitation for comment by interested members of the bar and the public.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Louis J. Caruso, Solicitor General, L. Brooks Patterson, Prosecuting Attorney, Robert C. Williams, Chief Appellate Counsel, and Thomas S. Richards, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Vincent D. Giovanni for defendant Reid.
Gerald M. Lorence for defendant Jordan.
Amicus Curiae:
State Appellate Defender (by Sheila N. Robertson).

Opinion:
Levin, J.
The question presented in these consolidated cases is whether a defendant in a criminal case may, after a conditional plea of guilty, appeal a decision denying a motion to suppress evidence.
We hold that he may do so where, as here, the defendant could not be prosecuted if his claim that a constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure was violated is sustained and the defendant, the prosecutor, and the judge have agreed to the conditional plea.
I
Gregory Jordan and Allen Reid were charged with kidnapping, armed robbery, and criminal sexual conduct. During the investigation, evidence was obtained on the basis of a warrant sworn to by Philip A. Denomme, Youth Officer for the Bloomfield Township Police Department. Denomme stated in the affidavit that a confidential informant, who had been reliable in the past, impli cated Jordan, Reid, and David Hardy in the abduction and rape under investigation.
Relying on Franks v Delaware, 438 US 154; 98 S Ct 2674; 57 L Ed 2d 667 (1978), and alleging that the warrants were based on an affidavit that was either false or made in reckless disregard of the truth, the defendants joined in a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence obtained on the basis of the warrant. A hearing was held at which Denomme and two other police officers testified that they had been present when the informant provided the information included in Denomme's affidavit. Denomme also testified that he had later paid the informant $100 for the information supplied at the meeting. A fourth officer testified regarding the informant's statement that he had information regarding the incident. The defense called the informant, who testified that, although he had met with the officers and told them he knew the defendants, he had denied any knowledge of the incident. The judge denied the motion to suppress, and defendants subsequently pled guilty to reduced charges.
Under the terms of their pleas, all three defendants reserved the right to appeal the denial of their motion to suppress. After sentencing, defendants appealed.
In Jordan, the Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant's conviction in an unpublished memorandum opinion. The Court of Appeals held that a conditional guilty plea is valid, and affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress.
In-Reid, a different panel of the Court of Appeals ruled that a conditional guilty plea is invalid and said that a defendant may not plead guilty while reserving the right to appeal and then on appeal challenge the validity of a search warrant. Reid's plea was set aside and the cause was remanded either for the taking of an unconditional plea of guilty or for trial. Justice Cavanagh, then a Judge of the Court of Appeals, writing in dissent, would have sustained the validity of the conditional guilty plea.
II
A defendant's right to appeal a criminal conviction is secured by the Michigan Constitution. A defendant may voluntarily and knowingly waive that right.
Jordan and Reid argue that the judge did not have the authority to accept a conditional plea and thus that they pled guilty without an adequate understanding of the value of commitments made to them in exchange for their pleas. This misapprehension, the defendants argue, rendered their pleas involuntary and requires that the pleas be set aside and their convictions reversed.
We disagree. We hold that a defendant may appeal from a denial of a Fourth Amendment or a Const 1963, art 1, § 11 search and seizure claim where, as here, the defendant could not be prosecuted if his claim that a constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure was vio lated is sustained and the defendant, the prosecutor, and the judge have agreed to the conditional plea.
A
The United States Supreme Court has ruled that a guilty plea does not insulate all claims from review. In Blackledge v Perry, 417 US 21; 94 S Ct 2098; 40 L Ed 2d 628 (1974), the Court held that a defendant had a right, although he had pled guilty, to claim on appeal that the trial court was without jurisdiction. Federal courts have also held that a guilty plea does not waive a claim on appeal that the conviction is violative of the Double Jeopardy Clause, that the statute pursuant to which the defendant was charged is unconstitutional, or that the indictment or information does not state an offense.
Some federal courts allow a conditional guilty plea whenever a substantial constitutional claim is involved. Although the United States Supreme Court has not squarely considered the validity of a conditional guilty plea, it has, in dictum, spoken with apparent approval of a New York statute allowing a conditional plea. _
It is well established in this state that a defendant may appeal from a conviction on a plea of guilty claiming that the procedure for taking a plea of guilty prescribed by GCR 1963, 785.7 was not followed, that he was not provided with the opportunity to obtain counsel, or that the plea was not an understanding and voluntary plea or was otherwise obtained in violation of his constitutional rights.
In addressing the question whether a defendant may appeal from a plea-based conviction, this Court has not adhered to a strict "jurisdictional/ non-jurisdictional" distinction. In People v Alvin Johnson, 396 Mich 424, 444; 240 NW2d 729 (1976), this Court said that notwithstanding a plea of guilty, a defendant may raise "the defense of double jeopardy, those grounded in the due process clause, those relating to insufficient evidence to bind over at preliminary examination and failure to suppress illegally obtained evidence without which the people could not proceed (Emphasis supplied.)_
In People v White, 411 Mich 366, 387; 308 NW2d 128 (1981), this Court extended the rationale of Johnson to include the claim of entrapment, stating that "[a] claim of entrapment does not involve an assessment of guilt or innocence, but rather expresses a policy that there should be no prosecution at all. In this respect, it is like a jurisdictional defect which is not waived by a plea of guilty."
The people acknowledge that they could not have proceeded with this prosecution without the evidence that Jordan and Reid sought to suppress.
B
It has been asserted that allowing a defendant to plead guilty and thereafter to appeal a non-jurisdictional issue could result in further overcrowding of the appellate courts. The state, however, has no legitimate interest in discouraging a defendant from appealing an adverse ruling in order to reduce the appellate caseload. The issues involved in an appeal may not be presumed to be frivolous.
The procedure for interlocutory review of a defendant's pretrial motion does not provide an adequate opportunity for appellate review of trial court rulings. Such review is granted only infrequently, not as a matter of course. In any event, if interlocutory review is granted, it presents no less a strain on appellate resources than appeal following a plea of guilty or trial.
A defendant may have a legitimate legal defense notwithstanding his factual guilt. As Justice Cav- Anagh stated in dissent in Reid, "[a] qualified plea does not cause the courts to consider claims to which a defendant 'was not entitled.' It merely allows a defendant to say, 'Yes, I did the act, but I contest the state's ability to present its case against me.' There may be a number of reasons why a defendant would feel he had a legitimate legal defense to the state's prosecution, but that it would be futile or impossible for the defendant to say that he did not do the act with which he was charged." 113 Mich App 262, 269; 317 NW2d 589 (1982).
It is argued that permitting an appeal from a guilty plea would deprive the plea of finality, create delay, and interfere with the deterrent effect of punishment. In cases where the defendant chooses to go to trial in order to preserve his right of appeal, however, not only is finality not achieved, but a successful appeal may result in two trials and two appeals. See People v Reid, supra, p 270 (Cavanagh, J., dissenting).
Ill
Jordan argues that the evidence obtained on the basis of the search warrant should be suppressed pursuant to Franks v Delaware, supra. In that case, the United States Supreme Court held that
"where the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires that a hearing be held at the defendant's request. In the event that at that hearing the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard is established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, and, with the affidavit's false material set to one side, the affidavit's remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit."
A hearing was held after the informant said that he had not made statements to the police implicating the defendants in the Bloomfield Township abduction, rape, and robbery. The judge determined that the defendants had not sustained their burden, enunciated in Franks, of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that Officer Denomine had recklessly or intentionally made false statements in the affidavit upon which the search warrant was based.
The defendants argued in the circuit court that if, as here, the informant denied having made the statements attributed to him by the officer, the inquiry must come to an end and the affidavit must be reviewed with the challenged material set to one side. We decline to take such a narrow view of the scope of the Franks hearing. At a Franks hearing, evidence may be suppressed only upon a showing that false material essential to probable cause was knowingly or recklessly included. Both the people and the defendant may present evidence.
In the case before us, three police officers testified that they had been present when the informant made the statements implicating the defendants. The judge found that the defendants had not sustained their burden of showing that the affidavit contained false statements. We conclude that his decision was not clearly erroneous.
IV
In sum, we hold that a defendant in a criminal case may, after pleading guilty, appeal a decision denying a motion to suppress evidence where, as here, the defendant could not be prosecuted if his claim that a constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure was violated is sustained and the defendant, the prosecutor, and the judge have agreed to the conditional plea. If they so agree, the defendant may offer a conditional plea of guilty, and, after his conviction on such a plea, he may appeal from the adverse ruling on his search and seizure claim. If the defendant's claim is sustained on appeal, he may withdraw his plea of guilty.
The convictions are affirmed.
Williams, C.J., and Kavanagh and Brickley, JJ., concurred with Levin, J.
MCL 750.349; MSA 28.581.
MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797.
MCL 750.520b; MSA 28.788(2).
This Court denied an application by David Hardy for leave to appeal. 419 Mich 853 (1984).
113 Mich App 262; 317 NW2d 589 (1982).
Const 1963, art 1, § 20.
See, e.g., People v Alvin Johnson, 396 Mich 424, 439; 240 NW2d 729 (1976); Tollett v Henderson, 411 US 258, 267; 93 S Ct 1602; 36 L Ed 2d 235 (1973).
Jordan and Reid pled guilty pursuant to an agreement with the judge and the prosecutor that their pleas would not constitute waivers of their right to appeal the denial of their motion to suppress. Because their pleas were accepted on the understanding that their right to appeal that issue was not waived, their pleas did not waive their right to appeal the suppression issue. Regardless of one's view of the conditional plea, these defendants must either be permitted to appeal on the merits or have their pleas set aside.
Menna v New York, 423 US 61; 96 S Ct 241; 46 L Ed 2d 195 (1975).
Haynes v United States, 390 US 85; 88 S Ct 722; 19 L Ed 2d 923 (1968); United States v Ury, 106 F2d 28 (CA 2, 1939).
Kolaski v United States, 362 F2d 847, 848 (CA 5, 1966).
See United States v Burke, 517 F2d 377 (CA 2, 1975); United States v Mendoza, 491 F2d 534 (CA 5, 1974); United States v Clark, 459 F2d 977 (CA 8, 1972) But see United States v Benson, 579 F2d 508 (CA 9, 1978); United States v Matthews, 472 F2d 1173 (CA 4, 1973); United States v Cox, 464 F2d 937 (CA 6, 1972).
Lefkowitz v Newsome, 420 US 283, 292-293; 95 S Ct 886; 43 L Ed 2d 196 (1975).
Three states provide by statute that a defendant may appeal an order denying a motion to suppress evidence, notwithstanding a prior plea of guilty. California Penal Code, § 1538.5(m); Wisconsin Statutes Annotated, § 971.31(10); New York Code Crim Proc, § 710.70(2) (McKinney).
Other states authorize conditional pleas by judicial decision. See, e.g., Nickels v State, 545 P2d 163 (Alas, 1976); Cooksey v State, 524 P2d 1251 (Alas, 1974); State v Hutchinson, 349 So 2d 1252 (La, 1977); State v Lain, 347 So 2d 167 (La, 1977); Dorsey v Cupp, 12 Or App 604; 508 P2d 445 (1973). But see, e.g., State v Dorr, 184 NW2d 673 (Iowa, 1971); State v Turcotte, 164 Mont 426; 524 P2d 787 (1974).
More than one commentator has suggested that there is no clear and useful definition of the term "jurisdictional":
"The obvious difficulty with 'jurisdictional error' is that it is not self-defining; it is a label one attaches to those constitutional defenses that are already determined — by some anterior standard — to deserve to be heard.
"In conclusion, for purposes of defining the kinds of claims that survive a guilty plea, the notion of jurisdictional error is either fallacious or useless: if understood in its technical sense as a term of art, it fails to explain the cases; if understood more broadly as a term for the guilty plea cases alone, it is superfluous." Westen, Forfeiture by Guilty Plea — A Reply, 76 Mich L Rev 1308, 1330-1334 (1978).
A study of conditional guilty pleas concludes that "[e]xperience with conditional pleas in New York and California indicates that a relatively small number of additional appeals are generated; no 'flooding' of appellate courts has resulted." Note, Conditional Guilty Pleas, 93 Harv L Rev 564, 573 (1980).
The Court of Appeals did not reach this issue in Reid.