Case Name: Smith, ex dem. Teller and others, against Burtis and Woodward
Court: New York Supreme Court of Judicature
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1812-08
Citations: 9 Johns. 174
Docket Number: 
Parties: Smith, ex dem. Teller and others, against Burtis and Woodward.
Judges: 
Reporter: Johnson's Reports
Volume: 9
Pages: 174–185

Head Matter:
Smith, ex dem. Teller and others, against Burtis and Woodward.
ALBANY,
August, 1812.
In an action tL^daintiflj’ after relying on the possesaion and descent cast of— fered to prove of 25-32 parts of the premiing supposed shopaper deibmianbrelied solely on an adverse possession of plaintiffs whose possession was reverse, entertobefenantfn common untitle, it was held, that this evidence was admissible, without requiring the plaintiff, at the same time, to admit the fact, that B. was a tenant in common with him.
To constitute an adverse possession, it is not necessary that there should be a rightful title. It must, however, be a possession under colour and claim of title, and exclusively of any other right.And if B, enters claiming as tenant in common, under the same title as that of the lessor, it admits the title of the lessor, so that neither B., nor those claiming under him, can set up such entry as adverse to the common title, or injurious to the righto of the other tenants in common.
THIS was an action of ejectment, to recover a house and lot of ground, in the 5th ward of the city of Nerv-York. (See S. C. vol. 6. p. 197.)
e The cause was tried before the Chief Justice, at the Nerv-York sittings, in December, 1810. The plaintiff proved that Isaac TelZer entered into possession of the premises, claiming the same as ]jjs own some time between the years 1760 and 1765, and erected a brick house thereon, in which he lived with his family, until the month of June, 1775, when he died in possession of the premises; that Isaac Teller, at the time of his death, had five children, to wit, John, his eldest son, Henry, his second son, one of ° e the lessors of the plaintiff, and Mary, (who intermarried with Peter Thalkimer,) Remsen and Isaac, the. other lessors of the plaintiff; ^at the widow and children of the said Isaac Teller, deceased, remained in possession of the premises, until the British army took possession of the city of Nerv-York, when they were compelled to leave the same. John, the eldest son, died in the month of J)ecember, in the year 17-77, aged between 12 and 15 years. The plaintiff farther proved, that after the British troops entered the city of Neru-York, in the year 1776, they took possession of, and occupied, the buildings and premises in question; and on the application of a judgment creditor, Isaac Teller, since deceased, permitted him, for 30 guineas, to take possession of, and appropriate to his own use, the materials of the buildings, which were sold by him, and out of the proceeds thereof he retained the amount due him, and a few years since paid the balance to Henry, one of the lessors of the plaintiff.
Michael Ortley, a witness on the part of the plaintiff, testified, that the house occupied by Isaac Teller, before the war, stood on the ground now in the possession of the defendants; that during the war, the house was pulled down by the British troops; and the ground on which it stood remained vacant, after the war, and until 1791, when the witness left the city. Three other witnesses testified to the same effect.
John Leonard, a witness, also testified that Henry B. Teller was eight or nine years old, at the time of his father’s death. Since the late war, Theophilus Beekman put a house on the premises. Before the war, Teller had three houses on the premises: the middle house was of brick, the other two of wood. The brick house stood opposite a house since occupied by Mr. Bremerton. The Beekman house was placed on part of the ground where the Teller house had stood, including the ground occupied by the wooden houses, which were nearest to Chamber-street, and a part of the ground occupied by the brick house. On the north of the houses of Teller, on Broadway, was a house, before the late war, called the Ackerman house, and to the north of which was another, called the Kip house.
The plaintiff having rested on this evidence, the defendants5’ counsel moved for a nonsuit, which was overruled by the judge.
The defendants, among other things, relied on an adverse possession of the premises, for more than 20 years prior to the commencement of the suit.
Peter Tom, a witness, testified, that in August, 1786, he went into possession of the Beekman house, under Theophilus Beekman, to whom he paid rent; and that he occupied the house a year and nine months. He particularly described the situation of the Beekman house, and stated that the house of the defendants in question, was where the Beekman house formerly stood, which had a yard in front, enclosed by a fence, in part along Broad way another yard in the rear, also enclosed by a fence. Several other witnesses corroborated his testimony, as to the place where the Beekman house stood, and its relative situation.'
e A Mrs. Benson went into possession of the Beekman house, in 1791, and paid rent to T. Beekman, until 1794, when she moved into the Kip house. The Beekman, Ackerman and Kip houses adjoined each other, and had yards, enclosed with fences.
Catharine Beekman moved into the Beekman house in May, 1786, and lived there until August, in the same year, and her husband, Harman Beekman, paid rent to Theophilus Beekman. She also confirmed the statement of the other witnesses, as to the situation of the house, and testified that the house of the defendants stands on the same ground.
Catharine Henry, about 22 years before the trial, lived iti the Beekman house a year, and paid rent to Theophilus Beekman. Catharine Fink also lived in the same house, some time after the war, and her husband paid rent to Theophilus Beekman; and, from the tax book of the collector, it appeared that her husband was assessed, as tenant of the Beekman house, in 1789. A receipt of the carpenters who placed the Beekman house on the lot in question, for their labour and materials found, was produced, bearing date the 14th November, 1785.
The defendants also produced a deed of partition, dated the 8th January, 1795, between Henry H. Kip, Abraham I. Van Vleck, John and Samuel Kip, of the first part; the trustees and executors of Samuel Bayard and Theophilus Beekman and his wife, of the second part; Isaac Van Vleck, of the third part; and Daniel Denniston, of the fourth part; by which deed commissioners were appointed to make partition of a certain tract of land, in the city of Nerv-York, claimed by the parties, as tenants in common, into eight parts; and Isaac Meade, one of the commissioners named in the deed, testified, that the partition was made in 1795, according to that deed, and the premises in question were included in the shares drawn by Daniel Denniston, and that soon afterwards, improvements on the premises were commenced.
The defendants then proved a regular chain of conveyances, from Daniel Denniston to the defendants,, accompanied with actual possession of the premises, since January, 1795, and that valuable improvements had been made on the property.
Several witnesses for the defendants testified their belief, from an early acquaintance with Henry R. Teller, that he was 45 or 46 years of age, at the time of the trial.
On the part of the plaintiff, several witnesses testified that Henry R. Teller was about 42 years of age.
C. Swart testified, that after the Teller family were compelled, by the British, to leave the houses they occupied, she took possession of one of them; that she was the sister of Isaac Teller’s widow, and took possession under that family, though she had no license or permission for that purpose. The house she occupied was called the Ackerman house.
Another witness testified that the property possessed by Isaac Teller before the late war, was for some time vacant, after the war, and that there were no fences near the Beekman house.
Several witnesses also testified as to the situation of the Beekman house; and, that it was not enclosed with fences; and that the ground occupied by the brick house of Isaac Teller remained vacant until about the year 1794, or 1795. William Lewis, one of the witnesses, said, that he returned to the city in 1791, and soon after that time, he took several loads of broken bricks out of the cellar of the brick house which had been occupied by Isaac Teller, before the war ; that the lot on which that house had stood was then vacant, and there was no fence about it; and the property continued vacant for some time.
The counsel for the plaintiff then offered to prove that Isaac Teller, the elder, was seised in fee of 25-32 parts of the premises in question, See. This was objected to by the counsel for the defendants ; and after some conversation between the judge and the counsel, the judge intimated that as the lessors had, on the first day, rested on the possession of Teller and the descent cast, and which was ruled to be sufficient, in the first instance, to recover, and the defendants had not set up any title, but rested upon the defence of an adverse possession for 29 years, it was useless to go into a paper title; for if the defence set up was made out, it would be a bar to any title, and if not made out, the plaintiff would be entitled to recover on his first showing.
The plaintiff’s counsel then offered to prove that Theophihts Beekman entered, in 1786, claiming to be a tenant in common„ under the same title. The judge asked the counsel for the lessors of the plaintiff, if they coupled that offer with an admis sion that Beekman was a tenant in common with them; and oh" served, that if they admitted that fact, he would admit the proof, otherwise not; for unless they admitted Beekman to be a tenant in common with them, it would not alter the case, as the plaintiff could not avail himself of such an entry as enuring to his benefit. The counsel for the plaintiff refusing to make the admission, the evidence was rejected, and a bill of exceptions was tendered.
The judge stated to the jury, that unless there was an adverse possession of twenty years, after the plaintiff came of age, and before the commencement of the suit, the plaintiff ought to re» cover; and that in his opinion, the evidence was in favour of such adverse possession. The jury found a verdict for the defendants.
A motion was made for a new trial. 1. Because the verdict was against evidence.
2. Because the evidence offered by the plaintiff was improperly rejected.
3. Because the judge misdirected the jury.
4. On account of newly discovered evidence.
The affidavit of newly discovered evidence stated, that since the trial, the plaintiff had discovered several witnesses, who would prove that they resided near, and were well acquainted with, the premises, after the late wrar, and that they were not included in any enclosure made by Theophilus Beekman; but were vacant, after the war, until the year 1795; and that the attempt of the defendants to prove, at the trial, an adverse possession of 20 years by Theophilus Beekman, was a surprise, and the lessors could not have been prepared with the testimony to prove the fact of the vacancy of the premises after the war, until 1795.
The case was argued by Hoffman and T. A. Emmet, for the plaintiff, and Griffen and J¡ Radcliff, for the defendants.
But, in reference to the decision of the court, it is thought un» necessary to state the arguments of counsel.

Opinion:
Spencer, J.
On the argument, two points were chiefly relied on, for anew trial; 1. The discovery of material evidence since the trial, as to the location of the premises, connected with the allegation of surprise; and, 2. The overruling of evidence that' Theophilus Beekman entered in 1796, claiming to be a tenant in common, under the same title with the plaintiff.
The view I have taken of the second point, renders it nnnecessary for me minutely to consider the first; though, from a carefiil review of the testimony, it appears to me that the weight of evidence is against the verdict. The fact testified to by William Lewis, is a strong and almost decisive one. He swears, that in 179.1, or shortly after, he took several loads of broken bricks out of the cellar of the brick house occupied by Isaac Teller, before the war, and that the lot was then vacant and unfenced. It appears to me that a new trial would throw light on the question, and that it is fit and discreet to have a re-examination before another jury.
The plaintiff offered to show that Isaac Teller, under whom die lessors of the plaintiff have deduced a title, was seised in fee of 25-32 parts of the premises. This was objected to, and the judge intimated an opinion, that it was unnecessary, as the defendants relied solely on an adverse possession, and the plaintiff had already proved enough to recover, bat for the adverse possession. The plaintiff then offered to prove that Theophilus Beekman entered in 1786, claiming to be a tenant in common under the same title; and the case states, that the chief justice asked the counsel for the plaintiff, if they coupled that offer with an admission that Beekman was a tenant in common with them and that if they admitted that fact, he would admit the proof, otherwise not, assigning as a reason that unless the plaintiff admitted Beekman to have been a tenant in common with him, it would not alter the case, as the plaintiff could not avail himself of such entry, as enuring to his benefit. The counsel for the plaintiff refusing to make such admission, the evidence was rejected, and a bill of exceptions tendered.
In determining the propriety of rejecting the evidence, as to the manner of Beekman's entry, we must not lose sight of the fact, -hat Beekman's possession was relied on by the defendants, as constituting a material portion of the time necessary to make the adverse possession, relied on by the defendants, as a bar to the plaintiffs recovery.
The plaintiff, too, had offered to show title, as a tenant in common, to 25-32 parts of the premises; and thus admitted that with respect to 7-32 parts, there were ether persons tenants in common with the lessors. It appears to me that the plaintiff ought not to have been required to admit the fact that Beekman v*s a tenant in common. To constitute an adverse possession, there must be a possession, under colour and claim of title; but Beeh> man's entry, claiming as tenant in common under the same title as that of the lessors of the plaintiff} qualified his entry and admitted *he title of the lessors; so that neither Beekman, nor the defendants,'could set up that entry, as adverse to the common title, or as injurious to the rights of the other tenants in common. A possession, for ever so long a time, stripped of the circumstance that it is unaccompanied with the claim of the entire title, will not amount to án adverse possession, barring those who have the real pnd legitimate title. When; therefore, Beekman evinced, by his acts and declarations, that he did not mean to usurp the possession to himself, but that he entered in subserviency to the same title, and as a tenant in common, his possession lost its adverse character, as regarded all those who had right and title in the premises.
It has never been considered as necessary to-constitute an adverse possession, that there should be a rightful title. Whenever this defence is set up, the idea of right is excluded; the fact of possession, and the quo animo it was commenced or continued, are the only tests; and it must necessarily be exclusive of any other rights.
The most that could have been imposed on the lessors of the plaintiff, to entitle them to the full benefit of Beekman's admissions .and declarations, would be to subject them to take those declarations as evidence, as well for as against Beekman, and thus leaving it to the jury to decide, whether, in point of fact, he was not to be considered as entering and having right as a tenant in common. But most clearly, the plaintiff ought not to have been required to admit any fact, as a prerequisite to giving the evidence of Beekman's declarations.
I think this point too clear to require being any further pursued ; and that a new trial ought to be granted, with costs to abide «he event of the suit.
Van Ness, I. and Yates, 3 were of the same opinion.