Case Name: STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. KENNETH BARNARD
Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
Jurisdiction: North Carolina
Decision Date: 2008-04-11
Citations: 362 N.C. 244
Docket Number: No. 347A07
Parties: STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. KENNETH BARNARD
Judges: Justice TIMMONS-GOODSON joins in this dissenting opinion.
Reporter: North Carolina Reports
Volume: 362
Pages: 244–261

Head Matter:
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. KENNETH BARNARD
No. 347A07
(Filed 11 April 2008)
Search and Seizure— traffic stop — thirty-second delay at green light — reasonable suspicion of driving while impaired
Defendant’s thirty-second delay at a green traffic light under the circumstances gave rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that defendant may have been driving while impaired; the stop of his vehicle was constitutional, and the evidence (a crack pipe) obtained as a result of the stop was properly admitted. It is irrelevant that part of the officer’s motivation for stopping defendant may have been a perceived, though apparently nonexistent, statutory violation of impeding traffic.
Justice BRADY dissenting.
Justice HUDSON dissenting.
Justice TIMMONS-GOODSON joins in this dissenting opinion.
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 184 N.C. App. 25, 645 S.E.2d 780 (2007), finding no error in a judgment entered 6 April 2005 by Judge James U. Downs in Superior Court, Buncombe County. Heard in the Supreme Court 13 February 2008.
Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Daniel S. Johnson, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.
Anne Bleymanfor defendant-appellant.
The Avery, RC., by Isaac T. Avery, III, for North Carolina Association of Police Attorneys, and Kimberly N. Overton for North Carolina Conference of District Attorneys, amici curiae.

Opinion:
NEWBY, Justice.
In this case we determine whether defendant's constitutional rights were violated by the traffic stop that led to his convictions. Based on the totality of the circumstances here, defendant's thirty-second delay before proceeding through a green traffic light gave rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that he may have been driving while impaired. Because the stop of defendant's vehicle was constitutional, we affirm the majority decision of the Court of Appeals that affirmed the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the stop.
Around 12:15 a.m. on 2 December 2004, Officer Brett Maltby was on patrol in a high crime area of downtown Asheville where a number of bars are located. Officer Maltby's marked patrol car was stopped behind defendant's vehicle at a red traffic light. When the light turned green, defendant remained stopped for approximately thirty seconds before making a legal left turn. Officer Maltby initiated a stop of the vehicle.
WThen he approached defendant to ask for his driver's license and registration, Officer Maltby noticed that defendant was shaking and that his breathing was rapid. Officer Maltby also detected a slight odor of alcohol on defendant's breath. Defendant said he did not have his license with him and gave Officer Maltby a name and birth date that did not match information on the officer's computer. Officer Maltby returned and asked defendant to step out of the vehicle. At that point, he observed an open container of alcohol in defendant's vehicle. After Officer Maltby placed defendant in investigatory detention, defendant provided his correct name, and Officer Maltby determined that defendant's driver's license was suspended. Officer Dwight Arrowood arrived at the scene and recovered a crack pipe (later determined to contain cocaine residue) and associated paraphernalia from defendant's vehicle.
Defendant offered to make a controlled buy of narcotics from a person known as "One-Arm Willy" if Officer Maltby would void defendant's citations for possession of an open container, driving while license suspended, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Officer Maltby agreed he would void the citations if defendant made a controlled buy. Later that night defendant successfully purchased a crack rock from One-Arm Willy. However, upon defendant's return to the police station, Officer Maltby searched defendant and found a second rock of cocaine, which defendant had obtained as a "front" from One-Arm Willy.
Defendant was subsequently charged with two counts of possession of cocaine and two counts of having achieved habitual felon status. Before trial, defendant moved to suppress evidence seized as a result of the searches of his vehicle and his person, as well as the statements he made to the police. Defendant's motion to suppress was denied. A jury found defendant guilty of two counts of possession of cocaine, and defendant pled guilty to one count of having achieved habitual felon status. The remaining habitual felon status charge was dismissed.
A divided Court of Appeals panel found no error. The majority determined that the thirty-second delay after the traffic light turned green gave Officer Maltby a reasonable suspicion that defendant was driving while impaired. Therefore, the evidence obtained as a result of the stop was properly admitted. State v. Barnard, 184 N.C. App. 25, 30-31, 645 S.E.2d 780, 784 (2007). The dissent argued that a thirty-second delay, standing alone, did not provide reasonable suspicion of driving while impaired. As a result, the dissent would have excluded the evidence obtained and statements made during the stop. Id. at -, 645 S.E.2d at 789-90 (Calabria, J., dissenting). However, the dissent recommended a remand to determine whether defendant consented to the search that occurred following the controlled buy. Id. at -, 645 S.E.2d at 790-91.
The question before this Court is whether the stop of defendant's vehicle was constitutional. The Fourth Amendment protects individuals "against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const, amend. IV. The North Carolina Constitution provides similar protection. N.C. Const, art. I, § 20. A traffic stop is a seizure "even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief." Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660, 667 (1979). Such stops have "been historically viewed under the investigatory detention framework first articulated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968)." United States v. Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d 392, 396 (3rd Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Despite some initial confusion following the United States Supreme Court's decision in Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1996), courts have continued to hold that a traffic stop is constitutional if the officer has a "reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot." Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S. Ct. 673, 675, 145 L. Ed. 2d 570, 576 (2000) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S. Ct. at 1884, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 911); see Delfin-Colina, 464 E3d at 396-97.
Reasonable suspicion is a "less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence." Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123, 120 S. Ct. at 675-76, 145 L. Ed. 2d at 576 (citation omitted). Only " 'some minimal level of objective justification' " is required. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1585, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1, 10 (1989) (quoting INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217, 104 S. Ct. 1758, 1763, 80 L. Ed. 2d 247, 255 (1984)). This Court has determined that the reasonable suspicion standard requires that "[t]he stop . be based on specific and articulable facts, as well as the rational inferences from those facts, as viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, cautious officer, guided by his experience and training." State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 441, 446 S.E.2d 67, 70 (1994) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22, 88 S. Ct. at 1880, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 906). Moreover, "[a] court must consider 'the totality of the circumstances — the whole picture' in determining whether a reasonable suspicion" exists. Id. (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S. Ct. 690, 695, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621, 629 (1981)).
Here, the trial court concluded that based on the totality of the circumstances "a reasonable articulable suspicion of wrongdoing on the part of the [defendant existed." This conclusion of law is supported by the trial court's finding of fact that, after the traffic light turned green, defendant's vehicle "remained stopped for some 30 seconds without any reasonable appearance of explanation for doing so." The trial court's conclusion of law is also supported by Officer Maltby's testimony showing that, based on his training and experience, he made a rational inference from the thirty-second delay that defendant might be impaired:
Q Based upon your training and experience, do you have an opinion as to whether or not that sort of delayed reaction could usually involve an impaired substance or driving while impaired?
A [Officer Maltby] Absolutely. Yes, sir.
Q Can you articulate that?
A People's reaction is slowed down. A red light turning green and hesitating for 30 seconds definitely would be an indicator of impairment.
Because defendant's thirty-second delay at a green traffic light under these circumstances gave rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that defendant may have been driving while impaired, the stop of defendant's vehicle was constitutional and the evidence obtained as a result of the stop was properly admitted. It is irrelevant that part of Officer Maltby's motivation for stopping defendant may have been a perceived, though apparently non-existent, statutory violation of impeding traffic. The constitutionality of a traffic stop depends on the objective facts, not the officer's subjective motivation. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 811-13, 116 S. Ct. at 1773-74, 135 L. Ed. 2d at 96-98; State v. McClendon, 350 N.C. 630, 634-36, 517 S.E.2d 128, 131-32 (1999).
All other issues raised by defendant are not properly before this Court. The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
. The majority also affirmed the admission of defendant's statements to Officer Maltby. Although defendant made the statements before he was advised of his Miranda rights, the evidence showed the statements were volunteered and not the result of an interrogation. Barnard, 184 N.C. App. at 30-31, 645 S.E.2d at 784-85. The dissent did not address this Miranda issue. As such, defendant's arguments on this issue are not properly before this Court. See, e.g., Steingress v. Steingress, 350 N.C. 64, 67, 511 S.E.2d 298, 300 (1999) (citing Clifford v. River Bend Plantation, Inc., 312 N.C. 460, 463, 323 S.E.2d 23, 25 (1984)).