Case Name: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Bobby CAIN, Defendant-Appellant, Robert Cain, Defendant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2016-10-03
Citations: 669 F. App'x 49
Docket Number: 15-1582-cr
Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Bobby CAIN, Defendant-Appellant, Robert Cain, Defendant.
Judges: PRESENT: Jon O. Newman, José A. Cabranes, Circuit Judges, Jane A. Restani, Judge.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 669
Pages: 49–50

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Bobby CAIN, Defendant-Appellant, Robert Cain, Defendant.
15-1582-cr
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
October 3, 2016
FOR APPELLEE: Michael Krouse and Karl Metzner, Assistant United States Attorneys, for Preet Bharara, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, NY.
FOR ' DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: Yuanchung Lee, Federal Defenders of New York, Inc., New York, NY.
PRESENT: Jon O. Newman, José A. Cabranes, Circuit Judges, Jane A. Restani, Judge.
The Honorable Jane A. Restani, Judge for the United States Court of International Trade, sitting by designation.

Opinion:
SUMMARY ORDER
Defendant-appellant Bobby Cain appeals from a judgment of conviction for conspiracy to rob commercial establishments entered on May 12, 2016, following a guilty plea before the Honorable Colleen McMahon in the Southern District of New York. On May 11, 2015, the District Court sentenced Cain to 71 months' imprisonment, three years' supervised release, and restitution in the amount of $4,608. We assume the parties' familiarity with the facts and procedural history of this case.
On appeal, Cain claims that that the District Court considered impermissible factors at sentencing. See United States v. Leung, 40 F.3d 577, 586 (2d Cir. 1994). Upon review of the record in its entirety, we conclude that Gain's claim does not warrant relief. See United States v. Jacobson, 15 F.3d 19, 23 (2d Cir. 1994). The claim focuses on some of the sentencing judge's statements in isolátion, but in context, it is clear that the statements were only comments on the unfortunate circumstances of Cain's early years.
Nevertheless, a limited remand is appropriate in order to permit the District Court to correct and conform its written judgment to the terms pronounced orally at sentencing. With regard to Cain's restitution obligations, the District Court's written judgment reflected a 15 percent monthly installment payment even though the District Court explicitly stated at sentencing that Cain was responsible for "monthly installments of 10 percent" of his gross monthly income commencing after his release from custody. A. 111. We have held that "[wjhere an unambiguous oral sentence conflicts with the written judgment, the constitutional right of a defendant to be present at sentencing dictates that the oral pronouncement of sentence must control." United States v. A-Abras Inc., 185 F.3d 26, 29 (2d Cir. 1999). Because the District Court's oral pronouncement was unambiguous in requiring Cain to pay 10 percent of his monthly income, we remand the cause with instructions to correct the written judgment.
CONCLUSION
We have considered all of the arguments raised by defendant-appellant on appeal and find them to be without merit except with respect to correcting the written judgment to conform with the District Court's controlling oral pronouncement. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of conviction and REMAND the cause for the limited purpose of permitting the District Court to conform the written judgment to its oral ruling regarding Cain's obligation to make restitution payments amounting to 10 percent of his gross monthly income.