Case Name: Wadsworth against Sharpsteen and Moffat executors of Sherman
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1853-06
Citations: 8 N.Y. 388
Docket Number: 
Parties: Wadsworth against Sharpsteen and Moffat executors of Sherman.
Judges: Gardiner, Jewett, Johnson, Mason, Morse and Taggart, JJ., concurred with the chief judge
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 8
Pages: 388–397

Head Matter:
Wadsworth against Sharpsteen and Moffat executors of Sherman.
After one has hy inquisition been found a habitual drunkard, he can not until it is vacated, or a commission thereon superseded, even in his sober intervals, make contracts to bind himself or his property.
Proceedings against one as a habitual drunkard are analogous to proceedings in rem, and are presumed to be known to all who subsequently deal with him
Accordingly, where the endorser of a bill of exchange who had prior to its maturity been found a habitual drunkard, by a written instrument made after such finding and before the appointment of á committee and while sober, waived notice of protest, in consequence of which the holder omitted to have notice served; held that the waiver was void. Willabd, J., dissented.
This action was originally brought by leave of the court of chancery against James N. Sherman, the defendants’ testator, then a habitual drunkard under the charge of a committee, as an endorser upon a bill of exchange. The bill was dated July 9, 1845, payable six months after date to the order of the drawer, and by him endorsed, and subsequently endorsed by Sherman. On the 18th day of December, 1845, a petition was presented to the court of chancery, praying a commission in the nature of a writ de lunático inquirendo, to inquire into the habitual drunkenness of Sherman. The commission was thereupon issued, and an inquisition taken in pursuance thereof on the 31st day of December, 1845, by which it was found that he was by reason of habitual drunkenness incapable of governing himself and of conducting his affairs. On the 5th day of January, 1846, Sherman, with the other parties to the bill, executed to the holder a written instrument waiving notice of nonpayment and protest, in consequence of which the bill was not protested. After the action was commenced, the defendant Sherman died, and the present defendants who were his executors were substituted in his place.
The cause was tried at the Livingston circuit, in December, 1847, before Mr. Justice Hoyt. After the facts above stated were given in evidence, the plaintiff’s counsel offered to show that at the time Sherman signed the waiver of notice of protest, he was sober and competent to transact business. The court excluded the evidence, and ruled that unless the plaintiff could charge him with notice of nonpayment in some other way than by the waiver, the proof would amount to nothing. The plaintiff’s counsel then offered to show that at the time the waiver was received he had no notice nor knowledge of the proceedings against Sherman as a habitual drunkard or of the inquisition. The court excluded this evidence.
The counsel for the plaintiff then asked the said justice to exclude from the evidence the irquisition and commission, upon the following grounds, viz:
1. The inquisition had not been returned when the waiver of notice of nonpayment and of protest of the draft was signed and delivered.
2. That no commission to appoint a committee for the defendant had been issued at the time the waiver of notice was made and delivered.
3. As this draft is commercial paper, it is not affected by the inquisition, in the hands of a bona fide holder for , a valuable consideration, who had no notice or knowledge of the proceedings.
4. Because there is no final order appointing a committee of the person and estate of the defendant.
The justice refused to exclude the inquisition and ordered the jury to find a verdict for the defendant and exceptions were taken to the ruling.
A judgment in favor of the defendant was entered which was affirmed at a general term of the supreme court in the eighth judicial district. The plaintiff appealed therefrom.
O. Hastings, for appellants.
If the inquisition is in all respects regular and the proceedings under it valid, it is not conclusive against the plaintiff who is a bona fide holder of commercial paper, and took the waiver of notice of nonpayment and of protest in good faith without notice or knowledge of the proceedings — he should therefore have been allowed to prove that the defendant, at the time he signed the waiver, was perfectly sober and competent to transact business. The inquisition is not competent in such a case, because that was an act by which the plaintiff was induced to hold .the draft and not present it at the place of payment, and have it protested. It is a well settled prin-. ciple that no man shall be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong. Now if the defendant was incapable of making a contract that would bind him, he was not incapable of committing a wrong for which he would be liable. If this waiver of protest is void as a contract, it is a fraud practiced by the defendant upon the plaintiff to prevent him from presenting and protesting the draft. Where one party to a contract fraudulently induces the other party to omit performance on his part, the party guilty of such fraud can not take advantage of such nonperformance.
The waiver of protest, whether viewed as a contract or a fraudulent device on the part of the defendant, dispenses with presentation and protest of the draft.
H. R. Selden, for respondents.

Opinion:
Ruggles, Ch. J.
When a man -has been found by inquisition duly taken in pursuance of the statute to be incapable of conducting his own affairs in consequence of habitual drunkenness, his property, real and personal, is taken out of his hands, and put into the custody and control of a committee. The object of this proceeding, as declared in the statute, (2 R. S. 52,) is to prevent the property being wasted and destroyed,- and to provide for the maintenance of himself and his family, and the education of his children. The committee is required to file an inventory of the property and to give security for the performance of the trust. This trust continues without interruption until the death of the drunkard or the superseding of the commission. The right of the committee to the custody and control of the property is not superseded during the drunkard's sober intervals; and therefore, during such intervals the drunkard has no more authority to deal with, or dispose of the property, than while he is in a state of intoxication. If it were otherwise, the proceedings would furnish a very ineffectual security against waste and improvidence. Every transaction would be open to litigation upon the question whether it took place while the drunkard was in a state of sobriety or. intoxication; and the committee could not execute his trust with safety to himself or benefit to the drunkard or his family. Similar consequences would unavoidably follow from permit ting the drunkard during sober intervals to contract debts or incur liabilities, by which the property might be seized and sold on judgment and execution. The effect of the inquisition is that the drunkard is incapable at all times of conducting his affairs; and they are therefore taken wholly out of his control. From the very nature and object of the proceeding therefore, the inquisition must be regarded as conclusive evidence of the incapacity of the drunkard to dispose of his property or to contract debts from the time when it is found. This was so decided in L'Amoreux v. Crosby, 2 Paige, 427. And in Leonard v. Leonard, 14 Pick. 283, a decree of the probate court declaring a person non compos mentis and putting him under guardianship was held to be conclusive evidence of the disability of the ward against a person dealing with him during his wardship.
It is contended however that the inquisition ought not to be conclusive against the plaintiff, a bona fide holder of the bill on which the action was brought, and who had no notice of the proceeding when he took the defendant's agreement to waive the protest of the draft.
The general rule undoubtedly is, that a decree or other judicial proceeding binds those only who are parties to it. But there are exceptions to this rule. Proceedings in rem are conclusive on all the world. (1 Starkie's Ev. 246, 7; Phil. Ed. 1837.) And inquisitions being made under competent public authority to ascertain matters of public interest and concern, are said to be analagous to proceedings in rem, to which no one can strictly be said to be a stranger. They are clearly admissible in evidence. Inquisitions of this nature are public and notorious, and presumed to be known to those who subsequently deal with the subjects of them. And as to all business which the committee is authorized to transact for the drunkard, strangers must deal with the committee and not with the drunkard, until the inquisition is set aside. There can be no doubt of the authority of the court to order an issue at the instance of a creditor ftir the purpose of retrying the facts found by the inquisition, and of setting it aside. (5 Paige, 242, In the matter of Christie; 11 Paige, 243, In the matter of Giles.) The creditor is therefore not without remedy against an inquisition improperly found. And if the creditor should happen to suffer from making a contract with a drunkard without knowledge of the inquisition, and should thereby sustain a loss, the hardship is no greater than if he dealt with a minor believing him to be of full age. It is his duty to ascertain whether those he deals with have the capacity to contract.
There are many dicta in the books to the effect that inquisitions of lunacy are admissible, but not conclusive evidence. But in all the cases where these dicta are found the question arose upon contracts or conveyances made before the finding of the inquisition. It has been adjudged however, that the inquisition is not conclusive evidence of the lunatic's incapacity to make a will. This is an exception to the general rule, and the reason given for it in the case of Leonard v. Leonard, 14 Pick. 284, is, that this is an act which the guardian can not do for him. And in another case, that the making of a will'is an act manifestly distinguishable from contracts and other acts done inter vivos and involves no conflict of authority with the guardian, because the will can not operate to any purpose till the death of the testator, and by that same event the authority of the guardian is determined. (18 Pick. 116.) To these may be added, as especially applicable to the case of a habitual drunkard, that the chief object of the proceeding by inquisition is the preservation of his property during his lifetime for the benefit of himself and his family, and that the motives which might induce him to make an improper disposition of it during his lifetime, do not exist in relation to a disposition to take effect after his death.
The judgment of the supreme court should be affirmed.
Gardiner, Jewett, Johnson, Mason, Morse and Taggart, JJ., concurred with the chief judge