Case Name: James A. Sandles, an Infant, by John Sandles, his Guardian ad Litem, Appellant, v. Morris Levenson, Respondent
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1903
Citations: 78 A.D. 306
Docket Number: 
Parties: James A. Sandles, an Infant, by John Sandles, his Guardian ad Litem, Appellant, v. Morris Levenson, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 78
Pages: 306–313

Head Matter:
James A. Sandles, an Infant, by John Sandles, his Guardian ad Litem, Appellant, v. Morris Levenson, Respondent.
Watchma/n shooting a boy on a shed adjacent to the premises in his charge—when it is done neither in self-defense nor in protection of his employer’s property, and consequently not within the scope of his employment.
In an action brought to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff through the alleged negligence of the defendant's watchman or through an alleged assault committed by the defendant’s watchman, it appeared that the plaintiff, an infant, with a number of companions, was playing ball in one of the streets in the city of New York and that the ball was driven into the defendant’s yard, which was inclosed by a high fence; that one of the plaintiff’s companions went upon an adjoining shed for the purpose of getting into the yard and recovering the ball; that as he stepped upon a ladder which led down into the yard, the defendant’s watchman, who was. stationed in the yard, pulled the ladder from under him, causing him to fall tO' the ground, where he was immediately seized by the watchman; that, while holding the boy, the watchman drew a pistol and, pointing it in the air, discharged it; that the bullet struck the plaintiff, who was standing upon a shed which did not belong to the defendant, although it was contiguous to his property.
The pistol with which the shooting was done was either taken by the watchman from a drawer in the defendant’s building or was furnished to him by the defendant. It did not appear that the watchman knew or had any reason to believe, at the time the pistol was discharged, that the plaintiff was on the shed, or whether the pistol was discharged by accident or by design.
Held, that the complaint was properly dismissed;
That there was no evidence which would justify a finding that the watchman discharged the pistol in self-defense or for the purpose of protecting the defendant’s property, and that, unless he did so, his act in discharging the pistol was not within the scope of his employment.
Ingraham and Hatch, JJ., dissented.
Appeal by the plaintiff, James A. Sandies, an infant, by John Sandies, his guardian ad litem, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the defendant, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 23d day of January, 1902, upon the dismissal of the complaint by direction of the court at the close of the plaintiff’s case upon a trial at the New York Trial Term.
Sumner B. Sidles, for the appellant.
Moses Feltenstewh, for the respondent.

Opinion:
McLaughlin, J.:
Action to recover damages for an injury sustained by the plaintiff by reason of an alleged assault by, or the negligence of, defendant's servant. The complaint was dismissed at the close of plaintiff's case, and from the judgment thereafter entered he has appealed.
The facts, so far as they are material, are as follows: On the 26th of May, 1901, the plaintiff, seventeen years of age, with several other boys, was playing ball in one of the streets of the city of New York, and the ball with which they were playing was driven into defendant's yard, which was inclosed by a high fence; the defendant had a watchman in the yard to look after it and the property in the building immediately adjoining; after the ball had been driven into the yard the plaintiff, or one of his companions, called to the watchman to throw it out; he threw out a ball, but it was not the one which belonged to the boys, and thereupon one of them, a boy by the name of Grilligan, went upon an adjoining shed, so that he could get into the yard; he stepped upon a ladder for the purpose of descending into the yard, and as he did so the watchman pulled the ladder from under him, he fell to the ground and was immediately seized by the watchman, who, while holding him in this position, drew a pistol, and pointing it in the air, either by accident or design, discharged it, and the bullet therefrom struck the plaintiff in the leg. It is to recover damages for the injury thus inflicted that this action was brought.
The pistol the watchman took from a drawer in defendant's building, or else it was furnished to him by the defendant. The plaintiff, at the time he was injured, was standing upon a shed, but it did not belong to the defendant, although it was near his property. There was no evidence to the effect that the watchman knew, or had any reason to believe, at the time the pistol was discharged that the plaintiff was upon the shed; on the contrary, the uncontradicted evidence was to the effect that the pistol was pointed in the air as soon as the Gilligan boy was seized and before the plaintiff went upon the shed.
This being the condition of the testimony at the close of plaintiff's case, I am of the opinion that the complaint was properly dismissed. The facts, it seems to me, brought the case clearly within the rule laid down in Grimes v. Young (51 App. Div. 239), and what the court there said in affirming a nonsuit is as applicable to this case as it was to that, viz.: " Taking all the evidence on this subject together, we have the case of a watchman armed with a revolver by his employers and authorized by them to fire with it into the air in order to frighten away intruders, for purposes of self-defense or to protect the property which he was employed to watch. If, under these circumstances, it appeared that the watchman, either to defend himself or to protect the property of his employers, had fired at a person and killed him instead of firing into the air, it might very well be that the toaster would be responsible for the wrongful act of the servant." Here, the plaintiff was not upon the defendant's premises, nor did the watchman even know that he was endeavoring to go upon them. Therefore, there was nothing which would have justified a finding that the watchman, when he discharged the pistol, did so for the purpose of self-defense or for the protection of the defendant's property. It is true he was, at the time, in the employ' of the defendant, but I take it that no one would contend that if the watchman, to gratify his own curiosity or for pleasure, had fired the pistol in the air and some one had been •injured, defendant could have been held liable. The discharge of this pistol was either by accident or else, so far as appears, for some purpose not disclosed on the part of the watchman. It certainly was not for the purpose of preventing the plaintiff entering the yard or interfering with or injuring the defendant's property, because, as already indicated, the watchman did not even know, at the time it was discharged, that the plaintiff was upon the shed or intended to go upon it. Where a servant goes outside of his employment, and without regard to his service, acts maliciously, or, in order to accomplish some purpose of his own, wantonly commits a trespass or causes damage to another, the master is not responsible. (Mott v. Consumers Ice Co., 73 N. Y. 543.) This is the general rule, and, applying it to the facts in this case, it seems to me it must be held that the watchman in discharging the pistol was not acting within the scope of his employment.
The judgment is right and should be affirmed, with costs.
Van Brunt, P. J., and O'Brien, J., concurred ; Ingraham and Hacth, JJ., dissented.