Case Name: President and Directors of the Bank of Newbern v. Turner Pullen
Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
Jurisdiction: North Carolina
Decision Date: 1833-12
Citations: 4 Dev. 297
Docket Number: 
Parties: President and Directors of the Bank of Newbern v. Turner Pullen.
Judges: 
Reporter: North Carolina Reports
Volume: 15
Pages: 297–300

Head Matter:
President and Directors of the Bank of Newbern v. Turner Pullen.
A return on an execution by a sheriff, of a private matter between himself and the plaintiff and execution, c. 9 “payment to the plaintiff” or “indulgence by him,” is no evidence for the sheriff in a suit brought against him by tho plaintiff in the execution.
But between third person, such return is evidence.
This was an action on tho case against the defendant as Sheriff of Wake, in which the plaintiff declared,
1st. That tho defendant has failed to make return of certain writs of execution, issued at the instance of the plaintiff against J?. 8. H, Burgess and others.
2d, for a false return,
3d, upon the special case or the facts stated.
On the trial before Martin, Judge, at Wake Spring term, 1830, the plaintiffs proved that they obtained a judgment in Wake County Court, at Angust_term, 1824, against S. II Burgess, principal, ami Wm. HUI and T. Hunter sureties, for $>980, with interest on g>950 till paid — that lie sued out a writ of ji, fa, on said judgment to November term, 1824, and placed it in the hands of * the defendant, then Sheriff of Wake, wise levied the same on the land and slaves of Burgess, 4th October, 1824, and closed bis return by saying, “all of which property is said to be under deed in trust, except Coy, Preston and Jiustin.” This execution, with the levy endorsed, was returned to the office of the court
The plaintiff then sued out a writ of venditioni expounds, on this judgment, returnable to February term, 1825, which was likewise delivered to the defendant, as Sheriff, and was returned by him with the following endorsement: “Indulged by order of the plaintiff. T. Pul' len, Sheriff.” The plaintiff then sued out an alias writ of venditioni exponas, on 1st April, 1825, returnable to May term, 1825, which also came into the hands of the defendant, and upon which ho returned, “ sale of the within property postponed by order of the plaintiff.”— The defendant continued Sheriff, until May term, 1825.
Several other executions in favor of other plaintiffs, against Burgess were produced in evidence, by virtue of which, the Sheriff sold negroes Coy, Preston, Jiustin and Jilbert and applied the proceeds of this sale to the satisfaction of those executions, except g 145, which lie returned, “ by agreement of all persons interested, was “paid to Jl. 8. II. Burgess, the balance of the property “ within named, viz. the lot .No. 16, &c. and negroes “ Ilarry and Polly being claimed by virtue of a deed of “trust, to secure the judgment of the Ncwbcrn Bank, “ and the other property within named, being covered by “ other deeds the same was not sold by me. T. Pullen, “ Sheriff.”
Upon the facts disclosed by the executions, &c. the Judge instructed the jury, that the plaintiffs had not pro-, duccd evidence to support their action; in submission to which opinion, the plaintiff submitted to judgment of nonsuit. A rule for a new trial being discharged, the plaintiffs appealed-
W. II. Haywood for the plaintiff.
Badger for the defendant.

Opinion:
Ruetin, Chief-Justice.'
I cannot think such a return as this evidence for the Sheriff. It is in his own discharge entirely; and is like one, that ho had paid the plaintiff the money — which surely would not be proof of the fact. If it be good that far, it is making it so altogether,* because it alleges a matter not susceptible of contradiction. The payment might have been in private; and so may the order for indulgence. It is but a slight inconvenience to the Sheriff, to call witnesses, or to take a permanent evidence in writing of tiic-fact; but if his own return Will do, it is opening the door to great abuses. It may be said that payment to the party is not an answer to the writ, but only an excuse for not making one. So is this; it is a reason why he did not execute the process, and not shewing how he has done it. In other cases, where his return has been held evidence, tiie question was either between third persons, between whom he stood indifferent, or when lie charged himself. If he returns satisfaction, he concludes all persons, because lie makes the debt his own. A return of a levy is evidence for him in an action of trover for the property seized, upon this ground. If he return a rescue, it is the same thing, because that does not excuse him, unless it be by the public enemies, which must bo a matter notorious, and then easily susceptible of proof by witnesses; and as to process upon it, the court only gives to such a return sufficient credence to grant the attachment, but not to convict or punish under it. Nulla bona is a negative return, and in its nature throws the proof on the other side, who must prove goods of the debtor, before he can subject the Sheriff no matter what the return was. In Gyfford v. Woodgate, 11 East. 297, the action was between the parties to the execution, between whom the Sheriff was indifferent. It does not follow, because his return was read in that suit, and indeed was part of the plaintiff's case, that it would have been received if the action had been against the Sheriff himself, for roa- king a second scisurc before be liad sold the property first seised. In Bradley v. Wyndham, 1 Wils. Rep. 44, the counsel for the Sheriff did not rely upon a return of ' the Sheriff, but proved the fact that the fraudulent in- * struclions were given by the plaintiff's attorney. And so in Smallcomb v. Buckingham, 1 Ld. Raym. 251, the Sheriff did not return, that the plaintiff did not apply for a warrant on his ft-fa. but showed the truth by other evidence and that the plaintiff in the other /a. proceeded to execute his writ. I admit that between the plaintiffs in the two writs, the return is evidence ; because if true, it ought to postpone the dilatory creditor ; and if tbc Sheriff cannot make it appear to be true, he is justly liable to the creditor, whose preferable right of satisfaction that return has postponed The truth is, that if the sheriff had returned nulla bona, as he may properly do, when the creditor postpones the sale and another then J . proceeds to sell, (which is the regular mode of making the return,) then the facts must have been proved by witnesses in justification of the Sheriff. Thequestion is, whether after .charging himself by the levy and entering it on his writ, he can discharge himself, not by entering nulla bona generally, which opens the whole ease to evidence on both sides, but by a special return of a private thing between him and the plaintiff, to which the other can probably have no opposing evidence. I think not. The Sheriffought to be held to a strict return according to the writ; or if he be permitted to excuse himself for not obeying its precept, he ought to he prepared to prove the excuse by other evidence than his own testimony. He now makes an affirmative return, which cannot well be negatived. No precedent in point is found ; and I think there ought to be a new trial.
maid bona is ProP,er T*íurn for a shewn, where one credit- or PostPones the then proceeds to the property™81*
Per Curiam. — Judgment reversed, and a new TRIAD GRANTED.