Case Name: Shirley CARROLL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. OTIS ELEVATOR COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1990-02-09
Citations: 896 F.2d 210
Docket Number: No. 89-1641
Parties: Shirley CARROLL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. OTIS ELEVATOR COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: Before EASTERBROOK and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges, and ESCHBACH, Senior Circuit Judge.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 896
Pages: 210–218

Head Matter:
Shirley CARROLL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. OTIS ELEVATOR COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 89-1641.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Argued Oct. 27, 1989.
Decided Feb. 9, 1990.
Mark Glass, Kirby Palmer, Carr, Korein, Schlichter, Kunin & Montroy, East St. Louis, Ill., for plaintiff-appellee.
Harold A. Donovan, Donovan, Rose, Nes-ter & Szewczyk, Richard E. Boyle, Gund-lach, Lee, Eggmann, Boyle & Roessler, Belleville, Ill., for defendant-appellant.
Before EASTERBROOK and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges, and ESCHBACH, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion:
ESCHBACH, Senior Circuit Judge.
This appeal arises from a diversity action in which a jury found the defendant Otis Elevator Company liable to pay the plaintiff Shirley Carroll damages in the amount of $42,899.51 for personal injuries she sustained while riding on an escalator manufactured by Otis. As its sole basis for appeal Otis asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in qualifying one of plaintiff's witnesses as an expert. Because the witness was qualified to give testimony which assisted the trier of fact, we affirm.
I.
On September 16, 1985 an unidentified child pushed the emergency stop button of the escalator on which the plaintiff, Shirley Carroll, was riding, causing her to fall and injure her knee. Carroll sued Otis Elevator Company, the manufacturer of the escalator, submitting strict liability in tort as a basis for recovery. The design defect asserted as part of this theory was that the escalator's "emergency stop button was unguarded and unreasonably attractive and operable by children."
In support of this assertion, the plaintiff called James Walker, an experimental psychologist, who testified that: red buttons attract small children, this button was unreasonably easy for a child to push, and that a covered stop button is less accessible to children than an uncovered stop button.
II.
The defendant's sole complaint on appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting plaintiffs witness, James Walker, to testify as an expert on the subject of escalator design. Walker's testimony is deprecated because he allegedly was permitted to testify outside his area of expertise and because the subject of'his testimony was not so distinctively related to some science as to be beyond the ken of the average juror.
Fed.R.Evid. 702 permits the trial court to admit the testimony of "a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education" if his expert testimony "will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." The decision to admit expert testimony is committed to the broad discretion of the trial court and its determination will be affirmed unless it is "manifestly erroneous." Bob Willow Motors Inc. v. General Motors, 872 F.2d 788, 797 (7th Cir.1989), citing Liquid Air Corp. v. Rogers, 834 F.2d 1297, 1308 (7th Cir.1987).
A.
Whether a witness is qualified as an expert can only be determined by comparing the area in which the witness has superior knowledge, skill, experience, or education with the subject matter of the witness's testimony. Gladhill v. General Motors Corp., 743 F.2d 1049, 1052 (4th Cir.1984). Though Walker's area of expertise is experimental psychology, which concerns the study of human behavior and experience, his testimony was limited to whether the design features of this allegedly defective escalator stop button would cause young children to push it more than the stop buttons of other escalators. Walker was qualified to opine on this subject because his area of expertise involves human behavior and perception, and his testimony related solely to the attractiveness and accessibility of the stop button to children.
Walker's testimony concerned three basic points. First he testified brightly colored, red objects attract small children. This elevator's red stop button was more brightly colored than others he had observed. Hence he concluded this stop button was more attractive to small children than others. Next he testified that a covered stop button is less accessible to children than this uncovered one. Finally he remarked that the more difficult a button is to push the less readily it is actuated by a small child, concluding that this button was unreasonably easy to push. These opinions were simple observations which required their declarant to have only some limited understanding of a human's visual perception and manual dexterity. Walker, whose specialty is visual perception, was eminently qualified to testify as an expert in this case.
B.
The plaintiff further asserts that even if qualified, Walker's testimony should not have been admitted because the subjects upon which he testified were within the ken of the average juror. Under Rule 702 expert opinion concerning matters about which jurors have general knowledge is admissible if the expert opinion "will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." "When opinions are excluded, it is because they are unhelpful and therefore superfluous and a waste of time." Fed.R.Evid. 702 advisory committee's note citing 7 Wig-more § 1918.
While it is true that one needn't be B.F. Skinner to know that brightly colored objects are attractive to small children and that covered buttons or those with significant resistance are more difficult to actuate by little hands, given our liberal federal standard, the trial court was not "manifestly erroneous" in admitting this testimony and its judgment is accordingly AFFIRMED.
. Suit was filed in the Circuit Court, Twentieth Judicial Circuit, St. Clair County, Illinois. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 the suit was removed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois which accepted jurisdiction of the case based on diversity of citizenship. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. A final judgment having been entered in the district court, we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.