Case Name: Glenys M. OLIVER v. WYANDOTTE INDUSTRIES CORPORATION &/or Travelers Insurance Company
Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court
Jurisdiction: Maine
Decision Date: 1973-07-31
Citations: 308 A.2d 860
Docket Number: 
Parties: Glenys M. OLIVER v. WYANDOTTE INDUSTRIES CORPORATION &/or Travelers Insurance Company.
Judges: Before DUFRESNE, C. J., and WEB-BER, WEATHERBEE, POMEROY, WERNICK and ARCHIBALD, JJ.
Reporter: West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 308
Pages: 860–872

Head Matter:
Glenys M. OLIVER v. WYANDOTTE INDUSTRIES CORPORATION &/or Travelers Insurance Company.
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.
July 31, 1973.
Perkins & Townsend by Clinton B. Townsend, George W. Perkins, Skowheg-na, for plaintiff.
Mahoney, Robinson, Mahoney & Norman by Robert F. Hanson, Portland, for defendant.
Before DUFRESNE, C. J., and WEB-BER, WEATHERBEE, POMEROY, WERNICK and ARCHIBALD, JJ.

Opinion:
WEATHERBEE, Justice.
On appeal from a pro forma decree denying workmen's compensation to appellant. The material facts are not in dispute.
On February 25, 1971 Petitioner left the plant where she was employed by Defendant corporation. She had completed her work for the day and was returning to her home. She entered her automobile in her employer's parking lot and drove about a quarter of a mile along a private road known as Head of the Falls Road which, although open to the public, was maintained and controlled by her employer. This road rises on an incline and passes through a railroad underpass immediately before it enters Front Street, a public street in Waterville. Front Street is a two lane road approximately 20 feet wide carrying one way traffic in a northerly direction and one emerging from the private road is required to make a right turn into the line of traffic flowing north. The private road was icy and slippery and there were high snowbanks at its intersection with Front Street. The Petitioner's car, while she was in the process of making this turn, was struck by a car proceeding on Front Street. There is no direct evidence as to whether or not any part of Petitioner's car remained on the private road at the moment of impact but there is evidence from which the Commissioner could reasonably infer that substantially all if not all of her car was on Front Street. Petitioner's car was hit on the left side and left front and the point of impact was very near the center line of the street. Moreover, Petitioner's own testimony lends support to this inference.
"Q. You were actually turning onto Front Street when you got hit, were you not?
A. Yes, but I had to go out there quite a ways to get on there.
Q. You had to ease out—
A. To see out around.
Q. You had to pull your car out onto Front Street to see?
A. Yes.
Q. And then you started — you didn't see anything, you started to turn and you were hit?
A. That's right."
It is at least clear that Petitioner was maneuvering to take a position in the line of traffic proceeding on Front Street at the time she was struck by the oncoming car.
The Petitioner, seeking compensation, contended that the location and condition of the private road combined with the presence of the high snowbanks at the intersection resulted in a blind and hazardous entrance onto Front Street. She testified that she was unable to ascertain whether traffic was approaching on Front Street until she had entered the street.
The Commissioner ruled during hearing that the condition of the private road approaching and at the intersection was not relevant to the issue of whether Petitioner's accident can be considered to have occurred in the course of and to have arisen out of her employment. He denied compensation ruling that "Petitioner was exposed to no greater risk than the public".
The issue of when an accident on the public highway may properly be said to arise out of and occur in the course of the employment has been before this Court several times.
This Court recognized in Roberts' Case, 124 Me. 129, 126 A. 573 (1924) that an injury suffered by an employee entering or leaving the premises of his employer on a way maintained by the employer to provide ingress or egress to the premises, or which the employer has the right to use for such purposes, is compensable. This position has been reaffirmed in Wheeler's Case, 131 Me. 91, 94, 159 A. 331 (1932) and in Dinsmore's Case, 143 Me. 344, 62 A.2d 205 (1948).
We have consistently recognized the principle that accidents occurring on the public streets when the employee is merely on his way to or from his place of employment are not compensable. While we have referred to this principle as the "public street" rule we have applied it not as a convenient arbitrary delineation of the outer limits of the employer's responsibility but with recognition that it is necessitated by the fact that when the employee is exposed to the same hazards, and no more, as other members of the travelling public the accident cannot have arisen out of the employment.
Our reluctance to extend the responsibility of the employer into the public way has been paralleled, however, by our acceptance of the truth that in certain fact situations the risks of employment may logically carry over after the employee has entered the public way.
This Court denied coverage in Rawson's Case, 126 Me. 563, 140 A. 365 (1928) to an employee who fell on an icy sidewalk on a public street while returning from his home during his lunch hour and carrying his employer's mail which he had received at the Post Office before arriving at his home. The Court recognized the general rule that an injury resulting from an accident in the public street is not compensable even though the injured person is on his way to or from work but acknowledged that there are exceptions to this rule. The Court noted four of them, but did not suggest that there were not others. The Court then found that "the present case does not fall within these exceptions" and concluded that when the Petitioner was in the street he was in no different position from that of any employee going to and from his home and his place of work.
In Babine v. Lane Construction Corporation, 153 Me. 339, 138 A.2d 625 (1958) we dealt with a situation in which Babine collided with his employer's truck while driving to work over a still uncompleted segment of the very highway in the construction of which he was then employed. The road had not been opened to public travel. We found that the risks to which Babine subjected himself were the hazards of construction which were inconsistent with the hazards of public travel. In analyzing the earlier cases of Dinsmore, Paulauskis and Kinslow, we noted that in each of those cases "the employee had left the zone of employment created risk and entered the area of common hazard, of risks shared equally by all members of the public".
We have not had occasion to examine a situation where the employee himself has left the employer's premises and is in the public street but is still actually within the area of employment risk and there was little if any precedent to guide the Commissioner in his evaluation of this evidence.
In Nelson v. City of St. Paul, 249 Minn. 53, 81 N.W.2d 272 (1957) the Petitioner was a teacher who was on her way to work and was walking along the public sidewalk adjacent to the school premises when she was struck by a ball which had been batted out of the school grounds by a student. The employer had contended that Petitioner's injury was not causally connected with her employment and that because the Petitioner was still outside of the geographical area of her employment when she was struck, her injury did not occur in the course of her employment. The Court rejected these arguments saying:
". . . In the instant case the injury-producing hazard, the batting of a ball, as a part of the game activities sponsored by the school for the children on its playground, originated on the premises of the employer. Employee's duties included the supervision of the children's playground activities. Clearly, her injury arose out of the employment.
It is enough here to hold, as we must clearly do under any reasonable application of the Workmen's Compensation Act, that whenever the hazards of employment spill over the boundary line and injure an employee on his way to work, his injury arises within the statutory space limitations of the employer's premises and is compensable as having arisen in the course of the employment. . . . " Nelson v. City of St. Paul, supra, 249 Minn, at 56, 81 N.W.2d at 276, 277.
It was the contention of the present Petitioner that the private way over which she travelled to reach the public street was so situated as to present her with a blind entrance to the public street which made it impossible for her to determine whether traffic was approaching from her left until she was actually so far into the street that she was already exposed to the danger. In the words of the Minnesota Court, she claimed that a hazard on the premises of the employer spilled over into the public street.
The Commissioner denied compensation, holding that:
"The general rule in Maine is that off-premises accidents are not compensa-ble. Wheeler's Case, 131 Me. 94, 159 A. 339. If the accident occurs while going to work or after leaving the premises, it is not compensable subject to the following exceptions: 1) where the employment requires the employee to travel on the highway; 2) where the employer contracts to and does furnish transportation to and from work; 3) where the employee is subject to emergency calls, as in the case of firemen; 4) where the employee is using the highway in doing something incidental to his employment, with the knowledge and approval of the employer. See Rawson's Case, 126 Me. 563, 140 A. 365."
We believe that the Commissioner's position on the state of the law excluded effective consideration of Petitioner's claim that a dangerous condition existed on the premises maintained by her employer to provide ingress to or egress from the place of work — to wit, a blind exit from the premises into the public street — which was a hazard not common to the travelling public and which was a cause of her accident.
In our opinion, the Petitioner's accident would be compensable if it is found that a condition existed on the employer's premises which made hazardous the employee's exit into the public street and was in fact a cause of the employee being injured after she had reached the street.
The entry will be:
Appeal sustained. Further ordered that an allowance of $350.00 to cover fees and expenses of counsel, plus cost of the record, be paid by the Defendants to the Petitioner.
DUFRESNE, C. J., concurs in result.
. Paulauskis' Case, 126 Me. 32, 135 A. 824 (1927); Kinslow's Case, 126 Me. 157, 136 A. 724 (1927); Ferreri's Case, 126 Me. 381, 138 A. 561 (1927); Raw-son's Case, 126 Me. 563, 140 A. 365 (1928); Wheeler's Case, 131 Me. 91, 159 A. 331 (1932); Dinsmore's Case, 143 Me. 344, 62 A.2d 205 (1948).
. We found such to have been the case where a fireman, subject to call at all times, was injured on his way home to lunch (Fogg's Case, 125 Me. 168, 132 A. 129 (1926)); where the employee was on his way to lunch in a conveyance furnished by the employer in order to save time (Beers' Case, 125 Me. 1, 130 A. 350 (1925)); where the agreement of employment provided that the employer would furnish transportation from the employee's home to the area where the daily work was to be performed, during which travel the employee was injured (Littlefield's Case, 126 Me. 159, 136 A. 724 (1927)); and, where the employee was using the public way in pursuance of his employment (Kimball's Case, 132 Me. 193, 168 A. 871 (1933)).
. "(1) Where the employment requires the employee to travel on the highway; (2) Where the employer contracts to and does furnish transportation to and from work; (3) Where the employee is subject to emergency calls, as in the case of the fireman; (4) Where the employee is using the highway in doing something incidental to his employment, with the knowledge and approval of the employer." In discussing the facts of Rawson we do not intend to suggest that today in a similar fact situation we might not conclude that such an employee had adequately brought himself within the protection of the fourth stated exception.