Case Name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Frederick Lamar CIVERS, Defendant-Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2002-01-10
Citations: 24 F. App'x 200
Docket Number: No. 01-4043
Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Frederick Lamar CIVERS, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 24
Pages: 200–201

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Frederick Lamar CIVERS, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 01-4043.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Submitted Dec. 18, 2001.
Decided Jan. 10, 2002.
E. Fitzgerald Parnell, III, Poyner & Spruill, L.L.P., Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Robert J. Conrad, Jr., United States Attorney, Brian L. Whisler, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Before WILKINS, NIEMEYER, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Frederick Lamar Givers appeals his conviction and 135 month sentence after pleading guilty to possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1994). Prior to entering into a written plea agreement, Givers filed a motion to suppress 28.2 grams of crack cocaine seized from his person and 177 grams of crack cocaine seized from the vehicle during a traffic stop, which the district court denied. Givers argues: (1) the district court committed error by denying his motion to suppress the evidence; (2) that 21 U.S.C. § 841 is unconstitutional in the wake of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000); and (3) the district court erred in sentencing him to a five-year term of supervised release. We affirm.
We review a district court's factual findings underlying its denial of a motion to suppress for clear error, while reviewing its legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 873 (4th Cir.1992). In addition, in reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. United States v. Seidman, 156 F.3d 542, 547 (4th Cir.1998). Under these standards, we conclude the district court properly denied Givers' motion to suppress evidence discovered in the course of a traffic stop and consensual search of his vehicle.
Next, Givers asserts § 841 is unconstitutional in the wake of Apprendi. This court recently held Apprendi does not render § 841 facially unconstitutional. United States v. McAllister, 272 F.3d 228, 230 (4th Cir.2001). Therefore, this issue lacks merit.
Finally, Givers asserts the district court erred in sentencing him to a five-year term of supervised release. Givers argues he was sentenced as if he had been convicted of an aggravated drug-trafficking offense under § 841(b)(1)(A), which carries a minimum supervised release term of five years. According to Givers, he should have been sentenced under § 841(b)(1)(C) and received a term of supervised release no longer than three years. We find this claim meritless. See United States v. Pratt, 239 F.3d 640, 647 n. 4 (4th Cir.2001).
For these reasons, we affirm Givers' conviction and sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not significantly aid in the decisional process.
AFFIRMED.
The plea agreement contains a conditional waiver of appeal that specifically permits Givers to seek appellate review of the district court's adverse ruling upon his motion to suppress.