Case Name: Ex parte GORE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1928-03-14
Citations: 4 S.W.2d 38
Docket Number: No. 11756
Parties: Ex parte GORE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 4
Pages: 38–39

Head Matter:
Ex parte GORE.
(No. 11756.)
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
March 14, 1928.
Gates & Swanger, of Huntsville, for applicant.
■ A. A. ,Dawson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

Opinion:
LATTIMORE, J.
By an original application for habeas corpus applicant seeks relief from confinement in the state penitentiary where he is held hy virtue of a final conviction of a felony.
On June 15, 1927, applicant began serving a sentence of 1 year in the penitentiary. Attaching to his application for habeas corpus a certificate of good conduct by the penitentiary authorities, he asserts that, under article' 6194 of the Revised Civil Statutes of 1925, he is entitled to 24 days' commutation for good behavior. Said article appears to grant 2 days per month for good conduct off the first year of a penitentiary sentence. Applicant also insists that, under the terms of article 962, 1925 C. C. P., he is entitled to have this court declare him entitled to a parole, and states in this connection that he has submitted his application for parole to the Governor of Texas and the honorable board of pardon advisers, and that they have declined summarily and without reason or explanation to grant him the desired parole. He prays that this court grant him relief.
Article 962, supra, when considered alone, seems to direct the parole of any prisoner in our penitentiary, who so desires, 3 months before the expiration of his time of service, after deducting from the sentence all commutations for good'behavior. Mathematical computation makes plain the fact that if applicant is entitled to 2 days' per month commutation for good behavior since June 15, 1927, and is also entitled to add to such commutation 90 days during which he is entitled to be paroled, he is now so entitled. Article 962 appears in our laws first in the Acts of the Thirty-Second Legislature, ch. 43, as part of section 3 of said chapter. Sections 1 and 2 of said chapter and act now appear in our statute as articles 959 and 960, respectively of our O. O. P. 1925. The last-mentioned two sections were parts of chapter 5, Acts of Hirst Called Session of Thirty-Third Legislature in 1913, which act was enacted to take the place of chapter 132, Acts Regular Session of Thirty-Third Legislature, which latter act was held violative of our Constitution in Ex parte Marshall, 72 Tex. Cr. R. 83, 161 S. W. 112. From the caption of said chapter 5 we learn that its purpose was to amend chapter 132 of the Acts of the Regular Session, supra. Section 2 of said chapter 5, supra, now article 959, C. C. P. 1925, reads as follows:
"Meritorious prisoners who may be in prison under a sentence to penal servitude may be allowed to go upon parole, outside of the building and. jurisdiction of the penitentiary authorities, subject to the provisions of this title,, and to such regulations and conditions as may be made hy the board of prison commissioners, with the approval of the Governor. Such parol shall he made only by the Governor, or with his approval.''
It is perfectly manifest that it is the duty of this court to look to all parts of a legislative act as originally enacted in order to properly construe the law, even though cpdifiers or some subsequent Legislature should separate the different sections of such act so that they appear in different parts of our statute. It is plain that article 962 must be construed in connection with article 959 just quoted. In Ex parte Nelson, 84 Tex. Cr. R. 570, 209 S. W. 148, we substantially held in line with the declaration of said article 959, supra, that the power to parole, to pardon, etc., is one confided by our Constitution to the Governor of this state, over whose discretion in such matters this court has no control or right of review. To discuss the matter at length or attempt to cite authorities would be but putting ourselves to the useless task of explaining that which is already plain; that is, that the power to parole is not one within the control of this court, but is inherent in the office of Governor. It being admitted that an application for parole has been presented to the Governor and by him-refused, there appears no ground given by the statute to applicant for standing upon his application here.
The writ of habeas corpus will be denied.