Case Name: INTERLACHEN LAKES ESTATES, INC., and Norservice, Inc., Florida corporations, Plaintiffs, v. Clinton R. SNYDER, Jr., as Tax Assessor of Putnam County, Florida, Defendant
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1973-09-12
Citations: 304 So. 2d 433
Docket Number: No. 43311
Parties: INTERLACHEN LAKES ESTATES, INC., and Norservice, Inc., Florida corporations, Plaintiffs, v. Clinton R. SNYDER, Jr., as Tax Assessor of Putnam County, Florida, Defendant.
Judges: CARLTON, C. J., and ADKINS and McCAIN, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 304
Pages: 433–438

Head Matter:
INTERLACHEN LAKES ESTATES, INC., and Norservice, Inc., Florida corporations, Plaintiffs, v. Clinton R. SNYDER, Jr., as Tax Assessor of Putnam County, Florida, Defendant.
No. 43311.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Sept. 12, 1973.
On Rehearing Dec. 9, 1974.
Edward E. Hedstrom, of Dowda, Hed-strom & Fields, Palatka, for plaintiff.
Kate L. Walton, Palatka, for defendant.

Opinion:
ERVIN, Justice.
Pursuant to Florida Appellate Rule 4.6, 32 F.S.A., the Honorable W. L. Wads-worth, Judge of the Circuit Court of Putnam County, has certified to this Court the following questions:
"QUESTION I: Whether valuation of lands which have been subdivided into lots by a duly recorded plat and which remain unsold by the original subdivider by the tax assessor for tax assessment purposes on the same basis as any un-platted acreage of similar character until sixty percent of such lands included in one plat shall have been sold as individual lots violates the provision of Section 2 of Article VII of the Florida Constitution of 1968 requiring that all ad valo-rem taxation shall be at a uniform rate within each taxing unit (except taxes on intangible personal property).
"QUESTION II: Whether such valuation for tax assessment purposes violates the provision of Section 4 of Article VII requiring that by general law regulations shall be prescribed which shall secure a just valuation of all property for ad va-lorem taxation (except agricultural or recreational lands and except tangible personal property held for sale as stock in trade and livestock).
"QUESTION III: If the foregoing questions are answered in the negative whether the tax assessor in assessing the unsold lots on the same basis as unplat-ted acreage of similar character may consider any or all of the following improvements as affecting valuation of the unsold area, to-wit:
"1. Survey and platting of area.
"2. Clearing, grading or paving of roads in the area.
"3. Availability of utilities to the unsold lots.
"4. Advertising and promotional costs.
"5. Qualification with the Florida Land Sales Board."
QUESTIONS I and II relate to the constitutionality of Florida Stat. § 195.062(1), F.S.A., which reads in part:
". . . [The tax assessor's manual of instructions] shall provide that platted lands unsold as lots shall be valued for tax assessment purposes on the same basis as any unplatted acreage of similar character until 60 per cent of such lands included in one plat shall have been sold as individual lots."
We need only specifically to answer one of the three questions, and that is Number II. Since we answer this question affirmatively, Number III is irrelevant. Since we hold that § 195.062(1) violates the constitutional provision requiring just valuation of all property for ad valorem taxation, we need not also consider Question I. Basically, Question I simply presents the additional problem of whether there can ever be an effectively equal rate of taxation, as required by the Constitution, when property valuation is unequal.
Article VII, Section 4, of the 1968 Florida Constitution, F.S.A. provides:
"By general law regulations shall be prescribed which shall secure a just valuation of all property for ad valorem taxation, provided:
"(a) Agricultural land or land used exclusively for non-commercial recreational purposes may be classified by general law and assessed solely on the basis of character or use.
"(b) Pursuant to general law tangible personal property held for sale as stock in trade and livestock may be valued for taxation at a specified percentage of its value." (Emphasis supplied.)
This section is different from the prior "just valuation clause" contained in Article IX, Section 1 of the 1885 Florida Constitution, in that the two subsections were added by the 1968 constitutional revisers. Apparently the revisers felt that the four classes of property mentioned in these two subsections should be valued according to different standards than all other property. The rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius applies, however, so that by clear implication no separate standards for valuation may be established for any other classes of property.
Under the 1885 Constitution, we had held that the legislature could tax different classes of property on different bases, as long as the classification was reasonable. Lanier v. Overstreet, 175 So.2d 521 (Fla.1965). The people of this State, however, by enumerating in their new Constitution which classifications they want, have removed from the legislature the power to make others.
It is true that the constitutional provision allows the Legislature to prescribe regulations for the purpose of securing a just valuation of all property, but such regulations must apply to all property and not to any one particular class. The regula tions contemplated by the Constitution are those which establish the criteria for valuing- property; and all property — save those four classes specifically enumerated in the Constitution — must be measured under the same criteria.
The statute we are examining here is a classification for taxation purposes, which is impermissible under Article VII, Section 4, Florida Constitution. The statute classifies property based on the ownership thereof, a classification which we might have found to be in violation of the 1885 Constitution as well, as being unreasonable, arbitrary, and not related to any valid legislative purpose.
If the statute applied to all property and could be considered as merely establishing one criterion for determining value, it would still not survive because it is so unreasonable and arbitrary.
The effect of the statute is to give a subdivision developer a tax break by treating his unsold lots as unplatted for tax valuation purposes until he sells sixty per cent of his lots, while all of the purchasers of his lots are not so favored. The statute also discriminates between subdividers who have sold sixty per cent of their lots and those who haven't.
It is true that at some point in the development of most subdivisions the character of the land therein changes and the lots may increase, in value, but the change is not dependent on who owns the lots. Indeed, in some subdivisions, such a change might not occur until long after all the lots have been sold by the developers. Any change in the value of lots in a subdivision can be measured by the same criteria used for other lands — the presence of roads, sewers, and telephone connections; im provements; the location; and many other factors, including those listed in Fla.Stat. § 193.011, F.S.A. Ownership in one party or another, however, would not be a valid criterion.
This Court has in the past pointed out the fundamental unfairness of statutorily manipulating assessment standards and criteria to favor certain taxpayers over others. See Walter v. Schuler, 176 So.2d 81 (Fla.1965); Franks v. Davis, 145 So.2d 228 (Fla.1962); and Schleman v. Connecticut General Life, 151 Fla. 96, 9 So.2d 197 (1942).
We find it impossible to consider Fla. Stat. § 195.062(1), F.S.A., as establishing a proper valuation criterion. The statute does no more than establish a classification of property to be valued on a different standard than all other property. Under the 1968 Constitution, Article VII, Section 4, this is no longer within the prerogative of the legislature to do.
Certified Question No. II is, therefore, answered in the affirmative. Questions I and III become irrelevant, and are not addressed. This cause is herewith remanded to the Circuit Court of Putnam County.
This decision operates prospectively from the date the opinion becomes final because persons relying on the state statute did so assuming it to be valid despite the new provisions of the 1968 State Constitution. Compare Gulesian v. Dade County School Board, Fla., 281 So.2d 325, opinion filed July 31, 1973, and City of Naples v. Conboy, 182 So.2d 412 at 417 et seq.
It is so ordered.
CARLTON, C. J., and ADKINS and McCAIN, JJ., concur.
BOYD, J., dissents with opinion.
DEKLE, J., dissents.