Case Name: DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Appellant/Cross Appellee, v. Linda McGHEE, Appellee/Cross Appellant
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1995-04-13
Citations: 653 So. 2d 1091
Docket Number: No. 93-3757
Parties: DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Appellant/Cross Appellee, v. Linda McGHEE, Appellee/Cross Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 653
Pages: 1091–1101

Head Matter:
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Appellant/Cross Appellee, v. Linda McGHEE, Appellee/Cross Appellant.
No. 93-3757.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
April 13, 1995.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Laura Rush, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellant/cross appellee.
Jack W. Shaw, Jr. of Osborne, McNatt, Shaw, O’Hara, Brown & Obringer, P.A., Jacksonville, for Florida Defense Lawyers Ass’n, amicus curiae.
Louis K. Rosenbloum and Virginia M. Buchanan of Levin, Middlebrooks, Mabie, Thomas, Mayes & Mitchell, P.A., Pensacola, Dawn Wiggins Hare of Hare and Hare, Mon-roeville, AL, for appellee/cross appellant.
Joel S. Perwin of Podhurst, Orseck, Josefs-berg, Eaton, Meadow, Olin <& Perwin, P.A., Miami, for Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers, amicus curiae.

Opinion:
WOLF, Judge.
The Department of Corrections (DOC) appeals from a final judgment awarding damages in a negligence action in favor of Linda McGhee (appellee). The appellant raises four issues on appeal; appellee filed a cross appeal which raises one issue. As a result of our disposition, it is only necessary for us to rule on two issues raised by appellant: (1) Whether the trial court erred in determining that the law of Florida rather than the law of Mississippi applied in determining whether DOC could be held hable as a result of criminal acts of escaped convicts, and (2) whether the trial court erred in determining that DOC owed a duty to appehee under the circumstances of this case.
We find that the trial court did not err in applying Florida law in determining whether the Florida DOC could be held hable as a result of alleged negligence occurring in Florida. We do find, however, that no common law or statutory duty existed in favor of appellee or her deceased husband, and reverse the final judgment. We also certify the same question which was certified in State of Florida, Dep't of Corrections v. Vann, 650 So.2d 658 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), as being one of great public importance.
John Fred Woolard and Dempsey Alexander Bruner escaped from the custody of DOC while being taken to the doctor for an eye examination. The escapees fled from Florida to Alabama and ultimately to Mississippi where they were responsible for the shooting of appellee's husband, a park ranger. Appel-lee filed suit against DOC, alleging that the agency was negligent in its care, supervision, and control of Woolard and Bruner, and that as a result of such negligence, the inmates escaped on May 24, 1990, and thereafter caused the death of Robert McGhee, Jr., her husband, on May 26, 1990. DOC moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the law of Mississippi rather than Florida should determine the rights and liabilities of the parties, and that Mississippi law did not recognize liability under these circumstances. Following the submission of written memo-randa of law by the parties and a hearing, the trial court denied the motion on a finding that Florida had the most significant relationship with the events and occurrences surrounding the claim. Prior to trial, the parties submitted written memoranda of law pertaining to the issue of whether DOC owed a duty of care to the decedent. At the close of McGhee's case, DOC moved for a directed verdict on grounds that DOC did not owe a duty of care to the decedent as a matter of law, relying on arguments set forth in its memorandum of law. The court denied the motion. DOC's timely motion for a new trial on the same grounds was also denied. The jury returned a verdict in favor of appellee.
Mississippi, like Florida, follows the "significant relationships" or "center of gravity" test from the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145, et seq. (1971), for choice of law decisions in tort cases. The focus of the significant contacts analysis is as to the particular issue which is to be decided rather than the ease as a whole.
Section 146 of the Restatement provides: In an action for personal injury, the local law of the state where the injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties, unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship under the principles stated in § 6 to the occurrence and the parties, in which event the local law of the other state will be applied.
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 146 (1971) (emphasis added). Following the Restatement's mandate, the Mississippi Supreme Court has specifically ruled that the center of gravity test followed in that state may require application of the law of different jurisdictions to different issues within the same ease:
First, the law of a single state does not necessarily control every issue in a given case. We apply the center of gravity test to each question presented, recognizing that the answer produced in some instances may be that the law of this state applies and on other questions in the same case the substantive law of another state may be enforceable.
Boardman v. United Services Automobile Ass'n, 470 So.2d 1024, 1031 (Miss.1985). See also Hanley v. Forester, 903 F.2d 1030, 1032 (5th Cir.1990) (Mississippi "center of contacts test may be applied in piecemeal fashion such that in a single case, the law of one state may be applied to one issue in the case while the law of another state may apply to another issue in the case depending upon which state has the most significant contacts with respect to each particular issue.")
Florida follows the same rule applicable in Mississippi. In Stallworth v. Hospitality Rentals, Inc., 515 So.2d 413 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), following section 146 of the Restatement, this court stated,
The Restatement's significant relationships test does not require the court to evaluate the recited contacts with a view to determine which state's local law should be applied to all issues in the case as a whole; rather, the contacts must be evaluated with respect to the particular issue under consideration.
Stallworth at 413 (emphasis added).
DOC's emphasis upon the situs of the injury, Mississippi, is misplaced because the location of the injury is unrelated to the issues of sovereign immunity and duty. DOC's immunity was determined by deciding whether its conduct in allowing the inmates to escape could result in liability for the criminal conduct of the escapee. All facts relevant to the issue of immunity and duty were centered in the state of Florida, and the state of Mississippi had no relationship to any of DOC's activities giving rise to its potential liability.
The determination of whether a state agency may be held liable for its conduct within the state of Florida is properly determined pursuant to Florida law.
While we have no problem with the trial court's decision to apply Florida law, we do find that it was error to find that DOC could be held liable for the criminal conduct of escapees. The trial court did not have the benefit of this court's recent decision in Vann, supra, at the time it was faced with this issue. We find that Vann is controlling, and that under the rationale stated in the opinion, DOC could not be held liable under these circumstances. We, therefore, reverse the final judgment and direct the trial court to enter a final judgment in favor of appellant. As in Vann, however, we certify the following question to be one of great public importance:
WHETHER THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS MAY BE HELD LIABLE AS A RESULT OF THE CRIMINAL ACTS OF AN ESCAPED PRISONER?
MINER, J., concurs.
ERVIN, J., concurs and dissents with written opinion.