Case Name: Vessie Lynn LEE v. STATE of Mississippi
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2006-12-07
Citations: 944 So. 2d 35
Docket Number: No. 2004-CT-00542-SCT
Parties: Vessie Lynn LEE v. STATE of Mississippi.
Judges: SMITH, C.J., WALLER AND COBB, P.JJ., CARLSON AND RANDOLPH, JJ., CONCUR. EASLEY, J., SPECIALLY CONCURS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY WALLER, P.J., CARLSON, DICKINSON AND RANDOLPH, JJ. DIAZ, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY GRAVES, J.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 944
Pages: 35–47

Head Matter:
Vessie Lynn LEE v. STATE of Mississippi.
No. 2004-CT-00542-SCT.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Dec. 7, 2006.
Matthew Warren Kitchens, attorney for appellant.
Office of the Attorney General by Deirdre McCrory, attorneys for appellee.

Opinion:
DICKINSON, Justice,
for the Court.
¶ 1. The Madison County Grand Jury indicted Vessie Lynn Lee for statutory rape (two counts), sexual battery (four counts), and gratification of lust (four counts) for engaging in sexual activities with a minor during a nine-month period which began when the child was twelve years old. The jury found Lee guilty, and we referred his appeal to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the conviction. Although we agree with the Court of Appeals' disposition of this case, we granted certiorari to clear up an apparent inconsistency in our precedent. The two issues presented for our review are whether an amendment to Lee's indictment was proper, and whether the trial court erred in refusing to allow a defense witness to impeach a prosecution witness.
BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
¶ 2. The twelve-year-old female victim lived down the street from Lee in a subdivision in Madison, Mississippi. She knew the Lee family and routinely baby-sat for Lee's small children. She testified that around August 2001, Lee began approaching her in a sexual manner. Lee's advances were initially limited to forced touching, but they soon progressed to forced oral sex and, eventually, non-consensual sexual intercourse. The victim testified that after each encounter, Lee told her not to tell anyone what happened, warning her that no one would believe her and that he would kill himself if she said anything. These events occurred over a nine month period, concluding in February 2002, when the victim finally told her track coach about the sexual assaults. Her family informed the police, and Lee was arrested.
¶ 3. After a five-day trial, a jury found Lee guilty and convicted him on all counts. The trial court fixed Lee's punishment at two life sentences, four thirty-year sentences, and three fifteen-year sentences. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences. Lee v. State, No.2004-KA-00542-COA, 944 So.2d 56, 2005 WL 3111989, 2005 Miss.App. LEXIS 918 (Miss.Ct.App. Nov.22, 2005). We thereafter granted Lee's Petition for Certiorari Review.
DISCUSSION
I.
¶ 4. Lee argues the trial court erroneously allowed the State to amend the indictment on the morning of trial. Counts III through VI of the original indictment alleged four separate instances of sexual battery with a child in violation of subsection (l)(d) of Miss.Code Ann. Section 97-3-95. However, each of these counts included the phrase "without her consent," an element of subsection (l)(a). Four days before trial, Lee filed a motion to quash counts III through VI of the indictment, claiming they tracked the language of both subsections (l)(a) and (l)(d), and thus did not provide him sufficient notice of the charged crime. The statute provides, in relevant part:
(1) A person is guilty of sexual battery if he or she engages in sexual penetration with:
(a) Another person without his or her consent;
(b) A mentally defective, mentally incapacitated or physically helpless person;
(c) A child at least fourteen (14) but under sixteen (16) years of age, if the person is thirty-six (36) or more months older than the child; or
(d) A child under the age of fourteen (Ik) years of age, if the person is twenty-four (21f) or more months older than the child.
Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-95 (emphasis added).
¶ 5. The Court of Appeals properly held that the trial court did not commit error by allowing the State to amend the indictment and remove the phrase "without her consent." However, this Court has followed two lines of analysis when addressing whether the removal of excess words in an indictment is proper.
¶ 6. Our precedent establishes that "sur-plusage" in an indictment may be removed without prejudice to the defendant. See, e.g., Mixon v. State, 921 So.2d 275, 279-80 (Miss.2005); Schloder v. State, 310 So.2d 721, 723-24 (Miss.1975); Sullivan v. Cook, 218 So.2d 879, 880-81 (Miss.1969). However, in Richmond v. State, 751 So.2d 1038, 1046 (Miss.1999), this Court held that the State was required to prove an unnecessary element alleged in the indictment. We find it appropriate to now clarify our holding in Richmond so that it is not misread as inconsistent with our precedent concerning motions to amend indictments to remove surplusage.
II.
¶ 7. Defendants in criminal cases have a constitutionally protected right to be informed of the nature and cause of charges brought against them. U.S. Const, amend. VI & XIV; Miss. Const, art. 3, § 26. See also Jones v. State, 856 So.2d 285, 289 (Miss.2003). This requires that an indictment describe with precision and certainty each element of the offense charged. Peterson v. State, 671 So.2d 647, 653 (Miss.1996) (citing Love v. State, 211 Miss. 606, 611, 52 So.2d 470, 472 (1951)).
¶ 8. Lee directs us to our language in Richmond, whereby we held that "the State handicapped itself through th[e] indictment by adding an unnecessary element of proof." 751 So.2d at 1046. Thus, Lee argues, the State should be precluded from amending his indictment. Although this Court's holding in Richmond seems, at first blush, inconsistent with other cases, cited infra, where we held that mere surplusage may be removed from an indictment by amendment, Lee's case is easily distinguishable. We shall first address the holding in Richmond.
¶ 9. In Richmond, the defendant was charged with motor vehicle theft. Id. at 1042. The indictment included a dollar amount for the vehicle, which was not a necessary element under the statute. Id. This Court stated that "[hjaving specifically informed Richmond of the offense charged, as well as the detailed code section number, the State handicapped itself through this indictment by adding an unnecessary element of proof." Id. at 1046. Lee interprets this language to mean that any indictment which includes an unnecessary element cannot be amended, and the State is required, as a matter of law, to prove the unnecessary element. However, Lee completely misreads the import of our holding in Richmond.
¶ 10. Richmond was clearly on notice of the charge against him. The indictment charged him with motor vehicle theft under Miss.Code Ann. Section 97-17-42, a crime which does not require proof of any specific value. Id. at 1042. Nevertheless, the indictment alleged that the vehicle taken by Richmond had a "total value of more than $250.00." Id. Prior to trial, the State moved to amend the indictment by removing the language relating to the value of the automobile. Id. Richmond objected and moved to quash. Id. at 1042-43. Referring to the requested amendment as "substantive," the trial court refused to allow the State to amend. Id. at 1046. The trial went forward, and the State presented proof that the value of the vehicle exceeded $250.00. Id. at 1049. Richmond was convicted of motor vehicle theft. Id. at 1050.
¶ 11. The trial court in Richmond would have committed no abuse of discretion had it found that the language related to value was mere surplusage and allowed the State to amend the indictment by removing the language. However, the trial court refused to allow the State to amend and required the State to prove not only the elements of motor vehicle theft, but also the additional element of value. Id. at 1046. During the discussion of jury instructions, the prosecutor succinctly summed up the State's position:
Your honor will recall that before the trial started, the State made a motion to amend out of the indictment the allegation of value in excess of $250 as being surplusage under the Motor Vehicle Theft Statute.

. for this trial, the State made a motion to amend it out, to make it conform with the exact amount of proof. Defense objected to that amount and allowed it to remain in there. They said they wanted that additional burden in there. Your honor then stated that since the State had voluntarily put that additional element on itself, we should continue to have to bare it, and we did.

What I may have said we were trying is of no moment. The State is bound by the indictment, which was an allegation of motor vehicle theft with the additional element, the unnecessary additional element which we had to prove — and did— beyond a reasonable doubt of a value of more than $250. Any embarrassment or trouble at trial caused to the defendant was caused by the defendant's prevailing on his opposition to our motion to amend. If this was a wound to the defendant, it was, your Honor, a self-inflicted wound.
Id. at 1044.
¶ 12. In Richmond, this Court was not presented (as we are today) with the question of whether an amendment to the indictment by removal of surplusage was appropriate. Thus, in the Richmond this Court had no need to address or discuss our precedent which analyzes the removal of surplusage and sets forth the test therefor. Accordingly, Richmond does not serve as precedent for the issue of whether a motion to amend an indictment should be granted or denied. Rather, Richmond remains authority in cases where the indictment includes surplusage which was not removed prior to trial.
¶ 13. The requested amendment in Richmond would easily have met the test for amendments to indictments espoused in Griffin v. State, 584 So.2d 1274, 1275-76 (Miss.1991) (discussed infra), and the trial court would have been fully justified in allowing the State to amend. However, because the Richmond trial court denied the State's motion to amend the indictment, the issue in that case is different from the issue before us today. We must therefore analyze this case by evaluating whether the amendment to the indictment violated Lee's constitutional right to a fair trial.
III.
¶ 14. In many instances, mere "surplus-age" may be stricken from an indictment without any prejudice to the defendant. For example, in Mixon, the defendant was charged with motor vehicle theft, but the indictment included the word "feloniously," an element under the grand larceny statute. 921 So.2d at 279. This Court held removal of the felonious intent language was proper. Id. at 280. Similarly, in Schloder, the indictment charged that the defendant "did willfully, unlawfully and fe-loniously possess more than one ounce of marijuana with intent to sell . " 310 So.2d at 722 (emphasis in original). The defendant argued that "there is no such offense in the State of Mississippi as possessing marijuana with intent to sell." Id. We pointed out that the relevant statute made it
unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally possess more than one ounce of marijuana and prescribe[d] as a penalty therefor a fine of $3,000 or imprisonment in the state penitentiary for not more than three years, or both. Therefore, the demurrer was properly overruled since the indictment charged appellant with the crime of possession of more than one ounce of marijuana. The words 'with intent to sell' were surplus-age. .
Id. at 723-24.
¶ 15. Additionally, and more on point with the present case, the defendant in Simmons v. State, 109 Miss. 605, 614, 68 So. 913, 914 (1915), was indicted for statutory rape. This Court held that the language "without her consent" in the indictment was mere surplusage that could properly be removed without prejudicing the defendant. Id. at 915.
¶ 16. In analyzing the amendment to an indictment against the previously mentioned background of constitutional protection, we look first to our Uniform Rules of Circuit and County Court Practice. Rule 7.09 provides that "[a]ll indictments may be amended as to form but not as to the substance of the offense charged." The rule further states that an "[a]mendment shall be allowed only if the defendant is afforded a fair opportunity to present a defense and is not unfairly surprised." Moreover, where a defect of substance exists, the indictment must be corrected by the grand jury. Spann v. State, 771 So.2d 883, 898 (Miss.2000). Amendments to an indictment are permissible if they do not prejudice the defendant by (1) materially altering the essential facts of the offense or (2) materially altering a defense under the original indictment. Griffin, 584 So.2d at 1275-76. Thus, taken together, this authority sets forth the following test for analyzing an amendment to an indictment for the purpose of removing sur-plusage: (1) the removal of the surplus-age must not change the substance of the offense charged; (2) the defendant must be afforded a fair opportunity to present a defense and must not be unfairly surprised; (3) the removal of the surplusage must not materially alter the essential facts of the offense; and (4) the removal of the surplusage must not alter a defense under the original indictment. Applying each part of the test, it is clear that the trial court did not err in amending Lee's indictment.
(1) The removal of the surplusage must not change the substance of the offense charged.
¶ 17. Lee was indicted under Section 97-3-95 of the Mississippi Code, which addresses the crime of sexual battery. Subsection (1) of that statute provides four separate and alternative acts, any one of which constitutes a violation of the statute. Lee was indicted and ultimately convicted under the fourth alternative, subsection (l)(d), which charged that Lee engaged in sexual penetration with "a child under the age of fourteen (14) years of age, if the person is twenty-four (24) or more months older than the child." The surplusage in the indictment was the inclusion of an additional alternative act which, if proven, would constitute a separate and additional violation of the same statute.
¶ 18. Specifically, the indictment, before it was amended, included the language, "without her consent." The first alternative under the statute provides that a person is guilty of sexual battery by engaging in sexual penetration with "[ajnother person without his or her consent." Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-95(l)(a). Stated another way, the original indictment charged that Lee committed two separate acts of sexual battery, one under subsection 1(a) and one under subsection 1(d).
¶ 19. Lee was fully on notice of both claims. The fact that the trial court allowed the State to amend the indictment and remove one of the claims is no more prejudicial to Lee than if the two claims of violation had been charged under two separate counts in the indictment, with the trial court later dismissing one of the counts. By allowing the amendment to the indictment which removed the claim that Lee engaged in sexual relations with the victim "without her consent," the State's burden of proof as to the charge that Lee engaged in sexual penetration with a child under the age of fourteen, when Lee was twenty-four or more months older than the child, did not change. Likewise, Lee's defense to this charge did not change. Thus, the amendment did not alter the substance of the offense charged, and the first prong of the test allowing the amendment is satisfied.
(2) The defendant must be afforded a fair opportunity to present a defense and must not be unfairly surprised.
¶ 20. There is no allegation, suggestion, or evidence in this case that Lee was not afforded the opportunity to defend the claim. Although Lee may validly assert he was surprised that the State moved to amend the indictment and remove the claim that his sexual relations with the child were without her consent, his surprise cannot be characterized as "unfair." The net effect of the amendment was that Lee only had to defend one claim that he violated the statute, rather than two. Thus, the second prong of the test allowing the amendment is met.
(3) The removal of the surplusage must not materially alter the essential facts of the offense.
¶ 21. The essential facts of the offense, that is, that Lee engaged in sexual penetration with a child under the age of fourteen at a time when Lee was twenty-four or more months older than the child, were the same at the time of conviction as at the time of indictment. Thus, the third prong of the test allowing the amendment is satisfied.
(k) The removal of the surplusage must not alter a defense under the original indictment.
¶ 22. As previously discussed, Lee was originally indicted for violating the statute in two separate and distinct ways. The removal of the surplusage did not alter Lee's defense to the claim which remained after the amendment. Thus, the fourth prong of the test allowing the amendment is met.
¶23. For the reasons stated, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the amendment to remove the surplusage from the indictment.
IV.
¶ 24. Lee also argues that the trial court erred when it refused to allow a defense witness to impeach a prosecution witness. A careful review of the record reveals that the testimony Lee sought to impeach was a collateral matter, and the trial court was well within its discretion to refuse to allow Lee to call the impeachment witness.
¶ 25. One of the State's witnesses, Connie Evans, testified concerning certain observations she made of Lee and the victim together. On cross-examination, Evans admitted that she distrusted men, that her daughter had been sexually molested, and that she had said as much to her family. She denied, however, also telling these things to her neighbor, who coincidentally happened to be Lee's wife. Lee then offered his wife to testify that Evans did, in fact, tell her these things that she had admittedly told her family.
¶26. Lee did not offer his wife as an impeachment witness to contradict whether Evans distrusted men or whether her daughter had been molested. Instead, Lee's attorney asked Evans whether she had told these things to Lee's wife, and Evans said she had not. Lee's attorney then sought to call Lee's wife to show that Evans had, in fact, told her these things. Thus, the matter to be impeached was not the crucial testimony that Evans distrusted men or that her daughter had been molested. Instead, the matter to be impeached was whether Evans had stated these things to a neighbor. The story Evans allegedly told to the neighbor was consistent with her testimony at trial. It is also important to note that Evans admitted telling her family. She simply denied that she also told Lee's wife. Thus, whether or not Evans actually spoke to Lee's wife is a collateral issue to which impeachment evidence is not allowed.
Price v. Simpson, 205 So.2d 642, 643 (Miss.1968).
¶ 27. The trial court recoril reflects the following relevant portion of Evans's testimony:
Defense: In that conversation — in a conversation with her after that date, did you tell her that you did not trust men?
Evans: No.
Defense: Never told her that?
Evans: No.
Prosecution: Was that did not trust "me", Mr. Rainer or "men"?
Defense: Did not trust "men."
Defense: Did you tell her in that same conversation that you didn't trust men because your daughter had been sexually molested?
Evans: No.
Prosecution: Your Honor, objection to relevancy.
The Court: I'm going to let him ask those questions.
Evans: No.
Defense: You didn't tell her that? You didn't tell her that your ex-husband had molested your daughter?
Prosecution: Objection, Your Honor.
The Court: Counsel Approach.
(Bench Conference)
Defense: So you deny having made those statements to Mrs. Lee?
Evans: I would never discuss that with anyone but my family.
Defense: So you have discussed it with someone, though, haven't you?
Evans: Never Mrs. Lee. Never anybody in my neighborhood.
Defense: But you have discussed it with other people?
Evans: My family.
Evans did not deny that her daughter had been molested or that she distrusted men. In fact, Evans was never even asked these questions during her cross-examination. Therefore, to allow the defense attorney to impeach Evans as to whether or not Evans told Mrs. Lee she "distrusted men" and "her daughter had been molested" is impermissible the issue is collateral.
¶ 28. Addressing collateral matters, this Court has established that a statement is collateral if it is not "one embodying a fact substantive in its nature and relevant to the issue made in the case." Williams v. State, 73 Miss. 820, 824, 19 So. 826, 827 (1896). In other words, a matter is collateral when it is not directly relevant to the issues in the case. Whether Evans distrusted men due to her daughter's molestation is relevant to show bias, but whether or not Evans conveyed that distrust to Lee's wife has nothing whatsoever to do with her bias. Whether or not Evans told her neighbor she "distrusted men" and "her daughter had been molested" is not directly relevant to the issues in this case.
¶ 29. Because the testimony sought to be impeached was a collateral matter, the trial court correctly refused to allow Lee to call his wife to impeach Evans.
CONCLUSION
¶ 30. Because the amendment to the indictment merely allowed the removal of surplusage, and because the trial court was correct in refusing to allow Lee the opportunity to impeach the State's witness on a collateral matter, we affirm the judgments of the Court of Appeals and the circuit court.
¶ 31. COUNTS I AND II: CONVICTIONS OF STATUTORY RAPE AND SENTENCES OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, AFFIRMED. COUNTS I AND II SHALL RUN CONCURRENTLY. COUNTS III, IV, V AND VI: CONVICTIONS OF SEXUAL BATTERY AND SENTENCE OF THIRTY (30) YEARS ON EACH COUNT IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, AFFIRMED. SENTENCES SHALL RUN CONCURRENTLY TO EACH OTHER BUT CONSECUTIVELY TO THE TERM OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT ORDERED IN COUNTS I AND II. COUNTS VII, IX AND X: CONVICTIONS OF GRATIFICATION OF LUST AND SENTENCE OF FIFTEEN (15) YEARS ON EACH COUNT IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, AFFIRMED. SENTENCES SHALL RUN CONCURRENTLY TO EACH OTHER BUT CONSECUTIVELY TO THE TERM OF LIFE ORDERED IN COUNTS I AND II AND THE THIRTY (30) YEARS ORDERED IN COUNTS, III, IV, V AND VI.
SMITH, C.J., WALLER AND COBB, P.JJ., CARLSON AND RANDOLPH, JJ., CONCUR. EASLEY, J., SPECIALLY CONCURS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY WALLER, P.J., CARLSON, DICKINSON AND RANDOLPH, JJ. DIAZ, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY GRAVES, J.
. The trial court granted the State's Motion to Nolle Prosequi Count VIII of the indictment (one of the four counts of gratification of lust), finding it was a lesser included offense of Count V (one of the four counts of sexual battery).
. These inconsistencies are discussed in a dissent in Cooley v. State, 803 So.2d 485, 490-91 (Miss.Ct.App.2001) (Southwick, P.J., dissenting).
. The term "surplusage" is defined as "language that does not add meaning" and "[e]x- traneous matter in a pleading." Black's Law Dictionary 1172 (7th ed.2000).