Case Name: Brenda HERTLEIN, Administratrix of the Estate of Edward Hertlein v. ST. PAUL FIRE AND MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY and Philip Tippin, M.D.
Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 1996-02-05
Citations: 323 Ark. 283
Docket Number: 95-407
Parties: Brenda HERTLEIN, Administratrix of the Estate of Edward Hertlein v. ST. PAUL FIRE AND MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY and Philip Tippin, M.D.
Judges: Glaze, Brown, and Roaf, JJ., dissent.
Reporter: Arkansas Reports
Volume: 323
Pages: 283–288

Head Matter:
Brenda HERTLEIN, Administratrix of the Estate of Edward Hertlein v. ST. PAUL FIRE AND MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY and Philip Tippin, M.D.
95-407
914 S.W.2d 303
Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered February 5, 1996
[Petition for Rehearing denied March 11, 1996. ]
Dunham & Ramey, P.A., by: James Dunham, for appellant.
Shaw, Ledbetter, Hornberger, Cogbill & Arnold, by: J. Michael Cogbill, for appellees.
Glaze, Brown, and Roaf, JJ., would grant.

Opinion:
Donald L. Corbin, Justice.
Appellant, Brenda Hertlein, as administratrix of the estate of Edward Hertlein, deceased, appeals the order of the Logan County Circuit Court granting summary judgment for appellee, Philip Tippin, M.D., on the ground that the statute of limitations expired prior to the commencement of this action for damages caused by medical injury to appellant's decedent. In its order, the circuit court also granted summary judgment for St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company, however, appellant raises no argument as to that part of the circuit court's order. Jurisdiction is properly in this court pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(a)(3) and (16). Appellant's sole point for reversal is that the trial court applied the wrong statute of limitations. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Where the operative facts of the case are undisputed, as here, we simply determine on appeal whether the appellee was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. National Park Medical Ctr., Inc. v. Arkansas Dep't Human Servs., 322 Ark. 595, 911 S.W.2d 250 (1995).
This action was commenced by complaint filed in May 1994. The gravamen of the complaint against appellee is that he acted negligently in his medical treatment of the decedent, which was rendered on February 2, 1992, and that his negligence resulted in the decedent's death on February 3, 1992. Appellant and her child are alleged to be the decedent's surviving spouse and child. The complaint prayed for damages for the pecuniary injury and extreme mental anguish of appellant and her child, for appellant's loss of consortium, for the decedent's medical bills as a result of the alleged negligence, and for the decedent's funeral expenses.
The issue, as framed by appellant, is whether the limitations period for a cause of action for wrongful death caused by a medical injury is three years from the decedent's date of death, as provided by the Wrongful Death Act, Ark. Code Ann. § 16-62-102(c) (1987), or two years from the date of the wrongful act complained of, as provided by the Medical Malpractice Act, Ark. Code Ann. § 16-114-203(a) and (b) (Supp. 1995). It is undisputed that this action was commenced after the medical-malpractice two-year statute of limitations expired on February 2, 1994, but prior to the expiration of the wrongful-death three-year statute of limitations on February 3, 1995. Relying upon Ruffins v. ER Arkansas, P.A., 313 Ark. 175, 853 S.W.2d 877 (1993), the trial court ruled that the Medical Malpractice Act controlled and the action was not timely filed. The trial court's order was entered on December 27, 1994, and this appeal arises therefrom.
Appellant relies in error upon Matthews v. Travelers Indem. Ins. Co., 245 Ark. 247, 432 S.W.2d 485 (1968), and its progeny, for the proposition that the Wrongful Death Act governs the statute-of-limitations issue. In Ruffins, we affirmed the trial court's dismissal of that wrongful-death case due to Ruffins's failure to give the "notice of intent to sue" that was then required by the Medical Malpractice Act, and we held:
In sum, we have expressly reserved ruling on whether wrongful death resulting from medical malpractice is governed by the Medical Malpractice Act, and this is the first time we are squarely faced with the issue. The Medical Malpractice Act provides that it applies to "all causes of action for medical injury." (Emphasis added.) The language is clear, and we are constrained to follow it. Accordingly, we hold that, under the then existing law, notice had to be given in compliance with the Medical Malpractice Act.
Id. at 180, 853 S.W.2d at 880.
The present case is undisputedly one for wrongful death resulting from medical malpractice. Consequently, the Medical Malpractice Act applies. Id. The Medical Malpractice Act expressly "applies to all causes of action for medical injury accruing after April 2, 1979, and, as to such causes of action, shall supersede any inconsistent provision of law." Ark. Code Ann. § 16-114-202 (1987) (emphasis added). In the present case, the limitations period provided under the Medical Malpractice Act conflicts with the limitations period provided under the Wrongful Death Act. Pursuant to the Medical Malpractice Act, the Wrongful Death Act's statute of limitations, as an inconsistent provision of law, is superseded by the Medical Malpractice Act's statute of limitations. Section 16-114-202. Thus, the trial court did not err, as a matter of law, in granting the motion for summary judgment.
Affirmed.
Glaze, Brown, and Roaf, JJ., dissent.