Case Name: The People of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Stephen S. Scopas and Jacob Cohen, Respondents; The People of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Stephen S. Scopas, Respondent
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1962-03-29
Citations: 11 N.Y.2d 120
Docket Number: 
Parties: The People of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Stephen S. Scopas and Jacob Cohen, Respondents. The People of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Stephen S. Scopas, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 11
Pages: 120–128

Head Matter:
The People of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Stephen S. Scopas and Jacob Cohen, Respondents. The People of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Stephen S. Scopas, Respondent.
Argued January 18, 1962;
decided March 29, 1962.
Frank S. Hogan, District Attorney (Peter R. Rosenblatt of counsel), for appellant.
I. The evidence adduced before the Grand Jury was legally sufficient to support the informations. Respondents violated the laws under which they were charged. (People v. Arnstein, 211 N. Y. 585; People v. Zayas, 217 N. Y. 78; People v. Werblow, 241 N. Y. 55; People v. National Radio Distrs. Corp., 9 Misc 2d 824; People v. Abeel, 45 Misc. 86, 100 App. Div. 516, 182 N. Y. 415; People v. Reilly, 255 App. Div. 109; People ex rel. Murray v. Becker, 78 Misc. 666; Matter of Anonymous, 286 App. Div. 161; People v. Slater, 279 App. Div. 1042, 304 N. Y. 896; People ex rel. Gill v. Lapidus, 202 Misc. 1116.) II. The evidence indicates that respondents possessed a consciousness of their own guilt. III. The validity of State statutes regulating the manner in which children may he placed out for adoption remains unimpaired by the Federal Refugee Relief Act of 1953 and successor legislation. (Matter of Davega-City Radio v. State Labor Relations Bd., 281 N. Y. 13; Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U. S. 199; Atchison Ry. v. Railroad Comm., 283 U. S. 380; Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Haber, 169 U. S. 613; Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How. [63 U. S.] 227.) IV. Respondents’ status as attorneys does not provide them with immunity from the operation of sections 371 (subd. 12) and 374 of the Social Welfare Law and section 487-a of the Penal Law. (People v. Slater, 279 App. Div. 1042, 304 N. Y. 896.)
Sol Gelb and Harold W. Wolfram for Stephen S. Scopas, respondent.
I. If the laws of the State of Hew York are construed in a manner which would forbid the procedures allegedly involved here, such laws were superseded and rendered ineffectual, under the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution, by Federal legislation designed to encourage proxy adoptions abroad of foreign orphans. (Hines v. Lowrey, 305 U. S. 85; Second Employers’ Liab. Cases, 223 U. S. 1; Erickson v. Macy, 231 N. Y. 86; People v. Broady, 5 N Y 2d 500; Teamsters Union v. Oliver, 358 U. S. 283; Hines v. Davidowits, 312 U. S. 52; Prig v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. [41 U. S.] 539; Chicago Ry. v. Hardwick Elevator Co., 226 U. S. 426; Missouri Pacific v. Porter, 273 U. S 341; San Diego Unions v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236; Dooley v. Anton, 8 N Y 2d 91.) II. There was no violation of the Hew York statutes because the child, at the time of the alleged “ placing out,” was delivered to one who, in contemplation of law, was its parent. (People v. McGuire, 5 N Y 2d 523; People v. Zambounis, 251 N. Y. 94; People v. Schults, 301 N. Y. 495; People v. Hamm, 9 N Y 2d 5; People v. Balnis, 14 Misc 2d 928; People v. Grogan, 260 N. Y. 138; Betz v. Horr, 276 N. Y. 83; Matter of Pierro, 173 Misc. 123; Matter of Anonymous v. Anonymous, 15 Misc 2d 389; People v. Issachar, 24 Misc 2d 826; People v. Fein, 292 N. Y. 10.) III. There was no violation of the New York statutes because arrangements were not made for the free care of the child for the purpose of adoption or for providing care. (People v. Slater, 279 App. Div. 1042, 304 N. Y. 896.)
Leon A. Rosenblum for Jacob Cohen, respondent.

Opinion:
Dye, J.
Subdivision 1 of section 487-a of the Penal Law makes it a crime for an unauthorized person or agency to " request, receive or accept any compensation # for placing out a child ". " Placing out ' ' is defined: "3. As used in this section the term placing out shall mean to arrange for the free care of a child in a family other than that of the child's parent for the purpose of adoption or for the purpose of providing care " (emphasis supplied).
The Social Welfare Law, insofar as pertinent, is to the same effect. It defines the phrase "place out " as meaning "to arrange for the free care of a child in a family other than that of the child's parent for the purpose of adoption or for the purpose of providing care " (§ 371, subd. 12).
It is conceded that the children allegedly unlawfully ' ' placed out " had already been legally adopted in Greece; a practice not offensive to the Federal Refugee Act of 1953 (U. S. Code, tit. 50, Appendix, § 1971c) and its 1957 successor (IT. S. Code, tit. 8, § 1205). The within alleged " placing out " occurred after the adopted children had arrived in New York and then immediately in the family of their adoptive parents and not, to use the statutory language, "in a family other than that of the child's parent". Such " placing out " was clearly not "for the purpose of providing care ", as the adoptive parents were under a legal obligation to provide parental care; nor was it " for the purpose of adoption ", as that had already occurred. It is one thing to " place out " a child or children in a home for free board and care, or for the purpose of adoption, with a person or persons other than a child's parent (Social Welfare Law, § 371, subd. 12), and quite another to place a child with persons who in contemplation of the law are parents.
It may well be that, had the Legislature envisioned a situation such as this, it would have been proscribed by appropriate lan guage. However, since it is axiomatic that no act or omission is a crime except as prescribed by statute (Penal Law, § 22), which statutes the courts have constantly ruled 1 ' must be narrowly and strictly construed and in manner not to embrace cases which do not clearly fall within their terms ' ' (People v. Benc, 288 N. Y. 318, 323) for "Acts otherwise innocent and lawful do not become criminal unless there is a clear and positive expression of legislative intent to make them criminal ' ' (People v. Adamkiewicz, 298 N. Y. 176, 179), we agree with the courts below that the conduct complained of is not criminal within the meaning of section 487-a of the Penal Law and sections 371 and 389 of the Social Welfare Law.
We note that a contrary construction would taint the conduct of the parents with criminality, since the statute likewise makes it a crime to pay or give any compensation for placing out a child (Penal Law, § 487-a, subd. 2).
The orders appealed from should be affirmed.