Case Name: LAWRENCE IRVING v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
Court: Court of Appeals of Virginia
Jurisdiction: Virginia
Decision Date: 1992-09-29
Citations: 15 Va. App. 178
Docket Number: No. 0440-90-2
Parties: LAWRENCE IRVING v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
Judges: 
Reporter: Virginia Court of Appeals Courts
Volume: 15
Pages: 178–187

Head Matter:
Richmond
LAWRENCE IRVING v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
No. 0440-90-2
Decided September 29, 1992
Counsel
Stefan M. Calos (Vergara & Associates, on brief), for appellant.
Michael T. Judge, Assistant Attorney General (Mary Sue Terry, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Opinion:
Opinion
BAKER, J.
A panel of this Court in an opinion, Irving v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 414, 412 S.E.2d 712 (1991), reversed and remanded the conviction of Lawrence Irving (appellant), holding that "the use of the 'mug shot' photographs is prejudicial to an accused's right to a fair trial." (emphasis added).
A dissenting opinion was filed with the panel decision. We granted the Commonwealth's petition for a rehearing en banc.
I. THE PHOTOGRAPH
State Trooper Cox, working under the supervision of Hopewell Police Sergeant Bage, purchased cocaine from appellant. Bage was not involved in the transaction. The target drug dealer was not appellant. Bage knew appellant and placed his police record photograph (mug shot) among forty others and showed them to Cox, who selected appellant's picture as the person who sold the drugs to him. When cross-examining Cox, appellant attempted to cast doubt on Cox's ability to make the photo line-up identification. The Commonwealth offered the mug shot as evidence to corroborate Cox's testimony. Appellant's only objection to its admissibility was as follows: "I'm objecting to the relevance of it.' ' (emphasis added). On appeal, appellant argues that the picture was inadmissible because it showed he may have been guilty of "other crimes" and because it was prejudicial. These arguments were not made to the trial court. Thus, by an evenly divided Court, we affirm the ruling of the trial court admitting evidence concerning the photographic identification because appellant did not state in the trial court his reason for objection with the specificity required by Rule 5A:18, and the ends of justice do not require reversal. See also Branch v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 91, 96, 300 S.E.2d 758, 760 (1983).
n. BIAS
The record supports the trial court's finding that when Cox was afforded the opportunity to purchase cocaine from appellant, Cox had targeted another drug dealer, not appellant. Bage was not involved in that transaction. Appellant attempted to show that Bage was biased toward appellant and to that end asked Bage a series of questions irrelevant to the issue. The trial court sustained objections to those questions; however, when told by appellant that he intended to show Bage had targeted appellant, the trial court permitted appellant to ask Bage what control and/or direction he gave Cox. The trial judge said that depending on Bage's answers, appellant might be permitted to pursue the matter further. When Bage denied giving any order "to pick on the defendant" and admitted inserting appellant's picture among the forty pictures reviewed by Cox, appellant made no further effort to develop his theory. We find no error in the trial court's rulings related to die alleged bias issue.
IB. CLOSING ARGUMENT
Appellant further argues that the trial court erroneously permitted the prosecutor to argue that Cox had seen appellant on a number of occasions and, therefore, was able to identify appellant as the criminal agent. Appellant asserts that the record did not contain facts upon which that argument properly could be made. The record discloses that between October 25 and December 29, Cox saw appellant "on several occasions." The trial judge confirmed that he did not sustain an objection to that testimony when asked in a different form after a leading question objection previously had been sustained. The trial court did not err in refusing to sustain appellant's objection made during the Commonwealth's argument.
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Duff, J., Moon, J., Willis, J., and Bray, J., concurred.
Judge Duff participated in the hearing and decision of this case prior to the effective date of his retirement on September 1,1992 and thereafter by designation pursuant to Code § 17-116.01.