Case Name: TURF LAWNMOWER REPAIR, INC., A NEW JERSEY CORPORATION, AND JOHN L. GLORIA, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, v. BERGEN RECORD CORPORATION, DAVID HALL, BYRON CAMPBELL, BRUCE LOCKLIN, MARY ANNE DEMARCO AND EDWARD MITCHELL, D/B/A EDDIE'S POWER EQUIPMENT DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS
Court: New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1994-01-03
Citations: 269 N.J. Super. 370
Docket Number: 
Parties: TURF LAWNMOWER REPAIR, INC., A NEW JERSEY CORPORATION, AND JOHN L. GLORIA, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, v. BERGEN RECORD CORPORATION, DAVID HALL, BYRON CAMPBELL, BRUCE LOCKLIN, MARY ANNE DEMARCO AND EDWARD MITCHELL, D/B/A EDDIE’S POWER EQUIPMENT DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Superior Court Reports
Volume: 269
Pages: 370–380

Head Matter:
635 A.2d 575
TURF LAWNMOWER REPAIR, INC., A NEW JERSEY CORPORATION, AND JOHN L. GLORIA, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, v. BERGEN RECORD CORPORATION, DAVID HALL, BYRON CAMPBELL, BRUCE LOCKLIN, MARY ANNE DEMARCO AND EDWARD MITCHELL, D/B/A EDDIE’S POWER EQUIPMENT DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.
Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division
Argued September 21, 1993
Decided January 3, 1994.
Wefing, J.S.C., filed concurring opinion.
Before Judges MICHELS, KESTIN and WEFING.
Richard E. Brennan argued the cause for appellants (Shanley & Fisher, attorneys; Mr. Brennan and Joseph M. Cerra, on the brief).
Peter G. Banta argued the cause for respondents (Winne, Banta, Rizzi, Hetherington & Basralian, attorneys; Mr. Banta, of counsel; Donald A Klein and Peter F. Weiss, on the brief).
During the pendency of this appeal, plaintiffs filed a stipulation dismissing the appeal with prejudice as to defendant Edward Mitchell, d/b/a Eddie's Power Equipment.

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
KESTIN, J.A.D.
In this defamation action, the trial court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, holding that plaintiffs had failed "to raise a genuine issue of actual malice." Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm.
Defendant newspaper, the Bergen Record Corporation, published an article authored by defendant Locklin which depicted in an unfavorable and allegedly false light the services rendered by plaintiff corporation (Turf) to its customers and the manner in which its president and owner, plaintiff Gloria, ran the business. The article and accompanying material entitled "A Clip Joint for Lawn Mowers," was the product of investigative reporting by Locklin and a research assistant employed by the newspaper, defendant De Marco. Plaintiffs contend that the impetus for the investigation and resulting publication was personal pique on the part of Locklin when, as a customer of Turf, he was displeased both with the treatment he was accorded by employees of Turf and with their advice that his lawnmower was not worth repairing. Loeklin's investigation included some tests intended to establish the manner in which Turf and a number of other lawnmower repair companies dealt with various lawnmower performance problems; undisclosed tape recordings of some conversations with Turf employees during tests; and interviews with the Better Business Bureau, local competitors of Turf, other lawnmower repair operators who did not compete with Turf, former Turf employees, customers of Turf, and with Gloria himself. Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that Locklin's tests were improperly conducted and falsely reported, that he knowingly relied on biased sources, that he intentionally omitted information favorable to plaintiffs, and that specified statements in the article were false.
Two of the issues that plaintiffs advance on appeal are interconnected. Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in applying a heightened proof standard in respect of their claim for compensatory damages. In this regard, they argue that the newspaper article for which defendants are responsible did not concern matters of legitimate public interest and that neither Gloria nor Turf was a public official or a public figure. The related issue advanced by plaintiffs is that their proofs, in respect of their claim for compensatory damages, are more than sufficient to establish defendants' negligence and knowledge of falsity. In addition, plaintiffs seek punitive damages and argue that their proofs will satisfy a heightened standard in this regard.
In Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974), the United States Supreme Court held that the "actual malice" standard articulated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), to govern defamation actions, applies only to public officials and public figures, not to private individuals.
[S]o long as they do not impose lability without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual.
[Gertz v. Welch, supra, 418 U.S. at 347, 94 S.Ct. at 3010, 41 L.Ed.2d at 809.]
The Supreme Court of New Jersey defined and applied our common law standard governing defamation actions by private plaintiffs in Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Publishing Co., 104 N.J. 125, 516 A.2d 220 (1986), and Sisler v. Gannett Co., 104 N.J. 256, 516 A.2d 1083 (1986), both decided on the same day. For reasons having to do with the character of each plaintiffs activities and the degree to which that conduct implicated matters of "legitimate public concern" the Supreme Court held the actual malice standard to apply in the instances presented in both cases. Dairy Stores and Sisler also demonstrate the method by which the governing proof standard is to be selected, and they refer to some of the permissible choices.
The statuses of the corporate and individual plaintiffs in this case are similar to those of the corporate and individual plaintiffs in Dairy Stores and Sisler respectively. They are clearly private persons who have been subjected to general public notice by the very conduct which they allege gives rise to their cause of action. See also Gertz v. Welch, supra, 418 U.S. at 351-52, 94 S.Ct. at 3012-13, 41 L.Ed.2d at 811-13.
There are qualitative differences between these plaintiffs and the plaintiffs in Dairy Stores and Sisler to be sure; but the differences and the manner in which they bear upon the needs of public discourse are not so substantial as to require a variant result. We conclude, instead, that the plaintiffs in this case should be held to the heightened proof standard that "actual malice" connotes.
One of the differences is that the alleged defamation to the corporate plaintiff in this case concerns a service rather than a product, bottled drinking water, as in Dairy Stores. That difference, however, provides no valid basis for distinguishing this case from Dairy Stores. We can perceive no principled basis for evaluating the legitimacy of the public interest in commercial activities differently because a service is involved rather than a product. Nor is the importance of the product or service as relating to "an essential of human life;" Dairy Stores, supra, 104 N.J. at 145, 516 A.2d 220, the only permissible basis for concluding that a matter of legitimate public concern is implicated. The Supreme Court, in initially defining our common law standard, decided Dairy Stores on that narrow basis, viewing "drinking water [as] a paradigm of legitimate public concern" because of its essential nature and because the State had for some time "regulated the sale of bottled drinking water, and anyone engaged in the business of bottling and selling drinking water must be licensed by and comply with regulations of the Department of Health." Ibid While employing that narrow basis of decision, the Supreme Court left "to the future a more complete definition of matters of legitimate public concern." Ibid.
We also do not understand the listing in Dairy Stores of then "developed criteria [in other jurisdictions] for determining wheth er the activities and products of corporations constitute matters of public interest" to limit our consideration in this case. The fundamental test that governs was succinctly stated by the Supreme Court in both Dairy Stores and Sisler.
We recognize that not everything that is newsworthy is a matter of legitimate public concern____ [T]he assessment of public interest includes a determination whether the person "voluntarily and knowingly engaged in conduct that one in his position should reasonably know would implicate a legitimate public interest, engendering the real possibility of public attention and scrutiny."
[Dairy Stores, supra, 104 N.J. at 144,516 A.2d 220 (citing Sisler, supra, 104 N.J. at 274, 516 A.2d 1083).]
When the plaintiffs in this case undertook a business serving the general public, they had to understand that the members of that public would be interested in the quality of that service, the prices that were charged, the treatment accorded to customers, promptness in performance, and other factors bearing upon the character, cost and dependability of the service offered. It is clear, as well, that Gloria, as an enterprising merchant, wanted his business to grow as large as possible as quickly as possible. His interest was in serving as many customers as could be attracted to Turf, not in developing a service marketed as exclusive in character and limited in availability to a select clientele. Thus, we can accept as given that plaintiffs did not choose to put their light under a bushel. Rather, it was their manifest intention, common among persons in commerce, that information concerning their business and its reliability would travel, and that customers would be attracted through word of mouth as well as whatever advertising plaintiffs purchased. It was, in short, to plaintiffs' benefit and very much their purpose to engender "public attention." See Dairy Stores, supra, 104 N.J. at 144, 516 A.2d 220.
No person with such an intention could reasonably hope to derive the benefits that flow from public notice and, at the same time, rely on the law to provide shelter from any detrimental consequences, including the "scrutiny" referred to in Dairy Stores and Sisler. The "legitimate need" of consumers "to learn about the reputation of the business entities" with which they deal cannot be gainsaid. Dairy Stores, supra, 104 N.J. at 151, 516 A.2d 220.
From that need emanates the right to publish information concerning the nature and quality of goods intended for human consumption, and the reputations of those who make, distribute, and sell those goods.
[Ibid.]
Because it is our view that, for this purpose, there are no differences between goods, on the one hand, and services, on the other, we hold that any person or business which opens itself to the general public thereby subjects itself to the scrutiny that naturally comes with the attention it seeks, and thus creates a subject of legitimate public interest. It follows by the rule of Dairy Stores, that the heightened proof standard of actual malice devolves when the owners of the business seek to vindicate their interests in a defamation action.
In this regard, Gloria has no legitimate claim to the private person's protection also sought by the plaintiff in Sister. Although it is clear that Gloria is not a public figure or official and that he is, therefore, protected by a broader zone of privacy than a public figure or official would be, the contents of defendants' article had nothing to do with those of Gloria's interests which are properly encompassed within his zone of privacy. The offending article in Sister, notwithstanding that it dealt with the plaintiff's private interests and activities, was held not to qualify for a more ordinary, negligence focused, proof standard because the activities addressed implicated a highly regulated business, banking, and the plaintiff as a sophisticated banker and business person was presumed to understand the public's interest in his private banking transactions.
[W]hen a private person with sufficient experience, understanding and knowledge enters into a personal transaction or conducts his personal affairs in a maimer that one in his position would reasonably expect implicates a legitimate public interest with an attendant risk of publicity, defamatory speech that focuses upon that public interest will not be actionable unless it has been published with actual malice.
[Sisler, supra, 104 N.J. at 279, 516 A.2d 1083.]
Our decision in this case rests upon no such nuance. Every comment complained of in the offending article dealt with Gloria's activities in the business of plaintiff Turf, which we hold to be of legitimate public interest; or with his activities in polities, which are per se matters of legitimate public interest.
We agree substantially with the reasons articulated by Judge Marguerite Simon for her conclusion, given the posture of the case and its probable proofs as presented through the papers filed on the motion for summary judgment, that "a genuine issue of material fact that defendants published with actual malice" did not exist, i.e., that defendants published false and injurious statements with knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard for their truth or falsity. Dairy Stores, supra, 104 N.J. at 155-57, 516 A.2d 220. In order to succeed, plaintiffs must be prepared to show that defendants or any of them "entertained serious doubts about the truth" of the published material. Id. at 157-58, 516 A.2d 220; see also St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 88 S.Ct. 1323, 20 L.Ed.2d 262 (1968). Nothing in the record before us creates a genuine issue of material fact when measured by the heightened proof standard in the light of the need for a "state of mind" showing. Dairy Stores, supra, 104 N.J. at 156-57, 516 A.2d 220; see also Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S.-, 111 S.Ct. 2419, 115 L.Ed.2d 447 (1991). Therefore, defendants' motion for summary judgment was properly granted.
Affirmed.