Case Name: Elbert Kitchen v. The State
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1925-06-10
Citations: 101 Tex. Crim. 439
Docket Number: No. 9339
Parties: Elbert Kitchen v. The State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Criminal Reports
Volume: 101
Pages: 439–446

Head Matter:
Elbert Kitchen v. The State.
No. 9339.
Delivered June 10, 1925.
Rehearing Denied October 21, 1925.
1. —Rape—Evidence—Of Wife — When Admissible.
Where on a trial for rape, of a negro upon a white woman, her husband being charged as a principal to the act of the negro, under our statutes the wife is a competent witness against the husband, when testifying to any violence done her by the husband. See Art. 195, Vernon’s C. C. P., and many authorities there cited.
2. —Same—Evidence—Of Motive — Admissible.
Where a wife is testifying against her husband as to violence committed against herself by her husband, she occupies the same position as any other witness would, and can give her testimony as to any tact, showing motive on the part of her husband for the offense committed against her.
3. —Same—Evidence—Of Co-Principal — Properly Admitted.
Where a co-principal of appellant, the actual perpetrator of the rape upon his wife, was used as a witness, it was proper to permit, him to show appellant’s motive for inciting and aiding him in ravishing appellant’s wife, also to explain why his testimony on the trial of appellant, was different from his testimony given on his own trial, for the same offense.
4. —Same—Evidence—Properly Admitted.
Where evidence of a witness, who was the paramour of appellant, as to his visits to her home, was admitted, no error is presented, such testimony tending to show appellant’s motive, in inciting a negro to commit an unnatural and brutal assault on his, appellant’s own wife.
5. —Same—Bills of Exception — 'When Insufficient.
Where a bill of exception complaining of the admission of testimony upon the trial, which fails to set out facts from which this court can determine whether the question objected to was improper or injurious, same is insufficient, and will not.be considered. See Sec. 29, page 543, Vernon’s C. C. P. for collection of authorities.
6. —Same—Charge of Court — On Accomplice — Properly Refused.
Where the evidence on a trial does not, even remotely raise the issue of a witness being an accomplice, the court should refuse a charge on the law of an accomplice as a witness. The fact that a witness had evaded process of the court, at the instance of appellant, would not raise the issue. See Branch’s P. C. Sec. 705 page 363. Following Shackey v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. App. 255.
7. —Same—New Trial — Newly Discovered Evidence — Statement of Facts.
Where a motion for a new trial is presented, and newly discovered evidence is one of the grounds set forth, and on the hearing of such motion, evidence is presented, a statement of facts, embracing such evidence must be presented and filed during the term at which the trial is held. Appellant presents such a statement of facts in this case filed more than sixty days after adjournment and same cannot be considered.
Olí REHEARING.
8. —Same—Evidence Held Sufficient.
On rehearing appellant urges that there is no evidence, aside from the uncorroborated testimony of accomplice to support the verdict. We cannot agree to this contention. The witness Blackshire, the paramour of appellant was not shown to have been a particeps crimini. She testified that appellant confessed to her on the night of the offense that he saw Melvin Carr, assault and rape his wife, was present when it occurred, and did not care, as he wanted to run her off. The evidence is amply sufficient to support the verdict, and the motion for rehearing is overruled. See opinion on rehearing for collation of authorities. Catlin v. State, 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 116, cited by appellant was overruled in Chenault’s, case, supra.
Appeal from the District Court of Walker County. Tried below before the Hon. Carl T. Harper, Judge.
Appeal from a conviction of rape; penalty, life imprisonment in the penitentiary.
This is a companion case to that of Melvin Carr v. State, decided by this court on June 3rd, 1925, and that case contains a sufficient statement of the facts.
Bennett & Broadway, for appellant.
Tom Garrard, State’s Attorney, and Grover C. Morris, Assistant State’s Attorney, for thé State.

Opinion:
BAKER, Judge.
Appellant was convicted of the offense of rape and his punishment assessed at confinement in the penitentiary for life. This is a companion case to that of Melvin Carr v. State, decided by this court on June 3, and that case contains a sufficient statement of the facts.
There are nine bills of exception in the record. Bills one to five are combined, and contained in the same bill, and in this bill objection is made to the testimony of five different witnesses. This bill is clearly multifarious, and we would be justified in refusing to consider it on that ground, but in addition to this under the record in this case, the five bills show no error.
The first bill objects to the witness Fannie Kitchen testifying against the defendant because she is his wife. There is no merit in this contention. This was an offense committed against the wife in which the record discloses that the appellant was a principal offender and under Article 195, Vernon's C. C. P. and the many authorities there cited construing said article, appellant's wife was clearly a competent witness against him.
Bill No. 2 complains at the action of the court in permitting the state to prove by the wife that the appellant had accused her of setting fire to a house in which Evanetta Blackshire resided. It was permissible to prove by the wife that the appellant had accused her of setting fire at or about the time of this transaction, concerning the negro woman, Evanetta Blackshire, because it was the theory of the state, strongly supported by the evidence in the case, that appellant was living in adultery with the woman Evanetta Blackshire and was desirous of having his wife leave him in order that his liason with the Blackshire woman might be uninterrupted. It was further in evidence that someone had set fire to the house in which appellant's alleged paramour lived, and it was clearly competent for the state to show by the wife of the appellant under these circumstances, that he had charged her with this offense. Being permitted by the article of the code above cited, to testify against her husband, it was proper for the State to prove by her any fact that would shed light on appellant's motives for the dastardly and unnatural crime with which he was charged.
There is no merit in appellant's complaint contained in bill number three to the effect that the witness Melvin Carr was permitted to testify that the appellant frequently stayed at the house of the Blackshire woman, his alleged paramour. This was proper and pertinent testimony showing motive on appellant's part for the commission of the crime with which he was charged. It was also pertinent for the state to prove the reason that caused the witness Canto testify differently on this trial from what he had testified on the trial of his own case. He had a right to explain the reason' for changing his testimony and it was a proper matter for the jury to consider and determine in weighing the value of the testimony given by this witness.
Bill No. 5 complains at the court's action in permitting the witness Blackshire, appellant's- alleged paramo.ur, to state that appellant had been coming- over to her house during the year she had lived there. What has been said above disposes of this complaint adversely to the appellant's contention.
In addition to what has already been said with reference to the above bills of exception, it may be proper to state that same do not set out any of the facts testified to by the witness which would show or tend to show the inadmissibility of the testimony complained of. A bill of exception to the admission of evidence which fails to state facts from which this court can determine whether the question objected to was improper or injurious is insufficient. See Par. 3, Section 29, page 543, Vernon's C. C. P. for many authorities sustaining this proposition.
Appellant complains by bill number six at the court's action in refusing to instructs a verdict of not guilty. The evidence in this case is entirely sufficient to convince us beyond any question that the jury was warranted in finding the defendant guilty.
By proper instructions appellant asked the court to submit the question of Evanetta Blackshire's being an accomplice to the jury. Under the undisputed facts in this case, we find nothing which to our minds suggests that this witness was in such a status as to require that her testimony be corroborated. The fact that she was appellant's paramour does not make her an accomplice. The only other circumstance that appellant could contend would bring her within the category of an accomplice is the fact that she at appellant's request evaded the process of the court and thereby failed to appear as a witness when appellant's co-defendant Melvin Carr was tried for this same offense. There is nothing in the. record that even tends to connect this witness with the commission of the offense as a principal and nothing further than the fact that she evaded the process of the court and thereby failed at appellant's request to testify against his co-defendant, that would in any manner tend to con nect her with.the offense of an accessory. Mr. Bishop has stated the rule to be:
11 The test of an accessory after the fact is that he rendered his principal some personal help to elude punishment, the kind of help being unimportant. ' '
He further states:
"Keeping a witness by persuasion or intimidation from appearing against a felon on his trial does not render one the felon's accessory."
The exact question here presented was in our opinion decided adversely to the appellant's contention in the case of Shackey v. State, 41 Crim. App. Rep. 255. See Section 705, page 362, Branch's P. C. for full collation of authorities on this subject. .
Appellant complains at the court's action in refusing him a new' trial because of the misconduct of the jury. The record shows that the statement of facts taken on the trial of this issue before the court was not filed in the court below until the 23rd day of February, A. D. 1925, and caption to the transcript shows that the term of the court at which the case was tried adjourned on the 6th day of December, A. D. 1924. The authorities are uniform to the effect that the statement of facts taken concerning- matters involving misconduct of the jury must be filed during- the term of court at which the trial occurs. We, therefore, cannot consider the statement of facts pertaining to the misconduct of the jury in this case, and in its absence we cannot do otherwise than presume that the court correctly decided the question presented.
We have carefully considered every complaint made by appellant in this record, and it is our opinion that he has been accorded a fair and an impartial trial, and that the judgment should be in all things affirmed.
The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the Judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the court.