Case Name: BUFFALO CLEAN STREET CO. v. CITY OF BUFFALO
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1906-05-02
Citations: 98 N.Y.S. 784
Docket Number: 
Parties: BUFFALO CLEAN STREET CO. v. CITY OF BUFFALO.
Judges: Argued before McLENNAN, P. J., and SPRING, WILLIAMS, HISCOCK, and NASH, JJ.
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 98
Pages: 784–787

Head Matter:
(113 App. Div. 887)
BUFFALO CLEAN STREET CO. v. CITY OF BUFFALO.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.
May 2, 1906.)
Municipal Corporations — Contracts—Validity.
Where an ordinance authorized the board of public works to make a contract for the period of 10 years, providing for placing receptacles for waste paper at street corners, and reserved the right to terminate the contract on 60 days’ notice, and a 10-year contract, entered into in pursuance of the ordinance, was terminated at the end of 2 years, the commissioner had no authority to enter into a new contract for the same purpose for a period of 10 years from the expiration of the first contract [Ed. Note. — For eases in point, see vol. 30, Cent Dig. Municipal Corporations, § 606.]
Spring, J., dissenting.
Appeal from Special Term, Erie County.
Action by the Buffalo Clean Street Company against the city of Buffalo. From a judgment dismissing the complaint, plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
The following is the opinion of Kruse, J., at Special Term:
The plaintiff seeks to reform a contract made with the commissioner of public works of the city of Buffalo, which provided for placing at street corners in the city, by the plaintiff’s assignors, of receptacles for receiving waste paper and the like material for the use of the city, with permission to the owners of the receptacles to place thereon advertising matter. The reformation desired does not seem to be seriously resisted by the city if the contract is binding upon it. It is, however, attacked by the city upon the ground of its invalidity, it being contended that inasmuch as one contract had been made by the city for the same purpose, covering a period of 10 years, although it was terminated by the city before the expiration of that period, the commissioner of public works was without authority to make this contract in question, for the reason that the resolution or ordinance authorizing the making of such a contract provided only for a single contract, covering a period of 10 years, beginning with the date of the contract, and that, one contract having been so made, although remaining in force for only 2 years, the power so granted by the common council was exhausted, and that the attempt to make a second contract was unauthorized, and not binding upon the city. I am inclined to the view contended for on behalf of the city. I think it quite plain that this method of furnishing means for receiving and storing this waste material, and thus serving to keep the streets clean, was experimental only, and that at the end of the contract term further action would have been required on the part of the legislative branch of the city government to continue this system; and so, where the original contract was terminated by the city before the expiration of the 10-year period, under the right reserved by the city in the resolution or ordinance, such further action was likewise necessary to authorize the making of a new contract, to supplement the original contract for the unexpired term thereof. Taking the view, however, that this resolution or ordinance contemplated that this system should continue for the maximum contract term of 10 years, and that the commissioner of public works was authorized to use this system for that entire period, and to that end make contracts for different sections of the city, or to supplement by further contracts such as might be terminated before the contract period had expired, under the right reserved to the city, yet it will be seen that this contract is for the period of 10 years from its date, and thus extends beyond the original maximum contract period, so that even in this view the contract was unauthorized. I think this contract is not binding upon the city, and that the plaintiff is not entitled to maintain this action.
Judgment may therefore be entered declaring it void, and dismissing the complaint.
Argued before McLENNAN, P. J., and SPRING, WILLIAMS, HISCOCK, and NASH, JJ.
Simon Fleischmann, for plaintiff.
Charles L- Feldman and Edward L. Jung, for defendant. .

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Judgment affirmed, with costs, on opinion of Kruse, J., delivered at Special Term.