Case Name: In the Matter of the Accounting of Joseph Polizzo, as Committee of the Estate of Minnie Polizzo, an Incompetent. Harrison B. Wright, Individually and as Executor of Joseph Polizzo, Deceased, et al., Respondents; Agnes W. Tymann, as Administratrix of the Estate of Minnie Polizzo, Deceased, Appellant
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1955-05-26
Citations: 308 N.Y. 517
Docket Number: 
Parties: In the Matter of the Accounting of Joseph Polizzo, as Committee of the Estate of Minnie Polizzo, an Incompetent. Harrison B. Wright, Individually and as Executor of Joseph Polizzo, Deceased, et al., Respondents; Agnes W. Tymann, as Administratrix of the Estate of Minnie Polizzo, Deceased, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 308
Pages: 517–526

Head Matter:
In the Matter of the Accounting of Joseph Polizzo, as Committee of the Estate of Minnie Polizzo, an Incompetent. Harrison B. Wright, Individually and as Executor of Joseph Polizzo, Deceased, et al., Respondents; Agnes W. Tymann, as Administratrix of the Estate of Minnie Polizzo, Deceased, Appellant.
Argued March 3, 1955;
decided May 26, 1955.
William B. Hoffman for appellant.
I. Property of an incompetent in the name of the incompetent and another cannot be disposed of except in accordance with the Civil Practice Act. (Matter of Haher v. Hamilton, 267 N. Y. 474; Sanford v. Sanford, 45 N. Y. 723; Boehmer v. Boehmer, 264 Wis. 15; Boyd v. De La Montagnie, 73 N. Y. 498; Loker v. Edmans, 204 App. Div. 223; Matter of McGuinness, 290 N. Y. 117; Matter of Wainman, 121 Misc. 318; Matter of Rasmussen, 147 Misc. 564; Matter of Maguire, 161 Misc. 219; Goldsmith v. Goldsmith, 277 App. Div. 3.) II. Minnie Polizzo, who was the source of the funds used to purchase the mortgage, presumptively only gave to her husband Joseph a right of survivorship. No true joint tenancy was created. (Matter of Albrecht, 136 N. Y. 91; Belfanc v. Belfanc, 252 App. Div. 453, 278 N. Y. 563; Wegmann v. Kress, 152 App. Div. 937, 208 N. Y. 622; Matter of Kane, 246 N. Y. 498; Matter of Kaupper, 141 App. Div. 54, 201 N. Y. 534; Sanford v. Sanford, 45 N. Y. 723; Wilcox v. Murtha, 41 App. Div. 408; Merritt v. Merritt, 27 App. Div. 208; Moskowitz v. Marrow, 251 N. Y. 380.) III. The evidence offered at the trial by respondent did not rebut the presumption arising from the origin of the mortgage and the relationship of husband and wife. IV. Harrison B. Wright had notice of the infirmities in the title of his assignor Joseph Polizzo.
Harrison B. Wright, in person, and Robert F. Tomlin for Harrison B. Wright, respondent.
I. Joseph Polizzo and Minnie Polizzo, his wife, held the bond and mortgage in question as joint tenants. (Matter of Blumenthal, 236 N. Y. 448; Matter of Albrecht, 136 N. Y. 91; Matter of McKelway, 221 N. Y. 15; Overheiser v. Lackey, 207 N. Y. 229; Mustain v. Gardner, 203 Ill. 284; Matter of Suter, 258 N. Y. 104; Belfanc v. Belfanc, 252 App. Div. 453; Matter of Suter, 138 Misc. 85; Matter of Brogan, 165 Misc. 111.) II. There is in the law no presumption that if a wife transfers her solely owned personal property to her husband and herself, the fact of her sole ownership of itself indicates her intention to keep ownership, control and the right of disposition during her lifetime. (Belfanc v. Belfanc, 252 App. Div. 453; Matter of Blumenthal, 236 N. Y. 448; Brosnan v. Gaffney, 209 App. Div. 430.) III. If there was or is a presumption of intention as to either a husband or a wife, it will be overcome by evidence indicating a contrary intention. (Belfanc v. Belfanc, 252 App. Div. 453; Matter of Kaupper, 141 App. Div. 54, 201 N. Y. 534; Matter of Blumenthal, 236 N. Y. 448.)

Opinion:
Desmond, J.
When Minnie (sometimes called Amelia or Amelia Anna) Wigger married Joseph Polizzo in 1917, she owned in her own right and her own name a $20,000 bond and mortgage. Shortly after her marriage she assigned the bond and mortgage to one Bautz, an attorney, the stated consideration being $100, and at the same time Bautz, for an expressed consideration of $100 " paid by Joseph Polizzo and Amelia Anna Polizzo, his wife parties of the second part " assigned the bond and mortgage to the parties of the second part. The habendum clause in the latter assignment was, in full, as follows: " To.have and to hold the same to the party of the second part, and to the successors, legal representatives the survivor, such survivor's heirs, assigns of the party of the second part, forever, subject only to the proviso in said indenture of mortgage mentioned." Attorney Bautz, as is obvious, acted as a conduit only. There is no evidence that the husband paid his wife anything for the transfer. The question of law on this appeal is: did the husband acquire a present joint ownership in the bond and mortgage, or a right of survivorship only, as to it?
Minnie Polizzo became incompetent in 1928, remained incompetent, and was a patient in a mental hospital till her death in 1953. Her husband, although not appointed as committee of her property till 1945, managed her affairs, including this bond and mortgage. The husband died in 1948. In the present proceeding, which is an accounting by Joseph's executor as to Joseph's committeeship, a dispute arose as to the ownership of the bond and mortgage above described. In 1947, Joseph Polizzo had executed and delivered to Harrison B. Wright (who was his attorney and is now his executor accounting here as to Joseph's proceedings as committee of the latter's wife) an assignment or purported assignment of a one-half interest in the bond and mortgage. The assignment recites a consideration of $8,500, one half the amount of the bond and mortgage as somehow reduced by $3,000 during Minnie's life. Special Term held that Joseph Polizzo, the husband, never had more than a survivorship interest in the bond and mortgage, and that, accordingly, and since he predeceased his wife, he had no assignable interest therein, and that nothing passed by his assignment to respondent Wright. The Appellate Division, however, held unanimously that the assignment from attorney Bautz to Polizzo and his wife created a joint tenancy in the bond and mortgage, each thereafter owning an undivided half interest therein, and that the husband's assignment to Wright was effective to terminate the joint tenancy, and that, thereafter, Wright and Mrs. Polizzo were owners in common. We agree with the Appellate Division.
If Minnie and Joseph had not been wife and husband at the time of the assignment of the mortgage to them, they would have become joint tenants with right of survivorship, and with the further right in each of them to terminate the joint ownership and create a tenancy in common, by conveying his or her interest to a third party (Matter of Suter, 258 N. Y. 104, 106). If the bond and mortgage had been owned originally by the husband and he had assigned it to himself and wife during marriage, or if he furnished the consideration and arranged to have it made to himself and his wife (with no inconsistent habendum clause, see second last paragraph of this opinion), then there would apply a presumption, in the absence of proof to the contrary, that the husband intended that his wife have a survivorship right only, and not present ownership of one half, or of any other part (Matter of Albrecht, 136 N. Y. 91; West v. McCullough, 123 App. Div. 846, affd. 194 N. Y. 518; Matter of McKelway, 221 N. Y. 15; Matter of Kane, 246 N. Y. 498; Belfanc v. Belfanc, 252 App. Div. 453, affd. 278 N. Y. 563). But none of those cited cases, and no others we find, deal with a transfer from a wife to her husband, without proof of consideration or specific intent. In the West case (123 App. Div. 846, 847, 848, 849, supra), it is explained that the rule creating the presumption above described (and operative as to a husband-to-wife transfer) is an aspect or result or vestige of the common-law rule that a husband owned all his wife's personalty, and that thus, when he purported to pass to her an interest in his own personalty, he could not have intended to give her anything greater than a right of survivorship. And consideration or lack thereof, in those common-law situations, had nothing to do with the matter, since the wife's personalty was the husband's, and so he would always be furnishing the consideration. But none of that historical theory has any impact on a modern-day transfer by a wife of her own personal property to herself and her husband, jointly. The question seems to be of first impression in this court. We might, therefore, choose to use the old (husband-to-wife transfer) presumption, in the absence of proof as to actual intent, that survivorship only was intended. But, since that presumption is a remnant only of a body of law that never did apply to transfers from wife to husband, we see no reason for giving it a new application to a new situation. In other words, we decline to enlarge the coverage of the old presumption. Therefore, and since the assignment to Joseph Polizzo and Minnie Polizzo would have "created a present joint tenancy had they been unmarried, we hold that the same kind of tenancy was created, notwithstanding their marital relationship.
There is nothing in the above-quoted language of the habendum clause in the assignment from Bautz to the Polizzos to require a different result. That inartistically drawn clause reads: " to the party of the second part, and to the successors, legal representatives the survivor, such survivor's heirs, assigns of the party of the second part ". Presumably the words " the survivor, such survivor's heirs " were dropped into the middle of the customary verbiage to show an intent that, on the death of either husband or wife, the whole bond and mortgage should become the property of the survivor. But the very same clause makes the assignment run to " assigns of the party of the second part ", and that language expresses the transfer of a present interest to the ' ' party ' ' of the second part.
The order should be affirmed, with costs to all parties appearing separately and filing separate briefs payable out of the estate.