Case Name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Artie Wayne STRAWDER, Defendant-Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2010-07-30
Citations: 390 F. App'x 844
Docket Number: No. 10-10479
Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Artie Wayne STRAWDER, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: Before CARNES, BARKETT and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 390
Pages: 844–845

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Artie Wayne STRAWDER, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 10-10479
Non-Argument Calendar.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
July 30, 2010.
Edmund A. Booth, Jr., James D. Durham, Karl Irving Knoche, Frederick William Kramer, III, Brian T. Rafferty, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Augusta, GA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Richard H. Taylor, Richard H. Taylor, Attorney at Law, Brunswick, GA, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before CARNES, BARKETT and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM:
Artie Wayne Strawder, through counsel, appeals his 160-month, within-guidelines sentence following his conviction for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute cocaine hydrochloride, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. On appeal, Strawder argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because it was greater than necessary to achieve the statutory purposes of sentencing.
We review a sentence for reasonableness, employing an abuse-of-diseretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 597, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). The party challenging the sentence carries the burden of establishing unreasonableness. United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir.2005).
Because Strawder does not offer argument pertaining to the procedural reasonableness of his sentence, he has abandoned any such argument. See United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1283 n. 8 (11th Cir.2003) (stating that a party abandons an issue if he does not raise it in his initial brief).
With respect to the substantive reasonableness of Strawder's sentence, the dis trict court acted within its discretionary authority by weighing the relevant factors, including Strawder's criminal history and minimal role in the conspiracy, to arrive at a sentence it determined was sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comport with the statutory purposes of sentencing. That the district court may have given less weight to the probation officer's recommendation and Strawder's admission of guilt than to his extensive criminal history is within its sound discretion. Furthermore, Strawder's 160-month sentence was within the lower portion of the guidelines range, and also below the statutory maximum of 20 years. Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not commit a "clear error in judgment" by sentencing Strawder to 160-months' imprisonment.
AFFIRMED.