Case Name: E. H. Pugh, plaintiff in error, vs. Jerry McCarty, defendant in error
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1869-12
Citations: 40 Ga. 444
Docket Number: 
Parties: E. H. Pugh, plaintiff in error, vs. Jerry McCarty, defendant in error.
Judges: McCay, J., concurred, but furnished no opinion.
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 40
Pages: 444–454

Head Matter:
E. H. Pugh, plaintiff in error, vs. Jerry McCarty, defendant in error.
1. The plaintiff brought his action for libel,- upon the following publication: “We have no reply to make to the statement of a lad who is convicted of perjury by the solemn oath of a gentleman whose veracity -stands unimpeached and unimpeachable.” The Judge charged the jury on the trial, that to charge another in a printed.newspaper, published and circulated-in the county, “that he is convicted of’perjury,” is actionable, without proof of special damages': Held, that this charge, when applied to the facts of the case was not sufficiently full, as it was calculated to produce an impression on the mind of the jury, that the legal effect of the publication was to charge the plaintiff with the commission of legal perjury, which most probably caused them to find heavier damages than they would have found, if they had been instructed that the publication did not amount to a charge of legal perjury.
2. Where the editors of two newspapers are engaged in a quarrel, conducted in the daily issues of their papers, in bad temper and bad taste, on the question who has the largest city circulation, and their employees volunteered to take part in the strife, and one charged an employee of the other, who was aiding in the quarrel, with theft and duplicity, and the other, in turn, charged that the employee of the first has been convicted of perjury, by the solemn oath of a gentleman whose veracity stands unimpeached and unimpeachable, and the latter brought suit for a libel on the charge contained in that published reply : Held, that the jury in such case, should give nominal damages only.
While the jury should give such damages in an action for libel, for a wanton assault made on an innocent person, as will fully compensate him for all his mental suffering and other injury, and will tend to check the licentiousness of the press, the same rule does not apply when th'ose who conduct the press are voluntarily and mutually engaged in the publication of libelous matter concerning each other, and one sues and the other does not;\while the action is maintainable, the damages should he rendered according to the circumstances of the case.
Libel. Charge of the Court. New Trial. Before Judge Gibson. Richmond Superior Court. ■ July Term, 1869.
McCarty brought case against' Pugh for maliciously publishing him, as having committed perjury, by reason of which he no longer was allowed by his acquaintances to have intercourse or business transactions with them. The words charged were as follows: “ Not content with one oath’ from Jerry McCarty, they.drag in another affidavit, almost a half a column in length.’ Surely, if their case is as clear as they pretend, one oath ought to suffice. We have no reply to make to the statements of a lad (meaning plaintiff) who is convicted of perjury, by the solemn oath of a gentleman whose veracity-stands unimpeached and unimpeachable.”
The case'was tried by a petit jury and plaintiff obtained a verdict for $5,000 00. Pugh appealed. On the last trial, plaintiff’s attorney read in evidence an article printed in the Daily Press, of Augusta, Georgia, as follows : “ The Chronicle and Sentinel, still sweating under our exposure of their duplicity in attempting to make it appear that they were entitled to the post-office printing, attempt to bolster up the statement of their mail clerk, (which is fully refuted, as every honest man knows, by that of Mr. Gregory,) in another column of vituperation. Not content,” etc., as ante. “We proudly leave the issue, and the editors who are sponsors for Jerry’s declarations to the verdict of the public” * * * . The balance of the article is directed against Messrs. Moore & Wright, editors of the Chronicle and Sentinel, concluding with the remark that they should not charge an employee of the Press with theft, when everybody knew that Moore & Wright had pocketed $500 00 which belonged to the proprietor of the Press.
' It was shown that at the date of said publication, Pugh was proprietor and publisher of the Press, that one Atkinson was its editor, and McCarty was (and still was) an employee of the Chronicle and Sentinel. The defendant introduced no evidence.
At the request of plaintiff’s attorneys, the Court charged the jury, that to charge of one, in a printed newspaper, published and circulated in the county, that he is convicted of peijury, is actionable, without proof of special damage. He further charged that malice is an essential ingredient in libel, and in an action for damages plaintiff must prove the existence of malice, on the part of defendant, in making the publication, unless it imputes a crime, or something calculated to degrade him in society. When the publication imputes no crime’to the plaintiff, nor anything actionable, the jury cannot infer malice on the part of the defendant, and then plaintiff must show that he sustained some damage in consequence of the publication. If the words of the publication complained of as a libel, are not actionable themselves, malicious intent in publishing them must be proved before plaintiff can recover.
The jury found for the plaintiff $2,500 00. Defendant’s counsel moved for a new trial, upon the grounds that the Court erred in charging as requested by plaintiff’s attorney, and because the verdict was contrary to the law and evidence, contrary to the, balance of the charge and excessive. The Court refused the new trial, and error is assigned upon each of the grounds of said motion.
Hilliard & King, for plaintiff in error.
A. R. Wright, by W. Hope Hull, for defendant.

Opinion:
Brown, C. J.
1. I do not think this case was fairly submitted to the jury. The legal proposition given in charge by the Judge, that to charge another, in a printed newspaper, published and circulated in the county, "that he is convicted of perjury, is actionable, without proof of special damages," is sound law, as, its legal effect is to say, that it is actionable to charge another with the commission of legal perjury, without proof of special damages. But when applied to the facts of this case it was not sufficiently full, and was calculated to mislead the jury, at least on the question of dapiage.
The words upon which the action was founded in this case were these: "We have no reply to make to the statement of a lad who is convicted of perjury by the solemn oath of a gentleman, whose veracity stands unimpeached and unimpeachable." This was not a charge that the plaintiff had committed or been convicted of legal perjury. On the contrary, the whole statement taken together explained the meaning of the writer so clearly, that any person of common sense who read it, could have no difficulty in understanding it. It showed that there had been no oath taken in Court, in any action on trial, or in any legal proceeding. In the controversy which was going on about the circulation of these two papers, Mr. Gregory had made a voluntary affidavit to one state of facts, and the plaintiff to another; and the charge siraply meant, that it had been shown by the voluntary oath of Gregory, that the voluntary oath of plaintiff was not true.
But it is said this language, when printed and published, is libelous, though it might not be objectionable, per se, if spoken. I do not deny that it may be libelous. But I say it would not justify the jury iin finding as heavy damages for the plaintiff, as a deliberate charge of legal perjury, written and published would justify. And I think the Judge should have so instructed the jury. To illustrate, suppose A writes and publishes of B that he committed perjury when testifying on a certain trial betweén C and D, in a Court of justice, in this, that the statement made by him under oath was positively false, but that he, A, is fully satisfied that B did it innocently because he thought his statement was true when he made it. And suppose an action for libel brought on this language, and the Judge on the trial should charge the jury, that it is actionable to charge another with perjury without proof of special damages, and stop there. This would be a sound legal proposition, but would it be a proper charge, when applied to the facts of the case on trial ? Clearly not. It would be calculated to produce the impression on the mind of the jury, that, in the view of the Court, the effect of the publication was to charge B with'legal perjury. And it would, if the publication as made were actionable, tend to induce the jury to increase the damages, as they would be sent to their room under the belief that A had charged B with a crime which he had not committed, and with which he had not, in fact, been charged.
2. But I am very well satisfied that the damages given by thejury, under the circumstances of this case, were excessive. An angry quarrel was being conducted, in bad spirit, and bad taste, between those who managed and controlled the columns of these two newspapers, about the extent of their circula tion. Tbe employees of the two establishments, or'at least part of them, had taken sides and voluntarily made themselves parties to the quarrel. It seems, from the record, that the charge of theft and duplicity had been made in the columns of the Chronicle and Sentinel against the employee of the Press, who had engaged in the strife, and in reply to this, the Press charged the employee of the Chronicle and Sentinel, so engaged, in the language already quoted. Whereupon he brought this action. Both parties were in fault, and so far as this record discloses, the party now suing, and the paper to which he belonged, were at least as much to blame as the other.
Now, while I do not claim that one tort can be set off against another, I say the jury should have taken into the account all these facts and mitigating circumstances, and should have found nominal damages only. See Code, section 3010. A party who provokes a difficulty, or who engages in it as willingly as the other party, and publishes libelous matter concerning >his adversary, has no right, in law or morals, to recover as much damages as an innocent party, who is wantonly assailed by a libelous publication.. Where there is equal culpability, and one party has a legal advantage, or - one only appeals to the Courts, he is not a favored suitor, and should not be encouraged. He may have a legal right to recover, but his damages should be reduced, according to the circumstances of the case.
While the Courts should neither encourage nor favor those who are engaged in the publication of libels concerning each other, a very different rule obtains when the character of an innocent person is wrongfully and maliciously assailed. In such case, the jury should find such damages as will fully compensate the plaintiff for the injury done, including his mental or other suffering, resulting from the unfounded and malicious attack; and such as will tend to cheek the wanton licentiousness of such presses as knowingly pervert the truth, and wilfully malign private character. Code, sections 3011, 3012.
Judgment reversed.
McCay, J., concurred, but furnished no opinion.