Case Name: Alphonso JORDAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1990-06-06
Citations: 562 So. 2d 820
Docket Number: No. 89-0817
Parties: Alphonso JORDAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: GUNTHER, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 562
Pages: 820–825

Head Matter:
Alphonso JORDAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 89-0817.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
June 6, 1990.
Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Louis G. Carres, Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Lynn Waxman, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
LETTS, Judge.
In this case, the trial judge did not reduce his reasons for departing from the sentencing guidelines to writing until after the sentencing hearing. We agree that under Ree v. State, 14 F.L.W. 565 (Fla. Nov. 16, 1989), this would normally require reversal. However, in the case at bar, written reasons were articulated on the scoresheet and we hold that is sufficient to satisfy Ree. See Mauney v. State, 553 So.2d 707 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). Accordingly, we affirm.
The public defender additionally points out that the trial judge did not personally sign the scoresheet, but we do not believe his actual signature is required.
The reasons for departure as noted on the scoresheet during the sentencing hearing read: "recent release; continuing and persistent pattern of criminal activity." This written notation is consistent with the trial judge's oral pronouncement at the hearing. We can find no requirement that the trial judge must personally sign the scoresheet. Indeed, to the contrary, our supreme court has upheld a notation on the scoresheet written by the clerk at the trial court's direction. See Torres-Arboledo v. State, 524 So.2d 403 (Fla.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 250, 102 L.Ed.2d 239 (1988).
The public defender further claims that the defendant's most recent acts of criminality occurred some six months before the crime now before us, and that six months is too long a time between crimes. We do not agree. The supreme court has not set an arbitrary number of days or months which would demonstrate, or not demonstrate, a continuing and persistent pattern of criminal activity. In fact, our supreme court in State v. Simpson, 554 So.2d 506 (Fla.1989), while discussing another case, spoke of a defendant's release from prison "only months before." From this, we conclude that "only months before" could certainly be interpreted to mean any period of less than a year. Moreover, ten months was held not to be too long in Williams v. State, 504 So.2d 392 (Fla.1987).
We find no merit to any other point on appeal.
AFFIRMED.
GUNTHER, J., concurs.
GLICKSTEIN, J,, concurs specially with opinion.
. This case is currently on rehearing in the Supreme Court.
. As to the distinction between continuing and persistent criminal activity vis-a-vis recent release from prison, see Judge Schwartz' comment in footnote 1 of Frederick v. State, 556 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).