Case Name: TAXPAYERS OF MICHIGAN AGAINST CASINOS v. STATE OF MICHIGAN (ON REMAND)
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 2005-09-27
Citations: 268 Mich. App. 226
Docket Number: Docket No. 225017
Parties: TAXPAYERS OF MICHIGAN AGAINST CASINOS v STATE OF MICHIGAN (ON REMAND)
Judges: Before: OWENS, EJ., and SCHUETTE and BORRELLO, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 268
Pages: 226–257

Head Matter:
TAXPAYERS OF MICHIGAN AGAINST CASINOS v STATE OF MICHIGAN (ON REMAND)
Docket No. 225017.
Submitted August 26, 2004, at Lansing.
Decided September 27, 2005, at 9:00 a.m.
Leave to appeal sought.
Taxpayers of Michigan Against Casinos and Laura Baird, in her official capacity as a state representative, brought an action in the Ingham Circuit Court against the state of Michigan, challenging the constitutionality of compacts between the state and various Indian tribes concerning casinos on tribal lands in Michigan. The Governor had negotiated the compacts on behalf of the state under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 USC 2701 et seq., and the Michigan House of Representatives and Senate had approved the compacts by concurrent resolution. Gaming Entertainment, LLC, intervened as a defendant. The court, Peter D. Houk, J., ruled that legislative approval of the compacts by resolution rather than by bill violated Const 1963, art 4, § 22 (which provides that all legislation shall be by bill) and that the provision in the compacts allowing their amendment by the Governor without legislative approval violated the Separation of Powers Clause, Const 1963, art 3, § 2. The court also concluded that the approval did not violate Const 1963, art 4, § 29 (which provides that the Legislature shall pass no local or special act in any case in which a general act can be made applicable). The defendants appealed, and the plaintiffs cross-appealed. The Court of Appeals, Hood, EJ., and Holbrook and Owens, JJ., affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that approval of the compacts by resolution did not violate Const 1963, art 4, § 22 or § 29, and that the issue of separation of powers was not ripe for review because the Governor had not attempted to amend the compacts. 254 Mich App 23 (2002). The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, but concluded that the separation of powers issue was now ripe for review because the Governor had amended one of the compacts. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for full consideration of that issue. 471 Mich 306 (2004). On remand, the Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians, a party to the compact amended, intervened as a defendant and appellant.
On remand, the Court of Appeals held:
The provision in the compacts that provides for their amendment by the Governor without legislative approval violates the Separation of Powers Clause, as did the Governor’s use of that provision in the compact between the state and the Little Traverse Bay Bands. The Constitution does not grant the executive branch authority to assume any legislative role. The Legislature did not approve subsequent amendments to the compacts in advance when it approved the compacts by concurrent resolution, and never delegated by means of a statute the authority to amend the compacts. Amendments to the compacts must be presented to the Legislature for approval.
Trial court decision relative to the separation of powers issue reinstated.
Borrello, J., dissenting, would conclude that the provision granting the Governor authority to amend the compacts without legislative approval does not violate the Separation of Powers Clause and would reverse the trial court’s ruling on that issue. The Legislature’s approval of the compacts by concurrent resolution included approval of the amendment provision and the amendment process it contained, effectively granting the Governor approval in advance of amendments or permitting the Governor to amend the compacts without legislative approval. The Legislature could validly confer this power on the Governor through resolution. The Legislature approved the compacts with full knowledge of the existence of the amendment provision. As long as any amendment of a compact was constitutional, it was proper. The Court should not interfere with the legitimate exercise of legislative discretion, and must be mindful of the limits on the judiciary’s role in matters involving separation of powers.
Indians — Tribal-State Casino Compacts — Amendments Without Legislative Approval — Constitutional Law — Separation op Powers.
A provision in a compact between the state and an Indian tribe pertaining to tribal casinos that allows amendment of the compact by the Governor without legislative approval violates the Separation of Powers Clause of the Michigan Constitution (Const 1963, art 3, § 2).
Warner Norcross & Judd LLP (by Robert J. Jonker, William C. Fulkerson, Daniel K. DeWitt, and John J. Bursch) for Taxpayers of Michigan Against Casinos.
Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, and Barris, Sott, Denn & Driker, P.L.L.C. (by Eugene Driker and Thomas F. Cavalier), Special Assistant Attorneys General, for the state of Michigan.
Kanji & Katzen, PL.L.C. (by Riyaz A. Kanji and Jennifer B. Salvatore), Drummond, Woodsum & MacMahon (by Kaighn Smith), and James Bransky, for the Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians.
Dykema Gossett PLLC (by Richard D. McLellan, R. Lance Boldrey, and Kristine N. Turna) for Gaming Entertainment, LLC.
ON REMAND
Before: OWENS, EJ., and SCHUETTE and BORRELLO, JJ.

Opinion:
SCHUETTE, J.
The issue presented to this Court on remand from our Supreme Court's decision in Taxpayers of Michigan Against Casinos v Michigan, 471 Mich 306, 333; 685 NW2d 221 (2004) (Taxpayers), is whether the amendatory provision in the tribal-state gambling compacts purporting to empower the Governor to amend the compacts without legislative approval violates the separation of powers doctrine found in the Separation of Powers Clause in Const 1963, art 3, § 2. As will be thoroughly discussed, we hold that the Separation of Powers Clause in Const 1963, art 3, § 2 was violated in this instance. We affirm the decision of the circuit court on this issue.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. LEGISLATIVE ACTION
The legal issues confronting this Court and the Supreme Court stem from the expansion of casino gambling in the state of Michigan.
In January 1997, Governor John Engler, on behalf of the state of Michigan, signed gambling compacts with four Indian tribes permitting class III gambling activities pursuant to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 USC 2701 et seq. These compacts were modified and reexecuted in December 1998. The Michigan Legislature approved these gambling compacts by passage of House Concurrent Resolution (HCR) 115. The House of Representatives approved HCR 115 by a resolution vote of 48 to 47, while the Michigan Senate passed HCR 115 by a resolution vote of 21 to 17. The passage of these compacts by resolution, instead of by bill, ironically had significance in 1998 and, as will be discussed, retains significance now. As acknowledged by our Supreme Court in Taxpayers, 471 Mich at 316 n 4, a bill must be passed by a majority of the representatives elected to and serving in each house of the Legislature. However, passage of a resolution merely requires a simple majority of the members present and voting as long as a quorum is present.
B. CIRCUIT COURT ACTION
The validity of the approval of these gambling compacts, by resolution rather than statute, spawned several lawsuits: two in federal court and this action originally brought in the Ingham Circuit Court. The Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Lake Superior sued in federal court to enjoin the operation of the new casinos, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit dismissed that suit on the grounds of lack of standing. Sault Ste Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v United States, 288 F3d 910 (CA 6, 2002). Two state legislators also challenged the approval by the Secretary of Interior of Michigan's 1998 compacts, but that suit also was dismissed on the grounds of lack of standing by the Sixth Circuit. Baird v Norton, 266 F3d 408 (CA 6, 2001).
Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the method of approval of the gambling compacts violated various provisions of the Michigan Constitution. Plaintiffs argued that legislative approval of the compacts by resolution violated Const 1963, art 4, § 22, which requires adoption of legislation by bill rather than mere resolution. Additionally, plaintiffs complained that the compacts violated Const 1963, art 4, § 29, the Local Acts Clause. Finally, plaintiffs alleged that the provision within the gambling compacts that permitted the Governor to amend a compact without legislative approval violated Const 1963, art 3, § 2, the Separation of Powers Clause, which is the very matter before this Court.
The trial court ruled in favor of plaintiffs in two instances, determining that the gambling compacts should have been approved by bill instead of by resolution and that the amendatory provision in the compacts ran afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. The trial court determined that the approval of the gambling compacts did not violate the Local Acts Clause of Const 1963, art 4, § 29.
C. COURT OF APPEALS DECISION
A panel of this Court in Taxpayers of Michigan Against Casinos v Michigan, 254 Mich App 23, 43-49; 657 NW2d 503 (2002), reversed the trial court's determination that passage of the compacts by resolution did not conform to the Michigan Constitution, affirmed the trial court's reasoning with respect to the Local Acts Clause, and declared that the issue of the amendatory provision within each of the four compacts, which at that time had not been exercised by the Governor, was not ripe for judicial review.
D. SUPREME COURT DECISION
Upon review, five justices of our Supreme Court held that legislative approval of the gambling compacts by mere resolution did not violate the Michigan Constitution, likening the tribal-state gambling compacts to a contract as distinguished from more traditional legislative or statutory actions of the Michigan Legislature. Taxpayers, 471 Mich at 327-328, 352. All seven justices of our Supreme Court also determined that there was no violation of the Local Acts Clause, Const 1963, art 4, § 29.
In July 2003, and before the Supreme Court's ruling, Governor Jennifer Granholm exercised the amendatory provision contained within an individual compact negotiated between the state of Michigan and the Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians. Chief Justice CORRIGAN, in her lead opinion, acknowledged this fact and stated that "the amendment provision in the compact may now be ripe for review. . . Taxpayers, 471 Mich at 313. Again, five justices of our Supreme Court concluded that the separation of powers issue alleged by plaintiffs was now ripe for review, but in the absence of an appellate court ruling on this precise issue, a remand to this Court was appropriate.
Justices TAYLOR and YOUNG joined Chief Justice CORRIGAN in her lead opinion, in which she stated that "we remand this issue to the Court of Appeals to consider whether the provision in the compacts purporting to empower the Governor to amend the compacts without legislative approval violates the separation of powers doctrine found in Const 1963, art 3, § 2." Id. at 333.
These tribes are the Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians, the Pokagon Band of Ottawa Indians, the Little River Band of Ottawa Indians, and the Nottawaseppi Huron Potawatomi.
The Michigan Legislature is composed of 110 members of the House of Representatives; 56 votes are required at a minimum for passage of a statute. The Michigan Senate is composed of 38 members; 20 votes are required at a minimum for passage of a statute.
Under the rules of the Michigan House of Representatives, a majority of the members of the House of Representatives must he present to constitute a quorum.
Justices Taylor and Young concurred in Chief Justice Corrigan's analysis concerning Const 1963, art 4, § 22 (constitutionality of approval by resolution, not by bill) and in her determination that Const 1963, art 4, § 29, the Local Acts Clause, was not violated by passage of HCR 115. Justice CAVANAGH, while concurring only in part IV of Chief Justice Corrigan's lead opinion, joined Justice Kelly's concurring opinion concluding that no violation of Const 1963, art 4, § 22 or 29 occurred. Justice Markman concurred with part VI of Chief Justice Corrigan's lead opinion concerning Const 1963, art 4, § 29, and Justice Weaver also concurred with the holding of no violation of Const 1963, art 4 § 29.