Case Name: KOSTENBAUM v. NEW YORK CITY RY. CO.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1907-06-14
Citations: 105 N.Y.S. 65
Docket Number: 
Parties: KOSTENBAUM v. NEW YORK CITY RY. CO.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 105
Pages: 65–68

Head Matter:
(120 App. Div. 160)
KOSTENBAUM v. NEW YORK CITY RY. CO.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
June 14, 1907.)
1. Street Railroads—Injuries to Persons on Track—Evidence—Sufficiency.
In an action against a street railroad for the death of a child, evidence held insufficient to show that the driver of the car was negligent in failing to keep a proper lookout.
[Ed. Note.—For eases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 44, Street Railroads, §§ 243, 244.]
2. Negligence—Contributory Negligence—Care Required of Children.
A child of tender years is not required to exercise the same degree of care and prudence in the presence of danger required of an adult under like circumstances, but is required to exercise such care and prudence as is commensurate with one of his age and intelligence. .
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 37, Negligence, § 123.]
Laughlin, J., dissenting.
Appeal from Trial Term, New York County.
Action by Samuel ICostenbaum, as administrator of the estate of Sadie Kostenbaum, deceased, against the New York City Railway Company. From an order setting aside a verdict for defendant and granting a new trial, defendant appeals.
Reversed.
Argued before INGRAHAM, LAUGHLIN, CLARICE, SCOTT, and LAMBERT, JJ.
James L- Quackenbush, for appellant.
David C. Hirsch, for respondent.

Opinion:
INGRAHAM, J.
This action was to recover for injuries caused by the death of the plaintiff's intestate. The jury found a verdict for the defendant, whereupon the plaintiff moved to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial, which motion was granted, and from the order entered thereon the defendant appeals. The order recites that the motion was granted on the ground that the verdict was contrary to the evidence, against the weight of evidence, and contrary to law.
The deceased was about six years of age, and attended the kindergarten school. On the 8th of June, 1904, the deceased's mother took her across the street and left her there with some other children playing in a kitchen. The deceased was in the habit of going into the street alone, but had been instructed by her mother to be careful when crossing the street, and to stop if she saw a car approaching. As to the accident a witness testified: That he was in Cannon street, and saw a car1 coming very fast, a closed car with two horses. That as the car passed him he heard people holler, "Hey, stop!" That when he first saw the driver he was standing on the car, and the witness did not know what he was directing his attention to, but he was looking straight ahead. He then said that his head was turned to the right side or the left side. That when he heard the people holler he stopped and looked around, and saw a little girl coming off the sidewalk. That as soon as she came off the sidewalk some one was hollering for the horses to stop. She stopped in a kind of a fright. "All of a sudden the car came down, and he started to pull the horses backwards, and he did. As soon as he pulled the horses backward, one horse went«out of the way, out of the tracks, and throwed the little girl away towards this way, and the little girl was-struck by the car." It thus appeared that the child stopped before going on the track; that when the driver was endeavoring to stop the car the horses left the track and struck the child, when she fell and rolled under the car. The car stopped immediately, showing that it was under control. .This witness subsequently testified that the horses were jogging along, the car going at the speed that horse cars usually go. It was the duty of the driver, when the child started to cross the track, to stop the car to avoid a collision. This the driver attempted to do. To stop the car he had to put on the brake, and there was nothing to show that he did not do all that a person could have done under the circumstances. There was no evidence offered by the defendant; .the question being submitted to the jury upon the plaintiff's evidence.
This was not a case in which there was conflicting evidence, where the trial judge had the advantage of seeing the witnesses testify and observing the manner in which they gave their testimony'; but here upon a conceded state of facts the question as to the negligence of the defendant was presented. I do not think there was evidence to sustain a finding that the defendant was negligent. There is nothing in relation to the speed of the car that jusühed a finding of negligence. The fact that the driver of the car was seen looking away from the track in front of the car was not .negligence. The driver has to watch for passengers and approaching vehicles, so as to avoid collision, as well as to watch the track immediately in front of the car, and there is nothing to show that this driver was not attending to his business and .had full control of the car. But there is nothing to connect this accident with the driver's looking the other way. If he had been looking at the child and saw it approaching, he could have done no more than he did; i. e., at once try to stop the car. The driver does not appear to have been responsible for the fact that a horse shied off the track. This would seem to be one of the accidents which are not caused by the negligence of the driver, and for which the defendant cannot be said to be responsible. If, however, there was evidence which justified the court in submitting the question of defendant's negligence to the jury, they were certainly justified in finding that the accident was not caused by the defendant's negligence, and the court was not justified in substituting its judgment for that of the jury.
There was no error in the charge as to contributory negligence. It is the settled rule in this state that a child of tender years is not required to exercise the same degree of' care and prudence .in the presence of danger which is expected and required of an adult under " like circumstances; but he is required to exercise such -care and prudence as is commensurate with one of his age and intelligence. Serano v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 188 N. Y. 156, 80 N. E. 1025; Costello v. Third Ave. R. R. Co., 161 N. Y. 317, 55 N. E. 897.
I think, therefore, it was error for the court to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial. The order appealed from should be reversed, and the,verdict of the jury be reinstated, with costs.
CLARICE, SCOTT, and LAMBERT, JJ., concur.