Case Name: JAMES G. O'DONNELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FIELD ENTERPRISES, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees
Court: Illinois Appellate Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 1986-03-26
Citations: 145 Ill. App. 3d 1032
Docket Number: No. 83—2807
Parties: JAMES G. O’DONNELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FIELD ENTERPRISES, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Appellate Court Reports, Third Series
Volume: 145
Pages: 1032–1053

Head Matter:
JAMES G. O’DONNELL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FIELD ENTERPRISES, INC., et al., Defendants-Appellees.
First District (3rd Division)
No. 83—2807
Opinion filed March 26, 1986.
McNAMARA, J., specially concurring.
Rick M. Schoenfield and Donna R. Lipshutz, of Chicago, for appellant.
Lawrence Gunnels, Samuel Fifer, and Charles C. Post, of Chicago, for appellees Chicago Tribune Company, Stanton R. Cook, James D. Squires, Charles T. Brumback, William H. Jones, Lynn Emmerman, Thomas Powers, CBS Inc., and Walter Jacobson.
Daniel S. Hefter and Irene B. Cramer, both of Isham, Lincoln & Beale, of Chicago, for other appellees.

Opinion:
PRESIDING JUSTICE RIZZI
delivered the opinion of the court:
This is an appeal from the dismissal of plaintiff James G. O'Donnell's libel action filed in 10 counts against defendants Field Enterprises, Inc., James Hoge, Ralph Otwell, Gregory E. Favre, Lois Wille, Jim Casey, Maurice Possley, Tom Page Seibel, Michelle Stevens, Pat Wingert, Jonathan Landman, Hanke Gratteau, Chicago Tribune Company, Stanton R. Cook, James D. Squires, Charles T. Brumback, William H. Jones, Lynn Emmerman, Thomas Powers, CBS Inc. and Walter Jacobson. The individually named defendants are or were officers, editors or reporters for the respective corporate defendants. We affirm.
During 1981, the Federal Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the Organized Crime Division of the Chicago Police Department (OCD) conducted a joint investigation of unlawful drug activities in the city of Chicago. The joint investigation was given the code name Operation Top Brass.
As a result of Operation Top Brass, on October 13, 1981, the Federal government indicted plaintiff, a medical doctor, in six counts for unlawfully distributing a controlled substance, phendimetrazine. Another medical doctor was indicted in seven counts for unlawfully distributing phendimetrazine. A pharmacist was indicted in five counts for unlawful possession with intent to distribute Talwin tablets. Another pharmacist was charged in a 26-count criminal information with unlawful possession with intent to distribute Talwin tablets and glutethimide, a water insoluble powder used as a hypnotic and sedative. Talwin, when mixed with the blue colored amphetamine pyribenzamine, is known as "T's and Blues," a heroin substitute. On the same day, also as a result of Operation Top Brass, a Cook County grand jury returned indictments against 75 persons for unlawfully dealing in drugs. Many of the persons indicted were members of a Chicago street gang known as the El Rukns.
The United States Department of Justice, through the United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, Dan K. Webb, made an official public announcement of the Federal indictments on October 13, 1981. At about the same time, the Chicago Police Department OCD made several arrests stemming from Operation Top Brass. Later in the day, an OCD police sergeant brought some of the people who were arrested to the narcotics section at police headquarters. The suspects were taken to a processing room where many news media reporters were gathered. There, the sergeant provided information concerning the arrests and Operation Top Brass to the news media reporters. Included in the information was the fact that plaintiff had been indicted as part of the joint Federal and local investigation.
Based upon the information that the news media reporters obtained from both the Federal and local governmental and public proceedings, on October 14 through October 16, 1981, the Chicago Tribune and the Chicago Sun-Times newspapers printed news headlines and articles regarding Operation Top Brass. The articles included the fact that plaintiff was indicted as part of the special drug investigation. On October 13 and October 14, Walter Jacobson, a newscaster for CBS affiliate WBBM-TV, also reported about the events of the Operation Top Brass investigation and the resulting indictments and arrests. The relevant newspaper articles are included as exhibits to plaintiff's amended complaint, and they are reproduced here as an appendix. However, the complaint does not allege or quote any specific statements that were made by Jacobson during his televised newscasts. In March 1982, plaintiff was tried on the six-count indictment in the Federal district court, and he was found not guilty on all counts. Thereafter, plaintiff filed this libel action.
We agree with plaintiff that his complaint sufficiently alleges that the statements about him in the newspaper articles are factually false and defamatory. However, we believe that what is at issue here is not whether the news media reports are factually false, but whether defendants are protected from a libel action by a privilege based upon the news media's first amendment right to report governmental and public proceedings that deal with matters of public concern. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn (1975), 420 U.S. 469, 495, 43 L. Ed. 2d 328, 349-50, 95 S. Ct. 1029, 1046.
Plainly, the news media's constitutional right to report governmental and public proceedings is rendered ineffectual unless the right is expansive enough to enable the news media to report news from the proceedings untrammeled by the specter of a libel action. Thus, there is a special privilege that protects the news media from libel actions when it publishes information obtained from governmental and public proceedings that deal with matters of public concern. Restatement (Second) of Torts sec. 611 (1977); see Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn (1975), 420 U.S. 469, 495-96, 43 L. Ed. 2d 328, 349-50, 95 S. Ct. 1029, 1046-47.
While the privilege is not absolute, it is broader in scope than the qualified or conditional privileges that are a part of the law of libel. Thus, the privilege exists even though the publisher does not believe that the defamatory statements from the proceedings are true and even though the publisher knows that they are false. (Restatement (Second) of Torts sec. 611, comment a; see W. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts sec. 115 (5th ed. 1984).) If reports in governmental and public proceedings dealing with matters of public concern are false, the news media must nevertheless be able to report to the people what it sees and hears — the news media's belief or knowledge as to the truth notwithstanding. If the news media cannot report what it sees and hears at governmental and public proceedings merely because it believes or knows that the information is false, then self-censorship by the news media would result. (Compare Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn (1975), 420 U.S. 469, 496, 43 L. Ed. 2d 328, 350, 95 S. Ct. 1029, 1046-47.) The first amendment cannot tolerate a tenet which engenders self-censorship by the news media. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. (1971), 403 U.S. 29, 50, 29 L. Ed. 2d 296, 315, 91 S. Ct. 1811, 1823.
If a news media account is not a complete report of the proceedings, it nevertheless remains under the aegis of the privilege so long as it is a fair abridgment of the proceedings. However, when a news media account is neither complete nor a fair abridgment of the proceedings, then the privilege is lost. (See Catalano v. Pechous (1980), 83 Ill. 2d 146, 168, 419 N.E.2d 350, 360, quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts sec. 611 (1977).) Here, it is admitted that the news media accounts are not complete reports of the governmental and public proceedings. Therefore, the critical issue is whether the news media accounts are a fair abridgment of the proceedings and thus protected by the privilege. On defendants' motions to dismiss, we must determine whether there is a genuine and material question of fact on the issue. Compare Meyer v. Murray (1979), 70 Ill. App. 3d 106, 114, 387 N.E.2d 878, 884.
Plaintiff argues that the newspaper articles are not a fair abridgment of the proceedings because they falsely connect him to the illicit drug activities of the El Rukn street gang, falsely link him with the unlawful distribution of Talwin, and falsely charge that he was one of the initial sources of such drugs in the distribution chain. Specifically, plaintiff states: "Any and all references to Dr. O'Donnell and his alleged connection with the El Rukn street gang are wholly false. That lack of connection between Dr. O'Donnell and the El Rukn street gang formed the basis for plaintiff's defamation complaint."
To determine whether the newspaper articles are a fair abridgment of the proceedings, the Federal and local governmental and public proceedings must be viewed together. The U.S. Department of Justice Information Release of October 13, 1981, which included the announcement of plaintiff's indictment, the indictments of another doctor and a pharmacist, and the criminal information of another pharmacist, states:
"Mr. Webb stated that these Federal Charges are the result of a lengthy coordinated investigation by federal and local law enforcement authorities aimed at the illegal distribution of Talwin (a heroin substitute) and other abused controlled substances. Mr. Webb indicated that these types of controlled prescription drugs are sold by 'pill pushers' in Chicago's neighborhoods, and his office is going to vigorously prosecute the medical providers, such as pharmacies and doctors, who are the initial sources of such drugs in the distribution chain.
These indictments resulted from an investigation conducted by the Chicago Office of the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Illinois Department of Law Enforcement."
The affidavit of the Chicago Police Department OCD sergeant states that on October 13, 1981, he gave the news media the following information:
"The information which I gave to the reporters included the facts that these indictments and arrests were the result of a joint DEA-Chicago Police Department investigation; that many of those indicted for pill-pushing at the street level as a result of the joint investigation were members of the El Rukn street gang; that others indicted for diverting drugs from legitimate uses were doctors, and that others were pharmacists; and the names of several of those indicted as a result of the investigation. Among the names of the indictees which I read to the reporters was that of Dr. James G. O'Donnell."
When the reports of the Federal and local government and public proceedings are read together, the only reasonable conclusion that can be reached is that the gist or sting of the defamation that is conveyed is the same as the gist or sting of the defamation that is conveyed from the newspaper articles. The gist or sting of the defamation in both instances is that plaintiff is a medical doctor who was indicted by the Federal government and that the Federal charges against plaintiff were a result of a lengthy, coordinated investigation by the Federal government and the Chicago Police Department OCD aimed at the illicit distribution of Talwin (a heroin substitute) and other controlled substances. In addition, the gist or sting of the defamation in both instances includes statements that these types of controlled prescription drugs are sold by pill pushers in Chicago's neighborhoods; that many of those indicted for pill-pushing at the street level were members of the El Rukn street gang; that others indicted as part of the same law enforcement investigation for diverting drugs from legal use included plaintiff; and that the U.S. Attorney's office "is going to vigorously prosecute" the pharmacists and doctors, which included plaintiff, "who are the initial sources of such drugs in the distribution chain." It follows that as a matter of law, the newspaper articles are a fair abridgment of the governmental and public proceedings from which they were made. Whether or not the statements in the newspaper articles are factually false is not relevant.
Plaintiff further argues that the newspaper articles state that he was indicted for distributing pyribenzamine, rather than phendimetrazine. However, the newspaper articles do not make that mistake. The newspaper articles state that the pharmacists — not the doctors— were indicted for distributing pyribenzamine. As an example, one newspaper article states: "Federal grand jury indictments also have been returned against two doctors in connection with distribution of a 'speed' derivative, and four pharmacists accused of dealing in 'T's' and 'blues,' Talwin and pyribenzamine, which in combination act like heroin." Moreover, unlike phendimetrazine, pyribenzamine is not a controlled substance. 21 U.S.C. sec. 801 et seq. (1982); Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. SGVa, par. 1201 et seq.
In addition, we believe that the privilege that exists here is not defeated merely because there may be a misstatement or some discrepancies between the statements in the newspaper articles and the statements from the governmental and public proceedings upon which they are based. No matter how carefully a reporter or publisher attempts to summarize a speech or proceeding, the summary is bound to convey a somewhat different impression than the speech or proceeding itself. It is for this reason that first amendment freedoms of speech and of the press must be given breathing space to survive. (See National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Button (1963), 371 U.S. 415, 433, 9 L. Ed. 2d 405, 418, 83 S. Ct. 328, 338.) Thus, when it comes to these special freedoms, some public misstatements must be tolerated by each of us in order that the freedoms be maintained for all of us. (See Time, Inc. v. Pape (1971), 401 U.S. 279, 292, 28 L. Ed. 2d 45, 54, 91 S. Ct. 633, 640.) Within this context, we believe that in order to constitute an unfair abridgment of a governmental or public proceeding so as to defeat the privilege that is involved here, the abridgment must significantly change the defamation appearing in the governmental or public proceeding. With regard to this case, we conclude that any purported misstatement appearing in the newspaper articles does not significantly change the defamation occurring in the governmental and public proceedings.
Plaintiff's next argument centers on the editorial printed in the Chicago Sun-Times. Plaintiff argues that the editorial "served to underscore and highlight the falsities published in the news story." Specifically, plaintiff states: "Headlined 'A cheer for T's and blues crackdown,' the editorial focused on the alleged indictment charging plaintiff and other professionals with supplying drugs to the El Rukn gang. The editorial suggested that plaintiff was 'high on the list' of those arrested. Further, the editorial stated, 'We hope the law reserves the utmost scorn — and strongest penalties — for professionals ultimately convicted of helping the El Rukns maintain their drug stranglehold on so many Chicago neighborhoods.' The editorial concluded by hailing the action taken against 'the worst of the T's and blues exploiters in Chicago.' "
We believe that whether the editorial is read independently or in conjunction with the newspaper articles, it cannot form the basis of a libel action because the editorial merely contains the ideas and opinions of the editor. There is no such thing as a false idea or opinion. Thus, expressions of ideas and opinions, even in the most pejorative terms, are protected by the first amendment. No matter how defamatory ideas or opinions may seem, in our system of government we depend for their correction not on the conscience of judges or juries in libel actions, but on the competition of other ideas and opinions. (See National Association of Letter Carriers v. Austin (1974), 418 U.S. 264, 284, 41 L. Ed. 2d 745, 761-62, 94 S. Ct. 2770, 2781; Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974), 418 U.S. 323, 339-40, 41 L. Ed. 2d 789, 805, 94 S. Ct. 2997, 3007.) The free flow of ideas and opinions imperative to our system of government demands strict adherence to this principle. Therefore, a defamatory expression of an idea or opinion is not actionable. However, if an expressed opinion or idea is, in effect, partly factual, in that it implies undisclosed defamatory facts as its basis, then it may be actionable. See Restatement (Second) of Torts sec. 566 (1977); W. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts sec. 113 (5th ed. 1984).
Here, it is clear that the ideas and opinions in the editorial do not imply undisclosed defamatory facts as their bases. To the extent that the editorial makes disclosed factual statements, the statements are privileged for the same reason that the statements in the newspaper articles are privileged; they are a fair abridgment of governmental and public proceedings that deal with matters of public concern.
Plaintiff relies mainly upon Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson (7th Cir. 1983), 713 F.2d 262, to support his argument that the newspaper articles and the editorial are not privileged and are not a fair abridgment of the governmental and public proceedings. However, we are neither bound (City of Chicago v. Groffman (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 112, 118-19, 368 N.E.2d 891, 894; Sorenson v. Fio Rito (1980), 90 Ill. App. 3d 368, 373-74, 413 N.E.2d 47, 52) nor persuaded by the opinion in Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. We decline to follow the Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. opinion.
Plaintiff's next argument relates to discovery and the law applicable to motions to dismiss. Defendants filed motions to dismiss pur-, suant to section 2 — 619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 110, par. 2 — 619). Defendants alleged in their motions that the newspaper articles are substantially true accounts of plaintiff's indictment and therefore nonactionable, that the newspaper articles are substantially true accounts of governmental and public proceedings and therefore privileged, and that the newspaper articles are not libelous and therefore nonactionable. In support of their motions, defendants filed: (1) a copy of the U.S. Department of Justice Information Release of October 13, 1981; (2) the affidavit of the police sergeant from the Chicago Police Department OCD stating the information that he gave to the news media on October 13, 1981; and (3) a copy of the Federal grand jury charges showing the six-count indictment against plaintiff.
Plaintiff sought discovery before responding to the motions to dismiss, but in the trial court, he "agreed that additional discovery beyond that which defendants voluntarily submitted was not necessary to respond to * whether the publications and/or broadcasts were substantially true and whether the inaccuracies in the news reports were not libelous in any event." In view of plaintiff's satisfaction that no further discovery was needed to decide these broad issues, plaintiff's contention that he needed additional discovery to respond to the narrow issue of whether the newspaper articles are privileged is unavailing. A decision as to whether the newspaper articles are privileged involves no more than the application of the law to the same discoverable facts that would be necessary to decide "whether the publications and/or broadcasts were substantially true and whether the inaccuracies in the news reports were not libelous in any event." Plaintiff's position is therefore without merit.
Plaintiff next states that "affidavits under section 2 — 619 cannot be used to establish factual defenses, only affirmative defenses, as a matter of law," and that "under a section 2 — 619 motion to dismiss all well pled facts within the complaint must be taken as true." From these principles, plaintiff postulates "that the defendants were not entitled to prevail on their privilege arguments on a motion to dismiss." We disagree.
Section 2 — 619 provides that a defendant may, within the time for pleading, file a motion for dismissal of the action upon any of nine stated grounds, and if the grounds do not appear on the face of the pleading attacked, the motion shall be supported by affidavit. The last of the stated grounds under section 2 — 619 is that "the claim asserted against defendant is barred by other affirmative matter avoiding the legal effect of or defeating the claim." In applying this stated ground to defamation cases, it has been consistently held that the issue of a privilege is an affirmative defense, and it may be raised by and determined upon a motion to dismiss under this section. See Kilbane v. Sabonjian (1976), 38 Ill. App. 3d 172, 175, 347 N.E.2d 757, 760-61. Compare Edwards v. University of Chicago Hospitals & Clinics (1985), 137 Ill. App. 3d 485, 489, 484 N.E.2d 1100, 1104, and Newell v. Field Enterprises, Inc. (1980), 91 Ill. App. 3d 735, 749, 415 N.E.2d 434, 446.
It follows that defendants' documents and affidavit in support of their motions to dismiss are being used not to establish a factual defense, but rather, to establish the existence of an affirmative defense as a matter of law. It also follows that establishment of the affirmative defense of privilege defeats the alleged cause of action even though the well-pleaded facts in the complaint are admitted for the purpose of defendants' motions to dismiss. We therefore conclude that plaintiff's contention that defendants were not entitled to prevail on their privilege arguments on a motion to dismiss is untenable.
With respect to defendants CBS and Jacobson, the complaint does not quote or state specific statements that were made by Jacobson in his televised newscasts. Rather, the complaint merely states the conclusion "[t]hat the report contained false, malicious and defamatory libels of and concerning the plaintiff." While notice pleading prevails under the Federal rules (Conley v. Gibson (1957), 355 U.S. 41, 45-47, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80, 84-85, 78 S. Ct. 99, 101-03; Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)), a civil complaint in Illinois is required to plead the ultimate facts which give rise to the cause of action. We are concerned here only with the specificity of the allegations. The allegations are sufficiently specific if they factually set forth the elements necessary to state a cause of action. (People ex rel. Scott v. College Hills Corp. (1982), 91 Ill. 2d 138, 145, 435 N.E.2d 463, 467.) It is obvious that the elements of a cause of action for libel are not factually set forth unless the defamatory words of the defendant are included. Thus, it has long been the rule that in an action for libel, the words alleged to be defamatory must be set forth clearly and with particularity. (Wilson v. Hunk (1977), 51 Ill. App. 3d 1030, 1035, 367 N.E.2d 478, 482; American Pet Motels, Inc. v. Chicago Veterinary Medical Association (1982), 106 Ill. App. 3d 626, 632, 435 N.E.2d 1297, 1302; American International Hospital v. Chicago Tribune Co. (1985), 136 Ill. App. 3d 1019, 1020, 483 N.E.2d 965, 968.) In Brown v. Glickstein (1952), 347 Ill. App. 486, 491, 107 N.E.2d 267, 269, the court held that an allegation that defendants "did make divers false, malicious and scandalous statements of and concerning the plaintiff" is "a mere conclusion and does not set forth slanderous or libelous words with required particularity." We therefore believe that in order to sufficiently allege a libel action, the particular words that are defamatory must either be pleaded in the complaint or appear in an exhibit that is part of the complaint. Thus, with respect to defendants CBS and Jacobson, we conclude that the complaint is fatally defective.
Plaintiff states: "If any such defect exists, obviously it can be cured by amendment if the case is remanded. Given the trial court's ruling, it would have been futile to make such an amendment previously." We disagree. The record clearly demonstrates that defendants furnished plaintiff's attorneys a tape of Jacobson's televised newscasts long before the motions to dismiss were heard or ruled upon. It is the responsibility of the plaintiff to ensure that the complaint sufficiently states a cause of action, and if it does not, to file an amendment at the earliest opportunity. A plaintiff cannot cavalierly assume that he will be given leave to file an amendment to properly state a cause of action for the first time at his own whim. Since plaintiff did not know what the trial court's ruling on the motions to dismiss would be before the ruling was announced, it would not have been futile "to make such an amendment previously."
Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of plaintiff's libel action against all defendants.
Affirmed.
WHITE, J., concurs.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts sec. 611 (1977) provides: "The publication of defamatory matter concerning another in a report of an official action or proceeding or of a meeting open to the public that deals with a matter of public concern is privileged if the report is accurate and complete or a fair abridgment of the occurrence reported."
For convenience, the term libel is being used in this opinion as including slander. In Illinois, all distinctions between libel and slander, except as to whether the defamation was written or spoken, have been abolished and the rules applicable to slander are now applicable to libel as well. (Mitchell v. Peoria Journal-Star, Inc. (1966), 76 Ill. App. 2d 154, 158-59, 221 N.E.2d 516, 518-19.) For a discussion as to the common law difference between libel and slander, see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974), 418 U.S. 328, 369-77, 41 L. Ed. 2d 789, 822-26, 94 S. Ct. 2997, 3022-25 (White, J., dissenting). See also Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 126, par. 1 et seq.
Phendimetrazine is an amphetamine drug which stimulates the central nervous system to control the appetite in the treatment of obesity. It is a controlled substance. 21 U.S.C. sec. 812 (1982); Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 56V2, par. 1208(b)(5).