Case Name: Vera TOOLEY, Wife of Ronald J. PENNISON v. Ronald J. PENNISON
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1963-11-04
Citations: 157 So. 2d 628
Docket Number: No. 1083
Parties: Vera TOOLEY, Wife of Ronald J. PENNISON v. Ronald J. PENNISON.
Judges: McBRIDE and REGAN, JJ., and HENRY F. TURNER, Judge pro tem.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 157
Pages: 628–632

Head Matter:
Vera TOOLEY, Wife of Ronald J. PENNISON v. Ronald J. PENNISON.
No. 1083.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Fourth Circuit.
Nov. 4, 1963.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 2, 1963.
Writ Granted Jan. 22, 1964.
Meunier, Martin & Meunier, Richard J. Meunier, New Orleans, for plaintiff and appellee.
James J. Morrison, New Orleans, for defendant and appellant.
McBRIDE and REGAN, JJ., and HENRY F. TURNER, Judge pro tem.

Opinion:
McBRIDE, Judge.
Two appeals taken by the defendant-husband are before us in this hotly-contested divorce suit. The first was from two portions of the judgment of June 1, 1962, that awarded him a divorce on his reconventional demand. He complains that said judgment insofar as it orders him to pay $120 per month for the maintenance and support of his two minor children is a nullity; he also is aggrieved by parts of the third paragraph of the judgment which read as follows:
"It is further ordered, adjudged and decreed that the effective date of termination of the community be the day of this Judgment, and that the community consist of the following items:
"1. The value of the equity in the 37 Fisher Court property to be the difference between the present value of this property and any encumbrance bearing against this property.
"2. The value of the property in Waveland, Mississippi as of the date of this Judgment — although it is not decreed that this is community property, but merely that the equity in this property should be divided between husband and wife, since this property was purchased with community funds.
"3. The property at 533-35 Belle-ville Street in its entirety subj ect to any encumbrance bearing against this property."
The second appeal is from the judgment of September 14, 1962, which dismissed defendant's rule against his wife for an accounting for all alimony he paid her for the children and also to force her to contribute to their support.
On motion to dismiss
Appellee has moved to dismiss the appeals on the ground they were not taken within the time prescribed by law on the theory judgments granting a divorce or awarding custody of a person or alimony must be taken within thirty days from the expiration of the delay for applying for a new trial when a new trial has not been applied for.
The appeal from that part of the judgment of June 1, 1962, which orders defendant to pay alimony to the children must be dismissed because it was not taken until August 28, 1962, which was a date beyond the thirty-day period prescribed by LSA-C.C.P. arts. 3942-3943 within which such appeal should have been taken. After the right of appeal lapses through the neglect of the appellant, this court cannot legally take cognizance of the appeal.
However, the motion to dismiss must be denied insofar as the appeal relates to that part of the judgment which adjudicates the status of the property-owned by the parties and their respective rights therein. The thirty-day period set: forth in LSA-C.C.P. arts. 3942-3943 has-no application to defendant's appeal from, said portion of the judgment for the reason, that the appeal was taken not from the judgment granting the divorce or the custody of the children but only from that-part thereof which affects the property-rights of the parties. Cure v. Tobin, 217' La. 713, 47 So.2d 329.
The second appeal was taken on October-11, 1962, well within a thirty-day period', even assuming, but without deciding, that the time for taking such appeal is to be-regulated by LSA-C.C.P. arts. 3942-3943.
Therefore, the motion to dismiss is maintained insofar as the appeal from the judgment of June 1, 1962, pertains to the award' of alimony and to that extent the appeal is-dismissed; but in all other respects the motion to dismiss the appeals is denied.