Case Name: DAVID J. ROBER, as Administrator of the Estate of Alfred J. Rober, Deceased, v. NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY, a Corporation
Court: North Dakota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: North Dakota
Decision Date: 1913-05-23
Citations: 25 N.D. 394
Docket Number: 
Parties: DAVID J. ROBER, as Administrator of the Estate of Alfred J. Rober, Deceased, v. NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY, a Corporation.
Judges: 
Reporter: North Dakota Reports
Volume: 25
Pages: 394–449

Head Matter:
DAVID J. ROBER, as Administrator of the Estate of Alfred J. Rober, Deceased, v. NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY, a Corporation.
(142 N. W. 22.)
Wrongful act — railway company — ordinary care — contributory negligence-question for jury — defendant—injury—proximate cause.
Where, in a suit for death by wrongful act, it is claimed that the deceased was run over by an engine of a railway company at a street crossing in an incorporated city, and a portion of the body of the deceased was found in a frog- located from 4 to 6 feet from the planking in said crossing, and within the limits of the highway; and the planking of said crossing did not extend, as required by § 4321, Rev. Codes, 1905, across the full length of the said highway, but only for about 16 feet; and there were no eyewitnesses to the accident; and some of the evidence showed that on the night in question a man could have been seen at a distance of 30 feet, and the outlines of a box car at a distance of from 150 to 200 feet; and the engineer of the engine, which it is claimed occasioned the loss of life, testified that he had switched past the crossing a number of times during said night, but that when he crossed the same he rang his bell, and that there were lights both in front and at the rear of his said engine; but the evidence also showed that the night was very cold and stormy; that a strong wind was blowing with a velocity of 30 to 45 miles an hour; that the thermometer registered 18 degrees below zero; that dust and gravel and débris was flying, and the crossing was not lighted; and that about an hour before the time at which the accident must have occurred a hackman drove close to an engine on the track, which the evidence tended to show was the one which ran over the deceased, without seeing same or hearing any bell or signal sounded; and the next morning blood was found upon the tender of a switch engine of the defendant, held: that the presumption of ordinary care which is based upon the instinct of self-preservation was not overcome as a matter of law, and that the question of contributory negligence was one for the jury, as well as the question as to whether there was negligence on the part of the defendant which was the proximate cause of the injury.
Note. — The authorities on the presumption of care of person killed at railroad crossing are discussed in notes in 16 L.R.A. 261; 4 L.R.A.(N.S.) 344; and 116 Am. St. Rep. 118. And upon the right to rely on presumption of self-preservation in action for negligent killing at railroad crossing in order to prevent non-suit where there were no eyewitnesses to the killing, see note in 11 L.R.A.(N.S.) 844.
The question of the duty to maintain lookout for persons on track, generally, is treated in notes in 25 L.R.A. 287, and 8 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1069. And as to the liability for failure to give statutory signals when they would not have prevented the injury, see note in 21 L.R.A. 723. And for failure to give customary signals as excusing nonperformance of duty to look and listen, see note in 3 L.R.A.(N.S.) 391. See also note in 26 Am. Rep. 207.
The admissibility of mortality tables in evidence is the subject of notes in 40 L.R.A. 553, and 12 Am. St. Rep. 380.
"Contributory negligence — burden of proof.
2. The burden of proving contributory negligence is upon the defendant.
Legal presumption — suicide.
3. There is a legal presumption that one has not committed suicide.
Crime — legal presumption.
4. There is no legal presumption that a crime has been committed, or that under circumstances such as those in the case at bar, the deceased was murdered and his body thrown upon the track.
Railway company — duty—crossings—lookout—travelers.
5. It is the duty of a railway company to keep a proper lookout for travelers at a highway crossing which is within the limits of a city.
Evidence — engineer—signals at crossings.
6. In such a case evidence is admissible that an engineer who is charged with having failed to ring his bell and to give proper crossing signals at a particular time failed to do so at the same crossing, and on the same night, and within an hour of the alleged accident, and while engaged in the same general switching transaction.
Death — mortality tables — substantial damages — expectancy—evidence—jury.
7. In a suit brought under § 7686, Rev. Codes, 1905, for death by wrongful act, the introduction of mortality tables is not necessary to a recovery of substantial damages, either to show the expectancy of the life of the deceased or of his beneficiaries. At the common law, standard tables, and in North Dakota the Carlisle tables, are proper and competent evidence for the purpose of aiding the jury, but the introduction is not absolutely necessary.
Verdict — evidence—damages.
8. Evidence examined and held, to sustain the verdict both as to the question of negligence and the damages awarded.
Opinion filed May 23, 1913.
Appeal from the District Court for Morton County, Nuchols, J.
Action to recover damages for death by wrongful act. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.
Judgment affirmed.
This action is brought by David J. Rober, the father of, and as the administrator of the estate of, Alfred J. Rober, deceased, for the killing of the said Alfred J. Rober on the night of the 31st day of December, 1909, at Mandan, North Dakota. The defendant made the usual motion for a directed verdict and a motion for a new trial. It, however, introduced no evidence in its behalf, and submitted no written instructions, and there were no exceptions to the charge. A verdict was rendered for $2,000 in favor of the plaintiff, and a judgment rendered thereon is here sought to be reversed.
The deceased was, at the time of his death, a young man of twenty-six years of age, of good health, and in the full possession of all of his faculties. There is no evidence whatever in the record that he was a drinking man, or that on the night in question he had used intoxicating liquors. ITe had been making his home with his father’s family practically all of his life. There were seven children in all, three girls and four boys, of whom the oldest was twenty-eight years of age and the youngest fifteen. The youngest child was a girl of fifteen, and the next in age was a boy of about nineteen. These two, with a boy of about the age of twenty-one, a girl of about the age of twenty-four, and the deceased, of about the age of twenty-six, lived with their parents. The two older daughters were married and lived elsewhere. Alfred Rober, the deceased, lived at home. He had lived there practically all of his life. The earnings that he derived from time to time from his own efforts, and which for some time prior to his death were earned in working with his father in the concrete business, and were estimated at about $-1 a day, were “practically all used as a family purse.” His earnings and those of his father were all turned “into the family purse,” “and were not divided.” The father was fifty-three years of age. The age of the mother is not given, but the fact that the oldest child was at least twenty-eight years old would lead one to infer that she was at least forty-six years of age. There is no direct testimony as to the joint earnings of the father and son, though it is shown that the father, during most of his lifetime, had been doing carpenter work and ■concrete work.
Deceased, on the night of December 31, 1909, and at about 11 o’clock, left his father’s house to go to a dance at the opera house. The house was two and one-half blocks from the railroad crossing where the body of the deceased was found at about 12 o’clock, — between 12 and 2 o’clock. The night was stormy and cold. There was a wind of a velocity of from 30 to 40 miles an hour, though there was probably no snow flying. The thermometer registered 18 degrees below zero. There is some testimony that on the night in question one could tell a man 30 feet away, and make out the outline of a box car 150 to 200 feet distant. One witness, however, testified that he drove within a few feet of an engine about an hour prior to the accident, without seeing it or hearing the bell rung. The deceased approached the railway track which ran ■east and west, from the north. There was a clear view of the yards 100 feet'south of the crossing. The wind was blowing from the northwest. There is evidence that a switch engine of the company ran up and down the track and across the crossing practically all night, and that this engine was seen between 10 and 11 o’clock, with no tail light on it; also, that between 10 and 11 o’clock this engine almost ran into a witness; that it had then no tail light, and that the witness heard no gong or bell sounded. This, however, was objected to as being prior to the supposed time of the accident. Blood was found upon a switch engine in the yards of the company on the following morning, though the particular switch engine was not identified as being the one last mentioned. There is evidence, however, that another engine and crew were also operating in the yards besides the one last mentioned, though whether it crossed the particular crossing was not testified to. There were no gates at the crossing, and there was no flagman. There were no lights except the switch lights. In the middle of the crossing, and between the rails, there were planks about 14 or 16 feet in length. There was, however, no sidewalk across the track. From 4 to 6 feet east of these planks was a frog with the Y pointing to the west and towards the crossing, and which, though not on the planking, was within the roadway. At the east end of this frog, which covered 4 or 5 feet, were found clothes and parts of the body of the deceased, at about 1 o’clock in the morning. Between the frog and the crossing was a piece of leg and a piece of back bone. The frog was full of clothes and parts of flesh. At the east end of the frog there was found a foot of the right leg with a shoe on it. Part of the body and the left leg were lying at the north side of the track between the frog and the planking. The left leg was west of the end of the plank. The other leg was east of the frog. Neither of the legs, however, were in the frog. The shoe belonging to the left foot was found removed from the foot, close to the main part of the body and right beside the frog, at the east end. Pieces of the body were scattered over a-distance of about 100 feet west of the crossing. The leg on which the-shoe was left was cut square off between the knee and the ankle. The defendant put no witnesses upon the stand, but the engineer of the switch engine mentioned was called by the plaintiff. He testified that he ran his engine across the crossing all that night, back and forth. He, however, testifies that he did not know that a man had been killed until about 1 o’clock in the morning, when he was coming back from supper. He said that he was told this fact by the engineer of the other switch engine-at that time, who was evidently in the court room at the time of the trial, but was not called by the defendant. He said that the other switch engine was in the vicinity that night, though he did not know that it. crossed the crossing. He said that he left his engine about 12 o’clock. He said that he had lights on both ends of his engine and rang his bell at the crossing. He testified, however, that he never, at any time during-the night, saw a man on or near the crossing, and never knew that any man was injured or killed until between 12:30 and 1 o’clock, when he was told of the fact by others; nor did he discover that there was any blood or flesh near the frog until afterwards.
Ball, 'Watson, Young, & Lawrence and E. T. Commy, for appellant.
Physical facts, ordinarily the best evidence, should be sufficient to-overcome the slight presumption raised by the instinct of self-preservation. Northern P. P. Oo. v. Freeman, 174 U. S. 379-383, 43 L. ed. 1014-1016, 19 Sup. Ct. -Rep. 763; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Landrigan,. 191 U. S. 461, 48 L. ed. 262, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 137.
The presumption of the exercise of due care is at variance with the-physical facts; these facts should overcome such presumption. G-arlichv. Northern P. R. Co. 67 C. C. A. 237, 131 Fed. 837; Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Andrews, 64 C. C. A. 399, 130 Fed. 65; Chicago, St. P. M. & O. E. Co. v. Eossow, 54 C. C. A. 313, 117 Fed. 491; Chicago, R I. & P. R Co. v. Pounds, 27 C. C. A. 112, 49 U. S. App. 476, 82 Fed. 217; Pyle v. Clark, 25 C. 0. A. 190, 49 IT. S. App. 260, 79 Fed. 744, 2 Am. Neg. Eep. 100; Tomlinson v. Chicago, M. & St. P. E. Co. 67 C. C. A. 218, 134 Fed. 234; Eich v. Chicago, M. & St. P. E. Co. 78 C. C. A. 663, 149 Fed. 80.
A person about to cross a railroad track must bear in mind the dangers, and use his senses of sight and hearing, to avoid injury. Hope v. Great Northern E. Co. 19 N. T). 438, 122 N. W. 997; Eollins v. Chicago, M. & St. P. E. Co. 71 C. C. A. 615, 139 Fed. 639; Payne v. Chicago & N. W. E. Co. 108 Iowa, 188, 78 N. W. 813; Wabash E. Co. v. De Tar, 4 L.RA.(N.S.) 352, 73 C. C. A. 166, 141 Fed. 932; Eich v. Chicago, M. & St. P. E. Co. 78 O. C. A. 663, 149 Fed. 84; Baker v. Chicago, E. I. & P. E. Co. 95 Iowa, 163, 63 N. W. 667; Hanna v. Philadelphia & E. E. Co. 213 Pa. 157, 4 L.E.A.(N.S.) 346, 62 Atl. 643; Crawford v. Chicago, G. W. E. Co. 109 Iowa, 433, 80 N. W. 519; Schmidt v. Missouri P. E. Co. 191 Mo. 215, 3 L.E.A. (N.S.) 196, 90 S. W. 136; Lynch v. Metropolitan Street E. Co. 112 Mo. 433, 20 S. W. 642; Mathews, Presumptive Ev. 203; Dalton v. Chicago, E. I. & P. R Co. 114 Iowa, 257, 86 N. W. 272; 33 Cyc. 922, 923, 1072-1074, 1117, 1118; Sims v. St. Louis & S. R Co. 116 Mo. App. 572, 92 S. W. 909; Indiana, B. & W. E. Co. v. Hammock, 113 Ind. 1, 14 N. E. 737; Beach, Neg. ¶ 64, p. 738 ; Woolf v. Washington E. & Nav. Co. 37 Wash. 491, 79 Pac. 997; Herbert v. Southern P. Co. 121 Cal. 227, 53 Pac. 65.1; Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. E. Co. v. Miller, 149 Ind. 490, 49 N. E. 445.
It is presumed that one actually saw and heard what he could have seen and heard, if he had looked and listened before attempting to cross the track. Malott v. Hawkins, 159 Ind. 127, 63 N. E. 308; Dalton v. Chicago, E. I. & P. R Co. 114 Iowa, 257, 86 N. W. 272; Kunkel v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. R Co. 18 N. D. 367, 121 N. W. 830.
The duty of the plaintiff in such a case is twofold. He must show due care, and that defendant's negligence was the direct and proximate cause of the injury.
The ride res ipsa loquitur does not apply where the injured person and the negligent person were both in the exercise of an equal right and were charged with the same degree of care. 29 Cyc. 590-592; 33 Cyc. 922, 923, 1066-1068; Holbrook v. Htica & S. E. Co. 12 N. Y. 236, 64 Am. Dec. 232; Cosulich v. Standard Oil Co. 122 N. Y. 118, 19 Am. St. Eep. 475, 25 N. E. 259; Dobbins v. Brown, 119 N. Y. 188, 23 N. E. 537; DeVau v. Pennsylvania & N. Y. Canal & E. Co. 130 N. Y. 632, 28 N. E. 532; Western v. Troy, 139 N. Y. 281, 34 N. E. 780; Le Barron v. East Boston Eerry Co. 11 Allen, 312, 87 Am. Dec. 717, 3 Am. Neg. Cas. 760; Kendall v. Boston, 118 Mass. 234, 19 Am. Eep. 446; Thomas, Neg. 574, 576, 582; Gahagan v. Boston & M. E. Co. 70 N. H. 441, 55 L.E.A. 426, 50 Atl. 146.
No recovery can be had where the circumstances of the accident are not sufficiently disclosed to warrant any inference upon the question of care or negligence. Crafts v. Boston, 109 Mass. 519.
The evidence must show how the accident occurred, and what the injured party was doing, at the time. Corcoran v. Boston & A. E. Co. 133 Mass. 507; Eiley v. Connecticut Eiver E. Co. 135 Mass. 292; McGrath v. St. Louis Transit Co. 197 Mo. 97, 94 S. W. 872; Benedick v. Potts, 88 Md. 52, 41 L.E.A. 478, 40 Atl. 1067, 4 Am. Neg. Eep. 484; Cothron v. Cudahy Packing Co. 98 Mo. App. 349, 73 S. W. 279; Hamilton v. Metropolitan Street E. Co. 114 Mo. App. 509, 89 S. W. 893; Ely v. St. Louis, K. C. & N. E. Co. 77 Mo. 34; Leslie v. Wabash, St. L. & P. E. Co. 88 Mo. 50, 4 Am. Neg. Cas. 569; Yamell v. Kansas City, Et. S. & M. E. Co. 113 Mo. 570, 18 L.E.A. 599, 21 S. W. 1, 4 Am. Neg. Cas. 714; Bunyon v. Citizens’ E. Co. 127 Mo. 19, 29 S. W. 842; Hite v. Metropolitan Street E. Co. 130 Mo. 136, 51 Am. St. Eep. 555, 31 S. W. 262, 32 S. W. 33; McManamee v. Missouri P. E. Co. 135 Mo. 447, 37 S. W. 119; Bartley v. Metropolitan Street E. Co. 148 Mo. 139, 49 S. W. 840, 5 Am. Neg. Eep. 635; Gayle v. Missouri Car & Foundry Co. 177 Mo. 450, 76 S. W. 987; Breeden v. Big Circle Min. Co. 103 Mo. App. 179, 76 S. W. 731.
There can be no recovery in damages for remote possibilities or conjectural losses. Watson, Damages for Personal Injuries, pp. 365-367; McLane v. Perkins, 92 Me. 39, 43 L.E.A. 487, 42 Atl. 255; Caven v. Troy, 32 App. Div. 154, 52 N. Y. Supp. 804; 29 Cyc. 597-600, 623, 624, 629; Jenkins v. St. Paul City E. Co. 105 Minn. 504, 20 L.E.A. (N.S.) 401, 117 N. W. 928; Philadelphia & E. E. Co. v. Sehertle, 97 Pa. 454; Douglass v. Mitchell, 35 Pa. 443; Philadelphia & E. E. Co. v. Heil, 5 W. N. C. 91; Omaha & E. Valley E. Co. v. Talbot, 48 Neb. 627, 67 N. W. 599; Welsh v. Erie & W. Valley E. Co. 181 Pa. 461, 37 Atl. 513, 2 Am. Neg. Eep. 777.
The lone fact that a person who was walking is found dead beneath a railroad engine at a grade crossing raises no presumption that those operating the engine were negligent, but negligence must be proved. St. Louis & S. E. E. Co. v. Chapman, 71 C. C. A. 523, 140 Eed. 129; Davis v. Quincy, 0. & K. C. E. Co. 155 Mo. App. 312, 136 S. W. 718; Kilpatrick v. Eichardson, 37 Neb. 731, 56 N. W. 481; Newhard v. Pennsylvania E. Co. 153 Pa. 417, 19 L.E.A. 563, 26 Atl. 105; Wright v. Boston & M. E. Co. 74 N. H. 128, 8 L.E.A.(N.S.) 832, 65 Atl. 687; 33 Cyc. 1061-1064, 1128, 1129; Thomas, Neg. 582; Strock v. Louisville & N. E. Co. 145 Ky. 150, 140 S. W. 40; Early v. Louisville, H. & St. L. K. Co. 115 Ky. 13, 72 S. W. 348; Louisville, St. L. & T. E. Co. v. Terry, 20 Ky. L. Eep. 803, 47 S. W. 588; Louisville & N. E. Co. v. Humphrey, 20 Ky. L. Eep. 642, 45 S. W. 503; Louisville & N. E. Co. v. Wathen, 22 Ky. L. Eep. 82, 49 S. W. 185; S. E. Dana & Co. v. Blackburn, 121 Ky. 707, 90 S. W. 237; Cameron v. Great Northern E. Co. 8 N. D. 125, 77 N. W. 1016, 5 Am. Neg. Eep. 454; Scherer v. Schlaberg, 18 N. D. 421, 24 L.E.A.(N.S.) 520, 122 N. W. 1000; Umsted v. Colgate Earmers Elevator Co. 18 N. D. 309, 122 N. W. 390.
Other independent acts of negligence on the part of the railroad company are clearly collateral and irrelevant matters. Northern P. E. Co. v. Heaton, 111 C. C. A. 548, 191 Eed. 24; Baker v. Irish, 172 Pa. 528, 33 Atl. 558; Gillrie v. Lockport, 122 N. T. 403, 25 N. E. 357; Thomas, Neg. p. 587; Thompson v. Bowie, 4 Wall. 463, 18 L. ed. 423; Carr v. West End Street E. Co. 163 Mass. 360, 40 N. E. 185; Eppendorf v. Brooklyn City & N. E. Co. 69 N. Y. 195,( 25 Am. Eep. 171, 5 Am. Neg. Cas. 219; Langworthy v. Green Twp. 88 Mich. 207, 50 N. W. 130; Hudson v. Chicago & N. W. E. Co. 59 Iowa, 581, 44 Am. Eep. 692, 13 N. W. 735; 1 Greenl. Ev. 52; Kennedy v. Spring, 160 Mass. 203, 35 N. E. 779; Greeno v. Eoark, 8 Kan. App. 390, 56 Pac. 329; Dalton v. Chicago, K. I. & P. E. Co. 114 Iowa, 257, 86 N. W. 273; Hutcherson v. Louisville & N. E. Co. 21 Ky. L. Eep. 733, 52 S. W. 956; Missouri, K. & T. E. Co. v. Texas, 35 Tex. Civ. App. 604, 81 S. W. 589; McGovern v. Smith, 73 Vt. 52, 50 Atl. 549; Clark v. Smith, 72 Vt. 138, 47 Atl. 391; Southern R. Co. v. Winchester, 127 Ky. 144, 105 S. W. 167.
Whether or not a signal was given by the approach of a train to a station or crossing on a certain occasion, cannot be shown or proven by the conduct of those in charge of some other train, or some other occasion. Eskridge v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co. 89 Ky. 367, 12 S. W. 581; Findley Brewing Co. v. Bauer, 50 Ohio St. 560, 35 N. E. 55.
Verdict cannot be based upon speculation or conjecture. Satterberg v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. R. Co. 19 N. D. 38, 121 N. W. 70; Rev. Codes 1905, §§ 7686-7691; Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. v. Goodykoontz, 119 Ind. Ill, 12 Am. St. Rep. 371, 21 N. E. 472.
In computing damages for wrongful death, only pecuniary loss to beneficiaries can be considered. Brady v. Chicago, 4 Biss. 448, Fed. Cas. No. 1,796; Hollyday v. Reeves, 5 Hughes, 89, Fed. Cas. No. 6,625; Conant v. Griffin, 48 111. 410; Illinois C. R. Co. v. Baches, 55 111. 379; Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Sunderland, 2 111. App. 307; Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Ouska, 51 111. App. 334; Armour v. Czischld, 59 111. App. 17; Gunderson v. Northwestern Elevator Co. 47 Minn. 161, 49 N. W. 694; Schaub v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. 106 Mo. 74, 16 S. W. 924; Wise v. Peerpenning, 2 Edm. Sel. Cas. 112; Oldfield v. New York & H. R. Co. 14 N. Y. 310; Lehman v. Brooklyn, 29 Barb. 234; Mitchell v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co. 2 Hun, 535; Hall v. Crain, 2 Ohio Dec. Reprint, 453, 3 Ohio L. J. 137; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Vandever, 36 Pa. 298; Caldwell v. Brown, 53 Pa. 453; March v. Walker, 48 Tex. 372; McGown v. International & G. N. R. Co. 85 Tex. 289, 20 S. W. 80; Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Worthy, 87 Tex. 459, 29 S. W, 376; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Southwick, — Tex. Civ. App. —, 30 S. W. 592; Potter v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 21 Wis. 377, 94 Am. Dec. 548, 7 Am. Neg. Cas. 157; Richmond v. Chicago & W. M. R. Co. 87 Mich. 374, 49 N. W. 621; Duval v. Hunt, 34 Fla. 85, 15 So. 876, 13 Am. Neg. Cas. 848; Illinois C. R. Co. v. Crudupt, 63 Miss. 291; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. State, 33 Md. 542; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. State, 41 Md. 268; Cumberland & P. R. Co. v. State, 45 Md. 234; Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. v. State, 58 Md. 372; Baltimore & R. Turnp. Road v. State, 71 Md. 573, 18 Atl. 887; Galveston v. Barbour, 62 Tex. 174, 50 Am. Rep. 519; Inter national & G. N. R. Oo. v. Ormond, 64 Tex. 490; Houston & T. C. R. Oo. v. Gowser, 57 Tex. 293; Houston & T. O. E. Oo. v. Nixon, 52 Tex. 19; Rev. Stat. art. 2909; Missouri P. E. Oo. v. Lee, 70 Tex. 496, 7 S. W. 860; Swift v. Gaylord, 229 111. 330, 82 N. E. 300.
The burden is upon the plaintiff to give some clear, definite data upon which damages can he estimated. James v. Florida C. & P. E. Oo. 115 Ga. 313, 41 S. W. 585; Potter v. Chicago & N. W. E. Co. 21 Wis. 373, 94 Am. Dec. 549, 7 Am. Neg. Cas. 157; Tilley v. Hudson River E. Co. 29 N. Y. 252, 86 Am. Dec. 297; Chicago, E. I. & P. E. Co. v. Hambel, 2 Neb. (Unof.) 607, 89 N. W. 643; Chicago, St. P. M. & O. E. Co. v. Lagerkrans, 65 Neb. 566, 91 N. W. 358, 95 N. W. 2, distinguished; Crabtree v. Missouri P. R. Co. 86 Neb. 33, 136 Am. St. Eep. 663, 124 N. W. 932; Yalente v. Sierra R. Co. 151 Cal. 534, 91 Pac. 481; Rhoads v. Chicago & A. E. Co. 227 111. 328, 11 L.E.A.(N.S.) 623, 81 N. E. 371, 10 Ann. Cas. 113; Pierce, Railroads, 393 — 399, and cases cited; Franklin v. Southeastern R. Co. 3 Hurlst. & N. 211, 4 Jur. N. S. 565, 6 Week. Eep. 573; Dalton v. Southeastern E. Co. 4 C. B. N. S. 296, 4 Jur. N. S. 711, 27 L. J. C. P. N. S. 227, 6 Week. Eep. 574; Pennsylvania E. Co. v. Books, 57 Pa. 339, 98 Am. Dec. 229; Little Rock & Ft. S. E. Co. v. Townsend, 41 Ark. 382; Fordyce v. McCants, 51 Ark. 509, 4 L.E.A. 296, 14 Am. St. Eep. 69, 11 S. W. 695; Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Davis, 4 Tex. Civ. App. 468, 23 S. W. 301; Richmond v. Chicago & W. M. E. Co. 87 Mich. 374, 49 N. W. 621; Toledo, W. & W. E. Co. v. As-bury, 84 111. 429; Hall v. Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. 39 Fed. 18; Illinois C. E. Co. v. Baches, 55 III. 379; Missouri P. E. Co. v. Lee, 70 Tex. 496, 7 S. W. 857; Staal v. Midland E. Co. 57 Mich. 239, 23 N. W. 795; Blake v. Midland E. Co. 18 Q. B. 93, 21 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 233, 16 Jur. N. S. 562; Duval v. Hunt, 34 Fla. 85, 15 So. 885, 13 Am. Neg. Cas. 848; Baltimore & E. Turnp. Road v. State, 71 Md. 573, 18 Atl. 884; Baltimore & O. E. Co. v. State, 33 Md. 542, 41 Md. 268; Barron v. Northern P. E. Co. 16 N. D. 277, 113 N. W. 102; Sedgw. Damages, 180, 483; Smith v. Evans, 13 Neb. 314, 14 N. W. 406; Esterly Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Frolkey, 34 Neb. 110, 51 N. W. 594; Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Thornsberry, — Tex. —, 17 S. W. 521, 6 Am. Neg. Gas. 610, 5 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 718; Scherer v. Schalberg, 18 N. D. 421, 24 L.E.A.(N.S.) 520, 122 N. W. 1000; Spicer v. Northern P. P. Co. 21 N. D. 61, 128 N. W. 302.
Melvin A. Hildreth> for respondent.
Errors not discussed, and to which the attention of the court is not directly called in appellant’s brief, are abandoned. Flora v. Mathwig, 19 N: D. 5, 121 N. W. 63.
The denying of the motion for a new trial or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is not assigned as error in the record, and this court ought not to review the case. State v. Wright, 20 N. D. 216, 126 N. W. 1023, Ann. Cas. 1912 C, 795; Pule 14-, 10 N. D. XLVI, 91 N. W. VIII; Acton v. Fargo & M. Street P. Co. 20 N. D. 434, 129 N. W. 225; Sucker State Drill Co. v. Brock, 18 N. D. 532, 123 N. W. 667.
The case was properly submitted to the jury, and by the verdict, every fact and inference has been settled in favor of the plaintiff. The negligence of the defendant, as the proximate cause of the injury, is fully established. Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. R. Co. 18 N. D. 463, 123 N. W. 281; Union Stock-Yards v. Conoyer, 41 Neb. 617, 59 N. W. 950; Phillips v. Milwaukee & N. P. Co. 77 Wis. 349, 9 L.R.A. 521, 46 N. W. 543; Kern v. Snider, 76 C. C. A. 201, 145 Fed. 327; Weiler v. Manhattan R. Co. 53 Hun, 372, 6 N. Y. Supp. 320, 5 Am. Neg. Gas. 472, affirmed in 127 N. Y. 669, 28 N. E. 255; Adams v. Bunker Hill & S. Min. Co. 12 Idaho, 637, 11 L.R.A.(N.S.) 846, 89 Pac. 624; Solberg v. Schlosser, 20 N. D. 315, 30 L.B.A.(N.S.) 1111, 127 N. W. 91; Northern P. P. Co. v. Everett, 152 U. S. 107, 38 L. ed. 373, 14 Sup. Ct. Pep. 474; Daily v. New York, N. H. & H. R. P. Co. 167 Fed. 600; Hall v. Northern P. R. Co. 16 N. D. 60, 111 N. W. 609, 14 Ann. Cas. 960; Higgs v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M- P. Co. 16 N. D. 447, 15 L.P.A.(N.S.) 1162, 114 N. W. 722, 15 Ann. Cas. 97; Henavie v. New York C. & H. P. P. Co. 166 N. Y. 280, 59 N. E. 901, 9 Am. Neg. Pep. 345; Dyer v. Erie R. Co. 71 N. Y. 228, 12 Am. Neg. Cas. 347; Houghkirk v. Delaware & H. Canal Co. 92 N. Y. 219, 44 Am. Pep. 370; Thompson v. New York C. & H. P. P. Co. 110 N. Y. 636, 17 N. E. 690; Vandewater v. New York & N. E. P. Co. 135. N. Y. 583, 18 L.P.A. 771, 32 N. E. 636.
Where the evidence of negligence is in doubt, or where different minds might draw different conclusions from all of the testimony, the case is one for the jury. McNamara v. New York C. & H. E. E. Co. 136 N. Y. 650, 32 N. E. 765; Wilson v. Southern P. E. Co. 62 Cal. 164; Painton v. Northern C. E. Co. 83 N. Y. 8; 2 Thomp. Neg. §§ 1697, 1699, 1700; Patterson, E. Acci. Law, p. 156, and cases cited in foot notes. See pages 166, 167; Kunkel v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. E. Co. 18 N. D. 377, 121 N. W. 830.
Where a party can offer proof of facts which would rebut the inferences which are already established, and fails to do so, the natural inference is that such proof, instead of rebutting, would be supporting the inferences against him. Pennsylvania E. Co. v. Anoka Nat. Bank, 47 C. C. A. 454, 108 Eed. 482; Union Trust Co. v. McClellan, 40 W. Ya. 405, 21 S. E. 1025; 1 Moore, Eacts, §§ 556-564.
It is to be presumed that plaintiff, on the night in question, was exercising ordinary care and diligence for his own protection. Kunkel v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. E. Co. 18 N. D. 380, 121 N. W. 830; Chicago, M. & St. P. E. Co. v. Donovan, 87 O. C. A. 600, 160 Eed. 826; Kern v. Snider, 145 Fed. 328, 76 C. C. A. 201; Missouri, K. & T. E. Co. v. Byrne, 40 C. C. A. 402, 100 Eed. 362; Big Bushy Coal & Coke Co. v. Williams, 99 C. C. A. 102, 176 Eed. 529; Chicago & N. W. E. Co. v. Netolicky, 14 O. C. A. 615, 32 U. S. App. 168, 406, 67 Eed. 668; Shaber v. St. Paul, M. & M. E. Co. 28 Minn. .103, 9 N. W. 578; Bolinger v. St. Paul & D. E. Co. 36 Minn. 418, 1 Am. St. Eep. 680, 31 N. W. 856; Loucks v. Chicago, M. & St. P. E. Co. 31 Minn. 526, 18 N. W. 651; Grant v. Oregon E. & Nav. Co. 54 Wash. 678, 25 L.E.A.(N.S.) 925, 103 Pac. 1126; Delaware, L. & W. E. Co. v. Converse, 139 U. S. 469, 35 L. ed. 213, 11 Sup. Ct. Eep. 569; Watertown v. Greaves, 56 L.E.A. 865, 50 C. C. A. 172, 112 Eed. 183; McGhee v. Campbell, 42 C. C. A. 94, 101 Eed. 936; St. Louis, I. M. & S. E. Co. v. Leftwich, 54 C. C. A. 1, 117 Eed. 127, 12 Am. Neg. Eep. 395; Hemingway v. Illinois C. E. Co. 52 C. C. A. 477, 114 Eed. 843; Texas & P. E. Co. v. Carlin, 60 L.E.A. 462, 49 C. C. A. 605, 111 Eed. 777; Patterson, Eailway Acci. Law, 166, 167; Gray v. Chicago, E. I. & P. E. Co. 143 Iowa, 268, 121 N. W. 1099; Liabraaten v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. E. Co. 105 Minn. 207, 117 N. W. 423; Mason v. Lansing & J. E. Co. 157 Mich. 1, 129 N. W. 468; Bruggeman v. Illinois C. E. Co. 147 Iowa, 187, 123 N. W. 1007; Stotelmeyer v. Chicago, 1VL & St. P. R. Co. 148 Iowa, 278, 127 N. W. 205; Stewart y. Hall, 150 Iowa, 744, 130 N. W. 994; Nilson v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. 84 Neb. 595, 121 N. W. 1128; Kafka v. Union Stock-Yards Co. 87 Neb. 331, 127 N. W. 129; Solberg v. Schlosser, 20 N. D. 307, 30 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1111, 127 N. W. 91; Whaley v. Vidal, 27 S. D. 627, 132 N. W. 245; Tietz v. Grand Trunk R. Co. 166 Mich. 205, 131 N. W. 710; Klotz v. Winona & St. P. R. Co. 68 Minn. 341, 71 N. W. 257; Cooper v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. 66 Mich. 261, 33 N. W. 306; McKenna v. Baessler, 86 Iowa, 197, 17 L.R.A. 310, 53 N. W. 104; 2 Thomp. Neg. § 1506, p. 183; see 6 Thomp. Neg. § 7390, p. 430; Great Northern R. Co. v. McLaughlin, 17 C. C. A. 330, 44 U. S. App. 189, 70 Ped. 669; Dwyer v. St. Louis & S. P. R. Co. 52 Ped. 88; Haugen v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 3 S. D. 394, 53 N. W. 769; Richardson v. Boston, 19 How. 263, 15 L. ed. 639; Frisbie v. Whitney, 9 Wall. 196, 19 L. ed. 672; Cork v. Blossom, 162 Mass. 330, 38 N. E. 476; Lehnertz v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. 31 Minn. 219, 17 N. W. 376; Madden v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. 30 Minn. 453, 16 N. W. 263; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Adler, 56 111. 344; Ohio & M. R. Co. v. People, 45 111. App. 583; 5 Enc. PI. & Pr. 691-693.
Where a party objects to testimony, he must at all times maintain a hostile attitude towards such testimony. See Abbott, Civil Jury Trials, 3d. ed. 323; Missouri P. R. Co. v. Bentley, 78 Kan. 221, 93 Pac. 150, 96 Pac. 800; Miller v. Miller, 92 Va. 510, 23 S. E. 891; Jenkins v. Salmon Brick & Lumber Co. 120 La. 549, 45 So. 435; Virginia & T. Coal & I. Co. v. Fields, 94 Va. 102, 26 S. E. 426; New York L. Ins. Co. v. Taliaferro, 95 Va. 522, 28 S. E. 879; Southern R. Co. v. Hansbrough, 107 Va. 733, 60 S. E. 58; Tacoma Light & Water Co. v. Huson, 13 Wash. 124, 42 Pac. 536; Wees v. Page, 47 Wash. 213, 91 Pac. 766; King v. Haney, 46 Cal. 561, 13 Am. Rep. 217.
■ Present negligence cannot be predicated upon proof of prior acts of negligence. But where the testimony tends to show circumstances similar as to time and place, and as to conduct and conditions, it is competent, and is not collateral. Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Adler, 56 111. 344;' Ohio & M. R. Co. v. People, 45 111. App. 583; 5 Enc. PL & Pr. 691 — 693; Northern P. R. Co. v. Patterson, 154 U. S. 134, 38 L. ed. 936, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 977; Gulf, C. & S. P. R. Co. v. Johnson, 4 C. C. A. 447, 10 U. S. App. 629, 54 Fed. 474; Berry v. Seawell, 13 C. C. A. 101, 31 U. S. App. 41, 65 Fed. 742; Field y. New York C. R. Co. 32 N. Y. 339; Quinlin v. Utica, 11 Hun, 217, 74 N. Y. 603; Chicago v. Powers, 42 111. 169, 89 Am. Dec. 418; Rich v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 78 O. C. A. 663, 149 Fed. 79; Northern P. R. Co. y. Lewis, 2 C. C. A. 446, 7 U. S. App. 254, 51 Fed. 658; Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Richardson, 91 U. S. 469, 23 L. ed. 362; Ohio & M. R. Co. v. People, 45 111. App. 583; 5 Enc. PI. & Pr. 691, and cases cited; Kent v. Lincoln, 32 Vt. 591; Kelly v. Southern Minnesota R. Co. 28 Minn. 98, 9 N. W. 588; Heinmiller v. Winston Bros. 131 Iowa, 32, 6 L.R.A. (N.S.) 150, 117 Am. St. Rep. 405, 107 N. W. 1102; Sheldon v. Hudson River R. Co. 14 N. Y. 218, 67 Am. Dec. 155; Payne v. Troy & B. R. Co. 83 N. Y. 572; Wolfldel v. 6th Ave. R. Co. 38 N. Y. 49, 5 Am. Neg. Cas. 106; Webber v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co. 58 N. Y. 451; Hart v. Hudson River Bridge Co. 80 N. Y. 622; 1 Wigmore, Ev. p. 18, subdiv. D; Gale v. Schillock, 4 Dak. 182, 29 N. W. 661; Hayden v. Palmer, 2 Hill, 205 ; Robers v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 35 Wis. 684; Gillett, Indirect & Collateral Ev. pp. 86-88, and cases in foot notes; McCarragher v. Rogers, 120 N. Y. 532, 34 N. E. 812; District of Columbia v. Armes, 107 U. S. 519, 27 L. ed. 618, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 840; Indianapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Stout, 53 Ind. 143; Judson v. New York & N. H. R. Co. 29 Conn. 434; Maltby v. Chicago & W. M. R. Co. 52 Mich. 108, 17 N. W; 717; Brown v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 102 Wis. 137, 44 L.R.A. 579, 77 N. W. 748, 78 N. W. 771; Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. v. Smith, 91 Ind. 119; Pittsburg, Ft. W. & C. R. Co. v. Dunn, 56 Pa.'280; Baughman v. Shenango & A. N. R. Co. 92 Pa. 335, 37 Am. Rep. 690; Mann v. Central Vermont R. Co. 55 Vt. 484, 45 Am. Rep. 628; O’Connor v. Boston & L. R. Corp. 135 Mass. 352; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Boylan, 104 111. 595; Wasmer v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. 80 N. Y. 212, 36 Am. Rep. 608; ■Oliver v. Northeastern R. Co. L. R. 9 Q. B. 409, 43 L. J. Q. B. N. S. 198; Milwaukee & C. N. R. Co. v. Hunter, 11 Wis. 160, 78 Am. Dec. 699; Johnson v. St. Paul & D. R. Co. 31 Minn. 283, 17 N. W. 622; Pittsburgh Southern R. Co. v. Taylor, 104 Pa. 306, 49 Am. Rep. 580; Paine v. Grand Trunk R. Co. 58 N. H. 611.
There is abundant evidence of the negligence of the defendant, and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the death of Rober. Worth Bros. v. Kallas, 89 C. C. A. 186, 162 Fed. 308; 2 Thomp. Neg. §§ 1695-1697; Milton v. Bangor K. & Electric Co. 103 Me. 218, 15 L.K.A.(N.S.) 203, 125 Am. St. Bep. 293, 68 Atl. 826; See Code Civ. Proc. § 4295; Gray v. Chicago, B. I. & P. B. Co. 143 Iowa, 268, 121 N. W. 1099; Korab v. Chicago, B. I. & P. B. Co. 149 Iowa, 711, 41 L.B.A.(N.S.) 32, 128 N. W. 531; Liabraaten v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. B. Co. 105 Minn. 207, 117 N. W. 423; Merrill v. Minneapolis & St. L. B. Co. 27 S. D. 1, 129 N. W. 468; Bruggeman v. Illinois C. B. Co. 147 Iowa, 187, 123 N. W. 1007; Stotelmeyer v. Chicago, M. & St. P. B. Co. 148 Iowa, 278, 127 N. W. 205; Knudson v. Great Northern B. Co. 114 Minn. 244, 130 N. W. 994; Nilson v. Chicago, B. & Q. B. Co. 84 Neb. 595, 121 N. W. 1128; Kafka v. Union Stock-Yards Co. 87 Neb. 331, 127 N. W. 129; Solberg v. Schlosser, 20 N. D. 307, 30 L.B.A.(N.S.) 1111, 127 N. W. 91; Whaley v. Vidal, 27 S. D. 627, 182'N. W. 245; Tnetz v. Grand Trunk B. Co. 166 Mich. 205, 131 N. W. 710; Klotz v. Winona & St. P. B. Co. 68 Minn. 341, 71 N. W. 257, 3 Am. Neg. Bep. 201; Cooper v. Lake Shore & M. S. B. Co. 66 Mich. 261, 11 Am. St. Bep. 482, 33 N. W. 306; McKenna v. Baessler, 86 Iowa, 197, Í7 L.B.A. 310, 53 N. W. 104; 2 Thomp. Neg. § 1506; Great Northern B. Co. v. McLaughlin, 17 C. C. A. 330, 44 U. S. App. 189, 70 Fed. 669; Dwyer v. St. Louis & S. F. B. Co. 52 Fed. 88; Haugen v. Chicago, M. & St. P. B. Co. 3 S. D. 394, 53 N. W. 769; Bichardson v. Boston, 19 How. 263, 15 L. ed. 639; Frisbie v. Whitney, 9 Wall. 196, 19 L. ed. 672.
The evidence is ample to show the expectancy or value of the life of deceased to those entitled to benefits. Buehl v. Lidgerwood Bural Teleph. Co. 23 N.-D. 6, 133 N. W. 793; State v. Waholz, 28 Minn. 114, 9 N. W. 578; Satterberg v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. B. Co. 19 N. D. 39, 121 N. W. 70; Tiffany, Death by Wrongful Act, 224-226.
Where no prejudicial error exists, and where the questions of fact have been properly submitted to the jury, and a verdict rendered, and a motion for a new trial heard before the trial court and denied, the order of the trial court should not be disturbed. MacGregor v. Pierce, 17 S. D. 51, 95 N. W. 281; Herrimen v. Menzies, 115 Cal. 16, 35 L.B.A. 318, 56 Am. St. Bep. 81, 44 Pac. 660, 46 Pac. 730; Cooney v. Furlong, 66 Cal. 520, 6 Pac. 388; Packer v. Doray, 98 Cal. 315, 33 Pac. 118.

Opinion:
Bruce, J.
(after stating the facts as above). Appellant relies upon four propositions for a reversal of this judgment: (1) That there was no proof of negligence on the part of the defendant; (2) that there is proof of contributory negligence; (3) that the proof offered does not in any way justify the awarding of anything hut nominal damages; (4) that the evidence in relation to the switch engine which was seen by the haekman at about 10 o'clock and probably an hour prior to the accident was improperly admitted.
On the first two objections it is argued that there is evidence which tends to show that a man could have been seen on the night in question at a distance of 30 feet, and that the outlines of a box car could have been seen from 150 to 200 feet. The proof, however, also shows that the night was very cold and stormy, and that a strong wind was blowing with a velocity of from 30 to 45 miles an hour, and that dust and gravel and debris were in the air; the thermometer registered 18 degrees below zero; the yards were not lighted. There is also evidence that at about 10 o'clock a haekman drove close to an engine upon the track, which the evidence strongly tends to show was the one which ran over the deceased, without even seeing the same or hearing any bell or signal sounded. There is also evidence that blood was found upon the wheels and tender of a switch engine of the defendant the next morning. On the other hand, the engineer testified that there were lights on both ends of his engine, and that he sounded his bell whenever he passed the crossing. We do not believe that this evidence overcomes the presumption of ordinary care which is based upon the instinct of self-preservation. Kunkel v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. R. Co. 18 N. D. 367, 121 N. W. 830, and cases there cited, 1 Moore, Facts, § 554, 555; Hanlon v. Milwaukee Electric R. & Light Co. 118 Wis. 210, 95 N. W. 100. It is true that this presumption does not overcome direct, probative evidence, but as we view the case, there is nothing in the record which rises to the dignity of such.
The plaintiff's intestate was killed on the crossing of a public highway, and within the limits of the city. There is no real dispute upon this question. The mangled remains of the body, and the clothes found in the frog in the highway, is sufficient evidence of this. The presumption of the law is that a man has not committed suicide; and therefore that the deceased did not voluntarily throw himself upon the track. Soules v. Brotherhood of American Yeomen, 19 N. D. 23, 120 N. W. 760 ; Schraeder v. Modern Brotherhood, 90 Neb. 688, 39 L.R.A.(N.S.) 157, 134 N. W. 266 ; Walden v. Bankers' Life Asso. 89 Neb. 546, 181 N. W. 962 ; 1 Moore, Facts, § 651. So, too, there is no presumption that anyone else committed a crime, that is to say, killed him and placed his body upon the track. There is a presumption of due care on his part arising out of the instinct of self-preservation. Kunkel v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. R. Co. supra ; Cameron v. Great Northern R. Co. 8 N. D. 134, 77 N. W. 1016, 5 Am. Neg. Rep. 454. There is also, and above all, a duty on the part of the railway company to keep a proper lookout at a highway crossing, especially within the limits of cities. Coulter v. Great Northern R. Co. 5 N. D. 568, 67 N. W. 1046 ; Bishop v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 4 N. D. 536, 62 N. W. 605 ; St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. v. Dingman, 62 Ark. 245, 35 S. W. 219. The engineer of the switch engine, which, as we view the evidence, must have occasioned the death of the deceased, or which, at any rate, was running up and down the track all night long and repeatedly crossed the crossing in question at and about the time when the accident must have occurred, testified that he knew nothing about the facts of the case at all, and did not know that the deceased had been run over until informed by someone else, some hour or so after the accident. The case, in our mind, was one for the jury to pass upon (Kunkel v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. R. Co. supra ; Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. R. Co. 18 N. D. 463, 123 N. W. 281; St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. v. Dingman, 62 Ark. 245, 35 S. W. 219). -If the accident had taken place between highway crossings, and upon the open prairie, where there was no absolute duty to ring a bell or to keep a proper lookout, and where the deceased would probably have been a trespasser, the case might have been different.
But counsel for defendant and appellant argues that improper evidence was admitted, and that much of the evidence which is urged in support of the verdict was inadmissible. He objected and still objects strenuously to the introduction of the testimony of the hackman, Chapin, to the effect that at some time and about 10 o'clock he saw a switch engine upon the track at the crossing, without a tail light; that this engine almost ran into him, and that he heard no bell or gong sounded. It is urged, in short, that proof of prior negligence cannot be had in support of an allegation of negligence at a particular time. We must remember, however, that in the case at bar practically all the evidence is, or should be, in the possession of the defendant. The victim of the accident is dead. The evidence is to us conclusive that he was run over by a switch engine belonging to the defendant company. The question to be decided was not merely whether the defendant failed to ring a bell at the crossing at the time of the accident, or whether it had a tail light upon its engine, but what was the cause of the accident, and was there evidence to overcome the presumption of due care on the part of the deceased. It was claimed that the deceased could see the engine at a distance of 150 to 200 feet. The hackman was allowed to testify that he almost ran upon an engine without seeing it. It was claimed by the defendant that the bell was sounded at the crossing, and could have been heard by the deceased. It is shown that a strong wind was blowing, and it is sought to he proved by the plaintiff that the hackman was almost run into by an engine, without hearing any gong sounded. All of this evidence was admissible as tending to show the physical facts attending the accident. Not merely was this evidence admissible on the question of contributory negligence and as to whether the deceased could have seen and heard the engine in the storm or not, hut for the purpose of arriving at the real cause of the accident. There were no eyewitnesses tp the accident, and prcof of this nature is the only proof that could be adduced, unless the defendant himself chose to furnish better evidence. This is not a case where negligent acts on other parts of the road or on other occasions, or committed by other engineers than those involved in the accident, are concerned, but a case in which the acts and conduct of the engineers and servants, and the physical equipment of the engine engaged in the same general switching transaction in which the injury occurred, are involved. We think the evidence was admissible. See Chicago v. Powers, 42 Ill. 169, 89 Am. Dec. 418 ; Rich v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 78 C. C. A. 663, 149 Fed. 79 ; Northern P. R. Co. v. Lewis, 2 C. C. A. 446, 10 U. S. App. 254, 51 Fed. 658 ; Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Pichardson, 91 U. S. 469, 23 L. ed. 362 ; Cotner v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. 220 Mo. 284, 119 S. W. 610 ; Woodward v. Southern R. Co. 90 S. C. 262, 73 S. E. 79 ; State v. Manchester & L. R. Co. 52 N. H. 528, 548 ; Davidson v. St. Paul, M. & M. R. Co. 34 Minn. 51, 24 N. W. 324 ; Swadley v. Missouri P. R. Co. 118 Mo. 268, 40 Am. St. Rep. 366, 24 S. W. 140 ; Aurora v. Brown, 12 Ill. App. 122 (affirmed in 109 Ill. 165) ; Goodwin v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. 82 S. C. 321, 64 S. E. 242 ; Lannis v. Louisville R. Co. 16 Ky. L. Rep. 446 ; Field v. New York C. R. Co. 32 N. Y. 339 ; Pennsylvania Teleph. Co. v. Varnan, 2 Monaghan (Pa.) 645, 15 Atl. 624 ; Quinlan v. Utica, 11 Hun, 217 ; Presby v. Grand Trunk R. Co. 66 N. H. 615, 22 Atl. 554 ; Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Kutac, 76 Tex. 473, 13 S. W. 327 ; Bourassa v. Grand Trunk R. Co. 75 N. H. 359, 74 Atl. 590.
We now come to the proof of the damages. Appellant insists that since no mortality tables were introduced, there is no proof of the expectancy of life either of the deceased or of his relatives. As we understand the law, and as held by this court in the case of Ruehl v. Lidgerwood Rural Teleph. Co. 23 N. D. 6, — L.R.A.(N.S.) —, 135 N. W. 793, the admission in evidence of such tables is not necessary to a recovery of substantial damages. According to the common law, standard tables were competent and proper evidence, but they were not absolutely necessary. Under § 7303 of the Code of North Dakota, the Carlisletables are admissible, but their admission is not necessary. We have-discussed this question at some length in the case of Ruehl v. Lidgerwood Rural Teleph. Co. before referred to, and we believe that no extended discussion is necessary here. We know that counsel for the appellant makes a distinction between a case where the expectancy of the-life of the deceased and the expectancy of the life of the beneficiary are-concerned, but we can find no such distinction in the authorities. We have examined the cases cited by appellant, and the case of Rhoads v. Chicago & A. R. Co. 227 Ill. 328, 11 L.R.A.(N.S.) 623, 81 N. E. 371, and the notes to that case as reported in 10 Ann. Cas. Ill, 113, and can find no support for the proposition. All that the cases hold is that there must be some proof of a pecuniary loss to the beneficiaries, and that in such cases mortality tables are competent evidence. All that the case of' Rhoads v. Chicago & A. R. Co. supra, held was that in a case where the mortality tables had been introduced it was error for the court to instruct the jury that a father was entitled to a sum equal to the earnings of his son during the son's expectancy of life, when the tables showed that the life of the son would have been twenty-eight years longer than that of his father. In other words, the court held that all the father could possibly recover would be a sum equal to the support that he would receive from his son during his, the father's, life. We have, indeed, examined the Illinois Eeports with a great deal of care, and we have yet to find a case in which a judgment has been set aside because of the failure to introduce mortality tables in evidence. It is well established, indeed, as we have shown in the Euehl Case, that the court may itself take judicial notice of such mortality tables. It is also well established that the things of which a court may take judicial notice are things which are generally known. Taking judicial notice, as we do, .and may, of the Carlisle expectancy tables and of the expectancy of life of the deceased, which was 37.14 years; of the father, which was 18.97 years; and of the mother, which was 22.50 years if we put her age at 48; of the youngest child, which was 45 years; and of the next child, which was 42.17 years; and considering the earning capacity of the deceased, shown on the trial, we are not prepared to say that the verdict was excessive, or that only nominal damages should have been awarded. Little v. Bousfield & Co. 165 Mich. 654, 131 N. W. 63.
But defendant and appellant says that there is no proof of any pecuniary loss on which a recovery can be "based, even if the mortality tables had been introduced or were unnecessary. Counsel argues that there is no direct proof as to the money contributed by the son to his family, or of the monetary condition and needs of that family. We do not so understand the evidence. We have held in the case of Satterberg v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. R. Co. 19 N. D. 38, 121 N. W. 70, that a legal obligation to support is not necessary to a recovery in such cases. The evidence shows that the boy's earning capacity was about $4 a day; that he was in business with his father; and that he and his father made no division of the profits, but turned all of their earnings into the family fund. The evidence shows that the father was fifty-three years of age, and we must infer that the mother was at least forty-six. There was a girl of fifteen years of age, and a boy of about nineteen. The earning capacity of the family as a whole was not, it is true, shown, but it was shown that the father and son were both carpenters and concrete makers and in what may be termed the poorer class of society. In fact, the evidence conclusively shows that all of the earnings were turned into a joint fund for the family support. We think that the evidence was sufficient to warrant the recovery of substantial dam ages, and. that the amount recovered ($2,000) should not, under the circumstances, be deemed in any way excessive.
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.