Case Name: Thomas J. RUSK et ux., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY et al., Defendants-Appellants
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1964-07-15
Citations: 167 So. 2d 205
Docket Number: No. 1205
Parties: Thomas J. RUSK et ux., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY et al., Defendants-Appellants.
Judges: Before TATE, FRUGÉ, and HOOD, JJ-
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 167
Pages: 205–209

Head Matter:
Thomas J. RUSK et ux., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY et al., Defendants-Appellants.
No. 1205.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Third Circuit.
July 15, 1964.
Concurring Opinion July 17, 1964.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 15, 1964.
Writ Refused Oct. 26, 1964.
Stafford & Pitts, by John L. Pitts, Alexandria, for defendants-appellants.
Polk, Foote & Neblett, by Robert B. Neb-lett, Jr., Alexandria, for plaintiffs-appellees.
Before TATE, FRUGÉ, and HOOD, JJ-

Opinion:
FRUGÉ, Judge.
This suit results from an automobile accident which occurred on March 11, 1963, in Alexandria, Louisiana. The district court rendered a judgment in favor of plaintiffs in the amount of $3,537. From this judgment defendants appeal.
Defendants freely admit liability. They do contend, however, that the award was excessive and pray for a reduction.
Parties for both sides agree that plaintiff sustained a whiplash injury. The only matter in dispute is the severity of the whiplash injury. Plaintiff Lena Rusk maintains that she sustained a moderately severe injury and was still suffering from it at the time of the trial, some eleven months after the accident. Defendants, on the other hand, contend that plaintiff sustained only a mild to moderate whiplash injury with no residual difficulty, calling for a reduction in the award to from $1,000 to $2,000.
The type of whiplash injury sustained by plaintiff is a question of fact which had to be decided by the trial judge after considering all the evidence.
Plaintiff testified that she and her husband were stopped for a red light and all of a sudden their car was hit and her head received a great jerk and she experienced severe pain. She stated that her neck still hurts her periodically. Plaintiff's husband corroborated her testimony. Dr. Pearce, a general practitioner, who was the treating physician, testified that it was his opinion that plaintiff sustained a moderately severe whiplash injury.
Defendants' evidence consisted of a deposition by Dr. Banks, an orthopedic surgeon. He examined plaintiff on January 22, 1964, about ten months after the accident. He stated that he found no residual from the accident. He stated that the headaches of which plaintiff was complaining were not the type that is usually associated with neck injury.
We are mindful that "[gjenerally the testimony of an attending physician who examined and treated his patient over a period of time is entitled to more weight than that of the physician who has examined the patient only once and then not for purposes of treatment but simply in connection with litigation". Thomas v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, La.App. (4th Cir.), 136 So.2d 824, 827. It has also been established that "the testimony of a specialist in orthopedics as to an injury which falls within his field, is generally entitled to greater weight than that of a general practitioner." Harris v. Great American Indemnity Co., La.App. (3rd Cir.), 142 So.2d 594, 597. But these rules do not demand a finding one way or another;- they only establish strong presumptions for the trier of fact to'cfon-sider when making his conclusions. The trier of fact must make the finding as to the extent of disability after all the evidence has been introduced. See 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 572.
In the case before us, although the trial judge did not submit written reasons for his judgment, we are certain that he had all of the above factors in mind when he obviously reached the conclusion that the plaintiff herein had sustained a moderately severe whiplash. From my reading of the record I can find no manifest error in this conclusion. I would therefore affirm the trial judge's finding if left to me. However, this court, by a majority, early adopted the policy of uniformity with respect to awards in whiplash injuries, and pursuant thereto the majority have determined that under the evidence in this case the award should be $1,000. Accordingly, I accede to the ruling of the majority and amend the judgment.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the district court is amended by reducing the award of $3,500 to $1,000, and in every other respect is affirmed. Defendant is assessed costs of this appeal.
Amended and affirmed.
TATE, J., dissents in part and assigns written reasons.
HOOD, J., concurs and assigns written reasons.