Case Name: STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. James HIGHTOWER, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1987-04-02
Citations: 509 So. 2d 1078
Docket Number: No. 68717
Parties: STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. James HIGHTOWER, Respondent.
Judges: MCDONALD, C.J., and OVERTON, EHRLICH, BARKETT and KOGAN, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 509
Pages: 1078–1081

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. James HIGHTOWER, Respondent.
No. 68717.
Supreme Court of Florida.
April 2, 1987.
Rehearing Denied July 16, 1987.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen. and W. Brian Bayly, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for petitioner.
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, Seventh Judicial Circuit, and Nancye R. Crouch, Asst. Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for respondent.

Opinion:
GRIMES, Justice.
We accepted jurisdiction of this case because of apparent conflict with State v. Lanier, 464 So.2d 1192 (Fla.1985). Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.
The defendant was charged with sexual battery of a six-year-old child, pursuant to section 794.011(2), Florida Statutes (1983). Over the defendant's objection the court instructed the jury that lewd and lascivious conduct as set forth in section 800.04, Florida Statutes (1983), was a lesser included offense. The jury found the defendant guilty of lewd and lascivious conduct. In a split decision en banc the Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed on the premise that the defendant had been convicted of a crime with which he had not been charged. Hightower v. State, 488 So.2d 106 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986). The district court of appeal grounded its ruling on Ray v. State, 403 So.2d 956 (Fla.1981), in which this Court held that lewd and lascivious conduct was not a necessarily lesser included offense of sexual battery. Accord Walker v. State, 464 So.2d 1325 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985); Harrielson v. State, 441 So.2d 691 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983). The state argues, however, that the decision below conflicts with this Court's later opinion in State v. Lanier.
In Lanier the defendant was charged under section 800.04 with handling, fondling, or making assault upon a twelve-year-old child by engaging in sexual intercourse, without intent to commit sexual battery. It was undisputed that the child was previously unchaste and that the sexual intercourse was consensual. In reversing the defendant's conviction, the Third District Court of Appeal held that he could not be prosecuted under section 800.04. Lanier v. State, 443 So.2d 178 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). The court reasoned that there was no assault because there was consent and that sexual intercourse did not constitute handling and fondling. The case was certified to the Supreme Court as passing upon a question of great public importance.
In the meantime, in response to the district court of appeal decision in Lanier, the legislature enacted chapter 84-86, Laws of Florida, to amend section 800.04. The preamble to that chapter read in part:
Whereas, the intent of the Legislature was and remains to prohibit lewd and lascivious acts upon children, including sexual intercourse and other acts defined as sexual battery, without regard either to the victim's consent or the victim's prior chastity....
This Court in Lanier relied in large part upon the foregoing legislative statement of intent in reversing the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal. We held that section 800.04 both prior to and subsequent to the 1984 amendment is violated when a male engages in sexual intercourse with a twelve-year-old girl even though the victim was previously unchaste and the sexual intercourse was consensual. The question now before us is whether in Lanier this Court implicitly overruled its decision in Ray. We think not.
The 1984 amendment to section 800.04 was passed to eliminate the anomalous interpretation that one could commit the conduct defined as sexual battery upon a person between the ages of twelve and sixteen and yet remain unpunished because of circumstances which would prevent conviction of the crime of sexual battery. Subsection (2) of section 800.04 as amended in 1984 utilized the sexual battery definition contained in section 794.011(l)(h). Therefore, it is evident that the phrase "without committing the crime of sexual battery" was included to differentiate between crimes of sexual battery and lewd and lascivious conduct. Had the phrase been excluded, a person having forcible sexual intercourse with a child under sixteen would be guilty of both crimes. As now worded, section 800.04 contemplates that if sexual activity takes place with a person under sixteen years of age which does not constitute the crime of sexual battery, the conduct is deemed to be lewd and lascivious. Thus, the unique language contained in the amendment to section 800.04 makes it clear that these particular crimes are mutually exclusive.
The consensual intercourse with an unchaste twelve-year-old in Lanier did not constitute the crime of sexual battery. Therefore, the defendant could be convicted of lewd and lascivious conduct which was the crime charged. In the instant case intercourse with a six-year-old child constituted the crime of sexual battery regardless of unchastity or consent. By definition such activity could not be lewd and lascivious conduct under section 800.04 as now worded. If the 1984 amendment to section 800.04 simply served to clarify the law rather than change it, the principle of Ray remains intact. The crime of lewd and lascivious conduct was not and is not a necessarily included offense of the crime of sexual battery.
As the opinion below does not conflict with Lanier, we deny the petition for review.
It is so ordered.
MCDONALD, C.J., and OVERTON, EHRLICH, BARKETT and KOGAN, JJ., concur.
SHAW, J., concurs specially in the result only with an opinion.
. At that time section 800.04 read as follows: Lewd, lascivious or indecent assault or act upon or in presence of child. — Any person who shall handle, fondle or make an assault upon any child under the age of 14 years in a lewd, lascivious or indecent manner, or who shall knowingly commit any lewd or lascivious act in the presence of such child, without the intent to commit sexual battery shall be guilty of a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083 or s. 775.084.
. Both parties agree that in the instant case lewd and lascivious conduct was not a permissibly included lesser offense (category 2) because the wording of the indictment did not include the statutory elements of an offense under section 800.04.
. As amended section 800.04 now reads:
Lewd, lascivious, or indecent assault or act upon or in presence of child; sexual battery. —Any person who:
(1) Handles, fondles or makes an assault upon any child under the age of 16 years in a lewd, lascivious, or indecent manner;
(2) Commits an act defined as sexual battery under s. 794.01 l(l)(h) upon any child under the age of 16 years; or
(3) Knowingly commits any lewd or lascivious act in the presence of any child under the age of 16 years without committing the crime of sexual battery is guilty of a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.-083, or s. 775.084. Neither the victim's lack of chastity nor the victim's consent is a defense to the crime proscribed by this section.
. If uncertain of the proof, the cautious prosecutor will probably charge sexual battery and lewd and lascivious conduct in separate counts, recognizing, however, that only one conviction can be obtained for the same conduct.