Case Name: Nathan Baidach, Respondent, v. Charles A. Togut, Doing Business as Linden General Hospital, Appellant; Henry Bloomberg, Respondent, et al., Defendants
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1959-12-30
Citations: 7 N.Y.2d 128
Docket Number: 
Parties: Nathan Baidach, Respondent, v. Charles A. Togut, Doing Business as Linden General Hospital, Appellant; Henry Bloomberg, Respondent, et al., Defendants.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 7
Pages: 128–138

Head Matter:
Nathan Baidach, Respondent, v. Charles A. Togut, Doing Business as Linden General Hospital, Appellant; Henry Bloomberg, Respondent, et al., Defendants.
Argued October 15, 1959;
decided December 30, 1959.
John M. Johnston and Casper B. Ughetta for appellant.
I. Plaintiff established a prima facie case; that is, that the proximate and primary cause of plaintiff’s injury was the negligence of Dr. Bloomberg in directing a practical nurse to administer the levophed, in failing to warn the practical nurse of the danger inherent in the use of levophed, in failing to discuss its use with the resident physician, and in failing to prescribe the rate of flow or method of its administration. II. The verdict of the court was proper under the court’s charge which became the law of the case. (Brown v. Du Frey, 1 N Y 2d 190; Buckin v. Long Is. R. R. Co., 286 N. Y. 146; Swensson v. New York, Albany Desp. Co., 309 N. Y. 497.) III. The doctor’s conduct constituted an abandonment of his patient which the jury could find was a proximate cause of his injury. (Meiselman v. Crown Heights Hosp., 285 N. Y. 389.) IV. The judgment insofar as it reversed the judgment against defendant Dr. Bloomberg should be reversed and judgment directed to be entered against Dr. Bloomberg. (Betzag v. Gulf Oil Corp., 298 N. Y. 358.) V. Respondent’s contention that appellant is not a “ party aggrieved ” is unsound. (Epstein v. National Transp. Co., 287 N. Y. 456; Jones v. H. Freedman, Inc., 249 App. Div. 710; Kalinowski v. Ryerson & Son, 266 N. Y. 608.)
Harold Shapero and Bart Ingraham for Henry Bloomberg, respondent.
I. Appellant has no right to appeal from the judgment of the Appellate Division insofar as it reverses the judgment of the trial court against codefendant Bloomberg because appellant is not a ‘ ‘ party aggrieved ’ ’ within the terms of section 557 of the Civil Practice Act. (Ward v. Iroquois Gas Corp., 258 N. Y. 124; Sobieski v. Mercedes Benz Co., 260 N. Y. 684; Bensaude v. Flomarcy Co., 293 N. Y. 656; Nekris v. Yellen, 302 N. Y. 626; Price v. Ryan, 255 N. Y. 16; Epstein v. National Transp. Co., 287 N. Y. 456; Kalinowski v. Ryerson & Son, 266 N. Y. 608.) II. The record clearly established that appellant’s resident knew that the order was directed to him, and not to nurse Levine, to start the levophed. IIP. Plaintiff failed to meet his burden of establishing that Dr. Bloomberg deviated from the practice generally employed. (Richardson v. Denneen, 192 Misc. 871, 274 App. Div. 878; Blackburn v. Baker, 227 App. Div. 588.) IV. According to the undisputed evidence, it was the duty of the special nurse and the house physician to check the arm and hand for possible infiltration. V. The proximate cause of the injury to plaintiff was the failure to check the infusion unit and plaintiff’s right arm and hand. VI. Plaintiff did not establish abandonment; the alleged abandonment was not the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury.

Opinion:
Desmond, J.
Since appellant Togut has no right of contribution against Bloomberg, Togut is not aggrieved by the dismissal of the complaint as to Bloomberg and, accordingly, has no right to appeal here as against Bloomberg. The $17,500 judgment which Togut paid was, when he paid it, a judgment against Togut alone, since the complaint as against Bloomberg had already been dismissed and Bloomberg was not a judgment debtor in any sense or for any purpose. Togut by paying a judgment which stood against himself alone could under no possible theory acquire any right of contribution against Bloomberg who had been dismissed out of the case.
The only legal basis in New York for any contribution between tort-feasors is section 211-a of the Civil Practice Act which neither in words nor in adjudged meaning can have any application to Togut's situation. That statute sets these plain, simple requirements for contribution: ' ' Where a money judgment has been recovered jointly against two or more defendants in an action for a personal injury and such judgment has been paid in part or in full by one or more of such defendants, each defendant who has paid more than his own pro rata share shall be entitled to contribution from the other defendants ". Again and again this court has held that this clear statute means just what it says and that all its requirements must be met. As we pointed out in Ward v. Iroquois Gas Corp. (258 N. Y. 124, 128): "Section 211-a was enacted to change the common-law rule and permit contribution where a money judgment has been recovered jointly against two or more joint tort feasors, and paid1 in part or in full ' by one or more defendants. ' ' The Ward opinion remarks " the clear wording of the section ". It makes it entirely plain that before section 211-a comes into play there must be payment by one judgment debtor of a judgment outstanding against him and others. There was no such judgment in this case at the time Togut paid.
Our most recent construction of section 211-a is found in McFall v. Compagnie Maritime Belge (304 N. Y. 314, 328): " The common-law rule denying contribution to joint tort-feasors has been partially abrogated in this State by the enactment of section 211-a of the Civil Practice Act which authorizes contribution if two conditions exist: (1) a joint money judgment against the tort-feasors, and (2) the payment by one tort-feasor of more than his prorata share thereof. (Fox v. Western New York Motor Lines, 257 N. Y. 305, supra.) " Numerous decisions attest to this. " Only judgments can be considered" (United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Hotkins, 8 Misc 2d 296, 302; see Birchall v. Clemons Realty Co., 241 App. Div. 286, 288). " A joint judgment is a condition precedent to the right to contribution " (Haines v. Bero Eng. Constr. Corp., 230 App. Div. 332, 334; see Twelfth Annual Report of N. Y. Judicial Council, 1946, p. 217).
Epstein v. National Transp. Co. (287 N. Y. 456) does not affect our case. In Epstein, the judgment was outstanding against the three defendants at the time defendant National paid it. The Epstein opinion, also, pointed out that at common law there was no contribution between tort-feasors and that the right to contribution depended on the pressure of specific statutory conditions. Section 211-a was described (p. 458) as a statute ' ' which permits contribution where a money judgment has been recovered jointly against one or more joint tort feasors and has been paid by one, either in part or in full."
I see no reason for stretching section 211-a to cover a situation not within its scope. Each of several tort-feasors, being severally a wrongdoer, is liable for the payment of the whole claim. The injured person can sue any one wrongdoer and collect in full from him (Neenan v. Woodside Astoria Transp. Co., 261 N. Y. 159, 164) or sue several and collect from one, and at common law that was the end of it. As to one particular carefully spelled out set of facts, the Legislature changed the common law and authorized contribution. We have no such facts here.
The appeal should be dismissed, with costs.