Case Name: PEOPLE v. MOSS; PEOPLE v. TILLEY
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1976-07-19
Citations: 70 Mich. App. 18
Docket Number: Docket Nos. 19796, 20315
Parties: PEOPLE v MOSS PEOPLE v TILLEY
Judges: Before: D. E. Holbrook, P. J., and J. H. Gillis and M. J. Kelly, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 70
Pages: 18–52

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v MOSS PEOPLE v TILLEY
Opinion op the Court
1. Homicide — Manslaughter—Proximate Causation — Independent Intervening Cause — Instructions to Jury — Jury Determination.
The determination of proximate causation or of the existence of an independent intervening cause is one to be made by a properly instructed jury; therefore where the jury was properly instructed on these concepts and there is evidence whereby the jury could reasonably conclude that one defendant disarmed the deceased police officer and played a major part in restraining the officer while a second defendant obtained the officer’s weapon which the second defendant then, almost immediately, used to kill the police officer, it was reasonable for the jury to determine that the action of the first defendant was the proximate cause of the killing and that the actual killing by the second defendant was not an independent intervening cause.
Partial Concurrence by M. J. Kelly, J.
2. Criminal Law — Prosecutor's Opening Statements — Improper Issues — Fair View op Evidence.
It is improper for a prosecutor to inject issues broader than the guilt or innocence of a defendant, however, it is proper to predicate argument on a fair view of the evidence; therefore it was not error for a prosecutor, in his opening statement to the jury, to refer to the killing involved in the case as the result of the brutality and inhumanity of the defendants where a review of the record shows that, when viewed in a light favorable to the prosecution, there was ample proof that the defendants did in fact behave in a brutal and inhuman manner.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1, 6, 7] 40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide §§ 17, 506.
63 Am Jur 2d, Prosecuting Attorneys § 27.
63 Am Jur 2d, Prosecuting Attorneys §§ 1, 26.
63 Am Jur 2d, Prosecuting Attorneys §§ 17, 27.
30 Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 1172.
3. Criminal Law — Improper Questioning — Good Faith — Admissibility of Subject Matter — Appeal and Error.
The very process of asking improper questions may fatally infect a trial; however, if the questions are asked in good faith there should be no reversible error and, conversely, if the approach cannot be ascribed to a bona fide belief in the admissibility of the subject matter the Court of Appeals will carefully consider a claim of prejudice; therefore, where a prosecutor refrained from further inquiry in a certain area when the court questioned the wisdom of the objected-to cross-examination and the Court of Appeals finds that the line of inquiry could have some tendency to prove matters properly a part of the case, there is no error.
4. Criminal Law — Appeal and Error — Judicial Misconduct — Duty to Control Proceedings — Fair and Impartial Trial — Statutes.
Defendants’ claim that the trial court improperly interrupted and criticized defense counsel in a manner which deprived the defendants of a fair trial must be considered in the context of the court’s duty to control the proceedings; the dispositive question is whether the court’s participation in the trial denied the defendants a fair and impartial trial by unduly influencing the jury and a few arguably intemperate comments by the court and a forceful curative instruction, when viewed in the context of a lengthy trial, did not deprive the defendants of a fair trial (MCLA 768.29; MSA 28.1052).
5. Criminal Law — Appeal and Error — Burden of Proof — Elements of Crime — Sufficiency of Evidence — Function of Jury — Standard of Review.
The burden in a criminal trial is on the prosecution to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on every element of the crime charged and an appellate court, in reviewing a convicted defendant’s claim of insufficient evidence, must remember that it is the jury’s function, as sole judge of the facts, to listen to testimony, weigh the evidence and decide the questions of fact; therefore where sufficient evidence exists, which may be believed by the jury, to sustain a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the decision of the jury should not be disturbed by an appellate court.
6. Homicide — Premeditation—Direct Evidence — Inferences—Defendant’s Conduct — Basis in Record — Appeal and Error.
Premeditation, being a state of mind, need not be established by direct evidence but may be inferred by a defendant’s conduct in light of the circumstances; however, such an inference must have an adequate basis in record evidence and where there is an adequate evidentiary basis for the jury’s finding of premeditation in a homicide, the jury’s determination will not be disturbed on appeal.
7. Homicide — Manslaughter—Independent Intervening Cause— Proximate Cause — Resisting Arrest.
A defendant is not guilty of manslaughter where his acts only create a situation which provides the opportunity for a killing by other independent means; therefore, where the defendant only struggled with a police officer in resisting arrest and a third person picked up the officer’s gun and killed the officer, the intervention of the third person was an independent intervening cause of death which broke the causal chain between the acts of the defendant and the eventual death of the officer; the prosecution is required to prove that the defendant’s acts were the proximate cause of the killing and not just a proximate cause.
Appeal from Wayne, James N. Canham, J.
Submitted November 6, 1975, at Detroit.
(Docket Nos. 19796, 20315.)
Decided July 19, 1976.
Leave to appeal applied for.
David A. Moss was convicted of manslaughter and Dennis E. Tilley was convicted of first-degree murder. Defendants appeal.
Affirmed.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William L. Cahalan, Prosecuting Attorney, Patricia J. Boyle, Principal Attorney, Research, Training & Appeals, and Ronald P. Weitzman, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Burdick & Fink, for defendants.
Before: D. E. Holbrook, P. J., and J. H. Gillis and M. J. Kelly, JJ.

Opinion:
D. E. Holbrook, P. J.
This opinion is written after Judge Kelly wrote his opinion affirming the conviction of Dennis Edwin Tilley for first-degree murder, and reversing the conviction of David Allen Moss for manslaughter. These cases had previously been consolidated for hearing on appeal.
We agree with Judge Kelly in his opinion as to defendant Tilley, affirming the conviction. We are constrained to write this opinion for affirmance of the conviction of defendant Moss.
We are convinced that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find defendant Moss guilty of manslaughter. The court below gave the following jury instructions regarding "independent intervening cause":
"The People allege that the decedent's death was brought about because of an unlawful act, resisting arrest and assault and battery by defendant Moss.
"With regard to the unlawful act, there must be such a relation between the commission of the unlawful act and the killing that it logically follows that the killing occurred as a part of the preparation of, or attempt to commit the unlawful act. The death must be due to the unlawful act of the accused and not due to the intervening act or negligence of a third person, which was unforeseeable, or to an independent intervening cause in which the accused did not participate and which he could not foresee; and the death must have been the natural and probable consequence of the unlawful act, and the act the proximate cause of the death.
"If you find that the defendant Moss is guilty of resisting arrest or assault and battery, you also find that the killing was the direct and proximate result of the commission of an unlawful act, you will find defendant Moss guilty of manslaughter. However, if you find that defendant Moss was not guilty of either resisting arrest or assault and battery, or if you find that the killing was not the direct and proximate cause of the commission of either of these acts or if the killing resulted from the intervening act of a third person or some independent intervening cause, then you must find defendant Moss not guilty of manslaughter."
Apparently the jury felt that the unlawful acts of defendant Moss were the proximate cause of the death of the two victims in this case, and that the acts of defendant Tilley did not constitute an independent intervening cause, for the jury found defendant Moss guilty as charged. Of course, the determination of proximate causation or of the existence of an independent intervening cause is one to be answered by a properly instructed jury. See, e.g., People v Flenon, 42 Mich App 457; 202 NW2d 471 (1972), lv den 388 Mich 801 (1972). Nevertheless, the opinion for reversal concludes that defendant Tilley's intervention was an independent intervening cause of death and that the acts of defendant Moss were not the proximate cause of the deaths in question. The opinion for reversal states: "In the instant case, the evidence does not show that defendant's behavior in fighting with Officer Mickel and resisting arrest directly caused death." Thus, it becomes obvious that the opinion for reversal takes a view of the facts in evidence in this case which is in opposition to that taken by the jury which convicted defendant Moss. It is stated at p 3 of the opinion for reversal: "It is a fair inference that Moss fled during the shooting." It is respectfully submitted that the transcript in this case contradicts the quoted statement from the opinion for reversal, and that it would be an unfair inference to conclude that defendant Moss was fleeing during the shooting. It is true that many of the witnesses stated that they did not know where defendant Moss was at the precise instant the shots were being fired. But this was generally explained by the witnesses as a result of the fact that they were watching the shooting itself, and not looking for defendant Moss. However, the following testimony was given at trial:
"Q. [Mr. Boak, assistant prosecutor]: Who was fighting at that time?
'A. [Mr. Staake, witness]: All three.
"Q. All three people?
"A. Right.
"Q. The man who had been holding the gun?
"A. Right.
"Q. And the two defendants?
'A. Right.
"Q. Where were they at that time?
"A. They were right in the parking lot, right there, right outside the window.
"Q. Were they standing or were they on the ground?
fA. They were standing.
"Q. Where was the gun at that time, if you know?
'A. I didn't see the gun.
"Q. What happened after that?
'A. Well, after that it was just so quick. I seen the gun fell [sic] two or three times, as far as I know.
"Q. Did you see who picked it up on those occasions?
"A. Right, I can't be sure, but if I remember correctly, Moss picked it up once and didn't use it, and then it was just more shuffling. Then it fell again, and I think the policeman held the gun and I think it dropped from him and then the other fellow picked it up.
"Q. Mr. Tilley?
"A. Right.
"Q. What happened then?
'A. Well, there was about maybe three seconds, four seconds and then he just started firing.
"Q. In what direction was he firing?
"A. At the policeman.
"Q. The other person that was out there?
"A. Right.
"Q. Where was he in relation to Mr. Tilley, the man who was firing the gun, how far away?
"A. It couldn't have been more than three feet, three, four feet.
"Q. Was he facing him?
'A. Yes.
"Q. What was the person who did not have the gun doing at that time?
"A. Which one is that?
"Q. The person who did not have the gun.
"A. There was two.
"Q. Did you see Mr. Moss?
"A. Yes.
"Q. What was he doing?
"A. Well, he was there, but I don't know. I guess he was just standing there."
It is apparent from the above-quoted testimony that the witness saw defendant Moss after defendant Tilley had obtained the deceased deputy's gun.
"Q. [Mr. Ritchie, for defendant Tilley]: Thank you. All right. You remember the men were struggling. The weapon was dropped on several occasions as you described and then what happened?
'A. [Mr. Staake]: Well, the party Tilley picked up the gun when it was dropped and pointed it for three seconds or so and then began shooting at the officer.
"Q. [Mr. Wisok, for defendant Moss]: Now, where were these people, the other people, when you say Mr. Tilley pointed the gun at the decedent?
'A. [Mr. Staake]: I think they were still on him."
The jury could have certainly found from the above testimony that defendant Moss did some thing more than simply disarm the officer and flee the scene. Another witness testified as to the events which occurred when one of the bouncers in the restaurant approached the deceased officer who had placed defendant Moss in a spread eagle position against a car in the parking lot:
"A [Miss Primm, witness]: The man said, T do not believe you're a policeman.'
"Q. [Mr. Boak]: What happened then?
'A. Mr. Mickel pulled in his wallet back here and he took out and he showed the man his I.D. He said, 'Will you please call the police?' And the guy walked back inside.
"Q. What happened after the man walked back inside?
"A Then Moss started to get away. He started pushing, you now, [sic] trying to get away and that, and he started to get away.
"Well, before he did start to get away, Tilley was standing behind the police officer, Mr. Mickel, and he started to say, 'Shoot me, cop, shoot me, kill me. Put the gun on me.'
"And Mr. Mickel said, 'Just go away. Your're not under arrest. Just leave.'
"And he kept saying this and saying this and Mickel kept looking back. This is when Moss started to get away and they started fighting.
"Q. Who started fighting?
"A Mr. Mickel and Mr. Moss. Then Mr. Mickel hit Mr. Moss on the head back here a couple of times trying to stop him.
"Q. What was Mr. Moss doing at that time when he got hit?
'A. He was still fighting.
"Q. Where was Mr. Tilley?
'A. He was still standing where he was. Then they came like near Mr. Tilley, and then Mr. Tilley started getting into it.
"Q. What happened at that point?
"A The next thing I seen, I seen Mr. Tilley have the gun, waving it up in the air.
"Q. Your're indicating. Is your finger sort of the barrel of the gun?
"A Right. It was like this.
"Q. He was waving it up in the air?
"A. Right.
"Q. What happened then?
"A. Then they took the police officer and put him spread-eagle against the car. That was right in front of the door of the restaurant, the entrance going into the restaurant.
"Q. What happened then?
"A Well, they had him there, both of them were holding him. Tilley was on the this [sic] side and Mr. Moss was on this side. He started to get away. And I seen Mr. Tilley and Mr. Mickel by the door, the entrance to the Nugget. I seen them starting to go by there because Mr. Mickel started getting away from him, from both of them, and I seen backfires of a gun. I heard shots three times.
'A. Well, he still kept, he started fighting. He turned around and he got so he was fighting with the police officer again. This is when they, they started fighting around there. This is when Tilley got in there and started fighting with them. Then the next thing, they were like, I seen them on the ground. The next thing I knew Tilley was waving the gun.
"Q. [Mr. Ritchie]: Where was [sic] the others when he was doing this?
'A. Moss had Mr. Mickel, he was holding onto him.
"Q. Then Mr. Tilley got the gun and what happened?
'A. Then Moss, Mr. Moss and Mr. Tilley had, they still had Mr. Mickel. They were holding him. They dragged him over and pulled him over to the car. The car that would be right there in front of the restaurant, right where the entrance door is like, right at it.
"Q. Then, what happened?
"A. Then they had Mr. Mickel spread eagle against the car.
"Q. Who dragged the officer over to the car?
'A. They both had the officer.
"Q. Who?
'A. Well — Mr. Moss really had the hold onto the officer. Tilley had the gun. He was just, you know, waving it around." (Emphasis supplied.)
It is apparent from the foregoing quoted testimony that a properly instructed jury could certainly have found that defendant Moss played a major part in the events following the securing of the gun by defendant Tilley. We believe the testimony was sufficient to show that defendant Moss not only disarmed the deceased officer, but played a major part in restraining him while defendant Tilley obtained the officer's weapon. We believe that a jury could have concluded that defendant Moss intended to do so. Certainly, once he had done so, it cannot be seriously argued that it was unforeseeable that defendant Tilley would use the weapon so obtained from the deceased officer. The Flenon case, supra, cited by the opinion for reversal, affirmed a conviction of first-degree murder of a defendant who shot the deceased in the leg. The deceased was rushed to a hospital where his leg was amputated. Five weeks later the deceased was released and returned home only to die a short time later of serum hepatitis and pneumonia. The Court held that the victim's death due to serum hepatitis was within the realm of foreseeability. Certainly the shooting of a police officer with the officer's own gun by a codefendant is just as foreseeable to a defendant who not only disarmed the officer, but restrained the officer in his attempt to regain possession of the weapon, and who assisted the codefendant in restraining the officer even after the codefendant had gained possession of the weapon.
There appears to be no meaningful distinction between the instant case and People v Arnett, 239 Mich 123; 214 NW 231 (1927). There being no meaningful distinction, there is no reason why the result should differ. Defendant Moss's conviction should therefore be affirmed.
Affirmed.
J. H. Gillis, J., concurred.