Case Name: EMILY WAGNER, Appellant, v. THOMAS J. DALY, Respondent
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1893-02
Citations: 74 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 477
Docket Number: 
Parties: EMILY WAGNER, Appellant, v. THOMAS J. DALY, Respondent.
Judges: Heebice, J., concurred.
Reporter: Supreme Court Reports (Hun)
Volume: 74
Pages: 477–484

Head Matter:
EMILY WAGNER, Appellant, v. THOMAS J. DALY, Respondent.
Trade-mark in a cigar-box label — want of novelty and invention.
/Vagner, a cigar manufacturer, sought to restrain the use by Daly, also a cigar manufacturer, of a cigar-box label, consisting of a picture of a pug dog, with the words “Pug Cigars,” on the ground that it was an infringement of Wagner’s right to a trade-mark, acquired by priox use, in a label consisting of the same picture with the words “ Wagner’s Pug.” It appeared that Wagner procured his labels from a label manufacturer, who had introduced the label, originally with the words “ Friend Pug,” in which form he had offered it to the trade generally, and had sold at least one lot of labels to a cigar-box manufacturer before the sale to Wagner of his labels.
Held, that Wagner was not the inventor of the word and symbol in question, nor the originator of their use as a cigar-box label, nor was such use by him new, and, therefore, that he was not entitled to their exclusive use as a trade-mark.
(Mayham, P. J., dissenting.)
Appeal by the plaintiff, Emily Wagner from a judgment of the Supreme Court, in favor of the defendant, entered in the office of the clerk of Montgomery county on the 19th day of September^ 1892, on the decision of the court dismissing the complaint, rendered -on a trial by the court without a jury at the Montgomery Circuit, in an action brought to restrain the infringement of a trade-mark and for damages.
Charles S. PTisbet and Hcm'vey Booh, for the appellant.
Thomas A. Murray and Z. S. Westbrook, for the respondent.

Opinion:
PutuaM, J.:
In Schneider v. Williams (14 N. J. Eq. [17 Stewart], 391), to which we are referred by appellant, it is held that one, to acquire title to a trade-mark, " must adopt some mark not in use to distinguish goods of the same class or kind already on the market belonging to another trader." In Van Beil v. Prescott (82 N. Y., 630) it is held that " to make an exclusive right to use a name or symbol as a trademark, such use must be new ; if ever before used as applicable to a like article, it cannot be exclusively appropriated." In Selchow et al. v. Baker et al. (93 N. Y., 59) it is determined that " where a manufacturer has invented a new name consisting either of a new word or words in common use, which he has applied for the first time to his own manufacture, he is entitled to be protected."
Plaintiff was not the inventor of the alleged trade-mark in question. She commenced using it on November 7,1883. It was invented by Wischt & Smidt, engravers, on August 14, 1883, as a cigar label. On September 11, 1883, said firm sent samples of said label all over the country to the cigar trade. They sold the first labels to plaintiff on October 19,1883, but prior to that time had sold ten labels to one Pople, a cigar-box manufacturer, of Newark. It also appeared by the evidence of the witness Wischt that from the time said firm originated this label and offered it to the trade, they had sold quite a number of such labels to other parties or other cigar-box makers for use in the cigar trade.
Hence, while plaintiff was not the inventor of the word and symbol in question, neither was she the originator of such word and symbol as a cigar-box label. When she commenced using them they were on sale to the cigar trade in the country as cigar labels, and at least one lot of such labels had been sold to a cigar-box manufacturer. Therefore, under the case of Van Beil v. Prescott (supra) I do not think it appears that plaintiff's use of the symbol and word in question asa cigar-box label was new. They were used before her adoption of tbem as applicable to a like article. Therefore, the plaintiff fails to make out a case showing herself entitled to the excl ve use of the said alleged trade-mark.
The plaintiff, in fact, in this action seeks to prevent the inventors and originators of said device from having the benefit of their invention. Of course, if purchasers from Wischt & Smidt of the labels in question cannot use them, the firm are prevented from a further sale thereof.
I think the trial court made a proper disposition of the case, and that the judgment of the court below should be affirmed, with costs.
Heebice, J., concurred.