Case Name: ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF NEWARK, A RELIGIOUS CORPORATION OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, ET AL, PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS, v. BOROUGH OF HO-HO-KUS, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF THE COUNTY OF BERGEN AND STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT, AND CHARLES A. BELTRAMINI AND ELEANOR K. BELTRAMINI, HIS WIFE, ET AL, DEFENDANTS-INTERVENORS-APPELLANTS, AND JOHN A. BYREM AND ELEANOR P. BYREM, HIS WIFE, DEFENDANTS-INTERVENORS
Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1966-05-23
Citations: 47 N.J. 211
Docket Number: 
Parties: ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF NEWARK, A RELIGIOUS CORPORATION OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, ET AL, PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS, v. BOROUGH OF HO-HO-KUS, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF THE COUNTY OF BERGEN AND STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT, AND CHARLES A. BELTRAMINI AND ELEANOR K. BELTRAMINI, HIS WIFE, ET AL, DEFENDANTS-INTERVENORS-APPELLANTS, AND JOHN A. BYREM AND ELEANOR P. BYREM, HIS WIFE, DEFENDANTS-INTERVENORS.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Reports
Volume: 47
Pages: 211–226

Head Matter:
ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF NEWARK, A RELIGIOUS CORPORATION OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, ET AL, PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS, v. BOROUGH OF HO-HO-KUS, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF THE COUNTY OF BERGEN AND STATE OF NEW JERSEY, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT, AND CHARLES A. BELTRAMINI AND ELEANOR K. BELTRAMINI, HIS WIFE, ET AL, DEFENDANTS-INTERVENORS-APPELLANTS, AND JOHN A. BYREM AND ELEANOR P. BYREM, HIS WIFE, DEFENDANTS-INTERVENORS.
Argued February 7, 1966
Decided May 23 , 1966.
Mr. Samuel M. Lyon, Jr., argued the cause for appellant Borough of Ho-Ho-Kus; Air. Merritt Lane, Jr., argued the cause for defendants-intervenors-appellants {Mr. Elliot A. Lawrence, on the brief; Messrs. McCarter & English, attorneys for defendants-intervenors-appellants).
Mr. Thomas E. Gassert argued the cause for respondents {Mr. Frederick J. Gassert, of counsel; Mr. Joseph A. darken, Jr., on the brief; Messrs. Gassert and Murphy, attorneys).

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered
Per Curiam.
Plaintiff seeks to erect a regional high school on lands it acquired for that purpose. The lands are in the highest residential district called R-l. At the time of the purchase the local zoning ordinance permitted the proposed use. The municipality thereafter amended the ordinance to bar all schools, public or private, from the R-l district, permitting them however in its other three residential districts. This suit followed.
The trial court held the municipality lacked power to bar the proposed school, finding that L. 1961, c. 138 (N. J. S. A. 40:55-33.1) had that effect. So holding, the trial court did not reach the charge that the ordinance was otherwise arbitrary and a denial of due process. We however concluded the statute only forbade discrimination between public and private schools and that, subject to that restraint, municipalities could deal with schools under the zoning power. Roman Catholic Diocese of Newark v. Borough of Ho-Ho-Kus, 42 N. J. 556 (1964).
Accordingly we reversed the judgment. The matter was remanded for consideration of the issue of arbitrariness. In that connection we made particular reference to the municipality's argument before us that it could take into' account the tax exemption such schools have. We said (42 N. J., at p. 565) :
"The substantial issue upon which the trial court made no finding is whether it is arbitrary to bar the use of plaintiff's property for a secondary school. The issue is constitutional insofar as it is claimed that the ban offends due process of law. The issue is also statutory insofar as it involves the question whether -the municipality exceeded the statutory authority or departed from state policy. In this connection it is appropriate to comment upon so much of the testimony and argument as stresses the tax implications of the proposed use.
We have held that a municipality may consider revenues in its plan for a well balanced community. Gruber v. Mayor and Township Committee of Raritan Twp., 39 N. J. 1, 9-11 (1962). Thus it may provide for industrial or commercial uses which are less demanding in public services than residential uses. It is, however, another matter to bar tax-exempt facilities on the ground that they are financially burdensome by reason of that exemption. The exemption is granted by the State because of the contribution of the exempt facility to the public good. It may be that an exemption will mean a net burden for the taxpayers of a particular municipality, but the municipality must nonetheless abide by state policy. Indeed, our Constitution of 1947 expressly preserved the then existing exemptions of real and personal property used exclusively for religious, educational, charitable or cemetery purposes and owned by a nonprofit corporation or association. Art. VIII, § I, par. 2. And N. J. S. A. 40:55-33.1, while not bearing the interpretation given it in the trial court, does serve to evidence the Legislature's concern for nonprofit private schools which furnish elementary and high school education.
No municipality may quarrel with this policy. Hence it may not zone against a private school, place it in one district rather than another, or refuse it a variance on the ground that it is exempt from taxation."
After remand, the parties took additional testimony upon the question whether the amendment was prompted by the tax exemption. The trial court found it was not. The trial court concluded, however, that the amendment was arbitrary and hence invalid. Defendants again appealed, and we certified the matter before argument in the Appellate Division.
We are satisfied plaintiff did not sustain its burden and hence that the judgment must be reversed.
In finding the ordinance invalid, the trial court, it seems to us, combined several approaches, each of which we are unable to accept. In part, the trial court seems to have been persuaded by decisions elsewhere which are not consistent with our basic conclusion that schools may be excluded from the highest residential district. In part, the trial court seems to have made a de novo evaluation of the legislative policy decision upon an inquiry into the zoning considerations. Einally the trial court appears to have tested the validity of the ordinance on the basis of the attributes of the particular parcel plaintiff owns. Basic to that test would be the belief that the Constitution or the zoning statute requires a zoning ordinance to authorize for each parcel every possible use to which it could be devoted.
As to the last facet, we point out that although a zoning ordinance may be invalid in its impact upon a particular parcel, as where the parcel is zoned into idleness, no one suggests the lands here involved cannot be used for residential purposes. On the contrary, they are ideally suited for that use, and this being so, a constitutional issue does not arise merely because these lands, appropriately zoned for highest residential use, are so extensive or otherwise so featured that a forbidden use might be harbored safely within its perimeter upon some special plan or design. Zoning contemplates the delineation of appropriate districts and the equal treatment of all property within it. The Constitution does not require, nor does the statute require or even permit, a municipality to enact an ordinance which deals separately with every owner's parcel and undertakes to prescribe the uses to which each parcel may be put by reason of its size or situation and the terms upon which each possible use may be made.
Rather, the statutory vehicle for the accommodation of zoning with individual situations is either a special exception, where the ordinance appropriately so provides, or a variance, as authorized in N. J. S. A. 40:55 — 39. Here the relevant provision is subsection d which authorizes the board of adjustment to "Eecommend in particular cases and for special reasons to the governing body of the municipality the granting of a variance to allow a structure or use in a district restricted against such structure or use," if "such relief can be granted without substantial detriment to the public good and will not substantially impair the intent and purpose of the zone plan and zoning ordinance." Indeed we said in our first opinion that plaintiff might wish to "seek a variance at this juncture, and if the variance should be denied, litigate the validity of that action along with the attack upon the ordinance itself." (42 N. J., at p. 567.)
Plaintiff remains free to apply for a variance. In this connection some observations seem appropriate without in any way intimating an opinion as to the outcome of an application. The educational mission of a regional high school is clearly a "special reason" within the meaning of the statute just cited. Andrews v. Ocean Twp. Board of Adjustment, 30 N. J. 245 (1959). Hence the question will be whether a sound exercise of discretion requires that the school be permitted. In dealing with that question, the local authorities should consider the State policy favoring such exempt functions and the fact that regional needs must be met somewhere. Unfortunately under present law the tax burden falls upon the single municipality rather than the whole area which is benefited. Yet a variance may not be refused on that account. 42 N. J., at p. 566. Consideration should also be given to the limited number of sites available to a charity for the reason that it cannot invoke the power of eminent domain. It would not be amiss to weigh also the circumstance that here the proposed use was authorized by the ordinance at the time plaintiff purchased the property. Finally, and of special importance in deciding whether the property can be put to the proposed use without substantial detriment to the public good and without substantially impairing the intent and purpose of the zone plan and the zoning ordinance, is the question whether the parcel is of such size and situation that, with suitable conditions, the proposed use will not subject the area to the conditions and influences which were the basis of the original zoning decision to exclude schools from this district. The burden of supplying an adequate buffer would be upon plaintiff, and indeed it would be incumbent on plaintiff to propose specific measures and to demonstrate their sufficiency to that end.
We suggested in our first opinion that the problem might well be committed to a State agency. 42 N. J., at p. 565. Meanwhile the reconciliation between the local interests and the needs of private educational projects remains in local hands, there to be exercised, as the Legislature must have intended, with due concern for values which transcend municipal lines.
The judgment in favor of plaintiff is reversed and judgment entered in favor of defendants. No costs.
Hall and Sciíettino, J. J., concur in result.
"No planning or zoning ordinance heretofore or hereafter enacted by any municipality governing the use of land by, or for, schools shall, by any of its terms or provisions or by any rule or regulation adopted in accordance therewith, discriminate between public and private day schools, not operated for profit, of elementary or high school grade."