Case Name: The CITY OF McALESTER, Oklahoma, a municipal corporation, Plaintiff, v. The Honorable William L. FOGG, Judge of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, Oklahoma, Defendant
Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oklahoma
Decision Date: 1956-12-18
Citations: 312 P.2d 867
Docket Number: No. 37428
Parties: The CITY OF McALESTER, Oklahoma, a municipal corporation, Plaintiff, v. The Honorable William L. FOGG, Judge of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, Oklahoma, Defendant.
Judges: JOHNSON, C. J., and WELCH, HALLEY and CARLILE, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Pacific Reporter 2d
Volume: 312
Pages: 867–875

Head Matter:
The CITY OF McALESTER, Oklahoma, a municipal corporation, Plaintiff, v. The Honorable William L. FOGG, Judge of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, Oklahoma, Defendant.
No. 37428.
Supreme Court of Oklahoma.
Dec. 18, 1956.
Dissenting Opinion June 25, 1957.
Rehearing Denied June 25, 1957.
Arnote, Arnote & Bratton, McAlester, for plaintiff.
Brown, Darrough & Darrough, Oklahoma City, for defendant.

Opinion:
DAVISON, Justice.
This is an original proceeding in this court wherein the plaintiff, City of Mc-Alester, Oklahoma, a municipal corporation seeks to prohibit the defendant, Wil-. liam L. Fogg, Judge of the District Court of Oklahoma County, from proceeding further in an action brought in said court by R. A. Lester, as plaintiff, against the defendants, Oklahoma Transportation Company, a corporation, City of McAlester, a municipal corporation and Ben J. Kerr, because the venue of said action did not lie in said county.
The primary action in the District Court of Oklahoma County, was brought for the recovery of damages for personal injuries suffered by said R. A. Lester in Pittsburg County, Oklahoma, wherein the City of McAlester is situated. The defendants were the Oklahoma Transportation Company, a corporation, owner of a motor bus transportation system, Ben J. Kerr, the bus driver, and the City of McAlester, a municipal corporation, on whose streets the accident occurred. The bus company's lines ran through Oklahoma County and its principal offices were located in said county and it was there, properly, served with summons. The individual defendant was not served. The municipality was served in Pittsburg County, the county of its situs. The petition alleged that the defendants were jointly liable. The plaintiff herein filed a motion in the primary action attacking the jurisdiction of the Oklahoma County District Court on the ground that, since the cause of action arose in Pittsburg County, the county wherein said city was situated and had all its offices and wherein all its principal offices resided, the venue of said action was in Pittsburg County. When the motion was overruled, the present case was filed.
The sole question we are called upon to determine is the venue of the action for damages. In this state, venue of actions is fixed by statute, 12 O.S.19S1 § 131 et seq. It is, therefore of prime importance that we take note of those provisions.
Section 131 fixes the venue of actions, the subject matter of which is real estate.
Section 132 fixes the venue of actions, the subject matter of which is real estate lying in two or more counties.
Section 133 fixes the venue of actions, the subject matter of which either is a statutory fine, forfeiture or penalty or is an official act of omission or commission of a public officer or is on the official bond of a public officer.
Section 134 provides:
"An action, other than one of those mentioned in first three sections of this article, against a corporation created by the laws of this state, may be brought in the county in which it is situated, or has its principal office or place of business, or in which any of the principal officers thereof may reside, or be summoned, or in the county where the cause of action or some part thereof arose."
Section 135 provides:
"Actions may be commenced against any transportation or transmission company in the county where any person resides upon whom service of summons is authorized to be made, irrespective of the order in which such persons are named in this chapter, and irrespective of the residence of any superior officer or authorized person upon whom service of summons may be had; or in the county where the cause of action, or some part thereof may have accrued; or, in any county through which or into which the lines of road or any part of the structure of such company may be, or passes; and the plaintiff may elect in which county he will bring the action."
Section 136 fixes the venue of actions against turnpike companies.
Section 137 fixes the venue of actions against foreign corporations and non-residents.
Section 138 fixes the venue of actions for divorce.
Section 139 provides:
"Every other action must be brought in the county in which the defendant or someone of the defendants resides or may be summoned."
It is the contention of plaintiff that, since it is a corporation within the contemplation of section 134, above quoted, the venue of any action and particularly the one being attacked is laid in Pittsburg County, where it is situated and where the cause of action arose. With this contention, we agree. In the case of Oklahoma City v. District Court, 168 Okl. 235, 32 P.2d 318, 93 A.L.R. 489, it was held that said statute, 12 O.S.1951 § 134 applied to municipal corporations and fixed the venue of actions against them. The opinion contains a thorough explanation of the reasons for that conclusion. The interpretation of the statute established it as a departure from the common law rule that a municipality could only be sued in the county of its situs. Applying the above cited statutes to the case at bar; as to the defendant bus company in the primary case, the venue was fixed by section 135; as to the defendant municipality, the venue was fixed by section 134; as to the individual defendant, the venue was fixed by section 139 only in cases where the foregoing provisions did not apply. Pittsburg County, then, was the only county meeting the requirements of all three statutes.
It will be noted that, as to a domestic corporate defendant, the venue of an action is fixed by section 134 and that section 139 can have no application as regards the municipality for the reason that the latter statute applies only to "every other action", meaning other than as provided for by sections 131-138 inc. A very similar situation was before the Kentucky Court in the case of Crume v. Taylor, 272 Ky. 585, 114 S.W.2d 1119. In that State, the venue of an action for personal or property injury lies in the county where " 'the defendant resides or in which the injury is done.' " Very similar to our section 134 relative to domestic corporations. Another section of the Kentucky law provided for other actions, much the same as our section 139 does. In the Kentucky case, the plaintiff sued two individual defendants residing in different counties for personal injuries. The action arose in one of said counties and suit was brought in the other. The non-resident defendant objected to the jurisdiction of the court because of lack of venue. In sustaining that contention, the court said,
"Plainly, the case at bar is controlled by section 74 and is therefore expressly excepted from the operation of section 78. The very provision localizing actions under section 74 thus excludes the application of section 78.
" Under section 74 the plaintiff could sue both defendants in the county where the injury occurred. If he chose to sue in the county of residence of but one of the two defendants, then both reason and justice, to say nothing of the provision of the Code, dictate that the nonresident should have at least the option of saying whether or not he would submit to a suit in that jurisdiction. Appellee .bias carefully preserved his rights, and the provisions of the Code are clear."
The same reasoning is here applicable. If the plaintiff had so desired, he could have maintained the action as against all defendants in the county where the cause arose but, if he chose to bring it in a county where venue did not lie as regarded the municipality, then, that defendant had the option of saying whether or not it would submit to a suit in that jurisdiction.
In the case of LaFayette v. Bass, 122 Old. 182, 252 P. 1101, there were three defendants — a foreign corporation, a domestic corporation and an individual. The action was brought in the county where the cause arose and where plaintiff resided. It was held that the venue as to the foreign corporation was in the county where plaintiff lived or the cause arose, 12 O.S. 1951 § 137; that as to the domestic corporation the venue was in the county where the cause arose, 12 O.S.1951 § 134; that, the action having been rightly brought in compliance with the two mentioned statutes, summons could be issued to another county for service on the domestic corporation and the individual defendant, 12 O.S.1951 § 154.
In the case of Board of Com'rs of Kiowa County v. Kiowa Nat. Bank, 141 Old. 271, 284 P. 634, it was held that a county was a municipal corporation and, since there was no specific statute fixing the venue of actions against it, the general statute as to domestic corporations, 12 O.S. 1951 § 134 was applicable and venue lay in the county where the cause arose.
In the case of Temple v. Dugger, 164 Old. 84, 21 P.2d 482, it was held that an action having been rightly brought against a transportation company in a county through which or into which the line passes, 12 O.S.1951 § 135, a summons could be issued to another county for service on an individual defendant and on the members of said company, a partnership.
The case of Wray v. Garrett, 185 Old. 138, 90 P.2d 1050, 1051, was an action for wrongful death, brought by the administra-trix, of the deceased against the individual who owned the truck involved in the fatal accident, the individual who was the driver thereof, and the foreign corporate insurance carrier. The action was brought in the county of plaintiff's residence, compliance with 12 O.S. 1951 § 137 as to the defendant foreign corporation. The individual defendants were non-residents of said county. It was there held that, since the action was brought in compliance with the statutory requirements as to foreign corporations, the venue was proper as to nonresident individual defendants. However, some of the wording in the opinion was somewhat loose, permitting a misconception as to the meaning intended. It was therein said,
"However, it is settled that an action against two or more defendants jointly liable may be maintained against such defendants in any county that is proper venue for any one of the defendants. Section 117, O.S. 1931, 12 Okl.St.Ann. § 139; Section 167, O.S.1931, 12 Okl.St.Ann. § 154."
The intention of the court would have been more clearly expressed if the statement had been worded, as follows:
"However, it is settled that an action against two or more defendants jointly liable may be maintained against such defendants in any county that is proper venue as provided by specific statutes for any one of the defendants when the venue as to the other defendants would have otherwise been fixed by 12 O.S.1951 § 139 and that, by virtue of 12 O.S.1951 § 154, summons may issue to other counties for service on said latter mentioned defendants."
Founded upon, and in harmony with, the former opinions of this court, including those cases hereinabove cited, we conclude that venue of actions against multiple joint defendants, lies only in the county or counties meeting the requirements of all applicable specific venue statutes and that, when such requirements have been met, the action is "rightly brought" so that under the authorization of 12 O.S. 1951 § 154 summons shall be issued to any other county or counties for service upon those defendants as to whom venue would have otherwise been fixed by 12 O.S.1951 § 139.
As to the primary action which is here under attack, the venue of any action against the City of McAlester was fixed by 12 O.S.1951 § 134 in Pittsburg County and the District Court of Oklahoma County, the defendant in the instant proceeding obtained no jurisdiction over said municipal corporation, the plaintiff here.
Writ of prohibition is granted and ordered issued.
JOHNSON, C. J., and WELCH, HALLEY and CARLILE, JJ., concur.
WILLIAMS, V. C. J., and CORN, BLACKBIRD and JACKSON, JJ., dissent.