Case Name: John J. Finney, Respondent, against Peter W. Gallaudet et al., Appellants
Court: New York Court of Common Pleas
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1888-12-03
Citations: 15 Daly (N.Y.) 66
Docket Number: 
Parties: John J. Finney, Respondent, against Peter W. Gallaudet et al., Appellants.
Judges: 
Reporter: Daly's Common Pleas Reports
Volume: 15
Pages: 66–69

Head Matter:
John J. Finney, Respondent, against Peter W. Gallaudet et al., Appellants.
(Decided December 3d, 1888).
That the jury believed the uncorroborated testimony of one witness, against the contradiction of two or more, is not ground for setting aside their verdict as against the weight of evidence, where there is nothing tending to show that they were influenced by passion or prejudice.
Plaintiff in an action against stock brokers claimed a balance due him on transactions down to a certain date, while defendants alleged subsequent transactions by them on his account, on which he was largely indebted to them, but as to which, for special reasons, they had not followed the usual custom of sending him written notice of each pur- ■ chase and sale. Held, that evidence of the method of business between the parties during the time of their undisputed dealings, and of the custom of the trade as to sending notices, was admissible on the question whether the subsequent transactions were for plaintiff.
The gist of the defense was that defendants’ clerk, as such, received confidential orders from plaintiff. Held, that, although evidence of conversations between one of defendants and tneir clerk was properly excluded, conversations between the clerk and plaintiff were admissible on plaintiff’s behalf.
Appeal from a judgment of this court entered upon the verdict of a jury and from an order denying a motion for a new trial.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Frazer & Miner, for appellants.
Edwin M. Felt, for respondent.

Opinion:
Larremore, Ch. J.
The defendants are a firm of stock brokers, and the plaintiff was a customer of theirs, and in this action sues to recover an alleged balance in his favor, arising out of purchases and sales of stocks for his account. It was condededthat down to a given date plaintiff's operations were successful and a profit resulted, but defendants set up an affirmative defense to the effect that, after the date of the last transaction referred to in the complaint, still other ventures were made on plaintiff's account,which not only consumed the balance then standing in his favor, but brought him out largely in debt to his brokers. It is undisputed that the§e subsequent purchases and sales of stock were made, and that they have been charged to plaintiff upon defendants' books. The question of fact upon which the whole controversy turned, and which has been decided in plaintiff's favor by the jury, was whether any authority to identify him with the transactions in question ever existed.
The verdict is not so obviously against the weight of evidence as to call for interference with it on that ground. It was admitted that in the later transactions, the defendants did not follow the usual custom of business by immediately sending plaintiff written notice of each purchase and sale, and it also appears that such formalities were observed with him in the prior and more fortunate dealings. The explanation offered by defendants of their ceasing to treat plaintiff like an ordinary customer, and as they had formerly treated him, was that he had grown very intimate with their confidential clerk, Mr. Wykes, and by reason of such intimacy, and also because plaintiff wished the fact of his trading in the market to be kept secret, he was allowed to privately give his orders and receive information of their result through Mr. Wykes. Plaintiff's denial of all the alleged circumstances necessary to make out this theory of defense is absolute and unqualified. He even denies that he was on terms of intimacy with Wykes, and asserts that the latter never had the slightest authority to bind or represent him. The mere fact that upon some points the uncorroborated word of one man was believed as against the contradiction of two or more xyitnesses, is no ground for impugning the verdict. The record discloses nothing tending to show that the jury was influenced by passion or prejudice.
Nor do we think the criticisms of counsel upon some of the rulings at the trial are well founded. A strenuous objection was made to the showing of the method of business between the plaintiff and defendants daring the time of their undisputed dealings with each other, as well as the ordinary custom of the trade as to sending notices, etc., which custom had been observed with plaintiff during such undisputed period. In our judgment this evidence was properly admitted. Proof of custom xvas not introduced here, as is usually the case, to modify or supplement the positive provisions of law, but merely to throw light on the matter of probability in determining a question of fact. As such it xvas clearly relevant, and it would have been a great injustice to plaintiff if, when called upon to meet the defendants' allegations, he had been deprived of the privilege of arguing inferentially as to their truth or falsity, from conceded facts in the business relations of the parties.
We are also of opinion that the trial judge correctly ruled at folios 141, 150, and 170. Conversations between one of the defendants and Mr. Wykes, defendants' confidential clerk, sought to be proved on behalf of defendants, were properly excluded. It is elementary that a party may not prove, in 1ns own favor, declarations made by himself or his agent in the absence of the other party. But an alleged conversation between Mr. Wykes and plaintiff was rightly admitted on plaintiff's behalf, because the declarations of an agent made in the course of business are competent against his principal. Counsel for appellant contends that these rulings were both erroneous because they assume that Wykes xvas defendants' agent. But what other supposition could the court possibly have entertained ? The whole gist of defendants' affirmative defense is that Wykes was their employé, and as such received confidential orders from their customer, the plaintiff. Unless this was conceded the facts alleged by way of affirmative defense were utterly irrelevant, and that part of the answer which contained' them was frivolous. The claim that Wykes was plaintiff's agent will not bear the most simple analysis. Mr. Wykes was in the employ of the defendants and.regularly assisted them in their business. If all his statements were taken as true, they would establish nothing further than that, having become intimately acquainted with one of defendants' customers, some of the rigid formalities of business were, through his influence, relaxed as to that particular customer. This state of affairs would not in any way alter the original legal status of the parties.
The judgment and order appealed from should be affirmed, with costs.
Van Hoesen, J., concurred.
Judgment affirmed, with costs.
The judgment entered on this decision was affirmed on appeal to the Court of Appeals, March 21st, 1890 (see 119 N.Y. 661).