Case Name: In the Matter of the State Bar of Wisconsin; Membership - SCR 10.01(1) & 10.03(4); Membership Dues & Dues Reduction - SCR 10.03(5); Assembly of Members - SCR 10.07(2); Referendum Procedure - SCR 10.08; Amendment of Rules - SCR 10.13(1)
Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Wisconsin
Decision Date: 1992-06-17
Citations: 169 Wis. 2d 21
Docket Number: 
Parties: In the Matter of the State Bar of Wisconsin; Membership — SCR 10.01(1) & 10.03(4); Membership Dues & Dues Reduction — SCR 10.03(5); Assembly of Members — SCR 10.07(2); Referendum Procedure — SCR 10.08; Amendment of Rules — SCR 10.13(1).
Judges: 
Reporter: Wisconsin Reports Second
Volume: 169
Pages: 21–48

Head Matter:
In the Matter of the State Bar of Wisconsin; Membership — SCR 10.01(1) & 10.03(4); Membership Dues & Dues Reduction — SCR 10.03(5); Assembly of Members — SCR 10.07(2); Referendum Procedure — SCR 10.08; Amendment of Rules — SCR 10.13(1).
Supreme Court
Filed June 17, 1992.
(Also reported in 485 N.W.2d 225.)

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
On May 16, 1991 the State Bar of Wisconsin petitioned for the reinstatement of the integrated bar in Wisconsin by resumption of enforcement of the court's rules, SCR 10.03(1) and 10.03(4), establishing membership in the State Bar of Wisconsin as a condition precedent to the right to practice law in Wisconsin and limiting the practice of law in the state to enrolled active members of the State Bar. The court unified or "integrated" the State Bar in 1956 and it has remained so until May 6, 1988, when the court suspended enforcement of its mandatory State Bar membership rules in response to the decision of the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin in Levine v. Heffernan, et al., 679 F. Supp. 1478 (W.D. Wis. 1988), holding that the court could not require the plaintiff in that action to be a member of the State Bar of Wisconsin as a condition of his practicing law in the state.
Thereafter, Levine, supra, was reversed by the United States Court of Appeals in Levine v. Heffernan, et al., 864 F.2d 467 (7th Cir. 1988). The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in Levine but on the same day granted certiorari in another action presenting the issue of thé constitutionality of an integrated bar, Keller v. State Bar of California. This court made no change in the status of the State Bar of Wisconsin while Keller was pending. In Keller the United States Supreme Court again upheld the constitutionality of a mandatory state bar membership rule but placed limitations on a state bar association's use of dues lawyers are required to pay to the association. Keller v. State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1, 110 S. Ct. 2228, 110 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1990).
Soon thereafter, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in an action concerning a state bar association's procedures for member objection to its use of compulsory dues, Gibson v. Florida Bar. Because that issue was relevant here, this court again took no action on the status of the State Bar of Wisconsin, with the result that enforcement of the court's mandatory membership rules remained suspended. After hearing argu-mentan Gibson, the United States Supreme Court dismissed the petition for certiorari as having been improvidently granted. Gibson v. Florida Bar, — U.S. —, 112 S. Ct. 633, 116 L. Ed. 432 (1991).
In the meantime, the State Bar of Wisconsin conducted a study of its status as a unified bar association and as a voluntary one. Following that study, the State Bar petitioned the court to reinstate the integrated bar in Wisconsin. As part of that petition, the State Bar also sought the amendment of the dues reduction rule, SCR 10.03 (5) (b), to conform to the holding in Keller, supra, in respect to the constitutional limitations on the use of compulsory dues.
Following the public hearing it held on the State Bar's petition, the court on March 10, 1992 reinstated the integrated bar in Wisconsin, effective July 1, 1992. The court adopted the proposed amendment to the dues reduction rule by separate order on March 13, 1992.
The court is persuaded that a unified association composed of all persons licensed by this court to practice law in the state is best suited to meet the lawyers' professional obligations to the public and to the legal profession itself. Because all lawyers, as practitioners of that profession, share those obligations, an association in which membership were voluntary would not be in the same position to meet them.
Members of the legal profession have a duty to promote the public interest, as well as the interests of their individual clients. A significant aspect of the public's interest is the efficient and effective administration of justice. It is necessary that lawyers join in a common effort to carry out this duty, for lawyers acting individually or in discrete groups might lack the commitment and resources to effectively address more than a portion of their professional responsibilities. Acting as one, however, the members of the legal profession constitute a powerful force to further the improvement of the legal system, its laws, its courts and its practitioners.
As each lawyer shares the profession's obligation to the public, each lawyer properly may be required to support the profession's functions and activities directed to the interest of the public, even if only financially by payment of membership dues to the association acting to fulfill those obligations. It is to be hoped, however, that membership in the integrated bar association will motivate lawyers to contribute their time and talent, as well as their money, to the association's activities in furtherance of the cause of justice.
The United States Supreme Court identified two state interests justifying a unified state bar association: regulating the legal profession and improving the quality of legal service available to the people of the state. Keller, supra, 496 U.S. 13-14. Each of these interests is indissolubly bound together with the public's interest in justice and the legal system's ability to make justice attainable. These interests of the state are best furthered by an association in which every lawyer licensed to practice by the state is required to join and, at a minimum, support financially.
The United States Supreme Court held in Keller, supra, that mandatory dues of the members of a unified bar association may constitutionally be used to fund activities germane to the identified state interests in regulating the legal profession and improving the quality of legal services. Consistent with that holding, we have adopted the State Bar's proposed amendment to the dues reduction rule, SCR 10.03 (5) (b). The procedure set forth therein for member withholding of payment for activities other than those directed to furthering the identified interests and for objection and arbitration of disputes concerning the State Bar's activities which may constitutionally be funded by mandatory dues provide adequate protection to the association's members who would limit their financial contribution to that which constitutionally can be exacted.
For the reasons set forth above and upon the specific petition of the State Bar of Wisconsin, on March 10,1992, the court ordered the reinstatement of the integrated State Bar of Wisconsin, effective July 1, 1992.
The court has addressed the issue of the integration of the State Bar on numerous occasions: Lathrop v. Donohue, 10 Wis. 2d 230 (1960), In re Regulation of the Bar of Wisconsin, 81 Wis. 2d xxxv (1977), Matter of Discontinuation of the Wisconsin State Bar, 93 Wis. 2d 385 (1980), Report of Committee to Review the State Bar, 112 Wis. 2d xix (1983).