Case Name: SLOAN v. AMBROSE
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1942-01-05
Citations: 300 Mich. 188
Docket Number: Docket No. 78, Calendar No. 41,772
Parties: SLOAN v. AMBROSE.
Judges: Chandler, C. J., and Boyles,, North, Starr, Butzel, Bushnell, and Sharpe, JJ., concurred.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 300
Pages: 188–194

Head Matter:
SLOAN v. AMBROSE.
1. Automobiles — Pedestrians—Traffic Light Change — Instructions — Contributory Negligence.
In pedestrian’s action against motorist for injuries received at street intersection when plaintiff, southbound on east crosswalk, had reached about the center of the street at time traffic light changed against her and defendant came from west, instruction that pedestrian who started across street under protection of traffic light would have the right to continue uninterruptedly even though the light did change while she was crossing the street but which wholly ignored plaintiff’s own testimony showing total want of care on her part in failing to observe defendant approach before starting to cross the street was erroneous.
2. Same — Pedestrians—1Traffic Light Change — Reasonable Care.
Pedestrians starting to cross a street under protection of a traffic light are still required to observe the change, if any, removing the protection and to employ reasonable care in proceeding into the path of released traffic and the drivers of released traffic must observe pedestrians caught by change of light and exercise reasonable care to avoid striking them.
3. Same — Pedestrians—Traffic Light Change — Subsequent Negligence.
In action by pedestrian who failed to see eastbound motorist approaching from west as plaintiff started south across east crosswalk under protection of traffic light and after light had changed was struck when she was at about the center of the street may not invoke the rule of subsequent negligence.
4. Negligence — Subsequent Negligence.
To apply the theory of subsequent negligence, the plaintiff’s negligence must have come to rest and defendant must have discovered such negligence in time and with the ability to avoid the accident and have failed to do so.
Per Chandler, C. J., and Boyles, North, Starr, Wiest, Butzel, Bushnell, and Sharpe, JJ.
Functions of court and jury on question of contributory negligence, see 2 Restatement, Torts, §§476, 285 comment (e), §434; also, see § 289 and comments (a) and (g) as to standard of care required of plaintiff.
Last clear chance, see 2 Restatement, Torts, § 480.
5. Automobiles — Pedestrians—Traffic Light Change — Contributory Negligence.
Pedestrian who started south across east crosswalk with traffic light in her favor who continued on across street after light had changed to favor east- and westbound traffic without making any observations of approaching eastbound traffic including defendant’s car was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
Per Chandler, C. J., and Boyles, North, Starr, Butzel, Bushnell, and Sharpe, JJ.
Appeal from Montcalm; Hawley (Royal A.), J.
Submitted October 16,1941.
(Docket No. 78, Calendar No. 41,772.)
Decided January 5, 1942.
Case by Ruth Sloan against Rel A. Ambrose for injuries received when struck by defendant’s autor mobile. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.
Reversed, without a new trial.
Thomas M. Kavanagh, for plaintiff.
Brake & Miel, for defendant.

Opinion:
Wiest, J.
December 11, 1939, at about 1 o'clock in the afternoon, plaintiff, while crossing Main street in the village of Carson City, was struck by the left fender of defendant's automobile and injured. Upon trial by jury plaintiff had verdict for $550. Defendant's motions for directed verdict and a new trial on the ground that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence were denied.
The day was bright and view of traffic unobstructed. Main street runs east and west and plaintiff was using the crosswalk in the business district at the east intersection of Main and Mercantile streets. Plaintiff testified that, before she stepped from the curb to cross the street, she looked at the suspended traffic light at the intersection and it was in her favor and an automobile from the east had come to a stop at the intersection, so she started to cross, passed in front of the stopped automobile and proceeded without again looking at the traffic light or making further observation of traffic; that, when about the center of the street and, whether south of the center or not she could not tell exactly, defendant's automobile, coming from the west, struck her.
"While she was crossing, the traffic light changed. It is true, she testified on cross-examination:
"Q. If you had looked to the west you could have seen this carl
"A. No, sir. I did look.
"Q. You did look and didn't see it?
"A. No, sir."
But on re-examination by her own counsel she stated:
"When I testified that I looked to the west and didn't see this car I referred to when I looked at the light and that was before I crossed in front of the Blackmer car and was when I was on the north edge of Main street just before I started across. At that time I looked to the west and didn't see any car coming."
The court instructed the jury:
"I think I stated that in substance, and that is this, that if while she was passing from one side of the street to the other and while she was making her progress along that line if the light changed in the meantime, she continued to have the right to pass to the other side of the street before the defendant could start his car in such a way and to such an extent as to collide with her. She had the right, in other words, having started to cross the street and uninterruptedly proceeding for that purpose, she had the right to cross to the other side of the street even though the light did change in the meantime."
This instruction was erroneous in wholly failing to include the duty of plaintiff to use reasonable care and in ignoring her own testimony showing total want of care on her part.
The rule, applicable to plaintiff's own testimony, is stated in DeJager v. Vandenberg, 288 Mich. 136 (6 N. C. C. A. [N. S.] 341), and cases there cited. See, also, Beaulieu v. City of Detroit, 293 Mich. 364.
Traffic lights change and one starting to cross a street under their protection is still required to observe the change, if any, removing the protection and to employ reasonable care in proceeding into the path of released traffic. The drivers of released traffic must observe pedestrians caught by change of light and exercise reasonable care to avoid striking them.
In the case at bar if the driver of defendant's automobile was guilty of negligence plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence under her own testimony as a matter of law. Under the evidence plaintiff may not invoke the rule of subsequent negligence.
"To apply the theory of subsequent negligence, the plaintiff's negligence must have come to rest and defendant must have discovered such negligence in time and with the ability to avoid the accident and have failed to do so. Wells v. Oliver, 283 Mich. 168; Szost v. Dykman, 252 Mich. 151; Cline v. Killing-beck, 288 Mich. 126." Gallagher v. Walter, 299 Mich. 69, 77.
The motion of defendant for a directed verdict should have been granted. The judgment is reversed, without a new trial, and with costs to defendant.
Chandler, C. J., and Boyles,, North, Starr, Butzel, Bushnell, and Sharpe, JJ., concurred.