Case Name: RUSSELL SAGE v. MICHAEL RUDNICK
Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Minnesota
Decision Date: 1904-01-22
Citations: 91 Minn. 325
Docket Number: Nos. 13,727 — (184)
Parties: RUSSELL SAGE v. MICHAEL RUDNICK.
Judges: 
Reporter: Minnesota Reports
Volume: 91
Pages: 325–335

Head Matter:
RUSSELL SAGE v. MICHAEL RUDNICK.
Nos. 13,727 — (184).
January 22, 1904.
Land Grant — Adverse Possession.
Held, following St. Paul, M. & M. Ry. Co. v. Olson, 87 Minn. 117, that the time during which the right of the plaintiff’s grantor to the land here in question under its land grant was in litigation in the Land Department of the federal government cannot be counted against him in determining whether his right to recover the land is barred by adverse possession.
After Reargument.
June 17, 1904.
Conflicting Land Grants.
In 1860 Congress granted to the state of Minnesota, in aid of the construction of a railroad therein, certain lands consisting of the odd-numbered sections within ten miles on either side of the center line of the road when definitely located. The state, by Sp. Laws 1807, p. 11 (c. 9), accepted the grant, and in turn granted the lands to the railroad company upon certain conditions named in the act. The Hastings & Dakota Bail-road Company, the grantee and beneficiary, filed its map of definite location in June, 1867, fully complied with the conditions of the grant, completed its road in 1880, and the land was formally conveyed by the state to plaintiff, the successor of the railroad company, in 1891. Defendant settled upon the land in controversy in this action, the same being a part of that so granted to the railroad company, and within the place limits of its grant, in 1877, and has ever since continuously remained in the open, adverse, and exclusive possession of the same. Subsequent to filing the map of definite location by the Hastings & Dakota Company and the completion of its road, the St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba Railroad Company made claim to this and other lands within the primary limits of the grant to the Hastings & Dakota Company, which claim it presented to the Interior Department of the general government for adjudication, where it was pending and undetermined from 1883 to 189Í, when it was disposed of adversely to the Manitoba Company. In this action by plaintiff, successor to all the rights of the Hastings & Dakota Company, to recover possession of the land from defendant, it is held:
Legal Title.
1. That the grant to the railroad company was in praesenti, and the legal title to the land in question passed to the Hastings & Dakota Bail-road Company upon the filing of its map of definite location in 1867.
Statute of Limitations.
2. The statute of limitations began to run in favor of defendant’s alleged title by adverse possession at the time of his settlement upon the land, the legal title thereto being then in the railroad company.
Litigation before Interior Department.
3. After the title so passed from the government to the railroad company, the Interior Department had no jurisdiction to hear or determine the asserted claim of the Manitoba Company, and the pendency of that controversy before the department did not suspend the running of the statute of limitations in favor of defendant’s adverse claim.
Jurisdiction of General Land Office.
4. When the legal title to public land has passed from the government, the Interior Department has no jurisdiction to determine controversies between individual claimants concerning the title or right to the possession thereof.
St. Paul v. Olson Distinguished.
5. St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba Ry. Co. v. Olson, 87 Minn. 117, distinguished.
Action of ejectment in the district court for Swift county. The case was tried before Qvale, J., who directed a verdict in favor of plaintiff. From an order denying a motion for a new trial, defendant appealed.
Reversed on rehearing.
C. A. Fosnes, for appellant.
Owen Morris, for respondent.
Reported in 98 N. W. 89; 100 N. W. 106.

Opinion:
START, C. J.
This is an action of ejectment, begun in March, 1896, to recover the possession of a quarter section of land in the county of Swift, and within the primary limits of the grant of lands to the Hastings & Dakota Railway Company, and the. indemnity limits of the St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba Railway' Company's grant. The plaintiff is the successor in interest of the Hastings & Dakota Company. The sole defense was adverse possession, which the defendant claimed began May 15, 1877. The evidence was undisputed that from May, 1883, until October 23, 1891, the land was in litigation between the Hastings & Dakota Company and the St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba Railway Company in the General Hand Office of the United States, each company claiming that it was entitled to the land by virtue of its grant; that the Secretary of the Interior on October 23, 1891, decided the contest in favor of the Hastings & Dakota Company; and further that the land was certified to the state April 16, 1892, and on April 22, 1892, it was conveyed to the plaintiff. Upon these facts, and the admission of the defendant that his sole claim to the land rested upon his alleged title by adverse possession, the trial court directed a verdict for the plaintiff. The defendant appealed from an order denying his motion for a new trial.
The question raised by the record is whether the plaintiff or his predecessor in interest could have maintained an action to recover possession of the land while the question as to which company was entitled to it was so in litigation in the land office. If he could not, then the trial court rightly directed a verdict for the plaintiff.- The question must be, and is, determined adversely to the defendant, on the authority of the case of St. Paul, M. & M. Ry. Co. v. Olson, 87 Minn. 117, 91 N. W. 294. It is, however, claimed by the defendant that the facts in the case cited distinguish it from the one now under consideration, in that in the Olson case the litigation in the land office was initiated and continued by the defendant, while in this case the defendant was not a party in any manner to the contest in the land office. We are of the opinion that such fact does not, in principle, distinguish the cases. In each case the question whether the land passed by the grant was in litigation in the General Land Office, which had in the first instance paramount authority to determine the question; and, so long as the question was still pending and undecided, the courts had no jurisdiction to decide the question. What was said in the opinion in the Olson case in reference to the fact that the defendant initiated the litigation was for the purpose of emphasizing the inequity of his claim; hence any fair doubt as to the correctness of the conclusion reached as to the effect of the pendency of the litigation in the Land Department ought to be resolved against him.
Order affirmed.