Case Name: Austin Wales v. Alexander H. Newbould
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1860-11-16
Citations: 9 Mich. 45
Docket Number: 
Parties: Austin Wales v. Alexander H. Newbould.
Judges: Campbell J., did not sit in this case, having been of counsel.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 9
Pages: 45–93

Head Matter:
Austin Wales v. Alexander H. Newbould.
Wales, who was administrator of the estate of Mrs. Newbould, his deceased daughter, and her only heir-at-law and next of kin, and also administrator de bonds non, of the estate of Knapp, her first husband (who died without issue), upon which estate she had partially administered in her life time, filed his bill against Newbould, setting forth that on a settlement and compromise with Knapp’s sister (who was his heir - at - law) of a claim the estate had against her, and of all rights in Knapp’s lands, Mrs. Newbould, as widow and administratrix, agreed to take a certain portion of the lands, releasing the remainder to the sister; and that defendant, acting as his wife’s agent in this compromise, had, without her knowledge, taken, in his own name a doed of the lands she was to receive, and sold the same: that he ;had also become possessed of moneys received by her for her dower in certain other of Knapp’s lands, and of a note she held against complainant, and certain other personal property which belonged to her at her decease. And praying that he account to complainant for the lands and dower moneys, and deliver over the note and other personal property, that it might bo disposed of and distributed in due course of administration of the Knapp and Mrs. Newbould estates. Defendant answered, claiming that the lands, the dower moneys and the note, were given to him by Mrs. Newbould, but setting up no right to the other personal property, and claiming by his answer the benefit of a demurrer. On the hearing on pleadings and proofs he insisted that the bill was multifarious, as the complainant claimed in three distinct characters. "Whether the bill was multifarious, quere.
The court in such case, if it finds the answer not sustained, will compel defendant to account to complainant, but will not undertake to determine how much of the property belongs to the one estate and how much to the other, nor how it shall be distributed, as these are questions to be passed upon by the Probate Court.
The complainant, as administrator of Knapp, electing to affirm the compromise under which the lands were deeded to defendant, and to demand the proceeds of their sale, the objection that this compromise was void, as against that estate, and that therefore the administrator has a remedy at law by resorting to the lands themselves, will not be listened to from defendant who acted on behalf of his wife in making the compromise, and has since sold to other persons the lands received. Especially as the case shows more personal assets than the amount of the debts proved against the estate, and it does not appear that the lands are needed for the payment of the debts of the estate.
The defendant objected that, as to the note and other personal property, complainant had an ample remedy at law. — Ueld, That though complainant might defeat an action on the note, by showing himself entitled to it as administrator, yet that this remedy was not adequate, as he was also entitled to have it delivered up to him. And that as defendant made no claim whatever to the other personal property, and complainant’s title was not disputed, the defendant should be decreed to surrender it, notwithstanding the remedy at law was adequate.
The defendant claiming the lands, &c., by gift from his wife, the burden of proof is upon him to establish the gift. The fact that the deed of the lauds was made to him, in the absence of .proof that it was so made by the wife’s direction, consent or knowledge, is no evidence of such gift, and warrants no presumption against the wife’s interest.
Argued July 15thth, 1859.
Re-argued April 12th, 13th and 14th, 1860.
Decide Nov. 16th.
Appeal from the Wayne Circuit in Chancery.
The bill of complaint set forth substantially the following facts:
Thomas F. Knapp, in his life- time, and John Thorn, owned together a certain tract of land in Port Huron, Michigan, the legal title to which was in Thorn. This tract was subdivided and platted, and Thorn had sold several lots before Knapp’s decease, which occurred prior to 1848, but had not accounted for the proceeds. LaFayette Knapp and Eliza Knapp were the children and heirs at law of Thomas F. Knapp, the latter of whom married Frank L. Hunt, about 1848, and she, her husband and La Fayette, then filed their bill in chancery in the St. Clair Circuit, against Thorn, for a settlement and partition of the lands, and a preliminary decree was made in the cause, that one-half the lands belonged to said LaFayette and Eliza, as heirs at law of Thomas F. Knapp, and that Thorn was indebted to them $2500. Thorn died before this suit was finally determined, and it was revived against his representatives. In 1849, LaFayette married Cornelia H. Wales, the daughter of complainant, and in 1850 he died without issue, and his widow, by his death, became entitled to one-half the claim against Thorn, and also to a claim of $8,000-against Mrs. Hunt for her support by LaFayette Knapp, Cornelia was made a party to the St. Clair Chancery suit. Defendant and Cornelia intermarried in October, 1852, when he also was made a party to the suit, and. a final decree was subsequently made in it, that the $2500, be paid by the Thorn estate to the heirs of Thomas F; Knapp either in money or in lands, and the one-fourth of the land was decreed to- be in Mrs. Hunt, as such heir, and another fourth as heir of LaFayette, subject to the rights of Cornelia, his widow, and who had been appointed administratrix on his estate. The heirs of Thomas F. Knapp elected to take the $2500 in lands, and eighteen lots were set off to Mrs. Hunt, by commissioners appointed for the. purpose, in satisfaction of this sum, but subject to all the rights of said Cornelia. The balance of the land was then divided between Mrs. Hunt and the Thorn estate.
June 6, 1853, an agreement was entered into between Mrs. Hunt and Cornelia, (Mrs. Newbould) — who still, notwithstanding her marriage, continued to act as administratrix on the estate of LaFayette Knapp — that Mrs. Hunt should give Mrs. Newbould' the eighteen lots in full of the §3000 claim, and of one-half the §2500, which she claimed as representative of LaFayette Knapp, and also seven other lots in full of her claim, as widow of LaFayette, upon the lands set off to Mrs. Hunt, as his heir. The lots were to be conveyed by Mrs. Hunt to Mrs. Newbould, and the latter was to give to one Trusdail, for Mrs. Hunt, a quit claim deed of the remainder of the land. This quit claim deed was executed accordingly. Mrs. Newbould, and her husband also, as a part of the same arrangement, gave Mrs. Hunt an indemnity against any claim which the estate of LaFayette Knapp might make against her.
In all these transactions, defendant acted as his wife’s agent, and she delivered to him, at Detroit, the deed to Truesdail, to take to Port Huron, and exchange for the conveyance from Mrs. Hunt. Instead, however, of' taking the deed from Mrs. Hunt in his wife’s name, he took it in his own, so that the legal title was vested in him contrary to her expectations and directions — a fact which she never knew during her life time.
LaFayette Knapp, in his life time, owned an interest in a farm near Detroit, and Mrs. Newbould sold her right of dower therein to John Owen, and took his note for §500 therefor, which she delivered to her husband, to collect for her. He collected it, but never accounted for the money. She also, before her marriage with him, and after-wards, owned several articles of personal property, which defendant has and retains.
After LaFayette Knapp died, and before his widow married defendant, complainant owed her $926, for which he gave her his note. Before her death, defendant got this note, and now holds it. Defendant also holds a note, given him by complainant, for $1086.VO, and about September 5, 185V, he sued both these notes in the Wayne Circuit Court, when he ought not to recover on the first at all, nor on the second till all the matters above set forth are settled.
Mrs. Newbould died February 23,' 1855, leaving complainant her heir at law, who thereupon took out letters of administration on her estate, and finding LaFayette Knapp’s estate not fully administered upon, and debts allowed against it, he also took out letters de bonis non upon that.
The bill prays for a full account of all property conveyed to defendant by Mrs. Hunt, and of the sales thereof by him, of the moneys received by him of Owen, and of all her personal property; that he may assign the same to complainant, and that all the property belonging to the estates of LaFayette Knapp and Mrs. Newbould may be disposed of in due course of administration.
The answer avers that Mrs. Newbould requested defendant to take a deed of the 25 lots in his own name, and as his own property, and the deed was so made at her request. She knew afterwards that he was using and selling these lots as his own, and never objected. It denies that the deed to Truesdail was delivered to him to take to Port Huron for exchange, but says all the papers were exchanged at Detroit,' where the parties then were. The ansAver also claims, that the moneys received from Owen, and the note of $926 against complainant, were given to defendant by his wife. And it insists that complainant has made by his bill no case entitling him to relief; that the bill is multifarious; that as to the personal property the remedy is in a court of law; and that complainant has mingled matters of his own with matters pertaining to the LaFayette Knapp estate, and Mrs. Newbould’s estate, and defendant claims the benefit of demurrer.
The following is the most material evidence in the case:
Henry T Backus (who represented the Thorn estate in the adjustment), testified on behalf of complainant, that Newbould acted on behalf of himself and his wife. “He acted as the husband of Mrs. Knapp. I so understood it from Mr. Newbould. From his actions and what he did, I have no hesitation in saying that Mr. Newbould was acting in behalf of the interest of his wife. I did not get any impression from defendant that he had any interest in the property,* except through his wife. I had no conversation directly with defendant about the property or his interest. I do not know anything about the title to the property as between defendant and his wife, except by inference. I do not know to whom the property was eventually deeded on the adjustment. I had no further connection with it except as to the Thorn estate.”
Edwin A. Wales, sworn, on the part of complainant:
“The $2500 mentioned in the decree in the chancery suit at St. Clair, and also in the pleadings in this suit, was a balance due from the Thorn estate to the Knapp estate, and belonged to LaFayette Knapp and Eliza A. Hunt, who were the only heirs of Tilos. F. Knapp. I was the attorney of L. Knapp in his lifetime, and acted for Mrs. Knapp during her widowhood, having charge of all the books and papers belonging to the estate of L. Knapp. I found upon the books and other evidences, claims against Eliza A. Hunt, formerly Eliza Knapp, to very near $3,000. It was for debts paid by Mr. Knapp during his lifetime for her, money advanced by him in and about the St. Clam chancery suit, and his ledger and book account for suj>plies furnished Mrs. Knapp.”
“ On the 6th of June, 1853, the lots mentioned in Schedules B and C annexed to bill were set apart to Mrs. New bould, in settlement [the 18 lots and the V lots]. The entire of the eighteen lots being set apart for the $3,000 and the half of the $2500, and the seven lots for her dower. Including some disbursements made by defendant, the claim of Mrs. Newbould, including dower, amounted to $'?,6'/,0 99. This claim was compromised at an agreed amount of $3,500. The lots were estimated at same value, and taken in payment of all the claims. All of Mrs. Newbould’s interest in the balance of the property she was to convey to Mrs. Hunt. Mr. Newbould, the defendant, co-operated with the attorneys for the jjarties in bringing about the settlement as above set forth. This was after the marriage of defendant with Cornelia. Cornelia herself did not take an active part. The arrangement was 'made at Port Huron. Mrs. Newbould was not there; she was in Detroit, and had no personal knowledge of it at the time. Mr. Newbould, the defendant, Mr. H. H. Emmons and myself, acted on behalf of Mrs. Newbould. I do not know positively that Mrs. Newbould knew that the deed was directed to defendant and not to Mrs. Newbould, — the deed of lots taken for her said claim. I do not know anything particular about it. I do not know that Mrs. Newbould expected to receive the proceeds of sales of said lots_made by defendant. Never heard defendant say anything to the effect that she should have the property, or that he would keep the property separate.”
Gross Moamination: “The settlement I have referred to between Mrs. Hunt and Mrs. Newbould in relation to St. Clair property, was the result of a negotiation of three or four days. The papers and exhibits annexed to my direct testimony were made out at Port Huron, while we were negotiating for the settlement. It was contemplated that the settlement was to be carried out by the execution of final papers. Mrs. Newbould was not there at the time of the negotiation. There was some controversy about the claim for $3,000, and that controversy was the reason why the claim • was compromised.
Question — Was not the result of the negotiation an agreement that Mrs. Hunt and husband, should convey the lots to Mrs. Newbould or whoever she directed, and that Mr. and Mr. Newbould should receipt the account, and indemnify Mrs. Hunt, in behalf of all claims from the Knapp estate?
Answer — Not so far as the defendant was concerned, to my knowledge. It was agreed that the account should be released and discharged.
Mrs. Hunt was to transfer the absolute 'fee to Mrs.. Newbould in consideration of the release and discharge of this account, &c. It was understood that Mrs. Hunt was to convey all the interest she had to Mrs. Newbould.. The design was to put the fee of those lots in Mrs. Newbould absolutely, and, as to other property, in Mrs. Hunt.”
Direct resumed — “The result of the negotiation, so far as the descrijrtion of the property is concerned, is embodied in Exhibit D, hereto annexed, and was drawn up at Port Huron, at the time of the negotiation. I do not know that anything was said during the negotiation, by any one, in relation to putting the property in the name of defendant.”
“I had several conversations with Mrs. Newbould in her lifetime, in which she repeatedly stated that her hus-. band , seemed very particular about keeping her property separate from his own. On one occasion she asked me what I thought of her taking two houses, one of which they occupied, of defendant in exchange for her Port Huron property. I stated to her my objections to her taking the property in exchange, as the houses were on leased land.. She always in her lifetime spoke of the property as her sole and separate property, and frequently commented upon the defendant’s delicacy in regard to the management thereof, and seemed to commend him for his apparent disinterestedness. I have heard her several times talk with other members of the family about this property. I had never known her to treat it as the property of her husband, or intimate that she designed it should become his. These conversations were had on several occasions.”
Gilbert G. Davidson, sworn on the part of defendant:
“I reside in Albany, N. Y. I knew Mrs. Newbould in her lifetime. I have been for a long time intimately acquainted with deiendant — about twenty years. For the past six or eight years I have been in Detroit two or three times a year, and I was in the habit of making the residence of defendant my home while in the city. I was on very intimate terms with the family, and constituted one of the family of defendant always when in Detroit. The defendant and his wife were in the habit of talking confidentially to me of their business and other affairs.
Question — State Avhether or not you ever knew from Mrs. Newbould whether she became entitled to property situate in Port Huron, and which was originally owned by John Thorn and Thomas Knapp, which was at one time in litigation between Thorn and the heirs of Thos. Knapp— or any interest therein. State fully.
Answer — I know that she said to me that she owned property in Port Huron, which came to her through the Knapp estate, i. e. her husband, LaFayette Knapp. She said to me that she desired and had placed in the defendant the title to that property, to be his absolute property. Defendant declined (as she stated) at the start, to have anything to do with the property. The defendant declined to have anything to do with the property at the start, because that in the chances of business he might fail — it would be better to have it in her own name; but she refused to have anything to do with it. She absolutely declined to have anything to do with the property, and said if he failed in business she could go into the kitchen to work. She also said that if it had not been for defendant she would never have got that Port Huron property. She talked about all the property she had, personal as well as real, and desired that all should be in him diming her life, as well as after death. We had such conversations oftentimes, time and again. Invariably her conversations were of the same tenor as I have testified.
Gross examination: The first conversation was between January, 1852 and 1854. I have talked with her often. All the conversations were after her marriage with defendant, at Ms two houses on Jefferson avenue, Detroit; I did not have any conversations with her at any other place about this property. I do not know that any one was present. I think that defendant was present at none of the conversations. I knew her before she married defendant. I knew her from as early as 1845, 1846, or 184'T. I knew her and was Mtrmate with her and her family. The conversa-, tions were introduced by talking about defendant’s affairs and about mine. I was intimate enough for that. I can not give an instance when any of these conversations took place in the presence of any one else. She was not in the habit of talking much. My acquaintance with the Wales family (her family), has continued up to the present time. I did not communicate any of these conversations to any one but to defendant during her lifetime. I have talked these matters and others over with defendant while she was alive. Can not recollect, but I think I may have told what she said. I talked the matter over with the defendant; defendant refused, at the start, to have anything to do with her property. I heard him say he did not want her property, at the start, but after-wards I never heard Mm say so. After the defendant got the property into his hands I never heard him say he did not want and would not have anything to do with it. I never heard Mm say that he intended that her property should be kept separate and for her own use. I never had any conversation with defendant before I talked with her, and what she stated to me she said of her own free will. I can not state the number of conversations, but I should think as often as twenty times.
Direct resumed — Defendant and myself, from our long and extreme intimacy, were in the habit of talking over freely all of our business affairs. My intimacy with defendant has been even greater than with my own brothers.”
The court below dismissed the bill, and complainant appealed.
Molbroolc & Bishop, for complainant:
1. The bill is not multifarious. — 19 Ala. 814; Story Eq. Pl. § 76 a, b, 278 a, 279 b; 7 Sim. 564; 1 Myl. & Cr. 603; 4 Myl. & Cr. 17, 31.
If it be determined that some of the matters are not of equitable cognizance, the court may nevertheless adjudicate upon the rest, — Story Eq. Pl. § 283 and note, 1 Craig & Phil. 197; 8 Sim. 467; 3 Myl. & Cr. 85; 5 Paige, 137, 160; 18 Ala. 439.
Independent claims between the same parties may be litigated in one suit: — 1 Sim. & Stu. 313; 6 Mad. 94; 27 Miss. 419.
It is impossible to lay down any general rule as to multifariousness. There is none on the subject, even on demurrer, and the courts will always exercise a sound discretion, and consider what is most convenient in all cases: 1 Myl. & Cr. 618; 21 Miss. 234; 12 Geo. R. 61; 3 How. 619. The objection of multifariousness is discouraged by the courts: — 12 Geo. R. 61. And see Story Eq. Pl. §§ 271, 539; 2 How, 619, 642.
But the objection comes too late.. It should have been taken by demurrer: — 2 Sch. & Lef. 370; 5 Mad. 80; 5 How. 127; 32 N. H. 9; Story Eq. Pl. § 284 a.
2. The defendant claims this property simply and especially as a gift from his wife. He is bound by the case he makes, and must hold the property as a gift, or not at all.
But a feme covert can not thus give property to her husband, even if it was hers to give. — 2 Kent, 106; 4 Dana, 142; 1 Greenl. R. 394; 8 Greenl. R. 63; 2 Barr, 67; 1 Johns. Ch. 60; 10 Vesey, 580; 33 Penn. St. R. 525, 526.
There is nothing which can help defendant in the statutes of this state for the protection of the rights of married women before 1855. [These statutes the counsel reviewed at length, and in the same connection referred to 33 Penn. St. R. 525; 5 Duer, 476; 24 Barb. 581; 1 Dutch. 302; 12 S. & M. 347; 16 Ark. 154; 3 How. 624; 28 Vt. 765; 11 Md. 29; 28 Mo. 47; 24 Miss. 85; 7 Johns. Ch. 229; 1 Bradf. 64; 2 Kern. 202; 28 Barb. 343; 18 N. Y. 265.]
S. T. Douglass and W. Gray, for complainant:
1. The bill is fatally defective in its frame, and must be dismissed on that ground.
If we regard the complainant as one person suing in different capacities, the bill is defective for the want of certainty in the statement of the title upon which he grounds his claim to relief.
He claims the same property, or the same, account, in each of his two representative capacities, and also in his individual capacity; or in other words, sets up three alternative and inconsistent titles to the same thing.
This is not permitted, because it is unjust to the defendant, in that it does not apprise him with sufficient certainty what case he is called upon to meet, and imposes upon him a needless and unreasonable burthen in preparing to controvert, both upon the law and by evidence, several distinct titles at once, without knowing which in the end will be relied upon. If permitted, it would lead to serious and wholly unnecessary prolixity and confusion in judicial proceedings. It imposes upon the court the onerous and unreasonable duty of selecting out of many different and inconsistent titles the one which, if any, can be supported. 5 Story, 333, 334; Story Eq. Pl. §§241, 510.
If we regard the complainant, in each of the three different capacities in which he sues, as in the eye of the law so many different persons, it is equally uncertain in the statement of title, and is also fatally defective on the ground of a misjoinder of complainants. — Story Eq. Pl. § 510. [Counsel in this connection also referred to Calv. on Parties, 87; 3 Mason, 333; 3 Story, 25, 51; 2 Sim. 332; 2 Sim. 329; 4 Sandf. Ch. 31; 10 Yerg. 386; 6 Pana, 186; 1 Stock. 483; 3 How. Miss. 258; Ibid. 155; 4 Johns. Ch. 199; 4 Blackf. 251; 4 Beav. 557; 1 Sim. & Stu. 108; 2 Ves. 327 ; 9 Ala. 351.]
The objection being distinctly taken by the answer, is available at the hearing: — 2 Myl. & K. 235; 1 Myl. & Cr. 433; 6 Paige, 273; 13 Pet. 375; 4 Paige, 515; 1 Keene, 619; 1 Myl. & K. 559.
The court ought to dismiss the bill sua sponte. — l Myl. & K. 559; 7 Ala,. 425; 11 Ohio, 456; 4 Hare, 557; 13 Pet. 375.
If the bill is bad for the defects alleged, it can not be made the ground of partial relief. — 5 Gill, 359; 2 Gill, & J. 14; 16 Ala, 87.
2. Mrs. Newbould made a valid gift of all her separate estate to her husband during her lifetime.
Of the capacity of a feme covert to give her separate property to her husband, as well as to any other person, if her disposition of it be free and not the result of flattery, force, or inrproper treatment, there can be no reasonable doubt. — Comp. L. §3289; 2 Kent, 165, 166; 17 Johns. 548; 5 Barb. 225; 7 Ohio St. R. 208.
"We concede that transactions between husband and wife, in regard to the wife’s separate estate, should be viewed with great jealousy: yet they should be judged of fairly and justly, and in the light of all those presumptions which arise out of a just view of the nature of the relation be tween them, and the motives which usually actuate persons in that relation. — 7 Ohio St. R. 208, 216; 11 Md. 415; 17 Johns. 584; 5 Barb. 225; 29 Ala. 244, 252, and, cases cited 22 Conn. 289; 4 Md. 280; 11 Eng. L. & Eq. 106.
Examine the evidence. Reading it in the light of these presumptions, there is no reasonable doubt that Mrs. Newbould, during her lifetime, did give all her property to her husband freely and voluntarily, and without fraud persuasion, or undue influence on his part.
This gift included her interest, or the proceeds of her interest, as distributee, in the unadministered estate of L. Knapp. — 2 Kern. 202.
3. Mr. Newbould, as husband, was entitled jwre ma/riti to all the personal property of his wife on her decease intestate.
Such was the husband’s right at common law, and it is not affected by the statutes of distribution. — L. 1833, p. 308, §§ 1, 2; p. 310, §8; R. S. 1838, p. 279, § 1; p. 267, §1; p. 280, § 3; Comp. L. §§ 2877, 2812, 2879; Bright on H. and W. 41, 42; 1 Wms. on Ex. 336; 2 Ib. 1271, 1275, 1276, sec. 1; 3 Ves. 246, 247, and note 2; 34 N. H. 445; 3 N. H. 129; 9 N. H. 321; 5 Fost. 342; 2 Dev. 360; 4 Ired. Eq. 56; 1 Yerg. 418, 426; 10 Yerg. 222, 223; 28 Barb. 635; 1 Green. Ch. 247; see 25 Ala. 195.
Nor by the married woman’s act.— C. L. §3289; 28 Barb. 633.
4. Whether the defendant takes the property as donee of his wife, or as husband jure mariti, he is liable to account to complainant only to the extent of the debts due from Mrs. Newbould’s estate. — 4 Rice Ch. 107; 2 Mich. 381.

Opinion:
Martin Ch. J.:
Wales files this bill to obtain from the defendant an account of the property of the late Cornelia Newbould, which came into his hands during her life, and of the avails of such as has been sold by him, and for payment of such moneys as have been received therefor, and a delivery of such of the property as remains in the defendant's hands. In doing this, he sets forth the several relations in which he stands to the estate of the late Cornelia Nowbould, alleging that he is administrator of such estate, administrator of that of Knapp, from and through which a large portion of the property was acquired, and her heir at law and distributee, and as such entitled to any residuum left after administration. For this description of the characters in which he claims and may claim title to the subjects of this litigation, and that of his relation to Mrs. Newbould's estate, the bill is charged to be multifarious.
I shall not attempt to define multifariousness, for the failure of every court to do so hitherto shows its impossibility. The question, to a great extent, depends upon the facts of each particular case, and the nature of the relief prayed for by the bill. But in any event, to hold a bill multifarious, the court must be able to see that disconnected and independent causes of action are brought upon the record, requiring different and independent decrees, or that the defendant is brought upon a record with a portion of which he has no connection, or in which the different complainants, if there be more than one, have no common interest. It sometimes, therefore, means misjoinder of causes of action, and sometimes misjoinder of parties. See Daniell's Ch. Pr. 384, 385; Story's Eq. Pl. §271, 530 and note 6. In the present case there is a misjoinder of neither. The complainant is actually the only party entitled, in any capacity, to litigate the questions involved against the defendant, and the subject matter is the right of the defendant to the property claimed by the complainant to have belonged to Mrs. Newbould, but which the defendant claims in his own right. The manner in which, and the source from which she acquired such property, although necessary subjects of inquiry to determine these conflicting- 'claims, do not raise any conflicting issues respecting her •title, for that is the common source of the claim of both parties. The title to her property centres in either the complainant or the defendant. If in the defendant, the bill will be dismissed; if in the complainant, the defendant must be •content to surrender the property in his hands, and account for and pay to the complainant the proceeds of such as has been sold; and in its ultimate use and appropriation by the complainant he can have no interest, unless as a creditor of her estate. Now, although distinct matters, in different rights, — as unconnected demands against different estates — can not be united in a bill without rendering it multifarious, yet distinct matters in the same right may be joined. And so, several parties may join in a bill where there is a common interest in the subject of controversy. Indeed a primary rule of pleading in equity, is, that all persons should be made parties who are interested in the subject matter, or whose rights may be affected by the decree ; and although this rule has been somewhat relaxed by modern decisions, so that the absence of some of those who might have been joined as parties, will not necessarily require a dismissal of the bill, yet their being parties can be no fatal objection to it in any case. If such be the rule, it is difficult to And any valid reason for holding that, where the same subject matter is claimed by a single individual, in distinct but consistent and dependent rights, or where several interests are united in him, he may not maintain a bill in his own name, setting forth such rights and interests as grounds of his claim, and descriptive of his interests, and the characters in which such claim is made. And it is far more difficult, upon any equitable or rational ground, to find any reason why he should be required to select, out of several valid titles, one upon which he will found his claim to relief, when in fact he may be entitled to it upon all, or when each independent title is but a link in the chain upon which his whole title and; his several rights depend. Equity recog nizes and enforces no inflexible technical rules of pleading' which will operate to deprive a party of his rights, or compel a multiplicity of suits to attain a single object, ox' to settle conflicting claims respecting the same property.
But in the case at bar, the complainant claims, primarily, as the administrator of Mrs. Newbould's estate. It is true that in the introduction to his bill he does not describe himself as such, but in the body he clearly avers such charactei-, and claims relief in it. I conceive this to be sufficient to authorize the court to afford him relief as such administratoi-. He also — and it is because of his various interests that he has framed the bill as we find it — avers that he is the administrator de bonis non of the Knapp estate; and that he is such, for the purpose of settling Mrs. Newbould's estate, the settlement of the latter depending in some degree upon the settlement of the former. But he alleges this as subordinate to his character as administrator of Mrs. Newbould, and claims nothing as administratoi' of Knapp, except in aid of his administration of the estate of Mrs. Newbould, as a very large, if not the major, portion of the property of the latter estate was derived from the former, and the settlement of the one depends upon that of the other. The complainant also alleges that he is the heir at .law and distributee of Mrs. Newbould, but he makes no claim and asks no decree to himself as such. This, therefore is mere descriptio personas, and in no manner affects the issue. But, were it otherwise, the joinder of the heir or distributee as co - complainant would not, I think, be a fatal objection, even were he a distinct person from the administrator; and I can conceive of no substantial reason why the allegation by a complainant of his several actual and prospective rights and claims, all being connected and dependent, should bar a decree based upon an actual right, fully set forth, and upon which relief is really prayed. So far as the defendant is concerned, if he be found to have no right to the property, it is of no concern to him that the complainant has several connected claims, and the litigation is no more complicated when several rights and claims center in one person, than when held by many. In Rhodes v. Warburton, 6 Sim. 617, where legatees of a testator and the executor joined in a bill for a debt due the testator, the bill was held not demurable for such join•der. See also Lewis v. Edmund, Id. 251.
In Cassells v. Vernon, 5 Mason, 333, a claim to money as administrator and in the complainant's individual right was held to be inconsistent, as the admissions of the one necessarily superceded the other, and this upon the ground that distinct and independent titles can not be set up in the same bill. But, admitting this to be good law, it by no means follows that distinct, but dependent or connected titles, may not be set up by a complainant, or that he may not set out all his claims without danger of the dismissal of his bill.
In that case the right of action was not derived from a single source, but was asserted upon independent grounds; while in the present case, all the complainant's rights flow from one source, although his duties under them may be different. But it is his right, and not his duty, which is now in question; and as he and the defendant each claim from a common source, there can be no sound reason shown why the complainant should be driven to institute several suits to settle his respective claims to a single subject, when the rights of the parties must be substantially determined by the same evidence in each case, and upon the same general principles of law. Here the complainant has, to use the language of Judge Story in Scott v. Calvert, "a common interest" in the whole subject of the bill, and none of the •objections applicable to multifariousriess apply.
Now, as already remarked, the claim of the complainant as administrator de bonis non of Knapp's estate is not independent of that as administrator of Mrs. Newbould's -estate. It is rather concurrent with it; the settlement of the latter being to some extent dependent iqion that of the former; for, as is admitted by the defendant's counsel, the title to the property acquired from that es'.ate upon the compromise of the litigation concerning it, is or may be-still subject to all rights of Knapp's administrator, and these are centered in this complainant. Now regarding the (defend-. ant, according to the theory of the bill, as having acquired the title to such property as the trustee of his wife, and as having disposed of it as such trustee, or, according to-his own theory, as having acquired it by gift from her-through such settlement, he can not question the right of Knapp's administrator over the property, if the necessity for its appropriation to the satisfaction of claims against, the estate is established, nor over the proceed» if it has been sold; while if he holds it only as trustee, he should account to the administrator, and can have no interest in its final disposition under the order of the Probate Court, where-these estates must be finally settled. Nor, if he has converted this property into money, can he resist the claim to-such money, if the administrat or chooses to suffer the title-to remain quiet in the bona fide purchasers, and pursue the proceeds of the sale. But in the present case, as the amount of Mrs. Newbould's interest which the complainant claims is. dependent upon the settlement of the Knapp estate, he may call for an account of such proceeds as the defendant lias realized from the sale of property acquired from it, however acquired. Nor can he insist that such interest of Mrs. Newbould was personalty, for he received it as realty,, and must account for it as such. How it may be regarded for the purpose of administration is no concern of Ms, for he has no interest in the question. As the estate of Mrs. Newbould, and the rights of the complainant through it, are dependent, so far as the eighteen lots or the proceeds of their sale are concerned, upon the settlement of the Knapp estate, and the questions of right and amount are thus blended, the complainant's character as adminis trator of the Knapp estate, is in no way conflicting with that of administrate, and distributee of Mrs. Newbould; and the averment that he has, or may have, rights in the former capacity, will not be fatal to his recovery in any other consistent and legitimate capacity. Consistent and dependent rights and titles may always be set up and relied upon by a complainant, when the bill does not require an adjustment of such rights, but a decree only which shall place the complainant in a position to settle them in another form. Were we exercising the power of a probate court, and this claim against the defendant made before us as such, the ease might be different, for our duties would be different. But the defendant can not, beyond the question of misjoinder of interests, litigate this question, as 'he derives his title to those lots from the heirs of that estate, through Mrs. Newbould's interest therein, and his claim is based upon her right. He can not be permitted to question his own title and still insist upon it; and therefore we may start in this suit where he starts in his answer, with the deed claimed by him to be the gift of his wife, which was executed by Hunt and his wife in the process of partitioning the property, in pursuance of a decree of the St. Clair Circuit Court. This was a compromise and settlement of all conflicting claims among the heirs, and the defendant and his wife, by the obligation given to Hunt and his wife at the time of this settlement, virtually bound these lots and their proceeds to answer the demands of any future administrator who might be appointed upon such estate; for they undertook to indemnify Hunt and his wife from all liability for such conveyance to any future administrator. As between himself and his wife, were she living, the defendant could raise no question, except as to the nature of his title; and as to the claims of this complainant representing her estate, he has no greater rights. What may be the linal disposal of the property, what estates may be settled with it, and how settled, are questions in which he has no concern, if he be found to have no rights in it; and as all interests adverse to him are before the court, the satisfaction of any decree against him will fully protect him from any future liability to any one. See Story's Eq. Pl. § 279b; Blease v. Burgh, 2 Beav. 221.
Aside from this property, which was derived through the Knapp estate, and its avails, and' the note for $926, which the defendant claims to have been given to him by his wife, there is other property which it is conceded the defendant is liable to account for to her administrator; and, as we think, to this complainant under this bill. The questions of fact to be considered are, therefore, Avhether the defendant acquired the Port Huron property, the note for $926, and the other moneys mentioned in his ansAVer, by gift from his Avife.
As to the note and money there is no evidence to sIioav such gift, nor any evidence whatever respecting his right to hold them; and the presumptions are strong against any gift. A daughter would hardly bestoAV a note executed by her father upon any one, not even her husband, as a gift unless for some strong reason. The defendant has alleged the gift, but he has not proven it, or shown any reason to render it probable. As to the real estate, the defendant claims that the title was taken in his name with his wife's knoAvledge and consent, and Avith her intention that it should be conveyed to him as her gift. There is no evidence upon this point except the deed itself, the testimony of E. A. Wales, and of Davidson. The deed of itself j>roves nothing; as the law could presume from the facts surrounding the acquisition of the title, and the relations of husband and Avife existing at the time, that he acquired the title for her, and would regard him as her trustee, not by contract, but by force of the transaction and such relation. The testimony of Wales, so far as it shows any thing, sIioavs that the settlement and partition were made for her, and although he was her brother and attorney, he appears not to have known that she ever entertained the design of gratuitously conferring this property upon the defendant. He was not present at the execution and exchange of the deeds, but, had such a design existed, from their relations it is exceedingly improbable that she should not have imparted a knowledge of it to him. The testimony of Davidson is so indistinct as to time, so improbable and immaterial, that I am compelled to exclude it from consideration altogether. He resides at Albany, and was only transiently here, and yet, if we believe his testimony, we must belieAre that he possessed her confidence in a degree superior to that of her own brother, if not of her husband; and that she concealed from all but him her benevolent purpose of bestowing this property upon the defendant.
If she had entertained any such design, it is utterly improbable, if not impossible, that the same should have been concealed from her attorneys, or that the person who received instructions to draw the deeds, and the witnesses, or some of them, should not have known of such intention ; and the fact that none of them were called to testify in this case, tends far more strongly to prove that she entertained no such design, than the testimony of Davidson does to establish it. It is not probable that she was present in the attorney's office while the deeds were being drawn. She naturally confided all the details to her husband, and her acquiescence in the conveyance proves no gift, for she had never had the title to give. If she gave directions for the deed to be made to her hirsband, this should have been and could have been proven; and the burthen is east upon the defendant to show it and her purpose. All the facts and circumstances show this, and only this; that the defendant was her husband, adviser and agent in this settlement, and that she left the whole matter to his direction, and if she had subsequently ascertained, or even if she at the time knew that the deed ran to him, her affection for, and confidence in him would have allayed any suspicions that he acquired the title for himself, or any doubts of the propriety of his proceeding. She might have thought that the title should properly run to him, as her husband, but it would be a monstrous and unnatural inference from these facts alone, to find that she was bestowing this property upon him as a gift. She is not shown to have been present when the deed was drawn, nor to have given any instructions respecting it; no act was done by her which manifested an' intention to give, or which could operate to give. She has granted nothing, and nothing appears which will justify the presumption required by the defendant, and none can be made against her interests; but the proof should be clear and conclusive.
But the claim that the note for $920, executed by her own father to her, was also given to the defendant, which is part and parcel of this general claim, is so unreasonable that it also throws doubt over this of the gift of the real estate. However much she might have confided in her husband, or however great might be her generosity, it is hardly probable, and indeed scarcely possible, that she should have bestowed upon him this demand against her father. Before we can find a gift to have been made by the wife to the husband, we must have evidence of a different character from that before us.
The question of her right to give her real estate to her husband does not arise in this case, as the fact of a gift is not proven. •
It is not necessary for the complainant to prove fraud on the part of the defendant to sustain this bill. He does not charge direct fraud, but that the title of Newbould was acquired without the knowledge and consent of his wife, and in fraud of her rights. This relates to the title, and not to his acts, and the facts of the case without other proof are sufficient to sustain the charge. The averment is of a";legal conclusion, and the rule contended for by the defendant's counsel does not apply in this case. The defendant having alleged a gift, the burthen was cast upon him to show it; the possession of the title, under circumstances like these before us, not warranting any inference of it, or presumption against the wife's interest.
The bill prays that the note of $926 may be decreed to be given up to the complainant, as also the personal property, and that the suit pending in the Wayne Circuit Court be enjoined. So far as the personal property is concerned, as the defendant asserts no title to or interest in it, he should be decreed to surrender it: as to the note for $926, a decree must be entered, that the injunction against its prosecution be made perpetual, and that it be surrendered to the complainant; but as to the note for $1056, we can make no decree. The defendant is at liberty to prosecute that to judgment, and in other respects a decree should be entered according to the prayer of the bill, except so far as relates to the disposal of the property in course of administration, which is left to the order and direction of the proper Probate Courts. As we do not find the title to the real estate to have been acquired by actual fraud, and hold the defendant to have been the trustee of the title, in taking the account of the proceeds of such real estate and other trust moneys in his hands, the defendant must be allowed for all taxes paid by him upon the trust property, and for all necessary expenses incurred and necessary disbursements made by him, in the due and proper management of the trust property, and for all moneys paid out, and expenses necessarily incurred by him in the St. Clair chancery suit, and the compromise thereof. He must also be allowed (should he claim it) a reasonable compensation for his, time and services as the agent of his wife, about the said chancery suit, and the compromise thereof, down to the time when the deed of the Port Huron property to him was executed, but not after; such accounts to be taken, before a Commissioner, on reference, and ¡massed upon as in other cases, and the case must be remitted to the court below for the execution of this decree, and for farther proceedings.