Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. John K. SNYDER
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1972-12-11
Citations: 277 So. 2d 660
Docket Number: No. 51762
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. John K. SNYDER.
Judges: BARHAM, J., dissents with reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 277
Pages: 660–669

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. John K. SNYDER.
No. 51762.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Dec. 11, 1972.
On Rehearing May 7, 1973.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Harry H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen., LeRoy A. Hartley, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., James D. Davis, Dist. Atty., Ad Hoc, for plaintiff-appellant.
J. Minos Simon, Lafayette, for defendant-appellee.

Opinion:
SANDERS, Justice.
Following a heated mayoralty election in the City of Alexandria, the Grand Jury of Rapides Parish returned ten indictments against John K. Snyder, a defeated candidate. One of the indictments was for perjury, and the remaining indictments were for criminal defamation of various persons.
After the indictments were returned, the District Attorney, who had participated in the election, recused himself. The trial judge then appointed James D. Davis, an attorney practicing in Alexandria, as district attorney ad hoc.
The district attorney ad hoc dismissed the indictments and filed bills of information containing the same charges.
The defendant filed motions for a bill of particulars in all cases, to which the district attorney ad hoc responded supplying additional information.
The defendant then filed a motion to quash in each case. At the hearing on the motions to quash, the trial judge allowed the introduction of evidence.
Assigning written reasons, the trial judge sustained all motions to quash and discharged the defendant. The State has appealed, relying upon five bills of exceptions. Because of our conclusions as to Bill of Exceptions Nos. 1, 2, 4 and 5, Bill of Exceptions No. 3, relating to the calling of the district attorney ad hoc as a witness, does not require our attention.
The trial judge held that the district attorney was without authority to recuse himself, that the district attorney ad hoc was therefore improvidently appointed, that the district attorney ad hoc had no authority to nolle prosse the indictments and file bills of information, that the evidence taken at the hearing established that the subjects of the alleged defamation were public figures and that the defamation statute was unconstitutional as applied to public figures. Moreover, the court held that the bills of information were insufficient to charge defamation against public figures.
As to the perjury charge, relying upon evidence received on the motion to quash, the trial judge found that no formal oath had been administered to the defendant before he signed the allegedly false statements. Hence, he concluded that no crime had been committed and sustained the motion to quash.
The grounds for a motion to quash a bill of information are set forth in Article 532 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure. Pertinent here is Subparagraph 5 that refers to Article 485.
Article 485 provides:
"If it appears from the bill of particulars furnished under Article 484, together with any particulars appearing in the indictment, that the offense charged in the indictment was not committed, or that the defendant did not commit it, or that there is a ground for quashing the indictment, the court may on its own motion, and on motion of the defendant shall, order that the indictment be quashed unless the defect is cured. The defect will be cured if the district attorney furnishes, within a period fixed by the court and not to exceed three days from the order, another bill of particulars which either by itself or together with any particulars appearing in the indictment so states the particulars as to make it appear that the offense charged was committed by the defendant, or that there is no ground for quashing the indictment, as the case may be."
Taken together, the codal articles mean that when a motion to quash is based upon the ground that the offense charged was not committed, the trial judge is restricted to a consideration of the bill of information as explained or limited by the bill of particulars. They permit no preliminary examination of guilt by the reception of evidence on the motion to quash.
We hold, therefore, that it was error in the perjury case to quash the indictment on the ground that the evidence disclosed that no offense had been committed.
As we have noted, the trial judge also received evidence on the motions to quash the defamation charges, that the subjects of the alleged defamation were public figures for the purpose of determining whether the constitutional privilege applied. The existence of the privilege is a matter of defense. See State v. Garrison, 244 La. 787, 154 So.2d 400 (1963), reversed on other grounds, Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 85 S.Ct. 209, 13 L.Ed.2d 125 (1964). Hence, the evidence was improperly received on the motion to quash.
These holdings, however, do not end our consideration of this appeal. Remaining for consideration is the recusal of the district attorney, the authority of the district attorney ad hoc to nolle prosse the indictments and file the bills of information, the constitutionality of the defamation statute, and the adequacy of the bills of information charging defamation.
Article 680 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure provides that a district attorney shall be recused when he has a "personal interest in the cause which is in conflict with a fair and impartial administration of justice."
Article 681 provides that a district attorney may recuse himself, whether a motion for his recusation has been filed or not, in any case in which a ground for recusation exists.
In State v. Snyder, 256 La. 601, 237 So. 2d 392 (1970), we addressed the question as to whether or not the District Attorney of Rapides Parish should be recused in the perjury case, as originally charged, because of his participation in the mayorality election.
We held:
"The district attorney repeated this statement during his oral argument and, while we do not doubt that he is sincere in his belief that he has banished the personal animosity he harbored toward relator during the campaign, we do not believe that, under the circumstances presented, it would serve the public interest for him to remain in the case as prosecutor. For, after all, while he may believe that his personal animosity has subsided or eroded, still, where such deep-seated hatred has once evinced itself, the district attorney might, even though unconsciously, have impaired his power to conduct relator's trial fairly and impartially. We therefore hold that the district attorney should be recused in the case."
The same considerations that moved us to recuse the district attorney in that case are present here. Hence, it was entirely proper for the district attorney to recuse himself in the present case.
Since the district attorney was properly recused, the appointment of a district attorney ad hoc was authorized. See LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 682.
The defendant strenuously contends, however, and the trial judge so held, that the district attorney ad hoc had no authority to nolle prosse the indictments and substitute bills of information.
Article 682 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure contains a succinct statement of the powers of the district attorney ad hoc:
"The district attorney ad hoc shall have all powers of the recused district attorney with reference to the case."
The defendant would give the words with reference to the case a restricted meaning. He equates case with the document that sets forth an indictment. Hence, he reasons that after the indictments were nolle prossed, the district attorney ad hoc had no authority to substitute bills of information.
We reject this narrow construction. The bills of information contained the same charges as the indictments. Obviously, the district attorney ad hoc undertook to remove any doubt concerning the validity of the indictments, which were returned while the recused district attorney was serving as advisor to the Grand Jury. The filing was curative only, and did not convert the prosecutions into new and different cases within the contemplation of the law.
This case is to be distinguished from State v. Garrison, 260 La. 126, 255 So.2d 352 (1971). There the original indictments against the defendant were for public bribery and gambling. After the district attorney ad hoc was appointed, he dismissed the original charges and filed a bill of information charging malfeasance in office. The trial judge quashed the bill of information, holding that the district attorney ad hoc had no authority to file new and entirely different charges against the defendant.
In denying a writ, we stated in the Per Curiam-:
"The ruling of the trial judge is correct. A district attorney ad hoc has no authority to institute a new and different criminal prosecution against the defendant. Both Article 682 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure and the order of appointment are explicit on this point. Article 682 restricts the powers of the district attorney ad hoc to the cases in which he was appointed. The order of appointment provides: ' . the said appointee shall act as district attorney ad hoc, in and for the parish of Orleans, with reference to these cases only . . . ' "
We hold, therefore, that the bills of information were properly filed.
In his motions to quash, the defendant attacked the constitutionality of LSA-R.S. 14:47, the defamation article.
That article provides:
"Defamation is the malicious publication or expression in any manner, to anyone other than the party defamed, of anything which tends:
"(1) To expose any person to hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or to deprive him of the benefit of public confidence or social intercourse; or
"(2) To expose the memory of one deceased to hatred, contempt, or ridicule; or
"(3) To injure any person, corporation, or association of persons in his or their business or occupation.
"Whoever commits the crime of defamation shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars, or imprisoned for not more than six months, or both."
Three succeeding articles deal with privilege.
Defendant's contention is that this article is unconstitutional, because it does not set forth the various constitutional requirements announced in recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court. Specifically, defendant alleges that when the subject is a public figure there is no requirement of actual malice, that is, that the defendant knew that the statement was false or made it with a reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
The constitutional privilege was first announced in the landmark case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), as to publications concerning public officials. There the United States Supreme Court stated:
"The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice' — that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."
In 1967, the United States ^Supreme Court extended the constitutional privilege to publications concerning public figures. Thus, those who thrust themselves into the public limelight have no redress for defamation without proof of actual malice. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts (Associated Press v. Walker), 388 U.S. 130, 87 S.Ct. 1975, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1967); Walker v. Associated Press, 251 La. 772, 206 So.2d 489 (1968).
In 1971, the United States Supreme Court handed down its decision in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 91 S.Ct. 1811, 29 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971), extending the constitutional privilege to publications about a private individual's involvement in an event or issue of wide public interest, though the individual is neither a public official nor a public figure.
It is true that the statute does not set forth the above standards in express language. However, we have often adapted our statutes to federal constitutional requirements. See State v. Eros Cinema, Inc., 262 La. 706, 264 So.2d 615 (1972); Levy v. State, Char. Hosp. of La. at N. Orleans Bd. of Ad., 253 La. 73, 216 So.2d 818 (1968); State v. Rideau, 246 La. 451, 165 So.2d 282 (1964).
In Snyder v. Ware, 314 F.Supp. 335 (D.C.1970), affirmed, 397 U.S. 589, 90 S.Ct. 1355, 25 L.Ed.2d 595 (1970), the United States District Court dealt with the indentical question in a related case. The Court stated:
"We find that the Louisiana statutory provisions in question are not unconstitutional per se, but that they may be susceptible of a limiting construction, in accordance with the holding of New York Times, Garrison, and Moity, supra."
We hold that the constitutional privilege relating to public officials, public figures, and private individuals' involvement in an event or issue of wide public interest as announced in the cited decisions of the United States Supreme Court is part of the Louisiana defamation statute. In short, a charge of defamation is well founded as to these subjects only when the statement was made with actual malice, that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
The bills of information charge wilful, unlawful, and malicious defamation. The State's bill of particulars in each case adopts the above standards.
We conclude that neither the statute nor the bills of information are deficient.
For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the trial court sustaining the motions to quash is reversed, the motions are overruled, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings according to law and consistent with the views herein expressed.
BARHAM, J., dissents with reasons.