Case Name: HOUSTON v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1924-06-11
Citations: 265 S.W. 585
Docket Number: No. 8496
Parties: HOUSTON v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 265
Pages: 585–588

Head Matter:
HOUSTON v. STATE.
(No. 8496.)
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
June 11, 1924.
Rehearing Denied Nov. 5, 1924.)
1. Larceny <©=330(1) — indictment held to sufficiently describe property taken.
In view of Vernon’s Ann. Code Cr. Proc. 1916, art. 458, indictment charging theft of bale of cotton of certain value, and alleging ownership, held not to be open to objection that it did not sufficiently describe property taken.
2. Larceny <©=332(4) — Ownership of cotton properly alleged in partner.
In view of Vernon’s Ann. Code Cr. Proc. 1916, art. 457, where cotton alleged to have been stolen was in care, control,, and management of partnership composed of W. and others, it was sufficient to allege ownership in W.
3. Criminal law <©=3406(5) — Proof that defendant told party having custody of cotton that he took ticket from office held competent.
Possession and taking of cotton ticket being necessary part of transaction, by which third person was induced by defendant to remove cotton from yard, evidence that defendant told party having custody that he took cotton ticket from office was competent.
4. Criminal law <©=>814(3) — Refusal of charges not called for by facts not error.
Refusal of charges not called for by facts was not error.
5. Criminal law <©=>982— Instruction that jury could not give suspended! sentence held proper.
Where there was no plea for suspended sentence, and no evidence on issues made available under application therefor, there was no error in judge’s written instruction to jury after retirement that they could not give defendant suspended sentence.
Motion for Rehearing.
6. Larceny <@=340(4) — No variance between allegation of theft of cotton and proof of tak- . ing by purchaser of ticket from defendant.
In view of Pen. Code, art. 77, in prosecution for theft of cotton, there was no variance between allegation of theft and proof of taking cotton from storage yard by purchaser of ticket from defendant.
7. Larceny <©=>31 — Allegations as to value not descriptive further than to affect degree of offense.
Allegation as to value is not descriptive further than as it affects question as to. whether offense be felony or misdemeanor.
8. Larceny <©=340(4) — Variance in allegation" and proof of value of cotton held immaterial.
In prosecution for theft of cotton, the fact that it was alleged 'to be worth $131.41, and proven that when taken its value was $118, was immaterial; proof of value of more than $50 being sufficient.
Appeal from District Court, Nacogdoches County; D. D. Guinn, Judge.
V. V. Houston was convicted of theft, and he appeals.
Affirmed.
V. E. Middlebrook, of Nacogdoches, for appellant.
Tom Garrard, State’s Atty., and Grover C. Morris, Asst. State’s Atty., both of Austin, for the State.

Opinion:
LATTIMORE, J.
Appellant was convicted in the district court of Nacogdoches county of theft, and his punishment fixed at two years in the penitentiary.
A bale of cotton weighing 610 pounds and of the value of more than $50 was in the cotton yard of Windham et al. A sample of same and the ticket containing the number, weight, and owner's name were in the office. Appellant was about the premises, and one of the proprietors suggested to a witness to watch appellant. This witness testified that he saw appellant take a certain sample, put it under his coat, and walk out. The next day appellant went to witness Brown and, by means of his possession of the ticket and sample, sold Brown the bale of cotton called for by the ticket for $118.45. Brown gave appellant a check for that amount in payment for the cotton, and had same removed from the cotton yard and shipped away. Thrash, the real owner of the bale of cotton, discovered its loss, and the . matter was traced to appellant. He at first denied having sold the cotton, but when confronted by Brown and the check given, he could no longer deny it, but made arrangements to reimburse the loss.
Our statute on principals, article 77, P. O., makes one a principal who causes an innocent agent to commit a crime, and many authorities are cited by Mr. Branch in section 683 of his Annotated P. C., in support of this proposition. Oases applying the doctrine to one who sells the property of another, who later removes the property so sold from the possession of the owner, are numerous and harmonious. Farris v. State, 55 Tex. Cr. R. 481, 117 S. W. 798, 131 Am. St. Rep. 824; Walls v. State, 43 Tex. Cr. R. 70, 63 S. W. 328; Lane v. State, 41 Tex. Cr. R. 559, 55 S. W. 831; Sikes v. State (Tex. Cr. App.) 28 S. W. 688; Dale v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. R. 78, 22 S. W. 49; Doss v. State, 21 Tex. App. 509, 2 S. W. 814, 57 Am. Rep. 618; Madison v. State, 16 Tex. App. 442. The facts in the instant case seem to fully support the proposition that, by appellant's sale of the cotton to Brown, the latter was caused to remove and appropriate to his own use the bale of cotton involved, and this meets t|ie requirements, of the law as announced in the cases cited, and makes appellant the taker of said cotton. It follows that we do not agree with appellant's contention that the proof makes a case different from that set out in the indictment.
An indictment charging theft of one bale of cotton of a certain value, and alleging the ownership thereof, is not open to the objection that it does not sufficiently describe the property taken. Article 458, Vernon's C. C. P., and authorities collated.
The property being in the care, control, and management of a partnership composed of Windham and others, it was sufficient to allege ownership in Windham. Article 457, Vernon's O. O. P., and authorities. Possession and taking of the cotton ticket being a necessary part of the development of the transaction by which Mr. Brown was induced by appellant to remove the cotton from the yard, it was not error for the state to prove by Windham that appellant told him that he (appellant) took said ticket from the office.
We have carefully examined the vari7 ous special charges requested by appellant, and think them not called for by the facts, or else to be so little at variance with the law, as stated in the main charge of the court, as that their refusal was not error. Nor do we And any of the parts of the court's charge as given open to the exceptions set out in several bills of exception by appellant. Nor are we able to agree with appellant in his-complaint of the court giving the jury forms for their verdict in case of acquittal or conviction.
After the jury retired they sent in a written request to the learned trial court to know if they might give appellant a suspended sentence, to which he replied in writing in the negative. This was proper. No plea for suspended sentence was filed, and no evidence introduced on the issues made available under such application. Speer v. State, 75 Tex. Cr. R. 348, 171 S. W. 201; Muldrew v. State, 73 Tex. Cr. R. 463, 166 S. W. 156; Lozano v. State, 83 Tex. Cr. R. 597, 204 S. W. 323.
finding no error in the record, an af-firmance will be ordered.
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