Case Name: Howard P. Eells, as Receiver of The Eastern Paving Brick Company, Respondent, v. T. Henry Dumary, Appellant
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1903
Citations: 84 A.D. 105
Docket Number: 
Parties: Howard P. Eells, as Receiver of The Eastern Paving Brick Company, Respondent, v. T. Henry Dumary, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 84
Pages: 105–110

Head Matter:
Howard P. Eells, as Receiver of The Eastern Paving Brick Company, Respondent, v. T. Henry Dumary, Appellant.
Pleading — when one of several numbered paragraphs will he treated as intended to present a separate affirmative defense.
The receiver of the Eastern Paving Brick Company, a West Virginia corporation, brought an action to recover a balance of §500 alleged to he due upon a contract for the sale of a quantity of brick to the defendant by the Oatskill Shale Brick and Paving Company. The complaint alleged that the contract was assigned by the Oatskill company to a New Jersey corporation known as the Eastern Paving Brick Company on May 20, 1896; that the latter company-performed the contract and that all but §500 of the amount due thereon had been paid by the defendant; that that corporation had assigned this balance to the corporation of which the plaintiff had been appointed receiver.
The answer of the defendant consisted of five paragraphs or subdivisions. In the first four paragraphs he admitted the making of the contract, also that up to the time of the assignment of the contract by the Oatskill company that company had duly performed all the conditions of the contract; that tiie contract price had become due and payable on December 30, 1896, and that all hut §500 thereof had been paid. It also averred in those paragraphs that the defendant had no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the alleged assignments of the contract and as to the performance of the contract by the New Jersey corporation.
The 5th paragraph of the answer was as follows: “Fifth. Defendant further answering said complaint alleges that during or about the month of December, 1896, there was due from him to the Oatskill Shale Brick and Paving Company, under the contract set forth in the complaint herein, the sum of five hundred dollars (§500.00) for brick sold and delivered by said company to him, and that said sum so held by this defendant was, during or about the month of December, 1896, duly attached by virtue of three warrants issued to the sheriff oí Albany county in three several actions against the Catskill Skate Brick and Paving Company- in favor of creditors, and that thereafter judgment was obtained in each of said actions and executions issued to said sherifE of Albany county, which said executions were satisfied by said sherifE out of said fund so held by said defendant.”
Held, that the 5.th paragraph of the answer was intended as a separate and affirmative defense, and that, in determining the sufficiency of this affirmative defense, all of the allegations of the complaint not controverted in the affirmative defense should be treated as admitted, and that, when so considered, the affirmative defense was demurrable.
Parker, P. J., dissented.
Appeal by the defendant, T, Henry Dnrnary, from a final judg, ment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Greene on the 15th day of August, 1902, pursuant to an interlocutory judgment entered in said clerk’s office on the '5th day of July, 1902, upon the decision of the court, rendered after a trial at the Albany Special Term, sustaining the plaintiff’s demurrer to the defendant’s answer, and also from said interlocutory judgment.
The facts are stated in the dissenting opinion herein. The corporation of which the plaintiff is the receiver is a West Virginia corporation. Its assignor was a Hew Jersey corporation.
A. .Page Smith, for the appellant.
Pierre S. Jermi/ngs, for the respondent.

Opinion:
Chase, J. :
. The demurrer should be sustained. Title 1 of chapter 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure plainly prescribes what shall be contained in the pleadings. An answer must contain, first, a general or specific denial of each material allegation of the complaint controverted by the defendant, and, second, a statement of any new matter constituting a defense or counterclaim. The orderly way of arrang, ing an answer is to have it start with admissions and follow with denials, defenses, either partial or complete, consisting of new matter, and then with a counterclaim or counterclaims, if any.
While a denial is sometimes called a defense (Staten Island M. R. R. Co. v. Hinchliffe, 170 N. Y. 473) it remains a denial only, although it is called by another name. ' If a denial is called a defense it does not for that reason become a defense under the 2d subdivision of section 500 of the Code of Civil Procedure,'and the use of the word " defense " in connection with a denial is, in nay judgment, unfortunate and confusing.
Denials and defenses consisting of new matter are independent parts of an answer. In the opinion in Douglass v. Phenix Ins. Co. (138 N. Y. 209) it is stated that " The allegations of the complaint not denied in the affirmative defense are, for the purposes of the question now presented, to be deemed admitted. The affirmative defense is to be treated as a separate plea, and the defendant is not entitled to have the benefit of denials made in another part of the answer unless repeated or incorporated by reference and made a part of the affirmative defense." (See Boyd v. McDonald, 35 N. Y. St. Repr. 484; Sbarboro v. Health Dept., 26 App. Div. 177; Craft v. Brandow, 24 Misc. Rep. 306; Delaney v. Miller, 84 Hun, 244; Wiley v. Village of Rouse's Point, 86 id. 495 ; Brookline National Bank v. Moers, 19 App. Div. 155; Douglas v. Coonley, 156 N. Y. 521; Ivy Courts Realty Co. v. Morton, 73 App. Div. 335.)
The first four paragraphs of the answer consist of admissions and denials, and they are followed by the 5th paragraph, which is the part of the answer demurred to by the plaintiff. The part of the answer so demurred to is not a denial, or a part of a denial, but it is new matter constituting an alleged affirmative defense, and unless it states a complete defense it is insufficient in law upon the face thereof. The argument is made that because the 5th paragraph of the answer does not in terms start out with a statement that it is a defense, or a separate or affirmative defense, it should be considered as a part of the defendant's general defense. It is a part of the answer, but it is a separate part of the answer alleging, under the 2d subdivision of said section 500, new matter, and it must be considered apart from the admissions and denials that precede it. An examination of the allegations of the first four paragraphs of the answer show that they are not intended as an affirmative defense, or as. a part of an affirmative defense, but that they are included in the answer for the purpose of putting the plaintiff to his proof as to such parts of the complaint as are denied by said paragraphs. The 5th paragraph starts with the words " defendant further answering said complaint." That is, for a further answer the defendant states new matter as an affirmative defense. This paragraph, by whatever words it may be introduced, or.by whatever name it may be called, is intended to be and is an alleged separate and affirmative defense. The demurrer thereto may be technical, but it is a right that the plaintiff has under our form of pleading, and the decision of our courts in. relation thereto, and it should be sustained, unless the paragraph to which it relates in itself is a complete answer to the plaintiff's complaint. General or specific denials as such are improper in an affirmative 'defense (Stieffel v. Tolhurst, 55 App. Div. 532), but the statement of new matter must be sufficient in itself if true to constitute a complete defense: Treating the allegations of the complaint not controverted in the affirmative defense as • admitted, the allegations of the 5th paragraph of the answer, if true, do not constitute a defense. The order and interlocutory judgment should he affirmed, "with costs.
All concurred, except Parker, P. J., dissenting in an opinion, and Chester, J., not sitting.