Case Name: Donald WARD, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2000-08-25
Citations: 765 So. 2d 299
Docket Number: No. 5D99-1977
Parties: Donald WARD, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: COBB, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 765
Pages: 299–305

Head Matter:
Donald WARD, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 5D99-1977.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Aug. 25, 2000.
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Barbara C. Davis, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Patrick W. Kreehow-ski, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

Opinion:
W. SHARP, J.
Ward appeals from his judgments and sentences in case number 98-134 for attempted first degree murder of a law enforcement officer with a firearm, robbery with a firearm, aggravated assault with a firearm, and felony causing bodily injury. He also appeals from his sentences imposed in case number 92-3339, after revocation of his probation for two counts of robbery with a firearm and aggravated battery.
Ward first argues he should not have been convicted of both attempted first degree murder of a law enforcement officer with a firearm and felony causing bodily injury, because both crimes grew out of the same act; ie., shooting Deputy Bal-dree during a robbery. Ward claims the dual convictions violate his double jeopardy protection.
This court rejected that argument in Gordon v. State, 744 So.2d 1112 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999), rev. granted, Case No. 96,834, 761 So.2d 329 (Fla. Feb. 10, 2000), where we held that attempted first degree murder, felony causing bodily injury, and aggravated battery causing great bodily harm are separate offenses, and are not degrees of the same offense so as to preclude multiple convictions arising from the same criminal transaction. See also Brown v. State, 761 So.2d 1135 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). However, as we did in Gordon, we certify to the Florida Supreme Court the question of whether Ward's dual convictions violate his double jeopardy rights.
Ward also argues that the prosecutor in his case committed error during his rebuttal closing argument by making inappropriate comments on the defense, and by implying that Ward had some burden of proof in this case. However, the defense failed to make any objections, and thus unless fundamental error occurred, this issue has not been preserved for appellate review. Delgado v. State, 2000 WL 1205960, — So.2d - (Fla. Aug. 24, 2000). In this case, most of the prosecutor's comments were "fair comment" on the defense counsel's closing argument. They did not rise to the level of fundamental error. See Delgado v. State, 2000 WL 1205960, — So.2d - (Fla. Aug. 24, 2000); Thomas v. State, 748 So.2d 970 (Fla.1999); McDonald v. State, 743 So.2d 501 (Fla.1999); State v. Fritz, 652 So.2d 1243 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995).
Ward also argues the trial judge erred in imposing upward departure sentences of life in prison on the two counts of armed robbery and fifteen years imprisonment on the aggravated battery with a firearm, in case number 92-3339 (the violation of probation case), without written reasons for departure. The failure to file written reasons for an upward departure sentence is a fundamental sentencing error which can be raised on appeal. Collins v. State, 766 So.2d 1009 (Fla.2000); Thogode v. State, 763 So.2d 281 (Fla.2000); Maddox v. State, 760 So.2d 89 (Fla.2000). Since there are no written reasons for the upward departure, we reverse and remand for sentencing within the guidelines. Pope v. State, 561 So.2d 554 (Fla.1990).
Finally, Ward argues the trial court erred in sentencing him as both an habitual violent felony offender and as a prison releasee reoffender on count one (attempted murder of a law enforcement officer with a firearm), and count two (armed robbery), in case number 98-134. We have held that the imposition of an habitual offender sentence and a prison releasee reoffender sentence for the same crime violates double jeopardy. Lewis v. State, 751 So.2d 106 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999); Thomas v. State, 745 So.2d 1119 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). The fourth district agrees. See McFadden v. State, 2000 WL 121793, — So.2d - (Fla. 4th DCA Feb.2, 2000); Adams v. State, 750 So.2d 659 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Melton v. State, 746 So.2d 1188 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Glave v. State, 745 So.2d 1065 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). But see Smith v. State, 754 So.2d 100 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000); Newsome v. State, 2000 WL 256153, — So.2d - (Fla. 2d DCA Mar.8, 2000); McDaniel v. State, 751 So.2d 182 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Jones v. State, 751 So.2d 139 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. granted, Case No. 00-282, 99-712, 760 So.2d 947 (Fla. March 4, 2000); Grant v. State, 745 So.2d 519 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) ,rev. granted, Case No. 99-164, 761 So.2d 329 (Fla. April 12, 2000). There is a conflict which the first and second districts have certified to the Florida Supreme Court. See Smith; Newsome; Jones.
The courts have held that the longer or harsher of the two sentences should stand and the lesser one vacated. Lewis; Glave. In this case, Ward was sentenced to life on both counts as an habitual violent felony-offender, and as a prison releasee reoffen-der. The Prison Releasee Reoffender Act does not allow for any form of early release. § 775.082(8)(b), Fla. Stat. (1997). Thus it is the harsher sentence, and the habitual offender sentences must be vacated on these two counts.
In summary, we certify the following question:
WHETHER DOUBLE JEOPARDY PRECLUDES WARDS' CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES ON CHARGES OF ATTEMPTED FIRST DEGREE MURDER OF A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER WITH A FIREARM AND FELONY CAUSING BODILY INJURY ARISING OUT OF THE SAME CRIMINAL ACT?
We vacate Ward's habitual violent felony offender sentences for attempted first degree murder of a law enforcement officer with a firearm and armed robbery in case number 98-134, leaving intact his sentences as a Prison Releasee Reoffender on those counts. We reverse the departure sentence in case number 92-3339 and remand for resentencing. The judgments and sentences are affirmed in all other regards.
AFFIRMED in part; Habitual Offender Sentences in case number 98-134 VACATED; Sentences in case number 92-3339 REVERSED and REMANDED for resen-tencing. QUESTION CERTIFIED.
COBB, J., concurs.
HARRIS, J., concurs specially with opinion.
. § 782.04(l)(a)l; 777.04(1), 775.0823(2); 775.087(l)(a), (2)(a), Fla. Stat.
. § 812'.13(2)(a), Fla. Stat.
. § 784.021(l)(a), Fla. Slat.
. § 782.051(1), Fla. Stat.
. § 812.13(2)(a), Fla. Stat.
. § 784.045(l)(a), Fla. Stat.
. U.S. Const. Amend. V; Art. I, § 9, Fla. Const.
.Ward also argues that the trial court should not have allowed the prosecutor to exhibit a firearm to the jury. The actual firearm used in the crimes was not'recovered but the firearm exhibited by the state was similar to that weapon. We find no abuse of discretion. See § 90.402, Fla. Stat.
. The Florida Supreme Court recently held that the Prison Releasee Reoffender Act does not violate the separation of powers doctrine State v. Cotton, 2000 WL 766521, - So.2d -(Fla. June 15, 2000).