Case Name: BLOUNT v. WALKER
Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1888-04-28
Citations: 28 S.C. 545
Docket Number: 
Parties: BLOUNT v. WALKER.
Judges: Before Wallace, J., Richland,
Reporter: South Carolina Reports
Volume: 28
Pages: 545–558

Head Matter:
BLOUNT v. WALKER.
1. Testatrix, residing in South Carolina, gave her estate, real and personal, in remainder, to such person as her daughter might appoint “by her last will and testament duly executed.” Held, that the power could be exercised only by a last will and testament executed according to the forms required in this State, and that a will executed according to the laws of North Carolina (where the daughter died domiciled), but not as required by South Carolina law, was not a valid execution of this power.
2. The admission of the daughter's will to probate in the proper court of North Carolina, and also here on exemplification, does not make such will a valid execution of this power. ' <
3. A point raised in the pleadings, before the Circuit Judge, and in the exceptions, but not passed upon by the Circuit Judge, is not properly before this court for consideration.
Mr. Chief Justice Simpson, dissenting.
Before Wallace, J., Richland,
July, 1887.
Mrs. Sarah J. Harris died at her home in Columbia, S. C., on December 5, 1885, leaving of force a last will and testament whereby she devised and bequeathed her entire estate (consisting of bonds and stocks and a lot of land in the said city of Columbia) to Julius H. Walker in trust for her daughter, Mrs. Mary Delia Blount, for life, with the following powers and limitations, as expressed in the 1st and 3d items of her will:
Item I. I give, bequeath, and devise to my nephew, Julius H. "Walker, and his heirs, to the use of the said J. H. Walker and his heirs, all the estate, real and personal, of which I may die seized,possessed, and entitled to: in trust, nevertheless, to permit my daughter, Mrs. Mary Delia Blount, for and during the term of her natural life (unless the trust be sooner executed, as is hereinafter provided in item II.), to receive unto her own sole, separate, and exclusive use, benefit, and behoof, all the rents, issues, and profits of the said estate, upon her own receipts and acquittances. And to the said J. H. Walker, in his character as trustee as aforesaid, full power and authority is given to sell,'exchange, or transfer, if in his judgment expedient, any part of the estate hereby given to him in trust, and to execute all necessary papers to that end, whenever he is thereunto requested by a paper in writing, executed by said Mrs. Blount in the presence of some clerk' of a court of record, who shall certify, under his hand and official seal, that the said request was so signed separately and privately in his presence; and the said trustee, upon such sale, exchange, or transfer, shall either reinvest the proceeds, or else turn the same over to the said Mrs. Blount for her sole, separate, and absolute use, freed and discharged of all trusts, as the said Mrs. Blount may direct by her writing, executed in manner and form as required aforesaid, for the request to sell, exchange, or transfer; provided, that the said J. II. Walker, as trustee as aforesaid, is satisfied that' the disposition so requested by said Mrs. Blount, is her free and untrammelled wish, and is for her own exclusive benefit and behoof; but if not so satisfied, he shall reinvest the proceeds according to his best judgment, and under the rules of law. The power hereinabove given to the said J. H. Walker, as trustee as aforesaid, is a continuingtpower and shall not be exhausted by one or more exercises thereof, but shall continue in full force so long as the trust remains unexecuted and any portion of the trust estate remains.
Item III. Upon the death of the said Mrs. Blount, the said property, or so much thereof as remains unconsumed and undisposed of in the hands of said J. II. Walker, trustee as aforesaid, is hereby bequeathed and devised to the issue of the said Mrs. Blount, to them and their heirs forever, per stirpes and not per capita ; and if the said Mrs. Blount die without issue surviving her at the time of her death, then the same is devised and bequeathed to such person or persons and in such proportions as the said Mrs. Mary Delia Blount may appoint by her last will and testament duly executed, to the said appointees and their heirs forever; and upon the death of the said Mrs. Blount, the trusts of this will shall become instantly executed in favor of the person or persons in this item designated as remaindermen, without any relinquishment or transfer of trust by the said trustee.
Julius H. Walker was nominated and qualified as executor, his residence being in Columbia, S. O.
Mrs. Blount returned, after her mother’s death, to her husband’s home in Wilson, N. 0., where she died without issue in April, 1886, leaving of force a last will whereby she appointed all of her mother’s estate to her husband, William H. Blount, the plaintiff herein. This will of Mrs. Blount was duly executed according to the laws of North Carolina, but not according to the laws of this State, in this — that the three witnesses did not sign in the presence of each other. The will was duly admitted to probate in the proper court of North Carolina, and an exemplification was admitted to probate in the Probate Court of Rich-land County, in this State.
W. H. Blount having demanded Mrs. Harris’s estate from Walker, the executor, and been refused, he filed his complaint against said Walker and Mrs. C. S. Walker, demanding an account and the possession of this property. The executor submitted himself to the instructions of the court, and Mrs. Walker answered claiming the entire estate as the sole heir of her sister, Mrs. Harris, since the death of Mrs. Blount, alleging that Mrs. Blount had not duly executed the power conferred upon her. by her mother’s will.
The decree of the Circuit Court was as follows :
The Court of Probate of North Carolina is, under the laws of N. C., a court of general jurisdiction in all matters testamentary. The exemplification of the judgment .of that court, establishing this will, was properly proved according to the acts of Congress.
Mrs. Blount’s will is not executed according to the laws of S. C. The question to be determined is whether Mrs. Blount’s will is a valid execution of the power contained in Mrs. Harris’s will ? It is conceded in the argument, and is undoubtedly sound, that the appointee, under a power like the one under consideration, takes under the instrument creating the power, and not under the instrument of appointment. And in this case Mrs. Harris’s will expressly conveys the property to the appointee under the power. The only requisite required by Mrs. Harris’s will for the execution of this power, is that the same shall be by “will duly executed” ; and in this case that formality has been complied with, and is shown by the judgment of the court of her domicile.
It is therefore ordered, adjudged, and decreed, that the power is well executed, and the plaintiff is entitled to the property set out in the complaint and in the hands of the defendant, Julius H. Walker. It is further ordered, that the defendant, Julius H. Walker, do account before the master for his actings and doings in the premises, and that he pay over and surrender to the plaintiff, or his attorney, the said estate.
From this decree defendants appealed upon the grounds that his honor erred in adjudging Mrs. Blount’s will a due execution of the power conferred upon her in Mrs. Harris’s will; and in failing to adjudge that Mrs. Walker was entitled to all of Mrs. Harris’s estate.
Messrs. Pope & Shand, for appellants.
Messrs. Allen J. Green and Hugh F. Murray (of N. C.), contra.
April 28, 1888.

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Mr. Justice McIver.
There can be no doubt that the donor of a power may prescribe the particular mode in which the power is to be exercised, and there is as little doubt that there can be no valid execution of the power unless the mode prescribed is strictly complied with. Sugd. on Powers, chap. 5, section 3,
So that the essential inquiry in all cases of this kind is: 1st. What is the mode prescribed by the donor of the power for its execution ? and 2nd. Whether such mode has been strictly complied with?
Now, in this case, the mode prescribed by the donor of the power is expressed in these words — "by her last will and testament duly executed" — and the controlling question is, what was the intent of Mrs. Harris in using those words? Did she mean a will duly executed according to the laws of South Carolina, or did she mean a will duly executed according to the laws of any State or country in which the donee of the power might happen to be domiciled at the time of her death? Inasmuch as it is conceded that Mrs. Harris was, at the time of her death, and always had been, a resident of South Carolina; that her will was executed here according to the laws of this State, and that the property therein disposed of was all located here, it seems to us that her language in describing the mode prescribed for the execution of the power, must be interpreted to mean exactly what such language is usually understood to signify here, unless there is something in the context which would impart to it a different signification.
For the rule, as we understand it, is that in interpreting a will, a contract, or any other instrument in writing, the words must be taken in the sense which they usually bear in the place where such instrument in writing is executed. The purpose is to ascertain the intent of the parties, and where there is no ambiguity in the language used, such intent must be gathered solely from the words of the instrument, and those words must be interpreted in their usual and ordinary sense in the place where they are used. This rule is not only fully supported by authority, but by reason and common sense. A person, in a particular State or country, using words which, in that locality, bear a specific and well defined meaning, would naturally, and we may say necessarily, be regarded as using such words in that sense, unless there was something in the paper itself which would indicate that the words were used in a different sense.
Now, apply this doctrine to the case under consideration. Here Avas a South Carolina lady making her will in this State, whereby she was undertaking to dispose of property located here, and in doing so she confers a poAver Avhich the donee can only exercise "by her last will and testament duly executed." It seems to us that, in the absence of anything in the avíII indicating a different purpose, these words must be interpreted to mean what they ordinarily and usually signify here; that is, a will duly executed according to the law's of South Carolina, for that is what those words, when used here, usually and ordinarily, and we may say, universally signify here.
Now, is there anything in the will of Mrs. Harris which would indicate that she intended to use those words in a different sense? We must confess that we are unable to find anything of the kind. On the contrary, when we look to other parts of the will and find that the testatrix has taken uhusual and extraordinary precautions to guard Mrs. Blount, the donee of the power, from any imposition or undue influence in exercising the power conferred by the will, to call upon the trustee "to sell, exchange, or transfer" any of the property given to Mrs. Blount for life, it would be difficult to believe that Mrs. Harris intended that she should be deprived of that protection which the laws of South Carolina throw around a testator, by requiring that his last will and testament shall be executed with all the solemnities required by our statute. Mrs. Harris manifestly regarded her daughter as a person liable to, and in danger of, being improperly influenced by some one, in the disposition of her property, and it can hardly be supposed that she intended that her daughter should exercise the power of absolutely disposing of this property by will without the observance of those forms -which she must be assumed to have known the wisdom of her State had prescribed for the protection of testators from undue influence.
It is said, however, that if Mrs. Harris had intended that Mrs. Blount should exercise the power of appointment only by a will executed in the manner prescribed by our statute, it would have been very easy for her to say so by the addition of a very few words to those prescribing the mode of appointment — that she might have said, "by her last will and testament duly executed," according to the laws of South Carolina. But according to our view, that is precisely what the words used mean, and the additional words suggested would have been mere surplusage. If, however, Mrs. Harris really intended that the power conferred could be exercised by the donee by her last will and testament, executed anywhere, and according to the laws of any place where Mrs. Blount might happen to be domiciled, then additional words would have been necessary to express such an intention, and the testatrix should have said, "by her last will and testament duly executed" according to the laws of the place where Mrs. Blount might reside or be domiciled.
Suppose the mode prescribed for the execution of the power had been "by deed duly executed," can there be a doubt that those words would be interpreted to mean an instrument in writing, signed, sealed, and delivered in the presence of two subscribing witnesses ? And why ? Simply because that is the meaning of the word "deed" here. For the same reason the words used in the will under consideration must be interpreted, a will duly executed according to the laws of South Carolina.
The fact that the paper alleged to be the will of Mrs. Blount has been admitted to probate in North Carolina, and an exemplification thereof in this State, does not affect the question. This paper was doubtless a valid will in North Carolina, sufficient to pass any property which Mrs. Blount was entitled to in her own right in that State, and any personal property which she owned anywhere, and was, therefore, no doubt, properly admitted to probate there, as well as here, upon the exemplification under the statute. But the question here is, not whether Mrs. Blount has made a will disposing of her own property, but whether the paper propounded as such is a valid execution of the power conferred by the will of Mrs. Harris; and for the reasons above stated we do not think it is.
Under the view taken by the Circuit Judge it was unnecessary for him to consider or determine the other question, discussed here, as to who would be entitled as heirs at law of Mrs. Harris to the property in the event of the failure to exercise the power conferred by her will, and accordingly he made no decision upon that subject. That question is, therefore, not properly before us at this stage of the case. The powers of this court being appellate only, so far as cases like this are concerned, we have no authority to decide, originally, any question, but are confined to a review of the judgments of the Circuit Court, and as that court has rendered no judgment upon this question, there is nothing before us for review, so far as such question is concerned. The case must, therefore, be remanded to that court for the considera tion and determination of the question, which now properly arises as to who will be entitled to the property involved in this controversy as heirs at law of Mrs. Harris — whether those who stood in that relation to her at the time of her death, or those who occupied that position at the time of the death of the life tenant, Mrs. Blount, together with any other questions incidental thereto.
The judgment of this court is, that the judgment of the Circuit Court be reversed, and the case remanded to that court for such further proceedings as may be necessary to carry out the views herein announced.
Mr. Justice McGowan concurred.