Case Name: PEOPLE v. GARLAND
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1974-12-19
Citations: 393 Mich. 215
Docket Number: Docket No. 54,677
Parties: PEOPLE v GARLAND
Judges: T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., and Swainson and M. S. Coleman, JJ., concurred with Williams, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 393
Pages: 215–233

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v GARLAND
Opinion op the Court
See headnote 11.
1. Criminal Law — Competency Examination — Psychiatrists—Expert Witnesses — Admissibility—Objections—Waiver.
The rationale of a previous Supreme Court decision was that waiver of an objection to the statute concerning diagnostic report and recommendations of a defendant who may be incompetent to stand trial is a waiver of objection to the testimony of the psychiatrists who conducted the forensic psychiatric examination; consequently, waiver of the statute waives all (MCLA 767.27a[4]).
Concurring Opinion
T. G. Kavanagh, Levin, and J. W. Fitzgerald, JJ.
2. Criminal Law — Psychiatrists—Competency Examination — Sanity.
There is no absolute bar to the psychiatrist who conducts the competency examination testifying also on the issue of sanity.
3. Criminal Law — Insanity Defense — Expert Witnesses.
A defendant who raises an insanity defense can be required to submit to an examination by the people’s experts.
4. Constitutional Law — Fifth Amendment — Criminal Law — Evidence.
The fifth Amendment, which protects an accused person in a criminal case from being compelled to be a witness against himself, precludes the state from compelling production of evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature (US Const, Am V).
References for Points in Headnotes
[1-11] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 44, 48, 62-74, 357, 365.
Investigation of present sanity to determine whether accused should be put, or continue, on trial, 142 ALR 961.
5. Constitutional Law — Fifth Amendment — Psychiatrists.
Communications to a psychiatrist are within the ambit of the Fifth Amendment privilege (US Const, Am V).
6. Constitutional Law — Self-Incrimination—Criminal Law— States — Employees—Psychiatrists.
The privilege against self-incrimination, if it means nothing else, most assuredly protects a man against being required to discuss with the employees of the state the details of events which form the basis of the charged offense; answers and other communications solicited by a psychiatrist from a defendant in a criminal case are testimonial and protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege (US Const, Am V).
7. Constitutional Law — Fifth Amendment — Psychiatric Examination — Waiver.
Although the Fifth Amendment privilege applies to psychiatric examinations, a competent defendant manifestly can waive the privilege (US Const, Am V).
8. Constitutional Law — Criminal Law — Insanity Defense — Fifth Amendment — Waiver—Psychiatric Examination — Cross-Examination.
A defendant who offers psychiatric testimony in support of an insanity defense must be deemed to have waived his Fifth Amendment privilege to the extent of subjecting himself to examination by the people’s psychiatrists; any other rule would preclude effective cross-examination of the defendant’s psychiatrists, impede the prosecutor in offering effective rebuttal psychiatric testimony and would constitute an abuse of the constitutional privilege (US Const, Am V).
9. Constitutional Law — Criminal Law — Psychiatrists—Competency Examination — Sanity.
There is no constitutional requirement that a psychiatrist, who has learned in the course of an examination to determine competency what he thinks necessary to enable him to testify on sanity, conduct yet another examination or that the state provide yet another doctor to examine the defendant on the sanity issue.
10. Criminal Law — Statutes—Diagnostic Report — Prejudice— Jury — Sanity—Competency to Stand Trial — District and Prosecuting Attorneys.
The apparent purpose of the statutory prohibition against the use of the diagnostic report and recommendations is to prevent prejudice possibly resulting if the jury were to learn that the defendant recently had been found competent and were to infer erroneously that he was, therefore, sane at the time the offense was committed; there is no inconsistency between that purpose and conducting only one examination to acquire information on both the issue of competency and the issue of sanity, or between that purpose and allowing the same doctor to testify on both issues; the prosecutor and the people’s witnesses should avoid any reference to the competency examination or the results of the examination in the jury’s presence (MCLA 767.27a[4j).
11. Criminal Law — Statutes—Diagnostic Report — Waiver—Competency Examination — Evidence.
The statutory bar against admission of the diagnostic report and recommendations, designed for the defendant’s protection, is not absolute and this protection may be waived by the defendant if he thinks it advantageous to present evidence from the competency examination to the jury (MCLA 767.27a[4]).
Appeal from Court of Appeals, Division 1, V. J. Brennan, P. J., and Quinn and O’Hara, JJ., reversing and remanding Recorder’s Court of Detroit, Joseph A. Gillis, J.
Submitted March 13, 1974.
(No. 12 March Term 1974,
Docket No. 54,677.)
Decided December 19, 1974.
44 Mich App 243 reversed.
Arville D. Garland was convicted on three counts of second-degree murder and one count of manslaughter. Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Reversed and remanded.
The people appeal.
Decision of the Court of Appeals reversed, and convictions affirmed.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William L. Cabalan, Prosecuting Attorney, Dominick R. Carnovale, Chief, Appellate Department, and Michael R. Mueller, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Kraizman & Kraizman, for defendant on appeal.

Opinion:
Williams, J.
(to reverse). I concur in the result reached by my Brother Levin but do not agree that the discussion in the introductory matter or Sections I, II, and III of his opinion is necessary to reaching the proper result in this case.
As my Brother Levin notes, this Court stated less than three years ago in People v Martin, 386 Mich 407, 425; 192 NW2d 215 (1971):
"We conclude that a psychiatrist who conducts such a forensic psychiatric examination may not be called to testify in the criminal triál if there is an objection to the admission of such testimony by defendant."
There is no need to consider whether this is a correct or incorrect interpretation of MCLA 767.27a(4); MSA 28.966(H)(4), inasmuch as in the instant case, as my Brother Levin points out, there is a clear waiver of the statute on the record. Defense counsel made specific reference to the Forensic Center competency diagnosis in the questioning of their own expert witness, Dr. Miller. The defense introduced a videotape of defendant's sodium brevital examination at the Forensic Center. The defense introduced into evidence the Forensic Center file.
My Brother Levin contends that the waiver of the statute is not a waiver of the testimony of the psychiatrists in question because there is a "separate Martin -declared statutory right to prevent" such testimony. The Martin rationale is: There is only one statute and one statutory right. There is no "separate Martin -declared statutory right". Without the statute there is no right; with the statute there is no reference to the competency transaction, and this includes reports, recommendations and examining psychiatrist or psychiatrists. As a consequence waiver of the statute waives all.
This finding of statutory waiver resolves this case and obviates the necessity of this Court reviewing the above analysis in Martin. I agree fully, therefore, with Section V of Justice Levin's opinion on waiver. I would not, however, go further in obiter dicta to discuss aspects of this case involving constitutional issues where there is no necessity to do so.
Accordingly, I concur in my Brother Levin's disposition of this case. The Court of Appeals is reversed; the defendant's conviction is affirmed.
T. M. Kavanagh, C. J., and Swainson and M. S. Coleman, JJ., concurred with Williams, J.
Of interest is that defendant's brief convincingly argues that the testimony of two psychiatrists in question cannot be disassociated from the statutorily prohibited report.
Sandra Garland left home a few days before her death. She explained in a long note to her family her reasons for leaving. A college student, she wanted to be financially independent and live with friends near campus. She expressed love for her family and the belief that she would always be welcome at home.
Her father's frantic search for her began immediately. He worked long hours from late afternoon to early morning and spent his days searching for Sandra. At least twice he visited the apartment house where Sandra was living, but he did not find her.
When his wife failed to persuade Sandra to return home, Garland put two handguns in his belt and a rifle in his car, and proceeded to his daughter's apartment building. A flashlight in hand, he broke down the door of the apartment where Sandra was sleeping. When he saw a young man in bed with her, he drew the gun from his belt intending, he said, to strike him. Instead, the gun accidentally discharged, killing his daughter. Within minutes, three other people in the apartment had been shot. Garland then sought his daughter's roommate but, unable to find her, he drove to a police station and made a full confession.