Case Name: MUTUAL BENEFIT LIFE INSURANCE CO. v. CUMMINGS
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1913-07-22
Citations: 66 Or. 272
Docket Number: 
Parties: MUTUAL BENEFIT LIFE INSURANCE CO. v. CUMMINGS.
Judges: Mr. Justice Moore and Mr. Justice Burnett concur.
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 66
Pages: 272–292

Head Matter:
Motion to Strike Out Respondent’s Additional Abstract, decided October 1, 1912.
On the Merits, argued July 6,
decided July 22,
rehearing denied September 9, 1913.
MUTUAL BENEFIT LIFE INSURANCE CO. v. CUMMINGS.
(126 Pac. 982: 133 Pac. 1169.)
ON THE MOTION.
Appeal and Error — Record—Motion to Complete — Requisites.
1. Motion by respondent to compel appellant to incorporate additional papers in the reeord is properly overruled if it is pot supported by' affidavit showing incompleteness of the record, as required by Section 555, L. O. I¿.
Appeal and Error — Record—Motion to Complete — Requisites.
2. Motion by respondent to compel appellant to incorporate additional papers in the reeord is properly overruled if it contains statement of a mere conclusion of law that omitted papers are a necessary part of the record, no facts being'set forth in the motion or a supporting affidavit to sustain such statement.
Appeal and Error — Record—Matters Properly Shown by.
3. A consent decree in interpleader discharging complainant insurance company on payment of insurance proceeds into court and directing defendants to interplead is not a proper part of the abstract of record on appeal involving merely a question as to which defendant was entitled to the fund, and hence motion suggesting diminution of the record on account of omission of the decree is properly overruled, and motion to strike an additional abstract of record containing sueh decree is properly sustained.
Appeal and Error — Record—Additional Abstracts — Time for Filing.
A Respondent having elected to suggest diminution of the record under Section 555, L. 0. L., and failed through making an insufficient showing, is not entitled to proceed under Supreme Court rule No. 7 by furnishing an additional abstract, where the ten-day period fixed by the rule for such action has expired.
ON THE MERITS.
Interpleader — Life Insurance — Evidence—Sufficiency.
5. In a contest between claimants to a life policy, evidence held to show that the insured intended that the proceeds should be paid to his mistress instead of his legal wife, the policy having named the mistress as beneficiary, though designating her as “wife.”
[As to the right of interpleader, see note in 91 Am. St. Eep. 593.]
Insurance — Life Insurance — Contracts—Construction.
6. A life policy is a contract and should be construed so as to effectuate the intention of the parties, being treated as of a testamentary character.
Names — Adoption of Name — Eight to Adopt.
7. A person may adopt or assume a different name from his true one and carry on business and make contracts under the fictitious name.
Insurance — Life Insurance — Designation of Beneficiary.
8. When a life policy is issued and delivered, naming a beneficiary without a reservation of power on the part of the insured to change, an irrevocable trust is created.
Insurance — Life Insurance^ — Eight to Proceeds of Policy.
9. Where a man, who had deserted his lawful wife and was living and cohabiting with another woman, took out a policy in the latter’s favor, designating her as “wife,” the contract being wholly made for her benefit, she is entitled to the proceeds of the policy as against insured’s true wife, for a person may insure his own life in favor of one having no insurable interest in his life, the fact that the beneficiary was named as his wife, and had adopted his surname not affecting her rights, for a person may adopt a fictitious name.
Appeal and Error — Review—Findings.
10. Findings in equity cases are of no persuasive force on appeal, Section 105, L. O. L.; providing that such cases shall be tried anew.
. On the Motion.
From Multnomah.: Henry E. McGinn, Judge.
Statement by Me. Justice Buenett.
This statement of facts is upon the hearing of the motion made by Evelyn M. Cummings to strike from the files the additional abstract of the respondent, Sophia J. Cummings.
According to the certified evidence in this ease which, by Subdivision 1, Section 554, L. O. L., is made part of the transcript, it appears that one Harry A. Cummings insured his own life with the plaintiff company for the sum of $2,000, which, by the terms of the policy issued by tbe company, was made payable to “Evelyn M. Cummings,.his wife.” Tbe insured, having paid tbe first semi-annual premium due on tbe policy, died. Tbe proof of bis death having been made to the company, it admitted its liability on tbe policy to tbe extent of $1,974.36. Tbe plaintiff company soon afterward filed in tbe Circuit Court its bill of interpleader, in substance, as follows: After alleging its corporate character, it stated tbe issuance of tbe policy and tbe terms thereof, and, after making allowance for deductions on account of unpaid premiums and additions for current dividends, conceded its liability upon tbe policy to tbe person entitled thereto in the sum already mentioned, in which amount tbe complainant averred it bad no interest and claimed no title. Tbe death of Harry A. Cummings on August 23,1911, was stated, and proof of bis death admitted, and tbe complaint further alleges that about August 28, 1911, Evelyn M. Cummings, one of tbe defendants, claimed to tbe company that she was entitled to tbe money due on said policy; further that about September 8, 1911, Sophia J. Cummings also claimed that she was entitled to tbe money, and, still further, that Sophia J. Cummings, representing herself to be tbe duly appointed, qualified, and acting administratrix of tbe estate of Harry A. Cummings, deceased, claimed tbe amount due upon tbe policy to be coming to her as administratrix, and, again, that about November 23, 1911, one M. 0. Wilkins made and filed a notice of attorney’s lien with tbe plaintiff, claiming to have acted as attorney for Sophia J. Cummings, and asserting a lien upon tbe money in tbe bands of the company to reimburse him for bis services in a sum not less than $250, and not more than $500. Tbe complainant, alleging that it did not know to whom to pay tbe proceeds of said policy, disclaiming any interest therein whatever, brought into court tbe sum mentioned, and prayed for a decree that the court require the defendants to interplead as to their rights to the money, and that the plaintiff be discharged from all further liability to pay the same.
For convenience of statement the parties to the suit will be, hereafter, called as follows: The plaintiff will be called the company; Evelyn M. Cummings, Evelyn; Sophia J. Cummings, Sophia; Sophia J. Cummings as the administratrix of the estate of Harry J. Cummings will be designated as the administratrix; and the defendant M. 0. Wilkins will be designated by his own proper name.
Sophia filed an answer to the bill of interpleader, in which she admitted all the allegations thereof, except the statements that Evelyn had made a claim to the money, and that Wilkins had filed a notice of attorney’s lien. She alleged “that she is entitled to the entire amount arising from the proceeds of said policy of insurance,” and prayed the court to decree that the proceeds of the policy be paid to her. Evelyn filed an answer in which she admitted all the allegations of the bill, except the one stating that Wilkins had filed a notice of attorney’s lien. She alleged affirmatively “that more than two years before the commencement of this action and during all of the time thereafter up to the time of the death of said Harry A. Cummings, as alleged in the bill of inter-pleader, she lived with the said Harry A. Cummings as his wife, and that said Harry A. Cummings represented to the public and claimed that said defendant, Evelyn M. Cummings, was his wife, and that she was, during all of said time, known by the said Harry A. Cummings, deceased, and the public, as the wife of Harry A. Cummings and accepted as such.” She, in turn, prayed that the proceeds of the policy be paid to her. The administratrix also filed what she termed a cross-bill, in which, without traversing any of the allegations of the bill, she challenged the claims of Evelyn and Wilkins, recited the claim of Sophia, and prayed that the money be paid to the administratrix. It does not appear from any data before us whether Wilkins filed an answer or not. By stipulation of all of the parties the court entered a decree of inter-pleader allowing the plaintiff to pay into court the net proceeds of the policy, and permitting it to go hence without further liability of any kind upon the policy. The court afterward heard the testimony, and entered a decree directing the payment of the proceeds to Sophia and disregarding the claim of Evelyn, Wilkins, and' the administratrix. Evelyn appealed from this decree, and, with the transcript on appeal, filed her abstract containing the complaint, the answer of Sophia, the answer of Evelyn, a recital of the stipulation for the decree of interpleader, setting out in full both findings of fact and conclusions of law in favor of Evelyn which were submittéd to and refused by the court, also in full the findings of fact and conclusions of law filed by the court, the final decree directing the payment to Sophia and ignoring the claims of Wilkins, Evelyn, and the administratrix, and reciting in full the assignments of error relied upon by the appellant. This abstract was filed July 16, 1912. On August 12, 1912, the respondent Sophia, filed her motion containing 27 specifications of mistake in the record, claiming diminutions in those respects and asking for a rule compelling the appellant, Evelyn, to file with the court a complete amended edition of the abstract of record, including all matters and corrections suggested by the motion or that the clerk of the Circuit Court be directed to properly certify the record. lyiany of the objections suggested were merely clerical or typographical. For the most part, how ever, the motion sought to incorporate in the abstract the cross-hill of the administratrix and the several answers and replies arising thereon. This motion was overruled hy the court August 14, 1912. Afterward, on August 26,1912, Sophia filed an additional abstract of record, consisting of 33 printed pages, which contains the cross-complaint of the administratrix, Evelyn’s answer thereto, and the reply of the administratrix to that answer, together with stipulated findings of fact and conclusions of law resulting in the decree also quoted, discharging the plaintiff, and directing ^that defendants interplead concerning their claims to the net proceeds of the policy. On August 31, 1912, Evelyn, the appellant, filed her motion to strike' from the files the additional printed abstract just mentioned.
Motion to Strike Sustained.
Emmons, Emmons & Beid, for the Motion.
Mr. Arthur P. Tifft and Mr. Hamilton Johnston, contra.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Burnett
delivered the opinion of the court.
It .is provided in Section 554, L. O. L., that: "Upon the appeal being perfected the appellant shall, within 30 days thereafter, file with the clerk of the appellate court a transcript, or such an abstract as the rules of the * appellate court may require, of so much of the record as may he necessary to intelligibly present the questions to he decided hy the appellate tribunal, together with a copy of the judgment or decree appealed from, the notice of appeal and proof of service thereof and of the undertaking on appeal. "
1-3. The terms of Section 555, L. O. L., are these: "When it appears by affidavit to the satisfaction of the court that the transcript is incomplete in any particular substantially affecting the merits of the judgment or decree appealed from, on motion of the respondent the court shall make a rule upon the clerk of the court below, .requiring him to certify as to such alleged omission, and if true, to transmit to the appellate court a certified copy of the pleading, entry, order or other paper omitted in the transcript; or, in such case, the respondent may move to dismiss the appeal, and the court shall allow such motion unless, on the cross-motion of the appellant, it makes a rule upon the clerk concerning such omission, as provided in this section, upon such terms as may be just. " It was under this section that Sophia was attempting to proceed when she filed the motion which this court overruled. The motion was properly overruled for three reasons: First, it was not supported by affidavit as required by the terms of the section already quoted; in the second place, although it alleges that the omitted portions of the record are necessary on review in this court, yet that statement was a mere conclusion of law, and no facts were set forth, either by averment in the motion, or by affidavit which would inform the court so that it might reach the same conclusion of law suggested by the motion; in the third place, the decree, directing payment of the proceeds of the policy to Sophia and disregarding the claims of Evelyn, the administratrix, and Wilkins, has never been appealed from by anyone except Evelyn. So, as far as appears by anything before us, it has been acquiesced in to this day by both the administratrix and Wilkins. The decree of interpleader, discharging the complainant on payment of proceeds of the policy into court and directing the defendants to interplead, was a consent decree, and has never been and could not be disturbed by an appeal. It was not necessary to a complete understanding of the case to incorporate that decree at large in the abstract. Neither is the court concerned about the claims of those defendants, on the funds, which were disregarded by the court below and have not been made the subject of appeal. The situation is this: Both Evelyn and Sophia claim the fund. As between them the Circuit Court has decided in favor of Sophia, and Evelyn has appealed. All that is necessary to be decided by this court, as the appellate tribunal, is the question of which of these two parties is entitled to the money in dispute. It has nothing to do with the interests or claims of those parties who have acquiesced in the decision of the court below. Evelyn and Sophia, the only parties before us, must depend upon their own pleadings as illustrative of the questions to be decided. Neither of them can claim anything under-the pleadings of other parties. These three reasons furnish ample ground for the decision of the court in denying the motion of Sophia, suggesting diminutions of the record. The third applies with equal force to the motion now under consideration to strike out the respondent's additional abstract of record, for it is an attempt to inject into the record matter which was denied by the ruling of the court on the motion already referred to.
4. There is yet another reason why the respondent's additional abstract of record is improperly before the court, and should be stricken out. Section 555, L. O. L., already 'mentioned, provides a way by which the defective record can be corrected. Sophia elected to proceed under that section, and has failed for good and sufficient reasons already pointed out. Amplifying, so far as may be, Section 555, L. 0. L., Buie 7 of this court reads thus: "If the respondent shall deem the appellant's abstract imperfect o.r unfair he may, within 10 days after receiving a copy thereof, deliver to the appellant's counsel one, and to the clerk of this- court with proof of service upon appellant, 16 printed copies of such further or additional abstract as he shall deem necessary to a full understanding of the question involved in the appeal." It is not necessary to decide whether the abstract of either party shall be compiled from the transcript lodged in the appellate court or from the papers on file in the Circuit Court. It is enough to say that the .respondent's additional abstract of record must be filed within 10 days after receiving the appellant's abstract. The certificate on this latter document-on file, signed by the counsel for Sophia, shows that they received copies of it July 15, 1912. As mentioned above, the respondent's additional abstract was not filed in this court .until August 26, 1912, whereas, according to the rule, it should have reached the custody of the clerk by July 25,1912. Sophia was too late to operate under the terms of Rule 7, already quoted, and,' having elected to proceed under Section 555, L. O. L., she cannot now change her position and attempt to operate under Rule 7 after the period of 10 days, therein prescribed, has elapsed.
Department 1. Statement-by Mr. Justice Ramsey.
This is a suit in equity in the nature of a bill of interpleader brought by the Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, against Evelyn M. Cummings and Sophia J. Cummings to re quire them to interplead concerning the right to receive the amount of a policy of life insurance on the life of Harry A. Cummings, deceased.
The motion to strike out respondent's additional abstract of record is sustained.
Motion to Strike Sustained.