Case Name: Bird Melton v. The State
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1913-04-02
Citations: 71 Tex. Crim. 130
Docket Number: No. 2220
Parties: Bird Melton v. The State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Criminal Reports
Volume: 71
Pages: 130–149

Head Matter:
Bird Melton v. The State.
No. 2220.
Decided April 2, 1913.
Rehearing denied June 18, 1913.
1. —Rape—Circumstantial Evidence—Venue—Fraud—Intercourse.
Where defendant was indicted for rape by fraud, etc., and the evidence showed a mock marriage and that the defendant thereafter, in the county of the prosecution, went to bed with his alleged wife who denied that she had had sexual intercourse with him that night, the circumstances were such that the jury could, nevertheless, find him guilty of having sexual intercourse with her that night, and the venue was thereby established under a proper charge of the court. Following Ward v. State, 12 Texas Crim. App., 174, and other cases. Davidson, Presiding Judge, dissenting.
2. —Same—Charge of Court—Venue—Requested Charge—Mock Marriage.
Where, upon trial of rape by fraud by reason of a mock marriage, the court submitted a full and fair charge on every issue of the case, and expressly required the jury to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix, in the county of the prosecution—defining rape—there was no error in refusing a requested charge on the same subject. Following Lee v. State, 4 Texas Crim. App., 345, and other cases.
3. —Same—Accomplice—Charge of Court.
Where defendant raped prosecutrix by fraud under a mock marriage, she was not an accomplice, and there was no error in the court’s failure to submit a charge thereon.
4. —Same—Jury and Jury Law—Special Venire—Sheriff.
Where it appeared from the record that in summoning the special veniremen, the sheriff summoned among others a certain juror, and by some mistake, the copy of the venire which was served on defendant omitted the name of said juror, and the defendant made a motion to quash the whole venire, which the court overruled and excused the said juror, and the jury was secured before defendant exhausted all of his challenges, there was no error. Following Bowen v. State, 3 Texas Crim. App., 617, and other cases.
5. —Same—Charge of Court—Definition of Fraud.
Where, upon trial of rape by fraud, the court’s charge required the jury before they could convict defendant to believe that he had obtained sexual intercourse with said female by the practice and perpetration of fraud, there was no error. Following Wilkinson v. State, 60 Texas Crim. Rep., 388,' and other cases.
6. —Same—Evidence—Bill of Exceptions.
In the absence of a bill of exceptions, complaints to the introduction of evidence can not be considered on appeal.
7. —Same—Reasonable Doubt—Venue.
It has always been held that it is not essential that venue should be proved beyond a -reasonable doubt, and the doctrine of reasonable doubt does not apply to the issue of venue. Following Barrara v. State, 42 .Texas, 260, and other eases.
8. —Same—Charge of Court—Venue.
Where the question of venue was not a distinct and affirmative defense, but the court, nevertheless, in his charge, required the jury to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense was committed in the county of the prosecution, when considering the charge as a whole, there was no error in refusing a special charge thereon.
9. —Same—Venue—Verdict—Indictment—Charge of Court.
Where, upon trial of rape by- fraud, the jury could not have found the defendant guilty under the indictment, charge of court, and verdict, without specifically finding that the offense was committed in the county of the prosecution, and that they could not have been misled that the offense was committed in another county, there was no error. Davidson, Presiding Judge, dissenting.
10. —Same—Sexual Intercourse—Sufficiency of the Evidence—Circumstan-
tial Evidence.
Upon a trial of rape by fraud, the offense can be established by circumstantial evidence as fully and completely as by positive or direct evidence, and the jury are the exclusive judges of the facts and the credibility of the witnesses, and have the right, from all the surrounding circumstances, appearances of the witnesses, etc.,- to find their verdict, and where they concluded that according to the ordinary experience of mankind, the defendant had sexual intercourse with the alleged female by reason of fraud of a mock marriage in the county of the prosecution, the conviction is sustained, although the said female denied that she had such intercourse. Davidson, Presiding Judge, dissenting.
11. —Same—Common Law Marriage—Bigamy—Rape.
In order to successfully prosecute a person for bigamy under a common law marriage, it takes not only the assent of the parties to the marriage, but a continuous living together thereafter as husband and wife, and where the evidence on trial for rape showed by the circumstances that the defendant had sexual intercourse with the alleged female in the county of the prosecution on the night following a mock marriage, he was not guilty of bigamy, but of rape. Davidson, Presiding Judge, dissenting.
12. —Same—Principle of Carving—Rape—Bigamy.
Where the defendant was tried for rape by fraud, he could not complain that he was guilty of bigamy also, as the State had the right to carve either offense out of the transaction, and the defendant had no right to elect for what offense he should be prosecuted. Following Quitzow v. State, 1 Texas Grim. App., 47, and other cases.
13. —Same—Presumption of Innocence—Presumption of Guilt.
The presumption of innocence is a legal presumption, but proof can be offered to show guilt, notwithstanding this presumption, and when that is done and the jury on sufficient evidence finds defendant guilty, the presumption of innocence is done away with and no longer prevails, and where such verdict is authorized by. circumstantial evidence that the defendant had sexual intercourse by fraud in the county of the prosecution, the fact that said female denies such intercourse, which the jury disbelieved, the verdict is, nevertheless, sustained. Following Lee v. State, 44 Texas Grim. Rep., 354. Davidson, Presiding Judge, dissenting.
Appeal from the District Court of Eastland. Tried helow before the Hon. Thomas L. Blanton.
Appeal from a conviction of rape by fraud; penalty, five years imprisonment in the penitentiary.
The opinion states the case.
J. R. Stubblefield, for appellant.
On question of venue: Miles v. State, 23 Texas Crim. App., 410; Smith v. State, 25 id., 454; Wilkenson v. State, 60 Texas Crim. Rep., 388, 131 S. W. Rep., 1108; Lee v. State, 44 Texas Crim. Rep., 354; Acts of 25th Legislature, p. 16; Davis v. State, 63 Texas Crim. Rep., 484, 141 S. W. Rep., 93.
On question that defendant has a right to have his defense distinctly and affirmatively submitted in connection with venue: Moore v. State, 59 Texas Crim. Rep., 361; Coleman v. State, 54 id., 396; Holt v. State, 57 id., 432; Martin v. State, 57 id., 264; Wheeler v. State, 56 id., 547.
Proof that an offense was committed in another county from that of the prosecution will not support a conviction: Chivarrio v. State, 15 Texas Crim. App., 330; Miles v. State, 33 id., 410; Mischer v. State, 41 Texas Crim. Rep., 313.
On question of charge on accomplice testimony: Johnson v. State, 58 Texas Crim. Rep., 244; Parr v. State, 36 id., 493; Winn v. State, 15 Texas Crim. App., 169.
On question that controlling importance should be attached to testir mony of prosecutrix: Johnson v. State, 58 Texas Crim. Rep., 244.
On question that defendant was married and prosecutrix was unmarried, etc.: Dissenting opinion in Lee v. State, 44 Texas Crim. Rep., 354.
C. E. Lane, Assistant Attorney-General, for the State.

Opinion:
PRENDERGAST, Judge.
By a proper count which alone was submitted to the jury, appellant was indicted for rape, alleged to have been committed on Annie Clarkson in Eastland County,.Texas, on October 9, 1911, by force, threat and fraud. He was convicted and his penalty fixed at five years confinement in the penitentiary, the lowest prescribed by law.
. Annie Clarkson was a girl about fifteen years old at the time this offense is charged to have been committed and lived with her parents. Her parents were tenant farmers living in a small house on a farm in Palo Pinto County. Hot a great while before this he had lived for several years in Eastland County, and prior to that in other counties in the State. Appellant was a young man who" boarded with her family for a few months just prior to the alleged commission of this offense, and while with the family he courted and became engaged to be married to Annie some three months prior to this offense. He had formerly at some time been married to another woman. Annie and her family knew this. He told Annie, however, that he had been divorced from that wife. A few days before the time of this offense he and Annie, together with her brother and sister just older than she, went in a wagon from her father's in Palo Pinto County to her uncle's, living in Eastland County. Appellant's parents also lived in Eastland County. They reached her uncle's in Eastland County Sunday morning about an hour by sun; it was arranged between Annie and appellant that they would be married in Eastland County at or near her old home where she and her parents had formerly lived. After they reached her uncle's, appellant left them and claimed he went to his father's. When he returned to Annie at her uncle's, he reached her about an hour by sun Monday evening. They then started to return to her parents, the same said four persons, and went by or to the place in Eastland County where she and her parents had formerly lived. Appellant claimed and told her he had procured a license to marry her at Eastland and had arranged to have a preacher to meet them near her old home and to perform the marriage ceremony. When they reached a point near her former home, appellant had the wagon stopped, got out and went back out of sight of the others for some distance and was gone several minutes,—the witnesses differing as to time from ten to thirty minutes. He then returned to the wagon, told Annie to get out and go with him, which she did, leaving her brother and sister. Appellant took her back some hundred yards out of sight of her brother and sister, met a person whom be claimed was a preacher, and who performed the ceremony and. pronounced them man and wife. This was at night,—a moonlight night. They then returned to the wagon, told her brother and sister that they had just been married and they drove on a few miles when they stopped and stayed all night. They made up a fire on the ground, the brother slept on the wagon seat at the fire, his unmarried sister in their wagon in which they were traveling, and appellant and Annie went into the field of someone and occupied a wagon that was in that field in which there was some seed cotton. They remained there all night.
The record shows clearly that - Annie was an ignorant country girl and her testimony indicates that she was not at all bright or smart. Appellant did not testify. Annie testified and showed that she believed he had procured a license as he told her he had, and that they had been legally and properly married by said person on that night. She testified that while they stayed .alone together in the wagon that night he kissed her and fondled her person and had his hands on her, but that he did not that night have sexual intercourse with her; that the next day they continued their journey, reaching her parents, where they announced their marriage, and that they occupied a bed and room at her parents that night and for a short time afterwards, and that that night he did have sexual intercourse with her; that they stayed with her parents only for a short time and then removed elsewhere in Palo Pinto County and lived as husband and wife for several months, she fully believing they were lawfully husband and wife; that she would not have permitted appellant to have had intercourse with her at any time if she had not believed that she was properly married to him. It was shown that appellant had procured no license at Eastland to marry her; that his wife or former wife was still living; that he denied to his brothers that he was married to Annie.
Practically the sole question of any moment in this case is whether . or not the evidence was sufficient to show that appellant had sexual intercourse with Annie in the wagon where they remained the first night after he married her in Eastland County. The court charged on circumstantial evidence. We take it that because of the ignorance and inexperience of said witness Annie, she would cross herself in her own testimony; but the jury who saw and heard her and who saw and heard the manner of her examination and cross-examination, were the judges exclusively of her credibility and the weight of her evidence. The whole record shows that appellant, who was a married man, deceived this girl and her whole family, claiming that he had been divorced from his wife, or previous wife. He was not living with her at that time and had not been for several months before. As a matter of fact, he was still married to that previous wife. He courted Annie and became engaged to be married to her and evidently deceived her and had this mock marriage by an assumed preacher for the sole purpose of inducing this girl to have intercourse with him, and he thereby accomplished his purpose. It is apparent from the record that he had failed otherwise to have sexual intercourse with her. While the girl denied that he had sexual intercourse with her that first night, the court having properly charged on circumstantial evidence, it was a question for the jury whether or not,—notwithstanding her denial,—he had sexual intercourse with her that night. The jury was composed of twelve fair and impartial jurors. Doubtless of different ages and business and at different locations in the county. They saw and heard all the witnesses. Appellant was, of course, before them during the whole trial. They reached the conclusion that he had sexual intercourse with this girl that first night. Under the circumstances it would stagger human credulity and would be the reverse of what every man knows to be human nature, if, under the circumstances, he did not have sexual intercourse with her that night. In our opinion the evidence was amply sufficient to justify the jury to believe and find as they did, that he did have sexual intercourse with her that night. Where they stayed that night was clearly shown to be in Eastland County. Ward v. State, 12 Texas Crim. App., 174; Price v. State, 18 Texas Crim. App., 474.
Any fact which can be established by direct, can also be established by circumstantial, evidence. The circumstances proven in this case, together with the knowledge of human, nature, is amply sufficient to authorize the jury to find that appellant had sexual intercourse with said Annie Clarkson, notwithstanding she testified he did not on said first night. It would, at least, be no more than one testifying he did not, while another, with equal, or like opportunity, testified he did. She testified he did not. The circumstances unerringly testified, or authorized the jury to find, he did.
Even if we should not be correct in this, then our venue statute as to this offense, is to this effect: Prosecutions can be carried on, first, in the county where committed; -second, in any county of the judicial district, and, third, in any county of the judicial district the judge of which resides nearest the county seat of the county in which the offense is committed. The evidence, without doubt and overwhelmingly established appellant had sexual intercourse with said girl in Palo Pinto County, if not, or in addition, to having done so in Eastland County, or without reference to Eastland County. There being nothing to the contrary on this question of venue, it must be determined that Judge Blanton was the judge nearest the county seat of Palo Pinto • County, and Eastland County being in his district and adjoining Palo Pinto, the case was properly tried by him in Eastland County. So that in either event the venue was in Eastland County. Mischer v. State, 41 Texas Crim. Rep., 212.
The court submitted a full, fair and apt charge on every issue in the case. His charge follows and is substantially what was given in Lee v. State, 44 Texas Crim. Rep., 354, and Wilkerson v. State, 60 Texas Crim. Rep., 388, which were expressly approved by this court. In addition, the court gave appellant's special charge to the effect: "Unless you find from the evidence that the defendant did not marry Annie Clarkson you will acquit him."
The court in his charge expressly required the jury to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant had sexual intercourse with said Annie in Eastland County, Texas, and that his private male organ penetrated the private female organ of said Annie, before they could convict him. Hence, the court did not err in refusing to give appellant's special requested charges on these subjects, because the court had clearly embraced them all in his main charge.
The evidence did not show that said Annie was an accomplice. If appellant raped her by fraud as alleged and as required to be affirmatively found by the court before they could convict him, she was not, and could not have been an accomplice; hence, the court did not err in refusing appellant's charge submitting to the jury whether or not she was an accomplice.
It appears that in summoning the special veniremen the sheriff, among others, summoned, and so returned, one J. B. Fenley. In proper time the clerk issued the proper process, requiring the sheriff to serve appellant with a copy of the veniremen summoned and included said Fenley's -name. By some mistake the copy that was served on appellant omitted Fenley's name. For this reason appellant made a motion to quash the w'hole venire. The court overruled this motion and'in the explanation to appellant's bill stated on July 8, 1912, the case was set down for trial for July 19, 1912, at 8:30 o'clock a. m.; that the special venire was served on appellant on July 17, 1912, but that it omitted said Fenley's name from the copy so served; that when the case was called, at the time set, appellant, the district attorney, witnesses and veniremen were all present, but appellant's counsel was absent; that after waiting a reasonable time for him, the court proceeded to empanel the venire as to matters touching their qualification. At this juncture appellant's counsel appeared and verbally moved the court to quash the venire for the reason that said Fenley's name had been left off of the copy served on appellant; that the court thereupon excused said Fenley and did not require defendant to pass upon him; that a jury was secured before defendant exhausted all of his challenges. This bill shows no error by the court. Judge White, in his Annotated C. C. P., section 721, says: "Mere discrepancies in some of the names as stated in the copy and the original will be immaterial where it appears that the parties named did not serve on the trial, and defendant did not exhaust his peremptory challenges. Bowen v. State, 3 Texas Crim. App., 617. If there is a variance between the name set out in the copy and the original, the proper practice is to stand such venireman aside. Mitchell v. State, 36 Texas Crim. Rep., 278: Hudson v. State, 28 Texas Crim. App., 323; Thompson v. State, 19 Texas Crim. App., 593; Swofford v. State, 3 Texas Crim. App., 76; Bowen v. State, 3 Texas Crim. App., 617." The court in this instance pursued the proper practice; appellant was not required to pass on this juror, he got a complete jury out of the panel that was served on him without exhausting his challenges.
As stated above, the charge of the court followed substantially if not literally the charges in said Lee and Wilkerson cases, supra, in the definition of fraud under our rape statute, and required the jury to believe 'before they could convict him that he had obtained sexual intercourse with this girl by the practice and perpetration of said fraud. So that the criticism of appellant of the. court's charge not requiring the jury to believe all the necessary requisites, which were held sufficient in said cases, is also without merit.
Appellant has several complaints in his motion for new trial about the introduction and exclusion of testimony, but there is no bill on the subject. Hence, such complaints can not be reviewed by this court.
We have carefully considered all of appellant's complaints and in our opinion none of them show any reversible error. Wherefore, this case will be affirmed.
Affirmed.
DAVIDSON, Presiding Judge.
I will add some observations later. I can not agree with a portion of this opinion.