Case Name: GROSVENOR et al. v. SUPERVISOR OF ASSESSMENTS OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY et al.
Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland
Jurisdiction: Maryland
Decision Date: 1974-03-01
Citations: 271 Md. 232
Docket Number: No. 166
Parties: GROSVENOR et al. v. SUPERVISOR OF ASSESSMENTS OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Maryland Reports
Volume: 271
Pages: 232–255

Head Matter:
GROSVENOR et al. v. SUPERVISOR OF ASSESSMENTS OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY et al.
[No. 166,
September Term, 1973.]
Decided March 1, 1974.
The cause was argued before Murphy, C. J., and Barnes, Singley, Smith, Digges, Levine and Eldridge, JJ.
David Macdonald, with whom were David E. Manoogian and Macdonald & Manoogian on the brief, for appellants.
K. Donald Proctor, Assistant Attorney General, with whom was Francis B. Burch, Attorney General, on the brief, for appellee Supervisor of Assessments of Montgomery County. H. Christopher Malone, Assistant County Attorney, with whom were Richard S. McKemon, County Attorney, and Robert tí. Tobin, Deputy County Attorney, on the brief, for appellee Montgomery County, Maryland.

Opinion:
Eldridge. J.,
delivered the opinion of the Court. Barnes, J., dissents and filed a dissenting opinion at page 242 infra.
The appellants, owners of real estate in Montgomery County, Maryland, contest the assessment and taxation of their property in 1970 for the years 1967, 1968 and 1969 under Maryland's "Escaped Property" statute, Maryland Code (1957, 1969 Repl. Vol.), Art. 81, § 34. It is claimed that the property was not "escaped property" within the meaning of the statutory provision.
The subject property consists of a 46.9 acre tract of land, improved by two houses and a garage, which appellants have owned for over forty years. Prior to 1967, appellants each year had paid the taxes imposed on the property. On May 1, 1967, appellants leased the property to an organization calling itself "National University." The lease was for a fifteen year term, and contained the proviso that after three years either party had an absolute right to terminate upon 90 days' notice. The lease also provided that the lessee was to pay the property taxes. The name of the lessee was later changed to "Potomac University," and later changed again to "National Graduate University."
The lessee University on June 12, 1967, filed with the Supervisor of Assessments a petition for a tax exemption under what was then Art. 81, § 9(8) of the Code. This section exempts from taxation real property "owned and used exclusively" by educational institutions. The petition was granted, and the property was treated as exempt for the years 1967,1968 and 1969.
In early 1970, a question arose concerning the propriety of the tax exemption in light of the provision in the tax laws that the lessee shall not be treated as the owner of property for tax purposes unless the lease is for ninety-nine years or, if for a shorter term, is perpetually renewable. The Attorney General issued an opinion that the exemption should not have been granted, and the Supervisor of Assessments, on June 3, 1970, rescinded the exemption.
Thereafter, the Supervisor of Assessments sent appellants an "Escaped Property Notice of Assessment" for each of the levy years 1967, 1968 and 1969. The Supervisor enclosed a legal memorandum to the effect that the property was subject to assessment and taxation for those years as "escaped property" under § 34 of Article 81. Appellants were told that tax bills would be rendered in the near future. Appellants thereupon formally protested the Supervisor's notices proposing to assess the property for the back years.
After a hearing on appellants' protest, the assessments were finalized by the Supervisor of Assessments. Upon appellants' successive appeals, the Supervisor's decision was upheld by the Appeal Tax Court for Montgomery County and then by the Maryland Tax Court.
Appellants do not here challenge the Supervisor's decision rescinding the tax exemption. All parties to the appeal agree that the Supervisor made a mistake in 1967 when he granted the exemption, although there is some disagreement as to whether appellants or their agents in any way submitted misleading information which induced the mistake. Consequently, no issue concerning the legality of the tax exemption is before us. Moreover, we shall assume arguendo that the Supervisor mistakenly granted the exemption entirely on his own, without any submission of misleading information or other fault on the part of the appellants or those in privity with them. The issue, then, is whether the Supervisor who erroneously granted an exemption is authorized by statute to later subject the property to taxation for the exempt years.
The Maryland "Escaped Property" statute, Code (1957, 1969 Repl. Vol.), Art. 81, § 34, provides:
"In case any property which by law is subject to assessment and taxation has escaped, such property shall be entered upon the assessment rolls at any time and shall be subject to taxation for current and previous years, not exceeding four years in all, in the same manner as other property is subject to taxation. The levy for each and every year by the county commissioners of the several counties and by any city shall be deemed and taken to have covered and embraced all property which was not assessed, but which ought to have been assessed, for the year for which any such levy was made."
The appellants argue that to come within the above statutory provision, the property must have escaped both "assessment" and "taxation." The property here involved, they insist, did not escape assessment but was- in fact "assessed." It was "assessed," appellants claim, because it was known to the Supervisor and listed in his records. Turning to the element of taxation, appellants acknowledge that the property was not taxed but claim that it did not "escape" taxation. The word "escape," in their opinion, does not encompass the deliberate, although mistaken, act of the Supervisor in granting an exemption. In sum, appellants assert that to come within § 34, property must escape both assessment and taxation and that this property escaped neither assessment nor taxation. Appellants' theory seems to be that only property which was unknown to the tax assessor, either by oversight or because the taxpayer withheld information, is encompassed by the statute.
Appellants' position, in our view, is not supported by the language of the statute or the decided cases. Moreover, their construction of the statute, if adopted, would create an illogical distinction with respect to properties which should have been taxed for prior years but were not.
In arguing that their property did not escape "assessment" but was in fact assessed in 1967, 1968 and 1969, appellants rely on the facts that the property was known to the Supervisor during that time, that he carried work sheets or cards on the property during the period, that he made a decision to exempt the property, and that this decision was marked on the work sheets or cards. Appellants insist that the property was therefore on the "assessments rolls" and that the "exemption from taxation was a direct product of the assessment process."
It is true that the term "assessment" as used in tax statutes has been given a somewhat fluid and imprecise meaning. Nevertheless, as normally used, "assessment" is incident to the actual imposition of taxes. It would be a non sequitur to refer to an "assessment" giving rise to a tax exemption. As Chief Judge McSherry stated for the Court in Consolidated Gas Co. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 101 Md. 541, 558, 61 A. 532, 538-39 (1905):
" . . . 'An assessment, strictly speaking, is an official estimate of the sums which are to constitute the basis of an apportionment of a tax between the individual subjects of taxation within the district. As the word is more commonly employed, an assessment consists in the two processes of listing the persons, property, &c., to be taxed, and of estimating the sums which are to be the guide in an apportionment of the tax between them.' Cooley, Tax, 258; New York v. Weaver, 100 U.S. 539; 3 Cyc. 1111."
We more recently set forth the same definition in Casey Dev. Corp. v. Montgomery County, 212 Md. 138, 146, 129 A. 2d 63, 67 (1957), adding: "The assessment and the levy are separate and distinct elements of the taxing process." 212 Md. at 146. See also, e.g., Whitehead v. Henson, 223 Ga. 329, 155 S.E.2d 391, 393 (1967) ("the assessment is the amount on which the taxpayer pays taxes."); Webb v. Bidwell, 15 Minn. 479, 483 (1870) (an assessment took place "when the amount or proportion of tax to which each parcel of real estate was subject, was fixed and determined."); Iowa Nat. Bank v. Stewart, 214 Iowa 1229, 232 N. W. 445, 451 (1930) ("The assessment consists in the listing of the property to be taxed and the estimation of the sums which are to constitute the basis of the apportionment of the tax ."); Northwestern Imp. Co. v. Henneford, 184 Wash. 502, 51 P. 2d 1083, 1085 (1935) ("'Assessment is the listing and valuation of property liable to taxation . . . .' "); Broad & Sansom Realty Co. v. Fidelity Bldg. Corp., 292 Pa. 287, 291, 141 A. 34, 35 (1928) ("Assessed, as used in our taxing statute and as here used, means a certain sum of money, fixed under a given rate on property valuation, due and payable as taxes."); People v. Priest, 169 N. Y. 432, 435, 62 N. E. 567, 568 (1902); Pipola v. Chicco, 169 F. Supp. 229, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). While these definitions of the word "assessment" vary somewhat, the cases all recognize that assessment is part of the process resulting in the payment of or demand for tax money.
The very section of the Maryland Code dealing with property tax exemptions, and the section under which the subject property was granted an exemption, shows that it is a distortion to refer to an assessment giving rise to a tax exemption. Section 9 of Art. 81 begins: "The following real and tangible personal property shall be exempt from, assessment and from State, county and city ordinary taxation . . . ." (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, exemptions are from assessment and taxation. Property cannot, under Maryland law, receive an exemption from taxation but not from assessment.
The ordinary meaning of "assessment," therefore, would preclude a holding that appellants' property was "assessed" but exempted from taxation during the years 1967, 1968 and 1969. As "assessment" is an integral part of the taxation process, leading to the imposition of taxes, exempt property is simply not "assessed." Absent some indication that the Legislature is using a term in an abnormal sense, a " 'statute should be construed according to the ordinary and natural import of the language used .'" Baltimore County v. White, 235 Md. 212, 218, 201 A. 2d 358, 360 (1964). And there is no indication that the Legislature was using the term "assessment" in the "Escaped Property" statute (Art. 81, § 34) in any unusual sense.
The same principle, that words in a statute are construed in accordance with their ordinary and natural meaning, is also fatal to appellants' other argument focusing upon the word "escape" in § 34. In appellants' view, their property did not escape assessment and taxation because, they say, the word "escape" does not encompass the deliberate act of the Supervisor granting an exemption because of a mistake of law. Appellants give an overly narrow meaning to the word. Property which was not assessed and taxed, even if by an intentional although mistaken act of the tax assessor, has "escaped" assessment and taxation.
Not only does the statutory language militate against appellants' position, but the cases fail to support their theory that only property which was unknown to the tax assessor or not on his records may be retroactively taxed under escaped property statutes. For example, in Mid Towne v. State Tax Dept., 228 Md. 66, 178 A. 2d 422 (1962), the taxpayer's tangible personal property had been assessed for the year 1957 and the tax was paid for that year. However, it was not assessed in 1958 and 1959 because of the taxpayer's initial failure to file annual reports during those years and the tax officials' subsequent failure to make the estimated assessments provided for in situations where the taxpayer had failed to report. Nevertheless, the tax officials obviously knew of the property and had records concerning it, as they corresponded with the taxpayer about the property during 1958 and 1959. In 1960, the authorities assessed the property for 1958 and 1959 as escaped property within the meaning of § 34. This Court sustained the tax officials' action, holding that Maryland's "Escaped Property" statute was applicable under the circumstances. See also Skinner Dry Dock Co. v. Baltimore City, 96 Md. 32, 53 A. 416 (1902), involving a local omitted property statute which was held applicable even on the assumption that the tax authorities knew of the property. (96 Md. at 40.)
The particular issue here, i.e., whether the Maryland "Escaped Property" statute embraces property which was erroneously granted a tax exemption for prior years, has not been decided by this Court. However, the question has arisen under the similar statutory provisions of a few other states, and the courts have held that property mistakenly given a tax exemption is escaped or omitted property subject to taxation for the period of exemption. Tally v. Brown, 146 Iowa 360, 125 N. W. 248 (1910); Inhabitants of Athens v. Whittier, 122 Me. 86, 118 A. 897 (1922); McCanna v. Board of Assessors, 48 R. I. 396, 137 A. 694 (1927); Armory Realty Co. v. Olsen, 210 Wis. 281, 293-94, 246 N. W. 513, 518 (1933). As explained by the Supreme Court of Iowa in Tally v. Brown, supra, 125 N. W. at 253:
"Is taxable property any the less omitted from the assessment roll when the assessor . . . renders his opinion that it is not taxable, than when it is left off the assessment roll through oversight or ignorance of its existence? . . . The cause of omission is not suggested in this statute, so that, if for any reason taxable property has been 'left out' of the assessment roll by the assessor, it is subject to assessment. . . ."
See also Sears v. Nahant, 215 Mass. 329, 334, 102 N.E. 494, 496 (1913), where the court stated:
"But we are of the opinion that section 85 as to omitted assessments does not require that the property be newly discovered in the sense of coming for the first time to the knowledge of the assessors, in order that it may be legally assessed. If the assessors, through want of knowledge of facts or ignorance of the law or as to their duty, or for any other honest reason have failed to include property in the annual assessment, it is omitted property within the meaning of that section, and in the exercise of good faith, they may include it in a supplemental assessment."
The principal case relied on by appellants is Baltimore C. & A. Ry. Co. v. Wicomico County, 93 Md. 113, 48 A. 853 (1901), where this Court held that the county commissioners could not "levy" taxes on a railroad's property for'previous years during which the railroad was erroneously given the tax exemption of its predecessor. However, Baltimore C. & A. Ry. Co. v. Wicomico County was decided twenty-eight years before the enactment of the present "Escaped Property" statute, Art. 81, § 34. At the time it was decided, there was no statutory provision authorizing the taxation for prior years of "escaped" property. Thus, the case cannot be relied upon in construing § 34 except to the extent it might be inferred that the Legislature, in enacting § 34, desired to overturn the result of the Wicomico County case.
The appellants also contend that several cases from other states support their position, citing Anniston City Land Co. v. State, 185 Ala. 482, 64 So. 110 (1913); People v. Dunham, 311 Ill. 439, 143 N. E. 52 (1924); German Savings Bank v. Trowbridge, 124 Iowa 514, 100 N. W. 333(1904); Thomas'etc. v. Comm., 308 Ky. 695, 215 S.W.2d 546 (1948); Gully v. Mississippi Valley Co., 181 Miss. 669, 180 So. 745 (1938); Adams v. Luce, 87 Miss. 220, 39 So. 418 (1905); Marshall Wells Co. v. Foster County, 59 N. D. 599, 231 N. W. 542 (1930); Palmer v. Beadle County, 70 S. D. 99, 15 N.W.2d 6 (1944). In all of these cases, the property involved was in fact assessed and some tax money was paid for the past years in question. Under these circumstances, the courts held that escaped property statutes wx>re not applicable and that the tax authorities could not collect more taxes on the theory that the prior assessment was defective or void (Adams v. Luce, supra)-, or because the wrong governmental entity had originally made the assessment and collected the tax (Gully v. Mississippi, supra; People v. Dunham, supra; Thomas' etc. v. Comm., supra); or because a portion of the property had not been included in the assessment (Anniston City Land Co. v. State, supra); or because the assessor had previously undervalued the property (German Savings Bank v. Trowbridge, supra; Marshall Wells Co. v. Foster County, supra; Palmer v. Beadle County, supra).
The above-cited cases disclose the line which has been drawn by most courts throughout the country. Where an assessment has actually been made and taxes paid on property, such property has not "escaped" assessment and taxation. It simply is not escaped or omitted property under the language of typical "escaped property" statutes. The language of these statutes reveals that they were not intended to authorize a retroactive increase in the assessment and taxation for prior years because of an asserted mistake in valuation, or some other alleged mistake. On the other hand, where property has not been assessed and taxed at all for the years in question, the courts have regularly held that escaped property statutes apply, regardless of whether the property wTas known or not.
Lastly, no possible reason or policy has been suggested which might justify the distinction urged by appellants. There is no rational basis for distinguishing betwxen property mistakenly granted a tax exemption and property which the assessor overlooked. In either situation, the property owners should have contributed their share to support governmental services but did not, thereby increasing the burden on other property owners. A construction of a statute which produces an unreasonable or illogical result should be avoided wherever it is possible to do so consistent with the statutory language. Coerper v. Comptroller, 265 Md. 3, 6, 288 A. 2d 187, 188 (1972); Pan Am. Sulphur Co. v. State Dept. of Assessments and Taxation, 251 Md. 620, 627, 248 A. 2d 354, 358 (1968); Sanza v. Maryland Board of Censors, 245 Md. 319, 340, 226 A. 2d 317, 328 (1967). To adopt appellants' view of the statute would lead to an unreasonable result.
The statutory language, the cases, and logic, all lead to the conclusion that the Supervisor and the courts below correctly applied the "Escaped Property'' statute to appellants' property.
Order affirmed.
Appellants to pay costs.
. Now Code (1957, 1969 Repl. Vol., 1973 Cum. Supp.), Art. 81, § 9(e).
. Code (1957, 1969 Repl. Vol., 1973 Cum. Supp.i, Art. 81, § 8(7)(ai.
. At the same time, appellants terminated the lease to the University, whereupon '.'.e "President" of the University and his family vacated the premises. Apparently, the University had no students or faculty, and the only occupants of the premises were its president and his family. Appellants state that their demands upon the president for reimbursement of the back taxes have met with no response.
. For our most recent discussion of this statute, see Supervisor of Assessments v. Bay Ridge Properties, Inc., 270 Md. 216, 310 A. 2d 773 (1973).
. Compare Code (1957, 1969 Repl. Vol., 1973 Cum. Supp.), Art. 81, § 232B, relating to the valuation of exempt property, where the context indicates that the Legislature was using the word "assessment" in two different senses in the same section.
. While the term used most often in statutes and cases is "omitted property" rather than "escaped property," it is significant that the cases seem to have used the two terms interchangeably. See, e.g., Adams v. Luce, 87 Miss. 220, 224, 39 So. 418, 419 (1905;; Independent Pipe Line Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 168 Okl. 432, 433, 33 P. 2d 797, 799 (1934); State v. Thompson-Parker Lumber Co., 173 Okl. 22, 24, 46 P. 2d 494, 496 (1935); McCanna v. Board of Assessors, 48 R. I. 396, 398, 137 A. 694, 695 (1927); Home State Bank of Blaine v. Whatcom County, 169 Wash. 486, 491, 14 P. 2d 21, 23 (1932;. And see Hopkins v. Van Wyck, 80 Md. 7, 30 A. 556 (1894;, where this Court, in connection with an earlier statutory scheme relating to 'omitted" or "escaped" property, used the two terms interchangeably throughout the opinion. See also Skinner Dry Dock Co. v. Baltimore City, 96 Md. 32, 53 A. 416 (1902).
. It should also be noted that Baltimore, C. & A. Ry. Co. v. Wicomico County involved an attempted retroactive "levy" by the county government. Section 34 does not authorize a retroactive ievy, but an assessment and taxation for past years when the property was not-assessed and taxed. Under § -34 the levy by the county commissioners for the past year is deemed to include the escaped property for that year. See Mid Towne v. State Tax Dept., supra, 228 Md. at 70-71.