Case Name: SERINTO v. BORMAN FOOD STORES
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1968-05-06
Citations: 380 Mich. 637
Docket Number: Calendar No. 45, Docket Nos. 51,502, 51,503
Parties: SERINTO v. BORMAN FOOD STORES.
Judges: Dethmees, C. J., and Black, Souths, and BebNNAN, JJ., concurred with Kelly, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 380
Pages: 637–650

Head Matter:
SERINTO v. BORMAN FOOD STORES.
Opinion op the Court.
1. Negligence — Storekeepers—Safe Condition op Premises — Customers.
The storekeeper has the duty to provide reasonably safe aisles for customers and he is liable for injury resulting from an unsafe condition caused by the aetive negligence of himself and his employees or, if otherwise caused, where it is known to the storekeeper or is of such a character or has existed a sufficient length of time that he should have had knowledge of it.
2. Evidence — Negative Evidence.
Negative evidence is evidence to the effeet that a circumstance or fact was not pereeived.
3. Same — Negative Testimony.
The burden upon the party who relies upon negative testimony is that of showing the circumstances pertaining to the nonobservance, the witness’ activities at the time, the focus of his attention, his acuity or sensitivity to the occurrence involved, his geographical location, the condition of his faculties, and all physical and mental attributes.
4. Negligence — Negative Testimony Test.
Testimony, in action by customer against storekeeper for personal injuries sustained by falling on floor of store on broken jar of mayonnaise, that during the 45 or 50 minutes she was in the store she heard no sound resembling a jar breaking held, not to meet the test for accepting negative testimony, and not to justify reasonable minds in inferring that the broken jar was on the floor before she entered the store.
Beferences for Points in Headnotes
[1] 38 Am Jur, Negligence §§ 131, 136.
[2-4] 29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 258; 30 Am Jur 2d, Evidence §§ 1092, 1093.
[5] 38 Am Jur, Negligence §§ 136, 332-334, 356, 358.
[6] 30 Am Jur 2d, Evidence §§ 1092, 1093: 38 Am Jur, Negligence §§ 285, 291.
[7] 20 Am Jur 2d, Courts § 233.
[8] 38 Am Jur, Negligence §§ 344, §45, 356,
[9] 38 Am Jur, Negligence § 358,
5.Same — Mayonnaise on Stoke Floor Aisle — -Notice—Question por Juey.
Evidence adduced in action by customer against storekeeper for personal injuries sustained by falling to floor of store aisle on broken jar of mayonnaise held, insufficient to raise a question for jury of defendant’s notice or constructive notice of unsafe condition.
Separate Opinion.
Black, J.
6.Negligence — Negative Testimony Test — Burden op Proop.
Testimony, in action by customer against storekeeper for personal injuries sustained by falling on floor of store on broken jar of mayonnaise, that during the 4S or 50 minutes she was in the store she heard no sound resembling a jar breaking does not meet the common-law test for accepting negative testimony, and does not justify reasonable minds to infer the broken jar was on the floor before she entered the store; however, the burden of proof in such cases should be revised so as to place the onus of producing evidence upon the party , who is possessed of superior knowledge or opportunity for explanation of the causative circumstances, and where a retroactive declaration is inexpedient a court should apply the outworn rule to the present case and announce that it will feel free to apply another rule to transactions consummated in the future.
Separate Opinion.
Beennan, J.
7.Negligence — Bueden op Peoop — Prospective Overruling.
Prospective overruling of the eommon-law rule placing burden of pro.of upon the customer in a supermarket slip and fall case is judicial usurpation of the legislative power and there should be no case where it is “inexpedient” to apply the correct rule of law to a case at hand.
Dissenting Opinion.
T. M. Kavanagh and Adams, JJ.
8. Negligence — Question foe Jury — Evidence—Storekeeper—Customer-Dangerous Premises — Mayonnaise.
Testimony, in action Toy customer against storekeeper for personal injuries sustained by falling on floor of store on broteen jar of mayonnaise, that during the 45 or 50 minutes she was in the store she heard no sound resembling a jar breaking, that the cashier had a view of the aisle where the mayonnaise was spilled, and that plaintiff observed no customers in the aislé, held, sufficient to present a question of storekeeper’s negligence upon which reasonable minds might differ,' and is thus a question for the jury.
Dissenting Opinion.
O’Hara, J.
9. Negligence — Constructive Notice of Dangerous Condition— Evidence.
Constructive notice of storekeeper as to existence of dangerous condition of premises is a question for jury in customer’s action for injury sustained as a result of falling on broken jar of mayonnaise in store aisle.
Appeal from Court of Appeals, Division 1, Lesin-ski, C. J., and Watts and Quinn, JJ.,. reversing Wayne; Streeter (Halford I.), J., presiding. Submitted December 5, 1967. (Calendar No. 45, Docket Nos. 51,502, 51,503.) Decided May 6, 1968. Rehearing denied September 25, 1968.
3 Mich App 183, affirmed.
Declaration by Catherine Serinto against Borman Food Stores, a Michigan corporation, for injuries sustained in a slip and fall in a store owned by defendant. Derivative suit by Anthony Serinto. Cases consolidated for trial. Verdict and judgment for plaintiffs reversed by Court of Appeals. Plaintiffs appeal.
Court of Appeals affirmed.
Jerry P. D’Avanso, for plaintiffs.
Gary, Be Gole, Martin, Bohall & Joselyn, for defendant.

Opinion:
Kelly, J.
A jury awarded plaintiff Catherine Serinto damages for an injury she received when she stepped and fell on a broken mayonnaise jar on the floor of defendant Borman Food Stores, and damages in her husband's suit for medical expenses, loss of services, and consortium. The trial court refused defendant's motion for directed verdict at the close of plaintiffs' proofs and, also, refused a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
The Court of Appeals set forth the issue by stating (3 Mich App 183, 188):
"The sole issue raised in these appeals is whether or not the plaintiffs proved a prima facie case of notice or knowledge as a matter of law. Stated another way, the question is: Was there enough evidence to raise a question of notice or constructive notice on the part of the defendant so that the matter should have been submitted to a jury for determination."
The sole question presented to this Court is: Did the Court of Appeals err in answering the above question in the negative, holding there was not enough evidence for the court to submit the question to the jury?
Carpenter v. Herpolsheimer's Co. (1937), 278 Mich 697 (syllabus 1), distinctly and concisely sets forth defendant's duty as a storekeeper, as follows:
"It is the duty of a storekeeper to provide reasonably safe aisles for customers and he is liable for injury resulting from an unsafe condition either caused by the active negligence of himself and his employees or, if otherwise caused, where known to the storekeeper or is of such a character or has existed a sufficient length of time that he should have had knowledge of it." (Emphasis ours.)
The only testimony offered to prove defendant's negligence was the testimony of plaintiff Catherine Serinto, and a resume of this testimony is set forth in 3 Mich App 183, 187, 188. The following facts are sufficient for this opinion:
Plaintiff Catherine Serinto entered defendant's store about 10:50 on Good Friday morning, March 27, 1959, with a shopping list she had prepared to take care of food and meat needs not only for Easter, but for the following week; after she had proceeded back and forth in 3 of the 5 shopping aisles, selecting articles from shelves so high she could not see from one aisle to another, she turned to enter the aisle where mayonnaise, pickles, et cetera, were displayed, and slipped and fell on a broken mayonnaise jar that was on the floor a foot or a foot and one half from the shelf; she did not see the jar or the mayonnaise on the floor before she slipped and fell; the floors in the store were "clean and clear" and the mayonnaise that was spilled on the floor from the broken jar "was a creamish white, the same as the floor"; she was familiar with the sound of breaking glass or the sound that a glass jar would make if it fell on a hard floor; and she had been in the store about 45 to 50 minutes prior to the accident and during this time she did not hear anything resembling the sound of a jar breaking.
Appellants contend the testimony that, during the 45 or 50 minutes plaintiff Catherine Serinto was in the store, she had heard no sound resembling the jar breaking, would justify reasonable minds in inferring that the broken jar was on the floor before she entered the store, and "defendant should have known of its existence after 45 to 50 minutes, and that this failure constituted negligence."
Appellee calls attention to the fact that there was no testimony as to what extent the jar was broken before Mrs. Serinto's fall, and contends there was no testimony to sustain plaintiffs' contention that the jar fell from a shelf with a clearly andible smash; that the jar could have rolled off a shopping cart; could have fallen from a shelf a few inches from the floor; could have dropped from the hand of a customer who partially arrested its fall, yet have fallen far enough to crack the glass sufficiently to scatter the mayonnaise, arid concludes with the statement : "To find constructive notice from this record, we have first to infer that the jar fell, second, infer that it made a noise, and finally, infer that the noise was such that Mrs. Serinto at some undefined distance, concentrating as she states she was upon her own shopping and her shopping list, would have heard it. To permit a jury to infer notice from these things, is simply to permit speculation in the place of proof."
Plaintiffs rely on "negative evidence," defined as "evidence to the effect that a circumstance or fact was not perceived," to sustain the requirement that they proved constructive notice.
Granting due favorable view to plaintiff Catherine Serinto's testimony that she did not hear any sound, the absence of which was and is requisite to her theory of recovery, the fact remains that what she related in such regard constitutes valueless negation within the rule which this Court applied in Dalton v. Grand Trunk Western Railroad Co. (1957), 350 Mich 479. In Dalton, as here, no witness heard what the plaintiffs said did not occur (the timely blowing of the whistle of the oncoming train), yet the Court ruled unanimously that the plaintiffs had .failed to make out a submissible case of causal neg ligence. The reason given was the same as that which we now assign (pp 485, 486):
"The mere fact of nonhearing, standing alone, ordinarily has no probative valne whatever as to the occurrence, or nonoccnrrence, of the event. Many of ns did not hear the bombs falling on Pearl Harbor. Thus the burden upon him who relies upon negative testimony is marked: he must show the circumstances pertaining to the nonobservance, the witness' activities at the time,- the focus of his attention, his acuity or sensitivity to the occurrence involved, his geographical location, the condition of his faculties, in short, all those physical and mental attributes hearing upon his alertness or attentiveness at the time. We expressed this principle in Lambert v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie R. Co., 209 Mich 107, 113, in which we held, per Fellows, J.:
" 'This analysis of the cases shows that in those relied upon by the plaintiff it was held that where the witnesses testified that they were listening, their attention was upon the train, its coming was upon their minds and they were paying heed to it, that then their testimony makes a case for the jury. This upon the theory that if they were listening, giving the train heed and attention, the probabilities are they would have heard the signals if they had been given.' "
This quotation was followed by an extended discussion of the authorities which have dealt with negative testimony and the circumstances under which such testimony will or will not make out a jury question of negligence and causation.
Plaintiff Catherine Serinto's testimony did not meet this negative testimony test and we do not agree with appellants' contention that her testimony that, during the 45 or 50 minutes she was in the store, she heard no sound resembling that of a jar breaking, would justify reasonable minds in infer ring that the broken jar was on the floor before she entered the store.
The Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that there was not sufficient evidence to justify submitting to the jury the question of defendant's notice of the existence of the broken mayonnaise jar on the floor of defendant's store.
Affirmed. Costs to appellee.
Dethmees, C. J., and Black, Souths, and BebNNAN, JJ., concurred with Kelly, J.
4 Callaghan's Michigan Heading & Practice (2d ed), § 36.193,