Case Name: Rafael VARAS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2001-12-05
Citations: 815 So. 2d 637
Docket Number: No. 3D99-2420
Parties: Rafael VARAS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: Before COPE, GREEN, and SHEVIN, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 815
Pages: 637–643

Head Matter:
Rafael VARAS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 3D99-2420.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Dec. 5, 2001.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 27, 2002.
Valerie Jonas, Miami Beach, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General and Roberta G. Mandel, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Before COPE, GREEN, and SHEVIN, JJ.

Opinion:
GREEN, J.
Appellant, Rafael Varas, was convicted of trafficking in cocaine after a jury trial. On this appeal, he argues, among other things, that the trial court abused its discretion in not permitting him to cross-examine the Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA") agent about certain testimony given at trial which the agent had omitted in prior sworn statements. The state responds that such cross-examination would have been tantamount to non-critical, negative impeachment of the DEA agent. We disagree with the state and reverse for a new trial.
The case against Varas began on November 7, 1996, when an acquaintance of Varas by the name of Rafael Alujas telephoned DEA Special Agent Luis Perez with a tip that Varas would be going to the home of Otoniel Ginard to pick up some cocaine. Agent Perez relayed this information to DEA Special Agent Brett Scott who immediately set up a surveillance operation in front of Ginard's home. Shortly thereafter, agents observed Varas drive up to the house and go inside, where he remained for seven to ten minutes. They also observed Varas leave the house carrying an opaque brown shopping bag. Varas did not attempt to conceal the bag, nor did he display any abnormal behavior. After he got back into his car and had driven one hundred yards, the DEA agents activated their police lights and stopped Varas.
Agent Scott identified himself as a DEA agent and observed the brown shopping bag in the middle of the floorboard. The bag was within arm's reach of Varas' right leg. Scott asked Varas' permission to search the car, to which Varas replied "no problem." Scott asked Varas about the contents of the bag and Varas did not respond. Scott then asked Varas' permission again to search the car and Varas again stated "no problem." Agent Scott deserved that crumpled floral type papers at the top of the opaque bag completely-obscured its contents from view, until he manually widened the opening. Underneath the crumpled papers, Scott found a brick comprised of 1003.3 grams of cocaine, wrapped in opaque tape. When this tape was dusted for prints by the police, they lifted a print matching Ginard, but found no evidence of a match to Varas. The police discovered additional cocaine and money on Ginard's person, but none on Varas. Both Varas and Ginard were arrested, although the case against Ginard was later no-actioned by the state.
Varas, who had no prior criminal record, defended this charge on the grounds that he was unaware of the fact that the bag contained cocaine. He testified at trial that he had agreed to pick up the bag at the request of Alujas, a mutual friend of his and Ginard, and was under the belief that the bag contained a power drill.
According to the defense theory, Alujas had set Varas up in order to procure a sentencing reduction in a pending federal criminal case. Alujas had been charged in a four-count federal indictment for cocaine-related offenses. Approximately seven months prior to Varas' arrest, Alujas entered into a cooperation agreement with the United States government. According to the terms of the agreement, if Alujas pled guilty to Count I, conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, and provided information to the government about the "criminal wrongdoing of other persons," the government would dismiss the remaining three counts against him and recommend a downward departure from the federal sentencing guidelines.
In the month following Varas' arrest in this case, Alujas was sentenced on Count I only, for possession with intent to distribute cocaine. This offense carried a minimum mandatory sentence of ten years or a maximum of life in prison and a fine of four million dollars. Alujas was sentenced to 108 months in prison and five thousand dollars. Prior to Varas' arrest, Alujas had never provided the government with any information which led to an arrest. In fact, the only information which Alujas provided pursuant to his agreement with the government was that which led to Var-as' arrest in this ease.
At trial, Agent Scott testified that when Varas was twice asked whether his car could be searched by the police, Varas appeared nervous, but appeared more nervous when asked about the contents of the brown bag. According to Agent Scott, Varas' eyes gave the appearance that he was scared, his face was sweating and his eyebrows were twitching. On cross-examination, Agent Scott was asked by the defense why he had failed to mention Var-as' scared eyes and sweaty, twitching demeanor in his written arrest report, pretrial deposition or during his testimony at the suppression hearing conducted on the day before trial. The state objected to this cross-examination on the grounds that it constituted "negative impeachment." The trial court sustained the objection.
At the close of the state's case in chief, the defense moved for a judgment of acquittal on the grounds that the state had failed to establish the element of Varas' knowledge of the cocaine in the bag. The trial court denied this motion based upon Agent Scott's testimony as to Varas' sweaty, twitching demeanor as well as Varas' silence when asked about the bag's contents. During closing argument, the state again alluded to Varas' nervous demeanor as circumstantial evidence of his knowledge of the contents of the bag. The jury convicted Varas as charged and the instant appeal was taken.
Varas asserts that the trial court erred in prohibiting the defense from impeaching Agent Scott on his failure to mention Varas' nervous demeanor when asked about the contents of the bag in three prior sworn statements: (1) DEA arrest report; (2) pretrial deposition and (3) the motion to suppress testimony given a day prior to trial. Through such cross-examination, the defense was attempting to establish that the witness was fabricating details about Varas' demeanor for the purpose of establishing Varas' knowledge of the contents of the bag. Varas argues, and we agree, that the lower court erred in its determination that this proposed cross-examination amounted to non-critical negative impeachment of the witness.
It is well-settled that a witness may be impeached by a prior inconsistent statement, including an omission in a previous out-of-court statement about which the witness testifies at trial, if it is of a material, significant fact rather than mere details and would naturally have been mentioned. See State v. Smith, 573 So.2d 306, 313 (Fla.1990). This also includes omissions in police reports provided such omissions are of material and critical facts which are in serious contention at trial. See State v. Johnson, 284 So.2d 198 (Fla.1973) (stating that: "[a]bsent some singular importance attaching to the point in question, which goes to a material and critical fact in serious contention in the trial, a negative basis is not the kind of use of a police report which justifies breaching the normally protected police reports and investigative notes, reports and files.... The inquiry must be upon a crucial point . and the point involved in vital focus so that it becomes critical to the defense."). Negative impeachment is more likely deemed to be permissible where a witness appears to be fabricating. See Morton v. State, 689 So.2d 259, 264 (Fla.1997).
The state does not challenge this well-settled law, but asserts that the DEA agent's trial testimony as to Varas' nervous demeanor while being questioned about the contents of the bag was mere non-critical details and for this reason, we must affirm Varas' conviction based upon our decision in Jimenez v. State, 554 So.2d 15 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). We do not agree that the DEA agent's omitted statements constituted immaterial or non-critical details and for this reason Jimenez does not control here. In order to be convicted of the offense of trafficking in cocaine, four elements must be established beyond a reasonable doubt: a) that the defendant knowingly purchased or possessed a certain substance, b) the substance was cocaine, c) the quantity was 28 grams or more, and d) the defendant knew the substance was cocaine. Fla. Stat. § 893.135(1) (1997). The state must establish its case either by direct or circumstantial evidence. Dupree v. State of Florida, 705 So.2d 90 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). While Varas' possession of the bag containing cocaine was undisputed at the trial below, his sole defense to the charge was that he lacked knowledge of the fact that the bag contained the substance and believed that he was transporting a power drill at the request of someone he deemed to be a friend. The state utilized the DEA agent's testimony as to Varas' demeanor to establish circumstantially Varas' knowledge of the contraband. Moreover, the trial court later relied upon that testimony to deny Varas' motion for judgment of acquittal. Considering the record before us, we do not understand how the DEA agent's testi mony may be deemed mere non-critical details. The DEA agent's testimony about Varas' demeanor went to the very heart of the defense below and we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to allow Varas to impeach the agent about the omission of such evidence during pretrial statements. As for Varas' remaining points on appeal, we find that they either lack merit or have been rendered moot by this decision.
We, therefore, reverse the appellant's conviction and sentence and remand for a new trial consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
SHEVTN, J., concurs.
. Other than Agent Scott's testimony, there was no other evidence of Varas' knowledge of the contents of the bag and during the trial below, Varas denied that he was ever asked about the contents of the bag by the DEA agent.