Case Name: Manning v. Tyler and another
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1860-06
Citations: 21 N.Y. 567
Docket Number: 
Parties: Manning v. Tyler and another.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 21
Pages: 610–617

Head Matter:
Manning v. Tyler and another.
Pleading defence of usury.
The Code has not relaxed the precision required in stating the defence of usury; an answer which merely avers usury, in general terms, is deemed frivolous, on a motion for judgment.
Appeal from the general term of the Supreme Court, where a judgment against the defendants, on the ground of the frivolousness of their answer, had been affirmed.
This was an action against the defendants, as maker and indorser of a promissory note for $300. The answer averred that the plaintiff made a loan to the maker of the note, upon which the other defendant was an accommodation indorser, on the security thereof, at a greater rate of interest than seven per cent, per annum; that the original note was renewed, from time to time, and upon each renewal thereof, the plaintiff received a greater rate of interest than seven per cent., wherefore, the answer averred, that the note sued on, which was the last of the series of renewals, was usurious and void.
aPPtica/fci°n °f the plaintiff to a justice of the court, judgment was given on account of the frivolousness of the answer, under § 247 of the code; which having been affirmed at general term, this appeal was taken.
Parker, for the appellants.
Porter, for the respondent.

Opinion:
Bacon, J.
That the answer in this case is bad, within all the rules of .pleading, heretofore recognised in the courts, cannot, I think, be questioned. It consists, in effect, of nothing more than a general averment that the note on which the suit is brought is void for usury. It does not aver what the usurious agreement was; between whom it was made; the quantum of usurious interest that was agreed upon and received; nor that the agreement was intentionally usurious and corrupt. The old rule of pleading required all this particularity. Thus, in Vroom v. Ditmas (4 Paige 526), the Chancellor, speaking of the manner in which usury must be set forth in a pleading, says, " the defence must be distinctly set up in the plea or answer, and the terms of the usurious agreement, and the quantum of the usurious interest or premium, must be distinctly and correctly set up." See also, to the same effect, New Orleans Gas Company v. Dudley (8 Paige 452); Curtis v. Masten (11 Id. 15), and numerous other cases. In the case of the New Orleans Gas Company v. Dudley, the Chancellor, speaking of an answer thus bald and deficient in these essential elements, says, that such a pleading would certainly be considered bad, both in form and substance, if pleaded as a defence to a suit upon a bond or evidence of debt, in a court of law.
Under our present system, which requires the facts constituting a defence to be plainly and concisely set forth, this rule cannot be deemed to be relaxed; and so are the cases, Fay v. Grimstead (10 Barb. 321-9); Gould v. Horner (12 Id. 601). The answer, then, is bad in sub stance for the *want of these essential allegations, .and being thus fatally defective, the defendant having presented to the court below no affidavit of merits, nor made any application to amend the pleading, s.o as to present a defence, the judgment here should be final against him.
Everything stated in this answer may be true, and yet no usury whatever have existed in the transaction; since, there may be many cases where more than seven per cent, is actually received upon a loan, and yet the transaction be entirely uninfected with usury; and the law will never presume a corrupt and usurious, nor, indeed, any other unlawful agreement, from a state of facts that-is equally consistent with a lawful purpose.
The case of Catlin v. Gunter (11 N. Y. 368) in no respect aids the defendant. That case turned entirely on the question of variance; the answer set forth the defence of usury, in a full and unmistakable manner, and cpuld not be objected to as a pleading in any form; the usury proved on the trial differed in several particulars from that alleged, but not in its entire scbpe and meaning; and the court consequently held, under the provision of the code applicable to variances and the power of amendment, that- the variance, it not having been alleged that the party was misled by it, should have been deemed immaterial. It is conceded, in the opinion of the court in that case, that if the answer had been,in general terms, that' the' note was, at its inception, negotiated upon a usurious consideration, it would have been bad for its generality. That is the whole scope of the answer in- this case.
It is insisted, that- the remedy of the plaintiff was, to move, under § 160 of the code, to^make the answer more certain and definite. It is very true, that resort might have been had to this section, if the plaintiff had elected to compel the defendant to put in an issuable answer; but' that is only one of the remedies which the law af fords. If the answer is so bad, that it presents no defence at all, then, another proceeding is provided, by which it can be disposed of in a summary manner, and the delay which the defendant obviously seeks (and which, in this *case, he has succeeded in oh-taming), by such a naked pleading, be defeated. (Code § 247; People v. Macumber, 18 N. Y. 315).
Such was the relief sought by the plaintiff in this case, and the court properly determined, upon a view of the pleadings, that it presented no defence, and gave judgment accordingly. The judgment should be affirmed.