Case Name: Keith Darnell JENKINS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1982-11-24
Citations: 422 So. 2d 1007
Docket Number: No. AI-309
Parties: Keith Darnell JENKINS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., C.J., and McCORD, BOOTH, LARRY G. SMITH, SHAW, JOANOS, THOMPSON and WIG-GINTON, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 422
Pages: 1007–1010

Head Matter:
Keith Darnell JENKINS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. AI-309.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Nov. 24, 1982.
Michael E. Allen, Public Defender, Nancy Daniels, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Kathryn L. Sands, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Opinion:
MILLS, Judge.
Jenkins was convicted of aggravated battery and carrying a concealed firearm. He contends the trial court erred in assessing costs of $10.00 for the Crimes Compensation Fund and $2.00 for the Law Enforcement Training Fund in each judgment entered against him. Jenkins further contends the trial court erred in excluding certain testimony as hearsay in the aggravated battery charge.
Of its own motion, the Court voted to consider this proceeding en banc.
A majority determined that the proposed opinion in this case conflicted with Mobley v. State, 414 So.2d 25 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), but then agreed to recede from Mobley and adopt the proposed opinion in this case.
The costs issue was not presented to the trial judge. At the sentencing proceeding the judge, in open court and before Jenkins and his counsel, imposed the costs. He then found Jenkins indigent and appointed the public defender to represent him on appeal. It is not apparent that these are inconsistent. Section 27.52, Florida Statutes (1981), establishes the criteria for a determination of indigency. Even the most cursory reading of that statute, as well as common sense, reveals that a defendant may be unable to afford attorneys and the large court costs dealt with in State v. Byrd, 378 So.2d 1231 (Fla.1979), or Arnold v. State, 356 So.2d 862 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), but is still easily able to pay $12.00 or $24.00. Jenkins was given ample opportunity to object and to convince the trial judge of his inability to pay the charge. He failed to take advantage of either.
Sections 939.05 and 939.15, as well as 924.17, are asserted as protecting Jenkins from the costs assessment. These are the statutes applied in Arnold and Byrd, supra. Neither are applicable to the special costs imposed by Sections 960.20 and 943.25(4), Florida Statutes (1981). See Griggs v. State, 416 So.2d 1270 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982).
We recede from our decision in Mob-ley v. State. A defendant who objects to the imposition of costs under Sections 960.-20 and 943.25(4) shall be required to timely object on the ground of insolvency and shall offer due proof of insolvency in open court.
The trial court must find that the defendant is wholly unable to pay the $12.00 in costs and, if it so finds, shall discharge the defendant from the payment of the $12.00. See Section 939.05. The finding of indigen-cy under Section 27.52 is not applicable to the costs imposed by Sections 960.20 and 943.25(4).
We recognize that our decision may conflict with Engle v. State, 407 So.2d 641 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981); Ivory v. State, 419 So.2d 695, (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); Jackson v. State, 419 So.2d 394 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); and Johnson v. State, 419 So.2d 412 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). It appears, however, that in each of these cases the trial court may have found the defendant insolvent and unable to pay the costs assessed under Section 960.-20 and Section 943.25(4). If this is the case, and the decisions do not specifically say one way or the other, there is no conflict.
Two points are raised against the aggravated battery conviction which require discussion.
Jenkins' defense was that the victim, Thorne, attacked Jenkins with a knife, requiring Jenkins to shoot Thorne in self-defense. Thome denied the knife attack. A witness, Furlough, testified that shortly before the incident Thorne sat next to Furlough, then approached Jenkins at a "slow run." Thorne had his knife out when sitting with Furlough, but Furlough was unable to see whether it was out when Thorne approached Jenkins.
Furlough was prepared to testify that Thorne had stated, "I'm going to straighten Keith (Jenkins) up." This was excluded as hearsay. This was error. The statement, while clearly hearsay, was admissible. Sections 90.803(3)(a) 1 and 2, Florida Statutes (1981), provide an exception for just such a statement of intent. Thorne's intent as he approached Jenkins was probative of whether his knife was in fact out, which is important to Jenkins' defense. The statement by Furlough that sometimes Thorne kidded does not indicate a lack of trustworthiness so as to invoke Section 90.803(3)(b) 2. The jury should have been allowed to .consider Thorne's statement and give it what weight it thought appropriate.
We need not decide whether the use of incorrect penalty instructions is reversible error, but on retrial the appropriate instruction for a case with a mandatory minimum should be used.
No error is asserted in Jenkins' conviction for carrying a concealed firearm and it is affirmed.
The assessment of costs issue is affirmed and the judgment of conviction for aggra vated battery is reversed and this charge is remanded for a new trial.
ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr., C.J., and McCORD, BOOTH, LARRY G. SMITH, SHAW, JOANOS, THOMPSON and WIG-GINTON, JJ., concur.
ERVIN, J., specially concurs.
SHIVERS, J., dissents in part and concurs in part with opinion with which WENTWORTH, J., concurs.