Case Name: In re Estate of George F. Bauer, deceased. Susie D. BAUER, Appellant, v. Mary Douglas REESE, as Executrix of the Estate of George F. Bauer, deceased, et al., Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1964-03-03
Citations: 161 So. 2d 678
Docket Number: No. E-172
Parties: In re Estate of George F. Bauer, deceased. Susie D. BAUER, Appellant, v. Mary Douglas REESE, as Executrix of the Estate of George F. Bauer, deceased, et al., Appellees.
Judges: CARROLL, DONALD K., J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 161
Pages: 678–683

Head Matter:
In re Estate of George F. Bauer, deceased. Susie D. BAUER, Appellant, v. Mary Douglas REESE, as Executrix of the Estate of George F. Bauer, deceased, et al., Appellees.
No. E-172.
District Court of Appeal of Florida. First District.
March 3, 1964.
Rehearing Denied March 30, 1964.
Shell, Fleming & Davis, Pensacola, for appellant.
James E. Hertz of Fisher & Hepner, Pensacola, for appellees.

Opinion:
STURGIS, Chief Judge.
George F. Bauer died testate on July 10, 1962, leaving a will executed September 13, 1956, devising his homestead to his widow, appellant Susie D. Bauer, and the remainder of his considerable estate equally to his paternal and maternal relatives. Bauer had no children and his parents predeceased him. Letters testamentary issued to appel-lee Mary Douglas Reese, a cousin, the executrix designated by his will. His widow, being dissatisfied with the terms of said will, petitioned to have same set aside upon two grounds: (1) that Bauer was mentally incompetent at the time he executed the will; and (2) that she is the pretermitted spouse of decedent. On motion of appellee the probate court struck the second ground of the petition, and after taking extensive testimony pertaining to the first ground dismissed the petition with prejudice. The widow now appeals.
The evidence herein reflects that Bauer's parents were exceptionally frugal persons who successfully instilled that characteristic into their son, George F. Bauer, the decedent. He lived with them until their death and thereafter continued to live on the home place, which was permitted to become impoverished and unlcept in its appearance and furnishings. In September of 1955 George and Susie were married, both being well along in their adult years. Approximately one year later, they became separated and on February 22, 1957, were divorced. After living apart for slightly more than one year, they were remarried on October 26, 1957, and continuously lived together as man and wife until George's death July 10, 1962.
On the question of decedent's mental capacity at the time of executing the will, his widow presented extensive proofs showing that he was a stingy man, one who did not want anything changed around the house from the way his mother had left it, that the house had only one electrical outlet and she had to cook on a kerosene stove. Her primary contention on the first ground for revocation is that since her husband was worth more than $300,000 (most of which he inherited from his parents) his frugal manner of living demonstrates mental incompetency. She also testified that on September 10, 1956, decedent dragged her into the kitchen and threatened to kill her, and insists that such an outburst on his part reflects mental instability rendering him incompetent three days later to execute the will. Decedent's doctor, lawyer, stockbroker and others testified that he was an astute businessman who knew what he was doing when he made his will. The record contains evidence amply supporting the trial judge's conclusion that appellant wholly failed to prove mental incompetency on the part of the testator.
Appellant's remaining contention is that she is a pretermitted spouse within the purview of section 731.101, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., so that the will executed by decedent in September 1956, which was prior to the decree of divorce terminating their first marriage, is inoperative to delimit the interest in his estate to which she is entitled as his widow in consequence of their remarriage and his death without having made another will. Otherwise stated, it is her position that by virtue of the statute the decree of divorce rendered null and void all provisions of the will providing benefits for her, and that their remarriage was inoperative in itself to renew or validate the same. We agree.
Section 731.101, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., provides:
"All wills offered for and admitted to probate subsequent to June 11, 1951, made by husband or wife who have been divorced from each other subsequent to the date of said will, shall be made null and void by means of said divorce insofar as said will affects the surviving divorced spouse."
It is apparent that enactment of this statute (c. 26914, Acts 1951) was induced by the fact that under the prior case law of this jurisdiction the fact of divorce and property settlement did not impliedly revoke a prior will or bequest benefiting the divorced spouse. See Ireland v. Terwilliger, 54 So. 2d 52 (Fla.1951), followed in Davis v. Davis, 57 So.2d 8 (Fla. 1952).
We find no special equities in this case invoking anything other than a literal construction and application of the statute. We are aware that in Conascenta v. Giordano, 143 So.2d 682 (Fla.App.1962), it was held that where a literal interpretation of the statute would lead to an unreasonable conclusion or purpose not designated by the legislature, it is the court's duty to interpret the statute in accordance with the clear purpose and intent of the legislature. We think our conclusion supports that rule. Indeed, in Conascenta the statute was applied to prohibit the pretermitted spouse from taking under the will.
Section 731.101, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., is clear, concise and unambiguous to a specific purpose. There is no room for exceptions contrary to its plain provisions, hence we have no difficulty in literally applying it in this case and in recognizing the appellant as the lawful widow of the deceased in like manner as if the first marriage never existed. The provisions of F.S. Section 731.-10, F.S.A., have no bearing upon the issue on this appeal.
As said by this court in Rogers v. Rogers, 152 So.2d 183 (1963) :
"The implication of these decisions is that in the absence of clear legislative intent, the courts will not create or destroy a testamentary disposition on the theory that the result accords with the natural desires of the deceased. These decisions provoked the enactment of F.S. 731.101, F.S.A." (Emphasis supplied.)
We do not recede from that pronouncement in any particular. The fact here is that the legislative intent is clear and affords no basis for gerrymandering the legislative will by fiat of this court.
We are convinced that the legislative intent behind F.S. § 731.101, F.S.A., was not to invest married persons with a spigot-like means to turn their testamentary attitudes off and on at random by the device of executing a will, following it with divorce, following it by remarriage, and so on ad in-finitum. The legislative purpose was unquestionably directed toward curing the incongruous situation resulting when, as is usually the case, the divorced parties do not make successive excursions upon the sea of matrimony and the testator dies leaving a will extant containing benefits to the divorced spouse. The legislature might well have had in mind the fact that some deaths occur before the testator has had an opportunity following divorce to reframe or destroy the existing will or has simply neglected to do so; that if he desires the divorced spouse to participate in his estate, the better rule is to require a new will to be executed to that effect.
Perkins v. Brown, 158 Fla. 21, 27 So.2d 521, relied on by appellee, was decided prior to enactment of F.S. § 731.101, F.S.A., so the conclusions therein were not based upon considerations applicable to the case on review. In Perkins the testatrix omitted any reference to her husband and the statute there involved (F.S. § 731.10, F.S.A.) insures that the surviving spouse shall share in the testator's estate to the extent that such spouse would have been entitled if the testator had died intestate "unless provision has been made for such spouse in the will." F.S. Section 731.10, F.S.A., has no relation to the circumstances involved on this appeal and is clearly inoperative to reactivate the provisions in favor of appellant as contained in the will made during the term of her first marriage to the deceased. The purpose of F.S. § 731.10, F.S.A., is clearly dis tinguishable from that of F.S. § 731.101, F.S.A., and these statutes are to be independently construed.
The power of the legislature to limit testamentary dispositions and to control the descent and distribution of estates of decedents is well recognized. Statutes governing descent and distribution are the product of the experience of the ages and commonly accepted standards of social behavior. When persons once divorced remarry they do so "for better or for worse" no less than in the first instance. Neither should be permitted to have his or her fingers crossed by the secret weapon of a will executed in the climate of their former marriage.
For the reasons stated, that part of the order striking the second ground upon which appellee relies for relief is vacated, and this cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.
CARROLL, DONALD K., J., concurs.
RAWLS, J., dissents.