Case Name: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Jackie YOUNG, Appellant
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1975-03-18
Citations: 460 Pa. 598
Docket Number: No. 565
Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Jackie YOUNG, Appellant.
Judges: Before JONES, C. J., and EAGEN, O’BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX and MANDERINO, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania State Reports
Volume: 460
Pages: 598–604

Head Matter:
334 A.2d 252
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Jackie YOUNG, Appellant.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Submitted Nov. 11, 1974.
Decided March 18, 1975.
Eugene II. Clarke, Jr., Philadelphia, for appellant.
F. Emmett Fitzpatrick, Dist. Atty., Richard A. Sprague, 1st Asst. Dist. Atty., Steven H. Goldblatt, Asst. Dist. Atty., Chief, Appeals Div., Philadelphia, for appellee.
Before JONES, C. J., and EAGEN, O’BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX and MANDERINO, JJ.

Opinion:
OPINION OF THE COURT
O'BRIEN, Justice.
Appellant, Jackie Young, was tried by a judge and jury and found guilty of voluntary manslaughter. Post-trial motions were denied and appellant was sentenced to a term of five to ten years in a state correctional institution. This appeal followed.
Appellant's conviction arose out of the homicide of one Morris J. Washington in Philadelphia on July 27, 1973.
Appellant first argues that his statement to police should have been suppressed as being the product of an unnecessary delay between his arrest and arraignment. The facts surrounding this statement are as follows. Appellant was arrested on July 30, 1973, at 7:15 a. m. and transferred to police headquarters, where he arrived at 7:35 a. m. He was left alone until 8:30 a. m. at which time he was given his Miranda warnings and was interviewed until 9:00 a. m. From 9:00 a. m. to 10:45 a. m. appellant was left alone and rested. He was again interviewed from 10:45 a. m. until 11:50 a. m., during which time he denied knowledge of the homicide and consented to a polygraph test. From 11:55 a. m. to 12:20 p. m., appellant was given lunch and permitted to make a phone call. From 12:20 p. m. until 1:15 p. m., he was given an explanation of the polygraph test and background information was taken. At 1:15 p. m., prior to the administration of the polygraph test, appellant gave an oral admission which was reduced to writing, and signed by appellant. This statement was the same as his formal confession, taken at a later time.
Upon the record before us today, we cannot conclude that the delay in appellant's arraignment bore a direct relationship to his statement. While appellant's initial statement came some five hours after his arrest, he was only questioned for one hour and twenty-five minutes during the five hour period; the remaining time was spent either while appellant rested, was given his meals, or was processed. There was no proof that the delay was a contributing factor in the confession. See Commonwealth v. Blagman, - Pa. -, 326 A.2d 296 (1974) and Commonwealth v. Rowe, 459 Pa. 163, 327 A.2d 358 (1974).
Appellant next argues that the trial judge erred in refusing to give appellant's requested charge relating to self-defense. We do not agree. Appellant's confession established that the homicide was committed after an initial encounter with the victim and after which he obtained a gun and sought out the victim to continue the affray. This certainly takes the case out of the rule of self-defense. Moreover, appellant's trial testimony in no way establishes self-defense. Appellant testified at trial that he did not commit the homicide. Under these facts, we find no error in the trial judge's refusal to charge on self-defense. See Commonwealth v. Camp, 459 Pa. 569, 330 A.2d 844, 1975.
Appellant lastly argues that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on the defense of alibi. We do not agree. The record in the instant case would not support such a finding and the trial judge was not in error when he denied the requested charge. Appellant's trial testimony establishes that the defense of alibi would not be involved in this case when he testified as follows:
"The next day, when I came out, a couple of people told me a man got killed on Sydenham and Columbia. Then I started thinking about me being around there, that I would get blamed for the problem.
"Q. Why did you think you would get blamed ?
"A. Well, for number one, I was around there at that time. I was around there."
Under these facts, appellant, in his trial testimony, placed himself in the area of the murder at the time it was committed and, therefore, eliminated the trial judge's need to charge on alibi. See Commonwealth v. Glenn, 321 Pa. 241, 183 A. 763 (1936).
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
ROBERTS, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which NIX and MANDERINO, JJ., join.