Case Name: Walter K. Shaw v. Postal Telegraph & Cable Company
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1901-10
Citations: 79 Miss. 670
Docket Number: 
Parties: Walter K. Shaw v. Postal Telegraph & Cable Company.
Judges: 
Reporter: Mississippi Reports
Volume: 79
Pages: 670–697

Head Matter:
Walter K. Shaw v. Postal Telegraph & Cable Company.
1. Contbacts. Foreign statute. Comity. Telegram. Cypher message.
The validity of a contract made in Massachusetts for the transmission and delivery of a cypher dispatch to an addressee in Tennessee is to be determined by the statutes of the state where made as construed by its supreme court, although such construction be in conflict with the principles of the common law. Whitfield, C. J., dissenting.
3. Same. Rules of telegraph company. Extra pay to insure acewracy.
Where, construing its own statutes, the supreme court of Massachusetts has held a regulation of a telegraph company requiring the payment of an additional sum to insure accuracy in the transmission of a dispatch reasonable and valid, the courts of this state will, in a suit on a contract there made, follow the Massachusetts decisions, although the contract would have been void if made in this state as exempting the company from liability for its negligence. Whitfield, C. J., dissenting.
From: the circuit court of Marshall county.
HoN. Z. M. Stepi-ieNs, Judge.
Shaw, appellant, was plaintiff in court below; the Telegraph Company was defendant there. The facts are fully stated in the opinion of the court.
The case was first decided at the March term, 1900, but a reargument was granted, and the judgment of reversal then entered vacated, and the cause was continued. The opinion of the court, delivered by Woods, C. J., at the March term, 1900, the one recalled, to which reference is made in the dissenting opinion of Whitfield, C. J., was as follows:
“It is much to be regretted that the opinion of the court in this case, by reason of the necessity for its immediate preparation by its writer, must be confined to a general statement of the views which are held by us.
“By sec. 195 of our present constitution telegraph companies are declared to be common carriers in their line of business, and subject to liability as such. On the case presented by the record before ns, we are of opinion that the stipulations of the Telegraph Company limiting its liability in the transmission .of messages by it is in purpose and effect an attempt by the company to limit its liability for negligence, and to guard against the consequences of its negligence, and is, under our law, and the public policy of this state, invalid.
“Regarding and treating this as an action for the wrong done by the company to the appellant by its breach of its duty to transmit his message correctly, and the substitution therefor of another and a false one, and in view of the knowledge of the company of the nature of appellant’s business, and- of its custom to receive and transmit his cipher messages in the transaction of his business, we are of opinion that the company is liable to the full extent of the injury suffered by the appellant for its breach of duty in the transmission of the cipher message.
“The authorities in harmony with, as well as those opposed to our views, will be found carefully collected in the briefs of the respective counsel.
“The action of the court below on the pleadings, as well as its judgment finally, must be overruled and reversed.
Reversed and remandad„
Tim B. Cooper, for appellant.
The single question upon which a reargument has been directed, is whether a certain stipulation printed on the back of the telegraph blank on which the message was written is and was a legal limitation of the liability of the company. The provision of this limitation was, that the company should not be liable for mistakes or delays in the transmission or delivery of an unrepeated message, beyond the amount received for sending the same.
Under the decisions of the supreme court of Massachusetts ’such limitation is held to be reasonable and legal, and it is admitted by the appellant that if suit had been brought in the courts of Massachusetts, no recovery could be had beyond the price paid for sending the message. The question upon which the court has invited reargument is whether the plaintiffs’ right of action is. controlled by the laws of Massachusetts, in which state the contract for the transmission of the message was made.
The following propositions are settled by the decision at the former term, and, as I understand, the court does not desire reargument as to these: (1) That the telegraph company is liable for the erroneous transmission of a cipher message; (2) that the damages sued for are such as may be recovered; (3) that at the common law the stipulation for exemption from liability by the telegraph company is unreasonable and invalid, because it is a stipulation to exempt the company from liability for its own negligence. Adhering to these propositions as decided, the inquiry of the court, as I understand it, is whether the law of Massachusetts recognizes the stipulation as valid and legal, and whether that law is to control because the contract was made in that state. The reply to the question thus propounded by the court is, that under the law of Massachusetts the stipulation for exemption is invalid and illegal, although under the decisions of the supreme court of that state it would be held to be reasonable and valid. In other words, my proposition is that the law of Massachusetts is one thing, the decisions of its supreme court is another; and that those decisions do not correctly decide what the law of that state is. The decisions of the supreme court of Massachusetts do not rest upon any statute. The only statute of that state having relation to telegraph companies is as follows: “Every company shall receive disj>atches from and for other telegraph companies and associations, and from and for any persons, and on payment of the usual charges for transmit- ling dispatches, according to the regulations of the company, shall transmit the same faithfully and impartially.” This statute means such regulations of the company as are “reasonable and proper,” as has been held by the courts of that state. Ellis v. Telegraph Company, 13 Allen, 235.
The supreme court of Massachusetts, in the cases cited by counsel for the appellee, has held, in accordance with the views expressed by some other courts, that a regulation by the telegraph company for exemption from injury resulting from ordinary negligence, is valid at the common law. It is not held that the statute makes valid such stipulation, but that they are valid at common law. The supreme court of Mississippi has uniformly held that no common carrier, and no corporation exercising callings or engaged in business from which arise duties to serve the public, can stipulate or contract for exemption from the consequences of its own negligence, whether the degree of negligence be what is called slight or gross. In this case this proposition remains so decided, and the court has'not invited its reargument.
It is not true that the decision of a court makes the common law except as to those matters which are of local concern, and which become by a settled course of decision rules of property in the several states, or become rules of settled local policy, The supreme court of this state, and the supreme court of Massachusetts, in determining precisely the same question, have reached diametrically opposite conclusions on a matter determinable, not by Massachusetts statutes, but by the general commercial or common law of the country. The Massachusetts courts say that at common law a telegraph company may stipulate for exemption from liability for its own negligence. The supreme court of Mississippi holds that such stipulations are unreasonable and illegal.
The question is, whose judgment is to control, in a suit pending in this court, and to be by it decided ? Both decisions cannot be right. If the Massachusetts court has rightly de- cicled, tbis court ought to follow such decision, not because it is the decision of the state in which the contract is made, but. because it is correct. But' if this court has rightly decided, the Massachusetts court has wrongly decided, and the single question is whether the supreme court of this state shall follow an erroneous decision of the supreme court of another state, simply because the 'question arises in a case in which the contract which has been breached was there made. It is admitted by counsel for the appellee that if the federal court, sitting in the state of Massachusetts, entertained the view which this court holds, such federal court, if the plaintiff had sued therein, would have awarded a recovery, notwithstanding the fact that the Massachusetts courts would hold the stipulation for exemption valid.
If this concession correctly states the law, it would seem to end the controversy. But since the court cannot accept the admission of counsel as the law of the case, I shall attempt to show by authorities that the rule is correctly stated by me and conceded by counsel.
There are some matters as to which the decisions of state courts in a sense make the common law of their states, and as to which other courts, without i'egard to their own views, will accept such decisions as conclusive. Among such instances the following may be stated:
1. The extent and character of the powers which its various political and municipal organizations shall possess. Claiborne Go. v. Brooks, 111 IT. S., 400.
2. The construction of its statutes and constitution as shown by a settled course of decision. Leffingwell v. Warren, 2 Black, 699; Luther v. Borden, 7 Hum., 1; Post v. Supervisors, 105 U. S'., 667.
3. Those rules declared by the local tribunals which relate to rights and titles to things having a permanent locality, such as rights and titles to real estate and other matters immovable and intraterritorial in tbeir nature. Swift v. Tyson, 16 Peters, 1.
4. Pules governing tbe descent, transfer, or sale of property. Bucher v. Cheshire R. R. Co., 125 IJ. S., 555.
5. Pules and law of evidence in actions at law. Ex parte Fish, 113 II. S., 713; Nitcor v. Hurt, 13 Pet., 378; Ryan v. Bindley, 1 Wall., 66.
6. Local usages and customs having the form of laws. Bonen v. Neivel, 1 Z. N. Y., 290; Banh v. Shaiv, 61 N. Y., 283.
7. Modifications of the common law made necessary by the situation and local conditions existing in the several states. V. & J. R. R. Co. v. Patton, 31 Miss., 156; Oreen v. Weller, 32 Miss., 650; Crane v. French, 38 Miss., 503.
Clearly the present controversy is not in reference to a matter local in its nature, within any of the tests just stated.
I shall now attempt to show by authority that the question involved is one of general law, which each court must decide for itself, and that the decisions of the Massachusetts courts are not of controlling authority. With due deference to opposing counsel, it is submitted that they have mistaken a Con'S ict of decision for a conflict of laws. When this court speaks of common law it means the same body of laws to which the Massachusetts courts refer when they speak of the common law; and although the courts of the two states may, in their application of the general principles of this body of laws, reach opposing conclusions, this does not show a conflict of law, but a conflict of decision or opinion merely. If an action had been brought in the state of Massachusetts upon a contract determinable by the laws of France, and the courts of that state had decided what the law of France was, such decision would not be conclusive upon this court in another action brought for breach of another contract made in France. Each court would determine for itself what the law of France was, and the decision of the Massachusetts court would be valuable only as an aid to this court in considering the question. Put whenever this court should be satisfied that the decision of the Massachusetts court was erroneous, such decision would be disregarded. Wherever a contract is made in a common law state, and its breach is sued for in' another common law state, nothing is gained by speaking of the lex loci contractus and of the lex fori, for they are precisely the same.
It is in the very nature of things impossible for a conflict of law to arise where the same system obtains in the two states. There may be a conflict of decision, but there cannot be a conflict of law. As I have heretofore stated, this court has held, and yet holds, that the stipulations for exemption printed on the back of the telegraph blank is invalid under the general law of the land; under that law which obtains both in Massachusetts and Mississippi. The supreme court of Massachusetts, on the other hand, have held that such an exemption is valid under that system of law common to both states. The decisions which are cited herein, are largely found in the cases before the sujDreme court of the United States, because they are more numerous in that court than elsewhere, and because the principles which apply are more fully and accurately stated in such decisions ; but it is respectfully submitted that counsel for appellee are mistaken in characterizing the principle which these cases announce as a mere rule of the federal court. In all the cases cited in this brief, and in all the cases to be found in the decisions of the supreme court of the United States, the principle which controls is, that when questions are determinable not by local, but by general laws, each court, when called upon to decide, must determine for itself what that law is, and must determine for itself to what state of facts it should be applied. The decision of the Massachusetts court is not more conclusive upon a common law question decided by it where the right of action arose in Massachusetts, than it would be if the right of action came into existence in another common law state. In either event that court would be speaking of the same general system of laws — what is known as the common law, and which when not modified by statute or by local usages, is the same in all the common law states.
The following authorities clearly support our contention: Swift v. Tyson, 16 Peters (TJ. S.), 1; Railroad Go. v. Prentice, 147 TJ. S., 101; Liverpool, etc., Co. v. Phoenix, etc., Go., 129 TJ. S., 397; Railroad Go. y. Lockwood, 17 Wallace (TJ. S.), 357; Myrick y. Railroad Go., 107 TJ. S., 102; Illinois, etc., R. R. Go. v. Frankenburg, 54 Ill., 88; Illinois, etc., R. R. Go. v. Johnson, 34 Ill., 389; Chicago v. Robbins, 2 Black (TJ. S.), 418; Railroad Go. v. Bank, 102 TJ. S., 14; Hough v. Railroad Co., 100 TJ. S., 217; Nutting y. Railroad Go., 1 Gray (Mass.), 502; Borroughs y. Railroad. Go., 100 Mass., 26; Railroad Go. v. Baugh, 149 TJ. S., 369.
J. R. McIntosh and Frank Johnston, for appellee.
There is no doctrine of law better settled, or more universally and firmly established, than that the validity and construction of a personal contract is governed by the place where it is made, and if valid by the lex loci contractus, that it is valid everywhere. Story’s Conflict of Laws, sec. 242.
Chancellor Kent states the doctrine to be, that a contract valid by the lex loci contractus is valid everywhere, and that “it is founded on necessity and commercial convenience.” 2 Kent’s Commentaries, 454, 458.
And the doctrine is so stated by Wharton in his work on the Conflict of Laws, secs. 401, 409.
In the case of Ivey v. Lalland, 42 Miss., 444, involving the question of the validity of a promissory note made in Louisiana, during the civil war, the consideration of which was Confederate money, the court thus stated the rule on this subject:
“The general principle as to the validity of a contract is, that a contract which is valid where it is made, is to be held valid everywhere. And, on the other hand, if void or illegal by the law of the place where made, it is void everywhere. The general rule as to the construction of contracts is, that if they relate to movables which have no situs or place, they are to be construed according to the place where they are made, or the lex loci contractus; and if they relate to immovables, or what the common law terms -real property, they are to be construed according to the laws of the place where the property is situated, or the lex loci rei sitae. But in respect to all questions as to the forms, or methods, or conduct of process or remedy, the law of the place of the forum applies, or the lex fori governs.”
The court decided the case according to the decisions of the supreme court of Louisiana.
This doctrine was announced by this court in the case of Brown v. Freeland, 34 Miss., 181. The note sued on in that case was made in Mississippi, and was payable in New York, and, according to the law of New York, was usurious. The question was whether it was governed by Mississippi law or the laws of New York. The court said in its opinion: “The lex loci contractus controls the nature, construction, and validity of the contract, and if valid by that law, it is equally so everywhere.” The court then noted the qualification to the rule, that where the contract is made in one country, but to be performed in another, it may be presumed that the parties contracted with reference to the laws of the latter country. But the court said on this point: “This, however, being but presumption, must be controlled by the actual truth of the case when ascertained, or, in other words, by the intention of the parties, to be collected from the contract itself and the surrounding circumstances. ”
In the case of Garroll v. Benich, 7 Smed. & M., 798, the question was in respect to the construction of an ante-nuptial contract made in Tennessee, and involving personal property. The question, arising upon the contract, was whether the instrument came within the rule in Shelley’s case. According to the decisions of the supreme court of Tennessee, the first taker under the instrument took a fee simple under that rule. Tbe supreme court of this state entertained the opinion that if the contract was gwerned by Mississippi law, the first taker would not have taken a fee, but a life estate, with the remainder limited over in fee. The court applied the law of Tennessee to the contract, but in doing so, Mr. Justice Clayton delivering the opinion, said: “We wish it distinctly understood that this opinion is given solely with reference to the laws of Tennessee. It is a case of first impression in this State, and we wish no misapprehension of our views on this point.”
The case of Banlc of Louisiana, v. Williams et. ux.„ 46 Miss., 618, involved the question as to what extent a promissory note made in Louisiana in the year 1857, by a married woman who was domiciled in Mississippi, was binding upon her personally, or upon her separate estate here. The note was secured by a mortgage on property in Louisiana. By the Mississippi law, if the contract had been made here, she would not have been bound personally by the note. The legislative charter of the Bank of Louisiana allowed married women, their husbands joining with them, to mortgage their property to secure debts due to the bank. The question in the case was whether the contract was governed by the lex loci contractus, or the lex domicilii.
The court decided that the contract was governed by the lex loci contractus, and, upon a construction of the Louisiana statute, held the contract to be valid, but that it was limited in its operation to the estate of Mrs. Williams in that state, and not binding upon her separate estate in Mississippi. Mr. Justice Simrall, delivering the opinion of the court, said, on the doctrine of the lex loci contractus: “It will thus be perceived that this is one of those embarrassing questions arising out of the conflict of laws so perplexing to the courts. The general rule is, that the lex loci contractus governs as to validity and ccustruelion, unless, indeed, some other state or country is appointed by the parties as the place of performance, and the contract is made with special reference to its law.”
In Lawrence v. Pullman Gar Go., 74 Miss., 782, the question of liability, as well as the question of the measure of damages, was decided according to the decisions of the State of Illinois, where the tort occurred. Both were common law questions, not arising under any statute. It is thus seen that this doctrine is firmly settled as the law of this state by the decisions cited, as well as by several other cases where the rule is also expressly recognized by this court.
The authorities in other states are to the same effect. Turnpike Qo. v. Warren, 6 N. TL, 150; Stix v. Matthews, 75 Mo., 96; King v. Knepper, 22 Mo., 550; Smith v. McLean, 21 Iowa, 329; Arnold v. Potter, 22 Iowa, 198; Davis v. Bronson, 6 Iowa, 424; Savary v. Savary, 3 Iowa, 272; Mead v. Smith, 3 Conn., 253; Bank v. Donally, 8 Peters (U. S.), 372; Pear-sall v. Dwight, 2 Mass., 84; Scudder v. Bank, 91 U. S., 406; Story’s Conflict ox Laws (2d ed.), sec. 37.
Contracts limiting the 'liability of common carriers and telegraph companies do not constitute any exception to the rule, but are governed by the doctrine .that the validity and construction of contrails are to be determined by the lex loci con-tractus.
There is a uniform current of decisions on this subject, in which the doctrine of the lex loci contractus is applied to this class of contracts. A number of leading and well-considered cases on the precise point now under consideration are cited for the consideral ion of the court. Qantur v. Bennett, 39 Tex., 303; Robinson v. Transportation Qo., 45 Iowa, 470; Railroad (Jo. v. Boyd, 91 Ill., 268; Hale, v. Navigation Go., 15 Conn., 539; Pennsylvania Qo. v. Fairchilds, 69 Ill., 260; Railroad Qo. v. Smith, 74 Ill., 320; ITazel v. Railroad Go., 82 Iowa, 477; Talbott v. Transportation Qo., 41 Iowa, 247; Forepaugh v. Railroad Qo., 128 Pa. St., 217; Fairchilds v. Railroad Qo., 148 Pa. St., 527; Railroad Qo. v. Exposition, etc., Mills, 81 G-a., 522; Palmer v. Railroad Go., 101 Cal., 187; Fonseea v. Steamship Go., 153 Mass., 130; Reed v. Telegraph Go., 135 Mo., 661.

Opinion:
CalhooN, J.,
delivered tbe opinion of tbe court.
Appellee bad a telegraph office in Boston, Mass. Appellant-contracted with it in that city to send a .cipher dispatch to Memphis, Tem£\in these words: "Haycock, to-day. Impetus, aggress, balcony ceremony, charter, charioteer, leaven, thirty, daisy." On the back of this message was a printed stipulation that the company should not be liable for mistakes in transmission of obscure or cipher messages unless the sender insured it, as he might do, by paying a trifling sum in excess of the usual charge. This message, as delivered in Memphis, Tenn., was as above, except that the middle letter "r" in the word "charter" was changed to the letter "t," so as to make the/ word "charter" read "chatter." This word "chatter" was also a cipher character in complainant's telegraphic code, but it had a very different meaning from the word "charter." The message contracted to be sent, when translated, would read thus: "We do not see any chance of selling the cotton you have offered to-day. The best offer we can obtain is 5 7-8 cents, 300 average strict middling, nothing below middling; good, strong staple, nothing below 1 1-16 inches long; cotton to be shipped within thirty days. Dwight Mfg. Co., Chicopee, Mass." The message actually delivered in Memphis, when translated, read thus: "We do not see any chance of selling the cotton you have-offered to-day. The best offer we can obtain is 5 7-8 cents, 300 average strict middling, nothing below middling; some sand and dusty staple, nothing below 1 1-16 inches long; cotton to be shipped within thirty days. Dwight Mfg. Co., Chicopee, Mass." The word "charter" meant "good, strong staple," while the word "chatter" meant "sand and dusty." The difference between the letter "r" and the letter "t" in the message cost the sender about $1,000. The mistake by the transmitting operators seems quite infinitesimal, but the result was grave; and this, to the average mind, emphasizes the curious carelessness in the telegraphic codifier in using such similar words with such opposite meanings. Ap- pell ant brought his action at law in tort for his damages— $1,054.18.
\ Whether the action be ex contractu, or ex delicto, arising out N*of the contract, it must be controlled by the lex loci of the contract. )This is finally conceded!) It is also conceded that in the courts of Massachusetts appellant would be denied the right of recovery. It is also plain, and conceded, that the constitution and laws of the state of Mississippi, have nothing whatever to do with the case, but that it must be determined by the Caws of the state of Massachusetts. On behalf of the appellant, [however, it is contended that the law prevailing in the state of Massachusetts was the general common law, which the courts of each state must determine for themselves, regardless of the adjudication of what the common law is by the courts of the state of the contract. But it is admitted, as it must be from the uniform and universal rulings of all courts, that, regardless of the residence of the parties, where there is. a statute, the construction and interpretation of the statute by the court of the state of the statute is binding on the courts everywhere. It is, of course, not tolerable to avoid this universal rule by a mere change of the form of action from one on the contract to one in tort for non-performance of the contract. If complainant could not sue in Massachusetts because of its statute, he cannot sue anywhere. A statute of Massachusetts, existing at the time of the contract, referring to the telegraph companies, is in these words: "Every company shall receive dispatches from and for other telegraph lines, companies, and associations; and, on payment of the usual charges for transmitting dispatches according to the regulations of the company, shall transmit the same faithfully and impartially." Gen. St., 1860, p. 373, sec. 10. This statute was considered by the supreme court of Massachusetts in 1866 in the case of Ellis v. Telegraph Co., 13 Allen, 226. That court, consisting of six judges, speaking through Chief Justice Bigelow, after discussing the common law, said: "But we need not have recourse to these familiar and well-settled principles of the common law, in order to establish the right of the owners and conductors of the telegraph companies to make rules and regulations by which to define and limit their duties and obligations in the transaction of the business which they assume to parry on. This right is clearly recognized and affirmed by the statute already cited." Page 235. The court then proceeds to hold that the "regulation" must be reasonable according to the "true interpretation of the statute" (page 235), and then holds that the requirements of increased tariff to insure accuracy is reasonable, about which the court says: "Upon this point we can entertain no doubt." The same court, differently constituted in its personnel as to several of its members, composed of seven members, speaking through Chief Justice Gray, recited the same statute, and arrived at the same conclusion. This was in 1873. Grinnell v. Telegraph Co., 113 Mass., 299 (18 Am. Rep., 485). Appellant tries to escape from these decisions by urging upon us that the scope and extent of the statute is a common-law question, not to be finally settled by the courts of the state of the statute. This cannot be. Courts may construe and interpret the scope and extent of their local statutes, and say what they embrace, or do not embrace, and their conclusion must be authoritative in every other state. It is not possible to interpret a statute without interpreting its scope. What a statute embraces, or does not embrace, is necessarily in every construction of it. At least, the writer cannot now recall or imagine a case where there could be any need of construction or interpretation except only to determine what it includes or excludes, what it comprehends or does not comprehend — in other words, its scope and effect. Now it is conceded that the Massachusetts court holds that the statute of that state does include the matter in controversy, and this ends the case. The 'position that because sec. 195 of our constitution makes telegraph companies common carriers, and our courts have held that they cannot contract against their own negligence, enables us to invalidate a valid or mate valid an invalid Massachusetts contract, is unsupported by any decision in the whole world. If so, Massachusetts could validate and invalidate Mississippi contracts. There is no penalty in either state. One simply makes the contract valid, the other invalid, and the whole question is, in which state was it entered into ? There is no statute in either state declaring that its courts shall not enforce, or shall enforce, valid or invalid contracts under the statutes of the other, as ivas the case in Lemonius v. Mayer, 71 Miss., 514 (14 So. Rep., 33). One state cannot be made the dumping ground for lawsuits between citizens of another State when they cannot recover from each other in their own state, where they made the contract, because of their own statute as construed by their own court. It is idle to attempt to assimilate this case to the case of general transitory actions allowable in the home courts. Our own court has repeatedly held that actions in tort, as well as in contract, are governed by the'law of the place of the ^injury. Railroad Co. v. Wallace, 50 Miss., 244; Car Co. v. Lawrence, 74 Miss., 782 (22 So. Rep., 53); Martin v. Railroad Co. (Miss.), 27 So. Rep., 646; Railroad Co. v. Crudup, 63 Miss., 291; Railroad Co. v. Doyle, 60 Miss., 977. And in some of these cases, there were no statutes, and the decisions are looked to in order to ascertain the law of the state of the injury. But it is unnecessary to decide upon the question of the controlling law where, there is no statute. The real complaint here is the non-execution of a Massachusetts contract, and the fact that the defendant's damaging mistake was made by its operative in Georgia in repeating the message can make no difference. The contract of transmission was entire; and solemn contract rights cannot be destroyed by a mere trick of pleading in denominating them torts, even if this changed the case. It is clear that we must look to the judicial decisions in a state to ascertain the law in all cases where they construe their own statutes. All statutes, without a solitary exception, existent or conceivable, must be interpreted by the rules of the common law. But the decisions of the courts of the state of the statute, right or wrong, must be final. It is for them tc say what is the true construction and scope of their own statute by their view of the common law, or by their own reasoning, sound or unsound. In Block v. McMurry, 56 Miss., 217 (31 Am. Rep., 357), our own court held a Sunday contract made here void because of our laws. But in McKee v. Jones, 67 Miss., 405 (7 So. Rep., 348), it held that a defendant sued in this state on a Louisiana Sunday contract, was bound because that state had no law against a Sunday contract. \Even public policy must yield to the law of the state of the contract, unless where the statutes of the forum forbid enforcement in its courts, or the matter is .malum, m ses An action in tort for damages for breach of a contract made in one state, by citizens of that state, which cannot be maintained, either in that state or in the state of performance, because of the ruling of the courts of those states, cannot be maintained anywhere. )jTt seems right to charge the whole world with notice of the statute law of the place of the contract, but to charge citizens only with notice of the rulings of their court on the binding force of such a contract in commercial dealingsj The powers given appellee, by the Massachusetts statute, to impose "reasonable regulations," as construed by her court of last resort, surely must govern all courts of all other states and nations. There has not been, and, it is probable, never can be, produced a case where two citizens of the same state contract in that state, and the courts of that state deny the right of action because of their construction of the powers allowable in the scope of their own state statute, that one of the parties, without relief in that state, may step across the border and find relief. That is the effort here, and it ought to fail. It is a misconception of a great and universal principle to hold that, because the Massachusetts court may have erred in its view of the common law in holding what was a "reasonable regulation" in the scope of the Massachusetts statute, therefore it did not bind all other courts. It is the conclusion arrived at, not the reasoning, wbicb binds. The former judgment is vacated, and the decision below is
Affirmed.