Case Name: Patricia A. FLYNN, Appellant (Petitioner Below), v. Eldon F. BARKER, Appellee (Respondent Below)
Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana
Jurisdiction: Indiana
Decision Date: 1983-06-27
Citations: 450 N.E.2d 1008
Docket Number: No. PS478
Parties: Patricia A. FLYNN, Appellant (Petitioner Below), v. Eldon F. BARKER, Appellee (Respondent Below).
Judges: GARRARD, J., concurs.
Reporter: North Eastern Reporter 2d
Volume: 450
Pages: 1008–1011

Head Matter:
Patricia A. FLYNN, Appellant (Petitioner Below), v. Eldon F. BARKER, Appellee (Respondent Below).
No. PS478.
Court of Appeals of Indiana, Third District.
June 27, 1983.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 10, 1983.
Patricia A. Flynn, pro se.
Robert E. Kabisch, Hunt, Suedhoff, Bor-ror & Eilbacher, Fort Wayne, for appellee.

Opinion:
HOFFMAN, Presiding Judge.
On February 23, 1979, the court dissolved the marriage of Patricia Flynn and Eldon Barker. The dissolution decree ordered that Barker should pay the sum of $200 per month as support for their minor child. The support was to be paid to the clerk of the court along with an annual fee. The decree also declared Barker the owner of his U.S. Social Security rights and military pension rights from Canada.
No payments were made by Barker to the clerk of the court. However, the parties did stipulate that more than $200 per month was received by the minor child in the form of social security and military pension funds due to Barker's disability. Flynn brought an action seeking support arrearages. The court ruled in favor of Barker and this appeal results.
Flynn raises the following two interrelated issues on appeal:
(1) Did the trial court err in construing the dissolution decree in such a manner that the disability income pay ments received by the minor child were credited to Barker as satisfying his support obligation? and
(2) Did the trial court's construction of the dissolution decree in such a manner amount to a retroactive modification of the support order?
A judgment entered by a trial court shall be upheld if sustainable on any theory. Creech v. LaPorte Production Credit Ass'n (1981), Ind.App., 419 N.E.2d 1008; Van Orman v. State (1981), Ind.App., 416 N.E.2d 1301. A trial court may "correct a judgment to make that judgment conform to the intent of the trial court in entering the judgment in [sic] first instance." Lankenau v. Lankenau (1977), 174 Ind.App. 45, at 48, 365 N.E.2d 1241, at 1243. In Lankenau the trial court was concerned with correcting a mistake in its prior judgment. The rationale of Lankenau applies with equal force in the case at bar, where the trial court attempted to interpret ambiguous language within its prior judgment. It is imperative that a trial court clear up an ambiguity in the language of its judgment so that the parties may conform their conduct to that intended by the trial court.
A judgment is construed in the same manner as a contract would be. The language of a judgment is ambiguous where it would lead two reasonable men to different conclusions as to its effect and meaning. Ethyl Corp. v. Forcum-Lannom Associates (1982), Ind.App., 433 N.E.2d 1214; Indiana Industries, Inc. v. Wedge Products (1982), Ind.App., 430 N.E.2d 419. When construing the language of a judgment the Court will attempt to read the provisions of the judgment so as to render all of them effective and not mere suplu-sage. Evansville-Vanderburgh Sch. Corp. v. Moll et al. (1976), 264 Ind. 356, 344 N.E.24 831; Woodruff v. Wilson Oil Co. (1978), 178 Ind.App. 428, 382 N.E.2d 1009.
The language at issue in the case at bar is quoted herein:
"83. That Respondent be and hereby is ordered to pay to the Clerk of this Court for the maintenance and support of said child the sum of $200.00 per month, commencing forthwith, said sums to be paid by the Clerk to the Petitioner herein. Respondent is further ordered to pay to the Clerk of this Court the annual support service fee.
* a # # #k u
"11. That the Respondent be and hereby is declared the owner of his U.S. Social Security Rights and any rights from Canada."
Record at 67.
The trial court presumably interpreted provision No. 11 as referring to the United States social security and Canadian benefits paid to respondent's son by reason of his disability. Any other interpretation would render the provision meaningless, a construction we will not apply. Appellant urges us to conclude that provision referred to respondent's personal United States social security and Canadian benefits. Such a construction would render provision No. 11 redundant as he already owns those individual benefits and neither the wife nor son would have any claim to them through the dissolution proceedings. By treating rc-spondent as owner of the benefits paid to his son, the receipt of those payments would satisfy the support requirement as they exceeded $200 as ordered. Provision No. 3 could be read so as to require respondent to pay $200 to the clerk in the situation where the benefits to the son are terminated as they would be if respondent returned to work and was no longer eligible for those benefits. Such an interpretation gives effect to both provisions.
In any event the trial court interpreted the ambiguous language of its judgment. The interpretation given that language by the trial court is supported by the facts and legal theory. Our duty as an appellate court is to uphold the trial court's decision when it is sustainable, as it is in this case. For the reasons stated above the trial court's judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.
GARRARD, J., concurs.
STATON, J., dissents with opinion.