Case Name: PEOPLE v. COLLINS
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1971-10-19
Citations: 36 Mich. App. 400
Docket Number: Docket No. 9684
Parties: PEOPLE v. COLLINS
Judges: Before: Levin, P. J., and Quinn and Y. J. Brennan, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 36
Pages: 400–423

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v. COLLINS
Opinion op the Court
3. Criminal Law — Sentence—Credit por Time Served.
The Court of Appeals orders a convieted defendant to be credited with 217 days on his sentence where the record shows that he is entitled to 217 days credit rather than 10 days credit allowed by the trial judge (MCLA § 769.116).
Concurrence by Levin, P. J.
2. Constitutional Law — Speedy ^rial — Demand—Waiver.
A defendant’s failure to malee a formal record-entered demand for a speedy trial constitutes a waiver of his constitutional right to a speedy trial under controlling Michigan precedent.
3. Constitutional Law — Criminal Law — Trial—Delay.
An accused person awaiting trial is protected from undue delay in the prosecution of the charge made against him by both the constitutional right to a writ of habeas corpus and the constitutional right to a speedy trial.
4. Criminal Law — Trial—Delay.
An indicted person held in prison shall, if he require it, be tried at the next term of the court after the expiration of six months from the time he was imprisoned, or shall be bailed upon his own recognizance unless it appears that the people’s witnesses have been enticed, detained, Tcept away or prevented from attending court (MCLA § 767.38).
Beferences for Points in Headnotes
[1] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 545.
[2, 9-11] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 254¡.
Waiver or loss of accused’s right to speedy trial. 57 ALB2d 302.
[3, 4, 8] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 241 et seq.
[5, 6] 39 Am Jur 2d, Habeas Corpus § 40 et seq.
[7] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 244.
5. Habeas Corpus — Bail—Discharge.
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is, at least, the right of a person to be admitted to bail if he is not indicted and to be discharged if not tried within a clearly defined period of time.
6. Habeas Corpus — Constitutional Law.
The right to a writ of habeas corpus is absolute and cannot be denied where the preconditions of the habeas corpus act have been met; it is therefore incumbent on courts to implement this constitutional right by providing clearly defined, unequivocal procedures for the release of persons held in jail for undue periods of time awaiting trial.
7. Constitutional Law — Criminal Law — Speedy Trial.
A criminal defendant is entitled to a speedy trial even where he is at large on bail.
8. Constitutional Law- — Criminal Law — Speedy Trial — Prejudice —Presumptions.
Prejudice is conclusively presumed when a criminal defendant is denied a speedy trial.
9. Constitutional Law — Criminal Law — -Speedy Trial — Demand.
A defendant’s failure to demand a speedy trial formally bars him from being discharged for not receiving a speedy trial.
10. Constitutional Law — Criminal Law — Speedy Trial — Demand.
The requirement that a defendant make a demand on the record for a speedy trial to enforce his right undermines the right to a speedy trial.
11. Constitutional Law — Criminal Law — Speedy Trial — Demand.
The rule that the burden is on a defendant in a criminal case to demand a speedy trial rather than on the prosecution and the courts to see to it that he is given a speedy trial is inconsistent with the constitution and with the language of statutes providing for a speedy trial; eases holding that a defendant must make a formal demand on the record for a speedy trial in order to enforce his right should be overruled.
Appeal from Recorder’s Court of Detroit, George W. Crockett, Jr., J.
Submitted Division 1 June 10, 1971, at Detroit.
(Docket No. 9684.)
Decided October 19, 1971.
Leave to appeal granted, 387 Micb 755.
Harold Collins was convicted of armed robbery. Defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William L. Cabalan, Prosecuting Attorney, Dominick R. Carnovale, Chief, Appellate Department, and Robert A. Reuther, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
George G. Matisb and Dorean M. Koenig, for defendant on appeal.
Before: Levin, P. J., and Quinn and Y. J. Brennan, JJ.

Opinion:
Quinn, J.
A review of the trial record, hriefs and oral arguments reveals no reversible error. That review does reveal that defendant is entitled to 217 days credit on his sentence pursuant to MCLA § 769-.11b (Stat Ann 1971 Cum Supp § 28.1083[2]), rather than the 10 days credit ordered by the trial judge.
Affirmed, but defendant's sentence is amended to reflect a credit of 217 days thereon instead of 10 days.
Y. J. Brennan, J., concurred.