Case Name: Albert Benjamin HARRISON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1977-10-19
Citations: 556 S.W.2d 811
Docket Number: No. 53245
Parties: Albert Benjamin HARRISON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
Judges: ROBERTS, J., joins in this dissent.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 556
Pages: 811–816

Head Matter:
Albert Benjamin HARRISON, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
No. 53245.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Oct. 19, 1977.
James Sparks, Jr., Beaumont, for appellant.
Tom Hanna, Dist. Atty. and Paul E. Ña-man, Asst. Dist. Atty., Beaumont, Jim D. Vollers, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

Opinion:
OPINION
PHILLIPS, Judge.
This is an appeal from a conviction for murder under the former penal code. Art. 1256, V.A.P.C. Punishment was assessed at seven years' confinement.
On June 16, 1973, appellant was arrested and charged with the murder of Daisy Taylor at the home of Robert Mouton. During the trial, it was established that the deceased, the appellant, Janette Landry and Robert Mouton were present when the shooting occurred. Mouton testified that all four persons were in the bedroom of his apartment and that as he started to leave the room he heard a shot. He immediately turned and observed the appellant with a gun in his hand pointing at the deceased.
The appellant testified that while he had been in the apartment most of the evening, he left the apartment to get a package of cigarettes. He stated that he first learned of the shooting when he returned from the store. Then, over objection and after a hearing outside the presence of the jury, the prosecutor was allowed to ask appellant if, after his arrest and during his ride to the police station, he told police officers that he had been cleaning the gun and it accidentally discharged, striking Daisy Taylor. Appellant denied making such a statement.
The State then recalled Officer Airhart, who testified, without objection, that appellant told him and the other officers that while he had been cleaning the gun it had accidentally fired and struck the deceased.
Appellant contends that this statement was a confession and, as such, the trial court erred in allowing testimony concerning the statement. Art. 38.22, V.A.C.C.P. The State, however, in its brief argues that the statement made was "exculpatory" and did not fall within the ambit of Art. 38.22, nor within this Court's decision in Butler v. State, 493 S.W.2d 190 (Tex.Cr.App.1973).
The Butler decision outlines the extensive case history behind Art. 38.22, pointing out the conflict in the cases as to whether "exculpatory" statements are included within our confession statute. In Butler, we spe cifically declined to decide if Art. 38.22 embraced exculpatory statements. In deciding the admissibility of the statement in that case, we held:
"The oral statement used for impeachment was not an exculpatory one. It was not, on the other hand, one that was incriminating, standing alone. It was an acknowledgement of subordinate facts, colorless with reference to actual guilt. It was used, however, as a direct attack upon appellant's testimony and to show that such testimony was false. And, in this sense, it was oral inculpatory testimony not within any of the exceptions pertaining to oral confessions or statements and, being by decisional law within the ambit of the statute, it was neither admissible as original evidence or for impeachment." Butler at page 196-97.
As illustrated by the Butler decision, the question here presented is not controlled by the labeling of a statement as either inculpatory or exculpatory. The issue is whether any fact or circumstance contained in an oral statement of an accused may be used by the State as a crimi-native or inculpatory fact against him. This is, in essence, the purpose of our confession statute.
"The purpose and effect of this statute is to prevent the prosecution from using against the accused the testimony of the officer having him under arrest to a verbal statement made by the accused which the state seeks to use to prove his guilt." Dover v. State, 81 Tex.Cr.R. 545, 197 S.W. 192, 196 (1917) (Concurring opinion by Judge Morrow).
In the instant case, the oral statement of the appellant was introduced by the State to negative and destroy his defense of alibi and is therefore incriminating evidence in the nature of a confession. The appellant's statement clearly falls within the purpose and spirit of the statute if not within the very letter of Art. 38.22. The plain language of the statute provides:
"In all cases where a question is raised as to the voluntariness of a confession or statement, the court must make an independent finding in the absence of the jury as to whether the confession or statement was made under voluntary conditions. If the confession or statement has been found to have been voluntarily made and held admissible as a matter of law and fact by the court in a hearing in the absence of the jury, the court must enter an order stating its findings, which order shall be filed among the papers of the cause. Such order shall not be exhibited to the jury nor the finding thereof made known to the jury in any manner. Upon the finding by the judge as a matter of law and fact that the confession or statement was voluntarily made, evidence pertaining to such matter may be submitted to the jury and it shall be instructed that unless the jury believes beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession or statement was voluntarily made, the jury shall not consider such statement or confession for any purpose nor any evidence obtained as the result thereof. In any case where a motion to suppress the statement or confession has been filed and evidence has been submitted to the court on this issue, the court within its discretion may reconsider such evidence in his finding that the statement or confession was voluntarily made and the same evidence submitted to the court at the hearing on the motion to suppress shall be made a part of the record the same as if it were being presented at the time of trial. However, the state or the defendant shall be enti'tled to present any new evidence on the issue of the voluntariness of the statement or confession prior to the court's final ruling and order stating its findings." (Emphasis added.)
As is readily ascertainable, the Legislature did not draw a distinction in the statute between exculpatory and inculpatory statements, but rather, sought to prohibit all statements which are incriminating.
This was the interpretation applied in the Butler decision, and although the Legislature could have spoken to this question, it had not done so at the time of appellant's trial. It must be presumed that the Legislature approved this interpretation. It is the function of the Legislature, not this Court, to amend the wording of Art. 38.22.
For the reasons stated herein, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
. We do not here address the question of how the amendment to Art. 38.22 affects our holding herein. See Acts 1977, 65th Legislature, p. 935, ch. 348, effective August 29, 1977.