Case Name: Warren T. Munroe, an Infant, by William T. Munroe, His Guardian ad Litem, et al., Appellants, v. Russell G. Booth et al., as Trustees of Hempstead Number 1 School District, Respondents
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1953-06-05
Citations: 305 N.Y. 426
Docket Number: 
Parties: Warren T. Munroe, an Infant, by William T. Munroe, His Guardian ad Litem, et al., Appellants, v. Russell G. Booth et al., as Trustees of Hempstead Number 1 School District, Respondents.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 305
Pages: 426–430

Head Matter:
Warren T. Munroe, an Infant, by William T. Munroe, His Guardian ad Litem, et al., Appellants, v. Russell G. Booth et al., as Trustees of Hempstead Number 1 School District, Respondents.
Argued April 24, 1953;
decided June 5, 1953.
Sidney J. Feltenstein for appellants.
I. The exclusion by the Trial Justice of a conversation was prejudicially erroneous and constituted an infraction of appellants’ constitutional rights. (Clarke v. Gilmore, 149 App. Div. 445; Dodds v. McColgan, 134 Misc. 518, 229 App. Div. 273; Timpson v. Allen, 149 N. Y. 513; Maryland Cas. Co. v. Central Trust Co., 297 N. Y. 294; Karscher v. Dewald, 246 App. Div. 21.) II. Respondents, guilty of a type of “ constructive fraud ” (passive deceit), were estopped from availing themselves of the benefit of the defense of irregularity, a defense which was the product of the fraud in question. (Matter of First Citizens Bank & Trust Co. of Utica v. Estate of Sherman, 250 App. Div. 339; Stewart v. Wyoming Ranche Co., 128 U. S. 383; Mitchell v. Mitchell, 177 Misc. 1050; Matter of Hearn, 158 Misc. 370; Rudolph v. City of New York, 191 Misc. 947.) III. The rule pronounced by the Court of Appeals in Matter of Martin v. School Bd. (Long Beach) (301 N. Y. 233) does not bar the instant cause of action. (Bubb v. Sondheim, 37 Pa. D. & C. 399; Hudson v. Ladd, 37 Wyo. 419; Carr v. Moragne, 136 S. C. 218; Russo v. City of New York, 258 N. Y. 344; Murphy v. Village of Fort Edward, 213 N. Y. 397; Matter of Hogan v. City of Cohoes, 279 App. Div. 282; Di Bartolo v. City of New York, 293 N. Y. 114; Teresta v. City of New York, 304 N. Y. 440.)
George J. Conway and George A. Garvey for respondents.
Plaintiffs having failed to serve notices of claim in the manner prescribed by law, the court had no jurisdiction over the action and hence the dismissal on the merits was correct. (Matter of Brown v. Board of Trustees, Hamptonburg School Dist., 303 N. Y. 484; Baker v. New York Central R. R. Co., 258 App. Div. 854; Hotel Glenmore v. American Eagle Fire Ins. Co., 280 App. Div. 445; Hill v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 277 App. Div. 942; Derlicka v. Leo, 259 App. Div. 607, 284 N. Y. 711; Matter of Haas v. Incorporated Vil. of Cedarhurst, 298 N. Y. 757; Matter of Martin v. School Bd. [Long Beach], 301 N. Y. 233; Di Bartolo v. City of New York, 293 N. Y. 114; Teresta v. City of New York, 304 N. Y. 440.)

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
A reversal would be justified in this ease only if the court were to ignore the plain command of the applicable statutes that the essential notice of claim must be served upon a " member of the board of education, [a] trustee, or the clerk thereof " (Civ. Prac. Act, § 228, subd. 6; General Municipal Law, § 50-e). Concededly, there was a complete failure to obey or comply with that mandate.
Mrs. Hardy, with whom the paper was left, was neither a member of the board of education nor " the clerk " of that board. And since, even on her own say-so, she had received only ' ' about three ' ' papers over a period of ten years, her acceptance of them on those prior occasions means little, if anything-. Certainly, it was not sufficient to cloak her with authority to act for the board and, obviously, not enough to render her a member of the board or its clerk.
Desirable though relaxation of statutory provisions relating to service may appear, to avoid a seemingly harsh result, the courts may not disregard clear and explicit requirements imposed by the legislature. In fact, that body, when providing that certain defects on the face of the notice itself could be rectified, was careful to exclude the correction of any irregularity 1 ' pertaining to the manner o/ service thereof ' ' — the precise situation here — unless the requisite notice was " actually received " by an authorized person (General Municipal Law, § 50-e, subds. 3, 6). It was in keeping with that legislatively declared policy that we recently held sufficient and proper the sending of a notice of claim by ordinary mail, even though the statute prescribed that it be forwarded by a ' registered " letter. (See Teresta v. City of New York, 304 N. Y. 440.)
The legislature having spoken unequivocally, the court may not disregard its pronouncement and, contrary to it, dispense with the requirement that the notice of claim he served upon one of the persons designated.
The judgment of the Appellate Division should be affirmed, with costs.