Case Name: Oliver BOZEMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2006-06-07
Citations: 931 So. 2d 1006
Docket Number: No. 4D04-2232
Parties: Oliver BOZEMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: GUNTHER, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 931
Pages: 1006–1010

Head Matter:
Oliver BOZEMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 4D04-2232.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
June 7, 2006.
Rehearing Denied July 12, 2006.
Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, and Anthony Calvello, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Richard Valuntas, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
TAYLOR, J.
Appellant Oliver Bozeman was tried by jury and convicted of grand theft of an automobile. He appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the inference to be drawn from possession of recently stolen property. He argues that the evidence was insufficient to show the exclusive possession required for the instruction. We disagree and affirm appellant's conviction.
While on routine patrol in Lauderdale Lakes shortly after midnight, Deputy William Leffew observed a 1990 Mazda pushing a 1967 Chevrolet Malibu. The deputy stopped the two vehicles. Appellant was driving the Mazda. His brother, Antoine McIntyre, was in the front passenger seat. Appellant was using the Mazda to push the Chevrolet Malibu. The Malibu had been stolen from a residence earlier that evening. Joe Bolling was in the driver's seat of the stolen Malibu. The Malibu's headlights were not on and the engine was not running. There was no vehicle tag on the Malibu. Inside, the vehicle's steering wheel column was damaged and there was no key in the ignition. The Malibu's driver side window was shattered and broken glass was on that side of the floorboard. When stopped, appellant told the deputy that McIntyre had purchased the Malibu and that he was merely helping him transport it to McIntyre's house. All three men were arrested at the scene for theft of the Chevrolet Malibu.
Co-defendant Bolling pled guilty to grand theft and possession of burglary tools. When he was sentenced, he told the judge that appellant had nothing to do with the crime. Bolling also testified at appellant's trial. He said that he and McIntyre elicited appellant's help in moving the car without telling appellant that the car was stolen.
During the jury charge conference, defense counsel argued that the standard instruction allowing the jury to infer that the defendant knew that the property was stolen based on his possession of the recently stolen property should not be given because it did not apply. The trial court disagreed and instructed the jury, as follows:
Proof of possession of recently stolen property, unless satisfactorily explained, gives rise to an inference that the per son in possession of the property knew or should have known that the property had been stolen.
Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 14.1 at 270.
The jury found appellant guilty of grand theft. He was sentenced to ten years in prison as a habitual felony offender. On appeal, he challenges the above instruction and his sentence.
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the inference arising from possession of recently stolen property because the evidence did not demonstrate that appellant possessed the stolen vehicle or that he possessed the vehicle to the extent that he exercised any dominion and control over it.
A trial court's decision regarding jury instructions is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. Lewis v. State, 693 So.2d 1055, 1058 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997).
At trial, appellant's defense to the grand theft charge was that he did not know that the car was stolen. The jury instruction at issue is a standard jury instruction in theft cases that permits the prosecution to prove by inference that a defendant knew or should have known that property in his possession was stolen. See Scobee v. State, 488 So.2d 595, 598 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). However, before the prosecution can receive the benefit of this jury instruction, it must first produce evidence that the defendant possessed the property. Chamberland v. State, 429 So.2d 842, 843 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); Ridley v. State, 407 So.2d 1000 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). The state must demonstrate that the possession was personal, i.e., involved a distinct and conscious assertion of possession by the accused, and that the possession was exclusive. Chamberland, 429 So.2d at 843; Garcia v. State, 899 So.2d 447 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005); Boone v. State, 711 So.2d 594, 596 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); King v. State, 431 So.2d 272 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983).
As the first district explained in Scobee:
The "exclusive" requirement does not mean that defendant's possession must be separate from the possession of all other persons. The joint possession of two or more persons acting in concert is "exclusive" as to any one of them.
Scobee, 488 So.2d at 598; see also Walker v. State, 896 So.2d 712, 720 n. 5 (Fla.2005) (approving Scobee's analysis of the "exclusive" requirement in joint possession cases).
In People v. White, 99 Ill.App.2d 270, 240 N.E.2d 342 (1968), officers observed the defendant pushing a recently stolen automobile into an alley at 3:00 a.m., and another person sitting at the wheel of the vehicle. When the officers approached, the man at the steering wheel fled. The court stated that the evidence established that "the car was in the joint possession of the defendant and his partner." Id. at 343. In finding the facts sufficient to raise a presumption of guilt and warrant a conviction for theft, the court explained that "[ajlthough the defendant was not inside the vehicle, he was exerting control over it by pushing in into the alley." Id.
Similarly, in this case, the evidence showed that appellant exercised dominion and control over the Malibu by pushing it while Bolling controlled the car's steering and braking. Without appellant's actions, the car could not have been moved. The two men jointly controlled the car and jointly possessed it. Because this was the sort of possession necessary to support the instruction on inference of knowledge, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in giving this instruction to the jury. It was up to the jury to weigh appellant's explanation for possessing the car and decide whether to accept the correctness of the inference. See Scobee, 488 So.2d at 599.
As to the defendant's habitual offender sentence, we affirm on the authority of McBride v. State, 884 So.2d 476, 478 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (holding that "Blakely does not entitle a defendant to have a jury determine whether he has the requisite predicate convictions for a habitual felony offender sentence"), and Washington v. State, 895 So.2d 1141, 1143 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (holding that "shotgun" notice of intent to seek habitual offender sentence is valid).
Affirmed.
GUNTHER, J., concurs.
FARMER, J., dissents with opinion.