Case Name: TOWNSEND v. PERRY et al.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1911-07-11
Citations: 130 N.Y.S. 951
Docket Number: 
Parties: TOWNSEND v. PERRY et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 130
Pages: 951–960

Head Matter:
TOWNSEND v. PERRY et al.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.
July 11, 1911.)
1. Specific Performance (§ 121 )—Contract to Devise—Evidence.
A contract of persons taking a child to live with them that on their death he should have all their property, if they had no children, otherwise an equal share with their children, if founded on paroi, must in an action for specific performance be established by the clearest and most convincing evidence.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Specific Performance, Cent. Dig. §§ 387-395; Dec. Dig. § 121. ]
2. Specific Performance (§ 121 )—Contract to Devise—Evidence.
Evidence in' an action for specific performance of a written contract, purporting to be 50 years old, whereby persons taking a child to live' with them agreed that on their death he should have all their property, if they had no children, otherwise an equal share with their children, held insufficient "to establish its genuineness.
[Ed. Note.—Por other cases, see Specific Performance, Cent. Dig. §§. 387-395; Dec. Dig. § 121. ]
3. Evidence (§ 313 )—Declarations—Weight.
Evidence of declarations made many years before is very unsatisfactory, especially where the declarants are deceased.
[Ed. Note.—Por other cases, see Evidence, Cent. Dig. §§ 1166-1167; Dec. Dig. § 313. ]
Spring and Williams, JJ., dissenting.
Appeal from Equity Term, Yates County.
Action by Frank B. Townsend against Ezekiel C. Perry and others. From a judgment for plaintiff (124 N. Y. Supp. 143), decreeing the specific performance of a contract, defendants appeal.
Reversed, and new trial granted.
See, also, 142 App. Div. 910, 126 N. Y. Supp. 1148.
Argued before McLENNAN, P. J., and SPRING, WILLIAMS, KRUSE, and ROBSON, JJ.
M. A. Leary, for appellants.
James O. Sebring, for respondent.
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes.

Opinion:
KRUSE, J.
This suit is based upon the claim that the property in question belongs to the plaintiff under a contract made by his mother with Cyrenius C. Townsend and Mary J. Townsend, his wife (the former owners thereof, now deceased), the nature and character of which will be stated presently. In 1861, when the plaintiff was between three and fotir years of age, he was taken from the Yates county poorhouse by Cyrenius C. Townsend and Mary J. Townsend, his wife, to their home, brought up by them, and lived with them until he married. After his marriage he and his wife resided for several years upon one of the farms in controversy here. The Townsends have died—the wife in February, 1905, and the husband in March, 1905. It is now claimed that within a short time after the plaintiff was taken by the Townsends an agreement was made between them and the plaintiff's mother that the Townsends should take and receive the plaintiff as their child, and that the mother should surrender and give up all right to the child to the Townsends, and, upon the death of the Townsends, the plaintiff should have all their property, provided they had no children of their own; and, if they did have children, then that he share equally with them. The learned trial judge finds that the contract was made as has been stated, and that it was performed by the plaintiff's mother, as appears by the fifth, sixth, and seventh findings of fact. By the eighth finding of fact he also finds that on the 24th day of January, 1862, an agreement in writing was made between the Townsends and the mother, as follows:
"Agreement made this 24th day of January, 1862, between Cyrenius C. Townsend and Mary J. Townsend, of the Town of Jerusalem, Yate Co., N. Y., partys of the first part, and Harriett Eaves party of the second part in consideration of one dollar, partys of the first part agrees to take Charles Eaves son of Harriett Eaves and give him a good education and at our death he is to have all of our property providing we have no children of our own if we do have children then he shall share equal with them, it is further agreed that Harriett Eaves gives up all claims on her son and will not try to get the boy away. Cyrenius 0. Townsend.
"Mary J. Townsend.
"Harriett A. Eaves."
If the decision rested upon the oral contract alone, it could not well be claimed that the plaintiff had any grounds for maintaining the action. Such claims, based upon oral agreements, have of late years rarely been sustained in this court or by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals in Hamlin v. Stevens, 177 N. Y. 39, 69 N. E. 118, refused to sustain a claim based upon such an alleged contract, and the rule laid down by Judge Vann in that case has, I think, been uniformly adhered to. Chief Judge Cullen in the recent case of Taylor v. Higgs, 202 N. Y. 65, 95 N. E. 30, after referring with approval to the doctrine of Hamlin v. Stevens, says:
"In Hamlin v. Stevens, 177 N. Y. 39, 47 [69 N. E. 118, 120] Judge Vann, speaking for the court and referring to agreements of the character here sought to be enforced, said: 'Contract's of the character in question have become so frequent of recent years as to cause alarm, and the courts have grown conservative as to the nature of the evidence required to establish them, and in enforcing them, when established, by specific performance. Such contracts are easily fabricated and hard to disprove, because the sole contracting party on one side is always dead when the question arises. Such contracts should be in writing, and the writing should be produced, or, if ever based upon paroi evidence, it' should be given or corroborated in all substantial particulars by disinterested witnesses.' In Rosseau v. Rouss, 180 N. Y. 116, 120 [72 N. E. 916, 918], the same judge, again speaking for this court, said: 'Thus the evidence relied upon to establish the contract is, first, the testimony of the mother, who tried to swear $100,000 into the pocket of her own child; and, second, the testimony of witnesses who swear to the admissions of a dead man. The former is dangerous, the latter is weak, and neither should be acted upon without great caution. We have repeatedly held that such a contract must not only be certain and definite and founded upon an adequate consideration, but also that it must be established by the clearest and most convincing evidence.' Tested by these rules, it seems to me the plaintiffs did not establish their case."
But it is urged that there was a written contract here, which has been established by the production of the writing and corroborated by declarations made by the Townsends, and surrounding circumstances. I am not convinced, however, that the writing has been established. While the learned trial justice saw and heard the witnesses, and undoubtedly was better able to form a correct opinion as to the credibility of their testimony than are we, the undisputed circumstances are such, as I think, to cast such doubt upon the genuineness of the writing as to leave it unproven, and without it I think the action must fail.
The question as to whether this writing was ever made by the Townsends depends almost entirely upon the opinion of witnesses1 as to whether the signatures to the writing are genuine; and the evidence is very strong that they are not. The plaintiff's mother, as- well as the Townsends, has died, and no one is produced who ever saw the writing until after the death of the Townsends. Not even the plaintiff knew about it until, as he claims, he found it among some! papers after their death, and after he had received legal advice that he would be unable to establish his claim by an oral contract. He claims that he found the paper in the possession of a granddaughter of his mother, that there were two wooden boxes, holding a bushel apiece of old papers, and that he found this paper in an envelope with a pension voucher. The granddaughter says she herself had found it in a tin box; that she burned the other papers, but kept this, because, as she states, "Frank Townsend (the plaintiff) will want to know who is the heir of that property."
The plaintiff undertook to show who drew the paper. A witness was called, who according to his testimony was then about nine years of age. He claims that he was at the Townsends when the plaintiff was there in 1861, and that there were some papers drawn there about six weeks after the plaintiff came there. He names several friends and neighbors of the Townsends who were there—Bert Cowen, the justice of the peace, and his mother, the witness and his mother, and the plaintiff's mother. In response to the question as to whether he knew which person drew the papers, he replied, "I think the woman did it," but he does not state which one. He further stated that the paper was read in his hearing, but that he did not remember the substance of it; that, after it was read, he saw names signed; that his mother and the Townsends sat at a table; that the plaintiff's mother was sitting around there. He further testified that he thought she made her mark to this instrument; but her signature to the paper produced is in excellent handwriting and without any mark. I need not call attention further to his testimony. It is very evident that his recollection is hazy and his testimony of little importance. It is not claimed that any of the persons present was a lawyer, and yet, while seemingly the wording of the writing may be somewhat awkward, it is legally perfect, embodying just enough to make it a binding contract. Whoever drew it could not have done better with the decision of the Court of Appeals before him in the case of Winne v. Winne, 166 N. Y. 263, 59 N. E. 832, 82 Am. St. Rep. 647, rendered some 40 years after the instrument here bears date. The circumstances are such as to invite serious inquiry as to whether the writing here is not a spurious output of some one who had before him that decision, where such a contract as this writing purports to be was upheld.
Furthermore, there is evidence quite convincing to me that the paper upon which the writing was drawn, although old in appearance, was not as old as it looked, and was of a kind not made until some years after the instrument bears date. Another conceded circumstance is the fact that nearly 30 years after the plaintiff went to live with the Townsends, in 1889, when he was living away from them, he brought an action against Cyrenius C. Townsend to recover for services rendered by him after he was 21 years of age, which was settled, and upon that settlement he gave Townsend a general release of all claims against him. It may be that the release would not have the effect to cancel any contract, such as is claimed here, or to release the Townsends from any claim thereunder; but it is a circumstance which may properly be considered upon the question whether in fact any such arrangement or contract ever existed, as the plaintiff now claims.
It is true that the plaintiff produces witnesses who swear to declarations claimed to have been made by the Townsends, which tend to sustain his claim. But such evidence, at the best, is as a rule not very satisfactory. However sincere and honest they may be, it is a long time for witnesses to carry in their memory conversations in which they had no particular interest; and where, as here, the testimony of the persons who, it is claimed, made the declarations cannot be had, such evidence is still more unsatisfactory. While the plaintiff and his mother seem to have had little to do with each other after he went to live with the Townsends, especially during the later years of her life, yet if this contract was actually made in 1862, as now is claimed by the plaintiff, and was in existence during all these years, it is singular that- the plaintiff should never have known about it until after the death of the Townsends and the death of his mother, and that no living witness can be produced who gives credible testimony of the making of this contract.
More might be said upon either side of this controversy, but I will simply say in conclusion that, while it may be that the Townsends ought to have given this property to the plaintiff, I think the evidence has not established that they did so or that the plaintiff has any legal right thereto. As it seems to me, the evidence is so unsatisfactory and lacking in convincing force that it ought not to be held sufficient to establish a transfer of real property.
I think the judgment should be reversed upon the law and the facts, and a new trial ordered.