Case Name: PEOPLE v. DAMRON
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1913-12-31
Citations: 145 N.Y.S. 239
Docket Number: 
Parties: PEOPLE v. DAMRON.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 145
Pages: 239–254

Head Matter:
(160 App. Div. 424)
PEOPLE v. DAMRON.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department.
December 31, 1913.)
1. Embezzlement (§ 47*)-—Prosecution—Evidence—Sufficiency. In a prosecution against the president of a bank for converting its funds to his own use, evidence held sufficient to carry the case to the jury.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Embezzlement, Dee. Dig. § 47.*]
2. Embezzlement (§ 11*)—Prosecution—Defenses. In a prosecution against the president of a bank who converted to his own use funds the bank carried in an account in his own name, the fact that the directors did not demand a return of the money is no defense, where it appeared that they never knew of the existence of the funds appropriated until after the bank was closed and put in liquidation by the state banking department.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Embezzlement, Cent. Dig. §§ 9, 10; Dec. Dig. § 11.*]
3. Embezzlement (§ 11*)—Prosecution—Defenses. Where a bank president, who had a special account in his name, but which consisted of the funds of the bank, drew a check on the account and appropriated the proceeds to his own use, the' fact that the cashier paid the check is no defense.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Embezzlement, Cent. Dig. §§ 9, 10; Dec. Dig. § 11.*]
4. Embezzlement (§ 8*)—Prosecution—Defenses. In a prosecution for conversion by a bank president of moneys belonging to the bank which were deposited in a special account in the president’s name, the fact that the money came from bonuses collected upon loans in defiance of the usury law is no defense.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Embezzlement, Cent. Dig. § 6; Dec. Dig. § 8.*]
5. Jury (§ 119*)—Challenqe—Failure to Except. Although Code Or. Proc. § 364, provides that, if the sufficiency of the facts alleged as a ground of challenge to a juror be denied, the adverse party may except to the challenge, and section 366 provides that if the challenge be denied the denial must be entered on the minutes of the court, and the court must proceed to try the questions of fact, the failure of the prosecution either to except to a challenge to the panel or to deny the facts therein recited does not necessitate the quashing of the panel, and the court’s failure to quash the panel will not render the subsequent proceedings wholly void.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Jury, Cent. Dig. § 546; Dec. Dig. § 119.*]
6. Jury (§ 58*)—Amendment—Effect. Laws 1901, c. 602, providing for the appointment of a commissioner of jurors in all counties having a population of 1,000,000 or over, was held unconstitutional in 1902, and in that year the Legislature passed a similar law applying to the appointment of commissioners of jurors in Kings county, which county would have fallen within the act of the earlier statute. Held, that as the earlier statute was completely void, Laws 1904, c. 458, expressly amending Laws 1901, c. 602, by adding a clause thereto, added nothing to Laws 1902, c. 564, and hence jurors did not have to be summoned in the county of Kings in accordance with the provisions of the amendment.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Jury, Cent. Dig. § 266; Dec. Dig. § 58.*]
7. Juey (§ 71*)—Dea wins op Jueobs—Statute. Under Laws 1902, c. 564, § 12, providing that at the time specified in the order the special jury shall be drawn at the office of the commissioner of jurors, by the commissioner or his deputy, and a judge or justice of a court of record residing in the department in which the special jury is to be drawn, a challenge to a special jury drawn before the hour fixed by the order must be sustained, as a strict compliance with the statute is necessary, and the fixing of the hour is for the purpose of preventing fraud.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Jury, Cent. Dig. §§ 368-379; Dec. Dig. § 71.*]
Burr and Thomas, JJ., dissenting in part.
Appeal from Trial Term, Kings County.
William C. Damron was convicted of grand larceny, and he appeals. Reversed and remanded.
See, also, 80 Misc. Rep. 114, 140 N. Y. Supp. 787.
Argued before JENKS, P. J., and BURR, THOMAS, CARR, and RICH, JJ.
John J. Curtin, of New York City, for appellant.
James C. Cropsey, Dist. Atty., of Brooklyn, for the People.

Opinion:
CARR, J.
The defendant was convicted in, the Supreme Court in Kings county of the crime of grand larceny in the first degree. From the judgment of conviction he appeals to this court. In a learned and earnest brief, the counsel for the appellant presents 14 points, on each of which he asks that the judgment of conviction be reversed. The case is unusual in its character, and presents some serious questions of law. A certificate of reasonable doubt was granted at Special Term.
The defendant was the president of a banking institution in the borough of Brooklyn, known as the "Home Bank." This bank was opened in 1905, and the defendant was its president from the beginning. From its opening down to date of the alleged larceny, October 23, 1907, there appeared upon the books of that bank an account in form as follows: "William C. Damron, President-Special." On the date of the alleged larceny, and for a considerable time prior thereto, there were also two other accounts, "William C. Damron," and, "William C. Damron, Special." The latter account does not figure in the circumstances attending the commission of the alleged larceny and may be omitted from further consideration. It appeared from the proofs of the prosecution that the account "William C. Damron, President-Special," was opened originally at the direction of the defendant. On October 23, 1907, .there was a balance to the credit of the "President-Special" account in a sum slightly over $2,500.- The defendant drew a check for $2,500 on this account, which he deposited in the Home Bank to the credit of his individual account. With this deposit, his individual account on that day exceeded $9,500 by several hundred dollars. He then drew a check upon his individual account for the sum of $9,500, which he deposited in the Manufacturers' & Traders' Bank, in the borough of Brooklyn. The moneys on deposit to his credit in the latter bank were then used by him to pay the purchase price of certain securities which he had contracted to buy for his own personal use and benefit.
It was the claim of the prosecution that the moneys on deposit in the Home Bank to the credit of "President-Special" account were actually the moneys of the Home Bank, and that in withdrawing the said sum of $2,500 on October 23, 1907, for the purpose of using the same for his private and individual purposes, he committed grand larceny. The burden, therefore, was on the prosecution to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the moneys so withdrawn were the moneys of the bank and were withdrawn with a felonious intent or purpose on the part of the defendant. The prosecution gave proof that this "President-Special" account was opened in September, 1905, by the express direction of the defendant as president of the bank, and that he then instructed the cashier that said account was one "where we are to credit search fees, bonuses and so forth, and any bad paper the bank may have, will be charged off against this account." It was likewise stated by the defendant that "it was customary among banks to have such an account." For the first two years of the defendant's presidency of the bank he received no salary, and he acted for it as an attorney in relation to various loans which the bank made, and in other legal matters. In 1907 he was awarded a salary of $2,000. The people traced the deposits to the credit of this "President-Special" account by showing that at the beginning there was paid into it various sums of money which belonged to the bank and which arose out of profits on the sale of securities and likewise of some real estate. At the end of June, 1906, the entire balance on deposit to the credit of this "President-Special" account was transferred by the direction of the defendant to "the profit and loss account" of the bank itself.
From time to time other deposits were made thereafter to the credit of this "Special Account," and at the end of May, 1907, the then balance to the credit of this account was likewise transferred to "the profit and loss account" of the bank by the direction of the defendant. The prosecution gave proof as to all items which were deposited to the credit of this account beginning June, 1907, and continuing up to the date of the alleged larceny. These items were eight in number, and aggregated the sum of $4,641.25. In September, 1907, by direction of the defendant, the sum of $2,000 was transferred out of this account to the credit of the bank itself, and was used to pay a dividend to stockholders of the bank. It should be noted that, of the items credited to this particular account, many arose from checks made by outside parties to the order of the Home Bank itself, for example: That of June 12, 1907, for $400; June 13th, $50; July 15th, $1,000. And all of these specific items'were credited to this account by the direction of the defendant himself. An item of $1,200 of June 21, 1907, arose from the retention by the bank itself, from a loan to one Brievogel, of the sum of $12,000, a check was made to her for $10,-800, the loan was entered on the books as of $12,000, and the difference, i. e., $1,200, was credited to the "President-Special" account, as aforesaid. The aggregate of the items of credit which I have just cited is the sum of $2,650. Against these items must be borne in mind the amount of $2,000, which was transferred from the account in question and used by the bank to pay a dividend. Making this allowance, however, there was a balance to the credit of the account in question of $650, arising from the specific items above recited, but other and additional items of credit were proved by the prosecution which went to make up the amount of the balance of $2,500 on' October 23, 1907, which was withdrawn on that day by the defendant under the circumstances above outlined.
It seems to us that the proofs of the prosecution on this question made out a case which required a submission to the jury as a question of fact whether the moneys comprising the balance of this account were actually the moneys of the Home Bank at the time the defendant withdrew them for his own private purpose. He did not take the stand himself. Of course, he was not obliged to; but the result was that the jury was left, for the determination of this question of fact, practically to the proofs offered by the prosecution. We are not surprised that they found against the defendant on this question, in view of the state of the record. Nor do we think that the jury were obliged to have a reasonable doubt on this question of fact, based upon the evidence in the case. Therefore we are not disposed to interfere with the judgment upon the questions of fact found by the jury. The jury was instructed by the court that it should not find the defendant guilty of larceny, if the proofs showed that the withdrawal of said moneys and their appropriation to his own use was made by him under an honest belief that he had a right to do so, even though such claim of right was untenable.
The only evidence in the case as to what claim of right the defendant may have entertained is confined to certain claims made by him after the Home Bank was in the hands of the Banking Department of the State, and the proof on this point, as given on behalf of the defendant, is to be found in the testimony of Clarke Williams; but that proof so offered by the defense was very damaging to the defendant, for it shows that, at the time he was examined by Mr. Williams, who was then superintendent of the Banking Department, he had then attempted to account for the use of the moneys so withdrawn by him in a manner that was in flat opposition to the uncontradicted proofs offered by the prosecution on this point. He told Mr. Williams that he had used the moneys so withdrawn in various ways to prevent a run on the bank in the panic of October, 1907, while it appears incontrovertible that the moneys so withdrawn were not used for such a purpose, but were applied to his own individual and private purpose, for the acquisition of certain shares of stock in a financial institution in the city of New York. The defense likewise attempted to prove that the directors of the bank had never made any demand upon the defendant for the restoration of the sums so drawn after the withdrawal was discovered, when the bank had been closed by the Banking Department. The purpose of this attempted proof was to show an acquiescence upon the part of the directors of the bank in whatever claim the defendant had made that the moneys in question were his own property, and not that of the bank.
The defendant complains that his attempt to prove inaction on the part of the board of directors was not permitted by the court. It seems to us that, if the moneys did in fact belong to the Home Bank, a failure on the part of its directors to demand from the defendant their restoration did not affect the question of his guilt in withdrawing them for his own use, and that the ruling of the trial court on this point was proper; but, on the cross-examination of these various directors, it appeared quite plainly that none of them knew of the existence of such an account on the books of the bank until long after the bank was closed and put in liquidation by the Banking Department.
It is argued by the appellant that the manner in which these funds were withdrawn from the "President-Special" account could not constitute, as a matter of law, a larceny on his part, for all that he did was by his check to present a claim against the bank which, through the other officers or employés of the bank, was admitted to be well founded, and that the payment on his check was voluntary by the bank itself, and that therefore the receipt of the moneys under such circumstances by the defendant was not tortious or criminal. This argument does not address itself to our minds with any convincing force.
The claim of the prosecution was that the credits to this "President-Special" account arose from moneys received by the bank, directly or indirectly as "bonuses" on loans which it made, sometimes directly and at other times through the instrumentality of two corporations, the Remsen Mortgage Company and the Clarendon Mortgage Company, of both of which the defendant was an officer. The defendant argues therefore that, as it was unlawful for the bank to receive a "bonus" in violation of the usury law, it could not acquire any property right in moneys which accrued from "bonuses," and that therefore such moneys could not be the subject of a larceny from the bank itself by this defendant. The mere statement of this argument, as it seems to us, answers itself.
In the brief of the appellant there is considerable discussion of certain alleged errors made by the trial court in the admission and exclusion of evidence, and likewise in its charge to the jury. We have considered these points, while we do not discuss them here, and we fail to find prejudicial error in any of them.
The defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for one year in the penitentiary. He was a lawyer, and his conviction of this offense resulted in his disbarment, and an order had been entered by this court to that effect. So_this judgment of conviction is far more important than the mere punishment of imprisonment, for it leaves him in middle life deprived of his right to follow the profession which he had practiced for many years. In view of such circumstances, we have scrutinized carefully the record on appeal.
We come now to the consideration of a very important question of statutory law which lies at the root of the trial. The defendant was tried by a jury selected from a panel of special jurors. The order, which directed a trial by a special jury, provided for the drawing of a panel of 10.0 jurors on the 18th day of January, 1913,'at 10 o'clock a. m., and required that the jurors so drawn should attend at part 5 of the Supreme Court on January 22d. The case came on for trial on January 22d. At the opening of the trial, the defendant presented in writing a challenge to the panel which specified two grounds of challenge, as follows: (a) That the jurors were not drawn in accordance with section 5 of chapter 602 of the Laws of 1901 as amended by section 2, c. 458, of the Laws of 1904, in that the jurors were required to attend the trial within less than five days after the date on which the panel was directed to be drawn; (b) that the panel of jurors was in fact drawn at 9 o'clock a. m., as directed in the order which provided for a panel of special jurors. The- record before us does not show that the district attorney either excepted to the sufficiency of the challenge or entered a denial as to the facts set forth therein. It does show that the trial court overruled the challenge and directed the counsel to proceed with the selection of a trial jury. The defendant excepted to this ruling. The matter of challenges to the panel is regulated by sections 361 to 368, inclusive, of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 361 defines a challenge to the panel. Section 362 prescribes that such a challenge must be based "only on a material departure, to the prejudice of the defendant, from the forms prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure and the judiciary law, in respect to the drawing and return of the jury, or on the intentional omission of the sheriff to summon one or more of the jurors drawn." Section 363 requires the challenge to be in writing. Section 364 (which we quote in full) provides as follows:
"If the sufficiency of the facts alleged as a ground of challenge be denied, the adverse party may except to the Challenge. The exception need not be in writing, but must be entered upon the minutes of the court; and thereupon the court must proceed to, try the sufficiency of the challenge, assuming the facts alleged therein to be true."
Section 365 provides that, if the court deems the challenge sufficient, it may permit the party excepting to withdraw his exception and to deny the facts alleged in the challenge, or that, if the exception be allowed, the court may permit an amendment of the challenge. Section 366 provides that:
"If the challenge be denied, the denial may, in like manner, be oral, and must be entered upon the minutes of the court; and the court must proceed to try the questions of fact."
The appellant contends that the trial court had no power to try and overrule his challenge to the panel unless the prosecution either excepted to it as insufficient or denied the facts therein recited. As the record stands, there appears to have been no exception as to sufficiency of the challenge, and no denial of its facts as alleged. This situation leaves the facts admitted, and the challenge must be considered by this court in that light. We are not prepared to go to the length of holding that, if a challenge to the panel be insufficient on its face, the failure of the record to show an exception to it as insufficient vitiates necessarily, the action of the trial court in overruling it as insufficient. There appears to have been an irregularity in the procedure adopted on the trial, but one, in our judgment, not important enough to invalidate all the further proceedings of the trial, if in truth the decision of the trial court overruling the challenge as insufficient was right upon the merits of the question of sufficiency.
We will take up for consideration separately the grounds assigned by the challenge to the panel. Chapter 602 of the Laws of 1901 provided for the appointment of a commissioner of jurors in all counties of the state having a population of 1,000,000 or over. The appointment of such commissioner was directed to be made by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the judicial department in which any of said counties was located, and on the commissioner so to be appointed powers and duties were imposed as to the selection of lists of special jurors in civil and criminal cases, the drawing of a 'special panel whenever such was ordered by the court, and the method of the return of the panel so drawn. When this statute was enacted in 1901, it purported to apply to the counties of New York and Kings. By section 5 thereof, it was provided under what circumstances a trial of a civil action or criminal proceeding before a special jury might be ordered. It was provided further in said section, if a trial before a special jury was ordered, that:
"The order must specify the time when the drawing of such special jury shall take place and the number of special jurors to be then drawn, the term of the court and the particular day in the term when such special jury must attend."
This section of the act of 1901 was amended by chapter 458 of the Laws of 1904, by adding thereto a clause as follows:
"The day so specified for the attendance of the special jury must, except in the case of an order for additional special jurors drawn under section seven of this act, be at least five days in addition to any Sunday, holiday or half holiday, after the day specified for the drawing of the special jury."
This amendatory act of 1904 is entitled "An act to amend chapter six hundred and two of the laws of nineteen hundred and one," etc. If at the time of this amendment the act of 1901 still applied to Kings county, the panel of special jurors in the case at bar was not made up in conformity with law, for, even not excluding a Sunday and a Saturday half holiday which intervened, the special jurors were required to attend in less than five days* "after the day specified for the drawing of the special jury." It is contended, however, by the respondents that the amendatory statute of 1904 had no application to Kings county, inasmuch as the act of 1901, which was thereby amended, did not then apply to Kings county.
A brief survey of the statutes relating to this question will be helpful to a determination of this question. By chapter 378 of the Laws of 1896, provision was made for the appointment of a special jury commissioner in all the counties of the state having a population of-500,000 or more, and for the preparation of lists of special jurors in criminal cases. That act provided for the appointment of the special jury commissioner by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the respective judicial departments in which the affected counties were located. Kings county was among those so affected. That act contained a number of detailed provisions as to the manner of making up the lists of special jurors and likewise as to the manner of drawing a panel from the names of special jurors so selected. By chapter 601 of the Laws of 1901, the act of 1896 was repealed expressly on' the 27th day of April, 1901. On the same day was enacted chapter 602, above referred to, which was entitled "An act to provide for the appointment of a commissioner of jurors and to provide for a special jury in civil and criminal actions in each county of the state having a population of one million or more, according to the last preceding federal census." Thus the act purported to relate to the counties of New York and Kings. Section 1 of this act directed the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, in the department in which each of the respective counties was situated, to appoint a commissioner of jurors within 20 days after the act took effect, and provided for the administration of the office of the commissioner of jurors so to be appointed. The remainder of the act, from sections 2 to 9, inclusive, conferred certain powers and imposed certain duties in relation to special juries upon the commissioner of jurors appointed under section 1 of said act. So far as this act applied to the appointment of a commissioner of jurors in Kings county by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Second Department, it was declared unconstitutional. Matter of Brenner, 67 App. Div. 375, 73 N. Y. Supp. 689; Id., 170 N. Y. 185, 63 N. E. 133. The decision of the Court of Appeals was handed down March 14, 1902.
On April 27th of that year, chapter 564 of the Laws of 1902 was enacted and took effect immediately. It was entitled, "An act in relation to jurors, and to the appointment and duties of a commissioner of jurors in the county of Kings." This act provided for the appointment of a commissioner of jurors in Kings county by the county judges and the surrogate of said county, and provided for the organization and administration of the office of said commissioner. The remainder of this act, from section 7 to section 15 thereof, inclusive, was practically in ipsissimis verbis, the same as sections 2 to 9, inclusive, of the act of 1901. By section 16 of the act of' 1902 it was provided that "all special or general laws inconsistent with the provisions of this act are hereby repealed."
The appellant contends that the various provisions of the act of 1901, not inconsistent with the act of 1902, were not repealed, but continued in full force as affecting Kings county. This is a question of legislative intent purely. In the first place, however, it becomes necessary to inquire if any provision of the act of 1901 ever became operative as to Kings county. All the provisions of that act as to the powers and duties of a commissioner of jurors related to a commissioner of jurors to be appointed in accordance with its directions. These powers and duties were not prescribed generally for a commissioner of jurors, but solely for the commissioner contemplated by this act itself, and none other. It would follow that, if the provision for the appointment of such commissioner never went into legal effect in Kings county, then the other provisions as to the powers and duties of such commissioner likewise did not go into legal effect. The result of the holding that the provision of said act of 1901 as to the appointment of the commissioner was unconstitutional as to Kings county was necessarily that no part of the act ever became operative as to Kings county. Therefore the Legislature, in enacting the statute of 1902 in relation to Kings county, did not simply re-enact and continue as to Kings county certain provisions of a prior general statute relating to Kings county, but, on the contrary, it put the whole subject-matter, so far as it related to Kings county, on a distinctly independent and exclusive statutory basis. Therefore the act of 1904, amending expressly the act of 1901, in no way amended the act of 1902, as neither an express repeal of the act of 1901 would have carried with it an implied repeal of the act of 1902, for each act was separate and distinct legislation. The mere fact that certain of the provisions of the act of 1901 were incorporated in the act of 1902, and without any express reference to the former act, did not so operate to continue these provisions, if ever applicable to Kings county, to such an extent that an amendment of the statute in which they had their origin, by itself and without legislative declaration to that effect, resulted in an amendment of the similar provisions of the later statute in which they had been incorporated. Knapp v. City of Brooklyn, 97 N. Y. 520. While the re-enactment of prior statutory provisions is not to be deemed a new enactment but simply a continuance of such provisions to the extent of the re-enactment, as to rights accrued or duties imposed, yet after the re-enactment the later statute is to be deemed the basis or the authority for the provisions so re-enacted, as to their future application, and they rest upon such basis and authority independently of the statute of their origin. Matter of Prime, 136 N. Y. 347, 32 N. E. 1091, 18 L R. A. 713, and cases cited.
This leads to the conclusion that this point is covered by section 11 of the act of 1902, which is in words the very same as section 5 of the act of 1901 as enacted originally. Therefore the first ground of the challenge to the panel was without legal merit and insufficient on its face.
As to the second ground, section 12 of the act of 1902 provides in part as follows:
"At the time specified in the order the special jury shall be drawn at the office of the commissioner of jurors, by the commissioner of jurors, or his deputy, and a judge or justice of a court of record residing in the department in which such special jury is to be drawn."
The time specified in the order in this case was January 18, 1913, at 10 o'clock a. m. The special jury was drawn at 9 o'clock a. m. on January 18th. Hence there was a disregard of the provision of the order and of the statute as to the time of the drawing. The respondents contend that this disobedience of the order and of the statute constituted at most but a mere irregularity which was not important enough to affect the subsequent proceedings, and they cite in support of their contention numerous authorities in which mere irregularities, not prejudicial to a substantial right, were disregarded in order to uphold a judgment. One of the obvious purposes of requiring the time of drawing special jurors to be fixed in advance, and that the draw ing should take place at the time so fixed, was to give the parties affected an opportunity to be present at the drawing and to see for themselves that the drawing took place in conformity with law, and, if any illegalities occurred, to secure their correction by appropriate methods. This was a substantial right intended for the benefit of the parties, and its denial was presumptively prejudicial. People v. Mc-Quade, 110 N. Y. 284, 18 N. E. 156, 1 L. R. A. 273. As the selection of a panel of special jurors was a departure from the ordinary methods of criminal procedure, strict compliance with the statute is necessary. Industrial & General Trust, Ltd., v. Tod, 104 App. Div. 518, 93 N. Y. Supp. 725.
There are many cases in which irregularities in the method of obtaining a panel of ordinary trial jurors in the trial of criminal cases have been considered by the courts, and were held not to invalidate the judgment. Friery v. People, *41 N. Y. 424-448; Ferris v. People, 35 N. Y. 125-129; People v. Schmidt, 168 N. Y. 568, 577, 61 N. E. 907. These cases, however, did not involve a consideration of a panel of special jurors. It was said, however, in the opinion in the Friery Case, ut supra, that, if the panel of jurors was to be specially selected, the forms and regulations prescribed by the statute became imperative upon those charged with the duty of selection, and that "in such case it would be the right of a litigant to have the statute relations and forms strictly complied with, independent of any suggestion of fraud or misconduct."
We have reached the conclusion that the second ground of the challenge should have been sustained, unless 'it be that no challenge lies to a panel of special jurors. Such is not claimed in the respondents' brief, and in People v. Hall, 169 N. Y. 184, 62 N. E. 170, and People v. Ebelt, 180 N. Y. 470, 73 N. E. 235, we have authorities where challenges to panels of special jurors were passed upon by the courts and disposed of upon the merits of the challenge.
We think the judgment of conviction should be reversed, and a new trial granted, on the sole ground of error in overruling the second ground of the challenge to the panel. Settle order before the Presiding Justice.
JENKS, P. J., and RICH, J., concur. BURR, J., reads for affirmance, with whom THOMAS, J., concurs.