Case Name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant, v. Victor Manuel Lee ARMIJO, Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1993-09-07
Citations: 5 F.3d 1229
Docket Number: Nos. 90-30408 and 91-30034
Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant, v. Victor Manuel Lee ARMIJO, Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee.
Judges: Before: SKOPIL, ALARCON and BEEZER, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 3d Series
Volume: 5
Pages: 1229–1239

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant, v. Victor Manuel Lee ARMIJO, Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee.
Nos. 90-30408 and 91-30034.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted May 7, 1993.
Decided Sept. 7, 1993.
Charles S. Dorn and Patrick K. Stiley, Stiley & Kodis, Spokane, WA, for defendant-appellant-cross-appellee.
Ronald W. Skibbie, Asst. U.S. Atty., Spokane, WA, for plaintiff-appellee-eross-appel-lant.
Before: SKOPIL, ALARCON and BEEZER, Circuit Judges.
. The Interim Regulations Implementing the Court Interpreters Amendments Act of 1988, pro mulgated by the administrative office of the United States Courts, suggests the following oath be given to court interpreters: "Do you swear (or affirm) that in the case now in hearing you will interpret truly the testimony you are called upon to interpret, so help you God?”

Opinion:
SKOPIL, Circuit Judge:
Victor Manuel Lee Armijo appeals his conviction following a jury trial for distribution of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1988). He contends that the district court erred by (1) admitting evidence of a witness' prior inconsistent statement; (2) admitting an English transcript of a recorded Spanish conversation; and (3) denying admission of a letter allegedly written by one witness to another witness. The government cross-appeals Armijo's sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines, assigning as error the reduction in his base offense level for acceptance of responsibility. We affirm.
FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
Armijo's conviction resulted from a Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) sting operation in which Jose Contreras sold a kilogram of cocaine to undercover agents. Contreras disclosed his supplier as Armijo. Contreras and his girlfriend, Michelle Massengale, engaged Armijo in two recorded telephone conversations that disclosed his involvement in the transaction. The DEA obtained search warrants for Armijo's home, vehicles, and his parents' home. At trial, the evidence against Armijo consisted primarily of Contreras' testimony against Armijo, the recorded conversations, and pager records reflecting that Armijo received an extraordinary number of messages each month. The defense theory was that Contreras identified Armijo as his source in order to protect the true source, Contreras' uncle, Santiago Avina. The jury "found Armijo guilty of distribution of cocaine.
DISCUSSION
1. Admission of Out of Court Statement
a. Hearsay
Armijo argues that the district court erred by failing to give a limiting instruction regarding Michelle Massengale's prior statement that Armijo had admitted to her that he supplied the cocaine delivered by Contreras. On direct examination, Massengale denied that she had previously identified Armi-jo as the cocaine supplier. The government asked Massengale about her previous written statement in which she had identified Armijo as the source for the cocaine. She testified that the written statement was incorrect. Massengale's written statement was admitted as an exhibit and was also introduced in the testimony of two FBI agents. One of the agents testified that he had read the written statement to Massengale, allowed her to review it, and gave her an opportunity to make changes. Both agents testified that Massen-gale had previously identified Armijo as the source of the cocaine.
Armijo contends that the district court committed plain error by failing to give a limiting instruction informing the jury that evidence of Massengale's prior inconsistent statement could- be used only to impeach her character for truthfulness and could not be used as evidence of Armijo's guilt. A prior inconsistent statement is not hearsay and may be admitted as substantive evidence if the declarant testifies at trial subject to cross examination and the statement was given under oath at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition. Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(1)(A); United States v. Vargas, 933 F.2d 701, 705 (9th Cir.1991). Massengale's prior inconsistent statement was inadmissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(A), however, because it was not given under oath. Since Armijo did not request a limiting instruction, see Fed.R.Evid. 105, the question is whether the district court committed plain error in failing to give sua sponte the instruction. See United States v. Hoac, 990 F.2d 1099, 1108 (9th Cir.1993); see also Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b).
We have authority to correct the error here only if it is "plain" and "affect[s] substantial rights." United States v. Olano, — U.S. —, —, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1778, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (quoting Rule 52(b)). We are not to exercise our discretion to correct a plain forfeited error affecting substantial rights unless it "seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Id. at —, 113 S.Ct. at 1779 (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160, 56 S.Ct. 391, 392, 80 L.Ed. 555 (1936)). Improper jury instructions will rarely justify a finding of plain error. Hoac, 990 F.2d at 1108; United States v. Bustillo, 789 F.2d 1364, 1367-68 (9th Cir.1986).
Armijo argues that United States v. Ragghianti, 560 F.2d 1376, 1379-81 (9th Cir.1977), controls this case. In Ragghianti, the defendant was charged with aiding and abetting a bank robbery. The defendant was never seen during the robbery but was observed with the bank robber in the back seat of the defendant's car, some 15 or 20 minutes later. Id. at 1377-78. Two witnesses including the bank robber corroborated the defendant's alibi that he -was shopping when the bank was robbed. The defendant's claim of alibi was his sole defense. One of the corroborating witnesses testified that she did not remember making statements to FBI agents. An FBI agent testified, without ob jection, about statements made by the witness that contradicted her testimony as well as the defendant's testimony about his alibi. The court ruled that admission of hearsay evidence of the witness' prior inconsistent statements without limiting instructions was plain error. Id. at 1381.
We first note that our ruling in Ragghianti on the prior inconsistent statement was dictum and is therefore not binding. We stated that our reversal was based on the failure to give an alibi instruction, and we discussed the prior inconsistent statement issue "in the interest of an error-free retrial." Id. at 1377. Furthermore, our ruling was based on the fact that the sole contested issue was the defendant's claim of alibi, which had to "stand or fall on the question of credibility." Id. at 1381. Because the witness' prior inconsistent statement in Ragghianti was apparently the only evidence that contradicted the defendant's and the witness' testimony, the error was likely so prejudicial that it tainted the jury verdict. See Hoac, 990 F.2d at 1108. Here, in contrast, as discussed below, there was other evidence presented that did not depend on Massengale's credibility that the jury could have relied on to convict Armijo.
Moreover, the precedential value of Ragghianti is questionable because the Supreme Court has recently clarified the review for plain error. Olano, — U.S. at —, 113 S.Ct. at 1776-81. First, there must be a forfeited error rather than a waiver. Id. at —, 113 S.Ct. at 1777. Second, the error must be "plain" in that it was clear under current law. Id. Third, the error must affect substantial rights. Id. at —, 113 S.Ct. at 1777-78. The defendant bears the burden of persuading us that the error was prejudicial, that is, that it affected the outcome of the district court proceedings. Id. at — , 113 S.Ct. at 1778. If the forfeited error is plain and affects substantial rights, we have authority to exercise our discretion but we are not required to do so. Id. We should exercise our discretion when the error " 'seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.' " Id. at —, 113 S.Ct. at 1779 (quoting Atkinson, 297 U.S. at 160, 56 S.Ct. at 392).
In this ease, there was a forfeited error rather than a waiver and that error was "plain" under current law. Hearsay is admissible as substantive evidence only as provided by the Federal Rules of Evidence. United States v. Tafollo-Cardenas, 897 F.2d 976, 979 (9th Cir.1990). Thus, our focus is on the third limitation on our authority to correct the error, whether the error affected substantial rights. See Olano, — U.S. at —, 113 S.Ct. at 1777-78.
In light of the other evidence presented at trial, we conclude that Armijo did hot meet his burden of making a specific showing of prejudice to satisfy the "affecting substantial rights'.' prong of Rule 52(b). See Olano, — U.S. at —, 113 S.Ct. at 1778. When Contreras was arrested, he told the agents that Armijo was his source of cocaine, and he testified to that fact at trial. Grant Kasselder, a friend of' Armijo's, was arrested with' Contreras and was found carrying a gun. Armijo admitted at trial that the "grips" on that gun were his and that he had placed them on the gun.
In a recorded telephone conversation between Contreras and Armijo, Armijo disclosed his knowledge of the transaction and expressed concern for his identity. Without prior references by Contreras-, Armijo expressed knowledge and concern over the gun, asked whether Kasselder had had "anything on him," asked if Contreras was "in that guy's room or what," asked whether "they [the police] took they [sic] guy away with all the shit," and asked whether they busted him "with the stuff." Armijo also asked Contreras if he had said "anything about me" and whether "they [the police] think it's somebody else." After Armijo realized that the police were listening to the conversation, he said "Well, I didn't give you NOTHING."
In a recorded conversation between Mas-sengale and Armijo, Armijo expressed further concern that the police knew of his involvement. He asked "Do you think they're watching me?" and said "I don't know if they got are [sic] on to me or not." Armijo also asked "But they are looking for someone else?" and asked whether the police said "anything like they had an arrest for me too." Armijo told Massengale to tell Contreras "not to worry about the money" and warned her to tell Contreras that "its not worth him, ah, saying anything because they're gonna give what they've [sic] gonna give him anyway." When Massengale asked "Do you know how much he got caught with?" Armijo replied "Yeh."
After Armijo's arrest, a search of his house revealed Contreras' pager number in Armi-jo's wallet and a digital pager in the garage. The pager that Armijo testified was in his possession "most of the time" in the month before August 4, 1989 received 715 pages between July 23,1989 and August 7,1989. A witness testified that the average number of pages in one month per pager is "in the 30's."
The determination of Armijo's guilt was not solely dependent on Massengale's credibility. In addition, to Contreras' testimony implicating Armijo, the most damaging evidence against Armijo is his participation in two tape recorded conversations. We conclude that Armijo did not meet his. burden of making á specific showing of prejudice under Rule 52(b). Therefore, the error did not affect "substantial rights," and we have no authority to correct the error. See Olano, — U.S. at —, 113 S.Ct. at 1778, 1781.
b. Confrontation Clause
Relying on United States v. McKinney, 707 F.2d 381 (9th Cir.1983), Armijo contends that the admission of Massengale's statement and the agents' oral testimony violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him. Armijo's reliance on McKinney is misplaced. In that case, the declarant did not testify at the defendant's trial and had testified earlier that she had no recollection of the statement at issue. Id. at 382-83. When a declarant is present at trial and subject to cross-examination,-the declarant's out of court statement does not create a confrontation problem. See United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 557-61, 108 S.Ct. 838, 841-44, 98 L.Ed.2d 951 (1988); Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622, 626-30, 91 S.Ct. 1723, 1725-28, 29 L.Ed.2d 222 (1971); Vargas, 933 F.2d at 705-06. Here, declarant Massengale was present as a witness and was subject to cross-examination. The admission of Massengale's prior statement did not violate the confrontation clause.
2. Admission of English Transcript of Spanish Conversation
Armijo argues that the court erred in admitting a transcript of a recorded Spanish telephone conversation between him and Contreras because the translation was inaccurate. Armijo's argument is based primarily on his incorrect assertion that the tape itself was never admitted into evidence. Both the tape and the transcript were admitted.
The use of transcripts as an aid in listening to tape recordings is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Taghipour, 964 F.2d 908, 910 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 113 S.Ct. 283, 121 L.Ed.2d 210 (1992). We review steps taken to ensure the accuracy of the transcripts: whether the court reviewed the transcript for accuracy; whether defense counsel was allowed to highlight alleged inaccuracies and to introduce alternative versions; whether .the jury was instructed that the tape, rather than the transcript, was evidence; and whether the jury was allowed to compare the transcript to the tape and hear counsel's arguments as to the meaning of the conversations. See United States v. Chen, 754 F.2d 817, 824 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1139, 105 S.Ct. 2684, 86 L.Ed.2d 701 (1985).
In this case, the trial judge did not review the tape for accuracy because he was not fluent in Spanish and there was no agent involved in the conversation who could testify to its accuracy. The conversation was translated twice — the first time was to produce a working copy and the second time it was translated for trial purposes by a court translator. The translator testified that the transcript accurately reflected the conversation on the tape. Armijo had access to the tape before trial, but he chose not-to submit his own translation or present an expert witness to contest the transcript's accuracy. The court reminded Armijo on more than one occasion that he had the right to call his own expert to translate the tape. The jury listened to the tape while they read the tran script and it was instructed that the tape, rather than the transcript, was the evidence. Armijo's attorney extensively cross-examined the translator on the accuracy of her translation, particularly as to discrepancies between the first and second translation's. Armijo had an opportunity to testify on direct and cross-examination about his understanding of the conversation. Armijo's attorney argued the meaning of the conversation in his closing argument. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the transcript.
Armijo also contends that the court erred by not requiring the translator to take an oath or affirmation before testifying. In United States v. Taren-Palma, 997 F.2d 525, 532 (9th Cir.1993) (per curiam), we held that Federal Rule of Evidence 604 applies only to interpreters who translate the testimony of witnesses on the stand and does not apply to language experts. In other situations, the standard oath for witnesses applies. Id. Federal Rule of Evidence 603 provides that "every witness shall be required to declare that the witness will testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered in a form. calculated to awaken the witness' conscience and impress the witness' mind with the duty to do so."
In this case, the district court asked the translator to swear'that she "translated the tape that is in issue here today from Spanish to English to the best of [her] ability." She did so and also later explained that as a court translator she is subject to a standing oath "so it doesn't have to be done every time I appear in Court." Armijo nevertheless argues this was insufficient to satisfy the requirements of Rule 603 since the translator appeared as a witness and was subjected to direct and cross examination. Armijo did not make that argument to the district court and, accordingly, we review for plain error. See Hoac, 990 F.2d at 1108.
We conclude that there was no error, and certainly no plain error, in the court's failure' to administer the more specific oath now advanced by Armijo. First, there is no constitutional or statutorily required form of oath. United States v. Ward, 989 F.2d 1015, 1019 (9th Cir.1992). Second, the oath that was- administered in our minds would have impressed upon the translator the importance of truthful and accurate translation. Her testimony and the direct and cross ex-animation that followed merely tested the accuracy and validity of her translation, not her credibility or veracity as a witness. There was no error.
3. Admission of Letter
Armijo contends that the court erred in denying admission of a letter from Contreras to Massengale that "was strongly probative of Contreras' motive to lie to protect his uncle," Santiago Avina. The defense theory was that Contreras lied about receiving the cocaine from Armijo when he was arrested in order to protect his uncle. The court denied admission of the letter on the ground of relevance, finding that the letter was not related to Armijo or the case against him.
"Relevant evidence" is evidence having any tendency to make a fact of consequence more or less probable. Fed.R.Evid. 401. We review for abuse of discretion. United States v. Schaff, 948 F.2d 501, 505 (9th Cir.1991). Because the letter was written eight months after the arrest and referred to a dispute between Massengale and Contreras' sister, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying its admission.
4. Cross-Appeal: Acceptance of Responsibility
The government cross-appeals the court's finding that Armijo was entitled to a reduction in his offense level for acceptance of responsibility pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a) (1989). It argues that there was no indication of "sincere contrition" by Armi-jo before or after his conviction.
The Sentencing Guidelines provide for a two level reduction "[i]f the defendant clearly demonstrates a recognition and affirmative acceptance of personal responsibility for his criminal conduct." U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a). We review for clear error. United States v. Gonzalez, 897 F.2d 1018, 1019 (9th Cir.1990). A defendant whose guilt was determined by a court or jury is not precluded from receiving a reduction. Unit ed States v. Barron-Rivera, 922 F.2d 549, 552-53 (9th Cir.1991); U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b). In determining acceptance of responsibility, the sentencing court "may not consider against the defendant any constitutionally protected conduct." United States v. Sitton, 968 F.2d 947, 962 (9th Cir.1992), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 113 S.Ct. 1306, 122 L.Ed.2d 695 (1993).
At sentencing, Armijo's testified that his attorney had advised him that he should not detail his participation or the extent of his involvement because he could expose himself to additional criminal charges. He also testified that he had remorse for his involvement and accepted responsibility for the transaction. "[T]he determination of the sentencing judge is entitled to great deference on review and should not be disturbed unless it is without foundation." U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, comment, (n. 5). We conclude that the sentencing judge had adequate foundation to determine that Armijo was entitled to a reduction for acceptance of responsibility.
AFFIRMED.