Case Name: Kansas City Grading Company, Appellant, v. Howard M. Holden, Respondent
Court: Kansas City Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1888-11-19
Citations: 32 Mo. App. 490
Docket Number: 
Parties: Kansas City Grading Company, Appellant, v. Howard M. Holden, Respondent.
Judges: Hall, J., concurs.
Reporter: Missouri Appeal Reports
Volume: 32
Pages: 490–505

Head Matter:
Kansas City Grading Company, Appellant, v. Howard M. Holden, Respondent.
Kansas City Court of Appeals,
November 19, 1888.
1. Charter of Kansas City: local assessments under : grading or streets. It is a fundamental rule that a local assessment or tax for a local benefit should be distributed among and imposed upon all equally standing in like relations. Under the charter of the City of Kansas and the rule above stated, one street cannot, by ordinance or contract, be graded at the exxiense of the property-holders of another.
2. ---:---: case adjudged. It is a part of the contract for ■ the grading of May street upon which the tax bill is issued, in this case, that the contractor shall grade Ninth street according to the specifications to the full width. And so if the grading on Ninth street had not been done as required the contractor would not have been entitled to this tax bill. Held that the contract violates the principle governing local assessments, and cannot be enforced. [Rámsay, J., dissents].
Appeal from Jaclcson Circuit Court. — Hon. Turner A. Gill, Judge.
Affirmed.
Certified to Supreme Court.
Statement of case by the court.
■ This is an action upon special tax bills issued for the grading of May street, in Kansas City, from Sixth to Ninth streets. The plaintiff did the work under a contract with the city, and seeks to enforce the lien of the bills against the real estate of defendants. Defendant admits the doing of the work, the signature of the city engineer to the bills, and the ownership of the real estate described in the bills, but claims that the contract between plaintiff and the city, under which the work was done, is void, and that the bills cannot therefore be collected. The contract is claimed to be void, because the specifications upon which the contract was let to the lowest bidder, the advertisement for bids, and the contract itself contained a provision specifying that the earth and quarry' rubbish taken from the street (the work being all excavation) was to be deposited on Ninth street between Broadway and Washington streets, until that part of it was brought to grade and full width, and that the remainder was to be deposited in Eighth street between Broadway and Bank streets, in Bank street between Seventh and Ninth streets, and in an alley in block 2, Lucas Place. This it was claimed .required the contractor to grade other streets at the expense „of the May street property-owners, and made the contract and all tax bills issued under it void. Plaintiff claimed-that this.provision, was put in, in pursuance of section 30 of chapter 31, of the Revised Ordinances. of the city, which authorizes the city engineer, in letting contracts for grading streets, to direct where any surplus material should be deposited, and that, it amounted any way to nothing more than a permission to put the surplus material in the streets designated. The testimony showed „ that the work was done at a reasonable price, and that the places where the -earth was deposited were closer to the work than any other places where it could have been deposited.
There .was a.verdict and judgment for defendants, from which plaintiff has appealed.
Johnson & Lucas, for the appellant.
(1) No testimony was admissible to sustain the defenses tendered by the answer, (a) If defendants were not injured by the work being so done as to benefit others, they cannot invoke the benefit to others to discharge their liability for benefits accruing to them. City v. Long, 31 Mo. 374; Moore v. Albany, 98 N. Y. 396. (b) The contract was let to the lowest bidder after the same had been duly advertised, and the testimony shows that the places where the earth was deposited were the nearest to the place of excavation at which it could have been deposited. (c) It nowhere appears from the pleadings that the city engineer sought to grade any other street at the cost and expense of defendants, and for that reason plaintiff’s objection should have been sustained. (2) No authorities need be cited to show that the action of the court in ordering section 31 of chapter 38 of the ordinances of the City of Kansas to be read in evidence was error. And this action of the court could have none but a prejudicial effect upon the jury so far as the plaintiff was concerned. (3) Plaintiff’s instruction should have been given. Defendants admitted that the contract had been let to plaintiff, and on the part of plaintiff fully complied with, and introduced no evidence that tended to show that the cost of grading said street had been increased by the mode adopted in letting the contract, or that they had been injured or damaged thereby. There was a complete failure of testimony. Morgan r>. Durfee, 69 Mo. 469; Charles v: Patch, 87 Mo. 450; Hunt «. Railroad, 89 Mo. 607; O’ Reilley v. City, 39 Hun, 286 ; Transfer Co. v. Huling, 22 Mo. App. 654. (4) The instruction given for defendants ought to have been refused, (a). It was for the court to determine the legal effect of the plans and specifications, and advertisement, bid and contract, and it was error to submit an undisputed question to the jury. Hickey ?>. Ryan, 15 Mo. 62; Miller v. Dunlap, 22 Mo. App. 97; Fruin v. Railroad, 89 Mo. 404. (b) The instruction given does not correspond with the pleadings. Bank v. Armstrong, 62 Mo. 59; Bank v. Murdock, 62 Mo. 70. (c) The issues cannot be changed by an instruction, and this the instruction in question seeks to do. Glass r>. Gelrtin, 80 Mo. 297; Beauchamp v. Higgins, 20 Mo. App. 514. The issue presented by the answer was, that by reason of the mode adopted in letting the contract the cost of grading the street had been increased. The instruction told the jury that if they found that the contract, advertisement and bid contained certain specifications, then the contract was void. Glass v. Gelvin, supra, (d) The city had the right to let the contract, and the contractor, or city, the right to use the waste earth in filling other streets in the city, and no damage was done to defendants by reason of any action of the city, its engineer or contractor. Huston v. Fort Atkinson, 56 Wis. 350 ; New Harten v. Sergeant, 38 Conn. 50; Bissell v. Collins, 28 Mich. 277; Neenan v. Smith, 60 Mo. 292.
C. O. Tichenor, for the respondent.
(1) Tax bills are valid because the land against ' which they are issued is presumed to be benefitted to the extent at least of their amount. “Special assessments are made upon the assumption that a portion of the community is to be specially and particularly benefitted in the enhancement of the value of property peculiarly situated as regards a contemplated expenditure of public funds; and in addition to the general levy, they demand that special contribution, in consideration of the special benefit, shall be made by the persons receiving it.” Cooley on Tax. 416. “ General taxation implies a distribution of the burden upon some general rule of equality, so a local assessment or tax for a local benefit should be distributed among and imposed upon all equally standing in like relation.” Hence, we say that special tax bills are based upon two principles— first, that the property assessed is benefitted to the extent of the tax; second, that the property so benefitted is taxed. (2) Section 2, article 7, of the charter, says: “The cost of grading any street * * * shall be charged as a special tax on all property on both sides of said street * * * graded,” etc. To grade means, of course, to bring to grade, either by means of a fill or a cut. Here we have the most valuable ground on the greater thoroughfare paying nothing for completing the grading of a portion of the same, fully completed to full width and to grade, while the less valuable property pays the whole of the cost. This kind of doctrine will breed all kinds of schemes. Here we see the engineer oí a street railway (which cannot be built until Ninth street is graded) circulating a petition for the grading of May street; the president of the road loans the money necessary to pay the 'tax bill to one lot-owner to get him to sign the petition. (3) Section 1 of article 7 of the charter of Kansas City provides that ‘ ‘ no street, etc., shall be graded * * * at the expense of property-owners fronting on it, unless a majority of the owners, in front feet, on such street, and residénts of.Kansas City, shall petition the common council to have such street graded.” Section 8 of same article provides, for publication, etc. The object of the notice was to give the owner a chance to be heard. Such requirements must be rigidly adhered to. ' City v. Casey, 3 Bush, 701; City v. Swope, 79 Mr. 446; Roberts ». Easton, 19 O. St. 88. (4) The time for a general meeting of the common council was a matter of law, that for a special meeting was a matter of fact. Mixon », Ruple, 1 Vroom, 60; Charter, art. 1, sec. 14, and art. 4, secs. 8 and 9. Hence, the owner yas bound to know the time of a general meeting. It was not necessary to state it in the notice. The law would presume the time to be the next general meeting. After it was published, a special meeting was called of which the owner was not notified and beni-e could not act. The council acted too soon, so that their action could not do away with a proper petition. If it was not a proper one the owner would be allowed to show it. State v. Road Com'rs, 41 N. J. 89; City v. Edwards, 78 Pa. 68 ; Olds v. Erie, 79 Pa. 383 ; State v. City, 1 Hutch. 310; State v. City, 2 Hutch. 446 ; Scott t. Diclcinson, 14 Pick. 276 ; Harris v. Sturdeoant, 29 Me. 366; .Shriver r>. Stevens, 20 Pa. 138; 38 N. J. L. 97. (5) The time given in the notice must be reasonable. Band v. Wilde a, 11 Cush. 296-; Cityv. Eckoards, 78 Pa. 63.

Opinion:
Ellison, P. J.
— At that part of Ninth street named in the contract and specifications for grading May street, there was a gulch or hollow, from forty to sixty feet in depth.. May street is near Ninth, but from the formation of the earth in that vicinity, to bring these streets to grade, it required excavation on May and filling in on Ninth. The result of the fulfillment of the contract was, that both streets were brought to grade at the expense of one. ' The charter of the city provides that: "The cost of grading any street shall be charged as a special tax on all property on both sides of said street graded," etc. To grade means, of course, to bring to grade, either by means of a fill or a cut. It is a fundamental rule that "a local assessment or tax for a local benefit should be distributed among and imposed upon all equally standing in like relation." Under the charter of the City of Kansas and the familiar rule governing local assessm ents, it is quite evident and apparent that one street cannot, by ordinance or contract, be graded at the expense of the property holders of another. The suggestions made in favor of the legality of these proceedings are that the work done in Ninth by filling and leveling- it, its full width, to grade did not enhance the cost of the work on May street; that the dirt taken from May might as well be deposited in the hollow on Ninth, as at any other point. In other words, and it is the strongest suggestion to be made in favor of plaintiff's case, the fill on Ninth street was a mere incident to the excavation on May; and while it may benefit Ninth, it is a natural result which often follows a public improvement. But, to my mind, the fact is, that the filling of Ninth street is not the mere incident resulting from the excavating of May. It is a part of the contract upon which this tax bill is founded, that the contractor shall grade Ninth street according to specifications, to its full width. And so if the work or grading on Ninth street had not been done as required by the contract and specifications the contractor would not have been entitled to this tax bill. One cannot close his eyes on the fact that the contract in this case bound the contractor to grade both streets, one by a cut an,d the other by a fill. Both were by the contract to be brought to the established grade, one by cutting down and the other by filling up. If he failed to do either, he failed in the performance necessary to entitle him to the tax bill. Suppose this matter had been the other way, and instead of an ordinance to improve May street, it had been to improve Ninth, and the contract had been that the contractor should gét the earth necessary to make the fill on Ninth'by excavating May its full width to grade; would it be right or just that the full cost of grading both streets should be put upon Ninth ? If the filling of Ninth street had been the mere incident to the work on May, the case would be wholly unlike this. In this case, as I have said, the contract is to bring both streets to grade at the expense of one. The argument that the work on Ninth has not added to the cost of grading May amounts to simply this: that as it would cost the. property-holders on May as much to grade their street alone as it would to grade both it and Ninth, therefore they shall be compelled to grade Ninth. If the argument be based on fact, it results from the natural lay of the earth at these points, and certainly both streets are entitled to share in this natural advantage when both are improved under the same contract.
Sections 30 and 31 of chapter 31 of the general ordinances of Kansas City were introduced in evidence, section 30, by plaintiffs and 31 by defendants, but these, separately or together, cannot be interpreted to overthrow the principle I have stated in a case of this character.
The judgment, with the concurrence of the other judges, is affirmed.