Case Name: Barton v. State
Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 1927-10-24
Citations: 175 Ark. 120
Docket Number: 
Parties: Barton v. State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Arkansas Reports
Volume: 175
Pages: 120–126

Head Matter:
Barton v. State.
Opinion delivered October 24, 1927.
Hamiter S Upton and McKay <& Smith, for appellant.
H. W. Applegate, Attorney General, and Darden Moose, Assistant, for appellee.

Opinion:
Smith, J.,
(after stating- the facts). In addition to the testimony stated above, two witnesses for appellant testified that they saw appellant in a Dodge roadster in and near Garland City at about midnight and at a later hour, in company with Green and Ernest Richardson, a brother of Orvil Richardson, and it was also shown that the casings had been recently removed from the rims found at Mrs. Kyle's house, and that the casings sold Orvil Richardson fitted these rims perfectly. "We think this testimony legally sufficient to support the conviction.
The question asked appellant, on his cross-examination, touching the use which he proposed to make of the building- which he had erected at Garland City, should probably not have been asked, but we do not think it constitutes prejudicial error calling for the reversal of the judgment. The question was asked appellant on his cross-examination, and the court told the jury the answer could be considered only as affecting the credibility of the -witness, and, when he answered the question, he denied that he was about to open up the place for the sale of intoxicating- liquors.
A witness may be interrogated on his cross-examination touching his recent and present residence, occupation and association, for the purpose of enabling the jury to pass upon his credibility as a witness. Hollingsworth v. State, 53 Ark. 387, 14 S. W. 41. The court, in permitting the question to be asked, remarked that the answer could be considered for this purpose only, and, when the question was answered, the witness, denied he was about to engage in a violation of the law.
Trial judges must be intrusted with some discretion in examinations of this character, 'and we reverse only where an abuse of this discretion is shown. Care should be used- in the exercise of this discretion to see that the prosecuting attorney does not, by insinuation, ask questions which are not intended to show the present or recent association or occupation of the witness, but, as we have said, we think no abuse of this discretion appears.
According to the testimony of Green and Orvil Richardson, they were not accomplices, and, if they were not, their testimony did not .require corroboration, but, even though they were, we think there was sufficient testimony corroborating them to sustain the conviction. The court gave, at appellant's request, an instruction defining accomplices. We think the court might very well have given instruction No. 10 as requested, but that no error was committed in the modification made, in view of the oral instruction set out above. The jury might have found that neither Green nor Richardson was an accomplice, or that Richardson was not an accomplice, even though Green was, and, if Richardson was not an accomplice, his testimony would not require corroboration, even though that of Green did. We think that the oral instruction makes it clear that a conviction could not be had upon the uncorroborated testimony of a witness found to be an accomplice, but that the corroboration would be required only as to the testimony of the witness found to be an accomplice.
No error was committed in the refus'al to give instruction numbered 7, set out above. We have held it was not improper to give such an instruction where a conviction was asked solely upon circumstantial evidence. Hazel v. State, 174 Ark. 1078, 298 S. W. 357. But the prosecution in this c-ase did not rely wholly upon circumstantial evidence.
We have held, however, that it is not improper to refuse to give such an instruction, even in Cases where conviction was asked wholly upon circumstantial evidence, where the jury was properly instructed as to the burden of proof resting on the State to establish the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, and where reasonable doubt was properly defined. Rogers v. State, 163 Ark. 252, 260 S. W. 23; Bost v. State, 140 Ark. 254, 215 S. W. 615; Cooper v. State, 145 Ark. 403, 224 S. W. 726; Cummins v. State, 163 Ark. 24, 258 S. W. 622; Barker v. State, 135 Ark. 404, 205 S. W. 805; Garrett v. State, 171 Ark. 297, 284 S. W. 734; Rogers v. State, 163 Ark. 252, 260 S. W. 23.
Certain other errors are assigned which we think do not require discussion.
As no prejudicial error' appears, the judgment of the court below must be affirmed, and it is so ordered.