Case Name: W. W. CHESHIRE and Angie M. Cheshire, his wife, Appellants, v. STATE ROAD DEPARTMENT of Florida, an Agency of the State of Florida, and Broward County, a Political Subdivision of the State of Florida, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1966-03-16
Citations: 186 So. 2d 790
Docket Number: No. 307
Parties: W. W. CHESHIRE and Angie M. Cheshire, his wife, Appellants, v. STATE ROAD DEPARTMENT of Florida, an Agency of the State of Florida, and Broward County, a Political Subdivision of the State of Florida, Appellees.
Judges: SMITH, C. J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 186
Pages: 790–795

Head Matter:
W. W. CHESHIRE and Angie M. Cheshire, his wife, Appellants, v. STATE ROAD DEPARTMENT of Florida, an Agency of the State of Florida, and Broward County, a Political Subdivision of the State of Florida, Appellees.
No. 307.
District Court of Appeal of Florida. Fourth District.
March 16, 1966.
Bruno L. DiGiulian of Price & Di Giulian, Fort Lauderdale, for appellants.
P. A. Pacyna, Tallahassee, for appellees.

Opinion:
ANDREWS, Judge.
This is an interlocutory appeal by the defendants, W. W. and Angie M. Cheshire, to review an order taxing costs entered subsequent to final judgment in condemnation proceedings brought by the plaintiffs, State Road Department of Florida, an agency of the State of Florida, and Broward County, a political subdivision of the State of Florida.
The defendants filed a post-judgment motion to tax costs against the plaintiffs in the amount of $340.82. Included was an item of $250.00 representing a real estate appraiser's fee. The trial judge denied such fee on the ground that the appraiser did not testify on behalf of the defendants at the trial. The defendants contend that it was necessary to have an expert appraisal of the property in order to determine the sufficiency of the value placed upon the property by the court appointed appraisers, and that such appraisal was fair and would result in full compensation for the property taken. They urge that the cost was reasonably incurred by them in the preparation for the trial and that such costs are .allowable under the provisions of F.S.A. § 73.16.
The plaintiff contends that the fee of a real estate appraiser for the defendants is only allowable as an expert witness fee where the appraiser testified as provided for under F.S.A. § 90.231(1) and (2).
The plaintiff, State Road Department, insists that the question presented here was .settled by the case of State Road Department v. Outlaw, Fla.App.1963, 148 So.2d 741, where the court held that an appraiser who had appraised numerous parcels in asingle condemnation suit was not entitled to be paid as an expert witness for parcels regarding which he had not testified in that settlement had been reached regarding said parcels prior to the trial.
Such is not the situation before the court here. In State Road Department v. Outlaw, supra, the court observed that there is a presumption upon settlement before trial that the agreed amount, unless otherwise stated, included all expenses of the defendant in preparing for trial. To the contrary, a verdict in condemnation proceedings does not include allowable costs of the proceedings as authorized by F.S.A. § 73.16.
Section 12 of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the State of Florida, F.S.A. provides that private property shall not be taken without just compensation. The state, its agencies and political subdivisions, are subject to that provision. Daniels v. State Road Department, Fla.1964, 170 So.2d 846. The theory and purpose of such guaranty is that the owner shall be made whole so far as possible and practical. The judicial history of eminent domain proceedings shows that the courts have been ever vigilant to fully protect the interest of persons whose property is being taken and in doing so to see that the amount received is not diminished by the costs necessarily incurred in protecting the owner in his right to such compensation. It has been pointed out that the condemning authorities are able to provide expert witnesses and appraisers, and if the defendant in condemnation proceedings is to be assured of full compensation he should have the same tools available to him in a defense of his right. Such costs, however, as are expended are subject to the close scrutiny of the court for the purpose of determining that such costs are reasonable and were necessarily incurred in the defense of the proceeding, and should be allowed only in an amount the court determines necessary and proper. Orange State Oil Co. v. Jack sonville Expressway Authority, Fla.App. 1962, 143 So.2d 892; Jacksonville Expressway Authority v. Henry G. Du Pree Company, Fla.1958, 108 So.2d 289; Dade County v. Houk, Fla.1956, 89 So.2d 649; Dade County v. Brigham, Fla.1950, 47 So.2d 602, 18 A.L.R.2d 1221.
One other point deserves comment. What now appears as F.S.A. § 90.231 was initially enacted by Laws of Florida, 1949, Chapter 2S090. As originally enacted, it contained the following provision:
"[P]rovided, this Act shall not apply to any condemnation suit filed in behalf of any state, county or municipal agency, or other body having right of eminent domain."
This proviso remained until eliminated by Laws of Florida, Chapter 59-201. Thus, until 1959 Florida had no statute with respect to expert witness fees in condemnation proceedings. The prior allowance of such fees was not dependent upon that statute. See Dade County v. Brigham, supra. The allowance of a reasonable fee for the appraiser should not he denied solely because he did not testify. F.S.A. § 90.231 is not controlling.
Accordingly, the cause is reversed with direction to the court to determine the reasonableness of the appraiser's fee and, to the extent that such fee is found to be reasonable and necessarily incurred in a defense of the suit, to award said sum to the defendants. The allowance of such fee, however, is not a matter of right as to the amount submitted or charged, but such fee should be allowed in such amount as is reasonable and necessary.
The cause is reversed and remanded for such further proceedings consistent with this opinion:
SMITH, C. J., concurs.
WALDEN, J., dissents.