Case Name: Varinder KAUR, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2012-03-02
Citations: 470 F. App'x 611
Docket Number: No. 08-74080
Parties: Varinder KAUR, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 470
Pages: 611–612

Head Matter:
Varinder KAUR, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General, Respondent.
No. 08-74080.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted Feb. 21, 2012.
Filed March 2, 2012.
Teresa Salazar-Cosmos, Daly City, CA, for Petitioner.
Ronald E. Lefevre, Office of the District Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, Eric Warren Marsteller, Esquire, OIL, Carol Federighi, Esquire, Senior Litigation Counsel, Jonathan Aaron Robbins, Esquire, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
Before: FERNANDEZ, McKEOWN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Varinder Kaur, a native and citizen of India, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' ("BIA") order denying her motion to reopen. Our jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for an abuse of discretion, Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945 (9th Cir.2004), and we deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.
The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Kaur's motion to reopen as untimely because the motion was filed over two years after the BIA's final order, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), and Kaur failed to present material evidence of changed circumstances in India to qualify for the regulatory exception to the time limitation for filing motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(h); see also Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 988, 996-97 (9th Cir.2008) (underlying adverse credibility determination rendered evidence of changed circumstances immaterial).
We reject Kaur's contentions that the BIA applied an incorrect standard, ignored evidence, or failed to adequately explain its decision. See Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 990-91 (9th Cir.2010).
The BIA did not abuse its discretion in construing Kaur's challenge to the underlying adverse credibility determination as a motion to reconsider and denying it as untimely. See Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 793 (9th Cir.2005) (BIA may construe motions based on their underlying purpose); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b) (a motion to reconsider must specify errors of law or fact in the BIA's prior decision and be filed within 30 days of that decision).
We decline to reconsider Kaur's challenge to the immigration judge's adverse credibility determination because this court already decided the issue in Kaur v. Gonzales, 235 Fed. Appx. 425 (9th Cir.2007); see also Merritt v. Mackey, 932 F.2d 1317, 1320 (9th Cir.1991) (explaining that under the "law of the case doctrine," one panel of an appellate court will not reconsider questions that another panel has decided on a prior appeal in the same case).
Finally, we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA's decision not to exercise its sua sponte power to reopen proceedings. See Mejia-Hernandez v. Holder, 633 F.3d 818, 823-24 (9th Cir.2011).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED in part; DISMISSED in part.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.