Case Name: Rufus K. Delafield et al. plaintiffs and respondents, vs. The Union Ferry Company, of Brooklyn, defendants and appellants
Court: New York Superior Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1868-01
Citations: 5 Rob. 207
Docket Number: 
Parties: Rufus K. Delafield et al. plaintiffs and respondents, vs. The Union Ferry Company, of Brooklyn, defendants and appellants.
Judges: 
Reporter: Reports of cases argued and determined in the Superior Court of the city of New York
Volume: 28
Pages: 207–216

Head Matter:
Rufus K. Delafield et al. plaintiffs and respondents, vs. The Union Ferry Company, of Brooklyn, defendants and appellants.
1. In an action for damages from the collision of a vessel of the defendants with that of the plaintiffs, where the question of the negligence of the former depended upon the fact whether it was so light at the time that the crew of the former could see the latter, and there was conflicting evidence upon that point, such question of fact ought to be submitted to the jury. McCunn, J. dissenting.
2. In such case, if it were light enough at the time of the collision for the crew of the vessel of the defendants to see the vessel of the plaintiffs, although it was after sunset, it was not such negligence on the part of the latter not to have signal lights hoisted, as to deprive them of their right of action. McCunn, J. dissented.
3. The verdict of a jury is controlling upon a question of negligence, where there is conflicting evidence.
(Before Robertson, Ch. J., and Garvin and McCunn, JJ.)
Heard October 14, 1867;
decided January, 1868.
This was an action for damages for injuries to a canal boat belonging to the plaintiffs, (The Ogden,) by a steam ferry boat belonging to the defendants, (The Abbie,) plying between New York and Brooklyn in January, 1857. The collision occurred at the former place. The river was at that time full of ice. The plaintiffs’ vessel was deeply laden, and had sacks of salt on deck. Her captain attempted to take her 'across the slip, into which the vessel of the defendants always ran, and where the ferry was, in order to moor his vessel under the lee of some wharf to protect her from the floating ice. It was after the sunset, which was one minute before five o’clock on that day. The vessel of the defendants was fully lighted; it had a pilot at the bow, and a look out along side of him. On the trial, witnesses on behalf of the plaintiffs testified that it was so light at the time that the vessel of the defendants could be seen at Brooklyn from the New York side without regard to her lights; that on her approach her pilot could be seen from the deck of the canal boat, and one witness stated that he could see the passengers in the ferry boat as plainly as he saw “the faces of the jury.” The captain of the canal boat testified that immediately after the collision took place he went to look for men to haul off his deck load, which was twenty minutes after six. One witness examined for the plaintiffs, (Gillen,') the pilot of the ferry boat, (Shepherd,) the look out, (Cole,) a bridge man, (Brown,) and a carpenter, (Goodrich,) testified that it was at' night. The pilot testified that he thought the canal boat to be a mass of ice, and as soon as he discovered his mistake he used every means to avoid a collision, he immediately stopped his engine and reversed the wheels, to back the ferry boat. Some of the witnesses also stated the time of the evening by the clock. No light was shown on board of the canal boat. Her captain saw the ferry boat from the time she left the Brooklyn side, but gave no warning, and did not do any thing to avoid a collision.
Upon the trial, the counsel for the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint upon two grounds: First, that there was no evidence of negligence or carelessness on the part of the defendants; and second, that the evidence showed negligence on the part of the plaintiffs, causing or contributing to the injury.
The court denied the motion, to which the defendants’ counsel excepted. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiffs of $3371.80. A motion was subsequently made for a new trial upon a case and denied. Judgment was entered upon such verdict, from which, and from the order denying a new trial an appeal was taken.
M. S. Bidwell, for appellants.
Cr. IT. Forster, for respondents.

Opinion:
By the Court, Garvin, J.
In the afternoon of the 17th of January, 1857, a collision took place between the plaintiffs' canal boat " Ogden," and the defendants' steam ferry boat "Abbie," at pier No. 36, East river, on the New York side. This action is brought to recover damages for the injury done to the "Ogden" and her cargo. Upon the trial, the plaintiffs had a verdict for a little over $3000. The only material question before us arose upon the denial by the court of the motion to dismiss the complaint on two grounds: (1.) That there was no evidence of negligence on the part of the defendants; and (2.) That the evidence showed negligence on the part of the plaintiffs, causing or contributing to the injury. As rules of law, both these propositions will be conceded; but whether the facts before the court were of such a character as to show negligence on the part of the plaintiffs, and a want of evidence showing negligence on the part of the defendants, are the questions before us. If it had been certain that the collision took place between the two boats in open day, without any intervening object to prevent a full and clear view of the canal boat by those on the steamboat, then the defendants would, beyond all doubt, have been guilty of negligence, and such negligence as to have entitled the plaintiffs to a recovery for such damages as they proved, provided they were free from negligence themselves. But this question, as to whether it was dark or light, was not so clearly made out, upon the proofs, as to warrant the court in pronouncing upon the case in favor of the defendants. The facts did not show a case of contributing negligence against the plaintiffs, unless it.was so dark that the defendants' employees could not see the canal boat; therefore it was entirely proper that the judge, at the trial, should submit that with other questions of fact to the jury. Upon their findings the cause turned. We must assume' the court charged, if it was so light that the defendants' servants could see the canal boat lying across the entrance to the' slip in time to have stopped the steamer before she struck the plaintiffs' boat, then the defendants were guilty of negligence, and the plaintiffs were entitled to recover. The jury must have found it was light enough to see the canal boat in time to have stopped her. Certainly, a collision under such circumstances would show a want of ordinary care and caution'on the part of the defendants, and it is difficult to see, upon such a finding, why the plaintiffs ought not to recover. The plaintiffs were not negligent in not having a light on their .boat, because under this state of facts it was light enough to see, and a light on the canal boat was unnecessary.
In this view of the case the verdict should be sustained, provided there is evidence in the case to support it. In cases of. this description, where there is conflicting evidence, the question of negligence as to both parties is one of fact for the jury. (Ernst v. The Hudson River Railroad Co., 35 N. Y. Rep. 9.) It was in proof on the part of the plaintiffs, that it was so light that the ferry boat could be seen across the river, on the Brooklyn side, before she left her dock to come over, without reference to her lights; that the canal boat was being moored to get under lee hom the ice, which was coming down so strong that it would be likely to run the canal boat down; that from the canal boat the pilot could be seen by the light of day; that it was so light the passengers could be counted and seen as plainly, one of the witnesses said, as he could see the faces of the jury. It is true there was conflicting evidence given'on the part of the defendants; but the questions of fact were submitted to the jury, and their verdict is controlling with us. We do not think the exceptions taken to the ruling made by the court, in denying the motion to dismiss the complaint, or in excluding evidence, are either of them well taken.
The judgment and order should be affirmed, with costs.
Robertson, Ch. J. concurred. '