Case Name: LENZ v. CITY OF DETROIT
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1960-09-16
Citations: 361 Mich. 166
Docket Number: Docket No. 15, Calender No. 47,944
Parties: LENZ v. CITY OF DETROIT.
Judges: Dethmers, C. J., and Carr, J., concurred with Kelly, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 361
Pages: 166–184

Head Matter:
LENZ v. CITY OF DETROIT.
Municipal Corporations — Presentation of Claims — War Veteran’s Salary.
War veteran’s claim for salary alleged to be due from defendant city was barred by reason of noncomplianee with charter provision requiring that unliquidated claim be presented to common council as a condition precedent to bringing an action thereon (Detroit Charter, title 6, chap 7, § 11).
Smith and Souris, JJ., dissenting.
References for Points in Headnotes
38 Am Jur, Municipal Corporations § 677.
Appeal from Wayne; Sullivan (Joseph A.), J.
Submitted April 6, 1960.
(Docket No. 15, Calender No. 47,944.)
Decided September 16, 1960.
Rehearing denied October 10, 1960.
Assumpsit by John N. Lenz against the City of Detroit, a municipal corporation, its mayor, and certain of its officials for salary and pension benefits of which he was deprived by reason of alleged wrongful discharge from civic employment. Judgment for defendants. Plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
Craig Thompson, for plaintiff.
Nathaniel H. Goldstich, Corporation Counsel, Helen Miller Smith and John B. McKinlay, Assistants Corporation Counsel, for defendants.

Opinion:
Kelly, J.
November 2, 1956, plaintiff filed Ms declaration alleging:
(1) That he was notified by letter on November 14, 1949, that he was discharged from his position of legislative clerk in the department of city clerk of Detroit for the following reasons: "Insubordination, conduct unbecoming a city employee, threatened intimidation of employer, misuse of council office, and fraudulent use of council stationery."
(2) That he appealed and protested, in due course, to the civil service commission and was duly heard at a scheduled hearing before said commission, after which said commission made a finding that said discharge was not for political reasons and was "not for reasons other than the good of the service."
(3) That following the finding of the civil service commission, plaintiff filed a written protest with the mayor of the city of Detroit on December 14, 1949.
.(4) That he (plaintiff) was notified by the mayor on February 6, 1950, as follows:
"After full and due consideration of all the facts submitted at''the hearing granted you before me on January 27, 1950, in accordance with the provisions of the veterans preference act, you are hereby advised of my decision.
"I find as a matter of fact that you did, while an employee of the city clerk, take militant action without regard to the recommendation of your employer, to change your classification and secure an increase in your salary. That you did, while so employed, collect facts in regard to the administration of" the city clerk's office, and did attempt to use such facts to embarrass and discredit yonr employer'. ' That you did use official stationery of the common council and assume the title of 'secretary of the common council' for yonr personal benefit and prestige.
"It is my decision that you are guilty as charged and it is, therefore, my order that you be discharged as a city employee in accordance with the recommendations of the city clerk and the civil service commission."
i (5) That plaintiff's mandamus action against the mayor to effect plaintiff's reinstatement as an employee was granted January 28, 1953, but the circuit court's decision was reversed by this Court on December 29, 1953 (Lenz v. Mayor of Detroit, 338 Mich 383), this Court ruling mandamus was not the proper remedy.
(6) That on February 10, 1955, the "Wayne circuit court sustained plaintiff's writ of certiorari ,"thereby quashing the proceedings before the mayor .and setting aside the order of discharge, and on December 1, 1955, this Court reversed the circuit court (Lenz v. Mayor of Detroit, 343 Mich 599).
i Plaintiff concludes his declaration (paragraphs 22, 23 and 24) as follows:
"It was above and beyond the official power, authority, and jurisdiction of defendant Albert E. Cobo to hold the required statutory hearing on the protest of plaintiff, in the manner in which he did proceed, as hereinbefore recited; same being unfair, biased, prejudiced, and wholly denying to plaintiff his undoubted right to due process of law.
"It was above and beyond the scope of authority, power, and jurisdiction of defendant city of Detroit to deny, through its agency the civil service commission, plaintiff's protest against and appeal from the void order made by Ernest Jones, deputy city clerk, as hereinbefore recited.
"As a direct and proximate result of the void acts of said defendants, made without jurisdiction to make them, as hereinbefore recited, plaintiff was arbitrarily, forcefully, and without due process deprived of valuable contractual and property rights, and suffered other financial losses, and was thus damaged in the sum of $68,200.17."
In finding no cause for action on the part of plaintiff, the court stated, in part, in its opinion:
"Finally, on November 2, 1956, plaintiff started suit in assumpsit in this court to recover damages for alleged breach of contract between himself and thé city. This was just 9 days short of 7 years from the date of discharge, and 6 years, 8 months and 27 days after the mayor's decision.
"Testimony was offered by the plaintiff and plaintiff's witness, in addition to a 'stipulation of facts' which attempted to incorporate everything that had transpired in the past in the plaintiff's efforts at reinstatement- — 'providing it was admissible.'
"Notwithstanding plaintiff's claim that he was not afforded a full and fair hearing (and, implicitly, that he was not guilty of the charges laid against him), he offered no testimony to refute the charges against him, but confined his testimony to his concept of damages as a result of the alleged breach of contract. The testimony on this point was quite disjointed, and appeared to establish that plaintiff prospered to a greater degree after he left the employment of the city than he had with the city."
Defendants contend that plaintiff is barred by his failure to file a claim with the common council of Detroit.
Title 6, chap 7, § 11, of the Detroit city charter, reads:
"The common council shall audit and :allow -all accounts chargeable against the city, but no unliquidated account, or claim, or contract shall be re ceived for audit or allowance unless it be accompanied by an affidavit of the person rendering it, to the effect that he verily believes that the services or property therein charged have been actually performed or delivered to the city, and the sums charged therefor are reasonable and just, and that, to the best of his knowledge and belief, no set-off exists, nor payment has been made on account thereof, except as are included or .referred to in such account or claim. It shall be a sufficient bar and answer to any action or proceeding in any court for the collection of any demand or claim against said city that it has never been presented to the common council for audit or allowance or if on contracts that it was presented without said affidavit and rejected for that reason or that the action or proceeding was brought before the common council had a reasonable time to investigate and pass upon it."
A previous decision by this Court in regard to the necessity of a war veteran complying with this provision of the Detroit city charter is disclosed by Burkheiser v. City of Detroit, 270 Mich 381, wherein we held:
"Charter provision requiring that unliquidated claim be verified when presented to common council and that court action on any claim may be barred by claimant's failure to present claim to council held, applicable to war veteran's claim for wages as inspector of sewer construction during period he was laid off (Detroit charter, title 6, chap 7, § 11)." (Syllabus 3.)
That proof of claim is a condition precedent to recovery is also established by Springer v. City of Detroit, 102 Mich 300; Moulthrop v. City of Detroit, 218 Mich 464; and Grand Trunk W. R. Co. v. Detroit, 342 Mich 537.
We see no merit to plaintiff's contention that he did not have to comply with the charter provisions because "at the time of filing this suit appellant did .not have any claim to present to the council, and still has no claim to present. Appellant will never have a claim to present to common council on the facts of this case, unless and until it he determined by this Court that his discharge was illegal and void."
Appellant's action was barred by his failure to file a claim with the common council.
Defendants also contend that plaintiff-appellant does not have a cause of action. In endeavoring to meet the statute of limitations argument, plaintiff, in his brief, states:
"It was only on the date when this Court handed down its decision in 343 Michigan 599; that'is to say, on December 1, 1955, that appellant's status was cleared to the point where he could no longer ask for or receive a valid hearing before the mayor of Detroit."
Having failed to establish the illegality of the mayor's decision of discharge, plaintiff, 6 years and 8 months after said hearing, commenced this action in assumpsit charging that because of the void acts of defendants, plaintiff is entitled to $68,200.17.
To grant plaintiff's request in this assumpsit action would result in final determination that even though the court has refused to uphold plaintiff's contention that the discharge was illegal and void, plaintiff is entitled to damages in an assumpsit action based upon a declaration that the hearing before the mayor was "unfair, biased, prejudiced, and wholly denying to plaintiff his undoubted right to due' process of law" and that- "plaintiff was arbi trarily, forcefully, and without due process deprived of valuable contractual and property rights."
The case of Sewell v. Detroit Electrical Contractors Assn., 345 Mich 93, dealt with a discharged employee of the city of Detroit who sued his department head and another superior in the department, claiming damages for a wrongful discharge. The suit- was dismissed upon motion because of former adjudication by the civil service commission which upheld the validity of the discharge. The Supreme Court, in the appeal of the damage suit, held that the finding of the administrative tribunal was final and could not be attacked in a collateral proceeding such as a suit for damages, and, in deciding the case, stated (p 115):
"It is urged by defendants Steiner and Wolff: that the dismissal of plaintiff's second application for leave to appeal'in the nature of certiorari by Judge O'Hara on July 17, 1953, by reason of plaintiff's •failure to furnish the trial court the transcript of the rehearing held by the civil service commission, left the decisions of the civil service commission on the hearing and rehearing and the judge's opinion and order of denial in full force and effect.
"In Hailey v. Saginaw Justice of the Peace, 320 Mich 59, 63, we said:
" 'The effect of a dismissal of an appeal is stated in 4 CJS, Appeal and Error, § 1386, pp 2007, 2008:
" ' "On the dismissal of an appeal the cause stands in the trial court as if no appeal had ever been taken; the decree or order appealed from becomes final, and the effect of such dismissal is to leave the parties where they were before the appellate proceeding was instituted."' (Emphasis supplied.) .
"We think the above rule should apply with equal force to quasi-judicial bodies such as the civil service commission of Detroit. In onr opinion the action taken by the civil service commission on plaintiff's subsequent attempt to appeal is an adjudication that plaintiff was lawfully discharged from employment with the city of Detroit, and it also follows that any claim for damages against defendants Steiner and Wolff, growing out of such discharge, is foreclosed by reason of such discharge."
See, also, Van Sant v. Atlantic City, 68 NJL 449 (53 A 701); 37 Am Jur, Municipal Corporations, § 264, p 886; and McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, § 12.227.
We conclude that defendants' contention that plaintiff did not have a cause of action should be upheld.
Because of what has been said hereinbefore it is not necessary to pass upon the question of statute of limitations.
Affirmed. No costs, a public question being involved.
Dethmers, C. J., and Carr, J., concurred with Kelly, J.
Municipal Code, City of Detroit, charter section, p 206.—Reporter.
Currently, 5 CJS, Appeal and Error, § 1386, pp 507-509.—Reporter.