Case Name: FRANCISCO GONZALES y BORREGO et al., Plaintiffs in Error, v. TERRITORY OF NEW MEXICO, Defendant in Error
Court: Supreme Court of New Mexico
Jurisdiction: New Mexico
Decision Date: 1896-09-01
Citations: 8 N.M. 446
Docket Number: No. 618
Parties: FRANCISCO GONZALES y BORREGO et al., Plaintiffs in Error, v. TERRITORY OF NEW MEXICO, Defendant in Error.
Judges: Collier and Bantz, JJ., concur.
Reporter: New Mexico Reports
Volume: 8
Pages: 446–496

Head Matter:
[No. 618.
September 1, 1896.]
FRANCISCO GONZALES y BORREGO et al., Plaintiffs in Error, v. TERRITORY OF NEW MEXICO, Defendant in Error.
Criminal Law — Review op Judgments op District Courts by Writ op Error — -Stay op Execution. — The judgments of the district courts of the territory of New Mexico, in criminal eases, are reviewable in the supreme court of the territory by writ of error, which operates as a stay of execution in such eases, though no provision is made for supersedeas, being a supersedeas by implication.
Id. — Special Term — Continuance Beyond Time op Regular Term— Validity. — Proceedings, in a murder case, at a special term of the district court, were not invalid because the term was continued beyond the time fixed for the regular terms of the other counties of the district.
Id. — Homicide—Indictment—Pleading—Sufficiency.—A charge in an indictment that the deceased “instantly” died of mortal wounds inflicted upon him by the accused, was sufficient to constrain the conclusion that his death was effected on the spot, at the place where it was caused, as the equivalent of “then and there.”
Id.- — Murder in First Degree — Indictment—Pleading—Sufficiency.— An indictment charging that the accused “unlawfully, feloniously, willfully, purposely, and with express malice aforethought did shoot and kill” deceased, embodied in its terms all the elements necessary to constitute murder in the first degree, so distinctly and comprehensively as to exclude murder in any less degree.
Id. — Murder- —Alibi — Onus — Reasonable Doubt — Instruction.—An instruction that it was incumbent on defendants to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that they were not at the place where the murder was committed or were in so,me other place, away from the place of the murder, but not beyond a reasonable doubt, and imposing on the prosecution the obligation to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants were at the place where deceased was killed, and giving defendants the benefit of their testimony to create in the minds of the jury a reasonable doubt as to their being at the place, was not error.
Id. — Murder—Evidence—Admissibility.—On a trial‘of B., and others, on indictment for the murder of C., where G-. testified that he was approached by V. with a proposition to assassinate 0., that the details of the nronosed assassination were discussed by V. and B. with him, that they informed him that two of the other defendants were in the agreement, that their object was to remove C. because o£ his prominence and great strength in his political party, to which they were antagonistic and wished to destroy in the county, that he seemingly acquiesced in their proposition, but, having no reason to murder C., determined, on reflection, to put him on his guard, and accordingly sent^him a note (which was found among the papers of C. after his death and identified by the witness), and that afterward to avoid importunity from V. and B. to cooperate with them in the assassination of 0., and from fear of them as members of a certain secret society, under apprehension that they would become aware of his betrayal of them, left the territory, — Held: That his testimony and the note were admissible to prove the conspiracy.
Id. — Witness Convicted oe Misdemeanor — Competency op Testimony. Conviction of an offense not greater than a misdemeanor, either by the statute or at common law, will not render a witness incompetent to testify.
Id. — Murder—Alibi—Cross-Examination op Accused-Judicial Discretion. — In a murder trial, where defendants, claiming an alibi, testified to their whereabouts from 7 o’ clock p. m. of the night of the murder, it was within the discretion of the court to permit them to be cross-examined as to their whereabouts from the noon preceding up to that time. The rule that a witness can not be cross-examined as to any facts irrelevant or collateral to the issue merely to contradict him, does not exclude the contradiction of a witness as to any facts immediately connected with the inquiry.
Id. — Murder—Admissibility op Testimony — Judicial Discretion. — The refusal, on such trial, to permit defendants, who were at a certain place at a certain time prior to the murder, to introduce testimony to show that the persons, who testified that they saw defendants at another place at that time, were not- there themselves at that time, was a matter within the sound discretion of the court.
Id, — Murder—Cross-Examination op Dependants por Purpose op Impeachment-Judicial Discretion. — The right of the court, in such case, to permit defendants to be asked, on cross-examination, as to the killing by them, of another, a few days after the murder in question, for the purpose of discrediting them, was within the limits of a sound judicial discretion.
Id. — Amendment op Record Nunc Pro Tunc — Proops Required. — In such case, an amendment, by the trial court, of the record, by an order nunc pro tunc, to show arraignment and pleas of not guilty, was warranted by the trial judge’s recollection of the facts of arraignment and pleas of not guilty, shown by the affidavits of the clerk, the sheriff, district attorney, and court stenographer, if not by a recital in the record alone, that “issue being joined,” the trial was had, and a verdict of guilty returned.
Id. — Record, Correction of, after Expiration of Term. — The correction, by the trial court, of an omission or false entry in a record, by an order nunc pro tunc, is not limited to the term at which such omission or entry was made, but may be made “whenever the ends of justice may require it.” Comp. Laws 1884, see. 1836.
Id. — Amendment of Record' by Order Nunc Pro Tunc — Extent of Power. — And this power of the trial court to correct the record by an order nunc pro tunc extends to criminal cases.
Id. — Power of Amendment, after Removal of Cause by Writ of Error. — And the trial court can not be deprived of this power to amend its record so as to make it conform to the truth, by the removal of the cause by writ of error.
Id. — Qualification of Associate Justice to Sit Outside of His District —Construction of Statutes. — -The judicial power vested in the district courts by act of congress of September 9, 1850, to be exercised in each district, “by one of the justices of the supreme court,” does not require that it shall be exercised by any particular one of the justices. There is nothing in the language of that clause, nor in the act- of congress of June 10, 1858, warranting such a construction as would confine the exercise of the power to the particular justice assigned to the district, when such justice is otherwise disqualified; and the maxim expressio unius exclusio alterius, does not apply.
Error, from a judgment of conviction for murder, to the First Judicial District Court, Santa Fe County.
Motion to quash, writ denied, and judgment affirmed.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Catron, Sriess & Gortner for' plaintiffs in error.
The judgments of the district courts of this territory, in criminal cases, are reviewable in the supreme court of the territory by writ of error. Rev. Stats., U. S., secs. 1868, 1869; Rice v. Rex, Cro. Jac. 404; Rex v. Seton, 7 T. R. 373; Rex v. West Riding, etc., Id. 467; Reg v. Carlisle, 2 B. & Ad. 971; State v. Shepard, 37 Wis. 395; Rex v. Earberry, Fort, 37; 1 Bish. Crim. Proc. [N. Ed.], sec. 1362; Comp. Laws, secs. 2194, 2199; U. S. v. Gibson, 1 Idaho, 364; Comp. Laws, sec. 2484; Barnett v. State, 36 Me. 198, and cita tions; U. S. v. Plumer, 1 Cliff, 58; Holford v. Alexander, 12 Ala. 280; Adler v. State, 35 Ark. 517; McKinney v. Western, etc., 4 Iowa, 420; Hawkins v. Bowie, 9 Gill. & J. 428; Fellows v. Griffin, 9 Sm. & M. 362; Calloway v. Nifong, 1 Mo. 223; Beid’s Admr. v. Stride’s Admr. , 7 Gratt. 76; Dows v. Harper, 6 Ohio, 518; Woods v. Caldwell, 34 Pa. St. 92; Comp. Laws 1884, secs. 2468-2473; Id., sec. 2201; Kidder v. Bennett, 2 N. M. 37; State v. Cunningham, 51 Mo. 479.
At common law, a writ of error is not a supersedeas so as to discharge from custody, but in capital cases it operates to stay execution. Whar. Crim. Prac. & Proc. 783. And it is a supersedeas by implication, where judgment is removed by the writ. 9 Bao. Abr. “Supersedeas,” p. 284. See, also, Bishop of Ossory’s Case, 3 Crooks, 534; State v. Pagels, 92 Mo. 300; Kitchen v. Bandolph, 93 H. S. 86.
Defendant in error, having invoked the jurisdiction of this court, can not be heard to object to the consideration of this cause on the present writ of erroiu 2 Ency. Pld. & Prac. 349.
The court erred in continuing the special term of court and the trial of this cause," after the time for the convening of the court and the adjournment thereof at the end of the three days, as fixed by law'. Comp. Laws 1884, sec. 551, et seq. See, also, Downey v. Smith, 13 111. 671; Bush v. Doy, 1 Kan. 86; Cooper v. Ins. Co., 3 Colo. 318; Davis v. Fish, 1 Green (Iowa), 409; Grable v. State, 2 Id. 565; Gregg v. Cooke, Peck. (Tenn.) 82; Ex Parte Lilley, 7 S. C. 372; Galushe v. Butterfield, 2 Scam. (111.) 227; Goodsal v. Boynton, 1 Id. 555; Mendum v. Comm., 6 Band. (Ya.) 715; Dunn v. State, 2 Ark. 249; In re Millington, 24 Kan. 160; Cox v. State, 30 Id. 202; Smith v. Chichester, 1 Cal, 409; Bates v. Gage, 40 Id. 184; Cain v. Goda, 84 Ind, 209; Batten v. State, 80 Id. 396; Newman v. Ham moud, 46 Id. 119; Norwood y. Kenfield, 34 Cal. 331; Earles v. Earles, 27 Kan. 542; Archer v. Boss, 2 Scarn. 303.
The indictment failed to charge that deceased died within a year and a day from the assault, or within what jurisdiction he died. Such averments were necessary to distinguish murder from common assault, and to confer jurisdiction on the court. Am. and Eng. Ency. Law, pp. 636, 638; Kerr on Horn., sec. 268; People v. Wall., 9 Cal. 32; People v. Cox, Id. 33; People v. Lloyd, Id. 34; Chapman v. People, 39 Mich. 360; Comm. v. Parker, 2 Pick. 558; State v. Qrrell, 1 Dev. (N. C.) 140; State v. Sides, -64 Mo. 385; State v. Lakey, 65 Id. 217; State v. Steeley, Id. 221; State v. Mayfield, 66 Id. 125; State v. Beaky, 1 Mo. App. 3; State v. Sundheimei’, 93 Mo. 315; Edmonson v. State, 51 Tex. 497; Comm. v. Macloon, 101 Mass. 1; U. S. v. Ball, 140 U. S. 118; Biggs v. State, 26 Miss. 55; Davidson v. State, 34 Me. 973; State v. Hobbs, 17 S. E. Bep. 38; Whar. o'n Horn., sec. 791; Whar. Am. Crim. L., sec. 272; State v. Conley, 39 Me. 94; State v. Testerman, 68 Mo. 413; State v. Fley, 2 Brev. (S. C.) 346; 1 Bish.' Crim. Proe. [3 Ed.], secs. 407-409; 2 Id., secs. 533, 534; 2 Whar. Pr. 114; 1 Whar. Crim. L. [9 Ed.], sec. 537; State v. Baker, 1 Jones L. 267; State v. Blan, 69 Mo. 317; State v. Shepard, 8 Ire. L. 195; 5 Bac. Abr., pp. 79-81; 1 Buss, on Crimes [2 Am. Ed.] 470; IT. S. v. Oruikshank, 92 IT. S. 542; IT. S. v. Crook, 17 Wall. 174. See, also, IT. S. v. Carl, 105 IT. S. 611; IT. S. v. Hess, 124'Id. 483; IT. S. v. Slenker, 32 Fed. Bep. 691; IL.S. v. Conant, 9 Cent. Law J. 129.
The court erred in admitting in evidence the declaration and writings of Juan G-allegos. Wright on Crim. Conspir. 217, 218; 3 Greenlf. Ev., sec. 94; State v. Larkin, 49 N.' H. .44; Logan v. U. S., 144 U. S. 308. See, also, Whar. Crim. Ev., sec. 698, et seq.; 1 Phil. Ev. 94; 2 Stark, 141; State v. Haney, 2 Dev. & Bat. 390; Kirby v. State, 7 Yerg. 259; Page v. Parker, 40 N. H. 62; Lee v. Lamprey, 43 Id. 15; 2 Best, on Ev. 508; People v. Davis, 56 N. Y. 103; State v. Dean, .13 Ired. 63; Patton v. State, 6 Ohio St. 467, and numerous other authorities.
The court erred in allowing the witnesses for the prosecution, Nowell and Trujillo, who had been convicted of infamous crimes, to testify. Mackin v. H. ■S., 117 ü. S. 352, 353; Spalding v. Saxton, 6 Watts, 338; Cox v. Oox, 26 Pa. St. 376-384; State v. Mullen, 33 La. Ann. 159; Cooper v. State, 7 Tex. App. 195.
The court erred in permitting prosecution, on rebuttal, to introduce evidence tending to contradict ■immaterial and collateral facts which the territory had itself adduced by its cross-examination. U. S. v. White, ■5 Cranch, C. C, 39; Gaines v. Comm., 50 Pa. St. 319; Rey v. Hilditch, 5 Carr & Payne, 298; Rey v. Stimp■son, 2 Id. 415; ,Foye v. Leighton, 22 N.,H. 71; Boies v. Henney, 32 111. 133; Clifton v. McKensie, 5 Strab. (N. C.) 36; Kohler v. Wells Fargo Co., 26 Cal. 615.
To charge murder in any degree, the'words describing the elements of that degree must be employed. State v. Love, 93 Mo. 547; Cannon v. State, 60 Ark. 564; Jones v. State, 58 Id, 390; Denham v. State, 22 Fla. 664; Wiggins v. State, 23 Id. 180; Simmons v. State, 32 Id.v387; Schaffer v. State, 22 Neb. 557; Blantin v. State, 1 Wash. 265; Blake v. State, 121 Ind. 433; State v. Fooks, 29 Kan. 425; Leonard v. Territory, 2 Wash. 381; State v. Brown, 21 Kan. 38; Smith v. State, 1 Id. 365; Bowers v. State, 5 Mo. 364; State v. Jones, 20 Id. 58; Robbins v. State, 8 Ohio St. 131; Id. 90, 306; Hogan v. State, 10 Id. 450; Loefner v. State, Id. 599; Snyder v. State, 59 Ind. 105. See, also, Tenorio v. Territory, 1 N. M. 279.
The jury were improperly instructed that the burden of proof was on defendants to prove the defense of alibi. Toler v. State, 16 OMo St. 583; Fifev. Comm. 9 Pa. 429; French v. State, 16 Ind. 670; Pollard v. State, 15 Miss. 410; 'Chappel v. State, 7 Colo. 92; Gibbs v. State, 1 Tex. App. 12; Otmer v. People, 76 111. 149; Howard v. State, 50 Ind. 190; Comm. v. Choate, 105 Mass. 451; State v. Storms, 94 N. C. 973; State v. Chee G-ong, 16 Ore. 534; People v. Chun Heong, 86 Cal. 309; People v. Nelson, 85 Id. 421; State v. Shoyer, 104 Mo. 441; Mullens v. People, 110 111. 442; State v. Freeman, 100 N. C. 429; People v. Stone, 117 111.-35; Balkinship v. State, 55 Ark. 244; Walters v. State, 39 Ohio St. 215; Roodey v. Comm. 108 Pa. 500; Davis v. TJ. S., 160 U. S. 469..
John P. Victory, solicitor general, J. H. Crist, district attorney, and H. L. Warren for the territory.
The special term of the district court had jurisdiction of the cause from the commencement of the trial to its conclusion. Laws 1893, chap. 61, sec. 20, p. 108; Laws 1891, chap. 90, sec. 3; Comp. Laws, secs. 531, 536, 543, 545, 552, 552a. See, also, Cooley’s Const. Lim. [5 Éd.] 73; Follett v. Hall, 47 Am. Dec. (Ohio) 365; Hemingway v. Davis, 24 Ohio St. 150; Davis v. Messenger, 17 Id. 231; State v. Knight, 19 Iowa, 96-99; State v. Calendino, 8 Id. 288; Weaver v. Cooledge, 15 Id. 244; In re Dossett, 37 Pac. Rep. 1066; Server v. State, 105 Ind. 125; Samuels v. State, 3 Mo. 73; Servier v. Dille, 17 Id. 69; Rail-road v. Hand, 7 Kan. 380; State v. Knight, 7 N. W. Rep. (Iowa) 3,6; Dunn v. State, 2 Ark. 229; Munzesheimer v. Fairbanks, 82 Tex. 351; Murray v. State, 17 S. E. Rep. (Ga.) 99; Smith v. N. P. Rd., 53 N. W. Rep. 173; Machine Co. v. McCaffrey, 38 N. E. Rep. 208; Casely v. State, 32 Ind. 62; State v. Montgomery, 8 Kan. 351; Cook v. Smith, 54 Iowa, 640. See, also, as to waiver, Railroad v. Power, 119 Mo. 269; Street v. Chapman, 29 Ind. 142; Croy v. State, 32 Id. 384; Murphy v. State, 97 Id. 579; Schlungger v. State, 113 Id. 295; Ard v. State, 114 Id. 542; Mannix v. State, 115 Id. 245.
That part of section 552, Compiled Laws, providing that special terms shall not conflict with regular terms is simply directory, and not mandatory. Mendum v. Comm., 6 Band. 704; Lewin v. Dille, 17 Mo. 64.
Under an indictment charging murder in the first degree, a verdict finding defendant guilty as charged, is a sufficient finding in the first degree, without specifying the degree, and the jury is not authorized or required to assess the punishment, which under our statute is the duty of the court. Acts 1891, sec. 10, p. 151; Territory v. Romine, 2 N. M. 114; Same v. Yarberry, Id. 391; Kennedy v. People, 39 N. Y. 245; State v. Werse, 53 Iowa, 92; State v. ‘Jennings, 24 Kan. 642; State v. Hooker, 17 Vt. 658; Hogan v. State, 30 Wis. 428. See, also, Whar. Crim. PI. & Prac. [9 Ed.], sec. 760; People v. Murray, 10 Cal. 309; Davis v. Utah, 151 U. S. 266; Wiggins v. State, 1 S. Rep. 693; State y. Bullock, 13 Ala. 413; Buckley v. State, 2 Greene (Iowa), 162; State v. Walton, 62 Me. 106; People v. Clements, 26 N. Y. 193; Surratt v. State, 45 Miss. 601; Pickett v. State, 22 Ohio St. 405-410; Bish. on Crim. Proe. 325, 612.
While an indictment for murder must allege the time and place of death, this is for the purpose of showing the venue, and that the death occurred within a year and a day; and where these facts appear with sufficient certainty to exclude every other intendment, it will be held good, and always so after verdict. 2 Chitty, Crim. PI. 737; Arch. Crim. PI. 34, 381. See, also, Hardin v. State, 4 Tex. App. 355; Turpin v. State, 80 Ind. 148; State v. Huff, 11 Nev. 17.
As to note sent by witness Juan Gallegos to deceased, it was admissible as a part of the res gestae of the facts and circumstances about which the witness testified. 1 Whar. Law Ev., seo. 259; 1 Greenlf. Ev., seo. 108; 100 Am. Dee. 49, and note, p. 51; Lander v. People, 104 111. 248.
The competency of the witnesses Nowell and Trujillo was a question of fact for the court to determine upon the examination of the witnesses on the voir dire. Butchers Co. v. Jones, 1 Esp. 160; Bosham v. Swingler, Id. 164; Bex v. Gisbum, 15 East. 57; Lummis v. Bow, 10 Ad. & El. 606; 29 Am. and Eng. Ency. Law, 658. It was disclosed on the examination of both the witnesses on the voir dire that they were pardoned. 1 Greenlf. Ev., sec, 95; Howser v. Comm., 51 Pa. St. 332.
While the rule is a witness can not be contradicted as to any matters drawn out on cross-examination, which are purely collateral and in no way relevant to the issue, this rule does not apply to any facts immediately connected with the main subject of inquiry, with reference to which the witness may be contradicted. 1 Stark. Ev. [9 Ed.] 200, 203; Lawrence v. Lanning, 4 Ind. 194; Ware v. Ware, 8 Me. 42; Comm, v. Hunt, 4 Gray (Mass.) 421; Bank v. Smith, 19 Johns. 123; Ohelton v. State, 45 Md. 564.
As to the action of the court in refusing to permit defendants to give testimony in answer to or contradiction of plaintiff’s rebuttal testimony to defendant’s alibi, the admission of such offers would have opened the door to interminable offers on both sides, and the admission or rejection of such evidence rested in the sound discretion of the court. Marshall v. Davis, 78 N. T. 414, 420; Hastings v. Palmer, 20 Wend. 225; Bheinhart v. State, 14 Kan. 322; Ford v. Miles, 1 Hill, 300.
The burden of proof is on the accused to establish an alibi by a preponderance of evidence. Thomp. on Trs., sec. 2437; Oomm. v. Webster, 5 Gush. 926; State v. Hardin, 46 Iowa, 623, 629; State v. Bed, 53 Id. 69; State v. Reed, 62 Id. 40; State v. Kline, 54 Id. 183; State y. Northrup, 48 Id. 583; State v. Hamilton, 11 N. W. Rep. 5; State v. Jennings, 81 Mo. 185; G-arrity v. People, 107 111. 162; State v. Johnson, 91 Mo. 439; "Ware v. State, 67 Ga. 349; Pellum v. State, 39 Ala. 28; State v. Nance, 25 S. O. 168; Underhill, Ev., sec. 249.
opinion on motion to quash wbit oe ebbob.

Opinion:
Smith, C. J.
This case was brought up to this court from the district court of the county of Santa Ee by writ of error. It is now before us upon motion by the territory through its solicitor general, to quash the writ of error and affirm the judgment of the court below for the alleged reason that appeal is the only process by which criminal cases can be brought up from the district courts to this court for review.
The organic act authorizes the review of the judgment by writ of error. This motion presents the question: Are the judgments of the district courts of the territory of New Mexico, in criminal cases, reviewable in the supreme court by writ of error or appeal? The organic act vests the supreme and district courts with common law and chancery jurisdiction. Sec. 1868, Rev. Stat. U. S.
And provides that "writs of error, bills of exceptions and appeals shall be allowed in all cases, from the final decisions of the district courts to the supreme courts of all the territories, respectively, under such regulations as may be prescribed by law." Sec. 1869, Rev. Stat. U. S.
It is elementary that the mode employed at common law, for the review of common law cases, is by writ of error, and decisions in chancery by appeal. Hence, the territorial courts being vested with common law jurisdiction by the organic act, the decisions of the district courts are reviewed in the supreme court, in common law cases, by writ of error, and in chancery cases by appeal.
At common law the review of a judgment in a criminal case could be by writ of error and in no other way. Rice v. Rex, Cro. Jac. 404; Rex v. Seton, 7 T. R. 373; Rex v. West Riding, etc., 7 T. R. 467; Reg v. Carlisle, 2 B. & Ad. 971; State v. Shepard, 37 Wis. 395.
Permission from the crown was, however, in criminal cases, always necessary to maintain the writ in England. This permission was granted as of right in misdemeanor, while in treason or felony it was a matter of grace from the sovereign, who could withhold or allow at pleasure, though there was manifest error in the record.
The reason assigned for this was that the felon had forfeited all he had to the crown, and the crown could exercise its pleasure-whether or not to give it back. Rex v. Earberry, Fort, 37.
The method of procuring a review when this grace was extended was always by writ of error and in no other way.
In the United States, forfeitures not being one of the penalties visited upon the felon, the writ is awarded by the courts as of course wherever it would have been granted in England by fiat of the crown. Sec. 1362, 1 Bishop, New Crim. Proc.
Congress, in preserving to litigants the right of review by writ of error undoubtedly must have had in mind the writ of error as the same was employed by common law, because it conferred common law jurisdiction upon the court wherein it was to be made use of, and left it to our legislature to regulate the manner of taking and allowing the same.
This, our legislature has done by the enactment of section 2194, Compiled Laws, -which provides: "The clerk of the supreme court shall issue a writ of error to bring into tbe supreme court any cause finally adjudged or determined in any of the district courts, upon a praecipe therefor at any time within • one year from the date of such judgment " And section 2199: "Hereafter no writ of error shall be allowed by the supreme court of this territory, except within one year after the rendition of the judgment on which said writ of error is based; and that said supreme court shall make rules for the govern-' ment of the practice in writs of error in common law cases, which said rules shall not conflict with any of the laws in force in this territory."
The terms "writs of error" and "appeals," as they appear in the organic act, have a technical significance well known to the law. It is then provided that they "shall be allowed in all cases" and are guaranteed parties in all cases.
Something' having definiteness and substance is secured to the court and to the parties before it by this language; and it is put beyond the power of the territorial legislature to deny,, alter, or curtail. The jurisdiction is fixed by the organic act, the power to regulate the procedure is reposed in the legislature. It can not be contended that congress has, in one and the same form of expression, secured to the supreme court a certain jurisdiction and to parties certain rights, and given to the territorial legislature the power to make that jurisdiction nugatory and these rights unavailing.
This provision, with its imperative phraseology, intends nothing short of assuring to the appellant, not whatever the territorial legislature may be pleased to call an appeal,,but an appeal known to chancery, and assuring to the plaintiff in error the writ of error with all the benefits growing out of, and incident to, such writ.
What congress had given, it has not authorized the territorial legislature to take away by regulations. The allowance of the writ of error may be regulated by the legislature, as has been done; but these regulations must not derogate from the nature and substance of the thing given it to regulate. Whatever the territorial legislation on this subject is, or may have intended, it can not have taken from the supreme court jurisdiction to review cases cognizable at common law by writ of error.
The power given by the organic act to the legislature to regulate writs of error and appeals is not operative to enable the legislature to limit or to regulate what is fixed and assured by the same organic act.
The power to regulate does not confer power to abrogate. Our legislature has not, however, made any attempt to interfere with or deny the jurisdiction conferred upon the supreme court by the organic act, but on the contrary has regulated such jurisdiction by sections 2193 and 2194, Compiled. Laws. In providing for appeals from final judgments in criminal cases, it has merely given a concurrent remedy.
In United States v. Horace C. Gibson, 1 Idaho, 364, the court reached the conclusion that a common law action could not be re-examined on appeal, but must be brought up by writ of error, in the following opinion:
"The courts of this territory are created by the organic act, and their jurisdiction and powers must be ascertained by the provisions of said act and the laws of the territory passed in pursuance thereof. Both the district and supreme courts are by the express terms of the act clothed with chancery and common law jurisdiction ; and the legislature has no authority to abridge such jurisdiction, nor has the legislative assembly made any attempt so to do . How shall this appellate jurisdiction be exercised? The organic act, in very plain and positive language, declares that writs of error, bills of exceptions and appeals shall be allowed in all eases from the final decisions of the district courts to the supreme court,- under such regulations as may be prescribed by law. Congress, therefore, has not delegated the power to the legislature to say in what cases writs of error and appeals may be allowed, but has emphatically declared in language that is plain, that they shall be allowed in all cases. The act, however, does not prescribe the mode in which the;* shall be' allowed, but expressly provides that they shall be allowed under such regulations as may be prescribed by law, thus giving to the legislature the power to prescribe the regulations as to the manner in which they may be taken and allowed."
"The declaration of the act is that writs of error, bills of exception, and appeals shall be allowed. These words have a technical and well understood meaning. 'Writs of error' are known to common law proceedings, but an appeal is not; but writs of error and appeals are the modes pointed out by congress whereby common law, equity, and admiralty causes may be reviewed and re-examined in the supreme court; and when congress used these words in the organic act, it must be considered that they used them in accordance with the sense that had been given them by the supreme court of the United States. There is no doubt but that they were so used and intended to be understood, in the same section, in providing for the writs of error and appeals from this court to the supreme court of the United States."
"If this be the sense in which these words were used, it follows that the true interpretation of that clause of the organic act is this — that writs of error and bills of exceptions shall, in suits at common law, be allowed and taken, and appeals in equity and admiralty cases shall be allowed from the district to the supreme court; and that the power is conferred upon the legislature to regulate the manner and prescribe the rules of practice in taking and allowing them."
II. Remedy by writ of error is concurrent with remedy by appeal.
In criminal cases the common law, as recognized by the United States and the several states of the union, shall be the rule of practice and decision. Sec. 2484, Comp. Laws.
Under the common law, as we have already seen, the writ of error was the method by which a judgment in a criminal cause could be reviewed.
By providing that the common law, as recognized by the United States and the several states of the union, should be the rule of practice and decision in the territory, the legislature lias vested the supreme court with jurisdiction to review judgments in criminal cases by writ of error.
In Barrett v. State, 36 Me. 198, the court say: "Although the remedy by appeal in civil cases takes away the remedy by writ of error, by implication, as a general rule, yet in criminal cases the reason for the rule ceases, and there it does not apply . His remedy for appeal would often be more onerous than that by writ of error to reverse an erroneous judgment, and, therefore, it is that his right to proceed by error is not taken away or impaired by giving him the right of appeal." Citing Cook, Pet., 15 Pick. 239; Thayer v. Com., 12 Metc. 9; Co. Lit., 288; 3 Blacks. Com. 407.
In United States v. Plumer, 3 Clifford, 1, at page 58, Judge Clifford said:
"At common law the writ of error would lie in criminal as well as in civil cases, and that the rule was just as applicable to misdemeanors as the case at b.ar (murder), which was declared by act of congress to be a felony."
In Sanders v. State, 85 Ind. 318, at page 257, the court say:
"It is held in well considered cases that although there is a statute governing proceedings 'in criminal cases, the writ is not abolished unless the statute specially or by implication abrogates it. This is so held, with respect to writs eoram nobis, by Marshall, C. J., in Strode v. Stafford, 1 Brock., U. S. C. 162. In speaking of the claim that the writ, coram nobis can not exist under the statute, Cowen, J., said in Smith v. Kingsley, 19 Wend. 620: 'There is no statute expressly and in terms repealing its power, nor any which does by necessary implication. Mere silence or omission to regulate proceedings upon such a writ will not operate as a repeal. The power, therefore, remains as at common law, except as to the mhre form coram nobis resident, because the fiction of the record, remaining before the King himself, is gone. We, therefore, have lost the name of.the writ, but nothing more.' "
In many of the states the common law writ of érror is recognized as forming part of the law. Holford v. Alexander, 12 Ala. 280; Adler v. State, 25 Ark. 517; McKinney v. Western, etc., 4 Iowa, 420; Hawkins v. Bowie, 9 Gill. & J. 428; Fellows v. Griffin, 9 Sm. & M. 362; Calloway v. Nifong, 1 Mo. 223; Reid's Adm'r v. Strides, Adm'r, 7 Grat. 76; Dows v. Harner, 6 Ohio, 518; Wood's Exec. v. Caldwell, 34 Penn. St. 92.
III. Our statute amply provides for a review of the judgment by writ of error.
Kearney's code, promulgated by General Kearney in 1846, and which was by the legislature of 1850 adopted, contains the only provision for appeals from final judgments in criminal cases. These provisions were incorporated into the compiled laws of 1884, as sections 2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2472 and 2473.
By section 2469 appeals are allowed from final-judgments rendered upon any indictment, to the supreme court, if applied for during the term at which the judgment was rendered. Appeals only lie from such final judgments if allowed during the term at which the judgment was rendered. After the term has expired no appeal can betaken.
In 1880 the legislature passed a comprehensive act, regulating the mode of taking appeals and suing out writ of error. This act is compiled in sections 2193 and 2194 of the Compiled Laws of 1884, and is in conformity with the organic act which gives the legislature power to regulate the writ of error and appeal, By that act it was provided that all causes either in law or equity, finally adjudged or determined in the district court, may be removed into the supreme court of the territory for review either by appeal or writ of error. Sec. 2193, Comp. Laws 1884. The next section, 2194, regulates the practice on appeal and writ of error, and provides that the writ of error may be sued out within one year from the date of the judgment brought into the supreme court. How could the language of section 2193 be made plainer for the purpose of providing for the review of judgments in criminal cases by writ of error? At.t, causes, either in law or inequity, maybe removed into the supreme court for review, either by appeal or writ of error. Criminal cases or causes at law as distinguished from causes in equity and as all causes at law may be removed into the supreme court by writ of error, it follows that criminal cases can be so reviewed.
The legislature of 1884 recognized the fact that judgments in criminal cases could be reviewed either by appeal or writ of error, under the laws as they then existed in the territory, and enacted what is compiled as section 2201 of the Compiled Laws of 1884, viz.: —
"Appellants or plaintiffs in error in criminal cases, removed into the supreme court of the territory for review, shall not be required to print the record, nor any part thereof," etc. See Kidder v. Bennet, 2 N. M. 37.
In Missouri, 2 Wagner's Stats., section 13, there is a provision "that the state in any criminal prosecution shall be allowed an appeal only in the cases and under the circumstances mentioned in the next succeed ing sections." Notwithstanding this provision, it was held in State v. Cunningham, 51 Mo. 479, that "when a motion to quash an indictment is sustained in the lower court, the state can bring the case to this court by writ of error or appeal."
The solicitor general in his brief, at page 8, seems to argue that section 2193 of the Compiled Laws does not apply to criminal cases, because no provision for supersedeas or stay of execution is therein contained. This contention is wholly without merit. At common law, a writ of .error is not a supersedeas so as to discharge from custody, but in capital cases it operates to stay execution. Sec. 783, Wharton's Crim. Prac. & Pro.
A writ of error is a supersedeas by implication. If the record of the judgment is removed by writ of error, it is necessarily a supersedeas for the record being removed it is impossible for the justices of the court in which it was to award execution. 9 Brac. Abr. Supersedeas, p. 284.
In the Bishop of Ossory's case, 3 Crooke, 534, it was held that "a writ of error is a supersedeas, although the record itself is not removed to the court where errors are brought, but a transcript only."
The right of appeal in a capital case is necessarily coincident with that of a stay of execution, until that appeal can be heard. State v. Pagels, 92 Mo. 300.
In Kitchen v. Randolph, 93 U. S. 86, the court say: ',"At common law, a writ of error was supersedeas by implication."
Under the statutes and the authorities it is plain that the judgment in this cause may be reviewed by writ of error.
The motion to quash the writ of error is therefore overruled.
Collier and Bantz, JJ., concur.