Case Name: William S. Hamilton v. The State of Ohio
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio
Jurisdiction: Ohio
Decision Date: 1842-12
Citations: 11 Ohio 435
Docket Number: 
Parties: *William S. Hamilton v. The State of Ohio.
Judges: 
Reporter: Cases decided in the supreme court of ohio : upon the circuit at the special sessions in Columbus
Volume: 11
Pages: 371–376

Head Matter:
*William S. Hamilton v. The State of Ohio.
A person having possession, in this state, of property which he had stolen in another, may he convicted here of larceny.
This is a writ of error, to the court of common pleas of Lawrence county.
The plaintiff in error was indicted for horse stealing. The court charged the jury that if the horse was stolen by the accused in the State of Illinois, and brought by him into the State of Ohio, he might be convicted of the crime of horse stealing in this state. This charge is claimed to be erroneous.
LeGrand Byington, for the plaintiff in error:
The doctrine of a new larceny for every fresh asportation, as known to the common law, is confined to the limits of the sovereignty, and can not be extended beyond it. This is supported by the following considerations:
1. The grade of the offense, the mode of trial, the quantum of punishment, and the process of expiation, would all be liable to be varied by the offender crossing a state line.
2. It would subject the offender to trial in a tribunal powerless to compel the attendance of witnesses necessary to establish the time, manner, and° place of the original taking, and to explain the possession.
3. It would render nugatory, as to this offense, the act of Congress providing for the surrender and delivery of fugitives from justice.
4. It would abrogate the provision of the constitution that no one “shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense,” for the record of conviction or acquittal would not be binding in another state.
5. *It subjects a person to penalties for an act not denounced by the laws of this state.
All crimes punishable by the laws of this state are statutory. They can not exist independent of statute. The penalties are prescribed by statute; but in this state there is no statute making it an offense to possess property stolen in another or prescribing any punishment for such offense. Nor can it be necessarily presumed that stealing a horse in Illinois constitutes there an offense of the same grade and subject to the same penalties as in this State. Necessity furnishes no ground for our courts to assume jurisdiction in such case. For the act of Congress has provided ample means whereby an offender against the laws of one state found within the limits of another can be reclaimed and brought to justice.
It is not sanctioned by the common law; for a larceny committed in Scotland or Ireland could not be tried or punished in the English courts until acts of parliament, 13 Geo. III, ch. 31, 54, and 44 Geo. III, ch. 92, 57, were passed. 4 Chitty’s Blackstone, 25, note 12.
It has also been held, in various states in this Union, that a person can not be convicted of larceny upon bringing into one state property stolen in another, as in the cases of the People v. Gardner, 2 Johns. 477; People v. Schenck, 2 Johns. 494; The State v. Brown, 1 Hayward, 100. These cases are cited and referred to in 1 New York Digest, 102; 2 Russell on Crimes, 176, note 1.
The charge of the court, therefore, is not sustained by the statute, the only foundation for criminal jurisdiction; and it is opposed to the common law and the practice in other states.
S. M. Tracey, for the state:
The cases in 1 Mass. 116; 2 Mass. 14; 5 Binn. 617; 3 Conn. 185, and 1 Root, 69, sustain the charge of the court.
Of the cases cited on the other side, that of Gardner, 2 Johns. 477, is the loading case in this country. It is of *no authority, per se, because the court assign no reasons, but merely refer to 2 East’s Pleas of the Crown, 774, tit. Larceny and Robbery, sec. 157. East here states the common-law doctrine, “that possession of goods stolen by the thief is a larceny in every county into which he carries the goods; because the legal possession still remaining in the true owner, every moment’s continuance of the trespass and felony amounts to a new caption and asportation. To this, however, there are some exceptions; as where the original taking is such whereof the common law can not take cognizance. And the same exception prevailed till lately in cases where the original taking was in Scotland,” citing Rex v. Anderson et al., MS. case. “ But that by the statute (13 Geo. III), the exception had ceased to prevail. This statute of 13 Geo. III is declaratory of the common law doctrine.”
Gardner’s case is not sustained by the authority to which it refers, and consequently imposes upon New York, also, the necessity of enacting a statute declaratory of,the common law. 11 Wend. 129. •

Opinion:
Lane, C. J.
The question on the record is not new, but has often arisen here and elsewhere. In Tennessee, Kentucky, and Pennsylvania, possession, by the thief, of property in one state which has been stolen in another, is not held sufficient for conviction. Such has been the doctrine in New York, although against the opinion of a late chief justice; but the power to convict, in such cases, has now been given by statute. In Massachusetts and Connecticut, such convictions have always been sustained. In England, the original taking must be within the kingdom.
A majority of the court entertain the opinion that a long-sustained practice in the criminal courts of this state has settled the construction on this point and established the right to convict in such cases. But, if not settled by usage, we feel free to choose, between these conflicting practices, a course best sustained by analogy and best calculated to promote justice.
*It would afford a large immunity for crime if thieves from other states were exempted from any other penalty than the remote risk of being returned to the place where the crime was first committed. We feel no scruples in inflicting his punishment here, and are justified, as well by the cases cited as by holding each continued possession, in our jurisdiction, of property stolen within another, as a crime well deserving the penalty of the law.
Judgment affirmed.