Case Name: Olga PERAZA, Appellant, v. Irma ROBLES, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2008-04-09
Citations: 983 So. 2d 1189
Docket Number: No. 3D06-725
Parties: Olga PERAZA, Appellant, v. Irma ROBLES, Appellee.
Judges: Before COPE and SUAREZ, JJ., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 983
Pages: 1189–1192

Head Matter:
Olga PERAZA, Appellant, v. Irma ROBLES, Appellee.
No. 3D06-725.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
April 9, 2008.
Rehearing Denied June 23, 2008.
Hunter, Williams & Lynch, Coral Gables and Christopher J. Lynch and Steven Hunter, for appellant.
Anania, Bandklayder, Blackwell, Baum-garten, Torrieella & Stein and Douglas H. Stein, Miami, for appellee.
Before COPE and SUAREZ, JJ., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.

Opinion:
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.
We grant appellant's motion for rehearing. The opinion issued on July 18, 2007, is withdrawn and the following opinion is substituted in its place.
After the plaintiff-appellant Peraza was involved in a serious automobile accident caused by the defendant-appellee Robles, Peraza's counsel sent Robles' liability carrier MGA Insurance Company a bad faith letter demanding that it pay the $10,000 policy limits within fifteen days. Virtually by return mail, a $10,000 draft from MGA claims adjuster Mario Fernandez was forwarded to counsel. The letter required that the check be held in escrow by Pera-za's counsel until MGA received "an unaltered release executed . along with a copy of the U/M Carrier Authorization of Settlement and Waiver of Subrogation Rights." [emphasis in original]. The plaintiff did not negotiate the draft, however, and filed suit in Monroe County circuit court. This appeal is by the plaintiff from a final order enforcing the $10,000 settlement and dismissing the case. We reverse.
We agree with the plaintiffs contention that MGA's response to her offer — that is the claims adjuster's demand for the unaltered release, which included an objectionable hold harmless provision and the UM carrier subrogation waiver — did not demonstrate an effective acceptance of Pera-za's offer. Because the documents demanded in MGA's response were not shown to be "usual settlement documents" implicit in any settlement, Nichols v. Martell, 612 So.2d 657, 658 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); Erhardt v. Duff, 729 So.2d 529, 530 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Boyko v. Ilardi, 613 So.2d 103, 104 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993), and thus, constituted a separate additional requirement that conditioned the settlement on the submission of the requested documents, we conclude that MGA's response was a counteroffer that served as a rejection of Peraza's offer. See Nichols v. Hartford Ins. Co. of the Midwest, 834 So.2d 217, 220 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002), review denied, 845 So.2d 890 (Fla.2003); Ribich v. Evergreen Sales & Serv., Inc., 784 So.2d 1201 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); see also Cheverie v. Geisser, 783 So.2d 1115, 1119 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), review denied, 805 So.2d 806 (Fla.2001); Grimsley v. Inverrary Resort Hotel, Ltd., 748 So.2d 299 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Bateski v. Ransom, 658 So.2d 630 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Dale Swope, Tips for Auto Practitioners, Fla. Just. Ass'n J., Aug. 2007, at 25; cf. Danta Jai-Alai Palace, Inc. v. Sykes, 495 So.2d 859 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986).
Robles counter argues, however, that Peraza accepted the counteroffer, rendering the settlement binding and enforceable. In support of that contention, she submitted an affidavit of her claims adjuster to the effect that he spoke with Peraza's counsel's secretary, and that she agreed to provide MGA with an executed release and a UM carrier authorization. We do not accept this contention because, in response, Peraza denied those allegations and sought an evidentiary hearing to resolve the conflict. See Architectural Network, Inc. v. Gulf Bay Land Holdings II, Ltd., 933 So.2d 732 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006); Nichols v. Martell, 612 So.2d at 658-59. In seeking enforcement of the purported agreement, it was MGA's burden to prove the secretary's acceptance and her authority to agree. Because it failed to do so, we reverse the dismissal, and remand for an evidentiary hearing.
Reversed and remanded.
SUAREZ, J., concurs.