Case Name: Dave Smith v. The State
Court: Texas Courts of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1886-03-23
Citations: 21 Tex. Ct. App. 133
Docket Number: No. 1965
Parties: Dave Smith v. The State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Court of Appeals Reports
Volume: 21
Pages: 133–140

Head Matter:
[No. 1965.]
Dave Smith v. The State.
1. Theft—Indictment—Consent.—-The indictment charges the appellant with the theft of five head of cattle, the property of E. M. T., and of eight head of cattle the property of W. A. T., and avers the non-consent of the owners as follows: ‘"without the consent of the said owners.” Held, that a joint possession and ownership not being charged, the allegation of non-consent is sufficient.
2. Same—Evidence.—Upon the understanding that the State would ini reduce other qualifying evidence, a State’s witness was permitted to testify that when the defendant and one of his co-defendants was at the witness’s house in possession of some of the alleged stolen cattle, this defendant’s co-defendant told him that still another co-defendant had no ranch out west, and that the cattle were home cattle. In explanation of the bill of exceptions reserved to this evidence, the trial judge certifies that, the State having failed to introduce the qualifying evidence, the evidence complained of was withdrawn from the jury. Held, that the evidence having been withdrawn from the consideration of the jury without prejudice to the defendant, he can not now be heard to complain. Further, that, being a part of the res gestee of the transaction and the declaration of one of the eo-eonspirators pertinent to the transaction, the evidence was, in any event, competent.
3. Same-Evidence.—See the third head note in the ease of M. M. Smith v. The State, ante page 107, for a correct rule of evidence, which applies as well to this ease, the identical evidence being the question at issue in both cases. But note the dissenting opinion of Hurt, Judge, holding that the contested evidence is inadmissible in this case, and assigning his reasons for so concluding.
4. Same.—-A bill of exceptions recites the testimony of one K., a State’s witness, to the effect that he had a conversation with M. M. S., one of the defendants, in the absence of this defendant, a few days before this defendant and another started after the cattle. The witness detailed the said conversation, and concluded with the statement that M¡ M. S. told him that he, M. M. S., had thirty-two or thirty-three head of cattle out west. The trial judge, explaining the bill of exception, certifies that only that part of the conversation which recited M. M. S.’s claim to thirty-two or thirty-three head of cattle was admitted. Held, that, as explained by the trial judge, the bill of exception shows no error. The evidence admitted was competent to throw light upon a subsequent portion of the transaction; and besides, it is not made to appear that, at the time the statements were made by M. M. S , the conspiracy between M. M. S. and defendant did not already exist. But if the defendant was not then a party to the conspiracy to steal the cattle, if he came into it after-wards, and adopted it as formed by other parties and M. M. S., he would be bound by it.
4. Same—Unlawfully Driving Stock From Accustomed Range—Indictment—Charge of the Court—Case Approved.—Under an ordinary indictment for theft of an animal, the accused may be convicted of that offense, or of wilfully taking into possession and driving from its accustomed range live stock not his own, without the consent of the owner and with intent to defraud the owner thereof, which is made theft and a felony by Article 749 of the Penal Code. See the opinion in extenso for a charge of the court upon the subject held correct, as being warranted by the facts in the case. See also the dissenting opinion of Hurt, Judge, traversing the doctrine; and note the approval of Foster’s case, ante, page 80, upon the question.
Appeal from the District Court of Erath. Tried below before the Hon. T. L. Nugent.
This is a companion to the preceding case of M. M. Smith v. The State, the conviction being for the same transaction, the theft of cattle, the property in separate parts of E. M. and W. A, Trammell. A term of four years in the penitentiary was the punishment assessed by the jury.
The same witnesses who testified upon the trial of M. M. Smith testified, in the same order, and substantially in the same language, upon the trial of the appellant. It is to be noted in this case that the objections interposed to evidence are directed principally to the testimony of the witness L. S. Kenyon. It is recited in the transcripts of both cases that the witness Kenyon testified circumstantially as did the witness P. J. Morris, who immediately preceded him upon the stand. Morris’s testimony is set out at length in the report of M. M. Smith’s case, supra.
The motion for new trial raised the questions discussed in the opinion.
No brief- for the appellant has reached the Reporters.
J. H. Burts, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.

Opinion:
White, Presiding Judge.
This is a companion case to that of M. M. Smith, just decided, and grew out of the same transaction.
In each of these cases the sufficiency of the indictment is attacked with regard to the averment of want of consent to the taking of the cattle. Five of the cattle are alleged to be of the property of Eugene Trammell, and eight of W. A. Trammell. Now, the averment of want of consent is as follows: "Without the consent of the said owners." Upon this point we copy from the opinion of Judge Hurt in Jim Smith's case, where the same question came up for review. He says: "It is urged by counsel for defendant that this is not sufficient, because each owner's consent is not denied. This criticism is j ust, but, under the allegations of this indictment, is it essential to the sufficiency of the indictment for the consent of each to the taking of all the cattle to be denied? It is not alleged that Eugene Trammell owned, controlled, or had possession of the eighteen head of cattle, nor that W, A. Trammell managed, controlled, or had possession of the five head. There was no authority in Eugene to give defendant or anyone else his consent, to take the eight head, or any part thereof. The fact that they were running together, when taken, certainly would confer no such authority. The observations ap- ' ply with equal force to the authority of W. A. to give consent to the taking of the five head, the property of Eugene. This is not a case in which there is joint possession and ownership." The allegation of want of consent is therefore sufficient.
The first bill of exceptions is explained by the judge, and from his explanation the evidence objected to, appears to have been expressly withdrawn by him from the jury. If it had not been withdrawn we are of opinion it was admissible as evidence, it being part of the res gestee of the transaction, and a declaration of one of the co-conspirators pertinent to the transaction.
The second bill of exceptions was taken to the admission of the testimony of the witness Guyger to the fact that, on the sixteenth of July, he saw Tom Saunders and Willis Brooks driving ten or fifteen head of cattle, about a quarter of a mile from Buckner's crossing on the Brazos. This matter is similarly presented and fully discussed in M. M. Smith's case, and for the reasons therein stated we hold the evidence was admissible.
The third bill of exceptions as explained by the judge shows no error. It was legitimate to permit the witness Kenyon to testify that M. M. Smith, one of the conspirators, told witness that he had thirty or more head of cattle out west. The evidence threw light upon a subsequent portion of the transaction; and, besides, it is not manifest that, at the time of these statements to the witness, the conspiracy did not already exist, with defendant. But suppose it did not then exist, so far as defendant was concerned, yet, if afterwards he came into it, and adopted the conspiracy as formed by other parties, he would be bound by the conspiracy as adopted; which seems to have been to steal some thirty odd head of cattle. This defendant was the party- to whom M. M. Smith executed his power of attorney to go out west and gather the cattle.
Under the explanation given by the judge there is no merit shown in the matter stated in the fourth bill of exceptions.
The fifth bill of exceptions was reserved to supposed errors in the charge of the court, and more especially to the third paragraph, which was as follows, viz: "If you believe from the evidence that the defendant, Dave Smith, at or about the time, and in the county alleged, wilfully took into his possession the said cattle, and removed the same from their accustomed range, without the consent of the alleged owner, and with intent to defraud the said owner; and if, moreover, you believe from the evidence that the said cattle were not, at the time of such removal, the property of the defendant, but were in fact the property of the parties charged in the indictment to have been the owners, you will, if you so believe and find, find the defendant guilty of theft, and assess his punishment at confinement in the penitentiary not less than two nor more than five years; or you may assess the punishment at a fine in any sum not exceeding one thousand dollars; or you may, in your discretion, assess both such fine and imprisonment." This charge was based upon Article 749 of the Penal Code, which denounces a wilful driving of stock from its accustomed range, under the conditions stated in the Article, to be theft.
It is contended that the charge was not warranted under the allegations of the indictment in this case, which was one in the ordinary form for theft. Thjs whole subject was recently discussed by us fully in the case of Foster v. The State, recently decided, wherein it was held that the crime denounced by Article 749 of the code was a lesser degree of theft, containing all the elements of theft; and that it was not only legitimate, but,"if the facts warranted, it was the duty of the court to charge the law of this Article under an indictment charging theft of animals in the ordinary form. There was no error in the court charging as above in this case; it was. a charge favorable to defendant.
As a whole, the charge is unobjectionable in its presentation of the law of this case. Mo additional instructions were requested for defendant. We have been unable to find any such error in the record as requires that this judgment should be reversed, and it is therefore affirmed.
Affirmed.