Case Name: Anderson WHITE, II, Appellant, v. Cora Gaultney WHITE, Appellee
Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1998-10-13
Citations: 722 So. 2d 731
Docket Number: No. 97-CA-00621 COA
Parties: Anderson WHITE, II, Appellant, v. Cora Gaultney WHITE, Appellee.
Judges: Before THOMAS, P.J., and KING and SOUTHWICK, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 722
Pages: 731–739

Head Matter:
Anderson WHITE, II, Appellant, v. Cora Gaultney WHITE, Appellee.
No. 97-CA-00621 COA.
Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
Oct. 13, 1998.
David M. Sessums, Vicksburg, Attorney for Appellant.
Richard E. Smith, Jr., Vicksburg, Attorney for Appellee.
Before THOMAS, P.J., and KING and SOUTHWICK, JJ.

Opinion:
KING, J.,
for the Court:
¶ 1. Anderson White, Jr. and Cora Gault-ney White were granted a divorce in the Warren County Chancery Court on the ground of irreconcilable differences. Feeling aggrieved by the chancellor's division of martial property and the amount of child support awarded, Mr. White has appealed and assigned the following errors:
1. The lower court erred in divesting Appellant of title to the marital residence acquired during the marriage of the parties.
2. The lower court erred in setting the amount of child support. We affirm.
Facts
¶ 2. The Whites were married on September 16, 1992. One child was born to that union on November 9, 1995. The parties separated on December 24, 1995, when Mrs. White, along with the minor child, left the marital domicile to reside with her mother.
¶ 3. On January 9, 1996, Mrs. White filed for divorce in the Warren County Chancery Court alleging habitual cruel and inhuman treatment or, in the alternative, irreconcilable differences. On April 29, 1997, the parties were granted a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences.
¶4. Mrs. White, along with her mother, owned two homes in Vicksburg. When first married, the Whites lived rent free in one of those homes. Approximately two months prior to their separation, the Whites purchased a home. The Whites made no down payment upon this purchase. Instead one of the homes, owned jointly by Mrs. White and her mother, was used as collateral to ensure payment of the purchase price of the marital residence. This same home was also used as collateral for a loan to purchase a Nissan truck, the couples's only other marital asset.
¶ 5. Mrs. White, who has a high school education, works as a cosmetologist earning approximately $1200 per month after expenses and tax deductions. She operates the business out of one of the jointly owned homes.
¶ 6. Mr. White, who has a college degree, has been employed by Warren-Yazoo Mental Health and the U.S. Corp of Engineers. The highest salary received by Mr. White was $17,500 from Warren-Yazoo Mental Health. Mr. White was unemployed at the time of this divorce and had been unemployed since November 22,1996.
¶ 7. After the separation, Mr. White purchased two cars (a 1994 Mazda and 1992 Camaro). He testified that these cars were purchased out of depression, to build up his self-esteem. He also testified that both vehicles were being repossessed.
¶ 8. The chancellor awarded Mrs. White sole physical custody of the minor child. He also awarded her the sole use and possession of the marital domicile and the baby's furniture. She was ordered to pay credit card debts of $1700 and $3200.
¶ 9. Mr. White was awarded all household furnishings and was ordered to pay a $3500 credit card debt. Mr. White was ordered to pay $178.50 a month in child support. Mr. White was receiving $780 per month in unemployment benefits at the time of the divorce.
Discussion
I. DID THE CHANCELLOR ERR IN DIVESTING ANDERSON OF TITLE TO THE MARITAL RESIDENCE ACQUIRED DURING THE MARRIAGE?
¶ 10. Mr. White argues that the chancellor committed an abuse of discretion in awarding Mrs. White sole use and possession of the marital residence. In support of this contention, he states that Mrs. White is the joint owner of two other homes in Vicksburg and that he contributed a substantial amount of money ($3500) toward the procurement of the marital domicile.
¶ 11. Mrs. White counters that the chancellor did not commit manifest error in awarding the marital residence to her because it was secured by a home which she owned jointly with her mother. Mrs. White testified that Mr. White made no financial contribution toward the procurement of the marital residence.
¶ 12. In explanation of his decision to divest Mr. White of title to the marital residence, the chancellor made the following on the record finding:
I'll be very frank with you, Mr. White, you can't afford [the marital residence], there's no equity in it. You will execute a deed to Mrs. White for that house....You can have everything in the house except the baby furniture, but you will vacate the house. Everything else in the house you can have.
¶ 13. On the date of the hearing, April 14, 1997, Mr. White had been unemployed since November 22, 1996, and was receiving $780 per month in unemployment benefits. The two cars which Mr. White had purchased after the parties separated were being repossessed, and the marital residence was secured by assets of Mrs. White's separate estate. Clearly, Mr. White lacked the resources to make the monthly payments on the home or to maintain it.
¶ 14. "This Court will not disturb a chancellor's findings unless manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or if the chancellor applied an erroneous legal standard." Knutson v. Knutson, 704 So.2d 1331, 1332 (Miss.1997), (quoting Johnson v. Johnson, 650 So.2d 1281, 1285 (Miss.1994)).
¶ 15. We note that the chancellor did perform an equitable division of the marital assets. In addition to being awarded all the household furnishings, excluding the baby's furniture, Mr. White was awarded the Buick automobile which was already in his possession.
¶ 16. Based on the record before this Court, it does not appear that the chancellor abused his discretion in the division of the marital assets.
II. DID THE CHANCELLOR ERR IN SETTING THE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD?
¶ 17. Mr. White argues that the chancellor erred in calculating child support payments against his gross income, instead of his adjusted gross income, as prescribed by the child support guidelines. The guidelines do, in fact, require that child support be calculated upon a non-custodial parent's adjusted gross income. Pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 43-19-101(3)(b) (Rev.1993), adjusted gross income is defined as that amount which remains after deductions of federal, state, and local taxes, social security, retirement, and disability contributions.
¶ 18. At the time of the hearing, Mr. White was not employed; however, he received $780 per month in unemployment compensation benefits. Because Mr. White was unemployed, the chancellor based the child support on Mr. White's potential earning capacity. In determining Mr. White's earning capacity, the chancellor considered Mr. White's educational level, past earning record, and employability. Based upon these considerations, the chancellor determined that Mr. White should be able to earn sufficient income to justify a child support award of $178.50 per month.
¶ 19. Additionally, Mr. White argues that the chancellor abused his discretion in wholly disregarding the other child for whom he pays monthly support. Mr. White states in his brief that he has a $100 monthly support obligation for another child. He states that both child support awards equal 35.70% of his total income.
¶ 20. Mr. White seems to suggest that any amount of child support should be predicated upon his unemployment compensation benefits and not his potential earning capacity. We disagree.
¶ 21. In Grogan v. Grogan, 641 So.2d 734, 740 (Miss.1994), our supreme court upheld a chancellor's upward deviation from the guidelines due, in part, to the chancellor's skepticism about the parent's true earning capacity. That case is not dissimilar to the situation confronted by the chancellor in the case at bar. We hereby hold that where temporary financial reverses create an unreliable measure for an award of child support, the chancellor may in his discretion predicate an award on reasonable earning capacity.
¶ 22. At the time of this divorce, Mr. White had obtained a baccalaureate degree. The chancellor estimated Mr. White's minimum earning capacity as $1274.75. These imputed wages closely mirror the wages Mr. White' received from his previous employer while having only a high school diploma. The chancellor, without abusing his discretion, could have imputed a higher earning capacity to Mr. White based on his completion of college.
¶ 23. A chancellor's deviation from the Mississippi child support guidelines must be supported by an on the record finding that said deviation is warranted. Rakestraw v. Rakestraw, 96-CA-0118-COA (¶ 13) (Miss.1998); Miss.Code Ann. § 43-19-101(1) (Rev.1993). In the case at bar, the chancellor made the following on the record finding:
It's kind of hard to fix child support for a guy who is not working. But it appears to me, Mr. White, you have the ability to work, you've got a college education. And it would seem to me that if you can work, you can make at least as much money as [Mrs. White] makes, particularly in light of our societal general preference for male employees. She makes twelve hundred and seventy-four dollars and seventy-five cents a month after her basic deductions, which the Court finds are all reasonable. And if you made that you'd pay $178.50 a month in child support. I think you can make that much, and I think you need to make that much. So the Court will set the child support based on that calculation and on that reasoning at $178.50 per month commencing on the first day of May, 1997.
¶ 24. As dictated by recent case law, the chancellor made "a specific finding on the record that the application of the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate." See Knutson, 704 So.2d at 1334; Johnson, 650 So.2d at 1287. The chancellor also stated on the record that he considered Mr. White's other monthly child support payments in setting the subject obligation.
¶ 25. Awards of child support predicated upon earning potential are reviewable under an abuse of discretion standard. "[A]n award of child support is a matter within the discretion of the chancellor and we will not reverse that determination unless the chancellor was manifestly wrong in his finding of fact or manifestly abused his discretion." Gillespie v. Gillespie, 594 So.2d 620, 622 (Miss.1992). Further, "[t]he process of weighing evidence and arriving at an award of child support is essentially an exercise in fact-finding, which customarily significantly restrains this Court's review." Grogan, 641 So.2d at 741.
¶26. Faced with the almost impossible task of setting child support for an unemployed parent, we decline to hold the trial court to absolute mathematical precision in the calculation of percentages.
¶ 27. Based on these specific on the record findings, the chancellor neither abused his discretion in distributing the marital assets nor in calculating the child support award.
¶ 28. THE JUDGMENT OF THE WARREN COUNTY CHANCERY COURT IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.
McMILLIN and THOMAS, P.JJ., and DIAZ, HINKEBEIN, PAYNE and SOUTHWICK, JJ" concur.
BRIDGES, C.J., dissents with separate written opinion joined by COLEMAN and HERRING, JJ.
. Mr. White testified at the hearing that the Nissan had been totaled and it was no longer in his possession.
. Mr. White has another child from a previous relationship.
. The parties purchased the marital domicile in October 1995, a mere two months prior to the separation.
. At the time of the divorce hearing, Mr. White was obligated to pay $100 per month in child support for another child. In the case sub judice, the chancellor set Mr. White's child support obligation at $178.50 based on a minimum projected earning capacity of $1274.75. Under the support guidelines, the recommended support for two children is 20% of adjusted gross income. Twenty percent of Mr. White's adjusted gross income of minimum projected earning capacity is $254.80. The total Mr. White is to pay for both children is $274.50 or 21.5% of minimum projected earning capacity. This upward deviation enjoys support in the record and was specifically addressed by the chancellor in his findings of fact.
. The chancellor's award exceeded the recommended guidelines by 1.5%.