Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. Rosetta K. JACKSON
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1981-12-14
Citations: 419 So. 2d 425
Docket Number: No. 81-KA-0422
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Rosetta K. JACKSON.
Judges: DIXON, C. J., and LEMMON, J., dissent and assign reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 419
Pages: 425–431

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. Rosetta K. JACKSON.
No. 81-KA-0422.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Dec. 14, 1981.
On Rehearing Sept. 7, 1982.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Samuel C. Ca-shio, Dist. Atty., Houston C. Gascon, III, Jack T. Marionneaux, Asst. Dist. Attys., for plaintiff-appellee.
John E. Bride, Asst. Indigent Defender, Sunshine, for defendant-appellant.

Opinion:
BLANCHE, Justice.
Defendant, Rosetta K. Jackson, was charged by grand jury indictment with second degree murder, a violation of R.S. 14:30.1. Defendant was convicted by unanimous vote of the jury and the court sentenced her to life imprisonment. The defendant appealed relying on two assignments of error. We affirm.
Assignment of Error Number 1
The defendant contends the trial judge erred in overruling her objection to allegedly leading questions the prosecutor asked a witness for the state. A leading question is one which suggests to the witness the answer he is to deliver, and though framed in the alternative, is inadmissible when propounded to one's own witness, unless such witness is unwilling or hostile. R.S. 15:277. The reason for this is the danger that a witness may acquiesce in a false suggestion. State v. Francis, 337 So.2d 487 (La.1976). During the redirect examination of the coroner by the state, the following colloquy took place:
"Q. Then the bullet entered the mouth when it was open?
A. Yes, sir, as far as we could tell. Q. Were teeth knocked out as a result of—
Mr. Bride: Objection, Your Honor, the—
A. Yes, two upper incisors.
The Court: Just a minute, Doctor, when an objection is made, please refrain from answering until the Court has an opportunity to hear the objection.
Mr. Marionneaux: Your Honor, he is an expert witness and I can lead him. The Court: Well, I don't know what the basis of the objection was, Mr. Mar-ionneaux.
Mr. Bride: It was on a leading question, Your Honor.
The Court: The objection is overruled. Proceed.
Q. Were teeth knocked out as a result of the entrance of the bullet?
A. Presumably.
Q. There were teeth missing?
Mr. Bride: Again, I am going to object. If he is an expert, he hasn't been qualified as such.
The Court: Mr. Marionneaux, do you wish to rephrase your question?
Mr. Marionneaux: Yes, sir.
Q. From your personal observation, were there any teeth missing in the mouth of the decedent?
A. In the emergency room, polaroid photographs were made and there is a view which distinctly shows the absence of the incisor upper teeth."
Control of the examination of witnesses is within the sound discretion of the trial judge. Absent a showing of an abuse of discretion, this Court will not disturb the trial court's ruling. State v. Carter, 363 So.2d 893 (La.1978). Further, even if these questions were improper, the defendant has failed to show any prejudicial effect that the question had on her defense. Although counsel should not be permitted to mold the witness' testimony, a verdict should not be reversed in the absence of a clear abuse calculated to prejudice the accused's rights. State v. Swift, 363 So.2d 499 (La.1978); State v. Sheppard, 350 So.2d 615 (La.1977).
This assignment lacks merit.
Assignment of Error Number 2
The defendant contends the trial judge erred when he refused to allow the defense counsel to question witnesses about the dangerous character of the victim in support of the defendant's plea of self-defense under R.S. 14:20.
Evidence of the decedent's dangerous character or his threats against the accused is admissible in support of a plea of self-defense, provided that the accused first produces evidence that the decedent made a hostile demonstration or overt act against the accused at the time of the incident. See R.S. 15:482.
"The reason for the overt act foundation
requirement has been expressed as follows:
'There ought, of course, to be some other appreciable evidence of the deceased's aggression, for the character-evidence can hardly be of value unless there is otherwise a fair possibility of doubt on the point; moreover, otherwise the deceased's bad character is likely to be put forward to serve improperly as a mere excuse for the killing, under the pretext of evidencing his aggression, and it is often feasible to obtain untrustworthy character-testimony for that purpose.'
I Wigmore on Evidence, § 63 (3d ed. 1940). See State v. Young, 344 So.2d 983 (La.1977); State v. Lee, infra."
In the case at bar, we feel that the requisite foundation was established by the testimony of William Knight, the brother of both the victim and the defendant. William Knight and the defendant testified to substantially the same sequence of events immediately prior to the shooting as set forth below.
On January 2, 1980, the defendant, the victim and Mr. Knight and other family members were present at a family gathering at the home of their mother in Dorsey-ville, Louisiana. There was a disagreement between the defendant and the victim over which record to play and an argument ensued during which the victim began stepping on the defendant's feet. The victim would not stop arguing so Mr. Knight carried her out of the house and she went to the car, came back to the door of the house, and threatened the entire family. Defendant went outside, intending to leave for the evening, approximately ten to twenty minutes later, and as she was walking toward the car that was coming to pick her up, the victim approached her with her right hand held behind her back. The victim was cursing the defendant as she approached and the defendant begged her to stay away. The defendant fired a warning shot into the ground when the victim continued to advance on her with her hand still behind her back. Defendant fired a second shot which was aimed low and hit the victim in the leg, but this also failed to halt her advance. The defendant was now backed up against another car which was parked in the yard and she fired the fatal shot when the victim was close to her and still advancing. This shot hit the victim in the mouth, transecting the spinal cord, and was the immediate cause of death.
The evidentiary foundation necessary under R.S. 15:482 to introduce testimony as to the victim's dangerous character is appreciable evidence of an overt act against the defendant. An overt act by the victim must be one which would cause a reasonable man to fear that he is in imminent danger of great bodily harm. State v. King, 347 So.2d 1108 (La.1977). The circumstances described here were sufficient to meet this evidentiary prerequisite. The fact that the victim continued to advance on the defendant in a hostile and frightening manner even after the defendant had fired two shots was enough to make the defendant believe that the victim was concealing a weapon. The relevant inquiry is not whether or not the victim actually had a weapon behind her back, but whether or not the defendant could reasonably believe she did. In this case, the defendant could have reasonably believed that she was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm.
When appreciable evidence is in the record relevantly tending to establish the overt act, the trial court cannot exercise its discretion to infringe on the fact determination function of the jury by disbelieving this defense testimony and, thus, deny the accused a defense permitted him by law. State v. Lee, 331 So.2d 455 (La.1976); State v. Green, 335 So.2d 430 (La.1976). For this reason, once Mr. Knight testified about the incident, the trial court should have accepted these facts as true, at least for the purpose of deciding whether or not an overt act had been shown.
A trial judge's determination that the defendant has not laid a sufficient eviden-tiary foundation upon which to introduce testimony concerning the victim's dangerous character will not be disturbed absent a finding of clear error. State v. Burkhalter, 319 So.2d 392 (La.1975). In this case, the determination that an overt act had not been shown was clearly erroneous; therefore, all admissible evidence about the victim's dangerous character was improperly excluded after William Knight's testimony.
The statutory provision governing matters which are not grounds for reversal provides that a judgment or ruling shall not be reversed by an appellate court because of any error, defect or irregularity, or variance which does not affect substantial rights of the accused. C.Cr.P. art. 921. Therefore, the critical determination is whether or not the trial judge's erroneous ruling, which resulted in the exclusion of some of the testimony concerning the victim's character, affected a substantial right of the defendant.
The jurisprudence contains few cases concerning the effect of a failure to admit testimony about the victim's character when self-defense is argued as a defense. The majority of cases deal with testimony that is erroneously admitted rather than testimony which is improperly excluded; however, in State v. Lee, 331 So.2d 455 (La.1975), this situation was discussed. In Lee, the defendant shot and killed the victim, Etchieson, after Lee's son and Etchie-son's daughter had a fight while waiting for the Sunday School bus. Lee testified that when they came out of their houses to check on the children, the victim sprang at him with a knife shouting, "I'm going to cut off your head." The accused relied upon a defense of self-defense and said that he only shot the victim to protect himself. The defendant was permitted to describe his own difficulties with the decedent and to testify about a violent act he had seen him commit; but state objections were sustained to questions asked of him and another defense witness which prevented him from attempting to establish the decedent's dangerous and violent character. This Court reversed the conviction and held that the effect of the rulings was to deprive the defendant of the opportunity to establish the known dangerous character of the decedent by the testimony of other witnesses, since his testimony might be regarded as self serving in the absence of corroboration. This Court also noted that the accused had a statutory right to present such evidence and the substantial curtailment of this right could not be regarded as harmless.
Although Lee set forth the law that is applicable in this area, it is not dispositive of the case at bar. In Lee, the line of questions to which objections were sustained was clearly designed to elicit testimony from other witnesses concerning the victim's violent character and the exclusion of these questions left the defendant no opportunity whatsoever to corroborate his testimony concerning the victim's dangerous character. In this case, only two questions were improperly excluded concerning the victim's violent character; both were to William Knight, the brother of both the victim and the defendant.
The first question addressed to William Knight to which an objection was sustained was, "Did you ever know her [the victim] to carry a gun?" In Louisiana, character may be shown in support of a plea of self-defense by general reputation in the community or by prior threats against the defendant or specific acts that were known to the defendant at the time of the offense. State v. Lee, supra. Since this question did not seek to elicit testimony concerning the victim's general reputation or specific acts known to the defendant, the answer was properly excluded, even though the basis for the exclusion was incorrect.
The second question to which an objection was sustained arose when the defense questioned Knight concerning what the victim said to the people in the house after he made her leave because of the fight over which record to play. The question began, "Was she threatening to harm anyone in the ." and the objection was made before the question was completed. This question was arguably admissible since it sought to elicit testimony concerning a prior threat made by the victim against the defendant. However, since the threat was directed at the entire family and not the defendant in particular, it was arguably properly excluded because it was not a threat against only the defendant. Regardless of whether or not the question should have been allowed as constituting a threat against the defendant, the exclusion did not affect the defendant's statutory right because this same question had been answered by William Knight earlier in his testimony in the following discussion:
"Q. Was she threatening the people in the house?
A. Yes, all of them.
Q. What was she threatening to do to them?
A. She dared us out of the house."
The defendant later gave the exact language of the threat in her testimony and she had the benefit of William Knight's corroboration since he testified that the victim was daring the family out of the house and the defendant's testimony was to the same effect.
The only other time a question was excluded, it was immediately rephrased and the desired information was obtained. This occurred when defense counsel questioned the defendant concerning what the victim said as she advanced on the defendant. The court sustained an objection to the question, "Was she making any threats?", but allowed an answer to the counsel's next question, "When she was approaching you, what did she say?". The response to the second question was the exact language of the threat made by the victim against the defendant.
This case also differs significantly from Lee because in Lee, no witnesses other than the defendant were ever allowed to testify concerning the victim's violent nature, while in the instant case, the trial court allowed the defense to call a defense witness to testify about the victim's dangerous character. The court obviously felt that the proper foundation upon which to admit character testimony had been laid at some point after Mr. Knight's testimony because no objection to questions asked of the defense witness about the victim's character was ever sustained; therefore, the defendant had a full opportunity to develop testimony concerning the victim's violent and dangerous character.
For the reasons stated, we find that the rulings complained of did not affect a substantial right of the accused. Therefore, this assignment lacks merit.
The conviction is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
DIXON, C. J., and LEMMON, J., dissent and assign reasons.
Judges Wallace A. Edwards, Remy Chiasson and Elmo E. Lear of the First Circuit Court of Appeal participated in this decision as Associate Justices Ad Hoc joined by Chief Justice Dixon and Associate Justices Marcus, Blanche and Lemmon.