Case Name: Ham v. Delaware & Hudson Canal Co., Appellants
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1893-05-25
Citations: 155 Pa. 548
Docket Number: Appeal, No. 238
Parties: Ham v. Delaware & Hudson Canal Co., Appellants.
Judges: Before Sterrett, C. J., Green, Williams, McCollum, Mitchell, Dean and Thompson, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania State Reports
Volume: 155
Pages: 548–572

Head Matter:
Ham v. Delaware & Hudson Canal Co., Appellants.
Negligence—Railroads—Ejection of passenger—Evidence.
It is the duty of a passenger who is wrongfully ejected from a train and placed upon the track, to leave the track at the earliest practicable opportunity that a reasonably prudent man would discover and seize upon, and the burden of proof that he did so is upon him.
A passenger Was wrongfully ejected from a train at a point in an apparent wilderness, and where the only possible way out seemed to be along the railroad tracks. The passenger was ignorant of the surrounding country, and knowing of no opening by which he could get off the track, and upon a traveled road, he took the track upon which he would face approaching trains, and followed it until he came to a bridge, and in crossing the bridge was struck by a locomotive and killed. The evidence as to the distance the passenger walked varied, but the lowest estimate placed it at about half a mile. There was evidence on behalf of defendant that there was a traveled road which could easily be seen from the point where the deceased was put off the track. It was held that the case was for the jury. Mr. Justice Green dissented on the ground that the presence of the passenger at so remote a point could not be justified except upon a clear proof of a most imperious necessity.
Evidence—View of ground by jury.
Where a jury has viewed the scene of an accident, it is not improper for the court to say in the charge that the jury have the aid of their own observations “ to supplement the testimony of the witnesses.”
Argued March 8, 1892.
Reargued March 13, 1893.
Appeal, No. 238, Jan. T., 1892, by defendant, from judgment of C. P. Susquehanna Co., Jan. T., 1889, No. 206, on verdict for plaintiff, Matilda Ham.
Before Sterrett, C. J., Green, Williams, McCollum, Mitchell, Dean and Thompson, JJ.
Trespass by widow for death of her husband caused by alleged negligence of defendant.
At the trial, before Searle, P. J., it appeared that plaintiff’s intestate, James Ham, on Nov. 3, 1888, was a passenger upon a train of defendant company from Carbondale to Forest City. When the conductor approached him for his ticket, Ham informed him that he had purchased one that morning, and began searching his pockets to find it, but failed to produce it. • There was evidence that Ham’s step-daughter offered to pay the fare, but that the conductor, notwithstanding the tender, ejected Ham from the train. Evidence on behalf of the company tended to show that the tender of the fare did not include the ten cents extra, which was charged when fare was paid on the car.
Evidence on behalf of plaintiff tended to show that Ham walked along the railroad from the point where he was ejected, and on the track upon which he would face approaching trains, for a distance of about half a mile, and in crossing a bridge was struck by an engine and killed. From plaintiff’s evidence it appeared that the place where Ham was put off was about half way between Carbondale and Forest City, and a few rods from a bridge across the Lackawanna river, called bridge No. 10; that at this point the country appeared, from the track where Ham was left, to be a wilderness; that no houses were in sight, and no sign of any traveled road; that the timber trees of the forest were cut down, leaving tops, and partially grown up by brush; that no cleared fields were in sight, and apparently no possible way out, except by following the railroad track; that at the actual place where Ham found himself when the train, left him, there was a steep bank caused by a side cut made in excavating for the railroad on one side, from ten to fifteen feet high, and on the other, a bank down to the river; that Ham was ignorant of the surrounding country, and had no way of getting out except by following the railroad; that from that point to the bridge where'he received the injuries from which he died, there appeared no opening by which he could get off the track and upon a traveled road. That at the point where the engine struck him, on the bridge called No. 9, the track, upon leaving the bridge at its northern extremity, made a sharp curve and entered a cut, so that one standing upon the bridge could see an approaching engine but a short distance away.
Evidence on behalf of defendant was to the effect that deceased was put off the train near a coal-breaker; that there were other houses in sight, and a reasonably easy and safe way to immediately leave the railroad track and reach a traveled road, which ran but a short distance away from the track and nearly parallel with it from the place where Ham was put off to beyond where he received the injury. That the traveled road and those houses were easily to be perceived from nearly the whole distance traveled by Ham after he was ejected from the train.
Much of the testimony is quoted in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Green.
Defendant’s points were among others as follows:
“ 1. That the presence of James Ham upon the track at bridge No. 9, where the accident happened could only be justified by a most imperious necessity, and there is no sufficient proof of any such necessity in this case.” Answer: Refused. [1]
“ 3. There is no sufficient evidence in this case that James Ham was compelled to walk upon the track from the point where he was ejected to bridge No. 9 where he met with the injury.” Answer: Refused. [2]
“ 4. That under all the evidence in the case the plaintiff is not entitled to recover.” Refused. [3]
“ 5. That when James Ham came to bridge No. 10 where there was no way to pass over except by walking upon the ties upon which the rails of the track were laid, it was his duty to stop and turn back and make such diligent search as a prudent man would have done, for some way off the track, and if such diligent search would have shown him an old road at No. 4 leading to the Forest City road or to the switches leading to the breaker where about one hundred men and boys were at work and where he could have found a road indexed with telephone poles and wires leading all the way to Forest City, then if he failed to do this and leave the track he was guilty of contributory negligence and the plaintiff cannot recover. Answer : Affirmed, with the qualification that if the stopping and turning back from the bridge to look for a place of egress would have been the action which a man of ordinary care and prudence would have adopted under the other circumstances detailed in the point, then a failure on the part of Ham to turn back and look for a place of egress was contributory negligence.” [4] Plaintiff’s points were among others as follows:
“ 7. If Ham was put off on the railroad track and left on the track where it was not a reasonably safe place, and he continued to follow the track to bridge No. 9, and, using reasonable diligence, discovered no highway between the point where he was put off the car and bridge No. 9 which a prudent man would have discovered, and was not guilty of any contributory negligence, then he was not a trespasser in following the track upon which the defendant had placed him to that point, and this is for the jury to determine.” Affirmed. [5]
“12. If James Ham was put off the cars on Nov. 3, 1888, at a point between the North West breaker and bridge No. 10, and although he might have gone up to the breaker and by inquiry found a way out to his home, or found any other place before he arrived at bridge No. 9 by which he could have reached his destination; yet if a man by the exercise of ordinary care and prudence would not have done so but would have walked on the track as James Ham did by reason of the apparent impassibility of a way out and was killed by an engine which the conductor should have foreseen would be the natural and probable consequence of leaving James Ham in the place and at the time he did, and James Ham was not guilty of contributory negligence, then the plaintiff is entitled to recover in this action.” Affirmed. [6]
“ 13. All the care that was required of James Ham, after being put off the car, is simply the ordinary care and diligence of a reasonably prudent man under the circumstances.” Affirmed. [7]
“ 15. Even if Ham, at the place where he was put off, could have seen the breaker, the law did not require that he should go to the breaker to find his way out, unless they find that a prudent man, exercising ordinary care would have taken such a course. And if they find as a fact that in order to reach the breaker, he would have been required to travel a long distance upon the railroad tracks, and cross a number of switches upon which cars were being run out from the breaker, this fact is to be considered by them in ascertaining whether an ordinarily prudent man would have taken such course, and the jury must consider all the evidence as to the condition of the roads leading out from the breaker. Answer: This point is affirmed. The jury should take into consideration all the circumstances as they find them from the evidence, in order to ascertain whether an ordinarily prudent man would, or would not have gone that way.” [8]
The court charged in part as follows :
“ [You have not only heard all the testimony given in the case, but nine of your number have been upon the ground where Ham was ejected from the cars, and from which he pass ed to where the accident occurred, and have the aid of your own observations to supplement the testimony of the witnesses. The questions as to the character of the place where Ham was ejected from the cars, whether dangerous or not, whether the putting him off the cars was the approximate cause of the injury resulting in his death, and whether Ham was guilty of contributory negligence or not, are all questions of fact for you to determine under the instructions we have given you.”] [9]-
Verdict and judgment for plaintiff for $8,412.50. Defendant appealed.
Errors assigned were (1-9), instructions, quoting them.
W. ■ H. Jessup, M. O. Jessup with him, for appellant, cited.
Graham v. P. R. R., 139 Pa. 149; Mulherrin v. R. R. 81 Pa. 366; R. R. v. Hummell, 44 Pa. 375; R. R. v. Schwindling, 101 Pa. 258; R. R. v. Collins, 87 Pa. 405; Hoffman v. R. R., 48 Leg. Int. 539; Flower v. R. R., 132 Pa. 524.
E. L. Blalceslee and A. B. Smith, Jr., for appellee, cited:
Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Ry. v. Rosenzweig, 113 Pa. 520; Sherman and Redfield on Negligence, 2nd ed. 333; 2 Wood’s R. R. Law, 1409; 37 A. & E. R. R. Cas. 87; Kreuziger v. R. R., 40 North Western Rep. 657; Evans v. St. Louis etc. Ry. Co., 11 Mo. Ap. 473; P. R. R. v. Ogier, 35 Pa. 70; Reeves v. D. L. & W. R. R., 30 Pa. 454; P. R. R. v. Zebe, 33 Pa. 318; P. R. R. v. Werner, 89 Pa. 59; Aiken v. R. R., 130 Pa. 380; Sioux City & Pac. R. R. v. Stout, 84 U. S. 657; Fritsch v. Allegheny, 91 Pa. 228.
May 25, 1893:

Opinion:
Opinion by
Mr. Justice Mitchell,
It must be accepted as settled by the evidence and the verdict that James Ham was wrongfully ejected from the car, and did not enter on the track as a.trespasser or by his own fault. Cases therefore like Mulherrin v. R. R. Co., 81 Pa. 366, and R. R. Co. v. Collins, 87 Pa. 405, and others which hold that a man who steps his foot on a railroad track except at a public crossing does so at his own peril, and that it is negligence per se, have no application.
The substantial controversy in this case is upon the standard of conduct required of a man who like Ham is wrongfully put on a railroad track, as to the time and manner of getting off. The learned judge below told the jury concisely in affirming the plaintiff's thirteenth point, that " all the care that was required of Ham after being put off the car, was simply the ordinary care and diligence of a reasonably prudent man under the circumstances; " and again in affirming the defendant's twenty-second point, that " when Ham was placed upon the track it was his duty to leave the same at the earliest practical (practicable) moment, and if he did not do so, he was guilty of contributory negligence." This instruction was repeated and reiterated with varied illustrations from the proved or hypothetical facts in evidence, in the general charge and in the answers to five points by the plaintiff and fourteen by the defendant on this branch of the case alone, but the standard prescribed, to wit, that Ham should have got off the track at the earliest practicable opportunity that a reasonably prudent man would have discovered and seized, and that the plaintiff had the burden of proof that Ham did so, was not varied, and unless this was an erroneous standard the judgment must be sustained.
That this was the proper rule for the guidance of the jury does not admit of question. Ham as already noted was put in a place of danger without fault of his own; he was bound to use care, diligence and judgment to get out at the first opportunity ; but using these he was not chargeable with responsibility for the result, and the standard of the care, diligence and judgment he was bound to use, was the common standard of the ordinary prudent and careful man.
This was the rule which was claimed by the appellant when the case was here before, and which we then said was applicable. Ham v. Canal Co., 142 Pa. 617. But a single expression in the opinion has led the appellant to claim now that nothing short of " imperious necessity " will excuse Ham for continuing on the track. In that case certain points were presented by the defendant, based on hypothetical statements of the facts which if true entitled the points to an affirmance. Our brother Green reviewed the evidence, and in doing so used the expression that w'hether the distance from where Ham was put off the car to where he was struck was four thousand feet as claimed by plain tiff, or a mile as claimed by defendant, " the presence of the men on the track at so remote a point cannot be justified except on clear proof of a most imperious necessity. Of that kind of proof we can discover none in this case." This was meant to show how the hypothetical points of defendant were supported by the evidence, and the character of evidence that should be satisfactory to the jury in connection with such points, not to take the case away from the jury or to set up a different standard for their guidance than the points contained. This is expressly stated in the opinion itself (p. 638-4). " From this brief review of portions of the testimony it is perfectly manifest that there was an abundance of evidence to justify the hypothetical points of the defendant, Nos. 7, 8 and 11, and the defendant was entitled to have a direct answer to these points." The standard that the points themselves set up (p. 622) is " the conduct of a reasonably prudent man " or an " ordinarily prudent man," and this was what the court held should have been affirmed. This standard is the same at all times, but the degree of care that it implies will of course vary with the circumstances of each ease. In the presence of great or imminent danger, more care would be exercised by a prudent man than where the risk was less, his prudence and care are sharpened by the exigencies of the situation. Therefore more care is required of the plaintiff who must conform to that standard. In the present case Ham's continuance on the track was fraught with continued danger, and when he came to the bridge the danger was still further increased. He was bound therefore to consider the situation with attention wide awake to its perils, and to take another way out of them, even though less direct and less convenient, if such other way was presented which would commend itself to a man of reasonable and ordinary prudence. But this, after all, is the standard to which we must continually return. It is the true standard which the law establishes for judging the conduct of men in the daily affairs of life, and no other was intended to be set up in the decision when this case was here before. The phrase "imperious necessity " used in the opinion was a very graphic and forcible expression of the necessity of care, but it was not intended to set up any other measure than that of a prudent man, alive to the dangers of the course he pursues, who nevertheless chooses it as the best of the alternatives open to him. It was used with regard to the character of the evidence that should be satisfactory to the jury, in taking the view that a prudent man would under the circumstances have risked continuing on the track for such a distance, and crossing the bridge. That it was not meant to set up a different standard of care as matter of law, is clear from the granting of a new venire, though the court could discover no proof of the kind described. That was for the jury.
We see no benefit in a detailed review of the evidence. It is mainly the same as when the case was here before, though somewhat strengthened for the plaintiff. There was much testimony as to the feasibility of getting off the track at various points and without crossing the bridge where the accident happened, and the jury might well have so found. But there was also much testimony to the contrary, and the preponderance was not so great and the result so one-sided that the court could have pronounced it as a matter of law. Whether a safe road was there or not was only a part of the question. There still remained whether Ham, with ordinary diligence and prudence could have seen it, and seeing ought to have taken it. A man familiar with a locality may take an uninviting path, knowing it will lead him aright, while a careful man not knowing how it may turn out, nor even whither it may lead, may well be exonerated from negligence in not making the experiment, though it would in fact have been the best thing to do. The elements of prudent conduct on the part of Ham were too many and too varied to be determined except by the jury, and' the rule laid down for the jury's guidance was in accordance with the settled law. If they have made a mistake in its application the remedy is not with us.
Nor do we find any error in the reference to the view of the ground by some of the jurors. They were told that they had the aid of their own observations " to supplement the testimony of the witnesses." This was not substituting their eyes exclusively for the evidence in the case, but using them as an aid in weighing and applying it. Though not so explicit and full as the charge in Flower v. R. R. Co., 132 Pa. 524, it was in substantial accordance with it.
Judgment affirmed.