Case Name: PETERSON, Appellant, v. CITY OF BUTTE, Respondent
Court: Montana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Montana
Decision Date: 1911-11-20
Citations: 44 Mont. 129
Docket Number: No. 3,037
Parties: PETERSON, Appellant, v. CITY OF BUTTE, Respondent.
Judges: Mr. Justice Smith and Mr. Justice Holloway concur.
Reporter: Montana Reports
Volume: 44
Pages: 129–137

Head Matter:
PETERSON, Appellant, v. CITY OF BUTTE, Respondent.
(No. 3,037.)
(Submitted November 1, 1911.
Decided November 20, 1911.)
[120 Pac. 231.]
Actions — Defenses—Abatement—Pleading and Practice — Pleas ' in Bar — Another Action Pending — Dismissal—Judgments on Merits — Statute of Limitations — Bes Adjudicata.
Actions — Defenses—Another Action Pending — Demurrer.
1. Where it appears from the face of á complaint that another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause, the pleading is open to objection by demurrer.
Same — When Deemed Pending.
2. Though section 6710, Revised Codes, defines a judgment as the final determination of the rights of the parties in an action or proceeding, entry of judgment is not conclusive that the action has been finally determined, since an action is deemed pending, within the meaning of section 7188, until its final determination on appeal or until the time for appeal has passed, unless the judgment is sooner satisfied.
Same — Another Action Pending — Dismissal—Reply.
3. The discontinuance or dismissal of another action between the same parties for the same cause may be alleged as a sufficient reply to the plea of another action pending, at any time prior to trial, and thus an abatement prevented.
Same — Another Action Pending — Failure to Deny — Judgment on Pleadings.
4. Where plaintiff in his reply to defendant’s special defense that there was another action pending between the parties for the same cause did not deny that such was the case or allege facts showing prima facie that the former action had been finally terminated, but merely denied that a judgment entered therein had been rendered on the merits, the court properly granted a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
Appeal from District Court, Silver Bow County; Jeremiah J. Lynch, Judge.
Action by John Peterson against tbe city of Butte. From a judgment rendered against him on the pleadings, plaintiff appeals.
Modified and affirmed.
Messrs. Nolan & Donovan, for Appellant, submitted a brief; Mr, L. P. Donovan argued the cause orally.
The plea of a former action pending will not be sustained where it appears that the prior action has been dismissed. The courts are unanimous in holding that where the dismissal takes place before the commencement of the second action, the plea of former action pending cannot be sustained. (1 Cyc. 24, and cases cited; 1 Ency. of PI. & Pr. 755, and cases cited.) And by the great weight of authority it is held that a dismissal of the prior action even after the commencement of the second suit is sufficient to defeat the plea of another action pending. The rule is thus stated in 1 Cyc. 25: “The tendency of the later cases and a preponderance of authority sustain the doctrine that it is a good answer to a plea of the pendency of a prior action for the same cause that the former suit has been discontinued, whether the discontinuance be before or after the filing of the plea. Under this doctrine the plea will be overruled unless the prior suit is pending at the time of the trial of the second.” (See, also, 1 Ency. of P1..& Pr. 762.) It is, however, necessary that a judgment of dismissal should be entered. (Evans v. Johnston, 115 Cal. 180, 46 Pac. 906.) It has been held by this court that when a judgment has been entered in a cause, the action has passed beyond the jurisdiction of the court for all purposes except to hear a motion for new trial. California ever since 1872 has had a section in its Code of Civil Procedure identical with our section 7188. The California section is number 1049 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Under this section, California has steadfastly held that a plea of former action pending cannot be sustained where a judgment has been entered in the former case, and that is so even though the judgment be entered after commencement of the second action. (Moore v. Hophins, 83 Cal. 270, 17 Am. St. Bep. 248, 23 Pae. 318; Balfour Guthrie Investment Co. v. Wodworth, 124 Cal. 169, 56 Pac. 891; Dyer v. Scalmanini, 69 Cal. 637, 11 Pae. 327; Evans v. Johnston, supra; McDougald v. Hulet, 132 Cal. 154, 64 Pac. 278.) The authorities are unanimous in holding that an entry of judgment of dismissal completely avoids the plea of a former action pending. The defendant in cause A-2026 did not recover any money judgment, or any judgment for costs; there was therefore nothing for plaintiff to pay. The judgment was fully satisfied when the action was dismissed. Moreover, the verdict in that cause was returned on the 8th day of March, 1910, and presumptively judgment was entered thereon on the 9th. (See. 6800, Rev. Codes.) The judgment in said cause was in fact entered on the 14th day of March, 1910. Therefore even the time for appeal had expired before the filing of the defendant’s answer, which was on the 18th day of March, 1911.
It appears from the pleadings in this case that the plaintiff has not yet had a trial upon the merits of his cause of action. It also appears that he has not slept upon his rights nor permitted them to grow stale. His first action miscarried because his complaint did not state a cause of action; his second action miscarried because no judgment of dismissal had been entered in his first action. These errors of counsel should not be imputed to the plaintiff, nor should plaintiff, for these reasons, be forever denied the right of having his cause heard upon the merits. The spirit of the law favors a trial upon the merits in every case.
Messrs. H. Lowndes Maury, John A. Smith, and N. A. Botering, for Respondent, submitted a brief; oral argument by Mr. Botering.

Opinion:
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BRANTLY
delivered the opinion of the court.
This is an appeal by plaintiff from a judgment rendered against him on the pleadings, in an action brought by him to recover damages alleged to have been caused to his property by a change by the defendant in the grade of its streets upon which the property abuts. The pleadings are somewhat voluminous. We shall not undertake to give a synopsis of them. The following statement of facts gathered from them is sufficient to present the question submitted for decision: Plaintiff's property consists of a lot situate on the northwest comer of West Caledonia and Jackson streets, within the corporate limits of defendant city. The building thereon was erected in 1901 to conform to the grade of the streets as it then was. During the year 1904 the defendant caused the streets to be graded by raising them to the height of somewhat more than 6% feet above the former grade. On May 31, 1905, the plaintiff commenced an action against the defendant to recover the damages claimed in this cause. The action was tried on February 26, 1909. The plaintiff was nonsuited. This action was designated in the files of court as No. 11,699. Judgment finally disposing of the cause was entered on January 26, 1911. This judgment dismissed it without prejudice. In the meantime, on April 28, 1909, the plaintiff had commenced another action to recover upon the same cause of action. This was designated as cause No. A-2026. The defendant interposed the defenses that cause 11,699 was still pending and undetermined, and that the cause of action alleged therein was barred by the limitations prescribed by sections 6447 and 6449 of the Bevised Codes. At the close of the evidence, the court on motion of defendant directed a verdict in its favor, and judgment was on March 14, 1910, entered accordingly. The present action was commenced on January 28, 1911. In its answer the defendant interposed three affirmative defenses: (1) That the cause of action was barred by the provisions of sections 6447 and 6449 of the Be-vised Codes; (2) that cause A-2026 was still pending and undetermined; and (3) that in another action theretofore tried in the district court of Silver Bow county, in which the parties plaintiff and defendant in this action and the cause of action alleged are identical, a judgment had been rendered and entered upon the merits, and that this judgment, never having been reversed, modified or set aside, is res judicata as to the right of plaintiff to recover in this action. The judgment relied on in this latter defense is the judgment rendered in cause A-2026 on March 14, 1910. In his reply the plaintiff does not deny that cause A-2026 is still pending or allege that the judgment therein has been satisfied, nor does he allege facts or circumstances showing that such is the case. He denies that it was rendered on the merits, and then alleges that the court directed the verdict therein for the plaintiff, upon the ground and for the sole reason that the action having been commenced while cause No. 11,699 was still pending and undetermined, it was not commenced in pursuance of the provisions of section 6464, Revised Codes, and hence was barred by the statute of limitations. Counsel for defendant in their motion demanded judgment on several grounds, among others that the reply of plaintiff admitted that another action, viz., cause A-2026 was still pending. We think that the motion for judgment was properly-granted.
It was incumbent upon the plaintiff to put in issue the allegations of defendant's. special defense, or to allege facts from which it would appear prima facie that the former action had been finally terminated. If it appears from the face of a complaint that another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause, the pleading is open to objection by demurrer- (Rev. Codes, see. 6534). The objection may be taken in the words of the statute. (Sec. 6535.) When this fact does not appear, the objection may be taken by answer. (Sec. 6538.) In either case the pendency of the former action is a conclusive reason why the court shall not entertain the latter. The fact •that judgment has been entered in the former action is not conclusive that it has been finally determined. An action is commenced when the complaint is filed. (Sec. 6457.) "An action is deemed to be pending from the time of its commencement until its final determination on appeal, or until the time for appeal has passed, unless the judgment is sooner satisfied." (Sec. 7188.) Though a judgment is defined as the final determination of rights of the parties in an action or proceeding (see. 6710), the action must be regarded as still pending, within the meaning of section 7188, supra, until the happening of one or more of the events enumerated therein. It was formerly the rule that it was not a good answer to a plea in abatement that the former suit had been dismissed when the latter was commenced (1 Ency. PI. & Pr. 755), but since pleas in abatement are not favored, the weight of authority now lends sup port to the rule that the discontinuance or dismissal of the former action may be alleged as a sufficient reply to the plea at any time prior to the trial, and thus an abatement prevented. (1 Ency. of PI. & Pr. 755; 1 Cyc. 25; Moore v. Hopkins, 83 Cal. 270, 17 Am. St. Rep. 248, 23 Pac. 318; Dyer v. Scalmanini, 69 Cal. 637, 11 Pac. 327; Evans v. Johnston, 115 Cal. 180, 46 Pac. 906.) The essential averment in the answer or plea is that another action for the same cause is still pending between the same parties. It would seem that if the demurrer may follow the language of section 6538, the answer need not be more explicit. But be this as it may, the sufficiency of the answer in this ease is not questioned. Therefore, in order to present a triable issue it was necessary either that a denial be interposed by the reply, or that the facts as they actually existed be alleged. So far as the reply shows, cause A-2026 may still be pending on a motion for a new trial or on appeal. If so, it is still pending within the meaning of section 7188, supra.
(Submitted December 12, 1911.
Decided January 11, 1912.)
Judgment on Merits — Abatement—Pleas in Bar.
1. Where a plea in abatement, — that another action is pending between the parties for the same cause,- — -is joined with pleas in bar, 1. e., the statute of limitations and res judicata, — and the judgment recites that it was rendered on the merits, such judgment, if permitted to stand, is a bar to a subsequent action, even though the decision of the questions arising upon the pleas in bar was erroneous.
Judgments — Dismissal of Action — Statute of Limitations.
2. One who within one year after an aetion is dismissed without prejudice commences a new action, brings himself within the privilege accorded by section 6464, Revised Codes, which provides that if an action is originally commenced within the time limited therefor, and is terminated in a manner other than by a voluntary discontinuance, a dismissal of the complaint for neglect to proceed with the action, or by a final judgment upon the merits, a new one may be commenced within one year after such termination.
We do not wish to be understood by anything said herein as holding that an acquiescence by the plaintiff in the judgment in the former action would not be sufficient to prevent abatement of the second action. His acquiescence must be made to appear, however, by appropriate allegation.
This conclusion renders it unnecessary to consider the other questions argued by counsel. The judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice Smith and Mr. Justice Holloway concur.