Case Name: PEOPLE v. SMITH
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1991-09-23
Citations: 438 Mich. 715
Docket Number: Docket No. 89414; Calendar No. 7
Parties: PEOPLE v SMITH
Judges: Griffin and Mallett, JJ., concurred with Levin, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 438
Pages: 715–743

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v SMITH
Docket No. 89414.
Argued April 3, 1991
(Calendar No. 7).
Decided September 23, 1991.
Rosie Smith escaped from a Department of Corrections facility. Thereafter, she was apprehended, charged with, and convicted of larceny in a building; was sentenced; and was returned to a Department of Corrections facility. Subsequently, she pleaded guilty in the Detroit Recorder’s Court, Robert L. Evans, J., of prison escape after her motion to quash the charge on the basis of a violation of the rule that she be brought to trial within 180 days was denied. She was sentenced consecutively to the sentence she was serving at the time of the escape and to the sentence for the larceny offense. The Court of Appeals, Sawyer and Gillis, JJ. (Griffin, P.J., dissenting), reversed, holding that Smith’s guilty plea did not waive application of the 180-day rule (Docket No. 110110). The people appeal.
In opinions by Justice Levin, joined by Justices Griffin and Mallett, and by Justice Boyle, joined by Justices Riley and Griffin, the Supreme Court held:
The 180-day rule does not apply in this case. People v Woodruff, 414 Mich 130 (1982), which held that the 180-day rule applies without regard to whether a concurrent or consecutive sentence is or might be imposed, was incorrectly decided.
Justice Levin, joined by Justices Griffin and Mallett, stated:
The 180-day rule does not apply to a charge of a criminal offense committed by an inmate in a correctional facility after the inmate has escaped and before the inmate has been returned to the custody of the Department of Corrections.
Justice Boyle, joined by Justices Riley and Griffin, stated:
Assuming the applicability of the 180-day rule, a defendant’s unconditional guilty plea will waive any claim of error based on its violation. Violation of the statute is a nonjurisdictional defect that does not survive an unconditional guilty plea.
Reversed; conviction reinstated.
Justice Brickley, joined by Chief Justice Cavanagh, dissenting, stated that the 180-day rule applies to a prisoner in the defendant’s circumstances. Although the defendant waived her constitutional right to a speedy trial with her unconditional guilty plea, the plea did not amount to a waiver of her claim that the 180-day rule was violated. Amendments of the rule were not effective until after she pleaded guilty, and the object and purpose of the statute supports the conclusion.
183 Mich App 537; 455 NW2d 719 (1990) reversed.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Gay Secor Hardy, Solicitor General, John D. O’Hair, Prosecuting Attorney, Timothy A. Baughman, Chief, Research, Training and Appeals, and John P. Puleo and Thomas Chambers, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for the people.
Marcia J. Covert for the defendant.

Opinion:
Levin, J.
Rosie Smith escaped from a Michigan Department of Corrections facility. She was apprehended on a larceny charge, convicted, sentenced, and returned to a Michigan Department of Corrections facility to serve the sentence.
Smith was subsequently arraigned on a charge of prison escape, and pleaded guilty after her motion to quash the charge for violation of the 180-day rule was denied. Smith was sentenced to serve a term of six months to five years in prison consecutively to the sentence she was serving when she escaped and the sentence for the larceny offense.
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the plea of guilty did not waive application of the 180-day rule because the statute provides that when the rule is violated "no court of this state shall any longer have jurisdiction" to try the charged offense.
The people contend that Smith's unconditional guilty plea waived any claim she might otherwise assert that the 180-day rule barred prosecution on the charge of prison escape.
A predicate of Smith's claim is this Court's per curiam decision in People v Woodruff, 414 Mich 130; 323 NW2d 923 (1982), that the 180-day rule applies without regard to whether a concurrent or consecutive sentence is or might be imposed. We are now persuaded that Woodruff was incorrectly decided, and that the view expressed in People v Loney, 12 Mich App 288, 292; 162 NW2d 832 (1968), that the 180-day rule does not apply in such a case, is correct:
The purpose of the statute is clear. It was intended to give the inmate, who had pending offenses not yet tried, an opportunity to have the sentences run concurrently consistent with the principle of law disfavoring accumulations of sentences. This purpose, however, does not apply in the instance of a new offense committed after imprisonment, nor where the statute, as in the case of an escape or attempted escape, sets up a mandatory consecutive sentence. The legislature was not concerning itself with the need for dispatch in the handling of a charge brought against an inmate for offenses committed while in prison. [Emphasis in original.]
1988 PA 400 amended the 180-day rule to provide that the rule does not apply to a charge of a criminal offense committed by an inmate while incarcerated in a correctional facility, or committed after the inmate has escaped from a facility and before the inmate has been returned to the custody of the Department of Corrections.
The Court of Appeals agreed with the prosecutor that Smith's unconditional plea of guilty waived any claim she might otherwise assert that her constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated. Although this Court's order granting leave to appeal was without limitation, we are now persuaded that this issue should not. be further reviewed by this Court.
The Court of Appeals is reversed and the conviction is reinstated.
Griffin and Mallett, JJ., concurred with Levin, J.
MCL 780.131; MSA 28.969(1). The 180-day rule as amended by 1988 PA 400 provides:
(1) Whenever the department of corrections receives notice that there is pending in this state any untried warrant, indictment, information, or complaint setting forth against any inmate of a correctional facility of this state a criminal offense for which a prison sentence might be imposed upon conviction, the inmate shall be brought to trial within 180 days after the department of corrections causes to be delivered to the prosecuting attorney of the county in which the warrant, indictment, information, or complaint is pending written notice of the place of imprisonment of the inmate and a request for final disposition of the warrant, indictment, information, or complaint. The request shall be accompanied by a statement setting forth the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time or disciplinary credits earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the parole board relating to the prisoner. The written notice and statement shall be delivered by certified mail.
(2) This section does not apply to a warrant, indictment, information, or complaint arising from either of the following:
(a) A criminal offense committed by an inmate of a state correctional facility while incarcerated in the correctional facility.
(b) A criminal offense committed by an inmate of a state correctional facility after the inmate has escaped from the correctional facility and before he or she has been returned to the custody of the department of corrections.
1988 PA 400 became effective on March 30,1989.
183 Mich App 537; 455 NW2d 719 (1990).
MCL 780.133; MSA 28.969(3). See n 1.
Similarly see People v Ewing, 101 Mich App 51, 59-60; 301 NW2d 8 (1980). But see People v Moore, 96 Mich App 754, 761-762; 293 NW2d 700 (1980), expressing the contrary view adopted by this Court in Woodruff.
Cf. People v Patterson, 392 Mich 83; 219 NW2d 31 (1974), holding that the statute does not require that sentence credit, MCL 769.11b; MSA 28.1083(2), be granted where the sentence for the offense of which the defendant is convicted begins at the expiration of the term or terms of the sentence that the person is serving.
The warrant charging Smith with prison escape was issued in February, 1987. She pleaded guilty on March 7, 1988.
See n 1. MCL 780.132; MSA 28.969(2) provides that the Department of Corrections shall notify each prisoner of any request forwarded under § 1. MCL 780.133; MSA 28.969(3) provides that in the event that the time limitation set forth in § 1 is violated, "no court of this state shall any longer have jurisdiction," and "the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice."
People v Smith, 436 Mich 882 (1990).