Case Name: BOCA BURGER, INC., etc., Petitioner, v. Richard FORUM, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2005-07-07
Citations: 912 So. 2d 561
Docket Number: No. SC01-1830
Parties: BOCA BURGER, INC., etc., Petitioner, v. Richard FORUM, Respondent.
Judges: PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, and BELL, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 912
Pages: 561–584

Head Matter:
BOCA BURGER, INC., etc., Petitioner, v. Richard FORUM, Respondent.
No. SC01-1830.
Supreme Court of Florida.
July 7, 2005.
As Revised on Denial of Rehearing Sept. 29, 2005.
John R. Hargrove and W. Kent Brown of Heinrich, Gordon, Hargrove, Weihe and James, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, FL, Edna L. Caruso of Caruso, Burlington, Bohn and Campiani, P.A., West Palm Beach, FL, and John A. Beranek of Ausley and McMullen, Tallahassee, FL, for Petitioner.
James Fox Miller, Charles Fox Miller and Greg A. Lewen of Miller, Schwartz and Miller, P.A., Hollywood, FL, for Respondent.
Paul D. Jess, Tallahassee, FL, William C. Gentry, Jacksonville, FL, and Robert S. Peck, Washington, DC, on behalf of the Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers, Inc.; Florida Consumer Action Network, Inc.; Coalition for Family Safety, Inc.; Florida League of Conservation Voters, Inc.; Florida AFL-CIO; Association of Flight Attendants, AFL-CIO; Des Action, National; Florida State Conference of Branches of NAACP; Florida National Organization for Women, Inc.; Children’s Advocacy Foundation, Inc.; Al J. Cone; and the Florida Alliance for Retired Americans, Inc., as Amici Curiae.
George N. Meros, Jr., and Lori S. Rowe of Gray, Harris and Robinson, P.A., Joseph W. Hatchett of Akermann, Senterfitt and Edison. P.A., Tallahassee, FL, and Raymond Ehrlich of Holland and Knight, Jacksonville, FL, on behalf of Publix Supermarkets; Citizens for a Sound Economy; Associated Industries of Florida; Florida Chamber of Commerce; Florida Institute of CPA’s; Florida Medical Association; Florida Retail Federation; Florida United Business Association; National Federation of Independent Business; Association of Community Hospitals and Health System of Florida, Inc.; City of Orlando; Dade County; Florida Association of Counties; Florida League of Cities; Florida Sheriffs Association; and Tort Reform United Effort (TRUE), as Amici Curiae.

Opinion:
CANTERO, J.
We review Forum v. Boca Burger, Inc., 788 So.2d 1055 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), which expressly and directly conflicts with Volpicella v. Volpicella, 136 So.2d 231, 232 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962). The conflict concerns whether a trial court has discretion to deny a plaintiff leave to amend the complaint once before a responsive pleading is served. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.; Boca Burger, Inc. v. Forum, 817 So.2d 844 (Fla.2002) (granting review). While we grant jurisdiction to review this issue, we also have authority to address other issues properly raised. See Savoie v. State, 422 So.2d 308, 310 (Fla.1982) (stating that once the Supreme Court accepts jurisdiction over a case to resolve the legal issue in conflict, it may, in its discretion, consider other issues properly raised and argued before the Supreme Court). For the reasons we explain below, we hold that a plaintiff has the absolute right to amend a complaint once as a matter of course before a responsive pleading is served, and a trial court has no discretion to deny such an amendment; that a defendant may assert an affirmative defense, including the defense of federal preemption, in a motion to dismiss; and that an appellate court may, in appropriate circumstances, impose sanctions on an appel-lee or its lawyer for its frivolous defense of a patently erroneous trial court order.
I. BACKGROUND AND FACTS
Respondent Richard Forum filed an action against petitioner Boca Burger, Inc., seeking declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and damages under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (the "FDUTPA"). See § 501.201-.213, Fla. Stat. (2000). Boca Burger filed a motion to dismiss with prejudice, arguing that Forum's complaint failed to state a cause of action and was otherwise preempted by federal and state law. For purposes of the motion, Boca Burger assumed that Forum purported to allege an FDUTPA violation in connection with the manufacture and distribution of a food product, which is Boca Burger's sole line of business. Boca Burger argued that any such claim was preempted by Florida's Food Safety Act, sections 500.01-.601, Florida Statutes (2000), which grants the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services exclusive jurisdiction to protect the public from injury flowing from intrastate commerce in food. It further argued that any claim not preempted by Florida law was preempted by the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, which governs the manufacture and distribution of food through interstate commerce. See 21 U.S.C. § 301-397 (2000).
Boca Burger scheduled a hearing on its motion to dismiss. On the morning of the hearing, Forum, through new (though not substitute) counsel, filed an amended complaint without leave of court. The amended complaint asserted multiple claims for relief arising from the alleged "intentional and negligent misrepresentations and omissions by [Boca Burger] concerning the nature and ingredients of their purportedly 'all natural' vegetarian hamburger patty substitute." Forum accused Boca Burger of omitting ingredients from the product label. Based on these facts, Forum alleged both statutory and common law violations. The district court summarized what transpired at the hearing:
The amended complaint was filed over the names of three sets of lawyers who had not appeared on the original complaint, but one had the same address as counsel who filed the original complaint. At the hearing the trial judge first mentioned both the filing of the amended complaint and the fact that the lawyer appearing at the hearing on behalf of plaintiff was not the lawyer who had signed the original complaint. Counsel responded that he had filed a notice of appearance that morning along with the amended complaint. The trial judge replied that he had a "fundamental problem" with both aspects: the complaint had been amended without leave of court, and the lawyer at the hearing was not the lawyer who had signed the original complaint on plaintiffs behalf.
The trial judge asked defense counsel if they had any comments on both matters raised by the court. Defense counsel first addressed the appearance of different attorneys who were now representing plaintiff. He stated that the lawyer who had filed the original pleading had his own firm, and that one of the lawyers signing the amended pleading had a different firm but at the same address as the first. He admitted that he had communications before the hearing with one of the new lawyers listed on the amended pleading but added that "he's never defined exactly — to my knowledge — his role.... " The tone and tenor of his remarks was to hint that there was some impropriety in these new lawyers appearing on plaintiffs behalf, notably failing to say what it might be. Defense counsel failed to acknowledge that the rules expressly permit the appearance of additional attorneys for a party without leave of court. The judge again suggested disapproval of the appearance but decided to "skip that one for a minute."
Turning to the issue of amending the complaint without leave of court, the trial judge next noted that the hearing had been set for nearly four weeks and that the amended complaint had been filed only on the day of the hearing. Plaintiffs counsel pointed out that the rules permit an amendment without leave of court before a responsive pleading is filed and that the pending motion to dismiss was not a responsive pleading. Again the court turned to defense counsel.
Defense counsel argued case authority from a federal trial court in Michigan that, as he put it, "suggests that attempting to amend a complaint while a motion to dismiss is pending is procedurally improper and causes prejudice to the party seeking to dismiss the complaint." He also cited a bankruptcy case which he claimed was to the same effect. He then added that our decision in Life General Security Insurance Co. v. Horal, 667 So.2d 967 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), "suggests that leave to amend or attempting to amend a complaint at the eleventh hour would cause prejudice to the opposing party, and it is within the discretion of the trial court to deny." While conceding that "the rule is what it is," he went on to contend "it is within the court's discretion to deny leave to amend."
The trial judge thereupon announced that he would proceed with the hearing for argument on the pending motion to dismiss — but only as to the initial complaint. The judge added that he would not "recognize" the amended complaint "as filed." The outcome was that the court granted the motion to dismiss the original complaint with prejudice, thereby refusing to permit any amendments to the pleading, and finding that the complaint raised claims that are "preempted" by federal and Florida law.
Forum, 788 So.2d at 1057-59 (footnotes omitted).
On appeal, the Fourth District reversed. The court did not "[overlook] defendant's argument that plaintiffs claims [were] preempted by federal law," but concluded that the "essential problem with that argument is that it was being raised at the wrong time, under the auspices of the wrong motion." Id. at 1061. According to the district court, Boca Burger's preemption argument constituted an avoidance, not a real defense, that should have been pled only as an affirmative defense and resolved on motion for summary judgment.
The district court also reversed the trial court's decision to dismiss the complaint, holding that Forum could amend his complaint by right, and that the amended complaint superseded the initial complaint. According to the district court, Boca Burger's counsel misled the trial court into believing that it had discretion to refuse Forum's amended complaint. Id. at 1059. Concluding that counsel could not have made such an argument in good faith at either the trial or appellate levels, the district court applied the recently amended attorney's fees statute and imposed trial and appellate court sanctions against Boca Burger's counsel. See § 57.105, Fla. Stat. (2000). We granted review. Boca Burger, 817 So.2d at 844.
II. ANALYSIS
We focus on three issues discussed in the district court's opinion: (A) whether a trial court has any discretion to deny a plaintiff the right to amend the complaint once before an answer is served; (B) whether a defendant may assert federal preemption in a motion to dismiss; and (C) whether the district court properly imposed sanctions against Boca Burger's counsel for both its trial court and appellate court conduct.
A. The Right to Amend a Complaint
We first address the issue on which conflict exists: whether a trial court has any discretion to deny a plaintiffs first amendment to the complaint before a responsive pleading is served. We hold that the plain language of the rule grants trial courts no such discretion.
The Fourth District held that it is "incontrovertible that plaintiff had every right under the rule — so early in the case — to amend his complaint without leave of court, and therefore the legal sufficiency of the original complaint was clearly moot." 788 So.2d at 1059. The court then discussed other cases:
There were some earlier cases outside this district finding a residual discretion in the trial judge to deny leave to amend when sought by a party before the filing of a responsive pleading, but even they go on to hold that it is an abuse of discretion to deny the amendment unless as a matter of law plaintiff clearly could never state a cause of action.
Id. at 1059. The court cited Volpicella, 136 So.2d at 232, as one of those cases. In Volpicella, the trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss without explaining the grounds for dismissal and without granting plaintiff leave to amend. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the court should have granted leave to amend. The Second District reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying leave to amend. In doing so, the court stated:
Under [rule 1.190], a party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served. This rule has not yet been construed as depriving a trial court of discretion to withhold leave to amend a pleading to which no response has been served. The rule does however indicate that a denial of leave to amend in such a case amounts to an abuse of discretion unless a complaint is clearly not amendable.
Id.
In Forum, the Fourth District "doubt[ed] the correctness of the second district's assertion of residual discretion. Rule 1.190(a) states a rule, not a discretion, as regards to amending before a responsive pleading is filed." 788 So.2d at 1059. Thus, the two cases conflict on whether the rule grants trial courts any discretion to deny a plaintiffs first amendment to the complaint before an answer is served. We agree with the Fourth District, as we explain below.
Rule 1.190(a) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure permits the amendment of a pleading "once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served." Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.190(a). The rule reads in its entirety:
A party may amend a pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed on the trial calendar, may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend a pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party. If a party files a motion to amend a pleading, the party shall attach the proposed amended pleading to the motion. Leave of court shall be given freely when justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended pleading within 10 days after service of the amended pleading unless the court otherwise orders.
Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.190(a). Thus, by its terms the rule provides for amendment as of right (first sentence) and amendment by agreement or leave of court (second sentence), depending on the circumstances.
Several courts have recognized that the first sentence of the rule grants plaintiffs an automatic right to amend the complaint once before a responsive pleading is served. See, e.g., Vanderberg v. Rios, 798 So.2d 806, 807 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001); Fusilier v. Markov, 676 So.2d 1053, 1054 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Posey v. Magill, 530 So.2d 985, 986 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Abston v. Bryan, 519 So.2d 1125, 1127 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988); Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Sys. Council U—4 of Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 307 So.2d 189, 191 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); Bryant v. Small, 271 So.2d 808, 809 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973). Moreover, a motion to dismiss is not a "responsive pleading" because it is not a "pleading" under the rules. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.100(a) (designating permissible pleadings and providing that "[n]o other pleadings shall be allowed"); see also Vanderberg, 798 So.2d at 807 (noting that a motion to dismiss is not a pleading) (citing Forum, 788 So.2d at 1057). Therefore, the filing of a motion to dismiss does not terminate a plaintiffs absolute right to amend the complaint "once as a matter of course."
Thus, the district court was correct in determining that Forum could amend his complaint without leave of court, regardless of the pending motion to dismiss, and that the trial court erred in refusing to recognize the amended complaint. Under the plain language of the first sentence of rule 1.190(a), a plaintiff has an absolute right to amend the complaint before a responsive pleading is served. Because Boca Burger had not served its answer, and had only filed a motion to dismiss, Forum had the right to file an amended complaint, even if that amendment was filed on the day of — or even just before' — the hearing on Boca Burger's motion to dismiss the original complaint. The rule clearly grants a plaintiff one free amendment to perfect the complaint before an answer is served.
A judge's discretion to deny amendment of a complaint arises only after the defendant files an answer or if the plaintiff already has exercised the right to amend once. At that time, the second and fourth sentences of rule 1.190(a) apply: "Otherwise a party may amend a pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party.... Leave of court shall be given freely when justice so requires." (Emphasis added.)
Although Volpicella implied that a trial court may deny leave to amend where the complaint is clearly not amendable, a court only has such discretion under the second sentence of the rule, not under the first. The cases that have recognized a court's discretion to deny amendment in those circumstances concerned either a plaintiffs second (or subsequent) amendment or an amendment requested after the answer was filed. See, e.g., Fla. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. State, 832 So.2d 911, 915 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (holding that where the plaintiff had amended once before a responsive pleading had been served and once again after the defendant filed an answer, the trial court abused discretion in refusing leave to amend the second amended complaint); Kohn v. City of Miami Beach, 611 So.2d 538, 539 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion where the plaintiff failed in four attempts to cure the defects in the complaint); Bouldin v. Okaloosa County, 580 So.2d 205, 207 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (stating that when a party seeks to amend a complaint after a responsive pleading has been served, leave should be granted unless the court finds a clear abuse of the privilege to amend or the complaint is clearly not amendable); see also Dimick v. Ray, 774 So.2d 830, 835 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (holding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying motion for leave to amend plaintiffs first amended complaint); Adams v. Knabb Turpentine Co., 435 So.2d 944, 946 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (same); Highlands County Sch. Bd. v. K.D. Hedin Constr., Inc., 382 So.2d 90, 91 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980) (same).
As the Fourth District held, a court has no discretion to deny an amendment under the first sentence of the rule. A defendant may contest the legal viability of a first amended complaint by moving to dismiss the amended complaint, not by contesting the plaintiffs right to amend. We disapprove Volpicella to the extent it holds that a trial court retains any discretion to deny an amendment under such circumstances — regardless of whether the plaintiff simply files an amended complaint or requests leave of court to file one.
B. Pleading Preemption in a Motion to Dismiss
We next discuss whether the defense of federal preemption may properly be asserted in a motion to dismiss. The district court held that Boca Burger could only plead the preemption defense as an affirmative defense, and therefore the issue could only be resolved on motion for summary judgment. 788 So.2d at 1062. On this point we disagree. Florida courts, including this Court, have held that the issue of federal preemption is a question of subject matter jurisdiction. See Jacobs Wind Elec. Co. v. Dep't of Transp., 626 So.2d 1333, 1335 (Fla.1993); Bankers Risk Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Av-Med Managed Care, Inc., 697 So.2d 158, 160 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); Fla. Auto. Dealers Indus. Benefit Trust v. Small, 592 So.2d 1179, 1183 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be properly asserted in a motion to dismiss. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(b). Florida courts regularly review arguments concerning subject matter jurisdiction on motions to dismiss. See, e.g., Bradshaw v. Ultra-Tech Enters., Inc., 747 So.2d 1008, 1009 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (affirming dismissal of complaint based on ERISA preemption of state law); Doe v. Am. Online, Inc., 718 So.2d 385, 388 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (rejecting the argument that a federal preemption defense constituted an affirmative defense that should have been raised in an answer, not on a motion to dismiss); Bankers, 697 So.2d at 160 (addressing an issue raised in defendant's motion to dismiss regarding federal preemption of plaintiffs claims).
Therefore, we reject the Fourth District's holding in this case that Boca Burger could not raise its preemption defense in a motion to dismiss. A defendant may, at its option, raise any affirmative defense, including the defense of federal preemption, in a motion to dismiss. Of course, when a defendant asserts such a defense in a motion to dismiss, a trial court must determine the issue as a matter of law based only on the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint, assuming the truth of the facts asserted. See Hanft v. Phelan, 488 So.2d 531, 532 n. 1 (Fla.1986).
C. The Imposition of Sanctions for Defending a Trial Court Order
The district court imposed sanctions on Boca Burger both for its conduct in the trial court and its conduct on appeal. The trial court had not imposed sanctions for such actions, and no authority exists for an appellate court's imposition of sanctions for conduct occurring in the trial court. "Where the trial court has failed to make . findings [under section 57.105], [the appellate court is] without authority to do so in the first instance on appeal." Kurzweil v. Larkin Hosp. Operating Co., 684 So.2d 901, 903 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). If the district court was concerned with counsel's conduct in the trial court, the proper procedure would have been to remand for the circuit court to allow the trial court to determine for itself whether to impose sanctions.
Regarding sanctions for counsel's conduct on appeal, however, we hold that a district court may, in appropriate circumstances, impose sanctions for counsel's defense of a patently erroneous order. As we explain below, (1) under the new version of section 57.105, Florida Statutes, an appellee as well as an appellant may be subject to sanctions; (2) allowing appellate courts to impose sanctions on appellees for frivolous defense of trial court orders will not chill representation, but instead will emphasize that counsels' obligations as officers of the court override their obligations to zealously represent their clients; and (3) because the district court's opinion addressed almost exclusively counsel's conduct in the trial court, we cannot determine to what extent, if any, the court intended to impose sanctions for conduct that occurred in the appellate court.
1. An appellee may he subject to sanctions
The petitioner argues that an appellee— who by definition is defending a trial court's order — cannot be sanctioned for asserting a frivolous defense on appeal. Some Florida courts agree with the petitioner's position. See State Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Salter, 710 So.2d 1039, 1041 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (holding that because the judgment of a trial court carries a presumption of correctness, defense of that judgment necessarily presents a justiciable issue); Coral Springs Roofing Co. v. Campagna, 528 So.2d 557, 558 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988) (same); McNee v. Biz, 473 So.2d 5, 6 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985) (holding that the appellate court could not award fees under section 57.105 against an appellee that did not cross-appeal the trial court's order because, as a matter of law, the appellee's position had to embody a justiciable issue of law or fact). At least one appellate court, however, has awarded fees to the appellant under section 57.105. See Rapid Credit Corp. v. Sunset Park Centre, Ltd., 566 So.2d 810, 812 n. 2 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (noting that the court had found counsel's attempt to defend a default on appeal so frivolous that it had granted appellant fees under section 57.105) (Schwartz, C.J., specially concurring).
All these cases were decided under a prior version of section 57.105. In 1999, the Legislature substantially rewrote that statute to significantly broaden the courts' authority to award attorneys' fees under that section. As revised, the statute reads:
(1) Upon the court's initiative or on motion of any party, the court shall award a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid to the prevailing party in equal amounts by the losing party and the losing party's attorney on any claim or defense at any time during a civil proceeding or action in which the court finds that the losing party or the losing party's attorney knew or should have known that a claim or defense when initially presented to the court or at any time before trial:
(a) Was not supported by the material facts necessary to establish the claim or defense; or
(b) Would not be supported by the application of then-existing law to those material facts.
However, the losing party's attorney is not personally responsible if he or she has acted in good faith, based on the representations of his or her client as to the existence of those material facts. If the court awards attorney's fees to a claimant pursuant to this subsection, the court shall also award prejudgment interest.
(2) Paragraph (l)(b) does not apply if the court determines that the claim or defense was initially presented to the court as a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law, as it applied to the material facts, with a reasonable expectation of success.
(3)At any time in any civil proceeding or action in which the moving party proves by a preponderance of the evidence that any action taken by the opposing party, including, but not limited to, the filing of any pleading or part thereof, the assertion of or response to any discovery demand, the assertion of any claim or defense, or the response to any request by any other party, was taken primarily for the purpose of unreasonable delay, the court shall award damages to the moving party for its reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the order, which may include attorney's fees, and other loss resulting from the improper delay.
§ 57.105(l)-(3), Fla. Stat. (2000). As the district court noted in this case, 788 So.2d at 1061, the statute no longer applies only to an entire action; it now applies to any claim or defense. The standard for granting fees also has changed. Previously, a movant had to show "a complete absence of a justiciable issue of either law or fact raised by the losing party." § 57.105, Fla. Stat. (Supp.1978). Under the revised version, however, a movant need only show that the party and counsel "knew or should have known" that any claim or defense asserted was (a) not supported by the facts or (b) not supported by an application of "then-existing" law. § 57.105, Fla. Stat. (2000). The amendments therefore greatly expand the statute's potential use.
We hold that an appellee is not shielded as a matter of law from the imposition of sanctions in an appropriate case. We acknowledge that an appellee, by definition, is defending an order of the trial court. Appellate courts, therefore, should impose sanctions against an appellee only in rare circumstances. Moreover, because a district court of appeal is, in the vast majority of cases, the court of last resort, it should exercise great restraint in impos ing appellate sanctions. We also warn, however, that an appellee cannot hide behind the "presumption of correctness" of an order that the appellee itself procured by misrepresenting the law or the facts. The presumption of correctness is necessarily based on another presumption: that the appellee correctly informed the trial court of the facts and applicable law. Busy judges managing overloaded motion calendars often depend on the attorneys appearing before them to provide them with accurate information about the issues involved, the facts relevant to those issues, and the law applicable to those facts. When it becomes apparent that counsel misrepresented this information, counsel cannot later hide behind the presumption of correctness to avoid sanctions.
Appellate courts, too, must manage heavy caseloads. They depend on counsel to accurately state both the facts and the applicable law. Therefore, regardless of trial counsel's conduct or representations, appellate counsel (who often is separate from trial counsel) has an independent ethical obligation to present both the facts and the applicable law accurately and forthrightly. This will sometimes require appellate counsel to concede error where, although trial counsel obtained a favorable result, either the facts were not as represented to the trial court or the law is clearly contrary to the appellee's position and no good-faith basis exists to argue that it should be changed.
2. Counsel's ethical obligations
Petitioner warns that adopting a rule allowing sanctions against appellees will require "the extreme, indeed unprofessional, act of 'throwing in the towel' when there is any chance that an order may be reversed on appeal." This argument overlooks counsel's professional responsibilities as officers of the court. We do not hold that appellate counsel should concede error in all or even many cases. And whether counsel should concede error does not depend on the statistical chances for reversal. In (we hope) rare cases, however, the trial court, whether because of its own misconceptions or counsel's misrepresentations, may incorrectly assume the relevant facts or apply the wrong law. In such circumstances, appellate counsel has a duty to recognize and apprise the appellate court of that fact.
Contrary to petitioner's arguments, allowing sanctions against appellees or their counsel for defending indefensible orders requires the quintessentially professional act of admitting defeat when there is no chance of victory, or when victory will have been obtained at the price of integrity and truth. "While counsel does have an obligation to be faithful to [his] [client's] lawful objectives, that obligation cannot be used to justify unprofessional conduct by elevating the perceived duty to zealously represent over all other duties." Lingle v. Dion, 776 So.2d 1073, 1078 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (alterations in original) (quoting Visoly v. Sec. Pac. Credit Corp., 768 So.2d 482, 492 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)). Section 57.105, as well as the Florida Bar rules of professional conduct and even the oath of admission to the Florida Bar, all warn — -if any warning were needed — that counsel must be governed by considerations other than mere zealous advocacy for the client. See § 57.105, Fla. Stat. (2002) (allowing a court to sanction the losing party and the losing party's attorney if the court finds the losing party's attorney knew or should have known that a claim or defense was not supported by the application of then-existing law); R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-3.3(a)(1) ("A lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal."); Oath of Admission, Fla. Bar J., Sept. 2004, at 2 ("I will employ for the purposes of maintaining the causes confided to me such means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and will never seek to mislead the judge or jury by any artifice or false statement of fact or law."). Rule 4-3.3(a)(3) of the Rules Regulating the .Florida Bar specifically prohibits an attorney from knowingly "failing] to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel." Therefore, contrary to the petitioner's assertions, the rules already require counsel to concede error on appeal when appropriate.
This is not a new concept. Appellees regularly concede error. Cases in which the State has conceded error on appeal are legion. Confessions of error in civil cases also occur frequently. The sheer number of such cases demonstrates that not only do the rules require counsel to concede error in appropriate cases; counsel can and do adhere to these rules in practice. Lawyers recognize every day when the defense of a trial court's order is untenable. The petitioner's protestations that such concessions would be "throwing in the towel" reflect an attitude that Chief Judge Schwartz has lamented:
Too many members of the Bar practice with complete ignorance of or disdain for the basic principle that a lawyer's duty to his calling and to the administration of justice far outweighs — and must outweigh — even his obligation to his client, and, surely what we suspect really motivates many such inappropriate actions, his interest in his personal aggrandizement.
Rapid Credit Corp., 566 So.2d at 812 n. 1 (Schwartz, C.J., specially concurring).
Finally, the district court's opinion aptly responds to the petitioner's proposition that conceding error on appeal is unprofessional:
The heart of all legal ethics is in the lawyer's duty of candor to a tribunal. It is an exacting duty with an imposing burden. Unlike many provisions of the disciplinary rules, which rely on the court or an opposing lawyer for their invocation, the duty of candor depends on self-regulation; every lawyer must spontaneously disclose contrary authority to a tribunal. It is counter-intuitive, cutting against the lawyer's principal role as an advocate. It also operates most inconveniently — that is, when victory seems within grasp. But it is precisely because of these things that the duty is so necessary.
Although we have an adversary system of justice, it is one founded on the rule of law. Simply because our system is adversarial does not make it unconcerned with outcomes. Might does not make right, at least in the courtroom. We do not accept the notion that outcomes should depend on who is the most powerful, most eloquent, best dressed, most devious and most persistent with the last word' — or, for that matter, who is able to misdirect a judge. American civil justice is so designed that established rules of law will be applied and enforced to insure that justice be rightly done. Such a system is surely defective, however, if it is acceptable for lawyers to "suggest" a trial judge into applying a "rule" or a "discretion" that they know — or should know — is contrary to existing law. Even if it hurts the strategy and tactics of a party's counsel, even if it prepares the way for an adverse ruling, even though the adversary has himself failed to cite the correct law, the lawyer is required to disclose law favoring his adversary when the court is obviously under an erroneous impression as to the law's requirements.
Forum, 788 So.2d at 1062 (footnote omitted).
3. Boca Burger's defense of the order
We now examine counsel's actions in this case. A lower court's decision to impose sanctions is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See Harless v. Kuhn, 403 So.2d 423, 425 (Fla.1981) (noting that "[i]n the absence of an abuse of discretion the sanctions imposed by [a] judge should stand"). As explained above, an appellate court only has authority to impose sanctions under section 57.105 for conduct occurring in the appellate court. Conversely, the trial court should determine any sanctions for conduct occurring in that court. Therefore, we quash that part of the district court's decision that imposes sanctions for conduct that occurred in the trial court. The district court is free to remand the issue of trial court sanctions to the circuit court for consideration.
We are perplexed by the dissent's accusation that we have "overlooked or failed to consider the trial transcript record" as it relates to this issue. Dissenting op. at 27. We have, of course, thoroughly examined that record. But our disposition of this issue — quashing the district court's order insofar as it imposes sanctions for counsel's trial court conduct — renders moot any discussion of counsel's conduct in that court. The dissent may well be correct that such sanctions would be inappropriate. As we have explained, however, that determination must first be made by the trial court.
We must now determine whether the district court abused its discretion in imposing sanctions for conduct that occurred on appeal. We have encountered difficulty in doing so, however. The vast majority of the district court's opinion discusses counsel's representations in the trial court, not on appeal; it appears that the district court imposed sanctions primarily for conduct that occurred in the trial court. Therefore, we cannot determine whether the district court intended to impose sanctions for any conduct that occurred on appeal. We therefore remand to the district court for it to reconsider its order imposing sanctions, addressing only conduct on appeal. In so doing, we neither approve nor disapprove the imposition of sanctions.
The dissent protests that the district court should not be allowed to impose sanctions for the conduct on appeal, because it was "incorrect on multiple important legal issues it has addressed." Dissenting op. at 29. But whether the district court may impose sanctions depends not on its decision, which we have before us and have reviewed, but rather on counsel's conduct. The dissent suggests that counsel did have a good-faith basis for each representation it made on appeal. We have not asserted otherwise. Our remand to the district court merely recognizes that the issue should be decided by the court before which relevant conduct occurred.
III. CONCLUSION
We approve that part of the district court's opinion holding that a plaintiff has an absolute right to amend the complaint once as a matter of course before a responsive pleading is served. It therefore follows that leave of court is unnecessary to amend a complaint for the first time before the defendant has filed an answer. We disapprove the district court's opinion, however, to the extent it holds that a preemption argument cannot be presented in a motion to dismiss. To the contrary, we hold that it can. Finally, we conclude that the district court had no authority to impose sanctions for the conduct of Boca Burger and its counsel in the trial court. Because we cannot determine how much, if any, of the district court's decision was based on counsel's conduct on appeal, we remand to the district court to consider that issue. If the district court does impose sanctions, it should state clearly whether its sanctions are to be imposed against Boca Burger itself, its counsel, or both. The court may also remand to the trial court to determine whether to impose sanctions for conduct that occurred in that court.
It is so ordered.
PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, and BELL, JJ., concur.
LEWIS, J., dissents with an opinion, in which QUINCE, J., concurs.
. The amended complaint alleges causes of action under the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(c) (2000), the FDUTPA, common law fraud and deceit, breach of contract, and breach of warranty.
. The Fourth District also cited Nenow v. Ceilings & Specialties, Inc., 151 So.2d 28 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963), as another of the "earlier cases." Nenow followed Volpicella's holding that the right to amend is not absolute. It interpreted Volpicella as holding that the right terminates upon a judgment of dismissal and that subsequent amendment is committed to the trial court's discretion. Id. at 30-31. In this case, Forum clearly amended the complaint before dismissal, and the Fourth District did not address whether the absolute right to amend the complaint terminates with dismissal. Neither do we.
. The third sentence of the rule was added in 2003 and is not at issue in this case.
. This approach is consistent with the rationale underlying the "abuse of discretion" standard that governs appellate review of a trial court's decision regarding sanctions. See, e.g., Mercer v. Raine, 443 So.2d 944, 945-46 (Fla.1983) (holding that a trial court's order granting sanctions should be reviewed using an abuse of discretion standard). That rationale emphasizes "the superior vantage point of the trial judge" as "essential to the just and proper application of procedural rules," id., and applies equally to our holding that appellate courts do not have authority to award sanctions for conduct that occurred in the trial court. "[I]t is the responsibility of the trial court, and not the appellate courts, to manage and control the trial process, including the application of sanctions for serious abuses." Tramel v. Bass, 672 So.2d 78, 83 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).
. The State conceded error in the following opinions published since the beginning of 2004: Brown v. State, 893 So.2d 714 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005); Santiago v. State, 893 So.2d 688 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005); Washington v. State, 890 So.2d 1276 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005); King v. State, 891 So.2d 1067 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); Card v. State, 889 So.2d 175 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); Walker v. State, 886 So.2d 1007 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004); Long v. State, 886 So.2d 280 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004); Stewart v. State, 884 So.2d 500 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004); Wilson v. State, 884 So.2d 74 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); Ellis v. State, 881 So.2d 685 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004); B.L.J. v. State, 880 So.2d 1290 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004); Taylor v. State, 880 So.2d 704 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); Hansell v. State, 879 So.2d 646 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004); McGill v. State, 878 So.2d 1270 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004); Washington v. State, 876 So.2d 1242 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); Williams v. State, 876 So.2d 27 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004); McGough v. State, 876 So.2d 26 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004); Turner v. State, 875 So.2d 731 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); Demps v. State, 874 So.2d 737 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004); Johnson v. State, 873 So.2d 558 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004); Carmona v. State, 873 So.2d 348 (Fla. 5th DCA), review denied, 888 So.2d 17 (Fla.2004); Botarf v. State, 867 So.2d 1280 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004); Henderson v. State, 867 So.2d 641 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004); Bakarania v. State, 867 So.2d 638 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004); Washington v. State, 867 So.2d 626 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); Frett v. State, 864 So.2d 577 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).
. Since the beginning of 2003, the following civil cases have been published in which the appellee conceded error: Torres v. Serv. Mgmt. Sys. & Gallagher Bassett Servs., Inc., 890 So.2d 1239 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005); Sherwood v. Quietwater Entm't, Inc., 888 So.2d 734 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004); Alpert v. Alpert, 886 So.2d 999 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); Houchins v. State Farm Ins. Co., 881 So.2d 62 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004); Dellicarpini v. Kerr, 873 So.2d 536 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004); Gundotra v. Gundotra, 859 So.2d 533 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), review dismissed, 872 So.2d 899 (Fla.2004); Christ v. Christ, 854 So.2d 244 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003); Burton v. Burton, 851 So.2d 861 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003); Yorke v. Yorke, 848 So.2d 1215 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003); Low Cost Auto Pawn, Inc. v. Greco, 851 So.2d 768 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Am. Home Assur. Co. v. Rosen Bldg. Supplies, Inc., 854 So.2d 666 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003); Channel 68 Marina, Inc. v. Gilliams, 842 So.2d 1017 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); Harris v. Kelly, 835 So.2d 1262 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003).
. We note, however, that the dissent has not eliminated every basis upon which the trial court could impose sanctions. It is unclear whether counsel acted in good faith when it opposed the amendment of the complaint without leave of court, citing an inapplicable federal district court case from Michigan, which involved the federal rather than Florida rules of civil procedure, and an inapplicable Florida district court case, in which the trial court's denial of leave to amend an answer was reversed as an abuse of discretion. See Forum, 788 So.2d at 1058 (citing Horal, 667 So.2d at 967). Although Volpicella, 136 So.2d at 232, arguably might have lent some support to counsel's position, we see no evidence that counsel relied on that case at the trial court level. Because we have quashed the district court's order, we have not focused on counsel's argument on this issue.