Case Name: DAVIES v. GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1978-04-19
Citations: 91 Mich. App. 347
Docket Number: Docket No. 29555
Parties: DAVIES v GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY
Judges: Before: D. F. Walsh, P.J., and R. M. Maher and Beasley, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 91
Pages: 347–356

Head Matter:
DAVIES v GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY
Docket No. 29555.
Submitted January 5, 1978, at Grand Rapids.
Decided April 19, 1978.
Archie Davies, a passenger in an automobile, was injured when a tire failed on a truck immediately ahead, the truck slowed to leave the roadway, and the car in which Davies was riding struck the rear of the truck. Davies brought an action for damages against Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, the manufacturer of the tire. The Kent Circuit Court, George V. Boucher, J., entered a judgment on a jury verdict of no cause of action. Plaintiff appeals, alleging that the trial court should have instructed the jury to find that the tire was not reasonably fit for its anticipated use, because testimony that the tire’s failure resulted from a manufacturing defect was uncontradicted. Held:
The plaintiff established a defect in the tire, required to be proved in a case based upon a breach of implied warranty, the theory upon which the case was submitted to the jury. Where the testimony regarding a fact is undisputed the jury should be instructed to find that fact in accordance with that testimony.
Reversed and remanded.
Beasley, J., dissented. He would hold that where the undisputed testimony was that of an expert witness who expressed an opinion, as occurred in this case, it constitutes an exception to the general rule that where the testimony regarding a fact is not disputed the jury should be instructed to find that fact in accordance with the testimony. He would affirm.
References for Points in Headnotes
63 Am Jur 2d, Products Liability §§ 3, 98, 114.
63 Am Jur 2d, Products Liability §§ 15, 63.
75 Am Jur 2d, Trial § 493.
76 Am Jur 2d, Trial § 1202.
30 Am Jur 2d, Evidence §§ 1080, 1083.
81 Am Jur 2d, Witnesses §§ 656, 657.
Credibility of witness giving uncontradicted testimony as matter for court or jury. 62 ALR2d 1191.
31 Am Jur 2d, Expert and Opinion Evidence § 183.
Opinion of the Court
1. Products Liability — Breach of Implied Warranty — Proof — Defect — Injury.
A plaintiff in a products liability case based on a theory of breach of implied warranty must prove a defect in manufacture and injury or damage caused by or resulting from that defect in order to prevail against the manufacturer.
2. Products Liability — Breach of Implied Warranty — Proof — Defect — Failure of Product.
A plaintiff has established the defect required to be proven in a products liability case based on breach of an implied warranty where he has proved that a particular defect in a product caused the product’s failure while it was being used for its anticipated or reasonably foreseeable purpose or use.
3. Trial — Instructions to Jury — Findings of Fact — Undisputed Testimony.
A jury should be instructed to find a fact in accordance with the testimony where the testimony regarding that fact is undisputed.
Dissent by Beasley, J.
4. Witnesses —• Assertions of Witnesses — Belief in Testimony.
A mere assertion by a witness does not, in itself, need to be believed, even though the witness is not impeached in any manner.
5. Witnesses —■ Expert Witnesses — Opinion Testimony — Undisputed Testimony.
The opinion of an expert witness, even though uncontradicted, is not conclusive or binding; the weight of such testimony is best left to the jury in its determination of an issue of fact.
Reamon, Williams, Klukowski & Craft, P.C., for plaintiff.
Wheeler, Upham, Bryant & Uhl, for defendant.
Before: D. F. Walsh, P.J., and R. M. Maher and Beasley, JJ.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
Plaintiff brought a products liability action to recover for injuries sustained as the result of the failure of a tire manufactured by the defendant. The case was submitted to the jury on a theory of implied warranty. Plaintiff appeals from a verdict of no cause of action.
The only issue on appeal is whether uncontradicted testimony that the tire's failure resulted from a manufacturing defect entitled the plaintiff to a jury instruction directing a finding that the tire was not reasonably fit for its anticipated use.
Defendant is a manufacturer of tires, one of which was sold to Great Lakes Express and installed. on the right front wheel of a cab tractor. As the tractor was hauling a trailer on 1-94, the tire's tread splice delaminated causing a portion of the tread to fall off the tire. When the truck slowed to pull off the roadway, it was struck from behind by an automobile in which plaintiff was a passenger. Plaintiff was seriously injured and filed this action seeking damages.
At trial, plaintiff presented expert testimony that the tire's failure was the result of a manufacturing defect—an open tread splice. In addition to describing the defect in detail, the expert witness also testified that his examination of the tire yielded no evidence of improper mounting or other condition that might have contributed to the tire failure. The opinions and conclusions of plaintiff's expert were corroborated by the report of an independent expert and of an expert in the defendant's employ.
The defendant rested without offering any proofs rebutting the above testimony and did not attempt to impeach either the testimony or the qualifications of plaintiff's expert, whereupon the plaintiff moved the trial court to instruct the jury that as a matter of law the evidence had established a manufacturing defect. The court denied the motion, ruling that in a products liability action based upon an implied warranty (the only theory submitted to the jury) the existence of a manufacturing defect was "irrelevant and immaterial".
We hold that the plaintiff was entitled to the requested instruction.
To prevail against a manufacturer in a products liability case on a theory of implied warranty, a plaintiff must prove (a) the defect in manufacture upon which he relies, and (b) injury or damage caused by or resulting from such defect. Kupkowski v Avis Ford, Inc, 395 Mich 155; 235 NW2d 324 (1975), Caldwell v Fox, 394 Mich 401; 231 NW2d 46 (1975), Piercefield v Remington Arms Co, Inc, 375 Mich 85; 133 NW2d 129 (1965). The import of the foregoing cases is that the gravamen of an implied warranty action is an injury caused by a manufacturing defect in a product.
It may be that not all manufacturing defects render a product unfit for its anticipated use. Hence, undisputed proof that a product was in some way defective would not always prove that the product was not reasonably fit for the use for which it was intended. However, when the plaintiff proves that a particular defect caused the product's failure while it was being used for its anticipated or reasonably foreseeable purpose or use, he has established the "defect" required to be proven in an implied warranty action. See Mosier v American Motors Corp, 303 F Supp 44 (SD Tex, 1967), aff'd 414 F2d 34 (CA 5, 1969).
In the instant case, all the pertinent evidence attributed the tire's failure to a defect in manufacture. Where the testimony regarding a fact is undisputed the jury should be instructed to find that fact in accordance with that testimony. Douglas v Edgewater Park Co, 369 Mich 320; 119 NW2d 567 (1963), Dondero v Frumveller, 61 Mich 440; 28 NW 712 (1886), Bensinger v Happyland Shows, Inc, 44 Mich App 696; 205 NW2d 919 (1973). Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred in denying plaintiffs motion. The proofs established the existence of a manufacturing defect. The jury should have been so instructed.
Because the jury returned a general verdict for the defendant, we can only speculate as to the reasons for their decision. Therefore, we reverse. Smith v Jones, 382 Mich 176; 169 NW2d 308 (1969), Rouse v Gross, 357 Mich 475; 98 NW2d 562 (1959). Insofar as the existence of a manufacturing defect has been established as a matter of law, we remand for a new trial to determine the remaining factors relating to defendant's liability. See Bensinger v Happyland Shows, Inc, supra.
Costs to appellant.
The trial court was convinced that the evidence did establish that a defect existed and indicated its willingness to so instruct the jury in the context of an express warranty theory.
This statement harmonizes the language of the Supreme Court cases defining this cause of action with that of the pertinent standard jury instructions. SJI 25.23(a), (b).
See Holbert v Staniak, 359 Mich 283; 102 NW2d 186 (1960), Druse v Wheeler, 26 Mich 189 (1872). Defendant would have us exclude expert testimony from this rule. However, neither the above cases nor those cited by the defendant support such a distinction.