Case Name: THE ELIZA LINES
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1895-10-30
Citations: 199 U.S. 119
Docket Number: No. 12
Parties: THE ELIZA LINES.
Judges: 
Reporter: United States Reports
Volume: 199
Pages: 119–141

Head Matter:
THE ELIZA LINES.
CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT.
No. 12.
Argued April 11, 12, 13, 1905.
Decided October 30; 1895.
'A vessel bound on a voyage from Pensacola to Montevideo with a cargo of lumber under a charter party, “the dangers of the seas, fire and navigation always mutually excepted” was abandoned, justifiably, in consequence of dangers of the seas and was afterwards picked up by salvors and brought into Boston. The master who was at St. John was notified and claimed the vessel and cargo from the salvors, stating his intention to repair the vessel and complete the voyage, to which cargo-owners objected claiming that the voyage was abandoned and they were entitled to the cargo and obtained an order for its sale. The Circuit Court held that the master should have been allowed to complete the voyage and earn freight and charged the cargo-owners personally with the net freight. Held error, and that the abandonment of the vessel by the master and crew gave the cargo-owners the right to refuse to go on with the voyage and that they were not to be treated as guilty of breach of contract for preventing the continuance of the voyage by their refusing to do so and procuring the sale.
An open cessation of performance with the intent to do no more, even if justified, excuses the other party from further performance on his side.
The same principles which apply to the making of a contract apply to the breach of it, and to nonperformance of the conditions attached to the other side.
If there is no injustice it is desirable that the maritime law of this country and of England should agree.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Mr. L. S. Dabney, with whom Mr. F. Cunningham was on the brief, for Ward & Co., cargo-owners:
When a vessel has been abandoned at sea by the master and crew without any intention of returning to her, the owner of cargo has the right, before the carrier or Ms agents have regained possession of the cargo, to treat the contract of affreightment as abandoned and at an end, and to receive Ms cargo without becoming liable for any freight; and this although the abandoned ship and cargo are carried by salvors to the origmal port of destination. The Arno, 8 Asp. Mar. Law Cas. 5 (1895); S. C., 72 L. T. (N. S.) 621; The Cito, L. R. 7 P. D. 5 (1881); The Kathleen, L. R. 4 Ad. & Ecc. 269, 1874; The Leptir, 5 Asp. Mar. Law Cas. 411, 1885; S. C., 52 L. T. (N. S.) 768; The Argonaut, Shipping Gaz., Dec. 5, 1884, 775; The Elizabeth and Jane, 1 Ware, 41, 1823; S. C., 15 Fed. Cas. 478, Case No. 8,321; The Mansanito, 22 Fed. Cas. 594, Case No. 13,075, 1861; The James Martin, 88 Fed. Rep. 649, 1883; Dunnett v. Tomhagen, 3 Johns. 154, 1808; Post v. Robertson, 1 Johns. 24, 1806.
Aftc the renunciation of a continuing agreement by one party, the other party is at liberty to consider himself absolved from any further performance of it, retaining Ms right to .sue for damages sustained. Roehm v. Horst, 178 U. S. 1.
The carrier is not bound to resume the voyage.
The carrier is not bound to stipulate for the cargo or even .for Ms own ship. He can without any breach of contract leave the salvage proceedings to take their course and let his ship be sold to pay the salvage. The Nathaniel Hooper, 3 Sumn. 542.
The owner of cargo may stipulate for his cargo but he has no right to stipulate-for the sMp. If he find her derelict upon the high seas with his cargo on board, he has no right to take .possession of her except as a salvor: certainly not for the -purpose of completmg the carriage of his cargo. The Arno, supra.
The voyage of the Eliza Lines could not after the abandon ment by the master and crew be resumed, as concerns the cargo-owner, with the same character of a transaction of commerce.
As Ward & Co: had exercised the right to treat the contract of affreightment as at an end, and to receive their cargo, or to have it sold, without the payment of any freight, it follows that they are not liable personally and that no decree can properly be made against them personally. They are not hable upon any express contract and can be liable only upon an implied contract, to pay for benefits received by services rendered or to sacrifices made to save- their cargo. Flaherty v. Doane, 1 Lowell 148.
The bottomry bondholder, of course, had no personal claiip against Ward & Co. and the decree against Ward & Co. for bottomry must rest wholly upon the consolidation of the causes, and convenience in the distribution of the amount awarded against them.
One of the best established and beneficent powers of the Admiralty Court has always been that of ordering a sale' upon the happening of a maritime disaster, after hearing all persons concerned. This power has been exercised for the very purpose of settling the question of the necessity and taking the responsibility from the shoulders of any one interested in the adventure; and while it is oftenest invoked by the master in order to relieve himself from responsibility, as for instance in selling cargo to obtain funds to carry on the voyage, it may be invoked by a cargo-owner or by any one else who is interested. 2 Parsons on Ship. 338; Benedict’s Adm. Prac., 3d ed., § 299; The Fanny & Elmira, Edward’s Adm. Rep. 117; The Gettysburg, 5 Asp. Mar. Law Cas. 347; Janney v. Columbian Ins. Co., 10 Wheaton, 411, 418; Dorr v. Pacific Ins. Co., 7 Wheaton, 581; Dunlap’s Adm. Prac. p. 64.
When the master sells upon a marine disaster, even without any legal proceedings, if it be done bona fide for the benefit of all concerned, the sale is upheld as against all persons, even though as a matter of fact it turns out to have been unfortunate. The Amelie, 6 Wall. 18; Post v. Jones, 19 How. 150.
Yet in this case, when a sale has been made in a port of refuge by order of an admiralty court upon due proceedings, and after hearing all persons interested, the Circuit Court rules that it must be assumed to have been made, unless the cargo is technically perishable, in the interest of the party moving it, and that that party is liable for the consequences of it.
The grounds for the motion for a sale were well known and valid grounds, and grounds, on which the courts have frequently ordered sales. There is no absolute right in case of salvage to a delivery of the property on stipulation. 300 Tons of Iron Ore, 38 Fed. Rep. 36; The Nathaniel Hooper, 3 Sumn. 542, 562; The Mendota, 14 Fed. Rep. 358; The Kathleen, L. R. 4 Ad. & Ecc. 269; The Lion, 1 Sprague, 399.
In proceedings in rem the allowance of process is the act of the law, so that no damages are allowed for the arrest and detention of a vessel, unless there is bad faith or deceit practiced in suing out the warrant, or the suit is one that may be characterized as a malicious- prosecution. The Alex Gibson, 44 Fed. Rep. 371, 374; The Adolph, 5 Fed. Rep. 114; Kemp v. Brown, 43 Fed. Rep. 391; The Wasco, 53 Fed. Rep. 546; Henry Adm. p. 337. Where a sale pendente lite is fairly made upon a valid order of the court, to prevent the property being eaten up by charges, it protects all parties equally with the purchaser. Pollard v. Baker, 101 Massachusetts, 259; American Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 1 Blatchf. & H. 9; Kleber on Judicial Sales, § 2, p. 58 and cases cited.
Mr. John Lowell and Mr. James A. Lowell for Andreasen, master.
Mr. Harrington Putnam and Mr. Edward S. Dodge, with whom Mr. Frederic Dodge was on the brief, for the salvors and holders of bottomry bond :
In England when a vessel abandoned by the ship-owner owing to stress of weather is brought into harbor by salvors, the cargo-owner may elect to treat the contract of affreightment as at an end if the vessel has not come into the possession of the ship-owner again. The Kathleen, 2 Asp. M. C. 367; The Cito, 4 Asp. M. C. 468; The Argonaut, Shipping Gazette, 1884, 775; The Leptir, 5 Asp M. C. 411; The Arno, 8 Asp. M. C. 5. The injustice of this rule is obvious. Saunders, Maritime Law, p. 133. The ship-owner has net been at fault, as his abandonment of the vessel was caused by the excepted peril of the seas; but he must deliver up the goods without receiving freight, if the cargo-owner so desires, or he may be compelled to carry them on. The English cases do not rest on a sound basis. They overlook the true nature of a contract of carriage. In such a contract the ship-owner agrees to carry the goods to their destination; the cargo-owner agrees to pay the freight when the goods arrive. Hunter v. Prinsep, 10 East, 378, 394; The Arno, 8 Asp. M. C. 5, 6; Ellis v. Willard, 9 N. Y. 529, 532; The Tornado, 108 U. S. 342; and under this contract the perils of the sea are excepted. The law of carriage by sea rests on the basis of this simple contract. The ship-owner has the right to carry the cargo and the cargo-owner has the right to have it carried. The ship-owner may carry to the destination, Allen v. Mercantile Ins. Co., 44 N. Y. 437; the cargo-owner cannot get the goods at an intermediate port except by paying full freight. Schouler Bailments, 3d ed., sec. 528; 2 Parsons Contracts, 9th ed., p. 425; The Teutonia, 1 Asp. M. C. 32; Palmer v. Lorillard, 16 Johns. 348, 355; The Nathaniel Hooper, 3 Sumner, 542, 555; unless they are voluntarily given up for a less amount. 2 Parsons Contracts, 9th ed. p. 427; Smyth v. Wright, 15 Barb. 51; McKibbin v. Peck, 39 N. Y. 262; Hunt v. Haskell, 24 Maine, 339. The ship-owner has the right to complete the carriage and may have a reasonable time in which to repair his injured vessel or he may trans-ship and send the goods on in another vessel. Shipton v. Thornton, 9 A. & E. 314; The Soblomsten, L. R. 1 A. & E. 293; McGaw v. Ocean Ins. Co., 23 Pick. 405; Harrison v. Fortlage, 161 U. S. 57, 65.
• Ordinarily the. ship-owner keeps possession of the goods during carriage, but possession in him is not essential. He may forward the cargo in a vessel belonging to someone else if his vessel is injured, Shipton v. Thornton, 9 A. & E. 314; and he is entitled to freight though the voyage be only partly performéd by himself and completed by salvors or insurers. Hubbell v. Great Western Ins. Co., 74 N. Y. 246; Hughes v. Sun Mutual Ins. Co., 12 Daly, 45; S. C. 100 N. Y. 58.
Capture, by an enemy does not put an end to the right to freight, which is only suspended and revests in the ship-owner on recapture. Carver, Carriage by Sea, 3d ed., p. 274; The Copenhagen, 1 Rob. 289; Spafford v. Dodge, 14 Massachusetts, 65.
If the cargo-owner forcibly takes possession of the goods the right to freight is not thereby lost. Braithwaite v. Power, 1 N. Dak. 455.
The question of possession therefore is not one of the important things to be considered as the- rights of the parties to a contract of carriage do not depend on it.
When Andreasen left .the bark he had no thought of completing the voyage, but his thoughts not communicated to the cargo-owner had no effect on the relations between the parties and there was no absolute remuneration. Palmer v. Lorillard, 16 Johns. 348, 357. He had the right to carry the lumber to Montevideo. He never gave up this right. His excusable abandonment of the vessel was not a breach of the contract because it was a thing mutually expected and expressly allowed for. Cargo of the Bark Luteken, 6 Ben. 565, 569; Ellis v. Willard, 9 N. Y. 529; Roehm v. Horst, 178 U. S. 1, distinguished.
When the master rejoined his vessel the situation was the same as if he had not been obliged to abandon her but had put ‘ into a port of necessity. ‘'The question was whether he could repair his ship within a reasonable time and complete the voyage. He could do so and he was bound to do so. If he had refused so to do he could not' have recovered any freight at all. 2 Parsons Contracts, 9th ed., p. 427; Hunter v. Prinsep, 10 East, 378, 394; Portland Bank v. Stubbs, 6 Massachusetts, 422; Adams v. Haught, 14 Texas, 243; Welch v. Hicks, 6 Cowen, 504; but would have been liable in damages for breach of the con tract of carriage. Hill v. Wilson, 4 C. P. D. 329; Assicurazioni Generali v. S. S. Bessie Morris Co. (1892), 1 Q. B. 571.
The master was entitled to full freight without deductions. Ward & Co. are not entitled to any credits.
The question is, not what amount Andreasen has lost but what the liability of Ward & Co. is for having seized the goods. In cases where the injured party is insured it is no defense to the wrong doer that the insurance has been paid. Clark v. Wilson, 103 Massachusetts, 219; Chicago Co. v. Pullman Co., 139 U. S. 79.
Here the same rules should apply as have always been laid down in cases where the voyage was prevented by the cargo-owners. Shipton v. Thornton, 9 A. & E. 314, 335; Cargo ex Galam, Br. & Lush., 167; The Soblomsten, L. R. 1 A. & E. 293; The Nathaniel Hooper, 3 Sumner, 542, 555. The voyage was prevented by Ward & Co. and they are, therefore, liable to the ■same extent as other cargo-owners who have broken up a voyage which the ship-owner was willing to carry on.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Holmes
delivered the opinion of the court.
This case comes here by certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals. The decree in that court was made in a cause in which were consolidated four suits: A libel for salvage against the Eliza Lines, her cargo and freight; a libel for possession by the cargo-owners against the cargo; a libel by the master against cargo and cargo-owners for freight and general average, and a libel by a bottomry lender against the vessel and freight. The Eliza Lines, a Norwegian bark, was bound on a voyage from Pensacola to Montevideo with a cargo of lumber, under a charter party, " the dangers of the seas, fire and navigation always mutually excepted." It was abandoned, justifiably, in consequence of dangers of the seas, and was afterwards picked up by salvors and brought into Boston on September 19, 1889. The master was notified by the owners and came on from St. John, New. Brunswick, arriving on September 21. The cargo-owners (Ward & Co.) and the master both demanded possession of the cargo from the salvors, but the salvors retained possession and filed their libel for salvage on September 26. The next day the master filed a claim for ship and cargo and within an hour Ward & Co. filed their claim for the cargo as above mentioned. On October 5 the vessel was delivered to the master, and on October 18 the master moved for a delivery of the cargo to him upon stipulation in order to resume his voyage, while Ward & Co. moved that the cargo be sold on the ground that its value was rapidly diminishing by reason of charges and costs. The former motion was denied and the latter granted on November 16. On November 27 the master filed his libel for freight and general average. The Circuit Court, reversing the decision of the District Court, held that the master should have been allowed to complete the voyage and earn freight, and charged the cargo-owners personally with the net freight that would have been earned, with other particulars not necessary to mention. 61 Fed. Rep. 308; 102 Fed. Rep. 184. The decree was affirmed with a slight variation by the Circuit Court of Appeals. 114 Fed. Rep. 307.
The question is whether the abandonment of the vessel by the master and crew gave the cargo-owners a right to refuse to go on with the voyage in the circumstances disclosed; in other words, whether the cargo-owners properly were treated as guilty of a breach of contract for preventing the continuance of the voyage by their refusal and by procuring a sale. It will be noticed that the decree must stand on the ground that the contract was broken by the cargo-owners and that the ship-owners were entitled to recover under it, although the voyage was not completed. The decree was not upon a new contract such as it was attempted to set up in Hopper v. Burness, 1 C. P. D. 137, or upon the analogy of a quantum meruit at common law, which was expressly disavowed. The very foundation of a recovery upon the latter ground is that the express contract is out of the way, but that a benefit has been received which ought to be paid for. Therefore, in such a case the recovery cannot exceed the benefit, as often has been explained in the books. Gillis v. Cobe, 177 Massachusetts, 584; Keener, Quasi-Contracts, Ch. 4. See Flaherty v. Doane, 1 Lowell, 148, 150. In the case at bar, while the District Court allowed freight pro rata as a charge on the proceeds of the cargo, the Circuit Court of Appeals held the cargó-oWners personally for a sum much exceeding that amount, and therefore much exceeding the benefit actually received. It will not be necessary to consider the decree of the District Court, since that was not appealed from by the cargo-owners, and we shall not discuss the effect of the judicial sale, as it is not necessary in the view which we take.
• There is no doubt that the English decisions confidently assert the cargo-owners' right to refuse to go on. They may be read in the reports, and there is no need to do more than to refer to them. The Arno, 8 Asp. Mar. Cas. 5; The Leptir, 5 Asp. Mar. Cas. 411; The Argonaut, Shipping Gazette, Weekly Summary, Dec. 5, 1884, p. 775; The Cito, 7 P. D. 5; The Kathleen, L. R. 4 Ad. & Ec. 269. The only point which, they leave open is | whether, if the master should get the abandoned vessel and cargó back from the salvors before the cargo-owners had declared an election to end the contract, he might in that way revive his right to finish the voyage. On that point it is enough to say here that if the English rule is right, then, even if there is any such qualification to it, the exception must depend upon something more substantial than a few minutes' priority in filing a libel, when neither master nor cargo-owner has possession either of cargo or ship, as, plainly, neither had in this case.
The right of cargo-owners to treat the contract as. ended by the abandonment of the ship was asserted much earlier than the English cases by Judge Ware in The Elizabeth and Jane, 1 Ware, 41, S. C. 15 Fed. Cas. 478, Case No. 8321, and earlier still by Mr. Story before he became a justice of this Court, in his edition of Abbott on Shipping (1810), pp. 338, 512, citing Dunnett v. Tomhagen, 3 Johns. 154, and Mason v. Ship Blaireau, 2 Cranch, 240. We see nothing in The Nathaniel Hooper, 3 Sumner, 542, suffi cient to prove that he changed his .opinion. That case is cited in 3 Kent Comm., 13th ed. 228, along with Post v. Robertson, 1 Johns. 24, in which and in Dunnett v. Tomhagen, supra, the Supreme Court of New York and Chief Justice Kent took the same general view, subject to the question whether there might be a recovery on a quantum meruit when benefits were-accepted under the contract, in spite of a failure of complete performance. See Caze v. Baltimore Ins. Co., 7 Cranch, 358, 362. 3 Kent Comm. 229. Other cases are The Mansanito, 22 Fed. Cas. 594, No. 13,075. The James Martin, 88 Fed. Rep. 649. See also 3 Kent Comm. 196. In short, we are aware of no decision in this country or in England before the present case which casts any dojlibt upon the rule.
It was thought .by the Circuit Court and Circuit Court of Appeals that the doctrine so unanimously, sanctioned by so many of the most eminent judges of this country and of England is unjust, and the case was put of a long voyage nearly completed and the ship and cargo subsequently brought by salvors intact to the port of destination. But we are of opinion that there is no injustice in holding that what excuses the ship excuses the cargo, and that the rule is in accord with the general principles of contract. Subject to the question whether the cargo-owners broke their contract, it seems to us more unjust to charge them personally, in favor of- those who failed to complete the voyage as contemplated, with a sum much exceeding the benefit which the cargo-owners received from what was done. Of course it is desirable, if there is no injustice,' that the maritime law of this country and of England should agree.
To begin at a. distance, a repudiation of a contract,-amounting to a breach, warrants the other party in going no further in performance on his side. Roehm v. Horst, 178 U. S. 1. But the same thing is true of an absolute repudiation not amounting to a breach. Frost v. Knight, L. R. 7 Ex. 111, 113; Phillpotts v. Evans, 5 M. & W. 475, 477; Ballou v. Billings, 136 Massachusetts, 307, 309.
It appears to us and we shall try to prove that an abandon ment'of the ship must be.regarded as a renunciation of the contract, even if not a repudiation of its terms as binding. It is an overt act which is more than an attempt to give up the voyage. It not merely makes the completion of the voyage so improbable, by. reason of the helplessness in which the ship is left and the intent with which the act is done, as practically to destroy the value of the contract to the cargo-owner-, see Swift and Company v. United States, 196 U. S. 375, 396, it is a present failure to do what the contract requires, if the purposes of the contract are to be carried out. The requirement is shown by the fact that the'abandonment would be a cause of action unless justified. It not only-wbuld be a breach of c'ontract but.no one questions that it would authorize a rescission of the contract on the other side, which not every breach of contract does. That it would • authorize rescission or refusal to allow the master to change his mind if the vessel was saved shows that a continuous intent aild'-effort to go on with the voyage is an essential condition to the obligation to pay freight. It shows, what needs no illustration, that the continuous care of the master is the main object of the cargo-owners' interest in the contract. By the general principles of contract an open cessation of performance with the intent to do no more, even if. justified, excuses the pther party from further performance on his side. The principle is not peculiar to charter parties, it is illustrated in other parts of the law. See Roehm v. Horst, 178 U. S. 1.
In the case at bar the vessel was abandoned with the intent not to return to her or to complete the voyage. This is admitted, if admission be necessary, by the testimony of the master. Of course it is not disputed that the completion of the voyage and delivery of the cargo are absolute conditions to the undertaking to pay freight, by the express terms of the contract and the familiar rule of law. 3 Kent Comm. 220, 228. The master left ship and cargo to their fate, and we cannot doubt, although it was denied, that, after he had done so, if the cargo-owners had been the salvors they could have treated the voyage as at an end. The ground must be that the abandon ment was more than an attempt, or a mere.offer of rescission-which might be revoked by the master before acceptance, and that it was an unequivocal departure from the conditions which the contract imposed. If the abandonment had'been tmjustified and a breach of contract, of course it would not have ended the contract, but would have left the choice whether to end it or not to the cargo-owner. If justified, the simplest view would, be that it was so because the contract authorized the master to , end it when prevented from performance by perils of the sea, and that the contract was ended. But at all events, as control of the ship and voyage was given up and never regained, the abandonment at least gave, an irrevocable power to the cargo-owners to .decline to be further bound. See, in addition, to cases cited above, 3 Kent Comm. 196. The opposite view must be that the master still is bound to go on with the voyage notwithstanding his justifiable abandonment, if a chance should turn up, a view which leaves his duties in a very ambiguous shape, or else that the master has the choice, which gives the election to the party whose act has made the trouble, as against the party that has done nothing and has had nothing to say.
If it be true that if, on the other hand, the master had rejoined the ship before any one else had taken possession, or had got it back from the salvors before the cargo-owners had been heard from, he might have had a right to complete the voyage, the ground must be that the law would not insist on a technical breach of condition when there had been no substantial change of circumstances and no harm done.
The argument on the other side consists largely in the attempt to treat leaving the ship under stress of perils of the sea as not distinguishable on principle from being torn bodily away from it by tempest. This is one of the oldest fallacies of the law. The difference between the two is the difference between an act1 and no act. The distinction is well settled in the. parallel instance of duress by threats, as distinguished from overmastering physical force applied to a man's body and imparting to it the. motion sought to be attributed to him. In-the. former >case. there is a choice and therefore an act, no less when the motive commonly is recognized as very strong or even generally overpowering, than when it is one which would affect the particular person only,' and not the public at large. It has been held on this ground that duress created by fear of immediate death did not excuse a trespass. Gilbert v. Stone, Aleyn, 35; S. C. Style, 72; Scott v. Shepherd, 2 W. Bl. 892, 894. See Miller v. Horton, 152 Massachusetts, 540, 547. It has been held that a similar plea in the case of shipwrecked men at sea did not prevent the killing of' one of them from being murder. Queen v. Dudley, 14 Q. B. D. 273. See United States v. Holmes, 1 Wall. Jr. 1. It is clear that a contract induced by such fear is voidable only, not void, and that the ground of avoidance being like fraud, that the party has been subjected to an improper motive for action, when that motive has been created by a stranger and is unknown' to the party the contract stands. Keilwey, 154a, pl. 3. Fairbanks v. Snow, 145 Massachusetts, 153. So a conveyance induced by duress is operative until avoided and cannot be set aside when the property has passed to a purchaser without notice. Bainbrigge v. Browne, 18 Ch. D. 188, 197; 2 Williams, Vendor & Purch. 767; Clark v. Pease, 41 N. H. 414. The distinction is as old as the Roman law, Tamen coactus volui. D. 4. 2. 21 § 5. 1 Windscheid, Pandekten, § 80.
The same principles which apply to the making of a contract apply to the breach of it and to non-performance of the conditions attached to performance on the other side. The contract before us by construction provides that an abandonment of the voyage in consequence of the perils of the sea shall not be an actionable breach, but it equally provides that a completion of the voyage shall be an absolute condition to the right to freight. The same absoluteness attaches the further condition implied from the first that the effort to complete the voyage shall not be given up voluntarily, midway.
The argument urged to the effect that the cargo's liability to general average created a right to have the voyage finished, however it might have been otherwise, does not need an ex tended answer. The cargo-owners had the same right to treat the contract as ended as against a ship-owner who had cut down a mast that they would have had against one who had made no sacrifice for the common good. The contract is the supreme source of mutual rights, and cannot be overridden by the incidents of its performance..
The case was brought here by the cargo-owners to get rid, if possible, of the personal liability imposed by the Circuit Court. As- this court is of opinion that the personal liability should not have been imposed, no other question needs consideration here.
Decree reversed.