Case Name: Robert LAMBERT, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. WOLF'S, INC. et al., Defendants and Appellees
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1961-07-12
Citations: 132 So. 2d 522
Docket Number: No. 256
Parties: Robert LAMBERT, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. WOLF’S, INC. et al., Defendants and Appellees.
Judges: Before TATE, HOOD and CULPEP-PER, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 132
Pages: 522–533

Head Matter:
Robert LAMBERT, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. WOLF’S, INC. et al., Defendants and Appellees.
No. 256.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Third Circuit.
July 12, 1961.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 7, 1961.
Certiorari Denied Nov. 6, 1961.
Piccione & Piccione, by Peter C. Pic-cione, Lafayette, for plaintiff-appellant.
Davidson, Meaux, Onebane & Donohoe, by Richard C. Meaux, Lafayette, for defendants-appellees.
Before TATE, HOOD and CULPEP-PER, JJ.

Opinion:
HOOD, Judge.
This is a workmen's compensation suit instituted by Robert Lambert against his employer, Wolf's Inc., and its compensation insurer, in which plaintiff alleges that he is totally and permanently disabled as the result of an accident which occurred on February 12, 1959. After trial of the case on its merits judgment was rendered by the trial court rejecting plaintiff's demands, and plaintiff has appealed from that judgment.
Plaintiff concedes that he has received all of the compensation benefits due him from the date of the accident until March 11, 1959, and all parties agree that the sole question presented on this appeal is whether plaintiff has had any disability attributable to the accident from and after the last mentioned date.
The evidence shows that on February 12, 1959, while plaintiff was engaged in loading 100-pound sacks of dry milk into a truck, he fell between the truck and the loading dock. As a result of this accident he sustained a twisting injury to his back and abrasions on his right leg. In the petition it is alleged "that plaintiff's injuries and disabilities have been diagnosed as 'lumbo-sacral strain' and 'post traumatic neurosis,' " etc.
Immediately following the accident, plaintiff was sent to Dr. J. J. Fournet, a general practitioner, who treated him from that date until February 27, 1959, or a period of about fifteen days. On the initial examination Dr. Fournet diagnosed plaintiff's injury as a lumbosacral strain and abrasions of the right leg. He testified that at that time plaintiff's back "was slightly sore," that "he had very little back complaint," and that "in retrospect I think if it was a lumbosacral strain, it was a very mild one; in other words, I was not at any time impressed with his back." On a subsequent examination, made on February 16, or four days after the accident occurred, Dr. Fournet found no muscle spasm, and the examination otherwise was completely negative as to any back injury or disability. Plaintiff continued to complain of pain, however, so on February 27, Dr. Fournet referred plaintiff to Dr. William Meuleman, an orthopedic surgeon, for examination and evaluation. He explained his reasons for referring plaintiff to an orthopedic surgeon as follows:
"The reason I referred him was the reason he was complaining and I couldn't find anything to account for his complaints. In other words, Robert maintained that his back bothered him. He stated that he was unable, he felt that he was unable to do anything. He complained of that bitterly and I could find no objective findings to account for it and I felt personally, of course, it was giving an opinion, but I thought he was putting on most of his complaints. I wasn't at all impressed with his complaints."
Plaintiff did not keep his appointment with Dr. Meuleman and did not return to Dr. Fournet for any further examinations or treatment. Dr. Fournet testified that in his opinion, plaintiff had fully recovered by February 27, 1959, and that on that date he was able to return to his regular work.
Plaintiff consulted his brother's family physician, Dr. Phillip Purpera, a general practitioner, on March 5, 1959. Dr. Purpera examined plaintiff on that date and treated him continuously thereafter until June, 1960, when plaintiff discontinued coming to him. On the initial examination Dr. Purpera found muscle spasm in the lumbar region, and he concluded that plaintiff had a lumbosacral strain. Between March 5 and October 20, 1959, he found muscle spasm in the lumbar region on some of the examinations and failed to find it on others, but he testified that no muscle spasm has been found since the last mentioned date. He stated that on May 6, 1960, he measured plaintiff's legs for the first time and found about one inch atrophy in the left leg, which he attributed to non-use of that leg due to the back injury. Since October, 1959, Dr. Purpera states that plaintiff has had symptoms of depression, headaches and impotency, which he feels are indicative of a traumatic neurosis resulting from the injury of February 12, 1959, and are disabling. As we understand Dr. Purpera's testimony, he feels that plaintiff was disabled from the date of the accident until some time in October, 1959, because of a lumbo-sacral strain, and that since the last mentioned date he has been disabled because of a traumatic neurosis and a weakness of the left leg. In his opinion plaintiff has been disabled from performing heavy manual labor continuously since the date of the accident, and that this disability resulted from and is attributable to the accident.
During the time Dr. Purpera was treating plaintiff, he referred plaintiff to severa" other doctors, who specialized in particular fields of medicine, for examination, evalu ation and treatment. Included among these specialists were Dr. James Gilly, Dr. Nick J. Accardo, Dr. William L. Zink and Dr. William L. Kirkpatrick.
Dr. Gilly, an orthopedic surgeon, examined plaintiff initially on March 31, 1959, at Dr. Purpera's request. He found no muscle spasm, no atrophy of either leg (although he noted that plaintiff favored his right leg instead of the left), and the examination in all other respects was negative as to injury or disability. He concluded, and so advised Dr. Purpera, that plaintiff had fully recovered from any injury which he may have had and could return to work.
Dr. Gilly examined plaintiff again on June 9, 1960, at the request of counsel for defendants, and at that time the clinical and X-ray examinations were completely negative as to any injury or disability, as they were the first time Dr. Gilly saw him. No muscle spasm and no atrophy were found, although Dr. Gilly was particularly careful to examine for atrophy, since he had been advised that another doctor had found it to exist. He testified that he was positive there was no atrophy of either leg. He concluded that "there was no residual disability as a result of an injury in this examination," and that plaintiff "was capable of performing his usual and customary work."
Dr. Gilly examined plaintiff a third time on September 7, 1960, after the trial had started, and his findings and conclusions at that time were essentially the same as they had been on previous examinations. He testified that he "could find no residual orthopedic disability."
Dr. Accardo, an orthopedic surgeon of New Orleans, examined plaintiff on May 20, 1959, upon the recommendation of Dr. Purpera and at the request of plaintiff's counsel. The physical, neurological and X-ray examination which he made were negative as to injury or disability, and Dr. Accardo reported his conclusions to plaintiff's attorney, as follows:
"Opinion: It is my opinion that whatever injuries this patient originally suffered on February 12, 1959, that no longer does any original disability exist. It is my opinion that this patient has no orthopedic diagnosis at this time.
"As I believe the above, I have no recommendations to make as far as treatment is concerned. It is my opinion, from an orthopedic standpoint, this patient could return to his former occupation with no residual disability."
Dr. William L. Zink, a surgeon, examined plaintiff on June 13, 1960, at the request of Dr. Purpera, and he treated plaintiff from that date until September 6, 1960. The record shows that he saw plaintiff a total of six times. On the first examination Dr. Zink found atrophy in plaintiff's left thigh, ranging from a little more than one-quarter to about three-quarters of an inch in measurement, although the calf of the left leg was larger than that of the right while plaintiff was in a standing position. He stated that a large varicose vein in the left calf region, with the usual swelling which accompanies it, could account for this difference in calf measurements. The difference in leg measurements, he feels, indicates that plaintiff has favored his left leg, or has used it less that he has the right. He also found some spasm of the lumbar muscles on the left, and a slight irregularity of the eleventh and twelfth ribs on the left, although he stated that "a rib fracture is not identified." He concluded from this examination that plaintiff "sustain a strain to his back musculature and that this may have been of sufficient magnitude to have fractured his eleventh and twelfth ribs on the left, thus accounting for the irregularity of the cortex of the eleventh and twelfth ribs now apparent on X-rays on the left as compared with the right side."
Dr. Zink concluded that plaintiff was disabled, but it appears to us that that conclusion was based on the assumption that the atrophy which he found in plaintiff's left leg was due to the accident, and that plaintiff's subjective complaints of pain in his back were genuine. In our opinion the following excerpts from Dr. Zink's testimony are significant:
"Well, on the examination as to disability estimate, I never gave any estimate on his disability. I don't know how much percent wise disability would be considered as having as a result of his leg being smaller on one side and the soreness in his back.

"Well, I considered his complaints genuine so I thought he was disabled when I saw him, but I really didn't go into the disability evaluation very deeply.
*
"A. I feel like his disability as far as I could determine was his complaint of his pain in his back and this area which is not an objective thing, and I feel that the disability is due to the weakness of his leg which is objective by measurement.
"Q. In other words, the only evidence of disability was this atrophy that you found on the thigh? A. Which I feel is a result of his back injury.
"Q. Of his back injury? A. Yes.
"Q. And what back injury is that? A. When he had the strain and broke his ribs."
We feel that Dr. Zink was in error in assuming that the muscle strain which plaintiff sustained on February 12, 1960, was sufficient to fracture two of his ribs. The evidence shows that plaintiff did not complain of pain in the area of the ribs at any time within at least one year following the accident, and Dr. Zink concedes that if plaintiff made no such complaints during physical examinations made by several doctors in February, March and May, 1959, then "the condition did not exist." Also, it seems to us that Dr. Zink is not justified in assuming that the atrophy which he found in plaintiff's left leg was attributable to the accident, because plaintiff himself testified that it was his right leg which he favored. Dr. Kirkpatrick, whose testimony will be discussed later, reported that plaintiff complained of weakness of the right leg in November, 1959. On March 31, 1959, plaintiff complained to Dr. Gilly of pain "in the right groin radiating toward the right knee." And, Dr. Accardo reported that plaintiff was "favoring neither of the lower limbs" on May 20, 1959. Also, Dr. Zink states that the varicose vein which he found in the calf of plaintiff's left leg, and which is not attributable to the accident, could have caused plaintiff to favor that leg and thus bring about the atrophy in plaintiff's left thigh.
Plaintiff also was admitted to the Veterans Administration Hospital in Alexandria, Louisiana, where he was treated from July 8 to July 28, 1959. The hospital reports, which were admitted in evidence by stipulation, reveal that no muscle spasm in the lumbar region and no atrophy of either leg were found. His condition was diagnosed as "myalgia (subjective symptoms only) lumbar muscles." Dr. Gilly explains that this diagnosis means simply that the patient complains of pain in the muscles but nothing objective could be found to support those complaints. While in the hospital plaintiff was treated by rest on a fracture board, muscle relaxants and physical therapy. The hospital reports then show that: "The above recommended treatment was continued and the pains in the back soon subsided. As no further hospitalization indicated patient is to be discharged and may resume his usual activities. Patient is discharged."
Dr. William L. Kirkpatrick, a neuro-psychiatrist, examined plaintiff on November 2 and again on November 9, 1959, at the request of Dr. Purpera. As a result of these examinations he found that plaintiff "was definitely disabled by virtue of his psychiatric condition to do any heavy work at that time." Plaintiff was referred back to Dr. Kirkpatrick on May 31, 1960, and he has been treated by that doctor for tension, nervousness and depression since that time. Dr. Kirkpatrick testified that in his opinion plaintiff has a post traumatic neurosis which is attributable to the accident of February 12, 1959, and which disables him from performing the type of work he had been performing before the accident. His testimony, in part, is as follows:
"I felt, as my letter shows, that this man did have a definite post traumatic neurosis. It appears I feel definitely, according to the evidence that I have in my records, that apparently it was precipitated by his injury and the circumstances following it. He had several disappointments after this. He did not receive any compensation except for one week following this, and this resulted in his worrying about income. The doctors that he went to see didn't seem to find anything definitely bad with him, which worried him even further. He attempted to get on Welfare to help his family and the Welfare turned him down because of State regulations, that he was a compensation case. He also went back and attempted to go back to work and was refused the opportunity to at least give it a try, and later on his wife had to go to work to help support the family, which more or less relegated him to the household, and I think all of these factors combined helped to prolong and intensify this neurosis that I feel he has."
Dr. Kirkpatrick's diagnosis was based upon the claimant's history and upon his observation of what he denoted as "definite objective findings that you can see in any neurosis, such as anxiety in all of its forms, such as extreme tremulous shaking, excessive sweating, extreme restlessness, very anxious appearance to the face, a lack of ability to comprehend, and usually an anxious person has impairment of memory capacity. We can pick up some definite objective signs, which when we tie them all together gives a positive diagnosis He further testified as follows:
"Q. What anxiety did he express or did he demonstrate when you saw him and treated him ? A. Well, he seemed to have the appearance of a person who is afraid, anxiety actually in a neurotic is fear, but it is fear with nothing external to be afraid of, so apparently the fear comes from inside; he appeared afraid. He was restless; he was nervous and obviously tense. He complained of headaches with tightness over the back of the neck, which is a common symptom of a tense headache that occur in neurotics. The neck muscles tighten up in tension to almost as hard as a board and very painful sometimes with those headaches. I think that is the main aspects of it.
"Q. You found these signs of anxiety in Robert Lambert in your examinations ? A. I found them in some of my examinations. They weren't present in all."
The evidence shows that plaintiff worked on Saturdays at a service station from about the last week in August, 1959, until the latter part of April, 1960. His duties in that job were primarily to wash cars, but he also serviced cars with gasoline, wiped windshields, swept floors of automobiles and repaired tires occasionally. After leaving his service station job, plaintiff obtained work picking up trash, and he was still doing that type of work at the time of the trial. He testified, however, that he works only two days a week, about an hour and a half each day, at that job, and that his back pains him while he performs those duties. Plaintiff further testified that he could not stoop down at all and that he could not bend his body forward very much at the waist. He, in fact, demonstrated to the court that he could bend forward only until the tips of his fingers reached a point about three inches above his knees, and he testified that he could bend no further. Later, during the trial, plaintiff stated that he could bend a little farther down by extending one of his feet forward, and-he then demonstrated that regardless of the position which he assumed he could not under any circumstances bend down farther than to barely permit his hand to touch his knee.
Defendants produced some moving pictures, taken by private investigators employed by defendants, showing some of the work performed by plaintiff on four different Saturdays in April, 1960, at the service station where he worked. Plaintiff, of course, was not aware of the fact that these pictures were being taken. These pictures, together with the testimony of the two private investigators who were present when they were taken and that of the owner of the service station, establish that plaintiff at that time could bend his body to a much greater extent than he testified and that he could lift heavy objects with apparent ease, including 140-pound sacks of terrazzo chips and a 70-pound wheel and tire. In these moving pictures plaintiff unwittingly demonstrated that he could bend his body forward with his legs kept straight until his hands touched the ground, and that he could lift substantial weights while in that bending position.
We are mindful of the fact that evidence in the form of moving pictures must be used with great caution, because such pictures show only very brief intervals of the activities of the subject, they do not show rest periods, they do not reflect whether the subject is suffering pain, and they do not show the after effects of his activities. Gagliano v. Boh Bros. Const. Co., La.App. Orl., 44 So.2d 732; Costanza v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co., La.App. 3 Cir., 124 So.2d 621, certiorari denied; 2 Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, Sec. 79.74, page 311. In this case, however, the moving pictures are supported by the testimony of two private investigators to the effect that they observed plaintiff performing the same type of duties as were shown in the picture over sustained periods of time with little or no rest, and by the testimony of the owner of the service station to the effect that plaintiff customarily performed his duties at the station as shown in the motion pictures. In our opinion these pictures and this testimony completely refute plaintiff's statements as to his inability to bend his body forward to any great extent and as to his inability to lift heavy obj ects.
A review of all of the evidence convinces us, as it did the trial judge, that plaintiff fully recovered from his leg and back injuries before March 11, 1959, and that he has not been physically disabled since that time.
Although we recognize that a post traumatic neurosis may be disabling and in a proper case may be compensable, the evidence in this case does not convince us that plaintiff is disabled from any such condition. We base that conclusion to some extent on the fact that plaintiff incorrectly represented to the trial court that his ability to bend his body forward was very limited, and we assume that he also greatly exaggerated his complaints during the course of examinations given by the doctors who diagnosed his condition as being neurotic in nature. Such a diagnosis was made largely upon the assumption that plaintiff's subjective complaints were genuine.
Assuming, however, that plaintiff is presently disabled because of an anxiety neurosis, as found by Dr. Kirkpatrick, we feel that the evidence fails to establish a causal connection between his present disability and the accident which occurred on February 12, 1959. Dr. Kirkpatrick indicated that plaintiff's depression, despondency, nervousness and pain which "seems to be real to him," were brought about by a number of circumstances. Included among these were the development of impotency (which was not mentioned by plaintiff until November, 1959, and is not shown to have any causal connection with his employment), the fact that he had been seen by several doctors who could find nothing wrong with him, worry about his income, his failure to obtain Welfare assistance, and hostility toward his former employer. Although Dr. Kirkpatrick feels that the accident of February 12, 1959, was the "precipitating factor" which brought about the anxiety neurosis, it seems to us that any or all of the above mentioned circumstances, which also were factors in bringing about the neurosis, could have existed with the same result even though no accident occurred. Most of the circumstances which caused plaintiff to develop this neurotic condition occurred after plaintiff had fully recovered from his injury, and we think the evidence fails to establish a causal connection between the accident of February 12, 1959, and the neurosis which Dr. Kirkpatrick found to exist.
In our opinion plaintiff has failed to establish that he has been disabled since compensation payments were discontinued, or that the neurosis which he may now have is attributable to the accident which occurred during the course of his employment by defendant. The trial judge, therefore, correctly rejected plaintiff's demands.
Accordingly, for the reasons herein assigned, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. The costs of this appeal are assessed to plaintiff-appellant.
Affirmed.