Case Name: SOUTHERN PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant, v. M. D. PAINTER, as Administrator, etc., Respondent
Court: Supreme Court of California
Jurisdiction: California
Decision Date: 1896-06-06
Citations: 113 Cal. 247
Docket Number: No. 19532
Parties: SOUTHERN PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant, v. M. D. PAINTER, as Administrator, etc., Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: California Reports
Volume: 113
Pages: 247–258

Head Matter:
[No. 19532.
In Bank.
June 6, 1896.]
SOUTHERN PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant, v. M. D. PAINTER, as Administrator, etc., Respondent.
Vendor and Purchaser—Specific Performance—Failure of Title— Congressional Grant—Construction of Contract with Railroad Company—Determination against Patent—Counterclaim.—In an action by the Southern Pacific Railroad Company to compel specific performance of a contract for the sale of land, claimed by it under congressional grant, in which it was stipulated that in case it be finally determined that patent shall not issue to it for the land sold, it would refund all money paid under the contract, it is a defense to the action, and forms the basis of a counterclaim for the recovery of the money paid under the contract, that the lands contracted for were within the overlapping limits of the grant to the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company, and that it has been finally determined by the land department of the United States, and by the supreme court of the United States, that no patent should issue to the Southern Pacific Company for any land within those limits; and the contract is not to be construed as requiring a distinct final adjudication as to the specific tract agreed to be sold, which is but a small fraction of a very large tract claimed by the railroad company under the same title, but as contemplating a final decision of the question as to the railroad company’s right to the tract, including the lands contracted for.
Id.—Judicial Notice—Construction or Act oe Congress—Decision op United States Supreme Court.—All other courts are bound to take judicial notice of the decisions of the supreme court of the United States, and that it is the ultimate tribunal for interpreting and determining the effect of an act of Congress, and that its decision thereupon is binding upon all other courts.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, and from an order denying a new trial. Lucikn Shaw, Judge.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
J. D. Redding, and John S. Mosby, for Appellant.
If the supreme court of the United States has decided that the railroad company has no title to the section of land sold to Painter, this must be proved as a fact by the production of a properly certified copy of the record under seal. No such evidence has been offered, and the court cannot know the fact judicially without legal proof. (Greenleaf on Evidence, secs. 501, 502.) Whenever it shall have been “finally determined ” that the corporation has no title to the two sections of land sold to Painter, the defendant’s right of action will accrue. (Baltimore etc. R. R. Co. v. Polly, 14 Gratt. 460; Condon v. South Side R. R. Co., 14 Gratt. 302.) A final determination as to the title must mean a judgment that is conclusive of the rights of the parties in the subject matter of a writ. (Washington etc. Packet Co. v. Sickles, 24 How. 333; Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations, 60.) There has been no such final adjudication as to the title of the United States to the Painter land. When the United States supreme court renders a decision in the case of United States v. Painter (No. 184), it will be such a final determination of the question. (Holmes v. Ricket, 56 Cal. 312; 38 Am. Rep. 54; Allen v. Pockwitz, 103 Cal. 85; 42 Am. St. Rep. 99; Anvil Min. Co. v. Humble, 153 U. S. 553; Sheffield etc. Ry. Co. v. Gordon, 151 U. S. 292.) The decision of the United States supreme court in the case of United States v. Southern Pac. R. R. Co., 146 U. S. 570, does not include or affect the lands in controversy herein. (Graham v. La Crosse R. R. Co., 3 Wall. 704; 87 Am. Dec. 517; 73 Am. Dec. 565; Barnes v. Chicago etc. Ry., 122 U. S. 14; Johnson Co. v. Wharton, 152 U. S. 261; Schuler v. Israel, 120 U. S. 506; Freeman on Judgments, sec. 542; 1 Greenleaf on Evidence, sec. 530; Davis v. Brown, 94 U. S. 428; Russell v. Place, 94 U. S. 608; Bigelow v. Winsor, 1 Gray, 299; Cromwell v. Sac County, 94 U. S. 351; Stryker v. Goodnow, 123 U. S. 527.)
A. R. Metcalfe, and Anderson & Anderson, for Respondent.
The facts show that these lands are within the granted limits of the Atlantic & Pacific Railroad Company, under its grant under the act of Congress of July 27,1866, and the supreme court of the United States has decided that plaintiff has no title whatever to lands so situated. (United States v. Union Pac. Ry., 148 U. S. 570.) The facts in this case being identical with the facts of United States v. Union Pac. Ry., supra, the law of that case is applicable to and controls this case, and is binding upon this court. United States v. Union Pac. Ry., supra, is a direct and final decision between the two parties entitled to litigate the matter, as to the status of a class of lands, and they are the very parties contemplated by the contracts in this case between whom it was to be “determined” whether “ patent shall issue to the party of the first part” for the lands in this controversy. And the lands in this controversy belong to said class. This court, upon mere suggestion, will take judicial notice that the supreme court, in a suit between the plaintiff and the United States, decided that none of the land within the granted limits of Atlantic & Pacific Company passed to the plaintiff under its grant of March 3, 1871, and that it has no title to any of said lands. (Code .Civ. Proc., sec. 1873, subd. 3; Kreiger v. Shelby R. R. Co., 125 U. S. 39.) It is the question which is decided which operates as an adjudication, not necessarily the identity of the property, and the rule is the same whether the subject matter is land or certain bonds embraced within a larger issue. (Bissell v. Spring Valley Tp., 124 U. S. 225; Washington etc. Packet Co. v. Sickles, 24 How. 333; Baxter v. Myers, 85 Iowa, 328; 39 Am. St. Rep. 298; Cromwell v. Sac County, 94 U. S. 351; Stout v. Lye, 103 U. S. 66; Morgan v. Beloit,7 Wall. 613; Harshman v. Knox County, 122 U. S. 306; Campbell v. Rankin, 99 U. S. 261; Wiggins Ferry Co. v. Ohio etc. Ry. Co., 142 U. S. 396; Southern Minnesota etc. Ry. Co. v. St. Paul etc. R. R. Co., 55 Fed. Eep. 690; 6 Land Decisions, 816, 819.)

Opinion:
Harrison, J.
The plaintiff entered into two several contracts with the defendant's intestate August 18,1887, for the sale to the latter of two designated sections of land in the county of Los Angeles. The land described in the* agreements was claimed by the plaintiff as a portion of a grant to it by the United States by virtue of the act of March 3, 1871. At the date of the agreements no patent had been issued therefor, and each of the agreements contained the following covenant:
"In case it be finally determined that patent shall not issue to said party of the first part for all or any of the tracts herein described, it will upon demand repay (without interest) to the party of the second part all moneys that may have been paid to it by him on account of any such tract as it shall fail to procure patent for."
The defendant's intestate paid to the plaintiff twenty per cent of the purchase money, with one year's interest upon the remainder, at the execution of the agreements, and by their terms was to pay the balance of the purchase money, with interest thereon at the rate of ten per cent per annum, on or before August 18, 1892. No nation of the question, the plaintiff's liability under the covenant would be also determined; and that, if that question was determined adversely to the plaintiff, it .would thereupon repay the money. In the case of United States v. Southern Pac. R. R. Co., supra, the question for determination was the right of the plaintiff herein to any of the lands within the limits of the grant to the Atlantic & Pacific Railroad Company, under the act of July 27,1866, and the court then held that it had no right to any of those lands, and that the act of 1871 gave no right thereto. Upon the stipulation in the present case, that the lands described in the agreements are within the limits of the grant of July, 1866, and that the plaintiff has no title or claim thereto save that derived under the act of March 3, 1871, the superior, court had no alternative than to apply the law as thus declared by the supreme court of the United States, and to hold that the question of the plaintiff's right to a patent for said lands had been finally determined adversely to the plaintiff. The supreme court of the United States is the ultimate tribunal for interpreting and determining the effect of an act of Congress, and all other courts are bound to take judicial knowledge as well of its interpretation of the act as of the act itself. The interpretation and construction of an act of Congress by the supreme court is determinative of the law which Congress has enacted, and is binding upon the judiciary of the several states, as well as of the United States; and the courts of the several states take judicial notice of the opinions of the supreme court of the United States, and of the law as declared therein, in the same way, and to the same extent, that the superior courts of this state take judicial notice of the opinions of this court.
The judgment and order are affirmed.
Garoutte, J., Temple, J., and Henshaw, J., concurred.