Case Name: S. T. STOCKHAM, J. E. HIETT, J. A. WEDDINGTON, R. L. NEWTON, and GEORGE HUTCHINSON, Appellants, v. LEWIS LEACH and O. W. FRUITS, Respondents
Court: Springfield Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1922-03-11
Citations: 210 Mo. App. 407
Docket Number: 
Parties: S. T. STOCKHAM, J. E. HIETT, J. A. WEDDINGTON, R. L. NEWTON, and GEORGE HUTCHINSON, Appellants, v. LEWIS LEACH and O. W. FRUITS, Respondents.
Judges: Farrington, J., concurs; Bradley, J., concurs in separate opinion.
Reporter: Missouri Appeal Reports
Volume: 210
Pages: 407–419

Head Matter:
S. T. STOCKHAM, J. E. HIETT, J. A. WEDDINGTON, R. L. NEWTON, and GEORGE HUTCHINSON, Appellants, v. LEWIS LEACH and O. W. FRUITS, Respondents.
Springfield Court of Appeals,
March 11, 1922.
1. APPEAL AND ERROR: Replevin: Verdict in Replevin for Possession of Saw Mill for Plaintiffs, and for Damages on the Taking for Defendants, Held Contradictory, and Ground for Reversal of Entire Judgment. In an action for replevin of saw mill, in which defendants claimed damages on account of wrongful taking and preventing their carrying out a contract with plaintiffs to use the saw mill in sawing timber, a verdict giving plaintiffs possession of the saw mill, and for damages for defendants for the wrongful taking, was contradictory, and requires reversal of the entire judgment based thereon.
2. SpT-OFF AND COUNTERCLAIM: Claim not Existing at Time of Filing Suit Cannot be Used as Counterclaim, finder Revised Statutes 1919, section 1233, providing for filing a counterclaim existing at commencement of the action, in an action to replevin a saw mill purchased of plaintiffs, and on which they had a mortgage, damages suffered by defendants because taking the saw mill prevented fulfilling a contract to saw timber for plaintiffs, cannot be the basis of a counterclaim.
3. CHATTEL MORTGAGES: Cannot be Foreclosed as Long as Mortgagor Complies with Contract Made in Connection Therewith. Where a note for saw mill, due one day after date, to be paid by sawing timber, and a chattel mortgage to the seller of the saw mill, and a contract to saw timber for the seller, were a part of one transaction, the right of the seller to take possession of the saw mill in a replevin suit, and to foreclose the mortgage, depended not on the fact that the note was due, but on whether the accompanying contract concerning sawing the timber was being fulfilled.
4. REPLEVIN: Where Right of Defendants to Damages Depended on Wrongful Taking of Property, They Must Deny Plaintiffs’ Right to Possession. Where plaintiffs sold defendants a saw mill, for which they gave them a note secured by a mortgage, the plaintiffs after replevying the mill, sold it under the mortgage, defendants ’ right to damages in the replevin suit depended on the wrongful taking of the saw mill, and, to have any standing in court, they must deny plaintiffs’ right to possession.
5. CHATTEL MORTGAGE: Damages for Conversion is Value of Property Taken. In replevin suit where plaintiffs had sold the property under a chattel mortgage, if their aets amounted to conversion, defendants would have the right to have the value of the property assessed as on the date it was taken.
C. -: Measure of Damages for Conversion of Mortgaged Property by Mortgagee is Value of Interest of Mortgagor Therein. In a replevin suit for saw mill on which plaintiffs had a mortgage, under which they sold it, the measure of damages due the mortgagees is the difference between the full value of the property at the time it was taken and the amount the mortgagees owed on the note given for the purchase price.
7. CONTRACTS: Contract of Doubtful Meaning Will be Given Construction Making it Reasonable and Fair Between Parties. A contract of doubtful meaning will be given a construction, which makes it reasonable and fair between the parties, to the end that one party will not have an unfair advantage over the other.
8. REPLEVIN: Answer Claiming Damages in Replevin, Held not a Counterclaim. -In an action of replevin of a saw mill, where defendants claimed damages on account of being prevented from carrying out a contract with plaintiffs to saw certain timber, des ignation of the claim as a counterclaim was incorrect, since it was an answer in replevin containing a count for damages based on breach of contract.
9. -: Where Answer Makes no Claim to Property, Judgment for its Value Cannot be Grifen. In replevin, where the answer makes no claim to the property, and no demand for its return, a judgment for defendants for the value of the property cannot be given, and the only judgment that can be rendered in their favor is for return of the property and damages sustained from the wrongful taking.
10. -: Verdict Held not in Proper Form. In a replevin suit for a saw mill, where possession was taken under the writ, a verdict that “We, the jury, find the issues for the plaintiffs for the return of the saw mill, all equipment thereto belonging,” was improper in form.
Appeal from Carter County Circuit Court. — Hon. E. P. Doris, Judge.
Reversed and remanded.
C. P. Turley, John L. Moore, and W. J. Orr for appellants.
(1) Since 1844 down to yesterday it has been the law of this State that after condition broken the mortgagee in a chattle mortgage becomes the absolute owner of and is entitled to the possession of the property mortgaged. Robinson v. Campbell, 8 Mo. 365; Citator to date. (2) The item allowed by the jury to the defendants was not a matter within the jurisdiction of the trial court in this replevin suit. Ely v. Sutton, 177 Mo. App. 556; Donohoe v. MeAleer, 37 Mo. 312.
W. N. Evans and Gary H. Yount for respondents.
(1) Where plaintiff claims damages for detention in replevin, defendants may plead and prove a counterclaim arising out of the same transaction against such claim for damages. Cobey on Replevin (2 Ed.), sec. 795; 34 Cyc., page 1417; Harvesting Co. v. Hill, 104 Mo. App. 544; Howard v. Haas, 131 Mo. App. 499; Small v. Speece, 131 Mo. App. 513. (2) Before the court can review the alleged errors the attention of the trial court must be called thereto in a motion for a new trial. State ex rel. v. Woods, 243 Mo. 25; State'v. Marshall, 36 Mo. 400; Long v. Towl, 41 Mo. 398; Maplegreen Co. v. Trust Co., 237 Mo. 365; Collins v. Saunders, 46 Mo. 389.

Opinion:
COX, P. J.
Replevin for possession of a saw mill and damages for misuse. Counterclaim for damages filed as an offset by defendants. Verdict for plaintiff for possession of the saw mill with no damages assessed and a verdict for defendants on their counterclaim for $589.97. Judgment in plaintiffs' favor for possession of the saw mill and a money judgment in defendants' favor against plaintiff for $589.97. Defendants have not appealed from the judgment in plaintiffs' favor for possession of the property. Plaintiffs have appealed from the money judgment against them.
The controversy in this case grew out of the following facts: Plaintiffs were the owners of 400 acres of timber land in Carter County and were desirous of having the timber sawed into railroad cross ties and lumber. They sold to defendants the saw mill involved in this action and in payment therefor took their note for $1150 due one day after date with a chattel mortgage on the saw mill as security. At the same time and as a part of the same transaction, the plaintiffs and defendants entered into a contract in writing by the terms of which defendants bound themselves to saw the lumber on the 400 acres of land owned by plaintiffs into ties and lumber and plaintiffs were to pay them $8 per. thousand feet therefor. The mortgage on the saw mill contained the following clause: "The parties of the second part agree that the party of the first part shall hold back the sum of Two Dollars ($2) per thousand (1000) of all lumber cut until the party of the first part shall receive in full payment of One-Thousand-One-Hundred-Fifty Dollars ($1150) and interest, the price of said mill fur nished by the said party of the first part." The written contract by which plaintiffs employed defendants to saw the timber on their land contained the same clause. Defendants had sawed 71,834 feet prior to January 5, 1921, and plaintiffs had paid therefor $514.64 and had applied $60.03 on the note. This paid for all that was sawed at that time. Plaintiffs on January 5, 1921, filed this suit in replevin for possession of the mill. The property was taken away from the possession of the defendants under the writ of replevin and delivered to plaintiffs. Afterward and before trial, the plaintiffs advertised and sold the mill under the chattel mortgage.
The petition was in the usual form alleging that plaintiffs were the owners and entitled to the possession of the property; that it was wrongfully withheld by defendant and had been damaged by misuse and asked judgment for possession of the property and damages.
The answer set up the fact that defendants had purchased a certain saw mill from plaintiffs and had executed their note therefor due one day after date and had executed a chattel mortgage to secure same, then pleaded that at the same time and as a part of the same transaction, the contract by which they were employed to saw the timber on plaintiff's land was executed and pleaded a breach of that contract by plaintiffs in that they had on January 5, 1921, taken possession of the mill and converted same to their own use without giving defendants a reasonable time in which to saw the timber on the 400 acres of land described in the contract and alleged that by reason of that breach and the defendants being prevented thereby from sawing the remainder of the timber, they lost profits amounting to $2400, and asked judgment for that amount. The answer did not ask a return of the property nor an assessment of its value.
Plaintiffs filed a reply admitting a sale of the saw mill to the defendants and the execution of the contract pleaded by defendants as a part of the same transaction, then alleged that defendants had failed to make pay ments on the note of $2, per thousand of lumber sawed and that defendants had failed to manufacture the lumber with dispatch and diligence and denied every other allegation of the answer.
It will be observed that by the pleadings, the parties have agreed that the sale of the mill and the execution of the note and chattel mortgage and the execution of the contract by which defendants had agreed to saw the timber on plaintiffs' land was all one transaction. The proof showed the same thing. The jury returned two verdicts. One for the plaintiffs as follows: "We, the jury, find the issues for the plaintiffs for the return of the saw mill all equipment thereto belonging" signed by ten jurors. The other verdict was for defendants and is as follows: "We, the jury, find the issues for the defendants and assess their damages at $589.97," signed by the same ten jurors. Neither of these verdicts can stand for they are directly opposed to each other. If plaintiff had the right to recover possession of the property, then defendants could recover nothing: If defendants were entitled to recover damages then plaintiff was not entitled to possession of the property. For the defects in these verdicts, the entire judgment will have to be reversed.
In view of another trial, we deem it best to express our views on what appears to us to be the issues attempted to be raised by the answer and reply. This record presents a peculiar situation. The petition is in the usual form and prays judgment for recovery of the property and damages. The answer does not deny plaintiffs' right to recover possession of the property, but alleges that they had bought a certain saw mill from plaintiffs and given a note for the purchase price due one day after date, and a chattel mortgage on the mill to secure the same, then pleads the contract by which they were employed to saw timber for plaintiffs, and a breach of that contract by plaintiffs and asks for damages on that account. Defendants do not allege that the mill they bought from plaintiffs and on which they had given the chattel mortgage, was the same mill that plaintiffs had taken from them; neither do they charge that plaintiffs took the mill under the writ of replevin in this case. The evidence, however, showed both of these facts.
Defendants' claim for damages cannot be upheld as a counterclaim in this case as they attempted to assert it because it did not exist at the time the suit of plaintiffs was filed against them. A counterclaim cannot be based on a right of action that accrued to a defendant after suit was begun against him. [Statutes 1919, sec. 1233; Meinche v. Brocksiesk, 14 Mo. App. 319; Todd v. Crutsinger, 30 Mo. App. 145; Reppy v. Reppy, 46 Mo. 571; Iler v. National Bank, 69 Mo. App. 64; Second Baptist Church v. Beecham, 180 S. W. 1065; Jansen v. Dolan, 157 Mo. App. 32, 137 S. W. 27.] If defendants had any right of recovery for damages as claimed in their answer it was as special damages resulting from a wrongful taking of the mill by plaintiffs in this suit and not as a counterclaim.
We think the note and chattel mortgage and the contract to saw the timber was all one transaction as stated by the parties in their pleadings in this case. That being true the plaintiffs' right to take possession of the property and foreclose their mortgage depended on whether the terms of the mortgage had been violated in some respect other than by a failure to pay the note, or whether the defendants were complying with the terms of the contract in sawing the timber. By the contract the plaintiffs had agreed that the note, which on its face was due one day after date, should be paid by sawing lumber and making payments out of what was coming to them for that service, and after having done that they could not foreclose the mortgage as long as defendants were complying with the contract.
The evidence shows that plaintiffs gave bond and took possession of the property and prior to the trial had sold it under the chattel mortgage. The property was therefore gone and could not be produced either at or after the trial. Under the facts as shown in this record defendants' right to claim any damages depended on the taking of the property by plaintiffs being wrongful, and to have any standing in court they must deny plaintiffs ' right to possession of the property. If the right of plaintiffs to possession is denied and defendants should win on that issue, then, since plaintiffs had sold the property their acts amounted to conversion and defendants would have the right to have the value of the property assessed as of the date it was taken. [Willison v. Smith, 60 Mo. App. 469; Rosentretor v. Brady, 63 Mo. App. 404; Wetsbay v. Milligan, 74 Mo. App. 179, 182; Jones v. Jones, 188 Mo. App. 220, 234, 135 S. W. 227; Forsee v. Zenner, 193 S. W. 975, 979.]
In assessing the value it should be confined to the value of defendants' interest therein, which would mean their interest over and above the amount due on the purchase price, if any. In other words, if plaintiffs' taking of the property was wrongful, then they should be charged with the full value of the property at the time they took it and defendants should be charged with what was still due and unpaid on the note given for the purchase price. If defendants should win as above stated on the question of the right of plaintiffs to possession of the property and could further show that they had been damaged as claimed by not being permitted to finish sawing the lumber they would be entitled to a further credit on that account. All these things should be taken into consideration and a balance struck between the parties and if the balance should be in favor of plaintiffs they would still be entitled to recover although their taking of the property was wrongful, but if the balance should be found to be in defendants' favor then they should recover for that amount. If it should be found that plaintiffs had the right to take possession of the property the defendants could not recover for any damages and there would be no occasion to. strike any balance.
The entire judgment, both in favor of plaintiffs and defendants, is reversed and the cause remanded.
Farrington, J., concurs; Bradley, J., concurs in separate opinion.