Case Name: Wm. Poag, adm'r., vs. Nancy Miller; Same vs. Joseph Black
Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1837-12
Citations: 1 Dud. 11
Docket Number: 
Parties: Wm. Poag, adm’r., vs. Nancy Miller; Same vs. Joseph Black.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Carolina Law Reports
Volume: 23
Pages: 11–16

Head Matter:
Wm. Poag, adm’r., vs. Nancy Miller; Same vs. Joseph Black.
Where the probate of a will has been set aside, the property of the deceased vests in the administrator, and he can recover it from any one in possession, or its value, from any one who has sold it.
It is no defence to the action, that the defendant is a bona fide purchaser, for a valuable consideration, from a legatee to whom the executor after probate had delivered the property.
TRIED BEFORE EARLE, J., AT YORK, FALL TERM, 1837.
The case against Miller, was an action of trover for a negro bojq named Jim. The' same title was relied on by both parties, as in the case of the same plaintiff against Joseph and John Carroll, ante, p. 1.
Jim was bequeathed in the supposed will of Thomas Carroll, and was delivered by the executors to Mrs. Grallaher, who sold him: after passing through various hands, he came to the possession of the defendant. The plaintiff proved a demand and refusal before action brought. Jim was sold by the executors of Mrs. Gallaher, in 1832, to one Puree; by Mm, in 1833, be was sold to Absberen; by him, in 1835, to Bander; and by him, to the defendant. The same grounds of defence were taken, and overruled, as in the case of Joseph and John Carroll. The jury, under the instructions of the Court, found for the plaintiff.
The defendant appealed and moved for a new trial, on the following grounds:
1st. Because the judge charged the jury that the defendant could not protect himself under the plea of the statute of limitations.
2d. Because the Court charged the jury that the defendant could not avail himself of the plea of the statute of limitation's, from the time of the probate of the will in solemn form.
3d. Because the defendant should have been protected, being an innocent purchaser for a valuable consideration.
4th. Because the verdict was, in other respects, contrary to law and the evidence.
Witherspoon, defendant’s attorney.
The case against Black was for a negro named Adam, and also depended upon the same title and evidence as the case against Joseph and John Carroll. Adam was bequeathed in the supposed will of Thomas Carroll, to Thomas the son of Matthew Carroll; and was delivered to the legatee by the executors in February, 1830. He passed through the bands of several purchasers, and was bought by the defendant, who kept him two years, and sold him before action brought, for one thousand dollars. The grounds of defence were overruled, and a verdict was rendered for the plaintiff.
The defendant appealed, and moved for a nonsuit or new trial, on the following grounds:
1st. Because bis Honor erred in holding that the present action could be maintained against the defendant, who was a purchaser, for valuable consideration, from a legatee under the will of Thomas Carroll; the will having been admitted to probate, and the legatee having received the negro in dispute by the assent of the executors.
2d. Because bis Honor charged the jury that the defendant could not protect' himself under the plea of the statute of limitations.
3d. Because the judge charged the jury that the defendant could not avail himself of the plea of the statute of limitations, from the probate of the will in solemn form.
4th. Because the verdict, in other respects, was contrary to law and evidence.
G. W. Williams, defendant’s attorney.

Opinion:
Curia, per O'Neall, J.
In these cases the verdicts must stand.
In the case of Poag, administrator, vs. Carroll, this Court held that the executor was not liable in trover for an act done under and in pursuance.of the will, while the probate remained; for the reason that his act was, when done, lawful; and that the subsequent revocation of his authority could not change its character.
In these cases the defence of the defendants must rest on the title. For in Black's case he sold the slave and received the proceeds, and in Miller's case she was in possession after a demand and refusal. In each, the conversion is perfect; and then the question is, was that conversion lawful or unlawful ? If the property was that of another, the conversion was, as to him, unlawful. There can be no question, that on the probate of the will being set aside, the property of the deceased vested in the administrator, and he could recover it from any one in whose hands it might be, or the-value of it from any one who had sold it. It is in vain to say that the legatees under the will received it from the executor; his delivery to them at the time was lawful, and discharged him ; but having no title himself, it follows that he could, not clothe the legatees with any. The defence of a purchaser for valuable consideration, without notice, is an equitable, not a legal one. It can never prevail against a perfect legal title. ' "
The statute of limitations cannot help the defendants, according to the case of Hill vs. Elmore, 2 Bail. 495, and Geiger vs. Brown, 4 McC. 423; the statute could only commence to run from the grant of administration. It is only from the accrual of a right of action, that the statute will commence to run. The plaintiff's right of action could not have existed before the date of his letters of administration, which constitute his title to demand the possession of his intestate's goods. The motions are dismissed.