Case Name: The New Thought Church, Appellant, v. Mary E. Chapin, Respondent
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1913-12-31
Citations: 159 A.D. 723
Docket Number: 
Parties: The New Thought Church, Appellant, v. Mary E. Chapin, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 159
Pages: 723–725

Head Matter:
The New Thought Church, Appellant, v. Mary E. Chapin, Respondent.
First Department,
December 31, 1913.
Corporation — religious corporation—right to enjoin use of corporate name —words in which no exclusive right can be claimed.
A religious corporation which has adopted the name “The New Thought Church” cannot claim an exclusive right to the use of any of such words, as they are neither peculiar, distinctive nor descriptive, but are all generic in character and of common use, and is not entitled pendente lite to enjoin another from conducting services under the name of “ New Thought Church Services.”
Appeal by the plaintiff, The New Thought Church, from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the New York Special ■ Term, and entered in the office of the clerk of. the county of New York on the 4th day of August, 1913, denying a motion for an injunction pendente lite.
Edgar H. Woodward, for the appellant.
George F. Parker, for the respondent.

Opinion:
Scott, J.:
The plaintiff, appellant, which claims to be a duly incorporated religious corporation under the name of "The New Thought Church," seeks to enjoin the defendant from conducting services under the name of "New Thought Church Services. "
This is clearly not a case for a temporary injunction. In the first place no damage is shown to result to plaintiff from the acts complained of, nor is it shown that any actual confusion has been produced by the similarity of names.
In the second place, without determining whether or not the plaintiff has ever been legally incorporated, we are of opinion that the name it has chosen is not one to which it can claim the exclusive right. It is conceded that it cannot successfully claim a monopoly-of the words "New Thought" or of the word " Church," but it claims the right to monopolize the combination of those words. This claim seems to us to be untenable. The words are all generic in character and of common use and are neither peculiar, distinctive nor descriptive.
The plaintiff claims that it teaches a form of religion based upon what it terms "New Thought." If it believes, as we must assume that it does, that this is a true religion and of benefit to those who receive its teachings, it surely cannot complain that others teach the same form of religion. It would not be contended for a moment that any body of people, whether incorporated or not, could sustain a claim to the monopoly of the use of the name "Christian Church" or " Jewish Church " against persons who taught religion after the Christian or Jewish creeds. The plaintiff apparently has founded a new system of religion based on a new creed. The name it has chosen indicates, first, the system of religion which it teaches, and, second, that it teaches that system through the medium of organizations known as churches. It surely is not in a position to successfully claim a monopoly of teaching this form of religious faith by means of organizations known by the generic names of churches.
The order appealed from must be affirmed, with costs.
Ingraham, P. J., Clarice, Dowling and Hotchkiss, JJ., concurred.
Order affirmed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements.