Case Name: LEONARD v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1912-12-04
Citations: 152 S.W. 632
Docket Number: 
Parties: LEONARD v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 152
Pages: 632–635

Head Matter:
LEONARD v. STATE.
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Dec. 4, 1912.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 15, 1913.)
1. Intoxicating Liquoks (§ 205 ) — Indictment — Sufficiency.
An indictment for pursuing the business of selling intoxicating liquors between March and September, 1911, in a county where prohibition was-in force, alleging that on June 6, 1910, in accordance with an order theretofore made by the commissioners’ court of the county, a prohibition election was held, that thereafter the commissioners’ court canvassed the result, and ascertained that prohibition had carried, that thereafter the proper orders were made, declaring the result and ordering the four weeks publication thereof required by law, and that thereafter such publication was made, was sufficient to show that the violation charged occurred while the prohibition law was in force, although the indictment did not allege the time when the order declaring the result and ordering publication was made, or the time when the publication was made.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Intoxicating Liquors, Cent. Dig. § 225; Dec.-Dig. § 205. ]
2. Criminal Law (§ 304 ) — Judicial Notice.
Where it appears that prohibition was adopted in a county at an election held June 5, 1910, the court will take judicial notice that another election could not have been held, and the law repealed prior to alleged violations between March and September, 1911.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 700-717; Dec. Dig. § 304. ]
3. Intoxicating Liquors (§ 236 ) — Criminal Prosecutions — Evidence— Sufficiency.
Evidence that during the time alleged in the indictment accused received four express shipments of alcohol and ten of whisky of various quantities, and one keg of beer, and that during that time he made two sales of alcohol and five of whisky to parties named in the indictment, was sufficient to sustain a conviction of pursuing the business of selling intoxicating liquors contrary to law.
[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Intoxicating Liquors, Cent. Dig. §§ 300-322; Dec. Dig. § 236. ]
4. Indictment and Information (§ 189 )— Criminal .Prosecutions — Conviction oe Lesser Oeeense.
A person indicted for pursuing the business of selling intoxicating liquors cannot be convicted for making a single sale in violation of another provision of the prohibition law; the statute not authorizing a conviction for a lesser degree of the same offense, or for any other offense than that charged.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Indictment and Information, Cent. Dig. §§ 582-595; Dee. Dig. § 189. ]
5. Criminal Law (§ 442 ) — Criminal Prosecutions — Evidence—Admissibility.
Where an express agent testified that the entries of shipments of intoxicating liquors into prohibition territory in the express book required by law to be kept were not made by him, that he took charge of the office at a later date, but that he knew accused and knew his signature by having seen him sign receipts for other shipments, and that in his opinion the signature to the receipts for the shipments in question were the genuine signatures of accused, the book and the entries therein were sufficiently identified, and accused’s connection therewith and signatures thereto sufficiently proven to justify the admission of the books in evidence.
'[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 1027; Dec. Dig. § 442. ]
6. Criminal Law (§ 442 ) — Criminal Prosecutions — Evidence—Admissibility.
In such case the subsequent entries were properly admitted for the purpose of permitting the jury to compare the signatures with those in question, in view of Code Cr. Proc. 1911, art. 814, providing that it is competent in every case to give evidence of handwriting by comparison, made by experts or by the jury.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 1027; Dec. Dig. § 442. ]
7. Intoxicating Liquors (§ 236 ) — Criminal Prosecutions — Evidence — Weight and Sufficiency.
In a prosecution for pursuing the' business of selling intoxicating liquors, evidence held sufficient to show that the signatures for shipments by express of intoxicating liquors were the genuine signatures of accused, and that he received the liquors.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Intoxicating Liquors, Cent. Dig. §§ 300-322; Dec. Dig. ]
(§§ 419, 420 ) — Criminal Evidence — Admissibil-8. Criminal Law Prosecutions — ITY.
In a prosecution for pursuing the business .of selling intoxicating liquors, where there was evidence of the receipt, by accused, of express shipments of intoxicating liquors, the testimony of accused’s father that a doctor, in his presence, advised accused to use intoxicating liquors on his broken leg for the purpose of causing it to heal, was properly excluded as hearsay, especially where it did not appear that any of such shipments were so used.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 973-983; Dec. Dig. §§ 419, 420. ]
Appeal from District Court,, Comanche County; J. H. Arnold, Judge.
Dude Leonard was convicted of a violation of the prohibition laws, and he appeals.
Affirmed.
Smith & Palmer, of Comanche, and J. R. Stubblefield, of Eastland, for appellant. C. E. Lane, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
For other oases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dee. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep’r Indexes
For other oases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
PRENDERGAST, J.
The appellant was indicted for pursuing the business or occupation of selling intoxicating liquors in Comanche county from March to September, inclusive, during 1911, after prohibition had been legally and properly declared in force therein, and charging that during that time he made some seven separate and distinct sales of intoxicating liquors to specific persons named. From a conviction he appeals.
The point is made against the indictment that it does not specifically allege that he followed said business or occupation, and made said specific sales, while said prohibition law was in force. The indictment does specifically allege that on June 5, 1910, in accordance with an order theretofore made by the commissioners' court of said county, a prohibition election was held, and that thereafter said commissioners' court canvassed the result, and ascertained that prohibition had carried, and thereafter that the proper orders had been made declaring said result, ordering the four weeks • publication thereof as required by law, and that thereafter such publication was made. The indictment then repeatedly specifically charges that in violation of said law the appellant from March to September, inclusive, followed the business or occupation of selling intoxicating liquors in violation of said law, and then charging several specific sales made within the space of said time in violation of said law. The specific time in which said order of the commissioners' court declaring said result and ordering said publication and when said publication was made is not specifically alleged, but the indictment would properly fix the time from the allegations as made, as June 5, 1910, as conceded by appellant in his brief, or not further than some six weeks later which it would take to put the law in effect by said orders, etc., and would thus be hot later than about July 15, 1910. The election having been ordered at the time specified and prohibition carried, and the proper orders made putting it in force, we judicially know that no other election could have been held and said law repealed prior to the alleged violation thereof by appellant. So that, taking the allegations of the indictment as a whole, there can 'be no question that it shows that said law was in force, and could not have been repealed at the time he is charged to have violated it. The indictment follows substantially and almost literally those heretofore uniformly approved by this court under the law under which this prosecution is had, and was amply sufficient (Slack v. State, 61 Tex. Cr. R. 372, 136 S. W. 1073; Mizell v. State, 59 Tex. Cr. R. 226, 128 S. W. 125, and many other cases unnecessary to cite), and the court correctly overruled appellant's motion to quash the indictment.
The testimony clearly shows the receipt by appellant, through the express company at Sipe Springs, .in Comanche county, where he lived during said five months, four shipments to him of alcohol, ten of whisky, and one keg of beer. These several shipments of alcohol and whisky were of various quantities. The evidence further shows during said time two sales of alcohol and five of whisky by appellant to the parties named in the indictment, and that prohibition was in force in said Comanche county. So that the evidence clearly was sufficient to sustain the conviction.
Appellant asked two special charges which were refused. It is unnecessary to quote them. They were to the effect that there were two prohibition laws in force in Comanche county, the one under which this conviction was had and another for making a single sale of intoxicating liquors, and requesting the court under this indictment to submit that, if appellant was not guilty of the offense charged, they might convict him of making a single sale if he had done so. Neither of these charges should have been given. The offense charged in this case and the statute under which the prosecution was had does not provide for a conviction for any lesser degree of the same offense or for any other offense than that charged. Under the indictment in this case, appellant could not have been convicted for making a single sale of intoxicating liquors in violation of another provision of the prohibition law. Robinson v. State, 147 S. W. 245.
Three other bills pertain to the same matter.^ It is unnecessary to give each separately. We will state them all together. By them and the qualification to each by the judge, it is substantially shown that the agent of the express company at Sipe Springs, in Comanche county, where appellant lived and where he is alleged and shown to have made said respective sales of intoxicating liquor, produced the express book at that place which the law requires shall be kept of shipments of intoxicating liquors into prohibition territory, and which is shown to have, been kept in compliance therewith, and identified the said book. It is also shown by him that he did not make any of the entries therein during the time appellant is charged with having received from said express company shipments of intoxicating liquors; that he took charge of that office and said book on December 1, 1911, subsequent to the time these entries were made; that he knew appellant, and knew his signature by having seen him subsequently sign it in said book on the receipt of other shipments by him after the time the said entries were made during the period in which appellant is alleged to have violated the prohibition law. He produced the said book and some 12 of appellant's signatures which he said he saw him sign, and knew he did sign at the time, and he identified these signatures as the genuine signatures of appellant. He was familiar in this way with appellants signature, and gave it as his opinion from his knowledge of his genuine signature that those signed to > the receipts of shipments of intoxicating liquor by him were appellant's genuine signatures. The signatures thus shown to have been made while that agent was the agent of the express company at Sipe Springs and the book containing them, together with the entries and receipts claimed by the state to have been made by appellant of the shipments of intoxicating liquors during the time he is charged to have violated said law, were admitted. The signatures made in said book after the time charged in the indictment appellant committed said offense were introduced in evidence solely for the purpose of comparison by the jury with the previous signatures, and the jury were instructed and informed at the time that these signatures were introduced solely for that purpose, and that they could not look to those entries or any of them to which these signatures were appended for any other purpose than comparison with previous signatures in the book. Appellant did not testify and in no way denied under oath any of his signatures introduced in evidence. Article 814, O. O. P., is: "It is competent in every case to give evidence of handwriting by comparison, made by experts or by the jury; but proof by comparison only shall not be sufficient to establish the handwriting of a witness i who denies his signature under oath." In our opinion the books and entries therein were sufficiently identified and appellant's connection therewith and signatures thereto sufficiently proven to admit the books and the testimony and these signatures to go to the jury for the purpose they were admitted and so stated by the court. And the evidence was amply sufficient to authorize the jury to find that , appellant's signatures receipting for said intoxicating liquors were his genuine signatures, and that he received said liquors. Neither of these bills show any reversible error. See the cases collated and cited under said article of the C. C. P.
By another bill appellant complains that the court erred in refusing to permit appellant's father, at his instance, to testify that in the presence and hearing of his father, while appellant was under treatment at Temple, Tex., for a broken leg, that the doctor advised him to use intoxicating liquors on his broken leg for the purpose of causing his broken leg to heal. When this was the bill does not disclose. Neither does it disclose that the appellant at any time so used any of the intoxicating liquors shipped to him. It does show, however, that at some time previous to this trial a bone in appellant's leg had been broken, and that he was carried to a hospital at Temple for treatment therefor. His father had been permitted to testify that while there the physician who treated appellant did use alcohol on his leg. The proposed testimony of his father was excluded because it was hearsay, and in our opinion correctly so.
The evidence was amply sufficient to sustain the verdict. The judgment will be affirmed.