Case Name: Antonio PEREZ, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1993-06-24
Citations: 620 So. 2d 1256
Docket Number: No. 76184
Parties: Antonio PEREZ, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
Judges: McDonald and HARDING, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 620
Pages: 1256–1273

Head Matter:
Antonio PEREZ, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
No. 76184.
Supreme Court of Florida.
June 24, 1993.
Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Howard K. Blumberg, Asst. Public Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, for petitioner.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Michael J. Neimand, Asst. Atty. Gen., Miami, for respondent.

Opinion:
GRIMES, Justice.
We review State v. Perez, 592 So.2d 1099 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990), because of certified conflict with Spann v. State, 529 So.2d 825 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). We have jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution.
The pertinent facts of the case are summarized in the opinion of the district court of appeal:
Two uniformed City of Miami police officers were on patrol in an area known to be high in narcotics activity. They observed Perez and another male, who appeared to be passing an object between them. Believing that the two might be engaging in a narcotics transaction, one officer exited the police car and started to walk toward Perez. He either told Perez to freeze, or to stop. Perez fled on foot and the officer chased him. Perez ran into an alley while pulling something from his waistband. The officer heard a loud, metallic noise of something dropping in the alley. The officer caught Perez who, after being given Miranda warnings, volunteered that he became nervous and ran "because he knew the gun that he had was stolen." A revolver was recovered in the alley. Perez was charged with carrying a concealed firearm and carrying a concealed firearm by a convicted felon. See § 790.01, 790.23, Fla.Stat. (1987).
Perez, 592 So.2d at 1099.
Perez successfully moved to suppress the firearm prior to trial. The judge found that the police did not have reasonable suspicion to support an investigative stop under section 901.151, Florida Statutes (1987), and held that the firearm was seized as a direct result of the illegal stop. The Third District Court of Appeal reversed the order of suppression. While acknowledging the State's concession of the absence of reasonable suspicion for the stop, the court held that the firearm was admissible in evidence because it had been abandoned prior to any search. The court relied on its prior decision in State v. Oliver, 368 So.2d 1331 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), cert. dismissed, 383 So.2d 1200 (Fla.1980), in which it had held that "a person's otherwise voluntary abandonment of property cannot be tainted or made involuntary by a prior illegal police stop of such person. Only when the police begin to conduct an illegal search can a subsequent abandonment of property be held involuntary as being tainted by the prior illegal search_" Id. at 1335-36 (citations omitted). Other cases supporting this view include Curry v. State, 570 So.2d 1071 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990), and Freyre v. State, 362 So.2d 989 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), cert. denied, 372 So.2d 468 (Fla.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 857, 100 S.Ct. 118, 62 L.Ed.2d 76 (1979).
In Spann v. State, 529 So.2d 825, the case certified as being in conflict, the police observed the defendant get out of a car and enter a nearby restaurant. A few minutes later the defendant returned to the car, whereupon the police ordered him to "freeze, stop." The defendant then dropped a package near his feet that proved to be cocaine. Because the defendant dropped the cocaine as a result of the illegal order to stop, the court held that the evidence must be suppressed. The court found the State's theory of abandonment unpersuasive.
Perez also cites State v. Bartee, 568 So.2d 523 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), as being in conflict with the opinion below. In that case, a police officer asked the defendant if he had seen the direction taken by a suspect who had fled upon sight of the officer. The defendant nervously pointed to a duplex and then began to run away. The officer told him to stop but he continued to run. While he was running, he threw a pill bottle. The police retrieved the bottle and determined that it contained cocaine. The district court of appeal affirmed the suppression of the cocaine on the premise that the stop was illegal and rejected the State's claim of abandonment.
While this case was pending in this Court, the United States Supreme Court rendered its decision in California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991), which is directly on point. In Hodari, several youths fled at the approach of a police car. The police disembarked and gave chase. When one of the officers was almost upon him, Hodari tossed away a small rock before he was tackled. The rock was later determined to be cocaine. In the juvenile proceeding which ensued, the State conceded that it did not have reasonable suspicion to justify stopping Hodari. The United States Supreme Court framed the issue as whether, at the time he dropped the cocaine, Hodari was seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. For purposes of its opinion, the Court assumed that the police pursuit was a "show of authority" calling upon Hodari to halt. However, the Court reasoned that a seizure does not occur until a person is physically subdued by the police or submits to an officer's show of authority. Therefore, the Court held that Hodari had not been seized as contemplated by the Fourth Amendment until he was tackled. The recovery of the cocaine that had been abandoned while he was running was not the fruit of an unlawful seizure.
By reason of the 1982 amendment to article I, section 12 of the Florida Constitution, this Court is bound to follow the United States Supreme Court's interpretations of the Fourth Amendment and to provide no greater protection than those interpretations. Bernie v. State, 524 So.2d 988 (Fla.1988). According to the rationale of Hodari, the call for Perez to halt and the subsequent chase did not constitute á seizure until he was caught. In the meantime, he had abandoned the firearm. Because the recovery of the firearm was not the result of an illegal seizure, it should not have been suppressed.
We approve the decision of the court below. We disapprove Bartee to the extent that it is inconsistent with this opinion. However, we find Spann to be consistent with this opinion and with Hodari because there the defendant had submitted to the illegal order to stop when he dropped the cocaine.
It is so ordered.
McDonald and HARDING, JJ., concur.
OVERTON, J., concurs with an opinion.
BARKETT, C.J., dissents with an opinion.
SHAW, J., dissents with an opinion, in which KOGAN, J., concurs.
KOGAN, J., dissents with an opinion, in which SHAW, J., concurs.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).