Case Name: In Re PROCEEDING TO RESTRICT USE OF PROPERTY ALONG GLADSTONE BOULEVARD AND TO CONDEMN CERTAIN RIGHTS THEREIN; KANSAS CITY, Appellant, v. FRED LIEBI et al.
Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1923-05-22
Citations: 298 Mo. 569
Docket Number: 
Parties: In Re PROCEEDING TO RESTRICT USE OF PROPERTY ALONG GLADSTONE BOULEVARD AND TO CONDEMN CERTAIN RIGHTS THEREIN; KANSAS CITY, Appellant, v. FRED LIEBI et al.
Judges: All concur, except Walker, J., who dissents in separate opinion, in which David E. Blair, J., concurs.
Reporter: Missouri Reports
Volume: 298
Pages: 569–618

Head Matter:
In Re PROCEEDING TO RESTRICT USE OF PROPERTY ALONG GLADSTONE BOULEVARD AND TO CONDEMN CERTAIN RIGHTS THEREIN; KANSAS CITY, Appellant, v. FRED LIEBI et al.
In Banc,
May 22, 1923.
1. RESTRICTING USE OF ESTABLISHED STREET: Resident Purposes: Eminent Domain: Valid Ordinance. The ordinance recited that Gladstone was the first boulevard or parkway established in the city, that all the buildings along its entire length o£ three miles are used for residential purposes, and that the overwhelming sentiment of the property-owners immediately interested is that the enactment and enforcement of the ordinance would “enhance and stabilize the value and utility of each piece of property within the benefit district herein prescribed and add to the beautification of said highway;” and then enacted that no house or building shall be constructed “within thirty-five feet of the nearest adjacent side line of said boulevard within twenty years, nor shall any house or building within said benefit district be used within that period for any other than residential purposes,” and specifically excluded bill boards, gasoline filling stations, and gasoline tanks used in connection with others having a capacity in excess of one hundred gallons. The benefit district was made to comprise all lands lying within one hundred and fifty feet of either side line of the boulevard, and the ordinance provided for a condemnation proceeding to determine the damage any property owner would sustain from an enforcement of the ordinance, which was to be paid by special assessment upon real property within the benefit district, according to terms prescribed by the city council. Some existing buildings were nearer than thirty-five feet to the boulevard line, but the ordinance did not require them to be moved. The petition asking for the enactment of the ordinance was signed by 107 persons interested in the development of the boulevard, and only five persons owning property abutting on the boulevard appeared to this proceeding in the circuit court and moved to dismiss it, and 46 others by their answers expressed satisfaction with the proceeding and prayed the court to carry it into effect. The boulevard is essentially a residence district, and the value of the abutting property is based on its use for dwellings, and its use for any other purpose would tend to depreciate its value; and the trend of the evidence was that the proposed restricted use of the abutting properties would tend to prevent overcrowded and congested districts, thereby promoting the public health and general welfare of the city, would make the city more attractive and thereby promote its growth, and would afford means of recreation to people who desired to drive or walk along the boulevard in the same way that a public park would. Held, that, to so restrict the use of the abutting lots is to devote them to a public use; to employ the power of eminent domain in enforcing such restricted use does not violate any constitutional provision; such restricted use is not the taking of private property for a private use without the owner’s consent; and the ordinance is within the charter powers of the city, and the judgment dismissing the proceeding is reversed; WALKER, -X, dissenting in a separate opinion, in which DAVID E. BLAIR, X, concurs.
2. -: Legislative Acts: Presumptively Valid: Eminent Domain. The propriety, expediency and necessity of a legislative act are purely for the determination of the legislative authority, and a legal presumption of validity attends a municipal ordinance authorized by statute, and if there is doubt as to its constitutionality it must- be held to be constitutional.
3. -: Eminent Domain: Public Use: Application. No satisfactory definition of the term “public use” has ever been achieved by the courts. One theory limits the application of the term to public “employment” or “occupation.” A more liberal and flexible meaning of “public use” makes it synonymous with “public advantage,” “public benefit.” Any definition will exclude some subjects that should be included, and include others that should be excluded. But the term as used in constitutions has a progressive flexibility, adapting its application to the interdependence and the complexity of communities of increasing density of population. And in order to constitute a public use it is not necessary that .the whole community or any large part of it should actually use or be benefited by a contemplated improvement-; benefit to a considerable number is sufficient. Nor does the mere fact that the advantage of a public improvement also inures to a particular individual or group of individuals deprive it of its public character.
4. -: -: Public Use Applied to Lands: Actual Occupation by Public. The taking of lands for public use is not limited to their actual occupation by the public. Any regulation which imposes a restriction upon the use of property by the owner, and any neighboring public improvement which tends to impair the enjoyment of property by affecting some right or easement appurtenant thereto, may be, under certain circumstances, a public use within the meaning of the Constitution.
Held, by WALKER, J., dissenting, with whom DAVID E. BLAIR, X, concurs, that a public use implies possession, occupation and enjoyment by the public at large or by public agencies; and where private property would remain private property and the effect of enforcing an .ordinance undertaking to condemn it would simply be to limit in some instances the right of enjoyment of the owner’s own property for the benefit of other private individuals, the use is not a “public use” in the constitutional sense.
5. -: -: -: -: Building Line: Adornment. An ordinance which devotes the abutting property on each side of an established boulevard to residential purposes exclusively and prescribes a building line thirty-five feet from the’ street for buildings thereafter constructed, is not unconstitutional. It is much like a parkway along a boulevard, which is not taken possession of by the public in the sense that the public occupies it, but tends to enhance the attractiveness of the street and the value of the property abutting upon it. Such restrictions are legitimate exercise of the sovereign power of the State in the interest of health, safety, morality, general enjoyment and education of the community.
Held, by WALKER, J., dissenting, with whom DAVID E. BLAIR, J„ concurs, that three things must concur to effectuate a vaUd condemnation: (a) The public must obtain possession of the property attempted to be condemned; (b) the use must be one of utility, not aesthetic or for pleasure, and (c) compensation must be made, but it will not supply the absence of possession and public utility. An ordinance attempting to restrict a1! property abutting on a boulevard to residential purposes exclusively and forbidding the construction of a house within thirty-five feet of the street line under the gui'se of the exercise of the power of eminent domain, if enforced, would result in the confiscation of private property for purely aesthetic purposes, and the attempted condemnation is therefore invalid.
6. -: -: Unreasonable Ordinance. Usually an ordinance will not be declared unreasonable in its operation upon the persons affected if it is within the express power of the municipal authorities ordaining it. The devotion by condemnation of the property abutting on both sides of an established boulevard to residential purposes exclusively' having been determined by the court to be a public use, the expediency and property of the ordinance ‘under which said use or restriction is authorized are for the municipal legislature, and not a subject of judicial inquiry. Held, by WALKER, J., dissenting, with whom DAVID E. BLAIR,
J., concurs, that an ordinance attempting, under the guise of the public welfare and ostensibly for public use, to prohibit owners of abutting lots from building any hind of structure within thirty-five feet of an established boulevard and to use the lots for any other than residential purposes, regardless of size, beauty, utility or desirability, is an unreasonable, excessive and unwarranted interference with the rights of private property.
7. -:-: Charter Limitations. The provisions of the Charter of Kansas City of 1908, providing for building restrictions and the establishment of building lines through the instrumentality of the Board of Park Commissioners and declaring that such provisions shall not apply to boulevards previously established, do not apply to an ordinance devoting property abutting on a previously established boulevard to exclusive residential purposes, establishing a building line for residences thereafter constructed and a benefit district, and providing for assessment of special benefits to pay damages to property owners injuriously affected thereby. By its charter and the statutes the city had such powers of eminent domain, and these provisions did not restrict those powers to property along boulevards already established.
Held, by WALKER, J., dissenting, with whom DAVID E. BLAIR, J., concurs, that no other provision than these is found in the charter for' placing restrictions upon boulevards and their building lines, and no power is therein found authorizing such restrictions by condemnation, and such power not being expressly granted cannot be implied. Held, also, that the charter provision, specifically including the subject-matter of establishing building lines for boulevards through the instrumentality of the Board of Park Commissioners, is a special enactment, and excludes any other method, whether expressed or not.
8. -: -=: Proceeding Authorized by Charter and Statute: Condemnation for Residential Uses: Educational Benefits: Police Regulation. The Charter of Kansas City, adapted in pursuance of constitutional authority, provides that the city máy acquire, by condemnation or otherwise, lands or other property, for art galleries, museums, educational and other public purposes. The statute (Sec. 8909, R. S. 1919) provides that cities of more than one hundred thousand inhabitants, by the exercise of the ipower of eminent domain, may acquire “lands for public use, including parks ■ or for any other public purpose.” Held, that these provisions of the charter and statute a-re sufficiently comprehensive to cover a condemnation ordinance, devoting the properties abutting on both sides of an established boulevard to exclusive residential purposes, forbidding the construction thereafter of houses within thirty-five feet of the street line, establishing a benefit district including the boulevard and one hundred and fifty feet on each side thereof, prohibiting the maintenance of bill boards, gasoline tanks and gasoline filling stations within the district, and providing for the assessment of special benefits to pay the damages of property owners injuriously affected thereby. The purpose is education, in that it provides a means of recreation and beautification, and for the enhancement of property • values, and the enlargement of all those elements which tend to promote civic pride and the consequent -growth of the city and its prosperity.
Held, by WALKER. J., dissenting, with whom DAVID E. BLAIR, J., concurs, that the police power does not sanction the confiscation of private property for aesthetic*purposes, and cannot be employed under the guise of the exercise of the power of eminent domain. In the exercise of eminent domain private property is applied to public use, because its enjoyment is beneficial to the public; in the exercise of the police power the owner of private property is denied its unrestricted use, because such use' would be injurious to the public welfare, health or morals.
Appeal from Jackson Circuit Court. — Hon. Allen G. Southern, Judge.
Reversed AND remanded.
E. M. Harber and Benj. M. Powers for appellant: W. G. Scarritt of counsel.
(1) The protective ordinance has for its scope and purpose a public use as distinguished from a private use. St. Louis Gunning Co. v. St. Louis, 235 Mo. 99; State ex inf. v. Merchants Exchange, 269 Mo. 346, 356; Welch v. Swasey, 214 U. S. 91; Opinion of the Justices, 234 Mass. 597; Welch v. Swasey, 193 Mass. 364; Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 53; City of Des Moines v. Manhattan Oil Co., 184 N. W. (Ia.) 823; State ex rel. v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 1; Atty. Geni. v. Williams, 174 Mass. 476; Bunyan v. Commissioners, 167 App. Div. (N. T.) 457; United States v. Gillesburg El. Ry. Co., 160 U. S. 668; St. Louis Poster Adv. Co. v. St. Louis, 249 U. S. 269; 1 Nichols on Law Eminent Domain (2 Ed.) 164, secs. 57, 58. Relativity of police power and eminent domain considered. Rideout v. Knox, 148 Mass. 368; Oneonta Light Co. v. Schwarzenbach, 150 N. Y. 76; 1 Lewis, Eminent Domain (3 Ed.) sec. 254, p. 504; 20 C. J. 558, sec. 40; Township Board v. Ilaekmann, 48 Mo. 243; County Court v. Griswold, 58 Mo. 176; Parker v. Commonwealth, 178 Mass. 199; Laws 1921, pp. 177, 178, 481, 510. (2) If the purpose and object be a public use as distinguished from a private use the necessity and expediency of appropriating any particular property is within the scope of the legislative department of the municipal government and is not subject to judicial inquiry or determination. Kansas City Charter, sec. 1, art. 3; 10 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law, 1052; 20 G. J. 624; Deitrich v. Murdock, 42 Mo. 283; Aldridge v. Spears, 101 Mo. 400; So. Ill. & Mo. Bridge Co. v. Stone, 174 Mo. 1; County Court v. Griswold, 58 Mo. 175. (3) The right of eminent domain is an inherent attribute of sovereignty and it is exercised by the legislative department and not by the judiciary, and that authority is limited, and not granted, by Sections 20 and 21 of Article 2 of the State Constitution, to the effect that the question whether the contemplated use be really public shall be a judicial question, and that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. 20 C. J. 513; So. Ill. & Mo. Bridge Co. v. Stone, 174 Mo. 1; C. B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. McCooey, 273 Mo. 29. (4) The State’s inherent power of eminent domain in respect to purely local affairs was automatically delegated to and vested in Kansas City, when that city was organized as a constitutional city in 1908, and it was so vested by Section 16 of Article 9 of the State Constitution. Sec. 16, Art. 9, Mo. Const; Enabling Act, R. S. 1919, sec. 8903-6-10; Kansas City v. Marsh Oil Co., 140 Mo. 458; Kansas City v. Yoerishoeffer, 249 Mo. 1; State ex rel. Realty Co. v. Thomas, 278 Mo. 85; Brunn v. Kansas City, 216 Mo. 108; Kansas City v. Bacon, 147 Mo. 257. (5) The power of Kansas City to exercise the right of eminent domain to the full, through its legislative department, consisting of its Mayor and Common Council, to the extent invoked in the protective ordinance, is .and was repeatedly declared in its charter, before and irrespective of Sections 40 and 41 of Article 13 and Section 18 of Article 6 thereof, in the most varied and un-stinted terms. Sec. 1, Arts. 1, 3, 6, Charter 1908; Sec. 1, Arts. 1, 3, Charter 1889. Like powers in successive charters are continuing powers notwithstanding the adoption of the new charter. City Charter 1908, secs. 30 and 32, Art. 18; Gunning Co. v. Kansas City, 240 Mo. 659. (6) The acquisition of the rights in the nature of negative easements sought to be acquired through- the protective ordinance may unquestionably be accomplished through the exercise of the power of eminent domain. State ex rel. v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 1; 1 Nichols on Eminent Domain (2 Ed.) sec. 58; St. Louis v. Hill, 116 Mo. 527; St. Louis v. Dorr, 145 Mo. 466; St. Louis v. Dreisoerner, 243 Mo. 217; Bill Posting Co. v. Atlantic City, 71 N. J. L. 72; City of Passaic v. Paterson B. P. Co., 72 N. J. L. 285; Commonwealth v. Boston Adv. Co., 188 Mass. 348; Kansas City v. Land Co., 260 Mo. 395; Kansas City v. Terminal Ry. Co., 201 S. W. 541; Atty. Geni. v. "Williams, 174 Mass. 476; Williams v. Parker, 188 U.. S. 491; Brunn v. Kansas City, 216 Mo. 108; Chaplin v. Kansas City, 259 Mo. 479; In Matter of Widening Bushwick Ave., 48 Barb. (N. T.) 9; In re City of New York, 68 N. Y. Snpp. 196. The ordinance with high reasonableness and legal precedent seeks to take only easements and those for a limited period; and these and other details of it are immune from rational criticism. State ex rel. v. Seehorn, 246 Mo. 568; United States v. Welch, 217 U. S. 333; Pacific Postal T. Co. v. Oregon Co., 163 Fed. 967; Hepburn v. Jersey City; 67 N. J. L. 686; Welch v. Swasey, 193 Mass. 364; Welch v. Swasey, 214 U. S. 91; State ex rel. v. Thomas, 278 Mo. 1, 97. (7) Sections 40 and 41 of Article 13 and Section 18 of Article 6 of the City Charter of 1908 are not limitations upon the city’s general sovereign power of eminent domain, but the evident purpose in the enactment of them was to enlarge the city’s power as to the subjects therein referred to or, at least, to indicate a procedure whereby those respective objects might one by one be accomplished. Those sections do not enumerate nor provide a method of acquiring all the rights deemed good and sought to be' acquired by the protective ordinance, and so they do not provide an exclusive method of accomplishing that object, that is, the whole object sought by the ordinance, or debar Kansas City from exercising its general powers'ip accomplishing that full purpose. State ex rel. v. Thomas,x 287 Mo. 85; St. Louis Gunning Co. v. St. Louis, 235 Mo'. 99; 2 Lewis’ Sutherland Stat. Const. (2 Ed.) sec. 369, sec. 370, pp. 694, 695, 705, 706; Adams v. Yazoo & Miss. Yal. Railroad Co., 75 Miss. 275; Dillon Mun. Corp. (5 Ed.) p. 586.
Smart & Strother for respondent Thomas A. Smart.
(1) Ordinance 39946, the ordinance in question (called by appellant the “protective ordinance” but more properly named the “prohibitive ordinance”) has the earmarks of being founded upon Section 40, Article 13, of the Charter of Kansas City of 1908, which is the only section in the entire charter which authorizes the establishing of a building line and the establishing of building restrictions, these being the first two restrictive or prohibitive provisions of the ordinance, but said Section 40 expressly provides that said section applies to boulevards established after the taking effect of said charter, and not to those established prior thereto.' That part of Gladstone Boulevard from Independence Bbuie:' vard to a point near Monroe Avenue (and upon1 which' respondent’s property abuts) was established in 1893',1 whereas said charter took effect September 4,1908( For' these reasons said ordinance is unauthorized and in'valid. (2) While that part of Gladstone Boulevard from Elmwood Avenue to Belmont Avenue, a distancé of about a mile (toward the east end of said boulevard), which is within the provision of said Ordinance 39946, was established in 1912 long after the charter of 1908 took effect, and while said Section 40 of Article 13 of said charter (and said section only) was applicable to said part of said boulevard in so far as it authorized a building line and building restrictions to be established along the same, yet said ordinance is void because it joins said part of said boulevard which was established after said charter took effect with that part (at the west or south end) from Independence Boulevard to a point near Monroe Avemie, a distance of about a mile (and upon which this respondent’s property abuts), which was established long before said charter took effect, and to which said Section 40 is not applicable, nor is any other provision of said charter applicable thereto. Charter of Kansas City 1908, sec. 40, art. 13, pp. 437j 438, 439. (•3) While said Section 40, Article 13 of the Charter of Kansas City of 1908, is applicable to that part of said boulevard that was established after said charter took effect, yet said ordinance is void for the further -reasons: (a) That the owners of a majority in front feet of the lands fronting- on said Gladstone Boulevard did not petition for the establishing of the building line and the building restrictions provided for by said Ordi nance 39946. (b) That the Board of Park Commissioners did not, in its resolution, nor did the Common Council in said ordinance, find and declare that the owners of a majority in front feet of all lands fronting on said Gladstone Boulevard, on which said restrictions were established by said ordinance, petitioned for the establishment of said building’ line and said building restrictions, provided for in said ordinance, as expressly required, as a condition precedent, by said Section 40, Article 13. Charter of Kansas City 1908, see. 40, art. 13, pp. 437, 438; St. Louis v. Gleason, 93 Mo. 37; Pash v. St. Joseph, 257 Mo. 332, 341; Kansas City v. Bacon, 147 Mo. 259, 283. (4) While Ordinance 39946, the ordinance in question, by establishing a building line and building restrictions, which are only authorized by said Section 40, Article 13, of the charter, indicate that it was upon this section that the law-making body of the city looked, while in the act of passing said ordinance, yet the city admits that said ordinance cannot stand upon said Section 40, for the reason that said Section 40 applies to boulevards, established after said charter took effect, and for the further reason that said section was not complied with by the city in the passage of said ordinance; but seeks to sustain the validity of said ordinance upon the general power of the city to condemn private property for public use. We submit •that there is no general power conferred upon the city by.its charter or otherwise which would authorize the Common Council to exercise a power so far-reaching as to establish a building line and building restrictions upon private property against the will of the owner. “With-, out a clear grant of such power, no municipal ordinance [of the sort invoked in this case] could possibly be sustained.” St. Louis v. Dorr, 145 Mo. 466, 472; St. Louis v. Dreisoerner, 243 Mo. 217, 223. (5) Section 40, Article 13, of the charter being a special law or provision expressly authorizing the establishing of a building line and building restrictions along boulevards estab- listed after said charter took effect (the only express power in the charter authorizing snch restrictions) and being applicable to said part of Gladstone Boulevard between Elmwood Avenue and Belmont Aveniie, which was established after said charter took effect, the building line and building restrictions, provided for in said Ordinance 39946 along said part of said boulevard could be established only by a strict compliance with said Section 40, and no general provision in the charter will be construed as abrogating or excusing the failure to perform the requirements of such special law. The requirements of said Section 40 not having been complied with said ordinance is invalid. Jaicks v. Merrell, 201 Mo. 91, 105; State v. Butler, 178 Mo. 272, 302; 2 Dillon on Municipal Corporations (5 Ed.) sec. 586, p. 921; Charter of Kansas City 1908, last sentence par. 41, sec. 1, art. 3, p. 163. (6) The third restriction or prohibitive provision in said ordinance is that “no bill boards shall be erected, maintained or used during that period” (twenty years) “within the said benefit district.” Section 18, Article 6, of-the Charter of 1908 (p. 218), provides that “thé Common Council may, by ordinance, prohibit the construction or maintenance of bill boards,” but it also requires that ‘ ‘ such ordinance shall prescribe the size, character and location of such advertising boards and structures so prohibited,” and then provides for condemnation proceedings in order to pay compensation to private property if damaged. Said Ordinance 39946, the ordinance in question, fails to state the size and character of bill boards prohibited, and for this reason it is in violation of said Section 18, and void. Charter of Kansas City (1908), sec. 18, art. VI, p. 280. (7) Section 18 of Article 6 of said charter authorizes the prohibition of bill boards, also expressly provides that “the same procedure for the ascertainment and assessment of just such compensation . . . and the manner of the payment of such damages • shall be adopted as is prescribed by sections two, three and four of this ar- tide relating to proceedings for condemning and damaging private property;” whereas Ordinance 39946 provides that said proceedings shall be “all in accordance with-Article XIII of the Charter of Kansas City with the same force and effect as though this ordinance were an ordinance duly authorized and enacted for the purpose of taking and condemning lands for park purposes. ” Said Article VI and said Article XIII being unlike and antagonistic to each other in reference to the condemnation proceedings respectively prescribed therein, said Ordinance 39946, for the reasons aforesaid, is void. Charter of Kansas City 1908, sec. 18, art. 6, pp. 280, 281; Idem. secs. 2, 3 and 4, art. 6, pp. 254 to 263; St. Louis v. Bell Realty Co., 259 Mo. 126-136. (8) The ordinance in question, in its application to respondent’s said property, is grossly unreasonable, oppressive and unjust and, for this reason, is null and void. St. Louis v. Handlon, 242 Mo. 88, 96; St. Louis v. Dreisoerner, 243 Mo. 217, 224; Union Cemetery Assn. v. Kansas City, 252 Mo. 466, 500; City of Plattsburg v. Hagenbush, 98 Mo. App. 669; Corrigan v. Gage, 68 Mo. 541-; Springfield v. Jacobs, 101 Mo. App. 339; Hyde v. Kansas City, 196 Mo. 498; Stoltman v. City of Clayton, 226 S. W. 321, 205 Mo. App. 568; Willison v. Cook, 54 Colo. 335; Crawford v. City of Topeka, 51 Kan. 756. (9) The ordinance in question, in its application to respondent’s said property, is lacking in equality and uniformity and denies to this respondent the equal protection of the laws guaranteed to him by the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. S.t. Louis v. Handlon, 242 Mo. 88; Wetterau v. Farmers & Merchants Trust Co., 226 S. W. 941; Cast Realty & Investment Co. v. Schneider Granite Co., 240 U. S. 55, 60 L. Ed. 523; Hayes v. Poplar Bluff, 263 Mo. 517, 533. (10) The ordinance in question grants to the . owners of the thirty-four residences fronting on Gladstone Boulevard between Independence Boulevard and Anderson Avenue special and exclusive rights, privileges and immunities in this that said owners enjoy tlie nse of their property within the thirty-five foot building line fixed by said ordinance for the location of their respective residences, whereas this respondent is, as to his said vacant lots, denied the right to use said thirty-five foot strip or any part thereof for any such purpose, in violation of Clause 26, Section 53, Article IV, Constitution of Missouri. Hayes v. Poplar Bluff, 263 Mo. 516, 533; St. Louis v. Handlon, 242 Mo. 88, 96. (11) The court will look, not only at the face of the ordinance, hut outside at the physical facts in order to determine whether such ordinance is reasonable or unreasonable or whether it is lacking in equality and uniformity or not. Stegmann v. Weeke, 214 S. W. 140; Union Cemetery Assn. v. Kansas City, 252 Mo. 500; Watterau v. Farmers & Merchants Trust Co., 226 S. W. 942. (12) The ordinance in question, Number 39946, cannot be justified or sustained under the exercise of the police power of Kansas City. For the police power — however far reaching it may be — can only regulate or restrain the use of private property when such use is injurious to the health, safety, morals or general welfare of the public and when this use is not injurious, it is not within the zone of the police power. Spann v. City of Dallas, 235 S. W. 513; St. Louis v. Hill, 116 Mo. 527; St. Louis v. Dorr, 145 Mo. 466; St. Louis v. Dreisoerner, 243 Mo. 217; St. Louis Gunning Co. v. St. Louis, 235 Mo. 99; Willison v. Cooke, 54 Colo. 320, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1030; Kansas City Gunning Co. v. Kansas City, 240 Mo. 659; Levy v. Mravlog, 115 Atl. (N. J.) 350; Passaic v. Paterson Bill Posting Co., 72 N. J. L. 285; Crawford v. Topeka, 51 Kan. 756; Bryan v. City of Chester, 212 Pa. St. 259; Haller Sign Works v. Physical Culture Training School, 249 Ill. 436, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 998; Bryne v. Maryland Realty Co., 129 Md. 202, L. R. A. 1917 A. 1216; 2 Dillon on Municipal Corporations (5 Ed.) sec. 695; Eubanks v. Richmond, 226 U. S. 137, 57 L. Ed. 156, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1123, Ann. Cases, 1914 B, 192. (13) There can be no presumption that tbe uses, prohibited by said ordinance, will constitute a nuisance or be injurious to tbe public welfare, but, on tbe contrary, tbe court will presume all sueli uses will be exercised by tbe owners of private property fronting’ on Gladstone Boulevard in an orderly and legal manner. (14) If this court find that any one of tbe five uses prohibited by said ordinance is properly prohibited in tbe exercise of tbe police power, because such use, so prohibited, constitutes a nuisance or a danger to the public welfare, then, for such prohibited use of bis private property, tbe owner would be entitled to no compensation, it being damnum absegue injuria. In this event, tbe ordinance would be void for assessing private property to pay damages which have no legal existence. 12 Corpus Juris, 905; Loan Assn. v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 665; Cole v. LaGrange, 113 U. S. 1. (15) Independent of what has been said above, tbe ordinance cannot be sustained under tbe power of eminent domain, because tbe enforcement of tbe restrictions described in said ordinance, whether viewed singly or collectively, does not constitute a taking or damaging of private property for any public use whatever, and for this reason, said ordinance violates the provisions of Sections 4, 20 and 30, Article II, Constitution. of Missouri, and tbe Fourteenth Amendment, Constitution of tbe United States. Farist Steel Co. v. City of Bridgeport, 60 Conn. 278; Hyde v. Kansas City, 196 Mo. 498; City of Richmond v. Carneal, 106 S. E. 403; Lewis on Eminent Domain (3 Ed.) sec. 257, p. 504, also sec. 256; Dillon on Mun. Corp. (5 Ed.), sec. 1011, p. 1602; 1 Lewis, Eminent Domain (3 Ed.) sec. 1, p. 1, sec. 257, p. 504, sec. 258, p. 506; Chesapeake Stone Co. v. Moreland, 126 Ky. 656; Alfred Phosphate Co. v. Duck River Phosphate Co., 120 Tenn. 260, 113 S. W. 412; Loan Assn. v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 665; Cole v. La-Grange, 113 U. S. 1; Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. (Miss.) 53, 85. (16) Aesthetic considerations or purposes alone will not justify the exercise either of the po lice power or of the power of eminent domain. City of St. Louis y. Dreisoerner, 243 Mo. 217; Byrne v.. Md. Realty Co., 129 Md. 202, 209; Haller Sign Works v. Physical Culture Training School, 249 Ill. 436; Passaic v. Paterson Bill Posting Co., 72 N. J. L. 285; Bryan v. City of Chester, 212 Pa. St. 259. (17) Kansas City is a constitutional city (like St. Louis) and is organized under Section 16, Article IX of the Constitution of Missouri. As such municipal corporation, it only possesses and can exercise the following powers: (a) those granted in express. words; (b)' those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted (c) those essential to the declared objects and purposes of the coiporation — not simply convenient but indispensable. Any fair, reasonable doubt concerning the existence of power is resolved by the courts ■ against the corporation, and the power is denied. St. Louis v. Dreisoer-ner, 243 Mo. 223; Hays v. Poplar Bluff, 263 Mo. 516, 531. • (18) The power to take private property for public use without the consent of the owner is in derogation of the rights of the citizen, and can only be justified on grounds of absolute necessity; and, when exercised, the power conferring the right must be strictly adhered to and complied with. It is no answer to say that certain things in a given enactment, conferring the authority, do not appear to be essential. Everything is essential which the law has said should be done before this high prerogative right can be carried out and enforced. Leslie v. City of St. Louis, 47 Mo. 474, 477; 20 C. J. 883.
A. N. Gossett for Respondent Small; John G. Park for Respondent Liebi.
(1) The proposed taking under Ordinance No. 39946 is not for public use and would violate Article II, Section 20, of the Mo. Constitution. Taking for an aesthetic purpose, or for sport or pastime, is not a public use. Cooley’s Const!. Lim. (7 Ed.) p. 768; 1 Lewis on Em. Dom. (3 Ed.) pp. 506, 507, 508; Penns. Ins. Co. v. Phila., 242 Pa. 47, 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1062; Albright v. Park Comrs., 71 N. J. L. 303, 309, 108 Am. St. 749, 69 L. R. A. 768; Farist Steel Co. v. Bridgeport, '60 Conn. 278, 292; Woodstock v. Gallup, 28 Vt. 587; Gardner v. Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162, 167, 7 Am. Dec. 520, 529; Gt. Falls Power Co. v. Railroad, 104 Va. 416; In re Niagara Falls Co., 108 N. T. 375. The taking must be for a use by the public. Kansas City y. Hyde, 196 Mo. 498, 507, 512; Gaylord v. Sanitary Dist., 204 Ill. 576, 63 L. R. A. 582, 98 Am. St. 235. If the improvement was effectuated, the public would not be in possession, and the property would not become public property in any sense. Pa. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Phila., 242 Pa. 47, 49 L. R. A. .(N. S.) 1062; Cooley on Const. Lim. (7 Ed.) p. 766. If it were effectuated the Board of Park Commissioners could not control the property acquired. If it were effectuated, the tax burden would be where it is today. The ordinance would take from respondents their property in order to confer a benefit upon others, which is no public use. Kansas City v. Hyde, 196 Mo. 498, 512; Pa. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Phila., 242 Pa. 47, 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1062. (2) The true purpose of Ordinance No. 39946 is to unlawfully extend the police power and to prohibit useful industries and harmless business within the restricted area, contrary to settled doctrines of this court. St. Louis v. Dreisorner, 243 Mo. 217, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 177; St. Louis v. Dorr, 145 Mo. 466, 42 L. R. A. 686, 68 Am. St. 575. It is unconstitutional to forbid a lawful business Spann v. Dallas, 235 S. W. 513; State v. Sperry Co., 94 Neb. 785, 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1123; Tolliver v. Blizzard, 143 Ky. 773, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 890. There is a strong analogy between the police power and the power of eminent domain. 1 Lewis on Em. Dom. (3 Ed.) sec. 6, p. 16; 1 Nichols on Em. Dom. (2 Ed.) pp. 53, 54. The courts may inquire as to the true purpose and effect of an ordinance to condemn property. Kansas City v. Hyde, 196 Mo. 498, 513. (3) Ordinance 39946 is not'maintainable as a lawful eminent domain proceeding, because: (a) Tbe taking is forbidden by tbe charter. (Art. 13, Sec. 40). Gladstone Boulevard antedates tbe present charter, (b) The charter framers proposed one particular way, and only one, for affixing such restrictions. The people adopted the proposal and enacted that there should be but one way for imposing restrictions. These were declarations that under no other circumstances might restrictions be imposed by law. Schmidt v. Densmore, 42 Mo. 225, 236; St. Louis v. Dorr, 145 Mo. 466, 472; St. Louis v. Raime, 180 Mo. 317. Expression of the one excludes all others. State ex inf. v. .Sweeney, 270 Mo; 685. (c) The only provision of the law which might in any way justify Ordinance No. 39946 is Art. 13, secs. 40 and 41. That provision is inapplicable because: Gladstone Boulevard antedates the charter of 1908. The ordinance was not approved by the park board. A sufficient number of the abutting owners did not petition. The park board did not find that the majority had filed petition. The council did not find that a majority of such abutting owners had filed petition. No resolution of the park board established restrictions. The proposed restriction is 150 feet on either side of the boulevard. Article 13, Section 40, contemplates one. 50 feet wide on either side. (4) It is not authorized by any statutory or charter provision. The power must be distinctly conferred. 36 Cyc. 1179-1180; Schmidt v. Densmore, 42 Mo. 225, 234; St. Louis v. Dorr, 145 Mo. 466, 472; Belcher Sugar Co. v. El. Co., 82 Mo. 121; Miss. Bridge Co. v. Ring, 58 Mo. 491; 20 C. J. 533-535. Legislature cannot authorize condemnation of land adjacent tó a boulevard for the purpose of selling or leasing it to others. Opinion of Justices, 204 Mass. 607. (5) The land proposed to be condemned is the benefit district. This is confiscation and violates Amendment XIY of the Constitution of the United States. No genuine benefit district is created and there is no provision for assessing benefits against the city at large. There is no real provision for compensation, and the ordinance violates Article II, Sections 21 and 30, of the Constitution of Missouri. Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S. 269, 43 L. Ed. 443. (6) This is not a proceeding to condemn property for park, parkway or boulevard purposes, nor is it a permanent appropriation, as provided and required by Article 13 of the city charter. (7) Kansas City has no power to establish a building line without respondents’ consent, by condemnation or otherwise. (8) Ordinance No. 39946, sec. 5, provides that the proceedings shall be conducted under Article 13 of the charter. Article 13 does not contemplate proceedings for exclusion of bill boards. (9) A substantial amount of respondents’ lands affected by Ordinance No. 39946 does -not abut upon parks or boulevards under direction of the park board, but upon streets regulated by the board of Public Works, who have never approved this ordinance. Nor does this board have any jurisdiction over St. John Avenue, 400 feet of property on each side of which is attempted to be restricted in this proceeding. (10) The only means provided for paying the damages is by special assessments upon property in the alleged “benefit district,” from all of which the same valuable rights are withdrawn. The power to levy special assessments must clearly appear and be expressly provided. It is a power exercised against common right. 28 Cyc. 1102, 1105-1106. No power to levy a special assessment for such purpose is shown to exist, and no express power is claimed to exist. The proposal to levy such assessments, therefore, does not exist. (11) Ordinance No. 39946 is highly unreasonable, confiscatory and detrimental, as it prevents respondents building as near the boulevard as their neighbors have done. St. Louis v. Handlan, 242 Mo. 88, 97. Art. 13, sec. 8, of the charter provides for the condemnation of “lands” for park purposes. Under this provision there can be no appropriation of an interest short of the entire estate. 20 C. J. 594, note 39. Reasonableness of this ordinance was a question for the court. Am. Tel. Co. y. St. Louis, 202 Mo. 656, 680.

Opinion:
WHITE-, J.
This is a proceeding to restrict the use and to condemn certain rights in property along Gladstone Boulevard in Kansas City, under Ordinance No. 39946, called a "Protective Ordinance."
Owners of certain property abutting on Gladstone Boulevard and within a benefit district were made defendants. Five defendants appeared and filed separate motions to dismiss the proceeding. The motions of two of these, Fred Liebi and T. A. Smart, with a supplemental motion of Smart,- are set out in the record. The other motions are not in the record. All the motions to dismiss were sustained December 15, 1921, the cause dismissed and the plaintiff appealed.
In addition to the defendants who moved to dismiss, forty-six defendants appeared and filed their joint . answer, expressing their satisfaction with the proceeding and praying the court to carry it into effect.
The proceeding affects Gladstone Boulevard from Independence Boulevard to Wheeling Avenue, a distance of about three miles. Section 1 of Ordinance No. 39946 recites that Gladstone was the first boulevard or parkway established in the city, and that all the buildings along its entire length are used exclusively for residential purposes, and that the overwhelming sentiment of the property owners immediately interested and of all citizens who desire to make Kansas City a good place to live in, is that the enactment and enforcement of the ordinance would "enhance and stabilize the value and utility of each and every piece of property within the benefit district herein prescribed and add to the beautification of said highway and North Terrace Park." Section Two of the ordinance is as follows:
"Section 2. Prom and after the enactment of this ordinance no house or building shall be constructed in whole or in part within thirty-five feet of the nearest adjacent side line of said boulevard within twenty years from the enactment of this ordinance, nor shall any house or building within the said benefit district he used within that period for any other than residential purposes or for purposes that are incidental and appurtenant to residential uses. No bill boards shall be erected, maintained or used during that period within the said benefit district. No gasoline tank, or gasoline tanks used in connection with others having a capacity of more than one hundred gallons shall be .placed at one locality within the said benefit district during said period, nor shall any gasoline filling station be erected or maintained within said district during said period."
Section 3 provides for a benefit district comprising all lands on either side of Gladstone Boulevard between Independence Boulevard and Wheeling Avenue,' lying within one hundred and fifty feet of the respective side lines of said boulevard, and provides certain methods of measurement for laying out the lines.
Section 4 provides for a condemnation proceeding to determine the damage, if any, which the several property owners within the said benefit district might sustain by reason of the enactment and enforcement of the ordinance, and the manner in which the proceedings should be prosecuted.
Section 5 of the ordinance provides that damage caused by the enforcement of the ordinance should be paid for by special assessment upon real property situated within the benefit district.
Section 6 recites that the Common Council shall prescribe the terms and describe the limits within which property shall be benefitted by this ordinance and assessed to pay the damages.
Section 7 provides that within a period of twenty years the ordinance could be repealed only upon petition of a majority-of the owners of private property abutting upon the boulevard and within the benefit district.
The motions to dismiss allege numerous grounds why the proceeding should not he maintained. These may be classified in general as:
(1) Those which questioned the constitutionality of the ordinance and the proceeding. It is claimed that the ordinance and the proceeding are contrary to Sections 20, 21 and 30 of Article 2 of the Constitution of Missouri, and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The briefs and arguments of the respondent upon this point mainly go to the provision of Section 20, Article 2, that no private property can be taken for private use except for certain given purposes, and the provision of Section 21, that property shall not be taken nor damaged for public use without gust compensation.
(2) Those which asserted reasons why the proceeding is not authorized by the charter óf Kansas City. Several questions are presented in considering the charter power of the city, which will be noticed later in the opinion.
On the hearing of the motion the movers introduced evidence to show that some of the buildings upon the boulevard were much nearer than the thirty-five feet. Section Two does not require buildings alrea'dy on the property to be moved, but prohibits any building to be constructed within less than thirty-five feet of the nearest side line, after the enactment of the ordinance. A petition signed by one hundred and seven persons interested in the development of Gladstone Boulevard urging the immediate passage of the ordinance, and suggesting certain changes in it, was offered by the defendants to show that the petition was not in accordance with the provisions of the charter. It was shown that no other petition was on file in the office of the city clerk having reference to the subject-matter of the ordinance.
The city offered as witnesses a number of persons who owned property on Gladstone Boulevard, as well as real estate men, to show that the erection of structures forbidden by the ordinance would injure the boulevard for residences. Several witnesses testified that the value of property on the boulevard would be greatly appreciated by enforcement of the ordinance; that because of benefits arising from the scheme the enhanced value of the property affected would be much more than the damages to property owners. Mr. George E. Kessler, landscape architect, gave his idea of zoning in a city:
"Q. What do you understand city zoning to be? A. An assembling of the uses of lands for their various purposes in given areas and an attempt to anticipate expansion; and in order to bring about a greater stability; and an ascertainment of this the uses of the property in a rational way throughout the city; placing of limiting lines, throughout the city in different areas; classifying their use into, principally, industrial areas, commercial areas, residential areas; and again subdividing those areas into further smaller units for different uses that would be applicable within its activities. This has usually been done on the broadest scale in recent years, say, only five or six years, under the usual State's powers, or police powers of the State, but for very many years before, both on the European Continent and in the United States, there have been efforts to bring about the same results of stability of property through the right of eminent domain, establishing building lines, establishing areas of use so that invasion of contrary uses would be checked, and thereby preventing the very great losses that have occurred in most American cities by the need of shifting from one area to another, due to unnecessary or untimely invasion of contrary uses."
It was shown that Gladstone Boulevard was essentially a residence district, and values along the boulevard were based on the use of the land for dwellings; that use for any other purpose would have a tendency to destroy values. It was said that establishment there of business enterprises would immediately reduce its value for residence purposes, including a very large area immediately adjoining the property on which such business might be placed. The purpose was thus expressed :
"A. Primarily, the purpose, of course, is to give outdoor recreation. The good appearance and attractiveness is a very distinct value, not usually considered as the prime element, but is one of the large factors in establishing pleasant use. Attractive surroundings always give a greater consciousness of the better things in a community and finally through that very attractiveness increase and sustain the city's growth and the comfort and welfare of the people living, regardless of those who may come."
All this evidence was introduced without objection, generally being the opinions of real estate experts and of experts upon city planning.
The trend of the evidence was that the planning of the city in relation to the use of different parts would tend to prevent overcrowded and congested districts, thereby promoting health and the general welfare of the city, would make the city more attractive and thereby promote its growth and general prosperity — afford means of recreation to people who desired to drive or walk along such streets in the same way that a public park or playground would.
I. The propriety, expediency and necessity of a legislative act are purely for the determination of the legislative authority,, and are not for determination by the courts. That applies to a municipal or-dinance authorized by statute. A legal presumption. of its validity attends the ordinance under consideration and if there is doubt as to its constitutionality we must hold it to be constitutional. [County Court of St. Louis County v. Griswold, 58 Mo. 175, l. c. 192-193; State ex inf. v. Merchants Exchange, 269 Mo. 346, l. c. 356.] These fundamental principles should be stated now and then in view of the popular notion that courts go out of their way to nullify a legislative act.
II. It is contended here that Ordinance No. 39946 has not for its purpose a "public use" of the property a;ffecte(3> which is a matter for the determination of the courts, under Section 20, Article II of the State Constitution.
No satisfactory definition of the term "public use" has ever been achieved by the courts. Two different theories are presented by the judicial attempts to describe the subjects to which the expression would apply. One theory of "public use" limits the application to ' ' employment, " " occupation. ' ' A more liberal and more flexible meaning makes its synonymous with "public advantage," "public benefit." [20 C. J. p. 552, sec. 39; 1 Lewis, Eminent Domain, sec. 257; 1 Nichols, Eminent Domain, sec. 40.]
The first theory, advocated by respondents, is expressed in a quotation from Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, as follows: "The public use implies a possession, occupancy and enjoyment of land by the' public at large, or by the public agencies."
Nichols on Eminent Domain (Vol. 1, pp. 130-131) thus generalizes the more liberal interpretation of the term: "Anything which tends to enlarge the resources, increase the industrial energies, and promote the productive powers of any considerable number of the inhabitants of a section of the State, or which leads to the growth of towns and the creation of new resources for the employment of capital and labor, manifestly contributes. to the general welfare and the prosperity of the whole community, and, giving the Constitution a broad and comprehensive interpretation, constitutes a public use."
A little investigation will show that any definition attempted would exclude some subjects that properly should be included in, and include some subjects that' must be excluded from, the operation of the words "public use."
Naturally a definition or description of the limits of "public use"-is likely to vary with the character of case in which, the term is employed. The expenditure of public money for pure ornamentation, statuary, pictures and the like; the condemnation of property for the alleged public purpose with compensation to the owner; the enforcement of a pure police regulation for public safety where no compensation is contemplated — each of these different circumstances naturally causes a different application of the term.
As might be expected, the more limited application of the principle appears in the earlier cases, and the more liberal application has been rendered necessary by complex conditions due to recent developments of civilization and the increasing density of population. In the very nature of the-case, modem conditions and the increasing interdependence of the different human factors in the progressive complexity of a community, make it necessary for. the government to touch upon and limit individual activities at more points than formerly.
In order to constitute public use it is not necessary that the whole community or any large part of it should actually use or be benefited by a contemplated improvement. Benefit to any considerable number is sufficient. [4 Words & Phrases (2 Ed.) p. 44.] Nor does the mere, fact that the advantage of a public improvement also inures to a particular individual or group of individuals deprive it of its public character. [West v. Whitehead, 238 S. W. (Tex.) l. c. 978; Henderson v. Lexington, 22 L. R, A. (N. S.), l. c. 80; 20 C. J. p. 558.]
III. The taking for "public use," when applied to land, is not limited to actual occupation by the public. Any regulation which imposes a restriction upon the use of property by the owner, and any neighboring public improvement which tends to impair the enjoyment of property by affecting some right or easement appurtenant thereto, may be, under certain circumstances, a public use within the meaning of the Constitution. [1 Nichols on Eminent Domain, sec. 101, p. 280; 10 R. C. L. p. 73.]
In the recent case of Peters v. Buckner, 288 Mo. 618, where the owners of property in a large addition had received deeds with building restrictions, in an action to condemn two blocks in the addition for school purposes it was held that every owner of property in the addition had an easement in the blocks taken and should be compensated in damages which might accrue to each individual lot. That is, the condemnation reached not only the blocks of ground actually used for school purposes, but it also reached the intangible easement in that property appurtenant to a lot several blocks away; the owner of each lot had a right to the maintenance of the restrictions and that right was condemned for public use.
Consideration of some of the cases in various jurisdictions sustaining the constitutionality of zoning ordinance is important as throwing light on the attitude of the courts regarding the subject. The validity of a statute limiting, in the city of Boston, buildings to a certain height in one part of the city and to another height in another part of the city, was attacked in the case of Welch v. Swasey, 214 U. S. 91, and was heard on writ of error from the Supreme Court of Massachusetts (193 Mass. 364.) It was claimed that this statute was unconstitutional, and the purpose did not justify the exercise of public pow-er, because the real purpose was of an aesthetic nature, designed purely to preserve architectural symmetry and a regular sky line. It was further contended that the statute was unreasonable. The Federal Supreme Court, 214 U. S. l. c. 106, sustained the ruling of the Massachusetts Supreme Court, holding that regulations in regard to the height of buildings were made by the Legislature for the safety, comfort, and convenience of the people, or for the benefit of the property owners generally and were valid, and that the statute was not unreasonable.
In Attorney-General v. Williams, 174 Mass. 476, an act of the Legislature limiting the height of buildings around Copley Square in the city of Boston, but permitting towers, domes and sculptured ornaments to ex tend above the regulation height, was declared constitutional. The restriction was held to be for public use, on the theory that the grounds of the park were enjoyed by the-people that used them, and the park administered not only to the coarser senses but was in the highest sense educational. The statutes provided for compensation to persons damaged by the enforcement of the restriction.
In the case of State v. Houghton, 176 N. W. 159, the Supreme Court of Minnesota had under consideration the constitutionality of an act providing for residence districts in cities of the first-class and prohibiting the erection in such residence districts of certain business structures. The court reviewed the authorities at length and held the act constitutional. The opinion quotes also from an earlier Minnesota case to the effect that the term "public use" is flexible and cannot be limited to the public use known at the time of the framing of the Constitution (1. c. 161). The court thus states the historical expansion of "public use" at page 161:
"In comparatively recent times it was questioned whether a public use extended so far as to justify the condemnation of property and the expenditure of money for public parks, or for boulevards, or for pleasure drives, or for public baths, or for playgrounds, or for libraries and museums, or for numerous other purposes which contribute to the general good. Now condemnation and expenditure for these and like or similar purposes is common, and recognized as lawful. Not so very long ago there would have been a revolt against restricting a property owner in the full use of his lot to the street line. But a condemnation for the purpose of widening a street by adding a strip on each side, which is not to be used for travel, but for ornament and beauty, and with the reservation of a limited use in the owner, is held valid."
The opinion then cited many cases illustrative of the more liberal doctrine interpreting public use.
Tbe Supreme Court of Massachusetts on a request of the House of Representatives of that State, gave their opinion on the constitutionality of a contemplated zoning-act, and held the act would be constitutional, using this language (234 Mass. 603-604): "Intelligent municipal planning to the end of furnishing access to pleasant natural scenery was recognized and held by this court many years ago to warrant the exercise of the power of eminent domain and the expenditure of public moneys. [Higginson v. Nahant, 11 Allen, 530-536.] Legitimate expenditures of public money and exercise of eminent domain cover a broader field than does the public power in its limitations upon the rights of use of private property. "
That statement of the extent of the State's exercise of eminent domain is generally recognized by the authorities. [20 C. J. 519.] Other pertinent cases are Zircle v. Southern Railway Co., 102 Am. St. l. c. 813; Cochran v. Preston, 108 Md. 220; Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U. S. 137.
An examination of cases in this State will show this court is inclined to a more liberal application of the term "public use." As early as 1874, in considering the' act establishing Forest Park entirely outside the city limits of Saint Louis, this court held that act to be constitutional. [St. Louis County v. Griswold, 58 Mo. l. c. 192-193.]
In the case of the City of St. Louis v. Hill, 116 Mo. 527, l. c. 535, this court had under consideration the constitutionality of a boulevard law, and an ordinance in pursuance of it which provided that houses to be erected on Forest Park Boulevard should conform to certain building lines forty feet distant from the line of the street. This court held the act unconstitutional, because it made no provision for compensation for those whose property was restricted and no such provision was contained in the ordinance (1. c. 536). No other objection to the validity or constitutionality of the ordinance was mentioned.
In the case of St. Louis v. Dorr, 145 Mo. 466, l. c. 485, this court had under consideration an ordinance providing that houses fronting certain streets should be u.sed for residence only. The court held that the Scheme and Charter of the city of St. Louis did not authorize the ordinance, but citing the Hill Case, 116 Mo. 527, it was indicated that if the ordinance were authorized by the charter and provided for a compensation to owners on account of the restrictions imposed, it would be constitutional.
In the case of St. Louis Cunning Company v. St. Louis, 235 Mo. 99, this court held that under its police power the city had a right to regulate without compensation the size and position of bill boards along the streets, for the reason that the regulation of bill boards would tend to prevent crimes and disorders and promote the safety, welfare and enjoyment of the people. The validity of the bill board ordinance arose in the case of the Kansas City Cunning Co. v. Kansas City, 240 Mo. 659, and it was held that the regulation of. bill boards was within the power of the city, excepting one section which was conceded to be invalid. That case, as well as the St. Louis Cunning Company Case, got before the Federal Supreme Court, 249 U. S. 269. In quoting the St. Louis Cunning Case, 249 U. S. l. c. 274, the court approved the doctrine announced where the ordinance prohibited bill boards in residence districts of the city, "in the interest of the safety, morality, health and decency of the community." In that case it was held also that the city might discourage bill boards by a high tax "even apart from the right to prohibit them altogether asserted in the Cusack Company Case."
There is not a single argument or reason advanced in favor of the constitutionality of an act or an ordinance providing for a public park, or for a parkway along the street between the sidewalk and the driveway, over which the public cannot travel, which does not apply to the ordinance in this case. The parkway along the street is not traveled, it is not taken in possession by the public in the sense that the public occupies it; it is merely ornamental, but tends to enhance the attractiveness of a street and the value of property upon a street. It has an educational value and promotes the physical enjoyment of people who travel the street: All of which applies to Gladstone Boulevard with the proposed restrictions.
Section 2 of the ordinance provides for a building line thirty-five feet from the street for buildings thereafter constructed; prohibits buildings other than for residential purposes, including gasoline tanks of capacity more than one hundred gallons, filling stations, and billboards. Any person damaged by such restrictions is to be compensated in the manner provided. Each and all of those restrictions, and restrictions of like character, have been held legitimate exercise of the sovereign power of the State in the interest of health, safety, morality, general enjoyment and education of the community. We hold, therefore, that the ordinance is constitutional.
IY. Another point against Section Two is urged with great pertinacity by respondents — that it is unreasonable. And they point to the g*eneral doctrine that a court will nullify an ordinance because ^s unreasonableness in its operation upon the persons affected. Usually an ordinance will not be declared unreasonable if it is within the express power of the municipal authorities which ordain it. The question usually arises regarding a regulatory ordinance claimed to be within the merely implied powers of a municipal corporation. [Dillon on Mun. Corp. (4 Ed.) 405; Coal-Float v. Jeffersonville, 112 Ind. 15; 28 Cyc. pp. 369-870.]
In a condemnation proceeding the court having determined that the proposed use is a "public use," the expediency and propriety of the enactment under which it is authorized are for the legislative body and not a subject of judicial inquiry. [So. Ill. & Mo. Bridge Co. v. Stone, 174 Mo. 1; Aldridge v. Spears, 101 Mo. 400.] In the case of a municipal ordinance proposing to take property for public use, where the charter of the municipality authorized the proceeding, the passage of the ordinance is conclusive as to the necessity and reasonableness of it. [Cape Girardeau v. Houck, 129 Mo. 607; State ex rel. v. Engleman, 106 Mo. 628; Kansas City v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 229 S. W. l. c. 773.] In cases cited by the respondents in support of their position, such as St. Louis v. Handlan, 242 Mo. 88, the ordinances were held invalid because not within the charter power of the municipality which ordained them. In cases where municipalities proceed by ordinance to condemn property for public use, the question of the reasonableness or unreasonableness of an ordinance does not arise. The question for the courts in such cases is whether under its charter powers the municipality has a right to condemn property for the purposes contemplated, and whether the use is a public use.
V. Respondents urge that the proceeding in this case is not within the charter powers of Kansas City. They point to Sections 40 and 41, Article 13, of the charter, as providing a method by which the purpose contemplated here may be carried through. These sections provide for bulding restic tions and for the establishment of building lines through the instrumentality of the Board of Park Commissioners. The proceeding in this case does not conform to the method provided for in those sections of the 'charter. A further objection to the proceeding is that this charter was adopted in 1908, and Sections 40 and 41 provide they shall not apply to any boulevard, etc., established prior to the taking effect of the charter. Gladstone Boulevard was established long before that. Neither by the terms nor by intendment can it be said that the subjects to which those sections of the charter do not apply are governed by them. If the chartej of Kansas City and the general laws of the State authorize the city to proceed by ordinance in the manner in which it is proceeding here, then the adoption of Sections 40 and 41 and the restriction of their operation to future thoroughfares would not prohibit the proceeding. Those sections simply provide what the municipal authorities suppose to be a practical method by which the property along future thoroughfares may be regulated. It did not prohibit nor restrict the powers of the city with regard to property along thoroughfares already established.
VI. It remains .to inquire whether Kansas City under its charter and the general laws had authority to condemn property for the purpose mentioned. Section 16, Article 9, of the Constitution of Missouri, authorizes a city of more'than one hundred thousand inhabitants to frame a charter for its "own government consistent with and subject to the Constitution and the laws of this State." In pursuance of that authority Kansas City adopted its charter. Section 1, Article 1, of .the Charter adopted in 1908 provides that the city may "acquire by gift '. . . condemnation proceeding or otherwise . . . lands or other property" for certain public purposes. The section then provides that the city might acquire in the manner aforesaid: "any property real, personal or mixed for art gallarles, museums, educational, benevolent, charitable or other public purposes, whatsoever."
It is not claimed that the provision is unconstitutional. It is certainly comprehensive enough to cover any purposes for which the city authorities might deem it. necessary to condemn property, provided the use for which it was taken was a public use, and of the same general character as those specifically mentioned.
Section 8906, Revised Statutes 1919, relating to cities of more than one hundred thousand inhabitants, provides that such cities may acquire and hold by gift, etc., "by tbe exercise of tbe power of eminent domain by condemnation proceedings, lands for public use" for certain public purposes mentioned, including parks,."or for any other public purpose and to provide for managing, controlling and policing tbe same." Other sections of tbe charter also bear upon'tbe subject and have been held by this court to invest Kansas City "with tbe power of eminent domain for tbe condemnation of property for public purposes." [State ex rel. Realty Co. v. Thomas, 278 Mo. l. c. 95; Kansas City v. Oil Co., 140 Mo. 458; Brunn v. Kansas City, 216 Mo. l. c. 117; Kansas City v. Woerishoeffer, 249 Mo. l. c. 46, and cases there cited.]
Those provisions in tbe charter, and Section 8906, Revised Statutes 1919, are comprehensive' enough to cover the ordinance and the proceeding here. The purpose is educational, means of recreation, enhancement of property values, and all those elements which promote civic pride and consequent growth and prosperity of the city.
VI. The rulings of the Federal Supreme Court in the case mentioned under Paragraph III above sufficiently answer the contention of the respondents that the proceeding here is contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. We have not been pointed to any reason why the pro ceeding in this case is contrary to the Constitution, nor to any reason why it is not within the powers granted to Kansas City. The order sustaining the motions to dismiss was therefore erroneous. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
All concur, except Walker, J., who dissents in separate opinion, in which David E. Blair, J., concurs.