Case Name: Jose BENITEZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2007-04-13
Citations: 952 So. 2d 1275
Docket Number: No. 2D05-4325
Parties: Jose BENITEZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: NORTHCUTT, J., Concurs in part and Dissents in part.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 952
Pages: 1275–1285

Head Matter:
Jose BENITEZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 2D05-4325.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
April 13, 2007.
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Judith Ellis, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Chandra Waite Dasrat, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appel-lee.

Opinion:
WHATLEY, Judge.
Jose Benitez appeals his judgments for five counts of burglary of a dwelling, five counts of grand theft, petit theft, and trespass. Benitez entered a plea to the charges after reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. In his motion to suppress and on appeal, Ben-itez argues that police did not have reasonable suspicion to stop him and that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights. We conclude that police did have reasonable suspicion to stop him and affirm as to that claim. However, we reverse because the order denying the motion to suppress suggests that the trial court may have applied an incorrect standard in determining whether Benitez knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights.
The trial court denied the motion to suppress Benitez's confession based on its finding that diminished capacity is not a recognized defense, "The State elicited testimony that the Court finds indicates the defendant is of diminished mental capacity. Diminished Capacity is not a defense recognized in Florida Law." However, Benitez never argued that diminished capacity was the correct test in determining whether he knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. The only reference to diminished capacity in the record occurs during the State's cross examination of Benitez's expert witness, Dr. Tracy Henley. The State asked Dr. Henley about a conclusion in her report that, under the totality of circumstances, it is likely that Benitez had a diminished ability to make a valid waiver of his Miranda rights.
We note that a defendant's diminished mental capacity, along with improper coercive police conduct, may be relevant to whether the defendant voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, but his diminished mental capacity is not relevant to whether he knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. See State v. Stewart, 588 So.2d 1063 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Benitez's counsel made it clear that he was arguing that Benitez did not knowingly and intelligently waive his rights and that he was not contending Benitez's waiver was. not voluntary. Consequently, the trial court should have examined factors relevant to whether Beni-tez knowingly and intelligently waived his rights.
In Ramirez v. State, 739 So.2d 568, 575-76 (Fla.1999), the Florida Supreme Court held that the following factors must be considered in determining whether a defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights: 1) the manner in which the Miranda rights were given, including any trickery or cajoling; 2) the defendant's age, intelligence, background, and experience; 3) whether the juvenile's parents were contacted and given an opportunity to speak with him before questioning; 4) the location of the questioning; and 5) whether police obtained a written waiver of the Miranda rights.
At the hearing on Benitez's motion to suppress, Detective James Sheely testified regarding the first and fourth factors in Ramirez. Detective Sheely testified that he interviewed Benitez at the police station after he had been taken into custody for burglary. Detective Sheely read the Miranda rights form to Benitez, and after reading each right to Benitez, he paused and made eye contact with Benitez to make sure he was following. Benitez appeared to understand what was going on, did not appear to be puzzled, did not appear to have any difficulty understanding the words he was using, and did not ask any questions. After Detective Sheely finished reading the Miranda form, Benitez specifically told him that he understood the Miranda rights, and Benitez also signed the Miranda form, acknowledging that he understood those rights. Detective Sheely testified that the interview was very "low key" and "laid back" and that Benitez's responses to his questions were "logical."
Benitez has never asserted, and there was no evidence presented at the suppression hearing, that police used threats, coercion or trickery to obtain the confession— which the supreme court has stated is a critical factor in determining whether the Miranda waiver is knowing, voluntary and intelligent. Id. at 576. Further, the trial court found that there was no "coercion on the part of the police and that the detective did not take advantage of the defendant." ,
Evidence was also presented regarding the second factor in Ramirez: Benitez's age, intelligence, background, and experience. Dr. Henley testified that, although Benitez was only three months shy of his eighteenth- birthday, his test scores indicated that, at best, he was in the mild mental retardation range. Benitez had completed the seventh grade in school.
Concerning the third factor, Detective Sheely testified that Benitez did not have an opportunity to speak with a parent before his interrogation. Detective Sheely attempted to contact Benitez's parent and, when he was unsuccessful, he attempted to contact an aunt with whom Benitez was living. His attempts to contact the aunt were also unsuccessful. However, the situation in the present case is different from that in Ramirez, where the videotape of the confession revealed that police began to ask the appellant about the location of his parents after he had confessed to the crime. Here, Detective Sheely attempted to contact a relative of Benitez before he questioned him about the crime. Id. at 578 n. 8. The final factor in Ramirez, whether police obtained a written waiver of the Miranda rights, was met in this case. Detective Sheely obtained a written waiver of the Miranda rights before he began questioning Benitez.
Unfortunately, there is no indication in the trial court's order that it weighed any of the above factors in a "totality of the circumstances" analysis before denying Benitez's motion to suppress. Id. at 575. Although the trial court stated in its order that it accepted the defense expert's testimony, the court went on to find that Beni-tez's confession was admissible pursuant to existing law: "Dr. Henley is an expert in the subject about which she testified and the court accepts her opinions but is not persuaded that the defendant's confession is not proper pursuant to existing law."
The defense presented the testimony of Dr. Henley, whose practice consists primarily of conducting psychological assessments. Dr. Henley conducted tests to determine Benitez's ability to understand the Miranda warnings and his IQ, which as noted earlier was in the mild mental retardation range. Dr. Henley testified Benitez correctly understood the Miranda warning that anything he said could be used against him in court. He also understood that if he could not afford a lawyer, one would be appointed for him.
Conversely, Dr. Henley testified that Benitez did not understand the statement that he had the right to remain silent. He also did not understand the Miranda warning, "You're entitled to consult with an attorney before interrogation and to have an attorney present at the time of the interrogation." Dr. Henley testified that Benitez said this meant "you can get a lawyer to speak first." In Dr. Henley's opinion, Benitez had difficulty understanding the words "interrogation" and "entitled."
However, when Dr. Henley tested Beni-tez's understanding of these Miranda rights, she used a form which differed from the one used by Detective Sheely. The form used by Detective Sheely did not contain the words "interrogation" and "entitled." His Miranda form contained the following language, "You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions and to have him with you during questioning if you wish." The form further warned, "If you decide to answer questions now without a lawyer present, you will still have the right to stop answering at any time. You also have the right to stop answering at any time until you talk to a lawyer." We note that, because Dr. Henley's form did not contain this last sentence, she never tested Beni-tez's ability to comprehend its meaning.
We cannot determine from the language used in the order denying the motion to suppress whether the trial court, while accepting Dr. Henley's opinion of Benitez's test results, nevertheless found that Beni-tez did understand the Miranda, rights as they were explained to him in simpler terms by the detective conducting the interview. See Morton v. State, 789 So.2d 824, 330 (Fla.2001) (explaining that "un-controverted expert opinion testimony may be rejected where it is difficult to square with the other evidence in the case."). It is possible that the trial court considered the detective's testimony, along with Beni-tez's own verbal and written acknowledgment that he understood his rights, and found that Benitez did understand his Miranda rights. On the other hand, it is also possible that the trial court accepted Dr. Henley's opinion as accurate that Benitez did not understand those rights and applied the incorrect standard of "diminished mental capacity" to its finding.
Because the trial court's order denying Benitez's motion to suppress and its failure to make critical Ramirez determinations of fact may have resulted from the trial court's erroneous view of the law, we reverse and remand for either a written order which makes the required findings and conclusion as to whether Benitez knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights or a new hearing and an order, whichever the trial court deems necessary. See Phillips v. State, 707 So.2d 774 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (holding that where trial court erred in applying established law to the facts of the case, it must be reversed and remanded for a new hearing to give the trial court an opportunity to address the issue); Wright v. State, 766 So.2d 467 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (where trial court failed to address whether appellant withdrew his consent to search, case reversed and remanded for trial court to conduct new hearing on the issue); Simpson v. State, 562 So.2d 742 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (concluding that where it was uncertain from the record what trial court intended in its ruling determining whether appellant's confession was voluntary, case had to be reversed and remanded for either a written order stating- its conclusion or a new hearing on appellant's motion).
Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with directions.
NORTHCUTT, J., Concurs in part and Dissents in part.
SILBERMAN, J., Concurs specially with opinion.
. A motion to suppress was not filed in the trespass case.
. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
. The form also contains the following statement, "I understand and know what I am doing."
. We are aware of the statements by Benitez's attorney at the sentencing hearing that Beni-tez had a criminal record but it was "not extensive." However, because this evidence was not presented at the sentencing hearing, it cannot be considered in our analysis. Ramirez, 739 So.2d at 577 n. 5.