Case Name: METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY, Appellant, v. Freddy DUBON, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2001-03-28
Citations: 780 So. 2d 328
Docket Number: No. 3D99-1279
Parties: METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY, Appellant, v. Freddy DUBON, Appellee.
Judges: Before JORGENSON, GERSTEN, and FLETCHER, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 780
Pages: 328–334

Head Matter:
METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY, Appellant, v. Freddy DUBON, Appellee.
No. 3D99-1279.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
March 28, 2001.
Robert A. Ginsburg, County Attorney, and Jason Bloch and Thomas A. Tucker Ronzetti, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellant.
Moscowitz, Starkman & Magolnick and Farah Koran, Miami, for appellee.
Before JORGENSON, GERSTEN, and FLETCHER, JJ.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Miami-Dade County appeals from a final judgment entered on a jury verdict finding the County liable for negligence. For the following reasons, we reverse.
The County operates Beckham Hall, a non-profit, no-fee shelter for homeless men. The shelter offers life skills training, remedial education, and substance abuse recovery programs. Clients are required to obtain employment and save a percentage of their income. Many had psychological or emotional problems; many were drug users or alcoholics who were referred to a mental health facility for evaluation and treatment.
Beckham Hall employed case workers who interacted with the clients and monitors at the facility who handed out meals and assured clients' attendance at Narcotics Anonymous. Although there were rules and regulations to maintain order, Beckham Hall had no security guards, and clients were free to come and go as they pleased.
Beckham Hall prohibited the possession of weapons on the premises; clients were searched for contraband when they initially entered the program. Until the incident involving plaintiff Freddy Dubon, no violent attacks had occurred. Dubon was stabbed in an attack by another client, Luis Garcia. Dubon and Garcia shared a room at Beckham Hall. Garcia, who had been anxious and depressed, verbally threatened Dubon. When Dubon reported the verbal threat to Garcia's case manager, Dubon was told that they "were working on that," as there had been an earlier complaint about Garcia. Garcia stabbed Dubon and then fled. He has not been heard from since. Dubon recovered, and sued the County for negligence.
The jury returned a verdict on liability for Dubon, finding the County 60% at fault for Dubon's injuries, and Dubon 40% at fault. The trial court denied the County's motion for a new trial, and motion for directed verdict. We hold that the County owed no legal duty of care to the plaintiff, and reverse.
Florida courts have refused to find that a party owes a duty to control the conduct of another absent a special relationship. Implicit in the "special relationship" exception to the general rule that no duty is owed is the proposition that the party must have the right or ability to control the third party's behavior.
Lighthouse Mission of Orlando, Inc. v. Estate of McGowen, 683 So.2d 1086, 1088 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (citations omitted), review denied, 697 So.2d 510 (Fla.1997). In Lighthouse Mission, the court held that a nonprofit organization that assisted and housed transients and ex-felons was not liable for the criminal attack by one of its residents upon a third party, as it had no control over the assailant.
Florida courts have adopted section 319 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1964) which states: "One who takes charge of a third person whom he knows or should know to be likely to cause bodily harm to others if not controlled is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control the third person to prevent him from doing such harm."
Lighthouse Mission, 683 So.2d at 1088 (citations omitted).
In Lighthouse Mission, as in this case, the assailant was "not in the custody or control of [defendants]. There were no restraints on his liberty." Id. Because the defendants did not have either the right or the ability to control the assailant, they did not owe a duty to the plaintiff. Id. See also Akinwande v. City of New York, 260 A.D.2d 586, 688 N.Y.S.2d 651 (N.Y.App. Div.1999) (holding that City owed no special duty to plaintiff for alleged failure to provide adequate security to prevent attacks by third'parties at homeless shelter where incident occurred); Abraham v. Wayside Cross Rescue Mission, 289 Ill.App.3d 1048, 225 Ill.Dec. 163, 682 N.E.2d 1240, 1245 (1997) (holding that defendant halfway house did not exert sufficient control over assailant so as to create a common law duty where facility "did not have disciplinary discretion, it did not have armed guards, it could not be locked down, the residents could not be restrained, and the residents could leave the facility at any time.").
Here, both the plaintiff and the defendant were absolutely free to come and go as they chose. Beckham Hall provided valuable services to its homeless residents. It did not have a common law duty to maintain a vigil over those who sought shelter.
Reversed and remanded with directions to grant the County's Motion for Directed Verdict.
JORGENSON and GERSTEN, JJ., concur.
. Dubon also sued the County for breach of an alleged third-party contract; the jury ruled against Dubon on that claim.
. Because the issue of duty is dispositive, we do not reach the issues of sovereign immunity or the propriety of remarks made in closing argument.