Case Name: William D. FRANKLIN, Individually, and as Trustee and Elaine Franklin, his wife, Appellants, v. SHERWOOD PARK, LTD., INC., and Sherwood Forest, Ltd., Inc., of Hollywood, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1980-03-18
Citations: 380 So. 2d 1323
Docket Number: No. 79-1757
Parties: William D. FRANKLIN, Individually, and as Trustee and Elaine Franklin, his wife, Appellants, v. SHERWOOD PARK, LTD., INC., and Sherwood Forest, Ltd., Inc., of Hollywood, Appellees.
Judges: Before PEARSON and SCHWARTZ, JJ., and EZELL, BOYCE F., Jr. (Ret.), Associate Judge.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 380
Pages: 1323–1324

Head Matter:
William D. FRANKLIN, Individually, and as Trustee and Elaine Franklin, his wife, Appellants, v. SHERWOOD PARK, LTD., INC., and Sherwood Forest, Ltd., Inc., of Hollywood, Appellees.
No. 79-1757.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
March 18, 1980.
Salter, Yeslow & Burnstein and Myron H. Burnstein, Hollywood, for appellants.
Joe N. Unger, Podhurst, Orseck & Parks and Joel D. Eaton, Miami, for appellees.
Before PEARSON and SCHWARTZ, JJ., and EZELL, BOYCE F., Jr. (Ret.), Associate Judge.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
This interlocutory appeal by the defendants is from an order which (1) denied the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and (2) denied the defendants' alternative motion to abate for improper venue. The motion to abate for improper venue should have been treated as a motion to transfer. See Ryder Leasing, Inc. v. Jorge, 168 So.2d 548 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964).
At oral argument, the defendants conceded that the point on personal jurisdiction had become moot because of subsequent personal service upon them.
The plaintiffs' action sought to enforce a contract to convey title to real property. As such, venue was governed by the "local action" rule. See Sales v. Berzin, 212 So.2d 23 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968); and Landmark Tower Associates v. First National Bank of Chicago, 439 F.Supp. 195 (S.D.Fla. 1977). We have declined the plaintiffs' invitation to depart from the established law in this area. The argument that the "local action" rule is without basis in modern law is, in our view, unconvincing when dealing with actions affecting the title to real property.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part; and remanded with directions to transfer the cause to Broward County.