Case Name: Stephanie CLARK, Plaintiff, v. MAZDA MOTOR CORPORATION, a/k/a Mazda Motors Corporation, f/k/a Toyo Kogyo, Ltd., Defendants
Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oklahoma
Decision Date: 2003-03-04
Citations: 68 P.3d 207
Docket Number: No. 97,514
Parties: Stephanie CLARK, Plaintiff, v. MAZDA MOTOR CORPORATION, a/k/a Mazda Motors Corporation, f/k/a Toyo Kogyo, Ltd., Defendants.
Judges: OPALA, V.C.J., HODGES, HARGRAVE, SUMMERS and WINCHESTER, JJ., Concur.
Reporter: Pacific Reporter 3d
Volume: 68
Pages: 207–212

Head Matter:
2003 OK 19
Stephanie CLARK, Plaintiff, v. MAZDA MOTOR CORPORATION, a/k/a Mazda Motors Corporation, f/k/a Toyo Kogyo, Ltd., Defendants.
No. 97,514.
Supreme Court of Oklahoma.
March 4, 2003.
Thomas A. Wallace, Charles F. Moser, John B. Norman, John W. Norman, Bradley E. Norman, Norman, Edem, Meyer, Wallace, Norman, Cox & Moser, PLLC, Oklahoma City, OK, for plaintiff, Stephanie Clark.
Bert M. Jones and Daniel D. Draper III, Rhodes Hieronymus Jones Tucker & Gable, Tulsa, OK, for defendants Mazda Motor Corp., a/k/a Mazda Motors Corporation, f/k/a Toyo Kogyo, Ltd., and Mazda Motor of America, Inc.
Rex K. Travis, Oklahoma City, OK, Charles W. Adams, The University of Tulsa College of Law, Tulsa, OK, for amicus curiae Oklahoma Trial Lawyers Association.
Hugh F. Young, Jr., Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., Reston, VA, P. Michael Jung, James K. Peden, III, Strasburger & Price, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas, Robert H. Alexander, Jr., John J. Love, The Law Office of Robert H. Alexander, Jr. P.C., Oklahoma City, OK, for amicus curiae Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc.

Opinion:
WINCHESTER, J.
T1 The instant matter involves a question certified by the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma in a manufacturers' products liability case. We are asked to answer the question of whether 47 O.S.2001, § 12-420 of the Oklahoma Mandatory Seat Belt Act, 47 O.S.2001, § 12-416 et seq., as interpreted in Bishop v. Takata Corp., 2000 OK 71, 12 P.3d 459, bars the admission of evidence of seat belt use or non-use, in a manufacturer's products liability crashworthiness case . The question is answered as follows: Section 12-420 does not bar the admission of evidence of the use or non-use of seat belts in a manufacturer's products liability erashworthiness case, although it prohibits introduction of such evidence to impute negligence or fault to a person who elects not to wear a seat belt.
[ 2 We held § 12-420 of Oklahoma's Mandatory Seat Belt Use Act did not preclude admission of evidence pertaining to seat belt use or nonuse in a manufacturers' products liability action for a defective seat belt restraint system in Bishop v. Takata Corp., 2000 OK 71, 12 P.3d 459. The Bishop matter came to us as a certified question from the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, Honorable Lee R. West. We discussed the implications of the Mandatory Seat Belt Act and concluded it protects persons in civil proceedings from connotations of fault but does not preclude admission of evidence pertaining to an automobile's design. Bishop, 2000 OK 71, ¶ 21-22, 12 P.3d 459, 466. In Bishop, the issue concerned the condition of the seat belt, as opposed to the conduct of the seat belt user. Bishop, 2000 OK 71, ¶ 12, 12 P.3d 459, 463. The plaintiff therein sought to introduce evidence of a defective seat belt that allegedly disengaged and caused her to be thrown from the vehicle. In the instant case, it is the defendant manufacturer who seeks to introduce seat belt evidence. Once again, as in Bishop, it is the design, construction and condition of the seat's occupant restraint system that is at issue herein, and not the conduct of the vehicle occupant who either used or elected not to use the seat belt.
Facts
T3 The facts reported by the United States District Court are as follows. This case arises from a multi-vehicle accident in which the 1989 Mazda 626 driven by plaintiff, Stephanie Clark, (hereinafter "Clark," crossed the center median of the H.E. Bailey Turnpike and was involved in four different collisions. In the first two, Clark's Mazda collided with a southbound pickup and the pickup's stock trailer. The third and fourth collisions occurred when Clark's Mazda was struck twice by a southbound tractor-trailer. The fourth collision ejected Clark out the back window of the Mazda, and amputated her lower left arm. Clark's impact with the pavement paralyzed her.
¶4 The facts reported to the Court establish that the safety restraint system in Clark's Mazda included a shoulder belt that engaged automatically when the driver closed the door. This shoulder belt was across Clark's torso at the time of the collisions. Clark was not wearing the manual lap belt.
T 5 An initial review of the elements essential to a successful manufacturers' products lability claim is necessary as we begin our analysis of the legal issue presented by this federal certified question. We set forth the legal blueprint for a manufacturers' products liability claim in Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 1974 OK 52, 521 P.2d 1353. In Kirkland, we articulated three elements a plaintiff must prove and determined that upon plaintiff's proof of these elements, a manufac turer incurs strict liability. These three elements, as they pertain to a product manufacturer such as Mazda, are as follows:
1) the product was the cause of the injury;
2) the defect existed in the product at the time the product left the manufacturer's possession and control;
3) the defect made the product unreasonably dangerous to the plaintiff or to the plaintiff's property.
Kirkland, 1974 OK 52, ¶ 29-31, 521 P.2d 1353 at 1363.
T 6 Clark brings the instant manufacturers' products liability action alleging a defective seatback and/or seat design, a theory that calls into question the design of the seat's occupant restraint system in the Mazda 626 automobile. Defendants, (hereinafter referred to collectively as "Mazda,") assert it was Clark's failure to wear her lap belt, (a component of the Mazda 626 seat's occupant restraint system) that caused her body to be moved within the vehicle in such a way that the force of the final collision collapsed the driver's seat and ejected her from the car. Mazda seeks to offer evidence that Clark would not have been ejected had she worn the lap belt, to prove the seat back and/or seat design are not defective.
T7 The lap belt, the shoulder belt, the driver's seat and seat back cumulatively comprise the seat's occupant restraint system in the Mazda 626. If we hold that Mazda may present evidence the lap belt was designed to keep occupants from being ejected and that this feature was not utilized by Clark, the holding is harmonious with our decision in Bishop to allow the plaintiff therein to introduce seat belt evidence pertaining to automobile design, as opposed to any negligence or fault of the plaintiff, the latter of which is prohibited by § 12-420.
T8 We are confident that our limitation of evidence regarding seat belt use to those products liability actions in which the vehicle seat's occupant restraint system is at issue adequately safeguards against Clark's concern that auto manufacturers will claim seat belts are "safety components" in all manufacturers' products liability cases. The shoulder belt, lap belt, driver's seat and seat back are either physically connected to each other or are so closely aligned in the Mazda 626 as to be a part of the seat's occupant restraint system.
T9 Clark contends the statute requires only that she wear the shoulder belt. While no legal authority is cited for her conclusion, we note that Clark's compliance with the seat belt statute is not at issue herein. Clark apparently contends she complied with the statute in an effort to demonstrate a defect in Mazda seat's occupant restraint system, reasoning that the shoulder belt alone should have restrained her from being ejected, and since it failed to do so, the driver's seat and/or seat back are defective in design. However, she cannot selectively eliminate evidence pertaining to certain components of the seat's occupant restraint system such as the lap belt, while offering evidence as to other elements such as the shoulder belt, driver's seat and seat bracket. Such an attempt misconstrues our holding in Biskop and ignores the statutory intent pertaining to § 12-420 we articulated therein.
110 The question is answered as follows: 47 O.S.2001, § 12-420, as interpreted in Bishop v. Takata Corp., 2000 OK 71, 12 P.3d 459, does not bar the admission of evidence of the use or non-use of seat belts in a manufacturer's products liability erashwor-thiness case.
QUESTION ANSWERED.
OPALA, V.C.J., HODGES, HARGRAVE, SUMMERS and WINCHESTER, JJ., Concur.
WATT, C.J. (joins KAUGER, J.), LAVENDER (joins KAUGER, J.), KAUGER and BOUDREAU (joins KAUGER, J.) JJ., Concur in Result.
. 47 0.$.2001, § 12-420 provides:
"Nothing in this act shall be used in any civil proceeding in this state and the use or nonuse of seat belts shall not be submitted into evidence in any civil suit in Oklahoma."
. The instant matter involves crashworthiness issues that arise in cases of second impact. We addressed the distinction between injuries received in the "first collision or impact" and those received in a "second collision or impact," in Lee v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 1984 OK 48, ¶ 11, 688 P.2d 1283, 1286. Lee involved "second impact injuries" that arose in an automobile accident wherein the driver and passenger in a Volkswagen "Beetle" were ejected and suffered injuries as a result. Plaintiff's manufacturers' products liability theory in Lee was that a defective door latch allowed the door to open, thus causing him to be ejected and injured.
. We note that Clark already has incorporated a component of the seat belt into her theory of the case, by her reliance on the shoulder belt alone, as the restraint system that allegedly failed to preclude her ejection.
. In Kirkland, we adopted the definition of "unreasonably dangerous" contained in § 402A comment g of the Restatement of Torts, Second Series, to-wit:
'The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics." '
Kirkland, 1974 OK 52, ¶ 26, 521 P.2d 1353, 1362,-1363.