Case Name: Albert Raymond RANDOLPH, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1974-02-27
Citations: 505 S.W.2d 845
Docket Number: No. 46978
Parties: Albert Raymond RANDOLPH, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
Judges: DOUGLAS, J., joins in this dissent.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 505
Pages: 845–850

Head Matter:
Albert Raymond RANDOLPH, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
No. 46978.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Feb. 27, 1974.
William E. Nicholas, Sinton and Joe J. Alsup, Corpus Christi, for appellant.
Jim D. Vollers, State’s Atty., Buddy Stevens, Asst. State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.

Opinion:
OPINION ON APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR REHEARING
ROBERTS, Judge.
The appellant was convicted of burglary. The jury assessed his punishment at two years' imprisonment.
All of appellant's grounds of error relate to the sufficiency of the evidence. Viewed in light of the jury's verdict, the evidence shows the following: W. L. Shel-burne testified that on June 26, 1970, he and his "hands" placed their saddles in a shed at the farm where the offense occurred. The door to the shed was closed. He returned on the following morning to find that the door to the shed had been pushed open and the saddles were missing. C. B. Owen, a deputy sheriff of San Patricio County, testified that he examined the shed and that the door appeared to have been pried open. Both Shelburne and Owen tes tified that another building on the same farm had been entered and a number of tools had been taken therefrom.
Shelburne testified that "almost a year" after the offense the appellant visited at his home, told him that he had possession of the saddles, that he had pawned them, that he wanted to know how much Shelburne had lost (" . . . what it would take to kind of offset my loss . . . "), and that he wanted to work with Shelburne " . . .in any way possible to try to clear the air . "
The State also showed, by the testimony of a clerk at the Olympia Pawn Shop in San Antonio, that on February 1, 1971 (some eight months after the offense), the appellant and his brother, Pat, appeared at the pawn shop with the saddles. At this time Pat apparently attempted to pawn the saddles; however, he was unable to produce his identification, so appellant pawned them. The State also showed, and this fact was developed on cross-examination, that the same saddles had previously been pawned and redeemed at the same shop by Pat alone.
It was also shown that one of the saddles carried a silver plate on which was engraved the name "Pat" and that this plate had been used to hide the name "Mike" (a deceased son of Mr. Shelburne) which had been tooled in the leather of the saddle.
The only other evidence of guilt was some rather ambiguous evidence of flight. Arturo Rodriguez, a Texas Ranger, testified that on February 24, 1971, he had two warrants for appellant's arrest. Rodriguez stationed himself in front of the Olympia Pawn Shop. The shop had just closed and the manager was driving away when Rodriguez observed the appellant and another drive up in a pick-up truck. The driver was a man named Vincent Clark. The Ranger testified that the men did not stop but continued down the street. He turned around to follow them and observed them make a u-turn and come back toward him. The Ranger made a u-turn, and followed them, observing them speed up and make two turns at intersections before he caught and stopped the truck. There was no testimony that the Ranger ever used a siren or red lights in order to call attention, including that of the occupants of the truck, to the fact that he was giving chase. Compare Talbert v. State, and Navy v. State, 489 S.W.2d 309 (Tex.Cr.App.1973).
We must assume, from this evidence, that the State relied upon recent unexplained possession to show appellant's guilt. In order to warrant the drawing of an inference of guilt from the mere circumstance of possession, such possession must be personal, recent, unexplained, and must involve a distinct and conscious assertion of property rights by the accused. See Smith v. State, 472 S.W.2d 121 (Tex.Cr. App.1971) and cases there cited.
In the case at bar, appellant's possession was not shown to be personal. The record shows that appellant's brother, Pat, apparently acting0 alone, had previously pawned and redeemed the saddles. Additionally, one of the saddles was marked with Pat's name. Appellant's statement to Shelburne was made after the saddles were pawned a second time and were unredeemed, so that appellant, while admittedly knowing their location, did not have possession of them. The fact that appellant entered the pawn shop with his brother on February 1, and pawned the saddles in his name when his brother could not produce identification, has little probative value, in view of the fact that his brother had previously pawned and redeemed the saddles and had his name on one of them. We are of the opinion that this is not sufficient evidence to show that the appellant and his brother were acting together and exercising joint control and possession of the property. Compare Beard v. State, 458 S.W.2d 85 (Tex.Cr.App.1970).
Appellant's "possession" was certainly not recent, since the saddles were pawned some eight months after the offense, and appellant's conversation with Shelburne occurred even later.
Appellant's possession was unexplained. He did not testify at trial and his conversation with Shelburne shed no light on the pawning of the saddles.
With regard to a distinct and conscious exercise of property rights in the saddles, the evidence shows at most that appellant pawned them in his name only after his brother was unable to do so.
A conviction on circumstantial evidence cannot be sustained if the circumstances proved do not exclude every other reasonable hypothesis except that of the guilt of the accused. Proof amounting only to a strong suspicion or a mere probability of guilt is insufficient. See Flores v. State, 489 S.W.2d 901 (Tex.Cr.App.1973) and cases there cited.
We are of the opinion that the evidence in this case was not such as to exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than that the appellant committed this offense.
For the reasons stated, the judgment of affirmance is set aside, appellant's motion for rehearing is granted and the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
. We have not been favored with a brief for the State either on original submission or on this reahearing.