Case Name: Francis v. Wells
Court: Colorado Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Colorado
Decision Date: 1875-02
Citations: 2 Colo. 660
Docket Number: 
Parties: Francis v. Wells.
Judges: 
Reporter: Colorado Reports
Volume: 2
Pages: 660–669

Head Matter:
Francis v. Wells.
Vendor’s lien in fmor of assignee of purchase-money. Where, upon, sale of land, the vendee agrees to pay a portion of the purchase-money to a third party, as against the vendee and those claiming under him, with notice, such third party may have a lien upon the land to secure the amount so agreed to be paid.
Where the vendee assigns his contract. And if the vendee assign the contract to another, the assignee will take the land subject to the same lien, and be equally bound to perform the stipulations of the contract.
Of the nature of the lien. But if the vendee altogether fail to perform the contract, he acquires no interest in the premises, and there is nothing to which a vendor’s lien can attach in favor of such third party.
Where time is of the essence of the contract, upon failure of the vendee to perform, the vendor may lawfully sell to another.
And the last purchaser will not be bound by the stipulations of the first contract, unless he agreed to so bind himself.
W. sold to M. certain lands, and gave a bond for a deed in the usual form, making time of the essence of the contract. Complainant negotiated the sale for W., and was entitled to part of the purchase-money as commission, which M. agreed to pay to him. M. failing to make payments, W. sold the same land to E. Held, upon bill to enforce a vendor’s lien:
1. That M. acquired no interest in the premises, and no lien could exist as against him.
2. That upon M.’s failure to perform his contract, W. might lawfully sell to E., and the latter was not bound by M.’s contract, unless he so agreed.
3. That if the last proposition is wrong, the premises were held by E. subject to M.’s contract, and complainant must look to the fund to be paid by M.
Pleading and proof must correspond. Complainant must recover according to the allegations of his bill, if at all, and if the proof establishes a different case from that which he has alleged, although a good one, he cannot have relie!
Appeal from District Court, Clear Creek County.
The bill was exhibited against Gasper S. Francis, George McFarland, George Way, Erskine McClellan and Chas. R. Fish. If the statement of the case in the opinion of the court is regarded as insufficient, the allegations of the bill will be found fully set forth in the dissenting opinion.
The bill was filed September 8, 1873, and an injunction was issued restraining Way from conveying to Francis. Afterward complainant consented that the deed should be delivered, reserving the right to enforce a lien against the premises. The court decreed that Francis pay to complainant within sixty days the sum of $1,692.60, and in default thereof, that the premises be sold.
Mr. L. C. Rockwell, for appellants.
Mr. E. T. Wells, pro se.

Opinion:
Brazee, J.
Appellee exhibited his bill in the district court of Clear Creek county, against appellant and others, to enforce a vendor's lien. He charges that one George Way, being the owner of certain realty, employed and empowered him to make a sale thereof, and authorized him to retain all that he should receive over and above a certain sum for his services ; that he accordingly made sale of the premises to the Franklin Silver Mining Company, for a sum exceeding the amount specified by Way by $750, payable in one year from the date of sale; that afterward, and before the money fell due, the Franklin Company assigned their contract to one McFarland, who obtained a renewal thereof from Way, and who executed to Way his promissory note for the sum of $3,000, payable on the 6th of September, 1872, and who also executed to appellee his note for $780, payable at the same time, the latter being the sum due to appellee for his services in selling the property. The bill also charges that McFarland failed to perform his contract, and that on the 6th of December, 1872, he assigned and transferred his interest therein to appellant. That appellant, McFarland and Myers, who acted as the agent of both, McFarland and Francis, fraudulently obtained another contract from Way, from which appellee's demand was omitted, no provision being made therein for the payment of his claim. It will be seen that the assignment from McFarland to appellant is an essential feature of the case made; for as provision was made in the bond given to Me Farland for appellee's demand, by accepting an assignment of it, appellant would become bound by its terms. As to this, however, the proof is wholly insufficient. It appears that the McFarland bond was surrendered to Way on the 6th of December, 1872, who executed a new obligation to Francis, by which he bound himself to convey the premises to the latter.
It will be observed that "Way was under no obligation to pay the sum promised by McFarland to appellee, nor could the premises be charged therewith until McFarland should perform his contract The lien of vendors for purchase-money attaches to the interest of the vendee in the premises sold, and if the contract is not performed in any way, there is nothing to which the lien can attach. If a portion of the purchase-money is paid, the interest of the vendee thereby acquired may be sold to satisfy the remainder of the purchase-money, but if nothing whatever is paid, it is impossible to say that the vendee had any interest in the premises. In .the case at bar nothing was paid by McFarland, and, therefore, he has no interest in the land which may be charged with appellee's demand. As to appellant, if he assumed to fulfill the McFarland contract, or expressly promised to pay appellee's demand, he may be held liable therefor, but he cannot be charged except upon his own contract, express or implied. In the McFarland bond, time was made the essence of the contract, and after the time therein specified had expired, it would seem that Way might sell to any one who would purchase, and upon the old terms or new terms, without regard to the previous contract. Oliver v. Supervisors of Livingston County, 62 Ill. 528.
In any event the purchaser would only be liable to perform the contract of his vendor, that is, to convey to McFarland upon payment of the money; that is, the fund from which appellee would receive payment, and not that paid to Way by the new purchaser. There is evidence to show that Francis, through his agent, Myers, promised to pay appellee's demand, as part of the price of the land, at the time the bond to him was executed. If such promise was made the right of an assignee of the purchase-money to maintain a lien being conceded, there can be little doubt as to its validity. But no such promise is charged in the bill, and as we understand that a plaintiff must recover according to his allegation, if at all, the decree cannot be supported in that view. Story's Eq. Pl., § 257. It will be proper, however, for the plaintiff to amend his bill upon such terms as the district court may prescribe, and for that court to consider the sufficiency of the evidence upon that point.
The decree of the district court is reversed, and the cause is remanded.