Case Name: BUCHANAN v. TILDEN
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1896-05-22
Citations: 39 N.Y.S. 228
Docket Number: 
Parties: BUCHANAN v. TILDEN.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 39
Pages: 228–241

Head Matter:
(5 App. Div. 354.)
BUCHANAN v. TILDEN.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
May 22, 1896.)
Action—Who May Sub—Persons not Parties to Contract.
A wife cannot sue on a promise made to her husband to pay her a sum of money in consideration of services to be rendered by the husband to the promisor, where the wife was not a party to the agreement; such promise having been made, not with a view of discharging the obligation of the husband to support his wife, but merely to provide her with a separate estate. Ingraham, J., dissenting. Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N. Y. 268, distinguished.
Appeal from circuit court, New York county.
Action by Adelaide E. T. Buchanan against George H. Tilden. From a judgment entered on a verdict directed by the court in favor of plaintiff, and from an order denying a motion for a new trial, defendant appeals.
Reversed.
The complaint alleges:
“That on or about the 19th day of February, 1887, an agreement was entered into by and between the defendant and Robert D. Buchanan, the husband of this plaintiff, whereby, in consideration of services theretofore rendered and thereafter to be rendered by the said Robert D. Buchanan and by Robert G. Dun, and other good and valuable considerations moving from the said Robert D. Buchanan and the said Robert G. Dun to the said defendant, the said defendant promised and agreed with the said Robert D. Buchanan that in the event of the success of certain proceedings then pending, or any which might thereafter be taken, to practically set aside the thirty-fifth section, article, or clause of the last will and testament of the late Samuel J. Tilden, the uncle of the said defendant, the said defendant would pay to this plaintiff, or to her order, the sum of fifty thousand dollars. That as evidence of the last-mentioned agreement the said defendant wrote and signed, and delivered to one Robert G. Dun, the following letter:
“ ‘New York, February 19th, 1887.
“ ‘Robert G. Dun, Esq., No. 314 B’way, N. Y. City—My Dear Sir: It is understood between Mr. R. D. Buchanan and myself that in the event of the success of the proceedings now pending, or any which may be taken, to practically set aside the thirty-fifth section of the will of my late uncle, Samuel J. Tilden, in view of the assistance looking to that end which has been and may be rendered by Mr. Buchanan, as well as yourself, that I will and do hereby become responsible for the payment to Mrs. Adelaide E. Buchanan, or her order, of the sum of fifty thousand dollars. * * *
“ ‘Yours, very respectfully, G. H. Tilden.’ ”
Upon the trial it was shown that, after the signing and delivery of this letter, Mr. Buchanan got from Dun, and delivered to the defendant, $10,000, and afterwards got other moneys for the defendant,—in-all, over $20,000,— for the purposes of the Will contest, on the faith of the promise made by defendant to benefit Mrs. Buchanan, which advances were secured by notes to Dun, and which, with interest, after the successful termination of the will contest, were paid. As the result of the contest of the will of Samuel J. Tilden, the defendant and his brothers and sisters were enriched to the extent of several millions of dollars; and the value to be attached to the pecuniary assistance which Buchanan had procured for him is evidenced by letters, in one of which the defendant says, “We shall ever be grateful for the assistance you have given us, and, if we succeed in getting our money, we shall have to thank you for our success.” The plaintiff was the adopted daughter of Moses Y., a brother of Samuel J. Tilden, who died before him; and, not being of the blood of the latter, the plaintiff, presumably, could not take at his death, and could only hope, as a result of a successful contest of the will, to benefit by such an agreement as was made by defendant. Dun was the brother-in-law and uncle of plaintiff’s husband, and, as shown, was interested by ties of relationship, as well as friendship, in the plaintiff, and on her account, principally, made the money advances; the testimony showing that the promise made by defendant to Dun was that the plaintiff should share alike with himself and his brothers and sisters in the estate of Samuel J. Tilden, in the event of success in the then pending litigation over the will, and that it was on this promise that Dun loaned the money to defendant, and also that it was to secure benefit to the plaintiff that her husband rendered the services which he concededly did in obtaining the moneys from Dun. The defendant offered no evidence upon the trial, and upon the showing made the court directed a verdict for the plaintiff.
Argued before VAN BRUNT, P. J., and RUMSEY, WILLIAMS, O’BRIEN, and INGRAHAM, JJ.
Delos McCurdy, for appellant.
Louis S. Phillips, for respondent.

Opinion:
O'BRIEN, J.
The court is impressed' with the strong equity of plaintiff's case, as exhibited, not only by the oral evidence, and the letters of the defendant, but by the very terms of the agreement sued upon. But, conceding this, and, further, that there was a contract' between Dun and the defendant, and between Buchanan and the defendant, upon a sufficient consideration, for the benefit of the plaintiff, the question remains whether she can recover upon such a contract. The respondent, recognizing the difficulty of sustaining such right upon the contract made between Dun and defendant, rests her case upon that made between the defendant and Buchanan, to pay the plaintiff §50,000 in consideration of Buchanan's services to defendant. In opposition the appellant contended below, as he does here, that the only contract shown was one between Dun and the defendant, relating to loans of money made by Dun to the latter, which were to be, and were, actually repaid to Dun, and not to plaintiff, who, it is insisted, had no interest in the contract claimed to have been made for her benefit; that no consideration was given by plaintiff for any promise made by the defendant; that the letter which was the basis of the action was addressed to Dun, and therefore showed a contract with him, and not with the plaintiff's husband; and that Dun advanced the only substantial consideration for the alleged promise, and that this has been repaid. There is much force in this construction of the contract between the parties; but, if we take the stronger and more favorable position advanced by the respondent, it remains to be considered, assuming a contract between plaintiff's husband and defendant for her benefit, whether, upon this theory, she would be entitled to recover. As thus presented, the question is, can a wife enforce payment in her own name, where the husband renders valuable services, and stipulates with the person to whom the same are rendered that compensation therefor shall be made, not to him, but to her?
It is insisted that the promise having been made to the husband of the plaintiff, who owed to her the obligation of support and nlaintenance (an obligation both legal and moral), she, as the designated beneficiary, is entitled to enforce the contract expressly made for her benefit, and on her behalf. In support of this proposition our attention is called to many English cases, and many cases in this state, beginning with that of Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N. Y. 268, wherein it was held that an action lies on a promise made by the defendant upon valid consideration, to a third person, for the benefit of the plaintiff, although the plaintiff was not privy to the consideration. In Vrooman v. Turner, 69 N. Y. 284, it is said:
"The courts are not inclined to extend the doctrine of Lawrence v. Fox to cases not clearly within the principle of that decision. Judges have differed as to the principle upon which Lawrence v. Fox and kindred cases rest, but, in every case in which an action has been sustained, there has been a debt or duty owing by the promisee to the party claiming to sue upon the promise. Whether the decisions rest upon the doctrine of agency, the promisee being regarded as the agent for the third party, who, by bringing his action, adopts his acts, or upon the doctrine of a trust, the promisor being regarded as having received money or other thing for the third party, is not material. In either case there must he a legal right, founded upon some obligation of the promisee, in the third party, to adopt and claim the promise as made for his benefit."
This and similar cases that might be cited, in which Lawrence v. Fox has been distinguished, will show that that case has been sharply criticised, and its scope materially limited, and that the tendency of the decisions is to adhere to the rule at common law—
"That one cannot acquire rights under a contract to which he is not a party, and hence no right to enforce a contract is given to a person not a party to it, or an assignee of such party." Lawson, Cont. § 113.
There have been, however, certain exceptions to this general rule recognized in some of the cases, beginning with the English case of Dutton v. Pool, 1 Vent. 318, upon which the learned trial judge relied for his action. This case is the foundation for a distinct class of cases where promises have been made to a father, or other near relative, for the benefit of a child or other dependent relative, in which the person for whose benefit the promise was made has been permitted to maintain an action for the breach of it. The nearness of the relation between the promisee and him for whose benefit the promise was made has been sometimes assigned as the reason for these decisions, and while the principle upon which they have been placed has been variously stated, and in some instances questioned, both in England and America, the decisions have been followed, and must therefore be regarded as settled law. In this state the cases in which reference has been made to Dutton v. Pool are Schemerhorn v. Vanderheyden, 1 Johns. 140; Cumberland v. Codrington, 3 Johns. Ch. 229; Barker v. Bucklin, 2 Denio, 45; Bleeker v. Bingham, 3 Paige, 246; King v. Whitely, 10 Paige, 465; Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N. Y. 268; Burr v. Beers, 24 N. Y. 178; Knowles v. Erwin, 43 Hun, 150. In all of these where the promise of the third person has been enforced, it will be found that, as in Dutton v. Pool, the promisee, and the person for whose benefit the promise was made, stood in the relation of parent and child, and in Todd v. Weber, 95 N. Y. 181, the person to be benefited was an adopted child; and they proceeded upon the fact that the promisor had obtained a consideration from the father, for which he undertook to discharge the duty that such father owed to the child,—of making suitable provision for the child by way of maintenance and support, or by the advancement of a portion,—and it was recognized that the cases were to be supported upon the principle of the duty or obligation that the father owed to the child, and which, for a valuable consideration, the promisor agreed to perform. We do not regard these cases, therefore, as authority for the broad proposition that a near relationship between the promisee and the person who is to be benefited by the contract would give such person a right of action. But it is insisted that the duty which a father owes his child is fio greater or higher than that which a husband owes his wife, and it was assumed by the learned trial judge that the duty and obligation of the husband to the wife is, as a consideration, quite equal to the duty and obligation of the father to the child. But if we concede that the obligation of the father is to support the child, and that the duty of the husband is to support the wife; that upon the death of the father the child will be entitled to a portion of his estate; and that upon the death of the husband the wife would be entitled to a portion of her husband's estate,—the fact still remains that this was not a contract looking towards the discharge of the obli gation which the husband owed to support the wife, and must therefore be supported, if at all, upon the mere relation of husband and wife. We can find no authority for holding that a promise made to the husband by a third person for the benefit of his wife, which was not intended, to provide for her support, or to discharge the husband's duty in that regard, could be enforced by the wife. Nor do we think that there is a disposition to extend the principle of some of the cases relating' to father and child to any other relationship. An examination of these cases will show that in almost all of them the obligation and duty of support and maintenance rested upon, or was assumed by, the person to whom the promise was made, and that the promisor, for a consideration passing from the promisee, undertook to discharge that duty or obligation. Here the arrangement was, not to provide a fund for the support and maintenance of the wife, but to furnish her with an independent sum; and the absence of any duty or obligation on the husband's part to provide such eliminates the essential element or principle which is the basis of nearly all the cases where actions on behalf of a child have been allowed upon promises made by a third party to the father. As we have said, however, we do not think there is a disposition to regard as authority any of the cases in which the mere relationship between the parties has been held a sufficient consideration moving from the party for whose benefit the promise was made, as against the promisor. On the contrary, the latest case in the court of appeals (Durnherr v. Rau, 135 N. Y. 219, 32 N. E. 49), while not directly in point, is, in its contr'olling principles, adverse to the plaintiff's right to maintain this action. There, IX, the plaintiff's husband, executed to defendant a deed of certain premises, with covenant of warranty. He had previously executed mortgages thereon, in which plaintiff joined. The grantee covenanted to pay all incumbrances "by mortgage or otherwise," and the deed declared that the grantor's wife reserved her right of dower in the premises. The mortgage was subsequently foreclosed, and the premises sold. In an action for breach of the covenant, plaintiff claimed as damages the value of her inchoate right of dower cut off by the foreclosure. In determining adversely to her right to maintain such an action, the court, in speaking of the force of a covenant by the grantee to pay off the mortgages and save the wife's right of dower, says':
"But the wife was not a party to the mortgages, and in no way bound to pay them. She had an interest that they should be paid without resort to the land, so that her inchoate right,-of dower might be freed therefrom. The husband, however, owed her no duty, enforceable in law or equity, to pay the mortgages to relieve her dower. The most that can be claimed is that the mortgages having, as is assumed, been executed to secure his debts, and he having procured the wife to join in them and pledge her right for their payment, he owed her a moral duty to pay the mortgages, and thereby restore her to her original situation. But, according to our decisions, no legal or equitable obligation, of which the law can take cognizance, was created in; favor of the wife, against the husband or his property, by these circumstances. There is lacking in this case the essential relation of debtor and creditor between the grantor and a third person seeking to enforce such, a covenant, or such a relation as makes the performance of the covenant at the instance of such third person a satisfaction of some legal or equitable duty owing by the grantor to such person, which must exist, according to the-cases, in order to entitle a stranger to the covenant to enforce it. It is not sufficient that the performance of the covenant may benefit a third person. It must have been entered into for his benefit, or at least such benefit must be the direct result of performance, and so within the contemplation of the parties, and in addition the grantor must have a legal interest that the covenant be performed in favor of the party claiming performance. The application of the doctrine of Lawrence v. Fox to this case would extend it much further than hitherto, and this cannot be permitted, in view of the repeated declarations of the court that it should be confined to its original limits."
While, therefore, in view of the strong equities in plaintiff's favor,, we regret that the action is not sustainable in her behalf, this is,, to some extent, lessened by the view we entertain,—that the husband may have the right in his own name, and on his own behalf,, to secure some of the recompense to which he is entitled, and which,, under the contract, he intended to secure for the benefit of his wife..
The judgment must therefore be reversed, and a new trial ordered, with costs to the appellant to abide the event.
VAN BRUNT, P. J., and WILLIAMS, J., concur.