Case Name: Jane Bishop, as Administratrix, etc., App'lt, v. The Grand Lodge of the Empire Order of Mutual Aid, etc., Resp't
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1889-03-05
Citations: 21 N.Y. St. Rep. 811
Docket Number: 
Parties: Jane Bishop, as Administratrix, etc., App’lt, v. The Grand Lodge of the Empire Order of Mutual Aid, etc., Resp’t.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 21
Pages: 811–818

Head Matter:
Jane Bishop, as Administratrix, etc., App’lt, v. The Grand Lodge of the Empire Order of Mutual Aid, etc., Resp’t.
(Court of Appeals,
Filed March 5, 1889.)
1. Mutual benefit association—When failure to obtain certificate not condition precedent to receiving fund.
Where in an action to recover a sum of money by reason of the membership of the deceased in the defendant corporation—the object of the corporation was to support members and their families in case of sickness or death, and the fund set apart for that purpose was to be paid to the families, heirs or legal representatives. The deceased was prior to and at the time of his death a member in good standing. Section 24 of the bylaws provided that each member should be entitled to a mutual aid certificate; “said certificate shall set forth the name and good standing of the member, the amount of the benefit to be paid at death and to whom payable.” The defendant failed to procure a certificate. Held, that the issuing of a certificate was not a condition precedent to the right of the legal . representatives to receive the fund, but was only necessary in cases where the money is to be paid as directed by a member to some person or body other than the family, heirs or legal representatives of the deceased member.
3. Same—What sufficient interest to sustain action against.
Held, that the plaintiff as administratrix represents both herself and others who are entitled to receive the fund as its intended, beneficiaries and has sufficient interest therein to sustain an action as administratrix.
Appeal from a judgment of the supreme court, general term, fifth department, affirming a judgment entered on the verdict of a jury in favor of the defendant.
The plaintiff brought this action as administratrix of William Bishop, deceased, to recover from the defendant $2,000 and interest from the 9th day of June, 1886, as the amount to which she was entitled by reason of the membership of the deceased in the corporation defendant at the time of his death.
Upon the trial the court directed the jury to render a verdict in favor of the defendant, and then • directed that the plaintiff’s exceptions should be heard at the general term in the first instance. That court overruled the exceptions and ordered judgment upon the verdict, and the plaintiff has appealed from such judgment to this court.
It was admitted at the trial that prior to the 17th day of April, 1879, the deceased was a member of the Empire Order of Mutual Aid, which was subsequently incorporated by chapter 189 of the Laws of 1879; and he was one of the persons associated with Charles A. Gould and others named in and incorporated by said act.
The objects of the corporation, as stated in the second section of the act, were, among others, to assist and support members or their families in case of sickness, want or death.
The third section provided that it should be lawful for the corporation to create, hold, manage and disburse a beneficiary fund sufficient to pay all losses and expenses of the corporation for the relief of members and their families, of the lodges under the jurisdiction of the grand lodge, working under and subordinate to it, and under such conditions and resolutions as might be adopted by it.
■ The fourth section provided that such beneficiary fund as might be deemed suitable by said grand lodge might be provided and set apart to be paid over to the “families, heirs or legal representatives of deceased or disabled members, or to such person or persons as such deceased member might while living have directed; and the collection, management and disbursement of the same, as well as the person or persons to whom, and the manner and time in which, the same should be paid on the death of a member, should be regulated and controlled by the rules and by-laws of the said grand lodge.”
It was further provided that such beneficiary fund should be exempt from execution and not be liable to be seized or taken on any process to pay any debt or liability of a deceased member.
• The fifth section provided that the corporation should have power to make such by-laws, rules and regulations as they should judge proper for the admission of new members into subordinate lodges, and the government and regulation of such subordinate lodges.
The constitution of the grand lodge among other objects ■stated that the object thereof was (section 7): “To promote benevolence and charity by establishing a beneficiary fund from which, on the'satisfactory evidence of the death of a member of the order who has complied with all its lawful requirements, a sum not exceeding $2,000 shall be paid to his family or as he may direct.”
The twenty-fourth section of the general laws provided that ‘ each member of the order shall be entitled to a mutual aid certificate; said certificate shall set forth the name and good standing of the member, the amount of the benefit to be paid at death, and to whom payable, and such certificate shall be issued, or caused to be issued, by the grand lodge, and signed by the president and secretary with the seal of the subordinate lodge attached. Each subordinate lodge shall, at any regular meeting, make a full report to the grand secretary of all members suspended, withdrawn or reinstated.”
The twenty-fifth section provided that the certificate issued should represent $2,000.
The twenty-sixth section provided that “any transfer desired by a member of the mutual aid certificate issued to Mm may be made by an indorsement thereon, signed by the holder, of which transfer the grand secretary shall have notice. If a certificate shall be issued payable to any ■ether than the member personally, and the member directing the issuing thereof shall desire to have the same payable to some other person than therein expressed, or return ■of the certificate issued, with fees for new one, with designation of party to whom to be made payable, the certificate returned shall be canceled and a new one issued in its place as desired. If the certificate originally issued is lost or cannot be obtained to be returned, the member shall give written notice to the party to "whom it was issued of his intent to apply for such change for at least twenty days, .and file affidavit of such fact with his application for the change, showing when, where, how and what notice was served. And if such change is opposed it shall be referred to the grand trustees, whose decision shall be followed and be final thereupon, except appeal to the grand lodge be made within thirty days thereafter. When the certificate shall in terms be payable to the member, he may transfer the same by will, which shall be construed for all intents and purposes as an assignment indorsed upon such certificate; but no notice thereof prior to the member’s death need be given ”
The twenty-eighth and thirty-eighth sections of the constitution of the subordinate lodge of which the deceased was a member provided as follows:
Section 28. “Each applicant for membership must sign, the application prescribed by the grand lodge, state his age, occupation and residence, and he must-be recommended by two members of the lodge in good standing. The application must be accompanied by a sum of not less than two-dollars.
Section 38. A member shall be considered in good standing so far as his membership "in the order is concerned as long_ as he is not suspended for non-payment of dues;, provided he is not under suspension for non-payment of assessments.”
It was also admitted upon the trial that upon the 8th of' March, 1879, the deceased was, pursuant to an application for membership, in dne and regular form received, and was- ' initiated into and became a member in good standing of Eagle Lodge No. 13, which was a subordinate lodge created! by and acting under the jurisdiction of the defendant; that-he paid his admission or membership fee when admitted, and at all times after he became such "member to the time of his death, he paid all the charges, dues and assessments charged or levied against him, and at all times and in all things complied with all the lawful. requirements of the order of said defendant, and was a member of the order in good standing at the time of his death; except that the defendant denied that the deceased complied with the rules and requirements of the order of the defendant in respect to designating the person to whom his benefit should be paid upon his death. .
The records of the defendant failed to show that any mutual aid certificate was ever issued to the deceased.
The plaintiff also read in evidence on' the trial the application of the deceased for membership in the order of the-defendant, pursuant to which he was received and initiated, which application was as follows:
“March 8th, 1879.
To Eagle Lodge No. IS:
I, William Bishop, being desirous of membership in your order, do hereby declare that the statements by me hereinafter subscribed are each and every one true to the. best of my knowledge and belief.
My age is forty-eight years last birthday. Occupation, butcher. Eesidence, 1,440 Seneca street Post-office address, Buffalo, N. Y.
■--—, having personally made the above answers to-the examing physician, I do hereby acknowledge, consent and agree that any untrue or fraudulent statement made,, or any concealment of facts by me, shall forfeit my right to membership in the order and all benefits arising there from. In case of my death I wish my benefit paid to --. (Signature of applicant), •
WILLIAM BISHOP.”
The deceased died on the 14th day of Eebruary, 1886, in Buffalo, and the plaintiff was duly appointed administratrix of his estate. He left him surviving a widow, the plaintiff, and two minor children, all of whom were living at the time of the trial.
The learned trial court directed a verdict for the defendant on the authority of a former decision of the general term in this case upon an appeal from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff upon a former trial, and which is reported in 7 Ñ. Y. State Rep., 121. The court there held that the failure to obtain the' certificate provided for in the rules above cited was fatal to the plaintiff’s cause of action.
Hopkins & White, for app’lt; Baker & Schwartz, for resp’t.
Reversing 7 N. Y. State Rep., 121.

Opinion:
Peckham, J.
We are unable to agree with the learned court below in its construction of the contract in question. By the act of incorporation the object of the defendant was to aid, and support members and their families in case of want, sickness or death; and the act further provided that the corporation might create a beneficiary fund for the relief of members and their families, subject to such conditions and regulations as might be adopted by the defendant. This fund was to be set apart to be paid over to the families, heirs, or legal representatives of deceased or disabled members, or to such person or persons as the deceased might while living have directed. Following out such general purpose the seventh section of the constitution of the defendant, in order to promote benevolence and charity, provided for the establishment of this beneficiary fund, from which, on satisfactory evidence of the death of a member of the order, who had complied with all its legal requirements, a sum not exceeding $2,000 was to be paid to his family, or as he might direct.
Stopping here it is plain that the parties who were to receive this $2,000 were by the very terms of the act of incorporation and of the constitution of the defendant, to be the families, heirs or legal representatives of deceased or disabled members, or such other person as the deceased member might while living have directed; and we think that in case no such direction was given, such payment was intended to be made to the family, heirs, or legal representative of a deceased member.
It is true the act and the constitution fail to state which it shall be in case no direction is given, whether it shall be the family, the heirs or legal representatives, but we think this expression should be construed with reference to the-general purpose of the corporation, and having such purpose in view we think it really was meant and that it should be held to include those who would take such property asín cases of intestacy.
It is true that by the 24th section of the laws of the defendant it is provided that each member of the order shall be entitled to a certificate setting forth the name and good standing of the member, and the amount of the-benefit to be paid at death, and to whom payable. But we do not think the issuing of such certificate is a condition precedent to the right of such legal representatives to receive the fund in question. The amount of the fund is provided in the by laws, and it is there stated to be $2,000. We think the certificate is only necessary in cases where the money is to be paid as directed by the member, to some person or body, other than the family, heirs or legal representatives of the deceased member.
We cannot think that it was. the intention of the defendant in making up its constitution, its general laws and its by-laws, to make the issuing of such certificate a condition precedent; to its liability to pay this amount to the families, etc., of deceased members, who at the time of their decease were in good standing, and who had paid all the assessments and fully complied with all the rules and regulations of the defendant up to that time. The neglect of the company might thus result in a forfeiture of the-fund. The whole object of the corporation would thus be-defeated, and a most unjust result would or might follow such a construction. If no certificate were given, it seems-to us it would be the same as if the direction were to pay the money to the family of the deceased.
This case is an example of the injustice that might be-done if the construction adopted by the general term were to prevail. For seven years the deceased had been a member of the order. He had paid all his dues and all the assessments which had been levied upon him by reason of his membership during that time, and had therefore contributed to the formation of the fund, part of whose benefits had gone to the representatives of other deceased members, and his right to share in which he may well have looked forward to as a mean's of alleviating the distress of his family consequent upon his death and as an aid to their support in the future. That he should lose all this by a simple failure to obtain a certificate stating that it was to' his family, or in other words, to his wife and infant children that the fund should be paid upon his death, is a result at war with every feeling of justice and propriety.
We do not think that any such result is called for by a fair construction of the provisions above alluded to.
The cases cited to sustain the judgment of the general term, viz.: Hellenberg v. District No. 1, Independent Order of B'nai B'rith, 94 N. Y., 580; Greeno v. Greeno, 23 Hun, 478; Arthur v. The Odd Fellows, etc., 29 Ohio St., 557; The Supreme Council, etc. v. Priest, 46 Mich., 429, and Renk v. Herrman Lodge, 2 Dem., 409, do not control the one at bar. In the first case, the corporation agreed upon the death of the testator, to pay $1,000 to his wife, if living, if dead, to his children, and if there should be neither wife nor children, then to such person or persons as he may have form, ally designated to his lodge prior to his decease. The deceased died without either wife or children, and he failed to in any manner, designate to his lodge prior to his decease, the person or persons to whom |he desired payment to be made, but he left a will giving the money to his brother. By the express terms of the contract, therefore, the defendant was not to be liable to pay until such formal designation was made by him to his lodge, prior to his decease, and as none such was made, no liability existed. The-contract was too clear and unambiguous for any other construction. None of the other cases cited is like the one at bar. In deciding here that in the absence of the certificate, the beneficiary fund would go to those, who by the general laws of the state, would take the money, we do not mean that the money would go as a part of the estate of the deceased, subject to the payment of his debts; but it would be a special fund, subject to the exemption provided for in. the act of incorporation, and not to be liable for the payment, of the debts of the decedent, or to be taken on any process, for the payment of such debts.
W e also think the plaintiff had sufficient interest in the fund to sustain this action in her capacity as administratrix. It is true, the fund does not come into her hands technically and strictly, as assets of the estate of her intestate, nor is it to be liable for his debts. But the plaintiff in her capacity as administratrix, represents both herself and those others who are entitled to receive the fund as its intended beneficiaries, for it comes to them by reason of the membership of the deceased, and the plaintiff is a quasi trustee for her children, and as administratrix represents them in this action. But the question as to the right of the plaintiff to maintain this action, assuming that there might be a liability on the part of the plaintiff to pay some one, has not, been raised herein. The issue really made and tried was as to the existence of any such liability on the part of the defendant, and the courts below have held there was none.
For the reasons already given, however, we think the action is properly brought in the name of the plaintiff.
We think the judgment of the court below, should be reversed, and a new trial ordered, with costs to abide the -event.
All concur.