Case Name: THE FLORIDA BAR, Complainant, v. Richard E. GENTRY, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1984-03-08
Citations: 447 So. 2d 1342
Docket Number: No. 62061
Parties: THE FLORIDA BAR, Complainant, v. Richard E. GENTRY, Respondent.
Judges: Overton, McDonald, ehrlich and SHAW, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 447
Pages: 1342–1347

Head Matter:
THE FLORIDA BAR, Complainant, v. Richard E. GENTRY, Respondent.
No. 62061.
Supreme Court of Florida.
March 8, 1984.
Rehearing Denied May 2, 1984.
John F. Harkness, Jr., Executive Director, John T. Berry, Staff Counsel and Dale E. Krout, Jr., Bar Counsel, Tallahassee, for complainant.
Richard E. Gentry, in pro. per., St. Augustine, for respondent.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
This disciplinary proceeding is before us on the complaint of The Florida Bar and the report of the referee recommending that petitioner, Richard E. Gentry, be found guilty of violating the Integration Rules of The Florida Bar and the Disciplinary Rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility. We accept the referee's final recommendation as to the disciplinary measures to be applied. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 15 of the Florida Constitution.
The referee's findings and recommendations, in summary, are as follows:
COUNT ONE
After receiving funds from a client in trust, Gentry removed them from an identifiable trust account and deposited them in a personal savings account. Upon termination of the attorney-client relationship, Gentry refused to return the funds when demanded by the client. He later pledged a portion of the trust funds as security for a personal loan. Gentry, therefore, should be found guilty of violating The Florida Bar's Integration Rule, art. XI, Rule 11.-02(4).
COUNT TWO
Gentry appeared at a deposition without bringing the records and documents requested by the subpoena duces tecum and gave false answers to questions about the savings and loan association where he had a personal savings account. Gentry, therefore, should be found guilty of violating The Florida Bar Code of Professional Responsibility Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(4), (5), and (6).
COUNT THREE
Gentry drafted a rental agreement between himself and his landlord, a Dr. Yost, and thereafter denied its validity. Gentry should, therefore, be found in violation of Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(4), (5), and (6) even though it has not been proven that he believed at the time he drafted the contract that it was unenforceable.
COUNT FOUR
Gentry admitted that he instructed his secretary to prepare a cheek to be drawn on his trust account in payment of a personal obligation. Gentry, therefore, should be found guilty of violating Florida Bar Integration Rule, Art. XI, rule 11.02(4), and Disciplinary Rule 9-102. The referee recommended that Gentry be suspended for a period of six months.
After examining the record and referee's report we approve the referee's findings and conclusions in counts one and two. We must reject as unfounded, however, the referee's finding of guilt in count three. In regard to count four, while we cannot accept the referee's factual findings in full, there exists sufficient evidence in the record to support the referee's conclusion of guilt.
Respondent argues that res judicata bars a finding of guilt on count one because the transaction in question had already been the subject of a previous disciplinary proceeding in which respondent was found guilty of misconduct and given a private reprimand. It is true that the earlier disciplinary proceeding and the allegations in count one both involve the withholding of trust funds and the transfer of those funds to a personal account. Count one of the complaint, however, is based on separate, additional, and continuing misconduct on the part of respondent. After Gentry had received notice that the monies in his personal savings account were es-crowed funds to be held for the benefit of his client, Gentry pledged those funds as collateral for a personal loan. Clearly, the subject matter of the prior disciplinary hearing and the allegations in count one of the complaint do not possess an "identity of facts" required for the application of the res judicata doctrine. See Gordon v. Gordon, 59 So.2d 40 (Fla.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 878, 73 S.Ct. 165, 97 L.Ed. 680 (1952).
With regard to count three, we accept the referee's findings of misconduct. While the evidence is insufficient to support a finding of violation of Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(4) and (5), it does reflect a violation of Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(6). Gentry prepared a contract and then claimed that it was unenforceable because his wife had not joined him in its execution. Little confidence of the bar can be expected if a lawyer seeks to escape from a personal contract because of errors created by that lawyer in its preparation or execution.
Regarding count four, the record indicates that, contrary to the referee's conclusion, Gentry did not admit that he knowingly instructed his secretary to draw a check on trust funds in payment of a personal obligation. The record does reveal, however, that Gentry learned that a trust account check had been issued and that he took no action to correct the matter until several days later when the check had been dishonored. Thus, there exists sufficient evidence to support the referee's finding of trust account misconduct.
We therefore conclude that, as recommended by the referee, Richard E. Gentry shall stand suspended as a member of The Florida Bar for a period of six months, commencing thirty days from the filing of this opinion. During this time he shall not engage in the practice of law in any manner. He is also directed to pay costs in the sum of $2,460.50 within thirty days of the filing of this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Overton, McDonald, ehrlich and SHAW, JJ., concur.
BOYD, Acting C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion.
This is Richard Ellis Gentry of St. Augustine, not to be confused with Richard Earl Gentry of Tallahassee.