Case Name: Edward R. Schafer, as Administrator, etc., of Franz Schafer, Deceased, Appellant, v. The Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of the City of New York, Respondent
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1896
Citations: 12 A.D. 384
Docket Number: 
Parties: Edward R. Schafer, as Administrator, etc., of Franz Schafer, Deceased, Appellant, v. The Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of the City of New York, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 12
Pages: 384–391

Head Matter:
Edward R. Schafer, as Administrator, etc., of Franz Schafer, Deceased, Appellant, v. The Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of the City of New York, Respondent.
Land used as a street — liability of the city for an injury caused by a projecting manhole— contributory negligence in driving .against it.
Where a city allows land to be used as a street and holds it out to the .public as. such, it is bound to exercise the same degree of care as if the street had been formally laid out according to law, and must keep the street in a reasonably safe .condition.
What acts on the part of the city present a question for .tho jury as to whether the particular case comes within this rule.
A city is chargeable with negligence where it allows a manhole to project at an unnecessary and improper elevation above the surface of a thoroughfare which is used as a street, although it has never been regularly paved and graded.
The driver of a heavily-laden truck, driving on an ungraded and uncompleted street, in which there were two obstructions within a distance of twenty feet, one a curbstone several inches in height, helping to form a gutter, and the other a manhole, which projected some six inches above the surface, in full view of these obstructions, drove his horses at a fast trot or gallop so that he struck the raised curb first with the front and then with, the hind wheels of his wagon, and then struck the manhole, by the force of which collision he was thrown from his. wagon and mortally injured.
Held, that the deceased was guilty of contributory negligence, and that his. administrator could not recover from the city damages resulting from bis death.
Barrett, J., dissented upon the question of contributory negligence.
Appeal by the plaintiff, Edward R. Schafer, as administrator, etc., of Franz Schafer, deceased, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the defendant, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Hew York on the 21st day of February, 1896, upon a dismissal of the complaint directed by the court after a trial before the court and a jury at a Trial Term of the Supreme Court held in and for the county of Hew York.
Maurice Unternvyer, for the appellant.
WiTUam H. Hand, Jr., for the respondent.

Opinion:
Patterson, J.
I entirely, agree with the views expressed in the opinion of Mr. Justice Barrett, respecting the relation of the city of Hew York to the projected thoroughfare called One Hundred and Twenty-seventh street, and the responsibility the city was under to keep that projected thoroughfare, which it permitted to. be used as a street, in reasonably safe condition; and I also agree that leaving the manhole with the cover projecting, as it was, above the surface of the roadway, was the negligent allowance of an obstruction in a thoroughfare which the city permitted to be used as a street and for general street purposes. But I do not agree with the conclusion that the cause should have been left to the jury.
It is quite plain that the plaintiff failed to show affirmatively that the decedent Franz Schafer was free from contributory negligence in connection with the accident which resulted in his death; and it was incumbent upon the plaintiff in this action to make that proof. (Weston v. City of Troy, 139 N. Y. 281; Whalen v. Citizens' Gas Light Co., 151 id. 70; N. Y. L. J., Dec. 4, 1896.) In making it the circumstances of the case may be shown, and it undoubtedly may be in many cases for the jury to infer from those circumstances that the sufferer from the accident was free from contributory negligence, and where two inferences may be drawn' from the testimony or from the circumstances appearing in evidence, the question is for the jury. (Chisholm v. State of N. Y., 141 N. Y. 246.) But in this case the circumstances are utterly insufficient to allow an inference that the decedent was free from negligence contributing to or inducing the accident. On the contrary, they all tend to show that, not only was he not free from negligence, but that he wás affirmatively guilty of negligence in the commission of the act" or series bf acts which led to his death.
On the day on which the accident occurred the decedent was driving a- heavy truck, drawn by two large horses, and upon the truck waá a load of from sixty-five to eighty filled beer kegs. He was on the way to deliver the truck load at a saloon, the approach to which was through One Hundred and Twenty-seventh street. It-was nejcessary for him to cross á curbstone, which the witnesses speak of ¡as forming the gutter on the east side of Second avenue. This curbstone extended upward, a distance variously stated at from two and ia half to ten inches above the level of Second avenue. To the eastward and in the roadway of the projected One Hundred and Twenty-seventh street was the manhole referred to. It was located fiineteen feet and .two inches east of the curbstone, a distance not greater if as great- as the length of the team and truck driven by. the decedent. The decedent knew of the situation so far as the curbstone is concerned, and the manhole projecting above the surface of the street was plainly in sight. Knowing this situation,.he drove his horses at a fast trot or gallop, turned them towards. One Hundred and Twenty-seventh street, struck- the curb, necessarily striking it twice, that is to say, both with the front wheels and with the hind wheels, and then seems to have struck the' manhole, andlwe must assume from the evidence that he fell, and was-run over after striking the manhole. That the necessary effect of striking the obstruction of the curbstone with this heavily laden truck would be to jar it violently cannot be doubted, and it would seem to be of itself an act of pure- recklessness to undertake to pass such an obstruction in such a way, and the effect of the jarring or oscillation of the truck upon the horses would be such that they could not draw the vehicle in a direct line and it might be thrown against the. obstruction which the driver would not be able to avoid. This occurrence cannot be so split up as to make the accident attributable only to the .existence of the manhole. There was the necessity of passing.two obstructions within a space of twenty, feet, that is to say, withm the length, or less than the length, of the team and truck that was to be taken past these .obstructions, and it cannot be said that •the decedent is shown to have been free from negligence; when he Attempted to pass the first obstruction driving his horses . over it at a fast trot or gallop when there was another obstruction plainly in sight and so close that before the effect of striking against the first obstruction was overcome he was exposed to the risk of driving against the second one.
I think it is plain from the nature of this accident and the circumstances under which it happened that the court below was right in dismissing the complaint on the ground that freedom from contributory negligence on the part of the decedent was not shown and that the judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
Van Brunt, P. J., and Williams, J., concurred; Rumsey, J., concurred in result; Barrett, J., dissented.