Case Name: Eric MILLS a/k/a Eric Reece Mills, Appellant, v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee
Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2000-07-25
Citations: 763 So. 2d 924
Docket Number: No. 1999-KA-00942-COA
Parties: Eric MILLS a/k/a Eric Reece Mills, Appellant, v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
Judges: BEFORE KING, P.J., PAYNE, AND THOMAS, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 763
Pages: 924–935

Head Matter:
Eric MILLS a/k/a Eric Reece Mills, Appellant, v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
No. 1999-KA-00942-COA.
Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
July 25, 2000.
Steven E. Farese, Sr., Ashland, Attorney for Appellant.
Office of the Attorney General by Billy L. Gore, Attorney for Appellee.
BEFORE KING, P.J., PAYNE, AND THOMAS, JJ.

Opinion:
THOMAS, J.,
for the Court:
¶ 1. Eric Mills appeals his conviction of simple possession of cocaine and possession of marijuana, more than one ounce but less than one kilogram, with the intent to sell, transfer or distribute. Aggrieved, Mills assigns the following issues as error
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE APPELLANT'S FIRST MOTION IN LIMINE IN ALLOWING THE HEARSAY TESTIMONY OF HIS FOUR YEAR OLD SON UNDER THE PRESENT SENSE IMPRESSION EXCEPTION.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR MISTRIAL AFTER AGENT STEVEN RAY VIOLATED THE APPELLANT'S THIRD MOTION IN LIMINE GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT.
III.THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE INTRODUCTION OF A RECEIPT, OVER THE OBJECTION OF THE APPELLANT, WHEN SAID RECEIPT WAS NEVER PROVIDED TO THE APPELLANT PRIOR TO THE TRIAL.
¶ 2. Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTS
¶ 3. On February 9, 1998, investigators from the Alcorn County Narcotics division arrived at Eric Mills's home to serve him with a capias for an unrelated charge of possession of a controlled substance. As they were arresting Eric Mills, his wife and children were present and preparing to leave to go to school and work. Mrs. Mills's vehicle had a low tire, and she planned on using a red truck also on the premises.
¶ 4. As the officers were walking Mills to the police car, the officers testified that they found a brown vial commonly used to hold cocaine in Mills's front yard. The officers asked Mrs. Mills for permission to search the premises, which she granted. The children went out to wait in the truck while the officers quickly searched the premises. After the search of the house the officers were walking out to the car with Mrs. Mills-where they noticed a plastic baggy containing what appeared to be marijuana lying on the ground by the open truck door.
¶ 5. Agent Marc Mills, a narcotics investigator with the Alcorn County Sheriffs Department, testified that he picked up the baggy and sarcastically asked a rhetorical question similar to "who does this belong to" or "what is this." Eric Mills's four-year-old son promptly blurted out, "It belongs to my daddy." Agent Mills also testified that after finding the baggy on the ground he found a baggie containing a "white powder substance" on the inside floorboard of the truck, a paper sack inside the truck underneath the front seat containing seven individually wrapped one ounce baggies of what appeared to be marijuana, and a set of weighing scales. The white substance was determined to be 3.15 grams of powder cocaine, and the green leafy substance was determined to be over 200 grams of marijuana.
¶ 6. Agent Steve Ray and Agent Marc Mills testified that while the defendant was at the police station and talking with the agents, but before he knew the agents had found the drugs in the truck, Eric Mills stated that the truck was his. They testified that Eric Mills had told them that he had traded another truck for the truck in question with Jerry Gifford a few months back. Agent Mills testified that later that day he told Eric Mills that drugs had been found in the truck. On February 10th, the next day, Eric Mills indicated on a notice of seizure claim that the truck was not his.
¶ 7. A motion in limine was granted prohibiting any of the State's witnesses from mentioning any other charges pending against Eric Mills and more specifically that law enforcement officers were at Mills's house to arrest him on the charge of possession of a controlled substance with the intent to distribute. The State called Agent Steven Ray, an agent with the Mississippi Bureau of Narcotics at the time of the offense, as their third witness. During direct examination, Agent Ray inadvertently mentioned the offense for which Mills was being arrested. Mills objected and the judge sustained the objection. Mills requested a mistrial which the trial judge refused. The trial judge denied the motion for a mistrial and found that the jury did not hear the response of the officer and that the officer unintentionally violated the order.
¶ 8. The judge also allowed the introduction of an Auto Mart receipt over the objection of the defense. During direct examination of Agent Mills there was no mention made of any receipt. During cross-examination defense counsel began to question Agent Mills about what proof the State had regarding whether the red truck belonged to Eric Mills. The relevant portion of the record reads:
Q. Tell me what items you found in the truck besides the drugs.
A. I found a — of course, there were some speakers. I found a receipt in the truck with Mills Auto Zone or Auto Mart in it. It was dated )ki of '98 with a state tax ID number. It also had — it was a cash receipt for a part for a lawn mower spark plug.
Q. To who?
A. It was to Mills Auto Mart with a state tax-
Q. And where are those, sir?
A. I believe they are in the case file somewhere.
Q. Thank you. May I see those, please?
A. There was also some tires in the back of the truck, a bunch of garbage, some pamphlets — I don't know what was on them. That was — I think there was a shirt, a flannel shirt in the toolbox. There was some tools.
Q. Where are those items?
A. I assume they're in the truck, locked in the truck, or in the truck.
Q. Who belonged to those items?
A. I have no idea.
Mr. Farese: If I can approach the witness, your honor?
The Court: You may.
Q. What is this?
A. This is a cash receipt from Auto Zone.
Q. To whom?
A. It says Mills Auto Mart. It's got a state tax ID number of 02-66 — or 6778, a tax exempt transaction for a part, a J19LM EZ Start, which is a spark plug for a lawn mower. $2.49
Agent Mills testified that he found the receipt the day before the trial because he went back down to the truck to look for some way to tie the truck to the defendant when he heard the defendant was claiming the truck was not his. During the redirect of Agent Mills the State introduced the receipt into evidence. The defense objected claiming a discovery violation, and the judge allowed the receipt into evidence since the defense opened the door.
¶ 9. The jury convicted Eric Mills of possession of cocaine and possession of more than one ounce of marijuana with intent to sell, transfer or distribute. Circuit Court Judge Barry Ford sentenced Eric Mills to serve a term of three years in the MDOC for simple cocaine possession and fifteen years with five suspended and five years on post-release supervision for marijuana possession with intent to sell. Eric Mills now appeals to this Court.
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE APPELLANT'S FIRST MOTION IN LIMINE IN ALLOWING THE HEARSAY TESTIMONY OF HIS FOUR-YEAR-OLD SON UNDER THE PRESENT SENSE IMPRESSION EXCEPTION.
¶ 10. During the trial, Agent Marc Mills, a narcotics investigator 'with the Al-corn County Sheriffs Department, testified that he picked up a baggy found on the ground below the truck door and sarcastically asked a rhetorical question similar to "who does this belong to" or "what is this" and Eric Mills's four-year-old son promptly blurted out, "It belongs to my daddy." Mills argues that this statement was erroneously admitted into evidence because it was a hearsay statement. He further argues that the exception the trial judge relied upon, the present sense impression exception, is not a proper exception since the statement was in response to a question and not a "spontaneous" statement, meaning "happening or arising without apparent external cause; self-generated."
¶ 11. The pertinent Mississippi Rule of Evidence, Rules 803(1) and (2) provide in pertinent part:
(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition or immediately thereafter.
(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.
¶ 12. In Evans v. State, 547 So.2d 38, 41 (Miss.1989), the Mississippi Supreme Court stated that to be admissible under this exception, the statement must be spontaneous. The Court went on to explain that the question of spontaneity is to be decided upon the facts and circumstances of each individual case and such a determination is a question for the trial judge whose action in admitting the statement should not be held to be error unless this Court would be justified in concluding that under all and any reasonable interpretation of the facts the explanation could not have been spontaneous. Id.
¶ 13. In Turner v. State, 573 So.2d 1335 (Miss.1990), the Mississippi Supreme Court addressed a similar issue. In Turner, Agent Vaughan testified that the confidential informant had a small car that momentarily obstructed his view of who the Cl was talking to so he asked the Cl, "who was that?" Id. at 1338. The defense objected to hearsay in allowing Vaughan to state what the Cl had told him, and the circuit court overruled the objection. Id. The Supreme Court held that:
[T]he statement at issue is hearsay and that its receipt into evidence may be defended only if it fell within one of our accepted hearsay exceptions. We find such an exception in Rule 803(1), Miss. R.Ev. which provides that hearsay statements of present sense impression are likely to possess sufficient accuracy that they should not be excluded by the hearsay rule.
Present sense impressions are:
. a statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition or immediately thereafter.
We have an apparent fit. The statement Cole made described and identified the person Cole was talking to while he was perceiving and talking to this individual. The official comment to Rule 803(1) explains that this exception to the hearsay rule: . is based on the theory that the contemporaneous occurrence of the event and the statement render it unlikely that the declarant made a deliberate or conscious misrepresentation.
Miss.R.Ev. 803(1). Applied to these circumstances, the idea is that it would be extremely unlikely that one such as Cole, while looking at and talking to Edward Turner, would in answer to the question, "who is that" answer with the name of some other person. Of course, there is always the possibility that Cole may be mistaken in his identification but that is the same human frailty that would be present if Cole himself were appearing at trial and stating that he was talking to E.T. on the afternoon of May 19, 1988. We hold that the statement at issue is admissible within the present sense impression of our hearsay rule.
Id. at 1338 (citations omitted).
¶ 14. The trial court here held that the statement was admissible even though coming from a four-year-old, holding that the child would unlikely respond so quickly by telling a lie and also finding that the child did not talk to anyone nor was he coached before uttering the statement. Thus, the trial court found the child's testimony competent and likewise admissible as a present sense exception to the hearsay rule.
¶ 15. We hold that the situation in Turner is similar to the case at bar, just as it is unlikely that the Cl would respond to a question of "who is that" with a name of some other person, it is unlikely that a four-year-old child would respond to a question of "who does this belong to" with an answer other than the truth, as was found by the trial court in determining admissibility. In conformance with Turner, we hold that this statement falls within the present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule. This issue is without merit.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR MISTRIAL AFTER AGENT STEVEN RAY VIOLATED THE APPELLANT'S THIRD MOTION IN LIMINE GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT.
¶ 16. Eric Mills argues that the trial court erred in denying the motion for a mistrial after Agent Ray violated the motion in limine. Agent Ray violated the motion in limine prohibiting any of the witnesses from mentioning any other charges pending against Eric Mills, especially that law enforcement officers were at his home to execute a warrant for his arrest on the charge of possession of a controlled substance with the intent to distribute. During direct Agent Ray stated that they were serving a warrant for sale of a controlled substance. The judge denied the motion for a mistrial, finding that the statement was made inadvertently and the jury did not hear the statement since the judge himself could not hear the statement.
¶ 17. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the granting of a motion for a mistrial is within the sound discretion of the trial judge. Hoops v. State, 681 So.2d 521, 528 (Miss.1996); Bass v. State, 597 So.2d 182, 191 (Miss.1992). We are reminded that the trial judge is in the best position to determine whether an objectionable remark has had any prejudicial effect and for that reason the trial court is allowed considerable discretion in determining whether a remark was so prejudicial as to warrant a mistrial. Roundtree v. State, 568 So.2d 1173, 1177 (Miss.1990). "The failure of the court to grant a motion for mistrial will not be overturned on appeal unless the trial court abused its discretion." Bass, 597 So.2d at 191. Each case must be decided individually in determining whether a particular error constitutes reversible error. Henderson v. State, 403 So.2d 139, 140 (Miss.1981). A violation of a motion in limine should not result in the costly and time-consuming penalty of a new trial unless it affirmatively appears from the whole record that a miscarriage of justice has resulted. Id.
¶ 18. In the case at bar, the judge denied the motion for a mistrial and held:
Your objection is noted for the record. And the motion for a mistrial will be overruled. The Court's of the opinion that the jury never heard any of the response of the officer. And for the purposes of this record, I do not think that the officer intentionally violated the order of the Court. I think that it was a response to the question that was asked by the' district attorney, that he was caught up in what he was saying, and had no intention. Because I'm of the opinion that the jury did not hear it because I barely heard it and I'm sitting less than four feet away from him and that the jury is approximately 10 to 15 feet away from him. For that reason, the motion for a mistrial will be overruled.
Clearly, the judge is in the best position to determine if the jury heard the statement. The trial judge addressed these issues and held that a mistrial was not necessary, and we thus give deference to the lower court's ruling.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE INTRODUCTION OF A RECEIPT, OVER THE OBJECTION OF THE APPELLANT, WHEN SAID RECEIPT WAS NEVER PROVIDED TO THE APPELLANT PRIOR TO THE TRIAL.
¶ 19. Mills alleges that the trial court erred in allowing the introduction of a receipt and the error requires a reversal. Mills argues that the receipt was never provided to him prior to trial and constituted a discovery violation and should therefore not have been admitted.
¶ 20. The State, 'however, argues that they did not discover the receipt until the day before trial and they were only intending to use the receipt in rebuttal, to show that Eric Mills had access to the truck. Furthermore, the State correctly points out that the defendant inquired about the receipt during cross-examination of Agent Mills and asked Agent Mills to produce the receipt. After reading the pertinent part of the record, we find that the State is correct in arguing that Mills first introduced the evidence of the receipt. The general rule is that a defendant cannot complain of the evidence which he himself brings out. Winters v. State, 449 So.2d 766, 771 (Miss.1984); Simpson v. State, 366 So.2d 1085, 1086 (Miss.1979); Stone v. State, 210 Miss. 218, 49 So.2d 263 (1950). Accordingly, Mills waived any objection to the introduction of the receipt. This issue is without merit.
¶ 21. THE JUDGMENT OF THE AL-CORN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT OF CONVICTION ON COUNT I OF POSSESSION OF COCAINE, AND SENTENCE OF THREE (3) YEARS; COUNT II OF POSSESSION OF MORE THAN ONE OUNCE OF MARIJUANA WITH THE INTENT TO SELL, TRANSFER OR DISTRIBUTE AND SENTENCE OF FIFTEEN (15) YEARS, WITH FIVE YEARS SUSPENDED, WITH SENTENCES TO RUN CONCURRENTLY, ALL IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND FINE OF $2,000 IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.
KING, P.J., BRIDGES, IRVING, LEE, AND PAYNE, JJ., CONCUR. SOUTHWICK, P.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY McMILLIN, C.J. AND MOORE, J. MYERS, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.