Case Name: Leslie v. Ebner, Administrator
Court: Appellate Court of Indiana
Jurisdiction: Indiana
Decision Date: 1918-03-01
Citations: 67 Ind. App. 32
Docket Number: No. 10,014
Parties: Leslie v. Ebner, Administrator.
Judges: 
Reporter: Indiana Court of Appeals Reports
Volume: 67
Pages: 32–45

Head Matter:
Leslie v. Ebner, Administrator.
[No. 10,014.
Motion to dismiss overruled October 25, 1917.
Opinion filed March 1, 1918.]
1. Executors and Administrators. — Olaims Against Estate. — Practice. — Motion for New Trial. — Statute.—Under §2843 Burns' 1914, Acts 1883 p. 156, providing that the trial of claims filed against decedents’ estates shall be conducted as in ordinary civil cases, the rules of procedure in civil causes should be followed where applicable, so that motions for new trial are contemplated as in civil causes, p. 36.
2. Appeal. — Bond.—Time for FilAng. — Statute.—Under §2978 Burns 1914, Acts 1913 p. 65, relating to appeals and providing that an appeal bond must be filed within thirty days after the decision complained of, the time begins to run from the rendering of final judgment, p. 36.
3. Executors and Administrators. — Claims Against Estate.— Time for Talving Appeal. — In civil causes, which include trials of claims against decedents’ estates, the thirty days after decision for filing an appeal bond, as provided by §2978 Burns 1914, Acts 1913 p. 65, begins to run from the time of overruling the motion for new trial when filed after the rendering of judgment, p. 36.
4. Appear. — Filing Transcript.- — -Time.—Under §2978 Burns 1914, Acts 1913 p. 65, relating to appeals from decisions growing out of matters connected with decedents’ estates and providing that the appeal bond shall be filed within thirty days after judgment and the transcript within ninety days after filing the appeal bond, where one whose interests are adverse to the estate prosecutes an appeal, he is entitled to 120 days from the rendering of final judgment within which to file his transcript in the appellate-tribunal, although the appeal bond may have been filed within less than the thirty days; and an administrator, even though not required to furnish an appeal bond, has the same period of time in which to file the transcript on appeal, p. 37.
5. Appear. — Briefs.-—Defects.—Necessity of Objections. — Statute.— Under §3 of the act of 1917, Acts 1917 p. 523, requiring appellee, within fifteen days after the time for filing appellant’s brief has expired, to file objections to the record and briefs, pointing out wherein the rules of court have not been complied with, and providing that failure to do so is a waiver of defects, where appellee did not file objections, the court is authorized to examine the record, including the evidence, to determine the merits of the appeal, though appellant has not complied with the rules of court in that his statement of the evidence consists largely of conclusions with nothing to indicate the source of such evidence, and his points and authorities consist largely of abstract propositions of law. p. 40.
6. Corporations.. — Stocle Subscription. — Collateral Agreements.— Effect. — An agreement made by one selling shares of corporate stock that, if the notes' given for the stock were paid by the maker, the amount thereof shall be repaid out of the first
' dividends declared and that dividends declared on the stock of the company’s financial agent might be appropriated for that purpose, did not amount to an agreement that the notes should be treated as a mere loan of the maker’s credit, and that they should be required to be paid only from dividends, p. 40.
7. Birrs and Notes. — Promissory Notes. — Actions.—Defenses.— Fraud. — Burden of Proof. — In an action on a promissory note, where defendant alleged that the execution of the note was procured by fraud, he had the burden of proof on that issue, p. 41.
8. Corporations. — Stoclc Subscriptions.• — Fraud.—Evidence.—Sufficiency. — In an action on promissory notes given in payment of a stock subscription in a mining company where defendant alleged that the execution of the notes was procured by fraudulent representations by the corporation’s financial agent that the company owned valuable mining properties in Mexico, evidence showing that at the time the notes were executed the company had acquired valuable mining properties in Mexico and that it thereafter extended its holdings until it owned five mines, that it had, under the supervision of its engineers, constructed substantial buildings, installed machinery, had done considerable work at a large expense in developing the mines, and partially completed a wagon road to a railroad connection twenty miles away, that the mines had actually produced a large amount of ore bearing gold, silver, iron and copper in paying quantities, and that, until the company was forced to suspend operations because of a civil war in Mexico, its property was of the value of several million dollars, is insufficient to show that the representations alleged were false and fraudulent, p. 41.
9. • Evidence. — Admissibility.—Documentary Evidence. — Identification. — It is improper to admit in evidence written communications in the form of exhibits where they are not sufficiently identified, p. 44.
From Daviess Circuit Court; James W. Ogdon, Judge.
Action by Frank W. Leslie on a claim against Lawrence A. Ebner, administrator of the estate of Joseph ■L. Ebner, deceased. From a judgment for defendant, the plaintiff appeals.
Reversed.
Milton 8. Hastings, Josiah O. Allen, Arthur W. Allen, William H. Hailey and Clem V. Holce, for appellant.
L. E. Ritchey, for appellee.

Opinion:
Caldwell, J.
Appellant has appealed from a judgment rendered against bim on a claim filed against the estate of appellee's decedent. Appellee moves to dismiss the appeal. The facts are as follows: Judgment was rendered on December 23, 1916. Appel lant's motion for a new trial was overruled on February 24,1917, and thereafter on that day he filed his appeal bond. The transcript was filed in this court on June 18, 1917. This court did not extend the time within which to file the appeal bond. It appears then that the appeal bond was not filed within thirty days after the judgment was originally rendered. It appears also that the transcript was not filed within ninety days after the filing of the bond, or within 120 days after the judgment was originally rendered, but that it was filed within 120 days after the overruling of the motion for a hew trial. The parties agree that §2978 Burns 1914, Acts 1913 p. 65, governs respecting both the time within which and the manner of perfecting the appeal. Literally that section is to the effect that the appeal bond must be filed within thirty days after the decision complained of, in the absence of an extension of time granted by the appellate tribunal, and that the transcript must be filed within ninety days after the filing of the bond. Appellee contends that December 23,1916, the day on which the judgment was originally rendered, marks the beginning of the time limited for the filing of the bond, and that consequently it was not filed within the thirty-day period. Appellant, however, insists that the overruling of the motion for a new trial, where that event is subsequent to the original rendering of judgment, is the beginning of the period so limited, and consequently that the bond was filed in time. It is appellee's second contention that in any event the filing of the bond is the beginning point of the time within which the transcript must be filed, and that it must' be filed within ninety days thereafter, while appellant argues that under the statute the rendering of the final judgment, in this case the overruling of the motion for a new trial, sets to run the time within which both the bond and the transcript must be filed, and that the former must be filed within thirty days and the latter within thirty days plus ninety days, or 120 days thereafter. It will be observed that here the bond was filed on the day on which the motion for a new trial was overruled, and the transcript was filed 114 days thereafter. We proceed to consider the various arguments advanced by the parties to support their respective contentions:
Section 2843 Burns 1914, Acts 1883 p. 56, provides in substance that the trial of claims filed against decedent's estates shall be conducted as in ordinary civil cases. It follows that where the statute does not specify the practice in the trial of such claims, the rules of procedure in civil causes should be followed where applicable. Goodbub v. Estate of Hornung (1891), 127 Ind. 181, 26 N. E. 770. It results that in trials of claims filed against decedent's estates, motions for a new trial are contemplated as in civil causes. Boots v. Griffith (1883), 89 Ind. 246; McConahey's Estate v. Foster (1898), 21 Ind. App. 416, 52 N. E. 619; Lester v. Lester, Exr. 1880), 70 Ind. 201; Henry, Probate Law §274, 284.
While, literally, §2978, supra, is to the effect that the appeal bond must be filed within thirty days after the "decision" complained of, the rendering of the final judgment in fact marks' the beginning of such time. Galentine v. Brubaker (1896), 147 Ind. 458, 46 N. E. 903.
In civil causes where the filing of a motion for a new trial is subsequent to the rendering of the judgment, the time specified by statute for taking an appeal begins to run from the time of overruling the motion. Blaemire v. Barnes (1909), 173 Ind. 657, 91 N. E. 232.
It follows that February 24, 1917, rather than December 23, 1916, is the date from which must be counted the ' time granted by §2978, supra, within which to file the appeal bond. The bond was filed on that day, and consequently within time. The transcript was filed 114 days thereafter, and consequently within 120 days after the overruling of the motion for a new trial, but not within ninety days after the filing of the appeal bond. Where the party whose interests are adverse to the estate prosecutes an appeal under §2978, supra, the courts hold, apparently in conflict with the literal reading of the section, that he is entitled to 120 days from the rendering of the final judgment within which to file his transcript in the appellate tribunal, although the appeal bond may have been filed within less than the thirty days specified. Thomas v. Davis, Admr. (1916), 64 Ind. App. 378, 115 N. E. 961; Simons v. Simons (1891), 129 Ind. 248, 28 N. E. 702. See, also, Bindley v. Darnall, Admr. (1899), 24 Ind. App. 399, 56 N. E. 861; Vail v. Page (1910), 175 Ind. 126, 93 N. E. 705.
The holding is the same where an administrator of an estate appeals, he not being required to file an appeal bond. Willis v. Ferguson (1916), 62 Ind. App. 563, 111 N. E. 810. See, also, Crittenberger v. State, etc., Trust Co. (1916), 63 Ind. App. 151, 114 N. E. 225.
Motion to dismiss is overruled.