Case Name: JAMES BROWN, Appellant, v. ALMON W. GRISWOLD, Respondent
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1881-01
Citations: 30 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 618
Docket Number: 
Parties: JAMES BROWN, Appellant, v. ALMON W. GRISWOLD, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: Supreme Court Reports (Hun)
Volume: 30
Pages: 618–621

Head Matter:
JAMES BROWN, Appellant, v. ALMON W. GRISWOLD, Respondent.
Mature of a pa/rty to pay costs — one party cannot tajee advantage of the default of another, while the formers proceedings a/re stayed heaa/use of his fail/wre to pap costs— Oode of Civil Procedure, see. 779.
This action was noticed for trial by both parties for the February Term, 1878. In June, 1878, a motion made by the defendant was denied, with ten dollars costs, which have never been paid. 'In February, 1879, the action was reached upon the calendar,, and on the plaintiff’s failing to appear, a judgment by default was taken by the defendant.
Held, that the failure of the defendant to pay the costs awarded against him, operated, under section 779 of the Oode of Civil Procedure, to stay all proceedings on his part; that he had no power to move for a dismissal of the complaint, and that the judgment should be set aside as entirely unauthorized.
(Brady, J., dissenting.)
Appeal from an order entered on the 21st day of July, 1880, denying the motion of the plaintiff to set aside the judgment herein entered against him, and all proceedings subsequent thereto.
This action was regularly noticed for trial by both parties for the February Term, 1878. In June, 1878, a motion made by the defendant for leave to renew a motion to vacate an order of arrest was denied, with ten dollars costs, which were not paid. In February, 1879, the action was reached on the calendar, and the defendant, on the plaintiff’s failure to appear, toot a judgment by default, which was entered February 25,1879. The defendant claimed, ana the plaintiff denied, that notice of the entry of this judgment was served upon June 4, 1879. In July, 1880, the plaintiff made this motion to vacate the judgment.
J. Grata Brown and Geo. 8. 8edgwiok, for the appellant.
G. A. BwnMe, for the respondent.

Opinion:
Baeeett, J. :
I am imable to concur in the conclusion arrived at by my brother Brady./'In my judgment the defendant's proceedings were stayed by the non-payment of the costs awarded by the order of June 19, 1878. It was before that date that plaintiff noticed the cause for trial. Indeed, such notice was for the prior February Term. 'That notice may have been a waiver of any statutory stay resulting from the non-payment of motion costs previously awarded, so far at least as to enable the defandant to prepare for trial and to meet his adversary thereon. But-1 am at a loss to perceive how such a notice could amount to a waiver with respect to costs subsequently imposed. Can it be possible that where a party once notices a cause for trial, the statute ceases to be operative with regard to the costs of all future motions. It seems to me not. I cannot but think that the defendant had no power to move the dismissal; that such dismissal was no mere irregularity, but a direct violation of the statutory stay, and that it should be set aside as entirely unauthorized. /
Upon the other point, I think the service of notice of entry of judgment is in such doubt, upon the affidavits, that it ought not to be found as a matter of fact. Before a party should be absolutely shut out, because of the lapse of the year, notice should be most clearly established. Then too the course pursued by the defendant seems to point to a belief, upon his part, in a formal but really ineffective service upon the attorney. Else why did he wáit wntil the expiration of the yearr before giving the plaintiff unmistakable notice, by sending the sheriff with an execution ?
I am in favor of reversing the-order and granting the motion to set aside the judgment of dismissal, but, as there was some negligence upon the part of the plaintiff's attorney, without costs.