Case Name: FLORIDA DEMOCRATIC PARTY, Petitioner, v. Glenda HOOD, Secretary of State of Florida, and The Florida Department of State, Respondent
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2004-10-28
Citations: 884 So. 2d 1148
Docket Number: No. 1D04-4667
Parties: FLORIDA DEMOCRATIC PARTY, Petitioner, v. Glenda HOOD, Secretary of State of Florida, and The Florida Department of State, Respondent.
Judges: ERVIN and LEWIS, JJ., CONCUR; PADOVANO, J., DISSENTS with written opinion.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 884
Pages: 1148–1156

Head Matter:
FLORIDA DEMOCRATIC PARTY, Petitioner, v. Glenda HOOD, Secretary of State of Florida, and The Florida Department of State, Respondent.
No. 1D04-4667.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Oct. 28, 2004.
E. Gary Early and Mark Herron of Messer, Caparello & Self, Tallahassee; Richard B. Rosenthal of the Law Offices of Richard B. Rosenthal, P.A., Miami; and Mitchell W. Berger of Berger, Singerman, Fort Lauderdale, for petitioner.
Charlie Crist, Attorney General, and John J. Rimes, III, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for respondents.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
The Florida Democratic Party (FDP) petitions for review of an emergency rule adopted by the Florida Department of State. It contends that the findings of immediate danger, necessity, and procedural fairness on which Emergency Rule 1SER04-1 is based are insufficient under section 120.54(4), Florida Statutes (2004), requiring a showing of such circumstances, and Florida case law. We deny the petition, but certify to the supreme court a question which we consider to be of great public importance.
The Department is responsible for examining and certifying electronic and electromechanical voting systems in Florida. § 101.5605, Fla. Stat. (2004). Florida's election recount procedures are governed by sections 102.141 and 102.166, Florida Statutes (2004), which create a two-stage process for recounts. A machine recount is triggered if the margin of victory is one-half of a percent or less. § 102.141(6). If the margin of victory is one-quarter of a percent or less, "a manual recount of the overvotes and undervotes cast in the entire geographic jurisdiction of such office or ballot measure" shall be conducted. § 102.166(1). "A vote cast for a candidate or ballot measure shall be counted if there is a clear indication on the ballot that the voter has made a definite choice." § 102.166(5)(a). The statute further dictates that the "Department of State shall adopt specific rules for each certified voting system prescribing what constitutes a 'clear indication on the ballot that the voter has made a definite choice,' " and also shall "adopt detailed rules prescribing additional recount procedures for each certified voting system which shall be uniform to the extent practicable." § 102.166(5)(b) & (6)(d).
On April 13, 2004, the Department amended the rule governing recount procedures. As amended, Florida Administrative Code Rule 1S-2.031(7) provided:
When a manual recount is ordered and touchscreen ballots are used, no manual recount of undervotes and overvotes cast on a touchscreen system shall be conducted since these machines do not allow a voter to cast an overvote and since a review of undervotes cannot result in a determination of voter intent as required by Section 102.166(5), F.S. In this case, the results of the machine recount conducted pursuant to (5)(c) shall be the official totals for the touchscreen ballots.
Rule 1S-2.031(7) was challenged in an administrative proceeding. On August 27, 2004, Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Susan Kirkland found that the rule was an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority, concluding that the Department did not have the authority to abolish manual recounts for touchscreen voting machines, because section 102.166(5)(b) required the Department to "adopt specific rules for each certified voting system prescribing what constitutes a 'clear indication on the ballot that the voter has made a definite choice.' " The Department did not appeal that order.
On October 15, 2004, the Department issued Emergency Rule 1SER04-1. Part (6)(a) of the rule applies the following standards in a manual recount of overvotes and undervotes cast on touchscreen voting systems to determine whether there is a clear indication, as required by statute, on the ballot-image report that the voter has made a definite choice:
(a) A clear indication on the ballot that the voter made a definite choice not to cast an overvote shall be determined by the presence on the ballot image of a selection in the race or issue or of an indication of an undervote in the manner prescribed by subsection 6(b). Touchscreen voting systems do not permit a voter to cast an overvote; therefore, the canvassing board shall accept the machine recount as conclusive that there are no overvotes in the manually recounted race or issue.
(b) The clear indication that the voter has made a definite choice to undervote shall be determined by the presence of the marking, or the absence of any marking, that the manufacturer of the certified voting system indicates shall be present or absent to signify an under-vote.
The specific reasons the Department of State gave for requiring the adoption of the emergency rule were as follows:
As a result of [the ALJ's rule invalidation], no statewide uniform standards for conducting manual recounts of touchscreen voting systems currently exist. The absence of a rule with applicable standards and procedures will have an adverse effect on the conduct of elections in the State of Florida. In the event that the results of a machine recount under section 102.141, Florida Statutes, trigger the requirement for a manual recount under section 102.166, Florida Statutes, counties with touchscreen voting systems would have to conduct a manual recount without applicable standards or procedures, unless an emergency rule is immediately adopted. Ad hoc, ex-post manual recount processes of touchscreen voting systems conducted on a county-by-county basis, reminiscent of the circumstances giving rise to the intensely litigated 2000 General Election, may violate the equal protection and due process clause[s] of the U.S. Constitution. See Bush v. Gore[,] 531 U.S. 98[, 121 S.Ct. 525, 148 L.Ed.2d 388] (U.S.2000).
The emergency rulemaking is necessary: 1) To put into place specified and uniform standards for conducting manual recounts of touchscreen voting systems prior to the 2004 General Election and 2) To ensure and maintain the efficiency, integrity and public confidence in the electoral process. Considering the immediacy of the election and the lack of a currently effective rule on manual recounts of touchscreen voting systems, the Department of State finds that the adoption of this emergency rule is necessary to prevent an immediate danger to the public health, safety, and welfare.
The Department asserted that the rule provided a uniform process for the 15 Florida counties using touchscreen voting systems to conduct a manual recount of overvotes and undervotes within the existing parameters and capabilities of such systems currently certified by the Department for the November 2, 2004, election.
In its petition for review, FDP argues that the emergency rule simply recasts language from the earlier invalidated rule prohibiting a manual recount of overvotes and undervotes cast on a touchscreen machine. It argues, among other things, that the Department's written reasons fail because they do not identify a sudden or unforeseeable event justifying emergency rulemaking. The fact that the general election is scheduled to be held on November 2, 2004, is, it contends, neither sudden nor unforeseeable. The only new event the Department identified was the ALJ's August 27, 2004, order finding that the previous rule had no basis in law. FDP further argues that the emergency rule does not call for the manual recount of votes to determine voter intent. FDP states that the emergency rule created two classes of Florida voters: those who are entitled to manual recounts in close elections and those who are not. We cannot agree.
If an agency finds that an immediate danger to" the public health, safety, or welfare requires emergency action, the agency may adopt any rule necessitated by the immediate danger. § 120.54(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2004). Section 120.54(4)(a)3 provides that an "agency's findings of immediate danger, necessity, and procedural fairness shall be judicially reviewable." Because of the accelerated emergency rulemaking process, judicial review takes place without an intervening administrative challenge to exhaust administrative remedies. Postal Colony Co., Inc. v. Askew, 348 So.2d 338, 339 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). The courts generally do not concern themselves with the substantive validity of the emergency rule. See Krajenta v. Div. of Workers' Comp., 376 So.2d 1200, 1202 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). Instead, the concern is whether the agency followed the requirements of section 120.54(4)(a).
Given the limited nature of our review, we deem the reasons given by the Department to be in compliance with the standard set forth in section 120.54(4). Initially, we disagree with the petitioner's reliance on this court's decision in Golden Rule Insurance Co. v. Florida Department of Insurance, 586 So.2d 429 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), as support for its argument that a judgment cannot constitute an unforeseen event justifying the adoption of an emergency rule. , There the adverse administrative ruling was a hearing officer's recommended order stating that the health-rate-filing requirements of the Department of Insurance were not validly delegated by statute or rule. The court, in rejecting the agency's emergency findings, noted that the department currently had in place rules setting forth filing requirements, and the emergency rule appeared to be an attempt to circumvent formal rulemaking by establishing additional criteria. Additionally, we note that this court has upheld an agency's emergency findings based upon a change in the law. Little v. Coler, 557 So.2d 157 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (dealing with a reduction in program appropriations for aid to families with dependent children and a legislatively mandated budget deadline).
Although we do not address the merits of the emergency rule, we note that a federal district court has rejected an equal-protection challenge in Wexler v. Lepore, No. 04-80216-CIV, — So.2d -, 2004 WL 2421584 (S.D.Fla. Oct. 25, 2004). There, a suit for declaratory and injunctive relief was brought against the Secretary of State and other election officials in which it was contended that the touchscreen voting systems used in 15 of Florida's counties lacked a manual-recount procedure which was available in the remaining 52 counties using an optical-scan voting system. The plaintiffs alleged that such a differential standard violated their rights under both the due-process and equal-protection clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. In rejecting the challenge, the court referred to the Department's emergency rule 1SER04-1, and characterized the issue as whether the rule complied with federal mandates governing such constitutional protections. In answering the plaintiffs' argument that it was impossible to ascertain a voter's deliberate choice from the ballot-image report because there was no way to determine whether an un-dervote recorded by the machine reflected the voter's deliberate choice not to vote, a mistake by the voter in choosing not to vote, or a misstatement of the machine on recording an undervote, the court answered:
With respect to the issue of whether the machine records the voter's intent not to vote or a mistake by the voter, the Court concludes that the current language of the statute does not inquire into the intent of the voter in attempting to discern a legal vote; rather the statute seeks to ensure that the voter has made a definite choice. Plaintiffs use the word[s] intent and choice interchangeably. Yet, the Court finds them to be different. Prior to the 2001 amendments to the election statutes, a legal vote was determined by a clear indication of the intent of the voter. The prior version of the statute, at section 102.166(7)(b), read as follows: "If a counting team is unable to determine a voter's intent in casting a ballot, the ballot shall be presented to the county canvassing board to determine the voter's intent." See Senate Bill 1118, at 1272. Under the current standard, a legal vote is determined by a "clear indication on the ballot that the voter has made a definite choice." See id. at 1272; see also Fla. Stat. § 102.166(5)(a). When the Legislature makes a change in the statute, it is presumed to mean something by that change. The earlier "intent" standard of section 102.166(7)(b) attempted to discern, ex post, a voter's state of mind; the amended standard instead looks to whether the ballot indicates that the voter has made a definite selection.
Thus, in the context of touchscreen voting machines, the "definite choice" standard entails determining whether the voter has made a definite selection rather than ascertaining a voter's intent, i.e., did a voter intend not to make a selection or did the voter unintentionally make a mistake in using the equipment. The Court finds that by pressing the button to cast his or her ballot on the touchscreen machines, the voter is making a definite selection. In warning the voter of an undervote and allowing for a review process before the ballot is east, touchscreen machines provide sufficient safeguards to ensure that a voter's un-dervote is intentional. As a result, the ballot images printed during a manual recount pursuant to the Emergency Rule reflect a voter's choices under the statutory scheme adopted by the Florida Legislature.
Id. at 21-22 (footnotes omitted). The court concluded by stating that the adoption of the rule "establishes a manual recount procedure for touchscreen voting systems, which not only meets the statutory requirements for manual recounts un der Florida law, but also establishes a uniform, nondifferential standard for conducting manual recounts in compliance with equal protection guarantees."
Although the issue before the court in Wexler was not identical to that before us, we find the court's analysis there highly pertinent to the issue of whether the reasons the Department gave for adopting the emergency rule were justified. The Department was clearly concerned with the fact that if no rule were in place, the same specter of confusion and inconsistency in divining a voter's intent that had attended the 2000 presidential election in Florida, and the same constitutional problems the United States Supreme Court addressed in Bush v. Gore, might yet recur in 2004. The rule appears to be the Department's difficult accommodation of the legislative dictate that it prescribe regulations for ascertaining a voter's selection as applied to the use of electronic touchscreen machines, which were designed to reduce the occasions for voter confusion and, indeed, to eliminate the opportunity for recounts altogether.
It may be, as alluded to by the dissent, that other actions than those undertaken by the Department may have been preferable, such as earlier establishment of procedures for manual recounts of votes, or, indeed, appealing the AL J's order of invalidation. It is not our review responsibility, however, in deciding the validity of the rule, whether other means may have been more appropriate. We only look to the reasons the Department expressed and, in so doing, we are unable to say that it failed to comply with the directions of section 120.54(4).
We deny the petition for review; however, we certify to the Florida Supreme Court the following question, which we consider to be of great public importance:
WHETHER, UNDER SECTION 120.54(4), FLORIDA STATUTES (2004), THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE SET FORTH SUFFICIENT JUSTIFICATION FOR AN EMERGENCY RULE ESTABLISHING STANDARDS FOR CONDUCTING MANUAL RECOUNTS OF OVER-VOTES AND UNDERVOTES, AS APPLIED TO TOUCHSCREEN VOTING SYSTEMS?
No motion for rehearing shall be entertained.
PETITION DENIED.
ERVIN and LEWIS, JJ., CONCUR; PADOVANO, J., DISSENTS with written opinion.
. In a pertinent footnote, the court observed:
Federal law does not require Florida to have voting equipment which distinguishes between an intentional and unintentional undervote. Following the problems of making such determinations as to punch-card ballots used in the 2000 election, the Florida legislature decided to allow use of touchscreen paperless voting systems which eliminate the need for such determinations.
Id. at 22, n. 18.