Case Name: TOWNSHIP COMMITTEE OF THE TOWNSHIP OF DENVILLE, THE GOVERNING BODY OF THE TOWNSHIP OF DENVILLE, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE VOCATIONAL SCHOOL IN THE COUNTY OF MORRIS, ETC., ET AL., DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS; TOWNSHIP COMMITTEE OF THE TOWNSHIP OF DENVILLE, THE GOVERNING BODY OF THE TOWNSHIP OF DENVILLE, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE VOCATIONAL SCHOOL IN THE COUNTY OF MORRIS, ETC., ET AL., DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS
Court: Supreme Court of New Jersey
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1971-07-23
Citations: 59 N.J. 143
Docket Number: 
Parties: TOWNSHIP COMMITTEE OF THE TOWNSHIP OF DENVILLE, THE GOVERNING BODY OF THE TOWNSHIP OF DENVILLE, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE VOCATIONAL SCHOOL IN THE COUNTY OF MORRIS, ETC., ET AL., DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS. TOWNSHIP COMMITTEE OF THE TOWNSHIP OF DENVILLE, THE GOVERNING BODY OF THE TOWNSHIP OF DENVILLE, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE VOCATIONAL SCHOOL IN THE COUNTY OF MORRIS, ETC., ET AL., DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Reports
Volume: 59
Pages: 143–156

Head Matter:
TOWNSHIP COMMITTEE OF THE TOWNSHIP OF DENVILLE, THE GOVERNING BODY OF THE TOWNSHIP OF DENVILLE, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE VOCATIONAL SCHOOL IN THE COUNTY OF MORRIS, ETC., ET AL., DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS. TOWNSHIP COMMITTEE OF THE TOWNSHIP OF DENVILLE, THE GOVERNING BODY OF THE TOWNSHIP OF DENVILLE, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE VOCATIONAL SCHOOL IN THE COUNTY OF MORRIS, ETC., ET AL., DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.
Argued May 10, 1971
Decided July 23, 1971.
Mr. Theodore E. B. Einhorn argued the cause for appellant (Messrs. Stein •& Einhorn, attorneys).
Mr. John A. Wyclcoff argued the cause for respondents (Messrs. James, Wyclcoff, Vecchio As Thomas, attorneys).

Opinion:
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Francis, J.
The sole question presented by this appeal is whether the zoning ordinance of the Township of Denville bars the operation of a county vocational school in a district where schools are not permitted uses. The Superior Court, Law Division, held that the prohibition was not applicable to the Morris County Board of Yocational Education and entered summary judgment in favor of the Board. We certified the ensuing appeal on our own motion before it was heard in the Appellate Division.
The Township of Denville is a municipality containing 13.06 square miles in Morris County. A zoning ordinance was adopted in 1964 dividing its land area into 14 use zones, three of which were industrial zones. At that time and until July 15, 1970, institutional uses were permitted as special exceptions in all zones upon approval by the Board of Adjustment. Such uses were defined as:
The use by a non-profit public or quasi-public institution such as a church, school, library, hospital or public utility .
The Morris County Board of Yocational Education was organized on October 7, 1969 and began a study of the need for vocational training in Morris County. In a survey subsequently conducted, over 4,000 students expressed a desire for a vocational training program. The study and survey also revealed a need for about 13 courses to service the requirements of students as well as those of local industry and business. As a result, the Board concluded that establishment of a vocational school facility was imperative. Investigation turned up an adequate and satisfactory building with approximately 20 acres of property located on Route 53 in the 1-2 industrial zone of the Township. It is said to be centrally located in the county and readily accessible to many of the existing high schools.
Early in July 1970, the Board entered into a contract, with an escape clause, to purchase the building at an agreed price of $1,100,000 for the purpose of operating a county vocational school therein. The State Board of Education, after finding a need for a county vocational school (N. J. 8. A. 18A:54—12), approved the project and the building and authorized State funding thereof in the amount of $500,000. The Board of Chosen Freeholders of Morris County approved expenditure of the balance of $600,000. On acquisition, the County Board intended to have vocational training classes for high school students during the day with adults and veterans attending evening classes five nights a week. It was hoped that apprentice programs would commence on October 1, 1970 with night classes for carpenters and electricians and a course on pollution control. Prior to the time the motion for summary judgment was heard in this action, 85 students had been enrolled in the carpenters and electricians courses and several classes of 25 students each were expected in the pollution control course.
On July 15, 1970, the Township amended the zoning ordinance to prohibit institutional uses, except for public utilities, in the three industrial zones, 1-1, 1-2 and I-P. These three zones constitute 12.40% of the municipal land area. Institutional uses continued to be authorized as special exceptions in the 11 other zones, representing 87.60% of the Township. This amendment resulted in the proceeding now before us in which the County Board of Vocational Education seeks a judgment declaring that it is not subject to the local zoning ordinance, and therefore that the contemplated school operation is not barred thereby.
On motion for summary judgment, the trial court held in favor of the County Board saying that it is an autonomous county public agency designed and authorized by the Legislature to be superior in authority to the zoning power of a municipality and therefore not subject to an exercise of such power which would thwart establishment of a county vocational school. On this appeal, the Township contends that the decisions of this Court in Roman Catholic Diocese of Newark v. Ho-Ho-Kus Borough, 42 N. J. 556 (1964), and on the second appeal in that case after remand, 47 N. J. 211 (1966) are dispositive of the matter and require a reversal of the judgment. We agree that the cited cases are controlling.
In Ho-Ho-Eus, the Diocese acquired 20 acres in the E-l residence district of the Borough for the purpose of erecting a parochial regional high school thereon. At the time of purchase, such use was permitted by the zoning ordinance, but soon thereafter an amendment was adopted which barred all schools from the R-l district. However, both public and private schools through the high school level continued to be authorized in the other three residential districts.
The trial court held that a municipality cannot zone with respect to public schools, and relying on N. J. S. A. 40¡55-33.1, which banned discrimination in zoning between the type of public and private schools involved, concluded that since the amendment affected only the private schools, it violated the statute. N. J. 8. A. 40 ¡55-33.1 provides:
No planning or zoning ordinance heretofore or hereafter enacted by any municipality governing the use of land by, or for, schools shall, by any of its terms or provisions or by any rule or regulation adopted in accordance therewith, discriminate between public and private day schools, not operated for profit, of elementary or high school grade.
In rejecting the trial court's determination, the Chief Justice, speaking for the majority of the Court, said:
We are unable to accept the trial court's view of the statute. The statute obviously was drawn on the thesis that a municipality may zone as to public schools and upon that premise sought to insure equality of zoning treatment for private schools. A legislator voting for that law could hardly have understood it to mean that thenceforth a private school shall be immune from zoning. That, of course, is the effect of the trial court's treatment of the statute. If the Legislature so intended, it would have said so in such simple terms. It would not ordain that private schools shall be subject to nondiseriminatory zoning in order to say that they shall not be subject to any zoning at all.
If public schools are beyond the local zoning power, then the statute in question is meaningless and a nullity. We cannot, however, say the Legislature erred in assuming the zoning power does apply. No statute expressly exempts public schools from zoning and no judicial decision has found the exemption. Indeed, we heretofore assumed that public schools are subject to zoning [citing cases]. 42 N. J. at 559-560.
It may be accepted that the County .Board of Vocational Education is a distinct statutory entity designed to operate essentially independent of the Denville governing body in the matter of vocational education. But such existence, of itself, is not so incompatible with application of local zoning strictures as to require the conclusion that the Legislature intended the location of the school to be within the sole discretion of the Board. We repeat what was said in Ho-Ho-KiCSj that the Legislature could have placed public vocational schools beyond the zoning power, but it did not do so either expressly or impliedly. 42 N. J. at 561; 47 N. J. at 220 (concurring opinion).
The County Board argues that N. J. S. A. 40 ¡55-33.1 is not applicable in this case and therefore should not be taken as an indication of legislative recognition of the right of a municipality to control location of a vocational school by zoning. The thesis is that such a school is not a "day" school "of elementary or high school grade." In our judgment, however, the statutory language of N. J. 8. A. 40:55-33.1, fairly construed, includes county vocational schools as defined in N. J. 8. A. 18A:54AL et seq. Such schools, which obviously are below the college level, may offer instruction in "day, part-time and evening classes." N. J. 8. A. 18A:54-3. Teachers engaged in vocational education in a city school district may be transferred to a county vocational school upon its establishment, retaining all their tenure and pension rights on being transferred, N. J. 8. A. 18A ¡54-11.3; teachers, principals, directors and assistant directors of boards of education of county vocational schools are given all the rights and privileges of teachers, principals, superintendents and assistant superintendents of schools in school districts, N. J. 8. A. 18A:54-22; N. J. 8. A. 18A:5A-9 and 18A ¡54^32 recognize that there may be full-time and part-time day vocational schools. Pupils over 14 years of age who study part-time in elementary or high school grades or in public vocational schools may obtain employment certificates to work part-time in approved manufacturing establishments, and the employment is considered part of the pupil's schooling. N. J. 8. A. 18A:38-36; at tendance or "truant" officers may be appointed for county vocational schools, N. J. S. A. 18A ¡38-32; the course of study in every such school must be approved by the commissioner of education, with the advice and consent of the state board of education. N. J. S. A. 18A ¡54-24. In view of the broad educational purpose to be served by vocational schools and their relation to conventional elementary and high schools, it would be an unreasonable construction of N. J. 8. A. 40 ¡55-33.1 to say that such schools do not qualify as public day schools of elementary or high school grade. See Yanow v. Seven Oaks Park, Inc., 11 N. J. 341, 349 (1953); and cf. Wiltwyck School for Boys, Inc. v. Hill, 11 N. Y. 2d 182, 227 N. Y. S. 2d 655, 182 N. E. 2d 268 (1962); Board of Coop. Ed. Services of Nassau Co. v. Gaynor, 33 A. D. 2d 701, 306 N. Y. S. 2d 216 (App. Div. 1969). And we do not believe that authorized attendance of adults at such schools militates against that view. See, N. J. S. A. 18A:50-1, 8. Thus the conclusion is warranted that vocational schools are within the coverage of N. J. S. A. 40 ¡55-33.1, and since all schools, public and private, are now excluded from the industrial zones, it cannot be said that the amendment to the ordinance visited any discrimination upon the county vocational school.
At any rate, no gain can come to the County Board even if N. J. S. A. 40 ¡55-33.1 does not apply to vocational schools. If there were no statute at all dealing specifically with the question whether public schools of whatever character were subject to municipal zoning power, the situation would be controlled by the view expressed in the first Ho-Ho-Kus case, that is, that public schools are subject to zoning. Roman Catholic Diocese of Newark v. Ho-Ho-Kus Borough, supra, 42 N. J. at 560-561; and see the cases cited therein, St. Cassian's Catholic Church v. Allen, 40 N. J. 46, 50 (1963); Andrews v. Ocean Twp. Board of Adjustment, 30 N. J. 245, 252 (1959); Yanow v. Seven Oaks Park, Inc., supra, 11 N. J. at 349-350.
Under all the circumstances, the trial court's view that the County Board of Yocational Education is not subject to the present zoning restrictions cannot be sustained.
As indicated by the foregoing discussion, the attack on the ordinance was based solely on the alleged lack of municipal authority to exclude a county vocational school from the industrial zones by means of exercise of the zoning power. Our decision is limited to disposition of that issue. There is substantial evidence in the record furnished by informed persons that a pressing public need exists for a vocational school in Morris County; that the building sought to be purchased by the County Board is ideally suited and situated within the county from the standpoint of student access; and that, from the standpoint of acquisition costs, the purchase of the existing structure represents a very considerable saving of public funds over the construction costs of a new building. The County Board suggests that the sole motivating factor for adoption of the exclusionary amendment was a desire on the part of the Township governing body to avoid loss of a tax ratable and to avoid a tax immune facility designed to serve students of the entire county and not those of Denville alone.
We have indicated that a municipality may consider its revenues in planning for a well-balanced community. But we have also said that a school may not be barred from a municipality or from a zone solely because the tax exemption may be burdensome; nor may a variance be denied solely for that reason. Educational institutions, such as public vocational schools, are tax free as a matter of paramount State policy which cannot be thwarted by exclusionary zoning. Roman Catholic Diocese of Newark v. Ho-Ho-Kus Borough, supra, 42 N. J. at 565-566. Nor should the fact that a vocational school will serve a regional need rather than solely a municipal need, of itself, support a total or a limited zoning bar. 47 N. J. at 217; Id. at 223 (concurring opinion). The Township points out that the school has not been excluded entirely but only from the in dustrial zones, and that 87.60% of the land area of the municipality is available for its location under the special exception provision of the ordinance. Moreover, on the oral argument before us, the assurance was given that the governing body would not oppose the grant of such exception. However, that matter is not before us in this case and we do not deal with it.
The County Board, of course, remains free to apply for a variance under N. J. 8. A. 40:55—39 from the bar to establishment of its school in the 1-2 zone. In this connection the language of the Ho-Ho-Kus opinion is pertinent:
some observations seem appropriate -without in any way intimating an opinion as to the outcome of an application. The educational mission of a regional high school is clearly a 'special reason' within the meaning of the statute just cited. Andrews v. Ocean Twp. Board of Adjustment, 30 N. J. 245 (1959). Hence the question will be whether a sound exercise of discretion requires that the school be permitted. In dealing with that question, the local authorities should consider the State policy favoring such exempt functions and the fact that regional needs must be met somewhere. Unfortunately under present law the tax burden falls upon the single municipality rather than the whole area which is benefited. Yet a variance may not be refused on that account. 47 N. J. at 217; Id. at 223-224 (concurring opinion).
Eor the reasons stated the judgment below is reversed and the cause is remanded for proceedings consistent herewith.
The original complaint in the case which was filed by the Township sought certain injunctive and other relief against the County Board. The trial court denied such relief and no appeal was taken therefrom.