Case Name: David F. Smith, Respondent, v. The New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company, Appellant
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1896-04
Citations: 4 A.D. 493
Docket Number: 
Parties: David F. Smith, Respondent, v. The New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 4
Pages: 493–503

Head Matter:
David F. Smith, Respondent, v. The New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company, Appellant.
Negligence — choice, between two perils—where a person, being driven by his servant, is injured at a railroad crossing both he and his servant must be. free from.contributory negligence.
In an action brought to recover damages resulting from personal injuries caused by the alleged negligence of the defendant, a railroad corporation, it appeared that the plaintiff was in a two-horse lumber wagon,.which was driven by his. hired man, Henry Speer, to whom the plaintiff gave no. directions as to the. manner in which he should drive; that as they approached á highway crossing a train was seen to be approaching; Speer first pulled up the horses, and* tlien both lie and the plaintiff urged them to cross the track, but the wagon "was struck and the plaintiff was thrown out and injured. There was a con-Diet of evidence as to Whether proper signals were, given, and there was. some evidence that a person would have to he within twenty-five feet of the track before he could see 500 feet up the track. The speed of the train was from thirty-five to fifty miles an hour.
Held, that the questions of negligence and of contributory negligence were properly submitted-to the jury;
That when a person is confronted by danger, from both of two lines of action, one of which he must take, his choice of either does not constitute negligence;
That in order that plaintiff might recover, it was necessary for him to show not only that he was' personally free from negligence, hut that Speer, his servant, • who was engaged in’ the same common purpose of approaching and safely crossing the defehdant’s tracks, was free from, contributory negligence;
That a charge: by the court, that if Smith', the plaintiff, was taking care for • • himself in watching for the train, it made no difference whether Spe.er was there or not,vbec'ause the plaintiff was: doing- all- he was -called upon to do, was - . not a correct statement of the law -under the facts of the case. •
Fóllett and Adams, JJ., dissented.
Appeal by the defendant, The New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company, from a judgment of the Supreme- Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Ontario on the 26'th day of December, 1895, upon the verdict of- a jury rendered after a-trial at-the Ontario Circuit, and also from an order entered in said clerk’s office on the 26tli day of December, 1895, denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial made upon the minutes.
The action was tó recover for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff' on the 16th of August, 1892, while crossing the defendant’s railroad about a mile east of Chapinville, which was the first station east of Canandaigua on the defendant’s road. A highway cross'es the railroad, in an easterly and westerly direction. There is a cut on thé defendant’s road some 300 feet from the railroad crossing, and the highway' as-it comes down to the railroad from the east, is also in á cut. The road has a descending' grade of. 33.79 feet to the mile to the northeast, and the highway at the crossing is 7 feet lower than it "is 200 feet further "east. ■ It descends about 2 feet within the last -38 feet of the track.’ The plaintiff approached the crossing from the-west and was unable to see along the railroad to the -southwest until he got. within, about-40 feet, of the track. It is claimed that at that-distance he could, see 240 feet,, and- when -within 26 feet he could see the ringing post on the road, which is some 1,345 feet southwest of the crossing. Plaintiff was the lessee of a farm, which was divided by the railroad, and resided west of the railroad, and he left his house about half-past one o’clock the day of the accident to cross the track to get a load of oats. He had a two-horse lumber wagon with a rack on it, and with him was his hired man, Henry Speer. The horses, first, were on a walk, and the walk became quite a brisk one as they approached the track. The plaintiff sat on the left-hand side of the wagon, with his back to the north, about the middle of the hay rack, and Speer, his hired man, was sitting on the other side of the wagon facing him, and was driving the horses. The east-bound train left Canandaigua twenty-two minutes late and was due at the crossing at about one-seventeen p, m. .The plaintiff testifies. that he supposed it1 had gone, anti ■ as- he "approached the track he was laboring under that impression,, and looked first for the west-bound train, and became satisfied that none was coming; he looked the other way, and the passenger train was right on him, approaching from the west. Speer testified that the plaintiff, as they approached the track, was filling his pipe or lighting it, and that he did not notice that the plaintiff paid any attention to the railroad, as they were talking together. The plaintiff, in his testimony, says: “ I had my pipe in my mouth, I think. I don’t think I took my pipe out as I went along down towards the railroad; still, I might. I don’t recollect the circumstance that, at about the time of the accident, or just before, that I was lighting my pipe. It is possible that I wras.” Speer testifies that he heard no signals, and that the wagon was making: a noise and that Smith and he were talking.- Smith testifies that he did not hear the-train whistle for-the crossing, but he refhséd'-to'-bé positive that it did not whistle. -As the plaintiff ■ and Speer discovered the approaching train,' Speer first pulled up on the horses, and then immediately he and Smith urged them across and the wagon was struck and the plaintiff, was thrown out and injured to some • extent. There is some evidence that the cut on the railroad was nearly 1,000 .feet long and from 14 to 31 feet deep. The base of the cut was in some places only 8 feet from the rails. There is some evidence to the effect that -the plaintiff would need to be within 25 feet of the track before- he could see 500 feet up the track. There was' some slight curve in the track. The train was running from thirty-five to fifty miles an hour. Plaintiff called several witnesses who testified that they heard no signal of any kind as the train approached the crossing. The witness Carson, who noticed the train and watched it, swears, that no signal nor warning of any kind was given from the- train until just as it struck Smith’s wagon, when it gave the danger signal. Smith and Speer were the only eye witnesses to the collision aside from what was discovered by the trainmen. The engineer testifies that he was within 500 or 600 feet of the crossing when he saw the horses’ heads, and that he then sounded the whistle in less than a second after he saw the horses’ heads, and that he ran about 200 feet when he. saw the men.
Albert H. Harris, for the appellant.
John Gillette, for the respondent.

Opinion:
Hardin, P. J.:
The facts and circumstances disclosed by the evidence are sufficient to make it a. question for the jury whether the defendant was guilty of negligence which caused or contributed to the injury which was received by the plaintiff. (Greany v. L. I. R. R. Co., 101 N. Y. 423; Parsons v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 113 id. 364;, Swift v. S. I. R. T. R. R. Co., 123 id. 649; Miller v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 82 Hun, 164; S. C. affd., 146 N. Y. 367.)
(2) Upon all the evidence given at the trial we are inclined to think that the question of whether the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence was one of fact proper to be submitted, to the jury. (Miller v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 88 Hun, 164; affd., 146 N. Y. 367; Wilcox v. N. Y., L. E. & W. R. R. Co., 88 Hun, 267; Salter v. U. & B. R. R. Co., 59 N. Y. 631; S. C., 88 id. 42.)
When Smith and Speer discovered the- on-coming train, whether it was wise to advance or to endeavor to hold the team may- have been a very close question, and, considering the imminent peril they were in, they could not be expected, to act with cool deliberation; and whether, under all the circumstances, their action was. such as might reasonably be expected, was a proper question for the jury to determine. (Miller v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., supra) " When a person is confronted by danger from both of two lines of' action, one of which he must take, his choice of either is not negligent." (Leavitt's Law of Negligence, p. 608, § 156; Buel v. N. Y. C. R. R. Co., 31 N. Y. 314; Coulter v. Am. Merch. Un. Ex. Co., 56 id. 585; Twomley v. Cent. Park, N. & E. R. R. Co., 69 id. 158; Salter v. U. & B. R. R. Co., 88 id. 42.)
(3) After the delivery of the body of the charge the counsel for the defendant asked the court to charge, and it did charge : " That if Speer, the driver of the horses, was negligent in not exercising care in approaching the crossing, or at the crossing, Mr.. Smith, the plaintiff, is chargeable with Speer's negligence and the consequences thereof."
Thereupon the counsel for the defendant requested the court to charge : " That if Speer, the driver, failed to look for tiie train, or pay any. attention to its approach, he was guilty of negligence, and Smith, the plaintiff, is chargeable therewith, and if the jury find that Speer's negligence contributed to the accident, the plaintiff cannot recover."
The court declined to so charge, and added, viz.:' " The law about that is just this, Speer was the hired man there; he was under the control of Smith, and if Smith himself was using proper care and watching out for that train, then it made no difference whether Speer was doing it or not, but if Smith Was not doing anything, and leaving it for Speer to see, not only about the driving of the horses, but watching out for the train and trusting the whole matter over to Speer, then Speer's negligence would be the negligence of Smith. But if Smith was taking care for himself, then it does not make any difference whether Speer was there or not, because Smith was doing all he was called upon to do."
Thereupon the defendant excepted to the refusal of the request made and also excepted to the charge as made. In considering these exceptions it is proper to call to mind the situation of Speer and Smith at the time they were attempting to cross the defendant's road. They sustained to each other the relation of. master and servant or principal and agent, and all the duties incident to those relations are to be imputed to them respectively. Speer was driving at the time, having the lines, in his hands and the management of the team. He says in the course of his testimony, viz.: " I was looking at the horses going along down. I had the responsibility of driving them. There were no direction's from Smith about the manner of driving."
According to the plaintiff's testimony he was doing .nothing to control or manage the horses. He says he looked and listened ; yet he states that he committed the control of the horses to his servant Speer. The request made called for a consideration of Speer's failure of suitable attention in approaching the crossing, and also of the manner in which he handled the 'horses at the 'time- the danger was discovered, especially in his efforts first to stop them arid then afterwards his sudden change of mind in urging them forward. The burden was upon the plaintiff to show that lie was free from contributory negligence. In bearing the burden it was incumbent upon him to indicate, by the testimony relating to the circumstances jueceding and attending the crossing, that he and his servant had used due diligence in approaching and attempting to cross the railroad.
In Donnelly v. Brooklyn City R. R. Co. (109 N. Y. 16) the plaintiff was riding to market on a fish wagon and the' two men Were so situated that each was in a situation where he could control or manage, or contribute to the management of, the team. The plaintiff was injured. In the course of the opinion delivered in that case it was said: "We think the plaintiff was chargeable with the neglect of his comrade."
In Brickell v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co. (12 N. Y. St. Repr. 450; S. C. affd., 120 N. Y. 290) it appeared that the plaintiff took passage in Pulver's top buggy for the village of Palmyra, and that plaintiff received injuries in attempting to cross the railroad, and in the course of the opinion delivered in that case I had occasion to. say: " If the plaintiff ór Pulver had attended vigilantly to their duty in approaching the crossing the injuries in question might have been averted. Apparently they were occupied in conversation, giving no especial attention to the circumstances affecting .their safety in crossing the railway during the progress from the" south side of the bridge 120 feet onward"'