Case Name: In the Matter of the Disciplinary Proceeding Against Gary W. Rentel, an Attorney at Law
Court: Washington Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Washington
Decision Date: 1986-11-26
Citations: 107 Wash. 2d 276
Docket Number: No. C.D. 7663
Parties: In the Matter of the Disciplinary Proceeding Against Gary W. Rentel, an Attorney at Law.
Judges: Brachtenbach, Dore, Callow, and Durham, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Washington Reports
Volume: 107
Pages: 276–300

Head Matter:
[No. C.D. 7663.
En Banc.
November 26, 1986.]
In the Matter of the Disciplinary Proceeding Against Gary W. Rentel, an Attorney at Law.
Robert T. Farrell, for Bar Association.
Gary W. Rentel, pro se, and Monte E. Hester, for respondent.

Opinion:
Andersen, J.
Facts op Case
At issue in this case is the appropriate sanction to impose upon an attorney who misappropriated client funds while addicted to cocaine and alcohol.
Respondent Gary W. Rentel was admitted to practice law in the State of Washington on November 16, 1972. In 1974 he became an associate with a law firm, and in 1980 joined a Tacoma firm as a partner.
Respondent drank socially until he became an attorney whereupon his drinking increased. In 1977, his alcohol consumption began to interfere with his marriage. In 1978 respondent and his wife separated. He then sought psychiatric treatment for depression.
Respondent continued to practice law. He also continued to drink. By 1981, he was drinking daily beginning at noon and consuming 10 to 15 drinks a day. Respondent and his wife divorced at the end of 1981. Before the divorce was final, and as early as 1978, respondent used cocaine. By the end of 1981 he was addicted; respondent used 1 to lVz grams of cocaine daily while consuming 10 to 15 drinks daily.
Respondent continued to practice law despite his cocaine and alcohol addictions. On February 17, 1983, he received a formal complaint from the bar association charging him with violating CPR DR 7-104(A)(2) in that he had given advice to an unrepresented person when the interests of that person conflicted with his client's interests. The complaint also charged respondent with violating CPR DR 1-102(A)(4), which prohibits conduct involving fraud, deceit, dishonesty or misrepresentation.
On March 5, 1983, one of respondent's partners confronted him with a client's claim that respondent had received and kept funds belonging to the client. After the partner examined the file and discovered that respondent had taken the client's money, he informed the bar association. Further investigation revealed additional misappropriations. With respondent's consent, he was suspended from practicing with his firm.
On March 18, 1983, respondent voluntarily suspended himself from the practice of law altogether. His clients were notified of his voluntary suspension. Then on April 6, 1983, this court entered an order formally suspending respondent from the practice of law pending the outcome of disciplinary proceedings against him. On July 7, 1983, respondent was admitted into the Kirkland CareUnit for treatment of alcoholism and drug addiction.
On November 4, 1983, the bar association amended its earlier complaint to charge respondent with misappropriating the funds of eight clients between March and December 1982. The complaint was further amended on March 30, 1984, to add another misappropriation charge. The total client funds taken exceeded $26,000. The com plaint noted that some of the misappropriated funds had been repaid. Respondent admitted taking the money in each instance, but stated that he suffered from diminished mental capacity and/or disability at the time of each theft.
Disciplinary proceedings against respondent were delayed while he was tried on 12 counts of felony theft in Pierce County Superior Court. Respondent stipulated to taking the money, but contended that he was not criminally liable because of his diminished mental capacity and his lack of intent to steal. A jury acquitted respondent on all 12 counts.
The disciplinary hearing began on June 25, 1984. Respondent admitted misappropriating client funds, but maintained that he remembered nothing about the incidents and took the money only because his reasoning was totally impaired by his alcohol and cocaine addiction. Several witnesses testified, however, that respondent functioned competently as an attorney during the period of his addictions. A psychiatrist who examined respondent at the bar association's request made three psychiatric diagnoses: narcissistic personality disorder of long-standing duration; continuous cocaine abuse during 1981, 1982 and 1983; and continuous alcohol dependence from 1976 through 1983.
The hearing officer concluded that respondent did engage in the charged acts of misconduct, which included misappropriation of client funds, failure to make full accountings and the giving of advice to a nonclient whose interests conflicted with those of his client. The hearing officer did not consider disbarment appropriate, however, because he found that during 1981, 1982 and 1983 respondent "was suffering from diagnosed personality disorders, depression, narcissistic personality, alcohol addiction and cocaine addiction, all of which were medical problems which had a profound effect upon his judgment." The hearing officer also noted respondent's apparently successful treatment at CareUnit and his involvement with Alcoholics Anonymous and Cocaine Anonymous. Respondent is now a mortgage banker and works as a volunteer at CareUnit.
The hearing officer recommended that respondent be suspended for 15 months commencing April 6, 1983. Since the hearing officer's decision was rendered on March 15, 1985, its effect would be immediate reinstatement for the respondent. The hearing officer also recommended a 10-year probationary period (increased from 5 years at respondent's request) which would involve conditions such as respondent's "intense involvement" with Alcoholics Anonymous, supervision by a committee of three attorneys, blood or urinalysis tests on 12 hours' notice and counseling from a certified alcohol and drug counselor.
On May 3, 1985, the Disciplinary Board reviewed the case. No oral argument was requested, and none was heard. On July 1, 1985, the Board rendered its decision adopting and modifying the hearing officer's decision. The Board made two additions to the findings of fact. One was drawn from the testimony of Dr. Petrich, the psychiatrist who examined respondent: "However, Mr. Rentel's ability to perceive reality was not so impaired that he could not distinguish between his money and his clients' money." The second addition also was based on the psychiatrist's deposition testimony:
According to the testimony of Dr. Petrich, people such as Mr. Rentel, with a narcissistic personality, are more vulnerable to alcohol and drug abuse, and it is extremely difficult for such persons to sustain a remission from use of alcohol or drugs.
The Board struck the hearing officer's recommendation and ordered that respondent (1) be required to make restitution to any client not yet fully reimbursed for funds misappropriated by respondent and (2) be disbarred. The Board's vote was 9 to O.
Respondent moved for reconsideration and requested that oral argument be permitted at the time of the hearing on the motion for reconsideration. The Board denied the motion for reconsideration and the request for oral argument. It also assessed costs and expenses against respondent.
Respondent then appealed the bar association's disbarment recommendation to this court.
We are presented with one ultimate issue.
Issue
What is the appropriate sanction for an attorney who, while addicted to alcohol and cocaine, misappropriates more than $26,000 of client funds over a 10-month period?
Decision
Conclusion. In order to protect the public and to maintain our strong policy against misappropriation of client funds, a majority of this court concludes that the only sanction appropriate under the circumstances presented here is disbarment.
Respondent initially raises several procedural issues. First, he argues that the Disciplinary Board erred in denying his motion for reconsideration and his request for oral argument. Respondent had the right to present oral argument at the May 3, 1985 review of his case before the Disciplinary Board. Neither respondent nor his attorney requested oral argument. The right to so argue was thus waived. Our rules do not provide for the Disciplinary Board reconsidering its own decision. The Board therefore did not err when it denied respondent's motion as well as his request to orally argue that motion.
Respondent also requested that oral argument and testimony be presented to this court or that his case be remanded to the Board for further proceedings. RLD 7.7(a) provides that oral argument before this court will be conducted under the provisions of Title 11 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, unless we otherwise direct. There is no provision in Title 11 for allowing testimony, nor do we regard it as necessary here. The record presented is sufficient for us to reach a decision. Respondent was allowed to speak to this court on his own behalf. We deem further proceedings unnecessary.
The main issue here presented, of course, is whether the appropriate sanction is disbarment, as recommended by the Disciplinary Board. In deciding this issue, we have recourse to the very helpful analytical framework proposed by the American Bar Association, ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1986).
We note initially the purpose of lawyer discipline as stated by the American Bar Association's Sanctions Committee:
The purpose of lawyer discipline proceedings is to protect the public and the administration of justice from lawyers who have not discharged, will not discharge, or are unlikely properly to discharge their professional duties to clients, the public, the legal system, and the legal profession.
Standard 1.1, at 7. This statement coincides with this court's traditional position that the purposes of attorney discipline are to protect the public and to preserve confidence in the legal system.
In satisfying these basic purposes of bar discipline, the consequence of disciplining an errant attorney is unavoidably punitive to some extent. Indeed, as observed in In re Little, 40 Wn.2d 421, 431, 244 P.2d 255 (1952):
The final adjudication should provide neither more nor less than the facts fairly required to penalize the offender, deter others, and indicate to laymen and members of the bar that proper discipline will be enforced and the standards of the profession maintained.
In determining how best to fulfill the purposes of bar discipline in any given disciplinary case, the ABA Sanctions Committee recommends that four questions be addressed. We commend this analysis. The questions are as follows:
1. What ethical duty did the lawyer violate?
2. What was the lawyer's mental state?
3. What was the extent of the actual or potential injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct?
4. Are there any aggravating or mitigating circumstances?
We will use this analytical framework and answer each of these questions in discussing what we consider to be the appropriate sanction to impose on the respondent in this case.
We initially observe that respondent violated ethical duties owed not only to his clients, but also to the general public and the legal system. By disregarding CPR DR 9-102(B) (which requires a lawyer to preserve his client's property) and CPR DR 1-102 (A) (4) (which prohibits conduct involving fraud, deceit, dishonesty, or misrepresentation), respondent violated the duties of loyalty and candor owed his clients.
Respondent's violation of CPR DR 1—102(A) (3) (which prohibits illegal conduct involving moral turpitude), as well as his violations of CPR DR 1-102 (A) (4), means that he also infringed upon duties owed to the general public.
Members of the public are entitled to be able to trust lawyers to protect their property, liberty, and their lives. The community expects lawyers to exhibit the highest standards of honesty and integrity, and lawyers have a duty not to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, or interference with the administration of justice
Standards, at 5; see also In re Case, 59 Wn.2d 181, 184, 367 P.2d 121 (1961).
Respondent similarly transgressed upon duties owed the legal system when he violated CPR DR 7-104(A)(2) (which forbids a lawyer from giving advice to an unrepresented person if the interests of that person conflict with those of a client). "Lawyers must always operate within the bounds of the law, and cannot create or use false evidence, or engage in any other illegal or improper conduct. . ."
Once having determined the ethical duties violated, a relevant factor for consideration then appropriately becomes what mental state the attorney possessed when he or she committed the violations in question. According to the ABA Standards, the mental states to be given consideration are defined as follows.
The most culpable mental state is that of intent, when the lawyer acts with the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result. The next most culpable mental state is that of knowledge, when the lawyer acts with conscious awareness of the nature or attendant circumstances of his or her conduct both without the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result. The least culpable mental state is negligence, when a lawyer fails to be aware of a substantial risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow, which failure is a deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable lawyer would exercise in the situation.
Standards, at 6.
Respondent claims that he has no memory at all of his misappropriations, and that his alcohol and cocaine addictions so affected his mind that he was totally unaware of what he was doing when he took his clients' funds.
We are aware that alcoholism impairs a person's judgment and sometimes causes blackouts or memory deficits. We are also aware that cocaine is an insidious drug that can affect a person's mind. The impact of cocaine in general, and upon respondent in particular, was vividly described by the psychiatrist who examined him:
[C]ocaine appears to be the most addicting substance yet known to medical science. Cocaine is a derivative of natural stimulants which has an extremely rapid onset of action and an extremely short duration of action. The effects are a euphoria almost unique to human experience. The combination of the unique euphoria and the short duration of action can cause extreme addiction in any animal. There are studies in monkeys showing that these individuals who prefer cocaine to food and water, will use cocaine until they die of either malnutrition or dehydration. They are totally unable to control their behavior in order to stop cocaine, and must be physically restrained and prevented from obtaining the drug. It is my opinion that Mr. Rentel's cocaine addiction was on the same level of the experimental addiction seen in monkeys.
The same psychiatrist also noted, however, that respondent's ability to distinguish between his money and his client's money was not totally impaired. Nor did he detect that respondent thought his law firm owed him the money:
His thinking and thoughts did not appear to be impaired to the point where he was irrationalizing or . . . delusional in his belief that this money was really his or that his partners had unfairly deprived him of his deserved money and the only way he could get them was by taking them unilaterally and things like that. I did not detect any of those things.
Moreover, judges before whom respondent appeared, attorneys against whom he argued, and even his own secretary thought that respondent functioned as a competent attorney during the period of his cocaine addiction. As one psychiatrist with 15 years' experience in substance abuse problems has stated with reference to cocaine, "A person can be high and still function well—that is, until he becomes absolutely paranoid." Based on the psychiatrist's testimony, the testimony of those with whom respondent worked, and the findings of fact set forth by the Disciplinary Board, we conclude that respondent took $26,000 over a 10-month period with knowledge of what he was doing. Under the facts here presented, whether the defendant is deemed to have "intended" to steal, or merely to have had "knowledge" of his actions, is immaterial; his mental state and conduct are both culpable in the extreme.
The third question to be addressed by this analysis is the extent of the actual or potential injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct. The extent of the injury is defined by the type of duty violated and the extent of actual or potential harm caused. The following hypothetical from the ABA Standards is helpful in considering this question:
[Ajssume that the client gave the lawyer $100 as an advance against the costs of investigation. The lawyer took the money, deposited it in a personal checking account, and used it for personal expenses. In this case, where the lawyer acted intentionally and the client actually suffered an injury, the most severe sanction—disbarment—would be appropriate.
Standards, at 6.
Here we have a lawyer who took more than $26,000 in client funds and used it for personal expenses; that is, to buy cocaine. Nine clients suffered serious financial injury, and the public and legal profession were injured as well. Such injury warrants a severe sanction.
By now, it can come as no surprise to the bar that so far as this court is concerned a lawyer's failure to preserve the integrity of client funds leads to disbarment, absent extraordinary mitigating circumstances. In discussing what mitigating factors, if any, will lessen the sanction usually imposed for misappropriating client funds, we reach the final question posed by the ABA Sanctions Committee, namely, whether there are "any aggravating or mitigating circumstances?" We have, on occasion, held that alcoholism is a mitigating circumstance in misappropriation cases. We emphasize here, however, that alcoholism is only a mitigating factor, and will only be considered as such in certain circumstances; it does not excuse an attorney's misconduct. We agree with the Illinois Supreme Court:
Perhaps in rare cases alcoholism might so change the character of the misconduct or so distort the attorney's state of mind as to provide a complete excuse. Usually, however, alcoholism is at most an extenuating circumstance, a mitigating fact, not an excuse. The attorney's impaired judgment diminishes the responsibility he must bear, but does not eliminate it. Not all alcoholics appropriate the money of their clients; the slide from drink to dishonor may be smooth, but it is neither automatic nor uncontrollable. We can understand it; we cannot excuse it or overlook misconduct as serious as respondent's. Alcoholics need not be treated just like other people; our duty to uphold the standards and reputation of the profession is not incompatible with sympathy and leniency for victims of alcoholism. But their tragedy cannot be used as a license to exploit clients by taking their money.
In re Driscoll, 85 Ill. 2d 312, 316, 423 N.E.2d 873 (1981).
Even looking sympathetically upon respondent's alcoholism, however, that addiction is only part of the story here.
From 1981 to 1983, a 3-year period, respondent was a cocaine addict as well as a practicing attorney. The use of alcohol is legal; the use of cocaine is not. Each time respondent used cocaine during those 3 years, he engaged in a felony having a maximum penalty of 5 years' imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. Respondent testified that he often pooled his money with others to buy cocaine. While there is no evidence that respondent sold cocaine, he effectively helped others buy this insidious drug and sustain their addictions.
Although the respondent was acquitted of felony theft, conviction thereof in the criminal courts is not a condition precedent to disciplinary action. The fact remains that respondent undeniably took client funds to support his cocaine habit. Such a repetitive pattern of misconduct demands more severe sanctions than an isolated violation.
Respondent's use of alcohol was not illegal and began in a social manner. His use of cocaine, while illegal in nature, at least in the beginning was likewise of a casual and experimental nature. At some point in time, however, while still functioning in a relatively normal manner, he abandoned his volition, his freedom of choice and indeed, his responsibility. Thus at some point in time, while the choice was still his, respondent chose the path which ultimately led to his cocaine addiction. Volition, freedom and responsibility fell to addiction. Whether he, as an individual, with a11 of his personality traits, recognized that critical step over the border can never really be known to this court. We can acknowledge that at some point he lost control either in a psychological or physiological sense, or both, yet that loss can only explain; it cannot justify his conduct to the clients, to the profession or to the public.
Respondent argues that under our previous cases involving misappropriation of client funds, we must conclude that disbarment is too severe a sanction for his misconduct. This is a misuse and misunderstanding of the function of precedent in disciplinary cases. Broad guidelines are laid down in the cases involving lawyer discipline, but no case is absolutely binding precedent for future cases. Considering the whole spectrum of facts, offenses, attitudes, cooperation or noncooperation, rehabilitation, client losses and the length of suspension, it is at once apparent that bar discipline must be tailored to fit the facts of each particular case. No prior case absolutely mandates a particular result in any subsequent proceeding.
Drug and alcohol addiction poses an especially troublesome problem because of the difficulty of predicting future avoidance of substance abuse. Indeed, respondent may well be more susceptible to substance abuse than others. As the psychiatrist who examined him observed in this case, "[generally speaking, people with the narcissistic personality are considered to be more vulnerable to alcohol and drug abuse." The doctor also replied "yes" to this question: "And the afflictions of drug abuse and alcohol abuse are also in and of themselves extremely difficult to sustain on remission; is that correct?" Other experts have noted the difficulty of overcoming cocaine addiction alone:
"Coke is physically addicting but the psychological craving for it is even stronger . It takes years before anyone can be sure they have cleaned up."
"Nationally, of the people who present themselves for treatment, just 15 to 17 percent stay off cocaine for more than a year," . . .
Cocaine Blues, 72 A.B.A. J. 25, 26 (May 1,1986). It was the respondent himself who requested a doubling of the 5-year probationary period originally proposed by the hearing officer.
In sum, we conclude that the 10-year probationary period proposed by the hearing officer is an unwieldy and unauthorized solution to the problem presented by the facts of this case. In the first place, such a sanction would impose an enormous, and perhaps impossible, burden upon the bar and others responsible for monitoring respondent's conduct. But more importantly, as discussed above, we concur with the Disciplinary Board's recommendation of disbarment to emphasize our strong policy against client fund violations and to protect the rights of clients, the public, the legal system and the legal profession as fully as possible.
Respondent Gary W. Rentel is disbarred and his name stricken from the roll of attorneys in this state. The costs of this proceeding are hereby assessed against respondent.
Brachtenbach, Dore, Callow, and Durham, JJ., concur.
RLD 7.2(a).
RLD 6.7(c).
In re Fortun, 97 Wn.2d 240, 241, 643 P.2d 447 (1982).
See RLD 4.8(c).
In re Kumbera, 91 Wn.2d 401, 403, 588 P.2d 1167 (1979); In re Little, 40 Wn.2d 421, 430, 244 P.2d 255 (1952).
Little, at 430.
ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, at 5 (1986).
See Standards, at 5.
Standards, at 5; see also In re Vetter, 104 Wn.2d 779, 793, 711 P.2d 284 (1985).
Cocaine Blues, 72 A.B.A. J. 25, 26 (May 1, 1986).
In re Noble, 100 Wn.2d 88, 92, 667 P.2d 608 (1983); In re Moynihan, 97 Wn.2d 237, 238, 643 P.2d 439 (1982).
See also Kumbera, at 405; In re Stock, 104 Wn.2d 273, 283, 704 P.2d 611 (1985).
See Noble, at 98.
See ROW 69.50.401(d).
RLD 1.1(a); In re Fortun, 97 Wn.2d 240, 242, 643 P.2d 447 (1982).
Noble, at 93; Moynihan, at 239.
See Noble, at 99; In re Salvesen, 94 Wn.2d 73, 79, 614 P.2d 1264 (1980).