Case Name: Zhenhe DAI, Petitioner, v. Michael B. MUKASEY, Attorney General, Respondent
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2008-07-23
Citations: 288 F. App'x 341
Docket Number: No. 07-74744
Parties: Zhenhe DAI, Petitioner, v. Michael B. MUKASEY, Attorney General, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 288
Pages: 341–342

Head Matter:
Zhenhe DAI, Petitioner, v. Michael B. MUKASEY, Attorney General, Respondent.
No. 07-74744.
United States Court, of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted July 14, 2008.
Filed July 23, 2008.
Zhenhe Dai, for pro se.
Lance Lomond Jolley, Esq., Trial, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, OIL, U.S. Department of Justice Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, CAC-District Counsel, Office of the District Counsel Department of Homeland Security, Los Angeles, CA, Ronald E. Lefevre, Office of the District Counsel Department of Homeland Security, San Francisco, CA, for Respondents.
Before: SCHROEDER, LEAVY and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
This is a petition for review from the Board of Immigration Appeals' ("BIA") denial of a motion to reopen.
We review the BIA's ruling on a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. Perez v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 770, 773 (9th Cir.2008).
The regulations provide that "a party may file only one motion to reopen," and that the motion "must be filed no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered in the proceeding sought to be reopened." See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner's motion to reopen, filed more than two years after the final administrative decision was rendered. See Iturribarna v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 894 (9th Cir.2003). Nor did the BIA err in concluding that petitioner failed to show that reopening was warranted based on changed circumstances in China. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii); see also Malty v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 942, 945-47 (9th Cir.2004).
Accordingly, respondent's motion for summary disposition is granted because the questions raised by this petition for review are so insubstantial as not to require further argument. See United States v. Hooton, 693 F.2d 857, 858 (9th Cir.1982) (per curiam) (stating standard).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.