Case Name: SCHIEFFELIN v. McCLELLAN, Mayor, et al.
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1909-12-22
Citations: 120 N.Y.S. 215
Docket Number: 
Parties: SCHIEFFELIN v. McCLELLAN, Mayor, et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 120
Pages: 215–221

Head Matter:
SCHIEFFELIN v. McCLELLAN, Mayor, et al.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
December 22, 1909.)
1. Statutes (§ 163 )—General and Special Statutes—Repeal.
A later special statute, which covers the whole subject-matter of an earlier general statute, and which, though not repugnant to the earlier statute, embraces new and more specific provisions, is a substitute for and a repeal, pro tanto, of the earlier general act.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. § 238; Dec. Dig. § 163. ]
2. Street Railroads (§ 4 )—Franchises—Statutes—Repeal.
Railroad Law (Laws 1890, p. 1109, c. 565) § 92, as amended by Laws 1893, p. 910, c. 434, providing for the manner of procuring the consent of local authorities for the construction and operation of street surface railroads, is a general act, covering the whole state, and is pro tanto repealed by Greater New York Charter (Laws 1901, p. 38, c. 466) § 74, as amended by Laws 1905, p. 1548, c. 630, on the same subject, subsequently enacted, and its provisions control within Greater New York.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Street Railroads, Cent Dig. § 7; Dec. Dig. § 4. ]
3. Street Railroads (§ 24 )—Franchises—Consent of Local Authorities— Proceedings.
The fact that the board of estimate and apportionment of New York City, assuming to proceed at the same time, under Greater New York Charter (Laws 1901, p. 38, c. 466) § 74, as amended by Laws 1905, p. 1548, c. 630, and Railroad Law (Laws 1890, p. 1109, c. 565) § 92, as amended by Laws 1893, p. 910, c. 434, relating to the consent to the construction and operation of street surface railroads, considered the application before the day fixed for a public hearing, under section 92, and expressed an approval of the application, did not show such a violation of the railroad law as to make the act of the board illegal in further considering the application, and the board was not thereby divested of jurisdiction to consider the application at the time and place fixed for a public hearing, under the railroad law.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Street Railroads, Dec. Dig. § 24. ]
McLaughlin and Clarke, JJ., dissenting.
Appeal from Special Term, New York County.
Action by William Jay Schieffelin against George B. McClellan, as Mayor of New York City, and others. From an order granting an injunction pendente lite, defendants appeal.
Reversed.
Argued before INGRAHAM, CLARICE, HOUGHTON, Mc-LAUGHLIN, and SCOTT, JJ.
Terence Farley, for appellants.
Julius H. Cohen, for respondents.
For other cases see tome topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
SCOTT, J.
This is an appeal from an order enjoining the board of estimate and apportionment of the city of New York from proceeding further with the hearing upon, and from acting upon, an application for certain changes and modifications to the contract heretofore entered into between the city of New York and the South Shore Traction Company. The only question we have considered is whether or not the board may legally proceed to act, and whether they may so legally, proceed depends upon the question whether or not their acts are reg ulated byi section 92 of the Railroad Raw (Raws 1890, p. 1109, c. 565, as amended by Raws 1893, p. 910, c. 434), as well as by section 74 of the Greater New York Charter (Raws 1901, p. 38, c. 466, as amended by Raws 1905, p. 1548, c, 630), and, if so regulated, whether or not the provisions of these acts have been complied with. The two provisions read as follows:
"Railroad Law, § 92. The application for the consent of the local authorities shall be in writing and before acting thereon such authorities shall give public notice thereof and of the time and place when it will first be considered, which notice shall be published daily in any city for at least fourteen days in two of its daily newspapers, if there be two, if not, in one, to be designated by the mayor. Such consent must be upon the expressed condition that the provisions of this article pertinent thereto shall be complied with and shall be filed in the office of the clerk of the county in which such railroad is located. Whenever the consent of the common council of a city is applied for, the first consideration, of which notice is hereby required, may be by committee of such Common Council. Any such notice, publication or consideration heretofore or hereafter given, made or had in substantial compliance with the requirements of this section, is and shall be sufficient notice, publication and consideration for all the purposes hereof notwithstanding any conflicting provision of any local or special act or charter."
The charter provisions, as they now stand, are as follows:
"Sec. 74. Before any grant of the franchise or right to use any Street, avenue, waterway, parkway, park, bridge, dock, wharf, highway or public ground or water within or belonging to the city shall be made by the board of estimate and apportionment, the proposed specific grant embodied in the form of a contract with all of the terms and conditions, including the provisions as to rates, fares and charges, and, together with the form of the resolution or resolutions for the granting of the same, shall be entered in the minutes of the board of estimate and apportionment, and after such entry shall be published at least twenty days in the 'City Record' and at least twice in two daily newspapers published in the city, to be designated by the mayor, at the expense of the proposed grantee. The board of estimate and apportionment shall, before authorizing any such contract or adopting any such resolution, set a date or dates for a public hearing thereon, at which citizens shall be entitled to appear and be heard. No such hearing shall be held, however, until the notice thereof shall have been published for at least ten day immediately prior thereto in the 'City Record' and at least twice in two daily newspapers published in the city, to be designated by the mayor, at the expense of the proposed grantee, and the said board of estimate and apportionment, before authorizing any such contract or adopting any such resolution, shall make inquiry as to the money value of the franchise or right proposed to be granted and the adequacy of the compensation proposed to be paid therefor, and publish the results of such inquiry at least ten days in the 'City Record' and at least twice in the daily newspapers in which such form of contract shall be published. Every such contract or resolution shall be entered on the minutes or record of such board of estimate and apportionment, and every contract or resolution containing or making such grant shall require the-concurrence of members of the board of estimate and apportionment entitled as provided by law to three-fourths of the total number of votes to which all the members of the said board shall be entitled and the votes shall be shown by the ayes and noes as recorded in the minutes of the board'. Thirty days at least shall intervene between the introduction and final passage of any such resolution or authorization of such contract. The separate and additional approval of the mayor shall be necessary 'to the validity of every such contract or resolution... This .act shall apply to any renewal or extension.of the grant or leasing of,the property to the same grantee or to others. Within, five days after the adoption- of any such resolution or any such authorization, a copy thereof, including the full text of the franchise, grant or contract, and duly attested by the clerk of the,board of estimate and apportionment shall be trans mitted to each, of the following: The comptroller, the corporation counsel, the city clerk and the board of rapid transit railroad commissioners of the city of New York, to be preserved by them among the archives of their departments or office. All such certified copies shall be deemed to be public records."
Here we have two acts providing how the consent of the local authorities may be given to the use of the public streets by a street railroad corporation, what notice of the application shall be given, and what public hearing shall be had. The earlier one is a general act not covering the whole state. The other is a local and special act relating exclusively to the city of New York. The one provides in general terms that, before the local authorities act upon such an application, 14 days' notice shall be given of the time and place at which it will be first considered. No positive provision is made for a public hearing, which has to be read into the statute by implication. Secor v. Village of Pelham Manor, 6 App. Div. 236, 39 N. Y. Supp. 993. No directions are given us to the form or contents of the notice; that being left wholly to the discretion of the public authorities.
The later special act designed to effect the same result, to wit, notification to the public of any proposed consent, and-an opportunity for a public hearing thereon, is much more stringent and specific. It requires that the proposed specific grant embodied in the form of a contract with all the terms and conditions, including the provision as to the rates, fares, and charges, together with the form of resolution for the granting of the same, shall be entered in the minutes of the board of estimate and apportionment and published at least 20 days in the City Record, and at least twice in two daily newspapers. The board is then required to set a date or dates for a public hearing thereon at which citizens shall be entitled to appear and be heard. Of this meeting 10 days' notice must be given by advertisement. The board must make inquiry as to the money value of the franchise or right proposed to be granted and the adequacy of the compensation -proposed to be paid therefor, the results to be published for 10 days; and, finally, to prevent anything approaching haste in the action of the board, it is provided that at least 30 days must intervene between the introduction and the final passage of any resolution authorizing such a contract. It is apparent that the charter provisions require as much, and indeed much more, in the way of preliminary notice, and opportunity to citizens to learn of the proposed action and to intelligently discuss it, than is required by the railroad law. It is unreasonable to assume that the Legislature intended that both procedures should be followed, especially in view of that clause of section 92 of the railroad law which provides that:
"Any such notice, publication or consideration heretofore or hereafter given, made or had in substantial compliance with the requirements of this section is, and shall be sufficient notice, publication and consideration for all the purposes hereof notwithstanding any conflicting provisions of any local or special act or charter."
It is a well-established rule of statutory construction that a later special statute which covers the whole subject-matter of an earlier general statute, and which, although not repugnant to the earlier statute, embraces new and more specific provisions, will be held to have been intended, within the scope of its operations, as a substitute for and a repeal pro tanto of the earlier general act. Heckmann v. Pinkney, 81 N. Y. 211; Excelsior Petroleum Co. v. Lacey, 63 N. Y. 422; People v. Gold & Stock Tel. Co., 98 N. Y. 67; N. Y. Cable Co. v. Mayor, 104 N. Y. 1—15, 10 N. E. 332. In my opinion this rule is distinctly applicable to the acts under consideration, and, as the preliminary acts of the defendants concededly follow the requirements of the charter, the injunction should not be continued.
Personally I should arrive at the same result if I considered that both acts must be followed, for I can see no basis for the claim that, in any event, proceedings must be carried to a conclusion under one act, before the preliminary steps may be taken under the other.
The order appealed from should be reversed, with $10 costs and disbursements, and the motion denied, with $10 costs.
INGRAHAM and HOUGHTON, JJ., concur. McLAUGHLIN and CLARKE, JJ., dissent.