Case Name: Pedro MEDINA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1997-02-10
Citations: 690 So. 2d 1241
Docket Number: Nos. 89758, 89762
Parties: Pedro MEDINA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: OVERTON, GRIMES and HARDING, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 690
Pages: 1241–1254

Head Matter:
Pedro MEDINA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Nos. 89758, 89762.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Feb. 10, 1997.
Martin J. McClain, Litigation Director and Jennifer M. Corey, Assistant CCR, Office of the Capital Collateral Representative, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General; and Kenneth S. Nunnelley and Judy T. Rush, Assistant Attorneys General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Pedro Medina appeals orders entered by the circuit court denying appellant's motions for postconviction relief. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. We reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.812. We find there is a need for an evidentiary hearing because in the submissions to the circuit court pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.811 there were three experts stating Medina is competent to be executed and three other experts stating Medina is not competent to be executed. We affirm as to all other issues.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Medina came to the United States from Cuba in 1980 when he was nineteen years old. Medina eventually lived with his half-sister in Orlando. Dorothy James, the victim, lived in an apartment next to Medina's half-sister. James befriended Medina.
James was found dead in her apartment on April 4,1982. She had been gagged, stabbed multiple times, and left to die. Early in the morning of April 8, 1982, Medina was found asleep in James' automobile at a rest stop on Interstate 10 near Lake City and was arrested for theft of the automobile. The next day, detectives from Orange County investigating the murder of James interviewed Medina in the Columbia County Jail about the auto theft and the murder. Medina's explanation of how he came to be in James' vehicle was not believed by the detectives. Medina was arrested and indicted for the murder of James.
Medina requested a psychiatric examination and was examined by two psychiatrists. Each determined that Medina met the statutory criteria for competence to stand trial. The trial court found Medina competent to stand trial.
Medina was tried before a jury in Orange County on March 15 through 18,1983. Medina testified in his own defense. Medina denied murdering James. However, Medina admitted being in James' apartment the night of the murder. Medina admitted that he was in James' apartment when James was dead. Medina admitted that a hat found by police detectives on a bed near James' body was his hat. Medina admitted taking James' automobile after she was murdered. Medina admitted driving James' automobile to Tampa and offering to sell the automobile in Tampa to a man with whom he engaged in a fight at the time of the attempted sale. The man to whom Medina was selling the automobile testified that he gave Medina $250 for the automobile, but then Medina left with the automobile. When law enforcement officers searched the vehicle following Medina's arrest, a knife was found in the vehicle.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Medina was convicted of first-degree murder and auto theft. The jury, by a ten-to-two vote, recommended the death penalty for the murder conviction. The trial court found two aggravating circumstances and a single mitigating circumstance. The court found the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstance and sentenced Medina to death. This Court affirmed Medina's convictions and sentences. Medina v. State, 466 So.2d 1046 (Fla.1985).
Medina then filed a motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. The trial court determined that twelve of his fourteen claims were or could have been raised on direct appeal and therefore were procedurally barred. The court held an evidentiary hearing on the other two claims: withholding of material, exculpatory evidence by the State in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and ineffective assistance of counsel during the sentencing phase in that counsel failed to investigate and present compelling and available mitigation evidence. The trial court denied all relief, and this Court affirmed the denial. Medina v. State, 573 So.2d 293 (Fla.1990). Medina filed a state petition for writ of habeas corpus, and this Court denied the petition. Medina v. Dugger, 586 So.2d 317 (Fla.1991).
Medina thereafter filed a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging numerous constitutional violations. The district court denied the petition. On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, Medina raised thirteen claims, only three of which the court of appeals found merited discussion. Medina v. Singletary, 59 F.3d 1095 (11th Cir.1995), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 116 S.Ct. 2505, 135 L.Ed.2d 195 (1996). One of the issues discussed by the court was Medina's claim that he was incompetent to be tried. Id. at 1105. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Medina's petition. Id. at 1114. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. Medina v. Singletary, — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 2505, 135 L.Ed.2d 195 (1996).
On February 17, 1995, Medina, proceeding-pro se, filed a civil rights action pursuant to 42 United States Code, section 1983 (1993), against the Capital Collateral Representative (CCR) and several of the attorneys in the CCR office who had been involved in his representation. The claim was centered mainly upon allegations that OCR's attorneys had not effectively represented him in the state proceedings and in the federal habeas proceeding. The federal district court dismissed the claim. Medina v. Minerva, 907 F.Supp. 379 (M.D.Fla.1995). Medina filed a notice of appeal on December 12,1995, which was dismissed on July 3, 1996.
The Governor signed Medina's death warrant on October 30,1996. The execution was scheduled for December 5, 1996. Medina filed a motion for change of counsel, which the trial court granted with the caveat that CCR continue to represent Medina. This Court upheld the trial court's ruling in an order directing CCR to continue representing Medina. Next, Medina filed in this Court a petition for all writs jurisdiction alleging that execution by electrocution is per se cruel and/or unusual punishment. This Court denied the petition, as did the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court. Medina v. Butterworth, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 553, 136 L.Ed.2d 435 (1996). Medina filed a motion to disqualify the trial judge from presiding over subsequent motions relating to Medina's death warrant. The judge disqualified himself and appointed another judge to consider Medina's motions.
On December 2, 1996, Medina's counsel wrote a letter to the Governor asking for a stay of execution in light of a mental health expert's assessment that Medina was not competent to be executed. The letter invoked the provisions of section 922.07, Florida Statutes (1995), which sets forth an executive procedure for determining competence to be executed, and therefore the Governor stayed the execution pending a psychiatric determination of competence for execution. Pursuant to section 922.07, the Governor appointed a commission of three psychiatrists to determine whether Medina understood the nature and effect of the death penalty and why it is being imposed upon him. The psychiatric commission examined Medina and forwarded its findings in a report to the Governor on December 10, 1996. The report states that "it is the unanimous opinion of the members of this commission that Mr. Medina understands the nature and effect of the death penalty and why it has been imposed upon him." Based upon the commission's findings, the Governor lifted Medina's stay of execution on January 6, 1997. The Governor rescheduled Medina's execution for the week beginning January 27, 1997, and ending February 3,1997.
On January 8,1997, the circuit court held a telephone status conference in which counsel for Medina and the State discussed the scheduling of hearings on pending motions, what motions would be heard, and what was going to be filed. On January 8, 1997, the circuit court noticed a hearing for 9:30 a.m. on January 14,1997, on a motion to withdraw by CCR, a motion to determine the competence of the defendant to proceed in the rule 3.850 proceeding, and a motion to appoint counsel for clemency proceedings. On January 10, 1997, counsel for Medina filed, pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.811, a combined emergency motion for a stay of execution pending judicial determination of competence. This motion was not noticed for hearing on January 14. Thus, Medina filed requests for two separate competency determinations: one on his competence to proceed in the 3.850 proceeding and one on his competence to be executed.
At the hearing on January 14, 1997, the circuit court first denied OCR's motion to withdraw and motion to appoint counsel for clemency proceeding. The court then heard extensive argument on the motion to determine the competence of defendant to proceed in postconviction proceedings pursuant to rule 3.850. The State contended that our decision in Jackson v. State, 452 So.2d 533 (Fla.1984), controlled. In Jackson, we held that a postconviction defendant is not entitled to a judicial determination of his competence to assist counsel in preparing either a 3.850 motion or a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Alternatively, the State noted that this Court was considering a ease with an issue similar to one contained in Jackson. The State argued that in view of the short time period until the execution, the circuit court should consider evidence and rule on Medina's competence to proceed. The State asserted that it was ready at that time to put on the testimony of the three psychiatrists who had examined Medina at the request of the Governor. Medina's counsel responded that she was not prepared to present her three expert witnesses at an evidentiary hearing on the issue because she had come to the hearing with the belief that there was only to be legal argument on whether Jackson controlled. The State replied that it was Medina's counsel's motion which had been scheduled for hearing and that Medina's counsel should have been prepared for an evidentiary hearing because a hearing would occur if the motion were granted. The circuit court agreed to hear the State's witnesses who were present. The court then agreed to consider any affidavits submitted by Medina's counsel by the following day.
On January 15, 1997, the circuit court entered an order on the motion for determination of competence of defendant to proceed pursuant to rule 3.850 proceedings. In the order, the court made alternative rulings. The court first found that Jackson was controlling. Second, the court stated that it had reviewed the reports of the experts and other evidence submitted by the State and by Medina's counsel. The circuit court determined that the standard in determining the competence of Medina to proceed in postconviction proceedings was the standard set forth in Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960). The circuit court then found that Medina "is competent to proceed in postconviction proceedings." On January 21,1997, Medina's counsel filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by order dated January 23,1997.
On January 16, 1997, the circuit court entered its order denying the combined emergency motion for a stay of execution pending judicial determination of competence. In the order, the court stated:
In accordance with the provisions of rule 3.811, the Court has extensively reviewed and considered the Motion, all reports of experts that were submitted to the Governor pursuant to the statutory procedure for executive determination of sanity to be executed, and all other evidentiary material and written submissions provided by the State and counsel for Defendant.
Based upon the totality of the Motion and all submissions, this Court finds that there are no reasonable grounds to believe that Defendant is insane to be executed.
On January 21, 1997, Medina filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by order dated January 23,1997.
On December 6, 1996, Medina filed in the circuit court an emergency motion to vacate judgment and request for evidentiary hearing and stay of execution pursuant to rule 3.850. The State filed its response on January 17, 1997. On January 21, 1997, the circuit court held a hearing on Medina's motion pursuant .to Huff v. State, 622 So.2d 982 (Fla.1993).
In an extensive order dated January 23, 1997, the circuit court reviewed the factual and procedural history of the case and each of the claims that Medina asserted. The court then denied the 3.850 motion.
On January 24, 1997, Medina filed an appeal of the circuit court's orders. We held oral argument on January 27,1997.
ARGUMENT I
Medina argues in this appeal that the circuit court erred in summarily denying Medina's combined motion for a stay of execution pending judicial determination of competence to be executed. Medina contends that the circuit court's order must be reversed because it ruled upon the motion without an oral hearing and because there were reasonable grounds to believe that the prisoner is not competent to be executed. Medina argues that, if submissions to the circuit court pursuant to rule 3.811 provide reasonable grounds to believe that a posteon-viction defendant is incompetent to be exe cuted, the rule requires the circuit court to stay the execution and hold a hearing pursuant to rule 3.812, which provides for a hearing on insanity at the time of execution. Rule 3.811(e) provides:
(e) Order Granting. If the circuit judge, upon review of the motion and submissions, has reasonable grounds to believe that the prisoner is insane to be executed, the judge shall grant a stay of execution and may order further proceedings which may include a hearing pursuant to rule 3.812.
Medina points to the reports of two psychologists and one psychiatrist which his counsel submitted pursuant to rule 3.811(d)(4). In those reports, the psychologists and psychiatrist state that in their expert opinions, Medina is insane to be executed as defined in rule 3.811(b). We agree with Medina that an evidentiary hearing pursuant to rule 3.812 should be held in this ease. We conclude that in this case the reports of the two psychologists and the psychiatrist meet the reasonable-ground threshold of rule 3.811(e) and that it was an abuse of discretion not to have an evidentiary hearing pursuant to rule 3.812in view of the conflicting opinions of the experts. For this reason, we have stayed Medina's execution. We reverse the circuit court's order denying the motion pursuant to rule 3.811, and we remand to the circuit court for a hearing pursuant to 3.811(e) within twenty-one days of the date this opinion is filed.
In the rule 3.812 hearing, the evidence to be admitted is to be as stated in rule 3.812(d), which provides that the court may admit such evidence as the court deems relevant to the issues, including but not limited to the reports of expert witnesses. In respect to Medina's counsel for that hearing, we have reviewed the contention of Medina's counsel, Martin McClain, that he and other CCR attorneys have' a conflict and cannot represent Medina in the competency proceeding. The factual basis of this contention focuses upon the following statement in the psychiatric commission's report to the Governor dated December 10,1996:
An affidavit from a correctional officer stated that on or about December 2, 1996, Mr. Medina was overheard telling another inmate in the Death Row Watch area that his attorney had instructed him to "act crazy."
We conclude that this statement does not present a conflict as to McClain or as to CCR; neither does it require that McClain or CCR withdraw from representing Medina in the rule 3.812 proceedings. It is in the consistent interest of Medina and his counsel to deny that Medina was instructed by counsel to "act crazy." We find no legal or ethical reason why McClain or any other CCR counsel should not represent Medina in this proceeding. We expressly authorize counsel, if counsel decides it is in Medina's interest, to testify under oath at the rule 3.812evidentiary hearing regarding this matter. Furthermore, the deposition of former death-row inmate John Mills may be admitted for consideration by the circuit court.
For purposes of the rule 3.812 hearing, we also address Medina's contention that the requirement in rule 3.812(e) that a finding by the court that a prisoner is insane to be executed is to be by clear and convincing evidence is unconstitutional based upon the United States Supreme Court decision in Cooper v. Oklahoma, — U.S.-, 116 S.Ct. 1373, 134 L.Ed.2d 498 (1996). We do not agree.
The circuit court is to follow rule 3.812(e), which provides:
(e) Order. If, at the conclusion of the hearing, the court shall find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the prisoner is insane to be executed, the court shall enter its order continuing the stay of the death warrant; otherwise, the court shall deny the motion and enter its order dissolving the stay of execution.
We find that Cooper does not apply to a rule 3.812proceeding. In Cooper, the issue involved the standard of proof in determining whether a defendant was incompetent to stand trial, which is clearly different from a. determination of sanity to be executed. In respect to competence to stand trial, the United States Supreme Court found that in weighing the interest of the defendant against the interest of the State, the defendant's interest was substantial and the State's interest was modest. However, in Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986), Justices Powell and O'Connor specifically found that in competency determinations for purposes of execution made while the execution is pending, the interests of the State were substantial. We specifically note the following from Justice Powell's concurring opinion:
First, the Eighth Amendment claim at issue can arise only after the prisoner has been validly convicted of a capital crime and sentenced to death. Thus, in this case the State has a substantial and legitimate interest in taking petitioner's life as punishment for his crime. That interest is not called into question by petitioner's claim. Rather, the only question raised is not ivhether, but when, his execution may take place. This question is important, but it is not comparable to the antecedent question whether petitioner should be executed at all. It follows that this Court's decisions imposing heightened procedural requirements on capital trials and sentencing proceedings do not apply in this context.
477 U.S. at 425, 106 S.Ct. at 2609-10 (Powell, J., concurring) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted), and from Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion:
The prisoner's interest in avoiding an erroneous determination is, of course, very great. But I consider it self-evident that .once society has validly convicted an. individual of a crime and therefore established its right to punish, the demands of due process are reduced accordingly. Moreover, the potential for false claims and deliberate delay in this context is obviously enormous. This potential is exacerbated by a unique feature of the prisoner's protected interest in suspending the execution of a death sentence during incompetency. By definition, this interest can never be conclusively and finally determined: Regardless of the number of prior adjudications of the issue, until the very moment of execution the prisoner can claim that he has become insane sometime after the previous determination to the contrary. These difficulties, together with the fact that the issue arises only after conviction and sentencing, convince me that the Due Process Clause imposes few requirements on the States in this context.
477 U.S. at 429, 106 S.Ct. at 2612 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
Moreover, we note that in this case the issue of competence to stand trial was heard the day before Medina's trial began. It was determined that Medina was competent. No issue as to that determination was raised on direct appeal except Medina's claim that he was entitled to evaluation by a third mental-health expert. We ruled that this issue was without merit. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals extensively reviewed and affirmed against the postconviction claims based on the pretrial and during-trial competency contentions. 59 F.3d at 1095.
We have granted a stay of execution in this case. We order that the evidentiary hearing pursuant to rule 3.812 be held. We here direct the circuit court to schedule the 3.812 hearing by written notice and to enter an order pursuant to rule 3.812(e) no later than twenty-one days from the date of the filing of this opinion. Within seven days of the filing of the hearing notice, the circuit court shall have a telephone scheduling and status conference to discuss the hearing. After the hearing, if the circuit court determines that Medina is competent to be executed, the stay which we have granted will continue until 7 a.m. on the twenty-first day following the date of the circuit court's order.
ARGUMENT II
Medina further contends that the lower court erred in determining that Medina had no right to a judicial determination of his competence to proceed under rule 3.850, erred in determining the standard for competence in postconviction proceedings, and erred in permitting the State to present wit nesses without giving Medina an opportunity to do the same.
This issue is determined by Jackson. We find no basis in this ease to revisit our decision in Jackson. This was a successive rule 3.850 proceeding, and until there was a determination that there was an issue that warranted an evidentiary hearing, Medina was clearly not entitled to a competency determination for the purpose of counsel proceeding to a Huff hearing.
Even assuming that Jackson did not control this case, we affirm the circuit court's order finding Medina competent to proceed in postconviction proceedings. We believe the Dusky standard is the correct standard for such a determination. We specifically reject Medina's contention that he was not given a fair opportunity to present witnesses. The motion was Medina's motion, in which he sought an evidentiary hearing. If Medina's counsel had a question about whether witness testimony could be presented, counsel should have inquired of the court. The State had its witnesses present. On January 8, the circuit court sent written notice of the January 14 hearing. We believe Medina's counsel was given adequate notice of the hearing. If Medina intended to offer live testimony in support of Medina's motion, the witnesses should have been present when the hearing was scheduled. We believe that confronted with the State's having witnesses available to oppose Medina's motion, the circuit court was well within its discretion to consider the live testimony of witnesses who were present and accept affidavits and reports from witnesses who were not present. Based upon the evidence presented, we find that the circuit court was within its discretion in determining that Medina was competent to proceed.
ARGUMENT III
Medina argues that the lower court erred in denying Medina's counsel's motion to withdraw. We find no merit in Medina's argument. We have addressed in respect to Argument I how counsel may proceed in the rule 3.812 hearing.
ARGUMENT TV
Medina argues that he was denied full adversarial testing of exculpatory evidence during the guilt and penalty phases of his trial. We find that the circuit court's order denying the emergency motion to vacate judgment and sentence dated January 23, 1997, considered and correctly ruled upon each of these issues. In the order, the circuit court delineates what Medina asserts as newly discovered evidence and explains why the evidence claimed to be newly discovered does not provide a basis for relief under rule 3.850. We quote the circuit court's well-written order in respect to the claims concerning Ernest Arnold, Reinaldo Dorta, Billy Andrews, and Joseph Daniels:
Correspondingly, nothing would have changed at all if Ernest Arnold had testified that there were two marijuana "joints" in an ashtray in the victim's apartment; nor would the jury have been swayed if he further testified that the detective told him not to say anything about his observation because the marijuana had nothing at all to do with the murder. This information simply had no relevance whatsoever. The same reasoning is true concerning the number of cigarettes Reinaldo Dorta gave to Defendant. At trial, it was mentioned that a Marlboro cigarette was found in an ashtray at the victim's home. Mr. Dorta testified that he had given Defendant Marlboro cigarettes. However, this information did not become a focus of the trial nor is it particularly relevant in light of Defendant's admission that he was at the victim's home the night she was murdered.
Faced with the evidence that the murder could have occurred in only a limited time period, that Defendant was seen around the victim's apartment during that time, that no forced entry was discovered, that Defendant admitted the victim knew him and would allow him to freely enter her home, that he was in the victim's apartment after she died, that he left his hat at the scene, that he took the victim's car and attempted to sell it, and that he was found in the car along with a knife hidden under a hubcap, the jury had no other choice but to convict Defendant. And, more impor tantly, that choice would have been the same even if presented with the additional evidence concerning Billy Andrews, Joseph Daniels, and marijuana "joints" and other cigarettes. Accordingly, this Court finds that presentation of this allegedly newly discovered evidence would not have produced an acquittal on retrial.
Defendant's submission that the State withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), is also barred because as discussed above the information upon which it is based is not newly discovered. Moreover, as also more fully discussed above, Defendant cannot show that "there is a reasonable probability that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Mills v. State [684 So.2d 801, 805] (Fla.1996). Additionally, even if this Court found that the material concerning Billy Andrews and Joseph Daniels was newly discovered and hence, not time barred, there still would be no violation of Brady. Brady does not require disclosure of all information concerning preliminary, discontinued investigations of all possible suspects in a crime. Spaziano v. State, 570 So.2d 289 (Fla.1990). In other words, simply because someone other than the defendant "was a suspect early in the investigation, though this theory was later abandoned, is not information that must be disclosed under Brady." Id at 291.
Likewise, we find the circuit court's order is correct in respect to the other claims of newly discovered evidence.
ARGUMENT V
Medina argues that the lower court erred in rejecting his claim that he was denied his constitutional right to trial before a fair and impartial tribunal and to postconviction proceedings that comport with due process.
We agree with the circuit court that the information concerning Dorta's petition for habeas corpus and suit against Judge Powell and the state attorney were available public records for a period much longer than the period which qualifies newly discovered evidence in a successive 3.850 motion. The fact that Judge Powell was represented in that proceeding by the Attorney General's office is irrelevant. Judge Powell had no duty to disclose any of the facts which Medina alleged Judge Powell had a duty to disclose. We find no error regarding this issue.
ARGUMENT VI
Medina argues that Florida's statute limiting his right to pursue executive clemency constitutes an unconstitutional legislative intrusion into the executive function.
We agree with the circuit court that this issue is not properly the subject of a 3.850 motion. Moreover, this issue is not properly presented in an appeal from the circuit court's denial of the emergency motions presently considered. Therefore, we reject Medina's argument and find no error in the circuit court's ruling.
ARGUMENT VII
Medina argues that he is innocent of first-degree murder and that he is "innocent of the death sentence." We agree with the circuit court that this issue is proeedurally barred. Even if it were not proeedurally barred, we find Medina's argument to be without merit because it is based upon some allegations we have rejected previously.
CONCLUSION
In sum, we reverse the circuit court's denial of Medina's motion pursuant to irnle 3.811. We remand for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to rule 3.812. We direct the circuit court to hold the hearing upon written notice and to enter an order pursuant to rule 3.812(e) no later than twenty-one days from the date this opinion is filed. We direct the circuit court to hold a status telephone conference concerning the rule 3.812 hearing no later than seven days from the date this opinion is filed. If the circuit court denies the rule 3.811 motion by order pursuant to rule 3.812(e), the order staying the execution entered by this Court on January 27, 1997, will remain in effect until 7 a.m. on the twenty-first day following the circuit court's order pursuant to rule 3.812(e).
All other orders of the circuit court are affirmed.
It is so ordered.
OVERTON, GRIMES and HARDING, JJ., concur.
WELLS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion.
ANSTEAD, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which KOGAN, C.J., and SHAW, J., concur.
NO MOTION FOR REHEARING WILL BE ALLOWED.
. Medina admitted during his trial testimony that the statement given to the Orange County detectives was a lie.
. The aggravating circumstances were: (1) that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; and (2) that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain.
.The mitigating circumstance was that Medina had no significant history of prior criminal activity-
. In its order, the circuit court noted:
Huff requires that attorneys representing a death-sentenced individual be given the opportunity to appear before the court on an initial 3.850 motion. See Huff, 622 So.2d at 983. The purpose of such a hearing is to determine whether an evidentiary hearing is required and to hear legal argument relating to the motion. Huff does not indicate whether such a hearing is required on a successive 3.850 motion. In an effort to ensure that none of Defendant's rights are violated, this Court decided to hold a Huff hearing on this, Defendant's second 3.850 motion.
. The correctional officer stated in his affidavit that Medina's statement concerning CCR counsel was made to Mills. Mills was executed on December 6, 1996. CCR states in the brief filed on Medina's behalf in this appeal that Mills' deposition was taken.