Case Name: PIERRARD v. HOCH
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1920-07-20
Citations: 97 Or. 71
Docket Number: 
Parties: PIERRARD v. HOCH.
Judges: 
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 97
Pages: 71–94

Head Matter:
Argued July 15,
reversed and remanded October 14,
Tehearing
allowed December 2,
argued on rehearing December 20, 1919,
former opinion set aside and decree affirmed July 20, 1920.
PIERRARD v. HOCH.
(184 Pac. 494; 191 Pac. 328.)
Army and Navy — Soldiers’ Relief Act Abating Mortgage Foreclosure not Affected, by Federal Statutes.
1. Laws of 1917, Chapter 275, abating mortgage foreclosure action where owner has enlisted in the military service of United States during and for 60 days subsequent to expiration of war, was not superseded or suspended by Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Aet (U. S. Comp. Stats. 1918, Sections 3078%£1,-3078%33)^ a federal aet not possessing superiority to state legislation upon-the subject of remedies and procedure in such courts.
Constitutional Law — Moratorium as to Soldiers not Impairment of Contracts.
2. Laws of 1917, Chapter 275, abating mortgage foreclosure action for period of war and 60-day period subsequent to termination thereof, where owner has enlisted in military service of United States, does not impair obligation of contracts; such stay being reasonable in view of nation’s need for enlisted men.
Army and Navy — Under Soldiers’ Relief Statute Mortgage Foreclosure Action not Enforceable.
3. Under Laws of 1917, Chapter 275, court had no jurisdiction to enter deeree in mortgage foreclosure aetion where owner was in the military service of the United States, having enlisted for a term of three years or for duration of war, under U. S. Comp. •Stats. 1918, Sections 1891a, 2026a.
ON REHEARING.
Constitutional Law — Moratorium Law for Soldiers Does no.t Impair Obligation of Contracts.
4. A moratorium law in favor of soldiers in some form is valid, not being violative of the constitutional provision against the passage of laws impairing the obligations of contracts.
Army and Navy — Legislation Protecting Soldiers Against Suit Within Power of Congress.
5. Federal legislation protecting soldiers .against suit during war, as the federal Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act (U. S. Comp. Stats. 1918, U. S. Comp. Stats. Ann. Supp. 1919, Sections 3078%a-3078%ss), held within the power of Congress under Article I, Section 8, of the U. S. Constitution, giving power to declare war, raise and maintain armies, .etc. '
Army and Navy — Federal Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act Superior to State Act.
6. Federal statute, protecting soldiers against suit during war, within power of Congress to enact under Article I, Section 8, of the U. S. Constitution, comes within Article VI, declaring Constitution and laws of United States shall be supreme law of land, binding on judges of every state, so that federal Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act (U. S. Comp. Stats. 1918, U. S. Comp. Stats. Ann. Supp. 1919, Sections SOJSU/ia-ilCUS^ss) is superior to Laws of 1917, Chapters 275, 515, forbidding mortgage foreclosure action where owner has enlisted in military service of United States during the war with Germany.
Judgment — Judgment by Default Rendered by Court Against Defendant on Whom Amended Complaint not Served not Void.
7. Judgment rendered by default by the court against a defendant on whom the amended complaint was not served, though irregular, is not treated as void, though the rule is otherwise respecting entry by the clerk of judgments by default under statute giving him that ministerial authority.
Judgment — Decree Void Pro Tanto Properly Canceled.
8. Where deeree - was void pro tanto as a deficiency judgment, forbidden by Section 426, L. O. .L., as to surplus remaining after return of judicial sale on foreclosure had been made, it was properly canceled to such extent by the court.
From Multnomah.: George "W. Stapleton, Judge.
In Banc.
This is a suit for the foreclosure of a mortgage. For the purposes of this appeal, the parties have stipulated the facts, which, briefly stated, are as follows:
In 1909 the plaintiff sold the property which is the subject of the suit, to the defendant Hoch for the sum of $40,500, of which $10,500 was paid in cash, and for the remaining $30,000, there were executed the note and mortgage sued upon. On April 11, 1918, Hoch sold the property to the defendant Guyer, who has since been the owner of the legal title thereto. On July 6, 1917, Guyer enlisted in the army of the United States in the volunteer forces thereof, and is still in such service. During the pendency of the suit in the lower court, he was with the army in France. Under the provisions of the act of Congress of 1918, entitled “Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Belief,” J. M. Haddock was appointed by the court as attorney for Guyer, for the purpose of protecting his interests in the litigation, by whom an answer was filed, pleading in abatement, by reason of Guyer’s military service. It is conceded that at the time when the suit was commenced the debt was due and unpaid. Upon a trial there was a decree entered awarding plaintiffs a judgment against Hoch in the sum of $33,579.50, foreclosing the mortgage in the usual form, and concluding with the following language:
“That the Beceiver be, and he is hereby discharged and is ordered to account to defendant Guyer for all the moneys collected by him; the decree to remain open for such further orders to be entered at the foot thereof, as the Court may hereafter direct for the purpose of granting such other and further relief as may be necessary to carry into force and effect the provisions of this decree, and for the purpose of protecting and enforcing the rights of all parties to this decree, or the rights of purchaser of said property under this decree, and to that end and purpose the Court hereby retains jurisdiction of this cause.
“Dated February 15th, 1919.”
Thereafter, on April 14, 1919, a supplemental decree was entered as follows:
“It Is Therefore Ordered: That the proceeds of said sale, be, and the same is hereby applied to the full and complete payment, satisfaction and discharge of the judgment and decree heretofore entered herein.
“And Be It Further Ordered: That no other or further execution be issued out of this Court upon said judgment or any part thereof, and that the same be cancelled of record as, paid in full by the applica^ tion of the proceeds of said sale; and the Clerk df this Court is hereby ordered to mark as satisfied the said judgment in the Journal and Judgment Docket in each of the places where entered or docketed.”
From these decrees the plaintiffs and defendant Hoch appeal.
Reversed and Remanded.
For appellants Eugene Pierrard and Pauline Pierrard, his wife, there was a brief over the names of Mr. Roscoe G. Nelson and Mr. John W. Kaste, with an oral argument by Mr. Nelson.
For defendant Eugene Hoch, there was a brief over the names of Mr. J. M. Haddock and Mr. Louis H. Tarpley, with an oral argument by Mr. Haddock.

Opinion:
BENSON, J.
Defendant Hoch bases his dissatisfaction with the conduct of the trial court, upon its action in proceeding with the suit in disregard of the provisions of Chapter 275, General Laws of Oregon for 1917. This act reads as follows:
"No suit or action shall be commenced or maintained, during the period hereinafter provided for, to foreclose any mortgage upon real property, or to collect the debt secured thereby, if the land covered by the mortgage be owned, wholly or in part, by an enlisted man in the Army or Navy of the United States, who shall have enlisted therein in the volunteer forces or who shall have been enlisted in the National Guard of the United States and of the State of Oregon and his organization called into the service of the United States; and the lands of any such soldier or sailor shall be exempt from judicial sale for _ the satisfaction of any judgment during the period hereinafter provided for; provided, that this moratorium shall extend only during the period of actual service in the army or navy forces of the United States, and in no case shall begin prior to the day on which the Congress of the United States shall declare war, nor continue after sixty days subsequent to the conclusion of such war; provided, that all statutes of limitation in effect in the State of Oregon shall be suspended during the period above described, as to the mortgages, debts and judgments in this Act described."
Defendant insists that this statute deprives the court of jurisdiction to entertain this suit so long as the defendant Guyer continues in the service of the United States Army, and that upon the disclosure of the facts, the court should have dismissed or continued the cause. It may here be noted that the complaint alleges that the defendant Guyer is in the military service of the United States, having enlisted on July 6, 1917, and it is stipulated that such enlistment was in the volunteer forces of the United States.
An examination of the U. S. Compiled Statutes, 1918, Sections 1891a and 2026a, discloses that the term of such enlistment is three years, or a less time if the war shall sooner be terminated.
Plaintiffs present two reasons for the disregard of the act of the state legislature of 1917: 1. That it was superseded or suspended by the act of Congress of March 8, 1918, known as the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Belief, which undertakes to cover the same ground; and 2. That the act is unconstitutional, in that it impairs the obligation of a contract.
Regarding the first of these contentions, it may be remarked that counsel have not favored us with any citations of authority upon the question, and it is difficult to conceive of a federal act possessing superiority to state legislation upon the subject of remedies and procedure in state courts.
The important question for our consideration is this: Does Chapter 275, Laws of 1917, impair the obligations of contracts? During our Civil War of 1861-1865, a number of the state legislatures enacted similar stay laws, and we have examined the cases arising thereunder with deep interest. The Pennsylvania Act was as follows:
"No civil process shall issue or be enforced against any person mustered into the service of this state, or of the United States, during the term for which he shall be engaged in such service, nor until thirty days after he shall have been discharged therefrom: Provided, That the operation of all statutes of limitation shall be suspended upon all claims against such person during such term."
Under the act, in the case of Breitenbach v. Bush, 44 Pa. St. 313 (84 Am. Dec. 442), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, speaking by Mr. Justice Woodward, gives us an exhaustive and well-considered discussion of the subject, in which are collated and reviewed all of the leading and important authorities which might aid in a satisfactory solution of the problem. Then, as now, the federal statutes fixed the term of enlist ment of volunteers at three years, or for a less time if the war was sooner ended. There, as here, it was urged that the act .violated the constitutional inhibition upon the states, to impair by law the obligation of contracts. The conclusion in that case is to the effect that such stay of proceedings is permissible and valid if for a time that is definite and not unreasonable, but void if for an indefinite time, or for a time that is unreasonable. It is further considered that the term of enlistment being fixed at three years, or a possibly shorter time, it was not unreasonable, considered in the light of existing circumstances. After reviewing the condition of war which then prevailed, the learned jurist continues:
"Now, if a stay of execution for three years would not be tolerated in ordinary times, did not these circumstances constitute an emergency that justified the pushing of legislation to the extremest limit of the Constitution? No citizen could be blamed for volunteering. He was invoked to do so by appeals as strong as his love _ of country. In the nature of things there is nothing unreasonable in exempting a soldier's property from execution whilst he is absent from home battling for the supremacy of the Constitution and the integrity of the Union. And when he has not run before he was sent, but has yielded himself up to the call of his country, his self-sacrificing patriotism pleads, trumpet-tongued, for all the indulgence from his creditors which the legislature has •power to grant. If the term of indulgence seems long in this instance, it was not longer than the time for which the President and Congress demanded the soldiers' services. It was not for him, nor is it for us to rejudge the discretion of the President and Congress in this regard. Basing ourselves on what they did, constitutionally, the question for us is, whether the stay granted by our own legislature to our citizen soldiers was unreasonable. In view of the extraordinary circumstances of the case, we can not pronounce it unreasonable. We see in it no wanton or careless disregard of the obligation of contracts, but only a sincere effort to enable the general government to prosecute with success a war which, in its exclusive right of judgment, it resolved to wage."
All that is said about existing conditions at the time when the statute was enacted, and what is said about the reasonableness of the suspension of the remedy in that case, is equally true and impressive in the consideration of the case at bar, and demands no elaboration at our hands. The doctrine of this opinion is supported by the following citations: Bruns v. Crawford, 34 Mo. 330; Johnson v. Higgins, 3 Metc. (Ky.) 566; Barkley v. Glover, 4 Metc. (Ky.) 44; Wolfkiel v. Mason, 16 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 221; McCormick v. Rusch, 15 Iowa, 127 (83 Am. Dec. 401); Edmondson v. Ferguson, 11 Mo. 344; Lindsey v. Burbridge, 11 Mo. 545; Coxe's Executor v. Martin, 44 Pa. St. 322.
We conclude, therefore, that the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter any decree at the time when it undertook to do so. This view renders it unnecessary to consider any other assignment of error.
The decree is reversed, and the cause will be remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith. Reversed and Remanded.
Former opinion set aside and deeree of lower court affirmed July 20., 1920.
Mr. John, W. Kaste for appellants Pierrard.
Mr. J. M. Haddock and Mr. Louis H. Tarpley for defendant Hoch.