Case Name: W. W. Berry et al. v. B. B. Shuler
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1860-10
Citations: 25 Supp. Tex. 140
Docket Number: 
Parties: W. W. Berry et al. v. B. B. Shuler.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 25 Supp.
Pages: 140–149

Head Matter:
W. W. Berry et al. v. B. B. Shuler.
The court instructed the jury, “If you find that, after the writ of error was sued out by 0. to remove the cause by which P. had obtained a judgment against him to the Supreme Court, and before the levy of execution on the land, C. had sold the land to S., then you will find for the defendant.” This was error. The act of 13th March, 1846, provides, that the error-bond “shall have the force and effect of a judgment against all obligors, upon which execution may issue in case of forfeiture." (Paschal’s Dig., Art. 1495, Note 587.) The judgment of this court, affirming the judgment of the District Court, is the forfeiture of the bond.
The lien which springs out of it relates back to the time of executing the error-bond, and binds the land of the surety in the county where the original judgment was rendered from that time.
Appeal from Guadeloupe. The case was tried before Hon. A. W. Terrell, one of the district judges.
The facts necessary to the decision are fully stated in^ the brief of counsel and opinion of the court.
Chandler Turner, for appellants.
—So far as this judgment is concerned, these executions have been issued regularly and with all the diligence that the law permits; and if the plaintiff in the execution ever had any lien upon the lands in controversy, he lost nothing by any laches of his. (Shappard v. Bailure, 3 Tex., 26.)
1. Did the judgment lien, provided* for hy the statute, ever attach to the land in question; and
2. Did the bond and writ of supersedeas discharge that . lien if it did attach.
Its operation and effect must be determined by adjudged cases, under statutes giving liens when the judgment is rendered. The statute creates this lien. (0. & W. Dig., Art. 1040.)
This lien attaches to lands acquired after the rendition of the judgment, as well as to lands, then in the county, provided the lands acquired are in the county when the judgment was rendered. This naturally results from the language of the law, as there is no limitation, reservation, or exception in the statute. The literal rendering of the statute is, that the judgment is a lien upon all the property (real) of the defendant in the county; the time at which the lien commences to run is the date of the judgment. That is, the judicial mortgage covers all the land of the defendant in the county after a judgment of a court of record till that debt is paid. It is a statute for the benefit of the creditor, and not for the benefit of the debtor. TTou cannot go back of that date with a view to affect him, or to secure the plaintiff in his rights. If this be the true version of the statute, then the lien attaches. See farther upon this point, Haydon v. Stuart, 1 Md. Ch. Dec., 459; Stow v. Teft, 15 J. R, 464, where the proposition is treated as a settled point; Kallock v. Jackson, 5 Ga., 153, 157, and 158. This case is full to the point, and under statute like ours. (Conrad v. Insurance Co., 1 Pet., marginal, 443; McClung v. Beirne, 10 Leigh. Va., 394; Meyer v. Campbell, 12 Mo. R, 602.
The lien thus being shown to have attached, did the '. removal of the case to the Supreme Court, by bond and writ of error, in double the amount, as was done in this case, discharge that lien? We think the case cited in 3 Tex. conclusive upon this point. (Montgomery v. Mc Gimpsey, 7 S. & M., 557: see this whole case; Harder v. Stovall, 1 Kel. Ga. R., 74; Stuart v. Mitchell, 3 S. & M., 231 and 233; Parker v. Kelly, 10 S. & M., 184; Craig v. Sibell, 9 Gratt. Va. R., 131.)
The defendant cannot take away, by his own act, a legal right which the plaintiff has; and the giving of statutory bonds in all such cases affords to the plaintiff cumulative, but not exclusive remedies. (See Parker v. Kelly, 10 S. & M., 184.)
James U. Burts, also for appellants.
-—-The statute provides that “Whenever final judgment shall be rendered by any of the courts of this republic, it shall operate as a lien on all the real estate of the defendant situate and being in the same county where the judgment is rendered, from the day of the date of the judgment.” (Hart. Dig., Art. 1335; O. & W. Dig., Art. 1040.)
1. The judgment in favor of Petty against Calicote and Brite was a final judgment, and operates as a lien on the land in controversy until reversed by. the Supreme Court. Ib.
2. If it should be held, that this judgment was not such final judgment as would, after it was taken to the Supreme Court by Calicote, be a lien on his real estate, then it is submitted that, so soon as it was affirmed it became such, and was thereby a lien on the land in controversy. Ib.
3. A lien, once acquired, is not lost or displaced unless intrinsically (lefeetive, or by some act of the party holding it.. (Ranken and Schalzill v. Scott, 6 Cond. R., S. C. U. S., p. 506.)
4. Personal security does not affect the security which a ' party holds on real estate, if such personal security arise from the operation of law, and not by the act of the party holding the lien or security on real estate. (Branch Bank at Montgomery v. Curry, 13 Ala. R., p. 304; Campbell v. Spence, 4 Ala. R., p. 503.)
Shelley Carrington, for appellee.
—By the terms of this statute, it will be perceived that a judgment, of the character mentioned, is made active, operative, from a fixed and certain time, the day of its rendition. “It shall operate,” &e., “from the day of the date.”
If the time is certain and definite, a judgment commences the exercise of its active energies as a lien; the thing upon which it is to operate must be equally certain and definite in its existence and relations. All the terms employed in the statute, to which the idea of time can be applied, are in the present tense: “all the real estate of the defendant, situate and being,” &e., “where the judgment is rendered,” &c.
The object of this statute, it may be assumed, was to prevent the fraudulent disposition of property to defeat creditors, by retaining within reach of execution the property of the debtor, upon the faith of which credit had been extended, and with reference to which, as a security for the payment of his debt, the creditor had pursued his remedy in the courts. The judgment, the instant of its rendition, is made to attach as a judicial mortgage to the real estate of the defendant, setting it apart from the unrestricted control of the debtor, and making a quasi appropriation of it to the satisfaction of the creditor’s demand.
This proposition would seem to be confirmed and established by an examination of the literal and grammatical construction of the statute: “Whenever final judgment shall be rendered,” &c., “it shall operate,” &c. The time when it shall operate, is here fixed at the date of its rendition ; and the property upon which it shall operate, is as certainly defined and specified.' as the time when its operation is made to begin, being all the real estate of the defendant “situate and being” (at the time specified) “in the same county where the judgment is rendered.” This construction of the statute, we conceive, is relieved of all doubt as to its correctness by the proviso to the antecedent terms of the law.
“ Provided, That the said lien shall cease to operate, if execution be not issued out within twelve months from the date of the judgment.”
Passing from the phraseology of our own statute, we submit, that, upon principle, a judicial mortgage should be certain, as well to the property affected by it, as to the time when it attaches thereto. Adapting the expressive language of Justice Brockenridge upon this subject, we are unable “to comprehend, as grounded upon the analogy of law, that, like a scorpion, a judgment can expand its claws and contract so as to fix what it has embraced; that is, bind the pledge originally given it, and open to take more, and shut again.”
The able review of all the English authorities, from the statute of elegit, 13 Edw. I, down, and the examination of the subject upon principle and policy, by Justices Yeates and Brockenridge, in Calhoun v. Snider, 6 Binn. R., pp. 137, 148, we think unanswerable in support of our position; and we respectfully ask an examination of this case by the court. It will be seen that the acts of Assembly of the State of Pennsylvania are quoted, so far as they bear upon the subject. In Ohio, under a statute having none of the peculiarities of phraseology of our own, but denouncing in general terms the lien of the judgment upon the property of the defendant, it has been held, that the lien did not bind or attach to land purchased after the elate of the judgment. (Stiles, ex dem. v. Murphy, 4 Ohio, p. 92; Roads v. Symmes, 1 Ohio R., p. 313; Michael v. Boyd, 1 Smith’s Indiana R., p. 100; Harrington v. Sharpe, 1 Green’s (Iowa) R., p. 131.) In Mississippi, under a statute declaring “that in all cases the property of the defendant shall be bound and liable to any judgment that may be entered up from the time of entering such judgment,” (How. & Hutch. Code, p. 621:) Held, “that the legislature had only in view such property as the debtor held at the time the judgment was rendered.” (Moody v. Doe, ex dem. Harper, 3 Miss. R., p. 484.)
Art. 551, O. & W. Dig., provides, that if the party desiring to appeal be unable to give the bond required, the judgment of the court below shall operate as a hen upon all the property of the appellant; and the sheriff shall take possession of his personal property, and keep possession of the same, or so much thereof as may be sufficient to satisfy the judgment of the appellate court. The party appealing must give bond, however, for the costs and damages of the appeal. The judgment of the appellate court, then, we take it, includes the judgment of the court below; and the sheriff is required to secure that, by taking the personal property of the appellant into possession, and, in addition thereto, in the absence of the security of a bond, with approved security in double the amount of the judgment, the judgment is declared to operate as a lien during the pendency of the appeal.
"Wherefore, we ask, the necessity of making this declaration in the statute, if the lien would operate in all cases without it? It will not be insisted that the legislature employed itself in this work of supererogation. It must have been intended, as we understand it, to provide a security for the plaintiff’s demand, which the defendant may be unable to give him by executing bond with approved security, by declaring that the judgment lien shall exist, which would not if bond were given.
It will be borne in mind, that the costs and damages of the appeal must be secured by bond before the appeal can be taken. (0. & W. Dig., Art. 551.) Again, it is provided, that where the recovery is for land, the judgment shall operate as a specific lien upon the land, but the appellant shall only be required to give bond for the costs of appeal. (0. & W. Dig., Art. 550.)
The hond, as required by the statute, is a substitution of the security of the judgment lien, as the execution and delivery of replevin bond is a discharge of the lien of execution levied upon personal property.
It is insisted by appellants, that the lien of the judgment is only suspended. It certainly cannot be operative during the pendency of writ of error. If this view taken by appellants be correct, the judicial mortgage or judgment lien would be still more uncertain and indefinite than we have regarded it, in consideration of the first proposition. However long the pendency of the appeal, and however many junior judgments may be recovered against the defendant pending the appeal, it would seem, if the view of appellants be correct, they would all be subject to the contingency of affirmance by the Supreme Court of the judgment below.
The judgment of the court below is merged in the judgment of affirmance by the Supreme Court, and the judgment upon which the plaintiff has his execution is a different one from the judgment of the court below: it differs in the amount and the parties defendant. This position is sustained by the Supreme Court of Alabama, in the case of Weswell et al. v. Munroe, 4 Ala. R, p. 9.
Where the execution is superseded by the suing out of a writ of error, and giving bond with surety, the lien of the judgment is discharged. (4 Ala. R, p. 543.)
In a controversy between a purchaser at an execution sale, made upon the original judgment after its affirmance in the Supreme Court on a writ of error, superseded by a bond and surety, and one claiming by a conveyance from the defendant in execution, executed pending the cause in the Supreme Court, the title of the latter will prevail. (Brock & Younge v. Younge, 7 Ala. R, p. 64.)
We believe that the statute in Alabama does not differ materially from the statute of this State.

Opinion:
Bell, J.
—This suit was instituted by the appellants, Berry, Fix, and Searcy, to recover a tract of land. The record discloses, that on the 27th day of October, A. D. 1866, one James Petty recovered a judgment in the District Court for Caldwell county against Thomas R. Brite and J. B. Calicote, and that execution issued on said judgment on the 29th day of December, A. D. 1866. Action upon this writ of execution was superseded, the defendants having sued out a writ of error to this court. The writ-of-error bond, which was signed by Calicote, was dated on the 16th of March, A. D. 1857, and was approved on the 25th of the same month. The judgment of the District Court in the case (Calicote v. Petty) was affirmed by this court on the 23d day of October, A. D. 1857. A second execution was issued by the district clerk of Caldwell county, on the 21st day of January, A. D. 1858. This last-named execution was issued against Brite, Calicote, and the sureties on the writ-of-error bond, and was levied on the land in controversy on the 20th of February, A. D. 1858. On the first Tuesday of April, A. D. 1858, the land was sold by the sheriff, and purchased by the appellants, Berry, Fix, and Searcy.
It appears further, from the evidence; that Calicote did not own the land in question at the time of the rendition of the judgment against him, viz, on the 27th day of October, 1856; but he acquired the land by deed, from one Coffee, on the 19th day of January, A. D. 1857, which, it will be borne in mind, was prior to the execution of the writ-of-error bond. Calicote sold the land to the present appellee, Shuler, on the 7th day of December, A. D. 1857. This sale by Calicote to Shuler was after the affirmance of the judgment in favor of Petty against Brite and Calicote by this court, and prior to the issuance and levy of the second execution.
The question upon which the decision of the cause must turn, arises upon the charge of the court below to the jury. The motion for new trial below was based partly upon the ground, that there was error in the charge, and the question is raised here by the first assignment of error.
Without discussing the first and second propositions contained in the charge, we think it clear, that there is error in the latter branch of it. The judge says: "If you find that, after the writ of error was sued out by Calicote to remove the cause in which Petty had obtained a judgment against him to the Supreme Court, and before the levy of execution on the land, Calicote had sold the land to Shuler, then you will find for the defendant."
This charge did not settle the effect of the execution of the writ-of-error bond. The act of March 13, 1846, provides, that the writ-of-error bond, when executed, "shall have the force and effect of a judgment against all the obligors, upon which execution may issue in case of forfeiture." The point now under consideration was adverted to by us in the case of Robertson v. Moorer, decided at the last term at Tyler, though the point was not then expressly decided. (25 Tex., 428.) It was then said by us, " That the judgment of this court, affirming the judgment of the District Court, is the declaration of the forfeiture of the bond." And we then ' intimated the opinion, that upon the declaration of the forfeiture of the writ-of-error bond, "the lien which springs out of it relates back to the time of its execution, and binds the land of the surety in the county where the original judgment was rendered from that time." We now announce this to be the opinion of the court, after having again considered the question. As a matter of course, if the forfeiture of the writ-of-error bond raises a lien upon the land of the surety, it must have the same effect upon the land of the principal in the bond, for he is also an obligor. Inasmuch, then, as Calicote acquired the land in controversy from Coffee, on the 19th day of January, A. D. 1857, we are of opinion that the writ-of-error bond, executed and approved in the month of March, A. D. 1857, operated as a lien on the land from the date of its execution, as a consequence of the forfeiture of the bond by the judgment of this court; and that the subsequent sale by Calicote to Shuler was a sale subject to the lien. These views will require the reversal of. the judgment, and we do not think it necessary to consider other questions which are urged by counsel.
The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the cause
Remanded.