Case Name: Louise S. Darlington v. The C., C., C. & St. L. Railway Co.
Court: Greene County Court of Common Pleas
Jurisdiction: Ohio
Decision Date: 1913-07
Citations: 14 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 427
Docket Number: 
Parties: Louise S. Darlington v. The C., C., C. & St. L. Railway Co.
Judges: 
Reporter: Ohio nisi prius and general term reports (new series)
Volume: 14
Pages: 427–432

Head Matter:
LIABILITY. OF CARRIER. FOR. BAGGAGE.
Common Pleas Court of Greene County.
Louise S. Darlington v. The C., C., C. & St. L. Railway Co.
Decided, July, 1913.
Shipments to Foreign Countries — Carmack Amendment Not Applicable, When — Lex Loci Governs Shipments to Canada — Liability for Loss of Baggage Not Limited by Statement on Back of Ticket.
1. Tlie act of Congress known as the Carmack amendment, which regulates “transportation from a point in one state to a point in another state,” does not apply in the case of a shipment from a point in one state to a point in a foreign country where a loss occurs.
2. The laws of this state with respect to shipments to foreign countries after they have passed beyond the United States were not superseded or abrogated by the Carmack amendment.
3. Where a trunk is checked from Cincinnati, Ohio, to Quebec, Ontario, via Toledo and Detroit, the fact that it passed through the state of Michigan does not bring it within the meaning of that act after it entered the Dominion of Canada, and the rights of the parties are determined by the lex loci where the trunk was received.
4. The initial carrier is liable for delay in delivery or loss of baggage, and the printed statements on the back of a ticket and check will not limit such liability. B. & O. Railroad v. Campbell, 36 O. S., 647.
Charles L. Darlington, for plaintiff.
Nevin & Kalbus and H. N. Quigley, contra.

Opinion:
Kyle, J.
The plaintiff in this action seeks to recover damages for delay-in delivery and loss of baggage from the defendant company.
The parties have agreed upon the facts and the case is submitted to the court on questions of law.
The plaintiff purchased a ticket from the defendant company at Cincinnati, Ohio, for transportation via Toledo, Detroit, to Quebec, Ontario, and at the same time checked her trunk from Cincinnati.'to Quebec and received the company's check therefor. The trunk was carried by the defendant company to Toledo, Ohio, and there delivered to the Michigan Central Railroad Company, and by said company in good order promptly delivered at Detroit, Michigan, to the Canadian Pacific Railway Company, and by said company carried in good order at least as far as Toronto, Canada. After it came into possession of the Canadian Pacific Railway Company, part of the contents of said trunk to the value of $172 was taken therefrom, or in some way had become lost, and when said trunk was delivered, after the filing of the petition in this case, to plaintiff at Xenia, Ohio, goods to the value of $172 were missing. One dress that was in the trunk when delivered was damaged to the extent of $15. The total value of all the contents of the trunk was $554.50. The reasonable value of the use of the contents of which the plaintiff was deprived was $100.
The defendant claims that the Carmack amendment supersedes all laws statutory or common of the state. There is no doubt that any act of Congress, under the constitutional powers granted it, would supersede all statutory or common laws affecting the same subject-matter.
Plaintiff claims the Carmack amendment does not apply for the reason that Congress has not acted upon the subject of the controversy in this case. In this case the trunk was received by the defendant company for transportation from Cincinnati to Quebec, a city in a foreign country.
The Constitution of the United States, Section 8, Article I, empowers Congress 1 ' to regrtlate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes."
The Carmack amendment provides "for transportation from a point in one state to a point in another state."
In Houston East & West Railway Company v. Inman, etc., 134 S. W., page 275, the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas in construing the Carmack amendment held "that the word state was used in such provision in its limited sense to represent and include only the states of the Federal Union, and that such section had no application to a shipment of cotton from a point in Texas to a foreign country."
Under the provisions of the Constitution above quoted Congress is empowered to do three things. The enactment of laws respecting commerce among the states has no application to commerce with foreign countries. If the Carmack amendment applies, and the language "from a point in one state to a point in another state" includes from a point in one state to a point in a foreign country, then the defendant company would be liable under the provisions of the Carmack amendment. But the defendant itself claims the Carmack amendment does not apply in the case at bar because the shipment was to a foreign country and the loss occurred therein. It seems incongruous to claim that by reason of the Carmack amendment all the state laws, statutory or common, have been superseded, and also to Claim that the Carmack amendment does not apply. If the Carmack amendment does not apply to commerce with a foreign country, then Congress has not passed any law upon that subject.
In the Texas ease the shipment was from Texas to a point in Germany, and the goods were shipped from Galveston, a port in Texas, to Germany. In the case at bar it is claimed that, because the trunk was shipped through Michigan on its way to Quebec, the Carmack amendment applied and the defendant was liable under it until it was delivered to the foreign country. The fact that it passed through another state does not change the fact that it was a shipment from Cincinnati, Ohio, to Quebec, Ontario. The language of the Carmack amendment "from a point in one state to a point in another state" in order to apply requires the starting point and point of destination both to be within the United States.
There might some question arise whether or not the Carmack amendment did not apply from the fact that the trunk was delivered by the Michigan Central Railroad to the Canadian Pacific Railway "at Detroit, Michigan." The Canadian Pacific ' Railway Company received the trunk in Michigan, and it might be that it became liable under the Carmack amendment, notwithstanding it carried the trunk outside the domain of the United States, but no claim has been made by either party on that ground.
I am of the opinion that the Carmack amendment does not apply to regulate commerce with a foreign country. The fact that the trunk in question was shipped through the state of Michigan does not bring it within the meaning of that after it entered the Dominion of Canada.
The rights of the parties in this case are determined by the lex loci where the trunk was received.
The trunk was received at Cincinnati, Ohio. The laws of this state with respect to shipments to foreign countries after they have passed beyond the United States were not superseded or abrogated by the Carmack amendment. And in the absence of legislation by Congress as to the regulation of commerce with foreign nations the law of the state of Ohio applies as to shipments from the state of Ohio to a point in a foreign country.
In the opinion in Adams Express Company v. Cronniger, Justice Lurton says that in the absence of legislation by Congress it is competent for the state to make regulations as to public carriers, although interstate commerce may be indirectly affected. So long as Congress has not legislated upon the particular subject as to commerce between a state and a foreign country, the state has power to regulate the rights and duties of all persons and corporations within its limits.
Having determined that the case at bar does not come within the Carmack amendment and that Congress has not legislated or made any provision as it has the right to do with respect to commerce between a point in a state to a point in a foreign country, it is unnecessary here to determine the limitations or liabilities under that act. The only question for determination is as to the liability of the defendant under the laws of the state of Ohio.
Plaintiff relies and has attempted to bring her suit within the law as determined in Baltimore & Ohio Railroad v. Campbell, 36 O. S., page 647. The first syllabus of that case is:
"Where'it is necessary for a traveler, in going from one place to another, to pass over the connecting lines of several railroad companies, it is competent for either company to contract with him for the transportation of himself and baggage the whole distance, or that its liability shall be confined to loss or damage occurring on its own road; but the collection, by such contracting carrier, of fare in advance for the entire journey, without agreement as to risks, renders it liable, on receipt of such traveler's baggage, to transport it safely to the end of the route, and there deliver it on demand, to such owner."
Under the agreed facts the fare was paid by plaintiff in advance from Cincinnati to Quebec, and there was no -agreement between the parties within the meaning of that case exempting the defendant company from liability. The printed statements on the cheek and ticket not being called to the attention of the plaintiff and not known to her would not limit.the liability of the defendant company. Under the 36 Ohio State, where the traveler purchases a ticket from one place to another, there is no limitation that the destination of the passenger must be within the state of Ohio, or the United States.
In the Campbell case the starting point was the city of New Work and the destination was Columbus, Ohio. It could hardly be claimed that that decision only applied when a ticket was sold from a point in Ohio to another point in Ohio, and if the rule applied from a point in Ohio to a point in another state, the territory of the other state would be just as foreign to the state of Ohio as the Dominion of Canada so far as fixing the liability upon the company selling the ticket and furnishing the transportation is concerned.
The defendant company having sold a through ticket from Cincinnati to Quebec and accepted the plaintiff's trunk for delivery at Quebec was bound to transport it safely to tbe end of the route and became liable to plaintiff for any loss by reason of its failure to do so.
There was no agreement as to any restriction of liability. The declared limitation of liabilities to the extent of only one hundred dollars upon the ticket and baggage check were not sufficient to release the defendant company from paying the loss occasioned by its negligence to transport such baggage safely to the end of the route and deliver the same on demand to tbe owner.
The agreed damage and the loss to the plaintiff by reason of missing and injured goods is $187, which under the statement of facts the defendant company would be liable to the plaintiff for upon her first cause ®f action.
It is also agreed that the loss of the use of the contents of the trunk from June 13, 1912, to the 12th day of September, 1912, was reasonably worth one hundred dollars. If the defendant company pays the full value for the missing goods there could be no recovery for their use. The plaintiff would be entitled to recover the reasonable value of the use of the goods returned. International, etc., R. R. Co. v. Phillips, 63 Texas, 590.
The language of the statement of facts would seem to imply that the one hundred dollars was the agreed value for the use of the whole contents of the trunk during the period of delay, and apportioning such value to the goods returned it would amount to approximately $63, which will be the amount allowed for the value of the use of the property returned.
Therefore the finding of the court is that the plaintiff should recover of the defendant the sum of $250, with interest from the 11th day of June, 1912, for which a judgment may be entered accordingly.