Case Name: MILTON STERN, RESPONDENT, v. FRANKLIN A. WARD ET AL., APPELLANTS
Court: New Jersey Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1920-03-01
Citations: 94 N.J.L. 279
Docket Number: 
Parties: MILTON STERN, RESPONDENT, v. FRANKLIN A. WARD ET AL., APPELLANTS.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Law Reports
Volume: 94
Pages: 279–281

Head Matter:
MILTON STERN, RESPONDENT, v. FRANKLIN A. WARD ET AL., APPELLANTS.
Submitted December 8, 1919
Decided March 1, 1920.
On appeal from the Supreme Court, in which court the following memorandum was filed by Mr. Justice Trenehard:
“The plaintiff in the District Court below [the prosecutor here] sued out a writ of replevin and took possession of an automobile. The defendants put in a bond, retained possession of the car, and filed a claim of property, and in that way the matter proceeded to trial and judgment for the defendant Abram B. Lane in the District Court.
“At the trial it appeared, as will be hereinafter shown, that the plaintiff leased the automobile to the defendant Franklin A. Ward; that the defendant Lane was a garage keeper and had possession of the ear on a claim for repairs and supplies which he had furnished at the request of Ward, the lessee.
“The prosecutor contends that such claim could not he asserted as a lien against the car in the circumstances of this case, and hence that the judgment was wrong.
“I am of the opinion that the prosecutor’s contention is pound.
“Our Garage act (Pam-ph. L. 1915, p. 556) provides for a lien where the repairs or supplies are furnished cat the request or with the consent of the owner or his representative whether such owner be a conditional vendee or a mortgagee remaining in possession or otherwise.’
“But- these repairs and supplies were furnished a.t the request or with the consent of Ward alone and without the Jcnowledge or consent of the plaintiff. The paper-writing ,under which Ward held possession of the automobile was a ¡lease. It was in that form. It was made in Pennsylvania.; the car was delivered in Pennsylvania, and was to be returned to the lessor in Pennsylvania at the end of the term or upon default under the lease. The lease itself provided expressly that it should be construed subject to and be governed by the laws of Pennsylvania. Under the law of Pennsylvania, as proved at the trial, it was in fact a lease. Ward was therefore the lessee of the car and not the owner or conditional vendee or mortgagor remaining in possession.
“The question remains, Was Ward, the lessee, the owner’s representative? I think not. The lease expressly provided that no repairs should be made without the consent of the lessor first had and obtained. Moreover, it appears that in Pennsylvania the lessee under a lease quite like that now under consideration has been held to be not the representative of the owner for the purpose of creating a lien for repairs and supplies. See Stem v. Sica, 66 Sup. Gt. (Pa.) 84.
“The judgment below must be reversed and a new trial awarded.”
For the respondent, Joseph Beck Tyler.
.For the appellants, Patrick II. Ilarding.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
The judgment under review herein should be affirmed, for the reasons expressed in the opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Trenchaxd in the Supreme Court.
For affirmance — The Chancellor, Chibe Justice, Svayze, Barker, Bergen, Minturn, Kalisoh, Black., White, Heppenheimer, Wllliams, Taylor, Gardner, Acicerson, JJ. 14.
For reversal—Alone.