Case Name: LEGAL ENVIRONMENTAL ASSISTANCE FOUNDATION, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION and Pinellas County, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1997-12-18
Citations: 702 So. 2d 1352
Docket Number: No.97-204
Parties: LEGAL ENVIRONMENTAL ASSISTANCE FOUNDATION, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION and Pinellas County, Appellees.
Judges: ERVIN, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 702
Pages: 1352–1356

Head Matter:
LEGAL ENVIRONMENTAL ASSISTANCE FOUNDATION, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION and Pinellas County, Appellees.
No.97-204.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Dec. 18, 1997.
Andrew Jubal Smith of the Legal Environmental Assistance Foundation, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
C. Anthony Cleveland and Segundo J. Fernandez of Oertel, Hoffman, Fernandez & Cole, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellee Pinellas County.
Cynthia K. Christen, Tallahassee, for Ap-pellee Department of Environmental Protection.

Opinion:
KAHN, Judge.
Appellant, Legal Environmental Assistance Foundation (LEAF), appeals an order entered by the-Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) finding that LEAF had no standing to intervene in the underlying administrative proceeding under either the substantial interest test of section 120.57, Flori-dá Statutes (1995), or under the liberalized provisions of section 403.412(5), Florida Statutes. LEAF is a nonprofit corporation organized under the laws of Alabama, has a certificate of authority to conduct business in Florida, and has Floridians among its members. Because DEP correctly construed section 403.412(5), and because LEAF does not contend that it is entitled to participate in these proceedings by virtue of a substantial interest, we affirm the order on appeal.
The statute dispositive of this case-provides:
In any administrative, licensing, or other proceedings authorized by law for the protection of the air, water, or other natural resources of the state from pollution, impairment, or destruction, the Department of Legal Affairs, a political subdivision of municipality of the state, or a citizen of the state shall have standing to intervene as a party on the filing of a verified pleading asserting that the activity, conduct, or product to be licensed or permitted has or will have the effect of impairing, polluting, or otherwise injuring the air, water, or other natural resources of the state.
§ 403.412(5), Fla. Stat. (1995) (emphasis added).
Relying upon Florida Wildlife Federation v. State Department of Environmental Regulation, 390 So.2d 64 (Fla.1980), LEAF argues that because a domestic nonprofit corporation would have standing in this matter, it also is entitled to standing because it has a valid certificate of authority issued by the Florida Department of State under section 617.1501, Florida Statutes (1995). By virtue of such certificate, and the provisions of section 617.1505(2), Florida Statutes (1995), LEAF argues that it has the same status as any domestic corporation not-for-profit when it .comes to intervention rights under section 403.412(5). Section 617.1505(2), Florida Statutes (1995), provides that a foreign corporation with a valid certificate "has the same but no greater rights and has the same but no greater privileges as . a domestic corporation of like character."
We cannot agree with LEAF'S contention. The rights, duties, and privileges of a foreign corporation holding a valid certificate of authority are not always identical to those of a Florida corporation. See National Rifle Ass'n v. Linotype Co., 591 So.2d 1021 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) (concluding that under section 607.1505, a foreign corporation's certificate of authority does not make the corporation a resident of Florida tor forum non conveniens purposes). Moreover, the generalized provisions of chapter 617 do not override the specific constraints of section 403.412(5). See McKendry v. State, 641 So.2d 45, 46 (Fla. 1994)("[A] specific statute covering a particular subject area always controls over a statute covering the same and other subjects in more general terms."). In Florida law, a more specific statute is considered an exception to, or qualification of, the general terms of the more comprehensive statute. See Floyd v. Bentley, 496 So.2d 862, 864 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986).
The Legislature enacted section 403.412 to extend standing to private and corporate citizens of Florida without any showing of special injury as required by the traditional rule of standing. See Florida Wildlife Fed'n v. State Dep't of Environmental Regulation, 390 So.2d at 67-68. LEAF does not argue that it can meet the substantial interest test. This court has no obligation to encourage, or broaden the scope of, specialized administrative litigation in light of clear legislative intent to the contrary.
AFFIRMED.
ERVIN, J., concurs.
BENTON, J., dissents with written opinion.