Case Name: Margaret L. Kilpatrick, Appellant, v. Joseph H. Kilpatrick, Respondent
Court: St. Louis Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1899-04-18
Citations: 80 Mo. App. 70
Docket Number: 
Parties: Margaret L. Kilpatrick, Appellant, v. Joseph H. Kilpatrick, Respondent.
Judges: Judge Bland concurs; Judge Biggs dissents.
Reporter: Missouri Appeal Reports
Volume: 80
Pages: 70–74

Head Matter:
Margaret L. Kilpatrick, Appellant, v. Joseph H. Kilpatrick, Respondent.
St. Louis Court of Appeals,
April 18, 1899.
1. Action for Divorce: desertion of husband: practice, trial. In the ease at bar the evidence of the good conduct of the wife came from several unimpeached witnesses; as his desertion was on account of his own dereliction she was necessarily the innocent and injured party. Held, that, upon the evidence, the trial judge had no right to conclude that she was not an innocent and injured party.
2. -: _: -: practice, appellate: dissenting opinion by judge biggs. In reviewing divorce eases the appellate courts must defer to the judgment of the trial court. In the ease at har the evidence as written is so plain that something must have occurred at the trial — some action of the complainant, that led Judge Spencer to conclude that the separation was collusive.
Appeal from the St. Louis City Circuit Court. — Hon. Selden P. Spencer, Judge.
Reversed and decree of divorce granted to PLAINTIFF.
Hickman P. Rodgers for appellant.
This court has full power to review the evidence and make such decree as it may deem proper. Deschodt v. Deschodt, 59 Mo. App. 102. Divorce is a legal right and, where the facts entitling either party to it exist the courts have no discretion to deny it. Deschodt'v Deschodt, Ibid. The desertion made out by appellant constitutes a prima facie case, “that is, intentional cessation from cohabitation for the statutory period without plaintiff’s consent.” Keaton v. Keaton, 74 Mo. App. 174-178. The only reasonable cause for desertion is one which would in itself furnish ground for divorce. 1 Bishop on Mar. and Div. (1881), sec. 799. This would be a matter for the defendant to allege and prove. Ibid, see. 777. In the absence of conflict of testimony it is impossible for the trial court to have determined from the manner and appearance of appellant that “the leaving of the husband and his subsequent absence was both agreeable to the plaintiff and with her full consent.” Nor is it material, if true, that the desertion was agreeable to the wife, since it was the husband’s conduct that furnished the ground for divorce. Such conclusion could only have been reached by disregarding appellant’s testimony, which this court will assume is true. Oohn v. City of Kansas, 108 Mo. 387-392; Efron v. Car Co., 59 Mo. App. 641 .(near bottom of page 645). * * It must be remembered that in all cases the positive testimony of an otherwise nnimpeached witness can only be disregarded when its improbability or inconsistency furnishes a reasonable ground for doing so, and this improbability or inconsistency must appear from the facts and circumstances disclosed by the evidence. It can not be arbitrarily disregarded by either court or jury, for reasons resting wholly in their own minds, and not based upon anything appearing on the trial.” Bank v. Donald, 56 Minn. 491-493; Clark v. McGrath, 22 S. W. Rep. 527.
No brief filed for respondent.

Opinion:
BOND, L
This action is for a divorce on the ground of unreasonable absence on the part of defendant for the space of one year. The defendant made default, the petition was dismissed, and plaintiff appealed.
On the trial the evidence showed that the parties intermarried on the ninth of April, 1890, and lived together as husband and wife until December 1, 1895, when the defendant abandoned the home because he was told by his wife that there was no food in the house and requested him to go out and get some which she would cook for their breakfast. The evidence shows that the husband did not thereafter return to his wife, nor make any provision for her support; that her conduct towards him was wifely and affectionate; that she is and was a woman of good conduct and behavior, and so esteemed in the circle of friends formed by herself and husband. At the time of the trial the abandonment of thehusbandhadcontinued i or about three years. As there is not a fact nor circumstance in the record proving that the desertion of the husband was the result of a voluntary agreement on the part of the wife, or tending in any wise to impair the full force of the evidence establishing the statutory ground of divorce relied upon, as well as her good conduct and innocence, a decree for divorce should have been entered in the trial court. The evidence of the good conduct of the wife came from several unimpeached witnesses. It was certainly no fault of hers that the husband, whose duty it was to provide food for his family, failed to do so. As his desertion was on account of his own dereliction, she was necessarily the innocent and injured party, hence the trial judge had no right to conclude that she was n0^ an innocent and injured party, and conceding that such was his personal opinion, as it was wholly unsupported by any evidentiary basis, it did not warrant him in refusing her the relief to which she was entitled by law under the evidence in this record. TJlrey v. Hlrey, No. 7500, unreported. His judgment dismissing the petition is therefore reversed and under the evidence in this record a decree of divorce in plaintiff's favor will be entered in this court. It is so ordered.
Judge Bland concurs; Judge Biggs dissents.