Case Name: Heirs of Dupuy v. Dupont and Wife
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1856-03
Citations: 11 La. Ann. 226
Docket Number: 
Parties: Heirs of Dupuy v. Dupont and Wife.
Judges: 
Reporter: Louisiana Annual Reports
Volume: 11
Pages: 226–232

Head Matter:
Heirs of Dupuy v. Dupont and Wife.
A simulated sale made by a father to a daughter and her husband, which is really a donation in disguise to the daughter, is without any more effect than if made to the daughter alone.
The rule that simulated contracts of a father when attacked by his forced heirs are only to be set aside in so far as they impair the UgiU/me of the heirs, does not seem to apply to the case of a simulated sale of land or slaves to a favorite child. Code 2419,1805-6-7-8-9-10,1826,1488.
The action en declm'aUon de swvulaUon may be instituted by the parties to the act, and their heirs and legal representatives, as well as by third persons, with this distinction, however, that the latter are allowed to have recourse to parol evidence to contradict the authentic act, whilst the former are precluded from the exercise of this right. (Voorhies, J-., with whom concurred Buchanan, J., dissenting.)
Heirs, except when suing to recover their legitima, stand in the same situation and enjoy the same and no other rights than those which were held by their ancestor. But when they sue for the recovery of their UgiUme, they are considered as third persons, or creditors. This difference is the result of the recognized distinction between the general rights of heirs and their rights to the UgiUme, the one being derived from the ancestor, and the other from the law. (Vooruies, J., with whom concurred Buchanan, J., dissenting.)
The presumption of simulation established by Article 2456 of the Code is inoperative with respect to the parties to the act, and therefore to the heirs, in a case where the heirs derive their rights from the ancestor, a party to the act. (Vooruies, J., with whom concurred Buchanan, J., dissenting.)
An 'vndirect donation is based upon a real contract, and is an advantage conferred upon the other contracting party under color of a real contract for the whole, whilst a disguised donation, whether it assumes the form of a direct sale to the party to be benefited, or of a sale to an interposed person, is wholly a simulation. The i/ud/irect donation is, therefore, a real contract, with the exception of the advantage indirectly conferred; but the dÁsgxUsed donation is a simulated contract. (Yoorhies, J., with whom concurred Buchanan, J., dissenting.)
The indirect, or disguised donation, clothed with the form of a sale, if made to a stranger, would be good as a donation, if there were no prejudice to the UgiUme, but should the UgiUme be impaired, it would be subject to reduction. 'When such an advantage is conferred upon a co-heir, it is not only subject to reduction, but, in the cases pointed out by law, may be liable to collation. Where, however, such advantages are conferred upon incapable persons by a' disguised donation, they are absolutely null, while, by an indirect donation, they are simply reducible. (Yoorhies, J., with whom concurred Buchanan, J., dissenting.)
The allegation in plaintiff’s petition, that the husband is an interpósed person for the benefit of his wife, does not deserve serious consideration, because the act of sale was passed to both husband and wife. (Voorhies, J., with whom concurred Buchanan, J., dissenting )
At the date of the sale tp the death of the vendor the parties lived in the same house, from which it must be inferred that delivery accompanied the act of sale, for it is well settled, that where a vendor and vendee live in the same house, possession follows title. (Voorhies, J.j with whom concurred Buchanan, J., dissenting,)
The relationship between the parties does not of itself constitute a badge of fraud or simulation. (Voorhies, J., with whom concurred Buchanan, J , dissenting.)
Code 20,1376, Í747, 2417, 2454, 2455, 2456,1275,1305,1329,1834,1335.
APPEAL from the District Court, Fourth District, Duffel, J.
Berault, for plaintiffs. Roselius and Mlleul, for defendants and appellants.

Opinion:
Spoppokd, J.
This suit appears to have been properly brought by virtue of an express provision of the Civil Code.
"The sales of immovable property or slaves, made by parents to their children, may be attacked by the forced heirs, as containing a donation in disguise, if the latter can prove that no price has been paid, or that the price was below one-fourth of the real value of the immovables or slaves sold, at the time of the sale." O. C. 2419.
The views we may happen to entertain of the policy of laws cannot control, or in any way affect the legal rights of parties which may be submitted to us for adjudication ; we are not permitted to distinguish between odious laws and laws entitled to favor. C. C. 20.
The District Judge, after hearing the witnesses, came to the conclusion that the sale in question contained a donation in disguise, and that no price was paid by the vendees; and he has given his reasons for judgment in a learned and elaborate opinion.
After a careful scrutiny of the evidence, a majority of this court are unable to dissent from his conclusions.
The plaintiffs are forced heirs of the deceased vendor, Antoine Dupwy, being his children by his first marriage.
The defendants, his vendees, are his daughter by a second marriage, and her husband, Dupont.
The sale was made to the defendants jointly, and produces in substance the same effect as if made to the wife alone, for in that case the property would have vested in the community if it passed at all. The petition expressly put at issue the verity of the sale; but the vendees have made no attempt to prove that a price was paid, except by showing that Dupont was an industrious man, and had money.
On the other hand, the negative is supported by strong circumstantial evidence, the only evidence of which the nature of the case seems to admit.
The sale purports to have been made about six years before the death of Dupwy. It comprised half his land and all his slaves. But no change of possession followed the deed. The defendants exercised no act of ownership until Dupuy died. For nearly six years, and up to the moment of his death, the pretended vendor, although his vendees lived in his house, continued to control the property exclusively, as owner, cultivating the soil and working the slaves, calling them his land and his slaves, and giving them in to the Parish Assessor as his own.
On one occasion, long after the pretended sale, ho made oath before the As sessor that the land and slaves in question wore his, in the presence of Dupont, one of his vendees, and without contradiction from him.
Under these circumstances, it is difficult to suppose that the parties regarded the sale as a reality.
The only reasonable hypothesis is, that it was resorted to as a device, to take effect only after the death of the vendor, by shifting the regular course of descent in favor of his child by the last marriage.
That no price was paid, may be inferred not only from the circumstance that the parties never, during- the partnership, treated the sale as a contract having a real existence, but from the facts that Dupuy never acquired any other property after the sale, and that no money was found in his succession at his death. He continued actively engaged in planting after the sale as before, and nothing is suggested to render it probable that he spent more than he made.
Dupont had some money, it is true, but he bought slaves from other persons, paid for them, and took possession.
We find in the record no legal evidence that he paid a dollar to Dupuy, and sufficient presumptive evidence that he did not.
With the District Judge we think he should derive no benefit from his own extra-judicial statements, made after the controversy arose.
The rule that simulated contracts of a father, when attacked by his forced heirs are only to be set aside in so far as they impair the Ugitime of the heirs, does not seem to apply to the case of a simulated sale of land or slaves to a favorite child. O. 0. 2419, 1305-6-7-8-9-10, 1326, 1488.
The District Judge decreed that the sale should be set aside, and the property declared to belong to the succession of Antoine Dupuy. It would have been more formal to have declared the sale a disguised donation to the daughter, and decreed that she should collate the property in a partition to be made hereafter among the heirs of Dupuy. "The advantage which a father bestows upon his son, though in any other manner than by donation or legacy, is likewise subject to collation. Thus, where a father has sold a thing to his son at a very low price, or has paid tor him the price of some purchase, or has spent money to improve his son's estate, all that is subject to collation." 0. 0. 1326.
.As there is enough in the record to show that the decree, as rendered by the District Judge, will produce substantially the same result as a more formal judgment it need not be disturbed.
Judgment affirmed, with costs.