Case Name: Michael L. RETZER v. Nancy B. RETZER
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1990-12-12
Citations: 578 So. 2d 580
Docket Number: No. 89-CA-0589
Parties: Michael L. RETZER v. Nancy B. RETZER.
Judges: ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., DAN M. LEE, P.J., and PITTMAN, J., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 578
Pages: 580–608

Head Matter:
Michael L. RETZER v. Nancy B. RETZER.
No. 89-CA-0589.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Dec. 12, 1990.
Rehearing Denied May 3, 1991.
Lester F. Sumners, Sumners Carter Trout & McMillin, New Albany, for appellant.
H.L. Merideth, Jr., Greenville, for appel-lee.

Opinion:
HAWKINS, Presiding Justice,
for the Court:
Michael L. Retzer was granted a divorce from Nancy B. Retzer in the chancery court of Washington County on the ground of adultery. He has appealed the chancery court award unto his wife of a cash award of $275,000, periodic alimony in the amount of $88,000 per year and custody of their children. We reverse and render on the lump sum award, and affirm on the award of custody. We affirm the annual award of $88,000 per year, not as alimony, however, but as a fair return on Mrs. Retzer's ownership of 1,600 shares in Retzer and Retzer, Inc., a close corporation in which Mr. Retzer is the majority shareholder.
FACTS
Michael L. Retzer and Nancy B. Retzer married in Louisiana December 19, 1970. He was a captain in the Air Force who shortly thereafter left the service and went to work for Texas Instruments in Houston, Texas. Mrs. Retzer received a bachelor of science degree in elementary education from Louisiana State University in January, 1971. The couple moved to Greenville, where Mrs. Retzer taught in the public school system. She was actively occupied as a teacher for the months of March-May, September-December, 1971, and all 1972. They moved to Greenville to secure a McDonald's corporation franchise and open a restaurant there. They rented an apartment; Mr. Retzer returned to work in Houston while she taught school. Later he moved to Greenville and was a substitute teacher in addition to regular employment.
According to Mr. Retzer, McDonald's corporation required more than an investor for a local franchise. The corporation wanted to assure itself the applicant could successfully operate one of its restaurants. He was required to work free for a thousand hours in McDonald's places of business and attend several training schools.
Mr. Retzer filed a financial statement with Sunburst Bank (formerly Grenada Bank) dated July 1, 1972, in support of a requested loan. It lists $44,200 cash assets. He testified approximately $25,000 of this sum were his savings, and another $20,000 a loan from his parents. This statement shows annual salaries of Mr. and Mrs. Retzer to be, respectively, $13,200 and $7,100. The Retzers secured a $65,000 loan from the First National Bank of Greenville in January, 1973, with both signing the note.
A McDonald's franchise, called a "License Agreement," runs for a 20-year term. The agreement also provides that during the last three years of the term, McDonald's may decide whether to extend the franchise for another 20-year period. On November 22, 1972, a License Agreement was executed by the licensor corporation, and "Michael L. Retzer and Nancy B. Retzer" as licensees.
At trial there was a disagreement as to Mrs. Retzer's initial investment. According to her, all of her teacher's salary went into a joint savings account and was part of the cash assets used to invest in the business. If so, it would have amounted to somewhere between $10,000 and $14,000. Mrs. Retzer brought no cash into the marriage. Mr. Retzer, on the other hand, testified Mrs. Retzer always spent beyond their means, and none of her funds went into the business. The 1972 financial statement contains no entry showing assets in a savings account. However, the $44,200 cash assets listed could have included a savings account.
When the business opened in 1972, Mr. Retzer was the manager, with two assistant managers, and testified he worked eighteen hours a day. Mrs. Retzer helped for several weeks, but returned to her teaching. She later did advise as to the interior decoration and employees' uniforms. Also, at one time she attempted to help settle a strike. Except for what has been noted, the entire management and operation of the business was by Mr. Ret-zer.
The business was quite successful. A second license agreement was obtained May 8, 1974, for a restaurant in Greenwood, with both Retzers as licensees. A third license agreement was obtained Octo ber 2, 1974, for a restaurant in Clarksdale. On April 15, 1976, Mr. Retzer obtained another license agreement in his name for a restaurant in Cleveland. On October 10, 1978, there was another license agreement for a restaurant in Indianola. In 1973 Ret-zer and Retzer, Inc., a Mississippi corporation, was organized, and Mr. and Mrs. Ret-zer were each issued 1,600 shares. All of these license agreements were assigned to this corporation, making it the owner of the five restaurants.
On April 14, 1983, Mr. Retzer obtained a license agreement in his own name for a restaurant in Yazoo City, and finally on January 21, 1985, a license agreement for a second McDonald's restaurant in Green-ville. The ownership of these two licenses and restaurants remained solely in the name of Mr. Retzer. At the time of their separation, there were five restaurants owned by the corporation, two by Mr. Ret-zer.
A daughter, Kathryn Reed Retzer, was born to their marriage July 1, 1976. In 1975 during her pregnancy, Mrs. Retzer developed choriocarcinoma, a rare cancer associated with pregnancy, from which she fully recovered.
Mr. Retzer began operating a sole proprietorship business in his own name as "Ret-co" in 1979. It started as a leasing operation of two trucks. Because of tax credits and a lower unemployment rate, Retco also employed personnel for the restaurants. Mr. Retzer drew a salary from Retco, but testified no Retzer and Retzer corporate assets of any kind were diverted to him or Retco, and that it was advantageous to the corporation to operate in this manner.
On September 29, 1982, their second child, Michael Lynn, was born.
ANTE 1979 INFIDELITIES
In 1978 a remark by Mrs. Retzer that Mr. Retzer's attorney was not his friend, and his own suspicion that there might be something going on between the attorney and Mrs. Retzer, caused Mr. Retzer to change attorneys.
Mrs. Retzer also learned from her next door neighbor in 1979 that Mr. Retzer had engaged in a sexual affair with her. Mrs. Retzer confronted him and he admitted it was true, and agreed to give Mrs. Retzer a divorce, to be obtained on the ground of irreconcilable differences. Also, Mr. Ret-zer had made extra-marital advances to at least two other women who did not reciprocate.
In July, 1979, while their divorce was pending, Mr. Retzer caught Mrs. Retzer and his former attorney in a motel room in Jackson.
The couple returned to Greenville that night. Following soul searching discussions lasting several weeks, they agreed to resume the marriage, both, however, solemnly promising to be faithful thereafter.
LATER DEVELOPMENTS
A planned assignation between Mrs. Ret-zer and the attorney in an Atlanta hotel in the summer of 1981 was suspected and discovered by Mr. Retzer.
According to him, his problems with his wife were not restricted to extra-marital relations. From the beginning of their marriage, she was an exorbitant spender. Mrs. Retzer was an only child. Also, when there were serious arguments about their marital problems, Mrs. Retzer would threaten to destroy or liquidate their business.
After the Atlanta incident, each retained separate legal counsel. But again, the two decided to remain married, this time, however, with three preconditions by Mr. Ret-zer.
Mrs. Retzer was to stop seeing her lawyer boyfriend. Second, she was to get her spending under control. Finally, the corporation was to issue Mr. Retzer ten additional shares so as to make him a majority shareholder and give him corporate control. Mrs. Retzer's attorney (who was not the boyfriend) advised her against agreeing to the issuance of ten shares to Mr. Retzer. Despite this advice, she executed all documents prepared by Wayne Drinkwater, a Greenville attorney, necessary to issue Mr. Retzer ten corporate shares. Drinkwater neither attempted to advise nor represent either party, but simply to prepare the necessary instruments to issue the shares.
Mr. Retzer also agreed, following this, that in the event the two were still married ten years thereafter, July 10, 1991, he would convey unto her whatever stock was necessary for each to own fifty percent of the stock. Drinkwater prepared this agreement by Mr. Retzer as well.
Mrs. Retzer's involvement with her boy friend, by their own chancery court admissions, resumed the last of 1984 or early 1985. They had assignations at a selected house on Highway 82 and at Lake Ferguson in Washington County, in Louisiana, and in Arkansas. The boy friend admitted also to having seen her in Vicksburg and Memphis. Both said the affair would flare up, and then die down, but the boy friend said there was no way he could answer how many times he had seen Mrs. Retzer.
The two had code telephone signals whereby planned meetings could be held. Affectionate greeting card exchanges were made. Mr. Retzer found the boy friend's Virginia Military Institute ring in Mrs. Ret-zer's jewelry box.
Mr. Retzer again suspected infidelity on the part of Mrs. Retzer during this period. For one thing, his suspicion was aroused concerning her greeting cards. Mrs. Ret-zer kept a copious card supply in stock to have on hand to mail to various friends and acquaintances upon the appropriate occasion. Mr. Retzer noticed among this inventory cards of a clearly sexually suggestive interest by its sender. Her possession of them did not cause him any concern. The fact he was never the recipient of a single one did. He removed and photostated some and replaced them.
For whomever they were meant, however, the local boy friend at trial denied having received these particular cards.
Mr. Retzer eventually hired a private investigator, and in 1986 when he saw the boy friend at a social function, he told him not to talk to "Nancy" again, and the boy friend agreed.
In May, 1987, the attorney's secretary rented a house in Benoit, about 25 miles from Greenville, which Mrs. Retzer furnished and decorated. Tables, chairs, sofa and lamps costing $593.60, baskets, pictures, including an original watercolor costing $397.50 were installed. Mrs. Retzer took draperies from their residence, and then had a headboard cover and bedspread and pillow shams of matching material sewed for the house. She admitted spending over $2,700 on furnishings, of which $814 was charged to the corporation. Also, Mrs. Retzer carried pots and dishware, towels and linens from their residence, together with some of Mr. Retzer's private wine stock. The boy friend had a few personal items in the house.
On July 13, 1987, the investigator reported the house to Mr. Retzer, who went to it, and discovered familiar items of personal property. Also in the house were two pornographic magazines, but Mrs. Retzer and the boy friend denied knowledge of these. The Retzers separated that day.
While perhaps attempting to minimize the number of their occurrences, both Mrs. Retzer and the boy friend testified to acts of adultery continuing over a span of several years. Mrs. Retzer's only reason or excuse for her assignations was her testimony at trial that she and Mr. Retzer made a deal in 1982 for them both to "discreetly" carry on extra-marital intercourse. In 1982 when Mrs. Retzer was pregnant, an irate male employee of the Greenwood restaurant telephoned their home and told Mr. Retzer to leave his girl friend alone. At trial this young lady, who in 1982 had been an employee of the Greenwood business, testified Mr. Retzer had made a sexual proposition to her, indeed suggested that she be his mistress. Following this telephone call from the young man, according to Mrs. Retzer, she was told by her husband that they were both attractive and well off, and no doubt would receive any number of offers to sexual engagement. They should each feel free to do so, so long as there would be no public knowledge, and only the two of them knew of any such activity.
Mr. Retzer denied ever having made any sexual advance to the young lady in Green wood, and denied making any agreement for adultery with Mrs. Retzer. He did admit to receiving the telephone call from the young man, who he said was drunk, and according to Mr. Retzer, he told him never to call him again.
With the exception of Mrs. Retzer's charge that Mr. Retzer had propositioned the young lady in Greenwood, the only evidence in the record that Mr. Retzer behaved in any way improperly from the time of their reconciliation in 1979 until they separated in July, 1987, was in the summer of 1982. She testified she noticed at the time his penis was "bruised." Mr. Retzer denied this.
On September 11 Mr. Retzer filed a complaint for divorce upon the ground of adultery and irreconcilable differences, and sought custody of the children. Mrs. Ret-zer filed an answer denying his ground for divorce, and a complaint for separate support and maintenance, custody of the children, an accounting, and an award of one-half of his assets.
THE RETZER LIFESTYLE
Mr. Retzer's management of the restaurants was quite successful. With less than $30,000 in 1971, the business had grown and flourished, and they were quite wealthy in 1988. The second restaurant in Greenville at the time of trial had been a consistent money loser, and another, the Clarksdale restaurant, was marginal, but the others highly successful. As above noted there were seven restaurants in told. The chancellor in his September 7, 1988, opinion estimated that the net worth of them both, consisting mainly of the value of the restaurants, was $4,100,000. He found that of this figure Mrs. Retzer had a net worth of $1,100,000, consisting almost entirely of the value of her corporate shares in Retzer and Retzer, Inc., and Mr. Retzer had a net worth of $3,000,000.
To get some concept of the part each of them played in the accumulation of these assets, it is necessary to examine their lifestyle. As above noted, Mrs. Retzer did not teach after 1972, and took no part in the business. Although Mr. Retzer testified she had no money whatever in the original investment and that she had consistently spent and overspent everything she made, it is possible several thousand dollars of her teacher's salary was initially invested in the first restaurant. Also, the banks for several years at least required her signature along with his on all loans.
According to Mr. Retzer, from the beginning Mrs. Retzer was continually in "financial distress."' It was a "constant irritant and dilemma in our marriage." (Vol. V, 249). He discussed the problem with his attorney in 1975. In their 1979 divorce he was shown a list of bills totaling $26,300, one being a $5,500 note to a local bank, of which he knew nothing, and was called upon to pay.
They each had separate personal bank accounts. For the years 1980-87 the corporation paid each the following salaries and bonuses:
YEAR MR. RETZER MRS. RETZER
1980 187.423.20 $ 16,350.00
1981 190.823.20 $ 18,800.00
1982 204,436.00 $ 20,775.00
1983 231,377.00 $ 21,596.00
1984 260.540.00 $ 21,590.00
1985 279,077.00 $ 21,591.00
1986 224,539.00 $ 21,610.00
1987 233,769.24 $ 33,611.20
TOTAL $1,811,984.64 $175,923.20
Also for 1980-86 their joint income tax returns showed the following:
Gross Taxable Federal State
Income Income Tax Tax
1980 $195,637 $172,534 $ 63,030 $ 6,280
1981 $212,816 $137,508 $ 50,068 $ 8,234
1982 $264,494 $196,633 $ 15,912 $ 4,774
1983 $599,398 $543,984 $110,639 $26,583
1984 $642,266 $117,445 $117,445 $22,005
1985 $460,229 $389,283 $ 76,449 $12,714
1986 $445,595 $393,695 $84,887 $18,170
Mr. Retzer's testimony as to her uncontrolled spending and incurring debts was essentially uncontradicted. He had given her over $40,000 worth of jewelry himself during the marriage. She had bills for dresses from all over the country, many costing more than $3,000. Typically, she would incur a large bill, pay something like $100 month for six to eight months, and then the "crunch" would come. (Vol. VI, 658) She had personal notes at several banks in Greenville. He expressed exasperation that the banks made loans to her freely. Her checking account in Planters Bank was constantly overdrawn.
He related a 1985 example of this chronic problem, which she conceded was accurate. Mr. Retzer was on the board of directors of Planters Bank, and every month at the board meeting the names of overdrawn depositors and amounts would be called out. To avoid embarrassing him, an officer at the bank would call him prior to each meeting, inform him of the overdraft that month, and Mr. Retzer would pay the overdraft. During that year the bank officer called him and told him that Mrs. Retzer's account was $4,700 overdrawn. He told the banker to let the checks bounce.
When the checks bounced, Mrs. Retzer came to the office and "threw a fit." She "broke valuable porcelain" and a "Picasso plate." (Vol. VI, 659) He called the pastor to calm her down. Upon Mrs. Retzer's promise never to stray again, he paid off the overdraft. "The woman needs no encouragement to spend vast sums of money." (Vol. VIII, 1138)
Mr. Retzer described the problem during cross-examination:
Q. Mr. Retzer, with your proven business ability, are you telling this Court that there was not any way that you could close accounts, take credit cards, give notice to people that extend credit, to keep Mrs. Ret-zer from spending sums of money like that?
A. Mr. Merideth, I want to tell you that I tried every system, every permutation of system under the sun to control Mrs. Retzer. Had her on a cash basis, had her on no credit cards, had her write a letter to every account in town closing the account. I did everything short of taking out a full page ad in the DDT telling people I would not be responsible for my wife's debts, yet every merchant in town when she walks in will accept her signature and let her carry out anything. As you have clearly seen, every banker in town will lend her large amounts on her signature without financial statements. Not even a court order, Mr. Merideth, can restrain her spending and what is the penalty for me when she starts bouncing things and her credit goes bad? I get rejections from people on credit. I get credit card rejections. My credit goes bad. This happened in '84 and since that time I've made sure that Mrs. Retzer and I never had a joint account again, but that's the punishment for me, Mr. Merideth, and the answer to your question — I never developed a system to control her.
You certainly could have closed her credit at the Planters Bank — you're a director there? <©
No, sir, she went in and got it on her own. I did not instruct the Planters Bank not to loan to customers, and she had it before I knew about it.
She had it before you knew about it? O'
Um-hm (affirmative response). <
You could have told Chuck do not lend my wife anymore money on that board and he would not have loaned her anymore money. o?
A. She had it before I knew about it. That loan is several years old and the only thing that gets paid on it is interest.
She's gone back since then and borrowed more at Planters, hasn't she? ©
A. I don't know. She probably has. She's borrowed everywhere else in town, Mr. Merideth.
(Vol. VI, 660-661)
Mr. Retzer testified that of the salaries and bonuses each received from the corporation it was their initial intention for Mrs. Retzer to pay for the groceries and children's clothes out of her compensation, and he would pay all their other expenses from his salary and bonus, including mortgage payment, interest, insurance, taxes. Then, at the end of the year they would split what was left. Because of her spending this did not work out (Vol. VIII, 1140), he claiming she spent $35-40 thousand each year on dresses alone.
Why this did not work out, and her spending problem can be illustrated by Exhibit 37 (Vol. V, 442) and their financial difficulty in March, 1987.
This exhibit, among other things, shows that in 1986 the total sum spent for groceries was $11,646.35, and total sum spent for children, including their clothes, was $5,307.08, totaling $16,953.43. Mrs. Ret-zer's personal income from the corporation that year was $21,600, leaving her a balance of $4,656.67.
As above noted, the total income of them both from the corporation for the year 1986 was $256,227.30. That year she wrote checks from her account totaling $72,-327.30. Of this she spent $40,574 on personal items for herself, another $10,599.59 went into a small business venture between Mrs. Retzer and a friend, called "Fantasy." Mr. Retzer deposited $36,009.67 from his account to hers. That year Mr. Retzer expended $47,162.72 from his account, of which $18,825.48 was for personal items for himself, the remainder in investment, with the exception of a $1,100 political contribution. The expenditures that year which could be classified as expenses for them both totaled $145,463.21.
In March, 1987, Mrs. Retzer was upset with what she claimed were approximately $27,000 overdue bills. At that time they were in something of a financial bind, and in order to pay these bills, Mr. Retzer agreed to go on her note at a bank for $27,000. Once the loan had been made, Mrs. Retzer informed him of another $8,000 in bills she had forgotten, and the corporation thereupon gave her a bonus of $12,000.
On May 12, 1987, Mrs. Retzer personally borrowed $5,407 from the local Trustmark Bank, and on June 29 borrowed $6,000 from Magnolia Federal in Greenville to "completely finish" paying off her debts. (Vol. Ill, 103) In August and September, 1987, she obtained loans totaling $17,500 from the local Sunburst Bank and in November her mother let her have $13,000. Finally, in January, 1988, she borrowed another $5,000 from Sunburst. She said she secured $57,000 in loans to pay off her debts.
She never purchased any stocks or bonds, or had a savings account.
In the first six months of 1987, Mr. Ret-zer spent $38,840.43 from his account, of which $8,416.46 went on personal expenses for himself, $750.00 went to a political contribution, and $16,000 went for a membership in "Catfish Point," an exclusive recreation club of which he was a general partner. He stated this would later be recouped because he had purchased three memberships, and when he sold two of them, his investment would be returned. Mrs. Retzer wrote checks during the same period from her account totaling $22,-539.73, of which $16,952.23 was for herself, $2,525 went into "Fantasy," and $2,862.50 was disbursed to Mrs. Trudy Boyette, Mrs. Retzer's mother. Mr. Retzer wrote checks to her from his account totaling $9,845.28. Expenses which could be classified as expenses for them both for the six-month period totaled $134,121.76.
Following the separation in July, 1987, the corporation paid Mrs. Retzer $1,178 every four weeks, and he paid her an additional $1,150 every four weeks, totaling $2,522 per month. Also, following the separation, Mr. Retzer paid $11,000 per month for her household expenses and $850 per month on the April 1, 1987, note at the bank, altogether totaling $14,372 per month.
At a pendente lite hearing before the chancellor in February, 1988, Mrs. Retzer requested he pay her another $3,000 monthly in order "to pay her additional debts and maintain her standard of living." The chancellor allowed her an additional $1,000 per month on her other bills, and directed her to refrain from incurring any additional indebtedness until "this matter is resolved." He also allowed her accountant's fee of $4,940 and attorney's fee of $7,585.
Although directed by the chancellor at the February hearing to refrain from incurring any additional debts, Mrs. Retzer later gave her maid a $529.00 ring as a present, and on April 25, 1988, because she was depressed, she purchased for herself a jewelry pin costing $3,800. (Vol. Ill, 138)
In the twelve months following April, 1987, Mrs. Retzer did not curtail her purchase of items of personal luxury. Exhibit 36 shows that her balances due for jewelry, liquor and clothing increased from $5,740 to $11,368. She bought $1,600 worth of intoxicating beverages from a local liquor store.
Mrs. Retzer did not deny her extravagance, and admitted she was a poor manager, giving as her only excuse that he, too, overspent. Mr. Retzer had gone on an African safari, taking his son, and a trip to Barbados with his children, each trip costing approximately $5,000. The family spent two weeks in France, renting a house for $5,500, and one of the weeks Mr. Ret-zer had his parents over to stay with them. He had two watches costing several thousand dollars each, and upon cross-examination when Mrs. Retzer's counsel asked him if he would take $4,000 for the one he had on, Mr. Retzer took it off and sold it to him. There had been a lavish birthday party for Mr. Retzer in New Orleans, costing thousands of dollars, but he attributed the outlandish cost to her, saying she had handled it and it got out of hand. Mr. Retzer, active in the Republican Party, had also financed an expensive dinner in Washington for state and national political leaders.
The Retzers were apparently generous to Mrs. Retzer's mother, Mrs. Boyette, the Retzers paying for her cosmetic surgery costing several thousands of dollars. Also, they rented a house to Mrs. Boyette for $375 a month, a modest rental for the investment. Mr. Retzer testified at trial that she could live there as long as she chose. In August, 1988, in a note to Mr. Retzer, requesting a loan of over $5,000 for the house she had bought on Kirk Circle in Greenville, Mrs. Retzer also asked that he reimburse her $301.50 she had paid on Mrs. Boyette's medical bill.
During the summer of 1988, following the divorce hearing, Mrs. Retzer went to Houston, Texas, for removal of a mole and cosmetic surgery of some kind. She testified her local dermatologist had found the mole and told her he could remove it. She chose instead to go to Houston, Texas, for its removal and for the cosmetic surgery. At the August, 1988, hearing she could not recall what the surgery was for or the amount she had paid.
While being examined by the chancellor, she could not tell him whether Mr. Retzer had given her $4,000 or $8,000 the previous month, saying when the court asked her questions, "it frightens me and he's frightened me." (Yol. VIII, 1091)
Mrs. Retzer testified that until their separation, Mr. Retzer had never complained seriously about her spending, that he had teased her about it.
CUSTODY
Insofar as this record reveals, both Mr. and Mrs. Retzer tried to devote time and interest to their children.
Following the birth of their second child, because of the hazard to Mrs. Retzer's health created by pregnancy, he had a vasectomy.
Mrs. Retzer attempted suicide upon one occasion at their home in Greenville by swallowing a number of pills. Mr. Retzer took her to the local hospital where her stomach was pumped out. Also, according to Mr. Retzer, in March or April, 1987, he had gotten a telephone call that Mrs. Ret-zer while returning from Jackson had run off the highway into a field. In later relating what happened, she told him that she had been drinking. She also told him that she had contemplated suicide and drove in front of a truck, but at the last minute lost her nerve and drove into the field. Mrs. Retzer also consulted with a psychiatrist in Jackson, but the purpose is not in the record.
Instances of pre-separation extra-marital conduct have been set forth.
After their separation, in January, 1988, Mr. Retzer left a restaurant in Greenwood late one night with a woman named "Linda." They drove to a local tennis club which was closed and parked for approximately two hours. Mrs. Retzer's private investigator followed, saw them parked, and saw when they left and returned to the restaurant. He reported this to Mrs. Ret-zer. Mr. Retzer testified he could only recall the young woman's name as "Linda," that he had been working that day at his places of business and went to the restaurant that evening. He had met or seen the young woman there once before. He said they left the restaurant and drove to the club, where they parked and talked. He produced a picture of the interior of the car they occupied, showing bucket front seats with a console in the middle. He said that he recognized he was being followed by the other car, and told "Linda" that Mrs. Ret-zer's private investigator was no doubt in the other car.
Although there were suggestions and attempts to prove some kind of relationship between Mr. Retzer and two local women, there was no proof of any marital misconduct beyond the incident with "Linda."
Following the separation, Mrs. Retzer had two more engagements with the local boy friend. Also, she made a trip to New York at the expense of a well-to-do local businessman and spent the night in a suite occupied by him. She and the businessman denied any improper conduct. They both testified he was attempting to advise and assist her in business matters.
In February, 1988, Mrs. Retzer began taking birth control pills. She stated her reason for doing so was that it took some time for them to be effective, and she took them in anticipation of her divorce.
Mrs. Retzer testified that Mr. Retzer was an excellent husband, and had been a good father. She also testified that he was the only man she had ever loved, and that she wanted to resume the marriage.
Mr. Retzer kept diaries of his trips with his children. He was a coach on his daughter's basketball team, and at the time of the divorce said that his business permitted him to spend a great deal of time with his children.
DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS
As noted, Mr. Retzer filed for divorce in September, 1987. There was extensive discovery by each side. Mrs. Retzer's certified public accountant William Baird had unlimited access to Mr. Retzer's and corporate records. In addition Mr. Retzer was required to list every purchase he had made exceeding $2,500 from 1981.
A pendente lite hearing was held in February, 1988, as noted, in which Mrs. Retzer sought additional temporary alimony to pay on her debts, and Mr. Retzer was required to add $1,000 per month to the $14,371.00 he was already paying a month. Also, attorney's fees and accountant's fee were awarded her.
The trial took place June 13-17, 1988. The chancellor rendered an opinion July 8 awarding Mr. Retzer a divorce on the ground of adultery. He found that there had been no collusion, connivance or provocation on the part of Mr. Retzer as to her adultery.
Custody of the children was awarded Mrs. Retzer. The court found that "the example set by both parents as to sexual conduct will greatly jeopardize the children," as knowledge would be widespread in the community. As to her over-spending, the court found Mr. Retzer was an extravagant spender himself, with his expensive parties, safaris, and a quarter of a million dollars spent in remodeling their home. The court went on to find that Mr. Retzer was a good parent, and should be allowed extensive visitation rights.
The court found that Mrs. Retzer was not entitled to any more corporate shares, that just as Mr. Retzer had voluntarily let her have the original shares in 1973, she had voluntarily permitted him to acquire the additional ten shares in 1981.
The court found that Mrs. Retzer was entitled to an equitable division of the property beyond her corporate shares.
. It makes no difference whether she got the stock by gift from her husband as he testified, or by investment of her own funds, for from that point on she was the owner of one-half the corporation. It was that corporation that provided the funds for later acquisition of other assets. It was also that corporation that made it possible for Mr. Retzer to develop Reteo and his management company.
The Court recognizes the earnings of the corporation were distributed to the owners in the form of salary and bonuses rather than dividends and that this was a substantial tax advantage to them. The Court also recognizes that Reteo and the management company were developed as tax saving devices and means for withdrawing corporate profits without the payment of corporate income tax. There is no doubt that had Mrs. Retzer's half interest in the corporation been owned by a totally unrelated party rather than a family member, this type arrangement for distribution of funds would not have been permitted. There is also no doubt that Mrs. Retzer received substantial benefit from the funds that were distributed to Mr. Retzer by way of salary, bonus, and payments to one of his other businesses, for these were the sources of funds that provided her expensive clothes, car, house, trips, and so on.
This Court also recognizes that Mrs. Retzer might have contributed slightly to the accumulation of assets through her labor such as, suggestions for decorations, but is of the opinion that her contribution through labor is very insignificant when compared to Mr. Retzer's, while her contribution through capital is significant when compared to his. This Court also is of the opinion that Mrs. Retzer has already received a significant distribution of the earnings from her capital in that this has supported some of her extravagant spending. With these facts, though, the Court concludes that she is entitled to some equitable divisions of the assets accumulated during the marriage, though she is clearly not entitled to half for her contributions have not been equal to his. (Emphasis added)
The chancellor went on to find, however, that even with all the discovery and accountants' services, he was unable to determine their assets. He therefore continued the matter for a later hearing to ascertain their assets.
Another hearing was conducted August 19, following which the chancellor rendered an opinion September 7, 1988. He concluded that their combined net worth was $4,100,000, with Mr. Retzer holding about $3,000,000 of the assets. He found that she owned 27% of the total assets and was entitled to another eight percent giving her a total of 35% of the assets. He directed Mr. Retzer to pay her $275,000 over a two-year period, with interest at the rate of eight percent per annum.
He awarded Mrs. Retzer $2,500 per month in child support. He then awarded her $88,000 per year alimony ($7,333.33 per month), with the provision that any sum paid by the corporation to her in dividends would be deducted from the alimony due her. He said that a fair return on her corporate investment should yield her eight percent per year.
He also directed that Mr. Retzer provide her with hospital insurance equivalent to that she had in the past, which could be paid by him directly or through the corporation. There was a division of two residences, with Mrs. Retzer being required to relinquish her interest in one, and he the other, and each thereafter to assume all indebtednesses on them.
There were other provisions in this involved matter unnecessary to include in this opinion.
LAW
In view of the chancellor's finding that Mr. Retzer was entitled to a divorce on the ground of adultery, and Mrs. Retzer having made no cross-appeal, it is immaterial what she alleged or proved as to his marital misconduct between their reconciliation in 1979 and their separation in July, 1987. The chancellor rejected her evidence, but in fairness we have nevertheless sought to set forth the facts concerning them both from the record.
With the exception of the 1982 incident with the female employee in Greenwood, and Mrs. Retzer's allegation that she observed his penis bruised at one time, both of which Mr. Retzer denied, there is no proof in this record of any extra-marital misconduct on his part from July, 1979, through July, 1987, when they separated. There is no proof whatever of any adultery on his part.
Mrs. Retzer's adultery on the other hand was not some isolated incident, but rather a continuing, persistent affair with a local man. She was caught in 1981 and forgiven, after promising it would end. It resumed and continued over a three- or four-year period.
A. LUMP SUM ALIMONY
While lump sum alimony is in a sense an award to a wife of a portion of her husband's estate, this Court has consistently made the distinction between divesting a husband of his property and vesting it in the wife, and lump sum alimony. We have always held that in the absence of a resulting or constructive trust the wife's services as a housewife or- a farm wife without more did not authorize a court in a divorce action to give her an equitable interest in his property. The authority of courts in a divorce to transfer property of either spouse to the other is purely statutory, and in the absence of statutory authority a court has no power to deal with vested property rights. Rosamond v. Rosamond, 250 Miss. 742, 748, 168 So.2d 294, 296 (1964). See also, Hinton v. Hinton, 254 Miss. 50, 179 So.2d 846 (1965); Brab-ham v. Brabham, 226 Miss. 165, 84 So.2d 147 (1955); Windham v. Windham, 218 Miss. 547, 67 So.2d 467 (1953); McCraney v. McCraney, 208 Miss. 105, 43 So.2d 872 (1950); Grego v. Grego, 78 Miss. 443, 28 So. 817 (1900).
On the other hand, we have long since recognized the discretionary authority of the chancery court to award lump sum alimony.
"... It [lump sum] is a settlement between the husband and the wife as to the interest of the latter in his property, and as to the extent of the husband's duty to contribute to her maintenance and support."
The solution of the question of whether or not an allowance of a gross sum should be made must be determined by the facts of the particular case, having due regard to the best interest of the parties and the husband's financial ability to respond to an award in gross. Where the husband's estate is sufficient to enable him to respond to an award in gross, it will often be conducive to the welfare and happiness of both parties to end the relation of debtor and creditor between them by making such an award, and thereby relieve the wife of further dependence upon the continued solvency of the husband and his financial ability to pay a periodical stipend and his continued response to such forced contributions without future legal steps to enforce them.
Miller v. Miller, 173 Miss. 44, 64, 159 So. 112, 119-120 (1935).
Until Jenkins v. Jenkins, 278 So.2d 446 (Miss.1973), none of our cases suggested, however, that a wife who had been a dutiful and frugal housewife without more was for that reason entitled as a matter of law to a lump sum alimony as opposed to or in addition to periodic alimony. Instead, it was discretionary with the chancery court. Aldridge v. Aldridge, 200 Miss. 874, 877, 27 So.2d 884, 885 (1946). See also, Harrell v. Harrell, 231 So.2d 793 (Miss.1970); McCraney v. McCraney, supra; Hopkins v. Hopkins, 174 Miss. 643, 165 So. 414 (1936). Then in Jenkins, supra, we departed from the rule of leaving the award of lump sum (as opposed to or in addition to periodic alimony) purely discretionary, holding that "where the wife has contributed to the accumulation of the property of her husband, doing her part as a housewife, it would not be improper that she be allowed a reasonable amount of lump sum alimony." 278 So.2d at 449. Thereafter in Clark v. Clark, 293 So.2d 447, 449 (Miss.1974), in which the wife had contributed to her husband's wealth by working in his business as well as a housewife, we held:
Under these circumstances, the wife, helpmate and co-worker who is forced out of the marriage partnership through no fault of her own is entitled to a fair, equitable and just allowance. This can be accomplished, in the discretion of the chancellor after a hearing to fully develop the facts in this regard, by either a lump sum award, plus monthly alimony payments or monthly alimony payments of such a substantial nature that it reflects not only the husband's duty to care for his former wife in the manner in which she has grown accustomed but also her share in the jointly accumulated assets so that she might, from this extra sum, provide for her future security. Jenkins v. Jenkins, 278 So.2d 446 (Miss.1973). (Emphasis added)
One or both of two common threads thereafter appear in all of our awards of lump sum alimony. First, the wife had through her efforts been a material economic benefit in the creation of her husband's wealth, such as quitting her job to help him in his business or profession, helping him through college, working in his business or profession, and frequently offering him valuable counseling in his business or investments. In these cases it could fairly be stated that but for her actual assistance to him in his business or profession he would not have accumulated such wealth, an excellent example being Jones v. Jones, 532 So.2d 574 (Miss.1988). The second factor, as first stated in Jenkins, supra, was in being a dutiful, faithful housewife.
In Clark and thereafter in Reeves v. Reeves, 410 So.2d 1300 (Miss.1982), we noted that these holdings did not "make Mississippi a community property state, but further delineate the serious responsibility of a chancellor to make intelligent and fair provision for the wife." Reeves, 410 So.2d at 1302; Clark, 293 So.2d at 449-450. Fol lowing these cases this Court considered lump sum awards alone or in conjunction with periodic alimony in Jones, supra; Skinner v. Skinner, 509 So.2d 867 (Miss.1987); Tutor v. Tutor, 494 So.2d 362 (Miss.1986); Abshire v. Abshire, 459 So.2d 802 (Miss.1984); Schilling v. Schilling, 452 So.2d 834 (Miss.1984). Then, in Cheatham v. Cheatham, 537 So.2d 435, 438 (Miss.1988), where the wife was granted a divorce from her husband on adultery, from our previous cases we congealed factors considered in awarding lump sum alimony where the wife was granted a divorce:
1) Substantial contribution to accumulation of total wealth of the payor either by quitting a job to become a housewife, or by assisting in the spouse's business. Tutor v. Tutor, 494 So.2d 362 (Miss.1986); Schilling v. Schilling, 452 So.2d 834 (Miss.1984);
2) A long marriage. Jenkins v. Jenkins, 278 So.2d 446 (Miss.1973); Tutor and Schilling, supra;
3.) Where recipient spouse has no separate income or the separate estate is meager by comparison. Jenkins, Tutor and Schilling, supra;
4. Without the lump sum award the receiving spouse would lack any financial security. Abshire v. Abshire, 459 So.2d 802, 804 (Miss.1984).
A closer analysis of these cases, however, reveal that the single most important factor undoubtedly is the disparity of the separate estates.
537 So.2d at 438. White v. White, 557 So.2d 480, 483 (Miss.1989).
Every lump sum alimony award addressed in this Court had one thing in common: the wife was granted the divorce from the husband because of his wrong-doing.
Going to the instant case, Mrs. Retzer must fail in the first instance because she was not granted a divorce. It was Mr. Retzer who was granted the divorce because of her wrong doing. Yet even if she had been granted a divorce, she still would not have satisfied the Cheat-ham test. Mrs. Retzer owns ⅛9.8% of the shares in Retzer and Retzer, the corporate owner of five commercially successful McDonald's restaurants, which should afford her a substantial income.
As to the first factor, she made no substantial contribution to the accumulation of the total wealth of Mr. Retzer and her. At most, all or a portion of her teacher's salary of from $10,000-$14,000 went into the original 1971 investment, which Mr. Retzer hotly disputed. Giving her credit for this, an almost equal ownership in the corporation was an eminently fair return. Nor can she claim the role of the dutiful, frugal housewife.
Mrs. Retzer did meet the second factor— it was a long marriage.
Mrs. Retzer did not meet the third and fourth factors because she will have a separate income or estate and financial security without any lump sum award.
The disparity in their ownership of the restaurants comes from Mr. Retzer as an individual starting two new McDonald's, one in Yazoo City in 1983, and the other in Greenville in 1985. He has no lump sum alimony obligation from these acquisitions during a period when she was committing adultery and living a profligate life-style. She contributed no property, income or services in the acquisition of these restaurants. To hold that she somehow had an equitable claim in the value of these restaurants would mean no principled guide whatever in awarding lump sum alimony, depending instead on the particular view of whatever chancellor heard the case. Indeed, it would make a mockery of our effort in these cases to deal fairly with both parties to a divorce.
B. PERIODIC ALIMONY
It is a general rule that alimony will not be allowed a wife when the husband is granted a divorce because of her fault. Beacham v. Beacham, 383 So.2d 146, 147 (Miss.1980); Russell v. Russell, 241 So.2d 366, 367 (Miss.1970).
The rule is a sound one and is based on the proposition that a husband is entitled to have his wife receive her support in his home while she is discharging the duties of a wife as imposed under the marriage contract.
Bunkley & Morse's Amis on Divorce and Separation in Mississippi, § 6.04, p. 184 (1957).
An exception to this rule has been made in cases where the marriage has been of long duration, the husband is able to pay alimony in some amount, and the wife has no means of livelihood. See, Wires v. Wires, 297 So.2d 900, 903 (Miss.1974) (on habitual cruel and inhuman treatment); Rainey v. Rainey, 205 So.2d 514, 515 (Miss.1967) (on habitual cruel and inhuman treatment); Gatlin v. Gatlin, 248 Miss. 868, 871, 161 So.2d 782, 783 (1964) (on habitual cruel and inhuman treatment); Shows v. Shows, 241 Miss. 716, 720, 133 So.2d 294, 296 (1961) (on habitual cruel and inhuman treatment); Hibner v. Hibner, 217 Miss. 611, 617, 64 So.2d 756, 758 (1953) (on habitual cruel and inhuman treatment); Carraway v. Carraway, 212 Miss. 857, 858, 56 So.2d 41, 42 (1952) (on desertion); Winkler v. Winkler, 104 Miss. 1, 61 So. 1 (1913) (on desertion). In each of these cases the ability of the husband to pay alimony was coupled with an inability of the wife to make a living or support herself.
Where divorce has been granted to the husband on the ground of the wife's adultery, however, this Court has consistently denied any alimony, period. Hodum v. Crumpton, 329 So.2d 667, 668 (Miss.1976); King v. King, 191 So.2d 409, 411 (Miss. 1966); Keyes v. Keyes, 252 Miss. 138, 144, 171 So.2d 489, 490 (1965). See, Winfield v. Winfield, 203 Miss. 391, 402, 35 So.2d 443, 447 (1948); Hulett v. Hulett, 152 Miss. 476, 119 So. 581 (1928).
Two of our decisions might suggest otherwise, Jordan v. Jordan, 510 So.2d 131 (Miss.1987), and Wood v. Wood, 495 So.2d 503, 506 (Miss.1986). In both these cases the husband had been granted a divorce from the wife on adultery, and in both cases the wife was awarded alimony, but in meager sums. In both, the wife appealed, challenging the granting of a divorce to the husband and the inadequacy of alimony, but no cross-appeal was perfected by the husband in either case. As a consequence we were not called upon to address the specific question of whether or not the wife was entitled to any alimony.
While our cases in which we have awarded the wife alimony when her husband was granted the divorce do not specifically make a distinction between the amount such a wife is entitled to as compared with a wife granted a divorce when her husband was at fault, the facts and our holding indicate the purpose of the award was not to afford the wrongdoer wife alimony in accordance with her standard of living, but rather alimony sufficient to prevent her from being in desperate need. In Carraway, 212 Miss. at 858, 56 So.2d at 42, the wife was sick, unable to make a living and was having to live with her parents, and her was husband partially at fault. In Gatlin, 248 Miss. at 870, 161 So.2d at 783, the wife was awarded $200 monthly alimony for eighteen months, which she contended was too small. We affirmed, directing the chancery court to retain jurisdiction to determine her condition at the conclusion of eighteen months. Id., 248 Miss. at 781, 161 So.2d 782.
Although appellant was the guilty party, the record reflects that she is poor and weak, and almost continually ill with chronic bronchitis, asthma, and alcoholism. We do not say that the chancellor should allow alimony after the eighteen months, but he should retain jurisdiction on that issue. Reconsideration of this question may or may not be appropriate, within the sound discretion of the chancery court, and in accordance with circumstances which might be developed at a later hearing.
Id.
In Wires, we held the chancery court "was in error in not providing adequate alimony under the close facts here shown, particularly where the wife is ill and willing to resume her marital duties." Wires, 297 So.2d at 902. We reversed "so that the court may reconsider the evidence and award additional adequate alimony until the appellant can reasonably earn her livelihood." Id.
Finally, in Wood, 495 So.2d at 506, the appellant wife made the argument that our cases failed to make any distinction between the wrong-doer wife and the wronged wife in alimony awards. We acknowledged as much. However, we did not increase the chancery court's alimony award to Mrs. Wood of $10,000 payable in $500 monthly installments without interest, which we would have been compelled to hold was shockingly inadequate had she been granted a divorce from her husband. This was a 36-year marriage with four children, and Mrs. Wood had no skills, and had only been employed as a babysitter and private nurse's assistant at $3.50 per hour. Id. She had recently had cancer surgery. Id. Mr. Wood, on the other hand, had an annual income of $40,000 of which $8,400 was non-taxable. Id. Had Mrs. Wood been granted a divorce from her husband in this case, the alimony award manifestly would have shocked the conscience as being pitifully inadequate.
Significantly, neither Jordan nor Wood overruled Hulett v. Hulett and its progeny. We are not called upon in this case to specifically decide whether adultery committed by the wife is an absolute bar to alimony because we find that Mrs. Retzer was not entitled to periodic alimony under Hibner v. Hibner, and its progeny, either. She is a college graduate, capable of full-time employment, and owns 49.8% of the shares in the corporate owner of five commercially successful McDonald's restaurants.
There is no justification to require Mr. Retzer to pay her periodic alimony.
OBLIGATION OF MR. RETZER TO MRS. RETZER
Mr. Retzer does have substantial financial obligations to Mrs. Retzer, however, arising from her ownership of almost half of the shares of Retzer and Retzer, Inc.
Courts look quite differently upon the respective duties existing between majority and minority shareholders in publicly held and close corporations. F. O'Neal, Oppression of Minority Shareholders, § 3.06 at 78 (1975); Comment, The Strict Good Faith Standard — Fiduciary Duties to Minority Shareholders in Close Corporations, 33 Mercer Law Review 595 (1982); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975); Smith v. Atlantic Properties, Inc., 12 Mass.App. 201, 422 N.E.2d 798 (1981) (holding minority shareholders also have fiduciary duties to majority shareholders). Retzer and Retzer, Inc., is a very close close corporation, which has existed solely for the financial benefit of two people, the Retzers. This corporation has no other purpose except through legal ownership of five McDonald's restaurants to create wealth for and furnish income to Mr. Retzer and Mrs. Retzer. For almost two decades, and through Mr. Retzer's management, the corporation has indeed furnished them both with large incomes.
Now, through ownership of ten more shares than she, Mr. Retzer has control of the management of Retzer and Retzer. As such, under well settled principles he has a fiduciary obligation to Mrs. Retzer in the management of her property, and imposed with a trustee's duty to preserve, protect and produce income from her corporate shares. See, Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 512; Matter of Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 63, 484 N.Y.S.2d 799, 803, 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1177 (1984); Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Cop-pock, 621 P.2d 270, 276 (Alaska 1980); Illinois Rockford Corp. v. Kulp, 41 Ill.2d 215, 222, 242 N.E.2d 228, 233 (1968); Zokoych v. Spalding, 36 Ill.App.3d 654, 671, 344 N.E.2d 805, 819 (1976); F. O'Neal and R. Thompson, O'Neal's Oppression of Minority Shareholders, § 7.17 (1985); Comment, supra, p. 27, at 593; 18 C.J.S. Corporations, § 327; 18A Am.Jur.2d § 764, p. 633. In fact, it has been held that he holds the same duty as a managing partner owes the other partner in the management of part nership affairs. Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 512; Knaebel v. Heiner, 663 P.2d 551, 552 (Alaska 1983). See, Delaney v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 278 Or. 305, 310, 564 P.2d 277, 281 (1977); Johns v. Caldwell, 601 S.W.2d 37, 41 (Tenn.App.1980). Any relaxation of this solemn obligation will be at his peril.
He must manage the corporation prudently, and after paying necessary and reasonable expenses, and setting aside whatever is reasonably necessary for corporate reserves and equipment and facilities, pay her 49.8% of the net remaining. He will not be acting at arm's length, but as trustee over her shares. He must keep her currently, fully and accurately informed and abreast of his management, and under regular periodic accounting. While their interest as husband and wife was essentially identical, now they are adverse to each other. This will make his conduct as trustee that much more subject to close scrutiny by a chancery court.
Just as it has authority to require a husband to pay his wife periodic and lump sum alimony from his property and estate, the chancery court clearly has authority to require a divorced husband to pay his wife whatever is due her in his management of her property. There was no manifest error in the chancellor's ordering Mr. Retzer to see that she received an income of $7,333.33 per month from Retzer and Ret-zer. This is neither a floor nor a ceiling, but from the present financial information an amount the chancellor considered reasonable. We find no occasion to reverse this amount. It will, of course, be subject to change, depending upon the economic welfare of the corporation.
With the hostility existing between them, it would no doubt be preferable if somehow the property of Mr. and Mrs. Retzer were entirely separate, with neither depending on the other. Indeed, having imposed upon him the obligation of a trustee, the greater burden in this continued economic joinder may very well fall upon Mr. Retzer. The fact remains that at present they are Siamese twins in Retzer and Retzer. If the burden becomes unduly oppressive for either, the chancery court is not without power to give relief, even to appointing a receivership for the corporation or dissolving it. Miss.Code Ann. § 79-4-14.32; § 79-4-14.30(2)(ii), (iv) (Supp.1990); Balvik v. Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383 (N.D.1987); 18 Am.Jur.2d § 767.
We therefore affirm the amount of monthly income Mrs. Retzer is to receive, but amend the judgment to reflect this as an obligation of Mr. Retzer to see that she receives this sum from his management of the corporation.
The error of the chancellor, as above noted, was in decreeing that Mr. Retzer pay Mrs. Retzer $88,000 per year, or $7,333.33 per month, as alimony. The chancellor, of course, recognized the difficulty of this holding, because in the same decree he held that any sum received by Mrs. Retzer from the corporation would correspondingly reduce his alimony obligation.
Our holding should also be preferable to Mrs. Retzer as there will be no financial impediment to her remarrying.
CUSTODY
While the chancellor awarded Mr. Retzer a divorce on the ground of Mrs. Retzer's adultery, he did not take this into consideration in awarding Mrs. Retzer custody of the children. Instead, he found that "the example set by both parents as to sexual conduct will greatly jeopardize the children." The alleged advance Mr. Retzer made to an employee in 1982, if true, is hardly praiseworthy, but it is a far cry from the record proof of Mrs. Retzer's continued, sustained infidelities culminating in the July, 1987, separation. It will not be the 1982 incident the children will hear about in school or from playmates. There was no basis from this record to equate the extra-marital misconduct of Mr. Retzer and Mrs. Retzer.
As to her overspending, again the chancellor equated Mr. Retzer's extravagance with hers. Here also the record does not support that Mr. Retzer, who after all was working for the income, spent anything like the money on himself that she did on herself, or that he in any way mismanaged his personal finances. Nor is there any suggestion in the record that Mr. Retzer was penurious or miserly with her, or attempted to keep her from doing anything except to wildly overspend. Retzer and Retzer owns five McDonald's restaurants with yearly profits of several hundred thousand dollars, and worth a fortune. If that is extravagant management, many investors would welcome the opportunity to have a stake in it.
Mrs. Retzer's lifestyle and emotional depression raise serious questions of the stability and example a parent should impart to his or her children. The record shows Mrs. Retzer — as she herself stated— "spoiled" and self-centered, intent on narcissistic personal pleasures and vanity. Having spent over $50,000 in 1986 on purely personal luxuries, Mrs. Retzer nevertheless in March, 1987, found herself over $40,000 in debt for unpaid bills for purely personal luxuries, and the debts for her personal luxuries in 1987 continued to mount. Mrs. Retzer's uncontrolled spending and intent on personal pleasure, and Mr. Retzer's testimony that even he could not control it, is borne out from the two examples.
At the February, 1988, temporary hearing when Mrs. Retzer was receiving $14,-372 for monthly expenses, she requested an additional $3,000 per month to permit her to live in her lifestyle. The chancellor awarded her an additional $1,000 per month. He also ordered and directed her not to increase her indebtedness prior to trial. Despite this she spent $530 for a piece of jewelry for her maid, and another $3,800 for a pin for an anniversary present for herself. She was feeling "very depressed." A court order did not restrain her.
Following the June, 1988, trial, and pending a hearing in August to set the amount of alimony to be awarded her, Mrs. Ret-zer's local dermatologist found a mole on her face. He assured her that he could remove it. Yet she went to Houston, Texas, to have the mole removed and for cosmetic surgery. At the August, 1988, hearing she would not tell, and the court did not require her to disclose the nature of the surgery, and she testified she could not even remember the cost of the medical bill.
However troubling the record, the decision of this Court comes over two and one-half years after the award of custody to Mrs. Retzer. The daughter is now a teenager. It would take the wisdom of Solomon to know at this time what is truly in the best'interest of these children, and we do not feel constrained to reverse the chancellor on his custody award.
The child support, while liberal, will of necessity come from the most part from the business Mr. and Mrs. Retzer own in almost equal shares, and we see no reason to reverse this award. If it is not spent with some degree of prudence, a chancery court can afford relief.
We therefore affirm the custody and child support award.
The decree of the chancery court is accordingly reversed. and rendered on the $275,000 lump sum award to Mrs. Retzer, and affirmed on the award of custody of the children. The $88,000 annual award to her is affirmed, but modified as a fiduciary obligation of Mr. Retzer to Mrs. Retzer to see that she gets that return from her ownership of 1,600 corporate shares in Ret-zer and Retzer.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND RENDERED IN PART.
ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., DAN M. LEE, P.J., and PITTMAN, J., concur.
PRATHER, ANDERSON and BLASS, JJ., dissent.
ROBERTSON and SULLIVAN, JJ., not participating.
. Mrs. Retzer testified it resumed the last of 1985 or early 1984.
. Mr. Retzer testified he would have put Mrs. Retzer's name on the Yazoo City (1983) and Greenville No. 2 (1985) franchise as well, but he was suspecting her of adultery.
. The chancellor gave no basis for his conclusion that the situation would be entirely differ ent if Mrs. Retzer's interest had indeed been owned by any investor businessman. The second conclusion, that "her contribution through capital is significant when compared to his[,]" is manifestly wrong. (Emphasis added)
. 86 A.L.R.3rd 87 lists a number of states which hold an adulterous wife is not entitled to alimony, 86 A.L.R.3rd 101, § 3, and in those states which allow alimony to an adulterous wife it is to prevent her from being destitute. 86 A.L. R.3rd 104, § 4. Jennings v. Jennings, 464 So.2d 1359 (Fla.App.), review denied 475 So.2d 695 (1985).
. One outstanding fact from this record is that throughout their turbulent marriage, both Mr. and Mrs. Retzer have had able legal counsel. Mr. Retzer will be well advised of his trust responsibility, and Mrs. Retzer of her ample avenues of relief in event of any deviation by him.
. Indeed, at trial Mrs. Retzer testified Mr. Ret-zer made no complaint as to her profligacy until they went to court,