Case Name: Carolyn Kijowski, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Henry Kijowski, Defendant-Appellant
Court: Illinois Appellate Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 1962-06-04
Citations: 36 Ill. App. 2d 94
Docket Number: Gen. No. 48,309
Parties: Carolyn Kijowski, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Henry Kijowski, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Appellate Court Reports, Second Series
Volume: 36
Pages: 94–104

Head Matter:
Carolyn Kijowski, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Henry Kijowski, Defendant-Appellant.
Gen. No. 48,309.
First District, First Division.
June 4, 1962.
Louis Z. Grant, of Chicago, for appellant.
LaRocque & Jones, of Chicago (Paul A. LaRocque, of counsel), for appellee.

Opinion:
MR. JUSTICE ENGLISH
delivered the opinion of the court.
Defendant appeals from a decree of divorce, on the grounds of cruelty, entered after a contested trial.
On oral argument defendant raised a question (not covered in his brief) as to the jurisdiction of the trial court. We consider that, because of its character, this point was timely, even though made at so late an hour, and we shall give it first consideration.
Defendant contends that, while the complaint alleges that the parties are residents of Cook County, it does not allege that such residence had continued for a period of one year as required by the Divorce Act (Ill Rev Stats, c 40, § 3) and that the court, therefore, lacked jurisdiction.
It is true that the language of the statute establishes certain residence requirements as a condition to jurisdiction, but plaintiff's failure to allege the duration of residence is not fatal if the record discloses that the necessary residence facts actually existed. And it does.
There is undisputed testimony by plaintiff that the parties lived in Chicago continuously from the date of their marriage in 1953 until after the date of the last-alleged act of cruelty in 1959, and that plaintiff had resided in Cook County for more than one year prior to the filing of her complaint. This evidence is corroborated by facts appearing in defendant's sworn answer to the complaint.
There is, thus, ample support in the record for the finding in the decree that "the Plaintiff has been, prior to the filing of her Complaint for Divorce in the above entitled cause, an actual resident of Cook County, Illinois for more than one year."
It would have been better practice to have amended the complaint in the trial court to conform it to the proofs on so important a point, hut that may also be done in this court, and we shall consider the amendment as having been made on our own motion. (Ill Rev Stats, c 110, § 46, 92(1) (a); Appellate Court Rule 26; Love v. Levisey, 11 Ill App2d 531, 137 NE 2d 869.
The purpose of the amendment is not to create a cause of action by the addition of a jurisdictional fact, but merely, by proper allegation, to show that a cause of action of which the court had jurisdiction, really existed. As stated by this court in Plotnitsky v. Plotnitsky, 241 Ill App 166,171-2:
"The proceeding here was not void; it did not affirmatively appear that there was no cause of action. The defect in the bill was simply in a failure to aver a material jurisdictional fact required by the statute. Had the bill affirmatively stated facts showing that the court where the bill was filed could not acquire jurisdiction, a different question would be presented."
Defendant's primary point on this appeal questions the sufficiency of both allegation and proof of the grounds for divorce, namely, extreme and repeated cruelty. The complaint charges that defendant committed such acts of cruelty on February 4 and on January 1, 1959 "and many times prior thereto." Defendant's answer denied that he was guilty of cruelty to plaintiff "at any time since the marriage."
Plaintiff testified that: on February 4, 1959 defendant beat her with the blade, the side, of his hand and with his fist; he struck her head, her face, her neck, arms and legs; she experienced pain and had large bruises on her arms, legs and hips; her wrists were twisted and swollen; he grabbed her by the hair; he held both wrists with one hand and then twisted her down to the floor; he then hit her with the blade of his hand and fist and when she flattened herself out to protect her hips he drove his knee into her stomach hard. The marks on her body lasted almost two weeks.
Mrs. Guither testified in corroboration that when she saw plaintiff six days later she was limping, had marks on her wrists, and was extremely fearful and nervous.
Plaintiff further testified that: on January 1, 1959 her husband beat her with the hard side of his hand, his fist and his knee; he struck her face, neck, wrists, arms, hips and legs; his nails cut her wrists; she was afraid, suffered pain and cried; her hair was dishevelled, her face was red and swollen and so also were her neck, arms and wrists.
Reverend Francis Guither, the Minister who had married plaintiff and defendant, testified that: he saw plaintiff at her home about 1:00 p. m. on January 1, 1959 and noticed that plaintiff was bedraggled, her hair was messed up, her face was red and swollen; her wrists were red; she wept a great deal.
Plaintiff also testified to acts of cruelty committed on her person by defendant on June 19, 1958 and again during Christmas week of 1958. On these occasions she sustained injuries to her foot and to her chest and abdomen.
Mrs. Wilson testified as an eye-witness to both of these acts. Mr. Wilson testified as an eye-witness to the December occurrence and as to the injury upon arriving at the scene momentarily after the occurrence in June. Mrs. Mitrega testified to having seen plaintiff's bruises shortly after the December occurrence.
On the basis of this record the chancellor found in bis decree that defendant had been guilty of acts of cruelty on all four dates. We see no error in this conclusion, and find it fully justified on both the pleadings and the evidence.
Defendant next contends that the decretal award of a $7,500 joint (plaintiff and defendant) bank ac count to plaintiff was not authorized in the absence of a special averment in the complaint asserting special circumstances as basis for a claim thereto. Cases cited are those arising under Section 17 of the Divorce Act. (Ill Rev Stats, c 40, § 18; Persico v. Persico, 409 Ill 608, 100 NE2d 904; Podgornik v. Podgornik, 392 Ill 124, 63 NE2d 715; Bissett v. Bissett, 375 Ill 551, 31 NE2d 955.) We believe that the principle for which those cases stand is not applicable here.
The complaint did allege that defendant had threatened to dissipate assets then standing in the joint names of plaintiff and defendant, and there was a general prayer for relief.
The undisputed facts are that: plaintiff was employed as a nurse in various hospitals during most all of her married life; she worked until five days before the birth of her first son, and until she was seven months pregnant with her second son; and during the entire time she endorsed each of her pay checks to defendant. Thus, in a very specific way, her earnings are traceable into the joint bank accounts of the parties. At the time of commencement of this suit there were two such joint bank accounts and the balance in each was approximately $7,500.
Having determined, properly, we think, that an even division of the accounts was equitable, the chancellor then could have awarded half of each bank account to each party, or, as seems more practical, he could have done what he did in awarding one account to each party. This did not, in reality, involve the conveyance of title to property from one holding legal title to another equitably entitled thereto under Section 17. It was merely a sensible division of joint property in accordance with the interest of each. Plaintiff was deprived of her interest in the joint account awarded to defendant, and vice versa. Defendant seems to assume that, had this not been done, he would have been entitled to both accounts as his exclusive property. But such would not have been the case. The accounts would have remained joint and would have required further court determination of the rights of the parties in order to prevent a race to the bank, with all the funds going to the winner. The same situation would result from a reversal of the part of the decree dealing with the bank accounts. We believe the matter has been fully and fairly litigated and requires no further inquiry by a trial court.
After all of plaintiff's case had been presented, and defendant had testified in his own behalf, defendant discharged his attorney. He now contends that he was allowed inadequate time to procure his new counsel who appeared for closing arguments, and has selected, out of context, some remarks of the trial judge in this regard as demonstrating a prejudicial attitude toward defendant. The full record speaks to the contrary. We believe the chancellor's admonitions on this point were proper; he was extremely patient with defendant's difficult behavior throughout the trial; and, under all the circumstances, he gave defendant ample time to obtain a substitute attorney.
Finally, it is contended by defendant that there is insufficient justification for the award of a $2,000 fee to plaintiff's attorney. Point is made that it was substantiated, not by testimony, but only by unverified statements of the attorney as to the nature and extent of the services he had performed.
The allowance of fees in divorce proceedings "rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, and, unless such discretion is clearly abused, its exercise will not be interfered with." (Ylonen v. Ylonen, 2 Ill2d Ill, 121, 117 NE2d 98.)
The earlier cases seem to emphasize the need for evidentiary support for the awarding of fees. (Czarnecki v. Czarnecki, 341 Ill 629,173 NE 752; Bar ton v. Barton, 323 Ill App 357, 55 NE2d 542; Gelbach v. Gelbach, 219 Ill App 503.) More recently, however, it has been held that, in the absence of a request for the hearing of evidence, the chancellor may base an award on the financial circumstances of the parties as shown by the record, statements of counsel as to necessary services, and the chancellor's own experience. (Moore v. Moore, 25 Ill App2d 255, 166 NE2d 629.) There was no request for the taking of testimony as to fees in the case at bar.
While it was not raised conditionally, it would appear that defendant's point as to fees must fall with our determination that the court properly awarded one of the joint bank accounts to plaintiff. This is a necessary result because the. decree specifically makes the fee allowed to plaintiff's attorney a charge against the bank account awarded to plaintiff. The fee is, therefore, not to be paid by defendant and his objection has no standing under the circumstances.
The judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
MURPHY, P. J., concurs.