Case Name: MARTIN v. ENGLISH, sheriff
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1919-02-27
Citations: 23 Ga. App. 484
Docket Number: 9725
Parties: MARTIN v. ENGLISH, sheriff.
Judges: Broyles, P. J., and Bloodworth, J., concur. Stephens, J., dissents.
Reporter: Georgia Appeals Reports
Volume: 23
Pages: 484–498

Head Matter:
9725.
MARTIN v. ENGLISH, sheriff.
1. Where an automobile, while conveying intoxicating liquors on a public road or a private way of this State, is seized by a sheriff under the provisions of section 20 of the prohibition law approved March 28, 1917 (6a. L. Ex. Sess. 1917, p. 16), and is being lawfully held by him in his official character as an arresting officer, pending the condemnation proceedings authorized by the statute or subsequently to the judgment of the court and pending the sale of the property, an action of trover against the sheriff can not be maintained by the owner of the automobile. The property is in custodia legis, and trover does not lie in such a case. Smith v. Kershaw, 1 Ga. 259; Wallace v. Kolly, 13 Ga. 389 (58 Am. D. 518) ; Chipstead v. Porter, 63 Ga. 220; Haslett v. Rogers, 107 Ga. 245 (33 S. E. 44); Geer v. Thompson, 4 Ga. App. 756 (62 S. E. 500); Barton v. Thompson, 13 6a. App. 786 (80 S. E. 30); Hoyt v. Smith, 20 Ga. App. 595 (93 S. E. 224); Bernstein v. Higginbotham, 148 6a. 110 (96 S. E. 1); 35 Cyc. 1737. The cases of Riley v. Martin, 35 6a. 136, and Wilson v. Paulsen, 57 6a. 596, and others wherein an apparently contrary ruling is made, are easily distinguishable by their facts from the instant case and the cases cited above.
Decided February 27, 1919.
(o) While in this ease there was no demurrer to the petition, nor a motion to strike it, substantially the same result was reached by the verdict for the defendant.
2. Even if an action' of trover would lie under the circumstances stated above, the agreed statement of facts in this case shows that the defendant sheriff had the right of possession of the automobile sued for, and that the plaintiff owner was not entitled to recover. “The gist of the action of trover is the injury to the right of possession” Roper Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Faver, 8 6a. App. 178. (68 S. E. 883). In some cases, to recover in trover, it is essential that the plaintiff show both title and the right of possession. In this class of cases, although the plaintiff may show that he has legal title, if it appears from the evidence •that the defendant is rightfully entitled to retain possession of the property sued for, a verdict for the defendant is not only authorized but demanded. Geer v. Thompson, supra; Birmingham Fertilisser Co. v. Dossier, 13 6a. App. 759 (79 S. E. 927) ; Clark v. Fleming, 78 6a. 782 (4 S. E. 12); Mitchell v. 6eorgia & Alabama Ry. Co., 111 6a. 760 (36 S. E. 971, 51 L. R. A. 622) ; 38 Cyc. 2061, 2081 (B).
Trover; from city court of Sandersville—Judge Jordan. April 18, 1918.
In this action L. J. Martin sought to recover a certain automobile from B. A. English, sheriff of Washington county, Georgia. The defendant filed an answer in which he admitted possession of the automobile and denied that it was the property of the plaintiff, and further answered as follows: Defendant is the. duly elected and qualified sheriff of Washington county, and by virtue o'f that fact is under the law the sheriff of the.city court of Sandersville. The automobile referred to in plaintiff’s petition as being in the possession of this defendant was seized by George W. Crawford, deputy sheriff of said county and of the city court of Sandersville, under and by virtue of the provisions of section 20 of the act of the General Assembly at its extraordinary session held on March 20-28, 1917, approved March 28, 1917, dealing with use and transportation, etc., of intoxicating liquors, said automobile being then and there used in conveying liquors and beverages the sale of which was prohibited by law. Subsequently, under and by virtue of said section, J..Hines Wood, as solicitor of said city court, instituted condemnation proceedings in the name and behalf of the State of Georgia against said ear and against one Marvis McBride as owner, in said city court. Said condemnation proceedings are now of file in said court, having been filed on August 21, 1917. In said condemnation proceedings the judge of said city court passed and entered up the following order or decree: “It having been made to appear to the court that copy of the within petition was duly served upon Marvis McBride on the 24th day of August, 1917, and that no answer has been filed by the said Marvis McBride, the same is hereby declared in default, and the sheriff is hereby directed to proceed to advertise, for two issues, in the Sandersville Progress, the legal organ of Washington county, said car described in the petition hereof, and to sell the same and apply the proceeds thereof as the law directs. This 2nd day of Oct. 1917. (Signed) E. W. Jordan, Judge City Court of Sandersville.” The said car in the possession of the defendant and to which said plaintiff has claimed title is the ear referred to in the order set forth aboye, and he holds the ear as sheriff of the city court, under and by virtue of the said order and for the objects and purposes required of him therein as sheriff. He does not hold possession of it or claim any right, title, or interest in it in his individual capacity, but holds it in the performance of his duty as sheriff and for the purpose of carrying out the process and mandate.of this court; and under the law the plaintiff can not and should not be permitted to maintain against him such action of trover. /
The case was tried on an'agreed statement of facts as follows: It is agreed that the answer filed by the defendant is true, and the case is submitted to the court upon the petition and the answer and the following facts: On January 27, 1917, Hardwick McBride executed and delivered to L.J.- Martin a bill of sale to the'property described in the plaintiff’s petition, to wit, one Eord automobile of the value of $100, and the automobile now in the possession of the defendant is the automobile covered by the bill of sale, which was duly recorded in the office of the clerk of the superior court of Washingtqn county, Georgia, -on January 30, 1917. Ben. A. English as sheriff acquired possession of said automobile on August 15, 1917, having .seized it while in the' possession of Marvis McBride on one of the highways of said county and when said automobile was being used to- transport intoxicating liquors. On August 21, 1917, J. Hines Wood, the solicitor of said city court, brought a petition for the condemnation of said automobile, which was served upon Marvis McBride, alleging that he was the owner thereof; which petition was heard by Hon. E. W. Jordan, judge of said city court, who, on October 2, 1917, passed an order directing.' the sheriff to advertise said automobile for sale and sell it at public outcry. The trover suit was' filed on October 2, 1917, and at that time the defendant, English, as sheriff, was in possession of the property described in the plaintiff’s petition, and more than ten days .prior to filing the said trover suit the plaintiff, Martin, made a -demand on the defendant for the said property, and the defendant refused to deliver the saíne.
The trial resulted in a verdict for the defendant, the plaintiff moved for a new trial, on the grounds that the verdict was contrary to law and to the evidence, the motion was overruled, and the movant excepted.
Evans & Evans, for plaintiff, cited:
19 Ga. App. 822; 3 Ga. App. 357; 116 Ga. 732 (2); 35 Ga. 136; 75 Ga. 697; 19 Ga. App. 706; 38 Cyce. 2041, 2023; 15 A. D. 150; 41 A. D. 126; 14 A. D. .358; 19 A. D. 345.
J. J. Harris, M. L. Gross, for defendant, cited the. statute and cases cited above in the headnotes, and distinguished 19 Ga. App. 822.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
The majority of the court are of the opinion that the headnotes require no elaboration. In view, however, of the lengthy dissenting opinion of Judge Stephens, it was thought advisable to set forth briefly the views of the majority of the court. The agreed statement of facts specifically shows that the condemnation proceedings were begun within ten days from the date of the seizure of the automobile; and that-statement of facts and the answer of the sheriff (which the plaintiff admitted was true) clearly show that in all other respects the proceedings- were in substantial compliance with the provisions of the statute; and no question as to the irregularity or illegality of the proceedings, including the order of the judge for the sale of the automobile, or as to the jurisdiction of the trial court, was raised in that court or in this court; nor was any attack made upon the statute by the plaintiff in error in either court. The brief of his counsel in this court states that "the only question in the case was whether or not trover would lie against the sheriff when brought by the real owner of the ear." With all due respect to our learned brother, we do not think the questions referred to above, as to the legality of the condemnation proceeding, or as to jurisdiction, are in the case. It is only when it clearly appears from the record that a judgment has been rendered by a court having no jurisdiction of the subject-matter that this court will of its own motion reverse the judgment. Smith v. Ferrario, 105 Ga. 51.(31 S. E. 38). No such lack of jurisdiction appears from the record in this case.
In our opinion the alleged owner of the automobile could not maintain an action in trover to recover it. As was said by Mr.' Presiding Justice Beck in the Bernstein case, supra: "The act of the legislature to which we have last referred provides a plain statutory remedy to promptly try the question of title where vehicles are seized under circumstances attending the seizure of the one in question. Chipstead v. Porter, 63 Ga. 220." And that remedy is not an action in trover. A complete answer to the inferential attack upon the act itself, made in the dissenting opinion, is found in the recent able and exhaustive opinion of Justice George, speaking for the Supreme Court, in Mach v. Westbrook, 148 Ga. 690 (98 S. E. 339). If, however, we are wrong in holding that under the facts of the case an action of trover will not lie, then, under the answer of the sheriff (which was admitted to be true) and the agreed statement of facts, the verdict for the defendant was clearly the only legal one possible.
Judgment affirmed.
Broyles, P. J., and Bloodworth, J., concur. Stephens, J., dissents.