Case Name: Gary Wayne SCHAFER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1984-11-23
Citations: 459 So. 2d 1138
Docket Number: No. 83-1148
Parties: Gary Wayne SCHAFER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: ORFINGER, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 459
Pages: 1138–1139

Head Matter:
Gary Wayne SCHAFER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 83-1148.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Nov. 23, 1984.
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Lucinda H. Young, Asst. Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Evelyn D. Golden, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dayto-na Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., Judge.
Appellant Gary Wayne Schafer, defendant below, appeals contending his right to self-representation was violated.
The defendant first requested permission to represent himself at his arraignment. The defendant stated that he wanted to conduct his own defense due to what he perceived as the public defender's inattention to his case. The trial court denied defendant's motion, stating that it was not satisfied that there was a conflict that could not be reconciled.
At pretrial proceedings, defendant again announced his desire to represent himself. Defendant's request was made in conjunction with his general complaints about the delay in bringing his case to trial. Although the trial judge listened patiently to defendant's complaints, he made no response to defendant's request for self-representation.
After defendant's trial had begun and the state had examined its first witness, the public defender informed the court that defendant desired to conduct his own defense. The court responded that defendant would be allowed to address the court, but would not be allowed to address the jury, and that it was the public defender's responsibility to conduct the case.
A defendant has a constitutional right to proceed pro se when he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). However, when an accused manages his own defense, he relinquishes, as a purely factual matter, many of the traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel. For this reason, in order to represent himself, the accused must "knowingly and intelligently" forego those relinquished benefits. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). To insure that the decision is "knowingly and intelligently" made, the trial court must make an inquiry on the record to demonstrate that the defendant fully understands and appreciates the seriousness of the charges and is capable of representing himself. Smith v. State, 444 So.2d 542 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Watts v. State, 434 So.2d 23 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Mansfield v. State, 430 So.2d 586 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); Williams v. State, 427 So.2d 768 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983); Mitchell v. State, 407 So.2d 1005 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).
Here the defendant clearly asserted his demand to proceed to trial without counsel. It was incumbent upon the trial court to make adequate inquiry to determine whether the defendant was knowingly and intelligently waiving his constitutional right to appointed counsel. Since no inquiry was made and the defendant was forced to proceed to trial with counsel he deemed ineffective, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
ORFINGER, J., concurs.
COWART, J., dissents with opinion.