Case Name: B.C., the father, Petitioner, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2004-09-23
Citations: 887 So. 2d 1046
Docket Number: No. SC03-1632
Parties: B.C., the father, Petitioner, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Respondent.
Judges: PARIENTE, C.J., and ANSTEAD, LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 887
Pages: 1046–1063

Head Matter:
B.C., the father, Petitioner, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Respondent.
No. SC03-1632.
Supreme Court, of Florida.
Sept. 23, 2004.
Rehearing Denied Nov. 11, 2004.
Frank A. Kreidler, Lake Worth, FL, for Petitioner.
Jeffrey Dana Gillen and Crystal Y. Yates-Hammond, West Palm Beach, FL, for Respondent.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
This case concerns termination of the parental rights of a person serving a prison sentence. We are called upon to construe section 39.806(l)(d)(l), Florida Statutes (2003), which provides, in pertinent part:
(1) The department . may petition for the termination of parental rights under any of the following circumstances:
(d) When the parent of a child is incarcerated in a state or federal correctional institution and
1. The period of time for which the parent is expected to be incarcerated will constitute a substantial portion of the period of time before the child will attain the age of 18 years. -
The certified conflict issue is whether this provision requires consideration of "the entire period of incarceration, or only the period to be served after the petition for termination is filed." Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. B.C., 884 So.2d 955, 955 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). The Fourth District concluded that the entire period is the correct measurement, and certified conflict with two Second District decisions holding that the remaining period of incarceration is the appropriate standard. See In re J.D.C., 819 So.2d 264 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); In re A.W., 816 So.2d 1261 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). For the reasons- that follow, we agree with the Second District.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
B.C. is the father of a daughter born in May 1998. At that time, B.C. was incarcerated, but was released in September 1998. B.C. was returned to custody in December 1998, and in June 1999 commenced concurrent prison sentences, which he is still serving, of sixty months (five years) and ninety-one months (seven years, seven months), for felony battery and aggravated battery. In January 2002, the Department of Children and Families (DCF) filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of both parents. DCF alleged that the father would be incarcerated in state prison for a "substantial portion" of the time before the child will turn eighteen, and that the father's violent criminal history and behavior are evidence that continuing the relationship would be harmful to the child.
The mother surrendered her. parental rights, but the father opposed termination of his rights.- During a September 2002 hearing on DCF's petition, B.C. testified that he anticipated completing his sentence within twenty-six to forty months after the hearing. He testified that he had attempted'to support his daughter and develop a relationship with her, including through prison visits. However, according to B.C., the maternal grandmother, who wished to adopt the child and with whom the child was sheltered, had discontinued contacts between father and daughter. The trial court denied the petition for termination, concluding that the father's remaining incarceration of approximately four years is not a substantial portion of the time before the child, then four -years old, will attain the age of eighteen years. The Fourth District reversed, concluding that the entire period of incarceration, rather than the period remaining to be served, was the correct measurement under section 39.806(l)(d)(l), and that the entire seven-year, seven-month sentence in this case constitutes a substantial portion of the child's eighteen-year minority. The Fourth District certified conflict with J.D.C., and AW., in which the Second District held that under section 39.806(l)(d)(l) the trial court is to consider only future incarceration in determining whether incarceration constitutes a substantial portion of the time before the child turns eighteen. See B.C., 884 So.2d at 956.
ANALYSIS
To explain our resolution of the certified conflict, as well as the related issue of how to quantify the statutory term "substantial portion," we first briefly trace the history of section 39.806(l)(d)(l), then discuss the Second and Fourth District court opinions construing its terms.
History of Section 39.806(l)(d)(l)
When enacted in 1997, the provision now codified in section 39.806(l)(d)(l) set out one of the three criteria that had to be met for termination of the parental rights of an incarcerated parent. See ch. 97-226, § 1, Laws of Fla. Subsection (l)(d) provided:
(1) The department, the guardian ad litem, a licensed child-placing agency, or any person who has knowledge of the facts alleged or who is informed of said facts and believes that they are true, may petition for the termination of parental rights under any of the following circumstances:
(d) When the parent of a child is incarcerated in a state or federal correctional institution and:
1. The period of time for which the parent is expected to be incarcerated will constitute a substantial portion of the period of time before the child will attain the age of 18 years:
2. The incarcerated parent has been determined by the court to be a violent career criminal as defined in s. 775.084, a habitual violent felony offender as defined in s. 775.084, or a sexual predator as defined in s. 775.21; has been convicted of first degree or second degree murder in violation of s. 782.04 or a sexual battery that constitutes a capital, life, or first degree felony violation of s. 794.011; or has been convicted of an offense in another jurisdiction which is substantially similar to one of the offenses listed in this paragraph . and
3. The court determines by clear and convincing evidence that continuing the parental relationship with the incarcerated parent would be harmful to the child and, for this reason, that termination of the parental rights of the incarcerated parent is in the best interest of the child.
§ 39.464(l)(d), Fla. Stat. (1997) (emphasis supplied). Thus, the various sections were in the conjunctive. In 1998, section 39.464 was renumbered to section 39.806 during a reorganization of chapter 39. See ch. 98-403, § 88, Laws of Fla. The reorganization was prompted by the federal Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub.L. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). See Fla. H.R. Comm, on Child. & Fams., HB 1019 (1998) Staff Analysis 1 (final June 17, 1998). The federal act sets time limits for developing a timely permanency plan for. children who are in the state's care, provides for expedited termination of parental rights under certain circumstances, and uses funding to encourage state compliance with federal requirements.
In 1999, the Legislature revised section 39.806(l)(d) by making its three subsections independent alternatives rather than the previous conjunctive requirements. See ch. 99-193, § 45,.Laws of Fla. The 1999 revision isolated the "substantial portion", language of subsection (l)(d)(l) from both subsection (l)(d)(2), which focuses on persons subject tp lengthy sentences because of the severity of the crime or recidivism, and subsection (l)(d)(3), which requires a finding that continuing the relationship with the parent would be harmful to the child. Each of these separate subsections now provides an independent basis for termination, of the parental rights of a parent incarcerated in a state or federal correctional institution:
(1) The department, the guardian ad litem, or any person who has knowledge of the facts alleged or who is informed of those facts and believes that they are true may petition for the termination of parental rights under any of the following circumstances:
(d) When the parent of a child is incarcerated in a state or federal correctional institution and either:
1. The period of time for which the parent is expected to be incarcerated will constitute a substantial portion of the period of time before the child will attain the age of 18 years;
2. The incarcerated parent has been determined by the court to be a violent career criminal as defined in s. 775.084, a habitual violent felony offender as defined in s. 775.084, or a sexual predator as defined in s. 775.21; has been convicted of first degree or second degree murder in violation of s. 782.04 or a sexual battery that constitutes a capital, life, or first degree felony violation of s. 794.011; or has been convicted of an offense in another jurisdiction which is substantially similar to one of the offenses listed in this paragraph .; or
3. The court determines by clear and convincing evidence that continuing the parental relationship with the incarcerated parent would be harmful to the child and, for this reason, that termination of the parental rights of the incarcerated parent is in the best interest of the child.
§ 39.806(l)(d), Fla. Stat. (2003) (emphasis supplied). For any termination of parental rights under chapter 39, the trial court must find, in addition to the specific grounds contained in section 39.806, that termination is in the best interests of the child. See § 39.810, Fla. Stat. (2003). Each ground for termination must be established by clear and convincing evidence. See § 39.811(2), Fla. Stat. (2003). Further, this Court has held — although not specifically as to section 39.806(l)(d)(l)— that termination of parental rights requires a showing by clear and convincing evidence that reunification of parent and child poses a substantial risk of significant harm to the child, and that termination of rights be the least restrictive means of protecting the child from serious harm. See Fla. Dep't of Children & Families v. F.L., 880 So.2d 602, 608 (Fla.2004); Padgett v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Servs., 577 So.2d 565, 571 (Fla.1991).
District Court Decisions
The Fourth District opinion in this case is one of several opinions in which the Second and Fourth districts have construed the language of section 39.806(l)(d)(l). In B.C., the Fourth District interpreted "period of time for which the parent is expected to be incarcerated" to be the entire period of the father's sentence, which in this case is seven years, seven months, and concluded that this constituted a "substantial portion of the eighteen years of minority." B.C., 884 So.2d at 955, 2003 WL 22014737. In so holding, the Fourth District clarified its position following its decision in W.W. v. Department of Children & Families, 811 So.2d 791 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). In W.W., the court stated that the statutory language "speaks to the future, not the past" and pointed out that the parent's incarceration was to end within several months after the termination hearing, but also noted that total incarceration of fifty-four months after the birth of the appellant's first child was not a substantial portion of eighteen years. Id. at 792. In B.C., the Fourth District clarified that it "considered the entire period, not merely the future portion," to be the correct measure of incarceration under the provision. 884 So.2d at 956, 2003 WL 22014737.
In each of the certified conflict cases, the Second District concluded that section 39.806(l)(d)(l) requires the trial court to measure the remaining incarceration at the time of the court's decision on termination against the time remaining before the child turns eighteen. In AW., the court was faced with the question of whether the statutory language "limits the trial court to relying solely on the length of the parent's sentence or whether the trial court may also consider the 'quality' of that time in the children's development." 816 So.2d at 1263. Concluding that the "plain language of section 39.806(l)(d)(l) speaks only to time," id. at 1264, the court determined that the fifty-four months remaining in the father's sentence did not constitute a substantial portion of the remaining fourteen- and seventeen-year minorities of the children, and therefore reversed the order terminating his parental rights. See id.
Without citing AW., a different Second District panel adopted the same interpretation of section 39.806(l)(d)(l) in J.D.C. There the district court reversed an order terminating parental rights in which the trial court determined that the parent "had been incarcerated for 'a substantial portion of [the] child's life.' " J.D.C., 819 So.2d at 266. The Second District held that the statutory provision "requires the court to evaluate whether the time for which a parent is expected to be incarcerated in the future constitutes a substantial portion of the time before the child reaches eighteen, not whether the time the parent has been incarcerated in the past is a substantial portion of the child's life to date." Id. The court concluded that the several months remaining in the father's prison term at the time of the termination hearing did not constitute a substantial portion of the fifteen years remaining before the child turned eighteen. See id.
Recently, the Second District, relying on its decisions in AW. and J.D.C., again reversed a termination order, holding that the remaining incarceration did not constitute a substantial portion of the time before the child turns eighteen. See In re E.I.F., 872 So.2d 924 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).
The Certified Conflict Issue
The certified conflict issue of whether section 39.806(l)(d)(l) is solely forward-looking or instead encompasses the entire period of incarceration presents a question of statutory construction. This Court's purpose in construing a statutory provision is to give effect to the "polestar" of legislative intent. See State v. J.M., 824 So.2d 105, 109 (Fla.2002). In attempting to discern legislative intent, this Court looks first to the actual language used in the statute. See Joshua v. City of Gainesville, 768 So.2d 432, 435 (Fla.2000); see also Overstreet v. State, 629 So.2d 125, 126 (Fla.1993) ("Legislative intent must be determined primarily from the language of the statute."). "When a statute is clear, courts will not look behind the statute's plain language for legislative intent or resort to rules of statutory construction to ascertain intent." State v. Burris, 875 So.2d 408, 410 (Fla.2004); see also Lee County Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Jacobs, 820 So.2d 297, 303 (Fla.2002). The language of section 39.806(l)(d)(l) speaks only to the future regarding both the period of incarceration and the child's minority as the criteria to be used in determining whether this ground for termination has been established. The provision specifies that a petition for termination of parental rights may be filed when "[t]he period of time for which the parent is expected to be incarcerated will constitute a substantial portion of the period of time before the child will attain the age of 18 years." (Emphasis supplied.) This is the test that the trial court must apply in a hearing on a petition for termination. See § 39.809(1) ("In a hearing on a petition for termination of parental rights, the court shall consider the elements required for termination."). From the perspective of the trial court deciding on termination, the terms "is expected to be incarcerated," "will constitute," and "will attain," make the provision entirely forward-looking.
We therefore agree with the Second District that the statutory language "requires the court to evaluate whether the time for which a parent is expected to be incarcerated in the future constitutes a substantial portion of the time before the child reaches eighteen, not whether the time the parent has been incarcerated is a substantial portion of the child's life to date." J.D.C., 819 So.2d at 266 (emphasis supplied). We are not at liberty to construe this unambiguous language differently. See Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. Fla. Mun. Power Agency, 789 So.2d 320, 323 (Fla.2001) (stating that this Court "will not deem itself authorized to depart from the plain meaning of the language which is free from ambiguity") (quoting Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So.2d 452, 454 (Fla.1992)). Nor are we permitted to add to a statute words that were not placed there by the Legislature. See Seagrave v. State, 802 So.2d 281, 287 (Fla.2001).
This construction of the provision also comports with the constitutional principle that statutes implicating constitutional rights must be "narrowly limited in their application according to the statutory language." State v. Jackson, 650 So.2d 24, 26-27 (Fla.1995). We have consistently held that termination of parental rights implicates the fundamental liberty interest of parents in the care and upbringing of their children. See F.L., 880 So.2d at 608; Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So.2d 1271, 1275 (Fla.1996); Padgett, 577 So.2d at 570; cf. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982). Thus, "because parental rights constitute a fundamental liberty interest, the state must establish in each case that termination of those rights is the least restrictive means of protecting the child from serious harm." Padgett, 577 So.2d at 571. In determining whether termination is necessary to protect the child from serious future harm, the trial court certainly may take into account evidence of past parent-child contact. Cf. F.L., 880 So.2d at 609 ("For a trial court applying section 39.806(l)(i), the circumstances leading to the prior involuntary termination will be highly relevant to the court's determination of whether the current child is at risk and whether termination is the least restrictive way to protect the child."). However, construing section 39.806(l)(d)(l) to require consideration of past incarceration in making the termination decision would be inconsistent with the constitutionally mandated narrow construction of the statutory language and the constitutionally required focus on future harm to the child.
Justice Bell asserts in his dissenting opinion that a forward-looking construction of section 39.806(l)(d)(l) contravenes section 39.801(9), Florida Statutes, which provides that the provisions of chapter 39 are to be Construed "liberally . and in conformity with the [chapter's] declared purposes." According to Justice Bell, the declared purpose of chapter 39 is to protect children. Although this is the certainly the primary purpose of chapter 39, as expressed in section 39.001(1), the provision also reflects the Legislature's intent that the protection of children be accomplished, if possible, within the family setting. See § 39.001(l)(b) (recognizing that "children achieve their greatest potential when families are able to support and nurture the growth and development of their children"); § 39.001(l)(b)(3) (stating that any "intervention should intrude as little as possible into the life of the family . and take the most parsimonious path to remedy a family's problems"). The purpose of protecting children is not necessarily better served by a construction of section 39.806(l)(d)(l) that requires courts to examine the entire period of incarceration during a child's minority than by a construction focusing on the remaining incarceration. Justice Bell's conclusion reflects an underlying assumption, for which there is no supporting legislative pronouncement, that a parent separated from his or her child by incarceration cannot support the child's development or participate in the life of the family. In fact, the Legislature apparently has concluded to the contrary. See § 944.8031(1), Fla. Stat. (2003) (finding that "maintaining an inmate's family and community relationships through enhancing visitor services and programs and increasing the frequency and quality of the visits is an underutilized correctional resource").
Further, we do not consider our construction to be either more or less "friendly" to incarcerated parents than the Fourth District's view. See dissenting op. at 1062 n. 11. If termination is gauged solely by the criteria of section 39.806(l)(d)(l), unwarranted termination can occur under either interpretation. For example, under a construction encompassing both past and present incarceration, the provision could authorize termination of parental rights in the eighth year of a ten-year prison term that was imposed upon the parent when the child was two year's of age, regardless of that parent's participation in the child's life during the first eight years of incarceration. Using a forward-looking construction, termination would not be authorized under those circumstances. In contrast, if termination is sought in the scenario of a fifteen-year-old child with a parent commencing a two-year prison sentence, the criteria of section 39.806(l)(d)(l) would be met under a forward-looking construction but not when taking into account the entire period of incarceration during a child's minority. In neither situation would termination based solely on the parent's incarceration necessarily accomplish the Legislature's purpose of providing for the protection of children with minimal interference in the lives of families. However, the potential consequences across the spectrum of situations under which termination may be sought based on parental incarceration are no more harsh to either parent or child under our construction than under Justice Bell's view.
The potential for unwarranted termination under either view is why the provision must be read in light of Padgett's requirement, reiterated in F.L., that "the state must show by clear and convincing evidence that reunification with the parent poses a substantial risk of significant harm to the child," and that "termination of parental rights is the least restrictive means of protecting the child from harm." F.L., 880 So.2d at 608; Padgett, 577 So.2d at 571. In addition, the petitioner must allege, and the trial court must find, that termination is in the. manifest best interests of the child. See § 39.802(4)(c), 39.810, Fla. Stat. (2003). Termination of the parental rights of a parent who has played a supportive and beneficial role in the child's life despite the disabilities of incarceration probably would not meet these additional statutory and constitutional criteria. Cf B.W., 498 So.2d at 948 (stating that "efforts, or lack thereof," by incarcerated parent "to assume his parental duties through communicating with and supporting his children must be measured against his limited opportunity to assume those duties while imprisoned"). Further, termination of an incarcerated parent's rights when another parent retains custo dy, which is permitted under section 39.810(3), Florida Statutes, would in many cases be contrary to the child's best interests if the custodial parent facilitates contact with the incarcerated parent.
In sum, termination cannot rest exclusively on the length of incarceration. The actual effect of incarceration on the parent-child relationship must also be considered in light of the additional statutory and constitutional requirements. As we recently stated in F.L. concerning the court's obligation to assess when termination is the least restrictive means of protecting the child from serious harm, the termination decision as a whole "can be made only after a judicious assessment of all relevant circumstances." 880 So.2d at 608. We are confident that trial judges will diligently apply all the statutory and constitutional criteria in ruling on petitions for termination.
Finally, we note that the conclusion we reach as to the interpretation of this statute would encourage the State to pursue termination, if at all, early in a prison term. A termination decision at that point can facilitate the timely development of a permanency plan when the child is younger and can therefore gain greater benefit from the stability created by permanency. In contrast, a construction that encompasses the entire sentence, regardless of when the termination petition is filed, creates no incentive to resolve the issue of parental rights of an incarcerated parent when the decision is of greatest significance to the child.
Accordingly, we reject the construction of section 39.806(l)(d)(l) adopted by the Fourth District in B.C. and instead adopt the forward-looking construction employed by the Second District in J.D.C., A.W., and E.I.F. as being consistent with the statutory language chosen by the Legislature, consistent with the constitutionally required emphasis on future harm, and consistent with the best interests of children of incarcerated parents.
This Case
The trial court, applying the forward-looking construction of section 39.806(l)(d)(l) that we endorse today, concluded that the approximately four years remaining in the father's sentence (from the filing of the petition in January 2002 to the January 2006 maximum release date) was not a substantial portion of the remaining fourteen-year minority of the child. This amounts to 28.6 percent of the child's remaining minority. This percentage is commensurate with the percentages of remaining incarceration that were determined not to constitute a substantial portion of the remaining minority in the district court decisions we have discussed. See e.g., W.W., 811 So.2d at 792 (holding that incarceration for a period constituting twenty-five percent of the child's minority was not a substantial portion); A.W., 816 So.2d at 1264 (holding that remaining incarceration constituting twenty-six percent and thirty-two percent of the remaining minority of the children did not constitute a substantial portion). Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not err in determining that termination was not authorized under section 39.806(l)(d)(l).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained herein, we hold that before the parental rights of a parent incarcerated in a state or federal correctional institution may be terminated under section 39.806(l)(d)(l), the trial court must find by clear and convincing evidence that the time remaining in the parent's incarceration constitutes a substantial portion of the time remaining before the child or children attain the age of eighteen years. Because the starting point for a termination proceeding is a petition alleging grounds for termination, the trial court should measure the time of remaining incarceration and minority from the date that the petition is filed. Accordingly, we approve the Second District's decisions in J.D.C., A.W., and E.I.F. to the extent that these decisions rely on a forward-looking construction of the provision. In this case, we quash the decision of the Fourth District, which reversed the order in which the trial court denied termination of B.C.'s parental right under the construction of section 39.806(l)(d)(l) that we adopt today, and remand for reinstatement of the trial court's order.
It is so ordered.
PARIENTE, C.J., and ANSTEAD, LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
PARIENTE, C.J., concurs with an opinion.
WELLS, J., dissents with an opinion, in which CANTERO and BELL, JJ., concur.
BELL, J., dissents with an opinion, in which WELLS and CANTERO, JJ., concur.
. The certified conflict creates jurisdiction for this Court to review the Fourth District decision. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.
. The requirement that incarceration constitute a "substantial portion" of the time before the child turns 18 is a basis for termination under section 39.806(l)(d)(l). Incarceration plus a finding that a continuing relationship would be harmful to the child are grounds for termination under section 39.806(l)(d)(3). This subsection is not before us in this case. The issue of abandonment as grounds for termination under section 39.806(l)(b) is also not before us because the trial court concluded that incarceration for a substantial portion of the child's remaining minority was the only viable basis for termination. This Court has held that incarceration alone does not, as a matter of law, authorize termination for abandonment. See In re B.W., 498 So.2d 946, 948 (Fla.1986).
. Chapter 99-193 was enacted to make "technical and necessary changes to chapter 39, F.S., to correct errors and inconsistencies" in the 1998 legislation. Fla. S. Comms. on Judiciary and Child. & Fams., SB 1666 (1999) Staff Analysis 1 (April 15, 1999) (on file with comm.).
. We have calculated the percentages in W.W. and A.W. from the figures used in the district court opinions.
. In Jesus M. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security, 203 Ariz. 278, 53 P.3d 203 (Ariz.Ct.App.2002), which is cited in the dissent, the court rejected a forward-looking construction of an analogous provision which would have measured the starting point from the decision on termination. The court stated that "[w]hat matters to a dependent child is the total length of time the parent is absent from the family, not the more random time that may elapse between the conclusion of legal proceedings for severance and the parent's release from prison." Id. at 206. Our conclusion that the filing of the petition is the starting point for a determination under section 39.806(l)(d)(l) avoids much of the randomness that caused the court concern in Jesus M. We agree that the length of the parent's absence from the family is what matters to the child, but conclude that the language of the provision does not require a court to measure this absence from a point before the filing of the petition.
. Because the remaining incarceration at the time the petition was filed clearly does not constitute a substantial portion of the child's remaining minority, we decline to address what specific percentage constitutes a substantial portion under section 39.806(l)(d)(l), and whether the provision encompasses qualitative as well as quantitative considerations. These questions are beyond the scope of the certified conflict. Cf. Welsh v. State, 850 So.2d 467, 471 n. 6 (Fla.2003); Wood v. State, 750 So.2d 592, 595 n. 3 (Fla.1999) (declining to address issues beyond the scope of the certified conflict). Moreover, these questions implicate constitutional concerns over section 39.806(l)(d)(l), as amended in 1999, which have not been raised by the parties and need not be addressed to reach final adjudication in this case. See Singletary v. State, 322 So.2d 551, 552 (Fla.1975) (warning that "courts should not pass upon the constitutionality of statutes if the case in which the question arises may be effectively disposed of on other grounds").