Case Name: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Christopher Alan CARLSON, Defendant-Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2013-07-16
Citations: 533 F. App'x 743
Docket Number: No. 12-10319
Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Christopher Alan CARLSON, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: Before: FERNANDEZ, PAEZ, and BERZON, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 533
Pages: 743–744

Head Matter:
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Christopher Alan CARLSON, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 12-10319.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted July 9, 2013.
Filed July 16, 2013.
Rachel Cristina Hernandez, Assistant U.S., USPX-Office of The U.S. Attorney, Phoenix, AZ, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Daniel L. Kaplan, Assistant Federal Public Defender, FPDAZ-Federal Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix, AZ, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before: FERNANDEZ, PAEZ, and BERZON, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Christopher Alan Carlson appeals his conviction for endangering the person or health of a child. See 18 U.S.C. § 13; Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 13-3623(B)(3). We affirm.
(1) Carlson first asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. We disagree. "[V]iewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution," as we must, we hold that a "rational trier of fact" could certainly have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Carlson did cause or permit a child in his care "to be placed in a situation where the person or health of the child" was endangered, and that he did so with criminal negligence. The presence of evidence that could have led to a different verdict does not affect our conclusion. See Nevils, 598 F.3d at 1164-65.
(2) Carlson's second assertion is that there was a constructive amendment of the indictment because he was charged with endangering a child "[ujnder circumstances likely to produce death or serious physical injury," but found guilty (on a lesser included offense theory ) of endangering a child "[ujnder circumstances other than those likely to produce death or serious physical injury." We disagree. The uncharged offense is, indeed, a lesser included offense of the charged offense because, as relevant here, the only difference between the two is that while in both the child must be placed in danger of injury to person or health, in the charged offense that danger must rise to the level of a serious physical injury or death. That is to say, the uncharged offense elements are a subset of the charged offense elements, and one cannot commit the latter without having committed the former. See United States v. Pierre, 254 F.3d 872, 875 (9th Cir.2001); see also Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 716, 109 S.Ct. 1443, 1450, 103 L.Ed.2d 734 (1989); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 633, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 2387, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980). In other words, this is a classic lesser included offense situation. See United States v. Quintero, 21 F.3d 885, 889-90 (9th Cir.1994); Salinas v. United States, 277 F.2d 914, 916 (9th Cir.1960); State v. Bass, 184 Ariz. 543, 911 P.2d 549, 551 (Ariz.Ct.App.1995); State v. Torres, 156 Ariz. 150, 750 P.2d 908, 910 (Ariz.Ct.App.1988); see also State v. Mott, 187 Ariz. 536, 931 P.2d 1046, 1049 (1997); State v. Mahaney, 193 Ariz. 566, 975 P.2d 156, 157-58 (Ariz.Ct.App.1999).
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); see also United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1163-64 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc).
. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. at 2789; Nevils, 598 F.3d at 1164.
. Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 13-3623(B). However that endangerment was not "likely to produce death or serious physical injury." Id.
. Id. at (B)(3). Criminal negligence is "a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation." Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 13-105(10)(d); see also State v. Far W. Water & Sewer Inc., 224 Ariz. 173, 228 P.3d 909, 936-37 (Ariz.Ct.App.2010); cf. In re William G., 192 Ariz. 208, 963 P.2d 287, 294 (Ariz.Ct.App.1997).
. See United States v. Mancuso, No. 12-30174, 718 F.3d 780, 791-92 2013 WL 1811276, at *6 (9th Cir.2013); United States v. Howick, 263 F.3d 1056, 1063 (9th Cir.2001).
. Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 13-3623(A) ("the charged offense").
. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 31(c)(1).
. Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 13-3623(B) ("the uncharged offense").