Case Name: STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Arvin MOORE, Defendant and Appellant; Arvin Moore, Petitioner and Appellant, v. Sheriff Dave Edmunds, Respondent and Appellee
Court: Utah Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Utah
Decision Date: 2009-05-14
Citations: 210 P.3d 967
Docket Number: No. 20070672-CA
Parties: STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Arvin MOORE, Defendant and Appellant. Arvin Moore, Petitioner and Appellant, v. Sheriff Dave Edmunds, Respondent and Appellee.
Judges: Before Judges THORNE, DAVIS, and McHUGH.
Reporter: Pacific Reporter 3d
Volume: 210
Pages: 967–973

Head Matter:
2009 UT App 128
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Arvin MOORE, Defendant and Appellant. Arvin Moore, Petitioner and Appellant, v. Sheriff Dave Edmunds, Respondent and Appellee.
No. 20070672-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
May 14, 2009.
Randy B. Birch and Corey S. Zachman, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.
Jami R. Brackin, Coalville; and Paul R. Christensen and David R. Brickey, Park City, for Appellees.
Before Judges THORNE, DAVIS, and McHUGH.

Opinion:
OPINION
MeHUCGH, Judge:
T1 Arvin Moore appeals the denial of his Rule 65B Petition for Extraordinary Relief. See Utah R. Civ. P. 65B. Moore argues that he was denied sufficient due process while housed in the Summit County Jail (the Jail), awaiting sentencing on a criminal conviction. Specifically, Moore claims that the Jail failed to provide him with adequate notice, access to legal counsel, and the right to confront witnesses and present evidence with respect to an internal disciplinary hearing that resulted in his administrative segregation. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
12 On February 2, 2007, Moore was convicted of aggravated sexual abuse of a child, a first degree felony, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1 (2008) (current version as amended at Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1 (2008)), and dealing in material harmful to a minor, a second degree felony, see id. § 76-10-1206 (2005) (current version as amended at Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1206 (2008). Moore was immediately transferred to the Jail to await sentencing.
T3 While at the Jail, Moore received a disciplinary notification, informing him that he had been accused of "(encouraging others to engage in any prohibited sexual activities." The notice indicated that there would be a disciplinary hearing two days later, on March 8, 2007. At the hearing, Moore requested an opportunity to consult with his legal counsel, which request was denied. Moore then attempted to invoke his right to remain silent, but he was questioned anyway and was encouraged to testify. In addition, Moore was not permitted to present or confront any witnesses. Following the proceeding, the hearing officer from the Summit County Sheriff's Office (SCSO) found Moore in violation of the Jail's policies and administratively segregated him from the Jail's general population. Moore also alleges that the SCSO placed a citation in his file.
14 Moore filed a Petition for Extraordinary Relief, see Utah R. Civ. P. 65B, on April 4, 2007, seeking relief from the alleged wrongful restraint on his personal liberty and an expungement of the citation from his prison disciplinary record. On May 15, 2007, the trial court heard argument on Moore's Petition for Extraordinary Relief, and on July 25, 2007, it entered an order holding that Moore's due process rights were not violated by the disciplinary proceedings. Moore filed this appeal on August 14, 2007. Thereafter, on December 4, 2007, Moore was sentenced and immediately transferred from the Jail to the Utah State Prison (the Prison). He is serving, concurrently, an indeterminate term of five years to life on the aggravated sexual abuse of a child conviction and an indeterminate term of one to fifteen years for the dealing in material harmful to a minor conviction. This appeal involves only the propriety of the Jail disciplinary hearing and resulting segregation; Moore does not challenge the underlying convictions, resulting in his incarceration.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
15 Because we are reviewing a rule 65B petition, "this court looks at the administrative proceeding as if the petition were brought here directly, even though technically it is the district court's decision that is being appealed." Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 26 (Utah Ct.App.1991). "We give no deference to the district court's initial appellate review since it was a review of the record, which this court is just as capable of reviewing as the district court." Id. Instead, we review the actions of the SCSO. See id. "Due process challenges . are questions of general law .," id. at 28, which "we review using a correction of error standard, giving no deference to the [SCSO]T's legal determination," id. at 27.
ANALYSIS
16 Although inmates are not " 'wholly stripped' of their constitutional rights even in their incarcerated state," Duran v. Morris, 635 P.2d 43, 44 (Utah 1981) (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974)), "[dliscipline by prison officials in response to a wide range of misconduct falls within the expected parameters of the sentence imposed by a court of law," Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995). To rise to the level of an interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, the prisoner must have suffered a "deprivation of liberty without due process of law." Duran, 635 P.2d at 45 (citing Wolff 418 U.S. at 555, 94 S.Ct. 2963); see also U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
I. Moore's Liberty Interest
T7 Moore asserts that he suffered a deprivation of liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution when he was segregated from the Jail's general population without adequate due process. See id. Liberty interests arise either directly from the Due Process Clause or from state law. See Perkins v. Kansas Dep't of Corrs., 165 F.3d 803, 808 (10th Cir.1999). In the prison context, state-created liberty interests
will be generally limited to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force, nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.
Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293 (internal citations omitted).
T8 In Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995), the Supreme Court concluded that a prisoner's thirty-day "discipline in segregated confinement did not present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might conceivably create a liberty interest." Id. at 486, 115 S.Ct. 2293. Nevertheless, Moore argues that his lengthy solitary confinement-twenty-three hours per day for nine months-imposes the very type of atypical and significant hardship that does create an unconstitutional deprivation of liberty. For purposes of this decision, we assume, without deciding, that Moore is correct that his nine-month solitary confinement imposed atypical and significant hardship on him in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life. See id. at 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293. Nevertheless, we do not consider whether he was afforded due process during the disciplinary hearing because his claim is now moot.
II. Mootness
19 Our conclusion that Moore's appeal is moot is guided by the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Duran v. Morris, 635 P.2d 48 (Utah 1981). Duran, an inmate at the Utah State Prison, claimed that his due process rights were violated when he was confined in administrative segregation and transferred from medium security to maximum security, pending investigation of a stabbing incident. See id. at 44. Twelve weeks later, the prison authorities held a hearing and found Duran guilty of participating in the stabbing. See id. As a result, Duran was reclassified from medium to maximum security. See id. Duran filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus while he was still reclassified to maximum security. See id. When the district court denied the writ, Duran appealed. See id. Before the appeal was resolved, however, the prison had returned Duran to medium security. See id. at 45.
10 The supreme court dismissed the appeal as moot, noting that mootness was established not simply because the prisoner had been released from administrative segregation but because "there are no collateral legal consequences attending [Duran's] temporary confinement." Id. ("[Where the ha-beas corpus petitioner was 'not attacking the validity of his conviction, but merely the administrative treatment he had received during confinement from which he had been released, . the appeal [was] moot ." (quoting Ayers v. Ciccone, 431 F.2d 724, 726 (8th Cir.1970))). The Duran court explained that "collateral legal consequences may include the use of the conviction to impeach the petitioner's character or as a factor in determining a sentence in a future trial, as well as the petitioner's inability to vote, engage in certain businesses, or serve on a jury." Id. The supreme court then held that "[intrapri-son administrative decisions such as the one before us entail no collateral legal consequences of the kind that result from a criminal conviction." Id.
{11 The Utah Supreme Court also concluded that Duran's appeal "must be dismissed as moot" because it could not "be shown to fit within a recognized exception to the mootness principle." Id. Where Duran complained "about the procedural mechanism by which one prisoner was transferred to a security classification" rather than about "the quality of living conditions affecting many prisoners," the Duran court held that his case did not raise an issue "'of wide concern{ that] affects the public interest, is likely to recur in a similar manner, and because of the brief time any one person is affected, would otherwise escape judicial review'" Id. at 46 (quoting Wickham v. Fisher, 629 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1981)). Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal as moot. See id.
12 In the present case, Moore is no longer in administrative segregation at the Jail. Instead, he has been transferred to the general population of the Prison to serve his sentence. Nevertheless, Moore contends that the disciplinary action taken against him at the Jail does have collateral legal consequences because it "affects every evaluation of his freedom which occurs while he is in prison" and "any parole decision . will be detrimentally affected by his disciplinary record." We disagree.
13 We first note that, as in Duran, the Jail's administrative action here entailed "no collateral legal consequences of the kind that result from a criminal conviction." Id. at 45. Indeed, the Jail's decision to place Moore in solitary confinement will have no bearing on his ability to vote, engage in certain businesses, or serve on a jury. See id. Nor could his disciplinary record be used to impeach his character or as a factor in determining a sentence in a future trial. See id.
4 14 Moore asserts, however, that his case can be distinguished from Duran because he is seeking an expungement of the matter from his interprison disciplinary record. Accordingly, Moore claims that his action is not moot because failure to expunge that record could affect his opportunity for parole. However, the hypothetical impact of the disciplinary record on a future parole hearing does not create a collateral legal consequence that prevents the conclusion that Moore's claim is moot. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court rejected a similar argument in Spencer v. Kemma, 523 U.S. 1, 118 S.Ct. 978, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998).
15 In Spencer, the petitioner was on parole from a three-year sentence for burglary when he was apprehended for parole violations and sent back to prison. See id. at 3, 113 S.Ct. 978. Although the petitioner filed a writ of habeas corpus alleging that he was afforded inadequate due process during the parole revocation proceedings, he completed his underlying sentence before the matter could be resolved. See id. at 5-6, 118 S.Ct. 978. Consequently, the district court dismissed his writ as moot, and the Eighth Cireuit affirmed. See id. at 6, 118 S.Ct. 978.
T16 On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that he had suffered injury sufficient to pursue his claim because the prior parole revocation could be used "to his detriment in a future parole proceeding." Id. at 14, 118 S.Ct. 978. The Spencer Court noted, "This possibility is no longer contingent on petitioner's again violating the law; he has already done so, and is currently serving a 7-year term of imprisonment." Id. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court concluded that a collateral legal consequence based upon a future parole deci-gion was "a possibility rather than a certainty or even a probability." Id. The Supreme Court explained that, under the applicable state statute, "a prior parole revocation [does] not render an individual ineligible for parole[,] [but is] simply one factor, among many, that may be considered by the parole authority in determining whether there is a substantial risk that the parole candidate will not conform to reasonable conditions of parole." Id. (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, the Spencer Court rejected the petitioner's argument and affirmed the Eighth Circuit's dismissal of the action as moot. See id. at 14, 18, 118 S.Ct. 978; see also Wilson v. Terhune, 319 F.3d 477, 480-81 (9th Cir.2003) (following Spencer and holding that there is no presumption of collateral legal consequences in challenges to prison disciplinary proceedings); Diaz v. Duckworth, 143 F.3d 345, 346 (7th Cir.1998) (same); cf. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 487, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995) (holding that the hypothetical future negative impact of prison disciplinary action on future parole hearings is not sufficient to create a protected liberty interest).
117 Like the statute considered in Spencer, Utah law provides no requirement that the parole board deny parole because of a prison disciplinary record. See Neel v. Holden, 849 P.2d 601, 602 (Utah Ct.App.1993) (holding that Utah's parole statutes contain no limitation on the parole board's discretion); see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-9 (2008) (parole proceedings). Thus, whether collateral legal consequences may or may not occur in Moore's case remains purely hypothetical. Indeed, Moore has shown no actual, adverse collateral consequences that have arisen from the failure to expunge his administrative record, and we will not presume that such collateral consequences exist. See Spencer, 523 U.S. at 14, 118 S.Ct. 978. Therefore, Moore's claim is moot.
{18 Furthermore, as in Duran, Moore's complaint relates to the "procedural mechanism by which one prisoner was transferred to a security classification admittedly unobjectionable for those properly transferred." Duran v. Morris, 635 P.2d 43, 46 (Utah 1981). Thus, Moore's petition does not address an issue of "wide concern." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
119 Likewise, contrary to the position of the dissent, Moore's due process argument did not escape judicial determination due to the "brief time any one prisoner is affected." Id. To rely on the exception to the mootness doctrine for issues capable of repetition yet evading review, Moore must show both that "(1) the challenged action [is] in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration, and (2) there [is] a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party [willl be subject to the same action again." Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 17, 118 S.Ct. 978, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moore has failed to demonstrate that it is likely he will be returned to the Jail and that he would likely be placed in administrative segregation upon return. See generally id. at 18, 118 S.Ct. 978 (refusing to find repetition where subsequent parole and revocation were speculative). Consequently, Moore's claim does not fall within the extraordinary reasons that would compel us to consider the matter despite its having become moot as to Moore.
CONCLUSION
T20 Because Moore is no longer confined in administrative segregation and there are no adverse collateral legal consequences flowing from the disciplinary actions on his record, the case before us is moot.
1 21 I CONCUR: JAMES Z. DAVIS, Judge.
. Due process is also guaranteed by article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution. Because Moore does not make a due process argument or provide any analysis under the Utah Constitution, we decline to consider his claim under the state constitution and instead rely on opinions interpreting the federal right. See State v. Worwood, 2007 UT 47, ¶ 16, 164 P.3d 397 ("[W]e have repeatedly refrained from engaging in state constitutional law analysis unless 'an argument for different analyses under the state and federal constitutions is briefed.' " (quoting State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n. 5 (Utah 1988))).
. A claim is moot when "the requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants." Duran v. Morris, 635 P.2d 43, 45 (Utah 1981).
. Moore argues that he has suffered actual collateral consequences because his disciplinary record from the Jail has adversely affected his placement assignment at the Prison. However, counsel for Moore admiited at oral argument that there is no evidence in the record to support this allegation or even that Moore's record from the Jail was forwarded to the Prison. We therefore do not consider it.
. We do not preclude an individual from establishing, as a factual matter, that an intraprison disciplinary matter had actual, not hypothetical, collateral legal consequences justifying review. Moore has simply failed to make such a showing.
. Although we agree with the dissent that Moore's complaints are substantial and that our consideration of the merits of his claims "would provide guidance to Utah's many correctional facilities," infra 125, we do not believe that this case falls into an exception to the mootness doctrine that would allow us to address the merits in the context of a "case or controversy," U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; see also Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7, 118 S.Ct. 978, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998).