Case Name: Laura Fussell CLIFTON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Sam ARNOLD, d/b/a Arnold's Sawmill, Defendant-Appellant
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1956-04-27
Citations: 87 So. 2d 386
Docket Number: No. 4164
Parties: Laura Fussell CLIFTON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Sam ARNOLD, d/b/a Arnold’s Sawmill, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: Rehearing denied; ELLIS, J., dissenting.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 87
Pages: 386–405

Head Matter:
Laura Fussell CLIFTON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Sam ARNOLD, d/b/a Arnold’s Sawmill, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 4164.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana. First Circuit.
April 27, 1956.
Rehearing Denied May 25, 1956.
Ponder & Ponder, Amite, for appellant.
Richard M. Mathews, New Orleans, for appellee.

Opinion:
TATE, Judge.
This is a compensation suit. Plaintiff widow seeks recovery for the death on August 17, 1954, of her husband, Joseph S. Clifton, who allegedly died as the result of an accident sustained eight days earlier in the course of his employment.
Decedent's death allegedly resulted from the aggravation of a pre-existing cardiac condition as a result of an industrial accident, wherein decedent slipped and fell and sustained a lumbo-sacral strain, as well as severe bruises of the hip and groin.
Defendant denies that an accident occurred in the course of decedent's employment and further defends on the ground that decedent died from natural causes and not as a result of any traumatic aggravation of his cardiac condition.
The defendant attacks the District Court's finding that an accident had occurred as based' solely on- hearsay evidence.
There were no eyewitnesses testifying as to the accident. All decedent's co-workers (still employed at date of trial by defendant employer) testified that they had not seen decedent fall at work. Some of them further testified to their belief that they would have seen decedent fall if he had done so. ' Further, defendant employer testified that on the morning of Aúgust 9th when he picked decedent up before the workday on which the accident occurred, decedent mentioned. having fallen the previous week. Doubtless, if accepted by the District Court, this testimony would support a finding by the District Court that no accident had occurred.
But there is other strong testimony, preponderant when accepted by the District Court, which proves that indeed an accident had occurred as alleged during decedent's day at work on August 9th with defendant. His physician had seen him Sunday, August 8th and decedent was well and unbruised. Decedent's wife and daughter testified that he had left for work the morning of August 9th unbruised, but returned that night (picked up and returned personally by defendant employer) with fresh bruises on his back and leg, which were then rubbed by his wife and daughter. He told them he had slipped and fallen at work that day.
Defendant objects strenuously to the admission of this testimony of what decedent told his wife and daughter on his return from work as hearsay (and not within the res gestae rule as too remote from the accident), as well as of the other testimony from the doctor and various lay witnesses as to decedent's subsequent statements of his fall at work. Certainly, in this workmen's compensation suit, the statements of the decedent to his wife and daughter upon his return from work as to the cause of the injuries received during the day are admissible, Arriggton v. Singer Sewing Machine Company, La.App,, 16 So. 2d 145, certiorari denied; Butler v. Washington-Youree Hotel Company, La.App., 160 So. 825; see also, Zito v. Standard Accident Insurance Company, La.App. 1 Cir., 76 So.2d 25; Duracher v. Canulette Shipbuilding Company, La.App. 1 Cir., 21 So.2d 100.
In a compensation suit, "The court shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence or procedure other than • as herein provided, but all findings of fact must be based upon competent evidence," LSA-R.S. 23:1317. " 'Competent evidence' is that which is relevant and material to the issue to be determined. Joseph A. Coy Co. v. Younger, 192 Okl. 348, 136 P.2d 890, 891. On review by circuit court of an award of the Workmen's. Compensation Board, the board's findings, of fact cannot be disturbed if sustained by any 'competent evidence', which means evidence that tends to establish the fact in issue and does not rest on mere surmise or guess. Black Motor Co. v. Spicer, 290 Ky. 111, 160 S.W.2d 336, 337. By 'competent evidence' is meant that which the very nature of the thing to be proved requires as the fit and appropriate proof in the particular case. Horbach v. State, 43 Tex. 242, 249." 8 Words and Phrases, Competent Evidence, p. 354.
However, even in a compensation proceeding there may be limits to the admissibility of hearsay evidence of a claimant's statements, as when made long after the event and in circumstances which indicate a self-serving nature to aid a pending lawsuit, see e. g., Jack v. International Paper Company, La.App., 56 So.2d 875, Stovall v. Thomas Lumber Company, La.App., 189 So. 379.
Whether or not the various other statements made during the week before his death by decedent as to his fall at work were admissible — and we expressly do not decide this point — we feel that the accident at work in this suit is preponderantly proved by the testimony accepted as credible by the District Court of decedent's wife and daughter as to decedent's bruises and explanation therefor after his return from work on August 9, 1954, said bruises being corroborated by the physical examination of a physician on August 12th.
It perhaps should be added that decedent's son testified that defendant Arnold stated to him at the. funeral that decedent had fallen at work (Tr. 129-130), which if accepted as correct by the trier of fact is admissible as proof of the accident itself, being an admission against interest by defendant, Gulf Refining Company v. Bagby, 200 La. 258, 7 So.2d 903, Ætna Finance Company v. Betz, La.App., 35 So.2d 909. On the final day of- this rather protracted trial, defendant Arnold seems to have tacitly admitted the accident when he testified: "I feel I am plumb clear-is why I am fighting it [i. e., the law suit], because I have had accidents bigger than this on the. job with no law suits, no questions asked or nothing. There was bigger accidents than this was." (Tr. 303.)
A more substantial controversy is presented as to whether the accident at work caused or proximately contributed to decedent's death.
Decedent Clifton worked the remainder of the day (August 9th) following the accident, and he returned and worked through the following day (August- 10th). Defendant's witnesses deny, plaintiff's witnesses testify, that decedent complained of pain or strain during this time.
On August 11th, decedent remained home in bed. On August 12th, .his family physician (Dr. Jacob Kety) examined him, found him suffering from lumbosacral strain, and ' placed him in traction. Dr. Kety noted the large bruises on the left thigh and flank and the patient's complaints of back and chest pain. With regard to the latter pains, Dr. Kety specifically checked decedent for cardiac effects of the injury, but none were clinically evident on August 12th.
On August 16th, while in bed decedent' suffered a massive coronary occlusion,' or heart failure, from which he died on August 17th.
Dr. Kety described the -mechanism of death in these words, Tr.-13:
"My opinion is that in this individual there was a normal amount of arteriosclerosis present. Arteriosclerosis is a generalized disease. Part of the pathophysiology of. the disease includes - the deposition of artheromatous plaques . in all of the.arteries of the body, including the arteries around the heart. This man has this condition. I know because I treated him. During times of stress or trauma, there is a — the patho-physiology that takes place at first is shock which may not he clinically evident altogether but shock always takes place in a minimized degree followed by a temporary hypotension. There may be and as it happened in this case, a bleeding into one of the atheromatous plaques which causes a slow closing off of the coronary artery. This develops, clinically, first at signs of coronary insufficiency which means an insufficient blood supply which means the same as an insufficient supply of oxygen to the heart which causes first a myocardial ischemia, which, if the blood supply is completely excluded the ischemia becomes an infarct which means death of the part. Since I observed this patient and saw him, every day there is no doubt whatsoever in my mind that he followed this course, that the mechanism of death' was first, — the acute cause of death was a myocardial infarct which was due to coronary insufficiency which was due to arteriosclerosis. Contributing cause of death was injury." (Italics ours.)
Thus in Dr. Kety's opinion the acute cause of Clifton's death was a myocardial infarct (i. e., damaging or death of part of the heart muscle), caused by a coronary insufficiency (i. e., decreased flow of blood to heart), which in turn was immediately caused by the shock resulting from the accident or the undue exertion in attempting to work with the painful injuries.
The medical question thus narrows down to whether the accident on the job, with the shock therefrom or from the undue exertion resultant from attempting to work with pain after the injury, caused or contributed or aggravated the coronary insufficiency so as to cause the myocardial infarct which subsequently caused decedent's death.
Dr. Kety reiterated several times that as attending physician he was certain the industrial injuries 'directly contributed to the myocardial infarct which caused Clifton's death.
Dr. Albert Hyman, a qualified cardiac specialist, testified on behalf of plaintiff most positively that trauma may precipitate the factors leading to death through myocardial infarct of a sixty-two year old man in decedent's position. He testified to his opinion, based on the history as proved by the evidence, that the attending physician's diagnosis of the cause of death was correct. That "the trauma is inextricably connected as a precipitating factor to the end result; that is, death", he felt "sure" was true. (Tr. 256.)
Dr. A. L. Lewis and Dr. J. H. McClen-don, general practitioners who (like Dr. Hyman) never saw decedent but testified in reply to hypothetical questions, admitted that an injuyy with shock, lowering the blood pressure, or exertion might cause the death-causing infarct. But both stated positively in their opinion that the shock in question, not being readily apparent or disabling, was not severe enough to cause the decreased blood flow or coronary insufficiency from which the infarct and death would result.
However, Dr. Hyman, the only cardiac specialist testifying, stated positively that "any form of trauma of any type regardless of the severity, any type of trauma or stress can more or less in ordinary words, be the trigger mechanism which can snowball" into the results herein observed (Tr. 255.) Dr. Kety, the only physician who actually saw and treated decedent during his last illness, testified to his positive opinion that the results of the trauma directly contributed to plaintiff's death, based upon such observation and treatment during the course of the last illness and his prior knowledge of Clifton's pre-existing cardiac condition gained as Clifton's family physician.
In a somewhat similar case allowing an employee compensation when disabled by a cardiac condition, pre-existing but aggravated by a trauma to his head and back or chest, White v. Delta Shipbuilding Company, Inc., 24 So.2d 497, our brothers of the Orleans Court of Appeals (Mr. Justice McCaleb the organ thereof) relied chiefly on the testimony of Dr. Sidney Jacobs, the attending physician who had discovered the heart trouble and administered treatment therefor; it regarded this as preponderating over the testimony of two specialists who examined plaintiff for purposes of litigation, stating, "It must be borne in mind that Dr. Jacobs' testimony is positive that there was causal connection between the traumatic injury and the subsequent heart ailment. This evidence was sufficient to make out a prima facie case for plaintiff and it thereupon devolved upon defendants to rebut it. , * the evidence of Dr. Jacobs establishes plaintiff's claim with legal certainty unless defendants' evidence can be viewed as preponderating", 24 So.2d 497, 499. See also Olivier v. Daniel Jeffrey & Sons, Inc., La.App. 1 Cir., 169 So. 247.
Decedent had been under treatment by Dr. Kety for "chronic coronary insufficiency due to arteriosclerotic changes" for about four months prior to the accident. Approximately four months before the accident, on diagnosing the coronary insufficiency, Dr. Kety had prescribed digitalis (a heart stimulant) in therapeutic doses; he testified that check by electric cardiogram approximately two weeks after the initiation of the digitalis therapy showed that Clifton was "digitalized", i. e., that the lost heart compensation was corrected, see Webster's New International Dictionary (Unabridged; second edition), Verbo "digi-talize."
Because all doctors herein testified that with this condition it is possible for a patient to die of numerous other causes or stresses, or perhaps even without stress and of simple heart failure, defendant-appellant urges strongly that decedent's death herein is not compensable. Defendant overlooks the positive testimony of Dr. Kety, reiterated several times under sharp cross-examination (Tr. 23, 33, 34, 35), that as summarized by the trial court "a man could die of that but that this man did not", Tr. 33-34, but died as a result of the trauma. Defendant further overlooks the well-established jurisprudence that "an injury is compensable where excessive heat, heavy lifting or other strenuous efforts, although usual and customary, cause or contribute to a physical breakdown or accelerate its occurrence because of a pre-exist-ing condition", Hemphill v. Tremont Lumber Company, 209 La. 885, 25 So.2d 625, at page 627, allowing recovery to dependents of an employee dying as a result of a heart attack.
See also Ozbolt v. Weber-King Mfg. Co., La.App. 1 Cir., 193 So. 383; Brister v. Miller, La.App. 1 Cir., 178 So. 284; Wright v. Louisiana Ice & Utilities Company, 1 Cir., 19 La.App. 173, 138 So. 450, 451; concerning deaths from pre-existing heart conditions. Cf. Henderson v. E. L. Dalton & Co., Inc., La.App. 1 Cir., 47 So.2d 111, concerning death from cerebral hemorrhage due to industrial strain aggravating preexisting condition.
Cases relied upon by defendant such as Hastings v. Homewood Development Company, La.App., 84 So.2d 883, simply hold that compensation is denied when no'causal connection, such as strain or excessive heat or other outside'condition, is Shown between the employee's work and his resultant heart failure. On the contrary, here the preponderant medical testimony shows that the fall at work, and the results thereof, directly contributed to decedent's death.
The District Court allowed proven medical and funeral expenses and court costs, and further allowed compensation for 300 weeks at the rate of $12.55 per week, being 32i/á%, the widow's, statutory rate, LSA-R.S. 23:1232(1), of "an average weekly wage of $38.62", arrived at by dividing the employee's 1954 earnings by the 33 weeks he worked during 1954. Plaintiff has answered the appeal requesting that the compensation rate be increased to the weekly compensation demanded in the petition of $14.30 per week, based on claimed average weekly wages of $44..
Plaintiff-appellee correctly points out that weekly wages, for purposes of computing the rate of weekly workmen's compensation, are Computed based on the rate of daily wages for an 8-hour day, 6-day week, Jarrell v. Travelers Ins. Co., 218 La. 531, 50 So.2d 22; Gibbs v. Pizzolato, La.App, 1 Cir., 67 So.2d 139, and not by averaging the weekly-wages actually earned as was done here. The undisputed evidence is- that decedent's hourly wage was $1.01 (Tr. 273); the weekly wages for purposes of computing compensation are thus $48.48, 32%% of which amount exceeds the weekly compensation -rate of $14.30 demanded by the petition and answer to the appeal, in excess of which demand of course we cannot allow. The amendment of the- compensation rate will be allowed as prayed for.
Plaintiff-appellee further answers the appeal and demands in accordance with the prayer of her petition 12% damages and reasonable attorney's fees for arbitrary failure to pay compensation, under LSA-R.S. 22:658. This is a penalty applicable only to insurers capriciously refusing to pay benefits within.sixty days after proof of loss. We are unable to accede to appel-lee's skillful argument that defendant, who was «¿«insured, comes under the terms of the penalty provisions' specifically applicable only to insurers as a ¿/-insurer.
For the above and foregoing reasons, the weekly compensation rate awarded is increased from $12.55 .to $14.30 per week, plus legal interest thereon from date of delinquency until paid; and as thus amended, the judgment of District Court herein is affirmed in all other respects. '
Amended, and affirmed as amended. .
. A fair sample of this line of cross examination is the following, Tr. 34 :
"Q. Dr. Kety, do you recall talking to me and didn't you tell me that Mr. Clifton could have died from a strain of some kind, or he could have died fx'om some exertion in his own bath room or some exertion in his own home or'even sitting in a chair? A. The answer'is yes but that, is only half of what I told you. He could have hut he did not, he died from a myocardial infarct due to coronary insufficiency due to -trauma."