Case Name: KRAJEWSKI v. KRAJEWSKI
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1984-12-28
Citations: 420 Mich. 729
Docket Number: Docket No. 71755
Parties: KRAJEWSKI v KRAJEWSKI
Judges: Williams, C.J., and Levin and Boyle, JJ., concurred with Kavanagh, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 420
Pages: 729–740

Head Matter:
KRAJEWSKI v KRAJEWSKI
Docket No. 71755.
Argued May 10, 1984
(Calendar No. 10).
Decided December 28, 1984.
Released January 25, 1985.
Theresa Krajewski was a ward of the Berrien Circuit Court as a result of a custody order entered in connection with her parents’ divorce. A protective services worker of the Department of Social Services petitioned the Berrien Probate Court, Juvenile Division, asserting that the division had jurisdiction of Theresa because of alleged neglect by her father and seeking an order making Theresa a ward of the probate court and placing her in foster care under the supervision of the department. Theresa was made a temporary ward of the probate court and placed under the department’s supervision. Subsequently, the department petitioned the probate court for termination of parental . rights. At a hearing to determine whether parental rights should be terminated, the question arose whether a waiver of jurisdiction by the circuit court was necessary before the probate court could enter a permanent order. The Berrien County Prosecutor moved the circuit court for an order of waiver of jurisdiction. The court, Julian E. Hughes, J., held that no waiver need be obtained for the probate court to enter a permanent order affecting the parental rights in question. The Court of Appeals, MacKenzie, P.J., and R. M. Maher and Simon, JJ., held that the probate court has jurisdiction to enter only temporary orders where a child’s custody is subject to the prior or continuing order of another court of record and that until such court waives its jurisdiction the probate court cannot exercise its full jurisdiction (Docket No. 63848). Theresa Krajewski, by her guardian ad litem, and the Berrien County Prosecutor appeal.
In an opinion by Justice Kavanagh, joined by Chief Justice Williams and Justices Levin and Boyle, the Supreme Court held:
The Legislature, having given concurrent jurisdiction to the probate court in matters concerning children under seventeen _years of age, intended the other provisions of the Juvenile Code, such as for notice, to operate as procedural rules calculated to accomplish efficiently the act’s purpose. Such provisions prescribe the manner in which the conferred jurisdiction should be exercised, but do not purport to limit jurisdiction. The authorization of temporary orders in the act should not be read as a proscription of permanent orders. Waiver by a circuit court confers no jurisdiction on a probate court. The act confers the jurisdiction.
Reference for Points in Headnotes
[1, 2] 20 Am Jur 2d, Courts § 104.
The observation in the General Court Rule that "no waiver or transfer of jurisdiction is required for the full and valid exercise of jurisdiction of the subsequent court” evinces the conviction of the Supreme Court that children intended to be protected by the constitution and the Juvenile Code can best be served by a procedure which, having provided for appropriate notice and opportunity for a prior court to exercise its responsibility under its jurisdiction to further the child’s best interests, nonetheless gives unrestricted freedom to the juvenile court to carry out its mandate.
Reversed.
Justice Cavanagh, joined by Justices Ryan and Brickley, dissenting, stated that when a neglect petition is filed in the juvenile division of the probate court and the minor child is the subject of a prior or continuing order of the circuit court, the Juvenile Code requires that the circuit court be notified of the pending action and that it take whatever measures are appropriate. Pending such action by the circuit court, the probate court has jurisdiction to make only temporary orders pertaining to care or custody of the child. The General and Probate Court Rules applicable to such a proceeding are in conflict with the Juvenile Code insofar as they authorize the juvenile division of the probate court to enter permanent orders prior to the circuit court waiving its concurrent jurisdiction. Because the conflict in this case involves a matter of jurisdiction, the statute controls.
Subsequent to argument in this case, the Legislature suspended the operation of the section of the Juvenile Code at issue between June 20, 1984 and July 1, 1986. This "moratorium” means that there is no statute presently limiting the probate court’s jurisdiction to the issuance of temporary orders pending the circuit court’s waiver of jurisdiction. Probate courts therefore may now exercise the full extent of their concurrent jurisdiction over neglected and dependent children, as long as they otherwise comply with the procedural requirements of the court rules.
125 Mich App 407; 335 NW2d 923 (1983) reversed.
Opinion op the Court
1. Courts — Probate Court — Juvenile Divisions — Jurisdiction.
The juvenile division of a probate court has jurisdiction to enter permanent orders in child custody proceedings where the custody of the child is subject to a prior or continuing order of another court of record; the Legislature intended that procedural rules in the Juvenile Code Which prescribe the manner in which jurisdiction should be exercised should not limit jurisdiction, and the applicable court rules are consistent with that intention (MCL 712A.2[b]; MSA 27.3178[598.2][b]; GCR 1963, 724.1[5]; PCR 111.2).
Dissenting Opinion by Cavanagh, J.
2. Courts — Probate Court — Juvenile Divisions — Jurisdiction.
The juvenile division of a probate court has jurisdiction under the Juvenile Code to make only temporary orders pertaining to care or custody of a child where the child is subject to the prior or continuing order of the circuit court until the circuit court waives its jurisdiction; court rules providing otherwise are in conñict with the statute, and, because jurisdiction is involved, the statute controls (MCL 7l2A.2[b]; MSA 27.3178[598.2][b]; GCR 1963, 724.1[5]; PCR 111.2).
Berrien County Legal Services Bureau, Inc. (by Mary Ellen Drolet), for plaintiff Edna Krajewski.
Seymour, Conybeare, Straub, Seaman & Allen, P.C. (by James M. Straub and Margaret A. Penninger), for defendant Theresa Krajewski by Guardian Ad Litem James M. Straub.
Paul L. Maloney, Prosecuting Attorney, and John T. Burhans and Robert S. Yampolsky, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for defendant Berrien County Prosecutor.
Amici Curiae:
R. Scott Ryder for Michigan Probate and Juvenile Court Judges Association.
Peter D. Houk and Joseph P. Kwiatkowski for Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan.

Opinion:
Kavanagh, J.
This case concerns the extent of power that may be exercised by the juvenile division of probate court in dealing with abused or neglected minors who are wards of a circuit court by virtue of a custody award rendered as part of a divorce decree..
The trial court held that a waiver of circuit court jurisdiction was not required. The Court of Appeals reversed. Krajewski v Krajewski, 125 Mich App 407; 335 NW2d 923 (1983). We are persuaded the Court of Appeals erred.
The facts giving rise to this, controversy are not complicated. Theresa Krajewski, a minor, was under the continuous jurisdiction of the Berrien Circuit Court by virtue of a custody order entered in connection with her parents' divorce in 1974. In 1979, a petition was filed in the Berrien Probate Court, Juvenile Division, asserting that Theresa came within the appropriate provisions, MCL 712A.2(b); MSA 27.3178(598.2)(b), of the Juvénile Code and praying the court to take jurisdiction. A temporary order granting the petition was entered.
At a hearing in April, 1981, to determine if parental rights should be terminated, the question was raised whether, in light of Rozelle v Dora, 103 Mich App 607; 303 NW2d 43 (1981), a waiver of circuit court jurisdiction was necessary. The juvenile court judge took the matter under advisement pending determination of that issue.
The juvenile division of probate court has:
"(b) Jurisdiction in proceedings concerning any child under 17 years of age found within the county
"(1) Whose parent or other person legally responsible for the care and maintenance of such child, when able to do so, neglects or refuses to provide proper or necessary support, education as required by law, medical, surgical or other care necessary for his health, morals, or who is deprived of emotional well-being, or who is abandoned by his parents, guardian or other custodian, or who is otherwise without proper custody or guardianship; or
"(2) Whose home or environment, by reason of neglect, cruelty, drunkenness, criminality or depravity on the part of a parent, guardian or other custodian, is an unfit place for such child to live in, or whose mother is unmarried and without adequate provision for care and support.
"If a petition is filed in any probate court alleging that a child is within the provisions of paragraphs (1) or (2) of subdivision (b), and the custody of such child shall be subject to the prior or continuing order of another court of record of this state, the court in which such petition is filed shall forthwith cause notice of the filing of such petition to be served upon the prosecuting attorney for the county in which such other court is situated, personally or by registered mail. Immediately upon receiving such notice, the prosecuting attorney shall prepare and file such pleadings, petitions, notices or orders as may be necessary to bring the matter before such other court for hearing and such disposition, consistent with the powers of such court, as may be for the best interests of such child. Pending action by such other court in regard to the matter, the probate court with which such petition has been filed shall have jurisdiction to make any temporary orders pertaining to care or custody which may be deemed advisable or necessary for the protection of such child." MCL 712A.2(b); MSA 27.3178(598.2)(b).
The Court of Appeals concluded that under the circumstances described by the foregoing statute the probate court has jurisdiction to enter only temporary orders. Until the circuit court waives its jurisdiction, said the Court of Appeals, the probate court cannot exercise its full jurisdiction.
We do not read that statute so narrowly. Once having given concurrent jurisdiction to the probate court, the Legislature intended the act's other provisions, such as for notice, to operate as procedural rules calculated to accomplish efficiently the act's purpose. Such provisions prescribe the manner in which the conferred jurisdiction should be exercised, but do not purport to limit jurisdiction. The authorization of temporary orders should not be read as a proscription of permanent orders.
Waiver by circuit court confers no jurisdiction on the probate court. The statute confers the jurisdiction.
To obviate questions over which court should first attend to the child's needs, we adopted GCR 1963, 724.1(5) and PCR 111.2, which for the most part adopted the procedures suggested by the Legislature.
The relevant provisions of GCR 1963, 724.1 read:
"Each and every provision of any prior order of any court of record shall continue in full force and effect for so long as or until, such provision or provisions are superseded, changed, or terminated by subsequent order of a court of record.
"The subsequent court shall give due consideration to prior continuing orders of other courts of record and refrain from entering orders contrary or inconsistent with such prior orders unless appropriate to the welfare of the child and in the best interests of justice."
The observation in GCR 1963, 724.1(5) that "no waiver or transfer of jurisdiction is required for the full and valid exercise of jurisdiction of the subsequent court" evinces our conviction that the children intended to be protected by the constitution and the Juvenile Code can best be served by a procedure which, having provided for appropriate notice and opportunity for the prior court to exercise its responsibility under its jurisdiction to further the child's best interests, nonetheless gives unrestricted freedom to the juvenile court to carry out its mandate.
For the foregoing reasons, we set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the order of the Berrien Circuit Court.
Williams, C.J., and Levin and Boyle, JJ., concurred with Kavanagh, J.