Case Name: Bertram F. B. Green v. Ole J. Tenold
Court: North Dakota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: North Dakota
Decision Date: 1905-01-11
Citations: 14 N.D. 46
Docket Number: 
Parties: Bertram F. B. Green v. Ole J. Tenold.
Judges: Young, J., concurs.
Reporter: North Dakota Reports
Volume: 14
Pages: 46–57

Head Matter:
Bertram F. B. Green v. Ole J. Tenold.
Opinion filed January 11, 1905.
Mechanics’ Liens — Occupant Under Federal Homestead Law.
Where materials are furnished for the erection of- a building-on lands held by an occupant under the homestead laws of the United States, the person furnishing such materials is not entitled to a lien upon the building nor upon the land. No lien attaches to a building unless the owner thereof has some interest in the land that can be sold to enforce the lien, except in the cases provided for under sections 4794 and 4795, Rev. Codes 1899. Gull River Lumber Co. v. Briggs, 9 N. D. 485, 84 N. W. 349, followed.
Appeal from District Court, Walsh county; Kneeshaw, J.
Action by Bertram F. B. Green against Ole J. Tenold. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.
Reversed.
Spencer & Sinkler and E. R. Sinkier, for appellant.
The defendant having no interest in the land, the title being in the United States, plaintiff can enforce his lien neither against the land nor building. Gull River Lumber Co. v. Briggs, 9 N. D. 485, 84 N. W. 349. ' '
Plaintiff’s assignor tdok back a portion of the lumber sold under his contract and thereby violated its terms. He cannot, therefore, file a valid mechanic’s lien against the building partially completed. Section 4788, Rev. Codes 1895; Marski v. Semmerling, 46 111. App. 531; Linn v. O’Hara, 1 Abb. Prac. 360; Cunningham v. Jones, 20 N. Y. 486; Pruesser v. Florence, 51 How. 385; Smith v. Sheltering Anns, 35 N. Y. S. 62; Mal-bon v. Birney, 11 Wis. 107.
Plaintiff’s action is barred by the statute of limitations. A mechanic’s lien is a .principal obligation under section 4696, Rev. Codes 1899, and when the statute runs against the debt the principal obligation is barred. 15 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 115; Hills v. Halliwell, 50 Conn. 270; Watson v. Gardner, 10 N. E. 192; Borst v. Corey, 15 N. Y„ 505; Prewitt v. Wortham, 79 Ky. 287.
E. Smith-Pet erspn, for respondent.
Appellant claims that defendant, not being the-owner of the land at the time the building, upon which lien is claimed, was erected, cannot enforce his mechanic’s lien, not even against the building. Gull River Lumber Co. v. Briggs, 9 N. D. 485, 84 N. W. 349.
The above case differs from the case at bar, in that the land therein sought to be affected, was the property of the state of North Dakota, and the person who contracted for the building had neither contract or lease and was a trespasser without right of occupancy. In the case at bar, defendant had no legal estate in the land, but was a rightful occupant under the homestead laws of the United States, and it being his duty to build a house thereon, such house was for his “immediate use and benefit,” and he was the “owner” under the mechanic’s lien law as defined in section 4798, Rev. Codes 1895, and being such owner his contract would sustain the lien. If section 5469, Comp. Laws, created a lien in favor of Mahon, as held in case of Mahon v. Surerus, 9 N. D. 57, 81 N. W. 64, then section 4788, Rev. Codes 1899, created one in favor of Green, in the case at bar. The language of the two sections is identical. If in the case cited — Surerus case — section 5483, Comp. Laws, constituted Surerus the “owner” with whom a contract for a lien could be made, then section 4798, Rev. Codes, constituted Tenold owner with whom a contract for a lien could be made. The amendment to section 5480, Comp. Laws, occurs in section 4790, Rev. Codes, and relates not to the right of lien but to its enforcement. Sections 4788 and 4789 create two separate liens, one on the land and one on the buildings, and if the Code fails to give a remedy to enforce them, equity will supply one. 19 Am. & Eng. Enc Law (2d Ed.) 35; Cairo & Vincennes R. R. Co. v. Fackney, 78 111. 116; Gilchrist v. Elelena Hot Springs Smelter R. R. Co., 58 Fed. 708; 13 Enc. PI. & Pr. 944, III; Waldorf v. Scott, 46 Texas, 1.
Appellant claims that plaintiff’s cause of action is barred by statute of limitations, six years 'having elapsed since its accrual. The lien is not barred by reason of the lapse of time since suit could be brought on original claim. Section 4696, Rev. Codes. Actions to foreclose mechanic’s liens are governed by sections 5207 and 4696, Rev. Codes 1899; 19 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) 177, VIII; Spear v. Evans, 8 N. W. 20 ; Lamb v. Clark, 5 Pickering, 198; 19 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) 152.

Opinion:
Morgan, J.
This is an action to' foreclose a mechanic's lien upon a building. The plaintiff's assignor furnished the lumber for such building in August, 1896. At that time the land on which the building was placed was occupied by the defendant under a homestead entry made pursuant to the laws of the United States. The defendant relies upon that fact to defeat the plaintiff's lien. After the plaintiff had rested his case he moved to amend the prayer of his complaint to the effect that he be declared entitled to a judgment against the defendant for the sum of $74.02, and that such judgment be declared a lien upon the buildings described in the complaint; that a special execution issue against said building, and that the same be sold under such execution; that the purchaser of such building at said sale be authorized to remove the same from the land on which it was placed within forty days after the sale thereof. This amendment was allowed, and at the close of the trial the court made findings of fact and conclusions of law in plaintiff's favor, and judgment was entered ordering the sale and removal of such building in accordance with the relief asked in the amended complaint. The defendant appeals from the judgment, and asks for a review of the entire case under section 5630, Rev. Codes 1889. Among other contentions, it is insisted by the appellant that the plaintiff is not entitled to a lien either upon the land or upon the building erected thereon. The basis of this contention is that the title to the land on which the building was erected was in the United States, and that such land is exempt from sale under execution for any debts created while the title remained in the United States, and that under the law of this state no> lien on buildings separate from the real estate on which the building is situated is given for materials furnished for the erection of such buildings in cases where the interest of the occupant of the land who procured the materials cannot be sold under execution to satisfy the lien.
It is well settled in this state and in others that lands held under the United States homestead laws, prior to the issuance of patent, are exempt from mechanics' liens based on contracts made while the title to such lands remained in the United States. Mahon v. Surerus, 9 N. D. 57, 81 N. W. 64; Gull River Lumber Co. v. Briggs, 9 N. D. 485, 84 N. W. 349; Kansas Lumber Co. v. Jones, 32 Kan. 195, 4 Pac. 74; Paige v. Peters, 70 Wis. 178, 35 N. W. 328, 5 Am. St. Rep. 156; Fink v. O'Neill, 106 U. S. 283, 1 Sup. Ct. 325, 27 L. Ed. 196. In Mahon v. Surerus, supra, this court held that, under the mechanic's lien law as it then existed under the Compiled Laws, a lien was given on the building separate from a lien on the land, and that where the occupant had no title to the land the lien could be enforced against the building, and the building removed from the land after sale under foreclosure of the lien. Section 5480, Comp. Laws 1887, authorized such sale and removal. Said section 5480 was repealed under the revision of the Code in 1895. In Gull River Lumber Co. v. Briggs, supra, this court held that the effect of the repeal of section 5480, Comp. Laws 1887, is to destroy the right to a lien upon a building when the lienee has no interest in the land, or the land is exempt from sale under liens, as in this case. The court said: "In all other cases the building must remain upon the land; but a lien upon a building that could in no manner be utilized would be so barren of benefits that we cannot presume the legislature ever intended to confer it." That case holds, in construing this same statute, that no lien attaches to the land or to the building unless the owner of the building has some interest or estate in the land out of which a lien can be enforced, and that a building cannot be sold separately from the land to satisfy a lien except in the cases prescribed by sections 4794 and 4795, Rev. Codes 1899; that is, in cases of leasehold interests that have been forfeited, and in cases of incumbrances on the land when the materials are furnished. We think the latter case decisive of the case at bar. This decision is assailed by counsel for respondent. In our opinion, the question of its correctness is not now open for discussion. A rule of property was announced by it, under which many and important interests have arisen. Under these circumstances the decision should not be changed, even were it conceded to be without authority to sustain it, or a doubtful construction of the statute. Smith v. McDonald, 42 Cal. 484. It has the support of authority, however: Kellogg v. Little & Smythe Co., 1 Wash. 407, 25 Pac. 461; Coddington v. Dry Dock Co., 31 N. J. Law, 477; Babbitt v. Condon, 27 N. J. Law, 154; Ranson v. Sheehan, 78 Mo. 668. No judgment for the value of the materials furnished can be ordered, as more than six years has elapsed since the materials were furnished.
The judgment is reversed, and the district court is directed to dismiss the action.
Young, J., concurs.