Case Name: John SEMMA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PRINCIPAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2007-06-12
Citations: 237 F. App'x 463
Docket Number: No. 06-15909
Parties: John SEMMA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PRINCIPAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: Before ANDERSON, MARCUS and COX, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 237
Pages: 463–464

Head Matter:
John SEMMA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PRINCIPAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 06-15909.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
June 12, 2007.
William Francis Rutger, Rutger & Donaldson, Palm Harbor, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Jay S. Blumenkopf, Adorno & Yoss, P.A., Boca Raton, FL, Jack R. Reiter, Adorno & Yoss, P.A., Coral Gables, FL, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before ANDERSON, MARCUS and COX, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM:
This case was scheduled for oral argument. Pursuant to the consent of counsel, however, the appeal was submitted on the briefs.
After careful consideration of the briefs, record and the district court's helpful opinion, we conclude that the judgment of the district court is due to be affirmed. With respect to plaintiffs accidental death and dismemberment claim, we readily conclude that Principal Life's determination— that the injury did not result from external, violent and accidental means — was not wrong. The "external, violent and accidental means" clause was not satisfied by plaintiffs designated cause, the surgery. Alternately, we also conclude that the claim was properly denied because a pre policy 1962 eye injury was a contributing cause of plaintiffs loss, so that plaintiff also failed to satisfy the "direct and sole cause of loss" clause.
With respect to plaintiffs accelerated life insurance claim, we also conclude that Principal Life's determination — that plaintiff failed to satisfy the "expected to die within twelve months" requirement— was not wrong. We reject plaintiffs argument that the limiting condition — "in the absence of extensive or extraordinary medical treatment" — applies to the "expected to die within twelve months" clause, or otherwise renders that clause ambiguous. That limiting condition applies to the definition of "Qualifying Event", but not to the "expected to die within twelve months" requirement.
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.