Case Name: Webb and Vanlear v. The Protection Insurance Company
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio
Jurisdiction: Ohio
Decision Date: 1834-12
Citations: 6 Ohio 456
Docket Number: 
Parties: *Webb and Vanlear v. The Protection Insurance Company.
Judges: 
Reporter: Cases decided in the supreme court of ohio : upon the circuit at the special sessions in Columbus
Volume: 6
Pages: 462–483

Head Matter:
*Webb and Vanlear v. The Protection Insurance Company.
Where evidence is given to the jury, the court will not set aside the verdict, unless it is palpably against the evidence, or its weight.
A proposition, by the insured, to abandon for a total loss, which is abandoned upon the agreement of the insurer to pay his proportion of the expense of repair, is not an agreement to defray the whole expense of repair, nor such an interference with the wreck to prevent an abandonment, as will subject the insurer to pay any greater loss than would otherwise be legally adjusted upon the policy.
A policy of insurance upon the hull of a steamboat, on time, does not cover expenses for the ordinary wages of the crew, while navigating the boat, into port for repair, after her founder.
Insurer is not liable for wages of the crew between the place o£ founder an<J discharge, on the direct line of the voyage.
Commission paid a commission merchant for advancing repairs, in a home port, are not chargeable against the insurer; and if the advance be at the port where the policy was executed, it is prima facie the home of the boat. Interest upon the amount of the loss may be assessed, after the expiration of the stipulated sixty days, from the proof of notice.
Such a policy does not cover wages paid to hands that were of the crew, who were discharged at the port for repair, and re-employed as common work hands in the repair, except for the wages of ordinary hands.
This case was adjourned from Hamilton county, on a motion for a new trial made by the defendants. It was an action of assumpsit on a policy of insurance, in which the defendants took a risk of five thousand dollars upon the hull, engine, tackle, and furniture of the steamboat G-alena, valued at seven thousand dollars, against unavoidable, external violence in navigating the western waters, for six months.
On trial to the jury, it appeared that in a voyage from Louisville, in Kentucky, to Florence, in Alabama, the boat struck a rock near the head of Colbert’s Island, in the Tennessee river, that had been dropped in the channel by those employed to clear out the river, and was seriously injured by the collision. It was conceded that the damage was within the perils insured against, and that the defendants are answerable for five-sevenths of the proper charge for repairing the injury.
The jury returned a special verdict finding the execution of the policy, and also:
1. That the injury was sustained on the 4th, and notified to the defendants on December 20, 1831, and the repairs completed on April 9, 1832.
2. That the plaintiffs proposed to abandon the boat for a total loss after the injury, but were prevented from doing so, by the defendants agreeing to pay their proportion of the costs of repairs.
*3. That the amount paid for repairs, including [457 the bill of Eobinson (exhibited), was...................$2,362 23
4. That the crew were employed after the accident in preserving the boat, and taking her to New Albany for repair; were there discharged as a crew, and some of them again' employed at the request of the boat carpenter to expedite the repairs; and that there was paid for their wages, between the time of the injury and the discharge at New Albany......... 1,085 61
And for like wages between such discharge and the completion of the repairs.................................... 1517 61
5. That the plaintiffs expended for provisions for the boat’s crew, between the time of the injury and the completion of the repairs.................................... 984 01
6. And paid Forsythe & Co., of Louisville, commissions for advancing the above payments............... 206 80
Miaking a total sum of.......................................$5,156 26
And the jury assess the plaintiff’s damages to so much of the said items set forth in the accounts exhibited as the court shall be of opinion they are, in. law, entitled to, with such interest as the law allows.
The defendants move for a new trial because the verdict is against evidence in the following particulars :
1. In finding the whole of Robinson’s bill of one thousand four hundred and fifty dollars as expense of repairs.
2. In finding that the crew were discharged.
3. In finding that five hundred and seventeen dollars and sixty-one cents was expended for wages of the crew after their discharge.
4. In finding the expense of repairs with the consent of the defendants.
5. In finding that the plaintiffs were prevented from abandoning by the defendant’s agreement to pay their proportion of the costs of repair.
There is also a motion by the plaintiffs for judgment for the whole items found by the jury.
C. Fox, for the plaintiffs :
On this verdict several questions present themselves for consideration of the court. They may be classed under the following heads: 458] *1. Where the state of injury is such as to justify an abandonment, but an actual abandonment is not made in consequence of an agreement on the part of the underwriter to pay for the repairs, what are the rights of the insured ?
2. Is the insured entitled to recover the amount of wages paid to the crew, and money expended for provisions used, in navigating the vessel from the port of distress to the nighest port for repair, when that port is sought and the repairs made by agreement with the underwriter?
3. After arriving at the port where the repairs are to be made, the crew are discharged, as a crew, and a part of them engaged as hands, is the insured entitled to recover the amount paid the hands thus re-engaged?
In answer to the first inquiry, I take it to be a well-settled rule, ■“that if, by any interference of the underwriter, the insured be prevented from abandoning, the underwriters are liable for all the loss sustained by the insured, to the extent of the sum insured.” 2 Condy’s Marshall, 598; 2 Term, 407.
The authorities show, conclusively, that where the insured has a right to abandon, and the underwriters agree to pay for repairs, and by such an agreement prevent an abandonment being made, they must pay the whole expense of the repairs, even if it exceed the amount insured. 2 Wash. C. C. 349; 3 Mason, 51, 437; 2 Term, 407.
If the voyage was broken up and lost, that circumstance authorized the insured to abandon. 3 Mason, 51, 437.
In answer to the second inquiry, we say: If the abandonment had been made, the charge of taking care of the boat would have been with the underwriter — the expense of taking her to the port of repair would have been the underwriter’s — the crew’s wages •and provisions must have been paid by the underwriter. Phillips •on Ins. 462.
The agreement on the part of defendant’s agents, that the ■plaintiffs should go on and repair, is an authority to use all the •necessary means of making the repairs. The repairs could not have been made at a port nearer than New Albany, where she was repaired ; the authority, therefore, to repair at that place imposes an obligation to pay the expense of getting her there.
I admit that if the vessel was injured, but still was able to proceed on her voyage, and was only detained to repair, according to the English rule, the wages of the crew, while so detained, could be no charge on the underwriter of the ship ; *but the rea- [459 son of that rule has no application to the present case. In the case alluded to, the wages of the crew depend upon the successful termination of the voyage. The owner is at no additional expense, except as to provisions, and the freight is said to include the wages. But when the voyage is broken up, there is no chance of earning freight, and all the expense of going to another port is an extra charge.
But where the ship is hired by the month, the expense of wage® and provisions during a detention are considered a charge on the underwriter. 2 Condy, 727; Park on Ins. 126,
It is a part of the history of this country, well known to every one acquainted with the navigation of the western waters, that the captain and crew, and indeed all persons employed on hoard a steamboat, are uniformly engaged by the month. The crew claim and exercise the right of leaving the boat, and the master claims and exercises the right of discharging any or all of the crew at any time. The wages are paid at the monthly rate agreed upon, but the amount paid is regulated by the length of the service.
Whether the voyage is performed or not, is immaterial to the crews employed on ste a-mboats — their wages must be paid at all events.
But whenever a ship is forced by a storm to enter a port to repair, “the wages and victuals of the crew are brought into an average, from the day it was resolved to seek a port to refit the vessel to the day of her departure from it, with all the charges of unloading, reloading, anchorage, pilotage, and every expense incurred by this necessity.” Park, 126.
In answer to the third inquiry, we contend that the owners-have the right to recover the amount paid to those of the crew who worked at the repairs. It is found, by the verdict, that the crew were discharged, as a crew, at New Albany, and that those of them who were employed at the repairs were so employed “at the request of the ship-carpenter, to expedite the repairs and that the expense of the repairs was not increased by employing those hands.”
What difference it can make to the underwriter whether a laborer is employed from this or any other boat, I can not imagine. So long as the cost of the repairs is not increased, he has no reason to complain. 2 Mason, 51; 2 Term, 407.
The right to allowance for commissions paid the merchant who 460] *made the advances, is clearly a correct charge, without deducting one-third new for old. Phillips, 371.
N. Wright, for the defendants:
It will be seen at once that the materiality of the reasons for a new trial, and the bearing of them upon the result of the case, depend upon the construction that may be given to the verdict* and the law which may be held to arise thereupon. If the court agree with us in the construction of the verdict and the law, then, probably, all these reasons, except the first, will be unimportant; but if otherwise, it maybe essential to show that tho jury had no evidence on which they could find these facts as they did. The wish of the defendants is, that the case may now be-finally settled ; and for that purpose that the items of the account sustained by a finding against evidence (if any such there be) should be rejected, and the amount recoverable should be now made up, upon the full and true merits of the case.
In arguing the case, I shall first consider the verdict, referring incidentally to matters arising on the motion for a new trial; and then consider any matters relating to the motion not previously referred to.
In relation to the special verdict, the items for the wages and provisions for the crew can not be recovered. It is hardly necessary to reiterate the law upon this point; this court, if I mistake not, has already fully settled it. There was in truth nothing to-settle, when once the proper discriminations are made in the adjudications on this matter. The present insurance is on the boat; such insurance has nothing to do with her profits, or the expense-of navigating her, either before or after damage, so far as ordinary expenses are concerned. The insurer simply warrants to make good the injury to the boat, tackle, etc.; if these are damaged he shall pay the cost of repairs ; but whether she shall make-one trip or twenty, whether the cost of navigating her shall be one-half or five times her income,is no concern of his ; these matters belong to the insurer on freights or profits ; if he can say to the owners, th ere is your boat as good as it was before, it matters not to him what business she has done. A strange confusion of ideas seems to have arisen among some of us at the bar, on this matter, by confounding with it a different class of questions. It is a question ^discussed in this country and in England, and [461 on which there is a diversity of decisions, whether, in case of a ship turning aside to repair, to avoid danger of foundering, the wages and provisions of the crew, during the detention, would be covered by a policy on the ship as general average. In New York it is held, that inasmuch as the delay is for the common safety of all concerned, for the preservation not only of property but of life; and good policy requires that the owners should have no- temptation to peril either, for the sake of avoiding expenses to themselves — that the ship ought to contribute its average of such -expenses. This is, perhaps, a correct doctrine. But the courts •of New York, as well as all others, hold that wages and provisions in such cases ate recoverable only as general average. Dunham v. Com. Ins. Co., 11 Johns. 315, 347 ; Barker v. Ph. Ins. Co., 8 Johns. 245 ; Leavenworth v. Dalafield, 1 Caine, 573 ; Walden v. Leroy, 2 Caine, 263; Paine & Scribner v. N. Y. Ins. Co., 3 Caine, 155 ; Mumford v. C. Ins. Co. 5 Johns. 262; Dodge v. H. M. Ins. Co., 17 Mass. 471; McBride v. M. Ins. Co., 7 Johns. 432, note a; Phil. Ins. 252, 347, 370; Beneck & Stevens, 127, 389; Hughes Ins. 370; Sage v. M. Ins. Co., 1 Conn. 239, In some of these cases, as in case of capture or wreck, the employment of the crew by law terminates by the casualty to the ship, so that if they are continued .afterward it is on a new engagement, and is construed as being done for the safety of all concerned, and so is included in general •average. Hence the distinction between capture and embargo; .the former dissolves the contract with the crew, the latter does not; and if the crew is retained, in one case, it is considered as a special employing to take care of ship and cargo, and to be ready for reshipping in case the ship is released ; in the other case, as the continuance of their ordinary employment, the former being general average, the latter not. Yarious other distinctions, arising out of special circumstances, might be referred to, were it necessary.
Another case has occurred, which has also led to confusion of the rules of law on this point. If a ship is compelled to employ •extra assistance to reach a suitable port of repair, that extra expense, in proper circumstances, is considered as part of the cost of repairs; as where a boat requires to be towed, or to employ extra hands, etc., to reach such port. This may be a proper charge, for the same reason that the cost of bringing the materials for re-462] pair to an inconvenient place would be *part of the expense. But this has no application to the present question. The principle is this: the insurer on the ship has nothing to do with the cost of navigating; this belongs to the owners; they provide the hands to navigate her, and take care of her, both when she is in prosperity and adversity, as well when on the rocks as when under way ; it is the duty of the crew at all times, as well after •the accident as before, to bestow their utmost exertions in taking care of and saving the ship; this is their ordinary duty, resulting' from their employment and the wages they receive; and if this is ■ not done, the policy is forfeited. Can it be contended that on these rivers, if a boat meets with an accident that disables her for the time, the crew may abandon her, and if they are employed afterward, it is at the cost of the insurer? And yet such is the result of the doctrine against which I contend. The moment of an accident is that in which all the efforts of the crew are required, as well as their continued exertions afterward, and what captain would ever employ a crew upon other principles? In the present case, the wages and provisions claimed are these ordinary expenses, resulting from the ordinary duty of the owners .to take care of their boat.
In the present case, there is no pretense that the claim can be sustained as general average. No facts, looking that way, are found in the verdict or exist in the case. It would hardly be claimed that the cargo, which might have been in the boat at the time, was liable to contribute to these repairs.
Another ground has been suggested on which a part of the wages are claimed to be covered; that is, that the hands were employed in making the repairs. I refer now to their employment independent of the circumstance of their discharge and reemployment, as found in the verdict. I shall consider that hereafter. The fact that the crew assist in making the repairs is no reason why their wages should be allowed. In Sage v. M. Ins. Co., 1 Conn. 239, this matter is ably treated. It is the duty of the crew to do all in their power to prevent and repair injury. If they are not able to do it, extra aid must be employed, for which the insurer is liable. While they are retained as crew they draw their wages, whether assisting in the repairs or not; their duty is to take all possible care of their boat, and it becomes impossible to distinguish so as to decide how much of their labor is bestowed on the repairs, and how much on their other duties. He who occasions a confusion *of property, so that the interests of [463 one can not be distinguished from those of another, must bear the loss. It is utterly impossible, therefore, where the hands are retained in the employ of the ship-owners, to make any apportionment of their work on account of repairs. Probably no case ever-occurred where the crew have not rendered some assistance in the - repairs; and yet no case has attempted to make a partition. The- rule must be one which can be acted upon, and which will be obvious ; and none can be found for this purpose but that in Sage v. M. Ins. Co.
In the present case the wages are claimed as wages, the account •is so kept; even the cook and his wife, the steward, etc., all as the ordinary hands of the boat; the captain, too, whose general care and superintendence of the boat would be indispensable, especially at a season when the boat would start on a voyage the moment .she was ready; all are allowed full wages in the name of wages, without an attempt to put them in the shape of cost of repairs. The accounts were necessarily so kept, while the hands were retained as a crew; and of course there could be no discrimination, by which an estimate could be made of the worth of that part of their services, which went into the repairs, if such a distinction ■could be taken in law, which surely could not. In Perry v. Ohio Ins. Co., 5 Ohio, 306, and Gazzam v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., ante 73, the law on the foregoing points is so fully settled that it was not necessary to have said what I have.
But the plaintiffs attempt to take this case out of the general principle by virtue of certain matters found in the verdict.
The verdict finds that “the plaintiffs offered to abandon, and were prevented from so doing by the agreement of the defendants to pay their proportion of the cost of repairs.” The plaintiffs contend that this subjects us to all their account, and cite Da Costa v. Newnham, 4 D. & E. 407. This case is so much relied upon that I must drop a word upon it. A writer in 10 Amer. Jurist, 254, speaking of this case, says that the court without referring to principles and without argument, took for granted certain principles of law, referring to authorities which in fact sustain no such principles; and in consequence of such a sanction the case has been since used to sustain absurd positions. I do not quote the language. The case is evidently a singular, if not an inconsistent one, though it is difficult to tell what it decides. It relies 464] on the fact of a refusal to accept the ^abandonment, and some agreement about making the repairs, but what items were brought in by virtue of this agreement does not appear. The whole expense claimed was six hundred and seventy-eight pounds; the verdict was for sixty-two pounds and nineteen shillings, to which the defendant objected. The judge says, it was a case where the party had a right to abandon. The case does not decide expressly that wages and provisions were not recoverable, even in that ease. He decides that an abatement of one-third new for old was not to be made; but this he puts solely on the ground that the ship after repair never came fully into the hands of the plaintiff. Now, if the matter about abandonment did not give a right to claim wages and provisions, the case is in our favor, and cuts off the whole claim under that finding in the verdict. Again, in the present case, there was no right to abandon ; the verdict does not find a ease for abandonment; the proof makes no such case; for the damages, as estimated by the witness, and the expense of repairs as proved, do not approach to half the valuation, seven thousand dollars.
The agreement, as found, is to pay our proportion of repairs, and nothing more, precisely what we are liable to do without the agreement; and how can it now be said that this is an agreement to pay, in addition, wages, provisions, etc. The finding, therefore, if relied upon, seems to me to protect us against all but repairs. If a case of abandonment had existed, and the boat had been abandoned, she would have been ours, run on our account, and when repaired, her earnings and enhanced price would have been ours. Surely it would be preposterous now, to attempt to charge us with the expenses of running to a certain date, and give us no account of subsequent profits and enhanced value.
Upon the motion for a new trial, if my construction of the verdict is not correct, there was not a particle of proof that the plaintiffs were prevented from abandoning by our offer to pay the proportion of the cost of repairs. All the proof on this point is included in the deposition of Eorsythe, his letter of December 14, and E. Marsh’s deposition. This letter is not even an offer to abandon, for it only offers to abandon an undivided interest, that is, five-sevenths. The principle of abandonment is, that the insured prefers to give up his interest in the boat, and take the insurance money, so that there can not be an abandonment in part. The basis of abandonment is a total loss, that is, the insured has lost all his interest; of ^course he can not stipulate to retain [465 a part, when he offers to abandon.
In the next place, after this letter was received, some time in January, the defendants, as they had a right to do, took time to deliberate and inquire, and on the 25th of January an answer was given, as Eorsythe states it, that defendants would make no corn- promise, the owners might go on and repair, and defendants would pay their proportion. Forsythe requested defendants to send an engineer to make the repairs; but they refused, saying the owners must make the repairs, and defendants would pay their proportion ; and they might make them whore they thought proper. Marsh states the matter in about the same way, showing a little more distinctly that all that passed was merely a declaration of what the law requires in case of a partial loss, that it was not the duty of the insurers to make repairs or to advance money for it; but the insured must make their own repairs and send in their bill. At the time of these negotiations the boat was lying safe at Waterloo, where she arrived December 30, as stated in Hacker’s deposition, or was employed in towing keels (same deposition), not a word was said in all these negotiations about abandonment; if Forsythe’s request, that defendant should send a hand to take charge of the boat, can be qonstruod as alluding to abandonment, the reply was a direct refusal, not upon any condition, or holding out any inducement to prevent an abandonment; but a direct negative, stating that defendants would do precisely what was their legal obligation in case of a partial loss; in this the plaintiffs acquiesced, without demanding any terms or conditions, or intimating that they wished to rely on an abandonment. Most clearly these statements can not, with the least color of fairness, be construed into any sort of a special contract, founded on the consideration of relinquishing the abandonment. In the first placo, no case for abandonment existed; in the second place, no 'valid one was offered ; in the third place, no inducements to relinquish it were held out, nor any terms proposed for doing so; but it was, if suggested, promptly refused, and the only offer was to do what the law required in case of partial loss. It is clear, therefore, if there be anything in this finding materially varying the rights of parties, that there was not a particle of testimony to warrant it.
Another item of the verdict which seems to be relied upon as giving some right to claim these wages and provisions, is, 466] *“ that the expense of repairs and subsequent control of the boat were by the assent of the defendants.” I understand from this, precisely what the words express, that defendants did not object to the making of the repairs, and the control of the boat, bv plaintiffs. This would probably bar us from objecting to the place and time of making the repairs; but our simple assent to what the plaintiffs had a right to do surely implies no additional obligation on our part. It might as well operate to bind us to pay for lengthening the boat, as to pay the wages of the crew.
If this finding has any other meaning or effect, it is entirely unsupported by testimony. The only proof on the point is Forsythe’s deposition, who says defendants’ agent told them to make the repairs, and that they might do it where they thought proper, and he thinks New Albany was spoken of as the place contemplated. This was merely stating to them their legal duty, surely not the making of a special contract. There can be no difficulty upon this point.
Another fact in the verdict is also relied upon to charge us with apart of the wages, viz: “that the crew were discharged as a crew, and afterward were employed by the captain, at the special request of the ship carpenter, to enable him to expedite the repairs.” This point is taken with reference to what is said in Da Costa v. Newnham, 4 D. E. 407, viz: that the crew having been discharged, and some of them employed by the day, by the ship carpenter, about the repairs, the wages so paid by the carpenter was a proper item of the expense of repairs. It must be kept in mind, what is the rule of law upon this point. The captain and crew, while employed as a ship’s crew, are bound to take care of the ship, to assist in repairing her, and to do everything «lse in their power for her benefit; they are bound to spend all their time in her service, and this results simply from their relation to^ the ship as her crew. I will not undertake to decide, nor to inquire, whether the actual damage to a ship might be recovered by estimation, without reference to the bills for repairing; and, if so, whether, in any possible ease of that kind, repairs actually made by the crew could be recovered ; probably not, however, from the impossibility of reducing any such rule to safe practice. But it is enough for the present case that the wages of the crew, as a crew, can not be recovered. To admit it would be a violation of all ^principle, and open the door to the grossest imposition [467 upon insurers.
The finding stated above is, that “the crew were again employed by the captain,” etc. I consider, therefore, that this reemployment was as a ship’s crew; for it was the captain who employed, and that not to work at the repairs, but “ to enable the •carpenter to expedite the repairs.” The ordinary duties of a crew about the boat would aid in expediting repairs; and the fact that they were employed by the captain, and not by the carpenter, shows that they were employed as-a crew. If this be the fail-construction of the finding (and that it is, is confirmed by the fact that it comes the nearest to anything which the proofs would war-' rant), then it leaves the matter as it stood before — the hands were ■still acting as a crew, owing duty to the boat in that capacity, and •entitled to their wages accordingly.
But if the true construction of the finding can be made to ■operate against us, then, under the motion for a new trial, we insist there is not a particle of proof to warrant such a finding.
The remaining item is two hundred and six dollars eighty cents, commissions paid by plaintiffs to Forsythe & Co., for advancing them four thousand one hundred and thirty-six dollars to pay the •boat bills.
This is a novel claim; the plaintiffs, not being flush of money, •raise it from a commission merchant and call on us to pay the commissions. If they had borrowed it from the bank we must have paid the interest; and if they had plenty on hand we should have been saved this item, so that the amount recoverable will ■depend on the wealth or the credit of the insured. This is not the law. There are cases of repairs made in foreign ports where commissions are recoverable. The captain, abroad, has a power, in case of necessity, to pledge the ship, or resort to any other fair ■means to raise funds; and the expense of raising them in a foreign port, if inevitable, is part of the cost of repairs. But at home no ■such principle applies. It is so decided in Sage v. Marine Insurance Co., 1 Conn. 242, and so always must be.
The defendants were not bound to advance money to make the ■repairs unless they had accepted an abandonment or a valid one was made and adhered to. The terms of the policy, as well as all practice, settle this — the loss is not payable till sixty days after notice, and the actual cost of repairs is the criterion by which the 468] amount of partial loss is usually estimated. *It would be absurd to say that the insured has a right to call at once for money in advance to make the repairs; his course is to exhibit his bills of repairs duly authenticated, and claim payment of them. As said in Peele v. Marine Insurance Co., 3 Mason, 85, “ the duty of the ■insurer is solvere, not f'acere, to pay the amount, not to do the work.” “ If the underwriter has a right to repair in one case he has in all cases, and in his own manner, and with his own materials.”
It remains to add some further remarks on the motion for a new trial. The damage to the boat was small. Even making a liberal allowance for the necessary injury by cutting the deck, it is difficult to conceive how the expense of repair could be made more than five hundred dollars. Yet the owners, while making the repairs, have seen fit to lengthen their boat twelve or thirteen feet, refloor the decks, new build parts of the engine, etc., and by thus inevitably blending the repairs with important improvements and alterations, charging us with the wages and provisions of their •captain and crew throughout, and even the commissions on their own money, make out a bill of upward of five thousand dollars. The account presented is the very reverse of that simple, distinct exhibit of the costs of repairing the damage, which usage in such cases requires. It is an obvious attempt to make out of the insurer, not only an indemnity for an unprofitable trip, but even a large proportion of the cost of a new and enlarged boat; for how else could they attempt to claim of us all the wages and provisions of the crew, while themselves admit that the improvements were in progress during the same period.
The first item objected to in the verdict is including the whole of Robinson’s bill of fourteen hundred and fifty dollars thirty cents in the repairs. On this we must ask the court to read De Hart’s deposition. He states the repairs to the bottom, including the hauling' out and launching, from four to five hundred - dollars. The boat was not hauled out. If we allow them five hundred dollars for the just share of Robinson’s bill, they will be fully remunerated as near as we can judge. The labor, applicable to both branches jointly, stands against us wholly; doubtless the same is true as to materials. We can not otherwise account for the great difference between the estimate for repairs and the bills rendered. The legal rule is, that wherever it can not be clearly shown that an item is applicable to repairs only, it ought to be set down to improvements; and this, among other reasons, because the plaintiffs *have chosen thus to confuse the two branches of busi- [469 ness, and it rests with them to show clearly what part belongs to us.
Another matter in which the verdict is supported by proof, is the amount paid to the crew after the supposed discharge ; or, in other words, the amount paid the crew for assisting in repairs. I have said before I do not suppose this item recoverable on the face of the verdict; but, if in that I mistake, the recovery must be on the ground that the amount was, in part, paid for repairs. On this point I wish to refer the court to the testimony, not only with reference to the point itself, but to show the manner in which the plaintiffs set up their claim, with reference to other points above referred to.
I believe all the other reasons for a new trial are sufficiently touched upon under the first branch of the case. The defendants wish that the case may be now finally adjusted ; and, for that purpose, if there be anything in those facts in the verdict not warranted by the proof, which operates against us, we wish that the amount may be made up by rejecting such unauthorized finding, or, in other words, on the whole merits of the case as presented in, the testimony.
On the question of interest, it can not be claimed prior to the 9th of April, when the work was completed, and money paid; for it could not have been demanded or paid before that time, the amount not being ascertained. But, further, the amount is payable sixty days after proof of loss ; this proof means the ordinary preliminary proof, which includes not only the fact of injury, but the amount, in case of partial loss; so that this proof could not be complete till the 9th of April, and sixty days after that must be allowed; and so interest would begin from June 8, 1832.
C. Fox and B. Storer, in reply:
As to the item of Robinson’s bill, the question was distinctly submitted to the jury. The defendant had the benefit of De Hart’s deposition. ¥e met it by the testimony of several witnesses, showing the standing of Robinson, his character as a carpenter, and by showing that De Hart was no mechanic. The matter was fairly submitted to the jury, on the question of credibility, and we suppose must rest as it is.
With regard to the mode and manner of keeping the accounts 470] of the expenditures; these matters were submitted to *the jury, and the objections which are now raised were fully discussed. So with regard to the amount paid for repairs.
There is much said about the term “ wages.” The counsel says, the fact of the term “ wages ” being made use of, shows that all the money paid the hands were for wages as a crew. The verdict ■shows that the crew were discharged, yet we find that the charges for wages are continued as before. And is not this the ordinary anode of keeping accounts of expenditures ? Is not the term applicable to compensation paid for all labor, whether as laborers, mechanics, or otherwise.
That an abandonment must embrace the whole subject insured is admitted; but that where five-sevenths only of a ship is insured, (the owner is bound to abandon the whole vessel, is not admitted. If a ship and cargo are insured, the owner can not abandon either the ship or the cargo alone. But if the owner of one-fourth of a vessel insure his part, and the other owners do not insure, can it >be seriously contended that the owner who did insure can not recover, merely because he can not give up the property not insured? All the books require is, that the insured abandon to the insurer his right to the property insured, so that he may stand in bis place. Park on Ins. 143.
But it is insisted that the case is not onepn which an abandonment could be made, because the injury was not half of seven thousand dollars. This point, we supposed, was conceded ; for we ■have no recollection of the question having been discussed before the jury; indeed, the charge and verdict shows it was not, and if it had have been the intention to raise the question as to the right, it was a question of fact which was for the jury to decide. Phil. Ins. 400; 3 Cranch, 386-391. But if it is properly before the court, it is evident that it is a clear ease of abandonment for several reasons :
1. The voyage was broken up and could not be pursued, and the vessel was at a place where re'pairs could not be made. 6 Mass. 483.
2. Because a great expense was necessary, and unless the underwriters would have agreed to pay that expense, the right to abandon did exist.
“ The cases where the insured may abandon are : if the voyage ■be lost or not worth pursuing; if the salvage be high ; if further expense be necessary; if the insurer will not, at all events, undertake to pay that expense.” 2 Condy’s Marshall, 580; 2 Burr. 1209; Park, 145.
*3. Because the actual expense of repairs, as we contend, [471 was more than one-half of the value.
Our claim is not for the ordinary wages of the crew. On the ■contrary, it is for the extraordinary wages and the extraordinary expenditures for provisions, etc., that we claim; and so G-azzam v. Cincinnati Insurance Company is not opposed to our claim. It stands upon the same principle as any other extraordinary expenditure. The seamen are not entitled to wages in case of wreck before the voyage is terminated; yet when the voyage is broken up, when it is impossible to proceed further, they may claim pay for their extraordinary exertions by way of salvage. Phil. Ins. 468.
But this crew, in coming from the port of distress, ought to be considered as re-engaged. It is a new voyage to all intents and purposes, and has a new object in view.
But these expenses are claimed as extraordinary, because they have been incurred at the solicitation and request of the defendants, to prevent what they considered a greater evil, viz: an abandonment. The court is specially referred to Hughes on Insurance, 327, on this question. He says: “If an underwriter authorize the insured to do what they conceive to be best under the circumstances, he is bound by acts done by the latter, in the exercise of a sound discretion.”
Again, suppose the plaintiffs had not seen cause to have repaired at all, and had sued as for a total loss, but on the trial were not able to prove a total loss, would they not have been entitled to a verdict for the actual injury sustained? Most assuredly they would. 2 Condy, 729; Hughes, 372; Park, 399. And the amount of that injury would have been the expense of repairing her, and this must have been determined by the opinion of men acquainted with the business. If at the port of distress there were no ship carpenters to be had, what would ‘ it cost to procure them? Would it be cheaper to take carpenters to the boat, or to make the temporary repair and navigate her to the most convenient, port? These questions would suggest themselves to the mind naturally, and lead to the correct conclusion.
It is perfectly immaterial, therefore, whether this was a case-where an abandonment could have been made; the question presented to the court is, what was the actual damage sustained at the place where she was injured — what would it cost to repair her there. Was it prudent or imprudent for the captain to 472] *take her to a convenient port? Was the expense increased by taking her to New Albany? If not, then defendants are not injured, whether they were bound by their agreement or not.
The case in 1 Conn, does not militate against our position. In that case the voyage was neither ended nor broken up. The seamen were under the customary wages, and their .services were no extra charge to the owner.
As to commissions, we claim them on the ground that they were paid in a foreign port. The owners live in Florence, Alabama. The funds were raised in Louisville. The ports of the different states are foreign ports to each other. If a bill of exchange is drawn in one state on a person in another state, it is a foreign bill. The states are, for all judicial purposes, foreign to each other. The allowance is claimed because it is a customary thing to transact business at a distance' by an agent, and there is as much reason for it in this case as any other. •

Opinion:
Judge Wright
delivered the opinion of the court:
The motion for a new trial first claims our attention. The items of Robinson's bill are by the jury placed under our supervision in settling the law of the case, and it will not be necessary to grant a new trial on that account; even if some of the items in the amount were improperly charged. But if it was not so, there was evidence given to the jury upon those items, as upon all the other matters objected to as found without evidence. The evidence submitted warranted the jury in finding as they did, as to all the general items, but that for the wages of the crew as laborers; and this court is not inclined to weigh the evidence after the jury, to see if they might not come to a different conclusion on the same premises. It is only where a verdict is palpably against the evidence, or the decided weight of it, that courts are warranted in interfering to set it aside, in order to send the cause to another trial. That is not this case. The motion for a new trial, therefore, is overruled. The claims for the wages of the crew as laboring hands we will consider hereafter.
The plaintiffs assert a claim to all the items returned by the jury, because the case made was of an injury warranting an abandonment for a total loss, and they were prevented from abandoning by the agreement of the underwriters to pay for the repairs.
The authorities show that where the underwriter, by his interference, prevents the insured from abandoning, he is liable 478] *for all the loss sustained by the injury to the extent of his insurance. 2 Cond. Marsh, on Ins. 598; 2 Term, 407. And if the right to abandon exist, and the underwriter agree to pay for the repairs, he may be held on such agreement even beyond the amount insured. 2 W. 6; 6 R. 3, 9; 3 Mass. 51, 437; 2 Term, 407.
It is insisted that as the voyage was broken up and lost, that circumstance authorized the insured' to abandon. 3 Mason 51, 437. If the right of the plaintiffs to abandon, depends upon the breaking up of the particular voyage in which the Galena was employed at the time of the injury, it can not be regarded in this case. The insurance here is on the boat upon time, and has no relation to the voyages of the boat, or the freight she'carries. If the boat lay in ordinary the whole time, she is at the risk of the insurer, and it is no part of the contract that she shall make any voyage. The breaking one up, then, can confer no right on the insured.
'The finding of the jury is, that the boat was not abandoned to the defendants. The plaintiffs proposed to abandon, but were prevented by the agreement of the defendants to pay their proportion of the costs of repair. This-is not an interference with the boat, nor an agreement to pay all repairs, but simply an agreement to pay their proportion of the costs of repair; that is, what they were liable to pay. If the insured had a right to abandon, this agreement to pay could not have prevented them from doing so, in any way to increase the liability of the insurer. The interference seems to us simply this, if you do not abandon and proceed in the repair, we will pay our proportion of the repair. It appears evident to us that the agreement precludes the idea that they were understood to agree to pay all expenses and repairs, and that the agreement prevented the abandonment. The proposition to abandon not being persisted in, the parties were left to their legal liabilities.
We are next to consider the items of the verdict. The defendants object to the whole, and,
1. Is the whole amount of Eobinson's bill chargeable upon the insurer? I have looked over the account. The charges are expressly made as for repairs of the injury to the Galena at the Colbert shoals, on the Tennessee, and sworn, to as such. The items are such as would ordinarily arise in such repairs. No particular item is objected to. The objection is directed *more against [474 the aggregate amount than the charges. The jury find the payment of this bill part of the expense of repairs.
2. As to the residue of the amount found for repairs íd the general item, it is not objected to.
3. The next item is for the wages of the crew between the founder of the boat and their discharge at New Albany. The decisions we have heretofore made on this point should put this item at rest In Perry v. Ohio Insurance Company, 5 Ohio, 306, and in Gazzam v. Cincinnati Insurance Company, ante, 73, this court expressly decided that the insurer was not liable on this kind of policy, for the wages and provisions of the crew, even though they were exclusively employed about the repair of the injured boat. The insured is only liable for the extraordinary expense occasioned by the injury, which does not include expenses for the mere delay of the boat, or ordinary wages for her navigation to the port of repair. These decisions, in our understanding of them, exclude from the verdict the item for the wages of the crew before their discharge at New Albany, and the item for the provisions of the crew. Besides, the boat on her way to the port of repair, earned towage of another boat, and passage money, one hundred and seventy-five dollars and fifty cents, which is credited in the- account. Instead, therefore, of being an unmanageable wreck, to be driven by external power, she was earning freight.
4. The next item found by the jury and objected to, is that for commissions on the money advanced for repairs. The right to this charge will be determined by the answer to the question : was New Albany, at the foot of the falls of the Ohio, a foreign port to the insured, upon a policy on time to navigate the western waters ? Such commissions for raising money have been allowed as a charge upon the underwriter, when from necessity the assured has been compelled to raise money in a foreign port. The expense of raising funds in a foreign port is inevitable, and therefore chargeable on the underwriter. But no such charge is admissible where the expenditure is at home. 1 Conn. 242. The policy in this case has express reference to the western waters as the range of the boat. She may run on them or lie still, in -either event the risk attaches. The policy was executed at .Louisville, the expenses were incurred there. Without other evidence we must regard that place the homo of the boat. The undertaking is to pay the loss, if it exceed ten 475] per cent., sixty days after proof of loss. *What do the terms-proof of loss mean in this policy? We think it must, of necessity, .include proof of the fact of loss, and the amount of the loss if partial, or if not, that it exceeds the whole amount at risk. The underwriter has no right to do the work in his own manner, and with his own materials. His undertaking is to pay the amount, not to do the work. 3 Mass. 85. This item, therefore, is not admissible-
The only remaining item is that for the wages of the crew, while engaged in the repairs at the request of the corporation,, after they were discharged as a crew. The amount found by the jury includes the wages of the captain, mate, clerk, several engineers, cook, and common hands, at a rate of compensation ranging from fifteen to one hundred and seventy-five dollars a month. The jury find that some of the hands after their discharge were employed by the captain at the request of the boat's carpenter to-expedite the repairs. The captain was not, therefore, among-those of the crew employed; he was the employer. His wages are-to be stricken out. The proof was that common hands were to be had, at the place of repair, for from seventy-five to eighty-seven and a half cents a day, finding themselves. If the crew, including-engineers at one hundred and seventy-five dollars a month, were-discharged as a crew, and employed as hands in expediting the-, repairs, they would be entitled only to the pay of common hands. The jury find that their employment did not increase the expense-of repair. In this they must have erred, or it must appear that their extraordinary wages were occasioned by extraordinary labor, of which there was no evidence. Robinson, the carpenter, says, in his deposition, " the captain retained some at my request, for the purpose of aiding me." Webb, the captain, says, " the hands who remained with the boat whilst the repairs were progressing,, were such hands as I was pleased with, and I kept them that did remain in that service with a view of having them altogether, that. I might command their services when the boat should be repaired." The account rendered is for payments, as we have seen for the different officers and men of the boat, at the wages pertaining to-their different stations and grade- of employment. As hands engaged merely in the repair, they were only entitled to the wages of such hands. Webb's deposition would seem to make it pretty clear that some other consideration entered into their discharge and new employment, beyond the mere labor on the repairs ; they were, in part at least, employed that they might be at command, ready for service, when the repairs were completed. *This [476 evidence and the manner of keeping the'accounts render this whole item suspicious. We have doubted if it should not be altogether-rejected, the confusion in the accounts arising from plaintiff's manner of keeping them ; but upon the whole, conclude that so much should be allowed, as the work of all the crew, except the captain, amounts to, at the wages of common hands, say seventy-five cents a day. At this rate the days charged three hundred' and thirty exclusive of Sundays, would make the sum of two hundred and forty-seven dollars and fifty cents.
Arranging the verdict upon these principles, it will stand as follows:
For the expense of repairs....................................... $2,362 23
Additional for the crew employed as hands three hundred and thirty days, exclusive of Sundays, at seventy-five cents per day......................................... 247 50-
Total................................................................. 2,609 73
Deduct proceeds of two lighters sold,......................... 25 00
Whole loss......................................................... $2,584 73
Five-eighths of which is.......................................... 1,846 23
Deduct one-third new for old,.................................. 615 41
And the amount of loss is.................................... $1,231 82
Add interest from sixty days after repairs completed, say from June 8, 1832, to May 2, 1834, nineteen months and twenty-four days,................................ 145 64
Sum for which the verdict is to be entered............... $1,377 46
The plaintiffs may take judgment for that amount, or if they refuse, a new trial will be awarded. Judgment for the plaintiffs. 2 Caine, 79.