Case Name: Donna D. Anthony, appellant, v. Howard H. Poppert et al., appellees
Court: Nebraska Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Nebraska
Decision Date: 1971-03-12
Citations: 186 Neb. 509
Docket Number: No. 37621
Parties: Donna D. Anthony, appellant, v. Howard H. Poppert et al., appellees.
Judges: Heard before White, C. J., Carter, Spencer, Boslaugh, Smith, McCown, and Newton, JJ.
Reporter: Nebraska Reports
Volume: 186
Pages: 509–514

Head Matter:
Donna D. Anthony, appellant, v. Howard H. Poppert et al., appellees.
184 N. W. 2d 648
Filed March 12, 1971.
No. 37621.
Lovell & Raymond and Robert Q. Hippe, for appellant.
Wright, Simmons & Hancock and Larry D. Hall, for appellees.
Heard before White, C. J., Carter, Spencer, Boslaugh, Smith, McCown, and Newton, JJ.

Opinion:
McCown, J.
This' is an action for personal injuries allegedly sustained by plaintiff as the result of a minor automobile accident. The jury returned a verdict for the defendants and the plaintiff has appealed.
The plaintiff, Donna Anthony, and the defendant, Howard Poppert, were both stopped near a stop sign at the intersection of Railroad Avenue and 20th Street in Scottsbluff, Nebraska, on a dry, clear summer afternoon in August 1967. Plaintiff's car was stopped at the stop sign and the defendant's vehicle was stopped immediately behind the plaintiff. They waited for traffic to clear. Plaintiff then started toward the intersection, proceeded for approximately half a car-length and stopped again for additional traffic. Poppert started forward when he saw the plaintiff proceed; looked to the left and right sides for approaching traffic; did not see the plaintiff stop- again; and bumped the rear of plaintiff's car when plaintiff stopped. Plaintiff had a police officer called to the scene. The police officer did not find damage to the vehicles nor could he locate any debris or establish the point of impact. The police officer stated that he did not think there was damage enough to the vehicles to make out a report, but plaintiff asked that a report be made and stated that her neck hurt.
The petition did not allege, and the evidence failed to establish any property damage to either vehicle. There were two passengers in plaintiff's car and one in defendant Poppert's vehicle. Of the five persons in the-two vehicles, only plaintiff claimed to have suffered personal injury of any kind. The claimed injury was a sprain or strain in the neck commonly called a whiplash. injury. In any event, the evidence was such as to raise a definite jury question as to whether the plaintiff suffered any personal injury, and whether the claimed injuries, if any, were the direct and proximate result of this accident.
The defendants' answer to plaintiff's petition was a general denial. There was no allegation nor issue of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. The district court overruled plaintiff's motion to direct a verdict in favor of the plaintiff on the issue of liability and submitted the issue of the negligence of defendant Poppert to the jury, as well as the issues on damages.
The motion for new trial and the assignments of error primarily rest on the contention that the defendant Poppert was negligent as a matter of law and that the issue of his negligence should not have been submitted to the jury.
The evidence as to how the accident occurred was substantially undisputed, although the evidence as to the force of the impact is sharply conflicting. Resolving all inferences in favor of the defendant Poppert, we hold that he was guilty of negligence as a matter of law under the circumstances of this case and that his negligence was the sole proximate cause of this accident. See, Ritchie v. Davidson, 183 Neb. 94, 158 N. W. 2d 275; Stewart v. Ritz Cab Co., 185 Neb. 692, 178 N. W. 2d 577.
The issue of Poppert's negligence and whether that negligence was the proximate cause of the accident should not have been submitted to the jury. As we said in the Ritchie case: "It is the duty of the district court, on its own motion, to submit to the jury only the issues upon which there are controverted questions of fact which must be determined by the jury in order to properly arrive at its verdict."
Instructions numbered 2, 3, and 4 submitted the issue of defendant Poppert's negligence to the jury, spelled out the burden of proof, and the effect of findings, all in the form set out in NJI No. 2.01, pp. 25, 26. The plaintiff was not entitled to a directed verdict in her favor because there was a jury question as to whether the plaintiff had sustained any injuries as the direct and proximate result of Poppert's negligence and the resulting accident. She was, however, entitled to have the jury instructed that Poppert was negligent in the operation of his automobile; that such negligence was the proximate cause of the accident; and that the plaintiff was; not guilty of any contributory negligence. The burden should remain on the plaintiff to prove that she sustained personal injuries; that the accident was a proximate cause of such injuries; and the nature, extent, and amount of the damages. See, NJI No. 2.06, p. 47; NJI No. 2.08, p. 49.
Where the facts adduced to sustain the issue of negligence are such that reasonable minds can draw but one conclusion therefrom, it is the court's duty to decide the question as a matter of law, rather than submit it to a jury for determination. See Stewart v. Ritz Cab Co., supra.
Other issues raised by the plaintiff have been considered and are without merit. The motion for new trial was proper and should have been sustained. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
Reversed and remanded.