Case Name: City of Cincinnati vs. Peter Bryson
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio
Jurisdiction: Ohio
Decision Date: 1846-12
Citations: 15 Ohio 625
Docket Number: 
Parties: City of Cincinnati vs. Peter Bryson.
Judges: 
Reporter: Cases decided in the supreme court of ohio : upon the circuit at the special sessions in Columbus
Volume: 15
Pages: 625–652

Head Matter:
City of Cincinnati vs. Peter Bryson.
The City Council of Cincinnati has power to license and regulate draymen, and may require a reasonable sum, by way of excise, on the special employment.
The right to license and regulate, confers no taxing power over the draymen.
This is a Writ or Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton County.
The writ is prosecuted to procure the reversal of the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, reversing the judgment of the Mayor of Cincinnati, rendered by that officer in a complaint pending before him, prosecuted by the city against the defendant, for a violation of the city ordinance.
The original complaint before the Mayor of Cincinnati, was “ for neglecting or refusing to take out license for a dray, in the city of Cincinnati, according to ordinance of said city.”' The defendant admitted the fact of refusal to take out a license, but objected to the validity of the ordinances. The Mayor overruled the objection, and the defendant was fined five dollars and costs, $ 1.05.
In Bank.
Dec. Term, 1846.
The Court of Common Pleas, on certiorari, reversed the judgment of the Mayor, and this writ is prosecuted by the city to review the reversal by the Court of Common Pleas.
The ordinance, passed the 30th of January, 1835, provided, “ that every owner of hackney coaches, wagons, carts, drays, ‘ and other four or two wheeled vehicles, who shall cause en- ‘ tries to be made, as specified in the fourth section of the £ ordinance to which this is an amendment, and acknowledge £ the same by his, her, or their signature, shall receive from the £ City Clerk a certificate, stating the number of each coach, £ wagon, cart, dray or other vehicle, as aforesaid, so entered, £ and the place of residence of the owner thereof; and such £ certificate shall be presented to the City Treasurer, who shall £ demand and receive, for the use of the city, of such owner or £ owners the following sums, to wit: For each hackney coach, £ for two or more horses, five dollars; for each barouche, dear- £ borne, or other four wheeled vehicle, three dollars; for each £ gig or other two wheeled vehicle, two dollars; for each wagon, £ drawn by six or more horses or oxen, six dollars; by four or £ five horses or oxen, five dollars; by a less number than four £ horses or oxen, four dollars; for each cart, drawn by two ‘ horses or oxen, four dollars; for each cart or dray, drawn by £ one horse, three dollars; and for every pair of timber wheels, ‘ five dollars. And on receiving the amount due as aforesaid, £ agreeably to the certificate of the City Clerk, the Treasurer £ shall make a particular entry of the same, in a book to be £ kept for that purpose, and acknowledge the receipt thereof on £ the back of such certificate; which receipt, on presentation to £ the Mayor, shall entitle the owner or owners thereof to receive £ a license for one year from the date of the same.”
An amendment to this ordinance, passed July 3, 1844, provided, that “ all vehicles named in this ordinance that shall use ‘ a tire of less width than is herein described, after the first day 1 of November, A. D., eighteen hundred and forty-five, shall be c required to pay fifty per cent, more than is provided for in the ‘ ordinance to which this is amendatory.”
An ordinance, supplementary to all former ordinances on the subject, passed January 8, 1846, provided, “that every owner ‘‘of hackney coaches, wagons, carts, drays, and other four and ‘ two wheeled vehicles, who shall neglect or refuse to take out ‘ license, or comply with the provisions of the ordinance now e in force, for licensing and regulating hackney coaches, wagons,' ‘ carts, drays, and other four and two wheeled vehicles, shall, ‘ upon conviction before the Mayor, or such other officer as ‘ may have jurisdiction, be subject to a fine of not more than ‘ ten dollars, and costs, for every vehicle for which he may re- ‘ fuse or neglect to take out such license; and every day such 1 owner shall continue to run said vehicle, without such license, ‘ shall be deemed a new offence.
“ This ordinance to be in force from and after its passage.”
S. M. Hart, for Plaintiff in Error.
We claim that the power to “regulate” drays and carts, accompanied by the power to “ license ” them, confers the power to assess a reasonable tax. We do not mean a tax in its literal sense, but a charge for the use of the streets paved, repaired and cleaned at the expense of the corporation.
In this view, there is a perfect analogy to the case of The City of Cincinnati v. Buckingham, 10 Ohio Rep. 257. The power conferred as'to markets was, “to erect, establish and regulate” them. “The due regulation of a market,” said Judge Lane, “'demands the expenditure of money, and the c levying of the tolls upon the sellers in market for the purpose ‘ of meeting these expenses, incurred mostly for their benefit, is c practiced by all municipal corporations. * * * * The e sum exacted for the purpose by this ordinance is called, by ‘ the defendant’s counsel, a tax upon the sale of commodities £ brought to market; it is, rather, the price demanded for ae- £ commodations provided to the frequenters, of the market by £ the city authorities.” This very principle, mutatis verbis, ought to decide the present case. To regulate the drays of the city, and the streets, demands an expenditure of money; and. a toll levied upon the owners of drays used in transportation for hire, is as universal as tolls levied upon market people are. The draymen, and cartmen, and hackney coachmen, are those who wear out the pavements of Cincinnati, and cause the heaviest expense to the corporation and its citizens. The sum exacted upon a license is the sum charged by the corporation for the accommodation of streets thus provided them, and justice requires that they should pay it.
But the defendant was fined for using his dray to transport goods and receiving hire, without a license. Now, unquestionably, the city may demand, by this section of the charter, that no one shall so use his dray without a license, else improper persons might engage in the business, which it is the very object of this section of the charter to prohibit.
And we take it to be equally so, that the corporation may require draymen to pay the expense of the licenses, if only to compensate the city for the cost of printed or written forms, and the time of the city officers employed, and for nothing else. ■
Now, if the sum charged for a license be more than necessary to defray those expenses, a certiorari to review the conviction of a man who never took out a license at all, is not the method to reach that question. The error complained of, upon a writ of certiorari, must affirmatively appear of record — not be made out by extrinsic proof, much less by suggestions of counsel or the court; Clements v. Benjamin, 12 Johns. Rep. 299. There is nothing here to show that more than a sum necessary for the very purpose mentioned, was ever exacted.
The defendant might have taken out his license, and, after-wards, in an action to recover the sum charged above the ne cessary expenses, the question might arise, but, surely, not in a proceeding of this kind.
And so, if the city has no right to demand a single cent, the defendant cannot here contest the question ; for, as much of the ordinance as requires him to take out a license, is clearly authorized • by the charter, and for violating that provision he was fined.
An ordinance may be good in part, though void as to the residue. Rogers v. Jones, 1 Wend. Rep. 226.
This is not the method properly to inquire into the power of the corporation to exact tolls.
Storer &f Gwynne, for Defendant in Error.
Can the City of Cincinnati demand the sum of five dollars for issuing a license to run a dray within its corporate limits ? We hold, as did the Court of Common Pleas, that an ordinance making such a demand is void.
In every question on any corporate right, the right should be manifest; 1 Bay Rep. 389. The powers of a corporation are to be strictly construed; 7 Ohio Rep. 35, part II. The act of incorporation is the law of the city. By the original charter, the city was called into being. By the amended acts, its vitality has been continued, and to them must we look for a a definition of the powers possessed by the city council. An ordinance of the city must be founded upon some power expressly granted therein, or its provisions must be necessary, and proper to cafry into effect the powers granted. This is a general rule of law, corresponding with section 38 of the act of March 1, 1834, incorporating the city. The ordinance under consideration is neither justified by the words, nor is it necessary and proper to carry into effect any clause of the act. It cannot be sustained under the powers conferred upon the city council by section 8. Those are general in their terms, such as are possessed by all cities, and not intended to reach an occupation like draying, which is neither pernicious nor immoral. Where specific reference is made to the subject in a subsequent portion of the charter, language so undefined will not confer more authority than the subsequent specific grant, nor, in fact, could this section be construed to embrace any other right than that which is contained in the clause upon the subject of drays.
We must turn, we suppose, to the 13th section, and upon this the council for the city has rested his claim. That section empowers the city council “to license and regulate all carts, wagons, drays,” &c. What is the meaning of these terms? The power to regulate drays is the power to prescribe the rules or laws by which drays are to be governed. Such is the common acceptation of the term, and such the definition given in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. Rep. 190; and Buffalo and Niagara Falls Railroad Company v. Buffalo, 5 Hill’s Rep. 211. The power to license drays is the power to permit or authorize drays to run. “The word ‘license’ means permis- ‘ sion or authority, and a license to do any particular thing is a ‘ permission or authority to do that thing; and, if granted by ‘ a person having power to grant it, transfers to that grantee ‘ the right- to do whatever it purports to authorizeGibbon v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. Rep. 213. The city council, therefore, can authorize drays to run and prescribe the rules by which they are to be governed when running. No power is given to exact money for their permission. If it is discretionary with them to withhold that permission, that discretion must be a sound one. They must act.from convictions of right; should neither be quickened nor influenced by a payment of money, either to themselves or to the city.
We do not deny that incident to the power of license may be the right to charge reasonable fees for the labor of the different officers in issuing the certificate and license, as in 14 Wend. 89; but the ordinance does not purport to provide for this; the money does not go to the officers, and it is far more than they would have any right to demand. It passes into the city treasury, is received by the terms of the ordinance for the use of the city, and the sum charged for licenses, under the section we are considering, is more than sufficient to pay the salaries of all the officers of the city. ■ It is, in fact, not a demand of a compensation for services rendered, not a police regulation, but a plan devised with the sole intent of swelling the revenues of the city.
The form in which this money is exacted does not change its character as a tax. Says Archer, J., in State v. Roberts, 11 Gill and Johns. 506, “ Congress possessing power to lay taxes, £ under that power impose taxes by licenses. That a license is ‘ a tax is too palpable for discussion, unless there is something £ in the idea that it is a political or police regulation, intended to £ preserve, maintain, and regulate the .lottery system. If it ‘ were purely so, there might be some weight in the argument, ‘ but if not, it still has the brand of tax. It must be conceded ‘ it is in part a tax, and if so, still it is a tax.” And again he says, Ibid., “ A license, required to be obtained by payment of ‘ money, is a tax.”
These ordinances, with the “ brand of tax ” upon them, can in no way be upheld. “ Where a charter of incorporation con- £ fers no right to tax, the right may follow as an incident, but £ where it confers the right, that right is limited, either by ex-c pressly denying it in some cases, or by specifying where and £ upon what it is to be exercised1 Martin’s La. Rep. The power to tax is one of the highest attributes of sovereignty; a right to interfere with the property of the subject, and appropriate it, to be returned to the community with no new value imparted to it in the meanwhile, or created from or through it. A municipal corporation, with defined powers in this respect, has none other, either in regard to the purposes for which or the objects upon which it shall operate. The ordinance, and every part of it, raising a fund for a purpose unwarranted by the statute law, was held void in 3 Greenl. Rep. 191; 13 Mass. Rep. 278; and the want of power to derive revenue from the subject of the tax was held fatal in 4 Peters’ Rep. 168, and 13 Mass. Rep. 278. The right to tax, its extent, the purposes for which, and the objects on which it shall be exercised, are so clearly specified in the acts incorporating the city of Cincinnati, and its amendments, that no room can be left to imply that right in a nonenumerated case. The present provisions of the law are grouped together, for more easy reference, in Appendix A. This very section thirteen, is explicit in all cases of. power granted, to which was intended to be annexed a right to tax. It contains a clause raising money from a road tax, and its provisions in regard to the streets are followed, in section thirteen, by a grant of power to raise a tax for opening, &c., streets, &c.
The case of the Mayor of Columbia y. Beasly, 1 Humphrey’s Rep. 240, was for selling liquor in 1839 without license from the town authorities. The Court said, “ The power to ‘ tax tippling houses must be derived from the direct taxing ‘ power conferred in the charter. It cannot be derived from e the power to regulate and restrain them. That must be done c- by ordinances preventing those houses from becoming disor- { derly and imposing penalties for infraction of such'laws.”
In Collins v. The City of Louisville, 3 Ben. Monroe’s Rep. 133, an ordinance of the city of Louisville, by which the seller of coal was charged a certain amount'per bushel for measuring, it was held void. By the act of incorporation, the Mayor and Council of that city were authorized to appoint measurers of coal and to affix a reasonable allowance to such measurer. But the Court, throwing out of view all other questions, said that this was a tax upon coal, not to defray the charges of measuring, but to raise revenue, and that, as the charter conferred no power to tax coal or its sale, the ordinance was void. We ask for the application of similar reasoning.
In Commonwealth v. Bean, Thatcher’s Crim. Cases, 87, the complaint was under an ordinance of the city of Boston “ for regulating the keeping of dogs in the city of Boston,” to recover of the defendant a penalty of $10 for permitting his dog to go at large. The ordinance required a payment of $5 to the city clerk before a dog was permitted to go at large. The defendant not having paid this sum, the jury found him guilty. The case came by appeal before the Municipal Court. Thatcher, J. said, “ I do not see why, if the city is competent ‘ to impose a tax on owners of dogs, it may not.do so also on ‘ owners of trucks and carts, ^c. It is said this is a nuisance; £if so, what right has the city to license it and derive revenue ‘ from it. This is the first time where a town has undertaken £ to require from persons a. sum of money for enjoying a p’rivi- ‘ lege which they would otherwise - be entitled to enjoy freely,. ‘ The case of Player v. Fere, Sir T. Ráym. R,ep. 288, 324, c applies here. . A bylaw ' may be good in part and void in ‘ part. ■ But as the city cannot1 require from owneis of dogs f going at large a sum of money fóra license, it is„substantially ‘ defective and invalid for this cause. The verdict must be^ set £ aside and the’complaint dismissed.”
In Mayor and. Aldermen of Mobile v. Yuile, 3 Ala. Rep; (N. S.), decided in 18411, the authorities of Mobile had- power “to license bakers and regulate the weight and price of bread, £-and' prohibit the baking .for sale except by those licensed;” The defendant, a baker, had been fined $20 under an ordinance of the city, which provided that nci‘one shall carry on baking unless he obtain a license, for which he shall pky $20, anti $1 to the clerk —r- that for carrying on baking without license, a fine not exceeding $50 shall be imposed, .and that all bread shall be of a prescribed weight, marked and inspected, and the bad bread, seized and forfeited.. The Court on error held the ordinance could not be supported, because the penalty must be reasonable; it must be a sum certain, and cannot be left to the arbitrary assessment of the corporation court, to be determined1 according to the nature of the offence. They say further, ■“ We £ also incliné to doubt the propriety of that portion .which for- £ feits bread,-ks also that portion which requires $20 to bé paid £ by the baker for a license, unless the-latter can be supported £ under the taxing,-power of the corporation. Though doubt- ‘ less it might require, a fee for the issuing and-registration of the license.” . -
The case of Player v. Vere, Sir T. -Raym. Rep.' 288, 324, above cited,,in Thatcher’s Cfim. Cases,'.and commented upon and approved', 6 Pick. 191.,-was upon an ordinance of the city -Of-London, passed in 1677, that'the president and directors of Christ’s 'Hospital, should have the.rules of cars and carts — that ño mdre than 420 shall be allowed to work for'hire, and that a certain sum shall be paid, for each car-room,, and that, if any shall work one not so allowed,' he shall forfeit 13s. 4d, In Hilary term, 31 and 32 Car. 2, after extended argument, if was “ ad- ■ ‘ judged by. the .whole Court, nemine contradicente — that the ‘ bylaw was not good by reason of thé fine and rent, but in all ‘.things’else very good, and.so a procedendo was denied.”
'' .These ordinances are void, because they are in restraint of trade. ,■ .
The common law prohibits nó man to exercise any trade or more'trades than one. , Hob. 211; 11 Co. 54. - All bylaws in restraint of trade are bad, unless there be a custom to support .them.; 3 B.urt. ,1847; Com, D.ig. Bylaw c, 3; Willes 388; 11 Co. 54; Tl Co. -86; 1‘P.'Wms. 184. These customs are against common-right. They are allowed only from their antiquity, “in consideration of the .plenitude of the regal power ‘ at the timé the places in which they prevail were incorporated; • *. and the necessity of yielding encouragement to commerce, at ‘ that timé almost exclusively confined to'corporate towns,’’ and have not experienced much favor in Westminster Hall. Wilcock on Municipal Corporations, 74, 75, . The bylaws made accordingly are good.by way of custom, but not by grant,' and .therefore no corporation made within time of memory, can have suoh privilege, unless1 it be by act of parliament. '8 Co. 248.
• ■ -Whether we examine the English or the American- cases, we will alike be unable to discover any, where ordinances, like the present have been supported, unless .authority to pass them is clearly shown. We propose to refer briefly to all the-American cases we have found.
• Here, as in England, certain police regulations, not repugnant to the charter, and framed'for the protection of the inhabitants- from nuisances or other evils. A bylaw of Boston, prohibiting "rapid driving in the streets, is valid; 3 Pick. 462. Alsoj .a bylaw of Boston, out of. iegftrd to the' security of -.the ' people, requiring . owners and occupants of land bordering on streets; to dear the'snow away from the adjoining'sidewalks.; 16 Pick: 504. And, the city of Boston may fill up a creek which is a, nuisance to those of'the inhabitants dwelling near it; 12 Pick: 1S4. Cities may make rules for the occupation óf .the property óf the city, as. that none may stand' in -the market place without permission of the clerk of the market; -11 Pick. •168. In 6 Pick. 187, a bylaw of the city of-Boston, prohibiting any person not duly licensed therefor, by the Mayor ¿nd Aldermen, from removing the house, dirt and. offal from-the city, was held'valid, because it wa's-the duty of. the city to preserve the health of 'the inhabitant's; and'this they could best do by employing risen, over whom they lia,ve entire control! Here, it will bp seen, the subject'matter was a nuisance, and no charge’ was made for a license.. In 'Boston v. Schaffer, 9 Pick. 418, the Mayor arid Aldermen were’authorized to license theatrical exhibitions,'“on such.terms and conditions as to-them' may seem just- and reasonable.” Under this general' power,' ■the. Court felt. authorized,', by a legislative construction of-the act, such as the city of Cincinnati does- not exhibit,'to say a sum of money might be exacted- for a license. The Court then examine whether.it-is competent to the Legislature to grant to a town, or city power to-assess a tax which is nót general. The Court say, that if the sum- were a ’tax, the', objection wo.uld- be valid, but 'that it was in .the' nature of an excise, whose constitutionality was not doubted, and was peculiarly proper in employments of. that Kind,-which required to be watched. It will be noted, however, that we deny that the Legislature here gave the power., as also that the constitution of Massachusetts contains a clause not to- be found in that of Ohio, expressly providing pow.er to-lay. an excise .on.occupations, &.c., and that the : peculiar .nature of- the occupation was dwelt upon. In Massachusetts, as in England and New Y.ork, it is held that a bylaw must be legi, fidei, fationi, consona, and that, an unreasonable bylaw.is void; 1 Me'tcf! 130; 6-Pick. 187; 16 Pick. 121; 7 Paige 263; and whether it is void for unreasonableness, is always a question for the Court; 3 Pick. 462. In 16 Pick. 121, a bylaw of the town of Charlestown, that no one should, without leave of the Selectmen, bring into the town, or bury there, any dead body, was held unreasonable and void. It was declared that the right of property shall not be invaded, under the guise of a police regulation, and that a bylaw being entire, if void in part, is void for the whole.
In New York, an ordinance that no person shall sell meat except in the public market place, has been sustained, (8 Johns. Rep. 327; 10 Wend. 99,) as being within a power to make bylaws relating to the public markets, and manifestly contemplated by it. In 10 Wend. 99, if is said “a bylaw, that no ‘ meat should be sold in the village, would be bad, being a ‘ general restraint, but that meat shall not be sold, except in a c particular place, is good, not being a restraint of the right to ‘ sell meat, but a regulation of that right.” In 7 Cowen, 349, and 9 Wend. 571, the power of a city to make ordinances for the removal of nuisances from harbors, and to authorize harbor masters to regulate and station vessels, for the purpose of avoiding disorder and confusion, was recognized. Under an express power to prevent the interment of the dead within the city, a bylaw to that effect was sustained, inasmuch as the city had “ power so to order the use of private property in the city as to prevent its proving pernicious to the citizens generally;” 7 Cowen, 604. The case in 14 Wend. Rep. 89, does not seem to have been well considered; it was of weighers of anthracite coal. In 5 Hill’s Rep. 209, an ordinance entirely prohibiting the propelling of railroad cars, by steam, through any part of the city of Buffalo, was held good, under a power to regulate the running of cars, for it was said, “ unless conducted with ‘ more than human watchfulness, the running of the cars by ‘ steam may well be regarded as a public nuisance.”
The only case in New York similar to the present, is Dun-ham v. Trustees of Rochester, 5 Cowen Rep. 462. There it was ordained that none should keep a huckster’s shop without a license from the trustees of the village, and hucksters were taxed, for a license, from $5 to $30. The suit was brought for a fine imposed for keeping a huckster’s shop without license. The question was presented in the very same form as in this case. The act gave the power to make prudential bylaws, rules and regulations, relative to taverns, gin shops and huckster shops, in said village. The Court said that it was not shown how huckster shops could be an evil, if conducted under proper regulations, nor could they see, judicially, that any restriction was necessary; that the corporation must show their power, else their proceedings were void; that their bylaws must be reasonable; that bylaws such as these, against trade, were not allowed, except by particular custom; that it was not intended that any man should depend, for the exercise of his business, on the will of the corporation, or that they may prohibit it altogether, or cripple it by heavy charges and grievous penalties; that the right was not derivable from the taxing power, which was given in definite and specific terms. The Court were of opinion that the ordinances were void, both for want of jurisdiction and conformity to the general law. The Court, in 10 Wend. 99, intimate that the right to carry on this business was guarantied by taking a license from the commissioners of excise of the town. But this was not the ground of the decision, in 5 Cowen. The license, under the State law, was for the sale of gin and other spirituous liquors; the offence that of being a huckster, for which no license had been taken from the commissioners of excise. The case in 5 Cowen stands unreversed, as an authority applicable to this case. In 10 Wend. 99, it is admitted to be law, and the ordinance is condemned as “ imposing a charge without any corresponding benefit.” The present ordinance is of the same character. Upon a like jealousy of these restraints, in 8 Conn. Rep. 391, the power of a town to make bylaws, to regulate the fishery of clams and oysters within its limits, is admitted; but that of prohibiting all persons, except its own inhabitants, from taking them, is denied. In 1 Wend. 260, the latter was upheld only in a case of sev eral .'-fisberi'es. See, also, 3-Ycates’ Rep. 54,. that'Borders of wood cannot be .appointed without special authority.-. ;
In Ohio, but few decisions upon the validity of. bylaws have been made. . It is said .that, upon the circuit, this clause of the city charter .was under-investigation in the case, of The. City;of Cincinnati v. Goodman. That, decision is • not binding upon this Court as an authority. It has never been reported, and we cannot judge what were the grounds upon which it .Was decided, whether from reference to the nature of the occupa-. tion,. which is very lucrative and not in high,repute, or' for other ■ causes. The case is said. not, to have: been very fully argued. We. are referred' to Cincinnati v. Buckingham, 10 Ohio Rep. 261. The. Legislature differed from the-Court iff their'view of that, ordinance, and passed a special"act preventing, such, in future. That was- the case-.of an- ordinance affecting what is peculiarly the property of the city — the market-spaces; .and the ground taken by the ■ Court is, that the sum charged was “ the price demanded- for accommodations provided to the frequenters of market, by the-city authorities].” .There was. a quid pro quo. -Here the drayman obtains no “ accommodation ” —• no standing-place -r- no room for locomotion, which is not enjoyed by every other citizen. Moreover, he' does not carry on a business, such as is in 6 Pick. 187, “ removing the house-dirt and offal,” over which, as to titne', &c.‘, the council need-exclusive control in order to preserve the health of the city. The ordinance is a géneral restraint,. amounting to this, that no one shall, in any part of the -city, or at ariy time,' drive a dray for hire, unless upon terms-to which, as we contend, he ought not to be compelled to‘submit.
Hart, in reply.
The citation ■ of the City of - Cincinnati ,v. Buckingham, 10 Ohio Rep. .261, is disposed of by counsel very briefly. “The Legislature,”,we are told, “differed from the Court in < their view of that ordinance, and passed a special act pre- ‘ venting such in future.” We should hardly admit the author ■ity of the Legislature.-to overturn;, the decision of this Court,; but the remark is. not pertinent; for the Legislature-acquiesced in the construction of the charter, and “ passed’ a! special act;”' to alter that construction in future cases'. , Th'e-'pbwer of ..the-city to 'tax the owners of market wagons .was affirmed, byithq'; Court, and admitted by the very' actionr;-of-the Legislature',We care not about “their view” of-the ordinance, for that..-jsnot ,the question:;ib be"discussed,.' '■ Underpower to regulate' markets,-the-city-has power to, tax the-'.owners of...marked wag-: ans; by perfect parity, of construction, a power-to';^regulate,” drays confers the power to tax .the owners of them;- :Atid' this entirely answers the argument, that in the 11th section of the' charter a special power to demand money, upon-a license to. keep a tavern or coffee-house -is conferred. The 'powerfto' “regulate’! carries the power of taxation-;- else,■ this-Court' erred, grossly in the cáse of Buckingham.'- ’■ -‘ff v."-.
There is.no distinction between the cases ';'an.ffithis- Court.; must either reverse'its Own decision or reverse the decision', of, the Court of Common Pleas. ; ' '
We cannot perceive, in most of the cases cited by the dé-, fendant’s oounsel, any'application to this question.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. -Rep..190, 213, céftainlydoés not, even by the statement of our-.opponents,' decide 'aught, 'against us. It does; in fact, decide,- that -iindé'r the power to-. “ regulate ” commence, Congress, m'ay levy a duty oh tonnage."
The Buffalo and Niagara Railroad, Company V. The City of Buffalo, 5'Hill’s fLep;-2ll, upon the other hand," decides, that a power,tb-'regulate, in some, connections, is aq absolute. power to suppress. And this answers the argument'of the-defendant’s counsel, that here the amount of tax is unlimited, and the city council may, if it’choOse, suppress th.e draymen, and more to the sanie -effect;- ' An - árgumept against the use of a thing,'drawn from the.abuse of-it, is altogether, frivolous. If the city council unreasonably exercise the.power'-conferred by the charter, the ordinance will.be void. Nothing here shows this ordinance to be unreasonable, for there is,' ho proof at all. upon the point. 1 '■
The Mayor of Columbia v. Beasley, 1 Humphrey’s Term. Hep- 240, is really opposed to our proposition, as we admit, but neither its own force nor the authority of the Court entitles it to much regard — far less, to overthrow the case of Buckingham.
Collins v. The City of Louisville, 3 B. Monroe, 333, has no sort of application. The opposing counsel shall themselves report it: ££ An ordinance of the city of Louisville, by which £ the seller of coal was charged a certain amount per bushel for £ measuring it, was held void. By the act of incorporation, the £ mayor and council of that city were authorized to appoint £ measurers of coal, and to affix a reasonable allowance to such £ measurers.” Why this case should be cited upon the question whether a power to regulate includes a power to tax or not, we are entirely at a loss to imagine. ■ There was not a word about the regulation of the sales of coal in the Louisville charter, and nothing seems to have been decided by the Court upon the question here presented.
The Commonwealth v. Bean, Thatcher’s Crim. Cases, 87, is a decision of the Boston municipal court, and certainly cannot be compared in authority with the decision of this Court on circuit. Besides, it is founded upon the case of Player v. Vere, T. Raym. 288, 324, which we shall by and by notice.
The Mayor and Aldermen of Mobile v. Yuile, next cited, from the new series of Alabama Reports, does not support our opponents. The decision was, that the corporation had enacted an unreasonable ordinance — which was, of course, void. To be sure, the Court expressed a doubt whether twenty dollars could be demanded for a license; but it was only a doubt, and no reason was given for it.
Player v. Vere, T. Raym. 288, 324, is the last case. It was ££ upon an ordinance of the city of London, passed in ‘ 1677, that the President and Directors of Christ’s Hospital 1 should have the rules of cars and carts; that no more than ‘ four hundred and twenty shall be allowed to work for hire, •£ -and that a certain sum shall be paid for each car-room, and ‘ that if any shall work one not so allowed, he shall forfeit 13s. ‘ 4d.” And in Hilary Term, 31 and 32 Charles II, we are told, that it was adjudged by the whole Court: “ That the bylaw £ was not good by reason of the fine and rent, but in all things £ else very good; and so a procedendo was denied.” Now, it is wonderful that the dust should be so industriously cleared away from this page of Sir Thomas Raymond, when, within a few years, the validity of this very ordinance has been before the Court of King’s Bench. And it was adjudged, by the whole Court, a good ordinance. Shaw v. Pope, L. B. & Ad. 465.
With this case, falls the high authority of the municipal court of Boston.
We have thus far argued only upon the force of the power to regulate, and omitted to notice the power to license, with which it is coupled. And in regard to the extent of a power to license, we beg leave to borrow the case of The State v. Roberts, 11 Gill & Johns. 506, from our opponents.- ££ That £ a license is a tax,” said Judge Archer, “is too palpable for £ discussion, unless there is something in the idea that it is a .£ political or police regulation.” Now, the defendant’s counsel have stoutly asserted, upon the seventh page of their argument, that our ordinance is not “ a police regulation;” to which we entirely agree. It is indisputable, therefore, that the grant of a power to license drays, in the charter, is a power to tax them by means of licenses. “ Congress,” said Judge Archer, “ possessing power to lay taxes, under that power impose taxes by means of licenses.” And the delegation of a power to tax, in the terms of a power to license, is clear, in the present instance.
This proposition established, it is entirely unnecessary to argue the question whether this ordinance be or be not in restraint of trade. That might be well objected to the legislation of the city council, but no such objection can be interposed to the legislation of the State government,
To.be sure, if, in the execution of this- power, the city, coun^as enacte^ an ordinance, which. improperly restrains trade, it would be void; but there is no pretence of that character set up.. The only restraint pretended, is the tax itself, and the Legislature has not regarded" that a sufficient reason for refusing the power of taxation, in this particular, to the city council. "It did not regard'the objection as forcible, in the case of markets, and, thereupon, took" away the power by an amendment of the. charter. And -it may be observed, that in the English cases cited by our opponents,- the municipal bylaws have no sanction from the Legislature at all, and altogether stand or fall upon their-own reasonableness or unreasonableness.
When we turn from these .to American cases, we find' that bylaws depend .'for their, validity solely upon the language of the charter. Dunham v. The Trustees of- Rochester, 5 Cow. Rep.. 462, has been repeatedly evaded by the same Court which decided it, if not, in effect,- overruled. Village of Buffalo v. Webster, 10 Wend. Rep. 99. -And it'was ..presented to this Court as a leading authority,- in the case of Buckingham, and entirely disregarded.
The City of Boston v. Schaffer, 9 Pick. Rep. 418, however, presents-authority to .strengthen, every part of our argument.' The councilmen of -Boston-were'empowered, by the' charter, to license theatrical exhibitions “on.such terms and conditions as to them- may seem' just and reasonable,” and it' was ' decided that théy could exact money for a license. A "power so e'x- ' pressed js" jüst the power to license and regulate, conferred upon the city of Cincinnati,' and nothing else.
The defendant’s counsel, however,-criticise this case to-the effect, th?it the constitution of -Massachusetts allows a tax upon occupations, which the constitution of " Ohio does not. Now, we have to correct "this by the remark, that thé constitution of Ohio has no power of taxation at all expressed; the only word in it upon the subject is, that poll taxes shall not be levied. Our government, therefore, has no power to tax any thing, or else every power except that of poll taxation. We prefer the latter doctrine, and insist that taxes upon trades, or excises, are constitutional in Ohio. And, in fact, we have an act taxing lawyers and physicians, and this Court has affirmed its validity. Why not tax the privilege of a drayman, as well as the privilege of the counsel who represents him ? We trow, the profession of the law, at least in the estimation of our opponents, is not one “ the subject matter ” of which is a “ nuisance.” Yet they assert, that only such species of trades and professions can be taxed.
In the case of 'The Village of Buffalo v. Webster, the former case of Dunham, v. The Trustees Of Rochester was, distinguished from it,-and declaréd to be a decision solely to the. effect, that1 when a huckster had taken .a license from the State commissioners, no municipal corporation could take away his privileges under that license.

Opinion:
Birchard, J.
Our inquiry is directed to the validity of the ordinances adopted by the city council. Their powers are those expressly conferred by the act of incorporation, and such as are necessary to carry them into effect. By the 8th section of the act passed March 1, 1834, the council has "power to ' make and publish all such laws and ordinances, as to them ' shall seem necessary, to provide for the safety, preserve the f health, and improve the morals, order, comfort, and conveni- * ence of said city."
By the 13th section, it is enacted thus: " They shall have ' power to license and regulate all carts, wagons, and drays, and ' every description of two and four wheeled carriages which { may be kept in said city for hire."
The objection to the ordinance rests solely on that provision which authorizes the demand of a fee, as a prerequisite to the licensing of a drayman. In general, the authority to license carries with it the power to impose the terms and conditions upon which it shall be granted. It would seem that the right to license and regulate, and to provide by ordinance for the carrying into effect the powers expressly conferred upon them, are sufficient to justify all reasonable acts incident to the business.
As usually received by mankind, particularly when applied to a municipal corporation, " to license and regulate " draymen, &c., implies the right of fixing the terms upon which they shall be permitted to exercise their calling, and of forbidding the exercise upon any other than upon the terms and in the manner prescribed. Such appears to have been the view of this Court in Buckingham's case, (10 Ohio Rep. 261,) wherein it was held that, under the grant of a power to regulate the markets, the council had the right to exact a tax from the owners of the market wagon using the market. That case appears, in principle, not to be distinguishable from this.
In Boston v. Schaffer, 9 Pick. Rep. 419, suit was brought to recover one thousand dollars, exacted for granting a license to theatrical exhibitions. The Court said, £t if the one thou- £ sand dollars were to be regarded as a tax, it was not compe- £ tent for the Legislature to grant to the city of Boston the £ power to collect it." ££ That it was not a tax; it was in the £ nature of an excise on a particular employment." ££ The £ levying of an excise has been practiced in regard to other oc- £ cupations, and the constitutionality had never been doubted."
The Court in that case held, that it was proper that towns, when put to expense by the exercise of particular employments, should be compensated., So in this case, the employment of drays, hacks, omnibuses, and other heavy vehicles, upon their pavements, cause no inconsiderable amount of expenditure to the city in the way of repairing the streets and alley's. It is manifest to every one, that, in a large city, vehicles of this description cause great destruction to the public ways; far greater than the usual ordinary travel of citizens otherwise employed. There is, therefore, no injustice in exacting a reasonable portion of the expenses which such special occupations cause to the community; and those who enjoy the special privilege, can refuse to bear a reasonable portion of the burden but with an ill grace. But aside from all this, it is unquestionble that the power to license and regulate drays, &c., authorized the assessment and collection of a fine from any one running such vehicle without a license. It was for this offence that the fine was assessed by the mayor.
The case made by defendant shows that he did not even ask a license. The city council had a clear right to exact all reasonable expenses; and if the ordinance provides for any thing beyond what was reasonable under the circumstances, the fact should have so appeared affirmatively. It should not be left to be made out upon the inference of the Court, as a matter of ingenious speculation, or upon the statements of counsel. It matters little by what name the sum to be paid for license is called, if it be but a reasonable charge; and if it were unreasonable, the appropriate and - reasonable sum should have been tendered and the license demanded. Instead of doing this, the whole ordinance and city authority were set at defiance.
Bryson had no right to disregard those parts of the ordinance which were strictly legal, and which a court would enforce, even if some parts of it were illegal, and such as a court might not enforce. His rule of construction is one that no court would adopt; for in construing statutes, the rule is to enforce them so far as they are constitutionally made, rejecting only those provisions which show an excess of authority by the enacting power. The same rule of construction must govern in passing upon the validity of the ordinance duly enacted by the city council. Bryson might have paid the fee required of him, under protest, and have taken his license, and then contested the question, whether it was reasonable or unreasonable, in an action to recover back the three dollars thus paid. He chose to take the construction into his own hands, and assume, in the. first instance, that the city council had exceeded its authority, and that the entire ordinance was void ; and he must abide the consequence of running his dray without any license in defiance of the city.
But it is again urged that the whole ordinances are void, because they are in restraint of trade and levy a tax. If this were the true character of the ordinances, they could not be sustained.
We, however, do not- view them .in any sil'ch light. . The gives, the drayman .or hackman special: privileges, which he enjoys. to. the prejudice of the. city, in' the. injury necessarily dope to her streets and pavements, th an amount far. greater, .than -'any benefit to be derived: from- the price of thé license; excluding the necessary burden of supervision. Nor does'the .case show that, three'dollars is too. much, to' pay'as'a reasonable fee for issuing.the .license, and the keeping the.' necessary registers. 1
Judgment reversed, and the judgment rendered which should have been rendered by-the Court of Common Pleas.