Case Name: Mrs. Thelma W. HODGES v. CANAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Worth Insurance Company, Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company and Roosevelt Johnson
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1969-05-26
Citations: 223 So. 2d 630
Docket Number: No. 45305
Parties: Mrs. Thelma W. HODGES v. CANAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Worth Insurance Company, Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company and Roosevelt Johnson.
Judges: JONES and PATTERSON, JJ., join in this dissent.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 223
Pages: 630–638

Head Matter:
Mrs. Thelma W. HODGES v. CANAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Worth Insurance Company, Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company and Roosevelt Johnson.
No. 45305.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
May 26, 1969.
Rehearing Denied July 3, 1969.
Mulhearn & Mulhearn, Natchez, for appellant.
Satterfield, Shell, Williams & Buford, K. Hayes Callicutt, Jackson, for Canal Ins. Co.
Laub, Adams, Forman & Truly, Natchez, for Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co.
Brandon, Hornsby, Handy, O’Beirne & Benoist, Natchez, for Worth Ins. Co.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM:
Part I
Associate Justice ROBERTSON is the writer of Part I of this opinion; all justices except Presiding Justice GILLESPIE concur in the disposition of the case as to Canal Insurance Company and Worth Insurance Company.
The appellant, Mrs. Thelma W. Hodges, filed a bill of complaint in the Chancery Court of Adams County against: Roosevelt Johnson; Appellee Canal Insurance Company, who had issued an automobile liability insurance policy covering the automobile of Ezell Johnson; Appellee Worth Insurance Company, who had issued an automobile liability insurance policy covering Roosevelt Johnson, the driver of the automobile of Ezell Johnson; and Appellee Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, who had written a policy of insurance containing an uninsured motorists clause on the automobile owned by Roy A. Hodges, the husband of the appellant, which automobile was being driven by the appellant at the time of the accident.
Appellant averred in her bill of complaint :
"[T]he two said insurance companies [Canal and Worth], through agents, immediately after said accident, began negotiations with the complainant toward settlement of the complainant's claim for a period of time long enough to permit the defendant Roosevelt Johnson to abscond from the jurisdiction of the State of Mississippi to places unknown. " (Emphasis added).
Appellant further averred in her bill of complaint that a discovery of the liability insurance policies issued by Canal and Worth was indispensable to the end that full and exact justice may be had and that she was entitled to a discovery of the contents of, and the terms and conditions of, the automobile liability insurance policies issued by Canal and Worth.
Appellant also prayed for discovery of the facts upon which Canal and Worth rely in denying coverage under their policies. She averred in her bill of complaint:
"The two said defendant insurance companies, Worth Insurance Company and Canal Insurance Company have denied that the said defendant Roosevelt Johnson was entitled to coverage under the said policies of insurance hereinbe-fore mentioned, and complainant shows that the facts relative to the denial of said coverage are material to the complainant's claim as hereinafter set out and as hereinbefore set forth, and the facts upon which the two said defendant insurance companies rely upon in denying coverage under the two said insurance policies aforesaid are exclusively within the knowledge and possession of the two said defendant insurance companies, and the complainant shows that it is indispensable to the ends of full and exact justice that discovery be had of the facts upon which the two said defendant insurance companies deny coverage and that the complainant is entitled to a discovery of said facts." (Emphasis added).
She pleaded in the alternative that if the trial court should find that Canal and Worth had lawfully and properly denied coverage that she would be entitled to a decree against Hartford in the amount of $5,000 under the uninsured motorists clause of its contract of insurance.
Appellant attached as exhibits to her bill of complaint a copy of the declaration filed in the Circuit Court of Adams County against Ezell Johnson and Roosevelt Johnson, and a copy of a letter, dated October 4, 1963, to H. B. Wellborn and Company, adjusters for Canal and Worth, wherein she advised of her demands upon Roosevelt and Ezell Johnson and also that suit had been filed in the circuit court. In this let ter she set forth her injuries and also a compromise offer of settlement.
She filed also as an exhibit a photostatic copy of the complete family automobile policy issued by Hartford to her husband, Roy A. Hodges, and a copy of a letter dated July 28, 1965, from Hartford denying coverage under the uninsured motorists clause because their investigation revealed that the vehicle "being driven by Roosevelt Johnson was insured by Canal Insurance Company and that Roosevelt Johnson was insured by Worth Insurance Company."
Canal filed a general demurrer, a special demurrer, and a motion to strike and dismiss; Worth filed a general demurrer, special demurrer, and motion to strike and dismiss.
The general demurrer of Canal sets up seven specific grounds of demurrer, and the general demurrer of Worth sets up six specific grounds. Both of these general demurrers are fatally defective because they are speaking demurrers. Such demurrers have been specifically condemned by Griffith in his monumental work, Mississippi Chancery Practice:
"A demurrer is, and must be always, based solely upon the allegations of fact well pleaded as such in the bill. A demurrer cannot contain anything which denies any allegation in the bill. A party cannot qualify his demurrer nor give it any other operation than such as the law gives. The challenge of a demurrer can be interposed only for defects and insuf-ficiencies apparent on the face of the bill itself; no question of fact other than as appears in the bill itself can be raised by demurrer. The substantial grounds of a demurrer must appear upon the face of the bill, and if a demurrer seeks to allege any fact or otherwise to import anything of fact into the question not shown on the face of the bill it is a 'speaking demurrer,' and will be overruled. Not only so, but moreover, a demurrant cannot aid himself by what the evidence would show, or does show if there be any evidence in the case, nor by any answer filed, nor by any of the proceedings taken, by other defendants in the case although then a part of the cause. " Griffith, Miss. Chancery Practice (2d ed. 1950) § 289, pp. 272-73. (Emphasis added).
Hartford filed a proper general demurrer.
On October 13, 1967, the chancery court signed a decree which recited:
"This cause coming on for hearing on Bill of Complaint, General Demurrer of Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, separate General and Special Demurrers and Motions to Strike and Dismiss the Bill of Complaint, respectively, of Canal Insurance Company and of Worth Insurance Company, upon consideration of the policies of insurance of each of the defendants filed herein and in possession of the attorney for the complainant, and upon briefs and argument of counsel, and the Court finding that the complaint has an adequate remedy at law.
"It is now Ordered and Adjudged that the aforesaid Demurrers and Motions to Dismiss be and the same are hereby sustained, but the complainant is allowed thirty (30) days within which to amend her bill of complaint, on failure of which the bill of complaint is and shall stand dismissed." (Emphasis added).
The appellant declined to plead further, and her bill of complaint was dismissed.
All of the judges, except Gillespie, P. J., feel that the bill of complaint stated a cause of action against Canal and Worth for discovery as to the specific facts on which they base their denial of coverage, and also that the averments of collusion between Canal and Worth and Roosevelt Johnson to defeat the claim of appellant are sufficient to withstand demurrer.
Part II
Presiding Justice GILLESPIE is the writer of Part II of this opinion with the concurrence of Chief Justice ETH-RIDGE and Associate Justices RODGERS, BRADY, INZER and SMITH.
The second question is whether the bill of complaint stated a cause of action against Hartford under the uninsured motorists provisions of the policy. The Hartford policy under which appellant was an insured included protection against uninsured motorists and provided that Hartford would pay all sums that the insured shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured automobile because of bodily injury sustained by the insured caused by an accident and arising out of the ownership, maintenance and use of such uninsured automobile. An uninsured automobile is defined as "an automobile with respect to the ownership, maintenance, or use of which there is no bodily injury liability bond or insurance policy applicable at the time of the accident with respect to any person or organization legally responsible for the use of such automobile."
The bill of complaint charges in the alternative that there has been a lawful denial of coverage by Canal and Worth because of the refusal of Roosevelt Johnson to cooperate in the defense of the suit. This raises for the first time in this jurisdiction the question stated in the first paragraph of this opinion as to whether the automobile being driven by Roosevelt Johnson was, under these circumstances, an uninsured automobile within the meaning of the uninsured motorists coverage of the Hartford policy.
This question has been considered by the courts of several of our sister states in recent years. In Vanguard Insurance Co. v. Polchlopek, 18 N.Y.2d 376, 275 N.Y.S.2d 515, 222 N.E.2d 383 (1966), the definition of an uninsured automobile was the same as in the present case, and the court stated that the phrase "applicable at the time of the accident" must be construed within the context of the clause wherein it is found and in the light of the purpose sought to be accomplished by the clause. In deciding that the definition of an uninsured automobile includes one where the insurance policy covering it at the time of the accident was later disclaimed because of failure to cooperate, the court stated that the policy's negative definitions of an uninsured motorist did not exclude an automobile upon which there had been a disclaimer of coverage. In Whitney v. American Fidelity Co., 350 Mass. 542, 215 N.E.2d 767 (1966) the plaintiff was insured under a liability policy with an uninsured automobile protection similar to the provisions of the Hartford policy. The insured thereunder sustained personal injuries in an accident while a guest in an automobile whose owner was the insured under an insurance policy issued under the compulsory motor vehicle liability law which excluded coverage as to guests. In holding that the automobile in which the plaintiff was riding at the time she was injured was an uninsured automobile, the court stated that there was no "applicable" insurance policy at the time of the accident capable of being applied to the bodily injury of the plaintiff.
There are cases to the contrary but we are persuaded that the New York and Massachusetts courts have properly construed the uninsured motorists provision.
In our opinion it would not be consistent with the purpose the uninsured motorist provisions of the policy purports to serve if it is narrowly construed so as to deny its protection if at the instant the accident happens there is a policy "applicable", although the coverage of the tort-feasor's policy is later lawfully disclaimed. As said in Whitney, supra, "applicable" can be said to mean "capable of being applied". A policy is applied, or is "applicable", at the time the policyholder is entitled to its protection.
The purpose of the uninsured motorist provision is to provide the insured a means of collecting that to which he is legally entitled for bodily injuries caused by accident arising out of the ownership, maintenance and use of an uninsured automobile. This provision must be construed from the perspective of the injured insured, from whose standpoint a tort-feasor operating an automobile with no insurance available is an uninsured motorist. It is all the same to him whether there is no insurance at all, or a policy that is incapable of being applied to satisfy his claim because the tort-feasor's insurer lawfully disclaims liability.
The case of K. L. M. Distributing Co. v. Washington General Ins. Corp., 215 So.2d 710 (Miss. 1968) is in point. The insured, a'truck brokerage company, was issued a policy on a load of frozen chickens to be shipped in interstate commerce by a non-leased carrier. A rider attached to the policy provided that "this policy is excess over any policy held by a non-owned or non-leased operator carrying a brokered load of merchandise for the assured." The brokered load was being carried by a non-owned non-leased operator (Miles Trucking Co.) who had a fire policy, but the "other insurance" insuring the Miles Trucking Co. was not available to K. L. M. and afforded no protection. Notwithstanding the wording of the policy the Court held that the "excess" clause in Washington General Insurance Company's policy necessarily implied that the "other insurnace" that would limit Washington General's liability must be insurance affording K. L. M. protection from liability for the loss in question. The Court then said:
The "excess" clause in Washington General's policy should not be interpreted in a vacuum, but in the context of the whole policy and the purposes for which it was issued and the premium paid thereon. The policy issued by The Home Insurance Company to Miles Trucking Service did not insure K. L. M. either as a named or unnamed insured, and it was not relevant to the "excess" clause relied upon by Washington General. Absent appropriate words indicating a contrary intention, the "excess" clause in Washington General's policy should not be given a construction that results in K. L. M. having no coverage against liability for the loss involved. To do so would defeat the purpose the policy purposed to serve. (215 So.2d at 713).
We are therefore of the opinion that appellant's bill of complaint was sufficient to withstand Hartford's demurrer. No issue is raised on the question of appellant's right to bring a direct action against her own insurer under the uninsured motorist clause. It seems obvious that appellant may bring a direct action against Hartford, her own insurer.
The decree of the trial court is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.