Case Name: The State of Louisiana v. Didio Baptiste and Francis Martini
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1874-02
Citations: 26 La. Ann. 134
Docket Number: No. 4622
Parties: The State of Louisiana v. Didio Baptiste and Francis Martini.
Judges: 
Reporter: Louisiana Annual Reports
Volume: 26
Pages: 134–140

Head Matter:
No. 4622.
The State of Louisiana v. Didio Baptiste and Francis Martini.
The judge a quo was right when he refused a continuance in order that the prisoners might obtain testimony from Europe to establish the fact that the man alleged to have been murdered was the nephew of one of the accused. The relationship of the parties has nothing to do with the guilt or innocence of the accused..
The judge did not err when he ordered that the witnesses for the State and the prisoners be separated, except the physicians. Dr. Jackson, being the coroner, was called to testify as such; Dr. Bernias and Dr. Board, being required as medical experts as to the cause of death were permitted to remain to hear the evidence in order that they might form an opinion as to the cause of death.
The court a qua did not err in permitting "Ward to testify as a witness. The objection was that he had been found guilty of two crimes, and had been sentenced to the penitentiary and to the parish prison; that he had been pardoned after his sentence had been completed; and that his pardon was not sufficiently proved.
It matters not whether the pardon came before or after the term of confinement had expired. There are disabilities which are the consequences of-conviction, and which remain after incarceration has ceased. The doctrine well recognized on this subject is, that a pardon gives to the person to whom it is granted a new character, and makes of him a new man. "When extended to him in prison, it releases him and removes his disabilities; when given to him after his time of imprisonment has expired, it removes all that is left of the consequences of conviction — his disabilities.
A communication from the Secretary of the Senate to the Acting Governor, informing him that his recommendation for pardon had been received, and that it had been acted upon favorably, is sufficient evidence of the completeness of the pardon.
The judge a quo did not err in permitting the physicians, as professional experts, to recapitulate to the jury the evidence they had heard, and which constituted the reason and foundation for their opinions in relation to the mode of death of the deceased.
The objection that they were physicians in the employ of two insurance offices which had each a policy in the life of the deceased, may go to their credibility, but does not make improper their answers to the questions propounded.
The jury, after being two days and two nights deliberating on their verdict, came into court, and through their foreman asked the court for further instructions as to the weight to be given to oircumstantial evidence; and the court having briefly charged the jury that they were bound to act on circumstantial evidence as much as on any other evidenoe, and being about to send back the jury to their room for further deliberations, the counsel for defendants asked the court to give the jury a more explicit charge as to the character of the circumstantial evidence which was entitled to consideration by them. The court interrupted the counsel, and absolutely refused to hear what he had to say, or even to permit him to address the court upon the right of asking for additional charges on the particular information wanted by the jury.
On this point, it is obvious that the judge a quo erred, and that he refused to the prisoners a most importánt, and, in this instance, vital right.
Appeal from the First District Court, parish of Orleans. Abell, J. Criminal case.
A. P. Field, Attorney General, for the State. Sambola & Atocha, for defendants and appellants.

Opinion:
Ludblin©, C. J.
In this case there are several bills of exceptions to the rulings of the judge a quo.
It will be necessary to notice only one of them. The State offered as a witness one Ward, to prove admissions made by the prisoners. Objection was made to permitting the witness to testify, on the ground that he was disqualified by law from testifying, having been convicted of an infamous crime. A pardon of the Acting Governor, P. B. S. Pinchback, was produced. It was granted after the convict had served out the term of his imprisonment, and it is denied that in such a case the Governor had the right to grant a pardon. Such is our opinon. The Governor may pardon a convict while some portion of the penalty after judgment is unsatisfied, but when the judgment has been satisfied there is nothing to pardon. By a rule of evidence one convicted of an infamous crime is disqualified from giving evidence in a court of justice, and we know of no law which authorizes the Governor to remove the disability except by a pardon legally granted. It is from the penalty inflicted by the judgment of the court that the Governor can pardon, and not from the consequences of a civil rule resulting from a former conviction. As well might it be claimed that the Governor could grant indulgences in advance of the commission of crimes.
The judge erred in permitting the witness to testify. It is therefore ordered and adjudged that the verdict of the jury and the judgment of the court be set aside, and that there be judgment remanding the case for a new trial, according to law.