Case Name: CITY OF BAY ST. LOUIS v. Huey P. JOHNSTON
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1969-04-14
Citations: 222 So. 2d 841
Docket Number: No. 45197
Parties: CITY OF BAY ST. LOUIS v. Huey P. JOHNSTON.
Judges: ETHRIDGE, C. J., GILLESPIE, P. J., and JONES and PATTERSON, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 222
Pages: 841–848

Head Matter:
CITY OF BAY ST. LOUIS v. Huey P. JOHNSTON.
No. 45197.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
April 14, 1969.
Rehearing Denied June 2, 1969.
Bryan & Gordon, Harry R. Allen, Pas-cagoula & Gulfport, for appellant.
Gex, Gex & Phillips, Bay St. Louis, Walter J. Gex, III, Satterfield, Shell, Williams & Buford, Jackson, for appellee.

Opinion:
ROBERTSON, Justice.
Appellee, Huey Johnston, was injured in a car-truck collision on Central Avenue in Bay St. Louis, Mississippi, on the morning of February 8, 1965. He recovered a judgment for $20,000 against appellant, the City of Bay St. Louis, in the Circuit Court of Hancock County.
Johnston, a car salesman, was driving the car of a customer, Delbert McArthur, in a northerly direction on Central Avenue. A city dump truck was being driven by Ola Moran in a southerly direction on Central Avenue. As the car and truck approached each other, the dump truck turned to the left and crossed appellee's lane of traffic in an attempt to enter a road leading to the garbage dump. The right front of ap-pellee's car struck the truck just behind the right front fender. Johnston sustained injuries to his face about the left eye, right thumb and neck. The neural arch of the second cervical vertebra was fractured. He has continued to suffer from his neck swelling, nervous tension and headaches. At times he must quit work, leave his customer, and go home because of nervous tension.
There were nine assignments of error. We will discuss briefly the following three assignments:
(1) The lower court erred in overruling the objection of appellant to testimony of appellee as a violation of Section 1690 Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated (1956), the Dead Man's statute.
(2) The lower court erred in overruling the objection of appellant to hospital records pertaining to treatment of appellee, including written reports by a doctor who did not testify, on the grounds that admission of such records was a violation of the hearsay rule, thereby depriving appellant of the right of cross-examination of this doctor and others who made written entries into said records.
(3) The lower court erred in refusing appellant's requested instructions permitting the jury to draw reasonable inferences of unfavorable effect from the failure of appellee to present Dr. Kenneth Meyer and other doctors from Oschner's Clinic as witnesses.
The appellant contends that the liability vel non of the City, as employer, was derived solely from the actions of its employee, the truck driver, now deceased (his death was not related to the accident), and that inasmuch as the City would have a claim against his estate for indemnity that this suit is, in effect, an action against his estate and that, therefore, the appellee was not competent to testify under Section 1690 Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated (1956).
That section provides:
"A person shall not testify as a witness to establish his own claim or defense against the estate of a deceased person which originated during the lifetime of such deceased person, or any claim he has transferred since the death of such decedent. "
The estate of the deceased truck driver was not a party to this suit; the City of Bay St. Louis was the only defendant. This Court has held many times that Section 1690 is applicable only to direct claims against the estate of a deceased, and not to indirect or consequential claims. This rule was recently applied in the case of Poole v. McCarty, 240 Miss. 341, 127 So.2d 398 (1961).
In Poole, the Court discussed the competency of a plaintiff to testify against a defendant, whose partner, active in the particular transaction and contract involved, had since died, and his estate had not been made a party to the suit.
We said:
"The fact that defendant might later have a claim for contribution against his deceased partner would be only an indirect or collateral consequence. It would not disqualify plaintiff as a witness. " Id. at 350, 127 So.2d at 402.
In Poole, the Court quoted with approval from Shepherd v. Johnston, 201 Miss. 99, 106, 28 So.2d 661, 663 (1947):
" 'Section 1690, Code 1942, prohibiting a person from testifying as a witness to establish his own claim against the estate of a deceased person, created an exception to the general rule as to the competency of a witness; and being an exception, it must be strictly construed in favor of the competency of- the witness. The exception must come within both the letter and spirit of the statute. ' " 240 Miss. at 346, 127 So.2d at 400.
This rule was applied in Security Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Brunson, 176 Miss. 893, 170 So. 824 (1936), wherein we said:
"The evidence was against the insurance company on its only real defense — a gift of the policy by W. E. Brunson to Sam J. Brunson in the lifetime of the latter. No right of Sam J. Brunson is involved in this suit. That his estate may be affected prejudicially in consequence of the result of this suit in W. E. Brunson's favor, and a future action by the insurance company against that estate, does not render W. E. Brunson incompetent as a witness in the present suit. 'To exclude a party as a witness to prove his own claim or right, it must be against the estate of a deceased person in the suit in which he proposes to testify.' [Love v. Stone, 56 Miss. 449 (1879).]" 176 Miss. at 903-904, 170 So. at 827.
Appellee's testimony was competent inasmuch as the estate of the deceased driver was not a party to this suit and appellee was not testifying to establish a claim against the estate of the deceased.
Appellant also contends that hospital records introduced into evidence at the trial were inadmissible because they were hearsay.
Appellee answers that hospital records were made an exception to the hearsay rule by statute in Mississippi. Since 1962, Mississippi has required hospitals to keep records:
"All hospitals, their officers or employees and medical and nursing personnel practicing therein, shall with reasonable promptness prepare, make and maintain true and accurate hospital records complying with such methods and minimum standards as may be prescribed from time to time by rules and regulations adopted by the licensing agency." Miss.Code 1942 Ann. § 7146-52 (Supp.1966).
6 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd. ed. 1940) § 1707, p. 36, has this to say about the admission into evidence of hospital records:
"The medical records of patients at a hospital, organized on the usual modern plan, deserve to be placed under the present principle. They should be admissible, either on identification of the original by the keeper, or on offer of a certified or sworn copy. There is a Necessity (ante, § 1421) ; the calling of all the individual attendant physicians and nurses who have cooperated to make the record even of a single patient would be a serious interference with convenience of hospital management. There is a Circumstantial Guarantee of Trustworthiness (ante § 1422); for the records are made and relied upon in affairs of life and death. Moreover, amidst the day-to-day details of scores of hospital cases, the physicians and nurses can ordinarily recall from actual memory few or none of the specific data entered; they themselves rely upon the record of their own action; hence to call them to the stand would ordinarily add little or nothing to the information furnished by the record alone. "
Hospital records of the Natchez Charity Hospital were admitted in evidence in Reynolds v. West, 237 Miss. 613, 115 So.2d 742 (1959). This Court approved the action of the trial court, saying in its opinion: "Such records are admissible in evidence, since the law required that such records be kept,
The hospital records were properly admitted into evidence in this case.
The appellant contends: The lower court erred in refusing appellant's requested instructions permitting the jury to draw reasonable inferences of unfavorable effect from the failure of appellee to present Dr. Kenneth Meyer and other doctors from Oschner's Clinic as witnesses.
This case was set for trial on January 9, 1968. On January 4, 1968, appellant received a letter confirming an earlier conversation in which appellee waived the privilege with reference to questioning Dr. Kenneth Meyer of Oschner's Clinic, New Orleans, Louisiana. Appellant made no motion for a continuance or for a reasonable delay; neither did appellant file interrogatories.
Section 1703 Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated (1956) says in part: "The deposition of any witness absent from or residing out of the state may be taken by any party to the cause, (Emphasis added.) After receiving the waiver, the appellant had the same right as the appellee to take the deposition of Dr. Meyer. No inference can be drawn from the appellee's failure to produce in person as a witness every out-of-state doctor who examined him. If the appellant felt that Dr. Meyer's testimony was important, he had an opportunity to present this matter to the trial court in the form of a motion for a continuance or by filing interrogatories. Since appellant did neither, it cannot now complain.
While the judgment is liberal, we are not prepared to say that the jury was actuated by bias, passion and prejudice. There was evidence that the appellee had been permanently injured, or that the swelling of the neck with consequent pain and tension might recur from time to time into the indefinite future. The judgment of the trail court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
ETHRIDGE, C. J., GILLESPIE, P. J., and JONES and PATTERSON, JJ., concur.