Case Name: Terry L. ADERHOLD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1992-01-28
Citations: 593 So. 2d 1081
Docket Number: No. 90-1116
Parties: Terry L. ADERHOLD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: BARFIELD, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 593
Pages: 1081–1087

Head Matter:
Terry L. ADERHOLD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 90-1116.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Jan. 28, 1992.
M. Alan Ceballos of Harris, Guidi, Ros-ner, Ceballos & Daze, Jacksonville, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Edward C. Hill, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.

Opinion:
WOLF, Judge.
Appellant was charged by amended information with sale or delivery of cannabis, possession of more than 20 grams of cannabis, and possession of a forged, fictitious, counterfeit or unlawfully issued driver's license. Appellant pled no contest, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress, and was adjudicated guilty as charged. Here, appellant challenges the denial of his motion to suppress. We reverse.
In a pretrial motion, appellant sought to suppress a suitcase and any other items of personal property seized from him on November 2, 1989. The only witness to testify at the hearing on the motion to suppress was Officer Charles Thompson, an officer with the Jacksonville Sheriffs Department. Thompson testified that he was advised by DEA officials that two men, arriving at Jacksonville airport, had been identified by DEA officials at the Dallas/Fort Worth airport as fitting a drug courier profile. Thompson was not told exactly how and to what extent the two men were found to fit the profile, but Thompson testified that he was advised that the airline tickets were purchased in cash. Thompson had also been given a physical description of the two individuals, a description of their clothing, and baggage information. He .knew that one of the individuals was traveling under the name of Don Osborne, which was the appellant's alias. Thompson also knew that appellant was a late boarder.
Upon arriving at the Jacksonville airport, Thompson spotted Osborne (appellant) on the concourse. He watched appellant at the luggage carousel where appellant's luggage circled twice before appellant retrieved it. Thompson noted that appellant appeared nervous and that he was constantly looking around. He followed appellant who met up with another individual identified as McGovern. Thompson testified that McGovern's clothing did not exactly fit the description provided by the DEA officials. As the two men were approaching a vehicle parked in a loading zone, Thompson approached the two with a uniformed officer. Thompson identified himself and asked if they had just flown in. Appellant produced an airline ticket with the name Don Osborne. Thompson asked appellant for identification, but appellant stated he had none. McGovern turned over a driver's license. Thompson indicated to appellant that airlines usually require some form of identification when tickets are purchased in cash. At that point, appellant produced a Florida driver's license with the name Don Osborne. Thompson testified that the two individuals acted as if they hadn't traveled together; they gave the impression that McGovern had met the appellant at the airport and was there to take appellant home. In fact, McGovern stated he had not flown in, but later during that conversation he retracted that representation and admitted that he had flown in with the appellant.
After conversing with the two gentlemen for approximately 10 minutes, the officer stated to appellant and to McGovern that he felt he had a reasonable suspicion to conclude that their luggage contained narcotics. The officer requested a consent search, which appellant adamantly refused. Thompson testified that during the conversation the appellant insinuated that the luggage belonged to him. Thompson then indicated that he was going to detain the luggage and obtain a search warrant, and offered appellant a receipt for the luggage. McGovern was placed under arrest for having a suspended license. The appellant accompanied Thompson to the narcotic interdiction office. Appellant left the office indicating that he was going to get a coke; instead he disappeared from the scene. He was arrested several months later. A narcotic detection dog was summoned which "alerted" on the luggage. Thereafter, the search warrant was obtained and marijuana was discovered.
In his motion to suppress, appellant asserted that the seizure of the suitcase was improper in that Thompson had no firsthand knowledge of any articulable facts that gave rise to a suspicion regarding the suitcase, and that the firsthand information which the officer did possess was partially inconsistent with the information provided to him. Appellant also asserted that there was no constitutionally valid basis to justify the initial stop, and that no consent was given to seize or search the bag.
In his memorandum of law submitted in support of his motion to suppress, the appellant argued that the specific information possessed by Thompson prior to the seizure of the suitcase did not amount to probable cause or reasonable suspicion; thus, the seizure of the bag constituted an unreasonable investigatory detention of personal property, contrary to United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983). Appellant also argued that the 90-minute detention of the luggage prior to the arrival of the narcotics dog was unreasonably long.
These arguments were repeated in the suppression hearing. The state responded that there were sufficient facts to constitute a reasonable suspicion and that the scope of the detention was not unreasonable given the fact that the appellant abandoned the suitcases shortly after they were seized. The trial court found, based on the evidence presented, that Thompson had reasonable articulable facts upon which to make the initial stop of the appellant and that Thompson's suspicions were aroused to a greater degree by the different stories told during the encounter. The trial court also found that because appellant left the scene, his argument regarding the length of the detention of his luggage was of no merit.
On appeal, appellant argues, as he did below, that the initial encounter between Thompson and himself and his companion was a stop which was not legally justified because Thompson did not have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the appellant of criminal activity, that the subsequent seizure of appellant's luggage was also unreasonable, and that the length of the detention of the luggage rendered the seizure unreasonable. We conclude, as did the court below, that the argument regarding the stop of the appellant is unavailing under the facts presented.
The issue of the legality of the initial stop of the appellant, however, is not dis-positive of the other issues raised by appellant. We must also determine the validity of the search and seizure of appellant's luggage. In United States v. Place, supra, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the fourth amendment protections from unreasonable search and seizure apply to the luggage of a traveler. In determining the legality of the actions taken by the police, "[w]e must balance the nature and the quality of the intrusion on an individual's Fourth Amendment interest against the importance of the governmental interest alleged to justify the intrusion." United States v. Place, 462 U.S. at 703, 103 S.Ct. at 2642, 77 L.Ed.2d at 118.
In United States v. Place, supra, the Supreme Court recognized that the level of intrusion to a party's possessionary interest in luggage may vary in nature and degree. Both the United States and Florida Supreme Courts have determined that a brief detention to allow a sniff test by a trained narcotics dog is a minimal level of intrusion which may be based on less than probable cause. See United States v. Place, supra; United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989); Cresswell v. State, 564 So.2d 480 (Fla.1990). See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). The length and nature of the detention, however, may demonstrate that a full seizure has taken place, and the action of the police in that case must be based upon probable cause:
Although the 90 minute detention of respondent's luggage is sufficient to render the seizure unreasonable, the viola tion was exacerbated by the failure of the agents to accurately inform respondent of the place to which they were transporting his luggage, of the length of time he might be dispossessed, and of what arrangements would be made for the return of the luggage, if the investigation dispelled the suspicion. In short, we hold that the detention of the respondent's luggage in this case went beyond the narrow authority possessed by the police to detain briefly luggage reasonably suspected to contain narcotics.
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. at 710, 103 S.Ct. at 2646, 77 L.Ed.2d at 122-123.
In this case, as in Place, the officer told the appellant that he would have to leave his luggage so that the police would have the opportunity to obtain a search warrant. The police at that point had already made a determination to seize the luggage from the appellant rather than to briefly detain the luggage to conduct further investigation (such as a sniff test by a trained narcotics dog at the scene). The level of intrusion in the instant case is indistinguishable from Place, supra. In that case, the United States Supreme Court determined that the police conduct could only be justified based on probable cause rather than the lower standard of reasonably ar-ticulable suspicion.
Probable cause means "a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found." United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585, 104 L.Ed.2d 1, 10; Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). The determination of whether probable cause exists involves a fact-intensive analysis that varies from context to context. Schmitt v. State of Florida, 590 So.2d 404 (Fla.1991). The analysis involves a view of the totality of the circumstances which would lead the police to reasonably believe that a crime is being committed. See Schmitt, supra; Harris v. State, 590. So.2d 551 (Fla. 1st DCA, 1991).
A criminal profile is one of the circumstances which may be utilized in determining the reasonableness of a search if the profile describes "circumstances which would reasonably indicate to a law enforcement officer the existence of criminal activity." Cresswell v. State, 564 So.2d 480, 482 (Fla.1990). Under certain circumstances, therefore, a detention- or a search based on a profile may be upheld. See United States v. Sokolow, supra; Cresswell v. State, supra. The factors in the instant case, however, were insufficient to lead the police to reasonably believe that a crime was being committed.
The police were unaware of what specific factors were utilized by the Dallas police to determine that the appellant met the drug carrier profile. The only factors of which the officer was aware at the time of the seizure were that appellant purchased his ticket in cash, he looked nervous, he let his luggage go around on the carousel twice, and his companion initially denied that the two were traveling together. These circumstances are insufficient to establish probable cause.
We also are unpersuaded by the state's argument concerning abandonment since the alleged abandonment only occurred after, and as a result of, the illegal seizure of the luggage. See State v. Anderson, 591 So.2d 611 (Fla.1992).
We conclude that under all of the circumstances of this case, the seizure of the appellant's luggage was unreasonable under the fourth amendment, and that the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion to suppress. We must, therefore, reverse the conviction.
BARFIELD, J., concurs.
SMITH, J., dissents with written opinion.
. In the instant case, as in Place, the police conducted a sniff test approximately 90 minutes after the luggage was seized. In Place, the United States Supreme Court found this constituted an unreasonable amount of time for an investigatory detention. It is unnecessary for us to reach the question of the lapse of time, as the police had already seized the luggage prior to conducting the sniff test.
. It is unnecessary for us to determine whether there was reasonable articulable suspicion as in Sokolow, supra, which would justify a brief detention, since the standard which must be met in the instant case is probable cause.