Case Name: Helen Jones WINGATE, Admx. of the Estate of John Goodman Wingate, Respondent, v. SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant
Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1964-06-11
Citations: 244 S.C. 332
Docket Number: 18225
Parties: Helen Jones WINGATE, Admx. of the Estate of John Goodman Wingate, Respondent, v. SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant.
Judges: Taylor, C. J., and Moss and Brailsford, JJ., concur.
Reporter: South Carolina Reports
Volume: 244
Pages: 332–344

Head Matter:
18225
Helen Jones WINGATE, Admx. of the Estate of John Goodman Wingate, Respondent, v. SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILROAD COMPANY, Appellant.
(137 S. E. (2d) 258)
Messrs. Grier, McDonald, Todd, Burns & Bradford, of Greenwood, and John Spratt, of York, for Appellant,
Charles B. Ridley, Esq., of Rock Hill, for Respondent,
June 11, 1964.

Opinion:
Lewis, Justice.
Plaintiff's intestate, John Goodman Wingate, was instantly killed on November 25, 1960, about 10:30 A. M., when his automobile was struck by a train of the defendant, Seaboard Air Line Railroad Company, ás he was proceeding across the defendant's tracks at a crossing near Edgemoor, South Carolina, where the main line and a side track of the defendant are intersected by an unimproved county road. Separate actions were instituted by the administratrix of the estate of the deceased against the defendant to recover for the intestate's alleged wrongful death and for the destruction of his automobile. The actions involved the same facts and were tried together, resulting in a verdict against the defendant for actual damages in each. This is a consolidated appeal by the defendant from the adverse judgment in each action, presenting the single question of whether the deceased was guilty of contributory gross or wilful negligence as a matter of law, so as to bar the administratrix of his estate from recovery.
The complaint alleges that the collision and resulting damage were caused by the negligence, recklessness and willfulness of the defendant and its employees in operating the train at an excessive rate of speed, in failing to maintain a proper lookout, in failing to give the statutory crossing signals, in failing to properly maintain the crossing so that those traveling over it would be provided with a safe and easy passage over the rails, in so maintaining the crossing that the view of a traveler was obstructed by an embankment, trees and high grass, in failing to erect and maintain at the crossing adequate warning signs, and in failing to apply the brakes on the train to avoid the collision. The defendant's answer contained a denial of these allegations and interposed the affirmative defense of contributory negligence, recklessness and willfulness on the part of plaintiff's intestate. During the trial of the case, the defendant made timely motions for a nonsuit and directed verdict upon the ground that plaintiff's intestate was guilty of contributory gross or willful negligence as a matter of law in that the evidence admits only of the reasonable inference that he approached and entered upon the crossing immediately in front of an oncoming train without taking due or even slight care for his own safety. These motions were refused by the trial judge and the correctness of his ruling is the sole issue presented in this appeal.
On the morning in question, the deceased was proceeding in a westerly direction along a dirt public road which crosses the tracks of the defendant about one and one-half miles north of the small town of Edgemoor, South Carolina. The railroad runs in a general north-south direction. The public road is described as forming an "S" curve as it approaches the crossing from the direction in which the deceased was traveling. From that direction, the first curve in the "S" turns to the traveller's left and the last to his right as he immediately approaches the crossing. One would come out of the first curve approximately 325 feet from the crossing and travel about 225 feet nearly parallel to the railroad tracks before entering the last curve to the right. As a traveller comes out of the last curve, the road is straight for a distance of approximately 60 feet to the defendant's main line where the collision took place, and intersects the tracks at a very slight angle.
The defendant maintained two tracks over the crossing, one its main line and the other a passing track. From the direction in which the deceased approached, one would first cross the passing track and then the main line. At the time of the collision, there was in place the statutory railroad cross arm sign. The testimony is uncontradicted that the deceased approached the crossing at a very slow speed, estimated at from 5 to 15 miles per hour, and that the train approached at approximately its scheduled speed of seventy miles per hour. The automobile of the deceased was struck on the right side near the rear fender.
In so far as this appeal is concerned, it is conceded that the statutory signals were not given by the employees of the defendant as required by Section 58-743 of the 1962 Code of Laws; and that, in order to require reversal of the judgment herein, it must appear from the evidence that the deceased was guilty of contributory "gross or willful negligence" as a matter of law, Section 58-1004 of the 1962 Code of Laws.
While the railroad is required to give the statutory crossing signals, the failure of the railroad to give such signals does not relieve a traveler of the duty to exercise due care to observe the approach of trains at the crossing. As stated in Robinson v. Atlantic Coast Line Railway Co., et al., 179 S. C. 493, 184 S. E. 96, 100: "Subject to applicable qualifications and limitations, where a traveler about to enter upon a crossing has an opportunity, by exercising his sense of hearing or sight, to discover an approaching train in time to stop in a place of safety, it is his duty under such circumstances to look and listen, and, if he fails to do so, or fails or neglects, as he approaches the crossing, to see or discover an approaching train dangerously near the crossing, which the evidence shows he could or must have discovered in the exercise of ordinary care, had he looked or listened, such failure to look and listen amounts not only to negligence, but to gross negligence as a matter of law."
The train which struck the deceased approached from his right. Admittedly, the deceased could not have seen a train on defendant's tracks until he reached a point on the public road approximately 325 feet from the crossing, due to tall pine trees growing between the road and the tracks. From that point to the crossing, the distance between the public road and the railroad tracks varies, but at no point is it greater than approximately 130 feet. The grade level of the public road, the intervening area, and the railroad tracks was approximately the same for a distance of 200 feet from the crossing. In this area between the public road and the railroad, there was growing at the time of the collision a thin growth of broom sage, at places about three feet in height, and six to ten scattered pine trees about six feet tall. There were no other possible obstructions to the view in that area. The height of the train was estimated to be from 14 to 16 feet, which would have made it at least ten feet taller than the broom sage and eight feet higher than the few scattered pines. Pictures of the scene taken shortly after the accident were placed in evidence by both the plaintiff and the defendant and differ in no material respects. They, together with the other testimony, clearly show that the broom sage and scattered pines constituted no material obstruction to the view of a traveler approaching the crossing.
While we think that the testimony clearly shows that the broom sage and few scattered pines constituted no material obstruction to the view of the deceased of an oncoming train, it is uncontradicted that, when the deceased reached a point on the public road forty-five feet from the point of collision with the train, he had passed any obstruction that might have been created by the broom sage and scattered pines and had an unobstructed view of the railroad in the direction of the approaching train for at least a distance of 1,000 feet.
Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, as we are required to do in determining the issues in this appeal, the conclusion is inescapable that the deceased was guilty of contributory gross negligence and recklessness as a matter of law. The accident occurred on a clear day. The deceased was 36 years of age with no impairment of his sight or hearing. There was nothing to distract his attention. The testimony shows that he approached the crossing, with which he was thoroughly familiar, at a speed of from 5 to 15 miles per hour and had an ample unobstructed view of an approaching train in which to have seen it and avoided the collision. There is no explanation of his driving into the path of the train under the foregoing circumstances except that he failed to exercise even slight care for his own safety. Under the circumstances such would constitute contributory gross or willful negli gence and bar recovery by the plaintiff. Moore v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 192 S. C. 406, 7 S. E. (2d) 4; Breeden v. Rockingham R. Co., 193 S. C. 220, 8 S. E. (2d) 366.
Therefore, the trial judge should have granted the motion of the defendant for a directed verdict in its favor, and the cause is remanded for the purpose of entry of judgment in favor of the defendant.
Reversed and remanded.
Taylor, C. J., and Moss and Brailsford, JJ., concur.
Bussey, J., dissents.