Case Name: Glover v. Holmes
Court: Constitutional Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1804-05
Citations: 1 Brev. 454
Docket Number: 
Parties: Glover v. Holmes.
Judges: Present, Grimke, Trezevant, and Brevard, Justices.
Reporter: South Carolina Law Reports
Volume: 3
Pages: 454–454

Head Matter:
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT,
CHARLESTON,
MAY, 1804.
Glover v. Holmes.
Interest on a judgment cannot be collected by execution; and it makes no difference, that the original cause of action bore interest. Sed vide Acts of 1815, p. 39.
Before Johnson, J., in Charleston. Parker, for the assignees of the defendant, obtained a rule on the sheriff, to shew cause why the moneys tendered in satisfaction of certain executions against the defendant, should not be received, and the executions returned satisfied. Bailey shewed for cause, that the money tendered, amounted to the principal sum only, found by the jury, without interest; and, that the plaintiff was intitled to interest on the respective verdicts, from the time they were found.
Johnson, J., decided, that no interest was chargeable upon the judgments ; and, that the sheriff could only demand the sums for which judgments are entered up, and no more. This decision was appealed from, and the motion in this court was to reverse the same.
Bailey, for the motion ; Parker, contra.

Opinion:
By the Court.
The executions in the sheriff's hands, were upon judgments obtained upon notes and open accounts, not subject to the instalment (aw. By the common law, judgments do not curry interest. In some of the Stat'-s, acts have been passed for the special purpose of declaring that judgments shall carry interest. By the instalment act of 17*s8, P. L. 467, the principal sum of all judgments, and all open accounts, sh til draw interest from the time they become due. But this had relation only to judgments and accounts then existing, and liable to the operation of the instalment act. It was a temporary provision, to guard against the injustice resulting from the interference of the legislature between debtor and creditor, to the hindrance and delay of the latter. It shews what the law was, and is, and that no interest can be demanded on judgments, although the practice has-been generally to the contrary' for many years.
Motion dismissed.
Present, Grimke, Trezevant, and Brevard, Justices.