Case Name: CITY OF HALLANDALE, a Florida municipal corporation, Petitioner, v. Wiliam F. CHATLOS, Acmar Engineering Corp., a Florida corporation, M. L. Watson, A. J. Dodge, G. B. Dodge, Jr., P. L. Watson and Ruby M. Watson, his wife, Respondents
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1970-06-03
Citations: 236 So. 2d 761
Docket Number: No. 39145
Parties: CITY OF HALLANDALE, a Florida municipal corporation, Petitioner, v. Wiliam F. CHATLOS, Acmar Engineering Corp., a Florida corporation, M. L. Watson, A. J. Dodge, G. B. Dodge, Jr., P. L. Watson and Ruby M. Watson, his wife, Respondents.
Judges: ERVIN, C. J., and ROBERTS, CARLTON and BOYD, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 236
Pages: 761–765

Head Matter:
CITY OF HALLANDALE, a Florida municipal corporation, Petitioner, v. Wiliam F. CHATLOS, Acmar Engineering Corp., a Florida corporation, M. L. Watson, A. J. Dodge, G. B. Dodge, Jr., P. L. Watson and Ruby M. Watson, his wife, Respondents.
No. 39145.
Supreme Court of Florida.
June 3, 1970.
Fred J. Ward, of Crouch & Ward, Hal-lendale, for petitioner.
E. F. P. Brigham of Brigham & Brigham, Miami, for William F. Chatios.
Lucien C. Proby, Jr., of Pallot, Silver, Pallot, Stern, Proby & Adkins, Miami, for Acmar Engineering Corporation.
Antonio Martinez, Jr., and Thomas H. Anderson, of Shutts & Bowen, Miami, for Watson and Dodge.

Opinion:
ADKINS, Justice.
This case arose when petitioner City of Hallandale commenced condemnation proceedings. After answers were filed by all respondents, and motions to dismiss were pending, the petitioner terminated the proceedings and filed notice of dismissal under R.C.P. 1.420(a), 30 F.S.A. On motion by respondents, the trial court assessed attorneys' fees against petitioner.
Petitioner sought certiorari in the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, on the question whether a trial judge has jurisdiction to determine attorneys' fees in a condemnation proceeding that has been terminated by condemnor filing notice of dismissal, where
(1) No order for taking has been requested,
(2) There has been no appropriation of or use of the lands, and
(3) No jury trial has been conducted.
The District Court denied certiorari.
We took jurisdiction on writ of certiora-ri to resolve apparent conflict in the result reached by the District Court with prior appellate decisions on the question central to this case.
In Jacksonville Terminal Co. v. Blanshard et al., 77 Fla. 855, 82 So. 300 (Fla.1919), we held that a landowner whose land was subject to condemnation must file a separate suit to recover attorneys' fees where a railroad's condemnation suit was dismissed before jury determination. The decision was adhered to after retrial; 85 Fla. 500, 96 So. 286 (Fla.1923). We reaffirmed our decision in Jacksonville Terminal Co., supra, when we decided DeSoto County v. Highsmith, 60 So.2d 915 (Fla.1952), stating that where the trial court had terminated a condemnation proceeding which had been dismissed, a separate suit for attorneys' fees would be permitted.
Subsequent to these decisions, with which conflict is alleged, the Florida Legislature altered the law, removing the requirement of jury trial to determine attorneys' fees, removing the requirement of a separate trial, and changing the definition of attorneys' fees to include them as part of costs. The statute, as enacted in 1963 and renumbered in 1965, provides:
"The petitioner shall pay all reasonable costs of the proceedings in the circuit court, including a reasonable attorney's fee to be assessed by that court."
Laws of 1965, Ch. 65-369. The provision is now Fla.Stat. § 73.091, F.S.A.
A reading of the pertinent statutory provision reveals that the Legislature intended that attorneys' fees be considered part of the costs of the proceeding, that the fees be assessed by the court, and that all reasonable costs be paid for the proceeding.
In Chatlos v. City of Hallandale, 220 So.2d 353 (Fla.1969), this case was before us for review of other issues. We stated (at page 355) :
"We expressly do not pass upon the question of whether the proper method of recovering such attorneys' fees and costs would be by_an independent suit."
This question we have examined in the present case. We conclude that in light of the statute enacted by the 1963 Legislature, which changed the law from that established in our decisions cited for conflict, any conflict which does exist is purely illusory, and the order of the trial judge granting attorneys' fees is within the purview of Fla.Stat. § 73.091, F.S.A.
We note that our conclusion accords with R.C.P. 1.420, which permits voluntary dismissal of actions, but also adds:
"Costs in any action dismissed under this rule shall be assessed and judgment for costs entered in that action." (Subsection (d) ).
We construe this to mean that costs, including attorneys' fees, are to be assessed and judgment entered for them in the same action which is the subject of voluntary dismissal under R.C.P. 1.420(a).
We conclude that we lack jurisdiction. F.A.R. 2.1, subd. a(5) (b), 32 F.S.A. The'writ heretofore issued is therefore discharged. Respondents' motions for attorneys' fees for appellate proceedings are remanded to the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, to further remand, to the trial court, for determination of the value of attorneys' fees in appellate proceedings.
It is so ordered.
ERVIN, C. J., and ROBERTS, CARLTON and BOYD, JJ., concur.
THORNAL, J., agrees to discharge of writ on jurisdictional grounds with opinion.
DREW, J., dissents with opinion.