Case Name: The State of Ohio v. Gardner
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio
Jurisdiction: Ohio
Decision Date: 1896-01-21
Citations: 54 Ohio St. 24
Docket Number: 
Parties: The State of Ohio v. Gardner.
Judges: 
Reporter: Ohio State Reports, New Service
Volume: 54
Pages: 24–60

Head Matter:
The State of Ohio v. Gardner.
Official acts of public officers — Performed before statute creating office has been declared unconstitutional — Collateral attack-Constitutional law.
In a prosecution for offering a bribe to an officer, who is acting' as such under a statute providing for the government of a municipal corporation, the defendant cannot question the constitutionality of such statute.
(Decided January 21, 1896.)
Exceptions to the Court of Common Pleas of Summit county.
The facts appear in the opinion.
Samuel G. Rodgers, prosecuting attornejq and Henry K. Sander, for plaintiff in error.
1. That the constitutionality of the act under which Hug-ill was holding- can not be considered upon demurrer in this proceeding.
2. The doctrine of estoppel should apply.
3. Whatever may be the fact as to the constitutionality of the acit, it appears by the admissions of the demurrer that there was a defacto office and that Joseph Hug-ill was a defacto officer.
4. The act of April 20,1893, is constitutional and valid.
We maintain that the constitutionality of this enactment can only be questioned by proceedings in quo warranto, brought directly against the alleged officer. In this case it is purely a collateral question, inasmuch as the officer bribed is not a party to the action, neither is any other officer in any city whose government is affected bj^ the act a party or in any manner connected with the cause, and they certainly have a right to be heard before they are declared by solemn judicial decision to be usurpers. Molitor v. State, 6 C. C. Rep., 263; Meacham on Public Officers, sec., 330; State v. Alling, 12 Ohio, 16; Ehrman v. Life Ins. Co., 35 Ohio St., 324; Chamberlain v. Railroad Co., 15 Ohio St., 225; Presbyterian Society v. Smithers, 12 Ohio St., 248; Thomas Sheehan’s Case, 122 Mass., 445.
It would be manifestly contrary to public policy to allow such an issue to be raised upon an indictment. It would put it in power of every one charged with crime to question the judicial authority of the court trying him before any finding is made oust-ting the court from its jurisdiction. Stuart v. School District, 30 Mich., 69; People v. Maynard, 15 Mich., 470; Fractional School District v. School Inspectors, 27 Mich., 3; Bird v. Perkins, 33 Mich., 28; President and Trustees v. Thompson, 20 Ill., 197; Kettering v. Jacksonville, 50 Ill., 39; People v. Webster, 86 Ill., 283; Donough v. Dewey, 82 Mich., 309.
Prom the cases above cited it clearly appears that the authority of officers claiming title under color of law can only be questioned by the state by proceeding’s in quo warranto. Coyle v. Commonwealth, 104 Pa. St., 117; Burt v. Winona & St. P. R. Co., 18 N. W. Rep., 287.
If Joseph Hugill had been indicted for accepting a bribe he would have been estopped, beyond question from setting up the unconstitutionality of the act under which he claimed to be serving. Bishop’s New Grim. Law, vol. 1, sec. 464; Bishop’s New Crim. Law, vol. 2, sec. 392.
In like manner, we maintain that a person offering a bribe, and thus recognizing- him as an officer under the act, would be estopped from denying his official authority.
Where an office is established by legislative act apparently valid, and the office is filled and exercised under the act it is a cle facto office. This doctrine is clearly established in Ohio. Smith v. Lynch, Treas., 29 Ohio St., 261; Leach v. The People, 122 Ill., 420; Burt v. Winona & St. P. R. Co., 18 N. W. Rep., 285; Mechan on Public Officers, sec. 318; Donough v. Dewey, 82 Mich., 209; Van Fleet on Collateral Attack, sec. 21.
To hold any other doctrine than that above stated would mean anarchy instead, of government. The public would be absolutely at sea as to the real state of the laws. There is not a municipality in the state of Ohio whose government is not open to question, and the public has no means of determining the constitutionality of the laws provided for them save by a decision of the courts, which necessarily requires time. ■ The result would be that municipal government must cease altogether. '■ •
The form of this statute is general. The operation of the statute is general. The effect of the statute is to create a class of municipal governments other than those theretofore provided for. The basis of the classification is the usual and natural one of population, and there is a margin of 7,000 inhabitants between the smallest and largest city which may fall within its provisions. This is a substantial condition and clurracteristic. It is a wider margin than the general classification theretofore in operation had provided for in many cases; which classification has been expressly approved by the judgment of this court. State v. Brewster, 39 Ohio St., 653; State v. Pugh, 43 Ohio St., 99; Railway Company v. Martin, 53 Ohio St., 386.
Our position is sustained by uniform and repeated decisions of this court. The constitutionality of such legislation is sustained not only by the early adjudications, but by the principles laid down in the most recent cases. Bronson v. Oberlin, 41 Ohio St., 476; State v. Anderson, 44 Ohio St., 247; Kenton v. State, 52 Ohio St., 59; Railway Company v. Martin, 53 Ohio St., 386.
It is not a case of special legislation; on the contrary, it is a return to the general legislation con-plated by the constitution, and contains the broadest classification known to our statutes.
Charles Baird, appointed to argue case against the prosecuting attorney.
It is perfectly clear that the legislature did not, in a fair sense mean, that the act last named should apply to any other cities now existing, but Akron and Youngstown.
The act in view confers corporate powers upon Akron and Youngstown, through the board of city commissioners, and organizes these two cities upon a basis of a special grade .for purposes of municipal government; suspends the operation of general laws as to them, while these suspended statutes must remain in full force, as to the other cities of the state of the same class and grade, or throw the laws regulating the organization of municipal corporations into inextricable confusion. State v. Anderson, 44 Ohio St., 249; State v. Ellet, 47 Ohio St., 90. We ask the court to read the discussion on pages 90-101, which is entirely applicable here. Costello v. Wyoming, 49 Ohio St., 202; State ex rel. v. Schwab, 49 Ohio St., 229; Commissioners v. State ex rel., 50 Ohio St., 653; Carr v. West Carrolton, 8 C. C. Rep., 1; Kenton v. State , 52 Ohio St., 59; State v. Bargus, 53 Ohio St., 94; Railroad Co. v. Martin, 53 Ohio St., 386.
What then is the legal status of Akron? We think it more reasonable to hold that it is a city of the second class, third grade, and governed by the general laws applicable to such cities, and that the act of April 20, 1893, is inoperative to create the office of city commissioner so far as the city of Akron is concerned.
There was and is, therefore, under the law no such office or officer as city commissioner of the city of Akron,, and the demurrer was properly sustained.
The position of the prosecuting attorney is that there may be a defacto officer although there is no de jure office.
In this country the doctrine is everywhere declared, that the acts of defacto officers, as distinguished from the acts of mere usurpers, are valid, and the principle extends not only to municipal officers generally, but also to those composing the council, or legislative or governing body of a municipal corporation. But in order that there may be within the meaning of the above rule, a defacto officer, there must be a de jure office; and the notion that there can be a de facto office has been characterized as a political solecism, without foundation in reason and without support in law; and, therefore, a person cannot claim to be a de facto officer of a municipal corporation when the corporation or people have, in law, no power, in any event, to elect or appoint such an officer. Dillon on Mun. Corp., Sec. 276; Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U. S., 425; Gorman v. People, 17 Col., 587; ex parte Roundtree, 51 Ala., 42; Hildreth v. McIntire, 1 J. J. Marsh, 206; Town of Decorah v. Bullis, 25 Iowa, 112.
It seems to us clear that this must be the rule applicable in a case of this kind. Under a constitutional government any other view practically nullifies the constitution. The demurrer, does not admit that there was a de facto office and that Joseph Hugill was a defacto officer. There could be no such thing as an admission of a defacto office because a de facto office, in the nature of things, cannot exist, nor can there be a de facto officer where there is no office to be filled. The authorities cited by the prosecuting attorney to support his contention that the question as to whether there is such an office or officer, as city commissioner of Akron, cannot be raised, do not sustain him. We do not question that if there be a deju/t'e office and a defacto officer filling it that the title of the officer who is thus filling a de jure office cannot be questioned collaterally. Our contention is that upon this demurrer we have a right' to raise the question as to whether there is such office or officer as city commissioner of the city of Akron. 'If our view of the case that a de facto officer cannot exist where-there is no de jure office is correct, then none of these cases cited by the prosecuting attorney are 'in point. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U. S., 425; Carleton v. People, 10 Mich., 259.
Where there is no office there can be no officer de facto, for the reason that, there can be none dejure.

Opinion:
Bradbury, J.
At the September term of the court of common pleas of Summit county, Omar N. Gardner was indicted for offering a bribe to Joseph. Hugi.ll, a city commissioner of the city of Akron. The accused demurred to the indictment on the ground that the act of April 20, 1893, under which Hugill was performing the duties of his office, was unconstitutional and void. The demurrer was sustained and the defendant discharged. To this holding of the court the prosecuting attorney excepted, and, by virtue of the provisionsof sections 7305,7306,7307and 7308 of the Revised Statutes, has brought the question to this court for review. Two questions are presented by the record: 1. Whether the act of April 20, 1893, which provides a municipal government for the city of Akron, is unconstitutional or not, and 2, if unconstitutional whether its constitutionality may be assailed in the collateral way, undertaken by the accused. The first question which logically arises, is the latter of the two; for if the accused should not be allowed to raise the question, in the way he attempted, it follows that the constitutionality of the act which created the office was not before the court. Whether an act of the general assembly creating an office and providing a method .for filling it may be collaterally attacked, is a question of the utmost importance in the practical administration of governmental affairs. Different courts have decided the question differently. Leach v. The People, 122 Ill., 420; Burts v. Winona & St. P. R. Co., 18 N. W. Rep., 285; Coyle v. Commonwealth, 104 Pa. St., 117; Mechem on Public Officers, sections 318, 327; Van Fleet on Collateral Attack, section 21, page 33; Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U. S., 425; Hildreth v. McIntire, 1. J. J. Marsh, 206.
It is now before this court for the first time, and while we are not insensible to the consideration justly due to the high standing of those courts and authors, we are bound to reach that conclusion which, in our judgment, is best sustained by sound reason; and that best comports with an enlightened public policy and the maintenance of public order.
If the official acts of officers, acting in an office created by an unconstitutional statute, should be regarded as falling within the principle that sustains the act of de facto officers, until the statute has been held unconstitutional by competent judicial authority in a proceeding appropriate'to that end, all difficulty vanishes. The opposite doctrine is based upon the assertion that there can be no defacto officer unless there is a de jure office. That is a simple and summary way to dispose of this grave question. That there can be no de jure officer without a de jure office is a proposition to which all minds will, of course, assent. But that there can be a de facto officer without a de jibre .office, is disputable, if the phrase "defacto officer" includes one who in fact discharges the duties of a public office, recognized by the great body of the people and by virtue of a statute solemnly passed by the general assembly of the state, which may be unconstitutional. That there have been many officers who occupied and discharged the duties of offices created by laws that were afterwards held unconstitutional is a fact well known to every one. While in such occupancy innumerable official acts, affecting both public and private rights, may have been actually performed by them; the duration of the office may, and often does, extend through a series of years. In the ease before us the act in question is one creating a municipal government for the city of Akron, and has been in force since its enactment in April, 1893; it superseded an act passed in the year 1891 for the government of that city, which latter act was subject to the same assault that was attempted to be made on the one under consideration. The existing government of the populous and thriving city of Youngstown, also rests upon the act now assailed. "While that of the city of Springfield depends upon air act, at least as vulnerable to the same attack, as the act under consideration. The constitutionality of the governments of the cities of Springfield and Young-stown have not been assailed, even collaterally, and may continue unchallenged for many years. The officers who in- these cities occupy offices created by the acts upon which the city government rests, are daily discharging duties affecting the rights of the city, and the private rights of individuals. These officers are either usurpers and trespassers, or de facto officers; if the latter, the rights of public, or of individuals who have submitted to their authority, or acquiesced in its exercise, would be unaffected by a subsequept authoritative judicial declaration that the statute was unconstitutional; if they were usurpers merely, every official act would be a nullity, and interminable confusion possibly follow such a decision. Were such results to follow, the courts might well pause, before declaring unconstitutional an act establishing a city government, unless its constitutionality was challenged upon the threshold of its existence.
The common, law in relation to defacto officers had its origin in England; it was there laid upon a foundation as broad as their necessities required. Such a thing as a written constitution controlling-legislative action was unknown to their jurispru clence; whatever office parliament chose to create was a de jure office. In the states of the American Union, however, we find .written constitutions, limiting the otherwise absolute power of the people to act through the legislative branch of the government. As a consequence of this peculiar feature of our government, a statute, regularly enacted by the legislative branch thereof, may, in express terms, create a public office, or it may authorize a municipal corporation to create one; an incumbent may be appointed in the mode prescribed by the statute, he may qualify, enter upon the discharge of the duties of the office, and continue to discharge those duties indefinitely — possibly for many years — during which he daily performs official acts affecting not only public rights, but private rights of the most sacred character. After all this has occurred, the constitutionality of the statute is successfully challenged, and the statute declared void, and for the first time in the history of the common law its principles must be invoked to ascertain the status of the rights of persons, and of the public, that accrued before the law was declared void.
We think that principle of public policy, declared by the English courts three centuries ag'O, which gave validity to the official acts of persons who intruded themselves into an office to which they had not been legally appointed, is as applicable to the conditions now presented as they were to the conditions that then confronted the English judiciary. We are not required to find a name by which officers are to be known, who have acted under a statute that has subsequently been declared unconstitutional, though we think such officers might aptly be called lide facto officers. " They actually performed official acts authorized by a statute solemnly enacted by the law making department of the government. Such a statute is presumed to be constitutional. Railroad v. Commissioners of Clinton County, 1 Ohio St., 77. The unbroken current of authority supports this proposition.
Courts in the practical administration of justice should regard the substance of things and deal with conditions as they actually exist. Here are grave and important official acts actually performed by virtue of an office, created under the provisions of a statute, regularly enacted by that branch of the government to which the-power to make law has been delegated by the constitution; there is a clearly established legal presumption of its validity. The public in its organized capacity as well as private citizens has acquiesced in and submitted to their authority. Such circumstances, the majority of the court are of opinion, are sufficient to give such color to their title as to make them defacto officers; but whether they fall within the previously existing definition of such officers or not, their official acts thus performed fall within the protection of that principle of public policy which defends them against collateral attack, and that, therefore, the question of the constitutionality of the statute in question was not before the court of common pleas.
Exceptions sustained.