Case Name: Ronald DARBY v. GILBERT RICHARD, INC. and Gilbert Richard, Individually
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 2003-02-05
Citations: 838 So. 2d 141
Docket Number: No. 02-1154
Parties: Ronald DARBY v. GILBERT RICHARD, INC. and Gilbert Richard, Individually.
Judges: Court composed of JOHN D. SAUNDERS, BILLIE COLOMBARO WOODARD, and ELIZABETH A. PICKETT, Judges.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 838
Pages: 141–155

Head Matter:
Ronald DARBY v. GILBERT RICHARD, INC. and Gilbert Richard, Individually.
No. 02-1154.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
Feb. 5, 2003.
Donald W. Price, Baton Rouge, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellant, Ronald Darby.
Michael D. Meyer, New Orleans, LA, for Defendant/Appellee, Gilbert Richard.
Court composed of JOHN D. SAUNDERS, BILLIE COLOMBARO WOODARD, and ELIZABETH A. PICKETT, Judges.

Opinion:
11 SAUNDERS, Judge.
Appellant, Ronald Darby, appeals from a judgment of the Office of Workers' Compensation finding (1) that the appellant failed to prove, by a preponderance of evidence, that he had an "accident" at work resulting in objective findings of an injury, and (2) that the claimant's testimony was based on inconsistencies, untruths, and misrepresentations, in violation of La. R.S. 23:1208 resulting in a forfeiture of all benefits, full restitution to the Defendant, Gilbert Richard, and a fine in the amount of $5,000.00. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the findings of the Workers' Compensation Judge (WCJ).
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
It is undisputed that on November 20, 2000, while in the course and scope of his employ as a driver of sugar cane trucks, Ronald Darby was involved in a motor vehicle accident. A motorist drove underneath the trailer of Mr. Darby's truck after losing control of his vehicle. After realizing that he had been involved in an accident, Mr. Darby applied the breaks of his vehicle. Upon applying the truck's breaks, Mr. Darby claims the truck began to shake violently, resulting in his being-thrown about the cab of the truck. Approximately one week after the accident Mr. Darby was fired by Mr. Richard for reasons unrelated to the accident or his alleged resulting injuries.
Mr. Darby maintains that, as a result of the accident, he injured his knees and back, and subsequently began to experience severe back and leg pain which has rendered him unable to work. Following the accident, and his being fired by Mr. Richard, Mr. Darby's condition allegedly began to deteriorate. He finally sought medical treatment from Dr. Keith Mack on December 27, 2000, at which time Mr. Darby complained of increasing pain in his legs and low back, and that his legs began to give out on him.
| fijpon examination of Mr. Darby, Dr. Mack found muscle spasm along with subjective symptoms of tenderness and decreased range of motion. Dr. Mack continued treating Mr. Darby through March 29, 2001. When Mr. Darby's low back and leg symptoms failed to improve, he sought treatment from hospital emergency rooms. He went to the emergency room at Iberia Medical Center on February 6, 2001 and March 22, 2001. He also sought treatment from the Dauterive Hospital Emergency Room on March 29, 2001. On May 16, 2001, Mr. Darby reported to Lafayette General Hospital's Emergency Room where he received an MRI showing spon-dylolisthesis and possible central disk herniation at L5-S1.
On May 26, 2001, Mr. Darby again returned to Lafayette General and was admitted for observation for several days. While admitted at Lafayette General, Mr. Darby began seeing Dr. John Cobb, who continued to provide follow up care for Mr. Darby after his discharge. In office visit follow-ups with Mr. Darby, Dr. Cobb ordered an EMG and a nerve conduction study, which showed bilateral L-5 radicu-lar changes. Dr. Cobb recommended surgery to remove the disk, decompress the nerves, and fuse the unstable space at L5-Sl. Mr. Darby has not yet undergone this recommended surgery, and to date his medical expenses total $11,129.46.
The matter was heard on May 22, 2002, by Judge Glynn F. Yoisin of the Office of Workers' Compensation, District 9. Mr. Richard moved for involuntary dismissal, which the WCJ took under advisement, and a judgment was rendered on June 28, 2002. The WCJ denied the motion for involuntary dismissal, found that Mr. Darby failed to meet his burden of proof establishing that his current disability was caused by the work-related accident of November 20, 2000, and therefore, Mr. Darby was not entitled to disability or medical benefits. Additionally, the WCJ found that Mr. Darby Rmade material misrepresentations in his testimony, which violated La.R.S. 23:1208 and resulted in a forfeiture of his right to compensation benefits. In his written reasons for judgment the WCJ outlined forty-three findings of fact documenting the inconsistencies in Mr. Darby's testimony, and illustrating the basis for the WCJ's finding that Mr. Darby's testimony lacked credibility.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review for appellate courts in workers' compensation cases is well established and it is clearly set out in Banks v. Indus. Roofing & Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 96-2840, pp. 7-8 (La.7/1/97); 696 So.2d 551, 556 as follows:
Factual findings in workers' compensation cases are subject to the manifest error or clearly wrong standard of review. Smith v. Louisiana Dep't of Corrections, 93-1305, p. 4 (La.2/28/94), 633 So.2d 129, 132; Freeman v. Poul-onfWeed Eater, 93-1530, pp. 4-5 (La.1/14/94), 630 So.2d 733, 737-38. In applying the manifest error-clearly wrong standard, the appellate court must determine not whether the trier of fact was right or wrong, but whether the factfinder's conclusion was a reasonable one. Freeman, 93-1530 at p. 5, 630 So.2d at 737-38; Stobart v. State, 617 So.2d 880, 882 (La.1993); Mart v. Hill, 505 So.2d 1120, 1127 (La.1987). Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, a factfinder's choice between them can never be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Stobart, 617 So.2d at 882. Thus, "if the [factfinder's] findings are reasonable in light of the record reviewed in its entirety, the court of appeal may not reverse, even if convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently." Sistler v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 558 So.2d 1106, 1112 (La. 1990).
In Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840, 844 (La.1989), the supreme court recognized that the complex nature of evaluating truthfulness and credibility is more properly determined at the trial level by the factfinder rather than by a court of appeal, which bases its determinations on a review of the cold record. Therefore, the court held that the deference given to the trier of fact is particularly great when evaluating the weight to be given to witness testimony:
|4When findings are based on determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses, the manifest error — clearly wrong standard demands great deference to the trier of fact's findings; for only the factfinder can be aware of the variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on the listener's understanding and belief in what is said.
Id. at 844. (citations omitted).
ARGUMENT
Assignment of Error # 1
In Mr. Darby's first assignment of error, he claims that the WCJ committed legal error, or alternatively, manifest error, in failing to find that his injury was caused by an on-the-job accident. He claims that the WCJ failed to apply the appropriate presumption of causation, and that the WCJ failed to hold Mr. Richard, who questioned factual causation, to the appropriate standard of proving alternative causation. For the reasons stated below, we find Mr. Darby's argument to be without merit.
In Bruno v. Harbert Int'l Inc., 593 So.2d 357, 361 (La.1992), the supreme court stated the burden of proof required of claimants seeking compensation for work related injuries. "[A]s in other civil actions, the plaintiff-worker in a compensation action has the burden of establishing a work-related accident by a preponderance of the evidence." La.R.S. 23:1021(1) defines an "accident" as "an unexpected or unfore seen actual, identifiable, precipitous event happening suddenly or violently, with or without human fault, and directly producing at the time objective findings of an injury which is more than simply a gradual deterioration or progressive degeneration." The supreme court identified the presumption of disability, relied upon by Mr. Darby, in Lucas v. Ins. Co. of North America et al, 342 So.2d 591, 596 (La.1977), which stated:
Is A claimant's disability is presumed to have resulted from an accident, if before the accident the injured person was in good health, but commencing with the accident the symptoms of the disabling condition appear and continuously manifest themselves afterwards, providing that the medical evidence shows there to be a reasonable possibility of causal connection between the accident and the disabling condition, (citations omitted.)
In the present case the WCJ held that there was not "a reasonable possibility of causal connection" between the accident and Mr. Darby's disabling condition. In light of the evidence in the record, we do not believe that the WCJ was manifestly or legally erroneous in reaching this conclusion. The statements and conclusions presented by Dr. Mack and Dr. Cobb in their deposition testimony provide sufficient evidence to support the WCJ's conclusions. Dr. Mack testified that he would "imagine that [Mr. Darby] would have been in considerable pain" during the week he continued working after the accident. Yet Mr. Darby, according to his employer, never mentioned a back injury. He only referred to his alleged knee or leg injuries. Dr. Mack also stated that it would be surprising for Mr. Darby to fail to develop back or neck symptoms within the week he continued working for Mr. Richard. He speculated that Mr. Darby would have developed his current neck and back symptoms within three or four days of the accident occurring, and "certainly within the first week after the accident."
The WCJ also gave great weight to the video evidence presented by the appellee. We recognize that it is not necessary for Mr. Darby to be completely homebound or bedridden to support a finding that he has sustained a compensable injury. Mr. Richard presented video tape evidence at the hearing, however, which shows Mr. Darby engaged in various activities on three separate days. This video directly contradicts several statements made by Mr. Darby concerning his symptoms 1 fiand the severity of his alleged disability.
Mr. Darby stated that he was unable to bend over for any period of time without pain. The video clearly shows Mr. Darby crouched by his vehicle for several minutes, checking the air level in his tires with no apparent difficulty. He also stated that he was unable to lift or carry even light grocery bags. This statement was later corrected and Mr. Darby indicated that he could carry only very light grocery bags containing items like bread. Despite these statements, the video shows Mr. Darby carrying a gas container with approximately $1.50 worth of gasoline in it. It also shows him bending while holding the gasoline container and using it to fill his gas tank.
In addition, Mr. Darby was adamant in his assertion that he now walks with a limp "most of the time." Despite this claim the video shows him walking significant distances, and carrying substantial items, yet never walking with a limp and walking at a relatively quick pace. Even when confronted at the hearing with the video evidence clearly showing him walking normally Mr. Darby amazingly continued to claim that he was limping while walking in the video footage. The WCJ found no evidence of this limp while viewing the tape, nor do we upon our own viewing of the video. Mr. Darby was also confronted on his earlier testimony that as a result of his injuries he was unable to do things as simple as getting in and out of a car. Yet on viewing the tape, Mr. Darby admitted that he was shown entering and exiting his vehicle repeatedly with no apparent difficulty or discomfort.
In his reasons for judgment the WCJ also referred to statements concerning his injuries, which Mr. Darby claims he made to Officer Pellerin and Mr. Richard at the scene of the accident. Mr. Darby testified that he informed both Mr. Richard and |70fficer Pellerin that he hurt his knees in the accident. During testimony neither Officer Pellerin nor Mr. Richard could corroborate this. Mr. Darby also testified that he was bleeding from the knees and limping at the scene of the accident and that Mr. Richard witnessed as much. Mr. Richard did not corroborate this. Officer Pellerin testified that he watched Mr. Darby walk around the scene of the accident and he never saw Mr. Darby limp. Additionally, Dr. Mack testified to seeing a "small superficial laceration of the skin overlying the kneecap which was in the process of healing." The WCJ questioned how anything but a severe cut requiring immediate medical treatment would still be healing five weeks after the alleged injury. Mr. Richard testified that after being fired Mr. Darby returned on two separate occasions to obtain paychecks. On both occasions he failed to mention any injury resulting from the on-the-job accident, or a workers' compensation claim.
In the conclusions of law stated in the WCJ's written reasons for judgment, he states that the court did not accept the claimant's testimony that he was disabled or injured in the November 20, 2000 accident. The WCJ highlights the fact that the claimant continued to work after the accident for a full week with no apparent difficulty and did not seek medical treatment for his alleged injury until after he was fired from his job. The WCJ further noted that Mr. Darby did not seek medical treatment until his attorney arranged an office visit approximately five weeks after the date of the accident. The WCJ also found that Mr. Darby failed to meet his burden of proof with respect to medical causation. Dr. Mack and Dr. Cobb relied on the history of the patient in relating his injuries to the accident. Since the court found Mr. Darby to be an unreliable witness, it also deemed the history he provided the doctors to be unreliable.
| sIn light of the overall lack of corroboration for Mr. Darby's statements to others regarding the extent of his injuries as a result of the November 20, 2002 accident, and in conjunction with Mr. Darby's general lack of credibility in several other areas of testimony, we find no error on the part of the WCJ in accepting Officer Pelle-rin's and Mr. Richard's recollection of Mr. Darby's stated injuries at the time of the accident. We also find no error, legal or otherwise, in the WCJ's conclusion that Mr. Darby failed to establish that he suffered a compensable injury in the on-the-job accident of November 20, 2000.
Assignment of Error # 2
In Mr. Darby's second assignment of error he asserts that the WCJ erred in entertaining his employer's claims under La.R.S. 23:1208, inasmuch as the office of workers' compensation lacks subject matter jurisdiction over such claims. He based this argument on our holding in Lanthier v. Family Dollar Store, 02-429 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/2/02); 827 So.2d 547, vacated by, 2002-2663 (La.11/27/02); 836 So.2d 5. Mr. Darby asserts that, although the constitutionality issue was not raised below, we should consider it because the statute was declared unconstitutional by this court after the appeal was lodged.
In Lanthier, we expressed concern regarding the civil and criminal penalties Section 1208 allows workers' compensation judges to impose.
[T]his court is troubled by the grant of power provided in La.R.S. 28:1208, which permits the Office of Workers' Compensation to impose criminal penalties against those in violation of the statute. As the court found in Rivera v. West Jefferson Medical Center, 96-152, p. 17 (La.App. 5 Cir. 7/30/96); 678 So.2d 602, 611, we also find:
There is a fundamental difference between criminal and civil matters. (Citation omitted). Criminal prosecutions put the defendant at risk of losing basic personal freedoms which are protected by both the United States and the Louisiana Constitutions. As such, criminal prosecutions must be conducted within the strict confines of the |gcriminal justice system. There is no provision in the Worker's Compensation Chapter which authorizes a hearing officer to convict a claimant of criminal activity and sentence him accordingly.
Lanthier, 827 So.2d at 550-51.
In a concurrence to Boise Cascade Corp. v. Dean, 99-1356, pp. 8-10 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/3/00); 767 So.2d 76, 86-87, writ denied, 2000-2505 (La.11/13/00); 774 So.2d 146, I discussed the constitutionality of 1208's criminal sanctions. I reiterate that discussion here.
Clearly, it is the very criminality of the statute [La.R.S. 23:1208] that places it in peril. In Grant, 696 So.2d 73, we discussed fraud as a civil tort matter. But a civil tortfeasor does not risk imprisonment, so it is now appropriate to consider when fraud becomes a criminal matter. A sanction is penal when it is "punishable; inflicting a punishment; containing a penalty, or relating to a penalty." (Citation omitted). A crime is any conduct so defined by the Criminal Code, by other acts of the legislature, or by the Louisiana Constitution. La.R.S. 14:7.
La.R.S. 23:1208 unquestionably provides for severe criminal sanctions, particularly where in Subsection (C)(1) and (C)(2) an offender may be subject to . felonious imprisonment at hard labor. The fundamental concerns that arise in a criminal setting are absent in civil matters, hence the need for the added procedural devices to safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused. In a criminal case, . procedural protections sufficient to afford due process are provided through criminal procedural rules.
In sum, with La.R.S. 23:1208, . [defendant enjoys none of the procedural safeguards of a criminal proceeding; nevertheless, he is subject to the sanctions of a penal statute. La.R.S. 23:1208, . in disregard of constitutional due process, is nothing more than a criminal statute masquerading in civil garb, designed to discourage fraud in •workers' compensation matters with over-broad penalization.
In Lanthier, 827 So.2d at 551-53, we also addressed 1208's defects with respect to its civil penalties section. Because those arguments still apply and are equally applicable now, we restate them.
The adjudication of criminal conduct is not the sole constitutional | ^infirmity posed by La.R.S. 23:1208. The determination of tortious conduct by the OWC under La.R.S. 23:1208 is violative of our constitution as well. Grant v. Natchi-toches Manor Nursing Home, 96-1546 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/14/97); 696 So.2d 73, writ denied, 97-1582 (La.10/17/97); 701 So.2d 1330 explained:
Thus, it appears that when an employee violates La.R.S. 23:1208, his actions are tortious in nature (the conduct may even be considered criminal in nature), rather than a workers compensation matter. At best, the conduct prohibited by La.R.S. 23:1208 presents a cause of action in tort for fraud or deceit.
In Coleman v. Sheraton Pierremont, 25,452 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1/19/94); 631 So.2d 50, 53, citing Sampson v. Wendy's Management, Inc.[J 593 So.2d 336 (La. 1992), the supreme court noted "that a retaliatory discharge cause of action found in the chapter on worker's compensation was not a worker's compensation matter to be heard by administrative hearing officers, since the cause of action was in tort and/or a claim for civil penalties." Following the reasoning in Sampson, we find that the penalties meted out by the hearing officer in accordance with La.R.S. 23:1208 against claimant clearly were not "directly associated with the employee's work-related injury," Sampson, 593 So.2d at 339. Instead, the nature of the cause of action embodied in La.R.S. 23:1208 is tor-tious/delictual in nature, falling beyond the jurisdictional authority of the hearing officer as authorized by La. Const. Art. V, § 10(A)(B), § 16(A), La.R.S. 23:1310.3. Clearly, the misconduct characterized by La.R.S. 23:1208 falls within a well recognized area of tort law (the tort of fraud/deceit), and thus we conclude that the hearing officer and the Office of Workers' Compensation lacked jurisdiction to impose sanctions under La.R.S. 23:1208. Additionally, La.R.S. 23:1291(B)(5), entitled "Creation, powers, and duties of the office of worker's compensation administration," states: To establish and promulgate in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act such rules and regulations governing the administration of this chapter and the operation of the office as may be deemed necessary and which are not inconsistent with the laws of this state. (Emphasis added). To allow the OWC power to adjudicate tortious and criminal conduct is antithetical to, and inconsistent with, the clear constitutional directions of Article 5, Section 1; Article 5, Section 16; and Article 2, Section 2 of the Louisiana Constitution. The constitution must take precedence. Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1208 is unconstitutional.
In addition to 1208's unconstitutional grant of jurisdiction over tortious and criminal conduct to the Office of Workers' Compensation, an administrative agency, the statute also raises substantial due process concerns. As written, Section 1208 Inrequires the complete forfeiture of all compensation rights even for relatively minor misrepresentations. In his dissent to the majority opinion in St. Bernard Parish Police Jury v. Duplessis, 02-632, p. 1 (La. 2002); 831 So.2d 955, 961, Justice Calogero noted the disproportionate severity of the penalties required under the current interpretation of Section 1208 in light of the relatively minor nature of possible infractions.
Further, I note that La.Rev.Stat. 23:1208, as it is interpreted by the majority, results in a draconian penalty that deprives workers' compensation claimants of their rights to compensation not reasonably related to or otherwise impacted by the misrepresentation. Because of the joint benefits flowing from the workers' compensation scheme in favor of employees and employers, an employee is required to waive his rights to pursue tort remedies against employers in consideration for which he receives a percentage of his salary during the period of his disability. To further deprive the claimant of his workers' compensation benefits because of a fraudulent claim for reimbursement of mileage expenses related to his attainment of medical treatment is a gross penalty that should be permitted only if the statutory provision is clear and unambiguous. Not only is the provision not clear and unambiguous in this case, but it is difficult to believe that the Legislature intended for the provision to have such a harsh effect. On the other hand, if the majority is right and the statute has to be interpreted as they hold, I suggest that the Legislature should reconsider whether workers' compensation statutory reform should extend this far.
Where the severity of the punishment so clearly outweighs the severity of the infraction, as in the misrepresentations involving mileage reimbursement discussed by Justice Calogero above, employees are effectively denied their due process rights.
Despite our continued contention that Section 1208 grants unconstitutional authority to Workers' Compensation Judges to impose criminal penalties and determine tortious conduct, as well as the argument by Justice Calogero above questioning the application of the statute as overbroad and unduly harsh, the Louisiana Supreme Court has not yet ruled that Section 1208 is, in fact, unconstitutional. The issue of constitutionality was not raised by the parties in \wLanthier at any time during the proceeding, therefore the supreme court vacated the judgment of this court on procedural grounds and the case was remanded for further proceedings. As with Lanthier, Mr. Richard asserts that because the constitutionality issue was not raised at the trial level, it is not properly before this court. In support of this proposition, Mr. Richard cites La. R.S. 23:1310.3(F)(1), which states:
Any party challenging the constitutionality of any provision of this Chapter shall specially plead such an allegation in the original petition, an exception, written motion, or answer, which shall state with particularity the grounds for such an allegation.
Despite our ongoing concerns as to the application of La.R.S. 23:1208 by the Office of Workers' Compensation, and while we maintain the arguments against the constitutionality of Section 1208 previously raised by members of this court, the majority is of the opinion that, as was the case in Lanthier, the constitutionality of Section 1208 is not properly before the court. This writer feels that the constitutionality of Section 1208 is properly before the court and provides reasons in the dissent.
Assignment of Error # §
In Mr. Darby's final assignment of error he asserts that the WCJ erred in finding a willful misrepresentation that warranted forfeiture under La.R.S. 23:1208. In Resweber v. Haroil Constr. Co., 94-2708, p. 7 (La.9/5/95); 660 So.2d 7, 12, the supreme court provided a clear test for the application of La.R.S. 23:1208. "The only requirements for forfeiture of benefits under Section 1208 are that (1) there is a false statement or misrepresentation, (2) it is willfully made, and (3) it is made for the purpose of obtaining or defeating any benefit or payment."
In Menard v. Mama's Fried Chicken, 97-488 p. 2 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/6/98); 709 So.2d 303, 304, writ denied, 98-956 (La.6/5/98); 720 So.2d 681, this court held that 113"[f]alse statements that are inadvertent or inconsequential will not result in forfeiture." However, we share the opin ion of the WCJ, that Mr. Darby's false statements in this matter were neither inadvertent nor inconsequential. Under the terms of Section 1208, the WCJ was not manifestly erroneous in holding that Mr. Darby's false statements and glaring inconsistencies and misrepresentations allowed for forfeiture of all compensation benefits under La.R.S. 23:1208.
The most blatant and damaging misrepresentation made by Mr. Darby was the highly inflated estimate of his weekly wages. We understand that the nature of the sugar cane hauling industry is such that wages are not fixed and the drivers' salaries are likely to fluctuate greatly from week to week. Mr. Darby's representations of his average weekly earnings, however, were so disproportionate as to his actual earnings as to be absurd. During his testimony at the hearing Mr. Darby stated that he earned between $900.00 and $1,200.00 per week. Even when Mr. Darby submitted his correction sheet to adjust errors made during his deposition he merely adjusted his estimated weekly income from "$1,800.00 a week" to "$1,300 a week or a little less." Mr. Darby's actual weekly gross prior to his accident totaled anywhere from $180.00 per week to $815.00 per week. At no point did his weekly earning ever approach $1,300.00. In fact, his average weekly wage, based on the payment information provided by his employer, was approximately $389.00 per week. Such a gross misrepresentation concerning earned wages is precisely the type of material misrepresentation Section 1208 was enacted to prevent.
Mr. Darby's clearly fraudulent misrepresentation of his weekly earnings alone provides sufficient support for the WCJ's determination that Mr. Darby violated 1208. Combined with Mr. Darby's statements concerning the severity of any physical |14symptoms associated with his alleged injury discussed in his first assignment of error, we find the WCJ had adequate evidence of a violation of Section 1208. Similarly, we find no error in the WCJ's imposition of a $5000.00 fine against Mr. Darby for his violation of Section 1208. Therefore, Mr. Darby's third assignment of error is also without merit.
Ultimately this case comes down to the credibility of the witnesses. The WCJ concluded that Mr. Darby was not a credible witness due to the inordinately large number of inconsistencies in his testimony at the hearing as well as during his deposition. We find that the WCJ was not manifestly erroneous in determining that Mr. Darby's testimony was not credible.
DECREE
For the reasons stated above we affirm the finding of the WCJ. All costs of this appeal are assigned to the appellant, Mr. Darby.
AFFIRMED.
SAUNDERS, J., dissents and assigns written reasons.
WOODARD, J., concurs and assigns written reasons.
PICKETT, J., concurs.