Case Name: SHREVE et al., Appellants, v. COPPER BELL MINING COMPANY, Respondent
Court: Montana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Montana
Decision Date: 1891-12-14
Citations: 11 Mont. 309
Docket Number: 
Parties: SHREVE et al., Appellants, v. COPPER BELL MINING COMPANY, Respondent.
Judges: Harwood, J., concurs.
Reporter: Montana Reports
Volume: 11
Pages: 309–351

Head Matter:
SHREVE et al., Appellants, v. COPPER BELL MINING COMPANY, Respondent.
[Argued October 19, 1891.
Decided December 14, 1891.]
Mines and Mining — Estoppel by deed. — Where the owners of a mining claim, prior to conveying by separate deeds all their right, title, and interest therein to the defendant, had changed the boundaries so that a portion thereof conflicted with an adjoining claim to which they afterwards acquired title, they cannot thereafter be heard to assert any claim to the area in conflict, as their deeds to ■the defendant must be construed to convey the claim as its boundaries were known to them at the date of their conveyances, and thereby an estoppel is created between the parties and their privies which is binding upon such after-acquired title. (De Witt, L, dissenting.)
Same — Location—Discovery—“Valuable” mineral deposit interpreted. — Under section 2319 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, opening to exploration and purchase all valuable mineral deposits in lands belonging to the United States, and section 1477, fifth division of the Compiled Statutes, requiring the discovery on the lode of a vein of quartz or ore with at least one well-defined wall, as a condition precedent to recording the notice, it is not essential to the validity of the location of a mining claim that the discoverer should have found, prior to his location thereof, that the lode contained mineral deposits of sufficient value to justify work to extract them; but the spirit of the statutes is satisfied by the discovery of mineral deposits of such value as to at least justify the exploration of the lode in expectation of finding ore sufficiently valuable to work. (Davis v. Weibbold, 7 Mont. 107; S. O. 139 U. S. 507, reviewed and distinguished.)
Appeal from Fifth Judicial District, Jefferson Cownty.
Action to determine the right to the possession of mining premises. The cause was tried before Galbraith, J. Defendant had judgment below.
McConnell & Clayberg, for Appellants.
I. The court found that the grantors of the plaintiffs did' everything necessary to make a valid location of the Lightning-Lode, except that they failed to make a valid discovery of a mineral-bearing vein or lode before making their location; and upon this point the court found as follows: “ That prior to the time of location, by posting the notice and marking the boundaries of the said Lightning Mining Claim, there had not been any actual discovery of any vein or lode containing rock in place, or any rock, bearing any known mineral deposits of sufficient value to justify expenditure in the effort to extract them.” And again, that they “did not know by assay or otherwise,, prior to the location by them of the surface ground, that this rock (found in the discovery) did actually contain any mineral of sufficient richness to justify work to extract it.” The court also found as a conclusion of law: “That the Lightning Claim and location is invalid, and of no force, for the absence of a discovery of any vein or lode containing rock bearing known mineral deposits of such richness as to justify work to extract them at or prior to the location of the surface ground of said claim.”
The foregoing findings were duly assigned as errors. The court adopted a false standard as to the requirements of the law of Congress in regard to what constitutes a discovery of a vein or lode containing valuable mineral deposits. The standard of the court is that the “mineral deposits” must be “of sufficient richness to justify work to extract them,” and in keeping with this erroneous standard, he found that the mineral-bearing rock which was discovered by the locators oí the Lightning Lode did not contain “ any mineral of such sufficient richness to justify work to extract it.” The meaning of the term “ n'iineral vein, lode, or ledge,” as found in section 2319 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, has been repeatedly defined by the courts; and it is the discovery of the mineral vein, lode, oi? ledge spoken of in this section that must be made before the location can be lawfully made; and the question in this case is whether the discovery upon a mineral vein, lode, or ledge must be of “ such richness as to justify work in extracting it,” before a valid location can be made. The court below held that it was; and in this we respectfully but earnestly' submit that there was error; that to hold such a doctrine would be to destroy the title of nine tenths of the quartz mining properties that are now being worked in the State of Montana. All experience teaches us that to find pay ore at or near the surface of the ground is the exception; and that the general rule is, that pay ore is not found except at considerable depths in the earth, and can only be reached after a great deal of labor and the expenditure of much money; and that it is an unreasonable construction of the foregoing acts of Congress to hold that ore must be found of “Such richness” as that it will pay to extract it before a location can be made, because until the locator is certain of his title he cannot afford such a great outlay of labor and treasure.
The following definition has the unqualified approval of the Supreme Court of the United States, to wit: “To determine whether a lode .or vein exists it is necessary to define those terms; and as to that it is enough to say, that a lode or vein is a body of mineral or mineral-bearing rock, within defined boundaries in the general mass of the mountain.” In this definition the elements are “ a body of mineral or mineral-bearing rock and the boundaries; with either of these things well established, very slight evidence may be accepted as to the existence of the other. A body of mineral or mineral-bearing rock in the general mass of the mountain, so far as it may continue unbroken and without interruption, may be regarded as a lode, whatever the boundaries may be. In the existence of such body, and to the extent of it, boundaries are implied. On the other hand, with well defined boundaries, very slight evidence of ore within such boundaries will prove the existence of a lode. Such boundaries constitute a fissure, and if in such fissure ore is found, although at considerable intervals and in small quantities, it is called a lode or vein.” (Iron Silver Min. Co. v. Cheesman, 116 U. S. 529-538. See, also, Stevens v. Gill, 1 Morr„ Min. Rep. 579; Eureka Min. Go. v. Richmond Min. Co. 9 Morr. Min. Rep. 587; Jupiter Min. Co. v. Bodie Con. Min. Co. 11 Fed. Rep. 675; Harrington v. Chambers, 3 Utah, 94; North Noonday Co. v. Orient Co. 9 Morr. Min. Rep. 387; Hyman v. Wheeler, 1 Morr. Min. Rep. 558, 559, 560; Foote v. National Min. Co. 2 Mont. 402; Chambers v. Harrington, 111 U. S. 350.) There can be no doubt but that the court would have found that there was a genuine legal discovery made upon the Lightning vein if it had not been for the false standard which he took as to -what the law was; that is, the locators must find a lead of such richness in precious metals as to justify labor in extracting them.
Counsel for' the respondent relied in the court below upon the case of Deffeback v. Hawke, 115 U. S. 392. That case had reference solely to a placer claim; and there was no contention upon this subject, so that what the court said in regard to it does not amount to any authoritative decision, and even if it was, it might be perfectly true in regard to a placer claim; but we submit that the rule is wholly different when referring to quartz mines. As having a bearing upon the case of Deffeback v. Hawke, we refer the court to the Colorado Coal Co. v. United States, 123 U. S. 327, and also Francoeur v. Newhouse, 40 Fed. Rep. 622. These cases do not in any manner affect the question as to what constitutes a vein, lode, or ledge, as given in authorities heretofore referred to. The mining laws are to be liberally construed. (.Robertson v. Smith, 1 Mont. 410; Upton v. Larkin, 7 Mont. 449.) The testimony of assays made after discovery are to be considered in determining whether a genuine discovery has been made or not. (Southern Cross Co. v. Europa Co. 15 Nev. 385.)
II. The court finds as a conclusion of law that the plaintiffs are estopped by the deeds of Nelson and Koegel from asserting title to any part of the ground embraced in the Edna Lode, as was marked off and designated on the seventeenth day of August, 1889, and prior thereto. This is duly assigned as error by the appellants, (o) The respondent introduced a deed from Charles Koegel to Riggs and Bradley, dated the seventeenth day of August, 1889, in which he conveys to them “an undivided one-fourth interest in and to that certain piece or parcel of land known as the Edna Quartz Lode Mining Claim, situated in Cataract unorganized mining district, Jefferson County, Montana Territory. Said Edna Lode is fully described in the notice of location thereof which is recorded in the office of the county clerk and recorder of Jefferson County, Montana.” No evidence was offered to explain this conveyance, and indeed none could have been lawfully offered, because it is plain and unambiguous and needs no explanation. It is axiomatic that in a deed, words of general description are limited by those of particular description. And it is furthermore an uncontroverted proposition of law, where in a description of a deed reference is made to another deed or writing for boundaries, that such description may be looked to, and have the same effect upon the description as if the descriptions contained in such paper referred to were themselves incorporated in the deed. Koegel in his deed refers to the location notice, and says that the Edna Lode which he was conveying on the 17th of August, 1889, was fully described therein. How can it be said, then, that he conveyed any portion of the land in dispute which was wholly unconnected with the Edna Lode until the effort was made to change the lines of the Edna Lode on the 13th of May, 1889? So on the 15th of June, 1887, when this description was made, and the very identical description of the very identical piece of land, an undivided one-fourth interest in which Koegel is conveying by his deed was marked out upon the ground. It seems to us that it is too absurd for argument to insist that there is any estoppel on Koegel and those who hold under him by reason of this deed. The contention that the appellants are estopped by this deed rests upon the provisions of section 267, fifth division of the Compiled Statutes, providing that an after-acquired title to real estate shall pass to the grantee where the grantor purported to convey the fee, but at the time of the conveyance did not have the legal estate therein. Admit, for the sake of argument, that the fact is as found by the court, that no relocation notice was recorded for the Edna Lode until the nineteenth day of November, 1889, after the execution of this deed; and admit the further fact that until this location notice was recorded, according to the finding of the court no possessory title or right to the land in dispute was vested in the grantors of the defendant, still, let it be admitted, that notwithstanding there was no estate whatever in Koegel and Nelson to the ground in dispute at the time their deeds were made for the want of this location notice, even upon the assumption that the Lightning Claim was void ; still we insist there was no estoppel for the reason that there was no conveyance by said deeds to Bradley and Biggs of any portion of the ground in dispute. That which was the Edna Lode, as it was recorded on the 15th of June, 1887, and not as it was changed or attempted to be changed on the 13th of May, 1888, was conveyed. (5) In the deed of Frank Nelson to Biggs and Bradley, executed on the twenty-first day of August, 1889, he “grants, bargains, sells, remises, releases, and forever quit-claims unto the said parties of the second part, and to their heirs and assigns, all of the undivided one-fourth interest of the said party of the first part in and to the Edna Quartz Lode Claim, situate in Cataract unorganized mining district, Jefferson County, Montana Territory. This claim is recorded on page 448 of Book P of Lode Locations of Jefferson County.” This is substantially the same description as given in the deed of Koegel. After describing the claim generally by its name, as the Edna Quartz Lode Claim, the deed proceeds to say: “ Said claim is recorded on page 488 of Book P of Lode Locations of Jefferson County.” The language of this deed is plain and unambiguous. It needs no parol testimony to show the subject to which it applies. It refers to. the record notice giving the book and page, and that of itself when read shows what was conveyed, (c) The court, over the objection of appellants, permitted Frank Nelson to be asked what he intended to convey by this deed. This was clearly erroneous. Where the description of land in the deed is definite and certain and no latent ambiguity exists, extrinsic evidence to vary its terms is inadmissible. (Holcomb v. Mooney, 13 Or. 503; Donnell v. Humphreys, 1 Mont. 518; Taylor v. Holier, 1 Mont. 688.)
Toole & Wallace, of counsel for Appellants.
I. Was the finding of the court, that the locators of the Lightning had not, prior to their location, discovered any vein containing rock in place, bearing known mineral deposits “of sufficient value to justify expenditure in the effort to extract them,” the true standard of guidance? Was it warranted by the evidence? and herein, did the court give the phrase its proper meaning in applying it to the evidence? Upon this point we insist that the evidence, as disclosed by the record, taken as a whole, clearly develops that there were deposits discovered of a value “sufficient to justify expenditure in the effort to extract them.” In this connection it must be borne in mind that both parties are claiming this ground as mineral land, and the government, as a party to the action, is desirous of discovering to which of the two parties, if either, a patent for this mineral land should be granted. This brings us to the question: What is sufficient discovery, so-called, to uphold a location?
Sections 2318 and 2319 of the United States Revised Statutes speak of “valuable mineral deposits,” and of “lands valuable for minerals,” respectively, and the latter section declares that such “deposits” shall be “open to exploration and purchase.” There is nowhere in the act of Congress regulating this subject any provision for a prior discovery, except as it may be gathered by inference by the language of the two preceding sections. Section 2324, the only section assuming to define the manner of segregating a claim from the public domain, while providing for marking of boundaries and for the contents of a record, if any be made, makes no provision for a discovery previous to either. This requirement is imposed pursuant to authority of the act of Congress, by section 1497, page 1054, of our own State statutes, and the language of that section is that before the would-be locator shall be entitled to record the notice previously provided for, he shall have discovered, first, “ a vein or crevice of quartz or ore with at least one well defined wall.” If the testimony of the locators of the Lightning be accepted as the true version of their acts, it is manifest that they developed a vein, that they developed a thoroughly well defined wall, called the hanging wall, and that within the boundaries of that vein they found ore matter bearing mineral. 'To deny the sufficiency of such a discovery would be an event in mining history disastrous in the extreme in its results.
The word “known,” used by the court in its findings, nowhere appears in the provisions of the act of Congress, and can only be found in some of the railroad land grant acts in the exception clause, where the term “mineral lands” is oftentimes further modified by excluding iron and coal. It would be unfair to adopt this provisional and qualified description — intended to except from a grant lands of a specific character at the time the grant takes effect — for the purpose of defining lands subject to exploration and purchase, as between the would-be locators and the government. So, toó, the language of the exception in the Town Site Act (§ 2392) varies in turn. Section 2386 of that act expressly recognizes the exception of claims from its operation, leaving by express reservation, however, the validity of such claims as between the claimants and the government still an open question. We insist that the word “exploration,” as used in section 2319, supra, is of the utmost significance in this connection. In addition to the cases cited by associate counsel upon this proposition, we call the attention of the court to the late case of Davis v. Weibbold, 139 IT. S. 507, where there is an exhaustive discussion of the term “known mineral lands” in connection with the reservation clause in the town-site act and in railroad land grants, and where the decisions are exhaustively reviewed.
II. Re-affirming the position that the deeds of Koegel and Nelson did not convey more than the ground called for under the original location of the Edna, we yet desire to insist that there could be no estoppel as against the Lightning Claim or its owner, for three reasons: (a) This is an action upon an adverse claim to determine the right of possession not only as between the individuals, but as to the government, i. e., which claim has segregated the land within its boundaries from the public domain, so as to entitle the claimants, by virtue of it, to a patent from the United States. The Lightning was located by qualified locators, Watson and Donnelly, at a time when the Edna had not segregated the premises in controversy from the public domain. What, then, was the effect of this location by Watson and Donnelly? Manifestly it- segregated the premises in controversy as a part of the Lightning Lode, and vested the exclusive right oí possession in Watson and Donnelly, who, as locators, and under the name of the Lightning, had connected themselves with the government. Such a location would have been necessary to segregate this land and to establish as to it any right of possession. The Lightning having been recorded, all subsequent purchasers of the Edna Claim, or any interest in it, were charged with notice of the Lightning Claim, its boundaries, and the extent to which, as a valid mining claim, it occupied the earth’s surface. (Deffeback v. Hawke, 115 U. S. 407.) The Lightning then invested in its locators an exclusive right to claim a patent for this ground from the government. The effect of this doctrine of estoppel invoked by the court would be to destroy the Lightning location, and send the patent of the government to the Edna, whereby the United States would be made to graut a patent to those who never had a location sufficient to entitle them thereto. A mining claim may be lost by forfeiture or abandonment, but never by estoppel. The facts found by the court might be presented in a subsequent suit to declare a trust in Nelson and Koegel to the extent of their one-lialf interest in the premises in controversy under the Lightning location, but they cannot have the effect of impairing or destroying the connection between the government and the Lightning location. .(Saimders v. Mackey, 5 Mont. 523— 534.) When Watson and Donnelly located the Lightning they initiated a new title under the United States. This title is the only one the government would recognize. Their conveyance to Nelson and Koegel, qualified locators themselves, does not defeat the location or change it status as to the United States. Nothing short of a conveyance to an alien would have this effect. (Tibbetts v. Ah Tong, 4 Mont. 536-543.) (b) This deed of Nelson, and also the deed of Koegel, to respondent’s predecessors was of the Edna Claim only — it did not purport to convey a fee-simple absolute, but simply the claim and right, of possession existing by virtue of the location. Hence, the statute of Montana as to after-acquired title clearly could have no application. Moreover, it did not assume to convey a portion of the earth’s surface by metes and bounds, designating it for convenience as the Edna, in which event it might be contended that any other title, howsoever acquired, to any portion within the bounds would inure to the benefit of the grantee. To say that by such a deed they were estopped would be to place a limitation upon their rights as citizens, to connect themselves with the government. Again, even if there had been a forfeiture of the Edna, this doctrine is clearly opposed to the principle announced in Mackey v. Saunders, supra; and so the court erred in permitting Nelson to explain that which he intended to convey by the deed for the additional reason that nothing beyond the Edna Claim, so designated in the deed, could be imported into it. And the purchasers under this deed knew, or were presumed to know, that all they could acquire by its terms was the right of possession, much or little, appertaining to this Edna Claim, being also charged with record notice of the existence of the Lightning. (Deffeback v. Hawke, 115 U. S. 407.) (c) Shreve became a cotenant in the Lightning to the extent of a one-half interest by the same deed whereby Nelson acquired his interest. Shreve never was in any manner connected with the Edna, and by conveyance from Watson and Donnelly became the owner of an undivided one half of the premises in dispute. How an alleged estoppel as against his cotenant Nelson could affect his interest, we fail to understand.
Word & Smith, for Respondent.
I. Section 2319 of the United States Revised Statutes provides: “That all valuable mineral deposits in land belonging to the United States .... are declared to be free and open to exploration,” etc. This section has been frequently before the courts, and has been construed so that the matter is now practically settled as to the character of land that can be entered under the United States mineral laws. The cases cited by counsel for appellant are simply definitions of “veins.” There may be veins well defined, and still barren of any kind of mineral. Such veins are not subject to location under the mineral laws. Before there can be a location of a mineral claim there must be a discovery of “ valuable mineral deposits.” The word “valuable” in the statute of the United States qualifies the word “deposits” and not the word “mineral.” Both words, “valuable” and “mineral,” are adjectives qualifying “deposits.” As to the character of land that can be located under the mineral laws, and for definition of mineral land, see Deffeback v. Hawke, 115 U. S. 392; Davis v. Weibbold, 139 U. S. 507; Colorado Coal do. Co. v. United States, 123 U. S. 307; Alford v. Barnum, 45 Cal. 482; Merrill v. Dixon, 15 Nev. 401; Territory v. Mackey, 8 Mont. 173; Mdiardt v. Boaro, 113 U. 8. 536.
II. Turning now to the question of estoppel pleaded and relied upon by the respondent, it will be observed that in May, 1889, the two west corners of the Edna Lode were changed and the line thrown some further to the south. At the time of this change both of the plaintiffs, Nelson and Koegel, were owners of the Edna Claim, and the plaintiff Nelson actually assisted in moving these corners. No new record of the change was made, because the owners supposed the old record was sufficient to cover the ground as embraced after the change. After this change of corners, to wit, on the seventeenth and twenty-first days respectively of August, 1889, Koegel and Nelson conveyed all their interest in the Edna Lode to respondent’s grantors by deeds of bargain and sale. These deeds are under the statute, section 285, page 665, fifth division, made warranty deeds of the title. It will be remembered that when the deeds were made the owners of the Edna Lode thought or supposed the old record was sufficient to take in the ground covered by the change. The description of the premises conveyed in the deeds of Nelson and Koegel is almost identical. The description of the Edna Lode in the location notice reads: “ Beginning at discovery shaft, and measuring one hundred feet to a post marked eastern boundary Edna Lode; thence northerly three hundred feet to a post marked northeast corner Edna Lode; thence westerly fifteen hundred feet to post marked northwest corner Edna Lode,” etc. Then, so far as the lines running east and west are concerned, the only call or direction is westerly, hence, after the change of corners the lines still ran westerly, and by the map and evidence introduced in the cause, ran more directly to the west after the change than before. Now, as the description in the deeds and location would meet the description of the claim after the change, as well as before the corners were moved, it was competent and proper to prove by parol evidence wbat was actually intended to be conveyed by the deed. The deed was equally susceptible of covering two-subjects, or one of two pieces of land; it may have been either one or the other. Hence, the court committed no error in permitting respondent to show by the grautor, Nelson, by parol evidence, just what land was intended to be embraced in the deed. This was not contradicting the deed, but was simply explaining what was intended as the subject-matter. (See 1 Green leaf on Evidence [14th ed.], §§ 285-288, inclusive, and notes; Donnell v. Humphreys, 1 Mont. 526; Reamer v. Nesmith, 34 Cal. 624; Lake Vineyard eta. Association v. San Gabriel Orange Grove, 58 Cal. 51; Reed v: Proprietors of Locks-a/nd Canals, 8 How. 274; Stephen’s Digest on Evidence, art. 91, subd. 7; French v. Carhart, 1 N. Y. 96; Swain v. Salt-marsh, 54 N. H. 9; Starkie on Evidence [9th ed.], pp. 649,, 680.)
In this case the plaintiffs at the time of their deeds to respondent’s grantors in August, 1889, supposed that they were-the owners of the Edna Lode, as marked by the new or changed condition of the lines, and supposing their record covered the new as well as the old lines, it was entirely competent and proper to prove by parol evidence what was actually intended as the subject-matter of the conveyance. • This proof did not change or contradict the deed, but only assisted to explain its terms in the light in which it was executed by the parties. There is another rule of law which is always to be-applied in cases where there is any doubt as to the true intent of the parties to a deed. In such cases the deed is to be construed most strongly in favor of the grantee and against ther grantor. (Bender v. Fromberger, 4 Dali. 436; 2 Washburnon Beal Property [2d ed.], p. 669, side p. 628; Vance v. Fore, 24 Cal. 436; Piper v. True, 36 Cal. 606; Sullivan v. Davis, A Cal. 291.) The record shows that the plaintiffs, Nelson and Koegel, conveyed to respondent’s grantors all their interest in the Edna Lode by the deed referred to, supra, and the plaintiff Shreve derived his title to the Lightning Lode from Nelson and Koegel; it follows, then, that if the deeds from Nelson and Koegel covered the land embraced in the Edna, lines after the change, then the plaintiffs are estopped from. setting up an outstanding title against their grantees, and any such title which may be afterwards acquired by them inures to the benefit of their vendees. (Comp. Laws Mont, fifth div. § 267, p. 662; House v. McCormick, 57 N. Y. 310; I Washburn on Beal Property [2d ed.], pp. 467, 468, 469; Irvine v. Irvine, 9 Wall. 617; Van Rensselaer v. Kearney, II How. 297; Stoddard v. Chambers, 2 How. 284; Easton v. Salisbury, 21 How. 426; Morgan v. Curtenius, 20 How. 1; Hitchens v. Ñongues, 11 Cal. 28; Clark v. Baker, 14 Cal. 630; 76 Am. Dec. 449; Green v. Clark, 31 Cal. 591.)
The court having found that the plaintiffs by their deeds intended to convey all their interest in the Edna Lode, which they had on the seventeenth and twenty-first days of August, 1889, the conclusion of law that the plaintiffs are estopped from asserting an adverse or afterwards acquired title is correct and proper. If the court is correct in this particular all the other points may be erroneous, and still the judgment of the court must be affirmed. Coming to the change of lines by the owners of the Edna Lode, the claim of respondent is, that if there was no valid location of the Lightning Lode, if there had been no discovery, the ground embraced therein was public domain, and the Edna claimants had the right to change their lines and corners, so as the change did not interfere with prior vested rights of third parties. (Golden Fleece Co, v. Cable Co, 1 Morr. Min. Bep. 136, 137; McGinnis v. Egbert, 8 Colo. 41; McEvoy v. Hyman, 25 Fed. Bep. 596; Gregory v. Pershbaker, 73 Cal. 118; Doe v. Sanger, 83 Cal.

Opinion:
Blake, C.J.
It appears from the findings of facts, whicJb. are admitted by the parties, that the Edna Lode Mining Claim was discovered June 4, 1887, and that the boundaries were marked by posts at each corner and the center of each end line. The notice of location was filed June 15, 1887, in the office of the recorder of Jefferson County. The owners of the Edna Lode Mining Claim, including Frank Nelson and Charles Koegel, two of the appellants herein, moved, May 13, 1889, M the two stakes at the west end between five and six hundred feet further south, but did not change the stakes at the east end; and that the old original west end stakes were not removed, but were left standing as they were prior to the said swinging around of the boundaries." Said Nelson "actually assisted in moving said corners." Koegel, by his deed, which was executed August 17,1889, conveyed to the grantors of the respondent all his right, title, and interest in and to the Edna Lode Mining Claim. The description of the premises is as follows : "An undivided one-fourth (j-) interest in and to that certain piece or parcel of land known as the ' Edna Quartz Lode Mining Claim,' situate in Cataract (unorganized) mining district, Jefferson County, Montana Territory. Said Edna Lode is fully described in the notice of location thereof, which is recorded in the office of the county clerk and recorder of Jefferson County, Montana. Also an undivided one-fourth interest in all tools, mining improvements, and buildings, together with all the dips, spurs, and angles, and also all the metals, ores, gold and silver bearing quartz, rock, and earth therein; and all the rights, privileges, and franchises thereto incident, appendant, and appurtenant, or therewith usually had and enjoyed; and also all and singular the tenements, hereditaments, and appurtenances thereto belonging or in any wise appertaining, and the rents, issues, and profits thereof; and also all the estate, right, title, interest, property, possession, claim, and demand whatsoever, as well in law as in equity, of the said party of the first part, of, in, or to said premises, and every part and parcel thereof, with the appurtenances. To have and to hold, all and singular, the said premises, together with the appurtenances and privileges thereto incident, unto the said parties of the second part, their heirs and assigns, forever. It is expressly covenanted that it is intended hereby to convey any and all right, title, interest, and estate which may hereafter be acquired to said premises, or any part thereof, by virtue of any patent, which may hereafter be issued by the United States government therefor, under proceedings heretofore instituted in that behalf."
Nelson, by his deed, which was executed August 21, 1889, also conveyed all his right, title, and interest in the Edna Lode Mining Claim to the grantors of the respondent. The same language is used in describing tlie premises which were conveyed by Koegel, with this exception, that the following recitals appear: "Said claim is recorded on page 488 of Book P of Lode Locations of Jefferson County;" and "Said mill-site is recorded on page 85 of Book H of the Becords of Jefferson County."
What was the intention of said Nelson and Koegel in the execution of these instruments ? What right, title, or interest in the Edna Lode Mining Claim was embraced in the foregoing deeds? The Code of Civil Procedure has prescribed the rule for their interpretation: " For the proper construction of an instrument, the circumstances under which it was made, including the situation of the subject of the instrument and of the parties to it, may also be shown, so that the judge be placed in the position of those whose language he is to interpret." (§ 632.) " The terms of a writing are presumed to have been used in their primary and general acceptation, but evidence is, nevertheless, admissible that they have a local, technical, or otherwise peculiar signification, and were so used and understood in the particular instance, in which case the agreement must be construed accordingly." (§ 633.) The statute is a codification of the decisions of the courts upon this subject. The property in controversy is of a peculiar and exceptional character. Parties who comply with the laws of the United States and this State, and the local customs and regulations of a mining district, acquire the right to occupy, possess, and explore a lode mining claim. The discoverers do not usually make an accurate survey of the premises; and the notices of location contain a description in general terms, and by name. When the true course of the vein has been ascertained by development, the boundaries are usually changed to protect the interest of the claimants. The owners of the Edna Lode Mining Claim availed themselves of this privilege, which is valid under certain conditions, and about three months after these boundaries had been changed and restaked, the deeds were executed by Nelson and Koegel.
In Phillpotts v. Blasdel, 8 Nev. 70, the court quotes with approval the following extract from the opinion of the district judge, the Hon. W. H. Beatty, who, since that time, has been an honorable member of the Supreme Courts of the States of California and Nevada, viz.: "I agree with the plaintiff that when a man conveys a lode, we have only to ascertain, by the best means in our power, what lode of ore he meant; and, if we can do so, it makes no difference that he has called it by a name illegitimately acquired — a name only applied to it by reason of his ignorance of the truth. Effect must be given to his real intention, and the lode intended must be held to have been conveyed." The court in Truett v. Adams, 66 Cal. 221, says: "In trying to ascertain that intention, it is the duty of a court to assume, as nearly as possible, the position of the contracting parties, and to question the circumstances of the transaction between them, and then to read and interpret the words which they used in the light of those circumstances." Chief Justice Wade, in Taylor v. Holter, 1 Mont. 695, recognized this rule for the interpretation of a deed, and said: " The intent of the parties must be gathered from what is written, rather than from parol evidence; but the language of the instrument may be construed by the light of surrounding circumstances, and, so far as possible, the court may put itself in the place of the parties, and may interpret the language from this stand-point, but nothing can be added to or taken from the written words." (See, also, Donnell v. Humphreys, 1 Mont. 518, and United States v. Power, 6 Mont. 271.)
Let us apply to the instrument before us the principle which . has been established by the authorities and the Code of Civil Procedure. The intention of Nelson and Koegel is clearly expressed in their respective deeds, and they thereby parted with their right, title, and interest in the Edna Lode Mining Claim, as this property was known to them in August, 1889, and for which a patent might be issued by the government of the United States. It is contrary to the words and acts of Nelson and Koegel to say that they intended to sell, and their grantees wished to buy, the Edna Lode Mining Claim, as originally located, when they had abandoned a portion thereof to the public, and were not seeking any patent thereto. In order to obtain this patent, it is essential that a number of acts should be done by the applicants, and the Edna Lode Mining Claim was surveyed according to the boundaries which had been fixed by the change of the lines by Nelson and Koegel and the owners in the month of May, 1889. When the application for patent was made in the United States land office by the respondent, which was then the owner thereof, the appellants filed a protest, for the reason that the parcel in controversy was a part of the Lightning Lode Mining Claim. The following findings of facts by the court should be considered upon this branch of the case:—
" 11. That on October 30,1889, plaintiffs, Nelson and Koegel, bought out all the interest which Watson and Donnelly had in the Lightning Claim.
"12. That the plaintiff Shreve derived his title or interest in the Lightning Claim by purchase from Nelson and Koegel."
The court below held that Nelson and Koegel were estopped by their deeds, and prevented from asserting any claim to the area in conflict. The question of ownership of the Lightning Lode Mining Claim, or the validity of its location, is not involved in this inquiry. If the appellants succeed in this litigation, they prevent the respondent from securing the Edna Lode Mining Claim, which they "expressly covenanted " that its grantors, and "their heirs and assigns forever," should have and hold.
In Van Rensselaer v. Kearney, 11 How. 297, the court, through Mr. Justice Nelson, said: "And therefore, if the deed bears on its face evidence that the grantors intended to convey, and the grantee expected to become invested with, an estate of a particular description or quality, and that the bargain had proceeded upon that footing between the parties, then, although it may not contain any covenants of title in the technical sense of the term, still the legal operation and effect of the instrument will be as binding upon the grantor, and those claiming under him in respect to the estate thus described, as if a formal covenant to that effect had been inserted; at least, so far as to stop them from ever afterwards denying that he was seised of the particular estate at the time of the conveyance.....The principle deducible from these authorities seems to be that, whatever may be the form or nature of the conveyance used to pass real property, if the grantor sets forth on the face of the instrument, by way of recital or averment, that he is seised or possessed of a particular estate in the premises, and which estate the deed purports to convey; or, what is the same thing, if the seisin or possession of a particular estate is affirmed in the deed, either in express terms or by necessary implication, the grantor, and all persons in privity with him, shall be estooped from ever afterwards denying that he was so seised and possessed at the time he made the conveyance. The estoppel works upon the estate, and binds an after-acquired title as between parties and privies. The reason is that the estate thus affirmed to be in the party at the time of the conveyance must necessarily have influenced the grantee in making the purchase, and hence the grantor, and those in privity with him, in good faith and fair dealing, should be forever thereafter precluded from gainsaying it. The doctrine is founded, when properly applied, upon the highest principles of morality, and recommends itself to the common sense and justice of every one. And although it debars the truth in the particular case, and therefore is not unfreqtiently characterized as odious, and not to-be favored, still it should be remembered that it debars it only in the case where its utterance would convict the party of a previous falsehood —would be the denial of a previous affirmation upon the faith of which persons had dealt, and pledged their credit or expended their money. It is a doctrine, therefore, when properly understood and applied, that concludes the truth in order to prevent fraud and falsehood, and imposes silence on a party only when in conscience and honesty he should not be allowed to speak."
In Smith v. Williams, 44 Mich. 242, Mr. Justice Cooley for the court said: "Where one assumes by his deed to convey a title, and by any form of assurance obligates himself to protect the grantee in the enjoyment of that which the deed purports to give him, he will not be suffered afterwards to acquire or assert a title, and turn his grantee over to a suit upon his covenants for redress. The short and effectual method of redress is to deny him the liberty of setting up his after-acquired title as against his previous conveyance. This is merely refusing him the countenance and assistance of the courts in breaking the assurance which his covenants have given." (Long Island R. R. Co. v. Conklin, 29 N. Y. 572; Doe v. Dowdall, 3 Houst. 369.)
In Kelly v. Taylor, 23 Cal. 11, the court below instructed the jury "that in the matter of estoppel a different rule applies to mining claims from that applicable to other species of real estate." But Mr. Justice Crocker in the opinion said: "The first branch of this instruction is erroneous. The rules of law relating to estoppel in pais apply to mining ground, the same as any other real estate claimed under a similar kind of title." (See, also, Clark v. Baker, 14 Cal. 612; 76 Am. Dec. 449; Fields v. Squires, Deady, 366; Yunker v. Nichols, 1 Colo. 563; Smith v. Moodus W. P. Co. 35 Conn. 400; Karnes v. Wingate, 94 Ind. 594; Dobbins v. Cruger, 108 Ill. 188; Irvine v. Irvine, 9 Wall. 617; Moore v. Crawford, 130 U. S. 122; Ryan v. United States, 136 U. S. 68.)
The Code of Civil Procedure provides as follows: " When the terms of an agreement have been intended in a different sense by the different parties to it, that sense is to prevail against either party in which he supposed the other understood it; and when different constructions of a provision are otherwise equally proper, that is to be taken which is most favorable to the party in whose favor the provision was made." (§ 636.) The language seems to be decisive in its application to the deeds of the appellants.
The authorities seem to be in harmony upon this question, and we are of the opinion that the court below construed correctly the deeds of Nelson and Koegel, and held that these parties were thereby estopped from maintaining this action. The appellant Shreve obtained his title and interest to the Lightning Lode Mining Claim from Nelson and Koegel, and being in privity with them, is also in like manner estopped.
We concur in the views of Mr. Justice De Witt regarding the construction of the law applicable to the discovery and location of the Lightning Lode Mining Claim.
It is ordered and adjudged that the judgment be affirmed.
Affirmed.
Harwood, J., concurs.