Case Name: John Bruce v. John P. Lord
Court: New York Court of Common Pleas
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1856-07
Citations: 1 Hilt. 247
Docket Number: 
Parties: John Bruce v. John P. Lord.
Judges: Beady, J. — Concurred.
Reporter: Hilton's Common Pleas Reports
Volume: 1
Pages: 247–251

Head Matter:
John Bruce v. John P. Lord.
The acceptor of a draft, drawn upon Mm personally, and accepted by him, with the addition to his name of the words “Treasurer Neuvitas M. Co.,” is prima fade personally responsible for the acceptance. Such an addition is only a descriptw personarm, and does not absolve him from personal responsibility.
In an action upon such an acceptance, he may discharge himself by showing that he accepted it as agent, and by authority of such company, and that the plaintiff was aware of the fact at the time of taking the draft. But the proof for this purpose must be of such a nature as would be sufficient to establish the liability of-the company in an action against it upon the draft.
Authority to thus accept on behalf of a company cannot be proved by parol. It can be conferred only by a resolution of the board of directors, and the resolution must itself be produced. Dalx, J., dissenting.
Appeal by plaintiff from a judgment of tbe Marine Court. This was an action against tbe defendant as acceptor of a draft drawn upon him, and accepted in these words: “ Accepted, John P. Lord, Treasurer Neuvitas M. Co., 31 Oct., 1854.” Upon tbe trial parol evidence was offered by tbe defendant and admitted under tbe plaintiff’s objection, for the purpose of showing that, tbe diaft was accepted by tbe defendant as treasurer, and by tbe authority of the Neuvitas Mining Company. The nature of this evidence is fully stated in the dissenting opinion of Judge Daly. Judgment was rendered for tbe defendant, from which the plaintiff appealed.
J. B. Auld, for the appellant.
I. It was necessary for the defendant to show authority from the Neuvitas M. Co. to accept for them. .Rossiier v. Rossiier, 8 Wend. 494; A Üünson v. St. Oroix If. Co., 11 Shep. 171; Iloss v. Livingston, 4 Corns. 208. II. Parol evidence was inadmissible for this purpose. Hills v. Bannister, 8 Cow. 81; Tassey v. Church, 4 Watts & Sergt. 346; Moss v. Livingston, 4 Corns. 208.
^Field and Sluyter, for the respondents,
cited Molt v. Hides, 1 Cow. 513 ; Rathbun v. Budlong, 15 Johns. 1; Peniz v. Blanton, 10 Wend. 271; Brochway v. Allen, 17 ibid. 42; Hides v. Hinde, 9 Barb. S. 0. E. 528; Watervliet Bank v. White, 1 Denio, 608; Babcock v. Beman, 1 Kern. 202.

Opinion:
INGRAHAM, First Judge. —
The case of Moss v. Livingston (4 Com. 208) decides that an acceptance like the present bound the party malting it personally, unless it appeared that he had authority from the company to bind them by such acceptance; and the case of Brockway v. Allen (17 Wend. 40) establishes that such an acceptance does not bind the party making it, if it appear that it was made by the authority of the company to bind them, and that the plaintiff had notice of such agency.
The facts necessary to establish this defence, under the case of Brockway v. Allen, are all sufficiently proven, except that of the defendant's authority. This was attempted to be shown by the drawer of the draft, who said that the defendant had authority to accept as secretary and treasurer; and by the testimony of Joseph L. Lot 1, who said that the defendant was secretary and treasurer, and had power to accept it; that he knew this, as he was present when the arrangement was made.
To this evidence the defendant's counsel excepted, upon the ground that the authority, if any existed, was in writing, and could not be proved by parol. A company cannot authorize a third person to bind them, except by a resolution of the board of directors. Such resolution being in writing can only be proven by its production, or by authority executed in pursuance of it. The plaintiff, before he was deprived of the right which the law gave him against the defendant as acceptor, was entitled to be furnished with proper evidence, by which he could establish such claim against the company. Mere parol proof that the defendant had, in the opinion of the witnesses, authority to bind the company, would never be held sufficient to make the company liable on such an acceptance, and it is not sufficient to defeat what otherwise would be a valid claim against the defer ant. It may be that on another trial the defendant may be able to produce proper evidence to establish this defence; but, for the error above mentioned, I think the judgment should be reversed.
Beady, J. — Concurred.