Case Name: BOLAND v. C D BARNES ASSOCIATES, INC
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1983-06-21
Citations: 126 Mich. App. 569
Docket Number: Docket No. 61474
Parties: BOLAND v C D BARNES ASSOCIATES, INC
Judges: Before: R. B. Burns, P.J., and Beasley and M. B. Breighner, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 126
Pages: 569–579

Head Matter:
BOLAND v C D BARNES ASSOCIATES, INC
Docket No. 61474.
Submitted December 7, 1982, at Grand Rapids.
Decided June 21, 1983.
J. David Boland and Construction Development, Inc., entered into a contract for the construction of an office complex. The construction was to be provided through C. D. Barnes Associates, Inc. Subsequently, Construction Development, Inc., and C. D. Barnes Associates, Inc., filed statements of account and mechanics’ liens on the property and thereafter commenced an action to foreclose the mechanics’ liens against Boland and others. The foreclosure action was voluntarily dismissed with prejudice pursuant to stipulation of the parties. Boland subsequently filed suit in Kent Circuit Court against C. D. Barnes Associates and Construction Development for the improper filing and perfecting of mechanics’ liens on the office complex project. The court, R. Stuart Hoffius, J., granted accelerated judgment for the defendants based upon the doctrine of res judicata. The plaintiff appealed. Held:
The trial court did not err in granting accelerated judgment for the defendants. The allegations contained in the plaintiff’s complaint, if proven, would have constituted a defense to the original foreclosure action and those issues could have, and should have, been raised in that action. Therefore, the plaintiff’s action is barred under the res judicata doctrine.
Affirmed.
Beasley, J., dissented. He would reverse the trial court’s grant of accelerated judgment and remand the case to the trial court. He believes that while plaintiff could have raised the issues in his complaint as a counterclaim in the foreclosure action he was hot required to do so. Because the applicable court rule is a permissive joinder rule, plaintiff had the option of raising his claims in a separate action. He does not believe that res judicata should be available to the defendants as a defense to the plaintiffs suit.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1, 3] 46 Am Jur 2d, Judgments § 394.
[2] 46 Am Jur 2d, Judgments § 430 et seq.
[4] 46 Am Jur 2d, Judgments § 492.
[5] 46 Am Jur 2d, Judgments § 397.
Opinion of the Court
1. Judgments — Res Judicata.
The doctrine of res judicata applies not only to points upon which a court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment but also to issues which could have and should have been raised in the original proceedings.
Dissent by Beasley, J.
2. Judgments — Accelerated Judgment — Action — Joinder of Counterclaims — Separate Actions — Court Rules.
Michigan provides for permissive joinder of counterclaims; where a party declines to file any counterclaim in pending litigation he is then free to maintain a separate independent action of his own even though he could have set up a counterclaim in the first action (GCR 1963, 203.2).
3. Words and Phrases — Res Judicata.
The doctrine of res judicata provides that, where two parties have fully litigated a particular claim and a final judgment has resulted, that claim may not be relitigated by either party; there are three prerequisites for a prior judgment to constitute a bar in a subsequent action under res judicata: (1) the former action must have been decided on the merits; (2) the same matter contested in the second action must have been decided in the first action; and (3) the two actions must be between the same parties or their privies.
4. Words and Phrases — Res Judicata — Voluntary Dismissal.
A voluntary dismissal of a lawsuit with prejudice is a final judgment on the merits for res judicata purposes.
5. Estoppel — Collateral Estoppel — Res Judicata.
Res judicata bars further action after an original cause of action between two parties goes to judgment whereas the doctrine of collateral estoppel is applied to subsequent actions based on a new cause of action and makes the prior litigation conclusive as to issues actually litigated and decided.
Rominger & Dewitt (by Charles S. Rominger, Jr.), for plaintiff.
Smith, Haughey, Rice & Roegge (by John C. O’Loughlin), for defendants.
Before: R. B. Burns, P.J., and Beasley and M. B. Breighner, JJ.
Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
R. B. Burns, P.J.
Plaintiff sought damages against defendants for allegedly improper filing and perfecting of mechanics' liens. The trial court granted defendants' motion for an accelerated judgment based upon a consent judgment taken in a prior action between the parties arising out of the same transaction which barred the present suit. GCR 1963, 116.1(5).
Essentially, defendants claimed in their motion for accelerated judgment that plaintiff's 1980 complaint was predicated upon facts that were either litigated or could have been litigated in a 1976 foreclosure action which was dismissed by the parties' stipulation. We agree.
This Court in Brownridge v Michigan Mutual Ins Co, 115 Mich App 745, 748; 321 NW2d 798 (1982), stated:
"Since both actions arise out of the same discharge from employment, both actions arise 'out of the same transaction', both actions involved 'point[s] which properly belonged to the subject of litigation', and both involved 'the same matter in issue'. See Arnold v Masonic Country Club, 268 Mich 430; 256 NW 472 (1934). A voluntary dismissal with prejudice is a final judgment on the merits for res judicata purposes, Astron Industrial Ass'n, Inc v Chrysler Motors Corp, 405 F2d 958 (CA 5, 1968). That plaintiff could have brought her state claims in the federal action may be shown by reference to United Mine Workers of America v Gibbs, 383 US 715, 725; 86 S Ct 1130; 16 L Ed 2d 218 (1966)."
In the instant case, plaintiffs complaint alleged that defendants improperly executed mechanics' liens and wrongfully initiated a suit to foreclose upon those liens. Further, the complaint alleged that bad faith by defendants in filing the liens caused plaintiff to suffer financial losses. The original action filed by the present defendants was to foreclose upon mechanics' liens against an office complex which defendants were constructing for plaintiff. The allegations contained in plaintiffs present complaint, if proven, would have constituted a defense to the original foreclosure action. They are issues which could have, and should have, been raised in the original proceedings. Therefore, they are barred under the doctrine of res judicata. See Gose v Monroe Auto Equipment Co, 409 Mich 147; 294 NW2d 165 (1980); Eyde v Meridian Charter Twp, 118 Mich App 43; 324 NW2d 775 (1982).
Affirmed.
M. B. Breighner, J., concurred.