Case Name: HOAG v. WASHINGTON-OREGON CORPORATION
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1914-11-10
Citations: 75 Or. 588
Docket Number: 
Parties: HOAG v. WASHINGTON-OREGON CORPORATION.
Judges: Mr. Chief Justice McBeide, Mr. Justice Bean and Mr. Justice Burnett concur.
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 75
Pages: 588–629

Head Matter:
Argued October 6,
reversed and remanded November 10, 1914,
modified and affirmed on rehearing April 13, 1915.
HOAG v. WASHINGTON-OREGON CORPORATION.
(144 Pac. 574; 147 Pac. 756.)
Exceptions, Bill of — Contents—Whole Testimony.
1. Under Section 171, L. O. L., providing that no particular form of exception shall be required, but that the objection shall be stated with so much of the evidence and other matter as is necessary to explain it and no more, a purported bill of exceptions, which is a full transcript of the evidence taken at the trial consisting of 440 typewritten pages, is not a bill of exceptions except as to the motion for nonsuit, and will be considered only for that purpose.
Exceptions, Bill of — Contents—Statutory Requirements.
2. Section 171, L. O. L., providing that no particular form of exception shall be required, but that the objection shall be stated with so much of the evidence and other matter as is necessary to explain it and no more, was not affected by the amendment to Article VII, of the Constitution, in 1910 (see Laws 1911, p. 7), which provides among other things that either party might have attached to the bill of exceptions the whole testimony.
Master and Servant — Injuries to Servant — Negligence of Superintendent — Employers’ Liability Act.
3. Under the Employers’ Liability Act (Laws 1911, p. 17), Section 2 of which provides that the manager, superintendent, foreman, etc., is held to be the agent of the employer, but does not create a liability upon the superintendent or manager, an injured employee may recover against the employer for the negligence of the manager or superintendent, but not against the manager or superintendent personally.
Master and Servant — Injuries to Servant — Master’s Liability — Delegation of Duty.
4. Where the manager and superintendent of an electric company superintended the work of repairing the wires, and the superintendent himself turned on the current while the lineman was in a place of danger, the company is liable for the superintendent’s act, notwithstanding his claim that another lineman had assumed the responsibility of looking out for the safety of the men.
Trial — Instructions—Questions of Law — Question for Court.
5. In an action for personal injuries to the servant, the court should instruct the jury whether the action comes within the Employers’ Liability Act (Laws 1911, p. 16), or under the common-law rules, and not leave that question for the jury to determine.
Master and Servant — Injuries to Servant — Laws Governing — Employers’ Liability Act.
6. Where an employee was injured while repairing electric wires, the case was clearly one of work in repairing or altering a structure involving danger and came within the provisions of the Employers’ Liability Act (Laws 1911, p. 16).
[As to what is accident arising out of and in course of employment within Employers’ Liability Act, see note in Ann. Cas. 1912D, 1284.]
ON EEHEAKING.
Master and Servant — Action for Injury — Sufficiency of Complaint.
7. A complaint in a lineman’s action against his employer, an electric company, and its superintendent and general manager, charging that, while he was engaged in repair work under the direction and supervision of its superintendent and general manager, a high-tension current was turned on near-by drop wires without notice to him, though the danger of his situation was known, whereby he was badly shocked, burned and disfigured, stated facts sufficient to justify a recovery under the common law, or under the statute (Employers’ Liability Act; Laws 1911, p. 16).
Action — Joinder—Separate Causes of Action — “Cause of Action.”
8. Within Section 67, L. O. L., requiring that a complaint shall contain a plain and concise statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, a “cause of action” comprehends a legal right on the part of the plaintiff, and a breaeh of a corresponding duty on the part of the defendant to accord that right, so that all breaches of legal duty arising out of one transaction, whether flowing from the common law or from the statute, constitute but one cause of action, unless the statutory remedy is so inconsistent with the common-law remedy that the same judgment could not be rendered uppn recovery, in which case the plaintiff may be required to elect upon which cause of action he will proceed.
Master and Servant — Action for Injury — Pleading—Single Cause of Action — Instructions.
9. In a lineman’s action for injury while repairing wires, by the aet either of his employer’s general manager or superintendent in the turning a current on near-by drop wires without notice to him, although they knew of his dangerous situation, whereby he was injured, wherein the defendant employer, without demurrer or motion to make mote definite and certain or to elect, answered, denying all allegations of negligence, and pleading assumption of risk and contributory negligence, and in which the testimony went in with few objections on either side, the ease permitted recovery either at common law, or under the Employers’ Liability Act, in which the measure of damages was the same, so that it was not error to instruct as to defendant’s liability at common law, and under the statute, and that if the acts charged showed a liability or want of liability, tested by the whole law, they should return a verdict consonant therewith, and that under the Employers’ Liability Act the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk should be eliminated.
Appeal and Error — Harmless Error — Admission of Evidence.
10. In a lineman’s action for injury, joining the employer’s general manager, the allowance of the cross-examination of the manager so as to give him an opportunity to state that he had nothing to do with the installation of certain wires and release himself from any liability on that account, if erroneous, was harmless.
Master and Servant — Action for Injury — Evidence.
11. In a lineman’s action for injury while repairing wires, by the turning of a current on nearby drop wires, evidence as to the dangerous situation of the drop wires was material upon the degree of care required of defendants in causing the current to be turned on them while plaintiff was working near them.
Trial — Objection to Evidence — Sufficiency.
12. The objection that testimony is immaterial, irrelevant and incompetent, without any statement as to why it is so, is insufficient.
Master and Servant — Representatives—Liability—Warning.
13. The general manager of an electric company, and its superintendent, both representing-it in repair work, were bound to exercise reasonable eare to prevent injury to a lineman, and, under the Employers’ Liability Act, it was the duty of eaeh to use every eare practicable for his safety, and they were liable for their failure to warn him of the fact that a current had been turned on near-by drop wires, as to which he was ignorant, and whieh, together with their failure to warn, was the proximate cause of his injury.
Appeal and Error — Harmless Error — Conduct of Trial — Remarks of Court.
14. The act of the trial judge in reading portions of the Employers’ Liability Act to the jury, and remarking after he had read its title that the act was passed by an affirmative majority in 1910, and beeame effective December 3, 1910, was not prejudicial error.
Trial — Instructions—Reading from Statute.
15. In a lineman’s action for injury, the action of the trial court, after reading a section of the Employers’ Liability Act, in saying that that was the point to which he directed their especial attention, and thereafter reading the part providing that all persons in charge of or responsible for any work involving danger to an employee should use every practicable precaution and device for safety, was not objectionable.
Trial — Instruction—Ignoring Issues, Defenses or Evidence.
16. In a lineman’s action for personal injury from the turning on of current on drop wires near where he was working, a charge on an employer’s duty to use every precaution and device practicable for safety, ignoring the limitation of duty by the necessity for preserving the efficiency of the structure or device, was misleading.
Trial — Instructions—Duty of Jury.
17. An instruction that it is the jury’s duty to follow the instructions given, and they were bound to decide a case without any feeling or prejudice for or against the plaintiff, the corporation defendant, or the individual defendants, and on its merits, as between two individuals, was proper.
Trial — Instructions—Appeal to Sympathy.
18. In a lineman’s action for injury from a current turned on drop wires near those which he was repairing, the court’s addition to a requested proper instruction on the jury’s duty to follow the law, by stating that, so far as sympathy and prejudice were concerned, neither had any place in a courtroom, but that did not mean that a man had to steel himself against his sympathies, but only that, if they believed the faets one way, they ought not let sympathy alone find a verdict, in view of plaintiff’s crippled condition ancf defendants’ gross negligence, was erroneous as allowing the play of sympathy.
Appeal and Error — Review — Reversal — Technical Errors — Constitutional Provisions.
19. Under Article VII, Section 3, of the Constitution, as amended in 1910 (Laws 1911, p. 7), providing that, in actions at law where the value in controversy shall exeeed $20, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, that on appeal to the Supreme Court either party may attach to the bill of exceptions the whole testimony, the instructions, and any other matter material to the decision on appeal, that, if the Supreme Court is of the opinion that the judgment appealed from should have been rendered in the ease, it shall be affirmed, notwithstanding error at the trial, that, if of opinion that the judgment should be changed, and that it can determine the judgment which should have been entered, it shall direct the entry of such judgment as in equity cases on appeal, the Supreme Court, on appeal by defendant in a servant’s action for personal injury, and on a showing of trial error in the instructions rendering the verdict and the judgment thereon erroneous, but not void, and with all the testimony before it, would retry the case, set aside the judgment below, and enter the judgment which should have been rendered.
Statutes — Construction—Legislative Intent.
2u. Statutes snouid be interpreted according to the legislative intent, to be ascertained from the whole statute and a consideration of the mischiefs which it was designed to remedy.
Jury — Right to Trial by Jury — Power of Legislature.
21. The legislature cannot enact a law abolishing jury trials in law actions, nor can a law court arbitrarily refuse to allow a jury to be called in such eases.
[As to relation of Magna Charta to jury trial, see note in Ann. Cas. 1914A, 873.]
Constitutional Law — Construction—Repugnant Provisions.
22. Where two provisions of a written Constitution are repugnant to each other, that which is last in order of time and in local position is to be preferred.
Constitutional Law — Construction—General and Particular Intent.
23. A general intent must control a particular intent, though such rule must sometimes give way, and effect be given to a particular intent plainly expressed in one part of a Constitution, although apparently opposed to a general intent deduced from other parts.
Damages — Measure of Damages — Personal Injury.
24. A lineman 30 years of age, who was earning $2.50 a day, and who, as a hook-tender in a logging camp, eoiild occasionally earn $3.50 to $5 a day, who was badly crippled, though not wholly disabled from doing some light work, would be fairly compensated for his injury by an award of $14,000.
From Multnomah: Henry E. McGinn, Judge.
Department 2. Statement by Mr. Justice Eakin.
In July, 1912, "Willis D. Hoag was a lineman for the Washington-Oregon Corporation, a corporation being at work on its line near Cornelius, Washington County, Oregon, under the direction and supervision of W. E. Turner, its general manager, and Art Gilmore, its superintendent. The current of electricity had been turned off for said repair work. The complaint states that, while plaintiff was engaged in said repair work, the high tension current was turned on the wires without notice to him, by which he was badly burned and disfigured; that the said Turner and Gilmore caused the said current to be turned on said wires well knowing the danger of plaintiff’s situation. Plaintiff sued the said Turner and Gilmore jointly with the said company. Upon the trial the court instructed the jury that, if they found the case was one where the liability of defendant was controlled by the Employers ’ Liability Act of 1910, they should apply that law exclusively without reference to the common-law liability; but, if they found that law did not apply to the case, they should apply the principles of the common law, and he instructed them as to the interpretation of the statute and as to the rules of the common-law liability. The jury found in favor of plaintiff for $30,000. Prom a judgment tbereon defendant appeals.
Reversed and Remanded.
For appellants there was a brief over the names of Mr. Charles A. Johns, Mr. P. C. Sullivan, Mr. M. A. Longhorne and Mr. Claude M. Johns, with oral arguments by Mr. Charles A. Johns and Mr. Sullivan.
For respondent there was a brief over the names of Mr. A. E. Clark and Mr. Roscoe F. Hunt, with an oral argument by Mr. Clark.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Eakin
delivered the opinion of the court.
We find, first, that the book in the record labeled "Bill of Exceptions" is the full transcript of the evidence taken at the trial and certified by the judge. It consists of about 440 typewritten pages, and is not such a bill of exceptions as is contemplated by Section 171, L. O. L., or by the rules of the court. Upon this question see the cases cited under Section 169, L. O. L. As already stated in State v. Murray, 11 Or. 413 (5 Pac. 55), and in Eaton v. Oregon R. & N. Co., 22 Or. 498 (30 Pac. 311), this court lays down the rule as to what constitutes a proper bill of exceptions. It may be stated in narrative form, such as there is testimony tending to prove, etc., and need not be prolonged by question and answer, objections and argument of counsel. Section 171, L. O. L., provides:
"The objection shall be stated with so much of the evidence or other matter as is necessary to explain it, but no more. ' '
And this rule still obtains and is not affected by the 1910 amendment of Article YII of the Constitution (see Laws 1911, p. 7). Many cases come to this court in which the bill of exceptions is the full transcript of the testimony. This conrt has taken great pains to explain this matter, but many lawyers have either not seen the decisions or carelessly sent np the whole testimony without a formal bill of exceptions: See Willis v. Horticultural Fire Relief of Oregon 69 Or. 293 (137 Pac. 761); Bigelow v. Columbia Gold Min. Co., 54 Or. 452 (103 Pac. 56, 1007); Oldland v. Or. Coal & Nav. Co., 55 Or. 345 (99 Pac. 423, 102 Pac. 596); Hahn v. Mackay, 63 Or. 100 (126 Pac. 12, 991); Keady v. United Rys. Co., 57 Or. 325 (100 Pac. 658, 108 Pac. 197); West v. McDonald, 67 Or. 551 (136 Pac. 650); Litscher v. Alexander, 68 Or. 369 (136 Pac. 847); National Council v. McGinn, 70 Or. 457 (138 Pac. 493). The bill of exceptions is intended as an aid to the court in finding the particular facts bearing upon a certain exception. The court has often protested that it will not read such a mass of testimony in an investigation of an assignment of error. The pretended bill of exceptions in this case is not in any sense such except as to the motion for nonsuit, and we will ignore it for any other purpose.
The instructions of the court include the construction of the Employers' Liability Act of 1910 (Laws 1911, p. 16). So far as it is not dependent upon the bill of exceptions we will discuss the instructions in the light of the issues. The action must be considered as brought and to be determined under that act. The issues tender no suggestion that could be treated under the common-law liability.
As to the motion for nonsuit, the statute of 1910 gives a remedy against contractors, etc., and only contemplates a liability against employers. Section 2 of the act provides that the manager, superintendent, foreman, etc., in charge or control of the work shall be held to he the agent of the employer, and the act does not create a liability upon the superintendent or manager. This is decided in Lawton v. Morgan, Fliedner & Boyce, 66 Or. 292 (131 Pac. 314, 134 Pac. 1037), where it is said by Mr. Justice Moore :
"It is evident that an employer, whether owner, contractor or subcontractor, who is engaged in the construction of a building, is the only party defendant in an action to recover damages. ' '
But the manager or superintendent is to be held the agent of the employer.
In this case the turning on of the current is admitted by appellant to be the proximate cause of the injury, and Gilmore, the superintendent, actually turned on the current. The manager and superintendent were both on the ground supervising the work, and should have looked after any matter where there was danger or risk to the lineman; and they cannot excuse themselves by saying that another lineman assumed that responsibility and thus relieve themselves. The company was responsible for such negligence, and the evidence was sufficient to go to the jury on that question ; and the motion for a nonsuit was properly denied as to the company.
The principal instruction which we may consider relates to the application of the 1910 statute. The trial judge in instructing the jury discussed that law at great length. This case evidently comes within that act, and it was the duty of the court to instruct the jury as to its application. Beading the law at length to the jury was likely to involve them in the determination of questions not relating directly to the issues. If any issues disclosed a liability that did not come within this statute, the court should have pointed it out to the jury and given instructions in relation thereto. The court in the trial of the case fell into the error mentioned in Schulte v. Pacific Paper Co., 67 Or. 334 (135 Pac. 527, 136 Pac. 5), which was not decided until after this case was tried. The jury was left to apply the law of 1910 if it desired and to determine for itself to what extent it applied to the case. This judgment must be reversed upon the authority of the Schulte case and remanded for new trial. The statute provides that an employer having charged any work involving risk or danger to employees shall use every precaution practicable for the safety of life and limb, and the manager and superintendent in charge or control of the work shall be held to be the agent of the employer. That is a brief statement of the liability leaving out all verbiage not applicable to this case. The court instructed the jury as to the common-law liability of the defendant company, and went into detail as to three elements of the common-law liability, namely, the fellow-servant rule, the assumed risk, and contributory negligence; but those elements are defenses in a common-law action, and are affected by the-statute of 1910. The first two elements are entirely eliminated by the statute, and the one modified; but the instructions of the court wholly fail to enlighten the jury as to what facts would take the case out of the statute, and the jury was left entirely in the dark on that question. In any event, it was his duty to control them on the issues and the law applicable thereto, and not to leave them to say what questions were under the common law and what evidence was applicable thereto.
The case was clearly a case of an owner doing work of repairing or altering a structure involving danger, and came under the statute; and whether proper care and precaution were used, or contributory negligence was established as an element affecting the amount of damages, should have been presented to the jury.
The judgment is reversed and the cause dismissed as to Turner and Gilmore, and remanded for such further proceedings as may seem proper.
Bevebsed and Bemanded.
Mr. Chief Justice McBeide, Mr. Justice Bean and Mr. Justice Burnett concur.