Case Name: HARBOR VENTURES, INC., etc., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Robert C. HUTCHES et al., Defendants-Appellees
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1979-01-18
Citations: 366 So. 2d 1173
Docket Number: No. 53659
Parties: HARBOR VENTURES, INC., etc., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Robert C. HUTCHES et al., Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: ENGLAND, C. J., and ADKINS, OVER-TON, SUNDBERG and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 366
Pages: 1173–1176

Head Matter:
HARBOR VENTURES, INC., etc., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Robert C. HUTCHES et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 53659.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Jan. 18, 1979.
David K. Deitrich, of Dye, Cleary, Scott, Deitrich & Price, Bradenton, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Robert E. Knowles and Clifford L. Walters> 111 of Knowles, Blalock, Coleman & Landers; and E. N. Fay, Jr., of Mann & Fay, Bradenton, for defendants-appellees.

Opinion:
HATCHETT, Justice.
We are asked to determine whether section 193.461(4)(a)3., Florida Statutes (1973), is unconstitutional because it sets up an irrebuttable presumption that land rezoned non-agricultural at the request of its owners will not be used for a bona fide agricultural purpose. Exercising jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution, we decline to address the constitutional question and find the statute inapplicable to the facts of this case because the zoning change was from one non-agricultural use to another non-agricultural use.
In 1973, appellants, Harbor Ventures, Inc. and others, owned land in the unincorporated area of Manatee County. The land was zoned R-1AA (non-agricultural). Agricultural use of land in a non-agriculturally zoned district is permitted by an exception granted by the County Commissioners of Manatee County. The appellants' property was classified and assessed as agricultural in 1973. On December 18, 1973, the land was rezoned at the request of its owner to a use classification of planned unit development (PUD) (non-agricultural). In a timely manner and in accordance with all existing laws, appellants sought agricultural classification and assessment for 1974. The request was denied by the appellees, the Property Appraiser for Manatee County and other county officials. After exhausting administrative remedies, appellants instituted this action in the circuit court seeking declaratory relief.
The facts in this case are undisputed. As of January 1, 1974, the land which is the subject of this suit was being used in the same manner as it was being used on January 1, 1973. The sole reason for the denial of agricultural classification and assessment was the rezoning of the land at the request of its owners. Because of the denial of the agricultural classification and assessment, appellants' land was assessed at a higher value than adjacent land devoted to the same use.
Appellants attack section 193.461(4)(a)3., Florida Statutes (1973), alleging that it denies equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States and article I, section 2 of the Florida Constitution. The trial judge upheld the constitutionality of the statute.
We must initially determine whether section 193.461(4)(a)3, Florida Statutes (1973), applies where land is rezoned from one non-agricultural use to another non-agricultural use. If the statute applies, we must address the constitutional question.
Article VII, section 4(a) of the Florida Constitution provides:
Section 4. Taxation; assessments—
By general law regulations shall be prescribed which shall secure a just valuation of all property for ad valorem taxation, provided:
(a) Agricultural land or land used exclusively for non-commercial recreational purposes may be classified by general law and assessed solely on the basis of character or use. [Emphasis added.]
In interpreting these provisions, we have held that the policy of the Greenbelt law and its 1972 amendments is to promote agricultural use of land.
Section 193.461(4)(a)3., Florida Statutes (1973), provides:
The assessor shall reclassify the following lands as nonagricultural: . 3. Land that has been zoned to a nonagri-cultural use at the request of the owner subsequent to the enactment of this law
Considering the stated purpose of the Greenbelt law and our adherence to the actual use test, we find that the legislature intended to limit application of this statute to those cases where land is rezoned from an agricultural use to a non-agricultural use at the owner's request. Such an interpretation provides an incentive for agricultural lands to remain devoted to agricultural production by discouraging speculative rezoning. Such speculative rezoning must have been viewed by the legislature as a first step toward non-agricultural use. The legislature could not have intended to deny the benefits of the Greenbelt law where a clear bona fide commercial agricultural use was being made of land that was rezoned from one non-agricultural use to another non-agricultural use.
We believe this interpretation is in compliance with our duty to construe tax statutes in favor of taxpayers where an ambiguity may exist. Maas Brothers Inc. v. Dickinson, 195 So.2d 193 (Fla.1967); Leadership Housing, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 336 So.2d 1239 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976).
We hold that section 193.461(4)(a)3. applies only to those situtations where land zoned agricultural is changed to a non-agricultural zoning at the request of its owner. In light of this disposition, we need not reach the constitutional issue.
Accordingly, the trial court is reversed and the case remanded to that court for further action consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
ENGLAND, C. J., and ADKINS, OVER-TON, SUNDBERG and ALDERMAN, JJ., concur.
BOYD, J., dissents with an opinion.