Case Name: The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Dwight Smith, Appellant
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 2016-08-25
Citations: 143 A.D.3d 31
Docket Number: 
Parties: The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Dwight Smith, Appellant.
Judges: Acosta, J.P., and Gesmer, J., concur with Manzanet-Daniels, J.; Kapnick, J., dissents in a separate opinion in which Andrias, J., concurs. .
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 143
Pages: 31–39

Head Matter:
[37 NYS3d 4]
The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Dwight Smith, Appellant.
First Department,
August 25, 2016
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
Robert S. Dean, Center for Appellate Litigation, New York City (Matthew Bova of counsel), for appellant.
Robert T, Johnson, District Attorney, Bronx CMarianne Strac-quadanio, Stanley R. Kaplan and Ramandeep Singh of counsel), for respondent.

Opinion:
OPINION OF THE COURT
Manzanet-Daniels, J.
We find defendant's right-to-counsel claim to be meritorious. The court here pressured defendant into giving a buccal swab for DNA testing, incorrectly advised him that he had no arguments against the prosecutor's untimely discovery, and ignored defendant's explicit and repeated requests for a lawyer during the critical pretrial stage of the proceedings. Proceeding without counsel under the circumstances violated defendant's Sixth Amendment rights.
On September 7, 2007, the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner reported that it had found biological material on items inside of the apartment where the homicide occurred.
On March 11, 2009 — more than seven months after defendant's arraignment, and nearly six months after the prosecution's discovery request deadline under CPL 240.90 (1) — the People filed a motion for discovery of a saliva sample. The motion did not even purport to explain why the prosecution had missed the discovery deadline by 179 days.
After the People served defense counsel with a written copy of the motion to compel in court the next day, the prosecutor asked defense counsel whether "it's something that defense is willing to consent to," and defense counsel replied, "I will discuss it with my client, Your Honor." The court stated, "If your client is not inclined to agree, would you put in your answer," and defense counsel replied, 'Yes, I will."
Codefendant Fair's attorney opposed the DNA test, contending that the prosecution had violated the 45-day discovery deadline (CPL 240.90 [1]). Defendant did not file papers opposing the motion to compel.
On April 30, 2009, defense counsel Gilbert Parris appeared before the court without defendant present and asked to be excused from the case because defendant would not be able to pay his fees. Following a discussion off the record, the court stated that "[w]ith respect to this matter, Mr. Parris will be relieved." When the court officer stated that defendant had not yet been produced, defense counsel stated, "He's not produced so I waive my client's production in this matter." The prosecutor stated, "We're going to ask the card be held so we can go get a swab."
Defendant appeared before the court later that same day, without an attorney. The court asked defendant whether he would "mind doing [the buccal swab] without your lawyer in light of the fact that there has been an order signed by this Court indicating that you have to do that?" In the exchange that ensued, defendant repeatedly indicated that he wanted to wait for his lawyer before agreeing to provide a sample or actually providing one. Defendant stated that he "wasn't aware of [the] buccal swab" and had not spoken to his attorney for "two months." He even stated, "I will probably want to [file] a motion to oppose."
Instead of adjourning, the court informed defendant that the motion practice "was already taken care of. The motions are finished. All I want to ask you is to cooperate." Defendant continued to insist that counsel be present, stating, "I don't want to do it. I want to wait for the attorney to be here. I don't mind doing [the test], but with [the attorney's] consent. I don't want to do things I'm not aware of basically. I don't want to do something that's not in my favor."
The court retreated from its initial statement that it would "wait for [defendant's] lawyer," advising defendant that his resistance to the DNA test was futile. The court explained that attorney Parris had consented to the taking of a buccal swab, and that "[t]he [new] attorney is not going to be able to help you in any way of preventing because I issued the order." The court explained that refusing to proceed with the test would significantly delay the trial, and suggested that it would order that the sample be obtained from defendant involuntarily if necessary. When defendant continued to insist that a lawyer be present, the court stated that he was "making a mistake," admonishing him that he had "no basis for fighting [the test]."
Defendant still declined to consent, explaining that while he "trustfed]" the judge, he did not "know the law." The judge replied, "I know the law." Defendant stated that he wanted to "make sure," but the judge responded, "It is absolutely a hundred [percent]," and asked him whether he "want[ed] to see the order in writing? Would that change your mind?" Defendant replied, "That will help." The judge showed defendant the order, and defendant acquiesced.
As an initial matter, we find that defendant's putative waiver of his right to appeal to be invalid inasmuch as the court failed to apprise defendant that his right to appeal was separate and distinct from those trial rights automatically forfeited upon entry of his guilty plea (see People v Oquendo, 105 AD3d 447, 448 [1st Dept 2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 1007 [2013]). Indeed, the court expressly instructed defendant that he retained the right to appeal "constitutional" errors.
Further, the "waiver" included the illegal notice of appeal provision we recently invalidated in People v Santiago (119 AD3d 484 [1st Dept 2014], lv denied 24 NY3d 964 [2014]) because it purports to foreclose appellate review of claims found to be unwaivable owing to their constitutional significance.
Claims alleging deprivation of the right to counsel "go to the very heart of the process" and survive a guilty plea (see People v Griffin, 20 NY3d 626, 630 [2013] [internal quotation marks omitted]).
The right to counsel attaches at arraignment and requires the presence of counsel at each subsequent "critical stage of the proceedings" (Hurrell-Harring v State of New York, 15 NY3d 8, 20 [2010] [internal quotation marks omitted]). The period between arraignment and trial when the case is "factually developed and researched," "plea negotiations conducted, and pretrial motions filed" is "critical." (Id. at 21-22.) As recognized by our own Court of Appeals, "[T]o deprive a person of counsel during the period prior to trial may be more damaging than denial of counsel during the trial itself" {id. at 22 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see also CPL 180.10 [3] [explicitly providing for the right to counsel "at the arraignment and at every subsequent stage of the action," and prohibiting a court from going forward without counsel for the defendant, unless the defendant has knowingly agreed to counsel's absence]).
The pretrial proceedings concerning the DNA test were "critical" within the meaning of the law. The DNA test fundamentally changed the outcome of the case, undermining defendant's plea bargaining posture and his chances for acquittal.
The order was based on the putative consent of former counsel Mr. Parris. However, defendant's protests put the court on notice that defendant had never communicated with his former attorney about the issue, nor did he wish to consent to the test. Defendant was unrepresented not only in the sense that he had been denied an attorney for the proceeding, but insofar as his former attorney evidently had never discussed the matter with him. Had the court appointed new counsel, he or she could have withdrawn consent and sought preclusion on the ground that the prosecutor had failed to show good cause for the late discovery under CPL 240.90 (1).
The People's argument that defendant's "concerns" are more properly expressed via a CPL 440.10 motion for ineffective assistance is unpersuasive. Claims that attorneys "waived important rights without authorization from their clients . . . [are] reasonably understood to allege nonrepresentation rather than ineffective representation" (Hurrell-Harring v State, 15 NY3d at 22).
The court rejected defendant's repeated pleas for a lawyer, pressured him into submitting to the DNA test, and incorrectly advised him that he had no argument against the prosecutor's untimely discovery. The denial of defendant's repeated entreaties to consult with a lawyer during this critical stage of the proceedings violated his Sixth Amendment rights. The deprivation of his Sixth Amendment rights is of constitutional dimension and is not subject to a harmless error analysis (see People v Hilliard, 73 NY2d 584, 587 [1989]). The appropriate remedy under the circumstances is to vacate both pleas, and to dismiss the indictment (see Hilliard, 73 NY2d at 587 [reversing conviction and dismissing indictment where counsel was precluded by the court from visiting his client for 30 days]; People v Chappelle, 121 AD3d 1166, 1168 [3d Dept 2014], lv denied 24 NY3d 1118 [2015] [pretrial deprivation to right to counsel required vacatur of plea and dismissal of the indictment]).
Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court, Bronx County (Steven L. Barrett, J., at pretrial proceedings; John W. Carter, J., at plea and sentencing), rendered September 28, 2012, convicting defendant of manslaughter in the first degree and burglary in the first degree, and sentencing him to concurrent terms of 18 years, should be reversed, on the law, the pleas vacated, and the indictment dismissed without prejudice to the People to represent any appropriate charges to another grand jury.