Case Name: ITT FINANCIAL SERVICES v. GIBSON et al.
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1988-09-06
Citations: 188 Ga. App. 188
Docket Number: 76440
Parties: ITT FINANCIAL SERVICES v. GIBSON et al.
Judges: Deen, P. J., McMurray, P. J., Banke, P. J., Sognier, Pope and Benham, JJ., concur. Carley and Beasley, JJ., dissent.
Reporter: Georgia Appeals Reports
Volume: 188
Pages: 188–191

Head Matter:
76440.
ITT FINANCIAL SERVICES v. GIBSON et al.
(372 SE2d 468)

Opinion:
Birdsong, Chief Judge.
ITT Financial Services, appellant, filed a petition for a writ of possession in the Dougherty County State Court, seeking possession of a boat, motor and trailer in which it alleged it had a "security interest." Appellee filed a motion to dismiss on the basis that the petition failed to state a claim. Following a hearing, the trial court entered judgment for appellees, finding that Jerry L. Gibson had borrowed $5,472 from ITT on September 19, 1986, executing a promissory note in that amount to ITT. Thereafter, ITT filed a "financing statement" with the Dougherty County Clerk of Court, on October 22, 1986, in which the collateral was described as: "1985 Bass Hawk Boat; One Hustler boat trailer; One 150 h.p. Mercury boat motor." The trial court also entered a finding of fact that Gibson sold a "1985 Bass Hawk Boat, No. BHF11463F585, one Hustler Trailer No. 1 HUS771JN85004037 and one Mercury Motor, 150 h.p. No. OA166892XR2" to the defendant Kenneth R. Lessard. Gibson defaulted on his loan to ITT and they initiated this petition to obtain possession of the boat, motor, and trailer from Lessard. The trial court found that "plaintiff's financing statement of October 22, 1986, is insufficient under OCGA § 11-9-110 and is thus fatally defective in its effort to describe the boat, motor and trailer," and denied ITT's petition for a writ of possession. This appeal followed. Held:
ITT enumerates as error the judgment of the trial court holding the description in its financing statement did not reasonably identify the collateral. Appellee argues, on appeal, that ITT failed to prove an enforceable security agreement and the financing statement relied upon by ITT did not contain an adequate description of the boat.
Appellee contends that he filed his motion to dismiss under the authority of OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (6) (failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted), and because ITT introduced evidence outside the pleadings, i.e., affidavits, the motion was converted to one for summary judgment. Appellee is correct as to his law (see OCGA § 9-11-12 (c); Jaynes v. Douglas, 147 Ga. App. 678 (250 SE2d 14)), but incorrect as to his facts. The trial court never ruled on the motion to dismiss. The trial court's judgment addressed only the appellant's petition for a writ of possession, and that is the only judgment on appeal.
Although ITT's enumerated error regarding sufficiency of the description of the collateral in the "financing statement" may have merit (see OCGA § 11-9-110, Thomas Ford Tractor v. North Ga. P.C.A., 153 Ga. App. 820, 822 (266 SE2d 571)), we do not reach that issue. The promissory note signed by Gibson contained a "Security Agreement" which states: "To secure payment and performance of the note and all renewals and extensions . I grant a security interest to the Secured Party in all the following property (the 'Collateral'): . . . See Collateral List and Valuation dated 9-19-86." The record does not contain a "Collateral List and Valuation" document.
Our Code provides that "a security interest is not enforceable against the debtor or third parties with respect to the collateral and does not attach unless: (a) The collateral is in the possession of the secured party pursuant to agreement, or the debtor has signed a security agreement which contains a description of the collateral. . . (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 11-9-203 (1) (a); Grier v. Skinner's Furn. Store, 180 Ga. App. 607 (1) (349 SE2d 826). The "collateral" was not in possession of the secured party and there is no evidence of record before us, and presumably the trial court, as nothing was omitted from the record on appeal, to establish a security interest in the security agreement in accordance with the statutory requirement.
" 'The general rule is that "(a) financing statement does not create or impose any personal obligation. A financing statement merely gives notice of the existence of a security interest but in itself does not create a security interest, for which a security agreement is required. . A financing statement cannot serve as a security agreement because it does not grant the creditor a security interest in the collateral and does not identify the obligation owed to the creditor." ' " Amoco Oil Co. v. G. Sims & Assoc., 162 Ga. App. 307, 310 (291 SE2d 128); accord Trust Co. of Columbus v. Associated Grocers Co-Op, 152 Ga. App. 701 (2) (263 SE2d 676); 1 Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code 469, § 9-402.4 (2d ed. 1971).
A security agreement is required to create a security interest (OCGA § 11-9-105 (1)), and it is not perfected until it meets the requirements of the Uniform Commercial Code (OCGA § 11-9-201), which includes the necessity of a signed "security agreement which contains a description of the collateral." OCGA § 11-9-203 (1) (a); First Nat. Bank &c. Co. v. McElmurray, 120 Ga. App. 134, 140 (169 SE2d 720); Grier, supra. The "security agreement" in the instant appeal does not contain a "description of the collateral" which was not in the possession of the secured party, and the "financing statement" cannot create a "security interest." Accordingly, appellant did not have a perfected security interest in the so-called collateral, as required by our Code. McElmurray, supra at 140. Any attempt to enforce a non-existent "security interest" against a third party is impermissible. Thus, the trial court was correct in denying appellant's petition for a writ of possession, albeit for a different reason. However, a judgment right for any reason will be affirmed. Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Walker, 251 Ga. 536, 539 (307 SE2d 914). Knight v. Stevens Logging, 173 Ga. App. 359 (326 SE2d 494). " 'A correct deci sion of a trial court will not be reversed, regardless of the reasons given therefor.' " Tony v. Pollard, 248 Ga. 86, 88 (281 SE2d 557); accord Adams v. Emory Univ. Clinic, 179 Ga. App. 620, 621 (347 SE2d 670); Highsmith v. Knox, 164 Ga. App. 736 (298 SE2d 41).
Judgment affirmed.
Deen, P. J., McMurray, P. J., Banke, P. J., Sognier, Pope and Benham, JJ., concur. Carley and Beasley, JJ., dissent.