Case Name: ONE (1) 1979 FORD 15V, VIN # E14HBEE7506; Six thousand sixty-one dollars and 11/100 ($6,061.11) in checking account number 305-0155-1, Peoples Bank of the Delta, Indianola, Mississippi, or its current balance, whichever is more; And one thousand two hundred eleven dollars and 40/100 ($1,211.40) in savings account number 9-200-32, Peoples Bank of the Delta, Indianola, Mississippi, or its current balance, whichever is more v. STATE of Mississippi, ex rel., MISSISSIPPI BUREAU OF NARCOTICS
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1998-08-27
Citations: 721 So. 2d 631
Docket Number: No. 94-CA-00521-SCT
Parties: ONE (1) 1979 FORD 15V, VIN # E14HBEE7506; Six thousand sixty-one dollars and 11/100 ($6,061.11) in checking account number 305-0155-1, Peoples Bank of the Delta, Indianola, Mississippi, or its current balance, whichever is more; And one thousand two hundred eleven dollars and 40/100 ($1,211.40) in savings account number 9-200-32, Peoples Bank of the Delta, Indianola, Mississippi, or its current balance, whichever is more v. STATE of Mississippi, ex rel., MISSISSIPPI BUREAU OF NARCOTICS.
Judges: PRATHER, C.J., and SULLIVAN and PITTMAN, P.JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 721
Pages: 631–642

Head Matter:
ONE (1) 1979 FORD 15V, VIN # E14HBEE7506; Six thousand sixty-one dollars and 11/100 ($6,061.11) in checking account number 305-0155-1, Peoples Bank of the Delta, Indianola, Mississippi, or its current balance, whichever is more; And one thousand two hundred eleven dollars and 40/100 ($1,211.40) in savings account number 9-200-32, Peoples Bank of the Delta, Indianola, Mississippi, or its current balance, whichever is more v. STATE of Mississippi, ex rel., MISSISSIPPI BUREAU OF NARCOTICS.
No. 94-CA-00521-SCT.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Aug. 27, 1998.
Azki Shah, Earnest Conrod, Jr., Clarks-dale, for Appellants.
Office of the Attorney General by Lisa Lynn Blount, for Appellee.

Opinion:
WALLER, Justice,
for the Court:
SUMMARY
¶ 1. The Mississippi Bureau of Narcotics filed a Petition for Forfeiture pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 41-29-177 (1972, as amended), in the Circuit Court of Leflore County seeking the forfeiture of narrow items of property, of which a 1979 Ford van and two bank accounts are at issue in this appeal. The petition alleged that the vehicle had been used to facilitate drug trafficking and that the money was traceable to drug activity.
¶2. Earnest Conrod ("Conrod"), the Appellant in this action, moved the trial court to have the forfeiture action dismissed on the grounds that it violated the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and had not been timely tried. The trial court denied the Motion to Dismiss. Conrod appealed to this Court assigning the following issues.
I. DID THE FORFEITURE OF CON-ROD'S PROPERTY VIOLATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS?
A. Is the forfeiture at issue excessive in that it violates the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment?
B. Does this forfeiture violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment?
II. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR BY QUESTIONING THE WITNESS?
III. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR BY ALLOWING THE STATE TO RECALL AGENT ANDERSON AS A REBUTTAL WITNESS WHEN THE RULE HAD BEEN INVOKED?
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
¶ 8. On February 7, 1990, narcotics agents negotiated a drug deal with Earnest Conrod. On the night of the negotiation, Conrod was driving a 1979 Ford van. The day of the purchase, which was the next day, Conrod arrived in a Corvette accompanied by others in a Maxima. Conrod was arrested at this time and approximately $90,000 was seized. Conrod eventually pled guilty in Federal Court to conspiracy to sell.
¶4. The Mississippi Bureau of Narcotics ("Bureau") filed its Petition for Forfeiture. At the hearing on this petition, Agent Anderson, who was involved in the investigation of Conrod, testified that Conrod owned a vast amount of property and jointly held several bank accounts with other individuals at the time of his arrest. Agent Anderson testified that the payments on the real estate were made in cash money. She also testified that Conrod had been loaned money from the bank to purchase some properties.
¶ 5. Agent Anderson's investigation also revealed that Conrod ostensibly derived his income from a small grocery store he owned in Sunflower, Mississippi; She testified that the money confiscated from Conrod at the time of his arrest, the money he had in the bank accounts either jointly or individually, and the payments on his notes did not match up with his income. Anderson testified that Conrod stated on the night of his arrest that the grocery store was not doing all that great. Conrod claimed that he borrowed the money he had in his possession on the night of his arrest from friends. Anderson did not point to any drug sale that would have accounted for the money in Conrod's possession.
DISCUSSION OF THE LAW
I. DID THE FORFEITURE OF CON-ROD'S PROPERTY VIOLATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS?
A. Is the forfeiture at issue excessive in that it violates the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment?
¶ 6. Conrod argues that the forfeiture of his property, a 1979 Ford van and two bank accounts, violates the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment and cites Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 113 S.Ct. 2801, 125 L.Ed.2d 488 (1993) in support of his position. In Austin, the defendant, upon his guilty plea, was sentenced to prison for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. Subsequently, the United States filed an in rem action in Federal District Court against his mobile home and auto body shop under the federal statutes which provide for the forfeiture of vehicles and real property used or intended to be used to facilitate the commission of certain drug-related crimes. Id. at 604-05, 113 S.Ct. 2801. The United States Supreme Court held that forfeiture under the federal statutes was monetary punishment and thus subject to the Excessive Fines Clause. The Supreme Court ruled that these sections were punitive in nature, even though they may also serve remedial purposes, because Congress provided for an "innocent-owner defense" within the statutes in addition to requiring that forfeiture be directly tied to the commission of drug offenses. Id. at 619-20, 113 S.Ct. 2801. The Supreme Court concluded that forfeiture under these federal statutes constituted payment for punishment for some offense and was, therefore, subject to the limitations of the Excessive Fines Clause. Id. at 622, 113 S.Ct. 2801. The Supreme Court stopped short of indicating exactly what was excessive and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for such a determination. Id.
¶ 7. The United States Supreme Court has not yet prescribed a test for determining whether a forfeiture is an excessive fine. The State argues that the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment does not apply to the states. Pervear v. Commonwealth, 72 U.S. 475, 18 L.Ed. 608 (1866); Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 78 S.Ct. 1302, 2 L.Ed.2d 1393 (1958). The Mississippi Constitution has its own excessive fines clause, which is identical to the Excessive Fines Clause of the United States Constitution. Miss. Const, art. 3 § 28 (1890). This Court can look to the United States Supreme Court for guidance or we can develop our own application under Miss. Const, art 3 § 28. Other courts have primarily employed two tests when determining whether a forfeiture is excessive.
¶ 8. The Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Chandler, 36 F.3d 358 (4th Cir.1994), has adopted the "instrumentality test," which requires an analysis of the following three factors, when determining whether forfeiture is excessive:
(1) the nexus between the offense and the property and the extent of the property's role in the offense,
(2) the role and culpability of the owner, and
(3) the possibility of separating the offending property from the remainder.
Id. at 365. This test focuses on how closely the property is tied to the crime and whether the property was instrumental to the crime committed. If the above three requirements are met, the forfeiture is considered constitutional. Since the Supreme Court's Austin decision, a number of other courts of appeal have applied the Excessive Fines Clause in the forfeiture context. Only the Chandler court has adopted Justice Sealia's "instrumentality" approach as the sole inquiry.
¶ 9. At the other end of the spectrum, one circuit has concluded that "the appropriate inquiry with respect to the Excessive Fines Clause is, and is only, a proportionality test" that compares the value of the property forfeited with the severity of the crime committed. United States v. One Parcel Property Located at 427 & 429 Hall Street, 74 F.3d 1165, 1170 (11th Cir.1996) (rejecting Chandler court's analysis and instrumentality test). Several courts of appeal, meanwhile, have adopted tests that combine instrumentality and proportionality inquiries. See United States v. Premises Known as 6040 Wentworth Avenue South, 123 F.3d 685, 688-89 (8th Cir.1997) (applying "gross dis-proportionality" analysis including both proportionality and instrumentality factors); United States v. One Parcel Property, 106 F.3d 336, 338 (10th Cir.1997) (applying instrumentality test first, then proportionality test); United States v. Real Property Located in El Dorado County at 6380 Little Canyon Road, 59 F.3d 974, 983 (9th Cir.1995) (adopting "proportionality test as a cheek on the instrumentality approach"); United States v. Milbrand, 58 F.3d 841, 847 (2d Cir.1995) (applying multi-factor analysis including both proportionality and instrumentality factors), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1182, 116 S.Ct. 1284, 134 L.Ed.2d 228(1996); United States v. Premises Known as RR #1, Box 221, Dalton, 14 F.3d 864, 876 (3d Cir.1994) (remanding with instructions to apply instrumentality test first, then examine proportionality). The Sixth Circuit has addressed the question but declined to adopt an approach, see United States v. Certain Real Property Located at 11869 Westshore Drive, 70 F.3d 923, 930 (6th Cir.1995), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 57, 136 L.Ed.2d 20(1996), while the First, Fifth, and District of Columbia Circuits apparently have yet to consider the issue.
¶ 10. As a court, we can not view forfeiture cases in a vacuum. The test employed must be one that permits forfeiture of property from those persons who utilize said property in furtherance of their own criminal activity. Yet, the test must also be flexible so as not to permit forfeiture where innocent persons will suffer or where the value of the property is grossly disproportionate to the crime.
¶ 11. Given that the weight of authority among the courts of appeal strongly favors the use of both instrumentality and proportionality review in this context, we decline to employ solely the instrumentality test. One can easily imagine cases in which the freestanding instrumentality approach could lead to results that are "excessive fines" under the circumstances.
¶ 12. A proportionality analysis is especially appropriate in the civil forfeiture context because it is the sovereign that profits from such forfeitures. See United States v. 6380 Little Canyon Road, 59 F.3d at 983 (adopting "proportionality test as a check on the instrumentality approach"). Justice Sca-lia recognized this when he stated:
There is good reason to be concerned that fines, uniquely of all punishments, will be imposed in a measure out of accord with the penal goals of retribution and deterrence. Imprisonment, corporal punishment and even capital punishment cost a State money; [whereas] fines are a source of revenue . [I]t makes sense to scrutinize governmental action more closely when the State stands to benefit.
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 978 n. 9, 111 S.Ct. 2680 n. 9, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion). All property, such as that which is at issue here, that is forfeited to Mississippi law enforcement agencies is either liquidated, in which case the arresting agency is entitled to a portion of the proceeds, or kept by the arresting law enforcement agency for its own use and benefit. Miss.Code Ann. 41-29-181 (Supp.1997). This incentive enhances the need for close scrutiny of in rem forfeitures. For this reason, the judiciary should be alert to detect constitutionally proscribed injustices imposed on individual wrongdoers. 6880 Little Canyon Road, 59 F.3d at 984-85.
¶ 13: This Court recognizes the factually intensive nature of forfeiture eases and we elect to apply a test that combines the three prongs of the "instrumentality" test with a "proportionality" review. The elements of the test that we elect to employ are as follows:
(1) The nexus between the offense and the property and the extent of the property's role in the offense;
(2) The role and culpability of the owner;
(3) The' possibility of separating the offending property from the remainder; and
(4) Whether, after a review of all relevant facts, the forfeiture divests the owner of property which has a value that is grossly disproportionate to the crime or grossly disproportionate to the culpability of the owner.
¶ 14. The above test combines the elements of the instrumentality test with a weighing of proportionality on the individual circumstances of each case to determine whether the forfeiture is excessive. It avoids the harsh and unjust results that can be, and will be, produced by the implementation of a "bright-line" instrumentality test. At the same time, it allows the lower courts, and this Court on review, to consider all relevant factors under a framework that is simple, yet complete.
V15. As outlined in this opinion, the vast majority of federal courts have also elected to temper the instrumentality with a proportionality review. In fact, the Fourth Circuit appears to be the only circuit that strictly follows solely an instrumentality test. United States v. Chandler, 36 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 1994).
¶ 16. The analysis under the proportionality test that we employ here is two-part. First, under the "instrumentality" (or "nexus") test, the forfeited property must have a sufficiently close relationship to the illegal activity. Second, under the "proportionality" test, forfeiture of the property must not impose upon the owner a penalty grossly disproportionate to his offense.
¶ 17. With these enunciated principles in mind, we proceed to determine whether the forfeiture of the 1979 Ford van and the two bank accounts are proper under the test we have set forth above.
1979 Ford van
¶ 18. Conrod pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine and the commission of a drug crime with a firearm which are felonies set forth in 21 U.S.C. § 841 and 846. This crime carries a maximum of fifteen years and possibly a $25,000 fine. Conrod drove the van to the site where the terms and details of the drug buy were negotiated. On the night of the actual drug deal, Conrod was driving a Corvette while others with him drove a Maxima. As he is the sole owner of the van, there are no innocent third parties that could be affected.
¶ 19. For forfeiture to be permissible, there must be sufficient nexus between the offense and the property and the extent of the property's role in the offense. The crime at issue here is not an isolated case of mere possession of a small quantity of illegal drugs. Conrod pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute a large amount of cocaine. In furtherance of this conspiracy, Conrod used the van to facilitate the eventual drug deal, which gives the van a role in the conspiracy. In addition, the van provided a cover for Conrod, as a different vehicle was employed to consummate the sale. The nexus between the property, the van, and the offense, conspiracy to distribute, was sufficiently established and the lower court was not clearly erroneous in its finding that the van should be forfeited.
¶ 20. We now proceed to determine whether the forfeiture of the van was excessive in light of the Eighth Amendment. Our inquiry brings us to the fourth prong of the test that we have set forth above. Specifically, we must determine whether, after a review of all relevant facts, the forfeiture divests the owner of property which has a value that is grossly disproportionate to the crime or grossly disproportionate to the culpability of the owner.
¶ 21. After careful review of the record, we hold that the forfeiture of the van was not grossly disproportionate to the crimes committed or grossly disproportionate to the culpability of Conrod. As noted above, Conrod was engaged in a conspiracy to distribute a large amount of cocaine. When arrested, Conrod had over $90,000 in his possession. In light of the severity of the crime and the amount of drugs and money involved, we can not say that the lower court erred in ordering forfeiture of the 1979 Ford van. The forfeiture of the van is affirmed.
The two bank accounts
¶22. Conrod argues that there was insufficient evidence to support a judgment of forfeiture of the two bank accounts. The burden of proof the State must meet in forfeiture proceedings is a preponderance of the evidence. Miss.Code Ann. § 41-29-179(2) (1993). The State used the testimony of Agent Anderson to tie together the van and the bank accounts with illegal drug transactions. Anderson testified that Con-rod told her that his grocery store was not doing well. As to the bank accounts, Anderson testified that she could not point to any drug sale or transaction that contributed proceeds to either the $6,912 or the $6,061.90 account. Conrod's accountant testified that he prepared Conrod's income tax returns in 1988, 1989, and 1990. The testimony indicated that Conrod had excessive amounts of cash in excess of what would normally be expected from the operation of a store or working at a factory.
¶ 23. This Court has held that when a judge sits without a jury, it will not overturn a finding unless the judge was clearly erroneous or applied incorrect legal standards. McClendon v. State, 539 So.2d 1375, 1377 (Miss.1989). In Mullins v. Ratcliff, 515 So.2d 1183, 1189 (Miss.1987), this Court held that it will not reverse a trial court's finding of fact unless it is manifestly wrong. It is not necessary for the government to trace property to a particular drug transaction for property to be forfeited; rather, it is a totality of the circumstances, not a minute accounting of each item of information, that leads to meeting the burden of proof. United States v. 127 Shares of Stock in Paradigm, Mfg., Inc., 758 F.Supp. 581 (E.D.Cal.1990).
¶ 24. We find that the trial judge was clearly erroneous in determining that the bank accounts could be forfeited. The State's witness could not tie the monies in the bank accounts with any criminal conduct on behalf of Conrod. Thus, there is no nexus between the bank and the crime committed by Conrod. As to the two bank accounts, we hold that there was insufficient evidence to hold that the relationship of the property was close enough to render the property guilty and thus forfeitable. We reverse and render as to the forfeiture of the two bank accounts.
B. Does this forfeiture violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment?
¶25. Conrod asserts that the beginning of forfeiture proceedings after he had entered a plea of guilty violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Conrod did not raise this issue in the lower court. It is established that this Court will not review matters on appeal that were not considered by the lower court. Ditto v. Hinds County, 665 So.2d 878, 880 (Miss. 1995). This issue is proeedurally barred.
II. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR BY QUESTIONING THE WITNESS?
¶ 26. During the forfeiture hearing, the judge directly asked several questions of the witnessess, including the defendant. Conrod argues this was error because it amounted to the court literally prosecuting the case on behalf of the State.
¶ 27. Rule 614(b) of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence specifically provides that the "court may interrogate witnesses, whether called by itself or by a party." "A trial judge has the responsibility, within judicial discretion, of confining the testimony during trial to the issues before it." Hannah v. State, 336 So.2d 1317, 1321 (Miss.1976). The questions asked by the lower court in this case all had to do with the issues brought out during that particular witness's testimony. The lower court appropriately confined its questions. The State also noted that the main concern in those cases cited by Conrod addressing this issue is the possible influence of a jury by the questions and comments of the judge. The ease at bar was a bench trial. Furthermore, the record reveals that counsel for Conrod was allowed to question each witness following questioning by the court. The lower court is affirmed on this issue.
III. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR BY ALLOWING THE STATE TO RECALL AGENT ANDERSON AS A REBUTTAL WITNESS WHEN THE RULE HAD BEEN INVOKED?
¶ 28. The State called Agent Anderson in rebuttal to which Conrod objected based on the fact that the Court ordered witnesses excluded from the courtroom at the request of counsel for the State, pursuant to M.R.E. 615, a practice known in Mississippi trial procedure as invoking "the Rule". Agent Anderson testified first and apparently remained in the courtroom throughout the trial. The lower court allowed the examination. Conrod asserts that this was error.
¶ 29. M.R.E. 615 provides that the court, at the request of either party or on its own motion, shall order witnesses excluded from the courtroom so that they can not hear the testimony of other witnesses. M.R.E. 615. However, the rule authorizes the State to have a designated representative present for the trial. Id. It does not appear Agent Anderson was so designated in the record.
¶ 30. Whether a witness may testify after being present in the courtroom for the testimony of previous witnesses is within the discretion of the trial judge. Davis v. State, 472 So.2d 428, 434 (Miss.1985). A review of the record reveals that the State asked only two questions of Agent Anderson on rebuttal. Further review of the record reveals that neither question concerned the subject matter of the forfeiture proceedings. Additionally, Conrod was afforded an opportunity to, and did, conduct a rebuttal cross examination on Agent Anderson. Under these facts, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in allowing Anderson to testify in rebuttal. This assignment of error is without merit.
CONCLUSION
¶ 31. Because there was insufficient evidence to establish a nexus between the bank accounts and the crimes committed by Con-rod, we can not hold that the two bank accounts are "proceeds" of illegal activity. Therefore, the two bank accounts were not properly ordered forfeited and we reverse and render as to this issue.
¶ 32. The 1979 Ford van was used to facilitate the furtherance of the conspiracy, and taking into account the severity of the crime and the amount of drugs and money involved, its forfeiture was not grossly disproportionate to the crimes committed. The lower court correctly ordered forfeiture of the van and we affirm. The remaining assignments of error asserted by Conrod are without merit.
¶ 33. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND RENDERED IN PART.
PRATHER, C.J., and SULLIVAN and PITTMAN, P.JJ., concur.
McRAE, J., dissents with separate written opinion.
BANKS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with separate written opinion.
SMITH, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with separate written opinion joined by JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr. and MILLS, JJ.
. The action originally involved certificates of deposit, bank accounts, two vehicles, and other defendants with various ownership interests.
. The sole instrumentality test advocated by Justice Scalia in his concurring opinion in Austin was not joined by any of the other justices.