Case Name: In re RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 3.851 (COLLATERAL RELIEF AFTER DEATH SENTENCE HAS BEEN IMPOSED) and Rule 3.850 (Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence)
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1993-10-21
Citations: 626 So. 2d 198
Docket Number: No. 82322
Parties: In re RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 3.851 (COLLATERAL RELIEF AFTER DEATH SENTENCE HAS BEEN IMPOSED) and Rule 3.850 (Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence).
Judges: McDonald, GRIMES and HARDING, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 626
Pages: 198–202

Head Matter:
In re RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 3.851 (COLLATERAL RELIEF AFTER DEATH SENTENCE HAS BEEN IMPOSED) and Rule 3.850 (Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence).
No. 82322.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Oct. 21, 1993.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
To assure that death penalty proceedings proceed in a more orderly manner, this Court, on its own motion, adopts a new Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851 and modifies Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. New rule 3.851 deletes prior rule 3.851 and the modification of rule 3.850 makes rule 3.850 consistent with new rule 3.851. These rule changes are consistent with the recommendations of the Supreme Court Committee on Postconviction Relief in Capital Cases.
New rule 3.851 reads as follows:
RULE 3.851 COLLATERAL RELIEF AFTER DEATH SENTENCE HAS BEEN IMPOSED
(a) Scope. This rule shall apply to all motions and petitions for any type of post-conviction or collateral relief brought by prisoners in state custody who have been sentenced to death.
(b) Time Limitation.
(1) Any rule 3.850 motion to vacate judgment of conviction and sentence of death shall be filed by the prisoner within one year after the judgment and sentence become final. For the purposes of this rule, a judgment is final: (a) upon the expiration of the time permitted to file a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court seeking review of the decision of the Supreme Court of Florida affirming a judgment and sentence of death (90 days after the opinion becomes final), or (b) upon the disposition of the petition for writ of certiorari by the United States Supreme Court, if filed.
(2) All petitions for extraordinary relief in which the Supreme Court of Florida has original jurisdiction, including petitions for writ of habeas corpus, shall be filed simultaneously with the initial brief filed on behalf of the death-sentenced prisoner in the appeal of the circuit court's order on the rule 3.850 motion.
(3) The time limitation in subdivision (b)(1) is established with the understanding that each death-penalty prisoner will have counsel assigned and available to begin addressing the prisoner's postconviction issues within 30 days after the judgment and sentence become final. Should the governor sign a death warrant before the expiration of the time limitation in subdivision (b)(1), this Court will, upon a defendant's request, grant a stay of execution to allow any postconviction relief motions to proceed in a timely and orderly manner. Further, this time limitation shall not preclude the right to amend or to supplement pending pleadings pursuant to these rules.
(4) An extension of time may be granted by the Supreme Court of Florida for the filing of postconviction pleadings if the prisoner's counsel makes a showing of good cause for counsel's inability to file the postconviction pleadings within the one-year period established by this section.
(5) The provisions of rule 3.850, to the extent they are not inconsistent with this rule, remain applicable to postconvietion or collateral relief.
(6) The Court will review the operation and effectiveness of this rule on or before July 1, 1995. This rule will govern the eases of all death-sentenced individuals whose convictions and sentences become final after January 1, 1994.
Commentary
This rule is consistent with the recommendation of the Supreme Court Committee on Postconviction Relief in Capital Cases, which was created because of the substantial delays in the death penalty postconviction relief process. The committee was created because of the inability of the Capital Collateral Representative to properly represent all death penalty inmates in postconviction relief cases and because of the resulting substantial delays in those eases. That committee recognized that, to make the process work properly, each death row prisoner should have counsel available to represent him or her in postconviction relief proceedings. The committee found that one of the major problems with the process was that the triggering mechanism to start or assure movement of the postconviction relief proceedings was the signing of a death warrant. In a number of instances, the courts were not aware of problems concerning representation of a defendant until a death warrant was signed. In other instances, the committee found that, when postcon-viction relief motions had been filed, they clearly had not moved at an orderly pace and the signing of a death warrant was being used as a means to expedite the process. The committee recommended that specific named counsel should be designated to represent each prisoner not later than 30 days after the defendant's judgment and sentence of death becomes final. To assure that representation, the committee's report noted that it was essential that there be adequate funding of the capital collateral representative and sought temporary assistance from The Florida Bar in providing pro bono representation for some inmates.
There is a justification for the reduction of the time period for a capital prisoner as distinguished from a noncapital prisoner, who has two years to file a postconviction relief proceeding. A capital prisoner will have counsel immediately available to represent him or her in a postconviction relief proceeding, while counsel is not provided or constitutionally required for noncapital defendants to whom the two-year period applies.
In the event the capital collateral representative is not fully funded and available to provide proper representation for all death penalty defendants, the reduction in the time period would not be justified and would necessarily have to be repealed, and this Court will forthwith entertain a petition for the repeal of the rule. In this context, it is important to emphasize that the governor agrees that absent the circumstance where a competent death-sentenced individual voluntarily requests that a death warrant be signed, no death warrants will be issued during the initial round of federal and state review, provided that counsel for death penalty defendants is proceeding in a timely and diligent manner. This Court agrees that the initial round of postconviction proceedings should proceed in a deliberate but timely manner without the pressure of a pending death warrant.
Subdivision 3.851(b)(4) above addresses concerns of The Florida Bar and The Florida Bar Foundation.
The provisions of the present rule 3.851 providing for time periods where a 60-day warrant is signed by the governor, are abolished because they are unnecessary if the guidelines are followed. The proceedings and grounds for postconvietion relief remain as provided under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, which include, as one of the grounds, the opportunity for a defendant to present newly discovered evidence in accordance with Scott v. Dugger, 604 So.2d 465 (Fla.1992), Jones v. State, 591 So.2d 911 (Fla.1991), and Richardson v. State, 546 So.2d 1037 (Fla.1989).
Rule 3.850(b) is hereby modified as follows (the underlined portion of the rule is new; the struck-through portion is deleted):
(b) Time Limitations. A motion to vacate a sentence that exceeds the limits provided by law may be filed at any time. No other motion shall be filed or considered pursuant to this rule if filed more than 2 years after the judgment and sentence become final in a noncapital case or more than 1 year after the judgment and sentence become final in a capital case in which a death sentence has been imposed unless it alleges that
(1) the facts on which the claim is predicated were unknown to the movant or the movant's attorney and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence, or
(2) the fundamental constitutional right asserted was not established within the period provided for herein and has been held to apply retroactively.
Any person whose judgment and-sentence became final prior to January 1, 1985, shall have until January--lt-l-987f-to file-ar-motion-in-accordance-with-this-rule-
Commentary
This amendment is necessary to make this rule consistent with rule 3.851.
These rules shall take effect at 12:01 a.m. on January 1, 1994. Any interested party has until November 15, 1993, to file comments with this Court regarding suggested amendments or changes to the rule.
It is so ordered.
McDonald, GRIMES and HARDING, JJ., concur.
OVERTON, J., concurs with an opinion.
BARKETT, C.J., dissents with an opinion, in which KOGAN, J., concurs.
KOGAN, J., dissents with an opinion.
SHAW, J., dissents.