Case Name: STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. WALTER PRESS, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
Court: New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1995-01-26
Citations: 278 N.J. Super. 589
Docket Number: 
Parties: STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. WALTER PRESS, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Superior Court Reports
Volume: 278
Pages: 589–607

Head Matter:
651 A.2d 1068
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. WALTER PRESS, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division
Argued September 27, 1994
Decided January 26, 1995.
Before Judges STERN, KEEFE and HUMPHREYS.
Daniel V. Gautieri, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Susan L. Reisner, Public Defender, attorney; Mr. Gautieri, of counsel and on the brief and reply letter brief).
Robin Parker, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Deborah T. Poritz, Attorney General, attorney; Ms. Parker, of counsel and on the letter brief).

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HUMPHREYS, J.S.C.
(Temporarily Assigned).
The defendant sold cocaine to an undercover police officer within 1,000 feet of the P.J. Hill Elementary School in Trenton. The Legislature has prescribed a mandatory minimum penalty for this crime of three years imprisonment during which the defendant will be ineligible for parole. N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7. The Legislature has also authorized the prosecutor to waive the mandatory minimum prison term in whole or in part. See N.J.S.A 2C:35-12.
In this case, the prosecutor entered into a plea agreement with the defendant in which the prosecutor agreed to a reduction of the three year minimum prison term to one year. The prosecutor also agreed to dismiss other charges. The defendant pled guilty and was sentenced to one year in prison pursuant to the plea agreement.
The defendant appeals his sentence contending that he was unfairly and illegally sentenced. He argues that if he had committed the crime in certain other counties, the prosecutors there would have agreed to a lesser sentence, namely 364 days in the county jail as a condition of probation. The defendant reasons that therefore, notwithstanding his voluntarily entered plea agreement, he too must receive the lesser county jail sentence. We disagree.
I
The Comprehensive Drug Reform Act of 1986 ("Act"), N.J.S.A 2C:35-1 et seq., provides for a mandatory minimum custodial sentence between one-third and one-half of the sentence imposed but no less than three years for a person selling certain drugs within 1,000 feet of a school. N.J.S.A. 20.35-7. This provision reflects "the Legislature's intention to impose heavy penalties on drug offenders . In promulgating the school-zone statute, the Legislature intended to keep school zones drug-free in order that schools can effectively educate children about the dangers of drug use." State v. Dillihay, 127 N.J. 42, 53, 601 A.2d 1149 (1992).
The statute also provides that the prosecutor may enter into a plea agreement with the defendant in which the prosecutor waives the three year minimum in whole or part. N.J.S.A. 2C-.35-12. The constitutionality of the Act was challenged on the ground that the ability to waive gave the prosecutor sentencing power in violation of the separation of powers doctrine. See State v. Shaw, 131 N.J. 1, 618 A.2d 294 (1993); State v. Vasquez, 129 N.J. 189, 195, 609 A.2d 29 (1992); State v. Peters, 129 N.J. 210, 609 A.2d 40 (1992). The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act by requiring that the prosecutor's exercise of a waiver be subject to judicial oversight. Vasquez, swpra, 129 N.J. at 196, 609 A2d 29. The Court stated that the prosecutor should indicate on the record the reasons for the waiver decision. Ibid. The defendant would be entitled to relief if the defendant could show clearly and convincingly that the prosecutor's exercise of discretion was arbitrary and capricious. Ibid.
The Court also interpreted the statute to require that guidelines as described in State v. Lagares, 127 N.J. 20, 32, 601 A.2d 698 (1992), be adopted to assist prosecutorial decision making. The Supreme Court in Lagares had stated that "[bjecause we are not familiar with all of the factors that law enforcement agencies might consider significant in determining whether a defendant should be exempted from an extended sentence, we request that the Attorney General, in consultation with the various county prosecutors, adopt guidelines for use throughout the state. Such guidelines will promote uniformity and provide a means for prosecutors to avoid arbitrary or abusive exercises of discretionary power." Ibid.
The Attorney General thereafter adopted guidelines. See Directive Implementing Guidelines Governing Plear-Bargaining and Discretionary Decisions in Drug Prosecutions Involving Mandatory Terms issued by Attorney General Robert J. Del Tufo to the Director of the Division of Criminal Justice and. All County Prosecutors on September 15, 1992 {"Guidelines").
Under the guidelines, each county prosecutor must adopt and implement written policies governing plea and post-trial agreements and discretionary decisions using the Attorney General's guidelines as a "model." Guidelines at 5-6. School zone violators must be incarcerated. Guidelines at 5. The "minimum" period of incarceration is 364 days in the county jail as a condition of probation. Ibid. Other provisions in the guidelines afford specific and detailed guidance to the prosecutors. See Guidelines at 5-10.
The Attorney General further provides that "nothing contained in these guidelines shall preclude a prosecutor from adopting more stringent policies or standardized plea offers consistent with the needs, resources and enforcement priorities of each county." Guidelines at 5. Our dissenting colleague finds this provision unconstitutional because it "formalizes the potential arbitrariness by permitting deviation from county to county." The dissent argues that this provision should be deleted from the guidelines, and we should hold that "a sentence recommendation premised on local guidelines which deviate from the Attorney General's otherwise uniform guidelines is arbitrary within the meaning of La-gares and Vasquez
The underlying premise of the dissent appears to be that the Supreme Court in requesting guidelines to promote uniformity has required as a matter of constitutional mandate that prosecutorial plea bargaining policies in drug school zone cases be completely uniform throughout the state; otherwise the executive branch would be violating the separation of powers doctrine by encroaching on the authority of the judiciary in sentencing criminals. Hence, the dissent concludes that a "local" guideline which differs from the Attorney General's model to the disadvantage of the defendant is arbitrary and invalid per se.
We disagree. The Supreme Court of New Jersey has not so ruled. In Lagares the Supreme Court requested that the Attorney General adopt guidelines to "promote" uniformity. Lagares, supra, 127 N.J. at 32, 601 A. 2d 698. If the Supreme Court had intended to mandate uniformity, then the Court would have so indicated. Promoting uniformity is not the same as mandating it.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has not attempted to promulgate the content of such guidelines. On the contrary, the Court candidly admitted in Lagares that it was "not familiar with all of the factors that law enforcement agencies might consider significant in determining whether a defendant should be exempted from an extended sentence." Ibid. We can glean no intimation in the quaternity of Supreme Court decisions, Lagares, Vasquez, Peters, and Shaw, that in the formulation of plea policies in school zone cases, the Supreme Court intended that prosecutors throughout the state must march in lock step.
The Attorney General's decision to allow some flexibility depending on local conditions is sensible and practical. Prosecutors are not fungible automatons. The prosecutor in one county may determine that the large number of drug sales near schools in that county requires stringent plea policies to deter such crimes and carry out the legislative intent that school zones should be free of drug sales.
The prosecutor in a second county may decide that drug sales in school zones are not a major problem in that county. The courts in that county may be burdened with the court congestion that plagues some of our vicinages. See Shaw, supra, 131 N.J. at 13, 618 A. 2d 294. The prosecutor in that county may determine to concentrate the limited resources of the criminal justice system on the prosecution of armed robbers, burglars or juvenile offenders. The prosecutor there may decide that a more lenient plea bargaining policy in drug cases is warranted so that law enforcement resources in a time of tight budgets can be concentrated on these other serious crimes.
Nor are counties in New Jersey all homogenous. A prosecutor in a densely populated urban county may have to cope with rapidly escalating crime. In several such urban counties in our state, the bulk of drug sales are within 1,000 feet of a school. In other lightly populated rural counties, few drug sales may be within 1,000 feet of a school. Obviously, the prosecutors in those widely disparate counties are faced with strikingly different conditions and problems.
Under the defendant's argument all prosecutors and counties are poured into the same rigid mold. One size apparently fits all. To the contrary, we find no legislative nor constitutional intent to deny law enforcement the ability to adapt its crime fighting policies to the varying conditions in our state. The judicial oversight mandated by the Supreme Court does not mean that law enforcement must be encased in a judicial straitjacket.
If, as the dissent suggests, we "delete" the portion of the Attorney General's guidelines which permits some local flexibility in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, then we have transformed the guidelines into an imperative binding on all county prosecutors. Consequently, in cases like the present one, the legislatively imposed three year mandatory minimum prison term in school zone cases would by a stroke of the judicial pen be reduced in every county in the state to 364 days in the county jail as a condition of probation. The Legislature has not given the judiciary such transforming and reducing authority, and we discern no constitutional basis for the judiciary to assume it.
Aside from the issue of judicial authority, the judiciary is ill equipped to formulate plea bargaining policies or impose them upon law enforcement. Striving for uniformity and a reduction in disparity are desirable goals. However, these goals should not be used as an excuse for judicial exercise of law enforcement functions. The judiciary has no business in determining what plea policies in school zone cases are necessary and consistent with the needs, resources and law enforcement priorities in a given geographical area. Judicial restraint is especially important in view of the strong legislative and executive policy "to keep school zones drug-free" and thereby protect a new generation from the scourge of drugs. Dillihay, supra, 127 N.J. at 53, 601 A2d 1149. Our judicial oversight should be limited as the Supreme Court has ruled, to instances in which prosecutors have clearly and convincingly acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner.
II
The dissent near the end of its opinion leaves the door slightly ajar. The dissent suggests that the Attorney General could permit some local flexibility if she amended the guidelines "to include factors unique to the county such as backlog, volume and limited prosecutorial resources, as a basis for deviation. For purposes of the Lagares/Vasquez review, however, the Attorney General's uniform guidelines would constitute the base with specif ic reasons necessary to justify a deviation, as opposed to local deviation constituting the norm under individual county guidelines."
We question whether the judiciary should "suggest" to the Attorney General how she should draft plea bargaining guidelines in order to make them possibly constitutional. This issue was not briefed or argued, and therefore we should not address it.
In our view, the Attorney General has complied with the Supreme Court's request for guidelines. The Attorney General has required the prosecutors to prepare and implement written plea policies. The Attorney General in the guidelines has set forth principles, standards, policies and guidance for those plea policies, the prosecutors are to use the guidelines as a "model." Guidelines at 4.
The Attorney General has also permitted a prosecutor some flexibility under certain conditions. If a prosecutor's exercise of that flexibility cannot be justified, then judicial review is available to curb prosecutorial abuse. This individual ease by case approach negates the potential for judicial encroachment on executive authority resulting from the judiciary mandating a uniform state-wide plea bargaining policy in school zone drug cases.
Ill
The constitutional guarantees of equal protection of the laws do not mandate uniformity here. See U.S. Const, amend. XIV; N.J. Const. art. I, para. 1. Equal protection relates to equality between persons rather than between geographic areas. Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545, 551-552, 74 S.Ct. 280, 283, 98 L.Ed. 281, 288 (1954). "Territorial uniformity is not a constitutional requisite." Salsburg, supra, 346 U.S. at 552, 74 S.Ct. at 284, 98 L.Ed. at 288.
Furthermore, the constitutional requirement of equal protection does not require that all persons be treated identically, but "only that differences in treatment be justified by an appropriate state interest." State v. Fernandez, 209 N.J.Super. 37, 48, 506 A.2d 1245 (App.Div.1986). See also Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1978); State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236, 253, 344 A.2d 289 (1975). Thus, distinctions in treatment will be upheld "if there is a rational basis for them." State v. Senno, 79 N.J. 216, 229, 398 A.2d 873 (1979) (excluding criminal defendants from P.T.I. Programs in some counties and not in others is not a denial of equal protection). See also Brown v. City of Newark, 113 N.J. 565, 573, 552 A.2d 125 (1989).
As Justice Pashman stated in State v. Sutton, 80 N.J. 110, 121-122, 402 A.2d 230 (1970):
It is well settled that a prosecutor's conscious exercise of some selectivity in the enforcement of criminal laws does not in itself constitute a federal constitutional violation. Rather, in order for a defendant to prevail on an equal protection challenge, he must demonstrate that the decision to prosecute him and not others was "deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification." Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364, 98 S.Ct. 663 [668], 54 L.Ed.2d 604, 611 (1978); see e.g., Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456, 82 S.Ct. 501 [505], 7 L.Ed.2d 446, 453 (1962); Yick Wo. v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct., 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886).
Here a rational basis clearly exists for "some selectivity in the enforcement of criminal laws." The nature and extent of illegal drug sales and use, the number and type of drug arrests, and the backlogs of criminal cases in the courts all vary from county to county. Similarly the "needs, resources and enforcement priorities of each county," Guideline II, No. 4, are far from identical.
The Attorney General has reasonably determined that county prosecutors in dealing with these varying conditions should have some flexibility in exercising their authority to agree to a reduced sentence in drug school zone cases. No constitutional violation can lie in that logical and sound determination.
IV
At bottom, the criminal justice system rests on the principle of fair treatment for everyone. The simple facts in this case belie any claim of unfair treatment. Defendant sold cocaine in Mercer County within 1,000 feet of an elementary school. The Legislature has provided a mandatory minimum punishment of three years without parole for such an offense unless the prosecutor agrees to less. The Mercer County Prosecutor agreed to less, namely one year in prison. The prosecutor set forth his reasons on the record. Defendant has not shown that the Mercer County Prosecutor's policy is arbitrary or capricious. A reduction from a three year prison term to one year is not abusive or harsh.
Basically, defendant's only complaint is that another prosecutor in another county might have treated him more leniently if he had committed the crime there. As former Chief Justice Weintraub siaid in response to a defendant's similar argument, "[i]f a defendant receives the punishment his offense warrants, he has received his due." State v. De Stasio, 49 N.J. 247, 260, 229 A.2d 636 cert. den., 389 U.S. 830, 88 S.Ct. 96, 19 L.Ed.2d 89 (1967). The defendant here has received much less punishment than his offense warrants under the school zone statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7. He has received his due and has no cause to complain.
A strong argument can be made that this sentence should simply be affirmed. The defendant has had his days in court. He admitted that he committed the crime. He voluntarily entered into a plea agreement. He was sentenced in accordance with the plea agreement and the Criminal Code of Justice. The assistant prosecutor placed on the record his reasons for the plea agreement. The court after hearing argument found that the prosecutor's office did not act arbitrarily or capriciously.
However, the assistant prosecutor did not state on the record why the Mercer County Prosecutor has determined not to follow the minimum 364 day term of imprisonment in the Attorney General's guidelines. This should be done in order to permit judicial review of whether that determination is arbitrary or capricious. This matter should therefore be remanded to permit the prosecutor to set forth those reasons on the record with the defendant having an opportunity to attempt to establish clearly and convincingly that the prosecutor's reasons are arbitrary and capricious. See Shaw, supra, 131 N.J. at 18, 618 A.2d 294.
We, therefore, remand for such a hearing. We do not retain jurisdiction.