Case Name: Fran T. BROWN, Appellant, v. UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS COMMISSION and Jacobs and Goodman, P.A., Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1994-02-04
Citations: 633 So. 2d 36
Docket Number: No. 93-637
Parties: Fran T. BROWN, Appellant, v. UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS COMMISSION and Jacobs and Goodman, P.A., Appellees.
Judges: HARRIS, C.J., and GOSHORN, PETERSON and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 633
Pages: 36–43

Head Matter:
Fran T. BROWN, Appellant, v. UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS COMMISSION and Jacobs and Goodman, P.A., Appellees.
No. 93-637.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Feb. 4, 1994.
Rehearing Denied March 14, 1994.
Thomas P. Moran and Kelly T. Blystone, Subin, Shams, Rosenbluth, Moran, Losey & Brennan, P.A., Orlando, for appellant.
Robert W. Thielhelm, Jr. of Baker & Hos-tetler, Orlando, for appellee Jacobs & Goodman, P.A.
No appearance for appellee Unemployment Appeals Com’n.

Opinion:
EN BANC
COBB, Judge.
The appellant, Fran Brown, appeals the affirmation by the Unemployment Appeals Commission of the decision of the appeals referee denying her claim for unemployment benefits. Brown was a legal assistant at an Orlando law firm, where she was sexually harassed by a male eoworker over a period of some five months. She did not report this to her employers. When they learned of it through another employee, they met with Brown and then placed her on paid administrative leave. Several days thereafter, they advised Brown they wanted her to return to work and would change her work location to the firm's main building. The administrator of the law firm, the harasser's wife, worked in the main building. Brown refused to return to work based upon the presence of the harasser's wife and upon the advice of her attorney and her psychologist. Brown said she would have refused to return to work even if the harasser was not permitted to be near her. She also felt she could not work around the harasser's wife, even though the latter was without fault. Brown was asked to cooperate in the investigation conducted by the employer, and refused to do so— again, on advice of counsel. She quit her job after her leave of absence expired.
Based on the foregoing facts, the referee arrived at the following "Conclusions of Law":
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: The unemployment compensation law provides that a claimant who has voluntarily left work without good cause or has been discharged by the employing unit for misconduct connected with the work shall be disqualified from receiving benefits.
The record and evidence in this case show that the claimant quit her job when she refused to return to work after her leave of absence was over.
The law further provides that a claimant who has voluntarily left work without good cause as defined in the statute shall be disqualified from receiving benefits. "Good cause" includes only such cause as is attributable to the employing unit or which consists of an illness or disability of the claimant requiring separation from the work.
The record and evidence in this case show that the claimant voluntarily quit her job when she refused to return to work after a leave of absence.
When an individual leaves work voluntarily, as the claimant did, she carries the burden to show that her leaving was with good cause attributable to the employer, in order to qualify for unemployment compensation benefits. That burden has not been met in this case.
There was no evidence that the employer had any idea that the claimant was a victim of unwelcome sexual advances until the end of January 1992. The claimant told several family members, two girlfriends, and two co-workers. The claimant never told anyone in authority that she was being sexually harassed. It appears obvious that the only way that the employer knew of the situation was because the claimant told a co-worker, who apparently told the claimant's supervisor. The claimant acknowledged the situation when confronted. The employer immediately placed the claimant on a paid leave of absence for several days, in order for them to investigate the claimant's allegations. The employer asked the claimant to cooperate with the investigations, one of which was ah outside investigation. The claimant refused to cooperate in any investigation conducted by the employer. The employer moved the claimant's work location to another building, but the claimant found this to be unacceptable because the harasser's wife worked there. The claimant stated at the hearing that even if the harasser would have no access to her, she still could not return to the work place because the harasser's wife worked there. The claimant further testified that the harasser's wife had no knowledge of the events, and had not caused the claimant any harm. The claimant determined that the employer's offer to remedy the situation was inadequate, and she refused to work in the new location.
The employer was entitled to a reasonable amount of time to investigate the situation, and determine if the claimant's allegations were true. The claimant speculated that the employer's remedy would not work. The claimant failed to act as a reasonable person in attempting to preserve the employer/employee relationship. Therefore, it can only be concluded that the claimant voluntarily quit her job without good cause attributable to the employer, and she is disqualified from the receipt of benefits.
The .law is clear that an employee who voluntarily leaves her employment without good cause attributable to her employer is not eligible to receive unemployment compensation benefits. See § 443.101(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (1991). This subsection only protects workers of employers who wrongfully cause their employees to "voluntarily" leave their employment. Moore v. Florida Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 498 So.2d 992 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Home Fuel Oil Co., Inc. v. Florida Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 494 So.2d 268 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986). The burden below was on the claimant, Brown, to show that her voluntary departure from employment was attributable to the wrongful conduct of her employer, Jacobs and Goodman, P.A. See Marcelo v. Dep't of Labor and Employment Sec., 453 So.2d 927 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). Clearly, as determined by the appeals referee and Unemployment Appeals Commission, she failed to meet that burden.
The "good cause" for voluntarily leaving employment focuses on whether the circumstances would have impelled the average, able-minded, qualified worker to give up her employment. Dean v. Florida Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 598 So.2d 100 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 605 So.2d 1268 (Fla.1992). The standard is not that of the highly emotional, super sensitive employee. Ritenour v. Unemployment Appeals Commission, 570 So.2d 1106 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). In the instant ease it is undisputed that Brown's employment was not terminated when she walked off the job. It was terminated only at that point in time when she refused to return to work after the situation which allegedly caused her departure had been corrected by the employer.
In affirming the denial of unemployment benefits to an employee who voluntarily left his employment, the Third District, in Perez v. State, Dep't of Labor and Employment Sec., 377 So.2d 806, 807 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), succinctly stated the correct legal principle applicable to this case:
Our affirmance is based primarily upon the familiar principle that this court lacks authority to interfere with an administrative decision based upon an acceptable view of the evidence below. See Florida Industrial Commission v. Ciarlante, 84 So.2d 1 (Fla.1955); Lundy's Market, Inc. v. Florida Department of Commerce, 373 So.2d 433 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), and cases cited. We simply may not substitute our judgment for the referee's conclusion....
See also Ritenour v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n.
We affirm the lower tribunal.
HARRIS, C.J., and GOSHORN, PETERSON and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.
DAUKSCH, J., dissents with opinion, with which GRIFFIN and DIAMANTES, JJ., concur.
GRIFFIN, J., dissents separately with opinion.
W. SHARP, J., recused.
. Indeed, she remained actively on the job for more than 30 days after the culminating incident referred to in Judge Dauksch's dissent without any complaint to her employers.