Case Name: PEOPLE v. SMITH
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1980-02-20
Citations: 95 Mich. App. 492
Docket Number: Docket No. 43243
Parties: PEOPLE v SMITH
Judges: Before: T. M. Burns, P.J., and J. H. Gillis and Bashara, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 95
Pages: 492–499

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v SMITH
Docket No. 43243.
Submitted December 11, 1979, at Lansing.
Decided February 20, 1980.
Arthur L. Smith was convicted of armed robbery, Macomb Circuit Court, Raymond R. Cashen, J. Defendant took the stand during the trial and asserted an alibi defense. He called a co-worker to substantiate that defense. After direct examination by defense counsel and cross-examination by the prosecutor, the trial judge examined the co-worker regarding his ability to recall the day of the robbery which occurred three years prior to trial. The only portion of the transcript requested by the jury during their deliberations was that part in which the trial judge asked these credibility-testing questions. Defendant’s trial counsel raised no objection to the trial judge’s interrogation until the jury had returned a verdict of guilty. Defendant appeals. On appeal the only issues center around the trial judge’s interrogation of defendant’s alibi witness. Held:
Objections to the calling of witnesses by the court or to interrogation by it may be made at the time or at the next available opportunity when the jury is not present. Defendant admits that no objection and motion for a new trial were made in compliance with a court rule. Failure timely to object precludes appellate review, especially where perusal of the transcript reveals that the trial judge’s examination did not denigrate the credibility of the witness so as to create manifest injustice.
Affirmed.
T. M. Burns, J., dissented. He would hold that the trial judge’s conduct was improper and prejudicial. The thrust of the court’s questioning of defendant’s alibi witness was to impeach his credibility and not to clarify conflicting testimony or elicit missing facts. The jury found in these questions an unjustified importance. Therefore, although defendant did not object to the judge’s questions at the next available opportunity when the jury was not present, it is obvious that manifest injustice has resulted and that defendant has been denied a fair trial. He would reverse and remand for a new trial.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1] 5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 553 et seq.
[1, 3] 81 Am Jur 2d, Witnesses §§ 3, 419 - 421.
[2, 3] 75 Am Jur 2d, Trial § 87.
[3] 75 Am Jur 2d, Trial § 88.
Opinion of the Court
1. Courts — Trial — Witnesses — Judicial Questioning — Objections — Prejudice — Credibility — Manifest Injustice — Appeal and Error — Rules of Evidence.
A court may interrogate witnesses called by itself or by a party and any objections to the calling of witnesses by the court or to interrogation by it may be made at the time or at the next available opportunity when the jury is not present; failure timely to object in compliance with a court rule until after a verdict when it becomes apparent that the court’s questions may have had a prejudicial effect on the jury precludes appellate review; counsel cannot sit back and harbor error to be used as an appellate parachute in the event of a jury failure, especially where perusal of the transcript reveals that the trial judge’s interrogation did not denigrate the credibility of a witness so as to create manifest injustice (MRE 614).
Dissent by T. M. Burns, P.J.
2. Courts — Trial — Judge’s Improper Conduct — Jury — Prejudice — Fair Trial.
Improper conduct by a trial judge during the course of a trial can prejudice a jury and deny a defendant a fair trial.
3. Courts — Trial ■— Judge’s Improper Conduct — Manifest Injustice — Fair Trial.
A trial judge has great power and wide discretion, and he has the right to question a witness where the obvious and sole purpose of such questioning is to clarify testimony, but where the sole purpose of the trial judge’s questions was not to resolve conñicting testimony but to challenge the credibility of an important witness for a defendant and the jury in their deliberations placed unjusti&ed importance on the judge’s credibility-testing questions, it becomes obvious that manifest injustice has resulted and that the defendant has been denied a fair trial.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, George N. Parris, Prosecuting Attorney, Don L. Milbourn, Chief Ap pellate Lawyer, and Robert John Berlin, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Donald Z. Ricard, P.C. (by John C. Foster), for defendant on appeal.
Before: T. M. Burns, P.J., and J. H. Gillis and Bashara, JJ.

Opinion:
Bashara, J.
Defendant appeals from his conviction by a jury of armed robbery, MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797. The only issues raised on appeal center around the trial judge's interrogation of an alibi witness.
Defendant took the stand during the trial and asserted an alibi defense. He called a co-worker to substantiate that defense. After direct examination by defense counsel and cross-examination by the prosecutor, the trial judge examined the coworker rather extensively. The court questioned the witness regarding his ability to recall the day of the robbery, which occurred three years prior to the trial.
Defendant's trial counsel raised no objection to the trial judge's interrogation until the jury had returned a verdict of guilty. We must, therefore, question whether defendant has precluded appellate review of the issue.
MRE 614 provides:
"(a) Calling by court. The court may, on its own motion or at the suggestion of a party, call witnesses, and all parties are entitled to cross-examine witnesses thus called.
"(b) Interrogation by court. The Court may interrogate witnesses, whether called by itself or by a party.
"(c) Objections. Objections to the calling of witnesses by the court or to interrogation by it may be made at the time or at the next available opportunity when the jury is not present."
MRE 614 is identical with Rule 614 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Advisory Committee's Note to FRE 614(c) states:
"The provision relating to objections is designed to relieve counsel of the embarrassment attendant upon objecting to questions by the judge in the presence of the jury, while at the same time assuring that objections are made in apt time to afford the opportunity to take possible corrective measures."
Defense counsel should have made objection directly after the court's questioning of the witness, or at the next available opportunity when the jury was not present. Certainly, an appropriate motion or request for a limiting instruction could have been made prior to the jury's deliberation. The opportunity could have been made available to take corrective measures, if any were necessary.
Defendant admits that the objection and motion for a new trial were not made in compliance with the court rule. However, he argues that they were made after the verdict, when it became apparent that the court's examination had a prejudicial effect on the jury. This reasoning is not only strained, but flies directly in the face of the admonition of People v Brocato, 17 Mich App 277, 305; 169 NW2d 483 (1969):
"Counsel cannot sit back and harbor error to be used as an appellate parachute in the event of a jury failure." See also, People v Williams, 84 Mich App 226; 269 NW2d 535 (1978).
We conclude that the failure to object timely in compliance with the court rule precludes appellate review. Perusal of the transcript reveals that the trial judge's examination, while lengthy, did not denigrate the credibility of the witness so as to create manifest injustice. The instant case can be distinguished on its facts from People v Redfern, 71 Mich App 452; 248 NW2d 582 (1976). See People v Smith, 64 Mich App 263; 235 NW2d 754 (1975), and People v Gray, 57 Mich App 289; 225 NW2d 733 (1975).
Affirmed.
J. H. Gillis, J., concurred.
The alleged crime occurred on September 11, 1975. Defendant's first trial, on October 27, 1977, resulted in a mistrial. The second one began on October 3, 1978.