Case Name: Deanne ATER, Mary Ann Buchanan, Sara Cogan, Del Greenfield, Susan Hering, and Patricia Wessinger, Petitioners, v. Phil KEISLING, Respondent; David LINDER and Elisabeth Linder, Petitioners, v. Phil KEISLING, Respondent; Theodore "Ted" BUGAS, Jacqueline Taylor, Vickie Barrett, John McGowan, Robert Miller, Gilbert Gramson, Richard Pearson, Kirk Anderson, Noni Anderson, Doreen Dailey, Patricia Garrett, Roger Berg, Margaret Forbes, Janet Stevenson, Karen Beauchamp, Douglas Sweet, Duane Jue, Diane Heintz, Karen Mellin and Duncan Law, Petitioners, v. Phil KEISLING, Respondent; Vicki Ervin PAULK, Petitioner, v. Phil KEISLING, Respondent; Carlos CABALLERO, Judy A. Caballero and Susan E. Johnson, Petitioners, v. Phil KEISLING, Respondent
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1991-10-15
Citations: 312 Or. 207
Docket Number: SC S38475; SC S38476; SC S38477; SC S38478; SC S38479
Parties: Deanne ATER, Mary Ann Buchanan, Sara Cogan, Del Greenfield, Susan Hering, and Patricia Wessinger, Petitioners, v. Phil KEISLING, Respondent. David LINDER and Elisabeth Linder, Petitioners, v. Phil KEISLING, Respondent. Theodore “Ted” BUGAS, Jacqueline Taylor, Vickie Barrett, John McGowan, Robert Miller, Gilbert Gramson, Richard Pearson, Kirk Anderson, Noni Anderson, Doreen Dailey, Patricia Garrett, Roger Berg, Margaret Forbes, Janet Stevenson, Karen Beauchamp, Douglas Sweet, Duane Jue, Diane Heintz, Karen Mellin and Duncan Law, Petitioners, v. Phil KEISLING, Respondent. Vicki Ervin PAULK, Petitioner, v. Phil KEISLING, Respondent. Carlos CABALLERO, Judy A. Caballero and Susan E. Johnson, Petitioners, v. Phil KEISLING, Respondent.
Judges: PETERSON, J.
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 312
Pages: 207–230

Head Matter:
Argued and submitted October 2,
the Ater, Bugas and Caballero petitions dismissed; the Paulk and Linder petitions granted; the reapportionment plan voided and returned to the Secretary of State with instructions October 15, 1991
Deanne ATER, Mary Ann Buchanan, Sara Cogan, Del Greenfield, Susan Hering, and Patricia Wessinger, Petitioners, v. Phil KEISLING, Respondent. David LINDER and Elisabeth Linder, Petitioners, v. Phil KEISLING, Respondent. Theodore “Ted” BUGAS, Jacqueline Taylor, Vickie Barrett, John McGowan, Robert Miller, Gilbert Gramson, Richard Pearson, Kirk Anderson, Noni Anderson, Doreen Dailey, Patricia Garrett, Roger Berg, Margaret Forbes, Janet Stevenson, Karen Beauchamp, Douglas Sweet, Duane Jue, Diane Heintz, Karen Mellin and Duncan Law, Petitioners, v. Phil KEISLING, Respondent. Vicki Ervin PAULK, Petitioner, v. Phil KEISLING, Respondent. Carlos CABALLERO, Judy A. Caballero and Susan E. Johnson, Petitioners, v. Phil KEISLING, Respondent.
(SC S38475)
(SC S38476)
(SC S38477)
(SC S38478)
(SC S38479)
(Consolidated)
819 P2d 296
Thomas A. Balmer, of Ater Wynne Hewitt Dodson & Skerritt, Portland, argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioners Ater et al and petitioners Linder.
Thane W. Tienson, Portland, argued the cause for petitioners Bugas et al. With him on the brief were Richard L. Sadler and David N. Goulder, Portland.
Laurence Kressel, County Counsel for Multnomah County, for petitioner Paulk.
Carlos Caballero, Judy Caballero, and Susan E. Johnson, petitioners, filed a brief pro se.
Rives Kistler, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause for respondent in the Ater petition. Robert M. Atkinson, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause for respondent in the Bugas and Linder petitions. With them on the briefs in opposition to all petitions were Dave Frohnmayer, Attorney General, and Virginia L. Linder, Solicitor General, Salem.
PETERSON, J.

Opinion:
PETERSON, J.
The Oregon Constitution requires that, following each federal decennial census, the "Senators and Representatives shall be apportioned among legislative districts according to population." Or Const, Art IV, § 6(1). If the Legislative Assembly fails to enact a reapportionment, the task falls to the Secretary of State (Secretary). Or Const, Art IV, § 6(3). The 1991 Legislative Assembly failed to enact a reapportionment; therefore, the Secretary did so and filed his reapportionment plan with this court on August 14, 1991.
Original jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme Court "to review any reapportionment and the record made by the Secretary of State." Or Const, Art IV, § 6(3)(b). Five petitions challenging specific parts of the reapportionment plan were timely filed.
Article IV, section 6(3)(a), of the Oregon Constitu-. tion directs the Secretary to "make a reapportionment of the Senators and Representatives in accordance with subsection (1) of this section and all law applicable thereto." Article IV, section 6(1) provides:
"At the regular session of the Legislative Assembly next following an enumeration of the inhabitants by the United States Government, the number of Senators and Representatives shall be fixed by law and apportioned among legislative districts according to population. A senatorial district shall consist of two representative districts. Any Senator whose term continues through the next regular legislative session after the effective date of reapportionment shall be specifically assigned to a senatorial district. The ratio of Senators and Representatives, respectively, to population shall he determined by dividing the total population of the state by the number of Senators and by the number of Representatives."
The petitioners seek review of the Secretary's plan on the ground that it fails to comply with section 6(1) "and all law applicable thereto." Or Const, Art IV, § 6(3)(a), (d).
The court's role in the reapportionment process also is prescribed by the constitution. Article IV, sections 6(3) (c) and (d) direct the court as follows:
' ' (c) If the Supreme Court determines that the reapportionment thus reviewed complies with subsection (1) of this section [and ] all law applicable thereto, it shall dismiss the petition by written opinion on or before October 15 of the same year and the reapportionment shall become operative on October 15.
' ' (d) If the Supreme Court determines that the reapportionment does not comply with subsection (1) of this section and all law applicable thereto, the reapportionment shall be void. The Supreme Court shall return the reapportionment by November 1 to the Secretary of State accompanied by a written opinion specifying with particularity wherein the reapportionment fails to comply. The opinion shall further direct the Secretary of State to correct the reapportionment in those particulars, and in no others, and file the corrected reapportionment with the Supreme Court on or before December 1 of the same year."
Initially, we note that Article IV, section 6, of the Oregon Constitution has been amended since the last reapportionment in 1981. In particular, the phrase "and all law applicable thereto" was added to the former section, which had required a reapportionment only ' 'in accordance with' ' or in "compliance] with subsection (1) of this section." Compare Or Const, Art TV, § 6(2)(b)-(d) and (3)(a), (c)-(e) (1989) (as amended in 1986) with Or Const, Art IV, § 6(2)(b)-(d) and (3)(a)-(d) (1985) (as effective from 1954 through 1986). Before the 1986 amendment, this court had held that its review was limited to ensuring compliance with Article IV, section 6(1). See McCall v. Legislative Assembly, 291 Or 663, 673, 634 P2d 223 (1981); Cargo v. Paulus, 291 Or 772, 777, 635 P2d 367 (1981); In re Legislative Apportionment, 228 Or 575, 579,365 P2d 1042 (1961). In 1981, this court specifically rejected challenges based on ORS 188.010, which sets forth criteria for the Legislative Assembly and the Secretary to follow in making a legislative reapportionment, and held that
"our original jurisdiction under art IV, section 6(2) is to review a reapportionment measure for compliance with section 6(1), including such surrounding constitutional mandates as must be respected in the interpretation and application of subsection (1). ORS 188.010 does not purport to be an authoritative interpretation of constitutionally mandated standards." McCall v. Legislative Assembly, supra, 291 Or at 673 (footnote omitted); Cargo v. Paulus, supra, 291 Or at 777 (quotingMcCall).
The 1986 constitutional amendment gives the court the authority found lacking under the previous version of Article IV, section 6, i.e., to review the reapportionment for compliance with statutory as well as constitutional law.
This expansion of our scope of review is significant, because all five petitions challenging the reapportionment are premised on the Secretary's alleged failure to follow the criteria set forth in ORS 188.010(1). That statute provides:
"The Legislative Assembly or the Secretary of State, whichever is applicable, shall consider the following criteria when apportioning the state into congressional and legislative districts:
"(1) Each district, as nearly as practicable, shall:
"(a) Be contiguous;
"(b) Be of equal population;
"(c) Utilize existing geographic or political boundaries;
"(d) Not divide communities of common interest; and
' ' (e) Be connected by transportation links. ' '
Although the scope of our review has been expanded to include ensuring compliance with statutes, e.g., ORS 188.010(1), as well as the constitution, the nature of the court's task remains essentially the same. In 1961, this court interpreted the previous version of Article IV, section 6, and articulated its standard of review as follows:
"Article IV, Section 6. (2) (c) calls upon us to exercise our usual judicial function in passing upon the constitutionality of the plan submitted by the Secretary of State. In the exercise of that function we are not privileged to substitute our judgment as to the wisdom of the plan of reapportionment; we are obliged to sustain a reapportionment if it is in compliance with Article IV, Section 6 (1). As we indicated in our review of the original plan created by the legislative assembly, there is a broad discretion vested in the legislature in applying the constitutional formula for apportionment. There we stated that 'the legislature has the discretion to make any adjustment in the treatment of major fractions which is rational and consistent with the fundamental constitutional requirement that apportionment be made according to the population of the state in each county or district.' ([In re Legislative Apportionment, 228 Or 562, 573,] 364 P2d [1004,] 1008 [(1961)]). A similar breadth of discretion is vested in the Secretary of State in formulating his draft of reapportionment." In re Legislative Apportionment, supra, 228 Or at 579.
Under Article IV, section 6, as amended, the court's task in this case is still to determine whether the reapportionment "complies"; it is not to substitute its judgment as to the wisdom of the plan.
In the past, this court has concerned itself primarily with questions of law in reapportionment cases. See McCall v. Legislative Assembly, supra, 291 Or at 674-76 (challenge to the legislature's failure to ensure continued senatorial representation of all districts); Cargo v. Paulus, supra, 291 Or at 774 (challenge to the Secretary's authority to assign Senators to newly drawn districts); Hovet v. Myers, 260 Or 152, 159-62, 489 P2d 684 (1971) (challenge to the Secretary's authority to depart from the constitutional formula in order to comply with the federal constitution); In re Legislative Apportionment, supra, 228 Or at 570-71 (challenge to the legislature's departure from the constitutional formula for reapportionment). The present case, although it involves law in the sense that the Secretary's decision must be consonant with the constitution and statutes, also involves contentions of the parties relating to the specific factual criteria identified in the statute: What are the communities of common interest? What are the geographic and political boundaries? What are the transportation links?
The record contains information concerning the procedures followed by the. Secretary and sets forth the reasons why he did what he did relative to the claims of the petitioners before us. In deciding those claims, we examine the decisions made by the Secretary in light of the record to determine whether the decision is consistent with the requirements of the constitution and ORS 188.010. Where it appears that the facts would permit more than one rational conclusion, we will uphold the Secretary's decision. See In re Legislative Apportionment, supra, 228 Or at 579 (the court does not substitute its judgment as to the wisdom of the plan). Where there is substantial support in the record for a particular factual finding, either made by the Secretary or implicit in his decision, we will apply that fact as the Secretary found it. Where the Secretary admits that an error was made, see section IV below, we normally will permit the Secretary to reconsider the matter and correct the error.
I. THE SECRETARY'S SUBMISSION
Before holding a series of 15 public hearings around the state, the Secretary adopted eight guidelines to be followed in drafting the reapportionment. The guidelines are:
"1. Aim for the ideal of zero population variance.
"2. Honor existing geographic and political boundaries, with particular attention to county lines and maintaining cities within a single district when possible.
"3. Retain identified urban neighborhoods, rural communities, and other communities of interest within a single district, giving consideration to market areas covered by local media.
"4. Make districts compact and contiguous.
"5. Not dilute the voting strength of any language or ethnic minority group.
"6. Not favor a party, incumbent or other person.
"7. Provide for transportation links within a district, with at least a county road available from one population area to another.
"8. Assure that two House districts are wholly contained within a Senate District."
In aiming "for the ideal of zero population variance," the Secretary made (and we quote from his transmittal letter accompanying the filing of the plan with this court) "a fundamental decision that no district would vary from the ideal district size of 47,372 by more than plus-or-minus one percent."
The Secretary also drafted a proposed reapportionment plan, to which individuals generally directed their testimony at the hearings. On August 14, the Secretary filed his reapportionment plan with the court. The Secretary's submission was in the form of a letter accompanied by 16 exhibits and the transcriptions of the 15 public hearings. The exhibits include a listing of the census blocks that comprise each House district and the House district pairings that make up each Senate District, various maps, a narrative description of the districts, a summary of the main points made in the hearings and of the Secretary's responses, as well as an explanation of changes made to the final draft plan, an opinion letter from the Attorney General regarding the legal framework for the reapportionment, statistical analyses of the reapportionment plan, and a list of criteria used for the assignment of current House and Senate members to the new districts created by the plan.
II. THE ATER AND BUGAS PETITIONS
The Ater petition was filed by six residents of northwestern Multnomah County, three of whom are also residents of the City of Portland. The petitioners contend that the reapportionment plan is not in compliance with Article IV, section 6(1), and ORS 188.010(1), because its assignment of their neighborhood to House District 7 rather than House District 11 fails to recognize (a) the community of common interest between the voters in the petitioners' neighborhood and the voters in adjacent District 11, an urban and suburban Portland district, and (b) their lack of common interest with the other voters in District 7, a rural and suburban district to which their neighborhood was assigned. Additionally, the petitioners contend that the reapportionment "arbitrarily and unnecessarily ignores the existing geographic and political boundaries of Multnomah County and the City of Portland." The petitioners claim that the Secretary's decision to adhere to the goal of strict population equality caused him to ignore or devalue the other statutory criteria, the appropriate application of which, the petitioners argue, would have resulted in their neighborhood's being assigned to House District 11.
The petitioners in Bugas are 20 individuals who reside in Columbia or Clatsop Counties. They argue that the Secretary's plan ignores the statutory criteria set forth in ORS 188.010(1) by failing to preserve existing geographic and political boundaries and by inappropriately and unnecessarily dividing communities of common interest within Clat-sop and Columbia Counties. In particular, the petitioners challenge the Secretary's decision to create a district along the Columbia River that includes Astoria and separates Astoria from the remainder of the north coast. Petitioners seek to have the plan redrawn to place all of Clatsop County within one district extending south into the northern portion of Tillamook County and east into the western portion of Columbia County.
The propositions underlying both the Ater and Bugas petitions are (1) that the Secretary was not required by statute or by either the state or federal constitution to adopt as strict a population deviation standard as he did and (2) that his decision to adopt the plus-or-minus one percent standard foreclosed adequate consideration of the other criteria set forth in ORS 188.010(1).
Article IV, section 6(1), provides that "the number of Senators and Representatives shall be fixed by law and apportioned among legislative districts according to population." Article IV, section 6(1) further provides that "[t]he ratio of Senators and Representatives, respectively, to population shall be determined by dividing the total population of the state by the number of Senators and by the number of Representatives." The Oregon Constitution speaks only of population as the basis for reapportionment. While absolute equality of population may be difficult or impossible to achieve, adoption of the plus-or-minus one percent standard certainly furthers the constitutional mandate, at least in the sense that it prevents deviations of more than one percent. The Secretary's decision to adopt the plus-or-minus one percent deviation standard was not irrational or contrary to the constitution.
The petitioners' argument that the federal constitution does not require strict population equality is beside the point. The question raised by the petitioners is whether the legislative districts as drawn by the Secretary are too equal, not whether they are equal enough. Additionally, because the constitutional mandate pursuant to which the Secretary acted speaks only of population as the basis for an apportionment, the Secretary reasonably could have believed that this court might interpret the Oregon Constitution to require a greater degree of equality than the standards under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. As this court noted in Hovet v. Myers, supra, 260 Or at 164, with regard to the possibility that multi-member districts would be held unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment, "[t]he Secretary could legitimately consider this possibility and devise a plan with single-member districts and thus avoid the constitutional vulnerability of a multi-member district plan." Likewise, the Secretary has the authority to interpret his mandate in a manner that minimizes the possibility of a successful state constitutional challenge to his reapportionment plan.
The petitioners assert that ORS 188.010(1), as incorporated into the constitution by the phrase "and all law applicable thereto," requires that appropriate consideration be given to each of the five criteria listed in the statute without giving one criterion priority over the others. They contend that the Secretary's adoption of a criterion that no district would vary from the ideal district size of 47,372 by more than plus-or-minus one percent made it impossible to give enough consideration to the other four statutory criteria.
ORS 188.010(1) requires the Secretary to "consider" the five criteria listed and that, "as nearly as practicable," the districts conform to the five criteria. We view the statute as giving the Secretary — and the Legislative Assembly — latitude in applying the five criteria. Thus, where the statutory goals collide — e.g., strict adherence to a geographical boundary might result in an apportionment that skews population equality — the reapportionment process necessarily requires some flexibility in application.
In essence, the petitioners ask us to second-guess the Secretary's decisions regarding the configuration of their legislative districts. That we will not do. We have reviewed the record and the reapportionment plan in light of the constitutional and statutory provisions. The record is replete with evidence that the Secretary did "consider" all five statutory criteria in arriving at the reapportionment decisions challenged in the Ater and Bugas petitions. The choices that the Secretary made in drawing the district boundaries at issue in Ater and Bugas were consistent with Article IV, section 6(1), of the Oregon Constitution and ORS 188.010.
III. THE CABALLERO PETITION
The Caballero petition challenges the choices made by the Secretary in drawing the boundaries of House District 27. The petitioners, residents of Aloha included in House District 27, would prefer to have been assigned to House District 6. Their petition is premised on the Secretary's alleged failure to follow the guidelines he had developed for the reapportionment process.
Like the petitioners in Ater and Bugas, the petitioners in Caballero are asking the court to second-guess the Secretary. We are satisfied that the Secretary fulfilled his constitutional duty by considering the criteria listed in ORS 188.010 in drawing the boundaries of House District 27.
IV. THE PAULK AND LINDER PETITIONS
In conducting the census, the federal government divided the state into approximately 108,000 geographic units known as census blocks. The Secretary used the census blocks, units for which he was provided population information, as building blocks of his reapportionment plan.
The Paulk petition, filed by the Multnomah County Director of Elections, alleged that the Secretary's reapportionment plan is inconsistent with ORS 188.010, because certain district assignments fail to respect existing political and geographic boundaries and in some cases result in the assignment of ceinsus blocks to districts to which they are not contiguous. Specifically, because of an error made by the United States Census Bureau in identifying eight census blocks that are wholly within Clackamas County as being in Multnomah County, those eight census blocks were assigned to House Districts that are otherwise entirely within Multnomah County. The Secretary's response to the Paulk petition states:
"The Secretary intended to respect the county line in the creation of these districts and could have done so without compromising population equality or any other statutory criterion. Therefore, the Secretary agrees that it would have been practicable to respect this existing political boundary and that the plan's failure to do so violates the terms of ORS 183.010(l)(c) [sic]. The court accordingly should void the apportionment and return the plan with instructions to assign these eight census blocks to the appropriate district."
Further, because of a failure of the United States Census Bureau to follow its own practice that census blocks be wholly within a single county, there is a ninth census block, which straddles the Clackamas-Multnomah County line that has been assigned to a district that is otherwise composed solely of Multnomah County residents. With regard to this census block, the Secretary acknowledges that he intended to observe county lines and could have done so without compromising population equality. As to this error, the Secretary notes:
"If the court returns the plan to correct the eight census blocks that are incorrectly included in Multnomah County, it would be appropriate to allow the Secretary to adjust the ninth census block if the USCB [United States Census Bureau] divides the block within the time for filing a revised plan."
Additionally, the Secretary states that an error in his computer program resulted in the assignment of six census blocks to districts to which they are not contiguous. Each of these census blocks is a "floatingblock"; it is an island within a district to which it was not, but apparently should have been, assigned. With regard to the six floating blocks, and any others that he might find, the Secretary states:
"None of the known floating blocks involves any population, and the Secretary does not anticipate that any other floating blocks he might find would have sufficient population to affect numerical equality if reassigned. These blocks were intended to be included in the surrounding districts, and assigning them to the surrounding district would not affect any statutory criterion. Therefore, the Secretary agrees that it would have been practicable to assign them to the surrounding district and that assigning them to non-contiguous districts violates the provisions of ORS 183.010(l)(a) [sic]. The Secretary also agrees that the court should void the apportionment and return the plan to the Secretary with instructions to assign all floating blocks to the appropriate districts."
The court accepts the Secretary's concessions and directs him to make the appropriate corrections to the reapportionment.
The Linder petition was filed by David and Elisabeth Linder, who are registered voters and residents of Multnomah County and the City of Portland. The petitioners reside in the 2100 block of Northwest Aspen Avenue in a neighborhood known as Willamette Heights. They and their two neighbors on Aspen Avenue have been assigned to House District 7, while all other residents of Willamette Heights have been assigned to adjacent House District 12. No more than ten residents on the 2100 block of Northwest Aspen Avenue are affected by this assignment.
The assignment of the Linders and their neighbors to House District 7, rather than House District 12, appears to have been unintentional. The record prepared by the Secretary suggests that the Secretary intended that all residents of Willamette Heights be included in House District 12 and that he believed that his plan accomplished that goal. Seven witnesses testified that Willamette Heights should be in a "Portland' ' district, because it "shares an urban lifestyle, a political orientation and the transportation lines [and] is geographically isolated from House District 7." The record shows that the Secretary responded that this goal was "Met. Willamette Heights in District 12, along with much of remainder of NW Portland." See Exhibit Jl, "A summary of the main points made in written oral testimony," at p 3 (Comments and Response), Secretary's transmittal letter accompanying filing of reapportionment with the Supreme Court, August 14, 1991.
But for the Secretary's erroneous belief that all of Willamette Heights had been kept undivided and assigned to House District 12, he may have drawn the district boundaries differently. The record suggests that, like the Paulk errors, the apparent factual error here was brought to the Secretary's attention after he filed his plan with this court. Because of this apparent error by the Secretary — similar though not identical to the errors referred to earlier in this section — it is appropriate to return the plan to the Secretary for further consideration.
CONCLUSION
In summary, the Ater, Bugas, and Caballero petitions are dismissed. The Secretary's decisions with regard to the issues raised by those petitions were consistent with the constitution and applicable law. Specifically, with regard to Ater and Bugas, the Secretary's decision to adopt a population deviation standard of plus-or-minus one percent was not contrary to Article IV, section 6, of the Oregon Constitution or ORS 188.010 and did not foreclose adequate consideration of the other statutory criteria.
With respect to the Paulk petition, pursuant to the Secretary's concession, the court voids the reapportionment with regard to the district assignments of the eight misidentified census blocks and the six floating census blocks. The court also voids the reapportionment with regard to its assignment of the straddling census block, Census Tract 1, Block 425.
With respect to the Linder petition, the court voids the reapportionment as it relates to the assignment of the Linders and their neighbors on the 2100 block of Northwest Aspen Avenue to House District 7.
The Secretary is directed to correct the errors in the reapportionment raised by the Paulk petition by reassigning the eight misidentified census blocks to the dppropriate Clackamas district and the six floating blocks, and any other floating blocks that he has found or may find, to the district within which they are physically located. Further, with respect to the straddling census block, discussed in Paulk, and the assignment of the 2100 block of Northwest Aspen Avenue, raised by the Linder petition, the Secretary is directed to reconsider the district assignments in light of our discussion herein.
The Ater, Bugas, and Caballero petitions are dismissed. The Paulk and Linder petitions are granted. The plan is voided and returned to the Secretary of State with instructions. The Secretary shall correct the reapportionment in the particulars discussed herein, and in no others, and shall file the corrected reapportionment with the court, on or before December 1, 1991. Or Const, Art IV, § 6(3)(d). j
Pour of the five petitions were filed on or before September 15, the constitutional deadline for petitions for review of a reapportionment plan drafted by the Secretary pursuant to Article IV, section 6(3). The petition in Caballero v. Keisling, S38479, however, was filed on Monday, September 16. Because September 15 fell on a Sunday, the filing deadline was extended to the next regular judicial day, as in an ordinary civil matter. In re Legislative Apportionment, 228 Or 575, 577 & n 2, 365 P2d 1042 (1961) (ORS 174.120 applicable to proceedings arising under Article IV, section 6, of the Oregon Constitution); ORS 174.120 (1989); ORAP 1.25 (1991); ORAP 11.35(9) (1991). Thus, the Caballero petition was timely filed.
The ' 'and' ' is necessary for the sentence to make sense. Its omission appears to have been unintentional given the context of the sentence and the remainder of the review provisions in Article IV, section 6. Or Const, Art IV, § 6(2)(b)-(d), (3)(d)-(e).
Article IV, section 6, of the Oregon Constitution was amended by a referendum approved by the voters in the November 1986 general election.
For example, the Bugas petitioners claim that the Secretary "fail[ed] to utilize existing political boundaries and not divide communities of common interest in creating House Districts 1 and 2" and that "alternative boundary lines [were] available which would have satisfied the criteria set forth in ORS 188.010.''The Ater petitioners claim that the Secretary "failed to utilize existing geographic and political boundaries and divided communities of common interest." The Caballero and Linder petitions make similar claims.
The changes made by the 1986 amendment to Article IV, section 6, of the Oregon Constitution included the elimination of the requirement that the legislators be apportioned among counties and of the language regarding the treatment of fractions in order to achieve that purpose. Cf. Hovet v. Myers, 260 Or 152, 489 P2d 684 (1971) (strict compliance with the subsection (1) formula was unnecessary where adherence to county lines would result in an apportionment in violation of the federal constitution); In re Legislative Apportionment, 228 Or 562, 573, 364 P2d 1004 (1961) (the legislature has the discretion to depart from the constitutional formula for the treatment of fractions where the formula is unworkable).
Petitioners do not assert that the Secretary refused or failed to consider the constitutional or statutory factors in fashioning a plan.
This decision was based in part on the advice of the Attorney General, who wrote to the Secretary as follows:
"Although I find the equal population goal to be primary, I cannot advise with certainty that the court would require the districts to have zero deviation (or de minimis deviation). The constitution also recognizes that the Secretary of State will apply state law to the redistricting plan. This is a recognition that other standards may apply. The court may very well find that some sacrifice in population equality was necessary in order to achieve one of the other goals (such as maintaining communities of interest or geographic or political boundaries). Given the practical realities of the difficult task of redistricting, the court may be willing to permit some minimal deviation, if the deviation is justified as necessary to achieve another important goal."
Census blocks are discussed in section IV below.
Additionally, the petitioners in Bugas advance the argument that the Secretary's decision to adopt the plus-or-minus one percent population deviation standard resulted from his misconception that the constitution required him to do so. They argue that neither the state nor federal constitution required so strict a standard, and that the Secretary's decision to seek population equality more strict than the federal standard infected the rest of the apportionment process. The record shows that the Secretary's decision to adopt a plus-or-minus one percent population deviation standard was a choice based on a host of factors and not one the Secretary felt compelled to make.
With regard to the challenge in Ater, the Secretary explained that achieving the goal of population equality required that approximately 15,000 Multnomah County residents be placed in predominantly non-Multnomah County House Districts and that the placement of petitioners' neighborhood was the best of the available choices. See Exhibit J2, "Explanation of Final Changes Made to the August 10,1991 Final Draft Plan," at ¶ 6, Secretary's transmittal letter accompanying filing of reapportionment with the Supreme Court, August 14, 1991. The record shows that the petitioners' neighborhood is contiguous to House District 7 and more proximate to the bulk of the population in House District 7 than other neighborhoods that might have been placed there. Id. Also, the petitioners' neighborhood has strong transportation links to the remainder of House District 7 via Highway 26. Id.
With regard to the challenge in Bugas, the Secretary has explained that his decision to split up both Columbia and Clatsop Counties to create a "river" district, House District 1, and a rural-coastal district, House District 2, which are combined into Senate District 1, was the result of his balancing the statutory criteria. Id., Exhibit J2, at ¶ 1. The Secretary concluded that neither Columbia nor Clatsop County could be maintained within a single district without splitting the other and creating serious difficulties in achieving the other statutory goals. Id. Further, the Secretary believed that Astoria's interests were more akin to those of the other communities on the river, which he believed share a strong community of common interest, than to the coastal communities of Clatsop County. Id. Additionally, the Secretary noted that "identifiable rural and coastal interests affect most of the residents of House District 2, including fisheries, tourism, timber production and agriculture." Id. Finally, he noted that the use of east-west Highways 30 and 26 provided "substantially better" transportation finks for House Districts 1 and 2, respectively, than would be available under other proposed plans for the region. Id.
The configuration of House District 27 resulted in part from the Secretary's desire to preserve, as much as possible, the city boundaries of Tualatin, Lake Oswego, and West Linn, as opposed to the Clackamas-Washington County fine, which the Secretary noted was not perceived as a meaningful dividing fine in that area. The Secretary thus used a combination of city and county lines and geographic boundaries to create a district with the requisite population and with sufficient transportation links.
The Secretary has asserted that the integrity of the census blocks must be preserved and that a census block should not be divided. Preservation of census blocks is not a statutory or constitutional criterion for reapportionment. Nor were census blocks referred to in the Secretary's "eight basic guidelines." We express no opinion as to whether the Secretary can or should split census blocks to achieve reapportionment consistent with the statutory criteria.