Case Name: LOBRAVICO v. CITY OF NEW YORK
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1913-02-14
Citations: 140 N.Y.S. 161
Docket Number: 
Parties: LOBRAVICO v. CITY OF NEW YORK.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 140
Pages: 161–167

Head Matter:
(155 App. Div. 184.)
LOBRAVICO v. CITY OF NEW YORK.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.
February 14, 1913.)
1. Municipal Corporations (§ 832 )—Sewers—Care Required.
A city was bound to use reasonable diligence to discover and remedy defects in sewers and gutters.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. § 1782; Dec. Dig. § 832.*]
2. Municipal Corporations (§ 843*)—Sewers—Liability op City.
Plaintiff sued for damages to his building from water which overflowed from a sewer which was exposed in excavations made by a street railway company under a permit from the city in changing its horse car line to an underground trolley system. The permit required that the company should, before beginning the work, submit for the city’s approval plans for all proposed changes in sewers, and that such work should be under the supervision of inspectors subject to the department of water supply, though their salaries were to be paid by the company; and the permits further provided that the work should be under the supervision' of inspectors paid by the company and appointed -by the borough president, from whom they were to receive their instructions. Held, that the city was liable for the damages resulting from the negli- . gent interference with the sewer; the work having been done under the actual direction of the inspectors appointed pursuant to the permit.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. § 1788; Dec. Dig. § 843.*]
Ingraham, P. J., and Laughlin, J., dissenting. ■
Appeal from Trial Term, New York County.
Action by .Giovanni B. Lobravico against the City of New; York. From a judgment dismissing the complaint, plaintiff appeals. Reversed, and new trial ordered.
Argued before INGRAHAM, P. J., and McLAUGHLIN, LAUGHLIN, CLARKE, and DOWLING, JJ.
Walter Carroll Low, of New York City, for appellant.
William E. C. Mayer, of Brooklyn, for respondent..
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
McLAUGHLIN, J.
In July, 1905, the Dry Dock, East Broadway & Battery Railroad Company, a corporation organized under chapter 512 of the Laws of 1860, was engaged under permits by the city in changing its horse car line in Grand street, in the city of New York, to an underground trolley system. For that purpose it had, prior to the 10th of that month, dug a trench in Grand street several feet deep and several feet wide. The plaintiff occupied a portion of a building at 60 Grand street, and the railroad company, in digging the trench opposite the building, exposed a large sewer and removed a portion of it, and dirt and stones in a large quantity were piled in the streets in such a way as to obstruct the gutters both to.the east and west. On July 10, 1905, an unusually heavy rainstorm occurred, during which the trench became filled with water from the surface of the street, or the sewer, and a large amount of it either percolated through or overflowed and ran into the basement of the building occupied by the plaintiff, damaging a quantity of tobacco stored therein. This action was brought to recover the damages sustained. At the conclusion of the trial the learned justice refused to submit any question to the jury and dismissed the complaint. From the judgment entered thereon plaintiff appeals.
I am of the opinion that the court erred in not submitting the case to the jury. The work which the railroad company was doing was under permits issued by the city, which required that before entering upon the work it should submit, for the approval of the city, plans and specifications of all proposed changes in watei; pipes and sewers, and that all such work should be under the supervision of inspectors to be appointed by and subject to the department of water supply or the borough president, though their salaries were to be paid by the company. The permits further provided that the entire operation, from the time the pavement was taken up until it was replaced, should be under the supervision of inspectors appointed by the borough president, from whom they were to receive their instructions, though their salaries were likewise to be paid by the railroad company. It also appeared that such inspectors did actually enter upon their duties, and that for at least 10 days prior to the storm the sewer had been interfered with—a portion of it removed—and the gutters in the street obstructed by the piling theréin of dirt and stone; and that the water which went into the plaintiff's basement was by reason of such obstruction.
The city had provided the sewer and gutters for the drainage of surface water, and it was thereby bound to use reasonable dili gence to discover and remedy any defects therein. Nims v. Mayor, 59 N. Y. 500; McCarthy v. City of Syracuse, 46 N. Y. 194; Barton v. City of Syracuse, 36 N. Y. 54; Ebbets v. City of New York, 111 App, Div. 364, 97 N. Y. Supp. 833; Gravey v. City of New York, 117 App. Div. 773, 102 N. Y. Supp. 1010.
A case directly in point, as it seems to me, is v. of New York, 166 N. Y. 103, 59 N. E. 773. There, a trench was dug in the street pursuant to a permit issued under a statute which authorized a corporation to place pneumatic tubes of iron beneath the surface of public streets, and for that purpose to open -any street or avenue upon obtaining the consent of the commissioner of public works. Chapter 400, Laws of 1874. The permit was granted upon certain conditions, quite similar to the ones here imposed. During' a heavy rain, water collected in the trench, overflowed, and, by reason of the fact that the gutters were obstructed, went upon plaintiff's property, and did him damage, to recover for which the action was brought. At the trial the complaint was dismissed, but on appeal to this court it was reversed and a new trial ordered (40 App. Div. 320, 57 N. Y. Supp. 968), and on appeal to the Court of Appeal^ the order of this court was affirmed; the court saying:
"The damages to the property of the plaintiffs were caused by the obstruction of the culvert and gutter, the construction of the trench and leaving it unprotected, in such a situation with reference to the culvert and gutter that the water from a heavy rain would flood the culvert, enter the trench, and percolate therefrom unto the basements of the adjacent buildings. The city had notice of the necessities of the locality with reference to surface drainage, for it created them. It knew the danger to be apprehended from an unusual rainfall in case the culvert and gutter should become obstructed, and if, on the occasion in question, it knew, or should have known, that the culvert was closed entirely, as well as the other facts as they then existed, yet took no care to prevent injury to neighboring property, it was liable for damages naturally resulting from its neglect. It is not excused because the storm was heavy and unexpected, as its care should include preparation, after notice of the obstruction, express or implied, for such storms as may reasonably be foreseen, and which, judging from experience, are liable to happen at any time in this climate. It made no attempt to open the gutter, uncover the culvert, protect the trench, or provide for the water."
In the present case the situation already described had existed for at least 10 days, upon a street much traveled. The trench, it must be assumed, was dug and the sewer interfered with under the supervision of inspectors appointed by the officials of the city. This was the condition of the permits, and the inspectors actually entered upon the performance of their duties. While it does hot expressly appear that they saw the situation as it existed at the time the storm occurred, nevertheless the jury could have found, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that they did actually see it and have knowledge of the danger, because it was their duty to see it and either to remedy or report it to the proper officials.
It is suggested that the inspectors did not represent the city, but this contention was answered adversely in the Schumacher Case.
It is also urged on behalf of the respondent that the decision in the Schumacher Case does not apply to the present case; the argument being that the permit in that case was granted as a favor, while here, as a matter of duty. The distinction urged is more fanciful than real. The statute giving to the railroad company the right to open the streets did not deprive or take from the city the right to exercise control over the manner in which the work was to be performed. This right was recognized by the railroad company when it applied for and obtained the permits, and they expressly provided that:
"No materials shall be piled or placed on any part of the roadway of the highways upon which the tracks are being constructed and the gutters shall always be kept unobstructed and open for proper drainage.
"All the work from the time the pavement is taken up or the excavation is commenced to the time the pavement is relaid and the railway completed shall be under the supervision of inspectors who will be appointed by the president of the borough."
The terms were accepted with these conditions, and the city did retain control of the manner in which the work was to be performed, and its own inspectors were acting for it in this respect. As was said by this court in the Schumacher Case:
"The work connected with this trench was being done under a permit of the city and under terms and conditions which gave it the control of essential details of the manner in which the work was to be performed. It has been frequently held that when a municipal corporation enters into a contract with a third party to do work, but reserves to itself the manner in which that work shall be done, it becomes liable for negligence in the performance of that work."
From the testimony the jury could have found there was negligence in the manner in which the work here was performed. If I am correct about this, then it follows the court erred in not submitting the case to the jury.
The judgment appealed from, therefore, is reversed, and a new trial ordered, with costs to appellant to abide event.
CLARKE and DOWLING, JJ.; concur.