Case Name: Joseph BOSTON, Appellant, v. Michael BOWERSOX, Superintendent; Jeremiah (Jay) Nixon, Attorney General, State of Missouri, Appellees
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1999-11-26
Citations: 202 F.3d 1001
Docket Number: No. 98-2122
Parties: Joseph BOSTON, Appellant, v. Michael BOWERSOX, Superintendent; Jeremiah (Jay) Nixon, Attorney General, State of Missouri, Appellees.
Judges: Before: BEAM, HEANEY, and FAGG, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 3d Series
Volume: 202
Pages: 1001–1004

Head Matter:
Joseph BOSTON, Appellant, v. Michael BOWERSOX, Superintendent; Jeremiah (Jay) Nixon, Attorney General, State of Missouri, Appellees.
No. 98-2122.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted: Sept. 15, 1999.
Filed: Nov. 26, 1999.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Jan. 11, 2000.
John William Simon, Jefferson City, Missouri, argued (Ronald L. Jurgeson, Lee’s Summit, Missouri, on the brief), for Appellant.
Stephen D. Hawke, Jefferson City, Missouri, argued, for Appellees.
Before: BEAM, HEANEY, and FAGG, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Joseph Boston, a Missouri prisoner, appeals the district court's order denying Boston's petition for writ of habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1996). We affirm.
On appeal, Boston contends his criminal trial was constitutionally flawed because the jury panel selected for his case did not represent a fair cross-section of the community. In denying Boston's § 2254 petition, the district court stated:
The Missouri Court of Appeals rejected [Boston's fair cross-section claim because]: "The selection of jurors here, although irregular and not strictly by statute, did not destroy the randomness of the selection procedure. The procedure used substantially complied with the statute, and the jury that served was [a] fair cross-section." [State v. Boston, 910 S.W.2d 306, 313 (1995) ].
The state court's resolution of [Boston's] claims regarding jury composition was not based upon "an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence" or a misapplication of "clearly established Federal law." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and (2).
Having considered the record, the briefs, and the parties' arguments, we agree that the jury selection process was a random one because, as Bowersox states in his brief, "the jury's supervisores decision to] sen[d] the first forty-five members of the 'qualified jury list' to arrive at the courthouse to [the trial judge's courtroom for jury selection in Boston's case] . was not race-based or gender-based; instead, it was numerical . and there was certainly no systematic exclusion." See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364, 99 S.Ct. 664, 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979) (to establish violation of fair cross-section requirement, petitioner must show distinctive group in community was systematically excluded in jury selection process).
We thus affirm the district court's denial of Boston's petition for writ of habeas corpus. See 8th Cir.R. 47B.