Case Name: Eiden, Special Administrator, Respondent, vs. Hovde and wife, Appellants
Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Wisconsin
Decision Date: 1952-02-05
Citations: 260 Wis. 573
Docket Number: 
Parties: Eiden, Special Administrator, Respondent, vs. Hovde and wife, Appellants.
Judges: 
Reporter: Wisconsin Reports
Volume: 260
Pages: 573–588

Head Matter:
Eiden, Special Administrator, Respondent, vs. Hovde and wife, Appellants.
January 9
February 5, 1952.
For the appellants there was a brief by Curran & Curran of Mauston, and oral argument by Charles P. Curran.
For the respondent there was a brief by Doar & Knowles of New Richmond, and oral argument by Warren P. Knowles III.
Motion for rehearing denied, with $25 costs, on April 8, 1952.

Opinion:
Martin, J.
The complaint herein alleges a conspiracy . among the nephews and nieces of August Anderson, the purpose of which was to deprive the rightful heirs and beneficiaries of their share of the property of the deceased; that the appellants and others conspired to prevail upon August Anderson to deed all of his real estate to his nieces and nephews; that the grantor was aged, infirm, mentally incompetent, and susceptible to undue influence; and that the appellants, together with others, did exercise undue influence upon him and prevailed upon him to convey said real estate to them.
It further alleges that, by reason of said conspiracy, August Anderson was wholly destitute and died insolvent; that the respondent is unable to pay decedent's creditors or the expense of his last sickness and burial, and that there are no assets out of which to pay the bequests under the will; that the deed and transactions in reference thereto were a fraud upon the grantor as well as his rightful heirs and the persons named as legatees in the will, and upon the federal and state inheritance tax divisions.
We have searched the record and find no evidence of any kind to sustain the allegations of conspiracy. It does not disclose any evidence of a meeting of the minds by the persons named in the complaint to accomplish a common purpose. The deed involved m this action was dated March 15, 1947; seven others, copies of which are exhibits here, are dated in December, 1947. August Anderson took them to the bank, executed and acknowledged them on February 26, 1948. The fact that he executed them all at one time is not in itself sufficient evidence of conspiracy among the grantees. So far as the appellant Sydney B. Hovde is concerned, he was out of the state and a student at Michigan State College when the deed was drawn and when it was executed.
"Although, of necessity, a finding of conspiracy may be inferred from established facts and circumstances, there must be some basis on which a finding of the conspiracy may rest. There must be more than a mere suspicion or conjecture. Boyce v. Independent Cleaners, Inc. (1932), 206 Wis. 521, 240 N. W. 132." Scheit v. Duffy (1946), 248 Wis. 174, 176, 21 N. W. (2d) 257.
Neither do we find any evidence of undue influence. According to the testimony of Selma Anderson, sister of the grantor, the parents of Sydney Hovde had told August Anderson on several occasions early in 1948 that he should make deeds because "they couldn't break them." The only construction that can be placed on these conversations is that they were advising a method of distribution of Anderson's property.
Respondent has failed to prove that August Anderson was a person unquestionably subject to undue influence. No witness testified to mental incompetence, although the decedent was eighty-six years old when he died. The record discloses testimony that he was "quite independent and somewhat hard to convince," that he was competent to make a will on March 20, 1947 (the deed here was drawn on March 15, 1947), that he was "normal and competent" in June and July of 1948, that he was "a pretty shrewd business man" in the spring of 1948, and that "he knew what he was talking about" in January of 1949, the month before he died. So far as his physical condition is concerned, although some witnesses testified that August Anderson had "failed," was "feeble" and "in poor health," there is also testimony to the effect that "he was up and around and had his meals at the table regularly," that he "cleaned up the yard and cut down trees to pass the time," that when one of the witnesses visited him he was pulling nails out of lumber.
August Anderson kept the deed in his possession eleven months, from March 15, 1947, to February 26, 1948, before he executed it, and it was not until sometime in September, 1948, after an interval of another seven months, that he delivered it to the appellant Sydney Hovde. Under these circumstances, it does not appear that any alleged influence exercised to accomplish the making of the deed robbed the grantor of the right to exercise his own judgment in regard thereto.
It might be argued that there is evidence of undue influence in the fact that the disposition of grantor's property by the deeds is different from the disposition provided for in his various wills, particularly the last will. However, this court has said in Deck v. Deck (1900), 106 Wis. 470, 472, 82 N. W. 293:
"This court held, many years ago, that 'motives of natural affection and gratitude on the part of the testator, and solicitations or arguments which appeal to such motives, do not constitute undue influence.' In re Jackman's Will, 26 Wis. 104. In that case it was further held that: 'Undue influence in such a case is such an influence that the instrument is not properly an expression of the will of the testator in regard to the disposition of his property, but rather an expression of the will of another person.' To the same effect are Layman v. Conrey, 60 Md. 286; Matter of Mabie, 5 Misc. (N. Y.), 185; Stulz v. Schoeffle, 18 Eng. Law & Eq. 576. In this last case the testator, whose capacity was weakened to a certain extent by disease, was induced by the influence of his wife to alter his previous will, so as to be more favorable to her; but it was held that such influence was not undue, and further held that 'importunity, to have legal effect, must be in such a degree as to take away free agency from the testator.' In the case at bar the wife's influence, if exerted at all, was in favor of certain of her children, and in a way, apparently, to meet the approbation of the testator. Their reasons for making the will as they did were best known to themselves."
And in Cutler v. Cutler (1899), 103 Wis. 258, 264, 79 N. W. 240:
"The only object in making a will is to make a different disposition of property than that provided by statute. The right to dispose of property by will includes the right to disinherit brothers and sisters and nephews and nieces. The testator was not obliged to give any reason or explanation why he favored one relative over the others. If the will is the result of his free and voluntary act, then no relative has any legal ground for complaint." See also Drinkwine v. Gruelle (1904), 120 Wis. 628, 98 N. W. 534.
Respondent calls attention to a statement of the deceased in September of 1948 that "these people are taking me to the poor farm" in support of his allegation of undue influence. No indication was made as to who was meant by "these people." The record contains a list of several outlawed notes and mortgages upon which neither principal nor interest had been paid. It would be just as reasonable to infer that those debtors of decedent were the people who were sending him to the poor farm as to speculate that he meant the nieces and nephews who were grantees of the deeds he executed.
Fraud and undue influence must be proved by clear and satisfactory evidence, not by a mere preponderance. The burden of proof is "upon one charging undue influence, from first to last, to establish it by clear and satisfactory evidence." Will of Ball (1913), 153 Wis. 27, 37, 141 N. W. 8. Likewise, in an action to set aside a deed on the ground of undue influence, it has been held in numerous cases that the burden is upon the person charging such undue influence to establish it by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence. Hass v. Hass (1946), 248 Wis. 212, 21 N. W. (2d) 398, 22 N. W. (2d) 151; Will of Faulks (1945), 246 Wis. 319, 17 N. W. (2d) 423; Will of Puls (1945), 246 Wis. 660, 18 N. W. (2d) 321.
There is no evidence to sustain the allegations that August Anderson died insolvent and that there are not funds with which to pay creditors. On the contrary, the record shows an accumulation of $10,000 in the estate, and claims filed amount to some $7,000, of which one claim for $4,500 plus interest admittedly should be $3,200 plus interest. Whether there are assets sufficient to pay bequests to beneficiaries under the will is immaterial, since there is nothing in the record to show that the grantor was not fully aware of the effect of his acts.
We do not find it necessary to discuss the errors in instructions and rulings on evidence which are assigned by appellants since in our view of the case the evidence does not in any way meet the requirements of clear, satisfactory, and convincing proof necessary to set aside the deed, and we are assuming the jury verdict was merely advisory. There is not in the entire record even a preponderance of the evidence to show undue influence or fraud as alleged in the complaint.
By the Court. — Judgment reversed and cause remanded with directions to dismiss the complaint.