Case Name: Tarrant County v. James W. Lively
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1860-10
Citations: 25 Supp. Tex. 399
Docket Number: 
Parties: Tarrant County v. James W. Lively.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 25 Supp.
Pages: 399–403

Head Matter:
Tarrant County v. James W. Lively.
A defendant must show a valid excuse for failure to plead in time, in order to set aside a judgment by default.
A judgment by default establishes the cause of action, and leaves nothing remaining but to assess' the damages; and where the amount is shown in the written pleadings there is no necéssity for a jury.
Appeal from Tarrant. The case ivas tried before Hon. Hat. M. Burford, one of the district judges.
James W. Lively sued Tarrant county for $264, the amount contracted to be paid for a transcript of the record of the land office for Tarrant county. Ho answer being filed until the fifth day of the term, judgment was taken by default. But, on the fifth day of the term, an answer and plea in reconvention were filed, before the judgment had been entered on the record.
Defendant’s counsel moved to set aside the judgment, because he “forgot to file the same (answer) on or before the fourth day of the term,” and averring that the motion was not made for delay; that defendant had substantial defense, and that the plaintiff had no right to recover. Motion overruled, as also the motion for new trial.
Withers and Tyler, for appellant.
—1. The statute requires the answer to be filed on or before the fourth day, and after that a judgment may be entered by default; yet it is well settled, that the defendant may file his answer at any time before the judgment becomes final and is entered on the record. The amount of the judgment must be ascertained, either by the intervention of a jury or otherwise, before any judgment can be entered. A judgment by default means a final judgment, which settles the rights between the parties. In this case, the answer was filed on the morning of the fifth day, and only an hour or two after the appearance-docket had been called, but was called to the attention of the court before any entry whatever was made on the minutes of the court. And in order to execute the writ of inquiry, the plaintiff was under the necessity of having the case continued until the next term of the court, before he could have a definite judgment. Indeed, no judgment was rendered until the next term. We refer to 2 Tex., 196; 4 Tex., 305; 6 Tex., 227-229.
2. But, supposing the judgment by default properly taken, it is evident the court erred in refusing to set aside said judgment, because no injury whatever could possibly have resulted to the plaintiff, and by so doing a full trial, on the merits of the case, could have been had.
3. Ho proposition is better settled than this, that the aUegata et probata must correspond, and the proof must accord with the pleadings. Hence, the court erred in permitting proof to be introduced, tending to show that the original contract had been waived. The plaintiff in his petition relies on the original contract, and alleges as a condition precedent, the performance of said contract' on his part. Therefore, the proof that he did not perform, but that the performance was waived on the part of the defendant, was a complete variance. (1 G-reenl. Ev., § 66, p. 84.) Admitting there is no variance, still the court erred in permitting the acts of the county court to be proved by parol. It is a court of record, and its acts can be proved only by its record. The chief justice and county commissioners may, each and* all, when not in court, agree to a contract, yet that agreement is not binding unless done in open court and entered on the record. The records, therefore, being the best and only evidence of their acts, must be produced. (16 Tex., 470; 1 Greenl. Ev., § 86, p. 110.) The acceptance by the county court, even if properly proved, is not such a waiver of the original contract as to authorize the plaintiff to recover the contract price. The plaintiff could not recover on the contract, yet, perhaps, he might recover a reasonable compensation for work and labor done, abating such damages as the county had sustained by the breach of the contract on the part of the plaintiff. Hence, the court erred in its instructions on this point. (Story on Cont., 23; Conrad v. Conrad, 2 Virg. Cases, 138; Green v. Reynolds, 2 Johns. 207; Stark, on Ev., tit. Assump., 68; 2 Greenl. Ev., 124, § 136 and notes.)
A. Y. Fowler, for appellee.
—A motion to set aside a judgment by default must contain at least three requisites: First, it must show a sufficient reason why the party had not filed his defense, and must be sworn to. (Sayles’ Pr., § 577, and cases cited; Cook v. Phillips, 18 Tex., 31.) The 1st cause assigned in the motion is the neglect of the attorney in not filing his answer in time. It has been frequently held, that the neglect of an attorney was no ground for relief, and no reason for disturbing judicial proceedings. (Sayles’ Pr., § 577.)
In the second cause assigned in the motion, it says, “ The defendant has substantial defense.” It will hardly require an argument to show that this does not comply with the law, which says that he must show a substantial defense. It is a universal rule of pleading, that the facts are to be stated, and the conclusions of law drawn by the court. I do not see how a legal affidavit could he made to such a statement of facts. Another fatal defect to this motion is, that it was filed at the June term of the court, 1859; it was not docketed or argued before the court till the January term, 1860, when the cause was regularly reached by the judge. (O. & W. Dig., Art. 513.)
In defendant’s motion for new trial, and in his assignment of errors, it is stated that the court refused to permit the defendant to introduce the records of the county court, to show that the transcript presented by defendant was rejected by the court. I have never seen or otherwise heard of such a record; and had there been such a record, I presume the attorney would have properly saved the ¡mint by bill of exceptions. I do not think this court can notice this point thus presented.
The only point in this case which deserves a notice from the court, is the bne presented -by defendant’s. exceptions to the admissibility of parol evidence to prove that the county court refused to pay or allow plaintiff’s claim. The act of May 11,1840, made each county in this State a body corporate, and pointed out the manner in which they might sue and be sued, &c. (O. & W. Dig., Art. 229, p. 77, et seq.)
The position of appellant is that, as “the county court is a court of record, its acts can only be proved by the record.” Even if this be correct as a general rule, it does not follow that the non-action or refusal to act must be proved by the record. The court was not under the control of the plaintiff; he could not compel them to place upon the record the fact'that they refused to receive this transcript. The unreasonableness of the proposition we think a sufficient answer.
The statute itself says, “ liabilities created by contract, in whatever form, by the county court or its agents, may be enforced.” (0. & W. Dig., Art. 236.) This would seem to imply that record evidence is not always necessary. If. there had been record evidence, the objection to parol should have been that there was better evidence of the fact; and, if there had been better evidence, it was peculiarly within the keeping of the defendant, and should have been produced by the defendant.
The old rule, that a corporation can only act by its seal or record, has long since been exploded, and now “ assumpsit on implied promises,” actions on the case for refusing to transfer stock", and the like, are frequently" sustained by parol proof. (2 Kent’s Com., 289, 6th ed., and note and cases cited.)

Opinion:
Wheeler, O. J.
—The court did not err in refusing to sot aside the judgment by default. The defendant showed excuse, which can be recognised as of any validity, for the failure to plead in time. (Dowell v. Winters, 20 Tex., 793.)
The judgment by default established the cause of action, and left nothing remaining hut to assess the damages. As the amount was evidenced by writing, there was no necessity for a jury. The rulings of the court upon evidence touching questions which had been established by the default are immaterial, and need not he revised.
There is no error in the judgment, and it is
Affirmed.