Case Name: PEOPLE v. JEFFRIES
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1972-03-27
Citations: 39 Mich. App. 506
Docket Number: Docket No. 10796
Parties: PEOPLE v JEFFRIES
Judges: Before: Fitzgerald, P. J., and R. B. Burns and Targonski, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 39
Pages: 506–517

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v JEFFRIES
Opinion op the Court
1. Criminal Law — On-the-Street Questioning — Warnings of Rights.
A defendant’s statement that he possessed an unregistered gun, made in answer to a question by police officers who had followed him out of a cafe and stopped him on the street after being told by an informant that a person fitting the defendant’s description had been waving a pistol around in the cafe, was voluntarily given and properly admitted at defendant’s trial for carrying a concealed weapon, even though the defendant had not been advised of his constitutional rights before the question, where the defendant was merely asked to stop and asked one question, which he readily answered and neither police officer had his gun drawn nor made any threatening gestures, because the defendant was not substantially deprived of his freedom of action.
References for Points in Headnotes
21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law, § 484 et seq.
47 Am Jur, Searches and Seizures § 12.
5 Am Jur 2d, Arrest § 40.
5 Am Jur 2d, Arrest § 13.
5 Am Jur 2d, Arrest § 46.
5 Am Jur 2d, Arrest § 1.
5 Am Jur 2d, Arrest § 46.
5 Am Jur 2d, Arrest § 40.
29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 764.
2. Criminal Law — Stop and Frisk.
Police officers are authorized to stop and frisk a person when they are conducting legitimate investigations of suspicious circumstances and where the officers reasonably fear for their safety.
3. Criminal Law — Stop and Frisk — Evidence—Admissibility.
A pistol recovered by police officers from the defendant’s pocket was properly admitted into evidence at the defendant’s trial for carrying a concealed weapon where the officers had followed the defendant out of a cafe and stopped him on the street after being told by an informant that a person fitting the defendant’s description had been waving a gun around in the cafe, the defendant identified himself, giving the name reported by the informant, the officers asked the defendant if he had a gun, the defendant said he did, and when he began to reach into his pocket, one officer stopped him and removed the pistol from the defendant’s pocket, because the officers had reasonable suspicion to frisk the defendant.
Dissent by Targonski, J.
4. Arrest — Without Warrant — Probable Cause.
The question of the existence of reasonable or probable cause to make an arrest without a warrant is best determined from the analysis of the statute providing for the necessary elements in an affidavit for a search warrant (MOLA 764.15, 780.653).
5. Arrest — Without Warrant — Probable Cause — Informants— Credibility.
Probable cause to malee an arrest without a warrant based upon information supplied by an informant requires that the information be reliable, that it comes from a credible person, and that the informant have personal Imowledge of the matters reported (MOLA 764.15, 780.653).
6. Arrest — Restraint of Freedom.
A defendant was effectively placed under arrest where police officers in uniform, who had followed the defendant out of a cafe onto the street after having been told by an unidentified informant that a person fitting the defendant’s description had been waving a gun around in the cafe, ashed the defendant to stop and identify himself.
7. Arrest — Without Warrant — Probable Cause — Informants— Credibility.
Police officers lacked probable cause to arrest a defendant without warrant where the arrest took place when the officers stopped the defendant on the street after following him out of a cafe in which a person fitting the defendant’s description had been waving a gun around according to information supplied by an unidentified informant, it was not shown that the officers knew the informant or that he was a credible source, and the officers had no other grounds to believe that the defendant had committed or was about to commit a felony (UCLA 764.15, 780.653).
8. Searches and Seizures — Arrest—Without Warrant — Fruits of Illegal Arrest.
A pistol seised by a police officer from a defendant’s pocket did not justify the arrest of the defendant and was inadmissible at the defendant’s trial for carrying a concealed weapon where the police officers had been told by an unidentified person that they did not know, that a person fitting the defendant’s description had been waving a gun around in a cafe, the officers observed the defendant leave the cafe and stopped him on the street, the defendant identified himself, giving the name reported by the informant, the officers asked the defendant if he had a gun, the defendant said that he did, and when the defendant began to reach into his pocket one of the officers stopped him and removed the pistol from the defendant’s pocket the pistol was the fruit of an arrest without a warrant unsupported by probable cause, because there was no information shown upon which to conclude that the informant was credible (UCLA 764.15, 780.653).
9. Criminal Law — Nonjury Trial — Preliminary Examination Transcript.
It is reversible error, as an absolute rule, for the trial court sitting without a jury to refer to the transcript of testimony taken at the preliminary examination except where the reference is made pursuant to the statute allowing the transcript to be considered because of the unavailability of a witness (UCLA 768.S6).
10. Criminal Law — Nonjury Trial — Preliminary Examination Transcript.
The Court of Appeals has an obligation as a matter of law to raise sua aponte the issue of the reading of the preliminary transcript by the trial court sitting in a nonjury criminal trial where the reading of the transcript was not due to the unavailability of a witness; the reading of the transcript by the trial judge in such circumstances is reversible error.
Appeal from Kalamazoo, Wade Yan Yalkenburg, J.
Submitted Division 3 January 6, 1972, at Grand Rapids.
(Docket No. 10796.)
Decided March 27, 1972.
Robert L. Jeffries was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon. Defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, Donald A. Burge, Prosecuting Attorney, and Robert L. Bangle, Chief Appellate Attorney, for the people.
Richard J. Howard, for defendant on appeal.
Before: Fitzgerald, P. J., and R. B. Burns and Targonski, JJ.
Former circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment pursuant to Const 1963, art 6, § 23 as amended in 1968.

Opinion:
Fitzgerald, P. J.
On the evening of October 11, 1969, a police officer for the City of Kalamazoo was approached by an unidentified male and told, that an individual by the name of Robert L. Jeffries was waving a pistol around in a nearby cafe. He and another officer then proceeded to enter the cafe where they observed an individual fitting the description as related by the unknown informant. The suspect then proceeded to leave the bar and walk down the street and the two police officers who had followed him, asked him to stop and identify himself. The suspect identified himself as Robert Jeffries.
When asked if he was carrying a pistol, the defendant answered, "Yes, sir, I have a gun. I don't have papers for it. A colored fellow gave it to me at McKerring's". The suspect then started to reach into his left hand pocket and the police officer stopped him and removed from the pocket a small caliber pistol. The suspect was then arrested and read his Miranda rights.
Prior to trial, the defendant made a motion to suppress his statement that he did possess a gun, and also to suppress the pistol itself. The defendant contended that these pieces of evidence were the result of an illegal search and seizure. The judge denied the motion to suppress.
On October 14, 1970, the defendant was tried on a charge of carrying a concealed weapon. The judge, sitting as trier of fact, found the defendant guilty, and sentenced him to two years probation.
On appeal, defendant contends that his conviction was obtained through the use of illegally obtained evidence, arguing that when the police officers stopped him, he was under arrest. He theorizes that at that point, he was so substantially deprived of his liberty that it was an in-custody interrogation and since he was not given his Miranda rights, the statement he made referring to possession of a gun should have been suppressed.
Defendant also claims that because the above-mentioned statement could not be used, the police officers did not have probable cause to stop him and make a search and an arrest. As a result, he says, the gun found was illegally obtained evidence and under the rule of Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643; 81 S Ct 1684; 6 L Ed 2d 1081 (1961), the evidence should have been suppressed.
Defendant further argues that the case of Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1; 88 S Ct 1868; 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968), should not apply in that the facts of the present case show that the police officers were motivated hy a desire to seek evidence rather than by any fear for their own protection.
The defendant's contention that this is an in-custody interrogation cannot be sustained. Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436, 439; 86 S Ct 1602, 1609; 16 L Ed 2d 694, 704 (1966), specifically states that "we deal with the admissibility of statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial police interrogation". Further on in the case, the Court announced that:
"General on the scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the fact finding process is not affected by our holding." 384 US at 477; 86 S Ct at 1629; 16 L Ed 2d at 725.
In the case at hand, the police officers merely asked the defendant to stop. He was only asked one question, and the answer was readily given to the police officers. Neither officer had his gun drawn nor made any threatening gestures.
Under the above facts, it is clear that the defendant was not substantially deprived of his freedom of action, nor was he threatened or coerced into making any kind of a statement; therefore, it should be found that the defendant's statement was voluntarily given and properly admitted into evidence.
As to the defendant's contention that the search was illegal, this also cannot be sustained. The case of Terry v Ohio, supra, authorizes police officers to stop and frisk an individual when they are conducting legitimate investigations of suspicious circumstances, and where the officers reasonably fear for their safety. The officers had reasonable suspicion to frisk the defendant. The police conduct in this case cannot be grounds for reversal.
The case of Orozco v Texas, 394 US 324; 89 S Ct 1095; 22 L Ed 2d 311 (1969), relied on by defendant is not analogous. The fact that the Orosco case followed a shooting and related to subsequent investigations removes it from serious consideration as controlling precedent in the instant case.
Affirmed.
R. B. Burns, J., concurred.
MCLA 750.227; MSA 28.424.