Case Name: Eliza Sands, Resp't, v. Derrick W. Sparling et al., as Administrators, etc., App'lts
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1894-12-04
Citations: 63 N.Y. St. Rep. 558
Docket Number: 
Parties: Eliza Sands, Resp’t, v. Derrick W. Sparling et al., as Administrators, etc., App’lts.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 63
Pages: 558–560

Head Matter:
Eliza Sands, Resp’t, v. Derrick W. Sparling et al., as Administrators, etc., App’lts.
(Supreme Court, General Term, Third Department,
Filed December 4, 1894.)
1. Husband and wipe—Services op wipe.
A wife, who takes boarders upon her husband’s promise that she might have the pay, may recover for such board.
2. Witness—! 829.
A husband, who promised his wife that, if she would take decedent to board, she might have the compensation therefor, is not an assignor of such claim within the meaning of § 829 of the Code.
3. Evidence—Opinion.
When a description of the board furnished -is given by one witness only, uncontradicted and consists of but one sentence, it is not error to allow witnesses to testify as to the value of ordinary board and that the kind furnished to decedent, as stated by the first witness, is ordinary board,
4. Appeal—First instance.
To raise the question of the impropriety of such testimony, the specific objection that the question was not a hypothetical one, should be interposed at the trial.
Appeal from a judgment on the report of a referee in favor of plaintiff.
William Lounsbery, for app’lts; Charles Irwin, for resp’t.

Opinion:
Putman, J.
This action was brought for board furnished by plaintiff to defendants' intestate for 47 weeks from 1884 to 1890. The claim was presented to defendants as administrators, disputed by them, and referred under the statute. On the trial it appeared that the board was furnished by plaintiff at her home, where she lived with her husband, She carried on no separate business. A witness testified without objection that deceased boarded with plaintiff during the time mentioned,-and to conversations between deceased and plaintiff indicating that deceased expected to pay plaintiff for her board; and plaintiff's husband testified that, at the time of the first conversation between plaintiff and deceased in reference to-board, he told his wife, if she did the work, she should have the pay; that he had no interest in it whatever. The referee held that plaintiff was. entitled to recover for 35 weeks' board, and, on his report, judgment was entered accordingly.
While, ordinarily, when the wife lives with her husband, and has no separate business, a claim for board in the family would belong to the husband, yet it has been determined that a contract between the husband and wife, by which he allows her to board a party and receive compensation therefor, is valid. In re Kimmer 14 St. Rep. 618; Burley v. Barnhard, 9 St. Rep. 587; Bowers v. Smith, 28 St. Rep. 346; 8 N. Y. Supp. 226. See Birkbeck v. Ackroyd, 74 N. Y. 356. We think, under the evidence in the case, the referee was justified in determining that the plaintiff was the owner of the claim for the board and services for which the action was brought
It is urged by the learned counsel for appellants that the referee erred in overruling the objections to testimony of plaintiff's husband as to personal transactions had by him with deceased ; that such testimony was incompetent, under the provisions of § 829 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But the witness was not the assignor of the claim against deceased, under which the action was brought. He never had any legal interest in such claim. Under the evidence in the case, the plaintiff was the only person who ever had any demand against the deceased; hence, the provisions of § 829 of the Code of Civil Procedure did not apply. Burley v. Barnhard, 9 St. Rep. 587; Porter v. Dunn, 43 id. 193.
It is further urged by the defendants that the court erred in receiving testimony as to the value of the board furnished the deceased. On the trial, Austin Sands, the husband of plaintiff, in answer to the question, " What kind of board was furnished for that period?" answered: 'Beefsteak, ham and eggs, pie and cake, vegetables,—and sometimes something extra,—coffee, tea, bread and butter, and ordinary table board." On cross-examination by defendants' counsel, the following question was asked: "In speaking of board, you have said, ' Milk, potatoes and ordinary board ?' " to which the witness answered, "Yes, and beefsteak." This is the only evidence given on the trial descriptive of the kind of board furnished, and it was not contradicted. The plaintiff, immediately after the giving of such testimony, produced two witnesses who testified that five dollars per week was the value of ordinary board; that the board furnished deceased, as testified by Austin Sands, was ordinary board,—which is another way of stating that the kind of board which Austin Sands had testified was furnished deceased was worth five dollars per week. Doubt-, less, the more proper way to have shown the value of the board would have been to have proposed a hypothetical question, in which the board furnished was described as sworn by the witness. Reynolds v. Robinson, 64 N. Y. 589; Link v. Sheldon, 136 id. 1; 48 St. Rep. 820; People v. McElvaine, 121 N. Y. 250; 30 St. Rep. 977. But in a peculiar case like this, where a description of the board furnished was only given by one witness, was uncontradicted, and consisted of but one sentence, we do not think that the referee erred in the ruling he made. We are of opinion that in this case the doctrine laid down by Danforth, J., in Seymour v. Fellows, 77 N. Y. 181, applies. The learned judge, in delivering the opinion of the court, used the following languge: "In Reynolds v. Robinson, 64 N. Y. 595, the question was subject to the same objection. The witness had heard the testimony of two physicians, and had heard read the evidence of another. He was then asked for his opinion. It is obvious that it must be made up, if at all, upon the weight of evidence, the comparison of testimony, ,and his estimate of the accuracy and reliability of the witnesses from whose narration he was to form an opinion. He was required to consider the evidence detailed by a group of witnesses, and eliminate what to him seemed material from the irrelevant. But none of these objections exist in this case. The question directed the attention of the witness to the testimony of a single witness upon a single subject, and was not other, in effect, than it would have been if the counsel had recited the statement of services rendered by the party, and, on that statement, asked an opinion of their value. As was held in McCollum v. Seward, supra, 1 This was equivalent to a question, assuming that the services rendered were as described by the witness, what they were worth.' " See, also, McCollum v. Seward, 62 N. Y. 316.
We are also inclined to believe now that, if it was improper for the referee to allow the witness to express an opinion based on what he had just heard the witness testify, the specific objection that the question was not a hypothetical one should have been interposed. Winters v. McMahon, 23 W. Dig. 119, 120.
We conclude that the judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
All concur*.