Case Name: STATE of Florida upon the relation of DADE COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State, Petitioner, v. Honorable Fred O. DICKINSON, Jr., as Comptroller of the State of Florida, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1969-11-03
Citations: 230 So. 2d 130
Docket Number: No. 38968
Parties: STATE of Florida upon the relation of DADE COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State, Petitioner, v. Honorable Fred O. DICKINSON, Jr., as Comptroller of the State of Florida, Respondent.
Judges: ROBERTS and BOYD, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 230
Pages: 130–143

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida upon the relation of DADE COUNTY, a political subdivision of the State, Petitioner, v. Honorable Fred O. DICKINSON, Jr., as Comptroller of the State of Florida, Respondent.
No. 38968.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Nov. 3, 1969.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 2, 1970.
Thomas C. Britton and Stuart Simon, Miami, for petitioner.
Larry Levy, Asst. Gen. Counsel, for respondent.
Allen Clements, Jr., Miami Beach, for intervenors.
Daniel P. S. Paul, Miami, as amicus curiae.

Opinion:
CARLTON, Justice.
Petitioner, Dade County, seeks a peremptory writ of mandamus in original proceedings requiring the Comptroller to approve, without further delay, its proposed 1969— 1970 County budget, including its millage rate of 11.75 mills.
The proposed budget was prepared by appropriate county officials and submitted to the Comptroller for his approval in accordance with Fla.Stat. § 129.03(2) (e), F.S.A. The Comptroller took exception to the budget "for the reason that said budget appears to be in conflict with the millage limitation found in Chapter 67-395, Laws of Florida, (Sections 193.321-193.327, Florida Statutes [F.S.A.])." Under protest, the County adopted a second budget based upon a millage rate satisfactory to the Comptroller and shortly thereafter it initiated these proceedings.
The litigants have framed the point of argument thusly:
"Does Dade County, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, have the power to levy a countywide millage of up to 20 mills for the County, District and Municipal purposes it effects pursuant to Section 193.325, Florida Statutes [F.S. A.], regardless of any millages that may be separately imposed by municipalities in Dade County?"
We think it is well-settled that Dade County can provide both county-wide and municipal functions and services as provided for in its Charter and in accord with general law. Home Rule for Dade, authorized by Fla.Const. art, VIII § 11 (1885), F.S.A., is preserved under the new Constitution by art. VIII § 6(e) and (f). Further, in the recent case of State ex rel. Dade Co. v. Brautigam, 224 So.2d 688 (Fla.1969), we declared that the County is vested with the rights and prerogatives of a regular municipality. We do not doubt, therefore, that the County may avail itself of the twenty-mill non-election aggregate limitation on county and municipal taxation as provided for under Article VII, § 9(b) of our Constitution and Chapter 67-395, Laws of Florida, 1967.
We do doubt, however, that Dade County is exempt from having to recognize that the article and chapters cited impose a twenty-mill non-election aggregate ceiling which embraces in single application both the County and the twenty-seven municipalities within it. We think it necessary at this point to discuss at length the background of the article and chapters cited in order that the reason for our judgment may be clearly understood.
County and municipal governments in Florida have long been hard pressed to fund the budgets they deem necessary for meeting our phenomenal population expansion, constantly rising costs and ever growing demands for public services. Indeed this is a general governmental problem that knows no city, county or state boundaries. See, e. g., Januta, Municipal Revenue Crisis: California Problems and Possibilities, 56 Calif.L.Rev. 1525-58 (1968) and Davies, Financing Urban Functions and Services, 30 Law & Contemporary Problems, 127-61 (1965).
In the past decade, the counties and municipalities of this State have followed the national trend of relying upon the property tax as a prime resource of steady revenue. In 1967 more than 70 percent, of the total tax revenues for American cities was produced by property tax revenues. Anderson, Urban Financial Resources: Changes and Challenges, 8 Current Municipal Problems, 271-85, 272 (Feb.1967). Florida has followed this trend primarily because of its tax structure and certain political realities. See Horwich, Florida Taxation: A State in Chains, 21 U.Miami L.Rev. 36-59 (1966).
Recently, because of our State's unparalleled growth in every area, the pressure exerted upon governmental services at all levels has become inordinate; consequently, property, as the prime source of local tax revenue, has been taxed to the limit. It is common knowledge that this process has resulted in seething resentment by taxpayers and mounting resistance to property taxation excesses not only in Florida, but throughout the nation as well. See, e. g., the article In States, Cities: A Cry for Services, a Revolt on Taxes appearing in 5 Current Municipal Problems 122-24, (May 1964). This situation has been further exacerbated by the impact of full valuation.
As Jefferson once said, "The purse is the seat of public sensibility." Accordingly, in the 1966 general elections the subject of tax relief was widely touted as the primary task facing the new post-election legislature, and many a candidate embraced the cause.
Subsequently, in July 1967 the legislature enacted two new chapters concerning taxation which were scheduled to take effect in January 1968. The first chapter, Ch. 67-395, Laws of Florida (1967) dealt primarily with county ad valorem taxation. The preamble stated that the legislature desired "to limit the overall millage that may be levied for county and district purposes to a specified millage The sections of Ch. 67-395 that follow are relevant to the disposition of this cause.
The initial section (Fla.Stat. § 193.321 (1), (2), F.S.A.) limited "aggregate ad valorem tax millage" levied by counties and districts to a maximum of ten (10) mills. In counties lacking a budget commission, the county commissioners were given power to apportion millages where necessary, "so as not to exceed the maximum millage provided herein
Section 2 (Fla.Stat. § 193.322, F.S.A.) provided that a millage rate over the ten mill limitation could be levied only upon approval by property-holders in a referendum for that purpose.
Section 4 (Fla.Stat. § 193.324(1), (2), F. S.A.) provided for a limited grace period for any county whose millage rate exceeded the ten-mill limit, but also provided that this excess could not be increased during the grace period except by vote of the property-holders. Counties undergoing total revaluation were exempted from the millage limitation until that process was completed.
Section 5 (Fla.Stat. § 193.325, F.S.A.) is of vital importance and, therefore, is given in full.
"Section 5. Nothing contained herein shall be construed to conflict with nor repeal sections 193.03 and 193.031, Florida Statutes, provided however, the provisions of section 193.031, Florida Statutes, shall not prevent an increase of millage approved in section 2 hereof. Those cities or counties which now or hereafter provide both municipal and county services as authorized under sections 9, 10, 11 and 24, or similar sections hereafter adopted, of Article VIII of the Florida constitution, shall have the right to levy for county, district and municipal purposes a millage up to twenty (20) mills on the dollar of assessed valuation under this section. For each increase in the county millage above ten (10) mills which is attributable to an assumption of municipal services by a county having 'home rule,' or for each increase in the municipal millage above ten (10) mills which is attributable to an assumption of county services by a city having 'home rule,' there shall be a decrease in the millage levied by each and every municipality which has a service or services assumed by the county, or by the county which has a service or services assumed by the city. Such decrease shall be equal to the cost of that service or services assumed, so that an amount equal to that cost shall be eliminated from the budget of the county or city giving up the performance of such service or services." (Emphasis supplied.)
Finally, in Section 7 (Fla.Stat. § 193.327, F.S.A.) the legislature announced that it "hereby finds and determines that taxation on real and tangible personal property above the rate of two percent. (2%) or twenty (20) mills is oppressive." The legislature went on to note that oppressive millage rates existed in many areas "in which the combined millage levied against real and tangible personal property by the various taxing authorities, including boards of county commissioners, municipalities, and various other districts and boards, far exceeds" twenty mills. Finally, the legislature declared its intent to provide replacement revenues by a certain time so that ad valorem millages levied by local governments would not exceed an aggregate or total of twenty mills.
In essence this chapter was a declaration that county millage rates had exceeded the people's tolerance; further that the combined millages levied against real or tangible personal property by "the various taxing authorities, including boards of county commissioners, municipalities and various other districts and boards" would be considered oppressive if over twenty mills, unless approved by vote of the property-holders. So strong was the intent to establish a state-wide millage ceiling that the chapter specifically required an automatic readjustment in millages whenever a "home rule" city or county exceeded the 10-mill limitation by taking on any function previously rendered by the entity which surrendered the function.
Chapter 67-396, Laws of Florida (1967), the second of the two tax relief chapters, dealt with the other side of the tax coin, i. e., municipal millage limitations. The sections of this chapter are analogues of the sections in the chapter dealing with counties.
Section 1 (Fla.Stat. § 167.441, F.S.A.) commands that "No municipality shall levy ad valorem taxes for real and tangible personal property in excess of one percent (1%) of the assessed value thereof (10 mills)
Section 2 (Fla.Stat. § 167.442, F.S.A.) provides that the ten mill limitation can be exceeded only upon approval of property-holders through a referendum.
Section 3 (Fla.Stat. § 167.443, F.S.A.) is of vital importance and, therefore, is given in full.
"Section 3. In the event any municipality should lose revenue through the loss of a proprietary activity or other source of revenue, the governing body of the municipality is authorized to increase the mileage in an amount sufficient to restore such loss of revenue. In the event any municipality should relinquish any governmental function to a county or other governmental body, the governing body of such municipality shall reduce the millage in an amount which will equal the cost of such governmental function." (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 4 (Fla.Stat. § 167.444, F.S.A.) provided for a limited grace period for any municipality whose millage rate exceeded the ten-mill limit, but also provided that this excess could not be increased during the grace period except by vote of the property-holders.
By the foregoing statutes, counties and municipalities are both restrained from levying ad valorem taxation in excess of ten mills singly, twenty mills jointly, except where approved by referendum of the property-holders directly affected. Limited grace periods are provided so that, where necessary, budgetary adjustments can be made in an orderly fashion; but adjustments in excess of authorized limitations must be accomplished through a referendum. The "home-rule" counties and "home-rule" cities are not exempt from these limitations. See and compare Fla.Stat. § 193.-325 and 167.443, F.S.A. set out in full above. Note also Op.Atty.Gen. Fla. 068-87 (July 23, 1968) wherein it is stated that "the obvious legislative intent expressed in both Chapters 67-395 and 67-396, Laws of Florida, 1967" was to impose "a definite millage maximum on ad valorem taxation." (Emphasis in original.)
The proposed Constitution was under consideration when the legislature enacted the chapters discussed above. Subsequently, this same legislature adopted a joint resolution proposing the new Constitution at the special session of June 24 — July 3, 1968. Contained within this new Constitution was a tax relief section, § 9(b), under the Finance and Taxation Article, Article VII, which was largely without antecedent in the 1885 Constitution. In the 1885 Constitution the only millage limitation analogous to the 1968 limitations was for school districts under Art. XII, § 8: "Each county shall be required to assess and collect annually for the support of the public free schools therein a tax of not less than three (3) mills, not more than ten (10) mills on the dollar on all taxable property in the same."
Section 9(b) is as follows:
"Ad valorem taxes, exclusive of taxes levied for the payment of bonds and taxes levied for periods not longer than two years when authorized by vote of the electors who are the owners of freeholds therein not wholly exempt from taxation, shall not be levied in excess of the following millages upon the assessed value of real estate and tangible personal property: for all county purposes, ten mills; for all municipal purposes, ten mills; for all school purposes, ten mills; and for special districts a millage authorized by law approved by vote of the electors who are owners of freeholds therein not wholly exempt from taxation. A county furnishing municipal services may, to the extent authorised by law, levy additional taxes within the limits fixed for municipal purposes." (Emphasis supplied.)
Dauer, Donovan and Kammerer offer the following valid commentary regarding this change in Should Florida Adopt the Proposed 1968 Constitution? An Analysis, Studies in Public Administration No. 31, U. of Fla. Public Administration Clearing Service, at 28:
"Section 9(b) represents a drastic departure from the present constitutional provisions governing local taxes, which set millage limitations only for school taxes. In its 1966 draft constitution the Committee on Constitutional Revision modified these limits as they apply to schools but did not go beyond this. Why then did the legislature take the drastic step of setting limits for each unit of local government ? Undoubtedly, this reflects the public reaction to the sharp increases in tax bills incurred by many following assessment of their properties at full value. In many of the legislators' campaigns property tax limitation was a key issue."
The view that Section 9(b) presaged tax relief was widely expressed. In a review of the proposed constitution entitled, "A People's Constitution Will be Offered to the Voters" in 42 Fla.Bar J. 1038, 1040 (1968), under the bold type internal title "Taxes Held in Check and Rights Protected" the author announced: "Ad valorem taxes shall not exceed 10 mills for all county purposes, 10 mills for all municipal purposes, and 10 mills for all school purposes." In an analysis of the proposed Constitution prepared at the request of the legislature, the Legislative Reference Bureau observed: "Millages are limited to 10 mills for all county purposes, ten mills for municipal purposes and ten mills for school purposes. Bond millages are excluded, and additional millages without limitation are permitted if approved by freeholders paying taxes. Counties providing municipal services may be authorized to levy additional taxes."
We again turn to the position asserted by the County. Simply put, the County contends that it is authorized to perform both county functions and municipal functions and is, therefore, entitled to impose a millage of up to 20 mills •without qualification or restriction and regardless of any millage that might be lawfully imposed by the municipalities within the county. The County bases its claim to an unfettered twenty mills on what it considers to be the "plain meaning" of certain disembodied portions of Section S, Ch. 67-395 (Fla.Stat. § 193.325, F.S.A.) and of Article VII, § 9(b). Precisely, the County relies upon the second sentence appearing in Section 5, supra, and the last sentence appearing in Article VII, § 9(b), supra, as the basis for its claim.
We are concerned with the impact of the county's position upon the municipal property-holding taxpayer residing in Dade County. The County argues that while a non-home-rule county is limited to a ten-mill maximum without referendum for county purposes, and while a non-home-rule municipality is similarly limited, a home-rule county can tax up to an additional ten mills without referendum within a municipality in which it is providing, under home-rule, municipal services. Reduced to its simplest terms and excluding the referendum approach, this would mean that a Dade County citizen living in a municipality is subject to a maximum of ten mills levy by the County for county services, ten mills maximum levy by the municipality for its services, and an additional ten mills maximum for municipal services provided by the County under home-rule — a total of thirty mills for county and municipal purposes (to which one can add a ten-mill maximum for school purposes for a total of forty mills; school millage, of course, is not at issue here).
We cannot reconcile the County's position with what we consider to be the expressed will of the legislature and the people, as reflected in Article VII, § 9(b) and Chapters 67-395 and 67-396, Laws of Florida (1967).
The fundamental object in construing a constitutional provision is to ascertain and give effect to the intentions of the framers and adopters, and constitutional provisions must be interpreted in such a manner as to fulfill this intention rather than to defeat it. State ex rel. West v. Gray, 74 So.2d 114 (Fla.1954). In construing particular constitutional provisions, the object sought to be accomplished and the evils sought to be remedied should be kept in mind by the courts, and the provisions should be so interpreted as to accomplish, rather than to defeat such objects. State ex rel. West v. Gray, supra; Owens v. Fosdick, 153 Fla. 17, 13 So.2d 700 (Fla.1943).
It is our view that both the legislature and the people intended to limit ad valorem taxation for county and municipal purposes in all areas of the State to a twenty-mill maximum beyond which millages could be raised but only if approved by referendum of the tax-paying property-holders directly affected. Regardless of any question as to the wisdom of this approach in face of expanding needs for public services, the people have spoken both through the legislature and through their direct approval of Article VII, § 9(b) and their voice ought to be heard and heeded.
Home-rule governmental bodies were not exempted from this over-riding intent. The inclusion of home-rule provisions in Article VII, and in Chapters 67-395 and 67-396, were not intended as provisions for exception, but rather as a means of accommodating home-rule areas within the taxation limits. Article VII, § 9(b) states that, "A county furnishing municipal services may, to the extent authorized by law, levy additional taxes within the limits fixed for municipal purposes." (Emphasis supplied.) Note that Section 5, Ch. 67-395 (Fla.Stat. § 193.325, F.S.A.) and Section 3, Ch. 67-396 (Fla.Stat. § 167.443, F.S.A.) both require that, subject to certain conditions, when a governmental body surrenders a function to a home-rule entity, that governmental body must reduce its millage levy accordingly in order to reflect the decrease in its costs. These provisions for millage counterbalancing obviously were intended to preserve a uniform State-wide millage ceiling for all purposes.
We think that what has been said thus far amply demonstrates that the Comptroller has no clear, legal duty at this time to approve the County's tentative budget for fiscal 1969-1970. This being so, the writ heretofore issued in this Court should be discharged, and the petition for pre-emptory writ dismissed. We intend to do this.
However, we also recognize that discharging the writ does not resolve certain correlative problems necessarily involved in this cause. After the most careful consideration and extended study, we have concluded that these problems require comment.
We construe Fla.Const. art. VIII, § 11(1) (1885) which has been carried forward under Article VIII, § 6(e) of'the current constitution, and the Home Rule Charter for Metropolitan Dade County in its present form, as granting to Metropolitan Dade County a preeminent right, superseding the right of the various Dade municipalities, to determine and set whatever millage level is necessary for the support of the county-wide municipal purposes, functions and services which the County fulfills, provides or renders under the Charter. In practical effect, this means that each municipality must share jointly with the County in the ten mill limitation on millages levied "for all municipal purposes" under Article VII, § 9(b) without referendum. Once the County has determined the necessary millage for countywide municipal purposes, each municipality may then advance its necessary millage from that millage level onward up to the ten mill municipal ceiling without referendum. If the municipality requires a millage which, in combination with the County's millage for municipal purposes, exceeds the ten mill ceiling, then it would appear that the municipality bears the burden of the referendum.
The question then naturally arises, "How does one distinguish between county purposes and services, municipal purposes and services, and municipal purposes and services susceptible to county-wide administration by the Metropolitan Commissioners?" We have not conclusively answered this question, save on a piecemeal basis as various situations have been presented. See State ex rel. Dade County v. Brautigam, 224 So.2d 688 (Fla.1969); Dressel v. Dade County, 219 So.2d 716 (3rd DCA Fla.1969) which was adopted by this Court in 226 So.2d 402; City of Coral Gables v. Burgin, 143 So.2d 859 (Fla.1962); State v. Dade County, 142 So.2d 79 (Fla.1962); State v. Dade County, 127 So.2d 881 (Fla.1961); State v. City of Miami, 119 So.2d 785 (Fla.1960); City of Miami v. Keton, 115 So.2d 547 (Fla.1959); Miami Shores Village v. Cowart, 108 So.2d 468 (Fla.1958); Dade County v. Young Democratic Club of Dade County, 104 So.2d 636 (Fla.1958); and Dade County v. Kelly, 99 So.2d 856 (Fla.1957). These cases, when read in conjunction with the constitutional home-rule provisions and the Charter adopted thereunder, offer uncertain guidelines for determining the exact status of interlocal governmental relations in Dade County. This uncertainty, which arises from the wording of several constitutional provisions and the Charter, presents to the taxing authorities throughout Dade County an impediment which must be removed in the interest of sound and effective government. Involved here also, of course, is the possibility — however remote — that the County could seek to preempt the total ten mills provided for "all municipal purposes," and thus force the municipalities to establish their respective millages through a public referendum.
We are of the view that the dispelling of the uncertainty which exists regarding interlocal governmental relations in Dade County is a legislative task of the most pressing urgency, the import of which transcends the boundaries of Dade, inasmuch as home-rule for several areas is preserved under Article VIII, § 6(e), and the opportunity for consolidation has been expanded state-wide under Article VIII, § 3 of the current amended Constitution. This must be done, of course, by general law.
In summation, we have held today that the constitutional limitations of ten mills for all municipal purposes, and ten mills for all county purposes, is all inclusive and embraces home-rule and consolidated governments as well as traditional counties and municipalities; that Metropolitan Dade County is the preeminent taxing sovereignty in regard to its county-wide municipal services; that the demarcation between county purposes and municipal purposes is uncertain; and that the dispelling of this uncertainty is a most urgent and pressing legislative task.
The alternative writ heretofore issued in this cause is discharged and the petition is dismissed.
It is so ordered.
ROBERTS and BOYD, JJ., concur.
DREW, J., concurs specially with opinion.
ADKINS, J., dissents with opinion.
ERVIN, C. J., dissents with opinion and concurs with ADKINS, J.
THORNAL, J., dissents with opinion.