Case Name: STATE of Florida ex rel. Robert L. SHEVIN, Attorney General, et al., Appellants, v. INDICO CORPORATION, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1975-08-28
Citations: 319 So. 2d 173
Docket Number: No. W-456
Parties: STATE of Florida ex rel. Robert L. SHEVIN, Attorney General, et al., Appellants, v. INDICO CORPORATION, Appellee.
Judges: BOYER, C. J., concurs, and RAWLS, J., dissents.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 319
Pages: 173–179

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida ex rel. Robert L. SHEVIN, Attorney General, et al., Appellants, v. INDICO CORPORATION, Appellee.
No. W-456.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Aug. 28, 1975.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 20, 1975.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Kenneth F. Hoffman and Thomas A. Harris, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellants.
L. Charles Hilton, Jr., and Ralph Julian Bennett, Jr., Panama City, for appellee.

Opinion:
McCORD, Judge.
This is an interlocutory appeal from a final costs judgment entered subsequent to a final judgment on the merits of the case.
This was a suit brought by the State of Florida on the relation of the Attorney General filed against three developers along the Gulf coast of the State of Florida in Bay County seeking to abate an alleged public nuisance allegedly created by dune destruction and building so close to the water as to interfere with natural beach processes, including sand drift, thereby allegedly causing excessive erosion to the public and private beaches. Following a preliminary injunction hearing, at which the relief sought was denied, the state dropped two of the defendants as parties and with permission of the court, filed an amended complaint. Subsequently, the State of Florida Department of Administration, moved for intervention, such intervention being granted. Thereafter, a second amended complaint was filed by the two parties, the State of Florida on relation of the Attorney General and the State Department of Administration. The amended complaint alleged that the construction of Indico Corporation's Pinnacle Port Condominium project would create a public nuisance pursuant to § 60.05 and 823.05, Florida Statutes. In support of the allegation of public nuisance, the complaint alleged violation of county ordinances of Bay County (which made the Department of Legal Affairs the enforcing agent for the ordinances) and further alleged violations of coastal construction requirements under § 161.052, Florida Statutes, and violations of Development of Regional Impact requirements under Ch. 380, Florida Statutes, and regulations promulgated thereunder. The complaint in addition sought a ruling on certain matters under Ch. 380, Florida Statutes, as requested by the State of Florida, Department of Administration. Appellee's answer denied all allegations.
Subsequently, the State of Florida conceded that the development of the Pinnacle Port project had commenced prior to the enactment of the Bay County ordinances and that such ordinances therefore were not applicable to the project. The state also admitted that Indico Corporation's Pinnacle Port, when completed as planned, would not violate the 50-foot setback line imposed by § 161.052, Florida Statutes, and a summary judgment was entered for Indi-co on that issue and on the issue concerning the Bay County ordinances. The parties submitted the issues concerning Ch. 380, Florida Statutes, to the court on stipulated facts and Indico's motion for summary judgment which the court granted. The remaining unresolved issue which went to final hearing was whether or not the construction of Pinnacle Port, Phase I, would create a public nuisance as defined by the Laws of Florida. Following a four-day trial in which the court heard a number of expert witnesses, final judgment was entered for appellee, the court finding that the construction and development would not create a public nuisance. Costs were reserved for a further hearing and after such hearing, a final judgment taxing costs against the state for a total amount of $32,455.32 was entered. It is this cost judgment from which this interlocutory appeal is taken.
The Attorney General contends that costs should not have been assessed against him in this action brought under § 60.05, Florida Statutes, to abate an alleged public nuisance as defined by § 823.05, Florida Statutes. We agree. § 60.05 provides in pertinent part as follows:
"(1) When any nuisance as defined in § 823.05 exists, the attorney general or state attorney or any citizen of the county may sue in the name of the state on his relation to enjoin the nuisance, the person or persons maintaining it and the owner or agent of the building or ground on which the nuisance exists.
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(3) . . . If the action is brought by a citizen and the court finds that there was no reasonable ground for the action, the costs shall be taxed against the citizen.
(4) On trial if the existence of a nuisance is shown, the court shall issue a permanent injunction and order the costs to be paid by the persons establishing or maintaining the nuisance . . . "
The foregoing statute authorizes suit for the abatement of nuisances to be brought by the Attorney General, or State Attorney or any citizen of the county in the name of the state. It also specifies the parties against whom costs may be assessed — (1) a citizen bringing the suit if the court finds that there was no reasonable ground for the action, or (2) the person who establishes or maintains the nuisance if the existence of the nuisance is shown. Neither the Attorney General nor the State Attorney are mentioned as parties against whom costs may be assessed. The rule "expres-sio unius est exclusio alterius" (which means "express mention of one thing is the exclusion of the other") is an often applied and cardinal rule of statutory construction. Dobbs v. Sea Isle Hotel, Fla., 56 So.2d 341; Ideal Farms Drainage District v. Certain Lands, 154 Fla. 554, 19 So.2d 234; Bergh v. Stephens, Fla.App. (1st), 175 So.2d 787; Biddle v. State Beverage Department, Fla.App. (4th), 187 So.2d 65. The rule is applicable here. By express mention in the statute of those against whom costs may be assessed in an action for abatement of a nuisance, the legislature apparently intended to exclude from assessment of costs the two not mentioned — the Attorney General and the State Attorney. Evidently, the legislature wished to leave these two state officials free to attempt abatement of alleged public nuisances without the deterrent of having costs assessed against them if they are unsuccessful. The legislature did not even include them with the qualifying factor (reasonable grounds for the action) which it placed upon a citizen bringing such an action if the citizen were to escape assessment of costs against him.
Appellee contends that the opinion of the Supreme Court in Simpson v. Merrill, Fla., 234 So.2d 350 (which affirmed the opinion of this court) is controlling. There the Supreme Court held that under the general costs statute, § 57.041(1), Florida Statutes, costs may be taxed against the state and its agencies, in favor of the party recovering judgment. The Supreme Court said:
" . . . Florida Statutes § 57.041 F. S.A. provides for the recovery of legal costs by the party recovering the judgment in all cases except those specifically exempted. The exemptions in the statutes do not include the State or its agencies and we can find no basis for reading such an exemption into the plain language of the Act."
In the case sub judice, § 57.041 must be considered in pari materia with § 60.05. Upon doing so, we reach the inescapable conclusion that costs may not be taxed against the Attorney General or a State Attorney who brings an action to abate an alleged public nuisance.
Reversed.
BOYER, C. J., concurs, and RAWLS, J., dissents.