Case Name: Mrs. Josie HINTON v. Mrs. Marie McKEE, Executrix of Estate of Julius Roy McKee, Deceased
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1976-03-30
Citations: 329 So. 2d 519
Docket Number: No. 48463
Parties: Mrs. Josie HINTON v. Mrs. Marie McKEE, Executrix of Estate of Julius Roy McKee, Deceased.
Judges: Before PATTERSON, ROBERTSON and SUGG, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 329
Pages: 519–523

Head Matter:
Mrs. Josie HINTON v. Mrs. Marie McKEE, Executrix of Estate of Julius Roy McKee, Deceased.
No. 48463.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
March 30, 1976.
Rehearing Denied April 20, 1976.
Robertson, J., filed dissenting opinion in which Patterson, P. J., and Smith, J., concurred.
Melvin & Melvin, Leonard B. Melvin, Jr., Laurel, for appellant.
W. Vol Jones, William Vol Jones, Jr., Waynesboro, for appellee.
Before PATTERSON, ROBERTSON and SUGG, JJ.

Opinion:
SUGG, Justice, for the Court:
Mrs. Josie Hinton, plaintiff, sued Mrs. Marie McKee, Executrix of the Estate of Julius Roy McKee, Deceased, in the Circuit Court of .Wayne County for injuries received in a collision in which Julius Roy McKee lost his life.
On November 12, 1971, about 5:30 p. m., plaintiff was driving her automobile south on Highway No. 63 and deceased was driving his pickup north on the same highway. As deceased negotiated a gradual curve to the left, his truck crossed the center line into the plaintiff's lane and struck her automobile head-on causing injuries to plaintiff. The defense was that, immediately prior to the collision, decedent was suddenly stricken with an illness which he had no reason to anticipate and which rendered it impossible for him to control his pickup. Defendant relied on the rule of law in this state that the driver of an automobile is not ordinarily chargeable with negligence when he is suddenly stricken by a fainting spell or loses consciousness from an unforeseen cause and is unable to control his car. Loss of consciousness while driving is a defense to an action based on negligence if such loss of consciousness was not foreseeable. Warren v. Pinnix, 241 So.2d 662 (Miss.1970) and Dickinson v. Koenig, 242 Miss. 17, 133 So.2d 721 (1961).
In both Warren and Dickinson the drivers of the vehicles survived the accidents and were able to testify that they suffered a sudden loss of consciousness which was not foreseeable. There is no direct evidence in this case that the deceased suffered a sudden loss of consciousness, but defendant attempted to prove that fact by circumtantial evidence.
The deceased had a heart attack on April 6, 1971, which was diagnosed by Dr. Dabbs as an acute myocardial infarction. Dr. Dabbs continued treating the deceased until the day of the collision and stated that the deceased had made a remarkable recovery, that his electrocardiogram had become stable, and that his prognosis was very good. Dr. Dabbs examined deceased on the morning before the collision.
A passenger in plaintiff's automobile testified that she observed deceased's pickup cross the center line into the plaintiff's lane of travel, that plaintiff slowed almost to a stop, and that deceased's pickup struck plaintiff's automobile head-on. She further testified that deceased remained seated upright in his pickup for a short interval after the collision and was able to get out of his pickup and take several steps toward the vehicle of plaintiff when he suddenly collapsed and died. Another witness stated that he took only one step after getting out of his pickup.
Dr. Dabbs testified that the cause of death was an acute coronary thrombosis, such diagnosis being based on the doctor's examination of the patient and knowledge of his past history. An autopsy was not performed on the body of the deceased.
The burden of proving the affirmative defense that decedent suffered a blackout or loss of consciousness rested on the defendant. The burden is on a defendant to prove matter in avoidance, special or affirmative defenses, and other new matter urged by him as ground for denying a plaintiff relief. Cf. Commercial Union Insurance Co. v. Byrne, 248 So.2d 777, 782 (Miss.1971). In Harris v. Sims, 155 Miss. 207, 124 So. 325 (1929), a false imprisonment case, an instruction secured by the plaintiff placed the burden on him [plaintiff] to prove the original issue tendered by his declaration, and then, as to the plea of justification, placed the burden on the defendant who pleaded it to prove it by a preponderance of the evidence. There the Court said:
"Where the party having the burden of proof establishes a prima facie case, and no proof to the contrary is offered, he will prevail. Therefore the other party, if he would avoid the effect of such prima facie case, must produce evidence, of equal or greater weight, to balance and control it, or he will fail. Still the proof upon both sides applies to the affirmative or negative of one and the same issue, or proposition of fact; and the party whose case requires the proof of that fact has all along the burden of proof. It does not shift, though the weight in either scale may at times preponderate. But where the party having the burden of proof gives competent and prima facie evidence of a fact, and the adverse party instead of producing proof which would go to negative the same proposition of fact, proposes to show another and a distinct proposition which avoids the effect of it, there the burden of proof shifts, and rests upon the party proposing to show the latter fact." [Original emphasis] (155 Miss, at 218-219, 124 So. at 328).
In our case plaintiff proved that decedent's vehicle crossed the center line of the highway and struck plaintiff's vehicle head-on in plaintiff's lane of travel. Plaintiff's evidence established the negligence of defendant, and she thus met the burden of proving her case by a preponderance of the evidence. The defendant did not offer any proof to negate the negligence of decedent, but sought to avoid his negligence by proving the affirmative defense of loss of consciousness. The burden of proof then shifted and rested on the defendant to prove the affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence.
We are of the opinion that since defendant's proof of the affirmative defense was so weak, this is one of those rare cases which should be remanded for a new trial before another jury.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
GILLESPIE, C. J., INZER, P. J., and WALKER, BROOM and LEE, JJ., concur.
PATTERSON, P. J., and SMITH and ROBERTSON, JJ., dissent.