Case Name: Roger Dale WELLS v. STATE of Mississippi
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1974-12-23
Citations: 305 So. 2d 333
Docket Number: No. 48099
Parties: Roger Dale WELLS v. STATE of Mississippi.
Judges: GILLESPIE, C. J., and PATTERSON, ROBERTSON, WALKER and BROOM, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 305
Pages: 333–343

Head Matter:
Roger Dale WELLS v. STATE of Mississippi.
No. 48099.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Dec. 23, 1974.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 20, 1975.
Corr & Carlson, Sardis for appellant.
A. F. Summer, Atty. Gen. by Billy L. Gore, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.

Opinion:
RODGERS, Presiding Justice,
for the Court:
This is a unique case of rare and singular facts. The grand jury of Tunica County, Mississippi, indicted Roger Dale Wells for the murder of Wayne H. Mayes. He was tried and convicted in the circuit court and sentenced to serve a term of his natural life in the Mississippi State Penitentiary. He has appealed to this Court and contends here that he should have been acquitted of the charge of murder or in the alternative that he is now entitled to a new trial for several alleged errors hereafter mentioned.
The state offered testimony to show that two men — Charlie M. Johnson and Wayne H. Mayes [the deceased] — were traveling from their place of employment at Colliers-ville, Tennessee, to their homes near West Helena, Arkansas. They stopped for refreshments at the Lady Luck Lounge in Tunica, Mississippi. After drinking 'beer they entered into separate games. Mayes played pool and Johnson operated a pinball machine. Finally, Mayes told Johnson that he was going to the men's room and that they would then go on home. Later, Mayes staggered into the poolroom holding his neck and told Johnson that somebody had cut his head off. Johnson put Mayes on the floor and tried to stop the loss of blood, but to no avail. Mayes died immediately. A witness testifed that he observed the defendant closing a knife, and he heard the defendant say, "I killed him." A deputy sheriff came and was given a large knife. He arrested the defendant. The defendant, Wells, after having signed a warning memorandum, admitted that he cut the deceased, but said that Mayes had been going in and across a dance floor without paying the required entrance fee; that his wife, Mrs. Wells, was taking up the admission fee for the dance; that she had requested the deceased Mayes to pay several times, and that she again requested payment, whereupon Mayes cursed Mrs. Wells. The defendant said that he then asked Mr. Mayes not to curse his wife. He said that Mayes first invited him [Wells] outside; that he refused and that Mayes said, "Come on, I am going to get you." Mayes then caught the defendant by the throat "cutting off his wind." At that point Wells got out his knife and opened it and said that he put it "close to his throat." I meant to scare him is all, when he saw the knife, he jumped, he jerked back, and the knife cut his throat."
A local physician testified that he examined the body of Mayes at the Tunica County Hospital and found a deep cut on the left side of his neck about eight (8) inches long which was of sufficient depth to sever the jugular vein system. He said that the deceased died from the loss of blood.
None of the witnesses for the state saw nor heard any part of the affray between the defendant and the deceased.
When the state had rested its case, the defendant made a motion for a directed verdict. The court overruled the motion, and the defendant introduced testimony to show the following facts. Mrs. Wells, the wife of the defendant, testified that she was acting as the cashier to collect the entrance fee to a dance that was being given in a room adjoining the poolroom, and that Wayne Mayes came into the place where the dance was being held three times and refused to pay to go into the dance. On each occasion he informed Mrs. Wells that he was going to the rest rooms. On the last occasion he told her that he was going to the bathroom, and her husband said, "Mr., are you getting smart with my wife?" and Mr. Mayes said, "What's it to you?" Then he blurted out a curse word. She said Mr. Mayes then invited her husband to go outside, and the next thing she knew, Mr. Mayes "got Roger around the throat 'choking him." She then said, "Well, I saw him he turned. As he was turning he tripped on the table leg and fell into the knife and run into the pool room."
Mrs. Roebuck, defendant's mother-in-law, testified about the same facts as those testified to by Mrs. Wells.
The defendant took the stand and testified that he did not know Wayne Mayes and had never seen him before. He gave his version of what occurred as follows:
"Well, my wife and my mother-in-law, they were telling me about this man keep walking in and walking out without paying, and I sat there a few minutes, we was counting money, and he walked in and walked over to the jukebox; he walked back out; I didn't say nothing to him; and then my- — he come back in a few minutes later and my wife asked was he going to pay, and he says something about he had to go to the bathroom; she told him to go ahead. He just stood there mumbling; and he cussed her, and I told him I didn't appreciate him getting smart and cussing my wife. He said, 'let's step outside', and he says, 'I'm going to get you.' I said, 'Ain't no need of that,' I said, 'If I was up there playing in the band — I mean if you was up there playing in the band, you'd want me to pay to come in; that's all we want just for you to pay us.' He said, 'All right, we'll just get it over with in here'. And, he reached over and grabbed me around the throat, and he had my wind cut off. I reached in my pocket and pulled my knife out, I was going to scare him, because I was scared to death, done had my wind cut off, and I put the knife up on his shoulder, and he tripped, turned around, jerked or something, and cut his neck."
Defendant admitted that the knife introduced as an exhibit to the testimony of the deputy sheriff was the knife he said that he did not intend to "cut nobody with it."
We have detailed the facts in this case because the real issue is whether or not the facts are sufficient to establish the charge of murder.
At the conclusion of the testimony offered by the State of Mississippi and again when both sides had rested their cases, the defendant requested the court to direct a verdict in favor of the defendant as to the charge of murder. The trial judge overruled both motions upon the ground that "the statement made by the defendant may or may not be reasonable; that will be a question for the jury, not a question for the court."
We are of the opinion that the learned trial judge was in error for the following reasons.
It will be remembered that none of the witnesses introduced by the State of Mississippi saw any part of the altercation between Mr. Mayes and the defendant Wells. The defendant and his witnesses testified that Mr. Mayes invited Mr. Wells to go outside to settle the matter and that he then seized the defendant by the throat. The defendant said he "cut off my wind." Mayes reached across a table to attack the defendant. The defendant claims he got his knife open and put it by the deceased Mayes' neck to scare him. Whether he intended to cut Mayes or to scare him is immaterial at this point, since we have reached the conclusion that in either case, the defendant could not be guilty of murder. The greatest crime for which he could be found guilty is manslaughter.
The testimony of the defense witnesses is neither unreasonable nor improbable. Moreover, there is no testimony in the record to indicate malice or premeditated design by the defendant to take the life of the deceased Mayes.
There are two sections of our Mississippi Code Annotated (1972) which we find to be applicable to the facts in this case— Sections 97-3-29 and 97-3-31. The first section is in the following language:
"The killing of a human being without malice, by the act, procurement, or culpable negligence of another, while such other is engaged in the perpetration of any crime or misdemeanor not amounting to felony, or in the attempt to commit any crime or misdemeanor, where such killing would be murder at common law, shall be manslaughter." Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-29 (1972).
This section is applicable because there is no malice shown by the evidence. The killing occurred in a sudden fight at a time when the uncontradicted testimony shows that Mayes was attacking the defendant.
Mississippi Code Annotated Section 97-3-31 (1972) is in the following language:
"Every person who shall unnecessarily kill another, either while resisting an attempt by such other person to commit any felony, or to do any unlawful act, or after such attempt shall have failed, shall be guilty of manslaughter." Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-31 (1972).
This section is applicable here because, if in fact it were unnecessary for the defendant to kill the deceased, the defendant was resisting an attack by the deceased. Furthermore, the defendant acted without malice or premeditated design to take the life of the deceased.
This Court has carefully analyzed and interpreted Section 97-3-31 beginning as early as' 1876 in the case of Long v. State, 52 Miss. 23 (1876), in which the Court gave a history of the statute. In that case the defendant shot a man who had previously attacked him with a knife in his hand at a time, however, when the defendant was out of the reach of his assailant. The Court, however, held that an instruction embodying the statute was properly refused because the Court said in this early case: "We do not think that it [the statute] was intended to apply to cases of mutual combat, unconnected with the commission or attempt to commit some other unlawful act by the party slain." 52 Miss. at 41.
This interpretation of the statute here involved gradually changed. In the case of Williams v. State, 120 Miss. 604, 82 So. 318 (1919), this statute was again argued before this Court. In that case a prisoner shot a deputy sheriff who beat him to make him reveal where he had concealed a pistol. This Court originally affirmed the death sentence conviction of murder [by a divided court] upon the ground that it was a jury question as to whether or not the defendant killed the deceased because of malice. Later, however, this case came back before the court on a suggestion of error in Williams v. State, 122 Miss. 151, 84 So. 8 (1920). The Court cited the last above quoted statute [now Mississippi Code Annotated Section 97-3-31 (1972)], and said:
"But when, as here, it is manifest that the intention to kill was formed because of the criminal act of the deceased, in repelling that act the offense, which but for the statute would be murder, is by its plain meaning reduced to manslaughter. Malice is not predicable under the facts of the case before us." 122 Miss. at 177-178, 84 So. at 14.
In Bergman v. State, 160 Miss. 65, 133 So. 208 (1931), a plantation manager was killed by Tom Travillion, at the alleged insistence of Alice Bergman, at a time when the plantation manager was trying to make an illegal arrest. This Court had the last above quoted section again under consider ation when it said: "We think, however, that the court below should have limited the jury to [a] convict[ion] of manslaughter, and should have eliminated murder from their deliberations, leaving them the theories that appellant was either guilty of manslaughter, or was innocent." 160 Miss. at 70, 133 So. at 210.
Since Bergman we have had many cases involving the foregoing Mississippi Code Annotated Section 97-3-31 (1972), and this Court has uniformly held that facts shown to be similar to the facts here in evidence do not meet the requirement of facts in evidence to establish murder.
In Bowen v. State, 164 Miss. 225, 144 So. 230 (1932), a man attempted to attack a woman in her home and she shot him. The homicide was not murder.
In Bangren v. State, 196 Miss. 887, 17 So.2d 599 (1944), this Court held that the killing of a mere trespasser in an assignation house was not murder, and that the trial court should have limited the charge to that of manslaughter.
In Cutrer v. State, 207 Miss. 806, 43 So. 385 (1949), the defendant killed the deceased after the deceased had struck defendant's wife in a sudden affray. This Court held that the trial court should have limited the charge to manslaughter.
In Trask v. State, 216 Miss. 557, 62 So.2d 888 (1953), the jury returned a verdict of manslaughter in a murder case arising in a sudden affray, and on appeal we held this verdict was proper.
In Coleman v. State, 218 Miss. 246, 67 So.2d 304 (1953), where the defendant cut an officer when the officer was unlawfully attacking the defendant, this Court again held that the trial court should have limited the charge to manslaughter because of the last quoted statute.
In the case of Jordan v. State, 248 Miss. 703, 160 So.2d 926 (1964), where the defendant killed a trespasser who slapped him, this Court held that the trial judge should have limited the charge to that of manslaughter.
Finally, in the recent case of McElwee v. State, 255 So.2d 669 (Miss.1971), where the defendant shot and killed a trespasser at his room door, this Court held that the trial judge should have instructed the jury that it could not find the appellant guilty of any crime greater than manslaughter.
It is clear, therefore, that by reason of both Code sections above quoted and particularly because of Mississippi Code Annotated Section 97-3-31 (1972), it was the duty of the trial judge to limit the charge under the facts shown in this case to manslaughter. The defendant could, of course offer such defense as he had to the charge of manslaughter for the determination by the jury.
The appellant has offered several other alleged grounds for reversal, only one of which merits further comment. We do not believe that the appellant was entitled to acquittal upon the ground that his witnesses' testimony should be accepted as the facts in the case under the so-called Weathersby Rule [Weathersby v. State, 165 Miss. 207, 147 So. 481 (1933)]. There are other facts in evidence which in our opinion raise a jury issue as to whether or not the appellant was guilty of manslaughter.
All of the justices agree that the evidence in this case is not sufficient to support a conviction for murder and should be reversed for that reason; however, there is disagreement among the justices on the scope of remand. The majority and dissenting opinions on this aspect of the case follow:
ON SCOPE OF REMAND
SUGG, Justice,
for the majority:
In other criminal cases we have reversed and remanded for sentencing for a lesser crime when such lesser crime was a con stituent of the offense charged in the indictment. In Anderson v. State, 290 So.2d 628 (Miss.1974), defendant was convicted of burglary. The burglary conviction was reversed but remanded for resentencing on the charge of trespass without granting defendant a new trial on the lesser charge. We held:
Trespass is necessarily a component of every burglary. Implicit in the verdict finding defendant guilty of burglary is the finding that he was guilty of the constituent offense of trespass, Section 97-17-87, Mississippi Code Annotated (1972). Inasmuch as the jury has found the defendant guilty of the greater crime, and the evidence of defendant's guilt of trespass is conclusive, the judgment is affirmed as a conviction of trespass, and the case is remanded for sentencing on that charge. See Washington v. State, 222 Miss. 782, 77 So.2d 260 (1955). (290 So.2d at 628-629).
In a number of cases where defendants have been convicted of assault and battery with intent to kill and murder, this Court has reversed such convictions but affirmed as a conviction of assault and battery and remanded for resentencing on the lesser charge. See Corley v. State, 264 So.2d 384 (Miss.1972); Woodall v. State, 234 Miss. 759, 107 So.2d 598 (1958); Washington v. State, 222 Miss. 782, 77 So.2d 260 (1955); Webb v. State, Miss., 30 So.2d 894 (1947); Daniels v. State, 196 Miss. 328, 17 So.2d 793 (1944).
We are unable to find any cases where this Court has reversed a murder conviction but affirmed a conviction of manslaughter ; however, this procedure was suggested in a specially concurring opinion in Bangren v. State, 196 Miss. 887, 17 So.2d 599 (1944) where the Court held that the issue of murder should not have been submitted to the jury, but should have been limited to manslaughter. Justice Alexander, in a specially concurring opinion stated:
I concur in the reversal of the case upon the asserted grounds but not upon its remand except for sentence. The jury rejected the plea of self-defense and resolved the issue of justification adversely to appellant. She was therefore found guilty of unjustifiable homicide which is either murder or manslaughter. The verdict is for murder, which, under the facts of the case, includes manslaughter. Hughey v. State, Miss., 106 So. 361. Had the jury found a verdict for manslaughter, we should have allowed it to stand. There seems to be no reason, therefore, why our assent to a conviction for the lesser offense should not stand, and the cause be remanded for sentence only. Oliver v. State, 5 How. 14, 6 Miss. 14; Ex parte Burden, 92 Miss. 14, 45 So. 1, 131 Am.St.Rep. 511; Martin v. City of Laurel, 106 Miss. 357, 63 So. 670; Smithey v. State, 93 Miss. 257, 46 So. 410; Jones v. State, 147 Miss. 85, 113 So. 191. This procedure is uniformly followed in some states. Reynolds v. State, 186 Ark. 223, 53 S.W.2d 224; Brooks v. State, 141 Ark. 57, 216 S.W. 705. Under our statute when there is a valid conviction, an error in fixing the punishment entitles a defendant only to a reversal as to the degree of punishment. 2 Miss.Code 1942, Section 2609. Defendant is in no position to complain since the judgment here is favorable to her. Compare Calicoat v. State, 131 Miss. 169, 95 So. 318. See also Grillis v. State (Miss.), 196 Miss. 576, 17 So.2d 525.
It may be that the course here advocated should not be followed in all reversals of convictions of murder, for the only alternative in some cases may be acquittal. But when as here, there was a deliberate homicide not justified as either, inadvertent or in the heat of passion, and when the jury have found defendant guilty not only of manslaughter but of murder, it should be affirmed as to that degree implicit in the jury's verdict.
A defendant's privilege against former jeopardy should not be enlarged to require the prosecution to be subjected to a similar hazard. To allow appellant a new trial means that she is entitled to have a second jury ratify the present conviction, with the added privilege of seeking an acquittal upon a plea of self-defense which has already been rejected. Upon the record, we have in effect said that she was guilty of manslaughter but must be again convicted before being punished.
I am authorized to state that Justice Griffith concurs in the foregoing views.