Case Name: Sandra CYR, obo all other persons similarly situated, John Quarles, obo all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS & CO., Du Pont Pension And Retirement Plan, Defendants-Appellees
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2012-05-31
Citations: 477 F. App'x 853
Docket Number: Nos. 10-4558 (L), 10-4560(Con)
Parties: Sandra CYR, obo all other persons similarly situated, John Quarles, obo all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS & CO., Du Pont Pension And Retirement Plan, Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: Present: PETER W. HALL, SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges, RICHARD M. BERMAN, District Judge.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 477
Pages: 853–854

Head Matter:
Sandra CYR, obo all other persons similarly situated, John Quarles, obo all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. E.I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS & CO., Du Pont Pension And Retirement Plan, Defendants-Appellees.
Nos. 10-4558 (L), 10-4560(Con).
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
May 31, 2012.
Sandra Cyr, Trumbull, CT, pro se.
John Quarles, Bridgeport, CT, pro se.
Lissa Jan Paris, Esq., Genea O. Bell, Esq., Murtha Cullina LLP, Hartford, CT, for Appellees.
Present: PETER W. HALL, SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges, RICHARD M. BERMAN, District Judge.
. Judge Richard M. Berman, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.

Opinion:
SUMMARY ORDER
Plaintiffs, pro se, appeal from the district court's judgment granting Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss their action brought under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1109, 1132(a)(1)(B) and 1132(c). We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal, and we discuss these only where necessary to explain our decision.
We review de novo a district court's grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, "accepting all factual claims in the complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor." Famous Horse Inc. v. 5th Ave. Photo Inc., 624 F.3d 106, 108 (2d Cir.2010). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the complaint must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 697, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Although all allegations contained in the complaint are assumed to be true, this tenet is "inapplicable to legal conclusions." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. A claim will have "facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. Having conducted an independent and de novo review of the record, we affirm the district court's judgment for substantially the same reasons stated by the district court in its well-reasoned and thorough order.
To the extent that Plaintiffs seek to revive any equitable estoppel claim or any claim brought under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c) that their complaint might have been construed as raising, their attorney voluntarily withdrew those claims before the district court, and Plaintiffs cannot now challenge his decision to do so. See Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633-34, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962) ("[E]ach party is deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent and is considered to have notice of all facts, notice of which can be charged upon the attorney." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
We have considered all of Plaintiffs' arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.