Case Name: JAMES LOWE v. THE UNITED STATES AND THE KICKAPOO INDIANS
Court: United States Court of Claims
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1902-03-31
Citations: 37 Ct. Cl. 413
Docket Number: No. 6545
Parties: JAMES LOWE v. THE UNITED STATES AND THE KICKAPOO INDIANS.
Judges: 
Reporter: United States Court of Claims Reports
Volume: 37
Pages: 413–428

Head Matter:
JAMES LOWE v. THE UNITED STATES AND THE KICKAPOO INDIANS.
[Indian depredations,
No. 6545.
Decided March 31, 1902.]
On the Proofs.
The Kickapoos move into Mexico in 1864 and live there with the consent of the Mexican Government. But in 1875 the United States request, as guardians of the Kickapoos, that they be sent back. Before their return, viz, in 1870, they cross the border and commit depredations in Texas.
I.The United States having treated the sojourn of the Kickapoos in Mexico from 1864 to 1875 as temporary, and having insisted on their return on the ground that they were wards of the United States, they must be regarded by the judiciary as domiciled in the country of the guardian, the United States, and be deemed liable for depredations committed in Texas during the period of their temporary absence in Mexico.
II.The temporary residence of American Indians in Mexico, without the consent of the United States, would not in legal effect terminate their relations with the United States, or relieve them from the obligations they owed’ to the United States, or relieve the United States from the responsibility which they have assumed for the acts of Indian tribes in amity.
III. It is not necessary under the Act 3d June, 1834 (4 Stat. L., 731), that Indians must pass directly “from the Indian country into any State or Territory ” where they may commit a depredation.
IV. The Indians being wards of the United States can not suspend that relation without the consent of the Government.
The Reporters' statement of the case:
The following are the facts of the case as found by the court:
I. At the time of the depredations hereinafter stated the claimant was a citizen of the United States.
II. On the 25th of September, 1870, and in the month of November, 1870, in the county of McMullen, State of Texas, Indians belonging to the Kickapoo tribe of Indians took and drove away property of the kind and characted described in the petition, the property of claimant, which was reasonably worth at the time the sum of $5,320.
Said property was taken, as aforesaid, without just cause or provocation on the part of the owner or the agent in charge, and has never been returned or paid for.
III. The defendant Indians, in the year 1864, left their reservation, in “ taking advantage of the temporary suspension of the authority of the United States,” and went to Mexico, and at the time of the depredation were located in Mexican territory near Santa Rosa, whence they came to said State of Texas and committed the depredation as aforesaid. When the civil war commenced this portion of the tribe, numbering about 250 warriors, refused to join the Southern Confederacy, and were granted by the authority of the Confederacy free exit out of the country to Mexico.
IV. At the time of said depredations the defendant Indians were in amity with the United States.
Y. The following letter was addressed to the President of the Mexican Republic by the American minister of foreign affairs, Mexico:
“LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
“Mexico, June 21/., 1875.
“To the President of the Republic of Mexico.
■“ Sir: The Government has for many years made itself responsible for the support, education, and care of the Kickapoo, Lipan, and Mescalero Indians, whose guardian it is, and they have been placed on a special reservation and are under the supervision of the official agents of the Government. During the late civil war the Indians took advantage of the temporary suspension of the authority of the United States to abandon their reservations, and they came into the Republic without the consent and contrary to the policy of the Government of Mexico at a time when its power was also partially suspended by the European intervention. In view of this state of facts, I am constrained to express the opinion that your excellency’s Government has erred in deciding that it could not require these Indians to return to their reservations. Under the circumstances they could only be considered as refugees from the authority of the Government of the United States, and, in the spirit of international comity, should again be returned to the territory of the United States.
“Your excellency seems to find the cause, if not a palliation, for the opposition manifested to the mission of the commissioner, in the bitter language and harsh judgment of the newspapers of Texas against the inhabitants of the Mexican frontier.
(Signed) “John W. Foster,
“ Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mexico A
Mr. William IT. Robeson for the claimant:
The questions for consideration are: First, whether the Kickapoo Indians acquired a domicile in Mexico; and, second, Avhether the establishment of a domicile there would relieve them, and consequently the United States, from liability for such depredations as they committed after their location there.
The positions avo take are:
First. That the Kickapoo tribe had not the capacity to acquire a domicile in Mexico.
Second. That even if such domicile were acquired, the tribe .could not thereby escape liability for its depredations.
We consider:
First. That the Kickapoos had not the capacity to expatriate themselves or to acquire a permanent domicile in Mexico.
It will not be denied by the defendants that the relationship between the United States and Indian tribes is that of guardian and ward. From the first decision regarding their legal status down to those of this latter day they have either been denominated as domestic dependent nations or as wards of the Gov ernment.
(Gherokee Nation v. Georgia-, 5 Pet., 1; United States v. Ifagama, 118 U. S., 315; Felix v. Patrick, 145 U. S., 311; United States v. Boyd, 68 Fed. Rep., 577; Garter y. United States, 37 S. W. Rep., 204; United States v. Boyd, 83 Fed. Rep., 547; United States v. Winans, 73 Fed. Rep., 72.)
The only difference between this relationship and that which exists between the ordinary guardian and his ward is that the United States, as guardian of the Indians, may and does determine for itself matters which are in the case of ordinary guardianship left to the determination of courts.
It results from this relationship that we must recognize the Indians as being parties under disability. It has been so adjudged. (Laughton v. Nadeau, 75 Fed. Rep., 789.)
Only those who are sui juris can acquire a domicile; married women can not acquire domicile other than that of their husbands; children under age can not acquire domicile separate from that of father or guardian; persons non compos mentis have not capacity to acquire a domicile.
If this is so, it is not a matter for consideration whether Mexico received them willingly or unwillingly; for the consent of the Mexican Government, in which the United States did not join, could not invest the Indians with a power to elect as to domicile, which was forbidden them by the nature of their relations to the United States.
Further than this, it is shown that the political and executive branches of the Government consistently refused to recognize the right of these Indians to expatriate themselves; and, we submit, the courts are bound by such action. (Graham v. TI. N, 30 C. Cls. R,, 318.)
In this connection attention is called to the letter of our minister to Mexico, addressed to the President of the Mexican Republic June 24,1875.
How well these views there expressed were subsequently sustained and confirmed by Congress appears in the fact 'set out in the defendants’ brief, that a commission afterwards appointed by Congress, with much labor and at great expense, brought these Kickapoos back to their old home in the United States.
Whether Indians may encumber their lands or expatriate themselves are not determinable upon grounds of personal intelligence, but upon our national policy. That policj^ has always been not to permit the Indians to make any disposition of themselves or their property, except with the assent of the United States. Defendants’ counsel appalls himself with the suggestion that this would bo a species of slavery. I should rather incline to the opinion that it was one of the necessary elements of guardianship.
Entertaining these views as to the lack of capacity to acquire a domicile in Mexico, counsel does not deem it of importance to discuss at any length whether the Kickapoos had the intention to return to the United States when they went into Mexico. The conditions preceding their departure for Mexico and the reasons for their going there are in some dispute. It may be that they left for the purpose of avoiding military service. It seems reasonable, from some of the evidences we have, that efforts were made by both the Federal and Confederate authorities to enlist their services in their respective armies, and it may be that was the occasion of their departure. We know that the Government of the United States, involved at this time in war, was neglectful of the welfare of many of the tribes, and it may have been in the hope of bettering their condition for the time that they went there.
Whatever the reason for their going, we have nothing to enable us to determine their intention, except what was actually done. They remained in Mexico several years, but finally came back to the United States; and it appears from certain reports hereinafter cited that many of them came back because they wanted to do so. The experiment which they had tried had proved unsuccessful. Again, at the time of their departure the United States was indebted to them in a large sum, regarding the distribution of which they made no provision whatever. If, therefore, there is anything in the record from which we may determine their intention in removing themselves, these facts would seem to indicate an intention to return.
The burden of showing an intention not to return is on the defendants. (Jacob’s Law of Domicile, secs. 114, 115.)
The defendants would secure immunity for the United States from liability for depredations committed by this tribe, upon the ground that the Indians being beyond the jurisdiction of the United States, the Government was powerless to prevent the commission of depredations by them. This statement of fact is negatived by the knowledge that these depredations were committed within the territory of the United States, where its jurisdiction was supreme. If they had been committed by these or any other Indians outside the territory of the United States, then Ave know the Government would not be liable. (Corralitos Stock Go. v. If. S.,35 C. Cls. K.,629.)
But the Government was under obligations to protect its citizens from the depredations of Indians who constituted its wards or were its domestic dependents, no matter whether they made their forays from Kansas or from Mexico; and it was just as much the duty of the Government to prevent these Indians going into Mexico as it was to prevent them from committing depredations while resident in our oavii territory.
This argument is, however, unnecessary. Liability for depredations is not in the nature of a penalty on the Government. It is the liability of the Indians which is sought to be established, and when that has been fixed the liability of the Government attaches as a necessary consequence of the promise of eventual indemnification in the trade and intercourse act of June 30, 1884, and the jurisdictional act of March 3, 1891.
Mr. Lincoln B. Smith (with whom was Mr. Assistant Attorney-General John G. Thompson) for the defendants:
The defendants do not concede that the jurisdiction of the United States over. Indians within the United States is to the extent that they may be restrained from peaceably leaving' its domain and becoming inhabitants of another. The Indian is, excepting the right of franchise, a citizen of the United States if he lives within its borders. To say that he may not remove himself from this to another country, renouncing this and adopting the other, is to say that a species of slavery exists that is abhorrent to all our institutions. Among the Indian tribes to-day there are many highly educated and enlightened members, who are members of their tribe in every sense, and who’ are capable of determining for themselves whether or not they shall retain their citizenship within the United States or whether or not they will renounce it and give their allegiance to some other country. It is not thought that for one moment could the proposition be entertained that under our institutions these people, who are born free, have not the right to remove themselves and to adopt any country upon the face of the earth that is willing to receive them.
The right of expatriation in every free person has its existence and is recognized in all free republics. By reason of some conflict between the legislative and judicial views upon this subject — the judicial having more peculiarly reference to persons who were formerly residents of foreign countries, and the political having reference to citizens of this country who had gone to foreign countries — on the 27th of July, 1868, Congress gave expression to the right of expatriation, stating that it “ is a natural and inherent right of all people indisputable to the rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” (15 Stat. L., 223.) Yattel and other elementary writers unhesitating^ admit this right as inherent to every free people, a contravention of which would carry us back to the feudal ages, where the subject was denied this privilege in order that he might be used as a defender of the soil of the sovereign.
In the Opinions of the Attorney-General of the United States (vol. 8, p. 139) it was stated by Cushing that “the doctrine of absolute and perpetual allegiance — the root of the denial of any' right of emigration — is inadmissible in the United States. It was a matter involved and settled for us by the revolution which founded the American Union.”
Judge Black, upon this subject, said (vol. 9, p. 356, Opinions of Atty. Gen. U. S.):
“The natural right of every free person, who owes no debt and is not guilty of any crime, to leave the country of his birth, in good faith and for an honest purpose — the privilege of throwing off his natural allegiance and substituting another allegiance in its place — is incontestable.” * * *
Morse on Citizenship, section 88, states the conflict upon this question between the judicial and legislative branches of the Government and the reasons underlying the different opinions of these two branches, citing as a conclusion of the whole question the section of the Revised Statutes above referred to upon the subject of the right of expatriation.
Whether or not a' distinction is to be drawn between the Indians inhabiting the United States and other free persons is practically the question under consideration, the right of expatriation in all other persons being too well settled for discussion. I have not found any authority against this right, and it seems that if Congress intended that Indians should be excluded such exclusion would have been in express terms.
Where a citizen expatriates himself, renounces allegiance to his native country and declares allegiance to some foreign power, such renunciation and declaration is evidenced by certain well-known proceedings of law, and the intention by such expressions becomes clear. In the case of Indians, who are rather inhabitants of the United States,- domiciled within its borders, where the right of .franchise has not been bestowed, no such evidences of renunciation and declaration are to be had, and we can only look to their acts to determine their intention. If the right of expatriation is accorded them, then the determination as to whether or not they expatriated themselves can be had alone from the acts of the Indians themselves, and the court must necessarily look to the circumstances attending the removal of these Kickapoos to old Mexico to determine this question. The'principle involved rests rather upon the basis of the right of domicile, it being a well-settled principle that a person can have but one domicile.
The Indians in question had for many years resided within the Indian Territory, their ancestors from time immemorial having been inhabitants of the United States; that those who originally went to Mexico in 1850 changed their domicile from the United States to Mexico is not subject to argument. They accepted grants from the Mexican Government and their descendants are living under the protection of that Republic to-day. If the remainder of the Kickapoos, who left the Territory in 1868, removed to old Mexico with the intention of remaining there, they lost their right of domicile within the United States, and the same became changed thereby to the country of their adoption. This question depends largely upon the intention and conduct of the party. {Swing v. Wright, 3 Wall., 134.)
Length of time, or even the shortest residence with the design of permanent settlement, stamps the party with the national character. {White v. Brown, 1 Wall., jr., 217.)
In other words, the consensus of authorities is that if one leaves his domicile with the intention of taking up his domicile at another place he loses the right of domicile'in the first instance, and his right of domicile must be held to the place to which he has removed.
The emigration from one State to another is the highest type of indication of domicile. In the case at bar there was an absolute, unequivocal abandonment by the Kickapoo Indians, in both instances, of the country they inhabited, the removal by them with all their effects from that section to the Republic of Mexico. This removal in the case of the Kicka-poos in 1863 was upon the invitation of the Mexican Government through its duly constituted officials, not to visit that section with a view of location, but to remove from the United States to that section with the purpose of permanent settlement there. These facts are shown by the reports from the Mexican Government, appended hereto as Exhibit A.
When such of the Kickapoos as returned to the United States were located, they were located in an entirely different section of the country to that tvhich they had formerly inhabited. The fact that some of them were returned to the United States through the efforts of the officials of this Government can have no part in the determination of this question; such return in no way evidences an original purpose of returning. We can only look to the intent at the time of the removal. The circumstances have heretofore been referred to, and, to reiterate, were practically as follows: The part of the Kicka-poos originally separating from their tribe had gone to old Mexico in 1850, been granted a certain number of leagues of land, adopted by the Mexican Government, even becoming a part of the army of the Government in repelling the invasions of hostile Indians, and remained under the jurisdiction of the Mexican Government from 1850 to the present time, their descendants now residing within that Republic. The Mexican Government, desiring the removal of the others of the Kicka-poos who had separated from their tribe, and who were residing in the Indian Territory, in the fall of 1863 sent a number of the Mexican Kickapoos to visit those located in the Indian Territory, who were commissioned to invite those Kickapoos to remove to old Mexico, join their brothers there, and be received and adopted and provided for by the Mexican Government, as were those who had removed there in 1850. In acceptance of this invitation, in 1863, the said Kickapoos in the Indian Territory removed with their families and effects to old Mexico and settled in and about Santa Rosa. If there is any evidence to be found evidencing an intention, at the time of such removal, of returning to the United States, defendants’ counsel has been unable to discover it. If the right of a homestead exemption rested upon the state of facts where there had'been such an abandonment of the homestead as there was of the country occupied by these Indians, with no more intention of returning than is evidenced in this case, could there be any question of the loss of this right? We think not.
It is thought that the questions hereinbefore discussed must control in this case. If the Indian has a right to expatriate himself, then these Indians had the right of removal to Mexico. If this right existed, then' there can be no question, it is thought, as to their intent at the time of their removal. This intent was clearly to adopt that country as their mother country and to abandon the country of their forefathers. If they were domiciled rightfully within the .Republic of Mexico, the3r were Mexican Indians. If they were Mexican Indians and came across the border and within the United States and committed depredations, then there can be no recovery had under the Indian depredation act of March 3, 1891. The question is taken out of the judicial’s sphere and becomes a political one, and is a subject for international settlement between the United States and Mexico.
The fact that these Kickapoo Indians, or the most of them, were subsequently removed to the U nited States and placed on a reservation does not determine their political status for the ten or twenty years they were in Mexico. The evidence shows that they were invited and induced to go to Mexico for considerations of profit; that they were to have land and the protection of the Mexican Government. ■ The many efforts of our Government to induce them to return show that they wore satisfied with their habitat, and it was only after repeated efforts and astute diplomacy that they were induced to change their domicile from Mexico to the United States.
These Indians did not go to Mexico as did the Victoria and Gerónimo bands of Apaches, who went as robbers and murderers to the mountain fastnesses of Coahuila and Sonora to escape punishment. These Apaches were alike a terror to the Mexicans and Americans. The Kickapoos went on the invitation of the governor of one of the States of Mexico to settle at a place designated by the governor of the State in a community settled by Mexicans. This band of Kickapoo Indians distinctly separated themselves from the tribe in the north, and took up their abode and dwelling place with their brothers in Mexico and were protected and sheltered by the Mexican Government. That Government exercised over them its sovereign jurisdiction for ten years, and during those ten years the sovereignty of the United States ceased.
So essentially were they the subjects of Mexico that their raids into the United States could not be followed up to Mexico and punished. The sovereignty of the United States, so far as controlling their personal conduct was concerned, had ceased and had been taken up by another sovereignty.
The promise of eventual indemnification for depredations committed by Indian tribes carried with it the idea that the United States would exorcise supervision over these tribes and interpose barriers between them and the frontier settlements to prevent depredations. It was contemplated, if necessary, that the United States might interpose the military arm of the Government to suppress lawlessness and depredation. It is submitted that for depredations committed by tribes without the borders of the United States, where none of these restraining influences could be brought to bear, that the Government should not be held responsible.

Opinion:
Weldon, J.,
delivered the opinion of the court:
This is a suit under what is known as the Indian depredation act (26 Stat. L., 851), and in the petition it is alleged that on September 25, 1870, the defendant Indians took and drove away 97 horses belonging to the claimant, and that on the-da.y of November, 1870, the same Indians took and drove away 125 horses belonging to the claimant, aggregating-in value the sum of $11,100. The findings show that at the times stated in the petition the Indians took from claimant horses aggregating in value the sum of $5,320.
There can be no serious dispute as to the amity of the Indians at the time of both depredations; but it is most earnestly contended that the Indians, at the time of the depredations, were not Indians belonging to the United States; but that they were "domiciled in the Republic of Mexico, under the jurisdiction of that country, and not under the jurisdiction of the United States."
The depredations were committed in the county of McMul-len, in the State of Texas, which lies in the southern portion of the State and not very far from the border line of Mexico. The statute giving the court jurisdiction does not specifically define the Indians for whose depredations a recovery may be had, simply describes them as Indians; but it must be assumed that the law did not intend to hold the United States collaterally liable for the depredations of Indians having no political connection with the United States at the time of the depredation. There must be some relation of responsibility between the United States and the Indians on which to predicate the claim before a liability can be adjudged against the defendants.
The Kiekapoo Indians who committed the depredation went to the Republic of Mexico during the summer of 1864, at the solicitation of a band of Kickapoos who had gone to that countiy about the year 1850, and had become domiciled in Mexico by the consent of the Mexican Government.
It is insisted by the counsel for the United States, that the Indians had the right of expatriation; that they emigrated to Mexico not expecting to return, and that in law they became assimilated with the Indians of Mexico and thereby ceased to have any relations with the United States; and having no relations with the United States, no responsibility can arise for their acts.
In the view which the court has taken of the law of this case, it is not necessary to pursue an investigation into or indulge in a discussion of the complex doctrine of expatriation, as it may be presented in the case of American Indians crossing the line which separates the territoiy of the United States from the territory of other nations. The legal status of the Indians who remain within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States has been the subject of many decisions of the Supreme Court; and their relation to the United States may be considered as well defined and adjudicated.
The law upon that subject is condensed in the case of the United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S., 382, in which it is said by Mr. Justice Miller:
"In the opinions in those cases they are spoken of as ' wards of the nation,' "pupils,' as local dependent communities. In this spirit the United States has conducted its relations to them from its organization to this time. But, after an experience of a hundred years of the treaty-making system of government, Congress has determined upon a new departure — to govern them by acts of Congress. This is seen in the act of March 3,1871, embodied in section 2079 of the Revised Statutes':
" ' No Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by treaty; but no obligation of any treaty lawfully made and ratified with any such Indian nation or tribe prior to March third, eighteen hundred and seventy-one, shall be hereby invalidated or impaired.' "
It is also said in substance that the States have no power over the Indians as long as they maintain their tribal relations, and that they owe no allegiance to a State within which their reservation may be established and the State gives them no protection. (Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Peters, 1; Wooster v. State of Georgia, 6 Peters, 515, 536.)
The depredating Indians left the United States during the civil war, and at the time the Republic of Mexico was struggling against the usurpation and invasion of Maximilian, so that neither nation was in a condition to assert or maintain a policy having reference peculiarly to its domestic condition. The Mexican Government had, however, before that time recognized the fact of the emigration of the Kickapoo Indians who had gone into its territory many years before the settlement of the depredating Indians, and had acquiesced in the permanent location of the Indians who had emigrated in 1850.
In the case of Fellows v. Blacksmith et al. (19 How., 366), it is decided that the only power having jurisdiction and control of the Indians is the United States, and that no relations exist between the Indians and the States so long as the tribal condition is maintained. That decision was afterwards affirmed in the case cited in 118 U. S. (supra). The United States having the exclusive guardianship of the Indian, that guardianship exists in law so long as it is not renounced or disavowed upon the part of the guardian. It is not within the power or caprice of the ward to terminate the relation, and there is nothing in the facts found in this case tending to show that the United States relinquished their right or disavowed the responsibility of their guardianship.
But, on the contrary, it is shown that on the 24th day of June, 1875, the American minister of foreign affairs in Mexico addressed a communication to the President of the Republic of Mexico, in which it is said in substance, that the Government of the United States for maiy years made itself responsible for the support, education, and care of the Kickapoo Indians, whose guardian it is; that they were placed on a special reservation and are under the jurisdiction and supervision of the official agents of the Government. That during the late war the Indians took advantage of a temporary suspension of the authority of the United States to abandon their reservation, and that they came into the Republic of Mexico without the consent and contrary to the policy of the Government of Mexico, at a time when its power was also partially suspended by European intervention; and it is further stated in the communication of the minister that in view of this state of facts he was constrained to express the opinion that his excellency's Government has erred in deciding that it could not require these Indians to return to their reservation, and that under the circumstances they could only be considered as refugees from the authority of the United States, and that in a spirit of international comity they should again be returned to the territory of the United States.
It is further contended on the part of the defendants that inasmuch as the Indians did not pass from the Indian country within the meaning of the act of June 3, 1834 (4 Stat. L., p. 731), in which it is provided that "if any Indian or Indians belonging to anjr tribe in amity with the United States shall, within the Indian country, take or destroy the property of any person lawfulty within said country, or shall pass from the Indian country into any State or Territory inhabited by citizens of the United States and there take," etc., there can be no recovery in this proceeding.
If the Indians had remained in the State of Texas during* the time they were in Mexico and had committed the depredation, as shown by the findings, could there be any question of the right of the claimant to recover? It is not necessary that the Indians committing a depredation be directly .from the Indian country. If they are within the jurisdiction of the United States, and in a condition of amity, a responsibility attaches to them for the consequences of the wrongs defined by the statute and a consequent liability upon the part of the United States. If the depredation be committed within the Indian country, then other questions might arise which are not applicable to the conditions of this proceeding.
The theory of liability is that the ward being at the time of the depredation within the territorial limits of the United States are in legal contemplation within the control of the United States, and therefore the United States are collaterally responsible.
In the case of Corralitos Stock Co. v. The United States and Apache Indians (33 C. Cls. R., 342) it is said:
'Every claim here pending under the remedial statute of 1891 must turn back to the statute of 1834 to establish a right to recovery. The act limits the claims to those arising from depredations committed by 'any Indian or Indians belonging to any tribe in amity with the United States,' and fixes the place of loss as 'within the Indian country,' or any 'State or Territory inhabited bjr citizens of the United States.'"
The case was afterwards affirmed by the Supreme Court (178 U. S., 280) in an elaborate opinion affirming the view which the court adopted not only in this case but in many cases decided under the act of 1891, holding the view that a liability attaches to the Indians when within the Indian country or within a State or Territory inhabited by citizens of the United States. The Indians left the reservation in going to Mexico in the year 1864, but came back to the State of Texas at the time they committed the depredations; they were not fresh from the Indian country, but they left the United States without the consent of their guardian, and were finally brought back to their ancient habitat by the act of the Government.
The Mexican Government regarded the Indians as having such right in Mexico as that it would not require them to return; but the United States took issue with that theory of international law, and that at the best the Indians were but refugees in the territory of Mexico, and being such the United States had a right to insist upon their return. The Government through its minister regarded their presence in Mexico as a temporary sojourn, and upon that theory, when they came to the United States, as they did in 1870, and committed the depredation on the rights of the claimant they became and were Indians of the United States to all intents and purposes, and their sojourn in Mexico for six years did not have the legal effect of terminating their relations with the United States.
The executive branch of the Government whose duty it is to deal with the Indians has, through its accredited representatives, determined the legal status of the Indians at the time the depredations were committed. They were brought back in pursuance of the asserted right and policj^ of the American minister; they left their reservation in 1864 in violation of the right and policj^ of the United States, and they were in amity with the United States at the time of the depredation, and for these reasons the court holds that it is a depredation for which the Indians and the United States are responsible, and a judgment is entered for the sum of $5,320, as shown in the conclusion of law.