Case Name: George C. HIBMA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Richard T. ODEGAARD, James Nikodem, and Michael Paul Szula, Defendants-Appellees, and Sawyer County, Wisconsin, Intervening Defendant-Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1985-07-30
Citations: 769 F.2d 1147
Docket Number: Nos. 84-1137, 84-1445
Parties: George C. HIBMA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Richard T. ODEGAARD, James Nikodem, and Michael Paul Szula, Defendants-Appellees, and Sawyer County, Wisconsin, Intervening Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: Before CUDAHY and COFFEY, Circuit Judges, and GRANT, Senior District Judge.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 2d Series
Volume: 769
Pages: 1147–1173

Head Matter:
George C. HIBMA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Richard T. ODEGAARD, James Nikodem, and Michael Paul Szula, Defendants-Appellees, and Sawyer County, Wisconsin, Intervening Defendant-Appellee.
Nos. 84-1137, 84-1445.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Argued Oct. 30, 1984.
Decided July 30, 1985.
Eric J. Wahl, Eau Claire, Wis., for plaintiff-appellant.
Richard C. Niess, Madison, Wis., for defendants-appellees.
Before CUDAHY and COFFEY, Circuit Judges, and GRANT, Senior District Judge.
Honorable Robert A. Grant, Senior District Judge for the Northern District of Indiana, sitting by designation.

Opinion:
GRANT, Senior District Judge.
Plaintiff-Appellant, Hibma, appeals the trial court's granting of intervening Defendant-Appellee's, Sawyer County's, motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the trial court's denial of Hibma's motions to increase the jury's award of damages or, alternatively, for a new trial on the issue of damages, and the trial court's award of attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. For the reasons stated below, this Court reverses the trial court's order granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict and affirms the trial court's decision in all other respects.
Facts
During the time relevant to this action, Sawyer County employed Defendants-Appellees, Nikodem, Szula and Odegaard. Odegaard served as full-time Chief Deputy Sheriff of Sawyer County, and the other two served as full-time deputy sheriffs. After having committed a series of burglaries in Sawyer County, the three deputies plotted to frame Hibma for their crimes. They chose Hibma because he had a prior burglary conviction and also because he worked as a carpenter for the son of the Sheriff of Sawyer County, Sheriff Lien, whom the deputies hoped to discredit. The deputies disliked Sheriff Lien and had previously attempted to poison him with lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) and to murder him by redirecting the exhaust system of his squad car into the heater.
The deputies solicited the help of one Proffitt, a Sawyer County Jail inmate serving time under a work release sentence for forgery. They promised Proffitt that he would receive favorable, treatment on his sentence if he could talk Hibma into stealing a hand gun which Proffitt would supposedly fence.
Proffitt did contact Hibma several times over the next couple of weeks and eventually convinced him to steal a particular gun from one of Hibma's construction sites. Hibma stole the gun and delivered it to Proffitt who transferred it to the deputies. When Hibma met with Proffitt to divide the proceeds of the sale, the deputies arrested him, at gun point, for suspicion of burglary and theft. They searched Hibma, handcuffed him and took him to the Sawyer County Jail.
The deputies placed Hibma in Chief Deputy Odegaard's office and questioned him about the handgun theft as well as unsolved Sawyer County burglaries, including those that they themselves had committed. Hibma admitted the handgun theft, but denied any involvement in the burglaries. The deputies ignored Hibma's request for an attorney and refused his entreaty for medical treatment. Hibma, a narcoleptic, was physically dependent on various legal and illegal stimulant drugs. He needed medical attention because he was beginning to go through stimulant withdrawal. The deputies booked Hibma, strip searched him, gave him a cold shower and a jail uniform, and locked him in a holding cell.
Over the next several hours, the deputies repeatedly interrogated Hibma as Hibma's drug withdrawal made him violently ill. Hibma finally consented to a search of his residence.
Upon searching Hibma's home, the Sawyer County Sheriff's Department claimed to find property stolen by Odegaard, Nikodem and Szula which the three had planted in Hibma's house earlier. The deputies confronted Hibma with the stolen property and tried to coerce him into confessing to their burglaries. They again ignored his plea for medical help and left him in the holding cell when he refused to confess.
Hibma, in order to draw attention to his medical condition, broke his eyeglasses and superficially cut his wrist. The jailor summoned a doctor who obtained a court order to transfer Hibma to a hospital for drug dependency treatment. Sawyer County Jail transferred Hibma sixteen hours after his arrest. Chief Deputy Sheriff Odegaard ordered that he be transported in full restraints and that the trip be prolonged.
On the day that Hibma was moved to the hospital, Nikodem filed investigative and administrative reports which concluded that Hibma had perpetrated many of the unsolved Sawyer County burglaries. Szula swore out a criminal complaint accusing Hibma of the burglaries.
After a month in a drug treatment program, Hibma was returned to the Sawyer County Jail. On June 29, 1977, he pled guilty to the theft of the handgun pursuant to a plea agreement under which the burglary charges were dismissed. Odegaard testified against Hibma at the plea hearing. Hibma received a two-year sentence in a maximum security prison in Green Bay, Wisconsin. After two inmates sexually assaulted Hibma in Green Bay, he was transferred to another prison. He actually served a year and a day of his sentence.
In 1980, two years after Hibma's release from prison, the Federal Bureau of Investigation instigated a probe into certain activities in Sawyer County. The FBI investigation eventually led to the convictions of Odegaard, Nikodem and Szula on various federal criminal charges as well as conspiring to frame Hibma for their crimes.
In 1982, Hibma then filed the present action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In August 1983, Nikodem and Szula stipulated that they entrapped Hibma and that he would not have gone to prison but for the entrapment. Sawyer County intervened because it was potentially liable, by way of indemnification, for the acts of the deputies which were done within the scope of their employment. Wis.Stat.Ann. § 895.46 (West Supp. 1983). After a three and one-half day trial, the jury awarded Hibma $166,500.00 for damages suffered by the actions of the deputies which they did under color of state law, and attributed $86,500 of that sum to acts performed in the scope of the deputies' employment. On January 5, 1984, the district court, 576 F.Supp. 1549, granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict to Sawyer County finding that all acts of the deputies were outside the scope of their employment under Wisconsin law. The district court also denied Hibma's motion for attorney's fees from the county, but granted attorney's fees from the individual deputies.
Issues
Hibma presents three issues on appeal:
I. Whether Odegaard, Nikodem and Szula acted within the scope of their employment when they violated Hibma's constitutional rights;
II. Whether the trial court erred in denying Hibma's post-trial motions to increase damages or alternatively for a new trial on the issue of damages; and,
III. Whether 42 U.S.C. § 1988 entitles Hibma to an award of all his attorney's fees and costs?
Issue I. Whether Odegaard, Nikodem and Szula acted within the scope of their employment when they violated Hibma's constitutional rights?
Wis.Stat. § 895.46 provides in pertinent part:
(l)(a) If the defendant in any action or special proceeding is a public officer or employe and is proceeded against in an official capacity or is proceeded against as an individual because of acts committed while carrying out duties as an officer or employe and the jury or the court finds that the defendant was acting within the scope of employment, the judgment as to damages and costs entered against the officer or employe in excess of any insurance applicable to the officer or employe shall be paid by the state or political subdivision of which the defendant is an officer or employe.
On and after March 1, 1983, all persons employed as deputy sheriffs, as defined in s. 40.02(48)(b)3, are covered by this subsection.
Wis.Stat.Ann. § 895.46 (West Supp.1983).
The Dissent incorrectly assumes that the 1977 version of section 895.46 applies in the instant case because the unlawful actions of the deputies took place in 1977. In so doing, the Dissent ignores the plain language of section 895.46 which makes a defendant's state or political subdivision financially liable only after, among other things, "the jury or the court finds that the defendant was acting within the scope of employment,____" In the instant case, Sawyer County had only potential liability until September 1983 when the jury found that the deputies were acting within the scope of their employment. Nothing in the statute indicates that the Wisconsin legislature intended that section 895.46 apply only to officials' unlawful acts occurring after March 1, 1983. On the contrary, the clear language of the statute indicates that the legislature intended that the statute apply once an official's actions were found to be within the scope of employment by a jury or a court. Because the deputies were found to be acting within the scope of their employment in September 1983, the 1983 version of section 895.46 applies to the instant case.
While the jury in the instant case found that the deputies had acted within the scope of their employment when they deprived Hibma of his constitutional rights, the district court granted Sawyer County's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because it found that the deputies were not acting within the scope of their employment as required by section 895.46. The district court reasoned that
an employee's tortious act is not within the scope of his or her employment unless two criteria are satisfied: the act must have been part of or reasonably incidental 'to the duties he or she was hired, directed, or expected to perform and it must have been intended to benefit the employer.
Hibma v. Odegaard, 576 F.Supp. 1549, 1553 (W.D.Wis.1984). The district court concluded that the deputies acted at all times for their own purposes and, therefore, could not have intended to benefit their employer.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has defined "scope of employment" in the following manner:
" ' "Not every act which an agent or servant may do while he is in the place appointed for the service, or during the time in which he is engaged in the performance, can be deemed to be within the course of the employment, or within the scope of the authority. The test lies deeper than that; it inheres in the relation which the act done bears to the employment. The act cannot be deemed to be within the course of the employment unless, upon looking at it, it can fairly be said to be a natural, not disconnected and not extraordinary, part or incident of the service contemplated." ' " Id. [Scott v. Min-Aqua Bats Water Ski Club, 79 Wis.2d 316, 255 N.W.2d 536, 538 (1977)] quoting Seidl v. Knop, 174 Wis. 397, 400, 182 N.W. 980 (1921).
The scope of employment has also been defined to include those acts which are "so closely connected with what the servant is employed to do, and so fairly and reasonably incidental to it, that they may be regarded as methods, even though quite improper ones, of carrying out the objectives of the employment." Prosser, Law of Torts, (4th ed.) pp. 460-61, sec. 70 (hornbook series).
. Conduct within the scope of employment is limited to those acts which by law are attributable to the master or employer.
Cameron v. City of Milwaukee, 102 Wis.2d 448, 307 N.W.2d 164, 168-69 (1981).
While the predecessor of section 895.46 provided for indemnification if a public employee acted in good faith, see Wis.Stat. § 270.58, the legislature amended the statute in 1973 and substituted the present scope of employment requirement for the good faith requirement. See 1973 Wis. Laws ch. 333 § 173p. In certain circumstances, the courts still require an employee to exercise good faith in carrying out his duties in order to receive the protection of the indemnification statute. Absent good faith, the employee's actions in these instances would not further the objectives of the employment. See, e.g., Schroeder, Gedlen, Riester & Moerke v. Schoessow, 108 Wis.2d 49, 321 N.W.2d 131 (1982) (the exercise of legislative discretion must be done in good faith to fall within the scope of an alderman's employment). In other circumstances, however, the courts recognize that scope of employment includes "those acts which are 'so closely connected with what the servant is employed to do, and so fairly and reasonably incidental to it, that they may be regarded as methods, even though quite improper ones, of carrying out the objectives of the employment.' " Cameron, 307 N.W.2d at 168-69 (quoting Prosser, Law of Torts, § 70 at 460-61 (4th ed. 1980)). The employee's actions in these instances further the objectives of the employment even absent good faith or an intention to benefit the employer. Id. Cf Ibrahim v. Samore, 118 Wis.2d 720, 348 N.W.2d 554 (1984) (section 895.46 makes no distinction as to judgments based on intentional or negligent conduct).
Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 536 F.Supp. 462 (E.D.Wis.1982), involved two policemen who planted evidence, filed false reports and gave fabricated testimony to conceal the true nature of a fatal shooting. The city contested its responsibility to indemnify one of the police officers, Grady, because he "knowingly lied to police officials during the investigation of the shooting and perjured himself during the inquest, _" Id. at 477. The city argued that Grady's actions were outside the scope of employment under section 895.46 because Grady "was acting on his own behalf, not on behalf of his employer." Id.
In considering the city's contentions, the court stated:
The actions taken by Grady during the chase and shooting of Daniel Bell and during the subsequent investigation, had they been done in good faith, would unquestionably be among the duties of a police officer and thus within the scope of employment. The duties of a police officer are not limited to the prevention of crime and apprehension of criminals. Rather, they include participation in investigations, reporting to superiors, and giving testimony at hearings and in court.
Id. The court found that Grady's actions carried out the objectives of his employment under Cameron: "[w]hile Grady's actions were unquestionably designed to further his own objective of escaping punishment for his wrongdoing, they also were designed to further the objectives of his employment. He was performing his duties as a police officer but used quite improper methods of carrying out those duties." Id. at 478. The court required the City to indemnify Grady.
In reviewing the propriety of the granting of the judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
we must affirm the district court if, without accounting for the credibility of the witnesses, we find that the evidence and its inferences, considered as a whole and viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, can support only one reasonable conclusion — that the moving party is entitled to judgment notwithstanding the adverse verdict. Neither the district court nor this court is free to weigh the evidence or reach a result that it finds more reasonable as long as the jury's verdict is supported by substantial evidence.
Airweld, Inc. v. Airco, Inc., 742 F.2d 1184, 1188 (9th Cir.1984) (citations omitted); see also Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 900 (7th Cir.1984). The evidence here before us reveals that Odegaard, Nikodem and Szula participated in investigations, reported to superiors, and gave testimony at hearings and in court regarding Hibma. While the deputies' actions were unquestionably designed to further their own objectives of escaping punishment for their own wrongdoing, they also were designed to further the objectives of Sawyer County. They were performing their duties as deputy sheriffs but using quite improper methods of carrying out those duties. The jury found that the deputies undertook some of their actions while in the scope of their employment and attributed $86,500 of the $166,500 award to those actions.
The district court granted Sawyer County's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because it determined that section 895.46 requires that the deputies act with the intent to benefit Sawyer County. However, Cameron and Bell recognize that section 895.46 may require indemnification for actions which are not intended to benefit the employer when those actions further the objectives of the employment. Because the instant case falls squarely within the holding of Bell and because the jury's verdict was supported by substantial evidence, this Court finds that the district court erred when it granted Sawyer County's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
Issue II. Whether the trial court erred in denying Hibma's post-trial motions to increase damages or alternatively for a new trial on the issue of damages?
The trial court denied Hibma's motions to increase damages or for a new trial on the issue of damages because it found that "the total amount of damages awarded by the jury was neither clearly excessive nor clearly deficient; [the trial court] therefore declines to order a new trial on damages or add to the total award." Hibma, 576 F.Supp. at 1555.
A. Motion to increase damages.
Because Hibma based his claims on federal law, federal substantive law with respect to additur applies to his case. See Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). Under federal law, a court generally may not increase a jury's determination of damages by additur. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Hibma's motion to increase damages. See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486-87, 55 S.Ct. 296, 301, 79 L.Ed. 603 (1935); see also United States v. 93.970 Acres of Land, More or Less, Situated in Cook County, Illinois, 258 F.2d 17, 30-31 (7th Cir.1958), rev'd on other grounds, 360 U.S. 328, 79 S.Ct. 1193, 3 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1959); Brewer v. Uniroyal, Inc., 498 F.2d 973, 976 (6th Cir.1974); see generally 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2816 (1973); 6A J. Moore, J. Lucas & G. Grotheer, Jr., Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 59.08[8] (2d ed. 1984).
B. Motion for a new trial on the issue of damages.
In considering whether the trial court erred in denying Hibma a new trial on the issue of damages, this Court notes that
"a motion for a new trial is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge," Durant v. Surety Homes Corp., 582 F.2d 1081, 1088 (7th Cir.1978), the standard of review is abuse of that discretion. "The only question before us is whether the district court abused its discretion in concluding that the jury did not abuse its discretion." Galard v. Johnson, 504 F.2d 1198 at 1202 (7th Cir. Ind.1974). As our court pointed out in Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. WagnerMorehouse, Inc., 401 F.2d 23 (7th Cir. 1968):
"If the evidence in the record, viewed from the standpoint of the successful party, is sufficient to support the jury verdict, a new trial is not warranted merely because the jury could have reached a different result. [Citing eases.] Neither the trial court nor this Court may substitute its judgment for that of the jury on disputed issues of fact."
Id. at 30 (quoting Gebhardt v. Wilson Freight Forwarding Co., 348 F.2d 129, 133 (3rd Cir.1965)).
Robison v. Lescrenier, 721 F.2d 1101, 1104 (7th Cir.1983). Having reviewed the record in the instant case, this Court finds that the evidence is sufficient to support the jury's verdict and award of $166,500 as damages. Because the jury could have awarded more (or less) does not require that a new trial be granted.
Hibma also seeks a new trial based on the exclusion of evidence of the sexual assault at the Green Bay Reformatory and based on the special verdict questions submitted to the jury.
1. Exclusion of evidence.
After the jury had determined that the deputies had violated Hibma's constitutional rights while acting in the scope of their employment, and before the damage phase of the trial, the trial court granted Sawyer County's motion in limine and excluded evidence of a sexual assault upon Hibma by prisoners at the Green Bay Reformatory. The trial court excluded the evidence because it found the evidence to be irrelevant and unduly prejudicial and because it did not believe that Sawyer County had opened the door to questioning on the subject.
The general principles of tort liability govern the liability imposed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Joseph v. Rowlen, 425 F.2d 1010, 1013 (7th Cir.1970); see also Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257-58, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 1049, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978), and they provide guidance in the instant case.
Causation constitutes a necessary element in all tort cases. To establish tort liability, the victim must show that the wrongful act of the tort-feasor caused his injury. See Schlanger v. Four-Phase Systems Inc., 555 F.Supp. 535, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 430 (1965). To be a legal cause of harm to another, a tort-feasor's conduct must constitute a substantial factor in bringing about the harm. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 431. "The word 'substantial' is used to denote the fact that the defendant's conduct has such an effect in producing the harm as to lead reasonable men to regard it as a cause, using that word in the popular sense, in which there always lurks the idea of responsibility, _" Id. comment a.
"The recovery of damages in actions for false imprisonment includes recovery for physical and mental injury, . as well as for physical discomfort in jail____ So long as a jury finds that the injury was the natural consequence of the false imprisonment and proximately related to it ." the tort-feasor's conduct constitutes a legal cause of the injury and the victim may recover. Whirl v. Kern, 407 F. 2d 781, 797 (5th Cir.1969) (citations omitted). "[T]he tort feasor (sic) in a false imprisonment action may be liable for damages which are not anticipated, apprehended or foreseen, so long as they are natural and probable or direct consequences of the intentional
tort." Johnson v. Greer, 477 F.2d 101, 105 (5th Cir.1973). If the deputies' entrapment and resulting arrest and imprisonment of Hibma naturally or proximately caused his rape at the Green Bay Reformatory, their actions formed a legal cause of the rape and the trial court erred in excluding the evidence regarding it.
In assessing the propriety of the exclusion, this Court notes that "a willful or intentional tort feasor (sic) does not become an insurer of the safety of those whom he has wronged." Id. at 106. While the intentional tort-feasor must exercise utmost caution to prevent his victim from sustaining further harm, "even he remains insulated from injuries caused by wholly unforeseen accidents occurring without his agency." Id. at 107. Stated another way,
[a] person who commits a tort against another for the purpose of causing a particular harm to the other is liable for such harm if it results, whether or not it is expectable, except where the harm results from an outside force the risk of which is not increased by the defendant's act.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 435A (1965). "[E]ven where the harm would not have occurred but for the tortious act, there is no liability if, although the resulting harm was of the same general nature as that intended, the defendant's act did not increase the risk of harm through the means by which it occurred." Id. comment a. Though this section of the Restatement (Second) considers the casual relationship between intentional torts and intended injuries, the principle logically applies where an unintended injury results from an intentional tort, Johnson, ill F.2d at 107 (quoting Restatement of Torts § 870 and comment g).
The intentional torts or criminal acts of a third person may constitute a superseding cause of harm and may relieve a tort-feasor from liability for the harm caused by the third person's torts or acts. This principle applies when the original tort-feasor's negligence creates an opportunity for the third person to commit an intentional tort or criminal act, Gillot v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 507 F.Supp. 454, 457 (D.D.C. 1981), as well as when the original tort-feasor's intentional action creates the opportunity, see W. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts, § 44 at 317-18 (5th ed. 1984); see generally Restatement (Second) of Torts § 448 and comment a (1965).
Further,
[o]ne who is required by law to take or who voluntarily takes the custody of another under circumstances such as to deprive the other of his normal power of self-protection or to subject him to association with persons likely to harm him, is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control the conduct of third persons as to prevent them from intentionally harming the other or so conducting themselves as to create an unreasonable risk of harm to him, if the actor
(a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control the conduct of the third persons, and
(b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 320 (1965). When the duty to prevent harm to a tortfeasor's victim shifts from the tort-feasor to a third party, the third party's failure to prevent harm to the victim may become a superseding cause and relieve the tort-feasor from liability. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 452 (1965). Comment f of Section 452 sets forth the factors that a court must consider in determining whether the duty has shifted:
the degree of danger and the magnitude of the risk of harm, the character and position of the third person who is to take the responsibility, his knowledge of the danger and the likelihood that he will or will not exercise proper care, his relation to the plaintiff or to the defendant, the lapse of time, and perhaps other considerations.
Id. comment f. Though Section 452 discusses shifting the duty of a negligent tort-feasor, the underlying principles and listed factors may give guidance to courts contemplating the liability of intentional tort-feasors.
The court has the exclusive function to declare the existence or non-existence of rules, such as those pertaining to superseding causes, which restrict the responsibility of a tort-feasor short of making him liable for harm of which his actions are a legal cause. Id. § 453. If the facts are undisputed, the court has the duty to apply to them the rules determining the existence or extent of the tort-feasor's liability. However, if reasonable men could differ as to whether the torts or criminal acts of a third person were intentional or foreseeable, the court should leave the application of the rules to the jury. Id. comment b.
In the instant case, Sawyer County transferred custody of Hibma from the deputies to the Wisconsin Prison System. During Hibma's incarceration at the Green Bay Reformatory, the duty to protect Hibma shifted from the deputies to the Wisconsin Prison System. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 320, 452 (1965). While Hibma was under the protection of the Wisconsin Prison System, other inmates sexually assaulted him. Though the deputies' actions set in motion the events which led to Hibma's confinement at the Green Bay Reformatory, the duty of protection assumed by the Wisconsin Prison System and the criminal acts of the other inmates formed superseding causes which prevent the deputies' actions from being a legal cause in bringing about the sexual assault. See W. Keeton, supra; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 440, 441, 448, 452. Because these facts were undisputed and because reasonable men could not differ as to whether the sexual assault was an intentional act and as to whether the duty to protect Hibma had shifted to the Wisconsin Prison System, the trial court properly determined whether the evidence of the sexual assault should be considered by the jury. Finally, the trial court correctly held that the sexual assault evidence was irrelevant for the purpose of assessing Hibma's dam ages because, as set forth above, the deputies' actions were not a legal cause of the assault upon Hibma.
2. Special verdict questions.
Finally, Hibma ought not be granted a new trial on the basis that the trial court submitted an improper special verdict form to the jury. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 49(a), "[t]he district court has considerable discretion as to the nature and scope of the issues to be submitted to the jury in the form of special verdict questions." Sadowski v. Bombardier Limited, 539 F.2d 615, 622 (7th Cir.1976) (citation omitted); see also Worsham v. A.H. Robins Company, 734 F.2d 676, 690 (11th Cir. 1984); Central Progressive Bank v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Company, 658 F.2d 377, 381 (5th Cir.1981). A reviewing court must limit its inquiry to whether the trial court abused its discretion. Central Progressive Bank, 658 F.2d at 381. Special verdict questions "must pose the question presented by the case accurately and be stated in a fashion that 'avoids the potential for confusing or misleading the jury.' " Worsham, 734 F.2d at 690 (quoting Petes v. Hayes, 664 F.2d 523, 525 (5th Cir.1981)); see also Central Progressive Bank, 658 F.2d at 381.
After the liability portion of the instant case, the trial court, by means of special verdict questions, asked the jury whether any of the deputies had acted within the scope of their employment while depriving Hibma of his constitutional rights. After the damage portion of the trial, the trial court submitted special verdict questions which asked the jury to determine the amount of damages which the deputies proximately caused while acting within the scope of their employment and to determine the amount of damages proximately caused by the deputies while acting outside the scope of their employment. These questions accurately posed the question presented in the instant case and avoided the potential for confusing or misleading the jury. In effect, the trial court asked the jury to apply what it had found in the liability portion of the trial to the evidence which the jury heard in the damage portion. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in submitting these special verdict questions.
Issue III. Whether 42 U.S.C. § 1988 entitles Hibma to an award of all his attorney's fees and costs?
42 U.S.C. § 1988 gives courts broad authority to award reasonable attorney's fees to "prevailing parties" in federal civil rights actions. Smith v. Robinson, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 3457, 3466, 82 L.Ed.2d 746 (1984); Illinois Welfare Rights Organization v. Miller, 723 F.2d 564, 566 (7th Cir.1983). Section 1988 entrusts the determination of a fee award to the sound discretion of the district court because of "the district court's superior understanding of the litigation and the desirability of avoiding frequent appellate review of what essentially are factual matters." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1941, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983); In re Illinois Congressional Districts Reapportionment Cases, 704 F.2d 380, 382 (7th Cir.1983). However, the district court has only a narrow discretion and should deny fees only where an award would be unjust. Lenard v. Argento, 699 F.2d 874, 899 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 69, 78 L.Ed.2d 84 (1983). A reviewing court may set aside a trial court's fee determination only for an abuse of discretion. In re Illinois Congressional District Reapportionment Cases, 704 F.2d at 382; Freeman v. Franzen, 695 F.2d 485, 494 (7th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1214, 103 S.Ct. 3553, 77 L.Ed.2d 1400 (1983). The amount of the fee awarded turns on the facts of each case. Hensley, 103 S.Ct. at 1937.
In the instant case, Hibma initiated this section 1983 action against Nikodem, Szula and Odegaard. Sawyer County intervened in October 1982 because it was potentially liable to Hibma by way of indemnification under Wis.Stat.Ann. § 895.46 (West Supp.1983). In August 1983, Nikodem and Szula stipulated to judgment be ing entered against them in an amount to be determined by the court. In determining the amount of attorney's fees to be awarded to Hibma, the trial court reviewed the time records submitted by Hibma's counsel and allowed all fees that it determined to be attributable to Hibma's section 1983 action and disallowed all fees that it determined to be attributable to Hibma's action against Sawyer County under Wis. Stat. § 895.46. In doing so, the trial court did not abuse the discretion afforded it under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
Section 1988 applies to federal civil rights claims. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The fact that a plaintiff makes a constitutional claim "does not render automatic an award of fees for the entire proceeding." Smith, 104 S.Ct. at 3467. "Due regard must be paid, not only to the fact that a plaintiff 'prevailed,' but also to the relationship between the claims on which effort was expended and the ultimate relief obtained." Id. at 3466 (citing Hensley, 103 S.Ct. 1933); see also Illinois Welfare Rights Organization v. Miller, 723 F.2d 564, 567 (7th Cir. 1983). The ultimate relief obtained by Hibma in the instant action consisted of damages against the deputies under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Wis.Stat. § 895.46 merely provided a means for Hibma to collect part of the award from Sawyer County. The Wisconsin statute neither enhanced nor diminished the award obtained under section 1983. Therefore, the trial judge properly disallowed all fees that it determined to be attributable to Hibma's pursuit of indemnification.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, this Court REVERSES the order of the district court granting Sawyer County's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, REVERSES the order of the district court vacating its previous order entering judgment against Sawyer County, and AFFIRMS the order of the district court in all other respects including the district court's determination of attorney's fees.
. The Dissent asserts that we and the jury have confused and commingled the "under color of state law" element of section 1983 with the "scope of employment" element of section 895.-46. If this were true, the jury would have awarded the full $166,500.00 to Hibma rather than reduce that amount by $80,000.00 to account for acts done outside the scope of the deputies' employment. By focusing on the most egregious acts of the deputies, the Dissent fails to notice that the deputies' participation in investigations, reporting to superiors, filing and paperwork, testifying at trial, etc. furthered the objectives of Sawyer County. Because those activities support the jury's verdict, the district court ought not to have granted a judgment notwithstanding that verdict.