Case Name: Vertie L. HOLLIDAY v. Andrew S. HOLLIDAY
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1978-04-10
Citations: 358 So. 2d 618
Docket Number: No. 60298
Parties: Vertie L. HOLLIDAY v. Andrew S. HOLLIDAY.
Judges: CALOGERO, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 358
Pages: 618–623

Head Matter:
Vertie L. HOLLIDAY v. Andrew S. HOLLIDAY.
No. 60298.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
April 10, 1978.
Dissenting Opinion May 31, 1978.
Thomas & Dunahoe, Edwin Dunahoe, Natchitoches, for plaintiff-applicant.
Russell E. Gahagan, Gahagan & Gahagan, Natchitoches, for defendant-respondent.

Opinion:
MARCUS, Justice.
On April 26, 1963, plaintiff, Vertie Eagles, née Leeper, and defendant, Andrew S. Holliday, entered into an antenuptial agree ment in which they stipulated that there would be no community of acquets and gains during the existence of their contemplated marriage, choosing instead to remain separate in property. The parties further agreed that plaintiff waived and relinquished "any and all rights or claims which she might have to claim or collect sustenance, alimony, support, maintenance or funds for any reason from the said Andrew Sampson Holliday . in the event a judicial separation or divorce is obtained by either of the parties hereto." Thereafter, on May 2, 1963, the parties were married.
On June 25, 1976, plaintiff instituted this action against defendant seeking a separation from bed and board on the ground of cruel treatment and custody of the minor children of the marriage. Additionally, plaintiff sought alimony pendente lite in the sum of $800 per month and child support in like amount. Defendant filed an answer denying the allegations of plaintiff's petition and pleading as a bar to plaintiff's right to alimony pendente lite the antenuptial agreement executed by the parties. He further reconvened seeking a separation in his favor on the ground of cruel treatment and custody of the minor children of the marriage. After trial on the merits, judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff awarding her a separation from bed and board and rejecting defendant's reconventional demand. Defendant was ordered to pay to plaintiff alimony pendente lite in the sum of $400 per month and child support for a minor child of the marriage in the amount of $50 per week.
Defendant appealed only that portion of the district court's judgment which awarded to plaintiff alimony pendente lite. The court of appeal concluded that the provision of the antenuptial agreement in which plaintiff waived her right to alimony pen-dente lite in the event of a judicial separation was a valid and binding agreement and was not against public policy. Hence, it barred plaintiff's right to alimony pendente lite. Accordingly, the court amended the lower court's judgment so as to delete therefrom the award of alimony pendente lite to plaintiff. We granted plaintiff's applicatión for certiorari to review the correctness of this decision.
With respect to antenuptial agreements, La.Civil Code art. 2325 provides:
In relation to property, the law only regulates the conjugal association, in default of particular agreements, which the parties are at liberty to stipulate as they please, provided they be not contrary to good morals, and under the modifications hereafter prescribed.
Pursuant to this provision, an antenuptial agreement is valid provided that it is not contrary to good morals or to public policy.
The sole issue presented for our determination is whether the provision of the ante-nuptial agreement in which plaintiff waived her right to alimony pendente lite in the event of a judicial separation from bed and board is null and void as against public policy.
Although, under La.Civil Code art. 86, marriage is designated as a civil contract, it is more than a contract. The law prescribes the manner of contracting and celebrating marriages, the legal effects and consequences of marriage, and the manner in which marriages may be dissolved. La. Civil Code art. 87. Hence, marriage is a relationship established according to law and it is the policy of the state to maintain it. In the public interest, the state has deemed it essential that certain rights and duties should attach to this relationship among which is the husband's obligation to support his wife during the existence of the marriage. With regard to this duty, La. Civil Code arts. 119 and 120 provide:
Art. 119:
The husband and wife owe to each other mutually, fidelity, support and assistance.
Art. 120:
The wife is bound to live with her husband and to follow him wherever he chooses to reside; the husband is obliged to receive her and to furnish her with whatever is required for the convenience of life, in proportion to his means and condition. (Emphasis added.)
Although a judgment of separation from bed and board terminates the spouses' conjugal cohabitation and their community of acquets and gains, where one exists, it does not dissolve the marriage itself nor does it extinguish the obligation of fidelity and duty of support and assistance provided for in La.Civil Code arts. 119 and 120 which terminate only upon dissolution of the marriage by death or divorce. Boucvalt v. Boucvalt, 235 La. 421, 104 So.2d 157 (1958); Hillard v. Hillard, 225 La. 507, 73 So.2d 442 (1954); Smith v. Smith, 217 La. 646, 47 So.2d 32 (1950). La.Civil Code art. 148 is the authority for the courts to allow alimony pendente lite. The right of the wife to seek alimony pendente lite does not depend at all upon the merits of the suit for separation from bed and board, or for divorce, or upon the actual or prospective outcome of the suit. The reason for this is that an order to pay alimony pendente lite is merely an enforcement of the obligation of the husband to support his wife as it exists under La.Civil Code art. 120, which continues during the pendency of a suit for separation from bed and board or for divorce and does not terminate until the marriage is dissolved either by death or by divorce. Murphy v. Murphy, 229 La. 849, 87 So.2d 4 (1956); Messersmith v. Messersmith, 229 La. 495, 86 So.2d 169 (1956); Hillard v. Hillard, supra; Eals v. Swan, 221 La. 329, 59 So.2d 409 (1952).
It is the public policy of this state as expressed in the provisions of La.Civil Code arts. 119, 120 and 148 that a husband should support and assist his wife during the existence of the marriage. It is against the public interest to permit the parties to enter into an antenuptial agreement relieving him of this duty imposed by law. The policy involved is that conditions which affect entitlement to alimony pendente lite cannot be accurately foreseen at the time antenuptial agreements are entered, and the public interest in enforcement of the legal obligation to support overrides the premarital anticipatory waiver of alimony.
We, therefore, conclude that the provision of the antenuptial agreement in which plaintiff-wife waived her right to alimony pendente lite in the event of a judicial separation from bed and board is null and void as against public policy. Hence, the court of appeal erred in recognizing the validity of the waiver as a bar to plaintiff's right to alimony pendente lite.
Since we are unable to ascertain from the record before us whether defendant raised in the alternative the issue of the excessiveness of the alimony award in his appeal to the court of appeal, we must remand the case to that court for further proceedings.
DECREE
For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the court of appeal is reversed and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with the views herein expressed. The costs in this court are assessed against defendant, Andrew S. Hol-liday.
CALOGERO, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
SUMMERS, J., dissents and will assign reasons.
. 346 So.2d 1382 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1977).
. 350 So.2d 678 (La.1977).
3. See also La.Civil Code arts. 11, 1892, 1895 and 2031.
. La.Civil Code art. 148 provides:
If the wife has not a sufficient income for her maintenance pending the suit for separation from bed and board or for divorce, the judge shall allow her, whether she appears as plaintiff or defendant, a sum for her support, proportioned to her needs and to the means of her husband.
. The great weight of authority is in general accord. Williams v. Williams, 29 Ariz. 538, 243 P. 402 (1926); Eule v. Eule, 24 Ill.App.3d 83, 320 N.E.2d 506 (1974); In re Marriage of Gudenkauf, 204 N.W.2d 586 (Iowa 1973); Norris v. Norris, 174 N.W.2d 368 (Iowa 1970); Cohn v. Cohn, 209 Md. 470, 121 A.2d 704 (1956); Motley v. Motley, 255 N.C. 190, 120 S.E.2d 422 (1961); Caldwell v. Caldwell, 5 Wis.2d 146, 92 N.W.2d 356 (1958).
.We express no opinion at this time regarding the validity of the clause in respect to its attempt to waive permanent alimony. This issue is not before us.