Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. Aubrey Joseph LECOMPTE
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1978-11-13
Citations: 371 So. 2d 239
Docket Number: No. 62117
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Aubrey Joseph LECOMPTE.
Judges: DIXON, J., dissents. We cannot constitutionally prohibit introduction of evidence tending to disprove essential intent.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 371
Pages: 239–247

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. Aubrey Joseph LECOMPTE.
No. 62117.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Nov. 13, 1978.
On Rehearing May 21, 1979.
Willis & Hardy, Paul J. deMahy, St. Mar-tinville, for defendant-appellant.
William A. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Knowles M. Tucker, Dist. Atty., George W. McHugh, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Opinion:
SANDERS, Chief Justice.
The State charged the defendant, Aubrey Joseph Leeompte, with four counts of attempted forcible rape, violations of LSA-R.S. 14:27 and 14:43.1. A jury returned guilty verdicts. The court sentenced him to five-year terms of imprisonment on each count, to run consecutively.
The defendant appeals, relying on eleven assignments of error for reversal of his convictions and sentences.
We adduce the following context facts:
While on Interstate-10, the defendant motioned to women driving alone that something was wrong with their right rear tires. Upon stopping, the defendant offered to tighten the lugs on the wheels but stated that he could only do it safely at the next exit. They left the Interstate at the Butte LaRose exit. In three instances, the defendant escorted the women to a nearby shell yard, and in the other instance, he followed the victim until she pulled off the exit road. After tightening the lugs, he attempted to forcibly rape each woman.
These offenses occurred over a two-month period.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NOS. 1 AND 2
Prior to and during trial, the defendant filed motions to quash and sever the four counts of attempted forcible rape. The court denied them.
In challenging these rulings, the defendant asserts that the joinder prevented the jury from giving a fair determination of his guilt or innocence on each offense. He contends that trial on the four counts confused the jury because each count had a separate victim, time and date, because there was an alibi for three counts, and because the State presented the evidence in a different order than the counts appear in the Bill of Information. He supports this contention by pointing to the fact that the jury asked the court for the specific time each offense occurred.
When the State charges the defendant in the same Bill of Information with two or more offenses pursuant to Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 493, he may apply for a severance of offenses under Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 495.1, which provides:
"The court, on application of the prosecuting attorney, or on application of the defendant shall grant a severance of offenses whenever:
"(a) if before trial, it is deemed appropriate to promote a fair determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence of each offense; or
"(b) if during the trial upon consent of the defendant, it is deemed necessary to achieve a fair determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence of each offense. The Court shall consider whether, in view of the number of offenses charged and the complexity of the evidence to be offered, the trier of fact will be able to distinguish the evidence and apply the law intelligently as to each offense."
In State v. Mitchell, La., 356 So.2d 974 (1978), we set forth the guidelines for severance, as follows:
"Two critical questions must be determined by the trial judge presented with a motion for severance of offenses. First, he must decide 'whether, in view of the number of offenses charged and the complexity of the evidence . offered, the trier of fact [could] distinguish the evidence and apply the law intelligently as to each offense.' La.Code Crim.P. art. 495.1; State v. Holstead, 354 So.2d 493 (La.1977); State v. Proctor, 354 So.2d 488 (La.1977). A second question to be decided is whether the offenses joined because they are of the 'same or similar character' under La.Code Crim.P. art. 493 (as opposed to 'same transaction' or 'common plan' joinder) are admissible as similar acts under La.R.S. 15:445 and 446. State v. Holstead, supra; State v. Carter, 352 So.2d 607 (La.1977).
"In relation to the first question, in deciding whether the complexity of the evidence warrants severance of the offenses, an appellate court evaluating the trial judge's denial of defendant's motion will examine the case for various problems:
"Some of the dangers inherent in a multiple offense joinder situation are that the jury may become confused in trying to apply the applicable law and evidence to the correct offense; that the jury may consider that a person charged with doing so many things is a bad man who must have done something, a feeling that might lead to a cumulation of the evidence; that the judge might find it difficult to adequately charge a jury as to the law with respect to each offense; that the prosecutor may find it troublesome to present his evidence in a compartmentalized and understandable manner; and that a defendant may be confounded or embarrassed in his defense because of the sheer number or complexity of the charges against him.
"State v. Proctor, supra. Also cited in State v. Holstead, supra.
U
"We next consider whether the offenses joined under La.Code Crim.P. art. 493 because they are of the 'same or similar character' are admissible as similar acts under La.R.S. 15:445 and 446. State v. Holstead, supra; State v. Carter, supra. In order to be admissible under this exception, the other crimes must first be so distinctively similar as to preponderantly demonstrate that their perpetrator must be the same person. State v. Jackson, 352 So.2d 195 (La.1977); State v. Slayton, 338 So.2d 694 (La.1976); State v. Waddles, 336 So.2d 810 (La.1976). The proof of the other crimes must also be relevant to prove a fact of consequence to the accused's present innocence or guilt (independent of the inadmissible purpose to infer that the accused committed the present crime because he had committed the other one). State v. Jackson, supra; State v. Frederick, 340 So.2d 1353 (La.1976). Finally, the probative value of the evidence of the other crime must outweigh its prejudicial effect. State v. Jackson, supra; State v. Ledet, 345 So.2d 474 (La.1977); State v. Moore, 278 So.2d 781 (La.1973) (on rehearing)." [Footnote deleted.]
This Court concludes that the trial judge properly denied the motions to quash and sever. Severance was neither appropriate nor necessary "to promote a fair determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence of each offense." LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 495.1. Under the circumstances here, we think the jury could distinguish the evidence and apply the law intelligently as to each offense. Several factors bolster our conclusion: the relatively small number of offenses joined and the uncomplicated nature of the offenses did not handicap the defendant in his defense; each offense was for the same crime committed in the same manner; there was no confusion in the application of the law because the law was the same for each offense; the statutes violated have few elements; the State presented its evidence in a compartmentalized, logical, and understandable manner; the State's evidence consisted primarily of the victims' testimony which was simple and largely identical in nature; and the court's instructions clearly explained the jury's duty to determine the defendant's guilt or inno cence on each offense. Most importantly, the court gave the jurors a list of each charge, the victim, and the date of the offenses to aid in their deliberations.
The jury initially returned two verdicts of not guilty and two verdicts of guilty. One of the not guilty verdicts was improper because it was not the verdict of ten jurors. See LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 782. The judge instructed them that ten must concur in each verdict and ordered them to deliberate further. Thereafter, they returned four guilty verdicts. The fact that the jurors initially rendered different verdicts for each count indicates that they separated the evidence and law for each count.
And finally, because the jurors asked for the specific times on each offense, does not indicate that the joinder of offenses confused them. The times were critical for evaluation of the alibis.
Secondly, we find these joined offenses which are of the "same or similar character" admissible as similar acts under LSA-R.S. 15:445 and 446. In the instant case, the forcible rapes occurred over a two-month period and exhibited almost identical modus operandi. The modus operandi is so distinctive that it supports a finding that the crimes were the action of the same person, i. e., they are "signature crimes."
Evidence of other crimes is relevant to prove a fact of consequence of the defendant's innocence or guilt. He placed his identity at issue when he presented alibis to three of the charges. The identification of the defendant as the assailant in the offense in which the defense failed to offer an alibi strengthens the identifications in the other three rape charges. In addition, the defense contested the specific intent. He unsuccessfully attempted to introduce expert evidence to prove that he did not have the specific intent to commit any crime and he testified that he did not intend to rape one of the victims. The fact that the defendant inserted his finger into one of the victims vagina strengthens the proof of the defendant's specific intent to forcibly rape the other three victims. Hence, the evidence of the other offenses was relevant to his identity and intent.
Lastly, the probative value of the evidence of each attempted forcible rape, relating to the proof of identity and intent, clearly outweighs its prejudicial effect.
In conclusion, we hold that the trial court properly denied the motions to quash and sever.
These assignments of error are without merit.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NOS. 4, 5, 6, AND 7
The defense alleges that there is no evidence that the victims were prevented from resisting his acts by force or threats of physical violence wherein the victims reasonably believed such resistance would be useless, and that there is no evidence of his specific intent to engage in sexual intercourse without the lawful consent of the victims.
In criminal matters, our appellate-jurisdiction extends to questions of law. La.Const. Art. 5, § 5 (1974). Only when defendant has moved for a new trial, or a directed verdict in a bench trial, based on the allegation that there is no evidence of the crime charged is a question of law presented which this Court can review. State v. Alexander, La., 339 So.2d 818 (1976); State v. Jack, La., 332 So.2d 464 (1976); State v. Jones, La., 303 So.2d 486 (1974). Here the defendant failed to make any such motion. At sentencing held seven days after conviction, counsel moved only for a continuance in order that he have additional time to file a motion for a new trial. The court denied it, and the defendant does not challenge that, ruling.
Assuming arguendo that we have jurisdiction to treat these contentions, we find that there was some evidence of each element of the crimes. The four victims' testimony alone constituted evidence of the defendant's force and his specific intent. Moreover, although "intent is a question of fact, it need not be proven as a fact, it may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction." LSA-R.S. 15:445.
These assignments of error are without merit.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 8 .
The court qualified defense witness Dr. Lillian Robinson as a medical expert in the field of psychiatry and psychoanalysis. She testified as to the defendant's mental history. When she stated that he had a "dissociative reaction" to the sudden death of his first wife and the rearing of his three children, the court interrupted and removed the jury. The following occurred:
"BY THE COURT: The State has [previously] raised an objection to the testimony of the psychiatric witness on the grounds that the defendant has entered a plea of not guilty to the crime and not a plea of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. What is the purpose of your testimony, [defense counsel]?
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: If Your Honor . please, I did not anticipate the State's objection on this.
"BY THE COURT: But you should have.
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: We did not enter a plea of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity for a very special reason. He's not insane.
H * % *
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: We entered a plea of not guilty. Now he is charged with the attempt to commit a forcible rape. The article which defines attempt requires a specific intent. The purpose of the doctor's testimony is to show that he did not have a specific intent to commit the crime." Tr. pp. 249-250.
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 651 provides in pertinent part:
"When a defendant is tried upon a plea of 'not guilty', evidence of insanity or mental defect at the time of the offense shall not be admissible."
Under this statute, evidence of a mental condition or defect is inadmissible when the defendant failed to plead not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. Moreover, a mental defect or disorder short of insanity cannot serve to negate specific intent and reduce the degree of the crime. State v. Rideau, 249 La. 1111, 193 So.2d 264 (1966) and the cases cited therein. See also LSA-R.S. 14:14; LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 651, Official Revision Comment (a); State v. Berry, La., 324 So.2d 822 (1975). In State v. Jones, La., 359 So.2d 95 (1978), we upheld a trial court's ruling which precluded counsel from arguing that defendant's "neurotic, prone-to-hysteria mental condition precluded the specific intent required for murder ." where defense had withdrawn her plea of not guilty by reason of insanity.
Initially, we note that specific intent is an ultimate legal conclusion to be resolved by the fact finders. Because an "expert witness must state the facts upon which his opinion is based," we can reasonably deduce that the testimony of an expert in psychiatry and psychoanalysis concerning the defendant's lack of specific intent would necessarily include testimony of a mental defect or condition. See LSA-R.S. 15:465. Stated another way, in order for the physician to testify as to the effect, no specific intent, she would testify as to the cause, mental condition. This is true even when he asserts (for the first time in brief) that the testimony would prove the absence of specific intent as a defense as distinguished from the inability to form specific intent.
We hold, therefore, that Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 651 precludes admission of an expert's testimony concerning the absence of specific intent when the defendant's plea is not guilty.
This assignment of error is without merit.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 11
The defendant challenges the victims' in-court identifications on the basis that he participated in a line-up without his attorney present despite the fact that he had an attorney.
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 841 prevents us from treating this issue for the defendant failed to object to any of the victims' identifications. Moreover, the record is void of direct evidence concerning the line-up. For example, it fails to reflect the date of the line-up in order that we may decide if the defendant had a right to an attorney. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972).
This assignment of error is without merit.
We have examined the remaining assignments of error and find them to be insubstantial.
For the reasons assigned, the convictions and sentences are affirmed.
DIXON, J., dissents. We cannot constitutionally prohibit introduction of evidence tending to disprove essential intent.
CALOGERO, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
DENNIS, J., dissents, disagreeing with the opinion as to the exclusion of evidence relating to intent.