Case Name: Scott A. HARRISON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. McNEESE STATE UNIVERSITY, Defendant-Appellee
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1994-03-23
Citations: 635 So. 2d 318
Docket Number: No. 93-288
Parties: Scott A. HARRISON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. McNEESE STATE UNIVERSITY, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: Before KNOLL and COOKS, JJ., and BERTRAND , J. Pro. Tem.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 635
Pages: 318–323

Head Matter:
Scott A. HARRISON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. McNEESE STATE UNIVERSITY, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 93-288.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
March 23, 1994.
Scott A. Harrison, pro se.
Donald Coleman Brown, Lake Charles, for MeNeese State University.
Before KNOLL and COOKS, JJ., and BERTRAND , J. Pro. Tem.
Honorable Luden C. Bertrand, Jr., participated in this decision by appointment of the Louisiana Supreme Court as Judge Pro Tem.

Opinion:
LUCIEN C. BERTRAND, Judge Pro Tem.
Scott Harrison, a pro se litigant, appeals a judgment imposing sanctions of $6,845.45 against him, pursuant to La.C.C.P. art. 863. For the following reasons, we affirm.
This case arises out of an incident on the campus of MeNeese State University, when Harrison, then a student, refused to remove pornographic material from an art class at his instructor's request. Harrison was subsequently suspended from the University after a full disciplinary hearing in which he was found guilty of failing to comply with instructions given by a University official, using obscene or public profanity, either written or oral, on the University campus and mental harassment. Harrison's suspension was upheld by the University president.
Harrison then sued MeNeese State University and certain University officials for redress of the following alleged •wrongful acts: (1) refusing to refund his tuition, lab and locker fees for the semester in which he was suspended; (2) falsely arresting him at the University library; (3) issuing a "slanderous" grade report of all "F's," when the correct grades should have been "W's;" (4) damaging his college career; and (5) violating his freedom of expression.
The case proceeded to trial with Harrison representing himself; he was the only witness called to testify. After the plaintiff rested, the trial court granted an involuntary dismissal in favor of all defendants.
After the judgment of dismissal was affirmed by this court, defendant MeNeese State University filed a motion for sanctions, contending that the plaintiff had filed frivolous pleadings and ultimately presented no evidence or testimony to support any of his claims. The University also sought sanctions and a protective order in response to a contemptuous letter containing obscene language that Harrison mailed to defense counsel.
At the hearing on the motion for sanctions, the trial court found that the evidence Harrison presented at trial in no way supported the allegations in his pleadings and, in fact, served only to support the contentions of the defendants. The court also found that Harrison consistently sought to harass and intimidate McNeese State University and further caused the University to incur needless expense. Pursuant to La.C.C.P. art. 863D, the court imposed sanctions of $6,845.45 in attorney's fees for the filing of frivolous and harassing pleadings. The court declined to sanction Harrison for the indecent letter because there was no proof that this document was ever filed into the record as a pleading or an exhibit.
La.C.C.P. art. 863 provides in part:
B. Pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit or certificate, except as otherwise provided by law, but the signature of an attorney or party shall constitute a certification by him that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact; that it is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.
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D. If, upon motion of any party or upon its own motion, the court determines that a certification has been made in violation of the provisions of this Article, the court shall impose upon the person who made the certification or the represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
Paragraph D above, which authorizes the imposition of sanctions for violations of paragraph B, was added by the legislature in 1988, and applies to all pleadings filed on or after January 1, 1989. Acts 1988, No. 442, § 2. Although Harrison's original petition was filed in 1987, he filed a supplemental amending petition on September 26, 1989 in which he reiterated the allegations of his original petition. Thus, the causes of action which the trial court found to be groundless and for which Harrison was sanctioned are contained in a pleading filed after Act 442's effective date.
The obligation imposed upon litigants and their counsel who sign a pleading is to make an objectively reasonable inquiry into the facts and law. Subjective good faith will not satisfy the duty of reasonable inquiry. Murphy v. Boeing Petroleum Services, 600 So.2d 823 (La.App. 3d Cir.1992). By choosing to represent himself, a party assumes the responsibility of familiarizing himself with applicable procedural and substantive law. His failure to do so does not give him any greater rights than a litigant represented by an attorney. Deville v. The Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society, Inc., 503 So.2d 705 (La.App. 3d Cir.1987). This court has imposed sanctions on a pro se litigant when such action has been justified by the facts presented. See Bankston v. Alexandria Neurosurgical Clinic, 583 So.2d 1148 (La.App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 589 So.2d 1066 (La.1991).
The standard to be applied by the appellate court when reviewing the trial court's imposition of sanctions is the "abuse of discretion," "manifestly erroneous" or "clearly wrong" criteria used in reviewing a trial court's factual findings. Murphy, supra, at p. 826.
After reviewing the record before us, we find no error in the trial court's decision to impose sanctions on Harrison. Under cross examination, Harrison admitted to his knowledge of facts which would have negated the possibility of recovery under any cause of action alleged against the University. Regarding his claim for return of tuition and other fees, Harrison admitted that the deadline for such refunds had expired before he made his request of the University. Concerning his claim of false arrest, Harrison admitted that at the time of his arrest he knew he had been barred from the campus because of his suspension. Further, he testified that he was aware that he could have requested a University escort to take him to the library. Regarding his defamation claim, he testified that the University promptly changed his grades from F's to Ws when notified of the error, and to his knowledge, the University did not show the incorrect grade report to anyone other than himself. He admitted, however, that he showed the incorrect grade report to others. Finally, regarding his claims of damage to his college education and violation of his rights of freedom of expression, Harrison acknowledged that upon his admission to the University, he signed a contract in which he agreed to abide by the University's rules and regulations.
La.C.C.P. art. 86B is intended only for exceptional circumstances. Failure to prevail does not trigger a sanction award, and the slightest justification for the exercise of a legal right precludes sanctions. Murphy, supra, at p. 827. However, the record in the instant case convinces us that Harrison's true motive was to harass and inconvenience the University rather than to exercise his legal rights. His own testimony establishes that he failed to make a reasonable inquiry into the facts and the law. The indecent letter sent to defense counsel, although not a pleading, is evidence of Harrison's intent to harass and intimidate the University and its officials. We find no error in the trial court's decision to sanction Harrison, and we further find that the sanction imposed, the actual attorney's fees of $6,845.45 incurred by the University, is reasonable.
For the above reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed to plaintiff-appellant, Scott Harrison.
AFFIRMED.
COOKS, J., dissents and assigns written reasons.