Case Name: Webb vs. Rice and another
Court: New York Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1841-07
Citations: 1 Hill & Den. 606
Docket Number: 
Parties: Webb vs. Rice and another.
Judges: 
Reporter: Hill's Reports
Volume: 1
Pages: 606–612

Head Matter:
Webb vs. Rice and another.
In ejectment by the grantee in a deed absolute on its face and recorded as such, against persons claiming by deed subsequent from the same source; held, that the plaintiff’s recovery might be defeated by oral evidence that his deed was intended as a mortgage, though the evidence did not consist directly of facts occurring when the deed was executed, but mainly of the grantor’s declarations made long afterward, importing a defeasance of some kind, but entirely indefinite as to the terms of it.
Bronson, J. dissented, holding that, even in a court of equity, oral evidence to contradict the terms of a deed should not be received, except on the ground of fraud or mistake; and that, at law, such evidence ought in no case to be admitted. He, moreover, regarded the evidence relied upon in the present instance as especially objectionable, and wholly insufficient
Ejectment for a village lot in Knowlesville, Orleans county, tried before Dayton, 0. Judge, at the Orleans circuit, in October, 1839. Frederick B. Moore, being the owner of the lot, by deed bearing date November 1, 1835, for the consideration of $550, as therein expressed, conveyed the same in fee to the plaintiff, with the usual covenants of warranty. The conveyance was in terms an absolute deed, and it was recorded as a deed on the 11th July, 1836.
On the 30th July, 1836, Moore also conveyed the lot to the defendant Aldrich, in fee, with a covenant of warranty, for the consideration of $400. This deed was recorded on the 8th August, 1836. The defendants offered to prove by parol, and without showing any written defeasance, that the deed to the plaintiff was intended merely as a mortgage, and the judge admitted the evidence. To make out this part of the case, the defendants off ered to give evidence of verbal declarations by the plaintiff made- since the giving of the deed; and although the plaintiff insisted that the defendants could, at the most, only show an;agreement made at the time the deed was ex-ecuted, the judge admitted the offered evidence. Two witnesses testified to conversations with the plaintiff just before this suit was commenced. Knowles said, the plaintiff told him that Moore had deeded the lot to him, (the plaintiff,) and if Moore paid a bank note, he would deed the lot back to him. Parker, the other witness, said, the plaintiff told him, in a conversation about the deed, that Moore was to have the land back if he (Moore) paid the consideration money, or paid a certain note which the plaintiff had endorsed for Moore—which form of expression was used the witness could not state. Moore, the grantor, was examined on interrogatories as a witness for the defendants, and testified, that the deed was executed and deposited with the plaintiff to secure him for his endorsement for the witness, and for no other consideration—that it was expressly understood the deed was not to be put upon record, but was to be retained by the plaintiff in his possession as a private collateral security for his said endorsement, and that whenever the witness called for the deed the plaintiff was to deliver it up to him.
In answer to an objection by the plaintiff that the evidence to prove a defeasance was uncertain and contradictory, the judge decided that if the jury believed the testimony of Moore, or that any defeasance to the deed was established, although the terms of that defeasance were not proved, the defence was established, and the defendants must have a verdict. The judge charged the jury in conformity to the foregoing decisions, and upon all of the points exceptions were taken by the plaintiff. Verdict for the defendants. The plaintiff now moved for a new trial on a bill of exceptions.
S. Stevens, for the plaintiff.
M. T. Reynolds, for the defendants.

Opinion:
Nelson, C. J. and Cowen, J.
considered the case as within the prior decisions of this court, allowing oral evidence, in a court of law, to show that a deed, absolute on its face, was in fact intended as a mortgage; and were of opin ion, therefore, that the motion for a new trial should be denied.