Case Name: PEOPLE v. KEAN
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1994-04-18
Citations: 204 Mich. App. 533
Docket Number: Docket No. 127486
Parties: PEOPLE v KEAN
Judges: Before: Michael J. Kelly, P.J., and Connor and A. A. Monton, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 204
Pages: 533–540

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v KEAN
Docket No. 127486.
Submitted December 9, 1993, at Grand Rapids.
Decided April 18, 1994, at 9:10 a.m.
Leave to appeal sought.
Jon P. Kean pleaded guilty in the Kalamazoo Circuit Court, Donald E. Goodwillie, J., of armed robbery pursuant to a plea agreement that recommended a sentence of five to twenty years in prison and provided that the defendant would enter a residential abuse treatment program or would report to the sheriffs department for the period between the plea and sentencing hearings. The defendant entered a treatment program, but left after one week, did not present himself at the sheriffs department, did not appear at his presentence interview and scheduled sentencing hearing, and remained at large until arrested more than 2Vz years later. The court found that the defendant’s actions constituted a violation of the plea agreement, held that the defendant was not entitled to the benefit of the bargain, refused to permit the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea, and sentenced the defendant to a prison term of eight to twenty years. The defendant appealed.
The Court of Appeals held:
1. The trial court properly found that the intent of the plea agreement was that the defendant would remain in any treatment program that he entered for the entire period between the plea hearing and the sentencing hearing and that his leaving the treatment program and absenting himself from the scheduled proceedings constituted a violation of the plea agreement. The court also properly held that the violation of the plea agreement precluded the defendant from insisting on performance of the provisions of the agreement and relieved the court of the obligation of permitting the defendant to withdraw his plea after the court determined to impose a more severe sentence than that which had been recommended.
2. The defendant’s claim that the plea was not voluntary because the attorney retained for him allegedly demanded a fee of $50,000 if the matter went to trial was not preserved for appeal because the defendant indicated at the plea hearing that his plea was given knowingly, understandingly, and voluntarily and that he was aware of his right to court-appointed counsel.
References
Am Jur*2d, Criminal Law §§ 469, 481, 483, 484, 486, 501, 502, 504.
Comment Note. — Right to withdraw guilty plea in state criminal proceeding where court refuses to grant concession contemplated by plea bargain. 66 ALR3d 902.
3. The defendant’s minimum sentence, although more than that recommended by the sentencing guidelines, was not disproportionate to the crime or to the individual in light of the defendant’s blatant disregard of the plea agreement and bond conditions and his disrespect for the criminal justice system.
4. The $1 million bond set following the recapture of the defendant was not excessive under the circumstances, and neither the bond nor the fact that the judge cautioned the defendant’s family concerning the possible consequences of their testimony at the sentencing hearing evidences bias on the part of the trial judge such as would require disqualification from imposing sentencing.
Affirmed.
Connor, J., dissenting, stated that the defendant’s entry into the treatment program constituted full compliance with the plea agreement in light of the fact that he made no specific agreement to remain in the program and, accordingly, the trial court should have given the defendant the opportunity to withdraw his plea when it determined to impose a more severe sentence than that recommended in the plea agreement. Further, the majority relies upon wrongly decided authority for the proposition that where a defendant has breached a plea agreement the trial court may refuse to honor a sentence recommendation embodied in the plea agreement without allowing the defendant the opportunity to withdraw the plea.
Criminal Law — Guilty Pleas — Withdrawal of Pleas — Plea Bargains.
The right of a defendant to withdraw a plea of guilty if the court determines not to follow a sentence recommendation embodied in a plea agreement is not absolute and may be waived where the defendant breaches the plea agreement by failing to comply with agreed-upon conditions during the period between the plea hearing and the sentencing hearing and by failing to appear for a scheduled sentencing hearing; under such circumstances, a court may impose a more severe sentence than that recommended in the plea agreement without allowing the defendant the opportunity to withdraw the guilty plea.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, James J. Gregart, Prosecuting Attorney, and Anne M. McCarthy, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Milton J. Marovich, and Jon P. Kean, in propria persona, for the defendant.
Before: Michael J. Kelly, P.J., and Connor and A. A. Monton, JJ.
Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
Michael J. Kelly, P.J.
Defendant pleaded guilty of armed robbery, MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797, and was sentenced to eight to twenty years' imprisonment. The trial court denied his motion to withdraw his plea. Defendant now appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant's plea agreement recommended a sentence of five to twenty years. As part of the agreement, defendant promised that "within twenty-four hours from the date of the taking of this plea the Defendant will be in a twenty-four hour in-house drug alcohol residential treatment center or he will report to the Kalamazoo County Sheriffs Department." The agreement specified that the treatment program would be a "twenty-four hour, seven-day-a-week program wherein the defendant will not be released from the care and custody of those individuals prior to sentencing."
Defendant did plead guilty, and he did enter a qualifying program within twenty-four hours of his plea. However, a week later he walked away from the program. He did not turn himself in to the sheriff, he did not appear for his presentence investigation interview, and he did not appear at his sentencing. He was finally arrested more than 2Vz years later.
The trial court found that by walking away from the treatment program and by not turning himself in, defendant had violated the plea agreement and, consequently, that he was not entitled to the benefit of the bargain. We agree. Although defendant fulfilled the requirement that he enter a qualifying treatment program, the obvious intent of the parties was that he also remain in the program. In fact, the only qualifying programs were those in which defendant would not be released before sentencing.
In People v Killebrew, 416 Mich 189, 209-210; 330 NW2d 834 (1982), our Supreme Court held that when a trial court decides not to follow a sentence recommendation that is part of a plea agreement, it must give the defendant an opportunity to withdraw his plea before imposing the sentence. However, the right to withdraw a plea is not absolute. People v Wilkens, 139 Mich App 778, 785; 362 NW2d 862 (1984). In People v Garvin, 159 Mich App 38; 406 NW2d 469 (1987), this Court held that a defendant implicitly waives his right to withdraw a guilty plea when he escapes from custody. There, as here, the "sentencing recommendation contemplated that no intervening factors would occur between the plea and the sentencing." Id. at 43. We believe that this case is sufficiently similar to Garvin to uphold the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to withdraw his plea.
We decline to decide whether defendant should be allowed to withdraw his plea because the lawyer retained for him allegedly demanded $50,000 to go to trial. Defendant has waived this issue by failing to address it in his appellate brief, People v Kent, 194 Mich App 206, 210; 486 NW2d 110 (1992), and by failing to raise such allegations at the time he offered his guilty plea and stated that he was doing so knowingly, voluntarily, and under standingly, see People v Kesl, 167 Mich App 698, 701; 423 NW2d 365 (1988). Furthermore, a failure to address this issue will not result in manifest injustice because defendant was aware of his right to court-appointed counsel.
Defendant next argues that his sentence violates the principle of proportionality set forth in People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630; 461 NW2d 1 (1990). We find nothing disproportionate in the sentence. Although the minimum term of years imposed exceeds the guidelines' recommendation of eighteen to sixty months, the guidelines do not take into account defendant's blatant disregard of the plea agreement and the conditions of bond and his disrespect for the criminal justice system. We also note that defendant already agreed to a minimum sentence of sixty months in the plea agreement, which reflects the maximum recommended in the sentencing guidelines. Three additional years for defendant's 2V¿ year evasion of criminal proceedings were not inappropriate.
We also reject defendant's argument that the trial judge should have been disqualified from presiding over the plea and sentencing proceedings on grounds of bias. Defendant contends that the trial court set excessive bond and threatened to prosecute his parents and former employer, who spoke on behalf of defendant at the sentencing. We find no evidence of bias. The $1 million bond set following defendant's escape and recapture was not inappropriate under the standards set forth in MCR 6.106(F). Although the trial judge may have been strict in applying MCR 6.106(F), a judge's view of the law, even if strongly held, is not grounds for disqualification. In the Matter of Hirsch, 116 Mich App 233, 242; 323 NW2d 349 (1982), modified on other grounds 413 Mich 943 (1982). Furthermore, the trial court's comments to defendant's family and employer were merely legitimate and helpful warnings about their Fifth Amendment rights in the face of a criminal investigation of their alleged role in harboring defendant during his 2 Vi. year evasion of criminal proceedings.
Affirmed.
A. A. Monton, J., concurred.