Case Name: SAN FRANCISCO PIONEER WOOLEN FACTORY v. HENRY BRICKWEDEL, Auditor, etc., and SPRING VALLEY WATER WORKS
Court: Supreme Court of California
Jurisdiction: California
Decision Date: 1882-03-10
Citations: 60 Cal. 166
Docket Number: No. 8252
Parties: SAN FRANCISCO PIONEER WOOLEN FACTORY v. HENRY BRICKWEDEL, Auditor, etc., and SPRING VALLEY WATER WORKS.
Judges: 
Reporter: California Reports
Volume: 60
Pages: 166–177

Head Matter:
[No. 8252.
In Bank.]
March 10, 1882.
SAN FRANCISCO PIONEER WOOLEN FACTORY v. HENRY BRICKWEDEL, Auditor, etc., and SPRING VALLEY WATER WORKS.
Water Rates—Order Number 1573 Establishing Water Rates in the City of San Francisco—Constitutional Law.—By an ordinance of the Board of Supervisors of San Francisco known as “Order No. 1573,”—es-tablishing water rates—it is provided that ‘ ‘ The rates of compensation to be collected for water supplied to the city and county of San Francisco for municipal purposes shall be as follows : Fifteen ($15) dollars per month for each and every hydrant for fire purposes and for flushing sewers. Five hundred ($500) dollars per month for water furnished to Golden Gate Park. Seven thousand ($7,000) dollars per month for water furnished for all the public buildings * * * due and payable at the end of the month ;” and rates are also prescribed to be collected for water furnished for domestic and other purposes to private consumers. But, it is also provided that “in case the rates or compensation hereby fixed for Water supplied to the city and county of San Francisco for municipal purposes shall be fully paid monthly by the said city and county to the Spring Valley Water Works, the same shall be allowed by said corporation upon the rates charged to its consumers other than the city and county, for the month succeeding the month in which the same are collected, and in such manner that the rates to such consumers for such succeeding month shall be diminished twenty-five (25) per cent., or such proportion thereof as may be collected from said city and county.
Held: The order does not fix the rates of compensation for the use of water, but leaves them indefinite and uncertain; and is therefore not a ■ valid execution of the power confered upon the Board of Supervisors by Section 1, Article xiv, of the Constitution.
Id.—Id.—Id.—(Myriok, J., concurring.)—The Board of Supervisors of the city and county of San Francisco has had, since the new Constitution went into effect, and has, the power to fix and determine the rates or compensation to be collected by the Spring Valley Water Works as well from the city and county (for water used for fire purposes, for flushing sewers, for public buildings and offices, for sprinkling streets and for beautifying parks), as from private persons; any provision in any statute to the contrary notwithstanding.
Id.—Id. —Id.-—Case Explained—(Ross, J., concurring.)—The construction placed on the provisions of the new Constitution in relation to water in the case of the Spring Valley Water Works v. The Board of Supervisors of San Francisco, 58 Cal.,—necessarily results in relieving that Company of the obligation to furnish water to the city and county of San Francisco free of charge for any purpose.
Application for writ of mandamus..
Wallace, Greathouse & Blanding, for Plaintiff.
It is claimed that the Spring Valley Water Works are under obligation to furnish water free to the city in case of fire, or other great necessity, under an Act entitled “An Act for the incorporation of water companies, approved April 22,1858 and that the Supreme Court has determined that the words “other great necessity,” apply to every municipal requirement except for the water used in the public buildings. (Statutes of 1858, p. 218, § 4; Spring Valley Water Works v. San Francisco, 52 Cal. 111.)
The answer to this is, that the provisions of the new Constitution above referred to, entirely sweep away Article iv of the Act of 1858, and establish a comprehensive plan controlling both individuals and corporations supplying water to municipalities and fixing their privileges, duties, and burdens. (Const. of 1879, Article xiv, § 1; also, Article xi, § 19.)
J. F. Cowdery, City and County Attorney, and for Respondent, Henry Brickwedel.
The company has no right under its charter to charge for water which it is bound to furnish free. The city has no authority to make an engagement with the Spring Valley Water Works to pay for water which it was bound under its charter to furnish free. (San Diego Water Co. v. San Diego, reported infra.)
In providing for the fixing of rates or compensation to be collected by any person, company, or corporation for the use of water supplied to any city and county, etc., section 1, Article xiv, of the Constitution does not abolish free water. It means that when water is furnished to any city and county which is not furnished in case of fire or other great necessity, such water shall be paid for at fixed and uniform rates.
An examination of Section 19 of Article xi, taken with the well known history of the water question of this State leads to the inevitable conclusion that the provisions of that section were never intended to apply to either water or gas companies in existence at the time of or before the adoption of the Constitution. That article speaks in futuro. Hereafter water and gas companies may take up streets and lay down pipes in cities. Those now in existence are to stand upon existing laws.
Flournoy & Mhoon (by permission of the Court), for “Contra Costa Water Co.”
F. G. Newlands, for Spring Valley Water Works.

Opinion:
Sharpstein, J.:
The petitioner alleges that on the first day of June, 1880, the Board of Supervisors of the City and County of San Francisco, passed an ordinance known as "Order Mo. 1,573— Establishing Water Bates," to take effect on the first day of July thereafter, and that by section 11 of said ordinance it is provided that " The rates of compensation to be collected for water supplied to the City and County of San Francisco for municipal purposes, shall be as follows:
"Fifteen ($15) dollars per month for each and every hydrant for fire purposes and for flushing sewers. Five hundred ($500) dollars per month for water furnished for Golden Gate Park. Seven thousand ($7,000) dollars per month for water for all the public buildings" "due and payable at the end of each month."
And it is further alleged that in and by said ordinance rates were also prescribed to be collected for water furnished for domestic and other purposes to private consumers.
But it was provided in said ordinance that "in case the rates or compensation hereby fixed for water supplied to the City and County of San Francisco for municipal purposes shall be fully paid monthly by the said city and county to the Spring Valley Water Works, the same shall be allowed by said corporation upon the rates charged to its consumers other than the city and county, for the month succeeding the the month in which the same are collected, and in such manner that the rates to such consumers for such succeeding month shall be diminished twenty-five (25) per cent, or such proportion thereof as may be collected from said-city and county."
Since the passage of that ordinance such proceedings have been had by said Board as to entitle the Spring Valley Water Works to have its claims for compensation for water furnished to said city and county, audited and allowed by the respondent as auditor of said city and county, provided said ordinance was valid. But it is alleged that the respondent has refused to audit and allow said claims, and that by reason thereof said Spring Valley Water Works has not allowed anything upon the rates 'charged to its private consumers, of which the petitioner is one, and it therefore asks the Court to compel the allowance of said claims against the city and county, in order that the Spring Valley Water Works may be compelled to proportionately diminish the rates charged to the petitioner as a private consumer of its water.
It is claimed on behalf of the petitioner that by Section 1 of Article xiv of the Constitution, it is made the duty of said Board of Supervisors to fix the rates or compensation to be collected by said Spring Valley Water Works for the water supplied to said city and county, or the inhabitants thereof, and that by the passage of the ordinance above referred to, said Board strictly fulfilled the requirement of said clause of the Constitution. But we have looked in vain for any provision of the Constitution which would authorize said Board to fix the rates to be paid by the city and county, and then, in effect, provide that if said city and county did not pay the rates so fixed for it to pay, that the same should be added to the rates fixed for private consumers to pay. Or, that in case the city and county did pay its rates or any part thereof, that the amount paid by it should be allowed to private consumers. We do not think that the language of the Constitution will admit of that construction. If it confers upon the Board the power to fix the rates or compensation which the city and county must pay to the Spring Valley Water Works, for water supplied to said city and comity, it is very clear that when said rates are fixed, it concerns nobody except the Spring Valley Water Works and said city and county, whether said rates are paid by the latter or not. The ordinance under consideration simply provides that, if the Spring Valley Water Works-collects any money from the city and county for water, it shall' credit the amount so collected to private consumers of water. Is that fixing rates? If not, that pro vision of the ordinance is void, and the petitioner can claim nothing by virtue of it.
The question mainly discussed on the hearing of this case was whether, under the Constitution, the city and county is chargeable for water which, under the general incorporation law of the State, it was entitled to have furnished without charge before the adoption of the Constitution.
But that question does not arise in this case. The petitioner's right to be heard depends wholly upon the validity of the ordinance now before us. If invalid, as we think it to be, the Auditor can not be compelled to audit and allow claims for water furnished to the city under it. And that is the only question now before the Court.
Application denied.
Morrison, C. J., and Thornton, McKinstry, and McKee, JJ., concurred in the judgment,