Case Name: MOORE v. MUTUAL RESERVE FUND LIFE ASSOCIATION
Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
Jurisdiction: North Carolina
Decision Date: 1901-09-18
Citations: 129 N.C. 31
Docket Number: 
Parties: MOORE v. MUTUAL RESERVE FUND LIFE ASSOCIATION.
Judges: 
Reporter: North Carolina Reports
Volume: 129
Pages: 31–34

Head Matter:
MOORE v. MUTUAL RESERVE FUND LIFE ASSOCIATION.
(Filed September 18, 1901.)
1. POWER OF ATTORNEY — Irrevocable—Insurance—Acts 1899, Ohap. 5.h, Sec. 62, Subd. 3.
A power of attorney conferred on the insurance commissioner by an insurance company in conformity with Acts 1899, Chap. 54, Sec. 62, Subd. 3, is. irrevocable so long as the company has liabilities in this State remaining unsatisfied.
'2. SERVICE OF PROCESS — Process—Insurance.
Service of process on State Insurance Commissioner made in conformity with Acts 1899, Chap. 54,Sec. 62,Subd. 3, is valid, although the insurance company has not domesticated under Acts 1899, Chap. 62.
ActioN by L. J. Moore and others against the Mutual Reserve Fund Life Association, heard by Judge A. L. Coble, at Spring Term, 1901, of the Superior Court of Chaven County. From .a judgment for tbe defendant, tbe plaintiffs appealed.
Simmons & Ward, and W. W. Clark, for tbe plaintiffs.
Hinsdale & Laiurence, Shepherd & Shepherd, and T. B. Womack, for tbe defendant.

Opinion:
Eueohbs, C. J.
This appeal involves identically tbe same question, and no more, tban was decided by tbis Court at its last term, in Biggs v. Life Association, 128 N. C., 5, and Ave are bound to reverse tbe judgment appealed from in tbis case,, or to reverse tbe judgment of tbis Court made at its last term. There is no question of tbe importance of tbis, that may not be sustained by arguments on either side.
While tbe defendant stands before tbis Court just as any other foreign corporation Avould stand, it does not stand just as an individual Avould stand. The Legislature would have no power to prescribe terms to an individual as to whether he should be allowed to do business in tbis State. lie would have tbe natural and constitutional right to do business here, without the permission or comity of the State. That is not so with the defendant. It had no right to do business here without tbe permission of tbe State. Tbis being so, the State bad tbe right to prescribe the terms upon which tbe defendant might carry on its business here. The State having this right, prescribed the terms and the defendant accepted them and proceeded with its business. The defendant being permitted, proceeded to make contracts with citizens of the State, and became liable to them under these contracts. One of the provisions upon, Avhioh defendant Avas allowed to do business here was that James E. Young, Insurance Commissioner, and his successors in office should be constituted its agent, upon Avhom service of process might be made, and that said agency should continue so long as the defendant bad any liabilities remaining unsatisfied in this State arising from or out of its said business of insurance. Tbe plaintiff alleges that tbe defendant is liable to bim for a breach of its contract of insurance — a liability of tbe defendant remaining unsatisfied. If plaintiff's contentions are true, there is still a remaining liability of the defendant unsatisfied. Tbe object of this action is to try that very question, Is tbe defendant liable to tbe plaintiff upon a breach of its contract of insurance?
But tbe defendant comes into Court, makes a special appearance, and in tbe face of tbe agreement upon which it was allowed to do business here, denies that it has violated its contract with tbe plaintiff; and therefore plaintiff bas-no such claim against it, as plaintiff alleges, and for that reason (that is, because tbe defendant says it is not liable to tbe plaintiff for anything) tbe action must stop. We can not adopt such arguments. It was tbe duty of tbe State to. protect its citizens against such practices as it seems to us is attempted in this case. It seems to us that tbe defendant is improperly attempting to evade a liability it has incurred with one of its patrons it bad induced to deal with it.
We do not feel called upon to discuss the question of revocability of this power to Young, further than to say that tbe time fixed in tbe act of tbe Legislature and in tbe power itself has not vet been reached, as tbe defendant admits that it still has outstanding liabilities in this State. It is conceded that, as a general rule, a principal has tbe right to revoke a power of attorney at any time, whether it is in terms irrevocable or not. But to this general rule there are well-established exceptions, as where it is coupled with an interest, or where it is contractual in its nature, given for a consideration and for tbe protection of some one, or some interest. In our opinion, this power falls under this exception to tbe general rule. It was contractual in its nature; was given upon consideration that defendant should have the right to carry on its business in this State, and for the protection of those who should deal with the defendant.
We have not cited authorities, as we find them cited in the case of Biggs v. this defendant, 128 N. C., 5.
There is error, and the judgment of the Court below is reversed.
The cases of Taylor v. Life Association, St. John's Lodge v. Life Association, Hancock v. Life Association, Pope v. Life Association, Moore and Wife v. Life Association, Foy v. Life Association, Barnum v. Life Association, Tisdale and Wife v. Life Association, Tisdale and Hackburn v. Life Association, all involve the same point as that involved in Moore v. Life Association, and were argued together. And upon the ruling of the Court in the first case (Moore v. Life Association) the judgment of the Court below is reversed in nil of them.
Reversed.