Case Name: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. William Russell WATKINS, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1996-02-23
Citations: 685 So. 2d 1322
Docket Number: No. 95-00329
Parties: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. William Russell WATKINS, Appellee.
Judges: SCHOONOVER, A.C.J., and FRANK, J., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 685
Pages: 1322–1325

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. William Russell WATKINS, Appellee.
No. 95-00329.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Feb. 23, 1996.
Rehearing Denied May 17, 1996.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Patricia E. Davenport, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellant.
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, Bartow, and Megan Olson, Assistant Public Defender, Clearwater, for Appellee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
The State of Florida appeals a trial court order dismissing four criminal charges that had been filed against the appellee, William Russell Watkins. We affirm.
On August 11, 1990, the appellee was arrested for possession of a short-barreled shotgun and for aggravated assault. After his first appearance hearing, he posted a $1500 surety bond and was released from custody.
On September 4, 1990, the state filed an information charging the appellee with possession of a short-barreled shotgun in violation of section 790.221, Florida Statutes (1989), and on November 27, 1990, the state filed another information charging him with aggravated assault in violation of section 784.021, Florida Statutes (1989). Both infor-mations alleged that the crimes were committed on August 11,1990.
After the appellee failed to appear for arraignment, the court estreated his bond and issued capiases for his arrest on the two original charges and for two additional charges of failing to appear. The capiases were executed by arresting the appellee on October 20, 1994, more than four years after the original crimes were allegedly committed.
The appellee filed, and the trial court granted, a motion to dismiss all four charges on the grounds that prosecution was barred by the statute of limitations. The state filed a timely notice of appeal from the order discharging the appellee on the charges.
We affirm the dismissal of the possession of a short-barreled shotgun and aggravated assault charges because the statute of limitations expired before the state commenced prosecution of these offenses.
Section 775.15(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1989), requires that prosecution of aggravated assault and possession of short-barreled shotgun offenses, both .third degree felonies, be commenced within three years of the date of the offenses. Section 775.15(5) provides that prosecution is commenced when either an indictment or information is filed, if the capias, summons, or other process is executed without unreasonable delay. The statute provides further that in determining what is reasonable, the inability to locate a defendant after a diligent search, or the defendant's absence from the state must be considered. § 775.15.
In this ease, the informations were filed within the three year period, but the capiases were not executed without unreasonable delay. The statute of limitations was, therefore, not tolled. At the hearing on the appellee's motion to dismiss, the state agreed that there was only one documented effort to locate the appellee and that there was no further effort taken to execute the capias before the three year time limit expired. The trial court, accordingly, properly found that the delay in executing the capias-es was unreasonable. Wright v. State, 600 So.2d 1248 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992); Chapman v. State, 581 So.2d 995 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); Walker v. State, 543 So.2d 353 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989).
On appeal, the state does not contend that the capiases were executed without unreasonable delay. Instead, it takes the position that prosecution commenced when the appellee was arrested and put on notice of the charges pending against him. We disagree with the state's position. The previous statute of limitations, section 932.465, did not provide a definition of the term "commencement of prosecution." Under that statute courts held that an arrest or the issuance and execution of an arrest warrant commenced prosecution. See Sturdivan v. State, 419 So.2d 300 (Fla.1982); State ex rel. Florida Petroleum Marketers Ass'n, Inc. v. McClure, 330 So.2d 239 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). However, the present statute, section 775.15, provides an express and unambiguous definition of this term and it does not include the act of arresting a person and notifying him of the charges that the state may or may not file against him at a later date. State ex rel. Allen Quincy Welch v. Circuit Court In and For Escambia County, 487 So.2d 65 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 492 So.2d 1330 (Fla.1986). See also State v. Fields, 505 So.2d 1336 (Fla. 1987). Time limitations upon criminal prosecutions are solely creatures of statute and are to be liberally construed in favor of the accused. Brown v. State, 674 So.2d 738 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).
Since the state did not commence a prosecution against the appellee by filing an infor mation or indictment and executing a capias without unreasonable delay, the court properly dismissed the charges against the appel-lee, and we affirm.
Affirmed.
SCHOONOVER, A.C.J., and FRANK, J., concur.
ALTENBERND, J., concurs specially.
. The state does not challenge the dismissal of the failure to appear charges, and we, therefore, affirm the dismissal of those charges without further discussion.