Case Name: CRAWFORD v. NASSOY
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1900-11-20
Citations: 67 N.Y.S. 108
Docket Number: 
Parties: CRAWFORD v. NASSOY.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 67
Pages: 108–112

Head Matter:
(55 App. Div. 433.)
CRAWFORD v. NASSOY.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department.
November 20, 1900.)
1. Exemptions—Rights oe Widow—Action against Administrator eor Conversion oe Exempt Property.
A complaint which alleges that a decedent died, leaving no minor children, and no property except the sum of $110 cash, a watch or two, a little wearing apparel, and household property not exceeding in value $40, the entire estate not being of value in excess of $150, is not sufficient to sustain an action of conversion by the widow against the administrator for such exempt property under Code Civ. Proc. § 2713, providing that necessary wearing apparel, family clothing, household furniture, and' other specified articles, not exceeding $150 in value, shall not be assets of the estate, but shall remain in the hands of the widow, and. if there be no minor children, that all the property named shall belong to the widow; since from the complaint it does not appear that the wearing apparel was necessary to the widow’s use, or that it was the clothing of the family, and it is not alleged that the household property was household furniture, so as to bring it within the language of the statute.
2. Same.
Code Civ. Proc. § 2713, provides that certain property specified shall not be appraised or deemed assets of the estate, but shall be left in the possession of the widow, and, if there be no minor child, the property mentioned shall belong to the widow. Held, that the question of whether certain property falls within the meaning of such section cannot be determined in an action against the administrator for its conversion, it being a question for the determination of the appraisers in the first instance, subject to review by the surrogate.
Williams, J., dissenting.
Appeal from special term, Erie county.
Action by Polly Lavina Crawford against Eugene Nassoy. From a judgment dismissing the complaint, plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
Appeal by plaintiff from a final judgment entered in the clerk’s office of Erie county on the 26th day of June, 1900, pursuant to a decision sustaining a demurrer to the complaint and directing a dismissal thereof. The complaint alleges that plaintiff is the widow of Alfred Crawford, who died in testate on the 16th day oí February, 1898, leaving no minor child him surviving, and no property “except the sum of about $110 cash in bank in the city of Buffalo, and a watch or two, a little wearing apparel, and household property not exceeding in value $40, and the entire estate left by him did not exceed in value the sum of $150,” of which she became the sole owner and entitled to possession upon his death; that defendant, upon his own petition, which omitted plaintiff’s name, has procured from the surrogate’s court of Brie county letters of administration to be issued to himself upon the estate of said decedent, without the issue of any citation or waiver thereof by plaintiff, and without her knowledge or consent; that thereupon defendant drew said money from the bank, took possession of all the personal property, and wrongfully and unlawfully converted the same to his own use; and that more than three months have elapsed since letters were issued, and he has failed, neglected, and refused to make or file an inventory, although requested so to do, and has failed, neglected, and refused, upon demand duly made, to deliver said money and property to plaintiff, and has expended and disposed thereof. The grounds of the demurrer are (1) that the court has not jurisdiction of the person, (2) or of the subject-matter, (3) that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, ana (4) that plaintiff has not a legal capacity to sue.
Argued before ADAMS, P. J., and McLENNAN, SPRING, WILLIAMS, and LAUGHLIN, JJ.
Ernest E. Kruse, for appellant.
George W. Wheeler, for respondent.

Opinion:
LAUGHLIN, J.
This is an action for conversion, and, unlike a suit in equity, it can be maintained if plaintiff is the owner and entitled to the immediate possession of the property, notwithstanding that there may be another adequate remedy. Under the complaint the only theory on which plaintiff can claim ownership of the property or the right to possession thereof is by virtue of the provisions of section 2713 of the Code of Civil Procedure. So far as material here, that section provides as follows:
"If a man having a family die, leaving a widow or minor child or children, the following articles shall not be deemed assets, but must be included and stated in the inventory of the estate without being appraised: 4. All necessary wearing apparel, beds, bedsteads and bedding, necessary'cooking utensils, the clothing of the family, the clothes of the widow and her ornaments proper for her station, one table, six chairs, twelve knives and forks, twelve plates, twelve tea cups and saucers, one sugar dish, one milk-pot, one tea-pot, and twelve spoons, and other household furniture not exceeding one hundred and fifty dollars in value. 5. Other necessary household furniture, provisions or other personal property, in the discretion of the appraisers, to the value of not exceeding one hundred and fifty dollars. Such articles and property shall remain in the possession of the widow, if there be one, during the time she lives with and provides for such minor child or children. If she ceases so to do, she shall be allowed to retain as her own, her wearing apparel, her ornaments and one bed, bedstead and the bedding for the same, and the property specified in subdivision five; and the other articles so exempted shall then belong to such minor child or children. If she lives with and provides for such minor child or children until it or they become of full age, all the articles and property in this section mentioned shall belong to the widow. If there be a widow and no minor child, all the articles and property in this section mentioned shall belong to the widow."
Where, as here, there is no minor child, it will be observed that, if certain articles and property are left by a decedent, the widow takes title absolutely by the express terms of the statute, and no discretion remains to be exercised by the appraisers. As to such property the-administrator and appraisers are only entitled to reasonable, temporary possession or opportunity for inspection to enable them to enumerate the same in the inventory. An action for conversion of property of this class will doubtless lie against the administrator individually or in his official capacity if he converts such property to his own use, sells the same, or declines to deliver the property to the widow after demand and a reasonable opportunity to inventory the-same. Fox v. Burns, 12 Barb. 677; Kapp v. Public Adm'r, 2 Bradf. Sur. 258; Vedder v. Saxton, 46 Barb. 188; Morris v. Morris, 9 Heisk. 814; Grafton v. Smith, 66 Miss. 408, 6 South. 209; Kellogg v.. Holly, 29 Ill. 437; York v. York, 38 Ill. 522; In re Scoville, 20 Ill. App. 426; Kellogg v. Graves, 5 Ind. 509; Carter v. Hinkle, 13 Ala. 529; In re Weir's Estate, 28 Wkly. Notes Cas. 268; Curd's Adm'r v. Curd. 9 Humph. 171; De Valengin's Adm'r v. Duffy, 14 Pet. 282,. 10 L. Ed. 457; Conger v. Atwood, 28 Ohio St. 134. Strictly speaking, there is no item of this class of property specified in the complaint. It is not alleged that the "wearing apparel" was "necessary'5 to the-widow's use, or that it was "the clothing of the family." Mor is it alleged that the "household property" was "household furniture." This, it may be conceded, is a somewhat technical construction of the-complaint, and might not be indulged in were the complaint otherwise meritorious. Where there is more personal property than the widow's exemptions, the appraisers are vested with discretion as to what property shall be set apart for her, and the limitation on the value of the property to be set apart to the widow necessarily incidentally requires the appraisers to estimate its value. Their determination in this regard may be reviewed by the surrogate, but it would be contrary to the scheme of the statute, prejudicial to the rights of creditors and those interested in the estate, and against public policy to have such determination reviewed collaterally, or the question tried in an action for conversion. Code Civ. Proc. § 2724; In re-Harris' Estate (Sur.) 20 N. Y. Supp. 68; In re Shedd (Sup.) 14 N. Y. Supp. 841; Lyendecker v. Eisemann, 3 Dem. Sur. 72; Applegate v. Cameron, 2 Bradf. Sur. 119; Kain v. Fisher, 6 N. Y. 597; In re Durscheidt (Sup.) 19 N. Y. Supp. 973; In re Frazer, 92 N. Y. 239; Wally v. Wally, 41 Miss. 657; Sawyer v. Sawyer, 28 Vt. 249. The same considerations lead to the conclusion that an action for conversion will not lie in such case on an allegation that the value of the personal property was less than $150. If the property is not such that it goes to the widow regardless of its valxie, the appraisers and surrogate's court are the axithorities designated*by law to determine and decide upon its value, and not a jury in a court of law. It may well be that, after the inventory is made, conversion would lie for a refusal on the part of the administrator to deliver the specific property specially set apart to the widow, notwithstanding the remedy prescribed by section 2724 of the Code of Civil Procedure; but it is. not necessary to decide that question now. Kapp v. Public Adm'r, 2 Bradf. Sur. 258; Drew v. Gordon, 13 Allen, 120.
It follows that the judgment appealed from should, be affirmed, with costs.
ADAMS, P. J., and McLENNAN, J., concur in result. WILLIAMS, J., dissents.