Case Name: Robert BRINSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Norman LARSEN, Robert Summe, George Miller, Defendants-Appellees
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2016-05-27
Citations: 650 F. App'x 733
Docket Number: No. 16-10103
Parties: Robert BRINSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Norman LARSEN, Robert Summe, George Miller, Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: Before HULL, MARCUS, and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 650
Pages: 733–734

Head Matter:
Robert BRINSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Norman LARSEN, Robert Summe, George Miller, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 16-10103
Non-Argument Calendar
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
Date Filed: 05/27/2016
Mark Byron Bullman, Bullman Law Group, Melvin Leroy Hewitt, Jr., Isenberg & Hewitt, PC, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Terri N. Gordon, Laura Karen Johnson, Aaron Ross, DeKalb County Law Department, Decatur, GA for Defendants-Appel-lees.
Before HULL, MARCUS, and WILSON, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM:
The plaintiff, Robert Brinson, appeals the district court's denial of his motion for partial summary judgment and grant of the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The district court found that DeKalb County police officers Norman Larsen, Robert Summe, and George Miller were entitled to (1) qualified immunity for Brin-son's ,Fourth Amendment claim, and (2) official' immunity for Brinson's false imprisonment claim under Georgia law. We affirm.
We review the district court's grant of summary judgment based on qualified immunity de novo. See Case v. Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1324-25 (11th Cir. 2009). After stopping Brinson for speeding, the officers held him for less than an hour and searched his car with a canine. Brinson asserts that this detainment and search violated his Fourth Amendment rights. However, even construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Brinson, the officers did not violate clearly established law. See id.; Jackson v. Sauls, 206 F.3d 1156, 1164-65 (11th Cir. 2000). Considering the "totality of the circumstances" surrounding the stop, including Brinson's behavior and responses to questions, details related to his car, and the location of the stop, the officers had an "arguable reasonable suspicion" of "criminal activity." See United States v. Boyce, 351 F.3d 1102, 1106-07 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted); Jackson, 206 F.3d at 1165-66 (11th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, Brinson cites no relevant authority to establish that — under the circumstances presented — the length of the detainment violated clearly established law. See Hoyt v. Cooks, 672 F.3d 972, 977 (11th Cir. 2012) ("In determining whether a right is clearly established, we look to the precedent of the Supreme Court of the United States, of this Court, and of the relevant state's highest court.").
Based on the foregoing reasons, the decision of the district court is AFFIRMED.
. The officers are also entitled to official immunity on Brinson's state law claim because Brinson failed to state a sufficient argument in his initial brief on appeal as to why the officers acted with actual malice or intent to injure. See United States v. Thomas, 818 F.3d 1230, 1239 n. 5 (11th Cir. 2016); United States v. Levy, 379 F.3d 1241, 1244 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (We "refuse[] to consider issues raised for the first time in an appellant's reply brief."); Roper v. Greenway, 294 Ga. 112, 751 S.E.2d 351, 352 (2013) ("[Cjounty law enforcement officers . may be personally liable if they . act with actual malice or an intent to injure when performing a discretionary act.").