Case Name: Everett V. BROWN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1995-12-18
Citations: 670 So. 2d 965
Docket Number: No. 95-669
Parties: Everett V. BROWN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: LAWRENCE, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 670
Pages: 965–967

Head Matter:
Everett V. BROWN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 95-669.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Dec. 18, 1995.
Nancy A Daniels, Public Defender; P. Douglas Brinkmeyer, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General; James W. Rogers, Bureau Chief of Criminal Appeals; Vincent Altieri, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for appellee.

Opinion:
WOLF, Judge.
Appellant seeks review from a judgment and sentence for attempted robbery, -with a firearm, carrying a concealed firearm, resisting arrest without violence, and possession of a firearm by a minor. Appellant argues that he may only be convicted of one crime involving a firearm arising out of a single criminal episode. In light of this court's opinion in A.J.H. v. State, 652 So.2d 1279 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), and the supreme court's holding in State v. Stearns, 645 So.2d 417 (Fla.1994), we vacate Brown's convictions for carrying a concealed firearm and possession of a firearm by a minor. We do, however, certify a question of great public importance, because we are unable to ascertain on what basis the supreme court determined in Steams that convictions and sentences for separate offenses involving different elements would be impermissible.
In A.J.H., supra, this court stated that in State v. Steams, supra, the supreme court interpreted State v. Brown, 638 So.2d 1059 (Fla.1994), "as standing for the-proposition' that a defendant could not be convicted and sentenced for two crimes involving a firearm that arose out of the same criminal episode." supra at 1280. This appears to be an accurate reading of Steams. We are unable, however, to see how the holding in Brown involved such a broad precept of law.
In State v. Brown, supra, the supreme court approved the decision of the first district, Brown v. State, 617 So.2d 744 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). The district court's decision held that a person could not be convicted and sentenced for both armed robbery with a firearm and posséssion of a firearm during commission of a felony because the second charge did not include any statutory elements which were not included in statutory elements of armed robbery with a firearm. The first district's decision in Brown v. State was based on analysis of State v. Smith, 547 So.2d 613 (Fla.1989), and section 775.021(4)(a), Florida Statutes. We stated,
With respect to cumulative sentences in a single trial, the dispositive question is whether the Legislature intended separate convictions and sentences for the two crimes. State v. Smith, 547 So.2d 613, 614 (Fla.1989). In State v. Smith, the supreme court recognized that the Legislature expressed its specific intent concerning separate convictions and sentences for two crimes committed during the same criminal transaction by the passage of chapter 88-131, section 7, Laws of Florida (codified in section 775.021(4)(b), Florida Statutes). The court stated in Smith that "absent a statutory degree crime or a contrary clear and specific statement of legislative intent . all criminal offenses containing unique statutory elements shall be separately punished" and, thus, "section 775.021(4)(a), Florida Statutes, should be strictly applied without judicial gloss." Smith, supra at 616. Section 775.021(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1991), reads as follows:
Whoever, in the course of one criminal transaction or episode, commits an act or acts which constitute one or more separate criminal offenses, upon conviction and adjudication of guilt, shall be sentenced separately for each criminal offense; and the sentencing judge may order the sentences to be served concurrently or consecutively. For the purpose of this subsection, offenses are separate if each offense requires proof of an element that the other does not, without regard to the accusatory pleading or the proof adduced at trial.
Brown, supra at 746 (emphasis in original).
In State v. Steams, supra, the supreme court, however, applied the Brown holding to crimes that contain distinct statutory elements: Burglary of a structure while armed, and carrying a concealed weapon while committing a grand theft. One crime contains the distinct element of a burglary, while the other crime not only requires the carrying of a weapon, but also that the weapon be concealed.
In the instant case, while all three crimes involve a firearm, they all contain distinct elements not contained in the other charges. The first charge has the element of an attempted robbery, the second charge requires the firearm to be concealed, and the third charge requires that the person carrying the firearm be a minor. While we feel that we are mandated to vacate two of the convictions pursuant to Steams, supra, we are unable to see the applicability of State v. Brown, supra, to this situation. We, therefore, certify the following question to be one of great public importance:
WHEN A DEFENDANT COMMITS THREE OFFENSES DURING THE SAME CRIMINAL EPISODE EACH INVOLVING A FIREARM BUT EACH HAVING SEPARATE AND DISTINCT ELEMENTS, MAY THE DEFENDANT BE CONVICTED AND SENTENCED FOR ALL THREE CRIMES?
LAWRENCE, J., concurs.
BENTON, J., concurring with written opinion.