Case Name: PENINSULAR PROPERTIES BRADEN RIVER, LLC, and Manatee River Corporation, Appellants, v. CITY OF BRADENTON, FLORIDA, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2007-08-01
Citations: 965 So. 2d 160
Docket Number: No. 2D06-5302
Parties: PENINSULAR PROPERTIES BRADEN RIVER, LLC, and Manatee River Corporation, Appellants, v. CITY OF BRADENTON, FLORIDA, Appellee.
Judges: FOSTER, ROBERT A., Associate Judge, Concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 965
Pages: 160–164

Head Matter:
PENINSULAR PROPERTIES BRADEN RIVER, LLC, and Manatee River Corporation, Appellants, v. CITY OF BRADENTON, FLORIDA, Appellee.
No. 2D06-5302.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Aug. 1, 2007.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 5, 2007.
Monterey Campbell, III of GrayRobin-son, P.A., Lakeland, and Mark S. Bentley and Colleen M. Fitzgerald of GrayRobin-son, P.A., Tampa, for Appellants. -
William R. Lisch, City Attorney, Bra-denton, and Caleb J. Grimes and Derin Parks of Grimes, Goebel, Grimes, Hawkins, Gladfelter & Galvano, P.L., Braden-ton, for Appellee.

Opinion:
WHATLEY, Judge.
Peninsular Properties Braden River, LLC, and Manatee River Corp. ("Peninsular") challenge a final order dismissing their petition for writ of certiorari seeking to overturn the City of Bradenton's rejec: tion of their application for a planned development project. The trial court dismissed their petition based on a finding that it was untimely filed. The court rejected Peninsular's reliance on the tolling provision of section 70.51(10)(a), Florida Statutes (2005), of the Florida Land Use and Environmental Dispute Resolution Act ("the Act") on the ground that the statute is an unconstitutional infringement on the supreme court's rule-making authority. Art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const. The trial court erred in finding section 70.51(10)(a) unconstitutional, and we therefore reverse.
This court conducts de novo review of a trial court's determination that a statute is unconstitutional. See City of Miami v. McGrath, 824 So.2d 143 (Fla.2002). " '[W]e are obligated to accord legislative acts a presumption of constitutionality and to construe challenged legislation to effect a constitutional outcome whenever possible.' " Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. City of Gainesville, 918 So.2d 250, 256 (Fla.2005) (quoting Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. Howard, 916 So.2d 640, 642 (Fla.2005)).
The Act, which is set forth in section 70.51, provides an alternative dispute resolution mechanism in quasi-judicial proceedings concerning development orders. It is a voluntary mechanism whereby a special magistrate facilitates resolution of the conflict between the property owner and the governmental entity that issued the development order. § 70.51(17)(a). If a property owner initiates a proceeding under the Act, section 70.51(10)(a) tolls the time for seeking judicial review until the governmental entity acts upon the special magistrate's recommendation.
After Peninsular obtained approval of its planned development project application from the Bradenton Planning Commission, the City of Bradenton City Council held a hearing on the application and ultimately denied it. Peninsular then initiated proceedings under the Act but soon determined that a settlement with the City was not going to be forthcoming. Consequently, it filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the circuit court. Because that petition was filed more than thirty days after the City's order denying approval of Peninsular's application, the City filed a motion to dismiss the petition as untimely pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.100(c)(1). The City raised its constitutional challenge to section 70.51(10)(a) in its motion to dismiss.
After a hearing on the City's motion, the circuit court determined that section 70.51 is both substantive and procedural but found that the procedural provision in section 70.51(10)(a) infringed on the supreme court's exclusive rule-making authority. However, "there are . circumstances where a legislative provision which would be deemed procedural if viewed in isolation will nonetheless be upheld against a challenge under article V, section 2(a) because of the connection between that provision and substantive provisions adopted by the legislature." Cartwright v. State (In re Commitment of Cartwright), 870 So.2d 152, 158 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004). The supreme court has "consistently rejected constitutional challenges where the procedural provisions were intertwined with substantive rights." Caple v. Tuttle's Design-Build, Inc., 753 So.2d 49, 54 (Fla.2000).
The intent of the Florida Land Use and Environmental Dispute Resolution Act is to encourage mediation, and that intent is facilitated by the tolling of the time required to file an action in court. Because the procedural tolling provision of subsection 70.51(10)(a) is intertwined with the remainder of the statute, the circuit court erred in finding section 70.51(10)(a) unconstitutional. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
FOSTER, ROBERT A., Associate Judge, Concurs.
CASANUEVA, J., Dissents with opinion.