Case Name: Edmund Quirk v. Almon Thomas and Others, AND John Greusel v. The Same
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1858-12-09
Citations: 6 Mich. 76
Docket Number: 
Parties: Edmund Quirk v. Almon Thomas and Others, AND John Greusel v. The Same.
Judges: 
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 6
Pages: 76–133

Head Matter:
Edmund Quirk v. Almon Thomas and Others, AND John Greusel v. The Same.
Bills by purchasers from the grantee against the heirs and administrator of the grantor, to re-form a deed, by correcting the description of the lands, which, by reason of the omission of four out of fourteen courses and distances, embraced but a small portion of the lands intended to be conveyed. Defense (which was fully proved), that the deed was made without consideration, and for the purpose of defrauding the creditors of the grantor. There was no proof of debts existing against the estate of the grantor at the time the bills were filed, but the administrator was taking proceedings in the probate court for the sale of the lands — for what purpose, did not appear. The deeds to complainants described the respective parcels purchased by them correctly. Both parties to the fraudulent conveyance were dead before the mistake was discovered. A full consideration was recited in this deed; the grantee assumed possession and control of the premises under it;,, and the grantor, who died before complainants purchased, had always, after giving the deed, represented, and twice made oath, that the land belonged to the grantee.
By Manning J.; Campbell J. concurring.
That one is a purchaser for a valuable consideration without notice, is not of itself an equity on which a bill may be sustained for relief. It is a shield to protect a party, but can not be made a basis of attack.
The reason of this rule is, that the effect which the law gives to a purchase without notice, is not a perfect right in itself, and, therefore, will not sustain an action at law or a bill in equity, but may, in certain circumstances, be used by a defendant to stay the interposition of the court, on the ground that he is equally entitled with the plaintiff to its protection.
Complainants, as purchasers from the fraudulent grantee, have all his rights, at law and in equity, and no more. As the court could not have corrected the mistake in favor of the grantee, who was a party to the intended fraud of the grantor, neither can it in favor of complainants.
It is immaterial, in such case, whether there are or are not creditors of the fraudulent grantor now to be injured. It is the corrupt intention — the illegal object had in view — the wrong intended, and not the wrong done — that stays the hands, of the court from giving effect to the illegal contract.
A court of equity will uot decree the specific performance of a voluntary contract, nor will it correct a mistake in a defective execution of it, where there is no intervening equity. In this case, the most complainants can claim, is, that they are, in equity, the assignees of such voluntary contract. As such assignees, they would take it subject to all its vices, and to all equities existing between the parties to it.
The deed in question having been recorded before complainants bought, they are chargeable with notice of every thing that appears on the face of the record, and can not, in law, be said to have been ignorant of the mistake. And, independent of the registry laws, they are chargeable with notice of whatever is in the deeds through which they claim. They are not, therefore, in law, dona fide purchasers without notice.
What complainants were informed, by third persons, of the declarations of the grantor, that ho had conveyed the whole premises to the grantee by this deed, was mere public rumor; and there is no equity growing out of it in their favor.
The Statute of Frauds, declaring a conveyance to defraud creditors void as against creditors only, is merely declaratory of the common law, by which all contracts, made in violation of law, or contrary to public policy, are illegal, and consequently void, and, when executory, will not be enforced, or relieved against when executed. Where such a contract has been executed in part, the law gives effect to it so far as executed, and holds it void so far as it remains unexecuted.
By Campbell J.
If the grantee in the fraudulent deed had any rights outside of the land therein described, they arose from the equity to have a new deed, conforming to some right which was not perfectly assured by the deed as executed. The deeds to complainants would be operative to pass no more than their grantor possessed, which would bo the legal estate in the lands actually covered by his deed, and any claim he might have to the lands not covored by it, and to which, consequently, he did not have the legal title.
The ground of relief in case of mistake is placed upon the same basis as that of specific performance, and the mistake is corrected by establishing the original right to a conveyance, or other instrument, under some agreement, which, by reason of the mistake, has not been fully carried out. To mako out the mistake, it is necessary to make out the contract, that the court may see how far it has failed in the performance.
As a general rule, rights which exist against an ancestor, will equally exist against his heirs. But the ancestor having died before complainants acquired their interests, they could have no rights against him, and can, therefore, have none against his heirs, by reason of his acts or representations not made to complainants, or to any one through whom they claim.
By Cheistianoy J.; Martin Ch. J. concurring.
The heirs of a grantor stand precisely in the condition of their ancestor, and can avail themselves of no defense which would not have been equally available to him. And there being no evidence of debts against the estate, and nothing to show that the administrator is seeking the property at the instance of creditors, the administrator stands in no better position than the heirs.
•Contracts are treated as void, at common law, on the ground of public policy only, and the rule ex turpi ccmsa non oritur actio is subject to all the limitations and qualifications which sound public policy may dictate. Courts may sustain, or refuse to sustain, an action upon such contracts, as may be most consistent with sound policy* and best calculated to discourage and suppress such violations of the law. The rule itself can not be made an engine of wrong and injustice in the hands of the wrong doer against innocent parties, nor set up to the prejudice of any party guiltless of all participation in the wrong, or whose rights have been acquired without notice of it.
Where, in case of a transaction merely illegal as against public policy, the party seeking relief is innocent of the fraud intended, the case is to be considered,, in all respects, as if there had been no fraud, and the contract between the original parties, under one of whom complainant claims, had been made in good faith, and for good consideration.
To enable a party to such a transaction to show his own fraud in his own defense, the complainant must not only be in delicto, but in pcvri delicto; for though he may to some extent have participated in the illegal transaction, yet, if not equally guilty with the defendant, or, at least, if there be strong mitigating circumstances in his favor, the defendant will not be allowed to avail himself of this defense.
Where a consideration is expressed in a deed, and complainants have purchased from the grantee on the faith of it, the grantor, as against them, is estopped from denying such consideration.
On a bill to correct a mistake in a written instrument, no proof of any actual previous agreement need bo given; but what was the understanding of the parties, and what the instrument was intended to be, may be inferred entirely from the instrument itself, the subject-matter, the surrounding circumstances, and the subsequent acts of the parties.
The reason of the rule that the assignee of a chose in action must be presumed to* have notice of what the rights of the parties to it really were, substantially fails where the one party understands that he is selling, and the other that he is purchasing, l(md, and not a mere contract respecting land. The rights of the purchasers, in such case, should be governed, as to notice of every thing affecting the rights of prior parties, by the same rules which apply to conveyances of lands.
The purpose of the registry laws is not to give notice as between the grantor* and his grantee, immediate or remote, for the protection of the grantor, but as between prior and subsequent purchasers and incumbrancers from the same grantor, and for the protection of purchasers.
The deed sought to be corrected, or the record thereof, was no more notice to complainants of the mistake, than to the grantee, at the time of taking it. And where the question arises without intervening equities, and the mistake is one. eminently calculated to mislead, and the parties can not be charged with gross negligence, the rule that the purchaser is bound, at his peril, to take notice of the defects in the conveyances through which he claims, can not apply, since, otherwise, the very fact that such a mistake has occurred would be a bar to its correction.
The acts of the grantor in giving a deed, the description in which was calculated to mislead, and did mislead, in reciting in the deed a full consideration, and inputting and continuing ■ the grantee in possession with all the indicia of ownership, were continuing representations which did not end with his death, and that event took nothing from their effect. They operate, as to those who have been deceived by them, as equitable estoppels upon his representatives.
The rule of equitable estoppel by representations, is not confined to such as are made, directly to the parties acting upon them. Whether direct or indirect, in the presence or in the absence of the parties, is immaterial, so that they be calculated and intended to produce, and do produce, the end.
Whore one has been induced to become a purchaser by the misrepresentation of another ignorant of his own right, but where he ought, as a prudent man, to have had notice of it, equity will grant relief to the purchaser. But the cases at bar are much stronger, and stand upon the ground of that class of cases where the party, knowing his rights, willfully conceals them, encourages another to purchase, and when the purchase has been made on the strength of the representation, seeks to take advantage of his own wrong, to the injury of the purchaser. The fraud of the party can not shield him where his ignorance would not. When others have been induced to purchase on the strength of his representations, he shall not be allowed to excuse himself on the plea that he only meant to defraud creditors, when the allowance of the excuse would defraud purchasers also.
A purchase for a valuable consideration is ground for affirmative relief in equity, where the equities of the complainant are superior to those of the defendant.
By Martin Ch. J.
As a general rule, courts of equity will not interpose to enforce a fraudulent contract, nor to assist the parties to it in any manner; but they will protect bona fide purchasers against all equities not superior, and assist them against all which are inferior.
The equities of these complainants are altogether independent of, and superior to, those of their grantor, and depend upon no contract between him and his grantor, but upon the facts of an attempted and supposed conveyance, possession under it, the purchase by complainants for value, and the inducements to such pur" chase held out by the acts and representations of the original grantor. In the case of a mere voluntary conveyance, accompanied by delivery of possession, a subsequent purchaser would be entitled to the remedy here sought, though no contract had ever existed.
The contract of conveyance, if any ever existed, must be held, in this case, to have been executed, so far as these complainants’ interests are to be affected. In their behalf, the maxim of equity, that what was intended to be done will be considered as done, will have its full force.
Heard October 8th, 13th, and 14th.
Decided December 9th.
Appeals by defendants from tbe Wayne Circuit in Chancery.
The facts in the two cases being substantially the same, and the testimony identical, they were heard and ’’decided together.
The hill in the first entitled canse sets forth, That on the 14th day of February, A. d. 1848, Thomas Alanson Thomas (called hereinafter Alanson Thomas), claiming to own, and being possessed of and controlling, a tract of land containing fifty acres, in tbe bill particularly described, and situated in Dearborn, Wayne county, proposed to sell the same to complainant, and that complainant, believing the land to belong to said Alanson, purchased the same of him for the consideration of $480 in hand paid; that said Alanson and his wife executed to complainant a conveyance thereof, of the date aforesaid: That complainant immediately went into possession of said premises, and has continued to occupy the same to this time: That at the time of said conveyance, said Alanson lived upon, and occupied and controlled, the farm of which said premises was a part, and so had ever since the year 1838: That Aaron Thomas, the father of said Alanson, lived on the said farm, near the residence of said Alanson, at the time of said purchase, and that, at that time and long previous thereto, and up to the time of his death, which occurred in May, 1847, said Aaron stated and gave out, that he held and owned no interest in said farm, but that he had sold and conveyed the same to Alanson, and said Alanson also claimed that he owned and held the same by title derived from his father. The bill further sets forth, That on the 18th day of June, 1838, said Aaron was the owner of said farm in fee simple, and proposed to sell the same to said Alanson for $5000, which proposition was accepted; and said Aaron, with the intent and design of conveying the whole of said farm to Alanson, executed and delivered to him a deed, expressing therein a consideration of $5000; which said deed was signed by Betsey Thomas, wife of said Aaron, now Betsey DeLong, with the design of relinquishing her right of dower in said farm: That the description in said deed, was taken from the original patent from the United States of the said farm, and that it was executed, delivered, and received, in the full belief by all the parties, that the whole land patented, except about 100 acres previously sold, was thereby conveyed: That the whole premises embraced in the patent (all of which, except the parcel before sold, was intended to be conveyed by said deed) included 437 6-100ths acres, but, by a mistake in drafting said deed, a number of courses and distances were wholly omitted, in consequence of which a small fraction only of the farm was in fact conveyed: That Alanson Thomas caused said deed to be recorded, and continued in possession under it of the whole land, except the portions from time to time sold by him, until his death, which occurred October 1st, 1850; and that both he and Aaron Thomas died without any suspicion of the said mistake: That Aaron uniformly, in speaking of said premises, gave out and represented that he had conveyed the same to Alanson; and in a certain suit in the Wayne Circuit Court, wherein Ebenezer Hurd was plaintiff and said Aaron defendant, and also in a certain proceeding in the Court of Chancery, in favor of Philip Warren against Aaron and Alanson, said Aaron made oath that he had conveyed all his interest in the premises to Alanson: That complainant purchased that portion of said farm bought by him, and paid for the same, in good faith, and before said mistake was discovered : That in fact the discovery of the mistake was first made by Titus Dort, administrator on the estate of said Alanson, in the year 1851: That since the discovery of such mistake, the widow and heirs of said Aaron have procured the appointment of the defendant David McGibbon, by the Probate Court of Wayne county, as administrator on the estate of said Aaron, and that said administrator now claims that the premises so sold to complainant belong to the estate of said Aaron, and has applied to the said Probate Court for license to sell the same as the property of said estate: That said administrator has also brought, in the Wayne Circuit Court, an action of trover for wood and timber appropriated by complainant to his use, from said premises.
And complainant prays for a correction of said mistake, so far as it affects the premises so purchased by him; that the widow and heirs at law of said Aaron (who are made defendants) be restrained from disturbing complainant in the possession of said premises; that the said administrator be enjoined from further proceeding on his application for license to sell the said land, and from further prosecuting said action of trover; and for other and further relief.
The bill in the second case is substantially the same,— complainant’s purchase being made September Yth, 1850, and including about forty acres.
Preliminary injimetions were issued as prayed, to restrain the legal proceedings being taken by McGibbon.
To these bills, Betsey DeLong filed a disclaimer, she having released to Alanson subsequent to the decease of Aaron, her former husband. Several of the heirs were infants, and filed, by their guardian ad litem, the usual general answer. Two were non-residents, and did not appear, and the others answered, denying many of the facts set up in the bill, and alleging that the deed of June 18th, 1838, was made to defraud the creditors of Aaron Thomas, and that complainants bought with notice of that fact, as well as of the mistake.
McGibbon defended by plea and answer. He alleged that the last mentioned deed was given by Aaron, and accepted by Alanson, for the sole and' only purpose of hindering, delaying, and defrauding the creditors of Aaron, who was then largely indebted; that no consideration whatever was paid for the same, and that nothing was ever said, sworn, or done, by said Aaron or Alanson, tending to show a sale of said lands, except for the purpose of consummating the said fraud; of all which complainants had notice before their respective purchases.
The causes having been put at issue, testimony was taken therein, in substance, as follows:
Thomas A. Sweeney had a demand against Aaron Thomas, and called for payment. Aaron told him he had sold*all his property to Alanson, who was to pay the debts. Witness then went to Alanson, who paid the demand. This was in 1841. He had another demand against Aaron, which originated in 1841, and was paid by Alanson in 1849. He frequently talked with both Aaron and Alanson about the property after 1838, and the story they always told was that Alanson owned it. He frequently bought farm produce there, and was always directed by Aaron to Alanson as the owner. The common report in the neighborhood was that Alanson owned the property, and from that report he should not have hesitated in going to Alanson to buy the farm which Aaron had formerly owned. Aaron lived on the premises, in what was called the old homestead, until he died. Alanson lived in the family with his father until after he was married —in 1839 or 1840. Alanson had sore eyes for several years. It was whispered in the neighborhood that Aaron conveyed the property to Alanson to keep it beyond the reach of Dr. Hurd, who was a creditor of Aaron. •
Josiah Dort had heard both Aaron and Alanson say, between 1838 and 1844, that the farm belonged to Alanson, Aaron frequently said in public places that he had sold his old farm to Alanson, and the farm was reputed to belong to Alanson after 1838. Alanson’s eyes were at times so bad as to unfit him for business. "Witness does not know that Alanson had any property previous to the farm being deeded to him. Some of the neighbors said the property was conveyed to Alanson to keep it away from creditors, and some denied it. Complainant Quirk moved into the neighborhood in 1831, and has lived there ever since.
John MoVay worked more or less on the farm every year after 1825; after the farm was said to have been, sold to Alanson, witness was paid for the labor by him. Alanson managed the farm after that, and Aaron frequently said he had conveyed to Alanson. If any one applied at the farm to purchase any thing, he was referred to Alanson. About a year before Aaron died, when the collector called for the taxes, Aaron told him he had nothing to do with it, and sent him to Alanson. Aaron told the witness he conveyed the farm to Alanson to keep it away from Dr. Hurd, who wanted to rob him. Does not know that Alanson had any property previous to the farm being conveyed to him.
Titus Dort knew Aaron and Alanson Thomas. The former died in February, 1847, and the latter in October, 1850. All the public transactions after June, 1838, were in the name of Alanson, and Aaron always said Alanson owned the farm, and had the management of it. When Aaron did business, he represented himself as agent of Alanson. From 1838 to the death of Aaron, it was common public report that Alanson owned the place. Witness was supervisor of Dear-born in 1844, and assessed the property to Alanson, by direction of Aaron, except a span of horses and a wagon, which Aaron claimed as his own. In 1839, Isaac Sherman commenced an action of trespass, before the witness as justice, against one Lawrence, alleging that the latter had trespassed upon his land adjoining a part of the Thomas farm, which Lawrence had leased of Alanson. Aaron was sworn as a witness in this suit, and testified that Alanson had leased a part of the farm to Sherman, and that he (Aaron) had no interest in the matter. Witness was appointed administrator on the estate of Alanson in the fall of 1850, and then discovered the error in the deed from Aaron to Alanson, and notified complainants of it, who expressed their astonishment at the mistake. Communicated it, also, to Betsey DeLong, who stated that she had never heard, of it before. Aaron Thomas told witness he did not intend to be forced to pay Dr. Hurd, but that he would pay him all he owed him. The farm,*agricultural implements, &c., were worth $2000 or $2500. It was the general impression in the neighborhood that the farm was conveyed to Alanson to keep it beyond the reach of Aaron’s creditors. From 1838 to 1847 witness would not have been willing to have bought of Alanson without full examination as to the title. From 1837 to the latter part of 1838, Alanson’s eyes were so bad as to incapacitate him from doing business. Witness found among the papers of Aaron Thomas, after his decease, another deed of ■ the farm from Aaron to Alanson, dated in 1836, and conditioned for £he support of Aaron and his family. Alanson told witness that Quirk had paid up for the land bought by him, and Greusel paid witness, as administrator, all but $100.
Nelson Klumph talked with Aaron in 1841 about buying a piece of the farm, and was informed that Alanson owned it and could give a good title to it. In the summer of 1844 or 1845, witness went to the farm to buy cattle. Alanson was away from home, and Aaron said the cattle were Alanson’s, and witness must come again. Witness did go again, and bought them of Alanson. Witness frequently bought cattle and produce at the farm, and was always informed by Aaron that the property belonged to Alanson, and that Alanson had the selling of it. From 1840, Alanson appeared to have the control and management of the farm until his death, and witness believed him the owner. He was reputed in the neighborhood to be the owner.
Daniel D. Tompldns was a constable, and, as such, in 1843, or before, went with an execution against Aaron Thomas, to search for property. Aaron told Mm every thing belonged to Alanson. Alanson claimed all the property, and witness retiumed the execution unsatisfied. There were reports in the neighborhood that Aaron had conveyed the property to Alanson to keep it away from creditors.
John F. Monroe exhibits a plat of the farm, and shows that but a small triangular piece of it is covered by the description contained in the deed from Aaron to Alanson. "The third, fourth, sixth, and seventh courses, of the fourteen contained in the patent, are omitted in tMs deed.
Christopher Maride came with Greusel to Michigan, in 1848, and heard some portion of the talk between him and Alanson about the purchase made by Greusel in 1850.
Joseph Lorrain often heard Aaron say the farm belonged to Alanson; this was from 1838 to 1844.
Gilbert Lognyan was frequently told by Aaron, that the farm belonged to Alanson. It was the talk among the neighbors that Aaron had put Ms property out of Ms hands to defraud his creditors.
Denison Miller leased part of the farm from Alanson, in 1845, for two years. - Aaron afterwards wanted to buy the lease of him, but they did not agree upon the price.
James Nowlin drew the deed from Aaron to Alanson; Alanson was not present. Aaron told witness he thought he would deed over his farm to his poor blind boy. He directed a deed to be drawn, and a bond and mortgage back for the same consideration stated in the deed, and said he would take the bond and mortgage home for Alanson to execute. Witness supposed the description contained ■ in the deed to cover the Aaron Thomas farm, though he does not recollect what he had to draw it from. He never heard, or suj>posed, it did not cover the farm until after the death of Alanson. Aaron often spoke of the farm as Alanson’s. When Aaron gave directions about the deed, he commenced speaking of his difficulty with Dr. Hurd, but witness checked him, as a matter of policy for Aaron. It was commonly talked in the neighborhood, that Aaron conveyed the farm to Alanson to keep it away from his creditors.
Henry T. JBacJcus became professional adviser for Aaron and Alanson as early as 1838 or ’39. The deed from Aaron to Alanson, as well as the patent, was frequently in the possession of witness, but he was never aware of the discrepancy in the descriptions until after the death of Alanson, when his attention was called to it' by Titus Dort. Both Aaron and Alanson frequently spoke to witness of Alanson being owner of the property under this deed from his father. Both Quirk and Greusel, prior to then- respective purchases, inquired of witness whether they could get good titles from Alanson Thomas, and was told that they could. Witness has no recollection that any thing was ever said to , him by Aaron or Alanson about the farm being deeded to the latter to keep it beyond the reach of Aaron’s creditors. In the transaction of all business relating to the farm, so far as witness observed, it was done in the name of Alanson.
Betsey BeLong was married to Aaron Thomas in 1830. Alanson was then about twenty years old. He had no home, except with his father, until after 1838. He was not able to support himself, and was supported by his father. He paid no consideration for the deed. It was made to keep Dr. Hurd from taking the place on execution. It was understood Aaron was to have it back again when he had settled with Hurd. Before Quirk bought, witness told Mrs. Quirk all about the object of the conveyance to Alanson. Witness was opposed to signing the deed, but Aaron said he would have the farm back within a year. Aaron managed the farm the same after the deed as before, and when Alanson wanted any thing on the farm, he either borrowed or bought it. After settling the Hurd matter, Aaron did not take back the property, on account of another claim for which he was liable. Alanson got married, and went to live in a house on another part of the farm about 1840. Witness threatened Alanson with litigation about the farm after her husband’s death, and he compromised with her. Aaron, during his lifetime, furnished the money to pay the taxes on the premises.
James Gondon heard a conversation between Greusel and one Irwin, in 1848, in which Greusel said he had been to look at the premises subsequently bought by him, and thought he should buy them. Irwin told him he should be afraid of difficulty with the title, as the land was understood to have been conveyed to Alanson to keep it away from creditors. Greusel said he thought things looked fair, and he should risk it.
Besides the evidence of this witness, 'there was some further testimony which defendants claimed had a tendency to show that Greusel must have had doubts of his acquiring a perfect title by his purchase.
Jesse A. Hides heard both Aaron and Alanson say the object of this conveyance was to prevent Hurd collecting a judgment against Aaron. Witness occasionally worked for Aaron on the farm, down to 1850.
James Gall was asked by Quirk to loan him $100 to make a payment on his purchase. Witness told him he had better inquire into the title before he paid his money. Quirk told him he had done so, and thought he could get a good title by getting a quit-claim from the Warren and Stacy heirs. Quirk told witness that he had already bought. It was rumored in the neighborhood that the land was conveyed to Alanson to keep it away from Aaron’s creditors, but witness did not mention these rumors to Quirk.
George Throop received from Aaron Thomas and his wife the taxes on the farm for 1844 and 1846. They were assessed to Alanson.
Considerable other testimony was adduced to show the fraudulent character of the conveyance from Aaron to Alan-son, and the rumors and talk in the neighborhood on the subject. Proofs were made also,, of improvements by complainants on them purchases respectively. The proceedings in the two suits mentioned in the bill were also given in evidence as follows:
JTwrd v. Aaron Thomas. Suit brought in 1833, to recover the amount of a physician’s bill. Judgment January 12th, 1834, for $468. October 8th, 1845, execution levied upon the premises in question, to satisfy a balance claimed due on the judgment. February 24th, 1846, affidavit made by Aaron Thomas that a levy had been made on the premises of Alanson, as the property of Aaron, and that the judgment had been paid by the delivery to Hurd of farm produce from time to time. Alanson also made affidavit to the delivery of the produce, and the court ordered the execution returned satisfied.
Warren v. Aaron and Alanson Thomas. Bill in chancery to quiet hi complainant the title to a certain portion of the farm, claimed by him. In January, 1845, defendants answered under oath, claiming adverse possession in Aaron until he conveyed to Alanson, and in the latter since. Aaron disclaimed title, and Alanson claimed to be owner.
The causes being brought to a hearing in the court below, in January, 1857, decrees were made in accordance with the prayer of the respective bills, and defendants appealed.
The following opinion was delivered in the court below:
Douglass, Circuit Judge:
After having gone over the voluminous testimony in these two cases, I feel no doubt as to how they should be decided. The facts appear to be these:
In 1838, Aaron Thomas, who was seized and possessed of -a certain tract of land on the river Rouge, known as the Thomas Farm, executed a deed to his son Alanson, which was intended by both parties to bo a conveyance -of the farm; but the description in this deed, in consequence of the omission of certain courses and distances, embraced but a small portion of it. This deed was executed without consideration, and for the sole purpose of defrauding the creditors of -the grantor. From that time until the death of Aaron Thomas, in 1847, both parties gave out to the world that Alanson was the owner of the property. Both Aarom and Alanson lived upon the farm, the latter being generally-held out to be the proprietor and manager thereof. On jbhe death of his father, Alanson set up title to the whole farm as against the widow and other heirs, and held undisturbed possession until his death.
In February, 1848, Alanson conveyed forty acres off from the rear part of the farm to the complainant Quirk. On the 9th of September, 1850, he conveye'd another forty acres, lying on the river Rouge, to the complainant Greusel^ Each of these conveyances was founded upon a valuable consideration.
In October, 1850, Alanson Thomas died. Titus Dort was appointed his' administrator. In the performance of Ms duties as administrator, Dort discovered the defect in the deed from Aaron to Alanson, which, up to this time, bad been wholly unknown to Aaron Thomas, his widow, and heirs, and also to both Quirk and Greusel. Dort, thereupon, filed a bill to have the description in this deed corrected, but the decree asked for was denied on the ground that the conveyance was fraudulent.
Quirk and Greusel have filed the present bills to obtain similar relief, so far as may be necessary to perfect the title of the respective portions, purchased by each of Alanson Tliomas. They claim that, conceding the fraudulent purpose of the deed from Aaron to Alanson, they are entitled to relief as purchasers in good faith from Alanson, without knowledge either of the mistake in that deed, or of the fraud.
That each purchased in ignorance of the mistake in that deed, there can be no doubt: they certainly would not have purchased if they had known it. It is true the deed was on record, and by careful examination they might have discovered the error, but when I consider the number of the courses and distances in the correct description of the Thomas farm, the fact that the error had escaped the vigilance of Aaron Thomas’s creditors for upwards of twelve years, and had not been discovered by his widow and heirs, whose interests and feelings strongly proposed scrutiny, and the fact that Alanson had been so long in possession and apparent ownership of the property, I can not say that there was any such want of care and vigilance on the part of the complainants as ought to deprive them of relief, if otherwise entitled to it.
It is again claimed in defense, that each of the complainants is chargeable with constructive notice that the conveyance from Aaron to Alanson was without consideration and for the purpose of defrauding Aaron’s creditors. What is sufficient to constitute such notice, it is impossible, from the nature of the case, to define with much precision. But it is well settled that the mere want of caution is not notice; that though willful abstinence from inquiry, or any other act of gross negligence, may be treated by the court as evidence of fraud, it is not the same thing as fraud; that the iparty may have acted bona fide, and if he has done so, there is no equity against him. And it seems that the mere notice •of a fact which may or may not, according- to circumstances, be held in a court of equity to amoimt to fraud, will not affect a purchaser for value denying actual notice of the 'fraud. — Adams Eq. 158, 159; Champ v. Poupard, and Doyle v. Stephens & Field, decided in this Circuit.
There is another view in respect to notice which it is material to consider in examining the present cases, and that is, that a parol notice, in order to be binding-, must proceed from some person interested in the property — that a purchaser is not bound to attend to vague rumors, or to statements of mere strangers. — Bernhardt v. Greenshield, 28 Eng. L. & Eq. 77.
No doubt from the time of the execution of the deed from Aaron to Alanson, in 1838, suspicions were very generally entertained and expressed in the neighborhood of the real nature •and objects of that conveyance. Alanson’s age (he was then but about twenty-one), his poverty and his blindness, and the fact of Aaron’s indebtedness, which were probably pretty well known, were well calculated to excite such suspicions. Quirk lived in the neighborhood from that time until his purchase from Alanson in 1848, and probably knew some or all of these circumstances, and had heard them talked about. Gall says he advised Quirk at the time the latter purchased, •to inquire into it, and see if he could get a good title, before he paid his money. Mrs Thomas, the widow of Aaron, tesifies that before Quirk pm-chased, she told Mrs. Quirk all about the objects and purposes of the conveyance from Aaron to Alanson. Upon the principles before laid down, the evidence, independent of the testimony of Mrs. Thomas, would be altogether insufficient to show notice to Quirk. With only such knowledge as he may be supposed to have had from other sources, I think no man of common prudence would have hesitated to purchase from Alanson Thomas, after he had been ■in undisturbed possession and apparent ownership for about twelve years. He would naturally have presumed that his. own and other people’s suspicions were not well founded.
I have great doubts as to Mrs. Thomas’s credibility in respect to her statements to Mrs/ Quirk; but conceding this portion of her testimony to be true, I think the information she communicated to Mrs. Quirk is not sufficiently brought home to Quirk to charge him with notice, in the face of the positive denials of his answer.
As to G-reusel, he did not come into the neighborhood until 1848 — after Alanson had been in the possession and apparent ownership of the property for ten years. His pur-, chase was not made until 1850, three years after the death of Aaron Thomas, during which time Alanson had occupied and enjoyed the property as his own. He is not shown ta have received any information in respect to -the fraudulent nature of the deed of Aaron Thomas, from any person having any interest in the property. Most clearly, I think, he is not chargeable with notice.
I am, therefore, of ojiinion that both complainants are entitled to the relief prayed.
Backus & Marbaugh, for complainants :
1. Mistake is a proper subject of equity jurisdiction, when satisfactorily proved.— Walk. Ch. 102; Willard's Eq, 13; 1 Paige, 218; 9 Cow. 14=1.
2. The burden of proof is on defendants, to show the conveyance to Alanson Thomas fraudulent, and notice of the fact, as well as of the mistake, to complainants. With-, out proof of such notice, complainants would not be affected by the fraud, either at common law or by the statute. — R. S. 1838, p. 332; R. S. 1846, p. 328; Walk. Ch. 465; Willard's Eq. 246; 1 Johns. Ch. 328; Story Eq. Juris. 315; 2 Mason, 252.
3. Fraud, or notice of fraud, will not be presumed, but must be proved. — Story Eq. Juris. §190; Willard's Eq. 148. The notice must be something more than vague rumor. — Willard Eq. 251; 2 Lead. Gas. in Eq. 111; 28 Eng. L. & Eq. 77.
There is here no pretence that complainants had any notice of the mistake. ‘As to the fraud, the question is, Had they such notice of it as will charge them with fraud in the purchase? The testimony brings this within none of the cases to be found in the books on the subject of notice, Notice to Quirk’s wife was not notice to him. — 1 Hill, 567.
Levi JBishop, for defendants:
1. Fraud vitiates all compacts and agreements, and even the most solemn adjudications. AE contracts and convey-anees of real property, to delay, hinder, and defeat credit-ors, are void on the ground of fraud. And as all parties, 'privies, and purchasers with notice, are in pari delicto, the courts wiE not releve them, but wül leave them in the same position where then own acts have left them. In "other words, the courts will not lend themselves to carry into effect fraudulent and illegal transactions. — 8 T. R. 575; Cowp. 790; 1 East, 96; 3 B. & P. 35; 7 East, 449; 12 East, 396, 404; 8 Johns. 113; 10 Mass. 274; 11 Mass. 368 to 379; 1 Bro. Gh. 543; 5 Ves. 173; 10 Ves. 360; 11 Ves. 168, 535; 1 Doug. Mich. 401; 2 Doug. Mich. 155, 344.
•But it is enough to defeat this suit, that the conveyance of 1838 was voluntary, and without valuable or meritorious consideration. Courts of equity wiE not interfere to carry into effect, or correct, or impyrove the informalities ‘of such a transaction.— 2 Story Eq. Juris. §§786, 793 a; 1 Dow. 711, 773; 9 Peters, 204; 3 Bro. Gh. 12; 1 Ves. 50; 6 Ves. 662; 12 Ves. 37; 18 Ves. 149; 1 Johns. Gh. 329, 336; 4 ■Johns. Gh. 498.
It is settled, therefore, that if these complainants had -notice, in law or in fact, that the conveyance of 1838 was .,fraudulent or voluntai-y, or that it was in any way defective, so that it would require the assistance of a court, they 'can -have no reHef.
2. These complainants had notice, as a matter of law,, through the registry acts, that the title they were about to purchase was defective.
A party must use reasonable diligence, or equity will' not relieve him.— 1 Story Eq. Juris. §146.
Any thing which is calculated to put a party on inquiry-is enough. — Ibid. §400. There can certainly be no doubt but this rule extends to registered title deeds, through which title must be derived, and especially the deed of the immediate vendor. The registry of deeds is taken in the United States as full and complete notice to all the world of the condition, and all infirmities, of title. — 15 Johns. 568;, 15 Wend. 594, 595; 3 Sandf. Gh. 592; 6 W <& S. 469, 474; 10 Ohio, 405; 6 B. Monr. 67; Adams' Eq. 151 to 155, and notes', 1 Mich. 202, 205. The same cases hold that a purchaser has notice of whatever appears in his title papers.
Certainly such a deed is notice as to the amount of' land claimed by the vendor. — 2 Lead. Gas. in Eq. pt. 1, p, 120, and cases cited.
The presumption of notice of the contents of a registered deed is so strong that equity will not alloAv it to be-explained away or rebutted; and such deed overrules an express denial of such notice.
No attempt has been made to explain away or rebut, such notice in these cases, but the attempt is made to ignore the rule itself, as clearly fatal to the relief prayed for by the complainants. The rule, however, is too well established to be shaken. — Rogers v. Jones, 8 N. H. 264; Farnsworth v. Childs, 4 Mass. 637; Sigourney v. Munn, 7 Conn. 324; Jackson v. Neely, 10 Johns. 374; Griffith v. Griffith, 1 Hoff. Ch. 153; Sterry v. Arden, 1 Johns. Ch. 267; Green v. Slayter, 4 Johns. Ch. 38; Bellas v. Lloyd, 2 Watts, 401; McAteer v. McMullen, 2 Barr, 32; Diehl v. Page, 2 Green Ch. 143; Oliver v. Piatt, 3 How. U. S. 333; Graves v. Graves, 1 A. K. Marsh. 165; Honore v. Blackwell, 6 B. Monr. 67, 73; Hachwith v. Damron, 1 T. B. Monr. 235, 237; Christmas v. Mitchell, 3 Ired. Eq. 535; Nelson v. Allen, 1 Yerg. 360; Mason v. Payne, Walk. Ch. 459.
The defective deed being therefore fraudulent and void, it passed no title to the lands to Alanson; and there being none in him of record (except to the fraction), when the complainants purchased, they acquired none. As a consequence, the complainants are seeking to create an original legal conveyance, not to correct a legal one which has been found defective. The registry showed no title in their vendor, and they had notice of that fact. It is, therefore, incumbent on them to establish a valid title in Mm, which they fail to do, and the case shows that none existed.. The conclusion from these circumstances, both of law and fact, is irresistible, that the complainants are not bona fide purchasers, and are not entitled to relief.
3. Complainants are chargeable with notice in faet, that the real title was not in AJanson. They had knowledge of such facts as were calculated to put them on inquiry; which is sufficient.

Opinion:
Manning J.:
I agree with the learned judge who decided the cases in the court below, that the deed from Aaron Thomas to his son Alanson, which complainants ask to have re-formed, was made to defraud the creditors of Aaron. The evidence is conclusive on that point; and admitting complainants are purchasers in good faith, for a valuable consideration,' and 'without notice of the fraud, or of the mistake in the deed from Aaron to Alanson, their grantor,- they still have failed to make a case entitling them to relief in a court of equity. On the ground of purchasers for a valuable consideration, without notice, they asked and obtained relief in the court below, where it seems to have been taken for granted that that, of itself, is an equity on which a bill may be sustained for relief. It can be used as a defense only. It is a shield to protect a party, but can not be made a basis of attack. It was so held in Beekman v. Frost, 18 Johns. 544, on appeal from Chancellor Kent — the Court of Errors reversing the decree of the Chancellor. In that case, as in the cases before us, the question was not raised in the court below. Spencer Ch. J. in delivering the opinion of the court, ®ays^ "In Patterson v. Slaughter, Amb. 293, Lord Hardwicke laid clown the rule to be, that the title of a purchaser for a valuable consideration is not ground for relief, though it is a good defense." The Chief Justice then says: "No book of precedents,, no treatise on equity, furnishes a case of a bill filed on the ground that there has been purchase without notice, and for valuable consideration." The principle i also recognized in Jackson v. Cadwell, 1 Cow. 622. Hare & Wallace, in their notes on Beading Cases in Equity, vol. 2, pt. 1, p. 55, say: "There can be no doubt that a defense resting on the ground of a purchase for valuable consideration, as technically made by plea, which does not allege the existence of a good title in the vendor, and which, as remarked by Lord Eldon, implies a want of title in the vendee, can not, in itself, furnish a ground for a suit or action, either in a court of equity or of law. Such a defense shows matter sufficient to exonerate the conscience of the purchaser and entitle him to retain what he has purchased, but does not, necessarily or usually, show enough to bind the conscience of others, and become the foundation of equitable proceedings against them."
The reason of the rule has been said to be, that the party to be affected by it is entitled to the oath of the party seeking to avail himself of it; I do not think this the true reason; for a defendant may obtain the oath of complainant on a bill e£ discovery. The rule rests on a more solid foundation; which is, that the effect the law gives to a purchase without notice, is not a perfect right in itself, and, therefore, will not sustain an action at law or bill in equity, but may, in certain circumstances, be used by a defendant to stay the interposition of the court, on the ground that he is equally entitled with the plain tiff to its protection. If the right was in itself a perfect right — one that'would sustain an action at law or bill in equity — no man's property would be safe. B having a horse belonging to A in his possession, sells it to C, who purchases in good faith, believing it to be the property of B, and pays him what the horse is worth. A sues C in trover for the horse. C is a bona fide purchaser for a valuable consideration, without notice, and has all the rights of such a purchaser ; and yet it is no defense. But if A, instead of having •a legal right to the horse, had an equitable right only that Was good against B's legal right, and to enforce it was under the necessity of going into a court of equity, the court would give him relief against B, and also against C, if he purchased of B with a knowledge of A's equitable title; but it would not give him relief against C if he had purchased of B without notice of A's equity. Why would the court give relief against C in the one case and not in the other ? Because, in the first case, C would have the legal title without any equity — he would have B's title, and nothing more — and A's equity would prevail against his legal title. In the other case, C would have the equity of a bona fide purchaser in conjunction with the legal title, and for that reason the court would refuse to divest him of his legal title in favor of A's equity. Or, in other words, it would leave' complainant his legal remedy. This is what I understand by the equity of a bona fide purchaser without notice.
When defendant has the legal title, and plaintiff is seeking to divest him of it by reason of some equity that was a good ground for relief against his grantor, he may 'turn on his adversary, and say: "I purchased the estate you claim of me in good faith; I paid a valuable consideration for it, and I had no notice of your claim when I parted with my money."
In the cases before us, complainants admit Alanson Thomas, their grantor, had no legal title when he conveyed to them, and they file their several bills to re-form the deed from Aaron to Alanson, so as to vest the legal title in him, and, through him, in themselves respectively, to the part of the premises severally purchased by them of Alanson. They stand in the precise position mentioned by Hare & Wallace in the note to which I have referred, of " purchasers for valuable consideration as technically made by plea, which does not allege the existence of a good title in the vendor" (Alanson Thomas, their grantor), "and which, as remarked by Lord Eldon, implies a want of title in the vendee." In the present cases, the want of title in complainants is admitted, not implied; and they come into a court of equity to get a title.
Asno relief can be given solely on the. ground that complainants purchased in good faith without notice, is there any other ground on which the relief asked may be granted? As purchasers from Alanson Thomas, they have all of his right at law and in equity, and nothing more. But this comt would not correct the mistake in favor of Alanson, on a bill filed by him, for he was a party to the intended fraud of the father. Neither can it in favor of complainants,, his grantees, without conceding to them greater rights than Alanson had, and making itself a party to .the intended fraud. It matters not there are no creditors, even if such be the case, now to be injured. It is the corrupt intention, the illegal object the Thomases had in view — -the wrong in' tended, and not the wrong done — that stays the hands of the court. If the court would not have corrected the mistake-the instant it occurred, it will not now; for, by correcting it now, it would give effect to the deed from its execution. To give effect to it on any day subsequent to the time the parties intended it should take effect, would not be enforcing the original contract, but making a new contract for the parties..
A court of equity will not decree a specific performance of an illegal contract. On what principle, then, can it correct a mistake in such a contract?
There is another ground, it seems to me, aside from the intended fraud, why the relief asked • should not be. granted. It is the want of a consideration for the deed from Aaron to Alanson. The deed was intended to be the execution of a voluntary contract. And as a court of equity will not decree the performance of such a contract (Colman v. Sarrell, 1 Ves. 50; Antrobus v. Smith, 12 Ves. 39 ; Edwards v. Jones, 1 Myl. & Cr. 226; Ellison v. Ellison, 6 Ves, 656; 2 Spence Eq. Juris. 285, notes b ande), I can not well conceive of a case, where there is no intervening equity, in which it would correct a mistake in a defective execution of it. The most complainants can claim, even in a court, of equity, under their deeds from Alanson, is, that they are in equity the assignees of such contract. And, a¡Si assignees, they would take it subject to all' its vices, and to all equities existing between the parties to it.
Complainants are not bona fide purchasers without no-, tice. In law, they could not be said to be ignorant of the mistake when they purchased. The deed from Aaron to Alanson was recorded, and they are chargeable with notice of every thing that appears on the face of the record. If they purchased without examining the record, or seeing whether it described the land they were about to purchase, it is then- misfortune, and, unhappily for them, one that this court can not correct. If it be said the registry is notice only to subsequent purchasers from the same grantor, there is still another principle of law which charges them with notice. It is, that a vendee is deemed to have notice of what appears on the face of a conveyance through which he claims title, whether it be in a conveyance to his grantor, or other prior conveyance in the chain of his title.
Aaron Thomas, in his lifetime, frequently said he had conveyed the farm to his son, and made the same statement under- oath in a court of justice. Such declarations were evidence to prove the mistake in the deed from,him to Alanson, but not to disprove the fraud with which the deed was tainted. They were consistent with the fraud, and were doubtless made with intent to conceal it. Nor can it be said they liken complainant's case to a purchase of a third person, in the presence of the real owner, under an impression such person was the owner, and the cotemporaneous declaration of the owner to the same effect. For it does not appear the declarations of Aaron Thomas, referred to, were ever made to, or in the presence of, complainants, or either of them. Aaron Thomas was not present, nor could such declarations have been made by him, when complainants purchased. He died in 1847; and it was on the 14th of February, 1848, Alanson deeded to Quirk, and on the 9th of September, 1850, he deeded to Greusel. I am therefore unable to see any equity in favor of complainants growing out of the declarations of Aaron Thomas. If there be any, in what does it consist, and where is it to be found? Certainly not in what Aaron Thomas said or did in the presence of complainants, but in what they may have understood from others he had said and done. This is public rumor — nothing more; and if public rumor can create an equity on one side, I know no reason why it may not on the other. Complainants forget, while calling in public rumor to assist them, that her testimony, like a two - edged sword, cuts both ways — that while she testifies in favor of a conveyance, she at the same time states it was made to defraud creditors. On what principle can one part of her story be received, and the other rejected? The truth is, there is no equity growing out of the declarations of Aaron Thomas, one way or the other, and I can not see that they have any thing to do with the case, except for the purpose I have already stated.
The Statute of Frauds, it is said, declares the deed void as against creditors only, leaving it good between the parties to it. The statute, in this particular, is declaratory of the common law only, by which all contracts made in violation of law, or contrary to public policy, are illegal, and consequently void; and when executory, will not be enforced, or relieved against when executed — the law treating the whole transaction as void and of no effect, in the former case, and giving full force and effect to it between the parties in the latter — when it has been executed in part, giving it effect so far as it has been executed, and holding it void so far as it remains executory. —Nellis v. Clark, 20 Wend. 24, and 4 Hill, 424. In that case the Statute of Frauds, the common law, and the validity and effect of such contracts, were fully considered, and all the cases bearing on them referred to and commented on by Cowen J., in the Supreme Court, and by Chancellor Walworth, in the Court of Errors. CoAven, J., in delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court, says: "It" (the statute) "declares all contracts, both executory and executed, to defraud creditors, void only as against the latter. It was wanted for nothing else. It was but declaratory; and Avere it not for the fourth section) giAÚng additional- sanctions, the common law would have reached every pin-pose. Now, had the statute stopped Avith declaring the contract simply void, it Avould have changed the common law, avoiding one class, viz., executed contracts, which that law would not interfere with. Therefore, the statute withdraws itself entirely from any interference between the parties, with the intent to let' the common -law take its own course." Chancellor Wahvorth, in his opinion, says: "A sale or assignment for the purpose of delaying, hindering, or defrauding a creditor in the collection of his debt, was illegal at the common law, and is, in itself, immoral, and against public policy. And the statutes declaring such transactions void as against creditors, are only in affirmance of the common law on that subject. The word only, as used in the statute of Elizabeth, and in our reAdsed statute of l^V, on this subject, was not intended to render executory contracts of that character legal and valid between the parties thereto. But it Avas inserted to prevent the general provisions of the statute from changing the common law rule, as between the parties themselves, in relation to executed contracts."
The decrees of the court below, I think, should be reversed, and the bills be dismissed.