Case Name: Bob HANEY, Appellant v. Pat HANEY, Appellee
Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2001-06-26
Citations: 788 So. 2d 862
Docket Number: No. 1999-CA-02078-COA
Parties: Bob HANEY, Appellant v. Pat HANEY, Appellee.
Judges: Before KING, P.J., PAYNE, and MYERS, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 788
Pages: 862–868

Head Matter:
Bob HANEY, Appellant v. Pat HANEY, Appellee.
No. 1999-CA-02078-COA.
Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
June 26, 2001.
Merrida Coxwell, Jackson, Attorney for Appellant.
Robert M. Carter, New Albany, Attorney for Appellee.
Before KING, P.J., PAYNE, and MYERS, JJ.

Opinion:
MYERS, J.,
for the Court:
¶ 1. The Union County Chancery Court granted a divorce to Bob and Pat Haney on the ground of irreconcilable differences. Bob now appeals the decision of the trial court, challenging the award of $104,974.77 in alimony and attorney fees. Finding error, we reverse and remand.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶ 2. Bob and Pat Haney were married on February 11, 1996. At the time of marriage, Pat was employed with Forms and Supplies in Memphis, Tennessee, and Bob was employed with Ameron. Shortly after the couple was married, Pat was diagnosed with several ailments, including an inner ear infection, digestive track problems, fibromyalgia, migraine headaches, and others. These various conditions resulted in thousands of dollars in health care costs and foreed Pat to quit her job. Each maintained separate homes throughout the course of their marriage. The couple separated on or about July 7, 1997. No children were born from the marriage.
¶ 3. A temporary hearing was begun on November 10, 1997, and was reconvened and concluded on December 15,1997. The chancellor issued an opinion and temporary judgment on January 8, 1998, finding that both parties had substantial estates which they possessed prior to the marriage, but nevertheless ordering Bob to pay Pat's car note in the amount of $873.67 per month and temporary support of $850 per month.
¶ 4. A second hearing was held on September 29,1999. The chancellor subsequently issued an opinion and judgment in which he found Pat to have non-marital assets totaling $115,930 and Bob to have non-marital assets totaling $482,464. The chancellor further found that Pat's monthly income was $1,801 and that her monthly expenses were $3,350. Bob's net monthly income was found to be $7,539 but no finding was made as to Bob's monthly expenses.
¶ 5. The judgment of the chancellor also noted that at the time of the temporary hearing in 1997, Pat's separate investments totaled $65,000, but that at the time of judgment those investments had been reduced to $42,000. Bob's separate investments at the time of the temporary hearing amounted to $396,964, but they grew to $618,214 by the time of judgment. A key factor in the chancellor's decision was the fact that Bob had canceled Pat's medical insurance coverage without her knowledge, and that as a result, Pat was forced to pay some $19,500 in medical bills from her own funds.
¶ 6. Those assets classified as marital assets in the trial court's opinion and judgment are the 1996 Volvo, valued at $14,250, $5,898.45 in checking accounts held in Pat's name, $8,848 in checking accounts held in Bob's name only, and the $221,250 growth on Bob's separate investments between the time of the temporary hearing and the time of judgment. The chancellor granted Pat the exclusive use and possession of the Volvo and ordered Bob to pay Pat "lump sum alimony" in the amount of $104,974.77, which he found to be "one half of the marital assets" less the value of the Volvo and the $5,898.45 which Pat held in her separate checking accounts.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 7. Our standard of review employed in domestic relations cases is well-settled. We recognize chancellors as having broad discretion, and we will not disturb a chancellor's findings unless the court's actions were manifestly wrong, constituted an abuse of discretion, or represent the application of an erroneous legal standard. Sandlin v. Sandlin, 699 So.2d 1198, 1203 (Miss.1997).
DISCUSSION
I. CLASSIFICATION OF GROWTH OF BOB HANEY'S NON-MARITAL ASSETS AS MARITAL PROPERTY
¶8. In its opinion and judgment, the chancellor found that Bob Haney held as non-marital assets "$618,214.00 in investments of which $221,250.00 is the result of growth since his last financial statement presented to the Court at the temporary hearing for a net non-marital asset investment of $396,964.00." Bob argues that the trial court erred in classifying the growth of his non-marital investments as a marital asset. Pat concedes this point but argues that it is inconsequential because the chancellor did not make an equitable distribution of the property. Rather, Pat asserts, the chancellor made an award of lump sum alimony. We agree. There is no need to discuss the growth of the invested non-marital assets because the chancellor handled the disparity in financial situations with an award of lump sum alimony. Therefore, we need only determine whether the amount awarded to Pat was equitable and was calculated pursuant to the correct legal standard.
II. AWARD TO PAT OF HALF OF THE GROWTH OF BOB'S NON-MARITAL ASSETS
¶9. In its opinion and judgment, the trial court considered the factors set forth by the Mississippi Supreme Court for the distribution of marital property. Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So.2d 921, 930 (Miss.1994). However, as stated above, the separate investments of Bob were not marital property and were therefore not subject to equitable distribution. Therefore, an award to Pat from those assets could only come in the form of lump sum alimony.
¶ 10. The Mississippi Supreme Court has established certain factors to be considered by a chancellor in awarding lump sum alimony. Cheatham v. Cheatham, 537 So.2d 435, 438 (Miss.1988). Those factors are: 1) substantial contribution to the accumulation of total wealth of the paying spouse either by quitting a job to become a housewife, or by assisting in the paying spouse's business; 2) length of the marriage; 3) separate income of the recipient spouse as compared to that of the paying spouse; and 4) financial security of the recipient spouse absent the lump sum payment. Id. The court went on to say the single most important factor is the disparity of the separate estates. Id. The chancellor in the case at bar made no reference to these factors in his opinion and judgment.
¶ 11. Pat testified that she helped Bob out with his business for a three or four month period during the marriage by making phone calls, typing, and handling faxes. The record reflects that the parties were married for approximately fifteen months. It is also apparent that Bob's monthly income is far greater than Pat's. The chancellor's finding that Pat's monthly expenses were greatly exceeding her monthly income is an indication that Pat would likely be financially insecure without a lump sum alimony payment. However, it appears as if the chancellor failed to consider Pat's interest in Barber Printing in reaching his decision. The chancellor did not illustrate his analysis of this marriage under the Cheatham factors. Thus, we are left with no guidance by which to review his decision. Therefore, we reverse and remand for specific findings of fact and conclusions of law on this issue based upon the above mentioned Cheatham factors. We note that the chancellor is authorized to require one ex-spouse to make medical insurance premium payments for the other ex-spouse. Driste v. Driste, 738 So.2d 763, 766 (Miss.Ct.App.1998). Such action would likely be appropriate under the circumstances of this case.
III. AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES TO PAT HANEY
¶ 12. "[T]he determination of attorney's fees is largely within the sound discretion of the chancellor." Smith v. Smith, 614 So.2d 394, 398 (Miss.1993) (citing Martin v. Martin, 566 So.2d 704 (Miss.1990); Devereaux v. Devereaux, 493 So.2d 1310 (Miss.1986); Kergosien v. Kergosien, 471 So.2d 1206 (Miss.1985)). Furthermore, we are "reluctant to disturb a chancellor's discretionary determination whether or not to award attorney fees." Geiger v. Geiger, 530 So.2d 185, 187 (Miss.1988). Mississippi maintains a "general rule that where 'a party is financially able to pay her attorney, an award of attorney's fees is not appropriate.' " Id. (quoting Martin v. Martin, 566 So.2d at 704; Carpenter v. Carpenter, 519 So.2d 891 (Miss.1988); Harrell v. Harrell, 231 So.2d 793 (Miss.1970)).
¶ 13. The chancellor in the case at bar found that Pat's monthly income totaled $1,801, while her monthly expenses totaled $3,350. The chancellor further found that Pat's financial statements indicated that she was being required to invade her investments to meet her monthly expenses. However, as stated above, the chancellor failed to include in his analysis Pat's interest in the printing business. Without this information, we are unable to determine whether Pat was financially able to pay her attorney. We therefore reverse and remand for specific findings of fact and conclusions of law on this issue as well.
¶ 14. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CHANCERY COURT OF UNION COUNTY IS REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLEE.
KING AND SOUTHWICK, P.JJ., AND BRIDGES, J. CONCUR. IRVING, J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY. CHANDLER, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY PAYNE AND THOMAS, JJ. McMILLIN, C.J., AND LEE, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.