Case Name: H. W. L. McCloskey, by his next friend John J. McCloskey, v. The Chautauqua Lake Ice Company, Appellant
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1896-03-02
Citations: 174 Pa. 34
Docket Number: Appeal, No. 250
Parties: H. W. L. McCloskey, by his next friend John J. McCloskey, v. The Chautauqua Lake Ice Company, Appellant.
Judges: Before Gbeen, Williams, McCollum, Mitchell, Dean and Fell, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania State Reports
Volume: 174
Pages: 34–45

Head Matter:
H. W. L. McCloskey, by his next friend John J. McCloskey, v. The Chautauqua Lake Ice Company, Appellant.
[Marked to be reported.]
Negligence — Definition of negligence.
Negligence is the want of care required by the circumstances. It may lie in omission or commission, in the failure to do what a reasonable and prudent person would ordinarily have done under the circumstances of the situation, or in doing what such a person under the existing circumstances would not have done.
Negligence — Evidence—Scintilla—Question for jury.
He who alleges negligence as the basis of his suit must prove it, because the injury alone affords no cause of action. If the evidence submitted to sustain his allegation amounts to more than a scintilla, it presents a question for the jury, although it is flatly contradicted by the evidence of the defendant.
Negligence — Evidence—Ice wagon — Backing of wagon against curb— Infant of tender years.
In an action against an ice company to recover damages for personal injuries to a boy six years old, resulting from the alleged negligent backing of an ice wagon by one of defendant’s drivers, the case is for the jury, where the evidence tends to show that on the street where the accident occurred pavement blocks were piled in the cartway against the curb; that in front of a butcher shop an opening was left wide enough to let a wagon back in, that the boy was caught while entering this open space by an ice wagon backing in to deliver ice, and the evidence is conflicting as to whether the driver before backing his wagon looked to see whether any one was in the opening, or approaching it from the street.
Argued Nov. 6, 1895.
Appeal, No. 250, Oct. T., 1895, by defendant, from judgment of C. P. No. 1, Allegheny Co., March Term, 1894, No. 720, on verdict for plaintiff.
Before Gbeen, Williams, McCollum, Mitchell, Dean and Fell, JJ.
Affirmed.
Gbeen and Williams, JJ., dissent.
Trespass for personal injuries. Before Slagle, J.
At the trial it appeared that on October 10, 1893, plaintiff, a boy six years old, was injured by defendant’s ice wagon in front of Ketterer’s butcher shop on Centre avenue, Pittsburg. The pavement on the other side of the street had been taken up for some time, and blocks for a new pavement were piled on tbe side of the street where the accident occurred, with open spaces at intervals forming passages from the sidewalk to the street. One of the spaces was immediately in front of Ketterer’s shop, and was from five to seven feet in width. At the time of the accident the ice wagon was being backed into this space to deliver ice to the butcher shop. The boy was caught in the space, and before he could get away was pinned between a tree box and the steps of the wagon and sustained serious injuries. The testimony as to the exact manner in which the accident occurred is quoted at length in the opinion of the Supreme Court and in the dissenting opinion.
The court charged in part as follows:
[These wagons you have seen upon the streets ; and I presume this was like the other wagons. How this was constructed particularly was not stated, but I think they are generally closed wagons, with a bulkhead right behind the driver so that he cannot see through the wagon; his only opportunity is to see around on the outside. That is what he did. He says he looked first on one side to see that there was no person on the sidewalk before he undertook to turn his wagon against it, and that there was nobody there; that then he looked on the other side. Whether he looked first to the pavement, or first to the street, he does not say; but he looked at the sidewalk, looked around to see whether there was any person there. Or rather, he says, to see whether his wagon would come to the right place. He did not say that he looked to see whether there was any person there or not; but he says there was no person there at that time. He looked on the other side to see if there was any person coming up the track of the railroad, because in turning his wagon it would be necessary for him to turn his wheels around upon the track of the railway. He says that he looked around to see if there was any danger there, and that he saw nobody, saw nothing. Now, was that all thatwas necessary ? If it was, if that was all that an ordinarily careful man would have done, then he did all that he was bound to do. But you must remember, in considering that, that he could not see through the wagon, that he looked around the wagon at the sides. If there was any person back of the wagon he could not see that person in that way. If this child was on the street running towards the wagon then he would have seen it in all probability.] [2]
Defendant’s point was as'follows:
That under the evidence the verdict must be for defendant. Answer: Refused and bill sealed for defendant. [1]
Yerdict and judgment for plaintiff for $8,000. Defendant appealed.
Errors assigned were (1, 2) above instructions, quoting them.
Johns MeCleave, Wm. H. MoQlung and J. A. Evans with him, for appellant.
The injury clearly resulted from the sudden and unanticipated act of the child in rushing from a place where there was no danger to. the only point where harm could possibly have come: Pass. Ry. v. Connell, 88 Pa. 520; Chilton v. Central Traction Co., 152 Pa. 425; Flanagan v. People’s Pass. Ry., 163 Pa. 102.
W. C. Stillwagen, for appellee.
Negligence is always a question for the jury where there is any doubt as to the facts or the inferences to be drawn from them: Penna. R. R. v. Barnett, 59 Pa. 259; Johnson v. Bruner, 61 Pa. 58; McKee v. Bidwell, 74 Pa. 218; Ledig v. Germania Brewing Co., 153 Pa. 298; Thurber v. Harlem, 60 N. Y. 326; Quirk v. Holt, 99 Mass. 164; Murphy v. Orr, 96 N. Y. 14; Moebus v. Herrmann, 108 N. Y. 349.
March 2, 1896 :

Opinion:
Opinion by
Mk. Justice McCollum,
The principal question raised by this appeal is whether the injury the plaintiff received on the 10th of October, 1893, was caused by the negligence of the defendant's servant. There can be no doubt that the injury was properly attributable to the act of the servant in backing the ice wagon against the curb at the opening in front of Ketterer's shop, but whether it was a negligent act is another and different matter. He who alleges negligence as the basis of his suit must prove it, because the injury alone affords no cause of action. If the evidence submitted to sustain his allegation amounts to more than a scintilla it presents a question for the jury although it is flatly contradicted by the evidence of the defendant. Negligence is the. want of care required by the circumstances.. It may " lie in omission or commission, in the failure to do what a reasonable and prudent person would ordinarily have done under the circumstances of the situation, or in doing what such a person under the existing circumstances would not have doiie." Baltimore Railroad Co. v. Jones, 95 U. S. 439. There is no question of contributory negligence in the case because the age of the plaintiff excludes it. It is not claimed that the verdict is excessive, and the criticism of the excerpt from the charge which is the subject of the second specification appears to us as destitute of merit and unwarranted. We regard the charge as clear and impartial, and we fail to discover anything in it to mislead or prejudice the jury against the defendant. We therefore limit our further consideration of the case to the single question whether the evidence was sufficient to warrant the jury in finding that the negligence of the defendant's servant was the proximateuause of the plaintiff's injury. If it was, the judgment must be affirmed, and if it was not, the court erred in refusing the defendant's point, and the judgment must be reversed.
The plaintiff was lawfully in the place where he was caught and his leg was crushed by the ice wagon. His position when discovered would indicate that he was caught while entering the open space maintained for the accommodation of the adjacent property owners and the general public in getting from the street to the sidewalk and from the sidewalk to the street. The placing of the ice wagon against the 'eurb in the manner described was an obstruction to travel through this space and there was no apparent necessity for it. It may have lightened the labor of delivering the ice to the customer but it was by no means indispensable to the proper performance of that work. A few minutes before the occurrence in question, and but a short distance from it, the ice was delivered to another customer through a similar opening upon the sidewalk, while the horses and wagon were standing parallel with the curb as they were near Ketterer's before the driver turned the horses toward the center of the street to back the wagon to the open space. The reason given for the change in the method of delivery was that the amount of ice to be unloaded at the latter place was greater than at the former. If the wagon had remained parallel with the curb at Ketterer's as it was at Voscamp's when the ice was taken from it, it is quite certain that there would have been no occasion for this suit.
We think there can be no serious doubt that in backing the wagon against the curb in the manner described it was the duty of the person having charge of it to see that the way was clear for doing so without injury to parties entering or leaving the open space which he was about to obstruct, and that his failure to exercise this precaution would constitute negligence, for the consequences oí which his employer would be responsible. Did Malone, the driver, do what an ordinarily prudent man would have done under the circumstances ? Did he look to see whether the way was clear for him to back the wagon against the curb in the manner he did ? He says that when he drove up to the open space, he stopped and looked out on the left hand side of the wagon " to see whether he had the rear end of it in the center of the space or he could swing* around and get into the space," and that he did not " see any one in the open space or near there." He says also that he did not see the plaintiff before he was caught and crushed between the step of the wagon and the tree box. Eugene Winslow, a witness called by the plaintiff, testified that he was driving up Centre avenue about a hundred and fifty feet below the ice wagon and that it and the horses were then standing parallel with the curb; that he saw the plaintiff crossing the street towards the opening in front of Ketterer's shop and that he had reached the middle of the street before Malone commenced to turn the horses around. We quote his description of what followed: He said: " I saw the driver start to pull, his team around to back in there, and then as soon as the boy saw the horses he tried to get out of the way and ran for the curbstone. He thought the driver, as I thought myself, intended to go down Centre avenue, but instead he went to back into the curbstone, and the boy started for the curbstone and he ran up to the tree box, and before he could get away from the tree box the steps of the wagon caught him in the leg and held him tight and crushed him. I called to the driver to pull out, and he stuck his head out of the wagon. He has to look around to see, he can't see anything, he is all boxed up." This description of the occurrence was not changed or materially qualified by the cross-examination, nor antagonized in any degree by the testimony of any witness except that of Malone. In fact, Malone and Winslow were the only witnesses in the case whose testimony relates to or in any wise affects the question of tha alleged negligence of the defendant. But it seems to us that their testimony required the submission of this question to the jury. If Winslow was where he said he was when Malone started to turn his horses around, and the plaintiff was then in the center of the street and advancing toward the opening would not Malone, in the exercise of the care required by the circumstances, have seen them ? He says he did not see either of them, although he says he looked to see if the way was clear for him to back against the curb. If Malone had seen the plaintiff in the center of the street, and running toward the opening, under the circumstances described by Winslow, ought he not to have relinquished his purpose to back the wagon against the curb, until the obvious danger the plaintiff was in was passed ? If Malone had the knowledge that Winslow had respecting the position and movements of the plaintiff, can it be said that in backing against the curb he exercised the care required by the circumstances ? It is true, that the testimony of Malone and Winslow was somewhat conflicting, but if that of the latter was believed, it afforded, we think, a reasonable basis for an inference that the negligence of the former was the proximate cause of the injury the plaintiff received.
Judgment affirmed.