Case Name: The State of Connecticut vs. George Yanz
Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Connecticut
Decision Date: 1901-09-27
Citations: 74 Conn. 177
Docket Number: 
Parties: The State of Connecticut vs. George Yanz.
Judges: 
Reporter: Connecticut Reports
Volume: 74
Pages: 177–188

Head Matter:
The State of Connecticut vs. George Yanz.
Third Judicial District, New Haven,
June Term, 1901.
Andrews, C. J., Torrance, Baldwin, Hamersley and Hall, Js.
Upon a trial for murder the accused claimed to have killed the decedent while he was committing adultery with the former’s wife. Held that an endearing expression respecting the deceased, uttered by the wife after the homicide and after she had left the scene, was mere hearsay and inadmissible in behalf of the defendant.
Malice essential to the crime of murder in the second degree under our statute (§1399), is not to be implied if the fatal act was the sudden result of what the law deems either a sufficient provocation, or an uncontrollable passion naturally excited by the circumstances of the occasion.
Accordingly, if the homicide is committed in a transport of passion upon discovering the decedent apparently in the act of adultery with the wife of the accused, under circumstances such as to induce and justify a reasonable belief on the part of the accused that such a crime was in progress, and there is no proof of actual malice, the offense is manslaughter only, although it subsequently turns out that adultery was not in fact being committed. (Two judges dissenting.)
Where inconsistent directions are given to the jury, and the accused is convicted, it is to be presumed that tbe instructions last given, especially if least favorable to tbe prisoner, were accepted by tbe jury as controlling.
Argued June 14th
decided September 27th, 1901.
Indictment for murder in the first decree, brought to the Superior Court of New Haven County and tried to the jury before Ralph Wheeler, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty of murder in the second degree, and appeal by the accused for alleged errors in the rulings and charge of the court.
Error and new trial granted.
The defendant, upon the trial, introduced evidence, mainly from himself as a witness in his own behalf, that on the day in question he discovered his wife in a piece of woods near his house with a man whom he did not recognize ; that they were partially reclining on the ground, and the man had his arms around her; that thinking the man might be armed he ran home and got his rifle; that he returned, loading it as he ran, and found her in the man’s arms, .lying on her bade, with her clothes up, and the man in a position justifying the belief that they were in the act of adultery; that he rushed upon them through the bushes, and in so doing the rifle was accidentally discharged, killing the man.
The State claimed and offered evidence tending to prove that he had previously made statements materially different, as to the circumstances of the homicide; that the man killed, George Goering, had been on friendly and familiar terms with Yanz, and was well acquainted with Mrs. Yanz; that he had occasionally called upon the defendant at his house; that on this occasion the defendant found him standing in the woods in conversation with Mrs. Yanz, and having got his rifle and loaded it deliberately shot him as he (Goering) was walking away.
Immediately after the homicide Mrs. Yanz, who was greatly excited, was assisted into her house by a neighbor, Mrs. Week, who laid her upon the lounge. This question was put to Mrs. Week on the witness-stand, as a witness for the defense: “ At the time you took Mrs. Yanz in and placed her upon the lounge, did she say anything concerning George Goering? ” Yanz was not then in the house. The defendant claimed that an answer would show that she used an endearing expression in regard to Goering. This question was excluded.
The defendant through his counsel claimed that if the jury should not believe his story that the shooting was accidental or involuntary, then at the very most he could only be convicted of manslaughter.
William C. Case and Jacob P. Goodhart, for the appellant (the accused).
William H. Williams, State’s Attorney, with whom was Alfred W. Wheeler, Assistant State’s Attorney, for the appellee (the State).

Opinion:
Baldwin, J.
There was no error in excluding the question put to Mrs. Week. It called for mere hearsay. The homicide had taken place and Mrs. Yanz had left the scene of the transaction. Her declarations could not have served to characterize any contemporaneous act, and therefore could not be claimed as part of the res gestee. That she could not be compelled herself to take the witness-stand was no cause for their admission.
The trial court in its charge to the jury used this language : " If the accused saw his wife in any such situation as he has described, he had at least a legal right to interfere and separate them, and to carry with him a weapon for defense against any possible attack. And further, if in pushing his way through the bushes, and under the excitement naturally and ordinarily to be expected under the circumstances, the rifle was accidentally discharged, and the man thus met his death, then the homicide was by misadventure, and the verdict should be 'Not guilty.'" "There is one kind of provocation, gentlemen, which is of such a grievous nature that the law concludes it cannot be borne in the first transport of passion. This is where or when a man finds another in the act of adultery with his wife; when, if he kills him in the first transport of passion, thereby aroused, he is only guilty of manslaughter. The law does not hold him altogether guiltless of crime: to kill even in the first transport of passion, when under that highest and strongest provocation, is in law criminal. It is manslaughter, the lowest form of criminal homicide; not murder. The adulterer under our law has a right to live: and the injured husband has no legal right to kill him, even in the first transport of passion aroused by finding him in the act. To have the effect of reducing the homicide from murder to manslaughter, the husband must find the adulterer in the act of adultery. The finding may be by any such observation of the circumstances and of the situation of the guilty parties as justifies the belief that adultery is being committed. Knowledge that the adultery is at the time being committed is sufficient; but if the husband, merely hearing that the adultery had already been accomplished, or merely observing the situation which leads to the belief that adultery has been accomplished, pursues and kills the offender, it will be murder. The witnessing of a passing fact is regarded as having a greater tendency to excite a transport of passion than the mere hearing or the mere belief that it has been accomplished. If, in fact, no adultery was going on, and the husband is mistaken as to the fact, though the circumstances were such as to justify a belief, even, of adultery the offense would not be reduced to manslaughter. The husband must judge at his peril that the jury may find that he was mistaken, and so find him guilty of murder instead of manslaughter."
There are inconsistent expressions in these instructions, but it is to be presumed that those used last were accepted by the jury as • controlling; and they were the least favorable to the accused.
In case, then, they believed so much of the defendant's testimony as described the circumstances in which he found his wife and Goering together, and the effect which they produced and were reasonably calculated to produce upon Ills mind, but disbelieved his statement that the gun was accidentally discharged, the charge gave them to understand that if the act of adultery was not in fact committed, the killing was murder.
The law justifies a jury in calling it but manslaughter when, on finding his wife in the act of adultery, a man, in the first transport of passion, kills her paramour. This is because from a sudden act of this kind, committed under the natural excitement of feeling induced by so gross an outrage, malice, which is a necessary ingredient of the crime of murder, cannot fairly be implied.
The excitement is the effect of a belief, from ocular evidence, of the actual commission of adultery. It is the belief, so reasonably formed, that excites the uncontrollable, passion. Such a belief, though a mistaken one, is calculated to induce the same emotions as would be felt were the wrongful act in fact committed.
The crime of murder in the second degree, under our statute, § 1899, rests upon implied malice. It is not sufficient to establish merely a criminal intent followed by a homicide. Malice is not to be implied if the fatal act was the sudden result of what the law deems either a sufficient provocation or an uncontrollable passion naturally excited by the circumstances of the occasion.' State v. Johnson, 41 Conn. 584, 587, 588. The law deems a husband's passion, excited by surprising his wife in the act of adultery, so far uncontrollable, from the frailly of human nature, that if he kill her paramour on the impulse of the moment, and no actual malice is disclosed, none ought to be implied. He is not justified; but he is not a murderer. The reason of this rule of law being the existence of an uncontrollable passion, naturally induced, it must logically follow that it suffices if such a passion has been naturally induced in the mind of the slayer by the sight of his wife in the embrace of the man whom he killed, and a reasonable belief of her guilt, formed under circumstances such as those to which the accused testified in the present case. If the jury believed this testimony, or so much of it as showed a state of facts which, in their opinion, justified and produced a reasonable belief on the part of the accused that adultery was being committed when the shot was fired, then, there having been no proof of actual malice, although they may also have believed that it was fired intentionally, the natural excitement of passion and want of premeditation make the offense manslaughter. Morris v. Platt, 32 Conn. 75, 83.
There is error, the judgment is set aside, and a new trial is ordered.
In this opinion Torrance and Hall, Js., concurred.