Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. Kennedy D. KIRK
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 2002-11-13
Citations: 833 So. 2d 418
Docket Number: No. 2000-KA-0190
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Kennedy D. KIRK.
Judges: (Court composed of Chief Judge WILLIAM H. BYRNES III, Judge MICHAEL E. KIRBY, Judge TERRI F. LOVE).
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 833
Pages: 418–427

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. Kennedy D. KIRK.
No. 2000-KA-0190.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
Nov. 13, 2002.
Harry F. Connick, District Attorney, Juliet Clark, Assistant District Attorney, New Orleans, LA, for Plaintiff/Appellee.
Sherry Watters, Louisiana Appellate Project, New Orleans, LA, for Defendant/Appellant.
(Court composed of Chief Judge WILLIAM H. BYRNES III, Judge MICHAEL E. KIRBY, Judge TERRI F. LOVE).

Opinion:
ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA
| .MICHAEL E. KIRBY, Judge.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE:
This case comes before us on remand from the Supreme Court of the United States. See, Kennedy D. Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, 122 S.Ct. 2458, 153 L.Ed.2d 599 (2002). In our original opinion we held that the police officers did not need a warrant to enter defendant's apartment because they had obtained sufficient probable cause, through surveillance, to make a warrantless arrest of him. The contraband for which he was prosecuted was recovered from his person, not the apartment, during a search incident to his warrantless arrest. Therefore we did not consider his contention that the officers lacked exigent circumstances to enter his apartment.
The Louisiana Supreme Court denied writs over Chief Justice Calogero's dissent to the effect that there is a fine line at the entrance of the home and, as such, the police need both probable cause to either arrest or search and exigent circumstances. The U.S. Supreme court agreed with Chief Justice Calogero, reversed our judgment that exigent circumstances were not required to justify the ^officers' conduct and remanded the case to us for further proceedings consistent with its decision.
FACTS:
The facts recited below are taken from our original opinion:
Detective John Brunet testified at trial that he and his partner, Detective Derrick Brumfield, went to the 2300 block of Washington Avenue on March 5, 1998, around 5:00 p.m. to observe the apartment in question. At the motion to suppress hearing, the officer testified that they went to the location in response to a citizen complaint. Once there, they saw a person approach the apartment and exchange currency for a small object. They continued watching the apartment and saw a total of four apparent narcotics transactions. Brunet saw the defendant complete a transaction. After the fourth transaction, Brunet ordered that the buyer to "taken down." Detective Steven Gaudet and his partner stopped the man. Because the stop took place within a block of the apartment, Brunet feared that evidence would be destroyed and ordered that the apartment be entered. Upon the officers' entering, the defendant sat on a gun. Another weapon was on a table to the defendant's left. Both defendants were "secured." Officers obtained .a search warrant. After the warrant was obtained, a search of the defendant revealed fifty-eight pieces of crack cocaine and $238.00. The officers seized a cooking tube from the apartment.
EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES:
We start this analysis from the well established proposition that a war-rantless search is presumptively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, unless it falls within a specific exception to the warrant requirement. See Roska v. Peterson, 304 F.3d 982, 989 (C.A.10 (Utah)). According to Roska, supra, exigent circumstances arise when
|3(1) the law enforcement officers . have reasonable grounds to believe that there is immediate need to protect then-lives or others or their property or that of others, (2) the search [is not] motivated by an intent to arrest and seize evidence, and (3) there [is] some reasonable basis, approaching probable cause, to associate an emergency with the area or place to be search.
United States v. Anderson, 981 F.2d 1560, 1567 (10th Cir.1992) (alterations in original). The government bears the burden of proving exigency. United States v. Wicks, 995 F.2d 964, 970 (10th Cir.1993). The government's burden is "Particularly heavy where the police seek to enter a suspect's home." Anderson, 981 F.2d at 1567 (quoting United States v. Maez, 872 F.2d 1444, 1452 (10th Cir.1989).) In evaluating whether exigent circumstances existed. We examine the circumstances "as they would have appeared to prudent, cautious, and trained officers." United States v. Anderson, 154 F.3d 1225, 1233 (10th Cir.1998). This exception is narrow, and must be "jealously and carefully drawn." Id.
The United States Supreme Court has defined exigent circumstances as "a plausible claim of specially pressing or urgent law enforcement need." See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 121 S.Ct. 946, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001).
DISCUSSION:
In applying the above principles to the facts of this case we find there were insufficient exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless entry. The only reason given by the officer in support of the decision to enter the apartment was because the "take down" of the fourth purchases occurred within the same block as the apartment. However, there is no testimony or other evidence in the record from which we can conclude that the occupants of the apartment were aware of the police surveillance or of the "take down" nearby. There is no evidence that anyone else discovered the police presence who could notify the occupants of the surveillance or "take down." There is no evidence that a crowd was gathering as a Rresult of the police activities. In the absence of a showing that the officers possessed specific and articulable facts, together with the rational inferences from those facts, we cannot find that their belief that exigent circumstances existed to enter the apartment without a warrant was a reasonable one. See U.S. v. Wilson, 306 F.3d 231, 238, (5th Cir.(Tex.) 2002). The evidence seized during that warrantless entry, therefore, should have been suppressed.
CONCLUSION:
For the above and foregoing reasons we reverse the defendant's conviction and remand for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
BYRNES, C.J., dissents with reasons.