Case Name: Calicoat v. State; Strickland v. Same
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1922-09
Citations: 131 Miss. 169
Docket Number: No. 22290; No. 22824
Parties: Calicoat v. State. Strickland v. Same.
Judges: I am authorized to say that Judge Anderson concurs in my construction of section 22 of the Constitution of Mississippi of 1890, and that thereunder, Avhen a conviction of manslaughter is reversed, the new trial should be on the original charge in the indictment.-
Reporter: Mississippi Reports
Volume: 131
Pages: 169–200

Head Matter:
Calicoat v. State. Strickland v. Same.
[95 South. 318.
In Banc.
No. 22290; No. 22824.]
1. Criminal Law. To reverse, an error must have been committed in the trial favorable to appellee and prejudicial to appellant.
Before this court will reverse a cause it must be satisfied of two facts, namely, that an error in favor of the appellee was committed in the trial of the cause, and, second, that this error was prejudicial to the rights of the appellant.
.2 Homicide. Unwarranted conviction of manslaughter held harmless error under indictment for murder supported by evidence.
Where a person is slain by the defendant, and the slaying is admitted, but the defense is self-defense, then, on an indictment for murder, and a conviction of-manslaughter, where the testimony would sustain a verdict of guilty- of murder, and where there are no elements of manslaughter involved, it is harmless error, of which the defendant cannot complain, that a jury convicted him of manslaughter.
Cook, J., dissenting in Calicoat case. Ethridge, J., concurring in result in Calicoat case, but dissenting as to Strickland case. Anderson, J., joining in dissent as to Strickland case.
Appeal from circuit court of Lafayette county.
Hon. W. A. Roane, Judge.
Appeal from circuit court of Pearl River county.
Hon. G. Wood Magee, Special Judge.
Callaway Calicoat and Loucinda Strickland were separately indicted for murder and convicted of manslaughter, and each appeals.
Affirmed.
The following is an abstract of the brief referred to in the dissenting opinion of Eti-iridge, J.
EL
In the event that the court below erred in charging the jury on the law of manslaughter, ivas the error in granting the instruction favorable or prejudicial to the defendant? In other words, ivas it harmless?
On the foregoing proposition there are, in Mississippi, two distinct lines of authorities announcing opposite doctrines. The cases holding the granting of a manslaughter instruction in a case where the facts warranted a conviction of murder, and no element of manslaughter is shown by the evidence, to be prejudicial error are: Virgil v. State, 63 Miss. 317; Parker v. State, 102 Miss. 113, 58 So. 978; Rester v. State, 130 Miss. 689, 70 So. 881. The cases holding the contrary rule that such an instruction is harmless error because favorable to the accused are: Rolls v. State, 52 Miss. 391; Lanier v. State, 57 Miss. 102; Powers v. State, 83 Miss. 691, 36 So. 6; Moore v. State, 86 Miss. 160, 38 So. 504; Huston v. State, 105 Miss. 413, 62 So. 421.
The first expression of our court on the subject was in the Rolls ease, supra, 52 Miss. 391, where it was contended that a conviction of manslaughter should be reversed because appellant Avas guilty of murder or nothing. The court’s response to this contention was: “But, if really guilty of murder, it is not quite clear that the plaintiff in error has been prejudiced by the failure of the jury to find him guilty of that crime.” In the case of Lanier v. State the court said that, Avhile the jury Avould have been war ranted in finding tlie accused guilty of the crime charged, that they failed to convict him of the higher offense was no reason why the court should discharge him of the lesser offense of which he had been convicted. The next case where the question arose was that of Virgil v. State, which held that it was reversible error for the court to grant an instruction in that case, but that such an instruction is ordinarily free from objection in trials of murder, because it is favorable to defendant, who may not complain if a more favorable view is taken of his case than the acts justify. The court in this case cited no authorities in support of its holding, and did not attempt to overrule the doctrine previously announced in the Rolls case or in the Lamer case. Then followed the cases of Powers v. State and Moore v. State, holding that a conviction of the lessor of the two crimes would not be set aside because of an instruction incorrect in that it directed a verdict of manslaughter upon the facts which would have warranted a conviction of murder. Then came the case of Parker v. State, 102 Miss. 113, 58 So. 978, where the court, under facts showing that defendant was either guilty of murder or innocent, held that such an instruction was reversible error, the case citing no authorities in support of its holding afid making no mention of prior rulings on the question which were in direct conflict with the doctrine there announced. Then followed the case of Huston v. State, 105 Miss. 413, 62 So. 421, where the court, which was at that time composed of the same personnel as when the case of Parker v. State was decided, in reviewing their decision in the Parker case, expressly overruled it, and likewise all other cases holding to the same effect, and announced the correct rule to be that of the 2Ioore case. The Roster case} 110 Miss. 689, 70 So. 881, is the latest expression of our court on the proposition, and falls within the line of cases illustrated by the Virgil case and which expressly overrules the cases subscribing to the doctrine announced by the Huston case erroneously stating that the ruling in the Huston case was a new and radical departure from the previous holdings of the court the same doctrine having been previously announced in the Rolls case, the Lanier case, the Powers case, the Moore case, and the Virgil case; Parker v. State, 102 Miss. 113, 58 So. 978, being the only case holding to the contrary.
It might be that in some cases such an instruction would be harmful to defendant, but the evil effect of an ironclad rule, making it so in all cases, is apparent. In the case at bar, where the instruction simply told the jury that it might, among other verdicts, bring in one of manslaughter, the self-defense theory being clearly expounded in instructions favorable to appellant, the jury wholly rejected the self-defense theory, and decided that defendant was guilty of an unlawful and felonious homicide. After the jury had gone this far with their deliberations, then it devolved upon them to say whether the “unlawful homicide” was murder or manslaughter. The court said that they might call it manslaughter, and so, tempering justice with mercy, they labeled the unlawful homicide “manslaughter” when the facts showed murder. The error, if any, in granting the manslaughter instruction saved appellant from a conviction of murder, and was therefore favorable to her, and of this she cannot complain.
The general rule laid down in the Huston case, supra, finds support in 17 C. J., p. 359, par 3729, and page 361, par. 3732, and also in 16 C. J., p. 1024, par. 2452.
The following are among authorities from other states which hold that, when accused is convicted of a lesser • crime than the evidence warrants, the verdict will be sustained against the objection that it is a compromise: State v. Hagan, 131 N. C. 802, 42 S. E. 901; State v. Quick, 150 N. C. 820, 64 S. E. 168; State V. Fowler, 151 N. C. 731, 66 S. E. 567; Warren v. State, 6 Okl. Or. 1, 115 Pac. 812; 34 L.- R. A. (N. S. 1121; Johns v.- State, 8 O/cL Or. 585, 129 Pac. 451; Ryan v. Slate, 8 Okl. Or. 623, 129 Pac. 685; Justice v. State, 6 Ga. App. 330, 64 S. E. 1004; State v. Phinney, 13 Idaho, 307, 89 Pac. 634, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 935, 12 Ann. Oas. 1079; Powell v. State, 5 Tex. App. 234; Campbell v. State, 65 Tex. Or. R. 418, 144 S. W. 966; Gatlin v. State, 86 Tex. Or. R. 339, 217 S. W. 698; Price v. State, 82 Ark. 25, 100 S'. W. 74; Sexton v. State, 91 Ark. 589, 121 S. W. 1075; Snow v. State, 140 Ark. 7, 215 S. W. 3; State v. Burns, 263 Mo. 594, 173 S. W. 1070; State v. Mittner, 247 Mo. 577, 153 S. W. 1020; State V. Berkley, 109 Mo. 665, 19 S. W. 192; State v.' Ilaugli, 156 Iowa, 639, 137 N. W. 917; State v. Dimmitt, 184 Iowa, 870, 169 N. W. 137; Bias v. State, 3 Ind. T. 27, 53 S. W. 471; State v. Underwood, 35 Wash. 568, 77 Pac. 863.
Under supreme court rule 11 (72 So. vii) it must affirmatively appear from the record that appellant has been prejudiced before a misdirection of the jury will cause a reversal.
IV and V.
In the event the judgment of the court beloAV should be reversed, should the case be remanded for a neAV trial, or should the appellant be discharged? In the event the cause is remanded, can the appellant be again tiled for the crime of murder?
A discussion of this proposition necessarily brings into revieiv the “former jeopardy” clause of our state Constitution, same being section 22 thereof, and also the rule laid down by our court in the Walker case, 123 Miss. 517, 86 So. 337, and prior decisions of our court holding to the same effect. The rule now in force, as announced in Hester v. State, 110 Miss. 689, 70 So. 881, is that it constitutes reversible error to grant an instruction on manslaughter, Avhere the proof shovvs murder or not guilty. There is also a line of authorities illustrated by the case of Hurt v. Stale, 25 Miss. 378, 59 Am. Dec. 225, which hold that, on a prosecution for murder, a finding by the jury that the accused is guilty of manslaughter, is an “implied” acquittal of the charge of murder. Other cases holding to the same effect are : Morris v. State, 8 Smedes & M. 762; Bolls v. State, 52 Miss. 391; Powers v. State, 83 Miss. 691, 36 So. 6; Walker v. State, 123 Miss. 517, 86 So, 337.
The Constitution of 1890 materially modified the “former jeopardy” clause in previous Constitutions, so that section 22 of the present Constitution is now in the following words:
“Section 22. No person’s life or liberty shall be twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense; but there must be an actual acquittal or conviction on the merits to bar another prosecution.”
Among the cases holding that, where accused is charged with murder and convicted of manslaughter, and his case is reversed on his appeal, he cannot again be put on trial for the greater offense, is that of Morris v. State, 8 Smedes & M. 762, which was decided in 1847. The court there held that a verdict of guilty on one count was tantamount to an acquittal on the other counts in the indictment, but at that time the Constitution of 1832 was in force, and the former jeopardy clause was not mentioned in the opinion. Also, each count in the indictment was for a separate offense, and not for different grades or degrees of the same offense. The Rolls case, 52 Miss 391, cites no authorities and gives no reasons and the portion of the opinion dealing with this part is mere dictum. The Powers case was decided in 1903, when the Constitution of 1890 was in effect, but apparently the court’s attention was not called to the material change of the former jeopardy clause after the decision of the Rolls case there relied on. The case of Walker v. State, 123 Miss. 517, 86 So. 337, makes no mention of the material change in the former jeopardy clause by the Constitution of 1890, and was apparently decided upon the idea that our Constitution in this respect was then as it stood in 1869 and prior Constitutions'.
If it be conceded for the sake of argument that the Hurt case, 25 Miss. 378, 59 Am. Dec. 225, and the Rolls case, 52 Miss. 591, is good law under the Constitutions of 1832 and 1869 respectively, we must admit that the Powers case, 83 Miss. 691, 36 So. 6, and the Walker case, 123 Miss. 517, 86 So. 337, which plant themselves upon the Rolls case and the Hurt case, must fall in view of the explicit provisions of section 22 of the present Constitution, which provides that there must he an actual conviction or acquittal to bar another prosecution. The people by this express injunction, said that nothing less than an actual acquittal could bar another prosecution, and they have fixed as a condition precedent what must exist before former jeopardy will operate as a bar. It is their Constitution, their bill of rights, and they have fixed this condition and attached it to the Constitution of 1890, apparently because of the construction placed on the former jeopardy clauses of previous Constitutions. If this is not the reason, then why the amendment, and why the use of the word “actual” preceding the words “acquittal and conviction?”
To hold that other than an actual acquittal or conviction Avould bar another prosecution would be to hold the amendment a nullity so far as the word “actual”.is concerned. The Powers case and the Walker case are condemned by section 22 of the Constitution, being contrary to the express provisions thereof, and therefore should be overruled.
The soundness of the rule under discussion was seriously questioned in the case,of Parker v. State, 102 Miss. 118, 58 So. 978.
It might be argued that the purpose of the amendment was to correct the evil flowing from the decision of the Teat case, 53 Miss. 349, 24 Am. Eep. 708, where it was decided that the accused had been placed in jeopardy when the trial had fairly been entered upon, and other cases which allowed the accused to escape a just punishment through technicalities. While this may be true, it is evident that the framers of the amendment were also seeking to remedy the anomalous situation then resulting from the holding in the Hurt case. If not, then why the word “actual?” Because all other conceivable causes would have been remedied if the amendment had only read, “but there must be a conviction or acquittal to bar another prosecution.” If this was the only remedy sought to be made, then the word “actual” preceding the words “conviction and acquittal” would not have been needed. It is evident that, since the Hurt case had held that an implied acquittal of murder was a complete bar to a subsequent prosecution of murder, the word “actual” ivas employed to correct this very situation.
Aside from the fact that the Constitution provides that there must be an “actual” acquittal or conviction, the leading authorities seem to reject the Mississippi rule, although the cases are by no means in harmony. Among the texts on criminal laAv which state an opposite rule to that adopted by our court are: Watson on the Constitution (4th Ed), vol. 2, p. 1442; Story on the Constitution (4th Ed.), vol. 2, par. 1787; 8 E. .0. L., p. 161, par. 158 on Criminal Law; 12 C. J., p. 1204, par. 937, on Constitutional Law; 16 O. J., p. 261, par. 436, where a discussion of both rules is found.
Among the cases holding that, if the defendant appeals from a conviction of the lower crime, he thereby Avaives the implied acquittal on the higher crime, and that if reversed his position is as if no trial had been had, are: Trono v. U. S., 199 U. S'. 521, 26 Sup. Ct. 121, 50 L. Ed. 292, 4 Ann. Cas. 773; U. 8. v. Gonzales (D. C.), 206 Fed. 239; Brantley v. State, 132 Ga. 573, 64 S. E. 676, 22 L. E. A. (N. S.) 959, 131 Am. St. Eep. 218, 16 Ann. Cas. 1203; Id., 217 U. S. 284, 30 Sup. Ct. 514, 54 L. Ed. 768; Perdue v. State, 134 Ga. 300, 67 S. E. 810; State v. Matthews, 142 N. C. 621, 58 S. E. 342, Avhich expressly overrules former holdings and follows Trono v. U. 8., supra; State v. Billings, 140'Mo. 193, 41 S. W. 778; State v. Ash, 68 Wash. 194, 122 Pac. 995, 39 L. E. A. (N. S.) 611; State v. Bradley, 67 Vt. 465, 32 Atl. 238; Briggs v. Commonwealth, 82 Va. 554; Bohanan v. State, 18 Neb. 57, 24 N. W. 390, 53 Am. Eep. 791; State v. Behimer, 20 Ohio St. 572; 4 Ann. Cas. 773; 14 Am. Eep. 752; Gibson v. Somers, 31 Nev. 531, 103 Pac. 1073, 24 L. E. A. (N. S.) 504, 135 Am. St. Eep. 700; State v. Morrison, 67 Kan. 144, 72 Pac. 554; Young V. People, 54 Colo. 298, 130 Pac. 1011; State v. Gillis, 73 S. O. 318, 53 S. E. 487, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 571, 114 Am. St. Rep. 95, 6 Ann. Cas. 993; Veatch v. State, 60 Ind. 291; State v. Kessler, 15 Utah, 142, 49 Pac. 293, 62 Am. St. Rep. 911; Turner v. Territory, 15 Okl. 557, 82 Pac. 650; People v. Palmer, 109 N. Y. 413, 17 N. E. 213, 4 Am. St. Rep. 477; State v. Arnold, 83 Ky. 1, 4 Am. St. Rep. 114.
The Kurt case, supra, cannot stand for these reasons: First, because of the express prohibition of section 22 of our Constitution, requiring an “actual” acquittal to bar another prosecution. Second, because the judgment of conviction of manslaughter is an entirely and inseparable, and if reversed the “implied” acquittal goes with it, there being nothing left upon .which it can stand. Third, appellant waives the constitutional guaranty against “former jeopardy” in electing to appeal from the conviction of manslaughter, and thereby forfeits any or whatever rights he may have in the “implied” acquittal of murder.
Parker & Shivers, for appellant.
Appellant relied in her former brief, on Mississippi cases, i. e. Rester v. State, 70 So. 881; Walker v. State, S6 So. 337; Richardson v. State, 85 So. 186. To these authorities in support of appellant’s contention we wish to add the further authority: Stovall v. State, 94 Miss. 373, 47 So. 479. This case, we think strikingly similar to the case at bar, and one which will sustain appellant’s contention conclusively.
Further reference to the bare question as to whether the court committed error in charging the jury on manslaughter; we wish to call attention to the fact that there is no diversity of opinion or authority on the question, that where there is no evidence of manslaughter it is error on the part of the court to give an instruction on manslaughter. And while we have two lines of authorities in Mississippi, and in practically every other state, on the question of whether such error is or is not harmless, there is no difference in our authorities or the text laws that the granting of • such instruction is error. The authorities cited on the question treated in this brief, both for and against, go entirely to the question of whether the error is harmful, 'or harmless, and none undertake to hold that it is not error, to give the instruction.
Second, in the event the foregoing question should be answered in the affirmative, was the error in granting the instruction favorable or prejudicial to the defendant? In other words was it harmless? When we come to deal with the above question as suggested by the court, in its request for additional briefs, we find that we are brought to consider rule 11 of the court, and the line of cases illustrated by: Iluston v. State, 105 Miss. 413, 62 So. 422; Rosier v. State, 110 Miss. 689, 70 S'o. 881.
The line of authorities in Mississippi holding that the granting of a manslaughter instruction on a trial for murder is prejudicial to the defendant, we find in the following authorities: Virgil v. State, 63 Miss. 317; Johnson v. State, 78 Miss. 627, 29 So. 515; Stovall v. State, 94 Miss. 373, 47 So. 479; Hannah v. State, 80 Miss. 375, 39 So. 855; Parker v. State, 102 Miss. 113, 48 So. 928; Rester v. State, 110 Miss. 689, 70 So. 881; Richardson v. State, 85 So. 186; Walker v. State, 86 So. 337.
The line of authorities in Mississippi tending to hold the contrary to the above rule appears in the following cases, or it is claimed by the state that they hold the contrary: Rolls v. State, 52 Miss. 391; Lanier v. State, 57 Miss. 102;' Powers v. State, 83 Miss. 691, 30 So. 6; Moore v. State, 86 Miss. 160, 38 So. 504; Iluston v. State, 105 Miss. 413, 62 So. 421. The appellant later in this brief proposes to show that the learned attorney general is in error in his brief, when he takes the position that all of the above cases sustain the contrary rule advocated by him in his brief.
The question which the court is now interested in is, which of the above lines of authority this state should plant itself upon, as we gather from its statement, that it will be called upon to' determine whether the Eester case should be overruled or modified.
We have been favored with the able brief of the attorney general submitted in this case; we have read same with a great deal of interest, as well as admiration. We recognize the. ability, of the learned attorney-general to find and present authorities supporting the line of Mississippi decisions, claimed by him as announced, that such an instruction is not prejudicial to a defendant following the announcement of the case of Huston v. State, supra.
In answering this brief, so far as the question of authority is concerned, we could cite authorities without number from equally as many states upholding the rule that such an instruction is prejudicial. This' is conceded by textwriters and courts, including our court. A fair example of this will be found from the fact that in the able brief of the attorney-general, page 18, we find that he cites as supporting the rule that such an instruction is not prejudicial. Powell v. State, 5 Tex. Cr. App. 334; Campbell V. State, 65 Tex. Cr. App. 418, 144 S. W. 696; Gatlin v. State, (Tex.), 217 S. W. 698. Wherein the case of Hester v. The State, we find cited by the learned Judge Stevens in his able opinion, the case of Flynn v. State, 43 Tex. Cr. Eep. 407, 66 S. W. 551. Also on the same page of attorney-general’s brief, we find cited: Justice v. State, 6 Ga. Ápp. —, 64 S. E. 1004. While one of the leading-cases relied on by Judge Stevens in support of the decision in the Eester case is: Bates v. State, 4 Ga. App. 486, 61 S'. E. 88.
Judge Stevens in his opinion says that it is based on the well-reasoned cases of the Georgia court, and he further makes the observation: “Our court is not alone in the holding announced in Parker v. State, supra, and along a line of Avell-reasoned cases decided by our court prior to the Parker case, supraP From a close study of the rulings of the various courts on the question, whether the granting of a manslaughter instruction to the state in a murder case, where there is no evidence to support same is prejudicial to the defendant, it will he found that there is not only a diversity of opinion between the rules of the different states, but that there is a diversity of the holdings within each state, as is-above shown from the Georgia and Texas courts, as well as that of Mississippi, and it is conceded by textwriters, and courts that there is a diversity of authority on the question.
We submit that while it is conceded that the authorities are divided on this subject, a citation of the authorities either for or against, will not be of special benefit to the court, since the authorities of different states would most likely be based on the rules of procedure, the constitution and statutes of the respective states; that the matter the court will be most interested in would be the reason supporting the line of authority which this court should adopt, and follow.
G. E. Dorroh, and B. O. Enochs, Assistants Attorney-General, for the state.
The appellant is guilty of the crime of murder, or he is innocent of any crime. That being true, it was-error for the trial court to grant an instruction that the jury might convict him of manslaughter, if the jury believed from the evidence the facts necessary to constitute that crime, there being no evidence from which to believe such facts. We do not understand that any court holds such an instruction proper in such case.
Now, as to whether such error on the part of a trial court is favorable or prejudicial to the accused; some courts say it is favorable, others, that it is prejudicial. This court, in Huston’s case, 102 Miss. 113, said it was favorable, but in Parker’s case, 58 So. 978, that it was prejudicial. The Huston case overruled the Parker case, but later this court, in Roster’s case, 110 Miss. 689, overruled the Huston case, and restored and reaffirmed the announcement of the law in the Parker case.
The courts of last resort of the other states are not in accord with each other, whether the instruction in such case, is harmful or harmless. In Powell v. State, 5 Tex. Ct. App. 234, wherein Powell, who was convicted of manslaughter on evidence that warranted his conviction of murder only, complained of the granting of a manslaughter instruction the court -said: “This court has never held, and the learned counsel for appellant have cited no case where it has been decided, that a judgment should be reversed because the court gave the defendant the benefit of a charge on a less offense than the evidence showed he was guilty of.”
Another Texas case, on the subject is that of Chambers v. State} 86 S. W. 752, wherein the appellant was convicted of manslaughter on evidence warranting a conviction of murder only and complained that the trial court erred in granting a manslaughter instruction. The court in that case said: “Appellant insists that the court should have told the jury, under said facts, defendant would be guilty of murder and not manslaughter. Perhaps this is correct, but appellant cannot complain of it, because it is more favorable to him than the facts authorized.” Other cases holding a manslaughter instruction in such case to be harmless, are State v. Quick, (N. C.), 64 S. E. 168; Barbee v. State, (Tex.), 124 S. W. 961; People v. Roselle, (Cal.), 129 Pac. 477; and State v. Quinn (Wash.), 105 Pac. 819.
The supreme court of Ohio views this matter differently from the above court, and in Dresback v. State, 38 Oh. St. Eep. 365, 369, said: If the jury found him guilty, it was their duty to find him guilty of murder in the first degree; but if the charge was not proved, he was entitled to an acquittal.” The court, however, instructed the jury that they might, consistently with their duty, find him guilty of murder in the second degree or manslaughter. . . .
It is claimed, that the accused was not prejudiced by the erroneous charge. We have all the evidence before us, and cannot say so. The evidence was wholly circum stantial, and we are unable to say the jury might not have acquitted him had they been properly instructed.
And the supreme court of Missouri, in State v. Punshon, 124 Mo. 448, 27 S. W. Ill in a similar case said: “Another contention is that the court erred in instructing the jury on manslaughter in the first degree. That there was no evidence whatever upon which to predicate such an instruction is admitted by the attorney general in his printed brief, but he argues that of this defendant cannot complain because we presume, of his conviction of a less offense than that for which he was indicted and put upon trial. We do not understand this to be the law. While, by statute, it is made the duty of the court to instruct upon every phase of the case warranted by the evidence it is not its duty to instruct upon any grade of offense, not authorized by the evidence, and it is error to do so. State v. Allen, 116 Mo. 548; State v. Herrell, 97 Mo. 105; State v. Wilson, 88 Mo. 13; State v. Turlington, 102 Mo. 642. In State v. Starr, 38 Mo. 272, it is said: “It is the duty of the court to instruct the jury with reference to the testimony in the case, and where the evidence all tends to prove an offense, it is wrong to mislead the jury by giving instruction in relation to a different one.” The instruction only had a tendency to mislead the jury, which it is evident from the facts in this case, as disclosed by the record, it did so. Defendant was either guilty of murder in the first degree, or not guilty of any offense at all, and the instructions should have been confined to that offense.
We do not understand that the courts that permit a verdict of manslaughter to stand when the evidence only warranted a conviction of murder, hold that the verdict is responsive to the issue being tried, but only let it stand on the ground that the defendant could have been convicted of murder, and was mercifully let off by the jury at manslaughter. It is by that process of reasoning that they reach the conclusion that the manslaughter instruction is harmless. The reasoning in the Huston case, supra, is a fair sample of the reasoning in such cases.
The Georgia court of appeals, in Watts v. State, 3 Ga. App. 606, has condemned such a verdict as in the case at bar in no uncertain terms. And the supreme court of Wisconsin in Pliemling v. State, 46 Wis. 516, 523, has paid its respect to juries that render verdicts for lesser offenses on evidence warranting conviction of higher offenses only, and stated the duty of courts in respect to such verdicts. The State v. Hammond, supra, and The State v. Erickson, 45 Wis. 86.
The states of Florida and Texas, the latter in recent years, now have statutes providing that persons convicted of lesser constituent offenses under indictments for higher offenses, cannot be awarded new trial for want of evidence, if the evidence warranted a conviction of the higher. McCoy v. State (Fla), 224 So. 285; Crowder v. State (Tex.), 180 S. W. 706. But Mississippi has no such statute. Whether such statute would be constitutional it is not necessary to decide, since we have no such statute. Mississippi has a statute, to-wit, section 1499, Code 1906, which provides that on an indictment for any offense, the jury may find the defendant guilty o£ the offense as charged, or may find him guilty of an inferior offense, or other offense, the commission of which is necessarily included in the offense with which he was charged in the indictment. But we do not understand that this statute permits a conviction, without evidence to sustain the particular- offense of which one may be convicted. We do not think the statute attempts to authorize a conviction on the indictment alone, but only on evidence providing every element necessary to constitute the particular crime of which the jury may convict.
A conviction of murder, on an indictment for murder, when the evidence only warranted a conviction of manslaughter, will be reversed by a court of last resort in any jurisdiction. And a conviction of manslaughter, on an indictment for manslaughter, when the evidence only warranted a conviction of murder, will be reversed by a court of last resort in any jurisdiction. But a conviction of manslaughter, on an indictment for murder, when the evidence only warranted a conviction of murder, will not be reversed by the court of last resort in all jurisdictions.
It is hard to conceive how the same learned judge who wrote the opinion in the Parker ease, 58 So. 978, could have written the opinion in the Huston case. The two opinions, in our opinion, set forth the reason for and against the rule here discussed better than in any other cases that we have been able to find. If the Huston case had had an error in it other than the manslaughter instruction, as was the case in the first Powers case, 74 Miss. 777, on a new trial, it would have presented a similar case to the second Powers case, 83 Miss. 691.
The rule in the Huston case cannot be sustained by logical reasoning. In our opinion, the announcement of such a rule of law, certainly in our own state, is the result of an effort, consciously or unconsciously, to avoid the palpably unjust consequences of an erroneous, though not recognized as such construction of the once in jeopardy clause of the state constitution.
We come now to the real cause of all the trouble, to-wit, the erroneous construction of the once in jeopardy clause of the Constitution. This constitutional guarantee that our lives or liberty shall not be twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense, is a very sacred right vouchsafed to us by the Constitution to be sacredly preserved to us by our judges sitting in our courts of justice. It is no less sacred, and no less sacredly to be guarded and preserved, than the right of trial by jury, which cost our ancestors so much blood and treasure. But this court, we respectfully submit, has misconstrued this guarantee, in our humble opinion. It would seem to us to be evident that a construction of this guarantee, the consequence of which is the discharge of the appellant in the case at bar, as in the Walker case, supra, of the avoidance of which necessitates such decisions as in the Powers and Huston cases, must be wrong. Under the present construction by this court of this guarantee, the law in reference to cases such as the one at bar, may be stated at this time to be: That a defendant, tried on a valid indictment for a specific offense, in a court of competent jurisdiction, and convicted of a lesser constituent offense, is forever acquitted of the higher offense, notwithstanding the judgment of conviction of the lesser offense is reversed on appeal by the defendant, and that too, notwithstanding the reversal is for want of evidence to.sustain the conviction of the lesser offense, although the evidence warranted a conviction of a higher offense. Of course, if this is the law, the conviction in the case at bar must be reversed, and the appellant must be discharged.
But in our humble personal opinion, unsupported by a single authority on earth, so far as we can discover, the true announcement of the law, which safeguards to the accused his constitutional guarantee against being placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense, as Avell as safeguards him against punishment for that of Avhich he is innocent, and at the same time protects the public against crime by punishment of criminals, may be stated as folIoaa’S : That a defendant, tried on a ATalid indictment for a specific offense, in a court of competent jurisdiction, and convicted of a lesser constituent ■ offense, is forever acquitted of the higher offense, notwithstanding the judgment of coirviction of the lesser offense is reversed on an appeal by the defendant, if the evidence warranted the conviction of the lesser offense, but the conviction thereof was reversed for errors attending the trial. Of course, if this is the laAV, the conviction in the case at bar must be reversed, and the cause remanded for the appellant to be again tried upon the indictment, as if there had been no previous trial.
It is generally conceded, that the defendant waives his constitutional guarantee against tAvice being placed in jeopardy for the same offense, as to the particular offense of which he was convicted, when he obtains a neAV trial, whether by motion in the court, in which he was convicted, or by appeal to a higher court; otherAvise he could not be tried again at all. “If so,” says tlie Georgia supreme court in Brantley v. State, 132 Ga. 573, 64 S.. E. 676, 22 L. B. A. (N. S.) 959, “Then whether the waiver merely has the effect of allowing a new trial as to the lesser offense, or on the indictment, as if there had been no previous trial, is a matter of degree and of construction of the extent of the waiver which the law declares the accused makes in asking for a new trial.
Now, the courts of last resort that have passed upon this question are in hopeless conflict as to the extent of this waiver by the defendant of his constitutional guarantee, when he secures, by motion or appeal, the setting aside of his conviction of- a lesser constituent offense than that charged in the indictment. The rock upon which they split, is, whether the judgment is an entirety or not. Those courts that have reached the conclusion that the judgment is an entirety, of course, have decided that the Avaiver is coextensive Avith the judgment, and that the defendant can be tried again on the indictment, as if there had been no previous trial. And those courts that have reached the conclusion that the judgment is not an entirety, have decided that the waiver is not co-extensive Avith the judgment, but is limited to the judgment of conviction only.
Before proceeding further, we desire to say, in' so far as they are involved in the case at bar, that the Hurt case, 25 Miss. 387 is right; the Parker Case, 102 Miss. 113 right in part and AArrong in part; the Huston case, 105 Miss. 413, altogether wrong; the Pester case, 110, Miss. 689, right and the Walker case, 123 Miss. 517, right in part and wrong in part.

Opinion:
Sykes, P. J.,
delivered the opinion of the court.
Opinion in No. 22290, Calicoat v. State.
The appellant (defendant in the circuit court) was indicted for murder, convicted of manslaughter, and by the court sentenced to a term of five years in the penitentiary; from which judgment this appeal is prosecuted.
At the request of the district attorney a manslaughter instruction was given for the state. The appellant shot and killed the deceased with a pistol. He admitted the shooting, but claimed he did it in self-defense. There was no testimony whatever of an altercation between the appellant and the deceased prior to the shooting. No hot words or insulting epithets passed between them. Under the testimony it was either a case of murder or justifiable homicide, committed in self-defense. . Presumably acting upon the instruction given for the state, the jury returned a verdict of manslaughter. The principal assignment of error, and in fact the only one which merits any consideration, is whether or not the giving of the manslaughter instruction constituted reversible error.
Under the decision of this court in the case of Rester v. State, 110 Miss. 689, 70 So. 881, and other cases which follow that one, this contention of the appellant is well taken. In this case, however, the court has considered the advisability of overruling the Rester case, and returning to the principles announced in the case of Huston v. State, 105 Miss. 413, 62 So. 421.
Since the Rester case was decided this court in following it has sometimes reversed and l'emanded cases, where, under the testimony, the defendant was guilty of murder or nothing, and where there was no element of manslaughter shown by the testimony. In a number of these cases which were remanded it became the duty of the circuit court to discharge the defendants because of lack of evidence upon which to base a verdict of manslaughter. In several instances this court here has discharged a defendant when it Avas satisfied that the state could not make out a case of manslaughter. The practical effect of the decision in the Rester case has certainly in some instances resulted in guilty parties going unwhipped of justice. This result has had great weight Avith the court in its conclusion to overrule the Rester case and return to the doctrine announced in the Huston case. There is authority in Mississippi to sustain the holdings of the court in each of these cases. The Rester case is in line with the Parker case, 102 Miss. 113, 58 So. 978, and Johnson case, 78 Miss. 627, 29 So. 515. The principles enunciated in the Huston case are supported by the Rolls case, 52 Miss. 391, Powers case, 83 Miss, 691, 36 So. 6, and Moores case, 86 Miss, 160, 38 So. 504. Each of these cases is also sustained by authority from without the state. However, the weight of authority seems to favor the decision in the Huston case.
The question here presented for our determination, and which we decide, is this: Where a person is slain by another, and the slaying is admitted by the defendant, whose plea is self-defense, then, on an indictment for murder, and a conviction of manslaughter, where the testimony would sustain a verdict of guilty of murder, and where there are no elements of manslaughter involved, it is harmless error, of which the defendant cannot complain, that a jury saw fit to find him guilty of manslaughter instead of murder. Or, stated briefly in a different way, where the killing is admitted, and only the nature and quality of the act are to be determined, a manslaughter instruction under the above circumstances is harmless error. Before this court will reverse a cause it must be satisfied of two facts, namely, that an error in favor of the appellee was committed in the trial of the cause by the court below, and, second, that this error was prejudicial to the rights of the appellant. Jones v. State, 104 Miss. 871, 61 So. 979; rule 11 of this court (72 So. vii).
The verdict of the jury in this case found that the appellant was guilty of an unlawful homicide. By this verdict they rejected in whole the testimony of the appellant that he shot- in self-defense. The mistake of the jury was in finding that the killing was done in the heat of passion, instead of with malice aforethought; for which mistake of the jury the appellant is now under sentence to serve a term of five years in the penitentiary, whereas, if this mistake had not been made, he would either have been hanged or sent to the penitentiary for life. Under the Huston case this error was certainly not prejudicial to this ap pellant. Without approving the facts upon which the opinion in the Huston case rests, we adopt this portion of the Huston case as correctly stating the rule which we shall follow in this case.
"We proceed now to analyze the verdict. The essential and potent fact is that the jury believed, and so said by their verdict, that the defendant was guilty of an unlawful and felonious homicide. To reach this conclusion, the jury necessarily and entirely rejected the evidence given on behalf of defendant. This is true, because if they had any reasonable doubt about -the truthfulness of any, or all, of this evidence, it was the duty of the jury to say not guilty. But the jury, by its verdict, said guilty, and ignorantly named the crime manslaughter. First, defendant was found guilty; second, the jury say he was guilty of manslaughter. If guilty, he should be punished for murder. That he was guilty was the solemn finding of the jury; but the jury went further, and said that he was guilty of the lesser crime, and it is of this that appellant complains.
"It seems to us that this complaint overlooks, or ignores, the fact that the jury rejected all of defendant's testimony, and pronounced him guilty, and that the jury could not have reached this verdict, unless they did reject the defendant's theory, and unless they did adopt and believe the state's theory of the facts. It is a fact that the jury, for some reason satisfactory to them, thought defendant was not guilty of the higher crime, which error of the jury resulted in a five-year sentence instead of a life sentence. So it seems, in the last analysis, the complaint is that the verdict, to satisfy the law, should have been for murder, and that defendant, by the verdict rendered, was deprived of his legal right to spend the balance of his days in the penitentiary.
"Technically the contention of defendant may be flawless; but practically we think it is without substance or merit. Logically the defendant is not complaining of any injury to himself, but insists that the law has been per verted in his interest, and to this he cannot give his consent. Upon an indictment charging- murder, the person charged may be legally convicted of manslaughter, provided there is evidence justifying the belief that the defendant is guilty of the lesser crime. This is admitted; but it is contended that there was no evidence even tending to prove manslaughter. The reply is that there was abundant evidence to prove murder . . . and we are unable to see how he can complain of the instruction on manslaughter, or of the verdict of the jury."
This opinion is in no wise conflicting with the opinion of the court in the case of Virgil v. State, 63 Miss. 317. In the Virgil case the indictment was for the murder of an infant by burning a house (arson). The sole issue in that case was the identity of the guilty party. The Virgil case in no wise attempted to modify or overrule the Rolls case, 52 Miss. 391, which is in accord with this opinion.
Since our views lead to an affirmance of the case, we ave not here presented with other questions argued by counsel at the request of the court in case it should be reversed and remanded.
Affirmed.
Opinion in No. 22821, Strickland v. State.
Sykes, P. J.,
delivered the opinion of the court.
The same questions are presented by this record as in that of Callaway Calicoat v. State, this day decided by us. For the reasons given in the Callaway Calicoat case, this case will be affirmed.
Affirmed.