Case Name: Jason VICKS; Mekeisha Vicks, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC; John Does 1-5, Defendants-Appellees
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2017-11-27
Citations: 704 F. App'x 241
Docket Number: No. 17-1786
Parties: Jason VICKS; Mekeisha Vicks, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC; John Does 1-5, Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: Before WILKINSON, DUNCAN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 704
Pages: 241–242

Head Matter:
Jason VICKS; Mekeisha Vicks, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC; John Does 1-5, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 17-1786
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Submitted: November 20, 2017
Decided: November 27, 2017
Jason and Mekeisha Vicks, Appellants Pro Se. Dennis Kyle Deak, TROUTMAN SANDERS, LLP, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees.
Before WILKINSON, DUNCAN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Appellants Jason and Mekeisha Vicks appeal the district court's order dismissing the remainder of their civil complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). We review the district court's Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal de novo. Mason v. Mach. Zone, Inc., 851 F.3d 315, 319 (4th Cir. 2017).
Our review of the record reveals no reversible error. First, the district court properly concluded that Appellants' claims are barred by collateral estoppel. See State v. Summers, 351 N.C. 620, 528 S.E.2d 17, 20 (2000) (describing doctrine); Thomas M. McInnis & Assocs., Inc. v. Hall, 318 N.C. 421, 349 S.E.2d 552, 557 (1986) (same); Funderburk v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 241 N.C.App. 415, 775 S.E.2d 1, 6-7 (2015) (applying doctrine to foreclosure context); see also Sartin v. Macik, 535 F.3d 284, 288 (4th Cir. 2008) (discussing privily). Further, even assuming, without deciding, that In re Lucks, 369 N.C. 222, 794 S.E.2d 501 (2016), could impact this holding, we conclude Appellants' claims remain subject to dismissal as impermissible collateral attacks on the May 2011 order of the Union County Superior Court Clerk authorizing foreclosure on Appellants' property, as well as the subsequent state appellate court decisions addressing that order. See Howse v. Bank of Am., N.A., 804 S.E.2d 552, 555-57 (2017) (addressing collateral attacks in foreclosure context); Clayton v. N.C. State Bar, 168 N.C.App. 717, 608 S.E.2d 821, 822 (2005) (describing doctrine). Finally, insofar as Appellants raise claims premised on their contention that their mortgage debt was extinguished in 2013, we conclude that those claims patently fail to state a claim for relief. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (stating standard); Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 166 (4th Cir. 2016) ("[I]f a plaintiff attaches documents and relies upon the documents to form the basis for a claim or part of a claim, dismissal is appropriate if the document negates the claim." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court's judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
We previously affirmed the dismissal of Appellants' complaint in part but vacated in part and remanded for further proceedings on Appellants' remaining claims. Vicks v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 676 Fed.Appx. 167, 169 (4th Cir. 2017).