Case Name: Shepherd Pickett and Wife v. Austin F. Peay
Court: Constitutional Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1815-11
Citations: 3 Brev. 545
Docket Number: 
Parties: Shepherd Pickett and Wife v. Austin F. Peay.
Judges: Bay, and Grimke, Js., concurred.
Reporter: South Carolina Law Reports
Volume: 5
Pages: 545–547

Head Matter:
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, COLUMBIA,
NOV., 1815.
Shepherd Pickett and Wife v. Austin F. Peay.
Dower cannot be barred by the provisions of a will, unless such provision be given expressly in lieu of it, and accepted by the widow.
Dower. Plea. The husband was not seized .upon the trial of the cause, and the defendant produced a copy of the will of Reuben Stark, the former husband of Mrs. Pickett, under whose seizin the plaintiffs claim, and contended, from the ample provision made for Mrs. Pickett, in the will of her former husband, that the jury had power of considering such provision as intended by the husband in lieu of dower, although not so expressed in the will. Of this opinion was the court, and so directed the jury ; and thereupon a verdict was found for the defendant. The will did not say in lieu of dower, nor did it contain any words of like import. The plaintiffs moved for a new trial, on the ground, that the verdict was contrary to law. The claim of dower being a common law right, of which the widow cannot be deprived by any provision made for her in the will of her husband, unless the same be expressed to be in lieu of dower.
Egan, for the motion. Clifton, contra.

Opinion:
,Colcock, J.
Dower is a legal estate, which cannot be barred by any collateral provision, except by jointure before marriage, according to the statute of Henry. It was urged, that ample provision made for the widow, was conclusive evidence that the testator intended it to be in bar of dower. Now, it appears to me, that this would be most vague and uncertain evidence of such an intention, because it would depend upon the opinion of the judge or jury, what was ample provision. One devises lands to his wife, and dies. She marries again, and brings dower, and this devise is pleaded in bar of dower, and it was held no bar. First, because the will imports a consideration in itself, and cannot be averred to be a bar of dower, without it be so expressed; and, secondly, because a wife's right of dower cannot be barred by collateral recompense. 2 Bac. Title Dower, letter H. And in a note, " If lands, money, goods, &c., are devised to a woman, without saying in lieu or bar of dower, yet the wife shall have both, because a devise implies a consideration ; and this has often been adjudged in chancery." 2 Chan. Cases, 24. 2 Vernon, 365. Ab. Ca. in Eq. 218, 219. Wood's Inst. 125. 1 Dall. 415. So firmly is this doctrine established, that, even words of similar import to those generally used " in lieu or bar of dower," were not held to be a bar. 1 Johns. Rep. p. 307. I am, therefore, in favor of the motion.
Bay, and Grimke, Js., concurred.
Smith, J.
The claim of dower is a common law right, of which the widow cannot be deprived by her husband, unless he makes a suitable provision for her in his last will and testament; and expresses that it is in lieu of dower. Or where the words of the provision are so strong, that they can admit of no other construetion. There a Court of Equity would interpose. But in the present case, the will has made no such express, or implied provision. And, therefore, I am for a new trial.
Bieevard, J.
The jury were not legally authorised to expound the will in question, upon the presumption that the devise to the testator's wife, was intended to be in lieu and bar of dower; no such intention being expressed in the will.
In the construction of wills, Courts of Equity have sometimes implied an intention to exclude the claim of dower; but only in cases where the intention appears evident from the whole scope and operation of the will, where the claim of dower would be inconsistent with, or in contradiction to the will. In such cases, the widow must make her election ; and chiefly because it is impracticable for her to take both under the will, and her dower at common law.
In this case there is no difficulty or inconsistency to prevent the widow from taking both, even if it should be conceded that a court of law is at' liberty to collect from the whole will an intention to bar dower, where none such is expressed. Dower is a claim highly favored in law; and a dévise imports a consideration, founded on a principle of benevolence.
The conjecture may be true, that the testator did not recollect when he published his will, that his -wife might claim her dower, as well as the provision made for her by the will; otherwise, he would have qualified his bounty, or guarded against the claim of dower; but no court of justice can be warranted in deciding on such a presumption. The testator had a right to give to her what he has devised to her, without interfering with her common law claim of dower; and he has not expressed a contrary intention. See 2 Ves. Jr. 578. 1 Dall. 415. Kennedy v. Nedraw, et al., 1 Binn. 565. Webb and Wife v. Evans, 1 Johns. 307, and the authorities therein cited. I am, therefore, of opinion, that the motion ought to succeed.