Case Name: Dale DAVIDSON, Appellee, v. Jeanette VAN LENGEN, Appellant
Court: Iowa Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Iowa
Decision Date: 1978-05-17
Citations: 266 N.W.2d 436
Docket Number: No. 60120
Parties: Dale DAVIDSON, Appellee, v. Jeanette VAN LENGEN, Appellant.
Judges: MASON, RAWLINGS, LeGRAND and REES, JJ., concur.
Reporter: North Western Reporter 2d
Volume: 266
Pages: 436–444

Head Matter:
Dale DAVIDSON, Appellee, v. Jeanette VAN LENGEN, Appellant.
No. 60120.
Supreme Court of Iowa.
May 17, 1978.
K. L. Kober, of Pickett & Kober, Waterloo, for appellant.
James W. Coddington, of Coddington & Kemming, of Waverly, for appellee.

Opinion:
MOORE, Chief Justice.
Defendant appeals from declaratory judgment holding she is estopped to demand child support payments from her former husband. We affirm.
The parties were married in January 1951 and divorced in January 1956. They had one son, Michael Anthony, born October 17, 1951. Their divorce decree provided, inter alia, that custody of Michael was awarded to his mother (defendant, now Jeanette Van Lengen) with reasonable rights of visitation granted to his father (plaintiff Dale Davidson). Plaintiff was ordered to pay child support in the amount of $10 per week in semi-monthly installments until Michael reached the age of 18.
Initially Dale fulfilled his support obligations although he experienced difficulties in attempting to visit Michael. It is undisputed no payments were made after March 26, 1957.
At the time of the divorce Dale did not own property. He subsequently acquired two parcels of real estate. One parcel was acquired in 1976 for $50,000 and at time of trial was subject to an $18,000 mortgage. The other was sold in 1976 for $33,000. When he attempted to convey the latter parcel, the prospective buyers refused to complete performance of the purchase contract until an apparent lien for the back child support was either shown as satisfied or otherwise removed of record. On June 8, 1976 Dale filed the present action for declaratory judgment claiming Jeanette was equitably estopped from enforcing the back due support because of her near 20-year acquiescence in a quid pro quo, whereby he ceased visitation and she agreed not to enforce the support obligation. Jeanette answered alleging there was no such agreement and she had never acquiesced in the nonpayment. Pending disposition of the controversy, $7000, which represented the alleged lien, was placed in escrow.
With the issues thus joined the case proceeded to trial. After the certified record of support payments was received into evidence, Dale testified in his own behalf. He explained that shortly after the divorce was finalized he was "denied" all of his visitation rights. Additionally, Jeanette in the summer of 1956 expressly told him: "She wished I would not come down to see Michael, and I could stop support payments if I so liked." Although he then followed her wishes, later some partial payments were made. However, all child support payments were stopped in March 1957 after a "mutual, understanding" was reached with Jeanette and her second husband, John A. Van Lengen. Over defendant's hearsay objection, Dale stated he was contacted by Mr. Van Lengen who pointedly told him to discontinue any further visitations:
"Basically he told me what his intentions were, that they would support Michael and I was not to bother with the support payments and I was not to visit him any more."
Thereafter Dale said he ceased making all payments.
Jeanette denied there was ever any "agreement" and testified she saw her lawyer, Everett A. Scott (now an Associate District Court Judge) every year until 1967 on numerous legal matters (primarily tax returns) and requested his assistance in collecting the back due child support. How ever, she conceded no court action was ever initiated to secure the money then owing. A judge since 1967, Scott corroborated this phase of her testimony stating no action was ever taken other than possibly a letter or phone call. He was not certain he had ever done either. He explained he had generally declined to undertake collection on cases which he had not handled from their inception.
After both sides had rested, defendant moved to reopen the case in order to obtain the testimony of her present husband who had not previously been called as a defense witness. She alleged she had been surprised by Dale's hearsay testimony regarding her husband's alleged statement. This motion was overruled on the basis defendant had been given adequate opportunity to call Mr. Van Lengen as a witness during trial.
On September 30, 1976, the court filed findings of facts, conclusions of law and judgment for plaintiff. The findings of fact were substantially the same as our statement of facts, supra. The court's conclusions of law were based on the legal principles set out in Anthony v. Anthony, Iowa, 204 N.W.2d 829 and Cullinan v. Cullinan, Iowa, 226 N.W.2d 33. The court concluded:
"Plaintiff relied on the acquiescence by Defendant in his failure to make child support payments, and the Defendant is equitably estopped from enforcement of the child support judgment."
On October 11, 1976 defendant filed a motion to reconsider and vacate the judgment. It was argued and submitted to the court within a few days.
On October 28, 1976 the court filed a detailed ruling on defendant's motion. The court noted the affidavit of Mr. Van Len-gen, denying plaintiff's testimony, offered no help as the court's judgment was founded on the doctrine of equitable estoppel by acquiescence.
I. The legal or equitable nature of an action for declaratory judgment turns on the nature of the case as well as the relief sought. Northern Natural Gas Company v. Forst, Iowa, 205 N.W.2d 692, 694. Where, as here, the action was tried below as an equitable proceeding, our review is de novo. Denning v. Denning, Iowa, 185 N.W.2d 238, 240. We give weight to fact findings of the trial court but are not bound by them. Rule 14(f)(7), Rules of Appellate Procedure.
II. Defendant first contends trial court erred in holding the doctrine of estop-pel by acquiescence applied to bar her claim for past due child support. She specifically alleges the court erroneously found plaintiff was materially prejudiced by delay in asserting her rights and improperly inferred estoppel from the mere passage of time.
The doctrine is applicable where a person knows or ought to know that she is entitled to enforce her right or to impeach a transaction and neglects to do so for such a time as would imply that she intended to waive or abandon her right. Anthony v. Anthony, Iowa, 204 N.W.2d 829, 834 and citations.
Previously we have considered the doctrine and held it may be interposed in a proper case where a former spouse has failed to timely pursue her claim for enforcement of a child support judgment. Cullinan v. Cullinan, Iowa, 226 N.W.2d 33, 36; Anthony v. Anthony, supra. Other states are in accord. Cf. Sonenfeld v. Sonenfeld, 331 Mich. 60, 49 N.W.2d 60.
In Anthony v. Anthony, supra, we expressly found a parental bargain such as the one herein alleged, whereby a waiver of decretory child support was exchanged for a surrender of visitation rights, to be void as contrary to public policy because it made the best interest of the child subservient to parental self-interest. Nevertheless, we held that the wife's long failure to exercise her right to collect back child support and her former husband's reliance thereon equitably estopped her from enforcing the judgment. We stated at page 834, 204 N.W.2d:
"Plaintiff knew of her right to child support for the 17 years she failed to pursue it. She led defendant to believe she intended to waive or abandon it. It is obvious defendant relied on this acquiescence. Plaintiff is equitably estopped from enforcement of the child support judgment."
Two years later we decided the case of Cullinan v. Cullinan, supra. There we considered the requisites for raising claims of laches and estoppel by acquiescence and held under the record the father was not entitled to relief because of a failure to prove he was "materially prejudiced" by his former spouse's delay in asserting her rights. Additionally, we said prejudice could not be inferred merely from the passage of time.
On first blush it would appear that Anthony and Cullinan are somewhat inconsistent and that the latter opinion limits application of the former; however, this is not the case. Anthony did not recite material prejudice as a requirement of estoppel by acquiescence. This is hardly surprising because while prejudice is generally included as an element of laches, Lovlie v. Plumb, Iowa, 250 N.W.2d 56, 63; Chadek v. Alberhasky, 253 Iowa 32, 40, 111 N.W.2d 297, 301, prejudice is not discussed in acquiescence cases. See Olson v. Clark, 252 Iowa 1133, 1138, 109 N.W.2d 441, 444; Carlson v. Smith, 213 Iowa 231, 237, 236 N.W. 387, 389. It is thus clear our discussion of material prejudice in Cullinan was directed at the laches claim. The acquiescence claim there was rejected because the facts showed the mother had attempted to enforce her claim. (At one point defendant-father had been cited for and later found to be in contempt for nonpayment.)
The distinction between estoppel by acquiescence and laches is reasonable when considered in light of the different focuses' of, and different policies served by, the two concepts. Estoppel by acquiescence is based on an examination of the individual's actions who holds the right in order to determine whether that right has been waived. It advances a policy of stability and conclusiveness. See Douthwaite, Attorney's Guide To Restitution, § 9.3 at 375; Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies, § 2.3 at 43. The application of laches requires focusing on the defendant's position and determining whether the delay harmed him or resulted in material prejudice. Douthwaite, supra, at 378-379. The doctrine is a purely equitable one and applies where there has been an unreasonable delay in asserting a remedy and is clearly demanded in the interests of justice. Davenport Hosp. Assn. v. Hospital Service, 261 Iowa 247, 261, 154 N.W.2d 153, 162. The basis of the doctrine is that public policy seeks to discourage stale claims. Thodos v. Shirk, 248 Iowa 172, 185, 79 N.W.2d 733, 741. Each case is governed chiefly by its own circumstances. Shives v. Niewoehner, Iowa, 191 N.W.2d 633, 637.
Trial court held under the facts the doctrine of "estoppel by acquiescence" applied to bar defendant's claim. We agree. We believe the case clearly is governed by our prior decision in Anthony v. Anthony, supra. Contrary to Cullinan v. Cullinan, supra, there is no indication defendant ever initiated court action to compel payment. Defendant is equitably estopped from enforcement of the child support which to trial time she never attempted to actively enforce. The parties at all times lived in the Waterloo-Cedar Falls area. Plaintiff and Mr. Van Lengen were fellow employees at Rath Packing Company from 1953 to 1963.
III. Defendant next contends the trial court was without power to bar her from attempting to enforce a statutory judgment lien (Code section 624.23) on real estate owned by plaintiff. Because this issue was never presented to the trial court we need not consider it. Schnabel v. Display Sign Service, Inc., Iowa, 219 N.W.2d 546, 548.
IV. At trial, the court permitted plaintiff to testify over defendant's hearsay objection that Mr. Van Lengen told him not to bother with the support and not to visit Michael. Rather than ruling on the objection, the trial court should have received the evidence subject to the objection. Stookey v. Stookey, Iowa, 229 N.W.2d 256, 257-258. However, this is not controlling as we arrive at the same result on the merits of the appeal with or without that evidence under our de novo review. We have disregarded it. In Re Scarlett, Iowa, 231 N.W.2d 8, 10.
V. Finally, defendant argues the trial court committed reversible error in overruling her motion to reopen after both parties had rested. She sought to call Mr. Van Lengen (her husband since 1957) to rebut plaintiff's hearsay evidence.
We have repeatedly stated the trial court enjoys a wide discretion in reopening a case for reception of additional testimony. Anderson v. City of Council Bluffs, Iowa, 195 N.W.2d 373, 376 and citations. We do not believe the trial court abused that discretion. However, assuming arguendo there was an abuse of discretion, it would not be reversible in view of our holding in Division IV, supra.
VI. Child welfare is not here involved. Michael became 18 on October 17, 1969. This action, filed June 8, 1976, is limited to the question of whether defendant is barred under the doctrine of equitable estoppel by acquiescence from enforcement of the child support judgment. Our de novo review causes us to agree with the trial court that she is so estopped.
Defendant knew of her right to child support for the more than 19 years she failed to pursue it. By words and actions she led plaintiff to believe she intended to waive and abandon her right. Obviously plaintiff relied on this acquiescence. As requested by defendant he ceased child visitations which he had previously exercised. Thereafter he remarried and became the father of four children and eventually took title to the real estate here involved.
The trial court's declaratory judgment was correct and is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
MASON, RAWLINGS, LeGRAND and REES, JJ., concur.
REYNOLDSON, UHLENHOPP, HARRIS and McCORMICK, JJ., dissent.