Case Name: Earnest W. Sampson, Respondent, v. The Grand Rapids School Furniture Company, Appellant
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1900-11
Citations: 55 A.D. 163
Docket Number: 
Parties: Earnest W. Sampson, Respondent, v. The Grand Rapids School Furniture Company, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 55
Pages: 163–164

Head Matter:
Earnest W. Sampson, Respondent, v. The Grand Rapids School Furniture Company, Appellant.
A complaint for money, alleging simply that it is the balance due for commissions upon a sale of goods, is demurrable.
A complaint in an action to recover a sum of money, which alleges that such sum is the balance due for commissions upon the sale of goods by the plaintiff’s firm for the defendant, but which does not set out the arrangement, under which the sales were made, the quantity of the goods sold or the amount of the commissions, is demurrable.
Smith, J., dissented.
Appeal by the defendant, The Grand Rapids School Furniture Company, from an interlocutory judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Broome on the 20th day of June, 1900, upon the decision of the court rendered after a trial at the Broome Special Term overruling the defendant’s demurrer to the complaint, and also from an order entered in said clerk’s office on the 20th day of June, 1900, upon which such judgment was entered.
The ground of the demurrer is that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
The allegations of the complaint are substantially as follows:
In or about the year 1897 the plaintiff and one Devereaux were copartners, doing business as such, with an office in Binghamton, under the firm name of A. J. Devereaux & Co. The business in which the firm was engaged was that of selling school and office furniture, etc., upon a commission for the defendant. The defendant is a foreign corporation having an office for the transaction of its business in the city of New York. In or about the month of October, 1897, said firm ceased to do business and was dissolved by-mutual consent. “ At the time of the dissolution of said firm and at the time it ceased to do business and to sell goods on commission for the defendant there was an unsettled account between the said firm and the defendant and there was due and to become due from the defendant to the said firm of A. J. Devereaux & Co.'the sum of about $850, as commissions upon the sale of goods by them for the defendant.” Devereaux afterwards duly transferred his interest therein to one Wheeler, to whom the defendant paid the sum- of $300. Wheeler has transferred all his interest in the balance to the plaintiff. There is now due the plaintiff thereon from the defendant the sum of $550.
Judgment is demanded for the sum of $550 and interest.
T. B. & L. M. Merchant, for the appellant.
John P. Wheeler, for the respondent.

Opinion:
Merwin, J.:
From the allegations of the complaint it may be inferred that there was some arrangement between Devereaux & Co. and the defendant under which the firm at some time was engaged in selling goods for the defendant on commission. It is not alleged what that arrangement was. A party seeking to recover on a contract must allege as well as prove what it was.
Assuming that it may be inferred that the firm was working for the defendant at its request, the amount of work done, and the agreed price, if there was one, or the value, should be alleged. . Proof of those facts would be essential to a recovery. They are not alleged. The allegation simply that the defendant is indebted to the firm or to the plaintiff in a certain amount is only the allegation of a conclusion of law. Nor does the characterization of the nature of the debt, that is, that it is for commissions on goods sold, help, the matter. It is not a statement of the facts from which the conclusion is to be drawn that the defendant is indebted in the claimed amount for commissions. It is not a statement, as required by the Code . (§ 481 subd. 2), " of the facts constituting each cause of action."
The demurrer is, I think, well taken.
All concurred, except Smith, J., dissenting:
Interlocutory judgment reversed and demurrer sustained, with costs, with usual leave to amend on payment of costs.