Case Name: Cecil Cameron SIMMONS, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1996-11-26
Citations: 683 So. 2d 1101
Docket Number: No. 94-539
Parties: Cecil Cameron SIMMONS, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: JOANOS and WOLF, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 683
Pages: 1101–1110

Head Matter:
Cecil Cameron SIMMONS, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 94-539.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Nov. 26, 1996.
Robert W. Pope of Pope & Henninger, P.A., St. Petersburg, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General; Daniel A. David, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for appellee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal from convictions for murder, sexual battery (two counts), and kidnapping. Appellant essentially raises three issues on appeal: (1) Whether the trial court erred in finding the witness James Burney competent to testify; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion for a psychological evaluation of Burney; and (3) whether the trial court erred in preventing appellant from impeaching Burney with a history of retardation and suggestibility. We find no error and affirm.
The victim, a young woman who was apparently driving alone on an interstate highway at night, had summoned a wrecker by using a roadside call box. Her call was received by the Florida Highway Patrol and relayed to a wrecker service between two and four o'clock on the morning of Friday, June 15,1990. Separate highway patrolmen as well as the wrecker driver reported stopping at the car they say had been abandoned. Around noon on Sunday, June 17, 1990, the young woman's body was found in a shallow creek approximately 100 miles from where her ear had been abandoned.
The police were unable to find the persons responsible for the young woman's death for approximately one year after the crime was committed. The police learned about the possible involvement of James Burney on June 27, 1991. After repeated questioning, Burney implicated the appellant and his brother (Simmons brothers) in the kidnapping, rape, and murder of the young woman. Burney testified that he saw the Simmons brothers and the victim in James Simmons' truck. Burney then stated that he joined the parties in the truck and went for a ride that ultimately resulted in Burney witnessing the Simmons brothers raping and killing the victim. The physical evidence presented was consistent with Burney's version of events, but Burney's testimony was the only evidence tying the Simmons brothers to the crime.
Prior to trial, appellant moved (1) to declare Burney incompetent, (2) to authorize a psychological evaluation of Burney, and (3) to allow the defendant to introduce Burney's school records (which included prior psychological testing).
Following a hearing, the trial court ruled that "based upon the evidence before me, it is not possible for this Court to make a finding as a matter of law . that . Mr. Burney is not competent to testify." The court also denied the other relief requested in the motion.
At trial, before James Burney testified, the defense renewed its motion to declare him incompetent. The trial court denied the motion with the assurance that the court would, if the question was raised properly, "make a determination as to the competence of the witness . and . make findings accordingly."
After direct examination, the defense again renewed its motion to declare Mr. Burney incompetent as a witness. This time the trial court ruled:
I have heard the testimony of the witness [on direct], have heard the witness recite a historical background. I have heard him recite an employment background. I have heard him recite a factual background.
He appears to be oriented in terms of time, place and location. He appears to appreciate the difference between a true factual statement and a nontrue factual statement.
. I would posit those observations are based solely on the presentation of the state's case. I have not as yet received evidence from the defendant. You are always welcome to raise a challenge.
Following Burney's testimony, defense counsel returned to the issues raised in the pretrial motion. Dr. Bedinger testified. He was the senior psychologist for Developmental Services for the local district of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, with particular expertise in the area of mental retardation. Dr. Bedinger asserted that "a person could be overall competent and not be competent to be a witness"; however, Dr. Bedinger was not comfortable offering an opinion on Burney without first doing a complete evaluation. The trial court expressed some skepticism about whether Dr. Bedinger could provide any useful information to supplement the court's own observations concerning Burney's competence, and asked whether "there's something unique and special about retardation that retarded people have a different standard of differentiating between the truth and a lie?" Dr. Bedinger replied that "many people with retardation have a clearly different standard," and noted that he was concerned about Bur-ney's statement during cross-examination where Burney said that he "thought [he] was telling the truth." However, Dr. Bedinger said that such a statement "is indicative, not conclusive, that [Burney] is not competent as a witness." Dr. Bedinger reiterated that he was reluctant to offer an opinion on Burney's competence without a personal evaluation.
The trial court denied defendant's renewed motion to either declare Burney incompetent or have him evaluated, finding that "the witness has demonstrated the capacity to differentiate between the truth and a lie and has demonstrated the capacity to relate in an understandable fashion those events about which he chooses to testify." The court also denied defendant's request to introduce Bur-ney's school records (including the psychological testing) and defendant's request to have Dr. Bedinger explain the significance of such records with respect to Burney's suggestibility and his ability to accurately recall the matters about which he testified. The court ruled that the records were too remote to be relevant.
The trial court announced its final ruling that Burney was competent as follows:
This court finds that based upon [Bur-ney's] statement of the historical development that he has undergone, his attendance in school, performance in school, his ability to maintain friendships over a period of years, his ability to be employed, his ability to be able to obtain a driver's license [despite his illiteracy], his ability to operate a motor vehicle, his ability to operate a motor vehicle in the course of his employment, his ability to make decisions and judgments predicated thereon, his ability to understand culpability, to acknowledge culpability in the form of his prior misdeeds . the fact that [Burney] to some extent is corroborated by some other witnesses in this case in terms of the incidents that he has related, to the extent that he has testified untruthfully [sic] in progressive fashion and has only when challenged given more and more information — he has described his reluctance to do that. He has described his response to intimidation. He has demonstrated the ea-pacity to relate facts, to relate explanations.
The one questionable criterion] is as a consequence of a series of questions derived there at the end after some six hours of testimony and, while it is true that there is no certitude in life, I find that the witness has demonstrated the capacity to differentiate between the truth and a lie and has demonstrated the capacity to relate in an understandable fashion those events about which he chooses to testify.
Appellant challenges the ruling relating to Burney's competency.
Unless otherwise provided by statute, every person is presumed competent to testify. § 90.601, Fla.Stat. A person may be disqualified to testify if the court determines that the person is incapable of expressing himself or herself so as to be understood, or is incapable of understanding the duty of a witness to tell the truth. § 90.604, Fla.Stat. It is within the sound discretion of the trial judge to determine the competence of a witness to testify. Rutledge v. State, 374 So.2d 976 (Fla.1979), cert. denied, Rutledge v. Florida, 446 U.S. 913,100 S.Ct. 1844, 64 L.Ed.2d 267 (1980); Kaelin v. State, 410 So.2d 1355 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).
The subject of a mentally challenged individual's competency to testify at trial was discussed in Hammond v. State, 660 So.2d 1152 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). In Hammond, the second district reversed for a new trial, finding that the trial court erred by failing to make the three specific determinations necessary to determine that the mentally challenged victims were competent to testify. Citing cases dealing with the competency of child witnesses, the Hammond court stated that the trial court had failed to determine whether the witnesses (1) were capable of observing and recollecting facts, (2) were capable of narrating facts to the court or jury, and (3) had the moral sense of the obligation to tell the truth. Id. at 1156. The Hammond court went on to note that the "competency determination is of heightened importance when the witness is mentally retarded, because there might exist a tendency on the part of the jurors to believe that the retarded are not capable of conniving or fabrication."
Id. (citing McKinnies v. State, 315 So.2d 211 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975)).
This court addressed a similar situation in McKinnies, where the issue was whether the trial court erred in holding a mentally challenged 16-year-old boy competent to testify. In McKinnies, as in Hammond, the testimony of the witness in question was crucial to sustaining a conviction. McKinnies, 315 So.2d at 212. Although the McKinnies court did not state whether the trial court made the proper findings, it concluded that based on the record the trial court could not have found the witness competent. This court stated that the "test of competency of a witness is his intelligence and ability to understand, not his age." Id. at 213 (citing Hall v. State, 260 So.2d 881 (Fla. 2d DCA 1972)). In McKinnies, this court found that the answers the witness gave through leading questions were so confusing and contradictory that there was no probative value, and emphasized that at no point did the witness amplify on any question, or answer in anyway except "yes" or "no" or by repeating a portion of the words asked by questioners. In McKinnies, we reversed and remanded for a new trial, noting that although the trial court has very broad discretion in determining the competency of a witness, it is not without bounds, and the exercise of discretion is subject to appellate review. Id. at 213.
The instant case is easily distinguishable from both Hammond and McKin-nies. In Hammond, the trial court erred because it did not address the three factors required to determine competency. In this case, however, the court did make the proper findings: The court found that Burney was capable of observing facts as was evidenced by his ability to be employed, to obtain a driver's license, and to operate a truck; the court found that Burney demonstrated the capacity to relate facts and explanations; and the court found that the witness demonstrated the capacity to differentiate between the truth and a lie and "demonstrated the capacity to relate in an understandable fashion those events about which he chooses to testify." Unlike the situation in Hammond, the relevant factors were addressed in this case.
Furthermore, in this case, unlike Hammond, there was physical evidence corroborating Burney's testimony (i.e., lack of semen and the victim's menstrual cycle, missing ring, cigarette marks and other injuries).
The McKinnies case, while having more points of similarity, is also distinguishable. Burney's testimony was not in a "yes" and "no" pattern, and his testimony was not only probative, but also comprehendible. Unlike the witness in McKinnies, once Bur-ney told his story, he stuck by it and presented a plausible account of the events. A careful reading of the testimony of Dr. Krop, the original doctor presented by the defense, provides nothing that required a finding that Burney was incompetent to testify. Dr. Krop had never met or talked to James Burney, but only spoke of retardation in the generic sense. The strongest statement made by Dr. Krop was that a person with mental retardation could still be competent to be a witness, but there was "a higher probability that a person at this level would not be competent." That is not enough to disqualify a witness, who, if believed, was an eyewitness observer of the torture and death inflicted upon the victim.
Appellant also challenges the court's denial of a psychiatric evaluation of Burney. A large number of the cases involving court-ordered examinations involve victims who are called to testify; however, this rule of law should be applicable to all witnesses, not just victims. See generally Murphy v. Superior Court for Maricopa County, 142 Ariz. 273, 689 P.2d 532 (1984) ("The standard for determining when a witness should be ordered to undergo a mental examination is no different for sex crime victims than for other witnesses."). In Ballard v. Superior Court of San Diego County, 64 Cal.2d 159, 49 Cal. Rptr. 302, 410 P.2d 838 (1966), the case upon which courts in many other states rely, the California Supreme Court stated:
We submit . that a general rule requiring a psychiatric examination of complaining witnesses in every sex case or, as an alternative, in any such case that rests upon uncorroborated testimony of the complaining witness would, in many instances, not be necessary or appropriate....
Rather than formulate a fixed rule in this matter we believe that discretion should repose in the trial judge to order a psychiatric examination of the complaining witness.
Id, 49 CaLRptr. at 313,410 P.2d at 849. The Ballard court also noted that a "complaining witness should not, and realistically cannot, be forced to submit to a psychiatric examination or to cooperate with a psychiatrist." Id.
In Hudson v. State, 368 So.2d 437 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), cert, denied, 381 So.2d 767 (Fla.1980), the trial judge denied the motion for evaluation after he conducted a personal examination of the victim and was satisfied as to the victim's competency to testify. The third district held that it was not an abuse of discretion to deny the defendant's motion for a psychological examination of a victim notwithstanding the fact that the victim had a history of "psychiatric disorder." In State v. Camejo, 641 So.2d 109 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994), opinion adopted, 660 So.2d 242 (Fla.1995), the fifth district found that, despite allegations of a witness' history of violence and mental instability, a psychological examination was not warranted. The mere fact that a witness is retarded or may have a history of mental problems is also not enough to compel an evaluation. People v. Neely, 228 Cal.App.2d 16, 39 Cal.Rptr. 251 (1964) (affirming denial of psychological evaluation of victim who was inmate of state mental hospital); Fulton v. State, 352 So.2d 581 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977) (psychological evaluation of allegedly mentally unstable witness unnecessary).
Similarly, in State v. Coe, 521 So.2d 373 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988), where the defendant alleged that the victim/witness suffered from alcoholism, that she was in a jealous relationship with her boyfriend, and that the victim gave conflicting accounts of the attack, the court reversed the trial court's order requiring the complainant to undergo psychiatric evaluation. Id. at 373-374. The court noted that even if it accepted the defendant's allegations as true, the reasons were not strong or compelling enough to suggest that an examination was required to prevent a miscarriage of justice. Id. at 376.
In the instant case, the trial court reviewed depositions given by the witness Burney, and had an opportunity to hear and observe Burney's trial court testimony. Review of the record on appeal reveals that but for one notable exception, Burney's testimony was complete, responsive, and consistent with his deposition testimony. The court noted that Burney's testimony concerning events was consistent with the physical evidence and indicated that it was taking Bur-ney's retardation into account in determining competency. We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that those factors outweighed the factors outlined in the dissenting opinion, which would support ordering a psychological evaluation.
As to the denial of appellant's request to admit the school records which were over ten years old, there was no reversible error. The records were simply outdated and irrelevant to the trial of this case. Furthermore, they were not at all inconsistent with what was admitted and clearly visible to all, that is, that the witness suffered from mild retardation.
Affirmed.
JOANOS and WOLF, JJ., concur.
BENTON, J., dissents with written opinion.
. In People v. King, 41 Colo.App. 177, 581 P.2d 739 (1978), the witness was allegedly "mentally immature," had a "vivid imagination," was "subject to flights of fancy," and had "fantasies concerning sexual contact and relationships." The appellate court, noting the wide discretion given to trial courts in evidentiary and witness issues, held that these allegations alone were insufficient to compel testing. In State v. Kahinu, 53 Haw. 536, 498 P.2d 635 (1972), cert, denied, 409 U.S. 1126, 93 S.Ct. 944, 35 L.Ed.2d 258 (1973), the Hawai'i Supreme Court noted that the mere possibility that a "key witness . was fabricating his story . was neither sufficient nor compelling grounds for such examination." Id., 498 P.2d at 642 (citing Ballard, supra ).