Case Name: David L. ARNETT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2003-04-23
Citations: 843 So. 2d 340
Docket Number: No. 1D01-4498
Parties: David L. ARNETT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: BROWNING, J., CONCURS with opinion; BOOTH, J., DISSENTS with opinion.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 843
Pages: 340–343

Head Matter:
David L. ARNETT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 1D01-4498.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
April 23, 2003.
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender; Anthony Cammarata, P. Douglas Brink-meyer, Kathleen Stover, and Paula S. Saunders, Assistant Public Defenders, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Charlie Crist, Attorney General, Robert R. Wheeler, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

Opinion:
ERVIN, J.
. Appellant, David L. Arnett, appeals his conviction for felony driving while his license was revoked pursuant to section 322.264, Florida Statutes (habitual traffic offender), in violation of section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes (2000). He contends that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence an order of license revocation issued by the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, because the state failed to establish the necessary predicate for admission of the document as a business record. We agree and reverse and remand for new trial.
The business records hearsay exception, section 90.803(6)(a), Florida Statutes (2001), provides that the following are not inadmissible as evidence:
A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinion, or diagnosis, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make such memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, unless the sources of information or other circumstances show lack of trustworthiness.
In order to be admissible under section 90.803(6)(a), the business record must be shown to have been: (1) made at or near the time of the event recorded, (2) by or from information transmitted by a person with knowledge, (3) kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and (4) the regular practice of that business to make such a record. Quinn v. State, 662 So.2d 947, 953 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995). Stated another way, business records are admissible if the records custodian or other qualified witness testifies as to manner of preparation, reliability and trustworthiness of the record. Cofield v. State, 474 So.2d 849, 851 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).
The state offered the testimony of Liz Sharpton to establish the necessary predicate for admission of the order of revocation. Her skeletal testimony, consisting merely of a statement that she had been employed by the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles for 31 years, that she was familiar with the Department's recording system, and that the order was sent to appellant as required by an unspecified statute, fails to establish any of the four predicate elements for admission.
Because the order was the only evidence to establish two of the elements necessary to prove appellant's conviction, i.e., that his license was revoked and that the revocation was based on the habitual-traffic-offender statute, the error cannot be considered harmless. We therefore reverse and remand for new trial.
As a second issue, appellant challenged the repeated reference to him as a habitual offender during trial. Because the habitual-offender designation appears to be an essential element of the crime under section 322.34(5), we affirm as to that issue without further comment.
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED for new trial.
BROWNING, J., CONCURS with opinion; BOOTH, J., DISSENTS with opinion.