Case Name: PEART v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1924-06-18
Citations: 265 S.W. 389
Docket Number: No. 8337
Parties: PEART v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 265
Pages: 389–392

Head Matter:
PEART v. STATE.
(No. 8337.)
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
June 18, 1924.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 29, 1924.)
1. Criminal law <&wkey;>l09l(ll)— Bill of exceptions in question and answer form not considered.
Bills of exception in question and answer form cannot be considered.
2. Criminal law &wkey;>l 114(2) —Bill not presenting surroundings or setting of matter objected to presents nothing for review.
Bill of exceptions, presenting none of surrounding circumstances or setting of matter objected to, presents nothing for review. •
3. Criminal law <@=>829< 18) — Refusal of charge on reasonable doubt with respect to' particular matter- held not error, in view of other instructions.
Where court charged law of presumption of innocence, and applied doctrine of reasonable doubt to entire case, there was no error in refusal of defendant’s charge that burden was on state to prove beyond reasonable doubt that defendant did not act in self-defense against either real danger or what appeared to be danger.
4. Criminal law <&wkey; 1090(7) — Refusal of continuances not subject of bill of exceptions not considered.
Where refusal of application for continuances was not subject of bill of exceptions, complaint thereof will not be considered.
On Motion for Rehearing.
5. Homicide <&wkey;>!22 — insulting conduct to female relative could not be relied on to reduce offense to manslaughter, where defendant did not then resent it.
Evidence that defendant had seen deceased drive to home of his daughter, and of his belief that he thought deceased intended to seduce her, could not be relied on as supporting manslaughter, under Pen. Code 1911, art. 1133, where he did not then resent it or attempt to inflict injury on deceased.
6. Homicide <&wkey;49i— Insulting conduct of deceased to defendant’s wife before divorce held not such as to reduce crime to manslaughter.
Alleged insulting conduct of deceased towards defendant’s wife, which occurred prior to her divorce from him, held under facts, not such as, under Pen. Code 1911, art. 1133, would reduce crime to manslaughter. ■
7. Homicide &wkey;>340(3) — Instruction giving jury right to convict only of manslaughter held favorable to defendant.
Where defendant alleged conduct of deceased towards his daughter and former wife as ground for reducing offense to manslaughter, held that charge which gave jury right to convict only of manslaughter, if they found defendant’s mind to be so inflamed by passion arising from any adequate cause as to render him incapable of cool reflection, was favorable to him.
Appeal from District Court, Jefferson County ; George C. O’Brien, Judge.
T. B. Peart was convicted of murder, and he appeals.
Affirmed.
Howtb & O’Eiel and Damar Hart, all of Beaumont, for'appellant.
Tom Garrard, State’s Atty., and Grover C. Morris, Asst. State’s Atty., both of Austin, for the State.

Opinion:
LATTIMORE, J.
Appellant was convicted in the district court of Jefferson county of murder, and a penalty of 99 years in the penitentiary affixed.
This court has a tremendous amount of work, and the ignoring of the rules laid down in the preparation of transcripts, and a failure to place the various documents composing same in the orderly manner prescribed by rule 85 of the rules for district and county courts prescribed by the Supreme Court, and contained in volume 142 S. W. xxiii, greatly multiplies the labor of this court. The transcript in this case does not follow the rule referred to in any particular. Tlie motion for continuance is 'near tlie end of the transcript, and the charge of the court' is about the middle thereof. There is little excuse for confusing transcripts which, when as long as the one in this record, adds enormously to the burdens which already greatly tax the powers of this court. Attention is called to this because there seems a growing tendency to carelessness in this regard, and it is hoped that those charged with the duty of preparing transcripts will carefully follow the order prescribed in the rule mentioned.
Appellant and his wife lived together for a number of years, one child, a daughter, being born of their union. Some 15 months before this homicide appellant's wife procured a divorce from him. The daughter was either then married or shortly thereafter did marry. Deceased, who was a widower, seems to have been paying attention to appellant's wife at the time of the homicide, and some two weeks before same the daughter of appellant communicated to him the fact that her mother and deceased were engaged to be married. At the time of the homicide deceased was walking along a public street in Port Arthur with the woman to whom he was engaged, the former wife of appellant, .when the latter appeared, and, according- to the state's testimony, began firing a pistol at deceased, who was eating an ice cream cone, and continued firing until deceased fell. Appellant claimed justification for ' his acts upon the ground of self-defense, and also asserted that he could be guilty of no greater offense than manslaughter because of the fact that he had been told in December of 1922 that before his wife was divorced she had been seen to get into a car with deceased and drive away; also upon the further proposition that he himself had seen deceased drive up to the home of his daughter at some date not mentioned, it being said that he thought deceased intended to seduce said daughter. The latter fact could not be relied on legally as supporting manslaughter, for the reason that it occurred in the presence of appellant, who did not then resent it or attempt to inflict injury upon deceased. Article 1133 of our Penal Code provides that, in order to reduce a homicide to manslaughter because of insulting conduct toward a female relative, it must appear that the killing took place immediately upon the happening of the insulting conduct or so soon thereafter as the parties meet, etc. As setting out our view of -this contention when the conduct takes place in the presence of the accused, see Henderson v. State, 89 Tex. Cr. R. 21, 229 S. W. 537, and authorities there cited.
Nor could appellant rely on what he claimed to be insulting conduct of deceased toward his wife which occurred prior to her divorce from him, but which he asserts was ' not communicated to him until after said divorce was granted. As decisive of this question we quote from Ex parte Jones, 31 Tex. Cr. R. 446, 20 S. W. 984:
"Upon the first ground, we hold that article 601 of the Penal Code is to be construed with article 597; that is to say, the insult must be given to the female while under the protection of the slayer, and the killing must also be done while she is under his protection. The difference between the cases of an actual relation and the statutory relationship of protection is that, while in both cases the insult must be given while the relationship exists, the killing must occur at the first meeting in the case of the actual relative, and in the statutory relationship it must occur during the existence of the relationship; for, if the female so insulted leaves the protection of the slayer before the first meeting with the one insulting her occurs, the right to act is gone. The proposition that one has a right to avenge the wrongs of any female he may take under his protection, without regard to the time the injury was done, is without force or merit; for. apart from the disastrous consequences of such a construction, the insult would not, in fact, have been offered to a female relation, which must be shown before the statute can be invoked."
We know of no authority holding a different doctrine, and think the reasoning of the court apt and sound in said opinion.
What we have jus't said renders it needless for us to discuss the numerous bills of exception appearing in this record complaining of various proceedings referring to or predicated on the proposition that manslaughter was rightfully in the case based on the one ground or the other above discussed.
Bills of exception Nos. 11 and 12 are in question and answer form, and cannot be considered. Bill of exceptions No. 13 presents none of the surrounding or setting of the matter objected to, and brings nothing before us for review. Bill No. 14 is qualified by the statement, which is in no wise disputed, that no exception was reserved to the matter complained of. Bills 15, 16, 17, 19, 21, 22, and 24 relate to1 various phases of the question of manslaughter growing out of the insulting conduct of deceased toward the wife or daughter, which question is not properly in the case as we have above indicated, .and for which reason said bills will not be discussed.
Bill No. 18 complains of the ruling of the court .upon the exceptions to the charge. Paragraph 11 of the charge was changed after the' exception was taken, and thereafter no exception was reserved. The court's charge as it appears in the record fully instructs the jury to apply the reasonable .doubt as between the grades of homicide, and there seems nothing in this exception, if there be two grades in this case. The remaining exceptions to the charge are directed at the court's manner of submitting manslaughter predicated on insulting con duct, and as we view it said charges were wholly uncalled for, and we therefore will not review complaints of their form.
The court gave to the jury the law of the presumption of innocence and applied the doctrine of reasonable doubt to the entire case, and also in many parts of the charge made particular application of said doctrine to specific matters submitted. We think it not incumbent on the court to give special charges which contained, among other things, the following:
"I further charge you in this connection that the burden is upon the state to prove to your satisfaction, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant did not act in self-defense against either real danger, or against what appeared to him, to be danger, and, if the state has not met this burden, you will say by your verdict not guilty."
Refusal to give this is complained of by bills of exception Nos. 20 and 23.
Bills of exception Nos. A, B, C, D, E, P, and PA are to matters pertaining to the motion for new trial and argument made by the state. These bills are lengthy, as are the qualifications of the trial court appended to each. The motion for new trial was not sworn to, nor was it accompanied by affidavits relating to any of the extraneous matters set up. The motion as to each of these matters was controverted by the state's attorney under oath. The qualifications appended by the learned trial judge to the bills seem to have been accepted by the appellant. In the light of such facts and the qualifications we deem the bills to present no error.
An application was made for a continuance, but its refusal was not made the subject of any bill of exceptions, and it is too well settled to need citation of authorities that in such case this court will not consider a complaint of the refusal of such application.
We have carefully considered the entire record, and, finding no error, an affirmance will be ordered.
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