Case Name: The H. B. Claflin Company, Limited, vs. B. Feibelman & Co. Sweetzer, Pembroke & Co. et al., Intervenors
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1892-04
Citations: 44 La. Ann. 518
Docket Number: No. 11,004
Parties: The H. B. Claflin Company, Limited, vs. B. Feibelman & Co. Sweetzer, Pembroke & Co. et al., Intervenors.
Judges: 
Reporter: Louisiana Annual Reports
Volume: 44
Pages: 518–526

Head Matter:
No. 11,004.
The H. B. Claflin Company, Limited, vs. B. Feibelman & Co. Sweetzer, Pembroke & Co. et al., Intervenors.
1. A peremptory exception going to the cause of action is not waived by being referred to the merits and tried and submitted with them.
2. The indorser of a promissory note only becomes the debtor of the holder after complying with the conditions of pi’esentment at maturity, failure of maker to pay and due notice given.
3. A demand against an indorser brought before maturity is properly rejected on exception to cause of action or even under the general issue.
i. Creditors who have attached the same property may intervene in a prior attachment proceeding by another creditor and oppose the maintenance thereof; and the prima facie proof of debt which the law sanctions as sufficient to authorize their attachments, is also sufficient to maintain their interventions without requiring them to anticipate the issues involved in their suits against their debtor and to make such proof as would sustain a final judgment.
45. The attachment must stand or fall according to state of facts at date of issuance and the demand in this case is not of a nature to authorize an attachment.
APPEAL from the Seventeenth District Oourt, Parish of East Baton Rouge. Buckner, J.
Ous. A. Breaux for Plaintiffs and Appellants:
A. Proceedings in attachment, and ex parte affidavit made to obtain such attachment, not admissible on behalf of an intervenor, in a suit between other parties except to prove rein ipsam.
2.An exceptor who goes to trial on the merits, on answer filed, without requiring the court to pass upon his exception, will be held to have waived such exception. C. P. 338; Mix vs. Iiis Creditors, 40 An. 626; Boon vs. Carroll, 35 An. 284; Chaffe vs. Ludeling, 34 An. 966; Francis vs. Lavigne, 2o An. 312.
Referring an exception to the merits, on filing an answer, is a waiver of the exception.
4. And intervenor must prove his claim as against plaintiffs and defendants; and an ex parte affidavit made to obtain a writ of attachment is no proof. Harper vs. Railroad Bank, 15 An. 136; Washburn, Administrator, vs. Frank, 31 An. 428; Walker vs. Simon, Jr., 21 An. 671; Golsan & Co. vs. Powell, 32 An. 524.
5. In the absence of allegation and proof of injury to himself an intervenor can not assail the rights of plaintiff in any suit.
6. An intervenor can not, without allegation of, fraud or collusion, urge defences which are personal to defendant. Flemming & Baldwin vs Shields, Jones’ Int., 21 An. 117; Cordell, Undertutor, vs. MeCullogh, 20 An. 174; Theaver vs. Smith, 24 An. 597; Herman vs Smith, 7 U. S. 676; Clamageran vs. Ricks et al.,4 U. S.487; Gasquet vs. Johnson, 1 La. 432.
7. Rational Bank vs. Moss & Co., 41 An. 227, distinguished and shown to have no application.
Farrar, Jonas & Kruttsohnitt on the same side on Application for Rehearing.
Bead & Goodale for Intervenors, Appellees:
1. In order to be entitled to intervene it is enough to have an interest in the success of either of the parties in the suit, or an interest opposed to hotli. C. P., Art. 390.
2. An intervention is a demand by which a third person is permitted to become a party to a suit, by joining plaintiff * * * or by uniting with the defendant in resisting the claims of plaintiff, or, when his interest requires it, by opposing both. Art. 389, C. P.
3. Exception as to cause of action and for prematurity not dilatory. Ohaffevs. Ludeling, 34 An. 966.
Even dilatory exceptions pleaded in answer prior t.o plea to merits will he entertained. 40 An. 626.
4. After a defence is made by a defendant, and he is joined therein by an intervenor, the defendant would not he permitted to abandon his pleas to the detriment of intervenor. Succession of Baum, 11 R. 314.
In the present case there is no abandonment of position by defendant.
All decisions which restrain intervenor from making pleas personal to defendant, and not urged by him, refer entirely to irregularities as to bond, affidavit, etc., and not to cause of action itself. 1 La. 425; 8 La. 57; 2 An. 118; 27 An. 239. Cases quoted from in brief.
6. A cause of action can no more lie on an obligation not due than if it never existed. 3 An. 33; 2 An. 498; 14 An. 426; 10 An. 324; 10 R. 533; 11 An. 368; 5 L. 225; 9 L. 457; 5 R. 189; 2 L. 221; 9 An. 562; 13 L. 404.
7. The remedy by attachment does not embrace cases of prospective and. contingent liability. 10 An 324; 41 An. 227; Read vs. Ware, 2 An, 478.
8. The bolder of anote can not proceed by attachment against an indorser previous to maturity. Taylor vs. Drane, 131.. 64; Ilarrod vs. Burgess, 0 It 44Í).
9. The latv in this State is settled that no recovery can be had either against the maker or indorser, without proof by plaintiff of a demand at the place designated in the note, and that too although the note is payable in another State. Ilennen, p. 192.
10. And it will not suffice to show that the surety had no funds there. Ibid. Failure to protest note in season will relievo indorser.
11. Nor will it make any difference that “acceptance is waived.” 10 An. 324.
12. In order to sustain attachment there must beproof that at the time the writ is issued the defendant had done or was about to do the act charged, “unlawful preference.” Cliaffe vs. MacKensie, No. 15, Vol. N, p. 371; 42 An., .Southern Reporter.
13. When documents or suits are made part of petition by special allegation, all their averments become the averments of the petition, and it will be unnecessary to introduce said documents or suits in evidence specially in order to have the benefit of their allegations, and the facts shown by them.

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Fenner, J.
The H. B. Claflin Company instituted this attachment suit against the commercial firm of B. Feibelman & Co., claiming an indebtedness as due them by the defendant of $30,970.70, of which, however, the sum of $22,500 was claimed by them as holders of three promissory notes of $7500 each, which were made by the firm of Cohn & Feibleman and endorsed by the defendant and not due at the date of suit.
The defendant firm promptly interposed an exception to the cause of action on the ground 11 that the action is premature and the debt nob due." Subsequently, Sweetzer, Pembroke & Co., and sundry other alleged creditors of B. Feibelman & Co., who had levied attachments on the same property attached by the Claflin Company, intervened in this suit, .and setting up that, as to the said claim for $22,500, it could not authorize or sustain an attachment, they prayed that, to this extent, the plaintiff's attachment be not sustained or recognized as inferior to their attachments.
This intervention was put at issue by answer, and the defendants also appeared and filed an answer to the principal suit, in which, first " reserving the benefit of the exception herein filed," they pleaded the general denial.
On January 18, on motion of defendant's counsel, without objection, the exception was referred to the merits. The cause was then assigned for trial instanter, and, after introduction of evidence and argument of counsel, was submitted to the court.
Judgment was rendered in favor of the Olaflin Company to the extent of the debt due, with recognition of their attachment privilege, but rejecting their demand on three notes of $7500 each above referred to, and also sustaining the intervention of Sweetzer, Pembroke & Oo. et al.
From this judgment the Olaflin Company appeals.
The appellant claims that, by referring their exception to the merits and by going to trial on the merits without requring the court to pass on the exception, defendant must be held to have waived th© exception.
He relies on the following authorities: Mix vs. Creditors, 39 An. 624; Boone vs. Carroll, 35 An. 284; Chaffe vs. Ludeling, 34 An. 966; Francis vs. Levine, 26 An. 312.
Reference to them will show that they apply only to dilatory or declinatory exceptions, the effect of which is only to retard, or change the forum of the action.
The exception here is not of that character. It is, by its terms, an exception to the "cause of action," based on the elementary proposition that the indorser of a promissory note incurs no other obligation except to pay in ease the maker, on due demand at maturity, shall fail to pay and in case due and legal notice thereof shall be given to him. Hence, before maturity, the indorser is not the debtor of the holder who has no cause of action against him. Such a defence would be conclusive under the general issue, or even on application to confirm a default. It was never waived by defendant, was entirely susceptible of being referred to and tried with the merits as part of them, and, in point of fact, the judgment, though it does not mention the exception, is obviously based upon it.
We think, moreover, the intervenors properly established their right to intervene. They were attaching creditors of the same property, and made their attachment proceedings parts of their petition. These exhibited the prima faoie proof of debt which the law sanctions as sufficient to authorize the attachment, and if they were authorized to attach they were authorized to intervene and to protect their attachment from being nulllified by the allowance of a preference in favor of a prior illegal attachment. They were not bound to anticipate the issues involved in their suit against their debtor by proof of their claims such as would sustain a final judgment against him. Their interest is too palpable to admit a dispute, since the maintenance of plaintiff's attachment would render their own futile.
The case is fully within the authority of National Bank vs. Moss, 41 An. 227, where we held that an attachment must stand or fall according to the state of facts existing at date of issuance; that in order to sustain it, the debt must be unconditional, and hence that the holder of a bill of exchange, not yet due, can not attach against the drawer of the bill because his liability does not arise until after compliance with the conditions of presentment at maturity, failure of the drawee to pay, and due notice. We can discover.no error in the judgment appealed from.
Judgment affirmed.