Case Name: PINSON v. ANDERSON ET AL.
Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1922-04-18
Citations: 119 S.C. 115
Docket Number: No. 10873
Parties: PINSON v. ANDERSON ET AL.
Judges: Mr. Justice Watts concurs.
Reporter: South Carolina Reports
Volume: 119
Pages: 115–120

Head Matter:
No. 10873
PINSON v. ANDERSON ET AL.
(111 S. E. 896)
Trial — Striking Out Ci-iarge After Making It Held Reversible Error. —In an action on a contract whereby defendants employed plaintiff to sell their lands at auction under an agreement that if defendants refused to confirm sale they would pay plaintiff fifty per cent, of the expenses thereof in which it was shown that the sale did not bring the agreed upset price and was called off, and the defense was that defendants were not requested to confirm the sale, the action of the Court in striking out an instruction that the law does not require a man to do a useless thing was reversible error, in that the jury may have thought that plaintiff was bound to demand of defendants that they comply with the bids that had been made before he could claim any part of the expense money.
Before FeaTherstonE, J., County Court, Greenwood, May, 1921.
Reversed.
Action by J. L,. Pinson, trading as Southeastern Realty Co. against ,W. H. Anderson and O. R. Rudisill. Judgment for defendants and plaintiff appeals.
The alleged contract directed to be reported is as follows : ■
Agreement to Seed.
“The undersigned owner hereby places with Southeastern Realty Company, hereinafter referred to as Company, the following described lands in Greenwod County, State of S. C.: All that tract or parcel of land situated in above county and State and bounded by lands of W. J. Moore, Mrs. Briggs, and C. & W. C. right of way, containing 25 acres, more or less, being the identical tract as survey of R..B. Cheatham, April, 1920.
“The company is authorized to cut the same into such parcels as it deems proper and offer the same for sale at auction or otherwise. The purchase price fixed for the whole is eight thousand and no/100, plus actual expense salé and preparing land, dollars. If a sale of the whole is made to one or more purchasers, the owner will make and execute to the purchaser or purchasers good marketable titles in fee, freed from liens and encumbrances, and will carry two-thirds dollars of the purchase price on purchase money-mortgage bearing 7 per cent, interest for one and two years; balance to be paid in cash. Possession will be given in immediately after contract of sale and when same has been complied with.
“The owner will pay company no per cent, of purchase price for its services and fifty per cent, of amount in excess of $8,000.00 after adding amount equal to actual expenses and preparing land for sale, cutting streets, etc.
“The owner reserves the right to withdraw lands from sale by paying company all expenses incurred and no per cent, commission on purchase price above named.
“The owner will pay company no per cent, commission and fifty per cent, of all expenses incurred if a sale is made by owner or owner refuses to confirm sale.
“This contract is exclusive and is to terminate on the 1st day of May, 1920.
“Witness my hand and seal this 29th day of April, 1920.
“-, Owner. [L. S.]
“Witness:
C<__ )f
A blank probate form on the bottom of the contract not filled in is omitted.
Messrs. Tillman, Mays & Peatherstone for appellant.
Messrs. Grier, Park & Nicholson for respondents.
April 18, 1922.

Opinion:
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Mr. Justice Fraser.
The respondents, Anderson and Rudisil, bought a tract of land and employed the appellant to resell it for them. The parties met and wrote out .a contract. While the contract was not signed, both respondents admit in evidence that the written contract expressed the agreement between them. They differed in their construction of the contract. The answer denies the plaintiff's construction of the contract. The complaint alleges that the plaintiff incurred expense in preparation, for the sale to the amount of $1,076.76, and that the defendants owed them one-half thereof, to wit, $486.38. The defendant also denied the expense account. The defendants demurred to the complaint, setting up the statute of frauds. The plaintiff demurred to the plea of the statute of frauds. When the plaintiff called up his demurrer, the presiding Judge said, "Go ahead; I will pass on it later." His Honor did not pass on the demurrer. The jury found for the defendants.
It seems that there was an upset price of $8,000. Before the sale was completed, the bidding stopped, and it was evident that the upset price could not be secured, and the sale was called off. One of the defendants said, "The sale called itself off."
There is a clause in the so-called contract that reads (let the whole be reported) :
"The owner will pay company [plaintiff] no per cent, commission and fifty per cent, of all expenses incurred if a sale is made by the owner, or owner refuses to confirm sale
The defendants say we were not requested to confirm a sale, and therefore we are not liable. The plaintiff claims that it would have been useless to demand of the defendants compliance when the price bid was not sufficient, and the plaintiff is not required by the law to do a useless thing.
The defendant Anderson testified:
Q. At the size of the bids made out there it would have been-foolish to ask you to confirm them?
A. At the price. Yes, sir.
Q. Pinson knew that you wouldn't accept them?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You agreed to call off the sale?
A. I guess that we agreed. I told you once that they quit bidding.
Q. It would have been foolish to have gone on with the sale ?
A. Yes, sir. If they had offered me $8,000 they would have gotten the land.
At first his Honor charged the jury, "I charge you that the law does not require a man to do a useless thing," and then said, "Strike it out." There are two exceptions, but only one question is raised. The striking out of the charge, after making it, was error, in that the jury may have thought that the plaintiff was bound to demand of the defendants that they comply with the bids that had been made before they could claim any part of the expense money.
The judgment is reversed.
Mr. Justice Watts concurs.