Case Name: Carol L. SHELTON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jack Merrill SHELTON, Defendant-Appellant
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1981-02-16
Citations: 395 So. 2d 899
Docket Number: No. 14442
Parties: Carol L. SHELTON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jack Merrill SHELTON, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: Before PRICE, MARVIN and FRED W. JONES, Jr., JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 395
Pages: 899–902

Head Matter:
Carol L. SHELTON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jack Merrill SHELTON, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 14442.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
Feb. 16, 1981.
En Banc. Rehearing Denied March 27, 1981.
Love, Rigby, Dehan, Love & McDaniel by William G. Nader, Shreveport, for defendant-appellant.
Burnett, Sutton, Walker, Callaway & Smith by Bobby D. Sutton, Shreveport, for plaintiff-appellee.
Before PRICE, MARVIN and FRED W. JONES, Jr., JJ.

Opinion:
PRICE, Judge.
Jack Shelton has appealed from that portion of the judgment of divorce which awarded his wife, Carol Henri Lipka Shelton, permanent alimony in the amount of $300 per month. We find no abuse of the trial court's discretion and affirm.
Appellant's principal complaint on appeal is that the trial court did not make a separate determination of alimony at the time of rendition of final divorce on June 26, 1980, but merely continued the same amount previously fixed for pendente lite alimony on May 21, 1980. He contends this was error as the multiple factors to be considered for permanent alimony under La.C.C. Art. 160 are much different from the standard set forth by Art. 148 providing for pendente lite alimony.
Appellant is correct in his argument as to the law in this regard. However, there is no showing that the trial court did not properly apply the standards of Art. 160, as amended in 1979, in continuing the sum of $300 per month. The evidence clearly shows appellee's needs exceeded the appellant's ability to pay in both instances. The trial court apparently determined the $300 amount was an equitable means of balancing the interests of both parties.
There is no merit to appellant's contention that appellee has not shown she is in need because her mother has been and may continue to provide for her food, shelter, and clothing. The record shows this was by necessity. The financial assistance provided by a parent under such circumstances certainly does not relieve a spouse of the obligation of support to the other spouse after divorce. See McCole v. McCole, 383 So.2d 55 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1980).
Appellant also contends the trial court did not give any consideration to ap-pellee's capability of obtaining employment. The record shows appellee is preparing herself to take the real estate license examination to provide her suitable employment so that she can continue to care for her invalid mother who has an incurable cancer of the spine. Whether appellee will be successful in passing the exam or when she will begin to receive any meaningful income from such a pursuit is highly speculative. It is apparent the trial court viewed this evidence in this light and gave it little weight. Appellant is not prejudiced in this regard as should appellee later become employed, the judgment can be modified or terminated as the need may be.
The most serious question raised by appellant is whether the court gave proper consideration to his ability to pay. His average monthly earnings in 1979 were shown to have been slightly in excess of $1,100. His net income is shown to be about $800 per month. He has submitted lists of expenses and fixed obligations which if accepted at face value would show an inability to pay almost any sum whatsoever. However, the record shows some of the items on the list of fixed monthly obligations are not being paid by appellant, and that he is referring these items to appellee for payment.
Furthermore, the jurisprudence has followed the theory that "the husband's alimentary obligations toward the wife come before his obligations to his creditors." Galbraith v. Galbraith, 382 So.2d 1042 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980); Laiche v. Laiche, 237 La. 298, 111 So.2d 120 (1959); Tablada v. Tablada, 356 So.2d 1031 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1977); Moore v. Moore, 380 So.2d 180 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979).
Likewise it is not error for the trial court to use gross income in applying the one-third rule of Art. 160. Ballard v. Ballard, 367 So.2d 1220 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1979).
In view of the above jurisprudence and the circumstances shown, we find no abuse of the discretion of the trial court in fixing the alimony at $300 per month.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed to appellant.
FRED W. JONES, Jr., J., dissents and assigns written reasons.