Case Name: PEOPLE v. STEWART
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1976-06-04
Citations: 397 Mich. 1
Docket Number: Docket No. 55230
Parties: PEOPLE v STEWART
Judges: Williams and Fitzgerald, JJ., concurred with Coleman, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 397
Pages: 1–22

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v STEWART
Docket No. 55230.
Argued December 10, 1974
(Calendar No. 5).—
Decided June 4, 1976.
Rehearing granted and case resubmitted 398 Mich 951.
Howard Stewart was convicted in Recorder’s Court of Detroit, Henry Heading, J., of sale and possession of heroin. Testimony at trial showed that the heroin was delivered to a police agent by a codefendant of Stewart; the codefendant, known as Junior, was not apprehended. The Court of Appeals, J. H. Gillis, P. J., and Bashara and O’Hara, JJ., affirmed with sentence modified (Docket No. 12243). Defendant appeals. Held:
1. Concert of action can be established by circumstantial evidence. Conversations between the defendant and the police agent and the movements of defendant and the absent co-defendant Junior, and especially the fact the police agent did not tell the codefendant the price she had agreed on with the defendant, yet the codefendant returned from speaking with the defendant and delivered heroin for the agreed price, were sufficient to establish a prima facie case of concert of action without any of Junior’s declarations.
2. Once a prima facie case of concert of action was made by the prosecutor, testimony as to what the codefendant Junior said outside of the defendant’s presence came within a well-established exception to the hearsay rule and was admissible.
3. Even without the hearsay, adequate facts to go to the jury were in evidence. In view of the circumstances absent Junior’s statement, and their safe bounds of relevancy and "indicia of reliability”, the trial judge did not err in allowing the testimony about the absent codefendant.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1, 3] 29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence §§ 4, 10.
[2, 5, 6, 8, 9] 29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence §§ 496, 497.
[3] 25 Am Jur 2d, Drugs, Narcotics, and Poisons §§ 46, 47.
[4, 6] 29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 658.
30 Am Jur 2d, Evidence §§ 1151, 1152, 1157.
[6, 8, 9] 16 Am Jur 2d, Conspiracy §§ 38, 40, 41, 61.
Admissibility as against coconspirator of extrajudicial declarations of coconspirator — -Supreme Court cases. 1 L Ed 2d 1780.
[7] 29 Am Jur 2, Evidence § 497.
[10] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 333 et seg.
Conviction affirmed.
Justice Levin, with Chief Justice Kavanagh concurring, dissented: The statements allegedly made by the absent codefendant are not admissible without evidence aliunde of the commission of the crime, and such evidence cannot consist of hearsay statements or be established by testimony of the sole prosecution witness who would also report the statements allegedly made by the defendant’s partner in crime. Since extrajudicial statements of a codefendant are regarded as having such infirmity that they are not admissible without independent proof of the corpus delicti, such proof may not consist of evidence having the same infirmity. The confrontation clause requires at a minimum that the people establish that there is a person described by the prosecution witness as the absent codefendant and that they made a good faith effort to produce him at trial. 46 Mich App 282; 207 NW2d 907 (1973) affirmed.
Opinion of the Court
1. Words and Phrases — Prima Facie Case — Evidence.
A "prima facie” case means evidence sufficient to justify, but not compel, an inference of liability, if the jury so finds.
2. Criminal Law — Evidence—Hearsay—Admissibility—Codefendant’s Statements — Concert of Action.
Testimony as to what a codefendant said outside of the defendant’s presence comes within a well-established exception to the hearsay rule and is admissible where a prima facie case of concert of action is made by the prosecutor.
3. Drugs and Narcotics — Heroin—Evidence.
Adequate facts to establish a prima facie case of defendant’s participation in a sale of heroin were in evidence where there was testimony in a trial for sale and possession of heroin that: (1) a police informant went to defendant’s restaurant, and arranged a sale of some pure heroin, (2) defendant asked the informant how much money she had and responded that $20 would be fine, (3) defendant told the informant he could get the heroin for her, (4) defendant left the restaurant and walked across the street to an apartment building, (5) a codefendant joined the informant while she was waiting in the restaurant, (6) defendant returned to the restaurant and walked directly to the kitchen in back of the restaurant, (7) defendant called the codefendant back to the kitchen and they engaged in conversation, (8) the codefendant returned, the informant gave him $20, and he passed a packet of heroin to her under the table, and (9) defendant emerged asking the informant if she would have herself together by 3 o’clock.
4. Criminal Law — Evidence—Admissibility—Acts of Codefendant —Concert op Action.
Whatever is said or done during the prosecution of a common unlawful enterprise by any one of several persons engaged in the enterprise is evidence against all the parties to the enterprise; acts and declarations of a codefendant in delivering heroin to a police informer were admissible against a defendant charged with sale and possession of heroin where a prima facie case of concert of action was established without the codefendant’s declarations.
5. Criminal Law — Evidence—Admissibility—Acts of Codefendant —Hearsay.
The act of a codefendant in delivering heroin to a police informer outside of the presence of a defendant charged with sale and possession of the heroin was not an “assertive” act sometimes excluded as hearsay when done outside the defendant’s presence, nor was it remote or irrelevant to the prosecution.
6. Criminal Law — Evidence—Admissibility—Concert of Action— Hearsay — Conspiracy— Agency.
Statements declared by a co-conspirator or one engaged in a concert of action are hearsay if used against another member of the conspiracy, but a widely recognized exception to the hearsay rule allows the use of those statements if the conspiracy is properly proven by evidence independent of the hearsay, under the rationale that the agency relation charges each conspirator with declarations and admissions of other conspirators.
7. Evidence — Non assertive Acts — Non assertive Conduct — Hearsay.
Nonassertive acts or conduct, i.e., acts or conduct which are not intended to be a means of expression, are not admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule — rather, they are not hearsay in the first place.
Dissenting Opinion
T. G. Kavanagh, C. J., and Levin, J.
8. Criminal Law — Evidence—Hearsay—Statements by Codefendant — Foundation.
Statements of a co-conspirator or coparticipant in the commission of a completed offense are not admissible unless there is independent evidence of the corpus delicti and of a concert of action between the declarant and the defendant.
9. Criminal Law — Evidence—Admissibility—Statements by Accomplice — Foundation.
Evidence aliunde of the commission of a crime and the connection of a defendant to the crime cannot consist of hearsay statements nor can it be established by testimony of the sole prosecution witness who would also report the statements allegedly made by a defendant’s partner in the crime; it must be adduced from another source, from outside.
10. Criminal Law — Constitutional Law — Confrontation Clause.
The Confrontation Clause requires at a minimum that the people establish the existence of an alleged accomplice of a defendant and that they made a good faith effort to produce him at trial before use of his hearsay statements may be made.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William L. Cahalan, Prosecuting Attorney, Patricia J. Boyle, Principal Attorney, Research, Training & Appeals, and Robert A. Reuther, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
State Appellate Defender Office (by Norris J. Thomas, Jr.), for defendant on appeal.

Opinion:
Coleman, J.
Howard Stewart was convicted in Recorder's Court of selling and possessing heroin. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Defendant claims the conviction should be reversed because the trial court did not reject certain testimony as hearsay. To the contrary, we find the testimony was properly admitted. The conviction is affirmed.
LaTonia Boldin was working as an agent for the Detroit police when defendant was arrested. The controversy concerns her appearance as a witness.
In chronological order, the testimony in question was:
(1) Mrs. Boldin went to defendant's restaurant, telling defendant she wanted a job to support her habit.
(2) When defendant asked when she could start work, Mrs. Boldin answered she could start as soon as she got her head together (i.e., got a fix).
(3) Defendant asked her what she "was on".
(4) Defendant suggested some "P" (pure heroin):
"A. (Mrs. Boldin): * M He says, 'Well, how about marijuana? I said, 'No.' I said, 'Because that's too mild.'
"He says, 'well, how about some P's?"
(5) Defendant asked Mrs. Boldin how much money she had, responding that the 20 dollars would be fine.
(6) Defendant told Mrs. Boldin he could get the "P" for her.
'A. (Mrs. Boldin): and I asked him, I says, 'Well, could you get it for me?' And he said yes."
(7) Defendant then left the restaurant, walking across the street to an apartment building.
(8) Junior joined Mrs. Boldin while she was waiting in the restaurant.
(9) Defendant returned to the restaurant, walking directly to the kitchen in back of the restaurant.
(10) Defendant called Junior back to the kitchen and they engaged in conversation.
(11) Junior returned and Mrs. Boldin gave him 20 dollars. Junior passed a packet of heroin to her under the table.
(12) Defendant emerged, asking Mrs. Boldin, "Do you think you'll have yourself together around 3 o'clock?"
In the kitchen, Junior was positioned so that Mrs. Boldin could not see what, if anything, passed to him from defendant, but concert of action can be established by circumstantial evidence. The conversations between defendant and Mrs. Boldin and defendant's and Junior's movements comprise sufficient circumstantial evidence, independent of Junior's conversation, to establish a prima facie case of concert of action.
Of notable impact is the fact that Mrs. Boldin did not tell Junior of the agreed purchase or price of the heroin, yet after Junior's return from speaking with defendant, he exchanged the packet of heroin for 20 dollars. Testimony concerning his conversation was not crucial to jury deliberation, although it did add flesh to the bare bones of the transaction.
In defendant's absence Junior introduced himself to Mrs. Boldin and asked whether she would be working at the restaurant and if defendant had gone. He asked her if she got high, to which she replied affirmatively. Junior then asked, "did Stewart go over to the apartment building to get some?"
After defendant returned to the restaurant and had spoken with Junior in the kitchen, Junior sat next to Mrs. Boldin at the counter and allegedly asked,
"Q. Do you have any money for me?
"A. What?
"Q. Do you have any money for me? Twenty dollars?
'A. Yeah."
Junior then told her to slip it up under the counter so no one would see her. She handed him the 20 dollars and he handed her a small tinfoil packet. She asked if that was all she was going to get and Junior replied, "Yeah, because Howard sells them real mellow P".
It was then that defendant came out and asked if she would have herself together by 3:00.
In our opinion, a prima facie case of concert of action was made by the prosecutor, so the conversation with Junior (an unnamed codefendant) comes within a well-established exception to the hearsay rule. Even without the hearsay, adequate facts to go to the jury were in evidence.
In 1867 Justice Christiancy stated:
"The general rule is well settled that, where several persons are engaged in one common unlawful enterprise, whatever is said or done by any one of them in the prosecution of the common enterprise, or while it is still in progress, is evidence against all the parties to it." People v Pitcher, 15 Mich 397, 403-404 (1867).
The challenged acts and declarations in this case were during the alleged concerted action, not before or after. A prima facie case of concert of action was established without any of Junior's declarations. The acts of Junior are not those "assertive" acts sometimes excluded (e.g., pointing, sign language) nor remote or irrelevant (e.g., collection of insurance as proof of death at sea). To the contrary, Junior's acts were relevant, immediate and constituted part of the transaction. His only crucial act outside of defendant's presence was passing the heroin to the witness who had been searched before entering the restaurant and who had the heroin when she emerged. We find no case in which a similar act was excluded.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized a valid distinction between acts and declarations of co-conspirators. In Lutwak v United States, 344 US 604; 73 S Ct 481; 97 L Ed 593 (1953), reh den 345 US 919; 73 S Ct 726; 97 L Ed 1352 (1953), the Court approved the use of a co-conspirator's acts against other members of the conspiracy although the conspiracy had ended. At the same time use of declarations was not allowed. The Court characterized the problem of declarations as one of hearsay:
"Therefore, the declarations of a conspirator do not bind the co-conspirator if made after the conspiracy has ended. That is the teaching of Krulewitch v United States [336 US 440; 69 S Ct 716; 93 L Ed 790], and Fiswick v United States [329 US 211; 67 S Ct 224; 91 L Ed 196 (1946)]. Those cases dealt only with declarations of one conspirator after the conspiracy had ended. They had no application to acts of a conspirator or others which were relevant to prove the conspiracy. True, there is dictum in Logan v United States [144 US 263, 309; 12 S Ct 617; 36 L Ed 429 (1892)], frequently repeated, which would limit the admissibility of both acts and declarations to the person performing them. This statement of the rule overlooks the fact that the objection to the declarations is that they are hearsay. This reason is not applicable to acts which are not intended to be a means of expression. The acts, being relevant to prove the conspiracy, were admissible, even though they might have occurred after the conspiracy ended. United States v Rubenstein 151 F2d 915, 917, 918 [CA 2, 1945]; see Fitzpatrick v United States, 178 US 304, 312, 313 [20 S Ct 944; 44 L Ed 1078, 1081, 1082 (1900)]; Ferris v United States 40 F2d 837, 839 [CA 9, 1930]."
Similarly, the necessity of proving a prima facie case of conspiracy is a problem arising out of the use of hearsay.
Statements declared by a co-conspirator (or one engaged in a concert of action) are hearsay if used against another member of the conspiracy. But, a widely recognized exception to the hearsay rule allows such use if the conspiracy is properly proven (prima facie) by evidence independent of the hearsay. People v Chambers, 279 Mich 73; 271 NW 556 (1937); People v Lewis, 264 Mich 83; 249 NW 451 (1933). The rationale is that the agency relation charges each conspirator with declarations and admissions of other co-conspirators. Lutwak v United States, supra. The same follows for certain acts of a co-conspirator. Acts or conduct not intended as assertive are not hearsay and, therefore, they are admissible. It should be noted that nonassertive acts or conduct are not an excep tion to the hearsay rule — rather, they are not hearsay in the first place.
In view of the circumstances absent Junior's statement, their safe bounds of relevancy and "indicia of reliability", the trial judge did not err in allowing the testimony about the absent co-defendant.
In addition, the nonassertive acts of the parties did not constitute hearsay and no error was committed in allowing a description to go to the jury.
We follow long recognized and necessary theories of criminal law as to this set of facts.
We affirm the conviction.
Williams and Fitzgerald, JJ., concurred with Coleman, J.
Lindemer and Ryan, JJ., took no part in the decision of this case.
" 'A "prima facie" case means, and means no more than, evidence sufficient to justify, but not to compel, an inference of liability, if the jury so find.' " Stewart v Rudner, 349 Mich 459, 474; 84 NW2d 816, 826 (1957).
"PRIMA FACIE CASE. Such as will suffice until contradicted and overcome by other evidence. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co v Wallace, 158 Or 210; 75 P2d 942, 947 [1938], A case which has proceeded upon sufficient proof to that stage where it will support finding if evidence to contrary is disregarded. In re Hoagland's Estate, 126 Neb 377; 253 NW 416 [1934]." Black's Law Dictionary, 1353 (rev 4th ed 1968).
For a somewhat similar case, see Sendejas v United States, 428 F2d 1040 (CA 9, 1970), cert denied, 400 US 879; 91 S Ct 127; 27 L Ed 2d 116 (1970) (hearsay declared to witness properly admitted to prove existence of conspiracy where evidence of how defendants reacted after being contacted by the witness reasonably established a prima facie case of conspiracy without considering any of the hearsay testimony). See also, United States v Bey, 437 F2d 188 (CA 3, 1971) (defendant's departure, declarant's arrival one-half hour later, and dialogue on price suggested union).
People v Heidt, 312 Mich 629; 20 NW2d 751 (1945); People v Roxborough, 307 Mich 575; 12 NW2d 466 (1943); People v Robinson, 306 Mich 167; 10 NW2d 817 (1943); People v Knoll, 258 Mich 89; 242 NW 222 (1932); People v Nankervis, 330 Mich 17; 46 NW2d 592 (1951); People v Chambers, 279 Mich 73; 271 NW 556 (1937); People v Woods, 206 Mich 11; 172 NW 384 (1919); People v Parker, 67 Mich 222; 34 NW 720 (1887).
Just as nonassertive conduct is not hearsay, neither are assertive declarations not offered to prove what is asserted. See Belvidere Land Co v Owen Park Plaza, Inc, 362 Mich 107; 106 NW2d 380 (1960); Koch v Production Steel Co, 344 Mich 161; 73 NW2d 323 (1955); McCormick's Handbook on the Law of Evidence, (E. Cleary ed 1972), pp 596-600. See also, Fed R Ev 801(a), 801(d)(2)(E) (to take effect July 1, 1975).
See Dutton v Evans, 400 US 74; 91 S Ct 210; 27 L Ed 2d 213 (1970).