Case Name: CLAY et al. v. WOOD et al.
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1895-12-18
Citations: 36 N.Y.S. 317
Docket Number: 
Parties: CLAY et al. v. WOOD et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 36
Pages: 317–324

Head Matter:
CLAY et al. v. WOOD et al.
(Supreme Court, General Term, First Department.
December 18, 1895.)
Wills—Construction.
Testator, after making specific devices arid bequests to bis wife and others, “gave, devised, and bequeathed” the residue of his estate to his wife, “and to her heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns forever.” The will further provided: “And it is my desire and request that my said wife do sustain, provide for, and educate L., the daughter of my said adopted daughter, J. And it is my further desire and request that my wife do make the said L., J., and my nephews and nieces * * * joint heirs, after her death, in the said estate which by this will I have bequeathed to my said wife.” Held, that the widow took the property absolutely; the provision of her husband’s will being simply a request, imposing no limitation on her estate, and creating no trust in favor of the persons therein named. Parker, J., dissenting.
Appeal from special term, New York county.
Action by George S. Clay and others against Lucretia M. Wood and others for partition, and, incidentally,, to construe the will of William W. Clay, deceased. The complaint was dismissed, and plaintiffs appeal.
Affirmed.
The facts are stated by Mr. Justice PARKER as follows:
William W. Clay died on the 21st of October, 1875, leaving a last will dated May 24, 1859. By the said will the testator devised and bequeathed his property as follows: First. He directed his debts and funeral and testamentary expenses to be paid, among which debts was included the mortgage then a lien on liis house and lot No. 23 West Thirty-First street, New York City, provided it should not be paid before his death. Second. He gave to his wife the said house and lot, and the household furniture, etc., contained in the house, and also the sum of $20,000, which sum was to be paid before any legacies thereinafter bequeathed. Third. He bequeathed to his two brothers, Caleb S. Olay and George Olay, and to his sister, Lucinda S. Olay, each the sum of $5,000. Fourth. He gave to his nephew William W. Olay, Jr., the son of his brother George Olay, $1,000, and one share of stock in a library association: to his nephew Edmund P. Olay, the son of his brother Caleb S. Olay, $500; and to his adopted daughter, Mrs. Josephine M. Wood, $3,000. He then provided, in case his estate was insufficient to pay these legacies in full after the payment of his debts, funeral expenses, and legacies to his wife, that these legacies should be reduced proportionably, and that in no case should they be a lien or charge upon the house and lot or household goods. The fifth clause, which occasions the controversy in this case, is as follows: “Fifth. All the rest, residue, and remainder of my estate, real, personal, and mixed, of which I shall or may die seised and possessed, or to which I shall be entitled at the time of my decease, after paying my debts and funeral expenses and testamentary expenses, and the legacies above bequeathed, I do give, devise, and bequeath to my beloved wife, Lucretia M. Olay, and to her heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns forever. And it is my desire and request that my said wife do sustain, provide for, and educate Lucretia M. Wood, the daughter •of my said adopted daughter, Josephine M. Wood. And it is my further desire and request that my wife do make the said Lucretia M. Wood, Josephine M. Wood, and my nephews and nieces, the children of my brothers, Caleb S. Olay and George Olay, joint heirs, after her death, in the said estate which by this will ! have bequeathed to my said wife.” Shortly after the death of William W. Clay, his widow, Lucretia M. Olay, made her will, by which she undertook to give all of the property to persons other than the children of Caleb S. Olay and George Clay. After the death of Lucretia M. Olay, and the probate of her will, this action was brought to obtain a judicial construction of the will of William W. Clay, deceased, late of the city and county of New York, 1 and for an accounting of the personal property bequeathed therein, and partition thereof, and for an account of the rents and profits, and partition of the real estate devised therein.
Argued before VAN BRUNT, P. J., and FOLLETT and PARKER, JJ.
John F. Dillon, for appellants.
James L. Bishop, for respondents.

Opinion:
VAN BRUNT, P. J.
I cannot concur in the conclusion arrived at by Mr. Justice PARKER in this case. It seems clear to me that it was not the intention of the testator to limit the estate which he had given, devised, and bequeathed to his wife in such absolute and'unmistakable terms by anything that was subsequently contained in the will. It seems to me idle to suppose that the testator in one breath should give to his wife all the rest, residue, and remainder of his estate, and to her heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns forever, and then, in the very next sentence, say that she should have only a life estate therein. The words do not require any such inconsistent action upon the part of the testator, and, in my judgment, such a limitation upon the estate given to the wife would be contrary to his intentions. In the very next sentence after having given to his wife all the residue of his estate as absolutely as it was possible for language to do so, using words of succession, which were not at all necessary, giving it to her heirs, executors,' administrators, and assigns forever, he says: "And it is my desire and request that my said wife do sustain, provide for, and educate Lucretia M. Wood, the daughter of my said adopted daughter, Josephine M. Wood. And it is my further desire and request that my wife do make the said Lucretia M. Wood, Josephine M. Wood, and my nephews and nieces, the children of my brothers, Caleb S. Clay and George Clay, joint heirs, after her death, in the said estate which by this will I have bequeathed to my said wife;" thus, in the very last words of the clause, declaring that he had given the estate to his wife. How can such language be construed to be a limitation upon an absolute gift? It is a request. He wished her to do it, but he did not intend to impose any obligation upon her so to do, unless she saw fit to comply with his desire and request. He did not intend to give these nephews' and nieces a vested interest in this estate. He put the title in his wife, and then he says: "When you get through with it, I would like to have you give it to the nephews and nieces." The testator did not give it to them. He did not intend to give it to them. He only made the request that his wife should do so, evidently intending to give her the option, if she saw fit, not to make such disposition of her estate, because it was hers,—he said it -was to be hers after his death; and it is the wife who is to give it,—a thing which the testator never attempted to do. In re Hamilton [1895] 2 Ch. 370.
The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
FOLLETT, J., concurs.