Case Name: William Harrigan, Resp't, v. The City of Brooklyn, App'lt
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1889-05-13
Citations: 24 N.Y. St. Rep. 352
Docket Number: 
Parties: William Harrigan, Resp’t, v. The City of Brooklyn, App’lt.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 24
Pages: 352–356

Head Matter:
William Harrigan, Resp’t, v. The City of Brooklyn, App’lt.
(Supreme Court, General Term, Second Department,
Filed May 13, 1889.)
Brooklyn (City of)—Presentation of claims against—Laws 1888, chap. 583, title 22, § 30—Construction of.
Tlie provision in. the act relating to the city of ’Brooklyn (Laws 1888, chapter 583, title 22, § 30), which provides that “ no action or special proceeding shall be prosecuted or maintained against the city of Brooklyn, unless it shall appear by, and as an allegation in the complaint or necessary moving papers, that at least thirty days have elapsed since the claim or claims upon which said action or special proceeding is founded, were presented, in detail and duly verified by. such claimant or claimants to the comptroller of said city, for adjustment, and that he has neglected or refused to make any adjustment or payment thereof for thirty days after said presentment. The comptroller may require any person presenting for settlement an account or claim against the city of Brooklyn, to be sworn before him touching such account or claim, and after being so' sworn to answer orally as to any facts relative to the justness of such account •or claim,” was intended for a case where the claim arises out of contract, and not to claims arising out of torts, for the reason that the comptroller has no power to compromise or pay such claims, and no useful purpose could therefore be served by serving the- same upon him. Barnard, J., dissenting.
This is an action brought by the plaintiff to recover for injuries sustained by him by reason of the negligence of the defendant.
By a special act which consolidated all local laws relative to the city of Brooklyn, there was enacted the following provision (chapter 583; Laws 1888, title 22, section 30):
“No action or special proceeding shall be prosecuted or maintained against the city of Brooklyn, unless it shall appear by, and as an allegation in the complaint or necessary moving papers, that at least thirty days have elapsed since the claim or claims upon which said action or special proceeding is founded, were presented in detail and duly verified by such claimant or claimants to the comptroller of said city for adjustment, and that he has neglected or refused to make any adjustment or payment thereof for thirty days after said presentment.
“ The comptroller may require any person presen ting for settlement an account or claim against the city of Brooklyn to be sworn before him touching such account or claim, and after being so sworn to answer orally as to any facts relative to the justness of such account or claim.”
The complaint in this action fails to contain any statement that the claim was presented to the comptroller, contending that the above provision was not intended to include actions for tort.
The defendant demurs, claiming that in actions for tort, the above provision applies, and that the complaint should contain an allegation to that effect."
The demurrer was overruled at special term, and this appeal is taken from the interlocutory judgment overruling the same.
Albert F. JenJes and William, T. Gilbert, for app’lt; James C. Church, for resp’t.

Opinion:
Pratt, J.
This contention involves the construction of section 30, title 22, chapter 583, of the Laws of 1888. There has been a similar provision in the charter of Brooklyn for many years, and it has been invariably held that the word " claim " referred to some account, or money demand, or contract, and not to claims arising out of torts, for the reason that the comptroller had no power to compromise or pay such claims, and, hence, an idle ceremony to present such claims to that officer.
The words of the statute are sufficiently broad to cover the case here presented, but seem to be qualified by the latter part of said section, where the words "account or claim " against the city are used synonymously, and this, together with the context, seems to imply that the statute was intended for a case where claim arises out of contract, and one where some useful purpose could be served, by serving the same upon the comptroller.
The case of Quinlan v. City of Utica (11 Hun, 217; affirmed by court of appeals, 74 N. Y., 603), is directly in point upon this question.
The case of Reining v. Buffalo (102 N. Y., 308; 2 N. Y. State Rep., 10), is not conclusive the other way upon this point, as it is upon'a widely different statute, to wit, the charter of the city of Buffalo. It is plain that the case of Gage v. Village of Hornellsville (106 N. Y., 667); 8 N. Y. State Rep., 885), upon a careful reading, is not in conflict with the Reining Case, as in the former case, it was held that section 3245 of the Code is construed as a re-enactment of section 2, chapter 262, of Laws of 1859, etc. See, also, McClure v. Supervisors of Niagara (3 Abb. Ct. App. Dec., 83; Howell v. City of Buffalo, 15 N. Y., 512; McGaffin v. City of Cohoes, 74 id., 387.
This word " claims or account," as used in charter of Brooklyn, has always been held by the local judges not to include a claim arising out of torts. It was recently so held by Mr. Justice Culler, also by city court opinion by Chief Justice Clement, in case of Corbin v. City of Brooklyn, whepe all the authorities are examined with great, care.
I am aware there are authorities that seem to hold a. different doctrine, such as Duryea v. Mayor (26 Hun, 324),. and Reed v. Mayor (31 Hun, 312). In the latter case, the-word " claim " was held to mean all kinds of claims, including one for personal injuries; but both of these cases-arose under the consolidation act of the city of New York, and under that act the comptroller has certain discretionary powers in such matters not conferred on the comptroller of' Brooklyn. A reason for such a rule exists in New York city which does not exist in Brooklyn.
This construction has been uniformly held for a number of years, and the last part of the section (30) seems to imply that such is a proper construction.
Judgment affirmed, with "costs.
Dykman, J., concurs.