Case Name: CORBETT v. HECK
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1969-12-10
Citations: 20 Mich. App. 708
Docket Number: Docket No. 2,991
Parties: CORBETT v. HECK
Judges: Before: Levin, P. J., and Holbrook and Danhoe, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 20
Pages: 708–719

Head Matter:
CORBETT v. HECK
Opinion op the Couet
1. Negligence — Fall—Bvbber Mat — Unreasonable Eisk — Directed Verdict.
Directed verdict for defendant was proper in a negligence action where plaintiff claimed that she sustained injuries when she left defendant’s business establishment, caught her heel in a rubber entrance mat, fell and broke her leg, but failed to establish proof of any unreasonable risk.
2. Negligence — Possessor op Land — Unreasonable Eisk.
A possessor of land is subject to liability for bodily harm caused to visitors by a natural or artificial condition on the land if, but only if, he knows or by the exercise of reasonable care could discover the condition which, if known to him he would realize as involving an unreasonable risk to them.
Eeferences por Points in Headnotes
'1] 38 Am Jur, Negligence §§ 344-361.
38 Am Jur, Negligence §§ 23-26, 97, 134.
'3, 5, 9] 38 Am Jur, Negligence §§ 134, 344-361.
A, 6] 38 Am Jur, Negligence § 34.
'7] 38 Am Jur, Negligence §§ 4, 131-138.
'8] 38 Am Jur, Negligence §§ 131-138.
AO] 38 Am Jur, Negligence § 211.
Dissenting Opinion
Levin, P. J.
3. Negligence — Doormat—Jury Question.
Whether a defendant exercised due care in using a v-link rubber doormat which could readily engage and dislodge the heel of a lady’s shoe is a jury question in a negligence action.
4. Negligence. — Evidence—Custom—Reasonable Care.
Evidence of a custom is no excuse and will not bar a plaintiff’s negligence action, but it is a factor which can be properly submitted to a jury on the question of whether a defendant exercised reasonable care.
5. Negligence — Property.—Occupiers—Glass Doors.
Occupiers of property have been found guilty of negligence in using unmarked glass doors or panels even though they are an accepted method of construction and it is common knowledge that they are used extensively.
6. Negligence — General Practice — Reasonable Care.
The fact that a negligent practice is general does not transform it into reasonable care.
7. Negligence — Proprietor.—Customers.
A proprietor of a business establishment is not an insurer of the safety of his customers but it is his duty to use due care to make them reasonably safe.
8. Negligence — Proprietor—Premises.
Failure of a proprietor of business premises to take reasonable precautions to make his premises reasonably safe is negligence.
9. Negligence — Reasonable Man — Doubtful Cases — Jury Question.
Negligence question of what a reasonable man would have done under the circumstances is to be determined in all doubtful cases by a jury.
10. Negligence — Contributory Negligence — High Heeled Shoes.
Whether wearing of high heeled shoes in conformity with feminine fashion constitutes contributory negligence is a jury question.
Appeal from Saginaw, Fred J. Borcliard, J.
Submitted Division 3 January 7, 1969, at Grand Rapids.
(Docket No. 2,991.)
Decided December 10, 1969.
Application for leave to appeal filed December 30, 1969.
Complaint by Maxine Delores Corbett against Erwin J. Heck for injuries sustained in a fall when leaving defendant’s place of business. Judgment for defendant. Plaintiff appeals.
Affirmed.
Joseph, J. Trogan, for plaintiff.
Stanton, Davidson & Carl (Robert C. Chálelos, of counsel), for defendant.
Before: Levin, P. J., and Holbrook and Danhoe, JJ.

Opinion:
Holbrook, J.
In this action plaintiff brought suit against defendant claiming damages arising out of a fall sustained by plaintiff on leaving defendant's business establishment on May 30, 1962.
Plaintiff testified that she had been in defendant's place of business two or three times before. The evidence indicates that plaintiff did not notice, on entering defendant's premises, a rubber mat located at the entrance. As plaintiff was leaving the premises she stepped down 4 in. from the floor level to the rubber mat in passing through the entrance door which was held by her husband, apparently caught her left heel in the mat and fell, breaking her leg. At the time of the fall, plaintiff was wearing 2 in. high-heeled shoes which were about 1/2 in. across on the bottom of each heel. At the close of plaintiff's proofs, defendant made a motion for directed verdict. The trial court in granting the motion stated:
"Examining the proofs in this matter as offered by the plaintiff in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, the court is of the opinion that the defendant's motion for a directed verdict should be granted.
"The court would rule that the plaintiff has not made a case for the jury and. that plaintiff did not prove any actionable negligence whatsoever.
"The negligence of the defendant in this case is predicated upon the theory, as the court sees it, that the defendant was bound to know the size of the heels of its customer's shoes and as a reasonably prudent man should have anticipated that the accident, as happened on the mat as testified to, was likely to happen to customers using reasonable care for their own safety.
"The court further finds from the evidence in this case that the mat as used as testified to in the case is an ordinary mat and is in common usage in this section of the country.
"The court finds that the mat in question is very similar to the mat used in the case of Nash v. Lewis (1958), 352 Mich 488, except as to the overall size as is indicated by plaintiff's exhibits 4, 5, 6 and 7.
"The court further finds that the complaint of the plaintiff does not indicate that there was anything inherently dangerous in the mat used in the entranceway except to state as follows from paragraph three of the complaint:
m £ke defendant negligently owned, placed and maintained a mat at the front entrance of said establishment at the time and place therein stated.'
"Numeral four:
" that said mat had many triangular shaped sections.'
"Numeral five:
a that the area inside the triangular shaped section was empty which created a space in each triangle,'
"Numeral six:
" ' that as plaintiff attempted to leave the premises of the said defendant and at said time and place the heel of her shoe was caught in said mat causing her to trip and to fall.'
"The court further finds that the standard of care as set forth in 2 Restatement of Law, Torts, Negligence, under the title of 'Business Visitor', § 343, is applicable in this case as the court rules it was applicable in Nash v. Lewis, and I quote:
" 'A possessor of land is subject to liability for bodily harm caused to visitors by a natural or artificial condition thereof, if, but only if, he knows or by the exercise of reasonable care could discover the condition which, if known to him, he would realize as involving an unreasonable risk to them.'
"And the court finds from the testimony in this case that plaintiff has not established proof of any unreasonable risk.
"The court would rule that to submit the case to the jury, on the proofs as offered by the plaintiff, would only lead to guess, speculation and conjecture on behalf of the jury.
"The court would rule that this was an unfortunate accident without negligence on behalf of the defendant from proofs as submitted by the plaintiff."
The applicable law governing this case is succinctly set forth in the cases of Humphries v. McCrory-McLellan Stores Corporation (CA 4, 1966), 358 F2d 901; Serinto v. Borman Food Stores (1968), 380 Mich 637; and Yearsley v. City Bank (1960), 361 Mich 574.
We conclude, after a careful review of the record, that the trial court did not commit error in granting defendant's motion for a directed verdict.
Affirmed. Costs to defendant-appellee.
Danhop, J., concurred,