Case Name: RUSSELL v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1913-06-18
Citations: 158 S.W. 546
Docket Number: 
Parties: RUSSELL v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 158
Pages: 546–548

Head Matter:
RUSSELL v. STATE.
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
June 18, 1913.)
1. Assault and Battery (§ 92 ) — Criminal Prosecutions — Evidence—Sufficiency.
Evidence showing that accused struck the prosecuting witness on the knuckles of one of her hands with a stick, with no evidence as to the size of the stick, or that the wounds of the prosecuting witness were serious, would not support a conviction for aggravated assault) as it failed to show that the stick was a deadly weapon, or that serious bodily injury was inflicted.
LEd. Note. — For other cases, see Assault and Battery, Cent. Dig. §§ 137-139; Dec. Dig. § 92. ]
2. Assault and Battery (§ 96 ) — Criminal Prosecutions — Instructions — Self-De-eense.
On a trial for aggravated assault, it was error to charge that every person was permitted by law to defend himself against unlawful violence to his person, but that, in exercising this right, he was only permitted to use such degree of violence as was reasonably necessary to protect himself against such unlawful violence, and that if accused in inflicting the injury charged acted in her own necessary self-defense against an assault made by the prosecuting witness, or to prevent .such assault, and used no greater force than was necessary to prevent such assault, she should be found not guilty, and to refuse instructions that a reasonable apprehension of bodily harm would excuse a party in using all necessary force to protect her person; that it was not necessary that there should be actual danger provided she acted upon a reasonable apprehension of danger as it appeared to her from her standpoint at the time; that in such case the party acting under such real or apparent danger was not bound to retreat or avoid the necessity of wounding her assailant; that if, when accused struct, the prosecuting witness had made, was making, and was about to make, an attack on accused, which, under the circumstances, caused her to have a reasonable expectation of bodily harm, and if acting thereunder she struck the prosecuting witness, she should be acquitted; that if the prosecuting witness was armed with a weapon, and the manner of its use such as were reasonably calculated to produce bodily harm, the' law presumed an intention to inflict bodily harm; that, if the prosecuting witness was making, had made, or was about to make an attack, accused had the legal right to strike back and use all necessary force to repel the attack, and that she would have the same right to defend her person against an attack made, or about to be made, without any weapon as against an attack with a weapon, except that the degree of force authorized would depend upon the character of the attack, the whole matter to be judged from accused’s standpoint, where there was evidence tending to show that the prosecuting witness was chasing accused when accused picked up a stick and struck the prosecuting witness, and that the prosecuting witness inflicted several wounds on accused’s body with a knife, since, if such were the facts, accused had a perfect right of self-defense without limitation, and was not bound to retreat or avoid more force than was necessary.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Assault and Battery, Cent. Dig. §,§ 142-150; Dec. Dig. § 96. ]
3. Criminal Law (§ 364 ) —Evidence — Res Gestas.
Where a few minutes after a fight and while a wound received in such fight was bleeding, and the party was laboring under the excitement incident to the fight, one of the parties made a statement to a physician as to the difficulty and how it occurred, such statement should have been admitted on such party’s trial for aggravated assault.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 805, 808-810, 813, 816-818; Dee. Dig. § 364. ]
4. Criminal Law (§ 448 ) — Evidence—Conclusions.
It was error to permit a witness to testify that he thought his license as a saloon keeper was forfeited by the authorities for the assigned reason that he was keeping a disorderly house, where it was not attempted to be shown that he, in fact, was keeping a disorderly house, or that the license was forfeited for that reason, since his testimony was merely an expression of opinion.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1035-1039,1041-1043,1045, 1048-1051; Dec. Dig. § 448. ]
Appeal from Jefferson County Court'; R. W. Wilson, Judge.
Amy Russell was convicted of aggravated assault, and she appeals. Reversed and remanded.
Blain & Howth, of Beaumont, for appellant. C. E. Lane, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
For other oases see same topic and section NUMBER in Deo. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep’r Indexes
For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
DAVIDSON, P. J.
Appellant was convicted of aggravated assault; her punishment being assessed at a fine of $50 and 90 days imprisonment in the county jail.
The complaint and information charged that she beat Chaney Thomas, wounding and bruising her with a club, and inflicted serious bodily injury upon her, and that the club was a deadly weapon. The evidence fails to show the size of the club or stick, and there is no evidence as to whether it was a deadly weapon or was not a deadly weapon, except the statement of facts simply shows the defendant struck Chaney Thomas on the knuckles of one of her hands with a stick. There is no evidence that the wounds were serious, and none offered to so show. Chaney Thomas testified that was the only bruise she had resulting from the fight. The evidence is very much in conflict as to who was the aggressive party. Chaney Thomas was armed with a knife, and inflicted several serious wounds upon the defendant. There is evidence that Chaney Thomas chased appellant, and that appellant fought back with the stick, and that Chaney Thomas during the fight .cut her several times. This is a sufficient general statement of the case, we think, to bring in review the questions raised.
Under this state of ease, appellant is not guilty of aggravated assault. There is no evidence that the stick was a deadly weapon, or that serious bodily injury was inflicted, and no attempt to show either. If appellant was the aggressive party, the assault under this record would not be of a more serious nature than simple assault. For this reason the judgment must be reversed. This matter is raised in several ways; and we deem it unnecessary to go further than to state that the evidence is not sufficient to support a conviction for aggravated assault, and, if the evidence upon another trial is such as developed by this record, the court should not submit the issue of aggravated assault to the jury. It is thought not necessary to cite authorities.
The court charged the jury in reference to self-defense "that every person is permitted by law to defend himself against any act of unlawful violence offered to his person, but in exercising this right of self-defense he is only permitted to use such degree of violence as is reasonably necessary to prevent or protect himself against such unlawful violence. Now if you believe from the evidence that the defendant in inflicting the injury upon the said Ghaney Thomas as charged in the complaint acted in her own necessary self-defense against an assault made by said Ghaney Thomas upon her, or to .prevent such assault, and that she did not use greater force than was necessary to prevent such assault, then you will find her not guilty." Objections were urged to this charge, and the following special requested instructions presented to the court, which were refused: "A reasonable apprehension of bodily barm will excuse a party in using all necessary force to protect her person, and it is not necessary that there should be actual danger, provided she acted upon a reasonable apprehension of danger as it appeared to her from her standpoint at the time, and in such case the party acting under such real or apparent danger is in no event bound to retreat in order to avoid the necessity of wounding her assailant. If from the evidence you believe the defendant struck the said Chaney Thomas, but further believe that at the time of so doing she had made an attack on her, or was making or about to make an attack on her, which' from the manner and character of it and the relative strength of the parties and the defendant's knowledge of the character and disposition of Chaney Thomas caused her to have a reasonable expectation of fear of bodily injury, and that, acting under such reasonable expectation or fear, the defendant struck Chaney Thomas, then you should acquit her; and if Chaney Thomas was armed at the time she was struck and was making such attack on defendant, and if the weapon used by her and the manner of its use were such as were reasonably calculated to produce bodily harm, then the law presumes that she intended to inflict bodily injury upon the defendant. In other words, if you believe Chaney Thomas was making, had made, or was about to make an attack on defendant, then you are instructed defendant had the legal right to strike back in her own defense and to use all necessary force to repel the attack upon her, and, if you so believe, you will acquit her, or, if upon this point you have a reasonable doubt, you will give her the benefit of such doubt and acquit her. And in this connection you are further instructed that she would have the same right to defend her person against an attack made or about to be, made without any weapon as she would against such attack with a weapon, except that the degree of force which she would be authorized to use would depend upon the character of attack made or about to be made, and the whole matter must be judged of from defendant's standpoint."
Appellant testified that "Chaney began to walk fast, and, when I crossed the street, I run, and Chaney run behind me, and this board was lying down there, and Chaney run at me, and I never did get to raise the thing up, when she run at me and hit me with her knife, and I dropped the stick." Beatrice Roberts testified: "Amy went on down the street, and Chaney gets up and goes down the street behind her. She had the knife in her hand." Charles Ainsworth testified: "I didn't see who struck the first lick. I saw Chaney Thomas running Amy Russell with a knife, and Amy running. The actual attack occurred round the corner from me." Under this testimony, which is rather a concrete statement of the case, the court's charge was wrong. If Chaney Thomas was chasing Amy Russell, and Amy Russell was trying to get the stick, and even did get it and strike her, she had the perfect right of self-defense without any limitation. She was not required to retreat or avoid more force than was necessary. Chaney Thomas was chasing her with a knife, and the facts show inflicted several sharp wounds upon the body of appellant with the knife. The court's charge was error, and the special charge requested by appellant more correctly presented the law applicable to the case.
Bill of exceptions was, reserved to the action of the court refusing to permit Dr. Winters to testify to a res gestae statement of appellant a few minutes after the difficulty. Dr. Winters was called in as physician a few minutes after the difficulty, and while the wound was bleeding and appellant laboring under 'the excitement incident to a fight of this sort She made a statement to Dr. Winters as to the difficulty, and how it occurred. If upon another trial it is offered under the circumstances stated, we are of opinion that it should be permitted to go to the jury. The bill is lengthy, and it is unnecessary here, we think, to state all the matters contained in the bill, but as presented we think it was a res gestae statement.
While the witness Ainsworth was on the stand testifying, over objections of -appellant, he was required to answer that his license as saloon keeper had been forfeited, and when asked if it was not forfeited for the assigned reason, that he was keeping a house of prostitution, he answered, "I think so." We are of opinion that this evidence as here presented upon another trial should not be permitted to go to the jury. This is but the statement of conclusion of the witness why he thought the authority forfeiting the license did so. It was not undertaken to show as a fact that appellant was keeping a house of prostitution in connection with his saloon, or that it was a disorderly house, or that as a fact it was for this reason forfeited. They were only proving by him the fact that his license had been forfeited, and that he thought the reason for it was that the forfeiting authority thought he had been using it as a disorderly house. It was but an expression of opinion on the part of the witness that he thought such was the reason. As that matter is presented in the bill, it should not have been permitted to go to the jury.
The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded.