Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. Ronald J. SUGAR
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1982-01-25
Citations: 408 So. 2d 1329
Docket Number: No. 81-K-0870
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Ronald J. SUGAR.
Judges: SCHOTT, J. ad hoc concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 408
Pages: 1329–1337

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. Ronald J. SUGAR.
No. 81-K-0870.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Jan. 25, 1982.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 19, 1982.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., John M. Mam-oulides, Dist. Atty., James D. Maxwell, Abbott J. Reeves, Asst. Dist. Attys., for plaintiff-appellee.
Camile F. Gravel, Jr., Helen G. Roberts, of Gravel, Robertson & Brady, Ralph L. Barnett, for defendant-appellant.

Opinion:
CALOGERO, Justice.
This defendant, Ronald J. Sugar, was convicted of aggravated burglary and sentenced to serve 21 years at hard labor.
During the voir dire, immediately before the prospective juror Ms. Martha Phillips was about to be sworn as a juror she asked whether it "might make a difference" that she was divorced from an Orleans Parish Assistant District Attorney. On questioning she testified that she had discussed eases with her former husband, had discussed his opinion randomly with him, had discussed crimes of violence, and had discussed a jury verdict with him on at least one occasion. She admitted that she tends to think "more on the side of the prosecution" because of discussions with her former husband. And in further response to a question she admitted that she could not say that these things she heard from her ex-husband would not prejudice her.
The defense thereupon challenged her for cause after which the trial judge allowed questioning by the assistant district attorney. He asked her only one question:
Q — "Now you've discussed this case with your husband, well not this case, but a lot of criminal cases. Well this is a completely different case. Could you sit there and decide this particular case only on the facts presented and not what you have discussed about other cases with your husband or other criminal cases what have you?
A — I can't answer yes.
Q — You can't. Okay."
The foregoing represents the entirety of the questioning of the prospective juror Martha Phillips after she alerted the Court to her predisposition toward the prosecution.
Immediately after the prosecutor's question quoted above the trial judge denied the challenge for cause, finding "that this juror is not to the point of prejudice against the defendant in this case." The defendant objected, then excused the juror peremptorily.
Before a defendant can complain that the trial judge denied a challenge for cause of a prospective juror, the defendant must have used all of his peremptory challenges. La.C.Cr.P. art. 800; State v. Lewis, 391 So.2d 1156 (La.1980); State v. Simmons, 890 So.2d 1317 (La.1980); State v. Jones, 376 So.2d 125 (La.1979); State v. McIntyre, 365 So.2d 1348 (La.1978); State v. Hysell, 364 So.2d 1300 (La.1978). The record in the instant case reveals that defendant did use all of his peremptory challenges. Therefore this matter is properly before us.
A trial judge is vested with broad discretion in ruling on a challenge for cause and his ruling will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of abuse of that discretion. State v. Lewis, supra; State v. Drew, 360 So.2d 500 (La.1978).
The fact that Ms. Phillips had been married previously to an assistant district attorney is not sufficient to sustain a challenge for cause. This Court has found nonprejudicial, denial of defense challenges for cause of relatives of law enforcement personnel when they have indicated that they could serve impartially and return a verdict without giving extra weight to the state's case. State v. Sonnier, 379 So.2d 1336 (La. 1979) (sister of sheriff in another parish); State v. Qualls, 353 So.2d 978 (La.1977) (wife of law enforcement officer); State v. Calloway, 343 So.2d 694 (La.1976) (aunt of police officer).
This juror, however, did not state that she could serve impartially. Instead, she said that she could not answer "Yes" when asked if she could decide this case on the facts presented. Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 797(2) sets forth as a basis for a challenge for cause that a juror is not impartial, whatever the cause of that impartiality. Ms. Phillips' answers preponderate in favor of the fact that she was not impartial.
The state suggests that nonetheless the defendant was not prejudiced. It is not necessary that a defendant show resulting prejudice to obtain a reversal of his conviction in a situation of this kind. He need only show (1) that he used all of his peremptory challenges and (2) that the trial judge incorrectly denied a challenge for cause. La.C.Cr.P. art. 800; State v. Sylvester, 400 So.2d 640 (La.1981); State v. Monroe, 366 So.2d 1345 (La.1978), appeal after remand 397 So.2d 1258 (La.1981). An erroneous ruling of a trial judge which deprives a defendant of one of his peremptory challenges does indeed affect a substantial right of the accused and therefore requires reversal of his conviction. La.C.Cr.P. art. 921; State v. Sylvester, supra; State v. Monroe, supra. The juror might possibly have been rehabilitated upon further questioning by the prosecutor or the trial judge. Unfortunately for the state, she was not. Reversible error occurred when the defense challenge for cause was denied.
Defendant's other assignments of error concern matters which are not likely to arise again; therefore we need not determine their merit. However, we do caution the prosecutor that he flirted with reversible error in his closing argument to the jury. Closing argument is to be limited to "evidence admitted, to the lack of evidence, to conclusions of fact that the state or defendant may draw therefrom, and to the law applicable to the case. The argument shall not appeal to prejudice." La.C.Cr.P. art. 774. The prosecutor's argument contained the following"
We can't let this happen in the community. We can't let people run around with guns. We can't let people attack women. We can't let that happen. It happens all the time. There is a man that does it.
As we said in State v. Hayes, 364 So.2d 923 (La.1978), the prosecutor may not turn closing argument into a plebiscite on crime.
Decree
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's conviction is reversed and the case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
SCHOTT, J. ad hoc concurs.
CHEHARDY, J. ad hoc dissents and assigns reasons.
Judges Patrick M. Schott, Lawrence A. Chehar-dy, and Denis A. Barry of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, participated in this decision as associate justices ad hoc, joined by Associate Justices Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., James L. Dennis, Jack C. Watson and Harry T. Lemmon.
. Defendant is alleged to have approached a young woman nearing the entrance to her apartment in Metairie, Louisiana, and forced his way inside by brandishing a pistol. His apparent object was a sexual encounter. He failed and fled, after the victim locked him out of the bedroom and jumped out of a window. He tried to, but did not, convince the jury that he had met the young woman at a lounge earlier in the evening, had gone to her apartment at her suggestion, only to find his sexual advance rebuffed when the young woman changed her mind and locked him out of the bedroom. The jury verdict, favorable to the state, was by a vote of 10-2.
. Earlier, as the fifth member of a group of six jurors called for voir dire, Ms. Phillips had responded to questions put to the group as a whole. She had said yes that she believed in the presumption of innocence, and that she would not let public opinion sway her in her determinations. She and the only other woman in that group of prospective jurors also said that they would not believe the victim over other witnesses merely because the victim was a young lady. These responses, except the last of course, were given to questions asked of the whole group of prospective jurors and, more significantly, came before Ms. Phillips revealed her bias.
. La.Const. art. 1, § 17 provides that an accused has a right to challenge peremptorily, and further provides that the number of challenges shall be fixed by law. La.C.Cr.P. art. 799 sets forth that in cases involving the death penalty or imprisonment necessarily at hard labor the defendant shall be allowed twelve peremptory challenges.
. In State v. Qualls, supra, the trial judge rehabilitated the prospective juror who said that she would give added credence to the testimony of a law enforcement witness because she was married to a law enforcement officer. After questioning by the judge the juror indicated that she could believe certain witness testimony over contradictory testimony by a police officer.