Case Name: David HALL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1983-11-23
Citations: 440 So. 2d 689
Docket Number: No. AS-7
Parties: David HALL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: SHIVERS, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 440
Pages: 689–691

Head Matter:
David HALL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. AS-7.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Nov. 23, 1983.
R. Larry Morris of Emmanuel, Sheppard & Condon, Pensacola, for appellant.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Richard A. Patterson, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Opinion:
MILLS, Judge.
In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the statutory presumption of impairment contained in Section 316.1934, Florida Statutes (Supp.1982), impermissibly shifts the burden of proof to a defendant to prove his innocence and whether, under the facts of this case, a violation of the rule in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), has occurred. We find no error and affirm Hall's conviction for driving under the influence of alcoholic beverages in violation of Section 316.-193, Florida Statutes (Supp.1982).
After his car was observed weaving along a public road, Hall was stopped and arrested for driving under the influence of alcoholic beverages. Deputy Bodry of the Es-cambia County Sheriff's Department read Hall his Miranda rights at the scene of the arrest. Approximately one hour and twenty minutes after the arrest, another officer asked Hall a series of questions contained in a questionnaire known as the Alcoholic Influence Report. He did not advise Hall of his Miranda rights again before asking these questions. At the conclusion of this series of questions, the officer administered an intoxilyzer test. The results showed that Hall had a blood alcohol level of 0.14%.
At trial, the jury was given the following charge in accordance with the Florida Standard Jury Instructions in Misdemeanor Cases:
If you find from the evidence . . [t]hat the defendant had .10% or more by weight of alcohol in his blood, it is prima facie evidence that the defendant was under the influence of alcoholic beverages to the extent that his normal faculties were impaired.
Hall contends that this instruction shifted the burden of proof to him to prove his innocence. We disagree. In State v. Kahler, 232 So.2d 166, 168 (Fla.1970), it was held:
Criminal acts declaring one fact prima facie evidence or presumption of another are frequent. Their purpose is not to relieve the State of the burden of proof, but to allow the establishment of a prima facie case. Constitutional guarantees are not violated as long as there is a rational connection between the fact proven and the ultimate fact presumed and reasonable opportunity is afforded to rebut the presumption.
There is a rational connection here between the fact proven (that Hall's blood alcohol level was 0.14%) and the ultimate fact presumed (that Hall was under the influence of alcoholic beverages to the extent that his normal faculties were impaired). Moreover, it is clear that Hall was not denied an opportunity to rebut the State's prima facie case. Section 316.-1934(2)(c), Florida Statutes (Supp.1982).
Nor did the trial court err in admitting into evidence Hall's responses to the questions contained in the Alcoholic Influence Report. It was unnecessary to read-vise Hall of his Miranda rights when he had just been advised of them such a short time before. State v. Williams, 386 So.2d 27 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
AFFIRMED.
SHIVERS, J., concurs.
ZEHMER, J., concurs specially with an opinion.