Case Name: LEAH J. KATZ, Executrix, etc., et al., Appellants, v. MARGARET D. WALKINSHAW, Respondent
Court: Supreme Court of California
Jurisdiction: California
Decision Date: 1903-11-28
Citations: 141 Cal. 116
Docket Number: L. A. No. 967
Parties: LEAH J. KATZ, Executrix, etc., et al., Appellants, v. MARGARET D. WALKINSHAW, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: California Reports
Volume: 141
Pages: 116–150

Head Matter:
[L. A. No. 967.
In Bank.—
November 28, 1903.]
LEAH J. KATZ, Executrix, etc., et al., Appellants, v. MARGARET D. WALKINSHAW, Respondent.
Water-Bights — Percolating Water — Artesian Belt — Biparian Bights.—An underground body of water lying in an artesian belt, which does not flow in any defined stream, but is produced by percolation through saturated soil, and is pressed forward by water accumulating from ravines, canons, and streams above, pressing down into the soil by percolation, is not a watercourse, and' is not governed by the law of riparian rights.
Id.—Bights of Owners of Percolating Water—Seasonable Use—Interference with Percolation.—Each owner of soil lying in á belt which becomes saturated with percolating water is entitled to a reasonable use thereof on his own land, notwithstanding such reasonable use may interfere with water percolation in his neighbors’ soil; but he has no right to injure his neighbors by an unreasonable diversion of the water percolating in the belt for the purpose of sale or carriage to distant lands.
Id.—Maxim Applicable.—The maxim, Sio utere tuo wt alienwm, non Iceias, is applicable as between adjoining users of percolating water, whenever justice requires its application.
Id.—Diversion from Artesian Belt for Sale—Injunction.—The owners of artesian wells sunk in an artesian belt of percolating water, the waters from which are necessary for domestic use and irrigation of their lands, on which are growing trees, vines, shrubbery, and other plants of great value, are entitled to an injunction to restrain the diversion of the water percolating in the artesian belt, by an owner of land situated in the belt, for the purpose of conveying the same to distant .lands for sale, to the irreparable injury of the plaintiffs.
Id.—Pleading—Subterranean Stream—Injury to Artesian Wells-Surplus age.—Where the complaint for the injunction stated in substance that plaintiffs had wells in their respective tracts, from which water flowed to the surface of the ground, which was necessary for domestic use and irrigation of their lands, and that the defendant by means of wells and excavations on her own lands drew the waters from plaintiffs’ lands and conveyed them to distant lands, it states a cause of action for an injunction to restrain the diversion of percolating water; and an averment that the diversion was from an underground stream may be regarded as surplusage.
Id.—Evidence—Improper Nonsuit.—Where the evidence supported the cause of action for wrongful diversion of percolating water from the lands of plaintiffs to their irreparable injury, a nonsuit should not have been granted, though the allegation of diversion from a subterranean stream was not proved.
Id.—Applicability op Common Law—Varying Conditions—Cessation op Rule.—Such parts of the common law of England as are not adapted to our condition, form no part of the law' of this state. The common law, by its own principle, adapts itself to varying conditions, and modifies its rules so as to subserve the ends of justice under different circumstances, and recognizes the principle embodied in section 3510 of the Civil Code, that “when the reason of a rule ceases, so should the rule.”
Id.—Rule as to Percolating Water Inapplicable.—The common-law rule that percolating water belongs unqualifiedly to the owner of the soil, and that he has the absolute right to extract and sell it, is not applicable to the conditions existing in a large part of this state, where artificial irrigation is essential to agriculture, and artesian wells in percolating belts are necessarily used for that purpose.
Id.—Difficulties in Preventing Diversion.—The difficulties that the courts will meet in securing persons necessarily using percolating water for irrigation by means of artesian wells from the infliction of great wrong and injustice by its diversion, if property right therein is recognized, cannot justify the court in abandoning the task as impossible. The courts can protect this particular species of property in water as effectually as water-rights of any other description.
Id.—Rules Applicable—Priority—Correlative Rights—Injunctions. —The rules respecting priority of appropriation and correlative rights in regard to the appropriation and use of percolating water include the right to appropriate any surplus not needed for use by well-owners on their lands, and an equitable adjustment of disputes between overlying landowners, where the supply is insufficient for all, and proper rules relative to injunctions and the remedy at law should be applied to the solution of questions arising in the courts as to such waters.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. John L. Campbell, Judge.
The main facts are stated in the opinion of the court on the original hearing in Bant. Further facts are stated in the opinion of the court on rehearing.
C. C. Haskell, Rolfe & Rolfe, and H. C. Rolfe, for Appellants.
One cannot divert surface, or underground, or percolating water to the injury of another, unless it is done to protect or benefit his own land. He cannot conduct it to a distance on other lands or divert it so as to injure his neighbor’s land, (Case v. Hoffman, 84 Wis. 438; Gould on Waters, 263; Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 43 N. H. 569; Sweet v. Cutter, 50 N. H. 439; Bartlett v. O’Connor, (Cal.) 36.Pac. Rep. 513; Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. St. 528 Herriman Irr. Co. v. Butterfield Min. etc. Co., 19 Utah, 453; Smith v. City of Brooklyn, 18 App. Div. 340; 46 N. Y. Supp. 147; Forbell v. City of New York, 56 N. Y. Supp. 790; 164 N. Y. 522. )
G. H. Gould, Amicus Curice, also for Appellants.
Percolating waters cannot be taken away from a soil-owner who has a beneficial use of them to his injury without beneficial use on the land of the taker. (City of Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, 124 Cal. 621, 644; Hanson v. McCue, 42 Cal. 303. ) Many equities in percolating water must be recognized and protected, and the first step toward a clear view of the subject should be in the direction of abolishing an antiquated and misleading formula.
Byron Waters, for Respondent; R. E. Houghton, for Riverside Water Company; E. W. Freeman, for Temescal Water Company; John E. Daly, and Henry J. Stevens, for Glendora-Azusa Water Company; Lucius K. Chase, for Corona City Water Company; Henry J. Stevens, for Citrus Belt Water Company; C. H. Wilson, for Corona Irrigation Company; M. B. Kellogg, for Gage Canal Company; Page, McCutchen, Harding & Knight, for Contra Costa Water Company; Houghton & Houghton, for Miller & Lux and Frederick Cox; Frank H. Short, Otis & Gregg, Howard Surr, Platt & Bayne, and Henley C. Booth, City Attorney of Santa Barbara, Amici Curice, also for Respondent.
The plaintiff can only recover on the cause of action alleged, which is for diversion of a subterranean stream, and not for diversion of percolating water. A plaintiff cannot recover on a different cause of action from that alleged. (Mandran v. Goux, 51 Cal. 151; Reed v. Norton, 99 Cal. 617, 619; Eastlick v. Wright, 121 Cal. 309; Kelly v. Plover, 103 Cal. 35; Riverside Water Co. v. Gage, 108 Cal. 240, 244; Rudel v. Los Angeles County, 118 Cal. 281, 286; Wallace v. Farmers’ Ditch Co., 130 Cal. 578, 583; Schirmer v. Drexler, 134 Cal. 134, 139.) The law of California is settled that percolating water belongs absolutely to the owner of the soil, with the right to use and divert it as the owner sees fit. (Hanson v. McCue, 42 Cal. 303; Painter v. Pasadena L. and W. Co., 91 Cal. 74, 82; Southern Pacific Co. v. Dufour, 95 Cal. 616; Gould v. Eaton, 111 Cal. 641; City of Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, 124 Cal. 597; Vineland Irr. Dist. v. Azusa Pl. Dist., 126 Cal. 486.) The California law on this subject accords with the great weight of American and English authorities. (27 Am. & Eng. Encvy. of Law, 425; Breuning v. Dorr, 23 Colo. 195; Wilson v. Ward, 26 Colo. 39; Roath v. Driscoll, 20 Conn. 533 ; Brown v. Ilius, 25 Conn. 593; S. C. 27 Conn. 84; Metcalf v. Nelson, 8 S. Dak. 180 Ill. 99; New Albany etc. R. R. Co. v. Peterson, 14 Ind. 116; 89; Deadwood Cent. R. Co. v. Barker, 14 S. Dak. 558; Tampa Waterworks Co. v. Cline, 37 Fla. 586 ; Saddler v. Lee, 66 Ga. 45 ; Warmack v. Brownlee, 84 Ga. 196; Edward v. Haeger, 180 Ill. 99; New Albany etc. R. R. Co. v. Peterson, 14 Ind. 116; Taylor v. Fickas, 64 Ind. 172 ; City of Emporia v. Soden, 25 Kan. 588; Kinnigird v. Standard Oil Co., 89 Ky. 473 ; Chase v. Silverstone, 62 Me. 175; Chesley v. King, 74 Me. 164; Greenleaf v. Francis, 18 Pick. 117; Wilson v. New Bedford, 108 Mass. 26; Davis v. Spalding, 157 Mass. 431; Upjohn v. Richland Twp., 46 Mich. 549 ; Ocean Grove C. M. Assn. v. Asbury Park, 40 N. J. Eq. 447; Ellis v. Duncan, 21 Barb. 230; Dehli v. Youmans, 50 Barb. 305; Goodale v. Tuttle, 29 N. Y. 459; Trustees of Dehli v. Youmans, 45 N. Y. 362; Bliss v. Greeley, 45 N. Y. 671; Johnstown etc. Co. v. Veght, 69 N. Y. 16; Phelps v. Nowlen, 72 N. Y. 39 ; Bloodgood v. Ayers, 108 N. Y. 400 ; Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 300; Elster v. Springfield, 49 Ohio St. 100; Taylor v. Welch, 6 Or. 199; Sullivan v. Mining Co., 11 Utah, 441; Crescent Min. Co. v. Silver King Min. Co., 17 Utah, 444, 451 ; Willow Creek Irr. Co. v. Michaelson, 21 Utah, 248 ; Chatfield v. Wilson, 28 Vt. 49; 31 Vt. 357; Harwood v. Benton, 32 Vt. 742, 737; Wheelock v. Jacobs, 70 Vt. 162 ; Miller v. Black Rock etc. Co., 99 Va. 747 ; Meyer v. Tacoma L. and P. Co., 8 Wash. 144, 147; Acton v. Blundell, 12 Mees. & W. 324; New River Co. v. Johnson, 2 El. & E. 405.)
36 Am. St. Rep. 937.
82 Am. Dec. 179.
9 Am. Rep. 276, and note.
64 Am.-Dec. 721, and note.
79 Am. St. Rep. 666.
10 Am. Rep. 299.
10 Am. Dec. 299.
52 Am. St. Rep. 201.
52 Am. Dec. 352.
71 Am. Dec. 49.
59 Am. St. Rep. 746.
53 Am. St. Rep. 262.
42 Am. Rep. 62.
31 Am. Rep. 114.
37 Am. Rep. 265.
25 Am. St. Rep. 545.
16 Am. Rep. 419.
43 Am. Rep. 569.
41 Am. Rep. 178.
6 Am. Rep. 100.
6 Am. Rep. 157.
25 Am. Rep. 125.
28 Am. Rep. 93.
2 Am. St. Rep. 443.
70 Am. St. Rep. 810.
81 Am. St. Rep. 687.
67 Am. St. Rep. 659, and note.
86 Am. St. Rep. 924.

Opinion:
SHAW, J.—
A rehearing was granted in this case for the purpose of considering more fully, and by the aid of such additional arguments as might be presented by persons not parties to the action, but vitally interested in the principle involved, a question that is novel and of the utmost importance to the application to useful purposes of the waters which may be found in the soil.
Petitions for rehearing were presented not only in behalf of the defendant, but also on behalf of a number of corporations engaged in the business of obtaining water from wells and distributing the same for public and private use within this state, and particularly in the southern part thereof. Able and exhaustive briefs have been filed on the rehearing. The principle decided by the late Justice Temple in the former opinion, and the course of reasoning by which he arrived at the conclusion, have been attacked in these several briefs and petitions with much learning and acumen. It is proper that we should here notice some of the objections thus presented.
It is urged, in the first place, that the decision goes beyond the case that was before the court; that the pleadings stated a cause of action solely for the diversion of water from an alleged underground stream, and that, therefore, there was no occasion for a discussion of the principles governing the rights to waters of the class usually denominated percolating waters. The proposition is not tenable. The complaint, in substance, states that the plaintiffs had wells upon their respective tracts of land, from which water flowed to the surface of the ground; that the water was necessary for domestic use and irrigation on the lands on which they were situate; that the defendant, by means of other wells and excavations upon another tract of land in the vicinity prevented any water from flowing through the plaintiffs' wells to their premises, and that this was done by drawing off the water through the wells of the defendant, taking it to a distant tract and there using it. If the principle is correct that the defendant cannot thus, and for this purpose, take from the plaintiffs' wells the percolating waters from which they are supplied, then no further allegations were necessary, and the averment that the water constituted part of an underground stream may be regarded as surplusage. The complaint was thus treated in the opinion of Justice Temple, and he properly considered the question whether or not, eliminating the surplus allegation that there was an underground stream, the complaint stated a cause of action which was sustained by the evidence. The fact that the court below supposed that the existence of a stream of water was necessary to make the diversion of the water an actionable wrong does not limit this court to the same view, if it be erroneous. If enough of the facts which are set forth in the complaint are established by the evidence, without substantial conflict, to constitute a good cause of action, then the nonsuit should not have been granted, although other allegations are not proven.
Many arguments, objections, and criticisms are presented in opposition to the rules and reasoning of the former opinion. It is contended that the rule that each landowner owns absolutely the percolating waters in his land, with the right to extract, sell, and dispose of them as he chooses, regardless of the results to his neighbor, is part of the common law, and as such has been adopted in this state as the law of the land by the statute of April 13, 1850, (Stats. 1850, 219,) and by section 4468 of the Political Code, and that, consequently, it is beyond the power of this court to abrogate or change it; that the question comes clearly within the doctrine of stare decisis; that the rule above stated has become a rule of property in this state upon the faith of which enormous investments have been made, and that it should not now be departed from, even if erroneous; that even if the question were an open one, the adoption of the doctrine of correlative rights in percolating waters would hinder or prevent all further developments or use of underground waters, and endanger or destroy developments already made, thus largely restricting the productive capacity and growth of the state, and that, therefore, a sound public policy and regard for the general welfare demand the opposite rule; that the doctrine of reasonable use of percolating waters would require an equitable distribution thereof among the different landowners and claimants who might have rights therein, that this would throw upon the courts the duty and burden of regulating the use of such waters and the flow of the wells or tunnels, which would prove a duty impossible of performance; and, finally, that if this rule is the law as to percolating waters, it must for the same reason be the law with regard to the extraction of petroleum from the ground, and, if so, it would entirely destroy the oil development and production of this state, and for that reason also that it is against public policy and injurious to the general welfare.
The idea that the doctrine contended for by the defendant is a part of the common law adopted by. our statute, and beyond the power of the court to change or modify, is founded upon a misconception of the extent to which the common law is adopted by such statutory provisions, and a failure to observe some of. the rules and principles of the common law itself. In Crandall v. Woods, 8 Cal. 143, the court approved the following rule, quoting from the dissenting opinion of Bronson, J., in Starr v. Child, 20 Wend. 159: "I think no doctrine better settled than that such portions of the law of England as are not adapted to our condition form no part of the law of this state. This exception includes not only such laws as are inconsistent with the spirit of our institutions, but such as are framed with special reference to the physical condition of a country differing widely from our own. It is contrary to the spirit of the common law itself to apply a rule founded on a particular reason to a case where that reason utterly fails." This quotation was subsequently ap-proved by the New York court of appeals. (People v. Appraisers, 33 N. Y. 461.) The same doctrine was followed in the case of English v. Johnson, 17 Cal. 116. In Pennsylvania and West Virginia, under similar statutes, it was held' that only such parts of the" common law as were applicable to the local situation of the particular state were in force (Carson v. Blazer, 2 Binn. 484; Powell v. Sims, 5 W. Va. 4 ), and this is the rule in all the states upon the question, irrespective of statutory adoption. (Commonwealth v. Knowlton, 2 Mass. 534; State v. Rollins, 8 N. H. 560; Pierce v. State, 13 N. H. 542; Currier v. Perley, 24 N. H. 223; Dennett v. Dennett, 43 N. H. 499; Van Ness v. Pacard, 2 Pet. 144; Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 659; Bloom v. Richards, 2 Ohio St. 391.)
The true doctrine is, that the common law by its own principles adapts itself to varying conditions, and modifies its own rules so as to serve the ends of justice under the different circumstances, a principle adopted into our code by section 3510 of the Civil Code: "When the reason of a rule ceases, so should the rule itself." This is well stated in Morgan v. King, 30 Barb. 16: "We are not bound to follow the letter of the common law, forgetful of its spirit; its rule instead of its principle. A rule of law applicable to the fresh-water streams of England may be wholly inapplicable to freshwater streams in this country of the same nature and character, because of different capacity, or because the adjoining country may furnish a commerce for them unknown in England, and yet be subject to the same principle. If so, the common law modifies its rules upon its own principles, and conforms them to the wants of the community, the nature, character, and capacity of the subject to which they are to be applied." In Beardsley v. Hartford, 50 Conn. 542, the court says: "It is a well-settled rule that the law varies with the varying reasons on which it is founded. This is expressed by the maxim: 'Cessante ratione, cessat ipsa lex.' This means that no law can survive the reasons on which it is founded. It needs no statute to change it; it abrogates itself. If the reasons on which a law rests are overborne by opposing reasons, which, in the progress of society, gain controlling force, the old law, though still good as an abstract principle, and good in its application to some circumstances, must cease to apply or to be a controlling principle to the new circumstances." Accordingly, in many instances in this country, in states where the common law is held to be in force, some of its rules are held to be not applicable to the conditions different from the place of its origin. (Connolly v. Goodwin, 5 Cal. 221; Ricketts v. Johnson, 8 Cal. 36; United States v. McCarthy, 18 Fed. 89; 21 Blatchf. 469; Bovard v. Kettering, 101 Pa. St. 185; Haywood v. Shreve, 44 N. J. L. 96; Green v. Liter, 8 Cranch, 249; Cole v. Lake, 54 N. H. 286; Pettingill v. Rideout, 6 N. H. 454; Boston and W. R. C. v. Dana, 1 Gray, 97; Lindsley v. Coats, 1 Ohio, 243; Stoever v. Whitman, 6 Binn. 420; Dawson v. Coffman, 28 Ind. 223; Wagner v. Bissell, 3 Iowa, 496; Reaume v. Chambers, 22 Mo. 54; Seeley v. Peters, 10 Ill. 130; Collins v. Chartiers V. G. Co., 131 Pa. St. 143, in which case this same doctrine of the absolute ownership in percolating water was modified; Harris v. Harrison, 93 Cal. 676, and Wiggins v. Muscupaibe Co., 113 Cal. 182, in which last-mentioned cases the common law respecting riparian rights was said to have been modified in this state to suit our peculiar conditions.) Whenever it is found that, owing to the physical features and character of this state, and the peculiarities of its climate, soil, and productions, the application of a given common-law rule by our courts tends constantly to cause injustice and wrong, rather than the administration of justice and right, then the fundamental principles of right and justice on "which that law is founded, and which its administration is intended to promote, require that a different rule should be adopted, one which is calculated to secure persons in their property and possessions, and to preserve for them the fruits of their labors and expenditures. The question whether or not the rule contended for is a part of the common law applicable to this state depends on whether it is suitable to our conditions under the rule just stated.
It is necessary, therefore, to state the conditions existing in many parts of this state which are different from these existing where the rule had its origin. In a large part of the state, and in almost all of the southern half of it, particularly south of the Tehachapi range of mountains, aside from grains, grasses, and some scant pasturage, there is practically no production by agriculture except by means of artificial irrigation. In a few places favored by nature crops are nourished by natural irrigation, due to the existence underneath the ordinary soil of a saturated layer of sand or gravel, but these places are so few that they are of no consequence in any general view of the situation. Irrigation in these regions has always been customary, and under the Spanish and Mexican governments it was fostered and encouraged. Even in the earlier periods of the settlement of the country, after its acquisition by the United States, and while the population was sparse and scattered compared to the present time, the natural supply of water from the surface streams, as diverted and applied by the crude and wasteful methods then used, was not considered more than was necessary. As the population increased, better methods of diversion, distribution, and application were adopted, and the streams were made to irrigate a very much larger" area of land. While this process was going on a series of wet years augmented the streams, and still more land was put under the irrigating systems. Recently there has followed another series of very dry years, which has correspondingly diminished the flow of the streams. After this period began it was soon found that the natural streams were insufficient. The situation became critical, and heavy loss and destruction from drought was imminent. Still the population continued to increase, and with it the demand for more water to irrigate more land. Recourse was then had to the underground waters. Tunnels were constructed, more artesian wells bored, and finally pumps driven by electric or steam power were put into general use to obtain sufficient water to keep alive and productive the valuable orchards planted at the time when water was supposed to be more abundant. The geological history and formation of the country is peculiar. Deep borings have shown that almost all of the valleys and other places where water is found abundantly in percolation were formerly deep cafions or basins, at the bottoms of which anciently there were surface streams or lakes. Gravel, bowlders, and occa sionally pieces of driftwood have been found near the coast far below tide-level, showing that these sunken stream-beds were once high enough to discharge water by gravity into the sea. These valleys and basins are bordered by high mountains, upon which there falls the more abundant rain. The deep eañons or basins in course of ages have become filled with the washings from the mountains, largely composed of sand and gravel, and into this porous material the water now running down from the mountains rapidly sinks and slowly moves through the lands by the process usually termed percolation, forming what are practically underground reservoirs. It is the water thus held or stored that is now being taken to eke out the supply from the natural streams. In almost every instance of a water supply from the so-called percolating water, the location of the well or tunnel by which it is collected is in one of these ancient eañons or lake basins. Outside of these there is no percolating water in sufficient quantity to be of much importance in the development of the country or of sufficient value" to cause serious litigation. It is usual to speak of the extraction of this water from the ground as a development of a hitherto unused supply. But it is not yet demonstrated that the process is not in fact, for the most part, an exhaustion of the underground sources from which the surface streams and other supplies previously used have been fed and supported. In some cases this has been proven by the event. The danger of exhaustion in this way threatens surface streams as well as underground percolations and reservoirs. Many water companies, anticipating such an attack on their water supply, have felt compelled to purchase, and have purchased, at great expense, the lands immediately surrounding the stream or source of supply, in order to be able to protect and secure the percolations from which the source was fed. Owing to the uncertainty in the law, and the absence of legal protection, there has been no security in titles to water-rights. So great is the scarcity of water under the present demands and conditions that one who is deprived of water which he has been using has usually no other source at hand from which he can obtain another supply.
The water thus obtained from all these sources is now used with the utmost economy, and is devoted to the production of. citrus and other extremely valuable orchard and vineyard .crops. The water itself, owing to the tremendous need, the valuable results from its application, and the constant effort to plant more orchards and vineyards to share in the great profits realized therefrom, has become very valuable. In some instances it has been known to sell at the rate of fifty thousand dollars for a stream flowing at the rate of one cubic foot per second. Notwithstanding the great drain on the water supply, the economy in the distribution and application, and the much larger area of land thereby brought under irrigation, there still remain large areas of rich soil which are dry and waste for want of water. This abundance of land, with the scarcity and high price of water, furnish a constant stimulus to the further exhaustion of the limited amount of underground water, and a constant temptation to invade sources already appropriated. The charms of the climate have drawn, and will continue to draw, immigrants from the better classes of the eastern states, composed largely of men of experience and means, energetic, enterprising, and resourceful. With an increasing population of this character, it is manifest that nothing that is possible to be done to secure success will be left undone, and that there must ensue in years to come a fierce strife, first to acquire and then to hold every available supply of water.
It is scarcely necessary to state the conditions existing in other countries referred to, to show that they are vastly different from those above stated. There the rainfall'is abundant, and water, instead of being of almost priceless value, is a substance that in many instances is to be gotten rid of rather than preserved. Drainage is there an important process in the development of the productive capacity of the land, and irrigation is unknown. The lands that from their situation in this country are classed as damp lands would in those countries be either covered by lakes or would be swamps and bogs. If one is deprived of water in those regions, there is usually little difficulty in obtaining a sufficient supply near by, and at small expense. The country is interlaced with streams of all sizes from the smallest brooklet up to large navigable rivers, and the question of the water supply has but little to do with the progress or prosperity of the country.
It is clear also that the difficulties arising from the scarcity of water in this country are by no means ended, but, on the contrary, are probably just beginning. The application of the rule contended for by the defendants will tend to aggravate these difficulties rather than solve them. Traced to its true foundation, the rule is simply this: that owing to the difficulties the courts will meet in securing persons from the infliction of great wrong and injustice by the diversion of percolating water, if any property right in such water is recognized, the task must be abandoned as impossible, and those who have valuable property acquired by and dependent on the use of such water must be left to their own resources to secure protection for their property from the attacks of their mofe powerful neighbors, and failing in this, must suffer irretrievable loss; that might is the only protection.
" The good old rule Sufficeth them, the simple plan,
That they should take who have the power,
And they should keep who can."
The field is open for exploitation to every man who covets the possessions of another or the water which sustains and preserves them, and he is at liberty to take that water if he has the means to do so, and no law will prevent or interfere with him or preserve his victim from the attack. The difficulties to be encountered must be insurmountable to justify the adoption or continuance of a rule which brings about such consequences.
The claim that the doctrine stated by Mr. Justice Temple is contrary to all the decisions of this court is not sustained by an examination of the cases. The decisions have not been harmonious, and in many of them what is said on this subject is mere dicttwi. A brief review of the cases will demonstrate this to be true. In Hanson v. McCue, 42 Cal. 303, —the first case on the subject,-—it was not necessary for the court to say anything at all with respect to the right of a. landowner to complain of a diversion of percolating waters. McCue's predecessor had made a ditch leading from a spring on his land across a tract of land belonging to Hanson's predecessor, and terminating upon another tract, also owned by McCue's pre decessor, through which ditch he conducted water from the spring across the Hanson tract to his other land. This ditch in its course over Hanson's land leaked water in such quantities that it collected into a stream, which Hanson used for irrigation. This was the only foundation for the right which Hanson had or claimed to the water. The court properly held that he had no right to the waste water and that McCue was not bound to continue to maintain the artificial stream for Hanson's benefit, but could by any means he chose change the use of the spring and the course of the ditch. The fact that the change was made by intercepting the percolating water which fed the stream was not material to the case, and all that is said as to the right to do so is dictum. The opinion, however, does, though unnecessarily, announce and approve the doctrine contended for by the respondent here. Huston v. Leach, 53 Cal. 262, decides only that the phrase "waters of said springs," in the decree of the court meant defined streams running into or issuing from the springs, and did not include the percolations which fed the springs. Hale v. McLea, 53 Cal. 578, referred to a well-defined though very small underground stream, flowing through fissures in the rocks, and has no relation to ordinary percolating water. The court held that the defendant could not cut off the entire stream, and at most could only use a reasonable portion thereof as an upper riparian owner. In Gross v. Kitts, 69 Cal. 217, the court in its opinion, again by way of dictum, announces the doctrine that the owner of the soil is the absolute owner of the percolating water therein; but the decision is against this doctrine. It is a ease of the court announcing one doctrine and deciding the contrary. The plaintiff, through a grant from defendant's predecessor, owned a right to take water on defendant's mining claim by means of a tunnel which served to collect the percolating water into a small stream of two miner's inches, which flowed out of the tunnel and was conducted by pipes to plaintiff's premises. This court decided that the defendant had no right to cut off the percolations which fed the stream issuing from the tunnel, although this was done in the legitimate work of mining his own land. The decision is in direct conflict with the dictum in Hanson v. McCue, 42 Cal. 303, and is in accord with the principles laid down by Justice Temple. It can only be distinguished upon the ground that the defendant was estopped by the grant of his predecessor to use the land so as to destroy the water-right granted—a distinction which is not mentioned or referred to in the opinion. The distinction made in the opinion, and upon which the decision in Cross v. Kitts, is based, is, that when percolating waters are gathered into a defined stream by means of a tunnel, the stream is property, and as such it is protected by law from injury or destruction by the diversion of such percolating water before it reaches the tunnel. There can be no distinction in law or reason between a stream consisting of percolating waters gathered together by means of a tunnel and one gathered by means of an artesian well. Therefore, the case supports Justice Temple's conclusion. The only point bearing upon the ease at bar that was decided in Painter v. Pasadena L. and W. Co., 91 Cal. 74, is, that the right of the owner of land to the water percolating therein may be reserved in a grant of the land, and that this right to such reserved water may subsequently be transferred. It does not touch the question of the extent of the right of the landowner to such water, as against the adjoining proprietors or others claiming rights in it. In Southern Pacific B. B. Co. v. Dufour, 95 Cal. 616, the decision was put upon the ground that the excavation of defendant, which caused the diversion of percolating water of which plaintiff complained, was made upon defendant's own land for the purpose of obtaining the water for the better use of the land, which it was held he had a right to do, although it destroyed the spring or stream claimed by the plaintiff. The dictum of Hanson v. McCue was approved. The decision seems to be in conflict with Cross v. Kitts, although the latter case is not mentioned. In Gould v. Eaton, 111 Cal. 639, the court below found that the tunnel complained of gathered and discharged a stream of water of which all except one and forty-three hundredths miner's inches was gathered from percolating waters in the sandstone, which did not come from the channel of the natural stream. It was this excess only which was in issue. The finding that it was percolating water was held to be conclusive upon the appellate court. It appeared that some of the percolating water thus developed would, if not interrupted, have reached the natural stream. The court adopts and approves the dictum of Hanson v. McCue, and holds that the plaintiff had no legal right to enjoin a diminution of the natural stream caused by a diversion of percolating water before it reached the channel. In Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, 124 Cal. 622, an instruction of the court below stating the dictum of Hanson v. McCue, was criticised by the appellants, not for the reason that it restated that doctrine, but upon the ground that it did not class as percolating waters all such water as might be found' in the sand or soil underneath the bed of a stream or adjacent thereto. So far as it restated the doctrine of Hanson v. McCue, it was favorable to the appellants, and, therefore, they did not object to that part of it. The court held that it was not subject to criticism on the ground that it did not properly define percolating waters. The decision, however, cannot be taken as an approval of the doctrine of Hanson v. McCue. In so far as that doctrine was stated, it being favorable to appellants, it was not presented for consideration to the appellate court. The objection of the appellants, and the point considered by the appellate court, was that the instruction departed from the rule quoted in Hanson v. McCue. Inasmuch as the writer of this opinion was also the writer of the instruction under consideration, it may be proper to say that he did not give the instruction because he approved that part of it restating the doctrine of Hanson v. McCue. The instruction was given because an instruction embodying that doctrine had been requested by the appellants in the case, and the respondents, the plaintiffs, believing that it would not materially affect the verdict, consented that that part should be given in substance, rather than take the chances of a reversal of the case, should the supreme court hold its refusal to be erroneous. The remarks of the court in Vineland District v. Azusa Distnct, 126 Cal. 494, giving the ordinary definition of percolating waters, and stating the rule contended for by the defendant as apply ing thereto, call for no discussion. The court was referring to this solely for the purpose of giving the proper meaning to the word "percolating" as used in the findings, and to show that the word was not there used to designate waters which were not a part of the subterranean stream under consideration. In Bartlett v. O'Connor, 36 Pac. (Cal.) 513, the defendants, with the intent to injure the plaintiff, attempted to reclaim their lands by drawing off the percolating water through an artificial ditch away from the natural stream. It appeared that this could have been done as well by deepening the natural channel of the stream. It was held to be an unlawful diversion. This comprises all the cases on the subject.
Excluding the cases in which the statement of the doctrine of absolute ownership is dictwm, and looking to what has been actually decided, we have remaining only Cross v. Kitts, 69 Cal. 217, holding that the owner of a mining claim, whose predecessor had granted a stream made up of percolating water collected by means of a tunnel, could not, even in the ordinary mining of his own land, interfere with the flow of the percolating water to the tunnel; Southern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Dufour, 95 Cal. 616, holding that a landowner can divert, for use on his own land, percolating water which feeds a spring rising on the land and flowing to an adjoining owner, although the diversion destroys the spring; Bartlett v. O'Connor, 36 Pac. (Cal.) 513, holding that such a diversion cannot be made in the process of draining the land for reclamation, where the draining and reclamation can be accomplished by another mode without diminishing the stream, and the mode used is adopted with the intention to injure the lower proprietor; and Gould v. Eaton, 111 Cal. 639/ declaring, in effect, that percolating water may be prevented from reaching a natural stream to the injury of a riparian owner, although the percolations are neither taken for use on the land where the diversion is made, nor in the use or reclamation of the land, but for use on other land distant from both the stream and the percolations. In view of this conflicting and uncertain condition of the authorities, it cannot be successfully claimed that the doctrine of absolute ownership is well established in this state. It is proper to state that in all the opinions which have so readily quoted and approved the supposed common-law rule, that injuries from interference with percolating waters were too obscure in origin and cause, too trifling in extent, and relatively of too little importance, as compared to mining industries and the wants of large cities, to justify or require the recognition by the courts of any correlative rights in such waters, or the redress of such injuries, there has been no notice at all taken of the conditions existing here, so radically opposite to those prevailing where the doctrine arose. It is also to be observed that in some instances in the eastern states, mentioned in the former opinion in this case, the injustice from the diversion of percolating waters has been so glaring and so extensive that the court there was compelled to depart from its previously decided cases and recognize the rights of adjoining owners.
We do not see how the doctrine contended for by defendant could ever become a rule of property of any value. Its distinctive feature is the proposition that no property rights exist in such waters except while they remain in the soil of the landowner; that he has no right either to have them continue to pass into his land, as they would under natural conditions, or to prevent them from being drawn out of his land by an interference with natural conditions on neighboring land. Such right as he has is therefore one which he cannot protect or enforce by a resort to legal means, and one which he cannot depend on to continue permanently or for'" any definite period.
It is apparent that the parties who have asked for a reconsideration of this case, and other persons of the same class, if the rule for which they contend is the law, or no law, of the land, will be constantly threatened with danger a,f utter destruction of the valuable enterprises and systems of waterworks which they control, and that all new enterprises of the same sort will be subject to the same peril. They will have - absolutely no protection in law against others having stronger pumps, deeper wells, or a more favorable situation, who can thereby take from them unlimited quantities of the water, reaching to the entire supply, and without regard to the place of use. We cannot perceive how a doctrine offering so little protection to the investments in and product of such enterprises, and offering so much temptation to others to capture the water on which they depend, can tend to promote developments in the future or preserve those already made, and, therefore, we do not believe that public policy or a regard for the general welfare demands the doctrine. An ordinary difference in the conditions would scarcely justify the refusal to adopt a rule of the common law, or one which has been so generally supposed to exist; but where the differences are so radical as in this case, and would tend to cause so great a subversion of justice, a different rule is imperative.
The doctrine of reasonable use, on the other hand, affords some measure of protection to property now existing, and greater justification for the attempt to make new developments. It limits the right of others to such amount of water as may be necessary for some useful purpose in connection with the land from which it is taken. If, as is claimed in the argument, such water-bearing land is generally worthless except for the water which it contains, then the quantity that could be used on the land would be nominal, and injunctions could not be obtained, or substantial damages awarded, against those who' carry it to distant lands. So far as the active interference of others is concerned, therefore, the danger to such undertakings is much less, and the incentive to development much greater, from the doctrine of reasonable use than from the contrary rule. No doubt there will be inconvenience from attacks on the title to waters appropriated for use on distant lands made by persons who claim the right to the reasonable use of such waters on their own lands. Similar difficulties have arisen and now exist with respect to rights in surface streams, and must always be expected to attend claims to rights in a substance so movable as water. But the courts can protect this particular species of property in water as effectually as water-rights of any other description.
It may, indeed, become necessary to make new applications of old principles to the new conditions, and possibly to modify some existing rules, in their application to this class of property rights; and in view of the novelty of the doctrine, and the scope of argument, it. is not out of place to indicate to some extent how it should be done, although otherwise it would not be necessary to the decision of the case. The controversies arising will naturally divide into classes.
There will be disputes- between persons or corporations claiming rights to take such waters from the same strata or source for use on distant lands. There is no statute on this subject, as there now is concerning appropriations of surface streams, but the case is not without precedent. "When the pioneers of 1849 reached this state they found no laws in force governing rights to take waters from surface streams for use on non-riparian lands. Yet it was found that the principles of the common law, although not previously applied to such cases, could be adapted thereto, and were sufficient to define and protect such rights under the new conditions. The same condition existed with respect to rights to mine on public land, and a similar solution was found. (Kelly v. Natoma W. Co., 6 Cal. 108; Conger v. Weaver, 6 Cal. 557; Eddy v. Simpson, 3 Cal. 253; Hill v. Newman, 5 Cal. 446 ; McDonald v. Bear River etc. Co., 13 Cal. 233.) The principles which, before the adoption of the Civil Code, were applied to protect appropriations and possessory rights in visible streams will, in general, be found applicable to such appropriations of percolating waters, either for public or private use, on distant lands, and will suffice for" their protection as against other appropriators. Such rights are usufructuary only, and the first taker who with diligence puts the water in use will have the better right: And in ordinary cases of this character the law of prescriptive titles 'and rights and the statute of limitations will apply.
In controversies between an appropriator for use on distant land and those who own land overlying the water-bearing strata, there may'be two classes of such landowners: those who have used the water on their land before the attempt to appropriate, and those who have not previously used it, but who claim the right afterwards to do so. Under the decision in this case the rights of the first class of landowners are paramount to that of one who takes the water to distant land; but the landowner's right extends only to the quantity of water that is necessary for use on his land, and the ap propriator may take the surplus. As to those landowners who begin the use after the appropriation, and who, in order to obtain the water, must restrict or restrain the diversion to distant lands or places, it is perhaps best not to state a positive rule until a case arises. Such rights are limited at most to the quantity necessary for use, and the disputes will not be so serious as those between rival appropriators.
Disputes between overlying landowners, concerning water for use on the land, to which they have an equal right, in cases where the supply is insufficient for all, are to be settled by giving to each a fair and just proportion. And here again we leave for future settlement the question as to the priority of rights between such owners who begin the use of the waters at different times. The parties interested in the question are not before us.
In addition, there are some general rules to be applied. In eases involving any class of rights in such waters, preliminary injunctions must be granted, if at all, only upon the clearest showing that there is imminent danger of irreparable and substantial injury, and that the diversion complained of is the real cause. Where the complainant has stood by while the development was made for public use, and has suffered it to proceed at large expense to successful operation, having reasonable cause to believe it would affect his own water supply, the injunction should be refused and the party left to his action for such damages as he can prove. (Fresno etc. Co. v. Southern Pacific Co., 135 Cal. 202; Southern California Ry. Co. v. Slauson, 138 Cal. 342. ) If a party makes no use of the water on his own land, or elsewhere, he should not be allowed to enjoin its use by another who draws it out or intercepts it, or to whom it may go by percolation, although perhaps he may have the right to a decree settling his right to use it when necessary on his own land, if' a proper case is made.
The objection that this rule of correlative rights will throw upon the court a duty impossible of performance, that of apportioning an insufficient supply of water among a large number of users, is largely conjectural. No doubt cases can be imagined where the task would be extremely difficult, but if the rule is the only just one, as we think has been shown, the difficulty in its application in extreme cases .is not a' sufficient reason for rejecting it and leaving property without any protection from the law.
It does not necessarily follow that a rule for the government of rights in percolating water must also be followed as to underground seepages or percolations of mineral oil. Oil is not extracted for use in agriculture, or upon the land from which it is taken, but solely for sale as an article of merchandise, and for use in commerce and manufactures. The conditions under which oil is found and taken from the earth in this state are in no important particulars different from those present in other countries where it is produced. There is no necessary parallel between the conditions respecting the use and development of water and those affecting the production of oil. Whether in a contest between two oil-producers concerning the drawing out by one of the oil from under the land of the other we should follow the rule adopted by the courts of other oil-producing states, or apply a rule better calculated to protect oil not actually developed, is a question not before us and which need not be considered.
With regard to the doctrine of reasonable use of percolating waters, we adhere to the views expressed in the former opinion.
The judgment of the court below is reversed and a new trial ordered.
McFarland, J., Van Dyke, J., Henshaw, J., Lorigan, J., and Beatty, C. J., concurred.
76 Am. Dec. 574.
4 Am. Dec. 463.
13 Am. Rep. 629.
47 Am. Rep. 677.
25 Am. Dec. 473.
17 Am. St. Rep. 791.
54 Am. St. Rep. 337.
58 Am. Rep. 558.
52 Am. St. Rep. 201.
10 Am. Rep. 299.
58 Am. Rep. 558.
10 Am. Rep. 299.
52 Am. St. Rep. 201.
65 Am. Dec. 528.
58 Am. Dec. 408.
63 Am. Dec. 140.
94 Am. St. Rep. 58.