Case Name: Glen R. HAGEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NCR CORPORATION and Does 1 through 100, Defendants-Appellees
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2011-02-28
Citations: 416 F. App'x 670
Docket Number: No. 09-56432
Parties: Glen R. HAGEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NCR CORPORATION and Does 1 through 100, Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 416
Pages: 670–672

Head Matter:
Glen R. HAGEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NCR CORPORATION and Does 1 through 100, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 09-56432.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted Feb. 15, 2011.
Filed Feb. 28, 2011.
Thomas R. Gill, Esquire, The Gill Group, APC, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Jason R. Dawson, Esquire, Camille Joy Decamp, Esquire, Miles D. Scully, Esquire, Gordon & Rees LLP, San Diego, CA, for Defendants-Appellees.
Before: GOODWIN, KLEINFELD, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
The district court granted summary judgment to Defendant NCR Corporation on Plaintiff Glen R. Hagen's claims under California's Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA"), Cal. Gov't Code § 12940 et seq., for disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, and failure to engage in an interactive process. On de novo review, Humphrey v. Mem'l Hosps. Ass'n, 239 F.3d 1128, 1133 (9th Cir.2001), we affirm.
1. The district court properly concluded that Plaintiff was not a "qualified individual" for purposes of FEHA. At the time he took disability leave, the medical documentation showed that he could not work at all because of severe memory deficits. Later medical documentation demonstrated that Plaintiffs condition was progressive and that his inability to work was permanent.
2. The district court properly concluded that Plaintiff did not suffer an "adverse employment action" for purposes of FEHA. Akers v. County of San Diego, 95 Cal.App.4th 1441, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 602, 612 (2002). Although Defendant proposed to lay him off, it did not do so. Instead, Plaintiff remained employed until his employment ended for a different reason (the end of long-term disability benefits).
3. Plaintiff argues that Defendant should have engaged in an interactive process or accommodated him during the two years before he took disability leave. But he continued to work at his regular position, without requesting an accommodation, and was fully paid until the point at which he himself successfully contended that he no longer could work at all. In the circumstances, Defendant had no obligation to engage Plaintiff in an interactive process or to find an accommodation for Plaintiffs disability prior to Plaintiffs disability leave. Avila v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 165 Cal.App.4th 1237, 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 440, 453 (2008).
4. Plaintiff also argues for an interactive process and accommodation during his disability leave. But he did not raise this issue in the district court, so it is waived. Abogados v. AT & T, Inc., 223 F.3d 932, 937 (9th Cir.2000). Similarly, Plaintiff has waived his three common law claims by failing to brief them here. Cmty. House, Inc. v. City of Boise, 623 F.3d 945, 959 n. 2 (9th Cir.2010).
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.