Case Name: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-respondent, v. Flora B. ALBRIGHT, Defendant-appellant; STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-respondent, v. Lester HOLLIDAY, Defendant-appellant; STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-respondent, v. Virginia Faye ANDERSON, Defendant-appellant
Court: Idaho Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Idaho
Decision Date: 1986-04-10
Citations: 110 Idaho 748
Docket Number: Nos. 15755-15757
Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-respondent, v. Flora B. ALBRIGHT, Defendant-appellant. STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-respondent, v. Lester HOLLIDAY, Defendant-appellant. STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-respondent, v. Virginia Faye ANDERSON, Defendant-appellant.
Judges: DONALDSON, C.J., and SHEPARD, J., concur.
Reporter: Idaho Reports
Volume: 110
Pages: 748–756

Head Matter:
718 P.2d 1186
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-respondent, v. Flora B. ALBRIGHT, Defendant-appellant. STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-respondent, v. Lester HOLLIDAY, Defendant-appellant. STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-respondent, v. Virginia Faye ANDERSON, Defendant-appellant.
Nos. 15755-15757.
Supreme Court of Idaho.
April 10, 1986.
Russell E. Webb, of Radin & Webb, Idaho Falls, for defendants-appellants.
Jim Jones, Atty. Gen., Lynn E. Thomas, Sol. Gen., and Myrna A.I. Stahman, Deputy Atty. Gen., Boise, for plaintiff-respondent.

Opinion:
BAKES, Justice.
Appellants were convicted of violating I.C. § 18-8004 which prohibits driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or other intoxicating substances.
At the time of citation, each appellant consented to a blood alcohol test by means of a drawn blood sample pursuant to the provisions of I.C. § 18-8002. The blood alcohol tests were conducted by hospital technicians from the Idaho Falls Consolidated Hospitals, Riverview facility. According to the results of the test, each of the appellants' blood alcohol content exceeded .21.
Some two weeks after the blood samples had been taken, defense counsel moved "to discover" the blood samples for purposes of retesting. While the prosecution orally notified counsel that the hospital had destroyed the samples after ten days, the prosecution did not respond in writing to the discovery request.
Defense counsel then asked that sanctions be imposed upon the prosecution for its failure to respond in a written form. At oral argument the prosecutor stated that he had orally informed defense counsel that the blood samples had been kept by the hospital for ten days but subsequently were destroyed and that he would thus be unable to furnish the samples to the defense. The prosecutor also stated that he had fully complied with the discovery request in that he had provided the defense with test results derived from the blood samples by the hospital technicians. The prosecutor further stated that it was the hospital's practice to destroy such samples after ten days. The magistrate denied appellants' motion for sanctions for the prosecutor's failure to respond in writing to the discovery request and further denied the additional motion to suppress the results of the prosecution's testing of the blood samples.
Appellants filed conditional pleas of guilty pursuant to I.C.R. 11(a)(2). Upon entry of judgments of conviction, appellants appealed the magistrate's ruling to the district court, claiming that the state's destruction of the blood samples violated their right to due process of law and that the state's failure to respond to their discovery requests in writing violated I.C.R. 16(e)(1). The appeals were consolidated for purposes of argument before the district court, which subsequently denied appellants' requested relief in all respects. The district court concluded that under the holding of California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984), the prosecution had no duty to preserve the blood samples. Appellants appeal, urging this Court to either dismiss the citations, or in the alternative, to suppress evidence of the test results obtained from the blood samples.
We agree with the district court that the prosecution had no duty to preserve the blood samples and that, based upon an application of the holding in California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984), to the facts of this case, appellants were not deprived of their right to due process of law. Thus, we now join the other jurisdictions which have recently recognized that the Court's reasoning in Trombetta is applicable to determining whether the destruction of a blood sample by the prosecution constitutes a due process violation. See Houser v. State, 474 So.2d 1193 (Fla.1985); State v. Casele, 198 N.J.Super. 462, 487 A.2d 765 (Ct.A.D.1985).
In Trombetta, a unanimous Supreme Court determined that intoxilyzer test results, obtained from breath samples, may be admitted into evidence at trial, despite the fact that the breath samples themselves had been destroyed. Refusing to find the due process guarantees of the federal Constitution violated by the destruction of the samples, the Court first emphasized that the law enforcement authorities involved
"did not destroy respondent's breath samples in a calculated effort to circumvent the disclosure requirements established by Brady v. Maryland, [373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963)], and its progeny. In failing to preserve breath samples for respondents, the officers here were acting 'in good faith and in accord with their normal practices.' Killian v. United States, [368 U.S. 231, 242, 82 S.Ct. 302, 308, 7 L.Ed.2d 256 (1961)]. The record contains no allegation of official animus toward respondents or of a conscious effort to suppress exculpatory evidence." California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 488, 104 S.Ct. at 2534.
The Court then refused to find California's policy of not preserving breath samples to be constitutionally defective. The Court stated:
"Whatever duty the Constitution imposes on the states to preserve evidence, that duty must be limited to evidence that might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect's defense. (Footnote omitted.) To meet this standard of constitutional materiality, . evidence must both possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and also be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means." California v. Trombetta, supra (emphasis added.)
An examination of the facts of this case against the rationale articulated in Trom-betta directs us to conclude that the destruction of the blood samples in this case did not deprive the appellants of their rights of due process.
As in Trombetta, the record before us contains no indication that the destruction of the blood samples represented a calculated effort by law enforcement personnel to circumvent disclosure requirements. It is clear from the record that the samples were destroyed by the hospital pursuant to the hospital's established practice of destroying blood samples after ten days.
Further, appellants have not established that the blood samples, if available, would have played a significant role in their defense. There is nothing in this record which would establish that additional tests on the samples of blood would show anything other than that the blood alcohol of each of the appellants was well in excess of .10, the legal limit pursuant to I.C. § 18-8004. Appellants whole argument is based upon the slight possibility that the tests conducted by trained technicians at an independent hospital, in these three independent and unrelated cases, might somehow have been defective. While it would be appropriate for a jury to consider such a slight possibility in arriving at a determination of guilt or innocence, it is not for this Court on appeal to speculate that the independent hospital tests were defective and that, had the appellants conducted additional blood tests, they would have disclosed that the independent hospital tests were flawed.
Nor have appellants convinced us that the destroyed blood samples were of such a nature that comparable evidence could not be obtained. Pursuant to I.C. § 18-8003(2) the appellants were entitled to have their own blood tests run. Thus, appellants could have had a blood sample taken and tested themselves or requested access to the hospital's blood sample prior to the destruction of the sample ten days after the sample was drawn. Because these alternatives were available to appellants, this case presents an even more compelling argument for the state's position, that destruction of the blood samples did not result in a deprivation of due process, than was presented in Trombetta. In any event, as the Court noted in Trombetta, the party challenging the accuracy of the tests could challenge the tests at trial through careful cross examination of the technicians that performed the tests.
Accordingly, we find no merit in the appellants' argument that destruction of the blood samples resulted in a deprivation of due process under the federal Constitution.
Appellants also contend that the prosecution's failure to respond in writing to the defense's discovery request entitles the appellants to dismissal of the cases at bar. The prosecution has acknowledged its failure to fully comply with the provisions of I.C.R. 16(e)(1). Thus, the appellants contend, since they were not notified in writing that the blood sample would not be furnished, this ease should be dismissed. It is clear from the record that the prosecution orally notified defense counsel that the blood samples had been destroyed. Accordingly, we find no error in the lower court's decision not to grant sanctions against the prosecution in this case.
DONALDSON, C.J., and SHEPARD, J., concur.
. 18-8002. Test for driver for blood alcohol.—
(1) Any person who drives or is in actual physi cal control of a motor vehicle in this state shall be deemed to have given his consent to an evidentiary test for concentration of alcohol, drugs or other intoxicating substances as defined in section 18-8004, Idaho Code, provided that such test is administered at the request of a police officer having reasonable grounds to believe that person has been driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, drugs or of any other intoxicating substances.
. [18-8003.] (2) The person tested may, at his own expense, have a person of his own choosing, who is authorized to make a test, administer an evidentiary test for alcohol concentration in addition to the one administered at the request "of a police officer."
. Appellants' brief, page 26, states, "Mr. Holli-day and Miss Anderson were cited for DUI on April 21, 1984, and Mr. Albright was cited on April 22, 1984. Counsel was appointed to represent Mr. Holliday on the 23rd, Mr. Albright on the 25th, and Miss Anderson on the 26th." Despite this early appointment of counsel, the samples of blood were not requested until discovery was filed on May 8, 1984.
. Rule 16. Discovery and inspection. — _
(e) Response to request, failure to file a response.
(1) Response to request. The party upon whom a request has been served shall file and serve a written response within fourteen (14) days of service of the request by filing the original copy with the court and serving a copy upon the opposing party which shall state one or more of the following:
A.That the response has already been complied with and that the inquiring party has been furnished the information, evidence and material listed in the request.
B. That there is no objection to the discovery of the information, evidence and materials sought by the request and that the opposing party shall be permitted discovery at a time and place certain.
C. That the responding party objects to part or all of the information, evidence and materials sought to be discovered in the response, which objection shall be specific and shall state the grounds for the objection.