Case Name: Garred F. NORMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SAN JOSE MUNICIPAL COURT, a Local Public entity; Judge Lynn, and in her Capacity as Judge; Santa Clara County, County District Attorney Office, a local public entity; Tony Piazza, Individually and in his capacity as District Attorney for the District Attorney Office for the County of Santa Clara County; James Bustamante; Sandra Banks; Dallas Brock, Defendants-Appellees
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2001-01-24
Citations: 2 F. App'x 788
Docket Number: No. 00-15299
Parties: Garred F. NORMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SAN JOSE MUNICIPAL COURT, a Local Public entity; Judge Lynn, and in her Capacity as Judge; Santa Clara County, County District Attorney Office, a local public entity; Tony Piaz za, Individually and in his capacity as District Attorney for the District Attorney Office for the County of Santa Clara County; James Bustamante; Sandra Banks; Dallas Brock, Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 2
Pages: 788–790

Head Matter:
Garred F. NORMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SAN JOSE MUNICIPAL COURT, a Local Public entity; Judge Lynn, and in her Capacity as Judge; Santa Clara County, County District Attorney Office, a local public entity; Tony Piaz za, Individually and in his capacity as District Attorney for the District Attorney Office for the County of Santa Clara County; James Bustamante; Sandra Banks; Dallas Brock, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 00-15299.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted Jan. 8, 2001 .
Decided Jan. 24, 2001.
Before BEEZER, O’SCANNLAIN, and KLEINFELD, Circuit Judges.
. The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Garred F. Norman appeals pro se the district court's Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b) dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for failure to comply with a court order. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
We review for abuse of discretion the district court's dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir.1992).
The district court adequately explained the deficiencies in Norman's complaint, afforded him time to amend, and explicitly warned him that failure to amend would result in dismissal. See id. at 1261-62. Because Norman failed to amend his complaint, the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing his action with prejudice. See id. at 1260-61.
Because we affirm the district court's dismissal for failure to comply with a court order, Norman may not challenge the district court's interlocutory order setting aside the entry of default. See Al-Torki v. Kaempen, 78 F.3d 1381, 1386 (9th Cir. 1996).
Because Norman's claim of bias and prejudice was based solely on the district court's prior adverse rulings, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying his motion for recusal. See Taylor v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 993 F.2d 710, 712-13 (9th Cir.1993).
AFFIRMED.
. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.