Case Name: WILLIAMS v. THE STATE
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 2003-11-17
Citations: 277 Ga. 368
Docket Number: S03A1259
Parties: WILLIAMS v. THE STATE.
Judges: All the Justices concur, except Hines, J., who concurs specially, and Carley and Thompson, JJ, who concur in part and dissent in part.
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 277
Pages: 368–372

Head Matter:
S03A1259.
WILLIAMS v. THE STATE.
(589 SE2d 563)

Opinion:
Fletcher, Chief Justice.
A jury convicted Frankie Laundell Williams of malice murder, aggravated assault with intent to murder, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime and disorderly conduct in connection with the shooting death of Antonio Moreland. Williams appeals, contending that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. Because Williams failed to establish that his trial counsel was deficient in his preparation, we affirm. However, we must vacate the aggravated assault convictions and one possession conviction.
1. The evidence at trial showed that Frankie Williams and the victim, Antonio Moreland, had been drinking and watching basketball at Williams's apartment. Williams accused Moreland of taking money from him, and the two got into an argument. Williams went to his room and Moreland called his girlfriend on the telephone. While Moreland was talking on the phone with his girlfriend, Williams returned with a gun, said to Moreland "what are you going to do now m**f**r," and shot him once in the head.
After agreeing to accompany police officers to the station for questioning, Williams suddenly became very belligerent and cursed at the officers.
After reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's determination of guilt, we conclude that any rational trier of fact could have found Williams guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted.
2. Although not raised by trial or appellate counsel, we must vacate the sentences for aggravated assault and one of the sentences for possession. The convictions and sentences for aggravated assault must be vacated because the evidence shows that they both merge as a matter of fact with the malice murder conviction. Furthermore, because the evidence shows the possession charges are based on the continuous possession of a single gun in an attack against a single victim, we must also vacate the conviction and sentence imposed on one of the possession charges.
3. Williams contends that his trial counsel was ineffective. To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, a defendant must show both that the attorney's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.
Williams asserts his counsel was ineffective because he failed to conduct any investigation of his case. The evidence at the motion for new trial hearing shows that trial counsel reviewed the police reports, spoke with most of the State's witnesses, reviewed statements from the remainder of the State's witnesses, visited the scene on two occasions, and met with Williams for a significant period just before trial to prepare him for trial and for testifying. The trial court credited trial counsel's testimony that he was prepared for trial and this factual finding is not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, Williams has not demonstrated that his counsel was deficient in his preparation.
Williams also challenges the failure of trial counsel to seek severance of the disorderly conduct charge from the murder charge. The disorderly conduct charge stemmed from Williams' obstructive behavior when police arrested him for the murder. This Court has upheld joinder of two crimes when one crime is a circumstance of the arrest on the other crime. Accordingly, Williams has not established any prejudice. Because Williams cannot establish prejudice, we need not decide whether his trial counsel was deficient for failing to consider the prejudicial effect the disorderly conduct charge may have had on the more serious charges.
Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part.
All the Justices concur, except Hines, J., who concurs specially, and Carley and Thompson, JJ, who concur in part and dissent in part.
The crimes occurred on June 2, 2001. The grand jury indicted Williams on January 25, 2002 for malice murder, felony murder, two counts of aggravated assault, two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and disorderly conduct. On February 13, 2002, following a trial, the jury found Williams guilty on all counts, and that same day, the trial court sentenced Williams to life imprisonment for malice murder, twenty years each on the aggravated assault convictions, to run concurrently with the fife sentence, five years each on the possession convictions, to run concurrent with each other and consecutive to the life sentence, and to a 12-month term for disorderly conduct, to run consecutively. Williams filed a motion for new trial on March 15, 2002. The trial court announced his denial of the motion in open court on September 17, 2002, and in a written order on March 18, 2003. Williams filed his notice of appeal on September 17, 2002, the appeal was docketed in this Court on May 8, 2003, and submitted for decision without oral argument on June 30, 2003.
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
See Curtis v. State, 275 Ga. 576, 577 (571 SE2d 376) (2003).
See Montes v. State, 262 Ga. 473, 474 (421 SE2d 710) (1992).
State v. Marlowe, 277 Ga. 383 (589 SE2d 69) (2003).
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984).
Suggs v. State, 272 Ga. 85, 88 (526 SE2d 347) (2000).
Roundtree v. State, 270 Ga. 504, 506 (511 SE2d 190) (1999); see also Dukes v. State, 273 Ga. 890, 893 (548 SE2d 328) (2001) (evidence of circumstances of arrest are subject to same standards of materiality and relevancy as other evidence).