Case Name: In re ALBERT M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ALBERT M., Defendant and Respondent
Court: Court of Appeal of the State of California
Jurisdiction: California
Decision Date: 1992-06-11
Citations: 7 Cal. App. 4th 353
Docket Number: No. E008920
Parties: In re ALBERT M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ALBERT M., Defendant and Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: California Appellate Reports, Fourth Series
Volume: 7
Pages: 353–362

Head Matter:
[No. E008920.
Fourth Dist., Div. Two.
June 11, 1992.]
In re ALBERT M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ALBERT M., Defendant and Respondent.
[Opinion certified for partial publication. ]
Counsel
Grover C. Trask II, District Attorney, and Juliann Anderson, Deputy District Attorney, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Phillip I. Bronson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent.
Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 976(b) and 976.1, this opinion is certified for publication with the exception of part III-A.

Opinion:
Opinion
TIMLIN, J.
I
Introduction
The People of the State of California (the People) appeal from a judgment entered following the dismissal, without prejudice, of a petition alleging that Albert M., a juvenile, was a minor who came within the provisions of section 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.
II
Facts
On January 22, 1990, a petition was filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 alleging that Albert M. was a minor coming within the provisions of that section because, on or about December 14, 1989, the minor had wilfully and unlawfully carried a loaded firearm on his person and in a vehicle while in a public place and on a public street. The matter was set for hearing on February 21, 1990, and the minor's parents were mailed a copy of the notice of hearing on January 24, 1990.
On February 21, minor and his mother appeared in court. Minor waived the time for the jurisdiction hearing "+ 30 days," and denied the allegations of the petition. Trial was set for March 6, 1990.
On March 6, 1990, the hearing was continued to April 10, 1990; no reason for the continuance is reflected on the court's minutes.
On April 10, 1990, the hearing was continued to May 9, 1990; no reason for the continuance is reflected on the court's minutes. A witness then present was ordered to return for the May 9 trial, and an attorney was appointed to represent that witness.
On May 9, 1990, the hearing was continued to June 4, 1990, at the request of minor's attorney. The three witnesses present were ordered to return for trial.
On June 4, 1990, the hearing was continued to June 18, 1990. The court's minutes do not reflect the reason for the continuance. The minutes do show that an arrest warrant would be issued for subpoenaed witness Jason P. upon the filing of the subpoena and proof of its service and the giving of his physical description.
On June 18, 1990, the hearing was continued to July 12 and the minor was ordered detained in juvenile hall pending further order. The court's minutes do not show any reason for the continuance.
On July 12, 1990, the hearing was continued to July 23, and the court's minutes also reflect that the order of June 18 should be corrected to show that the minor witness, Jason R, was to be detained in juvenile hall pending further order. The minutes do not state the reasons for the continuance.
On July 23, 1990, a pretrial was set for August 3, 1990, and an arrest warrant for minor (whether Albert M. or Jason P. is not clear) was issued and its execution stayed to August 3, 1990.
On August 3, 1990, the pretrial was reset for August 7, the arrest warrant for "minor" was further stayed until August 7, and the minor was ordered to bring proof to court that he was suffering from chicken pox.
On August 7, 1990, the contested jurisdiction hearing was continued to September 6, 1990, the arrest warrant was recalled, and minor was continued in the custody of his mother. No reasons for the continuance were stated in the court's minutes.
On September 6, 1990, the hearing was continued to September 27, 1990, and a witness was ordered to return on that date. The court's minutes do not show the reason for the continuance.
On September 27, 1990, the hearing was continued to October 23,1990, at 1 p.m., at the request of defendant's attorney. The minor was continued in his mother's custody, an arrest warrant was issued for minor (though whether for Albert M. or Jason R is not clear), and the minor was ordered to assist his attorney in serving witness Jason R The court's minutes do not reflect the reason for the continuance.
With the exception of the minutes of May 9 and September 27, the court's minutes do not show which party, if any, requested a particular continuance. None of the minutes indicate that the minor objected to any of the continuances.
On October 23, 1990, the hearing was apparently continued until almost 5 p.m. on that date. The juvenile court noted that this fact would require that the hearing be continued to yet another date. The court indicated that it believed the People had a witness problem. The deputy district attorney stated that the People did not have a witness problem, and that the People's witness was available on call. The juvenile court asked counsel for both sides to step into chambers for a moment, and a conference was held in chambers and off the record.
Following this conference, the juvenile court instructed the minor that the charge against him was serious, and asked if the minor understood. The minor agreed. The court then stated:
"However, this occurred when you were seventeen. You are now eighteen. This matter has been called apparently innumerable times for one reason or another and it's never managed to get enough priority or enough witnesses to get the matter actually to trial.
"And, although I have only been sitting on juvenile court matters since sometime in March of 1990, I've never seen a case that has been continued this many times. And it seems to me you've probably been in court almost as many times as you would have spent—almost the amount of time you would have spent in juvenile hall if you would have been convicted of this thing in the first place.
"Based on these circumstances, the Court is going to dismiss this charge without prejudice.
"And I am going to encourage the District Attorney's Office not to file it again.
"I would mention to you if you get in trouble with this kind of situation in the future you are going to be treated as an adult. If you get an adult record, that will make it very difficult for you in a variety of ways as an adult. All right?
"The Minor: (Nods head up and down.)
"The Court: So at this time the Court is going to dismiss this charge without prejudice.
"Mr. Curtis [for the People]: Your Honor, just for the record, I would like to indicate that the dismissal is over the People's objection."
The court's minutes of October 23 state that the "entire petition of 1-22-90 is dismissed," and that the "charge is dismissed without prejudice, over the People's objection."
The People filed timely a notice of appeal pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 39 and Penal Code section 1238, subdivisions (a)(1) and (a)(8). The People contend that the order of dismissal must be reversed. They argue that because the defendant allegedly requested many of the continuances, and because the juvenile court allegedly did not weigh the competing interests of society and the defendant, the dismissal was not in the furtherance of justice. Defendant contends that the appropriate standard is that of abuse of discretion and that there is no evidence that the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing the case.
Ill
Discussion
A. Matters Referred to by Both Parties Which Are Not Properly Part of the Record on Appeal Will Not Be Considered by This Court in Reaching Its Decision
B. The Juvenile Court Erred by Dismissing the Petition Without Making Any of the Findings Required by Welfare and Institutions Code Section 782 Before Its Exercise of Discretion to Dismiss
Welfare and Institutions Code section 782 provides that a petition which initiates those proceedings covered by Welfare and Institutions Code section 650 may be dismissed if the court finds that the interests of justice and the welfare of the minor requires such dismissal, or if the minor is not in need of treatment or rehabilitation. The reasons orally given by the juvenile court and recorded in the reporter's transcript do not demonstrate that the court made any of such findings, expressly or impliedly, before it exercised its discretion to dismiss the petition. The court merely noted that the matter had been continued many times, and that the minor had spent as much time in court as he would have spent in juvenile hall if "convicted." This does not constitute a finding under Welfare and Institutions Code section 782.
The juvenile court here simply stated reasons for dismissing the petition. The passage of time before the beginning of the jurisdiction hearing involved numerous continuances to which minor did not object or which he requested. In the absence of either some factual showing of prejudice to the minor or some statutory scheme requiring dismissal for failure to bring the matter to hearing within a certain time, such time lapse does not support a section 782 finding. The other reason was inappropriate because it amounted to a prejudged disposition assuming the allegation against the minor was found true. Under the procedural circumstances of this case, these reasons would not support any of the section 782 findings, assuming the court had made such findings.
IV
Disposition
The order of dismissal is reversed, and the matter remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Hollenhorst, Acting P. J., and McKinster, J., concurred.
All further references to code sections shall be to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted. Section 1238, subdivisions (a)(1) and (a)(8), provide: "(a) An appeal may be taken by the people from any of the following: [])] (1) An order setting aside the indictment, information, or complaint. . . . [fl] (8) An order or judgment dismissing or otherwise terminating the action before the defendant has been placed in jeopardy or where the defendant has waived jeopardy."
See footnote, ante, page 353.