Case Name: Alfred Eldridge, Respondent, v. The Atlas Steamship Company, Appellant
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1892-10-01
Citations: 134 N.Y. 187
Docket Number: 
Parties: Alfred Eldridge, Respondent, v. The Atlas Steamship Company, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 134
Pages: 187–196

Head Matter:
Alfred Eldridge, Respondent, v. The Atlas Steamship Company, Appellant.
Plaintiff, a seaman employed upon one of defendant’s vessels, was commanded to operate a wincli which he knew could not, because of visible defects, be operated' without risk of danger to himself ; he obeyed the order because he knew that disobedience would result in his punishment, and although exercising reasonable care, was injured. In an action to recover damages, held (Follett, Oh. J., Haight and Parker, JJ., dissenting), that conceding the order was unlawful and that plaintiff might rightfully have refused obedience, or that he made a mistake, as such refusal would have subjected him to punishment, his obedience was not per se negligence and that the question was properly submitted to the jury.
Reported below, 58 Hun, 96.
(Argued March 16, 1892;
decided October 1, 1892.)
Appeal from judgment of the General Term of the Supreme Court, in the first judicial department, entered upon an order made October 28, 1890, which affirmed a judgment in favor of plaintiff, entered upon a verdict and affirmed an order denying a motion for a new trial.
This was an. action for negligence, in that plaintiff, a sailor in the employ of defendant upon its ship, while in obedience to orders he was operating its which—an alleged unsafe machine—had his hand caught in the cog-wheels thereof, and the ends of four fingers taken off.
November 9, 1886, plaintiff at New York engaged as an able-bodied seaman to serve on board defendant’s ship, the Alvena. The defendant is a British corporation, but it was not shown under what flag the ship sailed. The plaintiff had not served upon that ship before. The ship had three winches, two horizontal—one, No. 3, diagonal. The cog-wheels of the horizontal winches were covered; those of the diagonal No. 3 were without cover. No. 3 was an old-fashioned winch; the other two of modern construction. Plaintiff did not observe No. 3 before he went to duty November tenth, on which day the ship sailed from New York for Kingston, Jamaica. From Kingston the ship proceeded to Aspinwall, and there was hauled alongside defendant’s ship Athos; some of the cargo of the Atlios was then transferred to the Alvena. Plaintiff was ordered to operate winch No. 3 in transferring the cargo. He had to stand between the winch and the house of the ship —■ a space eighteen inches wide. He had to operate a valve with his right hand so as let the steam on or shut it off as ordered by his superior, and to operate a lever with his left hand so as to revolve the drum forward or backward as ordered. There was so much noise that these orders were given by signals by the officer. Thus the officer raised his hand as the order to go forward, moved it down to go backward, opened it wide to stop, and twirled it round fast to go fast, etc. The officer was on the right of the front of the plaintiff. The valve to be moved by plaintiff’s left hand was as high as his knee and was at the end of the winch near its middle. The lever to be moved by his left hand was on the outside of the side of the winch. The plaintiff’s testimony was to the effect that he had to reach over the big and small cog-wheels to take hold of the lever. The defendant’s testimony was to the effect that he might have reached around the winch and seized the lever without passing his hand over the cog-wheels. The size of the winch is not given.
"While watching for orders and at the same time obeying them, the plaintiff’s fingers, in grasping for the lever, came in contact with the cog-wheels and were crushed. His contention is, if these wheels had been covered as the wheels of the other winches were, his fingers would have been protected. Defendant gave testimony tending to show that the winch was safe enough if plaintiff had been reasonably careful. The trial court charged the jury that if plaintiff entered defendant’s service, knowing that- this winch had no cover, he could not recover upon that ground, and if his own negligence in any way contributed to his injury he could not recover.
The court also charged that plaintiff was bound to obey all lawful orders of the defendant’s officers and for a refusal would have forfeited his wages or been punished. Testimony was given to this effect.
The court also charged that if this accident had happened on land, plaintiff not working as a sailor, he could not recover, but left it for the jury to say whether in view of the plaintiff’s duty as a sailor he was guilty of negligence.
Fherett P. Wheeler for appellant.
Jacob Fromme for respondent.

Opinion:
Landon, J.
In view of the verdict and the instructions of the trial court, we assume that the plaintiff knew that the winch could not be operated without risk of danger to himself, but was constrained to obey the order given him by his superior to operate it, because he knew that disobedience would result in his punishment, that he, therefore, did operate it and because of its known defects of construction was injured, notwithstanding his exercise of reasonable care to avoid injury.
The defendant insists that the commana to operate this dangerous winch was not lawful, and, therefore, plaintiff might rightfully have refused obedience. If it be conceded that the command was unlawful, it does not necessarily follow that plaintiff's obedience was negligence. For whether the command was lawful or unlawful, the evidence is to the effect that his disobedience would have resulted in his punishment. The boatswain, under whose orders plaintiff was operating the winch, testified that- the plaintiff " was bound to obey the order that I gave him ; if he did not obey the order he would have been put in irons and fined." Grant that the plaintiff had been so learned in the law as to know that the courts would ultimately decide that the command was unlawful, and disobedience to it lawful, he could know no way of escape from the ship's punishment of his disobedience, for there was none. The jury found in effect that he was coerced through fear of punishment into obedience. If the command was unlawful, the defendant's case is not improved by the fact that the punishment it would visit upon disobedience was also unlawful. In any event the plaintiff was in a dilemma. He had to choose between present punishment with a possible hope of remote justification, and customary obedience to orders with the hope that by care he would escape injury. Grant that he made a mistake in judgment under these difficult conditions, the law does not adjudge it to be negligence, and the jury upon consideration have refused to do so. We cannot hold that their refusal was error.
Except as the case is affected by the dangerous condition of the winch, the order to operate it was lawful and the plaintiff's obedience was the duty of his service. Whatever may be the practical administration of law or of arbitrary power on shipboard, the plaintiff, if amenable to the law of the United States, was also punishable by our courts for willful disobedience to any lawful command. Section 4596, U. S. E. S. provides, " Whenever any seaman who has been lawfully engaged commits any of the following offenses, he shall be punishable as follows: Fourth. For willful disobedience to any lawful command, by imprisonment for not more than two months, and also at the discretion of the court, by forfeiture out of his wages of not more than four days' pay."
Thus the plaintiff had to choose whether he wouia ooey the order, or take the hazard of liability under the statute. Whatever may have been the law of the flag of the ship, or of the United States of Columbia, in whose port the injury was received, it was not shown, and hence the parties in our forum must accept the law as we administer it. (The Scotland, 105 U. S. 24.)
In this view of the case, if the plaintiff made a mistake in judgment, the defendant could rightfully ask no more than that the jury should pass upon the facts.
We find no error of law requiring a reversal.
The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.