Case Name: MICHAEL CORVIN THOMPSON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. CUPP, Respondent
Court: Oregon Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1971-05-13
Citations: 5 Or. App. 393
Docket Number: 
Parties: MICHAEL CORVIN THOMPSON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. CUPP, Respondent.
Judges: Before Schwab, Chief Judge, and Foley and Fort, Judges.
Reporter: Oregon Reports, Court of Appeals
Volume: 5
Pages: 393–399

Head Matter:
Argued April 23,
affirmed May 13, 1971
MICHAEL CORVIN THOMPSON, Petitioner-Appellant, v. CUPP, Respondent.
484 P2d 858
Argued and submitted April 23, 1971.
David II. Bhmt, Salem, argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant.
James L. Carney, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Lee Johnson, Attorney General, and Jacob B. Tanzer, Solicitor General, Salem.
Before Schwab, Chief Judge, and Foley and Fort, Judges.

Opinion:
SCHWAB, C.J.
The petitioner, Thompson, petitioned the circuit court for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that he was illegally imprisoned in that the Oregon State Board of Parole and Probation had arbitrarily and capriciously revoked his parole. On appeal from judgment dismissing the writ he contends that the board's action was arbitrary and capricious, because (1) it failed to grant him a hearing with counsel prior to its order of revocation, and (2) there was no credible evidence that he had violated the conditions of parole.
[A] parolee has no constitutional right to a hearing or counsel as a condition of revocation of his parole." State ex rel Gilmore v. Cupp, 1 Or App 22, 24, 458 P2d 711 (1969); Whalen v. Gladden, 249 Or 12, 436 P2d 560 (1968); Anderson v. Alexander, 191 Or 409, 229 P2d 633, 230 P2d 770 (1951).
As Whalen v. Gladden, supra, points out at p 13:
" ° Although the policy considerations which have prompted the legislature to not provide for a parole board hearing in this situation may be debatable, we can find no authority which says that such a hearing is compelled by due process."
At the time Thompson was paroled, in accordance with the provisions of OPS 144.270, the board specified to him in writing the conditions of his parole which included a prohibition of the use of narcotic drugs. Although Thompson denied making such an admission, the judge who heard the habeas corpus proceedings found that Thompson had admitted to the board at a post-revocation hearing that he had in fact used such drugs while on parole. The burden of proof of arbitrary action on the part of the board rested •with Thompson. State ex rel Gilmore v. Cupp, supra. He failed to meet this burden.
Affirmed.