Case Name: HARDY v. MONSANTO ENVIRO-CHEM SYSTEMS, INC
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1982-08-23
Citations: 414 Mich. 29
Docket Number: Docket No. 63385
Parties: HARDY v MONSANTO ENVIRO-CHEM SYSTEMS, INC
Judges: Coleman, C.J., and Kavanagh and Fitzgerald, JJ., concurred with Ryan, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 414
Pages: 29–94

Head Matter:
HARDY v MONSANTO ENVIRO-CHEM SYSTEMS, INC
Docket No. 63385.
Argued March 4, 1980
(Calendar No. 6).
Decided August 23, 1982.
Ruth Hardy, administratrix of the estate of Robert G. Hardy, deceased, brought an action against Monsanto Enviro-Chem Systems, Inc., Leonard Construction Company, and J & L Roofing Company for the wrongful death of Robert G. Hardy as a result of injuries suffered in the course of his employment on a construction project. Monsanto had entered into a contract to construct a wastewater treatment facility, and delegated responsibility for the actual construction to its subsidiary, Leonard. Leonard, in turn, entered into a subcontract with J & L for roofing work. J & L engaged the J. Klanderman Company, Robert Hardy’s employer, to do the sheet-metal work on the project. Mr. Hardy was killed in a fall through an uncovered opening in a roof at the construction site, 27 feet above the ground. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants had a duty to implement reasonable safety measures to protect the workers at the construction site and breached that duty. Leonard filed a cross-claim against J & L, seeking indemnity.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1-3, 6-8, 12] Am Jur 2d New Topic Service, Comparative Negligence §§ 1, 29.
53 Am Jur 2d, Master and Servant § 230.
57 Am Jur 2d, Negligence § 125.
Modern development of comparative negligence doctrine having applicability to negligence actions generally. 78 ALR3d 339.
[4] 57 Am Jur 2d, Negligence §§ 13, 249.
[5] 57 Am Jur 2d, Negligence §§ 101-107, 245, 246, 259.
[6-12] 57 Am Jur 2d, Negligence § 50.
[9] 57 Am Jur 2d, Negligence §§ 115, 120, 121.
[10] 57 Am Jur 2d, Negligence § 123.
[11] 57 Am Jur 2d, Negligence §§ 288, 303.
[13] 57 Am Jur 2d, Negligence §§ 247, 248.
[14] 57 Am Jur 2d, Negligence §§ 101-107.
[15] Am Jur 2d New Topic Service, Comparative Negligence § 56.
[16] 13 Am Jur 2d, Building and Construction Contracts § 141.
41 Am Jur 2d, Indemnity § 5.
[17] 41 Am Jur 2d, Indemnity §§ 15-18.
[18] 58 Am Jur 2d, New Trial § 148 et seq.
During trial in the Kent Circuit Court, John T. Letts, J., the defendants were permitted to raise the defense of the contributory negligence of the decedent. The court later charged the jury that a finding that the decedent was guilty of "ordinary” negligence would operate as a complete bar to recovery, and further instructed the jury that a violation by the decedent of the labor safety act through his "ordinary” negligence, if found to be a proximate cause of his injuries, constituted contributory negligence as a matter of law.
J & L’s motion for a directed verdict on Leonard’s cross-claim for indemnity was denied.
Following trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of all defendants, five of the six jurors indicating when polled that they had concluded that, while the defendants had been negligent, the decedent also had been negligent. The Court of Appeals, D. F. Walsh, P.J., and J. H. Gillis, J. (T. M. Burns, J., dissenting), affirmed in an unpublished per curiam opinion (Docket No. 77-726). The plaintiff appeals; J & L cross-appeals.
In an opinion by Justice Ryan, joined by Chief Justice Coleman and Justices Kavanagh and Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court held:
The defense of contributory negligence as a total bar to recovery is not available in a negligence action such as this for failure to provide adequate safety devices on the job, but the defense of comparative negligence is available, assuming that any evidence of the plaintiffs negligence exists. The defense of comparative negligence is not limited to negligence not involving "safety devices”, but applies to all workplace negligence. Violation of the labor safety act by the decedent constitutes a prima facie case of negligence, rather than negligence as a matter of law. Leonard may attempt to show a right to indemnification under Illinois law on a theory of breach of contract.
1. The defense of comparative negligence serves not to undermine, but to enhance the goal of safety in the workplace. A contractor can never entirely avoid liability and thus escape a duty of care where the defense can be raised. This rule provides no strong financial incentive for a contractor to breach the duty to undertake reasonable safety precautions; rather, it rewards safety-conscious contractors. The rule does provide some financial incentive to the worker to act in a reasonable and prudent manner because he may be held answerable for his safety-related behavior.
2. Comparative negligence should not be barred as a defense in a case involving a missing safety device which a worker has not wilfully removed. Where the worker is fully aware of a missing safety device, he should be held answerable for his negligent behavior. To the extent that the worker’s behavior conforms to that of a reasonably prudent worker under all the circumstances, a trier of fact may consider any "ordinary inadvertence” and find him free from negligence. However, to the extent that "ordinary inadvertence” is a mere euphemism for the worker’s negligence, it should reduce his recovery. Application of the rule of comparative negligence to all instances of workplace negligence, and not only to cases not involving safety devices, satisfies the policies announced by the Supreme Court and encourages safer behavior by contractors and workers. A unitary approach under which the worker and the contractor are charged with the duty to act reasonably under all the circumstances is preferable.
3. Upon retrial, the issue should not be limited to the amount of damages. While five of the six jurors found the defendants to be negligent, it was not specified whether the negligence involved the failure to provide adequate safety devices or some other negligent act or omission. Sufficient evidence was presented to justify an instruction under the labor safety act in effect at the time of the worker’s death. The trial court should instruct the jury that a violation of the statute constitutes a prima facie case of negligence, rather than negligence as a matter of law. In addition, the Court does not define the word "wilfully” as used in the now-repealed statute, but leaves it to the trial court to decide in the first instance which of the parties’ proposed instructions accurately presents the law on this point.
4. The Court agreed with Justice Moody’s reasoning and result on the issue of Leonard Construction Company’s claim for indemnification, and the case is remanded for trial on that claim also.
Justice Moody, joined by Justices Williams and Levin, would hold that the defense of comparative negligence is not available in this case.
1. The trial court erred in instructing the jury that a finding of "ordinary” contributory negligence on the part of the decedent in moving a skylight hole cover which had been intended as a safety device would operate as a complete bar to recovery by the plaintiff. On the facts presented, the jury reasonably could have concluded that the defendants’ failure to supply adequate safety devices was the cause in fact of the decedent’s injuries.
2. Leonard, as general contractor, had a duty to take reasonable steps within its supervisory authority to alleviate the danger posed to workmen by the roof openings. Sufficient evidence was presented to support the conclusion that, as a matter of law, Leonard did not discharge its duty. Whether Leonard acted reasonably by providing adequate safety devices or implementing adequate safety programs or by requiring J & L to do so is a question of fact.
3. J & L, pursuant to the terms of its contract with Leonard, assumed the duty to provide adequate safety devices to prevent injury to workmen at the project site, and may be held to answer for its own failure to perform its contractual obligations. J & L shared control over the allegedly inadequate safety devices with Leonard, and did not have an unqualified right to rely on Leonard to discharge J & L’s duty of care in maintaining the devices in the common work area. Sufficient evidence was presented for the jury to conclude that J & L breached its duty to the decedent to implement a safety program to resecure covers removed during the roofing.
4. The doctrine of comparative negligence should not be applied to reduce the recovery of a worker injured because of a breach by a contractor of the duty to provide adequate safety devices or to implement adequate safety programs except where there is evidence that the worker unreasonably altered, dismantled, or failed to use an otherwise adequate safety device. Comparative negligence as a partial bar to recovery by a plaintiff whose negligence or fault contributed to his injury replaced the complete bar which previously resulted upon a finding of contributory negligence. Where a contractor is obligated to provide adequate safety devices to guard against a worker’s negligence and fails to do so, the worker’s negligence which would not have resulted in injury had the devices been provided is legally irrelevant. The defense of the worker’s negligence was rejected as a matter of policy prior to the adoption of the comparative negligence doctrine. The adoption of that doctrine did not create liability where none previously existed. Application of the doctrine would subvert the intent of the Legislature in enacting the safety statute and would undercut the goal of fostering worker safety.
5. The trial court erred in instructing the jury relative to the provision of the labor safety act proscribing a worker’s purposeful removal of a safety device which he realized was a safety device from a common work area without a reasonable excuse. While the court had the discretion to instruct the jury on the provisions of the statute, its charge to the jury regarding the standard of care set forth in the statute failed to distinguish between the purposeful conduct proscribed by the statute and ordinary inadvertence. Conduct is not purposeful if it is accidental, and intentional conduct is not purposeful if a reasonable worker would not have known both that a device is a safety device and that risk of injury or death may result from its removal or alteration. The court further erroneously instructed the jury that a violation of the statute, if found to have been a proximate cause of the decedent’s injury, constituted contributory negligence as a matter of law. The statute was intended to foster accident prevention in the workplace. Under the statute, only a purposeful violation of the statute could be raised by a contractor as a valid defense to an alleged breach of the duty to supply adequate safety devices, and if the jury concluded that the violation was a proximate cause of the injury, the worker’s negligence could be compared with the contractor’s.
6. The agreement between Leonard and J & L provides that its terms would be construed under the law of Illinois. Leonard concedes that under applicable Illinois law an express indemnity clause relating to an indemnitee’s own negligence is unenforceable, and is considered to have waived its claim under that clause. Nor is Leonard entitled to common-law indemnity from J & L. Common-law indemnity is available where a wrongdoer’s negligence is passive; however, on the facts presented, Leonard could be found negligent only as a result of á breach of its duty to provide adequate safety devices and programs, and such negligence would be active. Finally, Leonard claims indemnity on the theory that J & L breached its contractual duty to comply with safety laws and codes. Leonard did not show that such a ground for indemnity is recognized under Illinois law, but since the case must be retried, Leonard may present further evidence and authority to support this theory.
7. Retrial should not be limited to the issue of damages. The issue of liability was not clearly determined in the trial court. Should the plaintiff prevail, Leonard may be able to demonstrate its right to indemnity from J & L based on J & L’s breach of contract.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Opinion of the Court
1. Negligence — Safety Devices — General Contractors — Comparative Negligence.
The defense of comparative negligence is available to a contractor in a case involving negligence in the failure to provide an adequate safety device in the workplace where any evidence of a worker’s negligence exists.
2. Negligence — Safety Devices — General Contractors — Comparative Negligence.
The doctrine of comparative negligence applies to all instances of workplace negligence, and not only to cases not involving safety devices.
3. Negligence — Safety Devices — Comparative Negligence. The defense of comparative negligence is not barred in a case involving a missing safety device which a worker has not wilfully removed; where the worker is fully aware of a missing safety device, he should be held answerable for his negligent behavior.
4. Negligence — Comparative Negligence — Ordinary Inadvertence.
The trier of fact may find an injured worker to be free from negligence even though his behavior involved "ordinary inadvertence” where the behavior conforms to that of a reasonably prudent worker under all the circumstances; however, to the extent that "ordinary inadvertence” is a mere euphemism for the worker’s negligence, it should reduce his recovery.
5. Negligence — Safety Devices — Statutes.
Violation of the provision of the labor safety act which proscribed the wilful removal of a safety device in a workplace by a worker constitutes a prima facie case of negligence rather than negligence as a matter of law (MCL 408.853; MSA 17.49[3], since repealed, 1974 PA 154).
Opinion Dissenting in Part by Blair Moody, Jr., J.
6. Negligence — Safety Devices — General Contractors — Subcontractors.
A general building contractor has a duty to take reasonable steps within his supervisory authority to guard against readily observable, avoidable dangers in common work areas which create a high degree of risk to a significant number of workers, including providing adequate safety equipment or implementing adequate safety programs or requiring subcontractors to provide such equipment or implement such programs.
7. Negligence — Safety Devices — General Contractors — Subcontractors.
A general building contractor is not relieved from his duty to provide adequate safety equipment within his supervisory and coordinating authority by the absence of any conspicuous failure by a subcontractor to supply safety equipment for his employees; such an absence is only a factor to be considered by a trier of fact in determining whether the general contractor reasonably complied with his duty.
8. Negligence — Safety Devices — General Contractors — Subcontractors.
A provision in a subcontract requiring written approval of the general contractor prior to a subcontractor’s subletting work will not relieve the general contractor from his duty to guard against dangers posing a high degree of risk to a significant number of workers in common work areas occupied by employees of a subcontractor whom he has not approved where the general contractor is aware of the subcontractor prior to commencement of any work by the subcontractor and employees of another, approved, subcontractor occupy the same area.
9. Negligence — Safety Devices — General Contractors — Subcontractors — Assumption of Duty.
A subcontractor who assumes a duty under his contract with the general contractor to guard against dangers in common work areas posing a high degree of risk to a significant number of workers must perform his contractual obligation with ordinary care, and failure so to perform may support a cause of action against the subcontractor as well as the general contractor for injuries to workers resulting from inadequate safety precautions.
10. Negligence — Safety Devices — General Contractors — Subcontractors.
A subcontractor does not have an unqualified right to rely on the efforts of the general contractor in the discharge of the subcontractor’s contractually assumed duty to maintain adequate safety equipment in common work areas.
11. Negligence — Safety Devices — General Contractors — • Contributory Negligence.
Contributory negligence is no defense to failure by a contractor to provide adequate safety equipment in common work areas where the failure is causally connected to a worker’s injury.
12. Negligence — Safety Devices — General Contractors — Comparative Negligence.
The doctrine of comparative negligence may not be applied to claims involving breach of a contractor’s duty to guard against readily observable, avoidable dangers in common work areas which create a high degree of risk to a signiñcant number of workers as a total or a partial bar to recovery by an injured worker except where there is evidence that the worker unreasonably altered, dismantled, or failed to use an otherwise adequate safety device; the ability of a worker to avoid the risk of harm posed by absent or inadequate safety devices is inferior to the contractor’s, and such application would substantially undercut the primary goal of fostering worker safety by encouraging the provision of necessary safety devices.
13. Negligence — Standard of Care — Statutes — Common Law — Discretion.
A trial court retains ultimate discretion whether to apply a statutory standard of care in a civil action in lieu of a common-law standard absent speciñc language in the legislation creating civil liability; in determining which standard to apply, the court should look to the statute to ascertain whether application of the statutory standard of care would further the legislative intent.
14. Negligence — Safety Devices — Standard of Care — Statutes — Ordinary Negligence.
The provision of the labor safety act which proscribed wilful removal of a safety device in a workplace by a worker was aimed. at fostering accident prevention in the workplace and not at creating civil liability in the worker for inadvertence or for intentional removal of an object which the worker did not know was a safety device (MCL 408.853; MSA 17.49[3], since repealed, 1974 PA 154).
15. Negligence — Safety Devices — Jury Instructions — Comparative Negligence — Standard of Care.
A trial court, in an action by a worker for damages resulting from injuries received because of the absence of a safety device or an inadequate safety device in the workplace, may instruct the jury that a ñnding that the worker violated a statutory standard of care without excuse and that the violation was the proximate cause of his injuries constitutes a prima facie case of negligence where the instruction is supported by the evidence, the statute is designed to prevent the harm which occurred, and the standard of care involves conduct in which the worker unreasonably altered, dismantled, or failed to use an otherwise adequate safety device, and, if the jury concludes that the worker is responsible for such causal misconduct, his negligence may be compared with that of the defendant in assessing damages.
16. Conflict of Laws — Construction Contracts — Indemnity.
A clause in a construction contract which provides that the terms of the agreement will be construed in accordance with the laws of a foreign state will be enforced against the drafter absent a showing that the clause may not be enforced, and where the law of the foreign state precludes enforcement of express indemnity provisions in construction contracts relating to the negligence of an indemnitee that law will control and render the indemnity provision unenforceable.
17. Indemnity — Common-Law Indemnity — Negligence.
Common-law indemnity may be available to a party liable to an injured party where the liability arises by reason of his relation to another wrongdoer or is imposed by operation of law in the absence of personal fault or causal negligence or where the wrongdoer seeking indemnity is guilty merely of passive negligence.
18. New Trial — Damages.
Generally, a remand for a new trial limited to the determination of damages will not be ordered absent a clear indication of liability.
Murray & Mroz (by Terry J. Mroz and James R. Hulbert) for plaintiff.
Wheeler, Upham, Bryant & Uhl (by Buford A. Upham and Susan B. Flakne) for defendants Monsanto Enviro-Chem and Leonard Construction Co.
Rhoades, McKee & Boer (by Michael W. Betz and Ben T. Liu) for defendant J & L Roofing Co.

Opinion:
Ryan, J.
In this case we are required to determine the effect of the doctrine of comparative negligence on our decisions in Funk v General Motors Corp, 392 Mich 91; 220 NW2d 641 (1974), and Tulkku v Mackworth Rees Division of Avis Industries, Inc, 406 Mich 615; 281 NW2d 291 (1979). Since the defense of comparative negligence serves not to undermine but to enhance safety in the workplace, we are of the view that comparative negligence is available as a defense in those cases where Funk and Tulkku formerly prohibited the application of the contributory negligence defense. We conclude that negligence in the failure to provide an "adequate safety device" in the workplace is therefore subject to the comparative negligence defense, assuming that any evidence of the plaintiff's negligence exists. The verdict in favor of the defendants is reversed and the cause remanded for retrial under the principles of comparative negligence. Placek v Sterling Heights, 405 Mich 638; 275 NW2d 511 (1979).
I
The facts of this case are set forth in full and accurate detail in Justice Moody's opinion, to which reference is invited. The plaintiff-appellant argues that the jury should not have been instructed that contributory negligence was a defense to the claim that the defendant construction contractors negligently installed or maintained safety devices for the protection of construction workers at the work site.
Although the precise limits of this Court's opinion in Funk, supra, are unclear, we concur with the result reached by Justice Moody in parts I-III of his opinion. Under Funk, the defense of contributory negligence is unavailable when a construction worker alleges negligence in the failure to provide adequate safety devices on the job. The plaintiff in this case presented sufficient, albeit weak, evidence upon which the jury might have concluded that the plywood sheets covering the openings in the roof were "safety devices" which were negligently installed or maintained. Absent a reconsideration of the Funk doctrine, the plaintiff would be entitled to a new trial on the negligence claim, without the defense of contributory negligence.
However, the defense of contributory negligence as a total bar to recovery would be unavailable upon retrial in any event in light of Placek, supra. We must therefore decide whether the Funk policy of promoting safety in the workplace would be undermined or enhanced by the application of the principles of comparative negligence.
II
In Funk, this Court found the total bar of contributory negligence to be inconsistent with the public policy of promoting safety in the workplace. The Court refused to allow a . general contractor and a landowner to "avoid" liability "by pointing to the concurrent negligence of the injured worker in using the [unsafe] equipment". Funk, 113-114, quoting Koenig v Patrick Construction Corp, 298 NY 313, 318-319; 83 NE2d 133 (1948). Before Funk, the contractor could entirely avoid liability by convincing the finder of fact that the plaintiff was even 1% negligent. Apparently it was feared that some contractors might succumb to the temptation of employing skilled defense counsel instead of adequate safety devices. As the Court noted in Tulkku, 622:
"To allow defendants in this case to invoke the protection of the contributory negligence doctrine would be tantamount to subverting the very safety concerns that the Koenig and Funk courts extolled as of paramount importance. Such a position might allow a manufacturer to escape its duty of due care :
" 'It would be anomalous to hold that defendant has a duty to install safety devices but a breach of that duty results in no liability for the very injury the duty was meant to protect against.' " Quoting Bexiga v Havir Mfg Corp, 60 NJ 402, 412; 290 A2d 281 (1972). (Emphasis added.)
In stark contrast, the defense of comparative negligence never allows a contractor to entirely "avoid" liability and thus "escape" the duty of due care. Under Placek, the defendant must pay the full percentage of damages caused by his negligence. We do not find this partial defense "anomalous" as does our brother; quite the contrary, it would be "anomalous" to hold a defendant liable for damages in excess of the amount causally related to his negligence. The comparative negli gence defense does not provide a strong financial incentive for contractors to breach the duty to undertake reasonable safety precautions.
Our colleague asserts that a worker's recovery should not be reduced by his own comparative negligence when he works under dangerous conditions, since "considering the current state of the economy" it "would be unrealistic to conclude that workers have a choice not to work". Unfortunately, some workers are faced with the ultimatum "[i]f you don't want to work up in the steel, go home". Funk, 113. If a worker, acting reasonably under all the circumstances, would continue to work under the dangerous conditions, then the trier of fact could not conclude that the worker's recovery should be reduced, since the worker by definition was not negligent. On the other hand, at some point a worker must be charged with some responsibility for his own safety-related behavior. If a worker continues to work under extremely unsafe conditions when a reasonable worker under all the facts and circumstances would "take a walk", the trier of fact might appropriately reduce the plaintiffs recovery under comparative negligence. Comparative negligence enhances the goal of safety in the workplace under these conditions, since it gives the worker some financial incentive to act in a reasonable and prudent fashion.
The comparative negligence rule also enhances safety in the workplace by rewarding safety-conscious contractors. Undoubtedly, some contractors allow workers to refuse to work without fear of reprisal until dangerous conditions are reported and corrected. Yet our colleague's approach treats such a "safe" company identically with an "unsafe" company and prevents the safe company from reducing its damages despite a plaintiff's flagrant violation of company safety policy. The irrebuttable presumption that all contractors force workers to work under hazardous conditions might well become a grim self-fulfilling prophecy if we refuse to encourage safety-conscious contractors under the doctrine of comparative negligence.
Much the same response is appropriate to the comment that workers often become conditioned to working in dangers and deal with them prudently: continuing to work under those conditions would not constitute negligence on the part of the worker. Further, the contractor-defendant has little incentive to prove that the conditions were so dangerous that the plaintiff should have refused to work, since such an approach will probably increase rather than decrease the defendant's liability under comparative negligence. This is in contrast to the contributory negligence rule, which encouraged such a defense strategy.
In Tulkku, we noted that many workers rely on the effectiveness of what appears to be adequate safety equipment. In that case, the worker relied upon a four-palm-button switch that proved to be defective. Such reasonable reliance, absent proof that reasonably prudent press workers do not rely on the device, is not evidence of negligence; thus, no contributory negligence instruction should have been given in Tulkku because the defendant presented no evidence of the plaintiff's negligence. The Tulkku result would therefore remain the same even after the adoption of comparative negligence, since the worker "cannot and should not be required to temper his or her behavior because of a defect about which the [worker] has no awareness". Tulkku, 622. Suppose, however, that the press in Tulkku cycled after only three buttons were pushed, but no one was injured. A worker continuing to use the machine and receiving injuries the second time the switch fails should be answerable for his or her negligent behavior because the worker is fully aware of the defect. Yet our brother's opinion would hold exactly the opposite; the defense of comparative negligence would be unavailable in that situation because the worker has not "wilfully" removed a safety device.
Next, our colleague argues that a worker's recovery should not be reduced because of his or her "ordinary inadvertence". To the extent that the plaintiff's behavior conforms to that of a reasonably prudent worker under all the circumstances (even reasonably prudent workers act as plaintiff did because of job pressures, monotony, and attention to details of their work), the trier of fact is free to find the plaintiff free from negligence. To the extent, however, that "ordinary inadvertence" is merely a euphemism for a worker's negligence, it should reduce a worker's recovery. Until today, the notion that "mere inadvertence" should absolve persons from the effects of their negligence has been wholly foreign to our jurisprudence. We see no logical reason why it should immunize this particular class of plaintiffs from the defense of comparative negligence even if, as appears to be the case, we are observing the genesis of a new jurisprudence to be called "safety device" law.
Finally, it is argued that "in most instances" the worker's negligence will occur later than the defendant's negligence, making it "difficult" for the jury to accurately arrive at the correct percentage of relative fault. First, no empirical data supports the speculation that in "most" workplace accidents the worker's negligence happens last and understandably no authority is cited for it. Intuitively, it would seem that in "most" cases, as in Funk and Tulkku, the contractor's failure to provide an adequate safety device is probably a continuing omission which is concurrent with the employee's conduct that produces the injury. Secondly, our brother's opinion would abolish comparative negligence even in those cases where the contractor's negligence is "last" and the worker's negligence is the more distant in time. Thirdly, the idea that juries are not competent to make difficult allocations of proportional fault under comparative negligence is simply erroneous. Finally, on the basis of the speculation that the jury will reach the wrong allocation of fault, our colleague's approach guarantees that recovery will not be in proportion to fault, since if the defendant is negligent at all he pays 100% of plaintiffs damages. Truly this is a case of the cure being worse than the illness. As this Court acknowledged in Placek:
" 'What pure comparative negligence does is hold a person fully responsible for his or her acts and to the full extent to which they cause injury. That is justice.' " 405 Mich 661.
Our colleague's approach today would hold these defendants responsible for their acts above and beyond the extent to which they cause injury. That is injustice.
Ill
We also agree with the analysis and conclusion in part VII of Justice Moody's opinion which rejects plaintiff's claim that retrial should be limited to the issue of damages. While a poll of the jury revealed that five of the six jurors found all defendants to have been negligent, we do not know whether defendants' negligence was the failure to provide adequate "safety devices" or some other negligent act or omission such as the alleged failure to "adequately supervise and coordinate the activities of workmen on the roof'. Since the failure to adequately supervise was "ordinary negligence" and not "safety device negligence", under our brother's analysis the contributory negligence instruction would have been proper as to this claim; similarly, on retrial, comparative negligence will be available as a defense to this claim.
However, as noted, we do not limit the defense of comparative negligence to negligence not involving "safety devices". While that ambiguous and abstruse term was utilized in Funk and again in Tulkku, nothing in either opinion suggests a compelling reason why this apparently new subspecies of negligence should be treated differently than any other type of negligence. Indeed, in Funk, the Court noted that the defendants failed to give the plaintiff a "safety indoctrination"; yet that omission can hardly be forced into the category of failing to provide a "safety device". The misguided emphasis on the magic words "safety device" has already begun to lead to absurd, confusing, and therefore unfair results. As to non-safety device negligence, it appears that ordinary negligence and comparative negligence principles will apply. As to safety device negligence, ordinary negligence evidently applies as to liability, but a special comparative negligence instruction is required under my brother's analysis if the plaintiff "wilfully" removed a safety device.
The confusion perpetuated by that approach in this case is both unsound and unnecessary. By reinventing the comparative negligence wheel with "wilful removal of a safety device" language, our colleague would create a two-tier tort system, general negligence versus "safety device" negligence, each with its own set of instructions. As discussed above, the application of comparative negligence to all workplace negligence satisfies the Funk policies as well as encourages safer behavior by both contractors and workers. We prefer a unitary approach to negligence under which both the plaintiff and defendant are charged with the duty to act reasonably under all the circumstances.
IV
Since the issue is likely to arise upon retrial, we must also consider the appropriate instructions under MCL 408.853; MSA 17.49(3), since repealed. We agree that sufficient evidence was presented to justify an instruction under the statute. We also agree that under Zeni v Anderson, 397 Mich 117, 143; 243 NW2d 270 (1976), the trial court should instruct that violation of the statute constitutes a prima facie case of negligence, rather than negligence as a matter of law.
We disagree with the wisdom or necessity of adopting, at this appellate remove, our colleague's definition, or any definition, of the word "wilfully" as used in the since-repealed statute. Neither party requested a definitional instruction in the trial court or objected to the judge's failure to define the term sua sponte. We leave it to the trial court to decide in the first instance which of the parties' proposed instructions accurately represents the law on this point.
V
As to defendant J & L Roofing Company's cross-appeal that the trial court erred in denying its motions for directed verdict, we agree fully with the result and reasoning of Justice Moody in part VI of his opinion. The case is therefore remanded for trial on defendant Leonard Construction Company's claim for indemnification.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
Coleman, C.J., and Kavanagh and Fitzgerald, JJ., concurred with Ryan, J.
Adopted in Placek v Sterling Heights, 405 Mich 638; 275 NW2d 511 (1979).
This question was expressly reserved by the Court in Tulkku, 623.
At the extreme, Funk and Tulkku could be read to abolish the defense of contributory negligence in all actions where personal injury results from the defendant's negligence. All potential negligence defendants have a common-law or legislatively imposed duty to take reasonable precautions for the safety of others. If any negligence defendant "could avoid this duty by pointing to the concurrent negligence of the [plaintiff] the beneficial purpose of the statute [or common law] might well be frustrated and nullified". Funk, 113-114, quoting Koenig v Patrick Construction Corp, 298 NY 313, 318-319; 83 NE2d 133 (1948).
If the plaintiffs decedent had been "grossly negligent", a defense would be available. See Funk, 113, fn 18, citing Bowman v Redding & Co, 145 US App DC 294; 449 F2d 956 (1971).
Admittedly, the prospect of paying an additional arbitrary penalty above and beyond damages proximately caused by one's own negligence might provide an increased incentive to prevent accidents. But the proposed penalty is in inverse proportion to the defendant's culpability, since the 1% negligent defendant pays a hundredfold penalty while the 100% negligent defendant pays no penalty at all. Conversely, the more negligent the plaintiff, the greater his windfall recovery. The Court should not attempt to impose administrative penalties for safety violations under the guise of administering tort remedies. The Legislature has already enacted such an administrative scheme of inspections and fines under MIOSHA. See MCL 408.1001 et seq.; MSA 17.50(1) et seq.
Such a salutary policy might be adopted unilaterally, or under the terms of a collective-bargaining agreement.
The automobile operator who crosses the center line and crashes head-on into another vehicle cannot claim as a defense "mere inadvertence" due to "the monotony of the task". The surgeon who operates on the wrong leg may do so "inadvertently" due to "job pressures". The pedestrian who crosses against the traffic light is negligent even if he did so "inadvertently" while thinking about the details of his work back at the office.
Suppose the plaintiff in this case negligently removed the nails and the cover from the opening on Monday. The contractor negligently failed to reinstall the cover on Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday. On Friday, through no fault of his own, the plaintiff falls through the hole. The contractor's negligence in failing to correct the safety problem would be closer in time to the injury than the plaintiffs negligence in removing the cover.
As Justice Williams wrote in his separate opinion in Kirby v Larson, 400 Mich 585, 646; 256 NW2d 400 (1977), "Those who argue that comparative negligence is both confusing and difficult to administer both underestimate the modern jury and misread the facts." Justices Levin and Kavanagh joined Justice Williams in Kirby; the entire Court vindicated Justice Williams' position by adopting comparative negligence in Placek, supra.
See also United States v Reliable Transfer Co, Inc, 421 US 397, 406; 95 S Ct 1708; 44 L Ed 2d 251 (1975), adopting comparative negligence in the law of admiralty: "That a vessel is primarily negligent does not justify its shouldering all responsibility".
At the time of decedent's death, MCL 408.853; MSA 17.49(3), provided as follows:
11 No employee shall wilfully remove, displace, damage, destroy or carry off any safety device or safeguard furnished or provided for use in any employment or place of employment, or interfere in any way with the use thereof by any other person."
The statute was subsequently amended and the word "wilfully" was deleted. MCL 408.1012; MSA 17.50(12):
"An employee shall:
"(a) Comply with rules and standards promulgated, and with orders issued pursuant to this act.
"(b) Not remove, displace, damage, destroy, or carry off a safeguard furnished or provided for use in a place of employment, or interfere in any way with the use thereof by any other person." 1974 PA 154, effective January 1, 1975.
We decline to speculate about the effect of Placek and the products liability statute, MCL 600.2945; MSA 27A.2945, on the law of products liability. This cáse, as well as Tulkku and Funk, are negligence cases. The cases cited in our brother's opinion for the proposition that comparative negligence should not apply are inapplicable. Zerby v Warren, 297 Minn 134, 141; 210 NW2d 58 (1973), held that no comparative negligence defense was available under a statute imposing strict liability for selling model airplane glue to a minor; Suter v San Angelo Foundry & Machine Co, 81 NJ 150; 406 A2d 140 (1979), was a strict liability case holding that comparative negligence was unavailable under those facts but noting that comparative negligence is a defense in some strict liability cases. See Ettin v Ava Truck Leasing, Inc, 53 NJ 463; 251 A2d 278 (1969); Cintrone v Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Service, 45 NJ 434; 212 A2d 769 (1965).