Case Name: In the Matter of the Application of CARL PETERSON for a Writ of Habeas Corpus
Court: Supreme Court of California
Jurisdiction: California
Decision Date: 1939-07-25
Citations: 14 Cal. 2d 82
Docket Number: Crim. No. 4217
Parties: In the Matter of the Application of CARL PETERSON for a Writ of Habeas Corpus.
Judges: 
Reporter: California Reports
Volume: 14
Pages: 82–87

Head Matter:
[Crim. No. 4217.
In Bank.
July 25, 1939.]
In the Matter of the Application of CARL PETERSON for a Writ of Habeas Corpus.
Jerome L. Schiller for Petitioner.
Earl Warren, Attorney-General, William F. Cleary, Deputy Attorney-General, and A. E. Bagshaw, District Attorney, for Respondent.

Opinion:
EDMONDS, J.
Ordinarily, the purpose of a writ of habeas corpus is to procure one's discharge from custody alleged to be illegal. In the present case, the petitioner, an inmate of the state prison at San Quentin, is demanding the right to reject a parole granted to him by the board of prison terms and paroles under the indeterminate sentence law. (Sec. 1168, Pen. Code.) Although petitioner claims the further right to an absolute discharge from custody, logically, his primary contention would require an order remanding him to the custody of the warden for the remainder of the sentence originally imposed upon him. That an extraordinary writ may be used by a convicted prisoner to com pel the execution of his sentence was decided in In re Collins, 8 Cal. App. 367 [97 Pac. 188].
The petitioner's unusual position is occasioned by the fact that before his difficulties in this state he was convicted of a felony in Texas for which he was sentenced to a term of 30 years. Later he escaped from the Texas prison to which he was committed and came to California where, in 1935, he was charged with the crime of burglary in the second degree after having been previously convicted of a felony. The State of Texas having waived extradition, he was tried, convicted, and sentenced to the state prison for the term prescribed by law. (Sec. 1168, Pen. Code.)
In due time the board of prison terms and paroles fixed his term of imprisonment at 7% years, the last two years of which were to be on parole "to the custody of the Texas authorities". When he was eligible for parole, but still in custody at San Quentin prison, an agent of the State of Texas served a warrant of extradition, issued by the Governor of California, upon him. The return of the warden to the writ of habeas corpus by which it is sought to stay the execution of that warrant, states that unless otherwise ordered, by this court, he will deliver the petitioner to the agent of the State of Texas as directed by the governor.
The principal point urged by the petitioner challenges the right of the board of prison terms and paroles to terminate his imprisonment under parole conditions not accepted by him. He argues that as a parole is not a termination of the sentence imposed, but a continuance of that sentence under particular conditions fixed by the board and required to be fulfilled by the convict, it is only effective when accepted and cannot be forced upon him without his consent. In support of this contention, he relies by analogy upon pertinent rules which have been established in regard to executive pardons.
It has long been held that consent by the prisoner is a prerequisite to the validity of a conditional pardon because its terms may be more objectionable than the punishment fixed by the sentence. (United States v. Wilson, 7 Pet. 150 [8 L. Ed. 640] , and see cases cited in annotation, 52 A. L. R. 835.) The same conclusion has been reached in California. Many years ago this court held that to be effectual, a conditional pardon must be accepted by the prisoner. (Ex parte Marks, 64 Cal. 29 [28 Pac. 109, 49 Am. Rep. 684].)
The word' "parole" was originally a military term signifying the word of honor or promise of a prisoner of war that if he be released, he will comply with certain conditions, such as to refrain from bearing arms against his captors. As used in penology, the term has come to signify the release of a prisoner prior to expiration of his term of imprisonment conditioned upon his continuing good behavior during the remainder of the term. In its essential characteristics, therefore, a parole cannot be distinguished from a conditional pardon. Bach constitutes the release of a convict upon fixed conditions before the expiration of his term of imprisonment and many courts have drawn upon this analogy to hold that a proffered parole must likewise be accepted to be effective. (Ex parte Hawkins, 10 Okl. Cr. 396 [136 Pac. 991]; Ex parte Taggert, 12 Okl. Cr. 439 [158 Pac. 288]; Fuller v. State, 122 Ala. 32 [26 So. 146, 82 Am. St. Rep. 17, 45 L. R. A. 502] ; Re Patterson, 94 Kan. 439 [146 Pac. 1009, L. R. A. 1915F, 541]; Ex parte Colcord, 49 S. D. 416 [207 N. W. 213]; State v. Goddard, 69 Or. 73 [133 Pac. 90, 138 Pac. 243, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 146].) Section 1168 of the Penal Code, which defines the rights and duties of the board, and empowers it to parole prisoners upon such conditions as it may deem proper, does not authorize the board to require the prisoner to accept a parole ordered by it, and under the principles stated and applied in the authorities cited, the consent of the petitioner is a prerequisite to his release upon parole.
However, this conclusion does not entitle petitioner to an absolute discharge from custody at this time, for he cannot convert the board's order into an unconditional parole merely by rejecting the condition attached. In rejecting the order of parole, he renders himself bound to serve the unexpired term of his sentence as now fixed or subsequently modified. It is, therefore, ordered that petitioner be discharged from custody by virtue of the warrant of extradition and remanded to the custody of the respondent warden.
Houser, J., Langdon, J., and Curtis, J., concurred.