Case Name: Coleen ROOK, Appellant, v. James K. ROOK, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1985-05-21
Citations: 469 So. 2d 172
Docket Number: No. 83-607
Parties: Coleen ROOK, Appellant, v. James K. ROOK, Appellee.
Judges: DAUKSCH, ORFINGER and FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 469
Pages: 172–179

Head Matter:
Coleen ROOK, Appellant, v. James K. ROOK, Appellee.
No. 83-607.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
May 21, 1985.
Michael B. Swindle, Winter Park, for appellant.
James K. Rook, in pro. per.

Opinion:
COBB, Chief Judge.
We have considered this matter en banc for the dual purposes of (1) avoiding intrac-ourt conflict with prior opinions of this court, and (2) establishing the policy of this court as a matter of "exceptional impor tance" in regard to the utilization of percentage guidelines in the review of monetary awards in domestic cases.
In the instant case the trial court, at a modification hearing, increased the child support award to $130.00 per month. At the time of the award, the father's net income was $1,190.00 per month and the custodial mother's net income was $800.00 per month. The father had remarried, and has two children by his second marriage. His second wife, according to the evidence adduced below, has no steady employment and no income figure for her was established. The first wife, Coleen Rook, appeals on the basis that the trial court's increase was so inadequate as to constitute an abuse of. discretion.
The majority opinion by the original panel herein proposed to reverse the award based on Orange-Osceola Guidelines, which are not in the record before us. The appellant's brief urges that such guidelines were adopted in the Ninth Circuit as of November 1, 1975, and set child support for one dependent at 25% of the net income of the husband. The appellant also urges that the appellee's second marriage "does not relieve him of his primary responsibility" from the first marriage.
Our consideration and application of the asserted guidelines, as urged by the appellant, would contravene the fundamental precept that appellate cases are to be reviewed only upon the extant record. See Coffman Realty, Inc. v. Tosohatchee Game Preserve, 381 So.2d 1164 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); affirmed, 413 So.2d 1 (Fla.1982). Certainly, such local guidelines fail the test for judicial notice. See § 90.201-90.207, Fla.Stat. (1983). Moreover, the adoption of the Ninth Circuit guidelines by this court would arbitrarily impose them upon circuit courts in eleven other counties in the Fifth, Seventh and Eighteenth Circuits.
Even if such guidelines were part of the record in this case, they cannot serve as a substitute for the test prescribed by Canakaris for appellate review, which recognizes the broad discretionary power of the trial judge:
. [Wjhere the action of the trial judge is within his judicial discretion, as in the establishment of the amount of alimony or award of child custody, the manner of appellate review is altogether different.

. Our trial judges are granted this discretionary power because it is impossible to establish strict rules of law for every conceivable situation which could arise in the course of a domestic relation proceeding. The trial judge can ordinarily best determine what is appropriate and just because only he can personally observe the participants and events of the trial.
⅜: ⅝ ⅝ ⅜: ⅝ ‡
. [TJhat discretion is abused only where no reasonable man would take the view adopted by the trial court. If reasonable men could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion.
afc * ⅝: * ¾: ⅜
. If reasonable men could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then the action is not unreasonable and there can be no finding of an abuse of discretion. The discretionary ruling of the trial judge should be disturbed only when his decision fails to satisfy this test of reasonableness.
Canakaris at 1202-1203.
We previously have recognized and applied this standard of review in declining to reverse a trial judge's discretionary findings in regard to support awards. See, e.g., Severs v. Severs, 426 So.2d 992 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983), and Hair v. Hair, 402 So.2d 1201 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), review denied, 412 So.2d 465 (Fla.1982). We also have recognized that there are various factors to be considered by the trial court in setting alimony and child support awards. See Peak v. Peak, 411 So.2d 325 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982); Thompson v. Thompson, 402 So.2d 1220 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). Therefore, the mechanistic approach of reviewing the trial court's discretion based solely upon fixed percentages assessed against noncustodial wage-earners would not only contravene Canakaris, but also would create intrac-ourt conflict with Peak, Thompson, Severs, Hair, and other cases from this court utilizing the standard of review authorized by the Florida Supreme Court.
As to the priority of the support obligations emanating from sequential marriages, we can readily agree that a man under a fixed obligation of support who incurs subsequent obligations does so at his peril, insofar as enforcement and contempt proceedings are concerned. But the concept is different in regard to a modification increase, at which time pre-existent obligations are fixed by law. At that point, the trial judge is justified in considering other children the father is obligated to support. The so-called "first mortgage" theory in domestic law, referred to by the appellant, is illogical when applied, as urged in this case, to discriminate against dependent children of subsequent marriages. Cases cited for the proposition that first family obligations come first usually deal with attempts by a father to evade or reduce his child support obligation because of subsequent obligations he has voluntarily incurred. See, e.g., In Re Marriage of Johnson, 352 So.2d 140 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). That is not the situation before us.
In the instant case, the trial judge increased a child support obligation from $65.00 to $130.00 per month for the child of a first marriage. The appellant urges, in effect, that "no reasonable man would take the view adopted by the trial court." Canakaris at 1203. The $200.00 minimum figure sought by the appellant would result in the appellant and her daughter (two people) living on $1,000.00 per month; and the appellee, his present wife and his other two children (four people) living on $990.00 per month. The trial court's result is eminently more reasonable than that.
In Menendez v. Menendez, 435 So.2d 287 (Fla. 5th DCA), review denied, 441 So.2d 632 (Fla.1983), we referred to income percentages suggested by the concurring opinion in Hughes v. Hughes, 421 So.2d 544 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982), but only as another factor to be considered with the enumerated factors set out in Peak v. Peak. Unfortunately, the Menendez reference to the "fair share" percentages suggested in the concurring opinion in Hughes has given rise to the argument that this court has adopted percentage guidelines which trial judges must follow, their discretion under Canakaris notwithstanding. For that reason, we recede from any implication in Menendez that this court will utilize arbitrary percentage guidelines as a review standard; we reaffirm our commitment to the rule of reasonableness articulated in Canakaris.
The second point on appeal raised by the appellant relative to the fairness of the attorney's fee award below is without merit.
AFFIRMED.
DAUKSCH, ORFINGER and FRANK D. UPCHURCH, Jr., JJ., concur.
SHARP, J., dissents with separate opinion.
COWART, J., dissents with separate opinion.
. See Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.331(a), eff. January 1, 1985.
. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197 (Fla.1980).