Case Name: Dooley v. Richard's Standard Service
Court: Appellate Court of Indiana
Jurisdiction: Indiana
Decision Date: 1969-10-16
Citations: 145 Ind. App. 470
Docket Number: No. 1168A188
Parties: Dooley v. Richard’s Standard Service.
Judges: 
Reporter: Indiana Court of Appeals Reports
Volume: 145
Pages: 470–479

Head Matter:
Dooley v. Richard’s Standard Service.
[No. 1168A188.
Filed October 16, 1969.
No petitions for rehearing or transfer filed.]
Thompson & Jones, of Columbus, for appellant.
Richard W. Guthrie, Stewart, Irwin, Gilliom, Fuller & Meyer, of Indianapolis, for appellee.

Opinion:
Sullivan, J.
This appeal is taken from a negative award by the Indiana Industrial Board which denied claimant-appellant's application for compensation. The decision of the Full Board upheld the finding of the single hearing member to the effect that said claimant should take nothing by way of his application.
It is the position of the appellant that he received a herniated disc as a result of his activity as a service station attendant while carrying tires from the back of the service station to the front thereof which became noticeable a short time later while proceeding to put gasoline into an automobile.
The sole question for the single hearing member and the Full Industrial Board to determine was whether or not appellant sustained an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment with the appellee, Richard's Standard Service. At the time of his alleged accidental injury he worked as a service station attendant and performed all of the general duties required around a service station. It is important to note the exact activity in which he was engaged at the time he .claims he sustained the alleged injury. He was asked to describe what took place on the day in question, July 29,1966, and he answered:
"A — About 11:00 o'clock, I was asked to go around to the rear of the station where there is a storage building containing cases of oil and an inventory of tires and I had to get four tires of the same size. In order to do this, I had to move part of the inventory before getting the tires of the right size I wanted. After locating them and removing them from the building, I carried the tires around from the back of the station and then, when I got to the front of the station, I laid them down in front of the station and then walked out to the drive, to the pumps closest to the station, and proceeded to put gasoline in an automobile, and whén I bent over to put the gasoline nozzle into the car, I couldn't straighten up and I had a sharp pain in my back, and following that, I went to see a doctor and, finally, I got hold of a doctor to examine me, and on that same day, I was immediately admitted to the hospital."
The above-quoted testimony of the claimant is the only evidence from which the trier of fact could possibly infer that Dooley's alleged injury was in any way related to his employment. It should be noted, however, that the claimant had been previously rejected for employment or re-employment by a different employer because a doctor had indicated a weak back on the part of Dooley thereby giving rise to a potentiality of injury. Dooley had knowledge prior to July 29, 1966, that he was considered to be an employment risk because of a back weakness.
At the outset, it should be pointed out that appellant's assignment of error to the extent that it asserts that the "award of a single hearing member and the Full Industrial Board are not supported by sufficient evidence" presents nothing for review by this court. It is not necessary for the Industrial Board or one benefitting by a negative award to justify or support such decision by reference to sufficient or preponderating evidence. It is the claimant's burden in the first instance to prove his right to compensation. See Thomas Products, Inc. v. Review Board (Oct. 14, 1969), 145 Ind. App. 425, 251 N. E. 2d 473; Mitchell v. Lawson (1969), 145 Ind. App. 141, 250 N. E. 2d 259; Lewis v. Marhoefer Packing Co. (1969), 144 Ind. App. 220, 245 N. E. 2d 685; and, B.P.O. Elks v. Sponholtz (1969), 144 Ind. App. 150, 244 N. E. 2d 923.
To the extent, however, that appellant claims the negative award to be contrary to law we need only examine the evidence hereinabove set forth within the framework of the following language from City of Anderson v. Borton (1961), 132 Ind. App. 684, 694, 178 N. E. 2d 904:
"From a review of the evidence, it is apparent that there is no evidence whatever of any increase in the work load or of any extra exertion. The evidence from Borton's own testimony shows that the so-called accident which he claims to have caused the aggravation of his pre-existing back injury occurred as he 'reached over to raise the trap door.' There is no evidence that it was caused by lifting the door— rather it is apparent that he felt the pain as he 'reached over to raise the trap door.'
"We believe that this case falls squarely in line with the decision of our Supreme Court in the case of U.S. Steel Corporation v. Dykes (1958), 238 Ind. 599, 154 N. E. 2d 111, and followed by our Court in Bundy v. Concrete Ready-Mix Company (1960), 130 Ind. App. 542, 167 N. E. 2d 477. There is no evidence that appellee Borton suffered any unusual strain or exertion or any untoward or unusual incident of any kind which precipitated the back pains. On the contrary, there.is evidence by appellee's medical doctor witness, Dr. Reed, that Borton had a constant traumatic condition and that some trivial act, such as walking about as a normal person, might cause the protrusion of the degenerated disc pressing on the nerve root.
"In view of the fact that there is no conflict in the evidence concerning the performance of the act of bending over to lift the trap door when the pain occurred, and since there was nothing unexpected nor any unusual exertion connected with this incident, and with no conflict in the evidence that appellee's back had degenerated since his first injury to a point where pain and further damage might occur merely by the act of walking about as a normal person, we are of the opinion that the evidence was insufficient to prove that the injury occurred because of any increase in his work load or of any extra exertion. We are also of the opinion that there was a lack of any evidence to prove that the act of bending over to lift a trap door was anything so unusual to appellee's customary work as to cause an aggravation of a previously existing degenerated back."
The mere fact that here a Dr. Shaffer testified that an injury in the form of a herniated disc could have happened at one time but the actual experience of pain delayed until a subsequent time is wholly insufficient evidence upon which to base a rational finding of causal relationship between Dooley's employment and his alleged injury.
We believe that the appellant Dooley wholly failed in his burden before the single hearing member and the Full Board. We will not, therefore, disturb the determination of said board. The award of the Industrial Board is affirmed and the costs are hereby assessed against appellant.
Lowdermilk, P.J., and Carson, J., concur; Cooper, J., concurs with opinion.