Case Name: In the Matter of the Will of Charles F. Fowles, Deceased. Dorothy E. Smith et al., Appellants; Gertrude F. Browne et al., Respondents
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1918-01-08
Citations: 222 N.Y. 222
Docket Number: 
Parties: In the Matter of the Will of Charles F. Fowles, Deceased. Dorothy E. Smith et al., Appellants; Gertrude F. Browne et al., Respondents.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 222
Pages: 222–247

Head Matter:
In the Matter of the Will of Charles F. Fowles, Deceased. Dorothy E. Smith et al., Appellants; Gertrude F. Browne et al., Respondents.
Will — simultaneous death of testator and his wife — provision of will that testator should be deemed in such an event to have predeceased his wife — power of appointment to testator’s wife — bequest by testator’s wife under such appointment held valid although testator and his wife were lost at sea and it is not known who was the survivor.
This controversy over the will of. testator grows out of the ninth article which reads as follows: “ In the event that my said wife and myself should die simultaneously or under such circumstances as to render it impossible or difficult to determine who predeceased the other, I hereby declare it to be my Will that it shall be deemed that I shall have predeceased my said wife, and that this my Will and any and all its provisions shall be construed on the assumption and basis that I shall have predeceased my said wife.” The testator, by the eighth article of his will, gave part of his residuary estate in trust for t his wife for life, and authorized her to dispose of part of said share by her will. Husband and wife were lost at sea on May 7, 1915, with the steamship Lusitania. There is nothing to show which was the survivor. The wife left a will made at the same time as the husband’s. She recites the power of appointment, and undertakes to execute it.;: She gives her residuary estate (including the property affected by the power) to trustees for the use of a sister during life with remainder over. Held, that this gift in its application to the husband’s estate is made valid and effective by the ninth article of his will. The legacies to the testator’s wife under the third and fourth provisions of the will pass to the executors of the wife by virtue of the same clause. (Matter of Piffard, 111 N. Y. 410, 414, 415, followed.)
Matter of Fowles, 176 App. Div. 637, reversed.
(Argued November 15, 1917;
decided January 8, 1918.)
Appeal from an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the first judicial department, entered March 23, 1917, which reversed a decree of the New York County Surrogate’s Court construing the will of Charles F. Fowles, deceased.
The facts, so far as material, are stated in the opinion.
Charles F. Brown and Seldon Bacon for Dorothy E. Smith, appellant.
As to the legacies of $5,000 and of the Fairmile Court personalty, the intent of the testator that these should not lapse under the circumstances of uncertain survivorship that have arisen, but should survive and be paid over to Mrs. Fowles’ executors, is fully declared in the 9th clause, and is clearly operative, whatever difficulties may be found to affect the provisions affecting the twenty-two and one-half per cent of the residue. (Sibthorp v. Moxom, 1 Ves. Sr. 49; Rivers v. Rivers, 36 S. C. 302; Turner v. Martin, 7 DeG., M. & G. 429; Davis v. Taul, 6 Dana [Ky.], 51; Kimball v. Story, 108 Mass. 382; St. John v. Andrews Inst., 191 N. Y. 254.) The 9th paragraph of the will is valid and the directions contained therein are binding upon the executor and all persons interested in the testator’s estate. (St. John v. Andrews Inst., 191 N. Y. 267; Masterson v. Townshend, 123 N. Y. 462; Goebel v. Wolf, 113 N. Y. 412; Miller v. Gilbert, 144 N. Y. 73.) The power granted to Mrs. Fowles to dispose of the twenty-two and one-half per cent of the residuary estate of Mr. Fowles by her last will and' testament duly executed was duly and lawfully executed by her. (Hirsch v. Bucki, 162 App. Div. 659; Chaplin on Express Trust Powers, § 627; U. S. Trust Co. v. Chauncey, 32 Misc. Rep. 358; Cutting v. Cutting, 86 N. Y. 522; Matter of Piffard, 42 Hun, 34, 37.) The bequest to his own trustees to pay over to beneficiaries named in Mrs. Fowles’ will and pursuant to the directions therein contained is, even although Mrs. Fowles died first or simultaneously with the testator, a valid bequest to the trustees and the trust will be enforced. Such a bequest does not contravene the rule against incorporating by reference provisions of a testamentary character contained in an extraneous instrument. (Jay v. Lee, 41 Misc. Rep. 13; Gross v. Moore, 68 Hun, 412; 141 N. Y. 559.)
Egerton L. Winthrop, Jr., for Kenneth C. Smith, appellant.
The court should carry into effect the testator’s intention, if this can be done, without contravening any established rule of law. (Du Bois v. Ray, 35 N. Y. 166; Butler v. Butler, 3 Barb. Ch. 310; Terry v. Wiggins, 47 N. Y. 517; Greene v. Greene, 125 N. Y. 512.) The testator’s intention can be carried into effect without contravening the rules (1) that a will cannot speak until the testator’s death, (2) that no power of appointment can vest in the donee of the power unless, as a matter of fact, the donee is living at the death of the donor of the piower, and (3) that in cases of death by common disaster where there is no evidence as to survivorship there can be no presumption as to survivorship. (Matter of Pifard, 111 N. Y. 410; Matter of Peiser, 79 Misc. Rep. 671.)
George L. Ingraham and William M. Parke for Gertrude F. Browne et al., respondents.
Under the ,8th clause of the testator’s will the disposition of that part of the corpus of the trust consisting of one-half of forty-five per cent of his residuary estate, after the death of his wife, depended upon a valid execution of the power granted to his wife by her last will and testament, and, in the event of a failure to execute that power by his wife, the property went to his trustees for the benefit of his two daughters during their lives. (Root v. Stuyvesant, 18 Wend. 250; Connolly v. Connolly, 122 App. Div. 493; Matter of Haggerty, 128 App. Div. 479; 194 N. Y. 550; Crackenthorpe v. Sickles, 156 App. Div. 753.) Neither the trust established for the benefit of his wife by the 8th clause of his will nor the power of appointment by a moiety of the trust estate ever came into existence, by reason of the fact that the beneficiary of the trust and the grantee of the power did not survive the testator, and there was, therefore, a failure of the testator’s wife to make a testamentary disposition of one-half of the corpus of the trust estate. (Rose v. Hatch, 125 N. Y. 427; Holland v. Alcock, 108 N. Y. 312; Fosdick v. Town of Hempstead, 125 N. Y. 581; Sawyer v. Cubby, 146 N. Y. 192; Farwell on Powers [2d ed.], 226; Jones v. Southall, 32 Beav. 31; Baker v. Hanbury, 3 Russell, 340; Me Adam v. Logan, 3 Brown Ch. 310; Sharpe v. M’Call, 1903, 1 I. R. 179; Reid v. Bonshall, 107 N. C. 345; Curley v. Lynch, 206 Mass. 289; Matter of Mayo, 76 Misc. Rep. 416.) The 9th clause of the will does not purport to modify the provisions of the 8th clause of the will and cannot be construed to create a power to appoint where none ever did or could exist, or to bring into the wall of the testator the will of his wife and thus make her will the controlling element in the disposition of the testator’s property; and there is nothing in the will that indicates, or from which the inference can be drawn, that the testator had any such intention. (Matter of Piffard, 111 N. Y. 410; Central Trust Co. v. Eggleston, 185 N. Y. 23; Matter of Stewart, 131 N. Y. 274; Cutting v. Cutting, 86 N. Y. 522; F. L. & T. Co. v. Mortimer, 219 N. Y. 290; Langdon v. Astor, 16 N. Y. 9; Williams v. Freeman, 83 N. Y. 561; Matter of O’Neil, 91 N. Y. 516; Booth v. Baptist Church, 126 N. Y. 215; Matter of Emmons, 110 App. Div. 701.)
James W. Prendergast, for Stevenson Scott, as trustee under the will of Charles F. Fowles, deceased, respondent.
No presumption exists to the effect that Frances May Fowles, the wife of Charles F. Fowles, either predeceased him or survived him; the burden of proof as to the fact of survivorship rests upon the residuary legatees and devisees under the will of Frances May Fowles, as they are the persons who claim under her will as an instrument passing the property as to which she had power of disposition by virtue of the wall of her husband. (St. John v. Andrews Institute, 191 N. Y. 254; Newell v. Nicholas, 75 N. Y. 78; Y. W. C. Home v. French, 187 U. S. 401; Matter of Mclnness, 119 App. Div. 440; Southwell v. Gray, 35 Misc. Rep. 740; Dunn v. N. A. Casualty Co., 141 App. Div. 478.) The principle established by the common law in cases in which the fact of survivorship is in question cannot be disregarded to give effect to the direction contained in the 9th paragraph of testator’s will. (Matter of Anonymous, 80 Misc. Rep. 10.) The power conferred upon Frances May Fowles to dispose of one-half of forty-five per cent of the residuary estate of her husband by virtue of the provisions of subdivision “ eighth ” of his will, could be validily exercised by her only in the event that she survived her husband, and as there was no proof of such survivorship, and as effect cannot be given to the direction of the said will as to survivorship, the power failed. (1 Jarman on Wills [6th ed.], 428; Matter of Piffard, 111 N. Y. 410; Matter of Mayo, 76 Misc. Rep. 416; Jones v. Southall, 32 Beav. 31; Sharpe v. M’Call, 1903, 1 I. R. 179; Curley v. Lynch, 206 Mass. 289.) The contention that the provisions of the will of Charles F. Fowles, made in behalf of his wife may be rendered effective by incorporating the will of the latter into the will of the former, is open to the objection that the provisions of the will of the latter are plainly dispository in character, and, therefore, cannot be read into the will of the former. (Matter of O’Neil, 91 N. Y. 516; Booth v. Baptist Church, 126 N. Y. 215; Matter of Conway, 124 N. Y. 455; Locke v. Rings, 56 Hun, 428; Martin v. Pine, 79 Hun, 430; Matter of Emmons, 110 App. Div. 701; Matter of Westeon, 60 Misc. Rep. 275; Matter of Martindale, 69 Misc. Rep. 522; Keil v. Hoehn, 72 Misc. Rep. 255; Matter of Piffard, 111 N. Y. 410.)
A. Perry Osborn and Stephen P. Anderton for Marjory F. S. Browne et al., respondents.
The provisions of article “ ninth ” of Mr. Fowles’ will would alter or evade the law, and are a nullity. (Matter of Board of Education of N. Y., 173 N. Y. 321; Matter of Smith, 77 Misc. Rep. 76; Matter of Benjamin, 155 App. Div. 233; King v. Paddock, 18 Johns. 141; Cerf v. Diener, 210 N. Y. 156.) The persons named in Mrs. Fowles’ will do not take by substitution. (Matter of Wells, 113 N. Y. 396; 1 Jarman on Wills [6th ed.], 843; Griggs v. Gibson, 35 L. J. Ch. 458; Irish v. Huested, 39 Barb. 411; King v. Woodall, 3 Edw. Ch. 79; Kerr v. Dougherty, 79 N. Y. 327.)
Charles H. Beckett for Columbia Trust Company, respondent.
There is no presumption of law arising from age or sex as to survivorship .among persons who perish by a common disaster. Nor is there any presumption of law that all died at the same time. The question is one of fact, depending wholly on evidence, and if the evidence does not establish the survivorship of any one, the law will treat it as a matter incapable of being determined. The onus probandi is on the person asserting the affirmative. In the absence of any proof there is an intestacy. (Wing v. Angrave, 8 H. L. Cas. 183; Newell v. Nichols, 75 N. Y. 78; Young Women’s Christian Home v. French, 187 U. S. 401; St. John v. Andrews Institute, 191 N. Y. 272; Dunn v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 141 App. Div. 478.) A provision in a will contrary to the principles of the common law or the operation of which would reverse a rule of construction based on those principles is illegal and invalid. (Booth v. Baptist Church, 126 N. Y. 216; Matter of O’Neil, 91 N. Y. 516; Matter of Emmons, 110 App. Div. 701; Matter of Andrews, 162 N. Y. 1; Vogel v. Lehritter, 139 N. Y. 223; Matter of Conway, 124 N. Y. 455; Matter of Piffard, 111 N. Y. 410; Matter of Mayo, 76 Misc. Rep. 417; Curley v. Lynch, 206 Mass. 289; Condit v. De Hart, 62 N. J. L. 78; Jones v. Southall, 32 Beav. 31; Sharpe v. M’Call, 1903, 1 I. R. 179.)

Opinion:
Cardozo, J.
The will of Charles Frederick Fowles, made on April 29, 1915, is before us for construction. By the second article of the will he gave to his wife, Frances May Fowles, $5,000. By the fourth article he gave her the contents of his estate " Fairmile Court." By the eighth article he gave his residuary estate to trustees to divide into three parts, the first part to consist of forty-five per cent thereof, and each of the other parts to consist of twenty-seven and one-half per cent thereof. The income of the first part was to be paid to his wife during her life, and upon her death the trust was to cease and the corpus to be divided. Half of the corpus (22| per cent of the entire residue) was to be paid by the trustees " pursuant to the provisions of such last will and testament as my said wife may leave (hereby conferring upon my said wife the power to dispose of the said one-half by last will and testament duly executed by her)." If she failed to execute the power, the corpus was to be held in trust for his daughters by a former wife, with remainder to their children. To them also were given upon like trusts, and with like remainders, the other shares of the residue.
These provisions are not obscure, and their validity is not doubtful. The controversy grows out of the ninth article which reads as follows: " In the event that my said wife and myself should die simultaneously or under such circumstances as to render it impossible or difficult to determine who predeceased the other, I hereby declare it to be my Will that it shall be deemed that I shall have predeceased my said wife, and that this my Will and any and all its provisions shall be construed on the assumption and basis that I shall have predeceased my said wife."
Husband and wife were lost at sea on May 7, 1915, with the steamship Lusitania. There is nothing to show which was the survivor. The wife left a will made at the same time as the husband's. She recites the power of appointment, and undertakes to execute it She gives her residuary estate (including the property affected by the power) to trustees for the use of a sister during life with remainder over. Whether this gift in its application to the husband's estate is made valid and effective by the ninth article of his will is the chief question to be determined.
Of his intention, there can be no doubt. In that, we all agree. He was about to set sail with his wife upon a perilous journey. He knew that disaster was possible. He knew that if death came, there would be no presumption to whom it had come first (Newell v. Nichols, 75 N. Y. 78; St. John v. Andrews Institute, 117 App. Div. 698; 191 N. Y. 254). He told the courts what he wished them to do if all other tests of truth should fail. They were to distribute his estate as they would if his wife Were the survivor. We cannot know whether she wás in truth the survivor or not: there is no break in the silence and obscurity of those last hours. The very situation which 'was foreseen has thus arisen. If intention is the key to the problem, the solution is not doubtful. We are now asked to hold that under the law of the state of New York, a testator may not lawfully declare that a power executed by one who dies under such conditions shall be valid to the same extent as if there were evidence of survivorship.
Two rules of law are supposed to stand in the way. One is the rule that a power created by will lapses if the donee dies before the will takes effect. The other is the rule that wills must be executed in compliance with statutory formalities, and are not to be enlarged or diminished by reference to extrinsic documents which may not be authentic. A testator is not permitted at his pleasure to violate these rules. He does violate them, it is said, by indirection, if he may dispense with evidence of survivorship and still sustain the gift which purports to execute the power. If the wife had survived a single second, the gift would certainly be valid. That would be so though she had signed her will while her husband was yet alive and before the power took effect (Stone v. Forbes, 189 Mass. 163, 168; Airey v. Bower, 12 A. C. 263; Hirsch v. Bucki, 162 App. Div. 659, 665). It is possible that she did survive, but it is also possible that she did not. The latter possibility, it is said, renders the gift void. We do not think it does.
It is true that a power created by will lapses if the donee of the power dies before the maker of the will (Curley v. Lynch, 206 Mass. 289; Sugden on Powers [8th ed.], 460; Farwell on Powers [2d ed.], p. 226). That is because a will has no effect till the death of the testator. Whatever power it creates, comes into being at that time. But to say this, does not answer the question before us. The question is not whether this power of appointment lapsed. The question is whether the testator has avoided the consequences of a lapse. More concretely, it is whether the law permits him to provide that if the donee's survivorship is incapable of proof, he will give his estate none the less to whomever she has named. That is what this testator said, not in words, but in effect. His will in this respect has a parallel in the one construed in Matter of Greenwood (1912, 1 Ch. Div. 392). There gifts were made to relatives, with the provision that if the legatees died leaving issue, the benefits of the gifts should not lapse, " but should take effect as if his or her death had happened immediately after mine." These words were held equivalent to a gift to the personal representatives of the legatees named. So here, there is by implication a gift to the legatees named by the wife, and a ratification of any execution of the power, however premature. The intent to avert the consequences of a lapse is clear. The only question is whether the intent is one to which the law will give effect. One obstacle, and one only, can be thought of. That is the rule against the incorporation of extrinsic documents, testamentary in character but not themselves authenticated in accordance with the statute. It is said that this rule is violated when a testator, to keep a power alive, ratifies its execution, adopts the will which executes it as his own, and thus in effect averts a lapse. We do not share that view.
Everything that this testator did is justified by our decision in Matter of Piffard (111 N. Y. 410, 414, 415). The distinction between that case and this is purely verbal. There is none in substance. In that case the testator authorized his daughter to dispose of a share of his estate by will. If she died before him, leaving a will in execution of the power, he directed his executors to transfer the share to her executors or trustees. We upheld the validity of that provision. We said that it might not be " possible to sustain the power of appointment as such." We held, however, that the daughter's will might be referred to " not as transferring the property by an appointment, but to define and make certain the persons to whom and the proportions in which the one-fifth should pass by the father's will in case of the death of the daughter in his lifetime." There was a like decision upon like facts in Condit v. De Hart (62 N. J. L. 78). The argument is made that the express direction to transfer the share to the daughter's executors or trustees distinguishes the Piffard case from the one at bar. But in another form of words, this testator gave the same direction. He directed his executors to turn over his estate to the persons named by his wife. There is no distinction between a direction to pay the trustees named in another will, and a direction to pay the legatees named in a will. The daughter's trustees in the Piffard case were not to take as individuals. They had no beneficial interest. They were to take as trustees. Only by reference to the will which appointed them could the nature of the trust and the names and interests of the beneficiaries be learned. If there was a violation of the rule against incorporation here, there was equally a violation there.
Piffard's case cannot be distinguished. It ought not to be overruled. Only the clearest error would warrant us in baffling the just hopes and purposes of this testator by disregarding a decisive precedent. But there are substantial reasons to support the view that the decision was right. The reasons may appeal with different strength to different minds. For our present purposes, it is enough that they are at least substantial. The rule against incorporation has not been set aside. It has been kept within bounds which were believed to be wise and just. The rule is sometimes spoken of as if its content had been defined by statute, as if the prohibition were direct and express, and not inferential and implied. But the truth is that it is the product of judicial construction. Its form and limits are malleable and uncertain. We must shape them in the light of its origin and purpose. 'All that the statute says is that a will must be signed, published and attested in a certain way (Decedent Estate Law, § 21; Consol. Laws, ch. 13). From this the consequence is deduced that the testator's purpose must be gathered from the will, and not from other documents which lack the prescribed marks of authenticity (Booth v. Baptist Church of Christ, 126 N. Y. 215, 247). It is a rule designed as a safeguard against fraud and mistake. In the nature of things, there must be exceptions to its apparent generality. Some reference to matters extrinsic is inevitable. Words are symbols, and we must compare them with things and persons and events (4 Wigmore on Ev. § 2470). It is a question of degree (Langdon v. Astor's Executors, 16 N. Y. 9, 26, 31; Robert v. Corning, 89 N. Y. 225, 242). Sometimes the distinction is said to be between documents which express the gift and documents which identify it (Hathaway v. Smith, 79 Conn. 519, 521; Booth v. Baptist Church of Christ, supra). But the two classes of cases run into each other by almost imperceptible gradations (Langdon v. Astor's Executors, supra). One may ratify assumptions of power, extinguish debts, wipe out wrongs, confirm rights, by the directions of one's will (Bizzey v. Flight, L. R. 3 Ch. Div. 269; 1 Jarman on Wills, 99). In these and other cases, the expressions of the gift and the description of its subject-matter must often coalesce. No general formula can tell us in advance where the line of division is to be drawn.
It is plain, therefore, that we are not to press the rule against incorporation to " a drily logical extreme " (Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 110). We must look in each case to the substance. We must consider the reason of the rule, and the evils which it aims to remedy. ' But as soon as we apply that test, the problem solves itself. There is here no opportunity for fraud or mistake. There is no chance of foisting upon this testator a document which fails to declare his purpose. He has not limited his wife to any particular will. Once identify the document as her will; it then becomes his own. He authorizes her to act, and confirms her action (Condit v. De Hart, supra, at p. 81). For the purpose of the rule against incorporation, the substance of the situation is thus the same as it always is when a will creates a power. The substance is that a power which would otherwise have lapsed, has been kept alive by the declaration that its execution, however premature, is ratified and approved. But the execution of a power does not violate the rule against incorporation. It can make no difference for that purpose whether the execution is authorized in advance or made valid by relation. There is no greater impair ment in the one ease than in the other of the principle of the integrity and completeness of testamentary expression. The source of title may be in one case the appointment, and in the other the confirmatory will. But if we go beneath the form and reach realities, the truth is that under the sanction of the will, a power has been executed. That is the principle which underlies the ruling in Matter of Piffard and Condit v. De Hart. We reaffirm it now. To hold that the purpose of this testator has been adequately or inadequately declared according to the accident of time at which death came to him or his wife in the depths of the ocean, is to follow the rule against incorporation with blind and literal adherence, forgetful of its origin, its purpose, and its true and deep significance.
We have spoken thus far of the gift of the residuary estate under the eighth article of the will. Questions also arise under the second and fourth articles. The gifts under these articles did not lapse, but passed to the personal representatives of the legatee. On that subject it is impossible to add anything to what has been written by Judge Crane.
The order of the Appellate Division should be reversed and the decree of the Surrogate's Court affirmed with costs in the Appellate Division and in this court to be paid out of the estate.