Case Name: Ralph CLEVY v. Robert W. O'MEARA; Gary WILSON v. Robert W. O'MEARA
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1959-01-12
Citations: 236 La. 640
Docket Number: No. 43536
Parties: Ralph CLEVY v. Robert W. O'MEARA. Gary WILSON v. Robert W. O'MEARA.
Judges: FOURNET, C. J., concurs in the decree.
Reporter: Louisiana Reports
Volume: 236
Pages: 640–658

Head Matter:
108 So.2d 538
Ralph CLEVY v. Robert W. O'MEARA. Gary WILSON v. Robert W. O'MEARA.
No. 43536.
Jan. 12, 1959.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 16, 1959.
Reed, Reed & Reed, Floyd J., Reed, New Orleans, for plaintiffs-appellants
Richard Mathews, New Orleans, for defendant-appellee.

Opinion:
HAMITER, Justice.
In the petitions of the above captioned suits the respective plaintiffs demanded wages for twelve hours' work allegedly performed for the defendant on February 29, 1956. Additionally, they asked for penalties and attorneys' fees under the provisions of LRS 23:631 and 632.
The trial court awarded $13.33 to Clevy and $12.68 to Wilson on the basis of six and one-half hours' work by each during the day in question, but it rejected their demands for penalties and attorneys' fees.
Plaintiffs appealed, and the defendant answered the appeals praying that the judgments be amended by entirely rejecting the demands of plaintiffs.
Except that Clevy claims a base pay of $2.05 per hour and Wilson one of $1.95 per hour, the facts and issues of the two causes are identical. For this reason the suits were tried together, and in this court the appeals have been consolidated and docketed under a single number.
The record discloses that plaintiffs were employed during the month of February, 1956 as roughnecks on an oil drilling rig operated by the defendant. The employment arrangement called for their working in stretches of ten days each, at twelve hours per day, between which there would be off periods of five days. During such stretches they lived on a quarter boat located a few blocks from the rig.
About six-thirty or seven o'clock p. m. of February 29, 1956, while at the rig, the plaintiffs and two other crew members decided to quit their employment. Later, on returning to the quarter boat, they asked for their time report from one Thibodaux who was in charge of drilling operations at the time. He was unable to comply with the request because the records were then at the rig. However, he agreed to telephone plaintiffs' wage time to defendant's New Orleans office, and he stated that the checks should be available there on Friday, March 2.
When plaintiffs arrived at defendant's New Orleans office on the latter date they were informed by the lady bookkeeper that their checks had been made out for work performed through February 28, but that there was no one present authorized to sign them. She stated, however, that if they would call back the following day the checks would probably be ready.
Plaintiffs did not return on Saturday as the bookkeeper had suggested. Instead they consulted the law firm of Reed, Reed & Reed; and on that day Mr. Floyd J. Reed addressed a letter to the defendant (at his home) in which demand was made for plaintiffs' wages, including those for February 29.
The mentioned demand was received "Special Delivery" by the defendant on Sunday (March 4). On the following day (March 5), in response thereto, he sent'a telegram to plaintiffs' attorneys informing them that the pay checks had been ready since March 3. The telegram also recited the amounts of the checks which indicated that they did not include pay for February 29.
On March 7 these checks were obtained and receipted for at defendant's office by Mr. Floyd J. Reed, at which time his attention was directed to the fact that they were in payment of plaintiffs' wages only through February 28. Nevertheless, in accepting the checks, Mr. Reed made no objection that payment for February 29 was not included; nor did he insert in his written receipt any reservation of rights regarding the wage claim for that day. Later during March 7, however, he wrote to the defendant and claimed for his clients wages from February 29 to March 6, both dates inclusive.
The defendant refused to pay the claims and on March 23, 1956 plaintiffs instituted the instant suits, they invoking the penal provisions of LRS 23 :631 and 632 and demanding payment of regular wages running continuously from (and including) February 29, 1956 until finally paid, together with attorneys' fees.
On several occasions ths court has considered the mentioned statute and has held that the language thereof "is not so peremptory as to forbid an equitable defense against the penalty" (Deardorf v. Hunter, 160 La. 213, 106 So. 831, 832); that the statute "should be strictly construed" (Hazel v. Robinson & Young, 187 La. 51, 174 So. 105, 106); and that "it may yield to equitable defenses" (Bannon v. Techeland Oil Corporation, 205 La. 689, 17 So.2d 921, 922). See also Elliott v. General Gas Corporation, 229 La. 128, 85 So.2d 55, wherein the doctrine of the cited cases is affirmed as the jurisprudence of this court.
Unquestionably, under the facts above shown, a dispute existed between these plaintiffs and the defendant 'as to whether the former were entitled to wages for February 29. And in view of plaintiffs' accepting the above mentioned checks and retaining the proceeds thereof, knowing at the time that the payments were for amounts less than those demanded, it might well be seriously contended that the doctrine of accord and satisfaction is applicable here and, hence, prevents a claiming of any additional wages with penalties and attorneys' fees. See Jefferson & Plaquemines Drainage District v. City of New Orleans, 236 La. -, 107 So.2d 663, together with the cases cited therein.
But be that as it may, we have concluded that because of the equitable considerations hereinafter discussed plaintiffs are not entitled to the penalties and attorneys' fees demanded.
In the first place undoubtedly the defendant acted in good faith in refusing to pay plaintiffs any wages for February 29. In so refusing he relied on the records of one S. M. Bracey, the driller under whose control these plaintiffs principally worked, prepared during the course of the drilling operations. On Bracey's drilling report for February 29 plaintiffs' names were scratched out, this indicating that they performed no work that day. And corroborative thereof is the testimony given by Homer Hicks and Edward Thibodaux, defendant's top supervisory personnel in the field, which was to the effect that when visiting the rig at intervals during the day in question they noticed that plaintiffs were not working— they were merely sitting or lying around.
To contradict such evidence, including the mentioned report of Bracey, only the plaintiffs testified. And we find their testimony to be weak, not particularly convincing, and conflicting in several noteworthy respects.
Again, it is to be noticed that plaintiffs at all times — even in their petitions of the instant suits — have demanded payment for a full day's work of twelve hours on February 29; yet when testifying they admitted having worked only about one-half day on that date. Thus, Clevy stated: " we only worked six hours that day". And Wilson said: "We relieved a crew at twelve o'clock and worked until six-thirty
The above circumstances taken together constitute, in our opinion, an equitable and a sufficient defense to plaintiffs' demands for penalties and attorneys' fees. Hence, we are unable to disturb the rulings which disallowed those claims. Nor will we annul, as defendant requests in answering the appeals, the trial judge's awards of wages for six and one-lialf hours on February 29, 1956. Since he saw and heard the witnesses his finding respecting this item is entitled to great weight.
For the reasons assigned the judgments appealed from are affirmed. Plaintiffs shall pay the costs of these appeals.
FOURNET, C. J., concurs in the decree.
PONDER, J., dissents.
TATE, J., dissents and assigns written reasons.