Case Name: Creamer and others, Respondents, vs. Ingalls, Appellant
Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Wisconsin
Decision Date: 1894-12-11
Citations: 89 Wis. 112
Docket Number: 
Parties: Creamer and others, Respondents, vs. Ingalls, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Wisconsin Reports
Volume: 89
Pages: 112–119

Head Matter:
Creamer and others, Respondents, vs. Ingalls, Appellant.
November 19
December 11, 1894.
Estates of decedents: Fraud of administrator: Conveyance of estate to him: Setting aside order of distribution: Accounting: Jurisdiction of county court.
Where an administrator with the will annexed had failed to make a full and truthful disclosure of the situation, condition, and value of the property, and by false representations had induced the leg atees and devisees (who lived in other and distant states) to convey to him the entire estate, both real and personal, for about one third of its value, the county court had power, upon the petition of said legatees and devisees, to set aside' its final order of distribution, by which all of the estate was assigned to said administrator personally, and to require him to file a full account of his administration. »
Appeal from an order of tbe circuit court for Walworth ■county: Fbajtk M. Fisn, Circuit Judge.
Affirmed.
From a petition filed in the county court of Walworth county, and the records therein referred to, the following facts appear:
Mahala Martin died January 13, 1889,- leaving a last will and testament. On February 2, 1889, the defendant, Wallace Ingalls, of Elkhorn, was appointed special administrator ■of said estate. On March 19, 1889, the said will was admitted to probate, and said Ingalls was appointed administrator with the will annexed. On April 5, 1889, said Ingalls, as such administrator, filed an inventory of the property in his • possession belonging to said estate, appraised as follows: Real estate, $3,300-, personal property, $1,661.52. There' was other personal property belonging to said estate, of the value of not less than $350, not mentioned in said inventory. On April 19, 1890, said Ingalls, as administrator, made and filed in the county court a petition alleging, in effect, that he had fully administered said estate, and praying for an order of distribution. Attached to said petition there was a mere written statement that he had paid all debts and claims against said estate, and distributed the per- ■ sonal property among the heirs; and also attached thereto was a written assignment by the petitioners of their interest, in said estate to said Ingalls. Without any knowledge on the part of the petitioners herein, the county court made an4 entered an order in said matter May 20,1890, assigning all of said estate, both real and personal, to said Ingalls per- ' sonally. In and by said order it was adjudged by the county court that said estate bad been fully administered and settled, and that there were no debts and claims, against the-same. Aside from a small piece of land therein mentioned, the personal estate and the remainder of all of said real estate were thereby assigned to the said Ingalls:. By the' will all of said estate and property of said Mahala Martin,, deceased, was given, bequeathed, and devised to the five' petitioners, subject to the right of the life use of a certain piece of land therein particularly described, and which had been deeded to Lucinda Belknap in fee simple. The real estate covered by said will was situated in the counties of Walworth, Wisconsin, and McHenry, Illinois.
The petition was filed October 26, 1891, and, in addition-to the foregoing facts, stated, in effect, that during all the' times mentioned three of the five ¡petitioners had resided in Utah, one in Missouri, and one in New York; that said petitioners were all of full age, and the children of a brother of the said deceased, and mentioned as such in said will, and the identical persons mentioned in the proceedings in said matter as devisees or legatees under said will; that no claim was ever allowed against said estate, and only one presented, belonging to J. S. and Lucinda Belknap, which was after-wards withdrawn; that between the time of the probate of said will and April 19, 1889, the said Ingalls, having full knowledge of said estate and the value thereof, but fraudulently concealing the same from each and all of said petitioners, and by numerous false and fraudulent representations and pretenses made to said several petitioners, as specifically alleged in said petition, induced said petitioners to assign and convey to him, as aforesaid, all their interest in said estate for the sum of only $1,625, -which was paid to them out of the moneys belonging to said estate. The prayer of the petition was that Ingalls be cited to appear and make answer to the allegations contained therein, and make resti tution. of all tbe moneys be had thus fraudulently obtained; that the said order of May 20, 1890, be canceled and set aside, and said administration reopened; and that said In-galls be compelled to account for all the property which had come into his possession as such administrator.
On October 21, 1891, the county court made an order requiring said Ingalls to answer said petition, and on the same day issued a citation for that purpose. On November 18, 1891, said Ingalls appeared before said county court and filed a demurrer' to said petition, to the effect that it did not contain, allegations sufficient to obtain the relief prayed for, nor facts sufficient to reopen said administration, and that the county court had no jurisdiction to entertain or grant the relief prayed for therein. On the same day In-galls filed in said county court his verified answer to said petition, taking issue with the same upon the merits, at great length.
On February 6,1892, and after full hearing on the merits, the county court made and filed findings of fact and conclusions of law therein. On the same day, and upon said findings, the county court made an order revoking, vacating, and setting aside the said order of May 20,1890, and reopening the same for further proceedings according to law, and ordered said Ingalls to file therein a full, true, particular, accurate, and itemized account of his administration of said estate and all his doings with respect thereto or in any way concerning the same, and his management and conduct thereof from the beginning.
On April 4, 1892, Ingalls gave notice of appeal from said last-named order to the circuit court for Walworth county, and thereupon the records were certified and transmitted accordingly. On June 6, 1892, in said circuit court) the said Ingalls renewed his demurrer to the petition for the reasons and upon the grounds following, to wit: (1) Because it does not appear by said petition that said petitioners or plaintiffs have, or at tbe time of filing said petition bad, any interest whatever in the estate of Mahala Martin, deceased, or in the subject matter of said petition; (2) because. it appears from the face of said petition that said petition does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action or proceeding, or to entitle said petitioners to any relief; (3) because it appears on the face of said petition that said county court had no jurisdiction of said petition or proceeding, and no power to grant the relief asked for in said petition. From an order overruling that demurrer the defendant appeals.
John B. /Simmons, for the appellant, contended, inter alia, that if the conveyances to Ingalls are valid the order of distribution was proper and regular; and if irregular for any other cause the plaintiffs cannot be heard to object, because they would have no interest in the matter.
Boyle v. Laird, 2 Wis. 431; Gvmm, v. Green, 14 id. 316; McGinnis v. Wheeler, 26 id. 651; Downer v. Howard, 47 id. 476; McGregor <o. Dearson, 51 id. 122. Even if the conveyances Avere obtained by fraud they are not void, but only voidable, and until set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction remain in full force and are entitled to full faith and credit. 2 Pom. Eq. Jur. § 915; Groclter v. Bellangee, 6 Wis. 645; Bromley v. Goodrich, 40 id. 131; Milwaukee & St. P. B. Go. v. M. & M. R. Go. 20 id. 165, 174; Smith v. Hornbaclt, 4 Litt. 232; S. G. 14 Am. Dec. 122; Worthy ro. Johnson, 52 id. 399. The question then is, Can the county court entertain an action or proceeding of this nature Avhen, as a prerequisite to the relief sought, it becomes necessary to set aside or cancel a conveyance of land, and particularly when the land lies in another state? The authorities uniformly deny to courts of probate any extra-territorial jurisdiction. 2 Redf. Wills (1st ed.), 16 et seg.; Story, Conflict of LaAvs, 512, 539; Sheldon v. Estate, of Rice, 30 Mich. 296, 18 Am. Rep. 136. And such a court is equally powerless to set aside a conveyance of lands within this state. See Hcmley v. Tesoh, 72 Wis. 299. It is true the county court has plenary jurisdiction in matters of probate and the administration of estates, and may to a certain extent, in the exercise of such jurisdiction, enforce equitable remedies. Try on v. Farnsworth, 30 Wis. 577; Brook v. Chappell, 34 id. 405. But the transaction between the plaintiffs and the defendant, Ingalls, and their conveyance to him of their interests in the estate, were not acts of administration. On the contrary it -is alleged, and that is the burden of the complaint, the very essence of the controversy, that he purchased as an individual, for his own personal benefit and profit. And he purchased not at his own sale, but from the devisees themselves. The position Avhich defendant occupied undoubtedly imposed upon him the burden of showing the fairness of the transaction, yet this fact does not affect the jurisdiction but merely the measure and burden of proof. The defendant, though administrator, had a right to purchase the interests in question. Frskine v. De La Baum, 3 Tex. 409, 49 Am. Dee. 751; Barker v. Barker, 14 Wis. 131. In Estate of Leamns, 65 Wis. 440, it was -not necessary, as in this case, to first avoid a conveyance from the heir himself. It seems clear, upon principle, that respondents should seek relief in a court of equity, which has power, upon sufficient proof, to set aside conveyances procured by fraud. Barnesley v. Bowel, 1 Yes. Sr. 284; Archer v. Meadows, 33 Wis. 170; 1 Pom. Eq. Jur. §§ 235, 351, 352, and notes; 3 id. § 1154 and notes; CampbeWs Appeal, 80 Pa. St. 298; Freeman <o. Reagan, 26 Ark. 373; Reinhardt v. Gartrell, 33 id. 727; Shegogg v. Perkins, 34 id. 117; Mill v. MoLaurin, 28 Miss. 288; Heirs of Adams v. Adams, 22 Yt. 50; Morse v. Slason, 13 id. 296; Creer v. Cagle, 84 'N. G. 385; Worthy v. Johnson, 52 Am. Dec. 399; Goleen <v. Creighton, 10 Sm. & M. 159, 48 Am. Dec. 742.
E. H. Sprague, for the respondents.

Opinion:
Cassoday, J.
It is contended on tbe part of the appellant that the county court had no jurisdiction to set aside the conveyances to Mm of the real estate by the devisees, even though the same were procured by his false pretenses and fraud. Assuming- that to be so, still the question would remain whether that court did not have power, by the order of February 6, 1892, to set aside and revoke the order of final distribution made by the same couft, May 20,1890, and to require the appellant, as administrator with the will annexed, to account. Upon the repeated decisions of this court, we are constrained to hold that it did have such authority, upon the showing made. Brook v. Chappell, 34 Wis. 405; Newman v. Waterman, 63 Wis. 612; Estate of Leavens, 65 Wis. 440; Beem v. Kimberly, 72 Wis. 343; Frawley v. Cosgrove, 83 Wis. 444. This court has frequently sanctioned a broad equitable jurisdiction in the matter of estates in county courts. Ibid.
The several legatees and devisees all lived at great distances from the place of administration and where the property was situated, and none of them appear to have had any information respecting the same, except such as they acquired from the appellant. As such administrator, he had been intrusted by the county court with the possession and control of the personal property, amounting to more than $2,000. Whatever may be his relation to the real estate, he was certainly the sole trustee of the personal estate, 'which in equity was the property of the petitioners, subject, however, to the payment of legitimate debts. . Such being the .relation between them, the petitioners had the right to rely implicitly upon Ms representations and statements respecting the situation, condition, and value of the estate. The law imposed upon him the duty of a full, voluntary, and truthful disclosure to them of such situation, condition, and value. According to the petition,— which must be taken •as true for tbe purposes of this appeal,— be not only failed to make such disclosures, but by false representations and pretenses induced the legatees and devisees to transfer, -assign, and convey to him the entire estate, both real and personal, for about one third its value. In such a case the burden is upon the trustee to show that the oestuis que trust-ent knew at the time all the facts relating to the value of the property and their rights therein. Leach v. Leach, 65 Wis. 284; Davis v. Dean, 66 Wis. 100; Parry v. Parry, 80 Wis. 122; Gandy v. Macaulay, 31 Ch. Div. 1. While we do not commend the practice of resorting to a demurrer after a trial upon the merits, yet we are clearly of the opinion that the petition states a good cause of action, and that the demurrer thereto was properly overruled.
By the Court.— The order of the circuit court is affirmed.