Case Name: Vimont v. The Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company
Court: Iowa Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Iowa
Decision Date: 1884-10-21
Citations: 64 Iowa 513
Docket Number: 
Parties: Vimont v. The Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company.
Judges: 
Reporter: Iowa Reports
Volume: 64
Pages: 513–525

Head Matter:
Vimont v. The Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company.
1. Practice: bringing in party in interest: assignor in suit by assignee. A motion by the defendant in a suit for a tort to bring in, as a. party plaintiff, plaintiff’s assignor, the person who suffered the alleged injury, on the ground that he was the real party in interest, and that the assignment was invalid, and that a determination of the action between plaintiff and defendant would not conclude the assignor, was properly overruled, where the assignor appeared and filed a response to the motion, setting up his sale and assignment of the claim, and denying all ownership and control thereof.
2. Removal of Cause to Federal Court: trustee as plaintiff. citizenship of beneficiary not CONSIDERED. Where a trustee is plaintiff, and a citizen of the same state with the defendant, the cause will not be removed to the federal court on the ground that the person beneficially interested is a citizen of another state.
3. -: fraudulent assignee as plaintiff: citizenship of real party in interest. A motion to remove the cause to the federal court should have been overruled, the ground of which was that the plaintiff claimed to be the assignee of another — a citizen of another state, but that the assignment was colorable and fraudulent, and invalid for other reasons; because, if the court found the facts to be as alleged in the motion, the plaintiff had no right to prosecute the action, and should have been sent out of court, and there was nothing to remove.
4. Tort: right of action for may be assigned. A right of action for a tort may be sold and assigned like any other cause of action, so as to vest in the assignee a right of action in his own name. (See opinion for cases followed.)
5. Laws of Sister State: presumption. In the absense of proof to the contrary, the laws of another state must be presumed to be the same as those of Iowa.
6. Champerty: what is not: action by assignee agreeing to pay proceeds to assignor. The assignee of a claim arising upon tort may maintain an action thereon in his own name, though he takes the assignment with an agreement to pay a portion of the amount recovered to the assignor. Such assignment and agreement do not constitute champerty. Knadler v. Sharp, 36 Iowa, 232 followed.
'.7. Practice: bringing in assignor as plaintiff in suit by assignee. In an action by an assignee, a motion to bring in the assignor as a party plaintiff, on the ground that he was the real party in interest, and that the assignment was but a pretense, was properly overruled, where it appeared that the controversy could be determined between the original ¡parties without prejudice to the assignor. The statute (Code,'§ 2551) (does not contemplate the bringing in of a party for the convenience of ■one who is already a party.
■8. Removal of Cause to Federal Court: petition for and answer thereto ; what THE court may consider. Where a petition for the removal of a cause to the federal court, on the ground of citizenship, states merely the citizenship of the parties and the amount in controversy — that is, simply the jurisdictional facts, the court will consider such statements alone, disregarding what may be said by the plaintiff; but where the petition goes further, and states that some one not a party to the record is the real party, on account of whose citizenship a removal is demanded, and such allegations are controverted by the plaintiff, the plaintiff is entitled to have the issue thus made tried in the ordinary manner.
9. -: citizenship: assignment to defeat removal. Where one had a right of action in tort against a corporation, a citizen of another state, but, to avoid a transfer 'of the cause to the federal court, he assigned the cause of action to one who was a citizen of the same state as the corporation, who brought action thereon in the courts of this state, held that, the assignment being lawful, the assignee could maintain the action, and that defendant could not have it removed to the federal court on the grounds that the assignor was a citizen of another state, and that he was, by agreement, to share in the proceeds of the action, and that the assignment was made on purpose to defeat the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
Afjgeal from Pollc Circuit Court.
Tuesday, October 21.
The plaintiff appeals from an order remanding the cause to the federal court. The defendant appeals from an order overruling a motion made by the defendant to make one Johnson a party. The plaintiff perfected his appeal first.
PFourse c& Kauffman, for appellant.
PT. PL. Hubbard and W. S.. Clarice, for appellee.

Opinion:
Adams, J.
I. It seems proper to consider the question first which is presented by the defendant's appeal. The action is brought by the plaintiff', Yimont, as assignee of one O. O. Johnson, to recover for a personal injury alleged to have been sustained by the assignor by reason of the wrongful and negligent acts of the defendant.
The defendant moved that Johnson be made a party, but the court overruled the motion, and this constitutes the defendant's ground of complaint. "When a ° 1 determination of the controversy between the Pai'ties before the court cannot be made without £he presence of other parties, the court must order them to be brought in." Code, § 2551. The defendant contends that this is precisely such case. While it does not deny that the plaintiff may hold a nominal assignment of Johnson's claim for damages, yet it insists that it may not be a valid assignment, and, in fact, is not a valid assignment, and that, such being the fact, a determination of the action, either for or against the plaintiff, would not conclude Johnson, and that his presence, therefore, as a party, is 'necessary for the defendant's protection.
We do not care to go into an extended consideration of the doctrine upon which the defendant relies. The assignment from Johnson to the plaintiff is set out in the plaintiff's petition, and purports to convey all of Johnson's interest, and we do not understand that the fact of the execution of the instrument is controverted. It may, it is true, be invalid for reasons which do not appear on its face. But the case has this peculiar feature, Johnson did'in fact appear in the action, and filed what he called a response to the defendant's motion, setting up his sale and assignment of the claim to the plaintiff, and denying all ownership therein, or control of the prosecution thereof. After Johnson had thus appeared and put himself upon the record, there was, we think, no reasonable ground for sustaining the defendant's motion, unless it might be for reasons connected wholly with the question as to the defendant's right of removal to the federal court, and that we shall have occasion to consider hereafter.
II. Whether such right of removal existed is a question presented by the plaintiff's appeal. The petition for a removal shows that the defendant is a citizen of the state of Illinois, and, while it concedes that the plaintiff is a citizen of the same state, yet it avers that he is not the real party in interest, but that Johnson is, and that Johnson is a citizen of-the state of Iowa, and that by reason of this fact, in connection with the fact, that the amount in controversy is over $500, the. federal .court has jurisdiction, and the defendant a right- of removal.'
For the purposes of the opinion, it might be conceded that the circuit courts of the United States may, in some cases-, have jurisdiction on the ground of citizenship, even where all the parties are citizens of the same state. Possibly this would be so where the petition showed that the plaintiff was a merely nominal and passive party, having no interest in, nor right to control, the litigation, though, by reason of some provision of statute, a legal party, and where, also, the petition showed who the person beneficially interested in, and having the right to control, the litigation was, and where the petition for removal showed the citizenship of such person to be such as would give the federal court jurisdiction if the person were the plaintiff of record. In such case it may be that a court would be justified in deeming the person beneficially interested, and having the right to control the litigation, as the real plaintiff, so far as the question of federal jurisdiction is concerned. As supporting such doctrine, see Browne v. Strode, 5 Cranch, 303, and McNutt v. Bland, 2 Howard, 9. But these cases differ from the case at bar. The plaintiffs in those cases were mere conduits, designated by the law as such, and through whom the parties aggrieved were to seek their remedy. They were wholly passive. They had no right to commence the actions, nor the right to dismiss them when commenced by the parties in interest.
In the case at bar, if the assignment is valid in such sense as to give the plaintiff a right of action anywhere, it appears to us least a trustee. Now, we understand that the authorities are agreed that, where an action is brought by a trustee, who is such in good faith, and has power to control the . . , . . , . ,. ,. , claim, the citizenship ox the persons beneficially interested, but not parties to the record, is not considered on a question of removal. If the trustee is a citizen of the same state of which the defendant is, federal jurisdiction is excluded. Coal Co. v. Blatchford, 11 Wall., 176; Knapp v. Railroad Co., 20 Wall., 123. Probably the defendant would not dispute this proposition. The objections raised by it go to the validity of the assignment. It disputes the plaintiff's trusteeship. It avers that the assignment is color-able and fraudulent, and-invalid for other , reasons.
But, suppose the facts are as the defendant contends, do they constitute a ground for removal? Could the court below, after having found such facts, properly make an order of removal? We think not. If such were the facts, the plaintiff had no cause of action. He was not the real party in interest, and should go out of court. The defendant was entitled to something better than an order of removal. We do not see how the plaintiff could have interest and power enough to enable him to prosecute the action in any court, without its resulting in the exclusion of federal jurisdiction. This is not a case where the plaintiff could be regarded as a mere conduit, as in Browne v. Strode and McNutt v. Bland, above cited. If he were reduced to something less than a trustee, he would sustain no legal relation to the claim whatever. If the assignment, for instance, had provided that the object of it was merely to give the assignor the right to use the plaintiff's name, while he was to remain passive, with neither interest nor power, he should not be allowed to maintain the action anywhere. The controversy would be decided upon such facts appearing, and there would be nothing to remove.
Now, under the facts, as the defendant avers them to be, it appears to us. that the case is substantially the same. We think that on the defendant's appeal the judgment must be affirmed, and, on the plaintiff's appeal,
Reversed.