Case Name: IN THE MATTER OF APPEAL OF ADOPTION OF N.J.A.C. 7:7A-1.4 (DEFINITION OF "DOCUMENTED HABITATS FOR THREATENED AND ENDANGERED SPECIES" AND "SWALE"), 7:7A-2.5(B)(2), AND 7:7A-2.7(F)
Court: New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1989-09-07
Citations: 240 N.J. Super. 224
Docket Number: 
Parties: IN THE MATTER OF APPEAL OF ADOPTION OF N.J.A.C. 7:7A-1.4 (DEFINITION OF “DOCUMENTED HABITATS FOR THREATENED AND ENDANGERED SPECIES” AND “SWALE”), 7:7A-2.5(B)(2), AND 7:7A-2.7(F).
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Superior Court Reports
Volume: 240
Pages: 224–242

Head Matter:
573 A.2d 162
IN THE MATTER OF APPEAL OF ADOPTION OF N.J.A.C. 7:7A-1.4 (DEFINITION OF “DOCUMENTED HABITATS FOR THREATENED AND ENDANGERED SPECIES” AND “SWALE”), 7:7A-2.5(B)(2), AND 7:7A-2.7(F).
Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division
Argued June 1, 1989
Decided September 7, 1989.
Skillman, J.A.D., concurred in part and dissented in part and filed opinion.
Judgment 118 N.J. 552, 573 A.2d 143, reversed.
Before Judges KING, ASHBEY and SKILLMAN.
James P. Wyse argued the cause for appellant (Schenck, Price, Smith & King, attorneys; James P. Wyse, of counsel; Anne E. Aronovitch and James P. Wyse, on the brief).
Carol A. Blasi, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Peter N. Perretti, Jr. Attorney General, attorney; Michael R. Clancy, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel; Carol A. Blasi, on the brief).

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ASHBEY, J.A.D.
Appellants, New Jersey Conservation Foundation and New Jersey Audubon Society, appeal from the adoption of certain regulations implementing the Freshwater Wetlands Protection Act, N.J.S.A. 13:9B-1 et seq. (the Act) by the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP). With one exception, we affirm.
In July 1987 the Legislature enacted the Freshwater Wetlands Protection Act, N.J.S.A. 13:9B-1 et seq. N.J.S.A. 13:9B-25a directed DEP to adopt rules and regulations pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 et seq. DEP proposed 14 chapters of regulations. Following public hearings and written comments, DEP made changes and published the final regulations. Appellants challenge two of these regulations, asserting, that they were procedurally defective and substantively contrary to the Act. Appellants also claim on appeal that they are entitled to recover reasonable attorneys fees (not exceeding $10,000) pursuant to the Environmental Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:35A-1 et seq.
I
In order to evaluate these claims, it is necessary to examine the general format of the Act, its definitions, the permits required and the exemptions permitted. Under the Act "freshwater wetlands" (N.J.S.A. 13:9B-3) were divided into three categories. Those of "exceptional resource value" were
. freshwater wetlands which exhibit any of the following characteristics:
(1) Those which discharge into FW-1 waters and FW-2 trout production (TP) waters and their tributaries; or
(2) those which are present habitats for threatened or endangered species, —
[N.J.S.A. 13:9B-7a]
Freshwater wetlands of "ordinary value" were defined as those not of "exceptional resource value" and which were "certain isolated wetlands, man-made drainage ditches, swales, or detention facilities." N.J.S.A. 13:9B-7b. Freshwater wetlands of "intermediate resource value" were "all other freshwater wetlands." N.J.S.A. 13:9B-7c.
Under the statute (and the regulations), in addition to permits of varying strictness being required to develop "wetlands," a DEP waiver was required for the development for "transition areas," defined as "land adjacent to a freshwater wetland which minimizes adverse impacts on the wetland or serves as an integral component of the wetlands ecosystem." N.J.S.A. 13:9B-3. Under N.J.S.A. 13:9B-16(b), only wetlands of ordinary resource value required no transition areas.
The relevant primary effective date of the Act was July 1, 1988, but there were certain "grandfather" permit exemptions, primarily for projects previously in the municipal approval process. N.J.S.A. 13:9B-4d.
Appellants' challenge to the regulations is narrow. They do not dispute that the regulations carefully tracked most statutory definitions. Appellants contend, however, that two regulations as adopted differed so from the versions proposed that DEP was required to hold new hearings with an opportunity for new public comment. N.J.S.A. 52:14B-4.9; N.J.A.C. 1:30-4.3.
N.J.S.A. 52:14B-4.9 provides that
Any rule proposed by a State agency which revises, rescinds or replaces either (1) any proposed . rule . shall be considered as a new rule----
N.J.A.C. 1:30-4.3 provides:
(a) Where, following the notice of a proposed rule, an agency determines to make changes in the proposed rule which are so substantial that the changes effectively destroy the value of the original notice, the agency shall give a new notice of proposed rule and public opportunity to be heard.
(b) In determining whether the changes in the proposed rule are so substantial, consideration shall be given to the extent that the changes:
1. Enlarge or curtail who and what will be affected by the proposed rule;
2. Change what is being prescribed, proscribed or otherwise mandated by the rule;
3. Enlarge or curtail the scope of the proposed rule and its burden on those affected by it.
Appellants urge that the changes in question were "substantial," relying upon Insurance Brokers Assn. of N.J. v. Sheeran, 162 N.J.Super. 34, 40, 392 A.2d 203 (App.Div.1978), certif. den. 78 N.J. 408, 396 A.2d 594 (1978). DEP argues to the contrary. In Insurance Brokers, we quoted with approval that " '[t]he requirement of submission of a proposed rule for comment does not automatically generate a new opportunity for comment merely because the rule promulgated by the agency differs from the rule it proposed, partly at least in response to submissions---- If [the opposite] were the rule the proceedings might never be terminated.' " Ibid., quoting from International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 632 (D.C.Cir.1973).
We have carefully reviewed the changes to which appellants refer and reject their challenge to the regulatory "swale" definition (N.J.A.C. 7:7A-1.4) as unfounded. See N.J.S.A. 13:9B-23b; N.J. Guild of Hearing Aid Dispensers v. Long, 75 N.J. 544, 561, 384 A.2d 795 (1978).
II
We find appellants' challenge to DEP's regulation eliminating transition areas for projects which had received preliminary municipal approval before July 1, 1989, however, merited, not only because the promulgated regulation was a substantial change from the proposed regulation, but because it was unwarranted by the statute.
As originally proposed, N.J.A.C. 7:7A-2.7(c) provided:
Projects not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States Army Corps of Engineers and for which preliminary site or subdivision applications have been approved prior to July 1, 1988 shall not require transition areas. [Emphasis added]
After the comment period, however, this regulation was renumbered N.J.A.C. 7:7A-2.7(f) and the date was changed to "July 1, 1989." This change was based on comments which relied on the last section of the Act, L.1987, c. 156, § 34, providing that the N.J.S.A. 13:9B-16, -17 and -18 provisions respecting transition areas were not to be implemented until July 1, 1989.
In support of its regulation as promulgated, DEP contends there were two effective dates: July 1,1988 for wetland regulation and July 1, 1989 for transition area requirements (N.J.S.A. 13:9B-6 through 18). In this interpretation DEP relies on a statement attached to the Senate Committee substitute bill (which became the Act), saying "[t]his bill . would take effect one year after enactment____ The sections of the bill imposing the transition area requirements would not take effect until two years after enactment."
The law as enacted says,
This act shall take effect one year after enactment, except that section 25, section 26, section 27, section 30 and section 33 shall take effect immediately, and except that the department shall not implement the provisions of sections 16, 17 and 18 [the transition area requirements] until two years after enactment. The department shall take any administrative actions prior to the effective date of this act necessary to implement the provisions of this act on and after the effective date. [L.1987, c. 156, § 34; emphasis added]
Appellants argue plain meaning, emphasizing the difference between the words "take effect" and "implement." They assert that developers of projects with transition areas, while not subjected to DEP regulation before July 1, 1989, could not be exempt from such regulations unless they either applied for preliminary municipal approvals before June 8,1987 or obtained such approvals before July 1, 1988 (N.J.S.A. 13:9B-4d). They argue that the legislative purpose of providing for an additional year to "implement" the statute was to give DEP time to finalize the regulations and to give developers time to finish projects which had been started, not to give developers an additional year in which to obtain a preliminary approval and permanent exemption from regulation.
DEP responds that the "effective" and "implementation" dates must be synonymous, because if the Act created transition areas as of July 1, 1988, but DEP could not "implement" the statute until July 1,1989, the transition areas created would be without regulation during the intervening year. In this interpretation DEP cites N.J.S.A. 13:9B-30, providing that on the effective date of the Act, the Act would supersede local regulation. Moreover, DEP urges that permit applicants in August of 1988 "would not know until sometime after July 1, 1989 whether they could build in the transition area."
While in our review of DEP's interpretation of legislative intent, we must be guided by DEP's expertise and the fact that the Legislature designated DEP to interpret the statute, we may not accept its regulation if it varies from the statute. See In re Jamesburg High School Closing, 83 N.J. 540, 549, 416 A.2d 896 (1980); N.J. Chamb. Commerce v. N.J. Elec. Law Enforce. Comm., 82 N.J. 57, 82-83, 411 A.2d 168 (1980). If there is a anomaly in the statute, DEP cannot rewrite the statute through its regulations. If the regulation is plainly at odds with the statute, it is ultra vires. See Last Chance Development v. Kean, 232 N.J.Super. 115, 128, 556 A.2d 796 (App.Div.1989).
The law was precise in defining what projects were to be exempt from transition area requirements. These exemptions included
Projects for which (1) preliminary site plan or subdivision applications have received preliminary approvals from local authorities . prior to the effective date [July X, X988] of this act, [or] (2) preliminary site plan or subdivision applications have been submitted prior to June 8, X987____ [N.J.S.A. 13:9B-4d]
The third relevant exemption was that wetlands of ordinary resource value did not require transition areas. N.J.S.A. 13:9B-16a. Yet DEP's regulation provided that projects which had received preliminary municipal approval as late as July 1, 1989 required no transition areas. That interpretation extended the exemptions beyond the statutory language.
Moreover, this result is not only contrary to legislative intent as expressed, which directed DEP to regulate post-July-1989 construction, it is against the legislative history. In the Governor's executive order, which was issued June 8, 1987, the Governor particularly spoke of the danger presented by the inappropriate development of these "buffer" areas from "increased runoff, sedimentation and introduction of pollutants" to the wetlands. Executive Order 175. The statute described the transition area as a "sediment and stormwater control zone to reduce the impacts of development upon freshwater wetlands____" N.J.S.A. 13:9B-16a(2). While a plan to manage development runoff may be required by the municipality at the time of preliminary subdivision approval, that plan may be less than precise, so long as the "fundamental elements," are "resolved at least as to [the] feasibility of specific proposals or solutions before preliminary approval is granted." Field v. Franklin Tp., 190 N.J.Super. 326, 332-333, 463 A.2d 391 (App. Div.1983), certif. den. 95 N.J. 183, 470 A.2d 409 (1983). Such a plan may be declared feasible by the municipality without adequate consideration for adjoining wetlands.
The transition area regulations as proposed contain DEP'S informed reference to the impact of certain activities carried on in the land immediately bordering the wetlands, not only respecting "excavation", "dumping", "erection of structures", but also the "placement of pavements" and "destruction of plant life". 21 N.J.R. 598 (March 6, 1989), proposed N.J.A.C. 7:7A-6.2(a). Particularly regulated is the construction of "stormwater management facilities" and "[l]inear development". Id. at 602, proposed N.J.A.C. 7:7A-7.4(a). The proposed regulations also refer to a standard by which DEP would determine a project's required distance from a wetland (of exceptional resource value), using a matrix of "development intensity", which is defined as "the percentage of the surface area . which will be covered by impervious surfaces at the completion of the proposed project", including "pavement, rooftops, sidewalks, driveways, tennis courts and swimming pools." Id. at 601, proposed N.J.A.C. 7:7A-7.2(e)3. If N.J.A.C. 7:7A-2.-7(f) remains in effect, the developer with 1988 municipal approval could never be required to comply with or to receive a waiver from any of these environmentally sensitive specifications regardless of the state of their actual construction or the lack of inconvenience to the developer, and regardless of how close the activity was to the wetlands or how sensitive the wetland was. The project would be free from further regulation as well.
The legislation and its history are consistent. The intent was that there be no prohibition against construction in a future transition area based on a municipal approval until the "transition area requirements . take effect." Senate Committee Statement. Upon the date of regulation implementation, July 1, 1989, the project would become subject to State regulation as well as municipal. The important statutory requirement was that the preliminary municipal approval would not "immunize the owner from valid subsequently adopted legislation, state or municipal." Tremarco Corporation v. Garzio, 32 N.J. 448, 457, 161 A.2d 241 (1960), quoting Roselle v. Moonachie, 49 N.J.Super. 35, 40, 139 A.2d 42 (App.Div.1958).
Ill
Finally, because they are successful on appeal, appellants seek reasonable attorney's fees (up to $10,000) pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:35A-10 of the Environmental Rights Act, asserting their action was brought under that Act "to restrain the violation" of N.J.S.A. 13:9B-1 et seq. See N.J.S.A. 2A:35A-4a.
The purpose of the Environmental Rights Act is to assure that every state citizen has "ready access to the courts for the remedy of such abuses" as "pollution, impairment and destruction" of the State's environment. N.J.S.A. 2A:35A-2. To that end the Legislature directed that
Any person may maintain an action in a court of competent jurisdiction against any other person to enforce, or to restrain the violation of, any statute, regulation or ordinance which is designed to prevent or minimize pollution, impairment or destruction of the environment.
[N.J.S.A. 2A:35A-4a]
See Girandola v. Allentown, 208 N.J.Super. 437, 441, 506 A.2d 64 (App.Div.1986).
At no time, however, did appellants seek to enforce a law or to restrain any violations. Their notice of appeal recites that appellants were appealing from "adoption of regulations codified at N.J.A.C. 7:7A-1 et seq. effective June 6,1988." In I.H.R.A.C. v. Diamond Shamrock Chem., 216 N.J.Super. 166, 174, 523 A.2d 250 (App.Div.1987), we held that "... the primary, if not sole, thrust of the Act is the relationship of citizens to polluters." In line with this interpretation, we are satisfied that appellants' challenge to DEP's adoption of wetlands regulations was not an action against "polluters" under the Environmental Rights Act. To rule otherwise would be to provide that all challengers to DEP regulations could be financed with public funds, an intent which we do not derive from the wording or history of the Environmental Rights Act. See ibid.
N.J.A.C. 7:7A-2.7(f) is set aside as ultra vires. The regulations under appeal are otherwise affirmed. Appellants' application for counsel fees is denied.
Appellants' appeal concerning the regulations on documented habitats for endangered or threatened species has been withdrawn.
"FW-1" are wildlife waters, essentially not subject to human waste water; "FW-2" "TP" waters are "other freshwaters" providing areas for trout spawning. N.J.A.C. 7:7A-1.4.
DEP's regulations concerning these exceptions are challenged in a separate appeal, also before us. See A-132-88-T5.
DEP's brief which dismisses appellants' reliance on this section as an historical note following N.J.S.A. 13:9B-1 and as "provided by West Publishing and [of] no legal effect" is misleading. The "note" quotes from L. 1987, c. 156, § 34.
At oral argument before us DEP could specify no local regulation which would be superceded, however.
It would also appear contrary to legislative intent otherwise expressed to encourage a rush for municipal approvals in order to obtain permanent exemptions for future development. (See The Star-Ledger, May 14, 1989, § 1, at 25, col. 6, in which a member of an organization known as Save Our Swamp referred to a planning board application as a case of " "beat the clock' ' because the 1989 regulations would limit the planned development. See also, N.Y. Times, July 30, 1989, § 12, at 9, col. 5.)
The June 1987 Executive Order (175) directed DEP to formulate criteria "(1) for determining the extent of adequate freshwater wetland buffer areas and 2) for regulating development and construction activities in freshwater wetland buffer areas." There was a map of the State depicting "potential impacted wetlands" and a reference to the amount of relevant "acreage within pending applications" (5,601) attached to the order.
These regulations are not before us. We have examined them as relevant to DEP's enumeration of activities it considered environmentally hazardous in addition to certain commercial activities. See Id. at 601, proposed N.J.A.C. 7:7A-7.2(c)7i.
"Linear development" is partially defined as "roads, drives, railroads, sewerage and stormwater management pipes, gas and water pipelines____" N.J.S.A. 13:9B-3; N.J.A.C. 7:7A-1.4.
While we recognize that under N.J.S.A. 2A:35A-4b a developer could be restrained from "pollution, impairment or destruction [of wetlands]", that Draconian remedy (primarily for private persons in the event of governmental inaction, Superior Air Prod. v. NL Industries, 216 N.J.Super. 46, 58, 522 A.2d 1025. (App.Div.1987) is scarcely a substitute for DEP's power to require a developer, where feasible, to locate an unbuilt improvement a slight distance from a wetland area, a power which this statute confers, and which the regulation in question abrogates.
DEP contends, and appellants do not deny, that appellants did not originally bring this action under the Environmental Rights Act. The first mention of the Environmental Rights Act is in their appellate brief.
DEP also notes that, even if the Environmental Rights Act applied, appellants failed to provide the requisite notice to the Attorney General pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:35A-11. In light of our holding we need not comment on this claim.