Case Name: Christopher FOSTER; et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. COUNTY OF SPOKANE; et al., Defendants-Appellees
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2017-05-26
Citations: 691 F. App'x 451
Docket Number: No. 15-35056
Parties: Christopher FOSTER; et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. COUNTY OF SPOKANE; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: Before: HAWKINS, GOULD, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 691
Pages: 451–452

Head Matter:
Christopher FOSTER; et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. COUNTY OF SPOKANE; et al., Defendants-Appellees.
No. 15-35056
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted May 19, 2017 Seattle, Washington
Filed May 26, 2017
Richard David Wall, Attorney, Richard D. Wall, P.S., Spokane, WA, for Plaintiffs-Appellants
Heather C. Yakely, Attorney, Evans, Craven & Lackie, P.S., Spokane, WA, for Defendants-Appellees
Before: HAWKINS, GOULD, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Christopher Foster, Shannell Haddon, Lawrence Johnson, and Dina Tellez ("Plaintiffs") appeal the district court's summary judgment grant to Spokane County, David Skogen and Craig Chamberlain ("Defendants"). Plaintiffs argue summary judgment was improper as to their unlawful arrest and false arrest claims against Defendant Skogen, and as to their defamation claim against Defendant Chamberlain. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
1. At the time of Plaintiffs' arrests, the facts and circumstances within Defendant Skogen's knowledge were sufficient for a reasonable officer to believe that there was probable cause to arrest Plaintiffs on suspicion of trafficking. See Rosenbaum v. Washoe County, 663 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). Accordingly, Defendant Skogen was entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs' 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unlawful arrest claim. See id.
2. The district court also properly granted summary judgment to Defendant Sko-gen on Plaintiffs' false arrest claim. Lydia's tip satisfied both Aguilar-Spinelli prongs. See State v. Conner, 58 Wash.App. 90, 791 P.2d 261, 265 (1990). Because Defendant Skogen was "aware of facts or circumstances, based on reasonably trustworthy information, sufficient to cause a reasonable officer to believe a crime ha[d] been committed," State v. Gaddy, 152 Wash.2d 64, 93 P.3d 872, 875 (2004) (en banc) (emphasis omitted), probable cause existed for Plaintiffs' arrests, and Defendant Skogen was entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs' false arrest claim, see Hanson v. City of Snohomish, 121 Wash.2d 552, 852 P.2d 295, 301 (1993) (en banc); see also Luchtel v. Hagemann, 623 F.3d 975, 984-85 (9th Cir. 2010).
3.In addition, the district court correctly granted summary judgment to Defendant Chamberlain on Plaintiffs' defamation claim. Plaintiffs did not present sufficient evidence to create a genuine factual dispute that Defendant Chamberlain abused the qualified privilege that protects a police officer's statements to the press in the course of a criminal investigation. See Stansfield v. Douglas County, 107 Wash. App. 20, 26 P.3d 935, 942-43 (2001).
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.