Case Name: Ex parte BRADSHAW
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1913-04-16
Citations: 159 S.W. 259
Docket Number: 
Parties: Ex parte BRADSHAW.
Judges: HARPER, J., concurs in the opinion remanding relator. DAVIDSON, P. J., dissents.
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 159
Pages: 259–272

Head Matter:
Ex parte BRADSHAW.
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
April 16, 1913.
On Motion for Rehearing, May 14, 1913.)
1. Constitutional Law (§ 205 ) — Municipal CORPORATIONS (§ 661*) — CLASS LEGISLATION.
A city ordinance, making it unlawful to use the streets or alleys embraced within the fire limits of the city for the purpose of vending, displaying, or peddling goods, provided the ordinance shall not apply to one who offers for sale any product raised upon'property controlled by himself, is valid, and does not violate Const, art. 1, § 3, providing that all free men have equal rights, and no man is entitled to exclusive privileges.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 591-624; Dec. Dig. | 205; Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 1432, 1434-1436; Dec. Dig. § 661. ]
2. Constitutional Law (§ 101 ) — Vested Rights — Use oe Streets.
Persons have no vested rights to make a market of the streets and public places of an incorporated town.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 209-211; Dec.Dig. § 101. ]
3. Constitutional Law (§ 205 ) — Class Legislation.
The Legislature, and municipal corporations when authorized by their charters, may classify persons according to their businesses, and apply different rules to different classes of persons.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. |§ 59-624; Dec. Dig. § 205. ]
4. Evidence (§ 23 ) — Judicial Notice — Fire Limits.
The Court of Criminal Appeals knows as a matter of common knowledge that the fire limits of a city include thickly settled and business parts of the city.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Evidence, Cent. Dig. §§ 29, 30; Dec. Dig. § 23. ]
Davidson, P. J., dissenting.
Appeal from Hill County Court; J. D. Stephenson, Judge.
Application for habeas corpus by M. L. Bradshaw. From a judgment in the county court remanding relator to custody, he appeals.
Judgment affirmed, and relator remanded to custody.
Luther Nickels, of Austin, for appellant. Tarlton Morrow, City Atty., of Hillsboro, and O. E. Lane, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
PRENDERGAST, J.
The city of Hills-boro, in Hill county, was duly incorporated by a special act of the Legislature. Among other powers given by its charter, is the power "to control the streets, alleys, highways, sidewalks and public grounds and Xilaces in said city"; also "to regulate and control the use of said streets, alleys, etc., by any person,, animal, or vehicle in whatever way and for whatever purpose"; also to establish and erect markets and market house, and designate "and control, and regulate market places and privileges"; also "to license, tax, regulate, suppress and prevent hawkers, peddlers, pawnbrokers, and dealers in all kinds of junk and secondhand goods, wares and merchandise, itinerant venders of clothing or wearing apparel, or any other business or occupation which in the opinion of the city council shall be the proper subject of police regulation."
Under this power and authority said city duly passed and put into effect an ordinance regulating traffic upon the streets and alleys of said city within the fire limits, and regulating peddling, vending, and exhibiting thereon, and providing fines for violation thereof. Section 3 of said ordinance is: "It shall hereafter be unlawful for any person to use the streets or alleys embraced within the fire limits of the city of Hillsboro, for the purpose of vending or displaying goods, wares, merchandise or produce or other articles, or for the purpose of peddling goods, wares, merchandise, produce or other articles: Provided, however, that this section shall not apply to any person who himself offers for sale any products raised or grown upon the property owned or rented by him, or under his control." Section 7 of said ordinance makes the violation thereof a misdemeanor, punishable by fine not exceeding $25.
On December 12, 1912, proper complaint was filed against relator, Bradshaw, a proper warrant issued for his arrest, and he was arrested by the city marshal and properly held thereunder. He thereupon sued out a writ of habeas corpus before the county judge of 1-Iill county, claiming that he was illegally restrained of his liberty, because the >city of Hillsboro had no authority to pass such ordinance, and it is void. The county judge heard the evidence and argument, and remanded the relator to the custody of the marshal, from which this appeal is prosecuted.
The further facts show that on December 12, 1912, relator was a peddler, selling apples, which he had in his two-horse wagon; that he made a sale therefrom while he was on the public square, in what was shown to be a part of the public street or square of said city. The fee to this particular portion of the square or street was in 1-Iill county. Its courthouse, it'seems, was located in the center of this square. This part of the square or street, where relator was, had been paved, and was then and for many years prior thereto had been used by the public generally for road or street purposes. The city swept the whole of this paved street or square, and exercised control over it as one of the public streets or thoroughfares of the city. It appears that the relator offered for sale apples upon the square or streets of said city, embraced within the fire limits thereof, and that such articles offered for sale and sold by him were not products grown or raised upon his property, or property rented by him or under his control.
The main contention by relator is that said ordinance Is void because it is class legislation; that it prohibits peddlers from selling on its streets and authorizes other persons to sell on its streets, within said fire limits, any products raised or grown upon their property, rented by them or under their control, claiming that said ordinance violates that clause of our Constitution (section 3, art. 1) which is: "All free men, when they form a social compact have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public services." It is undoubtedly the law of this state, as held by the Court of Civil Appeals in Wade v. Nunnelly, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 256, 46 S. W. 672, that persons have no vested right to make marts of the streets, alleys, and other public places in any incorporated town. It is also unquestionably the law of this state that the Legislature may classify persons according to their business, and may apply different rules to those which belong to different classes, and that municipal cor porations, when authorized by their charters, can also do this. Supreme Lodge v. Johnson, 98 Tex. 5, 81 S. W. 18; Campbell, Receiver, v. Cook, 86 Tex. 634, 26 S. W. 486, 40 Am. St. Rep. 878; Insurance Co. v. Chowning, 86 Tex. 654, 26 S. W. 982, 24 L. R. A. 504; Marchant v. Railway Co., 153 U. S. 389, 14 Sup. Ct. 894, 38 L. Ed. 751; Green v. State, 49 Tex. Cr. R. 380, 92 S. W. 847; Smith v. State, 54 Tex. Cr. R. 298, 113 S. W. 289; Beaumont Co. v. State, 57 Tex. Civ. App. 605, 122 S. W. 615; Douthit v. State, 36 Tex. Civ. App. 396, 82 S. W. 352; Id., 98 Tex. 344, 83 S. W. 795; Insurance Co. v. Gooding, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 490, 49 S. W. 123; Insurance Co. v. Mettler, 185 U. S. 325, 22 Sup. Ct. 662, 46 L. Ed. 922; Nash Hardware Co. v. Morris (Sup.) 146 S. W. 874; Railroad v. Taylor, 134 S. W. 819; Railroad v. Grenig, 142 S. W. 135; De Grazier v. Stephens, 101 Tex. 194, 105 S. W. 992, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1033, 16 Ann. Cas. 1059.
This court, in Ex parte Henson, 49 Tex. Cr. R. 177, 90 S. W. 874, expressly held that the city of Greenville, in -Hunt county, had the power to prohibit the use of certain streets and the public square of that city for the purpose of peddling. The city of Greenville, as shown by the opinion in that case, was incorporated under the general incorporation laws of this state, and it was given the same power and authority over its streets that the city of- Hillsboro was substantially given over its-streets, square, etc. In that case, as is shown by the report of it, the city of Greenville made it an offense "for any person to peddle or in any other manner sell any kind of merchandise, patent medicine, or nostrum on the public square and certain streets," naming them. Henson eon-tended that the ordinance was unreasonable, and therefore void. He also contended that the ordinance was inseparable, and that it applied to others as well as peddlers. This court held that the rule of ejusdem generis applied, and that the "ordinance evidently had in view as its primary object to prohibit peddling in the public streets and on the public square of Greenville, and what follows as to other sales relates to this character of sales — -that is, sales by peddling." The opinion then proceeds to hold that, even if wrong in applying the rule of ejusdem generis, then .in the latter part of the ordinance, indicating that others than peddlers were prohibited from using the said streets and square for peddling purposes, that it was severable, and held the ordinance constitutional, and within the powers of the corporation to prohibit peddling on said streets and public square. The opinion also holds: "We have no doubt that it is within the power of the Legislature to confer on towns and cities the power to regulate peddling within the jurisdiction of such towns and cities, especially on the public streets and squares of such cities; the same being peculiarly within the jurisdiction of towns and cities. Wade v. Nunnelly, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 256, 46 S. W. 668. Nor does the fact that the state, as is the ease here, may license peddlers, exclude the idea of municipal supervision, where the power for such supervision is given in the charter,"
It is true that this court has uniformly held that ordinances levying any occupation tax on peddlers, which exempt from their operation other persons as peddlers, were invalid (Ex parte Jones, 38 Tex. Cr. R. 482, 43 S. W. 513; Rainey v. State, 41 Tex. Cr. R. 254, 53 S. W. 882, 96 Am. St. Rep. 786, and other cases), and that ordinances which exempted certain persons within any given class are uniformly held invalid. But those eases do not apply in this question. As shown by these decisions and on like questions, the very reason that they were held invalid and violative of said provision of our Constitution was because they excepted from the operation of the act other persons within that class, not because the Legislature or the municipal corporation did not have the right or power to make classes which were founded upon some just basis, and tax, regulate, or prohibit one class and not the other.
The question raised in this case has many times been decided adversely to relator's contention by the courts of different states. State v. Montgomery, 92 Me. 433, 43 Atl. 13; People v. Sawyer, 106 Mich. 428, 64 N. W. 333; In re Nightingale, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 168; 2 Dillon on Municipal Corporations (5th. Ed.) § 706; Commonwealth v. Rice, 9 Metc. (Mass.) 253; Wartman v. Phila., 33 Pa. 202; Dutton v. Mayor, 121 Tenn. 25, 113 S. W. 381, 130 Am. St. Rep. 748, 16 Ann. Cas. 1028; People v. De Blaay, 137 Mich. 402, 100 N. W. 598, 4 Ann. Cas. 919. See, also, note in 16 Ann. Cas. 1030, where many cases to this effect are cited.
In the case of People v. Sawyer, 106 Mich. 428, 64 N. W. 333, the Supreme Court of Michigan said: "The discrimination in favor' of mechanics and farmers in the sale of their products is within the power conferred by the charter upon the common council. These immunities have been recognized for many years. By the statute of 50 Geo. Ill, e. 41, § 23, real workers and makers of goods within Great Britain were exempt from the payment of the license which was imposed upon hawkers and peddlers. 1 Barn. & Adol. 279; 10 Barn. & C. 66. In many, if not in most, .of the American states, these immunities are granted to mechanics and farmers selling their own products, and the power is not questioned."
In the case of State v. Montgomery, 92 Me. 441, 43 Atl. 16, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine said: "And the argument is that the Legislature may not properly say that acts which,. if committed by one person, are a crime, if committed by another are not a crime. It is undoubtedly true that police regulations of this kind, to be valid, must be uniform, and must not discriminate against one class, and in favor of another. In other words, in an act to regulate peddlers, all peddlers of the same kind, under the same circumstances, must be regulated alike. It is a 'natural, inherent, and inalienable right' of every man that he shall be subject only to the same burdens, limited only by the same restraints, regulated only by the same laws, as is his neighbor, situated under the same conditions as he is. Is this right abridged by this statute? It is contended that the exception which permits one to peddle without license 'the products of his own labor, or the labor of his family, any patent of his own invention, or in which he has become interested by being a member of any firm, or stockholder in any corporation, which has purchased the patent,' is a discrimination in favor of some and against others. We do not think so. If one may peddle freely the products of his own labor, so may all. The products may be unlike; but the freedom to prosecute one's own business and to peddle his own products is free alike to all. So of the other exceptions. While it may happen that various producers may peddle each the product of his own labor without license, but not of the labor of another, still we think this fairly answers the requirements of uniformity. The Legislature is the sole judge of the extent to which the business of peddling should be regulated, and its conclusions are final, so long as the burdens imposed do not bear unevenly upon citizens. Ex parte Thornton [C. C.] 12 Fed. 538."
In the case of Wade v. Nunnelly, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 262, 46 S. W. 672, cited above, our Third Court of Civil Appeals, in discussing the power and right of a municipal corporation of our state to prohibit the use of its public streets for market places, speaking through Judge Key, said: "The ordinance in question does not undertake to prevent or interfere with the right of the appellees to purchase, sell, or otherwise deal in the products referred to upon their own premises; nor does it prohibit other persons from carrying such products and delivering them to appellees upon their premises. It may, and doubtless will, interfere with the privilege formerly enjoyed by the public at large of exhibiting such products upon the streets and in other public places within the territory referred to, and the convenience resulting therefrom to the appellees, as dealers in such products. But appellees have no vested right to make marts of the streets, alleys, and other public places; and to deny them the privilege of so doing is not to destroy or deteriorate any of their property rights. It may result in inconvenience, and even additional expense to them; but there a>re many laws, and especially police regulations, that have this effect, and are, nevertheless, valid."
Many reasons, all of which are very reasonable, could be given why the municipalities should have and do have the right to make just such classifications as was made by this ordinance. It is noticed that the ordinance prohibits peddling on those streets which are included within the fire limits. This, it occurs to us, in the larger towns and cities of this state, is necessary to be done. We know, as common knowledge, that fire limits in towns and cities include only that part of the thickly settled and business portion. In case a fire breaks out within this territory, it is necessary that the streets be kept open, so that the proper fire department, with its apparatus, will not be obstructed in reaching the fire as quickly as possible. If peddlers were not prohibited from occupying the streets within such localities, they could take possession of the streets and obstruct the fire department in such a nvay as to be a menace to the whole business and thickly settled portions of towns and cities. As aptly suggested by Hon. Tarlton Morrow, city attorney of Hillsboro, and who has filed a brief herein in behalf of the city and respondent, the city is charged with the duty of looking after the health of the citizens, and it is a known fact that products usually peddled are not so fresh nor wholesome as those offered by the farmer who raises them and himself offers them for sale on the streets. The farmer or other producer, who brings his own raised products to town, only comes occasionally, and does not remain long; whereas the peddler takes his stand in the public street, or on the public square, in the early morning, and remains throughout the whole day, and the filth that accumulates from the standing of teams, and throwing of the peel of fruits and other refuse matter into the street, makes more or less a nuisance and a burden, which must he removed, and is, daily by the city authorities. If, therefore, the city did not have authority to make such classification, and prohibit the peddler from occupying the streets for his business, they could practically take charge of the whole street every day, and from day to day throughout the year, and thus maintain their places of business in the public streets, which were never intended for any such purpose; whereas, the other merchants have to buy their own lots, erect their own buildings, or rent them, and stay on their own property for the purpose of conducting their business when their competitor, the peddler, could, if not prohibited, monopolize the whole streets, pay no rent or other revenue to the city, and create a nuisance and an obstruction continuously in various ways. So that we hold the classification made by this ordinance is reasonable and proper, and that the ordinance, for no purpose is invalid; but, on the contrary, it is valid. State v. Barbelais, 101 Me. 512, 64 Atl. S81; Louisville v. Roupe, 6 B. Mon. (Ky.) 593; Com. v. Rice, 9 Metc. (Mass.) 253; Atty. Gen. v. Tongue, 12 Price, 51; Com. v. Roenick, 10 Pa. Dist. R. 51; 21 Cyc. 372, and cases cited in note 49; 3 Dil. Mun. Corp. § 1166, and notes.
Appellant's contention that he was on that part of the public square, the fee and title to which was in the county, and that the county gave him authority to establish and maintain his peddling business there, cannot be maintained. Where he located and kept his wagon and horses in his peddling business, as shown, was in the public street or square.. Hill county could no more give him power or authority to obstruct the streets or public square than any other corporation or person could do. Clearly this location was within the city limits, and on the public streets or square, paved and used for public uses, and the city, and not the county, had jurisdiction, power, and authority over it, at least, for street purposes and for a public square for the public.
The judgment of the county judge will be affirmed, and the relator remanded to the custody of the marshal.
HARPER, J., concurs in the opinion remanding relator. DAVIDSON, P. J., dissents.