Case Name: Nancy GRAHAM, a/k/a Nancy L. Sheppard, formerly Nancy L. Azar, Petitioner, v. Charles T. AZAR, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1967-11-15
Citations: 204 So. 2d 193
Docket Number: No. 36311
Parties: Nancy GRAHAM, a/k/a Nancy L. Sheppard, formerly Nancy L. Azar, Petitioner, v. Charles T. AZAR, Respondent.
Judges: CALDWELL, C. J., DREW, J., and WHITE, Circuit Judge (Retired), concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 204
Pages: 193–197

Head Matter:
Nancy GRAHAM, a/k/a Nancy L. Sheppard, formerly Nancy L. Azar, Petitioner, v. Charles T. AZAR, Respondent.
No. 36311.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Nov. 15, 1967.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 13, 1967.
Charles J. Crowder, South Miami, for petitioner.
Jerrold A. Bross, Miami, for respondent.

Opinion:
THORNAL, Judge.
By a petition for a writ of certiorari we have for review a decision of the District Court of Appeal, Third District, which passes upon a question certified by the District Court to be one of great public interest. Azar v. Graham, 194 So.2d 684 (3d D.C.A. Fla.1967).
We must decide whether the head of a Florida family can claim a constitutional homestead exemption against a money judgment for child support recovered by a former wife.
The petitioner Nancy Graham obtained a decree of divorce from the respondent Charles Azar in Dade County, Florida. The final decree provided for payment of support for a minor child. After default in payment, Mrs. Graham obtained a final money judgment against Azar in the amount of $1,963.70 covering acctimulated delinquencies. She then obtained a writ of execution and levied on certain personal property owned by Azar who, like the petitioner, had remarried subsequent to the divorce. In defending against the levy, Azar filed an affidavit pursuant to Florida Statutes, Section 222.06, F.S.A. He claimed a constitutional exemption of personal property up to the value of $1,000.
Article X, Section 1, Florida Constitution, F.S.A., provides in part:
"A homestead owned by the head of a family residing in this State, together with one thousand dollars worth of personal property, shall be exempt from forced sale under process of any court, "
The cited section then provides certain exceptions to this broad exemption. A judgment of the type here involved is not listed among the exceptions.
Florida Statutes, Section 222.06, F.S.A. provides the procedure for ascertaining the claim of exemption against a levy under writ of execution.
The trial judge denied Azar's claim of exemption. The District Court of Appeal reversed, holding the exemption applicable to the instant judgment. Azar v. Graham, supra. It is this decision which we now review.
For reversal the petitioner relies upon the decision of this Court in Anderson v. Anderson, 44 So.2d 652 (Fla.1950). By way of obiter some of the broad language of Anderson would appear to aid the petitioner. However, the rule of the decision is not dispositive of the case before us. In Anderson the former husband had not remarried and established himself as the head of another family, as he has done here. He there undertook to claim that he was the head of a family consisting of his divorced wife and children. At the same time, he asserted the constitutional exemption against the very "family" which he claimed to head. This obviously could not be done. It was decided that the former husband, still unmarried, was no longer "the head of a family", custody of the children having been awarded to the former wife. Not being the "head of a family" Anderson was not entitled to claim the homestead exemption. In the instant case Azar has remarried and is admittedly the head of a new family. We assume from the record that he was remarried at the time the judgment was entered in favor of his former wife. See Pasco v. Harley, 73 Fla. 819, 75 So. 30 (1917).
Petitioner also relies on several decisions of the Supreme Court of Alabama. However, the Alabama Constitution, Article 10, Section 204, provides the exemption against execution "issued for the collection of any debt contracted" since a certain time. This exemption has been construed to apply only to contractual obligations. Brown Shoe Co. v. Schaefer, 242 Ala. 310, 6 So.2d 405 (1942).
The exempting language of the Florida Constitution is broad and comprehensive. It is clear and specific. It simply exempts to the head of a family $1,000 worth of personal property "from forced sale under process of any court". The second sentence of Article X, Section 1, supra, does exclude from the exemption protection certain specifically enumerated types of claims. A judgment for child support in favor of a divorced wife and against a remarried family head is not one of them.
This particular article of the 1885 Constitution was debated extensively by the Convention which proposed it. See, Journal of Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, 1885, and Index to the Journal, by Thursby and Hartsfield. At no point was it ever suggested that a judgment of the type under consideration should be excluded from the exemption provision. In view of the fact that the framers of the Constitution devoted extensive consideration to the wording of the exemption, as well as to the specific exclusions, we feel justified in concluding that any judgment within the broad scope of the exemption is covered by it, unless specifically excluded. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
When considering this section over the years, this Court and the District Court's of Appeal have consistently held that the exemption provision should be liberally construed. Bessemer Properties v. Gamble, 158 Fla. 38, 27 So.2d 832 (1946); Olesky v. Nicholas, Fla., 82 So.2d 510 (1955); In re Livingston's Estate, Fla.App., 161 So.2d 723 (2d D.C.A.1964); White v. Posick, Fla.App., 150 So.2d 263 (2d D.C.A. 1963). At the same time, it has been held that exceptions to the exemptions should be strictly construed. Lewton v. Hower, 18 Fla. 872 (1882) ; Wilhelm v. Locklar, 46 Fla. 575, 35 So. 6 (1903).
By applying these rules, as well as the clear language of the Constitution, we can arrive at no conclusion other than to agree with the District Court that the claimed exemption should be allowed. The Supreme Court of California reached a similar conclusion in Yager v. Yager, 7 Cal.2d 213, 60 P.2d 422 (1936).
We resist the temptation to venture upon a philosophical discussion regarding the father's duty to support his minor children. The entire record on the merits is not here. We do remind that delinquen cies in compliance with alimony and support decrees are otherwise enforceable despite the cited constitutional exemption provision. The potent power of a citation for contempt is always available to a chancellor in proper cases.
Having responded to the question certified, the decision of the District Court of Appeal is approved and the writ is discharged.
It is so ordered.
CALDWELL, C. J., DREW, J., and WHITE, Circuit Judge (Retired), concur.
ERVIN, J., dissents with opinion.