Case Name: STATE of Louisiana, Through the DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS, Plaintiff-Appellant-Appellee, v. Dorothy Finke MIMS et al., Defendants-Appellees-Appellants
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1976-07-06
Citations: 336 So. 2d 24
Docket Number: No. 5493
Parties: STATE of Louisiana, Through the DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS, Plaintiff-Appellant-Appellee, v. Dorothy Finke MIMS et al., Defendants-Appellees-Appellants.
Judges: Before HOOD, MILLER and WATSON, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 336
Pages: 24–36

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana, Through the DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS, Plaintiff-Appellant-Appellee, v. Dorothy Finke MIMS et al., Defendants-Appellees-Appellants.
No. 5493.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
July 6, 1976.
Dissenting Opinion July 21, 1976.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 18, 1976.
On Rehearing Aug. 19, 1976.
Writs Refused Nov. 5, 1976.
Jack C. Frugé, Ville Platte, Johnie E. Branch, Jr., Wm. W. Irwin, Jr., Marshall W. Wroten, Baton Rouge, for plaintiff-appellant-appellee.
Jack O. Brittain, Natchitoches, for defendants-appellees-appellants.
Before HOOD, MILLER and WATSON, JJ.

Opinion:
MILLER, Judge.
Plaintiff Louisiana Department of Highways appeals seeking a reduction in the $98,190.89 awarded defendants-landowners Dorothy Finke Mims and James Mims in payment for, and damages related to, the Department's expropriation under the "quick taking statute." LSA-R.S. 48:441 et seq. Landowners also appeal seeking an increase in the award together with attorney fees. We amend to make a slight reduction in the award, and affirm.
This is the same litigation which was before us in State, Department of Highways v. Mims, 311 So.2d 914 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1975). It now comes up on the merits.
On March 21, 1972, the Department filed expropriation proceedings to take eleven separate tracts totaling 35.25 acres. The Department deposited $22,982.20 as the fair market value of, and severance damages related to, the taken properties. Landowners were allowed to keep their minerals in perpetuity.
After the first trial the court awarded $56,250.02 for both the fair market value of the taken lands and severance damages suffered by landowners' remaining properties. In written reasons assigned at that time, the court accepted the appraisal by landowners' expert T. J. Stephens as being in accord with actual values. Nevertheless, specific reasons were assigned for reducing many items in Stephens' appraisal. No reasons were assigned after that first hearing to support the refusal to award $19,950 in severance damages which, according to Stephens, resulted from the highway dividing landowners' p.astureland into two separate operations.
Although little additional evidence was heard at the remand, the court increased the first award by $41,940.87. The court's written reasons were limited to a brief statement that Stephens' appraisal "accurately and truly sets forth the values of the properties taken and all damages resulting from the taking." On that basis the court awarded $98,190.89.
In order to understand the issues, one must be aware of the 1959 highway right-of-way servitude negotiated and signed by the Department and the Mims. On the ba sis that the Natchitoches bypass road was to be constructed in the early sixties, the Mims sold to the Department a 35.178 acre right of way and some 24 acres of borrow pits for $10,985.70. In the 1959 written agreements the Department undertook to 1) move a house, 2) move certain orna-mentals, 3) drill a waterwell, and 4) provide an underpass so that the Mims 828 acre cattle operation would not be divided by the highway fencing and 15 foot high fill needed for the new road. Except for the underpass, the projected 1959 road would have divided the pastureland into two separate farm operations — one of 478 acres to the east, and the other of 320 acres to the west.
The Department did not use the 1959 servitude before the 1972 taking. The eleven parcels taken in 1972 are alongside the 1959 servitude and were necessary because in 1972 the Department was providing for four lanes instead of the two planned in 1959, and the fill was to have a slope of one in six instead of one in four.
Construction of the road had commenced at the time of the first trial, and was almost completed at the second. The trial court's increase in the award could well have been based on the update of information at the second trial. For instance, at the first trial there was evidence tending to show that although the Department did not provide by contract for the underpass connecting landowners' two pastures, the contractor intended to provide an underpass. At the second trial the Department offered no evidence to indicate the underpass had been or would be provided. Landowners testified there was no underpass. The failure to provide the underpass alone could account for at least a $19,950 increase in the trial court's first award.
EXPERT APPRAISERS
The trial court's conclusion that T. J. Stephens' appraisal was the best defended is well supported by the evidence. Credibility of the Department's experts was reduced by several factors. Both were almost full time contract appraisers for the Department; both were directed by the Department to use only one method of appraisal, the before and after method, and they did not consider the front land-rear land method; neither of the Department's experts had ever bought or sold property in Natchitoches Parish, and both thought there were only two or three subdivisions between the Mims property and Natchi-toches, whereas there were at least ten; and finally, the Department's experts based their opinion in part on misinformation concerning the price paid for an important comparable.
Furthermore the Department failed to present testimony of one of its experts who appraised the Mims property. The Department did not explain why that expert was not called to testify. There is an adverse inference that this expert would have testified against the Department. State, Department of Highways v. Willet, 322 So.2d 383 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1975); Pugh, Louisiana Evidence Law (1974), pp. 716-8.
The trial court was impressed by Stephens' qualifications because he was an independent appraiser; his methods of appraisal have been approved by the jurisprudence; for many years he has bought and sold Natchitoches Parish properties on a daily basis; his comparables were well established — indeed, one witness testified that before the expropriation (and certainly after), he attempted to buy the Mims rural residential properties appraised by Stephens and was prepared to pay the sums used in Stephens' appraisal. The land was not for sale. It was the rural residential properties that landowners' experts valued at some four times the value set by the Department's appraisers.
There is no manifest error in the trial court's adoption of most of Stephens' appraisal, and his rejection of the Department's appraisals. State, Department of Highways v. Hab Monsur Corp., 301 So. 2d 667 at 672 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1974).
We find manifest error in only one phase of the trial court's award. In that instance we accept the trial court's first opinion. The court increased the $6,500 awarded for parcel 1-5 at the first hearing to $13,500 after the second. This parcel of 2.2 acres touches Spanish Lake Road at the intersection of the 1959 servitude. The Department's appraisals averaged $1,284 for the parcel while Stephens assigned a value of $13,500. According to Stephens the property was rural commercial property with a value of $30 per front foot. In written reasons assigned after the first trial, the court held Stephens' evaluation "somewhat too high because rather extensive work would have to be done filling the land to make it properly useable commercially and because of very limited commercial development in this area of Natch-itoches Parish." The refusal to award more than $6,500 was well supported by that reasoning. The only commercial development in the area was the road contractor's rental of a nearby parcel as a work area. If anything was established in this trial it is that fill work is costly. Therefore, we reduce the $13,500 awarded at the second trial to the original award of $6,500.
There is no manifest error in the trial court's acceptance of the remainder of Stephens' appraisal. The Department contends landowners' appraisals were based on values attributed to the fronting of some of the Mims properties on the 1959 servitude, arguing this is improper since no highway was built until after the 1972 taking. We follow the cases of State, Department of Highways v. Wax, 295 So.2d 833 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1974), and State, Department of Highways v. Beatty, 288 So.2d 900 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1974). The court there ruled that where expropriated property was not included within the scope of the project from the beginning, and the project was subsequently enlarged to include additional property, landowner is entitled to receive compensation for the second taking at the enhanced value due to its proximity to the first taking. 288 So.2d 900 at 905-6.
There is ample evidence showing that acquisition of the 1959 servitude increased the values of property along the proposed highway. A Natchitoches Parish real estate broker testified it was difficult if not impossible to purchase land near the Mims properties along Louisiana Highway 1. He was willing to pay $51,000 for 1700 front feet along the 1959 servitude before the 1972 taking. James Mims testified that a number of people attempted to buy property fronting the 1959 servitude. The land was not sold only because landowners did not put it up for sale.
We will not burden the record by describing each of the eleven individual tracts and detailing the exact appraisals by the Department's and the landowners' appraisers. Suffice it to say that pastureland was appraised at $325 per acre by the Department and $375 by landowner. There is no manifest error in the trial court's acceptance of the $375 per acre appraisal. Twenty-one acres of the taken lands were pastureland.
The remaining parcels were appraised on an acreage basis by the Department's experts while landowners' experts divided it into timberland (appraised by the acre), and rural residential or rural commercial (appraised by the front foot). There is no manifest error in the trial court's acceptance of landowners' appraisal and rejection of the Department's. State, Department of Highways v. Pommier, 270 So.2d 274 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1972); State, Department of Highways v. Wells, 298 So.2d 304 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1974).
The Department complains that Stephens was overly generous in his appraisal of several specific items taken — a shop was valued at $3,168 by Stephens while the Department's appraisals averaged $2,250; an old barn was valued at $669 by Stephens and the Department's experts considered it to be without value; fencing was valued at $1,495.65 by Stephens and the Department's appraisals averaged $1,000; a driveway was valued at $500 by Stephens and the Department's experts considered it to be without value. Stephens' appraisal was well documented and there is no manifest error in the trial court's acceptance of his opinion on these items.
The Department contends that Stephens appraised trees and shrubs at $3,000, but we find no separate allowance for trees and shrubs in Stephens' appraisal. He probably included that loss in his appraisal of the residental lot and the severance damages allowed to the residence, which is exactly what the Department contends should have been done.
The Department did not complain of Stephens' $1,200 appraisal for the taking of landowners' septic system.
The Department contends Stephens should not have allowed damages for the following items: $1,200 for a water well; $2,500 for a new cattle chute; and $4,300 for the Department's failure to replace Pampas grass, to relocate a residence and two sheds, to drill a new well, and to construct a drainage canal. Some of these items were required under the 1959 contract. It contends the $19,950 allowed for severance damages included these items. We don't find a duplication and fail to find manifest. error in the trial court's award. Without these items the severance damages could have been substantially increased.
SEVERANCE DAMAGES
All experts agreed severance damages were sustained by landowners' home. Prior to 1972, Louisiana Highway 1 was located some 165 feet from their home; after the construction, the right-of-way was only 23 feet away. Prior to the taking, numerous large trees and shrubbery on the taken property insulated their home from problems created by highway traffic. Stephens assessed severance damages at $4,272.90 while one Department expert set the damages at $3,000 and the other at $4,-218. There is no manifest error in the court's acceptance of Stephens' appraisal.
Stephens opined that landowners' pastureland suffered a $25 per acre diminution in value, or $19,950 in severance damages because it was impossible for cattle to cross from the 478 acre tract east of the highway to the 320 acre tract on the west. It was established at the second trial that, contrary to the Department's 1959 contract to provide an underpass, and contrary to the contractor's intent to build one, an underpass was not constructed. James Mims testified that over the years this barricade, the highway, would increase the cost of his cattle operations by more than $180,-000. Stephens' justification of this item of severance damages is well supported by the evidence.
LANDOWNERS'- CLAIMS
Landowners seek to increase the trial court's award by $8,125, contending the Department moved 65,000 cubic yards of dirt from landowners' hill properties onto the low area. In addition to this 65,000 cubic yards of dirt, the contractor needed 375,000 cubic yards to build up the lower area; the contractor bought the latter amount from the Mims for $46,875. It is argued that when the contractor moved dirt from the highway servitude in the higher elevations to the lower area, land owners were deprived of the opportunity of selling 65,000 cubic yards of dirt and should, therefore, be awarded $8,125 for that loss.
No authority has been cited; we know of none to prevent the Department from allowing its contractors to move dirt found on its servitude from high areas where it must be removed to low areas where it is needed. Landowners might as well have claimed damages because the Department had no place to store the excess 65,000 cubic yards of dirt found where the road had to be cut, and thus landowners were deprived of a loss of income by virtue of the Department's contractor finding another use for the dirt.
The trial court properly denied landowners' claim for the loss of $8,125 related to the alleged loss of their opportunity to sell 65,000 cubic yards of dirt.
Landowners also claim they will not receive just compensation for their taken land unless their attorney's $20,000 fee is assessed to the Department. They point to the fact that, as to cases filed after January 1, 1975, LSA-R.S. 48:453(E) permits an award of attorney fees to landowners when the court award exceeds the Department's deposit. Landowners review many factors which show this case to have been particularly onerous—the Department failed to comply with its obligations under its 1959 contract; it failed to negotiate in good faith with landowners for the 1972 takings by refusing to consider appraisals made by landowners' highly qualified appraisers.
Although it was established beyond doubt that landowners were required to employ an attorney to enable them to obtain the fair market value of their land, this is not the first case of its kind. Landowners admit the jurisprudence has uniformly denied attorney fees in these cases. This expropriation case was filed long before 1975, the effective date of the legislation allowing courts to grant attorney fees. There is no manifest error in the trial court's refusal to grant attorney fees. Knox v. Brown, 325 So.2d 295 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1976).
EXPERT FEES
Finally, the Department contends the $5,659.50 taxed to the Department for fees due landowners' six experts was exorbitant and contrary to the evidence. We disagree.
We distinguish State, Department of Highways v. Donner Corporation, 236 So.2d 841 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1970), cited by the Department. We agree with the holding that expert witnesses are entitled only to reasonable compensation for their appearance in court and for preparatory work done, and that their fees must be in line with those previously allowed in similar cases. LSA-R.S. 13:3666. The award of expert fees in this case is not contrary to that rule. In Donner, this court reduced expert fees of $4,755 and $6,209.50 to $2,250 each; landowner had been awarded some $17,700 more than the Department deposited for the taking. Here the $23,000 deposited was increased by almost $70,000. Stephens' bill was the largest of landowners' experts; he billed his time at $20 per hour in preparation and $125 for each day in court. The Department did not establish that Stephens did not spend time sufficient to justify his $2,060 bill.
The other experts did not document their time as thoroughly, but the trial court was impressed with their qualifications and testimony. Landowners' expert Lacaze filed a detailed and well documented report. His appraisals were slightly higher than Stephens'. His bill of $1,855 was in line with the work demonstrated by his report and testimony. A substantial part of the bill by landowners' experts was made up of a $100 per day charged for attending court. We find that all expert testimony was relevant and useful to the court. The Department failed to establish manifest error in the fixing of expert fees.
Specific objection was taken to landowners' expert photographer's bill of $486. He charged $186 for his photographs and $300 for court appearances. The photographer was a professional and his services were far more valuable than those of an amateur. When photographs are helpful to the court, landowner is entitled to have his photographer's expert fee taxed as costs. State, Department of Highways v. Willet, 322 So.2d 383 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1975). There is no manifest error in the trial court's assessment of this expert fee.
The trial court judgment is amended to reduced the $98,190.89 judgment to $91,-190.89. Otherwise the judgment is affirmed at the Department's costs. The Department's obligation to pay costs is subject to LSA-R.S. 13:4521.
AMENDED and AFFIRMED.
HOOD, J., dissents and will assign written reasons.