Case Name: ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY v. SHEEGOG
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1909-12-20
Citations: 215 U.S. 308
Docket Number: No. 41
Parties: ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY v. SHEEGOG.
Judges: with whom concurred Mr. Justice Harlan,
Reporter: United States Reports
Volume: 215
Pages: 308–331

Head Matter:
ILLINOIS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY v. SHEEGOG.
ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OP THE STATE OF KENTUCKY.
No. 41.
Argued December 12, 1909.
Decided December 20, 1909.
Where the joinder of the resident and the non-resident defendants prevents removal to the Federal court, the fact that on the trial •• the jury finds against the non-resident defendant only has no bearing on the question of removal if the joinder was not fraudulent.
Allegations of fact; so far as material in a petition to remove, if con- . troverted, must be tried in the Federal court, and therefore must be taken to be true when the state court fails to consider them.
A plaintiff may sue the tort-feasors jointly if he sees fit’, regardless of motive, and an allegation that resident and non-resident tort-feasors are sued for the purpose of preventing removal to the Federal court is not a sufficient allegation that the .joinder was fraudulent.
A lessor railroad company remains responsible, so far as its duty to the public is concerned, notwithstanding it may lease its road, unless relieved by a statute of the State.
•Whether defendants can be sued jointly as tort-feasors is for the state court to decide; and so held-that, where the state court decides that a lessor'road in that State is responsible for keeping its road- ' bed in order, the joinder of both lessor and lessee roads in a suit for damages caused by imperfect roadbed' and management is not-, fraudulent and the lessee road, although non-resident, cannot remove if the lessor road is resident.
126 Kentucky, 252, affirmed.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
■ Mr. Edmund F. Trdbué, with whom Mr. John C. Doolan, • Mr. Anilla Cox, Jr., and Mr. Blewett Lee were on the brief, . fop plaintiff in error: •
The lessor and conductor were joined as' petitioner’s co- defendants solely to prevent a removal to the Federal court, and the trial court sustained their motions for peremptory instructions' in their favor, and plaintiff below- prosecuted no appeal from these judgments, but abandoned his case as to them both.
The allegations of fact in a petition for removal must be accepted by the state court as true,-because an issue on such allegations can be tried only in the Federal court. Railway v. Dunn, 122 U. S. 513, 517; Plymouth v. Amador Co., 118 U. S. 264, 270; Louisville R. R. Co. v. Wangelin, 132 U..S. 599; Alabama Ct. Southern Ry. Qo. v. Thompson¡ 200 U. S. 218; Wecker v. National Co., 204 U. S. 176; Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. McCabe, 213 U. S. 207; Dow v. Bradstreet, 46 Fed. Rep. 824; Arrowsmith v. Railroad Co., 57 Fed. Rep.' 165; Diday v. Railway Co., 107 Fed. Rep. 565; Union Co. v. C., B. & Q. R. R. Co., 119 Fed. Rep. 209; Kelly v. C. & A. R. Co., 122 Fed. Rep.-286; Gustafson.v.'Railway Cor, 128 Fed. Rep. 85; Dishon v. C., N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co., 133 Fed. Rep. 471; Boatmen’s Bank v. Fritzlen, 135 Fed. Rep. 650, 668 (certiorari denied, 198 U. S. 586); South Dakota Co. v. Cin. & St. P. Ry. Co., 141 Fed. Rep. 578, 581; Thbmas v. Great North. Ry. Co., 147 Fed. Rep, 83, 86; Atlanta, K. & N. Ry. Co. v. Sou. Ry. Co., 153 Fed. Rep. 122, 126; M’Guire v. Great North.. Ry. Co., 153 Fed. Rep. 434, 439; Politz v. Wabash Ry. Co., 153 Fed. Rep. 941; M’AUster v. Ches.. & Ohio Ry. Co., 157-Fed. Rep. 740, 743; Harrington v. Gt. Nor. Ry. Co., 169 Fed. Rep. 714; Donovan v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 169 Fed. Rep. 363.
The state court, therefore, had no jurisdiction to try or determine the question of fact tendered by the petition for removal, much less to try it on evidence heard only on the merits'. Rutherford v. I. C. R. R. Co., 120 Kentucky, 15; Coley v. I. C. R. R. Co., 121 Kentucky, 385; Dudley v. I. C. R. R. Co., 127 Kentucky, 221; Underwood v. I. C. R. R. Co., 31 Ky'. L. R. 595, holding that the state court may try issues of fact upon a petition for removal, is a doctrine unsound in principle and in conflict with the decisions of this court and all of the other Federal courts.
Where the plaintiff joins as the real defendant’s co-defendants persons knowh.to be improper parties and fabricates averments concerning them in-order to misstate their connection with the case, a petition for removal in alleging fraud in the joinder of the improper defendants may aver the untruth of t&e •plaintiff’s averments, otherwise the right of removal to the Federal court might always be frustrated by the plaintiff ad libitum; and the courts will be astute to prevent such devices. Miller, J., 4 Dill. 277 (cited in 57 Fed. Rep. 169), and see Crawford v. I. C. Ry. Co., 130 Fed. Rep. 395; C., R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Stepp, 151 Fed. Rep. 908, and other cases cited supra.
' Although the state court was without jurisdiction to try an issue of fact upon the petition for removal and the assumption of the state court to pass upon the truth of the aver-ments of such petition of itself entitles the Illinois Central to a reversal of the judgment now assailed, nevertheless the same result would follow a consideration of the case which the state court assumed to try as arising upon the record, because it is demonstrable from the opinion itself that the state court was not justified in holding that the derailment of the engine was the proximate result of the failure of the lessor to perform its public duty in its failure to construct safe roadbed. .
• This unwarrantable speculation is too far-fetched to justify the joinder of the Kentucky Company upon the assumption that the supposed condition of its track caused the wreck in any such fantastic way as suggested by the state court. Neelmg v. C., St. P. & K. R. R. Co., 98 Iowa, 554;- Cox v. C. & N. W. Ry. Co., 102 Iowa, 711.'
If the state court had had jurisdiction to try the truth of the averments of the petition for removal it must have heard witnesses to that end. Instead of so doing the state court tried the Illinois Central’s averments on jurisdiction by evi dence upon the merits, and as if it were trying the liability of the Kentucky Company, which had previously been dismissed. Its judgment is, therefore, reversible from any standpoint.
Defendant in error’s case against the plaintiff in error is a distinct cause of action on which a separate suit might be brought and complete relief afforded without any other party’ in court. Barney.v. Latham, 103 U. S. 205.
Permission of state practice to join defendants does not prevent a separable controversy between plaintiff and one of them. Kelly v. Railroad Co., 122 Fed. Rep. 286, 291; Williard v. Railroad Co., 124 Fed: Rep. 796, 801; Yates v. Railroad Co., 137 Fed. Rep. 943; Iowa Ry. Co. v. Bliss, 144 Fed. Rep.' 446; Manufacturing Co. v. Brown, 148 Fed. Rep. 308; South Dakota Co. v. Railway Co., 141 Fed. Rep. 578,. 581; Stockton v. Oregon Short Line, 170 Fed. Rep. 627, 633; Wallin v. Reagan, 171 Fed.j Rep. 758, 763.
State legislation' cannot control Federal jurisdiction. Hyde v. Stone, 20 How. 170, 175; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466; Brow v. Wabash, 164 U. S. 271.
Mr. John G. Miller, with whom Mr. P. B. Miller was on the brief, for defendant in error: .
Case is not removable until the record, on its face shows, facts which give the Federal court jurisdiction. Ex parte Wisner, 203 U. S. 449; Kinney v. Columbia Sav. & Loan Asso., 191 U. S. 78.
If the case be not removed, the jurisdiction of the state court remains unaffected; and under the act of Congress the jurisdiction of the Federal court could not attach until it becomes the duty of the state court to proceed no further. Crehore v. M. & O. Ry. Co., 131 U. S. 240; Stone v. South Carolina, 117 U. S. 43Ó; Carson v. Hyatt, 118 U. S.'279; Stevens v. Nichols, 130 U. S. 230; Phcenix Ins. Co. v. Pechner, 95 U. S. 183; National Steamship Co. v. Tugman, 106 U. S. 118; B. & O. R. R. Co. v. Koonts, 104 U. S. 514.
The controversy must be wholly between citizens of different States in order to remove the case, and such is not the case when one or more defendants jointly sued are citizens of the same State with plaintiff. Core v. Vinal, 117 U. S. 347; Chesapeake v. Ohio R. R. Co., 179 U..S. 131; Powers v. C. & O. R. R. Co., 169 U. S. 92; Alabama G. 8. R. R. Co. v. Thompson, 200 U. S. 206; C., N. 0. & T. P. R. R, Co. v. Bohon, 200 U. S. 221.
If the act of an individual is within the terms of the law, whatever may be the reasons which govern him, or whatever may be the result, it cannot be impeached. Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., 94 U. S. 535; Prewitt v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 115 Kentucky, 26. '
.Plaintiffs motive in-the performance of a lawful act was not open to inquiry. C. & O. R. R. Co. v. Dixon, 179 U. S. 131.
The construction given to the statute of the State by the highest tribunal of the State is regarded as part of the statute and is binding upon the courts of the United States as a text. Leffingwell v. Warren, 2 Black, 599; Com. Bank v. Buckingham, 5 How. 317; Jackson v. Lamphire, 3 Pet. 280.
When the highest judicial tribunal of a State has determined the extent of the powers and liabilities of corporations created under -its laws, the decision is conclusive on the national courts in all cases in which no question of general or commercial law and no question of right under the Constitution of the United States is involved. See 92 Fed. Rep. 124; Claybome v. Brooks, 111 U. S. 400; Detroit v: Osborne, 135 U- S. 499; Gilman v. Sheboygan, 2 Black, 510; L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 183 U. S. 508; Connell v. Utica E. R. R. Co., 13 ^FeR Rep. 241; C. & 0. Ry. Co: v. Dixon, 179 U. S. 131; Southern Ry. Co. v. Carson, 194 U. S. 136; Alabama G. S. R. Co. v; Thompson, 200 U. S. 206; Cin., N. O. & T. P. R. R. Co. v. Bohon, 200 U. S. 221.
In case of a misjoinder, a plaintiff’s motive in joining a party as defendant can-be questioned only when by legislative act or judicial decision it is the settled law of the State in which the action is brought that the defendant, alleged to be joined as a sham and a fraud, is not liable; and no such question can arise where the law of the State by .judicial decision or legislative act fixes the liability of such defendant. Cases supra, and Person v. 7. C. B. B. Co., 118 Fed. Rep. 342.
The action for death is regulated by the Kentucky constitution and statute. Const. Ky., §241; Ky. Stat., § 6. And' the liability of a railroad corporation that leases its track- is regulated by the Kentucky constitution, § 203, which forbids the shifting of that liability from the lessor to the lessee.
Independent of the constitutional provision the corporation owning the road and having received a charter from the State is under certain public duties that even a duly authorized lease will not shift or change, and the owner cannot ' divest itself of those public duties. Brooker v. M. & B. S. B. B. Co., 119 Kentucky, 137; McCabe v. M. & B. 8. B. R.'Co., 112 Kentucky, 861; Sioice v. M.,& B. 8. B. B. Co., 116 Kentucky, 253; Howard v. M. & B. S. B. B. Co.,.70 S. W. Rep. 631; Davis v. C. & 0. By. Co., 75 S. W. Rep. 227; Clinger v. M. & ' B. S. B. B. Co., 109 S. W. Rep. 317.
While the lessor may not be liable to the servant of the lessee for an injury caused by the negligent act or omission of the lessee as to some duty growing out of the mere relationship of master and servant, the lessor is liable for an injury to any member of the public, including the servant of the lessee, who may be injured by a negligent act or omission as to a public duty, such as a failure to keep its roadbed or track, cattle guards, fences, or station houses in a reasonably safe condition. Swice v. M. & B. 8. By. Co., 116 Kentucky, 253; Nugent v. Boston Bailroad Co., 80 Maine, 62; Curl v. Bailroad, 28 Kansas, 622; Arrowsmith v. Bailroad, 57 Fed. Rep. 165; Lee v. 8. P. B. B. Co., 116 California, 97.
■ To sue all three of the defendants for damages resulting from-the negligent acts charged in the petition of plaintiff, is allowable under the Kentucky practice, and all were jointly bound or liable. Pugh v. C. & 0. By. Co., 101 Kentucky, 77; Rutherford v. I. C. R. R. Co., 27 Ky. L. R. 397; Jones. v. I. C. R. R. Co., 26 Ky. L. R. 31; I. C. R. R. Co. v. Coley, 28 Ky. L. R. 336; Cent. Pass. Ry. Co. v. Kuhn, 86 Kentucky, 578; Hawkins v. Riley, 17 B. Mon. 10 T; C. & O. R. R. Cq. v. Dixon, 179 U. S. 131.
Under the authorities supra, the construction given by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky to § 119 of the Kentucky Civil Code is conclusive; and no act of the legislature or authority for the lease is set forth in the petition for removal; and that being true, the lease, if such existed, is not shown by any allegation to have been authorized by law and should, therefore, be treated as void. Thomas v. West Jersey R. R. . Co., 101 U. S. 71; Railroad v. Winans, 17 How. 30.
Petition to remove after a trial on the merits comes too late. A peremptory instruction to find for any of the defendants was “ruling on the merits and not a ruling on the question of jurisdiction.” “The right to remove was not contingent on the aspect the case may have assumed .on the facts developed on the.merits of the issues tried.” Whitcomb v. Smithson, 175 U. S. 635: Kansas City Suburban Belt Ry. v. Herman, 187 U. S. 63.
Therefore, not only does the petition of the- plaintiff allege facts that would constitute a joint cause of action against all of the defendants, as held by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, but as stated by the opinion of that court in this case, “the testimony showed without much contradiction” the truth of plaintiff’s allegations as to the miserably defective and dangerous. condition of this track and thus absolutely fixed the liability of both the lessee and the lessor for the death of the plaintiff’s intestate which was caused thereby, — . and the effort to avoid this Conclusion- by claiming the striking of the stray mule by the engine was the proximaté cause, only makes matters worse for the corporations, because their actionable negligence in violating §1793, Kentucky statute, as to a cattle guard at that place, caused the collision with the mule.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Holmes
delivered the opinion of the court,.
This is a writ of error to reverse a judgment rendered by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky in favor'of the defendant in error, notwithstanding a petition and bond for removal to the Circuit Court of the United States. I. C. Ry. Co. v. Sheegog's Admr., 126 Kentucky, 252.
The defendant in error brought this actijon for causing the'{ death of his intestate, John E. Sheegog, by the throwing off the track of a railroad train upon which th^ deceased was employed as an engineer. The defendants were the conductor of the train, the Illinois Central Railroad' Company, which was operating the railroad and owned the train, and the Chicago, St. Louis and New Orleans Railroad Company, which owned the road and tracks where the accident happened, but, which had let the same to the first-mentioned road.; It was alleged that through the negligence of both companies the roadbed, track, etc., were in an improper condition; that through the negligence of the Illinois. Central the engine and cars were in an improper condition; and that the death was due to these causes acting jointly, the negligence of the Illinois Central in permitting its engine, cars and road to be operated while in such condition, and the negligence of the conductor in ordering and directing the management of the 'train.
In due season the Illinois Central Railroad Company, being an Illinois corporation, filed its petition to remove. The difficulty in its way was that the other two defendants were citizens and residents of Kentucky, to which State the plaintiff also belonged. To meet this the petition alleged that the . plaintiff had joined these parties as defendants solely for thej purpose of preventing the removal. It admitted the léase and averred that the Illinois Central Company operatéd the road exclusively and alone employed the deceased. It went on to allege that the charge of joint negligence against the lessor and lessee in causing the wreck as stated was made only for the above purpose and was fraudulent and knowingly false.' The question is whether these allegations were sufficient to entitle the petitioner to have its 'Suit tried in the Federal court. It may be mentioned.here that the jury found for the other two defendants and against the Illinois Central Railroad Company, but that fact has no bearing upon the case., Whitcomb v. Smithson, 175 U. S. 635, 637.
Of course, if iti appears that the joinder was fraudulent as alleged, it will not be allowed to prevent the removal. Wecker v. National Enameling & Stamping Co., 204 U. S. 176. And further, there is no doubt that the allegations of fact, so far as material, in a petition to remove, if controverted, must be tried in the court of the United States, and therefore must be' taken to be true when they fall to be considered in the state courts. Crehore v. Ohio & Mississippi Ry. Co., 131 U. S. 240, 244. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. McCabe, 213 U. S. 207. On the other hand, the mere epithet fraudulent in a petition does not end the matter. In the case of a tort which gives rise to a joint and several liability the plaintiff has.an absolute right to elect, and to sue the tort-feasors jointly if he sees fit, no matter what his motive, and therefore an allegation that the joinder of one of the defendants was fraudulent, without other ground for the charge than that its only purpose was to prevent removal, would be bad on its face. Alabama Great Southern Ry. Co. v. Thompson, 200 U. S. 206. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Ry. Co. v. Bohon, 200 U. S. 221. If the-legal effect of the declaration in this case is that the Illinois Central Railroad Company was guilty of certain acts and omissions by reason of which a joint liability was imposed upon it and its lessor, the joinder could not be fraudulent in a legal sense on any ground except that the charge against the alleged immediate wrongdoer, the Illinois Central Railroad itself, was fraudulent arid false.
We assume- for the purposes of what we have to say, that the allegations concerning the lessor state.merely a conclusion of law from the acts and omissions charged against its lessee. Or, if they he taken to be allegations Of fact, we as sume, again merely for the purposes of decision, that they are effectively traversed by . the petition to remove. . The Kentucky Court of Appeals appears to us to have dischssed the case on this footing. Whether it did or not, the question .whether a joint liability of lessor and lessée would arise from •the ácts and omissions of the Illinois Central Railroad Company alone was a question of Kentucky law. for it to decide, 'and it appears to us to have decided it.
We should observe in the first place that the cause of action alleged is not helped but rather hindered by the allegation that the deceased was an employé of the Illinois Central Road. The case did not stand on the' breach of any duty owed peculiarly to employés, and on the other hand was encumbered with the fact that a part of.the negligence charged was that of a. fellow-servant. The plaintiff recovered for a. breach of a duty to the public which at best was not Released or limited by his intestate's having been in the company's service. Now whether we agree with it or not the doctrine is familiar that in the absence of statute a railroad company cannot get rid of the liabilities attached to the exercise of its franchise, by making a lease. Whatever may be the law as to purely contract relations, to some extent at least the duties of the lessor to the public, including that part of the public that travels on the railroad, are held to remain unchanged. In this case the Court of Appeals, after noting that it does not appear that the lessor was relieved by statute, quotes an earlier Kentucky decision which seemingly adopted the following language of a commentator: "If it be true, as the decisions with substantial unanimity admit, that a lessor railway remains liable for the discharge of its duties to the public unless expressly exempted therefrom by statute, it seems difficult to conceive its absence of liability in any event, except perhaps when the plaintiff is suing upon an express contract made with him by the lessee corporation." McCabe v. Maysville & Big Sandy R. R. Co., 112 Kentucky, 861, 875.
The court, however, then goes on to refer to a distinction' taken in a later Kentucky case between torts, arising from negligent operation and those resulting from the omission of such duties as the proper construction and maintenance of the road, Swice v. Maysville & Big Sandy Ry. Co., 116 Kentucky, 253, and quotes, with seeming approval, decisions in other States limiting the liability of the lessor to the' latter class. But it then proceeds to show that the recovery in this case is upon a breach of a duty to the public, and that according to the declaration and the verdict the injury was due, in part, at least, to the defective condition of the road. It ends by saying (p. 278): "The appellee not only had reasonable grounds to believe that the resident corporation was responsible to him, but he had actual grounds to believe it." We understand the words 'actual grounds' to mean that the belief was correct on the- allegations and findings according to Kentucky law. So that, whatever may be .the precise line drawn by that court hereafter, it stands decided that in Kentucky the facts alleged and proved against, the Illinois Central Railroad in this case made its lessor jointly liable as matter of law. This decision we are bound to respect.
It follows, if our interpretation of the decision is correct, that no allegations were necessary concerning the Chicago, St. Louis and New Orleans Railroad Company, except that it owned and had let the road to its co-defendant. The joint liability arising from the fault of the Illinois Central Road gave the plaintiff an absolute option to sue both if he preferred, and no motive could make his choice a fraud. The only way in which fraud could be made out would be by establishing that the allegation of a cause of action against the. Illinois Central Railroad was fraudulent, or at least any part of it for which its lessor possibly could be held. But it seems to us that to allow that to be doné on such a petition as is before us would be going too far in an effort to counteract evasions "of Federal jurisdiction.' We have assumed, for purposes of decision, that the railroad held on what may be called a secondary ground is to be charged, if at all, only as a .consequence of the liability of its lessee. But when we come to the principal and necessary defendant, a man is not to be prevented from trying his case before that tribunal that has sole jurisdiction if his declaration is true by a mere allegation that it is fraudulent and false. The jury alone can determine that issue unless something, more appears than a naked denial. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Wangelin, 132 U. S. 599, 603. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Dixon, 179 U. S. 131, 138. However, the petition for removal hardly raises this point. For it directs itself wholly against the allegations of joint negligence, and does not attempt to anticipate the trial On the merits so far as the conduct of the Illinois Central is concerned.
Judgment affirmed.