Case Name: STATE HEALTH PLANNING AND COORDINATING COUNCIL, APPELLANT, v. WILLIAM F. HYLAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY AND THE HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION BOARD, RESPONDENTS
Court: New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1978-08-04
Citations: 161 N.J. Super. 468
Docket Number: 
Parties: STATE HEALTH PLANNING AND COORDINATING COUNCIL, APPELLANT, v. WILLIAM F. HYLAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY AND THE HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION BOARD, RESPONDENTS.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Superior Court Reports
Volume: 161
Pages: 468–482

Head Matter:
STATE HEALTH PLANNING AND COORDINATING COUNCIL, APPELLANT, v. WILLIAM F. HYLAND, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY AND THE HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION BOARD, RESPONDENTS.
Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division
Argued May 30, 1978
Decided August 4, 1978.
Eritz, P. J. A. D., concurred and filed opinion.
Gaulkin, J. S. C. (temporarily assigned), dissented and filed opinion.
Before Judges Fritz, Ard and Gaulkin.
Mr. Edward H. Tetelman argued the cause for the appellant.
Mr. Frederick 8. Title, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for the respondents (Mr. John J. Degnan, Attorney General, attorney; Mr. Stephen Skillman, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel).

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Ard, J. A. D.
This is an appeal by the State Health Planning and Coordinating Council (Council) from a decision of the Attorney General denying the Council legal representation at a hearing before the Health Care Administration Board.
Established by state law, the Council is responsible for coordinating the health planning activities throughout the State, and its duties include assessing whether proposed medical facilities meet statewide standards to deliver health care services. As part of its coordination responsibility it reviews all certificate of need applications by hospitals and like institutions. The aforesaid certificate of need process requires that applications for construction of new health services by health care facilities be filed with the Department of Health. N. J. S. A. 26:211-6; N. J. A. C. 8:33-1.3. The Council reviews the application in light of statutory criteria to determine if it meets statewide needs and standards. Its determination to approve or deny the project is communicated to the Commissioner of Health. The Commissioner may approve or deny the application, but if a determination .is made contrary to the Council's recommendation, the Council and the applicant have a right to a fair hearing pursuant to N. J. S. A. 26:2H-9. This hearing is held before a hearing examiner of the Health Care Administration Board.
The Council in the normal course of its business was considering applications of Cooper Medical Center (Cooper) and Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital (Lourdes) for a certificate of need with respect to the establishment of Perinatal Level III facilities. The Commissioner of Health, prior to a recommendation by Council, announced informal approval of the Lourdes' application for a certificate of need. The Council, after several months of debate and discussion, voted to recommend the issuance of a certificate of need to Cooper. This resolution had been preceded by the same recommendation from the local Health Systems Ag' ncy. The Commissioner then announced that she was overturning the Council's recommendation and granted conditional approval to Lourdes. The Council then applied for a "fair hearing" pursuant to N. J. S. A. 26:2H—9.
In a separate action Cooper moved for leave to appeal to this Court. Pursuant to R. 2:11—2 the court granted leave to appeal and determined the appeal on the papers submitted on the motion and oral argument. We vacated the decision of the State Commissioner of Health granting a certificate of need to Our Lady of Lourdes because of the Commissioner's failure to grant the applicants a fair hearing in accordance with N. J. S. A. 26:2H-9. The applications were remanded to the Department of Health for a hearing pursuant to the aforementioned statute.
In preparation for the hearing the Council requested the Attorney General to appoint an attorney to represent it at the hearing. The Council alleged it was entitled to such an appointment pursuant to N. J. S. A. 52:17A-4(e) and (g) or N. J. S. A. 52:17A-13. The Attorney General informed the Council that he could not represent it at the hearing since his office already represented the Commissioner. He also refused to appoint special counsel concluding that the Council's position on appeal was identical to Cooper's. The pertinent language contained in the letter is as follows:
It is not feasible for tbe office of the Attorney General to represent the Council on an appeal, since it is already representing the position of tbe Commissioner of Health at that hearing and ultimately may be called upon to advise tbe Health Care Administration Board. Therefore, any legal representation of the Council would have to be by the appointment of Special Counsel pursuant to N. J. S. A. 52:17A-13 with my approval and that of the Governor.
I have concluded that this would not be an appropriate occasion for the appointment of Special Counsel. Cooper Medical Center has taken its own appeal to the Health Care Administration Board and it appears that it will argue tbe same position before the HCAB as that of the Council. Therefore, it would not seem appropriate to retain a second attorney at public expense to argue precisely the same position as will be argued anyway by the attorney for Cooper Medical Center. Rather, it is our opinion that the interests of the Council in conveying its views to the HCAB can be adequately served by the preparation of written comments regarding the Council's own recommendations and the contrary decision of the Commissioner.
The Council took exception to this and wrote to him protesting the decision. Through its chairman, the Council stated, among other things:
In order to effectively perfect our appeal, the SHPCC [Council] must be represented by counsel. However, as the Attorney General's Office cannot represent the SHPCC because they already represent the Commissioner, it is clear that the SHPCC must have independent counsel.
It is of no consequence that Cooper Medical Center may have a similar position to the SHPCC. The SHPCC may ultimately take a different position in this matter and in terms of presenting our point of view, the SHPCC has the right to appeal under the law and is exercising it.
Thereafter, the Council was advised that the Attorney General felt his original determination appropriate. The hearing has been stayed pending this appeal.
Before us the appellant alleges: (1) the Council requires legal representation to meaningfully present its position at the mandated hearing; (2) the Attorney General's discretion is limited by the common sense interpretation of N. J. S. A. 26:211-9, and (3) the appeal is not interlocutory.
Initially, we do not believe that an application for leave to appeal pursuant to R. 2:5-6 (a) is necessary. We conceive this case to be a review of the final decision of a state officer and consequently is before us as of right. R. 2:2-3 (a) (2).
The statutes upon which the Council relies are N. J. S. A. 52:17A-4(e) and (g) as well as N. J. S. A. 52:17A-13. In pertinent part they provide:
N. J. S. A. 52:17A-4.
The powers and duties of the Division of Daw shall be the powers and duties now or hereafter conferred upon or required of the Attorney General, :
• *
e. Act as the sole legal adviser, attorney or counsel, notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, for all officers, departments, boards, bodies, commissions and instrumentalities of the State Government in all matters ' * and represent them in all proceedings or actions of any kind which may be brought for or against them in any court of this State;
# «¡P #
g. Attend generally to all legal matters in which the State or any officer, department, board, body, commission or instrumentality of the State Government is a party or in which its rights or interests are involved;
N. J. S. A. 52:17A-13.
No special counsel shall be employed for the State or for or by any officer, department, board, body, commission or instrumentality of the State Government except by authority of the Attorney-General, and then only with the approval of the Governor, and provided that appropriations have been made therefor, unless the matter be of such an emergency and shall be so declared by the Governor.
Unquestionably, the aforementioned statutes demonstrate the Council's eligibility, as a state board or body, to be represented by the Attorney General. However, eligibility does not constitute an affirmative duty on the part of the Attorney General to represent or supply the Council an attorney at public expense on request. Although the appellant fails to cite it, we deem N. J. S. A. 52:17A-12 to be of substantial significance. It clearly indicates the discretionary authority vested in the Attorney General. It states:
The Attorney-General may assign an assistant Attorney-General, a deputy Attorney-General or an assistant deputy Attorney-General to serve in any legal capacity in or for any officer, department, board, body, commission or instrumentality of the State Government on a part-time or full-time basis whenever, in the judgment of the Attorney-General, such assignment will contribute to the efficiency of the operation of such office, department, board, body, commission or instrumentality, .
While at first blush this statute may appear to provide only for the permanent or semi-permanent appointment of deputies either on a full-time or part-time basis to various arms of State Government, we are satisfied that it demonstrates an obvious legislative intent to invest broad discretion in the Attorney General in connection with any representation sought. The need for this discretion becomes obvious when one anticipates the chaos which would otherwise result if any officer, department, board, body, commission or instrumentality were able to command representation without boirnd, for any minor squabble in which it became involved.
The discretionary authority of the Attorney General in the statute is consistent with his common law powers. Our Supreme Court outlined the parameters of the Attorney General's functions in Alexander v. N. J. Power & Light Co., 21 N. J. 373 (1956), when it pointed out:
Under the common law of England, the Attorney-General was the chief law officer and adviser of the Crown upon whom devolved the management of its legal affairs and the prosecution of all suits, civil and criminal, in which the crown had an interest; and these functions and responsibilities, in the absence of constitutional limitations, appertain to the office of Attorney-General in New Jersey, as a part of our common-law inheritance, subject to enlargement or abridgement by the legislative authority. Wilentz v. Hendrickson, 133 N. J. Eq. 447 (Ch. 1943), Jayne, V. C., affirmed 135 N. J. Eq. 244 (E. & A. 1944). In equity, as at law, the Attorney-General has the right, save as provided otherwise by the lawmaker, to intervene by suit for the protection of the property of the sovereign or the interests of the public, where such are directly involved, [at 380; citations omitted]
N. J. S. A. 52:17A-12 neither enlarges nor abridges this common law discretionary power. This heritage was recently reaffirmed in Evans-Aristocral Industries, Inc. v. Newark, 75 N. J. 84 (1977).
The Attorney General's public role derives from the common law and, except as altered by the Legislature, his powers and duties as a governmental officer stem from the traditions of the common law. [at 94]
Although the appellant's brief alleges its position differs from the position of Cooper, the record reveals that the Council formally voted to endorse Cooper. Under these circumstances neither Council nor its attorney could properly take a different position at the hearing. We cannot conclude that the Attorney General was unreasonable in deciding that his office could not properly represent both the Commissioner and Council without conflict. Additionally, his interest in minimizing public expense was a legitimate concern. Moreover, there was a reasonable basis for his determination that the interest of Council, Cooper and the local Health Systems Agency coincided in such a fashion that Council would not be denied a fair hearing notwithstanding being without an attorney. We also see no reason why individual members of Council may not appear and testify at the hearing in addition to the written comments suggested in the letter of the Attorney General. We are satisfied there is no abuse of discretion in the Attorney General's failure to employ special counsel pursuant to N. J. S. A. 52:17A-13. Cf. Secretary of Admin. & Fin. v. Attorney General, 367 Mass. 154, 326 N. E. 2d 334 (Sup. Jud. Ct. 1975); Delaney v. Penza, 151 N. J. Super. 455 (App. Div. 1977); Edmond v. Public Advocate Dept., 137 N. J. Super. 82 (App. Div. 1975).
Although the Attorney General argues that his common law powers in this area are absolute and may not be challenged by other state officials in the courts, we need not meet this issue as we are satisfied that the appellant has, in any event, failed to demonstrate that the Attorney General's decision is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. To recapitulate, we are satisfied that his decision not to appoint counsel must be upheld -for the following reasons:
(1) N. J. S. A. 52:17A-12 represents a statutory grant by the Legislature giving him discretion in appointing representation;
(2) Cooper, which has retained counsel, is espousing the same point of view as Council;
(3) Council may not only present documentary evidence at the hearing, but any individual member of Council may be heard.
We conclude that in the circumstance of the community of interest of the Council and Cooper there is no duty to appoint an attorney or special attorney to represent the Council, and the refusal of the Attorney General to appoint same was not arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.
The appeal is dismissed.
A Level III Perinatal Center is designed to handle high risk or complicated maternity problems as well as normal births. Only one center is necessary in the Camden area, and both hospitals are competing for the single certificate.