Case Name: STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF, v. JOHN MAGUIRE, DEFENDANT
Court: New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1979-12-12
Citations: 176 N.J. Super. 164
Docket Number: 
Parties: STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF, v. JOHN MAGUIRE, DEFENDANT.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Superior Court Reports
Volume: 176
Pages: 164–174

Head Matter:
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF, v. JOHN MAGUIRE, DEFENDANT.
Superior Court of New Jersey Resentencing Panel
Decided December 12, 1979.
Before Judges MARZULLI, COLEMAN and YANOFF.
Carole M. Henderson, Deputy Attorney General for the State (John J. Degnan, Attorney General, attorney).
James K. Smith, Jr., Assistant Deputy Public Defender for defendant (Stanley C. Van Ness, Public Defender, attorney). The opinion of the court was delivered by

Opinion:
MARZULLI, J. S. C.
On December 16, 1975 defendant was found guilty of felony murder. Immediately thereafter a sentence of life in prison was imposed. He is presently serving that sentence.
Defendant brings this motion for resentencing under the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice, N.J.S.A. 2C:1-1 d(2). Defendant contends he has been sentenced to a maximum term of imprisonment for an offense committed prior to the effective date of the Code, which exceeds the maximum established by the Code for such offense. Defendant argues the maximum for murder under the Code is 30 years, although he admits under N.J.S.A. 2C:43 7, the extended term provision, a sentencing judge has discretion to impose a life sentence. Defendant correctly states that under Title 2A there was no such discretion, the court being compelled to impose a life sentence upon conviction of murder in the first degree. N.J.S.A. 2A:113-1, 113-4; State v. Funicello, 60 N.J. 60 (1972), cert. den. sub nom. New Jersey v. Presha, 408 U.S. 942, 92 S.Ct. 2849, 33 L.Ed.2d 766 (1976); State v. Corbitt, 74 N.J. 379 (1977), aff'd 439 U.S. 212,99 S.Ct. 492, 58 L.Ed.2A 466 (1978). Once defendant has been found guilty of murder in the first degree, the trial judge has no alternative except to "pronounce the prescribed, mandatory sentence of life imprisonment." A probation report should be prepared for the assistance of prison authorities. State v. Robinson, 139 N.J.Super. 58, 65 (App.Div.1976).
In endeavoring to determine whether this case qualifies for resentencing under the new Code, this court must decide whether the sentence defendant is serving is greater than the maximum established by the Code for such an offense. What is the meaning of the word "maximum" as it applies to murder under the Code?
N.J.S.A. 2C:ll-3 b provides:
Murder is a crime of the first degree but a person convicted of murder may, notwithstanding the provisions of 2C:44 1 f, be sentenced by the court (1) to a term of 30 years of which the person must serve 15 years before being eligible for parole, or (2) as in a crime of the first degree except that the maximum term for such a crime of the first degree shall be 30 years. Nothing contained in this subsection shall prohibit the court from imposing an extended term pursuant to 2C:43-7 for the crime of murder. [Emphasis supplied]
We note that a 30-year term is not mandatory, since even in murder cases sentence may be suspended. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-2 b.
N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7 a provides that the extended term for murder shall be for a specific term between 30 years and life. The extended term also is not mandatory and requires exercise of judicial discretion. Under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-6 e a defendant must be given notice and the court must state the grounds upon which it will rely to impose an extended term contemplated under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.
However, the Legislature recognized that murder was a unique offense because of its heinous nature. Therefore, it gave to the sentencing court greater latitude in imposing an extended term for murder by making the imposition of such an extended term discretionary with the trial judge, as opposed to satisfying the criteria set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3 as required in other cases.
Before comparing the maxima under Title 2A and Title 2C one must look to the underlying intent of the Code and to the consequences of any ruling made on the more than 100 life sentences which we will be required to review.
N.J.S.A. 2C:l-2, entitled "Purposes; Principles of Construction," provides in subsection b:
b. The general purposes of the provisions governing the sentencing of offenders are:
(1) To prevent and condemn the commission of offenses;
(2) To promote the correction and rehabilitation of offenders;
(3) To insure the public safety by preventing the commission of offenses through the deterrent influence of sentences imposed and the confinement of offenders when required in the interest of public protection;
(4) To safeguard offenders against excessive, disproportionate or arbitrary punishment ;
(5) To give fair warning of the nature of the sentences that may be imposed on conviction of an offense;
(6) To differentiate among offenders with a view to a just individualization in their treatment; and
(7) To advance the use of generally accepted scientific methods and knowledge in sentencing offenders. [Emphasis supplied]
N.J.S.A. 2C:1 2 c provides:
The provisions oí the code shall be construed according to the fair import of their terms but when the language is susceptible of differing constructions it shall be interpreted to further the general purposes stated in this section and the special purposes of the particular provision involved. The discretionary powers conferred by the code shall be exercised in accordance with the criteria stated in the code and, insofar as such criteria are not decisive, to further the general purposes stated in this section. [Emphasis supplied]
It is the court's responsibility to determine in each case whether the particular statute is clear and unambiguous. Cold Indian Springs Corp. v. Ocean Tp., 154 N.J.Super. 75, 94 (1977), aff'd 161 NJ.Super. 586 (App.Div.1978).
Chief Justice Weintraub, writing for the court in State v. Madden, 61 N.J. 377, 389 (1972), concerning the interpretation of murder (under N.J.S.A. 2A:113 1), stated:
We must enforce the legislative will if it is within constitutional limits whether we approve of the legislative intent or not. But it is our initial task to seek that intent, and to that end we must consider any history which may be of aid. Surely in so grave a matter as a capital offense, the Court ought to be certain that it does not read a statute to exceed the truly legislative objective.
Our task is simplified somewhat since all doubts as to meaning of a penal statute should be resolved in favor of the defendant. State v. Brenner, 132 N.J.L. 607, 611 (E.E.A.1945).
In determining the meaning of the word "maximum" as it applies to murder under the Code, one must be guided by the rules of statutory interpretation.
In Loboda v. Clark Tp., 40 N.J. 424 (1963), the court said:
. . words alone do not control; rather it is the internal sense of the law which controls. The intention comes from a general view of the whole expression rather than from the literal sense of the particular terms . The nature of the subject matter, the contextual setting and statutes in pari materia must all be viewed together in seeking the legislative intent. The import of a particular word or phrase is controlled accordingly. Isolated expressions cannot be invoked to defeat a reasonable construction, [at 435, 193 A.2d 97]
When a statute is ambiguous the court can resort to extrinsic aids in order to determine the legislative intent.
The Senate Judiciary Committee's statement to Senate Bill 738 on page one reads as follows:
By Judiciary Committee amendment, a provision of the code which would have permitted any person imprisoned on the effective date of the code, to move to have his sentence reviewed and to be sentenced as if he had been convicted under the code, was changed to permit such review only if the person was imprisoned for any offense decriminalized by the code or was sentenced to a maximum term of imprisonment which exceeds the maximum established by the code for such an offense. In either case, the imposition of a new sentence would be discretionary rather than mandatory. [Emphasis supplied]
Again, at page four it reads:
Murder, under the code, is a crime of the first degree; however, persons found guilty of murder may be sentenced up to 30 years imprisonment (the maximum for other first degree crimes is 20 years imprisonment) (See 2C:3-11 b.) The code also provides a special extended term of imprisonment between 30 years and a life sentence (See 2C:43-7(1)). [Emphasis supplied]
A reading of N.J.S.A. 2C:1-1 d(2) indicates the Legislature was referring to specific offenses when discussing the maximum penalties established by the Code.
By establishing extended terms under N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7 the Legislature permits a sentencing judge to impose an additional penalty upon a defendant who has been convicted of murder or a crime of the first, second or third degree, provided certain prerequisites have been satisfied. N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3, 2C:44-6. Thus, an extended term can be imposed upon a defendant only after conviction of a specific offense, and the additional criteria as provided in the Code have been met.
In State v. Spindel, 24 N.J. 395, 402 — 403 (1957), the court indicated the intent of the statute is also determined by the occasion and necessity of the law, the mischief felt and the remedy in view. The new law should be read in the light of the old law and the evils to be remedied. Union Cty. Park Comm'n v. Union Cty., 154 N.J.Super. 213, 223 (1976), aff'd 154 N.J.Super. 125 (App.Div.1977).
As a practical matter, defendants convicted under Title 2A provisions will serve in the same institutions as defendants convicted under Title 2C provisions. Problems of disparity will undoubtedly exist if the sentences served are unreasonably different. One cannot expect an incarcerated defendant to understand that he must serve a mandatory life sentence because the offense was committed at a specific time. It is reasonable to infer that the Legislature had this consideration in mind in the enactment of N.J.S.A. 2C:1-1 d(2).
The Legislature did not intend a life sentence be imposed in all murder cases; it permits such a sentence but structures judicial discretion to impose it.
The maximum sentence for "such an offense" is therefore to be distinguished from the maximum sentence permissible for murder. To argue otherwise ignores the legislative intent to apply the sentencing provisions retrospectively as well as prospectively. Taking into consideration the strong underlying purpose of the Code to diminish disparity between those sentenced for Title 2A offenses and those sentenced for Title 2C offenses, we conclude the maximum sentence for murder under the Code is 30 years. It may be argued that the parole provisions under Title 2C might be considered more stringent than under Title 2A, but one cannot argue that life imprisonment does not exceed the 30 years. Therefore, one must conclude that the extended term provision cannot be considered when determining the maximum sentence for "such an offense."
Defendant's application to be considered for resentencing is granted.
This is not intended to indicate that this defendant, or the more than 100 defendants who are similarly situated, will receive a different sentence from that which they are presently serving. What it does mean is that this court will be permitted to exercise its discretion to impose or not to impose a sentence in accordance with the criteria established under the new Code of Criminal Justice.
N.J.S.A. 2C:1-1 d(2): ". . for an offense committed prior to the effective date which exceeds the maximum established by the Code for such offense" [Emphasis supplied]