Case Name: Talvish S. REYNOLDS, individually, and Courtney Reynolds, Minor, and Brittany Reynolds, minor, by and through their Mother and Natural Guardian, Talvish S. Reynolds, Appellants v. COUNTY OF WILKINSON, STATE OF MISSISSIPPI, Appellee
Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2006-04-04
Citations: 936 So. 2d 395
Docket Number: No. 2004-CA-02282-COA
Parties: Talvish S. REYNOLDS, individually, and Courtney Reynolds, Minor, and Brittany Reynolds, minor, by and through their Mother and Natural Guardian, Talvish S. Reynolds, Appellants v. COUNTY OF WILKINSON, STATE OF MISSISSIPPI, Appellee.
Judges: KING, C.J., LEE, P.J., IRVING, CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, BARNES AND ROBERTS, JJ., CONCUR. ISHEE, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION, JOINED BY MYERS, P.J.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 936
Pages: 395–400

Head Matter:
Talvish S. REYNOLDS, individually, and Courtney Reynolds, Minor, and Brittany Reynolds, minor, by and through their Mother and Natural Guardian, Talvish S. Reynolds, Appellants v. COUNTY OF WILKINSON, STATE OF MISSISSIPPI, Appellee.
No. 2004-CA-02282-COA.
Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
April 4, 2006.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 15, 2006.
Lester Joseph Meng, attorney for appellants.
William Robert Allen, Robert 0. Allen, Brookhaven, attorneys for appellee.

Opinion:
SOUTHWICK, J.,
for the Court.
¶ 1. Talvish Reynolds filed suit against Wilkinson County for personal injuries received when her vehicle collided with a sheriffs vehicle. The trial court granted the county's motion for summary judgment. Reynolds appeals, alleging error in the trial court's interpretation of the county's immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. We conclude that the trial court properly interpreted that statute, find no disputes of material fact, and affirm.
¶2. In May 2002, Reynolds and her daughters were traveling east on Main Street in Woodville. Wilkinson County Deputy Sheriff Nathaniel Nelson was traveling in a county vehicle toward Main Street at this time, en route to a hardware store to have spare keys made for county gas pumps. Once he arrived at the intersection with Main Street, Deputy Nelson paused at the stop sign. The view to his left was blocked by a blue truck that was legally parked next to the curb on Main Street. Beginning a turn to the right, the deputy edged forward into the intersection to get a better view around the blue truck. As the deputy advanced, his car was struck by the vehicle driven by Reynolds. Reynolds and her daughters sustained injuries in the collision.
¶ 3. Reynolds brought a personal injury action against Wilkinson County on behalf of herself and her daughters. Reynolds later amended her complaint to allege reckless disregard of her safety by Deputy Nelson. The trial court granted the County's motion for summary judgment after finding that the County was entitled to immunity.
¶ 4. The parties agree that this suit is controlled by the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-1 through 11-46-23 (Rev. 2002). Those statutes provide immunity for the State and its political subdivisions such as Wilkinson County in certain defined circumstances. On appeal, Reynolds argues that the circuit court misapplied the statutes regarding immunity when police functions are involved and when reckless disregard for the safety of others has occurred. Reynolds also asserts that summary judgment should have been granted to her on liability, an argument that will be answered in our resolution of her first two issues.
ISSUE 1: Definition of "police protection"
¶ 5. Reynolds alleges that law enforcement personnel must be engaged in protective activities to be immune from tort liability. Since Deputy Nelson was driving to have keys made when this accident occurred, Reynolds alleges that there is no immunity.
¶ 6. The relevant statute provides that a governmental entity or employee is immune from suit as long as that person is "engaged in the performance or execution of duties or activities relating to police or fire protection...." Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46 — 9(l)(c) (Rev. 2002). This does not require that a law enforcement officer be then engaged in direct action to apprehend a criminal. Maintenance of a police vehicle has been held to constitute an activity "related to police . protection." McGrath v. City of Gautier, 794 So.2d 983, 986 (Miss.2001). The McGrath court reasoned under precedents that predated the Tort Claims Act that the relevant distinction revolved around "whether the municipality acted in a governmental or proprietary capacity." Id. The court held that under the Tort Claims Act, when "an injury is caused by a police vehicle, operated and maintained by the police department, liability will automatically be precluded because the maintenance of a police department is a governmental function, for which municipalities are exempt." Id. at 987.
¶ 7. The same reasoning applies to county-owned and operated law enforcement vehicles. Using a county sheriffs vehicle to drive to a location in order to procure keys for county gas pumps is as much of a governmental function as the vehicle maintenance discussed in McGrath.
ISSUE 2: Reckless disregard by Deputy Nelson
¶ 8. There is no immunity under the Tort Claims Act for a governmental employee if he "acted in reckless disregard of the safety and well-being of any person not engaged in criminal activity at the time of the injury." Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-9(l)(c) (Rev. 2002).
¶ 9. Reynolds asserts that Deputy Nelson acted with reckless disregard when: (1) he moved forward into the intersection when his view was obstructed; (2) he failed to have the legally parked truck removed with tow trucks to which he had access; (3) he failed to use sirens, lights, or a horn to alert other drivers to the fact that he was entering the intersection; and (4) he failed to use an alternate, less busy route where his view would not have been obstructed. Reckless disregard "usually is accompanied by a conscious indifference to consequences, amounting almost to a willingness that harm should follow." Maye v. Pearl River County, 758 So.2d 391, 394 (Miss.1999).
¶ 10. Specific uncontested facts should be highlighted here. The truck that ob- strueted Deputy Nelson's view to his left was legally parked. The deputy stopped at the intersection, saw nothing to his left, and drove slowly as he turned right onto the crossing street. The collision occurred almost immediately after the deputy began his turn.
¶ 11. In order to withstand a motion for summary judgment, the evidence presented by Reynolds must be able to support a finding that the officer was consciously indifferent to the consequences of his actions, "amounting almost to a willingness that harm should follow." Id. The only evidence was that the deputy encountered an intersection in which his view was obstructed, entered it slowly, but allowed his vehicle to move into the lane of crossing traffic without his being able yet to see that traffic. The actions or omissions alleged by Reynolds could not properly be found to constitute reckless disregard. Every time a law enforcement officer encounters circumstances that could usefully be corrected, there is not wanton disregard for the safety of others if the officer does not immediately take steps to ameliorate the risk. Calling a dispatcher about the hazard, or making note of it in some other way, or deciding even that the hazard is so temporary that there is nothing to be done, are all within the realm of possible actions. Doing nothing may at times be negligence, but failure to stop, park, and call for a tow truck or start directing traffic himself does not rise "almost to a willingness that harm should follow."
¶ 12. A somewhat similar fact situation arose in an earlier precedent of this Court in Kelley v. Grenada County, 859 So.2d 1049 (Miss.Ct.App.2003). There, the future plaintiff had finished at a gas station and was waiting to enter the adjacent highway. The lanes of the highway were divided solely by double solid yellow lines. As the plaintiff exited the station in order to cross over the highway and drive to her left, a pickup truck that had been proceeding on the same highway to the plaintiffs right was beginning to turn into the station. The plaintiff drove in front of the truck to cross the highway before turning left. At the same time, a deputy sheriff who had been driving the same direction as the pickup truck decided to avoid the slowing truck by crossing over the center double solid lines to steer around it. The deputy performed his maneuver around the left side of the pickup at the same time as the plaintiff was driving in front of the pickup. The resulting collision led to a suit against the county. Id. at 1051. We concluded that even though the deputy had failed "to anticipate that another vehicle might be pulling out from the blind spot in front of the truck in front of him, [his] decision to steer around that turning truck did not exhibit a wilful or wanton disregard for the safety of others. It showed negligence but not virtually a 'willingness that harm should follow.' " Id. at 1054.
¶ 13. Similarly in the present litigation, Deputy Nelson's decision to move forward into the lane of the crossing traffic was at worse a negligent failure to anticipate— i.e., to be conscious of the possibility and to drive in such a way as to protect against that eventuality — that there might be a vehicle in the blind spot beyond the parked truck. It does not constitute "reckless disregard."
¶ 14. The facts of what occurred in this accident are clear. There would be no purpose served by having the same facts shown at a trial. The circuit court was correct in entering a summary judgment for the County.
¶ 15. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WILKINSON COUNTY IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANTS.
KING, C.J., LEE, P.J., IRVING, CHANDLER, GRIFFIS, BARNES AND ROBERTS, JJ., CONCUR. ISHEE, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION, JOINED BY MYERS, P.J.