Case Name: Candis YOUNG v. Maria BARBERA
Court: Arkansas Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 2005-06-22
Citations: 92 Ark. App. 70
Docket Number: CA 04-1093
Parties: Candis YOUNG v. Maria BARBERA
Judges: Pittman, C.J., Gladwin, and Glover, JJ., agree.
Reporter: Arkansas Appellate Reports
Volume: 92
Pages: 70–79

Head Matter:
Candis YOUNG v. Maria BARBERA
CA 04-1093
211 S.W.3d 29
Court of Appeals of Arkansas
Opinion delivered June 22, 2005
Oscar Stilley, for appellant.
No response.

Opinion:
Larry D. Vaught, Judge.
Candis Young appeals the decision of the trial court — following the entry of a default judgment in her favor — awarding her only $4500 for past medical services after it determined that her medical bills for chiropractic care were excessive. We affirm.
Young filed a complaint alleging that she was physically attacked by Maria Barbera on October 29, 2002. Young asked the court to award her $35,000 in compensatory damages plus $15,000 in punitive damages. Young accused Barbera of assaulting her by punching and scratching her in the face, pulling fistfuls of hair out of her head, and violently jerking her head up and down and side to side while sitting on top of her. Because Barbera was larger in size, it took Young some time to escape. However, once she did, she promptly reported the incident to the police and sought medical attention from Dr. Philip Roberts, a chiropractor, the day after the incident. Young stated that she did not seek emergency-medical attention, nor did she consult a medical doctor. Dr. Roberts treated her for nine months, and his charges totaled $7135. Young testified that when she began seeing Dr. Roberts, she went three times a week. Young stated that after a couple of months, the visits were reduced to twice a week, then once a week, then once every other week, and so on until she was released.
Barbera filed an untimely pro se answer to Young's complaint. The court granted default judgment in favor of Young and held a hearing to determine her damages. Following that hearing, the court issued a final judgment awarding Young $4500 for medical costs, $2500 for pain and suffering, and $1000 in punitive damages. The court also awarded Young the costs associated with the lawsuit. The court found that the actual medical bills of $7135 were excessive — specifically in light of the fact that no expert witness was called at the hearing to testify regarding Young's medical needs — and declined to award her the full amount that she requested.
In civil cases where the trial judge, rather than a jury, sits as the trier of fact, the correct standard of review on appeal is not whether there is any substantial evidence to support the finding of the court, but whether the judge's findings were clearly erroneous or clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Schueck v. Burris, 330 Ark. 780, 957 S.W.2d 702 (1997). The trial judge, as fact-finder, is the sole evaluator of credibility and is free to believe or disbelieve the testimony of any witness. Id. at 786, 957 S.W.2d at 705.
The mere fact that a plaintiff has incurred medical expenses and the defendant has admitted liability does not automatically translate into a damage award equivalent to those expenses. Depew v. Jackson, 330 Ark. 733, 957 S.W.2d 177 (1997). A party seeking medical damages has the burden of proving the reasonableness and necessity for that party's medical expenses. Avery v. Ward, 326 Ark. 829, 934 S.W.2d 516 (1996). Whether the medical expenses were reasonable and necessary is a question of fact for the trier of fact. Blissett v. Frisby, 249 Ark. 235, 458 S.W.2d 735 (1970). While not controlling, evidence of expense incurred in good faith is some evidence that the charges were reasonable. Id. at 246, 458 S.W.2d at 742. However, evidence of expense incurred alone is not sufficient to show that medical-service charges were causally necessary. "Necessary" means causally related to the tortfeasor's negligence. Ponder v. Cartmell, 301 Ark. 409, 784 S.W.2d 758 (1990).
Expert medical testimony is not essential in every case to prove the reasonableness and necessity of medical expenses. Bell v. Stafford, 284 Ark. 196, 680 S.W.2d700 (1984). The testimony of the injured party alone, in some cases, can provide a sufficient foundation for the introduction of medical expenses incurred. Id. at 199, 680 S.W.2d at 702; see also Ark. Code Ann. § 16-46-107 (Repl. 1999). In Bell, our supreme court gave the following example:
if a litigant suffered a specific injury in an accident and was immediately taken to a hospital emergency room for treatment of only that specific injury the injured party's testimony would be sufficient to establish the necessity of the medical expense as a result of the accident. However, expert testimony would normally be required to prove the necessity of the expense when, as here, expenses for hospital tests were incurred many months after the accident, none of the physicians in attendance immediately after the accident referred the litigant either to the admitting doctor or to the hospital, and the expenses on their face do not appear to be related to the accident.
Bell, 284 Ark. at 199, 680 S.W.2d at 702-03.
Young relies on a statement in Ponder v. Cartmell, 301 Ark. 409, 784 S.W.2d 758 (1990), to support her argument that the trial court should not have been allowed to reduce her damages for medical treatment. In Ponder, our supreme court stated that "[i]f a plaintiff proves that her need to seek medical care was precipitated by the tortfeasor's negligence, then the expenses for the care she receives, whether or not the care is medically necessary, are recoverable." 301 Ark. at 412, 784 S.W.2d at 761. However, Ponder is clearly distinguishable from the present case. In Ponder, the court was ruling on issues of admissibility — whether the defendant in the case should have been allowed to introduce expert testimony that plaintiffs doctor had misdiagnosed the plaintiff and conducted an unnecessary surgery. Both the plaintiff and defendant in Ponder presented testimony of expert witnesses at trial, and the definitive issue was not whether the plaintiff had met her burden of proving her medical bills were reasonable and necessary to the trier of fact, but whether the defendant's doctor could second guess the plaintiff s doctor regarding treatment. On appeal, the plaintiff in Ponder was not arguing that the amount of damages awarded was insufficient because she had proven she was entitled to more, but rather, that the amount awarded was insufficient because the court had improperly admitted testimony affecting the necessity of a specific course of treatment.
In the present case, the trial court did not deny the admissibility of Young's medical damages — to the contrary, the judge allowed Young to testify regarding her medical treatment and submit her chiropractic bills into evidence. The issue in our case involves the province of the fact-finder to weigh the evidence and ascertain whether Young sustained her burden of proving damages, and we must decide whether the trial judge clearly erred in determining that Young was not entitled to the all the medical damages she sought.
Here, the trial judge was charged with weighing the evidence presented by Young. He was in the best position to observe Young, hear her testimony, and evaluate her credibility. In its order awarding damages, the court specifically found that Young's medical bills were excessive in light of the fact that she presented no expert witness to testify regarding what was medically required to treat her injuries. It was Young's burden to prove that her compensatory damages were reasonable and necessary, and the only evidence she presented was her own self-serving testimony and an invoice from her chiropractor in the amount of $7135. She admitted at trial that she did not seek emergency-medical attention after the assault and, in fact, never sought the care of a medical doctor. Additionally, based on the invoice of Dr. Roberts's charges that Young submitted, she visited the chiropractor at least once every five days for three months after the incident — excluding the week of Christmas, when the time between visits was extended to seven days. In the following months, she saw Dr. Roberts four times in February, four times in March, three times in April, three times in May, twice in June, and a final visit in July. Based on the evidence presented at trial, the judge's finding that the chiropractor's bill was excessive without some expert testimony that the treatment was medically necessary and reasonable in light of Young's injuries and his subsequent damage award were not clearly erroneous, and we affirm.
Affirmed.
Pittman, C.J., Gladwin, and Glover, JJ., agree.
Bird and Baker, JJ., dissent.
Young filed a motion to amend the judgment pursuant to Rule 52(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure a few days after the judgment was entered and attached an affidavit from Dr. Roberts regarding the necessity ofYoung's chiropractic treatment. The trial judge entered an order denying the motion because the court could not consider evidence not submitted at trial.
Taken on its face, such a statement could be interpreted to mean that once a plaintiff shows she was injured by a tortfeasor and sought medical attention, the tortfeasor is responsible for all medical bills regardless of the reasonableness and necessity of those charges.
In our view, although the statement establishes that all such medical costs are recoverable, it does not definitively conclude that the fact-finder is required to award that amount as damages. If it did indeed establish such precedent, then there would be no purpose in holding a hearing on damages once liability had been established. Rather, plaintiffi would be awarded whatever amount of compensatory damages prayed for and there would be no requirement that a jury deliberate on the amount.