Case Name: The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Costandino Argyris, Appellant; The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. John A. DiSalvo, Appellant; The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Eric R. Johnson, Appellant
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 2014-11-25
Citations: 24 N.Y.3d 1138
Docket Number: 
Parties: The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Costandino Argyris, Appellant. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v John A. DiSalvo, Appellant. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Eric R. Johnson, Appellant.
Judges: Judges Graffeo, Smith, Pigott and Abdus-Salaam concur; Judge Smith in a separate concurring opinion in which Judge Pigott concurs and Judge Abdus-Salaam in a separate concurring opinion in which Judge Graffeo concurs; Judge Read dissents in an opinion; Judge Rivera dissents in a separate opinion in which Chief Judge Lippman concurs.
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 24
Pages: 1138–1185

Head Matter:
[27 NE3d 425, 3 NYS3d 711]
The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Costandino Argyris, Appellant. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v John A. DiSalvo, Appellant. The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Eric R. Johnson, Appellant.
Argued October 21, 2014;
decided November 25, 2014
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
Steven R. Kartagener, New York City, for appellants in the first and second above-entitled actions.
Fiandach & Fiandach, Rochester (Edward L. Fiandach of counsel), for appellant in the third above-entitled action.
Barket, Marion, Epstein & Kearon, LLP, Garden City {Donna Aldea of counsel), and Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens {Robert J. Masters of counsel), for respondent in the first and second above-entitled actions.
R. Michael Tantillo, District Attorney, Canandaigua {Jeffrey L. Taylor and Robert C. Jeffries of counsel), for respondent in the third above-entitled action.

Opinion:
OPINION OF THE COURT
Memorandum.
In People v Argyris and People v DiSalvo, the orders of the Appellate Division should be affirmed. In People v Johnson, the order of County Court should be reversed, the suppression motion granted and the accusatory instrument dismissed.
Regardless of whether we apply a totality of the circumstances test or the Aguilar-Spinelli standard (see Spinelli v United States, 393 US 410 [1969]; Aguilar v Texas, 378 US 108 [1964]), there is record support for the lower courts' findings that the stops were lawful in People v Argyris and People v DiSalvo. The police had reasonable suspicion to stop defendants' vehicle based on the contents of a 911 call from an anonymous individual and the confirmatory observations of the police. Specifically, because sufficient information in the record supports the lower courts' determination that the tip was reliable under the totality of the circumstances, satisfied the two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test for the reliability of hearsay tips in this particular context and contained sufficient information about defendants' unlawful possession of a weapon to create reasonable suspicion, the lawfulness of the stop of defendants' vehicle is beyond further review. Furthermore, under these circumstances, the absence of predictive information in the tip was not fatal to its reliability (compare People v Moore, 6 NY3d 496, 499 [2006], with Navarette v California, 572 US —, —, 134 S Ct 1683, 1688-1692 [2014]). On this record, the lower courts did not err in concluding that the police's other actions were lawful (see People v Brnja, 50 NY2d 366, 372 [1980]).
In People v Johnson, whether evaluated in light of the totality of the circumstances or under the Aguilar-Spinelli framework, the reliability of the tip was not established. The caller's cursory allegation that the driver of the car was either sick or intoxicated, without more, did not supply the sheriff's deputy who stopped the car with reasonable suspicion that defendant was driving while intoxicated (see generally People v De Bour [La Pene], 40 NY2d 210, 225 [1976]; cf. Navarette, 572 US at —, 134 S Ct at 1690-1692). Although the deputy observed defendant commit a minor traffic infraction, this did not authorize the vehicle stop because he was outside his geographical jurisdiction at the time of the infraction (see CPL 140.10 [2] [a]), and defendant's actions in committing the violation did not elevate the deputy's suspicion sufficiently to justify the stop of defendant's car. The issue of whether suppression should be denied on the theory that the deputy's violation of the statutory limits on his jurisdiction does not warrant suppression is not before us.