Case Name: Lansing Becker, Respondent, v. Stephen Boon et al., Appellants
Court: New York Commission of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1874-09
Citations: 61 N.Y. 317
Docket Number: 
Parties: Lansing Becker, Respondent, v. Stephen Boon et al., Appellants.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 61
Pages: 317–332

Head Matter:
Lansing Becker, Respondent, v. Stephen Boon et al., Appellants.
(Submitted May 29, 1874;
decided September term, 1874.)
In order to make a tender before suit brought available, the defendant must pay the money into court and allege that fact in his answer.
An answer of tender omitting this allegation does not state facts sufficient to constitute a defence, and plaintiff may avail himself of the objection upon trial. He does not waive it by going to trial where other issues are presented by the answer. (Dwight and Gray, 00., dissenting.)
Sheriden v. Smith (3 Hill, 538) distinguished.
Payment to a referee upon trial before him is not payment into court; he is not the court for that purpose.
The sale by one of two copartners of all his interest in the firm assets to the other and the assumption by the latter of its liabilities confers upon the latter, by implication, all the usual powers of adjustment of claims, and, among others, that of disposing of them by arbitration. (Dwight, C.)
Where one partner enters into an agreement submitting a claim against the firm to arbitration the act may be ratified by the other partners, and if so ratified, the opposite party cannot raise the objection of want of power. (Dwight, 0.)
An award incomplete on its face may be supplemented by parol evidence, and the rule requiring an award to be certain only requires that the meaning of the parties can be ascertained certainly when all admissible • evidence is before the court. (Dwight, 0.)
When a portion of an award is void for uncertainty it does not vitiate the residue if, by striking out the defective portion, a substantial, definite and unobjectionable award remains. (Dwight, 0.)
An award was in these words: “ DueL. Becker (one of the parties), fifty-two and forty one-hundredths dollars and interest.” Held (Dwight, 0.), that the fair presumption was that the words “and interest” were intended as equivalent to “with interest;” but if not, they could be rejected and the residue of the award sustained.
Appeal from order of the General Term of the Supreme Court in the fourth judicial department, reversing a judgment in favor of defendants entered upon the report of a referee and granting a new trial.
The complaint in this action contained two counts; the first for an alleged balance due upon account from defendants, as copartners; the second setting forth an arbitration between the parties, and an award in favor of plaintiff for the sum of fifty-two dollars and forty cents, and one year’s interest. The answer contained: First. A general denial. Second. An arbitration and award substantially as set forth in the complaint, save as to the interest for one year, and also that the arbitration was between plaintiff and defendant Stephen Boon, who had bought out his partner and succeeded to his rights and interests, which award defendants alleged Boon was, and had been, at all times, ready to perform. Third. The same award was set up, with an allegation of a tender of the said sum of fifty-two dollars and forty cents, which plaintiff refused, upon 'the sole ground that the one year’s interest was not included. It was also alleged that defendant Boon has, at all times, been ready and willing to pay said sum, and to perform the award, but that plaintiff refused to accept or to perform the award on his part, and defendants asked judgment for the sum of thirty-two dollars, the alleged value of two steel plows which, by the award, plaintiff was to deliver to defendants. Plaintiff replied, denying each and every allegation of the answer constituting a counter-claim.
The referee found the submission to arbitration and the making of the award, as alleged in the answer, which award was in these terms :
“ Due L. Becker fifty-two and forty one-hundredths dollars and interest; due L. Becker one iron plow; due S. Boon two steel plows in storehouse. Fuller debt belongs to Boon.”
The referee also found that plaintiff accepted a verbal order for the iron plow; that Boon tendered his check, payable to plaintiff’s order, for the fifty-two dollars and forty cents, it being stated therein that it was in full of all accounts, which plaintiff refused to accept, upon the sole ground that it did not cover interest for a year; that said defendant informed plaintiff he could have the check at any time; that immediately on the commencement of the action it was delivered to defendant’s attorney; that it was not paid into court, nor was the money, but on the trial it was delivered to, and left with, the referee, in whose possession it still was. As matter of law he found that the award only called for fifty-two dollars and forty cents, and interest from date; that plaintiff, by putting his refusal on the ground that the amount was insufficient, waived all other objections to the tender and its sufficiency; that the fact that the tender was not paid into court when the answer was served was a mere irregularity, which plaintiff waived by receiving the answer without objection, and he directed judgment dismissing the complaint. In the judgment entered thereon was inserted a clause to the effect that plaintiff was entitled to receive the check. The General Term reversed the judgment, upon the ground that the award was void for uncertainty.
Levi H. Brown for the appellants.
The submission and award were valid. (Diedrich v. Pickley, 2 Hill, 271, and note; 2 Barb. Ch., 430, 437; 2 Cow., 638-650; 15 Wend., 99, 106, 108; 15 J. R., 197.) Plaintiff is estopped from denying the validity of the award, or that he is bound by it. (2 Hill, 75; 10 J. R., 143; 12 id., 300-305; 2 Kern., 9, 15, 16; 20 N. Y., 184-187; 1 Seld., 482; 17 id., 411, 420; 20 Barb., 481; 28 N. Y., 147; Burnside v. Whitney, 21 id., 148.) The award was binding on plaintiff and S. Boon, whether he knew the latter had, on dissolution, received assets and assumed to pay debts of S. Boon & Son or not. (Haugh v. Higham, 15 Barb., 524; Palmer v. Davis, 28 N. Y., 248; Smith v. Sweeney, 35 id., 291-295.) The tender of the check was a good tender. (2 Greenl. Ev., §§ 601, 605, and note; Holmes v. Holmes, 5 Seld., 528; Story on Con., 419, § 697; 3 Bonv. Inst., 16, note f, citing 8 D. P. C., 442; Huthings v. Munger, 41 N. Y., 155, 156, 158.) The referee correctly found that by the objection that interest was not paid, and the refusal on that ground, plaintiff waived all other objections. (8 M. & W., 298; 2 Exch., 14, 15, 16, and notes; Mitchell v. Cook, 29 Barb., 253; Black v. Smith, Peake, 88; Sands v. Graham, Gow., 121; Jones v. Arthur, 8 Dowl., 442; Wait’s L. and Pr., 1048-1052.) The practice only requires that the money should be paid into court, and does not require this fact to be stated in the answer. (Simpson v. French, 25 How., 464; Bklyn. Bk. v. Degraw, 23 Wend., 342; Hunter v. La Corte, 6 Cow., 728; Kortright v. Cady, 21 N. Y., 354, 355.) The verbal order on and acceptance by Lord, and plaintiff’s agreement to accept it, was a performance. (2 Pars. on Con., 195, 200, and note; Booth v. Smith, 3 Wend., 66-68; Story on Con., §82; Billings v. Vanderbeck, 23 Barb., 546-552; Tilton v. Olcott, 16 Barb., 598, 599; Coit v. Houston, 3 J. Cas., 243; Schermerhorn v. Vanderhyden, 1 J. R., 140; 2 Den., 60; Lawrence v. Fox 20 N. Y., 270; 33 id., 654, 655.)
Hammond & Whiting for the respondent.

Opinion:
Earl, C.
The plaintiff, in his complaint, among other things, claimed that defendants were indebted to him upon an award of arbitrators in the sum of fifty-two dollars and forty cents. The defendants, in their answer, set up the same award, and allege that on or about the 5th day of November, 1869, they tendered to plaintiff fifty-two dollars and forty cents, which he refused, solely upon the ground that he was entitled to interest thereon for' one year, and they further alleged that, from the making and delivery of the award, they had, at all times, been ready and willing to pay the sum awarded, and to comply with the award. There were no other allegations as to keeping the tender and readiness to pay the same, and no allegation or notice that the defendants had paid the same into court.
Upon the trial it was proved that the tender was made in a check for the amount upon a firm of bankers, payable to plaintiff's order, and that the only objection made by the plaintiff was the one set up in the answer. When defendants offered the check in evidence, the plaintiff objected to the same on the ground that it was immaterial and incompetent under the answer'; that there was no legal tender set up in the answer. The referee overruled the objection, and received and marked the check as an exhibit. The plaintiff requested the referee to find and decide that the answer of tender was without notice that the money was brought into court, and that no proof of tender could be given under it. The referee refused so to find or decide, and the plaintiff excepted. The referee found, as facts, that the check was tendered, and that plaintiff was informed that he could have it at any time; that this suit was commenced shortly afterward, when the check was delivered to defendants' attorneys; that the check was not paid into court when defendants' answer was served, nor the money therefor, but that on the trial of the action it was produced and delivered to the referee, in whose possession it remained when his report was made; and he found and decided, as matter of law, that the fact that the tender was not paid into court at the time the answer was served was a mere irregularity which plaintiff waived by receiving the answer without objection, and he ordered judgment in favor of the defendants. To these conclusions of law the plaintiff excepted. The judgment entered upon the report of the referee contained a clause that the plaintiff was entitled to receive and have delivery of the check referred to in the answer and in the referee's report.
These are all the facts to which, upon this appeal, it is important to call attention upon the question of the tender, and I am of opinion that the referee erred in reference' thereto. In order to make the tender effectual for any purpose, it was the duty of the defendants to pay the money into court, and allege that fact in their answer. (Graham's Practice, 249, 541; Tidd's Practice, 669; Brown v. Ferguson, 2 Denio, 196; Sheriden v. Smith, 2 Hill, 538; Simpson v. French, 25 How. Pr., 464.) This not having been done, all the authorities hold that the tender was a nullity. If we assume that this check could have been paid into court in the place of money, it was not done. Payment to the referee was not payment into court. He was not the court for the purpose of receiving the money tendered; but simply for the trial and decision of the action. Payment to an entire stranger, or the retention of the check by the defendants, would have been just as effectual. It does not appear, and was not found by the referee, that the check was delivered to him for the plaintiff. So far as appears it was delivered to him simply as proof in the action.
The object of payment into court is to place the money tendered where plaintiff will be sure to get it. It then becomes the plaintiff's money, and the defendants cannot dispute his right to it. If the te.nder be established, judgment goes against the plaintiff, and he takes the money tendered for his claim, and the defendants recover costs of the action. But what is the condition of the plaintiff here? He has been defeated in the action because the tender was made, and yet he has no means to enforce the recovery of the check in this action. The provision in the judgment that he shall receive the check cannot be enforced in case the referee has parted with it, or is unwilling to deliver it to the plaintiff, and before delivery to the plaintiff the drawers may withdraw their funds from the bankers, and the check may thus become entirely worthless.
It is said that the plaintiff waived the payment of the money into court by going to trial upon the answer. How did he do this ? The answer contained another defence besides tender, and hence the plaintiff was bound to receive the answer. He could not return it, nor treat it as a nullity. The answer of tender did not contain facts sufficient to constitute a defence, and of this objection plaintiff had the right to avail himself upon the trial, and such an objection is never, under our present system of practice, waived by going to trial.
The ease of Sheriden v. Smith (supra) is cited as authority to sustain the claim of waiver. In that case there was a plea of payment and of tender, but no allegation of payment into court, and the plaintiff filed a replication, to the plea of tender, thus taking issue thereon. Judge Helsok says, that by this act on his part the plaintiff waived the defect in the plea and payment of money into court, and he held under Buch a state of things that payment of money into court at the trial was sufficient. But in this case the plaintiff did nothing to recognize the validity of the answer of tender. He did no act upon which a waiver could be predicated. He objected to the sufficiency of the tender at the first opportunity when he was legally called upon to do so, and there is the further difference here that the tender was not paid into court. Hence, I am of opinion that the case of Sheriden v. Smith is not an authority for defendants' claim in this case.
Without, therefore, examining other alleged errors of the referee, I am of opinion that his judgment was properly reversed, and that the order of General Term should be affirmed, and judgment absolute ordered against the defendants, with costs.