Case Name: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Kirk KELLY, Winston George Hylton, and Adolph Washington Folkes, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2001-07-25
Citations: 790 So. 2d 563
Docket Number: No. 3D00-1599
Parties: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Kirk KELLY, Winston George Hylton, and Adolph Washington Folkes, Appellees.
Judges: Before GREEN, SORONDO, and RAMIREZ, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 790
Pages: 563–570

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Kirk KELLY, Winston George Hylton, and Adolph Washington Folkes, Appellees.
No. 3D00-1599.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
July 25, 2001.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General and Douglas J. Glaid, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.
Joel Defabio, Coral Gables; Peter D. Aiken (Ft.Lauderdale), for appellee.
Before GREEN, SORONDO, and RAMIREZ, JJ.

Opinion:
GREEN, J.
The State of Florida appeals an order suppressing evidence and statements ob tained as a result of a stop of the appel-lees' vehicle based upon information provided to police by an anonymous tipster. The trial court concluded that based upon the recent decision of Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 120 S.Ct. 1375, 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000), the police officers' stop of the ap-pellees' vehicle predicated upon the anonymous tip was unjustified. We completely agree and affirm the order under review.
The facts adduced at the suppression hearing below are simple and uncontra-dicted. Officer Luis Pelosi of the Miami-Dade Police Department testified that he received an anonymous telephone tip that a 'home invasion robbery was being planned by three black males. The only information provided by the tipster was an address where three armed black males would be getting into a gray Acura with tinted windows. Pelosi received two additional calls from the same tipster, each repeating the same information. Thereafter, Pelosi notified the robbery division. At trial, Officer Pelosi admitted that the anonymous tipster did not (1) state the source of his/her information; (2) provide the names of the men or a description of their clothing; nor (3) provide the name of the victim(s) and/or the location of the intended crime.
Detective Joseph Nagy of the robbery division testified that he received the information regarding the tip from his supervisor. Based upon this tip, Detective Nagy immediately set up a police surveillance of the address provided. After a few minutes, three black men were seen exiting the home and getting into a dark-colored Acura parked in the driveway. The men did not have any unusual bulges in their clothing, nor did the police note any unlawful activity.
The detectives watched the men drive away in the Acura and followed them in unmarked cars. After they had traveled less than one-half block, the police stopped the Acura. The stop was not based upon the commission of any traffic infraction or criminal activity, but was grounded solely upon the anonymous tip. The car was searched and firearms were found. The three men were subsequently arrested for carrying concealed firearms and for conspiracy to commit an armed home invasion robbery.
The appellees filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the stop. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the motion in accordance with the United States Supreme Court's decision of Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 120 S.Ct. 1375, 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000). The trial court made the following findings which were completely supported by the record evidence:
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4. The anonymous tipster provided no indication or any basis to allege or believe that this was inside information, there were no names, no addresses of the potential robbery site, no physical description or clothing [description] of the perceived assailants or perceived perpetrators.
5. There are no predictive factors in the record before this Court which would bring this case under the holding of Alabama v. White, such as a specific description of the defendants, specific time and specific hotel or location where the defendants were to be driving.
6. Therefore, the officers' stop can only be predicated upon the anonymous tip and there being no independent corroboration or proof of any criminal activity other than that anonymous tip, and the current status of the case law, this court is persuaded that defendants' Motion to Suppress should be granted.
The state filed the instant appeal and argues that this case is distinguishable from J.L. We disagree.
In J.L., like the instant case, the police received a vague anonymous tip about the possibility of future criminal activity which the police were unable to sufficiently corroborate. Acting on no more than this tip, the police approached J.L. who was wearing a plaid shirt at the specified bus stop. They frisked him and discovered a gun. Prior to that time, the officers had not seen a firearm and J.L. and made no threatening or furtive movements. The trial court grantéd J.L.'s motion to suppress and this court reversed. State v. J.L., 689 So.2d 1116 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). The Florida Supreme Court quashed this court's decision, and the United States Supreme Court affirmed.
The United States Supreme Court found that the contents of the anonymous call had provided no predictive information and therefore left the police without any means to test the informant's knowledge and/or credibility. Since the tip lacked the moderate indicia of reliability necessary to constitutionally justify an investigative stop, the Court held that this anonymous tip, without independent police corroboration, was insufficient to justify a Terry investigatory stop. Id.
Similarly, in this case, the tipster provided no predictive information such as the time and place of the proposed home invasion robbery, which would have permitted the police to test the tipster's knowledge and/or credibility. Indeed, the only information that the police were able to corroborate in this case from the tip was that three black males got into an Acura Legend at a specified address. These innocent details, without more, are insufficient to justify a Terry stop of these individuals. Indeed, with regards to innocent detail tips, the Florida Supreme Court in J.L. instructed that "the independent police investigation would have to uncover something more than just a verification of innocent details." The police "must observe additional suspicious circumstances as a result of the independent investigation." See J.L. v. State, 727 So.2d at 207 citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301.
The state argues that the tip in this case is more analogous to the tip contained in White and in Campuzano v. State, 771 So.2d 1238 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). The state is wrong and its reliance upon these decisions is simply misplaced.
In White, the anonymous tipster was in a position to tell the police that a named female individual would be leaving a particular apartment at a particular time in a specified vehicle and that she would be headed for a specified destination (i.e., Dobey's Motel) carrying an ounce of cocaine in a brown attache case. The police immediately proceeded to the specified apartment building in the named complex and observed a woman leave that building and get into the described car. The police followed the vehicle as it drove along the most direct route to Dobey's Motel before effectuating a stop of the vehicle.
Not every detail of the tip in White was independently verified by the police (e.g., the name of the woman leaving the building or the precise apartment from which she left). The Court, however, attached particular significance to the tipster's abili ty to predict White's future behavior. Specifically, the Court found that:
[t]he general public would have had no way of knowing that respondent would shortly leave the building, get in the described car, and drive the most direct route to Dobey's Motel Because only a small number of people are generally privy to an individual's itinerary, it is reasonable for police to believe that a person with access to such information is likely to also have access to reliable information about that individual's illegal activities. When significant aspects of the caller's predictions were verified, there was reason to believe not only that the caller was honest but also that he was well informed at least well enough to justify the stop.
Id. at 332, 110 S.Ct. 2412 (emphasis added). Thus, the White Court found that the anonymous tip had been sufficiently corroborated and therefore furnished reasonable suspicion to justify an investigatory stop. White, 496 U.S. at 331, 110 S.Ct. 2412.
Notwithstanding the numerous details provided by the tipster in White, the Court dubbed the reliability of that anonymous tip to be a "close case." If White was deemed to be a close case, the case before us completely misses the mark. Here, the details provided by the tipster were scant and, as stated earlier, gave only innocent details. The innocent details provided in the tip in this case were in no way incriminating or indicative of criminal behavior that would justify police action.
Equally misplaced is the state's reliance upon the Campuzano decision. There, the police received an anonymous call specifically stating that Jose Campuzano would be executing a drug transaction at the Riverbridge Plaza at 11:00 that night. The caller further stated that Campuzano would be driving a white two-door 1984 Oldsmobile Cutlass with a blue vinyl top, that he would have 28 grams of cocaine in his pocket and that he would be meeting a white female and white male. Acting on this tip, three police officers set up a surveillance at the Riverbridge Plaza and just before 11:00 p.m. they observed a car matching the tipster's description. The police saw Campuzano, known to them from a previous arrest, exit the vehicle and speak to a white female and white male briefly. Campuzano then entered a restaurant at the plaza and was joined thereafter by the same white male and female. The officers approached the parties and asked them to stand. When Campuzano stood up, the police noticed a bulge in his right pants pocket. Concerned for their safety, one of the officers patted Campuza-no down and felt a hard bulge "with a powdery feel" in his right pants pocket. The officer pulled the object out of Campu-zano's pocket, which was found to be a plastic bag filled with cocaine.
In upholding the stop, the fourth district concluded that, like White, the facts of the anonymous tip were sufficiently corroborated by the police. Specifically, the court found that:
[t]he anonymous caller predicted Cam-puzano's whereabouts two hours after the call by specifying the time and location of the meeting. The tipster correctly identified the car Campuzano would be driving, called Campuzano by name, and identified the number, gender and race of the people he would be meeting. Also, the caller identified the location and amount of the drugs Campuzano would be carrying.
Campuzano 771 So.2d at 1242. Whereas the tipster in Campuzano • provided detailed information of criminal activity that was subsequently corroborated by the police, the tipster in this case provided scant details which, for the most part, were inno cent in nature. Consequently, the police were unable to independently corroborate any proposed criminal activity by the ap-pellees that would give probable cause to justify an investigatory stop. Pursuant to J.L., the trial court correctly granted the appellees' suppression motion.
Therefore, for all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order under review.
Affirmed.
RAMIREZ, J., concurs.
. J.L. v. State, 727 So.2d 204 (Fla. 1998).
. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 120 S.Ct. 1375, 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000).
.Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).