Case Name: QUALLS v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1914-03-11
Citations: 165 S.W. 202
Docket Number: 
Parties: QUALLS v. STATE.
Judges: PRENDERGAST, P. X, concurs. DAVIDSON, X, dissents.
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 165
Pages: 202–208

Head Matter:
QUALLS v. STATE.
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
March 11, 1914.)
1. Ceiminal Law (§ 829 ) — Instructions— Requests — Matters Covered by General Charge.
In a prosecution for abandonment after seduction and marriage, a requested instruction that, if the wife abandoned accused in Oklahoma, then his subsequent refusal to live with her in Texas was not an abandonment, was sufficiently covered by an instruction that accused should be acquitted if, after they were married, his wife abandoned him.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 2011; Dec. Dig. § 829. ]
2. Criminal Law (§ 815 ) — Evidence — Instructions.
Where evidence is admissible, a requested instruction excluding the jury from considering it for any purpose as against defendant is properly refused.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, . Cent. Dig. §§ 1922, 1986; Dec. Dig. § 815. ]
3. Husband and Wire (§ 313 ) — Abandonment — Evidence.
Where, in a prosecution for abandonment after seduction and marriage, defendant sought to show that his wife abandoned him in another state, and that he refused to live with her when she came to Texas, because he had been informed by his father that she had returned to Texas to send him to the penitentiary, all of which the wife denied or explained, evidence that defendant did not intend to live with his wife longer than the two years required by law is pertinent.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Husband and Wife, Cent. Dig. § 1110; Dec. Dig. § 313. ]
4. Criminal Law (§ 829 ) — Instructions— Requests.
An instruction, in a prosecution for abandonment after seduction and marriage, that, if defendant seduced prosecutrix,- and thereafter offered to marry her, but she refused to marry him, then accused would not be guilty, sufficiently covers a requested instruction that, if defendant seduced prosecutrix, and he, in good faith, after she was found to be pregnant, offered to marry her, and she refused, he should be acquitted.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 2011; Dec. Dig. § 829. ]
5. Husband and Wife (§ 313 ) — Abandonment— Evidence.
In a prosecution for abandonment after seduction and marriage, evidence that the prosecu- trix had been engaged to other men prior to the time she became engaged to defendant was not germane, where there was no proof offered as to criminal intimacy.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Husband and Wife, Cent. Dig. § 1110; Dec. Dig. § 313. ]
6. Criminal Law (§ 656 ) — Remark of Court —Weight of Evidence.
Where it is sought to compel a prosecutrix, in a prosecution for abandonment after seduction and marriage, to gives the names of her former fiancés, a remark of the court in admitting the evidence that he did not think it was serious, and the jury could weigh it for what it was worth, was not a comment on the evidence.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1524r-1533; 656. ] see Criminal Dec. Dig. §
7. Criminal Law (§ 361 ) — Explanation of Testimony.
In a prosecution for abandonment after seduction and marriage, in which it was shown on the issue of abandonment by the wife in another state that prosecutrix made a remark that she was going to Texas to get revenge and place her husband in the penitentiary, it was permissible to explain the remarks by evidence that they were retaliatory statements made after she had been told she would be paid money to release her husband, and that she had possession of a letter written by her husband expressing his joy at his freedom.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 802, 803; Dec. Dig. § 361. ]
Davidson, J., dissenting.
Appeal from District Court, Coryell County ; J. H. Arnold, Judge.
Tom Qualls was convicted of abandonment after seduction and marriage, and he appeals.
Affirmed.
See, also, 158 S. W. 539.
C. E. Lane, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep’r Indexes
For other oases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes

Opinion:
HARPER, J.
I cannot concur in the reversal of this case, but think the judgment should be affirmed.
The first error stated in the above opinion reversing the case is stated as follows: "It will be noted the court did not submit the issue that if defendant's wife abandoned him in Oklahoma that his subsequent refusal to live with her in Coryell county would entitle him to an acquittal." The court did instruct the jury: "Unless you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the offense of seduction upon Miss Olive Pierce, as alleged in the indictment, you will acquit him. If you find from the evidence that the defendant, Tom Qualls, had intercourse with Miss Olive Pierce, without a promise of marriage, if he did do so, or if the defendant seduced Olive Pierce, and thereafter offered to marry her, but that she refused to marry him, or if, after they were married, his wife abandoned him, or was guilty of excesses, cruel treatment, or outrages toward him of such a nature as to render their living together insupportable, or if you have a reasonable doubt thereof, you will acquit the defendant." (Italics ours.) It will be noticed that in this charge the court instructs the jury that, if Mrs. Qualls abandoned her husband, he should be acquitted, and was a sufficient presentation of that issue, and it was not necessary to give the special requested charge, for in the main charge of the court he had affirmatively submitted every defensive issue made by the testimony offered in behalf of appellant.
Neither do we think that the second special charge quoted in the opinion should have been given. It was either error to admit the testimony, or the charge was inapplicable, for it. instructs the jury it could not be considere^ for any purpose as against the defendant. If it could not be considered by the jury "even as a circumstance against him" on any phase of the case, it was improperly before them. In the opinion on the former appeal, we held this testimony admissible (Qualls v. State, 158 S. W. 539), and our reason for so doing was that Mrs. Qualls was testifying to a positive abandonment by appellant, and a refusal to live with her after a solicitation on her part to renew their relations as husband and wife. Appellant, by his testimony, was attempting to show that Mrs. Qualls abandoned him, and the reason of his refusal to renew the relations as husband and wife, when solicited by his wife to do so, was that he had been informed by his father that she had returned to Texas to send him to the penitentiary. He denied that, when he left her in Oklahoma and came back to Texas, he intended' to abandon his wife; he said he intended to return to her all the time until he got this information from his father, and he would have continued to live with her but for the fact his father had told him his wife had said that she had come back to Texas to send him to the penitentiary; introduced his father to prove that he had so -told his son, and his uncle B. L. Qualls to prove that his wife had said that she was returning to Texas for this purpose. His wife denied making such remark, saying the only remark she did make to B. L. Qualls was, when appellant's uncle R. L. Qualls told her that appellant did not intend to live with her any more, and he would give her $250 to release appellant, she became angry and said that she was going home to get "revenge." And then testified that, when her anger cooled, she had no desire to prosecute appellant, if he would continue to live with her as husband and wife, and that she wrote him a letter in which she requested a renewal of the relations with appellant as husband and wife. B. L. Qualls testified he offered her the $250 to release appellant, but says he did not tell her that appellant had then quit her, saying he only told her that Tom (appellant) would not live with her longer than the two years required by law anyway. Under such circumstances we think appellant's often expressed intention, before and after marry ing Ms wife, that he did not intend to live with her longer than the two years required by law (of which fact she was not made aware at the time she married him), was admissible in evidence as bearing on the fact, first, whether he or Mrs. Qualls, in fact, did the act of abandoning, and, secondly, on the issue of whether or not the statement of his father to him that she had come to Texas to send him to the penitentiary, was Ms sole reason for refusing to live with her after she came back to Texas, as claimed by him. And if the testimony was admissible on these issues, the court correctly refused the special charge that it could not be considered for any purpose, and the charge of the court in submitting the -issues is not subject to the criticism that "it authorized the jury to convict appellant, if they believed he intended to abandon his,wife after two years." Such an issue was not submitted to the jury, nor could the jury have been misled into any such misconception of the charge as given.
The contention in the opinion that the court should have given the special charge presenting the issue that, if appellant offered to marry her, she refused such offer, we cannot agree to for two reasons: First, the court, as shown above in the charge copied, did so instruct the jury. Secondly, while the court did submit that issue, we do not think such an issue is really raised by the testimony. While it is true appellant testified that, before Miss Pierce (now Mrs. Qualls) told him she was pregnant, he discovered the fact that she had missed her menstrual period by looking at her, and suggested as much to her, and also suggested they get married at once, but says .she denied she was pregnant, and said she was not ready to get married right then. However-, appellant also testified that shortly thereafter Miss Pierce came to him and told him she was pregnant, and insisted on him marrying her, and he refused to do so. Mrs. Qualls denies all, except that, when she first discovered she was pregnant, she suggested to appellant that they get married at once, and he refused, and, when she kept insisting, he stopped coming to see her, when the prosecution for seduction was begun. Take the testimony of appellant alone, and in its strongest light it was not a refusal to marry, but only a suggestion of delay, which in but a short time he admits she came to him and said she was now ready to marry him. This does not present a refusal to marry in the sense that would bar a prosecution for seduction. And, furthermore, he subsequently did marry her to secure a dismissal of the prosecution for seduction, and, having done so to obtain the dismissal of that case, he was then under legal obligation to carry out the obligations he assumed by such a course.
As to whether Mrs. Qualls had been engaged to other men prior to the time she became engaged to appellant was not germane to any issue in the case, as he did not > propose to follow it up with any proof that she had had carnal intercourse with such men, and the objections of the district attorney should have been sustained. However, as the court did admit the testimony at appellants suggestion, the fact that, in doing so, he remarked, "X don't regard the matter serious, I think it admissible, and the jury can give it such weight as they think it entitled to," presents no error. It is shown that by the bill state's counsel contended that it was inadmissible to compel Mrs. Qualls to give the names of the men to whom she had formerly been engaged, and said it might cause divorces, as some of the men had married. The court remarked he did not regard it as a serious matter, implying that it would not be likely to cause divorces, and such a remark would not be a comment on the weight of the testimony, for he followed it up by saying that the jury could give the fact that she had been engaged to other men such weight as they thought proper. Neither do we think that the bill indicates the district attorney was nervous about the matter — he had a right to make an objection to testimony he "thought inadmissible, and we think his objection should have been sustained, for it would be immaterial how many men she had been engaged to prior to the time she became engaged to appellant.
We also think it was permissible under the circumstances for Mrs. Qualls to explain how she came to make the remark she was going to Texas to "get revenge." Appellant elicited this fact on cross-examination of the witness; introduced other testimony to prove that she did make the remark for the purpose of showing that his wife had abandoned him, and he had not abandoned her. The explanation she gave was that she had just been informed that she would be paid $250 to release appellant from his marital vows, and further informed, at least, that he would live with her only two years at most, if she did not take the money and release him; that this angered her, and she made this remark under such exciting influences. Xt also further appears she had just gotten hold of a letter written by appellant to his brother Oleve wherein appellant had said, one of them being in Texas, and the other in Oklahoma, "he was just as close to his wife as he ever expected to be, and he felt like a bird out of a cage, and felt free, and was going to see some of the world." A wife, under such circumstances, would be calculated to get angry and make remarks, and, when appellant elicited such remarks as defensive matter, the occasion for them being made is certainly admissible. This, too, especially when it appears that she subsequently made overtures to appellant, and he declined them.
We have discussed only the matters discussed in the above opinion; however, we do not think any of the other matters present error, and are of the opinion the judgment should be affirmed.
PRENDERGAST, P. X, concurs. DAVIDSON, X, dissents.