Case Name: HINES, Director General of Railroads, v. WALKER
Court: Texas Courts of Civil Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1920-07-02
Citations: 225 S.W. 837
Docket Number: No. 9354
Parties: HINES, Director General of Railroads, v. WALKER.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 225
Pages: 837–843

Head Matter:
HINES, Director General of Railroads, v. WALKER.
(No. 9354.)
(Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Ft. Worth.
July 2, 1920.
On Motion for Rehearing, Nov. 20, 1920.)
1. Death <@=58 (2) — Adult child’s loss of support not presumed.
When a child reaches its majority, parent’s legal duty to support it ceases, and, in absence of proof, it cannot be presumed that such support will be continued so’as to justify recovery under the federal Employers’ Liability Act (U. S. Comp. St. §§ 8657-8665) for loss thereof through the parent’s death.
2. Death <©=>95(3) — Child’s damages under federal Employers’ Liability Act iimited to benefits expected during minority.
Under federal Employers’ Liability Act (U. S. Comp. St. §§ 8657-8665), damages recoverable by deceased’s children are restricted to the benefits they might have expected to receive during minority, unless proof is made of unusual facts showing that child might reasonably expect support after reaching majority.
3. Appeal and error <@=1064(1) — Too broad instruction on damages for death held prejudicial.
In action under federal Employers’ Liability Act (U. S. Comp. St. §§ 8657-8665), for death of a fireman, an instruction, which did not restrict the jury to benefits that might have been expected during minority of children, held prejudicial error, where it was not dear that the jury did not go beyond the limits authorized by law.
4. Death <@=67 — Probability of railroad em-ployé’s promotion admissible.
In an action under federal Employers’ Liability Act (U. S. Comp. St. §§ 8657-8665) for death of a fireman who had previously acted as locomotive engineer, evidence showing decedent’s probable chance of being again employed as engineer and the wages he would then receive is admissible.
5. Master and servant <@=270(9) — Evidence of other defects in railroad track admissible.
In action for death of- locomotive fireman caused by defects in a spur track, admitting proof of defects at other points than where the accident occurred, was not erroneous where it appeared the track was in the same condition throughout its entire length.
On Motion for Rehearing.
6. Appeal and error <@=719 (9) — Verdict unsupported constitutes fundamenta! error, reviewable without assignment of error.
A verdict under the federal Employers’ Liability Act (U. S. Comp. St. §§ 8657-8665), which awarded deceased’s children damages for expected benefits, not alleged in the pleadings, nor supported by the evidence, constitutes fundamental error, which may be considered, although the assignment of error presented a question of law, and did not complain that there was no evidence supporting the verdict.
Buck, J., dissenting.
Appeal from District Court, Callahan County ; Harry Tom King, Judge.
Action by Mrs. Nora Walker, administra-trix, against Walker D. Hines, Director General of Railroads. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.
Reversed and remanded.
Shropshire & Bankhead, of Weatherford, for. appellant.
Johnson, Edwards & Hughes, of Tyler, and J. R. Black, of Baird, for appellee.

Opinion:
DUNKLIN, J.
The Texas & Pacific Railway Company maintained and operated a spur track about 600 yards long, which connected with its main line near the town of Baird in Callahan county and extended to a sand pit. The surface of thé land over which this spur track was constructed consisted of loose sand, and the purpose of that track was to enable the company to haul sand, for use on the main track. In some instances the cross-ties and rails would be laid on a foundation of sand, which later would be excavated and hauled away, and the track relaid on the clay beneath. As the clay was not of uniform depth from the surface, it would sometimes happen that the cross-ties at one end of a rail would rest on a clay foundation, while the other end would rest on sand. At places where the track was supported by a foundation of sand, it was unsafe to run heavy trains over it. On the 25th day of February, 1919, while a train composed óf a locomotive and several cars was being operated over the spur track at a slow rate of speed, the rails broke and gave way, in consequence of which the train was wrecked, and H. N. Walker, the fireman, was scalded to death by steam which escaped from the pipe connecting the boiler and engine.
• This suit was instituted by Mrs. Nora Walker, surviving wife of the deceased, as administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband, and for the use and benefit of herself as his surviving wife, and his three minor children, aged 3, 6, and S years, respectively, for damages sustained by reason of his death. The suit was against Walker D. Hines, Director General of Railroads. It was instituted under the federal Employer's Liability Statute (U. S. Comp. St. § 8657-8665), and plaintiff's petition contained allegations sufficient to give that act effect in this suit. Plaintiff recovered a judgment for the sum of $20,000, apportioned as follows:
One-half to plaintiff, as surviving wife of the deceased, and the other half to his three minor children, share and share alike. From that judgment defendant has appealed.
Plaintiff's suit was predicated upon the contention that the accident was caused by a defective and unsafe condition of the spur track, and that the defendant was guilty of negligence in maintaining the track in that condition, which negligence was the proximate cause of the death of H. N. Walker.
The case was submitted to the jury on special issues, in answer to one of which the charge of negligence, made by the plaintiff as the proximate cause of the death of.H. N. AValker, was sustained. Another special issue submitted was as follows:
"What amount of money, if paid now, will fairly and reasonably compensate the surviving widow and children of deceased for the pecuniary loss which they respectively suffered by reason of his death? This question you will answer by stating the • aggregate amount of such pecuniary loss or damages. By 'pecuniary loss' is meant such loss as may be compensated for in money. In answering this, the fifth question, you may take into consideration the contribution of money and other pecuniary benefits, if any, which the evidence may show that said surviving widow and children of deceased would have received from him after thé time of his death if he had continued to live; and in estimating the pecuniary losses suffered by the minor children of deceased by reason of his death you may take into consideration such nurture, advice, and training, if any, as the evidence may show that these children would have received from deceased after the time of his death if he had continued to live, but you cannot consider for any purpose the solace or grief or loss of companionship suffered by deceased's surviving widow and children, or either of them, by reason of his death, and you cannot award them, or either of them, any damages by way of solace or comfort for the death of deceased."
Before the charge was submitted to the jury, the defendant duly excepted to the instruction quoted, said objections and exceptions being in writing and filed with the papers of the ease. One of the objections so made was that the instruction did not limit the amount of damages to be awarded to the children to losses they would have sustained during minority had not their father been killed. The court overruled that objection, and also refused a requested instruction offered by the defendant, which presented such limitation of damages to be awarded to; the children. Error has been assigned to both those rulings.
The undisputed facts show that at the time I-I. N. Walker met his death he was engaged in the service of handling interstate commerce ; hence the federal Employer's Liability Act controls the case. That act prescribes that in such a ease the railroad company "shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce, or, in case of the death of such employee, to his or her per sonal representative, for tlie benefit of the surviving widow or husband and children of such employee; and, if none, then of such employee's parents; and, if none, then of the next of bin dependent upon such employee, for such injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats, wharves or other equipment." U. S. Oomp. St. § 8657. By that statute the recovery by a surviving child of a deceased employee is not expressly limited to the pecuniary benefit which the child may sustain during minority. It is broad enough to permit a recovery for such benefits of a pecuniary value which the child would have reasonable expectation of receiving after he reaches his majority.- Articles 4694 and 4698 of the Revised Statutes of Texas, in the same general terms, allow a recovery by the "surviving husband, wife, children and parents" of an employee whose death has resulted from the negligence of a railroad company. But it is a familiar rule of decisions of this state that an adult child will not be allowed to recover .for the death of his parent so caused unless it can be shown by evidence that such child had a reasonable expectation of receiving from the parent support or aid of pecuniary value, notwithstanding the fact that at the time of the death of the parent he had reached his majority and such parent was no longer under legal liability to render him such aid. I. & G. N. Ry. Co. v. De Bajligenthy, 9 Tex. Civ. App. 108, 28 S. W. 829; St. L. S. W. Ry. Co. v. Bishop, 14 Tex. Civ. App. 504, 37 S. W. 764; M., K. & T. Ry. Co. v. James, 55 Tex. Civ. App. 588, 120 S. W. 269; T. & N. O. Ry. Co. v. Mills, 143 S. W. 690.
Substantially, the same interpretation of the federal statute was given by the United States Supreme Court in G., C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. McGinnis, 228 U. S. 173, 33 Sup. Ct. 426, 57 L. Ed. 785. That suit was by a widow for the benefit of herself and four children, one of whom was a married daughter, who was supported by her husband. There was neither allegation nor proof that Mrs. Saunders, the married daughter, was in any way dependent upon her father, nor that she had reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefits as the result of the continuation of his life. In that case, the trial court refused a requested instruction to the jury that no damages could be allowed in favor of Mrs! Saunders, and the Supreme Court reversed the judgment for the refusal to give the requested instruction, notwithstanding the fact that the trial court in general terms, as was done in the present suit, instructed the jury to allow such damages, only as the evidence showed the beneficiaries had a reasonable expectation of receiving from the decedent if his death had not occurred.
To the same effect is the case of N. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Anderson, 134 Tenn. 666, 185 S. W. 677, L. R. A. 1918C, 1115, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 902, in which the Supreme Court of Tennessee gave the same construction to the federal statute as our courts have given the statute of this state. In that opinion, the following is quoted with approval from Tiffany on Death by Wrongful Act, § 160:
"The damages to the widow should be calculated upon the basis of their joint lives. The damages to the minor children for the loss of support should be confined to their minority."
And in the course of that opinion several decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States are cited to show that in that court the rule requiring proof of pecuniary damages in such cases is applied with more strictness than in some other courts. In the cases Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Holbrook, 235 U. S. 625, 35 Sup. Ct. 143, 59 L. Ed. 392, and in C. & O. Ry. Co. v. Kelly, 241 U. S. 485, 36 Sup. Ct. 630, 60 L. Ed. 1117, L. R. A. 1917F, 367, the charges given by the trial courts contained the limitation of the amount of recovery by the minors, which was insisted on by the defendant in this case. The correctness of such instructions in the particular noted was not questioned in either of those decisions. See, also, Richie, Federal Employer's Liability, § 183.
All the authorities seem to proceed upon the theory that a minor may recover in such a case because the parent is under legal obligation to support him during minority, and that he will perform that obligation. But after a child reaches his majority that legal duty of the parent ceases, and in the absence of proof it cannot be presumed that he will continue such support. If a child is crippled or has suffered some other permanent physical infirmity, that fact, in connection with proof of parental attachment and probable ability on the part of the parent to continue the support of his offspring beyond the age of majority, might perhaps support a verdict for damages for the loss of such support; but,' in the absence of some proof of that character, or some other proof that the child might reasonably be expected to .need the support of the parent beyond the period of minority and some reasonable expectation of receiving such support from his parent, we do not think there would be any' basis for such a recovery.
In the present case, there was' no proof that the children of the deceased were not in normal physical condition, and no proof of any character which reasonably would warrant a finding that their father would have continued to render them assistance of pecuniary valué after they reached their majority.
Under the instruction given in the present suit, the jury may not have limited the damages allowed in behalf of the minors to the benefits they had a reasonable expectation of receiving during their minority. They could not properly have gone beyond that period in allowing such compensation. But the instruction was broad enough to permit them to do so. In view of the amount of damages awarded in connection with all the facts and circumstances in evidence, it does not clearly appear that they did not do so, and for the error of the court in refusing to so restrict the amount of such recovery by the minors, we think the judgment should be reversed. In T. & P. Ry. Co. v. McCoy, 90 Tex. 264, 38 S. W. 36, it was held that an erroneous charge is reversible error Unless it clearly appears that the same did not result in injury to the appellant. See, also, Weisner v. M., K. & T. Ry. Co. (Com. App.) 207 S. W. 904, and Peden Iron & Steel Co. v. Jaimes (Com. App.) 208 S. W. 898.
Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Holbrook, 235 U. S. 625, 35 Sup. Ct. 143, 59 L. Ed. 392, cited above, was a suit by a widow for the benefit of herself and minor children under the federal Employers' Liability Act for the death of the husband of the plaintiff and the father of the children, and in that case the judgment of the trial court for plaintiff was reversed, because the jury was instructed that the pecuniary damages suffered by the minors for the loss of their father would be much greater than those suffered by adult beneficiaries. Notwithstanding the fact that the facts so stated in the court's charge was a matter of common knowledge, the judgment was reversed, and in the course of the opinion the court said:
"The facts brought out during the course of the trial were adequate to constitute a strong appeal to the sympathy naturally engendered in the minds pf jurors by the misfortunes of a widow and her dependent children. In such circumstances it was especially important that the charge should be free from anything which they might construe as a permission to go outside of the evidence. It is the duty of the court in its relation to the jury to protect the parties from unjust verdicts arising from impulse, passion, or prejudice, or from any other violation of lawful rights. Pleasants v. Fant, 22 Wall. 116, 121, 22 L. Ed. 780, 782."
The proof showed that H. N. Walker had formerly been employed as a'locomotive engineer for a short period of time, but at the time of his death he was filling the position of a fireman. Under such circumstances, the court did not err in admitting proof tending to show his probable chances of being again employed as an engineer and of the wages usually received by one in that employment. M., K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Lasater, 53 Tex. Civ. App. 51, 115 S. W. 103 (writ of error refused); St. L., A. & P. Ry. Co. v. Johnston, 78 Tex. 536, 15 S. W. 104; Ft. W. & D. C. Ry. C. v. Stalcup, 167 S. W. 279 (writ of error refused); M., K. & T. Ry. Co. v. St. Clair, 21 Tex. Civ. App. 345, 51 S. W. 666.
There is no merit in other assignments of appellant in which the contention is made that the proof of the defects in the spur track introduced should have been confined to the defects in the exact spot where the derailment of the engine occurred, in view of the fact that the evidence tended to show that the spur tract throughout its length was, generally speaking, in the same condition.
More than 40 other assignments of error are presented in appellant's printed brief of 225 pages, but we deem it unnecessary to discuss all of those assignments in detail. Many of them contain criticisms of the court's charge, which may be avoided upon another trial, even though it could -be said that they are meritorious, which we shall not attempt to determine. Some of the other assignments are addressed to the action of the court in admitting and excluding testimony, which assignments are, to say the least, of doubtful merit; but even those supposed errors, if any, may be cured upon another trial.
For the reasons indicated, the judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded.
<S=For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes