Case Name: Martin W. IVERSON, Claimant-Appellant, v. GORDON FARMING CO., INC. Defendant-Respondent
Court: Idaho Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Idaho
Decision Date: 1982-09-02
Citations: 103 Idaho 527
Docket Number: No. 13668
Parties: Martin W. IVERSON, Claimant-Appellant, v. GORDON FARMING CO., INC. Defendant-Respondent.
Judges: McFADDEN and SHEPARD, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Idaho Reports
Volume: 103
Pages: 527–534

Head Matter:
650 P.2d 669
Martin W. IVERSON, Claimant-Appellant, v. GORDON FARMING CO., INC. Defendant-Respondent.
No. 13668.
Supreme Court of Idaho.
Sept. 2, 1982.
Jay D. Sudweeks, of May, May, Sudweeks & Shindurling, Twin Falls, for claimant-appellant.
Robert M. Tyler, Jr., of Elam, Burke, Evans, Boyd & Koontz, Boise, for defendant-respondent.

Opinion:
DONALDSON, Justice.
The appellant, Martin W. Iverson, was injured on December 15, 1975, in an industrial accident arising during the course of his employment as a truck driver for the respondent, Gordon Farming. Because of a dispute over the payment of the claim Iverson filed an application for hearing with the Industrial Commission on February 11, 1976.
In October, 1976, Iverson's attorney entered into a stipulation with Gordon Farming that the claim before the Industrial Commission be dismissed "with prejudice for the reason that the same has been fully compromised and settled." The stipulation was based upon the preliminary determination that the injury was a result of agriculturally-oriented employment that would exempt Gordon Farming from the requirement of carrying Workmen's Compensation Insurance. The stipulation was not entered into on the basis that a payment, in an attempt to settle the claim, had been made to Iverson. Iverson's attorney later testified in an affidavit that he entered into the stipulation after misinterpreting a conversation he had with Iverson.
Pursuant to the stipulation, although not stating "with prejudice," the Industrial Commission dismissed the claim on October 22, 1976. An action was then brought by Iverson in district court on the theory of negligence but this suit was dismissed because of lack of jurisdiction.
Following this dismissal, Iverson, through new counsel, filed a motion to reopen the case before the Industrial Commission on March 27, 1978, under I.C. § 72-719(3) claiming that the case required reopening in order to correct a manifest injustice. The Industrial Commission referee recommended to the Industrial Commission that the motion be granted. Thereafter, the Commission granted the motion to reopen and a second application for hearing was then filed by Iverson on September 18, 1978. After several continuances the matter was set for hearing.
At the hearing Gordon Farming made a motion to dismiss the case at the close of the testimony. On February 29, 1980, an order dismissing the claim was entered by the Industrial Commission. The referee determined that Iverson "suffered an industrial accident, arising out of and during the course of his employment as a truck driver for the defendant on December 15, 1975," and that Gordon Farming's "trucking operation is not exempt from the Workmen's Compensation Law pursuant to the agricultural exemption." The referee also found that, "[a]s a consequence of his industrial accident, Claimant suffered a period of total temporary disability," "[b]y reason of his industrial accident, Claimant incurred certain medical expenses," and "[a]s a consequence of the industrial accident of December 15, 1975, Claimant suffers some permanent partial disability." However, the referee further determined that there was "no evidence in the record sufficient for making a determination of Claimant's average weekly wage for purposes of computing benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Law." Finally, the referee concluded, however, "that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss should be granted for the reason that no manifest injustice has been shown pursuant to Idaho Code, Section 72-719(3)." The Industrial Commission then entered its order dismissing the claim based upon the referee's memorandum decision. This appeal followed.
I.
The appellant, Iverson, argues that the Commission erred in dismissing his claim after a hearing on the basis that he failed to show manifest injustice because the Commission initially reopened his claim in order to correct a manifest injustice. The respondent, Gordon Farming, argues that the motion to reopen the case should not even have been granted. Iverson also claims that the Commission erred in finding that there was insufficient evidence to determine average wage and that attorney fees should be granted.
We are not persuaded by Gordon Farming's argument that the case should not have been reopened because (1) it had initially been dismissed with prejudice, and (2) the long delay in filing for rehearing had prejudiced the respondent. Firstly, even though the parties stipulated that the case "may be dismissed with prejudice," the Commission's order stated only that "[i]t is hereby ordered that the above-entitled claim, being No. I.C. 142350 is dismissed." Therefore, because the order did not dismiss the claim with prejudice we need not consider the appellant's first argument.
Secondly, concerning the long delay, this case was reopened within the five-year time period set forth in I.C. § 72-719(3). We hold that the time within which a motion to review can be brought is governed by this five-year period and not by a claim of prejudice. If prejudice were used as the standard for review a case might never be reopened since it is difficult to imagine a situation in which the other party would not be prejudiced in some manner.
We uphold the Commission's initial order reopening the case. Iverson's motion was supported by his attorney's affidavit stating that he entered into the stipulation because of a misunderstanding with Iverson. Because of this unauthorized stipulation Iverson was denied his right to a hearing before the Industrial Commission, and this was sufficient to establish a viable claim of manifest injustice which substantiated the Commission's grant of a hearing, Sines v. Appel, 103 Idaho 9, 644 P.2d 331 (1982), where we said that "the term 'manifest injustice' as a ground for reopening and review of an order must be construed broadly." Id. at 13, 644 P.2d at 335.
II.
The next issue the appellant asks us to consider is whether the Commission after a full hearing, was correct in denying relief on the grounds that Iverson failed to show manifest injustice under I.C. § 72-719(3), on the referee's recommendation. However, because the Commission did not make specific findings to support the conclusion that manifest injustice was not shown, we are unable to review this issue adequately and therefore, remand to the Commission to review their decision in light of Sines, supra, and to make specific findings in order that this Court can properly review the issue.
III.
Next, Iverson argues on appeal that the Industrial Commission's finding that "[tjhere is no evidence in the record sufficient for making a determination of Claimant's average weekly wage for purposes of computing benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Law" is incorrect. Gordon Farming argues that this finding should be upheld because the claimant had only worked for Gordon Farming a short time and there was no discussion of further trips to be made with the claimant. We disagree. Where, because of the shortness of time of the injured claimant's employment, or from the nature of the employment, a rate of average weekly earnings cannot be practicably determined, a method for computation is provided by I.C. § 72-419. However, it appears that the referee for the Industrial Commission did not take into consideration this method of computation, and therefore, we remand this case back to the Industrial Commission to again examine this issue in light of I.C. § 72-419.
This evidence relating to the claimant's length of employment is relevant in establishing whether Gordon Farming was exempt from coverage under I.C. § 72-212(2) dealing with casual employment. However, Gordon Farming argued only that the trucking operation was exempt from the Workmen's Compensation Law pursuant to the agricultural exemption and did not argue at the hearing or on appeal that Gordon Farming was exempt pursuant to the casual employment exemption. There fore, we decline to consider this evidence in light of I.C. § 72-212(2).
IV.
Finally, Iverson argues that because Gordon Farming failed to carry Workmen's Compensation Insurance that attorney fees should be awarded to him. Gordon Farming argues that it made a good faith attempt to procure the insurance. For us to award attorney fees at this time would be premature. However, this Court has recently stated in Heese v. A & T Trucking, 102 Idaho 598, 635 P.2d 962 (1981) that,
"[i]t is apparent that the legislature intended strict compliance with those provisions requiring the employer to obtain security for payment of the compensation to injured employees, and that it intended substantial penalties for non-compliance.
"I.C. § 72-210, the specific section invoked by the commission to impose the penalty in this case, is unambiguous. It requires no showing of bad faith or scienter as a prerequisite to the imposition of the 10% surcharge, costs or attorney fees." Id. at 600, 635 P.2d at 964.
Therefore, in the event the Industrial Commission determines that Iverson is covered the Commission is directed to follow Heese.
The order of the Industrial Commission is reversed and the claim is remanded for proceedings in conformity with this opinion.
Costs to appellant.
McFADDEN and SHEPARD, JJ., concur.
BISTLINE, J., concurs in Parts I, III, and IV, and writes separately on Part II.
(McFADDEN, J., registered his vote prior to his retirement on August 31, 1982.)
. I.C. § 72-719(3) reads as follows:
"72-719. Modification of awards and agreements — Grounds—Time within which made.—
"(3) The commission, on its own motion at any time within five (5) years of the date of the accident causing the injury or date of first manifestation of an occupational disease, may review a case in order to correct a manifest injustice."
. I.C. § 72-419(5) and (11) reads as follows: "72-419. Determination of average weekly wage.—Except as otherwise provided in this law, the average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the accident causing the injury or of manifestation of the occupational disease shall be taken as the basis upon which to compute compensation and shall be determined as follows:
"(5) If at such time the hourly wage has not been fixed or cannot be ascertained, the wage for the purpose of calculating compensation shall be taken to be the usual wage for similar services where such services are rendered by paid employees.
"(11) When circumstances are such that the actual rate of pay cannot be readily ascertained, the wage shall be deemed to be the contractual, customary or usual wage in the particular employment, industry or community for the same or similar service."