Case Name: Maro SALDANA, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff)
Court: Supreme Court of Wyoming
Jurisdiction: Wyoming
Decision Date: 1993-01-28
Citations: 846 P.2d 604
Docket Number: No. 90-24
Parties: Maro SALDANA, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).
Judges: Before MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT and GOLDEN, JJ.
Reporter: Pacific Reporter 2d
Volume: 846
Pages: 604–664

Head Matter:
Maro SALDANA, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).
No. 90-24.
Supreme Court of Wyoming.
Jan. 28, 1993.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 24, 1993.
Wyoming Public Defender Program: Leonard D. Munker, State Public Defender, Steven E. Weerts, Sr. Asst. Public Defender, Mike Cornia, Appellate Counsel, for appellant.
Joseph B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Mary B. Guthrie, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Before MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT and GOLDEN, JJ.
Chief Justice at time of oral argument; retired 1/1/93.

Opinion:
THOMAS, Justice.
The foremost question presented in this case arises out of the claim of Maro Salda-na (Saldana) that the State unlawfully invaded his reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to telephone company records for an unlisted telephone number. His specific contention is that certain records concerning telephone calls made to, and from, his unlisted telephone number at his residence were seized, or otherwise intercepted, in violation of Wyo. Const, art. 1, § 4 and Wyo.Stat. § 7-3-601 to -610 (Supp. 1990) and, because of the violation of the Constitution and statutes, those telephone company records should not have been admitted as evidence at his trial. Saldana also asserts the admission of certain papers seized from his bedroom dresser drawer, together with testimony of an investigative agent that interpreted those documents to the jury, deprived him of his constitutional right to confrontation. In addition, Salda-na contends testimony by the investigative agent was presented as an opinion regarding his guilt and as an opinion concerning credibility of various witnesses so that the testimony usurped the role of the jury. All of these assertions of error by Saldana culminate in his contention that, if the improper evidence had not been admitted, there would not be sufficient evidence in the record to sustain his conviction for the crime of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. Our review of the record in light of our statutes and controlling precedent leads us to conclude that no reversible error occurred in connection with Saldana's trial, and the judgment and sentence is affirmed.
As set forth in his Brief of the Appellant, Saldana presents the issues in the case as follows:
1. Was the evidence presented insufficient to sustain Appellant's conviction?
2. Was Agent Arter's testimony concerning his opinion of appellant's guilt and the credibility of various witnesses inadmissible and denied Appellant his right to a jury trial?
3. Did the admission of the papers found in the dresser drawer violate Appellant's right to confrontation?
4. Whether Appellant's phone records and the derivative evidence were seized in violation of Article 1, Section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution and therefore inadmissible as evidence.
5. Whether the Appellant's telephone toll records were intercepted in violation of § 7-3-601 et seq. W.S. (1990 Cum. Supp.) and therefore were inadmissible.
In its brief, the State of Wyoming states the issues in this way:
I. Whether sufficient evidence was presented to convict appellant of possession of cocaine with the intent to deliver, in violation of W.S. 35-7-1031(a)(i).
II. Whether DCI Agent Mike Arter gave his opinion on the guilt of the appellant and the credibility of witnesses.
III. Whether it was proper to admit evidence concerning papers which were found on appellant's bureau during the search of his house.
IV. Whether the records of appellant's telephone calls should have been admitted.
V. Whether the use of appellant's telephone records violated W.S. 7-3-601 through 7-3-610, which proscribes the unauthorized interception of telephone conversations.
Late in February of 1989, a package containing four and one-half ounces of uncut cocaine was shipped from Green Bay, Wisconsin to Torrington, Wyoming via United Parcel Service (UPS). The shipper was identified as "Bob Haeger," and the package was addressed to one Hilario Torres (Torres). Torres was an unemployed laborer from Texas who was temporarily residing in the basement of the Saldana home. Saldana lived upstairs with his wife and children.
The package arrived in Torrington, but it could not be delivered at the time because it was addressed incorrectly and, as a result, had to be returned to Green Bay. "Bob Haeger" could not be contacted in Green Bay and, in accordance with standard UPS policy, UPS officials opened the unclaimed parcel in an effort to determine the identity of the shipper or an alternate address. The cocaine that was discovered when the package was opened by UPS was turned over to appropriate law enforcement personnel.
No one who could be identified as "Bob Haeger" ever did inquire about this package. Nevertheless, numerous telephone calls were received by the UPS office in Green Bay regarding the package. As a product of those calls, together with some information from the UPS driver in Wyoming, sufficient information was developed to reveal that Saldana's brother, Umero, actually sent the package, and the Saldana residence in Torrington was the intended destination. Umero Saldana previously had been convicted at least once for trafficking in cocaine.
The Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) of the Attorney General's office in Wyoming entered the case when the Green Bay/Brown County, Wisconsin, multi-juris-dictional drug task force informed the DCI Wisconsin authorities had intercepted a parcel that was shipped to Torrington, Wyoming and contained a large quantity of cocaine. The addressee was identified as a person in the Torrington area named "Hilario Torres." An arrangement was made pursuant to which the resealed package was hand delivered to Mike Arter, a Wyoming DCI agent, on March 2, 1989. The same day, Arter obtained a search warrant and reopened the package. In addition to a jar containing four and one-half ounces of rock cocaine mixed in with coffee grounds, the box contained some empty paper sacks and a pair of worn boots. After it was searched, the package was, again, resealed, and Arter, attired as a UPS driver and operating one of its vans, took it to the Saldana address. Saldana's wife advised Arter the package was expected, but Torres was not at home. She then signed a receipt acknowledging delivery.
Agent Arter returned to the UPS truck but, approximately ten minutes later, he went back to the Saldana residence on the pretext that UPS needed some additional information contained on a "next day" shipping label he had forgotten to remove before delivering the package. On this occasion, Saldana answered the door. After hearing Arter's explanation, Saldana went down to the basement and returned with the package which had not been opened. Torres came upstairs later, after he was informed his signature was needed. The testimony in the record discloses Torres seemed confused but, nevertheless, he did as he was asked. The receipt obtained at that time, containing Torres' signature and his handwriting sample, subsequently was lost and was not offered into evidence at trial. After Torres' signature had been obtained, Arter then signaled to two other agents who were waiting outside, and both Torres and Saldana were arrested. Torres seemed unable to speak English, and it appeared to the agents he did not comprehend what was happening.
Agent Arter then obtained a search warrant for the Saldana residence and the package that had been delivered, and the package was opened once more. The rock cocaine and the other contents of the package were identical to those Arter had observed before he resealed the package after opening it when it was hand delivered to him. Other items that were seized, pursuant to the search warrant, included some scraps of paper taken from a dresser drawer located in the Saldana's master bedroom. One of these pieces of paper had written on it "1 oz. front 2-10-89 paid $1,000.00" and "front 2-12-89 paid 825 owes 575." There was another, purportedly signed by Federico Saldana, that listed Federico Saldana's address and contained the words "to pay 1/yr." Federico also is a brother of Salda-na and, like Umero, previously had been convicted of trafficking in cocaine. With respect to this latter document, Christine Saldana, the Saldanas' daughter, testified she, not Saldana, had written the second note and it related only to a sale of a used Pontiac Tempest by her father to his brother. Additional pieces of paper were seized from the kitchen during the course of the search of the Saldanas' house, and these contained handwriting referring to the return address of the package, the UPS tracking number, the UPS telephone number, and various other "things of that nature."
Within a short time, the authorities in Wyoming decided Torres was not a part of any drug trafficking scheme, and he had been manipulated to the end that he permitted his name to be used for the address on the package containing the cocaine. He was released from custody and permitted to return to Texas. Saldana was charged with possessing cocaine with intent to deliver in violation of Wyo.Stat. § 35-7-1031(a)(i) (1988). He was found guilty after a trial to a jury, and the trial court sentenced him to a term of not less than two and one-half years nor more than seven years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary with credit allowed for 333 days previously served prior to his sentence. It is from that judgment and sentence Saldana appeals. We will state the facts in more detail as they relate to the several issues Saldana poses.
Saldana asserts in his brief "[pjerhaps the linchpin of the state's case against Appellant was the introduction and interpretation of Appellant's phone records and derivative evidence," and he then argues this evidence was obtained in violation of the provisions of Wyo. Const, art. 1, § 4, and Wyo.Stat. § 7-3-601 to -610 (Supp.1990). Saldana's conclusion is that evidence obtained in violation of the constitution and the statute is not admissible at his trial. The significance of the contested evidence must be conceded, although its total impact may not be as significant as Saldana claims because there are additional facts pointing to his guilt. We must reject Saldana's contention and argument, however, and hold that the telephone records were lawfully obtained and were admissible into evidence.
With regard to the telephone records, Agent Arter testified he had obtained, through use of the federal subpoena power, since "the State of Wyoming doesn't have an investigative subpoena power," information that connected Saldana to an unlisted telephone number given to the UPS office in Green Bay by an unidentified caller. Through the use of the federal subpoena power, records of telephone calls, made from Saldana's residence and the homes of his two brothers, Federico and Umero, for a period of time extending both before and after delivery of the package containing cocaine, also were obtained. A request for this information previously had been denied by the telephone company, and no state warrant for obtaining the evidence ever was sought. Specifically, Arter testified as follows:
Q: You obtained phone records?
A: That's correct, sir.
Q: And when did you start that process, and what was that process?
A: I started the process almost — actually, to backtrack a little bit, I started the process prior to even delivery of the package.
During our investigation with help from that of our counterparts in Green Bay, one of the times that the UPS was called about the package wáS~by- a, man giving his identity as Homer, who later identified himself as Umero Saldana. He gave a delivery address, the corrected delivery address of what Mr. Saldana's real address is, and he also gave a delivery phone number. The delivery phone number was a local phone number here in Torrington, of course, and I checked that phone number through — who handles yours? It is not U.S. West.
Q: United.
A: United Telephone, yes. I checked that through United telephone. It was a nonpublished number. In order for any law enforcement agencies to get information on a nonlisted number, we have to get a search warrant. In this case— because the State of Wyoming doesn't have an investigative subpoena power. In this case the DEA was also working on the case on this due to the fact that it came from Wisconsin and the amount of drugs involved.
Q: Let's back up. DEA, what agency or what part of our government does that refer to?
A: The Department of Justice.
Q: So that is federal?
A: Yes, sir, we are talking federal.
Q: Federal Department of Drug Enforcement Administration?
A: That's correct, sir. They also had a case start on this, but since I was the case agent, I just merely kept them informed as to what was going on, and they gave me any support they can or any input.
Through one of the agents with DEA, Special Agent Larry Gregory, we submitted a federal subpoena for the records of United Telephone to determine, number one, who owned the return telephone number, the number that was given. That number was cement [sic] out to me that the person who owned that number was in fact Maro Saldana at the address indicated.
From there it sort of stayed for awhile until the package was delivered and everything else from there was my determination that since we did have someone from another state involved that there was a need to seeJf. they, communicated, so I subpoenaed, again, through the federal subpoena power — or had Special Agent Gregory subpoena — the phone tolls for a several month period, two months prior to the delivery and the month after.
When I received these tolls, I did basically analysis of where the calls were going to. The numbers that I could check that was not nonpublished, I checked to determine who they belonged to the toll calls he had made; and the ones that were nonpublished, if I felt they were germane to the investigation, I got a subpoena and tried to obtain the records also.
Q: All right. Whose phone records from Wisconsin did you obtain in terms of the toll calls?
A: Through the investigation of Mr. Saldana, Maro Saldana's phone records, there was frequent calls to the Green Bay area to several numbers, one being the 465-0171, which was the number of Michele Senechal, who is now the wife of Umero Saldana. Umero Saldana gave the address of 846 Edgewood, which was, of course, her address.
I obtained a subpoena for those toll records. Through also the analysis of Maro Saldana's, I noticed that he called his other brother an unusual amount of times, Federico, and I obtained a federal subpoena to get those phone records.
Arter continued to testify about the number and the length of the calls made between Saldana's residence and the residences of Umero and Federico. His interpretation of this telephone activity was that it indicated certain members of Saldana's family were calling other members to keep them informed as to what was happening.
When cross-examined about this testimony, Arter conceded there was no way of knowing who was talking to whom from the information developed by a search of the telephone records. On redirect examination, Arter then testified:
Q: You were asked by Mr. Newlon whether you know who made the calls, and you indicated that you did. What I would like to ask you, not what your opinion is as to who made the calls, but why do you think you know who made the calls?
A: Through the investigation that I have conducted and just the experience and the details of the case, it is obvious to me that the calls were made by Maro Saldana. When I was in the house and interviewed both his wife and his daughters, it was fairly obvious to me that the wife and daughters did nothing in that house without the permission of Maro Saldana.
The wife was, as we interviewed her, she was terrified of the results of his implication here and more from him than what had [sic] considered. There was indication from all the daughters, and the mother, that they were not allowed to use the phone. He told them that they weren't even allowed to answer the phone unless he had told them to. He made those type of phone calls. The phone calls from the month in question was over $266. It is hard for me to understand, how he would allow them to make that type of commitment for phone bills like that on their own sake and not his. I am convinced that he made those calls.
We have acknowledged many times the constitutional guarantee against government intrusion into an individual's legitimate expectation of privacy. through an unreasonable search and seizure. The guarantee is found in both Wyo. Const, art. 1, § 4, and U.S. Const, amend. IV. Goettl v. State, 842 P.2d 549 (Wyo.1992); King v. State, 780 P.2d 943 (Wyo.1989); Pellatz v. State, 711 P.2d 1138 (Wyo.1986). See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977). See also Stanford v. State of Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 85 S.Ct. 506, 13 L.Ed.2d 431, reh'g denied, 380 U.S. 926, 85 S.Ct. 879, 13 L.Ed.2d 813 (1965); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, reh'g denied, 368 U.S. 871, 82 S.Ct. 23, 7 L.Ed.2d 72 (1961); Wolf v. People of State of Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 69 S.Ct. 1359, 93 L.Ed. 1782 (1949). This protection is broad, but it is not absolute. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). See Jessee v. State, 640 P.2d 56, reh'g denied, 643 P.2d 681 (Wyo.1982); Neilson v. State, 599 P.2d 1326 (Wyo.1979), cert, denied, 444 U.S. 1079, 100 S.Ct. 1031, 62 L.Ed.2d 763 (1980). The courts have drawn a balance between the interest of the state in protecting its citizens from the criminal conduct of others and its interest in preserving the freedom of the individual from overly intrusive governmental invasion. Consequently, the rule has developed that any search, assuming first that it does invade a subjective and legitimate expectation of privacy sufficient to invoke the constitutional protections, must be unreasonable in order to be impermissible. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985); Chadwick; United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 96 S.Ct. 1619, 48 L.Ed.2d 71 (1976); Katz; King; Jessee; Neilson; State v. George, 32 Wyo. 223, 231 P. 683 (1924).
Whether a search is reasonable is to be determined from the facts and circumstances of the case in light of the "fundamental criteria" that are found in the Fourth Amendment, as those criteria have been interpreted and defined in the opinions of the Supreme Court. Berger v. State of New York, 388 U.S. 41, 87 S.Ct. 1873, 18 L.Ed.2d 1040 (1967); Ker v. State of California, 374 U.S. 23, 83 S.Ct. 1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963); George. The question of reasonableness does not arise, unless there has been an intrusion upon a legitimate expectation of privacy. Pellatz. The primary, and often ultimate, test for determining whether evidence must be suppressed, at least in the federal arena, has evolved into the determination of whether "the individual's expectation, viewed objectively, is 'justifiable' under the circumstances." Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740, 99 S.Ct. 2577, 2580, 61 L.Ed.2d 220 (1979). See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978), reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 1122, 99 S.Ct. 1035, 59 L.Ed.2d 83 (1979); United States v. Waupekenay, 973 F.2d 1533 (10th Cir. 1992).
The protection against unreasonable searches and seizures found in the Constitution of the State of Wyoming is virtually identical to that found in the federal constitution. U.S. Const, amend. IV; Wyo. Const, art. 1, § 4; State v. Hiteshew, 42 Wyo. 147, 292 P. 2 (1930). Even though the federal law establishes minimum requirements for individual protection and does not mandate any maximum criteria as to the degree of protection afforded an individual under state law, federal interpretations of the Fourth Amendment are regarded as persuasive and this court adheres to them closely absent some contrary direction from the legislature of the State of Wyoming. See U.S. Const, amend. X; Cheyenne Airport Bd. v. Rogers, 707 P.2d 717 (Wyo.1985), appeal dismissed, 476 U.S. 1110, 106 S.Ct. 1961, 90 L.Ed.2d 647 (1986).
The facts in Smith are similar to those in the case before us, but they can be distinguished since Saldana maintained an unlisted telephone number while the petitioner in Smith did not. The Supreme Court of the United States in that case held that the warrantless use of a pen register, installed at police request on telephone company property at the telephone company central office, did not constitute a " 'search' " invading a " 'legitimate expectation of privacy.' " Smith, 442 U.S. at 742, 99 S.Ct. at 2581. The rationale in Smith was that people generally do not "entertain any actual expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial" since they realize they "must 'convey' phone numbers to the telephone company." Smith, 442 U.S. at 742, 99 S.Ct. at 2581. Furthermore, pen registers acquire only the numbers dialed and do not report any part of the actual communication so there is no interception of the contents of the conversation. The Supreme Court noted:
Indeed, a law enforcement official could not even determine from the use of a pen register whether a communication existed. These devices do not hear sound. They disclose only the telephone numbers that have been dialed — a means of establishing communication. Neither the purport of any communication between the caller and the recipient of the call, their identities, nor whether the call was even completed is disclosed by pen registers.
Smith, 442 U.S. at 741, 99 S.Ct. at 2581 (citing United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 167, 98 S.Ct. 364, 369, 54 L.Ed.2d 376 (1977)).
Saldana's situation is different from the facts in Smith, but the two cases match sufficiently that the same reasoning can apply in both. Smith is controlling to the extent that we hold the DCI's procurement of Saldana's telephone records, including those linking his name to his unlisted telephone number, does not constitute a "search" invading a "legitimate expectation of privacy" sufficient to demonstrate an invasion of Saldana's constitutional rights. Any person using a telephone, whether on legitimate business or otherwise, assumes a risk that the telephone can, and will, reveal the numbers that he dials. Smith. It may be that an unlisted number such as that used by Saldana affords to a party some greater subjective expectation of privacy than one would find in connection with a listed number like Smith's. That expectation is not more "legitimate" with respect to criminal investigations, however, because the purpose and the privacy protections of an unlisted number go only to veiling it from the general public by not including it in telephone books and directory assistance services. An unlisted number and the name of its owner are not affected any more with respect to its procurement through use of a subpoena or warrant than is the information acquired by a telephone company pen register, which is similarly veiled from public scrutiny. The fact that Saldana's telephone number was not listed, even though permitting increased expectation of privacy with respect to who might call him, is a distinction without a difference for the purposes of this ,case. Here there was no "search" that invaded a legitimate expectation of privacy and, for that reason, no warrant was required. The DCI did not infringe on Saldana's Fourth Amendment rights by acquiring information through the use of the federal DEA investigative subpoena.
Under the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the freedom of the state to provide greater expectations of privacy for its citizens than those provided under the federal constitution is guaranteed if, in either its legislative or judicial discretion, it deems it necessary or appropriate to do so. U.S. Const, amend. X; Cheyenne Airport, 707 P.2d 717. See United States v. Millstone Enterprises, Inc., 684 F.Supp. 867 (W.D.Pa.1988), reversed on other grounds, 864 F.2d 21 (3d Cir.1988); State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash.2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986). Increased protection could be afforded to Wyoming citizens. It is our conclusion, however, that the substantial identity of the constitutional provisions involved does not suggest, nor do we perceive it appropriate in this instance to recognize, any increased protection as being afforded by our state constitution. U.S. Const, amend. IV; Wyo. Const, art. 1, § 4; Hinshaw.
We next turn to the statutes relied upon by Saldana, Wyo.Stat. § 7-3-601 to -611 (1987), to determine whether legislative discretion may have been invoked to expand the constitutional protection. Sal-dana claims that, under this Wyoming "wire-tapping" statute, the admission into evidence of his telephone records is prohibited. We rely upon the statute in the form that it had been adopted at the time of Saldana's conduct instead of at the later, and somewhat more expansive, version relied upon by Saldana. See Wyo.Stat. § 7-3-601 to -610 (Supp.1990). Cf. Dellapenta v. Dellapenta, 838 P.2d 1153 (Wyo.1992) (holding statutes are not applied retroactively absent clear legislative intent); Wyoming Refining Co. v. Bottjen, 695 P.2d 647 (Wyo.1985); Johnson v. Safeway Stores, 568 P.2d 908 (Wyo.1977). However, it is likely our resolution would be essentially the same under either version. Also, we reiterate our general rule that statutes will be strictly construed to cause them to comport with legislative intent and the first, and foremost, indicator of that intent is found within the language of the statute. Allied-Signal, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 813 P.2d 214 (Wyo.1991); Johnson v. Statewide Collections, Inc., 778 P.2d 93 (Wyo.1989); Halliburton Co. v. Adams, Roux & Assoc., Inc., 773 P.2d 153 (Wyo.1989). Furthermore, no statute should be interpreted so that any portion of it would be rendered meaningless. Halliburton; Reliance Ins. Co. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 713 P.2d 766 (Wyo.1986).
Wyo.Stat. § 7-3-602 (1987) provided, in pertinent part:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no person shall willfully:
(i) Intercept any wire or oral communication;
(ii) Disclose to another person the contents of any wire or oral communication, knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire or oral communication in violation of this section; (iii) Use the contents of any wire or oral communication knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire or oral communication in violation of this section.
(b) Nothing in subsection (a) of this section prohibits:
(i) An officer, employee or agent of a communications common carrier from intercepting, disclosing or using a wire communication intercepted in the normal course of that person's employment if the interception is made only for mechanical or service quality checks or to protect the property of the communications common carrier;
(ii) An officer, employee or agent of any communication common carrier providing information, facilities or technical assistance to a peace officer who is authorized pursuant to this act to intercept a wire or oral communication;

(v) A peace officer from intercepting, using or disclosing to another peace officer in the course of his official duties any wire or oral communication pursuant to an order permitting the interception under this act;
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(c) Any person who violates this section is guilty of a felony punishable by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1000.00), imprisonment for not more than five (5) years, or both.
Wyo.Stat. § 7-3-601(a)(iii) (1987) defines the contents of an oral or wire communication to be:
(iii)"Contents of an oral or wire communication" includes information concerning the identity of the parties participating in the communication and the existence, meaning, substance or purport of the communication; .
Wyo.Stat. § 7-3-601(a)(v) (1987) defines the word "intercept" to mean:
(v) "Intercept" means the aural acquisition of the contents of any oral or wire communication by use of an electronic, mechanical or other device; .
There are a few exceptions that are not pertinent in this instance, but the theme of the statute is to prohibit a person, with criminal sanctions attached to infractions, from willfully intercepting, disclosing, or using the contents of any wire or oral communication that is obtained in violation of the statute.
Saldana's argument is that acquiring the identities of the parties participating in a communication amounts to acquiring the contents of that communication within the purpose of this statute. Numerous different individuals can, however, have access to any given telephone number and, consequently, obtaining information regarding the name of the person owning the telephone number does not constitute acquiring information even as to the identity of the parties who were involved in any given communication. In this regard, it is also noteworthy that Wyo.Stat. § 7-3-601(a)(iv) (1987) defines an "electronic, mechanical or other device" as:
(iv) "Electronic, mechanical or other device" means any device or apparatus which can be used to intercept a wire or oral communication, other than:
(A) Any telephone, telex or telegraph equipment, or component thereof, used in the ordinary course of business; .
The equipment used to track the calls to, and from, Saldana's residence was equipment used by the telephone company to record connections in the interests of assessing charges in the ordinary course of its business. There is nothing in the record to indicate it was installed to intercept the contents of any wire or oral communication in contravention of the statute, and the information it furnished was specifically obtained for telephone company purposes. It was released to the authorities only under orders promulgated by virtue of a lawfully issued subpoena. It follows that, in light of Wyo.Stat. § 7-3-601(a)(iv) (1987), the devise was not an "electronic, mechanical or other device," and the information obtained by virtue of this equipment was not "intercepted."
We hold that the telephone toll records Saldana complains of were not "intercepted," and they were not, in fact, acquired, disclosed, or used contrary to the provisions of Wyo.Stat. § 7-3-602(a) (1987). The increased expectation of privacy the statute affords was not breached in this instance, and Saldana's claims to the contrary are not efficacious. In addition, in reaching this result, we recognize that the acquisition of telephone number information is not "aural acquisition of the contents of any oral or wire communication by use of an electronic, mechanical or other device," as is required for a violation of the statute. Wyo.Stat. § 7-3-601(a)(v) (1987) (emphasis added).
We next consider Saldana's contention that the testimony at trial encompassed testimony of an opinion concerning his guilt and an opinion relating to the credibility of certain witnesses, the result of which denied him his right to trial by jury. See U.S. Const, amend. VI; Wyo. Const, art. 1, § 9. These contentions relate to testimony by DCI Agent Arter in two separate areas. The first of those related to the interpretation of certain papers found during the search of the residence. The second related to comment upon the identification of an individual by a Mr. and Mrs. Cardeilhac as well as the explanation for the dismissal of the charge against Torres.
Turning to the matter of the papers first, the record discloses that Agent Arter testified before the jury that the two papers taken from the bedroom of the home indicated a long-term trafficking in controlled substances; that the individuals involved in the trafficking trusted each other greatly; and that "there was a knowledge of what was in the package." Specifically, Arter testified:
In the residence we picked up some papers that were recovered from the master bedroom of the Saldana residence which indicated to us through our experience, indicated trafficking in controlled substances, cocaine or something of that nature, or papers that indicated that there was a knowledge of what was in the package and that this type of thing had occurred before.
Defense counsel had objected to the admission of these papers on the ground they were not relevant because no showing was made with respect to who actually wrote the allegedly incriminating memoranda and because the handwriting appeared to be that of two different people. Nonetheless, they ultimately were received into evidence.
With respect to identification of the individual by the other witnesses, the State attempted, during the trial, to tie one Greg Chisholm, referred to as a known narcotics dealer, into its case. In making this effort, the State relied in part on testimony provided by Mr. and Mrs. Cardeilhac, the owners of a resort area known as the Oregon Trail Lodge. Both Mr. and Mrs. Cardeilhac claimed they had observed a blond male in and around their property during the month of February. This fact was relevant in light of earlier testimony indicating that an individual identified as "Hilario Torres" had registered at the motel at approximately the same time. When shown a photograph of Chisholm, both of the Cardeilhacs testified the individual in the picture resembled the blond male they had observed, but they could not be certain it was the same man.
The State recalled Agent Arter, and he was permitted to testify as follows:
What I did was I got a stack of photographs. I took a stack of individuals that are known to be involved in this case, the defendant, Maro Saldana, I took a photograph of Federico Saldana, lime-ro Saldana, Amato Saldana, Greg Chisholm, Hilario Torres, and I believe there was it. There were 7 or 8 pictures.
Defense counsel objected to the introduction of the photograph and the surrounding testimony on the ground that the witnesses who had testified were unable to make a positive identification of the parties allegedly involved. The defense argued that introduction of the evidence would be unduly and unfairly prejudicial under such circumstances. That objection was overruled by the court, and Arter was permitted to continue with this subject.
Arter's testimony then was:
There was one other — I just remembered there was Henry Castro's photo, also. He was also someone I felt was tied into this case. I showed the photographs to the individuals, in a stack, and I explained to them just to — look at the face and page through them. There was no order that the photographs were in. They were just random.
They went through and immediately discarded several of them, stated that they had never seen the individual. They stopped at one and said he looked vaguely familiar; and when they got to the photograph of Greg Chisholm they both stopped, independently, and said this individual had been there, had been contacted for making numerous phone calls. There were problems with the phone calls. They told me the entire story about the phone calls, but both Mr. and Mrs. Cardeilhac both independently identified Greg Chisholm as the individual in that room that day.
In addressing Arter's testimony, Saldana specifically objected to the testimony concerning how the papers taken from his bedroom tended to establish prior drug trafficking and his knowledge that the package contained cocaine. Saldana also contends there was error on the part of the trial court in permitting Arter to testify that the quantity and purity of the substance demonstrated it was meant for distribution and the telephone calls between his residence and the residences of his brothers, and between his residence and the Oregon Trail Lodge, established that Saldana and his brothers were trying to let each other know what was going on regarding the missing package. Saldana's argument is that all of these subjects reflected directly on his guilt, and Agent Arter was offering an opinion as to his guilt. Finally, Saldana objects to the testimony concerning the identifications or the lack of identifications by Mr. and Mrs. Car-deilhac as well as Arter's testimony regarding the dismissal of Torres as both amounting to comments on the credibility of witnesses.
In Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60, 66 (Wyo.1989), the court quoted from 3 Charles E. Torcía, Wharton's Criminal Evidence § 566 at 324-25 (14th ed. 1987), saying:
Ordinarily, the opinion of a lay or expert witness is not admissible if it amounts to a conclusion of law or a mixed conclusion of law and fact. Thus, a witness may not state his opinion as to whether the defendant was guilty or innocent of the crime charged; .
The court then held that "permitting a witness, lay or expert, to articulate an opinion as to the guilt of the accused constitutes plain error and demands reversal." Stephens, 774 P.2d at 67. See also Phillips v. State, 835 P.2d 1062 (Wyo.1992); Armstrong v. State, 826 P.2d 1106 (Wyo.1992); Bennett v. State, 794 P.2d 879 (Wyo.1990).
In addition to the testimony of Agent Arter, quoted above with respect to the papers seized during the search of the Sal-dana residence, Saldana points to the following testimony by Agent Arter as also encompassing a comment on his guilt:
In the residence we picked up some papers that were recovered from the master bedroom of the Saldana residence which indicated to us through our experience, indicated trafficking in controlled substances, cocaine or something of that nature, or papers that indicated that there was a knowledge of what was in the package and that this type of thing had occurred before,
and additionally:
Q. Now agent Arter, let's talk a little bit about 4½ or 4 ounces plus of cocaine?
A: Yes sir.
Q: First of all, have you ever seen it in rock form like that before?
A: Yes, I have, on many occasions.
Q: And does that in itself signify something based on your experience?
A: Based on my experience, it signifies it is for further distribution. Cocaine in that rock form means it was probably cut off a kilo size chunk of it. Cocaine when it is made and formed and shipped, it is shipped in kilo size packets in the rock, compressed form like that. When it is— when we intercept it in that way, it is either by a big dealer who is selling it, or through other people who are going to refine it to break it down into usable amounts, add adulterants to it, and then further put it out to the street to people that are actually going to use it.
It is very seldom we find someone for their personal use or someone who is not a distributor that has rock form of hydrochloric cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride in its form like that. It is usually in a powder already broke down and already cut, basically.
,
Q: What is the basic, bottom-of-the-line amount in a street transaction, usually?
A: Usually — and it varies from area to area — the area we work in the southeast here, we see deals that go for grams and as little as quarter grams, a quarter gram going for $25. The quarter gram is the basic user amount. What usually happens is a person who is buying will buy a gram itself, being about a hundred dollars worth. He will buy that gram. He will take half of it for his own personal use and not cut it. He will cut something else into the other half to equal his whole gram again, and then he will resell that gram either as a full gram or half gram or quarter gram to someone else. It is cut, cut down again. It is pretty weak as far as he is concerned, but he got half a gram of cocaine for his own use for that day, but he didn't spend a cent because he is getting his money back. That is the basic level we will see in this area.
Q: A quarter gram, when you get down to a quarter gram, that's what you use?
A: Basically, yes sir.
Q: And what usually — what has been the purity found in those quarter gram transactions?
A: Again, that varies from who you are getting it from, what the dealer is, who he is selling it to. Because if he is going to establish a clientele, he will keep it at a little higher level of purity. We have bought as low as 6 percent purity.
The normal, I would say, is somewhere between 20 and 25 percent, 20 to 25 percent being the cocaine, the other 75, 80 percent being some sort ever [sic] additive, adulterate.
⅜{ sjt * %
Q: So you are confident in the proposition that these 4 ounces plus of cocaine that you seized was not a consumer amount or quantity?
A: No sir, I can't testify that one person was going to cut it down to the amounts we are talking about and sell it [out], but it was for distribution somewhere to be cut'and put out in the streets in about 20 to 25 percent purity.
The specific testimony, furnished on redirect examination, regarding the significance of the long distance telephone calls was as follows:
Q: So there is a suggestion here, perhaps, that members of the defendants family were calling other family members to let them know what was going on?
A: Yes.
The selection of the particular testimony to which Saldana now objects suggests he would have us extend the holding in Stephens to reach, and exclude, all opinion testimony, expert or not, on any issue that could go to proving an element of the crime charged. Saldana's view is that any analysis offered by a witness on the evidence presented at trial is equivalent to a direct, and thus impermissible, comment on the defendant's guilt. We are not inclined to accept this premise, especially in light of the provisions of Wyo.R.Evid. 702 that permit opinion evidence even on an ultimate issue. Stephens; McCabe v. R.A. Manning Constr. Co., 674 P.2d 699 (Wyo.1983). An interpretation of the evidence by a witness, even though that interpretation may be important in establishing an element of the crime and thus leading to the inference of guilt, is not in the same category as an actual conclusional statement on the guilt or innocence of the accused party. We are particularly firm in this determination if the record demonstrates the proffered opinion was helpful to the jury in determining the facts of the case and was elicited for that reason. Wyo.R.Evid. 702.
The inquiry by the court when claims like this are raised, assuming that proper objections are presented, must be whether the testimony sought to be elicited will constitute a direct, and therefore impermissible, opinion with respect to the innocence or guilt of the accused or whether it is nothing more than related information offered to assist the jury in resolving the factual issues placed before it. See Wyo. R.Evid. 702; Rivera v. State, 840 P.2d 933 (Wyo.1992); Stephens; Lessard v. State, 719 P.2d 227 (Wyo.1986). Testimony that is given only as an aid to the jury in its pursuit of the facts and does not address directly the guilt of the accused in a conclu-sional way does not deprive a defendant of the constitutional right to a trial by jury.
In our view, contrary to the contentions of Saldana, the comments of Agent Arter were not offered as opinions concerning Saldana's guilt; taken by themselves, they could be construed as not even directly implicating Saldana. The average person, a concept that probably includes at least some jurors in this case, is not knowledgeable with respect to matters involving commerce in cocaine. We perceive these comments, instead of being comments on Sal-dana's guilt, to be statements offered chiefly to the jury to aid it in understanding and resolving the factual issues of the case. We understand the devastating impact a witness perceived to be an expert in a particular field may have when he offers testimony interpreting other evidence and that testimony is contrary to the interests of the defendant. That does not require, however, that the jury be isolated in some constructive vacuum under the pretext all comment on evidence, no matter how unbiased or neutral it might be, is unfair to the accused. In our jurisprudence, the trial is a search for the truth, the identification of the truth being within the province of the jury, and that effort demands the jury be given the benefit of whatever assistance may lawfully be provided. There was no error in the admission of Agent Arter's testimony in this case.
Much the same thing is true about Salda-na's contentions that Arter commented im-permissibly on the credibility of the witnesses. When cross-examined with respect to the testimony provided by Mr. and Mrs. Cardeilhac as to their inability to positively identify Greg Chisholm, Agent Arter testified:
Q: Now, when they identified this picture, I take it by your testimony it was a picture of Greg Chisholm; is that correct?
A: That's correct.
Q: How positive were they about that identification at that time?
A: That they had seen this individual, or who he was?
Q: Well, let's start with that they had seen him?
A: Mr. Cardeilhac was immediately certain that that was the individual that was involved in a room and was making all the phone calls. Mrs. Cardeilhac said the same thing from the get-go. She said when she saw the picture, "I know this guy. He was the one who made all the phone calls, and I had seen him outside." They were independently certain of it from the first time they saw the pictures.
Q: Now, you used the word "certain." You were sure in your mind that they were absolutely certain?
A: In my mind, it was the first time they had ever seen the photo. It was an initial response that immediately struck to them. You could see their eyes lit up that they recognized him from somewhere, and their first words were the words that came out.
I have a tendency to agree with that rather than when they get to the stand and are trying to swear to something. They were convinced. They have since talked themselves out of it.
Q: So you think what they told you makes more difference than what they say here?
A: I don't know that I said that. I hope you didn't understand that.
This court has held, on reasoning similar to the rationale in Stephens, that it is error for an expert witness to comment on the credibility of another witness. Zabel v. State, 765 P.2d 357 (Wyo. 1988). See Rivera; Lessard. The determination of credibility is exclusively within the province of the jury because the members of the jury are themselves the only "experts" in that area. Zabel. Nevertheless, testimony assisting the jury in understanding some aspect of the testimony of another witness that does not comment directly on that witness' credibility or veracity is not invasive of the role of the jury. Even though that testimony may have the collateral or incidental effect of either supporting or denigrating the other witnesses' statements, its admission does not constitute error. Zabel. See Griego v. State, 761 P.2d 973 (Wyo.1988). In connection with this issue, reality demonstrates all testimony may affect the credibility of other testimony in one way or another.
Viewed superficially, this testimony may appear to be contrary to Zabel because it does contravene statements made by the Cardeilhacs without providing any additional information helpful to the jury. We recognize, however, that this testimony was elicited by defense counsel in cross-examination of a key prosecution witness. It was not developed by the State. For that reason, there is no need to analyze its impact. If the error was made,'it was the error of the defendant, not that of the State of Wyoming, and we will not charge it to the prosecution. This sort of product is one of the hazards of cross-examination. Even though we find nothing improper in this particular instance, we do recognize that, if reversible error is found under this situation, precedent is established that would be regarded in the future as permitting a defense attorney to create error if it looked like the trial was leading to an unfortunate result for his client. We do not think the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial requires that such an opportunity be made available. In this instance, we also note, even though the testimony was elicited by the defendant, no motion was made to strike it. Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude there was error committed in its introduction.
With respect to Arter's testimony about the investigative disposition of the case against Torres, any tie between that testimony and Torres' testimony is tenuous at best. We see no merit to the contention by Saldana that Arter's testimony that Torres was not charged because he was "convinced beyond any doubt that he had no part in this plan to receive or deliver cocaine" constitutes any comment on the credibility of the witness. Arter was merely reporting what had happened in connection with the case. As we noted earlier, there is no requirement that the jury work in a vacuum in order to insure the guarantees of a fair trial. In concluding the analysis of this issue, we reiterate the rule that evidentiary matters are generally within the sound discretion of the trial court, and that discretion will not be overturned on appeal absent clear indications it has been abused. L.U. Sheep Co. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Hot Springs County, 790 P.2d 663 (Wyo.1990); Arnold v. Mountain West Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co., 707 P.2d 161 (Wyo.1985). There was no abuse in this instance.
The next claim to be addressed is Saldana's contention that the introduction of the papers found in his dresser drawer violated his right to confrontation. See Wyo. Const, art. 1, § 10. Essentially, Sal-dana is claiming these papers were hearsay, and he then elaborates by asserting the "documents" were out-of-court statements admitted without a showing of the unavailability of the witness and without fitting them into any recognized exception to the hearsay rule. We conclude these papers do not fit within the definition of hearsay found in Wyo.R.Evid. 801(c):
Hearsay. — "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
One of the papers carried language reading "1 oz. front 2-10-89 paid $1,000.00" and "front 2-12-89 paid 825 owes 575." The other simply listed Federico Saldana's address and contained the words "to pay 1/yr." We understand these notations are the out-of-court statements complained of by Saldana. As he acknowledges in his brief, these "documents" were offered as circumstantial evidence of his past trafficking in controlled substances and of his knowledge regarding the illicit contents of the package. They were not offered to establish the quantity and price of drugs, Federico's address, or any other matter contained therein. Consequently, since these papers were not offered "to prove the truth of the matter asserted," they simply do not constitute hearsay. Salda-na's creative claim in this regard fails for that obvious reason. Wyo.R.Evid. 801(c). The papers were evidence properly admitted at trial, and no error was committed by the court in receiving them.
Saldana's last claim of error obviously depends upon his success with respect to some of the other claims. We have resolved those other issues contrary to Saldana's argument. We still consider the question whether the admissible evidence presented at trial, viewed collectively, was sufficient to sustain Saldana's conviction. The standard with respect to sufficiency of evidence is this court's assessment as to whether all of the evidence presented is "adequate to support a reasonable inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to be drawn by the finder of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state." Lopez v. State, 788 P.2d 1150, 1152 (Wyo.1990); Schiefer v. State, 774 P.2d 133 (Wyo.1989); Washington v. State, 751 P.2d 384 (Wyo.1988). See Wehr v. State, 841 P.2d 104 (Wyo.1992) (citing Dreiman v. State, 825 P.2d 758 (Wyo.1992)); Jennings v. State, 806 P.2d 1299 (Wyo.1991); Kavanaugh v. State, 769 P.2d 908 (Wyo.1989); Dangel v. State, 724 P.2d 1145 (Wyo.1986). We do not substitute our judgment for that of the jury in applying this rule, and our only duty is to determine if a quorum of reasonable and rational individuals would, or even could, have come to the same result the jury actually did. See Munson v. State, 770 P.2d 1093 (Wyo.1989); Corson v. State, 766 P.2d 1155 (Wyo.1988); Wells v. State, 613 P.2d 201 (Wyo.1980). We do not serve as a second jury involved in assessing factual matters that apply to the case at hand according to our own perspective. Neither can we weigh the evidence nor re-examine the credibility of witnesses. Kavanaugh; Johnston v. State, 747 P.2d 1132 (Wyo. 1987). The judgment and sentence of the trial court must be affirmed if the test just stated is met.
The offense of which Saldana was convicted is encompassed in Wyo.Stat. § 35-7-1031(a) (1988). That statute provides, in pertinent part, that "it is unlawful for any person to manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance." At trial, the jury was instructed:
Instruction No. 6
The necessary elements of the crime of unlawful possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, , are:
1. The crime occurred within the County of Goshen, State of Wyoming, on or about the date of March 2, 1989; and
2. That the defendant possessed cocaine, a Schedule II narcotic drug controlled substance;
3. That the defendant did so possess with a specific intent to deliver cocaine, a Schedule II narcotic drug controlled substance; and
4. That the defendant did so knowingly and intentionally.
If you find from your consideration of all of the evidence that any of these elements has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt,- then you should-find the defendant not guilty.
If, on the other hand, you find from your consideration of all of the evidence that each of these elements has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant guilty.
There is no dispute by Saldana that the package addressed to Torres was delivered on March 2, 1989, nor that it contained cocaine. The only factual issue here before the jury is whether Saldana possessed the substance knowingly with an intent to deliver. The State's position is that, acknowledging the lack of actual possession on the part of Saldana, Saldana had constructive possession of the controlled substance, as that has generally been defined. The State contends this circumstance is sufficient to establish that element. The instruction given to the jury on this issue was:
Instruction No. 7
The law recognizes two kinds of possession: actual possession and constructive possession. A person who knowingly has direct physical control over a thing, at a given time, is then in actual possession of it.
A person who, although not in actual possession, knowingly has both the power and the intention, at a given time, to exercise dominion or control over a thing, either directly or through another person or persons, is then in constructive possession of it.
The law recognizes also that possession may be sole or joint. If one person alone has actual or constructive possession of a thing, possession is sole. If two or more persons share actual or constructive possession of a thing, possession is joint. You may find that the element of possession as that term is used in these instructions is present if you find beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant had actual or constructive possession, either alone or jointly with others.
An act or a failure to act is "knowingly" done, if done voluntarily and intentionally, and not because of mistake or accident or other innocent reason.
The State's position is correct that constructive possession is sufficient to meet the possession requirement in Wyoming controlled substance cases. The element of possession, in this instance constructive possession, may be established by circumstantial evidence. Wise v. State, 654 P.2d 116 (Wyo.1982). See Deluna v. State, 501 P.2d 1021 (Wyo.1972). Constructive possession is deemed present if the person charged as possessor has sufficient control over the party with actual possession that the illicit goods would be forthcoming at his command. As that concept was stated in Wise, 654 P.2d at 119:
If a defendant is sufficiently associated with the persons having physical custody so that he is able, without difficulty to cause the drug to be produced for a customer, he can also be found by a jury to have dominion and control over the drug and, therefore, possession.-
In the trial in this case, the evidence presented to the jury was that Torres was an unemployed laborer temporarily residing in Saldana's basement. It appears from the record that, even though the package was addressed to him, he had no knowledge of the contents of the package in its unopened condition. Perhaps more importantly, the record demonstrates that Saldana went downstairs and brought the package back upstairs when he was requested to do so by Arter, posing as the delivery man. Under these circumstances, the reasonable jury certainly is entitled to infer constructive possession of the controlled substance. Since such a finding is both rational and plausible, it should not be disturbed.
Turning to the element of the intent to deliver, the jury was provided evidence, again circumstantial, with respect to Salda-na's connection with previously convicted drug dealers. Those individuals happened to be his brothers. There also was submitted admissible evidence that the quantity and purity of the cocaine in question was such that it would not be likely a possessor would have acquired it for personal use. Circumstantial evidence, which is "proof of facts and circumstances from which the main fact to be proved reasonably follows according to common experience of mankind," is sufficient to establish the elements of a crime. Murray v. State, 671 P.2d 320, 328 (Wyo.1983); Russell v. State, 583 P.2d 690 (Wyo.1978). Cf. Jozen v. State, 746 P.2d 1279 (Wyo.1987) (holding circumstantial evidence has equivalent standing to direct evidence in criminal prosecution). As was true with respect to the element of possession, the jury in this instance would be entitled to infer the intent to deliver based upon this evidence. We should not, nor will we, overrule its findings.
In summation, after analyzing all of the issues presented in this appeal, we conclude: Saldana was not denied the right to a jury trial because of statements that were admitted allegedly constituting comments on his guilt or because of testimony allegedly constituting comment on the credibility of witnesses; the admission of papers found in his personal dresser drawer did not violate his constitutional right to confrontation; his telephone records and other evidence derived therefrom were not seized in contravention of Wyo. Const, art. 1, § 4; and the same telephone records were not intercepted in violation of Wyo. Stat. § 7-3-601 to -611 (1987). We further determine that the admissible evidence presented at trial indeed is sufficient to sustain his conviction. The judgment and sentence of the trial court is affirmed.
MACY, C.J., files a specially concurring opinion.
GOLDEN, J., files a concurring opinion.
URBIGKIT, J., Retired, files a dissenting opinion.