Case Name: Hodson v. Tibbetts et al.
Court: Iowa Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Iowa
Decision Date: 1864-04-19
Citations: 16 Iowa 97
Docket Number: 
Parties: Hodson v. Tibbetts et al.
Judges: Dillon and Cole, J. J., concurring.
Reporter: Iowa Reports
Volume: 16
Pages: 97–110

Head Matter:
Hodson v. Tibbetts et al.
1.’ Attachment: jurisdictkw: hekt. In an attachment suit, under the Code of 1851, property was levied upon under the writ, a return of not found, as to defendants, made, and the notice duly published in the manner prescribed by statute; and judgment was entered without any proof that a copy of the petition and notice was sent by mail to the defendant, and without any excuse for not so sending the same: Held:
1. That the District Court did not have jurisdiction to render the judgment, and that a sale of the property attached thereunder was invalid and should be canceled at the suit of a subsequent purchaser of the attachment defendant: following BroghiU v. Lash, 3 G. Greene, 351; HcGahen v. Carr, 6 Iowa, 331.
2. That the judgment could not be cured and.rendered valid by supplying the defects in the service and the proofs thereof after it was rendered.
3. That the entry of the judgment did not discharge the lien of the attachment on the property seized; and that the lien attached to the same in the hands of a purchaser, after the entry of the judgment, from the attachment defendant.
Appeal from Clinton District Court.
Tuesday, April 19.
On the 20th of October, 1857, Merritt brought his action in the Clinton District Court, upon the promissory notes, against William and Thomas Tibbetts. An attachment was asked and obtained, on the proper affidavit, that the defendants had absconded from the State. Defendants were not personally served, but the attachment was levied upon certain lands, a portion of which are the subject of this controversy. May, 7, 1858, judgment was rendered against the defendants, the “ record entry,” recites: “ This day this cause coming on to be heard, and the plaintiff appears by Graham his attorney, and the defendants, although three times solemnly called in open Court, come not, but make default, which is now here entered by order of Court; and it appearing the defendants have been duly returned by the Sheriff of Clinton county ‘not found,’ and that publication of the notice of the pendency of this suit had been made to the defendants for four full weeks successively in the ‘ Lyons Mirror,’ a weekly newspaper published - in Lyons, Iowa, which publication was duly made according to law, and it further appearing, that this action was brought on two promissory notes, the Court orders and the clerk assesses the damages at four hundred and forty dollars and twenty cents, with ten per cent interest per annum.
“It is therefore ordered, considered and adjudged, that the plaintiff do have and recover of and from the defendants the said sum of $440.20 damages, with costs, taxed, &c., and that special execution issue therefor against the property attached.”
An execution issued on this judgment, and the land in dispute was sold to one Newhouse, on the 27th of June, 1859, and a deed therefor made by the Sheriff. In July, 1859, Newhouse sold, by quit-claim deed, to Delilah Merritt, the wife of plaintiff in the law or attachment proceedings). On the 27th of August afterwards, the said Delilah sold and conveyed, by like deed, to Corbin & Dow; and on the same day Merritt assigned all his claim to the notes, right of action and judgment to the grantees in said last deed, the record, however, showing the judgment to be satisfied by the sale of the property to Newhouse.
No proof was made to the District Court, at or before the date of the judgment, that a copy of the petition and notice had been sent by mail to defendants, nor was any excuse shown for not doing so, as required by the Statute.
By deeds of November 27th, 1857, and November 28th, 1858, William and Thomas Tibbetts conveved the lands in controversy to complainant, who, on the first of December, 1859, filed his bill in this case, alleging that the judgment against the Tibbetts was null and void, and praying that the deeds and titles thereunder might be canceled. Corbin and Dow answered, denying generally the averments of the bill; and further asked, if the judgment was found to be void, that they might be subrogated to Merritt’s rights and have the benefit of the attachment lien.
On the hearing, the judgment was held null and void, but the lien created by the service of the attachment was preserved. The other material facts will be found in the opinion. Both parties appeal.
Grant & Smith for the complainant.
I. An attachment is a conditional lien, dependent upon two things: 1. A real debt; 2. A judgment for that debt. Drake Attach.. 233 ; Tayler v. Mixter, 11 Pick., 341; Suydam v. Huggeford, 23 Pick., 465; Lamb v. Belden, 16 Ark., 539Hall v. Cummings et al, 3 Ala., 398; Harrow v. Lyon, 3 G. Greene, 157.
II. The judgment being void it is not competent for a court of equity or a court of law to revise and correct it now; and by giving a new and proper judgment, give new life and validity to the attachment lien. Olmsiead, v. Webster, 4 Seld., 412 ; Blair v. Bussell, 1 Cart., 516; Smith v. Dudley, 2 Pike, 60; Walker v. Jefferson, 5 Pike (Ark.); Bawden et al v. Baffly, 14 Arle, 203 ; Van Dyke v. The State, 22 Ala., 57; Allen v. Whitney, 1 Story, 310; Haley v. Baird, 1 Hew. & Mini., 24.
G. S. C. Dow for the defendants,
contended that this case is within the rule of Boker v. Chaffline, 12 Iowa, 206.

Opinion:
Wright, Ch. J.
The Code of 1851 (§ 1826), in force when the law judgment was rendered, provides that, " When service has been made by publication only, and no appearance had, default shall not be entered until proof has been made that a copy of the petition and notice was directed 'to the defendant through the post-office, at his usual place of residence (stating the place) in sufficient time for his appearance, or that such residence is unknown to the plaintiff, or his attorney, or business agent, and could not .with reasonable diligence be ascertained." In the case of Broghill v. Lash, 3 G. Greene, 357; and McGahen v. Carr, 6 Iowa, 331, a construction was given to this section, which if followed must be decisive of one and the principal point in respondent's appeal. That this case falls within the rule there recognized does not seem, indeed, to be very strongly controverted. It is suggested, however, that the subsequent case of Boker v. Chapline, 12 Iowa, 204, is in conflict with the former rulings, or at least that under that decision this judgment is not vulnerable to tbe attack now-made. The circumstances of that case were so very different, however, from what appeared in the prior ones that we cannot believe there is any actual, if even seeming, conflict. The ease before us is much, very much, more like those first referred to, and must be governed by them. Thus holding, we need not repeat the arguments justifying the construction given in those cases to the statute.
Following these cases, therefore, a majority of the Court conclude, that upon this point the Court below did not err. Before leaving it, however, it is due to the members of the Court thus holding,-to say, that one of them regards the construction fully in- accordance with the spirit and policy of the statute, while another, without going further, is content to place this case upon the authority of the former rulings; and the third, without wishing to be positively concluded upon the question, conceives it to be his duty to follow the cases referred to, inasmuch as their correctness is not seriously controverted by counsel. Whether the attachment of the property conferred jurisdiction without reference to the subsequent proceedings, or whether the rule recognized in Paine's Lessees v. Mooreland, 15 Ohio, 435, and other similar cases relied upon by the other members of the Court, is applicable under a bill of this character, and a statute like ours,- is a question not made in the argument, and we have therefore not deemed its discussion or examination necessary.
It seems, however, that in September, 1861, after this bill was filed, plaintiff, in the law action, obtained an order of the following purport: He had filed on the 24th of August, 1859, an affidavit "of the non-residence of the said William and Thomas Tibbetts" and it was ordered and adjudged in September, 1861, that the said affidavit "be and the same is hereby ordered to be filed as of the 7th of May, 1858," (the date of the judgment), and should have like effect. And it is now claimed that though the judgment was originally invalid the filing of this affidavit and this order cured such invalidity and perfected the title under the sheriff's sale. In this view, however, we cannot concur.
It is not as if the record was incorrect, and plaintiff had, upon a proper case made, obtained an order impressing it with its true character. - Thus, if copies of the notice and petition were, in fact, sent to the defendants, or if the affidavit in excuse, contemplated by the statute, was actually filed, and plaintiff had obtained leave to substitute them if lost, or to file the proof nunc pro tunc, the question would have been very different from that now presented. But the proceedings of September, 1861, show that no such affidavit was filed until in August, in 1859; and establish affirmatively that the required proof was not made at or before the rendition of the judgment. The power of a court to correct or amend its judgments differs very widely from what was attempted in this case. To illustrate, an officer might have leave to amend his return or process in accordance with the truth, so as to prevent injustice and wrong, but the Court would have no power to sustain and uphold a judgment previously rendered, by allowing him, after its rendition, to make a service, because he ought to have made and intended to make one before. To sustain the position of respondents, would make jurisdiction depend, not upon what was done at or before the time of its exercise, but upon the action of parties and officers long after the judgment was rendered, the proceedings closed, and the rights of third persons had become vested. This should never be allowed. We need only remark, that the case of Walker v. Jefferson, 5 Ark., 23, relied upon by respondents, decides no question bearing remotely even, upon the one now under consideration. Suggesting that no argument of conclusiveness can be drawn from the order of September, 1861, inasmuch as the persons holding the title to the land under Tibbetts, were not parties to tbe proceeding, we pass to the consideration of complainant's appeal.
The decree, after setting aside the judgment,'proceeds at great length and with much particularity, to adjust and settle the rights of the respective parties. We do not understand complainant to object to the details of this decree, but to stand upon the proposition, that if there was no valid judgment, there was no attachment lien, and that the Court could not hold and declare that the property seized by the attachment should be held liable and bound to pay the debt of Merritt, or those who seek to be subrogated to his rights. The argument is this : The attachment of property passes no estate to the plaintiff, nor is the interest of defendant thereby divested. It constitutes a lien, it is true, but this can only be made available to the plaintiff} upon condition that he recover a judgment, which alone can determine that the claim on which the attachment rests, is just. If he fails to obtain "his judgment, the inchoate lien is gone. Drake Attach., 233; Hale v. Cummings, 3 Ala., 398.
The rule, as thus stated, however, has particular reference to cases where there is final judgment for defendant, or where plaintiff fails to prosecute his action, and the same is, as a consequence, dismissed. For the attachment proceedings are merely auxiliary to the main action, and if plaintiff fails in that, the auxiliary process failed also. But in this instance, there was no judgment for defendant; plaintiff did not fail in his action. It is, as though a judgment for plaintiff had been reversed in an appellate court, and the cause remanded. In such a case, the attachment lien is not lost. It may be assimulated also to a case, where a judgment at law is set aside on the ground of fraud, accident or mistake. Such an order remits the parties to their respective rights and liens as they existed before the judgment. The invalidity of the judgment, for whatever cause, does not defeat the lien. The original demand still exists. All the proceedings leading to the seizure of the property remain unaffected, and the parties are heard again upon the plaintiff's claim. The Case is taken up just as if no judgment had been rendered; all rights depending on the preceding steps being unimpaired.
These rules are sustained, as it seems to us, by the soundest principles of equity. If respondents have any valid defense to this claim, they have an opportunity, under this decree, to show it. Plaintiff, in the original action, if he has no just claim against respondents, fails entirely, and the lien of the attachment is at pnce extinguished. Not only so, but complainant bought, with constructive knowledge of the attachment lien. He knew then, that the property had been seized and was held under the writ. Suppose the execution had been set aside, and the judgment sustained, what weight then would have been in the proposition that he should* not pay the money owing on the judgment? None whatever; and the two cases are not substantially different. There has been no failure of the plaintiff's action. The Court rendered a judgment, it is true, which is held, on the application of defendants therein, or complainants who claim under them, to be invalid. And it strikes us as pre-eminently just and equitable that those holding under the sheriff's deed, and to whom the judgment, notes, and all claims connected therewith were assigned, should be subrogated to all the rights of said plaintiff, with the privilege of prosecuting said claim for their own use and benefit; and that the complainant, if he would take the land, must do so subject to the lien of the attachment, which has been in no manner set aside or dissolved. As to the right of Corbin & Dow to be thus substituted, we refer to Braught v. Griffith and McCleary, ante.
Affirmed.
Dillon and Cole, J. J., concurring.