Case Name: Lundy v. Second Ave. R. Co.
Court: New York Court of Common Pleas
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1892-11
Citations: 1 Misc. 100
Docket Number: 
Parties: Lundy v. Second Ave. R. Co.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Miscellaneous Reports
Volume: 1
Pages: 100–104

Head Matter:
Lundy v. Second Ave. R. Co.
(New York Common Pleas — General Term,
November, 1892.)
Defendant’s car stopped three or four feet below a crossing to permit a. passenger to alight. While plaintiff was attempting to cross the street in the rear of the car, she was struck and injured by the car suddenly moving backwards as the driver relaxed the brakes. Defendant gave no evidence; the court denied plaintiff’s request to go to the jury and dismissed the complaint. Held, error; that whether there was negligence on the part of defendant or its servant should have been submitted to the jury.
Appeal from judgment and order denying new trial..' Action by Elizabeth E. Lundy for negligent injury, upon this-state of facts: Defendant’s car having stopped three or four-feet below the crossing, plaintiff undertook to pass about a foot in its rear, when it suddenly moved backward, causing-the injury in controversy. The complaint was dismissed.
George W. Wilson, for plaintiff (appellant).
Payson Merrill, for defendant (respondent).

Opinion:
Pryor, J.
If, upon any construction of the evidence, it be-sufficient to authorize a verdict for the plaintiff, the dismissal of the complaint was error. Stackus v. R. R. Co., 19 N. Y. 464; Clemence v. City, 66 id. 334, 338. Hence, if the inferences from the evidence be not certain .and incontrovertible, the question of negligence is for determination by the jury. Hart v. Bridge Co., 80 N. Y. 622.
Upon the evidence before us, the jury would have been warranted in the conclusion that the driver might have so started the car as to arrest its retrograde movement; or, if this were impossible, that ordinary care required him to give notice to persons in the way of probable injury.
" To justify a nonsuit on the ground of contributory negligence, the undisputed facts must show the omission or commission of some act which the law adjudges negligence." Stackus v. R. R. Co., supra. Clearly, no act of the plaintiff can be held to be negligence as matter of law.
Conlin v. Rodgers, 39 N. Y. St. Repr. 51, is authority only for the proposition that in the absence of any evidence as to the occasion of the injury — in other words, in the absence of evidence on the issue of negligence — a nonsuit is inevitable. Dobbins v. Brown, 119 N. Y. 188. Here, the cause of the injury was demonstrated; and we are unable to affirm that it is equally consistent with inferences fatal and favorable to the plaintiff's case.
The conclusion is, that the judgment should be reversed and a new trial ordered, costs to abide the event.
Daly, Ch. J., concurs.