Case Name: George Morton and Philo Clark v. John Edwin
Court: Vermont Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Vermont
Decision Date: 1846-12
Citations: 19 Vt. 77
Docket Number: 
Parties: George Morton and Philo Clark v. John Edwin.
Judges: 
Reporter: Vermont Reports
Volume: 19
Pages: 77–85

Head Matter:
George Morton and Philo Clark v. John Edwin.
The certificate of a justice of the peace, of the time when an execution and return of levy upon real estate was recorded in his office, is. but prima Jade evidence; and parol evidence is admissible to show the true time when such record was made.
The justice of the peace, who made such record and certificate, maybe called as a witness, to prove when the record was in fact made.
The levy of an execution upon real estate is a proceeding» invitwm; the requirements of the statute are in the nature of a condition precedent, and must have been strictly complied with, in order to pass the title.
Qumre, Whether it is essential to the passing of the title, that the execution and return must have been recorded at length in the office of the town clerk and of the clerk, or justice of the peace, from whence it issued, within the life of the execution ?
But at all events the creditor cannot sustain an action of ejectment against the debtor, founded upon the levy, unless the execution and return have been recorded at length, in both offices, prior to the commencement of the ■ action.
In this case, after judgment had been pronounced, affirming the judgment of the court below, which was in favor of the defendant, the judgment of affirmance, on motion, was not entered up, but the court, pro forma, reversed the judgment of the county court and suffered the plaintiff to become nonsuit.
Ejectment for land in Williston. Plea, the general issue, and trial by the court, March Term, 1845, — Bennett, J., presiding.
The plaintiffs claimed title to the premises by virtue of the levy of an execution in their favor against the defendant, and gave in evidence, among other things, a certified copy of the record of the execution and return of the levy from the office of the justice of the peace who issued the execution. The execution was dated October 10, 1842, and was made returnable in one hundred and twenty days. The officer’s return of the levy was in due form, and was dated February 7, 1843; and there was appended to it a certificate, signed by the justice, in these words, — “ Received and recorded, February 7, 1843, at six o’clock in the afternoon.” To this the defendant objected, and he offered to prove, by the justice who issued the execution, that the record was not in fact made by him until after the expiration of the life of the execution. The plaintiffs objected to this evidence, but the objection was overruled and the justice was introduced as a witness, and testified that the execution was returned to him within its life, and he then minuted upon it the true time when it was received for record, but that he did not in fact record it in his office until after the commencement of this suit. Upon this evidence the court held that the title to the premises did not pass by the levy and rendered judgment for the defendant. Exceptions by plaintiffs.
C. D. Kasson for plaintiffs.
1. The important question in this case arises upon the construction of section seventeen of chap. 42 of the Revised Statutes. By comparing that section with sections four and six of chap. 60, it will be noticed, that the language relative to the recording of deeds is far more imperative than that relating to the recording of executions. Yet it has been uniformly held, that, as between parties and purchasers with notice, a deed is good without recording. The object of the statute is notice to others. The record in the town clerk’s office is sufficient for this, or, if not, the files of the justice are as •open to inspection as his records. The actual time of transcribing a deed on the book has always been held to have relation to the time it was received into the office for record, and so, when a record is required and is made, the instrument becomes operative from its date, or execution, by retrospect, or relation. Douglass v. Spooner, N. Chip. 74. Our statute upon this subject seems to be a copy, in most of its phraseology, of the Massachusetts statute; and it has been often held there, that the actual transcribing of the return of the levy was unnecessary. Laddv. Blunt,A Mass. 403. McLellan v. Whitney, 15 Mass. 137. Prescott v. Pettee, 3 Pick. 331. 1 Sw. Dig. 795. 6 T. R. 20. The uniform construction practically given to the statute in this State is entitled to great weight, as furnishing evidence of the plain intention of the legislature.
2. We claim, that, as the duly certified copy of the execution and return, offered in evidence, showed them to be recorded, it could not be contradicted by parol. The certificate that the execution is recorded, and of the time when it was received, is part of the record itself. Barnard v. Flanders, 12 Vt. 658. Durfee v. Hoag, 1 Aik. 286. Spalding v. Chamberlain, 12 Vt. 538. Pike v. Hill, 15 Vt. 183.
D. A. Smalley for defendant.
1. The levy, under which the plaintiff claims title, is invalid,— the record not having been made in the justice’s office within the life ¿Í the execution. Downer v. Hazen, 10 Vt. 418. Hubbard v. Dewey, 2 Aik. 312. Hall v. Hall, 5 Vt. 304. Bennett, J., in Fletcher v. Bradley, 12 Vt. 22.
2. The statute requires, that the execution be recorded, — not merely received for record. And such a levy being solely authorized by statute, the directions of the statute must be literally followed, in order to make it valid. The minute made by the justice is not even a part of the process of recording. It constitutes no notice to any one. Burton v. Pond, 5 Day 162.
3. The evidence of the justice was properly admitted, to show when the record produced was actually made. Carpenter v. Sutoyer et al., 17 Vt. 122. Isaacs v. Chandler et al., cited in lb. Burton v. Pond, 5 Day 162. - '
. 4. Even if the court should be of opinion, that the levy might be recorded after the life of the execution had expired, and that it would then be effectual to pass the title, it would not help the present case, since it appears that the record was not made until after the commencement of this suit.

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Bennett, J.
The first question relates to the admissibility of the parol evidence, which was offered to show the true time, at which the execution was recorded in the office of the justice, from whom it issued. In the case of Olmstead v. Hoyt, 4 Day 436, it was held, that parol evidence was admissible, to show the actual time of praying put a writ, though it contravened its date ; and the same decision was had in Parkman v. Crosby, 16 Pick. 297; and in Connecticut it seems well established, that the return of an officer, whether on mesne or final process, is only prima facie evidence, and may be disproved by parol; Dutton et al. v. Tracy, 4 Conn. 79; Watson et al. v. Watson, 6 Conn. 334. In the case of Burton v. Pond, 5 Day 162, which was an action of ejectment to recover land set off on execution, the town clerk had endorsed on the execution, these words, "Received for record the 15th day of .Tune, 1809, and recorded by -Clerk." Yet it was held, that the true time, when the execution was recorded, might be shown by parol. The case of Isaacs v. Chandler et al., decided in our own • court, Lamoille County (1842) is a full authority for the decision of the court below. See Carpenter v. Sawyer et al., 17 Vt. 122.
In Hubbard v. Dewey, 2 Aik. 312, it was expressly held, that the respective certificates of the town clerk and magistrate, or clerk of the court, that they have recorded the execution, are but prima facie evidence and may be rebutted.
The evidence in this case shows, that the execution was not recorded in the justice's office, until after this suit was commenced. The important inquiry is, shall this defeat the present action ? The statute provides, that " All executions, extended and levied upon real estate, with the return of the officer thereon, being recorded in the office wherein deeds of such real estate are required by law to be recorded, and also returned into the office of the clerk of the court, or justice, from whom such execution issued, and there recorded, shall, as against the debtor in such execution, his heirs and assigns, make a good title to the creditor, his heirs and assigns forever." Rev. St. 240, § 17.
It has always been held, that, to pass the title to real estate under a levy of execution, the statute must have been strictly complied with. It is a proceeding in invitum, as was said in Mitchell v. Kirtland, 7 Conn. 229, and in derogation of the common law. Hence all the statute requisites to the passing of the title must have been complied with. They are in the nature of conditons precedent. The record ing of the execution in each of the offices is as much a prerequisite to the passing of the title, as the levy itself.
The question raised in this case can hardly be considered an open one in this state. In Hubbard v. Dewey, 2 Aik. 312, it was expressly held, that the title does not pass, until the execution has been recorded at length in both offices; and this has been the doctrine of our courts as often as the question has come before them. See Hall v. Hall, 5 Vt. 304. Downer v. Hazen, 10 Vt. 418. The same doctrine has been established in Connecticut, under their statute, which is similar to ours. Burton v. Pond, 5 Day 162. Coe v. Stow, 8 Conn. 536.
It is said in argument, that the recording the execution in the justice's office should, by fiction of law, have relation back to the time it was received and filed for record. But a legal fiction is always consistent with equity, and will never be permitted to work á wrong, contrary to the real truth and substance of the thing. The plaintiffs had no title, when they commenced the suit; and there was no eviction, or adverse holding, by the defendant. It would be strange indeed, if all this could be supplied by legal fiction. The defendant is neither party or privy to the proceeding; and a fiction of law will not be adopted to the injury of such person. 5 Day 162. 8 Conn. 536. In the case of a deed, the title passes by the deed, and the only object of the recording is notice. In. such case, the recording may well have relation back to the time the deed was received and filed by th'e town clerk for'record.
It has been argued, that it is essential to the passing of the title, that the execution should have been recorded in the two respective offices in its life. In the case of Hubbard v. Dewey, 2 Aik. 312, it is said, it was held to be the duty of the officer to procure the execution to be recorded, not only in the. town clerk's office, but also in the office from which it issued; and in Hall v. Hall, 5 Vt. 304, it is said, the court advance the doctrine, that it is absolutely necessary, that some period should be definitely fixed, in which the doings of the officer should be completed and the rights of the parties fixed. That all this should be done being necessary to the passing of the title, it is claimed that it must be done within the life of the execution ; and if not, we are asked, when shall it be done ? And after what lapse of time shall it be too late to complete the records, so as to divest the debtor of his title 1
It is also said in argument, that the debtor's equity of redemption only runs from the time the legal title'passes from him, and that the crédito:- would not be entitled to possession until six months from the time the debtor is divested of his title; and if the officer might, at any convenient time after the execution had run out, cause it to be recorded in either of the offices, " no certain period " it is said, " could be definitely fixed, in which the doings of the officer should be completed and the rights of the parties fixed."
Though there appears to be much weight in the argument, yet we do not find it necessary to pass upon the question, notwithstanding the counsel have argued it at length.
To sustain ejectment, the plaintiff must have title, both at the commencement of the suit, and at the time of trial. We all agree, that the recording the execution at length in both offices was essential, and a prerequisite to the passing of the title under the levy. As this was not done, when this suit was commenced, the judgment of the county court must be affirmed.