Case Name: Hubie VIGREAUX v. LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT, the City of New Orleans and the New Orleans Public Service Inc
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1988-12-13
Citations: 535 So. 2d 518
Docket Number: No. 88-CA-0074
Parties: Hubie VIGREAUX v. LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT, the City of New Orleans and the New Orleans Public Service Inc.
Judges: Before SCHOTT, BARRY, KLEES, CIACCIO and ARMSTRONG, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 535
Pages: 518–522

Head Matter:
Hubie VIGREAUX v. LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT, the City of New Orleans and the New Orleans Public Service Inc.
No. 88-CA-0074.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
Dec. 13, 1988.
Rehearings Denied Jan. 18, 1989.
Sophia Pappas Barnett, Frank J. D’Ami-co, New Orleans, for plaintiff-appellant Hu-bie Vigreaux.
Caleb H. Didriksen, New Orleans, James Maher III, New Orleans, for defendant-ap-pellee New Orleans Public Service Inc.
Before SCHOTT, BARRY, KLEES, CIACCIO and ARMSTRONG, JJ.

Opinion:
KLEES, Judge.
This suit arises out of an accident in which plaintiff, Hubie Vigreaux sustained permanent physical injuries when his automobile struck a utility pole on Tchoupitou-las Street. Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, the City of New Orleans, the Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD) and New Orleans Public Service Incorporated (NOPSI), the owner of the utility pole. DOTD was summarily dismissed from the suit after it was determined that DOTD did not own or maintain Tchoupitoulas Street. Plaintiff does not appeal DOTD's summary dismissal. NOPSI also moved for and was granted a summary judgment. It is from this judgment that plaintiff appeals. We reverse.
Plaintiff was driving his automobile in an easterly direction on Tchoupitoulas Street between Nunn and St. Mary Streets during the early morning hours of January 1, 1984, when an unidentified vehicle confronted a sharp curve in the roadway and crossed the center line of Tchoupitoulas Street. Plaintiff swerved his vehicle to avoid a head-on collision, lost control of his car and struck a utility pole on the river side of Tchoupitoulas Street. Plaintiff had not been drinking and the road conditions were dry at the time of the accident.
The NOPSI utility pole which plaintiff struck was located 100 feet from the corner of Nunn Street on the river side of Tchoup-itoulas and eight inches from the street.
The issue before us is whether or not, as a matter of law, NOPSI owed a duty to plaintiff to avoid negligent conduct in the placement and design of its utility pole.
In support of the summary judgment, NOPSI relies principally on our decision in Armand v. Louisiana Power and Light Co., 482 So.2d 802 (La.App. 4th Cir.1986), writ denied 484 So.2d 669 (La.1986). There the plaintiff, Joni Armand, suffered severe permanent injuries when the car which she was operating jumped a curb on West Esplanade Avenue, slammed sideways into a La. Power & Light Co. pole, and was demolished. In reversing the trial court's judgment in favor of plaintiff by a 3-2 decision Judge Barry writing for the Court stated:
The location of the pole did not create an unreasonable risk of harm. To so hold would create absolute liability. We are cognizant of the inestimable number of poles and trees which line our streets, many next to or a few inches off the roadways. LP & L's pole is no more a legal cause of Joni's injuries than if she had hit an object in the road, lost control, then struck the pole. The pole's location in the elevated, parish approved, designated right of way was not a cause-in-fact of the accident, nor was it a substantial contributing factor. A utility company has no obligation to guard against rare exigencies such as an out of control vehicle leaving a traveled roadway. 482 So.2d at page 804.
While we readily admit the Armand decision was proper in that case, we conclude that the Armand decision does not control the result in this case. The facts in Armand are distinguishable from those in the instant matter in many respects. In Armand, Joni Armand was intoxicated when she hit the utility pole. It was misting rain and West Esplanade Ave. was wet. There was testimony to indicate that Joni Armand may have been speeding along the straight narrow avenue when her car jumped the 5⅛" — 6" curb. The utility pole in Armand was 29" — 30" from the curb on the grassy elevated border of a wide, open drainage canal. The car's front wheels stopped a few feet from the canal's sloping embankment.
In the instant matter, there is no evidence to indicate that plaintiff was intoxicated. Tchoupitoulas Street was dry and the accident took place immediately after plaintiff and the phantom car driver encountered the sharp 90 degree curve in the roadway. The utility pole which plaintiff hit was only 8" from the street and a steel plate approximately 3 to 5 feet was placed on the pole. The greatest distinction between the Armand case and the present one is that Joni Armand had the opportunity to present her case before a jury at trial. To uphold the granting of NOPSI's summary judgment in this matter precludes plaintiff from that opportunity.
We do not find that our decision in Armand stands for the principle that a utility company, as a matter of law, will never be held liable to a plaintiff for injuries incurred where the placement of a pole is not in the roadway itself or in an area designated for vehicles to voluntarily drive onto when leaving a primary roadway. Our decision in Armand said that in that particular case the location and design of La. Power & Light Co.'s pole was not the cause-in-fact of the accident, but rather Joni Armand's own negligence was the sole cause of the accident. We conclude it is possible that liability may be imposed where the placement of a pole close to the edge of a roadway constitutes a foreseeable and unreasonable risk of harm to users of the roadway. In such cases, the conditions of the roadway are critical in determining whether the location of a utility pole adjacent thereto constitutes an unreasonable risk of harm to users of the road. The sharp curve and general contours of Tchoupitoulas Street, the failure to warn motorists of the placement of the pole, the proximity of the pole to the street, whether the utility company had notice of previous accidents at that location and whether alternative less dangerous locations for the pole existed are all circumstances from which a jury could conclude that NOPSI's placement of the pole constituted an unreasonable danger to users of the road.
The present case is before us on a summary judgment which is properly granted only if there was no genuine issue of material fact considering the pleadings and other documents of record. C.C.P. Art. 966. Plaintiff submitted to the trial court several affidavits and other evidence which indicate that there were other similar incidents involving the 90 degree curve on Tchoupitoulas Street between Nunn and St. Mary Streets, that NOPSI had knowledge of the dangers this curve presented to motorists and that NOPSI could have relocated the utility pole to a less dangerous location. Because it is conceivable that such factors may support a valid legal theory of liability on NOPSI and because such factors have not been foreclosed on, we conclude that summary judgment was erroneously granted. This conclusion is bolstered by the principle that the court in considering a motion for summary judgment should resolve every reasonable doubt against the mover. Oller v. Sharp Electric, Inc., 451 So.2d 1235 (La.App. 4th Cir.1984), writ denied 457 So.2d 1194 (La. 1984).
We do not suggest that plaintiff can or should prevail on the merits of the case. But a summary judgment is not to be used as a substitute for a trial on the merits. The court should not seek to determine whether it is likely the mover will prevail on the merits but rather whether there is an issue of material fact. Oiler v. Sharp Electric, Inc., supra. Our conclusion is that the question of NOPSI's liability is factual.
Accordingly, the summary judgment in favor of NOPSI is reversed and set aside. The case is remanded to trial for further proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
SCHOTT, J., concurs with reasons.
ARMSTRONG, J., concurs for the reasons assigned by SCHOTT, J.
BARRY, J., dissents with reasons.
CIACCIO, J., dissents for the reasons assigned by BARRY, J.