Case Name: Succession of Freddie Robertson KILLINGSWORTH. Mrs. Rome Schlater Johnston TUTTLE et al. v. Edward Hill SCHLATER et al.
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1973-09-24
Citations: 292 So. 2d 536
Docket Number: Nos. 53128, 53156 and 53171
Parties: Succession of Freddie Robertson KILLINGSWORTH. Mrs. Rome Schlater Johnston TUTTLE et al. v. Edward Hill SCHLATER et al.
Judges: BARHAM, J., dissents with reasons.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 292
Pages: 536–557

Head Matter:
Succession of Freddie Robertson KILLINGSWORTH. Mrs. Rome Schlater Johnston TUTTLE et al. v. Edward Hill SCHLATER et al.
Nos. 53128, 53156 and 53171.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Sept. 24, 1973.
On Rehearing March 25, 1974.
Rehearing Denied April 26, 1974.
Charles H. Dameron, Currett, Hardin, Hunter, Dameron & Fritchie, Baton Rouge, applicants in 53128.
Robert J. Vandaworker, Taylor, Porter, Brooks & Phillips, Baton Rouge, applicants in 53171.
Byron R. Kantrow & Gerald L. Walter, Jr., Kantrow, Spaht, Weaver & Walter, Baton Rouge, for appellees Schlater, Appleton, Mitchell, Melton and others.
John D. Kopfler, John D. Kopler & Associates, Victor A. Sachse, Frank P. Sim-oneaux, Paul M. Hebert, Jr., Breazeale, Sachse & Wilson, Baton Rouge, for applicants in 53156.

Opinion:
CALOGERO, Justice
This protracted litigation has been heard twice in the District Court and twice in the Court of Appeal. See Succession of Killingsworth, and Tuttle v. Schlater, 194 So.2d 331 (La.App. 1st Cir., 1966); Succession of Killingsworth, and Tuttle v. Schlater, 270 So.2d 196 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1972). Upon application for writs after the first Court of Appeal decision, we refused to grant, 250 La. 175, 194 So.2d 738 (1967). The matter is now before us because following the second decision of the Court of Appeal we granted writs. 273 So.2d 292, 293 (La.1973).
The proceedings which have heretofore transpired, the contentions asserted, disposition of those contentions and holdings of the various courts (evident from a reading of the cited opinions) will not be restated herein except to the extent necessary to discuss the issues presently before us.
For convenience in this opinion, we will refer herein to the following- parties or factions as follows: Mrs. Leila Obier Cutshaw and W. P. Obier, Jr. are the legal heirs of Mr. W. P. Obier, (deceased attorney and Notary Public who executed the will of Mrs. Killingsworth) and will be referred to hereinafter as the Obier heirs; Mr. W. B. Middleton, Jr. is an attorney who had formerly been the law partner of Mr. Obier; St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company is the professional liability insurer of Mr. Obier, Mr. Middleton, and the former law partnership designated Obier & Middleton and will be referred to as St. Paul; Mrs. Rome Schlater Johnston Tuttle, Mrs. Mary Lewis Johnston Rowe, Mrs. Winona Johnston Bell, Mrs. Nona Mae Bronner Miller and Mrs. Barbara Jean Bronner Norton are legal heirs of Mrs. Freddie. Robertson Killingsworth, who were designated as the principal legatees under the will of Mrs. Killingsworth (all of the foregoing parties are proponents of the will, validity of which is at issue in this litigation) ; Edward Hill Schla-ter, Sarah Elizabeth Schlater Appleton, Mary Blewett Mitchell, Frances S. Melton; Mildred T. Landers, Frederick M. Schlater, Thomas Wessinger Schlater, Mary Hughes Schlater Stumb, John Day, Mary Alice Day, and Frank V. LeBlanc are other legal heirs of Mrs. Killingsworth (principally nieces and nephews) who were not designated as legatees in the will of Mrs. Killingsworth (they are opponents of the will). Mrs. Tuttle, et al, will be referred to hereinafter as legatees. Edward Hill Schlater, et al, will be designated hereinafter as legal heirs.
The principal contest in this litigation has to do with the validity of the will of Mrs. Killingsworth which was executed as a nuncupative will by public act before Mr. Obier on October 7, 1955.
When first confronted with the issue, posed by various exceptions, the trial court determined that the will would be valid even if typed by Mr. Obier's secretary. The judge therefore invited a motion for judgment on the pleadings, then rendered a j udgment declaring the will valid.
On appeal from this judgment (on the pleadings) the Court of Appeal reversed, held that a will would be invalid for failure to comply with a requirement of Article 1578 of the Civil Code (that it be "written" by the Notary) if it were in fact typed by the Notary's secretary. Upon application for writs to this Court we denied, with the comment that "we find no error of law in the judgment complained of." 250 La. 175, 194 So.2d 738 (1967).
After remand the case was tried on the merits. The trial court admitted evidence over objection, concerning the confection of the will, and concluded that the will was indeed invalid because it had been typed by Mr. Obier's secretary, and because such did not constitute "written" by the Notary as required by Article 1578 of the Civil Code. On appeal the First Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment in this respect, holding the will invalid. There were and are, of course, incidental issues for decision which will be discussed more fully hereinafter. We granted writs on applica tion of Mr. Middleton and St. Paul (# 53,128 on our docket) the legatees (# 53,156) and the Obier heirs (# 53,171), all of them proponents of the will.
The specific supplemental issues for decision by this Court will, as indicated, be considered hereinafter. At the outset however, we must dispose of the primary issue in this litigation which has to do with the validity of the will under attack. The Ob-ier heirs, Mr. Middleton, St. Paul and the legatees, while denying that the will was typed by Mr. Obier's secretary, urge that we hold the will valid even assuming that it had been so typed.
They contend that the disposition of these issues by the Court of Appeal's first decision was not final because the case then was on appeal only on exceptions and motion for judgment on the pleadings, the case since then having been fully tried on the merits. They also take the position that our earlier refusal to grant writs does not bar our reconsideration of the issue (that a secretary's typing the nuncupative will by public act, if it be so found, strikes it with invalidity) because the earlier refusal does not constitute the "law of the case". In this regard they call our attention to Day v. Campbell-Grosjean Roofing and Sheet Metal Corp., 260 La. 325, 256 So.2d 105 (1972). Our present resolution of this issue, in effect affirming our earlier decision in refusing to grant writs, pretermits any need to consider whether we may properly rule contrary to the earlier decision.
Proponents of the will argue here, essentially as they did in 1967 (both before the Court of Appeal and on writ application to this Court) that the right of testamentary disposition is strongly provided by our law as a clear and distinct corollary of the right of property (Kingsbury v. Whitaker, 32 La.Ann. 1055, 1880); that statutory interpretation should carry out the general social purpose of legislation (22 La.L.Rev. 727); that there is a strong presumption of a will's validity where on its face all of the formalities of a nuncupative will by public act have been complied with (Succession of Watson, La.App., 157 So.2d 612, 1963 and Renfrow et al. v. McCain, 185 La. 135, 168 So. 753, 1936); that this Court's decision in Knight v. Smith, 3 Mart.O.S. 156 (1813), invalidating a nun-cupative will by public act because there written by the Notary's clerk, is outmoded and inappropriate; and that Prudhomme v. Savant's validation of a nuncupative will by public act typed by the Notary, in 1922, presages the "logical" extension that typed by the secretary should be construed as written by the Notary, particularly since Article 1578 merely requires written by the Notary, not written "by the hand of" as is required of the testator in an olographic testament (C.C. Art. 1588).
We find no more merit in these arguments than the Court of Appeal, and this Court, did, in 1967.
Civil Code Article 1578 requires that the nuncupative will by public act must be received by the Notary as dictated by the testator, "and written by the notary as it is dictated." (Emphasis supplied) The statutory language is much too clear to permit the strained interpretation that "written by" means, permissibly, authored by, or dictated to secretary by, the Notary.
Proponents' alternate contention on the will's validity (or primary contention depending on the emphasis) is that the will's witnesses cannot legally be heard 12 years after the will's confection, to dispute their own solemn attestation to the contrary, evidenced by their subscription under oath in the notarial act of October 7, 1955.
While we subscribe to this plausible principle as first enunciated in Succession of Beattie, 163 La. 831, 112 So. 802 (1926) and repeated in Taiton v. Todd, 233 La. 146, 96 So.2d 327 (1957) we do not feel that our present holding is contrary, for two reasons.
First, both Beattie and Taitón held that testimony impeaching the earlier solemn statement in the act was not itself sufficient to overcome the presumption of validity if not "corroborated by independent facts or reasonable inferences." In this case we agree, and have agreed, with the Court of Appeal, that the independent inference is supplied by use of the word "revenue" rather than "residue" where the latter rather than the former word was obviously and logically intended (and in fact used by both testator and notary, according to the testimony of one of the witnesses). The logical inference, of course, was that the legally untrained secretary rather than the attorney-notary had typed the inappropriate word "revenue" and presumably therefore the entire will. (For a more elaborate discussion on this point see Court of Appeal discussion commencing at page 202, Vol. 270 So.2d) Finding that this independent inference permits us to entertain the witnesses' testimony, the essential inquiry (as to who in fact typed the will) is easily answered, by the uncontradicted testimony of Mr. Obier's secretary and one of the witnesses, that the secretary had typed the will. (Incidentally, while the third witness to the will, Mr. Desobry, said that he couldn't remember who did the typing he was under the "impression" that Mr. Obier did not type it.)
A second distinction between this case and Beattie and Taitón which we consider worth noting is that the testimony here was not nearly so contrary to the earlier attestation. In Taitón the contradictory testimony had to do with whether the witnesses were present and whether the will was read. In Beattie the contradictory testimony had to do with whether the witnesses were present, whether the testator dictated her will, and whether the witnesses heard the dictation.
In the case before the Court, we are not dealing with a situation of whether the witnesses were present, whether they heard the dictation or whether the witnesses actually signed the will.
The contradiction with which we are here confronted is that the witnesses subscribed to an attestation clause which stated that the will was written by the Notary, whereas at trial 12 years later they have testified under bath that the Notary's secretary typed the will as dictated by the Notary (after the testatrix had first dictated the content of the will to the Notary). This inconsistency is not nearly so contradictory as was the proffered testimony in Beattie and Taitón. The witnesses' explanation that "written by the notary" here was done by the notary's dictating to his typist-secretary is in fact comparable in some degree to the trial judge's good faith but faulty initial interpretation that the words "written by the notary" in C.C. Art. 1578 would permit dictation by the Notary to his typist-secretary.
We do not feel that- the witnesses here necessarily impeached their earlier attestation. Since there was however, independent corroboration in the will itself, that the will was not typed by Mr. Obier, we need not rely upon the foregoing distinction, for our opinion here is not contrary to the holdings in Beattie and Taitón.
Having determined that Mrs. Killings-worth's will is invalid because not con-fected in accordance with law, we now turn our attention to the remaining issues before us.
The first of these issues is whether or not a notary is liable to legatees under a will which is invalid as a result of his failure to use proper care in the confection. The Court of Appeal held the notary liable under Louisiana Civil Code Article 2315 after it rejected liability founded upon a breach of a stipulation pour autrui as that doctrine was enunciated in Woodfork v. Sanders, 248 So.2d 419 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1971). We agree that the legatees may recover under article 2315 but find error in the rejection of liability founded upon a breach of a stipulation pour autrui.
The Court of Appeal explained its rejection of the Woodfork stipulation pour autrui as follows:
"With due respect to our brothers of the 4th Circuit, who in Woodfork v. Sanders, supra, held that a stipulation engaging the attorney to confect a will to institute third parties legatees is a stipulation pour autrui (C.C. Art. 1890), we prefer to hinge our decision of C.C. Art. 2315.
"First, we are not convinced that such a stipulation is a true stipulation pour autrui. See Prof. J. Denson Smith's article at 11 T.L.R. 18. Second, C.C. Arts. 1890 and 1902 imply the assent of the beneficiary and once such assent is given the stipulation cannot be revoked without the beneficiary's consent. Certainly, the beneficiary is not a true party to such a stipulation until he does assent to the agreement. Third, a legatee cannot by law accept until the will becomes effective which is upon the death of the Testator. Fourth, a testator may revoke, change or alter his will at any time." (Emphasis supplied)
The first objection goes to the very nature of a stipulation pour autrui. The Court of Appeal was unconvinced that the stipulation between the notary and the testatrix was a true stipulation pour autmi, citing Professor Smith's article in the Tulane Law Review.
We find in this article the following explanation of the classical stipulation pour autrui.
"By the Romans the word 'stipulate' was used in opposition to the word 'promise'. The creditor stipulated and the debtor promised, to stipulate was to provoke a promise. Therefore, to stipulate for another was to provoke a promise for another." Smith, supra at 18.
Mrs. Killingsworth provoked a promise from Mr. Obier to confect a will which was to name Mrs. Tuttle et al legatees. Mr. Obier entered into an agreement by which he undertook to do something which would benefit the legatees. The legatees were benefited by the agreement between testatrix and notary and such bene fit had to be intended by the testatrix and had to be known, if not also intended, by the notary. The failure of the notary to use reasonable care was a breach of the stipulation in favor of the legatees which has caused them damage giving rise to a cause of action founded upon that breach. We adopt with approval the following language from Woodfork, supra, as it is applicable to this case.
"Defendant's second ground of exception, lack of attorney-client privity between himself and plaintiff, is likewise rejected. The testator sought defendant's professional legal assistance in order to benefit plaintiff, the intended universal legatee. We believe the stipulation that a lawyer is to confect a will to institute third parties legatees is a stipulation pour autrui, C.C. Art. 1890, for damages breach of which the third party may sue. See the analogous contract case of Andrepont v. Acadia Drilling Co., 255 La. 347, 341 So.2d 347 (1969). On other grounds it has been held in Weintz v. Kramer, 44 La.Ann. 35, 10 So. 416 (1892), that a notary is liable to intended legatees deprived of their legacy by the notary's clear error. We are satisfied that an attorney's clear error in confecting a will, which the exercise of a reasonable competence would have avoided, constitutes a breach of the contractual stipulation for the benefit of the intended legatee." 248 So.2d at 425. (Emphasis supplied)
The second objection appears to be that the beneficiaries have not assented to the stipulation in their favor. Thus they are not true parties to the stipulation. Assent has nothing to do with the beneficiary's being a party to the contract.
"In the first place, the true third party beneficiary is never a party to the contract. He is never a promisee. The promisee is the stipulator and the promise runs to him and is merely in favor of the third party. It was this very fact that made the progress of the rule so slow among the Romans and that has stood in the way of the development of the doctrine, even to our day, in England. But the French and Louisiana Codes set at rest any notion that a third party could not recover on a contract merely because he was not a party." Smith, supra, page 33.
Assent of the beneficiary is only of consequence (the means of making his advantage indefeasible) where revocation of the contract (by promisee and promisor) is attempted. C.C. Arts. 1890 and 1902. No such revocation, of the promisor's commitment, to confect a valid will, is involved here.
"It seems settled, however, that the right of any beneficiary arises immediately upon the making of the contract although it is subject to revocation until acceptance. In fact the text of the Code does not require an 'acceptance'; it requires only 'consent' by the beneficiary 'to avail himself of the advantage.' In short, the right to the advantage is already his, it has already been acquired, and his 'consent' alone is necessary to render it indefeasible. Furthermore, no particular kind of 'acceptance' is necessary. Thus, the required consent may be found in any action by the beneficiary which manifests his recognition of the advantage or interest provided for him such as . by instituting suit ." Smith, supra at 55.
Justice Summers, speaking for the Court in Andrepont v. Acadia Drilling Co., 255 La. 347, 231 So.2d 347 (1969) said:
"Equally without merit is the argument that the third party beneficiary cannot avail himself of the stipulation in his favor for he has not consented to or accepted the stipulation. A categorical answer to this contention is found in a recent decision of this Court. Mr. Justice LeBlanc, speaking for the Court in First State Bank v. Burton, 225 La. 537, 549, 73 So.2d 453, 457 (1954), said:
" 'The law does not provide for an express acceptance of or consent to a stipulation pour autrui by the beneficiary nor does it prescribe any particular form of acceptance or consent; In some cases it was held that the appearance of the beneficiary as claimant in a suit before the Court is evidence of acceptance and certainly it would seem, under that jurisprudence that the claim now being asserted by Morris & Kendrick in this proceeding, regardless of any proof of their assent, is sufficient. See Muntz v. Algiers & Gretna Ry. Co., 114 La. 437, 38 So. 410; Vinet v. Bres, 48 La.Ann. 1254, 20 So. 693. See also Twichel v. Andry, 6 Rob. 407 (La.1844); Smith, Third Party Beneficiaries in Louisiana; The Stipulation Pour Autrui, 11 Tul.L.Rev. 18, 55 (1936).'"
The third objection was that by law the legatees cannot accept the legacies until the will becomes effective on the death of the testatrix. The promise provoked by the testatrix for the benefit of the legatee was not that the attorney-notary deliver legacies, but only that he exercise reasonable care to confect a will naming them legatees. Further, there is no time limitation in which the beneficiary must accept the stipulation in his favor. Rather the stipulation pour autrui subsists until the time of assent, provided it has not been lawfully revoked prior to the time of assent. See Smith, supra, at 55.
The fourth objection was that the testatrix could have changed her will at any time. This doesn't affect the duty of the notary to have confected a proper will, although had the testatrix changed her will it may have lessened the consequences of his negligence.
Thus we find that the aggrieved legatees may recover from the attorney-notary who has confected an invalid will, as contract beneficiaries under a stipulation pour au-trui.
While finding a stipulation pour avitrui in the agreement to confect a will, we have not found in this case, nor would we ordinarily expect to find, a warranty by the attorney-notary to execute a valid will, but only an implied promise to exercise reasonable care in the performance of his work.
Furthermore, we believe, as did the Court of Appeal in this case, that C.C.Art. 2315 provides a basis for recovery as well. A notary public is a public officer, owing to all men a duty to use reasonable care in the confection of his public acts. LSA-R. S. 35:2 (1950); Levy v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 43 So.2d 291 (La.App. 1950). The test is stated in 58 Am.Jur.2d Notaries Public, Sec. 23, as follows:
"In order to recover for the act or default of a notary in the performance of his duties as such the burden is upon the plaintiff to show first that the notary did not faithfully perform the duties of his office, and, secondly, that the plaintiff was injured and damaged as a result of such failure, and that such failure was the proximate cause of the loss and injury which he sustained." 58 Am.Jur. 2d at 469.
We find that the required showing has been made in this case. In the confection of a nuncupative will by public act, the notary is well aware that the benefit bestowed on the legatees by that act is contingent upon the observance of the prescribed formalities. The consequences of his failure to observe these formalities is foreseeable. Where, as a result of his negligent failure to use reasonable care to comply with these formalities, the bequest is rendered invalid, the notary may be held liable in damages to the injured legatee in tort.
The Obier heirs, Middleton & St. Paul next argue, (in the alternative since their principle contention was that the will is valid) that the Court of Appeal erred in permitting the use of the testament which it had declared null, to establish the identi ty of the legatees and the nature of their respective legacies. They say that the legatees bear the burden of establishing not only that the invalidity of the testament was occasioned by negligence on the part of the notary, but also who were the intended legatees and what were the intended legacies. It is argued that there is not a word of testimony to establish either of these facts. The witnesses to the will had no independent recollection which would establish the identity of the legatees or the nature of the property it was intended they should receive. They say that the Court of Appeal relied simply on the recitals of, and the testament itself. If the will is null for one purpose it should be null for all purposes, it is argued.
While the argument is interesting, it is less than persuasive. The document purporting to be the last will and testament of Mrs. Killingsworth has been determined to be invalid as a will because of noncompliance with a statutory requirement in its confection. Nonetheless, it is the strongest possible proof of Mrs. Killingsworth's desire and intention with respect to the disposition of her estate. It is probably a good notarial act (since executed before a Notary Public and at least 2 witnesses and because a simple notarial act may be typed by a person other than the Notary Public) although it does not suffice as a nuncupa-tive will by public act. It is at least an admissible solemn instrument signed by the deceased expressing her desires relative to disposition of her estate. It is indeed better evidence than, say, hearsay testimony as to decedent's oral expressions relative to intended bequests made prior to death.
Furthermore, to bar use of the invalid will to prove its content would in virtually all instances effectively preclude holding the negligent attorney for the loss to legatees occasioned by such negligence. See Weintz v. Kramer, 44 La.Ann. 35, 10 So. 416 (1892) and Woodfork v. Sanders, 248 So.2d 419 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1971). While these cases are not authority for the precise evidence question here at issue, they are cases implying that the invalid will ought to be admissible to prove its uncon-troverted contents.
Then let the legatees be bound by all of the will's provisions, including that they were meant to receive only the "revenue" and not the bulk of the decedent's estate, argue appellants. While this argument is a bit more difficult to counter than the earlier effort to bar the will entirely, to legatees' prejudice, we find that it too has no merit.
Logic dictates that "residue" was intended since it appears at the end of the will where the universal legacy would normally be found; decedent left no surviving spouse to whom a usufruct (assuming that "revenue" was intended to mean usufruct) might logically be intended; decedent made no disposition of the corpus of her estate and surely would be expected to have done so if she had intended in the controverted clause to have disposed of only the revenue of her estate; the legally untrained and inexperienced secretary (she was then 19 years old, this was her first job and she had been employed by Obier & Middleton only 16 months) could easily have misconstrued residue for revenue, two words phonetically similar; and one of the witnesses testified that he distinctly recalled that both the decedent and the notary used the word "residue", rather than "revenue."
Furthermore, regarding the balance of the will, there has been no showing that in its confection there were any other mistakes as to its content. Under these circumstances we believe the Court of Appeal was correct in finding that Mrs. Tuttle, et al. were the intended legatees and that the residue, or bulk of the estate was intended by Mrs. Killingsworth for them.
The Obier heirs, Middleton and St. Paul, further argue that there has been no showing of negligence on the part of Mr. Obier, that there was no proof of the standard of care required of an attorney in drafting a will nor evidence of the general standard of care exercised by members of the legal profession in the area of the State in which Mr. Obier practiced. And, of course, reasonable care is the maximum duty owed as we have earlier determined, whether impliedly agreed, upon entering the contract to confect the will or under Art. 2315.
Whether there exists a single statewide standard of care for practicing attorneys or community by community standards we are satisfied that an attorney-notary who prepares a nuncupative will by public act by permitting his secretary to type the will is negligent. As was stated in Weintz v. Kramer, supra: "5. A Notary undertakes the confection of a testament by public act with full knowledge that its validity depends on the most exact fulfillment of the formalities required by law. If he chooses to deviate from the law, and to substitute language of his own choice to convey the same meaning, he does so at his own risk, and cannot throw resulting loss on innocent persons."
The Obier heirs filed a plea of one year prescription under Article 3536 of the Civil Code. It was rejected in both the District Court and the Court of Appeal and is reurged here. Counsel for excep-tors direct our attention to 7 Am.Jur.2d 154, § 186 for the general proposition that a client's cause of .action based on professional negligence or misconduct accrues at the time of the negligence or misconduct and the statute of limitation begins to run at that time. They also cite Goldberg v. Bosworth, 29 Misc.2d 1057, 215 N.Y.S.2d 849 (N.Y.S.Ct. 1961). The Court of Appeal held that prescription in a case of this nature does not commence to run until there is a final judgment decreeing the will to be invalid. We agree that the plea of prescription was properly overruled.
While we would be inclined to hold that prescription did not commence to run against the legatees any sooner than the date of Mrs. Killingsworth's death (in which event not even the one year tort prescription would lie under the facts here) we need not so hold since the prescription plea urged (one year) is not applicable to a contractual claim of the third party beneficiary (The applicable prescription on a claim under contract is 10 years). C.C.Art. 3544. Federal Insurance Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 262 La. 509, 263 So.2d 871 (1972).
Middleton and St. Paul argue that the Court of Appeal erred in holding the law partner of an officiating Notary vicariously liable for acts committed by the Notary in confecting a nuncupative will by public act. They argue that the record does not indicate whether Mr. Middleton was a notary nor that there was any partnership except that of a law partnership, nor that Mr. Obier had been consulted by Mrs. Killingsworth as an attorney in connection with the preparation and confection of the will. The record shows that Mr. Obier was Mrs. Killingsworth's attorney and that she visited him at his office on legal business, frequently. We hold as did the Court of Appeal that confection of Mrs. Killingsworth's will was law partnership business.
St. Paul takes the position that the professional liability policy issued by them affords coverage for Middleton but does not afford coverage for Mr. Obier or his heirs.
The pertinent facts in connection with this contention are as follows:
1. St. Paul issued a lawyers professional liability policy with the named insured being the partnership of Obier and Middleton and W. B. Middleton, Jr. and W. P. Obier.
2. The effective date of the policy was February 5, 1960.
3. The policy period was from February 5, 1960 through February 5, 1963.
4. There was an endorsement to the policy including the "insured's" capacity as Notary Public.
5. The invalid will was executed before Mr. Obier on October 7, 1955.
6. Mr. Obier died on May 10, 1961.
7. Mrs. Killingsworth died on July 19, 1961.
8. The full three year premium had been paid by the insureds.
9. After Mr. Obier's death in May 1961 and before Mrs. Killings-worth's death and subsequent discovery of Mr. Obier's negligence, St. Paul issued an endorsement naming a new firm as insured, Middleton & Templet and deleting Mr. Obier, from the policy.
10. There was no refund of premium to anyone incident to the deletion of Mr. Obier from the policy.
11. No one informed Mrs. Obier or the heirs of Mr. Obier that Mr. Obier's name had been deleted from the policy by endorsement.
St. Paul acknowledges that under the provisions of the policy there is coverage for negligence of an insured committed before the effective date of an initial policy provided that the claim is made or suit is brought during the existence of the policy or any renewal thereof. (In this case there was only one policy and one policy period.) They further contend, however, that coverage for negligent acts occurring prior to the effective date of the policy is not afforded if such claim is discovered or asserted for the first time after the termination of policy coverage. They contend that upon Mr. Obier's death policy coverage as to him necessarily terminated, and since his negligence committed in 1955 was not discovered, nor claim asserted until after his death that his negligent act in the year 1955 was therefore not covered.
While their construction of the policy provisions as to prior negligence discovered after policy termination may be correct in the situation where an attorney has voluntarily discontinued coverage, or perhaps even for a deceased attorney following expiration of his last policy period it is clear that construction does not prevail in this instance, where the prior negligent act was discovered during the policy period.
Article IV of the policy (Insuring Agreements) provides, "This policy applies within the United States of America, its territories or possessions or Canada to professional services performed for others (a) during the policy period (b) prior to the effective date of the policy if claim is made or suit is brought during the policy period and providing the Insured had no knowledge or could not have reasonably foreseen any circumstance which might result in a claim or suit at the effective date of the policy."
The only definition of "policy period" appears in Item 3 of the policy and reads as follows: "Policy Period: From February 5th, 1960 to February 5th, 1963, 12:01 Standard Time at the address of the named insured as stated herein."
Since policies of insurance are to be interpreted reasonably in favor of the insured and since there is really no ambiguity anyway relative to what constitutes the policy period according to the terms of the policy, we find no merit in St. Paul's contention. The claim was clearly made and suit brought in the Fall of 1961, within the 2/S/60-2/5/63 policy period.
Nor do we find any comfort to St. Paul in Section 8 of the policy which they have directed to our attention. It provides as follows: "8. Assignment. The interest of the Insured under this policy shall not be assignable to any other person. In the event of the death or incompetency of the Insured, this policy shall cover the insured's legal representative as an insured as respects any liability previously incurred and covered by this policy." (Emphasis supplied)
For the foregoing reasons we find that the policy issued by St. Paul affords coverage for the Obier's heirs.
The next alternative assertion by the Obier heirs, Middleton and St. Paul is their specification of error that the Court of Appeal erred in rejecting their third party demands filed against the legal heirs.
On the matter of the third party demand the Court of Appeal said:
"St. Paul, Mr. Middleton, and the heirs of Mr. Obier seek third-party relief against the legal heirs of Mrs. Killings-worth on the grounds of unjust enrichment. It is claimed that the legal heirs have been unjustly enriched by the error of Mr. Obier and that but for this error they would not have received their respective portions of the decedent's estate. We have examined the authorities cited and find the facts therein inapposite to those in the case at bar. In Smith v. Town of Vinton, 216 La. 9, 43 So.2d 18 (1949) and Boxwell et al. v. Department of Highways, 203 La. 760, 14 So.2d 627 (1943), the recipient receives certain advantages resulting from an illegal contract which was entered into in good faith by plaintiff. Such is not the case here. The legal heirs were not parties to the confection of the will and their rights flow from the laws of this state relative to the distribution of an intestate succession. On the other hand, the liability of the heirs of Mr. Obier and Mr. Middleton flow from the act of Mr. Obier in not typing the will himself, wherein he failed to exercise the degree of care and diligence required of a Notary. St. Paul, the insurer, stands in the same position as that of the insured. To permit recovery in their favor would, in effect, validate the error complained of, and permit the insurer to completely escape liability for the very act it insured. Generally, the doctrine of unjust enrichment is inapplicable where the recipient is receiving what the law allows and is thus not unjustly enriched."
We find no error in this determination of the Court of Appeal. The cited cases, Smith and Boxwell are inapposite. The rights of the legal heirs here flow from the laws of the State relative to distribution of an intestate's succession, as aptly stated by the Court of Appeal, and not from any improper enrichment or illegal contract as in Smith and Boxwell.
Counsel for St. Paul takes issue with the language of the Court of Appeal which might be read to imply that the existence of insurance coverage makes a difference in determining the availability of the asserted third party claim (based on unjust enrichment). Counsel, of course, is correct in that the insurance company stands before the Court just as any other litigant and should have the merit of their claim here passed upon as though it were being urged by the insured alone. We have given the claim that consideration. It has no merit.
The final error urged by the Obier heirs, Middleton and St. Paul has merit.
The trial 'court held that the extent of the loss of the legatees should be the difference between what they will inherit as heirs and what they would have received as legatees. In computing the amounts that each legatee would have received, the trial judge used the gross value of the estate as of August 24, 1961 ($95,765.27) and deducted therefrom certain debts and taxes ($5,995.59), estimated fees of the executor and the executor's attorney ($6,000) and particular legacies ($4,500). Thereupon he fixed the legatee losses as the difference between this net figure, $79,269.68, and $33,663.63, the amount he calculated would likely be the legatees' legal inheritances. He therefore allowed $45,606.05 as the loss to the legatees, and cast the Obier heirs, Middleton and St. Paul in this total sum.
The Court of Appeal noted that the District Judge erred by not taking into account additional estate revenues and stock dividends amounting to $19,081.95, this being contained in a stipulation of November 15, 1967. The court thereupon set aside the judgment pending reconsideration and remanded the case to the District Court directing that the court in determining the losses to the legatees give consideration to the $19,081.95 stipulated additional revenues as of November 15, 1967 and to ascertain upon conclusion of the administration the amount of the respective inheritances and/or damages so that defendants can be properly cast in judgment.
It should also be noted that the judgment of the trial court had directed that the defendant pay legal interest at the rate of 5% per annum from date of judicial demand on the sums which the trial court awarded. Appellants contend that several mistakes were committed. They allege that the status of the lower court judgments if unchanged would require them to pay to the legatees sums based on an administered estate with accumulating revenues while at the same time paying legal interest from date of judicial demand (demand was in 1961, shortly after the death of Mrs. Killingsworth). They further allege that the trial judge has not been instructed in the order of remand by the Court of Appeal to take into account debts of the succession following the date of stipulation, November 15, 1967. They further allege that neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeal has allowed in computation of the legatee losses a deduction for the amount of inheritance taxes which the legatees would have had to pay in the event they had received their legacies under the will.
Then they argue that the measure of damages ought to be based upon at most the net succession inventory as of August 24, 1961 plus 5% legal interest from date of judicial demand.
While we do not agree that the Court of Appeal remand order directs the trial court to disregard succession debts after November 15, 1967, and while the damages should not be ascertained based upon the August 24, 1961 net inventory and legal interest, we do agree that in computing the legatee losses there should not be included both legal interest from date of judicial demand and at the same time, from an administered succession revenues which are necessarily included in inheritances ascertained after administration, and we do agree that in calculating the loss of the legatees there should be a reduction equal to any inheritance taxes which would otherwise have been paid by the legatees had they inherited under the will. Legal interest, if any, should be allowed only from the date on which the trial court, upon remand, fixes the damages due the legatees.
Accordingly, for the above and foregoing reasons the judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed in part, reversed in part and the case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings in accordance with the views herein expressed.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.
BARHAM, J., dissents with reasons.
. The legatees would enjoy almost the entire estate of Mrs. Killingsworth if the will is valid. They are also legal heirs, however, and will enjoy approximately % of Mrs. Killings-worth's estate if the will is invalid.
. These legal heirs would inherit nothing under the will, hut will receive % of Mrs. Kil-lingsworth's estate if the will is invalid.
. Civil Code of Louisiana, Article 1578.
The nuncupative testaments by public act must be received by a notary public, in presence of three witnesses residing in the place where the will is executed, or of five witnesses not residing in the place.
This testament must be dictated by the testator, and written by the notary as it is dictated.
It must then be read to the testator in presence of the witnesses.
Express mention is made of the whole, observing that all those formalities must be fulfilled at one time, without interruption, and without turning aside to other acts.
. It should be noted that the "ruling" being considered in the Day case, as to writs had earlier been denied, was on a question of fact, and not a question of law as is involved here.
. 150 La. 256, 90 So. 640 (1922).
. 96 So.2d at p. 329 — (Succession of Beattie) "Testimony of subscribing witnesses which is adduced on the contest of the will and which, in effect, impeaches the solemn statements contained in the instrument which by their signatures they have attested as correct, is not in itself sufficient to overcome the presumption of validity arising from their presence and signatures and the official certificate of a public officer fortified by his oath. Their testimony must he corroborated by independent facts or reasonable inferences. » (Emphasis ours.)
. Smith, Third Party Beneficiaries in Louisiana; The Stipulation Pour Autrui, 11 Tul. L.Rev. 18 (1936).
. By way of clarification of the promise which was to benefit the legatees, it was to place the legatees in a will which would be valid insofar as reasonable competence by the attorney-notary could guarantee. The benefit was not a guarantee that they would receive the legacies, but only a promise that they would be legatees under Mrs. Killingsworth's October 7, 1955 will. The negligence of the notary denied them the intended benefit of being named legatees under a valid will. The fact that his negligence meant the legatees were, in law, never legatees caused them harm. The measure of this harm is not known until the death of the testatrix. Had she changed her will so as to exclude these legatees then the harm suffered as a result of the notary's negligence would be negligible. Where, however, as here the testatrix does not undertake to change her will, then the negligence of the notary causes them harm, the loss of the intended legacies. The fact that the loss, or the extent thereof, is not established until the death of the testatrix will not alter the fact that the intended legatees were harmed (or at least not benefited) when the attorney-notary negligently breached the stipulation pour autrui by confecting an invalid will.
. The Court of Appeal properly noted, incident to its remanding the case to the District Court that the practice of law is an ordinary partnership (Jones v. Caperton & Weeks, 15 La.Ann. 475 (1860) and that while the partner tort feasor is liable for a plaintiff's full damages, the partner not a tort feasor is liable only for his virile share as a partner. Champagne v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co., 170 So.2d 226, (La.App. 4th Cir. 1965) writs refused 247 La. 417, 171 So.2d 668 (1965). Since the judgment in the trial court, as it casts the various defendants for their respective and/or solidary sums is not in accord with the aforestated principle, it is expected that upon remand such judgments shall be re-couched appropriately.
. St. Paul has conceded coverage for Mr. Middleton and has defended him in this suit.
. See Footnote No. 1.
. See Footnote No. 9.