Case Name: Alisa WINGERTER, Appellant, v. BROTHERHOOD PRODUCTIONS, INC., Stone Group Pictures, Yoram Ben Ami, Craig Baxley, Paul Baxley and Evan James, Appellees
Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2002-01-08
Citations: 822 So. 2d 300
Docket Number: No. 2000-CA-01088-COA
Parties: Alisa WINGERTER, Appellant, v. BROTHERHOOD PRODUCTIONS, INC., Stone Group Pictures, Yoram Ben Ami, Craig Baxley, Paul Baxley and Evan James, Appellees.
Judges: Before SOUTHWICK, P.J., IRVING, and MYERS, JJ. ,
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 822
Pages: 300–306

Head Matter:
Alisa WINGERTER, Appellant, v. BROTHERHOOD PRODUCTIONS, INC., Stone Group Pictures, Yoram Ben Ami, Craig Baxley, Paul Baxley and Evan James, Appellees.
No. 2000-CA-01088-COA.
Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
Jan. 8, 2002.
Rehearing Denied March 19, 2002.
Certiorari Denied July 25, 2002.
Paul S. Minor, Mark D. Lumpkin, Biloxi, Attorneys for Appellant.
Dorrance Dee Aultman, Jr., Hatties-burg, Kyle Stuart Moran, Attorneys for Appellees. •
Before SOUTHWICK, P.J., IRVING, and MYERS, JJ. ,

Opinion:
MYERS, J.,
for the Court.
¶ 1. This case was filed in March, 1994 in Harrison County Circuit Court seeking compensation for Alisa Wingerter's damages while employed by Brotherhood Productions, Inc., a subsidiary of Stone Group Pictures. Ultimately this cause was submitted for summary judgment which was granted in favor of Brotherhood Productions by Honorable Jerry 0. Terry. Win-gerter now appeals that decision. Finding no error in the lower court's ruling, we affirm.
FACTS
¶ 2. Alisa Wingerter was hired by Brotherhood Productions to be an extra in a film they were making in the summer of 1990. She was injured whilé riding a motorcycle during filming when the actor with whom she was riding lost control of the vehicle. Wingerter was thrown thirty feet and suffered multiple injuries. She filed a complaint in federal court in June 1993. In February 1994 an order was entered dismissing the case without prejudice to allow refiling in state court.
¶ 3. The state court case was filed in the beginning of March 1994. A claim was made under the Mississippi Workers' Compensation Act for benefits. The workers' compensation claim was settled on April 14, 1998, with the entry of an order approving final compromise settlement. After signing, Wingerter executed a release to Brotherhood Productions in May 19981
¶.4. On May 3, 1999, Brotherhood Productions filed a motion for summary judgment alleging . that Brotherhood Produc tions and the remaining defendants were immune from civil liability under the exclusivity provisions of the Mississippi Workers' Compensation Act. On July 2, Win-gerter filed a motion for an M.R.E. 56(f) denial or in the alternative for an extension of time within which to respond. Wingerter alleged that she had not been afforded enough time in which to depose the remaining defendants. On July 15, Wingerter filed her response to Brotherhood Production's motion for summary judgment alleging that statements alleging the other defendants were co-employees of Wingerter were insufficient and without support of evidence that would be competent at trial.
¶ 5. The defendants filed a joint reply to Wingerter's response to their summary judgment motion. In their reply they contended that Wingerter had already compromised and settled all claims that she had under the provisions of the Act. A hearing was held on May 15, 2000, and the findings of fact and conclusions of law were entered on May 30th in favor of Brotherhood Productions and the other named defendants.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 6. "This Court conducts de novo review of orders granting or denying summary judgment and looks at all the evidentiary matters before it — admissions in pleadings, answers to interrogatories, depositions, affidavits, etc." Branch v. Durham, 742 So.2d 769, 770 (¶4) (Miss.Ct.App.1999) (quoting Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co. v. Berry, 669 So.2d 56, 70 (Miss.1996)). In addition, this evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Branch, 742 So.2d at 770(¶ 4). The burden is on the moving party to show there is no issue of material fact. Conversely, the opposing party need only "establish a genuine issue of material fact by the means available under . Miss. R. Civ. P. 56(c)." Spartan Foods Systems, Inc. v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 582 So.2d 399, 402 (Miss.1991). The supreme court has further stated that
[w]e do not try issues. Rather, we only determine whether there are issues to be tried. Furthermore, it is well-settled that motions for summary judgment are to be viewed with a skeptical eye, and if a trial court should err, it is better to err on the side of denying the motion. The focal point of our de novo review is on material facts. In defining a "material" fact in the context of summary judgments, the Mississippi Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he presence of fact issues in the record does not per se entitle a party to avoid summary judgment. The court must be convinced that the factual issue is a material one, one that matters in an outcome determinative sense."
Dailey v. Methodist Med. Ctr., 790 So.2d 903, 907 (¶ 3) (Miss.Ct.App.2001), citing Evans v. Jackson Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 771 So.2d 1006, 1008 (Miss.Ct.App.2000).
¶ 7. In addition, we must consider the applicability of the exclusiveness of liability section of the Mississippi Workers' Compensation Act which provides:
[t]he liability of an employer to pay compensation shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer to the employee, his legal representative, husband or wife, parents, dependents, next-of-kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages at common law or otherwise from such employer on account of such injury or death, except that if an employer fails to secure payment of compensation as required by this chapter, an injured employee, or his legal representative in case death results from the injury, may elect to claim compensation under this -chapter or to maintain and action at law for damages on account of such injury or death. In such action the defendant may not plead as a defense that the injury was caused by the negligence of a fellow servant, nor that the employee assumed the risk of his employment, nor that the injury was due to the contributory negligence of the employee.
Miss.Code Ann. § 71-3-9 (Rev.2000)¡ "This is more than a statement of the law — it is a statement of public policy by the legislature justifying the imposition of liability for payment of benefits under the Act and the taking away of the employer's common law defenses. We have extended to co-employees this umbrella of immunity provided employers by statute." Sawyer v. Head, 510 So.2d 472, 476 (Miss.1987).
DISCUSSION
¶ 8. Brotherhood Productions and Stone Group are essentially the same entity in that Brotherhood was a-subsidiary of Stone Group. Wingerter's signed release prevents any common law recovery against Brotherhood and Stone Group. "[T]he claimant may not collect on the tort claim against his employer or co-employee if the evidence shows that he is entitled to worker's [sic] compensation." Sawyer v. Head, 510-So.2d 472, 476 (Miss.1987). After completing her workers' compensation claim, Wingerter wants to sue the people she worked with during the filming of the movie. She includes several names in her suit. However, Wingerter offers no evidence that these people are not employees of Brotherhood Productions, as all -of the defendants claim. Under the Act, "[t]he acts, other than those of willful negligence, of the employee merge into and remain solely the act of the employer. The employee's liability vánishes." Sawyer, 510 So.2d at 477.
¶ 9. The judge reviewed the evidence presented by each party and issued a ruling with his findings of fact-and conclusions of law. He found that Brotherhood and the other named defendants presented affidavits, the actual movie, credits and a certified copy of the production company's workers' compensation policy detailing that all of these defendants were employees of the production company. Wingerter only provided her belief that she "anticipated" that additional depositions would divulge additional factual material which, in turn, would negate the motion for summary judgment. Wingerter did not offer evidence alluding to what "additional factual material" might be.
¶ 10. The Rule 56(f) exception is not to be used in place of active diligence during the discovery process. "[N]ormally the party invoking Rule 56(f) must show what steps have been taken to obtain access to the information allegedly within the exclusive possession of the other party:" Hobgood v. Koch Pipeline Southeast, Inc., 769 So.2d 838, 845(¶ 35) (Miss.Ct.App. 2000), quoting Marx v. Truck Renting and Leasing Assoc., Inc., 520 So.2d 1333, 1344 (Miss.1987). The judge ruled that Win-gerter failed to actively- pursue the claim which began' with an accident that occurred nine years earlier. The record is lacking any proof that Wingerter sought in earnest to obtain this information prior to the Appellees' motion for summary judgment. Finding no error, we affirm the ruling of the lower court.
¶ 11. THE JUDGMENT OF THE « CIRCUIT COURT OF HARRISON COUNTY IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.
McMILLIN, C.J., KING AND SOUTHWICK, P.JJ., BRIDGES AND THOMAS, JJ., CONCUR. CHANDLER, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY LEE AND IRVING, JJ. BRANTLEY, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
. Appellant claims the case was filed on March 4, 1994, and Appellee claims it was filed March 1, 1994.
. M.R.E. 56(f) provides that: Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such order as is just.