Case Name: PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, Consisting of GEO. E. ERB, E. M. SWEELEY and J. M. THOMPSON, Respondent, and BOISE CITY, a Municipal Corporation, JESSIE M. HURTT and EDWARD STEIN, Intervenors and Respondents, and Mrs. CRUSA AROSTEGUI and JUAN YRIBAR, Intervenors and Respondents, v. NATATORIUM COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellant
Court: Idaho Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Idaho
Decision Date: 1922-11-06
Citations: 36 Idaho 287
Docket Number: 
Parties: PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, Consisting of GEO. E. ERB, E. M. SWEELEY and J. M. THOMPSON, Respondent, and BOISE CITY, a Municipal Corporation, JESSIE M. HURTT and EDWARD STEIN, Intervenors and Respondents, and Mrs. CRUSA AROSTEGUI and JUAN YRIBAR, Intervenors and Respondents, v. NATATORIUM COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellant.
Judges: Lee, ;J., concurs.
Reporter: Idaho Reports
Volume: 36
Pages: 287–336

Head Matter:
(November 6, 1922.)
PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, Consisting of GEO. E. ERB, E. M. SWEELEY and J. M. THOMPSON, Respondent, and BOISE CITY, a Municipal Corporation, JESSIE M. HURTT and EDWARD STEIN, Intervenors and Respondents, and Mrs. CRUSA AROSTEGUI and JUAN YRIBAR, Intervenors and Respondents, v. NATATORIUM COMPANY, a Corporation, Appellant.
[211 Pac. 533.]
Percolating Waters — Ownership op Under Constitutional and Statutory Provisions — Absence op Intention to Dedicate to Public Use — Essential Elements op Public Use — Evidence— No Jurisdiction in Public Utilities Commission.
1. Percolating water existing in the earth belongs to the soil as a pa~t of the realty, and may be used and controlled by the owner to the same extent as the land itself.
2. Held, that there is sufficient evidence in the record to justify the conclusion that no natural springs or streams, subterranean or otherwise, are cut off or interfered with by the sinking of the wells of appellant and the gathering of the hot water in question at the depth found into its pipes, or by the use of pumps for the purpose .of increasing the flow of said water, such water so far as shown being merely percolating or seepage water arising out of the earth without an outlet through any definite channel, and not being shown to belong to any natural spring or stream or subterranean flow.
Publisher’s Note.
1. Land owner’s rights in percolating waters, see note in 991 Am. St. 66.
Appropriation of percolating waters on public lands, see notes in 30 L. R. A. 186 j 21 L. R. A., N. S., 76.
3. The constitution of this state, art. 15, sees. 1, 2 and 3, does not make all waters within the state public waters and subject as such to appropriation under its laws. The constitutional right to divert and appropriate water does not extend to private waters.
4. C. S., sec. 5556, declares that the publie waters of the state consist only of sueh as flow in their natural channels, including the waters of natural springs and lakes. It does not enumerate or include percolating waters.
5. 'C. S., sec. 5572, is a statutory recognition of the private ownership of the waters of any spring located wholly upon the lands of the owner of the fee, expressly denies to the state the right to control the same, denies the right of appropriation without the consent of the owner of the fee, and gives to such owner the right of exclusive use. The ownership and use of percolating waters cannot be taken from the owner of the fee against his Will, without compensation, nor otherwise than as provided by law.
6. Since the waters flowing from appellant’s hot-water wells are private waters, the fact of distribution to a selected class of customers and the receiving of compensation therefor, the fact that the appellant company originally filed notices of location and appropriation of the hot waters of certain springs, the fact that the company was authorized by its charter to devote such water to a public use, in the absence of an unequivocal intention to dedicate to a publie use, are not of themselves such acts or facts as would constitute appellant a public service corporation, inasmuch as sueh waters belonged to appellant as unqualifiedly as the land upon which, the springs were found.
7. Held, that the evidence in this case did not warrant the respondent Public Utilities Commission in holding that the appellant either expressly or impliedly dedicated to a publie use the hot water owned by it; it is therefore not a public service corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the commission, and the order of the commission so holding must be vacated.
APPEAL from the Public Utilities Commission.
Reversed.
Johnson & Nixon, for Appellant.
The filing of the water right notice is not an implied dedication of the hot water to a public use. The right to the water was acquired by actual application to beneficial use independently of the statute. (Sandpoint etc. Go. v. Panhandle Go., 11 Ida. 405, 83 Pac. 347; Neilson v. Parker, 19 Ida. 727, 115 Pae. 488; Purey v. Taylor, 22 Ida. 605, 127 Pac. 676; Crane Falls Co. v. Snake River Irr. Co. (on rehearing) , 24 Ida. 63, 133 Pac. 655; Haight v. Costanich, 184 Cal. 426, 194 Pac. 26; Bean v. Morris (C. C. A.), 159 Fed. 651.)
The language of a water right appropriation notice does not in itself make the owner a public utility. (Del Mar Water, Light & P. Co. v. Eshleman, 167 Cal. 666, 140 Pac. 591; Thayer v. California Dev. Co., 164 Cal. 117, 128 Pac. 21; Allen v. Railroad Com., 179 Cal. 68, 175 Pae. 466, 8 L. R. A. 249; De Pauw University v. Public Ser. Com., 253 Fed. 848.)
Neither the statute nor provisions of art. 15 of the constitution of Idaho can make a private use public, without unjustly interfering with private property in violation of the federal constitution. (Marin Wader & Power Co. v. Sausalito, 168 Cal. 587, 143 Pac. 767; Storey v. Richardson, 186 Cal. 162, 198 Pac. 1057, 18 A. L. R. 750; Stratton v. Railroad Com., 186 Cal. 119, 17 A. L. R. 72, 198 Pac. 1051; Stoehr v. Natatorium Co., 34 Ida. 217, 200 Pac. 132; Producers’ Transp. Co. v. Railroad Com., 251 U. S. 226, 40 Sup. Ct. 131, 64 L. ed. 239; Producers’ Transp. Co. v. Railroad Com., 176 Cal. 499, 69 Pac. 59; Associated Pipe Line Co. v. Railroad Com., 176 Cal. 518, 169 Pae. 62, L. R. A. 1918C, 849.)
The common-law doctrine that the owner of the land is the owner of the water developed and situated thereon ap plies where his right to the water does not come in conflict with the superior and paramount right of one who has appropriated the water for beneficial use in conformity with the statutes. (27 R. C. L., sec. 170; Hutchinson v. Watson Slough Ditch Go., 16 Ida. 484, 133 Am. St. 125, 101 Pac. 1059, 23 L. R. A., N. S., 1109; Schoddc v. Twin Falls Water Go., 224 U. S. 107, 33 Sup. Ct. 470, 56 L. ed. 686; King v. Chamberlin, 20 Ida. 504, 118 Pac. 1099.)
The hot water in question may properly be regarded as within the expression “developed water” as used in some of the decisions and discussed in 2 Kinney on Irrigation, 2d ed., page 2187, sec. 1206, and which the author says belongs to the parties who, by their own exertion, discovered and developed the water. (Reno v. Richards, 32 Ida. 1, 178 Pac. 81.)
The settled doctrine in America as expressed in the later decisions may be said to fully recognize the private property rights to subterranean waters, in one who has developed the same on his own land, where the question of the correlative rights of other adjoining proprietors equally entitled to it does not arise, and subject to the maxim that one must, use his own so as not to injure his neighbor. {Katz u. Walltinshaw, 141 Cal. 116, 99 Am. St. 35, 70 Pac. 663, 74 Pac. 766, 64 L. R. A. 236; Gagnon v. French Licit Springs Co., 163 Ind. 687, 72 N. E. 849, 68 L. R. A. 175; Ohio Oil Go. v. Indiana, 177 U. S. 190, 20 Sup. Ct. 576, 44 L. ed. 729; 20 Morrison Min. Rep. 466; Horne v. Utah Oil Refinmg Go. (Utah), 202 Pac. 815; Soiothern Pac. R. R. Go. v. Dufour, 95 Cal. 615, 30 Pae. 783, 19 L. R. A. 92.)
The provisions of art. 15 of the constitution are not self-executing but require legislation to carry them into effect. (Boise City Irr. & Land Go. v. Turner, 176 Fed. 373; Palmer v. Railroad Com., 167 Cal. 163, 138 Pac. 997.)
The law itself has recognized the ownership of private waters and has excepted private waters from the provisions of the statute. (C. S., sec. 5572.)
“It is fundamental that no executive officer or board has the power to deprive a party of a vested right to the use of water. (Speer v. Stephenson, 16 Ida. 707, 102 Pae. 365.) To permit this would clearly be depriving him of his property without due process of law.” (Sanderson v. Salmon River Canal Co., 34 Ida. 145, 199 Pac. 999.)
J. M. Lampert, for Respondent Boise City.
The disclaimer of public service made by a company’s officer when the legal consequences of their conduct are drawn in question is not entitled to great weight, after many years of serving a substantial portion of the public. (Public Service Com. v. Valley Mercantile Co. (Mont.), P. U. R. 1921D, 803.) •
The intention to which courts will give heed is the intention which finds expression in conduct and not that which is secreted in the heart of the owner. (Indianapolis v. Kingsburry, 101 Ind. 201.)
There is a physical service limit to all public utility plants, but if that portion of the public is served that can reasonably be served and to the limit of the available supply, especially if the supply is increased for the specific purpose of serving the maximum number of customers, it is a public service. (1 Wyman on Public Service Corporations, 239; Public Service Com. v. Valley Service Com., supra.)
A corporation, firm or individual employing an agency purchased at the expense of the taxpayers, and hence solely for public purpose for distribution of its product through pipes such as the company distributing hot water using the public streets and alleys, is in a public service. (12 R. C. L. 883.)
The acceptance of a franchise to use the public streets is almost conclusive evidence of public profession. (1 Wyman oh Public Service' Corporations,' p. 183, sec. 215; Urmaoga Tel. Co. v. Lorraine, etc. (111.), P. U. R. 1920E, 243.)
This natural hot water based upon a water right filing secured from the state, tapping a subterranean flow and by the company’s notice pledging to the state and to the public that the use of such water would be for domestic and other beneficial uses is very similar to the natural gas and water power privileges which give to the owner a natural monopoly, and the rule making the distributors of such commodities public service corporations has been well established. (1 Wyman on Public Service Corporations, p. 74, sec. 94.)
“If virtual monopoly is made out as the permanent condition of affairs in a given business, then the law, it seems, will consider that calling public in its nature.” (1 Wyman on Public Service Corporations, p. 133, sec. 156.)
“The question whether a corporation is or is not a public utility is determined by its acts, and not by what its charter provides.” (State ex rel. Dancigar & Co. v. Public Service Com. (Mo.), P. U. R. 1919A, 353; Be Appalachian Power Co. (W. Va.), P. U. R. 1919D, 286; Be New State Canal Co. (Ariz.), P. U. R. 1919A, 672; Be Portageville Light & Power Co. (Mo.), P. U. R. 1919E, 586; Be Union Electric Light & Power Co. (Mo.), P. U. R. 1918E, 490; Be Commonwealth Mining & Milling Co. (Ariz.), P. U. R. 1915B, 536; Teatman v. Towers, 126 Md. 513, P. U. R. 1915E, 811, 95 Atl. 158.)
“A company that holds itself out to serve the public within a given area with water upon specified terms is a public utility.” (Berry v. Oro Loma Earms Co. (Cal.), P. U. R. 1917F, 631; Van Dyke v. Geary, 244 U. S. 39, 37 Sup. Ct. 483, 61 L. ed. 973; Terminal Taxicab Co. v. Kutz, 241 U. S. 252, Ann.- Cas. 1916D, 765, 36 Sup. Ct. 583, 260 L. ed. 984; Van Hossear v. Bailroad Com., 184 Cal. 553, 194 Pac. 1003; Clarksburg Light & Heat Co. v. Public Service Com., P. U. R. 1920A, 639; Be Garden Home Water Works (Or.), P. U. R. 1919D, 1921.)
Davidson & Davison, for Respondents Hurtt and Stein et al.
The use of all waters of the state sold, rented or distributed is a public use, subject to the regulation and control of the state, in the manner prescribed by law. (Const., sec. 1, art. 15; WUterding v. Greene, 4 Ida. 773, 45 Pac. 134; Speer v. Stephenson, 16 Ida. 707, 102 Pac. 365.)
All of the water claimed by appellant was appropriated under the provisions of the constitution and statutes of the state, and to entitle it to the use thereof there must have been an application to a beneficial use; this beneficial use included the sale, rental and distribution, and the consumer of such water under a sale, rental or distribution thereof acquired a vested right therein, subject to continued use and payment. (Const., art. 15, secs. 1, 2 and 3; Murray v. Public, Utilities Corn., 27 Ida. 603, 150 Pae. 47, L. R. A. 1916F, 756; Sard v. Boise City Irr. Co., 9 Ida. 589, 76 Pac. 331.)
The charter powers to “acquire, develop, hold springs, wells and streams of both hot and cold water, and to conduct the waters thereof to Boise City and vicinity in the county of Ada, state of Idaho, for the use of said city ■and the inhabitants thereof,” followed by a performance of said acts, is a pursuit of the charter’s powers sufficient to make the service a public utility. (Del Mar Water Co. v. Eshleman, 167 Cal. 666, 140 Pac. 948.)
The original company laying the pipes in the streets and alleys of Boise City, the Artesian Hot & Cold Water Co., was a water company organized under the laws of the state, and was controlled by the provisions of secs. 2710 to 2713, inclusive, of the Revised Statutes of 1887, in force at the time of its incorporation. (Price v. Riverside Land & Irrigating Co., 56 Cal. 431; Crow v. San Joaquin Irr. Co., 130 Cal. 309, 62 Pac. 562; Fresno Canal Co. v. Parke, 129 Cal. 437, 62 Pae. 87; Merrill v. Southside Irr. Co., 112 Cal. 426, 44 Pac. 720.)
The water having been applied to a public use by a sale thereof cannot be again retaken for a private use. (Riverside Land Co. v. Jarvis, 174 Cal. 316, 163 Pac. 54; Leavitt v. Larsen Irr. Co., 157 Cal. 82, 106 Pac. 404, 29 L. R. A., N. S., 213; Limoneira Co. v. Railroad Com., 174 Cal. 232, 162 Pac. 1033.)
The use of the streets and alleys for the purpose of laying and maintaining pipes is of itself sufficient to fix the business of supplying water as a public business. (20 Cyc. 1160; Sangen v. Albina Light & Power Co., 21 Or. 411, 28 Pac. 244, 14 L. R. A. 424; Portland Natural Gas & Oil Go. v. State, 135 Ind. 54, 34 N. B. 818, 21 L. R, A. 639; American Water Works Co. v. State, 46 Neb. 194, 67 N. W. 711, 30 L. R. A. 447; Seaton Mt. Electric Light, Seat <& Power Co. v. Idaho Springs Invest. Co., 49 Colo. 122, 111 Pac. 834, 33 L. R. A., N. S., 1078.)
Roy L. Black, Attorney General, and A. H. Conner, Special Assistant Attorney General, for Commission.
Dedication is a question of intent, which is deduced from the acts and conduct of the owner. (Sanson v. Proffer, 23 Ida. 705, 132 Pae. 573; 18 C. J. 38, 54, 58; Wood v. Surd, 34 N. J. L. 87; City of Columbios v. Dahn, 36 Ind. 330; Lamar County v. Clements, 49 Tex. 347; Elliott on Roads and Streets, 3d ed., sees. 138, 140.)
Use by the public constitutes an acceptance of the dedication. (Morgan v. C. <& A. B. B. Co., 96 .U. S. 716, 24 L. ed. 743.)
A portion of the water appropriated may be dedicated to a public use and a portion of it reserved for private use. (Del Mar Water L. <& P. Co. v. Eshleman, 167 Cal. 666, 140 Pac. 591; Allen v. Railroad Com., 179 Cal. 68, 8 A. L. R. 249, 175 Pac. 466.)
The dedication may be to only a portion of the public. (Banning v. Osborne, 76 Fed. 319; 1 Wyman, Public Service Corporations, see. 271; Pocantico Water Works Co. v. Bird, 130 N. Y. 249, 29 N. B. 246; Minnesota Carnal & P. Co. v. Koochiching Co., 97 Minn. 429, 7 Ann. Cas. 1182, 107 N. W. 405, 5 L. R. A., N. S., 638.)
The common-law distinction made between percolating and other subterranean waters, and waters on the surface, has been expressly repudiated in the arid land states which recognize the priority of appropriation as distinguished from the riparian right principle. (Kinney on Irrigation, 2d ed., secs. 1155, 1188, 1193; Katz v. Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116, 90 Am. St. 35, 70 Pac. 663, 74 Pac. 766, 64 L. R. A. 236; Malad Valley Irr. Co. v. Campbell, 2 Ida. 411, 18 Pac. 52; Sail v. Blackmam, 22 Ida. 556, 126 Pac. 1047.)
Seepage and percolating waters are considered as public waters in Idaho and as such are subject to appropriation. (Le Quime v. Chambers, 15 Ida. 405, 98 Pac. 415; Bower v. Moorman, 27 Ida. 162, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 665, 147 Pae. 496; C. S., secs. 5558, 5562.)
Subterranean waters, artesian waters, percolating waters and natural springs, whether formed from percolating or seepage waters or a subterranean stream, are subject to appropriation. (Moe v. Harger, 10 Ida. 302, 77 Pae. 645; Van Camp v. Emery, 13 Ida. 202, 89 Pac. 752; City of Pocatello v. Bass, 15 Ida. 1, 96 Pac. 120; Jassign v. Daly, 15 Ida. 137, 96 Pae. 568, 18 L. R. A., N. S., 886; Youngs v. Regam,, 20 Ida. 275, 118 Pac. 499; Marshall v. Niagara Springs Co., 22 Ida. 144, 125 Pac. 208; Walbridge v. Robinson, 22 Ida. 236, 125 Pac. 812, 43 L. R. A., N. S., 100; Tobey v. Bridgewvod, 22 Ida. 566, 127 Pac. 178; Cottonwood etc. Co. v. Monastery, 29 Ida. 761, 162 Pac. 242; Donaldson v. Thousand Springs Power Co., 29 Ida. 735, 162 Pac. 334; Breyer v. Baker, 31 Ida. 387, 171 Pac. 1135; Rábido v. Fwey, 33 Ida. 56, 190 Pac. 73.)
What is known as the “Colorado System” rejects completely the doctrine of riparian rights and rests entirely upon the theory that all of the waters in the state, of whatever nature they may be, are the property of the state, that they shall be devoted to the highest use, and the right to use such waters can only be acquired by application to a beneficial use. (Mills Irr. Manual, secs. 5, 21-25, inc.; Yunker v. Nichols, 1 Colo. 551; Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443.)
Idaho follows the Colorado system. (Mills Irr. Manual, see. 25; Drake v. Earhart, 2 Ida. 750, 23 Pac. 541; Idaho Power Co. y. Stephenson, 16 Ida. 418, 101 Pac. 821; Hutchinson v. Watson Slough Ditch Co., 16 Ida. 484, 101 Pac. 1059.)
The whole theory of the law in 'Idaho is that in this arid region water must be subjected to the highest and greatest duty, and it must be the constant aim of judicial 'construction to effectuate that purpose. (Van Camp v. Emery, supra; Nida/y v. Barker, 16 Ida. 73, 101 Pac. 254; Nampa Irr. Dist. v. Petrie, 28 Ida. 227, 153 Pae. 425; Adams v. Twin Falls etc. Co., 29 Ida. 357, 161 Pac. 322.)
A locator of the public waters of the state acquires no property right in the water; he only acquires the right to use that water. (Boise Irr. Co. v. Steivart, 10 Ida. 38, 77 Pac. 25; Bennett v. Twin Falls etc. Co., 27 Ida. 643, 150 Pac. 336; secs. 5556, 5558, C. S.)
If a railway company organizes, under see. 5, art 11 of our constitution and the railway corporation laws passed pursuant thereto, it becomes a common carrier by virtue of the constitutional provision, regardless of what its intention may have been. No dedication to the public is necessary. (Connolly v. Woods, 13 Ida. 591, 92 Pac. 573; McLean v. Dist. Court, 24 Ida. 441, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 542, 134 Pac. 536; Blackwell Lumber Co. v. Empire Mill Co., 28 Ida. 556, 155 Pac. 680; 29 Ida. 421, 160 Pac. 265.)
Where a person or corporation has “stood by and allowed the public to use his property as though it had been dedicated to the public use and has allowed private rights to grow up under that assumption, and in view of such belief and opinion, and a disturbance of those rights would amount to an injustice, an inequity or a fraud, the owner will thereafter be estopped to set up the true state of facts or assert his own title to the prejudice of the public or the private rights thus accrued.” (Village of Hailey v. Riley, 14 Ida. 481, 95 Pae. 686.)
The mere sale, rental or • distribution constitutes a dedication to the public or the portion thereof served under sec. 1, and a dedication to the use under sec. 4. (Wilterding v. Green, 4 Ida. 773, 45 Pac. 134; Idaho Fruit Land Co. v. Great Western Co., 17 Ida. 273, 105 Pac. 562; Brose v. Board of Directors, 20 Ida. 281, 118 Pac. 504; Mellen v. Great Western Co., 21 Ida. 353, 122 Pae. 30; Niday v. Barker, supra; Hobbs v. Twin Falls Canal Co., 24 Ida. 380, 133 Pae. 899; Childs v. Neitzel, 26 Ida. 116, 141 Pac. 77.)
It is clear, from an examination of the irrigation cases decided by this court, that it is the sale, rental and distribution which constitutes the dedication to a public use. (Adams v. Twin Falls etc. Go., supra; Shelby v. Farmers’ Ditch Co., 10 Ida. 723, 80 Pac. 222; Parrott v. Twin Falls Co., 32 Ida. 759, 188 Pac. 451.)

Opinion:
BUDGE, J.
This is an appeal from an order of the Public Utilities Commission, in which the commission held that the Natatorium Company was a public utility, as to its sale of the use of hot water to certain inhabitants of Boise City for heating and domestic purposes.
From the record it appears that in 1890, EL B. Eastman, Timothy Regan, W. H. Ridenbaugh and J. W. Cunningham acquired an option to purchase the SE. % of the SE. 14 of the SW.14 of section 12, T. 3 N., R. 2 E., B. M., in Ada county, adjoining Boise City on the east, from Robert Wilson, and, due to certain surface indications, began prospecting beneath the surface of said land to secure a flow of hot water. They drilled two wells about 400 feet deep and secured a flow of hot water, enough to fill two six-inch casings.
When this land was purchased, on May 28, 1890, by the above-named individuals, it was deeded by Robert Wilson and wife to Eastman and Ridenbaugh. On April 27, 1891, Eastman and Ridenbaugh and their wives transferred this same property to the Boise Artesian Hot & Cold Water Company. On November 24 and 25, 1894, this company caused to be posted notices of location of a water right, as is more fully set out in the dissenting opinion written by Justice Dunn. This hot water was first diverted to the Natatorium, a bathing resort, and used' for bathing and heating purposes, some time prior to May, 1892. The first pipe laid from the hot-water wells to the Natatorium consisted of two sizes, a ten-inch pipe down to a tree in front of the Natatorium, where a six-inch pipe and a %-inch pipe were taken off to serve that institution with hot water.
The present Natatorium Company was incorporated on September 15, 1917.
While the evidence is not the most satisfactory touching the amount of the flow of the wells used by the Natatorium, witness Drake testified that from the time the hot-water wells were completed in 1891 until the supply of hot water was increased approximately fifty per cent by pumping, about the year 1912, a six-inch main would carry all the hot water. This witness also further testified that it had been calculated that the Natatorium used eighty per cent of the flow of the hot-water wells.
In 1891, the hot water was piped to the home of one Moore and Eastman. About 1891, 1892 or 1893, a portion of this hot water was conveyed through mains, some distance down what is now known as Warm Springs Avenue and Idaho Street, to the Boise City National Bank Building.
On December 1, 1906, a sale of the Natatorium was made to the Boise Railroad Company, and on January 2, 1907, a correction deed was made to this same property. On September 17, 1917, one Miller, trustee, at a master's sale, purchased the Natatorium. The Natatorium was subsequently repurchased by the appellant and is now owned by it.
About the' year 1912, in order to increase the flow of natural hot water from these springs, air pumps were installed. Later on, these proving unsatisfactory, electric pumps were installed and the natural flow of hot water increased approximately fifty per cent.
Gradually since the delivery of the first hot water to Moore and Eastman, residences in the vicinity of where the mains of the hot-water company now lie have been supplied with a portion of this hot water, for heating and domestic use, until there are now a total of 276 users, 173 of whom were heating customers, 81 summer and 22 winter domestic users.
It may be reasonably inferred that the maximum supply of hot water has been reached. These users of water were not solicited, and there is no written contract fixing the tenure of their use. The arrangement would seem to be that the customers using the water pay for it annually in advance. Ordinarily there have been no changes made in the right to the use of this hot water by those who have used it. It has never been considered, so far as we have been able to ascertain from the record, as-an appurtenance :to the land or premises where used, or conveyed as such to subsequent purchasers of the premises where used.
The quantity of hot water delivered and the method of 'its use has at all times been controlled by the appellant.
It is not Contended that the use of hot water by the Natatorium is such a public use as brings the appellant corporation under the jurisdiction of the Public Utilities Commission.
The question, therefore, for decision is whether the hot water distributed by the appellant to the various users thereof, exclusive of the Natatorium, has been dedicated to a public use. If this question is to be answered in the affirmative, the appellant company is a public utility and subject to the jurisdiction of the Public Utilities Commission. If these waters are public waters, the sale, rental or-distribution of the same would be a public use and subject to the regulation and control of the state in the manner prescribed by law, and the use of the same would be controlled under the provisions of art. 15, sees. 1, 2 and 3 of the constitution. If these waters are private waters, in the absence of an unequivocal intention to and dedication thereof to a public use by the appellant, the appellant would not be a public service corporation, and therefore subject to regulation as a public utility. Such dedication is never presumed. (Niles v. City of Los Angeles, 125 Cal. 572, 58 Pac. 190.)
In my opinion the waters of these hot wells are not public waters, and were not when located by the original locators. Not being public waters, they were not subject to appropriation, except by the owners of the fee.
The evidence conclusively shows that the ground where these wells are now located was boggy or swampy, and at most the waters at that time were only seepage or percolating waters rising through the intervening soil.
In my opinion there is sufficient evidence to justify the conclusion that no natural springs, streams and subterranean streams are cut off or interfered with by reason of the sinking of the wells and the gathering of the water at the depth found, into the pipes, or by reason of the use of pumps for the purpose of increasing the flow. This being percolating or seepage water, merely, rising out of the earth, without an outlet through any definite channel, and no part of any natural spring or stream, or • any subterranean stream or flow, was not subject to appropriation, except by the owner of the fee. It was the property of the owner of the land upon which it stood, and under .the well-recognized doctrine that percolating water existing in the earth belongs to the soil as a part of the realty, it may be used and controlled to the same extent by the owner of the land as the land itself. (Bruening v. Dorr, 23 Colo. 195, 47 Pac. 290, at 292, 35 L. R. A. 640.)
The owner of the fee was the owner of the corpus of the water. The right to appropriate subterranean waters is not involved in this ease, as disclosed by the record, and the cases cited in support of the right to appropriate subterranean waters have no application.
The constitutional provisions, namely, art. 15, secs. 1, 2 and 3, do not declare that all waters of the state are public waters and subject to appropriation.
These waters were not appropriated at any time for strictly private use, but were diverted for use in the Natatorium, for the purpose of heating the building and to temper the water for bathing purposes.
C. S., see. 5556, provides that all waters of the state when flowing in their natural channels, including the waters of all natural springs and lakes within the boundaries of the state are declared to be the property of the state, whose duty it shall be to supervise their appropriation and allotment to those diverting the same therefrom for any beneficial purpose, and the right to the use of any of the waters of the state for useful or beneficial purposes is recognized and confirmed. This statute contains a limitation, in that it declares that the waters of the state consist of such waters only as flow in their natural channels, including the waters of all natural springs and lakes. This does not include percolating waters.
C. S., see. 5572, is as follows: "The department of reclamation is hereby prohibited from issuing or granting permits to divert or appropriate the waters of any lake not exceeding five acres in surface area at high water mark, pond, pool, or spring in this state, which is located or situated wholly or entirely upon the lands of a person or corporation, except to the person or corporation owning said land, or with his or its written permission, executed and acknowledged as required for the conveyance of real estate.' '
This is a statutory recognition of the private ownership of any lake not exceeding five acres in surface area at high-water mark, and any pohd, pool or spring in this state, located wholly or entirely upon the lands of the owner of the fee, and expressly denies to the state the right to control the same, and denies the right of appropriation without the consent of the owner of the fee, and gives to the owner of the fee the exclusive right of appropriation or use. And this ownership in percolating waters cannot be taken from the owner of the fee against his will and without his consent, without compensation and in the manner as provided by law.
I am not willing to subscribe to the theory that all waters within the borders of the state, which are found where nature places them, are public waters of the state, the property of the state and solely under the control of the state wherever found. To carry this doctrine to its logical conclusion, the owner of the fee who sinks a well upon his premises and discovers water has but a qualified ownership in the soil and a limited right only to the use of the water found therein. Any person may condemn a right of way across the owner of the fee's premises to the well and divert the waters of the well not then' being used by the owner of the fee, upon the theory that the water placed there by nature is the property of the state and subject to appropriation, for which the owner of the fee is entitled to no compensation except for the right of way. To hold to such theory is going beyond a safe and reasonable interpretation of the constitutional provisions heretofore cited and falls within no reasonable interpretation- of the right to appropriate public waters of the state as fixed by the statutes of this state.
The ease of Le Quime v. Chambers, 15 Ida. 405, 98 Pac. 415, 21 L. R. A., N. S., 76, does not support this theory. That ease held in effect that percolating waters upon the public domain, when gathered, are subject to appropriation under our statute, and as such will be recognized and protected by the courts, but as will be observed in that opinion, that would not be the case if the land on which such waters were located had already been patented. An entirely different question would then arise, that is to say, had the land been patented prior to the diversion of such waters by the locator no right could have been acquired or no appropriation made of such waters by any person not the owner of the fee, without the latter's consent.
I think the correct principle of law is announced in the case of King v. Chamberlin, 20 Ida. 504, 118 Pac. 1099, where the court inter alia says: "In the first place, a land owner may use the surface of his land for any lawful purpose without let or hindrance from anyone. There is nothing unlawful in collecting and impounding surface and waste water; if he sees fit to turn his farm into a lake, he may lawfully do so, so long as he does not injure someone else in the process. Here the question of cutting off the flow of a natural stream or in any mánner obstructing a watercourse or stream of water is in no manner involved. The waters collected by respondents were wholly surface and flood waters. They built their dams and dikes so as to collect the water in the winter and springtime, and thus hold it on their lands throughout the season."
In the instant case the water was collected beneath the surface of the soil and did not obstruct or interfere with any. watercourse upon the surface or beneath the soil. Whether the waters are collected on the surface or beneath the soil, the principle involved is the same, and further on in the opinion this court says:
"This it is as lawful for them to do as it would have been to sink a well on their premises and collect therein either surface water or the waters percolating through the ground. . The constitutional right to divert and appropriate water does not extend to private water.....
"See. 3, art. 15 of the constitution, is dealing with the water of a natural stream and provides, among other things, as follows: 'The right to divert and appropriate the unappropriated waters of any natural stream to beneficial uses shall never be denied,' etc. See. 3253 of the Rev. Codes, which provides for making applications to the state engineer for permits to appropriate water, has reference to 'public waters' and 'the waters of any natural stream, spring or seepage waters or lakes, or other public waters.' Neither the statute nor the constitution ever contemplated authorizing one man to appropriate and divert the property of another. Both the constitution and statute were dealing with the public, unappropriated waters of the state as distinguished from private property. The entire legislation of this state, as well as the repeated decisions of this court, has been along the line of encouraging economy in the use of water and collecting and impounding the same. If a man collect and impound surface and flood waters from his own land before they reach any natural stream or channel and hold the same on his own land and premises, the fact that he may not use it for irrigation or any other commer eial purpose does not render it any less his property or authorize anyone else to invade his property or appropriate and divert the same."
And in support of this principle, this court cites the base of Metcalf v. Nelson, 8 S. D. 87, 59 Am. St. 746, 65 N. W. 911, where that court had under consideration the right of a land owner to recover damages from one who entered upon his premises and diverted and carried away a large quantity of water from a spring located on his land. The court in passing upon that question said:
"As the hidden water in the plaintiff's soil belonged to him as a part of it, he might, by artificial means, separate it from the soil, and it would still belong to him. He might sink a well, into. which such water would work its way, and the accumulation in the well would still be his, and subject to his proprietary control. (Davis v. Spaulding, 157 Mass. 431, 32 N. E. 650, 19 L. R. A. 1021.) If the water which fills this spring is not subject to the law of ruuning streams, but to that of percolating water, did the plaintiff lose his ownership of it when it appeared upon the surface? If a cloud had burst on plaintiff's land, and filled a cavity thereon with rain, it would, while so confined, belong to plaintiff, and we are unable to see why or how the question of ownership can be made to depend upon which way the water comes from. Suppose this percolating water appeared at the surface only at the point of the spring, and at once sunk away again into the surrounding soil, resuming its character of wandering, seeping water, would the plaintiff's proprietary rights.come and go with the appearance and disappearance of the water? It must be remembered that we are not dealing- with a running stream, or with riparian rights, but simply with percolating waters which have combined and struggled to the surface on plaintiff's land. We think the plaintiff had more than the ordinary usufruct in the water of this spring, so long, at least, as it was held in the spring. He might consume or dispose of it all if he chose. He might convey it away in pipes, or carry it off in tanks. If medicinal, he might bottle it, and sell it for the healing of the nations. It would be inconsistent with the maintenance of such right in plaintiff to allow that the defendant or any other stranger had also the right, in hostility to the plaintiff, to take and carry away water from the same spring."
While it will be conceded that in California the eases passing upon the right to appropriate percolating waters are not in harmony, in a great number of decisions the supreme court of that state has held that percolating waters cannot be appropriated under the statutes of that state. (Southern Pac. R. Co. v. Dufour, 95 Cal. 615, 618, 30 Pac. 783, 19 L. R. A. 92; Hanson v. McCue, 42 Cal. 303, 10 Am. Rep. 299; Cross v. Kitts, 69 Cal. 217, 222, 58 Am. Rep. 558, 10 Pac. 409; Painter v. Pasadena L. & W. Co., 91 Cal. 74, 82, 27 Pac. 539; Gould v. Eaton, 111 Cal. 639, 644, 52 Am. St. 201, 44 Pac. 319.)
There is a clear distinction between the right to appropriate the waters of a subterranean stream and the right to appropriate percolating waters which form no part of a subterranean stream. (Trustees etc. of the Village of Delhi v. Youmans, 50 Barb. 316.) I do not wish to be understood that the right to appropriate the waters of subterranean streams does not exist in this state, as well as the right to appropriate all waters of natural springs, streams or lakes. My position is that mere percolating waters or waters gathered together in wells upon the lands of the owner of the fee are not subject to appropriation by a third party, either under the constitution or statutes of this state.
Neither am I in accord with the theory that it is incumbent upon the owner of the fee to establish the fact that the percolating water which is a part and parcel of the soil is not a part of a subterranean stream or basin or an underground lake. This burden rests upon the party seeking to make the appropriation.
If I understand correctly the position taken by Justice Dunn in his dissenting opinion, it is to this effect, that had the appellant in this case, after driving the wells and gathering the water into pipes, conducted the same to the Natatorium only, for the purpose of heating the building and furnishing water for bathing purposes, this would not have constituted a public use, subject to the control of the commission, but added to that fact the further fact that the water was conducted through mains and pipes into dwelling-houses and a number of residences and business houses of the city, and thus distributed and sold, the water was thereby dedicated to a public use, and appellant became a public service corporation and subject to the control of the commission.
If the waters are public waters as distinguished from private waters, the act of distribution and sale under a franchise or otherwise may have constituted such a public use. But since the waters are not public waters, but private waters, the mere fact of distribution or the receiving of compensation for the use thereof, in the absence of an unequivocal intention to dedicate to a public use, would not be such a use as would make the appellant a public service corporation. And I am in accord with the views of Chief Justice Bice upon the point, namely, that the evidence submitted to the commission' does not disclose an intentional dedication of the hot water of the appellant company to a public use.
The water being private water, it was private property and could not be impressed with a public use and subjected to the jurisdiction of the commission without the consent of appellant, express or implied, for to so hold would be in effect to take its property without due process of law.
The mere fact that the appellant company filed notices of location or appropriation of the hot waters, in and of itself was not such an act as would constitute it a public service corporation, whatever its notice may have contained. Nor would the fact that it was authorized by its charter to devote the hot water to a public use. The waters of the wells belonged to the appellant as much as the land upon which they wrere located. The filing of the notice of appropriation gave them no greater right than they had theretofore enjoyed.
Appellant's every act from the date of its first distribution of hot water up until the hearing before the commission clearly showed an intention upon its part not to dedicate the hot water of these wells to a public use, but it sought in every reasonable way to avoid such dedication. Its arrangements with users were from year to year. There was no written contract or sale or lease or undertaking upon its part to furnish a continual flow. It reserved the right to furnish whom it pleased and where it pleased. It did not hold itself out to the public as being ready and willing upon demand to furnish service of its hot water without discrimination. It nowhere appears that the public was entitled to the hot water as a matter of right .and not of grace, or that the appellant held itself out as being ready and willing to serve the public.
Its contracts were all private contracts between the users of the hot water and the company, and were made to a selected class of customers, and the moment that such a status arose and so long as it existed it could not be held to be a public utility.
As was said in Del Mar Water, Light & Power Co. v. Eshleman, 166 Cal. 666, 140 Pac. 591, at 596:
"One may acquire and hold a water supply and waterworks, and thereby distribute and sell water for domestic use and irrigation or other purposes, without engaging in public service. It may make such sales to particular persons, and in such a manner that the public would not be entitled to it. The mere fact, therefore, that a company having such powers has acquired a water supply and constructed waterworks constituting a system which it is operating for compensation does not necessarily justify the conclusion that it is engaged in public service, or that its water is dedicated to public use. The only effect of the adoption of such articles by a corporation is to give it the capacity to engage in such public service if it so desires. After having become incorporated in this manner, it has the power to engage in sneh service in the same sense that an individual has power to engage in such service. It may or may not do so, and until it does, it cannot be said to be subject to the jurisdiction of the Railroad Commission."
See, also, Thayer v. California Development Co., 164 Cal. 119, 128 Pac. 21; Allen v. Railroad Com., 179 Cal. 68, 8 A. L. R. 249, 175 Pac. 466; Stoehr v. The Natatorium Co., 34 Ida. 217, 200 Pac. 132; Story v. Richardson, 186 Cal. 162, 198 Pac. 1057, at 1059; Newell v. Redondo Water Co., 55 Cal. App. 86, 202 Pac. 914; Marin Water & Power Co. v. Town of Sausalito, 168 Cal. 587, 143 Pac. 767.
Moreover, as is stated in Wyman on Public Service Corporations, vol. 1, sec. 200, pp. 167, 168:
"Even one who has acquired a virtual monopoly is not forced into.public service against his will; it is only when he has held himself out in some way as ready to serve that he is bound thereafter to deal with all indiscriminately."
In my opinion the evidence in this case did not warrant the commission in reaching the conclusion that the appellant, either expressly or impliedly, dedicated to a public use the hot water owned by it, and failing to do this it is not a public service corporation, subject to the jurisdiction of the commission, and the commission erred in so holding.
The order appealed from should be reversed, and it is so ordered. Costs are awarded to appellant.
Lee, ;J., concurs.