Case Name: David BOGIGIAN, Appellant (Respondent), v. Hazel BOGIGIAN, Appellee (Petitioner)
Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana
Jurisdiction: Indiana
Decision Date: 1990-03-26
Citations: 551 N.E.2d 1149
Docket Number: No. 49A02-8908-CV-424
Parties: David BOGIGIAN, Appellant (Respondent), v. Hazel BOGIGIAN, Appellee (Petitioner).
Judges: STATON, J. concurs.
Reporter: North Eastern Reporter 2d
Volume: 551
Pages: 1149–1153

Head Matter:
David BOGIGIAN, Appellant (Respondent), v. Hazel BOGIGIAN, Appellee (Petitioner).
No. 49A02-8908-CV-424.
Court of Appeals of Indiana, Second District.
March 26, 1990.
Robert G. Bogigian, Dickman, Reason & Bogigian, Greenfield, Gustin Raikos, In-dianpolis, for appellant.
B. Scott Skillman, Dann Pecar Newman, Talesnick & Kleiman, P.C., Indianapolis, for appellee.

Opinion:
BUCHANAN, Judge.
CASE SUMMARY
Respondent-appellant David Bogigian (David) appeals from the reinstatement of a judgment in favor of Hazel Bogigian (Hazel), claiming the trial court erred when it determined Hazel's release of her judgment was not supported by consideration.
We affirm.
FACTS
The facts most favorable to the trial court's judgment reveal that on January 31, 1986, David's marriage to Hazel was dissolved, and Hazel was given the following judgment:
"Wife shall receive a judgment on the family home in the amount of Ten Thousand Three Hundred Dollars ($10,800) Said judgment is to be paid when the parties' youngest child is emancipated, when Husband remarries, or if a woman is living in the residence in a married situation, or when the Husband sells the real estate, or if the children or the Husband cease to reside in the residence, whichever occurs first."
Record at 82 (emphasis supplied).
The residence was sold by David on February 20, 1987, and Hazel attended the closing with David. At the closing, Hazel executed several documents to effectuate the sale of the house. Among the doe-uments executed was a quit claim deed and the release of her judgment against David. The release provided:
"Comes now HAZEL BOGIGIAN, this 20TH day of FEBRUARY, 1987, being first duly sworn upon oath, who deposes and says:
That a certain judgment rendered JANUARY 31, 1986, as Cause number # $885-126, against DAVID J. BOGIGI-AN in favor of HAZEL BOGIGIAN, is hereby satisfied and released."
Record at 67.
Because David had no equity in the residence, the sale did not provide any funds from which to satisfy Hazel's judgment. Several months after the closing, David paid Hazel five dollars as her share of the sale's proceeds.
On June 80, 1988, Hazel initiated proceedings supplemental to satisfy her judgment. On January 1, 1989, David filed the release of judgment signed by Hazel during the closing. After a hearing on February 22, 1989, the trial court concluded that the release executed by Hazel was voidable for lack of consideration. The trial court reinstated Hazel's judgment on May 4, 1989.
ISSUE
David raises several issues on review which we consolidate and restate as:
Whether the trial court erred when it reinstated Hazel's judgment?
DECISION
PARTIES' CONTENTIONS-David contends that because Hazel received a benefit, as she was released from her obligations on the mortgage, her release was supported by consideration and therefore the trial court erred when it reinstated her judgment. In the alternative, David argues that Hazel should be equitably es-topped from executing the judgment because he relied to his detriment on her release. Hazel responds that there was no consideration supporting her release because she did not realize the release she signed was a release of her judgment against David.
CONCLUSION-The trial court did not err when it reinstated Hazel's judgment because her release was not supported by consideration.
Because David filed a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law as permitted by Indiana Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 52(A), this court cannot affirm the trial court's judgment on any ground which the evidence might support; rather we must determine whether the specific findings are adequate to support the trial court's decision and we will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses; we may consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment. Matter of Dull (1988), Ind. App., 521 N.E.2d 972, trans. denied.
A release, to be valid, must be supported by consideration. Pope v. Vajenm (1889), 121 Ind. 317, 22 N.E. 308; Gates v. Fauvre (1918), 74 Ind.App. 882, 119 N.E. 155. Consideration consists of borgained-for exchange. Tolliver v. Mathas (1989), Ind.App., 588 N.E.2d 971; - Wavetek Indiana, Inc. v. KH. Gatewood Steel Co. (1984), Ind.App., 458 N.E.2d 265, trons. denied; Burdsall v. City of Elwood (1988), Ind.App., 454 N.E.2d 484.
The evidence adequately supports the trial court's factual finding and legal conclusion that Hazel received no consideration for the release. The record demonstrates that Hazel and David did not bargain for the release in exchange for any benefits flowing to Hazel for detriments incurred by David. Both Hazel and David admitted that no representations concerning the release were made. Record at 186-37, 155. Hazel testified she thought she was signing the release of the mortgage so the house could be sold. Record at 165. Any benefit received by Hazel, or any detriment suffered by David, therefore, cannot be consideration for the release because David and Hazel did not agree the benefit or detriment would be consideration. See Colorado Nat'l Bank of Denver v. Bohm (Oth Cir., 1961) 286 F.2d 494; Bank of Marion v. Robert "Chick" Frits, Inc. (1974), 57 TL2d 120, 311 N.E.2d. 1838; 17 CJ.S. Contracts 74 (1968) pp. 762-68.
The United States Supreme Court, almost one hundred years ago, recognized:
"'The mere presence of some incident to a contract which might, under certain circumstances, be upheld as a consideration for a promise, does not necessarily make it the consideration for the promise in that contract. To give it that effect, it must have been offered by one party, and accepted by the other, as one element of the contract."
Fire Ins. Assoc., Ltd. v. Wickham (1891), 141 U.S. 564, 579, 12 S.Ct. 84, 88, 35 L.Ed. 860. That consideration must actually be bargained-for is a long recognized and fundamental common law principle, Bohm, supra; 1 Williston, Contracts 100 (8rd Ed. 1957); Restatement, Contracts 75 Comment b (1982), a principle which frequently is seen in the cases as part of the definition of consideration: "Consideration consists of bargained-for exchange." See Tolliver, supra; Wavetek, supra; Burdsall, supra.
Because David and Hazel did not bargain for the release, the evidence most favorable to the trial court's judgment supports its finding and conclusion that Hazel received no consideration for the release.
As to David's estoppel claim, we observe that the elements of estoppel are: (1) a representation or concealment of material facts; (2) the representation must have been made with knowledge of the facts; (8) the party to whom it was made must have been ignorant of the matter; (4) it must have been made with the intention that the other party should act upon it; and (5) the other party must have been induced to act upon it to his detriment. Glaser v. Dept. of Pub. Welfare (1987), Ind.App., 512 N.E.2d 1128, trans. denied.
Because David and Hazel did not bargain for the release, and because no representations concerning the release were made, David has failed to establish that the release was made with the intent that David act upon it; thus David has failed to establish Hazel should be equitably estopped from having her judgment reinstated. (@laser, supra.
Judgment affirmed.
STATON, J. concurs.
SULLIVAN, J., dissents with opinion.