Case Name: The TOWN OF WHEATLAND, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. BELLIS FARMS, INC.; M.C. Short; Delmar H. Landen; Jean Landen; Allen L. Cook; Carol A. Cook; Thomas R. Burns; Barbara A. Burns; County of Platte, State of Wyoming; Jesse Jenkins; John Wilhelm; Janet Wilhelm; James Wilhelm; Cheryl Wilhelm; and Federal Land Bank of Omaha, Appellees (Defendants); BELLIS FARMS, INC.; M.C. Short; Allen L. Cook; Carol A. Cook; Jesse Jenkins; John Wilhelm; Janet Wilhelm; James Wilhelm; and Cheryl Wilhelm, Appellants (Defendants), v. The TOWN OF WHEATLAND, Appellee (Plaintiff)
Court: Supreme Court of Wyoming
Jurisdiction: Wyoming
Decision Date: 1991-02-19
Citations: 806 P.2d 281
Docket Number: Nos. 89-180, 89-181
Parties: The TOWN OF WHEATLAND, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. BELLIS FARMS, INC.; M.C. Short; Delmar H. Landen; Jean Landen; Allen L. Cook; Carol A. Cook; Thomas R. Burns; Barbara A. Burns; County of Platte, State of Wyoming; Jesse Jenkins; John Wilhelm; Janet Wilhelm; James Wilhelm; Cheryl Wilhelm; and Federal Land Bank of Omaha, Appellees (Defendants). BELLIS FARMS, INC.; M.C. Short; Allen L. Cook; Carol A. Cook; Jesse Jenkins; John Wilhelm; Janet Wilhelm; James Wilhelm; and Cheryl Wilhelm, Appellants (Defendants), v. The TOWN OF WHEATLAND, Appellee (Plaintiff).
Judges: Before URBIGKIT, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.
Reporter: Pacific Reporter 2d
Volume: 806
Pages: 281–292

Head Matter:
The TOWN OF WHEATLAND, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. BELLIS FARMS, INC.; M.C. Short; Delmar H. Landen; Jean Landen; Allen L. Cook; Carol A. Cook; Thomas R. Burns; Barbara A. Burns; County of Platte, State of Wyoming; Jesse Jenkins; John Wilhelm; Janet Wilhelm; James Wilhelm; Cheryl Wilhelm; and Federal Land Bank of Omaha, Appellees (Defendants). BELLIS FARMS, INC.; M.C. Short; Allen L. Cook; Carol A. Cook; Jesse Jenkins; John Wilhelm; Janet Wilhelm; James Wilhelm; and Cheryl Wilhelm, Appellants (Defendants), v. The TOWN OF WHEATLAND, Appellee (Plaintiff).
Nos. 89-180, 89-181.
Supreme Court of Wyoming.
Feb. 19, 1991.
Frank J. Jones, Douglas W. Weaver, Wheatland, for Town of Wheatland.
Kim D. Cannon and Anthony T. Wendt-land, Sheridan, for Beilis Farms, Inc., et al.
Before URBIGKIT, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

Opinion:
GOLDEN, Justice.
In this eminent domain appeal, the principal issue is whether the district court correctly applied W.S. l-26-504(a)(ii) of the "Wyoming Eminent Domain Act."
The town of Wheatland decided to extend the runway of its local airport. The project required the town to acquire from several landowners acreage that was mostly irrigated and nonirrigated farmland. In August 1988, the town ended its attempt to negotiate a purchase price and instead initiated condemnation proceedings. Following a hearing the district court ruled, inter alia, that the town failed to establish that the project was planned or located in a manner that would be most compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury. The district court also denied the landowners' application for attorney fees.
The town raises three issues:
A. Did the district court judge improperly substitute his judgment for that of a legislative body by failing to grant the request of plaintiffs complaint?
B. Are the findings of the trial court judge supported by evidence?
C. Are defendants entitled to recover their litigation expenses?
The landowners raise two issues:
1. Was the town of Wheatland required to prove the requirements set forth in Wyo.Stat. § l-26-504(a) in this case by a preponderance of evidence?
2. Is the Trial Court's determination that the Wheatland airport extension proposal did not meet the mandatory requirements of Wyo.Stat. § 1 — 26—504(a)(ii) (June 1988 Repl.) supported by substantial evidence?
In their cross-appeal, the landowners raise an additional issue:
1. Was the trial court statutorily required to award Beilis Farms, et al. their reasonable attorney's fees?
We affirm.
THE SECTION 504(a)(ii) REQUIREMENT
The town claims that the district court misapplied W.S. 1 — 26—504(a)(ii) and for support cites Johnson County Board of County Commissioners v. Atter, 734 P.2d 549 (Wyo.1987). We disagree. The Atter case turned on the public necessity requirement found in W.S. l-26-504(a)(i) and, therefore, did not reach the additional greatest public good/least private injury requirement found in W.S. 1 — 26—504(a)(ii).
The -role of the district court was discussed in Atter. In an eminent domain proceeding, the district court reviews the condemnor's actions vis-a-vis the three statutory requirements found in W.S. 1-26-504(a). To comply with W.S. 1-26-504(a)(ii), the town needs to present evidence that it has planned or located the project in a manner most compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury. The district court then reviews the evidence and decides whether the town has met its burden. Once W.S. 1-26-504(a)(ii) has been complied with and the landowners still wish to contest the action, the burden shifts to them to show that the condemnor acted in bad faith or abused its discretion as to that particular determination. Atter, 734 P.2d at 553.
In this instance, the district court found that the town had presented insufficient evidence to demonstrate that it planned or located the project in a manner most compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury. The district court, in a letter to counsel, addressed what the town needed to do to comply with W.S. l-26-504(a):
In my ruling, I did not intend to hold that the property in question could not be condemned. I intended to say that the condemnation procedures instituted by the town of Wheatland were deficient and inadequate, and that there was a failure of proof. This is not to say that the town cannot condemn this land, if they follow the correct procedures and make the required proofs.
The above letter does not reflect a district court's "substituting its judgment" for that of elected officials; rather, it reflects a district court's reviewing the evidence and applying a clear legislative directive to the facts. The district court, over the course of a two-day hearing, heard testimony from twenty-six witnesses and reviewed over seventy exhibits before making its decision.
The district court reviewed the evidence and found that the proposed condemnation would "substantially interfere with the existing irrigation system upon which the farm land adjacent to the proposed condemnation is dependent and cause other private harm The district court detailed in extensive findings the various types of private injury the project would cause if the condemnation went forward as planned: impairment of irrigation, impairment of prime agriculture land, and excessive private damage due to the location of the new road. The district court concluded that 520 acres of irrigated farm land would suffer "substantial private harm" from the condemnation. See State Etc. v. Standley Brothers, 215 Mont. 475, 699 P.2d 60 (Mont.1985).
When we review a district court's decision
"we uphold the judgment if there is evidence to support it, and in doing so we look only to the evidence submitted by the prevailing party and give to it every favorable inference which may be drawn therefrom, without considering any contrary evidence."
Sun Ridge Development v. City of Cheyenne, Inc., 787 P.2d 583, 589 (Wyo.1990) (quoting Smithco Engineering, Inc. v. International Fabricators, Inc., 715 P.2d 1011, 1015 (Wyo.1989)).
We hold there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's ruling that the town failed to locate or plan the project "in a manner most compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury."
THE SECTION 604(a)© REQUIREMENT
The condemnor must also comply with W.S. l-26-504(a)(i) and present evidence that the public interest and necessity require the project. The district court, in applying this section, appears to have balanced the minimal increase in safety, if the project was completed, against other factors and found this minimal increase insufficient to satisfy the public interest/necessity requirement.
The language of W.S. l-26-504(a)(i) does not permit the district court to balance the competing interests. Once the town presents evidence that the project will increase safety, it has met its burden as to that particular determination. The burden then shifts to those opposing the condemnation to present evidence of bad faith or abuse of discretion. See Atter, 734 P.2d at 553.
The town has filed a second condemnation action involving essentially the same parties and issues. Therefore, if this case goes before the district court a second time, it should review the evidence and determine whether the town has shown that the project will increase the safety of the airport. Once the town has established that the project will increase safety and the landowners are not able to demonstrate that the town acted improperly, the court should next review whether the evidence demonstrates that the town has planned or located the project in a manner most compatible with the greatest public good and least private injury.
ATTORNEY FEES
Finally, we address whether the landowners are entitled to attorney fees. In its amended judgment, the district court de nied the landowners' application for attorney fees, but ruled that they were entitled to recover their costs incurred in defending against the condemnation. In their cross-appeal, the landowners claim that W.S. 16-7-116 (Oct.1982 Repl.) entitles them to recover their reasonable attorney fees. The landowners argue that under the statute a final judgment in their favor entitles them to recover their litigation expenses.
In a Nebraska case involving essentially the same statutory framework, landowners attempted to recover their attorney fees under a state statute. The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the district court's order did not prevent a later condemnation of the land. Sorensen v. Lower Niobrara Natural Resources District, 215 Neb. 681, 340 N.W.2d 164 (1983). The court noted that if the condemnor has the right to reinstitute the proceedings, there is no final judgment, and denied the landowners their attorney fees. In other words, attorney fees are allowable only when the "final judgment prevents the agency from acquiring the property by any condemnation proceeding or the agency abandons all attempts to acquire the property by condemnation." Id., 215 Neb. at 686, 340 N.W.2d at 167.
We agree with the Nebraska court's resolution. Here, the district court has not issued a final judgment that the land can never be acquired by condemnation. The district court has instead ruled that the land may be condemned if the town properly follows the requirements set out in W.S. l-26-504(a). The town has not abandoned the condemnation; instead, it has filed a second action. Thus, we affirm the district court's ruling denying the landowners their attorney fees.
URBIGKIT, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion.
.The act, now W.S. 1-26-501 through 1-26-817 (June 1988 Repl.), was adopted in 1981. For a brief overview see E. Rudolph, Wyoming Local Government Law, § 6.2 (1985): "Eminent domain proceedings are now largely governed by the Wyoming Eminent Domain Act, enacted in 1981, and Rule 71.1 of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, adopted in 1965." See also Comment, Wyoming Eminent Domain Act, 18 Land & Water L.Rev. 739 (1983).
Section 1-26-504. Requirements to exercise eminent domain.
(a) the power of eminent domain may be exercised to acquire property for a proposed use only if all of the following are established:
(i)The public interest and necessity require the project ;
(ii) The project is planned or located in the manner that will be most compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury; and
(iii) The property sought to be acquired is necessary for the project.
Whether the condemnor has satisfied each element of W.S. l-26-504(a) is a justiciable issue in Wyoming. See Johnson County Board of County Commissioners v. Atter, 734 P.2d 549, 552 (Wyo.1987).
. The condemnation would result in the town's gaining fee ownership of thirty-eight acres and a clear zone aviation easement of six acres.
. W.R.C.P. 71.1(e) defines the hearing's parameters.
. A town does not fall within the definition of a "state agency" as defined in W.S. l-26-504(b) and, therefore, its condemnation action is subject to a more stringent review. See W.S. 16 — 3— 101(b)(i) and (x) (Oct.1982 Repl.); and Atter, 734 P.2d at 553.
. In Atter this court stated, "the district court must look beyond the language of the resolution and examine the facts underlying the determination ." Id., 734 P.2d at 553 n. 6. The landowners attempt to use this statement to argue that the condemnor must prove the factual elements set out in W.S. l-26-504(a) by a preponderance of the evidence. We disagree; evidence that the town has complied with the statutory requirement is sufficient.
.We emphasize the word "most" because the legislature's use of it requires that the town devote time to the planning/locating of a project before it exercises its power of eminent domain.
. Contrary to the town's claim, judicial review of a condemnation action
does not involve a judicial displacement of a legislative body's judgment; it involves the judicial application of a state statute that requires the courts to determine whether a con-demnor has abused its discretion through a taking that is not compatible with the greatest public good and least private injury.
Emerald PUD v. Pacificorp, 100 Or.App. 79, 784 P.2d 1112, 1117 (1990).
. W.S. 16-7-116 is part of the "Wyoming Relocation Assistance Act of 1973" found at § 16-7-101 through 16-7-121. This portion of the act involves condemnations funded with federal financing and is patterned after 42 U.S.C. 4654(a) (1982). • Here, the FAA is funding a large portion of the costs associated with the extension of the Wheatland airport. The statute provides that
[i]f a condemnation proceeding is instituted by an agency to acquire real property for a purpose as set forth in W.S. 16-7-115, and the final judgment is that the real property cannot be acquired by condemnation or that the proceeding is abandoned, the owner of any right, title or interest in the real property shall be paid a sum which will, in the opinion of the court, reimburse the owner for his reasonable attorney, appraisal and engineering fees actually incurred because of the condemnation proceedings. The award of the sums will be paid by the agency which sought to condemn the property.