Case Name: A. E. McMillan and W. P. Brownson, Co-partners, as McMillan Brick Company, Plaintiffs in Error, v. Western Union Telegraph Company, a Corporation, Defendant in Error
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1910-06
Citations: 60 Fla. 131
Docket Number: 
Parties: A. E. McMillan and W. P. Brownson, Co-partners, as McMillan Brick Company, Plaintiffs in Error, v. Western Union Telegraph Company, a Corporation, Defendant in Error.
Judges: Shackleford, and Parkhill, J. J., concur;
Reporter: Florida Reports
Volume: 60
Pages: 131–153

Head Matter:
A. E. McMillan and W. P. Brownson, Co-partners, as McMillan Brick Company, Plaintiffs in Error, v. Western Union Telegraph Company, a Corporation, Defendant in Error.
On Behearing.
1. A message reading “We want some brick when are you going to skip” puts a telegraph company on notice that substantial business loss to the addressee may follow non-delivery.
2. The fact that one party may at will put an end to a continuing contract does not destroy the right to substantial damages against a telegraph company whose negligence alone actually caused its discontinuance.
This case was decided by the Court En Banc.
Writ of error to the Circuit Court for Escambia County.
Statement.
The plaintiffs in error brought an action in the Circuit Court for Escambia County against the defendant in error, in which the declaration alleges “that the defend ant was during the months of May and June, A. D. 1906, the owner of and was operating a public telegraph line between the city of Camden, in the State of Alabama, and the station of Pine Barren in the State of Florida, and held itself out to the public as receiving, transmitting and delivering for hire telegraphic messages between the said two points; that during said months the plaintiffs were engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling brick, and entered into a contract with the Camden Hardware Company, whereby the said Camden Hardware Company agreed to buy from them brick at the rate of four (4) cars per week, beginning June 1st, 1906, until notified to stop, - (which said brick were purchased by the said Camden Hardware Company for the purpose of erecting a certain building which the said Hardware Company had contracted to build, and it was understood between the said Hardware Company and the plaintiff in entering into said contract, that the said Hardware Company expected to buy from the said plaintiffs all of the brick amounting to about 150,000, which would be required for the said building.) That on the 4th day of June, A. D., 1906, the said Camden Hardware Company delivered to the said defendant, at its office in Camden, Alabama, for transmission and delivery for hire to the plaintiffs at Pine Barren, Florida, a message as follows:
“Camden, Ala., 4th.
We want some brick. When are you going to ship?
Camden Hardware Company.”
Which message was received by the said defendant com pany for transmission and delivery to the said plaintiffs as aforesaid, and which it was its duty to transmit with all due promptness and diligence to the plaintiff at said Pine Barren, yet the said defendant disregarding its duty in the premises neglected and failed promptly to transmit and deliver the said message to the plaintiff, and unreasonably neglected, delayed and withheld, the same until the 6th day of said month of June, at which time it was delivered to the plaintiffs. (That the plaintiffs immediately upon receipt of said message made a shipment of brick to the said Camden Hardware Company, and telegraphed said Hardware Company of said fact, and that they would rush the balance of the order; but the said Camden Hardware Coinpany being in need of brick, and incurring liability for demurrage for want of them, on said 6th day of June before hearing from the plaintiffs in response to their said telegram, and being ignorant as to whether any brick had been shipped, or when brick would be shipped under their said contract, upon said 6th of June wrote to the plaintiffs declining and refusing to continue their said contract or to take brick from the plaintiffs thereunder; that but for the said neglect and failure of duty on the part of the said defendant in failing with due diligence and promptness to transmit and deliver the message as aforesaid, the said Camden Hardware Company would have purchased from these plaintiffs who were ready, able and willing to supply same under said contract, and would have done so had said message been delivered with reasonable promptness, the brick required for the erection of the building aforesaid, amounting to 150,000 brick, whereby the said plaintiffs would have derived their reasonable profits in the sale of said brick, amounting to the sum of five hundred ($500.00) dollars, and which said profits they have lost by reason of the said failure and neglect of duty on the part of the defendant as aforesaid.) Wherefore plaintiffs sue and claim one thousand ($1,000) dollars.”
On motion the court struck the two portions of the declaration contained within the parentheses. The plea of not guilty was entered and withdrawn. Default was entered and upon waiving a jury the court tried the cause and rendered judgment for one dollar and costs in favor of the plaintiffs, who on writ of error here insist merely that the trial court erred in sustaining the motion to strike the portions of the declaration contained in the parentheses as above set forth. Only compensation for loss of probable profits is involved.
Maxtcell c6 Reeves for Plaintiff in Error.
Blount & Blount & Garter for Defendant in Error.

Opinion:
Cockrell, J.,
(after stating the facts.)—The wording of the message "We want some brick, when are you going to ship" addressed to a Brick Company clearly put the telegraph company on notice that a matter of real business concern to the addressee was involved, and that negligence in its transmission would probably result in considerable pecuniary loss. This being so, the chief question is do the allegations stricken from the declaration destroy this potential right to substantial damages ?
The fact that the sender of the message could put an end to the contract at any time might well prevent a cause of action ex contractu against it, but. it does not of necessity destroy this action in tort against the Telegraph Company. This would seem to be foreshadowed by the court in Chipley v. Atkinson, 23 Fla., 206, 1 South. Rep. 934, in which we held that the inability of an employee to recover from his employer for a discharge from service did not prevent recovery against a third party who maliciously caused the dismissal.
There are cases such as Savannah, F. & W. R. Co. v. Willett, 43 Fla. 311, 31 South. Rep. 246, where it was held that a servant could not recover upon a contract of employment of indefinite duration, terminable at the will of the master, and also cases holding no recovery can be had for lost prospects of employment or other contracts, uncertain as to duration, because terminable at the whim or will of the other party.
There would seem, however, to be a basis for distinction between contracts not yet entered into and those already made where the only element of uncertainty as to time or volume of business is the ability of the losing party to please. To hold otherwise and to confine the addressee of a telegram to cases where an ironclad contract exists would be to deny him redress altogether. For if the other party to the contract be solvent, he has there full redress, and if he be not solvent, there has been no loss.
The declaration states positively that the building-company would not have discontinued the purchasing had it not been delayed and subject to damage by reason of the negligence in the delivery of the message, putting that fact in issue.
There would seem no special difficulty in admeasuring the damages in cases of this character and this can be regulated by proper charges.
The judgment is reversed.
Shackleford, and Parkhill, J. J., concur;
Whitfield, C. J., and Hocker, J., dissent;
Taylor, J., absent on acount of illness.
A re-hearing having been granted and the cause again fully considered, it is ordered and adjudged that the judgment heretofore entered stand as the judgment of the court.
All concur except Whitfield, C. J., dissenting.