Case Name: U.L., individually and as father and natural guardian of E.L., an infant under the age of 18 years, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEW YORK STATE ASSEMBLY, New York State Senate, Sheldon Silver, in his official capacity as Speaker of the New York State Assembly, Jeffrey D. Klein, in his official capacity as President Pro Tempore of the New York State Senate, and as Senate Independent Democrat Conference Leader, Dean G. Skelos, in his official capacity as President Pro Tempore of the New York State Senate, and as Senate Republican Conference Leader, State of New York, Defendants-Appellees
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2015-02-05
Citations: 592 F. App'x 40
Docket Number: No. 14-555-cv
Parties: U.L., individually and as father and natural guardian of E.L., an infant under the age of 18 years, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEW YORK STATE ASSEMBLY, New York State Senate, Sheldon Silver, in his official capacity as Speaker of the New York State Assembly, Jeffrey D. Klein, in his official capacity as President Pro Tempore of the New York State Senate, and as Senate Independent Democrat Conference Leader, Dean G. Skelos, in his official capacity as President Pro Tempore of the New York State Senate, and as Senate Republican Conference Leader, State of New York, Defendants-Appellees.
Judges: Present DENNIS JACOBS, RICHARD C. WESLEY and SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 592
Pages: 40–41

Head Matter:
U.L., individually and as father and natural guardian of E.L., an infant under the age of 18 years, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEW YORK STATE ASSEMBLY, New York State Senate, Sheldon Silver, in his official capacity as Speaker of the New York State Assembly, Jeffrey D. Klein, in his official capacity as President Pro Tempore of the New York State Senate, and as Senate Independent Democrat Conference Leader, Dean G. Skelos, in his official capacity as President Pro Tempore of the New York State Senate, and as Senate Republican Conference Leader, State of New York, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 14-555-cv.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Feb. 5, 2015.
Elliot B. Pasik, Law Office of Gerald P. Gross, Cedarhurst, NY, for Appellant.
Mark H. Shawhan (Barbara D. Underwood, Anisha Dasgupta, on the brief), for Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General of the State of New York, New York, NY, for Appellees.
Present DENNIS JACOBS, RICHARD C. WESLEY and SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges.
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the official caption in this case to conform with the caption above.

Opinion:
SUMMARY ORDER
Plaintiff-appellant U.L. appeals from the judgment of the United Státes District Court for the Southern District of New York (Griesa, /.), dismissing this case on the ground that defendants-appellees enjoy sovereign and legislative immunity. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.
U.L., the father of a child enrolled in a Jewish religious school in New York, brings myriad constitutional claims challenging New York's child-protection laws, which regulate New York public schools.
We review de novo dismissals of claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6). Jaghory v. N.Y. State Dep't of Educ., 181 F.3d 326, 329 (2d Cir.1997). We agree with the district court that U.L. cannot sue the State of New York, the New York State Assembly, or the New York State Senate because those defendants enjoy sovereign immunity. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984); Pikulin v. City Univ. of N.Y., 176 F.3d 598, 600 (2d Cir.1999) (per curiam) (articulating test for whether governmental entity is "arm of the state"). The state legislator defendants enjoy immunity for their legislative acts. State Emps. Bargaining Agent Coal. v. Rowland, 494 F.3d 71, 88 (2d Cir.2007).
U.L. argues that, even if his claims are barred as presently pleaded, he should be given an opportunity to replead them to avoid the immunity doctrines. We do not think it is necessary to remand for this purpose. Assuming U.L. could successfully plead around the immunity doctrines, his claims would still fail as a matter of law. The challenged child-protection laws, which are unquestionably secular, are equally inapplicable to all private schools, religious and secular. Nothing about them offends the Establishment or Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993).
U.L.'s claims under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment likewise fail, because the laws neither target a suspect class nor impair the exercise of a fundamental right, and easily pass muster under rational basis review. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996).
For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in U.L.'s other arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
. Because remand is unnecessary, U.L.'s demand that Judge Griesa be disqualified from any future proceedings is moot.