Case Name: PEOPLE v. PATTERSON
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1977-11-08
Citations: 79 Mich. App. 393
Docket Number: Docket No. 27063
Parties: PEOPLE v PATTERSON
Judges: Before: D. E. Holbrook, P. J., and R. B. Burns and M. F. Cavanagh, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 79
Pages: 393–414

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v PATTERSON
Opinion of R. B. Burns, J.
1. Constitutional Law — Criminal Law — Right of Confrontation —Cross-Examination of Witnesses.
The right of confrontation protected by the Sixth Amendment secures principally the right to cross-examine witnesses; however, there is no fundamental right to ask a witness questions that are irrelevant.
2. Rape — Evidence—Victim’s Sexual Behavior with Third Persons — Relevancy.
Inquiry on cross-examination into a rape victim’s sexual behavior with third persons is not relevant.
3. Evidence — Relevancy—Prejudice—Probative Value.
Evidence is relevant when it is sufficiently probative of a fact in issue to offset the prejudice its admission produces.
4. Rape — Evidence—Victim’s Sexual Behavior with Third Persons — Credibility—Relevancy—Prejudice.
Evidence of a rape victim’s sexual activity with third persons is in no way probative of the victim’s credibility or veracity; if it were, the relevancy would be so minimal that it would not meet the test of prejudice.
5. Rape — Evidence—Victim’s Sexual Behavior with Third Persons — Consent—Probative Value — Prejudice.
The fact that a rape victim has consented to sexual intimacy with a third party does not indicate consent to intimacy with the defendant in a trial for third-degree criminal sexual conduct; the probative value of such evidence would not outweigh the prejudice to society and the criminal justice system of the consequences of its admission.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 333-336.
81 Am Jur 2d, Witnesses § 464.
[2, 4, 13] 65 Am Jur 2d, Rape § 86.
[3] 30 Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 1080.
[5, 6, 9, 10] 65 Am Jur 2d, Rape §§ 82, 83.
[7,11] 16 Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law § 552.
21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 17.
[8] 29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 9.
[12] 5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 798.
D. E. Holbrook, P. J., Concurring in Result
6. Rape — Evidence—In Camera Questions — Victim’s Sexual Behavior with Third Persons — Unusual Facts.
In camera questioning of the complainant in a trial for criminal sexual conduct concerning prior sexual conduct with third persons may be necessary where unusual facts exist, but the issue should not be decided by the Court of Appeals where a decision of that issue is not necessary for disposition of the case.
M. F. Cavanagh, J., Concurring Separately
7. Constitutional Law — Criminal Law — Criminal Sexual Conduct — Vagueness—Statutes.
The statute on third-degree criminal sexual conduct is not impermissibly vague since it adequately provides fair notice Of the conduct it proscribes; a law fails to meet the requirements of the due process clause to adequately provide fair notice of the ■ conduct proscribed where it is so vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits or leaves judges and juries free to decide, without any legally ñxed standards, what is prohibited and what is not in each particular case (MCLA 750.520d; MSA 28.788[4j).
8. Constitutional Law — Rape—Evidence—Victim’s Sexual Con-
duct — Reasonable Doubt — Probative Value — Prejudice— Statutes.
The statute which precludes, with certain exceptions, the admission of evidence of speciñc instances of the victim’s sexual conduct in prosecutions for criminal sexual conduct is unconstitutional to the extent that it excludes evidence which, if received, might raise in the mind of a juror a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt; where evidence possesses this degree of probative value, it may not be excluded on the ground of its prejudice to state interests (MCLA 750.520j; MSA 28.788[10]).
9. Constitutional Law — Rape—Victim’s Sexual Conduct with Third Persons — Evidence—Cross-Examination—Reasonable Doubt — Consent—Prejudicial Impact.
A defendant is constitutionally entitled to cross-examine the prosecutrix in a trial for third-degree criminal sexual conduct about prior sexual conduct with third persons if the witness’s responses, when considered with other evidence in the case, might be sufficient to raise in the mind of a juror a reasonable doubt as to whether the intercourse was consensual; this rule applies irrespective of its prejudicial impact on the state’s interests.
10. Rape — Cross-Examination of Victim — In Camera Hearings— Victim’s Sexual Conduct with Third Persons — Reasonable Doubt — Consent.
The prosecutrix in a trial for third-degree criminal sexual conduct must be made available for cross-examination in an in camera hearing before the trial judge regarding the prosecutrix’s prior sexual conduct with third persons where the defendant offers proof that might raise a reasonable doubt in the mind of a juror whether the intercourse was consensual; the trial court must protect the witness where such evidence is ruled admissible from questions which go beyond the bounds of proper cross-examination merely to harass, annoy or humiliate.
11. Constitutional Law — Rape—Evidence—Admissibility—Victim’s Sexual Conduct with Third Persons — Consent—Credibility —Statutes.
Constitutional analysis of the statute regarding the admissibility of evidence, in a trial for criminal sexual conduct, of the prosecutrix’s prior sexual conduct with third persons remains the same whether the evidence is offered to prove consent, and circumstantially damages credibility, or is offered to impeach credibility, and inferentially establishes consent (MCLA 750.520j; MSA 28.788[10]).
12. Constitutional Law — Rape—Evidence—Victim’s Sexual Conduct with Third Persons — Appeal and Error — Harmless Error — Constitutional Test — Admissibility.
A ruling that evidence regarding the prosecutrix’s prior sexual conduct with third persons was inadmissible without having considered the evidence as measured by the constitutional standard regarding the admission of such evidence was harmless error in a trial for third-degree criminal sexual conduct where application of the constitutional test regarding such evidence would not mandate admission of the evidence.
13. Rape — Evidence—Victim’s Sexual Conduct with Third Persons —Relevancy—Consent.
Evidence of the prosecutrix’s prior sexual conduct with third persons may, on the facts of a given case, be logically relevant to the issue of consent in a trial for third-degree criminal sexual conduct.
Appeal from Oakland, William P. Hampton, J.
Submitted February 7, 1977, at Lansing.
(Docket No. 27063.)
Decided November 8, 1977.
William D. Patterson was found guilty of third-degree criminal sexual conduct. Defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, L. Brooks Patterson, Prosecuting Attorney, Robert C. Williams, Chief Appellate Counsel, and James L. McCarthy, Assistant Appellate Counsel, for the people.
Lustig and Friedman, P. C, for defendant.
Amici Curiae: Legislative Task Force Southern Michigan Anti Rape Network (by Allyn Ravitz).
Before: D. E. Holbrook, P. J., and R. B. Burns and M. F. Cavanagh, JJ.

Opinion:
R. B. Burns, J.
The defendant was found guilty by a jury of third-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCLA 750.520d; MSA 28.788(4). He appeals and we affirm.
The facts in this case are adequately set forth in the opinion written by Judge M. F. Cavanagh.
I would affirm the trial court on the basis of the reasoning set forth by Judge T. M. Burns in People v Thompson, 76 Mich App 705; 257 NW2d 268 (1977).