Case Name: Charles H. GALLOWAY, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee
Court: District of Columbia Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: District of Columbia
Decision Date: 1974-10-17
Citations: 326 A.2d 803
Docket Number: No. 6951
Parties: Charles H. GALLOWAY, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.
Judges: Before KERN, GALLAGHER and YEAGLEY, Associate Judges.
Reporter: West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 326
Pages: 803–807

Head Matter:
Charles H. GALLOWAY, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.
No. 6951.
District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
Argued Sept. 13, 1973.
Decided Oct. 17, 1974.
Rehearing and Rehearing en Banc Denied Dec. 12, 1974.
Carol Garfiel Freeman, Washington, D. C., appointed by this court, for appellant.
William M. Brodsky, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Harold H. Titus, Jr., U. S. Atty., John A. Terry and James M. Hanny, Asst. U. S. Attys., were on the brief, for appellee.
Before KERN, GALLAGHER and YEAGLEY, Associate Judges.

Opinion:
KERN, Associate Judge:
Appellant asks us to overturn his conviction for carrying a pistol without a license for which he was sentenced to pay a $100 fine or serve sixty days in jail upon the grounds that the police had (1) no probable cause to search and seize the gun from the auto he was driving on the night they stopped him and (2) no justification under the circumstances of this stop to seize the pistol from the auto as a protective "frisk" authorized by the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed.2d 889 (1968).
We have no occasion to reach the government's assertion that a Terry frisk was justified here because we believe the particular circumstances gave the officer probable cause to search the car, see Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S. Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970), and therefore the seizure of the pistol was proper.
The arresting officer who recovered the pistol was the government's sole witness at both the pretrial hearing on appellant's motion to suppress and at trial. He testified that while on duty in his police cruiser he received over his radio a "flash lookout" for an auto of a specifically described make, color and license tag, proceeding in a certain direction containing two people with a pistol. The radio flash (1) identified by name and assignment the police officer (Tr. II at 6) who had "just been advised of this fact [occupants of the car had a gun] by a citizen" (Tr. I at 4, 7), and (2) advised that that particular officer, after receiving the information from the citizen, had seen this car and verified both its description and the number of its occupants. (Tr. I at 6.) Within twenty minutes, the officer receiving the lookout saw the car and, after calling for assistance, stopped it. Having found no pistol as a result of his frisk of the two men who had been riding inside it, he reached under the driver's seat of the car and discovered it there.
Appellant argues vigorously (Br. at 7) that the "report of a non-violent crime by an unidentified citizen" simply does not constitute probable cause upon which the "receiving" officer could have lawfully searched the car in this case. We disagree since "[i]t is enough that the police officer initiating the chain of communication either had firsthand knowledge or received his information from some person —normally the putative victim or an eyewitness — who it seems reasonable to believe is telling the truth." Daniels v. United States, 129 U.S.App.D.C. 250, 252, 393 F.2d 359, 361 (1968). (Emphasis added.) See Carter v. United States, D.C.App., 244 A.2d 483 (1968). This conclusion is consistent with the requirements established by the Supreme Court that to find probable cause on the basis of information received from an unknown informant there must be some showing of (1) the factual basis upon which that informant concluded a crime had been committed, and (2) the informant's veracity or the reliability of his information. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964); see Note, Probable Cause and the First-Time Informer, 43 U.Colo.L.Rev. 357, 359-60 (1972). An informant who is an eyewitness to or a victim of the crime he subsequently reports satisfies these requirements. United States v. Evans, 447, F.2d 129, 132 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047, 92 S.Ct. 727, 30 L.Ed.2d 735 (1971); McCreary v. Sigler, 406 F.2d 1264, 1269 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 984, 89 S.Ct. 2149, 23 L.Ed.2d 773 (1969), and, see United States v. Bell, 457 F.2d 1231, 1238-1239 (5th Cir.1972); Schmidt v. State, 17 Md.App. 492, 302 A.2d 714, 716 (1973).
In the instant case, the named officer "initiating the chain of communication" received the report of a pistol inside a certain car travelling in a certain direction from a citizen. He immediately confirmed that report by his own observation to the extent of verifying the existence of the car, its make, color and tags, and the number of its occupants. We believe that since the citizen's report here was of a rapidly moving street occurrence, rather than an informant's tip about a future criminal transaction, see, e. g., Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed. 2d 327 (1959) and United States v. Thornton, 147 U.S.App.D.C. 114, 454 F.2d 957 (1971), or an informant's relay of rumor or hearsay information, see, e. g., Aguilar v. Texas, supra, it is reasonable to conclude that such report resulted from an eyewitness observation by that citizen. See District of Columbia v. M.E.H., D.C.App., 312 A.2d 561, 564-565 (1973); United States v. Walker, D.C.App., 294 A.2d 376, 378 (1972); Gaskins v. United States, D.C.App., 262 A.2d 810, 811 (1970). Accordingly, the officer receiving the look-out had probable cause under the facts and circumstances of this case, as measured by Chambers v. Maroney, supra, to stop and search the car for the pistol.
We are constrained to comment in upholding the search here that in the future (1) the police should secure the name and address of a citizen giving information concerning a crime to a police officer, see United States v. Frye, D.C.App., 271 A.2d 788, 791 (1970), and (2) the government, if at all possible, should present as a witness that particular officer to whom the citizen complains since his testimony is obviously relevant and material in establishing that the complainant was an eyewitness or vic tim. See United States v. Walker, supra; District of Columbia v. M.E.H., supra.
Affirmed.
. The officer who conducted the search cannot insulate his action from constitutional challenge by pleading that he merely was acting on information contained in a radio bulletin. Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 568, 91 S.Ct. 1081, 28 L.Ed.2d 306 (1971).