Case Name: SLUDER v. ST. LOUIS TRANSIT COMPANY, Appellant
Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1905-06-01
Citations: 189 Mo. 107
Docket Number: 
Parties: SLUDER v. ST. LOUIS TRANSIT COMPANY, Appellant.
Judges: Brace, G. J., Burgess, Valliant, Fox and Lamm, JJ., concur; Marshall, J., dissents in a separate opinion.
Reporter: Missouri Reports
Volume: 189
Pages: 107–196

Head Matter:
SLUDER v. ST. LOUIS TRANSIT COMPANY, Appellant.
In Banc,
June 1, 1905.
1. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS: Legislative Power: Delegation: Safety of Citizen. Tie people may in their State Constitution or through, the General Assembly in the exercise of its legislative power, when not restricted by the Federal or State Constitution, grant municipal corporations the power to pass all necessary ordinances for the protection of the safety of their citizens and their property. And such a delegation of power is no- infringement on the maxim that legislative power cannot be delegated.
2. -: Regulating Street Cars. The city of St. UouiSi, under its Scheme and Charter, has the power to regulate the use of its streets and pass all ordinances needful for maintaining the peace, good government, health and welfare of the city. And by “regulate” is meant that it may control the mode of propelling cars within its limits, may prohibit the use of steam ears, and regulate the speed of cars.
3. -: -: Vigilance Ordinance: Contract or Police Regulation. The city, in enacting an ordinance requiring motormen and other persons in charge of streets ears to keep a vigilant watch for vehicles and persons on the track or approaching them, etc., was exercising its governmental police power to regulate the use of the streets, and not its proprietary right to contract for its municipal advantage as such.
4. -: -: -: Distinction. There is no distinction between an ordinance regulating the speed of cars in and across streets, and one requiring the motorman to exercise a vigilant watch for vehicles and pedestrians on the track or moving towards it. Both are referable to the police powers of the city, and both are based upon the obvious necessity of compelling those who use dangerous and powerful agencies on public thoroughfares to be careful that they do not injure others who have an equal right there, and on the obvious fact that a car moving slowly can be more readily stopped to- prevent a collision than one moving rapidly.
5. -: -: -: Acceptance. The ordinance requiring motormen on street cars to keep a vigilant watch for pedestrians on the track or moving towards it, being an exercise of the police powers of the city, does not depend upon its acceptance by the street car company to make it obligatory upon it to obey it, but has the full force and effect of a law, and is an exercise of the city’s governmental powers.
6. -: Police Powers: Contracted Away. A city has no power to contract away its police powers or to bind itself not to exercise them whenever the public good or exigencies require it. And, hence, the right of a private citizen to recover damages for injuries resulting from the violation by a railway company of a police regulation in no way depends upon the acceptance by the company of that regulation.
7. -: -: Vigilance Ordinance: Acceptance: Violation: Civil Action. A pedestrian or traveler whose injuries are traceable to the negligent failure of a street car company to observe an ordinance requiring the motorman to keep a vigilant watch for pedestrians on the track or approaching it, and to stop the car in the shortest time possible, can maintain an action for damages against said company, whether said company has accepted said ordinance or not, and in¡such case it is not necessary to either allege or prove the acceptance by the company of the ordinance. (Again overruling Path v. Railroad, 105 Mo. 537, and the subsequent cases founded upon it.)
8. -: -: -: Actions Ex Contractu and Ex Delicto. An action by a pedestrian or traveler in a vehicle who charges his injuries to the negligent failure of defendant’s mctorman to observe the requirements of an ordinance requiring motormen to keep a vigilant watch for pedestrians or vehicles on the track or approaching it and to stop their cars in the shortest possible time, etc., does not arise out of a breach of contract, but is founded on tort, just as is an action founded on an unlawful speed of the car, or failure to sound the gong.
9. NEGLIGENCE: Viligance Ordinance: Higher Degree of Care Than Common Law. An ordinance of a populous city which requires motormen in charge of street cars to keep a vigilant watch for all vehicles or pedestrians, either on the track or moving towards it, and on the first appearance of danger to them, to stop the ear in the shortest time and space possible, does not exact a higher degree of care or diligence than the common law rule of ordinary care imposes, nor is it out of harmony with the general laws of the State.
10. -: Negligence of Plaintiff’s Servant: Driver of Hired Carriage. Plaintiff, a physician, contracted with a livery-stable keeper to carry him to see a patient, and the keeper sent the carriage by his servant as driver. Plaintiff told the driver to drive to a certain number, but gave him no other direction. The carriage was a close one and the night was dark. On the way the carriage, in attempting to cross a railway track, was struck by a street car. Held, that the negligence of the driver, if any, was not plaintiff’s negligence. The driver was the servant of the livery-stable keeper, and the relation of master and servant did not exist between plaintiff and the driver.
11. -: -: -: Contributory Negligence: Concurring Negligence. The negligence of the driver of a hired carriage, whether private or public, is not imputable to the person being carried, if he did not by some act or word encourage the driver’s special act of rashness or carelessness which resulted in his injury. And, in such case, though his injuries may have re-suited from the concurrent acts of negligence of the driver and of the motorman in charge of the street car with which the carriage collided, the railway company cannot excuse itself by imputing the driver’s negligence to plaintiff as his contributory negligence.
12. -: -: -: -: Sanctioning Driver’s Negligence: Circumstances. Where the hirer of a carriage gives no express sanction to the driver’s conduct which contributed to his injury and was in no position to see or know the danger to himself, he is not chargeable with the negligence of the driver, on the ground that he himself was guilty of negligence in permitting the driver to go upon the railway track in face of obvious danger of a collision with a street car. Where the night was dark and the carriage a close one and the driver was proceeding in a slow trot on his journey^ and the bell or gong of the car was not sounded, and the car was indifferently lighted, and when plaintiff first knew of its approach it was too' close to avoid the collision, it cannot be said that he was guilty of negligence in sanctioning the driver’s want of care.
13. -: Damages: Loss of Earnings: Physician. The best evidence of a physician’s loss of earnings is the actual value of his practice during the period of the previous year corresponding to that in which by the injury he was incapacitated for practice.
14. -: Speed of Car: Evidence. The testimony of a physician as to the speed of a car is not incompetent simply because he is not an expert. His judgment may be of little weight, but its admission is not reversible error, especially when the objection thereto was not to its competency, and he had testified that he . was familiar with the speed of cars.
Per Marshall, J., in Separate Opinion.
1. CIVIL ACTION: Delegation of Power. The General Assembly cannot constitutionally delegate to a city powei* to enact a law that would create a right of civil action between citizens inter sese.
2. -:--: Legislative Power: Meaning. The term “legislative power,” as applied to a city, means only the power to pass rules and regulations for the government of the municipality, the conduct of its officers, and the conduct of the citizens with respc_t to the municipality. In no- sense does it mean, when used in reference to a municipality, the right in the municipality to enact a law that will be the rule of civil action between citizens inter sese.
3. -: -: Scope of Police Powers Conferred. The power conferred by the charter of St. Louis upon that city to regulate the use of its streets, to abate nuisances, to regulate the speed of cars, or the general welfare clause, does not confer upon the city the right to create a civil cause of action between citizens inter sese. The delegation to a municipality of a police power does not confer upon it the right to create a private right of civil action, but the city’s power is limited to forbidding certain acts or offenses, and to punishing the violators of such regulations by fine, forfeiture or imprisonment.
4. -: Police Regulation. A right of action between citizens inter sese cannot arise out of a mere police regulation. The right of a city to regulate the actions of citizens between each other arises entirely out of the police power, but the right of civil actidn cannot arise out of police regulations. The power of St. Louis, under its charter, to regulate the use of the city’s streets and the speed of ears, is a police power; and the' same charter confers on the city the power to enforce such regulations by fines and forfeitures, but it nowhere confers on the city the right to enact a law that will afford the basis of a civil action between citizéns inter sese for the violation of such regulations.
5. -: -: Delegation: Exercise. Even if the power to create a civil cause of action between citizens inter sese is conferred upon the city of St. Louis by its charter, or if such power can arise out of a police regulation, the city of St. Louis has ' never attempted to exercise that power. No intention to exercise that power can be gleaned from the Vigilant Watch Ordinance or any other ordinance enacted by the city. On the contrary, the article in which the Vigilant Watch Ordinance is found provides that any person or company failing to comply with the provisions of the article shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and fined, and the charter limits the rights of the city to enforce the police regulations it may enact to punishment by fines, penalties and forfeiture. Held, that the city in passing the ordinance did not attempt to create a private civil liability for failure to obey the ordinance, and the ordinance having prescribed a specific punishment for its violation, no other punishment can be inflicted therefor.
6. -: Negligence: Ordinance: Declaratory of Common Law. The Vigilant Watch Ordinance, requiring all motormen on street cars to keep a vigilant watch for pedestrians or vehicles on the track or moving towards it and on the first appearance of danger to the passenger or vehicle to stop the car in the shortest time and space possible, is not simply declaratory of the common law, and even if it were it adds nothing to the common law. Nor is it within the power of a city to pass an ordinance that is simply declaratory of the common law.
7. -: -: -: Authorities From Other States. Authorities from other jurisdictions upholding the doctrine that a citizen has a right to maintain an action for damages against a street railroad company for his injuries where its servants violated an ordinance requiring them to keep a vigilant watch for vehicles on the track, cannot properly be considered authority or precedent for a judgment for plaintiff in such a case in this State, because the laws in such other jurisdictions either expressly permit the delegation by the State of legislative power to a city, or the State statutes expressly give the right of action' to citizens inter sese for wrongs arising out of a violation of municipal police regulations, or else such cases were not carefully considered, and are inaccurate, illogical and unscientific.
8. -: Ice on Sidewalk: Speed Of Cars: Distinction. No valid distinction can be made between police regulations, no matter what their purpose may be. The distinction made in Jackson v. Railroad, 157 Mo. 637, between a police regulation requiring abutting property-owners to remove ice from the sidewalk, and a police regulation regulating the speed of trains within the corporate limits, cannot be maintained. It cannot be maintained, on the ground that it is the duty of a city to keep its streets in a reasonably safe condition for travel thereon, that a failure to obey the ordinance to remove ice from the sidewalk affords no foundation for a civil action against the abutting property-owner by the person injured in consequence thereof, and that a violation of an ordinance regulating the speed of trains affords the person injured in consequence therof the right to a civil action against the railway company. The liability of the city is the same in each case. Ice on sidewalk is a nuisance, and excessive speed of cars is also a nuisance, and the power or duty of the city to require the abutting property-owner to remove the one or to regulate or stop the other arises out of its police power to suppress a nuisance. If a violation of an ordinance to' remove ice from the sidewalk does not create the right in the pedestrian to recover from the abutting property-owner for personal injuries due to ice on the sidewalk, neither can a violation of a speed ordinance or the “Vigilant Watch Ordinance” give the injured party the right to recover from the railway company.
Appeal from St. Louis City Circuit Court . — Eon. Franklin Ferriss, Judge.
Affirmed.
Morton J our dan and Sears Lehmann for appellant; George W. Easley and Boyle, Priest & Lehmann of counsel.
(1) Tire motions to elect should have been sustained. The petition blends causes of action arising ex delicto with causes of action arising ex contractu. The Vigilant Watch Ordinance could only be passed under the power of the city to contract. Charter, art. 10, secs. 1, 2. It could not he passed under its power to legislate. Charter, art. 3, sec. 26 ; Path v. Railroad, 39 Mo. App. 452; Path v. Railroad, 105 Mo. 537; Senn v. Railroad, 106 Mo. 152; Moran v. Car Co., 134 Mo. 641; Byington v. Railroad, 147 Mo. 673; Murphy v. Railroad, 153 Mo. 253; Saunders v. Railroad, 153 Mo. 253; Holwerson v. Railroad, 157 Mo. 245; Anderson v. Railroad, 161 Mo. 411; Nellis on Street Railways, 306, sec. 10. The cases of J ackson v. Railroad, 157 Mo. 621, and Weller v. Railroad, 164 Mo. 180,120 Mo. 655, were cases under a speed ordinance, and cannot be decisive of the principle here involved, and cannot be held to overrule the long line of cases specially decided on the Vigilant Watch Ordinance. A rule established and followed for a long series of years cannot be fairly overruled by inference or construction from rulings on questions involving entirely different propositions. There is a very broad distinction in the exercise of these two powers. One is public and general, the exercise of sovereignty; the other, private and proprietary. One legislative, the other contractual. State ex rel. v. St. Louis, 145 Mo. 572; Trust Co. v. Arkansas City, 76 Fed. 282; Power Co. v. Colorado Springs, 105 Fed. 1; Seltzenger v. Tamaqua, 187 Pa. St. 539; Sehaub v. Lancaster City, 156 Pa. St. 362; Weston v. Syracuse, 158 N. Y. 274. If these positions are correct, then the plaintiff has joined in the same count a cause of action arising out of contract with two causes of action arising out of tort for common law negligence. The common law distinctions between actions ex contractu and ex delicto are in substance retained by our code. Sumner v. Rogers, 90 Mo. 329. The rule in this State is that such actions cannot be blended in the same count. Kendrick v. Railroad, 81 Mo. 521; Harris v. Railroad, 51 Mo. App. 128; Linnville v. Harrison, 30 Mo. 228; Jamison v. Copher, 35 Mo. 351; Ederlin v. Judge, 36 Mo. 483; South-worth Co. v. Lamb, 82 Mo. 242. The fact that the injuries grew out of the same transaction would authorize the joining of them in the same petition, but they would have to be stated in separate counts, with a prayer for separate relief. 1 Burns’ Anno. Code, sec. 413. (2) The court erred in permitting the plaintiff to testify as to the rate of speed of the car. He “no more than saw the car when the car- ■ riage was struck. ’ ’ He showed no experience or observation in regard to the speed of cars, and in the short length of time, only one or two seconds, during which the car was under his observation, he could not judge of its speed, except by mere inference and deduction from the facts stated by him. Koenig v. Bailroad, 173 Mo. 720. (3) The court erred in permitting the plaintiff to testify to his earnings for the corresponding months of the previous year, for the purpose of showing the loss of earnings caused by the injury. (4) The court erred in refusing the instruction in the nature of a demurrer to plaintiff’s evidence. Both the plaintiff ' and his driver were negligent in going upon the track in front of a moving car, without looking or listening for the same, and such action upon the part of both of them, and each of them, was the proximate cause of the injury, and without such negligence on their part, the accident would not have happened. It is the duty of the passenger, as well as the driver, when there is an opportunity to do so, to learn of danger,. and avoid it if possible. Smith v. Bailroad (Me.), 32 Atl. 967; Bailroad v. McLeod, 29 So. 76; Brannen v. Bailroad, 115 Ind. 115; Meenagh v. Buckmaster, 50 N. Y. S. 85; Bush v. Bailroad, 62 Kan. 7091; Dean v. Bailroad, 18 Atl. 718; Township of Crescent v. Anderson, 8 Atl. 381; Hoag v. Bailroad, 111 N. Y. 199; Boach v. Bailroad, 21 S. E. 67; Koehler v. Bailroad, 44 Fed. 574; Aurelius v. Bailroad, 49 N. E. 857; Slater v. Bailroad, 32 N. "W. 264; Miller v. Bailroad, 27 N. E. 339; Bailroad v. Boyts, 45 N. E. 812; Brickell v. Bailroad, 24 N. E. 449. '(5) The eighth-instruction given on behalf of plaintiff is erroneous. It ignores the plea of the personal negligence of plaintiff in permitting the driver to go upon the track in the face of open and obvious danger. It ignores the proof in the record that the driver was subject to the orders and under the control of the plaintiff. We are not contending for the rule of “identification” founded upon the old case of Thorogood v. Bryan, 8 C. B. 114; nor for a rule, the'effect of which “would be to make an innocent person answerable Tor the wrong act of another, over whom he has and exercises no control, and who is neither his servant nor his agent.” Becke v. Railroad, 102 Mo. 550. Our contention is that the plaintiff shall be responsible for the act of one who was under his control and “subject to his orders.” It seems clear in this State that if the driver, Cavanaugh, was subject to the orders and -under the control of the plaintiff, plaintiff cannot, because of the negligence of Cavanaugh, recover. This question turns upon the fact of whether the plaintiff- has the right to control the driver. If he had such right and failed to exercise it, he is responsible for the driver’s act. If he had not such right, he is not liable. Becke v. Railroad, 102 Mo. 550; Dickson v. Railroad, 104 Mo. 504; O’Rourke v. Railroad, 142 Mo. 352; Borough of Carlisle v. Brisbane, 113 Pa.- St. 552; Dyer v. Railroad, 71 N. T. 228; Larkin v. Railroad, 85 Iowa 492; Roach v. Railroad, 21 N. E. 67; Mullen v. Owasso, 100 Mich. 103-; Railroad v. Hogeland, 66 Me. 149; 1 Thomp. Neg. (2 Ed.), see. 502, note 22; 2 Thomp. Neg. (2 Ed.), sec. 1621; Little v. Hackett, 116 II. S. 366; Follman v. City of Mankato (Minn.), 29 N. W. 317; Robinson y. Railroad, 66 N. T. 11; Payne v. Railroad, 49 Iowa 523. If the plaintiff allowed the driver to take full control of the team, when he had the right and power to control and direct him, he is liable for the negligence of the person to whom he submitted such control. Holmes v. Mather (Eng. Ct. of Ex., 1875), 16 Am. Rep. 384; Sharrod v. Railroad, 4 Ex. 580. It was the duty of the plaintiff, as well as of the driver, to learn of the danger and avoid it if possible. The hiring of the outfit did not excuse the plaintiff’s failure to exercise care for his own protection. Railroad v. McLeod, 29 So. 76; Smith v. Railroad, 32 Atl. 967; Miller v. Railroad, 128 Ind. 97; Hoag v. Railroad, 111 N. T. 199. The rule of non-imputability of the negligence of the driver, however, when no contract is shown does not absolve the passenger from ordinary care for his own safety. The instruction now under discussion directed the minds of the jury to the sole inquiry whether the driver was negligent or not, and was “erroneous as calculated to mislead them.” 1 Thomp. Neg. (2 Ed.), see. 503; 2 Thomp. Neg. (2 Ed), sec. 1621.
Campbell <fc Thompson for respondent.
(1) The court properly overruled appellant’s motion to require respondent to elect, and properly permitted respondent to read in evidence the “Speed and Vigilant 'Watch” Ordinance, and properly instructed the jury that a failure by appellant to observe the requirements of said ordinance, was negligence. It was not necessary for respondent to prove that appellant had accepted the provisions of said ordinance. Riska v. Railroad,180 Mo. 168; Jackson v. Railroad, 157 Mo. 621; Hutchinson v. Railroad, 161 Mo. 246; Weller v. Railroad, 164 Mo. 180; Wendler v. House Fur. Co., 165 Mo. 527; Gebhardt v. Railroad, 97 Mo. App. 373; McLain v. Railroad, 73 S. W. 909; Cox v. Railroad, 74 S. W. 858; Moore v. Railroad, 75 S. W. 699; Sepetowski v. Railroad, 76 S. W. 693; Kolb v. Railroad, 76 S. W. 1050. (2) The court properly gave the jury instruction 8, on behalf of plaintiff. The case of Thorogood v. Bryan, 8 C- B. 114, has been expressly repudiated by the later English cases, by the Supreme Court of the United States, and, with possibly one or two exceptions,-by every State of the Union, in which the question has arisen, and especially has it been repudiated by the Supreme Court of Missouri. March v. Railroad, 78 S. W. 284; Becke v. Railroad, 102 Mo. 549; Dickson v. Railroad, 104 Mo. 491; O’Rourke v. Railroad, 142 Mo. 352; Bailey v. Railroad, 152 Mo. 462; Munger v. Sedalia, 66 Mo. App. 629; Profit v. Railroad, 91 Mo. App. 369; Johnson v. St. Joseph, 96 Mo. App. 663; The Bernina, L. R. 12 Probate Div. 58; Jones v. Liverpool, 14 Q. B. Div. 890; Donovan v. Laing, 1 Q. B. Div. 629; Quarman v. Burnett, 6 M. & W. 499; Dean-v. Branthwaite, 5 Esp. 36; S'ammell v. Wright, 5 Esp. 263; Little v. Hackett, 116 U. S. 366; Randolph v. O’Riordan, 155 Mass. 331; Huff v. Ford, 126 Mass. 24; Femmer v.. Crisp Bros., 109 Iowa 455; Joslin v. Ice Co., 50 Mich. 516; Richardson v. Yan Ness, 53 Hun 267; Weyant v. Railroad, 3 Duer (N. Y.) 360; Philips v. Railroad, 127 N. Y. 657; Crockett v. Calvert, 8 Ind. 127; Hnightstown v. Musgrove, 116 Ind. 121; Herschberger v. Lynch, 11 Atl. 642; Bunting v. Hogsett, 139 Pa. St. 376; Quinn v. Construction Co., 46 Fed. 506; Railroad v. Railroad, 41 Fed. 316; Railroad v. Lapsley, 51 Fed. 800; Railroad v. Markens, 88 Ga. 62; Nesbit v. Town of Garner, 75 Iowa 314; Follman v. City of Mankato, 35 Minn. 522; Land Co. v. Mingea, 89 Ala. 521; State v. Railroad, 80 Me. 430; Railroad v. Hogeland, 66 Md. 149; Noyes v. Boscumen, 64 N. H. 369; Railroad v. Eadie, 43 Ohio St. 91; Railroad v. Kutoc, 72 Tex. 643; Railroad v. Cooper, 85 Ya, 939; Railroad v. Steinbrenner, 47 N. J. Eq. 161. (3) The court properly permitted plaintiff to state the rate, of speed at which the car was moving. It is not necessary that one be an expert to give such testimony. Walsh v. Railroad, 102 Mo. 582; Coveil v. Railroad, 82 Mo. App. 186. (4) The averment in the petition that defendant had accepted the ordinance, was an unnecessary averment, and hence it was not incumbent upon plaintiff to prove such acceptance. Campbell v. Railroad, 121 Mo. 340; Hartpence v. Rodgers, 143 Mo. 632; Palmer v. Tel. Co., 91 Mo. App. 115.
George W. Easley -with Boyle, Priest & Lelvmann on validity of Vigilant Watch. Ordinance.
(1) “It is beyond the power of amnnicipal corporation by its legislative action directly to create ‘a civil duty enforceable at common law, ’ for this is an exercise of power of sovereignty belonging alone to the State. ’ ’ Path v. Railroad, 105 Mo. 545; Iieeney'v.' Sprague, 23 Mm. Rep. 508; Flynn v. Canton Co., 17 Am. Rep. 603, and note 616; St. Louis v. Ins. Co., 107 Mo. 92. An ordinance that merely prescribes a penalty for its violation does not create a liability in favor of a private individual. The only liability which attaches to its infraction is the penalty. Hartford v. Talcott, 48 Conn. 425; Keokuk v. Dist. of Keokuk, 53 la. 352; Kirby v. Boylston Market Co., 14 Gray 249'; Flynn v. Canton Co., 40 Md. 312. The city has no authority to create any other liability than the penalty it is authorized to impose. Van Dyke v. Cincinnati, 1 Disney 532; Moran v. Car Co., 134 Mo. 631. It seems to be elementary law that an ordinance can neither create or release a civil liability. Horr & Bemis on Munic. Ord., sec. 7. (2) One of these three positions must be the true construction of this ordinance: 1, The ordinance is but declaratory of the common law rule of ordinary care, or, 2, that it requires more than ordinary care, or, 3, that it requires less than ordinary care, (a) If the first of these conclusions, that the ordinance but declares the rule of ordinary care, be reached, then the ordinance can give no addititional remedy. The common law, the general law of the State, must govern, and not the special or local ordinance. The ordinance adds nothing to and can take nothing from the general common law rule of ordinary care. Horr & Bemis on Ord., sec. 7; Jenks v. Williams, 115 Mass. 217. The ordinance is not de claratory of the common law rule of ordinary care, but on the contrary, it abolishes that rule and imposes a harsher one than ordinary care, (b) This ordinance is inconsistent with the general law of the State, and the law is well settled that: “Municipal by-laws must also be in harmony with the general laws of the State and with the provisions of the municipal charter. Whenever they come in conflict with either, the by-law must give way.” 1 Smith on Mun. Corp., p. 468, sec. 499; and authorities collected in note 29. Indeed, the Municipal Assembly of St. Louis, by the very- terms of its charter, is limited to the passing of ordinances “not inconsistent with the Constitution or any law of this State or of this-charter.” Charter, art. 3, sec. 26. Can it be doubted that this ordinance is inconsistent with the common law rule of ordinary care so long enforced in this State? 2 Dillon on Corp. (4 Ed.), sec. 727; 1 Smith on Mun. Corp., sec. 521. If the common law of the State fixes the care that the managers of street railways must exercise in operating them, then the ordinance gives no additional remedy. Horr & Bemis on Ordinances, sec. 7; Jenks v. Williams, 115 Mass. 217. An ordinance or by-law of a municipal corporation, not consistent with the general law of the State creating such municipality, is void. Robinson v. Mayor of Franklin, 34 Am. Dec. 625; Horr. & Bemis, Mun. Ord., sec. 7. We have no contention to make that, asrapplied to a speed ordinance, the doctrine of the Jackson case is not sound in principle. Our contention is 'that the Vigilant Watch Ordinance is not an ordinance of the nature of a speed ordinance — that this suit is not “bottomed upon the violation of an ordinance which a city had the right to pass as a police regulation.” This case is bottomed on an ordinance which undertakes to regulate the degree and kind of care that is to be exercised by the operators of street ears. That, we say, is a matter which is controlled by the common law of the State, and is not the proper subject of municipal legislation. If the ordinance is merely declaratory of the common law, then the common law controls, and not the ordinance. If the ordinance requires more vigilance than the common law requires, and commands more prompt action upon the part of a motorman than does the common law, then the ordinance is not in harmony with the general law of the State, and is void. The ordinance in question must he either declaratory of the common law of the State or more stringent in its requirements than the common law. In either event, the ordinance does not create liability for anything more than the penalty prescribed. Mason v. Shawneetown, 77 111. 533; Hayes v. Eailroad, 111 U. S. 267; Fath v. Eailroad, 105 Mo. 550. The power to'legislate upon the question of the care to be exercised in the operation of street cars has not been delegated by the Legislature to the city of St. Louis.
Given Campbell for respondent in reply.
(1) The Fath case overruled the following decisions of the Supreme Court on that principle of law: Ma-her v. Eailroad, 64 Mo. 275; Merz v. Eailroad, 88 Mo. 677; Keim v. Eailroad, 90 Mo. 321; Eswin v. Eailroad, 96 Mo. 290; Schlereth v. Eailroad, 96 Mo. 509; Grube v. Eailroad, 98 Mo. 330; Keliny v. Eailroad, 101 Mo. 77; Murray v. Eailroad, 101 Mo. 236; Hanlon v. Eailroad, 104 Mo. 387; Dickson v. Eailroad, 104 Mo. 501. (2) Since the decision in the Fath case, the Supreme-Court has refused to follow it in the following cases: Brannock v. Elmore, 114 Mo. 55 ; Gratiot v. Eailroad, 116 Mo. 450 ; Karle v. Eailroad, 55 Mo. 483; Jackson v. Eailroad, 157 Mo. 621; Hutchinson v. Eailroad, 161 Mo. 246; Weller v. Eailroad, 164 Mo. 180; Wendler v. House Furn. Co., 165 Mo. 527; Hirst v. Eeal Estate Co., 169 Mo. 194; Cox v. Eailroad, 74 S. W. 859; Eiska v. Eailroad, 180 Mo. 168; Story v. Eailroad, 83 S. W. 994; Eeed v. Eailroad, 80 S. W. 919. (3) The ordinance re quiring the motorman, etc., to keep a “vigilant watch,” and on the first appearance of danger, to stop or check his car in the shortest time, etc., has been held valid, and its violation negligence per se) in the following recent cases in this State: Meyers v. Railroad, 99 Mo. App. 363; Kolb v. Railroad, 102 Mo. App. 143; Riska v. Railroad, supra; Nagel v. Railroad, 104Mo.App. 438; Heinzle v. Railroad, 81 S. W. -848. (4) The great weight of authority is with Missouri. 1 Shear. & Redf. on Neg. (5 Ed.), sec. 13; 2 Dillon, Mun. Corp. (4 Ed.), sec. 713; 1 Thomp. Law of Neg., secs. 10, 11. In the following eases the violation of ordinances was held to be negligence per se: Tobey v. Railroad, 94 Iowa 256 (speed of cars); Siemers v. Eisen, 54 Cal. 418 (unhitched horse); Allen v. Glenn, 87 Ga. 425 (obstructing street with engine more than five minutes); Railroad v. Smith, 78 Ga. 694 (speed of trains at crossing in city); Railroad v. Horton, 132 Ind. 189 (speed of trains — cars); Railroad v. Des Lauriers, 40 111. App. 654 (speed of trains); Railroad v. Dunavan, 84 Ala. 141; Mueller v. Railroad, 86 Wis. 340 (stopping car in middle of street); Railroad v. Robbins, 2 Colo. App. 313 (obstructing of street by train); Osborn v. McMasters, 40 Minn. 103 (statute requiring labeling of drugs); Bott v. Pratt, 33 Minn. 323 (leaving horse untied) ; Railroad v. McDonnell, 43 Md. 552 (speed ordinance) ; Clements & Wf. v. Elec. Light Co., 44 La. Ann. 692 (insulated electric light wires); Railroad v. Dunn, 78 111. 197 (speed under circumstances negligence); Railroad v. White, 84 Va. 498. (5) It is the duty of the city by ordinance to lay down rules regulating the use of the streets. This power is inherent in all cities. Railroad v. Richmond, 96 H. S. 527. And the reasonable rules laid down in the exercise of this power are obligatory, and become duties, to be observed by all to whom such rules are applicable, and a neglect to observe these rules is punished by a fine for the violation of duty towards the city in its governmental capacity, and is negligence, so far as any individual is damaged by their failure to comply with these rules and perform the duties enjoined thereby. The primary object of such ordinances is to promote the public welfare, by securing the safety of the citizen; and in this aspect they are remedial, while as to the penalty for violation in the shape of a fine, they are penal. Ins. Co. v. Needles, 113 U. S. 580.

Opinion:
GANTT, J.
This is an action for damages for personal injuries, caused by the collision of one of defendant's street cars with a livery carriage in which plaintiff was riding, at the crossing of McPherson avenue by Boyle avenue, on which last-named avenue the defendant company owned and operated a double-track street railway, in the city of St. Louis. Plaintiff re: covered judgment in the circuit court for $6,000, and defendant appeals.
The petition in substance states that on or about the 27th day of December, 1901, about 7:15 o'clock in the evening of that day, the plaintiff, a physician, was being driven in a hired livery carriage west along McPherson avenue, a street running east and west, at its intersection with Boyle avenue, a street running north and south, in the city of St. Louis, and that the lamps on the said carriage were lighted and burning brightly; that at said time and place, and as such carriage in which plaintiff was riding was crossing defendant's south-bound or western street railway track, one of defendant's cars, propelled by electricity and southbound on said track, with great speed, force and violence, struck and collided with said carriage, driving plaintiff's right arm into his floating ribs, fracturing the large bone of plaintiff's right fore arm, inflicting a body blow on plaintiff's body opposite the solar plexus, rendering plaintiff unconscious, and seriously hurting, bruising and crushing plaintiff's .back and body.
"And plaintiff avers that at the time of receiving said injuries, there was in force in the city of St. Louis an ordinance known as Ordinance 19,991 approved April 3,1900, which ordinance defendant, long prior to the happening of the accident complained of, accepted and agreed to he bound by the terms and provisions thereof; that section 1760 of said ordinance in substance provides that all street cars after sunset shall be provided with signal lights; that no ear shall be drawn at a greater speed than eight miles per hour, and that the conductor, motorman, gripman, driver or any other person in charge of each car shall keep a vigilant watch for all vehicles, either on the track or moving towards it, and on the first appearance of danger to such vehicle, shall stop the car in the shortest time and space possible.
"And plaintiff avers that though at the time of receiving said injuries aforesaid, it was long past sunset and dark, defendant had negligently failed to provide said car with signal lights, or to place.a headlight on said car; that defendant's servants in violation of said provision of said ordinance were running said car southwardly on Boyle avenue towards McPherson, at the time said injuries were inflicted, and immediately prior thereto, at a careless, negligent and dangerously high rate of speed, to-wit, at a rate of speed far in excess of eight miles per hour; that defendant's servants in charge of said car, in violation of the provisions of said ordinance hereinabove referred to, negligently failed to keep a vigilant watch ahead for vehicles moving toward the track upon which said car was running, and negligently failed to stop or to- attempt to stop or check the speed of said car in the shortest time and space possible, when they saw, or by the exercise of ordinary care or diligence could have seen the vehicle in which plaintiff was riding, in a position of danger, in time to have stopped said car before striking said vehicle, or to have so checked its speed as to have avoided said collision; and for another and further as signment of negligence, plaintiff states that at the time and place of receiving said injuries aforesaid, defendant's servants in charge of said car negligently failed to sound the gong or to give warning of said car's approach."
The answer of the defendant was a general denial and the following defense:
"Second. Further answering, defendant says that whatever injuries plaintiff sustained, if any, were caused by his own negligence, in suffering and permitting the driver of said carriage to drive in front of the approaching car, when, by looking, he might have seen, or by listening he might have heard said car approaching, and have avoided the said accident."
The reply was a general denial.
The facts developed in the trial were in substance the following:
On the evening of December 27, 1901, the plaintiff was and for some time prior thereto had been a practicing physician in St. Louis. On that evening he ordered a carriage from the Palace Livery Company, a livery stable owned by Charles H. Wilcox, in the city. Wilcox sent a two-horse hack or carriage in charge of one of his drivers, Thomas Cavanaugh, to plaintiff's residence, with directions to call for the doctor. When plaintiff got into the carriage he directed the driver to take him to a house on Westminster Place, the third from the corner of Forty-fourth Street, and gave no other orders.
The driver drove into McPherson avenue, which runs east and west, to Boyle avenue, which runs south, beginning at Olive street. The first street south of Olive street crossed by Boyle avenue is Westminster avenue. Boyle avenue is 37 feet wide from curb to. curb, and McPherson is 40 feet in width. On Boyle avenue the defendant company has a double-track street railway from Olive street, which crosses both Westminster and McPherson as it goes south. At the northeast corner of Boyle and McPherson there is a brick house facing south on McPherson avenue and standing back 30 feet from the north line of McPherson with its west side flush with the building line on the east side of Boyle avenue. On the opposite corner to the west or the northwest corner of Boyle and McPherson was a vacant lot, and on the southwest corner and fronting on McPherson was the residence of Mr. Jones.
It was a dark, windy night, a little foggy — a dark and cloudy night. The driver of plaintiff's carriage sat upon the top seat outside and on the front of the carriage and was driving west on McPherson avenue, on the north side thereof, and about seven or eight feet from the north curb stone, in a slow trot. The lamps on the carriage were lighted. Plaintiff sat on the back seat of the carriage and on the south side. The testimony of the plaintiff was to the effect, that as the carriage neared Boyle avenue a car passed going south, and the driver checked up a little and went forward in a little dog trot, and as he started across the track he heard the click of the wheels on the rails and heard the driver slap the horses, and he looked out of the north window of the carriage and saw a car at about what seemed to him fifty or sixty feet distant. He had hardly seen the ear when it struck the carriage and he received the injuries of which he complains. Cavanaugh, the driver, testified that he was proceeding, west, on McPherson in a slow trot, on the north side of the street, and when he got within seven or eight feet of the east rail of defendant's tracks, a car passed south and then he looked both ways and saw no car coming and drove on to cross the tracks, and after he got on the west track he suddenly discovered another car coming south and only about 10 or 12 feet from him He tried to get out of its way but it came so fast he couldn't do so, and it struck his carriage, the front part of it. He was thrown from the carriage on to the vestibule of the car, right at the feet of the motorman. He testified he looted north before attempting to cross and saw no car. No bell or gong was sounded. The only light on the street car was a single incandescent bulb with a reflector at the top of the car. The force of the blow cut the horses loose from the carriage and they ran west on McPherson avenue. The car drove the carriage across McPherson avenue to a position differently estimated from twenty to forty feet south of McPherson avenue, and the rear platform of the car when it stopped stood over the crossing on the south side of McPherson.
Two eye-witnesses testified in behalf of defendant, to-wit, young Masterson and the motorman, Middleton.
The motorman testified he first discovered the carriage when he was very close to the north line of McPherson avenue; that his car was about 5 or 10 feet from the north crossing when he first saw it. Asked if a carriage was 25 feet from the east line of Boyle avenue, going west, on the north side of McPherson avenue, how far down or from what point on Boyle avenue he could first see that carriage, he answered, "about fifteen feet" from the north crossing of McPherson avenue; that is, he couldn't see around the comer further east than that on account of the building on the corner; that the building was very close to the corner. Asked what there was to prevent him from seeing the carriage at a further distance than five or ten feet from it, he answered he was looking both ways to see if anything was approaching; that he had to look in more directions than one. There was liable to be carriages coming from other directions. He testified his car was running four or five miles an hour. He testified to seeing the boy (Masterton) on a pony about Westminster-Place, a block north'of McPherson. The boy was a little ahead of his car, riding south in a slow trot. He rang the gong for him near Westerns Ar or a little south of it.
Masters on testified he. remembered the incident of the car striking the carriage. He was riding a pony belonging to Watkins, a liveryman, going south on Boyle. He first noticed the car before he got to Westminster • Place. He heard it come around the corner from Olive street on to Boyle. He was riding then close to the track but pulled away from it. The bell did not ring nor the gong sound after it passed Westminster. It did ring two or three times between Olive and West-' minster. He looked back and the light on the car was very dim. He could see the light but it was very dim. The car was gaining speed all the time. It was going at a pretty good gait, about 15 miles an hour. "I was riding as fast as the pony would go." He testified he ran his pony off into McPherson avenue, and after the collision caught the two horses that were attached to the carriage and brought them back; that the car stopped on the south crossing of McPherson and Boyle avenues.
Plaintiff testified it looked as if it was going 20 to 25 miles an hour.
Mrs. Penley says it was going very fast and she noticed' no effort to check the speed.
Mitchell testified it was going nearly 20 miles an Imur.
Cavanaugh says about 25 miles an.hour.
On the other hand, the motorman and conductor placed the speed at 4 miles an hour.
The plaintiff, himself a physician, and Hr. Harvey Gr. Mudd testified to the nature of the injuries received and their evidence tended to show not only serious injuries causing much pain and suffering but a loss of time from his practice entailing a large pecuniary loss.
The instructions will be noted in the course of the opinion.
I. The first proposition advanced for a reversal of the judgment in this case is that the court erred in not requiring plaintiff to elect upon which assignment of negligence he would proceed to trial.
This contention, is based upon the assumption that the petition blends causes of action ex delicto with causes of action arising ex contractu, and this in turn is predicated upon the principal insistence in this case, to-wit, that section 1760 of ordinance 19991, approved April 3, 1900, and commonly known as "the Vigilant Watch Ordinance," from the fact that it provides that the motorman or other employee propelling a street car in said city shall keep a vigilant watch for all vehicles either on the track or moving towards it and on the first appearance of danger to such vehicle shall stop said car. in the shortest time and space possible, could only be passed under the power of the city to contract, and could not be passed under its police power to protect the lives, limbs and property of those using its streets in the pursuit of their lawful business, but could only control defendant and render it liable for its violation when it accepted it and agreed to be amenable to it, and hence a suit for its violation would be ex contractu, whereas the other acts of negligence were torts, either at common law or by statute or ordinance, and ex delicto.
In the solution of this contention fundamental principles must be invoked. That the people in £he Constitution of the State or the Legislature in the exercise of its general legislative power, when not restricted by the Federal or State Constitution, may grant municipal corporations the power to pass all necessary ordinances for the protection of the safety of their citizens and their property is the settled law of this State, and such a delegation of power is no infringement of the maxim that legislative power cannot be delegated. [State v. Field, 17 Mo. 529; 1 Dillon on Munic. Corp., sec. 308, and cases cited; State ex rel. v. Francis, 95 Mo. 49; Morrow v. Kansas City, 186 Mo. 675; State ex rel. v. Murphy, 130 Mo. 10.]
The freeholders' charter of the city of St. Louis, adopted August 22,1876, has all the force and effect of a legislative charter. [Kansas City v. Oil Co., 140 Mo. 468; City of St Louis v. Gleason, 15 Mo. App. 25; Ibid v. Ibid, 93 Mo. 33.]
By section 1 of article 10 of the Scheme and Charter of St. Lonis it is provided that "the Municipal Assembly shall have power by ordinance to determine all questions arising with reference to street railroads in the corporate limits of the city, whether such questions may involve the construction of such street railroads, granting the right of way, or regulating or controlling them after their completion."
Under section 26, article 3, of said charter "The Mayor and Assembly shall have power within the city by ordinance not inconsistent with the Constitution or any law of this State or of this charter . . to establish, open, vacate, alter, widen, extend, pave or otherwise improve and sprinkle all streets, avenues, sidewalks, alleys, wharves and public grounds and squares; . . . to construct and keep in repair all bridges, streets, sewers and drains and to regulate the use thereof," etc.
Elsewhere the charter gives the city power to declare and abate nuisancés and pass ordinances for the general welfare.
Thus we find that the people of Missouri by their organic law have expressly delegated to the city of St. Louis the power to regulate the use of its streets and pass all needful ordinances expedient in maintaining the peace, good government, health and welfare of the city. [State ex rel. v. Murphy, 130 Mo. 22; Railroad v. Kirkwood, 159 Mo. 239; sec. 20, art. 12, Const, of Mo. 1875.]
Discussing section 26 of article 3 of the St. Louis charter, in St. Louis v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 149 U. S. l. c. 469, the Supreme Court of the United States said: "It is given power to own and establish streets, to improve them as it sees fit, and to regulate their use, paying for all this out of its own funds. The word ' regulate ' is one of broad import. It is the word used in the Federal Constitution to define the power of Congress over foreign and interstate commerce, and he who reads the many opinions of this court will perceive how broad and comprehensive it has been held to be. If the city gives a right to the use of the streets or public grounds, as it did by ordinance No. 11,604, it simply regulates the use when it prescribes the terms and conditions upon which they shall be used."
Judge Dillon in his Municipal Corporations (4 Ed.), vol. 2, sec. 713, says: "Resulting from the power over streets, and to protect the safety of citizens and their property, municipal corporations may control the mode of propelling cars within their limits, may prohibit steam cars and regulate the rate of speed."
It is not then to be questioned that, under the comprehensive grant in its charter, the city of St. Louis has the police power to regulate the use of its streets by street car companies for the protection of the public which uses them for the paramount purpose for which they are established, to-wit, for travel thereon, and so long as they are streets the city itself cannot appropriaté them even to another public use which would wholly or practically deprive the public of the right to travel thereon. [Lockwood v. Railroad, 122 Mo. 86; Khapp & Co. v. Railroad, 126 Mo. 26.]
Looking, then, to the ordinance which requires of street railway companies that its motormen and other servants propelling their cars on the streets keep a vigilant watch for vehicles and persons on their tracks or approaching them, it is too clear for argument that in enacting said ordinance it was exercising its governmental police power under its authority over and to regulate the use of said streets, and not its proprietary right to contract for its municipal advantage as such. That St. Louis and the other cities of this State have the power to regulate the speed of trains running along or across its highways has been asserted by this court on numerous occasions, and this is expressly conceded by defendant, both in the briefs of its counsel and in the oral argument.
This question was thoroughly examined and so decided in Jackson v. Railroad, 157 Mo. 621. In that case Burgess, J., collates the decisions of this court from an early period down to the promulgation of the opinion in that 'case and reference only need be made to that case for them.
Counsel earnestly labor to show that there is a distinction between an ordinance regulating the speed of cars in and across the streets, and one requiring the motorman to exercise a vigilant watch for vehicles and pedestrians, especially children, on the track of such street railways or moving toward it, but it is obvious that both spring from the same power to regulate the use of the streets for the protection of the traveling public, their lives, limbs and property, and both alike fall within the recognized domain of a police law. In Bluedorn v. Railroad, 108 Mo. l. c. 443, Judge Black, speaking for this Court in Banc, said: "Our attention has not been called to any provision of the charter of the city of St. Louis which gives the city power, in terms, to regulate the speed of railroad trains; but the charter, among other things, gives the mayor and assembly power to regulate the use of streets; to regulate or prevent the carrying on of any business which may be dangerous or detrimental to the public health; to declare, prevent and abate nuisances on public or private property and the causes thereof; and to pass all such ordinances as may be expedient in maintaining the peace, good government, health and welfare of the city, its trade, commerce and manufactures. It is well to bear in mind that laws and ordinances regulating the speed of railroad trains are police regulations purely. [Grube v. Railroad, 98 Mo. 330; Knobloch v. Railroad, 31 Minn. 402; Railroad v. Deacon, 63 Ill. 91; Thorpe v. Railroad, 27 Vt. 140.] '
Indeed, Judge Redeield says: "We should enter-. tain no doubt of the right of the municipal authorities of a city or large town to adopt such an ordinance without any special legislative sanction, by virtue of the general supervision which they have over the police of their respective jurisdiction." [2 Redfield on Railways (5 Ed.), 577-8.]
But it is unnecessary to look for support for a proposition so universally conceded as that ordinances regulating the speed of trains in cities are referable to the police power, and that such regulation is based upon the obvious necessity of compelling those who use powerful and dangerous agencies on the public thoroughfares to be careful that they do not injure others who have an equal right to the use of the highway, and the obvious fact that a train of cars moving slowly can be much more readily stopped to prevent a collision than one moving at a rapid speed. On identically the same 'principle is the ordinance for a vigilant watch based.
Since the adoption of electricity and cables as the motive power the danger to pedestrians and those traveling in vehicles on the streets is greatly multiplied, and it is a wise and salutary provision that requires the motormen in charge of these ponderous and rapidly moving cars- to carefully watch that they do not run over pedestrians, old men, women and children who have an equal right to the use of the streets, and such an ordinance falls as clearly within the police power as does the speed ordinance.
Being then the exercise of the police power, the ordinance does not depend upon the acceptance of the street car companies to make it obligatory upon them to obey it, but it is a municipal law enacted by the city in its governmental capacity, of which all who come within its scope are bound to take notice, and it has the full force and effect of law within the limits of the corporation. [Jackson v. Railroad, 118 Mo. 218, 219.]
Being a police power it was and is not within the power of the city to contract it away or to bind itself not to exercise it whenever the public good or exigencies require its exercise. This is so universally recognized that it is unnecessary to refer to precedents to establish it.
But, say counsel, even if this be conceded, thepower is coupled with a power to prescribe limited punishment by fine, penalty or imprisonment for disobedience only, and no civil liability to any third party injured by a violation of the ordinance can result therefrom. This contention finds support in the decisions in Fath v. Railroad, 105 Mo. 537; Byington v. Railroad, 117 Mo. 673; Murphy v. Railroad, 153 Mo. 252. All the subsequent cases are bottomed upon the Fath case in which, although unnecessary to the decision of the case, arguendo, it was held "that it is beyond the power of a municipal corporation by its legislative action directly to create; 'a civil duty enforceable at common law; ' for this is an exercise of the power of sovereignty belonging alone to the State."
In Jackson v. Railroad, 157 Mo. 635, et seq., Burgess, J., reviewed all the authorities upon which the doctrine above announced in the Fath case was bottomed, and showed conclusively that those decisions had reference to that class of cases in which private persons sought to avail themselves of a violation of ordinances which the city had passed for its own protection and for which the city was primarily liable, such as the ordinances requiring owners to remove ice and snow upon the sidewalks adjoining their premises and ordinances of a similar character, and pointed out that those cases were different from those founded upon the violations of ordinances enacted under the police power for the protection of lives and property, which all cities in this State have the right to pass as police regula tions, and which relate primarily to the duty of those whose conduct they regulate for the benefit of persons traveling on the streets, who have a right to rely upon the observance of such ordinances.
The line of demarcation is clearly drawn between the two classes of ordinances in the Jackson case, and is abundantly sustained by authority in other States, and by the text-writers.
Thus, in 1 Shearman & Redfield on Negligence (5 Ed.)., sec. 13, it is said: "The violation of any statutory or valid municipal ordinance, established for the benefit of private persons, is of itself sufficient to prove such a breach of duty as will sustain a private action for negligence, brought by a person belonging to the protected class, if the other elements of actionable negligence concur."
In Bott v. Pratt, 33 Minn. 323, cited with approval by this court in Bluedorn v. Railroad, 108 Mo. 439, and Jackson v. Railroad, 157 Mo. 636, the distinction was clearly drawn and emphasized, and the authorities throughout the Union collected and distinguished. The opinion in Jackson v. Railroad, 157 Mo. 621, however, answers the contention of defendant fully on this point. As to the criticism of the opinion in that case as obiter on this proposition, the contrary is the fact. In that case the learned counsel for defendant in that case in the second paragraph of their brief made the point that "the petition did not state a cause of action because it did not show the existence of a civil duty owed by defendant to deceased and enforcible against it at common law," and there was no allegation of a contract between defendant and the city to comply with the regulations pleaded. [Jackson v. Railroad, 157 Mo. loc. cit. 624.]
Not only was the point fairly and ably presented, but counsel for defendant were right in assuming that the obiter in the Fath case was to be followed, and that since the street car company in St. Louis could not be held amenable to the police regulations of said city then no reason existed why railroad companies in other cities should not avail themselves of this exemption for violations of like police regulations, unless forsooth they had signified their consent to be amenable thereto. So that counsel were not only justified in making the point, but we would have been wanting in respect to counsel had we not considered the point and decided it.
It is urged also that, until the Jackson case, no one had questioned the Path case, and that, this court had followed the latter case is several decisions. This is true, but we duly considered these decisions, and because in our opinion they were not in harmony with an unbroken line of decisions from Karle v. Railroad, 55 Mo. 476, down to Prewitt v. Railroad, 134 Mo. 615, in all of which it had been held that the running of a railroad train through the corporate limits of a city in excess of the speed prescribed by ordinance was negligence per se and a cause of action resulted to any person injured by such violation of the statute. [Vide cases cited in Jackson v. Railroad, 157 Mo. loc. cit. 641.] Jackson v. Railroad, 157 Mo. 621, has received the approval of this Court in Banc in Weller v. Railroad, 164 Mo. 180, and the principle upon which it stands has been reiterated in Hutchinson v. Railroad, 161 Mo. 246, and Wendler v. People's House Furnishing Co., 165 Mo. 527, and Cox v. Railroad, 174 Mo. 605, and we see no reason for regarding it longer as an open question in this State.
Fath v. Railroad, 105 Mo. l. c. 545, and the subsequent cases of Byington v. Railroad, 147 Mo. 673; Murphy v. Railroad; 153 Mo. 252; Sanders v. Railroad, 147 Mo. 411; Holwerson v. Railroad, 157 Mo. 245, which announce the doctrine that no cause of action can arise to a person injured from the violation of such an ordinance as this, should no longer be followed. Since the promulgation of the opinion in Jackson v. Railroad, 157 Mo. 621, the St. Louis Court of Appeals has fol lowed it in various cases. [Gebhardt v. Transit Co., 97 Mo. App. 373; McLain v. Railroad, 100 Mo. App. 385; Moore v. Railroad, 95 Mo. App. 728; Sepetowski v. Railroad, 102 Mo. App. 119.]
There was no misjoinder in uniting the several grounds of negligence in one petition. The failure to keep a vigilant watch out for vehicles was not a cause of action arising out of contract and it was not necessary to prove the company's acceptance of the ordinance.
This brings us to the next insistence of defendant, to-wit, that the ordinance exacts a higher degree of diligence and chre than the common law rule of ordinary care and imposes a harsher one, and for that reason is not in harmony with the general laws of the State, and hence void. This objection to the ordinance in question was urged by the same learned counsel in the St. Louis Court of Appeals in Sepetowski v. Railroad, 102 Mo. App. 119, but that court held that "properly construed it is but declaratory of the common law duty of corporations operating street railways in populous cities," and that conclusion is in harmony with the decision of this court. [Riska v. Railroad, 180 Mo. 168.]
As was said by Judge Sherwood, in Lamb v. Railroad, 147 Mo. loc. cit. 204, that although there was no ordinance of the city of Pleasant Hill, regulating the speed of engines and requiring the ringing of the bells on the engine and although in his opinion the eighty rods statute did not apply in such cities, "but while we say this, at the same time we say that outside of the statute, and under the principles of the common law, a railroad corporation would not perform its full duty of ordinary care, unless those employed on a switching engine, engaged in its customary avocation, should ring its bell, or if necessary, take any other precaution adapted to the exigency which, like the mercury in the thermometer, determines to what degree prudence shall rise in order to reach the mark of ordinary care."
The same principle is enunciated in Holden v. Railroad, 177 Mo. 456, wherein the rule announced in Hicks v. Railroad, 64 Mo. l. c. 439, that "in running through towns and cities, and over public crossings, they are expected to be more careful than at other places where not so likely to injure persons or property, ' ' is approved, as was the rule announced in Prick v. Railroad, 75 Mo. l. c. 609, to the effect that "a less degree of vigilance will ordinarily be required between the streets of a town or city, than will be required at a street crossing, or when running longitudinally in a street. ' ' Indeed, so apparent is the duty of the driver or motorman in charge of cars moving on the rapid transit lines maintained by street car companies, to. keep a constant and vigilant lookout for persons and vehicles that a failure to do so would be regarded as negligence and a failure to exercise ordinary care in the absence of an ordinance. Certainly such an ordinance is not out of harmony with anything in the Constitution or laws of this State.
But learned counsel urge that if it does not require more than ordinary care, then there is no excuse for its existence.
It is a novel argument against the validity of a statute that it conforms to the laws of the State and requires the same prudence that the general law of the State exacts, particularly so when the charter of the city commands that its ordinances shall be in harmony with the Constitution and laws of the State. "We can see no merit in this contention.
Our conclusion is that this ordinance was the exercise of a. police power clearly vested in the city for the protection of the lives and property of its citizens on its streets; that it exacts no more than ordinary care, when the conditions and circumstances to which it is applicable are considered, and that a breach of its requirements is negligence; that the acceptance or agreement of the defendant company was not at all necessary to give said ordinance the binding force of a valid municipal law within the limits of the city.
II. A second insistence is that the eighth instruction given in behalf of plaintiff was erroneous. That instruction is in the words following:
"8. The court instructs the jury that the carriage and horses used by the plaintiff at the time of the accident belonged to a livery-stable keeper, and if they further believe from the evidence that the driver of the carriage was an employee of the livery-stable keeper, and that the plaintiff hired said carriage, horses and driver from said livery-stable keeper, and exercised no control over the movements of said carriage or the handling of said horses, except to give the driver his destination, then the jury are instructed that the driver was not the servant of the plaintiff', and although they may find from the evidence that the plaintiff's said injury was contributed to by the negligence or want of ordinary care of said driver, without any co-operation on the part of the plaintiff, yet the jury cannot impute such negligence of said driver to the plaintiff, and if they find that the injury was caused both by the negligence of defendant as explained in the foregoing instructions and the negligence of said driver, they will yet, nevertheless, find for the plaintiff."
The objection to this instruction is twofold, first, that the driver in the circumstances detailed in evidence was the servant of and under the control of plaintiff, and therefore the driver's negligence was plaintiff's contributory negligence; second, that it ignores plaintiff's own personal contributory negligence in failing to look out for his own safety, in permitting the driver to drive into obvious danger.
As to the first, counsel for defendant do not insist upon the doctrine of Thorogood v. Bryan, 65 Eng. Com. Law (8 M. G. & S.) 114, wherein it was ruled, "that a passenger upon the vehicle of a common carrier who sustains an injury which is the result of the concurrent negligence of those in charge of such vehicle and third persons is so identified with the former as to be chargeable with their negligence in an action against the latter, and therefore only entitled to recover damages from his former carrier." The doctrine of that case was afterwards repudiated by the Court of Appeals in England in the case of "The Bernina," 12 L. R. Prob. Div. (1887) 58, and other cases, and by this court in Becke v. Railroad, 102 Mo. 548, et seq., in which Brace, J., reviewed all the English and American decisions on this point. The decision in .Becke v. Railroad has been repeatedly followed by this court. [Dickson v. Railroad, 104 Mo. 491; O'Rourke v. Railroad, 142 Mo. 352.] And such has been the uniform ruling of our Courts of Appeals. [Hunt v. Railroad, 14 Mo. App. 160; Keitel v. Railroad, 28 Mo. App. 657; Munger v. Sedalia, 66 Mo. App. 629; Profit v. Railroad, 91 Mo. App. 369.] The distinction claimed between the Becke case and this is, that the driver in this case was subject to the orders of plaintiff and if plaintiff had the right to control the driver and failed to exercise it, he is responsible for the driver's act.
It is well that we determine at the outset what relation plaintiff and the driver Cavanaugh bore to each other.
We think it is plain that Dr. Sluder contracted with Hickox, the owner of the Palace Livery Stable, to transport him to the residence of his patient on Westminster avenue near 44th street. In the performance-of his part of the contract of conveyance, Wilcox sent his carriage and driver. The carriage and horses were in the control of Wilcox through his agent and driver all the time it was occupied by plaintiff, just as much so as if Wilcox himself had driven it, and it is a confus ion of legal principles to say that under such circumstances the relation of master and servant existed between plaintiff and Wilcox or that of principal and agent — nor was such relation created between plaintiff and Cavanaugh, Wilcox's driver. The evidence shows that plaintiff ordered the carriage to take him to the house on Westminster and when the driver came, simply told him where he was to go and gave no other directions, and, assumed no control over Cavanaugh as to the management of his team or the route he was to take.
This identical question arose in Randolph v. O'Riordon, 155 Mass. 331, and the Supreme Court of that State held the relation of master and servant was .not created by a mere contract like this for a conveyance. Said the court: "Whether the hack and driver were hired at a public stand or of a private person could make no difference, nor whether the' party furnishing them was engaged in the business of a common carrier of passengers or not. It would not do to say that one who buys a passage from New Tork to Liverpool sustains the relation of master to the officers and crew and owners of the steamer on which he embarks. No more would it do to say that one who buys conveyance for his own person or his family from place to place within the same city, or to an adjoining city, thereby assumes the relation of master to a servant or liability for his acts uncommanded and uninterfered with by him." The court then proceeds to show that Thorogood v. Bryan, upon which the defendant rested in that case, stood upon "indefensible ground," citing Little v. Hackett, 116 U. S. 366-375, and many other cases.
, In Railroad v. Steinbrenner, 47 N. 3. Law 161, it appeared that plaintiff hired a coach and horses with a driver from one Merkins to take his family on a particular journey. In the course of the journey, in crossing a railroad track, the coach was struck by a passing train and the plaintiff was injured. In his action against the company for damages, it was held, that the relation of master and servant did not exist between plaintiff and the driver and that the negligence of the driver co-operating with that of the persons in charge of the train which caused the accident was not imputable to the plaintiff as contributory negligence to bar his action; that, while a passenger in a hired coach might by words or conduct at the time so encourage a special act of rashness or careless driving as to commit an act of negligence which would bar a recovery, in order to impute contributory negligence to the passenger it must arise from his own conduct, and the negligence of the driver alone without some co-operating negligence on his part could not be imputed to the passenger in virtue of the simple act of'hiring.
Such is the settled doctrine in England. In Quarman v. Burnett, 6 M. & W. 499, the defendants were the owners of a carriage and were accustomed to hire horses and coachmen of a job mistress for a day or a drive for which the job mistress charged and received a certain sum. The defendants generally had the same horses and always the same coachman. As a gratuity they gave the coachman two shillings for each drive, and provided him a livery hat and coat. He had driven the defendants one day and on his return after the defendants had alighted, the coachman left the horses and carriage unattended. The horses ran off and ran against the plaintiff's chaise, threw him out and'injured him and damaged the chaise. Plaintiff sued the owner of the carriage, but it was held the driver was not the servant of the owner of the carriage, but of the job mistress who alone was liable for his negligence.
Without citing further authorities we think the instruction was correct in advising the jury that the driver in this case was not the servant-of Dr. Sluder so as to make the latter guilty of the driver's contributory negligence, if any.
"We have examined with care the long list of cases cited by defendant to sustain its proposition that the demurrer to the evidence should have been sustained on the ground that while the driver's negligence is not imputable to plaintiff, yet the plaintiff was guilty of neglig'ence in permitting the driver to go upon the track in the face of obvious danger. Without reviewing each of these cases it must suffice to say that each of them contains some element of express sanction by the injured party of the driver's negligent conduct or some circumstance showing the plaintiff was in a position to see or know the danger to himself and made no effort to protect himself. In almost every one of them the plaintiff was driving in an open vehicle with the driver in broad daylight and in nearly all of them the accident occurred at steam railroad- crossings, known to the plaintiff to be notoriously dangerous.
In no one of them are the facts such as appear in this case. Ur. Sluder was riding in a close carriage on a dark winter night. There was no.evidence that the driver was a negligent or reckless driver, and that such a fact was known to Ur. Sluder.
On the contrary, the evidence was that the driver was proceeding in a slow trot until he was about to cross Boyle avenue when he checked his team and the first knowledge Ur. Sluder had that they had reached the railroad crossing was the click of the tires on the rails and then looking through the carriage window to the north he discovered a car rapidly bearing down on his carriage and not over fifty feet distant. Almost instantly it struck the carriage and inflicted his injuries. To sa.y that he was guilty of co-operating negligence in sanctioning the want of care of the driver, if considering the darkness of the night, the failure of the servants of the company to sound the gong or ring the bell and the very indifferent light on the car, he was negligent, would be to disregard all tbe reasons upon which the rule that the negligence of the driver is not to be imputed to the passenger is based. The facts of this case do not bring it within the reasoning of any of the cases which are cited as excéptions to the rule itself.
Plaintiff was not outside with the driver where he could see and advise the driver as to the crossing. He was not situated so that he could have jumped out of the carriage after discovering his peril on the approach of the car. Prom the inside of the close carriage he could not even have communicated' with the driver and directed him to stop or to rush his team after he saw the car or by the exercise of ordinary care under the conditions then confronting him could have seen it in time to have averted his injury. [Railroad v. Boyts. (Ind.), 45 N. E. 812; Bricknell v. Railroad, 120 N. Y. 290.] We find no evidence of negligence on the part of the plaintiff which would have justified an instruction driving him to a nonsuit.
As to the instruction 8 it was dealing with one question, to-wit, whether the negligence of the driver was imputable to plaintiff, and it was not erroneous, nor was there any error in refusing defendant's instructions which made plaintiff responsible for the driver's negligence. There was no evidence even tending to show any contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff and hence it was not error to decline to tender that issue to the jury, in any other way than to advise them he was not to be charged with any negligence of the driver in view of the facts developed on the trial. [Railroad v. Markens, 88 Ga. 62.]
III. The point is also made that the court erred in. permitting plaintiff to testify to his earnings for the corresponding months of the previous year. The evidence on this point is as follows: "Q. What-were you earning at that time, Doctor ? A. I was earning for the month of December, I think, about $2,000 to the month. For the months corresponding of the previous year to the time I was disabled, I earned $3,500. ' ' To this counsel for defendant objected. "The Court: "Wait a minute, Doctor. You have answered the question?" Ans. "There is no way except by comparing with previous times. " " Question. Was that an average month ? ' ' Objection. No ground stated. "The Court: He can answer." Exception saved. "Ans. That was the best month of the year. December, January and February always are."
It will be observed no objection was made when the question which elicited the answer was asked. No motion was made to strike it out. The only exception saved was to the question, "was that an average month?" The evidence had previously shown that the Doctor was incapacitated to practice his profession eleven and one-half weeks, and wehave heardno reason stated why it was not competent for the physican himself to testify what his actual monthly practice averaged him. It was not guess work, but actual knowledge to which he was testifying. It was not remote, but the value of his profession to him for the immediate month during which he was disabled and we agree with him that the best evidence was the actual earnings of the month in which he was injured.
IY. As to his testimony as to the rate of speed at which the car was running he was competent to testify to what he saw, not as an expert. His judgment may under the circumstances have been of little weight, but the objection to it went to its weight and not its competency. At all events, in view of the actual physical facts not controverted by defendant, its admission is no ground for a reversal of the judgment. He had testified he was familiar with the speed of trains running twenty or twenty-five miles an hour and that in his judgment it was running about that fast.
We have considered all the propositions advanced for a reversal of the judgment and in onr opinion there was no reversible error committed on the trial, and the judgment is affirmed.
Brace, G. J., Burgess, Valliant, Fox and Lamm, JJ., concur; Marshall, J., dissents in a separate opinion.
SEPARATE OPINION.