Case Name: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Joseph BROOME, Appellant
Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1983-07-08
Citations: 317 Pa. Super. 1
Docket Number: No. 1623
Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Joseph BROOME, Appellant.
Judges: Before WICKERSHAM, CIRILLO and LIPEZ, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports
Volume: 317
Pages: 1–7

Head Matter:
463 A.2d 1053
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Joseph BROOME, Appellant.
Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
Submitted March 9, 1982.
Filed July 8, 1983.
Reargument Denied Aug. 31, 1983.
Vincent Wayne Mirigliani, Philadelphia, for appellant. Steven J. Cooperstein, Assistant District Attorney, Philadelphia, for Commonwealth, appellee.
Before WICKERSHAM, CIRILLO and LIPEZ, JJ.

Opinion:
LIPEZ, Judge:
In a nonjury trial, defendant was convicted of robbery, theft, aggravated assault, simple assault, possession of an instrument of crime, and criminal conspiracy. Post-verdict motions were filed and denied, and sentences imposed. We agree with defendant that because the juvenile court judge failed to state specific reasons for certifying him for trial as an adult, we must vacate the judgment of sentence and remand for a new certification hearing.
Specifically, defendant contends that there was no adequate statement of reasons for determining that he was not amenable to treatment in the juvenile system. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6355(a)(4)(iii)(A).
In order to comply with the statute, the lower court need not make a formal statement or conventional findings of fact but "the statement should be sufficient to demonstrate thát . the question [of certification] has received the careful consideration of the Juvenile Court; and it must set forth the basis for the order with sufficient specificity to permit meaningful review." Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 561, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 1057, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966). When the lower court advances no specific reasons for its conclusion that the juvenile is not amenable to treatment, supervision, or rehabilitation as a juvenile through available facilities, we will remand for a new certification hearing. Commonwealth v. Bey, 249 Pa.Super. 185, 375 A.2d 1304 (1977).
Commonwealth v. Harrod 260 Pa.Super.Ct. 312, 316, 394 A.2d 567, 570, (1978); accord, Commonwealth v. Stokes, 279 Pa.Super.Ct. 361, 367, 421 A.2d 240, 243 (1980).
Here the juvenile court judge's complete statement concerning amenability to treatment as a juvenile was as follows: "A further review of the juvenile file indicates he is not amenable to treatment within the system and accordingly the Court will certify." The Commonwealth contends that the bald reference to the juvenile file is sufficiently specific because the juvenile file has been made part of the record, but these are precisely the circumstances held to be insufficient in Commonwealth v. Stokes, supra, 279 Pa.Superior Ct. at 367-69, 421 A.2d at 243-44. We must therefore vacate the judgment of sentence and remand for a new certification hearing. If it is determined that certification was improper, the informations must be dismissed and the defendant returned to juvenile court. If it is determined that certification was proper, the judgment of sentence shall be reinstated, and defendant may then take a new appeal on the certification issue only. See Commonwealth v. Stokes, supra, 279 Pa.Superior Ct. at 373, 421 A.2d at 246; Commonwealth v. Bey, supra, 249 Pa.Superior Ct. at 204, 375 A.2d at 1314.
Judgment of sentence vacated, and case remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction is relinquished.
CIRILLO, J., files dissenting opinion.
. The lack of a specific statement precludes review of defendant's contentions that the Commonwealth failed to sustain its burden of proof at the certification hearing, and that the juvenile court judge abused his discretion in making the certification. See Commonwealth v. Bey, 249 Pa.Super.Ct. 185, 195, 375 A.2d 1304, 1310 (1977). Defendant's only other contention is that the testimony of his accomplice was so unreliable and contradictory as to render any verdicts based on it pure conjecture. See Commonwealth v. Farquharson, 467 Pa. 50, 354 A.2d 545 (1976). We find that the accomplice's testimony does not meet the standard of patent unreliability required by Farquharson; but even if it did, reversal would not be required because the victim's own testimony provided a sufficient basis for the verdicts.