Case Name: Roger B. BURGE and Courtney Amber Burge, a minor, by and through her Father and Next Friend, Appellants, v. RICHTON MUNICIPAL SEPARATE SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellee
Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2001-10-16
Citations: 797 So. 2d 1062
Docket Number: No. 2000-CA-01844-COA
Parties: Roger B. BURGE and Courtney Amber Burge, a minor, by and through her Father and Next Friend, Appellants, v. RICHTON MUNICIPAL SEPARATE SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellee.
Judges: Before KING, P.J., BRIDGES, and IRVING, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 797
Pages: 1062–1069

Head Matter:
Roger B. BURGE and Courtney Amber Burge, a minor, by and through her Father and Next Friend, Appellants, v. RICHTON MUNICIPAL SEPARATE SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellee.
No. 2000-CA-01844-COA.
Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
Oct. 16, 2001.
M. Marcia Smalley, Hattiesburg, Attorney for Appellants.
Thomas A. Waller, Robert Elliott Briggs III, Gulfport, Attorneys for Appellee.
Before KING, P.J., BRIDGES, and IRVING, JJ.

Opinion:
BRIDGES, J., for the Court:
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS
¶ 1. On or about August 23, 1998, Roger Burge provided written notification to the Richton Municipal Separate School District that his daughter, Courtney Amber Burge, should not be picked up from school by her mother and non-custodial parent, Melinda Burge Lea, without a signed court order allowing her to do so. However, on December 17, 1998, Lea was seen on the school's campus just before she abducted Courtney from her unsupervised classroom.
¶ 2. The Burges properly filed a notice of claim in accordance with Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-11(1) (Supp.2000), informing the school district of their intent to file a complaint against it for negligence in allowing Lea to take Courtney from its property. The Burges allege that this incident has caused them severe emotional and mental distress and they wish to be compensated for such. Because the notice of claim was filed according to statutory guidelines, an extension of ninety-five days was added to the one-year statute of limitations in which the Burges had to file a complaint in this matter. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-11(3) (Supp.2000). The complaint was not filed against the school district, however, until May 23, 2000, after the one-year plus ninety-five days allowed, which had run on March 21, 2000.
¶ 3. The school district subsequently filed a motion to dismiss for failure on the Burges' part to file a timely complaint. A response to this motion was never filed by the Burges, but arguments were heard on this issue on September 28, 2000. The trial court granted the dismissal in favor of the school district and dismissed the case with prejudice. Following that ruling, a timely notice of appeal was filed by the Burges.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
¶ 4. In their brief before this Court, the Burges tirelessly argue that, because the courts have moved from a mandatory compliance standard to a substantial compliance standard on the notice of claim requirement under Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-11(1) (Supp.2000), we should take the step to consider also applying a standard of substantial compliance to the subsection of that statute which dictates the limitations period in which to file a complaint. Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-11(3) (Supp.2000). That subsection reads as follows:
All actions brought under the provisions of this chapter shall be commenced within one year next after the date of the tortious, wrongful or otherwise actionable conduct on which the liability phase of the action is based, and not after; provided, however, that the filing of a notice of claim as required by subsection (1) of this section shall serve to toll the statute of limitations for a period of ninety-five days from the date the chief executive officer of the state agency receives the notice of claim.... After the tolling period has expired, the claimant shall then have an additional ninety days to file any action against the governmental entity served with proper claim notice.
Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-11(3) (Supp.2000).
¶ 5. The action in this case accrued on December 17, 1998, the day that Lea walked onto school grounds and removed her daughter without a court order. The one-year statute of limitations in which to file a claim against the school district for its negligence would have run on December 17, 1999. However, it is undisputed that a notice of claim was timely and properly filed by the Burges according to Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-11(1) (Supp.2000). Therefore, the statute of limitations on this action would be tolled for ninety-five days after December 17, 1999, which would have allowed the Burges to filed their claim up until March 21, 2000. After March 21, 2000, the Burges' claim was lost.
¶ 6. While it would appear, at first glance, from the amendments to § 11-16-11(3) found in the 2000 supplement, that the Burges would then have had an additional ninety days after March 21, 2000, to file the action against the school district, thereby giving them until June 19, 2000, this is not the case. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-11(3) (Supp.2000). As well, it is not the case that the Burges could argue that the minors' savings clause under Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-11(4) (Supp.2000) would save their action here. Both of these provisions were not yet in effect at the time the action occurred on December 17,1998.
¶ 7. "The legislature shall have no power to revive any remedy which may have become barred by lapse of time, or by any statute of limitation of this state." Miss. Const., art. 4, § 97. See also Cole v. National Life Insurance Company, 549 So.2d 1301, 1307 (Miss.1989). Applying either the provision in Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-11(3) (Supp.2000), allowing for the additional ninety days to file a claim, or the minors' savings clause found in Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-11(4) (Supp.2000), to circumvent the March 21, 2000 deadline would therefore be unconstitutional. Cole, 549 So.2d at 1307.
¶ 8. The Burges' argument that the statute of limitations here should be reduced to a substantial compliance standard rather than a strict compliance standard is a far-reaching claim indeed. While they are correct in pointing out that the Mississippi Supreme Court has ruled in recent years that the notice of claim requirements should be changed to this lower standard, this has no relevance to the statute governing limitations here. See Ferrer v. Jackson County Board of Supervisors, 741 So.2d 216 (Miss.1999); Carr v. Town of Shubuta, 733 So.2d 261 (Miss.1999) (both overruling the strict mandatory compliance standard for the notice of claim requirement set out in City of Jackson v. Lumpkin, 697 So.2d 1179 (Miss.1997)).
¶ 9. These statutes of limitation set out by our legislature serve very valid purposes. Mississippi Dept. of Public Safety v. Stringer, 748 So.2d 662, 666 (Miss.1999); Cole v. State, 608 So.2d 1313, 1317 (Miss.1992). According to the Mississippi Supreme Court in Stringer, one important reason for our one-year statute of limitations under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act is to "protect the State's interest in conserving government funds and protecting the public health and welfare at the earliest possible moment." Stringer, 748 So.2d at 666. Furthermore, it has been said that the primary purpose for limitations statutes in general is to make sure that a right of action is pursued within a "reasonable" amount of time. Cole, 608 So.2d at 1317.
These statutes are founded upon the general experience of society that valid claims will be promptly pursued and not allowed to remain neglected. They are designed to suppress assertion of false and stale claims, when evidence has been lost, memories have faded, witnesses are unavailable, or facts are incapable of production because of the lapse of time.
Id. The court in Cole goes on to hold that simply because a time-barred claim is an honest and possibly merited claim, or because it has "the sanction of a moral obli gation," it does not become exempt from the limitation period. Id.
¶ 10. Additionally, as argued by the school district, the doctrine of equitable estoppel would not work to avert the Burges' limitations problem here. "Inequitable or fraudulent conduct must be established to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel to a statute of limitations." Trosclair v. MOOT, 757 So.2d 178, 181 (Miss.2000); Stringer, 748 So.2d at 665. We find no such conduct to be present on the part of the school district according to the evidence presented. As such, we are not required to apply the doctrine to avoid a "serious injustice" in this case. Trosclair, 757 So.2d at 181.
¶ 11. Because of the notable purposes served by our statutes of limitation, we decline to relax those limitations into a standard of substantial compliance simply because the Burges ask us to do so. They would request that this Court take the moral "high-ground" here, but we are not at liberty to make such a decision based on whatever our feelings may be about this case. We find that a conclusion predicated on morality and emotions would not be in the best interest of justice and society. The Burges have not convinced us that, simply because a lower standard has been applied by the Mississippi Supreme Court to the notice of claim requirement, the same should be done for our one-year statute of limitations here. It stands to reason that there would be no need to legislate limitation periods at all if we are simply going to allow plaintiffs to only "substantially comply" with them. Because the Burges filed a proper and timely notice of claim according to Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-11(1) (Supp.2000), they were entitled to ninety-five extra days in which to file their cause of action past the one-year deadline. They did not do so. That is neither the fault of this Court nor the school district.
¶ 12. Because this action was defunct after March 21, 2000, and because it cannot be revived according to the cited mandates by the Mississippi Constitution, which have been recognized by the Mississippi Supreme Court, we affirm the decision of the lower court to grant a dismissal with prejudice to the school district for the reason that the claim was statutorily time-barred at the time it was filed on May 23, 2000.
¶ 13. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PERRY COUNTY IS HEREBY AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANTS.
KING P.JJ., THOMAS, IRVING, MYERS AND CHANDLER, JJ" CONCUR. SOUTHWICK, P.J., CONCURS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY McMILLIN, C.J. AND BRANTLEY, J. LEE, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.