Case Name: Antonio Ramon GASSET, Petitioner, v. The STATE of Florida, Respondent
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1986-04-29
Citations: 490 So. 2d 97
Docket Number: No. 85-2356
Parties: Antonio Ramon GASSET, Petitioner, v. The STATE of Florida, Respondent.
Judges: Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and BASKIN and JORGENSON, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 490
Pages: 97–100

Head Matter:
Antonio Ramon GASSET, Petitioner, v. The STATE of Florida, Respondent.
No. 85-2356.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
April 29, 1986.
Rehearing Denied July 21, 1986.
Thomas N. Balikes, Miami, for petitioner.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen. and Charles M. Fahlbusch, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and BASKIN and JORGENSON, JJ.

Opinion:
JORGENSON, Judge.
Antonio Gasset seeks review of an order of the circuit court, appellate division, affirming his conviction in county court for driving while under the influence of alcohol. We have jurisdiction pursuant to arti- ele V, section 4(b)(3), of the Constitution of the State of Florida and Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(b)(2)(B). For the reasons which follow, we decline to grant certiorari.
Two Metro-Dade police officers observed Gasset make an erratic turn at a major intersection in southwest Dade County. The officers followed the vehicle, and, subsequently, a high-speed chase ensued at speeds of up to eighty miles an hour, all in an area best characterized as residential. On at least one occasion Gasset's vehicle spun out. The officers continued their chase with emergency lights flashing and siren intermittently being activated. Gas-set drove onto his residential property and into the garage which is attached to the house. The officers arrived immediately behind him. As Gasset exited his vehicle, the officers entered the garage and arrested him; Gasset was ultimately charged with driving while under the influence (section 316.193, Florida Statutes (1983)). At no time during the sequence of the foregoing events did the officers ever lose sight of Gasset.
Relying principally on Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984), Gasset argues that under fourth amendment standards his arrest was unlawful, and, therefore, the evidence of his blood-alcohol level, which was obtained from him at the police station shortly after his arrest, should have been excluded. Gasset's reliance on Welsh is misplaced. In Welsh, unlike in this case, there was no immediate and continuous pursuit; Welsh was home and in bed prior to the arrival of the law enforcement officers. Further, Welsh is predicated upon a civil non-jailable offense. The Supreme Court specifically noted that it was leaving open the question of whether the fourth amendment imposes an absolute ban on warrant-less arrests in the home for "certain minor offenses." Welsh, 466 U.S. at 749 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. at 2097 n. 11, 80 L.Ed.2d at 743 n. 11.
When the State of Florida decriminalized its traffic laws, ch. 74-377, Laws of Fla., it chose to maintain criminal sanctions for certain serious traffic offenses, including reckless driving and fleeing or eluding an officer, see § 316.655(1), (4), Fla. Stat. (1985), thereby indicating the state's view of the seriousness of these offenses and the state's interest in arresting individuals who commit them. Cf. Welsh, 466 U.S. at 754, 104 S.Ct. at 2100, 80 L.Ed.2d at 746. In the instant case, the officers had abundant probable cause to arrest Gasset for reckless driving in violation of section 316.192, Florida Statutes (1983) (for a first conviction, punishable up to 90 days imprisonment and $500 fine), and fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer in violation of section 316.1935(1), Florida Statutes (1983) (punishable up to one year imprisonment and $1,000 fine). The fact that they did not arrest Gasset on these charges is of no moment; the propriety of an arrest does not turn on the charges upon which the arrest was effected. Thomas v. State, 395 So.2d 280 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Chaney v. State, 237 So.2d 281 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. denied, 242 So.2d 461 (1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 904, 91 S.Ct. 2205, 29 L.Ed.2d 680 (1971). Nor can it turn on the charges ultimately filed.
Gasset waived any expectation of privacy he may have had in his garage by engaging in the high-speed chase previously described and leading the officers directly to the place of his arrest. The enforcement of our criminal laws, including serious traffic violations, is not a game where law enforcement officers are "it" and one is "safe" if one reaches "home" before being tagged. Accord State v. Blake, 468 N.E.2d 548, 553 (Ind.Ct.App.1984). "[A] suspect may not defeat an arrest which has been set in motion in a public place . by the expedient of escaping to a private place." United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 43, 96 S.Ct. 2406, 2410, 49 L.Ed.2d 300, 306 (1976) (act of retreating into house cannot thwart an otherwise proper arrest); see also Bey v. State, 355 So.2d 850 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
Gasset's actions in this case were of sufficient gravity to justify the de minimis intrusion involved here. He jeopardized his own safety, the safety of the officers, and that of the general public. By his own actions, he cast aside any fourth amendment shield which might have served to protect him. We will not erect one for him now.
Certiorari denied.
SCHWARTZ, C.J., concurs.
. The prosecutor has great discretion in deciding which charges should be filed and may decide, for a myriad of reasons, not to prosecute on certain charges notwithstanding the fact that sufficient evidence exists to support a conviction thereon. See 1 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice Std. 3-3.9 (2d ed. 1980). See generally Wilson v. Renfroe, 91 So.2d 857 (Fla.1956); State v. Brown, 416 So.2d 1258 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Hield v. State, 201 So.2d 235 (Fla. 4th DCA 1967) (Andrews, J., specially concurring); State v. Hargis, 328 So.2d 479 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976) (Rawls, Acting C.J., dissenting).
. The authority of the officers to arrest Gasset is provided by section 901.15, Florida Statutes (1983), which states:
When arrest by officer without warrant is lawful. — A law enforcement officer may arrest a person without a warrant when:
(1) The person has committed a felony or misdemeanor or violated a municipal or county ordinance in the presence of the officer. Arrest for the commission of a misdemeanor or violation of a municipal or county ordinance shall be made immediately or in fresh pursuit.
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(5) A violation of chapter 316 has been committed in the presence of the officer. Such arrest may be made immediately or on fresh pursuit.