Case Name: STATE, use of William Hazzard and wife vs. C. S. LAYTON et al.
Court: Delaware Superior Court
Jurisdiction: Delaware
Decision Date: 1842
Citations: 3 Harr. 469
Docket Number: 
Parties: STATE, use of William Hazzard and wife vs. C. S. LAYTON et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Delaware Reports
Volume: 3
Pages: 469–481

Head Matter:
STATE, use of William Hazzard and wife vs. C. S. LAYTON et al.
The saving of the sixth section of the act of limitation in favor of persons under disability applies to administration and other bonds, which by the Jirst section are barred in six years from their date. And if the person entitled be a feme covert at the time the cause of action accrues, an action may be maintained by the husband, though brought after the expiration of six years from the date of the bond.
The principles of calculating interest and deducting payments on bonds; running accounts; and for and against administrators or guardians,1 stated.
The jury are not bound to state the principles on which their verdict is founded; but if they return, together with the verdict, a statement which shows errors of law, or of admitted fact, the court will set aside the verdict for this cause, and grant a new trial.
Debt on an administration bond on the estate of John Wilson, deceased, dated the 11th of January, 1826. Narr. without suggesting breaches. Oyer granted. Pleas, non est factum; performance; and Ihe act of limitation. Replication suggesting breaches, and issue on the plea of non est factum. To the plea of the act of limitation, re-olicdtion precludi non, because John Wilson by his will, dated the 1th of November, 1825, did devise thus: “Item, it is my wish and desire that my estate shall, after taking out the legacies that I have given my daughter, be equally divided between my son, David James knd daughter Elexine Wilson, when they arrive at the age of maturity;” that said Elexine married William Hazzard, the -plaintiff, on Ihe 9th of January, 1834, and she arrived at the age of twenty-one gears on the 22d of June, 1840; and that this suit was brought with-three years after she arrived at age or maturity. To this replica-lion the defendant demurred.
Ridgehj, in support of the demurrer,
said the replication was not sufficient answer to the plea. The act of limitation of 1829 provides that no action shall be brought upon an administration bond after the expiration of six years from the date of such bond. The provision as to other bonds in the same act is different, and the difference is noticeable, as forming a designed distinction The legislature designed to make the limitation on administration bonds to com menee from the date of the bonds; in all other cases the limitation begins to run only from the accruing of the cause of action. It is not competent for any man by his will to repeal or defeat the law of the land. Suppose A. by his will bequeaths to his son, then of full age, a legacy payable ten years after the grant of letters of administration. Would not the act of limitation bar the claim in six years after its date! The suit on the bond would be barred, though he had never any right of action within the six years; yet he would have a remedy in assumpsit, after the time of payment appointed had arrived And though this may be regarded as a hardship, it is a necessary consequence of the policy of the law, that the sureties of an administrator, and the administrator himself, should not be officially responsible for a longer time than six years. There can be no doubt on the tuords of this act, that this bond is barred, and it is always safer to place the construction on the face of a law. (9 Law. Lib. 702-3: Dicams 48, 52.) Does the proviso in section G take the case out oi statute! “If the person entitled shall at the time of the accruing oi such cause of action, have been under the disability of infancy, co-verture,” &c. Who is the person entitled! William Hazzard the husband and not his wife. So decided by this court in the appeal fro the Orphans’ Court between these same parties. (Jlnle 348.)
The court in Shankland’s case decided that the husband could no take any benefit under the saving of coverture, which is a personal saving to the wife, to be enjoyed by her after discoverture. No mor can the husband be benefited by the wife’s saving-of infancy. Th wife’s interest may be protected as to her, both during infancy and during coverture, and her right of action may revive on the death the husband, yet during the life of the husband he cannot take th benefit of the saving of the statute, which is a saving exclusively fo| his wife’s benefit.
Houston. — It is not necessary for us to controvert the decision cl the court in the former case between these parties. This is a verf different case. The former was a question whether the husband a legatee, having suffered three years to elapse after his marriagij during all which time he had the power to except to this defendant administration accounts, was not barred of his right to except; hcil it is whether the husband and wife may not bring suit on the administration bqnd almost at the first moment at which either of them could bring the suit.
John Wilson by his will directed his daughter^ share of his estate to be paid only when she attained full age; her marriage with the plaintiff did not accelerate the time of payment or give Hazzard any right of action before she came of age. The defendant entered into an administration bond, c. t. a., to settle and distribute the estate according to law, and according to the will. This was a contract on his part to pay when and as the will directed. This contract was ■entered into,in 1826, andonee entered into it was covered by the protection of the constitution of the United States, even against State egislation. It would not even be competent for the legislature to anticipate the time of payment, and direct it to be paid earlier. The contract was binding on both parties, just as the will and bond made t. Elexine Wilson had the right to receive, and the defendant was bound to pay, this money only as the will directed. And if the act if 1829, of limitation, is to have the effect to give Hazzard the ower of suing before that time, or takes away from him and his wife the power to sue at that time, it is unconstitutional and void. agree that limitation laws have not been held as violating the institution of the United States; but a law that does not merely imit the time of bringing action, but altogether takes away the right d action, is unconstitutional and void. Such is the offect of the contraction-of the other side, which not merely limits the time of bring-ng suit, but takes it away altogether.
2d. The legislature designed in all cases to secure the parties entitled |o distributive shares by bond and security. The law requires such ond in every case. And if there is any difference between cases where e estates may be settled immediately, and those where it must be ostponedfor many years, the necessity of extending the security of the ond to a remote settlement is stronger than that which provides secuity for the earlier payments. The proviso of the sixth section, both by s spirit and letter, saves to any person entitled to an action, the right f suing at any time within three years after the removal of any of e disabilities mentioned in the act. A statute is to be construed as lear as may be to the common law, and to further the objects of the atute;' to cure the evil, and advance the remedy. (9 Law. Lib. 39-b.) The object of the act of limitation is to compel persons having a ¡ght to sue to do so within a reasonable time; not to take away the right of suit before it arises. The evil was, that any one who had a right to sue might do so at any time; the object was to restrain, not to take away, the right of suit. If Elexine Hazzard is barred by this act of limitation, she was barred for many years before she had a right of action; that is, her right to sue was limited before it accrued; a power is restrained which does not exist. Even the words of a statute may be disregarded to effect its object. (2 Harr. Rep. 184, Luby vs. Cox; 9 Law. Lib. 61.)
Ridgely replied.

Opinion:
By the Court:
Booth, Chief Justice.
This is an action of debt brought under the act of assembly relating to bonds and penal sums, in the name ofl the State, for the use of William Hazzard and Elexine, his wife, late Elexine Wilson, against the defendant, upon the administration bond executed by him, as the administrator with the will annexed, of John Wilson, deceased, and by the sureties of the defendant, bearing date the 11th of January, 1826. The suit is instituted to recover the shar of said Elexine of the personal estate of her father, John Wilson, deceased; which, by his will, was directed to be paid on her attainin. to the age of twenty-one years. The case presents a good and sub sisting right of action in her, upon this administration bond, whicl: she could not prosecute, because of the disability of infancy and th supervening disability of coverture; and which no person could pro secute for her, or in her right, sooner than the commencement o: this suit. The only question submitted by the counsel on the argument of the demurrer, is whether this present action is barred by th act for the limitation of personal actions. The first section declared that "no action shall be brought upon the official recognizance of an sheriff, or upon any administration bond, or upon any testamentar bond, against either the principal or sureties, after the expiration o| six years from the date of such recognizance or bond." The secón third, fourth and fifth sections relate to other personal actions. Th sixth section provides "that if the person entitled to any action com] prehended within either of the foregoing sections, shall have bee. at the time of the accruing of the cause of such action, under disa bility of infancy, coverture or incompétency of mind, this act sha not be a bar to such action during the continuance of such disability] nor until the expiration of three years from the removal thereof.
The defendant's counsel insists that the present suit is barred b the positive terms of the first section, and is not within the protectio of the sixth; or in other words, that this action prosecuted' by the husband, for the use of himself and wife, is barred by the act of limitation before the right of action accrues. This proposition in itself untenable, is adverse to the object of all acts of limitation, which is to urge parties to prosecute their legal rights, and not to slumber over them; to quiet stale demands, but not to bar actions before the right to sue arises. In support of it the defendant's counsel contends, that this case comes within the principle decided by this court in the appeal from the Orphans' Court, between these same parties: that there the appeal, although taken by the husband in the name of himself and wife, was deemed to be his suit; because instituted by him in the exercise of his marital rights, and for his own exclusive use: pat for the same reason, this present action on the administration bond, being instituted by him for his exclusive use and benefit, is to Ire considered as his suit; and as he is under no disability himself, he cannot be shielded by the infancy of his wife, and her supervening ¡disability of coverture, and thus be protected by the sixth section from the operation of the first.
I In answer to this argument, let us consider what was the principle decided in the appeal from the Orphans' Court. The present defendant, as administrator with the will annexed, of John Wilson, de-feased, had passed several administration accounts before the regis-jer, upwards of three years prior to the marriage of William Haz-iard, then of full age, with Elexine Wilson, then and for- several fears afterwards an infant. The eleventh section of the act for the imitation of personal actions, declares that no exceptions to an ac-lount of an executor, administrator or guardian shall be received in lie Orphans' Court after the expiration of three years from the set-lement of such account; and then provides that this limitation, in re-Buect to any person under disability of infancy, coverture or incom-etency of mind at the time of the settlement of any such account, mall begin to run from the ceasing of such disability, and not from le time of such settlement. The right to take exceptions to the ac-fcunts of the administrator with the will annexed, by way of appeal B the Orphans' Court, accrued to the said Elexine immediately upon Beir settlement by the register, and was saved to her by reason of ¡r disability of infancy. This right passed to the husband at the ne of their marriage; and he then, in the language of the' constitu-ía, became a party concerned_ in the settlement of the accounts. r right to take the appeal then accrued; and as there was then a cause of action, a person competent to sue, a person competent to be sued, and a jurisdiction in which the suit might be maintained, this court decided that the act of limitation began to run against him from that time; and as he was then under no disability, and did not take the appeal until after the expiration of three years from the accruing of his right, he was barred by the act. This decision then is in direct opposition to the ground taken by the defendant's counsel. If his argument be correct, that the present suit is barred because instituted after the expiration of six years from the date of the administration bond; then for the same reason, the appeal to the Orphans' Court ought to have been barred, because it was taken more than three years from the date of the settlement of the administration accounts. But as the court decided that the act of limitation did not I begin to run against the husband until his right of appeal accrued; it follows, upon the same principle, that the act does not begin to run[ against him in the present case, until the accruing of the cause ol action, namely: the arrival of his wife to the age of twenty-one years;l and therefore, as this suit was instituted immediately after that period,| the act of limitation interposes no bar.
In the appeal from the Orphans' Court between these parties, this! court viewed the proviso or saving in the eleventh section of th< present act of limitation, as substantially the same with that in th< former act (Del. Laws 890, vol. 2, sec. 2,) which, according ti the plain import of its language, had respect only to persons laboring under the usual disabilities. It interposed to protect them, an< not those who could assert their rights at any time before the expiration of the period of limitation. The latter were within the operation of the act; but against the former, it did not begin to run untij the ceasing of the disability. Upon this ground Shankland's cas< was decided by the former Court of Errors and Appeals; and thi; court being of the opinion that the case between these parties, in th( appeal from the Orphans' Court, fell within the principle of Shankl land's case, decided accordingly. But the proviso or saving in th< sixth section of the act now in force, on which this case dependsl differs from that in the eleventh section of the same act, and fronl the saving in the second section of the former act in vol. 2 Del. Law\ 890. And although it was well observed in Murray vs. The East India Company, 5 Barn. & Ald. 205, that the several statutes of limi tation being in -pari materia, ought to receive an uniform construí tion, it may also be remarked, that'where the expressions in tw| the section of another act s proviso, saving or exception several sections of the same act, and in on the same subject, each containing a from the limitation of certain actions are different, the reasonable in fcrence is, that a different meaning was intended. The phraseology of the sixth section is peculiar to itself. The saving is to the action to which the person under disability is entitled. It does not declare that as to the persons under disability, the limitation shall begin to run at the ceasing of the disability; but that the action to which they are entitled shall not be barred by the act, during the continuance I of such disability, nor until the expiration of three years from the removal thereof. Why were the words "during the continuance of skc/i disability" inserted? If the legislature intended, as in the second section of the former, and in the eleventh section of the present act, merely to save to persons under disability the right to bring their action within a certain time after their disability ceased, the saving [of the action during the continuance of the disability was nugatory; because during such continuance they are incompetent to sue or act for themselves; and therefore their rights would be equally well protected without such clause, by simply allowing them to bring their action within a limited time after the removal of their disability. It leems then, that it was intended in the sixth section of the present pet, to allow the action to which a person under disability was enti-lied, to be prosecuted by a party in right of such person, during the fcontinuance of such disability. At the time of the marriage of William Hazzard with Elexine Wilson, and for several years after, she Ivas an infant; and thus was under the double disability of infancy Ind coverture. When the right accrues, on her attaining the age of Iwenty-one years, to demand from the defendant, as administrator with the will annexed, her share of her father's personal estate, she k still under the disability of coverture. She is then a person enti-led to an action upon the administration bond of the defendant, and Inder the disability of coverture at the time of the accruing of the lause of such action. In positive terms it is declared, that the act liall not be a bar to such action during the continuance of such disa-Iility. And although the present suit, according to the argument of lie defendant's counsel, is to be considered the husband's suit, and lot the wife's; prosecuted by him for his, and not for her benefit; Iver which he has the whole control, and she none; the proceeds of |hich wrhen obtained under judgment and execution, belong to him, lid not to her; still it is an action to which she is entitled; and it is only because she is so entitled that he has a right to prosecute it, or take any step respecting it. It would seem, therefore, by the very terms of the sixth section of the act of limitation now in force, that the legislature intended to avoid the principle established in Shank-land's case, and that such an action as the present should not be barred during the continuance of the disability of the person entitled to it.
. The opinion of the court is, that judgment on the demurrer be rendered for the^plaintiff.