Case Name: Amos C. Hotaling vs. Thomas C. Hotaling
Court: New York Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1866-03-05
Citations: 47 Barb. 163
Docket Number: 
Parties: Amos C. Hotaling vs. Thomas C. Hotaling.
Judges: 
Reporter: Barbour's Supreme Court Reports
Volume: 47
Pages: 163–171

Head Matter:
Amos C. Hotaling vs. Thomas C. Hotaling.
Where the purchaser of land has made default in the payment of money, under , an executory contract, no notice to quit, nor any demand of the amount due, or of the possession, or tender of a deed, is necessary, on the part of the vendor, before bringing an action of ejectment.
By a parol contract between the parties, certain premises were sold by the plaintiff to the defendant, for $55, a portion of which sum ($20) was paid at the time of the sale, without any agreement as to the time when the remainder should be paid. Held that the legal effect of the contract was to make the balance payable whenever the purchaser should take possession of the premises.
And the purchaser having entered into possession without paying such balance; held that he was in default from that time. And that the fact of his having remained in,possession for a number of years, so long as his occupancy had not ripened into an adverse possession, wpuld not excuse the default, or change the principle.
Held, also, that under these circumstances, a demand of the money, and tender of a deed, by the plaintiff, was unnecessary; and that, the defendant being in default, the plaintiif could on that ground maintain an action to recover the possession of the premises. Houeboom, J. dissented.
Assuming that a demand is necessary in such a case, yet where it is clear that the defendant has failed to perforar the contract, on his part, if he be excused from performance by reason of the vendor having demanded too much, the judgment should be that the plaintiff give a deed upon the payment of the proper amount.
And although the vendor has demanded too much, yet if no objection was urged by the purchaser, on that, ground, nor any tender made by him of the sum he admitted to be due, the judgment, in an action of ejectment by the vendor, should be based upon thei equitable rights of the parties, and should not direct the dismissal of the complaint,
APPEAL from a judgment entered upon the report of a referee. The action was brought to recover the possession of certain lands in Greene county. The complaint contains two counts. The first is the usual count in ejectment. The second count alleges that in May, 1844, the plaintiff and defendant entered into a parol agreement for the purchase of a lot of land by the defendant, of the plaintiff, containing one acre, more or less, for the sum of $55, to be paid within a reasonable time thereafter, with interest; the' defendant to have immediate possession of the premises; and the plaintiff was to execute and deliver the deed when the money, and interest thereon, should be paid. That the defendant entered into possession under said agreement. That the plaintiff had performed the agreement, on his part, but the defendant had not paid the purchase price of the land and the interest thereon, and he had neglected and refused to perform the contract on his part, and was in possession of the premises, and unlawfully withheld the same from the plaintiff.
The defendant, by his answer, denied the complaint; set up the twenty years’ statute of limitations ; and alleged that the plaintiff sold the lot to the defendant for $50, instead of $55, and was immediately to execute and deliver to him a good and sufficient warranty deed therefor. That the defendant went into immediate possession of the premises ; and that by the contract the defendant had the right to pay the purchase money at his convenience, and in such amounts, and at such times, either in money, labor or trade, as would best accommodate the defendant. That afterwards the defendant did, at different times, pay to the plaintiff the full amount of the purchase price; and that afterwards the plaintiff again agreed to execute and deliver said deed, but had since neglected and refused so to do, although the defendant demanded such deed, and tendered full performance on his part, and made valuable improvements on the premises. The defendant demanded judgment for affirmative relief that he be adjudged the owner of the premises; and that the plaintiff be decreed to execute and deliver the deed and pay the costs.
The action was referred to John B. Bronk, Esq. as sole referee, to hear and determine the same, who, after hearing the cause, made his report, by which he found the following facts, viz:
1st. That in the month of May, 1844, the plaintiff was in the lawful possession of, and had a legal title to, the premises mentioned and described in the complaint.
2d. That on or about the 1st day of June, 1844, the plaintiff sold said premises to the defendant for the sum of $55, who paid him at the same time thereon the sum of $20, and took possession of the premises, which he has ever since held.
3d. That there was no written agreement between the parties in relation to the sale of the premises.
4th. That at the time of the verbal sale it was understood between the parties, that when the defendant paid the balance of the purchase money, the plaintiff was to give him a deed.
5th. That in the year 1849 the plaintiff sowed with oats, and on shares, about two and a half acres of the defendant’s land; that the average yield of the oats per acre, was forty bushels, and worth thirty-eight cents per bushel, in all worth the sum of $38; and that the defendant’s half thereof was, or should have been, applied in pursuance of an agreement between the parties to that effect, which the referee found was satisfactorily established by the evidence in the case, to the payment of the purchase moneys of the said premises.
6th. That previous to the year 1850 the defendant paid to the plaintiff the further sum of $15 towards said purchase money.
7th. That on the 24th day of May, 1864, the plaintiff tendered to the defendant a deed of said premises, and at the same time demanded of him, as a condition, the sum of $82.70, which he claimed was the amount, principal and interest, which the defendant then owed him on the purchase of said premises.
8th. That at the time the said deed was tendered and de- . mand made, there was only due from the defendant to the plaintiff, for principal and interest, as aforesaid, the sum of $28.
As conclusions of law, the referee found: 1. That the plaintiff, by demanding of and from the defendant, at the time of said tender and demand, a sum exceeding the amount then due him, was precluded from any recovery in this action.
2d. That the plaintiff was not entitled to the judgment of relief prayed for by him in his complaint; and he' therefore decided that the complaint be dismissed, with costs of suit.
Upon the trial, the referee excluded evidence, offered by the plaintiff, tending to show that certain moneys paid by the defendant to the plaintiff, and which the defendant had testified were, by agreement, to be applied upon this contract, were in fact applied by the plaintiff upon general account, and not upon this contract. The plaintiff excepted to the ruling.
The plaintiff excepted to the report of the referee, and appealed from the judgment entered thereon.
D. K. Olney, for the appellant.
B. W. Peclcham, Jr. for the respondent.

Opinion:
Miller, J.
The authorities hold, beyond any question, that when the purchaser of land has made default in the payment of money, under an executory contract, no notice to quit is necessary, nor any demand of the amount due, or of the possession, or tender of a deed, before bringing an action of ejectment. (Wright v. Moore, 21 Wend. 230. Dolittle v. Eddy, 7 Barb. 74. Candee v. Haywood, 34 id. 352.)
The main question in the present case is, whether the defendant was in default in making the payments upon the contract under which he claimed to hold the premises, to recover the possession of which this action was brought.
I have arrived at the conclusion that the defendant was in default, and hence the action was properly brought, and was maintainable, and the referee erred in dismissing the complaint. By the contract between the parties, the premises were sold for a given sum, a portion of which was paid on the sale, without any agreement as to when the defendant should pay the remainder. The deed was not to be given until the balance was paid. Under such circumstances, I think the legal effect of the contract was to make the balance payable whenever the defendant took possession of the premises. In the absence of any stipulation to the contrary, it certainly would become due when the defendant took possession, and had the benefit of the property. It being then due, any delay was for the defendant's advantage, and from that time it appears to me that he was in default. Being thus in the wrong, the fact that he remained in possession for a number of years, without tendering the plaintiff the money and demanding a deed, does not exonerate him from his default, or help his case. If it had been for a lesser period—say for one year—it would not aid him, for the reason that it does not excuse the default, or change the principle applicable to such a case. The great length of time which he occupied and remained in possession, so long as it did not ripen into an adverse possession, can not, it seems to me, excuse the default for not paying the balance remaining due upon the contract.
If I am correct in these views, then the demand of the money, and the tender of the deed, by the plaintiff, was unnecessary and of no sort of consequence. And as the defendant was in default, the plaintiff could maintain the action, for that reason.
Assuming, however, that a demand was essential, under the facts existing, still I think that the judgment of the referee Was erroneous. The whole matter was before him; the complaint setting forth the agreement under which the defendant claimed to hold the premises, and the defendant claiming, in his answer, equitable relief. It was clear that the defendant had not performed the contract, on his part, and if excused from performance by reason of the plaintiff having demanded too much, the referee could have relieved him by a judgment that a deed be given, upon the payment of the proper amount.
It may also be observed that if the plaintiff demanded too much, no objection was made to the demand, by the defendant, on that ground, hi or did the defendant tender what he claimed.Was due, as he might have done, and as he was bound to do before he was entitled to a deed. The circumstances to which I have adverted should have been considered .by the referee, I think, even if a demand was essential; and his judgment should have been based at least upon the equitable rights of the parties, and should not have been a dismissal of the complaint.
The referee having erred, the judgment must be reversed,- and a new trial granted, with costs to abide the event.
Ingalls, J. concurred.