Case Name: Lucelia Willes, Respondent, v. Stoel W. Loomis, Appellant, Impleaded with Ellen Loomis and Others
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1904-05
Citations: 94 A.D. 67
Docket Number: 
Parties: Lucelia Willes, Respondent, v. Stoel W. Loomis, Appellant, Impleaded with Ellen Loomis and Others.
Judges: 
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 94
Pages: 67–71

Head Matter:
Lucelia Willes, Respondent, v. Stoel W. Loomis, Appellant, Impleaded with Ellen Loomis and Others.
Cotenants in real property — one who simply occupies the premises is not liable to his , cotenants for the rental mine thereof.
One tenant in common of real property, who receives no money or property from the premises, but simply occupies them himself, is not liable to his cotenants for the value of the use of the property so occupied, in the absence of an agreement to pay rent, an actual ouster, or an act amounting to a total denial of the rights of his cotenants.
Appeal by the defendant, Stoel W. Loomis, from a final judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Jefferson on the 17th day of January, 1903, upon the report of a referee appointed to sell the property sought to be partitioned in the above-entitled action, with notice of an intention to bring up for review upon such appeal an interlocutory judgment entered in said clerk’s office on the 5th day of April, 1902, upon the report of a referee appointed to hear and deter mine-the issues in the action.
The action was commenced on the 19th day of September, 1900,' for the partition of certain real property situate .in the county of Jefferson, of which one Manley Loomis, who died intestate on the 9th .day of January, 1896, was the owner and in possession of at the time of his death. He left him surviving the plaintiff, Lucelia Willes, a daughter, and the defendants Rachael B. Loomis, his widow; Laura Loomis, a daughter; Stoel Loomis and Jay Loomis, his sons; said parties being his only heirs at law and next of kin. The plaintiff alleged in her complaint that the four children of Manley Loomis, deceased, were each entitled to an undivided one-fourth part of the premises described in the complaint, subject to the dower rights of the widow of tbe deceased. She also alleges that upon the death of said Manley Loomis, the defendant Stoel Loomis entered into possession of the said real property, and has ever since occupied and used the same in carrying on his business, to the total exclusion of the other parties to the action; that such use and occupation was reasonably worth $200 per year from the date of the death of said Manley Loomis. The plaintiff demanded judgment that the real property be partitioned and “ an accounting be had as to the use and occupation of the said premises by the defendant Stoel Loomis, and the value thereof fixed by the court.”
The only defendant who answered was Stoel Loomis. He denied that he used or occupied the premises in question to the exclusion of his cotenants or of the defendant Rachael B. Loomis, and alleged that his brother, Jay Loomis, and his mother, Rachael B. Loomis, occupied a portion of said premises either personally or through tenants, from whom they received! rents ; and alleged that all of his cotenants have had the privilege to' occupy the premises in question in connection with his use thereof^
The referee found that the plaintiff and the defendants, children of Manley Loomis, deceased, are entitled to an undivided one-fourth interest in the property described in the complaint, subject to the dower right of their mother, Rachael B. Loomis; that upon the death of Manley Loomis, the defendant Stoel Loomis entered into possession of the premises and has ever since occupied the same to the exclusion of his cotenánts, and that the value of such use and occupation was $200 a year, or $1,200 for the entire term of his occupation thereof. The referee found that the defendant Stoel Loomis had expended for taxes and necessary repairs upon the premises the sum of $197.32, for which he should be credited upon the rental value, leaving $1,002.68, for which the said Stoel Loomis should account. Of such balance the referee found that the widow, Rachael B. Loomis, is entitled to $334.22; the plaintiff, Lucelia Willes, the defendants Stoel Loomis, Jay Loomis and Laura Loomis, are each entitled to $167-11. The referee also determined that a judgment recovered by Stoel Loomis against his mother, Rachael B. Loomis,'for $436.58, is a lien upon the interest of Rachael B. Loomis
in. and to the premises sought to be partitioned; also that a judgment recovered by Stoel' Loomis against the defendant Jay Loomis for $115.95 is a lien upon the interest and share of Jay Loomis. It was also found that the property in question is so situated that it cannot be sold in parcels without material injury to the interests of the parties.
Judgment of partition and sale was ordered and directing that the proceeds should be distributed in accordance with the findings of the referee above referred to. From such judgment this appeal is taken.
Wilbur A. Porter, for the appellant.
A. E. Kilby, for the respondent.

Opinion:
McLennan, P. J.:
The only question raised by the pleadings or upon the trial was as to the value of the rental of the premises described in the complaint and the share of such rental, if any, which should be charged to the defendant Stoel Loomis, and what proportion, if any, should be charged to the defendants Rachael B. Loomis and Jay Loomis.
There were situated upon the premises three buildings and several sheds. One building was used for a paint shop and show room; another for a blacksmith and woodworking shop, underneath which was an oil cellar, and the third building was a dwelling house. At the time of Manley Loomis' death, the shops were occupied by the •deceased and the defendant Stoel Loomis, who were copartners engaged in carrying on the business of blacksmithing, painting and woodworking. The oil cellar was occupied by the defendant Jay Loomis, and the dwelling house by a tenant of the deceased. After the death of Manley Loomis, the defendant Stoel Loomis continued to carry on the business of blacksmithing, painting and woodworking, and for that purpose occupied the shops upon the premises until the time of the trial, with the exception of the oil cellar, which was used by Jay Loomis until the fall of 1898, and the evidence tends to show that from time to time Jay Loomis used some portion of the shops and sheds for storing his property. The dwelling house was continuously occupied by the same tenant until the time of the trial, and the rent for it was collected either' by Jay Loomis or Rachael Loomis, at least the defendant Stoel Loomis received no part of the same. There was no agreement on the part of Stoel Loomis to pay rent to his cotenants, and no acts on his part were shown which would tend to prove an ouster until a considerable time after the death of Manley Loomis. There was evidence given tending to show that Rachael B. Loomis collected rent for the dwelling house for a portion of the time after her husband's death, but the amount so collected is not found by the referee, and no charge is made against her for the same. '
The referee found that upon the death of Manley Loomis, the defendant Stoel Loomis entered into possession of the premises in question, and has occupied the same to the exclusion of his cotenants to occupy the same. We think such finding is not supported by the evidence. The evidence does tend to show that at a certain time after the death of Manley Lobmisj the defendant Stoel Loomis did deny the right of his cotenants to occupy the shops or any por-. tian of the premises connected therewith. But there is no evidence that he took such position until a considerable time after the death ' of his father.
The referee also finds, that the fair rental of the real property described in the complaint is $200 per year, or $1,200 from the time of the death of Manley Loomis until the trial of the action, and the whole of said sum is charged against the defendant Stoel Loomis, when, without contradiction, it appears that he did not occupy the tenant house and did not receive any rent for the same. And as we have seen, no charge for rent óf the tenant house is made against Rachael B. Loomis, although the evidence indicates that she received such rent during a considerable portion of the time.
We think the law applicable to this case is well settled. One tenant in common who receives no money or property from the premises owned in common by himself and others, but who simply occupies them himself, is not liable to his cotenants for the value of the use of the property so occupied. In order to charge such tenant with rental for the premises occupied there must be an agreement to pay rent, an actual ouster or an act amounting to a total denial of the rights of the other cotenants. ( Wood v. Phillips, 43 N. Y. 152 Osborn v. Schenck, 83 id. 201.)
In the case at bar the defendant Stoel W. Loomis should be charged only with the rental value of the property occupied by him from and after the date when he, if at all, commenced to occupy the same in hostility to his cotenants. He should be charged only with rental for such part as he occupied, and not fbr the entire premises, as found by the referee. Equitably the other cotenants should be charged with the rental of any part of the premises which they occupied in like manner, and it was entirely proper that an accounting between the parties should be had in this action, settling their respective interests to the property in question. The defendant Stoel W. Loomis in his answer alleged that his codefendant Jay Loomis had occupied a portion of the premises, and that Rachael B. Loomis had leased certain other portions and collected and appropriated to her own use the rents thereof. The issues thus raised by the answer could not be determined except by its service by Stoel W. Loomis upon his codefendants. This was necessary in order that a full and complete determination of the rights of the parties might be .had. While the judgment must be' reversed, for the reasons above indicated, we think it should be without costs to the appellant, because of his failure to serve a copy of his answer upon the other defendants.
All concurred.
Judgment reversed and new trial ordered upon questions of law and fact, without costs of this appeal to either party.