Case Name: KEEFE v. BANNIN
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1901-01-09
Citations: 68 N.Y.S. 352
Docket Number: 
Parties: KEEFE v. BANNIN.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 68
Pages: 352–356

Head Matter:
(57 App. Div. 361.)
KEEFE v. BANNIN.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.
January 9, 1901.)
Bills and Notes—Payment—Demand—Default.
Where plaintiff held a note for $125, payable $25 in money, and the balance in cut stone of the value of $100, within six months, as ordered by plaintiff, and no stone was ordered within the six months, but subsequently a portion was ordered and delivered, plaintiff could not maintain an action on the note for the balance without showing demand made and refusal.
Parker, P. J., dissenting.
Appeal from Warren county court.
Action by Daniel F. Keefe against William A. Bannin. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals.
Reversed.
Argued before PARKER, P. J., and KELLOGG, EDWARDS, MERWIN, and SMITH, JJ.
King & Angelí (H. Prior King, of counsel), for appellant.
A. & L. Armstrong (A. Armstrong, of counsel), for respondent.

Opinion:
KELLOGG, J.
The action was brought in a justice court, and .a jury there gave a verdict in favor of defendant. On a new trial in the county court, a jury gave a verdict for plaintiff. The action is to recover upon a promissory note, which reads as follows:
"July 8, 1896.
"For value received, I promise to pay to the order of Daniel F. Keefe the sum of one hundred and twenty-five dollars, as follows: Twenty-five dollars and interest thereon six months from the date hereof, and the balance is to be paid by furnishing the said Keefe cut stone of the value of one hundred dollars, within six months from this date, as ordered by him.
"[Signed] W. A. Bannin."
The $25 and interest promised in money was paid. The six months mentioned in -the note expired January 8, 1897. No stone were ordered or delivered within that six months. After January 8th, and during the winter, some stone was furnished, the value of which the jury allowed. In October, 1897, plaintiff ordered other stone, which defendant furnished in November following, and the value of these also was by the jury allowed in partial discharge of the promise to deliver stone as the note provides. No stone was subsequently ordered by plaintiff, and no demand was made that defendant complete his contract to deliver stone. In June, 1899, plaintiff brought this action, alleging in his complaint that plaintiff had ordered the cut stone, and defendant had failed and refused to deliver it, and asked for a money judgment. The answer denies that plaintiff had ordered stone which had not been delivered, alleged that plaintiff had failed to order the stone, and readiness and willingness at all times on defendant's part to perform. The learned county judge in his charge to the jury said: "The plaintiff is entitled to recover this one hundred dollars and interest from the 8th day of January, 1897, subject to a deduction for the value of "the stone on Grand street and the value of the stone on Chester street, if the jury find that they had been accepted, ¿or had been ordered and accepted, by Mr. Keefe,"—to which defendant excepted. The jury settled these questions in favor of defendant, but, under the charge, the jury had no option but to find for plaintiff for the balance.
In this view of the facts and the law, I think there was fatal error. The case of Gilbert v. Danforth, 6 N. Y. 585, holds that the maker of the note is not discharged from the obligation to perform because of failure of the payee to make selection within the stipulated time. While his legal right to make selection may be extinguished by delay beyond the time fixed, still the payee may demand payment according to the tenor of the note at a future day, and if he does so, and the maker refuses to deliver the articles stipulated for, then plaintiff may recover a judgment for money. If it be conceded to be the law as to contracts of this character that, after the date fixed in the note, the maker may exercise the right of selection himself, and make delivery of stone cut in any form or of any dimension, either monuments, grave stones, building stones, curb stones, or paving stones, or stone cut in any other form, if he choose, at any time after the date fixed, still that concession detracts nothing from plaintiff's duty, and adds nothing to his rights, under the contract. If he wishes to place defendant in this case in default, he must make his demand, make his order for stone, stating uses, quality, and form, or demand that defendant himself exercise the right of selection and make delivery within a reasonable time. Any other construction would permit plaintiff to reap a material benefit from his own failure to perform.
I do not think that silence on the part of the plaintiff, who in this case is both a promisee and a promisor, can better his position, or add to defendant's burden. The plaintiff promised to select the stone, and he is in default. T'he defendant did not promise to select the stone at any time, and until demand he cannot be in default. Should it be conceded that defendant might, at some time after the time fixed in the contract or note, legally perform by delivery of stone selected by himself, when does that time expire? He may safely wait, I think, until the payee himself makes the demand. Here the plaintiff or payee was exercising the right of selection nine months after the time fixed in the note, and the order so given was complied with by defendant. So long as the defendant is willing that the plaintiff should exercise the right of selection, the plaintiff has no right to complain. This was the duty he assumed. He cannot relieve himself from performance, and throw the duty upon defendant by simply remaining silent. If the question should ever become a question of reasonable time in which to perform, then, under such facts as in this case appear, that would be a question of fact, and not one of law, and would belong to a jury.
The judgment should be reversed, with costs in this court and in the county court.
MERWIN, SMITH, and EDWARDS, JJ., concur.