Case Name: Willis T. Honsinger and Others, Respondents, v. John Mulford, Appellant
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1895-12
Citations: 97 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 589
Docket Number: 
Parties: Willis T. Honsinger and Others, Respondents, v. John Mulford, Appellant.
Judges: Herrick, J., concurred.
Reporter: Supreme Court Reports (Hun)
Volume: 97
Pages: 589–604

Head Matter:
Willis T. Honsinger and Others, Respondents, v. John Mulford, Appellant.
Statute of Jfi'auds — the defense must be interposed, by demurrer, or answer, otherwise it is waived — it cannot be raised by mere objections to evidence — promise to pay. the debt of a corporation as a consideration of an extension of time.
• Where it does not appear from the allegations contained in a complaint whether the promise upon which the action was brought was oral or written, if the defendant has not set up the Statute of Frauds in his answer, he must be deemed to have waived any defense based upon that statute.
Unless the statute is pleaded, objections, made by the'defendant upon the trial to verbal proof of the contract in suit, will not avail him.
Where it appears from the complaint that the contract upon which the plaintiff seeks to recover is within the Statute of Frauds, the defendant should demur; if the invalidity of the. contract does not appear from the complaint the defendant should take the objection by answer, and if the objection is not taken either by demurrer or answer it is waived.
In an action brought upon an alleged personal agreement by the defendant to pay certain notes, made by the Mutual Benefit Ice Company, it appeared that the ice company was a domestic corporation; that it was indebted to the plaintiffs who were about to commence an action upon tlieir claim; that the defendant was the principal stockholder of the corporation and its president; that he requested the plaintiffs, at the time the notes in question were given, to extend the time of the payment of the indebtedness of the company and promised that, if the extension was granted, he would become personally liable to pay the claim when it became due under the arrangement then made with the plaintiffs, and that, in reliance upon this promise, the plaintiffs extended the time of payment of the debt and took the notes in suit. The agreement of the defendant was in fact oral, but the complaint failed to state whether it was written or oral.
Held, that the agreement of the defendant, to pay the claim against the company, upon an extension being given to it of the time of payment, was founded upon a sufficient consideration;
That, as the defendant had failed to plead that, inasmuch as the promise of the defendant related to the payment of the debt of a third person, it must be in writing, that defense was not available to him, and that his objection, to any ■evidence tending to prove the contract, was not effectual to raise a defense based upon the Statute of Frauds.
Mayham, P. J., dissenting.
Appeal by the defendant, John Mulford, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiffs, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Clinton on the 21st day of November, 1894, upon the verdict of a jury rendered after a trial at the Clinton Circuit, and also from an order entered in said clerk’s office on the 21st day of November, 1894, denying the defendant’s motion for a mew trial made upon the minutes.
T. F. Oq-jiway, for the appellant.
L. L. Shedden, for the resjiondents.

Opinion:
.'Putnam, J.:
On the conflicting evidence in this case the jury were authorized to find that on September 2,1890, the Mutual Benefit Ice Company, a domestic corporation, was indebted to plaintiffs in the sum of $6,000 then due, and that plaintiffs were about to commence an action upon said claim; that the defendant was the principal stockholder in said corporation and its president; that in an interview with two of the plaintiffs at the date above mentioned, defendant requested them to extend the time of payment of said indebtedness, and agreed, if such extension was granted, to personally become liable for and pay the said claim when it became due under the arrangement then made; that, relying upon such agreement of defendant, plaintiffs extended the time of payment of such debt and took two notes of the corporation, which are set out in the complaint, payable at a future date.
The agreement of defendant to pay the claim of plaintiffs was not in writing, but in the complaint it was not stated whether it was written or oral.
On the trial the defendant objected to evidence tending to show the alleged agreement made between the plaintiffs and the defendant at the time in question, on the ground-that such an agreement, to be valid, must be in writing, and that the oral agreement of defendant to pay the debt of the corporation was void under the Statute of Frauds, and afterwards moved to strike out such evidence for the same reason, and upon plaintiffs resting, and again at the termination of the trial, moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the promise of defendant, on which the action was based, was not in writing, and, therefore, within the Statute of Frauds and void. The motions were denied, the case was submitted to the jury by the trial court and a verdict rendered in favor of the plaintiffs.
The agreement of defendant to pay plaintiffs' claim against the Mutual Benefit Ice Company, on their extending the time of payment, was founded upon a sufficient consideration. (Meltzer v. Doll et al., 91 N. Y. 365; Penn. Coal Co. v. Blake, 85 id. 226-232; Hamer v. Sidway, 124 id. 538.)
Hence the plaintiffs were entitled to recover on the defendant's promise, unless the objection made by the defendant on the trial to the recovery, on the ground that the promise of defendant, not being in writing, was within the Statute of Frauds and void, should have been sustained by the trial court.
As we have seen, it did not appear by the allegations in the complaint whether defendant's promise was in writing or oral. Hence we think the defendant, not having set up the Statute of Frauds in his answer, waived the benefit of that statute. In Hamer v. Sidway (supra), Parker, J., says : " It does not appear on the face of the complaint that the agreement is one prohibited by the Statute of Frauds, and, therefore, such defense could not be made available unless set up in the answer." And the learned justice cites Porter v. Wormser et al. (94 N. Y. 431), in which case the same doctrine is stated in the opinion of Andrews, J. (p. 450). In Wells v. Monihan, et al. (129 N. Y. 164), Finch, J., says: " So far as the defense in this case rests upon the Statute of Frauds it must fail, for two reasons. No such defense has been pleaded, and it is not raised by the averments of the complaint, and without one or the other of these conditions the defense, if existing' cannot be made available."
But if any doubt existed'before as to whether it was necessary to plead the Statute of Frauds as a defense or otherwise the benefit of the statute was waived, no such doubt can be entertained since the late decision of the Court of Appeals in Crane v. Powell (139 N. Y. 379).
That case, in effect, holds that unless the statute is pleaded, objection upon the trial to verbal proof of the contract will not avail the defendant. If it appears from the complaint that the contract on which plaintiff seeks to recover is within the statute, defendant must demur. If the invalidity of the contract does not appear from the complaint, defendant must take the objection by answer, and if the objection is not taken, either by demurrer or answer it is waived. In the case cited no objection was taken by defendant to verbal proof of the contract on the ground that it was within the Statute of Frauds, although at the close of the evidence he moved to dismiss the complaint on that ground. In his opinion, O'Brien, J., adverted to that fact and said: " But the important question in the case, and upon which we prefer to let the decision rest, is whether, in the light of the adjudged cases, it is not necessary for a defendant who intends to avail himself of the benefit of the statute, as a defense to an action for damages for breach of a verbal agreement, within the statute, to specifically plead it." The learned judge further said : " In this State cases may be found where the opinion is expressed that the defendant may avail himself at the trial of the benefit of the statute, under the general issue, by objection to verbal proof of'the contract. Some of these cases, and perhaps the principal ones, have already been cited to show when and how the defendant is deemed to have waived the benefit of the statute by admitting the allegations of the complaint. It is proper, I think, to observe that they are cases where the complaint was admitted in some way, or the decision was before the Code or founded upon authority antecedent to it. The recent cases in this court sustain the view that it is necessary to plead the statute. The Statute of Frands is a shield which a party may use or not for his protection just as he may use the Statute of Limitations, the statute against usury, that against betting and gaming, and others that might be mentioned. I take it to be a general rule of universal application that the statutes last mentioned are not available to a party unless specifically pleaded, and there is no reason for making the Statute of Frauds an exception to the rule.
" The present system of procedure is founded upon the idea that litigants should, when possible, know in advance the precise questions they must meet at the trial. When a contract is set out in the complaint as the cause of action, and the defendant intends to assail it on some special or statutory ground, the general spirit of the system is not complied with unless notice is given of this .intention to the opposing party by the pleadings.
" When the defect in the plaintiff's cause of action appears on the face of the complaint, the defense must be interposed by demurrer. (§ 488.) When the complaint does not, as in this case, disclose an invalid agreement upon its face, but it is, in fact, invalid for some reason, the defendant must take the objection by answer (§ 498), and if the objection is not taken in either way, the defendant is deemed to have waived it. (§ 499.) The conclusion is thus reached that the defendant waived the benefit of the statute in this case by omitting to plead it."
Under the above authorities we are of opinion that defendant waived the benefit of the Statute of Frauds by not setting up the invalidity of the contract as a defense, and, hence, that the trial court did not err in submitting the case to the jury.
We have examined the exceptions taken by the defendant on the trial to the charge of the court and to its rulings in excluding and receiving evidence, and do not think that any of such exceptions require a reversal of the judgment.
The judgment should he affirmed, with costs.
Herrick, J., concurred.