Case Name: Cocke's Ex'or & Others v. Philips
Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
Jurisdiction: Virginia
Decision Date: 1841-04
Citations: 12 Leigh 248
Docket Number: 
Parties: *Cocke’s Ex’or & Others v. Philips.
Judges: STANAED, J., concurred in the opinion of Brooke, J., and CABI5LL, J., concurred with Allen, J.
Reporter: Virginia Reports
Volume: 39
Pages: 875–880

Head Matter:
*Cocke’s Ex’or & Others v. Philips.
April, 1841,
Richmond.
Widow — Renunciation of Husband’s Will — Construction of Statutes. — A married man dies possessed of personal estate, leaving a will wherein he bequeaths his whole estate to his nephews and nieces, and makes no provision for or mention of his wife : Held, upon the construction of the statute 1 Rev. Code, ch. 104, § 26, 29, that, in order to entitle herself to a distributive share of her husband’s personal estate, the widow must declare her dissatisfaction with the will and renounce all benefit under the same, within the time and in the manner prescribed by the statute ; disen-tiente Brooke and Stanard, J.
Dower — Estates in Expectancy. — Husband dies entitled to a remainder in fee of real estate, expectant on an estate of freehold therein ; his widow is not entitled to dower of the land when the remainder falls in.
Joseph Cocke being entitled to the remainder in fee in 141 acres of land in Hanover, and to the remainder likewise in threq slaves, expectant on a life estate therein then held by his mother, by deed of trust, in his lifetime, conveyed his remainder in both the land and slaves to Philip Winston, upon trust to secure a debt of 318 dollars with interest to William Cocke; and being thus entitled to the equity of redemption of the remainder of the land and slaves, and some personal chattels in possession, of trivial value, he died in 1823. He left no children or other issue. He was, however, a married man ; but his wife had separated from him many years before his death, and was then still living apart from him; though, it seemed, the separation was imputable to his own misconduct, not to any fault of hers. He left a will, in which he made no provision whatever for his wife; but, after charging his whole estate with his debts, he devised and bequeathed the same, subject thereto, to his nephews and nieces, thirteen in number. And Joseph Wingfield, an executor named in the will, took upon himself the trust.
*In 1824, after Cocke’s death, but before the death of his mother the tenant for life, his remainder in the 141 acres of land was sold by Winston, the trustee, under the deed of trust to secure the debt of 318 dollars to William Cocke, upon the requisition of the creditor’s administrator, who himself became the purchaser at the sale. The purchase money exceeded the debt; the bond for which was taken in by the trustee, but a large balance of the purchase money remained unpaid.
Cocke’s mother, the tenant for life, died in 1827, and upon her death, the three slaves came to the possession of his executor Wingfield.
Cocke’s widow married Thomas Philips, whom she also survived. She never made any renunciation of her first husband’s will; and never during her first widowhood, or during the life of her second husband, set up a claim to any provision out of her first husband’s estate, real or personal.
But in 1835, after the death of Philips, she exhibited a bill in chancery in the circuit superior court of Hanover, against Wingfield the executor of her first husband Cocke, his devisees and legatees, Winston the trustee, and the purchaser of the 141 acres of land under the deed of trust; wherein she claimed dower of that land, and the share allowed her by law of Cocke’s personal estate; and prayed an account of Wingfield’s administration, and a decree for her dower of the land, and for her distributive share of the personal estate.
The defendants, in their answers, admitting that the plaintiff was the relict of Cocke, denied, nevertheless, that she had any claim to dower of the land, her husband never having been seized of any estate in possession therein during the coverture, but only entitled to an estate in remainder; and as she had never renounced his will, they also denied, that she had any right to a distributive share of his personal estate; or, if she ever had a just claim thereto, they insisted that she ought *not, after such a lapse of time, to be allowed now to assert it.
The court directed Wingfield to render an account of his administration of Cocke’s estate before a commissioner; and the account was accordingly stated and reported; by which it appeared that there was a balance in the executor’s hands, of 1477 dollars, principal and interest, of which all but 113 dollars arose from the hires of the three slaves,'accrued since 1827; and that only two of the slaves were now living.
It further appeared, by evidence, that of the purchase money of the land sold under the deed of trust, after paying- the debt of 318 dollars with interest to William Cocke for which it was mortgaged, there remained still due from the purchaser, a balance of 909 dollars, principal and interest.
Upon the hearing, the court declared, that the plaintiff was entitled to one third of the slaves of her first husband Cocke’s estate, to be held for her life, and to one-half of his other personal estate in absolute property; and decreed, in part, that Wing-field the executor should pay her one half of the balance reported to be in his hands; but as to the two slaves which now remained, as they were not divisible in kind, the court, for the present, made no decree as to them. And the court ordered, that the purchaser of the land should deposit the 909 dollars, the balance of the purchase money thereof yet due from him, in the bank of Virginia, subject to future order; and, in case he should fail to deposit the same within sixty days from the date of the decree, that the land should be sold by <a commissioner appointed for the purpose, and the proceeds be brought into court.
*Upon the petition of the defendants, Wingfield the executor, and the devisees and legatees, of Cocke, this court allowed them an appeal from the decree.
The cause was argued here, by Uyons for the appellants, and R. T. Daniel for the appellee, upon several objections taken by the former to the. principles and the details of the decree; but the court considered only two of them, viz. That the widow was not dowable of the land, because her husband was never seized thereof, but was only entitled to a remainder expectant on a freehold estate; and that, as she had not renounced her husband’s will, within the year after his death, she was not, upon the true construction of the statute, entitled to any distributive share of the personal estate.
Widow — Renunciation of Husband’s Will — Statutes. —As to when and how the widow must renounce provisions under her husband’s will, see Va. Code 1887, ch. 113, sec. 2559; W. Va. Code, ch. 78, sec. 11, p. 713.
Dower. — See monographic note on “Dower” appended to Davis v. Davis, 25 Gratt. 587.
It will he observed, that while the decree declared the plaintiff entitled to only one third of her husband’s slave property for her life, it gave her one half of the profits thereof, accrued since his death, in absolute property ; and that the debt due to William Cocke was treated as a charge upon the land mortgaged for it, instead of being charged upon the personal estate in exoneration of the real. — Note in Original Edition.
The statute of wills, intestacy and distributions, 1 Rev. Code, ch. 104, § 26, 29, p. 381-2, the peculiar provisions of which must be borne in mind, in order to understand the point, and the opinions of the judges upon it.
§ 26. “When any widow shall not be satisfied with the provision made for her by the will of her husband, she may within one year from the time of his death” (in manner prescribed by the statute) “declare, that she will not take or accept the provision made for her by such will or any part th ereof, and renounce all benefit which she might claim by the same will; and thereupon, such widow shall be entitled to one third of the slaves whereof her husband died possessed, which she shall hold during her life, and at her death, they shall go to such person or persons, to whom they would have gone if such declaration had not been made ; and she shall moreover be entitled to such share of his other personal estate, as if he had died intestate, to kola as her absolute property : but every widow not making a declaration within the time aforesaid, shall have no more of her husband’s slaves and personal estate than is'given her by his will.”
§ 29. “When any person shall die intestate as to his goods and chattels, or any part thereof, after funeral debts and just expenses paid, if there be no child, one moiety, or if there be a child or children, one third, of the surplus shall go to the wife, but she shall have no more than the use for life of such slaves as shall be in her share,” &c.
Thus, if the husband die testate, whether he leave children or not, the widow, on renouncing the will, is entitled to only a third of the husband’s slave property for life ; but if the husband die intestate leaving no children, she is entitled to half of his slaves for life. — Note in Original Edition.

Opinion:
AUI/EN, J.
The testator Joseph Cocke made no provision by his will for his wife; she never renounced the will; and the question arises, whether, under these circumstances, *she is entitled to any portion of his personal estate? The phraseology of the statute is ambiguous; and I was at one time inclined to think, that no renunciation was necessary, where the will is silent as to the widow. If "the widow shall not be satisfied with the provision made for her by the will of her husband," she is to declare she will not take or accept it, ' 'and renounce all benefit she might claim" under the will. It would, at first view, seem to be a useless act, to refuse that which had not been given, to renounce a benefit where none was conferred. But, upon the supposition that no renunciation would be necessary in case the will contains no provision for the widow, the question still presents itself, to what would she be entitled? It is not a case of intestacy; the deceased has made a will disposing of the whole of his estate. Where a will is made, and the widow renounces, she is entitled to but a third of the slaves for life; but in case of intestacy, if the deceased leaves no child, the widow is entitled to a moiety. How would she take, where the will makes no provision for her? the moiety, as in case of intestacy? or the third, as in case of renunciation? If a moiety, as in case of intestacy', it would defeat the statute, which, in case the husband has made a will, intended, if the widow does not take under it, to give her one third only of the slaves, whether the husband left a child or not; and if she takes a third, then she must take under the statute, and must be bound by its provisions, which look to the case of renunciation alone, and declare that "thereupon, she shall be entitled" &c. recognizing but two *modes of providing for her, that prescribed by the will, and that which is to take place on her renunciation.
There seems to have been some contrariety of opinion, as to the extent of the husband's power of disposing of his personalty at common law. According to Blackstone (2 Comm. 492,) by the ancient common law, a man's goods were to be divided into three equal parts; of which one went to his heirs or lineal descendants, another to his wife, and the third was at his own disposal. And this he seems to think continued to be the law, as late as the reign of Charles I. If this were so, it was the law in force at the settlement of Virginia, and it might be argued was the common law brought over by the colonists. "This law" (Blackstone says) "is at present altered bjr imperceptible degrees, and the deceased may now by will bequeath the whole of his goods and chattels, though we cannot trace out when first this alteration begun." But' Sir Edward Coke (Harg. Co. Litt. 176 b., note 6,) considers, that this was never the general law, but only obtained in particular places by special custom. The correctness of this opinion is controverted by Blackstone ; but in a note in 1 Wms. on Ex'ors 2, it is said, the learned discussion of Mr. Somner on this subject, which tends to confirm the correctness of Coke's opinion, seemed to have escaped the notice of Blackstone. The question was discussed in Lightfoot's ex'ors v. Colgin & ux., 5 Munf. 66, where Judge Brooke, after adverting to the difference between Coke and Blackstone, proceeds to shew, that when the legislature of Virginia first took up the subject, the common law was understood to be as laid down by Coke: that, at that day, Coke upon Littleton and the Institutes were the oracle of the law in this country, and the text books of lawyers and legislatures; that the law, as laid down by Coke, was in the mind of the legislature, when the acts of 1673 and 1705 were passed; and that those statutes were intended to restrain the husband, in the ^exercise of a preexisting right to dispose of his whole estate by will. If this view of Judge Brooke was correct (and it strikes me as being so), the husband, by the common law as understood in Virginia, could dispose of the whole of his personal property, as he still may in England, without making any provision for his wife: and we must look to our statutes, to ascertain what limitations have been imposed upon this general power, and what remedy has been provided for the widow.
The statute of 1673, 2 Hen. Stat. at large 303, was the first. It makes provision for the wife in case of intestacy; and then proceeds, "and in case the husband make a will, that he hath it in his power to devise more to his wife than what is above determined, but not less." This statute provided no mode by which the widow was to assert her claim.
In 1705, another statute was passed, 3 Hen. Stat. at large 373. The fourth section provided, that when any person dies testate, leaving no more than two children, one third part of his estate, at least, should be given to his wife; if more than two children, she should have at least a child's part; and if there were no children, not less than a moiety: and if any person should leave a will, wherein a lesser part of his estate should be given to the wife than was directed therein, such will, as to so much thereof as related to the wife, upon her petition to the court where the same should be proved, should be declared null and void; and thereupon she should be empowered to sue for and recover such part of her deceased husband's estate, as was therein before directed to be given to her. This statute is silent as to the case where no provision has been made for the wife. What, in such case, under that statute, would have been her condition? The phrase lesser part would seem to imply, that the legislature only intended to provide for the case, where something, but less than she was entitled to, had been given. The literal meaning of the *phrase would require that construction as strongly, as the existing statute would seem to require that the will should contain some provision which the widow was to renounce. But if we adopt that construction, we must come to the conclusion, that the legislature intended to give her a remedy, where the will made some provision for her, but left her as at common law, when nothing was given. The common law (as then understood) authorized the husband to dispose of the whole estate. She would, therefore, by this construction, be in a worse condition when the will gave her nothing, than when it gave her something, but less than what she had a right to. The statute shews an intention to alter the then existing law; to limit the authority of the husband, and. afford a remedy to the widow. To effectuate that intention, the phrase used (lesser part) must be construed to extend to and include, not only the case of a partial, though an inadequate, provision, but the case also of a total omission to give any thing. If the last case was embraced in the scope of the statute, a petition to the court was the proper remedy, to declare the will .null and void as related to her. The fifth section of the statute seems to confirm this view; it provided that if the wife should die before distribution, her representatives should be empowered to sue for and recover so much of the estate as shall be given her by the will, and no more. This excludes the idea that she had any rights other than those given by the will,, or conferred upon her by the statute, or setting aside the will by petition. If any such right, other than that under the will, or acquired by renunciation, existed, it must have vested at her husband's death, and would therefore have passed to her representatives, though she died before distribution: but the statute limited the recovery of her representatives, when she died before distribution, to the property given by the will, and no more.
^Another difficulty would occur, if she took in any other way than by renunciation: what would have been the extent of her claim? We have seen, that she was entitled to a third of the slaves in the case of a will when she renounced, whether the husband left a child or not; but in the case of intestacy, there being no child, she was entitled to a moiety: which rule would govern, where the will was silent, and she did not renounce? So, in regard to the other personal estate; by the common law, according to Blackstone, and supposing it to have been in force in Virginia, she took a third if a child, but a moiety if no child, was left. Under the statute of 1705, she was entitled to a child's part only, where there were more than two children.
All these difficulties are obviated by holding, that in the case of testacy, there are but two classes of claims provided for, the claim under the will, and the claim by renunciation. I therefore think that notwithstanding the use of the word lesser in the statute of 1705, the legislature intended to apply the taw to the case where nothing was given, as well as to the case where .less was bequeathed than she was entitled to; and that it was incumbent on the widow in both cases to petition, and have the will declared null and void as to her, before she could be let into any thing.
Doubts arising whether the statute of 1705 had any relation to the disposition of slaves, and what right the widow had in the slavé property of her husband, in case of his dying testate, the statute of 1727, ch. 11, § 21, 4 Hen. Stat. at large, 228, provided, that when a widow was not satisfied with the provision made by her husband's will, she might, within nine months after his death, renounce, and she should thereupon be entitled to one third of his slaves for life, and moreover to such share of his personal estate) as by the said act (the statute of 1705) was directed. This statute had two objects in view; 1. to remove the doubts as to slaves and *to define the widow's interest; and 2. to furnish her a more convenient remedy; her renunciation in court or by deed, being substituted to the petition and judgment of the court declaring the will null and void as related to her. This statute did not operate upon her rights as to the personal property generally; they remained as defined by the statute of 1705. And if I am correct in supposing that, under that statute, a petition to declare the will null and void was necessary, whether it gave her less than she was entitled to, or nothing, the renunciation, substituted for the petition, by the statute of 1727, was equally necessary in both cases.
The statute of 1727 has been incorporated in the subsequent revisáis, and, with very slight alterations, is the law as it now stands in the code.
It seems to me', therefore, that as the widow made no renunciation, she can claim no part of the slaves or personal estate. This construction of the statute will be attended with the least inconvenience. A widow, for family considerations, may choose to acquiesce in such a disposition of her husband's estate: it may have been made with her concurrence; or she may be satisfied with her dower, or with her own separate estate. If it be held, that no renunciation is necessary, where the will makes no provision for her, she, or after her death her representatives, may come at a distant day, and set up her claim; and the executor who may have delivered the property to the legatees, and the legatees who may have dealt with it as their own, may be called to account. By requiring the renunciation within the time prescribed, in all cases, this inconvenience is avoided: if it be not made within the time, her claim is at an end, and the legatees may rest in security.
The widow has no claim to dower of the land in which her husband died entitled only to an estate in remainder expectant on his mother's life estate. To entitle a widow to dower, the husband must have been ^seized in fact or in law. "If the husband maketh a lease for life of certain lands reserving rent, and he taketh wife and dieth, the wife shall not be endowed; neither of the reversion (albeit, it is within the word tenements) because there was no seisin in deed or in law of the freehold; nor of the rent, because the husband had but a particular estate therein, and no fee simple." Co. Litt. 32 a.; D'Arcy v. Blake, 2 Scho. & Lef. 387; Blow v. Maynard, 2 Leigh 29, 56.