Case Name: AETNA CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY v. Hal Otis WILLIAMS, Sr., Individually, Hal Otis Williams, Sr., as Administrator of the Estate of Hal Otis Williams, Jr., Mechell Williams and Nedra Williams, Minors, By and Through Hal Otis Williams, Sr., as Natural Father and Next Friend
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1993-09-02
Citations: 623 So. 2d 1005
Docket Number: 89-CA-0790
Parties: AETNA CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY v. Hal Otis WILLIAMS, Sr., Individually, Hal Otis Williams, Sr., as Administrator of the Estate of Hal Otis Williams, Jr., Mechell Williams and Nedra Williams, Minors, By and Through Hal Otis Williams, Sr., as Natural Father and Next Friend.
Judges: DAN M. LEE, P.J., and SULLIVAN, BANKS, JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr. and SMITH, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 623
Pages: 1005–1022

Head Matter:
AETNA CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY v. Hal Otis WILLIAMS, Sr., Individually, Hal Otis Williams, Sr., as Administrator of the Estate of Hal Otis Williams, Jr., Mechell Williams and Nedra Williams, Minors, By and Through Hal Otis Williams, Sr., as Natural Father and Next Friend.
89-CA-0790.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Sept. 2, 1993.
David A. Barfield, Kirkland Barfield & Moore, Jackson, Steven C. Panter, Marietta, GA, for appellant.
James Ed Brown, Starkville, for appellees.
Jonathan B. Fairbank, John Jones Law Office, Jackson, amicus curiae.

Opinion:
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
McRAE, Justice,
for the Court:
Aetna Casualty and Surety Company appeals a judgment from the Chancery Court of Oktibbeha County awarding the estate of Hal Otis Williams, Jr., $20,000 under the uninsured motorist provisions of an automobile policy held by Hal Otis Williams, Sr. The threshold issue on appeal is whether an unemancipated minor of divorced parents is a resident of the household of both parents for purposes of the Uninsured Motorist Act. We affirm the chancellor's finding that the minor decedent was a resident of both parents' households, thereby entitling his estate to uninsured motorist benefits under the Aet-na policy.
FACTS
Hal Otis (Junior) Williams, Jr., a nineteen-year-old student at Mississippi State University, was killed in a two-car accident on May 30, 1987. Neither the car in which he was riding as a passenger nor the other vehicle involved were covered by liability insurance. The present suit arose from Junior's father's attempt to recover against Aetna Insurance Company under his uninsured motorist policy-
Junior's parents, Hal Otis Williams, Sr. (Williams), and Mary Frances Williams (Mary Williams) were divorced on February 11, 1982. Mary Williams was awarded permanent custody of the couple's three minor children, subject only to reasonable visitation rights with Williams.
The record indicates that Junior had his own bedroom at each parent's home. He also kept some of his personal items at a friend's dormitory room on the Mississippi State campus, where he often stayed on weekends and during football season.
At the time of his death, Junior's mailing address on his school records and driver's license was listed as 59 Bennett Drive, Stark-ville, Mississippi, his mother's home. Williams stated that this address was used in order to facilitate Junior's school loans.
Williams purchased a used car for Junior, and paid for its maintenance and frequent repairs. He carried Junior on his health insurance policy and, until changes were made in the tax laws in 1987, listed Junior and his two sisters on his tax returns as dependents.
At the time of Junior's death, Williams had an automobile liability insurance policy with Aetna Casualty & Surety Company (Aetna) with $20,000 uninsured motorist coverage on the two automobiles he owned. Paragraph 11(a) of the policy states:
ÍI. PERSONS INSURED
Each of the following is an insured under this insurance to the extent set forth below:
(a) the named insured and, while residents of the same household, the spouse and relatives of either. (Emphasis added).
This policy language follows exactly the definition of "insured" provided by Miss.Code Ann. § 83-ll-103(b) (Supp.1986).
Junior died intestate, and Williams was appointed administrator of Junior's estate. Junior's heirs were Williams, Mary Williams, and his sisters, Mechell and Nedra.
On July 8, 1987, Williams' attorney, James E. Brown, wrote to Aetna demanding payment of $20,000 in uninsured motorist benefits to Junior's estate. Aetna requested signed affidavits stating that neither vehicle involved in the accident was covered by liability insurance as well as proof that Junior was "regularly residing in the household of Hal Otis Williams, Sr., our named insured." In response, Williams sent Aetna the requisite affidavits regarding the accident as well as two additional affidavits as proof that "for some time prior to the death of HAL OTIS WILLIAMS, JR., that he was a resident at 105 Churchill Circle, Starkville, Mississippi, which is the residence of the decedent's father Hal Otis Williams, Sr." One was signed by Williams, the other, by Junior's sister, Nedra.
After receiving these affidavits, Aetna sent a check to James E. Brown for $20,000 payable to Williams, Mary Williams, Nedra Williams, Mechell Williams and James E. Brown, along with a release. Williams signed the release at Brown's office. He then took it home and, without their permission or knowledge, signed the names of Mary Williams, Nedra and Mechell on the release as well as on the check. Two checks were later written from Brown's trust account, where the original check had been deposited, one payable to Williams for $9,000 and one payable to Williams and Nedra for $4,334. The i'emainder of the $20,000 ($6,666) was retained by Brown as attorneys' fees.
On November 27, 1987, Mary Williams filed suit in federal court against her automobile insurance carrier, Maryland Casualty Company, seeking to recover uninsured motorist benefits as a result of Junior's death. She claimed that Junior was a resident of her household at the time of his death, and therefore that she was entitled to recover uninsured motorist benefits. Approximately one month after it paid Williams' claim, Aetna learned of Mary Williams' suit against Maryland Casualty. On June 30,1989, Aetna filed a complaint against Williams, his daughters and his attorney in the Oktibbeha County Chancery Court for return of the funds, alleging fraud in securing payment under the policy.
At the February 20,1988, hearing in chancery court, Mary and Nedra Williams, as well as several of Junior's friends, testified that Junior spent most of his time at his mother's house. Williams and his wife offered testimony about the time Junior spent with them, particularly in the last few weeks before his death, after Junior and his mother had an argument about a six-pack of beer.
Following the hearing, the chancellor rendered a bench opinion finding that while Williams had forged the names of Mary Williams, Nedra Williams and Mechell Williams on the release as well as on the endorsement of the check from Aetna, the affidavits were not forged, and thus there had been no fraud in obtaining payment of the claim.
The chancellor further found that although Junior was principally a member of his mother's household, he was also a resident of his father's household. The chancellor held:
Just because this mother and father are uncooperative is not sufficient of itself for this Court to determine and so adjudicate that children of divorced parents do not remain residents of both households. The divorce decree in no wise terminates parental rights, duties and obligations. If the insurance carriers are desirous of precluding children similarly situated, they may do so by expressed contractual provision.
In the final judgment, the chancellor noted that:
The Court finds factually that the decedent was a resident of both households at the time of his death, and that under the facts presented to this Court, children of divorced parents may establish two residencies, one with each parent, and thereby become an insured of either or both parents, under the terms and conditions of the insurance contract relating to uninsured motorist coverage.
The chancellor accordingly dismissed Aet-na's claim, but removed Williams as administrator of the estate because of his handling of the claim proceeds.
Aetna appeals from an adverse ruling, asserting primarily that the minor decedent was a resident of his mother's household, but not of the household of his father.
LAW
In this case, we are called upon to determine whether a minor child of divorced parents may be considered a "resident of the same household" of both parents pursuant to the language of the Uninsured Motorist Act, Miss.Code Ann. § 83-ll-103(b) (Supp.1986). The uninsured motorist policy Aetna issued to Hal Williams, Sr. expressly followed the statutory definition of the term "insured," providing coverage for Williams and all relatives who reside in his household. That Junior was his father's relative is beyond ques tion. However, Aetna asserts that at the time of his death, Junior was not a resident of his father's household, notwithstanding that Junior maintained a room at his father's house in which he kept clothes and other personal belongings; that Williams helped provide for his son's material needs, including buying him a car and giving him money; that Junior was named on Williams' hospitalization policy and that Williams claimed Junior as a dependent on his tax returns until the 1986 Tax Reform Act prevented a noncustodial parent from claiming the minor child as a dependent regardless of the amount of support paid over and above the parent that had paramount custody. According to Aetna's rationale, it does not matter that Junior, despite being in the legal custody of his mother, was still his father's minor son and thus also an integral part of his father's family. However, because two parents can no longer live together, their responsibilities to their children do not change and the children remain a part of each parent's family.
The chancellor expressly found as follows:
[B]oth the father and mother of the decedent, who were divorced, maintained separate households and residency in Stark-ville, Oktibbeha County, Mississippi, and that the decedent under the proven facts was a resident of the mother's household and also of the father's household, and that as envisioned by the contract of insurance before the Court, the decedent was a resident of his father's household and was an insured under the terms and conditions of the insurance contract.... The Court finds that just because parents are divorced and uncooperative this does not constitute sufficient facts to say that children of divorced parents do not remain residents of both households where the facts show to the contrary.... The Court finds factually that the decedent was a resident of both households at the time of his death, and that under the facts presented to this Court, children of divorced parents may establish two residencies, one with each parent, and thereby become an insured of either or both parents, under the terms and conditions of the insurance contract relating to uninsured motorist coverage.
The record undeniably contains substantial evidence supporting the chancellor's finding that Junior resided in both his mother's and his father's households. Further, the chancellor's decision reflects the familiar public policy that courts must interpret the terms of an insurance policy (and the statutes from which they derive) liberally in favor of providing coverage for the insured. The holding of the lower court is thus well-grounded in both law and reason.
The policy provision at issue reads:
II. PERSONS INSURED
Each of the following is an insured under this insurance to the extent set forth below:
(a) the named insured and, while residents of the same household, the spouse and relatives of either.
This language reflects the wording of Mississippi's uninsured motorist statute, Miss.Code Ann. § 83-11-103 (Supp.1986), which provides:
As used in this article:
(b) The term "insured" shall mean the named insured and, while resident of the same household, the spouse of any such named insured and relatives of either.
We consistently have held that the language of the Mississippi Uninsured Motorist Coverage Act "must be construed liberally to provide coverage and strictly to avoid or preclude exceptions or exemptions from coverage." Harris v. Magee, 573 So.2d 646 (Miss.1990); accord Cossitt v. Federated Guaranty Mutual. Ins. Co., 541 So.2d 436, 440 (Miss.1989); Washington v. Georgia American Ins. Co., 540 So.2d 22, 24 (Miss.1989); Wickline v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 530 So.2d 708, 711 (Miss.1988); Mississippi Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Garrett, 487 So.2d 1320, 1323 (Miss.1986); Matthews v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 471 So.2d 1223, 1225 (Miss.1985); State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Nester, 459 So.2d 787, 790 (Miss.1984); Stevens v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 345 So.2d 1041 (Miss.1977); Parker v. Cottonbelt Insurance Co., Inc., 314 So.2d 342 (Miss.1975). Our law thus embodies a mandate that the term "resident" be construed broadly to include Williams' son as an insured under the father's uninsured motorist coverage. The term "resident" appears in both the policy and the statute by which it is governed, and we must read both provisions broadly as a matter of public policy.
The chancellor's decision also harmonizes with the legislative intent and purpose which gave rise to the Uninsured Motorist Act. The legislature, in setting mandatory parameters of who constitutes an "insured" under an uninsured motorist policy, chose the word "residence" instead of the more restrictive term "domicile." Given the profusion of divorces and broken homes in today's society, it is clear why the legislature selected the more generous term. Quite often, a noncustodial parent provides insurance for his or her children even though the children spend more time with the other parent. It is easy to imagine a situation where a custodial parent purchases an uninsured motorist policy with only the basic $10,000-$20,000 coverage, and the non-custodial parent wishes to purchase a policy which provides the child with greater coverage. Were we to accept Aet-na's reasoning, the non-custodial parent could provide his or her child with no uninsured motorist coverage whatsoever. The parent would then shoulder the burden of the exorbitant costs of any injuries suffered by the child which were caused by an uninsured motorist and be held accountable for failing to see that his child was reasonably protected from such losses. The chancellor was thus correct in holding, as a matter of policy, that a minor child qualifies as a "resident" in both households of divorced parents.
To construe the term "resident" otherwise would also conflict with Miss.Code Ann. § 93-13-1 (1972) which provides in part: "The father and mother are the joint natural guardians of their minor children and are equally charged with their care, nurture, welfare and education, and the care and management of their estates." Parental rights and responsibilities continue despite divorce. Providing insurance is surely part of the proper "care" and "welfare" that parents should provide for their children, as evidenced by the number of child support decrees requiring the non-custodial parent to pay for a minor child's insurance coverage. See Miss.Code Ann. § 93-5-23 (Supp.1992). A stricter interpretation could dissuade noncustodial parents from fulfilling the mandate to provide fully for the maintenance and support of their minor children.
Generally, a person may reside in more than one household. We do not require a child to relinquish residence with one parent in order to establish residence with the other nor have we ever before defined the terms "resident" or "residence" so restrictively.
Apparently, Aetna desires that we equate the term "residence" with the term "domicile." The law is clear that a person can have but one domicile. In re Estate of Burshiem, 483 N.W.2d 175 (N.D.1992); In re Marriage of Tucker, 277 Cal.Rptr. 403, 226 Cal.App.3d 1249 (Cal.Ct.App.1991); Laufer v. Hauge, 528 N.Y.S.2d 878, 140 A.D.2d 671 (N.Y.App.Div.1988); Mutual Service Casualty Insurance Co. v. Olson, 402 N.W.2d 621 (Minn.App.1987); Davis ex rel. Davis v. Maryland Casualty Co., 76 N.C.App. 102, 331 S.E.2d 744 (N.C.Ct.App.1985); Gowins v. Gowins, 466 So.2d 32 (La.1985). Once established, a person's domicile remains stationary absent a clear indication of intent to abandon the existing domicile and to establish another. However, one may still have other residences. See Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 109 S.Ct. 1597, 104 L.Ed.2d 29 (1989) (person can reside at one place but be domiciled at another).
Residence is an entirely different and more flexible concept. The limitations applicable to one's domicile do not apply to one's residence. For instance, a person may have multiple residences simultaneously. In re Estate of Burshiem, 483 N.W.2d 175 (N.D.1992); In re Marriage of Tucker, 226 Cal. App.3d 1249, 277 Cal.Rptr. 403 (Cal.App.Ct.1991); Laufer v. Hauge, 140 A.D.2d 671, 528 N.Y.S.2d 878 (N.Y.App.Div.1988); Mutual Service Casualty Insurance Co. v. Olson, 402 N.W.2d 621 (Minn.Ct.App.1987); Davis ex rel. Davis v. Maryland Casualty Co., 76 N.C.App. 102, 331 S.E.2d 744 (N.C.Ct.App.1985); Gowins v. Gowins, 466 So.2d 32 (La.1985). Further, a dwelling place need not be fixed and permanent in order to qualify as a residence. Even a temporary and transient habitation can qualify. See Huffman v. Huffman, 232 Neb. 742, 441 N.W.2d 899 (1989); In re Brown, 132 Misc.2d 811, 505 N.Y.S.2d 334 (N.Y.Sur.1986); see also Black's Law Dictionary, "Domicile" at 572 (4th ed. 1951) ("'Domicile' and 'residence' . are frequently distinguished, in that domicile is the home, the fixed place of habitation; while residence is a transient place of dwelling."). To merge these two concepts would constitute an abrupt departure from prior caselaw in most jurisdictions, including ours. See Jones v. State, 207 Miss. 208, 42 So.2d 123 (1949) ("Ordinarily, 'domicile' and 'residence' are not synonymous or controvertible terms."); accord, Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 109 S.Ct. 1597, 104 L.Ed.2d 29 (1989); McMahon v. Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Ass'n, 596 So.2d 1384 (La.Ct.App.1992); Greenwood v. Hildebrand, 357 Pa.Super. 253, 515 A.2d 963 (Pa.Super.1986).
A more narrow construction of "residence" would bear no resemblance to the term's commonly accepted meaning. Former President of the United States, George Bush, for instance, was a resident of Texas and Maine, in addition to being a resident of Washington, D.C. His "official residence" was a hotel suite in Houston, Texas, although he stayed there on a relatively infrequent and transient basis. Likewise, college students are still residents of their parents' home even if they rarely return there during the school year.
It has been held that "the term 'residence' imports merely having abode at a particular place which may be one of any number of such places at which one is, at least from time to time, physically present." In re Brown, 505 N.Y.S.2d 334, 132 Misc.2d 811 (N.Y.Sur.1986). Whether a person "resides" at a particular location is a practical question which turns on the degree of one's attachment to a particular place of abode. In the instant case, Junior's .attachment to his father's household was considerable. He had a room. He had clothing and personal possessions there. He stayed there at least occasionally. He depended, in part, on his father to provide transportation and money. His father carried him on a hospitalization insurance policy. Moreover, he was still his father's son and a part of his father's family. The trial court found each of these facts to be true and concluded in a very thoughtful and astute opinion that Junior was sufficiently connected to his father's household to be considered a resident thereof. The trial court's findings are fully supported by the record and are not manifestly erroneous.
Other jurisdictions are split as to whether a child of divorced or separated parents continues to be a "resident" of both parents' households within the meaning of an uninsured motorist provision in a parent's insurance policy. See David B. Harrison, Annotation, Who Is "Member" or "Resident" of Same "Family" or "Household," Within No-Fault or Uninsured Motorist Provisions of Motor Vehicle Insurance Policy, 96 A.L.R.3d 804 (1979); Couch on Insurance 2d § 45:637 (1981). Numerous courts have found that a minor child may be considered a member or resident of a non-custodial parent's household for purposes of uninsured motorist coverage. Snedegar v. Midwestern Indemnity Co., 44 Ohio App.3d 64, 541 N.E.2d 90 (1988); Grange Mutual Casualty Co. v. Brinkley, 182 Ga.App. 273, 355 S.E.2d 767 (1987); Alava v. Allstate Insurance Co., 497 So.2d 1286 (Fla.App. 3 Dist.1986); Ferret v. Allstate Insurance Co., 106 Idaho 696, 682 P.2d 649 (App.1984); Bond v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 407 So.2d 401 (La.1981). Other courts, however, have rejected the extension of coverage. Davis v. Hartford Insurance Co., 456 So.2d 302 (Ala.1984); Pierce v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 29 Wash.App. 32, 627 P.2d 152 (1981). We believe the former is the better approach.
A minor is legally unable to establish a residence separate and apart from his or her parents. Because a child's parents are unable to live together or because custody is granted to one parent, the other party's parental rights are not extinguished. An award of physical custody is never etched in stone. It may be changed or modified as material changes in circumstances dictate. When a child reaches the age of fourteen, he may even choose the parent with whom he prefers to stay. In some cases, joint physical custody may be arranged.
Our laws require that where the evidence shows that both parents have separate incomes or estates, each shall contribute to the support and maintenance of the children of the marriage to the extent of his or her financial ability. Miss.Code Ann. § 93-5-23 (1972). Moreover, legally responsible parents may be required by the court to provide health insurance for their children. Miss. Code Ann. § 93-5-23 (Supp.1992). Just as a child remains a member of both households when his parents divorce, so each parent remains a parent to that child. Parental responsibilities are not predicated upon love or affection for the child or the frequency of their visits. Neither are they based upon the parents' decision to live together or apart or even marital status. Miss.Code Ann. § 93-13-1 (Supp.1992).
Where one parent is precluded from recovering under an insurance policy covering the minor child, a disproportionate burden of the loss may fall on the other parent. Further, it is often the non-custodial parent who is in a better financial position to maintain insurance policies on the minor children. Thus, to thwart the non-custodial parent's ability to provide uninsured motorist coverage for his children and recover under any policies he holds could serve not only to limit the protection available to the child, but also adversely impact the custodial parent.
A non-custodial parent is just as much a "parent" as a custodial parent and the child is still a member of the non-custodial parent's family. Consequently, the child is still a "resident" in the household of the noncustodial parent. We hold, therefore, that a child is a resident of both parents' households until he or she reaches the age of majority or becomes fully emancipated.
The chancellor found that Junior was a resident of his father's household, and thus qualified as an insured under Williams' uninsured motorist policy with Aetna. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the chancery court dismissing Aetna's claim.
AFFIRMED.
DAN M. LEE, P.J., and SULLIVAN, BANKS, JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr. and SMITH, JJ., concur.
HAWKINS, C.J., dissents with separate written opinion joined by PRATHER, P.J., and PITTMAN, J.
. While we recognize that the conduct of Hal Otis Williams, Sr. was reprehensible in this case, we do not address these facts because they do not go to the merits of the issue now before us. The chancellor properly removed Williams as administrator of his son's estate and ordered him to pay a pro rata share of the insurance proceeds to the other heirs.
. Compare 26 U.S.C. § 152 (1986) with the former requirements for claiming minor children as dependents.
. We note that Miss.Code Ann. § 11-7-13 provides that an action for wrongful death may be brought "by the parent for the death of a child" without any qualifications such as those sought by Aetna.