Case Name: KILLEEN v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1986-04-21
Citations: 151 Mich. App. 7
Docket Number: Docket No. 77031
Parties: KILLEEN v DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Judges: Before: Allen, P.J., and J. H. Gillis and W. J. Giovan, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 151
Pages: 7–18

Head Matter:
KILLEEN v DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Docket No. 77031.
Submitted January 8, 1985, at Lansing.
Decided April 21, 1986.
Leave to appeal applied for.
Robert P. Becker died after sustaining injuries in an accident wherein his motor vehicle crossed the center line of Ballenger Highway in Genesee County and rolled down an embankment. Plaintiff, George Killeen, as personal representative of the estate of the decedent, filed a claim in the Court of Claims against defendant, Department of Transportation. Plaintiff alleged that the state assumed jurisdiction of the highway in 1968 and 1969, in connection with the construction of the 1-69 and 1-75 interchange in Genesee County, and that defendant’s negligent design and construction of the portion of the highway involved in the accident was the proximate cause of decedent’s death. The Court of Claims, Thomas L. Brown, J., granted summary judgment in favor of defendant, after ruling that the county, and not the state, had jurisdiction of the highway at the time of the accident. Plaintiff appealed. Held:
1. The state did not have jurisdiction of the highway at the time of decedent’s accident. Therefore, as a matter of law, defendant cannot be subject to tort liability. The Court of Claims properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendant.
2. The state has statutory authority to contract for and perform work on any highway, road or street in Michigan. The Court of Appeals therefore rejected plaintiffs claim that defendant acted ultra vires when it performed work on Ballenger Highway.
3. Defendant did not create an intentional nuisance in fact as alleged by plaintiff.
Affirmed.
W. J. Giovan, J., dissented. He would hold that any person sustaining bodily injury by reason of a failure of a governmental agency to properly maintain and repair a highway may recover damages for his injury if, inter alia, he establishes that his injury was causally related to the government agency’s breach of its duty to maintain the highway at the time the governmental agency had jurisdiction. The governmental agency’s jurisdiction need not extend to the time of injury. He would reverse and remand for further proceedings.
References
Am Jur 2d, Highways, Streets, and Bridges §§ 342-356.
See the annotations in the ALR3d/4th Quick Index under Highways and Streets § 7.
Opinion of the Court
1. Highways — Governmental Immunity.
The governmental immunity act limits liability for highway maintenance to the governmental unit having jurisdiction over the road at the time of the injury (MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996[102]).
2. Highways — Jurisdiction — Liability.
The duty to maintain a highway in reasonable repair so that it is reasonably safe and convenient for public travel is exclusive with the governmental unit having jurisdiction over that highway and cannot be superimposed upon other governmental agencies; therefore, a governmental unit may not incur liability for negligent repair and maintenance of a highway outside its jurisdiction (MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996[102]).
Dissent by W. J. Giovan, J.
3. Highways —• Negligence — Repair.
Any person sustaining bodily injury by reason of a failure of a governmental agency to properly maintain and repair a highway may recover damages for his injury if, inter alia, he establishes that his injury was causally related to the governmental agency’s breach of its duty to maintain the highway at the time the governmental agency had jurisdiction; the governmental agency’s jurisdiction need not extend to the time of injury (MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996[102]).
John J. Kalo, for plaintiff.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Louis J. Caruso, Solicitor General, and Carl K. Carlsen and Jerrold H. Keyworth, Assistant Attorneys General, for the defendants.
Before: Allen, P.J., and J. H. Gillis and W. J. Giovan, JJ.
Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
Allen, P.J.
Plaintiff appeals from a summary judgment rendered by the Court of Claims on the basis that the defendant was immune from suit.
Plaintiffs decedent died as a result of injuries he sustained on November 4, 1980, when his motor vehicle crossed the center line of Ballenger Highway in Genesee County and rolled down an embankment. Asserting a claim of negligent design and construction, the complaint alleged that in 1968 and 1969, in connection with the construction of the 1-69 and 1-75 interchange in Genesee County, the state assumed jurisdiction of the highway and that the "superelevation" of that portion of the highway, which was constructed and designed by the state, was the proximate cause of decedent's death.
Defendant moved for summary judgment, claiming that it was immune from suit as a matter of law because the county, not the state, had jurisdiction of the roadway at the time of the accident. Plaintiff filed a responsive affidavit alleging that, in 1953-54 and in 1968-69, the state had assumed jurisdiction over the roadway for the purpose of implementing expressway projects and during those periods had relocated, redesigned and reconstructed the highway prior to restoring jurisdiction to the county.
MCL 691.1407; MSA 3.996(107) provides:
Except as in this act otherwise provided, all governmental agencies shall be immune from tort liability in all cases wherein the government agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function. Except as otherwise pro vided herein, this act shall not be construed as modifying or restricting the immunity of the state from tort liability as it existed heretofore, which immunity is affirmed.
The design, construction, and maintenance of a highway constitute the exercise or discharge of a governmental function. Thomas v Dep't of State Highways, 398 Mich 1; 247 NW2d 530 (1976). See also Ross v Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567; 363 NW2d 641 (1984). The only statutory exception to governmental immunity under which the state can be liable is found in MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102), which provides in part:
Each governmental agency having jurisdiction over any highway shall maintain the highway in reasonable repair so that it is reasonably safe and convenient for public travel. Any person sustaining bodily injury or damage to his property by reason of failure of any governmental agency to keep any highway under its jurisdiction in reasonable repair, and in condition reasonably safe and fit for travel, may recover the damages suffered by him from such governmental agency.
Relying on Potes v Dep't of State Highways, 128 Mich App 765; 341 NW2d 210 (1983), the trial court granted summary judgment for defendant. The facts of the Potes case are virtually identical to those in the case at bar, involving the same stretch of highway, the same kind of single vehicle accident, and the same allegations of negligence against the Department of State Highways. As here, the plaintiff contended that the state was liable for design and construction defects created by the state before it relinquished jurisdiction of the highway to the county. The Potes Court, affirming accelerated judgment in favor of the Department of State Highways, construed MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102) as limiting liability to the governmental agency having jurisdiction of the road at the time of the accident.
In the same spirit, we view that statutory exception as parting the immunity curtain only as to the governmental unit having jurisdiction of the subject roadway at the time of the accident. Application of this rule is compatible with the language of MCL 224.21; MSA 9.121, which places the duty to keep county roads in reasonable repair exclusively upon the counties. See Mullins v Wayne County, 16 Mich App 365; 168 NW2d 246 (1969), lv den 382 Mich 791 (1969). To hold two governmental units responsible for correcting design or construction defects could result in confusion and inefficiency. [128 Mich App 769.]
We agree with Potes and disagree that somehow or other liability might attach to the state even though maintenance and repair of the highway had been under the jurisdiction of the county for upwards of ten years before the accident. It is undisputed that, at the time of the accident, Ballenger Highway was a county primary road, under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Genesee County Road Commission. Contrary to the clear words of the statute that liability is imposed on governmental agencies which fail "to keep any highway under its jurisdiction in reasonable repair," the dissent argues that liability extends to a governmental agency which some time in the past had jurisdiction. We don't construe the statute that broadly. Had the Legislature intended to impose liability on governmental units which at one time had jurisdiction over a highway but did not have such jurisdiction at the time of the accident, the Legislature could easily have worded the statute to read "failure . to keep any highway which at any time was under its jurisdiction in reasonable repair."
The argument that two authorities could, for purposes of determining liability for an unsafe highway, both have jurisdiction over the road was rejected in Austin v Romulus, 101 Mich App 662; 300 NW2d 672 (1980), lv den 411 Mich 955 (1981). Similar results have been reached in Furness v Public Service Comm, 100 Mich App 365; 299 NW2d 35 (1980), Summerville v Kalamazoo Road Comm'rs, 77 Mich App 580; 259 NW2d 206 (1977); lv den 402 Mich 924 (1978); Bennett v Lansing, 52 Mich App 289; 217 NW2d 54 (1974), lv den 399 Mich 840 (1977).
For similar reasons we disagree with plaintiff that Hargis v Dearborn Heights, 34 Mich App 594; 192 NW2d 44 (1971), lv den 386 Mich 751 (1971), should control. As noted in Potes, the factual situation in Hargis arose prior to the effective date of MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102). The dissent considers that distinction irrelevant because the statutes in effect at the time of Hargis were similar to MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102). We disagree. That rationale completely ignores the recent line of cases beginning with Bennett and ending with Austin, supra, which expressly reject the theory that two authorities have jurisdiction for determining liability of an allegedly unsafe highway. Further, we conclude that, to the extent that Hargis conflicts with Potes, Hargis is rejected. Accordingly, we find no error as to issue i raised by plaintiff on appeal.
In issue ii, plaintiff argues that, when the state became involved in the relocation of Ballenger Highway in the 1950s and late 1960s, the statute under which the state acted, 1957 PA 262, only permitted the county to contract with the state regarding state trunklines, and since Ballenger Highway was not then a state trunkline highway, the state acted ultra vires and immunity does not attach. McCann v Michigan, 398 Mich 65; 247 NW2d 521 (1976). Contrary to plaintiff's claim, 1957 PA 262, in what is now MCL 247.661(l)(e); MSA 9.1097(ll)(l)(e), specifically grants the state the authority to perform work on any highway, road, or street:
(g) The state highway commissioner may enter into agreements with boards of county road commissioners and with incorporated cities and villages to perform work on any highway, road or street, and such agreements may provide for the performance by any of the contracting parties of any of the work contemplated by such contract including engineering services and the acquisition of rights-of-way in connection therewith, by purchase or condemnation by any of the contracting parties in its own name, and such agreements may provide for joint participation in the costs, but only to the extent that the contracting parties are otherwise authorized by law to expend moneys on such highways, roads or streets.
It is clear that the state was discharging a governmental function at the time it entered into the contract and that its acts were not ultra vires, as plaintiff maintains.
In issue in, plaintiff argues that count ii of the first amended complaint alleges that defendant created an intentional nuisance in fact which, under Michigan law, is not barred by governmental immunity. Citing Madajski v Bay County Dep't of Public Works, 99 Mich App 158; 297 NW2d 642 (1980), plaintiff contends that jurisdiction is not an element necessary for a governmental unit to be held liable for intentional nuisance in fact. Unlike the instant case, Madajski involved immunity given a county under MCL 250.61; MSA 9.901 for deficiencies in the maintenance of a portion of state highway which the county had contracted with the State Highway Commission to maintain. In that case jurisdiction had been retained by the state. In the instant case there is no contract and there is no jurisdiction retained by the state. Accordingly, we find no liability under count ii.
Affirmed. No costs, a public question being involved.
J. H. Gillis, J., concurred.