Case Name: MAYOR AND COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF BUTLER v. HORTMAN
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1944-03-11
Citations: 70 Ga. App. 855
Docket Number: 30360
Parties: MAYOR AND COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF BUTLER v. HORTMAN.
Judges: MacIntyre and Parher, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Georgia Appeals Reports
Volume: 70
Pages: 855–859

Head Matter:
30360.
MAYOR AND COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF BUTLER v. HORTMAN.
Decided March 11, 1944.
Rehearing denied March 30, 1944.
Jule Felton, for plaintiff in error. B. 8. & G. W. Foy, contra.

Opinion:
Sutton, P. J.
This is a companion case to Mayor &c. of Butler v. Hortman, ante. The facts of both cases are substantially the same, except that in the present case the salary sued for was for the months of July and August, 1943; and the defendant contends that the office held by the plaintiff was abolished by an ordinance passed on August 3, 1943, which provided as follows: "Be it ordained by the Mayor and Council of the City of Butler, and it is hereby ordained by authority of the same, that from and after the passage of this act, the mayor and council of the City of Butler, Georgia, shall have authority to employ one marshal and the office of any other marshal by whatever name called, is hereby abolished. And to make the matter entirely clear, it is ordained that the office now held by J. D. Cook as city marshal is continued and upheld, and the office of marshal occupied by G. J. Hortman prior to June 1, 1943, is hereby specifically abolished, together with all the incidents of the same. This ordinance to take effect at once." The judge, trying the case without a jury, rendered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and the exception here is to that judgment.
The plaintiff was either the marshal or deputy marshal of the city, and therefore a public officer with his term fixed by law under the provisions of the city charter. Under the ruling in Mayor &c. of Butler v. Hortman, supra, he can not be legally removed from that office without a notice and hearing on the charge or charges preferred against him and an opportunity to defend, and he was entitled to collect his salary at least up to August 3, 1943. However, there is an additional question in this case, and that is as to the validity of the ordinance of August 3, 1943, which sought to abolish the office held by the plaintiff. The plaintiff in error contends that, since it was optional with the city as to whether it would elect a deputy marshal or not, it was also within its power, after it had elected the plaintiff to such office, to abolish the office at its pleasure. In City of Nashville v. Whitley, 53 Ga. App. 587, 588 (186 S. E. 717), it was said: "The term of office by the charter was for one jrear. The mayor and council had the power to have an election. They acted. The elections was regular; and even if the resolution is construed to mean an attempt to elect for one month, or at will, or any other time than that prescribed by the charter, this limit of the legal period of time did not change the charter or limit the term. Having the power to elect, and having elected, the election was valid for the charter period." The ease of Raley v. Warrenton, 120 Ga. 365 (47 S. E. 972), cited by the plaintiff in error, is distinguishable on its facts from the present case. There the person dispensed with had not been elected to a charter office. But even in that case, the same principle of law was recognized and stated as is being ruled in this case, viz: "One regularly elected to the charter office of marshal of the Town of Warrenton can not, during the term for -which he was elected, be legally' discharged from that office, unless removed in the manner prescribed by law." It was held in Wilson v. Dalton, 135 Ga. 240 (2) (69 S. E. 163): "Where an act of the legislature amending a municipal charter provided that the city 'shall be and is authorized to create the office of city tax-receiver/ prescribed his duties and the mode of his election by popular vote, and declared that he should be elected for a term of two years, after the municipal authorities had passed an ordinance creating the office of city tax-receiver, and the officer to fill such place had been duly elected for the term fixed by the charter and qualified, it was not within the power of such municipal authorities, at their option, during such term, to abolish the office." In the present case, the charter of the defendant city provided that the mayor and aldermen should elect a marshal, and if they deemed it necessary, a deputy marshal, each of whom, unless removed; was to remain in office two years. The mayor and council met and elected the plaintiff and J. D. Cook to the positions of marshal and deputy marshal, and they thereby became public officers with their terms fixed by the legislature, and not by the municipal authorities. Under these circumstances, after the plaintiff was elected and had qualified as such officer, the municipal authorities could not, during his term, abolish the office, and the ordinance passed by the city on August 3, 1943, purporting to abolish the office held by the plaintiff, was invalid and not binding upon the plaintiff. It follows that the judge did not err in rendering judgment in favor of the plaintiff against the defendant for the. amount sued for in this ease. Judgment affirmed.
MacIntyre and Parher, JJ., concur.