Case Name: Mary Jo KELLY, Petitioner, v. William KELLY, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1991-07-03
Citations: 583 So. 2d 667
Docket Number: No. 76946
Parties: Mary Jo KELLY, Petitioner, v. William KELLY, Respondent.
Judges: SHAW, C.J., and BARKETT, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 583
Pages: 667–669

Head Matter:
Mary Jo KELLY, Petitioner, v. William KELLY, Respondent.
No. 76946.
Supreme Court of Florida.
July 3, 1991.
Gerald C. Surfus and Philip S. Prosch, Surfus & Prosch, Sarasota, for petitioner.
James E. Aker, Icard, Merrill, Cullis, Timm, Furen & Ginsburg, P.A., Sarasota, for respondent.

Opinion:
McDonald, justice.
We review Kelly v. Kelly, 568 So.2d 70 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990), because of conflict with Iodice v. Scoville, 460 So.2d 576 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.
The issue presented is what adjustments should be made in the division of profits from the sale of what was once jointly owned marital property. The essential facts as recited by the district court are as follows:
The appellant, Mary Jo Kelly, and the appellee, William Kelly, were divorced in 1982. The court granted the wife possession of the marital home until the parties' minor child attained age eighteen. After the child reached majority, the court entered a final supplemental judgment ordering an equal division of the proceeds from the sale of the property. In its order, the trial court denied the wife credit for one-half the mortgage payments and expenses for repairs and maintenance, citing the husband's setoff claim of one-half of the home's rental value for the years she and their child were in possession....
The alimony and support clauses of the final judgment of dissolution, entered in 1982, provided:
The Wife is given the use and possession of the marital home until the child reaches majority at which time the house shall be sold and the equity divided equally between the parties. The Husband and Wife shall each contribute one-half of the monies each year for the payment of taxes and insurance on the home.
Several months before the minor child was to become eighteen, the wife petitioned for a modification in alimony and a declaratory judgment that she receive credit for "carrying expenses" from the proceeds of the sale of the marital residence. The husband counterclaimed for partition and sought a setoff for rental value against the wife's claim.
568 So.2d at 70-71 (footnote omitted).
The district court granted the former wife's claim for one-half of the repair and maintenance costs and one-half of the mortgage payments to the extent the principal was reduced, but denied her claim for half of the interest payments. It also denied the former husband's claim for credit for fair rental value because possession had been granted to the former wife in the final judgment. We approve in part and quash in part.
The district court correctly denied the former husband's claim for rental value. The rights of an out-of-possession co-tentant for credit for fair rental value depends on the circumstances. If such person is ousted by a court order following a marriage dissolution, and no reimbursement for rental value is provided in that judgment, it is assumed that the trial judge intended that there be none. We agree with Goolsby v. Wiley, 547 So.2d 227 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989), and the opinion under review on this point.
On the issue of' whether the spouse in possession who pays the mortgage payments is entitled to one-half of the full mortgage payments or only one-half of the principal, we find merit in the former wife's argument that she is entitled to re-imbursment for one-half the full mortgage payments. The rule applicable to tenancies in common is that all owners contribute equally to the maintenance of the ownership interest in the property. Potter v. Garrett, 52 So.2d 115 (Fla.1951). After divorce, the parties become tenants in common and, as such, have equal responsibility in making all payments necessary to maintain their ownership of the property. On this issue, therefore, we approve Iodice and Brandt v. Brandt, 525 So.2d 1017 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988).
We therefore approve in part and quash in part the decision under review and remand with instructions for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
SHAW, C.J., and BARKETT, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur.
HARDING, J., dissents with an opinion, in which OVERTON, J., concurs.
The original divorce judgment did not address the mortgage payments. Should a trial judge, in adjusting the equities between the parties, determine that one party should bear the burden of making principal and interest payments without adjustment or credit when the property is sold, that judge should explicitly do so in the final judgment.