Case Name: Marquat and Marquat agt. Marquat and wife
Court: New York Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1853-02
Citations: 7 How. Pr. 417
Docket Number: 
Parties: Marquat and Marquat agt. Marquat and wife.
Judges: 
Reporter: Howard's Practice Reports
Volume: 7
Pages: 417–429

Head Matter:
SUPREME COURT.
Marquat and Marquat agt. Marquat and wife.
The mere fact that the plaintiffs furnished to the defendants money to purchase land, does not give them an equitable lien on such land for the money so advanced. Such lien only exists as between vendor and vendee, or those representing them.
And where, as an inducement to the lending of such money, the, defendants agreed to execute to the plaintiffs a mortgage on the lands purchased, held, that such promise was void by the statute of frauds. Such a contract being for the conveyance of an interest inlands, to be valid, must be in writing and subscribed by the party agreeing to execute the mortgage.
The advancing of the money by the plaintiffs in such case, is not such a part performance as will take the case out of the statute of frauds.
Where an action was commenced in such case against husband and wife, the title to the land purchased with the money lent having been taken in the name of the wife, and the only specific relief demanded in the complaint, was that the defendants execute to the plaintiffs a lien on such lands, by mortgage or otherwise, to secure the money so advanced, with a further demand for such other or further relief as the court might deem proper, and the' defendants answered, denying, among other things, that the money was advanced on the credit of the said defendants, and alleging that it was advanced on the credit of a third person, which was denied in the reply, and on the trial it was established that the money was advanced on the credit of the defendants, and at their request, held (Justice Parker dissenting), that the plaintiffs having failed to establish an equitable lien, were not entitled to recover against the husband the money so advanced, but that the complaint should be dismissed as to both defendants.
Justice Parker, in dissenting, claimed that the case came within section 275 of the Code, and that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover judgment for the money so advanced, against the husband, who alone was legally capable of contracting, and that the plaintiffs ought not to be put to a second action to recover such judgment.
The practice applicable to such a case, before and since the adoption of the Code, reviewed and discussed.
Albany General Term, Feb. 1853
before Justices Parker, Wright and Harris. The' plaintiffs state in their complaint, that about the 30th of April 1849, they lent to the defendants $300, to enable them to purchase certain real estate described in the complaint, upon an agreement that the defendants should secure the repayment of the loan by a lien upon the premises to be purchased; that the purchase was made, and the title to the lands had become vested in the defendant Elizabeth. That though the whole amount of $300, with the interest thereon, is still due to the plaintiffs from the defendants, they refuse to secure the plaintiffs' therefor. The relief demanded is that the defendants may be compelled to execute to the plaintiffs a lien upon the lands described, by mortgage or otherwise, to secure the loan with interest; or that the plaintiffs may have such other or further relief, as the court may deem proper in the premises.
The defendants in their answer, denied that they had agreed to secure the loan by a lien upon the land, or that the plaintiffs had made the loan upon any such promise; and denied also that the loan was made on the credit of the defendants, and set up that it was made to and for the benefit of one David Marquat. The plaintiffs in their reply reaffirmed that the loan was made to the defendants and not to said David Marquat.
The cause was tried without a jury, at the Ulster circuit, in December 1851, before Mr. Justice Parker, who decided that the plaintiffs had no equitable lien on the premises, and were not entitled to enforce the execution of a mortgage by the defendants; but that the plaintiffs were entitled to a judgment against the defendant Peter Marquat, for the $300, and the interest thereon; and that as to the other defendant, the complaint should be dismissed without costs.
The following-is an extract from the opinion delivered by Justice Parker, at the circuit:
“ This is not a case in which the plaintiffs have an equitable lien for the purchase money; such lien exists only as between vendor and vendee, or those representing them; such, for example, as the personal representatives of the vendor; or where a third person interested in a claim against the personal estate of the vendee, by way of marshalling assets, compels the vendor to enforce his lien on the land, instead of obtaining payment out of the personal assets of the vendee. Here the plaintiffs were not the vendors of the land to the defendants. The mere fact that they furnished the money to make the purchase, gives them no equitable lien (2 Story Eq, Jur. § 12, 27, et seq. and cases there cited).
But it is shown that there was an agreement on the part of Peter Marquat to execute to the plaintiffs a mortgage on the lands. This agreement, if valid, would give the plaintiffs a'remedy only against Peter Marquat, who could mortgage no more than his life interest in the premises. His wife being a feme covert, could make no contract to bind herself personally. But the agreement to execute a mortgage was void by the statute of frauds. It was an agreement to convey an interest in lands, that, to be valid, should have been in writing and not by parol (2 R. S. 3d ed. 194, § 6, 8).
If the title deeds of defendants had been actually deposited with the plaintiffs as security for the money advanced, it would be held to be an equitable mortgage and not within the operation of the statute of frauds (2 Story Eg. Jur. § 10, 20); but even that doctrine has been very much questioned (17 Vesey, 231; 2 Ves. Sf Bea. 84; 17 Ves. 371: 19 Ves. 480); and the courts have uniformly said they can go no further; and where the deeds are delivered, not as a pledge but for the purpose of having a legal mortgage prepared, there would be no lien, and the case would be within the statute (2 Story Eg. Jur. § 10, 20; 9 Ves. 115; 12 Ves. 199; 2 Cox, 247; Turner, 280; 6 Price, 501; 3 Brown, 401).
Advancing the money on the part of the plaintiffs, was not such a part performance as would take the case out of the statute (2 Story Eg. §760). It only entitles the plaintiffs to recover it back—the agreement being void. Such relief only are the plaintiffs entitled to on the facts alleged and proved in this case.
The plaintiffs must have judgment against Peter Marquat for $300, and interest from 30th April 1849; and as to his wife, the complaint must be dismissed. But considering the part she has taken in the transaction, and what she is proven to have said in regard to it, she must not recover costs against the plaintiffs.”
Judgment having been perfected upon the judgment thus rendered, the defendant, Peter Marquat, appealed to the general term.
John Van Burén, of Kingston, for Plaintiffs.
J. O. Linderman, for Defendants.

Opinion:
By the Court, Harris, Justice.
The complaint, so far as it states a cause of action at all, states matters of exclusive equitable cognizance. The plaintiffs allege that the defendants had agreed to execute a mortgage to secure a loan of money, and having refused to do so, they bring their action to compel them to perform their agreement. There is some evidence to show that Peter Marquat did promise to execute such a mortgage, but there -was no valid agreement to that effect. The plaintiffs have therefore failed to sustain their action according to the allegations in their complaint, and, of course, they are not entitled to the specific relief demanded. The question now is, whether they can, in this action, recover judgment against one of the defendants for the money loaned?
The 375th section of the Code authorizes the court in any case in which the defendant has answered, to grant any relief consistent with the case made by the complaint and embraced within the issue. In other words, the judgment must be secundum allegata et probata. It must be appropriate to the facts alleged and proved. Here the case made by the complaint is that the defendants had agreed to secure the plaintiffs for their loan by a lien upon certain premises, and had unjustly refused to keep the agreement. This is controverted by the defendants. No other material isssue has been made. Whether or not the plaintiffs, when they brought their action, were entitled to a repayment of their loan is not stated. The recovery of the money due them is no part of the claim made in their complaint. It is not embraced in the issue.
The defendants have successfully resisted the claim against them, as it is stated in the complaint. The only material, issue in the case is decided in their favor, and yet judgment is rendered against one of them for a cause of action, which if it had been set forth in connexion with that stated in the complaint, would have rendered the complaint demurrable. The cause of action stated in the complaint is against both defendants, and that upon which the recovery has been had is against one only. Nor does it meet this difficulty to say that the cause of action upon which the plaintiffs have been allowed to recover, is involved in the case stated in the complaint. Suppose an action in the nature of replevin brought by the vendor of goods, on the ground that they have been fraudulently obtained, would it be pretended that if upon the allegation of fraud being controverted he should fail in sustaining his action, he could still recover for the price of the goods? Or, suppose he should bring his action against the vendee, alleging false representations, and fraudulent devices in making the purchase, as in Field agt. Morse (7 How. Pr. R. 12), would he be entitled to a judgment for his debt, though he failed upon the issues he had tendered by his complaint? The effect in such case would be, what it has been in this, that the successful party would be charged with the costs of the litigation. The party who has prevailed upon the whole issue has judgment rendered against him. Whatever else may be charged to the account of the reformed practice, it is not justly chargeable with such injustice. If the plaintiffs had brought their action against Peter Marquat alone, to recover their debt, it may be presumed that, if he justly owed them, he would not have defended the action. If he had defended it without success, he would have been justly chargeable with the costs of the litigation. The plaintiffs have, in fact, brought their action for a very different purpose. That action has been successfully defended, and yet the plaintiffs have recovered not only the amount of their loan with interest, but the costs of their unsuccessful litigation. Thus, though defeated, they have triumphed.
I admit that from the facts as they appear in the case, there is some reason to apprehend that the plaintiffs, after having assisted the defendants to secure the title to their property, are not likely to be well requited for their friendly aid. I would willingly, therefore, if it could be done upon any sound principles, relieve them from the payment of the costs of the action. But wholly misconceiving their remedy, they have brought their action upon a claim which they could not sustain. They have entirely failed upon the issue whichy the themselves chose to make, and they must share the fate of other unsuccessful litigants. I think the judgment should be reversed and that the complaint should be dismissed with costs.
Wright, J., concurred.