Case Name: STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. AHMED ELKWISNI, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
Court: New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 2006-04-06
Citations: 384 N.J. Super. 351
Docket Number: 
Parties: STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. AHMED ELKWISNI, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Superior Court Reports
Volume: 384
Pages: 351–395

Head Matter:
894 A.2d 1180
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. AHMED ELKWISNI, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division
Argued November 30, 2005
Decided April 6, 2006.
Before Judges WECKER, FUENTES and GRAVES.
Jeffrey J. Garrigan argued the cause for appellant (Cammarata, Nutty & Garrigan, attorneys; Thomas J. Cammarata, on the brief).
John J. Scaliti, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent {John L. Molinelli, Bergen County Prosecutor, attorney; Mr. Scaliti, of counsel and on the brief).

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FUENTES, J.A.D.
Defendant Ahmed Elkwisni was convicted after a jury trial of second-degree robbery, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; and third-degree possession of a weapon without a permit, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b. He was acquitted of kidnapping, armed robbery, aggravated assault, terroristic threats, and second-degree possession of a handgun for an unlawful purpose. The trial court sentenced defendant to -an aggregate term of four years, subject to an eighty-five percent parole ineligibility period under the No Early Release Act (NERA). N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. The court also imposed the mandatory fines and penalties.
Defendant now appeals raising the following arguments:
POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY PERMITTED THE STATE TO INTRODUCE A STATEMENT BY THE DEFENDANT ELKWISNI REGARDING THE LOCATION OF THE GUN USED IN THE ROBBERY SINCE THE STATEMENT WAS MADE WHILE HE WAS IN CUSTODY AND WITHOUT A VOLUNTARY, KNOWING AND INTELLIGENT WAIVER OF HIS FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS TO REMAIN SILENT AND TO HAVE COUNSEL PRESENT AFTER ADEQUATE ADVICE.
POINT TWO
THE PROSECUTOR'S REPEATED CROSS-EXAMINATION AND COMMENTS IN SUMMATION ON DEFENDANT'S SILENCE AT THE TIME OF HIS ARREST INFRINGED ON THE DEFENDANT'S PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND NEW JERSEY STATE LAW.
POINT THREE
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED BY DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE TO ORDER A NEW TRIAL AS THE VERDICT WAS AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
We agree with defendant's argument as to Point One. We are satisfied that the record developed before the trial court at a N.J.R.E. 104 hearing was insufficient, as a matter of law, to determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant voluntarily and knowingly waived his constitutional rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). See also State v. Adams, 127 N.J. 438, 447, 605 A.2d 1097 (1992). We are equally satisfied, however, that the appropriate remedy to correct this error is not reversal of defendant's conviction, but to remand this discrete issue to the trial court to conduct a new hearing on voluntariness.
We discern no legal basis to reverse defendant's conviction based on the arguments raised in Points II and III. The argument raised in Point III lacks sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11 — 3(e) (2). In the interest of clarity, we will nevertheless examine the argument raised in Point II, in order to delineate the proper boundaries of cross-examination by the State when a defendant testifies regarding statements he made to the police after his arrest. Here, defendant offered these statements in support of his affirmative defense of duress.
As the facts here illustrate, the line of demarcation between legitimate impeachment of a defendant's credibility through the use of prior inconsistent statements, and improper inquiry or comment on defendant's constitutional right to remain silent, is not always clear. This question was only obliquely noted by the Supreme Court in State v. Muhammad, 182 N.J. 551, 566 n. 3, 868 A.2d 302 (2005), and was not directly raised in State v. Black, 380 N.J.Super. 581, 883 A.2d 1065 (App.Div.2005), our most recent post-Muhammad opinion.
This case gives us the opportunity to address the issue directly, and, in the process, provide guidance to the trial courts on how to: (1) safeguard a defendant's constitutional right to remain silent, by setting strict limits on the scope of the State's cross-examination; and (2) craft jury instructions that will enable jurors to distinguish between legitimate evidence that may affect a defendant's credibility, and an unconstitutional inference of culpability based on a defendant's post-arrest silence.
We will consider all of defendant's arguments on appeal in the context of the following facts, which we summarize here based on the evidence presented at trial.
I
The Facts
On March 24, 2003, at approximately 8:30 p.m., Ibrahim Samha and defendant entered a convenience store in Fairfield owned and operated by Jamal Darwish. The two men approached Darwish while he was sitting behind the cash register and Samha pointed a handgun at Darwish's head and demanded money. Samha was wearing blue transparent gloves. Samha then pulled the storekeeper from behind the counter, and struck him in the face and head several times with the handgun. According to Darwish, while he was on the floor, defendant kicked him repeatedly in the stomach. Both men then dragged the victim to an aisle, in an apparent attempt to shield him from the view of any passerby. Samha kneeled on Darwish's neck, maintaining the gun pointed at his head.
According to Darwish, defendant obtained the keys to the store and, after some initial difficulty, was able to lock the entrance doors. Darwish was then tied up with duct tape, while Samha continued to kneel on him, demanding money and making repeated threats to kill him. Darwish finally capitulated to the assailants' demands, and gave defendant directions on how to open the register. Dissatisfied with the amount of money in the register, defendant allegedly told Samha to "finish [Darwish] off."
While the robbery was in progress, a customer, subsequently identified as Alan Pollock, tried to enter the store, only to discover the door was locked. Pollock testified that he saw defendant walk to the cash register and attempt to open it. Pollock also observed defendant wave his arms at him, as if to indicate that the store was closed. Although Pollock initially left, he quickly returned and observed Samha standing behind the counter ripping phone cards off the wall. The police arrived shortly thereafter.
Upon their arrival, the police observed Darwish inside the store, lying on the floor, with his hands tied with duct tape. He was also bleeding from the head. Darwish testified that as the police attempted to break down the locked door, defendant told Samha to cut the duct tape from Darwish's hands. It was also around this time that defendant took possession of the gun, and hid it. According to defendant, he did this to avoid the potential for a violent confrontation with the police.
Prior to the police forcibly entering the store, Darwish testified that one of the defendants gave him the store key. All three men then walked, single file, toward the front of the store, with Darwish in the front, Samha behind him, and defendant in the rear. Darwish opened the door, and the police immediately rushed in and ordered the two defendants to the ground.
II
The Miranda Issue
During the trial, at the completion of the victim's testimony, the trial court excused the jury, and conducted a N.J.R.E. 104 hearing to determine the admissibility of an oral statement allegedly made by defendant after he was in police custody. Richard Uram was the first Garfield police officer to interact with defendant. Uram handcuffed defendant while he was on the ground, and placed him in the back of a police car. According to Uram, he read defendant his Miranda rights. At the time of defendant's arrest, Uram's main concern was the recovery of the handgun used in the robbery. Uram gave the following account of what transpired after he placed the handcuffed-defendant in his police car:
I began talking to [Elkwisni]. Well, first, after I arrested him, I — I read him his rights. I remind him again of his rights inside the ear and I asked him — I said, you know, believe there's a gun involved, this is a store, kids go in the store, if you hid it in the store, tell us where it is. I mean, God forbid a kid goes in there and grabs this gun and he ends up thinking it's a toy, he shoots somebody and he kills him. You know, we have to put the public safety—

Q. And you said that you reminded him of his rights in the car. Where was the first place that you advised him of his rights?
A. Once he was cuffed.
Q. All right. And was that a verbal or written form?
A. Verbal.
Q. And then you said you reminded him of his rights again in the car. What car are you referring to?
A. My police unit at the time.

Q. Okay. So the only two people in the car when you were reminding him of his rights in the car was you and the defendant Ahmed Elkwisni?
A. He was in the car, I was standing alongside the car speaking with him with the door open.
Q. Okay. You're standing alongside. Okay.
A. Yes. He was in the back.
Q. Now when you're having this conversation with him, I take it you're speaking in English?
A. Yes.
Q. And what about him? What is he speaking to you and after you advised him of his Miranda rights did he say anything to you.
A. He was — he was speaking. When he spoke to me, he speak [sic] English. At first he declined that there — he didn't know anything about a gun. As he's telling me this, he's looking around. He just appeared very nervous. He just kept looking right to left, right to left, looking — looking around and he just — he kept denying it, denying it, denying it. Then eventually he told me — he goes, "It's behind the Huggies."
Q. And nobody else was around other than — the other defendant was not there at the time, correct?
A. The other defendant had — had no contact whatsoever where I was.

Q. Now at a later point in time at headquarters, was there a written form given to the defendant with regards to his Miranda rights, Ahmed Elkwisni? Were you involved in that at all?
A. Not by me.
Q. That was another police officer?
A. I — if—if someone else gave it to him, I don't know. Maybe a detective did.
[Emphasis added.]
Uram gave the following additional facts during defense counsel's cross-examination:
Q. Okay. And what is this document?
A. Advising somebody of their Miranda rights.
Q. Okay. And what time is that document executed?
A. It says 11:30 p.m.
Q. Okay. You had arrested him much earlier in the evening, hadn't you?
A. Yes.
Q. In the incident report that you filled out—
A. Yes.
Q. —you never indicated that you read him his Miranda rights, did you? A. I don't believe I put it in the report.
Q. Customarily it would be included in there, wouldn't it?
A. I usually don't put it in there, only on DWI cases.
Q. Well, aren't you required to by statute?
A. To put it in the report?
Q. Correct.
A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. You also [in your report] used the words "with the safety of the public in mind"?
A. Correct.
Q. Do you normally qualify the reason that you're asking a suspect a question?
A. Can you repeat that?
Q. Do you normally qualify, indicate the reasoning for asking a suspect a particular question in your reports? You say the reason that you're asking the question.
A. I just put it down. I mean, I don't understand what you're trying to say.

Q. Okay. So when you normally fill these out, okay, in other cases other than this one, do you normally, customarily, in your regular course of filling these out state in your reports the reason that you're asking a suspect a particular question?

A. I just — if—if, I mean, sometimes you have to do things in order, like probable-cause order, you know?
Q. So you were trying to establish some reason or justification for asking him the question?
A. What was the — what was the line again?
Q. Well, the line was, "This officer, with the safety of the public in mind, asked." A. Right. Well, because that was my — I wanted to make sure whoever read it understood that's why I was asking him that question.
%
Q. Your testimony now is that you can remember an arrest a lot of arrests ago, maybe seventy-five arrests ago, we'll say, today even though there's no record of it of what you did that day?
A. When I place somebody in custody, I read them their rights.
Q. Is that something that you normally do?
A. That's how we're trained.
Q. So you're testifying from what you normally do. You don't necessarily know that you did it that day?
A. I know I did it that day because I do it every time I make an arrest.
Q. So you only know you did it that day because you customarily do it?
A. Because I always do it.
Uram was the only witness to testify at the N.J.R.E. 104 hearing. In fact, his testimony was the only evidence presented by the State in support of admitting the statements made by defendant shortly after he was arrested.
At the close of the testimony, defense counsel made the following argument in support of his application to exclude defendant's statement:
I think he clearly testified that he doesn't have any independent record of having read his Miranda rights to this witness that day. His testimony was that he normally does it, but that he doesn't have any independent recollection as to this particular arrest.
Clearly, there's nothing in his statement to support a claim that he did read him his Miranda rights. The Miranda form itself is not executed until 11:30 p.m. that evening. He indicates in his statement a reason or some justification for having questioned him, which seems a little unusual. I think, Your Honor, the statement should be excluded.
Relying exclusively on Uram's testimony, the trial court made the following findings:
[In determining the adequacy of) Miranda warnings, basically the Court is instructed to go to the totality of the circumstances. This particular case the testimony is that [Uram] responded to an armed robbery arrest____and at the time he arrested [defendant], that he had read him his rights and reminded him of those in the car; that he had cuffed him; that initially Mr. Elkwisni said he knew nothing about the gun, but then the officer had said something to him about safety of children. And as a result of that, he said they were behind the Huggies.
Based upon the totality of the circumstances, it appears the Miranda warnings were read to him; that the defendant understood them based upon the officer's question. There didn't seem to be any trickery. I guess we're touching upon the Christian burial a little bit as to the safety of children, but it was voluntarily made. I will allow it.
A
Waiver of Miranda Rights
We start our analysis of this issue by reaffirming certain basic principles of constitutional law. In determining the adequacy of Miranda warnings given by the police as a prerequisite to finding that defendant knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived the rights contained therein, a court's function is not simply to ascertain whether the police meticulously performed some mechanical exercise. A court must carefully review the substance of what was communicated by the police to a defendant, in order to determine whether the alleged waiver was the product of an informed, intelligent and voluntary decision. As Justice Clifford wrote more than thirty years ago:
In resolving the adequacy of the language of a Miranda warning a court should give precedence to substance over form. The decision does not require that any specific language be used to inform an accused of his rights----The "words of Miranda do not constitute a ritualistic formula which must be repeated without variation in order to be effective. Words which convey the substance of the warning along with the required information are sufficient."
[State v. Melvin, 65 N.J. 1, 13-14, 319 A.2d 450 (1974) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).]
See also State v. Dixon, 125 N.J. 223, 242, 593 A.2d 266 (1991); State v. Messino, 378 N.J.Super. 559, 577, 876 A.2d 818 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 185 N.J. 297, 884 A.2d 1266 (2005).
The dissent concludes that the trial court was "entitled to credit the officer's unrefuted testimony that he followed his usual procedure of giving the required warnings to every arrestee." Adoption of the dissent's analysis would render a Miranda hearing perfunctory, devoid of both substance and meaning.
Miranda warnings are given with the purpose "to neutralize the pressure inherent in custodial interrogation." State v. Smith, 374 N.J.Super. 425, 433, 864 A.2d 1177 (App.Div.2005). Prior to questioning defendant, Officer Uram was required to warn him (1) of the right to remain silent; (2) that any statement he made could be used against him; (3) he had a right to an attorney; (4) if he could not afford an attorney, one would be provided; and (5) he had the right to stop answering questions at any time. Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 198, 109 S.Ct. 2875, 2877, 106 L.Ed.2d 166, 174 (1989); Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at 444-45, 86 S.Ct. at 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d at 706-07; State v. Knight, 183 N.J. 449, 462, 874 A.2d 546 (2005); State v. Godfrey, 131 N.J.Super. 168, 173, 329 A.2d 75 (App.Div.1974), aff'd, 67 N.J. 267, 337 A.2d 371 (1975).
We review a trial court's findings as to the admissibility of a defendant's confession under the "sufficient credible evidence" standard. Knight, supra, 183 N.J. at 468, 874 A.2d 546. We will only reverse these findings if they are not supported by substantial credible evidence. State v. Johnson, 116 N.J. 99, 102, 561 A.2d 243 (1989). Under this standard of review, it is "improper for the Appellate Division to engage in an independent assessment of the evidence as if it were the court of first instance." State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 471, 724 A.2d 234 (1999). We are "not permitted to "weigh the evidence, assess the credibility of witnesses, or make conclusions about the evidence.' " Id. at 472, 724 A.2d 234 (quoting State v. Barone, 147 N.J. 599, 615, 689 A.2d 132 (1997)). Our review is restricted to assessing '"whether the findings made [by the trial court] could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record.'" Ibid.
Mindful of this standard, we nevertheless conclude, as a matter of law, that the evidence presented to the trial court was insufficient from which to conclude that defendant made a knowing, informed, and voluntary waiver of his rights under Miranda. Here, we are unable to discern from the phrases "I read him his rights," or "I advised him of his rights," what information Uram conveyed to the handcuffed defendant when Uram began to question him in the back of the police car. Without more, there is no factual or legal basis to sustain the trial court's conclusion that "[b]ased upon the totality of the circumstances, it appears the Miranda warnings were read to [defendant]" and that "defendant understood them based upon the officer's question."
It is self-evident that there can be no knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of the rights under Miranda, when the record does not reflect that a fair and accurate recitation of those rights was in fact given by the police to the defendant. Cf. State v. DiFrisco, 174 N.J. 195, 235-36, 804 A.2d 507 (2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1220, 123 S.Ct. 1323, 154 L.Ed.2d 1076 (2003). Without competent evidence from which to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant waived his rights under Miranda, State v. Adams, 127 N.J. 438, 447, 605 A.2d 1097 (1992), the trial court's legal conclusion cannot be sustained.
Based on the record developed at the N.J.R.E. 104(c) hearing, the police did not use any improper interrogation techniques to extract an inculpatory statement from defendant. In fact, defendant's attack on the admissibility of the statement is based entirely on a "sufficiency of the evidence" standard, not on the methods used by the police to question defendant. Stated differently, the record here lacks an adequate evidential foundation from which to conclude that defendant, who was in custody, was given the required information under Miranda; that he understood the information; and that he voluntarily decided to speak to the police about the location of the gun, without first consulting with an attorney. We consider this situation to be the functional equivalent of the total absence of a hearing, requiring a remand to the trial court to conduct a new hearing on voluntariness. State v. Kelly, 61 N.J. 283, 294-95, 294 A.2d 41 (1972); State v. Marczak, 344 N.J.Super. 388, 398, 782 A.2d 440 (App.Div. 2001), certif. denied, 171 N.J. 44, 791 A.2d 222 (2002). On remand, if the State fails:
[T]o establish voluntariness beyond reasonable doubt, the defendant will be entitled to a new trial at which the statements will be excluded. If, however, the State does establish beyond reasonable doubt that the statements were voluntary, and the trial judge so determines, then the defendant's conviction may stand.
[State v. Kelly, supra, 61 N.J. at 294, 294 A.2d 41 (citations omitted).]
We are thus satisfied that the remedy here is to remand the matter for a new hearing to determine voluntariness.
B
Public Safety Exception
The State argues in the alternative that even if the record does not support the conclusion that defendant waived his Miranda rights, his statements about the whereabouts of the handgun were nevertheless admissible pursuant to the exigency or public safety exception to Miranda. We disagree.
The public safety exception to the requirement that a person subjected to custodial interrogation by police be given Miranda warnings was first articulated in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655-56, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 2631, 81 L.Ed.2d 550, 557 (1984). In Quarles, the police were investigating a sexual assault committed with a handgun. The investigating officer spotted the suspect approaching a supermarket checkout counter. The suspect was apprehended inside the store carrying an empty guii holster. Immediately after handcuffing the suspect, and prior to reading him his Miranda rights, one of the officers asked him about the whereabouts of the gun. The suspect "nodded in the direction of some empty cartons and responded, 'the gun is over there.' " Quarles, supra, 467 U.S. at 652, 104 S.Ct. at 2629, 81 L.Ed.2d at 554.
In creating an exigency exception, the majority of the Court in Quarles emphasized that "in the very act of apprehending a suspect, [the police] were confronted with the immediate necessity of ascertaining the whereabouts of a gun which they had every reason to believe the suspect had just removed from his empty holster and discarded in the supermarket." Quarles, supra, 467 U.S. at 657, 104 S.Ct. at 2632, 81 L.Ed.2d at 557-58.
The Court thus reasoned that "concern for public safety must be paramount to adherence to the literal language of the prophylactic rules enunciated in Miranda." Quarles, supra, 467 U.S. at 653, 104 S.Ct. at 2630, 81 L.Ed.2d at 555.
In State v. Stephenson, 350 N.J.Super. 517, 796 A.2d 274 (App.Div.2002), we declined to invoke the exigency exception, and emphasized the need to narrowly construe its application. Id. at 524-25, 796 A.2d 274. The facts in Stephenson illustrate this point. The police received information that the defendant had threatened to shoot a person with whom he had allegedly argued earlier. The police proceeded to the defendant's motel, handcuffed him, and demanded to know the location of the gun. Contrasting the facts in Stephenson to the Quarles ease, we noted that the circumstances of the threat were not immediate, and the gun was not believed to be concealed in a public area, with unrestricted access to it by third parties.
The Stephenson court established that the Quarles exigency exception applies only where the circumstances indicate "(1) there [is] an objectively reasonable need to protect the police or the public; (2) from an immediate danger; (3) associated with a weapon; and that (4) the questions asked were related to that danger and reasonably necessary to secure public safety." State v. Stephenson, supra, 350 N.J.Super. at 525, 796 A.2d 274.
Here, defendant and his cohort were apprehended by the police, without any opportunity to conceal the weapon used in the robbery, in any other location but inside the store. The store was surrounded by law enforcement personnel, and the entire area was secured as a crime scene after defendant's arrest. The record is silent as to what efforts, if any, the police undertook to locate the weapon without defendant's assistance. One thing is clear, however; there was no immediate threat to public safety triggering the application of the Quarles exception.
Uram's questions about the gun began after defendant had been handcuffed and placed in the police car. There is no evidence to support the State's claim that the police's interrogation was the product of a spontaneous concern for the safety of the public. According to Uram, he read defendant his Miranda rights on at least two separate occasions. Once immediately after arresting defendant and escorting him to the police car, and again after Uram learned that the gun used in the robbery had not been located. In this context, the "public safety" issue arose as an interrogation tactic, not as an impromptu attempt to address an obvious and immediate public danger. Applying the Quarles exception to these facts subverts the constitutional protections embodied in Miranda, and opens the door to the pretextual invocation of "public safety" whenever the police are not immediately able to recover weapons used in the commission of a crime.
III.
Posh-Arrest Conduct
We will now address a question left partially unanswered by the Supreme Court in Muhammad. Namely, what are the limits of prosecutorial inquiry as to defendant's post-arrest silence, when defendant testifies at trial as to the substance of exculpatory statements he allegedly made at or near the time of his arrest. This issue pits defendant's constitutional right to remain silent against the State's right to challenge the credibility of defendant's affirmative defense of duress. Stated differently, are the concerns raised by the Supreme Court in Muhammad nunimized or rendered irrelevant once a defendant affirmatively testifies about what he told the police at or near the time of his arrest?
As with most things in life, the answer to this question cannot be stated through a simple "yes" or "no." Once a defendant testifies about statements he made to the police at or near the time of his arrest, the State must be permitted to cross-examine him regarding whether or not these alleged statements were actually made. Cross-examination of the defendant however, must be carefully circumscribed. The prosecutor may not wander into areas not covered by a defendant's direct testimony, to suggest, even implicitly, that a defendant had an affirmative duty to come forward with exculpatory evidence. The State is not permitted to use omitted details or other indicia of the right to remain silent, to shift the burden of proof to the defendant. See State v. Galiyano, 178 N.J.Super. 393, 397, 429 A.2d 385 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 87 N.J. 424, 434 A.2d 1096 (1981).
The trial court must also craft jury instructions that will enable jurors to distinguish between legitimate evidence that may affect a defendant's credibility, (internal inconsistencies in the testimony and rebuttal evidence), and drawing a constitutionally impermissible inference of culpability from a defendant's post-arrest silence.
Here, defendant asserted the affirmative defense of duress. He testified that he was never part of any plans to carry out the robbery, and only entered the store to purchase a soft drink and get something to eat. During his direct examination, he gave the following description of the events that transpired once inside the store:
Q. What did you observe when you walked in the store?
A. When I walked into the store, I saw [the co-defendant]. He was standing at the — at the register, and he was talking to the cashier.
Q. Okay. And what did you do?
A. I walked down the aisle to the refrigerators to get like an orange drink or something.
Q. Okay. And what happened next?
A. Well, when I was at the refrigerator, I could hear like yelling in the front. It was like loud yelling, and there was like stuff falling. I could hear like stuff falling. So I turned around to see what was going on but the shelves were pretty high, so I had to walk back to the front of the store to see what was going on.
Q. And what did you observe when you got to the front of the store?
A. When I got to the front of the store, [the co-defendant], he was fighting with the store guy. There were like — they were grabbing each other and they were both fighting over a gun, so I was shocked. I was just standing there, and the [col-defendant had blue gloves on and, in a matter of seconds, the—
THE COURT: You mean [the co-defendant] had blue gloves on.
PROSECUTOR: Objection, Your Honor.
A. Sorry about that. The — [co-defendant], he had blue gloves and, in a matter of seconds, the store guy was on the floor, and now the gun was being pointed at me.
Q. The gun was being pointed at you?
A. Yeah.
Q. And what did you do?
A. I couldn't do anything; he was standing right in front of me.
Q. So what happened next?
A. He started yelling at me to like come here. He kept yelling come here. And I was shocked. This guy had blue gloves on; he had the gun; I didn't know what was going on; and the other guy, he was just laying on the floor. So [the co-defendant], he comes up to me, he grabs me by my shirt, and starts pulling me to the back of the store.
Q. What happened after that?
A. When I got to the back of the store, like he was standing behind me, he kept like pushing me to the back of the store, but the store guy, he was like laying on the floor, and like X couldn't walk over him, so he kept like pushing me up against the aisles and stuff were falling off the aisles.
Q. And Mr. Darwish was on the ground?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. What happened once he got you to the back of the store?
A. When I was in the back of the store, he told me not to move. He told me just stay there, and he started yelling at the store owner.
Q. What was he yelling to him?
A. He was yelling to him I want my money, and then he kept yelling to him give him the keys to the store.
Q. Okay. And did Mr. Darwish give him the keys?
A. Yeah. He took it out of his pocket.
Q. And what happened then?
A. Then [the co-defendant] like — he came up to me again, he started grabbing me, and he walked me towards the front door and told me to lock the door. I dropped the keys. I didn't want to — I was scared, I didn't want to lock the door. I didn't lock myself in there, too, so—
Q. Why were you afraid?
A Because he had a gun to the — like he was grabbing the back of me, and he had the [gun] in his other hand.
Q. Okay.
A So—
Q. What did you do with the keys?
A. I dropped the keys, then like he pushed me down to pick them up, and I picked up the keys and I gave them back to him. And then he handed me back the keys and he said go lock the door. I got to the front, I put the key in the door, I didn't lock it, but he was still standing behind me just like persistent for me to lock the door. He kept yelling at me, so I locked the door and I took the keys and I put it on the counter.
Q. Okay. And what happened after that?
A Then he grabbed me to the back of the store, and he told me just stand there. And he walked to the front; he started grabbing stuff off the shelves.
Q. Okay. And where was Mr. Darwish during that time?
A He was on the floor.
Q. Okay. And was he tied up or anything?
A. No. He was just told not to move.
Q. And what were you doing?
A. I was just standing in the back.
Q. Okay. And [the co-defendant], what was he doing at that point?
A. I don't know. He went to the front of the store. I couldn't see him because of the shelves again. He just kept yelling, he was yelling at the store owner.
Immediately after he was arrested, defendant testified that his first concern was to avoid being placed in the same police car as the co-defendant. Once he was certain that he would not be exposed to any further intimidation or possible retaliation by co-defendant, defendant testified that he attempted to inform Officer Uram about the coercion and intimidation he experienced in the store. The following excerpt from his direct testimony illustrates the point:
After I saw the officer take [co-defendant] to the other car . because I told [the police officer] — I said, don't bring him over here. And he said, all right. He's going to send him over to another ear. When they sent Ico-defendant] to the other car, I told [the officer] what happened inside the store.
[Emphasis added.]
It is clear to us that defendant used this testimony as a critical part of his duress defense. These post-arrest statements, allegedly made at the scene, without the opportunity to reflect or consult with counsel, are intended to bolster defendant's credibility, by rebutting any implication of recent fabrication. Under these circumstances, the State must be given a fair and reasonable opportunity to cross-examine defendant as to what details he allegedly gave to the police.
The State is also entitled to present rebuttal testimony from the officer allegedly involved in these conversations. Such rebuttal evidence may, if necessary to contradict defendant's testimony, include not only what the officer remembers defendant saying, but also what he remembers him not saying. This conclusion does not contravene Muhammad. This kind of rebuttal testimony, (what the witness remembers defendant not saying), is proper, so long as it is restricted to refuting defendant's trial testimony. That is, if defendant testifies that he told the police officer: "the car was red," the officer, in rebuttal, may testify that defendant made no such statement.
On the other hand, if defendant does not testify that he made a statement about the color of the car, the State cannot use that omission as a means of attacking defendant's credibility, by having the rebuttal witness testify that no such statement was made to him or her. Rebuttal testimony impinges upon a defendant's constitutional right to remain silent when it suggests that the mere absence of a statement at the time of arrest is a basis to doubt the veracity of defendant's trial testimony.
The circumstances in this case are critically different than the facts the Supreme Court confronted in State v. Muhammad. In Muhammad, defendant, who had identified himself as a Paterson police officer, used this authority to lure the victim into his car. He then drove the victim to a secluded area where he sexually assaulted her. State v. Muhammad, supra, 182 N.J. at 559, 868 A.2d 302. After the assault, defendant took the victim to the Paterson police headquarters. Once there, defendant identified himself as a police officer to the desk sergeant, and claimed that he had "brought [the victim] in" because she had been harassing his brother and sister. The victim immediately denied these allegations, accused defendant of sexually assaulting her, and produced the condom defendant had allegedly used during the assault as proof of her claims. Id. at 560-61, 868 A.2d 302.
At the trial, during opening and closing remarks, defense counsel argued to the jury that the victim was a prostitute, and the sexual encounter was consensual. Defendant did not testify. Id. at 562, 868 A.2d 302. As part of the State's case-in-chief, the prosecutor called the desk sergeant, who testified not only about the statements defendant made to him, but also about the lack of any mention by defendant that he had engaged in consensual sex with the victim. Specifically, the prosecutor focused his questions to highlight defendant's failure to characterize the victim as a prostitute. Id. at 562-63, 868 A.2d 302. The prosecutor emphasized this latter point during his closing argument to the jury.
Writing for the majority of the Court, Justin Albin concluded that the prosecutor's repeated references to defendant's failure to mention any facts that supported his ultimate defense strategy, " 'at or near' the time of his arrest," constituted an unconstitutional infringement upon defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 573-74, 868 A.2d 302.
We cannot accept the State's depiction of the prosecutor's remarks as merely-highlighting the inconsistency between defendant's statement at police headquarters and the defense advanced by his attorney. In assailing defendant's consent defense, the prosecutor's leitmotif was defendant's silence at police headquarters. The prosecutor was entitled to let the jury know that defendant's claim to the police that he picked [the victim] up for harassment stood in stark contrast to his attorney's trial argument of a consensual sexual encounter. However, the prosecutor went far beyond pointing out that significant inconsistency; instead the prosecutor called for the jury to reject the consent defense because defendant remained silent when he had the opportunity to present it to the police. Here, the prosecutor's thrust was that both before and after [the victim] accused him of rape, defendant did not give to the police the exculpatory account that his counsel provided to the jury. In other words, the prosecutor impaled defendant on his silence, intimating that an innocent man would not have stopped speaking to the police officers, but would have revealed to them the defense offered as truth at trial. We conclude that the prosecutor elicited testimony and commented on defendant's silence at police headquarters to impugn his defense at trial.
[Id. at 566-67, 868 A.2d 302 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).]
The Court, however, acknowledged that a defendant's statements or inconsistencies, "'at or near' the time of his arrest," are, nevertheless, proper areas of prosecutorial inquiry. Id. at 566 n. 3, 868 A.2d 302.
Here, although some of the prosecutor's questions came dangerously close to crossing the line of demarcation between proper impeachment of defendant's credibility, and unconstitutional comments on his right to remain silent, the thrust of the interrogation stayed within the boundaries of proper cross-examination. The following exchange between the prosecutor and defendant illustrates this point:
Q. In fact, Officer Uram, after he advised you of your rights, you didn't say anything else to him'—
A. I did. I was trying to talk to him.
Q. —about what happened in the store? Isn't that correct?
A. I did. I tried to talk to him, but he wouldn't listen to me.
Q. You're saying that Officer Uram, after he was trying to get you to talk about where this gun was, that he just didn't want to hear anything else from you? Is that what your testimony is?
A. Yes.
Q. Isn't it true that on March 24th, 2003, you said that you — a gun was pointed at you by [co-defendant], correct?
A. Yes.

Q. Has that ever happened to you before?
A. No.
Q. A gun being pointed at you?
A. No.
Q. Was this the first time on March 24th, 2003?
A. Yes.
Q. But you never decided to tell Officer Uram on March 24th, 2003 about that, correct?
A. I did tell him.

Q. Isn't it true that you, at first, did not want to tell Officer Uram anything about a gun?
A. Yes, I thought they were going to bring [co-defendant] with me. I thought they were going to put us together.
Q. But the fact that a gun was pointed at you, you didn't think that that was important to tell the police officer while you were in his custody, in the back of his car, alone?
[Although the trial court overruled defense counsel's timely objection, the prosecutor did not secure an answer to this question from defendant.]

Q. So when the Police Officer Uram had you in his custody, again, you did not tell him anything about the fact that a gun had just been pointed to your head? A. I did. I tried to tell him, he wouldn't listen to me.
As this excerpt from the State's cross-examination reveals, defendant repeatedly asserted that he attempted to tell the arresting officer what had occurred inside the store, as evidencing his lack of volition to commit any criminal act. Unlike what occurred in Muhammad, what makes this line of inquiry proper, is that defendant affirmatively testified at trial that he had mentioned the details of his duress defense to the arresting officer.
Through its cross-examination, the State was not casting a shadow of culpability based on defendant's post-arrest silence at the scene. Under these circumstances, the prosecutor was properly attacking defendant's credibility by suggesting to the jury that his trial testimony was inconsistent with the events described by the arresting officer.
We hold, however, that at this juncture in the trial, and as part of its overall charge on the law, the trial court should have reminded the jury, using clear and emphatic language, that (1) defendant had the right to remain silent; and (2) no inference of culpability should be drawn from his exercise of that right. Absent such instructions, a jury may improperly conclude that defendant had a duty to come forward with information supporting his duress-defense, at or near the time of his arrest, and that his failure to do so should be considered against him in weighing his overall credibility. This would be precisely the type of unconstitutional inference the Supreme Court found improper in Muhammad.
Because defendant did not request such a charge here, we must review any alleged error in this respect under the plain error standard of review. R. 2:10-2. "Under that standard, we disregard an error unless it is 'clearly capable of producing an unjust result.' " State v. Daniels, 182 N.J. 80, 95, 861 A.2d 808 (2004) (quoting B. 2:10-2). Given the substantial evidence presented, we cannot conclude that the absence of such an instruction constitutes plain error.
IV.
Conclusion
Defendant's conviction is affirmed. The matter is remanded for the trial court to conduct a new hearing with respect to the admissibility of defendant's statements to the police.
Although defendant was convicted of a second-degree offense, the court imposed a sentence within the third-degree range, because, in this case, "the court [was] clearly convinced that the mitigating factors substantially outweighed] the aggravating factors." N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1f(2).
The NERA parole disqualifier only applied to the robbery conviction.
Although not directly discemable from the record, we assume that the State fulfilled its discovery obligation under R. 3:13 — 3(c)(2). Therefore, defense counsel should have been aware of the need to challenge the admissibility of any statement made by his client to the police, well before the commencement of the trial. R. 3:10-2(a) requires counsel to advise the court, at the post-indictment arraignment/status conference, of his/her intention to file any motion. Thereafter, the timely filing of a motion to suppress a defendant's post-arrest statement triggers a commensurate obligation upon the trial court, absent good cause, to decide the motion before fixing a trial date. R. 3:10-2(b).
Here, the question of the admissibility of defendant's post-arrest statements to the police arose after the commencement of the trial. While we recognize that under State v. Jordan, 147 N.J. 409, 419, 688 A.2d 97 (1997), a trial court is obligated to determine the admissibility of a defendant's post-arrest statements under Miranda, modem criminal case management practices require that this determination be made in advance of trial. R. 3:9 — 1(d).
Without this pre-trial determination, a defendant is left in the dark about a critical part of the State's proofs against him. A defendant is entitled to know, in advance of trial, the full arsenal of evidence the State has amassed against him, including whether the State can legally present to the jury statements he may have made to the police. Such knowledge is not only indispensable to formulate a sound defense strategy at trial, but it is also essential in assisting a defendant in making the decision to accept or reject a prosecutor's plea-agreement offer. R. 3:9 — 1 (b),(e).
The State is also prejudiced if a determination as to the admissibility of a defendant's statements is not made before trial. Without advance notice of what evidence will be admitted at trial, the prosecutor: (1) is unable to assess rationally the strengths and weaknesses of the State's case; and (2) risks creating grounds for a mistrial, by unknowingly advising the jury, in the course of his/her opening statement, of information the court may subsequently determine to be inadmissible.
While we have no basis to fault the trial judge here, it is the responsibility of trial courts, at the final pretrial conference, to insure that all pretrial motions have been addressed and decided.
We note that defendant's challenge here is limited to the admissibility of his statements, not to the admissibility of the gun itself.