Case Name: Johnnie Howel JARRELL, Plaintiff, v. Joseph Wilmer GORDY et al., Defendants; ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant, Eugene R. COFFEY, Third-Party Defendant-Appellee
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1964-03-24
Citations: 162 So. 2d 577
Docket Number: No. 1087
Parties: Johnnie Howel JARRELL, Plaintiff, v. Joseph Wilmer GORDY et al., Defendants. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant, Eugene R. COFFEY, Third-Party Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: Before TATE, CULPEPPER and HOOD, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 162
Pages: 577–589

Head Matter:
Johnnie Howel JARRELL, Plaintiff, v. Joseph Wilmer GORDY et al., Defendants. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant, Eugene R. COFFEY, Third-Party Defendant-Appellee.
No. 1087.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana. Third Circuit.
March 24, 1964.
Dissenting Opinion March 26, 1964.
Rehearing Denied April 21, 1964.
Gold, Hall & Skye, by Jimmy M. Stoker, Alexandria, for defendant-third-party plaintiff-appellant.
O. L. Stewart, Asst. U. S. Atty., Shreveport, for defendant-third-party appellee.
Gravel, Sheffield & Führer, by James S. Gravel, Alexandria, for defendants-appel-lees.
Hall & Coltharp, by H. O. Lestage, III, De Ridder, for plaintiff-appellee.
Before TATE, CULPEPPER and HOOD, JJ.

Opinion:
HOOD, Judge.
This is a tort action instituted by Johnnie Howel Jarrell against Joseph Wilmer Gordy and his wife, Lela J. Gordy, and against Mr. Gordy's public liability insurer, Allstate Insurance Company. Plaintiff claims damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained by him as the result of a collision between an automobile being driven by Mrs. Gordy and a truck owned by the United States Government and being driven by Sergeant Eugene R. Coffey, a member of the United States Army. Plaintiff Jarrell was riding as a passenger in the government-owned truck at the time of the accident.
Answers were filed by all of the defendants denying negligence on the part of Mrs. Gordy. Allstate Insurance Company, one of the defendants, also filed a third party demand against Coffey, the driver of the truck in which plaintiff was riding, alleging that the accident resulted wholly or partially from the negligence of Coffey, and demanding in the event Allstate is held to be liable to plaintiff that judgment be rendered in its favor and against Coffey for one-half the amount of that judgment.
Coffey thereupon filed a motion to dismiss the third party petition, a motion for summary judgment dismissing the third party action against him, and an exception of no cause and no right of action. All of these pleadings are based on allegations that at the time the accident occurred Sergeant Coffey was an employee of the United States Government and he was acting within the scope of his employment. He contends that under these circumstances he is immune to suit, and that the third party plaintiff's exclusive remedy, if any it has, would be a suit against the United States under the provisions of the Federal Tort Claims Act (28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) and § 2671-2680). He relies specifically upon the provisions of subsection (b) of Section 2679, Title 28 of the United States Code.
Coffey is represented in this proceeding by the United States District Attorney for the Western District of Louisiana. It is made clear in the written briefs submitted by counsel, in their oral arguments and by the pleadings, however, that the motions and the exception in this suit were filed in behalf of Coffey, individually, and that the "Federal Government is not a party to this litigation at this stage of the proceeding."
A hearing was held on the motion to dismiss and on the motion for summary judgment, and the matter was held open after that hearing to allow the mover to supply affidavits that Coffey was within the scope of his employment. Within the time allowed for that purpose Coffey filed in the record two affidavits, in one of which the "Post Quartermaster" stated that both Sergeant Coffey and plaintiff were within the scope of their employment when the accident occurred. The other affidavit was executed by Coffey himself, and is to the effect that he was acting within the scope of his employment at that time.
On this evidence the trial court granted Coffey's motion for summary judgment, and judgment was rendered dismissing the third party petition filed by Allstate. Allstate has appealed from that judgment
The principal legal question presented on this appeal is whether Sergeant Coffey, on his own motion filed in the State trial court and upon showing that he was acting within the scope of his employment, is entitled to a summary judgment in that court dismissing the third party action which has been instituted against him on the ground that he is immune from suit under the provisions of 28 U.S.C.A. § 2679(b). The trial judge, apparently feeling that he is immune to such a suit, rendered judgment dismissing the third party action, even though the United States has not accepted responsibility, it has not declared Coffey to be immune and the United States has not been substituted for Coffey as a party to the action. The appellant, Allstate, contends that Coffey is not entitled to a dismissal of the third party demand by the State Court on that ground, but that his sole and only remedy is to have the case removed to the United States District Court under the provisions of 28 U.S.C.A. § 2679(d), thereby substituting the United States for himself as the third party defendant.
The resolution of this question requires an interpretation of the provisions of Section 2679, Title 28 of the United States Code, as that section was amended on September 21, 1961 (Pub.L. 87-258 ; 75 Stat. 539). All counsel agree that this question is res nova.
The pertinent portions of this section of the United States Code, as amended, read as follows:
Ҥ 2679. Exclusiveness of remedy

"(b) The remedy by suit against the United States as provided by section 1346(b) of this title for damage to property or for personal injury, including death, resulting from the operation by any employee of the Government of any motor vehicle while acting within the scope of his office or employment, shall hereafter be exclusive of any other civil action or proceeding by reason of the same subject matter against the employee or his estate whose act or omission gave rise to the claim.
"(c) The Attorney General shall defend any civil action or proceeding brought in any court against any employee of the Government or his estate for any such damage or injury. The employee against whom such civil action or proceeding is brought shall deliver within such time after date of service or knowledge of service as determined by the Attorney General, all process served upon him or an attested true copy thereof to his immediate superior or to whomever was designated by the head of his department to receive such papers and such person shall promptly furnish copies of the pleadings and process therein to the United States attorney for the district embracing the place wherein the proceeding is brought, to the Attorney General, and to the head of his employing Federal agency.
"(d) Upon a certification by the Attorney General that the defendant employee was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the incident out of which the suit arose, any such civil action or proceeding commenced in a State court shall be removed without bond at any time before trial by the Attorney General to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place wherein it is pending and the proceedings deemed a tort action brought against the United States under the provisions of this title and all references thereto. Should a United States district court determine on a hearing on a motion to remand held before a trial on the merits that the case so removed is one in which a remedy by suit within the meaning of subsection (b) of this section is not available against the United States, the case shall be remanded to the State court."
Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b) the United States District Courts have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions against the United States for damages for personal injury caused by the negligent act of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his employment. And 28 U.S.C.A. § 2674 provides that "The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages."
We agree with counsel for Coffey that the purpose of the 1961 amendments to Section 2679 is to relieve the government employee, acting within the scope of his employment, from personal liability and from the expense of providing private liability insurance or of defending suits for damages which may be instituted against him. Also, we agree that the provisions of subsection (b) of Section 2679, Title 28, considered alone and without reference to the subsections which follow it, may be logically interpreted to mean that a government employee is entitled to a judgment of dismissal in the State Court upon showing that he was acting within the scope of his employment. We think subsection (b) takes on a somewhat different meaning, however, when it is read or considered with the other provisions of that Section, as amended in 1961. Subsection (d) provides the procedure which we think must be followed in order to relieve the employee from liability when the suit is instituted against him in a State Court. That procedure is for the United States (through the Attorney General) to accept responsibility for the acts of the employee, and to have the case removed to the Federal Court, following which removal the proceedings against the employee are deemed a "tort action brought against the United States under the provisions of this title and all references thereto."
In this case no effort has been made by the United States District Attorney, by the Attorney General, by Sergeant Coffey or by anyone else to remove the case from the State Court to the Federal District Court, under the procedure set out in 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d). The Attorney General has not certified that the defendant employee was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident out of which the suit arose, and the United States Government has not accepted the responsibility for the tort nor has it declared the alleged tort-feasor to be immune.
In Gustafson v. Peck, 216 F.Supp. 370 (N.D.Iowa, W.D.1963), plaintiffs sued defendant in a State Court for damages arising out of a collision between a motor vehicle being driven by one of the plaintiffs and a vehicle being driven by the defendant, who at the time of the accident was within the scope of his employment as an employee of the United States Government. Upon petition of the United States the case was removed to the Federal District Court in accordance with the procedure provided in subsection (d) of Section 2679. Plaintiffs then filed a motion to remand the case to the State Court on the ground that the 1961 amendment to the Federal Tort Claims Act did not preclude their cause of action against the defendant employee. The United States District Court denied plaintiffs' motion to remand, but in doing so it indicated that the employee is not immune unless and until the United States Government both accepts the responsibility and declares the tortfeasor immune, neither of which has been done in the instant suit. In the Gustafson case the court said:
"The remaining question is whether the Congress has now manifested its intent to immunize federal employees from suit eo nomine arising out of their negligent operation of motor vehicles in the scope of their federal employment and now intends that such suits shall be against the United States. Actually, these immunity statutes probably do not completely ob literate the liability of the individual tortfeasor, hut at best there is no direct liability against such tortfeasor as long as the United States Government both accepts the responsibility for the tort and declared the tortfeasor immune. See Gardner v. Panama Ry. Co., 342 U.S. 29, 72 S.Ct. 12, 96 L.Ed. 31.
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"On September 21, 1961, Amendments b through e to Section 2679 were adopted and approved. These amendments deal directly with the present case. They grant immunity from personal liability to Federal employees which may arise out of their negligent operation of motor vehicles while in the scope of their Federal employment. These amendments also require the United States to remove any such action to the Federal Courts which may have been started in a State Court and that the action then becomes one exclusively against the United States with the individual employee immune from liability. Remand is only allowed when it is determined that the employee was not within the scope of his Federal employment at the time the tort was committed. This is the evident clear meaning of this statute. When this is true, there is no room for any other construction by the Court. " (Emphasis added).
In Perez v. United States, 218 F.Supp. 571 (S.D.New York, 1963), the suit was instituted originally in the United States District Court. The government employee and the United States were named as parties defendant. The United States, agreeing that the employee was driving the government truck in the course of his employment by the United States, moved to have the action dismissed as to that employee, and that motion was granted. Since the Perez case was filed originally in the Federal District Court it was unnecessary to follow the procedure set out in subsection (d) of Section 2679, relative to the removal of the case from the State Court. Also, unlike the facts in the instant suit, the United States was a party defendant in that suit, it accepted responsibility for the acts of the employee, and plaintiffs were permitted to continue their action against the United States. The Perez case, therefore, serves as authority only for the proposition that where an action based on the Federal Tort Claims Act is pending in the Federal District Court, and both the government employee and the United States are parties defendant in such suit, then the United States, upon accepting responsibility for the acts of the employee, may have the suit dismissed as to the employee. As we have already pointed out, the facts and issues in the instant suit are different from those presented in Perez v. United States.
Although the Perez case is not applicable to the instant suit, we note that in its opinion the court quoted excerpts from House Report No. 297, which report accompanied the 1961 amendments to Section 2679 when those amendments were being considered. We think this report shows that the amendment was intended to require that the United States accept responsibility for the acts of its employee and that the case be removed from the State Court to the Federal District Court before the employee is relieved from liability. The following pertinent language was used in that report:
" 'Subsection (d) requires that any such action brought in a State court shall be removed before trial to the U. S. district court for the district and division for the place in which the action is pending. In the U. S. district court the proceedings are to be deemed a tort section (sic) against the United States under title 28. " (Emphasis added). (218 F.Supp. 571, 574).
In Adams v. Jackel, 220 F.Supp. 764 (E.D.New York, 1963), plaintiff sued the United States in Federal District Court, and he filed a separate suit against the government employee in the State Court. Upon motion of the United States Attorney in the last-mentioned suit, which motion was accompanied by a certificate of that attorney to the effect that he was "of the opinion" that the employee was acting within the scope of his employment, the suit instituted against the employee was removed from the State Court to the Federal District Court. The defendant employee in that suit then moved to have the suit dismissed as to him. The court denied the motion, however, because it found that the United States Attorney's "certificate" was not sufficient to "convert the case into one against the United States." In so ruling, the court said:
"The difficulty with granting the relief sought, however, is that even an unqualified certificate by the Attorney General — and the present certificate falls far short of that and may not be borne out by evidence hereafter coming to the attention of the United States Attorney — does not with finality convert the case into one against the United States. The reference back to subsection (b) and its further reference to 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) indicate that the case must not merely be a government motor vehicle case in which a proper Attorney General's certificate has been given. It must also be a case in which a remedy is 'available' under the respondeat superior principle, that is, where in fact the employee was acting within the scope of his office or employment and the exceptions of 28 U.S.C. § 2680 do not operate. Until that issuable point of fact is set at rest with finality the case cannot be dismissed. " (Emphasis added).
In the instant suit, as in Adams v. Jackel, the United States has not accepted responsibility for Coffey's actions and the case has not been converted into one against the United States. Also, a decision of the trial court or of this court that Coffey was or was not within the scope of his employment would not set that question at rest "with finality." If we should conclude, for instance, that Coffey was not within the scope of his employment when the accident occurred, we presume that the case thereafter may still be removed to the Federal District Court under subsection (d), of Section 2679, and the proceedings would be continued with the United States substituted for the employee in the same manner as could have been done had we rendered no decision at all. On the other hand, if we should affirm the trial court's determination that Coffey was within the scope of his employment, the United States may still defend any action which may hereafter be instituted against the United States, based on the same cause of action, on the ground that the employee was not within the scope of his employment.
The case of Uptagrafft v. United States, U.S. Court of Appeal, 4 Cir., 315 F.2d 200, which has been cited by counsel for Coffey, is inapplicable because the accident involved there occurred before the 1961 amendments to Section 2679 became effective. In commenting upon the 1961 amendments, however, the court said:
" The express purpose of the amendments 'is to provide a method for the assumption by the Federal Government of responsibility for claims for damages against its employees arising from the operation by them of vehicles in the scope of their Government employment.' Behind it is the desire to protect the government driver from the ever-present danger of personal liability and relieve him of the expense of supplying private liability insurance. Senate Report, 87th Congress, 2d Sess. (Aug. 1961) U.S.Code Cong. & Adm. News, p. 2784."
Although the issue presented here was not considered in any of the cases hereinabove cited, we think the language used in those cases indicates that a government employee who is named as defendant in a damage suit filed in a State Court cannot be relieved of liability on the ground that he is immune under 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (b) unless and until the United States ac cepts responsibility for the acts of the employee, by certifying that he was acting within the scope of his employment, and has the case removed to the Federal District Court as provided in 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d). If that is done, the government employee is relieved of liability, but the plaintiff (in this case the third party plaintiff) is entitled to continue the suit, with the United States substituted for the employee as a party defendant.
Aside from the jurisprudence herein-above cited, however, we think the language used in the 1961 amendment itself indicates that Congress did not intend for it to be applied as was done by the trial court in this case.
A fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and, if possible, to give effect to the intention or purpose of the-Legislature as expressed in the statute. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 321. There is a presumption that every word, sentence or provision was intended for some useful purpose, that some effect is to be given to each, and that no superfluous words or provisions were used. Conversely, it will not be presumed that the Legislature inserted idle, meaningless or superfluous language, or intended for any part or provision of the statute to be meaningless, redundant or useless. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 316.
If the interpretation which the appellee places on this statute is correct, then subsection (b) alone would be sufficient to enable the government employee to have the suit in a State Court dismissed completely as to him, without a certificate of the Attorney General, without removing the case to the Federal District Court and without substituting the United States as a party defendant in the suit, all as is required by subsection (d). Such an interpretation of the statute, we think, would render subsection (d) meaningless and useless. There would be no occasion for the procedure set out in subsection (d) to be used, except perhaps as an optional type of relief after a motion to dismiss has been tried and rejected by the State Court. We think Congress intended to give subsection (d) more effect and usefulness than that.
When a case is removed to a Federal District Court under the provisions of subsection (d), we note that the statute does not give that court authority to dismiss the action completely as to the government employee. The proceedings must be continued in the Federal District Court as a tort action against the United States, or that court may remand the case to the State Court if it finds that the action cannot be maintained under subsection (b). Under the interpretation which appellee in this case places on that subsection, the State Court is empowered to dismiss the suit completely, even though the United States does not certify that the employee was acting within the scope of his employment and although the plaintiff (in this case the third party plaintiff) is not permitted to continue the suit as one brought against the United States under the provisions of the Federal Tort Claims Act. We do not think Congress intended for the 1961 amendments to have that effect.
Counsel for appellee urges that we consider the interpretation which courts have placed on other statutes which grant an "exclusive remedy" against the United States, citing 46 U.S.C. § 745, and 28 U.S.C. § 1498, as examples of such related statutes. We have examined these statutes and find that although they do stipulate that the remedy therein provided is "exclusive," there is no provision in either statute similar to that contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (d). The interpretations placed on the two cited statutes, therefore, would not be apposite to this case.
In our opinion, while Congress in adopting the 1961 amendments was concerned primarily with the rights of the government employee, it also considered the rights of the plaintiff in the action and the possibility that plaintiff's rights might be adversely affected by prescription or by the added inconvenience, time and costs of additional litigation, if there were not some provision for maintaining the suit which originally was instituted against the government employee alone. We agree that Section 2679, as amended, does grant immunity from personal liability to Federal employees which may arise out of their negligent operation of motor vehicles while in the scope of their Federal employment. Considering that section as a whole, however, we are convinced that when such a claim is urged in a State Court the employee does not become immune to liability unless and until the United States accepts responsibility and has the case removed to the Federal District Court as provided in 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d). In this case, since there has been no compliance with the provisions of subsection (d), we think the trial court erred in dismissing the third party demand as to the appellee, Coffey.
For the reasons herein set out the judgment appealed from is reversed, and the case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with the views herein expressed. The costs of this appeal are assessed to the third party defendant-appellee, Eugene R. Coffey.
Reversed and remanded.
TATE, J., dissents' from the reversal of the trial court and assigns written reasons.