Case Name: SPRENKLE'S APPEAL
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1882-05-29
Citations: 1 Walk. 365
Docket Number: 
Parties: SPRENKLE’S APPEAL.
Judges: 
Reporter: Reports of cases decided by the supreme court of pennsylvania which have been omitted from the regular reports
Volume: 1
Pages: 365–377

Head Matter:
SPRENKLE’S APPEAL.
Two administrators filed a joint account in which they charged themselves with the receipt of a sum of money charged upon land, which they had no right to receive. One of the administrators died, and the other, who retained possession of the fund, became insolvent; it was held that the estate of the deceased administrator was liable for the fund retained by the administrator, who beoame insolvent.
Appeal from the Orphans’ Court of York County.
Peter Sprenkle, senior, the father of said George Sprenkle, on the 4th day of April, 1831, entered into a written agreement with his said son, George,, and Joseph Graybill, a son-in-law of said Peter, to convey to each of them certain tracts of land in York County, for the consideration therein named. Among other stipulations'in the said contract it was covenanted that the sum of $2,949.63 should remain in the hands of said George Sprenkle and Joseph Graybill, “or their order, heirs or assigns,” for the use and maintenance of Christina Sprenkle, a daughter of said Peter Sprenkle, $1474.81 of- said sum to remain in the hands of said George Sprenkle, and the like sum of $1474.81 thereof to remain in the hands of said Joseph Graybill, the interest only of said principal sum to be paid for the use and maintenance of said Christina Sprenkle, “if all wanted,” and after her death “the principal of her legal share to be divided equally among the surviving heirs or their respective order, heirs or assigns,” in the language of said agreement.
Deeds of conveyance in fee, bearing date the same day as the date of said agreement, were executed by said Peter Sprenkle and his wife to said George Sprenkle and Joseph Graybill for the tracts of land contracted to be conveyed to them respectively in said agreement.
The deed of Ceorge Sprenkle contains the following clause: “Subject to a certain article of agreement between the above named Peter Sprenkle and his son George party thereto relation being had thereto.”
The deed to Joseph Graybill has the following clause : “Subject to a certain article of agreement made by and between the above named Peter Sprenkle and Joseph Graybill.”
These deeds were both recorded in July, 1831, and the said agreement was recorded in September, 1831.
Peter Sprenkle died 'in 1831. George Sprenkle and Joseph Graybill were in possession of their respective tracts of said land when the said deeds to them for the same were executed. The tracts lay contiguous. George Sprenkle continued in possession of said tract until his death, and his widow and children have been in possession of the same since.
Joseph Graybill died in 1853, intestate. George Sprenkle died in 1857, testate.
Christina Sprenkle was supported on the premises of George ■Sprenkle from the death of her father, Peter Sprenkle, in 1831, to the time of her death, in September, 1861, except for a short period after the death of George Sprenkle, when she lived on the premises of Joseph Graybill.
In 1853 letters of administration on the estate of said Joseph Graybill, deceased, were granted to his son, Samuel Graybill, and said George Sprenkle, and after proceedings in partition on order ■of the Orphans’ Court, the said administrators sold the real estate subject to á charge of one-third of the purchase money in favor of the widow of Joseph Graybill for life.
The said administrators filed an account in 1856, charging themselves with the proceeds of the real estate, and among other credits taken in their said account, the following appear, to wit:
By interest in arrears on contract of decedent with Peter
Sprenkle....................................$ 929 13
By principal on do. retained ........!............. 1474 81
The purchase money of the real estate and other moneys of the ■estate, with the $1474.81, were paid into the York Bank and placed to the credit of Samuel Graybill, administrator ol Joseph Graybill, deceased. In May, 1856, Samuel Graybill, as administrator, drew a check on the funds of the estate in said bank, to the order of George Sprenkle, for $980. This sum of $980 paid to George Sprenkle by Samuel Graybill as administrator ol Joseph Graybill, is supposed to cover the amount of surplus interest for which credit is laken in their administration account, and which was probably due to, George Sprenkle for the maintenance of Christina Sprenkle, as she had up to that time been living on his premises. The balance of the money of the estate of Joseph Graybill, with the $1474.81, remained in said bank until after the death of George Sprenkle, in February, 1857. It was then drawn out by Samuel Graybill. The $1474.81 remained in the York Bank until after the death of Christina Sprenkle, which occurred in September, 1861. Samuel Graybill had it about his house for several years after that. In September, 1864, he loaned it to the First National Bank at interest, and it remained there until October, 1866. After that he invested it in real estate. When he drew the money from the York Bank, and while it was in the First National Bank, and up to October, 1877, he was solvent. In October, 1877, he made a voluntary assignment in trust for the benefit of creditors.
Said Christina Sprenkle died September 17, 1861, intestate, unmarried and without issue, and at the time of her death the surviving heirs of said Peter Sprenkle, senior, deceased, and her heirs were the same, to wit, the children of said George Sprenkle, deceased, Nancy Graybill, widow of said Joseph Graybill, deceased, and the children of Peter Sprenkle, junior, deceased, said George, Nancy and Peter being brothers and sisters of Christina. Upon her death the said fund of $2949.63, which remained charged on said tracts of land for her maintenance, was to be divided among said two brothers and sister, or their children. A short time after the death of Christina, the devisees of George Sprenkle paid out to the children of Peter Sprenkle, junior, deceased, one-third of the said sum of $1474.81 that waschai'ged on the tract of land devised to them. Nancy Graybill died soon after Christina, and before any of said fund charged on said land for Christina’s maintenance was paid out. But the heirs and devisees of George Sprenkle paid no part of said $1474.81, charged on their land, to the children of Nancy Graybill, deceased. The heirs of George Sprenkle were entitled to one-third of the $1474.81, which was charged on the lands of Joseph Graybill, and they regarded the one as a set off to the other.
No demand was made on any person for the $1474.81 for more than sixteen years alter the death of Christina Sprenkle, although the parties now claiming the money from the estate of George Sprenkle, deceased, knew that Samuel Graybill, the surviving administrator of Joseph Graybill, had the money, and that he could have paid it on demand, They knew, also, that he drew it out of the York Bank after the death of Christina Sprenkle, and that it was money payable by the estate of Joseph Graybill, after the death of Christina, under the provisions of the said agreement.
George Sprenkle left a large estate, and his executor, John Sprenkle, continued in the execution of his trust for more than six years after the death of the testator, and for nearly two years after the death of Christina Sprenkle. No demand was made on this executor to account for the money remaining in the hands of Samuel Graybill, surviving administrator of Joseph Graybill, deceased.
Samuel Graybill, as surviving administrator of Joseph Graybill, was not called upon to account for this money. It was not until he became insolvent, in 1877, that an effort was made by some of the claimants to get the money from the estate of George Sprenkle, deceased.
The widow and children of George Sprenkle continued in possession and enjoyment of his real and personal estate, under the provisions of his will, and on the 10th day of October, 1877, letters of administration de bonis non, with the will annexed, were granted to his sons, David B. Sprenkle and Peter B. Sprenkle. They filed an account of their administration November 30, 1878, charging themselves with the amount of the personal estate remaining, under the will, and took credit for various sums paid, for which the estate was liable, the account showing a balance in favor of the accountants.
To this account exceptions were filed on behalf of the appellees in this case, as alleged creditors. An auditor was appointed to settle the exceptions. The auditor’s powers were afterward so enlarged by the Court as to authorize and empower him to adjust and determine the right of the exceptants to file said exceptions, .and also to-authorize him to make report of distribution of the balance on said account.
At the hearing before the auditor, the exceptants claimed that the estate of George Sprenkle should be charged with the $1474.81 and the $929.13, “interest in arrears,” for which credit was taken by George Sprenkle and Samuel Graybill in their account as administrators of Joseph Graybill, deceased, March 31,1856, with interest from the 17th of September, 1861, the date of the death of Christina Sprenkle, and also two-thirds of the $1474.81 that, remained charged on lands of George Sprenkle, deceased, under said agreement, with interest on same from the death of Christina.
The auditor decided that the $929.13, “interest in arrears,” had been fully paid and satisfied, and disallowed the claim to the $1474.81, which remained in the hands of Samuel Graybill, surviving administrator of Joseph Graybill, deceased, but allowed the claim of the heirs of Nancy Graybill to their shares of the $1474.81 charged on lands of George Sprenkle, under said agreement.
The auditor held that the lien of $1474.81, charged on the lands of Joseph Graybill under said agreement and deed, for the use and maintenance of Christina Sprenkle, was not divested by the sale of the land on order of the Orphans’ Court after proceedings in partition, no reference having been made to this lien in the proceedings in partition or in the order of Court authorizing the sale.
That the fund having been charged on the lands of Joseph Gray-bill, under the agreement and deed, for the use of Christina Sprenkle, the lien thereof could not be divested in the lifetime of Christina Sprenkle, and the attempt to do so was wholly ineffectual.
That in no event could that fund go into the hands of the administrators of Joseph Graybill for administration, and not being, legally assets of Joseph Graybill’s estate, the estate of George Sprenkle could not be liable for it by reason of the insolvency of his co-administrator, who received the fqnd.
Exceptions to the report of the auditor were filed on behalf of legatees of George Sprenkle, and also on part of the said alleged creditors.
The Court on February 14,1881, sustained the exceptions of the creditors, deciding that the estate of George Sprenkle was liable, and recommitted the report to the auditor, with instructions to make distribution according to the views expressed in the following opinion per:
WlCKES, J.
We agree with the learned auditor in much that he has decided, in the full and carefully prepared report which is before us ; but we differ, in regard to the main question involved in this inquiry.
Without pausing to recapitulate the facts found by him, and which are not seriously questioned by any party to this controversy, we pass at once to an examination of the principal ground upon which the auditor’s finding is based.
The fácts.necessary to its consideration are as follows: George Sprenkle and Samuel Graybill jointly administered upon the estate of Joseph Graybill, and under proceedings in partition sold the real estate (part of the proceeds beit g necessary for the payment of debt,) upon which a charge had been created, which operated as a lien in the title, and which could not be discharged, by an Orphans’ Court sale. The purchaser, however, paid the ' amount charged upon the land to the administrators, who filed a joint account in 1855, in which they took credit for the sum of money so received, and for the unexpended interest on the lien, due from the intestate. The interest passed into the hands of Sprenkle, and was accounted for by him; the principal into the hands of Graybill.
Christina Sprenkle for whose benefit the charge had been created, was living at that time, and continued to live until 1861. The parties claiming this money were not entitled to it until after her death.
The joint account as we have said was filed in 1855, and the following year George Sprenkle died. Graybill continued to administer the estate, and was the custodian of the principal sum received by him.
He subsequently became insolvent, and now it is sought to recover the principal sum received by Graybill from the estate of George Sprenkle. The auditor has awarded to them all that remained a charge upon Sprenkle’s land under the original deed to him, hut thinks his estate not liable for the principal received by Graybill, because, in his opinion, his death operated to discharge him from liability, under the facts recited.
While many other questions were addressed to the auditor it is evident his award proceeds upon this interpretation of the law.
The auditor starts out with the proposition that the sums of money received by those administrators, did not constitute assets which they could legally administer, and that therefore they are not liable to account for them. This defence would of course avail Graybill quite as well as Sprenkle, and if valid, we would have the singular spectacle presented, of a trustee who confessedly received money belonging to other people, and stands upon the record, as holding it, the auditor says “to meet an obligation not then’ payable,” who, when that “obligation” becomes payable, meets those entitled to demand it, with an assertion of his own wrong in receiving it, as an excuse for his further wrong in retaining it.
In a Court of Equity, to state this proposition is to answer it.
But the main question remains — did George Sprenkle’s death absolve his estate from liability for money which he and his co-ad- . ministrator, received in his lifetime, and jointly accounted for.
Certainly death operates to discharge a man from the active duties of every trust; but if those who represent him desire to get rid of liability incurred, during his life, there are proper steps necessary to be taken, for the Act of 2d February, 1853, 558, pi. 248 P. Laws 31, expressly provides that such discharge even when properly granted by the Court, “shall not affect liabilities existing ■at the time of the discharge of the party or parties.” The auditor cites the case of Taylor vs. Smith, 4 Phil. R. 270, as authority for his position. But he loses sight of the important distinction between the two cases.
We are bound to presume that Taylor made a settlement of his -accounts, so far as he had administered the estate, for otherwise the Orphans’ Court, under the Act of March 29, 1832, Purdon 558, pi. 247 P. Laws 194, would have had no right to discharge him.
At all events the Court in that case was formally moved to discharge, and after rule granted, and a hearing, 'decreed the discharge of the administrator. The effect of this action of the Court was the question passed upon in Taylor vs. Smith. But in the matter before us, no formal discharge was ever asked for, by any party interested in the estate of George Sprenkle, no account was filed, no rule granted, no decree of the Court, nothing in short, except the death of Sprenkle, which of itself, as we have said, the Act of Assembly in effect provides, “shall not affect existing liabilities.”
Was it then an existing liability, at the time of Sprenkle’s death ? For the answer to this question must determine the matter in controversy here.
The case cited by the auditor, Stephens’ Appeal, 6 P. F. Smith 409, as authority for the doctrine he applies here, viz.: that the estate of a deceased administrator is responsible only for what he has done in his lifetime, is not a very satisfactory case. Mr. Justice Agnew calls it “a very confused case,” but the account filed charged the deceased, administrator with matters accruing subsequent to his death, making him, as the opinion says, “a party to the administration of the estate of his father after his own death.” It was in speaking of this “clear error” that the language was used the auditor so much relies on. — The statement of the law is doubt, less correct but the facts were wholly different from those found by the auditor; for the liability is here distinctly for money received in the lifetime of Sprenkle, and not subsequent to his death.
Without stopping to investigate, and, if possible, reconcile the conflicting opinions which have prevailed in England and in this State, touching this question, we may consider as established, the rule laid down in Boyd vs. Boyd, 1 Watts 368, it was declared to be, that in a joint administration, the administrators become responsible for each other as principals.
The sureties are bound that they, as principals without regard to who is, and who is not the acting administrator, or recipient of the money, will faithfully administer the estate, and each administrator ■is liable as a principal to sureties, creditors and legatees.
In Ducommún’s Appeal, 5 Harris 268, it was held that by the settlement oí a joint account by two executors, and its confirmation, they become jointly liable and their division of the balance equally between themselves, does not alter the case.
In Hengst’s Appeal, 12 Har. 413, a case not unlike the present in many of its features, Lewis, C. J., delivering the opinion of the Court, says, “it seems to be settled that the confirmation of a joint account, discharges a previous separate liability, (Haage’s Appeal, 5 Har. 190), and establishes, by admission and adjudication a joint one. It is alleged, however, that the death of Harbach, his colleague, discharged the former from all liability. — This is its effect at law. But in equity the liability of his estate, depends upon equitable considerations. Said Judge Woodward, who also delivered an opinion, “whilst, however, at law the death of a joint obligor worked the discharge of his estate, it was still liable in equity, if there were circumstances to move the conscience of chancery. The actual receipt of the consideration by the deceased obligor, or the insolvency of the survivor, were either of them sufficient for this purpose.”
In Irwin’s Appeal, 11 Casey 296, the same Justice delivering the opinion of the Court, reviews the numerous decisions upon this question and says, “but I do not understand Ducommuu’s Appeal, 5 Har. 270, recognized in Hengst’s Appeal, 12 Har. 419, to be inconsistent with any of the foregoing adjudication, for that was the case of a joint account settled and confirmed, whereby both executors were held to have admitted themselves, of record, to be liable for the balance of the account.
There are many other cases which point to the same conclusion as to the general principle, but those already referred to are sufficient to indicate the current of opinion as to the liability of the estate of a deceased administrator, for money received either by himself or his co-administrator, and jointly accounted for. The co-administrator in this instance, the auditor has found insolvent, it is therefore the very condition pointed out by Mr. Justic Woodward in Hengst’s Appeal, in which the conscience of a chancellor would be moved. What is there then to except this case from the oper. ation of the established rule.
It is answered that this money was not assets to be administered. We say they are estopped from setting up such a defence inequity.
It is also said it does not appear as part of the balance in their hands, but credit is taken for it in the account.
The undisputed fact is that they received it as administrators— accounted for it as such; and have never paid it to those for whom they professed to hold it. They saj' further in effectj “you can make it out of the land and you should bring your action of ejectment and compel the innocent purchasers who have already paid it once, to pay it over again.” But this would be the merest burlesque upon equity, and although the right of these exceptants to compel the purchasers of the land to pay the amount charged upon it, may be entirely clear, these accountants are not in a position to suggest such a course. It is said to be a great hardship to compel payment out of this estate, and the auditor seems to entertain the same opinion. I confess it does not occur to me in this light. If the contest was between G-raybill solvent, and Sprenkle’s estate, it would of course be monstrous to burden the estate with Graybill’s indebtedness ; but narrowed, as is the controversy between Graybill’s co-adminis.trator and the innocent purchasers of the property, I am at a loss to appreciate the. equity that would protect the administrator’s estate, at the expense of the owners of. the land, who have already paid the charge upon it.
Either they must suffer this loss who had no part in causing it, or it must be borne by those who represent Sprenkle, and who could have avoided it, by taking proper steps at his death, to secure the fund, or at least to fix the liability for it upon the surviving administrator.
The auditor has found, and I think correctly, that neither the laches of the claimant nor the statute of. limitations will prevent a recovery.. He has also found that George Sprenkle’s estate is not liable for the charge which Peter Sprenkle originally created upon it, because of settlements made by Sprenkle during his lifetime— this is not seriously questioned and need not be further commented' upon. The auditor awards to the claimants so much of the money as was due to the heirs of Graybill, from the amount charged upon' the land of George Sprenkle, and charges the administrators of Sprenkle’s estate with enough to pay this amount. But if we are in our view of the law, he ought to have awarded that also which Sprenkle’s co-administrator received, and this will require a further consideration of the exceptions filed to this account.— Whether it is necessary to formally exhaust Samuel Graybill’s estate, before demanding the money from Sprenkle’s, is a question not necessary to be decided now. Precisely why it should be done, when the auditor has found Graybill’s estate insolvent, we do not perceive; but it was suggested on the argument, and acquiesced in on all sides.
The rule may be different when separate accounts are filed, as in Patterson’s Estate, 1 W. & S. 292, and Davis’ Appeal, 11 Har. 208, but even then each is bound for the devastavit of the other when sued on the bond.
Enough, however, is shown to entitle the claimants to be heard on their exceptions, and to determine the liability of Sprenkle’s estate, and this is all we have before us at present.
■ And now, to wit, the report of the auditor is re-committed with, instructions to settle the second, fourth and sixth exceptions filed to the account of David B. and Peter B. Sprenkle, administrators of George Sprenkle, deceased, and to make distribution according to the views expressed in this opinion.
The auditor.made report according to instruction, to which report exceptions were filed on the part of the legatees of George Sprenkle. The Court dismissed the exceptions and confirmed the amended report of the distribution.
From the decree of Court dismissing the exceptions and confirming the report of distribution this appeal is taken by the lega-, tees of George Sprenkle.
Messrs James Kell and Cochran & Hay for appellants, argued that:
The claimants slept too long on their rights, and they ought not now to have the aid of the Court: Gress’ Appeal, 2 Harris 463; Hercy vs. Dinwoody, 2 Ves. Jr. 89; Smith vs. Clay, 3 Brown’s C. C. 639 n.; Ashhurst’s Appeal, 10 P. F. Smith 290; Jones vs. Tuberville, 2 Ves. Jr. 14; Ellison vs. Moffatt, 1 ,Johns Ch. R. 46; Gregory vs. Gregory, Cooper 201; Bony vs. Rigard, 1 Cox 145.
Although claimants may have been remaindermen: Andrew vs. Wrigley, 4 Brown’s C. C. 125; Harrison vs. Hollins, 1 Sim & Stu. 240.
The acquiescence of the claimants that the money should remain-in the hands of Samuel Graybill for sixteen years was such laches, on their part as must deprive them of any relief in equity: Hassler vs. Bitting, 4 Wr. 68.
This charge was on a lien on the land, and could be enforced by an action of ejectment, as it binds all parties: Bear vs. Whisler, 7 Watts 144; Pollard vs. Shaaffer, 1 Dallas 210; Sandwith vs. DeSilver, 1 Brown 221, 222; Barclay vs. Steamship Co., 6 Phila. 558; Scott vs. Burton et al, 2 Ashmead 312.
Hence there was no personal liability on the part of Joseph Graybill, and therefore none on the part of George Sprenkle.
A discharged administrator is not liable for the default of a continuing administrator: Taylor vs. Smith, 4 Phila. 270; Stephen’s Appeal, 6 P. F. Smith 409.
All Christina’s rights in the fund could have been enforced by an action at law in debt or ejectment, against the owners of the land, and after her death the remainder men could have enforced the payment of the money to them by the same compulsory legal process. It is not a trust exclusively cognizable in a court of equity ; the question here does not arise between trustee and ces~. tui que trust, and it is not, therefore, exempt from the operations of the statute of limitations and the statute is now a bar: McCandless’ Estate, 11 P. F. S. 9; Lyon vs. Marclay, 1 Watts 271; Zacharias vs. Zacharias, 11 Harris 452; Keller vs. Rhoads, 3 Wr. 520; Barton vs. Dickens, 12 Wr. 522; 7 Johns. Chane. Rep. 100 et seq.; Note to Fonblanque’s Equity 262, 263; Daniel’s Chanc. Practice vol. 2, Star page 157.
Messrs. E. W. Spangler and V. K. Keesey, for appellees argued that:
John Sprenkle, executor of George Sprenkle, was discharged as such May 2, 1863. From that time till 1877 there was no administrator, and hence there was no laches: McCandless’ Estate, 11 P. F. Smith 9.
The testimony shows that those claimants did make a demand for the money due them.
The administrators having sold the property clear of the lien took credit for the amount of their account so as to be able to pay the amount when needed. Hence it became a part of Joseph Graybill’s estate for which they are responsible.

Opinion:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court below on May 29, 1882, in the following opinion :
Per Curiam.
We affirm this decree upon the opinion of the learned judge of the Court below.
Decree affirmed and appeal dismissed at the cost of the appellants.