Case Name: CRENSHAW v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1952-11-12
Citations: 254 S.W.2d 402
Docket Number: No. 26033
Parties: CRENSHAW v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 254
Pages: 402–405

Head Matter:
CRENSHAW v. STATE.
No. 26033.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Nov. 12, 1952.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 28, 1953.
Cofer & Cofer, Austin, for appellant.
George P. Blackburn, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

Opinion:
BEAUCHAMP, Judge.
Appellant was assessed a penalty of fifty years in the penitentiary upon a charge of murder.
The evidence of the night preceding the tragedy is quite involved. It appears, however, that a number of young people, at least some of whom lived in the City of Austin, were in a car; that some of them were drinking; and that an argument took place involving appellant and the deceased about whether or not they should go to Lockhart- and, if they did, who would pay for the gasoline. These matters are not important to the questions raised.
It was the state's evidence that the parties arrived at Sims Place at St. Johns Colony. The appellant was driving the automobile which was occupied by five of the young people: Beauty Morris, A. S. Hill, Jr., Ella Mae Breeden, Meardis Davis, Jr. (the deceased) and the appellant. The three boys went into the cafe and the two girls walked down a path some distance and then returned to the car where they were joined by A. S. Hill, Jr. and defendant. At this point it was suggested by someone that they go to Lockhart. The deceased came out to the car and said he did not want to go, that he was not going to pay for the gasoline. Deceased then walked back into the cafe but later came out accompanied by A. S. Hill, Jr. The deceased at that time told appellant that he was joking, that he did not mean what he had said. Deceased seems to have become incensed by the remark which appellant made in reply to his statement and made the threat to slap appellant. There is much conflict as to just what was said at this time — just prior to the shooting. Deceased then walked around the car towards appellant. As he approached appellant shot him. Two shots were fired and deceased fell to the ground. Later appellant was taken into custody and placed in jail. The sheriff came to talk to him and, as the result of a statement made, went with appellant to the home of his mother and secured the pistol with which he had killed Davis.
On the foregoing statement of facts, relied on by the prosecution, it is contended that no malice was shown and that the jury's verdict should have been set aside by the court. In this we cannot concur. To hold that this evidence was not sufficient to show malice would be to adopt the theory of self-defense, which was duly submitted to the jury and by them refused. Stripped of an issue of self-defense, it would be placing a cheap price on human life to say that because one was approaching another with a threat to slap him, the opposite party would be justified in pulling a deadly weapon, shooting into his body twice and taking his life. In the absence of malice the act is inconceivable and the jury was authorized to so find.
The next question complains of the evidence of the sheriff given in rebuttal. After the defense had concluded its case and the appellant had testified in his own behalf, the sheriff was recalled. He reviewed his statement as to the things that were said while appellant was in his custody in jail and then he was asked if the defendant, during that conversation, had said anything about having killed Meardis Davis, Jr., in self-defense. To this the sheriff answered that he did not. Objection was made to this evidence and exception taken to the ruling of the court.
The question before us turns upon the language of the objection made. Under proper objection the evidence would be clearly inadmissible. Brown v. State, 101 Tex.Cr.R. 421, 275 S.W. 1069; Ely v. State, 139 Tex.Cr.R. 520, 141 S.W.2d 626; and Sharp v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 217 S.W. 2d 1017.
We must take the record as we find it, however, and the objection is in this language: "I want to make the same objection; he was still in custody and could not make a confession that way." The objection previously made, to which reference is had: "I ana going to object; he had him in charge at that time and he was under arrest and in confinement. I don't believe that is admissible, not a proper confession in form like the law provides. I don't believe it is admissible under the circumstances."
We have given careful consideration to the foregoing objection and the exception taken. It is our conclusion that it fails to raise the question discussed by appellant's brief and in oral argument, as to the admissibility of the silence of the party accused of crime for the purpose of impeaching him, or for the purpose of proving an independent fact. Counsel presenting this argument were not in the trial of the case and could only bring it to us as they found the record made. Their very able brief and argument have been helpful but we are unable to apply it to the bill as taken.
We find no reversible error and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.