Case Name: BROWN v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1925-02-18
Citations: 270 S.W. 179
Docket Number: No. 8646
Parties: BROWN v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 270
Pages: 179–181

Head Matter:
BROWN v. STATE.
(No. 8646.)
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Feb. 18, 1925.
Rehearing Denied March 18, 1925.)
1. Criminal law &wkey;>1092(9) — Bills of exception, filed within extension granted within 30 days of term end, considered.
An order during term which allowed 30 days for filing bills of exception did not preclude court, after expiration of such time, but within 30 days after adjournment of term, which lasted less than 8 weeks, from extending time for filing bills, in view of Vernon’s Ann. Code Cr. Proc. 1916, art. 845, and bills filed within extended time were timely.
2. Embezzlement &wkey;>38 — Testimony of statement of defendant, posing as officer, that he had arrested others properly admitted.
In prosecution for embezzlement, based on charge that accused pretending to be officer, arrested prosecuting witness, and accepted money, promising to use same to pay fine and costs, statements of accused at time of alleged arrest that he had arrested fi've others that night, held admissible as tending to show inducement to witness to turn money over.
3. Criminal law <§=»406(7) — Conversation relative to return of embezzled money properly admitted.
In prosecution for embezzlement, conversation of accused relative to return of embezzled money held material and properly admitted as against objection that it occurred subsequent to commission of alleged offense.
4. Embezzlement <&wkey;48(3) — Instruction defining “agent” held correct.
In prosecution for embezzlement, instruction that agent is one who undertakes to transact some business or to manage some affair for another by the authority and on account of the latter held not erroneous.
5. Embezzlement <&wkey;44(5) — Charge of embezzlement sustained under evidence.
Evidence that accused posed as officer, and purported to make arrest, accepting money to pay fine for charge to be preferred, held to sustain conviction of embezzlement.
6. Embezzlement <&wkey;IO — Evidence negativing intent to return money held not to show mere “theft by bailee.”
In prosecution for embezzlement, evidence that accused posed as officer and purported to make arrest, accepting money with which to pay fine for charges to be preferred against victim, held not to show mere “theft by bailee,” which consists of obtaining property of another with intent to use it for bailee’s benefit and then return it.
[Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Theft.]
On Motion for Rehearing.
7. Embezzlement <&wkey;4 — Theft by false pretext not shown in exclusion of “embezzlement.”
In prosecution for embezzlement, evidence that accused posed as officer, and purported to make arrest, accepting money with which to pay fine for 'charges to be preferred against victim, held not to show mere theft by false pretext, but to warrant conviction for “embezzlement,” which is fraudulent appropriation of property of another by one to whom it is intrusted.
[Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Embezzle —Embezzlement.]
8. Embezzlement &wkey;> 10 — Agency, element necessary to embezzlement, shown under evidence.
■ In prosecution for embezzlement, evidence that accused posed as officer and purported to make arrest, accepting money with which to pay fine for charges to be preferred against victim, held to show necessary element of agency of accused for victim.
Appeal from Tarrant County Court at Law; P. W. Seward, Judge.
B. A. Brown was convicted of misdemean- or embezzlement, and he appeals.
Affirmed.
Mays & Mays, of Fort Worth, for appellant.
Tom Garrard, State’s Atty., and Grover C. Morris, Asst. State’s Atty., both of Austin, for the State.

Opinion:
LATTIMORE, J.
Appellant was convicted in the county court at law of Tarrant county of misdemeanor embezzlement, and his punishment fixed at two years in the county jail and a fine of $200.
There were three counts in -the indictment, one charging theft in the ordinary form, one charging theft-by bailee, and the third charging embezzlement. Only the third count waf submitted by the learned trial judge. Two special charges were requested, each of which was given. There are three bills of exception. The state contends that we cannot consider said bills because filed too late. The contention is not supported. The trial term of the court below ended on January 5, 1924. In his order overruling the motion for new trial made on January 3d the court granted 30 days in which to file bills of exception. On the 3d of February the court granted an extension order, extending the time 60 days in which to file such bills of exception. The state contends that the 30-day period first granted had expired before February 3d, and hence the trial court was without power on said last-mentioned date to make an order extending the time. This would be true if the term of the trial court extended -more than 8 weeks, but it did not. Article 845, Vernon's C. O. P., provides that, in the absence of any order at all, parties to criminal cases sháll have 30 days after adjournment of the court in which to file statements of fact and bills of exception, in case the term of court does not extend more than 8 weeks. The term of the trial court ending January 5, 1924, and the ex tending order being made on February 3d following, would be witbin tbe 30 days allowed by said statute. Tbe bills were filed March 18th, and were in time.
The complaint in the first bill of exceptions is that witness Smith, owner of the alleged embezzled money, was permitted to testify that appellant told him on the night of the alleged embezzlement that he had arrested five other couples that night. In our opinion the testimony was admissible. The state's theory of the case was that appellant, pretending to be an officer, arrested Smith and his companions for parking their ear by the roadside at night, and that appellant obtained $38.40 in money from Smith upon his promise and agreement to take said money and with it pay a fine and the costs which he said would be adjudged against Smith upon appellant entering a plea of guilty for Smith to a criminal charge based on what Smith was doing at the time. The testimony ob jected to would appear to be a part of the representations psed by appellant to induce Smith to turn over the money to him.
It is urged in the second bill of exceptions that the trial court erred in letting in a conversation testified to by witness Smith as having been had with appellant in regard to returning the money, which conversation was objected to upon the ground that it occurred subsequent to the commission oi the alleged offense. We are unable to see the validity of the objection. If appellant came to Smith after having obtained from him the money, and probably after charges had been made, and had a conversation with him in regard to returning the money, thi^ might be very material evidence.
The third bill of exceptions was taken to a paragraph in the charge of the court wherein the court said:
"Gentlemen, you are instructed that an agent is one who undertakes to transact some business, or to manage some affair for another, by the authority, and on account of the latter."
We find ourselves unable to uphold this contention. In Corpus Juris, vol. 2, under the head of "Agency" on page 420, appears the following:
"An agent is defined to be one who acts for or in place of another by authority from him; one who undertakes to transact some business or manage some affair for another by authority and on account of the latter."
This appears to be in harmony with the instruction given by the trial judge.
Appellant, has filed a brief in which he uyges that he could not be guilty of the offense of embezzlement under the evidence in this case. He seems to insist that at most the question involved would be one of bailment. The relation of bailee as involved in our statute on theft by bailee is constituted where one obtains the property of another with the intent to usé it for his own benefit, and then to return it. As we understand the facts in this ease, it was not contemplated, if the state's theory be true, that the money should ever be returned to witness Smith. Appellant, having arrested Smith in his pretended character as an officer, then entered into an agreement with him that he would act for Smith in taking the money of the latter and delivering it to the proper authorities in payment of a fine and costs which they would assess against Smith, upon complaint being made against him. We find nothing in Grice v. State, 88 Tex. Cr. R. 106, 225 S. W. 172, supporting any issue properly raised by the facts in this case. The money delivered to' appellant was unquestionably the money of Smith. Appellant was undertaking as Smith's agent to deliver it to the proper authorities in payment of a fine which he informed Smith would be assessed against him. Appellant was not a judge or a sheriff, and had no power to then assess or collect a fine. The fact that appellant was undertaking to do this ostensibly without compensation would not alter the fact of his agency.
Not being able to agree with any of the propositions advanced, the judgment will be affirmed.
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