Case Name: Richard L. DIXON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2002-04-04
Citations: 812 So. 2d 595
Docket Number: No. 1D00-3636
Parties: Richard L. DIXON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: ALLEN, C.J. and VAN NORTWICK,
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 812
Pages: 595–597

Head Matter:
Richard L. DIXON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 1D00-3636.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
April 4, 2002.
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender and David P. Gauldin, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Karen Armstrong and Douglas T. Squire, Assistant Attorneys General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Richard L. Dixon appeals his convictions for forgery of a written instrument and driving without a valid driver's license. He argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion in limine by which he sought to exclude, on the authority of section 316.650(9), Florida Statutes (2000), the admission into evidence of a traffic citation issued to him. Because the language of section 316.650(9) unambiguously provides that traffic citations are not admissible in any trial, we must reverse.
Upon being stopped by a police officer following the commission of several traffic infractions, appellant provided a false name to the officer. That name was placed on the traffic citation, which appellant signed using the false name. When it was learned that appellant gave a false name, he was charged with forgery under section 831.01 and driving without a valid driver's license. By his motion in limine, appellant sought to preclude the admission of the traffic citation into evidence. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the legislature could not have intended the exclusion of a traffic citation when the execution of the citation is the basis of the offense at trial. Appellant thereafter entered a plea of nolo contendere, reserving the right to appeal the issue of whether it was error to admit the traffic citation into evidence. The trial court expressly found that the evidentiary ruling on the motion in limine was dispositive of the case and the state has not asserted below or on appeal that this evidentiary ruling was not dispositive.
Florida courts have recognized that signing another person's name to a traffic citation constitutes a forgery. See Rushing v. State, 684 So.2d 856 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). Nevertheless, section 316.650(9) provides that a traffic citation "shall not be admissible evidence in any trial." The statute contains no exceptions to this clear and unambiguous prohibition. It is a well-established principle of statutory interpretation that an unambiguous statute is not subject to judicial construction, no matter how wise it may seem to alter the plain language of the statute. State v. Jett, 626 So.2d 691, 693 (Fla.1993). "Moreover, '[e]ven where a court is convinced that the legislature really meant and intended something not expressed in the phraseology of the act, it will not deem itself authorized to depart from the plain meaning of the language which is free from ambiguity.' " St. Petersburg Bank & Trust Co. v. Hamm, 414 So.2d 1071, 1073 (Fla.1982)(quoting Van Pelt v. Hilliard, 75 Fla. 792, 78 So. 693 (1918)). Further, although courts may interpret a statute to give effect to discernable legislative intent even though such intent may contradict the strict language of the statute, see Vildibill v. Johnson, 492 So.2d 1047, 1049 (Fla.1986), here we have been presented with no basis to discern a legislative intent contrary to the unambiguous language of section 315.650(9).
Courts should go behind the unambiguous meaning of the words in a statute only when "an unreasonable or ridiculous conclusion" would result from failure to do so. Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla.1984). While following the unambiguous mandate of section 315.650(9) will make convictions for forgery of a traffic citation more difficult, the application of the plain and ordinary meaning of the words of the statute do not lead to either an unreasonable or ridiculous result. See Corfan Banco Asuncion Paraguay v. Ocean Bank, 715 So.2d 967, 970 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). As the Florida Supreme Court stated in Jett:
We trust that if the legislature did not intend the result mandated by the statute's plain language, the legislature itself will amend the statute at the next opportunity.
626 So.2d at 693.
Accordingly, in view of the absolute mandatory terms of section 316.650(9), we conclude that the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion. The appellant's conviction for forgery is REVERSED, and, because the evidentiary ruling was deemed dispositive of this case, the cause is REMANDED with directions to discharge appellant.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
ALLEN, C.J. and VAN NORTWICK,
J., concur and POLSTON, J., dissents with written opinion.