Case Name: KINGSTOWN MOBILE HOME PARK, Pearl Krzak v. Michael A. STRASHNICK
Court: Supreme Court of Rhode Island
Jurisdiction: Rhode Island
Decision Date: 2001-06-26
Citations: 774 A.2d 847
Docket Number: Nos. 99-166-Appeal
Parties: KINGSTOWN MOBILE HOME PARK, Pearl Krzak v. Michael A. STRASHNICK.
Judges: Present WILLIAMS, C.J., LEDERBERG, BOURCIER, FLANDERS and GOLDBERG, JJ.
Reporter: West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 774
Pages: 847–865

Head Matter:
KINGSTOWN MOBILE HOME PARK, Pearl Krzak v. Michael A. STRASHNICK.
Nos. 99-166-Appeal.
Supreme Court of Rhode Island.
June 26, 2001.
John J. Kupa, Jr., North Kingstown, for Plaintiff.
Richard L. Walsh, III, North Kingstown, for Defendant.
Present WILLIAMS, C.J., LEDERBERG, BOURCIER, FLANDERS and GOLDBERG, JJ.

Opinion:
OPINION
LEDERBERG, Justice.
Can a tenant of a mobile home park be evicted for reasons other than those enumerated in the Rhode Island Mobile and Manufactured Homes Statute (mobile home act) if the tenant does not have a written lease and has remained in possession as a month-to-month or holdover tenant? Pearl Krzak (Krzak), the owner and operator of Kingstown Mobile Home Park (the park), has appealed a judgment by the Superior Court that denied her eviction claim and her constitutional challenge to G.L.1956 § 31-44-2 (the statute) and granted the counterclaims of her tenant, Michael A. Strashnick (Strashnick), for malicious prosecution and reprisal. A summary of the pertinent facts and the applicable statutes is presented as necessary for our discussion of the issues on appeal.
Factual Background and Relevant Statutes
Since 1946, Krzak has owned and operated Kingstown Mobile Home Park in North Kingstown, Rhode Island. The park contains approximately 125 mobile home lots, all but seven or eight of which were occupied at the time of trial, each at a monthly rental fee between $260 and $285 per lot. In 1993, Strashnick bought an older mobile home formerly owned by Krzak's son's mother-in-law, and he became a tenant at 29 A Krzak Road.
Apparently from the beginning, the relationship between landlord and tenant was contentious. Krzak, who had a policy of not granting year-long leases unless they began in January and ended on December 31, testified that only about twenty-five of her tenants had leases and that she considered all other residents "month-to-month" tenants. Given that § 31-44-7(1)(xiv) requires that the operator of a mobile home park "[p]rovide a written lease of not less than one year unless the resident requests in writing a shorter term, or unless a resident in writing states that he or she does not desire a written lease," Strash-nick, whose tenancy began after August 1993, refused to sign the four-month lease offered by Krzak. Instead, he requested a one-year lease, which Krzak refused. At that point Strashnick left without signing, taking with him a copy of the lease and park regulations.
At the time he applied for tenancy in the park, Strashnick was required to pay a nonrefundable $140 application fee. Section 31—44—3(8)(i) states in pertinent part that "[a] prospective resident shall not be charged an entrance fee for the privilege of leasing or occupying a lot, except as provided in § 31-44-4," which is the section relating to the sale of mobile and manufactured homes. Although this section was applicable to Strashnick's purchase of an existing mobile home in the park, a nonrefundable fee was violative of Rhode Island law, and Strashnick subtracted the amount from his first rental payment. Krzak vehemently denied this transaction at trial, acknowledging that such a charge was illegal. Krzak's denial was contradicted by her handwritten notation on Strashnick's canceled check: "nonrefundable application processing fee and credit check."
In late November 1996, Strashnick and other residents received a notice postmarked November 27, 1996, for a rental increase effective January 1, 1997. Because G.L.1956 § 31-44.1-2(b) provides that "[a]ny person who owns, operates, or maintains a mobile and manufactured home park pursuant to the provisions of chapter 44 of title 31 shall give the mobile home owners of the park sixty (60) days written notice prior to any lot rent increase going into effect," Strashnick enclosed a letter to Krzak in his January rental payment, explaining that in light of the improper notice, he was paying his usual rent and would comply with the increase only when he received the sixty-days' notice provided by law.
At trial, Krzak testified that in the previous five years, she had evicted only a few tenants from the park, all for the nonpayment of rent, but that she was seeking to evict Strashnick as a month-to-month tenant for "all the things that he's done without permission." Strashnick, in addition to other extensive renovations of his mobile home, replaced an existing metal garden shed with another shed, removed some shrubbery, and poured a concrete slab. Krzak also testified that she did "not appreciate it" when Strashnick addressed her as "Pearly baby" and used other offensive language. She expressed her frustration with Strashnick: "He wouldn't do anything that he doesn't feel like he wants to do, and he tells ya that, too."
The record before us revealed that differences between the parties frequently ended in Krzak's initiating litigation, the long saga of which we need not discuss in detail for our analysis. In July 1995, Krzak filed an eviction claim against Strashnick for violating parking regulations and for erecting too large a garden shed. After a hearing in August 1996, a District Court judge permitted Strashnick to cure the breach and dismissed his counterclaim for "harassment." In May 1996, as the result of another complaint by Krzak, Strashnick was permitted by a Superior Court justice to erect a carport over the then-existing concrete slab. In October 1996 and August 1997, Krzak sent notices of "Termination of Tenancy" to Strashnick, requesting that he remove himself and his mobile home from the park within sixty days. The first notice stated that Strashnick's tenancy was "a periodic one on a month-to-month basis" and was being terminated "pursuant to Rhode Island General Laws 31-44-2 and 34-18-37." A second notice added that the reason for the month-to-month tenancy was Strash-nick's failure to sign a lease. Strashnick ignored both notices, and in October 1997, Krzak filed a complaint for Strashnick's eviction as a holdover tenant. After a District Court judge found in favor of Strashnick, Krzak filed for a trial de novo in Superior Court. Strashnick responded by filing a counterclaim for reprisal under § 31-44-5, retaliatory conduct under G.L. 1956 § 34-18-46, abuse of process, malicious prosecution, and trespass.
A bench trial was held in the fall of 1998, the outcome of which is now before us on appeal. The trial justice granted Strash-nick's motion for a judgment on partial findings because Krzak had failed to comply with § 31 — 44-2(a), which limits the termination of a mobile home park tenancy to six enumerated circumstances. The justice further ruled that a constitutional attack on § 31-44-2 — which Krzak proposed to submit should her eviction claim fail— was not ripe for consideration because the Attorney General had not been notified. Strashnick then proceeded with his counterclaim. The trial justice, after dismissing the claims for abuse of process and for trespass, awarded Strashnick $780 on the reprisal claim, and $920 for compensatory damage and $2,000 for punitive damage on the malicious prosecution claim. Krzak appealed.
Constitutional Challenge
In her appeal, Krzak argued that the Legislature did not contemplate creating near-permanent mobile home tenancies and that an interpretation of § 31-44-2 that limits eviction only to the six conditions specified therein would violate constitutional property rights. Although she admitted that the Attorney General's office had not been notified before trial, she contended that the Superior Court justice erroneously refused to consider her constitutional challenge. Our review of the trial transcript revealed that Krzak based her claim for eviction "on the basic common law doctrine of holdover tenancy" and that only if the claim was not permitted on that basis, did she intend to pursue a "constitutional argument which we will brief further and submit to the Court upon proper application to the Attorney General." In response, the Superior Court justice decided that without notification of the Attorney General, the constitutional attack was not ripe for consideration.
General Laws 1956 § 9-30-11 provides in pertinent part:
"In any proceeding which involves the validity of a municipal ordinance or franchise, the municipality shall be made a party, and shall be entitled to be heard, and if the statute, ordinance, or franchise is alleged to be unconstitutional, the attorney general of the state shall also be served with a copy of the proceeding and be entitled to be heard."
Similarly, Rule 24(d) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure anent intervention by the Attorney General requires:
"When the constitutionality of an act of the legislature is drawn in question in any action to which the state or an officer, agency, or employee thereof is not a party, the party asserting the unconstitutionality of the act shall serve the attorney general with a copy of the proceeding within such time to afford the attorney general an opportunity to intervene."
We have addressed this issue repeatedly and have held that when a party "both fail[s] and neglect[s] to comply with its clear obligation when challenging the constitutionality of a state statute to 'serve the attorney general with a copy of the proceedings,' [w]e do not believe that this Court should undertake to determine the constitutionality of a state statute in a given case without first affording the Attorney General the opportunity to intervene and be heard. See Crossman v. Erickson, 570 A.2d 651, 654 (R.I.1990)." Global Waste Recycling, Inc. v. Mallette, 762 A.2d 1208, 1214 (R.I.2000). Although on May 14,1998, Krzak amended her original complaint to include an attack on the constitutionality of § 81-44-2, she failed to give the required notice to the Attorney General, and thus we affirm the trial justice's decision to preclude the constitutional challenge.
In her appeal, Krzak suggested that the constitutionality of § 31-44-2 nevertheless should be considered on the merits, "due to their significance and as exception ] to the 'raise or waive' doctrine." The raise-or-waive doctrine and its exception — which Krzak attempted to invoke in her appeal — are not applicable to the present case, but rather the doctrine applies to circumstances in which a party's counsel fails to raise a specific objection to an event or to evidence during trial. See, e.g., State v. Bettencourt, 723 A.2d 1101, 1107 (R.I.1999) (holding that issues that were not preserved by a specific objection at trial may not be considered on appeal). Moreover, "[w]e have indicated on more than one occasion that § 9-30-11, as a rale relating to service of process, must be followed and construed strictly." Brown v. Samiagio, 521 A.2d 119, 121 (R.I.1987). There is absolutely no evidence that Krzak complied with the statutorily required notification of the Attorney General at any time in the course of these proceedings, including during her appeal to this Court. Consequently, we decline to consider her constitutional challenge here.
Overview of § 31-44-2 Statutory Provisions
Many states, including Rhode Island, have enacted statutes that set limits on the eviction of mobile home park tenants in consideration of their special circumstances. See generally Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Mobile Home Eviction Statutes, 43 A.L.R.5th 705 (1996). Mobile homes present an economic housing alternative, but frequently are restricted to placements in mobile home parks. The resulting shortage of sites for mobile homes and the generally unequal bargaining position of tenants can lead to abuses by the landlord. Id. at 719.
This is a case of first impression that examines how the statute applies in a case of an attempted eviction. Although we do not reach the constitutional issue in this appeal, given the landlord's failure to notify the Attorney General, other courts have ruled that restrictions on eviction of mobile home tenants are not unconstitutional. See, e.g., Palm Beach Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Strong, 300 So.2d 881, 883-88 (Fla.1974) (holding that limiting the grounds for evicting mobile home tenants was a proper exercise of police power). The Florida Supreme Court explored the question of whether the Florida mobile home statute limiting evictions of mobile home park tenants "constitute[d] an arbitrary and unreasonable regulation by the state constituting a deprivation of property rights without process, impairment of contractual obligation, and a violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution of Florida." Id. at 885. The Court answered the question in the negative and explained:
"We recognize the liberty and property right that every owner of a mobile home and every owner or operator of a mobile home park possesses to use his property in his own way and for his own purposes subject only to the restraint necessary to secure the public welfare. However, we find that Section 88.271, Florida Statutes, constitutes a reasonable and necessary regulation of that right in view of the peculiar nature and problems presented by mobile homes." Id.
Moreover, the Court stated that any constitutional challenge on the grounds that a mobile home park owner was permanently deprived of the use of his land for other purposes than a mobile home park had become moot once the Florida Legislature had enacted into law a section that permitted the eviction of tenants, if a change in use of land was desired. Id. at 887. Similarly, pursuant to § 31-44-2(a)(6) of the Rhode Island mobile home act, in case of "[c]ondemnation or change of use of the mobile and manufactured home park," a park owner can evict tenants with proper notice. Subject to one-year notice and the payment of relocation benefits to tenants, a park owner may sell or lease a mobile home park, even if that event results in the discontinuance of the mobile home park. Section 31-44-3.2.
The Vermont Supreme Court noted that "owners and renters of mobile homes tend to be lower-income groups that may have difficulty finding alternative housing." State Agency of Development and Community Affairs v. Bisson, 161 Vt. 8, 632 A.2d 34, 38 (1993). The Vermont mobile home act, which "added security from arbitrary eviction" by limiting eviction to specific narrow grounds, was held not to violate the takings clause of- the United States Constitution because a landlord was not prevented from selling his property. Id. at 38-39. The Court further stated that the provision allowing evictions only for cause was "a cléar exception to the general landlord and tenant law of Vermont, which allows evictions without cause in the absence of a written rental agreement." Id. at 36. It went on to hold that Vermont's landlord-tenant act and mobile home act were complementary in most instances but when they conflicted, the mobile home act would prevail. Id. at 37.
The United States Supreme Court rejected the argument that the interplay between a city mobile home rent control ordinance and California's Mobilehome Residency Law — which limited the bases upon which a park owner may terminate a mobile home owner's tenancy — rendered "the mobile home owner effectively a perpetual tenant of the park, and [that] the increase in the mobile home's value thus represents the right to occupy a pad at below-market rent indefinitely." Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 527, 112 S.Ct. 1522, 1528, 118 L.Ed.2d 153, 165 (1992). The Supreme Court reasoned that
"[petitioners voluntarily rented their land to mobile home owners. At least on the face of the regulatory scheme, neither the city nor the State compels petitioners, once they have rented their property to tenants, to continue doing so. To the contrary, the Mobilehome Residency Law provides that a park owner who wishes to change the use of his land may evict his tenants, albeit with 6 or 12 months notice. [T]he state and local laws at issue here merely regulate petitioners' use of their land by regulating the relationship between landlord and tenant. 'This Court has consistently affirmed that States have broad power to regulate housing conditions in general and the landlord-tenant relationship in particular without paying compensation for all economic injuries that such regulation entails.'" Id. at 527-29, 112 S.Ct. at 1528-29, 118 L.Ed.2d at 165-66.
Under a comparable provision in Rhode Island's mobile home act, a change in the use of a mobile home park is one of the express conditions for which a tenancy may be terminated, subject to proper notice. Section 31—44—2(a)(6) and (b).
In addition, the Supreme Court distinguished the circumstances in Yee from a case in which "the statute, on its face or as applied compelled] a landowner over objection to rent his property or to refrain in perpetuity from terminating a tenancy." Yee, 503 U.S. at 528, 112 S.Ct. at 1529, 118 L.Ed.2d at 166 (citing Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 831-32, 107 S.Ct. 3141, 3145-46, 97 L.Ed.2d 677, 686 (1987) (Coastal commission conditioning the grant of a building permit on the grant of a public easement); FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245, 251-52, n. 6, 107 S.Ct. 1107, 1111-12, n. 6, 94 L.Ed.2d 282, 289-90, n. 6 (1987) (FCC order limiting rates which utility may charge cable television companies for use of utility poles), and Fresh Pond Shopping Center, Inc. v. Callahan, 464 U.S. 875, 877, 104 S.Ct. 218, 219, 78 L.Ed.2d 215, 216 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (requiring the purchaser of rent-controlled apartment housing to obtain permission from the rent control board to remove the property from the rental housing market). Although the Rhode Island mobile home act limits the circumstances under which a tenant can be evicted, a landowner cannot be compelled to use his land as a mobile home park, nor is he precluded from changing the use of his land, if appropriate steps are followed. See ante.
Before continuing with our resolution of this case, we briefly review the provisions and purposes of the Rhode Island statute. The Rhode Island Mobile and Manufactured Homes Act (mobile home act), chapter 44 of title 31, was enacted in 1984 with an effective date of July 1, 1985. It defines seventeen significant terms to aid in the interpretation of the chapter, § 31-44-1, and, along with other provisions, sets forth the process of mobile home park licensing, § 31-44-1.7, and provides for triennial surveys by the Department of Health, § 31-44-1.8. The mobile home act establishes notice requirements for the rules and regulations of a park, § 31-44-3, and specifies the necessary procedures to be followed for an eviction of a mobile home park tenant in § 31-44-2, the section at issue in the present case. It further requires a park owner to provide a written lease of no less than one year and prohibits the operator from charging an entrance fee or from providing for one in the lease. Section 31-44-7. Pursuant to § 31-44-17, any owner of a mobile home park or any resident therein may file a complaint with the director of the Department of Business Regulation, whose decision may be appealed to the Superior Court. The statute on the whole affords tenants of mobile home parks more protection than tenants enjoy in other residential housing. For example, pursuant to § 31-44-3.1, a tenants' association has a right of first refusal to purchase before a park may be sold or leased for any purpose that would result in a discontinuance of its use as a mobile home park. As noted previously, in case of a discontinuance due to sale or leasing of a park, tenants are entitled to relocation benefits pursuant to § 31-44-3.2.
Six years after the enactment of the mobile homes act, the Legislature added chapter 44.1 to title 31 of the Rhode Island General Laws, titled "Mobile and Manufactured Home Lot Rental Increases," that included the following declaration of policy:
"The general assembly finds and declares that the provision of affordable housing is of vital concern to the citizens of the state, that mobile and manufactured homes are an important source for affordable housing, that lot rent increases for these homes are a continuing concern for low and moderate income citizens and the elderly, and that some form of limited regulation relative to lot rental increases for mobile and manufactured homes is in the public interest." Section 31-44.1-1.
The chapter then sets forth notice requirements for rent increases and outlines the procedure for arbitration between a park owner and mobile home owners "[i]f a majority of the mobile home owners of the park believe that the rent increase is clearly excessive." Section 31-44.1-2. Although we do not address the constitutionality of the mobile home act in this appeal because it is not before us, in light of the Legislature's expressed intent to provide special regulations for mobile home park residents, we interpret the act to afford more protection to residents of mobile home parks than is provided to tenants under G.L.1956 chapter 18 of title 34, the Residential Landlord and Tenant Act (landlord-tenant act).
Eviction under the Act
At the time of the Superior Court proceedings, § 31 — 44—2(a), titled "Evictions— Termination of tenancy," read as follows:
"After July 1, 1985, a tenancy may be terminated by a park owner or operator pursuant to chapter 18 of title 34, provided, however, that jurisdiction as it relates to this chapter shall be in the district court but subject to one or more of the following reasons and limitations which shall take precedence over any conflicting state statute or local ordinance."
The statute sets forth six specific grounds on which a tenancy may be terminated: (1) nonpayment of rent or charges; (2) the tenant's failure to comply with laws or regulations, subject to notice and opportunity to comply; (3) damage by the tenant to the property; (4) repeated conduct of the tenant which disturbs the peace and quiet of other tenants; (5) the tenant's failure to comply with rules of the park, provided the tenant is afforded an opportunity to comply; and (6) condemnation or change of use of the mobile home park.
Although § 31-44-2(a) refers to the landlord-tenant act, the statute clearly and unambiguously states that eviction of a tenant can only be effectuated if one of the six enumerated conditions applies, conditions that "take[ ] precedence over any conflicting state statute or local ordinance." (Emphasis added.) In addition, § 31-44-2(b) specifies that a tenancy may be terminated on thirty days' notice for nonpayment of rent. Termination on one or more of the other grounds requires sixty days' notice.
The circumstances in the instant case exemplify the difficulties encountered by a mobile home park tenant when faced with eviction. Krzak testified that the eviction of Strashnick would necessitate removing the mobile home skirting required by the park, detaching his porch, garden shed, and carport, removing his mobile home from the park, and returning the lot to the condition it was before any home had been placed on it. In our opinion, limiting eviction to the circumstances enumerated in § 31-44-2(a) is consistent with the legislative intent of affording special protection to residents of mobile home parks, who often are low and moderate income citizens and the elderly.
The statutory reference to the landlord-tenant act is made to specify the procedures to be followed in the District Court, not to bestow on the owner of a mobile home park the ability to evict a tenant for no reason, as a landlord can with a typical residential tenant-at-will. In our opinion, the Legislature did not intend to incorporate into the mobile home act the landlord-tenant act's easier termination of tenancy provisions.
We have consistently held that "[i]n carrying out our duty as the final arbiter on questions of statutory construction, Tilt is well settled that when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, this Court must interpret the statute literally and must give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings.' " State v. Flores, 714 A.2d 581, 583 (R.I.1998) (per curiam) (quoting Accent Store Design, Inc. v. Marathon House, Inc., 674 A.2d 1223, 1226 (R.I.1996)). Moreover, "[i]t is our task 'in interpreting a legislative enactment to determine and effectuate the Legislature's intent and to attribute to the enactment the meaning most consistent with its policies or obvious purposes.' " Dias v. Cinquegrana, 727 A.2d 198, 199-200 (R.I.1999) (per curiam) (quoting Brennan v. Kirby, 529 A.2d 633, 637 (R.I.1987)).
Our review of the record of the trial proceedings revealed that Krzak complied with the sixty-days' notice for termination of tenancy specified in § 31-44-2(b) but, as the Superior Court justice noted, in all other respects treated Strashnick "like a month-to-month tenant of any other type of dwelling." Krzak in fact conceded that none of the grounds enumerated in § 31-44-2(a) was at issue in the litigation before us. Instead, she relied "on the basic common law doctrine of holdover tenancy, which basically, allows an owner of real estate to evict an individual after their term is up and upon proper notice." The Superior Court justice rejected this approach, and we agree with her assessment that "[t]here is no question that the plaintiff attempted to evict the defendant in violation of the clear and unambiguous provisions of the statute." Once Krzak had admitted that the conditions of the eviction statute had not been fulfilled, she could not make a claim based on common law that clearly was superseded by the statute enacted in 1985, eight years before Strashnick became a resident at the park.
Krzak's reliance on the landlord-tenant act is equally unavailing, and we concur with the Superior Court justice's finding that the mobile home tenancy dispute in this case fell exclusively within the purview of the mobile home act, without reference to the landlord-tenant act. The Superior Court justice addressed this distinction:
"This statute was enacted in 1985 for the purpose of protecting residents of Mobile Home Parks by treating them differently than other residential tenants for purposes of eviction proceedings.
"It reflected a recognition of the difficulties and expenses involved in relocating a structure such as the defendant's mobile home, from leased land. It re- fleeted a recognition of the need for affordable housing in this State and the particular burdens imposed upon an owner of a mobile home if he or she was required to relocate it."
Krzak argued on appeal, as she did in her original complaint, that "§ 32-44-2(a) should not bar evictions for holding over if a tenant does not sign a lease and does not demand one." Although Krzak maintained throughout her appeal that "nothing in the record suggests that tenant ever asked for [a lease]," the evidence clearly contradicted this statement. On cross-examination, Krzak admitted that she offered Strash-nick an initial limited lease for a period of four months, in accordance with her convention of having all leases run from January to December 31. Asked whether "at that time, Mr. Strashnick requested that [she] give him a lease of at least one year," Krzak responded: "He can't have it. He wanted to, but he cannot have it." Clearly Krzak violated the statute and deprived Strashnick of the opportunity to obtain the one-year lease to which he was entitled. Krzak's counsel suggested for the first time at oral argument that one-year leases were held available at the mobile home park's office each January. Our thorough review of the transcript revealed that no evidence of this purported fact was submitted to the Superior Court justice, and therefore the issue of whether this would have been sufficient in light of the mandate of § 31-44-7(1)(xiv) that a landlord "[p]rovide a written lease of not less than one year" was not presented to the trial justice. In sum, we hold that unless one or more of the six conditions set forth in § 32-44-2(a) applied, Krzak could not evict Strashnick from the mobile home park without violating the terms of the mobile home act.
Counterclaims
Krzak's remaining issues in this appeal centered on Strashnick's counterclaims for malicious prosecution and reprisal. Krzak contended that "the former claim lacks merit as a matter of law because Krzak had a good-faith belief that she could evict him as a holdover tenant." She further maintained that Strashnick could "not invoke the statutory rebuttable presumption of reprisal because he never demanded a written lease" and that the trial justice "failed to state any facts underlying her conclusion" on reprisal.
This Court has previously defined malicious prosecution as "a suit for damages resulting from a prior criminal or civil legal proceeding that was instituted maliciously and without probable cause, and that terminated unsuccessfully for the plaintiff therein." Clyne v. Doyle, 740 A.2d 781, 782 (R.I.1999) (per curiam) (quoting Hillside Associates v. Stravato, 642 A.2d 664, 667 (R.I.1994)). To establish malice, it must be shown that " 'the person initiating the original action was primarily motivated by ill will or hostility or [regardless of such motivation] did not believe that he or she would succeed in that action,' " id. at 783, and that "the prior suit resulted in a special injury to the defendant therein." Nagy v. McBurney, 120 R.I. 925, 929 n. 1, 392 A.2d 365, 367 n. 1 (1978).
It is well settled that the findings by a trial justice sitting without a jury in a civil case are accorded great weight and will not be disturbed on review "unless such findings are clearly erroneous or unless the trial justice misconceived or overlooked material evidence or unless the decision fails to do substantial justice between the parties." Harris v. Town of Lincoln, 668 A.2d 321, 326 (R.I.1995). Here, the Superior Court justice's findings included her assessment that "the instant action was commenced by [Krzak] without probable cause and that it terminated unsuccessfully, that the conduct of [Krzak] was malicious[,] [and that her] hostile motive was inferred by the lack of probable cause and also from the evidence." The justice further stated that she had "observed the testimony of [Krzak], the demeanor of [Krzak] when she testified, particularly when cross-examined by [Strashnick's] attorney," and she concluded that "this action was commenced because [Krzak] had great feelings of hostility toward [Strashnick] [a]nd great feelings of frustration at failing to succeed when she attempted to evict him in the past." The trial justice found that Krzak was "primarily motivated by ill will or hostility and did not actually believe that she would succeed with the action and [that] she was seeking possession by harassing [Strash-nick] into submission."
Notwithstanding these findings by the trial justice, Strashnick failed to present any evidence that as a result of Krzak's litigation, he had suffered special injury, a requisite element in a claim of malicious prosecution. Salvadore v. Major Electric & Supply, Inc., 469 A.2d 353, 357 (R.I.1983); Ring v. Ring, 102 R.I. 112, 114-15, 228 A.2d 582, 584 (1967). Because Strashnick did not claim any special injury "beyond the trouble, cost, and other consequences normally associated with defending oneself against an unfounded legal charge," Jacques v. McLaughlin, 121 R.I. 525, 525, 401 A.2d 430, 431 (1979), the award of $920 for attorney's fees as costs resulting from the malicious prosecution was error. Consequently, we sustain Krzak's appeal on this issue and vacate that part of the trial justice's award.
With respect to punitive damages, this Court has stated that "the question of whether punitive damages are appropriate in a given case is a question of law to be decided by the court, [and] once a court determines that such damages may appropriately be awarded, 'such an award is discretionary with the finder of fact.' " Callaghan v. Rhode Island Occupational Information Coordinating Committee/Industry Educational Council of Labor, 704 A.2d 740, 745 (R.I.1997) (quoting Morin v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 478 A.2d 964, 967 (R.I.1984)). Punitive damages are awarded when there is " 'evidence of such willfulness, recklessness or wickedness, on the part of the party at fault, as amount[s] to criminality, that ought to be punished.' " Allen v. Simmons, 533 A.2d 541, 543 (R.I.1987) (quoting Morin, 478 A.2d at 967). Although the Superior Court justice's finding stated that Krzak's conduct in this case rose to the level that warranted punitive damages, her award of $2000 for punitive damages was predicated on Strashnick's claim of malicious prosecution. Because we hold that the claim of malicious prosecution failed in the absence of a special injury to Strashnick, we vacate the punitive damage award as well.
Finally, we address the issue of reprisal, defined in § 31-44-1(14) as "any act taken against a resident which is intended as a penalty for any protected lawful action taken by a resident." Such behavior is prohibited under § 31-44-5(a), which states that "[n]o licensee shall take reprisal(s) against a resident, prospective resident, or association formed pursuant to § 31-44-3.1." Under § 31-44-5(b), if a licensed mobile home park operator takes certain steps against a resident within six months after the resident has taken a protected lawful action, a rebuttable presumption of reprisal arises. Section 31—44-5(c) provides that a resident who has been the subject of a reprisal is entitled to the remedies for retaliatory actions provided in § 34-18-46 of the landlord-tenant act, including "three (3) months periodic rent or threefold the actual damages sustained by him or her, whichever is greater, and reasonable attorney's fees." Section 34-18-34.
The Superior Court justice found that "the term 'protected lawful action' [was] sufficiently broad as to include [Strashnick's] action in his defending the previous eviction action and in filing the previous, albeit unsuccessful, counterclaim," and she rejected Krzak's narrow definition that attempted to limit "a protected lawful action" to such events as the reporting of a violation of a building or health code. Section 31-44-1(13) defines "protected lawful action" as "any report of a violation of this chapter, or of any applicable building or health code, or any other justified complaint to governmental authority, or any other justified lawful act by a resident or prospective resident." (Emphasis added.) Given the extensive protection of tenants' rights in the act and the broadly stated language of the definition, we conclude that a defense of an eviction action or any counterclaim resulting therefrom are clearly among those lawful actions contemplated by the Legislature. See Commercial Union Insurance Co. v. Pelchat, 727 A.2d 676, 681 (R.I.1999) (holding that statutory provisions are examined in their entirety and in contemplation of the Legislature's intent).
In her decision, the Superior Court justice found that within six months of proceedings in District Court — in which Strashnick successfully fought an eviction and was permitted to cure park rule violations — Krzak attempted to evict Strashnick yet again. Without making a finding on whether Strashnick had the benefit of the presumption under the act, the Superi- or Court justice found that "the facts and reasonable inference from those facts are so clear, that [Strashnick] has sustained his burden of proof on the question of reprisal." Krzak contended on appeal that the Superior Court justice failed to state any facts underlying her conclusion that Krzak intended to evict Strashnick as a penalty for his defense of a prior eviction action. As we have explained, a trial justice's findings on mixed questions of law and fact are generally entitled to the same deference as the justice's findings of fact. Hawkins v. Town of Foster, 708 A.2d 178, 182 (R.I.1998). In her decision, the Superior Court justice concluded that Krzak "commenced an action for possession, and it is clear that possession is exactly what she wanted to accomplish." Moreover, the justice commented in detail on Krzak's attempts to "evict [Strashnick] for a lengthy period of time" and noted that Strashnick "has apparently been a thorn in the side of [Krzak] for several years." In light of the Superior Court justice's finding that Krzak's objective in this litigation was to rid herself of Strashnick, and absent any finding that the eviction proceedings initiated by Krzak were primarily "intended as a penalty," the judgment for Strash-nick on the claim of reprisal was error. Consequently, we vacate the award of $780.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is denied in part and sustained in part. We affirm the Superior Court judgment denying Strashnick's eviction, reverse the judgment on the counterclaims, and vacate the compensatory and punitive damages awards for malicious prosecution and reprisal. The case is remanded to the Superior Court with our direction to enter judgment consistent with this opinion.
. Pursuant to G.L.1956 § 31-44—4(g)(2), "[i]f the park owner or management collects a fee or charge from a prospective purchaser of a mobile and manufactured home in order to obtain a financial report or credit rating, the full amount of the fee or charge shall be credited toward payment of the first month's rent for that purchaser."
. Krzak testified at trial that she still maintained a provision in her rules and regulations incorporated in the lease which required the $140 application fee. Pursuant to § 31-44-7(6)(iv), a mobile home park lease may not contain such a provision.
. Krzak testified that after Strashnick had moved into the park, she retroactively approved of already-built garden sheds that were not in compliance with the prescribed dimensions and approved the building of a gazebo that was noncompliant with the regulations.
. Before a September 5, 1995 amendment to Rule 24 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, the Attorney General had to be notified "within such time to afford the attorney general an opportunity to intervene," indicating that the Attorney General was an indispensable party. See, e.g., Griffin v. Ben-dick, 463 A.2d 1340, 1344 (R.I.1983). Notwithstanding cases establishing that intervention is left to the discretion of the Attorney General, notice is still mandatory. Snicker's, Inc. v. Young, 574 A.2d 1246, 1247 (R.I.1990) (per curiam).
. It appears that neither party has filed a complaint with the director.
. This part of the section was subsequently amended to read: "A tenancy may be terminated by a park owner or operator pursuant to chapter 18 of title 34. Jurisdiction in matters relating to this chapter shall be in the district court, but subject to any of the following limitations which takes precedence over any conflicting state statute or local ordinance." Section 31-44-2(a), as amended by P.L.2000, ch.109, § 45, enacted July 7, 2000. The compiler's omission of the word "reasons" in the 2000 Reenactment of the General Laws was not and, of course, could not represent a substantive change in the Legislature's intent without its consent. In our opinion, no such change in intent is evident. The compiler wisely realized that redundancy is to be avoided. Moreover, any substantive change could be applied only prospectively.