Case Name: W. H. ROBINSON, Respondent, v. SOUTHERN PACIFIC COMPANY, Appellant
Court: Supreme Court of California
Jurisdiction: California
Decision Date: 1895-01-05
Citations: 105 Cal. 526
Docket Number: No. 152S3
Parties: W. H. ROBINSON, Respondent, v. SOUTHERN PACIFIC COMPANY, Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: California Reports
Volume: 105
Pages: 526–558

Head Matter:
[No. 152S3.
In Bank.
January 5, 1895.]
W. H. ROBINSON, Respondent, v. SOUTHERN PACIFIC COMPANY, Appellant.
Railroads—Right of Passenger to Stop Over—Construction of Code. Under section 490 of the Civil Code the purchaser of a railroad ticket is entitled to stop over at any intermediate station between the station at which the ticket was bought and the station of his destination, and may resume his journey within six months after the purchase of the ticket to the point named as his destination.
Id.—Construction of “And” and “Or.”—The words “and” and “or” are not ordinarily convertible terms, and the conjunction “and ” should not be read disjunctively as equivalent to “or,” unless it is entirely manifest from the context that the intention of the law-making power can only be given effect by holding these terms convertible.
Id.—Implied Repeal of Statute—Rates of Pare—Reference to Repealed Section—Substitute.—The fact that section 489 of the Civil Code, which is referred to in section 490, as fixing the fare to be tendered for a ticket, was repealed by the provision of section 22 of article XII of the constitution, creating a railroad commission, and authorizing it to fix rates of fare, does not effect an implied repeal of section 490 of the Civil Code, but the constitutional provision operates as a substitute for section 489, and the substance of the provision in section 490 is to require the tender of lawful fare for the purchase of the ticket.
Id.—Purchase of Alternative Ticket—Choice of Longer Route— Right of Stopover.—The purchase of a ticket at the regular rate of fare, which in terms gives the passenger the alternative right to go to Oakland or Alameda at the same regular rate, confers the right upon a passenger, who elects to go over an established route to Alameda by way of Oakland, to stop over in Oakland, and afterward resume his journey to Alameda, at any time within six months from the purchase of the ticket, without additional fare, although the railroad company has a shorter and direct route to Alameda, without an intermediate station, and has a rule requiring the passage to Alameda by the longer route to be continuous.
Id.—Notice of Rules Contravening Statute.—The purchaser of a ticket conferring the right to go between two stations by way of an intermediate station cannot be deprived of his right to stop over at the intermediate station, by reason of the rule or custom of the railroad company to issue only alternative tickets, making the intermediate station one terminus named in the ticket; and the passenger is not bound to take notice of any rule or regulation of the railroad company’s requiring the passenger to ride from the intermediate by the longer route without stopover, in contravention of the statute.
Id.—Corporation not Subject to Code—Rights of Lessee.—The fact that a railroad corporation was organized prior to the adoption of the Civil Code, and is not subject to its provisions, cannot inure to the benefit of a lessee of the road which is a corporation organized under the code, nor exempt the lessee from the obligations imposed upon it as a code corporation.
Appeal—Disqualification of Justice—Relationship to Stockholder of Corporation.—The fact that a justice of the supreme court is a first cousin by marriage, or cousin german, to one of the stockholders of a corporation does not disqualify him to hear and participate in the decision of a case in which the corporation is interested.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Foshay Walker, Baker, Wines & Dorsey, E. L. Craig, S. C. Denson, and Garret W. McEnerney, for Appellant.
The complaint in this case does not state facts sufficient to constitute any cause of action in favor of the plaintiff against the defendant, because section 490 of the Civil Code does not give any stopover rights. Independently of statutory enactment, a passenger on a railroad train, having a ticket entitling him to ride from one station to another, has no right to stopover at an intermediate station and afterward to resume his journey upon the same ticket, except by virtue of some special contract made between him and the carrier. (Drew v. Central Pac. R. R. Co., 51 Cal. 425; McClure v. Philadelphia etc. R. R. Co., 34 Md. 532; 6 Am. Rep. 345; Dietrich v. Pennsylvania etc. R. R. Co., 71 Pa. St. 432; 10 Am. Rep. 711; Stone v. Chicago etc. Ry. Co., 47 Iowa, 82; 29 Am. Rep. 458; Cheney v. Boston etc. R. R. Co., 11 Met. 121; 45 Am. Dec. 190; Yorton v. Milwaukee etc. R. R. Co., 54 Wis. 234; 41 Am. Rep. 23; note to Commonwealth v. Power, 41 Am. Dec. 479.) A passenger who voluntarily leaves a railroad train at an intermediate station, having a ticket entitling him to go to a more remote station, thereby terminates the contract of carriage, and must pay additional fare upon resuming his journey. (Drew v. Central Pac. R. R. Co., 51 Cal. 425; note to Commonwealth v. Power, 41 Am. Dec. 479; Hatten v. Railroad Co., 39 Ohio St. 375; 13 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 53, and note p. 55. See, also, note to O'Brien v. New York Cent. etc. R. R. Co., 80 N. Y. 236; 1 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 262; 1 Redfield on Railways, sec. 28, p. *97, and note; State v. Overton, 24 N. J. L. 435; 61 Am. Dec. 671.) “ Stopover” privileges are only derived from express contract or from implication of law arising from some express statutory regulation. (Cheney v. Boston etc. R. R. Co., 11 Met. 121; 45 Am. Dec. 190, and note; Johnson v. Concord R. R. Corp., 46 N. H. 213; 88 Am. Dec. 199, and note; State v. Overton, 24 N. J. L. 435; 61 Am. Dec. 671, and note.) Section 490 of the Civil Code, upon which plaintiff relies to give him the right to stop over, was repealed by section 22 of article XII of the California constitution of 1879, which placed the full and exclusive power of fixing railroad transportation charges within this state in the railroad commissioners. Section 490 depends upon section 489, and the repeal of the latter section operated to repeal the former. (San Francisco v. Spring Valley Water Works, 48 Cal. 494, 529, 530; People v. Parks, 58 Cal. 654; Warren v. Charlestown, 2 Gray, 84; Allen v. Louisiana, 103 U. S. 80; O’Brien v. Krenz, 36 Minn. 136; Slauson v. Racine, 13 Wis. 398; State v. Perry Co., 5 Ohio St. 497; Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 178, et seq.; French v. Teschemaker, 24 Cal. 546, 553, 554; Reed v. Omnibus R. R. Co., 33 Cal. 219; Wills v. Austin, 53 Cal. 178, 179.) In an action for a penalty, growing out of a statutory right, and for which no relief was afforded at the common law, the party must show himself clearly entitled to the relief, and the statute will be strictly construed against him. (Dwarris on Statutes, 611; Sedgwick on Statutory Construction, 319; Curran v. Shattuck, 24 Cal. 432; San Francisco etc. Water Co. v. Alameda Water Co., 36 Cal. 644; Gimmy v. Doane, 22 Cal. 635; San Diego Lumber Co. v. Wooldredge, 90 Cal. 574; Elliott v. Railroad Co., 99 U. S. 576; People v. Tisdale, 57 Cal. 104; Occidental Building and Loan Assn. v. Sullivan, 62 Cal. 394; People v. Perry, 79 Cal. 114.) That the statute under consideration is a penal statute cannot be doubted, as similar statutes are uniformly
held to be penal. (See Sutherland on Statutory Construction, secs. 208, 358, 360; 1 Rorer on Railroads, c. 20, entitled “Penalties and Forfeitures,” pp. 570, 571, 576; Bond v. Wabash etc. Ry. Co., 67 Iowa, 712; State v. Chicago etc. Ry. Co., 37 Fed. Rep. 497.) The condition in section 490, as set forth in the words, “ on being tendered the fare therefor fixed as provided in the preceding section,” and the words “ every such ticket,” is a condition precedent to the operation of the section, which failing, the whole section dependent upon it fails. (4 Kent’s Commentaries, 124, 125; State v. Douglass, 5 Sneed, 608.) Section 490 of the Civil Code, upon which plaintiff relies to give him the privilege of “ stopover,” does not apply to the defendant Southern Pacific Company, because it does not apply to its lessor, the Central Pacific Railroad Company. The Central Pacific Railroad Company, being a corporation in existence when the code took effect, was, by section 288, excluded from the provisions of the code referred to in said section, and the defendant, being its exclusive lessee, in possession, operating its line, stood precisely in the same position, with no greater rights or privileges, and subject to no greater burdens. (Gilmore v. City of Utica, 121 N. Y. 561; McMillan v. Michigan etc. R. R. Co., 16 Mich. 79; 93 Am. Dec. 211; Sprague v. Smith, 29 Vt. 421; 70 Am. Dec. 426; McCall v. Chamberlain, 13 Wis. 637; Cook v. Milwaukee etc. Ry. Co., 36 Wis. 48; 1 Wood’s Railway Law, sec. 203, p. 578.)
Foshay Walker, Garret W. McEnerney, and H. L. Gear, upon rehearing for Appellant.
Section 490 of the code should not be construed as granting a stopover right, as such a construction would be unreasonable and open the door for fraud and imposition, as it would give the passenger the right to stop off at any intermediate station, and to resume his trip, at any time within six months, even though he had surrendered his ticket. (See Beebe v. Ayers, 28 Barb. 279; Breen v. Texas & Pac. R. R. Co., 50 Tex. 46.) The custom requiring a passenger-to surrender his ticket at the inception of his passage is a reasonable custom for the prevention of fraud. (Northern R. R. Co. v. Page, 22 Barb. 132.) Section 490 of the code should be reasonably interpreted, and fraud and injustice excluded, and an interpretation which leads to fraud and injustice-is not reasonable, and ought not to be countenanced. (23 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 361, 558, and cases cited.) The provision entitling the holder of the ticket to ride upon the cars “ at any time within six months thereafter” serves to limit the time within which the ride must be commenced, and the ticket used after its issuance, and it would seem that they do not limit the time within which the ride must be completed, or qualify the terms of the contract of carriage after the ride has once been commenced and the ticket used. The rules of the common law must be considered in interpreting section 490 of the code, as the code is presumed to be declarative of the common law, unless an intent to change it distinctly appears. (People v. Langtree, 64 Cal. 259; Canavan v. Gray, 64 Cal. 8; Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 367, 374, 375; Churchill v. Pacific Improvement Co., 96 Cal. 492, 493; Claiborne v. Castle, 98 Cal. 33.) All reasonable usages of the railroad company enter into and become part of its contracts with its passengers. (Northern R. R. Co. v. Page, 22 Barb. 130-32; Beebe v. Ayres, 28 Barb. 275, 280; Terry v. Flushing etc. R. R. Co., 13 Hun, 361; Johnson v. Concord R. R. Co., 46 N. H. 221; 88 Am. Dec. 199; Lietrich v. Pennsylvania etc. R. R. Co., 71 Pa. St. 432; 10 Am. Rep. 711; Cheney v. Boston etc. R. R. Co., 11 Met. 123; 45 Am. Dec. 190; Chicago etc. R. R. Co. v. Randolph, 53 Ill. 510; 5 Am. Rep. 60; State v. Campbell, 32 N. J. L. 3.12; Brown v. Howard, 1 Cal. 424; Hayes v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 23 Cal. 188, 189; 83 Am. Dec. 89; Taylor v. Castle, 42 Cal. 371; Schroeder v. Schweizer L. T. V. G., 66 Cal. 298.) Section 490 should be construed in harmony with the settled rule declared by the courts, under the common law, that the contract of a railroad company to convey a passenger from one- station to another is an entire contract, in the absence of an agreement making it divisible, and that the obligation created by the sale of an ordinary passage ticket between two local points on the same railroad, where not otherwise specified, is for one continuous trip, and that neither the passenger nor the carrier has the right,, without the consent of the other, to split the contract up into parts and perform it piecemeal, though the passenger may elect to perform any part of the contract in lieu of the whole, and if he leaves the train at an intermediate station after he has commenced his journey, he releases the railroad company from further performance at another time. (Drew v. Central Pac. R. R. Co., 51 Cal. 428; Churchill v. Chicago etc. R. R. Co., 67 Ill. 390-93; Dietrich v. Pennsylvania etc. R. R. Co., 71 Pa. St. 432-37; 10 Am. Rep. 711; Stone v. Chicago etc. R. R. Co., 47 Iowa, 82-87; 29 Am. Rep. 458;. Roberts v. Koehler, 30 Fed. Rep. 94-96; McClure v. Philadelphia etc. R. R. Co., 34 Md. 532-36; 6 Am. Rep. 345; Hamilton v. New York Cent. R. R. Co., 51 N. Y. 104, 105; Cheney v. Boston etc. R. R. Co., 11 Met. 122, 123; 45 Am. Dec. 190; Oil Creek etc. Ry. Co. v. Clark, 72 Pa. St. 231-35; Cleveland etc. R. R. Co. v. Bartram, 11 Ohio St. 457, 462, 463; Hatten v. Railroad Co., 39 Ohio St. 375, 377; Auerbach v. New York etc. R. R. Co., 89 N. Y. 284, 285; 42 Am. Rep. 290; Little Rock etc. R. R. Co. v. Dean, 43 Ark. 530-33; 51 Am. Rep. 584; State v. Overton, 24 N. J. L. 435, 438; 61 Am. Dec. 671; Walker v. Wabash etc. R. R. Co., 15 Mo. App. 340; Gale v. Delaware etc. R. R. Co., 7 Hun, 670,. 673; Terry v. Flushing etc. R. R. Co., 13 Hun, 362; Breen v. Texas & Pac. R. R. Co., 50 Tex. 46; Wyman v. Northern Pac. R. R. Co., 34 Minn. 210, 212; Hutchinson on. Carriers, sec. 575.) The plaintiff’s ticket accepted without objection created an alternative contract of carriage-to Oakland or Alameda, and when plaintiff alighted at Oakland his ticket became functus officio. It is a well-settled principle of the common law, of which the Civil Code is expressly declarative, that a party to an alternative contract who has an option to choose one of two alternatives, must choose one of the alternatives in its entirety, and cannot choose them both, and that when his election is once made it is binding upon him, and cannot be revoked. (Civ. Code, sec. 1450; Bishop on Contracts, sec. 808; 1 Bouvier’s Institutes, 269; 5 Lawson’s Rights, Remedies, and Practice, sec. 2512.) A passenger has no inherent right to select a more circuitous route, but should select the most direct route, unless by consent of th,e railroad company he is permitted to travel by a circuitous route. (Bennett v. New York Cent. etc. R. R. Co., 69 N. Y. 594; 25 Am. Rep. 250.) .
C. M. Jennings, for Respondent.
Neither section 489 nor 490 of the Civil Code have been repealed by section 22 of article XII of the constitution. Moreover, this section of the constitution is itself illegal and void, as it makes the rates fixed by the railroad commissioners final and conclusive. (Chicago etc. Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418-52, et seq.; Mercantile Trust Co. v. Texas & Pac. R. R. Co., 51 Fed. Rep. 529; Richmond etc. Co. v. Trammel, 53 Fed. Rep. 196; Georgia etc. Banking Co. v. Smith, 128 U. S. 174-79.) But whether section 489 of the Civil Code is repealed or not is wholly immaterial in the case at bar, as the legislature had the power to require carriers to provide tickets and attach the right to stop over thereto. (Const., art. XII, secs. 8, 10, 15, 17, 20, 21; Civ. Code, sec. 465, subd. 10; Dryden v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 60 Me. 512; Carpenter v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 72 Me. 388; 39 Am. Rep. 340; Stone v. Farmers’ etc. Co., 116 U. S. 317.) Section 490 of the Civil Code is not a penal statute, but is remedial, entirely changing the common law as to the subject matter of which it treats, and should be liberally construed. (Potter’s Dwarris on Statutes, 73, 74; Johns v. Johns, 3 Dow, 15; Gillett v. Moody, 3 N. Y. 479; People v. Runkle, 9 Johns. 147.) In construing this section the legislative intent should be ascertained. (Dwarris on Statutes, 144; Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations, 5th ed., 213, 218-22; Chicago etc. Ry. Co. v. Dey, 35 Fed. Rep. 866, 874; Lovel v. Stowell, Plow. 366; United States v. Freeman, 3 How. 556, 564, 565; United States v. Hartwell, 6 Wall. 386; Oates v. National Bank, 100 U. S. 239-44; The Emily, 9 Wheat. 388; Brown v. Barry, 3 Dall. 367; Schumate v. Williams, 34 Ga. 245; Taylor v. United States, 3 How. 197; United States v. Hodson, 10 Wall 395; United States v. Kirby, 7 Wall. 482; Woodruff v. State, 3 Ark. 296; Walker v. Springfield, 94 Ill. 364-71; People v. Hoffman, 97 Ill. 234; Commonwealth v. Kimball, 14 Pick. 370; Costner v. Walrod, 83 Ill. 171; 25 Am. Rep. 369; Tracy v. Troy etc. R. R. Co., 38 N. Y. 433; 98 Am. Dec. 54; Tounele v. Hall, 4 N. Y. 144; Smith v. People, 47 N. Y. 330; People v. Clute, 50 N. Y. 451; 10 Am. Rep. 508; In re Folsom, 56 N. Y. 66; People v. Hyde, 89 N. Y. 18; Fontaine v. Southern Pac. R. R., 54 Cal. 652; Knowles v. Yates, 31 Cal. 86.) Interpretation must be reasonable. (Civ. Code, sec. 3542.) An interpretation which gives effect is to be preferred to one that makes void. (Civ. Code, sec. 3541, Deering’s ed., and cases there cited.) The mention of fare in section 490 of the Civil Code is merely incidental to the subject matter of the section, and the incident cannot repeal the subject. (Civ. Code, sec. 3540.) Repeals by implication are not favored. (Cole v. Fisher, 66 Cal. 441; Estate of Beech, 63 Cal. 459; Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations, 5th ed., 183, old ed., 152.) One statute is not to be construed as repealing another if it is possible to reconcile them. (McCool v. Smith, 1 Black, 459; United States v. Walker, 22 How. 299; In re Yick Wo, 68 Cal. 304; 58 Am. Rep. 12.) When the subject matter or object of two statutes is different there is no repeal by implication. (People v. Platt, 67 Cal. 22; Rosborough v. Boardman, 67 Cal. 118.) It must clearly appear the whole subject matter of the old statute was revised, and that the new one was intended as a substitute for the whole thereof, before any repeal by implication can take place. (United States v. Barr, 4 Saw. 254-56; United States v. Tynen, 11 Wall. 95; Murdock v. Memphis, 20 Wall. 617; Treadwell v. Yolo County, 62 Cal. 564.) And, if there be doubt in the judicial mind, validity of .the law must be upheld. (United States v. Rhodes, 1 Abb. U. S. 49; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113; Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations, 5th ed., 213, 218-22; Chicago etc. Ry. v. Dey, 35 Fed. Rep. 866, 874.) It is a cardinal rule of interpretation that a statute must be construed with reference to the objects intended to be accomplished by it. (People ex rel. Burr v. Dana, 22 Cal. 20; Carson v. Central R. R. Co., 35 Cal. 335; People v. Lynch, 51 Cal. 28; 21 Am. Rep. 677.) A law must be applied according to its manifest intent, and a thing within the letter is without the statute if without its intention. (Kinsey v. Kellogg, 65 Cal. 114.) The words of section 490, “ on being tendered fare therefor fixed as provided in the preceding section,” are equivalent to the words “ lawful fare,” and all reference to fare may be eliminated from section 490 without affecting the legislative intent, or impairing the reciprocal rights of the carrier and the passenger—the one a lawful fare, the other the ticket, etc.—at all. (Civ. Code, sec. 465, subd. 10, secs. 2173-87; Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Sly, 65 Pa. St. 205; Boyle v. Philadelphia etc. R. R. Co., 54 Pa. St. 310; Campbell v. Marietta etc. R. R. Co., 23 Ohio St. 168.) A statute remedial in its object, if its meaning is doubtful, will be so construed as to suppress the mischief and advance the remedy. (Toomy v. Dunphy, 86 Cal. 642.) Section 490 of the Civil Code is not dependent at all on section 489, and certainly the sections are not so mutually connected with and dependent on each other as to warrant a belief that the legislature would not have passed one without the other. (Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations, 5th ed., 183, 213, 218-22.) Section 288 of the Civil Code does not exempt the Central Pacific Railroad Company from the operation and regulation of its business by part IV of division 1 of that code, but conceding that it does, still it could not transfer such exemption, by lease or otherwise, to the Southern Pacific Railroad Company or any other corporation. (Civ. Code, secs. 700-03, 1045; Cooley on Taxation, 145; Morgan v. Louisiana, 93 U. S. 217; Wilson v. Gaines, 103 U. S. 421; St. Louis etc. R. R. Co. v. Berry, 113 U. S. 465; Chesapeake etc. R. R. Co. v. Miller, 114 U. S. 184; Louisville etc. R. R. Co. v. Palmes, 109 U. S. 244, 250, 257; Memphis etc. R. R. Co. v. Railroad Commrs., 112 U. S. 609.) A rule inconsistent with general law is a nullity. (Chicago etc. Ry. Co. v. People, 56 Ill. 365; 8 Am. Rep. 690; Merrihew v. Milwaukee etc. R. Co., 5 Am. Law Reg. 364; Williams v. Great Western Ry. Co., 10 Exch. 15.) So, also, any rule infringing the right of passenger to be carried, for such right is superior to any regulation of the company. (Day v. Owen,5 Mich. 520; 72 Am. Dec. 62; Thompson on Carriers, 306; Const. 1879, art. XII sec. 8.) A passsenger having surrendered his ticket is entitled to ride to the end of his journey whether he received a check or not. (Chicago etc. R. R.Co. v. Griffin, 68 Ill. 499.) And after surrendering his ticket, if the passenger is expelled for nonpayment of fare, the 'company is liable. (Pittsburg etc. Ry. Co. v. Hennigh, 39 Ind. 509.)
Thomas V. Cator, also for Respondent.
The ticket was a contract, and its terms are the same as if the law was written or printed on it, as the law ■entered into and formed a part of it. (Walker v. Whitehead, 16 Wall. 314, 317; Blanchard v. Russell, 13 Mass. 1; 7 Am. Dec. 106; Hicks v. Hotchkiss, 7 Johns. Ch. 306; 11 Am. Dec. 472; Mather v. Bush, 16 Johns. 233, 237; 8 Am. Dec. 313.) Section 490 of the Civil Code is not repealed. The words therein, “ fare therefor fixed as provided in the preceding section,” should be construed as if they read “ provided in the law,” as the preceding section was /law. Force must be given to every part of a statute, and to do this the meaning of the words may be enlarged. (French v. Teschemaker, 24 Cal. 518, 539; People v. Hyde, 89 N. Y. 18.) Every thing necessary to make interpretation reasonable is implied. (Buck v. Burk, 18 N. Y. 339, 341.) Sections may be rejected as named, and others imported into the place. (People v. King, 28 Cal. 272; Donlon v. Jewett, 88 Cal. 530; Greer v. State, 22 Tex. 588; Tracy v. Troy etc. R. R. Co., 38 N. Y. 433; 98 Am. Dec. 54; People v. Clute, 50 N. Y. 451; 10 Am. Rep. 508.) The failure of the Central Pacific Railway Company to reorganize under section 287 of the Ciyil Code did not exempt it from section 490 of the Civil Code and similar provisions. Exemption from general laws must be clear, certain, and strictly construed. (Cooley on Taxation, 146.) The Central Pacific Railway Company, if it had any immunity from general law, did not and could not assign it to the Southern Pacific Company, because such immunities are personal .to the identical corporation, and non-assign able, except by express consent of the state. (Morgan v. Louisiana, 93 U. S. 217; Wilson v. Gaines, 103 U. S. 417, 421; Louisville etc. R. R. Co. v. Palmes, 109 U. S. 250-57; Memphis R. R. Co. v. Railroad Commrs., 112 U. S. 609; St Louis R. R. Co. v. Berry, 113 U. S. 465; Chesapeake etc. R. R. Co. v. Miller, 114 U. S. 176-84.) Plaintiff had a right to travel by any route which the defendants operated as a common carrier, whether the shortest or not. (Civ. Code, secs. 481, 2168.) Section 490 of the Civil Code having declared stopover rights as belonging to every ticket issued by a railroad corporation, it is not within the power of the company to make rules contrary to general law, or compel a person to accept a contract different from that prescribed by statute. A rule inconsistent with a general law is a nullity. (Chicago etc. R. R. Co. v. People, 56 Ill. 365; 8 Am. Rep. 690; Merrihew v. Milwaukee etc. R. R. Co., 5 Am. Law Reg. 364; Williams v. Great Western R. R. Co., 10 Exch. 15; Civ. Code, sec. 2174; Day v. Owen, 5 Mich. 520; 72 Am. Dec. 62; Thompson on Carriers, 306; Const., art. XII, sec. 8.) The contract provided for by section 490 of the Civil Code is one beneficial and remedial, to be liberally construed with a view to effect its objects. (Civ. Code, sec. 4.) The right to stop over was a right the plaintiff had under the contract, which could only be waived by signing a written waiver. (Schroeder v. Schweizer L. T. V. Co., 66 Cal. 299; Civ. Code, sec. 2176.) Plaintiff had a right to treat Oakland as a place to stop over, and if the word “ Oakland,” as printed on the ticket, was intended in any manner to operate as a condition to affect or destroy plaintiff’s right to stop over at Oakland, such word is a nullity and void. (Civ. Code, sec. 1441.) Words are to be taken most strongly against those who use them. (Civ. Code, sec. 1069; Elphinstone on Interpretation, rule 21; Muller v. Boggs, 25 Cal. 182; Hooper v. Wells, 27 Cal. 11; 85 Am. Dec. 211.) Alternative destinations are not permitted in the contract or ticket defined by law. (Civ. Code, sec. 490.) It was the duty of the defendant company, upon taking up the plaintiff’s ticket, to give a stopover check to the plaintiff to stop at Oakland; and the fact that he surrendered the ticket did not take away his right to ride to the end of his journey. (New York etc. R. R. Co. v. Winter, 143 U. S. 60, 72, 73; Chicago R. R. Co. v. Griffin, 68 Ill. 499; Pittsburg etc. R. R. Co. v. Hennigh, 39 Ind. 509; Indianapolis etc. R. R. Co. v. People, 91 Ill. 452.)

Opinion:
Beatty, C. J.
The three principal questions arising in this case were very fully and elaborately argued by counsel, both' orally and in the printed briefs filed prior to its submission, and they were as carefully considered in0the opinion of the court heretofore filed, wherein it was held: 1. That section 490 of the Civil Code is still in force; 2. That it confers stopover privileges upon the holders of the tickets therein provided for; and 3. That the defendant is subject to its provisions. As to these points, our views remain unchanged, and nothing further need be said concerning them. The rehearing, indeed, was ordered with special reference to a question which, although it had been stated in the briefs, had not been discussed at the oral argument, and had been but slightly considered in the opinion of the court. This question, to which the reargument was practically confined, may be briefly stated as follows: Did the plaintiff, by purchasing and accepting a ticket which, in terms and in fact, gave him the alternative right to go to Oakland or Alameda, become thereby entitled to go to Oakland, stop off there, and afterwards resume his journey to Alameda? When this question is considered in the light of the principles established by our former decision, and with reference to the facts stated in the opinion and other facts appearing in the record, it is -of comparatively easy solution. The defendant had a ferry and railroad line which it was operating between the foot of Market street, in San Francisco, and the -city of Alameda, and which passed through the city of Oakland, where there was a station at which passengers were accustomed to enter and leave its cars. The fact that defendant had another and more direct line of road (and ferry) between the same termini did not relieve it of its statutory obligation to fix (either alone or in conjunction with the railroad commission) a regular passenger rate by the longer route. The right to operate the road and the obligation to fix such regular rate are correlative. It had, in fact, complied with the statute, and fixed the rate at fifteen cents, and this was well known, not only to the plaintiff, but to the public generally. Such being the case, the plaintiff, desiring to go from San Francisco to Alameda via Oakland, tendered the regular fare, and demanded the ticket which it was the duty of the defendant to furnish. rHe received a ticket in the form set out in our original opinion, which was the only ticket the defendant was accustomed to issue to passengers desiring to go by either of two routes to Oakland, or either of two other routes to Alameda. But the fact that the ticket gave the plaintiff his choice of these various routes and different destinations made it none the less effective as a, ticket from San Francisco to Alameda via Oakland. What he wanted was a ticket of that particular kind, with all the lawful privileges thereto attached, and it was not in the power of the defendant to deprive him of such privileges by offering him other privileges in exchange. This conclusion does not involve the consequences that are apprehended by counsel for appellant. We do not hold, and it does not follow from the views herein expressed, or from any thing decided or said by way of argument in our original opinion, that there can be no ticket sold on any line of road which is not a stopover ticket. We only hold that there must be a regular passenger rate established from one depot to another, and that a passenger who tenders the regular fare is entitled to a ticket to his place of destination, which ticket, under the law, gives him a right to stop over at an intermediate station. And the railroad company cannot demand the regular rate, and at the same time deny the privilege which the law confers upon all who pay such rate. If, in consideration of an abatement from the regular established rate, a passenger voluntarily accepts an excursion or other limited ticket, an entirely different case is presented. Here the regular established fare was tendered and accepted, and a ticket issued, which was the only ticket a passenger from San Francisco to Alameda via Oakland could obtain—the only ticket provided by the defendant. This being so, the defendant cannot be permitted to say that it was not the ticket which the statute obliged it to provide and issue, .and this is more especially true in view of the fact that it contained nothing which in terms denied or assumed to curtail the rights conferred by the statute.
Bat it is said that the ticket is not the contract; that at is a mere token or voucher, and that it is the duty of the passenger to inform himself of the rules and regulations of the carrier, which really determine his rights. This is, perhaps, true to a certain extent. But the passenger is not bound to take notice of any rule or regulation which contravenes the law of the land. So far as the law fixes the terms of the contract it cannot be varied by rules of the company, known or unknown, unless assented to by the passenger. We have held that under the law of California the ticket issued by a railroad company upon receipt of the regular fare from one depot to another gives the holder the right to stop over at an intermediate station, and to resume his journey at any time within six months; and, if this is so, it matters not how well it may be known to a particular passenger that this right is contested or denied by the company. He nevertheless acquires, by payment of the regular fare, all the rights which the statute gives him. The passenger who is informed of the claim and practice of the carrier is in no worse position than one who is not informed. So far as the law goes it protects all alike. These views are conclusive of the question submitted for reargument, and for the reasons here stated, and those set forth in the original opinion, the judgment and order of the superior court are affirmed;
Garoutte, J., Harrison, J., Van Fleet, J., Fitzgerald, J., and De Haven, J., concurred.