Case Name: HOOPER v. HOOPER
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1913-09-23
Citations: 67 Or. 187
Docket Number: 
Parties: HOOPER v. HOOPER.
Judges: Mr. Chief Justice McBride, Mr. Justice Bean and Mr. Justice Eakin concur.
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 67
Pages: 187–194

Head Matter:
Argued and submitted on appellant’s brief September 10, 1913.
No appearance for respondent.
Decided September 23, 1913.
•Modified on rehearing October 14, 1913.
HOOPER v. HOOPER.
(135 Pac. 525: 135 Pac. 525.)
Marriage—Annulment—Process—“Summons”—“Complaint.”
1. Under Section 1020, L. O. L., providing that, in any suit for the dissolution of a marriage contract, or to have the same declared void, the state is to be deemed a party defendant, and the plaintiff shall cause the summons to be served upon the district attorney, the court is without jurisdiction of a proceeding for the annulment of marriage, where the plaintiff, instead of serving a summons upon the district attorney, delivered a copy of the complaint, for the "complaint” is merely the means of conveying to the defendant the nature of the grievance laid .against him, while the “summons” is notice of the limitation of the time in which the charge is to be met by appropriate legal action.
Marriage—Annulment—Parties.
2. Under Section 1020, L. O. L., providing that, in a suit to have a marriage declared void, the state is to be deemed a party defendant, and the plaintiff shall serve summons upon the district attorney, the state is a neeessary party defendant, in the sense that it must be notified by service of summons, so that the district attorney may prevent fraud or collusion.
ON REHEARING.
Divorce — Effect — Right to Remarry — Marriage Within. Prohibited Time.
3. Under Section 515, L. O. L., forbidding remarriage by the divorced person within the time allowed for an appeal, and Section 550, allowing an appeal to be taken within six months, a marriage contracted by a divorced woman less than six months after the decree was rendered is absolutely void, and will be annulled at the suit of the other party.
Divorce — Effect—Right to Remarry — Marriage Within Prohibited Time.
4. ■ The fact that the former husband, who was served by publication, defaulted in the divorce proceedings is immaterial, in a suit by the second husband to annul his marriage as void because contracted within six months of the decree of divorce in violation of Section 515, L. O. L., under Section 59, L. O. L., allowing the defendant against whom summons has been published to defend the action at any time within one year for good cause shown, and Section 1020, requiring the district attorney to appear on behalf of the state in divorce eases.
From Clackamas: James U. Campbell, Judge.
Department 2. This is a suit by B. M. Hooper against Mary Hooper for a divorce. The facts are fully set forth in the opinion.
Aeeirmed.
For appellant there was a brief and an oral argument by Mr. Clyde Richardson.
No appearance for respondent.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice McNary
delivered the opinion of the court.
This is a suit to declare a marriage contract void agreeably to the provision of Section 502, L. O. L.: "All marriages which are prohibited by law, on account of consanguinity between the parties, or on account of either of them having a former husband or wife then living, or on account of either of them being one fourth or more of negro blood, shall, if solemnized within this state, be absolutely void."
On the 2d day of October, 1911, at the city of Vancouver, Washington, the parties litigant weré married. Six days later plaintiff brought this suit to annul the marriage, complaining that a period of six months had not intervened between the nuptials and a prior divorce had by defendant.
Due service was made upon defendant, though a copy of the complaint alone was served upon the district attorney. Default for want of an answer was made by defendant and the representative of the state. The trial court decided adversely to the petition of plaintiff.
Section 1020, L. O. L., prescribes the duty of a district attorney in matters of divorce: "In any suit for the dissolution of the marriage contract, or to have the same declared void, the state is to be deemed a party defendant, and the party plaintiff in such suit shall cause the summons to be served upon the district attorney of the district within which the suit is commenced at least ten days before the term at which the defendant is required to appear and answer. It shall be the duty of such district attorney, so far as may be necessary to prevent fraud or collusion in such suit, to control the proceedings on the part of the defense, and in case the defendant does not appear therein, or defend the same in good faith, to make a defense therein on behalf of the state. ' '
It will be observed the statute expressly declares that the plaintiff shall cause a ' ' summons " to be served upon the district attorney, whereas, the record reveals the complaint only was served upon that official. This omission of a plain statutory requirement is fatal. The office of a summons and a complaint are too variant to admit of the one doing the service of the other. The complaint is but a vehicle, construed by law to convey to the defendant, in extenso, the nature of the grievance laid against him, while the summons performs the function of imparting notice of the limitation of the time in which the charge is to be met by appropriate legal action.
Obviously, by force of Section 1020, L. O. L., the state is made a úeeessary party defendant, in suits for the dissolution of the marriage contract, or to have the same declared void. Not, however, in the sense the state must be named a party litigant, but in the larger sense that the state must be notified by service of summons upon the state's representative of the commencement of the litigation, for the statute says: "It shall be the duty of the district attorney, so far as may be necessary, to prevent fraud or collusion in such suit, to control the proceedings on the part of the defense, and in case the defendant does not appear therein, or defend against the same in good faith, to make a defense therein on behalf of the state. ' '
On account of the importance of litigation involving the marital contract, and the evils that would issue from a loose observance of the law, statutes regulating service of process should be strictly construed, and a failure to comply therewith must necessarily defeat the jurisdiction of the court.
For the reasons herein assigned, the decree of the lower court is affirmed. Affirmed.
Mr. Chief Justice McBride, Mr. Justice Bean and Mr. Justice Eakin concur.