Case Name: Loretta Mason, Appellant, v. Paul E. Mason, Appellee
Court: Illinois Appellate Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 1950-12-04
Citations: 342 Ill. App. 140
Docket Number: Gen. No. 45,146
Parties: Loretta Mason, Appellant, v. Paul E. Mason, Appellee.
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Appellate Court Reports
Volume: 342
Pages: 140–151

Head Matter:
Loretta Mason, Appellant, v. Paul E. Mason, Appellee.
Gen. No. 45,146.
(Niemeyer, J., dissenting.)
Opinion filed December 4, 1950.
Rehearing denied December 18, 1950.
Released for publication December 19, 1950.
Sol R. Friedman & I. S. Friedman, of Chicago, for appellant.
George Teller", of Chicago, for appellee.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice Feirberg
delivered the opinion of the court.
This appeal is from a decree of divorce in favor of defendant and from an order denying the petition to vacate the decree. The original complaint filed by plaintiff on July 7,1947, was for separate maintenance, charging desertion and, by strong implication, adultery. An answer was filed and also a cross-complaint for divorce, charging plaintiff with cruelty.
The cause was heard November 2,1949, and a decree entered on November 3, 1949, dismissed the separate maintenance complaint for want of equity and granted a divorce to defendant and cross-complainant on the charge of cruelty. It gave the custody of the children to plaintiff and directed defendant to pay plaintiff $20 a week for their support and maintenance.
Upon the hearing no evidence was offered by plaintiff as to the inference of adultery, nor was any explanation made for the failure to offer such evidence, though the cause had been pending for two years.
On November 30, 1949, plaintiff filed her petition to vacate the decree on the grounds of newly discovered evidence, alleging that plaintiff had discovered, after the entry of the decree, that the witnesses named in her petition would testify for her to circumstances that would indicate defendant was guilty of adultery. Attached to her petition were affidavits of the witnesses named in the petition, setting forth facts to which they would testify, if called as witnesses. An examination of the petition and affidavits satisfies us that they fall far short, even if true, of proving the charge of adultery. A hearing was had upon the petition, and an .order entered dismissing the petition.
Plaintiff now argues that the evidence upon the trial of the cause fails to support the decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty; that the facts testified to by defendant established only slight acts of cruelty, and do not constitute extreme and repeated cruelty under the statute; and that the corroborating witnesses, not eyewitnesses to the alleged acts of cruelty, merely testified that they had seen the bruises testified to by defendant, immediately after the alleged acts of cruelty.
Extreme and repeated cruelty, under the statute, to warrant a divorce, has been defined as "physical acts of violence, bodily harm or suffering, or such acts as endanger life or limb or such as raise a reasonable apprehension of great bodily harm." Wesselhoeft v. Wesselhoeft, 369 Ill. 419, 424.
In Levy v. Levy, 388 Ill. 179, 183, the court said:
". . . that in suits for divorce on the grounds of cruelty no different principles of law or rules of evidence can be applied where the husband is plaintiff than where the wife is plaintiff. Both parties are governed by the same statute which draws no distinction because of sex but in fact states that a divorce may be had where 'either party . . . has been guilty of extreme and repeated cruelty.' Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, chap. 40, sec. 1."
In the case cited the court further traced the development of the rule since the early case of De La Hay v. De La Hay, 21 Ill. 252, down to Teal v. Teal, 324 Ill. 207, to the effect that slight acts of cruelty on the part of the wife will not constitute extreme and repeated cruelty under the statute, and said (p. 184):
"However, it should by no means be construed as subjecting a husband to one degree of cruelty or mistreatment and a wife to quite another. Our statute requires proof of 'extreme and repeated cruelty' and obviously ' slight acts of violence ' are not extreme as to a normal person whether husband or wife.
"It is true that the physical condition of the parties involved must be taken into account and each case considered upon its own facts. Thus, while a light slap ordinarily would not constitute extreme cruelty as to the average, healthy person the same act might well have a different effect upon one who is quite frail or an invalid. It is only in this respect that we might differentiate acts of cruelty or calibrate marital violence in degrees."
In the instant case, defendant testified that an argument arose on November 15, 1946, about bills incurred by plaintiff; that he requested her to cut them down ; that she became angry, took a saucepan and hit him on the head, made a gash along his ear, and started swinging and hit him on the shoulder and back of the neck; that on January 4,1947, another argument arose about the same subject matter; that she started swinging, and that he turned his back to her and she hit him on the back. The evidence of the corroborating witnesses has been held competent. Albert v. Albert, 340 Ill. App. 582; Muir v. Muir, 310 Ill. App. 443.
In our judgment, under the reasoning of the cases cited, this evidence, if believed, constitutes extreme and repeated cruelty under the statute. The chancellor was in a better position to judge, having seen the witnesses, and we should not disturb his finding unless we are satisfied that it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. We cannot, upon this record, say it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. We think the chancellor exercised a sound discretion in denying the petition to vacate the decree", upon the showing made.
The decree and order appealed from are affirmed.
Affirmed.
Tuohy, J., concurs.