Case Name: STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Jesus Alsman LOZANO aka Luis Ricco Gutierrez, Defendant and Appellant
Court: Utah Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Utah
Decision Date: 1969-12-15
Citations: 23 Utah 2d 312
Docket Number: No. 11423
Parties: STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Jesus Alsman LOZANO aka Luis Ricco Gutierrez, Defendant and Appellant.
Judges: CROCKETT, C. J., and TUCKETT and HENRIOD, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Utah Reports, Second Series
Volume: 23
Pages: 312–318

Head Matter:
462 P.2d 710
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Jesus Alsman LOZANO aka Luis Ricco Gutierrez, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 11423.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Dec. 15, 1969.
Jay V. Barney and Jay D. Edmonds, Salt Fake City, for appellant.
Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., Lauren N. Beasley, R. Bruce Bybee, Asst. Attys. ■Gen., Salt Lake City, for respondent.

Opinion:
CALLISTER, Justice.
Defendant seeks reversal of his conviction of burglary in the third degree on the ground that he was denied his right to a speedy trial as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah.
Defendant was charged, by information, with burglary in the second degree, was convicted by a jury of burglary in the third degree, and sentenced to the State Prison for an indeterminate term as provided by law.
Defendant was arrested on January 1, 1968; he was arraigned on March 25, 1968. (Defense counsel had previously objected to a continuance of the preliminary hearing from February 5th to March 11th on the ground that said continuance denied defendant's right to a speedy trial.) On March 27, 1968, defendant filed a demand for a speedy hearing on the ground that he was unable to procure a bond and had been incarcerated in the County Jail since January 1, 1968. Defendant's trial was set for May 10, 1968; he was not tried. On May 13, 1968, defendant was given a trial date of July 12, 1968. Defendant objected to this continuance. On July 12, 1968, defendant was ready to proceed; the trial was again continued and defense counsel objected and made a motion to dismiss on the ground defendant had been denied a speedy trial. Defense counsel again filed a demand for a speedy trial on the ground defendant had been incarcerated since the first of January. On July 15, 1968, the court set defendant's trial for August 5, 1968, and he was tried and convicted thereon. At the commencement of the trial, defense counsel made a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of prosecution and the denial of defendant's right to a speedy trial; counsel cited the two prior continuances and the seven-month incarceration to substantiate his claim. The trial court denied the motion.
A minute entry, dated May 13, 1968, stated that based on the court's own motion and good cause appearing the case was reset for July 12. A minute order, dated July 12, 1968, recited that the district attorney moved the court for a continuance of the trial and that the court granted the State's motion to continue. A minute entry, dated July 15, 1968, stated that based on court's own motion, and good cause appearing therefor, the trial was reset for August 5, 1968. No further reason or cause, except for these recitals, was given for these continuances.
The State, in the instant appeal, has asked this court to take judicial notice of the congested criminal docket and current backlog of criminal cases in the Third Judicial District. Consequently the seven-month delay was necessary in the orderly administration of criminal justice.
Section 78-25-1(3), U.C.A., 1953, provides that courts may take judicial notice of the official acts of the judicial department. The legislature has also dealt with the manner of proof of facts recited in entries made in official records, see 78-25-3, U.C.A., 1953, but it has not made such facts a matter of judicial knowledge, nor does this court.
The Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a speedy trial is an important safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial, to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation, and to limit the possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of an accused to defend himself.
"The right of a speedy trial is necessarily relative. It is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to a defendant. It does not preclude the rights of public justice." [Citation Omitted] "Whether delay in completing a prosecution amounts to an unconstitutional deprivation of rights depends upon the circumstances. The delay must not be purposeful or oppressive" [Citation Omitted] "[T]he essential ingredient is orderly expedition and not mere speed."'
Defendant further cites § 77-1-8(6) U.C.A., 1953, which provides:
every defendant in a criminal action unable to get bail shall be entitled' to a trial within thirty days after arraignment, if court is then in session in such county .
In State v. Rasmussen, this court held that Section 77-1-8(6), was a statutory implementation of the constitutional guarantee to a speedy trial; however, this provision is directory and not mandatory.. Each case must be examined in light of its own particular facts. In the Rasmussen case, the defendant was arrested April 3,. arraigned on June 2, and a trial date was' set for June 15. The trial was postponed because the trial court had a homicide casein process. A second trial date, set for July 2 was postponed on account of the trial judge's illness and hospitalization. Another trial date on July 21 had to be postponed because defense counsel did not appear, allegedly for lack of notice. The trial took place on July 27, about forty five days after defense counsel had moved for a dismissal for lack of a speedy trial. The parties further stipulated the delay was caused only by circumstances. Based on the foregoing facts this court held that no one was intentionally prejudiced, and the ends of justice were not aborted.
In the instant action, defendant, under § 77-28-3(1) U.C.A., 1953, had first priority on the trial calendar. He first made demand for a speedy trial on February 5 when his preliminary hearing was postponed for over a month. After his arraignment on March 25, he filed a demand for a speedy trial on March 27. Defendant was incarcerated 218 days, 135 of which were after his demand for a speedy trial. 'The minute entry of July 12 indicates that the prosecution requested a continuance over defendant's objection. The reasons for the other continuances are not indicated ;in the record. These facts are clearly distinguishable from the circumstances in State v. Rasmussen. The protracted incarceration of defendant prior to trial, without cause or excuse, was undue and oppressive and constituted a denial of his right to a speedy trial.
The judgment of conviction is reversed.
CROCKETT, C. J., and TUCKETT and HENRIOD, JJ., concur.
. Holbrook v. Carter, 19 Utah 2d 288, 290, 431 P.2d 123 (1967).
. United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120, 86 S.Ct. 773, 776, 15 L.Ed.2d 627, 630 (1966).
. United States v. Ewell, note 2, supra, at p. 120 of 383 U.S., at p. 776 of 86 S.Ct., at p. 631 of 15 L.Ed.2d.
. 18 Utah 2d 201, 418 P.2d 134 (1906).