Case Name: Michael A. Glynn vs. Sarah T. Zabriskie et al.
Court: Supreme Court of Rhode Island
Jurisdiction: Rhode Island
Decision Date: 1895-09-27
Citations: 19 R.I. 215
Docket Number: 
Parties: Michael A. Glynn vs. Sarah T. Zabriskie et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Rhode Island Reports
Volume: 19
Pages: 215–216

Head Matter:
NEWPORT COUNTY.
Michael A. Glynn vs. Sarah T. Zabriskie et al.
A notice of intention to claim a lien on land for materials furnished which states that the lien intended to be claimed is created by Pub. Stat. R. I. cap. 177, § 5, as amended by Pub. Laws, cap. 696, of March 21, 1888, is fatally defective, the lien being given by Pub. Stat. R. I. cap. 177, § 1, as amended by Pub. Laws, cap. 696, § 1.
Query, whether a notice of intention to claim a lien on land for materials furnished is sufficient where it omits to state what the materials were, or that they had been furnished within sixty days prior to the giving of notice, or against whose estate in the land it is intended to claim the lien.
Petition for a mechanic’s lien.
September 27, 1895.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
The notice of intention to claim a lien, served on the respondent, a copy of which is recorded in the office of the City Olerk of Newport, omits several matters which it is customary and desirable, if not essential, that such a notice should contain, viz., it does not state what the materials were which had been furnished, nor that they had been furnished within sixty days prior to the giving of notice, nor against whose estate in the land it is intended to claim the lien.
It is not necessary, however, for us to determine whether the notice is insufficient on account of these omissions, or any or either of them, for it is fatally defective in that it states that the lien intended to be claimed is created by Pub. Stat. cap. 177, § 5, as amended by Public Laws, cap. 696, of March 21, 1888. ' The.lien for materials furnished is given, not by § 5, referred to in the notice, but by § 1 of cap. 177 of the Public Statutes as amended by Pub. Laws, cap. 696, § 1. Section 5 merely limits the period for the commencement of legal process to enforce the lien created by § 1, as amended, and for the notice to he given to the owner of the property of an intention to claim the lien. The statute being in derogation of the common law, a strict compliance with its requirements is necessary. Dodge v. Walsham, 16 R. I. 705.
Charles Acton Ives, for petitioner.
Samuel B. Honey, for respondents.
Petition denied and dismissed.