Case Name: PENNSYLVANIA CO. v. UNITED STATES (INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION et al., Interveners)
Court: United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1914-05
Citations: 214 F. 445
Docket Number: No. 36
Parties: PENNSYLVANIA CO. v. UNITED STATES (INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION et al., Interveners).
Judges: Before BUFFINGTON and HUNT, Circuit Judges, and ORR, District Judge.
Reporter: Federal Reporter
Volume: 214
Pages: 445–455

Head Matter:
PENNSYLVANIA CO. v. UNITED STATES (INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION et al., Interveners).
(District Court, W. D. Pennsylvania.
May Term, 1914.)
No. 36.
Cakbiebs (§ 33*) — Interstate Carriers — Switching Facilities--Discrimination.
Complainant, an interstate carrier, had terminal facilities within the switching district of N., owning depots, freight stations, yards, team tracks, and tracks connecting with and running into numerous separate industries located along or connected with its facilities and other railroads. Within such district there was also physical connection between complainant’s tracks and those of the B. & O. R. Co. over the tracks of which the B., R. & P. R. Co. operated trains into N. from B. Complainant company had been in the habit of receiving cars tendered to it by the B. & O. and other railroads at junction points within the switching limits of N. and transporting them to industries on its lines within the city for the uniform charge of $2 per .car and would transport ears from industries on its lines in N. to junction points with the carriers other than the B., R. & P. Co. for a similar charge. Seld, that the right of the B., R. & P. Co. to a similar service over complainant’s lines did not involve the use of complainant’s tracks and terminal facilities by the B., R. & P. Co., but was a right to equal facilities without discrimination to which the company was entitled under Interstate Commerce Act (Act Feb. 4, 1887, c. 104, § 3, 24 Stat. 380 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3155]), requiring every carrier to afford reasonable and equal facilities for the interchange of traffic between their respective lines, etc.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Carriers, Cent. Dig. §§ 86-90; Dec. Dig. § 33. ]
Buffington, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
In Equity. Suit by the Pennsylvania Company against the United States, in which the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburgh Railway Company intervene. On motion for preliminary injunction.
Denied.
Upon motion for interlocutory injunction. The Pennsylvania Company asks the court for an order to restrain the United States from undertaking to enforce an order made by the Interstate Commerce Commission in a proceeding between the Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburgh Railway Company and the Pennsylvania Company, which requires the Pennsylvania Company to cease from continuing certain acts found by the Commission to be unduly and unreasonably prejudicial as against the Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburgh Railway Company. The United States and the Interstate Commerce Commission resist the application; so does the intervening carrier.
The Pennsylvania Company is engaged in the transportation of property by railroad between points in Pennsylvania and New York. The Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburgh Company extends from Rochester, N. Y., and from Buffalo, N. Y., into Pennsylvania to a place known as Butler, about 40 miles from New Castle, Pa., and the Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburgh Company transports freight from a further line of 'railroad from Butler to New Castle under a trackage agreement with the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, and operates its line in competition with the Pennsylvania line. . ,.
New Castle is a city of 40,000 people, situated about 50 miles north of Pittsburgh. The Pennsylvania Company has terminal facilities within the switching district of New Castle, and owns depots, freight stations, yards, team tracks, and tracks connecting with and running into numerous separate in dustries located along or'connected with the Pennsylvania’s facilities. Much traffic is handled by the Pennsylvania Company within the switching district.
New Castle is reached and served by the. Pennsylvania, Pittsburgh & Lake Erie, the Erie, and the Baltimore & Ohio railroads. The Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburgh Company, jointly with the Baltimore & Ohio, operates certain lines of track between Butler and New Castle, and since 1899 has operated its freight trains into New Castle. The terminal facilities of the Pennsylvania in New Castle consist of depots, freight stations, tracks, spurs, and side tracks aggregating about 24 miles, with switching limits at New Castle extending in the direction of their greatest length for a distance of about four miles, within which there are more than 100 industries served by the Pennsylvania Company, or by the Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburgh Company, or by other carriers. Near the center of the city at Moravia street, and at one other point a mile and a quarter from Moravia street, a physical contract and connection occurs between the tracks of the Pennsylvania Company and those used by the Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburgh Company; at the latter point there are ample facilities for the interchange of car load freight, and at the former the Pennsylvania Company has interchange yards with a capacity for 250 cars. The Pennsylvania Company receives cars tendered to it by the Pittsburgh & Lake Erie, the Erie, and the Baltimore & Ohio, at junction points within the switching limits of New Castle, and transports them to industries on its lines within the city for a uniform charge of $2 per car, and will transport cars from industries on its line in New Castle to junction points with the three carriers just named for a similar charge. Industries on the tracks of the Pennsylvania Company within the switching limits, which receive car load freight transported by the Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburgh, or which desire to ship over its lines to points beyond New Castle, must dray their traffic from or to that company’s yards to great disadvantage to themselves. The Pennsylvania Company refuses to transport cars within the switching limits tendered by the Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburgh Company to it at either junction point in New Castle, or to transport cars from industries on its line within the switching limits to the junction points on the lines of the Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburgh for transportation by it beyond. It avers that the average distance from one of the points of physical connection to all of the industrial tracks operated or served by the Pennsylvania Company therefrom is less than a mile, and from the other point of physical connection the average distances of the various industrial tracks are slightly greater. The tariffs of the Pennsylvania Company name 128 industries within the switching limits and the immediate vicinity of New Castle from and to which car load shipments are transported by the Pennsylvania Company and certain other carriers at switching charges named therein.
The Interstate Commerce Commission found that the Baltimore & Ohio renders less service for the Pennsylvania Company than that company performs for it, and that it appeared that, at several' points in the Shenango and Mahonipg Valleys of Pennsylvania and Ohio, reciprocal switching arrangements are in effect, and that the total amount of switching secured by the Pennsylvania Company was greater than that performed by it for the valleys, including New Castle, and for New Castle proper. The Commission also considered the contention of the Pennsylvania Company that the three carriers hereinbefore named, other than the Buffalo, Rochester, & Pittsburgh Company, were in a position, either at New Castle or elsewhere, to offer reciprocal advantages to the Pennsylvania Company for the switching done for it in New Castle, while the Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburgh was not in a position to offer similar advantages by way of compensation at New Castle or elsewhere. The Commission, however, found that car load shipments transported to New Castle by the Baltimore & Ohio or by the Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburgh arrive at New Castle from Butler and beyond under similar circumstances and conditions; the Commission saying that, if the cars are hauled to New Castle by a Baltimore & Ohio engine and tendered to the Pennsylvania Company, they will be transported by the Pennsylvania Company to any point within the switching limits for a charge of $2 per ear, but that, if similar cars are transported over the same line and to the same point by the Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburgh, the Pennsylvania refuses to transport them to any point within the switching limits. The Pennsylvania Company in its bill avers that at one of the points of connection in New Castle all through interstate commerce received from points on the Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburgh road outside of the switching limits of New Castle and destined to points on the lines of the Pennsylvania Company outside of such switching limits is interchanged, and that it also receives from points on the lines of the Pennsylvania Company, outside of such switching limits, traffic destined to points on the line of the Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburgh outside of such limits, and affords reasonable and equal facilities, without discrimination in rates or charges, and that the interchange required by the order of the Commission amounts merely to terminal service and ‘delivery, and that, if enforced, will involve the use by the Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburgh Company of the tracks and terminal facilities of the Pennsylvania Company without its consent.
The Commission held that the practice of the Pennsylvania Company constituted undue and unreasonable discrimination, and made an order to the effect that the Pennsylvania Company should desist from the undue and unreasonable prejudice.
The United States filed an answer, admitting the facts as to the situation, conditions, and methods of operation adopted at New Castle, and found by the Interstate Commerce Commission in its report, but denies that the order of the Commission exceeded authority conferred upon that body.
F. D. McKenney, of Washington, D. C., and Gordon Fisher, A. P. Burgwin, and Dalzell, Fisher & Hawkins, all of Pittsburgh, Pa., for Pennsylvania Co.
E. Lowry Humes, U. S. Atty., of Meadville, Pa., and Blackburn Esterline, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., of Washington, D. C., for the United States.
Joseph W. Folk, of St. Louis, Mo., and Charles W. Needham, of Washington, D. C., for Interstate Commerce Commission.
William A. Glasgow, Jr., of Philadelphia, Pa., for intervening carrier, Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburgh Co.
Before BUFFINGTON and HUNT, Circuit Judges, and ORR, District Judge.
For other eases see same topic & § number in Deo. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
HUNT, Circuit Judge
(after stating the facts as above). The'motion for a restraining order was asked upon the premise that, if that portion of section 3 of the act to regulate commerce, which requires that every carrier subject to the provisions- of the act shall, according to its respective powers, afford all reasonable, proper, and equal facilities for the interchange of traffic between their respective lines for receiving, forwarding, and delivering property to and from the several lines and those connected therewith without discriminating in their rates and charges between such connecting lines, stood alone, the Pennsylvania Company would be obliged to perform the service which the Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburgh Company wishes it to perform, and which the order of the Interstate Commerce Commission says it shall ' perform. The question, therefore, is whether the additional clause in section 3, forbidding a construction of the language just referred to, which will require any' such common carrier to give the use of its tracks or terminal facilities to another carrier engaged in like business, can under the facts avail the Pennsylvania Company.
We hold that it is not a use of the tracks or terminal facilities of the Pennsylvania Company that the Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburgh Company seeks for- itself, but a service of transportation in receiving and forwarding freight tendered by it to the Pennsylvania Company, a service to be performed upon the payment of a reasonable compensation to the Pennsylvania Company; such compensation to be fixed, of course, in the first instance by that company. The use of the tracks and terminal facilities under the service asked for will be no greater than that which the Pennsylvania Company extends to other carriers which may' desire traffic carried. No physical occupancy by running trains or locomotives of the Buffalo Rochester and Pittsburgh Company is asked; there being, as we look at it, only tender of freight at a point of interchange already established by the Pennsylvania Company, and where it receives the cars ' of every other road except the Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburgh Company and hauls after delivery. The facts, therefore, take the case from within the scope of the rule of Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Central Stock Yards Co., 212 U. S. 132, 29 Sup. Ct. 246, 53 L. Ed. 441, where the Stock Yards Company demanded that the cars should be received by the Louisville & Nashville at a point which was an arbitrary one, near its terminus.
We have given careful consideration to the argument of counsel for the Pennsylvania Company -iii their effort to withdraw the case from the rule laid down in Grand Trunk Railway Co. v. Michigan Railroad Commission, 231 U. S. 457, 34 Sup. Ct. 152, 58 L. Ed. 310, but we believe the doctrine of that case controls this. The statute of the state of Michigan which was there examined by the court, in so far as it required interchange of traffic, was quite similar to the provisions of the act to regulate commerce pertinent to this case, for the language of the Michigan law, which required the forwarding and delivering of property, contained a proviso to the effect that nothing in the statute should be construed as requiring any railroad to give the use of its tracks or terminal facilities to another railroad engaged in like business. The extent of the city of Detroit was considered, a'nd necessarily the court was called upon to distinguish the facts in order to demonstrate the inapplicability of its previous ruling in Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Stock Yards Co., supra, upon which reliance was placed by the railroad company in its effort to prevent the enforcement of the order of the State Commission. The court, however, regarded the effect of the order made by the state Railroad Commission as merely requiring the railroad companies to accept freight at the designated points for shipment to other designated points, and said that, "except in an extreme sense," such an acceptance of freight was not a use of tracks and terminals other than in the sense of being only a proper use for which the roads were constituted to afford. So, upon the principle that the order made was a regulation of the business of a carrier and not an appropriation of terminal facilities for the use and benefit of other roads,' it was sustained.
The underlying principle is that a common carrier may be required to accept a car for transportation whenever such a car is offered at a place where the common carrier has established a point of interchange, provided always a reasonable compensation is fixed for the service. Here, the place where the cars are offered not being an arbitrary one, the carrier Pennsylvania Company may not inquire into the ownership of the car, nor into .the route over which it has been moved to reach its rails merely to decide whether or not it will transport the car so offered. To hold otherwise would greatly diminish the regulating power of the Interstate Commerce Commission to treat all carriers as within the letter of the 'act to regulate commerce with respect to their duties to transport. It follows that, where compensation is offered, a practice of hauling the cars of several connecting carriers and absolutely refusing to haul the cars of another carrier is'a discrimination which, in the interests of the public, may. be removed as properly within the power of just and reasonable regulation by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 220 U. S. 235, 31 Sup. Ct. 392, 55 L. Ed. 448.
The question of reasonable compensation is in no way involved, ánd no opinion is passed thereon.
Restraining order must be denied.