Case Name: HIGGINS v. HAMPSHIRE PRODUCTS, INC.
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1948-01-05
Citations: 319 Mich. 674
Docket Number: Docket No. 48; Calendar No. 43,851
Parties: HIGGINS v. HAMPSHIRE PRODUCTS, INC.
Judges: Bushnell, C. J., concurred with Sharpe, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 319
Pages: 674–692

Head Matter:
HIGGINS v. HAMPSHIRE PRODUCTS, INC.
1. Corporations—Articles—Reports—Purpose op Public Record.
The purpose of the requirement that the articles of incorporation and annual report of a corporation be made a public record is to provide a means of furnishing reliable information to those ■ who deal with corporations (Act No. 327, § 4, Pub. Acts 1931, as amended by Act No. 160, Pub. Acts 1943; § 81, as amended by Act No. 194, Pub. Acts 1935).
2. Same—Articles—Reports—Residence.
The purpose of the requirement that the location and postofS.ee address of the corporation be specified in the articles and tho annual reports .is to fix the location or residence of the corporation for purposes of securing service of process, determine venue, general jurisdiction and taxation (Act No. 327, § 4, Pub. Acts 1931, as amended by Act No. 160, Pub. Acts 1943; § 81, as amended by Act No. 194, Pub. Acts 1935).
3. Same—Residence—Venue—Records op County Clerk.
Records on file in a county clerk’s office which have been executed and verified by a corporation are assumed to be proper and may be relied upon by one who examines them for the purpose of selecting a court of competent jurisdiction for the ■bringing of a suit, hence where corporation, although its place of business was located in Monroe county, filed its articles of incorporation in Washtenaw county and annual reports designated latter county as its place of doing business, it was a “resident” of such latter county at least'for prarposes of venue in a transitory action (3 Comp. Laws 1929, § 13997, as amended by Act No. 225, Pub. Acts 1931;' Act No. 327, § 4, Pub. Aets 1931, as amended by Aet No. 160, Pub. Acts 1943; § 81, as amended by Aet No. 194, Pub. Aets 1935).
4. Same—Articles—Residence—Venue in Transitory Action.
Although the designation of residence in the certificate of incorporation is not absolutely conclusive as to the corporation so as to bind all persons, it is nevertheless conclusive as to the corporation where a question of venue in a transitory action isu involved (3 Comp. Laws 1929, § 13997, as amended by Aet No. 225, Pub. Acts 1931; Aet No. 327, §4, Pub. Acts 1931, as amended by Aet No. 160, Pub. Acts 1943).
5. Same—Articles—Residence—Service of Process.
The statement in the articles of incorporation that the residence of the corporation is in a designated county estops it to say that that is not its residence for certain purposes, such as for service of process in a transitory action, notwithstanding it is the rule that the residence of a private corporation is where its principal office, is (3 Comp. Laws 1929, § 13997, as amended by Aet No. 225, Pub. Aets 1931; Aet No. 327, § 4, Pub. Acts 1931, as amended by Aet No. 160, Pub. Aets 1943).
6. Same—Legal Entity—Residence.
It is a general and well-established principle of law that a corporation has a legal entity distinct from its members and must be a resident of some place.
7. Same—-Venue—Transitory Actions.'
A transitory aetion was properly brought in the place of defendant corporation’s de jure residence, notwithstanding its principal place of business was in another county.
8. Same—Venue—Service of Process.
Where a transitory actioh is commenced against a defendant corporation in the county of its de jure residence, service of process could then be made any where within the State (3 Comp. Laws 1929, § 14090).
9. Sheriffs and Constables—Service of Process.
A sheriff, or his deputy, is a county officer and has no jurisdiction to serve process outside the limits of his own county unless specially authorized to do so.
10. Appeal and Error—Questions Reviewable—Res Judicata.
Question of res judicata is not considered on appeal where, although properly raised on motion to dismiss, no testimony was taken ’ thereon, trial court did not make findings in respect thereto and attorneys for defendant on appeal declined to argue the point.
11. Same—Sufficiency of Declaration—Service of Process.
Where sufficiency of declaration against corporation was not questioned, except upon a question of res judicata which defendant’s attorneys declined to argue on appeal, it was error to grant motion to dismiss and to quash service except so far as quashal of service because made by deputy sheriff outside the county of which he was an officer (3 Comp. Laws 1929, § 13997, as amended by Act No. 225, Pub. Acts 1931; § 14009; Act No. 327, § 4, Pub. Acts 1931, as amended by Act No. 160, Pub. Acts 1943; § 81, as amended by Act No. 194, Pub. Acts 1935).
Bushnell, C. J., and Sharpe, J., dissenting in part.
Appeal from Washtenaw; Breakey, Jr. (James R.), J.
Submitted October 9, 1947.
(Docket No. 48, Calendar No. 43,851.)
Decided January 5, 1948.
Assumpsit by Russell C. Higgins, and others, co-partners, doing business as Consolidated Aircraft Products Company, against Hampshire Products, Inc., a Michigan corporation, with ancillary garnishment against Ann Arbor Bank and others, garnishee defendants. Motion to dismiss and to quash service'granted. Plaintiffs appeal. Order dismissing suit reversed.
Action and garnishment reinstated.
Freud <& Toppin (Henry J. Freud, of counsel), for plaintiffs.
Boscoe O. Bonisteel and Charles C. Menefee, for defendant.

Opinion:
Sharpe, J.
(dissenting in part). This is an appeal from an order of the Washtenaw circuit court dismissing plaintiffs' declaration for claimed lack of jurisdiction.
The material, facts are not in dispute. Plaintiffs, as a copartnership and residents of Wayne county, instituted the present action in Washtenaw county by filing a declaration with rule to plead indorsed thereon. On the same day a deputy sheriff of Washtenaw county served the declaration with rule to plead upon LeRoy Briggs, an accountant of defendant corporation, at its office at 495 Redmond road, Milan, Michigan. Thereafter, the deputy sheriff filed a return certifying that he had served the defendant corporation in Washtenaw county.
Subsequently, the principal defendant entered a special appearance and filed a motion to dismiss and quash the service of process on the ground that the court had obtained no jurisdiction of the cause for the reason that neither the plaintiffs nor principal defendant were residents of Washtenaw county; and that no service was obtained upon defendant in Washtenaw county. Testimony was taken upon this motion and the follqwing facts were established. Defendant company was incorporated in 1941. In its articles of incorporation, the city of Milan, Washtenaw county, was designated as the location of the corporation with annual reports filed with the county clerk of Washtenaw county. It is also an established fact that the Monroe-Washtenaw county line runs through the city of Milan; that 495 Redmond road is in Monroe county; that the principal defendant's office and place' of business has not been changed since incorporation; and that service of process'was in fact made in Monroe county.
The trial court entered an order quashing the service of process and dismissing plaintiffs' declaration with rule to plead for the reason that service of process was made in Monroe county and, therefore, the circuit court of Washtenaw county had obtained no jurisdiction over defendant. córporation.
Plaintiffs appeal and urge:
"1. ' The trial court should have ruled that defendant is, a resident of Washtenaw county in point of law and fact, estopped by its conduct from asserting any contrary claim.
"2. Although, as the court of the county of defendant's residence in which suit was brought, its process can he served on the defendant any place where defendant can be found in the State of Michigan (3 Comp. Laws 1929, § 14090 [Stat. Ann. §27.757]), the court should have ruled that defendant was estopped to assert or testify that service of process at its registered office was not made in Washtenaw county.
"3. 'Although, if the return of service of process was false, the trial court could properly, at the most, have quashed service and issued new process directed to the sheriff of any county of Michigan, the trial court should have ruled that, let alone clear and convincing proof, there was utterly no evidence whatever to impeach the return of service of'process."
We shall first discuss the question of whether defendant corporation is estopped from defiying that it is a resident of Washtenaw county.
In Orloff v. Morehead Manfg. Co., 273 Mich. 62, a suit by a minority of stockholders was started in Washtenaw county to dissolve the corporation. Its place of business was* located in, Wayne county. Plaintiffs lived in Washtenaw county. Service of process was obtained upon defendants in Wayne county. We there said:
"It is settled that a corporation in this State does have a 'local habitation.' Detroit Transportation Co. v. Board of Assessors of Detroit, 91 Mich. 382.
" 'Its residence depends not on the habitation of the stockholders in interest,' but on the official exhibition of legal and local existence. Angelí and Ames on Corporations (11th Ed.), § 107.' Republic Motor Truch Co. v. The Buda Co., 212 Mich. 55, 65.
" 'It is a familiar doctrine that a private corporation must be held to reside-in the town where its principal office is, as a local inhabitant.' People, ex rel. Detroit Fire & Marine Ins. Co., v. Saginaw Circuit Judge, 23 Mich. 492."
In Flewelling v. Prima Oil Co., 291 Mich. 281, the defendant company had its registered office and was conducting its business in Wayne county. Plaintiffs began an action in Jackson county and'service of process was made upon defendant officer and registered agent of the corporation in Wayne county. Defendant corporation had abandoned its registered office and was conducting its business from the private residences of its officers, all of whom resided in Wayne county. We there said:
"The corporation may have violated the provisions of Act No. 327, § 38, Pub. Acts 1931, as amended by Act No. 194, Pub. Acts 1935 (Comp. Laws Supp. 1935, § 10135-38, Stat. Ann. § 21.38), in abandoning and failing to maintain its registered office, but this did not subject it to service of process anywhere within the State. Although neglecting this duty, it should, nevertheless, be deemed to have a place of residence in the county where it exercises its corporate powers and transacts its business. See State, ex rel. Oakland Motor Car Co., v. District Court of Waseca County, 176 Minn. 78 (222 N. W. 524); Hildebrand v. United Artisans, 46 Ore. 134 (79 Pac. 347, 114 Am. St. Rep. 852); Connecticut & Passumpsic Rivers R. Co. v. Cooper, 30 Vt. 476 (73 Am. Dec. 319). Plaintiffs elected to institute their action in Jackson county rather than the county of residence of the defendant corporation,, and process could be served only in the county in which the suit was instituted. No valid service having been had in the county of Jackson on any of the defendants, no authority existed for serving any of them in Wayne county under the provisions of 3 Comp. Laws 1929, § 14090 (Stat. Ann. § 27.757)."
In 19 C. J. S. p. 976, it is said:
"It has been held that in the absence of any law defining the residence of a corporation, such residence is not necessarily where its principal place of business is, yet, when it is necessary to determine the venue of an action to which a corporation is a party by its residence, the county in which it has its principal place of business or its principal office is generally considered as its residence, although it may not be the county wherein the certificate of incorporation is filed, and although its actual business is carried on, and its 'officers reside, in some other coupty, or its charter permits it to maintain an office outside of the State."
In the case at bar, defendant corporation has always had its office and place of business in Monroe county. The fact .that the original articles of incorporation designated Washtenaw county rather than Monroe county as its corporate residence does not estop defendant corporation from asserting that its residence and place of business is in Monroe county. In Dewey v. Central Car & Manfg. Co., 42 Mich. 399, we held that service of process upon a corporation can be made only within the county where its business officé is fixed. In Whitehead v. Van Buren Circuit Judge, 220 Mich. 504, we held that a sheriff is a county officer and has no jurisdiction to serve process outside the limits of his own county unless specially authorized to do so. It follows that service of process by a deputy sheriff of Washtenaw county upon defendant corporation in Monroe county is a nullity and the trial court was right in quashing such service. Moreover,'the general policy of our laws requires all suits to be brought in the county where ' one or the other of the parties resides. See Greacen v. Buckley & Douglas Lumber Co., 167 Mich. 569.
Defendant corporation, being a resident of Monroe county, must be siied in that county. It also follows that the trial court was right in dismissing plaintiffs' declaration filed against defendant corporation in Washtenaw county. The judgment should be. affirmed, with costs to defendant.
Bushnell, C. J., concurred with Sharpe, J.