Case Name: DELTA HEALTH GROUP, INC., Scott J. Bell, Sharon Sauerwein, Nora Segues and Shelby Nursing, Rehabilitation Center f/k/a Chateau Manor Nursing Center and Pensacola Health Trust v. The ESTATE OF Ellen POPE, By and Through James PAYNE, Individually and as the Personal Representative, for the use and Benefit of the Estate of Ellen Pope, and on Behalf of and for the use and Benefit of the Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Ellen Pope
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2008-10-02
Citations: 995 So. 2d 123
Docket Number: No. 2006-IA-02138-SCT
Parties: DELTA HEALTH GROUP, INC., Scott J. Bell, Sharon Sauerwein, Nora Segues and Shelby Nursing, Rehabilitation Center f/k/a Chateau Manor Nursing Center and Pensacola Health Trust v. The ESTATE OF Ellen POPE, By and Through James PAYNE, Individually and as the Personal Representative, for the use and Benefit of the Estate of Ellen Pope, and on Behalf of and for the use and Benefit of the Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Ellen Pope.
Judges: SMITH, C.J., WALLER, P.J., CARLSON, DICKINSON AND LAMAR, JJ., CONCUR. EASLEY, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY DIAZ, P.J., AND IN PART BY GRAVES, J.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 995
Pages: 123–129

Head Matter:
DELTA HEALTH GROUP, INC., Scott J. Bell, Sharon Sauerwein, Nora Segues and Shelby Nursing, Rehabilitation Center f/k/a Chateau Manor Nursing Center and Pensacola Health Trust v. The ESTATE OF Ellen POPE, By and Through James PAYNE, Individually and as the Personal Representative, for the use and Benefit of the Estate of Ellen Pope, and on Behalf of and for the use and Benefit of the Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of Ellen Pope.
No. 2006-IA-02138-SCT.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Oct. 2, 2008.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 11, 2008.
Gaye Nell Lott Currie, Nicole Collins Huffman, Lynda Clower Carter, Benjamin Noah Philley, Jackson, attorneys for appellants.
Douglas Bryant Chaffin, Anthony Lance Reins, attorneys for appellee.

Opinion:
RANDOLPH, Justice,
for the Court.
¶ 1. Ellen Pope was a resident of Shelby Nursing and Rehabilitation Center ("Shelby"), i/k/sj Chateau Manor Nursing Home, from approximately June 15, 1997, until her death on January 12, 2004.
¶2. On August 25, 2004, Pope's great-nephew, James Payne, filed a wrongful-death suit against Delta Health Group, Inc; Scott J. Bell; Sharon Sauerwein; Nora Pegues; Pensacola Health Trust, Inc.; John Does 1 through 10; and Unidentified Entities 1 through 10 (as to Shelby Nursing and Rehabilitation Center f/k/a Chateau Manor Nursing Center) (all Defendants will be referred to collectively as "Delta"). The complaint incorrectly stated that Payne was the nephew of Pope. The suit was filed on behalf of "[t]he Estate of Ellen Pope, by and through James Payne, Individually and as the Personal Representative, for the use and benefit of the Estate of Ellen Pope, and on behalf of and for the use and benefit of the wrongful death beneficiaries of Ellen Pope." The complaint asserted negligence, medical malpractice, gross negligence, fraud, wrongful death and breach of fiduciary duty arising out of Pope's time at Shelby. It is undisputed that at the time this suit was commenced, no estate had been opened on behalf of Pope.
¶ 3. On or about March 14, 2005, nearly seven months after filing the complaint, Payne filed a Petition for Letters of Administration. In his Petition, Payne falsely testified that he was the nephew of Pope, as Payne's mother, Viola Ross, was Pope's sister. The Petition for Letters of Administration was granted by the Chancery Court of Bolivar County, Second Judicial District, on April 14, 2005.
¶4. To the contrary, on November 9, 2005, Payne testified in a deposition that he was Pope's great-nephew. Payne further testified that Viola Ross was actually Payne's grandmother and that Payne's mother was a niece of Pope. Discovery further revealed that at the time of her death, Pope had no living spouse, children, parent or siblings and therefore, no individuals who could be classified as a wrongful-death beneficiary of Pope.
¶ 5. Subsequent to this information being revealed in discovery, on October 6, 2006, Delta filed a Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment for Lack of Standing. Delta averred in these pleadings that Payne lacked standing to assert claims on behalf of the Estate of Pope, and further that Payne did not qualify as a wrongful-death beneficiary pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated Section 11-7-13 (Rev.2004), as he was the "merely the son of one of Ellen Pope's surviving nieces."
¶ 6. Prior to Delta's motion being ruled upon, Payne filed a Motion to Substitute on November 8, 2006. Payne asserted he had standing to bring the action for the following reasons:
1) This suit was filed on behalf of The Estate of Ellen Pope, by and through James Payne, Personal Representative for the use and benefit of the Estate of Ellen Pope, and on behalf of the wrongful-death beneficiaries of Ellen Pope.
2) Letters of Administration were issued to James Payne by the Chancery Court of Bolivar County, Mississippi, appointing him the Administrator of the Estate of Ellen Pope.
3) The Estate of Ellen Pope, by and through James Payne, Administrator, is the appropriate party to bring the above styled action.
¶ 7. On the same day, the trial court entered an Order of Substitution for reasons mirroring those in Payne's motion. On December 1, 2006, the trial court denied Delta's Motion to Dismiss, or in the alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment. The trial court found that "James Payne had standing to file the subject lawsuit and/or properly substituted himself as the Administrator of the Estate of Ellen Pope, deceased." tion.
¶ 8. From this denial, Delta filed its Petition for Interlocutory Appeal and Motion to Stay Proceedings, which was granted on January 26, 2006. Delta presents the following issues to the Court:
I. Whether the trial court erred in holding that James Payne had standing to file the complaint.
II. Whether the trial court erred in allowing James Payne, as Administrator, to be substituted as the proper party plaintiff in a null and void complaint.
III. Whether the trial court erred in denying Delta's Motion to Dismiss.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 9. "This Court reviews de novo a trial court's grant or denial of a motion to dismiss." Cmty. Hosp. v. Goodlett, 968 So.2d 391, 396 (Miss.2007) (citations omitted).
ANALYSIS
1. Whether the trial court erred in holding that James Payne had standing to file the complaint.
¶ 10. Delta submits to this Court that Payne lacked standing to bring suit not only because he was not the personal representative of the Estate at the time the complaint was filed, but because Payne was not a wrongful-death beneficiary pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated Section 11-7-13 (Rev.2004). Delta logically asserts that a necessary prerequisite for filing any lawsuit is that the Plaintiff must have standing to assert the claims contained in the complaint, and that "because Payne had no legal authority to file this lawsuit, and because no estate existed at the time suit was filed, the trial court's rulings are contrary to the law and should be reversed."
¶ 11. Payne counters by asserting to this Court that "[t]he Estate was, at all material times in this lawsuit, the proper party." Additionally, Payne submits that he was properly substituted pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a).
¶ 12. It is undisputed that when this complaint was filed, no estate had been opened on behalf of Ellen Pope. This Court has held, "It is certainly an undis-putable and invariable rule of law that a right of action must be complete when an action therefor is commenced.... " Crawford Commercial Constructors, Inc. v. Marine Indus. Residential Insulation, Inc., 437 So.2d 15, 16 (Miss.1983) (citations omitted). The complaint was filed on August 25, 2004, and Payne did not file his Petition for Letters of Administration until February 11, 2005. Long v. McKinney requires that, "[i]n the event the litigants wish to pursue a claim on behalf of the estate of the deceased, such estate must, of course, be opened and administered through the chancery court." Long v. McKinney, 897 So.2d 160, 174 (Miss.2004). The record is clear that at the time of the filing of the complaint, no estate had been opened on behalf of Pope, thus Payne was not the administrator of a non-existent estate. Mississippi Code Annotated Section 91-7-233 (Rev.2004) holds that "[ejxecu-tors, administrators, and temporary administrators may commence and prosecute any personal action whatever, at law or in equity, which the testator or intestate might have commenced and prosecuted." Payne held none of the offices mentioned therein when suit was commenced.
¶ 13. The United States Supreme Court has ruled that "standing is to be determined as of the commencement of suit." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 571, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2142, 119 L.Ed.2d 351, 371 (1992) (emphasis added). The fact that Payne subsequently was appointed as administrator does not change the undisputable fact that Payne lacked standing to commence the suit.
¶ 14. Additionally, this action cannot rightfully proceed as Payne has no standing as a wrongful-death beneficiary of Pope. Mississippi Code Annotated Section 11-7-13 (Rev.2004) holds that an action for damages in a wrongful-death suit may be brought:
in the name of the personal representative of the deceased person or unborn quick child for the benefit of all persons entitled under the law to recover, or by widow for the death of her husband, or by the husband for the death of the wife, or by the parent for the death of a child or unborn quick child, or in the name of a child, or in the name of a child for the death of a parent, or by a brother for the death of a sister, or by a sister for the death of a brother, or by a sister for the death of a sister, or a brother for the death of a brother, or all parties interested may join in the suit....
¶ 15. The Legislature failed to confer standing on a greatnephew. See Nat'l Heritage Realty, Inc. v. Boles, 947 So.2d 238, 245 (holding a cousin is not a wrongful-death beneficiary pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-13). Since Payne did not qualify as a wrongful-death beneficiary or as an officer of an estate, he unequivocally lacked standing to commence an action. This Court is without authority to expand the enunciated beneficiaries by granting standing to a great-nephew and empowering him with a legal right to commence suit.
¶ 16. A distant relative such as Payne is not empowered to exercise rights restricted to close family members by the Legislature or persons approved by a chancery court, even pre-commencement of suit. Were this Court to allow such a scenario, any person could commence an action, toll the statute of limitations, open an estate when convenient, and during the interim, keep the courthouse door open until a real party in interest, that is, one who has suffered injury and is entitled to remedy, appears before the bench and bar for relief. To allow a great-nephew without standing to commence the action is not only violative of the law long established by our Legislature, which determines who may bring a wrongful-death action, whether by kinship or through an estate, but also subverts our Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, we find Payne, at the time of filing of the complaint, lacked locus standi.
¶ 17. Accordingly, we find the circuit court erred by denying Delta's motion to dismiss, and we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand to the trial court for entry of an order consistent with this opinion.
¶ 18. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
SMITH, C.J., WALLER, P.J., CARLSON, DICKINSON AND LAMAR, JJ., CONCUR. EASLEY, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY DIAZ, P.J., AND IN PART BY GRAVES, J.
. Payne also listed himself as the nephew of Pope in his Petition for Letters of Administra-
. Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a) holds:
Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. An executor, administrator, guardian, bailee, trustee, a party with whom or in whose name a contract has been made for the benefit of another, or a party authorized by statute may sue in his representative capacity without joining with him the party for whose benefit the action is brought. No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed for objection for ratification of the commencement of the action by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest; and such ratification, joinder or substitution shall have the same effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of the real party in interest.