Case Name: Marvin F. FOWLER, et al. v. Bobby R. ROBERTS, et al.
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1989-09-12
Citations: 556 So. 2d 1
Docket Number: No. 88-C-1422
Parties: Marvin F. FOWLER, et al. v. Bobby R. ROBERTS, et al.
Judges: COLE, J., respectfully dissents for reasons assigned.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 556
Pages: 1–20

Head Matter:
Marvin F. FOWLER, et al. v. Bobby R. ROBERTS, et al.
No. 88-C-1422.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
Sept. 12, 1989.
Rehearing Granted Oct. 12, 1989.
On Rehearing Feb. 5, 1990.
Dissenting Opinion Feb. 9, 1990.
Robert L. Roshto, Baton Rouge, for applicant.
R. Wayne Smith, Ruston, Robert P. Hogan, Raleigh Newman, Lake Charles, Charles H. Heck, Theus, Grisham, Davis & Leigh, Monroe, for respondent.

Opinion:
LEMMON, Justice.
The principal issue in this case is whether the State Department of Public Safety (DPS) is liable for damages sustained by plaintiffs in a three-car collision caused by defendant Bobby R. Roberts while Roberts was undergoing the effects of a seizure. The basis of plaintiffs' claim against DPS was that DPS issued a virtually unrestricted driver's license to Roberts with full knowledge that he was prone to seizures and without requiring any monitoring or subsequent evaluation of the known condition, and that DPS later automatically renewed the license of the seizure-prone driver at a time when Roberts was regularly experiencing seizures which could no longer be controlled by medication. We hold that a driver's licensing agency which issued a license to an applicant known to be subject to a condition that produced seizures in the past and was likely to do so in the future, which failed to institute reasonable procedures for monitoring the condition of the driver, and which automatically reissued the license three years later without inquiry into the driver's current condition, may be held liable to motorists injured in an accident caused by the driver's operation of a vehicle while under the effects of a seizure.
Facts
The October, 1983 accident occurred when Roberts' car, traveling at an excessive speed, struck the rear of a car driven by Evelyn Fowler, causing the Fowler vehicle to collide with an oncoming car driven by Hugh Winfree. Mrs. Fowler and an occupant of the Winfree vehicle were killed, and Winfree, his wife and another occupant were seriously injured. At the time of the collision Roberts was suffering the effects of a seizure.
Roberts' seizure disorder resulted from a severe head injury in 1966 at age twenty-three. The injury left him with permanent brain damage, partial paralysis of his left side, and some memory impairment. He later developed seizure disorders which grew progressively worse. Because of his medical condition, he was unemployable.
When Roberts moved to Louisiana from Texas in 1968, he did not have a Texas driver's license. In 1975 he attempted to obtain a Louisiana driver's license, voluntarily disclosing his seizure disorder. He was given a medical report form to be completed by his doctor verifying that he had been seizure-free for a period of one year. He did not return to DPS until 1977 when he applied for a license as a "new driver", indicating on his application the fact of the prior denial. He submitted a completed medical report form on which a doctor recited that Roberts had been seizure-free for one year, was under regular medical care, and was taking medication to control the disorder. The report further contained a positive answer to a request for the doctor's opinion whether the applicant was capable from a medical standpoint of safely operating a motor vehicle.
On the basis of the medical report DPS issued Roberts a standard driver's license, but did not instruct him to notify DPS if he had further seizures or require him to update the medical report periodically as to his current condition. Further, while Roberts' license contained an "05" restriction limiting him to driving an automatic transmission vehicle because of his partially paralyzed arm and leg, the license contained no indication of his seizure disorder which would alert future licensing officers to that condition and to his need for regular medical care and medication.
In 1980 Roberts' license was automatically renewed for four years at the same DPS office, without any inquiry as to recent seizures. At that time Roberts' seizures could no longer be controlled by medication, and he was experiencing seizures regularly.
On the day of the accident Roberts failed to take the medication prescribed for his condition. While preaching as a lay Pentacostal minister to a group of prison inmates, he became dizzy and asked for their prayers. When he left the prison, he drove his car off the road into a ditch. He refused help and drove toward the highway, insisting he was able to continue on his way.
At various points along the highway witnesses saw Roberts driving very erratically with his head slumped over the steering wheel, driving alternately very slow and fast, stopping briefly in the road, weaving on and off the road, and forcing several vehicles off the road. The inevitable collision occurred about fifteen miles from the prison. Roberts did not remember anything that occurred after the preaching services.
After the ensuing bench trial judgment was rendered holding Roberts and DPS solidarily liable for plaintiffs' damages, with fault allocated equally between them. As to DPS, the judge reasoned that it had the duty, under its responsibility for licensing drivers on state highways, to formulate and implement rules and regulations reasonably designed to insure that drivers with seizure disorders would be properly evaluated and screened before original or renewal licenses were issued. According to the judge, the absence of a statutory requirement for such an evaluation did not render DPS immune from liability for a breach of this duty. The judge concluded that DPS breached this duty at least in connection with the issuance of the renewal license to Roberts, inasmuch as there was no procedural safeguard at the issuance of the initial license to protect against automatic renewal without required inquiry into the current condition of the known seizure-prone driver. The judge further concluded that Roberts more probably than not would have refrained from driving if his license had not been renewed. Finally, citing Pierre v. Allstate Insurance Co., 257 La. 471, 242 So.2d 821 (1970), the court determined that the risk encountered by plaintiffs was within the scope of protection afforded by the duty imposed on DPS.
The court of appeal affirmed. 526 So.2d 266. The court determined the source of DPS's duty by examining the highway regulatory statutes in Title 32 of the Revised Statutes and DPS's Policy/Procedure Statements in effect for the issuance and renewal of driver's licenses during the pertinent period. The court then determined DPS's liability by using the duty-risk analysis, essentially paralleling the analysis used by the trial court. Citing Stewart v. Schmieder, 386 So.2d 1351 (La.1980), the court first pointed out that a public agency may be held liable for a breach of duty owed to the general public. As to the policy analysis regarding imposition of liability on a driver's licensing agency which breaches its duty to establish adequate procedures in monitoring handicapped drivers, the court noted the significant difference between licensing a handicapped driver whose condition does not require periodic monitoring (such as a driver with a paralyzed leg) and licensing one whose condition does require such monitoring (such as a seizure-prone driver under medication to control that condition). The court concluded that DPS should be held liable because it failed to provide any safeguards whatsoever after the initial licensing of a known seizure-prone driver.
We granted certiorari because of the important public policy questions involving the liability of a governmental agency in performing a governmental function. 531 So.2d 257.
Duty-Risk Analysis
The determination of liability in a negligence case usually requires proof of five separate elements: (1) proof that the defendant had a duty to conform his conduct to a specific standard (the duty element); (2) proof that the defendant's conduct failed to conform to the appropriate standard (the breach element); (3) proof that the defendant's substandard conduct was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's injuries (the cause-in-fact element); (4) proof that the defendant's substandard conduct was a legal cause of the plaintiff's injuries (the scope of liability or scope of protection element); and (5) proof of actual damages (the damages element). The first element is usually a judge question, and the other four are usually jury questions unless reasonable minds could not differ. D. Robertson, W. Powers, Jr. & D. Anderson, Cases and Materials on Torts 83-84 (1989).
Prior to this court's decision in Dixie Drive It Yourself System v. American Beverage Co., 242 La. 471, 137 So.2d 298 (1962), Louisiana courts generally determined liability by using the proximate cause approach, wherein the third and fourth elements were effectively combined into a jury question whether the defendant's substandard conduct was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. This approach was easy to explain to the jury. Proximate wa,s a relatively familiar word, meaning, "very near" or "next immediately preceding or following". Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1971). But while the proximate cause approach was simple, it had a false simplicity that ignored complicating factors, particularly in the case of multiple defendants. It appealed to reactions that were ultimately visceral in nature. Robertson, Reason versus Rule in Louisiana Tort Law: Dialogues on Hill v. Lundin & Associates, Inc., 34 La.L.Rev. 1 (1973).
Determination of causation by first determining whether the defendant breached a standard of care imposed on him and then testing for proximate cause also tended to exclude from liability all but the defendant whose negligence occurred latest in point of time. Because the proximate cause approach often included distinctions between active and passive negligence, there was a tendancy to place further undue emphasis on the chronology of acts or omissions. As a consequence, many tort cases determined by the proximate cause approach resulted in holding only one defendant liable, even though two or more parties were guilty of substantial contributing misconduct. Another important weakness of the proximate cause approach was that it failed to determine factual causation in relationship with the other issues in the case which affect liability, rendering the approach relatively devoid of flexibility and of opportunity for analytical examination.
The duty-risk approach to determining liability in negligence cases was adopted in Dixie and subsequently refined in Pierre v. Allstate, 257 La. 471, 242 So.2d 821 (1970). The decision in Pierre employed the method of determining causation first by inquiring into eause-in-fact, and then determining whether there is a duty imposed under the law, whether the risk is within the scope of protection contemplated by imposition of that duty, and whether there is a breach of that duty which calls for a response in damages. Id. 242 So.2d at 830 n. 2. In most cases the result from applying either approach will be the same. However, the duty-risk approach is more policy orientated and offers a better opportunity for use of logic and reasoning, particularly when the critical issue in the case involves the scope of protection contemplated by the statute or rule of law which imposed the duty that was breached.
Cause-in-Fact Element
Cause-in-fact is usually a "but for" inquiry which tests whether the injuries would not have occurred but for the defendant's substandard conduct.
In the present case DPS contends that its conduct was not a cause-in-fact of this accident, arguing first that the cause-in-fact was Roberts' failure to take his medication. The medical evidence credited by the trier of fact established that Roberts' seizure disorder could not be controlled by medication at the time of the accident. Furthermore, there can be more than one cause-in-fact of an accident, and Roberts' failure to take the medication was a cause-in-fact inquiry pertinent only to his liability. The inquiry as to DPS's liability is not whether DPS's failure to monitor the licensed driver's taking of medication was a cause-in-fact of this catastrophe, but rather whether a cause-in-fact was DPS's failure to establish reasonable procedures for monitoring the known seizure disorder that was likely to become dangerous.
DPS further argues that Roberts would have driven his car that day even if he had not been licensed. Therefore, according to DPS, one cannot reasonably conclude that, but for its action in issuing and renewing the license, the accident would not have occurred.
Roberts, although licensed, essentially limited his driving to his Sunday preaching trips. The trial judge, observing that Roberts exhibited a "great sense of right and wrong", accepted the testimony of Roberts and his wife that he would not have driven his car at all without a valid license. We cannot say that the judge manifestly erred in this regard.
Duty Element
The most critical issue in the present case is whether there was a duty imposed by statute or rule of law on DPS, when the applicant being licensed was known to have a seizure disorder which forseeably might worsen and make his driving a hazard on the highway, to adopt procedures to monitor the continuation of the licensed status of the driver by requiring periodic examinations, by restricting the license, or by some other means.
The duty issue in the determination of liability in negligence cases is often confused with the scope of liability or scope of protection issue. The former usually questions the existence of a duty, while the latter (which assumes that a duty exists) usually questions whether the plaintiff's injury was one of the risks encompassed by the statute or rule of law which imposed the duty.
The following method has been suggested for distinguishing between the duty element and»the scope of protection element in negligence cases:
As is often the case with torts puzzles, a view through the prism of trial court procedure points toward a solution. Careful speakers will reserve the formulation, "defendant had no duty," for situations controlled by a rule of law of enough breadth and clarity to permit the trial judge in most cases raising the problem to dismiss the complaint or award summary judgment for defendant on the basis of the rule. On the other hand, if the case is of a sort such that typically the judge will need to know the details of the occurrence before ruling for defendant — i.e., if the case is of a type that must normally reach the directed verdict (or later) stage before defendant can expect to prevail — then the appropriate formulation is in terms of [scope of protection],
D. Robertson, W. Powers, Jr. & D. Anderson, Cases and Materials on Torts 161 (1989). The authors therefore submit that the duty element normally comes into questiqn when there is a categorical rule excluding liability as to whole categories of claimants or of claims. See Donaca v. Curry County, 303 Or. 30, 734 P.2d 1339 (1987). On the other hand, the scope of protection element comes in question when there is a fact-sensitive case that may require limitation of the "but for" consequences of the defendant's substandard conduct. Determination of the scope of protection issue is not based on a categorical rule, but on a case-by-case decision whether liability should be imposed under the particular circumstances. D. Robertson, supra, at 163.
Implicit in DPS's "no duty" defense in this case is the proposition that DPS had no duty under any circumstances to monitor a handicapped driver who was licensed after a doctor attested to the fact that he was then medically capable of operating a ve- hide safely. This argument is similar to the public duty doctrine rejected by this court as a categorical rule in Stewart v. Schmieder, 386 So.2d 1351 (La.1980). In the Stewart case this court held that a parish building inspector, whose duties under the Building Code included the examination of engineering plans and specifications for building the structure and the inspection of construction for compliance with safety ordinances, may be held liable, based on the negligent performance of these duties, to persons injured by the collapse of the improperly designed or constructed building.
The public duty doctrine involves the intellectually questionable concept that when a governmental body owes a duty to everyone, the result is a duty to no one. See Stone & Rinker, Governmental Liability for Negligent Inspections, 57 Tul.L. Rev. 328 (1982). The immunity for governmental bodies conferred by this doctrine was properly rejected by this court as a categorical rule in Stewart. On the other hand, the Stewart decision did not hold (and we do not here hold) that a governmental body will be liable any time a person's injury could have been prevented by a public official's proper performance of an inspection or similar function. The existence of a duty and the scope of liability resulting from a breach of that duty must be decided according to the facts and circumstances of the particular case. We therefore conclude that governmental agencies in the performance of governmental functions may be subjected to the imposition of certain duties, the breach of which may result in liability for damages to those injured by a risk contemplated by that duty.
The determination whether a particular duty should be imposed on a particular governmental agency is a policy question. A duty may be imposed by legislation or by a rule of law. As to DPS's duty here, the statutory scheme for licensing drivers generally authorizes DPS to investigate drivers and to refuse, suspend or revoke licenses. La.R.S. 32:414. In cases of handicapped persons DPS is further authorized to issue restricted licenses, La.R.S. 32:423, and to compel a licensee to submit to an examination, La.R.S. 32:424. These statutes are couched in terms of grants of authority, but do not contain any specific requirements governing the issuance or denial of licenses to handicapped persons. Nevertheless, rules of reason require DPS, which is charged with the responsibility for issuing or denying licenses, to adopt reasonable procedures to prevent issuance or automatic renewal of the license of a driver whose known physical condition poses a present danger or probable future danger to the motoring public. Moreover, the authority to impose suitable restrictions on handicapped drivers arguably implies a responsibility not to issue a license to a handicapped driver without imposing suitable restrictions when the known probability of significant future danger reasonably dictates such a procedure. -
DPS contends that there are other medical conditions which are as hazardous to driving as seizure disorders and that the magnitude of the licensing operation makes it impossible to monitor the physical condition of licensed drivers. Certainly no licensing agency can be expected to monitor the physical condition of all drivers within its jurisdiction. However, while knowledge of many handicaps does not warrant subsequent monitoring, knowledge of an applicant's seizure disorder should raise a "red flag" for licensing agencies, as was admitted by DPS's field office manager. A licensing agency simply cannot be allowed, when presented with an applicant who has had seizures in the past, who is taking medication to control this condition and whose condition is likely to worsen and become dangerous, to license such an un-fortuante person without restrictions and with automatic right of renewal, thereby turning him loose as a danger to the motoring public forever.
We conclude that DPS has the duty, when it knows that an applicant for a driver's license has a seizure disorder that may be dangerous either at present dr in the future, to adopt reasonable procedures designed to ensure safety on the highways not only in the initial issuance of a license, but also in the continuation of the authority to drive. We further decline to adopt a categorical rule excluding DPS from liability for failure to adopt such procedures.
Breach Element
A handicapped driver whose condition may foreseeably become dangerous can only be licensed safely if adequate provisions are made for subsequent review of the condition. The procedures employed by DPS in licensing handicapped drivers did not provide reasonable safeguards for protecting motorists from the dangers that might result from a foreseeable worsening of the condition. While DPS did demand from initial applicants the medical report required by La.R.S. 32:403.2, the form report did not request the information necessary to determine whether the applicant should be monitored after initial issuance of the license. Also missing from the procedure was a notation on the license of restrictions either requiring periodic reevaluation of a condition which was likely to become dangerous or preventing reis-suance of the license without further review. There was not even a procedure by which handicapped persons were instructed upon receiving a license to report any worsening of the condition. By not implementing any safeguard to alert future licensing officers about nonapparent handicaps, DPS effectively rendered the waiver provisions of La.R.S. 32:403.2 meaningless.
We therefore conclude that DPS breached its duty to adopt reasonable safeguards in licensing drivers with known seizure disorders that foreseeably might worsen so as to cause future dangers to motorists on the highways.
Scope of Protection Element
The final issue is whether the injuries sustained in this case were within the contemplation of the duty discussed above. The question is whether the risk of injury caused by a licensed driver while under the effects of a seizure is within the scope of protection of a rule of law which requires driver's licensing agencies to establish procedures in licensing handicapped drivers to monitor that condition which foreseeably may worsen.
This court has suggested the following approach in cases with more than one cause-in-fact:
The keys for the solution of the issue of responsibility when there is more than one cause-in-fact of damages are (1) a determination of the exact risk or risks anticipated by imposition of the legal duty which has been breached and (2) the legal or policy considerations which grant excuses from certain consequences which follow an act of negligence. This requires, under the facts and the law of each case and the attendant exigencies, a jurisprudential determination which will implement and make effective our broad codal provisions concerning those who should respond in damages for their faults.
Pierre v. Allstate Insurance Co., 257 La. at 499, 242 So.2d at 831.
One cause-in-fact of this accident was the licensing agency's breach of its duty, when issuing a license to a handicapped person with a known seizure disorder which fore-seeably may worsen and make his driving a hazard on the highway, to adopt reasonable procedures for monitoring the continuation of the driver's licensed status. Once this duty has been carefully delineated, it is evident that the principal purpose for imposing such a duty is the protection of other motorists using the highway from injuries caused by a handicapped person while driving under the effect of his worsened condition. The risk that the handicapped driver might harm other motorists while undergoing the effects of his condition was therefore clearly within the scope of protection contemplated by imposition of that duty.
Decree
The judgments of the lower courts are affirmed.
COLE, J., respectfully dissents for reasons assigned.
MARCUS, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
DENNIS, J., dissents with reasons.
. The questions on the form did not include any inquiry of the physician whether follow-up examinations were recommended or whether the applicant had been reliable in taking his medication.
. If the license had contained an "09" restriction, an inquiry to Roberts and his physician as to his condition at the time of renewal presumably would have been made. At the time of renewal Roberts' current medical condition would have precluded issuance of a renewal license.
. Roberts had suffered additional seizures and a worsening of his condition after issuance of the initial license. The doctor who undertook to treat Roberts about the time of the license renewal asserted that he would never have recommended licensing Roberts to drive in 1980.
. As DPS points out, this is the first Louisiana case which has held the state responsible for the actions of a driver licensed by the state. DPS's contentions in this court stress the dramatic effect of this decision on the administration of licensing drivers.
. The authors use the term "proximate cause", rather than "legal cause" for the fourth element. Because of the confusion between proximate cause and cause-in-fact, the term "legal cause" is used in this opinion. Terminology of legal cause in relation to duty is used in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 4, 9, 431 (1965).
. Another technique for determining cause-in-fact is the "substantial factor" inquiry, which is useful when the combined active conduct of two separate parties operates to cause harm. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact, 9 Stan.L. Rev. 60, 88-90 (1956).
. This finding distinguished the present case from Guillot v. Sandoz, 497 So.2d 753 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1986), in which the trial court found on the basis of the defendant's dismal driving record that, more probably than not, he would have been driving even if his license had been suspended. Because of this finding the court concluded in Guillot that DPS's failure to suspend the license was not a cause-in-fact of the accident.
. Although DPS emphasizes that many physical conditions develop after the initial issuance of licenses, the present case does not present that factual situation. Whether DPS has the responsibility to inquire of renewal applicants about substantial changes in their physical condition since the issuance of their last license is a question left for another case.
. According to Policy/Procedure Statement # 10.0, a licensing officer may place an appropriate restriction on a license when reexamination may be needed during the duration of the license.
. Other courts have refused to apply a categorical rule to exclude governmental agencies from liability for negligent issuance or renewal of driver's licenses. Oleszczuk v. Arizona, 124 Ariz. 373, 604 P.2d 637 (1979); Trewin v. California, 198 Cal.Rptr. 263, 150 Cal.App.3d 975 (1984); Pendergrass v. Oregon, Motor Vehicles Division, 74 Or.App. 209, 702 P.2d 444 (1985); Annot., State's Liability to One Injured by Improperly Licensed Driver, 41 ALR 4th 112 (1985).
. La.R.S. 32:403.2 requires a physically handicapped person applying for a license for the first time to attach a medical report by a physician "indicating the severity of his disability and the limitations imposed thereby which might impair the applicant's ability to exercise ordinary and reasonable control in the operation of a motor vehicle". The statute further permits DPS to waive the furnishing of such a report when the handicapped person applies for a renewal license.
. DPS argues that it relies on medical reports in issuing licenses to handicapped drivers and does not follow up unless the medical report recommends such action. However, the medical report form does not request such a recommendation and is seriously deficient in this regard.
. DPS does not dispute that'plaintiffs sustained the damages found by the trial court.
. An example of the use of the scope of protection element to limit the "but for" consequences of a defendant's negligent conduct was Lewis v. Kehoe Academy, 346 So.2d 289 (La.App. 4th Cir.1977). Plaintiffs' small child, while at a day care center, ingested rat poison which exaggerated the appearance of some minor bruises. The juvenile authorities, upon seeing the bruises, sought to remove the child from plaintiffs' custody. The court held that the defendant's duty to prevent young campers from ingesting rat poison did not encompass the risk that, if the poison causes accentuation of subsequently incurred bruises, the juvenile court will reach the erroneous conclusion that the child was neglected.