Case Name: E. B. Wheeler and Josephine and Sarah F. Livingston vs. W. W. Durant and S. M. Stevenson
Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1851-05
Citations: 3 Rich. Eq. 452
Docket Number: 
Parties: E. B. Wheeler and Josephine and Sarah F. Livingston vs. W. W. Durant and S. M. Stevenson.
Judges: Dunkin, Oh., concurred.
Reporter: South Carolina Equity Reports
Volume: 24
Pages: 452–465

Head Matter:
E. B. Wheeler and Josephine and Sarah F. Livingston vs. W. W. Durant and S. M. Stevenson.
S. C., by instrument under her hand and seal, attested by three witnesses, (who subscribed without an attestation clause, and simply after the word “witness,”) and addressed “to all whom it may concern,” gave “in consideration of the natural love and affection which I bear to my grand-children, and others hereinafter men- . tioned, the following pronerty:
“ To Josephine and Sarah L., I'give all the interest I have in the estate of Joseph L. — it consisting principally of a bond for the payment of some fourteen or fifteen hundred dollars, secured by a mortgage of nine negroes.
“ To Laura and Sarah C., viz: to Laura a feather bed and furniture, one set silver teaspoons, and one silver hoop and chain for scissors, and to Sarah, &c.
“ To my daughter P. my wearing apparel and my books.
“ To my daughter M. one feather bed and furniture.
“ And I hereby appoint S. S. and E. W. trustees to this deed, with the full understanding that the above property does not vest in another of the parties until my death.”
Under proceedings in equity to marshal the assets of Joseph L., S. C. purchased some of the mortgaged negroes, and the proceeds of the sale were allowed her on account of the lien of the mortgage; S. C. executed a will, which after her death was admitted to probate, by which she revoked the instrument; the negroes purchased by S. C. went into the possession of defendant as agent of S. C., and, after her death, E. W., as trustee, and the cestuis que trust, Josephine and Sarah L., filed their bill against defendant, without making tire personal representative of S. C. a party, claiming the negroes under the instrument; at the trial the instrument was not produced, and to prove its execution, delivery, loss and contents, O. W.i one of the attesting witnesses, testified, that he saw the instrument executed; that it was subsequently delivered to him by E. W. to be registered — and he referred to the copy on record for its contents; that a day or two before the trial, E. W. told him it was lost, and got him to assist hint to search for it, which search proved ineffectual; Held that plaintiffs were not entitled to recover.
Johnston, Ch., doubted whether the instrument was testamentary; heheld, 1st. that the plaintiffs’s remedy, if they had any, was against the personal representative of S. C. for the money collected on the bond; 2d, that the delivery and loss of the instrument were not proved.
Wardlaw and Dunkin, CC., held that the instrument was testamentary, and had been revoked; — they thought the delivery and loss sufiiciently proved.
Dargan, Ch., doubted whether the instrument was testamentary; he thought the delivery proved prima facie, and held, 1st. that the proof of loss was insufficient; 2d. that plaintiffs’s remedy was against the personal representative oí S. C., and not againstt he defendant.
Before Johnston, Ch., at Marion, February, 1851.
Johnston, Ch. On the 7th of October, 1843, one Sarah Conner executed the following instrument, to wit:
South Carolina, Marion District.
To all whom it may concern, I, Sarah Conner, do hereby, in consideration of the natural love and affection which I bear to my grandchildren, and others hereinafter mentioned, give the following property:
To Josephine Livingston and Sarah Franklin Livingston, I give all the interest I have in the estate of Joseph Livingston,— it consisting principally of a bond for the payment of some fourteen or fifteen hundred dollars, secured by a mortgage of nine negroes:
To Laura D. Conner and Sarah C. Conner, viz: to Laura a feather bed and furniture, one set silver teaspoons, and one silver hoop and chain for scissors, and to Sarah, &c.;
To my daughter Picket, my wearing apparel and my books :
To my daughter Mary Eliza Picket, one feather bed and furniture ;
And I hereby appoint Samuel M. Stevenson and E. B. Wheeler, trustees to this deed, with the full understanding that the above property does not vest in another of the (probably any of the) parties until my death.
Witness my hand and seal 7th of Oct. 1843.
Sarah Conner, [l.s.J
Witness^ — M. C. Durant, O. P. Wheeler, E. B. Wheeler.
Sarah Conner is now dead ; but during her life time, under proceedings in this court, a certain portion of the negroes mortgaged by Joseph Livingston as aforesaid, now amounting to seven, were sold to satisfy said mortgage and the demands of all of his creditors, and were bid off by her, and are now in the hands of the defendant, Durant, as her agent.
The bill is against Durant, setting up a claim to the said ne-groes, under the aforesaid instrument, on behalf of Josephine and Sarah F. Livingston.
If the instrument is testamentary, it has not been admitted to probate ; and besides, it is revoked by a will, executed by Sarah Conner the 15th of July, 1844, which has been admitted to probate. But the plaintiffs contend that it is not testamentary, but on the contrary, that it is a deed, and is to he allowed as such, under the authority of Dawson vs. Dawson, and Jaggers vs. Estes.
The first difficulty of the plaintiffs is, that the deed, if it be such, is not duly proved. The original is not produced ; and, in order to let in secondary proof, it is necessary to prove its loss, as well as its execution and contents. The only witness to this point is O. P. Wheeler, who states that he saw it executed, and that it was subsequently delivered to him by E. B. Wheeler to be registered ; and he refers to the copy on record for its contents. This may suffice if the deed is proved to be lost. But all that the witness can say on that subject is, that a day or two before the hearing, E. B. Wheeler told him it was lost, and got him to assist him to search for it, which search proved ineffectual. The proof of loss is manifestly nothing but the declaration of E. B. Wheeler.
Suppose this difficulty overcome ; the next thing incumbent upon the plaintiffs, is to show that the instrument was intended as a deed. An instrument purporting to be a deed may have a present operation to pass the right to property, though it provided that the enjoyment of the property shall be postponed to a future time.
In Dawson vs. Dawson and in Jaggers vs. Estes, it was held, that the postponing of the enjoyment till the death of the donor does not render the instrument testamentary, if, upon its face, or from the circumstances, it was intended to operate in 'presentí, and not to remain ambulatory.
The difference between a deed and a will is not exactly what it is stated to be in Welch and Kinard. It is there intimated, that the proper definition of a will is, the declaration of a party as to what is to be done with his property after his death. But a better definition, is the declaration of a party, made by an instrument intended to be ambulatory and revocable, as to the disposition of his property after his death. A deed may declaie how the property is to be enjoyed after the death of the grantor, and such a deed is, according to our decisions, as effectual as one which gives present enjoyment. It is a deed and not a testament, if the instrument is intended to have a present and not a future operation ; if it is intended to pass the right in presentí ; to be a perfected and executed contract, — and. not revocable or ambulatory.
But here the witness says he heard nothing from Mrs. Conner at the execution of this paper, showing her intention in respect to it. He saw her subscribe, and he and the other witnesses attested. He says nothing about the delivery. The paper itself does not contain any thing on the subject of delivery.
Then the provisions of the instrument are generally of a testamentary character. It is not usual for persons to give their wearing apparel while yet alive. Besides, the idea that a right to the property is to pass presently is expressly negatived on the face of the paper. Again; does not the number of attesting witnesses countenance the idea that the paper was regarded as a will? These are not all the difficulties of the plaintiffs. What is given by this instrument is not the negroes, but the bond with the collateral security of the mortgage: a debt on Livingston who was then alive.
The most that can be made of the paper is, that it is an assignment of the bond. Mrs. Conner subsequently collected the debt; and if the plaintiffs have any claims, it is against her personal representative for money received to their use; and perhaps to have the slaves declared liable as collateral security for the amount. The personal representative is not before the Court, and it is not necessary to say what right might be established against him; but I doubt whether Mrs. Conner’s estate could be made liable for the debt collected by her, to parties who claim as mere volunteers.
It is ordered that the bill be dismissed.
The complainants appealed, on the following grounds:
1. Because the instrument of writing was a deed and not a will.
2. Because O. P. Wheeler, a subscribing witness, proved that it had been executed in his presence; that he afterwards, at the instance of Edward B. Wheeler, the trustee, who had it in his possession, recorded the same in the Register’s Office of Marion, which was evidence of delivery.
3. Because the loss of the instrument was proved by O. P. Wheeler, who searched with his father, Edward B. Wheeler, amongst his papers, and testified that it could not be found; and because the contents were fully proved by the said O. P. Wheeler.
4. Because the aforesaid instrument having conveyed a bond and mortgage, which was paid in part by the purchase of the negroes sued for in this case, the negroes stand in the place of the bond, especially as they were mortgaged to secure its payment, and may be followed in this Court as the property of the complainants, to which they have a legal title, having been purchased with their funds and under the mortgage conveyed to them. Their title is legal, not equitable merely, because their estate in the aforesaid bond and mortgage is a vested remainder after the life estate of Mrs. Sarah Conner the donor, which life estate had terminated before this suit was commenced.
5. Because their title being legal, the complainants had a right to sue the holder of the negroes alone for them, without making the person, from whom or under whom he holds, a party ■ and because there was no objection made by the pleadings to want of proper parties.
6. Because the circuit Chancellor having indicated that the remedy of the complainants is at law, against the personal representative of Mrs. Sarah Conner, for money had and received to their use, in case the aforesaid instrument be a deed, it is necessary, in order to entitle the complainants to proceed at law, that the decree of the circuit Chancellor should be reversed as to the testamentary character of the said instrument; otherwise such decree would be a bar at law, as res judicata.
Miller, for complainants.
Phillips, contra.
2 Rice Eq. 34.
2 Strob. Eq. 278.
Sp. Eq. 256.

Opinion:
Johnston, Ch.,
announced the judgment of the Court.
I must acknowledge that I am, in some degree, shaken in my impressions as to the testamentary character of this instrument: but not sufficiently, to enable me to declare the decree, upon that point, erroneous.
But the other grounds upon which the decree is put are sufficient to show its correctness.
The gift is of the bond, as a debt, and of the mortgage, — as an incident, — to enforce its collection.
If, as is argued, the negroes were purchased by Mrs. Connor with the bond, (which is not the case.) it may be true that a trust resulted to the plaintiffs, to have the negroes declared to stand as a substitute of the capital employed; or to have the capital, itself, at their election : but such a decree could not be made, unless upon bill directly for that purpose against the party who converted- the capital, or her legal representative.
The ground that the loss of the instrument was not established, so as to let in secondary proof of the instrument, is, also, quite satisfactory to me. The doctrine is not novel or doubtful. All our decisions are one way on the subject, from Sims vs. Sims, (2 Mill, 225,) to Wardlaw vs. Gray, (Dud. Eq. 85,) and even down to the last term of this Court, as may be seen in the case of Gibson vs. McCully, not yet reported.
The loss in this case depends exclusively upon the assertion of E. B. Wheeler, one of the plaintiffs in the cause ; and unless the fact of loss, unlike all other facts, is to be made out by mere statements, there was no foundation laid for letting in secondary evidence. The frauds that may be accomplished by withholding original papers, and resorting to secondary proof, need not be suggested. The hardships complained of, of shutting out parol evidence, unless upon regular proof of loss of written instru ments, would soon be transferred to the shoulders of the opposite party, if proof of the loss were dispensed with.
I am of opinion that the decree should be affirmed, and the appeal dismissed ; and such being the opinion of the majority of the Court, (though upon grounds somewhat differing,) it is so ordered.