Case Name: Barry BARD, Appellant, v. Judith A. WOLSON, Chairman, Florida Parole Commission, et al., Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1996-12-02
Citations: 687 So. 2d 254
Docket Number: No. 96-1822
Parties: Barry BARD, Appellant, v. Judith A. WOLSON, Chairman, Florida Parole Commission, et al., Appellee.
Judges: MINER and LAWRENCE, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 687
Pages: 254–256

Head Matter:
Barry BARD, Appellant, v. Judith A. WOLSON, Chairman, Florida Parole Commission, et al., Appellee.
No. 96-1822.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Dec. 2, 1996.
Order Denying Rehearing Feb. 4, 1997.
Barry Bard, Bonifay, Pro Se.
Kurt E. Ahrendt, Assistant General Counsel, Florida Parole Commission, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

Opinion:
ALLEN, Judge.
The appellant challenges an order of the trial court by which his petition for a writ of habeas corpus was denied. Because the trial court denied the petition without giving the appellant an opportunity to contest the response, we reverse.
Following the revocation of the appellant's conditional release, he filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus by which he challenged the legality of his detention. The trial court found the petition facially sufficient and issued an order to show cause. After receiving a written response with attachments from the Florida Parole Commission (the commission), the trial court denied the petition.
On appeal, the appellant has attacked the procedure employed by the trial court in disposing of his petition. The appellant contends that the trial court was obligated to issue the writ once it determined that his petition stated a prima facie case. He also contends that he should have been allowed to reply to the commission's response.
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.630 and Chapter 79, Florida Statutes, specify the procedure to be followed in habeas corpus proceedings before the trial court. Under chapter 79 and rule 1.630, if the complaint (i.e., the petition for the writ), states prima facie grounds for relief, the trial court must issue the writ. Issuance of the writ is the vehicle which acknowledges the facial sufficiency of the complaint and triggers the necessity of a response (also called "the return"). Although Rule 1.630 does not provide for the petitioner to reply to the response, section 79.04(2) recognizes the right of the petitioner to file a motion to quash the return, or a motion to discharge notwithstanding the return. The supreme court has explained the petitioner's options as follows:
[A]fter the respondent has filed his return, the petitioner may present exceptions raising questions of law; he may traverse the facts set forth in the return; he may allege facts not appearing in the petition or return that may be material in the case; or he may adopt his petition as a traverse of the return.
Sneed v. Mayo, 66 So.2d 865, 870 (Fla.1953).
Once the respondent has filed its response and the petitioner has replied thereto, the court "may examine into the cause of the imprisonment or detention, receive evidence in contradiction of the return, and determine it as the truth of the case requires." § 79.06(1). The court then determines the legality of the detention and "shall either discharge the prisoner, admit him or her to bail or remand him or her to custody, as the law and evidence require." § 79.08.
In the present case, the trial court seemed to be following to some extent the habeas corpus procedure set out in Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.100, which specifically authorizes the court to issue an order to show cause if it finds the petition demonstrates a preliminary basis for relief. But rule 9.100(i) specifically authorizes a petitioner to serve a reply and supplemental appendix, which the court did not permit in this case.
We perceive no prejudice to the appellant in the trial court having issued the show cause order rather than the writ, since either would have required the commission to respond to the appellant's petition. But the appellant might have been prejudiced by the trial court's failure to either conduct a hearing or otherwise permit the appellant to reply to the response. We accordingly reverse the order and remand for further proceedings in which the appellant is provided an opportunity to reply to the response.
MINER and LAWRENCE, JJ., concur.