Case Name: Fierro, Appellant, v. Williamsport
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1956-03-13
Citations: 384 Pa. 568
Docket Number: Appeal, No. 44
Parties: Fierro, Appellant, v. Williamsport.
Judges: Before Stern/ C. J., Stearne,'Jones/Chidsby, Musmanno and Arnold, JJi
Reporter: Pennsylvania State Reports
Volume: 384
Pages: 568–574

Head Matter:
Fierro, Appellant, v. Williamsport.
Argued January 10, 1956.'
Before Stern/ C. J., Stearne,'Jones/Chidsby, Musmanno and Arnold, JJi
Patrick E. Fierro> appellant, in propria persona.
Charles Bidelspacher, Jr., City Solicitor, with him Charles A. Szybist and Bidelspacher & Bidelspacher, for appellee.
March 13, 1956:

Opinion:
Opinion by
Me. Justice Arnold,
This was a complaint in equity seeking to enjoin the City of Williamsport from enforcing its ordinance levying a tax on the privilege and transaction of engaging in the operation of mechanical or electronic phonographs (juke boxes) played by persons who inserted coins into the machines. Plaintiff appeals from the decree of the court below dismissing the complaint.
The pertinent provision of the city's ordinance reads as follows: "Section 2: (a) 'Admission' shall mean monetary charge of any character whatever, charged or paid for the privilege of engaging in amusements as hereinafter .defined, (b) 'Amusement' shall mean all manner and form of entertainment within the City of Williamsport, Pa., including among others, the following: juke boxes, pinball machines, and any other form Of mechanical and/or electronic device for which, admission is charged or paid."
The'authority for the ordinance is the so-called "tax anything" Act of 1947, P. L. 1145, as amended, 53 PS §2015.1. The "tax anything" Act is similar to the Sterling Act and a similar ordinance of Philadelphia was sustained in Phonograph Operators Association v. City of Philadelphia, 54 D. & C. 83.
Obviously and literally, the word "amusement," includes juke boxes or any other form of mechanical or electronic device for which admission is charged or paid. Admittedly the ordinance, section 2 (a), provides that admission shall mean a monetary charge of any character whatsoever charged for engaging in the amusement as defined. The ordinance clearly contemplates taxation of these juke boxes. The tax was not upon a "place of amusement" but upon the privilege of engaging in amusement as defined in section 2 (b) of the ordinance. The ordinance in its title gave notice of defined meanings thereafter set forth and is unimpeachable.
Decree affirmed; appellant to pay the costs.