Case Name: Bruce Douglas ANDERSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1989-10-05
Citations: 549 So. 2d 807
Docket Number: No. 87-1835
Parties: Bruce Douglas ANDERSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: COBB, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 549
Pages: 807–814

Head Matter:
Bruce Douglas ANDERSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 87-1835.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Oct. 5, 1989.
James Gibson, Public Defender, and Barbara L. Condon, Asst. Public Defender, Daytona Beaeh> for appellant,
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Belle B. Turner, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
PER CURIAM.
We grant appellee's motion for rehearing, withdraw our prior opinion, and in its place, issue the following.
Anderson appeals from his convictions on four counts of engaging in sexual activity with his stepdaughter, a child under eighteen years of age, with whom he stood in a position of familial or custodial authority. We agree that one conviction should be reversed because the child was unable to testify with certainty that Anderson abused her on or between December 4 and December 9, 1985, as was specified in the amended information. We remand this cause for resentencing on the three remaining convictions and direct that the trial court provide for a procedure to determine the amounts to be ordered in restitution in the future for the child's rehabilitation and therapy, in view of Anderson's ability to pay the sums to be required.
Anderson argues that the three remaining counts of sexual battery should be reversed for new trial because the state introduced at trial evidence that Anderson prostituted his stepdaughter to other men, that he sexually abused her almost every day or night for six years since she was nine years old, and that Anderson sexually abused his sister some eighteen years before the trial. We think all of this claimed improper Williams Rule evidence provides no basis for reversal on appeal because no objection was made to its admission at trial. Steinhorst v. State, 412 So.2d 332 (Fla.1982).
In this case the state filed a notice of intent to offer specified Williams Rule evidence some two months before trial: that for six years (commencing when the child was nine years old) Anderson had vaginal, anal, and oral intercourse with her on an almost daily basis; that he prostituted her to other men; and that he sexually'abused his sister some eighteen years prior to the date of the trial. On the first day of the trial, the defense filed a motion in limine as to the proposed Williams Rule evidence, alleging the acts were not sufficiently similar nor specifically described and too remote in time. Prior to commencement of the proceedings before the jury, the trial judge apparently was not asked to rule on the motion.
During the state's opening argument, defense counsel objected to the prosecutor's reference to the collateral evidence. At a bench conference, the trial judge denied defense counsel's motion in limine. Later in the trial when testimony about the collateral crimes was given by Anderson's stepdaughter and sister, no objections were raised by the defense. Further, much of the child's testimony about being prostituted to other men was brought out by defense counsel on cross-examination.
Defense counsel's contemporary objection to the testimony when it is offered at trial is essential to raise the propriety of its admission on appeal. The controlling law is clearly stated in Correll v. State, 523 So.2d 562 (Fla.1988), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 183, 102 L.Ed.2d 152 (1988). The Court held:
Even when a prior motion in limine has been denied, the failure to object at the time collateral crime evidence is intro duced waives the issue for appellate review. Phillips v. State, 476 So .2d 194 (Fla.1985); German v. State, 379 So.2d 1013 (Fla. 4th DCA), cert. denied, 388 So.2d 1113 (Fla.1980).
Correll at 566. Because the evidence against Anderson in this case was overwhelming, we reject any suggestion that the admission of any of the claimed erroneously admitted Williams Rule evidence constituted fundamental error. Craig v. State, 510 So.2d 857 (Fla.1987).
We agree that the sister's testimony was properly admitted under the dictates of Heuring v. State, 513 So.2d 122 (Fla. 1987). These collateral events involving Anderson's sister took place nineteen years before the trial, but those in the Heuring case took place twenty years prior to the trial. With regard to the argument that the abuse of the sister was too remote in time, the court in Heuring noted:
[T]he opportunity to sexually batter young children in the familial setting often occurs only generationally. Heuring sexually battered the young female members of his family when the opportunity arose.... We agree with the district court that the passage of time in this instance did not affect the reliability of the evidence.
Indeed, Anderson's sexual advances against his sister were not successful. The sister was twelve when he abused her; the stepdaughter was fourteen when the acts charged under the indictment took place and nine when the pattern of abuse began. However, exact identity or similarity of crimes is not a requirement under Heuring v. State, 513 So.2d 122 (Fla.1987). The court said:
[S]ome courts have in effect relaxed the strict standard normally applicable to similar fact evidence. These courts have allowed evidence of a parent's sexual battery on another family member as relevant to modus operandi, scheme, plan, or design. We find that the better approach treats similar fact evidence as simply relevant to corroborate the victim's testimony, and recognizes that in such cases the evidence's probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect.
Heuring at 124-125.
Accordingly, we affirm Anderson's conviction on counts II, III and V, and reverse his conviction on count VI. We remand for resentencing on those three counts, as specified in this opinion.
AFFIRM in part; REVERSE in part and REMAND for resentencing.
COBB, J., concurs.
SHARP, J., concurs and concurs specially with opinion.
COWART, J., dissents with opinion.
. Section 794.041(2)(b), Florida Statutes, makes it a first degree felony for any person who stands in a position of familial or custodial authority over a child between the ages of twelve and eighteen to engage in sexual activity with such child.
. § 948.03(l)(e), Fla.Stat. (1985); McCaskill v. State, 520 So.2d 664 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); James v. State, 499 So.2d 24 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Goodling v. State, 482 So.2d 594 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); Ballance v. State, 447 So.2d 974 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
. Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.1959); cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959); see also § 90.404(2)(a), Fla.Stat. (1985).
. For example, on cross-examination, the child said Anderson told her he was going to put her in a lock-house in Louisiana when she turned sixteen, to be a whore; and he told her he was a "voyeur," "whatever that is." The court said, "I didn't understand that." Defense counsel obligingly repeated it.