Case Name: CARDEN v. CARDEN
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 2004-03-08
Citations: 266 Ga. App. 149
Docket Number: A03A1903
Parties: CARDEN v. CARDEN.
Judges: Eldridge, J., concurs. Mikell, J., concurs specially.
Reporter: Georgia Appeals Reports
Volume: 266
Pages: 149–154

Head Matter:
A03A1903.
CARDEN v. CARDEN.
(596 SE2d 686)

Opinion:
JOHNSON, Presiding Judge.
This case is a continuation of a family dispute involving assets of Lois Carden. Lois Carden was previously held incompetent, with the result that various deeds she executed were set aside by the court in a separate suit between Robert Carden and Elvis Carden, Lois Carden's sons. A consent order entered into in 1998 dissolved Robert Carden's responsibility for the management of Lois Carden's affairs and placed certain duties on each party, including a duty for Robert Carden to pay Lois Carden $250 per month for as long as she lives. The same order also involved the transfer of real properties between the parties. Lois Carden has apparently now regained her competence and is no longer under the court-ordered guardianship.
Lois Carden filed this contempt action against Robert Carden, claiming he was past due on monthly payments due to her under the 1998 order. She also claimed Robert Carden had refused to deliver title to a specific piece of property, as required by the 1998 order. Robert Carden denied that he owed any money and counterclaimed, urging the court to find Lois Carden in contempt for refusing to subordinate her interest in a second piece of property, as required by the 1998 order.
Following a hearing, the trial court found that Lois Carden's credibility was undermined and that she was guilty of "unclean hands" and could not invoke the equitable remedy of contempt with respect to Robert Carden's failure to deliver title to a specific piece of property as required by the 1998 order. With respect to the monthly payments owed under the 1998 order, the trial court found that Robert Carden was not guilty of contempt. The court further found that Robert Carden was entitled to a set-off against the monthly amount he owed Lois Carden for payments he made for Lois Carden's debts. The trial court then instructed the attorneys to report back to the court what documents were necessary to complete all transfers of real property as ordered in 1998.
Lois Carden contends the trial court erred in considering Robert Carden's counterclaim for contempt, in allowing Robert Carden a set-off for amounts owed under the 1998 order, in attempting to enforce the 1998 order, and in modifying the 1998 order. Lois Carden does not appeal the trial court's finding that Robert Carden was not in contempt of the 1998 order, and therefore the issue of Robert Carden's purported contempt is not before this Court.
1. Lois Carden argues that the trial court erred in considering Robert Carden's counterclaim for contempt because a counterclaim cannot be filed in response to a motion for contempt. We are constrained to agree.
The contempt remedy is part of the judiciary's inherent power to enforce its orders. As such, an action for contempt is ancillary to the primary action and is characterized as a motion and not a pleading. Because a contempt action is not a new civil action, many provisions of the Civil Practice Act do not apply, and the Supreme Court of Georgia has consistently held that a party may not file a counterclaim in response to a motion for contempt. While it would seem in the interest of judicial economy that the trial court could treat the counterclaim as a separate motion for contempt, Robert Carden has not cited any authority, and we can locate no authority, permitting the trial court to treat the counterclaim in this manner. Therefore, it was error for the trial court to consider Robert Carden's counterclaim in the context of Lois Carden's motion for contempt. Robert Carden must file a separate action for contempt. The trial court's order as it relates to Robert Carden's counterclaim to hold Lois Carden in contempt for failing to subordinate her interest in a piece of property, as well as the trial court's efforts in its order to make Lois Carden comply with the 1998 order, are hereby reversed.
2. Lois Carden also argues that the trial court erred in allowing Robert Carden a set-off against his arrearages for expenses he incurred which were not addressed in the 1998 order. We agree with Lois Carden's analysis that a plea for set-off is a plea for affirmative relief and not a defense. The case of Baer v. Baer is directly on point and precludes assertion of a claim for set-off made in a counterclaim to a motion for contempt. On the other hand, a judgment which is right for any reason will be affirmed.
A close reading of the trial court's order of December 13, 2002, reveals that the court did not award Robert Carden any money on his claim for set-off. The court does mention the set-off and says that "therefore" the respondent is not in contempt. But the court later says that Lois Carden was "guilty of unclean hands" and therefore "not entitled to invoke the equitable remedy of contempt." This independent ground for the court's declining to find Robert Carden in contempt does not depend on the claimed set-off, but on defenses legitimately raised in Robert Carden's answer. The trial court ruled that Robert Carden was not in contempt, and Lois Carden does not appeal that finding. Therefore, we affirm that portion of the judgment, which renders this enumeration of error moot.
3. Lois Carden contends the trial court improperly modified the 1998 judgment. However, the 2002 order merely clarified, rather than modified, the prior order. The portions of the 2002 order appointing an escrow agent and apportioning costs were well within the court's discretion in enforcing its order. But, as we stated in Division 1, the court presumably would not have required Lois Carden's counsel to prepare real estate documents if the court had not considered the affirmative counterclaims brought by Robert Carden. Thus, those portions of the order which mandate future action, as distinguished from those finding Robert Carden not to be in contempt, must be reversed.
4. Lois Carden contends the trial court erred in attempting to enforce the 1998 order because that order had been nullified by a 2001 order. However, this enumeration of error is confusing because Lois Carden initiated the present action by arguing that Robert Carden was in contempt of the 1998 order — the order she suddenly claims was nullified. Lois Carden cannot have it both ways. She cannot argue that Robert Carden is in contempt of the 1998 order, and at the same time argue that she cannot be held in contempt of the 1998 order because it has been nullified.
Moreover, a review of both the 1998 and 2001 orders reveals that the 2001 order does not nullify the 1998 order. The 2001 order merely sets aside certain transactions because, at the time, Lois Carden did not possess the mental capacity to enter into the transactions. The 2001 order does not refer to the 1998 order and, certainly, does not nullify the 1998 order. This enumeration of error lacks merit.
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Eldridge, J., concurs. Mikell, J., concurs specially.
See In re Siemon, 264 Ga. 641 (1) (449 SE2d 832) (1994).
See Brown v. King, 266 Ga. 890, 891 (1) (472 SE2d 65) (1996); Phillips v. Brown, 263 Ga. 50, 51 (2) (426 SE2d 866) (1993).
See Baer v. Baer, 263 Ga. 574, 575 (1) (436 SE2d 6) (1993); see also Brown, supra; Phillips, supra.
See Charles S. Martin Distrib. Co. v. Bernhardt Furniture Co., 213 Ga. App. 481, 484 (5) (445 SE2d 297) (1994); see also Stewart v. Stewart, 236 Ga. App. 348, 349 (1) (511 SE2d 919) (1999).
Supra.
See Jones v. Trussell, 221 Ga. 271, 273 (144 SE2d 344) (1965).
See Opatut v. Guest Pond Club, 254 Ga. 258, 260 (5) (327 SE2d 487) (1985) (court may clarify but not modify orders).
Id.
See Davis v. Davis, 230 Ga. 33 (195 SE2d 440) (1973).