Case Name: King BROOKS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1997-12-23
Citations: 703 So. 2d 504
Docket Number: No. 96-1771
Parties: King BROOKS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: PADOVANO, J., concurs. '
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 703
Pages: 504–511

Head Matter:
King BROOKS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 96-1771.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Dec. 23, 1997.
Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Michael A. Wasserman, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Diane D. Starke, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

Opinion:
ALLEN, Judge.
In this direct criminal appeal, the appellant challenges his conviction for burglary of a dwelling. Because the trial judge failed to conduct any inquiry pursuant to Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), when he permitted the appellant to conduct a portion of his defense at trial, we reverse the appellant's conviction and remand this ease for a new trial. Payne v. State, 642 So.2d 111 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).
Prior to trial, the trial judge granted the appellant's motion to be appointed as trial co-counsel. On the day of jury selection, the appellant requested that his court-appointed counsel be discharged due to ineffectiveness. The judge inquired into the appellant's reasons and ultimately denied the motion. The jury was selected that day, and the trial was held the following day. The appellant delivered the opening statement and his court-appointed counsel handled the record portion of the remainder of the proceeding.
On appeal the appellant raises two issues, contending that the trial judge conducted an inadequate hearing when the appellant moved to dismiss his court-appointed attorney due to ineffectiveness, and that the trial judge erred in failing to conduct an inquiry when he granted the appellant's request to act as co-counsel. Although we conclude that the first contention is without merit, the record supports the appellant's assertion that the trial judge did not conduct an adequate inquiry pursuant to Faretta when he granted the appellant's motion to act as co-counsel. Further, federal caselaw and our opinion in Payne require reversal upon this point.
The problems associated with hybrid representation are legion in the cases. For this reason, hybrid representation, such as the arrangement that occurred in the present case, is generally disfavored. The United States Supreme Court has expressly recognized that "Faretta does not require a trial judge to permit 'hybrid' representation." McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 183, 104 S.Ct. 944, 953, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984). Nonetheless, it generally has been found to be within a trial judge's discretion to permit it. See, e.g., United States v. Kimmel, 672 F.2d 720 (1982).
Describing hybrid representation as "[o]ne of the most difficult and confusing components of the right to self-representation," one commentator has nonetheless noted that there are several "well-adhered to rules" followed by the courts. Among them is that "where a trial court does allow hybrid representation, the court must obtain a valid waiver of counsel from the defendant." See John F. Decker, The Sixth Amendment Right to Shoot Oneself in the Foot: An Assessment of the Guarantee of Self-Representation Twenty Years After Faretta, 6 Seton Hall Const. L.J. 483, 537-540 (1996). As explained by the Ninth Circuit:
When the accused assumes functions that are at the core of the lawyer's traditional role . he will often undermine his own defense. Because he has a constitutional right to have his lawyer perform core functions, he must knowingly and intelligently waive that right. This holding is a logical extension of the well-established rule that a waiver is required despite the presence of a court appointed advisor.
Kimmel, 672 F.2d at 721; see also, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 113 F.3d 1136 (10th Cir.1997); State v. Penson, 630 So.2d 274 (La.Ct.App.1993).
Thus, while certainly within his discretion, the trial judge in this case was in no sense obligated to grant the appellant's motion to serve as co-counsel. Had he simply denied the motion, the appellant would have had no grounds to complain, and no Faretta warnings would have been required in the absence of an unequivocal request for self-representation. See Bell v. State, 699 So.2d 674 (Fla.1997); Cason v. State, 652 So.2d 1191 (Fla. 3d DCA1995).
However, in this case, unlike in either Bell or Cason, the trial judge did grant the appellant's motion to serve as co-counsel, and the appellant in fact did conduct a "core function" of a lawyer. The trial judge should therefore have conducted a Faretta inquiry and obtained a knowing and intelligent waiver of the appellant's right to counsel. Such was required under the prevailing majority view in the United States and under our opinion in Payne.
In Payne, the trial judge denied Payne's motion to discharge his court-appointed attorney and proceed pro se, but appointed Payne as co-counsel. Payne then conducted the entire trial and was convicted. We reversed because the record did not reveal that Payne made a knowing and intelligent decision to represent himself. 642 So.2d at 113. While superficially distinguishable from the case at bar, a careful reading of Payne and the cases cited therein reveals that, after careful consideration of the cases and underlying policies, we adopted a bright-line rule requiring a trial judge to administer Faretta warnings whenever a defendant undertakes a portion of his defense:
Some courts have concluded that when a defendant proceeds in a hybrid fashion the trial court need not conduct the same inquiry as required when the defendant proceeds pro se without the assistance of counsel. See, e.g., West Virginia v. Layton, 189 W.Va. 470, 432 S.E.2d 740 (1993) and cases cited therein. Some courts have advocated that an appellate court may retroactively determine to what extent a defendant participated in his own defense, Parren v. State, 309 Md. 260, 523 A.2d 597 (1987). We believe, however, the better standard is to require that the trial court give the same warnings to a defendant who has standby counsel as to one who does not. The reason for this conclusion is that at the time the trial court is faced with the request from the defendant to represent himself, the court cannot predict how much of his own defense a defendant will conduct; therefore the court cannot predict how much of his right to counsel a defendant will waive. The only way for a trial court to ensure that a defendant is adequately informed of the risks he undertakes in representing himself when the defendant proceeds to trial with co-counsel or standby counsel is to inform the defendant at the beginning of the trial of the dangers of self-representation.
Id. at 113. One of the cases relied upon in Payne was Penson, a case virtually indistinguishable from the present case. In Penson, as in the present ease, the defendant was granted co-counsel status prior to trial, and although he likewise attempted to discharge his court-appointed counsel, when that motion was denied he proceeded to trial without ever making an unequivocal request to represent himself. At trial, he delivered part of the opening statement, asked some questions in cross-examination of two state witnesses and partially argued some legal issues; his court-appointed attorney handled the remainder of the trial. The court reversed his conviction, finding that he had performed several functions of an attorney, and thus, despite the lack of an unequivocal demand for self-representation, the trial judge should have warned him of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation and determined whether his waiver of counsel was voluntary and intelligent. Id. at 278.
We are persuaded of the wisdom and forethought of Payne by the factual situation in the present case. When the trial judge appointed the appellant "co-counsel," he was only contemplating that the appellant would do a little research in the law library while he was in jail. Such an innocent accommodation of the appellant's desire hardly seems worthy of an extended lecture on the wisdom of self-representation. However, as it turns out, the appellant actually did more than just research; he filed pretrial motions and he gave the opening statement at his trial, unquestionable "core functions" of an attorney. See Kimmel; Penson. As was indicated in Payne, the appellant's right to Faretta warnings could have been easily satisfied had the trial court complied with Faretta before authorizing any acts of self-representation. And, if such warnings had been given, the appellant's misguided attempt at self-representation might have been avoided.
The appellant's conviction is reversed and the case is remanded.
PADOVANO, J., concurs. '
MINER, J., dissents with written opinion.