Case Name: R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. Diane SCHLEIDER, etc., Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2018-12-26
Citations: 273 So. 3d 63
Docket Number: No. 3D15-1634
Parties: R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY, Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
v.
Diane SCHLEIDER, etc., Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Judges: Before ROTHENBERG, C.J., and EMAS and LOGUE, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Third Series
Volume: 273
Pages: 63–92

Head Matter:
R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY, Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
v.
Diane SCHLEIDER, etc., Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
No. 3D15-1634
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Opinion filed December 26, 2018
Rehearing Denied February 14, 2019
King & Spalding LLP, and William L. Durham II, Chad A. Peterson, Val Leppert (Atlanta, Georgia), and Scott M. Edson and Ashley C. Parrish (Washington, DC); Carlton Fields Jorden Burt, P.A., and Benjamine Reid, Douglas J. Chumbley, Jeffrey A. Cohen, and Olga M. Vieira, for appellant/cross-appellee.
Alex Alvarez ; Gary M. Paige (Davie, Florida); The Mills Firm, P.A., and John S. Mills and Courtney Brewer (Tallahassee), for appellee/cross-appellant.
Before ROTHENBERG, C.J., and EMAS and LOGUE, JJ.

Opinion:
LOGUE, J.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company appeals the final judgment entered in favor of Diane Schleider, the wife and personal representative of the Estate of Andrew Schleider, and Suzanne LeMehaute, their daughter. We affirm and write only to address R.J. Reynolds' challenge to the closing arguments and the size of the damage awards.
Background
Andrew Schleider, a cigarette smoker, died from lung cancer and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. His wife sued R.J. Reynolds for wrongful death in her capacity as personal representative of his estate alleging she and their daughter were statutory survivors within the meaning of Florida's Wrongful Death Act. The complaint alleged the father was a member of the class created in Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So.2d 1246 (Fla. 2006). Under Engle, if the plaintiff qualifies as a member of the class, certain facts are found against the defendant tobacco company as a matter of res judicata without the need of further proof.
One of the prerequisites for Engle class membership is that the decedent's disease manifested on or before November 21, 1996. Id. at 1275. The issue of when the father's disease manifested was one of the main issues at trial and the jury's finding in favor of the wife and daughter is challenged on appeal, but we affirm that point without discussion.
The trial spanned nearly three weeks. In addition to the evidence presented at trial, the jury was instructed on specific findings it must apply if, as occurred, Mr. Schleider was found to be a member of the Engle class. The instructions read to the jury were:
1. Smoking cigarettes causes lung cancer.
2. Cigarettes that contain nicotine are addictive.
3. Defendant, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, placed cigarettes on the market that were defective and unreasonably dangerous.
4. Defendant, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, concealed or omitted material information not otherwise known or available knowing that the material was false and misleading or failed to disclose a material fact concerning the health effects or addictive nature of smoking cigarettes or both.
5. Defendant, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, entered into an agreement with other companies and industry organizations to conceal or omit information regarding the health effects of cigarettes or their addictive nature with the intention that smokers and the public would rely on this information to their detriment. Those companies include Philip Morris, USA, Inc., Lorillard Tobacco Company, Lorillard, Inc., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation, individually and as a successor by merger to the American Tobacco Company, and Liggett Group, Inc. The industry organizations are the Council for Tobacco Research USA, Inc., and the Tobacco Institute, Inc.
Defendant R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company was negligent. These findings may not be denied or questioned and they may carry - they must carry the same weight they would have if you had determined them yourselves.
.
The findings may not be considered in any way when determining whether punitive damages may be warranted. You must make your determination regarding whether punitive may be warranted based only upon the factual evidence presented to you in the trial.
(Emphasis added). These instructions specified that R.J. Reynolds intentionally concealed facts regarding the dangers and addictive qualities of cigarettes.
Evidence was presented throughout the trial indicating the tobacco industry spent approximately $250 billion dollars between 1940 and 2005 to promote and advertise cigarettes. The jury also heard evidence regarding the tobacco industry's lobbying efforts and attempts to conceal the hazards of smoking. In addition, the jury heard from R.J. Reynolds' own corporate representative that 400,000 to 480,000 people were dying each year from smoking cigarettes.
During the closing arguments addressing entitlement to punitive damages, the Plaintiffs' attorney made various arguments dramatizing the number of deaths caused by cigarettes and the size of the sums spent to promote smoking and conceal its dangers. In particular, he noted that 450,000 deaths equate to three plane crashes every day for a year. He also asked the jury to compare the attempts of Mr. Schleider, an individual addicted to nicotine, to stop smoking with the $250 billion spent by the tobacco industry "with all their power, all their money" to encourage people like Mr. Schleider to continue smoking.
Regarding the damages awards, the jury heard testimony from the wife regarding her husband's illness, the difficulties they endured, and the impact his suffering and death had upon their lives and future plans. The jury heard from the wife how she and her husband had been married for thirty years and how his death came shortly after commencing their retirement in the Florida Keys.
The jury heard the daughter was twenty-two years old when her father died. The father had been a stay-at-home parent who raised her. She followed her parents to the Keys, first to live with them, and then to live near them. She saw her father continually and provided care for him up to his death. At her wedding, she refused to have anyone walk her down the aisle in her father's absence.
In closing argument, Plaintiffs' counsel requested an award of non-economic damages for loss of companionship and protection and mental pain and suffering in the amounts of $11 million to the wife and $7 million to the daughter. Plaintiffs' counsel informed the jury that they "could go lower . or higher, it's completely within [the jury's] province to do." On rebuttal, Plaintiff's counsel again requested those amounts and argued that the figures represented "fair compensation:" "if we could ask for more compensatory damages, I assure you that we would have." R.J. Reynolds's counsel immediately objected on the basis, stated in front of the jury, that "there is no limit on what they can ask for."
The jury ultimately awarded $15 million in non-economic damages to the wife and $6 million to the daughter, but refused to award the requested punitive damages. Regarding comparative negligence, Plaintiffs' counsel requested the jury find R.J. Reynolds 87.5% at fault and the decedent 12.5% at fault. The jury instead found R.J. Reynolds 70% at fault and the decedent 30% at fault. Following the application of comparative fault, the final judgment awarded $10.5 million to the wife and $4.2 million to the daughter.
Among other motions, R.J. Reynolds moved for a new trial on damages and for remittitur. The motions were denied and this appeal followed.
Analysis
R.J. Reynolds first argues that Plaintiffs' counsel made improper arguments during closing which warranted a new trial. We review the trial court's denial of the motion for a new trial under an abuse of discretion standard. See Engle, 945 So.2d at 1271 ("A trial court's order granting or denying a motion for a new trial based on either objected-to or unobjected-to improper argument is reviewed for abuse of discretion."). "If the issue of an opponent's improper argument has been properly preserved by objection and motion for mistrial, the trial court should grant a new trial if the argument was so highly prejudicial and inflammatory that it denied the opposing party its right to a fair trial." Id. (quotation omitted).
While we do not condone the closing argument comments to which R.J. Reynolds objected, we conclude that the complained-of comments fall short of denying R.J. Reynolds its right to a fair trial. In reviewing the comments, it is important to remember their context. This case was a nearly three-week-long bifurcated Engle progeny case involving claims for intentional and non-intentional torts and prayers for non-economic compensatory damages flowing from Plaintiffs' loss of companionship and protection and pain and suffering, as well as for punitive damages.
Arguments inappropriate in a simple negligence case may be appropriate concerning record evidence of a party's intentional misconduct in the context of a claim for punitive damages. To give an obvious example, it is generally reversible error in a simple tort case seeking compensatory damages to ask a jury to "send a message" and punish or penalize the defendant. See, e.g., Erie Ins. Co. v. Bushy, 394 So.2d 228, 229 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). Here, however, the jury was instructed to consider whether R.J. Reynolds committed intentional misconduct, meaning "Reynolds had actual knowledge of the wrong of the conduct and the high probability that injury would result and, despite that knowledge intentionally pursued that course of conduct," in which event the jury was directed to consider the propriety of punitive damages "as a punishment to Reynolds and as a deterrent to others."
R.J. Reynolds complains about the way Plaintiffs' counsel in closing noted that the 450,000 deaths from smoking annually equated to three airline crashes per day every day for a year. Although provocative and even somewhat inflammatory, the comparison itself was mild considering the magnitude of the number of deaths due to smoking (400,000 to 480,000 deaths annually) which was testified to by R.J. Reynolds' own corporate representative. The Surgeon General of the United States and the Connecticut Public Health Policy Institute have made this same, or similar comparison.
Among other things, this comparison was probative of whether R.J. Reynolds had actual knowledge of its wrongdoing "and the high probability that injury would result." In the context of this trial, it appears that Plaintiffs' counsel was simply illustrating or contextualizing the number of smoking-related deaths in an attempt to establish entitlement to punitive damages. Importantly, the jury was repeatedly informed and instructed that they were to assess damages only for the harm caused to the individual plaintiffs in this case. The jury ultimately did not award any punitive damages.
Nevertheless, R.J. Reynolds contends this argument requires reversal under cases such as Walt Disney World Co. v. Blalock, 640 So.2d 1156 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). Blalock involved a lawsuit filed by the parents of a child who had his thumb amputated while on the Pirates of the Caribbean ride at Walt Disney World. The jury entered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and Walt Disney World appealed. On appeal, the Fifth District noted that counsel for the plaintiff in closing "express[ed] his personal opinion that it was 'outrageous' for [Walt Disney World] to assert its defense of contributory negligence-despite evidence that the minor plaintiff and his father had been told to keep their arms inside the boat at all times and an admission that the boy's hand had been in the water." Id. at 1157-58.
Moreover, in Blalock, the plaintiffs' "[c]ounsel also expressed his personal opinion on the credibility of several [Walt Disney World] witnesses, contrary to Rule 4-3.4(e) of the Florida Bar Rules Governing Professional Conduct." Id. at 1158. Beyond that, "other [Walt Disney World] witnesses were sarcastically referred to as 'a good soldier' or 'this joker' to derogate them, and [Walt Disney World] was compared to 'some nickel and dime carnival'
throwing 'pixie dust' to delude the jurors." Id. The court concluded that the closing argument in Blalock was "pervaded with inflammatory comments and the personal opinion of counsel." Id. at 1157. The comments in Blalock were unconnected to the evidence. They were not made to place the gravity of certain evidence in context, but rather, amounted to an expression of personal opinion in violation of the rules governing professional responsibility. The comments also violated well-settled black letter law by inviting the jury to consider matters outside of the evidence based on the denigration of witnesses.
Other cases cited by R.J. Reynolds are equally distinguishable. For example, in DeFreitas v. State, 701 So.2d 593 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), the criminal defendant was accused of pointing a laser-sighted firearm at two individuals. The Fourth District concluded there were several instances of prosecutorial misconduct warranting reversal. The misconduct included: (1) "the prosecuting attorney . suggesting or inferring on cross-examination . that Appellant was a person with a temper which perhaps was so bad that it led him to hitting his own sister in the head with a baseball bat," even though any such evidence was inadmissible; (2) the prosecutor made a golden rule argument during closing, by asking the jurors to consider how terrifying it would have been for any given juror to have had the gun at issue pointed at his or her chest by the defendant; and (3) the prosecutor impermissibly made a comparison in closing between the defendant's case and the O.J. Simpson case. Id. at 601. The O.J. Simpson "reference, coupled with the reference to [the defendant] as a stalker, possessive ex-boyfriend who disapproved of his ex-girlfriend's friends, simply crossed the line of proper vigorous and diligent advocacy and violated the rule against inflammatory argument." Id.
Notably, the court specifically stated that "the prosecutor's reference to the O.J. Simpson [case], standing alone, may not have been sufficient to reach the very heart of [the defendant's] criminal trial and may not have risen to the level of fundamental error; however its contribution to the cumulative effect of the totality of the misconduct reached far beyond that which the right to a fair criminal trial allows." Id. DeFreitas is therefore distinguishable because it involves a cumulative impact and level of attorney misconduct which is not present in the case before us.
R.J. Reynolds also contends reversal is warranted because the Plaintiffs' counsel compared the efforts of Mr. Schleider to quit smoking with "all their power, all their money" (referring to R.J. Reynolds and other tobacco companies) spent to encourage individuals like Mr. Schleider to keep smoking. After the parties went to sidebar and Plaintiffs' counsel explained the comment, the court allowed him to rephrase before the jury. Plaintiffs' counsel then proceeded to remind the jury of the testimony regarding the amount of $250 billion dollars spent between 1940 and 2005 on cigarette advertising and promotion. Counsel further clarified the "power" comment by reminding the jury of the evidence presented regarding the lobbying efforts of the tobacco companies to influence Congress. R.J. Reynolds did not object to the explanation made by Plaintiffs' counsel.
When these comments are placed in the unique context of the evidence presented at this trial, the comments related to "wealth" and "power" do not merit reversal. In this regard, Samuels v. Torres, 29 So.3d 1193 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010), relied upon by R.J. Reynolds, is not comparable. Samuels was injured in an automobile accident caused by Torres and filed suit against him. The first trial resulted in a mistrial due to improper comments of Torres' defense counsel suggesting that Torres could not afford to pay a substantial award. During opening statements in the second trial, the defense attorney gave "a little bit of background on Mr. Torres" which amounted to telling the jury of Mr. Torres' work as a truck driver and the meager nature of his earnings. Id. at 1195-96.
The Fifth District noted that "[w]hen counsel for Torres revealed the meager income of his client, a juror began to cry and told the trial judge that the stories she heard were 'sad.' " Id. at 1196-97. Furthermore, despite the fact that "Samuels presented significant evidence regarding her injuries," and evidence regarding a $60,000-$80,000 future spinal surgery, the jury only awarded the future medical expenses in "the sum of $1,000 per year of her projected thirty-four years of remaining life, an award completely devoid of evidentiary support" which the trial court believed "is explainable only as a result of the prejudicial statement made about the irrelevant issue of Torres' meager income." Id. at 1197. This is not what occurred in the case before us.
Finally, R.J. Reynolds contends that Plaintiffs' counsel improperly denigrated the defense. After carefully reviewing the transcript, we reject this argument. Plaintiff's attorney in closing was in the middle of saying "so in fact they still, still, to this day, trying to pretend like they . " when his statement was interrupted by an objection and he was ordered to move on, which he did. While some of Plaintiffs' counsel's comments approached the boundary of what constitutes proper argument, they did not rise to the requisite level to warrant a new trial. The evidence at trial, as well as the jury instructions, demonstrated that R.J. Reynolds affirmatively attempted to conceal from the public information regarding the health dangers of cigarettes. Furthermore, testimony demonstrated that at one point, when public service announcements were shown along with cigarette ads, tobacco companies attacked the public service announcements, calling them false and misleading. Evidence at trial also showed that executives within the tobacco industry actively disputed - if not misrepresented - the harmful effects of cigarettes despite available scientific proof at the time.
"Attorneys should be afforded great latitude in presenting closing argument, but they must 'confine their argument to the facts and evidence presented to the jury and all logical deductions from the facts and evidence.' " Murphy v. Int'l Robotic Sys., Inc., 766 So.2d 1010, 1028 (Fla. 2000) (quoting Knoizen v. Bruegger, 713 So.2d 1071, 1072 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) ). Plaintiffs' counsel's comments during his closing argument in this case may be considered to be close to the limits of what is acceptable. Indeed, they may well justify reversal in a different context. In the context of the evidence of this particular trial, however, we find that the comments did not rise to a level that requires reversal.
This conclusion is particularly compelling here because the trial spanned nearly three weeks and closing argument ended on a Friday. The jury returned the following Monday, engaged in two days of deliberation, and found in favor of R.J. Reynolds on the question of punitive damages and concealment; awarded less than the compensatory amount requested for the daughter; and attributed a higher percentage of comparative negligence to Mr. Schleider than what Plaintiffs' counsel argued for in closing. These actions by the jury strongly indicate the jury was not inflamed, prejudiced, or improperly mislead by closing arguments.
This brings us to R.J. Reynolds' main argument on appeal. R.J. Reynolds' main argument on appeal concerns the trial court's denial of its motions for remittitur and a new trial on damages. It contends the amounts awarded by the jury of $15 million to the wife and of $6 million to the daughter are excessive. The award of money damages for pain and suffering reflects an attempt to establish an objective economic equivalent for the subjective pain a person suffered. It has been described as "an attempt to 'measure that which is immeasurable.' " Ortega v. Belony, 185 So.3d 538, 540 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (quoting Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Morgan, 338 So.2d 89, 92 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976) ).
Because of the inherent difficulty in measuring non-economic damages such as pain and suffering, the Florida Supreme Court has determined that "[t]he jury, guided by its judgment and everyday life experiences, is in the best position to make a fair assessment of these damages." Odom v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 254 So.3d 268, 276 (Fla. 2018) (quoting Angrand v. Key, 657 So. 2d 1146, 1149 (Fla. 1995) ). As the Supreme Court has further explained:
Jurors know the nature of pain, embarrassment and inconvenience, and they also know the nature of money. Their problem of equating the two to afford reasonable and just compensation calls for a high order of human judgment, and the law has provided no better yardstick for their guidance than their enlightened conscience. Their problem is not one of mathematical calculation but involves an exercise of their sound judgment of what is fair and right.
Id. (quoting Braddock v. Seaboard Air Line R.R. Co., 80 So.2d 662, 668 (Fla. 1955) ).
For this reason, a jury's award of damages should not be disturbed unless "it is so inordinately large as obviously to exceed the maximum limit of a reasonable range within which the jury may properly operate." R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Townsend, 90 So.3d 307, 311 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (quoting Bould v. Touchette, 349 So.2d 1181, 1184-85 (Fla. 1977) ). Moreover, having heard the same evidence as the jury, "[t]he trial court is in the best position to determine whether the compensatory damages award is excessive." Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Alexander, 123 So.3d 67, 79 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013). For this reason, "[w]e review the trial court's denial of . post-trial motions for remittitur and new trial under the abuse of discretion standard." Maggolc, Inc. v. Roberson, 116 So.3d 556, 558 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013).
The remittitur statute reads in pertinent part as follows:
(1) In any action to which this part applies wherein the trier of fact determines that liability exists on the part of the defendant and a verdict is rendered which awards money damages to the plaintiff, it shall be the responsibility of the court, upon proper motion, to review the amount of such award to determine if such amount is excessive or inadequate in light of the facts and circumstances which were presented to the trier of fact.
.
(3) It is the intention of the Legislature that awards of damages be subject to close scrutiny by the courts and that all such awards be adequate and not excessive.
.
(5) In determining whether an award is excessive or inadequate in light of the facts and circumstances presented to the trier of fact and in determining the amount, if any, that such award exceeds a reasonable range of damages or is inadequate, the court shall consider the following criteria:
(a) Whether the amount awarded is indicative of prejudice, passion, or corruption on the part of the trier of fact;
(b) Whether it appears that the trier of fact ignored the evidence in reaching a verdict or misconceived the merits of the case relating to the amounts of damages recoverable;
(c) Whether the trier of fact took improper elements of damages into account or arrived at the amount of damages by speculation and conjecture;
(d) Whether the amount awarded bears a reasonable relation to the amount of damages proved and the injury suffered; and
(e) Whether the amount awarded is supported by the evidence and is such that it could be adduced in a logical manner by reasonable persons.
(6) It is the intent of the Legislature to vest the trial courts of this state with the discretionary authority to review the amounts of damages awarded by a trier of fact in light of a standard of excessiveness or inadequacy. The Legislature recognizes that the reasonable actions of a jury are a fundamental precept of American jurisprudence and that such actions should be disturbed or modified with caution and discretion. However, it is further recognized that a review by the courts in accordance with the standards set forth in this section provides an additional element of soundness and logic to our judicial system and is in the best interests of the citizens of this state.
§ 768.74, Fla. Stat. (2014) (emphasis added).
None of the factors set forth in the remittitur statute to justify a reduction are present here. The jury did not find in favor of the Plaintiffs on all counts. The jury apportioned a greater percentage of fault to the decedent than requested by Plaintiffs. The jury awarded the daughter less than she sought. Lastly, the jury elected not to award punitive damages. Indeed, the jury awarded the wife $15 million when she only requested $11 million, but counsel for R.J. Reynolds told the jury there was no limit on what the Plaintiffs could request and counsel for R.J. Reynolds suggested no actual number to the jury. On balance, we find nothing to suggest impropriety, partiality, or a runaway jury.
"Under Florida law an award of non-economic damages must bear a reasonable relation to the philosophy and general trend of prior decisions in such cases." Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Cohen, 102 So.3d 11, 18 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012), quashed on other grounds in R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Cohen, No. SC13-35, 2016 WL 375143 *1 (Fla. Jan. 26, 2016) (quoting Bravo v. United States, 532 F.3d 1154, 1162 (11th Cir. 2008) ). Here, the awards do precisely that.
The award of $15 million is indeed higher than awards in the $10 to $12.5 million range previously upheld by this and other courts. See, e.g., Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Cuculino, 165 So.3d 36, 39 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (upholding $12.5 million verdict) ; Alexander, 123 So.3d at 76-79 (upholding trial court's reduction of $20 million verdict to $10 million); Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Kayton, 104 So.3d 1145, 1147 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (upholding $8 million compensatory damages award but reversing $16 million punitive award for determination of statute of repose issue), quashed on other grounds in Kayton v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., Nos. SC13-171, SC13-243, 2016 WL 390261 (Fla. Feb. 1, 2016) (summarily quashing decision and reinstating jury verdict); Cohen, 102 So.3d at 19 (upholding $10 million compensatory damages, but reversing $10 million punitive damages for determination of statute of repose issue); Townsend, 90 So.3d at 307 (upholding a $10.8 million compensatory damages award and $80 million in punitive damages).
However, these awards from other cases do not establish a cap on non-economic damages for surviving spouses in the amount of $10 million for all time and for all circumstances. As the Supreme Court recently noted, "neither the Legislature nor this Court has limited or established a bright-line cap on the amount a survivor may be awarded in noneconomic damages under the wrongful death statute." Odom, 254 So.3d at 279.
Moreover, the award here is only a fraction higher-not multiple times higher-than those previously upheld. Cf. Rety v. Green, 546 So.2d 410, 420 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (reversing denial of remittitur of award "nearly twenty times higher than any libel verdict which has ever been upheld on appeal in Florida or elsewhere"). This award therefore cannot be said to be "so inordinately large as obviously to exceed the maximum limit of a reasonable range within which the jury may properly operate." Bould, 349 So.2d at 1184-85.
Considering the unique facts of this case and weighing the evidence, the jury made its determination that a $15 million award to the wife was warranted. The jury heard significant evidence in support of the wife's loss of consortium and pain and suffering claims. The jury heard evidence that Mr. Schleider was fifty-six and his wife was fifty-five at the time of his death; they had been married for thirty years, and had four children. Mr. Schleider had become disabled and, as a result, was a stay-at-home parent and the primary caregiver for their family. The wife had just retired and the couple moved to the Florida Keys when Mr. Schleider was first diagnosed. He passed away within roughly two years. During that time, the wife watched as Schleider withered away and suffered.
By the end, he had lost all of his hair, he could not use the commode by himself (which was kept next to his bed because he could not walk to the bathroom), and was being daily administered morphine for his pain. After testifying about the suffering she witnessed, she said, "I do not want to ever see anybody else suffer like that." Even twenty years later, the wife has never remarried. Plaintiffs also published certain life expectancy tables to the jury to establish the duration of loss. The trial court, having heard the same testimony the jury relied upon, upheld the jury's award. Given the evidence presented, fifteen million dollars for the loss of a spouse as the wife embarked on her retirement and the couple moved to the Florida Keys may be more than what we would have awarded as jurors, but it is not so inordinately large as to justify reversal of the jury award and the trial court in this case.
Similarly, the jury determined that a $6 million award to the daughter - $1 million less than what Plaintiffs requested - was appropriate. R.J. Reynolds primarily relies on a number of cases involving damages awards to adult children to establish that the award in this case is an outlier, and therefore, excessive. However, a comparison of this award to cases involving adult children is inappropriate because the daughter was not an adult child under the statute. Florida's Wrongful Death Act expressly permits recovery of damages by either a decedent's surviving spouse, surviving minor child, or both. § 768.21(1) - (3), Fla. Stat. (permitting recovery for loss of parental companionship and pain and suffering for a surviving adult child only where there is no surviving spouse). In doing so, the statute defines a minor as a child "under 25 years of age, notwithstanding the age of majority." § 768.18(2), Fla. Stat. Here, the Schleiders' daughter was twenty-two years old, and thus a statutory minor, when her father died.
The jury heard the daughter's testimony regarding her father's presence in her life and the closeness of their relationship. She testified that he was the primary caregiver, "Mr. Mom," and the primary source of support and guidance in her life. She moved from New York to the Florida Keys to be closer to her parents and, once her father got sick, she helped take care of him. The jury also heard that no one walked her down the aisle at her wedding. The jury heard that she is unable to speak about his death even 20 years later because "the way he died" causes her to cry. She explained that she began experiencing and still has panic attacks to this day as a result of his death.
We simply cannot draw a bright line establishing a particular age involving a surviving minor under Florida's Wrongful Death Act that would warrant a lesser or greater award. Children will have different relationships with parents. Some parents and children will be close, as was the case here; some not. An inquiry into this matter is factually intensive and turns largely on the nature and credibility of the evidence presented, not merely the age of the surviving child.
There are few published opinions for comparison. However, the award in this case falls squarely within the realm of those awards. At the outset, we acknowledge the cases where appellate courts have reversed jury awards of $6 million to adult children as excessive. See Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Putney, 199 So.3d 465, 470-71 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (concluding that $5 million award to each of three surviving adult children of the deceased smoker was excessive and there was no evidence "of the type of close or supportive relationship that would justify such an award") ; R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Webb, 93 So.3d 331, 337 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (reversing an $8 million award to an adult surviving child of a cigarette smoker who was fifty-four years old when her father passed away on the basis that it was excessive as compared to other similar Engle awards).
But we do not read these cases as establishing a cap for minor children for all time and all circumstances. Indeed, a court has upheld awards of $7.5 and $4 million to surviving minor children under similar circumstances. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Grossman, 211 So.3d 221, 229 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017), review denied, No. SC17-706, 2017 WL 3751318, review granted on other grounds, No. 17-688, 2018 WL 3097036, remanded on other grounds to 247 So.3d 25 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018). A court has also upheld an award of $4.4 million to a surviving minor whose mother was killed instantly in a car accident. See Citrus County v. McQuillin, 840 So.2d 343, 347-48 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). Moreover, as noted above, the Supreme Court recently held that "neither the Legislature nor this Court has limited or established a bright-line cap on the amount a survivor may be awarded in noneconomic damages under the wrongful death statute." Odom, 254 So.3d at 279.
Given the extremely fact-specific nature of the individual relationships that are a basis for a compensation award to a minor statutory survivor, it is only natural that jury verdicts will vary. The problems of determining the nature of these relationships and a commensurate award go to the heart of why we use juries to set the amount. While we entertain notions that an award may "raise judicial eyebrows" or "shock the judicial conscience," we have yet to establish an objective measure to evaluate when a jury's award for pain and suffering is too large or too small. In deciding whether to grant remittitur, the trial court has wide discretion precisely because it has a better vantage to determine whether an award is excessive. In contrast, as appellate courts, having only the cold transcripts before us, we lack the vantage of the trial courts in these matters.
The dissent somewhat summarily concludes that there is nothing "unique" about the daughter's suffering. We are reminded of Tolstoy's observation that "all happy families are alike; each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way." Reflecting this wisdom, our system of laws leave the nature and extent of the daughter's suffering to the province of the jury, and then to the trial judge who actually saw and heard the testimony. Particularly, as appellate judges with only the cold record before us, we "must resist the urge to 'declare a verdict excessive merely because it is above the amount which the court itself considers the jury should have allowed.' " Odom, 254 So.3d at 280 (quoting Bould, 349 So.2d at 1184 ).
Here, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying remittitur or a new trial on the awards to the wife and daughter.
Affirmed.
EMAS, J., concurs.
The findings include:
(i) "that smoking cigarettes causes" certain named diseases including COPD [chronic obstructive pulmonary disease ] and lung cancer ; (ii) "that nicotine in cigarettes is addictive;" (iii) "that the [Engle ] defendants placed cigarettes on the market that were defective and unreasonably dangerous;" (iv) "that the [Engle ] defendants concealed or omitted material information not otherwise known or available knowing that the material was false or misleading or failed to disclose a material fact concerning the health effects or addictive nature of smoking cigarettes or both;" (v) "that the [Engle ] defendants agreed to conceal or omit information regarding the health effects of cigarettes or their addictive nature with the intention that smokers and the public would rely on this information to their detriment;" (vi) "that all of the [Engle ] defendants sold or supplied cigarettes that were defective;" (vii) "that all of the [Engle ] defendants sold or supplied cigarettes that, at the time of sale or supply, did not conform to representations of fact made by said defendants;" and (viii) "that all of the [Engle ] defendants were negligent." Id. at 1276-77.
Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Douglas, 110 So.3d 419, 424-25 (Fla. 2013) (footnote omitted).
The deposition testimony of James Figlar, PhD, where he appeared as corporate representative for R.J. Reynolds in another case, was read to the jury in this case. The jury also viewed Dr. Figlar's videotaped deposition taken in this case.
See C. Everett Koop, Don't Forget the Smokers, Washington Post, March 8, 1998, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/1998/03/08/dont-forget-the-smokers/3560fbed-880a-45ff-8669-110fd8b63509/?utm_term=.9c67a0fe6169; Joseph Cooney, et al., Examining Tobacco Use, Consequences and Policies in Connecticut: Smoke and Mirrors?, The Connecticut Public Health Policy Institute, April 28, 2010, at 6.
We also note that in Blalock, the plaintiff's expert began telling the jury of Walt Disney World's post-accident remedial measures, apparently unaware of the court's in limine order precluding same. Blalock, 640 So.2d at 1158. The court also considered the impact of the attorney's conduct during closing in light of the $275,000 future medical expenses award for which "[t]here was no evidentiary basis . and had not even been sought in the closing argument." Id. at 1159.
The Cuculino jury apportioned 60% of the fault to Mr. Cuculino, reducing the actual award to $5 million. Cuculino, 165 So.3d at 39.
The Townsend jury found R.J. Reynolds to be 51% responsible for the death of Mr. Townsend, reducing the jury award in accordance with the allocation of percentage of fault. The trial court entered a judgment against R.J. Reynolds in the amount of over $46 million, consisting of approximately $5.5 million in compensatory damages and $40.8 million in punitive damages.
The initial brief in Putney indicated that the adult children were each in their thirties and living independently. Initial Brief for Appellant Philip Morris USA Inc. and R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company at 20, Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Putney, 199 So.3d 465 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (Nos. 4D10-3606 & 4D10-5244 Consol.).