Case Name: David Yancy et al. v. W. C. Batte (next Friend) et al.
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1877
Citations: 48 Tex. 46
Docket Number: 
Parties: David Yancy et al. v. W. C. Batte (next Friend) et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 48
Pages: 46–82

Head Matter:
David Yancy et al. v. W. C. Batte (next Friend) et al.
Community property—Improvements—Liability of heir.—G and his wife, F, owned as community property a tract of land, which, in 1862, and after the death of F, was sold by G to Y. In a suit brought to establish title, and for partition by the heirs of F, through their next friend, against Y, and others claiming under him, the defendants pleaded that Y was a purchaser in good faith, who had paid for the land, and suggested under the statute valuable improvements made in good faith. They also relied as a defense on the fact that the plaintiffs had inherited from their father, G, who died in 1864, assets in excess of their interests in the land, and that they were thereby precluded from recovering, by reason of their father’s warranty, until they had refunded to Y one-half of the purchase-money, with interest: Held—
1. In the absence of facts establishing an equitable defense, the heirs of F were entitled to recover one-half of the land acquired as community property during the marriage of G and F, and which had not been sold by G before the death of F.
2. The statute authorizing the defendants to recover pay for their improvements (Paschal’s Dig., 5300) does not apply in this case, as it would where the plaintiff recovers the entire tract of land. That statute Was designed to protect the defendants from losing their improvements without compensation, but does not entitle them to pay for their improvements while retaining them on partition of the land. Neither was the statute designed to give defendants the right to object that the land should be so divided, if practicable, as to give to them the part they had improved.
3. The case being submitted to the jury on special issues, it was proper to instruct them to find, not only what estate of their mother the plaintiffs had inherited, but what portion of it had been received by them.
4. The responsibility of the heir for the debt or covenant of the ancestor, is to be measured, not by the amount of the ancestor’s estate which vested in him, but by the amount actually received.
5. At common law, the liability of the heir did not exceed the lands inherited.
Appeal from Titus. Tried below before the Hon. James H. Rogers.
July 2,1873, Mary A. Grigg, Richard B. Grigg, and John H. Grigg, by W. C. Batte, their next friend, brought suit in the District Court of Titus county against David Yancy, Sr., W. H. C. Yancy, David Yancy, Jr., and L. W. Yancy, for one half interest in a tract of 1,000 acres of land claimed by the defendants.
The plaintiffs alleged, substantially, that they were the only children of H. C. Grigg and his wife, Mary A. Grigg, who intermarried in 1850; that on August 2-3, 1851, said H. C. Grigg bought and acquired title in the land sued for; that they immediately moved upon the place, and occupied it as their homestead; that they made large and valuable improvements thereon, a farm of 300 acres, dwellings, cotton-gins, &c.; that in 1858, Mary A. Grigg, mother of plaintiffs, died intestate; that a large quantity of community property passed into the hands of the surviving husband, and that the community was not indebted; that in 1859, H. C. Grigg married a second time, and continued to reside upon said land until January 22, 1862, when he, joined by his second wife, sold the said tract to the defendant David Yancy, for $4,750; that from that date said David Yancy and the other defendants had occupied the same, claiming the whole tract, taking and using the rents, &c.; that plaintiffs had never received anything from the estate of their mother.
Prayer was for partition, and for damages in rents for half the said property.
The defendants pleaded not guilty; purchase and payment of purchase-money in good faith from H. C. Grigg, in possession, and having the legal title; suggested good faith and permanent improvements; specially pleaded that plaintiffs inherited property from their father largely in excess of the community interest of their mother in the land sued for, claiming protection of the warranty by the father in his deed executed 22d of January, 1862, to defendant David Yancy, Sr.
In replication, plaintiffs alleged that they had received no assets from their father’s estate, and that the consideration paid their father for the land was in Confederate money.
The testimony adduced by the plaintiffs was as follows:
1. Deed by W. C. Batte to H. C. Grigg, of date August 23, 1851, for the land in controversy, in consideration of $1,500 recited as paid.
2. Deed from H. C. Grigg and his wife, Rebecca Y. Grigg, to David Yancy for the same land, of date January 22, 1862, in consideration of $4,750 recited as paid. Deed with covenant of general warranty.
3. W. C. Batte testified that the plaintiffs, Mary A., Richard B., and John H. Grigg, are the only children of H. C. Grigg, deceased, and also the only children of Mary A. Grigg, the first wife of H. C. Grigg; and that they are the children of the first coverture of H. C. and Mary A. Grigg; that said Mary A. Grigg was a Miss Tucker, and that after then marriage, in 1851, and after they had permanently settled in Texas, the said H. C. Grigg purchased of witness the tract of land in controversy at the price of $1,500, said land being then unimproved; that Grigg and his first wife and one of the plaintiffs, then an infant, immediately entered upon said land, and occupied it as their homestead; made large, permanent, and valuable improvements thereon, to wit, a two-story framed dwelling-house, well finished, kitchen and necessary out-houses, and tenement houses for slaves, stables, cribs, &c., a farm of 300 acres, cleared, fenced, and in cultivation; that said Grigg and his first wife continued to reside on and use said place as their homestead—the other two plaintiffs being born on' it—until August, 1858, when said Mary A. Grigg, mother of plaintiffs, died on the place; that long before her death the fifteen hundred dollars purchase-money of the place had been fully paid off" and discharged to witness by said H. C. Grigg.
After the death of said Mary A., the mother of plaintiff, said H. O. Grigg and his children (the plaintiffs) continued to reside on said place as their only home; that in 1859, about a year after said Mary A. died, H. C. Grigg went on a visit to Virginia, (borrowing money to go on,) and there married his second wife, Rebecca V. Grigg, and he brought her to his said home in Texas, where they and his three minor children resided as them home until January, 1862, when he and his said second wife made a deed for the place to the defendant David Taney. Soon afterwards, H. C. Grigg left the State as a soldier, and in the year 1863 he died in Mississippi. He left no children by the second marriage. Plaintiffs, at his death, were left in charge of their step-mother, who took them to Virginia, the fall of 1863. The widow and one of the plaintiffs are still in Virginia; the other two have returned to Texas, and have been living at witness’ house. The oldest is a confirmed invalid, and none of them have any means of support whatever, except that furnished by the charity of their friends. They (nor any of them) have not received anything from the estate of either parent.
David Taney paid for the place after Grigg left the State to go to the war, and paid in Confederate money to the wife, R. V. Grigg.
There was no administration on the estate of Mary A. Grigg, and none on that of H. C. Grigg, until after the war was ended.
When Mary A. Grigg died, the estate of herself and said H. C. Grigg was solvent, and free of debt. After his first wife died, H. C. Grigg became rapidly involved in debt; borrowed large sums of money; expended a great deal in his visit to Virginia, and otherwise. In 1859 and 1860, he borrowed of witness, and others, large sums, the amount of which witness cannot state.
When H. C. Grigg died, there was no estate of the second community; and his whole estate, both separate and community, of both marriages, was insufficient to pay his outstanding indebtedness..
A portion of the money paid by defendant Taney to Mrs. Grigg, as much as $3,000, as witness is perfectly cognizant, was used by her to pay debts of her husband, incurred in 1859 and 1860; only $400 or $500 thereof were taken by her to pay her. expenses, and the expenses of plaintiffs, in traveling to Virginia.
No inventory or appraisement of the first community estate was ever filed.
After H. C. Grigg went to the army, and at the time of his death, his estate was going rapidly to waste. His family lived at a place on White Oak as their home. The stock, carried there from the old place, consisting of cattle, hogs, &c., soon died, and became lost. The crops were wholly used to maintain the place, except 30 bales of cotton, which witness took possession of, at the close of the war, to save it from destruction. Said cotton was applied, in part, to the payment of just debts of said H. C. Grigg. It brought 17 cents per pound, and did not pay the entire indebtedness of the estate, which is still in debt. There are no assets of the estate, except the place on White Oak, the second homestead, which is subject to overflow, and not worth paying taxes on.
Cross-examined: Witness stated there were three negroes on hand at H. C. Grigg’s death, his separate property; seven or eight received by his first wife, and five or six by his second wife. Dive were men, one a common plantation blacksmith. The average value of the men was $1,000 each; the average of the rest, $200 each. Witness could not estimate the amount of debts owed by Grigg at his death. Witness paid debts to Harley, to Hays, and to others; could not tell how much. The horses and mules on hand were worth $60 or $70 each, and cattle $5 per head.
Administration was opened on the estate in 1868. Oath and bond were filed by W. P. McLean, as administrator. An account for $200 was probated, which is still unpaid.
Plaintiffs closed.
David Yancy, one of the defendants,
testified that he came to Texas, in January, 1862, in search of a home. Was a stranger in the country. H. C. Grigg, learning his business, offered to sell him the land in controversy. He examined the premises. Was at Grigg’s house; saw his wife and children there. Agreed to buy at $4,750. Grigg and wife executed the deed to witness for the land (the same read in evidence by the plaintiffs).
Witness believed he was getting a good title, and did not know at the time of his purchase that Grigg had ever had any other wife than the one he then had, and never heard of it until some time afterwards. Witness entered upon the land in controversy at the time of purchase, and made his first crop that year. The purchase was made in good faith. The witness testified as to the improvements made by him and by the other defendants, who held by purchase under him, and as to the value of said improvements, &c.
Witness paid $4,000 of the purchase-money in the spring of 1862, and the remainder ($750) in the summer following. The land without improvement was worth from one to two dollars per acre.
David Yancy, Jr., testified in substance as did the former witness.
The defendants read in evidence an extract from plaintiffs’ petition, as follows: “ The said H. C. Grigg died in the year 1863, leaving his said children in charge of their said mother-in-law, who, having no children by said H. C. Grigg, abandoned the State of Texas, and now resides in the State of Virginia. Petitioners further show, that at the time of the death of the said H. C. Grigg, as above described, he had several slaves, and horses, mules, teams, wagons, cattle, hogs, provisions, corn, and some fifty or sixty bales of cotton, and many other articles of personal property, all of which were left in this State.”
W. P. McLean testified that he had done nothing as administrator of H. C. Grigg but to qualify and give bond. He filed no inventory, collected nothing, nor did he attempt to do so. He paid no debts. A claim of one or two hundred dollars had been probated, which is still unpaid. He had never paid tax on the land.
I. C. Sherry, clerk of the District Court, produced the record of the administration by McLean. It showed that he took the oath and gave bond as administrator of Grigg’s estate in 1868. Ho inventory or appraisement appeared of record.
Defendants then read, from the records in the District Court of Titus county, a decree, in which William C. Batte was plaintiff, v. W. M. Witt et al. defendants, v. W. P. McLean, administrator of H. C. Grigg, intervenor, of date December 10, 1870, in which it was adjudged—
1. McLean, as administrator of Grigg, do make, execute, and deliver to said Witt a good and sufficient deed of conveyance to certain lands described in the pleadings in said case.
2. That said McLean, as administrator of Grigg, recover of the defendant Witt the sum of $2,221.45 in gold and silver coin, principal and interest.
3. Enforcing the vendor’s lien for said sum on 320 acres of land, (described,) and ordering sale.
4. Awarding to Batte, vendor of Grigg, judgment against McLean for said sum, directing McLean to pay over the same, when collected, to Batte, less costs over expenses.
The defendant closed.
In rebuttal, plaintiffs introduced H. C. Lindsay, who testified that in 1862, a very short time after defendant David Taney, Sr., took possession of the place, and before he had placed any improvements thereon, witness, while riding with David Taney, Sr., one of the defendants, informed him that “the plaintiffs were children of a former wife of H. C. Grigg, and if he didn’t mind, he had bought a lawsuit.” Plaintiffs read their whole petition in evidence, explanatory of the extract read by the defendants.
Special issues were submitted to the jury; which issues, and the responses thereto by the jury, are sufficiently shown in the opinion.
The verdict, however, found substantially for the plaintiffs, and that defendants, as possessors in good faith, were entitled to pay for improvements; finding value, &c.
The court rendered judgment for plaintiffs for half of the tract of land described in the petition, awarding partition; appointed commissioners to make partition; ordered the commissioners, in making partition, to set apart, if possible, to each of the defendants, his improvements; directing the commissioners, in the event partition could not be so made, to report the facts to the court, for further action.
Motion for new trial was overruled, and defendants appealed. The errors assigned are discussed in the opinion.
J. D. McAdoo and Culberson & Armistead, for appellants.
The findings of the jury were, that the appellants purchased and paid for the whole of the one thousand acres of land in controversy in good faith, and put, in good faith, very valuable improvements thereon, largely in excess of the value of rents. They also found, that a very large amount of property of the father of plaintiffs was on hand (never administered) at the time of his death; that this property went into the hands of their friends who had care of them, and became squandered and lost by the fortunes of the war.
We hold—
I. That the statute on the subject of the right to recover value of improvements in good faith, applies as well to a case like this, where a plaintiff recovers a part of the land (a joint, undivided interest) by reason of a secret equitable title, as to a case where the whole land is recovered. Certainly, the law does not design to leave a party who is ousted of the right to a part of the land, under a greater disadvantage than one whose whole title fails. And yet the court below so treated the appellants in this case. This case was treated in the decree as a suit merely for partition. Of what value were the findings of the jury as to value of improvements, if they were to be ignored in the decree ? If the purchase and im provement be in good faith, then the defendant in no way shall be disturbed in his possession until the value of his improvement be paid. (Paschal’s Dig., art. 5300.)
II. The court erred in submitting the twenty-first special issue, and in the decree under it. That issue was doubtless understood by the jury to be an inquiry as to whether the appellees, (little children,) at the death of the father, took actual personal possession of his estate, and hence found that they had received nothing. Is not the possession of the natural guardian and next friend of minors, the possession, in a legal sense, of the minors themselves ? Should not the jury have been instructed what constituted possession?
It certainly cannot be maintained, that in order for a purchaser from the ancestor, with warranty, to require the heir to account, before he recovers, for the value of a homestead and other lands attached, and a number of slaves and other property on hand, while the heir, a minor, lives on the place "where all the property is, simply because, before the warrantee fails, the property so inherited is squandered or destroyed by the fortunes of war years afterwards. The appellees inherited; the property was on hand; it was in possession of those who had personal care of them; and it was their misfortune, and not the fault of the appellants, if this property was lost, before their father’s warrantee failed.
Such an equity as is shown by the testimony and the findings of the jury in this case, cannot certainly sustain the decree rendered in the cause.
George T. Todd, for appellee.
Half the property vested eo instanti in plaintiffs. (Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 20 Tex., 244; Walker v. Young, 37 Tex., 519; Wright v. McGinty, 37 Tex., 733.)
The court will take judicial notice of the manumission of the slaves, by war. Plaintiffs might be held to account for what they- received from their father’s estate; and unless they had received from him enough to reimburse them in full for their interest inherited from their mother, they are entitled to recover. (Burleson v. Burleson, 28 Tex., 383; Walker v. Howard, 34 Tex., 513.)
Here plaintiffs have shown that they absolutely received nothing from their father’s estate, and that all said estate was absorbed by his creditors for debts contracted after the death of his first wife.
Though the court below has declared appellants to be entitled to their improvements, yet the facts show them to be possessors mala fide, with actual notice of plaintiffs’ claim long before the payment of the Confederate money for the land.
Decay and deterioration, instead of permanent improvement, is shown to be the true condition of the land.
The debts of H. C. Grigg, paid by his last wife, were just and valid, and subsisting when paid; and the fact that they were not paid through administration, cannot affect the justice of the payment, or the fact that plaintiffs received nothing.

Opinion:
Gould, Associate Justice.
Mary A. Grigg, Richard B. Grigg, and John H. Grigg, minors, brought this suit, by their next friend, W. C. Batte, to recover and have partitioned an undivided half of 1,000 acres of land, claiming that it was the community property of their deceased parents, H. C. and Mary A. Grigg, and that at the death of their mother, in 1858, they inherited her community interest. They allege an attempted conveyance, in 1862, by their father, joined by a second wife, Rebecca, to David Yancy, Sr., of the entire tract, and that the other defendants, the sons of David Yancy, claim parts of the tract through said David.
The defenses relied on were purchase and payment and valuable improvements, in good faith, and that the plaintiffs had inherited from the estate of their father assets in excess of their interest in the land claimed, and that by reason thereof, and of the warranty contained in the conveyance of their father to David Yancy, Sr., plaintiffs were precluded from recovering until they had refunded to said David one-half the purchase-money paid by him, with interest.
On the trial, the court submitted numerous special issues to the jury, and from their findings it results, that the land was the community property of the first marriage; that the mother died in 1858, and the father, after contracting the second marriage and selling the land, as alleged, died in 1864, leaving, at his death, on hand, of property acquired during coverture of his first, wife, ten negroes, valued at §2,000, and cattle, horses, &c., of the value of §970; of property of the last community, cotton and hogs, of the value of §3,920; and of the separate property of H. C. Grigg, three negro men, valued at §1,000 each. They find that no debts of the estate of H. C. Grigg have been paid since his death, and that only §200 had been probated against his estate. In response to the issue, (twenty-first,) " What amount of the separate or community estate of H. C. Grigg have his children actually received from his estate since his death, and how much of this came from his estate acquired after the marriage to the mother of said children and before her death ?" the answer is, " We find plaintiffs in this cause have received nothing from their father or mother's estate." The issue was submitted separately, as to each of the defendants, whether he had made valuable improvements, in good faith; and the finding is, that each defendant has made improvements, specifying the improvements and fixing their value, which is, in each case and in the aggregate, in excess of the amount of rent, also found.
On these findings, the court entered up judgment, that the plaintiffs recover of the defendants an undivided one-half interest in the land sued for, and that their title to the same be established, decreeing that the tract of land claimed by each defendant be partitioned between the plaintiffs and the respective defendants according to quality and quantity, allotting to the plaintiffs one-half and to the defendants the remainder of said land, and allotting to each defendant the improvements made thereon by him, (specifying the improvements of each,) if the same could be done " in justice to the rights of plaintiffs in said land." After naming the commissioners, directing them to report at the ensuing term of court, and instructing them that the rights of the plaintiff's and defendants, to the improvements made prior to the sale by H. C. Grigg, were equal, the decree proceeds: " That if said commissioners shall set apart to the plaintiffs any part of the improvements made by either of the defendants, that such part shall be reported to this court, for its further orders."
There was a motion for new trial, and a motion to reform the judgment rendered, both of which were overruled.
The first error assigned, is that the findings of the jury were insufficient to support the judgment 'rendered, or any judgment.
The findings established that the land was acquired during the marriage of the parents of plaintiffs, and was on hand, undisposed of, at the death of their mother. This was sufficient to entitle plaintiffs to recover, unless the findings on other issues established some equitable defense. Such is believed to have been the doctrine recognized in this court from so early a period, and in so many cases, that we do not regard it as now open to controversy. (Duncan v. Rawls, 16 Tex., 501; Parker v. Parker, 10 Tex., 96; Robinson v. McDonald, 11 Tex., 390; Jones v. Jones, 15 Tex., 143; Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 20 Tex., 244; Thompson v. Cragg, 24 Tex., 600 ; Magee v. Rice, 37 Tex., 501; Primm v. Barton, 18 Tex., 206; Monroe v. Leigh, 15 Tex., 519.
But, instead of following the assignment of errors, it will suffice to notice the two questions which are alone discussed in the brief of appellants' counsel, both of which arise out of other findings of the jury.
It is claimed that the jury found improvements, in good faith, by defendants largely in excess of rents, and that, under the statute, the defendants were entitled to pay for their improvements,.before their possession of any part of the land could be disturbed. (Paschal's Dig., art. 5300.) The objection urged, is not that it is impracticable to make the partition so as to give defendants their improvements, nor that the judgment is incomplete in failing to prescribe distinctly the rule to be applied in case that some of the improvements of defendants had to be allotted to plaintiffs. The position taken is, that the statute applies just as it does in cases where the plaintiff recovers the entire tract. But it seems too plain for argument, that the statute was designed to protect the defendant from losing his improvements without compensation. It was never designed to entitle defendants to pay for improvements, and, at the same time, to retain them; nor was it designed to give defendants the right to object that the land be so divided, if practicable, as to give to them the part which they have improved. If such a partition be impracticable, and it be necessary to dispossess the defendant, the statute would protect him. But there is nothing in the statute to prevent the partition "being made, as in other cases of partition between joint owners. The decree of the court follows the course marked out by Chief Justice Hemphill in a similar case, and is not erroneous in the point complained of. (Robinson v. McDonald, 11 Tex., 388.)
It is claimed that the findings of the jury show that the plaintiffs inherited property from the estate of their father in excess of the one-half of the purchase-money, with interest, paid to their father for the land by David Yancy, Sr., and that, by reason of that fact and the warranty of their father, they were precluded from recovering the land until they had repaid one-half the purchase-money, with interest. It is contended, that as the findings of the jury establish that H. C. Grigg, at his death, left separate and community property to a considerable amount, and that this property had not been appropriated to pay debts of the estate, only $200 of debt being probated, that it necessarily followed that the plaintiffs had inherited a considerable amount from said estate. This view of the findings disregards the further finding, that the plain tiffs actually received nothing from the estate of either father or mother,—an issue, it is said, which should not have been submitted to the jury. The presumption which might arise from the other findings, is rebutted by the finding that nothing was received,—an issue, under the facts of the case, proper to be passed upon. In this State, it is true that the entire estate vests at once in the heir, on the death of the ancestor; but it is also true, that administration may intervene, and the estate having been absorbed in the course of administration, may never reach his hands. (Paschal's Dig., art. 5488.) So, as in this case, the property on hand at the ancestor's death may be wasted or destroyed by the fortunes of war, or appropriated, without administration, to payment of just debts, and never reach the hands of the heir, so as to become assets chargeable to him. We think it clear, that, in this State, the responsibility of the heir for the debt or covenant of his ancestor is to he measured, not by the amount of the ancestor's estate which vested in him, but by the amount received. (Montgomery v. Culton, 18 Tex., 749; The State v. Lewellyen, 25 Tex., 797; Holman v. Criswell, 15 Tex., 399; Ansley v. Baker, 14 Tex., 607; Paschal's Dig., art. 1332.)
At common law, the liability of the heir did not exceed the lands inherited. (2 Blackst., 243; Rawle on Cov., 579.) The issues submitted were not, perhaps, exhaustive of the case. Indeed, on the question last discussed, no issue was submitted as to the fact of warranty,—a fact patent on the face of the deed in evidence, it is true, but one which should either have been found by the jury, or agreed upon by the parties. But if there were other issues which should have been submitted, it does not appear that any were suggested; and if the evidence seems insufficient to support the findings on some immaterial points, that constituted no good reason for granting a new trial.
Because we find no material error, the judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed.