Case Name: PETERS, Sheriff, v. UNITED STATES ex rel. KELLEY
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1910-01-28
Citations: 177 F. 885
Docket Number: No. 1,584
Parties: PETERS, Sheriff, v. UNITED STATES ex rel. KELLEY.
Judges: Before GROSSCUP, BAKER, and SEAMAN, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: Federal Reporter
Volume: 177
Pages: 885–892

Head Matter:
PETERS, Sheriff, v. UNITED STATES ex rel. KELLEY.
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
January 28, 1910.)
No. 1,584.
1. Habeas Corpus (§ 30 ) — Scope oe Writ — Original Controversy.
Where relator was imprisoned under a body execution on a judgment in an action for trespass vi et armis and assault and battery, a writ of habeas corpus was unavailable to bring the original parties into court to reliti’gate the original controversy, or to review alleged errors of law or fact in the original litigation.
[Ed. Note.. — For other cases, see Habeas Corpus, Cent. Dig. § 25: Doe. Dig. § 30.*]
Bankruptcy (§ 424*) — Discharge—Liability.
The character of the “liability,” as that word is used in Bankr. Act (Act July 3, 1898, e. 541, 30 Stat. 550 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3428]) § IT. subd. 2, as amended by Act Feb. 5, 3903, c. 487, § 5. 32 Slat. 798 (U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 3909, p. 3310]), specifying certain debts of a bankrupt not affected by a discharge, is not changed by the fact that the liability has been reduced to judgment.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Dec. Dig. § 424.*]
3. Bankruptcy (§ 424*) — Discharge—“Willful and Malicious Injury.”
The term “willful and malicious injury,” as used in the bankruptcy act, providing that a discharge shall not relieve the bankrupt from liability therefor, does not necessarily involve hatred or ill will as a state of mind, but arises from a wrongful act done intentionally without just cause or excuse; it being sufficient, to constitute a willful and malicious injury to person or property, that the wrongful act is intentionally done without just cause or excuse, special malice .not being required.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Dec. Dig. § 424.* :
For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 8, pp. 7477-7480; vol. 5, p. 4308.]
4. Bankruptcy (§ 424*) — Willful and Malicious Injury.
Where a judgment against a bankrupt was rendered on a declaration containing a count for trespass vi et armis, alleging that she overstepped her authority as a school teacher in administering corporal punishment to the plaintiff, it would he assumed, under the full faith and • credit clause ,of the federal Constitution, that the verdict rendered in the state court on which the judgment was based was sustained by sufficient evidence, and was rendered under proper instructions, and hence that the judgment was for a willful and malicious injury from which a discharge in bankruptcy would not relieve, under the rule that a judgment for damages under a count for trespass vi et armis cannot lawfully be rendered except on proof of a willful and malicious injury.
[lid. Note. — For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Dec. Dig. § 424. ]
Grosscup, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Illinois.
Habeas corpus by the United States, on the relation of Annie Kelley, against J. M. Peters, Sheriff of Champaign County, Illinois. Erom an order discharging petitioner from custody (1'66 Fed. 613), respondent appeals.
Reversed.
After relatrix was adjudged a bankrupt by the court below, and before she was discharged, appellant as sheriff took her into custody under an execution against her body. The execution was issued by virtue of a judgment entered against her in favor of Michael Burke by the circuit court of Champaign county, 111., before her voluntary petition in bankruptcy was filed. On her petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court, she was temporarily released from custody, pending her application for a discharge in bankruptcy. After her discharge in bankruptcy was granted, the District Court considered her petition for the writ, the sheriff’s return, and certain testimony, and thereupon entered the order appealed from, finally discharging relatrix from the custody of the sheriff.
Section 17 of the bankruptcy act of July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 550 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3428), as amended in 1903 (Act Feb. 5, 1903, e. 487, § 5, 32 Stat. 79S [U. S. Comp. St. Supp, 1909, p. 1310]), provides that “A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts, except such as * * * (2) are liabilities * * * for willful and malicious injuries to the person or property of another.”
The sheriff’s return exhibited the record of the proceedings and judgment of the Champaign county circuit court. On the hearing, relatrix admitted that the proceedings and judgment were correctly stated in the return.
Burke’s declaration was in thrée counts. The first was the common-law count for trespass vi et armis. The second stated that Burke was-J.1 years old, and was attending a public school in Champaign county, of which relatrix was the teacher; that relatrix, under pretense of inflicting punishment upon him for some alleged infraction of the rules, kept him after school, and then and there, without any just or sufficient excuse, unlawfully, willfully, wantonly, and maliciously struck and beat him violently with a certain stick or club; that the punishment administered as aforesaid was grossly and maliciously excessive; whereby he was permanently injured, etc. The third also detailed a “wanton and malicious” assault with a stick and club.
Relatrix pleaded the general issue; also that the alleged assault was only a moderate and proper punishment of Burke as pupil by relatrix as teacher; and, further, that the alleged assault occurred while relatrix was making a proper, defense against an assault by Burke.
On issues so tendered, and closed by Burke’s general replication, the jury returned a general verdict of guilty and assessed Burke’s damages at $lj800. Judgment in due form was entered. Relatrix prayed an appeal to the Appellate Court of Illinois, but the appeal was never perfected; and no bill of exceptions, preserving the evidence and the instructions of the court to the jury, was ever filed.
At the habeas corpus hearing the District Court permitted relatrix. over • appellants objection, to go into her side of the merits of the alleged assault. Appellant introduced no evidence touching the original occurrence on which ■the declaration was based.
H. I. Green and William M. Acton, for appellant.'
W. A. Perkins, for appellee.
Before GROSSCUP, BAKER, and SEAMAN, Circuit Judges.
For other eases see same topic & § number In Dee. & Am. Digs. 3907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes
Fof other cases see same topic & § nu.wbeh in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
BAKER, Circuit Judge
(after stating the facts as above). If the District Court and this court were at liberty to inquire de novo into the question whether relatrix inflicted a willful and malicious injury upon the person of her 11 year old pupil, a fair answer could not be given from this record. Relatrix and her witnesses gave their present version of her side of the story (some of them admitting on cross-examination that they were adding matters not testified to by them in the state court); but the boy and his witnesses did not attend the hearing in the District Court. We could not properly pass upon the truth of the original charge de novo, without considering the testimony in support of the charge.
Relatrix's direct adversary in the District Court was not the boy, but the sheriff; and he evidently thought that he was doing his full duty as a disinterested officer of the law when in response to the demand that he show cause why he detained relatrix in custody he produced the writ he held and the record of the proceedings and Judgment on which the writ was issued. And so he was; for a writ of habeas corpus cannot lawfully be used as a means of bringing the original parties into court to relitigate their original controversy — it cannot even be used lawfully to review and revise alleged errors of law or fact in the original litigation. "No court may properly release a prisoner under conviction and sentence of another court, unless for want of jurisdiction of the cause or person, or for some other matter rendering its proceedings void. Where a court had jurisdiction, mere errors which have been committed in the course of the proceedings cannot be corrected upon a writ of habeas corpus, which may not in this manner usurp tlie functions of a writ of error." Kaizo v. Henry, 211 U. S. 146, 29 Sup. Ct. 41, 53 L. Ed. 125, and cases there cited. Also Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet. 193, 7 L. Ed. 650, and In re Lennon, 166 U. S. 548, 17 Sup. Ct. 658, 41 L. Ed. 1110.
The character of the "liability," as that word is used in amended section 17 (2) of the bankruptcy act, is not changed by the fact that the liability was reduced to judgment. Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U. S. 473, 24 Sup. Ct. 505, 48 L. Ed. 754; Boynton v. Ball, 121 U. S. 457, 466, 7 Sup. Ct. 981, 30 L. Ed. 985; Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U. S. 265, 292, 8 Sup. Ct. 1370, 32 L. Ed. 239. The question, therefore, is whether the judgment of the state court is conclusive evidence of a liability of relatrix for a willful and malicious injury to the person of the judgment plaintiff.
"Willful and malicious injury," in the bankruptcy act and everywhere in the law, does not necessarily involve hatred or ill will as a state of mind, but arises from "a wrongful act, done intentionally, without just cause or excuse." "In order to come within that meaning as a judgment for a willful and malicious injury to person or property, it is not necessary that the cause of action be based upon special malice, so' that without it the action could not he maintained." Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U. S. 473, 485, 24 Sup. Ct. 505, 508, 48 L. Ed. 754.
In the second and third counts of the declaration the charge was explicitly .made that relatrix inflicted the injury willfully and maliciously; that she intentionally overstepped her authority as teacher, and administered an excessive punishment without just cause or excuse. By her pleas of denial, of authority as teacher, and of self-defense, she accepted the gage; and the jury found her guilty. What the evidence was, what the instructions were, we do not know; nor, if the second and third were the only counts, could we inquire, for unquestionably a judgment thereon would be conclusive that in fact and in law the relatrix had inflicted a willful and malicious injury rtpon .the.person of the judgment plaintiff.
Relatrix contends that under the first count, for trespass vi et annis, a recovery could be had without proof of a willful and malicious injury, and thereupon insists that it was not erroneous for the District Court to inquire de novo into the real nature of the alleged assault. If tire assumption as to the character of the first count were warranted, the predicated result would not follow. The most that would be authorized (if anything) would be to show that at the trial in the state court no evidence was introduced in support of the second and third counts, and that the evidence which was introduced under the first count did not tend to prove a willful and malicious injury. This, not •on the theory of., disputing the record or questioning the adjudication, but on the theory' that the record was ambiguous, and that therefore evidence dehors the record was proper and necessary to disclose what in truth had been adjudicated. The assumption,' however, is unwarranted, for by the law of Illinois (as generally elsewhere) a judgment for damages • under a count for trespass vi et armis cannot lawfully be rendered except upon proof of a willful and malicious injury. Jernberg v. Mix, 199 Ill. 254, 65 N. E. 242; Gilmore v. Fuller, 198 Ill. 143, 65 N. E. 84, 60 L. R. A. 286; Forsyth v. Vehmeyer, 176 Ill. 365, 52 N. E. 55; In re Mullen, 118 Ill. 551, 9 N. E. 208; In re Murphy, 109 Ill. 31; Paxton v. Boyer, 67 Ill. 133, 16 Am. Rep. 615; Razor v. Kinsey, 55 Ill. App. 605; Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U. S. 473, 24 Sup. Ct. 505, 48 L. Ed. 754; McChristal v. Clisbee, 190 Mass. 120, 76 N. E. 511, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 702. And the full faith and credit to which the judgment of the state court is entitled would not be rendered if a doubt were entertained that the jury under proper instructions based -their verdict on sufficient evidence.
The order appealed from is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the District Court with the direction to dismiss the petition.