Case Name: BUSCAINO v. RHODES
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1969-12-03
Citations: 20 Mich. App. 329
Docket Number: Docket No. 5,624
Parties: BUSCAINO v. RHODES
Judges: Before: J. H. Gillis, P. J., and Levin and Bronson, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 20
Pages: 329–340

Head Matter:
BUSCAINO v. RHODES
Opinion op J. H. G-illis, P. J.
1. Limitation of Actions — Tolling—Offioer^-JIisoretion. .
Statute of limitations 90-&ay tolling period is not to be construed as a gratuitous extension of time in which a party, provided he places a copy of a summons and complaint in the hands of an officer may further exercise his discretion as to when service will be made (CLS 1961, § 600.5856).
2. Limitation of Actions — Tolling—Process—-Immediate Service —Officer.
Statute of limitations was not tolled since summons and complaint were not placed in the hands of an officer for-immediate serviee, where a copy of the summons and complaint were placed in-the hands of a sheriff and at that time plaintiffs’ counsel advised the sheriff that one of the defendants was temporarily outside of the state and requested service not to be made on either defendant until the absent one returned (CLS 1961, § 600.5856).
3. Limitation of Actions — Postponement of Effect.
Any act or declaration that is to postpone the effect of a statute of limitations is to be clearly scrutinized.
.4. Courts — Court of Appeals — Stare Decisis — Precedent.
The Court of Appeals is not bound by its decision in a prior case.
5. Appeal and Error — Leave to Appeal — -Denial.
A denial of leave to appeal is an act of judicial discretion and does not constitute an affirmance on the merits.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1, 2, 6-8] 34 Am Jur, Limitation of Actions §§ 255, 258.
34 Am Jur, Limitation of Actions §§ 37-46.
20 Am Jur 2d, Courts §§ 183-203.
4, 5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error §§ 309, 353, 930.
[9,10] 41 Am Jur, Pleading §§ 340-343.
Concurring Opinion
Bronson, J.
6. Limitation of Actions' — Accelerated Judgment — Good Faith— Defenses — Waiver.
Plaintiffs, who placed a summons and complaint in the hands of a sheriff to toll the statute of limitations for 90 days and at that time told the sheriff to hold the papers because one of the defendants was out of the jurisdiction, might have been allowed to show evidence of good faith at the time defendants moved for accelerated judgment, but they should not be allowed to remain silent and later assert a defense of good faith after accelerated judgment has been rendered (CPS 1961, § 600.5856; GCP 1968,116).
Dissenting Opinion
Levin, J.
7. Limitation of Actions — Tolling—Process—Service—Officer— Good Faith.
Ashing an officer at the time a summons and complaint are delivered to him to refrain from attempting to serve defendants until he receives instructions to do so does not necessarily indicate that the process was not delivered in good faith for immediate service, thus tolling the statute of limitations for 90 days; if plaintiffs’ attorney in good faith believed that an attempt to effectuate service on both defendants at the same time would prove ineffective because one of the defendants was outside the state or otherwise unavailable, then he might be justified in instructing the officer to refrain from any attempt to serve with a view to later simultaneously serving both defendants (CPS 1961, § 600.5856).
8. Limitation of Actions — Tolling—Process—Good Faith — Accelerated Judgment — Testimonial Hearing.
Plaintiffs who delivered a copy of summons and complaint to an officer with instructions not to serve defendants until he received instructions to do so should be given an opportunity at a testimonial hearing on a motion for accelerated judgment to establish that the process was in fact delivered in good faith, thus tolling the statute of limitations, for the purpose of effecting simultaneous service on both defendants as soon as it could be achieved.
9. Motions — Accelerated Judgment — Competing Affidavits — Issue of Fact.
Accelerated judgment could not properly he granted where competing affidavits presented a disputed issue of fact requiring a trial hearing (GCB 196S, 116.3).
10. Motions — Accelerated Judgment — Trial Judge — Trier of Fact.
A trial judge considering a motion for accelerated judgment may not anticipate his own role as trier of fact and decide on competing affidavits alone (GCB 1963,116).
Appeal from Branch, Mark S. Andrews, J.
Submitted Division 3 April 8, 1969, at Lansing.
(Docket No. 5,624.)
Decided December 3, 1969.
Rehearing denied January 13, 1970.
Leave to appeal granted July 21, 1970.
See 383 Mich 807.
Complaint by Ross C. Buscaino and Jeanne Buscaino against Terrance Rhodes and Patricia Rhodes for damages sustained in an automobile collision. Accelerated judgment for defendants. Plaintiffs appeal.
Affirmed.
Harold J. Smith,, for plaintiffs.
Richard F. Biringer, for defendants.
Before: J. H. Gillis, P. J., and Levin and Bronson, JJ.

Opinion:
J. H. Gillis, P. J.
The cause of action in this case arose out of an automobile accident on November 13,1964. The suit was commenced on November 7, 1967, six days before the expiration of the statute of limitations, and on that date a copy of the summons and complaint were placed in the hands of the sheriff (for service). At that time counsel for plain tiffs advised the sheriff that one of the defendants was temporarily outside the jurisdiction and requested service not to he made on either defendant until the absent one returned.
RJA § 5856 provides as follows:
"The statutes of limitations are tolled when
"(3) the complaint is filed and a copy of the summons and complaint in good faith, are placed in the hands of an officer for immediate service, but in this case the statute shall not be tolled longer than 90 days thereafter." (Emphasis supplied.)
Service was made on January 2, 1968, within the 90-day period commencing with the date the summons and complaint were given to the sheriff. On January 22, 1968, defendants' attorney moved for accelerated judgment pursuant to GrCR 1963, 116.1 (5) on the ground that the statute of limitation had not been tolled but had expired because the summons and complaint had not been given to the sheriff for immediate service. The trial court granted the motion in an order dated March 26,1968. On April 12, 1968, plaintiffs moved to set aside the order and from a denial of that motion they appeal.
The question is whether a copy of the summons and complaint were placed in the hands of the sheriff for immediate service. The 90-day tolling period of § 3 is not to be construed as a gratuitous extension of time in which a party, provided he places a copy of the summons and complaint in the hands of an officer, may further exercise his discretion as to when service will be made. The import of the statute is to facilitate notice to a defendant and to stop the running of the statute of limitation for 90 days to allow defendant to be served by the officer. See committee comment to RJA § 5856. Thus, a plaintiff upon whose claim a statute of limitations is running-will not he penalized for the time it takes an officer to serve a defendant, up to 90 days.
In this case plaintiffs' attorney instructed the sheriff to withhold service until further notice because, as stated by affidavit, he "wanted-both defendants served at the same time in order to prevent said defendant from avoiding service." One defendant was capable of being served and alternative means were available to serve the defendant who was outside the jurisdiction. A copy of the summons and complaint were not placed in the hands of an officer for immediate service and the statute of limitation was not tolled.
Any act or declaration that is to postpone the effect of a statute of limitation is to be clearly scrutinized. Glass v. Drieborg (1941), 296 Mich 30. We deem a strict construction of the term "for immediate service" to be consistent with other cases in which § 5856 has been applied or construed. See Sera v. Eberlein (1968), 11 Mich App 139; DiGiovanni v. Yacenick (1968), 9 Mich App 590; Constantini v. Hofer (1967), 5 Mich App 597; Meyers v. Geer (1966), 4 Mich App 392; Bush v. Watson (1966), 3 Mich App 94; State Accident Fund v. Catsman Company, Incorporated (1965), 376 Mich 194.
I have carefully considered Hoseney v. Zantop (1969), 17 Mich App 141 (leave to appeal denied June 23, 1969, 382 Mich 765), a case which reaches a contrary result. We are not, however, bound, by that case, see Hackett v. Ferndale City Clerk (1965), 1 Mich App 6. Nor is the fact that leave to appeal was denied of any relevance. Such denials are acts of judicial discretion and do not constitute affirmances on the merits. People v. Berry (1968), 10 Mich App 469. As I am unpersuaded by its reasoning, I decline to follow Hoseney.
Affirmed. Costs to appellees.
CLS 1961, § 600.5805 (Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27A.5805).
CLS 1961, § 600.5856 (Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27 A.5856).