Case Name: CITY OF DARLINGTON, City of Hartsville, J. Ronald Ward, Cecil Chandler, Pat Howle, Earl Johnson, James Hammons, Roseann W. Harry, Oby G. Lyles, Jr., L.M. Cannarella, T. James Bell, Jr., Pam P. Carrol, William A. Gaskins, Franklin Hines, Mary F. Jordan, T.B. Thomas, Tom Stewart, Marion "Bud" Gandy, Mrs. Guy Beatty, George Beckroge, Bishop Lenist Hunter, Beth Weaver, Mrs. Ann Osborne, Donald Sylvester, Bill Segars, Edward L. Melton, James T. Gainey, Marvin Odom, A.M. Odom, W.R. "Bill" Gunnells, William A. Bramlett, Jr., Jan Bramlett, Robert Hitch, Susan Hitch, Robert B. Moody, Barbara W. Moody, Don A. Parnell, Jack W. Price, Laurie G. Price, Respondents v. Robert L. KILGO, Jr., Jerrell Sansbury, Rosa Lee Gerald, Robert L. Bryant, Bobbie S. Gardner, Lucious T. Bacote, Richard Griggs, Maxie O. Redic, Jr., and Billy D. O'Neal, Appellants
Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1990-05-07
Citations: 302 S.C. 40
Docket Number: 23213
Parties: CITY OF DARLINGTON, City of Hartsville, J. Ronald Ward, Cecil Chandler, Pat Howle, Earl Johnson, James Hammons, Roseann W. Harry, Oby G. Lyles, Jr., L.M. Cannarella, T. James Bell, Jr., Pam P. Carrol, William A. Gaskins, Franklin Hines, Mary F. Jordan, T.B. Thomas, Tom Stewart, Marion “Bud” Gandy, Mrs. Guy Beatty, George Beckroge, Bishop Lenist Hunter, Beth Weaver, Mrs. Ann Osborne, Donald Sylvester, Bill Segars, Edward L. Melton, James T. Gainey, Marvin Odom, A.M. Odom, W.R. “Bill” Gunnells, William A. Bramlett, Jr., Jan Bramlett, Robert Hitch, Susan Hitch, Robert B. Moody, Barbara W. Moody, Don A. Parnell, Jack W. Price, Laurie G. Price, Respondents v. Robert L. KILGO, Jr., Jerrell Sansbury, Rosa Lee Gerald, Robert L. Bryant, Bobbie S. Gardner, Lucious T. Bacote, Richard Griggs, Maxie O. Redic, Jr., and Billy D. O’Neal, Appellants.
Judges: Gregory, C.J., and Toal, J., concur.
Reporter: South Carolina Reports
Volume: 302
Pages: 40–50

Head Matter:
23213
CITY OF DARLINGTON, City of Hartsville, J. Ronald Ward, Cecil Chandler, Pat Howle, Earl Johnson, James Hammons, Roseann W. Harry, Oby G. Lyles, Jr., L.M. Cannarella, T. James Bell, Jr., Pam P. Carrol, William A. Gaskins, Franklin Hines, Mary F. Jordan, T.B. Thomas, Tom Stewart, Marion “Bud” Gandy, Mrs. Guy Beatty, George Beckroge, Bishop Lenist Hunter, Beth Weaver, Mrs. Ann Osborne, Donald Sylvester, Bill Segars, Edward L. Melton, James T. Gainey, Marvin Odom, A.M. Odom, W.R. “Bill” Gunnells, William A. Bramlett, Jr., Jan Bramlett, Robert Hitch, Susan Hitch, Robert B. Moody, Barbara W. Moody, Don A. Parnell, Jack W. Price, Laurie G. Price, Respondents v. Robert L. KILGO, Jr., Jerrell Sansbury, Rosa Lee Gerald, Robert L. Bryant, Bobbie S. Gardner, Lucious T. Bacote, Richard Griggs, Maxie O. Redic, Jr., and Billy D. O’Neal, Appellants.
(393 S.E. (2d) 376)
Supreme Court
Margaret C. Pope, Frank W. Cureton and Virginia L. Vroegop, Belton T. Zeigler, Sinkler and Boyd, P.A., Columbia, and Karl H. Smith, Hartsville, for appellants.
Martin S. Driggers, Hartsville, and Paul A. Sansbury, Darlington, for respondents.
Roy D. Bates, Columbia, for amicus curiae Mun. Ass’n of S.C.
Heard June 8, 1989.
Decided May 7, 1990.

Opinion:
Finney, Justice:
This is an appeal of a summary judgment order granting respondents, City of Darlington, City of Hartsville (Cities) and other individuals who live in or near the Cities an injunction against appellants, the Darlington County Administrator and members of the Darlington County Council (County). We affirm.
Darlington County Council passed an ordinance creating a fire district which included all unincorporated areas of Darlington County. The County did not seek an agreement with the Cities prior to adopting this plan. The respondent Cities sued to enjoin implementation of the plan as a violation of S.C. Code § 4-19-10 (1976) because the County's proposed service area includes areas for which the Cities provided fire protection. The Cities moved for summary judgment. The trial court enjoined appellants from creating a fire district which included property within five miles of the Cities' boundaries unless and until the parties executed an agreement. This appeal followed.
In addition to furnishing full fire protection service within their corporate limits, the Cities also contract to provide limited service within a five-mile radius outside their municipal boundaries. Service to these outlying areas is confined to structures under contract or life-threatening fires. The record reflects that the Cities respond to fire calls for non-contract structures, at which time the owner generally agrees to pay the fee.
First, appellants contend § 4-19-10 does not restrict its ability to create a county-wide fire district without an agreement because the Cities' limited fire protection does not qualify the five-mile radius as a "service area" as contemplated by the statute. The County Fire Protection Services Act, Section 4-19-10, provides:
Powers of governing body generally.
The governing body of each county has the following powers:
(a) To establish, operate, and maintain a system of fire protection.
(b) To designate, subject to the provisions of § 4-19-20, the areas of the county where fire protection service may be furnished by the county under the provisions of this chapter (referred to in this chapter as service areas); provided, however, that these service areas shall exclude those areas where fire protection is then being furnished by some other political subdivision unless an agreement be entered into between the county and such other political subdivision for the joint exercise of fire protection powers within the service area of such political subdivision and the sharing of the costs thereof.
. (Emphasis added.)
In its findings preceding reenactment of the County Fire Protection Services Act in 1984, the South Carolina legislature made clear its intent by stating that "[t]he General Assembly has determined to reenact this legislation under which counties may provide fire protection services within the unincorporated areas of such counties where no fire protection services are presently offered by any existing special purpose district or municipality . . ." Act No. 408, 1984 S.C. Act 1818. (Emphasis added.) As noted in § 5-7-60, municipalities may only provide service outside their corporate limits by contract.
The trial court concluded that legislative intent was to allow municipalities to continue to offer fire protection service in areas previously served under contract, and that such areas could not be included in any county district plan without prior agreement with the municipality. We agree. It is our view that S.C. Code § 4-19-10(b) protects the rights of cities and customers who have contracted for fire protection under § 5-7-60 and that, in the absence of an agreement, newly created county fire districts must exclude areas served by cities under contract. Since the legislature did not qualify the nature or extent of the "fire protection services . . offered," this Court is constrained to hold that the five-mile radius protected by the Cities under contract constitutes a "service area."
Second, appellants assert that S.C. Code Ann. § 5-7-60 prohibits Cities from providing fire protection service to unincorporated areas after the County undertakes service in such areas. Appellants recite language from City of Myrtle Beach that "under no circumstances could the cities have a governmental right to interfere with the creation of such [county created fire] districts." City of Myrtle Beach v. Richardson, 280 S.C. 167, 169, 311 S.E. (2d) 922, 923 (1984). In the instant case, respondents do not challenge appellant's right to "create" a fire district; they contend that such a district may not include areas presently served by the Cities.
Under S.C. Code Ann. § 5-7-60 (1976), South Carolina cities may contract with any individual, corporation, state or political subdivision or agency to furnish fire protection outside the cities' corporate limits. Thus, the question is whether there is a conflict between the County Fire Protection Services Act, § 4-19-10(b), and the Cities' statutory rights under § 5-7-60. This Court finds no conflict between § 4-19-10 and § 5-7-60.
The 1984 County Fire Protection Services Act authorized the creation of such districts and established criteria which must be met for the institution of county fire districts. It is only when an existing municipal service area within the county is affected that an agreement for the joint exercise of fire protection powers must be entered into prior to the creation of a county fire protection district. This provision does not embody veto power, but allows both entities to furnish service with a determination of how the costs thereof shall be shared.
It is this Court's conclusion that the legislature balanced the county residents' interest in having full fire protection with the municipalities' interest in continuing service it has been providing by requiring an agreement between the two when the county proposes to institute county-wide protection. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Gregory, C.J., and Toal, J., concur.
Harwell, J., and Goolsby, Acting Associate Justice, dissenting in separate opinion.
Appellants assert that fire protection is available within the five-mile radius only upon payment of a fee, that such coverage is provided only for structures, and that less than one-third of the property owners are covered by contract.
In City of Myrtle Beach, supra, this Court held in 1984 that the County Fire Protection Services Act of 1974 was repugnant to the 1975 Home Rule Act. We reasoned that because the 1975 Home Rule Act required freeholder initiative as a precondition of all special taxing districts, including fire protection districts, and the 1974 County Fire Protection Services Act did not require freeholder initiative, the former act was impliedly repealed by the latter. However, later in 1984, the General Assembly reenacted the 1974 County Fire Protection Services Act without change, thereby limiting the precedential value of the decision in City of Myrtle Beach.
The statutory mandate for an agreement between counties and municipalities provides for a resolution of such disputes with a view to providing uniform comprehensive fire protection to all residents in accordance with the spirit of the statute.
Section 5-7-60 of the Code of Laws of South Carolina (1976) provides in pertinent part: Any municipality may perform any of its functions, furnish any of its services, except services of police officers, and make charges therefor and may participate in the financing thereof in areas outside the corporate limits of such municipality by contract with any individual, corporation, state or political subdivision or agency thereof or with the United States Government or agency thereof... [emphasis added].