Case Name: Christopher David WILHELM, Appellant, v. Dan GRAY, Court Clerk of Oklahoma County, Appellee
Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oklahoma
Decision Date: 1988-12-06
Citations: 766 P.2d 1357
Docket Number: No. 61296
Parties: Christopher David WILHELM, Appellant, v. Dan GRAY, Court Clerk of Oklahoma County, Appellee.
Judges: HARGRAVE, V.C.J., and HODGES, LAVENDER and ALMA WILSON, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Pacific Reporter 2d
Volume: 766
Pages: 1357–1371

Head Matter:
Christopher David WILHELM, Appellant, v. Dan GRAY, Court Clerk of Oklahoma County, Appellee.
No. 61296.
Supreme Court of Oklahoma.
Dec. 6, 1988.
As Corrected Feb. 14, 1989.
Robert K. McCune, Stipe, Gossett, Stipe, Harper, Estes, McCune & Parks, Oklahoma City, for appellant.
Phyllis L. Walta, Asst. Dist. Atty., Oklahoma City, for appellee.

Opinion:
SIMMS, Justice.
Appeal from a judgment of the district court dismissing plaintiff/appellant's cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because an adequate remedy under state law exists for redress of plaintiff's claim. AFFIRMED.
The relevant facts are as follows. Plaintiff received a traffic citation. Because he failed to appear in court at the designated time, a bench warrant was issued for his arrest. Later, the plaintiff paid his fine. The warrant was recalled by the Court three days after the fine was paid.
The Court Clerk, appellee Dan Gray, failed to notify the Oklahoma County Sheriffs Office that the warrant had been recalled. Four months later, on Christmas Eve, the appellant was performing his duties as a private security guard when his activities near a business that had closed for the night attracted the attention of a Midwest City police officer. The officer detained the appellant long enough to run a "wants and warrants" computer check on him. When the officer was informed that an outstanding warrant existed, he arrested the appellant.
The appellant was taken to the Midwest City jail where he remained until December 27, at which time it was verified that his fine had been paid and the warrant had been recalled. Thereafter, appellant filed the instant action, alleging that his rights guaranteed by the" 4th, 5th, 6th, and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution had been violated by his erroneous arrest, and seeking damages pursuant to the remedies provided under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The appellant's first petition to the district court named the Board of County Commissioners as defendants. Later, the appellant was allowed to amend the petition, naming instead the appellee herein. The appellee responded by demurrer, alleging that a cause of action under § 1983 did not lie because an adequate remedy exists under State law for the appellant's claim.
The appellant was given the opportunity to again amend his petition. He declined, however, choosing to stand on the petition as presented. The district court then sustained appellee's demurrer and dismissed the case. It is from this order dismissing his § 1983 claim that the appellant brings this appeal.
I.
A single issue is presented on appeal. The question here is whether the trial court erred in dismissing the appellant's § 1983 claim for relief because an independent state remedy for the alleged wrong exists. Any other issues or errors that may have been present have not been briefed and are waived. Messler v. Simmons Gun Specialties, Inc., Okl., 687 P.2d 121 (1984); Sooner Drainboard Co. v. Deaton, Okl., 512 P.2d 1185 (1973).
We are of the opinion that resolution of this issue is controlled by four decisions of the United States Supreme Court, see: Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979); and to a limited extent, the analysis adopted by that court in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981). Both Hudson and Parratt address the question of whether a cause of action may be maintained under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a deprivation of a Constitutionally protected right when alternate state grounds for relief are available. Daniels and Baker are determinative on the question of whether negligence, alone, may give rise to a § 1983 claim for relief based upon the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The appellant places great weight on the fact that both Hudson and Parratt deal with deprivations of property without due process of law, rather than with deprivations of liberty. The appellant argues that this distinction alone is ground for maintaining his § 1983 suit because liberty interests are afforded greater importance in law than are property interests.
While we might agree that, in many circumstances, liberty interests are held in higher regard than property interests, we do not read these cases that narrowly. It is the deprivation of a constitutionally protected interest which is the subject matter of both the cases and § 1983, not the interest itself. Therefore, whether the alleged violations pertain to liberty interest or to property interests, it is not the type of interest which is determinative, it is the deprivation of a protected right which is actionable.
The clear import of Hudson and Parratt is that a § 1983 action may not be maintained for the deprivation of a constitutional right if adequate and meaningful State grounds for redress exist. Hudson v. Palmer, supra, 468 U.S., at 534, 104 S.Ct., at 3204; Parratt v. Taylor, supra, 451 U.S., at 543-544, 101 S.Ct., at 1916-1917. In Oklahoma, those State remedies exist in the form of our Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, 51 O.S.Supp. 1987, § 151, et seq. It is irrelevant that the appellant may not recover as much under the State remedy as he could through § 1983. Hudson v. Palmer, supra, 468 U.S. at 535, 104 S.Ct., at 3204.
There are common elements between this case and the discussion by the United States Supreme Court in Parratt which lend support to the result reached by the trial court here. The appellant's petition sounds in negligence. In fact, the appellant admits as much in his brief. Here, as in Parratt, there is no doubt that a state actor is involved. Similarly, there is no suggestion that the deprivation suffered by the appellant was the result of an established state procedure, but rather was the result of the apparent negligence of one state agent. The Supreme Court in Par-ratt, addressing these very points, adopted the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit in Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311, 1319 (7th Cir.1975), where that court stated:
"It seems to us that there is an important difference between a challenge to an established state procedure as lacking in due process and a property damage claim arising out of the misconduct of state officers.... even though there is action 'under color of state law sufficient to bring the amendment into play, the state action is not necessarily complete. For in a case such as this, [the state laws provide], in substance, that the plaintiff is entitled to be made whole for any loss.... occasioned by the unauthorized conduct of the [state employees]. We may reasonably conclude, therefore, that the existence of an adequate state remedy to redress property damage inflicted by state officers avoids the conclusion that there has been any constitutional deprivation of property without due process of law within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment." Parratt v. Taylor, supra, 451 U.S. at 542, 101 S.Ct., at 1916. (emphasis added)
Following the above quotation from Bonner, the Supreme Court explicitly stated that the Bonner analysis "is the proper manner in which to approach a case such as this." Parratt, at 542, 101 S.Ct., at 1916. Accordingly, even though this case concerns the arguably negligent deprivation of constitutionally protected rights rather than solely property interests, we adopt the Bonner analysis.
II.
Because the appellant's amended petition sounds only in negligence, the cases of Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986) and Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979) are determinative of the narrow issue raised: whether a negligent act by a state agent resulting in a deprivation of a protected right is actionable under § 1983 as a violation of due process. The court's holding that the protections of the Due Process Clause are not triggered by allegations of negligence or lack of due care has been applied in this circuit. See, Graham v. Gray, 827 F.2d 679 (10th Cir.1987).
Simply stated, under the rule from Daniels, this appellant's allegations of negligence do not rise to a level sufficient to state a claim under § 1983. As stated by the Supreme Court:
"Section 1983 imposes liability for violations of rights protected by the Constitution, not for violations of duties of care arising out of tort law....
False imprisonment does not become a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment merely because the defendant is a state official. Where a government official's act causing injury to life, liberty or property is merely negligent, no procedure for compensation is CONSTITUTIONALLY required." Id. 474 U.S., at 333, 106 S.Ct., at 666. (emphasis supplied) (citing Baker v. McCollan, supra, 443 U.S., at 137, 99 S.Ct., at 2689)
The discussion by the United States Supreme Court in the Baker case is especially relevant here. In that case too, the plaintiff had been arrested pursuant to a facially valid arrest warrant and held three days over a holiday weekend, despite his repeated declarations that a mistake had been made. As further stated by the Supreme Court:
"respondent's complaint is simply that despite his protests of [mistake], he was detained in the . jail [over the holiday weekend until] the validity of his protests was ascertained. Whatever claims this situation might give rise to under state tort law, we think it gives rise to no claim under the United States Constitution. Respondent was indeed deprived of his liberty for a period of days, but it was pursuant to a warrant conforming, for purposes of our decision, to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Obviously, one in respondent's position could not be detained indefinitely in the face of repeated protests of innocence even though the warrant under which he was arrested and detained met the standards of the Fourth Amendment. For the Constitution likewise guarantees an accused the right to a speedy trial, invocation of the speedy trial right need not await indictment or other formal charge; arrest pursuant to probable cause is itself sufficient.
[M]ere detention pursuant to a valid warrant but in the face of repeated protests of innocence will after the lapse of a certain amount of time deprive the accused of "liberty . without due process of law." But we are quite certain that a detention of three days over a [holiday] weekend does not and could not amount to such a deprivation." Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S., at 144-5, 99 S.Ct., at 2694-5, (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
We think it abundantly clear that the appellant's Fourteenth Amendment claim must fail in light of the Supreme Court's holdings in Daniels and Baker.
III.
As stated herein, the Oklahoma Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act is perfectly suited to providing redress for appellant's grievance. As in Parratt, Oklahoma "provides a remedy to persons who believe they have suffered a tortious loss at the hands of the state." 451 U.S. at 543, 101 S.Ct. at 1917. Again, as in Parratt, the remedies provided by 51 O.S.Supp.1987, § 151, et seq., can fully compensate the appellant for the loss he has suffered, "and we hold that they are sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process." Id. at 544. The Due Process Clause is not implicated by a merely negligent act of a state official which results in an "unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property." Daniels, supra, 474 U.S. at 327, 106 S.Ct., at 662. Therefore, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is unavailable as a means of redress for the wrongs alleged in this case.
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
HARGRAVE, V.C.J., and HODGES, LAVENDER and ALMA WILSON, JJ., concur.
. Parratt was overruled insofar as the case held that the mere lack of due care by a state agent can give rise to a § 1983 claim for violation of Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Daniels v. Williams, 106 S.Ct., at 665.
. The appellant has neither plead nor argued that the alleged negligent acts of the appellee were with malice, wantonness, reckless or were the result of gross negligence. Accordingly, like the United States Supreme Court in Daniels, supra, we have no occasion to consider whether forms of extreme negligence by a state agent could "trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause." 106 S.Ct., at 667, n. 2.