Case Name: SAUNDERS v. BUSCH-EVERETT CO.
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1914-11-04
Citations: 138 La. 1049
Docket Number: No. 20367
Parties: SAUNDERS v. BUSCH-EVERETT CO.
Judges: 
Reporter: Louisiana Reports
Volume: 138
Pages: 1049–1069

Head Matter:
(71 South. 153)
No. 20367.
SAUNDERS v. BUSCH-EVERETT CO.
(Nov. 4, 1914.
On the Merits, Feb. 21, 1916.)
(Syllabus by Editorial Staff.)
On Motion to Dismiss.
1. Appeal and Error <&wkey;154(l) — Grounds for Dismissal — Acquiescence in Judgment.
That plaintiff pending his appeal from an adverse judgment in a suit to annul an oil and mineral lease sold to a third party an undivided one-half of the oils and minerals under a part of the land and conveyed same by an instrument specifying that the land was leased- to defendant, and that the sale was made subject to such lease and included an undivided half interest in all royalties due under such lease, did not require the dismissal of the appeal on the ground that plaintiff had acquiesced therein, even though it be deemed an express admission of the validity of the lease and the correctness of the judgment appealed from; an admission of the correctness of a judgment, though good ground for affirming a judgment, constituting no ground for. dismissing the appeal on the ground of acquiescence.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Gent. Dig. §§ 957, 958, 961, 962; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;154(l).]
2. Appeal and Error &wkey;>154(l) — Grounds for Dismissal — ‘ ‘Acquiescence’ ‘ ‘Admission.”
“Acquiescence,” in a judgment such as will authorize dismissal of an appeal implies consent, and is not the same as an “admission” of the correctness of the judgment. A candid person admits a thing not because he wants to do so, but because truth compels him to do so, whereas it is the element of consent in acquiescence that furnishes the ground for dismissing an appeal.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 957, 958, 961, 962; Dec. Dig. &wkey;154(l).
For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Acquiescence; Admission.]
3. Appeal and Error <&wkey;154(l), 805 — Ratification of Judgment — Abandonment of Appeal.
That plaintiff pending his appeal from an adverse judgment in a suit to annul a duly recorded oil and mineral lease stated in an instrument whereby he conveyed an interest in the oil and mineral to a third person, that the land was leased to defendant, and that the sale was made subject to the lease and covered an interest in royalties and rents due under it, did not amount to a ratification of the judgment by plaintiff and a consequential abandonment of his appeal.
[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 957, 3174, 3175; Dec. Dig. &wkey;154(l), 805.]
4. Estoppel &wkey;>56 — Admission—Inducement to Action.
Such alleged admission by plaintiff of the correctness of the judgment could not serve as a basis for estoppel where it was not acted on by defendant.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Estoppel, Gent. Dig. § 142; Dec. Dig. <S&wkey;56.]
5. Estoppel <&wkey;25 — Deeds — Rights of Strangers.
Strangers to a deed, cannot avail themselves of an estoppel arising from it.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Estoppel, Cent. Dig. §§ 61, 62; Dec. Dig. <&wkey;>25.]
6. Appeal and Error <&wkey;780(2) — Dismissal-Right — Transfer of Interest.
That one to whom plaintiff had sold an interest in property and royalties pending his appeal from an adverse judgment in a suit to annul an oil and mineral lease, could, by setting up the sale, have prevented plaintiff from further prosecuting the suit, did not entitle defendant to a dismissal of the appeal because of the sale.
[Ed. Note — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, D,ee. Dig. <&wkey;780(2).]
7. Appeal and Error <&wkey;154(l) — Right of Appeal — Abandonment—Acquiescence in Judgment.
For an acquiescence in a judgment to take away the right of appeal, there must he an unconditional, voluntary, and absolute acquiescence by appellant, and he must have intended to acquiesce and abandon his right of appeal.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Gent..Dig. §§ 957, 958, 961, 962; Dee. Dig. <&wkey;154(l).]
(Syllabus'by the Court.)
On the Merits.
8. Mines and Minerals &wkey;>58 — Option to Drill for Oil and Gas — “Potestative Condition.”
A contract whereby the owner of land grants to another, in consideration of payments, made and to be made, of certain agreed sums of money and other considerations which are to arise in a certain contingency, his right, or option, to drill for oil or gas within a year, and to extend the time thus granted, quarter by quarter, until it reaches a limit of 5 years, contains no potestative condition by reason of its failure to impose upon the grantee any obligation to drill, since it is not within the contemplation of the contract that he should drill, unless he so elects. The purpose is to confer the right to drill without imposing the obligation, and there is nothing in that purpose or in the nature of the contract which contravenes any law of this state.
[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Mines and Minerals, Cent. Dig. §§ 168, 169; Dec. Dig. &wkey;?58.
Eor other definitions, see Words and Phrases, Eirst Series, Potestative Condition.]
9. Mires and Minerals <&wkey;58 — Option to Drill eor Oil and Gas — Consideration— “Serious Consideration.”
Where, as a consideration for an option to drill for oil and gas upon lands in improved territory, the grantee pays, cash in advance, an amount equal to 3 per cent, on the market value of the lands for one year’s time within which to exercise his option, and a like amount, in quarterly payments, in advance, during four years for quarterly extensions of the time, it cannot be said, either that the price (if the transaction be considered a sale) is not “serious” or that it is “out of all proportion to the value of the thing,” within the meaning of Civ. Code, art. 2464. Whether it is adequate or inadequate is a question with which the courts have no concern, where neither error nor fraud are alleged and shown.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Mines and Minerals, Cent. Dig. §§ 168, 169; Dec. Dig. 58.]
Appeal from Eirst Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; John R. Land, Judge.
Action by D. W. Saunders against the Busch-Everett Company. Prom judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals, and defendant moves to dismiss.
Motion to dismiss overruled, and judgment affirmed.
Scarborough & Carver, of Natchitoches, and Hall & Jack, of Shreveport, for appellant. Alexander & Wilkinson and Hampden Story, all of Shreveport, for appellee. Thigpen & I-Ierold, of Shreveport, amici curiae.

Opinion:
On Motion to Dismiss.
PROVOSTY, J.
This being a suit to annul an oil and mineral lease made by the plaintiff to the defendant, the Busch-Everett Company, to a large tract of land, and plaintiff having appealed from an adverse judgment, motion is made to dismiss, the appeal on the ground that plaintiff has. acquiesced in the judgment. This acquiescence is sought to be deduced from the fact that subsequently to the rendition of the. judgment plaintiff sold to a third party an undivided half of the oil and minerals in, and under a part of said land by a notarial act duly recorded, containing the following, clause:
"And, whereas, said land is now leased to the-Busch-Everett Company, and by the Busch-Everett Company assigned to the Pasadena Petroleum Company, for development for oil and gas, as shown by lease recorded in the recqrds of De Soto parish, this sale is made subject to said lease, and this sale covers and includes an undivided one-half interest in all royalties and rentals that may be due under the terms of said lease."
It is argued that by this clause plaintiff admitted the validity of the lease as to the part of the land embraced in the sale, and that, the lease being indivisible — not susceptible of being valid in part and invalid in part — the recognition of its validity as to a part of the land was a recognition of its validity as to the whole; and, ergo, was an admission of the correctness of the said judgment, and an acquiescence therein. That it was either this, or it was a fraudulent attempt on the part of plaintiff to defraud said third person by depriving him of "an undivided interest in all the royalties and rentals that may be due under said lease."
This argument impresses us not at all. 'Even if plaintiff had made an express admission of the validity of the lease and of the correctness of the judgment appealed from, this would not have furnished ground for dismissal. While the admission of the correctness of a judgment may furnish the best of grounds for affirming the judgment on appeal, it furnishes no ground whatever for dismissing the appeal on the ground of acquiescence; acquiescence implies consent; admission does not. A candid person admits a thing, not because he wants to do so, but because truth compels him to do so; whereas, it is the element of consent in acquiescence that furnishes the ground for dismissing an appeal. What we here say with regard to an admission not forming a basis for dismissal is illustrated by the fact that an admission furnishes no ground for estoppel until it has been acted on to the prejudice of the person to whom it was made. 16 Cyc. 755. But, putting all this aside, as savoring, perhaps, more or less of refinement, what are the plain facts of the matter? The lease was duly recorded, and therefore any sale made by plaintiff of the oils and minerals embraced in it was necessarily subject to it. This condition of things was an existing, stubborn fact, which plaintiff did not have the power to change. The concealment, or attempted concealment, of it by plaintiff from his vendee would have constituted— what the defendant intimates the mention of it was — a fraud upon the said vendee. In common honesty it had to be mentioned. So that, all that plaintiff could do was to do exactly what he did do, namely, mention the fact of the existence of the lease and of the property passing subject to it, and, at the same time, convey all the rights he had un der it. By this means the vendee was placed exactly in plaintiff's shoes with reference to the 'oils and minerals proposed to be sold; in other words, the object of the sale was fully accomplished.
To argue from this, that plaintiff intended to ratify the judgment from which he was appealing, and abandon his appeal, appears to us to be far-fetched in the extreme. Nothing shows that he intended anything of the kind. ITe had to either do as he did, or else not make the sale; and, unquestionably, he was at perfect liberty to make the sale. Perhaps, for his own greater safety, he might have gone further and mentioned the fact of the pendency of the present suit; but his not having done so is a matter which in no way, shape, or form concerns the defendant.
It is argued, further, that if this sale had been made prior to the institution of the present suit, it would "indubitably" have operated as an estoppel to it, and that therefore it is an acquiescence in the judgment.
We fail entirely to see the force of this reasoning. An admission not acted upon cannot serve as a basis for estoppel. Defendant has never acted on this so-called admission; so that, even if it had been made prior to this suit, the defendant could not have invoked it as a basis for estoppel. Moreover, nothing is more fundamental in the law of estoppel than that strangers to a deed cannot avail themselves of an estoppel arising from it. 16 Cyc. 710. True, if, in the present case, plaintiff's vendee should prefer that the lease should not be annulled, but should continue in existence, so that he might reap the advantages under it, he might set up this sale of all the plaintiff's right under the lease as an estoppel to the further prosecution by plaintiff of the present suit to annul said lease; but this is no business of the defendant. And, besides, we have little doubt that plaintiff's said vendee is as desirous to have said lease annulled as plaintiff himself is, and for the same reasons.
In the said act of the plaintiff and appellant we fail to discover even the slightest evidence of acquiescence, whereas to take away the right of appeal there must be an unconditional, voluntary, and absolute acquiescence in the judgment on the part of the appellant, who must have intended to acquiesce and abandon his right of appeal. Sims v. Jeter, 129 Da. 263, 55 South. 877, and authorities there cited.
The motion to dismiss is therefore overruled.