Case Name: WILLIAMS v. PACIFIC SURETY CO.
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1912-10-22
Citations: 66 Or. 151
Docket Number: 
Parties: WILLIAMS v. PACIFIC SURETY CO.
Judges: Mr. Chief Justice McBride dissents.
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 66
Pages: 151–163

Head Matter:
Argued October 15,
decided October 22, 1912;
rehearing denied April 29, 1913.
Judgment modified on motion June 3, 1913.
Motion to recall mandate and modify same denied July 29, 1913.
WILLIAMS v. PACIFIC SURETY CO.
(127 Pac. 145: 131 Pac. 1021: 132 Pac. 959: 133 Pac. 1186.)
Parties — Plaintiffs—Joint Obligees.
1. At common law a joint obligee could not sue in his own name alone, but could join his co-obligee as plaintiff, even against his remonstrance, by giving bond to save him harmless from costs.
Setoff and Counterclaim — Existence of Remedy — Rights at Common Law,
2. At common law a defendant could not counterclaim a demand so as to obtain an afiirmative judgment against plaintiff for anything but costs, but under the code counterclaims are allowed, and an affirmative judgment may be had thereon without limit.
[As to the right to interpose counterclaim or setoff exceeding jurisdiction of court, see note in Ann. Cas 1913B, 159.]
Judgment — Determination of Issues — Several Parties.
3. While at common law only one judgment can be given in favor of all plaintiffs or all defendants, the court, under Section 41, L. O. L., may give judgment for or against one or more of several defendants, or for or against one or more plaintiffs, as justice may require, and determine the ultimate rights of the parties between themselves.
Parties — J oinder.
4. Under Article I, Section 10, of the Constitution, providing that every man shall have remedy by due course of law for injury done him, and Section 983, L. 0. L., providing that when jurisdiction is by the organic law or by the code, or by any other statute, conferred on a court, all the means necessary to carry into effect are given, and, in the exercise of the jurisdiction, where the course of the proceeding is not specifically pointed out, any suitable process may be adopted, the court, where a particular form of procedure is not prescribed by the code, may pursue that wbieh will secure the rights of all the parties and an orderly trial of the case, and, in the absence of any statutory provision for compelling an unwilling co-obligee to join as plaintiff in an aetion at law, one obligee may, on the refusal of the co-obligee to join, sue the obligor and make the co-obligee a defendant, and compel him to litigate his rights, and thereby determine the rights of all the parties.
Appeal and Error — Affirmance—Overruling of Demurrer — Permission to Answer.
5. In an aetion at law where the judgment of the trial court overruling a demurrer to the complaint is affirmed, the Supreme Court will not remand the case with directions to permit the defendants to answer on the merits, it having no authority to determine, on affidavits dehors the record, the question of the existence of possible meritorious defenses which were not interposed.
Appeal and Error — Disposition of Case on Appeal — Allowance of Leave to Plead.
6. The Supreme Court, affirming an order overruling a demurrer to the complaint in an action at law, thereby overruling prior decisions, will allow the defendant the privilege of applying to the Circuit Court for leave to answer, whieh permission may be granted or not in the discretion of the Circuit Court.
Appeal and Error — Jurisdiction of Appellate Court After Remand.
7. This court retains jurisdiction over a. cause until the end of the term at which the ease was decided, although the remitter may have been issued before the expiration of the term.
Appeal and Error — Correction of Mandate — Jurisdiction.
8. If a remitter fails to express correctly the ultimate determination of a eause, the appellate court, though after the term at which the ease is decided, has, in its inherent authority over its own judgments and decrees, plenary power to recall and correct the mandate so as to make it conform to ihe decision which was rendered.
Pleading — Demurrer—Answering Over.
9. Answering over after a demurrer to a complaint is overruled does not waive the objections, raised by the demurrer, that the complaint does not state a eause of action and that the court has no juris diction of the subject matter, so the prudent practice is to answer over after the demurrer is overruled.
Principal and Surety — Breach of Contract — Liability of Surety— Damages.
10. Where a surety company executed a bond for the sum of $25,000 to guarantee the performance of a contract by a third party for the delivery of 200,000,000 feet of logs, the measure of the surety’s liability upon breach is not the sum specified in the bond but actual damages.
From Multnomah: Henry E. McGinn, Judge.
Statement by Mr. Justice McBride.
This is an action by F. F. Williams against the Pacific Surety Company, a corporation, the Oregon-Idaho Company, a corporation, and A. H. Ford, the facts being as follows:
In August, 1910, the defendant Oregon-Idaho Company, a corporation, entered into a written contract with A. H. Ford and F. F. Williams, the plaintiff in this action, whereby they agreed to furnish said Ford and the plaintiff 200,000,000 feet of saw-logs at the agreed price of $7 per thousand feet, the time and manner of said delivery being set forth in the contract. To secure the performance of the contract,, the Oregon-Idaho Company gave a bond to Ford and Williams in the sum of $25,000, conditioned for its faithful performance, upon which bond the defendant Pacific Surety Company became surety. The Oregon-Idaho Company defaulted and was adjudged bankrupt, and Williams brought this action on the bond, alleging that Ford refused to join with him as a plaintiff, and for that reason he was made a defendant. There was a prayer in the complaint for judgment against the defendant Pacific Surety Company and in favor of plaintiff and defendant Ford for the amount of the bond.
All the defendants except the Pacific Surety Company made default. That company demurred on the ground (1) that there was a defect of parties plain tiff, in that Ford was not joined as a plaintiff; and (2) that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. This demurrer being overruled, they elected to stand thereon, and thereafter a judgment was taken against them for want of answer, from which judgment they appeal to this court.
Affirmed.
For appellant there was a brief over the names of Mr. Thomas H. Crawford, Mr. Thomas Mannix and Wilbur, Spencer é Dibble, with oral arguments by Mr. Crawford and Mr. Mannix.
For respondent there was a brief over the names of Platt & Platt and Mr. J. 0. Bailey, with oral arguments by Mr. H. G. Platt and Mr. Bailey.

Opinion:
Mr. Justice McBride
delivered the opinion of the court.
This appeal presents but one question: Can the plaintiff bring this action without joining his co-obligee in the bond as a plaintiff?
1. At common law a joint obligee could not sue in his own name, but could join his co-obligee as plaintiff even against his remonstrance by giving a bond to save him harmless from costs. The same rule prevailed in many of the states, and especially prior to the adoption of code procedure: 1 Chitty, Pl. 11; Petrie v. Bury, 3 Barn. & C. 353; Vernon v. Jeffreys, 2 Stra. 1146; Ingham Lumber Co. v. Ingersoll Co., 93 Ark. 447 (125 S. W. 139, 20 Ann. Cas. 1002); Gray v. Wilson, Meigs (Term.), 394; Sweigart v. Berk, 8 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 308; Darling v. Simpson, 15 Me. 175.
2. But at common law a defendant could not counterclaim a demand so as to obtain an affirmative judgment against the plaintiff for anything but costs, the amount of which could be readily estimated, so that it was not difficult for the court to fix the amount of a bond which would safely protect dn unwilling coobligee against any liability which might result from a failure of an action in which he was included as a plaintiff. Under our code counterclaims are allowed, and an affirmative judgment may be had thereon without limit. It would, therefore, be impossible for the court in advance to fix, with any approximation to certainty, the amount of a bond which would protect an unwilling plaintiff from the possible consequences of an action begun in his name.
3. Again, at common law, only one judgment could be given, namely, a judgment in favor of all the plaintiffs or all the defendants, or vice versa. In this state, the court may give judgment for or against one or more of several defendants, or for or against one or more plaintiffs, as justice may require, and determine the ultimate rights of the parties between themselves: Section 41, L. O. L.
4. Article I, Section 10, of our Constitution provides that "every man shall have remedy by due course of law for injury done him in person, property or reputation," and in pursuance of this provision (Section 983, L. O. L.) provides that "when jurisdiction is, by the organic law of this state, or by this code, or by any other statute conferred upon a court or judici-al officer all the means to carry it into effect are also given; and in the exercise of the jurisdiction, if the course of the proceeding be not specifically pointed out by this code, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which may appear most conformable to the spirit of this code. ' ' This wipes out common-law procedure, as such, with all its delays and technicalities, and léaves the court free to adopt such common-law procedure when in conformity with the spirit of the code, and to reject it when a procedure better calculated to faciliate the administration of justice presents itself. In this state no provision is expressly made in the code for compelling an unwilling co-obligee to join as a plaintiff in an action at law. By the demurrer the making of the bond, the breach, and the injury to plaintiff are admitted. Considered apart from the common-law holdings of the courts on this subject, the plain, speedy mode of procedure would appear to be to bring the unwilling co-obligee in as a defendant and compel him to litigate his rights. By this course nobody is injured or defrauded. The defendant can set up any defense here that it could have had he appeared as a plaintiff. Procedure is not the end for which law was instituted, hut the means by which justice may be administered in an orderly manner; and where a particular form of procedure is not prescribed by the code, as in this case, it is the duty of the court to pursue that which will secure the rights of all the parties, and an orderly trial of the case, and we think this has been done in the case at bar.
The judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed.
Affirmed.