Case Name: Pedro Salsedo PEDROZA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2000-12-15
Citations: 773 So. 2d 639
Docket Number: No. 5D99-1500
Parties: Pedro Salsedo PEDROZA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: ORFINGER, M., Senior Judge, concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 773
Pages: 639–644

Head Matter:
Pedro Salsedo PEDROZA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 5D99-1500.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Dec. 15, 2000.
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Nancy Ryan, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Richard L. Polin, Assistant Attorney General, Miami, for Ap-pellee.

Opinion:
SAWAYA, J.
The State of Florida, the appellee, instituted commitment proceedings against Pedro Salsedo Pedroza, the appellant, pursuant to the "Jimmy Ryce Act," hereinafter referred to as the Act. The Act estab lishes procedures for the involuntary civil commitment of sexually violent predators.
The commitment trial commenced with the State calling Pedroza as a witness. Pedroza had been convicted in 1981 of attempted sexual battery on a child under eleven years of age and aggravated assault. He received prison sentences of thirty and fifteen years respectively for those offenses. The evidence revealed that Pedroza discovered his victim, eight years old at the time, on the street outside an apartment complex. He approached her, grabbed her, and dragged her into a room in the apartment and, holding a knife to her throat, threatened to kill her if she screamed. He raped her and then stabbed her several times with the knife. Pedroza testified that he was under the influence of drugs and became angry when he could not penetrate the victim. He further testified that the little girl began to scream and he lost control of his emotions and started to stab her repeatedly with the knife.
At the conclusion of the commitment trial, the jury returned a verdict finding that Pedroza is a sexually violent predator. The trial judge, pursuant to the verdict, entered a final judgment of commitment, which committed Pedroza to the Department of Children and Families for confinement in a secure facility for control, care, and treatment until such time as Pedroza's mental abnormality or personality disorder has so changed that it is safe for him to be at large.
Pedroza appeals the final judgment of commitment and contends that reversal is warranted for the following reasons: 1) the Act is unconstitutional because it violates the due process, ex post facto, equal protection, and double jeopardy clauses of the federal and Florida constitutions; 2) the trial court erred by denying Pedroza's requested jury instruction defining the statutory terminology "likely to engage in acts of sexual violence"; and 3) the trial court erred by allowing the State's psychologists to testify that they believed Pe-droza would reoffend. These are the same issues we that we considered in Westerheide v. State, 767 So.2d 637 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). As we did in Westerheide, we affirm on all of these issues.
The other issues raised by Pe-droza, with one exception, are without merit and do not warrant discussion. The issue that does warrant discussion involves prejudicial comments that the attorney for the State made during closing argument. Perdoza's attorney objected to one prejudicial remark, but did not object to the other. The objection that was made was sustained by the trial court, but Pedroza's attorney failed to move for mistrial. Im proper comments during closing argument, like other trial errors, must be properly preserved for appeal by making a contemporaneous objection. See Murphy v. International Robotic Sys., Inc., 766 So.2d 1010 (Fla.2000). If a party makes a contemporaneous objection to an improper comment which is sustained by the trial judge, the party must move for mistrial if he or she wishes to preserve the objection for appellate review. See Ed Ricke & Sons, Inc. v. Green, 468 So.2d 908 (Fla.1985); Weise v. Repa Film Int'l Inc., 683 So.2d 1128 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Hagan v. Sun Bank of Mid-Florida, N.A., 666 So.2d 580 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996), disapproved of on other grounds, Murphy v. International Robotic Sys., Inc., 766 So.2d 1010 (Fla.2000); Newton v. South Florida Baptist Hosp., 614 So.2d 1195 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Wasden v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 474 So.2d 825 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985).
In Murphy, the court realized that the time had come "to restate the approach to be taken regarding the issue of improper, but unobjected-to, closing argument in civil cases." 766 So.2d at 1026-27. The court held that "a civil litigant may not seek relief in an appellate court based on improper, but unobjected-to, closing argument, unless the litigant has at least challenged such argument in the trial court by way of a motion for new trial even if no objection was voiced during trial." Id. at 1027. Pedroza did not file a motion for new trial. Therefore, he is not entitled to reversal. Furthermore, the prejudicial statements do not rise to the level of fundamental error that would require reversal and a new trial based on decisions of this court and other District Courts of Appeal decided prior to Murphy. See Fravel v. Haughey, 727 So.2d 1033 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999); Hagan v. Sun Bank of Midr-Florida, N.A., 666 So.2d 580 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996) ; see also Murphy.
We affirm the judgment of commitment. As we did in Westerheide, we certify to the Florida Supreme Court the following questions which we find to be matters of great public importance:
1) DOES THE JIMMY RYCE ACT VIOLATE THE EX POST FACTO CLAUSES OF THE UNITED STATES AND FLORIDA CONSTITUTIONS?
2) DOES THE JIMMY RYCE ACT VIOLATE THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSES OF THE UNITED STATES AND FLORIDA CONSTITUTIONS?
3) DOES THE JIMMY RYCE ACT VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSES OF THE UNITED STATES AND FLORIDA CONSTITUTIONS?
4) DOES THE JIMMY RYCE ACT VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES OF THE UNITED STATES AND FLORIDA CONSTITUTIONS?
AFFIRMED; QUESTIONS CERTIFIED.
ORFINGER, M., Senior Judge, concurs.
W. SHARP, J., concurs with certification only, and dissents, with opinion.
. The Act was originally found in sections 916.31-.49, Florida Statutes (Supp.1998) which became effective on January 1, 1999. See Ch. 98-64, § 24, at 276, Laws of Fla. Shortly thereafter, the Legislature amended and renumbered the Act as sections 394.910-.930. The Act is currently located in Part V, Chapter 394 of the Florida Statutes entitled "Involuntary Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators." See Ch. 99-222, § 1, at 961, Laws of Fla. These changes became effective on May 26, 1999. See Ch. 99-222, § 29, at 972, Laws of Fla. Although the Legislature amended the Act, the amendments did not change the particular statutory provisions which apply to the instant case. Therefore, we will cite to the most recent statute found in chapter 394 in this opinion even though the proceedings in the instant case were actually brought against Pedroza pursuant to chapter 916.
. The attorney for the State stated:
What's really at issue here, though, what you're being asked to decide, is he likely to reoffend. If you decide that he's not, he walks out of this courtroom, and we all have to be comfortable that someone else is not at risk out there as a result of what we've done here today.
. The attorney for the State stated:
Even taking Dr. Krop's tests, the RRASOR, about 11% failure rate after ten years. The SORAG was, I think-did he say 17% after seven years. Another one, the Minnesota test, about 12% he's likely to reoffend. The base rate for all offenders was 22%. All that sounds like 'likely to reoffend,' you know. The only-it's only about 12% chance here that you have cancer or are going to die. Whoa, whoa, whoa! That's pretty scary when we're talking about human lives and behavior. That's 'likely.'
. The court in Murphy disapproved of Hagan to the extent that it stands "for the proposition that a trial court's grant of a new trial based on unobjected-to closing argument should be subject to a de novo standard of review on appeal. The nature of the elements to be examined and the impact upon a trial are issues that are more properly resolved at the trial level, subject to extremely limited review on appeal." Murphy, 766 So.2d at 1030-31 n. 24.