Case Name: Wm. Fox, by Guardian, etc., Resp't, v. Joseph Le Comte, App'lt
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1896-02-11
Citations: 72 N.Y. St. Rep. 502
Docket Number: 
Parties: Wm. Fox, by Guardian, etc., Resp’t, v. Joseph Le Comte, App’lt.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 72
Pages: 502–508

Head Matter:
Wm. Fox, by Guardian, etc., Resp’t, v. Joseph Le Comte, App’lt.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department,
Filed Feb’ry 11, 1896.)
1. Master and servant—Appliances—Knowledge.
It is not necessary that the master should personally have knowledge oí a defective appliance, where its repair is not a mere detail of the work, hut a part of the master’s duly in providing safe appliances.
2. Same—Coservaht.
Where such duty is committed to the machinist, he, in the discharge oí it, is not a coservant who represents the master, and for his neglect the 1 master is liable.
S. Same.
The evidence in this case was held not to show, as a matter of law, that the servant knew that the click of the press was a sign that the machine was out of order and, therefore, assumed the risk therefrom by reason of the plunger’s dropping without pressure being placed on the treadle.
4. Appeal—Verdict.
No verdict, that is based on the negation of a well known and accepted scientific fact of common knowledge, or on the existence of a physical impossibility, will he allowed to stand.
Appeal from, a judgment, entered on a verdict in favor of plaintiff, and from an order denying a motion for a new trial.
Flamen B. Candler and Edgerton L. Winthrop, for app’lt; Charles J. Patterson, for resp’t

Opinion:
CULLEN, J.
—This action is—servant against master—to recover damages for personal injuries. The plaintiff, a boy of sixteen years, was employed to work a power press which is set in motion by pressure of the foot upon a treadle. When the pressure is-removed, the punch should cometo rest. After working some two weeks in the factory, part of his thumb was cut off by the plunger or punch. The plaintiff's claim was that the press was out of order, and the plunger moved without pressure being applied to the treadle. The defendant's claim was that the press was nowise defective, but that the plaintiff carelessly let his foot fall on the treadle. Testimony was given to support the claims of the respective parties, both as to the facts of the accident, and also, of an expert nature, as to the operation of such machines. At the close of the case the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, both on the contributory negligence of the plaintiff, and a failure to establish negligence on the part of the defendant. The exception to the refusal of the court to grant this motion, and the claim of the defendant that the verdict was against the evidence, present the only questions necessary to discuss on this appeal. .
It is charged that the plaintiff was negligent in two respects. The first is that he placed his thumb under the plunger, while be was instructed to take the disk between his finger and thumb when placing it on the die, by which only the soft parts of the fingers would be exposed. Plaintiff denies this instruction, and claims that his thumb was necessarily exposed. The jury saw the press operated at the trial and could determine whether its proper operation placed the thumb of the plaintiff in danger. The second claim is that the plaintiff knew of the defective character of the press, and, with that knowledge, continued to work on it. We think that this was not conclusively established, but was a question for the jury to determine. Doubtless, the plaintiff knew the press had been defective, but, according to his testimony, on his complaint the press was repaired by the machinist, whose duty it was to care for and repair the machines. Plaintiff was then told to go to work, and worked on the press for about an hour before the accident occurred.- By his statement, during all tin's period, the press continued to click. To charge him with negligence, it was not only necessary to show that he knew of me clicking, but also that he knew that the clicking imported that the machine was dangerous. Not only does plaintiff swear that -he did not know this fact, but it was a question most seriously litigated at the trial, the defendant's witnesses swearing that the clicking of the press did not indicate that it was defective or out of order.
As to the defendant's negligence, it is undisputed that, if the plunger moved without pressure on the treadle, the press was defective. It was alleged that, though this was the case, the defendant had no knowledge of the fact. It was not necessary that the-defendant should personally have such knowledge. The repair of the press was not a mere detail of the work, as in Webber v. Piper, 109 N. Y. 496 ; 16 St. Rep. 423, but a part of the master's-duty to use reasonable care to provide safe appliances for his servants. This duty was cdmipitted to the machinist, but, being the-master's duty, the machinist, in the discharge of it, was not a co-servant, but represented the master. For his neglect the master was liable. Fuller v. Jewett, 80 N. Y. 46 ; Bush by v. N. Y., L. E. & W. Railroad Co., 107 id. 375 ; 12 St. Rep. 9. The present case cannot be distinguished from those of Haves v. Manufacturing Co., 41 Hun, 407 ; Van Sickel v. Ilsley 75 id. 537 ; 58 St. Rep. 731.
The court, hearing a constant repetition of the tale, in cases of accidents occurring in the use of these presses, that the press clicked, and then the punch came down without action by the operator, may be suspicious of the truth of some of these narratives. The question, however, is one of fact, for the jury, and the court is not justified in interfering, unless the verdict is manifestly against the evidence. Of course the court will allow no-verdict to stand that was based on the negation of a well-known- and accepted scientific fact of common knowledge, or on the existence of a physical impossibility. But the operation of these-presses is not a matter of common knowledge, and, if the move-' ment of the plunger without pressure on the treadle is an impossibility, it was incumbent upon the defendant to establish it. The defendant did not satisfy the jury of the fact, nor has he satisfied us.
The judgment and order appealed from should be' affirmed, with costs.
BROWN, P. J., and BARTLETT, J., concur.