Case Name: Eddie Quinn v. State of Indiana
Court: Supreme Court of Indiana
Jurisdiction: Indiana
Decision Date: 1976-11-10
Citations: 265 Ind. 545
Docket Number: No. 176S29
Parties: Eddie Quinn v. State of Indiana.
Judges: 
Reporter: Indiana Reports
Volume: 265
Pages: 545–549

Head Matter:
Eddie Quinn v. State of Indiana.
[No. 176S29.
Filed November 10, 1976.]
Richard D. Gilroy, of Indianapolis, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendafc, Attorney General, Elmer Lloyd Whit-mer, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.

Opinion:
Givan, C.J.
Appellant was charged by indictment with first degree murder. Trial by jury resulted in a verdict of guilty of second degree murder. Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment.
The record reveals the following facts: On February 15, 1975, the appellant was at home with his wife when his 18 year old daughter returned with a boyfriend from visiting with her grandmother. Another boyfriend was waiting for her at her house. The appellant immediately became abusive to his daughter because of her attentions to her boyfriends. Appellant became so abusive to the daughter that his wife intervened on the daughter's behalf and asked her to leave the house and call the police. Appellant tried to prevent the daughter leaving, however she managed to get out the back door with the help of the intervention of her mother. She went to a neighbor's house and called the police but, by the time the police arrived, appellant's wife was dead of a gunshot wound. Appellant admits it was his gun that killed his wife however he states that during a heated argument, while he was holding the gun in his hand, his wife hit at the gun causing it to discharge and fatally wound her.
Prior to trial the State moved the court to allow introduction of evidence concerning the appellant's rape of his daughter. It was the State's position that this evidence would establish motive for the murder of appellant's wife. The appellant objected to this procedure; however the trial court overruled the objection in part and sustained it in part, in that the court permitted the admission of the evidence of the appellant's alleged misconduct for the limited purpose of showing motive and nothing else. The court would not permit the introduction of the evidence of other criminal charges which were pending against the appellant.
Appellant concedes in his argument that under certain circumstances it is permissible to show the commissions of other crimes when the motive, malicious intent or guilty knowledge of the defendant is an issue, citing Vandeveer v. State, (1971) 256 Ind. 509, 269 N.E.2d 865 and Loveless v. State, (1959) 240 Ind. 534, 166 N.E.2d 864. Appellant argues however that the case at bar does not come within these exceptions. With this we do not agree. In the case at bar the appellant freely admits that it was his gun that killed his wife and that the killing occurred in the course of an argument. However he states the killing was accidental and that he had no intention of shooting his wife. With these contentions on the part of the appellant the testimony of the daughter became pertinent to establish the situation which existed between the husband and wife immediately prior to the killing. The daughter's testimony was that six months prior to the killing she had been raped by her father, that he had become extremely jealous of her attentions to other men and that her mother knew about the rape. The daughter also testified concerning her mother's intervention in her defense on the night of the killing. There is ample evidence in this record from which the jury could reasonably conclude that the appellant killed his wife because she intervened between him and his daughter. Contrary to appellant's contention we hold the cases above cited support the trial court in its ruling in permitting the evidence. This same principle of law was recently stated in the case of Jenkins v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 589, 335 N.E.2d 215, 49 Ind. Dec. 159.
Appellant next claims the trial court erred in permitting introduction of State's exhibits 5, 6, 7 and 16, over his objection. Exhibits 5, 6 and 7, are pictures of decedent's body at the scene of the crime. Exhibit 16 is a picture of the upper half of decedent's body taken after the body had been removed from the scene of the crime. There is nothing unusual about any of these photographs. It is certainly true they do not present a pleasant sight. Certainly a color photograph of a person who has been shot can be described as a gruesome sight; however in each instance the picture shows the body of the decedent to be in a natural state immediately following the crime. So long as pictures involving a crime such as those in this record are relevant to the questions at issue they are admissible. The mere fact that they may be gory, revolting or inflammatory does not make them inadmissible. Soleto v. State, (1976) 264 Ind. 298, 342 N.E.2d 844, 51 Ind. Dec. 578; Wilson v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 469, 333 N.E.2d 755, 48 Ind. Dec. 663; Meredith v. State, (1966) 247 Ind. 233, 214 N.E.2d 385, 7 Ind. Dec. 692. We therefore hold the trial court did not err in admitting the photographs in evidence.
We find no reversible error in this record. The trial court is in all things aifirmed.
Arterburn, DeBruler and Prentice, JJ., concur; Hunter, J., dissenting with opinion.