Case Name: VILLAGE OF TRENTON v. RUCKER
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1910-07-14
Citations: 162 Mich. 19
Docket Number: Docket No. 130
Parties: VILLAGE OF TRENTON v. RUCKER.
Judges: Bird, C. J., and Hooker and McAlvay, JJ., concurred with Brooke, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 162
Pages: 19–27

Head Matter:
VILLAGE OF TRENTON v. RUCKER.
1. Waters and Watercourses — Easements and Servitudes— Flowing Lands — Drains.
Residents of villages are subject to the rule, applicable to rural localities, that their land is bound to receive the flow of surface water from adjacent higher land, coming in substantially its natural amount and condition.
2. Same — Municipal Corporations — Villages.
Municipalities may not collect and discharge surface waters in unnatural volume upon private land.
3. Equity — Pleading — Affirmative Relief — Prayer of Answer.
Without a prayer in defendant’s answer for affirmative relief, the court of equity cannot enjoin complainant from discharging upon his real property waters artificially collected.
4. Waters and Watercourses — Easements—Villages.
In a village -which has no sewage system, a property owner may not interfere with the natural flow of water across his lands not in process of improvement, and may be enjoined by the village from interfering with the flowage of surface water which .has from time immemorial drained across his land.
Ostrander, Moore, and Stone, JJ., dissenting.
Appeal from Wayne; Murphy, J.
Submitted February 10,1910.
(Docket No. 130.)
Reargued July 1,1910.
Decided July 14, 1910.
Bill by the village of Trenton against J. Dean Rucker to restrain defendant from interfering with certain drains. From a decree for defendant, and an order adjudging complainant to be in contempt for violation of said decree, complainant appeals.
Reversed, and decree entered for complainant.
Lehman, Biggs & Lehman, for complainant.
Frank W. Atkinson, for defendant.
. Defendant is the owner of a lot in the village of Trenton, lying between Front street and the Detroit river, 83£ feet by 160 feet. The block lying immediately to the northwest of defendant’s lot and across Front street slopes somewhat to the south and east. The water collecting on said block has, for a great many years", run in a southeasterly direction, crossing Front street in front of defendant’s lot, and thence across defendant’s lot to the Detroit river. Defendant had been the owner of the lot in question about nine years before the filing of the bill herein. Some time prior to his purchase thereof, the water, collecting on the block to the northwest, instead of being permitted to find its way to defendant’s lot over the surface, was carried by an underground drain to Front street, and thence across Front street, under the surface of the street, to defendant’s lot, whence by a natural channel it reached the river. About eight years ago, the complainant, by agreement with the defendant or his agent, put in a six-inch tile drain across defendant’s lot, from Front street to the river, to carry said water, the tile being laid in the old channel. Just before the village filed its bill of complaint, defendant stopped up the drain, causing the water to back up on Front street. This he did because, he says, he learned that a sewer had been connected with the drain higher up by one Stokes, and it was his understanding that surface water only should be carried through it. Thereupon the bill of complaint herein was filed, praying for an injunction against defendant restraining him from obstructing said drain. A temporary injunction was issued. Defendant answered, admitting that from time immemorial the surface water collecting on the block, lying to the northwest of his lot, had reached the river by running across his land. He asked that the injunction be dissolved, and the bill of complaint dismissed, but prayed for no affirmative relief. After a full hearing in open court, and on March 5, 1909, the following decree was entered:
“ (1) That the bill of complaint filed in this cause be and the same is hereby dismissed.
“ (2) That the injunction heretofore issued in this cause be and the same is hereby dissolved.
“ (3) That the said complainant remove from the property of said defendant the underground system of drainage, placed in said property of said defendant by virtue of the said license, and discontinue the use of said property of said defendant for the purpose set up in said bill of complaint, or for any purpose whatsoever, within ninety days from the date of this decree.”
After the entry of said decree, complainant took out the crocks it had laid in defendant’s land, and compelled all sewers to be disconnected with the drain. Thereafter the surface water continued to flow through the box or pipe laid across Front street, and upon defendant’s land, to the river through the ditch where the pipe had lain, as it had done since time immemorial, except that by the construction of a new drain from the center of the block north to Pine street a considerable portion of the surface water was diverted in another direction. Defendant then petitioned the circuit court for an order holding the complainant in contempt, claiming that under the third clause of the decree above quoted, the complainant was bound to prevent any surface water from passing on or over defendant’s land. After a full hearing on the contempt proceeding, the court held the complainant guilty of contempt, because it had failed to prevent all the surface water from passing onto and over defendant’s land. Complainant appeals.
For rights as to flow of surface water, see note to Gray v. McWilliams (Cal.), 21 L. R. A. 593.

Opinion:
Brooke, J.
(after stating the facts). In what we have to say hereinafter, it will be borne in mind that the complainant village has no sewage system. That it is not claimed by defendant, that by reason of urban improvements, raising, grading streets, etc., therein, the natural course of the surface water has been diverted upon his land, or that the volume thereof has been increased by any act of complainant. He specifically admits in his answer that the water in question has flowed across his land from time immemorial. Under the circumstances disclosed by the record in this case, therefore, we are of opinion that the rules of law established by this court, relative to the care of surface water in rural districts, must control. A contrary holding would, it seems to us, place it within the power of any resident of a village to compel the village to enter upon the construction of a sewage system, whenever he happened to become the owner of a lot which from time immemorial had borne the servitude of carrying surface water from adjacent lands. Villages ordinarily are not wealthy enough to undertake expensive public works, and residents therein must be presumed to have taken up their homes there with a knowledge of this fact. In villages, taxes are lower and conveniences are fewer than in towns and cities. Those who choose to live in villages must bear the ordinary inconveniences incident to such residence. Treating this case as falling within the rural, rather than the urban, class, there is no difficulty in holding that the defendant is bound, under our decisions, to receive the flow of surface water from the adjacent higher land, coming in substantially its natural amount and condition. Boyd v. Conklin, 54 Mich. 583 (20 N. W. 595, 52 Am. Rep. 831); Rice v. City of Flint, 67 Mich. 401 (34 N. W. 719); Osten v. Jerome, 93 Mich. 196 (53 N. W. 7); Horton v. Sullivan, 97 Mich. 282 (56 N. W. 552); Finkbinder v. Ernst, 126 Mich. 565 (85 N. W. 1127); Cranson v. Snyder, 137 Mich. 340 (100 N. W. 674). See, also, Gregory v. Bush, 64 Mich. 37 (31 N. W. 90, 8 Am. St. Rep. 797).
It seems to be settled law in several other States that municipalities are not obliged to provide artificial drainage for surface waters. They may not, however, collect them and discharge them in unnatural volume upon private lands. Lynch v. Mayor, etc., of New York, 76 N. Y. 60 (32 Am. Rep. 271); Davis v. City of Crawfordsville, 119 Ind. 1 (21 N. E. 449, 12 Am. St. Rep. 361); Gilfeather v. City of Council Bluffs, 69 Iowa, 310 (28 N. W. 610); City of Atchison v. Challiss, 9 Kan. 603; Collins v. City of Waltham, 151 Mass. 196 (24 N. E. 327).
Clause 3 of the decree in the court below was, in any event, unwarranted by the pleadings. Defendant sought no affirmative relief. Thayer v. Lane, Walk. Ch. (Mich.) 200; Smith v. Rumsey, 33 Mich. 183; Booth v. Thompson, 49 Mich. 73 (13 N. W. 363); Andrus v. Scudder, 120 Mich. 502 (79 N. W. 794). But this is unimportant, as we are of opinion that complainant was entitled upon the hearing to a decree enjoining defendant from interfering with the natural flow of surface water over his premises, such decree to become operative only when complainant had caused all sewers {i. e., drains connected with water-closets) to be disconnected with said drain.
Inasmuch as the proceedings upon contempt, subsequent to decree, show that nothing but surface water at that time passed through the drain, a decree will be entered in this court to that effect, with costs of both courts.
Bird, C. J., and Hooker and McAlvay, JJ., concurred with Brooke, J.