Case Name: RAPPLEYE v. RAPPLEYE
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1990-04-16
Citations: 183 Mich. App. 396
Docket Number: Docket No. 113614
Parties: RAPPLEYE v RAPPLEYE
Judges: Before: Murphy, P.J., and Mackenzie and Cavanagh, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 183
Pages: 396–404

Head Matter:
RAPPLEYE v RAPPLEYE
Docket No. 113614.
Submitted November 20, 1989, at Lansing.
Decided April 16, 1990.
James A. Rappleye obtained a divorce from Stacia Lynn Rappleye. Custody of the parties’ minor child, Adria, was granted to defendant, who subsequently cohabited with, and ultimately married, William Gregory. From the time defendant and William Gregory began living together, they called Adria, then three years old, "Adria Gregory” rather than "Adria Rappleye” although her legal name remained Rappleye. Several years later, plaintiff brought a motion in Jackson Circuit Court seeking to enforce his visitation rights and to enjoin defendant from using any surname for Adria other than her legal name. The court, John C. Timms, J., after conducting a hearing and an interview in camera of Adria, by then nine years old, ruled that the child may use the surname of Gregory if she so wishes. Plaintiff appealed.
The Court of Appeals held:
Under the common law a person may adopt any name he wishes, without resort to any court and without any legal proceedings, provided it is not done for fraudulent purposes. Similarly, a minor of sufficient age and maturity to make an intelligent choice may assume any chosen name. The trial court in this case did not abuse its discretion in determining that it is in Adria’s best interest to allow her to continue using the name Gregory if she so desires.
Affirmed.
Mackenzie, J., dissented and would reverse the trial court. She would hold that a mother who has been awarded custody of a minor child may not, over the objection of the noncustodial father, unilaterally change the surname of the child to that of the mother’s subsequent husband unless the change would be in the best interest of the child. Under the circumstances of this case, Judge MacKenzie would hold that the name change would not be in the child’s best interest given the child’s young age and inability to make an intelligent choice, and the desirability of maintaining a bond between father and child.
References
Am Jur 2d, Name §§ 14,15, 42-45.
Rights and remedies of parents inter se with respect to the names of their children. 92 ALR3d 1091.
Names — Name Changes — Common Law.
Under the common law a person may adopt any name he wishes, without resort to any court and without any legal proceedings, provided it is not done for fraudulent purposes; similarly, a minor of sufficient age and maturity to make an intelligent choice may assume any chosen name.
Rademacher & Musbach (by Randy A. Musbach), for plaintiff.
David R. McEvers, for defendant.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Mackenzie and Cavanagh, JJ.

Opinion:
Murphy, P.J.
The issue before this Court is limited. Did the trial court err by including language in a postjudgment divorce order that provided that "the minor child may use the surname of Gregory if she so wishes"?
The parties were married in 1977. Their only child, Adria, was born November 27, 1978. In 1981, the parties separated. Defendant mother took custody of Adria and left South Africa where the parties had been living. By 1982, defendant and Adria were living in the United Kingdom with William Gregory. Plaintiff and defendant were divorced in 1984. The judgment of divorce granted defendant mother physical custody of the child. Following the divorce, defendant married William Gregory. In the fall of 1984, the Gregorys and Adria returned to the United States to live in Jackson, Michigan.
From the time defendant and William Gregory began living together, they called Adria "Adria Gregory" rather than "Adria Rappleye," the child's birth name. Adria's medical, dental, and school records state her surname to be Gregory. However, the school administration is aware of her legal name and legal documents such as her passport, social security card, and bank account show the surname Rappleye. Adria's friends refer to her as Adria Gregory.
When plaintiff learned that his daughter was using Gregory instead of her legal surname, he asked defendant to change Adria's name back to Rappleye. Later, plaintiff brought a motion to enforce his visitation rights which also asked the court to enjoin defendant from using any surname for Adria other than her legal name.
We are not presented with issues concerning the propriety of a legal name change of a minor under the probate code, MCL 711.1; MSA 27.3178(561). We are not dealing with an order of the court that requires a minor to go by a surname other than that given on her birth certificate pursuant to MCL 333.2824; MSA 14.15(2824). In fact, we are not even facing a legal name change at all. Simply, we have before us an order from the trial court that allows a minor, if she so desires, to continue informal use of a name she has used for the past several years.
At common law a person could adopt any name he or she wished, without resort to any court and without legal proceedings, provided it was not done for fraudulent purposes. Piotrowski v Piotrowski, 71 Mich App 213, 215-216; 247 NW2d 354 (1976). Similarly, the common law would permit a minor who was of sufficient age and maturity to make an intelligent choice to assume any chosen name. 57 Am Jur 2d, Name, § 42, p 679. There is no contention in this case that Adria Rappleye's use of the surname Gregory was for a fraudulent purpose. If common law allows such use, we are hard pressed to conclude that the trial court erred by ordering nothing more than that which is permitted at common law.
Again, we emphasize that we are not addressing a grant of a legal name change for the parties' minor child pursuant to the probate code, a decision we would review for an abuse of discretion. MCL 711.1; MSA 27.3178(561). Assuming that this is the correct standard in the present case, we cannot conclude on this record that the trial court abused its discretion by determining that it is in the minor child's best interest to allow her to continue using the name Gregory, if she so desires. Abuse of discretion implies that the trial court's decision was not based on fact, logic, and reason. Poet v Traverse City Osteopathic Hosp, 433 Mich 228, 251; 445 NW2d 115 (1989); Spalding v Spalding, 355 Mich 382, 384-385; 94 NW2d 810 (1959). In the present case, the trial court's decision was clearly based on the facts and on what was right and equitable under the circumstances. See Lagnes v Green, 282 US 531, 541; 51 S Ct 243; 75 L Ed 520 (1931).
The record establishes that Adria, who was almost ten years old at the time of the hearing, expressed her desire to use the name Gregory. She had used that name since she was four years old. She was in the custody of her mother who is remarried and is known by the surname of Gregory. The child was known to her friends and classmates by the name Adria Gregory.
The trial court interviewed the minor child, in camera, to determine whether the use of the Gregory surname was being imposed for the purpose of frustrating the plaintiff father's relationship with his child and to foster ill feelings. The court concluded that it was the child's true desire to be known as Gregory. The trial court had ample opportunity to determine the child's maturity level and was apparently satisfied that she was mature enough to understand her own desires and make an intelligent choice.
We defer to the trial court's special opportunity to judge the credibility of the parties and, in particular, of the minor child, and will not disturb its findings. MCR 2.613(C).
Affirmed.
Cavanagh, J., concurred.
We also question the practicality, effectiveness, and enforceability of an order that attempts to restrain the third party, or the individual whose name is at issue, from informally using a surname other than the person's birth name.
Although not stated by the court, it is certainly conceivable that forcing a change in the minor child's commonly used name at this point would only confuse the child and her friends and acquaintances. A forced change might well foster such resentment in the child as to lead to a further breakdown in the already fragile parental relationship between plaintiff and the child.