Case Name: FOOD LION, Appellant, v. Shirley JACKSON, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1998-06-26
Citations: 712 So. 2d 800
Docket Number: No. 97-1572
Parties: FOOD LION, Appellant, v. Shirley JACKSON, Appellee.
Judges: GOSHORN, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 712
Pages: 800–806

Head Matter:
FOOD LION, Appellant, v. Shirley JACKSON, Appellee.
No. 97-1572.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
June 26, 1998.
Kendall B. Rigdon of Boehm, Brown, Rig-don, Seacrest & Fischer, P.A., Cocoa, for Appellant.
Jack Perlmutter, P.A., Melbourne, for Ap-pellee.

Opinion:
PETERSON, Judge.
Food Lion appeals an order granting Shirley Jackson's motion for additur or in the alternative, a new trial for damages only. We reverse and remand.
Food Lion attempted to restrict its customers from entering an area in the produce department of its grocery store, where the floor was noticeably wet, by barricading the area. The barricade consisted of a cone with 'Wet Floor" and "Caution" printed on it, and a bucket with a mop in it. Ignoring the barricade, Jackson reached behind or walked around it to gain access to some produce and fell to the floor. Asked whether she was hurt immediately after the fall, Jackson said that she felt fine, but was embarrassed. The manager of Food Lion testified that he did not notice any impairment of Jackson's movements after she stood up.
Later, after leaving the store Jackson said that she began feeling discomfort in her neck, back and right leg. She also complained of headaches. She obtained treatment from a chiropractor 27 times but last visited him almost a year prior to the date of trial. The chiropractor predicted Jackson would continue to experience pain in the future as a result of her fall.
The verdict form submitted to the jury provided:
We, the jury, return the following verdict:
1. Was there negligence on the part of the Defendant, FOOD LION, which was a legal cause of damage to Plaintiff, SHIRLEY JACKSON.
YES X NO_
If your answer to Questions [sic] 1 is no, your verdict is for the Defendant and you should not proceed further except to date and sign this Verdict and return it to the Courtroom. If your answer to Question 1 is YES, please continue.
2. Was there negligence on the part of the Plaintiff, SHIRLEY JACKSON,-which was a legal cause of her damage?
YESjX_ NO_
If your answer to question 2 is YES, please answer question 3. If your answer to question 2 is NO skip question 3 arid answer question 4.
3. State the percentage of any negligence, which was a legal cause of damage to Plaintiff, 'SHIRLEY JACKSON, that you charge to:
FOOD LION 90%
SHIRLEY JACKSON 10% '
TOTAL MUST BE 100%
Please answer questior 4.
" 4. What is the tota amount (100%) of any damages sustained by Plaintiff, SHIRLEY JACKSON, and caused by the incident in question?
Total damages of Plaintiff, SHIRLEY. JACKSON $ 2061.80
In determining the total amount of damages, do not make any reduction because of the negligence, if any, of the Plaintiff. If you have the Plaintiff negligent in any degree, the Court in entering Judement [sic] will reduce Plaintiffs total amount of damages (100%) by the percentage of negligence which you found is chargeable to the Plaintiff.
Please answer Question 5.
5. What is the present value of any damages sustained by Plaintiff, SHIRLEY JACKSON, and caused by the incident in question?
$ 2061.80
In using the above verdict form, the parties and trial court ignored the itemization requirements of section 768.77, Florida Statutes (1995); only one line was provided for a composite of all damages rather than setting forth separate amounts for past economic and non-economic losses, and future economic and non-economic losses. The jury found the damages to be $2,061.80, the. exact amount placed in evidence as Jackson's past medical damages. During their deliberations, the jury asked two questions which could' only be interpreted as evidence of the intent to award Jackson only her past medical expenses without damages for pain and suffering. The questions were:
1) How can we give Shirley Jackson medical expenses only of $2,061.80? What should we put in number four and number five in order to do this?
2) If we award $2,061.80 to the plaintiff in both four and five, can we not answer number three? Or how do we answer number three in order for her to get that exact amount?
Both parties agreed with the court to answer the questions as follows:
1) You [the jury] may insert the medical expenses figure contained in your note in numbers four and five.
2) If you award $2,061.80 to the Plaintiff on numbers four and five, you may answer number three, "Food Lion--100%" for her to get that exact amount.
Post-trial, Jackson filed a motion for additur which the trial court granted in the amount of $5,000. The trial court, in the same order granting additur, ordered a new trial on the issue of damages if Food Lion did not agree with the additur. Food Lion appeals from this order and asks that the jury verdict be reinstated or in the alternative, that we remand for a new trial on the issue of both liability and damages.
Food Lion first contends that Jackson's failure to request an itemized verdict requires reinstatement of the jury's verdict. We reject that argument in view of the opportunities given to all of the parties to complain about the noncompliance with the verdict form required by section 768.77.
The instant case is very similar to Broward County School Board v. Dombrosky, 579 So.2d 748 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), in which the fourth district remanded for a new trial on damages and liability while recognizing the provisions of section 768.74, Florida Statutes (1987), require that the adverse party be given the choice of accepting the amount of the additur or a new trial on damages only. The Dombrosky court concluded that a new trial on both liability and damages was warranted because there was some suggestion from the hotly contested evidence of liability that the jury may have compromised on the verdict in light of the small amount of damages awarded to the plaintiff. See also, Bucci v. Auto Builders South Florida, Inc., 690 So.2d 1387 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (jury's award for past medical expenses only, viewed together with note that jury sent to court during deliberations, in which jury indicated that it wanted to award damages only for present medical damages to date, and in which jury asked how to assign percentages of negligence to arrive at final medical expense amount, strongly indicated that jury compromised verdict; thus, case was remanded for new trial on both liability and damages).
In the instant case, the questions from the jury and the verdict convey a strong indication of compromise on the issue of liability when it awarded Jackson her medical expenses without considering non-economic damages. We, accordingly, choose to follow, Dombrosky in remanding for a new trial on both liability and damages. We also recognize that section 768.74 instructs that the adverse party be given the choice of accepting the amount of additur or a new trial on damages only, but we do not believe that the legislature intended to preclude a court from ordering a new trial on both damages and liability where the jury compromised the verdict.
The order requiring Food Lion to choose between additur or a new trial on damages only is reversed and we remand for a new trial on both issues of liability and damages.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
GOSHORN, J., concurs.
THOMPSON, J., dissents, with opinion.
. Food Lion did not raise the issue of Jackson's failure to object to the apparent inadequacy of the verdict before the jury was discharged so as to give the jury the opportunity to correct any error. See Bucci v. Auto Builders South Florida, Inc., 690 So.2d 1387 (Fla. 4th.DCA 1997) and Allstate Insurance Co. v. Manasse, 681 So.2d 779 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), decision quashed on other grounds, 707 So.2d 1110 (Fla. 1998).