Case Name: Lydia G. IVIE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Dennis Waring RICHARDSON, Defendant and Appellant
Court: Utah Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Utah
Decision Date: 1959-03-09
Citations: 9 Utah 2d 5
Docket Number: No. 8856
Parties: Lydia G. IVIE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Dennis Waring RICHARDSON, Defendant and Appellant.
Judges: WADE and McDONOUGH, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Utah Reports, Second Series
Volume: 9
Pages: 5–17

Head Matter:
336 P.2d 781
Lydia G. IVIE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Dennis Waring RICHARDSON, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 8856.
Supreme Court of Utah.
March 9, 1959.
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker, Marvin J. Bertoch, Salt Lake City, for appellant.
Gordon I. Hyde, Salt Lake City, for respondent.

Opinion:
CROCKETT, Chief Justice.
Plaintiff, Lydia G. Ivie, was struck by the left rear part of defendant's automobile as it backed out of, a driveway leading from the City Welding & Radiator Works ga rage onto Third East in Salt Lake City. She recovered a jury verdict and judgment. Defendant appeals.
The questions presented here are: 1. Is plaintiff barred from recovery because of contributory negligence as a matter of law, and 2. Were certain instructions given by the trial court erroneous and prejudicial.
Construing the evidence relating to the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, they are substantially as follows: plaintiff and her little niece had been to a grocery store on the northwest corner of the intersection of Third East and Broadway. They walked north on the sidewalk on the west side of Third East until they came to the driveway leading out of the garage. Plaintiff glanced in the open entrance and saw no car therein, then turned directly east and walked out along the driveway toward the street, intending to cross Third East. There is no pedestrian crossing there. While facing away from the garage plaintiff was struck from behind by defendant's automobile as he backed it out of the garage, knocking her to the ground, spilling her groceries, and naturally causing her some shock and bruises. The defendant was solicitous and apologetic and, according to the plaintiff, stated: "I was looking for my sun glasses and didn't see you."
Due to the statement just quoted and other facts as recited, defendant concedes that there is evidence from which the jury could find he was negligent, but contends that the evidence is so clear that the plaintiff was also negligent, which contributed to cause her own injury, that reasonable minds could not find to the contrary, and consequently, she is precluded from recovery. It is to be kept in mind that there are two aspects of this question: (a) was plaintiff negligent, and (b) if so, was it a proximate cause of her injury.
As to plaintiff's negligence, defendant cites Section 41-6-7(c), U.C.A.1953, which defines roadway as "That portion of highway improved, designed or ordinarily used for vehicular travel, exclusive of the berm or shoulder contending that plaintiff was illegally on such part of the roadway and had a duty to yield the right of way to vehicular traffic. He cites the case of Brunette v. Bierke, wherein it was held that the area of ingress off the highway into a service station was part of the traveled portion of the roadway. The soundness of that case on its own facts is not in issue here. But the idea should certainly not be extended so that every driveway between a sidewalk and a street would be regarded as part of "that portion of highway ordinarily used for vehicular travel " because it obviously would not come within the ordinary meaning of that language. Furthermore, plaintiff testified that she was at the very south edge of the driveway and thus out of the regular course of travel. There is therefore no basis to sustain defendant's charge that she was violating a statute designated for her safety which would make her contributorily negligent as a matter of law.
The other facet of the charge that plaintiff must be deemed guilty of negligence as a matter of law is that, knowing that cars used the driveway going in and out of the garage, she turned her back on a source of potential danger and failed to keep a proper lookout. The answer to this is found in the fact that on redirect examination she expressly said, as above indicated, that she was right on the south edge of the driveway area; that the defendant's car had swerved to the south out of the regular lane of travel to strike her. Assuming such facts, it is our opinion that reasonable minds might well find that in keeping south of the regular lane of travel she was within the required standard of ordinary care.
At this point we digress to treat a question raised as to the quality of the evidence bearing on the matter just discussed. Defendant contends that no such finding could be made because the plaintiff admitted on cross examination that she had walked up even with the door, looked in, turned and "walked down the driveway" and on several occasions used similar expressions. Defendant cites the rule that testimony is no stronger than her cross examination and argues that she therefore must be deemed to have been in the traveled portion of the driveway. .The rule is correct, but its attempted application here is not. Like all rules, it must be applied with due consideration for the situation at hand. It does not preclude a witness who may have been confused or mistaken from either clarifying his testimony or rectifying errors on redirect. Such is the purpose of redirect examination.
Even if a witness had testified one way as to a given fact, that would not preclude him from testifying otherwise if the matter were again called to his attention. One might even have testified falsely and later recant and tell the truth. In such instance testifying two ways on a given situation may discredit the witness so the jury would not believe him; or they may believe the testimony against his in terest. But it would be for the jury to decide as to the credibility of the witness and the version of his testimony, if any, they would accept. The fact here is that the plaintiff did not identify the exact portion of the driveway she walked down in her prior testimony, although in fairness it must be conceded that her statement might reasonably imply that she walked down the regularly traveled portion. She was at liberty to explain on redirect examination with more particularity just where she was.
There is the other aspect of the charge that she is barred by contributory negligence: the question of proximate cause. The jury could have found her negligent in turning her back to potential traffic and yet reasonably fail to believe that her negligence was a proximate cause of the collision. It could have viewed the matter thus: that as she walked east along the south edge of the driveway, and as the defendant backed eastward in the traveled area toward her, he swerved to the south and struck her; and consequently, that even if she had been watching him, she could not have jumped out of the way or otherwise avoided being struck. Under such facts her failure to keep a lookout would have had nothing to do with causation of the incident. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the questions of plaintiff's negligence and proximate cause are properly jury questions, and the defendant is not entitled to prevail as a matter of law as he contends. We agree, however, that because of other errors assigned, to be discussed presently, the defendant is entitled to a new trial.
The court gave this Instruction No. 4:
"If you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant failed to keep and maintain a proper lookout for the plaintiff in the driveway where the accident occurred and that such failure proximately resulted in the accident, then your verdict must be in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant."
The above instruction, taken by itself, is in error because it fails to take into account the possible contributory negligence of the plaintiff. This kind of instruction, sometimes referred to as a "formula" instruction, which makes a recital in accordance with the contention of a party and ends with the conclusion: " and if you so find, then your verdict must be for [the party]" is not generally a good type of instruction to give. This is so because it lends itself to the error just noted and also' because it tends to be argumentative rather than to set out the principles of law applicable to the issues impartially as to both parties. For such reasons it is better to avoid giving instructions of that type. It is conceded that the issue of contributory negligence was properly covered in the next instruction. This, however, pitted one instruction against the other and might have been confusing to the jury.
Of more importance is the error assigned in giving Instruction No. 10. It states that the driver of a vehicle, " emerging from any driveway, or building, shall stop such vehicle immediately prior to driving on to a sidewalk and shall yield the right of way to any pedestrian to avoid collision, This instruction is a correct statement of the law, but it is not applicable to the instant fact situation. The plaintiff was not on a sidewalk or a sidewalk area. The failure of the defendant to stop, if he did, had no causative effect in this incident. Nor was the plaintiff in any area where she necessarily had the right of way over the defendant. It was simply a situation where each had the duty to use due care for the safety of themselves and each other. The above instruction might well have had the effect, as the defendant contends, of giving the jury the impression that the plaintiff was entitled to the right of way, and therefore was in error in this fact situation.
There are additional circumstances in the instant case that are indicative of the fact that a fair trial was not had by the defendant. Counsel for the plaintiff appears to have tried quite overtly to get before the jury the idea that the defendant was covered by insurance. Defendant's attorney found it necessary in cross examining plaintiff to use a statement taken from her sometime after the accident. Although counsel were well aware that this man was an insurance company investigator, plaintiff's counsel persisted in inquiring about identification of this man in the presence of the jury. Inquiry as to who the man was was quite proper, but inquiry as to his connections and purpose obviously lent itself to the thinly veiled ulterior design of getting the fact of insurance before the jury. There seems to be no question about the impression it made. This is shown clearly by a colloquy between counsel and the trial court, in the absence of the jury, during which the judge stated:
"Now I strongly suspect, and I might just as well let the record show, that most of this that you are seeking now is for the purpose of disclosing to this jury that an insurance agent is involved and that some money was offered, you claim some money was offered. If there is any other fact that you want to show that will go to show the truth or the incorrectness of this statement you are at liberty to do so. But if it is just for the purpose of disclosing to the jury an insurance company may be standing behind this defendant the objection to that will be sustained, no matter under what approach you make to it."
We agree with the trial judge that such conduct is improper.
Implementing the impression of the trial judge is the fact that the jury award seems out of proportion to the plaintiff's injury and any damage that she might have suffered, even under the most favorable aspects of her testimony and that of her physician. In a report made by the latter is the following statement: "She asked me if I thought there had been any permanent trouble from the contusion to her knee which had been received in June, 1956. Since that was a very minor injury, I did not think it had any permanent effect. "
The plaintiff did not go to a doctor until eleven days after the accident and only a few times thereafter. She was unable to recall any particular number of days she lost as a result of this injury. Nor could she remember having lost as much as two or three days consecutively. Despite these facts the jury awarded her $5,000. This, it is commonly known, is the limit of one type of insurance policy for personal injuries to one person.
It is unnecessary and would serve no useful purpose for us to decide whether any one of the errors above discussed, considered separately, would constitute sufficient prejudicial error to require a new trial. The question is whether the case was presented to the jury in such a manner that it is reasonable to believe there was a fair and impartial analysis of the evidence and a just verdict. If errors were committed which prevented this being done, then a new trial should be granted, whether it resulted from one error, or from several errors cumulatively. We expressly do not mean to say that trivia which would be innocuous in themselves can be added together to make sufficient error to result in prejudice and reversal. The errors must be real and substantial and such as may reasonably be supposed would affect the result. However, errors of the latter character, which may not by themselves justify a reversal, may well, when considered together with others, render it clear that a fair trial was not had. In such event justice can only be served by the granting of a new trial, absent the errors complained of. It is so ordered. Costs to appellants.
WADE and McDONOUGH, JJ., concur.
WORTHEN, J., concurs in the result.
. Lewis v. Rio Grande Western Ry. Co., 40 Utah 483, 123 P. 97.
. Section 41-6-82(a), U.C.A.1953, states: "Where. sidewalks are provided it shall be unlawful for any pedestrian to walk along and upon an adjacent roadway." Section 41-6-79(a) states: "Every pedestrian crossing a roadway at any point other than within a marked crosswalk or within an unmarked crosswalk at an intersection shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles upon the roadway."
. 271 Wis. 190, 72 N.W.2d 702.
. See Coombs v. Perry, 2 Utah 2d 881, 275 P.2d 680.
. Jury Instruction Forms — Utah p. XVI, states an express warning against this type of instruction.
. Sorenson v. Bell, 51 Utah 262, 170 P. 72; Morrison v. Perry, 104 Utah 151, 140 P.2d 772.
. See 5A O.J.S. Appeal & Error, § 1676, p. 683.
. Crellin v. Thomas, 122 Utah 122, 247 P.2d 264; Jensen v. Logan City, 89 Utah 347, 57 P.2d 708.