Case Name: Mrs. Mary Chiasson GRAVOIS et al. v. TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY et al.
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1965-03-08
Citations: 173 So. 2d 550
Docket Number: No. 6247
Parties: Mrs. Mary Chiasson GRAVOIS et al. v. TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY et al.
Judges: Before ELLIS, LOTTINGER, HER-GET, LANDRY and REID, JJ
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 173
Pages: 550–565

Head Matter:
Mrs. Mary Chiasson GRAVOIS et al. v. TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY et al.
No. 6247.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana. First Circuit
March 8, 1965.
Rehearings Denied April 12, 1965.
Writ Refused June 7, 1965.
Charles S. Becnel, of Becnel & Kliebert, Vacherie, for appellants.
A. Deutsche O’Neal, of O’Neal & Waitz, Houma, for appellees.
Before ELLIS, LOTTINGER, HER-GET, LANDRY and REID, JJ
Due to subsequent death of HERGET, X, this opinion is rendered by ELMS, LOTTINGER, LANDRY, AND REID, JJ.

Opinion:
REID, Judge.
This is a suit for tort brought by Mrs. Mary Chiasson Gravois, individually and as the duly qualified administratrix of the succession of her husband, Stephen J. Gra-vois, and also as the duly qualified tutrix of her two minor children, Kimberly John Gravois and Stephanie Maria Gravois, for the death of her husband Stephen J. Gra-vois. The suit was brought against the Jeffers Construction Company and the individual partners, namely, J. Earl Bou-dreaux, Ray Boudreaux and Chase Jeffers, and its insurer Travelers Indemnity Company.
Plaintiff alleged that on February 18, 1960, Stephen J. Gravois was working on a sulphur mine installation owned and operated by Freeport Sulphur Company located approximately seven miles south of Grand Isle and more than a marine league from the shore of the State of Louisiana. There was no dispute as to the fact that the Freeport Sulphur mine was approximately seven miles south of Grand Isle and neither was it disputed that the decedent Stephen J. Gravois was, on February 18, 1960, a regular employee of Freeport Sul-phur Company and a member of an installation crew working on the mine complex belonging to Freeport Sulphur Company. The plaintiff was granted an award and was at the time of the trial receiving payments under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act.
Plaintiff had brought an action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana as well as in the 17th Judicial District Court of the State of Louisiana. The Federal Court action has been stayed pending the outcome of this suit and counsel for plaintiff states in his brief it will be heal'd only if the State Court holds that it has no jurisdiction in this case.
The record shows that a labor contract had been entered into between Jeffers Construction Company and Freeport Sulphur Company wherein Jeffers Construction Company agreed to furnish labor, equipment, and supervision as required by Free-port Sulphur Company and that Jeffers Construction Company would be considered as an independent contractor with regard to the work done thereunder.
Plaintiff contends the decedent's death was caused by negligence of employees of Jeffers Construction Company and that under the provisions of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 933(a), there is reserved to the third person entitled to compensation a third party remedy in the event that the injured party or his representative determines that some person other than the employer or person or persons in his employ is liable for damages.
In order to bring this action under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act plaintiff's counsel urges in his brief the provisions of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C.A. § 1333(c) which reads:
"With respect to disability or death of an employee resulting from any injury occurring as a result of operations described in subsection (b) of this section, compensation shall be payable under the provisions of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. "
He then alleges the wrongful death of plaintiff was directly caused by the negligence of third parties, namely, employees of the Jeffers Construction Company.
Plaintiff's suit then is based upon the provisions of 46 U.S.C.A. § 761-767, entitled "Death on the High Seas Act", which provides that the personal representative of the decedent may maintain a suit for damages in the District Courts of the United States. In the alternative plaintiff alleges that in the event the Death on the High Seas Act is not applicable, suit could be brought under the laws of the State of Louisiana under the "saving to suitors clause" of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1333(1) which provides in cases of admiralty that:
"The District Courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the •courts of the State, of:
"(1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled."
The theory of the plaintiff's case is all important in the issue here presented as the main point is the question of jurisdiction of the State Court.
In summary, the plaintiff's theory of the case is that she assumes that the structure at issue is within the Outer Continental Shelf, and as the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act provides that the exclusive remedy for the employee is the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act which permits either the employee or his representative to bring an action of tort against a third party, she is entitled to bring this action under the Death on the High Seas Act, or, under the "savings to suitors clause" under the laws of the State of Louisiana and under Article 2315 of the LSA-Civil Code.
Exceptions of no cause of action and of lack of jurisdiction were filed and an answer in the form of a general denial, with a plea of contributory negligence was filed. All of the exceptions were referred to the merits because the Trial Judge wanted to hear the entire case on the facts. At the time of the trial defendants reurged their exceptions but the Trial Judge felt it was unnecessary to go into a long discussion of the exceptions and decided to dispose of the case on the facts "and not on any delicately posed question of law."
The Trial Court did pass on the question of jurisdiction and found that the Court did have jurisdiction under the case of Presley v. Upper Mississippi Towing Corporation, La.App., 141 So.2d 411. He then concluded as a matter of fact that the Jeffers Construction Company, its employees and agents were free from any negligence in this case and therefore there could be no judgment against them and he dismissed plaintiff's suit.
It is from that judgment plaintiff has appealed.
In the opinion of this Court, the prime question at issue is the question of jurisdiction. An exception to the jurisdiction ratione materiae was filed by the defendants although no specific grounds were raised for the basis of the exception. On this appeal the question of jurisdiction is treated by both parties in an offhanded manner and it could almost be said defendants have abandoned their argument on the question of jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the question of whether or not the Courts of the State of Louisiana would have jurisdiction over the subject matter is one that cannot be avoided, nor, can it be waived or consented to by the parties, even if they so intended. LSA-C.C. Art. 3.
Jurisdiction in this case is determined by the provisions of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C.A. § 1331 through § 1343. Section 1331(a) defines the Outer Continental Shelf as follows:
"The term 'outer Continental Shelf' means all submerged lands lying seaward and outside of the area of lands beneath navigable waters as defined in section 1301 of this title, and of which the subsoil and seabed appertain to the United States and are subject to its jurisdiction and control."
Section 1332 reads as follows:
"(a) It is declared to be the policy of the United States that the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf appertain to the United States and are subject to its jurisdiction, control, and power of disposition as provided in this subchapter.
"(b) This subchapter shall be construed in such manner that the character as high seas of the waters above the outer Continental Shelf and the right to navigation and fishing therein shall not be affected."
Section 1333 reads in pertinent part as follows:
"(a) (1) The Constitution and laws and civil and political jurisdiction of the United States are extended to the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf and to all artificial islands and fixed structures which may be erected thereon for the purpose of exploring for, developing, removing, and transporting resources therefrom, to the same extent as if the outer Continental Shelf were an area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction located zvithin a State: Provided, however, That mineral leases on the outer Continental Shelf shall be maintained or issued only under the provisions of this sub-chapter. (Emphasis ours).
"(2) To the extent that they are applicable and not inconsistent with this subchapter or with other Federal laws and regulations of the Secretary now in effect or hereafter adopted, the civil and criminal laws of each adjacent State as of August 7, 1953 are declared to be the law of the United States for that portion of the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf, and artificial islands and fixed structures erected thereon, which would be within the area of the State if its boundaries were extended seaward to the outer margin of the outer Continental Shelf, and the President shall determine and publish in the Federal Register such projected lines extending seaward and defining each such area. All of such applicable laws shall be administered and enforced by the appropriate officers and courts of the United States. State taxation laws shall not apply to the outer Continental Shelf. (Emphasis ours).
"(3) The provisions of this section for adoption of State law as the law of the United States shall never be interpreted as a basis for claiming any interest in or jurisdiction on behalf of any State for any purpose over the seabed and subsoil of the outer Continental Shelf, or the property and natural resources thereof or the revenues therefrom.
"(b) The United States district courts shall have original jurisdiction of cases and controversies arising out of or in connection with any operations conducted on the outer Continental Shelf for the purpose of exploring for, developing, removing or transporting by pipeline the natural resources, or involving rights to the natural resources of the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf, and proceedings with respect to any such case or controversy may be instituted in the judicial district in which any defendant resides or may be found, or in the judicial district of the adjacent State nearest the place where the cause of action arose."
We are here dealing with a fixed structure as defined by Section 1333 which is, by admission of all parties, in the Gulf of Mexico seven miles south of Grand Isle. It is, therefore, necessary to determine whether or not the State Courts of Louisiana have jurisdiction covering a tort claim arising out of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. Regarding the Trial Court's finding as to jurisdiction, it should be pointed out that the Presley case, supra, relied on by the Trial Judge, deals with the Jones Act which specifically gives jurisdiction under certain circumstances to both the State and Federal Courts, but which Act is not appropriate here. It would follow that the Death on the High Seas Act is inappropriate as we are not dealing with a death over navigable water on the high seas but are dealing with an offshore structure which, under 43 U.S.C.A. § 1333, is placed under the meaning of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. It would therefore follow that if the State Court should have jurisdiction the jurisdiction could only arise out of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, which Act expresses adoption of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 901, as the basis of compensation for death or disability of an employee and, as mentioned in plaintiff's brief, this Act provides for suits in tort against a third party under Section 933.
In Pure Oil Company v. Snipes, 293 F.2d 60, the United States Court of Appeal, Fifth Circuit, held:
" Of course § 933 does not purport to define the substantive basis upon which the third person 'is liable in damages' to the injured employee. It does not confine it to federal law, or to state law, or to maritime law, to common law or to civil law. Presumably it embraces whatever law is legally available. "
It might be assumed from a reading of 43 U.S.C.A. § 1332, quoted above, that State law could apply and that under the saving to suitors clause of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331, quoted above, the State Courts would have jurisdiction. However, any such supposition on the part of this Court is meaningless in view of the holding of the U. S. Court of Appeal in the Pure Oil Company case, supra, that under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act only Federal Maritime law was applicable. In that case the injury occurred on a fixed drilling platform owned and controlled by Pure Oil Company. It rested permanently on vertical upright members securely affixed to the ocean floor. The platform was located approximately 65 miles off the coast of Louisiana and was, in the opinion of the Court, substantially seaward of Louisiana's-historic extended maritime boundary recognized in the Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C.A. § 1301-1315, and whether measured in terms of Louisiana's claim or the boundary finally delineated in United States v. State of Louisiana, Texas, Mississippi, Alabama and Florida, 363 U.S. 1, 80 S.Ct. 961, 4 L.Ed.2d 1025, this platform was in the area defined in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. In that case plaintiff was not working for Pure Oil Company but was an employee of Loffland Brothers Drilling Company. Loffland had undertaken to drill two wells from the platform. Loffland was described as an independent contractor (Jeffers was so called in its contract with Freeport). The claim of Snipes against Pure Oil was a familiar suit against a third party and, as mentioned by the Court, brought under Section 933 of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act which was adopted by the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. The Court in the Pure Oil case held that the accident did not happen in Louisiana nor did it happen in waters which Louisiana could regard as within her territorial boundaries and "if Louisiana law is to apply, it is because Congress has specified that this is so." The Court pointed out that Pure Oil contended this is the consequence of Section 1333(a) (2) providing for the extension of the laws of adjacent states to the outer Continental Shelf. The issue in the Pure Oil Company case was whether or not the equitable doctrine of laches controlled the timeliness of filing suit or whether the Louisiana one year statute of limitations applied. The Court concluded that only Federal Maritime law was applicable, stating:
"We think that a consideration of both intrinsic and extrinsic factors requires the conclusion that it was the intention of Congress that (a) this occurrence be governed by Federal, not State, law, and (b) that the Federal law thereby promulgated would be the pervasive maritime law of the United States. In connection with the latter phase — the choice by Congress of maritime law — it is again important to keep in mind that we are in an area in which Congress has an almost unlimited power to determine what standards shall comprise the Federal law."
The Court examined Title 43, Sec. 1332, cited above, dealing with the extent of the law of the adjoining states to the outer Continental Shelf and concluded:
" And second, it was a determination that this matter could not adequately be left to the adjacent states either in the creation of the underlying substantive standards or in their enforcement. Of course enforcement and effectuation of such congressional policy makes the question of sanctions, including that of civil tort liability, of like congressional concern."
Therefore, it would follow that as the Court has stated that only Federal Maritime law would be applicable, then under 28 U.S. C.A. § 1331(1) the Federal District Courts would have original jurisdiction exclusive of the Courts of the State and the saving to suitors clause of 28 U.S.C.A. § 2331 is meaningless in this context because the Court has said there is no other remedy in such a case and cannot be used as a means of conferring jurisdiction upon this Court. Moreover, the last sentence of Section 1333(a) (2) provides that whatever the applicable laws may be they are to be "administered by the courts of the United States" which strongly implies though it does not explicitly declare exclusive jurisdiction.
See also Touchet v. Travelers Indemnity Company, D.C., 221 F.Supp. 376 (1963) in which the Court, citing the Pure Oil Company case, held that Federal, not State, law governs recovery of oil field laborers for injuries sustained while working on structures located on the outer Continental Shelf.
Therefore, as the Freeport Sul-phur mine structure involved in this case is within the limits of the outer Continental Shelf the Federal Courts have exclusive jurisdiction under the provisions of 43 U.S.C.A. § 1333, supra. The clear intent of the Act was to vest all civil and political jurisdiction in matters involving the off shore drilling activities on the outer Continental Shelf in the exclusive Federal Court jurisdiction. Had Congress intended to grant concurrent jurisdiction to the State Courts it would have so specified in this Act as they did in the Jones Act. The failure to do so shows their intention to retain jurisdiction in the United States Courts.
In regard to the "savings to suitors" clause of the Admiralty Jurisdiction Law 28 U.S.C.A. § 1333, we believe this clause has no application to matters involved on the outer Continental Shelf under the provision of said Section 1333, 43 U.S.C.A., supra.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that our Learned Brother below committed error in failing to sustain the exception to the jurisdiction ratione materiae filed in this case. In view of this finding it will not be necessary to pass on the merits herein.
For these reasons it is ordered, adjudged and decreed that the ruling of the District Court overruling the exception to the jurisdiction ratione materiae is hereby overruled, and judgment is rendered herein sustaining said exception and dismissing suit on these grounds. In all other respects the judgment of the Lower Court is affirmed.
Reversed in part, rendered in part, and affirmed.
. See. 1301 defines "lands beneath navigable waters" thus:
"(1) all lands within the boundaries of each of the respective States which are covered by nontidal waters that were navigable under the laws of the United States at the time such States became a member of the Union, or acquired sovereignty over such lands and waters thereafter, up to the ordinary high water mark as heretofore or hereafter modified by accretion, erosion, and reliction;
"(2) all lands permanently or periodically covered by tidal waters up to but not above the line of mean high tide and seaward to a line throe geographical miles distant from the coast line of each such State and to the boundary line of each such State where in any case such boundary as it existed at the time such State became a member of the Union, or as heretofore approved by Congress, extends seaward (or into the Gulf of Mexico) beyond three geographical miles, and
"(3) all filled in, made, or reclaimed lands which formerly were lands beneath •navigable waters, as hereinabove defined."