Case Name: Martin VOGEL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. HARBOR PLAZA CENTER, LLC, Defendant-Appellee.
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2018-06-25
Citations: 893 F.3d 1152
Docket Number: No. 16-55229
Parties: Martin VOGEL, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
HARBOR PLAZA CENTER, LLC, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: 
Reporter: Federal Reporter 3d Series
Volume: 893
Pages: 1152–1169

Head Matter:
Martin VOGEL, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
HARBOR PLAZA CENTER, LLC, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 16-55229
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Filed June 25, 2018
Submitted October 2, 2017 Pasadena, California
Scottlynn J. Hubbard, Disabled Advocacy Group APLC, Chico, California, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
No appearance for Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Andrew J. Kleinfeld, Susan P. Graber, and Morgan Christen, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
Concurrence by Judge Christen ;
Dissent by Judge Kleinfeld
GRABER, Circuit Judge:
In this action brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), Plaintiff Martin Vogel timely appeals the district court's award of $600 in attorney's fees following the entry of a default judgment. Defendant Harbor Plaza Center, LLC, originally filed an answer and took other actions but, before trial, failed to appear. The district court eventually struck the answer, entered a default judgment against Defendant, and awarded fees pursuant to a local rule. By eschewing the ordinary considerations that apply when calculating fees in ADA cases, the district court abused its discretion. Accordingly, we vacate the award of fees and remand for reconsideration.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff Martin Vogel is a paraplegic who uses a wheelchair when traveling in public. He visited the Harbor Plaza Shopping Center and, in the parking lot, encountered barriers that prevented him from fully enjoying the shopping center.
In June 2014, Plaintiff filed this action against the shopping center's owner, Defendant Harbor Plaza Center, LLC. He alleged violations of state law and the ADA, and he sought declaratory and injunctive relief, statutory damages, and attorney's fees. In July 2014, Defendant, represented by counsel, filed an answer to the complaint. The court scheduled trial for October 2015. In September 2014, Defendant filed a request to substitute counsel, which the court approved. The request was signed by Defendant's initial lawyer, its new lawyer, and its representative (Defendant's vice-president). Defendant and Defendant's lawyer thereafter stopped appearing. In the meantime, Plaintiff dutifully prepared for trial and, pursuant to the district court's scheduling order, filed motions in limine, a witness list, an exhibit list, and a pretrial brief.
At the scheduled pretrial conference, in September 2015, Defendant and its lawyer failed to appear. Plaintiff expressed concern that Defendant was unaware of the proceedings. The court shared that concern and noted that, in 2005, Defendant's lawyer had been convicted of a federal corruption charge. The court continued the pretrial conference and ordered Plaintiff to provide notice to Defendant's lawyer and to Defendant's representative of the now-postponed conference. Plaintiff provided notice, but Defendant and Defendant's lawyer failed to appear at the continuation of the pretrial conference. The court struck Defendant's answer and ordered that Plaintiff "may proceed by way of entry of default and then default judgment."
Plaintiff filed an ex parte application for default, which the court entered. But Plaintiff remained concerned that Defendant was unaware of the proceedings. Instead of filing a motion for default judgment, Plaintiff filed an ex parte application for the court to reschedule the pretrial conference and to order Defendant's representative to appear personally. The district court denied the application without explanation. The court later ordered Plaintiff, upon pain of dismissal, to file a motion for default judgment.
Plaintiff then filed a motion for default judgment, seeking injunctive relief, statutory damages, attorney's fees, and costs. Plaintiff sought $36,671.25 in attorney's fees. In an attached declaration, Plaintiff's lawyer provided the court with a seven-page itemized list of the work that his firm had performed.
The district court granted Plaintiff's motion for default judgment. The court entered an injunction ordering Defendant to make specific structural changes to the parking lot:
(1) install a handicap and van-accessible parking stall with a width greater than or equal to 132 inches, with (a) appropriate signage; (b) a curb cut offering walkway access to the entrance of Defendant's Shopping Center located at 13011-13129 Harbor Boulevard, Garden Grove, CA 92843; and (c) an adjacent access aisle at least 60 inches wide that is nearly level in all directions to the parking spaces they serve, with a slope no steeper than 2.082%; and (2) ensure that no disabled parking spaces have slopes or cross-slopes exceeding 2.082% due to encroaching build-up curb ramps.
The court awarded Plaintiff statutory damages of $4,000, and it awarded Plaintiff all of his requested costs, $3,590.83.
On Plaintiff's request for attorney's fees, the district court consulted the Local Rules of Practice in Civil Proceedings before the United States District Court for the Central District of California. In particular, Local Rule 55-3, titled "Default Judgment-Schedule of Attorneys' Fees," provides:
When a promissory note, contract or applicable statute provides for the recovery of reasonable attorneys' fees, those fees shall be calculated according to the following schedule:
Amount of Judgment Attorneys' Fees Awards $0.01-$1,000 30% with a minimum of $250.00 $1,000.01-$10,000 $300 plus 10% of the amount over $1,000 $10,000.01-$50,000 $1200 plus 6% of the amount over $10,000 $50,000.01-$100,000 $3600 plus 4% of the amount over $50,000 Over $100,00 $5600 plus 2% of the amount over $100,000
This schedule shall be applied to the amount of the judgment exclusive of costs. An attorney claiming a fee in excess of this schedule may file a written request at the time of entry of the default judgment to have the attorney's fee fixed by the Court. The Court shall hear the request and render judgment for such fee as the Court may deem reasonable.
Consulting the local rule's formula, the district court calculated fees of $600. The court held that, because it was awarding Plaintiff the full amount of his requested costs, "[t]he Court does not believe . that further modification of the Local Rule's recommended attorneys' fees award is necessary here. The Court therefore awards Plaintiff $600 in attorneys' fees."
Plaintiff timely appeals, challenging only the district court's calculation of fees. Defendant declined to file a responding brief, and we granted Plaintiff's request that we decide this appeal without oral argument.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
We review for abuse of discretion a district court's award of attorney's fees under the ADA. Armstrong v. Davis , 318 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2003). But we review de novo questions of law that underlie a court's fee award. Id. at 971. Here, the central legal issue underlying the district court's award of fees is the proper interpretation of Local Rule 55-3. Ordinarily we give great deference to a district court's interpretation of its own local rules. Bias v. Moynihan , 508 F.3d 1212, 1223 (9th Cir. 2007). That deference rests on the idea that a court that creates a rule is in the best position to apply it to the circumstances of particular cases. E.g. , Morgan Distrib. Co. v. Unidynamic Corp. , 868 F.2d 992, 996 (8th Cir. 1989). But where, as here, the interpretive question is a purely legal one and the judges of the district court have been inconsistent in their interpretation of the rule, the amount of deference that we owe is diminished. See Jackson v. Beard , 828 F.2d 1077, 1079 (4th Cir. 1987) (suggesting that an interpretation of a local rule in a particular case should be given less deference when the interpretation "is at odds with that of any other . judges of the district").
DISCUSSION
"The general rule in our legal system is that each party must pay its own attorney's fees...." Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn , 559 U.S. 542, 550, 130 S.Ct. 1662, 176 L.Ed.2d 494 (2010) (citation omitted). But many federal statutes protecting civil rights, including the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12205, contain fee-shifting provisions that allow a "prevailing party" to recover "a reasonable attorney's fee." Perdue , 559 U.S. at 550 & n.3, 130 S.Ct. 1662. Despite minor textual differences, we interpret those provisions uniformly. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res. , 532 U.S. 598, 601-03, 603 n.4, 121 S.Ct. 1835, 149 L.Ed.2d 855 (2001) ; City of Burlington v. Dague , 505 U.S. 557, 562, 112 S.Ct. 2638, 120 L.Ed.2d 449 (1992).
The district court correctly held that Plaintiff is entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee under 42 U.S.C. § 12205. Plaintiff is indisputably a "prevailing party," because he has secured an "enforceable judgment[ ] on the merits." Buckhannon , 532 U.S. at 603-04, 121 S.Ct. 1835. And we see nothing in the record that would render an award of fees unjust. See Jankey v. Poop Deck , 537 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2008) ("A prevailing plaintiff under the ADA should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust." (internal quotation marks omitted) ). The only remaining question is the calculation of a reasonable fee.
"[A] 'reasonable' fee is a fee that is sufficient to induce a capable attorney to undertake the representation of a meritorious civil rights case." Perdue , 559 U.S. at 552, 130 S.Ct. 1662. "[T]he district court must strike a balance between granting sufficient fees to attract qualified counsel to civil rights cases and avoiding a windfall to counsel." Moreno v. City of Sacramento , 534 F.3d 1106, 1111 (9th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). "The way to do so is to compensate counsel at the prevailing rate in the community for similar work; no more, no less." Id. "Where a plaintiff has obtained excellent results, his attorney should recover a fully compensatory fee. Normally this will encompass all hours reasonably expended on the litigation...." Hensley v. Eckerhart , 461 U.S. 424, 435, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983). These principles apply equally to prevailing parties who obtain a default judgment in a civil rights action. See, e.g. , Fair Hous. of Marin v. Combs , 285 F.3d 899, 908 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying these principles and, for case-specific reasons, affirming an award of fees "more than five times the amount of compensatory and punitive damage awards combined").
"The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate." Hensley , 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933. Once the court has calculated that amount, known as the lodestar, "[t]here remain other considerations that may lead the district court to adjust the fee upward or downward, including the important factor of the 'results obtained.' " Id. at 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933. The "lodestar approach" has "achieved dominance in the federal courts" and is "the guiding light of [the Supreme Court's] fee-shifting jurisprudence." Perdue , 559 U.S. at 551, 130 S.Ct. 1662 (internal quotation marks omitted). Ultimately, the district court has discretion in determining a reasonable fee, but the court must exercise that discretion consistently with the principles described above. Perdue , 559 U.S. at 552-53, 558, 130 S.Ct. 1662 ; Hensley , 461 U.S. at 433-37, 103 S.Ct. 1933.
Here, the district court declined to apply the lodestar approach. Instead, the court looked to the schedule of fees described in the Central District's Local Rule 55-3. The local rule's schedule of fees provides a default calculation of fees amounting to a small percentage of the monetary component of a default judgment. Applying the schedule, the court calculated fees of $600. Local Rule 55-3 also provides that, upon timely written request, the district court "shall hear the request and render judgment for such fee as the Court may deem reasonable." In response to Plaintiff's detailed written request, the district court concluded that no "modification" of the $600 calculation was warranted. In effect, the court interpreted the rule as prescribing a presumptively correct award of fees in cases in which prevailing parties claim fees in excess of the scheduled amount.
We read the local rule to require a different procedure. If a party seeks a fee "in excess of" the schedule and timely files a written request to have the fee fixed by the court, then the court must hear the request and award a "reasonable" fee. That process does not describe a "modification" of the schedule of fees. Rather, it prescribes an alternative process when a party invokes it in the proper way at the proper time. When a party invokes that process, the court is obliged to calculate a "reasonable" fee in the usual manner, without using the fee schedule as a starting point.
Our reasons for reading the local rule in this manner are straightforward. First, the text of the rule provides that, when a lawyer claims a fee in excess of the scheduled amount, the lawyer is asking "to have the attorney's fee fixed by the Court. The Court shall hear the request and render judgment for such fee as the Court may deem reasonable." The rule thus specifies that the district court, not the schedule, will fix the fee when a lawyer seeks more than the schedule provides and that the touchstone for the court's award is reasonableness. The rule contains no presumption that the schedule is "reasonable" in this situation.
In addition, in a case in which a statute provides for attorney's fees, a "reasonable" fee within the meaning of the local rule is a fee that is "reasonable" under the relevant statute-in this case, the ADA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (providing that local rules "shall be consistent with Acts of Congress"); 42 U.S.C. § 12205 ("In any action . commenced pursuant to this chapter, the court . may allow the prevailing party . a reasonable attorney's fee...."). Local Rule 55-3 was last amended in 2003, well after the lodestar method had "achieved dominance" as the principal method for calculating reasonable attorney's fees in civil rights cases. See Gisbrecht v. Barnhart , 535 U.S. 789, 801, 122 S.Ct. 1817, 152 L.Ed.2d 996 (2002)
(noting that the lodestar method "achieved dominance" following three Supreme Court decisions in the mid-1980s). Given that historical background, we do not think that the drafters of the local rule intended to deviate from the well-established lodestar method and set a different fee amount as presumptively reasonable. Cf. Keene Corp. v. United States , 508 U.S. 200, 212-13, 113 S.Ct. 2035, 124 L.Ed.2d 118 (1993) (applying the "presumption that Congress was aware of [existing] judicial interpretations [of statutory text] and, in effect, adopted them" when it reenacted that text without change). Instead, the rule gives lawyers who obtain default judgments and who are entitled to statutory fees the option of recovering a set amount without going through the hassle of submitting records.
We emphasize that the lodestar amount is calculated by multiplying "the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate." Costa v. Comm'rof Soc. Sec. Admin. , 690 F.3d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (alteration omitted) (emphases added) (quoting Hensley , 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933 ). In calculating the lodestar, district courts "have a duty to ensure that claims for attorneys' fees are reasonable," Swedish Hosp. Corp. v. Shalala , 1 F.3d 1261, 1265 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (emphasis added), and a district court does not discharge that duty simply by taking at face value the word of the prevailing party's lawyer for the number of hours expended on the case, Gates v. Deukmejian , 987 F.2d 1392, 1398-99 (9th Cir. 1993). Rather, a district court must "ensure that the winning attorneys have exercised 'billing judgment.' " Case v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 233 , 157 F.3d 1243, 1250 (10th Cir. 1998). In a contested case, a district court ordinarily can rely on the losing party to aid the court in its duty by vigorously disputing any seemingly excessive fee requests. Moreno , 534 F.3d at 1116. In a case in which a defendant fails to appear or otherwise defend itself, however, the burden of scrutinizing an attorney's fee request-like other burdens-necessarily shifts to the court. Cf. Tuli v. Republic of Iraq (In re Tuli) , 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that a court "has an affirmative duty" to assure itself that it has personal jurisdiction over a defendant before entering a default judgment, even though personal jurisdiction need not be addressed sua sponte in contested cases).
By treating the fee schedule as presumptively reasonable, rather than using the lodestar approach to calculate a presumptively reasonable fee, the district court misinterpreted Local Rule 55-3 and abused its discretion. Furthermore, we think that the district court's erroneous methodology may have affected the fee award-Plaintiff achieved practically all of the relief that he sought, "excellent results" by any measure, but the court awarded him a tiny percentage of the requested fees. See Corder v. Gates , 947 F.2d 374, 378 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying harmless error analysis in the context of a challenge to an attorney's fee award). On this record, we cannot understand how the award of $600 meets the court's obligation to "compensate counsel at the prevailing rate in the community for similar work; no more, no less." Moreno , 534 F.3d at 1111. We therefore vacate the award of fees and remand for reconsideration in a manner consistent with this opinion. We express no view on the appropriate award of fees.
Award of fees VACATED and REMANDED for reconsideration. Costs on appeal awarded to Plaintiff-Appellant.
Earlier, the court had awarded sanctions against Defendant in connection with a failure to appear for mediation. The cost and fee requests did not duplicate the amounts awarded earlier.
Several judges in the Central District have interpreted the rule in the same manner. Indeed, some judges have ruled that "[o]nly 'an unusual case warrants deviation from the attorneys' fees schedule set forth in the Local Rules.' " Constr. Laborers Tr. Funds for S. Cal. Admin. Co. v. Tennyson Elec., Inc. , No. 2:16-cv-04908-ODW(GJSx), 2016 WL 6602571, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2016) (alteration omitted) (quoting BWP Media USA, Inc. v. P3R, LLC , No. 2:13-cv-05315 SVW, 2014 WL 3191160, at *5 (C.D. Cal. July 3, 2014) ). Other judges, on the other hand, have interpreted the rule as we do. See Powell v. Blackrock Asset Mgmt., LLC , No. 11-0517-JST (RNBx), 2011 WL 4551450, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2011) (using the lodestar method in a default judgment case).
We need not decide whether Local Rule 55-3 is consistent with the ADA and other civil rights statutes insofar as it authorizes a prescribed attorney's fee in cases in which a party does not ask for more than the scheduled amount. At any rate, it is difficult to see how that issue could ever be presented properly on appeal-any party in a position to complain would necessarily have failed to ask for more than the scheduled amount, thus waiving or forfeiting such a request.
The dissent characterizes our holding as a "new rule," but it is nothing of the sort. For more than 30 years, the lodestar approach has been used by district courts across the country to calculate reasonable attorney's fee awards in cases that result in default judgments. See, e.g. , Andrade v. Arby's Rest. Grp., Inc. , 225 F.Supp.3d 1115, 1143-44 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (applying the lodestar approach to determine reasonable attorney's fees in a case in which the defendant failed to defend itself); Obenauf v. Frontier Fin. Grp., Inc. , 785 F.Supp.2d 1188, 1206-07 (D.N.M. 2011) (same); Thomas v. Nat'l Bus. Assistants, Inc. , No. Civ N82-469, 1984 WL 585309, at *2-3 (D. Conn. Oct. 5, 1984) (same). More fundamentally, there is nothing about a case that ends in a default judgment that justifies departing from the lodestar approach. Whether a case is contested or not, a "reasonable" fee is one that would "induce a capable attorney to undertake the representation of a meritorious civil rights case," and the lodestar approach "yields a fee that is presumptively" sufficient to achieve that goal. Perdue , 559 U.S. at 552, 130 S.Ct. 1662.
Because district courts have a duty to ensure that attorney's fee requests are reasonable, we find unpersuasive the dissent's dire warnings about the real-world consequences of our decision. Indeed, the cases cited by the dissent in which district courts have sanctioned or reproached lawyers for inflating hourly rates or hours billed go only to show that district courts are well equipped to ferret out unreasonable fee requests. In a typical default situation, we would expect fee awards to be modest.