Case Name: Eyster v. Gaff et al.
Court: Colorado Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Colorado
Decision Date: 1873-02
Citations: 2 Colo. 228
Docket Number: 
Parties: Eyster v. Gaff et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Colorado Reports
Volume: 2
Pages: 228–247

Head Matter:
Eyster v. Gaff et al.
Pbbsumptions— of performance of official duty. A trustee held certain lands, whereon was situate a town site, for the use of the occupants; and, by the terms of the statute creating the trust, the execution thereof was directed to be according to certain prescribed regulations: Semble, that a conveyance by the trustee, reciting that the grantee is entitled to the premises, under the provisions of the statute creating the trust, referring to such act by its title, raises a presumption of compliance with the regulations.
Evidence — original record of a conveyance. Semble: It is admissible to receive the original record of a conveyance of lands; production of a certified copy is not essential.
Mobtgage — evidence of subsisting debt. Semble: Production of the mortgage, where this recites an indebtedness, is sufficient prima facie to establish the continued existence of such indebtedness ; the accompanying note or bond need not be produced. ,
Bankruptcy op mortgagor — effect on mortgagee’s estate. The bankruptcy of the mortgagor is no bar to an ejectment by mortgagee against a third person not connected with the assignee in bankruptcy, even though such ejectment be without permission of the bankruptcy court, the assignee never having assumed possession of, or intermeddled with, the estate.
The assignee in bankruptcy is not bound, in all cases, to assume possession of mortgaged lands pertaining to the estate, and no legal presumption exists of such possession, either actual or constructive.
Appeal from District Court, Arapahoe County.
Aw act of congress, passed on the 23d of May, 1844 (5 Stat. at Large, 657), authorized the entry of lands of the public domain whereon should be situated any town, by certain officials named, “intrust for several use and benefit of the occupants thereof, according to their respective interests ; the execution of which trust, as to the disposal of the lots in such town, and the proceeds of the sales thereof, to be conducted under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the legislative authority of the State or territory in which the same is situated.” The act contained a proviso that any act of the trustees, not in conformity to the rules and regulations prescribed, should be null and void.
The act of May 28, 1864 (13 Stat. at Large, 94), extended the above act, so as to authorize the probate judge of Arapahoe county to enter certain lands named, whereon was situated the city of Denver, and provided the execution of its provisions should be controlled in all things by the provisions of the former act.
The legislature of the territory, by an act passed May 11, 1864, prescribed rules and regulations for the execution ■of the trusts arising under an entry made in pursuance of the first-mentioned act and any amendments thereto. This act directed that the official making the entry should, within thirty days thereafter, give notice thereof in a manner pre scribed, and that every person claiming to be an occupant, or entitled under the trust, should, within ninety days after the first publication of notice of the entry, deliver into - the office of the official charged with the trust, a statement in writing, containing an accurate description of the particular parcels or lots wherein he or she claimed an interest, and the specific right or interest or estate which he or she claimed to be entitled to receive. Those failing to observe this requisition were declared forever barred, etc.; provision was made for the settlement of adverse claims ; the apportionment of the cost and expenses of the entry, and directing conveyance to be made to the claimant after ninety days from the first publication of notice of the entry.
Thomas and James W. Gaff brought ejectment for certain lots, part of the Denver town site; the declaration counting, for the premises as the plaintiff’s estate in fee.
Upon the trial, which was had before the court without a jury, it was shown that one George W. McClure had resided upon the premises, and was the owner of certain improvements thereon, from 1862 to 1868.
It was also shown that one Hall, probate judge of Arapahoe county, had entered the lands described in the act of congress, on the 6th day of May, A. D. 1865, in pursuance of the provisions of that act.
The plaintiffs also gave in evidence, from the files of the probate judge’s office, a statement, subscribed by McClure, and filed in that office on May 25, 1865, by which McClure applied for a conveyance of the lots in question, under the provisions of the latter act of congress, stating that he “ claimed the same as the owner thereof,” but not otherwise particularizing the estate or interest claimed. It was shown, against the defendants’ objection, that this paper accorded in form with those generally used by claimants of lots in this town site.
Plaintiffs also produced a book, admitted to be one of the books of records of the office of the recorder of the county, and offered to read therefrom the record of a conveyance of the premises in controversy, purporting to have been executed by Hall, probate judge, to McClure, on the 11th of August, A. D. 1865, and which recited the act of con gress, the entry by the probate judge, and that McClure was entitled to the premises, under the provisions of the act, but not otherwise showing compliance with the provisions of the territorial legislation. The defendant objected to this record: 1. Because the original record, and not a certified copy, was produced. 2. Because the deed did not, upon its face, show a compliance with the regulations prescribed by the territorial legislature; but the evidence was received, and this was assigned for error.
Plaintiffs also gave in evidence, over the defendant’s objection, a mortgage of these and other premises, executed by McClure to themselves, and expressed to be for securing the payment of certain moneys, payable in installments, and evidenced by sundry promissory notes; the mortgage bore date February 2d, A. D. 1867, and the last installment of the mortgage debt matured in nine months thereafter. Mo evidence was given of the non-payment or continued existence of the mortgage debt; and this was the ground of the defendant’s objection. The reception of this evidence was also assigned for error.
It was also shown, that on the 11th December, 1868, these plaintiffs exhibited in Arapahoe district court their bill for the foreclosure of this • and another mortgage, of which they were the assignees ; that a decree of foreclosure and sale was entered on the 1st July, 1870 ; that a sale of the premises had been had under this decree on the 27th August, 1870, and confirmed October 27 following, at which the plaintiffs were the purchasers, and that the premises were conveyed to the plaintiffs, in pursuance of this sale, on the 29th of May, 1871.
It was also shown on the part of the defendant, by an exemplification out of the supreme court of the territory, which then exercised jurisdiction in bankruptcy, that McClure, on the 10th day of May, 1870, filed his petition to be declared a bankrupt (the accompanying schedules setting forth the property in controversy, as part of the bankrupt’s estate, incumbered by the mortgage given in evidence in this cause, and the plaintiffs, as secured cred itors, for the mortgage debt); that he was adjudged bankrupt, May 11, 1870 ; that a warrant issued to the marshal, by which he was required to summon the creditors therein named, including the present plaintiffs, among others, to attend the first meeting of creditors; that said warrant was returned by the marshal, duly served ; that publication of notice of the first meeting of creditors was also made ; and that at this meeting, John Meechling, Esq., was elected assignee of the bankrupt’s estate ; that he accepted the appointment on the 4th June, 1870; and received the assignment of the bankrupt’s estate on the 9th of June; that on the 30th of June, 1870, he had filed in the foreclosure cause of Gaff et al. v. Eyster, a certificate of his appointment.as assignee, but, so far as appeared, he had never appeared therein, or sought to become party thereto ; nor had he in any way sought to intermeddle with any of the mortgaged premises, except that, upon the 2d day of August, 1870, after final decree in the foreclosure suit, he had filed in the supreme court, sitting in bankruptcy, a petition for an order directing certain tenants, including the defendant below, to pay the rents which might be due to the estate of McClure; no action was ever taken upon this petition, nor, so far as appeared, was the attention of the court in bankruptcy called to it.
The plaintiffs below, so far as appeared, had never proved their claim, in the bankruptcy court, nor was the consent of that court obtained to the proceedingsdn the foreclosure suit, subsequent to the bankruptcy, nor to the ejectment suit.
The district court found the defendant guilty, and the plaintiffs entitled in fee, and gave judgment accordingly; the defendant below excepted to this judgment, and assigned it for error.
The record did not show that, in the court below, any evidence had been given of the defendant’s possession of the premises. It was orally admitted, however, that such evidence had been given, and plaintiff in error stipulated not to object upon the ground of this omission.
Mr. O. S. Eyster, pro se.
Mr. J. Q. Charles, for appellees.
Mr. Justice Beleord dissented.

Opinion:
Wells, J.
Passing by all questions as to whether the assignee of McClure was or was not a necessary party to the bill to foreclose, and as to whether the decree given therein, after the bankruptcy, and without joining him, is or is not void, it appears to us that the appellees were properly permitted to recover in the court below, upon their mortgage alone. This results necessarily, as we think, from the nature of the mortgagee's estate, and the relation of the assignee thereto. The lien and estate of the mortgagee is preserved, notwithstanding the bankruptcy, and the assignee succeeds to the right which the mortgagor had before bankruptcy.' If the assignee has, in person, or by another, taken actual possession of the estate, the mortgagee cannot disturb that possession by an action brought after the initiation of the bankruptcy proceedings; in such case the possession of the assignee is the possession of the court in bankruptcy, and if the mortgagee would enter, he must first obtain the permission of that court. But in many cases he is not entitled to such possession; e. g., when the estate assigned consists of realty, subject to mortgage, and the mortgagee has entered before the bankruptcy. In such case the mortgagee unquestionably may retain the possession which he has lawfully acquired. So there are other cases where, though technically entitled to the possession, he is not only not bound to assume it, but his duty is to leave it where the bankruptcy finds it, e. g., where the estate assigned is subject to incumbrance exceeding its value. Lambert's case, 2 B. R. 138. Therefore, where the estate is assigned subject to mortgage, it ought not to be said, that as matter of law, nothing being shown as to the fact, the assignee had either the actual or constructive possession. And in the present case the appellant had not in any way connected himself with the assignee, nor shown even that the assignee had ever assumed or attempted to assume the possession of the premises. If, as for aught we know is the case, the assignee disclaims the estate, the plaintiffs certainly are entitled thereto, and they ought to be permitted to proceed against the defendant, who appears to be a mere stranger in the ordinary courts; notwithstanding the bankruptcy.
The judgment of the district court is
Affirmed.