Case Name: STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. ANGELO GONZALEZ MORALES, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
Court: New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1974-02-20
Citations: 127 N.J. Super. 1
Docket Number: 
Parties: STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. ANGELO GONZALEZ MORALES, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Superior Court Reports
Volume: 127
Pages: 1–13

Head Matter:
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. ANGELO GONZALEZ MORALES, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division
Argued September 25, 3973—
Decided February 20, 1974.
Before Judges Kolovsky, Fritz, and Crane.
Mr. Robert J. Konzelmann, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Mr. Stanley C. Van Ness, Public Defender, attorney).
Mr. Willard F. Byer, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Mr. Richard W. Berg, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief; Mr. George F. Kugler, Jr., Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney).

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Fritz, J. A. D.
Appellant, with another, was convicted by a jury of assault with an offensive weapon (N. J. S. A. 2A: 90-3) and possession of a firearm without a permit (N. J. S. A. 2A:151-41, subd. a). He was sentenced to a two to four-year term on the former charge, and to a consecutive one to three-year term on the latter.
Here he urges as grounds for reversal that (1) the sentence was manifestly excessive, (2) the two charges are fraction alizations of one offense, and (3) "the trial court committed reversible error by allowing the prosecutor to show the defendant failed to make an exculpatory statement to the police."
We find the first two assertions to be without merit. While the sentence is substantial, it is within statutory limits, and we cannot say we are persuaded that there was a mistaken exercise of discretion by the sentencing judge. State v. Tyson, 43 N. J. 411, cert. den. 380 U. S. 987, 85 S. Ct. 1359, 14 L. Ed. 2d 279 (1965). Nor do we agree that the offenses charged constitute a fraetionalization within the doctrine enunciated in State v. Jones, 94 N. J. Super. 137 (App. Div. 1967), as defendant contends. In Jones defendant was charged with Tobbery while armed with a knife, and with un lawful possession of the knife. Conviction of the latter charge required the State to prove unlawful use or an intent to use the knife unlawfully against another (N. J. S. A. 2A:151-56). The court there held that since proof of the robbery was necessary to prove both the robbery and the necessary ingredient of unlawful use or attempt so to use in the possession statute, there was a merger of offenses and only one crime could be charged. 94 N. J. Super, at 140. In the matter before us the prohibition of the possession statute is violated by mere possession without a permit (subject to certain exceptions not here applicable). Conviction on the possession charge could be had without proof of the assault, and proof of the illegality of possession was not necessary for the assault charge. See State v. Leibowitz, 22 N. J. 102 (1956).
The third ground set forth above is meritorious and warrants reversal.
Defendant, who had no prior criminal record, elected to testify on his own behalf. His testimony was elicited through an interpreter. On direct examination he admitted that on the night of the crime he had a gun with him which, he claimed, he had just bought from someone whose name he did not know, but who was going to Puerto Rico and needed to dispose of the gun. Defendant said, "He cried in necessity to me." Defendant testified that he intended to take the gun home and keep it. But he and the codefendant stopped at "the Prank Club" where, defendant testified, there was a man who had "his head down at the counter two or three minutes later he said somebody robbed me." Defendant and his friend went outside, "maybe to call the police," but were detained on the sidewalk and arrested. It is significant that nowhere in his direct testimony did defendant testify, either directly or indirectly, that he had told the police anything with respect to the events in question. Nor was any such information volunteered on cross-examination prior to the question and unsuccessful defense objection which is here challenged.
We observe at this point that while nothing of significance was developed in the State's case in chief with regard to any statement (or absence thereof) of Morales at police headquarters after his apprehension, credible evidence in the record in testimony from a police officer demonstrates that Morales had been advised of his right to remain silent pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
On cross-examination by the assistant prosecutor defendant was asked if, when he went to the police station, Ee talked to "Spanish Detective Villabobos." An affirmative response elicited the further question: "Did you tell him that you had bought that gun from a man who was in necessity and wanted to go to Puerto Eico to see his sick mother ?" An immediate and timely objection followed, and was overruled. We think this was error.
The right of an accused to remain silent after Miranda warnings cannot be diminished by a concern that such silence may be used against him, or, put otherwise, may be utilized to compel his forever remaining silent. State v. Griffin, 120 N. J. Super. 13 (App. Div. 1912), certif. den. 62 N. J. 73 (1912). We held this was so with respect to later exculpatory statements. We see no reason why the rule should not be the same a fortiori where the subsequent statement is, as here, inculpatory. The considerations of Harris v. New York, 401 U. S. 222, 91 S. Ct. 643, 28 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1971), and State v. Kimbrough, 109 N. J. Super. 57 (App. Div. 1970), were distinguished in State v. Griffin, supra, and the distinction applies here as well. Additionally, it does not appear that Miranda warnings were given in either Harris or Kimbrough. Cf. State v. Burt, 101 N. J. Super. 390 (App. Div. 1969), aff'd o.b. 59 N. J. 156 (1971), cert. den. 404 U. S. 1047, 92 S. Ct. 728, 30 L. Ed. 2d 735 (1972). The essential inconsistency, said in Harris, supra, to justify the admission of "traditional truth-testing devices" in a challenge to credibility on the basis "of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances," is absent when silence can be rea sonably explained as consequent to Miranda -warnings. Without the inconsistency, even relevance disappears.
The dissent, relying particularly on Harris v. New York, supra, disclaims error on the basis that, "Once defendant had testified that he had told the police his story about the purchase of the gun, the State had the right to attack defendant's credibility We subscribe to this proposition as a general statement, and have no doubt that had defendant so testified prior to the impugned inquiry on cross-examination, such a determination would be eminently sound. But under the circumstances here present, the conclusion begs the issue: it was the compulsion secured by the erroneous overruling of the objection which produced defendant's only testimony as to what he had told the police.
We are satisfied that the obligation imposed upon a testifying defendant by Harris "to speak truthfully and accurately" (401 U. S. at 226, 91 S. Ct. 643) was not intended to create an obligation to speak where none exists and in defeasance of Miranda. State v. Griffin, supra.
The dissent further justifies the result — and distinguishes Gh-iffin — by noting that defendant did not testify, in answer to the objectionable question, that he remained silent. The dissent notes, correctly, that defendant's testimony was that he had told his story to the police. This rationalization makes the availability of the constitutional protection depend on the answer given, rather than the propriety of the inquiry. In this context at least, such an approach completely emasculates the Fifth Amendment protection, for if the testimony of an accused as to prior silence or speech differs from evidence which the State produces, there is no error under the dissent's rationale, and if he testifies conformably the error is harmless. It is axiomatic that the time to test a question for its propriety (as contrasted with the harmlessness vel non of the answer) is when the question is asked, and not after the answer is given.
Satisfied that the court below was mistaken in its ruling, we turn to the question of whether the error was sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a reversal, for defendant, in his compelled response, testified that he had in fact told the police' substantially that to which he testified on direct examination, except for some few facts about which he replied that he was not asked. Had this been the end of it, the error might well have been harmless.
But in rebuttal the State produced the detective to whom defendant said he had told of the acquisition of the gun. This witness contradicted defendant's testimony and said, "He refused [sic] to say anything at all." Thus the State had an opportunity to which it was not rightfully entitled, to confront defendant head-on, on an issue not relevant to guilt or innocence, in a credibility battle. This opportunity would not have occurred except for the trial error. That the effort was intentional is demonstrated by the State's concession at argument that the prosecutor knew of the availability of the detective's testimony that defendant had said nothing. The soundness of this concession is illustrated by the representation of the State, at the outset of the trial, on inquiry from the court, that there were no statements or concessions, exculpatory or inculpatory, involved.
Then, in summation, the assistant prosecutor, in pointing up the importance of credibility, commented vigorously on the divergent testimony relating to whether defendant said anything to the detective. He asked the jury if defendant's story concerning the gun acquisition was true, "Don't you think he would tell the police that?"
Whether the inquiry as to the effect of the error is measured in terms of plain error in view of the imprecision of the objection, or in terms of harmless error upon the assumption that the objection should have served to alert the judge sufficiently, we cannot say that in the circumstances here present defendant had a fair trial, at least with regard to the assault count. Some inconsistencies in the testimony of the State's witnesses were apparent. Some discrepancies existed. In these circumstances we are satisfied that there was a distinct potential for improper prejudice and a real possibility of a miscarriage of justice The interests of justice require a new trial on the assault count.
On the other hand, defendant's guilt on the possession count is inescapably clear from his own volunteered testimony on direct examination. The verdict of guilty returned as to this count was uninfluenced, beyond any doubt, by any trial error.
The conviction on the first count for assault is reversed and the count is remanded for a new trial. The conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm is affirmed.
Because of our determination on the merits, we need not consider here whether we should reverse without regard to the presence or absence of prejudice, to protect the integrity of the Fifth Amendment by the deterrence of unlawful prosecutorial conduct. See United States v. Calandra, - U. S. -, 94 S. Ct. 613, 38 L. Ed. 2d 561 (1974).