Case Name: John S. Moore v. Elizabeth Aldrich
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1860-10
Citations: 25 Supp. Tex. 276
Docket Number: 
Parties: John S. Moore v. Elizabeth Aldrich.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 25 Supp.
Pages: 276–280

Head Matter:
John S. Moore v. Elizabeth Aldrich.
The 5th clause of the statute upon frauds reads, “ or upon any agreement which is not to be performed within the space of one year from the making thereof, unless the agreement, &c., be in writing.” (Paschal’s Dig., Art. 3875, Note 905.)
Where the defendant got possession of cattle on a contract to keep them several years, and receive one-fourth of the increase for his compensation, and he converts them to his own use, this statute does not apply.
Where the plaintiff had sold a part of the cattle sued for, which the defendant refused to deliver, he cannot object that the right was in the third person.
In an action of trover, the measure of damages is the value of the property converted, unless there be peculiar circumstances of aggravation.
Appeal from Bell. The case was tried before Hon. 2ÑT. W. Battle, one of the district judges.
Aldrich sued Moóre, and alleged that appellant, a stock-keeper of appellee, took charge of two hundred and fifty head of cattle, belonging to appellee, in the middle of July, 1853; that he was to take good care of said cattle for the space of three years from said time; and, as compensation for said care and attention to said cattle, the said appellant was to retain, for his own use and benefit, one-fourth of the increase of said stock of cattle during said three years; and he was, under said contract, to deliver back to appellee the whole of the original stock, and three-fourths of the increase, at the termination of said period of three years. A breach of the contract is charged, and a conversion to his own use by appellant of the original stock and the increase thereof, to the damage of appellee $2,500.
The defendant jilead the general issue, and also plead specially facts to the effect, that he jiurchased twenty-two head of cattle from the plaintiff, and he plead away the balance as having been lost or returned. The jilaintiff amended, averring maladministration of his trust, neglect of his duty, loss of the cattle, and the sale and conversion of portions of them to his own use, &c. She amended again, averring that, under the contract, the defendant received two hundred and fifty head of cattle to keep on shares; that he was to take care of them for three years, and to receive a fourth as compensation, &c.
The facts substantially are, that in 1853 the plaintiff placed in the hands of Moore, the defendant, two hundred head of stock; that the defendant said there were one hundred and sixty, including thirty-nine mother cows, the residue being ordinary stock cattle; that Moore was to go to Houston county and gather up the stock, and deliver them to the plaintiff' in Milam county, and the distance was one hundred and twenty miles; that he was to be paid for his trouble; that Moore was to go directly in the spring of 1853; that instead of this, he went to Red river, and Arkansas, on his own business; that the plaintiff sent another agent, who gathered and brought home most of the cattle; that, when Moore returned without cattle, he charged $300; that the dispute was arbitrated, and Moore was allowed $120 for his services; that Moore then made a contract to keep the stock, and kept them three or four years, when he delivered to John H. Pierson, the assignee of the plaintiff, about thirty head of cattle. Other witnesses fix the original stock at from two to three hundred. The defendant was to have one-fourth of the increase for his trouble. He counted, branded some of the cattle, and sold them to other persons. Mrs. Aldrich sold fifteen head, and received back thirty-three head. A witness stated that he delivered to Moore, in Houston county, one hundred and ninety-five head in the summer of 1853. It was proved that Moore refused to deliver the cattle on demand in 1855; that the cattle were worth $7 50 a head, and ought to have increased 100 per cent, during the three years that the defendant kept them.
The defendant’s witnesses reduce the number received by him to about one hundred, and state that twenty-five were given • to him for bringing them from Houston to Milam county. The defendant took a bill of exceptions, to the effect, that the contract not being in writing it could not be proved.
The court instructed the jury that the plaintiff was entitled to the value of the missing cattle, but was not liable for such as she had sold and delivered, to him; that the jury were to judge of the conflicting evidence, and refused to instruct the jury that the plaintiff could not recover, if she had sold part of the cattle to a third person before bringing the suit; and, for the defendant, the court instructed the jury that they could not presume fraud against the defendant. The jury returned a verdict of $2,530 damages, for which there was judgment, and from which the defendant appealed.
Herring Nowlin, for the plaintiff in error.
—The first ground relied upon for a reversal is, that the court erred in admitting testimony to prove the parol contract declared upon, as shown by bill of exceptions.
In support of this, we submit, first, that said contract, as alleged, is void, under the statute of frauds. (0. & W. Dig., Art. 936.) The language of the statute is, “Any agreement which is not to be performed within the space of one year from the making thereof.” This is fully and clearly construed' in Peter v. Compton, 1 Smith’s Lead. Cases, marg. p. 145. It is there held, that a contract which cannot be fully performed within a year is manifestly and essentially within the provisions of the statute of frauds. Thus, in Hessin v. Butters, 20 Me., 119, “ an agreement to clear and sow land, in consideration of being allowed to take the jirofits for three years, was held to be insusceptible of performance in a year, and consequently invalid without a writing.”
In Ray v. Young, 13 Tex., 552, this court says: “If the suit had been founded upon the verbal contract set out in the petition, and for its specific performance, as damages for its breach, there can be no doubt but the demurrer would have been well taken, and correctly .sustained by the court.”
The second assignment is, that the court erred in his 1st, 2d, 3d, and 4th instructions to the jury, and that this is well made.
The 4th assignment is, that the court erred in not granting a new trial. All the grounds of the motion for a new trial that are necessary to he considered have been presented; except the 3d, to wit, the verdict of the jury is contrary to the law as charged, and to the evidence submitted in the case; and the 4th, to wit, the verdict of the jury is excessive, oppressive, vindictive, and unwarranted by the pleadings and the evidence.
Hancock West, on the same side,
filed a written argument, to prove, by detail, that the verdict gave excessive damages.

Opinion:
Wheeler, O. J.
—We are of opinion, that the court did not err in overruling the objection to the introduction of the plaintiff's evidence. The defendant was to receive one-fourth of the increase of the stock for taking care of them, but he acquired no title or interest in the residue. They remained the property of the plaintiff, and she could maintain her action to recover them or their value. The gist of the action was the conversion by the defendant to his use of the plaintiff's property; not the enforcement of a contract which was not to he performed within a year. The statute of frauds has no application to the case. The defendant could not resist the plaintiff's right to recover her property, or damages for its conversion, because he had had the possession of it for more than a year with her consent.
hfor do we think there was error in the charge of'the court respecting the right of the plaintiff to maintain the' action. We do not understand, from the evidence, that the plaintiff had assigned or transferred to the witness her right or interest in all her cattle which had come into the possession of the defendant, and which had been converted by him to his own use, or her right to recover of the defendant damages for their conversion. But we understand the witness to have purchased all he could find, or all that had not been converted by the defendant to his use, and that remained to he found. And, in this view of the evidence, there was no error in the charge.
But we are of opinion, that the verdict was excessive, and that for this reason a new trial ought to have been granted. Taking the highest estimates furnished by the testimony of the plaintiff's witnesses, and supposing the jury to have credited their statements rather than the testimony of the defendant's witnesses, still, in that view of the evidence, they were not warranted in finding a verdict for the plaintiff for so large a sum. We cannot suppose they proceeded upon the idea of giving exemplary damages, for the charge of the court restricted their finding to the value of the missing cattle. The plaintiff does not appear to have thought, nor does the court appear to have considered, the case a proper one for the awarding of exemplary damages. In any other view the damages are excessive. We are of opinion, therefore, that the court erred in refusing a new trial; for which error the judgment must he'
Beversed and the cause remanded.