Case Name: In the Matter of Ann Trenchard LEAMAN and Paul J. Leaman, Jr.
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1994-09-14
Citations: 643 So. 2d 1286
Docket Number: No. 94-CA-119
Parties: In the Matter of Ann Trenchard LEAMAN and Paul J. Leaman, Jr.
Judges: Before KLIEBERT, GRISBAUM and CANNELLA, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 643
Pages: 1286–1289

Head Matter:
In the Matter of Ann Trenchard LEAMAN and Paul J. Leaman, Jr.
No. 94-CA-119.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit.
Sept. 14, 1994.
Mitchell J. Hoffman, Lowe, Stein, Hoffman, Allweiss & Hauver, New Orleans, for defendant/appellant Ann Trenchard Leaman.
William W. Hall, Metairie, A.D. Freeman, New Orleans, for plaintiff/appellee Paul J. Leaman, Jr.
Before KLIEBERT, GRISBAUM and CANNELLA, JJ.

Opinion:
11 CANNELLA, Judge.
Appellant, Ann Trenchard Leaman, appeals from the judgment of the trial court which granted a divorce to appellee, Paul J. Leaman, Jr., based on living separate and apart for six months under the provisions of La.C.C. art. 103(1). For the reasons which follow, we affirm.
The parties were married on January 13, 1983 and no children were bom of the marriage. On August 17, 1993, appellee filed a petition for divorce, alleging that the parties had lived separate and apart for over six months. He also alleged that they were separate in property by virtue of a prenuptial agreement. Appellant answered with a general denial and a reeonventional demand alleging that the prenuptial agreement was invalid, she was free from fault and in need of support, and she was entitled to a partition of the community.
On November 12, 1993, appellee filed a Motion To Set the divorce action for trial. He asserted that there were no exceptions or preliminary matters pending on the main demand for divorce. The court signed the order on that date, setting the matter for trial on December 1,1993. On November 19, 1993, appellant filed a Motion To Continue. The motion was argued and denied on December 1,1993. Thereafter, the divorce only was |2heard on the merits, reserving appellant's rights to assert the allegations she raised in her reeonventional (incidental) demand. Appellant was not present but her counsel was present. Appellee testified that he had lived separate and apart from appellant, without reconciling, for over six months. Appellee's son testified, generally corroborating that the parties had lived separate and apart for over six months. Judgment was rendered that day granting the divorce. Appellant appeals from this judgment.
Appellant argues on appeal that the trial court erred in refusing to grant her continuance. She argues that she was unable to take depositions concerning the validity of the prenuptial agreement and that her alimony pendent lite had not yet been awarded. She also argues that she was unable to attend the hearing.
The decision to grant a continuance rests in the discretion of the trial judge. La.C.C.P. art. 1601. His ruling on a motion for a continuance will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing of abuse of that discretion. Russell v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 572 So.2d 1093 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1990). No such showing was made in this ease.
As pointed out by the trial judge, none of appellant's arguments in support of the continuance related to the divorce. Her discovery concerns only related to the prenuptial agreement. Her absence from court was not raised in the trial court as a reason for the continuance. In fact, the trial court even offered counsel an opportunity to make arguments for the continuance relative to the divorce and he declined. Appellant's counsel was given an opportunity (albeit brief) to apply for writs from the court's action and he declined to do so. All of appellant's rights relative to her incidental demands were reserved and only the divorce was taken up. We cannot say, based on this record, that the trial judge abused his discretion in refusing the continuance. Therefore, we affirm the denial of the continuance by the trial judge.
Next, appellant argues that the divorce judgment should be set aside because the trial court set the divorce matter for trial on a motion that was not in compliance with the local rules of the Twenty-fourth Judicial District Court. Particularly, appellant contends that the Motion To Set was not in compliance with Rule V. We disagree.
|3The Motion To Set for trial was in substantial compliance with the rules of court. It essentially provided that the parties had answered and that there were no outstanding preliminary matters pending or applicable to the demand for divorce. Moreover, appellant does not allege that she suffered any prejudice by a deficiency in the motion. Accordingly, appellant's argument for reversal of the judgment because of the form of the Motion To Set lacks merit.
Appellant next argues that the judgment of divorce should be set aside because the court severed the main demand of divorce from the incidental demands. La. C.C.P. art. 1038 provides the trial court with the discretion to "order the separate trial of the principal and incidental actions" in a lawsuit. While it may be preferable in most instances, in the interest of judicial efficiency, to not separate the actions, it is a matter of judicial discretion that will not be reversed absent a showing of abuse. Napoli v. Napoli, 543 So.2d 98 (La.App. 1st Cir.1989). La. C.C. art. 103(1) provides the statutory right of spouses to a divorce based on the grounds of living separate and apart continuously for a period of six months or more. Appellee testified that the parties had lived separate and apart continuously for over six months and his son corroborated those facts. The evidence was sufficient to support the demand for divorce. There was no evidence of reconciliation and, in fact, there have been no allegations of reconciliation. Further, appellant alleges no prejudice because of the severance of the actions. Therefore, we find that appellee's right to a divorce was proven by him, was essentially not contested by appellant and the trial court did not abuse his discretion in severing the divorce from the other contested demands and granting the divorce.
J^Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to deny appellant's request for a continuance and sever the divorce action from the contested incidental actions, and we affirm the judgment of divorce, reserving to appellant her right to litigate the incidental actions raised in her reconventional demand.
AFFIRMED.
GRISBAUM, J., dissents.
. The Twenty-Fourth Judicial District Court Civil Rule V provides:
Section 1. All cases that have been allotted and all proceedings in connection therewith shall be set for trial upon written motion filed by the counsel seeking such trial. The motion to set shall be accompanied by a certificate that all parties have answered or preliminary defaults have been taken against them, including third-party defendants, all depositions and discovery have been completed and all medical treatment and date are complete and that all exceptions and preliminary matters have been disposed of and the matter is ready for a pretrial conference or to be set for trial.
Section 2. The Minute Clerk shall keep a trial docket upon which shall be entered all matters set for hearing and from which docket the judges' daily dockets shall be prepared and in readiness at the opening of the court.