Case Name: The People ex rel. The Manhattan Railway Company, Respondent, v. Edward P. Barker et al., as Commissioners of Taxes and Assessments of the City of New York, Appellants
Court: New York Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1900-11-27
Citations: 165 N.Y. 305
Docket Number: 
Parties: The People ex rel. The Manhattan Railway Company, Respondent, v. Edward P. Barker et al., as Commissioners of Taxes and Assessments of the City of New York, Appellants.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Reports
Volume: 165
Pages: 305–341

Head Matter:
The People ex rel. The Manhattan Railway Company, Respondent, v. Edward P. Barker et al., as Commissioners of Taxes and Assessments of the City of New York, Appellants.
1. Appeal — Findings op Fact by Special Term at Variance with Reperee’s Findings. The findings of a referee, appointed to take evidence and report to the court with his findings and conclusions, do not become the findings of fact in the case, unless they are approved by the Special Term, and where the Special Term makes findings of facts at variance with those of the referee, its findings become the findings in the case that are brought up for review in the Appellate Division by an appeal taken from an order of the Special Term made upon the evidence returned in the referee’s report, and further evidence introduced before it
2. Reversal op Order Vacating Assessment. The Court of Appeals, on appeal from an order of the Appellate Division, reversing a final order of the Special Term in a proceeding by certiorari to review an assessment, which involved a trial of an issue of fact, the commissioners of taxes and assessments claiming that the relator had taxable assets of great value, and the relator that it had none, is required by sections 1338, 1361 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to assume that the reversal was not upon the facts, but upon some error of law, unless the contrary clearly appears in the record body of the order appealed from.
3. Tax—Deduction op Indebtedness op Street Railway Company. Indebtedness incurred by a street, railway company in the purchase of franchises cannot he deducted from its assets for the purpose of determining the proper assessment for municipal taxes for the year 1894, since such franchises were not then taxable and consequently fell within the express provision of the Revised Statutes (1 R. S. 391, § 9, subd. 4, amd. L. 1892, ch. 202) prohibiting the deduction of indebtedness incurred in the purchase of non-taxable property.
4. Appeal — Finding, When Conclusive upon the Court op Appeals. A finding by the Special Term in certiorari proceedings to review an assessment upon the property of a street railway company for the purposes of taxation, upon the question whether certain indebtedness was contracted in the purchase of franchises, is purely one of fact, and, if it has support in the evidence, cannot be reviewed by the Court of Appeals upon appeal from an order of the Appellate Division reversing the order of the Special Term upon the law and not upon the facts.
5. Finding op Yalue. The value of an item denominated “open accounts," included in the assessment, representing the expenditures of the company upon the structure of another company, and on account of land damages paid for that company, is also purely a question of fact for the determination of the trial court and its findings, if supported by the evidence, cannot be disturbed by the Court of Appeals.
6. Assessment op Property op Elevated Railway Company — Fee Damages as Assets. Fee damages paid by an-elevated railroad company to abutting owners represent property that may be assessed, but damages paid on account of past interference w-ith their use of easements of light, air and access do not form a basis upon which any valid assessment can be made, since no right or property of value is acquired by the railroad company in consequence of such payments.
7. Taxation op Corporate Property—Evidence op Impairment op Capital Stock. The commissioners of taxes and assessments are justified in assuming that the capital stock of a corporation remains unimpaired, where it appears that it 1ms paid a dividend annually of six per cent; but evidence may be introduced showing that it has been impaired by the existence of debts, which evidence, if believed, overcomes the presumption that might otherwise exist.
8. Proper Relief on Appeal to Appellate Division. Upon appeal from an order of the Special Term in a certiorari proceeding confirming an assessment of corporate property made by the commissioners of taxes and assessments, the Appellate Division may modify the order or reverse it and send -the proceedings back for a reassessment, but should not vacate the assessment absolutely where it appears that there is property properly assessable, and it is not contended that any improper basis was adopted in determining the amount of the taxable assets of the relator, and the questions raised have reference to the items which should or should not be included in making up the value of the assets.
9. Deduction op Surplus. The “surplus profits or reserve funds” contemplated by section 3 of chapter 456 of the Laws of 1857, providing that “the capital stock of any company liable to taxation, except such part of it as shall have been excepted in the assessment roll, or as shall have been exempted by law, together with its surplus profits or reserve funds exceeding ten per cent of its capital * * * shall be assessed at its actual value and taxed in the same manner as other personal and real estate of the company,” are the accumulations of the company of moneys or property in excess of the par value of the stock issued by it; and if, alter the real estate and personal property is assessed at its actual value, no surplus over the par value of the stock is shown, or if such surplus does not exceed ten per cent of the capital stock, there is nothing to assess as surplus and nothing from which the ten per cent of the capital can be deducted.
People ex rel. Manhattan Ry. Co. v. Barker, 48 App. Div. 248, reversed.
(Argued October 3, 1900;
decided November 27, 1900;
motion for reargument submitted January 7, 1901; denied January 22, 1901.)
Appeal from an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the first judicial department, made March 1, 1900, reversing a final order of Special Term which dismissed a writ of certiorari to review an assessment against the property of the relator, and vacating such assessment.
The facts, so far as material, are stated in the opinion.
John Whalen, Corporation Counsel (William L. Turner and James M. Ward of counsel), for appellants.
The finding of the Special Term, that the indebtedness of the relator respecting $9,500,000 of the bonds of the Yew York Com.pany evidenced by $8,500,000 of the latter’s first mortgage bonds and by $1,000,000 of its debentures, was directly contracted by the relator in the acquisition of the Yew York Company’s railroad franchises; and that $1,127,112 of its own first mortgage bonds. represented a cash payment concededly made for the same purpose, amounting in all to $10,627,112, was supported by undisputed evidence, and was the' determination of a fact based on competent evidence which the court below not only did not reverse hut with which it had no power to interfere. (People ex rel. v. Dederick, 161 N. Y. 195 ; Matter of N. Y. El. R. R. Co., 43 N. Y. S. R. 651; Matter of M. El. R. R. Co., 12 N. Y. Supp. 511; Prouty v. L. S. & M. S. Ry. Co., 52 N. Y. 363; Boardman v. L. S. & N. S. Ry. Co., 84 N. Y. 181; Polhemus v. F. R. R. Co., 123 N. Y. 502; Shepherd v. May, 115 U. S. 505 ; Belmont v. Coman, 22 N. Y. 438; Calvo v. Davies, 73 N. Y. 211; Burr v. Beers, 24 N. Y. 178.) The cash land damage payment of $7,932,981 was made from the proceeds of $8,814,423.33 of Manhattan first mortgage bonds issued at ninety per cent of par, and the whole of this latter amount measures the value of a right of property acquired from abutters along the lines both of the Metropolitan and Mew York companies, whether part of the payment was made for “ rental ” damages or not, and such amount was either represented in the taxable property of the relator on assessment day in 1894, as part of the cost of reproducing its structures, or it was represented by “ non-taxable ” property, in which case the indebtedness contracted in its acquisition, evidenced by these bonds, claimed and allowed as offsets by the courts below, is non-deductible under the statute of 1892. (People ex rel. v. Davenport, 91 N. Y. 574; Kane v. N. Y. El. R. R. Co., 125 N. Y. 164; Lahr v. Met. El. Ry. Co., 104 N. Y. 268; Story v. N. Y. El. R. R. Co., 90 N. Y. 122; People ex rel. v. Hilts, 27 Misc. Rep. 295 ; Fobes v. R., W. & O. R. R. Co., 121 N. Y. 505.) The $1,488,035 of Manhattan first mortgage bonds, which represent unpaid dividends to stockholders, and which the Special Term allowed as a deductible item of indebtedness, but which the Appellate Division has not considered, should be refused as a legal offset, if necessary, to sustain the reassessment in whole or in part. (People ex rel. v. Barker, 23 App. Div. 532; People ex rel. v. Bd. of Assessors, 76 N. Y. 202.) The determination of the Special Term that in valuing the structures of the appellant the estimate is to be based on cost and earning capacity ; its rejection of the figure adopted by the referee of $8,770,587 as the value of this item, being the cost of their reproduction at the market price of labor and materials only on a given day, and involving, as it did, their entire non-existence and the suspension of the appellant’s business for at least two years, and its tentative acceptance as a partial value of the higher figure of $11,542,242.22, based upon the incomplete statement furnished by the relator of the original cost in cash of this detail of its assets, being its own valuation as shown by its books, were clearly sound, and this latter figure should be adopted rather than the figure suggested by the Appellate Division, which simply adds six per cent per annum for two years to the referee’s cost of replace ment. (People ex rel. v. Barker, 31 App. Div. 315; 158 N. Y. 109; People ex rel. v. Barker, 114 N. Y. 94; Brooklyn El. R. R. Co. v. City of Brooklyn, 11 App. Div. 131; Fealey v. Bull, 163 N. Y. 391; People ex rel. v. Barker, 116 R. Y. 315.)
John F. Dillon, David B. Hill, Julien T. Davies and Brainard Tolles for respondent.
The Appellate Division was right in determining the actual value of the capital stock of the relator by a direct valuation of its assets and liabilities, rather than by presumptions or intricate theories. (People ex rel. v. Coleman, 126 N. Y. 433 ; People ex rel. v. Feitner, 11 App. Div. 573; People ex rel. v. Barker, 139 N. Y. 61; People ex rel. v. Barker, 141 N. Y. 255; People ex rel. v. Dederick, 25 Misc. Rep. 539 ; People ex rel. v. Neff, 19 App. Div. 601; People ex rel. v. Dykes, 45 N. Y. S. R. 621; 64 Hun, 634; People ex rel. v. Roberts, 37 App. Div. 1; People ex rel. v. Barker, 7 App. Div. 27; People ex rel. v. Barker, 16 Misc. Rep. 252.) The Appellate Division was right in valuing the relator’s railroad structures according to the cost of replacement. (People ex rel. v. Clapp, 152 N. Y. 490; People ex rel. v. Hilts, 27 Misc. Rep. 290; People ex rel. v. Dolan, 126 N. Y. 126; People ex rel. v. Davenport, 91 N. Y. 574; Hubbard v. Brainard, 35 Conn. 563, 568; Varick v. Briggs, 6 Paige’s Ch. 323; W., etc., R. Co. v. Cæur d’Alene Nav. Co., 160 U. S. 77; Savings Bank v. Nashua, 46 N. H. 389 ; People ex rel. v. Barker, 16 Misc. Rep. 258; People ex rel. v. Kalbfleisch, 25 App. Div. 432.) The Appellate Division was right in holding that the bonded indebtedness originally incurred by the New York Elevated Railroad Company was to be deducted in determining the value of the capital stock of the relator. (People ex rel. v. Barker, 155 N. Y. 330; People ex rel. v. Dederick, 161 N. Y. 195; Polhemus v. F. R. R. Co., 123 N. Y. 502; Tompkins v. A. S. R. Co., 102 Ga. 436; Arbuckle v. M. R. Co., 81 Ill. 429; C., etc., R. Co. v. Moffit, 75 Ill. 524 ; L., etc., R. Co. v. Boney, 117 Ind. 501; Berry v. K. C., etc., R. Co., 52 Kans. 774; Dodson v. B., etc., R. Co., 77 Md. 489; N. B., etc., R. Co. v. O. C. R. Co., 120 Mass. 397.) . The Appellate Division was right in holding that all the bonded indebtedness of the relator was to be deducted in determining the value of its capital stock. (People ex rel. v. Barker, 23 App. Div. 532 ; People ex rel. v. Bd. of Assessors, 76 N. Y. 202.) The Appellate Division erred in estimating the open account against the Metropolitan Elevated Railway Company at its face value instead of its actual value. (People ex rel. v. Feitner, 51 App. Div. 178.) The Appellate Division erred in holding that the sum of $2,320,658.74 paid by relator as fee damages to abutting property was to be included in the cost of replacement of its railroad and the assessed value of its real property. (People ex rel. v. Hilts, 163 N. Y. 594; People ex rel. v. Clapp, 152 N. Y. 49; People ex rel. v. Hilts, 27 Misc. Rep. 290; Newman v. M. El. Ry. Co., 118 N. Y. 618; Bohm v. M. El. Ry. Co., 129 N. Y. 576; Bookman v. N. Y. El. R. R. Co., 137 N. Y. 302; Sperb v. M. El. Ry. Co., 137 N. Y. 596 ; S. A. R. R. Co. v. M. El. Ry. Co., 138 N. Y. 548; Lazarus v. M. El. Ry. Co., 69 Hun, 191; Parmenter v. Fitzpatrick, 135 N. Y. 196.) The Appellate Division did not exceed its powers in directing the assessment to be stricken from the roll. (Code Civ. Pro. §§ 1022, 1317, 1361; Matter of Chapman, 162 N. Y. 456; Wood v. Baker, 60 Hun, 337; Stanley v. Crowe, 19 N. Y. S. R. 828; Wood v. Bd. Suprs., 30 N. Y. S. R. 706; Ross v. Caywood, 162 N. Y. 262; New v. Vil. of New Rochelle, 158 N. Y. 41; Hendrickson v. City of New York, 160 N. Y. 144; Howells v. Hettrick, 160 N. Y. 308; Benedict v. Arnoux, 154 N. Y. 715.)

Opinion:
Haight, J.
The commissioners of taxes and assessments for the city of Hew York originally assessed the property of the relator for the purpose of taxation for the year 1894 at $17,860,712. Hpon review that assessment was vacated and set aside and a reassessment ordered by this court. (146 N. Y. 304.) Thereupon the commissioners of taxes reassessed the property of the relator for that year at the sum of $15,526,800. The relator then instituted proceedings by cer tiorari to review the assessment so made, and upon the return of the writ an order was entered appointing a referee to take evidence upon all of the issues in the case and to report to the court his findings of fact and conclusions of law with all convenient speed. The referee so appointed, after taking the evidence submitted by the parties, made his report to the court, containing findings of fact and conclusions of law, which conclusions were to the effect that the reassessment of the relator's property was erroneous and illegal and should be wholly vacated and set aside. The case was then brought to a hearing before the Special Term upon the evidence returned in the referee's report, and the further evidence of a mortgage made on the 26th day of November, 1890, between the Manhattan Railway Company and the Metropolitan Elevated Railroad Company of the first part, and the Central Trust Company of New York of the second part, and after such hearing the court made a final order, containing specific findings of facts, in which some of the facts found by the referee were approved and others were not, and concluded by confirming the assessment made by the commissioners and dismissing the writ. Thereupon an appeal was taken by the relator to the Appellate Division, which resulted in an order reversing the order of the Special Term and vacating the assessment.
The chief controversy arises out of the claim of the relator that the items for open accounts, $6,217,939.79, and land damages, $8,814,423.33, should be stricken from the amount of its assets and that there should be added to the amounts allowed by the Special Term as deductions from the relator's assets the following items:
New York first mortgage bonds........... $8,500,000.00
New York debenture bonds................ 1,000,000.00
And Manhattan bonds . 1,127,112.00
Making a total of................... $10,627,112.00
The first question which it becomes necessary to consider has reference to the power of the court upon this review. As we have seen, the case was referred to a referee, not to hear, try and determine, but to take the evidence and report to the court, with his findings and conclusions. The findings of the referee, therefore, do not become the findings of fact in the case unless they are approved by the Special Term. In this case the Special Term made findings of fact with reference to the disputed items, at variance with the' findings of the referee. The findings of the Special Term thereupon became the findings in the case that were brought up for review in the Appellate Division by the appeal that Avas taken from the order of the Special Term. The Appellate Division has reversed the order of the Special Term, but in the order entered it has not stated that the reversal was upon the facts. This is a special proceeding involving a trial of an issue of fact, the commissioners claiming that the company has taxable assets of great value, and the relator that it has none. Section 1361 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in making provision for a review of special proceedings, provides that " The proceedings upon an appeal, taken as prescribed in this title, are governed- by the provisions of this act, and of the general rules of practice, relating to an appeal in an action, except as otherwise specially prescribed by law." Section 1338 provides for a revieAV in the Court of Appeals of judgments entered in actions and that upon an appeal to that court "from a judgment, reversing a judgment entered upon the report of a referee, or a determination in the trial court; or from an order granting a neAV trial, upon such a reversal; it must be presumed that the judgment Avas not reversed, or the new trial granted, upon a question of fact, unless the contrary clearly appears in the record body of the judgment or order appealed from." Under these sections Ave are required to assume that the order of the Special Term was not reversed upon the facts, but that the reversal was upon some error of law. (Matter of Chapman, 162 N. Y. 456; Wetmore v. Wetmore, 162 N. Y. 503; People ex rel. Manhattan Ry. Co. v. Barker, 152 N, Y. 417; Matter of Keefe, 164 N. Y. 352.)
Considering the facts, therefore, to be as found by the Special Term, Ave proceed to inquire whether there were errors of law presented which justified a reversal. It is not contended that any improper basis was adopted in determining the amount of the taxable assets of the relator. The questions raised have reference to the items which should or should not be included in making up the value of the assets.
We will first consider the items which the relator claims should be deducted from the amount of the assets found to belong to it. The three items above referred to "may properly be considered together. The Special Term finds as follows :
" 22nd. Prior to the second Monday of January, 1894, the Manhattan Bailway Company had paid for the franchise to operate an elevated railway in certain streets and avenues in the city of ¡New York, to the ¡New York Elevated Bailroad Company and to the Metropolitan Elevated Bailway Company, in addition to other sums agreed to be paid for the same purpose, the sum in cash of one million and fourteen thousand dollars (§1,014,000)."
27th. " That of the said eleven million six hundred sixty-three thousand and thirty-five dollars ($11,663,035) of the mortgage bonds of the Manhattan Bailway Company, at least one million one hundred twenty-seven thousand one hundred and twelve dollars ($1,127,112) represented the payment specified in the foregoing 22nd paragraph of one million and fourteen thousand dollars ($1,014,000), by the said Manhattan Bailway Compan y for franchises to operate elevated railways in certain streets and avenues in the city of ¡N"ew York to the ¡New York Elevated Bailroad Company and to the Metropolitan Elevated Bailway Company, the bonds so representing said sum having been issued for cash at ninety per cent of their par value."
29th. " That the liability of the Manhattan Bailway Company, created by certain promises to pay the eight million five hundred thousand dollars ($8,500,000) of mortgage bonds of the ¡New York Elevated Bailroad Company and the one million dollars ($1,000,000) of debenture bonds of the same company contained in said leases and said merger agreement hereinbefore referred to, was directly incurred in tho purchase and acquisition of the frmichises of the said ¡New York Elevated Bail- road Company to maintain and operate its lines of elevated railway in certain streets and avenues in the city of New York, and its indebtedness respecting the same was contracted for such purpose."
38th. " That of its total indebtedness of $21,907,590.35, $9,500,000 was incurred by the relator in the, purchase of its franchises, as determined in the foregoing 29th paragraph, and $l,127,112/or a like purpose, as determined in the foregoing 27th paragraph."
It will thus be seen that as to each of the three items of indebtedness, amounting in the aggregate, to $10,627,112, the finding is express that it was contracted by the relator in the purchase of franchises which are not taxable for town, county or municipal purposes, and, consequently, cannot be deducted from its assets under the express provision of 1 E. S. 391, sec. 9, subd. 4, as amended, Laws 1892, chap. 202, which prohibits the deduction of indebtedness incurred in the purchase of non-taxable property. (People ex rel. Cornell Steamboat Company v. Dederick, 161 N. Y. 195.) It is contended that these findings are erroneous. It is true that they are at variance with the findings made by the referee, but, as we have seen, the findings of the referee as to these items have not been ratified by the Special Term, and, consequently, they constitute no part of the facts brought up for review in the Appellate Division. That court, as we have already shown, has reversed upon the law and not the facts. The facts, therefore, as found by the Special Term, are deemed to stand as the facts in the case, unless it can be held that there is no evidence in the case tending to support them. Upon that question we are required to take into consideration the history of the organization of the relator, its purpose, and • the contracts that were entered into by it, with the inferences of fact that may be drawn therefrom. Doing this, we think that it cannot be properly held that the findings are without support from the evidence. The question as to whether the indebtedness was contracted in the purchase of franchises is purely one of fact, and we find no question of law involved as to these items upon which a reversal could properly have been founded by the Appellate Division.
The next question in controversy relates to the item of $6,217,939.79, denominated "open accounts." The referee found the amount to be $2,023,487.57. The Special Term found that they amounted in the aggregate to the sum first named. The open accounts represent the relators expenditures upon the structure of the Metropolitan Elevated Bail-way, of the amount found by the referee, and the balance found by the Special Term was for expenditures on account of land damages paid for that company. The counsel for the relator now concedes that the amount of open accounts, as found by the Special Term, at the time stood upon the books of the company as a valid asset against the Metropolitan Bail-road Company, but as we understand its contention, it is that the Special Term erred in assessing this item at its face value, for the reason that its actual value did not exceed the sum of $166,667. Whether these open accounts were of the value of one dollar, one hundred thousand dollars, or six million dollars, was purely a question of fact for the determination of the trial court. The opinion of the Appellate Division approves of this item as found by the Special Term, and under the Constitution, which limits this court to the review of questions of law, we think we have no jurisdiction to review that determination.
The other and perhaps the most troublesome question presented for our consideration relates to the item of land damages, $8,814,423.33, of which ninety per cent, $7,932,980.99, was realized. Of this sum $4,451,993.49 was paid for land damages on the Metropolitan line, and is included in the item of open accounts. Of the balance, $3,480,987.50, $1,160,329.37 thereof was paid for rental damages of the Hew York line and $2,320,658.13 for the fee damages, so called, bn that line. It is contended on behalf of the relator that these damages do not constitute taxable assets. We are inclined to the view that this contention presents a question of law which it is the duty of this court to determine. We have presented two elements of damages: One consists of payments made to abutting property owners on account of the relator's interference with or use of their easements of light, air and access, while the other consists of payments made to such owners by the relator in acquiring such easements, with a perpetual right to operate its railroad in front of such abutting property. There is a difference between the two elements of damages here referred to. The operating of an elevated railroad in a street in front of abutting property without acquiring from the owners the right so to do is an interference with and a partial destruction of such owners' easements of light, air and access. The structure is, therefore, to that extent unauthorized and illegal, and the company operating it is deemed to be a trespasser upon the right of such owners. Hence, in an action brought to recover damages for such use, the company becomes liable for all of the damages that it has caused by reason of its unlawful structure, not only for its impairment of the owners' easements of light, air and access, but also for its interference with their privacy and their convenience. For the damages so recovered, no right or property of value is acquired by the railroad company. It is for others' property rights destroyed and for injuries inflicted upon others that the company is compelled to make compensation in damages. Such damages, consequently, do not form a basis upon which any valid assessment can be made. It is quite different,' however, as to the damages ordinarily denominated " fee damages." Such damages are awarded for rights acquired from others for all time to come, or at least during the existence of the railroad company. The rights acquired are the easements of light, air and access of the abutting property owners in the streets occupied by the elevated railroad structure, and when these easements are acquired by the company its structure becomes lawful and its right to operate' its road in front of the abutting property unquestioned. (Messenger v. Manhattan R. Co., 129 N. Y. 502.) The acquirement of these easements, it is true, destroys in a measure the value of the abutting property, but to the extent that such value is destroyed, that of the railroad com pany is increased. We think, therefore, that the fee damages represent property that may be assessed. The case of People ex rel. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co. v. Hilts (27 Misc. Reports, 290), which has been affirmed in this court, is clearly distinguishable from the case that wé now have under consideration. In that case the railroad was upon the surface of the ground. There was no infringement upon the easements of light, air and access of the abutting owners. Their property was damaged by reason of its proximity to the railroad, and that was all. The railroad company in that case had acquired its right of way years before, when the consequential damage to the abutting property may have been very different from what it was at the time the proceedings were instituted. Under the peculiar circumstances presented by that record this court saw fit to approve of the determination made by the Special Term ; but the question we now have under consideration relates to the fee damages of an elevated structure, an entirely different question, and one which was not considered in that case.
The Special Term, as we have seen, found that the value of the relator's assets, after making the proper deductions, was $14,440,641.58. Also that the relator had paid an annual dividend of six per cent upon its capital stock of $29,925,200, and had a surplus besides. And, finally, that the commissioners were justified in assuming that the capital stock of the relator remained unimpaired, and that the assessable value of its assets was $15,526,800, as determined by the commissioners, and that their assessment should be confirmed. In the case of People ex rel. Equitable Gas Light Company v. Barker (144 N. Y. 94), and also in this case on the former hearing (146 N. Y. 304), this co art held that such a presumption may be indulged in. Evidence, however, may be introduced showing that the capital stock of a company is' impaired by the existence of debts, which evidence, if believed, overcomes the presumption that might otherwise exist. In this case the indebtedness disclosed by the relator consisted of mortgages, bonds and judgments, about which there now appears to be no controversy as to the facts. It would seem, therefore, that the presumption was overcome hy the evidence, and the assessment should be made in accordance with the testimony and not based upon the presumption that" the capital stock remained unimpaired.
The Appellate Division appears to have found that the structure in the streets cost $9,823,057, instead of $8,770,587, as found hy the referee. It also found that the judgments unpaid of $744,555.35 . had been obtained for land damages, of which $248,185.11 was for rental damages and the rest was for fee damages. We fully agree with the learned Appellate Division with reference to its disposition of these items. Indeed, we do not understand them to be seriously questioned. We agree fully as to the assets, and only differ as to the deductions of the items first considered by us.
Assets as found by the Appellate Division :
Beal estate and other structures............. $5,120,216.00
Hew York equipment.................. 2,213,602.59
Suburban equipment..................... 142,175.13
Gash................... 1,382,838.00
Tools and machinery...................... 381,538.09
Structure in streets . 9,823,057.00
Open accounts.......................... 6,217,929.79
Land damages........................... 2,320,658.13
Total............... . $27,602,014.73
Deductions:
Manhattan bonds issued for
dividend scrip........... $1,488,035.00
Manhattan bonds issued for
land damages........... 8,814,423.33
Manhattan bonds not specifically appropriated........ 235,864.67
Judgments................. 248,185.11
Assessed value of real estate.. 7,323,200.00
Total deductions......................... 18,109,708.11
$9,492,306.62 Bemaining assets.
The Appellate Division could have modified the order of the Special Term or it could have reversed the order and sent the proceedings back for a reassessment. It, however, should not have vacated the assessment absolutely.
The order of the Appellate Division should be reversed and the order of the Special Term modified so as to reduce the assessment of the relator's property to the sum of $9,192,306.62, and as so modified affirmed, with costs of this appeal to the appellants.