Case Name: PEOPLE v. ROWELL
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1968-10-25
Citations: 14 Mich. App. 190
Docket Number: Docket No. 3,354
Parties: PEOPLE v. ROWELL
Judges: Lesinski, C. J., concurred with Andrews, J.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 14
Pages: 190–201

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v. ROWELL
Opinion of the Court
1. Criminal Law — Appeal and Error — Record—Scope of Review.
Claims of criminal defendant on appeal which are not supported by the record may not be considered by the Court of Appeals.
2. Same — Speedy Trial — Delays Charseable to Dependant.
Defendant eannot assert as denial of his right to a speedy trial delays in his trial caused by the holding of an examination after he had earlier waived examination and the holding of second examination to remove possible prejudice in the first occasioned by appointed counsel’s having been related to the complaining witness where the record does not show that defendant made demand for a speedy trial and defendant failed to show he was prejudiced by the delays.
References for Points in Headnotes
'1] 5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 867.
’2] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 252.
’3] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 309 et seq.
A, 5, 7] 21 Am Jur 2d_, Criminal Law § 368.
Admissibility of evidence as to extrajudicial or pretrial identification of accused. 71 ALR2d 449.
5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 867.
3. Same — Opportunity to Obtain Assistance of Counsel.
Defendant charged with armed robbery was not denied adequate opportunity to consult with counsel before examination where he was allowed to consult counsel and, having heard testimony of complaining witness at an earlier examination, was in a position to aid counsel in conducting cross-examination of complaining witness and where defendant failed to show any resulting prejudice.
4. Same — Constitutional Law — Assistance of Counsel — Lineup —Prospective Application of Precedent.
Eight of criminal suspeet to be represented by counsel at lineup, decided to be constitutional right by Supreme Court of the United States on June 12, 1967, is not to be given retroactive application to cases in the appellate process on that date, by virtue of another decision rendered by the Court on the same day.
5. Same — Due Process — In-Custody Identification.
Defendant charged with armed robbery was not denied due process by in-custody identification procedures which included the selection of defendant’s photograph from a number of photographs by complaining witness the day before she pointed out defendant in police lineup and the viewing of the lineup by two eyewitnesses, one of whom identified defendant, and where jury was presented with sufficient credible evidence to support its verdiet.
6. Same — Appeal—Presumption of Innocence — Trial—Error^Burden of Proof.
After lawful conviction a criminal defendant is no longer presumed innocent but must bear the burden of satisfying the Court of Appeals that the reeord on which he was eonvieted discloses reversible error.
Concurring Opinion
Levin, J.
7. Criminal Law — Photographic Identification.
Photographic identification of a criminal defendant where dedefendant is in custody and physically able to go to a place where a lineup can be conducted should be prohibited.
Appeal from Recorder’s Court of Detroit, Burdick (Benjamin D.), J.
Submitted Division 1 March 7, 1968, at Detroit.
(Docket No. 3,354.)
Decided October 25, 1968.
Leave to appeal denied June 19, 1969.
382 Mich 763.
Donald Versarle Rowell was convicted of robbery armed. Defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William L. Cahalan, Prosecuting Attorney, Samuel J. Torina, Chief Appellate Lawyer, and Barbara K. Hackett, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Mayer & Mayer, for defendant on appeal.

Opinion:
Andrews, J.
On October 21, 1966, defendant was convicted by a Detroit recorder's court jury of robbery armed for the robbery of $125 from a bakery shop.
He appeals upon the grounds that the trial court erred in denying his motions to quash the information and for a directed verdict of not guilty, because of inadequate representation prior to trial and because due process was not accorded him in identification procedures.
The robbery occurred August 25,1965. Defendant was arrested October 5, 1965. He appeared in a lineup on October 7 and was identified by the manager of the bakery. At a second lineup on October 8 he was identified by a customer who was an eyewitness to the holdup. On October 6 the manager was shown five pictures and picked the defendant's picture from the group. Another eyewitness customer was unable to identify the defendant at a. lineup. No pictures were shown to the customers. Defendant was arraigned before the magistrate October 7, bond was fixed and examination set for October 11. On this date an attorney filed his appearance for examination only and requested an adjournment, which was granted to October 27. On this date examination was waived. Defendant claims by his appellate counsel that he was not present in court on October 27 and did not consent to or authorize his attorney to waive examination. For reasons which will hereafter be evident there is no merit to this unsupported claim. The defendant, having been bound over for tidal, was arraigned November 23, at which time he stood mute. A week later assigned counsel entered his appearance. Trial was ordered for January 12, 1966, and on that date was adjourned to March 17. On oral motion of March 3, the case was remanded for examination. This was held March 9 and the complaining witness testified on direct and cross-examination in the presence of the defendant. The defendant was bound over for trial. On March 10 assigned counsel moved to withdraw because he discovered at the examination that he was related to the complaining witness-. The motion was granted and substitute assigned counsel filed his appearance March 17 and on March 22 moved to remand for examination. The motion was granted and a second examination was held April 15, at which the complaining witness again testified on direct and cross-examination in defendant's presence. Defendant was bound over for trial. He was arraigned May 6 and trial was set for June 22. Due to a complaint filed by defendant with the court administrator, the court assigned new counsel, who filed an appearance July 13. The trial previously set for June 22 was adjourned to August 8 and then to August 26. On August 15 a motion was filed to quash the information on the grounds that the evidence produced at the two examinations was insufficient to support the charge, that no preliminary examination was held until seven months after defendant's arrest, that the lineup was conducted in violation of defendant's constitutional rights and that the complainant's testimony resulted in illegally obtained evidence being used against him, denying him due process. The motion was heard August 19 and a written opinion denying the same was filed September 19. Trial was ordered for October 19 and commenced October 20. Prior to the opening of trial, the assigned trial judge denied defendant's oral motion to quash the information. The complaining witness, the two customers and one police officer testified. Defendant waived the right to cross-examine the remaining witnesses endorsed on the information. Defendant's motion for a directed verdict was denied, whereupon he rested. After conviction, present appellate counsel was assigned to prosecute a timely appeal.
The foregoing statement of the proceedings had in this case is compiled after a careful examination of the record on appeal. The claims of defendant not supported by the record cannot be considered. People v. Fritch (1910), 161 Mich 111.
Defendant's claims requiring consideration are substantially those presented to the trial court in the motion to quash the information and we hold that the ruling of the trial court was correct.
The delay in the proceedings cannot be charged to the people. The first scheduled examination was waived by counsel. An examination was then ordered on motion of defendant. The transcript of this examination reveals a careful cross-examination of the complaining witness. Yet before the transcript was filed substitute assigned counsel moved for and was granted a second examination "to remove any suspicion of the defendant [not] getting a fair and impartial hearing due to the fact that his former counsel and the witnesses [sic] in the case were relatives at the time of the examination." Again the complaining witness gave substantially the same testimony at this examination. The record does not show any request by defendant for an earlier trial or in what way he was prejudiced by the delay. This Court, in People v. Donald D. Williams (1965), 2 Mich App 91, held that, absent such a showing, a delay of seven months did not deny defendant a speedy trial. In People v. Foster (1933), 261 Mich 247, the Court held that the accused must demand trial before he can claim denial of speedy trial.
Defendant claims that he did not have adequate opportunity to consult with counsel before the examination of April 15. Furthermore, he does not show in what manner he was here prejudiced. He does not claim that he was denied the opportunity to consult with counsel during the examination. He had heard the testimony of the complaining witness at the prior examination, and was in a position to aid his counsel in conducting a searching cross-examination. Nevertheless, he does not claim that the testimony before the magistrate was insufficient to warrant holding him for trial. That the testimony was sufficient cannot be denied. The complaining witness testified that she was robbed of money at the point of a gun and identified the defendant in the courtroom as the man who robbed her.
The record does not disclose any basis for holding that the rights of the defendant were not af forded him during the preliminary proceedings or that any one of his attorneys did not fairly and adequately protect his rights.
Defendant's claim that the identification procedures denied him due process is without merit. The rule announced in United States v. Wade (1967), 388 US 218 (87 S Ct 1926, 18 L Ed 2d 1149), has no application here. People v. Wilson (1967), 8 Mich App 651. Moreover, in Wade the Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether the in-court identification had an independent source or whether its introduction into evidence was harmless error. Thus the Court did not hold, and counsel has cited no case which holds, that such lineup procedures as were here used denied to defendant his constitutional due process protections. The fact that the complaining witness selected a picture of defendant on the day before she identified him in the lineup was brought out each time she testified and each time she identified him in the courtroom. The two eyewitness customers who were not shown pictures of defendant also identified him at the trial. One of these persons did and one of them did not identify him at the lineup. All of these facts, including the alleged contradictory testimony of the complaining witness at the examinations, presented a question of credibility for jury determination. The verdict is clearly supported by the evidence. This Court will not overturn the verdict of a jury where there is sufficient credible evidence to support it. People v. Arither Thomas (1967), 7 Mich App 103.
After lawful conviction a defendant is no longer presumed innocent. He then has the burden of satisfying the reviewing court that the record upon which he was convicted discloses reversible error. People v. Fritch, supra; CL 1948, § 769.26 (Stat Ann 1954 Rev §28.1096). This the defendant has not done.
Affirmed.
Lesinski, C. J., concurred with Andrews, J.
CLS 1961, § 750.529 (Stat Ann 1968 Cum Supp § 28.797),
It is apparent from a close reading of the motion that the word "not" was inadvertently omitted in the writing of the motion hy the typist.