Case Name: CHIN SEE FUN v. LOUISVILLE AND NASHVILLE RAILROAD COMPANY et al.
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1977-02-15
Citations: 344 So. 2d 8
Docket Number: No. 7834
Parties: CHIN SEE FUN v. LOUISVILLE AND NASHVILLE RAILROAD COMPANY et al.
Judges: Before SAMUEL, REDMANN and BEER, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 344
Pages: 8–11

Head Matter:
CHIN SEE FUN v. LOUISVILLE AND NASHVILLE RAILROAD COMPANY et al.
No. 7834.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
Feb. 15, 1977.
Rehearing Denied April 13, 1977.
Writ Refused June 3, 1977.
Curet & Curet, Douglas T. Curet, LeRoy R. Curet, New Orleans, for plaintiff-appellant.
Bruce J. Borrello, Stephen L. Huber, Robert A. Katz, George J. Richaud, A. Miles Pratt, III, Metairie, for defendants-appel-lees.
Before SAMUEL, REDMANN and BEER, JJ.

Opinion:
BEER, Judge.
Appellant, Chin See Fun, brought suit against Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company (hereafter "L&N"), John Doe and XYZ Insurance Company on March 7, 1975, for damages allegedly resulting from an accident on March 7, 1974, caused, in part, by an improperly parked trailer owned by L&N. Plaintiff alleged that the negligence of John Doe (an unknown motorist), as well as negligence on the part of L&N in parking the trailer, were causes of the accident. On July 15,1975, he amended his petition to add, as defendants, Republic Freight System, Inc. (now known as Yellow Freight System, Inc. but hereinafter, for our purposes, "Republic") and its insurer Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (hereafter "Liberty"), Consolidated Express, Inc. (hereafter "Consolidated") and his liability insurer All State Insurance Company (hereafter "All State"). He contends that the parked trailer "was being used" by Republic who employed Consolidated as its delivery agent. Republic and Liberty, its insurer, filed a peremptory exception of prescription on September 3, 1975, contending that there was no relationship between Republic and L&N supportive of a finding of solidary obligation such that prescription could have been interrupted by the timely filed suit against L&N.
Judgment was rendered maintaining the peremptory exception of prescription and dismissing plaintiffs suit as to Liberty and Republic. Chin See Fun has devolutively appealed, urging that the trial court erred in maintaining the peremptory exception of prescription and that the trial court ". exceeded the purview and intent of the trial on said exception of prescription, by allowing the issue of 'joint liability' to be decided."
In response, Republic and Liberty submit that evidence is admissible at a hearing on an exception of prescription and that the ruling was proper in all respects.
The trial court may hear a peremptory exception of prescription in advance of trial and, at such a hearing, evidence may be taken. LSA-C.C.P. Arts. 929 to 931; Hollingsworth v. General Accident & Life Ins. Corp., Ltd., 297 So.2d 446 (La.App. 3rd Cir., 1974); Calzavara v. Biehl & Co., 181 So.2d 809 (La.App. 4th Cir., 1966).
Thus, the trial judge acted within his discretion in admitting and considering evidence bearing ultimately on the relationship (or lack thereof) between L&N and Republic since, in this case, the exception of prescription necessarily hinged upon the determination of solidary liability. At that hearing, the trial judge was obliged to consider evidence which may be said to touch on the merits of the case, yet such evidence was indispensable with regard to his ability to effectively and fairly decide the question of solidarity. In administering this flow of evidence, the trial judge should exercise discretion and consider only that evidence necessary to resolve the prescriptive issue. We have no reason to believe that this was not done. The only evidence admitted at the hearing on the exception was the testimony of Clifford E. Cooney, Jr., district manager of Republic. That testimony supports the factual conclusion reached by the trial judge.
We find no reason to intrude upon the trial court's preserve as an original fact finder whether that function is exercised in a trial on the merits or in a hearing on an exception as long as the record supports the conclusion and the trial court has not manifestly erred. This remains the rule when the trial court has reached a similar conclusion with respect to a "Joe Doe" defendant. If, upon consideration of the pleadings and the evidence, the trial court concludes that the record does not support application of the rule announced in Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Bringol, 262 So.2d 532 (La.App. 4th Cir., 1972), we will not interfere absent a showing of manifest error in reaching the factual conclusions which are supportive of the ruling.
The test announced by the Supreme Court in Majesty v. Comet, 296 So.2d 271 (La., 1974), was, we believe, properly applied by the trial court whose ultimate conclusions — based upon that proper application — are supported by the record.
This case is, we believe, distinguishable from Pearson v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, 281 So.2d 724 (La.Sup.Ct., 1973), in view of the fact that the factual issues regarding the prescriptive contention were squarely met and ultimately resolved by the trial court. The record contains a transcript of the testimony of the witness whose factual descriptions form the basis for the trial court's judgment. Granted the premise that the party pleading prescription has the burden of proving same, we observe that, in the opinion of the trial court, such burden was carried.
We find no manifest error in such a conclusion on the part of the trial court and, accordingly, affirm its judgment at appellant's cost.
AFFIRMED.
. Cooney's testimony described the relationship (or, more specifically, the lack thereof) between Republic and L&N.