Case Name: In re ESTATE OF Margaret WALKER
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1992-08-05
Citations: 609 So. 2d 623
Docket Number: No. 91-0728
Parties: In re ESTATE OF Margaret WALKER.
Judges: DOWNEY, ANSTEAD, LETTS, HERSEY, DELL and WARNER, JJ„ concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 609
Pages: 623–627

Head Matter:
In re ESTATE OF Margaret WALKER.
No. 91-0728.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Aug. 5, 1992.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 4, 1992.
Richard L. Allen and Alfred I. Hopkins, Wallace, Engels, Pertnoy, Solowsky & Allen, P.A., Miami, for appellants Walter Martin and Norean Martin.
Brian M. O’Connell, Boose Casey Ciklin Lubitz Martens McBane & O’Connell, Larry Klein, Klein & Walsh, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellee Robert B. Reed.
William R. Merkle, Merkle, Bright & Sullivan, P.A., Delray Beach, for appellee First Presbyterian Church of Delray Beach.
Larry Klein, Klein & Walsh, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellee First Presbyterian Church of Delray Beach.

Opinion:
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING EN BANC
STONE, Judge.
By our initial opinion in this case, the court essentially determined that a specific bequest of "all of my personal property," in the absence of other descriptive, limiting, or modifying words, is not ambiguous. As a result, we determined that the trial court erred by considering extrinsic evidence of the testator's intent, notwithstanding a residuary provision leaving the remainder of the estate to another. Upon considering the issue en banc as a matter of exceptional importance, we withdraw our opinion of January 22, 1992 and substitute this opinion, affirming as to all issues.
The testator's initial will provided, in article II:
GENERAL BEQUESTS
I hereby give and bequeath all real property owned by me in the states of Florida, Michigan or elsewhere, together with all of my personal property which I may own at the time of my death, to my good friends, WALTER MARTIN and NOR-EAN MARTIN, jointly, or to the survivor between them.
This was amended by codicil as follows: ARTICLE II.
GENERAL AND SPECIFIC BEQUESTS
A. I hereby give and bequeath my residence and lot located at Route 1, Box 982, L'Anse, Michigan to my nephews, THOMAS MENGE and WILLIAM MENGE, jointly or to the survivor between them.
B. I hereby give and bequeath all other real property owned by me, together with all of my personal property which I may own at the time of my death, to my good friends, WALTER MARTIN and NOREAN MARTIN, jointly or to the survivor between them.
Article III of the will provides:
RESIDUE
All the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, real, personal or mixed, wheresoever situate, including the proceeds of my insurance policies payable to my estate, of which I may die seized or possessed, or to which I may be or become in any way entitled or have any interest, or over which I may have any power of appointment, I give and bequeath to the FIRST PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH, USA, Delray Beach, Florida, to be used for its general purpose.
Patently, there is no express provision in the will distinguishing between tangible and intangible property. When a dispute arose, the appellee-Reed, the personal representative, petitioned for construction of the will. The appellants, the Martins, also did so and additionally sought an order removing the personal representative and surcharging him for distributing intangible personal property to the residuary beneficiary.
The trial court, looking at the will as a whole, recognized that there are at least two possible interpretations of the testator's intent, and found latent ambiguities in the will and codicil. Upon final hearing, the trial court heard testimony concerning earlier wills, and also heard from the Martins and other witnesses. The trial court determined that the testator intended that only the tangible personal property pass to the Martins, and that the intangible property pass to the residuary beneficiary.
Every lawyer learns that the term personal property includes both tangible and intangible property. The term essentially encompasses all property other than real property. Nevertheless, the polestar concern in interpreting this, as any, will is determining the testator's intent in using that phrase. In evaluating the (testator's) intent, courts have frequently recognized that the term "personal property" may have a limited popular meaning that is restricted to describing tangible property, and in context it has often been deemed not to have a fixed meaning. E.g., In re Lesher's Estate, 365 So.2d 815 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); In re Horne's Estate, 171 So.2d 14 (Fla.2d DCA 1965).
Further, the interpretation of the trial court is consistent with what appears to be a majority view, where the term personal property is considered in the context of other provisions in the will. Here, those additional factors could be its inclusion in a paragraph with a devise of realty, the subsequent residuary provision, or both. See generally In re Dodge's Estate, 6 Cal.3d 311, 98 Cal.Rptr. 801, 491 P.2d 385 (1971). See also 94 A.L.R. 1106, 1111; In re Graham's Estate, 49 Cal.2d 333, 316 P.2d 945 (1957); Blakeman v. Harwell, 198 Ga. 165, 31 S.E.2d 50 (1944); In re Chad wick's Estate, 247 Iowa 1050, 78 N.W.2d 31 (1956).
In In re Horne's Estate, the Second District stated:
The words "personal effects" or "personal property" when used in a will have no fixed meaning and there "is always a question of the intention of the testator so ascertained from the particular setting in which the phrase appears and the general tenor of the will." In re Kordes' Will, supra, [(1948), 192 Mise. 626, 82 N.Y.S.2d 499] and cases therein cited; In re Chadwick's Estate, 1956, 247 Iowa 1050, 78 N.W.2d 31, 33; Bryant v. Bryant, 129 Me. 251, 151 A. 429; 57 Am.Jur. Wills, § 1339, (Personal Property), § 1130 (Ejusdem Generis Rule.) Although the term "personal property" is sufficiently broad in its technical sense to include all forms of property other than interests in land, "in the majority of cases" the courts view the intention of the testator as carrying a restricted meaning not including various species of intangible personalty. 57 Am.Jur. Wills, § 1339.
Home's, 171 So.2d at 17. The Horne's court continued:
It seems to be argued by appellant that the principle reason for inserting a residuary clause in a will is to dispose of some property of testatrix that might have been overlooked, or some legacy that might have lapsed and not thereafter been covered by some other provision of the will, or some property that came into existence after the will was executed and could not, at the time of its execution, be otherwise disposed of. We do not agree with this reasoning. A residuary clause is not a catch-all, in which is cast worthless, non-existent or unwanted things to clean up, as it were, the debris of an estate. As all lawyers know, in many wills, the bulk of an estate passes by virtue of the residuum clause instead of by specific bequests.
Horne's, 171 So.2d at 18.
We recognize that in Emmert v. Hearn, 309 Md. 19, 522 A.2d 377 (1987), the Maryland Supreme Court held that the term personal property as used in the will in that case was not ambiguous. Nothing is to be gained by a strained distinction of Emmert and we treat it simply as a minority view in conflict with the view expressed here.
In concluding that the trial court did not err by construing the provision in this will as ambiguous, we are mindful that the paramount consideration in the construction of a will is the testator's intent. E.g., Adams v. Vidal, 60 So.2d 545 (Fla.1952); In re Hopkin's Estate, 349 So.2d 663 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977); In re Lesher's Estate, 365 So.2d at 817; In re Horne's Estate, 171 So.2d at 17. Here, there is no reason to construe the will so as to necessarily make the residuary clause insignificant in determining the intended scheme of distribution. Had the testator intended the residuary provisions to apply only in some extremely remote and unanticipated circumstance, surely more appropriate terminology would have been used to limit the residuary expectation to such circumstances.
In deciding to consider this opinion en banc, we recognize that although the facts of this case may be unique, our decision will have a far reaching effect. Many existing wills may loosely use the term "personal property." For instance, a will in which a person might leave a home and "personal property" to a companion, or spouse of a second marriage, while leaving a residuary remainder of the rest of the estate to his or her children not otherwise mentioned in the specific bequest.
Additionally, at trial the court overruled objections to the personal representative, who drafted the will, testifying to the decedent's intent. The appellee contends that the personal representative is an interested party in this case by virtue of the pending petition to remove and impose a surcharge upon him. Therefore, appellant contends that the "deadman's statute," section 90.-602,- Florida Statutes, applies.
We conclude that the trial court did not err in allowing the personal representative to testify. In re Udell's Estate, 324 So.2d 703 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975), cert. denied, 336 So.2d 108 (Fla.1976). We have considered In re Estate of Hatcher, 439 So.2d 977 (Fla.3d DCA 1983), but deem it inapposite here. But for the surcharge claim, there is no basis for a conclusion that the personal representative would gain or lose from any interpretation of the will. Here there is no contention that his fee would be based on any factor other than quantum meruit. Nor was the validity of the will in issue. We need not consider under what other circumstances the dead man's statute might prevent a personal representative from testifying.
Therefore, the judgment is affirmed.
DOWNEY, ANSTEAD, LETTS, HERSEY, DELL and WARNER, JJ" concur.
POLEN, J., dissents with opinion in which GLICKSTEIN, C.J., and GUNTHER and FARMER, JJ., concur.
GARRETT, J., recused.