Case Name: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. PERI ALLEN, Appellee
Court: Illinois Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 2006-06-02
Citations: 222 Ill. 2d 340
Docket Number: No. 99977
Parties: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. PERI ALLEN, Appellee.
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Reports, Second Series
Volume: 222
Pages: 340–391

Head Matter:
(No. 99977.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. PERI ALLEN, Appellee.
Opinion filed June 2, 2006.
Rehearing denied September 25, 2006.
Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and James W. Glasgow, State’s Attorney, of Joliet (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, Linda D. Woloshin and Russell K. Benton, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Norbert J. Goetten, Lawrence M. Bauer and Terry A. Mertel, of the Office of the State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Ottawa, of counsel), for the People.
Robert Agostinelli, Deputy Defender, and Fletcher E Hamill, Assistant Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Ottawa, for appellee.
James W. Glasgow, State’s Attorney, of Joliet (Domenica A. Osterberger, Assistant State’s Attorney, of counsel), for amicus curiae Paul J. Kaupas, Will County Sheriff.

Opinion:
JUSTICE KARMEIER
delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Chief Justice Thomas and Justices Fitzgerald and Garman concurred in the judgment and opinion.
Justice Freeman dissented, with opinion, joined by Justices McMorrow and Kilbride.
OPINION
After a jury trial in the circuit court of Will County, defendant, Peri Allen, was found guilty of burglary and was sentenced to a four-year term of imprisonment. The appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that defendant had "adequately alleged plain error" where the trial court abused its discretion in requiring defendant to wear an electronic stun belt as a restraining device at trial without the explicit analysis and finding of necessity required by People v. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d 261 (1977). 354 Ill. App. 3d 442, 446. We granted the State's petition for leave to appeal under Rule 315 (177 Ill. 2d R. 315), and granted Paul J. Kaupas, Will County sheriff, permission to file an amicus curiae brief in support of the State (155 Ill. 2d R. 345(a)).
Defendant was indicted for the offense of burglary for entering a motor vehicle, belonging to Will County Auto Wreckers, with the intent to commit a theft. Prior to jury selection on February 11, 2003, defense counsel asked to approach the bench for a sidebar conference with the trial judge, after which the judge stated: "Apparently the defendant still has his handcuffs on. They have been under the table there, so the jurors didn't get all the way into the courtroom so there should be no problem, but if we can take them off now. Okay. Thank you." Two days later, after the trial court's denial of defendant's motion for a directed verdict and immediately prior to the State resting and defense counsel calling defendant to the stand, the following colloquy occurred:
"[Defense Counsel]: Oh, your Honor, one thing. I don't know exactly what it is that [defendant] has. There is something that he is wearing on his back and—
THE COURT: Well, it is under his clothes, correct?
[Defense Counsel]: Right, but even standing here I can notice it. It is a fairly noticeable object.
THE COURT: Would you prefer to just have him seated in the witness stand at this point?
[Defense Counsel]: I would prefer unless that can be removed somehow.
THE COURT OFFICER: No.
THE COURT: That's a security device. The deputy has control of it. [Defendant] does not have shackles on. He does not have handcuffs on. He is in custody and he is restrained in no other manner whatsoever, so for security purposes we keep that on him. At this time it has been out of view. It is under his clothes, but I think that if he did walk across the room, [the jury] may view something or a form of some kind under his clothes, so if you prefer to have him seated in the box, we can do that now.
[Defense Counsel]: Can we do that now?
THE COURT: Have a seat right up here, sir. When you're sworn in, I suppose you can just sit. You don't have to stand to be sworn in.
DEFENDANT: Right.
THE COURT: That way they'll never see it. All right, bring the jurors in." (Emphasis added.)
No further mention of the "security device" was made at trial, and defendant did not include any issue concerning the restraint in his posttrial motion.
On direct appeal, the sole issue raised by defendant was "whether it was error for the defendant to be forced to wear an electronic security belt as a restraining device at trial." 354 Ill. App. 3d at 443. Initially, we agree with the appellate court that while the trial court never referred to the "security device" as an electronic stun belt, "we feel confident in our assessment that it was indeed that type of restraining device." 354 Ill. App. 3d at 443. The State does not suggest what the bulging security device under defendant's shirt might have been, other than a stun belt. The appellate court's finding is especially probable where, in People v. Martinez, 347 Ill. App. 3d 1001, 1003 (2004), another recent Will County circuit court case, the State asked the appellate court to validate the Will County sheriff's "standard operating procedure" of requiring all felony defendants in custody to wear a stun belt while appearing in court. Even the dissent agrees that such a "blanket policy" existed in the Will County sheriffs department. 222 Ill. 2d at 379 n.6 (Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by McMorrow and Kilbride, JJ.). In addition, there is at least one other case pending before this court involving the use of electronic stun belts on felony defendants in Will County. See People v. Johnson, 356 Ill. App. 3d 208 (3d Dist. 2005), appeal denied, 221 Ill. 2d 655 (2006).
Having agreed with the appellate court that defendant was wearing an electronic stun belt, we now examine whether Boose, which generally applies to the "physical restraint" of defendants in the courtroom (Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 266), also applies to the concealed electronic restraint involved in this case. First, the Will County sheriff, as amicus curiae, argues, inter alia, that an electronic "security belt" is not a restraining device that lends itself to due process scrutiny pursuant to Boose, citing Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 161 L. Ed. 2d 953, 125 S. Ct. 2007 (2005). However, Deck does not speak to the circumstances present here. In Deck, the United States Supreme Court concluded that due process "prohibit[s] the use of physical restraints visible to the jury absent a trial court determination, in the exercise of its discretion, that they are justified by a state interest specific to a particular trial." (Emphasis added.) Deck, 544 U.S. at 629, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 963, 125 S. Ct. at 2012. Nowhere in Deck does the Court consider the question raised herein, i.e., whether a concealed electronic stun belt worn under a defendant's garments should be classified as a "physical restraint" which lends itself to due process scrutiny. Accordingly, Deck does not support the argument of amicus, as it does not even address concealed restraints. Indeed, we find that the Deck Court's stated reasons which prompt due process scrutiny in visible restraint cases — the presumption of innocence, securing a meaningful defense, and maintaining dignified proceedings — may be applied with like force to stun belts which are not necessarily visible to the jury. See Deck, 544 U.S. at 631, 161 L. Ed. 2d at 963-64, 125 S. Ct. at 2013.
In In re Staley, 67 Ill. 2d 33, 37 (1977), this court stated:
"The possibility of prejudicing a jury, however, is not the only reason why courts should not allow the shackling of an accused in the absence of a strong necessity for doing so. The presumption of innocence is central to our administration of criminal justice. In the absence of exceptional circumstances, an accused has the right to stand trial 'with the appearance, dignity, and self-respect of a free and innocent man.' [Citation.] It jeopardizes the presumption's value and protection and demeans our justice for an accused without clear cause to be required to stand in a courtroom in manacles or other restraints while he is being judged."
Thus, even when there is no jury, any unnecessary restraint is impermissible because it hinders the defendant's ability to assist his counsel, runs afoul of the presumption of innocence, and demeans both the defendant and the proceedings. See Staley, 67 Ill. 2d at 36-37; Martinez, 347 Ill. App. 3d at 1005-06. We therefore agree with the appellate court herein which, citing Martinez, concluded that an electronic stun belt "is no less a restraint than manacles or handcuffs." 354 Ill. App. 3d at 445.
As noted by defendant, it appears that almost every court which has reviewed this issue has held that electronic stun belts are restraining devices, the use of which is subject to the same restrictions as shackles. See, e.g., United States v. McKissick, 204 F.3d 1282, 1299 (10th Cir. 2000); People v. Mar, 28 Cal. 4th 1201, 1219-20, 52 P.3d 95, 106, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 161, 175 (2002); People v. Melanson, 937 P.2d 826, 835 (Colo. App. 1996); Young v. State, 269 Ga. 478, 479, 499 S.E.2d 60, 61 (1998); State v. Adams, 103 Ohio St. 3d 508, 529-30, 817 N.E.2d 29, 52-53 (2004). One exception to this approach for dealing with electronic stun belts is found in Wrinkles v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1179, 1194 (Ind. 2001), wherein the Supreme Court of Indiana banned the use of such restraints from its courtrooms altogether. However, contrary to the dissent's contention, in this case we are not faced with the question of whether stun belts should continue to be used in Illinois courtrooms. Rather, we are asked to determine whether, and we find that, this court's holdings in Boose and Staley regarding shackles apply equally to those defendants who are restrained by means of an electronic stun belt worn under their clothing at trial, and that nothing in Deck precludes applica- • tion of due process protections to such cases.
Given these findings, we hold that the use of electronic stun belts in the courts of this state is warranted only where there has been a showing of manifest need for the restraint. See Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 265-66. This holding comes with the understanding that there are certain circumstances that will require restraint of a defendant at trial. Factors to be considered by the trial court in making this determination may include: (1) the seriousness of the present charge against the defendant, (2) the defendant's temperament and character, (3) the defendant's age and physical characteristics, (4) the defendant's past record, (5) any past escapes or attempted escapes by the defendant, (6) evidence of a present plan of escape by the defendant, (7) any threats by the defendant to harm others or create a disturbance, (8) evidence of self-destructive tendencies on the part of the defendant, (9) the risk of mob violence or of attempted revenge by others, (10) the possibility of rescue attempts by other offenders still at large, (11) the size and mood of the audience, (12) the nature and physical security of the courtroom, and (13) the adequacy and availability of alternative remedies. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 266-67.
The determination of whether and how to restrain a defendant is left to the discretion of the trial court, and a reviewing court examines whether the trial court has abused that discretion. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 267. The trial court should state for the record its reasons for allowing the defendant to remain physically restrained, and it should give the defendant's counsel an opportunity to present reasons why the defendant should not be restrained. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 266. In this case, the State argues that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the stun belt to remain on defendant without conducting a Boose hearing. However, based on the record presented, we disagree. The only reason given by the court to sustain its ruling was that the restraint was necessary "for security purposes." While the security of the courtroom is indeed one of the factors to be considered, without further explanation or justification by the court and where it appears that no other "Boose factors" supported this decision, we find the trial court's ruling to be an abuse of its discretion.
Here, as in Martinez, the trial court never made a Boose analysis; it simply deferred to the judgment of the sheriff. We agree with the Martinez court that this abdication of the trial court's responsibility is not acceptable. "The court must rigorously control its own courtroom procedures and, consistent with the mandates of due process, protect the rights of the parties and the public." Martinez, 347 Ill. App. 3d at 1004. Indeed, the type of policy adopted by the Will County sheriff, requiring all custodial felony defendants to wear stun belts while in court, was frowned upon by this court almost 30 years ago in Boose.
" 'The fact that defendant was a state prison inmate who had been convicted of robbery and was charged with a violent crime did not, without more, justify the use of physical restraints. * [T]he trial judge must make the decision to use physical restraints on a case-by-case basis. The court cannot adopt a general policy of imposing such restraints * unless there is a showing of necessity on the record. The court's summary denial of the motion to release defendant from his shackles was not based upon such a showing of record and implies a general policy of shackling all inmate defendants accused of violent crimes.' " (Emphasis added.) Boose, 66 Ill. 2d at 268, quoting People v. Duran, 16 Cal. 3d 282, 293, 545 P.2d 1322, 1329, 127 Cal. Rptr. 618, 625 (1976).
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court's failure to follow the procedures set forth in Boose before ordering that defendant continue to wear an electronic stun belt during his trial constitutes a due process violation. See People v. Crutchfield, 353 Ill. App. 3d 1014, 1021 (2004); Martinez; 347 Ill. App. 3d at 1004.
In Martinez, the appellate court, upon finding that the trial court had abdicated its responsibility to determine the measures necessary to assure courtroom security, reversed the defendant's conviction and remanded for a new trial. Martinez, 347 Ill. App. 3d at 1005. However, in this case, as the appellate court noted, defendant did not even mention the electronic restraint at any time until the third day of his trial, while the defendant in Martinez objected vigorously. 354 Ill. App. 3d at 445; see also Staley, 67 Ill. 2d at 35-38 (reversal and remand for new adjudicatory hearing required where no Boose hearing conducted by trial court after defense counsel moved that defendant's handcuffs be removed during adjudicatory hearing). Defense counsel's statement "I would prefer [defendant be seated in the witness stand before the jury returns] unless [the stun belt] can be removed somehow" does not constitute an objection, but merely an alternative to the court's suggestion on how to keep the jury from seeing the device under defendant's clothing. After the court rejected counsel's alternative suggestion to remove the restraint, counsel did not ask that an objection be noted on the record or that a Boose hearing be held, but simply deferred to the procedure suggested by the court.
The failure to object to alleged error at trial and raise the issue in a posttrial motion ordinarily results in the forfeiture of the issue on appeal. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186-87 (1988). The appellate court herein therefore reasoned that it must decide whether the trial court's error "was so significant that it warrants plain error review." 354 Ill. App. 3d at 445. The majority then determined that People v. Doss, 347 Ill. App. 3d 418 (2004), was controlling, as there "we found plain error, since the defendant was denied a fair trial because of the failure of the trial court to conduct the appropriate manifest need analysis before ordering the defendant to be shackled at trial." 354 Ill. App. 3d at 446. Thereafter, the appellate court held that here, as in Doss, defendant had "adequately alleged plain error" which justified its review and also required the reversal of defendant's conviction and remand for a new trial. 354 Ill. App. 3d at 446. We disagree with the appellate court's reasoning and also its conclusions.
Supreme Court Rule 615(a) provides: "Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the trial court." (Emphasis added.) 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a). In People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 178-79 (2005), this court recently stated as follows:
"The plain-error doctrine, as it has developed in Illinois, allows a reviewing court to reach a forfeited error affecting substantial rights in two circumstances. First, where the evidence in a case is so closely balanced that the jury's guilty verdict may have resulted from the error and not the evidence, a reviewing court may consider a forfeited error in order to preclude an argument that an innocent person was wrongly convicted. [Citation.] Second, where the error is so serious that the defendant was denied a substantial right, and thus a fair trial, a reviewing court may consider a forfeited error in order to preserve the integrity of the judicial process. [Citations.] This so-called disjunctive test does not offer two divergent interpretations of plain error, but instead two different ways to ensure the same thing — namely, a fair trial." (Emphasis added.)
In another recent case, People v. Brown, 356 Ill. App. 3d 1088, 1090-91 (2005), the appellate court majority, as did the appellate court majority herein, cited Doss for the proposition that restraining defendants without a Boose hearing automatically constitutes plain error and is not subject to forfeiture. However, we agree with Justice Schmidt's partial dissent in Brown, which argued that the majority was misreading Doss. Indeed, Justice Schmidt, who authored the Doss opinion, stated: "Doss did not hold that it is always plain error to shackle a defendant without a Boose hearing. Rather, the shackling issue was reviewed under the plain error doctrine because we found the evidence closely balanced." Brown, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 1091 (Schmidt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In the appeal before us, defendant appears to have accepted this interpretation of Doss. Indeed, defendant impliedly admits that the evidence was not closely balanced where he contends only that the second type of plain error occurred, stating: "[I]t was such a serious error that it threatened the fundamental fairness of the defendant's trial and the integrity of the judicial process."
In Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 187, this court further described the second prong of the plain error test, stating: "In the second instance, the defendant must prove there was plain error and that the error was so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant's trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process. [Citation.] Prejudice to the defendant is presumed because of the importance of the right involved *. * [However,] the burden of persuasion remains with the defendant." (Emphasis added.) Indeed, defendant, citing this passage from Herron, acknowledges that he bears the burden of persuasion as to whether the error was so serious that it affected the fairness of his trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process. Thus, given the test for determining plain error under the "second prong" as set forth in Herron, we agree with Crutchfield, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 1021, a case from the Fifth District of the appellate court which, under facts similar to those presented here, held that even constitutional errors can be forfeited (see People v. Thurow, 203 Ill. 2d 352, 363-64 (2003)) if the error is not of such magnitude that it deprives the defendant of a fair trial. See People v. Graham, 206 Ill. 2d 465, 476 (2003). See also People v. Barney, 363 Ill. App. 3d 590 (2006); People v. DuPree, 353 Ill. App. 3d 1037 (2004) (both holding that the physical restraint of a defendant at trial does not automatically amount to plain error).
Moreover, a fair trial is different from a perfect trial. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 177; People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179, 214 (1998). The plain-error doctrine is not " 'a general saving clause preserving for review all errors affecting substantial rights whether or not they have been brought to the attention of the trial court.' " Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 177, quoting People v. Precup, 73 Ill. 2d 7, 16 (1978). Instead, it is a narrow and limited exception to the general rule of forfeiture, whose purpose is to protect the rights of the defendant and the integrity and reputation of the judicial process. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 177. Thus, while defendant herein has proven a due process violation which amounted to error by showing that he was required to wear an electronic stun belt at trial without the court having first determined that it was necessary, defendant has failed to persuade this court "that the error was so serious that it affected the fairness of [his] trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process." Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 187; see also People v. Nicholas, 218 Ill. 2d 104, 121 (2005) (the burden of persuasion remains with the defendant under the second prong of the plain error test, but before the court may apply either prong, there must be a plain error).
Here, defendant cannot, and does not, claim that the evidence presented was closely balanced. Further, he has not shown that his presumption of innocence, ability to assist his counsel, or the dignity of the proceedings was compromised. In fact, defendant wore the electronic device into the third day of his jury trial with no objection, complaint, or any apparent difficulty consulting with his counsel. Thus, we agree with the appellate court in Nicholas that although the failure to conduct a Boose hearing under these circumstances is an error, defendant's failure to object and to carry his burden of persua sion amounts to forfeiture of the error, where he cannot establish that it prevented him from obtaining a fair trial. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512-13, 48 L. Ed. 2d 126, 135, 96 S. Ct. 1691, 1697 (1976) (although the State cannot compel an accused to stand trial before a jury in prison clothes, the failure to make an objection to the court to being tried in such clothes, for whatever reason, is sufficient to negate the presence of compulsion necessary to establish a constitutional violation); see also People v. Hyche, 77 Ill. 2d 229, 241 (1979) (rejecting the defendant's contention that his conviction should be reversed due to his appearance before the venire in handcuffs, where he "waived any error by failing to object").
Further, we reject the dissent's attempt to distinguish Estelle and Hyche, where those cases, as here, recognized that a serious assault on the defendant's presumption of innocence was implicated, but held that the defendant had failed to properly preserve the error for review. Estelle, 425 U.S. at 513, 48 L. Ed. 2d at 135, 96 S. Ct. at 1697; Hyche, 77 Ill. 2d at 241. While the dissent contrasts Hyche with People v. Buss, 187 Ill. 2d 144, 215 (1999), wherein the court chose to review a shackling issue on its merits, the dissent fails to note that the defendant in Buss had filed a pretrial motion to preclude shackling and had included the issue in his posttrial motion. Only in the alternative did he argue plain error or that his counsel was ineffective for failing to properly preserve the issue for review. Additionally, although the dissent states that this court, in Buss, "cited with approval People v. Bennett, 281 Ill. App. 3d 814 (1996)" (222 Ill. 2d at 370 (Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by McMorrow and Kilbride, JJ.)), the Bennett court held "it was plain error for the judge in this case to deny the defense request to have the defendant's shackles removed," when "the only reason the judge gave for refusing the defense motion related to the security of the courtroom" and the court failed to address the other Boose factors. Bennett, 281 Ill. App. 3d at 825.
Next, we note that in his dissent, Justice Freeman agrees with the majority opinion that the issue presented in this case is "whether defendant is entitled to a new trial because he was made to wear, without a showing of manifest need, an electronic stun belt as a restraining device during his trial." 222 Ill. 2d at 361 (Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by McMorrow and Kilbride, JJ.). However, after defining the parameters of the case, the dissent goes on to enlarge those parameters by contending that we should also address the propriety of using stun belts in any criminal trial. While we might agree with some of the medical and other important concerns identified in the lengthy dissent, as we previously noted, the issue of whether to continue to use such restraints in Illinois courts is, unfortunately, simply not raised in this case. Thus, despite the dissent's desire for this court to determine whether stun belts are an acceptable form of restraint in Illinois, until a case comes before us which actually raises that particular issue, any attempt to answer such an abstract question would be improper. See People v. Campa, 217 Ill. 2d 243, 269 (2005) (as a general rule, a court of review will not decide moot or abstract questions or render advisory opinions).
Therefore, the dissent's claim that this court's opinion has "the effect of countenancing the continued use of stun belts" in Illinois, simply because we decline to engage in dicta, is unfair at best. 222 Ill. 2d at 389 (Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by McMorrow and Kilbride, JJ.). Indeed, contrary to that assertion, the majority, in addressing the limited issues raised in this case of first impression, fully appreciates the impact that electronic restraints may have on a defendant's trial rights. This opinion sends a clear message to the trial courts: control of the courtroom is vested in the trial judge. While the sheriff may be responsible for courtroom security, it is the trial judge who makes the determination as to how security involving a defendant who is on trial is handled, so as to fully protect his constitutional rights. Towards that end, a Boose hearing is required in stun belt cases, as in shackle or handcuff cases, because regardless of the differences between the types of restraints, they each implicate due process concerns and thus require strict limits be placed on their use.
Additionally, this opinion takes judicial notice of the routine use of stun belts on felons in other Will County cases in order to establish the fact of their use here, and cites cases both in and outside our jurisdiction in support of our holding that stun belts should be subject to a Boose hearing. The dissent, however, relies on information outside the record and cases outside our jurisdiction to speculate as to the type and effect of the stun belt worn in this case and to proselytize for a ban on the use of stun belts in Illinois, an issue which we have clearly determined to be outside the scope of this appeal. The facts are that defendant himself did not ask that we determine whether the "medical impact" or anxiety which stun belts may create makes them an improper form of restraint under all circumstances, and there is nothing of record to show that the type of electronic device worn in the nonprecedential cases cited by the dissent are in any way similar to the device worn by defendant. Further, although the dissent agrees that defendant has forfeited the issues regarding the trial court's requirement that he wear an electronic restraint where neither he nor his counsel made any overt complaint at trial or in a posttrial motion (People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186-87 (1988)), the dissent then invites speculation as to what defendant could have been experiencing. Such speculation is completely irrelevant and has no place in this court's review, which must be based solely on the facts of record. See People v. Guerrero, 356 Ill. App. 3d 22, 28-29 (2005); People v. Colon, 20 Ill. App. 3d 858, 864 (1974) (reviewing court cannot speculate as to facts that do not appear in the record).
A fair reading of the cold transcript leads us to the more likely conclusion that defendant was not suffering any of the anxiety or nervousness speculated upon by the dissent. As noted, what the record does show is that neither defendant nor his counsel objected to the use of the stun belt at any time. Counsel's only expressed concern, made on the third day of trial, when defendant was about to take the witness stand, was that whatever defendant was wearing under his clothes might be visible to the jury as he walked across the room to take the stand. The colloquy between defense counsel and the trial judge clearly reveals that counsel did not even know what defendant was wearing under his clothes. This fact supports the inference that defendant never expressed any concern to his attorney about wearing the device, nor did it impinge on his ability to work with counsel. See Buss, 187 Ill. 2d at 217 (no error occurred where: (1) the trial court's initial failure to state his reasons for requiring shackling was "presumably because defense counsel indicated that defendant did not object to leg shackles so long as the jury did not see them"; (2) the court explained its reasons for the shackling in detail during its denial of the defendant's posttrial motion; (3) "the tables in the courtroom had been skirted so that the shackling * was 'never obvious to the jurors' "; and (4) defendant's ability to consult with counsel had not been hindered by the shackling). Here, the dissent can point to nothing of record which demonstrates that defendant was made nervous or anxious by the fact that he was wearing the device. Thus, none of the actions of defendant, his counsel or the court support the conclusion that defendant's presumption of innocence or the dignity of the court was effected by the error in failing to hold the requisite Boose hearing. Instead, counsel's concern about the possibility of the jury's seeing the bulky device under defendant's clothing was resolved by the trial court's action in seating defendant on the stand before the jury reentered the courtroom.
Further, we disagree with the dissent's claim that this procedure of "preseating" the defendant, because it was dissimilar to that used with previous witnesses, would cause the jury to "attach undue significance to such discrepancies." 222 Ill. 2d at 377 (Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by McMorrow and Kilbride, JJ.). It is just as reasonable to draw the opposite conclusion, i.e., that while those of us "trained in the law" (222 Ill. 2d at 377 (Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by McMorrow and Kilbride, JJ.)) and familiar with court proceedings would know that it is somewhat unusual for witnesses to already be seated when court reconvenes and the jury reenters, few laypeople, not being involved in jury trials on a regular basis, would actually discern this difference, much less impute a negative connotation toward defendant from it. Nor does the dissent's quotation from Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344, 25 L. Ed. 2d 353, 359, 90 S. Ct. 1057, 1061 (1970), that disparate treatment of defendant from other witnesses not on trial " 'might have a significant effect on the jury's feelings about the defendant' " support his theory. 222 Ill. 2d at 366, 377 (Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by McMorrow and Kilbride, JJ.), quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344, 25 L. Ed. 2d 353, 359, 90 S. Ct. 1057, 1061 (1970). This comment by the Court in Allen in no way dealt with any disparate treatment of defendant from other witnesses, but concerned the jury's response to "the sight of shackles and gags" on that defendant after he displayed conduct which was disorderly, disruptive and disrespect ful to the court. Allen, 397 U.S. at 343-44, 25 L. Ed. 2d at 359, 90 S. Ct. at 1061.
Finally, we object to the dissent's statement that "the unjustified use of the stun belt in this case is deemed inconsequential by a majority of this court." 222 Ill. 2d at 389 (Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by McMorrow and Kilbride, JJ.). The instant matter presented a narrow issue which we have resolved through the consistent use of this court's previous case law. We have cited as controlling this court's findings in Boose and Staley that a trial court's failure to examine the necessity of requiring a defendant to wear restraints at trial is a due process violation, and continued this line of reasoning to include not only visible restraints, but the type of "semi-hidden" electronic device used herein. Therefore, contrary to the dissent's assertion, we have most definitely shown that an error such as occurred here has consequences. However, Boose and Staley, as well as Martinez and Deck, present a different factual situation which allows for a per se finding of reversible error which is not applicable under the facts presented in this case. Here, unlike the aforementioned cases where a trial objection was made, due to defendant's complete forfeiture of the issue, not only the fact of the error but proof that the error "affected the fairness of the defendant's trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process" was necessary. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d at 187; see also Barney, 363 Ill. App. 3d at 597 ("The necessity to preserve the integrity and reputation of the judicial process is a purpose of the [plain error] doctrine, not a lone, triggering factor for its implementation"). Thus, simply because we follow the strict application of that doctrine as recently set forth in Herron and find that defendant has not met his burden of persuasion does not mean we are in conflict with our decisions in Boose and Staley, cases with different facts must be decided based on those facts. Nor is the Supreme Court's holding in Deck that a defendant need not demonstrate actual prejudice to make out a due process violation contrary to our decision, which finds a due process violation but refuses to find plain error in the violation.
As this court stated in People v. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d 99, 138 (2000), "[t]o determine whether defendant's right to a fair trial has been compromised * [under] the second prong of the plain error test * [w]e ask whether a substantial right has been affected to such a degree that we cannot confidently state that defendant's trial was fundamentally fair." We thus agree with the dissent and with defendant that the trial court's actions here amounted to error. However, under the circumstances presented, we are not persuaded that such error resulted in fundamental unfairness or caused a "severe threat" to the fairness of defendant's trial. See People v. Durr, 215 Ill. 2d 283, 298, 308 (2005). Thus, where defendant has failed to establish plain error under the second prong as set forth in Herron, we hold that the procedural default of this issue must be honored. See Durr, 215 Ill. 2d at 308; see also Blair, 215 Ill. 2d at 444 n.2 ("procedural default" relates to the failure by counsel to comply with certain procedural requirements which results in the forfeiture of the defendant's right to raise that error on appeal). Because we find that the right to review is forfeited in this case, we need not reach the question which divided the appellate court below, i.e., whether a new proceeding or merely a retrospective Boose hearing is the proper remedy where plain error has occurred.
For these reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is reversed and the judgment of conviction entered by the circuit court is affirmed.
Appellate court judgment reversed; circuit court judgment affirmed.
While courts often use the terms "forfeit," "waive," and "procedural default" interchangeably in criminal cases, for purposes of this opinion, we choose to use "forfeited" to mean issues that could have been raised, but were not, and are therefore barred. See People v. Blair, 215 Ill. 2d 427, 444 n.2 (2005).