Case Name: Lucious WILSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Deputy COSIO, No 495876, in individual and official capacity, Defendant-Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2017-01-26
Citations: 676 F. App'x 711
Docket Number: No. 15-56535
Parties: Lucious WILSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Deputy COSIO, No 495876, in individual and official capacity, Defendant-Appellee.
Judges: Before: TROTT, TASHIMA, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 676
Pages: 711–711

Head Matter:
Lucious WILSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Deputy COSIO, No 495876, in individual and official capacity, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 15-56535
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted January 18, 2017
Filed January 26, 2017
Lucious Wilson, Pro Se
Elise Hur, Attorney, Amber A. Logan, Attorney, Nelson & Fulton, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant-Appellee
Before: TROTT, TASHIMA, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Lucious Wilson, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court's summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim arising from his arrest. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Glenn v. Washington County, 673 F.3d 864, 870 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment because Wilson failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant's use of less-lethal force to disarm Wilson and effectuate his arrest violated Wilson's Fourth Amendment rights. See Lal v. California, 746 F.3d 1112, 1115, 1117 (9th Cir. 2014) (setting forth framework for analyzing an excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment); see also Glenn, 673 F.3d at 871-72 (explaining circumstances under which a bean bag gun, which is a " 'less-lethal' weapon," is permissible).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Wilson's motion for default judgment because the clerk never entered a default. See Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986) (setting forth standard of review and factors to consider before entering default judgment).
To the extent that Wilson's request, filed on June 3,2016, seeks entry of default, the request is denied.
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.