Case Name: Alvin E. BLAND v. Charles W. HILL
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1999-04-22
Citations: 735 So. 2d 414
Docket Number: No. 97-CA-00970-SCT
Parties: Alvin E. BLAND v. Charles W. HILL.
Judges: PRATHER, C.J., SULLIVAN, P.J., BANKS, SMITH, WALLER AND COBB, JJ., CONCUR.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 735
Pages: 414–428

Head Matter:
Alvin E. BLAND v. Charles W. HILL.
No. 97-CA-00970-SCT.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
April 22, 1999.
Janet McMurtray, Fred Krutz, III, Jackson, James Hugh Ray, Tupelo, Michael D. Simmons, Jackson, Attorneys for Appellant.
Michael J. Malouf, Charles Eric Malouf, Michael James Malouf, Jr., Jackson, Attorneys for Appellee.

Opinion:
PITTMAN, Presiding
Justice, for the Court:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
¶ 1. This appeal arises out of a complaint filed by Charles W. Hill ("Buddy") against Alvin E. Bland for the loss of the affections of Buddy's wife, Judy, and for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. This matter was tried before a jury which found in favor of Buddy and awarded him $200,000 in damages. Bland timely filed his notice of appeal and now asks this Court, among other things, to abolish the common law tort of alienation of affections. Buddy has filed a cross-appeal. The following issues are presented for this Court's consideration and review:
ISSUES ON DIRECT APPEAL
I. WHETHER MISSISSIPPI SHOULD ABOLISH THE TORT OF ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS.
II. WHETHER IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO EXCLUDE ALL EVIDENCE RELATING TO BUDDY HILL'S ADULTEROUS AFFAIR WITH ANOTHER WOMAN AND THE EFFECT THE AFFAIR HAD ON JUDY'S AFFECTION FOR AND TRUST IN BUDDY HILL.
III. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DIRECT A VERDICT FOR BO BLAND ON THE CLAIM OF INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS.
IV. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DIRECT A VERDICT FOR BLAND ON THE CLAIM OF NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS.
V. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING BLAND'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUBMITTING THE ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS CLAIM TO THE JURY.
VI. WHETHER THE DAMAGES AWARDED WERE EXCESSIVE.
ISSUES ON CROSS APPEAL
I. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING ALL EVIDENCE RELATING TO BLAND'S ADULTEROUS AFFAIR WITH JUDY.
II. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO SUBMIT PUNITIVE DAMAGES TO THE JURY.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
¶2. Buddy Hill married Judy Mills on December 31, 1959. Buddy and Judy had two children and lived in Nettleton, Mississippi, where they attended the Pentecostal Church. According to Judy's deposition testimony, on December 30, 1984, Buddy confessed to Judy that he was having an adulterous affair. Several days later, Buddy also confessed that his lover was pregnant and that he could be the father. Buddy told Judy that if he was in fact the father, he did not know if he would stay married to Judy. At trial, Buddy moved in limine to have any mention of his adulterous affair excluded from evidence. This motion in limine was granted.
¶3. The trial court allowed Bland to make an offer of proof as to what Judy would have testified to concerning Buddy's affair. Depositions of the parties and witnesses were also incorporated into the record as part of the offer of proof. Counsel for Bland proffered that Judy would have testified that Buddy's affair destroyed any love, trust and affection that she had for Buddy. Judy would also have testified that she never regained her trust, love, and affection for Buddy and that the affair was the cause of the break up of her marriage.
¶ 4. Buddy was a self-employed painting contractor by trade. Buddy began doing-various jobs for Bland in 1984 and had worked for Bland every year thereafter. In the early 1990s, Buddy was working at Bland's home hanging wallpaper. Bland was married at the time to Lou. Lou had lost her housekeeper and asked Buddy if he might know anyone who would be interested in some part-time work. Judy expressed an interest in the job, and eventually took it. Judy worked primarily for Lou and, over time, she and Lou became good friends. In April, 1993, Lou died, leaving Bland devastated.
¶ 5. Judy continued to work for Bland after Lou's death. In 1994, Judy and Bland became friends. At trial, Judy testified that she told Bland that she was not happy in her marriage and that she did not love Buddy. Over the. next several months, Judy developed feelings for Bland. Judy testified that Bland did not cause her to lose her feelings for Buddy.
¶ 6. Judy testified that she sought the advice of her brother-in-law, Coy Hill, a Pentecostal minister. She also spoke with her sister about her unhappiness in her marriage. Judy told Coy and her sister that Buddy had "killed" the love she had for him, and she wanted to leave him.
¶ 7. In the fall of 1994, Bland, Judy, Buddy, and an employee of Bland's took a trip on Bland's boat up the Tennessee River to see the fall foliage. Sometime after the trip, Judy brought home a videotape of the trip. There was also footage at the end of the tape which showed Judy being followed around Bland's house. Buddy perceived this footage as flirtatious and had the tape admitted at trial.
¶ 8. Around the middle of December, 1994, Judy told Buddy that she wanted to move out of their home because she needed "some space". A week or so later, Judy told Buddy that she was in love with Bland and wanted a divorce.
¶ 9. On or about December 16, 1994, Buddy and Judy went to talk to Bland. Bland told Buddy that he had been depressed after Lou's death and that Judy had cheered him. Eventually, they had fallen in love. Buddy told Bland that he still loved Judy, and he asked Bland not to interfere. Bland told Buddy that he would respect Judy's desires.
¶ 10. Buddy testified that after the confrontation with Bland, Judy agreed to try and work things out. In February or March, 1995, Judy told Bland that she was definitely going to leave Buddy. In preparation for leaving, Judy opened a separate bank account, and placed in it $1000. Subsequently, Bland gave Judy $10,000. In March, 1995, Bland purchased a condominium. Judy told Buddy on April 23, 1995 that she was moving out the following day. On April 24, 1995, Judy moved into the condominium.
¶ 11. In June, 1995, Judy and Buddy filed for divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. The divorce was final on September 13, 1995. Judy married Bland in December, 1995. Buddy described the loss of Judy as "devastating". As a result of losing Judy, Buddy became depressed and went to see a psychologist. Buddy also testified that he lost 25-30 pounds after Judy left.
¶ 12. On May 30,1997, the jury returned a verdict for Buddy in the amount of $200,-000. Bland filed a motion for JNOV, or alternatively, for a new trial, or a remitti-tur on June 13, 1997. The motion was denied on July 17, 1997. From the denial of his motion, Bland perfected his appeal to this Court.
DISCUSSION OF LAW-DIRECT APPEAL
I. WHETHER MISSISSIPPI SHOULD ABOLISH THE TORT OF ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS?
¶ 13. The primary issue raised by Bland on appeal is that this Court should abolish the tort of alienation of affections. This Court has said "[t]he purpose of a cause of action for alienation of affection is the 'protection of the love, society, companionship, and comfort that form the foundation of a marriage .'" Saunders v. Alford, 607 So.2d 1214, 1215 (Miss., 1992)(quoting Norton v. Macfarlane, 818 P.2d 8, 12 (Utah 1991)). To prove an alienation of affections claim, the plaintiff must show: (1) wrongful conduct of the defendant; (2) loss of affection or consortium; and (3) causal connection between such conduct and loss. Saunders, 607 So.2d at 1215. (citations omitted). A claim for alienation of affections does not require that the plaintiff prove an adulterous relationship, although a claim for criminal conversation does require such proof. Id. at 1215-16.
¶ 14. In Saunders, this Court abolished the tort of criminal conversation because it had "outlived its usefulness". Id. at 1219. The Court did not address the issue of the abolition of alienation of affections and said that:
We are not here concerned with the tort of alienation of affections. That cause was decided adversely to the plaintiff and he does not challenge that disposition by cross appeal. Our task is but to consider the extent to which it is advisable to judicially abolish the tort of criminal conversation and whether we have the authority to do so.
¶ 15. On the same day that Saunders was decided, this Court upheld a jury verdict of $50,000 on an alienation of affec tions claim in Kirk v. Koch, 607 So.2d 1220 (Miss., 1992). However, as in Saunders, whether Mississippi should abolish alienation of affections was not raised as an issue.
¶ 16. It is significant that in both Saunders and Kirk, this Court refused to extend its abolition of "heart balm" torts to include the tort of alienation of affections. As noted above, we said in Saunders that the important purpose of the tort of alienation of affections is to protect the underlying foundation of marriage: love, society, companionship and comfort.
¶ 17. This Court has stated that:
. where a husband is wrongfully deprived of his rights to the 'services and companionship and consortium of his wife,' he has a cause of action 'against the one who has interfered with his domestic relations.' . The husband might then sue for . alienation of affection....
Camp v. Roberts, 462 So.2d 726, 727 (Miss., 1985). This Court has further held that in dealing with loss of consortium of a spouse:
The interest sought to be protected is personal to the wife [husband] and arises out of the marriage relation. She [He] is entitled to society, companionship, love, affection, aid, services, support, sexual relations and the comfort of her husband [his wife] as special rights and duties growing out of the marriage covenant. To these may be added the right to live together in the same house, to eat at the same table, and to participate together in the activities, duties and responsibilities necessary to make a home. All of these are included in the broad term, "conjugal rights." The loss of consortium is the loss of any or all of these rights....
Kirk v. Koch, 607 So.2d 1220, 1224 (Miss.1992) (citing Tribble v. Gregory, 288 So.2d 13, 16 (Miss., 1974)). We believe that the marital relationship is an important element in the foundation of our society. To abolish the tort of alienation of affections would, in essence, send the message that we are devaluing the marriage relationship. We decline the invitation to abolish the tort of alienation of affections.
II. WHETHER IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO EXCLUDE ALL EVIDENCE RELATING TO BUDDY HILL'S ADULTEROUS AFFAIR WITH ANOTHER WOMAN AND THE EFFECT THE AFFAIR HAD ON JUDY'S AFFECTION FOR AND TRUST IN BUDDY HILL.
•' [4] ¶ 18. Prior to trial, the trial court ruled that no evidence of Buddy's affair with another woman would be allowed at trial. The trial judge ruled that:
Also — there will be no mention of it, and there will also be no mention of prior adultery by the plaintiff in this case. The Court is of the opinion that that adultery was more than 10 years [ago]. And in addition, there was a condonation. They reconciled and went back together, and I'm not going to allow that, so it won't — both sides instruct your witnesses. I don't want any mention of that. We are going to try this case based upon the alienation and what's alleged in the complaint and nothing else.
¶ 19. Bland now argues that the court's ruling was in error because the evidence was relevant, and its probative value was not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. " 'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Miss. r. evid. 401. "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Miss. r. evid. 403. "The definition is a broad one, favoring admissibility." Foster v. State, 508 So.2d 1111, 1117 (Miss., 1987). The trial court, however, is afforded broad discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence. Foster, 508 So.2d at 1117.
¶ 20. The elements of an alienation of affections cause of action are: (1) wrongful conduct of the defendant; (2) loss of affection or consortium; and (3) causal connection between such conduct and the loss. Kirk v. Koch, 607 So.2d 1220, 1222 (Miss.1992). Bland asserts that the essence of this test is whether the marriage at issue was damaged by some wrongful conduct of the defendant or by prior conduct between the husband and wife. He argues that evidence of Buddy's affair was relevant as to causation because it was relevant to Judy's feelings toward Buddy and her marriage and to the depth of Buddy's love for and commitment to Judy. Essentially, Bland is arguing that this evidence was relevant to show that Buddy, not Bland, alienated Judy's affections. Bland also argues that evidence of Buddy's affair was relevant to damages because this evidence was more probative than any other evidence on the issue of the value that Buddy placed on his marriage.
¶ 21. Buddy argues that the evidence was properly excluded because the affair was remote in time, and even after Judy was told of the affair, she did not leave Buddy. Buddy argues that Judy condoned Buddy's conduct. The trial court also relied on this condonation argument.
¶ 22. Whether Judy condoned Buddy's affair is irrelevant. This was not a divorce action on the grounds of adultery where condonation would be a defense. The issue is not whether Judy condoned Buddy's affair, but whether Buddy's affair was still having an effect on the condition of the marriage.
¶ 23. The evidence of Buddy's affair should not have been excluded at trial. It was clearly relevant on the issue of causation. Furthermore, it cannot be said that its relevancy was "substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." Miss. R. evid. 403. The primary issue in this case was whether Bland wrongfully interfered with the marriage and caused Judy's loss of affection. As it stood, Buddy was allowed to portray his marriage as perfect until Bland entered the picture. This jury was not given the whole story.' By excluding this evidence, the trial court abused its discretion. Thus, on this issue, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
III. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DIRECT Á VERDICT FOR BLAND ON THE CLAIM OF INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS.
IV. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DIRECT . A VERDICT FOR BLAND ON THE CLAIM OF NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS.
¶ 24. Because we reverse the trial court on Issue II and remand for a new trial, it is not necessary for this Court to address Issues III and IV.
V. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING BLAND'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUBMITTING THE ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS CLAIM TO THE JURY.
¶ 25. Bland argues that Buddy did not prove the elements of alienation of affections. Specifically, Bland argues that Buddy did not prove Bland committed any wrongful conduct or that the conduct caused Judy to leave Buddy. Bland relies on the fact that Judy testified that she was unhappy in her marriage before falling in love with Bland.
¶ 26. Buddy counters that Judy's testimony did not entitle Bland to summary judgment. Her credibility was to be judged,- just as all the other witnesses, by the jury. Buddy's position is well taken. There was much conflicting testimony in this case such that the claim for alienation of affections was properly submitted to the jury.
VI. WHETHER THE DAMAGES AWARDED WERE EXCESSIVE.
¶ 27. Because we reverse the trial court on Issue II and remand for a new trial, it is not necessary for this Court to address Issue VI.
DISCUSSION OF LAW-CROSS APPEAL
I. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING ALL EVIDENCE RELATING TO BLAND'S ADULTEROUS AFFAIR WITH JUDY.
¶28. The trial court excluded all evidence relating to an adulterous affair between Bland and Judy. The trial court ruled that:
In making that ruling, there was nothing in the complaint that was alleged about adultery in the complaint that you filed in this action. There was nothing in the divorce about the complaint — the divorce was on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. Looking at the complaint that you filed and the divorce on the basis of that, this Court ruled that adultery was not an issue and was not going to let that come in.
¶ 29. Buddy contends that the trial court erred and that he was not required to allege adultery in his complaint for punitive damages. He argues that he provided notice of the damages sought and that adultery was not a separate cause of action required to be pled in the complaint.
¶ 30. Bland argues that he had no notice that evidence of adultery would be offered until twenty days after the discovery deadline. He argues that adultery was not pled in the complaint and was never mentioned in discovery. Judy and Bland both denied any sexual relationship prior to their marriage. Bland also argues that Buddy made no proffer as to any direct proof of adultery and, therefore, should be proeedurally barred.
¶ 31. It is clear that the reason Buddy wanted to put on proof of adultery is to obtain a punitive damage instruction. This Court has held that in cases of adultery malice is presumed. Walter v. Wilson, 228 So.2d 597, 598 (Miss., 1969). Buddy cites to Walter, but in Walter the plaintiff was suing for alienation of affections and criminal conversation. Criminal conversation, when it was a viable claim, required proof of a sexual relationship between the alienated spouse and the defendant. In the case sub judice, Buddy was suing only for alienation of affections. Bland was not on notice that he would have to defend against accusations of adultery until after the discovery deadline. Buddy did not proffer any direct evidence, and this Court proeedurally bars this claim.
II. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO SUBMIT PUNITIVE DAMAGES TO THE JURY.
¶ 32. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-1-65 (1991) provides, in part that:
Punitive damages may not be awarded if the claimant does not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant against whom punitive damages are sought acted with actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed actual fraud.
¶ 33. This Court stated in Walter, supra, that:
The modern trend of authority in the case of alienation of affection is that before the trial judge warranted and submitted to the jury the question of punitive damages on account of alienation of affections, as distinguished from criminal conversation, the testimony must show that the acts of the defendant in alienating the affection of the spouse were done with malice or that there were circumstances or aggravation....
Walter, 228 So.2d at 598.
¶ 34. This is not a case warranting punitive damages. Because the trial court made the correct ruling with regard to the evidence of adultery between Bland and Judy, punitive damages would not have been proper. There was simply no proof that Bland acted with actual malice. Therefore, this issue is without merit.
CONCLUSION
¶ 35.' This Court declines the invitation to abolish the tort of alienation of affections. Because the trial court abused its discretion in excluding proof of Charles W. (Buddy) Hill's alleged adulterous affair with another woman, we reverse the judgment below and remand for a new trial.
¶ 36. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED ON DIRECT APPEAL. AFFIRMED ON CROSS-APPEAL.
PRATHER, C.J., SULLIVAN, P.J., BANKS, SMITH, WALLER AND COBB, JJ., CONCUR.
SMITH, J., SPECIALLY CONCURS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY BANKS, J., WALLER, J., JOINS IN PART.
McRAE, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.
MILLS, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.