Case Name: Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York v. John A. Getzendanner et al.
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1900-04-05
Citations: 93 Tex. 487
Docket Number: No. 884
Parties: Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York v. John A. Getzendanner et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 93
Pages: 487–499

Head Matter:
Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York v. John A. Getzendanner et al.
No. 884.
Decided April 5, 1900.
1. Accident Insurance — Total Disability — Charge.
In an action on an accident policy securing a weekly indemnity for injuries which should “wholly disable and prevent the assured from performing any and every kind of duty pertaining to his occupation,” a charge authorizing recovery if insured was disabled and prevented from performing such duties “in a manner reasonably as effective as * * * if he had not sustained such injury,” is erroneous. (Pp. 496, 497.)
2. Same.
Such charge can not be justified by the fact that the alleged disability was a mental one, — the gradations in mental deteriorations being infinite, as in physical. (P. 497.)
3. Same.
It seems, however, that in the description of the disability for which indemnity is provided in an accident insurance policy, the language “wholly disable and prevent the assured from performing any and every kind of duty pertaining to his occupations” is not to be taken literally. (P. 497.)
Certieioate oe dissent from the Court of Civil' Appeals for the Second District, in an appeal from Tarrant County.
Harris, Etheridge & Knight, for appellant.
To entitle plaintiff and intervener to a recovery it was incumbent upon them, in view of the stipulations contained in the policy, to establish that the assured sustained such bodily injuries through external violent and accidental means as, independently of all other causes, immediately, continuously, and wholly disabled and prevented him from performing any and every kind of duty pertaining to visiting yards and ranches and buying and selling cattle not in transit, and it was error for the court to authorize a recovery if the assured was disabled and prevented from performing any and every kind of duty which was materially essential to his occupation stated in the policy "in a manner reasonably as effective as the same would have been performed by him had he not sustained injury,” in that such charge did not confine the right of recovery to the event of total disability but authorized a recovery for partial disability in contravention of the stipulations contained in the policy. Saveland v. Fidelity and Casualty Co., 58 Am. Rep., 863; Am. Dig. for 1895, p, 2491, sec. 687; 1 Am. and Eng. Enc. of Law, 2 ed., 298, note 3; Accident Assn. v. Millard, 43 Ill. App., 148; Ford v. Accident Co., 148 Mass., 153; Knapp v. Accident Assn., 53 Hun, 84; Gracey v. Accident Assn., 21 Pittsb. L. J., 25; Merrill v. Insurance Co., 64 N. W. Rep., 1039.
Flournoy & Altman, for appellee.
The assured is wholly disabled and prevented from performing any and every kind of duty pertaining to his occupation when he can not perform any and every such duty materially essential to his occupation, substantially, that is, reasonably as effectively as he performed such duties before the injury. Lobdill v. Laboring Men’s Assn., 71 N. W. Rep., 696; Young v. Insurance Co., 80 Me., 244; Thayer v. Standard Life, etc., Co., 41 Atl. Rep., 182; Wolcott v. United Life Assn., 8 N. Y. Supp., 263; Hohn v. Casualty Co., 72 N. W. Rep., 1105; Baldwin v. Accident Assn., 46 N. Y. Supp., 1016.
To construe the clause in controversy in accordance with the contention of appellant, would be to require that the assured, before he can recover on his policy, be reduced to a state of complete paralysis of body and mind, — that he suffer, virtually, physical death; for if the injured person, though in the throes of dissolution, be able to give a word of intelligent direction concerning his business, or make one movement in his handicraft, he is not, according to this interpretation, wdiolly disabled from performing any and every duty pertaining to his occupation. It is needless to cite authorities that in doubtful cases such policies are to be construed most favorably to the assured. May on Ins., sec. 175. The policy in question was intended to insure against more than death of the assured. The clause under review was certainly meant to cover a disability something short of practical physical dissolution. Clay v. Insurance Co., 25 S. E. Rep., 417.
If, then, appellant’s construction is rejected, where will the law set the limit? It would not be in consonance with'the reason or the principles of the law to attempt to define the intermediate stages between absolute mental and physical collapse and full powers. It can only safely declare, that when one is incompetent to substantially perform his duties, he is disabled, and when he can not by any effort, however honestly or strenuously made, perform those duties in a manner reasonably as effective as before, he is wholly disabled. The cases cited in this brief exhibit some variety of opinion as to how the clause in question should be applied to the facts in issue. Some hold that incapacity in one or more material and essential functions of a business amounts to total disability as to any and every function pertaining to such business; but the vital principle involved in all is that if the assured is prevented from substantially carrying on his business, whether by literal total disability as to one or more important duties, or by inability to perform reasonably as effectively as before any and every such duty, he is wholly disabled within the meaning of this policy of insurance. It would seem that the charge of the court in the case at bar presents the principle in a more logical and comprehensive form, and is a better expression of it in its general application to all cases which may arise under the clause in question, than the instructions reviewed in the authorities cited above. It will be remembered, too, that the charge complained of by appellant is directed to a state of facts which show the injury to be one which affected the brain, and, xvhen the assured found his mental powers impaired to that extent that he could perform none of his duties reasonably as effectively as he had before, it would appear that, with the shadow of insanity hovering over him, it was high time for him to cease from his labors and to declare himself totally disabled in any and every particular relating to his business.
The majority and dissenting opinions, upon which this case was certified, were as follows:

Opinion:
"Stephens, Associate Justice.
The accident policy declared on insured John A. Getzendanér in the sum of $25 per week against bodily injuries sustained through external violent and accidental means, as follows, quoting its second clause: 'Or if such injuries, independently of all other causes, shall immediately, continuously, and wholly disable and prevent the assured from performing any and every kind of duty pertaining to his occupation, the company will pay the assured the weekly indemnity before specified, during the continuance of such disability, but not exceeding fifty-two consecutive weeks/
"The occupation of the assured was that of 'visiting yards and ranches, buying and selling cattle not in transit/ During the life of the policy, about January 10, 1897, while engaged in driving a cow on horseback, the assured, his horse stúmbíing, fell to the ground, and though there were then no signs of physical injury, on the first day of March following became wholly insane and has ever since been confined in the lunatic asylum.
"According to the agreed statement of facts, whether this insanity was caused by the fall from the horse, or whether the assured 'for a month or six weeks after the accident was up and about and attending to his business/ were controverted issues, upon which the testimony would have sustained a verdict either way.
"The fourth paragraph of the agreed statement of facts reads: 'The testimony was conflicting as to whether the injury of the assured resulting from the accident, did or did not, independently of all other causes, immediately, continuously and wholly disable and prevent him from performing any and every kind of duty pertaining to his occupation, but there was sufficient evidence to support a verdict for either party upon this issue/
"There was no other controverted issue of fact.
"The main contention of appellant is that the court erred in submitting the issue of total disability to the jury, the charge reading:
"'If you believe from the evidence that John A. Getzendanner sustained the injury alleged in plaintiffs petition through external violent and accidental causes in the manner alleged, and that such injury independently of all other causes immediately and continuously after such injury was sustained, disabled and prevented said John A. Getzendanner from performing any and every kind of duty which was materially essential to his occupation stated in the insurance policy introduced in evidence, in a manner reasonably as effective as you believe the same would have been performed by said John A. Getzendanner if he had not sustained said injury, then you will find for the plaintiff and inter vener against the defendant for the sum of twenty-five dollars per week for each and every week, not to exceed fifty-two consecutive weeks, that said John A. Getzendanner was so disabled. The word "immediately" in the sense used above and in following portions of this charge refers to the proximity of time with the alleged injury and means the same as the word "presently." The burden is upon the plaintiff and intervener to make out their case by a preponderance of the evidence, and if they have not done so you will find for the defendant.
" 'You will find for the defendant unless you believe from the evidence that the disability, if any, of John A. Getzendanner alleged in said petition immediately followed the injury, if any; or unless you believe that said injury, if any, independently of all other causes, continuously disabled and prevented said Getzendanner from performing any and every kind of duty materially essential to his occupation in a manner reasonably as effective as you believe he would have performed the same but for said injury; or unless you believe that said injury, if any, was sustained from external violent and accidental means/
"In so far as this charge instructed the jury that appellee's case would be one of total disability, if the injury complained of prevented him from performing the duties of his occupation 'in a manner reasonably as effective as he would have performed the same but for said injury,' it had the effect of making partial disability the equivalent of total disability, and was therefore clearly erroneous. The vice of the charge is in the language'just quoted. The cases cited in appellees' brief to sustain the charge, so far from doing so, are quite to the contrary, the language of the policy in one of them, Hohn v. Interstate Casualty Co. (Mich.), 72 N. W. Rep., 1105, being identical with the clause construed in this case. See, also, Lobdill v. Laboring Men's Association (Minn.), 71 R. W. Rep., 696.
"But whether this error should require a reversal of the judgment is another question. It seems from the condensed statement of facts that the evidence was such that the jury might have found that appellee 'for a month or six weeks after the accident was up and about and attending to his business,' but might have also found that he was not; but whether or not there was any evidence from which the jury might have found that he was 'up and about and attending to his business' less effectively than he would have attended to the same but for said injury, the record is wholly silent. We are therefore unable to determine whether there was any evidence of partial disability, as contra-distinguished from total disability. That is to say, the testimony of the witnesses relied on by the appellant may have been to the effect that for six weeks after the accident he was attending to his business in the usual way and as effectively as ever, while that relied upon by appellee may have warranted the jury in finding that he could not and did not attend to it at all after the accident.
"The error in the charge therefore may have been purely abstract. We hardly think that we would be warranted in reversing the judgment upon the assumption that there might have been evidence of partial disability, as contradistinguished from total disability. It is incumbent upon the party seeking the reversal of a judgment to show by the record the materiality. of the error of which he complains. True, - it may be said that, if no such issue was presented by the evidence, that would itself be an insuperable objection to the charge; but we have searched appellant's brief in vain to find any complaint of the charge upon that ground.
"None of the other assignments are well taken. The judgment is therefore affirmed."
Filed November 4, 1899.