Case Name: JASON L. MOWRY, Appellant, v. THE GOLD STABECK COMPANY, a corporation, formerly known as the Gold-Stabeck Loan & Credit Company, Herman C. Ritz and A. F. Winters, Respondents
Court: North Dakota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: North Dakota
Decision Date: 1922-01-31
Citations: 48 N.D. 764
Docket Number: 
Parties: JASON L. MOWRY, Appellant, v. THE GOLD STABECK COMPANY, a corporation, formerly known as the Gold-Stabeck Loan & Credit Company, Herman C. Ritz and A. F. Winters, Respondents.
Judges: Grace, C. J., and Ci-iristianson and Birdzell, JJ., concur.
Reporter: North Dakota Reports
Volume: 48
Pages: 764–770

Head Matter:
JASON L. MOWRY, Appellant, v. THE GOLD STABECK COMPANY, a corporation, formerly known as the Gold-Stabeck Loan & Credit Company, Herman C. Ritz and A. F. Winters, Respondents.
(186 N. W. 865.)
Witnesses —■ testimony concerning transactions with deceased admissible, where none of parties are representatives, heirs, or next of kin.
1. In an action to determine adverse claims where no one of the parties is a personal representative, the heir or next of kin of a deceased person, testimony concerning transactions had with such deceased person is not rendered inadmissible, pursuant to § 7871 C. L. 1913.
Quieting title — court held to have properly fixed priority.
2. In an action to determine adverse claims, it is held, for reasons stated in the opinion, that the trial court did not err in determining the defendant to be the equitable o>wner of-the land and in fixing the priority of liens thereupon.
Opinion filed Jan. 31, 1922.
Action in District court, Rolette county, Buttz, J.
Plaintiff has appealed from a judgment in defendant’s favor.
Affirmed.
Fred L. Ellsworth, Fred B. Harris, for appellants.
“A fee simple title is presumed to be intended to pass by a grant of real property, unless it appears from the grant that a lesser estate was intended.” Little v. Braun, 92 N. W. 200, 11 N. D. 10; Jasper v. Hazen, 58 N. W. 454, 4 N. D. 1; 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1046 and cases cited; 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 3§7; § 6754 C. L. 1913.
“Every grant of real property or of an estate therein, which appears by any other writing to be intended as a mortgage within the meaning •cf chap. 86 of this Code, must be recorded as a mortgage; and if such grant or other writing, explanatory of its true character, are not recorded together at the same time and place, the grantee can derive no benefit from the record.” Merchants State Bank v. Tufts, 14 N. D. 238, 103 N. W. 760.
“When a grant of real property purports to be an absolute conveyance, but is intended to be defeasable on the performance of certain conditions, such grant is not defeated or affected as against any other person than the grantee, his heirs or devisees, or persons having actual notice, unless an instrument of defeasance, duly executed and acknowledged, shall have been recorded in the office of the Register of Deeds of the county where the property is situated.” § 6755 C. L. 1913; Pat-node v. Deschenes, 15 N. D. 166, 106 N. W. 573; Gray v. Harvey, 17 N. D. 1, 113, N. W. 1034; Vallaley v. Eirst Nat. Bank, 14 N. D. 580, 106 N. W. 127.
W. 0. Newhouse, R. C. Morton, and /. /. Weeks, for respondents.
“We cannot say that it was the purpose of the legislature to exclude all evidence merely because the witness from whose lips it might fall would enjoy the advantage of testifying to a transaction with a deceased person, who on that account could not confront and contradict him. Statutes which exclude testimony on this ground are of doubtful expediency. There are more honest claims defeated by them by destroying the evidence to prove such claim than there would be fictitious claims established if all such enactments were swept away, and all persons rendered competent witnesses.” St. John v. Lofland, 5 N. D. 140.
This case and this expression of Judge Corliss is qouted with approval in “Wigmore on Evidence” § 578. See also Jones on Evidence 776.
Next of kin must be a party as such. Clarke v. Ross, Sup. Ct. Ia., 60 N. W. 629; Lake Grocery Co. v. Chiostri; 34 N. D. 400; Nora L. Savage v. M. W. A. Russell Savage et al., 113 Pac. 802, Yol. 33 E. R. A. (N. S.) p. 773-

Opinion:
Bronson, J.
This is an action to determine adverse claims concerning one-half section of land in Rolette county. The plaintiff has ap pealed from the judgment, and has demanded a trial de novo.
The trial court found: That the Twin City Investment Company the owner of the land in May, 1915, gave to one Winter a contract for a deed. That Winter in May, 1916, assigned such contract to the defendant Ritz. In February, 1914, the investment company made a mortgage for $5,000 to Klein. In May, 1916, the defendant Ritz made a mortgage to the Gold-Stabeck Company for $2,000. In November, 1917, the defendant Ritz being indebted to Wheelock Mowry, the father of the plaintiff, made an agreement, for purposes of securing such indebtedness and advances to be made, with Mowry to have a warranty deed executed by the investment company to one Janzow, and thence by Janzow to Wheelock Mowry, to secure $5,000 then due from Ritz to Mowry, and that thereupon Mowry would execute a contract for a deed to Ritz for reconveyance upon payment of such $5,000 and the $5,000 first mortgage. Such deeds and contract were made. At that time the defendant Ritz had paid to the investment company the balance owing on the contract for a deed with Winter, and Ritz was then entitled to a warranty deed of the land. At that time Wheelock Mowry had full knowledge of the Gold-Stabeck mortgage, and that the same was unpaid. That the plaintiff at all times had full knowledge of such transactions. The plaintiff, or other members of the Mowry family, paid taxes and the principal and interest of the Klein first mortgage, aggregating, in toto with interest, $6,869.36. That the defendant Ritz is the owner of the lands, and entitled to the possession subject to the payment to plaintiff of $6,869.36, the $2,000 Gold-Stabeck mortgage with interest, and the sum of $5,000 to the plaintiff with interest. Pursuant to such findings judgment was entered. In the evidence it appears that Wheelock Mowry died in 1919, and prior thereto made a deed of the land, dated March 29, 1919, to the plaintiff for a consideration of $1 and other valuable considerations. At the trial, defendant Ritz testified concerning many transactions and arrangements had with Wheelock Mowry, then deceased. The record is long, and the exhibits numerous. It is unnecessary to state at length the evidence. The plaintiff contends that, upon the record, he is an innocent purchaser of the land without notice of the Gold-Stabeck mortgage, and that the trial court should have confirmed his title; that the trial court erroneously permitted the defendant Ritz to testify concerning transactions had with a deceased person; that the contract for a deed given to Ritz by Mowry was duly canceled, and the defendant Ritz had no title in the land; that the Gold-Stabeck mortgage did not attach to the land so far as plaintiff's interests are concerned; that, in any event, the trial court erred in not allowing priority to the plaintiff for certain payments made for taxes and upon the Klein mortgage. The defendant contends that the deed from the father to the plaintiff was a forgepy (the trial court, in its memorandum opinion, strongly so intimates) ; that the trial court erred in not granting priority to the Gold-Stabeck Company mortgage.
Upon^a consideration of the entire record we are of the opinion that the findings and conclusions of the trial court should be sustained. Although the record is neither clear nor definite concerning application that should be made for payments made by Mowry in taxes or liens upon the land, we are unable to find that the computations of the trial court are erroneous. The contention of the plaintiff, namely, that the trial court erroneously received testimony of the defendant Ritz concerning transactions had with the deceased Mowry, cannot be sustained. The statute, precluding testimony concerning transactions had with deceased persons, is specific in its character, and relates only to actions wherein the person representative, heirs, or next of kin are parties. § 7871, C. L. 1913. The plaintiff did not appear in that capacity he claims title through a deed made by his father during lifetime. The statute cannot be extended by judiical construction beyond its plain application. Lake Grocery Co. v. Chiostri, 34 N. D. 386, 400, 158 N. W. 998; Clarke v. Ross (Iowa) 60 N. W. 627, 629. See St. John v. Lofland, 5 N. D. 140, 64 N. W. 930; Wigmore on Evidence, vol. 1, § 578; Druey v. Baldwin, 41 N. D. 473, 479, 172 N. W. 663, 182 N. W. 699; Williams v. Clark, 42 N. D. 107, 114, 172 N. W. 825, 827. Accordingly, the judgment should be in all things affirmed.
Grace, C. J., and Ci-iristianson and Birdzell, JJ., concur.