Case Name: FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY, Appellant, v. Glenn V. LIVELY, Sr. and Barbara Lively, his wife, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1985-03-05
Citations: 465 So. 2d 1270
Docket Number: No. 81-1571
Parties: FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY, Appellant, v. Glenn V. LIVELY, Sr. and Barbara Lively, his wife, Appellees.
Judges: Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and HENDRY, BARKDULL, HUBBART, NESBITT, BAS-KIN, PEARSON, FERGUSON and JOR-GENSON, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 465
Pages: 1270–1285

Head Matter:
FLORIDA POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY, Appellant, v. Glenn V. LIVELY, Sr. and Barbara Lively, his wife, Appellees.
No. 81-1571.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
March 5, 1985.
Richard E. Hardwick, Coral Gables, Daniels & Hicks and Mark Hicks, Miami, for appellant.
Bartel, Shuford & Dubitsky; Morgan, Lewis & Bockius and Paul J. Levine, Miami, for appellees.
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and HENDRY, BARKDULL, HUBBART, NESBITT, BAS-KIN, PEARSON, FERGUSON and JOR-GENSON, JJ.

Opinion:
OPINION ON REHEARING EN BANC
BARKDULL, Judge.
This is an appeal by Florida Power and Light Company (FPL) from an adverse jury verdict arising out of the collision of a single engine airplane, while in an emergency situation, with two static lines attached to the top of FPL's electrical transmission towers, located 8.7 miles from Miami International Airport (MIA) and 102 feet from the ground. Prior to trial the parties stipulated that damages were $500,-000.00. The only issues submitted to the jury were liability and comparative negligence.
The negligence claimed against FPL was that it had a duty to place markers on its static lines so as to make them more visible to pilots encountering problems with flight. In other words, FPL should have foreseen that airplanes might encounter trouble in the area of the power lines and be required to fly between the transmission towers. Thus, FPL had a duty to mark the static lines.
On April 28, 1979, Glenn Lively, as pilot, and a passenger, took off from the Tamia-mi Airport in a 1978 Bellanca Citabria (an aerobatic plane). They flew to North Perry Airport in Broward County for breakfast. Their flight to North Perry was at 800 feet and it took them under the MIA Terminal Control Area (TCA). After breakfast they took off and headed back to Tamiami. They ultimately went west at an altitude of 800 feet and at 130 m.p.h. toward Krome Avenue in northwest Dade County. The plane began slowing down and losing altitude. The speed dropped to 80 m.p.h. and the pilot assessed the situation as a fuel starvation problem. He unscrewed the manual primer and injected fuel directly into the cylinder heads. This allowed him to regain RPMs and a speed of 120 m.p.h. which would have permitted the plane not only to maintain altitude but to climb. When the airplane regained power, Mr. Lively was about a quarter of a mile from the transmission lines and he admitted seeing them. After regaining power, he climbed to about 100 feet and he decided to fly to Krome Avenue and land there. Prior to impact, Mr. Lively saw the transmission towers, which stood about 102 feet high and 1000 feet apart. He also saw the heavy transmission lines which had not yet been pulled tight because the lines were under construction. They were attached 71 feet above the ground, but they hung about 30 or 40 feet from the surface. At the top of the transmission towers were strung two % inch galvanized steel wires or (nonenergized) static lines which are used to absorb lightning. Mr. Lively stated that he could not see the static lines. Another witness testified that they were sometimes visible. He proceeded toward Krome Avenue and collided with the wires, resulting in the crash. Mr. Lively testified that all flight manuals teach that one must stay clear of transmission poles and assume that there are wires strung between them.
Plaintiffs expert testified that the crash occurred within what is known as the Dade County Airport Zoning Area and the FAA TCA (or approach zones). He testified that because many airplanes fly into MIA and through the area surrounding the airport, "... unusual considerations for safety have to be made." He then concluded that all static wires in the airport approach zones, which range from the airport up to 20 miles out in many directions, should be marked, and in particular the wires involved in this accident, which were 8.7 miles out and 102 feet off of the ground. However, in reaching this conclusion, he testified that he knew of no instance where such markers are used in the State of Florida. He has not seen any markers 8½ miles from an airport in Florida and, out of the many people that fly into the airport zoning area, Mr. Lively is the only one he knows of that has hit a line. The plaintiffs expert also stated that he had no personal experience in installing, inspecting or flying over such markers. Significantly, he conceded that failing to mark the static lines did not violate any FAA regulations. The uncon-troverted evidence revealed that at the location of the accident the appropriate regulations permit structures up to 1620 feet high. Such structures need only be mark ed if they are in excess of 200 feet. The plaintiffs expert testified that pilots should not fly between towers or poles.
The essential elements of negligence from which liability will flow are duty, breach of duty, legal cause and damage. W. Prosser, Torts § 30 p. 143 (4th ED. 1979). FPL contends that the first three elements are absent in this case.
The term duty has been criticized as a "... shorthand statement of a conclusion, rather than an aid to analysis in itself." Prosser, supra, at p. 325. No universal test has ever been formulated, however one recognized definition of "duty" is the existence of a relationship between individuals which imposes upon one the legal obligation to conform to a standard of reasonable conduct so as to protect the other from foreseeable and unreasonable risks of harm. Prosser, supra, at pp. 143, 324. Whether a duty exists is a question of law for the court. Prosser, supra, at p. 206. The issue of breach of duty is often considered a question for the jury, unless only one reasonable conclusion may be drawn from the facts in evidence. See Rice v. Florida Power and Light Company, 363 So.2d 834 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). Bayman v. Clearwater Power Co., Inc., 15 Wash.App. 566, 550 P.2d 554 (1976). "If no reasonable duty was abrogated, as a matter of law, no negligence [can] be found." Rice v. Florida Power and Light Company, supra. FPL contends that under the evidence elicited below, there was no duty or breach of duty as a matter of law.
FPL's contentions are supported by authorities which discuss duty in cases involving injuries resulting from the location or placement of power lines. A recent case involving an aircraft which struck a static line is Lea v. Baumann Surgical Supplies, Inc., 321 So.2d 844 (La.App.1975). There the passenger in a plane was killed when the aircraft struck a ⅜ inch static wire while attempting to land on a privately owned strip. The transmission poles were located 1,191 feet from the runway and they were strung 98.6 feet high. The passenger's wife sued several parties including the power company. As to the power company's negligence, it was contended, inter alia, that it failed to properly mark the wires and supporting structures with markers or lights to make them more visible. The jury found the company negligent. The Louisiana Court of Appeal reversed and said:
"It is elementary tort law that negligence is the breach of a duty of care owed the injured party. If there is no duty to exercise care as to a given plaintiff, defendant's conduct does not amount to negligence and is not actionable."
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"The first inquiry is whether the conduct complained of is a cause in fact of the harm. Secondly, it must be determined whether defendant was under a legal duty imposed to protect against the particular risk involved. The final question is whether defendant breached a duty imposed."
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"Notwithstanding the erection of the wire by LP & L was a cause in fact of the accident, liability does not attach upon LP & L herein for the simple reason there was no duty, statutory or otherwise, resting upon LP & L with respect to either erecting or marking the line. LP & L cannot be negligent in failing to discharge a duty of care which did not exist....
We do not believe it could be argued logically that every transmission line, regardless of height and location must be marked, under penalty of liability for all ensuing air accidents. Such a rule, we believe, would be basically nonsensical. Our appreciation of the record impels the inescapable conclusion that erection of this facility did not constitute a hazard to air navigation, albeit the poles and wire extended a maximum of 98.6 and a minimum of 67 feet above the earth at the span in question. As thus constructed, the wire did not constitute a hazard to any pilot landing at Cora airstrip pursuant to a normal flight pattern and observing basic rules of air safety."

"We do not deem it negligence to fail to foresee that a pilot will attempt a landing in violation of fundamental principles of safe flying. We find the same reasoning applies with respect to LP & L's failure to mark the line. Since the line was not a hazard to air navigation, we do not deem it negligence to fail to mark its existence."
Another case finding no duty is Gunn v. Edison Sault Electric Co., 24 Mich.App. 43, 179 N.W.2d 680 (1970). There, a seaplane collided with the power company's transmission wires while attempting to land on a river. The wires ran 120 yards over the water at an altitude of 38 feet. The plaintiff alleged that "[t]here were no markers on the poles of the defendant, nor on the power lines." As noted by the Court:
"The question presented to us on appeal is whether the defendant was guilty of common-law negligence in failing to have the line and poles marked with either paint or some type of reflector."
As a predicate to answering this question, the Court observed that the pilot had approached the landing from a different direction than most pilots had ever been known to do. The Court then stated as follows:
"Conversely, the law is complied with when an electric or telephone company or others engaged in the transmission or use of electricity provide such a protection as will safely guard against any contingency that is reasonable to be anticipated. The extent of the duty or standard of care is measured in the terms of foreseeability of injury from the situation created. There is no duty to safeguard against occurrences that cannot be reasonably expected or contemplated. A failure to anticipate and guard against a happening which would not have arisen but for exceptional or unusual circumstances is not negligence, nor does the law require those maintaining power transmission lines to anticipate every possible fortuitous circumstance that might cause injurious contacts with those lines."
In Walker v. Texas Electric Service Co., 499 S.W.2d 20 (Tex.Civ.App.1973), the power company was charged with negligence in failing to mark a ⅜ inch static line located 500 feet from the runway and 100 to 110 feet from the ground. The plaintiff's aircraft struck the line while' attempting to land. A summary judgment was granted for the power company and the plaintiff appealed. In affirming the summary judgment, the court noted that the lines were constructed in compliance with all ordinances and that this was the first accident of its kind which had occurred at the airport. The court concluded that "[i]n the absence of proof that the appellee either knew or should have known of danger there could be no breach of duty and negligence". See also Bayman v. Clearwater Power Co., Inc., supra, which affirmed a summary judgment for the power company finding no breach of duty where an airplane hit a cable. Columbia Helicopters, Inc. v. United States, 314 F.Supp. 946 (D.Or.1969); Hughes v. Mississippi Power Co., 244 Miss. 326, 141 So.2d 539 (1962).
It is apparent from these authorities that no duty or breach of duty exists as a matter of law where the following elements exist: the height of power lines and their location are in compliance with applicable ordinances and FAA regulations; no notice of prior accidents of a similar kind involving the power lines exists; and the power lines, as constructed, do not create an unreasonable risk of harm. The uncontroverted evidence in this ease fits this criteria, and therefore no duty exists as a matter of law. In fact, the evidence in this case is far more compelling than the evidence presented in the cases cited.
The height and location of the static lines were fully in compliance with FAA regulations and the Dade County code. It is undisputed that the FPL lines were located 8.7 miles from the airport (where struc tures may be built up to 1620 feet in height), while in Lea v. Baumann Surgical Supplies, Inc., supra, and Walker v. Texas Electric Service Co., supra, they were located at 1191 feet and 500 feet respectively. In addition, plaintiffs expert testified that he knew of no instance where such markers are used in the State of Florida. He also knew of no such markers located 8V2 miles from an airport. Further, out of the many people flying in the vicinity of the airport, Mr. Lively is the first and only person he knew of that was injured by a power line. (The fact that the power lines were under construction also establishes lack of notice as to any potential problems which may arise.)
The plaintiff herein was required to be at least 500 feet above the towers or at an altitude in excess of 600 feet while in normal flight. FPL was in conformity with both the F.A.R. and the county aviation ordinance when it erected the towers. They were under 200 feet in height and therefore not required to be lighted per the FAA. In the area in which they were erected, as long as they were under 1610 feet they were within the height limitations of the county ordinance.
It is also significant that the accident in question did not occur during a landing or departure from an airport. Instead, it occurred as a result of a totally unanticipated emergency which arose while Mr. Lively happened to be flying near the lines.
Based upon these facts, it is clear that the only reasonable conclusion which may be reached in this case is that no duty or breach of duty exists. Any other result would require all persons and entities lawfully using their land within the approxi- . mately 140 square mile airport zoning area to anticipate every possible type of emergency which might occur involving an airplane and guard against it. Telephone lines, guy wires and even clothes lines would have to be marked in anticipation of a possible emergency situation. This is not the law. One need not "... anticipate and guard against a happening which would not have arisen but for exceptional or unusual circumstances_" Gunn v. Edison Sault Electric Co., supra. FPL was under no duty to anticipate that an airplane would fly 8.7 miles out into the Everglades, encounter engine trouble, and deliberately fly between its transmission towers in an attempt to land safely.
The plaintiffs theory was that Florida Power and Light was required to anticipate that because of the number of flights in and out of the several airports in the control zone, that one might have an emergency and thereby, in an attempt to make a landing, strike the static lines. As was candidly admitted during oral argument of the case en banc, such a theory would require FPL to mark all its static wires as well as its transmission wires in the entire airport area with visible lighted markers because even those visible during the day would be invisible at night. As reflected by the sectional chart, put into evidence by the plaintiff, this marking would be required in the entire airport approach zone, which extends out some 20 miles from Miami International Airport, and the entire area covered by the county aviation ordinance. This is an area which encompasses some 140 square miles. The sectional chart further shows there are airport terminal areas surrounding eight airports which overlap and encompasses an area in Southeast Florida almost contiguous in length from South Palm Beach County to South of Homestead or an area approximately 65 miles long by 12 miles wide. All of this would be in addition to the existing requirement that if the towers were over 200 feet tall they would have to be lighted. We simply cannot accept such a theory because first, the record shows that no such accident had ever taken place in this control zone, and second the mere possibility of an event is not the same as foreseeability. There must be a probability that something will occur, not a possibility. Crown Liquors of Broward, Inc. v. Even rud, 436 So.2d 927 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1983); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., Inc. v. Lippincott, 383 So.2d 1181 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); Stanage v. Bilbo, 382 So.2d 423 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980); State, Agency of Stephen Boyles v. Simer, 363 So.2d 357 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); Bryant v. Jax Liquors, 352 So.2d 542 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). As implied, if not affirmatively appearing in this court's opinion in Speigel v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. and Florida Power & Light Co., supra, wherein no duty was found, it was possible that one of the many automobiles that passed a particular power pole might have a malfunction, leave the roadway and strike the pole, yet it was not negligence to erect the pole because such an event was not probable, notwithstanding the fact that the pole was in close proximity to the roadway.
In Speigel, FPL and Southern Bell were sued for negligence in maintaining a light and telephone pole so near the highway that plaintiffs driver was fatally injured when her automobile collided with the pole. The trial court granted a summary judgment in favor of FP & L and Southern Bell and this Court affirmed, relying upon the following reasoning:
"[A] utility company is under no obligation to guard against extraordinary exigencies created when a vehicle leaves the traveled portion of a roadway out of control. Oram v. New Jersey Bell Telephone Company [132 N.J.Super. 491] 334 A.2d 343 (1975). The uncontradicted evidence in this case clearly shows that the plaintiff vehicle had left the roadway prior to impact with the utility pole involved herein. Summary Final Judgment therefore be and the same hereby is granted in favor of the defendants. ."
There is absolutely no rational reason to find that a vehicle leaving the roadway and hitting a utility pole is an extraordinary exigency which is unforeseeable, while finding that it is foreseeable that an airplane crash landing would hit the static line in this case.
We believe that the analysis in Speigel is correct because courts must place limits on foreseeability. Clearly, it is foreseeable in the practical sense that planes and cars will crash or encounter emergencies. However, only acts which are likely to result in injury are compensa-ble. Acts which cause injury but are foreseeable only as remote possibilities, those only slightly probable, are beyond the limit of legal liability. National Airlines, Inc. v. Edwards, 336 So.2d 545 (Fla.1976).
Under these circumstances, in this case, there is only one reasonable conclusion which may be reached. FPL had no duty, breached no duty and was not the legal cause of injury to Mr. Lively. See Pinkerton-Hays Lumber Co. v. Pope, 127 So.2d 441 (Fla.1961).
Therefore for the reasons above stated we find that the trial court erred in denying FPL's motion for directed verdict. The final judgment is reversed with directions to enter judgment for the defendant.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
. After the rendition of a panel opinion of this Court, an appropriate petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc was filed by the appellee, the rehearing en banc having secured the necessary votes of the active members of this Court, the panel opinion was withdrawn and the matter was set for additional oral argument, which resulted in this opinion. The basis for the rehearing en banc was that the panel opinion in effect announced a rule of law which conflicted with a rule previously announced by this Court in Speigel v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 341 So.2d 832 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
. In fact, the sectional chart introduced into evidence as the plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2 contains the following language:
"CAUTION, This chart is primarily designed for VFR navigational purposes and does not purport to indicate the presence of all telephone, telegraph and power transmission lines, terrain or obstacles which may be encountered below reasonable and safe altitudes."
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"CAUTION, Guy wires may extend outward from structures"
. § 91.79(c) Federal Aviation Regulations.
. § 33-334 & 33-336 Dade County Code.
. This case does not involve an injury occasioned by energized electrical transmission wires, the maintenance of which puts a high duty of care on the electric supplier. Therefore the following authorities are not applicable to this case. See Richmond v. Florida Power & Light Co., 58 So.2d 687 (Fla.1952); Florida Power & Light Co. v. Bridgeman, 133 Fla. 195, 182 So. 911 (1938); Escambia County Light & Power Co. v. Sutherland, 61 Fla. 167, 55 So. 83 (1911); See also Annot., 30 A.L.R.3rd 779-781 (1970).
This case does not involve electrical wires maintained in such a fashion as to constitute a trap to aircraft flying under normal conditions in accordance with applicable federal aviation regulations. Therefore the following authorities are not applicable to this case. McCauley v. United States, 470 F.2d 137 (9th Cir.1972); El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. United States, 343 F.2d 145 (9th Cir.1965); Arizona Public Service Co. v. Brittain, 107 Ariz. 278, 486 P.2d 176 (1971); Weber v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 209 Kan. 273, 497 P.2d 118 (1972); Reminga v. United States, 448 F.Supp. 445 (W.D.Mich.1978); Yoffee v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 385 Pa. 520, 123 A.2d 636 (1956); Mills v. Orcas Power & Light Co., 56 Wash.2d 807, 355 P.2d 781 (1960).
. Because of this disposition we do not reach the second point urged for reversal.