Case Name: GUO REN CHEN, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2013-10-17
Citations: 536 F. App'x 118
Docket Number: No. 12-2495 NAC
Parties: GUO REN CHEN, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
Judges: PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, DENNY CHIN, and SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 536
Pages: 118–120

Head Matter:
GUO REN CHEN, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER, Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent.
No. 12-2495 NAC.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
Oct. 17, 2013.
Gary J. Yerman, New York, NY, for Petitioner.
Stuart F. Delery, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General; Douglas E. Ginsburg, Assistant Director; Franklin M. Johnson, Jr., Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, DENNY CHIN, and SUSAN L. CARNEY, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
SUMMARY ORDER
Petitioner Guo Ren Chen, a native and citizen of China, seeks review of a May 31, 2012 decision of the BIA denying his motion to reopen his deportation proceedings. In re Guo Ren Chen, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. May 31, 2012). We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues on appeal.
We review the BIA's denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. See Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir.2006) (per curiam). An alien seeking to reopen proceedings must move to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered and is permitted to file only one such motion. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Chen's order of deportation became final in 1995; so there is no dispute that Chen's second motion to reopen, filed in 2011, was untimely and number-barred. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (47) (B) (ii).
Chen alleges that he has become a devout Christian, and that the Chinese government's intensified crackdown on Chinese Christians constitutes a material change in country conditions excusing his motion from the applicable time and numerical limitations. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3).
The BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding that Chen failed to demonstrate a material change of conditions in China. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir.2008); see also In re S-Y-G, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 253 (B.I.A.2007) ("In determining whether evidence accompanying a motion to reopen demonstrates a material change in country conditions that would justify reopening, [the BIA] compares the evidence of country conditions submitted with the motion to those that existed at the time of the merits hearing below."). The BIA explicitly compared evidence of current conditions in China to those that existed at the time of Chen's deportation proceedings and reasonably determined that the evidence reflected a continuation of suppression rather than a material change. Therefore, because the BIA's inference that conditions in China have not materially changed "is tethered to the evidentiary record, we will accord deference to the finding." See Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 168 (2d Cir.2007) ("[S]upport for a contrary inference — even one more plausible or more natural — does not suggest error.").
Because Chen's motion was defeated by the time and number limitations, we do not address his prima facie eligibility for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture. See INS v. Bagamashad, 429 U.S. 24, 25, 97 S.Ct. 200, 50 L.Ed.2d 190 (1976).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).