Case Name: Ambar Margarita ZELAYA DE CERON, Josue Neftali Ceron-Herrara, Josue Gilberto Ceron-Zelaya, Petitioners, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, United States Attorney General, Respondent
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2016-05-04
Citations: 648 F. App'x 78
Docket Number: No. 13-3208-ag
Parties: Ambar Margarita ZELAYA DE CERON, Josue Neftali Ceron-Herrara, Josue Gilberto Ceron-Zelaya, Petitioners, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, United States Attorney General, Respondent.
Judges: Present: JOHN M. WALKER, JR., GUIDO CALABRESI, PETER W. HALL, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 648
Pages: 78–80

Head Matter:
Ambar Margarita ZELAYA DE CERON, Josue Neftali Ceron-Herrara, Josue Gilberto Ceron-Zelaya, Petitioners, v. Loretta E. LYNCH, United States Attorney General, Respondent.
No. 13-3208-ag.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
May 4, 2016.
Heather Yvonne Axford, Esq., Central American Legal Assistance, Brooklyn, NY, for Petitioners.
Paul Fiorino, Senior Litigation Counsel; Derek C. Julius, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington D.C., for Respondent.
Present: JOHN M. WALKER, JR., GUIDO CALABRESI, PETER W. HALL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
SUMMARY ORDER
Ambar Margarita Zelaya de Ceron, Josue Neftali Ceron-Herrara, and Josue Gilberto Ceron-Zelaya, natives and citizens of El Salvador, seek review of an August 7, 2013, decision of the BIA affirming an Immigration Judge's ("U") July 9, 2012, denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture ("CAT"). In re Ambar Margarita Zelaya-De Ceron, et al., Nos. [ AXXX XXX XXX ]/321/323 (B.I.A Aug. 7, 2013), aff'g Nos. [ AXXX XXX XXX ]/321/323 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Jul. 9, 2012). We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of this case.
Under the circumstances of this casé, we have reviewed the IJ's decision as modified by the BIA decision, ie. minus the IJ's particular social group determination. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir.2005). The applicable standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir.2009).
The sole issue on appeal is whether substantial evidence supports the agency's determination that the Petitioners failed to show that the Salvadoran government is unable or unwilling to control gang violence, specifically at the hands of the Mara Salvatrucha ("MS gang"). See Rizal v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 84, 92 (2d Cir.2006) (noting that "persecution can certainly be found when the government, although not itself conducting the persecution, is unable or unwilling to control it").
The agency cited two newspaper articles in support of its determination that the Salvadoran police were able to control the MS gang. The articles showed that police hoped to view surveillance videos that might reveal the identities of the men who murdered a local business owner and that police invited the public to report crimes. The Petitioners argue that the agency cherry picked these statements from the articles, ignoring other evidence in the record showing that the police had little control. We agree. One of the cited articles does not discuss the MS gang — or any gang, for that matter — and police review of surveillance videos does not equate to a police force that is able to control gang violence. The same article quotes business owners, stating that authorities provided "little security" and that they lacked trust in the police and planned to implement their own security measures. Certified Administrative Record ("CAR") at 274. The second article surmises that a murder was gang-related and concludes with a statement from a police officer inviting the public to report crimes. These articles are insufficient to establish that the police are able to effectively control gang violence. This is especially true in the face of Zelaya de Ceron's credible testimony and the country conditions reports in the record.
We find it troubling that the agency decisions do not cite to the country conditions reports considering the reports support Petitioners' claim that the Salvadoran police are unable to control gangs. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir.2005). For example, a 2007 report by the Strategic Studies Institute states that: "there were not enough properly trained [police] personnel . to manage the gang problem," and, although "the Salvadoran government has not raised the level of the gang threat to the level of a threat to national security . [,] from time to time since 2005, Army troops have been deployed to help the police patrol the streets." CAR at 302-03. The report goes on to state that gangs "control larger and larger parts of 'turf within the El Salvadoran national territory and effectively exercise their own sovereignty over the people in it." Id. at 303. Likewise, the State Department's 2010 Country Report on Human Rights Practices for El Salvador, states: "Inadequate training, insufficient government funding, lack of a uniform code of evidence, and isolated instances of corruption and outright criminality interfered with the PNC's effectiveness." Id. at 345. These reports undermine the agency's finding that the Salvadoran police can control gang violence.
Nor is the fact that Zelaya de Cerón could make a report to police sufficient to support the agency's finding. In denying relief, the agency relied on the fact that Zelaya de Ceron's aunt complained to police about the MS gang's threat to her son. The record reflects, however, that the police advised Zelaya de Ceron's aunt to move and change her telephone number because gang cases were difficult to solve and they received a large quantity of gang-related complaints. The police then lost the report. This evidence does nothing to support the agency's conclusion that police are able and willing to respond to gang violence.
The record as a whole does not support the agency's conclusion that the Salvadoran police are able and willing to control the MS gang. The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision only on this basis, without addressing the IJ's alternative finding that the Petitioners did not show that any fear was linked to a protected ground. Because the BIA did not address whether there was a cognizable social group, we remand for further proceedings.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is GRANTED and the case is REMANDED to the BIA for further proceedings consistent with this order. The pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot.