Case Name: Pleasants v. Pleasants
Court: Court of Appeals of Virginia
Jurisdiction: Virginia
Decision Date: 1800-04
Citations: 2 Call 319
Docket Number: 
Parties: Pleasants v. Pleasants.
Judges: 
Reporter: Virginia Reports
Volume: 6
Pages: 329–341

Head Matter:
Pleasants v. Pleasants.
[April Term, 1800.]
Perpetuities and Executory Limitations. — The doctrine of perpetuities and executory limitations considered.
This was an appeal from a decree of the High Court of Chancery in a suit brought by Robert Pleasants son and heir of John Pleasants deceased against Charles Logan, Samuel Pleasants junior Isaac Pleasants and Jane his wife, Thomas Pleasants junior and Margaret his wife, Elizabeth Pleas-ants, Robert Langley and Elizabeth his wife, Margaret Langley, Elisabeth Langley the younger, and Anne May. The bill states, that the said John Pleasants by his last will devised as follows, “my further desire is, respecting my poor slaves, all of them as I shall die possessed with shall be free if they chuse it when they arrive to the age of thirty years, and the laws of the land will admit them to be set free without their being transported out of the country. I say all my slaves now born or hereafter to be born, whilst their mothers are in the service of me or my heirs, to be free at the age of thirty years as above mentioned, to •be adjudged of by my trustees their age.” That the said John Pleasants in a subsequent part of his will devised to the plaintiff eight of the said slaves upon the same condition, that he should allow them to be free if the laws of the land would admit of it. That the testator then devised to his grandson Samuel Pleasants *one-third part of his slaves not otherwise disposed of, on the same conditions on which he devised the said eight slaves to the plaintiff. That the testator devised to his daughters Elizabeth Langley the use of all the slaves conveyed to him bj* Robert Langley and also the slaves sold by the said Robert Langley to John Hunt or Samuel Gordon during the term of her natural life, and after her death to her children upon the same limitations and conditions relative to their freedom, as are mentioned in-the other bequests. That the said testator then devised to his son Jonathan Pleasants, when he should attain the age of 21, one third part of all the slaves not otherwise disposed of by that will including his mothers jointure negroes and those given to her by her father to be reckoned as part of the share or third part of the said Jonathan Pleasants in the share of the said slaves. That the testator devised to his grand daughter Jane Pleasants a negro girl named Jenny upon condition, in addition to the general condition first mentioned respecting the freedom of the said slaves, that she the said Jane as .one of the children of her deceased father John Pleasants should release all claim to any dividend in a copartnership mentioned in the said will. That he devised four slaves to his daughter Mary Pleasants; to his grand daughter a negro woman named Pender and her children; and to Elizabeth Pleasants wife of Joseph Pleasants a mulatto woman named Tabb and her child Syphax. That the said testator then devised as follows. ‘ ‘Item I give and bequeath unto my son Thomas Pleas-ants the. remaining third part of my ne-groes, before directed to be equally divided between my grandson. Samuel Pleasants and son Jonathan, with the same proviso and limitations respecting their freedom as is before mentioned and intended towards the whole by this will given or devised.” That the several devisees became possessed under the will' aforesaid, and the said Jonathan Pleasants in the year 1V77 by his last will, made *the following devise “And first believing that all mankind have an undoubted right to freedom and commis-serating the situation of the negroes which by law I am invested with the property of, and being willing and desirous that they may in a good degree partake of and enjoy that inestimable blessing, do order and direct, as the most likely means to fit them for freedom, that they be instructed to read, at least the young ones as they come of suitable age, and that each individual of them that now are or may hereafter arrive to the age of thirty years may enjoy the full benefit of their labour in a manner the most likely to answer the intention of relieving from bondage. And whenever the laws of the country will admit absolute freedom to them, it is my will and desire that all the slaves lam now possessed of, together with their increase, shall immediately on their coming to the age of thirty years as aforesaid become free, or at least such as will accept thereof, or that my trustees hereafter to be named, or a majority or the successors of them may think so fitted for freedom, as that the enjoyment thereof will conduce to their happiness, which I desire they may enjoy in as,full and ample a manner as if they had never been in bondage, and on these express conditions and no other I do make the following bequests of them.” That the testator then proceeds to dispose of his slaves among the following persons to wit, Mary Pleasants, Anne Langley, Elizabeth Langley, Mary Langley, Jane Pleasants, David Woodson, Anne Woodson, Joseph Pleasants, Samuel Pleasants and the plaintiff; again expressing in almost every particular devise the same positive condition in favor of their freedom. That the said Anne Langley hath intermarried with May, Margaret Langley with Teasdale, Anne Woodson with Pope, and Mary Pleasants with Logan. That the plaintiff is heir at law and executor of the said John Pleasants ^deceased, as well as executor of the said Jonathan Pleasants, and in those characters in the year 17 applied to the Legislature for the manumission of the said slaves; but the Legislature were of opinion that it belonged to the judiciary. That the plaintiff hath been much embarrassed as to the mode of bringing the question before the Courts, as the slaves could not sue at common law, 1. On account of their not being capable of being manumitted, but upon the terms mentioned in the act of Assembly. 2. As they claimed their freedom in the nature of a legacy. That the devises to the defendants were only on condition that they would emancipate them when they arrived at a certain age and the laws would permit it. Of course that they have no title to them, but either the plaintiff is entitled, for a breach of the condition, or as executor, on whom the legal estate vested to perform the will. That there are no debts due from the said John and Jonathan Pleasants now unsatisfied. That the plaintiff hath applied to the defendants to emancipate the said slaves, but they refuse. Therefore the bill prays that the slaves may be delivered up to the plaintiff to be holden in trust for the purposes of the wills of the said John and Jonathan Pleasants’; that the Court would direct the manner of their manumission; and for general relief.
The defendant Mary Logan demurred to the jurisdiction ; and by answer says that her late husband died indebted to several persons.
Isaac Pleasants also demurred to the jurisdiction ; and by answer says that the increase of the slaves devised to the said Jane are under thirty years of age.
Samuel Pleasants likewise demurred for want of jurisdiction ; and by way of answer states, that some of those in his possession are under 30 j’ears of age.
^Elizabeth Pleasants, says that Tabb and her increase were given to the defendant by the said John Pleasants in his lifetime as bj his letter will appear. And that the will of John Pleasants doth not operate to give freedom to the other slaves.
The defendant Teasdale denies his responsibility to the plaintiff, either as heir or executor. By amended answer he says, that T. Atkinson has by virtue of a mortgage recovered part of those held by the defendant, and the defendant hath since paid him a valuable consideration for them.
A suit was afterwards brought by Ned one of the slaves in forma pauperis against Elizabeth Pleasants widow of Joseph Pleas-ants, setting forth the clauses of the will of Jonathan Pleasants, stating the act of Assembly authorizing the manumission of slaves, and that the plaintiff is now upwards of 30 years of age; and hath so de meaned himself as to shew that freedom would be conducive to his happiness. The bill therefore prays the court to decree the defendant to release him from slavery.
The Court of Chancery overruled the demurrers, and declared itself of opinion, that, in equity, of the slaves, on whose behalf the suit was instituted, they who were thirty years old or older in the year 1782, when the act authorizing manumission was enacted, were, at that time, entitled. They, who, born before the testators death, were not 30 years old at the time of the decree, would, when they should attain the same age, be entitled to freedom, and that they who had been born since the statute was enacted, were at their birth entitled to freedom: That the plaintiff Robert Pleasants heir and executor as aforesaid, was the proper party to vindicate that freedom. It therefore referred it to a commissioner to ascertain their ages, and to take an account of their profits since their respective rights to freedom accrued. Prom which decree the defendants appealed to this court.
*Wickham for the appellants.
If the plaintiffs were entitled to their freedom it was either by the common law, or by statute; and either way they could have asserted it at common law. Consequently their remedy was at common law, and they ought not to have resorted to the Court of Chancery.
It will be said that the legatees are trustees ; and therefore that the Court of Equity had jurisdiction upon the ground of a trust. But the history of uses, which were invented to avoid the statutes of mortmain, shews that a Court of Equity only exercises jurisdiction, where the beneficial interest is in one person, and the legal in another. Now it cannot be said that the legatees have the legal estate, and that the beneficial interest, that is the labour of the slaves, is in the slaves themselves. Of course it is not a case which consists with the nature and foundation of trusts.
Perhaps it will be said, that several may join in one suit here; and that, that circumstance will give the jurisdiction. But that will not alter the case ; because several may sue at law also. Coleman v. Dick and Pat, 1 Wash. 233. Therefore the Court of Chancery ought not to have sustained its jurisdiction, but the decree is erroneous, upon that ground.
Then as to the right of the plaintiffs to have their freedom. It may be proper to premise, that, although it may be true that liberty is to be favored, the rights of property are as sacred as those of liberty; and therefore, that this cause should be decided on the same principles of law, that other causes are.
Emancipation of slaves was prohibited by the act of Assembly in 1748, p. 262, edit. 1769: Which act was in force at the time of making this will; and therefore the condition, annexed to the bequests, is void.
*There is a distinction in law, which is well known, between conditions precedent and subsequent. The first must be performed, before any estate at all vests ; but it is otherwise as to the latter, because then the condition must happen to destroy the estate which has already vested. In our case the condition was precedent, and it remains to consider, whether the title, depending on it, could ever take effect?
This condition was contrary to the nature of the estate, for it tended to bar the alienation of the property, and therefore was void. Shep. touch. 129; 1 Co. 83; 1 Inst. 223. During all the period, between the death of the testator and the happening of the contingency, it was wholly uncertain, whether the law would pass, or not; and consequently the condition operated as a bar of alienation, for that time; which the authorities declare will render it void. For it is, in effect, but a devise of the slaves in absolute property', with a condition, that the devisee shall not alien. In Co. Bitt. -224, it is said, that a privilege, inseparable from the estate, cannot be restrained ; and the right of alienation is á privilege inseparable from the right of property.
But the condition is void, upon another ground; namely, that it was illegal and contrary to the act of Assembly; which having forbid emancipation, every attempt to effect it, was repugnant to the act, and. therefore void.
If it be said that the act only respected absolute and not conditional emancipations, the answer is, that the latter is comprehended in the former, for every lesser is contained in the greater. So that this was an attempt at emancipation, which was void on account of its repugnancy to the law.
Perhaps it will be said, that the law permitted manumission at the time, when the emancipation took effect in point of operation, although there was no such law at the death of the testator; and ^therefore that the case is out of the meaning of the act of 1748. But this is not so; for there is no limitation, for the happening of the event; and the question is not, whether subsequent events can make it lawful? but whether the devise was good upon the face of the will? for posterior events could not make it good, if it were not so at its creation; that is, at the death of the testator. This is evinced in the common cases of remainders of personal estate, where the events may actually take place, within the limits allowed "by ‘law, but the remainders will, nevertheless, be void, because too remote in their creation. This principle was adhered to, by the Court in the case of Carter v. Tyler; in which it was clearly held, that posterior events would not alter the construction from what it ought to have been, at the death of the testator.
Thus then it appears, that during all the period between the death of the testator and the passing of the act of Assembly, the legatees had property, to which there was a repugnant and illegal condition annexed ; which was consequently fruitless and void.
By the act of Assembly in 1782 for emancipation of slaves, there is nothing which either . manumits the plaintiffs in terms or obliges the legatees to do it; for the act has certain prescribed terms, and the present case is not within any of them: But the plaintiffs must shew, that they are within the requisites of the act; and this they cannot do.
It is a rule that all acts upon the same subject shall be construed as one act; because the whole are onl3r parts of the same system. Therefore ' this act of Assembly and that of 1748, are to be taken as one law. It will then be correct to saj- in the language of 1748, that it is generally true, that there shall be no emancipation; but that there may be certain specified emancipations, according to the *act of 1782. So that the provisions of the act of 1748 will still be the general principle; and those of the act of 1782 will only operate as exceptions out of that of 1748. Therefore any case which is not strictly within the terms of the act of 1782 will come within the operation of that of 1748. Thus if a man were to attempt to emancipate his slave by parol, this, not being within the terms of the act of 1782, would be void by that of 1748.
Besides the act of 1782 is prospective, and not retrospective. It was not intended to embrace any prior cases.
Again the act is permissive, and not compulsory. So that the proprietor may do it or not, as he pleases; for there is no obligation upon him; and therefore the legatees may refuse.
But the act of Assembly imposes certain conditions upon the owner who emancipates, such as the maintenance of- the young and aged slaves. Now this the proprietor may do or not, as he pleases, and no person can complain if he will not. But the construction made by the Court of Chancery, upon this will, would go to compel the legatees to give this security; for it cannot be dispensed with, if they are emancipated; or else the helpless and aged Will be thrown as a burthen upon the public, contrary to the intention and express provisions of the act of Assembly.
The court cannot compel the administrators to emancipate. No person but the proprietor can do it by law, and, for the reasons already given, the court cannot force him to do it.
The decree of the Court of Chancery, does not follow the testators intention. He intended to erect the slaves into a distinct kind of property; that is to say, they were to be slaves till 30, and free men after-wards : but this idea is not pursued by the decree, which has not only changed the law, but the will too. For a mother having children *before thirty, those children wilt be subject to the term of slavery too. The word hereafter takes in all future generations.
As the decree of the Court of Chancery is clearly wrong, how will the court mould another? Must it be, that the plaintiffs and their progeny to all generations shall, in succession, be entitled to freedom at thirty? This would be to allow the testator to create a new species of property,' subject to rules unknown to the law. But this is what no man can do.
• The whole amount therefore is, that the testator has wished to do, what the law will not permit him to do; and, consequently, the attempt is void.
Upon principles of convenience, the construction of the plaintiffs ought not to prevail. For sup'pose Bogan had contracted debts, between the death of the testator and the- passing of the law, ought the creditors, who had trusted him on a fair presumption that no law of emancipation would pass, to lose their debts?
■ The will of Jonathan Pleasants ought to receive the same construction.
With respect to the account of profits, who are to repay the expenses,of those that were chargeable? It could scarcely have been intended by the testator, that this burthen . should be borne by the legatees.
But the general idea of the country and the practice in the courts of law are opposed to such a demand; and therefore damages are never given, in actions of this kind, by the juries who decide them.
Randolph on the same side.
By the act of 1727 § 3, slaves can only be conveyed as chattels; and as such a limitation of a chattel would be too remote and therefore void, it follows that this is so ^likewise. The act of 1748, instead of curtailing, rather extended the power of emancipation. For prior to that law a man could not manumit his slave.
Warden for the appellee.
This was the case of a trust which gave the Court of Chancery jurisdiction. The nature or kind of the trust does not make any difference, in this respect. Saund. trusts, 14, 18.
This was a trust to perform a certain act, when the trustee should be enabled to do it: Which trust was not inconsistent with law; and the act of 1782, having enabled the legatees to do it, their conscience is affected, and, consequently, they are bound to perform it.
The application to the Court of Chancery, therefore, in order to compel an observance of this equitable obligation, was proper.
' The act of 1748 has not the effect, which is contended for, by the other side. It does not ipso facto make void the deed of emancipation. On the contrary, the right of the proprietor is extinguished thereby; although, the freedom of the slaves is liable to determine by the officers of Government exercising the powers given by the act of Assembly, and selling the slave. Which not having been done in this case, and the act of ’48 being now repealed, it follows that the devise, which, at first, was effectual to pass the testators right, continues to be effectual.
The decree pursues the intention of the testator; which was, that all above thirty should have their freedom.
The plaintiffs have a right to the profits of their labour. The decree, therefore, as to this point, is right; especially, as it only directs the commissioner to enquire which of'them are entitled to their freedom, and to profits: This, in effect, *is no more, than instituting an en-quiry, which of them came up to the cases contemplated by the testator.
The notion of the perpetuity, contended for by Mr. Wickham, is without foundation. Because, from a fair construction of the devise, the contingency was confined to a reasonable period.
Marshall on the same side.
As to the point of jurisdiction, there can be no question, but that the ordinary principles, founded on the general doctrines of trusts apply; and the rather, perhaps, because, being a suit for freedom, the forms of proceeding will not be so strictly adhered to, as in other cases. This was decided in the case of Coleman v. Dick & Pat, cited by Mr. Wickham. But it was clearly a trust; and therefore upon that ground, the Court of Chancery properly sustained its jurisdiction. Besides the difficulty of deciding the nature of the case, as whether freedom was actually given, so as that there might be a common law remedy? Or, whether it was not rather in the nature of a contract to be enforced in equity upon the happening of the events? Whether the property was in the heir or administrator? and which of them should perform the act? All these circumstances rendered the resort to the Court of Chancery proper.
As to the question upon the right to freedom, The right of the testator clearly passed by the will. That was irrevocable; although the slaves would not have enjoyed their freedom, had the officers of government chosen to exert their powers, and sold them as the act directed. But as the act of 1748 was repealed, without this being done, on the part of the officers of government, if they had the power in this case, the right of the paupers to their libertj' continues,
The question then is, whether the condition shall be performed?
*If not, it must be, either, because it is against law, or because it is an attempt to create a perpetuity.
As to the first there is nothing malum in se, in it; and therefore, it is not void upon any principle of morality: Neither is it void, upon the ground of the statutory prohibition. Before the act of 1748, every person, who pleased might have emancipated his slave; and that statute does not say, that the testator may not give his slave liberty, when the law shall permit. The old rule of devises to a child in ventre sa mere is, in principle, not unlike this case. For, according to that rule, an exec-utory devise to such a child by words de prsesenti was void; but it was otherwise, where the devise was future. So here an immediate emancipation was liable to be defeated by the ■ statute, but a future one, like this, was not.
The great question therefore is, as to the perpetuitj'; Now a perpetuity is a condition which may run forever, or to an unreasonable time. But this does not. For th'e will relates to several subjects; and therefore may be construed severally.
For instance as to those born, the devise is to be confined to a life in being; and for this purpose it may be taken distributively: So as to make the contingency with regard to them, fall within a life in being, or a reasonable period afterwards. Thus where a mother was born at the death of the testator, the most remote limitation would be a life in being, and thirty years afterwards. Which is a period not denied by , any book. For the authorities are all affirmatively, that it may depend on a life in being and twenty one years áfterwards; and not negatively, that it shall not depend on a longer time than a life in being, and twenty one years afterwards. Therefore, as to the mothers born at the testators death, the bequest is good, upon the soundest principles of law.
The mothers born after the testators death may perhaps form a class of different cases; but that *very circumstance shews, that the account directed by the Court was proper.
The act of 1782 operated a clear repeal of that of 1748; and therefore the only impediment, which could be supposed to exist, is removed.
If justice requires it, the Court may compel the Administrators to emancipate; and the legatees, by taking the legacy, bound themselves to perform the trust. Of course they may be compelled io a specific performance of it. For if the testator was himself in that situation, he would be decreed to perform; and in principle, there is no difference.
With respect to the argument of inconvenience, from Logans having contracted debts, if that were the case, the plain answer would be, that the creditors having trusted a contingent estate, must be subject to the contingency.
Randolph in reply.
Upon the question of jurisdiction; this was a plain legal question, and if the plaintiff had any right they might have asserted it at law. The nature of the subject did not alter the case; nor did the qualities of the parties as combining the rights of the heir and trustee. In a case concerning lands such an argument would not prevail. You cannot in equity join different rights in one suit; and if you do, it is cause of demurrer. The paupers might all have united in one suit at law. Besides numbers alone cannot give jurisdiction to the Court of Chancery. If it be said, that, being a legacy, it was properly sued for in equity, the answer is, that the executor has assented, and, consequently, that the remedy at law was sustainable. It follows therefore that the Court of Chancery had not jurisdiction.
The law of 1727 declares, that slaves shall pass as chattels; and it is most clear, that such a limitation of a mere chattel would be void, as tending to a perpetuity.
*It is said that the act of 1748 only prohibits immediate, and not future emancipations; but this is not correct; and, before that act, it was not lawful to emancipate.
That statute was an existing prohibition, at the time of making this will; and, if a chattel had been devised upon such condition, that such a law should pass, the bequest would have been void. For it would have been a condition contrary to law, and therefore void. 2 Black. Com. 160.
Executory devises must take effect within a limited time or not at all. Thirty years is too long, and never has been allowed. If it were, you might go on to any extent. The period of a life, or lives, in being, and twenty one years afterwards, is the fixed rule; insomuch that it has now become a canon of property; and to alter it, would be to shake' titles, and unsettle property.
In the present case, the devise is not to take effect within that period, and therefore the limitation is too remote. A law was first to pass; and when that should be, was wholly uncertain. The posterior event did not alter the nature of the case in its origin ; it must be decided, by the will, at the testators death; at which time it would have been determined to be void, on account of the remoteness of the contingency.
Upon the whole, the devise is contrary to the policy of the law, as tending to create a perpetuity, and annexing conditions contrary to the genius and spirit of the acts of Assembly. It is therefore void; and of course the decree is erroneous, upon the general ground.
But, at any rate, the account of profits is contrary to practice, and the equity of this case in particular ; because the defence was reasonable, and' therefore the defendants justifiable in making it.
Cur. adv. vult.
Executory Limitation — Dying without issue. — In Higgenbotham v. Rucker, 2 Call 316, the opinion in the principal case is adopted as authority tor the following proposition, a limitation to a person in esse for life, after dying without issue is good, becanse the contingency must happen, if at all, in the lifetime of the remainderman; and the limitation to him for life restrains the generality of the words “dying without issue.” It is otherwise if the limitation is to him in fee or in tail; in that case there will he no such restriction and the limitation over will be void. See also, citing the principal case, for this proposition, Royall v. Eppes, 2 Munf. 491; Wilkins v. Taylor, 5 Call 156, where it is said a limitation over in remainder to A. after the death of B. without issue, is void, as being too remote.
SSaves — Future Emancipation — Validity.—In the principal case a testator devised certain slaves on condition that the legatees should manumit them whenever the laws would permit manumission, and it was held that the legatees took an estate in the slaves liable to he defeated by such contingency. Upon this question of the future emancipation of slaves the principal case is cited and approved in Manns v. Givens, 7 Leigh 715; Wood v. Humphreys, 12 Gratt. 341, 342, 345, 347, 351, 355, 360, 361; Osborne v. Taylor, 12 Gratt. 132; Charles v. Hunnicutt, 5 Call 317, 318, 327, 328, 330, which case holds that a devise by a Quaker, in 1781, of his slaves to the monthly meeting, of which he was a member, to be manumitted by such persons as they should appoint, was a good devise.
In the second headnote of Moses v. Denigree, 6 Rand. 560, it is said, the devise in Pleasants v. Pleas-ants, was supported, because the testator did not attempt to vest a right to freedom in violation of law, but directed that his slaves should have their freedom, whenever the laws would permit it, and created a trust to support it: and that case has carried the doctrine far enough. But. where either a deed or will, made before May, 1782, emancipates a slave absolutely a.nd without condition, although the freedom is to take effect at a future time, it is unlawful, and therefore void.
Same — Same—Increase.—The question as to whether the increase of slaves who are manumitted infutwro are also entitled to their freedom, seems to depend upon the intention of the testator. See, citing the principal case, Maria v. Surbaugh, 2 Rand. 232, 244, 246; Osborne v. Taylor, 32 Gratt 128 (see note); Hunter v. Humphreys, 14 Gratt. 297; foot-note to Binford v. Robin, 1 Gratt. 327.
Same — Suit for Freedom. — Negroes recovering freedom by suit in forma pauperis, cannot, in any case recover profits or damages. Paup v. Mingo, 4 Leigh 163, citing the principal case at pp. 176, 184. See also, citing the principal case, Osborne v. Taylor, 12 Gratt. 130; foot-note to Peter v. Hargrave, 5 Gratt. 32.
Seme — Emancipation—Election by Slave. — See the principal case cited in Bailey v. Poindexter, 14 Gratt. 393, 394; dissenting opinion of MoNOUíib, J.,in the same case, pp. 204,208 (szq foot-note); Williamson v. Coalter, 14 Gratt. 404. See principal case cited in Gregory v. Baugh, 2 Leigh 691.
1 Call's Reports p. 165.

Opinion:
*ROANE, Judge.
This is a bill brought, by R. Pleasants the heir and executor of John Pleasants deceased, claiming title on behalf of the negroes, who were the property of the said Pleasants, at the time of his death, and their descendants.
This claim is founded upon the will of the said John Pleasants, dated the 11th of August 1771; and which has this general clause, "My further desire is respecting my poor slaves all of them as I shall die possessed with, shall be free, if they chuse it, when thejT arrive to 30 years of age, and the laws of the land will admit them to be free, without their being transported out of the country, I say all my slaves now born, or hereafter to be born, whilst their mothers are in the service of me or my heirs, to be free at the age of 30 years, as above mentioned, to be adjudged of, by my trustees, their age."
He then gives his son Robert the plaintiff eight negroes "On condition he allows them to be free at the age of 30 years, if the laws of the land will admit of it." And, then, devises the residue of the slaves to various persons, under conditions similar to that last mentioned, in the devise to his son Robert.
The will of Jonathan Pleasants (who was a legatee under the will of, John Pleasants of one third of his negroes on the same condition) dated the Sth of May 1776 has a general clause respecting the freedom of his negroes, as also particular conditions annexed to each bequest, in substance similar to those, before stated, to be contained in the will of John.
As, however, it does not appear, as well as I recollect, that Jonathan Pleasants had any slaves, other than those derived from his father, as aforesaid, and entitled to the benefit of his will, the will of Jonathan may be thrown out of the present case. But, if it were otherwise, I do not think it would make any material alteration in *any estate, or in the decision, which I think ought now to be given.
After a demurrer by' some of the defendants, for that the bill contained no matter of equity, but that the matter of it was proper for the cognizance of a court of law, and answers (which it is not now necessary to specify particularly,) the Chancellor, on a hearing, overruled the demurrer, and decreed in favour of the plaintiffs; directing an account, also, to be taken of their profits. It is here to be remarked, that the cause with respect to the answers, does not appear, to have been matured and regularly set for hearing; but as all parties were willing to try it, upon the general question, which most probably did not, at all, depend upon the particular answers, and more especially, one which, involving liberty did not admit of delay, and cannot be drawn into precedent, as applicable, on the point, to other cases, the decision given in that case, as upon the general question, was not premature; and the decision, under the restrictions now contemplated as to subordinate questions, can produce no injury to any of the parties.
In considering the general question, growing out of the will of Robert Pleasants as before stated, I will first consider slaves as a species of property recognized and guaranteed by the laws of this country, and to be considered, with respect to a limitation over (by the act of 1727,) on the same footing with other chattels.
I will also consider, in the first place, the claim of the appellees to their freedom, only, as that of ordinary remainder-men, claiming property in them, and endeavour to test it by the rules of the common law, relative to ordinary cases of limitations of personal chattels. And if their claim will be sustained on this foundation, and by analogy to ordinary remainders of chattels, every argument will hold, with increased force, when "the case is considered in its true point of view, as one, which involves human liberty.
The doctrines of the common law, relative to perpetuities as to estates of inheritance, hold a fortiori as to terms for years and personal chattels. If it be contrary to the policy of that law, to render unalienable, for a long space of time, real estates of inheritance, on reasons of public inconvenience and injury to trade and commerce, these reasons apply, with much more force, as to interests of short duration in lands and personal chattels; not only, because the latter are better adapted to the purposes of trade than the former, but also, because of their transitory and perishable nature.
This observation goes to fortify what is so fully established by the books, as to render citation unnecessary; namely, that the policy and reason of the law leans, at least, as strong against perpetuities in personal as in real estates.
The utmost limits allowed by law for the vesting of an executory devise (or as Fearne has it, as applicable to personal chattels, on executory bequest,) is the term of a life or lives, in being, and twenty one years after. This limitation, then, has become a fixed canon of property, and ought not to be lightly departed from. And the true distinction is, where the event must happen, if at all, within those limits, the executory devise is good; and on the happening of the contingency, the estate will become absolute, in the remaiderman.
Thus a limitation to one, in esse, in fee or in tail, after a dying without issue, is not good, because the contingency, the dying without issue, is too remote. But such a limitation to one, in esse, for life is good; because the contingency must happen, if at all, so as to vest the estate, within a life in being, viz. that of the remainderman; that is to say, the limitation in remainder for life restrains the previous disposition, in the 'same manner, as if it had been expressly limited to the re-mainderman, on the event of d37ing without issue, in his life time.
This case seems directly parallel, with the case before us, the happening of the contingency here; i. e. the passing a law to authorize emancipation, standing simply, is too remote, as it may not happen, within 1000 years: But when the testator goes on further, and means the benefit of it to persons in esse (for they are the objects of his bounty, and unless it happened within their lives, it might as well, as to them not happen, at all,) this restrains the happening of the contingency, as in the case before put; and makes the executory devise good, at least as to all, who are within the legal limits.
Nay, the doctrine is carried so far, as to terms for years and personal estates (for it is otherwise, with regard to estates of inheritance, in favor of the heir,) that Courts are inclined to lay hold of any words, in the will, to restrain the general words, "leaving issue," to mean leaving issue at his death; and thus to support the remainder. As, in the case of Keely v. Fowler, Fearne rem. 370, where those words were so restrained, in a case, where the estate was to return back to the executors in the event of dying without leaving issue and to be distributed by them, and ¿£50. were given them for their personal trouble. Here the words were so restrained, in order to reconcile the limitation to the devisee, with the nature of the trust reposed in the executors, and to be executed by themselves, in their lives.
The construction, in this case, must be, as it would have been, at the instant of the testators death, Doe v. Fonnercau, Cowp. 477. And (the event put out of the question, at present, and leaving, for an after consideration, the circumstances of the contingency having actually happened, and its effects upon the case,) as upon the will itself, *the estate, limited on the contingency (if I may so express it,) that is to say, the right to freedom, was good, if the contingency happened within the legal limits, in favour of such, as might be in esse to enjoy it, and void, if it happened beyond those limits.
This brings us to the consideration, whether the limitation can be sustained, as on the construction of the will itself, as to such as might be in esse during such limits; although it may be void, as to such as might be born, in a remote generation?
And I have no doubt but it may.
I have no doubt but that the limitation, as upon the will itself, may be construed distributively; so as to be efficacious, as to some of the plaintiffs, although it might be void as to future claimants; that is to say, such as claim beyond the legal limits, in the event of the contingency's happening sooner or later, as the case may be. In the case of Forth v. Chapman, 1 Wms. 663, there was a limitation of freehold and leasehold lands in the same manner, to wit, "If the first devisee die, without issue. ' These last words, die without issue, were construed, under the distinction before taken, to be tied up to mean issue living at the death as to the leasehold land, and consequently the limitation was held good; but, as to the freehold lands, they were not considered as being so restrained, and they received the same construction, by the Ld. Chancellor as if they had been twice repeated.
To come now to the case, before us, as it really is. The contingency has happened, within the limits. The effect is, that the limitation over has thenceforth become vested, in interest, in all the appellees, then in esse; and vested in possession, as to all, then, or as they might become, thirty years of age. As to all the slaves, then, in esse, but under thirty years of age, their right to freedom was complete, but they were postponed *as to the time of enjoyment. They were in the case of persons bound to service for a term of years; who have a general right to freedom, but there is an .exception, out of it, by contract or otherwise.
What then, after the passing of the act, is the condition of the children born of mothers, so postponed in the enjoyment of their freedom? Are they, at their birth, entitled to freedom? Or are they too, to be postponed, until the age of thirty? The condition of the mothers of such children is, that of free persons, held to service, for a term of years, such children are not the children of slaves. They never were the property of the testator or legatees, and he, or they, can no more restrain their right to freedom, than they can that of other persons born free. The power of the testator, in this respect, has yielded to the great principle of natural law, which, is also a principle of our municipal law, that the children of a free mother are themselves also free. The conditions of the will then, as applicable to such children, if indeed it was intended, or can be construed to apply to them, is void, as being contrary to law; it being an attempt to detain in slavery, persons that are born free. Considering the mothers of such children, by analogy to others persons held to service, it will be found, that a particular law was here necessary ; the power of the Legislature, alone, was competent to subject the children of mulatto mothers, held to service till the age of thirty one, to serve till the ages, respectively, of twenty one and eighteen. But this case goes further, and, is an attempt, by an individual to hold to service, till the age of thirty, persons, who, following the condition of their mothers, are born free.
The view of the subject I have now taken, (which will sustain the claim of the plaintiff, by referring to the ordinary doctrine of limitations of personal chattels) will supersede the necessity of a very delicate and important enquiry: Namely, *whether the doctrine of perpetuities is applicable to cases in which human liberty is challenged?
It is clear, that the restraints, rightly imposed on the alienation of inheritances, to prevent perpetuities are founded principally, if not solely, on considerations of public policy ana convenience. That those restraints have gradually been extended to terms for years and chattel interests, and that the utmost tolerable limits in such cases, have not been settled till after much investigation, and a considerable lapse of time. It is also clear, that neither the particular species of property now in question, nor the case of a remainderman (if I may so express it) claiming his own liberty, were in the contemplation of the judges, who established the doctrine on this subject; which therefore may- not apply. But this is an extensive question, and if it were necessary tobe now decided (but it is not,) it would be proper to weigh the policy of authorizing or encouraging emancipation (a policy which has certainly received in many instances, and partly by the act of 1782, the countenance of the Legislature, at least from the jera of our independence, and must always be dear to every friend of liberty and the human race,) against those secondary considerations of public policy and convenience; which appear to have supported and established the doctrine of the law, on the subject of perpetuities, as relative to ordinary kinds ol property.
But it is said the act of 1782, authorizing emancipation, is prospective in its operation, and does not take in the present case. In answer to this, I am of opinion, that the acceptance of the negroes, in question on the condition stated in the will, created in inchoate contract to emancipate on the part of the devises; which, on the passing of the act, became essentially complete. That an emancipation ought, therefore, to have been made; that the devisees were, thereafter, trustees, *for the purpose of making such emancipation ; and that the plaintiffs are right, in coming into a Court of Equity, to enforce the fulfillment of that trust. And this is one answer to the objection on the score of jurisdiction.
It is said too, that as the will speaks of an unqualified emancipation, (without respect to bond and security, to prevent aged and infirm slaves from being chargeable to the public,) and as the act of 1782 has required that such security should be given, an act authorizing emancipation, in the sense contemplated by the will, has not yet passed; and therefore the condition imposed upon the legatees, is not obligatory.
In answer to this, I am of opinion, that the testator cannot reasonably be supposed, to have contemplated an act of emancipation, making no provision to prevent the persons liberated from being chargeable to the public. That therefore the act, as contemplated, has substantially taken place; and, that a Court of Equity may carry the contract into execution, if in no other manner, at least by throwing the burthen of the indemnity, required by the act of 1782, upon the slaves themselves, and making it a lien, upon the liberty granted them; and such an arrangement, it is evident would place- the holders, in the same, and no worse condition, than if an unqualified act in favor of emancipation had actually passed. The necessity of making such an arrangement, in this case, shews the propriety of applying to a Court of Equity; because no other Court has adequate power. Which is another answer to the want of jurisdiction.
In what manner the arrangement should be made, in this case, so as to comply with the act of 1782, requiring an indemnification against aged and infirm slaves, becoming chargeable to the public, is a subject, upon which, I.have had considerable difficulty. But I am fully persuaded, that the powers, of a Court of Equity, which regards *the substance of things more than forms, are competent thereto; and I now beg leave to refer to the project of a decree, which I shall take the liberty of stating, presently, as containing the result of my deliberations, on the subject.
Another ground, upon which, the jurisdiction of the Court of Equity is sustainable, in the present case, is, that it involves the rights of a great number of claimants. So that the joint suit prevents a great deal of litigation and expense; besides involving, in the same common fate, those who stand on one common title. Whereas if separate suits were brought, it might turn out, either upon general or special verdicts, that persons having the same rights, nay even children of the same mother, might one be adjudged to be free, and another a slave. An enormity, which the joint proceeding is wisely calculated to prevent.
With respect to the slaves claimed by Elizabeth Pleasants and by Teasdel, paramount to the will of J. Pleasants, my opinion, in the present case, does not extend to-them, so far, as, the title, thereto, is claimed paramount to that will; but such title ought' to be considered, as still open, if desired for discussion and decision.
With respect to the debts of the original testator, if any, the original slaves and their descendants are clearly liable. But whether they are liable to the debts of the devisees accepting them, or their right to freedom is lost by a bona fide sale, if any such has taken place, are questions which I also consider, as open for the decision of the Chancellor, if required. It would seem to me, however, as at present advised, that if the limitation was good, by the rules of law, the right thereby created would not-yield, either, to the claim of creditors or purchasers. But, on this point, I give no-decided opinion.
I have now gone through, or touched upon such points in the case, as appeared to me necessary *to be noticed. There is yet one part of the Chancellor's decree, which I could have wished had not been made. I mean the reference to a commissioner to ascertain the. profits of the slaves. We have no precedents, either of the Courts of England, or this country, to guide us. In the former country, indeed, no such case could occur; because slavery is not there tolerated; and, in this country, I believe, no instance can be produced of profits being adjudged to a person held in slavery, on recovering his liberty. Among a thousand cases of palpable violations of freedom, no jury has been found to award, and no court has yet sanctioned a recovery of the profits of labour, during the time of detention. Yet it must be admitted, that juries are often excellent Chancellors. But this is not a palpable violation of freedom. To say the least, i-t is a very nice question, whether these plaintiffs be entitled to freedom or not? And ought the court, in such a doubtful case, to award that, which the whole equity of the country, flowing through a thousand channels, has not yet awarded, in a single instance? It seems to be a solecism, to award ordinary profits to recompence the privation of liberty ; which, if it is to be recompenced, the power of money cannot accomplish.
But what, with me, is decisive on this point, is this, that as, in my opinion, all the children born of the female negroes, in question, since the passage of the act of 1782, are, and were thenceforth entitled to freedom bjr birth, the burthen of rearing such persons, during their infancy (which must be borne by the legatees,) will form perhaps not an unreasonable offset against the profits of those, who were capable of gaining profits by their labour.
I have thus endeavoured to make known the grounds upon which my opinion is founded. I entirely concur in the result of the Chancellor's decree, except-in the particulars, in which, I *have airead}1-stated my opinion to be different. As it is the policy of the country to authorize and permit emancipation, I rejoice to be an humble organ of the law in decreeing liberty to the numerous appellees now before the court. And this upon grounds, as I suppose, of strict legal right, and not upon such grounds, as, if sanctioned by the decision of this court, might agitate and convulse the Commonwealth to its centre.
The general outlines and substance of the decree, which I think should be made in this case, are as follows.
That whensoever, and as soon as the ap-pellee Robert Pleasants or any other responsible person or persons, shall under the direction of the High Court of Chancery enter into bond with sufficient securities in such Court or Courts under such' penalty or penalties, as the said High Court of Chancery shall direct, with condition to indemnify and save the public harmless, with respect to all such of the slaves in question as were in esse, at the time of the passage of the act of 1782, authorising emancipation, and shall be deemed to fall within the provisions of that act, relative to old age and infirmity, with an exception however, with respect to such indemnity, as to such of the said slaves as may be under the age of thirty and may be deemed infirm, for the period or periods of time it may respectively require them to accomplish the said age of thirty years, and during which they will remain, at the proper charge of the legatees or holders under the will or wills, in question. Or whensoever, and as soon as the Legislature of this Commonwealth shall, if it ever shall remit the indemnity above supposed, necessary to be given. And when, in addition in either case, it shall appear to the satisfaction of the said High Court of Chancery, either that there are no legal and subsisting debts of the said John Pleasants the testator, or that being so, a sufficient fund has *been raised, by the common labour, of thé said slaves to discharge the said debts, which in that event, saving the right of the legatees as aforesaid, the said Robert Pleasants or any other trustee to be appointed by the said court are authorised to do; and if it shall be found that the testator Jonathan Pleasants possessed, at his death, any slave or slaves other than those derived under the will of the said John and now in question, then a like provision to be extended to them in respect of his the said Jonathan's proper debts, - if any; it shall be the duty of the said High Court of Chancery to emancipate and set free the said slaves respectively; subject nevertheless to the rights of the legatees and those claiming under them to their labour, until they' shall severally have attained the age of thirty years, in like manner and to all intents and purposes, as if they had been respectively emancipated, conformably to the said act. But if such indemnity be given or remitted, as the case may be, within a reasonable time, to be adjudged of by the said Court, it shall in that event be lawful, for the said Robert Pleasants or any other trustee or trustees to be appointed by the said Court to possess the whole of the said slaves (subject as aforesaid) in trust, to raise a sufficient fund to answer or procure the said indemnity and satisfy the debts, if any, as is aforesaid ; and as soon as those purposes are accomplished, in the opinion of the said Court, it shall have power and is hereby directed to manumit the said slaves, subject, as is aforesaid, in the manner above directed; adopting and pursuing, in either case, such measures as are provided by the said act of 1782, as far as may be, for preserving the evidences of their title to freedom. Provided, that nothing, herein contained, shall be construed to extend to any of the slaves, in question, born since the passage of the act of 1782, and who are entitled to freedom, by birth and not by emancipation. Nor to the paramount titles set up, by Elizabeth Pleasants and Daniel Teasdel, *to a part of the said slaves. Nor to the question, whether the said slaves are liable to pay the debts of the original legatees, or those who claim under them? Nor, if sold to bona fide purchasers, whether, such sale be valid to bar the right of liberty now asserted? Nor to bar or affect the title or titles of any person or persons whatever, other than the said testator or testators, as the case may be, and those claiming under them respectively. All which questions ought to be considered, as open and undecided, as if the present decision had never been made.