Case Name: PEOPLE v. LUTZKE
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1976-03-23
Citations: 68 Mich. App. 75
Docket Number: Docket Nos. 22044, 22045
Parties: PEOPLE v LUTZKE
Judges: Before: Quinn, P. J., and J. H. Gillis and Allen, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 68
Pages: 75–84

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v LUTZKE
Opinion op the Court
1. Criminal Law — Appeal and Error — Preliminary Examination.
Alleged error at a preliminary examination will not be considered on appeal where it was not raised prior to or at trial.
2. Homicide — Murder—Premeditation.
The actions of a defendant charged with murder, who had returned to a bar with a weapon an hour after he was refused service, could support an inference of premeditation.
3. Criminal Law — Instructions to Jury — Defense op Intoxication — First-Degree Murder — Assault—Great Bodily Harm —Failure to Object.
An alleged failure to instruct the jury on the defense of intoxication to first-degree murder and assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder is not grounds for reversal where an instruction on the defense of intoxication to a lesser included charge was given, this instruction applied to all charges when the instructions are read as a whole, and no objection was made.
4. Criminal Law — Defense of Intoxication — Capacity Standards —Cooley Standard— Instructions to Jury.
An instruction to a jury on the defense of intoxication which contained both the capacity standard (whether the requisite intent could not exist) and the Cooley standard (whether the requisite intent did not exist) is not reversibly erroneous where in the instruction the capacity standard was supplementary to, rather than in conflict with, the Cooley standard and the instruction as a whole properly informed the jury of the effect intoxication should have upon a finding of criminal responsibility.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1] 4 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 79.
[2] 40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide §§ 246, 263.
[3, 4, 8-10] 45 Am Jur 2d, Intoxicating Liquors §§ 402, 403.
[5] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 107.
[6] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 82, 83, 110.
[7] 40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide § 44.
[11] 75 Am Jur 2d, Trial §§ 759, 765.
[12] 52 Am Jur 2d, Malice § 6.
[13] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 345-348.
81 Am Jur 2d, Witnesses § 464.
Dissent by Allen, J.
5. Criminal Law — Defense of Intoxication — Specific-Intent Crimes.
An accused may interpose the defense of intoxication where the crime charged requires proof of a specific intent.
6. Assault and Battery — Great Bodily Harm — Less than Murder —-Specific-Intent Crimes.
Assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder is a speciñc-intent crime.
7. Murder — First-Degree Murder — Specific-Intent Crimes.
First-degree murder is a speciñc-intent crime.
8. Criminal Law — Instructions to Jury — Defense of Intoxication — First-Degree Murder — Assault—Great Bodily Harm —Less than Murder.
Failure to instruct the jury that voluntary intoxication may negate the intent required for ñrst-degree murder and assault with intent to commit great bodily harm less than murder was error, and even though an instruction was given on the defense of intoxication to assault with intent to commit murder, this instruction cannot be read as applying to the other charges.
9. Criminal Law — Appeal and Error — Failure to Object — Instructions to Jury — -Defense of Intoxication.
Failure to object to an erroneous instruction on the defense of intoxication does not preclude a defendant from raising the issue on appeal.
10. Criminal Law — Defense of Intoxication — Capacity Standards —Cooley Standard — Instructions to Jury.
An instruction to a jury on the defense of intoxication which incorporates both the capacity and Cooley standards is reversibly erroneous where the instruction predominantly stresses the improper capacity standard; an instruction containing both standards may be proper where it clearly and predominantly emphasizes the Cooley standard.
11. Criminal Law — Intent—Inferences—Presumptions—Instructions to Jury.
An instruction to a jury that it may infer that a defendant intended the natural consequences of his acts, if the jury believes the evidence supports the inference, is proper; however, a trial judge should avoid instructing that the law presumes that every person intends the natural and usual consequences of his own voluntary acts.
12. Criminal Law — Inferences—Malice—Deadly Weapons.
A jury may infer malice from the use of a deadly weapon, but should not be required to do so.
13. Criminal Law — Evidence—Anonymous Phone Calls — Eight to Confront Witnesses.
Testimony of a police officer as to the contents of an anonymous phone call which identified a defendant as a suspect denies the defendant his right to confront witnesses against him.
Appeal from Arenac, Carl L. Horn, J.
Submitted February 4, 1976, at Grand Rapids.
(Docket Nos. 22044, 22045.)
Decided March 23, 1976.
Leave to appeal applied for.
William H. Lutzke, Jr., was convicted of second-degree murder and assault with intent to commit great bodily harm less than murder. Defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, and Norman Ehrnst, Prosecuting Attorney (Prosecuting Attorneys Appellate Service, Keith D. Roberts, Assistant Attorney General), for the people.
Sharon M. Sloan and Lawrence Baron, Assistant State Appellate Defenders, for defendant.
Before: Quinn, P. J., and J. H. Gillis and Allen, JJ.

Opinion:
Quinn, P. J.
Charged with first-degree murder, MCLA 750.316; MSA 28.548, and assault with intent to commit murder, MCLA 750.83; MSA 28.278, the jury convicted defendant of second-degree murder, MCLA 750.317; MSA 28.549, and assault with intent to commit great bodily harm less than murder, MCLA 750.84; MSA 28.279. He was sentenced and he appeals.
Shortly after 8 p.m. on February 26, 1974, defendant entered the Alger Bar in Arenac County. Due to the erratic walking of defendant, the bartender informed defendant that he would not be served. Defendant said nothing and left. An hour later defendant returned at which time the bartender and one customer were the only persons in the bar. After defendant had walked several feet toward the bar, the bartender again informed defendant he would not be served. Defendant walked back to the door, opened it, turned, pointed a gun at the bartender's direction and fired two shots. One shot fatally wounded the customer. The bartender ran after defendant and tried to pull him out of his vehicle. When he observed defendant reach for an object, he ran to the rear of the vehicle and then heard two shots. The bartender returned to the bar and called the police. At trial, the defendant testified that he was present at the bar and had fired shots. The defense was intoxication.
Defendant's first issue alleges lack of proof of premeditation and asserts as error (a) his bind-over on an open charge of murder, and (b) denial of his motion for directed verdict on the first-degree murder charge. As to (a), it was not raised prior to or at trial and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, People v Miller, 62 Mich App 495; 233 NW2d 629 (1975). As to (b), defendant's actions, his return a second time after an hour lapse with a weapon could support an inference of premeditation, People v Juniel, 62 Mich App 529; 233 NW2d 635 (1975).
Second, defendant claims error in the instruction on intoxication because the trial judge failed to instruct that intoxication was a defense to first-degree murder and to assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder. When the instructions are read as a whole, the instruction on intoxication as a defense applied to all charges on which the jury was instructed, and no objection was made to the instruction given. We find no error.
We consider defendant's third issue to be frivolous. There was evidence to support both charges. Under People v White, 390 Mich 245; 212 NW2d 222 (1973), those charges had to be joined in one trial.
Defendant contends that the instruction on intoxication violates People v Crittle, 390 Mich 367, 212 NW2d 196 (1973). The instruction complained about is very similar to the instruction reviewed in People v Scott, 55 Mich App 739; 223 NW2d 330 (1974), namely: a mixture of the capacity standard and the standard required by Crittle, supra. The Scott, supra, analysis of this question is sound and we adopt it as dispositive of this issue. No error occurred. We note again that no objection was made below to this instruction.
The remaining issues raised on appeal either have not been properly preserved for review, merit no discussion, or their resolution is unnecessary to the proper disposition of this case.
Affirmed.
J. H. Gillis, J., concurred.