Case Name: In the Interest of: D.C.M., a Minor, Appellant, v. PEMISCOT COUNTY JUVENILE OFFICE, Respondent.
Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 2019-08-13
Citations: 578 S.W.3d 776
Docket Number: No. SC 97595
Parties: In the Interest of: D.C.M., a Minor, Appellant,
v.
PEMISCOT COUNTY JUVENILE OFFICE, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter Third Series
Volume: 578
Pages: 776–792

Head Matter:
In the Interest of: D.C.M., a Minor, Appellant,
v.
PEMISCOT COUNTY JUVENILE OFFICE, Respondent.
No. SC 97595
Supreme Court of Missouri, en banc.
Opinion issued August 13, 2019
The juvenile was represented by Craig A. Johnston of the public defender's office in Columbia, (573) 777-9977.
The juvenile officer was represented by Christopher R. Wray and Solicitor General D. John Sauer of the attorney general's office in Jefferson City and Deputy Solicitor General Peter T. Reed of the attorney general's office in St. Louis, (573) 751-3321; and Joshua L.D. Tomlin, an attorney in Caruthersville, (573) 333-2396.
Mary R. Russell, Judge D.C.M. appeals a judgment of the circuit court finding he committed an act that, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the felony of making a terrorist threat in the second degree in violation of section 574.120. Evidence adduced at the adjudication hearing demonstrated D.C.M. was sitting in the school cafeteria talking to another student, Jonathan, when D.C.M. stated he felt like "blowing the school up" or wanted to see how it feels to "shoot the school up."
D.C.M. argues his attorney ("Counsel") was ineffective in representing him in the juvenile proceeding by failing to investigate and call Jonathan to testify at the adjudication hearing. He also argues the circuit court abused its discretion in denying Counsel's request for a continuance to subpoena Jonathan. Finally, he argues the circuit court lacked sufficient evidence to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed an act that, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the felony of making a terrorist threat in the second degree.
The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Counsel's request for a continuance, and, further, when viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment, there was sufficient evidence for the circuit court to find beyond a reasonable doubt that D.C.M. committed an act, which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the felony of making a terrorist threat in the second degree. The record is insufficient, however, to determine whether Counsel was ineffective. As a result, these claims cannot be addressed on direct appeal. The case is remanded to the circuit court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Counsel was ineffective. In all other aspects, the judgment is affirmed.
Background
D.C.M. was a 16-year-old high school student with autism, when the juvenile officer in Pemiscot County filed a petition against him. The petition alleged he had committed an act that, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the felony of making a terrorist threat in the second degree, and, as a result, he was subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile division. Evidence adduced at the adjudication hearing demonstrated that D.C.M. was sitting in the high school cafeteria when another student, Tamara, overheard D.C.M. tell a classmate, Jonathan, "I feel like blowing the school up." A student named Zachary testified he heard D.C.M. say that "he wanted to see how it feels like to blow up the school and wanted - shooting up the school." Zachary further testified, "He said that he might do it tomorrow, the day - same day at - He said he's going to do it tomorrow." After hearing D.C.M.'s comments, Tamara left the cafeteria and told the school principal. The principal called the police, and the staff isolated D.C.M. in a classroom until law enforcement officers arrived. Officers then took D.C.M. to the juvenile office.
Police interviewed D.C.M., who denied making any threatening statements and said he was only joking. Police also interviewed Jonathan. The police report provided, "Jonathan stated that he did not recall [D.C.M.] making any threats or statements but that he didn't doubt it. [Jonathan] stated that [D.C.M.] has made racial comments towards other students but that he had not heard [D.C.M.] make any statements."
The juvenile officer filed a petition, and an adjudication hearing was held 12 days later. The juvenile officer called seven witnesses: four students, a police officer, and two school principals. Two witnesses, Tamara and Zachary, testified they heard D.C.M. make the threatening statements. D.C.M. testified he did not make any threatening statements and said the other witnesses were lying. Counsel then requested a continuance to subpoena Jonathan as well as two other students, Joshua and Marcus, who were also sitting at the table with D.C.M. The juvenile officer objected, asserting Counsel had access to the police report that named all of the witnesses and, therefore, had a sufficient opportunity to obtain the witnesses' presence at the hearing. The circuit court denied the request.
Based on the evidence presented at the adjudication hearing, the circuit court continued jurisdiction over D.C.M. and placed him in the custody of the division of youth services for an indefinite term. D.C.M. appeals.
Analysis
I. Mootness
D.C.M. turned 18 and was released from supervision approximately one month before the case was argued and submitted. As a result, this Court must examine whether this appeal is now moot.
Because "[m]ootness implicates the justiciability of a controversy and is a threshold issue to appellate review," this Court must consider, either on a party's motion or acting sua sponte , whether an appeal is moot. Mo. Municipal League v. State , 465 S.W.3d 904, 906 (Mo. banc 2015) (alteration in original) (quoting LeBeau v. Comm'rs of Franklin Cty. , 459 S.W.3d 436, 438 (Mo. banc 2015) ). "When an event occurs that makes a court's decision unnecessary or makes granting effectual relief by the court impossible, the case is moot and generally should be dismissed." State ex rel. Griffith v. Precythe , 574 S.W.3d 761, 763 (Mo. banc 2019). "A case is moot when the question presented for decision seeks a judgment upon some matter which, if the judgment was rendered, would not have any practical effect upon any then existing controversy." State ex rel. Gardner v. Boyer , 561 S.W.3d 389, 394 (Mo. banc 2018) (quoting State ex rel. Hawley v. Heagney , 523 S.W.3d 447, 450 (Mo. banc 2017) ). If a case is moot, this Court can exercise its discretion to decide the case on the merits if one of two narrow exceptions to the mootness doctrine exist: "(1) when a case becomes moot after submission and argument; and (2) when the issue raised is one of general public interest and importance, recurring in nature, and will otherwise evade appellate review."
State ex rel. Peters-Baker v. Round , 561 S.W.3d 380, 384-85 (Mo. banc 2018) (citations omitted).
Both D.C.M. and the State argue a decision by this Court would impact D.C.M. and urge this Court to decide this case on its merits. While D.C.M. recently turned 18 and has since been released from supervision, a record of his adjudication would remain. Juvenile records for offenses that would be felonies if committed by an adult are open to the public to the extent criminal proceeding records are open to the public. Section 211.321.2(2). The offense of making a terrorist threat in the second degree is such a felony. See section 574.120. The question whether an appeal of a case in which a juvenile has been released from supervision implicates the mootness doctrine is one of first impression for this Court.
In a case factually analogous to the one here, but in a criminal context, this Court addressed the merits of an adult's appeal of his conviction despite that he had been pardoned. State v. Jacobson , 348 Mo. 258, 152 S.W.2d 1061, 1064 (Mo. 1941). Although the pardon allowed him not to serve his sentence, the appeal was not moot because the underlying conviction remained on his record. Id. Jacobson emphasized that an individual should have the opportunity "to remove the discredit and stigma flowing from the judgment of conviction." Id. Further, if convicted of another crime in the future, Jacobson recognized the defendant would be subject to greater penalties due to his prior conviction. Id. As a result, this Court concluded the case was not moot because there was "still a substantial element of controversy existing." Id.
As in Jacobson , D.C.M. should be given the opportunity to remove the discredit and stigma associated with his record of adjudication. Even though D.C.M. has been released from supervision, his conduct would have constituted a felony had he been an adult at the time he committed the act. If D.C.M. is tried in the future for a criminal offense, evidence of this prior juvenile adjudication could be introduced. See S.B.A. , 530 S.W.3d at 620. For these reasons, this case is not moot, as addressing this appeal would have a practical effect on an existing controversy. See Gardner , 561 S.W.3d at 394. Accordingly, this Court will review the merits of the appeal.
II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
D.C.M. argues that he had a due process right to the effective assistance of counsel in his juvenile proceeding and that Counsel violated this right when he failed to investigate and call Jonathan to testify, as well as when Counsel elicited and failed to object to certain testimony. The State recognizes juveniles have a due process right to effective assistance of counsel under Missouri law but argues D.C.M. cannot raise these claims on direct appeal and, even if he could raise these claims, Counsel did not provide ineffective assistance. The issue of what procedure should be followed when reviewing ineffective assistance of counsel claims in juvenile cases is a question of law that receives de novo review. See Grado v. State , 559 S.W.3d 888, 895 (Mo. banc 2018).
It is well-established that a child has a right to counsel at a delinquency proceeding pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In re Gault , 387 U.S. 1, 36, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967), overruled on other grounds by Allen v. Illinois , 478 U.S. 364, 372-73, 106 S.Ct. 2988, 92 L.Ed.2d 296 (1986) ; see also Rule 115.02 ("In any proceeding under subsection 1 of section 211.031, RSMo, the court shall appoint counsel for the juvenile when necessary to assure a full and fair hearing."). This right to counsel implies that counsel must be effective. Gault , 387 U.S. at 30, 87 S.Ct. 1428 ; In re R.G. , 495 S.W.2d 399, 403 (Mo. 1973). The due process right to counsel "would be hollow were there no accompanying requirement counsel be effective." Grado , 559 S.W.3d at 896.
Despite the right to effective assistance of counsel, no statute or case from this Court provides a mechanism for a committed juvenile to raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. D.C.M. encourages this Court to address the claims on direct appeal. The State, on the other hand, argues direct appeal is a "suboptimal path" for juveniles to raise ineffective assistance claims, suggesting the legislature should adopt a statutory procedure or this Court should adopt a rule setting forth a procedure.
When deciding whether claims for ineffective assistance of counsel can be addressed on direct appeal, the pertinent question is whether the record is sufficient to address the claim. Considering the sufficiency of the record when determining whether ineffective assistance of counsel claims can be addressed on direct appeal is consistent with the approach taken by this Court in termination of parental rights and sexually violent predator cases. See In re Adoption of C.M.B.R. , 332 S.W.3d 793, 820 n.22 (Mo. banc 2011) (clarifying that ineffective assistance of counsel claims could be addressed on direct appeal when such claims could be sufficiently evaluated on the record), overruled on other grounds by S.S.S. v. C.V.S. , 529 S.W.3d 811, 816 n.3 (Mo. banc 2017) ; Grado , 559 S.W.3d at 897 (addressing claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a sexually violent predator proceeding when all claims "involve[d] counsel's actions at trial, and [were] evident on the record"). In accordance with this precedent, this Court will review the record and, if the record is sufficient, address D.C.M.'s ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal.
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel typically cannot be addressed on direct appeal, however, when "issues are likely to arise regarding ... counsel's failure to adequately investigate or prepare for trial, or counsel's failure to pursue defenses or witnesses." Grado , 559 S.W.3d at 897 (quoting In re Carmody , 274 Ill.App.3d 46, 210 Ill.Dec. 782, 653 N.E.2d 977, 985 (1995) ). In each of these scenarios, the record is likely to be incomplete with respect to the claim of ineffective assistance.
D.C.M. alleges Counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and call Jonathan to testify. The record is clear Jonathan was sitting next to and talking with D.C.M. when D.C.M. allegedly made the threatening statement. Despite having access to the police report detailing Jonathan's interview with the police, Counsel called no witnesses other than D.C.M. and was unaware that Jonathan was a potential witness until the day of the hearing, indicating Counsel failed to consider the police report. When asking for a continuance to subpoena Jonathan as well as two other students sitting at the table with D.C.M., Joshua and Marcus, Counsel stated:
Your Honor, [D.C.M.] has provided names of a Joshua [ ], a Jonathan [ ] and a Marcus somebody that was at his table, and I wasn't provided that information and wasn't provided any opportunity, if I could, to subpoena these people to testify. I would like to have some opportunity to have them present, Your Honor, since he's denied the fact that [Zachary] was - was not at his table, but he does testify that a Joshua [ ], a Jonathan [ ], and a Marcus or Demetrius or whoever - whatever his name was, was also at the table.
The record is silent, however, regarding what Jonathan's testimony would have been or whether Jonathan was able to be located by D.C.M.'s attorney. While the police report provides some indication as to what Jonathan's testimony might have been, Jonathan's statements were not under oath, and the report is not a substitute for sworn testimony in court. Had Jonathan been located, his testimony could have unequivocally supported D.C.M.'s defense, as the police report indicated that Jonathan did not hear D.C.M. make a threatening statement. But it is also possible Jonathan's testimony could have cast doubt on D.C.M.'s defense, as the police report further reflects Jonathan stated he "wouldn't doubt" D.C.M. made threatening statements.
Jonathan also told police he was aware D.C.M. had made racial comments toward other students. This statement directly conflicts with D.C.M.'s testimony that he never made racial comments and would not be beneficial to D.C.M. "If a potential witness's testimony would not unqualifiedly support a defendant, the failure to call such a witness does not constitute ineffective assistance." Worthington v. State , 166 S.W.3d 566, 577 (Mo. banc 2005).
Unlike in Grado , in which the claim involved the counsel's failure to object to evidence and was evident on the record, 559 S.W.3d at 897, the record is incomplete with respect to D.C.M.'s claim. This Court cannot speculate as to whether Jonathan would have been located or what his testimony would have been. Without knowing this information, it cannot be determined on this record whether Counsel was ineffective.
Neither the legislature nor this Court's rules have established how to address claims of ineffective assistance in a juvenile hearing when the record is insufficient to do so on direct appeal. D.C.M. encourages this Court to remand for an evidentiary hearing in the circuit court or to appoint a master on appeal pursuant to Rule 68.03.
States such as Georgia and Illinois remand the case to the circuit court for an evidentiary hearing and finding regarding whether counsel was ineffective. See D.C. , 705 S.E.2d at 314 (remanding the case for an evidentiary hearing and determination on the ineffective assistance claims); Alonzo , 397 Ill.Dec. 44, 40 N.E.3d at 1234 ("Such a hearing will give [the juvenile] a full opportunity to prove facts establishing ineffectiveness of counsel, the State a full opportunity to present evidence to the contrary, and the establishment of a factual record on the issue."). An evidentiary hearing would allow a record to be established regarding whether Jonathan could have been located to testify and what his testimony would have been, as well as other evidence pertaining to D.C.M.'s counsel's effectiveness. An evidentiary hearing is preferable to a special master in this context because the additional findings and conclusions will be made by the circuit court, which is already familiar with the case. Accordingly, the case is remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Counsel was ineffective. If the circuit court finds Counsel ineffective, D.C.M. should be granted a new adjudication hearing. Alonzo , 397 Ill.Dec. 44, 40 N.E.3d at 1234. If D.C.M.'s claim is rejected, he can appeal, and the record on appeal will include the new evidence. Id.
III. The Circuit Court's Denial of D.C.M.'s Request for a Continuance
D.C.M. argues the circuit court abused its discretion by not allowing a continuance for Counsel to subpoena Jonathan, Joshua, and Marcus, three students who were sitting at the table with D.C.M. at the time he made the alleged threat. Counsel requested the continuance at the close of all evidence and made no offer of proof regarding the students' testimony.
Standard of Review
Whether to grant a continuance is within the sound discretion of the circuit court. State v. Edwards , 116 S.W.3d 511, 535 (Mo. banc 2003). An accused must demonstrate he was prejudiced by the denial of the continuance. State v. Blocker , 133 S.W.3d 502, 504 (Mo. banc 2004). "If a continuance is not likely to result in the presence of the witness at trial, the court will not be held to have abused its discretion in denying the continuance." Id.
Analysis
Although there are no rules pertaining to requests for continuances in juvenile proceedings, this Court's rules in civil and criminal actions require that an application for a continuance for the purpose of securing a witness demonstrate: the particular facts the witness would allegedly prove, the applicant's due diligence to obtain the witness or testimony, and the name and location of the witness as well as grounds to believe the attendance could be procured within a reasonable time. Rules 24.10; 65.04; see also Williams v. Dir. of Revenue , 764 S.W.2d 176, 177 (Mo. App. 1989) ("An application for a continuance based on the absence of a witness or his evidence, among other things, must show due diligence upon the part of the applicant to obtain such witness or testimony.").
In his request for a continuance, Counsel indicated he was not provided with the names of Jonathan, Joshua, and Marcus.
Counsel's request was vague and failed to specify, among other requirements, the facts the witnesses' testimony would prove.
The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Counsels' request for continuance, as Counsel failed to make an adequate offer of proof as to the witnesses' expected testimony. See State v. Selvy , 921 S.W.2d 114, 118 (Mo. App. 1996) (circuit court in juvenile hearing did not abuse its discretion in denying continuance where the record was silent as to what the witness's testimony would have been). Further, granting a continuance could cause undue delay, and under this Court's rules, juvenile hearings must be completed expeditiously. See Rule 127.08. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Counsel's request for a continuance, and, further, D.C.M. has failed to demonstrate he was prejudiced by this action.
D.C.M. was subject to the jurisdiction of the circuit court pursuant to section 211.031.1(3). All statutory references are to RSMo 2016, unless otherwise specified.
This opinion refers to students by their first names for confidentiality purposes.
After an opinion by the court of appeals, this Court granted transfer. Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 10.
This Court issued an order requesting supplemental briefing from both parties showing cause why the appeal is not moot.
Because this case is not moot, as explained below, these exceptions are inapplicable here.
Further, D.C.M. may have a duty to disclose his adjudication on various applications in the future. For instance, the military considers an applicant's juvenile record when determining an applicant's fitness, see 32 C.F.R. § 96.1, et seq. (2016), and the character and fitness requirements for admission to the bar of this state require disclosure of juvenile matters. Character & Fitness Update Application, https://www.mble.org/browseprintform.action?formId=82 (last visited Aug. 12, 2019).
Although this issue has not been considered by this Court, the court of appeals has addressed whether juvenile appeals were moot. See In re S.B.A. , 530 S.W.3d 615, 621-22 (Mo. App. 2017) (finding an exception to the mootness doctrine because there was a movement to make more juvenile records public and the record could have "other lifelong consequences and stigma"); In re N.R.W. , 482 S.W.3d 473, 475 (Mo. App. 2016) (finding appeal was not moot when juvenile was adjudicated delinquent for an offense that would have been considered a felony if committed by an adult); T.S.G. v. Juvenile Officer , 322 S.W.3d 145, 148 (Mo. App. 2010) (finding an exception to the mootness doctrine where juvenile was initially adjudged to have committed sexual misconduct because of the "movement to make more juvenile records public"). But in S.B.A. and T.S.G. , the court of appeals relied on the so-called "significant collateral consequences" exception to the mootness doctrine, an exception not recognized by this Court. S.B.A , 530 S.W.3d at 621-22 ; T.S.G. , 322 S.W.3d at 148. In N.R.W. , the court found the case was not moot, as the collateral consequences the juvenile would suffer as a result of his prior adjudication constituted an existing controversy. 482 S.W.3d at 475.
Several states have addressed claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in a juvenile hearing on direct appeal when the record is sufficient. See In re N.A.D. , 338 P.3d 226, 229 (Utah App. 2014) ; In re C.W.N. , 227 N.C.App. 63, 742 S.E.2d 583, 585-88 (2013) ; Commonwealth v. Ogden O. , 448 Mass. 798, 864 N.E.2d 13, 19-21 (2007) ; State v. A.N.J. , 168 Wash.2d 91, 225 P.3d 956, 965-67 (2010) ; In re Parris, W. , 363 Md. 717, 770 A.2d 202, 205-13 (2001) ; In re Maricopa Cty. Juvenile Action No. JV-511576 , 186 Ariz. 604, 925 P.2d 745, 747-48 (Ariz. App. 1996). Other states have declined to address juveniles' ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal when the record is insufficient. See In re Alonzo O. , 397 Ill.Dec. 44, 40 N.E.3d 1228, 1234 (Ill. App. 2015) ; In re D.C. , 307 Ga.App. 542, 705 S.E.2d 313, 314 (2011) ; State v. Megan S. , 222 W.Va. 729, 671 S.E.2d 734, 739 (2008) ; In re Robert P. , 16 A.D.3d 512, 791 N.Y.S.2d 614, 615 (2005).
The dissenting opinion correctly indicates that, if Jonathan had testified consistent with his statement to the police, his testimony would not have unequivocally supported D.C.M. The dissenting opinion further adds that, if Jonathan's hearing testimony were inconsistent with statements made to the police, those statements could be used to impeach Jonathan's testimony. But this Court cannot speculate regarding what Jonathan's testimony would have been or what would have occurred at the hearing had he testified.
In the criminal context, this information is typically demonstrated by testimony at a subsequent evidentiary hearing. See Johnson v. State , 406 S.W.3d 892, 908 (Mo. banc 2013) (potential witness testified at the evidentiary hearing that, had she been contacted, "she would have been willing and able" to testify and further explained what she would have said at trial).
Missouri law has not defined the standard to be applied when determining whether a juvenile's counsel was effective. D.C.M. encourages adoption of the Strickland standard, arguing delinquency proceedings, in which a juvenile's liberty is at stake, are similar in nature to criminal cases. See Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). In response, the State argues that the "meaningful hearing" standard, the standard used by this Court in termination of parental rights cases, is more consistent with the United States Supreme Court's "fundamental fairness" standard required in juvenile proceedings. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania , 403 U.S. 528, 543, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 647 (1971). Under the meaningful hearing standard, this Court would determine "whether the attorney was effective in providing his client with a meaningful hearing based on the record." In re J.P.B. , 509 S.W.3d 84, 97 (Mo. banc 2017). The Strickland standard would require D.C.M. to prove (1) Counsel failed to demonstrate the level of skill and diligence of a reasonably competent attorney under similar circumstances, and (2) D.C.M. was prejudiced by this failure. Watson v. State , 520 S.W.3d 423, 435 (Mo. banc 2017). Both prongs "must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence." Tisius v. State , 519 S.W.3d 413, 420 (Mo. banc 2017). Prejudice requires a showing of "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. Further, to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to call a witness, the Strickland standard requires a showing that "1) [t]rial counsel knew or should have known of the existence of the witness; 2) the witness could be located through reasonable investigation; 3) the witness would testify, and 4) the witness's testimony would have produced a viable defense." Worthington , 166 S.W.3d at 577. Because the record is insufficient to address D.C.M.'s claims on appeal, the standard need not be determined by the Court today.
In addition to the appointment of a special master or remanding for an evidentiary hearing, cases such as the present one could also be remanded for a limited evidentiary hearing, which would involve instructing the circuit court to make findings and conclusions about the ineffective assistance of counsel issue and to then file those findings with this Court to resolve the issue on appeal while deferring to the circuit court on any factual findings. See State v. Wilder , 946 S.W.2d 760, 765 (Mo. App. 1997). Although both the appointment of a special master and remanding for a limited evidentiary hearing would avoid the delay of a subsequent appeal, the action taken by an appellate court may depend on the facts of a particular case. Here, D.C.M. is no longer in the division of youth services' custody and any delay would have little impact on his case. Accordingly, remanding the case to the circuit court is preferable.
Because this Court finds the record insufficient and remands for an evidentiary hearing and determination regarding whether Counsel was ineffective, there is no need to reach D.C.M.'s second claim that counsel was ineffective for eliciting and failing to object to certain testimony. This claim can be raised by D.C.M. on remand to the circuit court.

Opinion:
IV. Sufficiency of the Evidence
D.C.M. argues the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly made a threat or that he recklessly disregarded the risk of causing the evacuation, quarantine, or closure of his school.
Standard of Review
Juvenile proceedings are reviewed "in the same manner as other court-tried cases." C.G.M., II v. Juvenile Officer , 258 S.W.3d 879, 882 (Mo. App. 2008). This Court will affirm a judgment in a juvenile proceeding unless it is not supported by evidence, is against the weight of evidence, or erroneously declares or applies the law. In re A.S.W. , 226 S.W.3d 151, 153 (Mo. banc 2007). The credibility of the witnesses and the weight their testimony should be given is a matter to be determined at the hearing by the circuit court, "which is free to believe none, part, or all of their testimony." C.L.B. v. Juvenile Officer , 22 S.W.3d 233, 236 (Mo. App. 2000).
For a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, "[t]he evidence, including all reasonable inferences therefrom, is considered in the light most favorable to the judgment, disregarding all contrary inferences." State v. Pike , 162 S.W.3d 464, 473-74 (Mo. banc 2005). When a juvenile is alleged to have committed an act that would be a criminal offense if committed by an adult, the standard of proof, like that in criminal trials, is beyond a reasonable doubt. C.L.B. , 22 S.W.3d at 239 (citing In re Winship , 397 U.S. 358, 362, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) ).
Analysis
D.C.M. was alleged to have committed an act that, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the felony of making a terrorist threat in the second degree. A person commits the offense of making a terrorist threat in the second degree if the person "recklessly disregards the risk of causing the evacuation, quarantine or closure of any portion of a building, inhabitable structure, place of assembly or facility of transportation and knowingly . [c]ommunicates an express or implied threat to cause an incident or condition involving danger to life." Section 574.120.1(1). A person acts recklessly "when he or she consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or that a result will follow, and such disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation." Section 562.016.4. A person acts knowingly when "he or she is aware of the nature of his or her conduct." Section 562.016.3(1). Accordingly, the juvenile officer had to establish that, when making the threatening statement, D.C.M.: (1) was aware he was communicating an express or implied threat to cause an incident endangering human life and (2) consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk of causing the evacuation or closure of the school.
Tamara and Zachary testified D.C.M. stated he either felt "like blowing the school up" or "wanted to see how it feels like to blow up the school and wanted - shooting up the school." Zachary further testified, "He said that he might do it tomorrow, the day - same day at - He said he's going to do it tomorrow." Such a definite, declaratory statement indicates awareness of the intent to cause danger to human life. C.G.M , 258 S.W.3d at 883. Both Tamara and Zachary testified D.C.M.'s statements scared them, and Tamara immediately reported the threat to the principal. "[T]he desired reaction of the listener may constitute some evidence of the intent of the person making the statement." Id. When viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment, there was sufficient evidence for the circuit court to conclude D.C.M. was aware he was making a threat to cause an incident endangering human life.
After Tamara reported the threat, the principal called the police. The staff isolated D.C.M. in a classroom until law enforcement officers arrived about an hour later to take D.C.M. to the juvenile office. School attendance declined substantially the next day. The principal testified that, had she not been able to isolate D.C.M. and had the alleged statement been that D.C.M. planned to shoot up the school that day, she would have evacuated or locked down the building immediately. Actual evacuation or lockdown is not required to show a terrorist threat was made, but a principal's testimony regarding the possibility of an evacuation "is pertinent to the determination of whether a substantial and unjustifiable risk of evacuation existed." Id. The principal's testimony indicated a substantial risk of an evacuation or lockdown as a result of D.C.M.'s statement. There was sufficient evidence for the circuit court to conclude that D.C.M. consciously disregarded a risk of causing the evacuation of the school.
When viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment, the evidence showed D.C.M. made a clear, declaratory statement indicating his intent to "shoot up" or "blow up" the school. There was sufficient evidence for the circuit court to find beyond a reasonable doubt that D.C.M. committed an act, which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the felony of making a terrorist threat in the second degree.
Conclusion
The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Counsel's request for a continuance, and, further, there was sufficient evidence for the circuit court to find beyond a reasonable doubt that D.C.M.
committed an act that, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the felony of making a terrorist threat in the second degree. The record is insufficient, however, to determine whether Counsel was ineffective. As a result, these claims cannot be addressed on direct appeal. The case is remanded to the circuit court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether counsel was ineffective. In all other aspects, the judgment is affirmed.
Draper, C.J., Breckenridge, and Stith, JJ., concur; Powell, J., dissents in separate opinion filed; Wilson, J., concurs in opinion of Powell, J.; Fischer, J., authored separate opinion.
Under a different factual scenario, the court in C.G.M. held there was insufficient evidence to find the juvenile made a terrorist threat. 258 S.W.3d at 884. In C.G.M. , the juvenile told another student that "he may get dynamite from his dad for his birthday" and asked if the student "wanted to help him blow up the school." Id. at 880 (emphasis added). Four or five months passed before the other student reported the juvenile had made the statement. Id. Testimony from the student indicated that he did not believe the juvenile would receive dynamite for his birthday and that he was not in fear the juvenile would blow up the school. Id. The court determined the statement was not declaratory and did not indicate intent to commit the act. Id. at 884. Unlike the statement in C.G.M. , D.C.M.'s statement indicated intent and a sense of immediacy, as he specifically stated he would "do it tomorrow." Further, unlike C.G.M. , the students who heard D.C.M.'s statement were scared, and the threat was immediately reported to school authorities.