Case Name: SCHMIDT v. OREGON GOLD MINING CO.
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1895-06-03
Citations: 28 Or. 9
Docket Number: 
Parties: SCHMIDT v. OREGON GOLD MINING CO.
Judges: 
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 28
Pages: 9–34

Head Matter:
Decided June 3;
rehearing, July 22, 1895.
SCHMIDT v. OREGON GOLD MINING CO.
[40 Pac. 406, 1014.]
1. Appeal from Consent Decree — Code, § 536.— A decree entered at the request of a party, the other party being present and expressly consenting thereto, cannot be appealed from by either side: liada v. Barr, 22 Or. 496, approved and followed. Such a decree will he governed by the provisions of section 536, Hill’s Code, although, strictly speaking, it is not a decree given either by confession or for want of an answer.
2. Consent Decree — Conditions Beyond the Scope of the Pleadings.— Where, ihn complaint in a suit by a trustee to foreclose the mortgage prays judgment for reasonable attorney fees and for professional services rendered therein, and the parties consent that judgment he rendered in accordance therewith, provisions in the decree that the trustee recover the attorney fees and fees for other professional services in trust for the parties rendering the services are not so entirely without the scope of the pleadings, and the authority of the parties to agree thereto, that the appeU.no court will declare them void at the instance of the party requesting that such judgment he rendered.
3. Consent Decree — Issues Made by mie Pleadings. — A judgment or decree entered upon the pleadings or after a contest must fall within the issues made by the pleadings, hut consent decrees will be valid and binding if they fall within the general scope of the case.
4. Power of Attorney — Presumption — Practice.— The courts must presume, in the absence of a showing to the contrary, that orders and proceedings of attorneys in the conduct of cases are made and conducted under proper authority from their clients, and when it is desired to impeach the acts of attorneys as beyond the terms of their employment, the proper method is to move in the lower court whore the facts may be determined by testimony, rather than by an appeal from tho objectionable proceedings
Appsal from Union: Morton D. Clifford, Judge.
This suit was instituted to foreclose three several mortgages executed by the Oregon Gold Mining Com pany to A. L. Schmidt as trustee to secure the. payment of certain bonds of the company, bearing dates respectively May first and October first, eighteen hundred and eighty-eight, and September first, eighteen hundred and eighty-nine. Each of said mortgages in effect provides that in case of default in the conditions imposed the trustee might foreclose and sell the property described therein, and that out of the proceeds he should be allowed for attorney’s fees such sum as the court might adjudge reasonable, together with all necessary costs and expenses incurred, including a reasonable compensation to himself for the execution of the trust. The complaint sets forth by appropriate allegations the legal purport of these promises, and the prayer, among other things, is “for judgment and decree fixing and determining the amount to which plaintiff is entitled in this suit for reasonable attorney’s fees for foreclosing the said mortgage, and for professional services herein, and declaring the same a lien upon the said mortgaged property, rights, privileges, and franchises, and directing payment therefor out of the proceeds of said mines, and the proceeds arising from the sale of said mortgaged property.” The decree, among other things, contains the following findings and provisions, viz.: “Now at this day this cause came on to be heard upon the motion of plaintiff for judgment and decree as prayed for in the complaint herein, the plaintiff appearing by T. Calvin Hyde and T. H. Crawford, of counsel, and the defendant by C. A. Johns and W. F. Butcher of counsel. And it appearing to the court that the referee heretofore appointed herein by the court to take the testimony in this case, and to report the same to the court, together with his findings of fact and conclusions of law thereon, namely, Charles F. Hyde, an attorney of this court, did, with the assistance of John Wheeler, Esq., the official stenographer of this court, proceed to and take the testimony in full of the plaintiff in this cause regularly as in his appointment ordered and directed, at which time the said defendant notified the plaintiff by and through its said attorneys that defendant would offer no testimony, but would consent to a judgment and decree as prayed for in plaintiff’s complaint, and that for this reason no testimony was offered and taken on behalf of the defendant by said referee in this cause; and it further appearing to the court that the said referee has filed in court the testimony so taken by him on behalf of the plaintiff, and the same fully sustains the allegations of plaintiff’s complaint, and that said defendant by his said attorneys in open court here now consents that a judgment and decree may • be here now made and entered in this cause in favor of said plaintiff, A. L. Schmidt, trustee, and against the said defendant, the Oregon Gold Mining Company, as prayed for in plaintiff’s complaint, and that in said judgment and decree the court shall fix the referee’s fees at the sum of two hundred dollars, the stenographer's fees at the sum of - dollars, and the plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees at such sum as the court may find reasonable for the services performed, and that the referee’s fees, stenographer’s fees, and the plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees shall be a preferred lien upon the mortgaged property of the defendant, and the proceeds thereof, in favor of the said referee, stenographer, and the plaintiff's said attorneys, for the respective amounts due" each as found and settled by the parties and the court, and that they or either of them may have execution therefor against the said mortgaged property.” * * * “18. The court further finds that the sum of five thousand five hundred and fifty dollars is a reasonable attorney's fee in this suit for the foreclosure of the said several mortgages and trust deeds, and that of said sum plaintiff’s attorney, T. Calvin Hyde, should receive the sum of two thousand seven hundred and fifty dollars, and the plaintiff’s attorney, T. H. Crawford, should receive the sum of two thousand seven hundred and fifty dollars, and that said amounts so allowed each of said attorneys should be a preferred lien upon the said mortgaged premises, and upon the funds arising from the sale of the said mortgaged property, for the payment of the same, for the enforcement of which either of said attorneys should have execution. * * * 19. That upon the agreement of the parties herein made in open court, the court finds and fixes the compensation of Charles F. Hyde, referee herein, at the sum of two hundred dollars, and the compensation of the court stenographer, John "Wheeler, at the sum of one hundred and fifty dollars, and that the compensation and fees of said referee and stenographer should also be preferred liens upon the said mortgaged property, and the proceeds thereof, for the payment of the safhe.” ® * * “It is therefore ordered, considered, adjudged, and decreed, that plaintiff A. L. Schmidt, as trustee for the holders of said bonds, have and recover off and from the defendant ® * * the further sum of five thousand five hundred dollars, reasonable attorneys’ fees herein, in trust for T. Calvin Hyde and T. H. Crawford, plaintiff’s attorneys herein; and for the further sum of two hundred dollars, referee’s fees, in trust for Charles F. Hyde, referee herein; and for the further sum of one hundred and fifty dollars, stenographer’s fees herein, in trust for John Wheeler, court stenographer, and for the costs and disbursements of this suit. * * * And it is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the judgment herein made and entered for attorneys’ fees, stenographer’s fees, and costs and disbursements, be and the same is hereby adjudged and decreed to be a first lien upon all the property described in said several mortgage deeds, and the proceeds arising from the sale thereof, * * * and that the proceeds arising from such sale be applied to the payment of the attorneys’ fees decreed in this suit, the referee’s fees, and the stenographer’s fees.”
The notice of appeal contains nine assignments of error, which may be comprised in two as follows: First, the court erred in finding, adjudging, and decreeing that plaintiff recover off and from defendant five thousand five hundred dollars attorneys’ fees in trust for T. Calvin Hyde and T. H. Crawford, two hundred dollars in trust for Charles F. Hyde, referee, and the further sum of one hundred and fifty dollars in trust for John Wheeler, stenographer, and that these several sums should be a first and superior lien upon the property described in the said several mortgages, and directing the same to be first paid out of the proceeds thereof; and, second, the court erred in not adjudging and decreeing the amount found to be reasonable as attorneys’ fees to plaintiff, and in not decreeing to plaintiff a reasonable sum as compensation for services under his trust as such trustee. The appeal is taken by Messrs. Dolph, Nixon and Dolph, as attorneys for plaintiff. The defendant made no appearance in this court, but T. Calvin Hyde and T. H. Crawford, in their own behalf, and as attorneys for Charles F. Hyde and John Wheeler, attack the appeal by a motion to dismiss it, and filed a brief herein. The ground mainly relied upon for dismissal is that the decree appealed from was given by consent, and is therefore not appealable.
Dismisse’d.
Opposed to the motion was a brief by Messrs. Dolph, Nixon and Dolph, and an oral argument by Mr. Joseph N. Dolph, making these points:
Under the allegations of the complaint, and the provisions of the mortgages concerning costs and expenses of foreclosure, any allowance for attorneys’ fees should have been made to the- plaintiff. Messrs. Hyde and Crawford were not the only attorneys employed by the plaintiff. The question for this court to consider is whether the court below erred in attempting, without any allegation in the complaint to give it jurisdiction of the subject-matter, to render a decree in favor of persons not parties to the suit and against a party with whom they had no contract; to make a contract between the plaintiff and his attorneys without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiff; and without allegations as to the value or the character or the extent of the services rendered, and without notice to the plaintiff to adjudicate a claim of plaintiff’s attorneys against their client. It would seem as if it were unnecessary to submit arguments to show that such a proceeding is not warranted by law and is without precedent in practice. That a judgment or decree cannot be rendered in an action or suit for or against a person not a party is an elemental principal of law. It would be idle to expect to find a decision directly in point for such a thing as was attempted in this case. It was probably never before attempted by any court. The decree in so far as it purports to be a decree in favor of Messrs. Hyde and Crawford was made without jurisdiction and is void: Freeman on Judgments, § 154, 3d ed.
The statutes of Oregon provide in what cases and to what extent an attorney has a lien for services and in what manner such lien may be secured: Hill’s Code, § 1044. Subdivision 4 provides for a lien for attorney’s fees, and that such lien shall be subordinate to the rights existing between the parties to the action, suit, or proceeding. As to referee’s fees and stenographer’s fees all that it is necessary to say is that the Code provides what fees may be taxed in a suit, and the manner of their taxation.
A decree or judgment adjudicating a matter outside the issue raised by the pleadings is an absolute nullity and open to collateral attack: Beach’s Modern Equity Practice, § 790; Gibson’s Suits in Chancery, § 539; Jones v. Davenport, 45 N. J. Eq. 77; Reynolds v. Stockton, 43 N. J. Eq. 211; Elliott v. Pell, 1 Paige, 263; Tripp v. Vincent, 3 Barb. Ch. 613; Goodhue v. Churchman, 1 Barb. Ch. 596.
On Rehearing.
No case like this one has come under our observation, and we hope for the honor of the legal profession no case like it is to be found in the reported decisions. The court evidently proceeded upon the theory that the provisions of the decree appealed from were adjudications of rights between the parties to the suit, whereas they are solely concerning claims, demands, or rights between the attorneys for plaintiff and the referee and stenographer on one side, and the plaintiff on the other. The supposed consent upon which they are based is the consent of the attorneys for the plaintiff agreeing with themselves for the plaintiff to an adjustment of claims of their own against the plaintiff, and to a decree against the plaintiff in their favor.
There is a salutary principle of law coeval with the history of law itself, and which no court in any civilized country has ever yet failed to apply and enforce, which, even if the matters adjudicated or attempted to be adjudicated had been within the issues made by the pleadings, and the attorneys had been parties to the suit, would have made the transaction wholly void. It is the rule that prohibits all persons having fiduciary relations with others from using their position, power, or authority for their own advantage.
The attorneys for plaintiff instead of taking judgment and decree in favor of the plaintiff, procured a decree which is in legal effect a decree in favor of themselves and against the plaintiff. It is immaterial how this was done. No consent, as we shall pres ently show, of the attorneys for the plaintiff could authorize such a proceeding. The decree does not provide that the plaintiff shall recover the five thousand five hundred dollars in trust for the attorneys, to be paid after the mortgaged debt is satisfied or pro rata with the bondholders or with the other expenses, but to be first paid, even if such payment exhausts the entire proceeds of the property.
Such a judicial proceeding is a scandal upon the administration of justice, and if allowed to stand must weaken the respect for the courts and the confidence of citizens in the security for their rights of property, and prevent the investment in Oregon of capital from other states and from foreign countries. There could, be but one greater reproach upon our judicial system and the legal profession, and that would be to have the law deliberately settled by the highest court in the state that the party injured in such a case was precluded by the act of his attorney from having the error corrected and the wrong righted on appeal. It must receive the severest condemnation by every upright judge and every honorable lawyer. It is not such a transaction as to induce a court of equity to adopt a new principle of equity or to strain the application of an established principle to protect it from judicial investigation, or to prevent the righting of the wrong done. It is entirely immaterial whether the amount decreed to the plaintiff’s attorneys was reasonable or unreasonable, so far as the legal questions are concerned. It is a matter of comparative unimportance whether the plaintiff in this particular case shall be robbed or not; but it is of the utmost importance to the profession, to suitors, and to the courts that the legal questions involved should be properly settled. If the attorneys for a plaintiff can by their own act, acting for themselves and at the same. time for their client, consent to a decree and bind their client by their consent by which five thousand five hundred dollars of the amount their client is entitled to recover is decreed to them so that the wrong cannot be considered and righted on appeal, there is nothing to prevent them from so binding their client to a decree by which the entire relief the plaintiff is entitled to is decreed to the attorneys instead of to the plaintiff, or by which the plaintiff is decreed to recover the entire relief he is entitled to in trust for the attorneys. There can be no distinction drawn between the two cases.
The plaintiff’s attorneys had no authority to consent to the provisions of the decree complained of. If upon the face of the decree it is held that the decree appears to have been cbnsented to by the plaintiff’s attorneys, and, therefore, by the plaintiff, it is too plain for argument that an attorney at law has no implied authority to enter a consent decree, by which a definite fee is given him, and made a first lien upon the property which is the subject of the action. The authority of an attorney -as an attorney at law to bind his client has never been extended to such a case. His authority in the management of a suit is only to do in behalf of his client all acts in and out of court, necessary to the prosecution and management of the suit, and which affect the remedy only and not the cause of action: Moulton v. Bowker, 115 Mass. 36 (15 Am. Rep. 72). An attorney is not dominus litis. His relation with his client is fiduciary: Hughes v. Wilson, 26 N. E. 50. An attorney employed to foreclose a lien against land has no lien entitling him to a sale thereof: McCoy v. McCoy, 15 S. E. 973. And it has been held that he cannot give up the security of his client without payment or express authority: Terhune v. Colton, 2 Stock. Ch. 21; Tankersley v. Anderson, 4 Dessaus, 45. Nor to release sureties upon the claim of his client: Savings Insurance v. Chinn, 7 Bush (Ky.), 539; Givens v. Brisco, 3 J. J. Marsh, 529, 532; Union Bank v. Govan, 10 Sm. and M. 333. Nor to discharge a lien created by levy of execution: Banks v. Evans, 10 Sm. and M. 35 (58 Am. Dec. 734); Benedict v. Smith, 10 Paige, 126. Nor to release a lien obtained by judgment; or to discharge any security resulting from his prosecution of the claim. And an honest belief that he is acting in his client’s interest cannot supply the defect of authority to make such an arrangement: Wilson v. Jennings, 3 Ohio St. 528. He may control the manner of conducting a cause, but cannot waive any substantial acquired right of his client: Howe v. Lawrence, 2 Zab. 99.
It is also held that an attorney cannot release a third person for the purpose of making him a compe tent witness: Shores v. Caswell, 13 Metc. 413; Succession of Weigel, 18 La. Ann. 49; Marshall v. Nagel, 1 Bailey, 308. Nor discharge an indorser upon a note committed to him for collection without satisfaction or the express consent of his client: East River Bank v. Kennedy, 9 Bosw. 543; Bourne v. Hyde, 6 Barb. 392; Kellogg v. Gilbert, 10 Johns. 220 (6 Am. Dec. 335); Simonton v. Barren, 21 Wend. 362; York Bank v. Appleton, 17 Me. 55; Varnum v. Bellamy, 4 McLean, 87. Nor sell or assign a judgment of his client: Maxwell v. Owen, 7 Coldwell, 630; Baldwin v. Merrill, 8 Humph. 132; Campbell’s Appeal, 29 Penn. St. 401 (72 Am. Dec. 641); Rowland v. Slate, 58 Penn. St. 196. Nor discharge a judgment or execution except upon payment in full: Beers v. Hendrickson, 45 N. Y. 665; Lewis v. Woodruff, 15 How. Pr. 539; Wilson v. Wadleigh, 36 Me. 496; Harrow v. Farrow, 7 B. Mon. 126 (45 Am. Dec. 60); Chambers v. Miller, 7 Watts, 63. Nor receive any other thing but lawful money in payment of his client’s claim: Stackhouse v. O’Hara, 14 Penn. St. 88; Harper v. Harvey, 4 W. Va. 539; Smock v. Dade, 5 Rand. 639; Jeter v. Haviland, 24 Ga. 252; Miller v. Edmonston, 8 Blackf. 291; Jones v. Ransom, 3 Ind. 327; Trumbull v. Nicholson, 27 Ill. 149; Lawson v. Bettison, 7 Eng. 644; Bailey v. Bagley, 19 La. Ann. 172; Wright v. Dailey, 26 Texas, 730; West v. Ball, 12 Ala. 340; Clark v. Kingsland, 1 Sm. and M. 248. Nor indorse a note left him for collection: Child v. Eureka Powder Works, 44 N. H. 354. Nor compromise a suit: Holker v. Parker, 7 Cranch, 436; Stokely v. Robinson, 34 Penn. St. 315; Huston v. Mitchell, 14 S. and R. 307 (16 Am. Dec. 506); Dodds v. Dodds, 9 Penn. St. 315; Abbe v. Rood, 6 McLean, 106; Derwort v. Loomer, 21 Conn. 245; Keller v. Scott, 2 Sm. and M. 81. Nor employ associate counsel, save in the absence of his client: Briggs v. Georgia, 10 Vt. 68. Nor waive the right of inquisition: Hadden v. Clark, 2 Gratt. 107. Nor accept service of summons: Masterson v. LeClaire, 4 Minn. 163. Nor consent to a judgment against Ms client: People v. Lanborn, 1 Scam. 123. Nor enter a retraxit: Lambert v. Sanford, 2 Blackf. 137 (18 Am. Dec. 149). Nor make an agreement for suspension of proceedings upon a judgment: Pendexter v. Vernon, 9 Humph. 84. Nor discharge a trustee: Quarles v. Porter, 12 Mo. 76. Nor give an extension of time upon a debt due to his client: Lockhart v. Wyatt, 10 Ala. 231 (44 Am. Dec. 481). Nor transfer to another the property in a note committed to him for collection. Nor bind his client by an agreement to refund money overpaid: Ireland v. Todd, 36 Me. 149; see Bingham v. Salene, 15 Or. 208 (2 Am. St. Rep. 152) cited in brief of counsel for respondents.
See also section 219, Week’s on Attorney at Law, for a full statement of what the attorney may not do by virtue of his retainer and without special authority.
The leading case upon the subject of purchases by persons thus occupying confidential relations, towards the vendor is, probably, Fox v. Mackreath, 1 Lead. Cas. in Eq. part 1, White and Tudor (4th Am. ed.), 188, p. *115. There the court held, that a purchase by a trustee for sale from his eestui que trust, although he may have given an adequate price and gained no advantage, should be set aside at the option of the eestui que trust, unless the connection between them had been dissolved, and the knowledge of the value of the property acquired by the trustee had been communicated to the cestui que trust. Exhaustive notes are added to the report of this case by the very able editors, and most of the cases relating to purchases by persons occupying confidential relations, are reviewed. We have cited these authorities concerning the powers of an attorney at law to bind his client, and concerning the relations between attorney and client to show, first, that it was not within the power of plaintiff’s attorneys of their own volition and by their own act, to consent, so as to bind their client, to a decree by which the relief which the plaintiff was supposed to be entitled to upon the complaint and upon consent of the defendant should be adjudged and decreed to them, the plaintiffs attorney, instead of to the plaintiff; seeond, to show how courts scrutinize the dealings of attorneys with their clients, and how jealously they protect the interests of the clients, and that therefore such a decree as the one in this cause will not be held to be a consent decree.
Upon the authorities above cited we respectfully contend that the agreement between counsel above recited was plainly beyond the power of counsel to make. It introduced new and important rights, and conferred them upon plaintiff’s counsel, entirely unknown to either party. It materially changed and unsettled the • rights of all the parties, and made them different from what they were under the mortgage. It postponed the rights of the plaintiff under the mortgage, as well as of the bondholders, to the rights of plaintiff’s attorneys, by giving the attorneys a first lien on the mortgaged property. We submit that the taking of a decree by plaintiff’s attorneys in their own favor and against their client was clearly not within their authority, was a violation of their obligations and duty as attorneys at law and as officers of the court, was a violation of their obligations and duties to their client, and in violation of the just, long established, and inflexible rule of law which requires not only common honesty but the utmost good faith in dealings of persons holding fiduciary relations with others and which renders all such transactions as the one in question void.
Was the decree on its face a consent decree? We believe that the court also erred in holding and deciding that the decree in question purports on its face to be a consent decree, so far, at least, as it relates to the matter of attorney’s fees. The only motion made by plaintiff’s attorneys or consent by them to the decree, so far as it relates to attorney’s fees, is found in these words: “Now at this time this cause came on to be heard, on the motion of plaintiff, for a judgment and decree as prayed for in the complaint herein.” The defendant, it is true, consented to several things concerning attorney’s fees; but, as we have already stated, the defendant had no interest whatever in and no control whatever over the matter of the claim of the plaintiff’s attorneys against the plaintiff for fees and could give no consent whatever which would bind anybody concerning the same. In conclusion, we have not hesitated to discuss freely the nature of the transaction concerning which we complain, and to present as forcibly as possible our reason for claiming that the court erred in dismissing the appeal. We have not examined all the cases in which the question of consent decrees has been discussed; but we repeat that we have not been able to find and we think there cannot be found a reported decision which holds that a decree to be a consent decree must not be between the parties to the suit, and must not be concerning a matter which is within the general scope of the case, that is to say, within the issues made by the pleadings; and we feel certain that no case can be found which holds that an attorney at law, representing his own interests and the interests of his client at the same time, can consent for his client so as to bind him to a decree adjudicating a claim of his own against his client without pleadings and without notice. We have made and now submit this application to the court, not only because the interests of our client seemed to demand that it should be done, but because we believed the good name and honor of the legal profession required that the transaction in question and the legal questions involved should receive further consideration by the court.

Opinion:
Opinion by
Mr. Justice Wodverton.
Section 536 of Hill's Code provides that "any party to a judgment or decree other than a judgment or decree given by confession, or for want of an answer, may appeal therefrom." The decree appealed from, in a strict sense, is neither a decree given by confession nor for want of an answer; but it has been held by this court that by consenting to the rendition of a judgment against himself the defendant, in effect, waives his answer, and thereby leaves no issue in the case to be tried; and that from such a judgment no appeal lies: Rader v. Barr, 22 Or. 496 (29 Pac. 889). In the present case the decree shows upon its face that the "defendant, by his said attorneys, in open court, here now consents that a judgment and decree may be here now made and entered ® as prayed for in plaintiff's complaint." What more could plaintiff have obtained in the absence of an answer, or upon defendant's entire default? The recitals in the decree also show that the defendant gave its consent to the fixing of plaintiff's attorneys' fees by the court at such sum as it should find reasonable, and, there being no evidence in the record to guide it in determining what would be reasonable, we conclude that the parties intended that the court should ascertain the amount in its own way, and that they should be bound by the result. And, further, it is apparent that the amount of the attorneys' fee which plaintiff should recover and have entered in the decree as the finding of the court was a matter not to be determined by the court in invitum. The simple fact that plaintiff did not complain of the court's judgment in fixing this sum at five thousand five hundred dollars would indicate that he so understood it, and expected to be fully bound thereby. All other conditions of the decree appear to be either deducible directly from the allegations of the complaint, or were specially consented to by the defendant. As to the matter of the referee's and stenographer's fees, the record shows that they were fixed and entered by the express agreement of both parties. So we have here a decree which the plaintiff, through his attorney, specifically requested the court to make, and to every feature of it which the defendant has upon the record consented. True, the record does not show upon its face that the plaintiff consented to the decree in the form as entered, but it was entered nevertheless at his expressed request, so that this decree is essentially a consent decree. The conditions, simply stated, are, the court is requested by one party to make certain findings, and to enter a decree thereon with certain definite conditions. To all this the other party consents, and the decree is entered. Now the party making the request appeals to this court, and demands that the decree be reversed in part, without even so much as moving the lower court to modify its findings, or the decree entered thereon, or calling its attention to errors and irregularities, so that the court could, upon its own motion, purge the record of its infirmities. To say the least, this is not fair treatment of the eourt below, and in support of its decree this court will presume the consent of plaintiff to the entry thereof in its present form: Hayne's New Trial and Appeal, § 285, p. 846; Parker v. Altschul, 60 Cal. 380; Lesse v. Clark, 28 Cal. 36; Wilson v. Dougherty, 45 Cal. 35; Reynolds v. Hosmer, 45 Cal. 627. Consent excuses error, and ends all contention between the parties. It leaves nothing for the court to do but to enter what the parties have agreed upon, and when so entered the parties themselves are concluded. From such a decree there is no appeal: Beach on Modern Equity Practice, § 795; Armstrong v. Cooper, 11 Ill. 540. Under section 692 of the Revised Statutes of the United States the practice of the national courts is to entertain an appeal from a consent decree; but they will not decide any matters that appear to have been consented to by the parties, and if the errors complained of come within the waiver the decree of the court below -will be affirmed: Pacific Railroad v. Ketchum, 101 U. S. 295. This court, however, is committed to the doctrine that no appeal lies from such a decree: Rader v. Barr, 22 Or. 496 (29 Pac. 889). For these reasons the appeal must be dismissed.
It is further claimed that, notwithstanding the parties may have consented to all the terms and conditions of the decree, yet that those portions thereof wherein it is found and decreed that plaintiff have and recover off and from the defendant two thousand seven hundred and fifty dollars in trust for T. Galvin Hyde, two thousand seven hundred and fifty dollars in trust for T. H. Crawford, two hundred dollars in trust for Charles F. Hyde, and one hundred and fifty dollars in trust for John Wheeler, are entirely without the scope of the complaint, and for that reason void, and therefore reversible upon appeal. Undoubtedly, under the allegations of the complaint, the plaintiff could recover the fees named. He sues in the capacity of trustee, and whatever he may recover by reason of the decree would be in trust for the bondholders. Now, if, at his own request, the court has decreed that he recover these certain fees in trust for the parties named, who, for all that appears of record, have earned them, when, at the same time, he, as trustee for the bondholders, is under personal obligations to these parties for services rendered in the suit instituted by him, we cannot say that these provisions are so entirely without the scope of the pleadings, and the authority of the parties to agree to under them, as that the court will declare them void at the instance of a party requesting the court to enter just such a decree. We therefore consider the point not well taken.
As to the error assigned because the court did not ascertain and decree to plaintiff a reasonable sum as compensation for services rendered as trustee, if the question was properly here we could not consider it, as no testimony is found in the record upon which to base such a finding and decree. Dismissed.