Case Name: Deanna Gayle AARON v. NEW ORLEANS RIVERWALK ASSOCIATION, The Rouse Company, and Mike Anderson's Seafood
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1991-05-30
Citations: 580 So. 2d 1119
Docket Number: No. 90-CA-0164
Parties: Deanna Gayle AARON v. NEW ORLEANS RIVERWALK ASSOCIATION, The Rouse Company, and Mike Anderson’s Seafood.
Judges: SCHOTT, C.J., and WARD, ARMSTRONG, BECKER, JJ., and HUFFT, J. Pro Tem.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 580
Pages: 1119–1124

Head Matter:
Deanna Gayle AARON v. NEW ORLEANS RIVERWALK ASSOCIATION, The Rouse Company, and Mike Anderson’s Seafood.
No. 90-CA-0164.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
May 30, 1991.
Bruce G. Whittaker, New Orleans, for plaintiff/ appellant.
John F. Young, Jr., Richard G. Duplantier, Jr., Hebert, Mouledoux & Bland, New Orleans, for defendant/appellee.
SCHOTT, C.J., and WARD, ARMSTRONG, BECKER, JJ., and HUFFT, J. Pro Tem.

Opinion:
BECKER, Judge.
Plaintiff appeals the trial court's judgment granting defendant's, Mike Anderson's Seafood, motion for summary-judgment, and dismissing plaintiffs claims against Mike Anderson's Seafood. Plaintiff, Deanna Gayle Aaron, instituted the present suit against Mike Anderson's, New Orleans Riverwalk Associates, and J.B. Rivers, seeking damages for injuries incurred as a result of a rape and sexual assault which occurred while she was in the course and scope of her employment with Mike Anderson's.
On August 30, 1987, plaintiff was employed by Mike Anderson's as manager of the restaurant at the Riverwalk in New Orleans, Louisiana. That evening, after the restaurant closed, plaintiff entered Mike Anderson's storeroom to deposit into the safe the daily receipts. After entering the storeroom, Ms. Aaron was robbed by Booker Diggins and Charles Washington, at which time she was raped by Diggins and sexually assaulted by Washington.
Diggins and Washington had received the keys to the storeroom from Karis Scott and Matthew Thomas, two employees of Mike Anderson's. Scott and Thomas were aware of, and conspired with Diggins and Washington to rob Mike Anderson's. However, neither Scott nor Thomas were aware of any intentions of Diggins and/or Washington to rape and/or sexually assault the plaintiff. Scott and Thomas were not present at the time of the robbery, rape and sexual assault.
Defendant, Mike Anderson's, filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that it was entitled to a summary judgment as a matter of law because plaintiff's sole remedy against Mike Anderson's, her employer, is under the Louisiana Worker's Compensation Act; and that the employees of Mike Anderson's were not responsible for the rape and/or sexual assault on the plaintiff, and thus, Mike Anderson's can not be held responsible for the assault on Aaron.
Plaintiff opposed the Motion for Summary Judgment and filed a Motion to Strike certain documents Mike Anderson's had attached to its motion. In particular, the plaintiff sought to strike from the record an uncertified copy of the criminal trial transcript, and the affidavit of Richard Williams, a vice-president of Mike Anderson's.
After a hearing on the motions, the trial court denied plaintiff's Motion to Strike and granted defendant's, Mike Anderson's, Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff now seeks review of the trial court judgment arguing that the trial court committed error in denying her Motion to Strike and granting defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
A motion for Summary Judgment should be granted, if and only if, the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. L.S.A.-C.C.P. article 966; Employers Surplus Line Insurance Company v. City of Baton Rouge, 362 So.2d 561 (La.1978).
In support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, Mike Anderson's attached a copy of a portion of the transcript of the criminal trial of Diggins and Washington. However, the copy of the transcript is not certified, and the pages from the transcript are not entirely consecutive. The defendant apparently had taken certain pages from the criminal transcript to support its motion. Testimony should neither be received nor considered, even with consent of counsel, to decide a motion for summary judgment. Urban Management Corp. v. Burns, 427 So.2d 1310 (La.App. 2nd Cir.1983); Landau v. Groves, 397 So.2d 866 (La.App. 4th Cir.1981). Thus, we must find that the trial court erred in denying plaintiff's request to strike the criminal trial transcript.
Plaintiff also argues that the affidavit of Richard Williams should have been stricken from the record. She contends that the affidavit was not properly constructed as it does not set out the facts upon which Mr. Williams' personal knowledge is based. Ms. Aaron further contends that Mr. Williams expresses a conclusion of law in the affidavit.
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 967 provides in pertinent part that affidavits "shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated herein." Mr. Williams, as vice-president of Mike Anderson's, stated in his affidavit that he had personal knowledge of the day to day operations of Mike Anderson's, and was involved in and familiar with the investigation of the incident involving the plaintiff and all events subsequent thereto. The affidavit, thus, does sufficiently provide a basis to determine that Williams had personal knowledge of the incident in question. However, we must acknowledge that Mr. Williams, in his affidavit, does make a conclusion of law in regards to the employment relationship between Karis Scott, Matthew Thomas, and Mike Anderson's.
Accordingly, we must find that the trial court erred in refusing to strike the portion of Mr. Williams' affidavit that provided:
"9. At all material times hereto, when Karis Scott and Matthew Thomas conspired to rob Mike Anderson's Seafood of Riverwalk, Inc., they were not acting within the course and scope of their employment with Mike Anderson's Seafood and were in no way benefitting the interest of Mike Anderson's Seafood of River-walk, Inc."
However, the rest of the affidavit was properly admitted and considered by the trial court.
Even with striking the criminal trial transcript and a portion of Mr. Williams' affidavit, it appears that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. In her petition, plaintiff asserts that Mike Anderson's is liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior, based upon the intentional acts of Karis Scott and Matthew Thomas, for the injuries she received as a result of the rape and sexual assault.
The law is clear that for any employer to be held vicariously liable for an intentional tort of a co-employee against a co-employee, the tortfeasor/employee must be acting in the course and scope of his employment. L.S.A.-R.S. 23:1032; Tampke v. Findley Adhesives, Inc., 489 So.2d 299 (La.App. 4th Cir.1986), writ denied, 491 So.2d 24 (La.1986); Cazenave v. Pierce, 568 So.2d 1360 (La.App. 4th Cir.1990). In determining whether an employee was acting in the course and scope of his employment, the employee's conduct must be so "closely connected in time, place and causation to his employment duties as to be regarded a risk of harm fairly attributable to the employer's business, as compared with conduct motivated by purely personal considerations entirely extraneous to the employer's interest." LeBrane v. Lewis, 292 So.2d 216 (La.1974); Johnson v. Dufrene, 433 So.2d 1109, 1112 (La.App. 4th Cir.1983), writ denied, 441 So.2d 765 (La.1983).
The Louisiana Supreme Court in LeBrane v. Lewis, supra and Miller v. Keating, 349 So.2d 265 (La.1977), further set out several factors to be considered in determining whether an employee was acting in the course and scope of his employment when he committed an intentional act:
(1) whether the tortious act was primarily employment rooted;
(2) whether the violence was reasonably incidental to the performance of the employee's duties;
(3) whether the act occurred on the employer's premises; and
(4) whether it occurred during the hours of employment.
In the ease at bar, the acts complained of did occur on the employer's premises but not during the hours of Scott's and Thomas's employment with Mike Anderson's. While Scott and Thomas did give the storeroom keys to Washington and Diggins, neither was present at the time of the actual robbery and assault. Further, the violence which Ms. Aaron suffered was in no way reasonably incidental to Scott's and Thomas's employment duties. Scott and Thomas were not employed as supervisory personnel nor were they placed in a position of authority. They were simply minimum wage level food service personnel whose responsibilities included preparing food, washing dishes and cleaning the premises.
Scott's and Thomas's actions and motivations were of a purely personal nature. Their intentions to rob Mike Anderson's had no benefit to, and was entirely against the interests of Mike Anderson's. The employee's manual, which defendant attached as an exhibit to its Motion for Summary Judgment, stated that an employee could be subjected to disciplinary action, including termination, if he engaged in "[t]heft of property belonging to the company or another crew member" and/or an "[ajssualt on a supervisor or fellow crew member."
Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding that Scott and Thomas were not acting in the course and scope of their employment when they conspired to rob Mike Anderson's, and granting Mike Anderson's Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff's sole remedy against her employer Mike Anderson's Seafood, is under the Louisiana Worker's Compensation Act.
Accordingly for the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
SCHOTT, C.J., concurs with reasons.
ARMSTRONG, J., dissents with reasons.