Case Name: Hine v. Cushing
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1889-07-09
Citations: 6 N.Y.S. 850
Docket Number: 
Parties: Hine v. Cushing.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 6
Pages: 850–856

Head Matter:
Hine v. Cushing.
(Supreme Court, General Term, First Department.
July 9, 1889.)
1. Landlord and Tenant—Tenancy at Will—Principal and Agent.
One holding a mortgage as executor, foreclosed and bought the mortgaged premises. He agreed that the former owner’s husband should continue in charge of the premises, collect the rents, retain for his own use a certain portion, and account for the balance. When sufficient payments were made the premises were to be re-conveyed. The husband having died, his family suggested, and the purchaser agreed, that A. should take his place. A. took possession and control of the premises, made leases, collected rents, made repairs, and, after deducting expenses, his own compensation, and a sum agreed on for the support of the former owner’s fain- , ily, paid over the balance to the purchaser, to whom he also rendered accounts. Held, that A. was not a tenant at will in possession, but the purchaser’s agent.
2. Same—Repairs by Landlord—Negligence—Damages.
Where a landlord attempts to make repairs to the supports of a large building, the repairing being done under the personal superintendence of an agent, who has no expert knowledge of the work required, and the building falls immediately after it is allowed to rest on the new foundation, the act is one of negligence, and the landlord is liable for damages resulting therefrom.
3. Same—Connected Buildings.
Buildings designated on a diagram as Nos. 4 and 5 had separate and distinct walls, about 26 feet apart, the space being used as an elevator building, with wooden passage-ways between the two buildings, water-closets, stairs, ana elevators, all of which were used by the occupants of both buildings. Held that, for all purposes of damage resulting from a fire, the two buildings and connecting elevator were one building. x
4. Same—Damages—Proximate Cause.
A conflagration is the natural and proximate result of the fall of a building in which fires are used, and which is itself inflammable, and contains alarge amount of inflammable material, and one by whose negligence the building falls is liable for damages caused by its burning.
5. Same—Destruction op Business.
As part of the damage caused by the destruction of a business, loss of profits may be allowed for the reasonable time necessary to re-establish the business.
6. Witness—Examination—Contradictory Statements.
On cross-examination of a witness of defendant it appeared that he had made an affidavit inconsistent with his direct testimony, but it did not appear whether he adhered to or receded from his direct testimony. Held, that defendant could not, by cross-examining him on the old affidavit, make direct testimony of any of the • previous declarations made by witness; but the entire affidavit was admissible to show former statements of witness which were inconsistent with his testimony. Daniels, J., dissenting.
7. Same—Hypothetical Questions—Harmless Error.
A new trial will not be granted on account of hypothetical questions improperly put to a witness, where it appears that the questions proved both useless and harmless. Daniels, J., dissenting.
8. Trial—Objections to Evidence—Admission oe Statutes.
The admission in evidence of the building laws was immaterial, and could not affect the rights of defendant, as the laws of the state may be referred to without being put in evidence. Daniels, J., dissenting.
Appeal from judgment on report of G-eoege C. Holt, Referee.
Action by Milo Hine against Nathan Cushing, owner in fee of a certain building in Brooklyn, a portion of which was leased to plaintiff, to recover $9,777.91 damages sustained by reason of the fall of the building, and a fire resulting therefrom, which destroyed plaintiff’s machinery, tools, stock, and business, and which was alleged to have been caused by defendant’s negligence. Originally the defendant, Gushing, held a mortgage upon the property as executor of an estate. Upon foreclosure he bought in the property, and took title in his own name. The title to the property had stood in the name of a Mrs. Houghton. When the defendant purchased it he made a verbal arrangement with Mr. Houghton that he (Houghton) should continue in charge of the property, collect the rents and profits, see to the care of the premises, retain for his own use a certain portion of the proceeds, and account to the defendant for any balance. Mr. Houghton was, also, when the payments made by him amounted to the claims held by the defendant against the property, to have the right to have a reconveyance of the property. The property was thus managed during Houghton’s life. At his death, the Houghton family suggested that George L. Abbott should take the deceased Houghton’s place, and to this the defendant assented. Abbott took control of the premises, assumed the entire management of them, made leases, collected rents, made repairs, and, after deducting all expenses and a certain sum agreed upon for the support of the Houghton family, paid over the balance to defendant. The referee found Abbott to be the agent of defendant, and that the property was destroyed through defendant’s negligence in making repairs to the foundations of the buildings. These repairs were under the personal direction of the agent, Abbott, who had no expert knowledge of how such work should be done. On the filing of the referee’s report a judgment for $7,617.88 was entered in favor of plaintiff, from which report and judgment defendant appeals.
Argued before Van Brunt, P. J., and Daniels and Barrett, JJ.
Albert Stickney and ¡Samuel H. Ordway, for appellant. Richards & Heald, {John R. Parsons, of counsel,) for respondent.

Opinion:
Barrett, J.
I concur in the opinion of Mr. Justice Daniels upon the general merits of this controversy. But I am unable to agree with him that the judgment must nevertheless be reversed because of errors in the admission and exclusion of testimony. .
First. With regard to the witness Miller. The defendant was not surprised by the testimony of this witness, nor does he seem to have been a hostile witness. The excluded questions were not necessitated by anything which transpired upon the direct examination. Upon that examination there was neither inconsistency nor want of recollection. The excluded questions were put upon the redirect, after the witness, upon cross-examination, had admitted making an affidavit somewhat modifying his direct testimony. The rule laid down in Bullard v. Pearsall, 53 N. Y. 230, (which is evidently the case referred to by Justice Daniels,) does not apply to such a situation. The defendant had a right, upon the redirect, to inquire into the circumstances attending the making of the affidavit. He could also ask the witness whether he still adhered unqualifiedly to his direct testimony. If he did, the defendant could not add to that adherence, or corroborate the witness, by asking him whether he had not-previously testified (even more strongly) to the same effect. If, however, upon being confronted with the affidavit, the witness receded from the direct- testimony, the defendant could probably refresh his recollection, and bring him back to his original statement, by recalling the previous testimony. But where the witness was not asked whether he reaffirmed or receded from his direct testimony, the latter simply stood, subject to the legitimate effect of the cross-examination. The defendant could not, under such circumstances, and under the guise of a cross-examination of his own witness upon the affidavit, make direct testimony of the previous declarations. It was not a complete lapse or change of memory with which the party here calling the witness had to contend, but merely the weakening of his direct testimony by cross-examination. That did not justify an iriquiry into the witness' testimony in other cases. A party calling a witness, who is surprised by testimony contrary to his expectations, is permitted to interrogate the witness as to previous declarations inconsistent with the testimony, "for the purpose of probing his recollection, recalling to his mind the statements he has previously made, and drawing out an explanation of his apparent inconsistency." Rapallo, J., in Bullard v. Pearsall, supra. Here, however, there was no inconsistency between the testimony given and the previous declarations. The direct testimony was not perhaps quite so strong as the previous testimony, but it was substantially the same. At all events, the previous testimony was not admissible, nor could the witness be interrogated with regard to it, merely for the purpose of giving color and strength to the present direct testimony, there being no inconsistency between the latter and the former. The inconsistency, if any, was in the affidavit to which the witness' attention was called upon cross-examination. But the rule does not extend to such surprises of cross-examination, nor to declarations inconsistent with affidavits used to weaken perfectly consistent direct testimony. My conclusion is that the defendant was deprived of no legal right by the exclusion of these declarations.
Second. As to the admission of the entire affidavit. This was unobjectionable, as the referee expressly limited its use to its proper function, namely, the showing of statements inconsistent with the witness' present testimony. The referee then added: "The statements in the affidavit are not admissible as evidence for any other purpose." And when the defendant's counsel repeated his objection in another form the referee again said: "I overrule the request, on the ground that the whole of the affidavit must be admitted in evidence, but holding at the same time that the affidavit constitutes no proof of the facts in the portion of the affidavit which has been read "
Third. As to the admission, upon Hatfield's cross-examination, of the building laws applicable to the city of Hew York. This was immaterial, and could not possibly have prejudiced the defendant. It was also superfluous, as the laws of the state can be referred to without being put in evidence.
Fourth. As to the hypothetical questions put to the witness Robertson. Justice Daniels concedes that this evidence was both useless and harmless. For that very reason I cannot assent to the granting of a new trial merely because the questions put to this witness were intricate and prolix, nor because of the manner in which this useless and harmless testimony was taken. In my judgment, substantial justice was done in this case, and whatever errors may have been committed, in the course of a long and earnestly contested trial, were trivial and unimportant. They were not, at all events, sufficiently grave to affect the result or to warrant the disturbance of the judgment. The judgment should be affirmed, with costs.