Case Name: ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, Sandra B. Nichols, M.D., Director, and Henry C. Robinson, Jr., Director and State Registrar, Division of Vital Records v. WESTARK CHRISTIAN ACTION COUNCIL, a Nonprofit Corporation
Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 1995-11-13
Citations: 322 Ark. 440
Docket Number: 94-1264
Parties: ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, Sandra B. Nichols, M.D., Director, and Henry C. Robinson, Jr., Director and State Registrar, Division of Vital Records v. WESTARK CHRISTIAN ACTION COUNCIL, a Nonprofit Corporation
Judges: Newbern, J., not participating.
Reporter: Arkansas Reports
Volume: 322
Pages: 440–452

Head Matter:
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, Sandra B. Nichols, M.D., Director, and Henry C. Robinson, Jr., Director and State Registrar, Division of Vital Records v. WESTARK CHRISTIAN ACTION COUNCIL, a Nonprofit Corporation
94-1264
910 S.W.2d 199
Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion delivered November 13, 1995
George A. Harper, Gen. Counsel, Arkansas Department of Health, for appellants.
R. Gunner DeLay, for appellee.
Bettina E. Brownstein, Eve C. Gartner, and Dara Klassel, for William Harrison, M.D., Planned Parenthood of Eastern Oklahoma and Western Arkansas, Inc., Planned Parenthood of Greater Arkansas, Inc., Curtis E. Stover, M.D., and Little Rock Family Planning Services, P.A., as amici curiae in support of appellants.
Simons & Assoc., by: L. Vance Marker, attorney, and Penny Shane, Emily Granrud, and Ellen Nachtigall, of counsel, for the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, the American Medical Women’s Ass’n, the American Public Health Ass’n, the Ass’n for Vital Records and Health Statistics, the Committee on Privacy and Confidentiality of the American Statistical Ass’ii, and the Society of General Internal Medicine, as amici curiae in support of appellants.
J. Fred Hart, Jr., and Charles Suphan, for Prolife Arkansas, as amicus curiae in support of appellees.

Opinion:
Robert L. Brown, Justice.
The issue in this appeal is whether certain reports of aborted pregnancies are either "medical records" or "vital records" and, thus, exempt from the requirements of the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), which is codified at Ark. Code Ann. § 25-19-101 to 107 (Repl. 1992, Supp. 1993). Appellants Arkansas Department of Health; Sandra B. Nichols, Director; and Henry C. Robinson, Director and State Registrar of the Division of Vital Records (jointly referred to as Health Department) appeal from a judgment of the circuit court ordering the release of these reports to appellee Westark Christian Action Council. We conclude that the court erred in finding that the reports were not vital records and exempt from the FOIA. We reverse and remand.
On July 1, 1994, Dale W. Morfey, Chairman and President of Westark, requested copies of aborted pregnancy reports and files under the FOIA for Washington, Crawford, and Sebastian Counties from 1980 to present or, alternatively, access to the files containing this information. The precise request was for copies of Form ACHS-01 for these counties for that time frame, which is a form entitled a "Report of Induced Termination of Pregnancy." Form ACHS-01 is filed with the Health Department's Center for Health Statistics "for statistical use only." The data required in the form is the facility name and address where the induced termination occurs and the following information about the patient: age; marital status; date of pregnancy termination; address by city, county, state and zip code; residence inside the city limits; race; education level; previous pregnancies; date of last menses; and type of procedure used in the termination.
On July 6, 1994, the General Counsel for the Health Department responded and stated that the Division of Vital Records had interpreted Form ACHS-01 to be a "vital record" and not subject to release under the Vital Statistics Act. On July 28, 1994, Westark filed suit under the FOIA and alleged that the reports requested were not "vital records" but statistical reports and that their release would constitute no breach of confidentiality. Wes tark contended that the Health Department had violated the FOIA. The Health Department answered and denied the allegations in the complaint. It filed a Trial Brief, asserting that Form ACHS01 was not only a "vital record" under the Vital Statistics Act, codified at Ark. Code Ann. § 20-18-101 to 705 (Repl. 1991), but also a "medical record" and exempt under the FOIA at Ark. Code Ann. § 25-19-105(b)(2) (Repl. 1992).
On August 18, 1994, following a hearing on the matter, the circuit court found that Form ACHS-01 was neither a "vital record" nor a "medical report." The court ordered disclosure of the reports requested by Westark pursuant to the FOIA but stayed its order pending appeal.
The dual arguments advanced by the Health Department on appeal are that Form ACHS-01 is both a "medical record" and a "vital record" and, thus, exempt from the FOIA under either exemption. We begin by referencing the policy considerations surrounding the FOIA and our rules of construction regarding it. The FOIA opens "all public records" for public inspection. Ark. Code Ann. § 25-19-105(a) (Supp. 1993). The term "public records" is defined to include all documents required by law to be kept and which record the performance or lack of performance of official functions. Ark. Code Ann. § 25-19-103(1) (Repl. 1992). We liberally construe the FOIA to accomplish its broad and laudable purpose that public business be performed in an open and public manner. Sebastian County Chap, of the Am. Red Cross v. Weatherford, 311 Ark. 656, 846 S.W.2d 641 (1993); Bryant v. Mars, 309 Ark. 480, 830 S.W.2d 869 (1992). In conjunction with this rule of construction, we narrowly construe exceptions to the FOIA to counterbalance the self-protective instincts of the government bureaucracy. Byrne v. Eagle, 319 Ark. 587, 892 S.W.2d 487 (1995); McCambridge v. City of Little Rock, 298 Ark. 219, 766 S.W.2d 909 (1989). A statutory provision for nondisclosure must be specific. Ark. Code Ann. § 25-19-105(a) (Supp. 1993); Troutt Bros. v. Emison, 311 Ark. 27, 841 S.W.2d 604 (1992). Less than clear or ambiguous exemptions will be interpreted in a manner favoring disclosure. Troutt Bros. v. Emison, supra; Young v. Rice, 308 Ark. 593, 826 S.W.2d 252 (1992).
Bearing these principles in mind, we address the issue of whether Form ACHS-01 is a "vital record" and, if so, whether it is exempt from the FOIA. The Vital Statistics Act, as it existed in 1994, provided these definitions which are pertinent to this appeal:
(1) "Vital statistics" means the data derived from certificates and reports of birth, death, fetal death, induced termination of pregnancy, marriage, divorce, or annulment and related reports but does not mean or include the unintentional destruction of a fetus in performance of the surgical procedure dilation and curettage;
(3) "Vital records" means certificates or reports of birth, death, marriage, divorce, or annulment and the data related thereto;
(7) "Fetal death" means death prior to the complete expulsion or extraction from its mother of a product of human conception, irrespective of the duration of pregnancy. The death is indicated by the fact that after the expulsion or extraction, the fetus does not breathe or show any other evidence of life such as beating of the heart, pulsation of the umbilical cord or definite movement of voluntary muscles;
(A) "Spontaneous fetal death" means the expulsion or extraction of a product of human conception resulting in other than a live birth and which is not an induced termination of pregnancy, sometimes referred to as stillbirth and miscarriage;
(B) "Induced termination of pregnancy" means the intentional termination of pregnancy with the intention other than to produce a live-born infant or to remove a dead fetus;
Ark. Code Ann. § 20-18-102(1), (3), (7) (Repl. 1991).
The Act, in 1994, further prohibited disclosure of "vital records":
(a) To protect the integrity of vital records, to insure their proper use, and to insure the efficient and proper administration of the system of vital statistics, it shall be unlawful for any person to permit inspection of or to disclose information contained in vital records or to copy or issue a copy of all or part of any record except as authorized by this chapter and by regulation or by order of a court of competent jurisdiction. The regulations shall provide for adequate standards of security and confidentiality of vital records.
(b) The board may authorize by regulation the disclosure of information contained in vital records for research purposes.
(c) The state registrar shall not permit searching of the files and records of the division by any person other than by the authorized employees of the division and shall not furnish lists of births or deaths for commercial purposes.
Ark. Code Ann. § 20-18-304 (Repl. 1991).
The Act, thus, provides under § 20-18-102(7) that induced terminations of pregnancies are embraced within the definition of "fetal death." The Act at § 20-18-102(3) also provides that "vital records" are reports of "death" and "the data related thereto." Westark argues, however, that reports on fetal death are not specifically listed under § 20-18-102(3) as vital records while fetal death is mentioned in § 20-18-102(1) and § 20-18-102(7). This, according to Westark's theory, substantiates a legislative intent to exclude Form ACHS-01 reports as "vital reports." That contention, however, ignores the fact that a broader, more encompassing category is referenced under § 20-18-102(3) — death — which subsumes the subcategory of "fetal death." We have addressed comparable arguments in other contexts. For example, it has been urged upon us on occasion that the term "robbery" does not include "aggravated robbery" for purposes of capital felony murder. We have dismissed that argument as having no merit. See Nooner v. State, 322 Ark. 87, 907 S.W.2d 677 (1995); McClendon v. State, 295 Ark. 303, 748 S.W.2d 641 (1988).
On an analogous point, Westark urges that Form ACHS-01 is a form for collecting data and statistics and as such is not a vital report. We give this argument little credence. The definition of "vital records" set forth at § 20-18-102(3) includes reports on death and the data related thereto. Under the clear terms of the statute, as already stated, "induced termination of pregnancy" is a subset of "fetal death" and data relating to death reports constitutes a "vital record." We conclude that Form ACHS01 provides that data and easily qualifies as a vital record under the Vital Statistics Act.
We are mindful of the fact that the Vital Statistics Act does provide that reports on fetal deaths involving more than 20 weeks of gestation are made to the Division of Vital Records whereas reports on fetal deaths resulting from induced terminations of pregnancies are filed with the Division of Health Statistics. Ark. Code Ann. § 20-18-603 (Repl. 1991). We also are aware that under § 20-18-603 these statistical reports are not made part of the permanent records of the system of vital statistics. But contrary to the assertion by Westark, we do not view § 20-18-603 as undermining our conclusion that Form ACHS-01 is a vital record. This section merely describes where the report is to be filed and its lack of permanency. Regardless of its eventual location, Form ACHS-01 provides data relating to a category of death and is included within the definition of "vital records."
Moreover, the Vital Statistics Act evinces a clear and specific policy in favor of the confidentiality of the Form ACHS01 reports. That policy is evidenced by the general provision which expressly renders disclosure of "vital records" unlawful under § 20-18-304. It is further evidenced by § 20-18-603(b)(3), which requires that reports of fetal deaths "not include the name or other personal identification of the individual having an induced termination of pregnancy." To underscore this policy even further, the General Assembly enacted Act 1254 of 1995, which amends the Vital Statistics Act to include a category of statistics entitled "vital reports." Under the new Act, "vital reports" are defined as "reports of fetal death and induced terminations of pregnancy and data related thereto," and disclosure of "vital reports" is expressly proscribed. Act 1254 also defines "fetal death" and "induced termination of pregnancy" separately. We do not give retroactive effect to this legislative enactment. By the same token, the most basic rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. Graham v. Forrest City Housing Auth., 304 Ark. 632, 803 S.W.2d 923 (1991). While we view the Vital Statistics Act, as it existed in 1994, to be clear and unambiguous on the issue of whether Form ACHS-01 constituted a vital record and was nondisclosable, the enactment of Act 1254 confirms the manifest intent of the General Assembly to render unlawful the release of this data. See Nathaniel v. Forrest City School Dist. No. 7, 300 Ark. 513, 780 S.W.2d 539 (1989).
Finally, though the circuit court did couch its order in terms of "finding" that Form ACHS-01 was not a "vital record," we do not consider that to be a finding of fact which would bring into play the clearly erroneous standard of review. See Ark. R. Civ. P. 52(a). This case presents issues of statutory construction — what is included within the term "vital records" and whether the data is subject to disclosure — and it is for this court to decide what a statute means. See Peters v. State, 321 Ark. 276, 902 S.W.2d 757 (1995); Furman v. Holloway, 312 Ark. 378, 849 S.W.2d 520 (1993); Bryant v. Mars, supra.
Because we decide that Form ACHS-01 is a vital record within the confines of the Vital Statistics Act and exempt from the FOIA, we need not address whether it is also a "medical record." We reverse the order of the circuit court and remand the case for purposes of entry of an order consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Newbern, J., not participating.
Special Justice Jesse L. Kearney concurs.