Case Name: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Michael Anthony COLBERT, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2007-11-30
Citations: 968 So. 2d 1043
Docket Number: No. 5D07-122
Parties: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Michael Anthony COLBERT, Appellee.
Judges: PLEUS, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 968
Pages: 1043–1048

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Michael Anthony COLBERT, Appellee.
No. 5D07-122.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Nov. 30, 2007.
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Brigid E. Collins, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Henry T. Swann, III, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

Opinion:
LAWSON, J.
The State appeals from Michael Anthony Colbert's downward departure sentence pursuant to section 943.0435, Florida Statutes (2006). Finding that the State failed to preserve the issue it now raises for appellate review, we affirm.
Section 924.051(3), Florida Statutes (2006), provides that a "judgment or sentence may be reversed on appeal only when an appellate court determines after review of the complete record that prejudicial error occurred and was properly preserved in the trial court or, if not properly preserved, would constitute fundamental error." For purposes of this rule, "preserved" means "that an issue, legal argument, or objection to evidence was timely raised before, and ruled on by, the trial court, and that the issue, legal argument, or objection to evidence was sufficiently precise that it fairly appraised the trial court of the relief sought and the grounds therefore." § 924.051(l)(b), Fla. Stat. (2006).
Consistent with this statute, the Florida Supreme Court has held that proper preservation requires the following three components:
First, a litigant must make a timely, contemporaneous objection. Second, the party must state a legal ground for that objection. Third, "[i]n order for an argument to be cognizable on appeal, it must be the specific contention asserted as legal ground for the objection, exception, or motion below."
Harrell v. State, 894 So.2d 935, 940 (Fla.2005) (emphasis in original) (quoting Steinhorst v. State, 412 So.2d 332, 338 (Fla.1982)); see also Rodriguez v. State, 609 So.2d 493, 499 (Fla.1992) (stating that "the specific legal ground upon which a claim is based must be raised at trial and a claim different than that will not be heard on appeal"). "The purpose of this rule is to 'place [] the trial judge on notice that error may have been committed, and provide [ ] him an opportunity to correct it at an early stage of the proceedings.' " Harrell, 894 So.2d at 940 (quoting Castor v. State, 365 So.2d 701, 703 (Fla.1978)).
We have reviewed the complete record on appeal. The full extent of the prosecutor's objection below was her statement that: "Just for the record, obviously the State objects." It is clear from the transcript provided that some off-record discussions occurred between the parties before Colbert entered his plea, and that these discussions involved some type of factual proffer by Colbert's attorney relating to the basis for departure found by the trial court. It also appears obvious that all parties understood from these off-record discussions that the trial judge would impose a departure sentence, to which the State would object. After taking Colbert's plea, the trial judge simply announced that this "will be a downward departure over the State's objection," and indicated that the basis for departure was section 921.0026(2)(j), Florida Statutes (allowing a downward departure where "[t]he offense was committed in an unsophisticated manner and was an isolated incident for which the defendant has shown remorse.").
We agree with the State that the record does not contain any evidentiary basis to support the trial court's finding that this basis for departure was appropriate. However, because the prosecutor failed to make this objection below, the issue was not preserved for appellate review. In so holding, we recognize that a general objection, such as the one made here, can be sufficient to preserve the State's right to challenge the basis for a downward departure sentence "when the basis for that objection clearly appears from the context," State v. Roberts, 963 So.2d 747 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007), or when "it is clear from the hearing transcript that the trial court was aware of the legal errors associated with its ruling" and therefore "had the opportunity to correct it." State v. Walker, 923 So.2d 1262, 1265 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). These exceptions do not apply here.
Because of the off-record proffer and discussions, the State's general objection could have meant any number of things. The State could have meant exactly what it now argues on appeal: that the court could not depart unless Colbert put his supporting evidence on the record. If that objection had been timely made, Colbert then would have had the opportunity to respond and place any supporting evidence on the record. Perhaps the State had no objection to counsel simply proffering the evidence, but viewed that evidence as insufficient to support a downward departure under section 921.0026(2)(j). Alternatively, the State could have conceded that whatever evidence had been proffered would support a departure, but then objected to the trial court's decision to exercise his discretion to depart. For all we know, the prosecutor may have agreed, off-record, as to the basis for departure, but indicated that she would still "object for the record." Given the context of this general objection, we simply cannot tell what legal argument the prosecutor was attempting to make. Therefore, we must affirm. Harrell, 894 So.2d at 940.
AFFIRMED.
PLEUS, J., concurs.
RAINWATER, T., Associate Judge, dissents with opinion.
. In giving his reason for the departure, the trial court expressly referenced information that "[Colbert's] counsel has represented."