Case Name: D. M. Crenshaw vs. W. T. Crenshaw
Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1851-11
Citations: 4 Rich. Eq. 14
Docket Number: 
Parties: D. M. Crenshaw vs. W. T. Crenshaw.
Judges: JOHNSTON, DüNKIN, DaRGAN and Wakdlaw, CC. concurring.
Reporter: South Carolina Equity Reports
Volume: 25
Pages: 14–16

Head Matter:
D. M. Crenshaw vs. W. T. Crenshaw.
A general grant of guardianship of the estate authorizes the guardian to receive any estate afterwards accruing to the ward.
Where the same person unites in himself the characters of administrator and guardian of one of the distributees, and in Ms returns as guardian charges himself with the share of the distributee, he is no longer liable to account as administrator to that distributee.
Before Wardlaw, Ch. at Union, June, 1851.
The circuit decree, from which the case will be sufficiently understood, is as follows:
Wardlaw, Ch. This was an appeal, in behalf of the sureties in the administration bond, from a decree of the Ordinary, that W. T. Crenshaw, as administrator of Jane Crenshaw, pay to D. W. Crenshaw, a distributee of the estate, who had cited the ad- minístrate to account, the sum of $172 46, with interest thereon from January 1, 1847.
It appeared from the report of the Ordinary, that Jane Cren-shaw died intestate in 1834, leaving six brothers and sisters, of whom E. M. Crenshaw was one, the distributees of her estate, and that administration of her estate was granted to W. T. Crenshaw; that the administrator made a return to the Ordinary, May 16, 1836, which was the basis of the decree; that by proceedings in equity, said W. T. Crenshaw was appointed guardian of the person and estate of said D. M. Crenshaw; and that at the date of the appointment, the intestate, Jane, was alive; and the petition and report of the Commissioner in Equity referred to the interest of the ward in the estate of his deceased father, James Crenshaw, as the estate of the ward needing guardianship, although by the order the guardian was appointed in general terms; that the said W. T. Crenshaw, May 16, 1836, probably after his return to the Ordinary of the same date, made his return, as guardian, to the Commissioner in Equity, in which he charged himself with the interest of the ward in the estate of said intestate, Jane. The Ordinary, proceeding apparently upon the notion that the guardianship was limited to the interest of the ward in the estate of his father, decreed that W. T. Crenshaw, as administrator, was liable for his ward’s share in the estate of his sister Jane.
I am of opinion that the appeal must be sustained. A general grant of guardianship of the estate authorizes the guardian to receive any estate accruing to the ward after the appointment. It is proper, in case the subsequent acqidsition of estate by the ward be large, that the fact be brought to the attention of the Court, by the officer of the Court, or by some friend of the ward, so that additional security may be required from the guardian; but the guardian is appointed to protect the possible as well as the actual interests of the ward. His authority cannot be apportioned according to the security he may have given. The case of Sionhins, Ordinary, vs. Qobh, (2 Bail. 60,) is direct authority that if the administrator of an estate be appointed guardian of the distribu- tees, enter into bond as guardian, and charge himself in his returns as guardian with the balances in his hands as administrator, the administration bond is discharged. As guardian, he becomes creditor of himself as administrator, and thus uniting the characters of creditor and debtor, the debt upon the administration bond is extinguished. (Johnson vs. Johnson, 2 Hill Oh. 284.)
It is ordered and decreed, that the decree of the Ordinary be reversed, and that D. M. Crenshaw pay the costs.
The petitioner appealed, on the following grounds:
1. Because the defendant was not appointed guardian of the interest of the petitioner in the estate of Jane Crenshaw; and he, having her estate as administrator, is liable for the same in that character.
2. Because, even if defendant made himself and his sureties, on his guardianship bond, liable for what he received as administrator, it cannot discharge the sureties on the administration bond to the petitioner.
Dawliins, for appellant.
-, contra.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
We concur in the Chancellor's decree, which is hereby affirmed and the aj>peal dismissed.
JOHNSTON, DüNKIN, DaRGAN and Wakdlaw, CC. concurring.
Decree affirmed.