Case Name: Janet M. CARLINI, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, DEPARTMENT OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1988-03-02
Citations: 521 So. 2d 254
Docket Number: No. 87-1981
Parties: Janet M. CARLINI, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, DEPARTMENT OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, Appellee.
Judges: HERSEY, C.J., and DOWNEY, ANSTEAD, LETTS, DELL, GUNTHER and STONE, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 521
Pages: 254–258

Head Matter:
Janet M. CARLINI, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, DEPARTMENT OF LEGAL AFFAIRS, Appellee.
No. 87-1981.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
March 2, 1988.
Sheldon D. Stevens of Stevens & Peters, P.A., Merritt Island, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Mona Fandel, Asst. Atty. Gen., Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.

Opinion:
WALDEN, Judge.
This is an appeal from an order denying appellant's/respondent's motion to quash service of process. We reverse.
The appellee, State of Florida, instituted an action for forfeiture of real property, naming as respondents Robert P. Carlini and appellant, Janet M. Carlini, his wife. Service of process was sent to the address for which forfeiture was sought, and it was delivered to Peter Carlini, the brother-in-law of appellant, who did not reside at the attempted place of service. A motion to quash service was filed on behalf of the appellant. Attached to this motion was an affidavit by Peter Carlini which stated that appellant did not live at the address, her whereabouts were unknown to affiant, and that affiant did not reside at the attempted place of service. The trial court denied the motion on the basis that it failed to inform the movant how to cure the defects in service.
We recognize that both this court and the third district has held that a motion alleging a defect in personal jurisdiction must set forth sufficient facts to demonstrate the defect in service and how the defect can be cured. See Leatherwood v. Royal Oaks Rentals, 473 So.2d 721 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); Over 30 Association, Inc. v. Blatt, 118 So.2d 71 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960). However, for the reasons stated below, we recede from Leatherwood and acknowledge a conflict with Over 30.
The third district in Over 30 refers to federal law as authority for its holding that a motion to quash must state how the defects can be cured. However, there is no requirement in the federal rules that the defects must be identified and cured before a motion to quash will be granted. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2), (4) & 12(b)(2), (5). To be effective, the motion must merely show defects that would cause material prejudice to the defendant's substantial rights. Hawkins v. Department of Mental Health, 89 F.R.D. 127 (W.D.Mich.1981).
Similarly, there is no requirement in Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.140(b) that a motion to quash must state how the alleged defects may be cured. The rule merely states in pertinent part, "[t]he grounds on which any of the enumerated defenses are based and the substantial matters of law intended to be argued shall be stated specifically and with particularity in the responsive pleading or motion."
The object and purpose of service of process is to give notice of the proceedings so that the opposing party may be given the opportunity to defend the suit brought against him. Haney v. Olin Corporation, 245 So.2d 671 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971); Bussey v. Legislative Auditing Committee of the Legislature, 298 So.2d 219 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974), cert. denied, 304 So.2d 451 (Fla.1974); Home Life Insurance Co. v. Regueira, 243 So.2d 460 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970), cert. denied, 248 So.2d 170 (Fla.1971). Without proper service of process, the court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Sierra Holding, Inc. v. Inn Keepers Supply Co., 464 So.2d 652 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985); Bussey; Federal Insurance Co. v. Fatolitis, 478 So.2d 106 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985).
Statutes dealing with service of process are to be strictly construed. Sierra Holding Inc.; Baraban v. Sussman, 439 So.2d 1046 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983). The burden of proof to sustain the validity of service of process is upon the person who seeks to invoke the jurisdiction of the court, and to achieve proper service of process, there must be a strict compliance with the appli cable statute. Youngblood v. Citrus Associates of the New York Cotton Exchange, Inc., 276 So.2d 505 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973); Mac Organization, Inc. v. Harry Rich Corp., 374 So.2d 81 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Sierra Holding Inc.; Baraban.
By requiring that the motion to quash must state how the defects can be cured, the burden of proof has been improperly shifted from the plaintiff to the defendant. However, the law is clear that the burden of proof to sustain the validity of service of process is upon the person who seeks to invoke the jurisdiction of the court. Youngblood, 276 So.2d at 509. The only affirmative burden on the defendant is to not frustrate or avoid the service, and to accept service when it is reasonably attempted. Haney v. Olin Corporation, 245 So.2d 671 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971).
Furthermore, the plaintiff would not be prejudiced if the motion to quash does not contain how to cure the defect. The reason being is that if, after a diligent search and inquiry, the plaintiff can not locate the defendant, he can obtain valid substituted service of process pursuant to section 48.-161, Florida Statutes. Therefore, we hold that in order to be effective, the motion to quash does not need to state how the defect can be cured.
In the instant case, the statute through which the appellee was attempting to achieve service of process was section 48.-031(1), Florida Statutes. This section provides:
Service of original process is made by delivering a copy of it to the person to be served with a copy of the complaint, petition, or other initial pleading or paper or by leaving the copies at his usual place of abode with any person residing therein who is 15 years of age or older and informing the person of their contents. Minors who are or have been married shall be served as provided in this section.
The appellee had service of process sent to the address of the property for which forfeiture was sought, and it was delivered to Peter Carlini, the brother-in-law of appellant, who did not reside at the attempted place of service.
Clearly, this service of process was not effective. The appellant's motion to quash showed the defects in the service of process. Specifically, that the address was not appellant's usual place of abode and that Peter Carlini, the person with whom the papers were left, was not a resident of the abode. This motion should have been granted.
REVERSED.
HERSEY, C.J., and DOWNEY, ANSTEAD, LETTS, DELL, GUNTHER and STONE, JJ., concur.
GLICKSTEIN, J., concurs specially with opinion.