Case Name: PEOPLE v. WOODWARD
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1883-09
Citations: 2 N.Y. Crim. 32
Docket Number: 
Parties: PEOPLE v. WOODWARD.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York Criminal Reports
Volume: 2
Pages: 32–44

Head Matter:
Supreme Court—General Term—Third Department
September, 1883.
PEOPLE v. WOODWARD.
Larceny.—Oausa Luori, Essential Element of.—Malicious Mischief.—Killing of Animal with sole INTENT TO INJURE OWNER.
To constitute larceny under the Revised Statutes, the taking must be for the purpose of converting to the use of the taker, and the qualification lueri causa, has been accepted as a part of the common law definition of that ofiense. (Learneb, J., dissenting.)
The malicious killing of a horse is a misdemeanor.
Accordingly, where upon the trial of an indictment for grand larceny, the evidence tends to show a taking of a horse to kill him with a sole desire to injure the owner, and that, said horse was so killed, and the carcass left where the animal fell, the defendant is entitled" to a charge which shall enable the jury clearly to distinguish between malicious mischief and larceny.
Appeal from judgment of the Court of Sessions of Sara-toga county, December 19, 1881, convicting defendant of grand larceny, Hon. J. W. Crane, County Judge, presiding.
Defendant was indicted in January, 1881, for the crime of grand larceny in having been guilty of feloniously stealing, taking and carrying away a horse, the property of one Jewell, of the value of $150. He was twice tried, the first trial, July 1881, resulting in a disagreement, and the second trial in a conviction as stated above. The evidence showed that the defendant, with others, took from the barn of said Jewell, a horse, which they led away from the premises and killed, leaving the carcass of the animal on the spot where it fell; and there was also evidence tending to show that this was done solely with a design to injure said Jewell. Various exceptions were taken, which appear in the opinion, and after motions in arrest of judgment and for a new trial were made and denied, defendant was sentenced to imprisonment in the state prison at hard labor for one year and nine months.
H. L. Grose, for the prisoner, appellant.
I. The court erred in refusing to charge: “ That without a specific and actual intention of defendant to steal Jewell’s horse, there can be no larceny, and the taking, though wrongful, would be only a trespass ; and the act of taking the horse, and this felonious intent to steal, must both concur in fact and in point of time.” This refusal left the jury without knowledge that larceny, which is composed of the act of trespass and the superadded intent to steal, is not committed when this trespass and this intent do not exist at the precise moment together. 1 Bishop Crim. Law, § 207. The jury were not made aware that any intention formed after- a wrongful taking and carrying away, would not not make a larcenous offense. Wilson v. People, 39 N. Y. 459; 1 Barb. Crim. Law, 185; 2 Russ. Crimes, 49-53; 392 East P. C. 655.
II. A variance between the indictment and the proof entitles defendant to an acquittal. State v. Noble, 15 Me. 476 ; Starkie Ev. 623-639 ; 81 N. Y. 296. The indictment charges horse-stealing; but the evidence, if it proves anything, proves horse-killing. Intention being the gist which distinguishes between crimes, it is essential to justice that it be proved as charged in the indictment.
In Chapman v. State, 1 Texas App. 727, the defendants were indicted for stealing a cow, which it was proved they aided in killing. They were convicted in the court below, but in the appellate .court the judgment was reversed.
On the trial of an indictment for stealing a steer, the judge charged, that if defendant caused the steer to be killed, with the intent to deprive the owner of it, he might be convicted, notwithstanding he had not actually carried the animal away. Held, erroneous, as the instruction authorized the jury'to convict, even though the steer had been killed as an act of malicious mischief. People v. Murphy, 47 Cal. 103. A taking of property for the purpose of destroying it does not constitute larceny. Rex v. Crump, 1 C. & P. 658. An offense for such purpose would be malicious mischief. Reg. v. Godfrey, 8. C. & P. 567; People v. Murphy, 47 Cal. 103; State v. Hawkins, 8 Porler (Ala.) 461; People v. Moody, 5 Parker C. C. 568; Paris v. People, 75 Ill. 274.
That intent makes a difference in the nature of an offense, •s-ee case reported in 2 East’s Pleas of the Crown, 513: “ Joseph Dobbs was indicted for a burglary in breaking and entering the stable of James Bayley, part of his dwelling, in the night, with a felonious intent to kill and destroy a gelding of one A. B. „ . . there being.” On the trial, “it appeared that the gelding was to have run in a race for forty guineas, and that the prisoner cut the sinews of his fore-leg to prevent his running, in consequence of which he died.” Parker, Chief Baron, ordered him to be acquitted; for his intention was, not to commit the felony by killing and destroying the horse, but a trespass only, to prevent his running, and therefore no burglary.”
■ It is a cardinal doctrine of the criminal law, founded on natural justice, that it is the intention with which an act is done, or omitted to be done, that constitutes its criminality. The intent and the act must concur to constitute a crime.
In the case of State v. Revels (Buckbee, 200), the indictment alleged a larceny of the property of a person named, but the proof showed that the owner was unknown, and this variance acquitted the prisoner.
The court erred in refusing to charge the following propositions : That if the jury should find that defendant found Jewell’s horse in the highway, and then and there, before the taking, conceived only the purpose of destroying the horse, and pursuant to that purpose did destroy it, the crime was not larceny, and defendant cannot be convicted upon the indictment on which he has been tried. 3 Greenl. Ev. 137; 3 Par. Cr. 129. 7. That if before the taking of a horse, the intent was to take it and kill it, the crime would not be a felony, but an offense under the statute, classed among misdemeanors, under the terms, “ malicious mischief.” 3 Rev. Stat. 6th ed. 974, § 32; Stage Horse Cases, 15 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 59. That if defendant had concerted with Sullivan to get Jewell’s horse into possession, for the purpose of killing it, and that, pursuant to such purpose, the horse was killed by defendant, such purpose makes the act of killing “ malicious mischief,” and not larceny. 5. That if the jury find that defendant caught Jewell’s horse in the highway, near defendant’s house, “ with the sole, object of killing it, from motives of revenge and injury,” to Jewell, “ this is not larceny, but malicious mischief ” (3 Greenl. Ev. 137), and therefore defendant cannot be convicted of the crime charged in the indictment.
Against defendant’s objection, evidence was received as to his killing the horse in question, the court overruling the objection on the ground that££ for the purpose of showing the intent with which it was taken, everything done after the taking is proper to be shown.” Then th a fact of killing must show that the intent was to kill; and if that was the rntent, the crime was not larceny. The testimony is that such was the intent, and no other intent is expressed or implied. This brings the offense within the statutory definition of “ malicious mischief,” and takes it out of the class of larcenous crimes. The statute is : “ Every person, who shall, by his act or neglect, maliciously kill, maim or wound any horse, belonging to himself or another, shall, upon conviction, be adjudged guilty of a misdemeanor.” 3 Rev. Stat. 914, § 32, 6th ed.
There is undoubtedly, in most cases of this description, an element of personal hostility and spite, of actual ill-will, toward some individual. May’s Crim. Law, 191. “ Where property . . . was taken, either for the purpose of retaliating for a real or supposed injury, or through wanton mischief, held not to be larceny.” 28 Eng. Rep. 580, Moak’s Notes, citing Kemble’s Case, 1 City Hall Rec. 177; People v. Anderson, 14 Johns. 294. If property is taken for the purpose of destruction, the offense is punishable as malicious mischief. State v. Hawkins, 8 Porter, 461. An intent to commit one crime precludes the intent of perpetrating a different offense. Desty Grim. Law, 540. The intent to kill, precludes the intent of stealing.
J. Van Rensselaer, district attorney, for the people, respondent.
Driving or leading away the property is a taking or carrying away, Barb. Crim. Law, 168; 3 Russ. Crimes; 4 Black. Com. 231. The intent in taking and carrying away, must be felonious, to appropriate the property of another and dispose of it without his consent. Barb. Grim. Law. 172. The question of intent is one for the jury. lb. The felonious quality consists in the intention of the prisoner tb deprive the owner of his property • it is not necessary that it should be done lucri causa, for the sake of gain. A taking with intent to destroy .or otherwise deprive the owner of the goods will be sufficient, if done to serve the offender or any other person,though not in a pecuniary way. Barbour’s Crim. Law, 174; Rex v. Cabbage, Russ. & Ry. C. C. 292, 207, 118. It is larceny, although no benefit is sought; but only injury to the owner. Desty Am. Crim. Law, § 145.
It is no defense to say that on the same state of facts the defendant was guilty of other crimes, to wit: malicious mischief and cruelty to animals,, as contended in the court below. Sometimes; and frequently, .it occurs that in committing the main crime the defendant is guilty on the same state of facts of other crimes. As in the case of murder, manslaughter or abortion, defendant commits assault and battery as completely as he does the main crime. In burglary, where the accused breaks and enters for the ¡purpose of committing a larceny, the fact that he did commit larceny, being Ms intent in breaking and entering, does not render the act less a burglary. So in arson; that defendant broke and entered the building to set the fire on the inside, makes the crime no less arson because he was also guilty of burglary. So. in this case; that the defendant stole the horse for the purpose of depriving the owner of his property by killing it, and because in fact he did so dispose of it to gratify a spirit of revenge or hatred, or did it in order to prevent Jewell from appearing at the law-suit in his defense on the following morning, makes the crime no less a larceny.
If the felonious intent exists at the time of the taking to deprive the owner of Ms property without his consent, it is larceny; no matter how he intended to dispose of it, and no matter whether he, in fact, did dispose of it or not.

Opinion:
Boardman, J.
The court below did not properly state the legal questions before the jury. Upon the evidence it is certainly a grave question whether the act charged and proved was larceny or malicious mischief. To constitute larceny, there must have been a felonious intent, animo furandi or lucri causa. The malicious killing of a horse is a misdemeanor. Penal Code, § 654; 2 R. S. *695; L. 1866, c. 682. The offenses are quite distinct. In either case there is a trespass. In larceny the taking must be for the purpose of converting to the use of the taker; in malicious mischief no such intent is necessary. In the present case the evidence tends to show a taking of the horse to kill him, with a sole desire to injure the owner. It was incumbent on the court then, to point out to the jury the legal elements in the crime of larceny, so as to distinguish it from malicious mischief. This, we think, was not done. The jury was told, in substance, if defendant took, or procured to be taken, this horse, and killed, or aided in killing him, he must be found guilty. In no part of the charge is this language modified or qualified.
The seventh request to charge is as follows: " There must have been a felonious intent, for without such, an intent there was no crime; and the felonious intent must have been formed before the taking ; and that if, before the taking of the horse, the intent was to take it and kill it, the crime would not be a felony, but an offense under the statute, classed among misdemeanors, under the term malicious mischief." The defendant excepted to the refusal to charge as requested. The request to charge, the refusal to charge, and the exception, are all very informal and inartificial, but sufficient, we think, to present the important point in the case. The defendant was entitled to have the jury instructed in substance as requested. Mr. Wharton, in his work on Criminal Law (§§ 1781-4), has considered whether larceny can exist where there is no intent on the part of the taker to reap any advantage from the taking. He has reviewed the decisions, from the case of Rex v. Cabbage, Russ. & Ry. C. C. 292, cited by the district attorney, to the time of his writing, and concludes that the qualification " luori causa " has been accepted by our courts as an unquestioned part of the common law. He says (§ 1784), " thus it has been frequently held to be a misdemeanor, of the nature of malicious mischief, to kill an animal belonging to another, though it has never been held larceny so to kill and take unless some benefit was expected by the taker." And he cites in support of such statement, among other cases, Commonwealth v. Leach, 1 Mass. 59; People v. Smith, 5 Cow. 258 ; Loomis v. Edgerton, 19 Wend. 420. The conclusion is sustained by the authorities.
It was a serious matter for the defendant whether he should be convicted of grand larceny upon facts which he claimed could only constitute malicious mischief. He had the right to have the distinction pointed out to the jury. He requested it, but it was not done. Thus the court-neglected and refused to point out the essential ingredient of the crime of grand larceny, whereby the defendant may have been convicted of a felony, while the facts arid the charge were equally applicable, to a misdemeanor. The learned county judge very properly and fully recognizes the serious importance of .this question, when he stays the execution of the senten'ce pending an appeal. There are various other questions presented, but it is unnecessary to consider them, sinc.e upon the point already discussed a new tidal must be granted. The judgment and conviction are reversed, and a new trial is granted.
Bockes, J., concurs.