Case Name: Spencer Stafford versus Martha Gold et al. Executors, &c.; Same versus Same
Court: Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
Jurisdiction: Massachusetts
Decision Date: 1830-09
Citations: 9 Pick. 533
Docket Number: 
Parties: Spencer Stafford versus Martha Gold et al. Executors, &c. Same versus Same.
Judges: 
Reporter: Massachusetts Reports
Volume: 26
Pages: 542–543

Head Matter:
Spencer Stafford versus Martha Gold et al. Executors, &c. Same versus Same.
A demand due to the plaintiff as surviving partner of one firm, may be joined in the same action with a demand due to him as the surviving partner of another firm. Where two actions are brought at the same term of the court, upon demands which might have been joined, the plaintiff will recover the same costs as if he had joined the demands in one action.
The plaintiff, as the surviving partner of two distinct mercantile firms, commenced two actions of assumpsit, for different causes of action, against the defendants, at the same term of the Court of Common Pleas, both of which actions were brought up to this Court and determined in favor of the plaintiff.
Hubbard and Bishop contended,
that the plaintiff was entitled to recover costs in only one action, the St. 1794, c. 28, § 12, having provided, “ that where a plaintiff shall, at the same court, bring divers actions upon demands which might have been joined in one, he shall recover no more costs than in one action only.” To show that the plaintiff might have joined the two demands in one action, they cited 1 Chit. Pl. 200 ; Hancock v. Haywood, 3 T. R. 433 ; Slipper v. Stidstone, 5 T. R. 493, and 1 Esp. R. 47 ; French v. Andrade, 6 T. R. 582.
C. A. Dewey, for the plaintiff.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
It is settled that a surviving partner may join m the same action a demand due to the firm, and another due to himself in his own right. For the same reason, he may unite demands due to him as the surviving partner of two firms. Where the plaintiff sues era rattier droit, as executor or administrator, the case is different. The plaintiff will therefore tax full costs in one of the suits, whichsoever he may elect, and in the other he will tax such additional costs as would have accrued if the causes of action had been embraced by one suit.
See Collyer on Partnership, 399,436.
See Revised Stat. c. 121, § 15.