Case Name: Ex parte WOLTERS. Ex parte GRAY
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1911-12-06
Citations: 144 S.W. 531
Docket Number: 
Parties: Ex parte WOLTERS. Ex parte GRAY.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 144
Pages: 531–589

Head Matter:
Ex parte WOLTERS. Ex parte GRAY.
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Dec. 6, 1911.
On Motion for Rehearing, Feb. 28, 1912.)
1.States (§ 32 ) —Legislatube — Special. Session — Powees — Petition fob Submission of Additional Subjects — Goveen-ob’s Reply.
In response to a petition from the Legislature at a special session for the submission of certain matters other than those embraced in the call, the Governor responded that when the appropriation bill was passed he would “consider the advisability” of submitting additional questions for the 'consideration of the Legislature. Held, that the reply was merely a courteous refusal to accede to the request, especially when taken in connection with a failure to submit the matters requested. Per Davidson, P. J., Harper and Prendergast, JJ., dissenting.
[Ed. Note. — Por other cases, see States, Dee. Dig. § 32. ]
2. States (§ 40 ) —Legislatube — Special Session — Powees — Subject-Matteb — Investigations.
Under Const, art. 3, § 40, providing that at a special session of the Legislature there shall be no legislation on subjects other than those stated in the Governor’s proclamation or presented by him to them, the Legislature at such session may not investigate matters as to which it could not legislate or take any action; so that where a committee was appointed by one house of. the Legislature at a special session to investigate a matter not mentioned in the call or otherwise submitted by the Governor, the appointment of the committee was not authorized, and it was without - power to call witnesses; and hence a witness’ refusal to answer questions was not an obstruction of the proceedings of the house, which the house could punish as a contempt. Per Davidson, P. J., Harper and Prendergast, JJ., dissenting.
[Ed. Note. — Por other cases, see States, Dec. Dig. § 40. ]
3. States (§ 40 ) — Legislatube —Special Session — Powees — Investigation — Contempt.
Const, art. 3, § 15, providing that the Legislature may “punish, by imprisonment during its session, any person, not a member, * * * for obstructing any of its proceedings,” places a limitation on the power to punish for contempt; and hence, where the Legislature at special session appointed a committee to investigate a matter not submitted to them, and undertook to punish a witness for contempt in refusing to answer questions before the committee, the entire proceeding being beyond the legislative power, as referring to a matter as to which there could be no legislation, the Legislature was without jurisdiction either of the subject-matter or of the person of the witness, and powerless to pronounce judgment punishing the witness for contempt. Per Davidson, P. J., Harper and Prendergast, JJ., dissenting.
[Ed. Note. — Por other cases, see States, Dec. Dig. § 40. ]
4. States (§ 40 ) —Legislatube — Investigating Committee — Scope—Questions to Witness — Contempt.
Where the Legislature appointed a committee with authority to investigate whether, at a recent election on the issue of state prohibition of intoxicating liquors, poll taxes had been illegally secured, or receipts or exemption certificates illegally issued, and to whom, and who furnished the money therefor, and to inquire into all violations and evasions of the election-laws of the state, and the manner and method thereof, and by whom made or instigated, the refusal of a witness before such committee to disclose who contributed to the campaign fund of the anti-prohibition side, the amount of the fund, and its disposition, was not a contempt; the questions not suggesting any violation of law. Per Davidson, P. J., Harper and Prendergast, JJ., dissenting.
[Ed. Note. — Por other cases, see States, Dec. Dig. § 40. ]
5. States (§ 39% ) — Legislative Powers— Special Session — Matters Submitted by Governor.
A message to the Legislature in special session from the Governor, asking an increase over the usual appropriation for the offering of rewards and the enforcement of the law, was insufficient as a submission to the Legislature of the subject of irregularities and viola tions of law at a recent election, so as to authorize the Legislature to investigate such subject, though the Governor in the message mentions his offer of rewards for the arrest and conviction of offenders at such election, and includes his proclamation making the offer as a part of the message. Per Davidson, P. J.; Prendergast, J., dissenting.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see States, Dec. Dig. § 39%. ]
6. States (§ 34 ) —Legislature — Special Session — Powers — Petition for Submission of Further Subjects — Governor’s Reply.
In response to a petition from the Legislature at a special session for the submission of certain matters other than those embraced in the call, the Governor replied that when the appropriation bill was passed he would “consider the advisability” of submitting additional questions for the consideration of the Legislature. Held, that the reply was not'a refusal to submit further matters, but was a promise to consider whether to do so, so that the Legislature, by a committee, could seek information to impress on him the necessity for a submission of such matters. Per Harper, J.; Davidson, P. J., dissenting.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see States, Cent. Dig. § 42; Dec. Dig. § 34. ]
7. States (§ 34 ) —Legislature — Special Session — Powers — Constitutional Limitations — “Legislation.”
The Legislature at a special session has all the power it has at a regular session, except so far as restrained by the Constitution, and the limitation by article 3, § 40, providing that at such sessions there shall be no “legislation” on subjects not designated by the Governor, does not preclude the appointment of an investigating committee to obtain information for future use, even on a subject not submitted by the Governor; the word “legislation” having a well-defined meaning, and including only the enactment, repeal, and amendment of laws. Per Harper and Prendergast, JJ.; Davidson, P. J., dissenting.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see States, Cent. Dig. § 42; Dec. Dig. § 34.
For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 5, p. 4086.]
8. States (§ 34 ) — Legislature—Investigations — Scope — Questions to Witness — Propriety.
Questions by a legislative committee, investigating the conduct of a recent election, calling on a witness to disclose the character of expenditures made by him in a general way, and the amount spent in preparing, mailing, and distributing campaign matter, were calls for information on subjects which were subject to legislative control, and were proper; but questions as to who contributed to the campaign fund, or the amount of such contributions, were improper. Per Harper, J.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see States, Dec. Dig. § 34. ]
9. States (§ 32*) — Legislature —Special Session — Powers—Petition for Submission of Further Subjects — Governor’s Reply.
In response to a petition from the Legislature at a special session for the submission of matters, not embraced in the call, relating to amending the election laws, so as to prevent illegal payment of poll taxes, and to prevent, detect, and punish election frauds, limiting the number of saloons, and otherwise regulating the liquor traffic, the Governor replied that when the appropriation bill was passed he would “consider the advisability” of submitting additional matters for the consideration of the Legislature. Held, that the reply was not a refusal of the request, but, taken in connection with another message from the Governor requesting an increase over the usual appropriation for enforcing the laws, and calling attention to the charges of frauds and irregularities of a recent election on the issue of state prohibition of intoxicating liquors, and to the fact that he had offered a reward for the arrest and conviction of offenders against the election laws, was an implied indication, if not a promise, that he would submit the requested matters. Per Prendergast, J.; Davidson, P. J., dissenting.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see States, Dec. Dig. § 32. ]
10. States (§ 34 ) — Legislature —Special Session — Powers—Investigations.
The House of Representatives being an independent branch of the Legislature, and as such having hot only all the powers expressly and by necessary implication granted by the Constitution, but also all the inherent powers not expressly or impliedly denied, was entitled to appoint a committee, at a special session, to investigate a recent election on the issue of state prohibition of intoxicating liquors, and determine whether there were any irregularities connected with the payment of poll taxes, or the issue of receipts or certificates of exemption, whether there were any violations or evasions of the election laws, and by whom and how, whether there was any corrupt use of money, and how much and by whom money was contributed, whether there was any conspiracy to corrupt the ballot box, etc. Per Prendergast, J.; Davidson, P. J., dissenting.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see States, Dec. Dig. § 34. ]
11. States (§ 34 ) — Legislature—Powers— Investigation — Contempt — Refusal to Answer.
Questions asked of a witness before a committee appointed by the House of Representatives to investigate the conduct of a recent election, relating to the campaign fund of one of the parties, its sources, amount, and disbursement, held all pertinent and material to the subject. Prendergast, J.; Davidson, P. J., dissenting.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see States, Dec. Dig. § 34. ]
12. States (§ 40 ) — Legislature—Powers— Contempt — Punishment.
Where a branch of the Legislature properly appointed an investigating committee of its members, and the committee summoned a witness, who refused to answer pertinent questions, which refusal was reported to the house, where the questions were determined to be proper, and his refusal to answer them an obstruction of the proceedings of the house, whereupon a judgment nisi was entered against him for contempt, and he was summoned before the bar of the house to show cause why he should not be punished, where he persisted in refusing to answer, and the house by full resolutions determined that he was guilty of obstructing its proceedings and ordered him punished for contempt, all of which appeared on the journal of the house, the courts cannot prevent the enforcement of the sentence, on the ground that he was not obstructing the proceedings of the house, but only of the committee; the house, and not the courts, being entitled to determine its procedure. Per Prendergast, J.; Harper J., dissenting.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see States, Dec. Dig. § 40. ]
13. States (§ 39% ) — Legislature —Powers of Separate Houses — Appointment op Investigating Committee.
A single branch of the Legislature has the power to appoint a committee to gather information and report recommendations as to the enactment of law's. Per Harper and Pren-dergast, JJ.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see States, Cent. Dig. § 45; Dee. Dig. § 39%. ]
14. States (§ 34 ) — Legislature—Investigating Committee — Scope op Powers.
The powers of an investigating committee, appointed by one house of the Legislature, to ask questions and gather information, are as broad as the language of the resolution appointing the committee, except that the committee is confined to matters as to which the Legislature can act by prohibition or regulation, or as to which it could inquire to enable it to properly perform its duty as to matters on which it would be authorized to act. Per Harper, J.
[Ed: Note. — For other cases, see States, Dec. Dig. § 34. ]
15. Constitutional Law (§ 70 ) — Judicial Functions — Encroachment on Legislature.
So long as the Legislature acts within its powers, its good or bad faith in so doing is a matter of which the courts can take no cognizance; motives and purposes being immaterial, if they have the legal right to act. Per Harper and Prendergast, JJ.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 129-132; Dec. Dig. § 70. ]
16. States (§ 40 ) — Legislature—Power to Punish eor Contempt.
Under the constitutional division of the government into departments, and the provision “that no person or collection of persons, being of one of these departments, shall exercise any power properly attached to either of the others,” except as expressly permitted, the power to punish for contempt, being a judicial power, requiring ascertainment of a fact and the adjudgment of punishment, is not inherent in the Legislature, but is limited to such cases as are expressly provided for by the Constitution. Per Harper, J.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see States, Dec. Dig. § 40. ]
17. States (§ 40 ) — Legislature—Power to Punish por Contempt.
Under Const, art. 3, § 15, authorizing the Legislature to “punish, by imprisonment during its session, any person, not a member, for obstructing any of its proceedings,” a refusal by a witness to answer questions propounded by an investigating committee cannot be punished as a contempt; the proceedings of the committee not being proceedings of the house which appointed it. Per Harper, J.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see States, Dec. Dig. § 40. ]
On Motion for Rehearing.
18. Contempt (§ 3 ) — “Criminal Contempt.”
A “criminal contempt” means acts committed against the majesty of the law, the primary purpose of their punishment being the vindication of public authority; acts of disrespect to the court or its process; cases in which the state alone is interested in the enforcement of the order. Per Davidson, P. J., and Harper, J.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Contempt, Cent. Dig. § 4; Dee. Dig. § 3.
For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 2, pp. 1747, 1748.]
19. Contempt (§ 4 ) — “Civil Contempt.”
A “civil contempt” is the failure to do something required by order of the court, for the benefit or advantage of a party to the proceeding. Per Harper, J.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Contempt, Cent. Dig. § 4; Dec. Dig. § 4.
For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 2, p. 1194.]
20. States (§ 40 ) — Refusal of Witness to Answer Before Legislative Committee.
The refusal of a witness, before an investigating committee of the Legislature, to answer proper questions, is a criminal contempt. Per Davidson, P. J., and Harper, J.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see States, Dec. Dig. § 40. ]
21. Habeas Corpus (§ 90 ) — Rehearing— Right of State — “Criminal Case.”
Under Pen. Code 1911, art. 3, providing that no person shall be punished for any act or omission, unless the same is made a penal offense and a penalty affixed thereto by the written law, and the further provision of the Code that no person shall be prosecuted for a criminal offense, except by indictment in case of felony, by information in case of misdemeanor, or by complaint in justice’s court; and in the absence of any statute making a criminal contempt an offense, a proceeding by habeas corpus to review an order committing relator to prison for such a contempt is, not a “criminal case,” so as to preclude a rehearing on motion of the state, within 'the rules prohibiting the state to have a new trial or an appeal in criminal cases. Per Harper and Prendergast, JJ.; Davidson, P. J., dissenting.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Habeas Corpus, Dec. Dig. § 90.
. For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 2, pp. 1743-1745.]
22. Habeas Corpus (§ 90 ) — Rehearing— Right of State.
Even if a proceeding by habeas corpus in the Court of Criminal Appeals to obtain relator’s discharge from confinement under an order of a house of the Legislature holding him guilty of contempt were a criminal case, that court would not be debarred from granting a rehearing after deciding there was no contempt and discharging relator; the court being merely a reviewing tribunal, and in no sense trying the case. Per Harper and Pren-dergast, JJ.; Davidson, P. J., dissenting.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Habeas Corpus, Dec. Dig. § 90. ]
Petitions by J. F. Wolters and W. H. Gray for habeas corpus to obtain discharge from imprisonment under orders of the House of Representatives and’ the Senate, respectively, holding them, in contempt for refusal to answer questions asked them by investigating committees.
Relators discharged.
A full statement of the facts relating to the Wolters Case will be found in the dissenting opinion by Judge PRENDERGAST, and in the Gray Case in the opinion by Judge HARPER; the essential facts being similar in the two cases.
Jonathan Lane, R. H. Ward, W. A. Hanger, J. L. Storey, H. M. Garwood, Nelson Phillips, R. S. Neblett, J. B. Stubbs, and William Thompson, for relators. D. W. Odell, Cullen F. Thomas, Luther Nickels, C. M. Cureton, and C. E. Lane, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
tor other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Rep’r Indexes
For other oases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dee. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Rep’r Indexes
For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
Ex parte Wolters.
DAVIDSON, P. J.
The applicant was adjudged guilty of contempt of the House of Representatives, at the recent called session of the Legislature, for refusing to answer questions propounded by a committee appointed by that body to inquire into sundry and divers things supposed to have occurred in connection with the prohibition election held on July 22, 1911. If this election had resulted favorably to prohibition, the proposed amendment would have supplanted the present system of local option and placed in effect state-wide prohibition. The result, however, was antagonistic to prohibition, and the amendment was lost by a majority of about 6,000 votes.
. On June 20, 1911, his excellency, Governor Colquitt, issued a proclamation calling a special session of the 32d Legislature, to convene on Monday, July 31, 1911, in which 'proclamation he indicated the purposes to be: (1) To mate appropriations for the support of the state government "and for the public service for the fiscal years beginning September 1, 1911, and September 1, 1912. (2) To apportion the state into senatorial districts and into representative districts, and to fix the basis of representation therefor. (3) To consider and act upon such other matters as may be presented by the Govern- or, pursuant to section 40 of article 3 of the Constitution of Texas.
The Legislature met, and, in pursuance to said call, began its work on July 31, 1911. About August 1st, realizing the fact that authority had not been mentioned in the proclamation of the Governor for the purposes for which concurrent resolution No. 1 was introduced in the Senate, 17 members of the Senate, who were all favorable to state-wide prohibition, presented said resolution to the Governor. The first section of that resolution related to the amendment of the election laws, so as to further provide against illegal payment of poll taxes, and to enact such other laws as were deemed by the committee necessary to safeguard the ballot box, and to secure elections without taint of irregularity, fraud, or other corrupt practices. The second section of the resolution related to the prohibition of brewery owners, stockholders therein, saloons, saloon owners, and all others connected directly or indirectly with the liquor traffic, from contributing to campaign funds to influence elections, and also prohibiting persons from receiving, using, or disbursing funds so contributed by those engaged in the liquor traffic. The remaining sections of the resolution referred to legislation in regard to the sale of liquor in some form or another. The Governor refused to respond to this request, and declined to submit the matters therein mentioned for the action of the Legislature. Concurrent resolution No. 1 was abandoned by the Legislature. To meet this refusal of the Governor, each branch of the Legislature acted independently in the appointment of committees.
On the 3d of August a resolution, not concurrent, was introduced in the House of Representatives by friends of state-wide prohibition, providing for the creation of a committee to investigate supposed irregularities occurring at the election held on July 22, 1911. This committee, by the terms of the resolution, was empowered to investigate whether or not there had been poll taxes illegally secured, or receipts or exemption certificates, etc., issued, and, if paid for or issued, by whom paid for and by whom issued, and to whom issued, and who furnished the money for such purposes. It was also empowered to inquire into all violations and evasions of the election laws of the state, and the manner and method of such evasions, and by whom made or instigated. These matters all related to the election held on July 22d in regard to the prohibition amendment. There were other matters mentioned in the resolution to be submitted to said committee unnecessary to enumerate.
The committee was promptly created and given all the power possible to be conferred by the House of Representatives to carry out the purposes of the resolution. This included the issuance of process, its execution and enforcement, and providing for the expenses incurred by the members of the committee. It may be also mentioned as a matter of some materiality that the friends of the amendment recently defeated met at Ft. Worth and passed a number of resolutions condemnatory of those who opposed the prohibition amendment, in which many derelictions were charged, intimating corrupt practices, and calling upon the Legislature to cause an investigation to be made in regard to these charges. This occurred two days before the Legislature was to meet at Austin. The convention at Ft. Worth adjourned to meet at Austin simultaneously with the convening of the Legislature. On the day the Legislature did convene at Austin, those gentlemen, or a large part of them, met in the city of Austin and held a meeting. Quite a number of the members of the Legislature attended that meeting, that body having adjourned for that purpose, at which meeting practically the same resolutions were indorsed that had been indorsed at the Ft. Worth meeting. It is also stated that it was understood or agreed in that meeting that the Legislature should carry out the will and wishes expressed at said meeting. The above is shown by the record in this case. The creation of the committee and its work occurred after the Governor had declined to submit the matters requested in the concurrent resolution No. 1.
The consideration "of the advisability of submitting additional questions for the consideration of the Legislature" was but a courteous refusal to comply with request con tained in concurrent resolution No. 1 on the part of the Governor. The Legislature so understood, and acted. The committee, after its appointment, met and began work. Among other witnesses summoned before it' was this applicant, who was chairman of the anti state-wide executive committee, and, as its head, managed the campaign against state-wide prohibition. Many questions were asked of and answered by him. Other questions were asked, which he declined to answer. These cover several pages of the committee's report. It is deemed unnecessary here to set out all these matters. They can be summarized with this statement: He declined to answer questions seeking to elicit information as to who contributed to the campaign fund of the anti state-wide side of the issue, and the amount received, from whom received, as well as to whom he paid out the money contributed. Names were suggested in the questions to him, but to all these he firmly declined to give an answer. We may sum up, in a general way, that he did state the money" received by him or paid to him for such purpose was not used in violation of any of the laws of the state, or so as to infringe any idea of good morals, or in any illegitimate manner. There are many matters of evidence brought out in the record which brought in review the conduct of the political campaign and incidents thereto pertaining. These are not mentioned, because not thought to be necessary to a decision of this case.
Several questions are presented for discussion. It is not the purpose of this opinion to review all these questions. The first one to be discussed is: Did the House of Representatives have authority to appoint the committee it did appoint? Second. If so, did that committee have authority to demand of applicant answers to the questions propounded to him, and were the questions and answers material to the matter under investigation? Both propositions should be answered in the negative. Be it remembered that this was a special, and not a regular or biennial, session of the Legislature. The scope of the authority of a special session of the Legislature is to be found in section 40 of article 3 of the Constitution, which reads as follows: "When the Legislature shall be convened in a special session, there shall be no legislation upon subjects other than those designated in the proclamation of the Governor calling such session, or presented to them by the Governor, and no such session shall be of longer duration than thirty days."
From this it will be observed that, when the Legislature is convened in special session, such express limitation is placed upon the power of that body that it cannot legislate upon any subject or subjects except those specially designated in the proclamation of the Governor calling the body together, or such as may be subsequently presented to that body by the Governor. This limited rule set out in the above section does not apply to the Legislature when sitting in its biennial session. It will therefore be observed there is a marked difference between the power of the Legislature in regular session as compared with its power when sitting in a special session. The Legislature by the terms of article 2, § 1, of the Constitution, is made the lawmaking power of the state. This provision of the Constitution limits that body to legislation, unless there be found some other provision in that instrument authorizing it to exercise other powers and functions, such as, among other things, to present articles of impeachment against named officials, or expel members for sufficient cause. It also has power under article 3, § 15, to punish by imprisonment during its session any person not a member for disrespectful or disorderly conduct in its presence, or for obstructing any of its proceedings, provided such imprisonment' shall not at any time exceed 48 hours.
The question, then, here is: What may the Legislature do at a special called session in regard to legislation, and for what purpose by concurrent resolution, or a resolution of either house, and for what purpose may either or both houses appoint committees, and what subjects may be invested by said committee? To the mind of the writer, these are answered definitely by article 3, § 40. By the express terms of that section, the Legislature is expressly restricted and limited, first, to the passage only of such laws as the Governor has authorized in his proclamation, or in subsequent messages submitted by him; and, second, either or both houses may have authority to make investigations looking to the enactment of such laws as are within the proclamation or message of the Governor, but the Legislature may not and cannot investigate matters for legislative purposes not within the proclamation. Nor would the Legislature have authority to investigate matters the Governor declined to submit to it, and this proposition is intensified when the demand or request has been made upon him and he declines to accede. This, the writer understands, would be the limit of authority on the part of the Legislature to either legislate or investigate matters looking to legislation. This, as before stated, is more than intensified when the fact is taken into consideration that the Governor refused to refer or submit these matters for legislation. It is thought to be a correct statement that the Legislature either in general or special session would have no authority, either as a body or through committees, to investigate matters for legislation about which that body could not enact laws, and when they were without authority to so enact. It might be concluded as a correct proposition, so far as this case is concerned, that whenever the Legislature has authority to enact laws, it would have corresponding authority to make necessary investigations for the ascertainment of such facts as would be necessary as a predicate for the enactment of laws wherein the matter was then pending and formed a part of the proceedings of that body. These rules apply as well to special as to general sessions, but there must be authority in either event as a predicate for legislative action upon the subject or subjects under investigation; otherwise, it could not be considered a part of the proceedings of the Legislature. If the above propositions are correct, then the special session had no authority to appoint the committee to investigate, and the committee so appointed was powerless to investigate matters about which that body could not possibly legislate or take action.
It is true the Legislature is one of the three co-ordinate branches of the government, and in a general way has power in matters of legislation; but there is to be noted a marked difference and distinction between the scope of power of the regular session and that of a special session of the Legislature. When that body meets in its biennial session, its authority to enact laws and make investigations is as broad as is the constitutional guaranty of power, to wit, as the lawmaking department of the government. The limitation of such power .is to be found in the terms of the Constitution as expressed or necessarily implied. It .is not the purpose here to go into any discussion as to the limitations of express or implied power, but the rule is entirely different when the Legislature meets in special session. In the latter case they have no authority to legislate, except as set forth by the Governor in his proclamation, or in subsequent messages sent by him to that body. These propositions being correct, the Legislature was without authority to create the committee before whom applicant was called upon to testify, and the committee was without authority to propound questions to or demand answers from this applicant. The House of Representatives, recognizing they had no such authority, called upon the Governor to submit such matters to them as would justify them in exercising such authority. This he declined. It must be evident, then, from this action of the Legislature, and the subsequent refusal of the Governor to respond to their wishes, that they had no authority to create the committee and make, the investigation, and fully recogr nized that fact. The committee, under .this view, was a body without authority to call witnesses, or to put questions and require answers from them. Their action did not form a part of the proceedings of that body and no obstruction could occur.
It may be stated as a proposition incontrovertibly true that the 'Legislature derives its power from the Constitution, and is dependent solely on the Constitution for its existence and authority. Both houses of such body are but the creatures of the Constitution, and outside of the provisions of that instrument, would and could have no authorized existence. Both houses act under delegated authority, which, in a general way, is confined to legislative matters, except in a few instances where it is otherwise provided, and in no instance could it act as a judicial body, unless power is expressly conferred upon it by the Constitution for that purpose. Judicial power is conferred upon another branch of the government, to be exercised by it to the exclusion of other branches of the government. It would follow, then, that the Legislature, in matters within its jurisdiction, would have authority to protect itself against disrespectful and disorderly conduct in its presence, as well as for obstructing its proceedings. Some of the books speak of this as inherent power. Had the Constitution remained silent upon the question of the power of the Legislature to punish for contempt, we might be called upon to enter the dojnain of such inherent power and discuss it; but we are relieved from that by the terms of the Constitution, wherein it specifies how and when each branch ofi the Legislature may punish for contempt for such conduct. If it may be said that the Legislature would have inherent power to-punish for contempt, it might also be said that the Constitution recognizes the fact and empowers that body to protect itself under-the circumstances stated in article 3, § 15. That section fixes the limits of jurisdiction;, at least, it sought so to do by the language-employed. To a certain extent, under the terms of section 15, the Legislature may be-said to have judicial authority, or rather it may be said it has authority to act in a judicial capacity in ascertaining the facts- and assessing the punishment therein prescribed. Whether the power is inherent or-not, section 15, art. 3, grants authority, as-well as expressly limits the extent of that authority. It is, therefore, unnecessary to-discuss the question of inherent power further than is stated in that, section. Such authority, then, cannot be exercised in any instance by the Legislature, unless the contempt. or punishment was for a violation of something the Legislature had authority to do.
There are some fundamental rules that, have long since been decided, and have become so thoroughly settled in regard to matters of this sort, that they ought to be held conclusive. First, before a contempt punishment can be inflicted, the body seeking to-impose the punishment must have jurisdiction of the subject-matter; second, it must, have jurisdiction of the person; third, it must have authority to render the particular-judgment that is rendered. The correctness of the above rules is not an open question in Texas, and ought not to be debatable anywhere. One of the best-considered cases involving these questions is found in an opinion by the then presiding judge of this court, in Ex parte Degener, 30 Tex. App. 666, 17 S.. W. 1111. The question here involves the jurisdiction of the authority seeking to inflict punishment. It has been said that jurisdiction is of two kinds: First, the power to determine the particular matter and render some judgment upon the hearing; and, secondly, the power to render the particular judgment which was rendered. There was some conflict in the authorities for awhile upon some of these matters; but this all seems to have faded. Many of the cases cited in support of the above proposition will be found collated in Ex parte Degener, supra. That case has been followed in quite a number of opinions by this court a few of which will be enumerated; Ex parte Taylor, 34 Tex. Cr. R. 594, 31 S. W. 641; Ex parte Kearby, 35 Tex. Cr. R. 538, 34 S. W. 635; Ex parte Wilson, 39 Tex. Cr. R. 637, 47 S. W. 996; Ex parte Duncan, 42 Tex. Cr. R. 661, 62 S. W. 758; Ex parte Snodgrass, 43 Tex. Cr. R. 359, 65 S. W. 1061; Ex parte Lake, 37 Tex. Cr. R. 656, 40 S. W. 727, 66 Am. St. Rep. 848. In Ex parte Duncan, supra, it was held there must be contempt in order to justify punishment for the offense, and the facts must justify the judgment imposing such punishment. "There are three essential elements necessary to render a conviction valid. These are that the court must have jurisdiction over the subject-matter, the person of the defendant, and the authority to render the particular judgment. If either of these elements is lacking, the judgment is fatally defective, and the prisoner held under such judgment may be released on habeas corpus." In addition to the authorities cited, supra, on these propositions, there will be found cited in the report of the Duncan Case the following cases: Ex parte Tinsley, 37 Tex. Cr. R. 517, 40 S. W. 306, 66 Am. St. Rep. 818; Ex parte Kearby & Hawkins, 35 Tex. Cr. R. 531, 34 S. W. 635; Brown on Jurisdiction, § 109 and 110; Ex parte Lake, 37 Tex. Cr. R. 656, 40 S. W. 727, 66 Am. St. Rep. 848.
It was further held that "jurisdiction of the person and subject-matter are not alone conclusive, but the authority of the court to render the particular judgment is the subject of inquiry; and if, upon a review of the whole record, it appears that a judgment unwarranted by law was entered, the party thus placed in contempt will be released, under the writ of habeas corpus. Same authorities." Following the above quotation are a great number of cases cited in the opinion in the Duncan Case, supra. It has also been lield that the judgment is not conclusive upon the question of the authority of the court, or the body imposing the contempt; but, where the facts justify it, the court will go behind the judgment and inquire into the facts, and if the facts are such that ought not to justify or permit the particular judgment rendered, then the applicant will be discharged upon writ of habeas corpus. This was expressly decided in Parker v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. R. 12, 29 S. W. 480, 790, and Ex parte Juneman, 28 Tex. App. 488, 13 S. W. 783. This doctrine was reasserted in Ex parte Duncan, supra. The leading case in the United States on the question involved in this case is Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168, 26 L. Ed. 377. That case has been followed in quite a number of cases, and, in our judgment, clearly settles the law in this case in favor of the applicant It is not the purpose of this opinion to review the Kil-bourn Case, but it is referred to approvingly as setting forth correct principles of law applicable to the questions here involved. See 7 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 62-65, and notes, for cases.
It would follow from what has been said that, the Legislature not having power to legislate upon matters about which the investigation was had at the called session, the action of the House creating the committee was without authority; and, this being true, the committee would not have power to make the investigation, call witnesses before it, ask questions, or demand answers. If the House was not authorized to legislate upon any of the matters about which the investigation was made, it would necessarily follow that that body could not impose punishment for contempt upon the refusal of the witnesses to appear before the committee, or, appearing, refusal to give testimony sought to be elicited. It would be clearly beyond the jurisdiction of the committee and of the 'Legislature, and, therefore, the rules above set forth would apply; that is, that body would have neither the jurisdiction of the subject-matter, of the person, nor the authority to render any judgment, much less the judgment it did render. From- this viewpoint of this record, the applicant is entitled to his discharge.
In regard to the second original proposition, it may be said, conceding the Legislature had authority to appoint the committee, and the committee had jurisdiction of the subject-matter by virtue of its appointment by the legislative body, and had jurisdiction of the person of applicant by having him before .the committee, still there would be authority wanting under this record justifying them in imposing the punishment for contempt. The matters inquired about were such matters as did not require applicant to answer and could form no basis of a judgment. They suggested no violation of any law of this state, and, if they did, the -Legislature was not authorized to investigate violations of law. That belonged to the judicial department. Nor could applicant be required to criminate himself. They were matters not necessary in any way to aid the legislative body in reaching a conclusion on any matter submitted to it by the Governor. That body could not revise the election laws, and could not legally engage in any proceedings tending to such revision, because the Governor had refused to submit such matters to them. There was nothing before the Legislature to whieh the answers of the witnesses, whatever those answers might have been, could possibly have been germane. The only purpose for whieh that Legislature was called was to legislate on specified subjects. It was not authorized to collect data for future legislation, nor with a view of legislating upon any matter* not submitted to them; and, if it attempted to do so, such attempt cannot be termed legal proceedings of the house. Being a called session, its power was limited to the 30 days mentioned in the Constitution, and exclusively to the questions mentioned by the Governor in his proclamation calling them together, and in such communications as he might subsequently make. These constituted the only proceedings to be indulged in by the Legislature. It would hardly be contended seriously that this Legislature could sit longer than 30 days for any purpose. The Constitution had put a limit to its existence at the expiration of the 30 days. This clause (section 40, art. 3), in regard to the 30-days limit, is no more binding than other clauses of the same section. It will be observed, then, that the rule governing the power of a special session is the reverse from the rule that controls the general session with reference to legislative authority. One is general; the other is specifically restrictive and restricted.
There is some intimation that the Governor, after the committee had been organized, sent a communication asking an increase in the appropriation bill from what it had theretofore been under previous appropriations, looking to the enforcement of the law. That message was to the effect that he desired an increased appropriation from what had theretofore been given. By no stretch of reasoning could this matter justify the action of the committee here under discussion. Theretofore the Legislature had been appropriating less than the amount of money requested by the Governor. This request from the Governor was for an increased appropriation to the amount of $27,-500. Without placing it upon the ground, directly or indirectly, that the message was subsequently sent in by the Governor, and that, therefore, the committee could not extend its jurisdiction to that matter, because of its original illegality, it is too clear for discussion that this did not justify the committee in its course of investigation of the July election. It was but an item of appropriation which was asked by the Governor to be enlarged from what it had theretofore been, and for the purposes of prosecuting before the courts those who were violators of the law. We hardly think it would be contended, either seriously or otherwise, that that matter would justify the committee in their action. I have written beyond what I had intended, and perhaps more than is necessary.
For the reasons indicated, we are of opinion that the applicant is illegally restrained of his liberty. It is therefore ordered that he be discharged from custody. There are other questions presented, but the above matters discussed dispose of the case.