Case Name: Edgar T. Andrews vs. John R. Peck
Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Connecticut
Decision Date: 1910-12-16
Citations: 83 Conn. 666
Docket Number: 
Parties: Edgar T. Andrews vs. John R. Peck.
Judges: 
Reporter: Connecticut Reports
Volume: 83
Pages: 666–675

Head Matter:
Edgar T. Andrews vs. John R. Peck.
Third Judicial District, Bridgeport,
October Term, 1910.
Hall, C. J., Prentice, Thayer, Roraback and Wheeler, Js.
This court, upon appeal, will accept the issue as framed by the pleadings and presented by the parties to the trial court for its determination.
The 'defendant purchased a horse which was warranted to be “sound and true in every spot and place." In an action by the seller to recover the balance of the purchase price, the defendant set up this warranty and alleged, as the only breach, that the horse was unsound because of its unmanageableness while being shod; and this breach was denied by the plaintiff. Held that such a trait or habit constituted a vice rather than an unsoundness, and therefore was not within the issue raised by the pleadings and determined by ,the trial court.
To render a horse unsound at the time of his sale, he must either have some disease, or must have undergone some alteration of structure, which diminishes, or in the ordinary course of things will diminish, his natural usefulness.
Submitted on briefs October 28th
decided December 16th, 1910.
Action to recover the balance of the purchase price of a horse sold by the plaintiff to the defendant, brought by appeal from the judgment of a justice of the peace to the Court of Common Pleas in Fairfield County and tried to the court, Scott, J.; facts found and judgment rendered for the plaintiff for $39, and appeal by the defendant.
No error.
The plaintiff brought suit to recover the balance of the purchase price of a horse. The defendant purchaser filed a counterclaim for the breach of an express warranty of the animal. The warranty alleged was that the horse was sound and true in every spot and place. The only breach set up was that it was then unsound, by reason of being unmanageable while it was being shod. The allegation of this breach was denied by the plaintiff. The court found that the warranty was made as alleged, save that one eye was excepted. No question is made growing out of this latter defect. It was also found that upon the last occasion before the sale, when the horse was shod, it was hurt or terrified during the operation; that from this terror or hurt there originated so great a fear of the tools of a blacksmith, that when the horse was first shod after the sale it was unruly and fractious, and habitually thereafter exhibited the same trait whenever it was taken into a blacksmith shop; that it was never unruly or fractious under other conditions; that as a consequence of this trait it was necessary to place it in stocks, or to throw it, in order to shoe it; that while it could be thus shod without danger to itself or the smith, it was more troublesome and expensive to shoe it than it otherwise would have been; and that the facts thus outlined were such as to decrease the market value of the animal. Both parties .at the time of sale were ignorant of these facts, and of what occurred when it was last shod during the plaintiff’s ownership. No other breach of warranty was claimed than such as arose from the existence of this trait and resulting habit.
Frank M. Canfield, for the appellant (defendant).
Martin J. Cunningham, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Opinion:
Prentice, J.
The defendant seeks recovery upon a counterclaim for the breach of warranty of a horse. It is found that the warranty was made. The only breach alleged is one resulting from the fact that the horse was at the time of sale unsound. The unsoundness complained of is expressly alleged to have been unmanageableness while being shod. The issue presented to the court was, therefore, whether or not the animal was unsound for reasons substantially as averred. That defendant's counsel recognized this as the issue, and tried the case upon that theory, is apparent, and the court's memorandum of decision is confined to a consideration and determination of it. Its conclusion, which was made the sole basis of decision, was that a warranty of soundness was not broken by the existence of the conditions which were found to have existed.
We have no occasion, therefore, to inquire whether or not the terms in which the warranty was couched, in their true intent and meaning, carried a more comprehensive warranty than that of soundness. It is our duty under the circumstances to accept the issue as framed by the pleadings, and review the court's determination of it. »
Baron Parke, in Kiddell v. Burnard, 9 Mess. & W. 668, following the tenor of his ruling in the earlier case of Coates v. Stephens, 2 Moo. & Rob. 157, defined the effect of a warranty of soundness in a horse as follows: "The rule as to unsoundness is, that if at the timé of sale the horse has any disease, which either actually does diminish the natural usefulness of the animal, so as to make him less capable of work of any description, or which in its ordinary progress will diminish the natural usefulness of the animal; or if the horse has, either from disease or accident, undergone any alteration of structure, that either actually does at the time, or in its ordinary effects will diminish the natural usefulness of the horse, such horse is unsound." This statement, concurred in by his associates, has ever since remained the settled rule in England, and been accepted and followed by the courts of this country and text writers as embodying the correct test to be applied under all ordinary conditions. We have looked in vain for authority which gives to the warranty a wider scope. It furnishes the test to be applied to the situation before us.
Applying it, the conclusion is inevitable that the horse in question, when sold, was not unsound by reason of the unfortunate trait which it had acquired. It had no disease, incipient or otherwise, and, the eye aside, it had not, either from disease or accident, undergone any alteration of structure. It had a bad trait, which developed into a bad habit, which impaired its value. But such traits or habits constitute a vice rather than unsoundness. Not everything which impairs the value of an animal constitutes unsoundness. No such test is recognized by any authority which we have been able to discover. Language of opinions can be found which is susceptible of a construction to the effect that a physical condition, to constitute unsoundness, should be one which depreciated value; but nowhere is it held, we believe, that whatever depreciates value amounts to unsoundness, or that the conditions stated by Baron Parke need not be present. Alexander v. Dutton, 58 N. H. 282.
There is no error.
In this opinion Hall, C. J., Thayer and Roraback, Js., concurred.