Case Name: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. James E. HYATT, Appellant
Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1990-12-14
Citations: 401 Pa. Super. 14
Docket Number: No. 1904
Parties: COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. James E. HYATT, Appellant.
Judges: Before CIRILLO, President Judge, and FORD ELLIOTT and BROSKY, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports
Volume: 401
Pages: 14–29

Head Matter:
584 A.2d 956
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. James E. HYATT, Appellant.
Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
Argued March 14, 1990.
Filed Dec. 14, 1990.
Reargument Denied Jan. 28, 1991.
Mariann E. Jarvis-Luksik, Pittsburgh, for appellant.
Edward M. Clark, Asst. Dist. Atty., Pittsburgh, for Com., appellee.
Before CIRILLO, President Judge, and FORD ELLIOTT and BROSKY, JJ.

Opinion:
CIRILLO, President Judge:
This is an appeal from a judgment of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County against appellant, James E. Hyatt. Following a jury trial, Hyatt was convicted of one count of rape. He filed timely post-trial motions which were denied and thereafter the court imposed sentence. In this appeal, Hyatt raises ten issues for our consideration:
1. Did the trial court err in failing to suppress evidence seized from defendant's vehicle without a search warrant?
2. Did the trial court err in failing to suppress evidence seized from defendant's person, without a warrant and without defendant's voluntary consent?
3. Did the trial court err in sua sponte giving a jury instruction on evidence of flight by defendant?
4. Did the trial court err in failing to instruct the jury on evidence of other crimes or improper conduct by defendant?
5. Did the trial court err in quashing defendant's subpoena duces tecum to Pittsburgh Action Against Rape?
6. Did the trial court err in denying a new trial where the verdict was inconsistent?
7. Did the trial court err in disallowing defense cross examination of the alleged victim concerning surgery which she underwent prior to the alleged crime?
8. Did the trial court err in denying examination of alleged victim regarding bias or motivation?
9. Did the trial court err in refusing to grant defendant's request for jury voir dire?
10. Did the trial court err in failing to grant defendant's demurrer to Commonwealth's case in chief?
Upon review, we conclude that Hyatt's fifth claim is meritorious and requires vacatur of his judgment of sentence. Therefore, we address only that issue.
Hyatt claims that the trial court erroneously quashed his subpoena duces tecum which he served upon Pittsburgh Action Against Rape ("PAAR"), the rape crisis center where the rape victim received counselling. The subpoena directed PAAR to produce its file concerning the rape victim. Hyatt claims that he served the subpoena so that PAAR would produce in court "any and all of its records in its possession for examination by the court to discern if any exculpatory material may have been contained therein." PAAR refused to accept the subpoena and made an oral motion to quash the subpoena at a hearing before the Honorable Jeffrey A. Manning. At the hearing, Hyatt was permitted to question Molly Knox, the director of PAAR, only about the type of information usually maintained in PAAR file; he was not permitted to question Knox with respect to any specific information contained in the victim's records. Subsequently, the trial court granted PAAR's motion to quash.
In its opinion in support of its decision to grant the motion to quash, the trial court stated that it had heard testimony from Knox regarding the information routinely developed by PAAR during its counselling sessions. The court stated, "no substantially verbatim statements by the victim exist or are maintained by PAAR; nor does any material exist which could be considered as such; nor does the victim adopt as her own, any information written or recorded by PAAR's sexual assault counselors." The trial court concluded that the information contained in the files could not be deemed material evidence under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). Therefore, the trial court reasoned, it was unnecessary to conduct an in camera review of the victim's PAAR records.
Hyatt claims that it was erroneous for the trial court to refuse to conduct an in camera review of the file and for the trial court to preclude him from reviewing, or questioning Knox about, the victim's file. Hyatt contends that the trial court's actions contravene the mandates of Commonwealth v. Wilson, 375 Pa.Super. 580, 544 A.2d 1381 (1988), alloc. granted, 525 Pa. 582, 575 A.2d 113 (1990). We agree.
The facts in Wilson are remarkably similar to those in the case at bar. Wilson was convicted of the rape and indecent assault of a woman. The day after the assault the victim went to Alice Paul House ("APH"), a rape crisis center, and was interviewed by staff members. Prior to trial, Wilson served a subpoena duces tecum on the director of APH, requesting production of their records. APH filed a petition to quash the subpoena, stating that the records were confidential pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 5945.1. The trial court granted APH's motion.
On appeal, Wilson claimed that section 5945.1 was inapplicable and, in the alternative, if it was applicable it was unconstitutional. We examined our supreme court's decision in In the Matter of Pittsburgh Action Against Rape, 494 Pa. 15, 428 A.2d 126 (1981), a case decided prior to the enactment of section 5945.1, in which the court refused to create an absolute privilege of confidentiality for communications between a rape counselor and victims seeking aid. Id., 494 Pa. at 26, 428 A.2d at 131. The court, in In the Matter of Pittsburgh, stated that
upon defense request a court should authorize defense inspection of only those statements of the complainant contained in the file which bear upon the facts of the alleged offense. The court, however, must not permit defense inspection of statements having no bearing on the facts of the counselling services PAAR provides. The trial court shall not permit defense review of any other aspect of the file.
In the Matter of Pittsburgh, 494 Pa. at 19, 428 A.2d at 127-28 (emphasis added). We noted that our supreme court in In the Matter of Pittsburgh also required the trial court conduct its review of the PAAR file in camera so that "... only those statements of the complainant, and not interpretations or recollections of the PAAR counsellor, are to be made available." Id., 494 Pa. at 28, 428 A.2d at 132. The court limited the term "statements" to include only "verbatim accounts of the complainant's declarations and notes that the complainant has approved as accurately reflecting what she said." Id., 494 Pa. at 28, 428 A.2d at 132.
In Wilson, we further cautioned that only statements having a direct bearing to the facts of the alleged offense may be released, and not those relating to counselling services. Wilson, 375 Pa.Super. at 583, 544 A.2d at 1383. Prior to reaching our conclusion in Wilson, we noted that section 5945.1 grants sexual assault counselors a privilege "not to be examined as a witness in any civil or criminal proceeding without prior written consent of the victim being counselled." Id., 375 Pa.Superior Ct. at 583, 544 A.2d at 1383; see 42 Pa.S.C. § 5945.1. We then concluded that section 5945.1 was inapplicable to the facts in Wilson because defense counsel had sought only the pretrial examination of certain materials in the possession of the rape crisis center and never sought to examine any counselor as a witness. Id., 375 Pa.Superior Ct. at 584, 544 A.2d at 1383 (emphasis added). See also Commonwealth v. Samuels, 354 Pa.Super. 128, 511 A.2d 221 (1986) (when defense counsel does not seek to examine a rape crisis counselor as a witness section 5945.1 is inapplicable). Accordingly, we found the principles set forth in In the Matter of Pittsburgh, supra, to be controlling. As a result we vacated Wilson's judgment of sentence and remanded the case to the trial court for an in camera hearing. We stated:
If the court concludes that any or all of the materials released to it by APH are statements of the complainant that should have been disclosed to appellant and heard by the jury, then a new trial shall be granted. If, however, the court concludes that the materials are not statements of the complainant or are statements relating only to counselling services, and thus outside the scope of defense review, the court shall reimpose sentence.
Id., 375 Pa.Superior Ct. at 585, 544 A.2d at 1384.
Most recently, in Commonwealth v. Aultman, 387 Pa.Super. 113, 563 A.2d 1210 (1989), alloc. granted, 525 Pa. 575, 575 A.2d 107 (1990), this court followed Wilson and concluded that it was reversible error for the trial court to quash the portion of a subpoena, served by Aultman upon Women Against Rape ("WAR") personnel, directing a WAR employee to bring to trial all the records pertaining to the victim. Id., 387 Pa.Superior Ct. at 122, 563 A.2d at 1215.
Aultman claimed that section 5945.1 was inapplicable because he was not seeking to examine a counselor but only attempting to obtain records. We agreed, and noted that in Samuels, supra, we had stated that section 5945.1 is inapplicable when defense counsel is not seeking to examine a counselor as a witness. Id., 387 Pa.Superior Ct. at 122, 563 A.2d at 1215. Further, we noted that Samuels held that because the trial court, in its review of appellant's post-trial motions, had examined the PAAR records and found that they contained no statements made by the victim, appellant was not prejudiced by the trial court's improper quashal of the subpoena. In Aultman, we distinguished Samuels and concluded that because the trial court in Aultman never conducted an in camera review of the records, it, like the trial court in Wilson, had committed reversible error. Id., 387 Pa.Superior Ct. at 124, 563 A.2d 1216.
In this case, Hyatt has sought only the victim's PAAR records and we conclude, therefore, that section 5945.1 is inapplicable. Accordingly, we find that the supreme court's decision in In the Matter of Pittsburgh is dispositive. Pursuant to In the Matter of Pittsburgh we vacate the judgment of sentence and remand the case so that the trial court may conduct an in camera review to determine if there are any statements of the victim in the PAAR records which "bear upon the facts of the alleged offense." Wilson, 375 Pa.Super. at 583, 544 A.2d at 1383. If the court concludes that any or all of the materials released to it by PAAR contain statements of the victim that should have been disclosed to Hyatt and heard by the jury, then a new trial shall be granted. If, on the other hand, the trial court determines that the materials do not contain statements of the complainant or contain statements relating only to counselling services, and thus are outside the scope of defense review, then the court shall reimpose sentence.
Judgment of sentence vacated and case remanded.
FORD ELLIOTT, J., files a concurring opinion.
. The trial court stated that the holding in Wilson is in conflict with our earlier decision in Commonwealth v. Kyle, 367 Pa.Super. 484, 533 A.2d 120 (1987). In Kyle, this court upheld the trial court's decision denying defense counsel access to the file prepared on the victim by a psychologist. The court held that pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 5944 the psychologist's records were privileged communications. Id., 367 Pa. Superior Ct. at 504, 533 A.2d at 130. In the instant case, Judge Manning stated that "in view of Kyle as well as the plain meaning of section 5945.1(b), it makes little sense that a statute designed to grant a privilege of confidentiality for any communication between a rape victim and a counselor would not further protect the records or reports made by that counselor in the course of his or her counselling efforts."
. Following In the Matter of Pittsburgh, our legislature enacted 42 Pa.C.S. § 5945.1 which grants a testimonial privilege to sexual assault counselors. Section 5945.1 states the following:
§ 5945.1 Confidential communications to sexual assault counselors (a) Definition.—As used in this section the following words and phrases shall have the meanings given to them in this subsection:
"Rape crisis center." Any office, institution or center offering assistance to victims of sexual assault and their families through crisis intervention, medical and legal accompaniment and follow-up counselling.
"Sexual assault counselor." A person who is engaged in any office, institution or center defined as a rape crisis center under this section, who has undergone 40 hours of training, and is under the control of a direct services supervisor of a rape crisis center, whose primary purpose is the rendering of advice, counseling or assistance to victims of sexual assault.
'Victim." A person who consults a sexual assault counselor for the purpose of securing advice, counseling or assistance concerning a mental, physical or emotional condition caused by a sexual assault.
"Confidential communication." Information transmitted between a victim of sexual assault and a sexual assault counselor in the course of that relationship and in confidence by a means which, so far as the victim is aware, does not disclose the information to a third person other than those who are present to further the interests of the victim in the consultation or those to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or an accomplishment of the purposes for which the sexual assault counselor is consulted. The term includes all information received by the sexual assault counselor in the course of that relationship.
(b) Privilege.—A sexual assault counselor has a privilege not to be examined as a witness in any civil or criminal proceeding without the prior written consent of the victim to the counselor or as to any advice, report or working paper given or made in the course of the consultation.