Case Name: Alvie Charles HUGHEY v. STATE of Mississippi
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1987-09-02
Citations: 512 So. 2d 4
Docket Number: No. 56308
Parties: Alvie Charles HUGHEY v. STATE of Mississippi.
Judges: Before WALKER, C.J., and PRATHER and SULLIVAN, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 512
Pages: 4–12

Head Matter:
Alvie Charles HUGHEY v. STATE of Mississippi.
No. 56308.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Sept. 2, 1987.
Mary Ann Smith, Corinth, for appellant.
Edwin Lloyd Pittman, Atty. Gen. by Wayne Snuggs, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.
Before WALKER, C.J., and PRATHER and SULLIVAN, JJ.

Opinion:
WALKER, Chief Justice,
for the Court:
In the Circuit Court of Alcorn County, Alvie Charles Hughey was convicted of armed robbery. The jury being unable to fix his penalty, the trial court sentenced him to a term of fifteen (15) years. Hu-ghey appeals that conviction and sentence. Finding no error, we affirm.
On the afternoon of April 29, 1981, Mr. and Mrs. Haley Haney were working in the small grocery store they owned on Proper Street in Alcorn County. At 4:00 p.m., two (2) men came into the store, but left without making any purchase. Approximately an hour later, they returned to the store, accompanied by a woman. While the woman asked to purchase some bologna, the two (2) men closed the doors to the store, which had been propped open because of the warm weather. After the doors were closed, one of the men demanded that Mrs. Haney give him her ring, which she did, and that Mr. Haney give him the money from the cash register. When Mr. Haney hesitated, one of the men, later identified as Alvie Hughey, threatened to shoot and kill Mrs. Haney. Hughey had "what appeared to be a gun", under his shirt, and Mrs. Haney saw "the prints of a gun" under his shirt, although Hughey "never took the gun out." Before Mr. Haney could remove the money from the cash register, Tommy Williams, a frequent customer, came to the door of the grocery store, intending to enter. While moving toward the other door along with his two (2) companions, Hughey again threatened to shoot Mrs. Haney unless someone gave him the money from the cash register. Mrs. Haney opened the door which Tommy Williams was approaching, informed him that the store was being robbed, and asked him to "call the law." Mr. Haney then took the money from the cash register and gave it to Hughey. As Williams left to call law enforcement officers, the trio exited the store with $200.00 in cash and the ring, which was a diamond cluster.
As he drove away to call the police, Williams encountered a red light and had to stop because of approaching vehicles which had the right of way. While Williams was stopped at the intersection, Hughey opened the door to Williams' car and got in. Hu-ghey stated that he had robbed the store and that he had a gun. When Hughey instructed Williams to drive to "the projects," Williams did so. Hughey then got out of the car.
Before he could be apprehended, Hughey fled to New York state, where he was arrested for criminal possession of a weapon. After being convicted on that charge, he entered a New York prison in March of 1982.
In 1984, Hughey was tried on the armed robbery charge in the Circuit Court of Al-corn County; the jury returned a verdict of guilty, but could not reach an agreement as to penalty. The trial court then sentenced Hughey to serve a term of fifteen (15) years. He appeals, assigning three (3) errors.
I. WAS THE EVIDENCE INSUFFICIENT TO CONVICT FOR ARMED ROBBERY?
Hughey argues that there was no evidence to prove that he exhibited a gun, and that he therefore could not be convicted of armed robbery. This argument is without merit. Hughey had under his shirt an object which looked like a gun. Mrs. Haney testified that she saw "the prints of a gun." Immediately after the robbery, Hughey himself told Tommy Williams that he had a gun. This evidence, along with the reasonable inferences flowing therefrom, was sufficient to present a jury question as to whether Hughey exhibited a deadly weapon. Valentine v. State, 415 So.2d 687, 689 (Miss.1982).
II. DID THE COURT ERR IN CAUSING HUGHEY TO GO TO TRIAL ON THE DAY HE WAS ARRAIGNED, AND IN CAUSING HUGHEY TO GO TO TRIAL ON A DATE NINE DAYS AFTER HIS COUNSEL WAS NOTIFIED THAT SHE WAS APPOINTED TO REPRESENT HIM?
Hughey moved for a continuance, alleging that he needed more time to prepare his claim of a violation of his right to a speedy trial. Although the trial court denied the continuance, an evidentiary hearing on Hughey's speedy trial claim was conducted after trial. The merits of that claim are discussed with regard to the next assignment of error. The grant or denial of a continuance lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. Gates v. State, 484 So.2d 1002, 1006 (Miss.1986); Carter v. State, 473 So.2d 471, 475 (Miss.1985). We find no abuse of that discretion in the instant case.
III. WAS THE DEFENDANT DENIED HIS RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL?
The following is a chronology of the events involved in this claim:
April 29,1981 The robbery with which Hughey was charged occurred.
May, 1981 Hughey was indicted for armed robbery.
September 9,1981 Hughey was arrested in New York state on a weapons charge.
March 5,1982 Hughey entered a state prison in New York to serve two to six (2-6) years for the weapons conviction.
April 22,1982 New York correctional officer notified Mississippi Assistant Attorney General by mail that the Mississippi detainer lodged against Hughey had been received, that Mississippi authorities would be notified before Hughey was released, and that the Mississippi "warrant [was] not eligible for speedy trial." That same day Hughey executed a document entitled "Agreement on Detainers: Form II," which contained a notice of place of imprisonment, request for disposition of indictments, and waiver of extradition. Had Mississippi been a party to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, then Mississippi would have been required, within 180 days of Hughey's waiver, to try him or remove the detainer. Mississippi, however, is not a party to the IAD. The document was not effective to waive extradition. It is not clear whether this document was sent to Mississippi officials.
September, 1982 Hughey, having been informed by legal services that Mississippi was not a party to IAD, wrote to a Mississippi Assistant Attorney General and to the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Alcorn County, asking that he be tried at the earliest possible date.
October 21,1982 District Attorney John R. Young wrote to Rodney Moody, a New York corrections official. In the letter, which was apparently a follow-up to a telephone call, the district attorney thanked Moody for advising him of the "papers needed by [the New York prison] to return [Hughey to Mississippi] for trial." The letter ended, "Would you please send me your Interstate Forms 6 and 7 so that I can be sure to have what you need."
December 3,1982 District attorney wrote to Hughey, telling him that he should sign a waiver of extradition so he could be tried in January of 1983. The district attorney stated in the letter that Hughey should see Rodney Moody, who would furnish him with the appropriate forms.
January 4, 1983 Rodney Moody wrote to Hughey, stating the following: "This is in response to your recent communication indicating that I was to furnish you with the appropriate forms for Waiver of Extradition for the State of Mississippi. My records indicate that you signed the correct form . on April 22, 1982. For your information I am enclosing a copy of that form." The document to which Moody referred was the IAD form.
February 22,1983 Prisoners' Legal Services of New York wrote to Hughey, responding to his letter and telling him that he had done everything possible to get Mississippi to prosecute.
May 17,1983 Hughey wrote to a Mississippi Assistant Attorney General and to the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court of Alcorn County, asserting his right to a speedy trial and stating, by. affidavit, that he had waived extradition.
July 20,1983 New York informed the district attorney that Hughey would be released on September 20,1983.
October 4,1983 The district attorney began extradition procedures. New York continued to hold Hu-ghey for Mississippi.
November 29,1983 Governor of New York signed extradition order.
December 19,1983 The day before New York would have released Hughey (they would hold him on de-tainer for 90 days past his release date) Mississippi authorities went to New York and transported him to Mississippi.
February 1,1984 Hughey was tried in Mississippi for armed robbery.
In determining whether a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated, we utilize a four-part balancing test set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), and applied by this Court in numerous cases, the most recent of which is Kinzey v. State, 498 So.2d 814 (Miss.1986). The factors to be considered are 1) length of delay, 2) reason for delay 3) defendant's assertion of the right, 4) prejudice to the defendant.
In regard to the length of the delay, we note that Hughey was tried approximately thirty-three (33) months after he was indicted. The State attempts on appeal to persuade us that Hughey became an accused, for purposes of computing the length of delay, only when the detainer was lodged against him in April of 1982. The State cites Perry v. State, 419 So.2d 194, 199 (Miss.1982), where we held that Perry became an accused when a detainer was lodged against him. The State misconstrues our holding in Perry. Because the detainer was lodged against the defendant in Perry before he was indicted, we held that the defendant became an accused at the time of the detainer. In the instant case, however, Hughey was indicted in May of 1981, long before the detainer was ever lodged against him. "The constitutional right to a speedy trial, . attaches at the time of a formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge." Perry, 419 So.2d at 198 (emphasis added). In the case at bar, Hughey became an "accused" when he was indicted in May of 1981. Therefore, the length of the delay which we consider in determining whether Hughey's constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated, is thirty-three (33) months. Violation of the constitutional right to a speedy trial has been found in cases involving lesser delays. Beavers v. State, 498 So.2d 788, 790 (Miss.1986) (fourteen (14) months); Perry v. State, 419 So.2d 194 (Miss.1982) (nineteen (19) months).
In assessing the reason for the delay, we consider the State's argument that Hughey could not be brought to Mississippi for trial because he was incarcerated in a state prison in New York. Nothing in the record or the briefs clarifies for us what, if anything, Mississippi could have done to procure Hu-ghey's extradition before the completion of his New York prison term. The district attorney testified at the evidentiary hearing that New York simply "would not let Mississippi have Hughey." Two (2) letters appear in the record from New York authorities to Mississippi authorities which contain the statement, "This warrant [Hu-ghey] is not eligible for a speedy trial." It appears that the district attorney contacted Rodney Moody with the New York Department of Corrections, and was told by Moody what steps would be necessary in order for Hughey to be returned to Mississippi for trial before the completion of his New York prison term. The district attorney wrote to Moody, thanking him for the information and asking that the necessary forms be sent to the district attorney. Although no further mention of these forms appears in the record, there does appear a letter from the district attorney to Hughey, instructing Hughey to waive extradition and obtain the appropriate forms to do so from Rodney Moody. Unfortunately, Rodney Moody believed, and so informed Hu-ghey, that Hughey had waived extradition when he signed the IAD forms in April of 1982. When Hughey contacted Prisoners' Legal Services of New York, he was again told that he had done everything possible to get Mississippi to try him.
When a defendant incarcerated in another state asserts his right to a speedy trial, the state seeking to prosecute him must make a diligent, good-faith effort to bring him to trial. Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 383, 89 S.Ct. 575, 579, 21 L.Ed.2d 607, 614 (1969); Saxton v. State, 394 So.2d 871, 875 (Miss.1981). The record in the case at bar reveals that the district attor ney contacted New York officials by telephone and by letter in an attempt to have Hughey returned to Mississippi for trial. Furthermore, the district attorney wrote to Hughey, informing him that he would have to waive extradition in order to be returned to Mississippi. The district attorney by these actions fulfilled his duty to make a diligent, good-faith effort to have Hughey returned to Mississippi for trial. Therefore, we hold that the reason for the delay weighs heavily in favor of the State.
The next factor we consider is the defendant's assertion of his right to a speedy trial. Suffice it to say that, as described above, Hughey was diligent in his assertion of this right.
Next we consider the prejudice to the defendant. Hughey has made no allegation, in the trial court or on appeal, that he lost witnesses or was otherwise prejudiced in the trial of the case. Although he argues on appeal that various aspects of prison life in New York were more difficult for him because of the detainer, we note that, had he been tried in Mississippi, convicted (as he ultimately was), and then returned to New York to complete his term, the effect on his prison life would have been the same as that resulting from the detainer. We find no prejudice resulting to Hughey by virtue of this delay.
In balancing these Barker factors, we conclude that Hughey was not denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Because this and the previous assignments of error are without merit, we affirm the conviction and sentence.
AFFIRMED.
ROY NOBLE LEE, and HAWKINS, P.JJ., and DAN M. LEE, PRATHER, SULLIVAN, ANDERSON and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur.
ROBERTSON, J., concurs in parts I and II and dissents in part III with written opinion.