Case Name: Benjamin F. Jackson, Plaintiff, v. Andrew Egan and Others, Defendants, Impleaded with George Robins and Brooklyn Builders' Supply Company, Appellants, and Albert W. De Long, Respondent
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1910-05-26
Citations: 138 A.D. 505
Docket Number: 
Parties: Benjamin F. Jackson, Plaintiff, v. Andrew Egan and Others, Defendants, Impleaded with George Robins and Brooklyn Builders’ Supply Company, Appellants, and Albert W. De Long, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: Appellate Division Reports
Volume: 138
Pages: 505–510

Head Matter:
Benjamin F. Jackson, Plaintiff, v. Andrew Egan and Others, Defendants, Impleaded with George Robins and Brooklyn Builders’ Supply Company, Appellants, and Albert W. De Long, Respondent.
Second Department,
May 26, 1910.
Mechanic’s lien—material men and contractors defined — agreement to furnish material and use it in construction —priority of liens.
If a person who furnishes material for the improvement of real property further agrees with the owner to use that particular material in the erection of any structure upon the lands, he ceases to be a material man and becomes a contractor. '
A mechanic’s lien filed by a material man is superior to a prior lien filed by a contractor; and the lien of a material man has priority over the liens of other material men subsequently filed.
Thomas, J., dissented, in part, with opinion.
Appeal by the defendants, George Robins and another, from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the 'Kings County Special' Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Kings on the 14th day of September, 1909, overruling the said defendants’ objections to the report of a referee, and also from an order entered in said clerk’s office on the 6tli day of October, 1909, confirming the said report.
Herbert Reeves [(7. <3. Van VaTkenburgh with him on the brief], for the appellant George Robins.
W: G. Damron, for the appellant Brooklyn Builders’ Supply Company.
Mortimer M. Menken [Howard T. Gole with him on the brief], for the respondent.

Opinion:
Pee Cubiam :
While injustice may result from affirming these' orders, we can see no escape therefrom. The statute relating to mechanics' liens defines the words " material man " and " contractor." (Lien Law [Gen. Laws, chap. 49; Laws of 1397, chap. 418], § 2, revised into Lien Law [Consol. Laws,.chap. 33: Laws of 1909, chap. 38], § 2.) If we transpose the order in which thes.e definitions appear therein, it may assist in understanding it. The term material man " means any person other than a contraetor who furnishes material" for the improvement of real property. This would indicate that a person who furnishes material may, under certain circumstances, be a contractor. The term contractor " means a person who enters into a contract with the owner of real property for the improvement thereof." Therefore, if the person who furnishes material also agrees with the owner of real property to use that particular material in the erection of any structure upon it, he ceases to be simply a material man and becomes a contractor. We do not claim that this exhaustively points out the difference between these two classes, but it is sufficient for the purposes of this. case. De Long and the Brooklyn Builders' Supply Company were, therefore, material men, and Robins- was a contractor. As De Long's lien was prior in point of time to that of the Brooklyn Builders' Supply Company, he is entitled to the surplus, money -as against it, and because he is a mate rial man and not a contractor he has a preference over Eobins, notwithstanding Eobins' lien was prior in point of time to his.