Case Name: Humberto CABRERA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2004-10-08
Citations: 884 So. 2d 482
Docket Number: No. 5D03-2367
Parties: Humberto CABRERA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: PLEUS and PALMER, JJ„ concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 884
Pages: 482–491

Head Matter:
Humberto CABRERA, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 5D03-2367.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Oct. 8, 2004.
Ricardo R. Pesquera, Orlando, for Appellant.
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Angela D. McCravy, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Humberto Cabrera appeals the judgment and sentences imposed pursuant to a jury verdict finding him guilty of sexual battery on a mentally defective person, two counts of battery and two counts of lewd and lascivious behavior. Of the several issues Cabrera raises, we write to address two: (1) whether his convictions for the two counts of lewd and lascivious behavior violate the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Florida and federal constitutions, and (2) whether his designation as a sexual predator should be reversed. We answer the first question in the affirmative and reverse one conviction of lewd and lascivious behavior; as to the second, Cabrera's failure to preserve the issue precludes appellate review. We will briefly explain our conclusions. Regarding the other issues raised by Cabrera, we affirm without discussion.
While Cabrera and his mentally challenged victim were together in a swimming pool, Cabrera committed the two alleged acts of lewd and lascivious behavior. Specifically, count four of the information alleged that Cabrera touched the breasts of the victim and count five alleged that he touched the buttocks of the victim. The State charged that each act was committed in violation of section 798.02, Florida Statutes (2002), which provides:
If any man. and woman, not being married to each other, lewdly and lasciviously associate and cohabit together, or if any man or woman, married or unmarried, engages in open and gross lewdness and lascivious behavior,-they shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
The evidence reveals that Cabrera and the victim were in the pool a relatively short period of time — approximately thirty minutes. The victim's mother, who was present at the pool, testified that the inappropriate touching occurred within a span of minutes. Cabrera alleges that he was improperly convicted of both counts because the touching occurred during one criminal episode and therefore, his multiple convictions violate double jeopardy principles.
In Hunsicker v. State, 881 So.2d 1166 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004), we explained the analysis that should be ehiployed to determine whether two convictions arise from a single criminal episode:
"The prevailing standard for determining the constitutionality of multiple convictions for offenses arising from the same criminal transaction is whether the Legislature 'intended to authorize separate punishments for the two crimes.' " Gordon v. State, 780 So.2d 17, 19 (Fla.2001) (quoting M.P. v. State, 682 So.2d 79, 81 (Fla.1996)); see also Cruller v. State, 808 So.2d 201, 203 (Fla.2002). If the Legislature did not clearly express its intention to authorize separate punishments, the courts must resort to the test of statutory construction established in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), now codified in section 775.021(4), Florida Statutes (2002). Cruller; Gordon; M.P. The court in Cruller emphasized that if there is a clear expression of legislative intent to require two separate punishments analysis ends and we do not resort to the Blockburger test. In accordance with Cruller, we begin our search for clear legislative intent by examining the language, structure, and legislative history of section 800.04. Cruller, 808 So.2d at 203.
Id. at 1170.
Our examination of the language, structure and legislative history of section 798.02 leads us to conclude that there is no clear legislative intent to authorize two separate punishments for acts of lewd and lascivious behavior alleged to be in violation of the statute. Moreover, our application of the Blockburger analysis codified in section 775.021(4) does not lead us to conclude that each act in violation of the statute is a separate offense. We, therefore, advert to the proper legal analysis to determine whether the acts for which Cabrera was convicted occurred during a single criminal episode. Hunsicker. Because there was not a sufficient temporal break between the two acts on which counts four and five are based to have allowed Cabrera time to pause, reflect and form a new criminal intent for each offense, both acts occurred in a single criminal episode. Id. Hence, both convictions violate double jeopardy principles and, accordingly, we affirm Cabrera's conviction on one count and reverse his conviction for the other and remand for resentencing.
Regarding the alleged erroneous sexual predator designation, this court held in Nicholson v. State, 846 So.2d 1217 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003), that an erroneous designation as a sexual predator under section 775.21, Florida Statutes (2002), is a sentencing error that must be properly preserved for review. If it is not, the defendant may not raise it for the first time on appeal. When Cabrera was sentenced, he did not object, and he has not filed an appropriate motion pursuant to rule 3.800(b), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. Therefore, he has not properly preserved this issue for review by this court and, because we are bound by the decision in Nicholson, we must affirm without prejudice to Cabrera to raise it in a proper motion pursuant to rule 3.800(a) or rule 3.850. We certify conflict with Coblentz v. State, 775 So.2d 359 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), review denied, 789 So.2d 344 (Fla.2001), and Angeli v. State, 712 So.2d 1132 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998).
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.
PLEUS and PALMER, JJ" concur.
SAWAYA C.J., concurs specially with opinion.
. The other issues that we affirm are: 1) whether the trial court erred by failing to make specific findings of fact to support its conclusion that the child who testified was competent to do so; 2) whether the trial court erred by admitting alleged hearsay statements of the victim without making proper and specific findings of reliability and trustworthiness; 3) whether the State committed prose-cutorial misconduct and invaded the province of the jury by bolstering the credibility of the victim; and 4) whether the Florida Sexual Predator's Act, section 775.21, Florida Statutes (2002), is unconstitutional because it violates procedural due process. As to the last issue, we certify conflict with Espindola v. State, 855 So.2d 1281 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003).
. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932).