Case Name: James ARTHUR, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2002-04-26
Citations: 818 So. 2d 589
Docket Number: No. 5D00-2863
Parties: James ARTHUR, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: COBB, SHARP, W., PETERSON, SAWAYA, PLEUS, PALMER and ORFINGER, R.B., J.J., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 818
Pages: 589–595

Head Matter:
James ARTHUR, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 5D00-2863.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
April 26, 2002.
Rehearing Denied June 21, 2002.
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Susan A. Fagan, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Lamya A. Henry, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

Opinion:
HARRIS, J.
We elect to consider this case en banc. Here, Arthur was charged with violating sections 322.34 and 322.264, Florida Statutes, because he was caught driving a vehicle after being notified that he had been designated an "habitual traffic offender" according to the records maintained by the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (Department) resulting in his driving privileges being revoked. Section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes makes it a third-degree felony for one whose driver's license has been revoked as an habitual offender to drive a motor vehicle upon the highways of this state. Thus, the elements of the offense are (1) that while defendant's license was revoked as an "habitual offender" (2) he drove a motor vehicle upon the highways of this state.
Section 322.264, Florida Statutes, defines "habitual traffic offender" as "any person whose record, as maintained by the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, shows that such person has accumulated the specified number of convictions for offenses described in subsection (1) or subsection (2), within a five year period." (Emphasis added). Section 322.27(5), Florida Statutes, mandates that the Department revoke the license of anyone designated an habitual offender. To show that Arthur had been so designated and that his license had been so revoked, the State introduced a certified copy of defendant's entire driving record showing his classification as an habitual traffic offender (as well as his numerous convictions) and the revocation of his driving license. Since the definition of one of the elements, habitual traffic offender, incorporates the Department's records, it is essential that such records, or at least the relevant portions thereof showing such designation and revocation, be proved to the jury. These records are admissible under section 322.201, Florida Statutes.
The charged offense in this case was not that Arthur had committed a set number of previous offenses for which judgments had been entered as in the case of felony DUI which was being considered by the court in State v. Harbaugh, 754 So.2d 691 (Fla.2000). Here, Arthur's charged offense was continuing to drive after being notified that the Department had determined that he was an habitual traffic offender and that his license had been revoked for that reason. If after receiving the notice of revocation Arthur believed his driving record was in error his remedy was to have his record corrected, not to ignore the revocation and continue to drive. Arthur does not contend he was without knowledge of the revocation. Nor did he suggest below that the driving record introduced was not his. Arthur's objections to the introduction of his driving record were (1) hearsay, (2) not the best evidence, and (3) denial of his right of confrontation.
On appeal, Arthur urges that the State failed to allege in the information the specific prior offenses which led to his being designated an habitual traffic offender. But it is the fact that the Department has designated the defendant as an habitual traffic offender based on his driving record and has thereby revoked his license, and not the underlying traffic offenses themselves, which is the element of the offense. Specifically designating the numerous traffic citations or offenses which led to the designation is not required. To state it simply, the law requires that one whose license is revoked because he is an habitual traffic offender must not drive unless or until his revoca tion is set aside. The State proved that Arthur's was, that he did, and that it wasn't.
Also on appeal, Arthur urges that this court's opinion in Sylvester v. State, 770 So.2d 249 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000), (even though a proper objection was not made below) mandates reversal because we held therein that the Department's records cannot sufficiently tie the prior convictions to Arthur. But again, it is the fact of the designation as an habitual traffic offender and the resulting revocation which are the elements of the current offense and which must be tied to Arthur, not the prior traffic citations or offenses which led to the designation and revocation. There is sufficient proof in this case that the records submitted as evidence showing the designation and the revocation were Arthur's. The records reflect not just his name, not just his address, not just his birthdate, but even his social security number. The only thing lacking was DNA. To the extent that Sylvester conflicts with this opinion, we hereby recede from Sylvester.
AFFIRMED.
COBB, SHARP, W., PETERSON, SAWAYA, PLEUS, PALMER and ORFINGER, R.B., J.J., concur.
THOMPSON, C.J., concurs in part; dissents in part, with opinion with which GRIFFIN, J., concurs.
GRIFFIN, J., concurs in part; dissents in part, with opinion.
. Arthur urges that section 322.201 merely removes the necessity for authentication and does not address the hearsay problem. The statute makes the records admissible without authentication "provided the same is otherwise admissible in evidence." These are public records and reports of a public office or agency and are excepted from the hearsay rule under section 90.803(8), Florida Statutes.
. The evidence code exempts the driving records from the hearsay exclusion and places certified copies on par with originals. Concerning the right of confrontation, these records reflect a compilation of traffic offenses committed by Arthur, offenses which were not counted toward revocation until after Arthur was given the opportunity to confront the witnesses against him. Further, these records were presented in open court to "confront" Arthur and he was given the opportunity to confront these records by challenging any entry therein.
. State v. Fields, 809 So.2d 99 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2002).
. The dissent suggests that while the defendant's driving record is sufficiently linked to defendant by its introduction under section 322.201, it does not adequately link the convictions listed therein to defendant. At least, says the dissent, the driving record does not prove that defendant is the one who committed the offenses listed in his driving record. We believe that the convictions appearing in the records maintained by the Department, records obtained from the courts as a part of the Department's business records (records not disputed by defendant when he was notified that his license had been suspended), are sufficiently linked to defendant to constitute prima facie evidence that defendant committed the offenses reflecting his driver's license and shifts the burden of going forward with the evidence to defendant. Unrefuted, the records are sufficient to sustain a conviction. See State v. Kahler, 232 So.2d 166 (Fla.1970).
. It is true that Sylvester can be distinguished on the facts. The gravamen of the offense in Sylvester [section 322.34(2)(c) ] was that the defendant was thrice convicted of knowingly driving with a suspended license, whereas the gravamen of the offense herein is that Arthur was convicted of driving after his license had been revoked because he was an "habitual traffic offender" [section 322.34(5) ]. The conflict appears in the Sylvester analysis which holds not only that Sylvester's driving record, which was properly admitted in evidence, was insufficient to prove the prior convictions beyond a reasonable doubt but also insufficient to link Sylvester to the prior convictions. Sylvester relied on State v. Harbaugh, 754 So.2d 691 (Fla.2000), but this reliance was misplaced. Section 322.201, Fla. Stat., makes the driving records admissible and section 322.34(2), Fla. Stat., if the record reflects that notice was given, creates a rebuttable presumption of knowledge of the suspension. Harbaugh was primarily concerned with whether a bifurcated process would be required in establishing felony DUI if the defendant elected a jury trial. Although the court discussed submitting certified copies of each judgment in order to evidence the prior convictions, it did not discuss the effect of section 322.201, Fla. Stat., which makes the driving records, the business records of the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, admissible in evidence. There would be no reason to make these records admissible unless the records constituted some evidence of the truth of their contents. It is these records which reflected the two prior convictions of driving while license suspended which convinced the jury in this bifurcated hearing that Sylvester was guilty as charged. If the content of the defendant's driving record deemed admissible in evidence is probative of the information contained therein, a record the dissent herein admits is adequately connected to defendant, then at least a prima facie case is established. We held in Sylvester that aside from the question of whether the driving record was probative of the fact that the prior convictions occurred, the mere fact that defendant's name appeared on the driving record along with his address, physical description, date of birth and his driver's license number was insufficient to "link" defendant to the offenses. It is this portion of the analysis which conflicts with this opinion.