Case Name: Johnnie Bell BURTON v. The CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, Mississippi
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 1991-09-04
Citations: 595 So. 2d 1279
Docket Number: No. 90-CA-0285
Parties: Johnnie Bell BURTON v. The CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, Mississippi.
Judges: Before ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., and PITTMAN and BANKS, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 595
Pages: 1279–1282

Head Matter:
Johnnie Bell BURTON v. The CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, Mississippi.
No. 90-CA-0285.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Sept. 4, 1991.
Dissenting Opinion of Justice McRae Sept. 25, 1991.
As Modified on Denial of Rehearing April 29, 1992.
Laurel G. Weir, Thomas L. Booker, Jr., Weir & Booker, Philadelphia, for appellant.
Thomas R. Jones, Bourdeaux & Jones, Meridian, for appellee.
Before ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., and PITTMAN and BANKS, JJ.

Opinion:
ROY NOBLE LEE, Chief Justice,
for the Court:
Johnnie Bell Burton appeals from an order of the Circuit Court of Neshoba County, Mississippi, Honorable Edward A. Williamson, presiding, which granted the motion of the City of Philadelphia, Mississippi, for summary judgment. She presents four (4) issues for decision by this Court:
I. DID THE LOWER COURT ERR IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT?
II. WAS THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT CONTRARY TO THE OVERWHELMING WEIGHT OF THE LAW AND FACTS?
III. DID THE LOWER COURT ERR IN COMPLETELY BARRING BURTON'S CLAIM SIMPLY BECAUSE SHE WAS CONTRIBUTORlLY NEGLIGENT?
IV. DID THE LOWER COURT FAIL TO APPLY THE CORRECT LEGAL STANDARDS?
FACTS
On September 17,1987, Johnnie Bell Burton, appellant, fell and injured her back while walking on a sidewalk of the City of Philadelphia. The accident occurred on a sidewalk joining Beacon Street, which runs east and west through the City of Philadelphia and along the court square. The sidewalk was located on the north side of Beacon Street.
Burton was deposed and also filed an affidavit in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. In her deposition, she stated:
Q: Do you know how long the hole had been there?
A: Eight months to a year.
Q: If that's true, then you yourself had walked past it on other occasions?
A: Yes.
Q: Ma'am?
A: Yes, sir. I wasn't hunting holes in the sidewalk so I hadn't paid it any attention.
Q: I think you've said that wasn't on your mind.
A: No.
Burton had left work, parked her car along the street, walked up the street, past the place where she later fell, did some shopping and returned to her car. On her return, she fell and injured her back. Burton had used the walk many times before and was familiar with the walk and the area. She stated that the hole, or crack, which caused her to fall, was approximately five (5) inches long and two and a half (2½) to three (3) inches in depth and was near a water meter. She further stated that the defect in the sidewalk had been there in excess of eight (8) months.
DISCUSSION
I., II., III., AND IV.
The issues presented may be discussed under the general issue of whether or not the lower court erred in granting summary judgment.
The appellee relies upon the deposition and affidavits of appellant and her husband, except legal conclusions, and the affidavit for the appellee that there is no genuine issue of material fact in the case. The lower court agreed and granted summary judgment for the appellee on February 22, 1990.
In City of Ruleville v. Grittman, 250 Miss. 842, 168 So.2d 527 (1964), this Court held:
A municipality is required to exercise ordinary care to maintain streets and sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition for use of persons exercising ordinary care and caution. City of Meridian v. Raley, [288 Miss. 304, 118 So.2d 342 (1960)].
Grittman, 250 Miss, at 845, 168 So.2d at 529. See also City of Greenville v. Laury, 172 Miss. 118, 159 So. 121 (1935).
This Court has distinguished the cases on liability for injuries resulting from defects in sidewalks — those caused or contributed by construction; repairs or causes by human or corporate means; and, those that are the result of natural causes such as roots under walks causing them to buckle; grass growing over walks; attrition by nature; etc. See Grittman, 250 Miss, at 845-47, 168 So.2d at 529-30. City of Biloxi v. Schambach, 247 Miss. 644, 157 So.2d 386 (1963) (judgment in favor of pedestrian who tripped because two sections of the sidewalk were of unequal height to the extent of several inches was reversed); Rowe v. City of Winona, 248 Miss. 411, 159 So.2d 282 (1964) (directed verdict in favor of city where the defect in the sidewalk was a crack wide enough to catch the heel of a pedestrian's shoe was affirmed); City of Meridian v. Raley, 238 Miss. 304, 118 So.2d 342 (1960) (judgment in favor of pedestrian who tripped by stepping in a hole between the end of a dirt sidewalk and the beginning of a concrete sidewalk partly covered by grass was reversed); City of Cleveland v. Threadgill, 246 Miss. 23, 148 So.2d 670 (1963) (judgment in favor of the injured pedestrian who stepped on the cover of a defective water drain was affirmed); Birdsong v. City of Clarksdale,- 191 Miss. 532, 3 So.2d 827 (1941) (peremptory charge in favor of city where a pedestrian was injured due to a leaking water meter was reversed); Gould v. Town of Newton, 157 Miss. Ill, 126 So. 826 (1930) (directed verdict in favor of city where pedestrian was injured by tripping on a stake protruding one inch above the ground was reversed).
In City of Tupelo v. Vaughn, 246 So.2d 88 (Miss.1971), this Court reversed a judgment in favor of a pedestrian where the crevice was "several inches wide, a few inches deep, and extended across the width of the walk." Id. at 88.
It is undisputed that if plaintiff had looked where she was going, she would have seen the defect in the sidewalk, and upon seeing it, reasonable care would require that she step over it. The rule laid down in case after case means that one walking along a city sidewalk must look where he is going and avoid a defect which is obvious.
Vaughn at 89 (emphasis added).
However, our comparative negligence law in this state applies and, unless the plaintiff's negligence is the sole proximate cause of the injury, the plaintiff is entitled to recover. In responding to the motion for summary judgment, plaintiff was required to show evidence of circumstances from which it could reasonably be concluded that the city had notice of the defect. There was no evidence that the city caused the defect, nor was there evidence proffered to show that the city had notice of the condition causing the accident and, after notice, failed to take reasonable steps to cure the condition. Without such evidence, there is no evidence of negligence on the part of the city.
We are of the opinion that there was no genuine issue of fact in this case and that the lower court did not err in granting the motion for summary judgment. Likewise, there was no showing of negligence which would activate the comparative negligence doctrine since the record reflects that appellant's negligence was the sole approximate cause of the accident.
AFFIRMED.
HAWKINS and DAN M. LEE, P.JJ., and PRATHER, ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN, PITTMAN and BANKS, JJ., concur.
McRAE, J., dissents, with written opinion to follow.