Case Name: The STATE, Respondent, v. David Brian CAPPS, Appellant
Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1981-02-24
Citations: 276 S.C. 59
Docket Number: 21396
Parties: The STATE, Respondent, v. David Brian CAPPS, Appellant.
Judges: Littlejohn, Gregory and Harwell, JJ., concur.
Reporter: South Carolina Reports
Volume: 276
Pages: 59–68

Head Matter:
21396
The STATE, Respondent, v. David Brian CAPPS, Appellant.
(275 S. E. (2d) 872)
Chief Atty. John L. Sweeny and Staff Atty. TaraD. Shurling of S. C. Commission of Appellate Defense, Columbia, for appellant.
Atty. Gen. Darnel R. McLeod, Asst. Atty. Gen. Brian P. Gibbes and State Atty. Lindy Pike Funkhouser, Columbia, and Sol. William W. Wilkins, Jr., Greenville, for respondent.
February 24, 1981.

Opinion:
Ness, Justice.
Appellant David Brian Capps appeals from the order denying his motion to quash the indictments and his -conviction for assault and battery with intent to kill and criminal sexual conduct in the first degree. We affirm.
The sole issue is whether the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion to quash all indictments because the assistant solicitor participated as a witness before the grand jury. We hold it did not.
In Ex Parte McLeod, In Re: Investigation in Charleston Magistrate's Court, 272 S. C. 373, 252 S. E. (2d) 126 (1979), this Court, in adhering to the rule that grand jury proceedings -should remain non-adversarial, refused to permit the attorney general or his assistants to examine -or cross-examine witnesses before th-e grand jury.
We did not address the issue of a solicitor appearing as a witness in a grand jury proceeding; therefore, we -do so now.
In State v. McNinch, 12 S. C. 89 (1879), this Court held the -solicitor has .the right and duty to -communicate with the grand jury relative to the manner in which they conduct th-eir business and error is not presumed. Furthermore, the appellant cannot claim prejudice by the mere fact evidence was presented by the prosecution. State v. Bramlett, 166 S. C. 323, 164 S. E. 873 (1932). In State v. Williams, 263 S. C. 290, 296, 210 S. E. (2d) 298 (1974), we held an indictment based upon hearsay was valid; citing Costello v. U. S., 350 U. S. 359, 76 S. Ct. 406, 100 L. Ed. 397 (1956) in which the United States Supreme Court held, "[a]n indictment returned by a legally constituted and unbiased grand jury, . if valid on its face, is enough to call for trial of the charge on .the merits." The fact that an assistant solicitor was called by the grand jury as an invesigating witness did not render him legally incompetent nor was it an improper attempt to influence the grand jury. People v. Bissonnette, 20 Ill. App. (3d) 970, 313 N. E. (2d) 646 (1974).
Here, the only involvement of the assistant solicitor was to present a summary of the evidence in the case to the grand jury. The trial court held: (1) the solicitor did not examine or cross-examine any witnesses- and was not present in the grand jury room during deliberations; (2) the appellant was not prejudiced by the solicitor's presence as a witness and there were no violations of appellant's constitutional rights. We agree and specifically hold that the only capacity in which an unauthorized person may be called before or attend a grand jury session is that of a witness during the actual taking of his own testimony. Here, the assistant solicitor was not present when the grand jury were deliberating or voting on the charge. 4 A. L. R. (2d) 392.
This Court shares with the nation's founders a concern that on occasions prosecuting officers will expand too far and abuse the powers granted to them. A grand jury is not a prosecutor's plaything and the awesome power of the State should not be abused but should be used deliberately, not in haste. A prosecutor should at all times avoid the appearance or reality of a conflict in interest with respect to his official duties.
The public policy of maintaining the secret and non-adversarial nature of grand jury proceedings was not violated by allowing the assistant solicitor to appear as a witness and present a summary of the evidence in this case. Ex Parte McLeod, supra, is distinguishable as the appearance of the assistant solicitor as a mere witness, in this case, did not constitute an improper influence on the grand jury. The practice of using a solicitor or other officer of the State, as the sole witness before the grand jury, to provide only a summary of the evidence could be abused and we strongly suggest it be abandoned unless no alternative is available.
We have examined the record and find no violation of appellant's rights and conclude the trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion to quash the indictments.
Appellant's remaining exceptions were not argued in his brief and are abandoned. State v. Jones, 273 S. C. 723, 259 S. E. (2d) 120 (1979).
Affirmed.
Littlejohn, Gregory and Harwell, JJ., concur.
Lewis, C. J., dissents.