Case Name: McDONALD v. COHEN
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1909-12-22
Citations: 120 N.Y.S. 94
Docket Number: 
Parties: McDONALD v. COHEN.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 120
Pages: 94–96

Head Matter:
McDONALD v. COHEN.
(Supreme Court, Appellate Term.
December 22, 1909.)
Landlord and Tenant (§ 296 )—Foreclosure of Mortgage on Premises— Dispossession of Tenant by Receiver.
A tenant, who was not a party to a suit to foreclose a mortgage on the premises, is not bound by the proceedings; and, not having attorned.to a receiver of rents and profits appointed therein, he cannot be devested of his possession by summary proceedings brought by such receiver.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Landlord and Tenant, Dec. Dig. § 296. ]
Appeal from Municipal Court, Borough of Manhattan, Sixth District.
Summary proceedings by Edward W. McDonald against Harry Cohen. From an order awarding to the former possession of leased premises, the latter appeals.
Reversed.
Argued before GIEGERICH, GOFF, and LEHMAN, JJ.
Alexander Kahn, for appellant.
James E. McDonald, for respondent.
For other cases see same topic & § number in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
GOFF, J.
An order in summary proceedings dispossessing the tenant appellant has been made under the following circumstances: The owner of the premises in question, of which the tenant is in possession of a part, executed a mortgage upon them, which was recorded in 1905. In February, 1909, the owner executed the lease to appellant, under which he holds possession. In March, 1909, the landlord,'who is respondent here, was appointed receiver of rents and profits, in a suit to foreclose the mortgage. The tenant paid in advance for five months' rent of that part of the premises which he leased, being the whole term of his lease, and, now refusing to pay rent to the receiver from April 1, 1909, an order dispossessing him has been made accordingly.
The learned justice of the trial court rendered his decision upon the authority of Fletcher v. McKean, 71 App. Div. 378, 75 N. Y. Supp. 817, in which the essential circdmstances were on all fours with those presented here, with one exception: In that case, the tenant was a party to the foreclosure action; in this, there is no evidence that the tenant was a party. Not being a party, he is not bound by proceedings in the action (Wiltsie on Mortgage Foreclosure, § 157); and, not being a party and not having attorned to the receiver, he cannot be divested of his possession. Plaintiff's remedy is pointed out in Bowery Savings Bank v. Richards, 3 Hun, 366.
Final ordered reversed, with costs, and proceeding dismissed.
GIEGERICH, J., concurs.