Case Name: Daniel J. Davis and Thomas Rankin, Co-Partners as Davis & Rankin, Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. Emma C. Bronson and Lorenzo N. Bronson, Co-Partners as E. C. & L. N. Bronson, Defendants; Lorenzo N. Bronson, Defendant and Appellant
Court: North Dakota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: North Dakota
Decision Date: 1891-11-27
Citations: 2 N.D. 300
Docket Number: 
Parties: Daniel J. Davis and Thomas Rankin, Co-Partners as Davis & Rankin, Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. Emma C. Bronson and Lorenzo N. Bronson, Co-Partners as E. C. & L. N. Bronson, Defendants; Lorenzo N. Bronson, Defendant and Appellant.
Judges: All concur.
Reporter: North Dakota Reports
Volume: 2
Pages: 300–309

Head Matter:
Daniel J. Davis and Thomas Rankin, Co-Partners as Davis & Rankin, Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. Emma C. Bronson and Lorenzo N. Bronson, Co-Partners as E. C. & L. N. Bronson, Defendants; Lorenzo N. Bronson, Defendant and Appellant.
Rescission of Contract — Action for Breach.
Defendant having refused to perform a contract for the erection of a creamery by plaintiffs before they had entered upon the performance thereof, held, that an action to recover the contract price would not lie, although plaintiffs had, notwithstanding defendant’s refusal to perform, completed the creamery according to contract. Plaintiffs had no right to go on with the contract under such circumstances, and recover the contract price; their only remedy being for damages for breach of the contract.
(Opinion filed Nov. 27, 1891.
Rehearing denied Jan. 2,1892.)
PPEAL from district court, La Moure county; Hon. W. , S. Lauder, Judge.
George W. Newton, for appellant. Moer & Harris, for respondents.
Action to recover upon a contract of subscription to the capital stock in a creamery company. Judgment for plaintiffs. Defendant appeals.
Eeversed.
George W. Newton, for appellant:
■ It was predjudicial error to admit secondary evidence of the contract. Anglo-American Packing Co. v. Connor, 31 Eed. Eep. 313; Post v. School District, 26 N. W. Eep. 911; Nelson v. Central Land Co., 29 N. W. Eep. 121; In re Assignment of Gazett, 29 N. W. Eep. 347; Sebree v. Dorr, 9 Wheat. 555; Myers v. Bealer, 46 N. W. Eep. 479. It was error for the court to refuse to submit the question of damages to the jury and to rule that the measure of damages was the subscription with legal interest from the time the creamery was completed. Dan-forth v. Walker, 37 Yt. 239; Derby v. Johnson, 21 Yt. 17; Nye v. Taggart, 40 Yt. 295; Clark v. Marsiglia, 1 Denio 317; Spencer v. Halstead, 1 Denio 606; Dillon v. Anderson, 43 N. Y. 237; Moline Scale Co. v. Beed, 3 N. W. Eep. 96.
Moer & Harris, for respondents:
Tbe points made in appellant’s brief are all that will be considered by the respondents, as any error of tbe trial court not pointed out therein, is deemed to be waived. Brewing Co. v. Mielenz, 5 Dab. 136; Martz v. Putnam, 20 N. E. Bep. 270; Express Pub. Co. v. Aldine Press, 17 Amer. Bep. 608. Tbe answer of appellant confesses and seeks to avoid tbe contract by new matter; no proof of tbe contract was necessary except as against tbe defendant, E. C. Bronson, and if tbe trial court erred as against her it was cured by tbe verdict of tbe jury and cannot be urged .as a reason for a new trial. Gale v. Shillock, 29 N. W. Bep. 661; Derby v. Gallup, 5 Minn. 119; Gas Co. v. City of Davenport, 15 Iowa 6; Martin v. Sevearengen, 17 Iowa 346; Wollen v. Whitacre, 73 Ind. 198. Tbe contract itself determines tbe amount appellant agreed to pay and controls in fixing tbe measure of damages. Davis & Bankin v. Belford, 37 N. W. Bep. 919; Gibbons v. Grinsel, 48 N. W. Bep. 255.

Opinion:
Tbe opinion of tbe court was delivered by
Corliss, C. J.
Tbe theory on which plaintiffs were allowed to recover against tbe appellant was that they bad fully performed on their part all tbe conditions of an agreement with appellant and others to erect and equip a creamery at La Moure, in this state. "We are compelled to reverse tbe judgment, because it appears that tbe plaintiffs were not justified in proceeding with tbe work under the contract for tbe purpose of charging tbe appellant with tbe full amount, which be and bis co-partner agreed to pay as their share of tbe contract price, as it is undisputed that tbe appellant broke tbe contract tbe day after it was made, and plaintiffs received notice of bis determination not to carry out tbe agreement on bis part on tbe second day after tbe contract was entered into. This was before they bad taken any steps under it. Appellant could not, under tbe facts of this ease, rescind tbe agreement without the assent of all parties thereto. Nor is it claimed that be did rescind it. Tbe utmost that can be urged is that be arbitrarily refused to perform bis part of tbe contract. This would subject him to an action for damages for breach of tbe contract. But the plaintiffs could not, in the face of this refusal on' 'his part to perform, undertake and carry to completion the work under the contract to be pei'formed by them, and thereupon insist that they were entitled to recover from the appellant his share of the contract price. The authorities are very cledr on this point. Bishop Cont. § 837-841; Danforth v. Walker, 37 Vt. 239, 40 Vt. 257; Moline Co. v. Beed, 52 Iowa 307, 3 N. W. Rep. 96; City of Nebraska v. Coke Co., 9 Neb. 339, 2 N. W. Rep. 870; Clark v. Marsiglia, 1 Denio 317; Butler v, Butler, 77 N. Y. 472. No damages for breach of the contract by the appellant were proved, nor was there any allegation of such damages. The action was upon the contract to recover the contract price, and not for damages for breach of it. For this vital error the judgment is reversed, and- a new trial ordered.
All concur.