Case Name: Vaughn Damon WILSON, Appellant, v. ALMA CITY COURT; State of Arkansas, Appellees
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2010-04-12
Citations: 371 F. App'x 708
Docket Number: No. 09-3503
Parties: Vaughn Damon WILSON, Appellant, v. ALMA CITY COURT; State of Arkansas, Appellees.
Judges: Before MELLOY, BOWMAN, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 371
Pages: 708–708

Head Matter:
Vaughn Damon WILSON, Appellant, v. ALMA CITY COURT; State of Arkansas, Appellees.
No. 09-3503.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted: April 6, 2010.
Filed: April 12, 2010.
Vaughn Damon Wilson, Mulberry, AR, pro se.
Before MELLOY, BOWMAN, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Non-prisoner Vaughn Wilson appeals from an order of the District Court dismissing his action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) prior to service of process, even though Wilson was not proceeding in forma pauperis (IFP). Wilson has also filed a motion for a restraining order.
Upon careful de novo review, see Moore v. Sims, 200 F.3d 1170, 1171 (8th Cir.2000) (per curiam), we find that the District Court erred in dismissing the complaint under § 1915 because that statute applies only to IFP cases, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (limiting application of provision to IFP proceedings); see also Porter v. Fox, 99 F.3d 271, 273 n. 1 (8th Cir.1996) (per cu-riam) (observing that procedures allowing dismissal for failure to state a claim under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) amendments to § 1915 do not apply to a plaintiff who was neither proceeding IFP nor in prison). In addition, because the period for serving process upon the defendants had not yet expired, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was premature. Smith v. Boyd, 945 F.2d 1041, 1043 (8th Cir.1991) (holding that a district court may dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) sua sponte as long as the dismissal does not precede service of process).
Accordingly, we vacate the District Court's order of dismissal and remand the case for further proceedings. We also deny Wilson's pending motion.
. We emphasize that our remand should not be construed as questioning the merits of the District Court's Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, only the timing of that dismissal.