Case Name: Chalkley J. Hambleton, Sydney J. Harris, Duncan Thorp, Elmer J. Winter and the Gibralter Township Property Owners Association, Inc., a Wisconsin corporation, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Ralph T. Friedmann, Jr., Elizabeth E. Friedmann, James Building Corporation, a foreign corporation, and North Point Development Corporation, a Wisconsin corporation, Defendants-Appellants, Door County, a body corporate, Door County Board of Supervisors, Door County Resource Planning Committee, Defendants-Respondents
Court: Wisconsin Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Wisconsin
Decision Date: 1984-01-24
Citations: 117 Wis. 2d 460
Docket Number: No. 83-134
Parties: Chalkley J. Hambleton, Sydney J. Harris, Duncan Thorp, Elmer J. Winter and the Gibralter Township Property Owners Association, Inc., a Wisconsin corporation, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Ralph T. Friedmann, Jr., Elizabeth E. Friedmann, James Building Corporation, a foreign corporation, and North Point Development Corporation, a Wisconsin corporation, Defendants-Appellants, Door County, a body corporate, Door County Board of Supervisors, Door County Resource Planning Committee, Defendants-Respondents.
Judges: Before Foley, P.J., Dean and Cane, JJ.
Reporter: Wisconsin Reports Second
Volume: 117
Pages: 460–464

Head Matter:
Chalkley J. Hambleton, Sydney J. Harris, Duncan Thorp, Elmer J. Winter and the Gibralter Township Property Owners Association, Inc., a Wisconsin corporation, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Ralph T. Friedmann, Jr., Elizabeth E. Friedmann, James Building Corporation, a foreign corporation, and North Point Development Corporation, a Wisconsin corporation, Defendants-Appellants, Door County, a body corporate, Door County Board of Supervisors, Door County Resource Planning Committee, Defendants-Respondents.
Court of Appeals
No. 83-134.
Submitted on briefs October 31, 1983.
Decided January 24, 1984.
(Also reported in 344 N.W.2d 212.)
For the appellants the cause was submitted on the briefs of Pinkert, Smith, Koehn & Weir and Roger Pinkert of Sturgeon Bay.
For the respondents the cause was submitted on the brief of La Follette, Sinykin, Anderson & Munson of Madison.
Before Foley, P.J., Dean and Cane, JJ.

Opinion:
DEAN, J.
Ralph and Elizabeth Friedmann, James Building Corporation, and North Point Development Corporation (appellants) appeal a judgment and an order that invalidates a conditional use zoning permit that the Door County Resource Planning Committee issued. The action was before the trial court on remand from this court. Hambleton v. Friedmann, No. 80-1366, slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. July 28, 1981). Appellants contend that the trial court wrongly interpreted the applicable local zoning ordinance. They also make several other contentions that were raised in the earlier appeal. Because the trial court correctly interpreted the ordinance and because the other issues were decided by our earlier decision, we affirm the judgment and the order.
James applied for and received a conditional use zoning permit to build condominiums on property zoned for single-family residences. A public hearing was held on the application, but no notice of the hearing was posted in the vicinity of the conditional use. The local zoning ordinance required the notice to be "posted in the vicinity of the conditional use where practical." Door County Zoning Ordinance sec. X. Our earlier decision remanded this action to have the trial court determine whether posting was practical. On remand, the trial court found that posting was practical and, since no notice was posted, it invalidated the conditional use permit.
We agree with the trial court that the ordinance requires notice to be posted where a posting is physically possible. The meaning of an ordinance is a question of law that we independently decide. See First National Leasing Corp. v. City of Madison, 81 Wis. 2d 205, 208, 260 N.W.2d 251, 253 (1977). The rules for the construction of statutes and ordinances are the same. County of Columbia v. Bylewski, 94 Wis. 2d 153, 163 n. 7, 288 N.W.2d 129, 137 n. 7 (1980). In construing statutes, effect must be given, if possible, to every word. Id. at 164, 288 N.W.2d at 135.
The ordinance required posting "where practical." If the ordinance was intended to mean, as the appellants contend, that posting was required only when useful, the ordinance would have required posting "when practical" or "if practical." The only reasonable interpretation of the phrase is, as the trial court concluded, that notice had to be posted where it was physically possible to post.
The other issues the appellants raise were effectively decided by our earlier decision. We will not reconsider the merits of arguments considered in the first appeal. See Fehrman v. Smirl, 25 Wis. 2d 645, 649, 131 N.W.2d 314, 316 (1964). Appellants again contend that the notice requirement is directory, not mandatory, and that the local authorities waived the requirement by their failure to comply with it. Our earlier decision held "if such posting is practical, then this notice must be given for the subsequent proceedings to be valid." Since posting was practical, the notice is mandatory.
The claims that the respondents failed to exhaust their administrative remedies and that they are estopped from challenging the lack of notice were also rejected by our prior decision to remand. If the trial court was without jurisdiction, we would not have remanded the cause to that court. If the respondents were estopped from challenging the lack of notice, no determination of the practicality of posting would have been required.
By the Court. — Judgment and order affirmed.