Case Name: STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Carl Lee HICKS, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1985-05-23
Citations: 478 So. 2d 22
Docket Number: No. 65495
Parties: STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Carl Lee HICKS, Respondent.
Judges: BOYD, C.J., and OVERTON, EHRLICH and SHAW, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 478
Pages: 22–24

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Carl Lee HICKS, Respondent.
No. 65495.
Supreme Court of Florida.
May 23, 1985.
On Rehearing Oct. 31, 1985.
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen. and Carolyn V. McCann, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for petitioner.
Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender and Margaret Good, Asst. Public Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, for respondent.
Enoch J. Whitney, Gen. Counsel, Tallahassee, amicus curiae for Florida Parole and Probation Com’n.

Opinion:
McDonald, justice.
We accepted jurisdiction of Hicks v. State, 452 So.2d 606 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), because of conflict with Sanderson v. State, 447 So.2d 374 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution, and we approve Hicks.
The issue in this case is whether a person subject to probation revocation has an absolute right to counsel in such a proceeding, and, if so, whether the right must be afforded him before he is required to admit or deny the revocation charges. We hold that unless there has been an informed waiver thereof such a person is entitled to counsel, and it must be afforded him before he is required to respond in any manner to the revocation charges.
We note at the outset that there is no constitutional requirement for the appointment of counsel in all probation revocation hearings. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973). We predicate our decision here on the ground that a uniform rule in all probation revocation hearings is more easily understood and easier to administer than requiring attorneys in some cases but not in others. We do not believe that a uniform requirement will unduly tax the resources of the public defender system; we believe it will result in a more orderly and uniform administration of the criminal justice system. Judge Downey, writing for the district court, has cogently stated reasons to adopt the ruling we make. We doubt that we could improve upon his opinion and therefore adopt it as the opinion of this Court.
The opinion of the district court of appeal is approved.
It is so ordered.
BOYD, C.J., and OVERTON, EHRLICH and SHAW, JJ., concur.
ADKINS and ALDERMAN, JJ., dissent.
Further, a probation revocation usually leads to sentencing; an attorney is required at a sentencing proceeding. It seems illogical not to mandate an attorney when revocation is likely to lead to incarceration and to require an attorney only when the length of that incarceration is being decided.