Case Name: Bernard SLOSS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2007-09-19
Citations: 965 So. 2d 1204
Docket Number: No. 5D03-3120
Parties: Bernard SLOSS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: TORPY, J., concurs and concurs specially, with opinion.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 965
Pages: 1204–1210

Head Matter:
Bernard SLOSS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 5D03-3120.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Sept. 19, 2007.
James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and Dee Ball, Assistant Public Defender, Day-tona Beach, for Appellant.
Bernard Sloss, Chipley, pro se.
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Robin A. Compton, and Kristen L. Davenport, Assistant Attorneys General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

Opinion:
THOMPSON, J.
Bernard Sloss ("Sloss") appeals his conviction for aggravated battery with a deadly weapon. We reverse.
The charge against Sloss arose from a fight in his apartment complex. Sloss lived directly above McKinney Milsap ("McKinney") and McKinney's nephew, Frank Milsap ("Frank"). Sloss was playing music loudly after midnight on 21 February 2003. McKinney asked Sloss to turn down the music. When Sloss refused, McKinney walked across the street to complain to their landlord. Sloss joined their conversation and, as he walked away, said "I'll show you something." McKinney returned to his apartment.
According to McKinney and Frank, Sloss came downstairs, cursed at McKinney, and went to his car. Sloss then approached McKinney and cut McKinney's thigh with a knife. They fought, and Sloss stabbed McKinney several times. Frank went outside after hearing McKinney yell that he was cut. Frank tried to assist McKinney, but was cut three times by Sloss. Frank went inside, got a knife, and went back outside. Frank cut Sloss's hand, forcing Sloss to drop his knife.
According to Sloss, Sloss decided to move out of the apartment that weekend. After going downstairs, he was under his car's hood when he was hit in the back by a chair. He attempted to talk to McKinney, who threw the chair, but McKinney struck him three times. Sloss did not pull his knife until Frank came out of the apartment with a knife. Sloss then began to stab McKinney.
At trial, the defense requested the jury instruction of self-defense and did not object to the inclusion of the "forcible felony" portion of the instruction.
Sloss's jury instructions stated:
A person is justified in using force likely to cause death or great bodily harm if he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or another, or the imminent commission of aggravated battery.
However, the use of force likely to cause death or great bodily harm is not justifiable if you find [Sloss] was attempting to commit, committing or escaping after the commission of aggravated battery, or [Sloss] initially provoked the use of force against himself unless the force asserted- toward the defendant was so great that he reasonably believed that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, and had exhausted every reasonable 'means to escape the danger.
(Emphasis added).
This instruction is based on section 776.041(1), Florida Statutes (2003), which provides that the justification of self-defense or defense of others is not available to a person who "[i]s attempting to commit, committing, or escaping after the commission of, a forcible felony."
The jury found Sloss guilty. The court sentenced him to ten years' impris onment followed by five years' probation. The issue is whether giving an instruction on the forcible felony exception to self-defense constitutes fundamental error, where the defendant allegedly engaged in two forcible felonies, but is charged with a single crime.
The forcible felony instruction should be given only where the defendant claiming self-defense engaged in an independent forcible felony at the time. See, e.g., Hawk v. State, 902 So.2d 331, 331 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005); "More specifically, the forcible felony instruction is given in situations where the accused is charged with at least two criminal acts, the act for which the accused is claiming self-defense as well as a separate forcible felony." Id. (quoting Cleveland v. State, 887 So.2d 362, 363 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)); accord Carter v. State, 889 So.2d 937, 939 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004). Where the defendant is charged only with aggravated battery, the act for which the defendant claims self-defense, giving the forcible felony instruction improperly negates the self-defense claim. Hawk, 902 So.2d at 331; Cleveland, 887 So.2d at 363; Williams v. State, 901 So.2d 899, 899 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). The instruction tells the jury that the very act the defendant seeks to justify precludes a finding of justification. Giles v. State, 831 So.2d 1263, 1266 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).
The State argues that Sloss did not object to the instruction at trial and that any error was harmless. However, several courts have held that giving the forcible felony instruction when the defendant is charged with only one crime constitutes fundamental error renewable in the absence of an objection below. Hawk, 902 So.2d at 331; Carter, 889 So.2d at 939; Cleveland,' 887 So.2d at 363. When the defendant admits the stabbing but argues solely self-defense, an instruction negating that defense creates a reasonable possibility that the instruction led to the conviction. See Estevez v. State, 901 So.2d 989, 992 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005); see also Dunnaway v. State, 883 So.2d 876, 878 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (quoting Rich v. State, 858 So.2d 1210, 1210-11 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)).
The. State argues that Sloss's aggravated battery against Frank constitutes an independent forcible felony sufficient to justify the forcible felony instruction in the • prosecution for aggravated battery against McKinney. Courts considering • similar scenarios have ruled that the forcible felony instruction is reversible error. The question turns on whether the defendant claims that he acted against both victims in self-defense; if so, the forcible felony instruction constitutes fundamental error. See Ruiz v. State, 900 So.2d 733 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (reversing two convictions for aggravated battery against two victims); see also Hernandez v. State, 884 So.2d 281 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (holding that the forcible felony instruction where the defendant claimed self-defense against four charges of aggravated battery constituted reversible error); Baker v. State, 877 So.2d 856, 857 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (involving a defendant's aggravated battery conviction against one victim and uncharged battery against another victim). It remains error no matter how credible the defendant's claim of self-defense. For example, a defendant convicted for felony criminal mischief and two counts of assault had claimed self-defense, despite confronting two men installing a pool enclosure, threatening them with golf clubs, throwing their tools into a pool, ramming their truck with his car, and beating their windows with a golf club. Nevertheless, giving the forcible felony instruction was fundamental error. See Bevan v. State, 908 So.2d 524 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); see also Bates v. State, 883 So.2d 907, 907-08 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (holding that, despite defendant's alleged unauthorized display of a firearm against a mother and her two children in a Wal-Mart parking lot, the forcible felony instruction improperly negated his self-defense claim).
The State is correct to note that the statute and instruction are intended to prevent defendants from asserting self-defense when they initiate violence and engage in felonious acts. The portion of the forcible felony instruction dealing with provocation and retreat is acceptable for accomplishing that purpose. However, the issue here is the instruction in which jurors, upon finding Sloss committed aggravated battery, are precluded from considering the self-defense claim Sloss raises to justify the battery. In this case, giving the instruction takes consideration of Sloss's self-defense claim out of the jury's hands altogether. Sloss is entitled to a new trial without the forcible felony exception. As we did in Blanton v. State, 956 So.2d 480, 482 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007), Slattery v. State, 32 Fla. L. Weekly D305, — So.2d -, 2007 WL 186947 (Fla. 5th DCA Jan. 26, 2007), and Zinnerman v. State, 942 So.2d 932, 933 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006), we certify to the Florida Supreme Court the following question of great public importance:
DOES FUNDAMENTAL ERROR OCCUR WHEN AN ERRONEOUS JURY INSTRUCTION RELATES ONLY TO AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE AND NOT TO AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE CRIME?
REVERSED and REMANDED; QUESTION CERTIFIED.
TORPY, J., concurs and concurs specially, with opinion.
ORFINGER, J., concurs in part,- dissents in part, with opinion.