Case Name: VICTOR INDUSTRIES CORPORATION v. Charles L. DANIELS, Director of Labor and Ronnie GATES
Court: Arkansas Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 1981-02-25
Citations: 1 Ark. App. 6
Docket Number: E 80-123
Parties: VICTOR INDUSTRIES CORPORATION v. Charles L. DANIELS, Director of Labor and Ronnie GATES
Judges: Glaze, J., and Mayfield, C.J., dissent.
Reporter: Arkansas Appellate Reports
Volume: 1
Pages: 6–14

Head Matter:
VICTOR INDUSTRIES CORPORATION v. Charles L. DANIELS, Director of Labor and Ronnie GATES
E 80-123
611 S.W. 2d 794
Court of Appeals of Arkansas
Opinion delivered February 25, 1981
James A. McLarty, for appellant.
Thelma Lorenzo and Bruce Bokony, for appellees.

Opinion:
Lawson Cloninger, Judge.
In this unemployment compensation benefits case, the employee, appellee Ronnie Gates was discharged by the employer, appellant Victor Industries Corporation, for excessive absences from work. This appeal is from a finding by the Employment Security Division, which was upheld by the Appeals Tribunal and Board of Review, that appellee was entitled to benefits because he was discharged for reasons other than misconduct connected with the work.
The only issue is whether the finding that appellee's absences did not constitute misconduct, as defined by the Arkansas Employment Security Act, is supported by substantial evidence.
We find that the decision is not supported by substantial evidence and we reverse.
Appellee worked for appellant for six years when he was discharged on March 10, 1978, for excessive absenteeism under a labor agreement which provided:
An employee may lose all seniority and may be discharged without warning if he: . (d) is irregular in attendance or a chronic absentee, viz: has an average of one day weekly for three months regardless of reason .
At the time of his employment, appellee was given an Employees Information Handbook which he acknowledged receiving and reading, the relevant parts stating:
Good attendance and promptness is essential from a financial point of view and for job security . Certain acts have been designated at this plant as prohibited. Intentional performance of any of these acts may subject you to dismissal or suspension. . Excessive absenteeism which is defined as (a) unexplained or unreported absences for as many as three or more working days spread over any six-month period, or (b) an average of one day's absence weekly for any three month period regardless of reason (excluding granted leaves of absence).
It is not disputed that appellee was absent during his final thirteen weeks of his employment a total of twenty-two working days, or thirty-six percent of the time. Ten of the absences were never reported, and one was reported the following day; the remainder were reported shortly before the beginning of appellee's scheduled workday, six of them being reported forty minutes or less before appellee's shift was to begin.
Appellee's personnel director testified that appellant makes toothpaste tubes, and that it takes a full crew to run a production line; that if there are absences the company has to try to get a replacement from over a three-county area, and to find a skilled worker who is available on short notice is difficult. He stated that the company has a sick leave policy, and if a leave is requested and verified the company grants it; that appellee made no sick leave request; and that appellee had been a good and conscientious worker.
Appellee testified that he missed the days because he was sick, and that each time he was sick he called appellant; that he did not really know when to call when he was sick, and thought that if he called in an hour and ten minutes before his shift began the company could get someone else to do his job; that he was a press operator, and that the company has production helpers who can run his press, but that another qualified operator had to show them what to do; and that he knew he was missing too many days.
The first paragraph of the Employment Security Act declares that the measure is created for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 81-1101 (Repl. 1976). The Act should not be extended to protect a person unemployed through fault of his own, as fault is defined in subsequent sections of the Act.
Ark. Stat. Ann. § 81-1106 (Repl. 1976) provides that an individual shall be disqualified for benefits,
(b)(1) . if he is discharged from his last work for misconduct in connection with his work.
Ark. Stat. Ann. § 81-1107 (d)(7) (Supp. 1979) provides that the findings of the Board of Review as to the facts are conclusive on appeal if they are supported by evidence. The definition of evidence in this context has been extended by the courts to mean substantial evidence. Terry Dairy Products Company, Inc. v. Cash, 224 Ark. 576, 275 S.W. 2d 12 (1955). Substantial evidence is valid, legal, and persuasive evidence; such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Partlow v. Arkansas State Police Commission, 271 Ark. 351 (1980). Whether the evidence is substantial is a question of law. Skorcz v. Howie, 243 Ark. 640, 421 S.W. 2d 874 (1967).
We find that appellee was discharged through fault of his own making, and that his excessive absences constituted misconduct as defined by the Employment Security Act. He had been an employee of appellant for six years; and not only had he been placed on notice that good attendance was essential in the plant; he knew that his skills at his position made it difficult to replace him on short notice. Appellee made no report at all of ten of his absences, in direct violation of the company policy that an employee was subject to dismissal if he had as many as three unexplained or unreported absences over any six-month period; and he was absent a total of twenty-two working days when company policy limited him to thirteen. We find his absences amounted to willful disregard of the employer's rules, and a disregard of the standard of behavior which the employer had the right to expect of him. These derelictions constitute misconduct. Stagecoach Motel v. Krause, 267 Ark. 1093, 593 S.W. 2d 495 (Ark. App. 1980). Willis Johnson Company v. Daniels, 269 Ark. 795, 601 S.W. 2d 890 (Ark. App. 1980).
In the case of Parker v. Ramada Inn, 264 Ark. 472, 572 S.W. 2d 409 (1978), the Board of Review had found that a cook was properly discharged for misconduct because he missed one day's work out of eight. The Arkansas Supreme Court upheld the finding and noted:
. a single incident of missing work has ordinarily been considered misconduct within the meaning of the employment security laws when the failure to report and appear for work involved a disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has a right to expect... consequently, we cannot say that appellant's conduct did not, as a matter of law, involve a violation of the standard of behavior that a restaurant operator has a right to expect. .
We find that appellee's conduct in the instant case, as a matter of law, involved and violated a standard of behavior that the appellant had a right to expect.
Reversed.
Glaze, J., and Mayfield, C.J., dissent.