Case Name: Stephanie TILLMAN, a Minor, by and Through her Legal Guardian, Theresa MIGUES, v. David SINGLETARY and Stacy Powe
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2003-11-13
Citations: 865 So. 2d 350
Docket Number: No. 1999-CT-00686-SCT
Parties: Stephanie TILLMAN, a Minor, by and Through her Legal Guardian, Theresa MIGUES, v. David SINGLETARY and Stacy Powe.
Judges: PITTMAN, C.J., EASLEY AND CARLSON, JJ., CONCUR. GRAVES, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. McRAE, P.J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED IN PART BY WALLER, J. COBB, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY SMITH, P.J., AND IN PART BY WALLER, J. DIAZ, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 865
Pages: 350–357

Head Matter:
Stephanie TILLMAN, a Minor, by and Through her Legal Guardian, Theresa MIGUES, v. David SINGLETARY and Stacy Powe.
No. 1999-CT-00686-SCT.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Nov. 13, 2003.
Robert H. Tyler, Michael E. Bruffey, Biloxi, attorneys for appellant.
Britt R. Singletary, Jackson, Tina Rose Singletary, Biloxi, attorneys for appellees.

Opinion:
WALLER, Justice,
for the Court.
¶ 1. This action for negligence arises from a boating accident in Harrison County. The circuit court rendered partial directed verdicts in favor of each of the two defendants, and the jury found for the defendants on the remaining issues. A divided Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, finding that a jury instruction on unavoidable accident was improperly given. Tillman ex rel. Migues v. Singletary, 2001 WL 268246 (Miss.Ct.App.2001). After granting certio-rari, we affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.
FACTS
¶ 2. Singletary and Powe were boating in Singletary's 115-horsepower motorboat on a sunny weekend day of water activity on the busy Tchoutacabouffa River. Powe was Singletary's employee, but this outing was not work related. After a stop for a social visit, Powe asked for and received Singletary's permission to take the helm. Powe had never driven the boat, but had some prior experience driving powerboats. Powe set off with Singletary acting as his look-out and adviser.
¶ 3. As he navigated the river, Powe soon found himself trailing a pair of inner tube riders being towed by another boat some 200 yards ahead. The "tubers" fell off at the edge of a sharp bend in the river, and Powe stood at the helm to get a better view. The lead boat was turning left to pick up its fallen tubers, another boat was coming up from behind Powe, and jet skis were approaching from the opposite direction on his port side, all as Powe rounded the sharp bend in the river.
¶ 4. Singletary said he advised Powe to pass the lead boat on its right side, toward the river bank. Powe said he slowed the boat to 10 to 12 knots. As he attempted to go around the lead boat, the impact of the other boats' wake caused his gamy knee to collapse. Powe fell into the boat, away from the steering wheel. Singletary testified that the force of these events almost threw him off the boat and pinned him against the passenger side of the boat. After the boat had been out of control for some fifteen seconds, Singletary managed to grab the steering wheel and shut down the motor. Obviously, there was no cut off switch to the engine attached to the operator. During all this, however, the boat had careened into the roped-off swimming area of a private lot, where it hit twelve-year-old Stephanie Tillman. The youth suffered multiple lacerations of her upper left arm and shoulder which left permanent scarring. Tillman said she saw Singletary at the controls of the boat before she was hit.
¶ 5. Powe testified he never saw the tethered wooden swimming platform at the heart of the swimming area. Singletary said he knew from experience that the swimming area was there, but it could not be seen by Powe from the direction his boat made the "blind curve." Powe was given a sobriety test and registered a .025 blood alcohol level. Singletary was not tested for alcohol.
¶ 6. Powe's knee had been injured three times. The first injury required surgery. Surgery was recommended after the second injury, but was not done. At the time of the accident, Powe was recuperating from a third knee injury which occurred eight months before. On that occasion Powe's knee locked, causing him to fall to the ground.
¶ 7. Tillman sued Powe and Singletary for negligence in the operation of the boat. The complaint also charged Singletary with negligent entrustment of his boat to Powe. The circuit court rendered a directed verdict in favor of Singletary on the issue of negligent entrustment and in favor of both defendants on the issue of punitive damages. The circuit court submitted the defendants' unavoidable accident instructions to the jury and refused to grant an instruction that would have allowed the jury to find Singletary liable for negligent supervision. The jury was given a plaintiffs instruction that both defendants could have been negligent by operating the boat at different times of the incident, but was also given a conflicting form of jury verdict that asked the jurors to determine which of the defendants was "the operator" of the boat on the day in question. The jury returned a verdict for both defendants, finding that neither defendant was negligent under the given instructions.
¶ 8. The Court of Appeals found that giving Powe an unavoidable accident instruction was reversible error because he operated a power boat on a crowded river with knowledge of his bad knee. It also affirmed the directed verdict for boat-owner Singletary on the issues of negligent entrustment and punitive damages. Further, Singletary could not be liable for negligent supervision, apparently because that theory was subsumed by negligent entrustment. All other issues were deemed moot for purposes of the appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. WHETHER UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT JURY INSTRUCTIONS SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN.
¶ 9. An unavoidable accident is "an occurrence which was not intended, and, which, under all the circumstances, could not have been foreseen or prevented by the exercise of reasonable precautions." Buford v. Riverboat Corp. of Mississippi-Vicksburg, 756 So.2d 765, 770-71 (Miss.2000) (quoting William L. Prosser, § 29, at 140 (4th ed.1971) (footnote omitted)). An unavoidable accident instruction should be used with caution. Buford, 756 So.2d at 770.
¶ 10. Here, the accident was avoidable. Even if Powe's knee had not locked up, Powe was guilty of negligence because he was going too fast under the circumstances (a bend in the river, other boat traffic, and people on jet skis), and he did not have the boat under proper control. Furthermore he was operating the boat without using the kill switch. A reasonably prudent boat driver should have known that he would be encountering the wakes of other boats and should have operated the boat in such a manner that the boat was able to negotiate the wakes without incident. Singletary testified that the force of hitting the other boat's wake almost threw him off the boat and pinned him against the passenger side of the boat. It is therefore clear that the boat was not under proper control.
¶ 11. Nor can Singletary benefit from an unavoidable accident instruction. As discussed in the next issue, the jury should have been instructed to consider whether Singletary was negligent in failing to supervise Powe properly.
II. WHETHER A JURY INSTRUCTION ON NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN.
¶ 12. Tillman offered, but was refused, a jury instruction on a theory of negligent supervision of Powe by Single-tary, the more experienced boatman. Sin-gletary was a more experienced boater, and he had a superior knowledge of the river and its riparian usage. Powe described Singletary as his "back seat driver." Singletary advised Powe how to go around the lead boat.
¶ 13. A person conducting an activity through servants or other agents is subject to liability for harm resulting from his conduct if he is negligent or reckless: (a) in giving improper or ambiguous orders or in failing to make proper regulations; or (b) in the employment of improper persons or instrumentalities in work involving risk or harm to others; (c) in the supervision of the activity; or (d) in permitting, or failing to prevent, negligent or other tortious conduct by persons, whether or not his servants or agents, upon premises or with instrumentalities under his control. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 213 (1958).
¶ 14. A party has the right to embody its theories of the case in the jury instructions provided there is testimony and/or evidence to support it, and if the instructions are conditioned upon the jury finding that such facts existed. Reese v. Summers, 792 So.2d 992, 994 (Miss.2001). There was a sufficient basis of facts for the granting of plaintiffs instruction P-5, the instruction on negligent supervision. The trial court erred in failing to put this instruction to the jury.
III. WHETHER IT WAS ERROR TO GRANT A DIRECTED VERDICT IN FAVOR OF SINGLE-TARY ON THE ISSUE OF NEGLIGENT ENTRUSTMENT.
¶ 15. Negligent entrustment is a theory of liability which may be summarized as follows:
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for use of another whom the supplier knows or has reason to know to be likely because of his youth, inexperience, or otherwise, to use it in a manner involving unreasonable risk of physical harm to himself and others whom the supplier should expect to share in or be endangered by its use, is subject to liability for physical harm resulting to them.
Sligh v. First Nat. Bank of Holmes County, 735 So.2d 963, 968-69 (Miss.1999).
¶ 16. Powe was twenty-five years old at the time of the accident. Although he had not previously driven Singletary's boat, he testified that he had prior experience driving power boats, sailboats and john-boats. Evidence supporting the circuit court's denial of the instruction was the fact that Powe had prior boating experience. Furthermore, no evidence was submitted which showed that Singletary had knowledge that Powe's knee could buckle under. Clearly the foreseeability element is not met. Thus, Singletary cannot be held accountable under a theory of negligent en-trustment. We affirm the circuit court's decision to direct a verdict in favor of Singletary on negligent entrustment.
IV. WHETHER THE CIRCUIT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A DIRECTED VERDICT IN FAVOR OF SINGLETARY ON THE ISSUE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES.
¶ 17. Tillman appealed the directed verdict on the issue of punitive damages insofar as Singletary was concerned. The basis for punitive damages is the testimony of a single witness that Singletary was staggering and red-eyed and appeared drunk after the accident. On cross-examination, however, this witness said that she got no closer than thirty-five feet to Sin-gletary. Powe and Singletary testified that Singletary had consumed a minimal amount of alcohol, and later witnesses offered substantiation during the presentation of defendants' case.
¶ 18. Punitive damages may be recovered for willful and intentional wrong and for such gross and reckless negligence as is equivalent to willful wrong. A trial court's decision not to send punitive damages to the jury will only be reversed upon a finding of an abuse of discretion. Hurst v. Southwest Miss. Legal Servs. Corp., 708 So.2d 1347, 1351 (Miss.1998). The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in directing a verdict for Singletary on the issue of punitive damages.
CONCLUSION
¶ 19. In summary, we affirm in part and reverse in part the Court of Appeals' judgment. We affirm the circuit court's grant of directed verdicts on the issues of negligent entrustment and punitive damages. We reverse the circuit court's judgment and remand for a new trial consistent with this opinion as to both Powe and Singletary because the circuit court improperly granted the unavoidable accident instruction and improperly refused a jury instruction on the negligent supervision issue.
¶ 20. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART.
PITTMAN, C.J., EASLEY AND CARLSON, JJ., CONCUR. GRAVES, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. McRAE, P.J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED IN PART BY WALLER, J. COBB, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY SMITH, P.J., AND IN PART BY WALLER, J. DIAZ, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.