Case Name: STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Lucas Jeffery WILSON, Defendant and Appellant
Court: South Dakota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: South Dakota
Decision Date: 2004-03-10
Citations: 678 N.W.2d 176
Docket Number: No. 22655
Parties: STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Lucas Jeffery WILSON, Defendant and Appellant.
Judges: [¶ 34.] KONENKAMP and ZINTER, Justices, concur.
Reporter: North Western Reporter 2d
Volume: 678
Pages: 176–188

Head Matter:
2004 SD 33
STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Lucas Jeffery WILSON, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 22655.
Supreme Court of South Dakota.
Argued Oct. 8, 2003.
Decided March 10, 2004.
Lawrence E. Long, Attorney General, Craig M. Eichstadt, Deputy Attorney General, Pierre, SD, for plaintiff and appellee.
Veronica L. Duffy of Duffy & Duffy, Rapid City, SD, for defendant and appellant.

Opinion:
GILBERTSON, Chief Justice.
[¶ 1.] Lucas Wilson (Wilson) was a passenger in a car that was stopped after a highway patrol officer noticed objects dangling from the rearview mirror and observed the vehicle crossing the fog line. Upon stopping the vehicle, the trooper became suspicious of drug use. The ensuing search of the vehicle revealed methamphetamine, marijuana, and various drug paraphernalia. Subsequently, the trooper placed Wilson under arrest. A grand jury indicted Wilson on four counts of various drug offenses, including possession of methamphetamine, ingesting a substance other than alcohol for purposes of becoming intoxicated, possession of marijuana less than two ounces, and possession of drug paraphernalia. After waiving the right to a jury trial, Wilson was convicted on all four counts. Wilson appeals the trial court's judgment and argues that evidence seized from the vehicle should have been suppressed. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
FACTS AND PROCEDURE
[¶ 2.] On the morning of February 16, 2002, Wilson was a passenger in a vehicle owned and driven by Jeremy Neff (Neff). At approximately 7:00 a.m., Trooper Ryan Mechaley (Mechaley) of the South Dakota Highway Patrol observed Neffs vehicle cross the fog line and noticed objects dangling from the vehicle's rearview mirror. Mechaley then proceeded to stop the vehicle for these traffic violations. After obtaining identification from both Neff and Wilson, the trooper asked Neff to follow him back to his patrol car. Wilson remained in Neffs vehicle.
[¶ 8.] Once in the patrol car, Mechaley told Neff that he intended to write him a warning ticked for the traffic violations and that he would then "get [him] on down the road." While Mechaley ran a check on Neffs and Wilson's licenses, he engaged Neff in general conversation. In the approximately fifteen minute long conversation, Mechaley and Neff discussed Neffs employment, birth date, and each made observations about drug-related topics. Neff, however, became somewhat agitated when Mechaley asked him about methamphetamine use in the area, and he twice attempted to change the subject. During the conversation, Mechaley noticed Neffs pupils appeared to be "pinpoint," a sign that, in the trooper's experience, often indicated methamphetamine use. When asked, Neff denied any current drug use but admitted past methamphetamine use.
[¶ 4.] Based upon the conversation and the appearance of Neffs pupil's, Mechaley became suspicious of drug use. He then asked for Neffs permission to search the vehicle. Neff responded he had received advice from an attorney in Idaho that he should not give consent to such a search. The trooper responded that this was "bad advice" and that "you're in South Dakota now." After Mechaley indicated he felt he had enough reasonable suspicion to call for a drug dog, Neff consented to the vehicle search.
[¶ 5.] Trooper Mechaley then directed Wilson to step out of the vehicle and told him to stand directly in front of his patrol car. Mechaley proceeded to question Wilson. During the questioning, the trooper's voice was commanding and accusatory, and his questions assumed Wilson's guilt. Despite the fact that Wilson was not free to leave during this questioning, the trooper failed to advise Wilson of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Subsequently, Wilson made several incriminating statements regarding drug use. In addition, Wilson appeared to make numerous uncontrollable head and arm movements during the questioning, symptoms which further suggested the use of methamphetamine.
[¶ 6.] Based on Neffs consent, Mecha-ley began a search of the vehicle. Within a short period of time, the trooper found a hypodermic needle cap between the floorboard and the door. Fearing that he may be injured by an uncovered needle, Mecha-ley asked Wilson to show him where any drugs were in the vehicle. Wilson proceeded to locate a sunglass case under the passenger seat. In the case, the trooper found syringes, methamphetamine, marijuana, and a marijuana pipe. Because Wilson indicated that the drugs were his, Mechaley placed Wilson under arrest and read him his Miranda rights. Subsequent tests indicated Wilson's urine was positive for methamphetamine and marijuana.
[¶ 7.] A grand jury indicted Wilson on several drug-related charges. Before trial, Wilson made motions to suppress his statements and any evidence found in Neffs vehicle. The trial court found Wilson was subjected to custodial interrogation without being advised of his Miranda rights. Therefore, the trial court suppressed these statements, and the state does not appeal this ruling. The trial court ruled, however, that the evidence found in the vehicle should not be suppressed because Mechaley had reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle and Wilson lacked standing to challenge whether or not Neffs consent was voluntarily given. Wilson waived the right to a jury trial. After the parties stipulated to a set of facts, the trial court found Wilson guilty of possession of methamphetamine, ingesting a substance other than alcohol for purposes of becoming intoxicated, possession of marijuana less than two ounces, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Wilson raises three issues for our review:
1. Where a vehicle has objects dangling from its rearview mirror and crosses the fog line, does an officer have a reasonable suspicion in order to justify a traffic stop.
2. Where an officer tells a driver at the beginning of a traffic stop that he will "get [him] on down the road" and then detains the driver after becoming suspicious of drug use, is the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures violated.
3. May a passenger in a vehicle challenge the validity of the driver's consent to a vehicle search.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[¶ 8.] We review motions to suppress founded on alleged constitutional violations under the de novo standard. State v. De La Rosa, 2003 SD 18, ¶ 5, 657 N.W.2d 683, 685 (citing State v. Rechtenbach, 2002 SD 96, ¶ 6, 650 N.W.2d 290, 292 (citations omitted)). "[A]s a general matter determinations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be reviewed de novo on appeal." State v. Hirning, 1999 SD 53, ¶ 9, 592 N.W.2d 600, 603 (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1663, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996)). We will only reverse a trial court's findings of fact if they are clearly erroneous. De La Rosa, 2003 SD 18, ¶ 5, 657 N.W.2d at 685 (citing State v. Hodges, 2001 SD 93, ¶ 8, 631 N.W.2d 206, 209). It is well settled that "[o]nce the facts have been determined, however, the application of a legal standard to those facts is a question of law reviewed de novo." Hirning, 1999 SD 53, ¶ 8, 592 N.W.2d at 603 (citation omitted).
[¶ 9.] Statutory interpretation is also a question of law reviewed under the de novo standard. Steinberg v. State Dept. of Military & Veterans Affairs, 2000 SD 36, ¶ 6, 607 N.W.2d 596, 599 (citing Zoss v. Schaefers, 1999 SD 105, ¶6, 598 N.W.2d 550, 552 (citation omitted)). In construing a statute, we presume "that the legislature did not intend an absurd or unreasonable result" from the application of the statute. State v. I-90 Truck Haven Service, Inc., 2003 SD 51, ¶ 3, 662 N.W.2d 288, 290 (citing Martinmaas v. Engelmann, 2000 SD 85, ¶ 49, 612 N.W.2d 600, 611).
ANALYSIS AND DECISION
[¶ 10.] 1. Where a vehicle has objects dangling from its rearview mirror and crosses the fog line, does an officer have a reasonable suspicion in order to justify a traffic stop.
[¶ 11.] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article VI § 11 of the South Dakota Constitution protect the people from unreasonable searches and seizures by government officials. Generally, any seizure of personal property without a warrant is considered per se unreasonable. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 2641, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983). The United States Supreme Court, however, has recognized the "narrow authority of police officers . to make limited intrusions on an individuáis personal security based on less than probable cause." Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 698, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 2591, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 905 (1968)). Brief, investigatory traffic stops fall within this exception. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 750, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002). "An investigatory stop satisfies the Fourth Amendment if the officer's action is supported by reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity 'may be afoot.' " De La Rosa, 2003 SD 18, ¶ 7, 657 N.W.2d at 686 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct. at 1884, 20 L.Ed.2d at 911). See also State v. Ballard, 2000 SD 134, ¶ 12, 617 N.W.2d 837, 841 (requiring "reasonable, articulable suspicion that [a] person is involved in criminal activity unrelated to the traffic violation."). If upon further investigation an officer develops probable cause to believe either the driver or a passenger has committed a crime, a warrantless arrest "is consistent with the Fourth Amendment." Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S.-, -, 124 S.Ct. 795, 799, 157 L.Ed.2d 769 (2003). Searches based upon consent do not violate the Fourth Amendment so long as the consent was voluntary and not the product of coercion. United States v. Welerford, 356 F.3d 932, 935 (8thCir.2004) (quoting United States v. White, 42 F.3d 457, 459 (8thCir.1994)).
[¶ 12.] Wilson first challenges the constitutionality of the initial stop of Neffs vehicle. We have recognized that "[a] passenger in a vehicle has standing to challenge the stop of a vehicle because a stop is a seizure of all persons in the vehicle." State v. Krebs, 504 N.W.2d 580, 584 (citing United States v. Erwin, 875 F.2d 268, 270 (10thCir.1989)); see WAYNE R. LA-FAYE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 11.3(e) (3d ed. 1996) ("If either the stopping of the car or the passenger's removal from it are unreasonable in a Fourth Amendment sense, then surely the passenger has standing to object to those constitutional violations.").
[¶ 13.] In its findings of fact, the trial court found Mechaley stopped Neffs vehicle because it crossed the fog line and had objects dangling from its rearview mirror. Wilson disputes the presence of dangling objects in the car and argues that even if he crossed the fog line, he did not violate South Dakota law. Thus, according to Wilson, Mechaley lacked the requisite reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle in the first place.
[¶ 14.] Wilson argues there is insufficient evidence to establish the presence of dangling objects in the vehicle. According to SDCL 32-15-6 "[i]t is a petty offense for any person to drive any vehicle upon a highway with any object or gadget dangling between the view of the driver and the windshield of the vehicle." The trial court found that there were objects dangling from the vehicle's rearview mirror, and in order for this Court to reverse this finding, the trial court must have been clearly erroneous. De La Rosa, 2003 SD 18, ¶ 5, 657 N.W.2d at 685.
[¶ 15.] Wilson offers several reasons why the trial court was clearly erroneous in finding that there were objects dangling from the rearview mirror. No objects can be seen in the stop video, and the State never presented any objects into evidence. Wilson also believes Mechaley's testimony was inconsistent regarding the nature of the dangling objects.
[¶ 16.] After reviewing the record, we believe Wilson has not established that the trial court was clearly erroneous on this issue. While it is true that no dangling objects can be distinctly seen in the stop video, due to the angle of the sun, almost nothing can be seen inside the vehicle in the video; therefore, we cannot say that the stop video suggests the trial court was clearly erroneous. When the Trooper initially stopped the vehicle he told both Neff and Wilson the reason for the stop was in part because of dangling objects in the back window. Neither Neff nor Wilson challenged the officer's statement of the existence of the objects at the time of the stop. In addition, the trial court had the opportunity to evaluate Trooper Me-chaley's testimony, and it chose to believe his version of events. As the Supreme Court has stated:
[W]hen a trial judge's finding is based on his decision to credit the testimony of one of two or more witnesses, each of whom has told a coherent and facially plausible story that is not contradicted by extrinsic evidence, that finding, if not internally inconsistent, can virtually never be clear error."
Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 575, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 1512, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985); see State v. Zachodni, 466 N.W.2d 624, 628 (S.D.1991) (recognizing that on issues of credibility, a trial court "was in the position to observe the witness testifying, and we give due regard to its superior position to judge credibility."); see also Welerford, 356 F.3d at 936 (utilizing the clearly erroneous standard when reviewing a district court's decision to credit a trooper's version of a traffic stop). We have no reason to believe that Mechaley lied when he said he stopped the vehicle because it had dangling objects. Nor has Wilson pointed to some extrinsic evidence to contradict Mechaley's testimony. In the absence of such a showing, we must conclude the trial court's determination on this issue was not clearly erroneous. Because the trial court was not clearly erroneous in finding that there were dangling objects in the vehicle, the violation of SDCL 32-15-6 provided the trooper with reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop. See State v. Chavez, 2003 SD 93, 668 N.W.2d 89; Hirning, 1999 SD 53, 592 N.W.2d 600; State v. Dreps, 1996 SD 142, 558 N.W.2d 339; State v. Shearer, 1996 SD 52, 548 N.W.2d 792; State v. Ramirez, 535 N.W.2d 847 (S.D.1995); Krebs, 504 N.W.2d 580.
[¶ 17.] 2. Where an officer tells a driver at the beginning of a traffic stop that he will "get you on down the road" and then detains the driver after becoming suspicious of drug use, is the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures violated.
[¶ 18.] The dangling objects in the vehicle provided Trooper Mechaley with reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle. Once he stopped the vehicle, Mecha-ley was entitled "to conduct an investigation reasonably related in scope to the traffic violation, including the request for a driver's license, registration, proof of insurance and even a computer check for outstanding warrants." State v. Kenyon, 2002 SD 111, ¶ 16, 651 N.W.2d 269, 274. Wilson contends, however, that when the trooper said he would issue Neff a warning ticket and then "get you on down the road," he was not entitled to any subsequent investigation under our holding in Ballard, 2000 SD 134, ¶ 17, 617 N.W.2d at 842 (citing United States v. $404,905 in U.S. Currency, 182 F.3d 643, 648 (8th Cir. 1999)).
[¶ 19.] In Ballard, a deputy sheriff observed a vehicle drive on the shoulder of a road and then cross the center line. Suspecting that the driver of the vehicle was intoxicated, the deputy stopped the vehicle. Once stopped, the driver of the vehicle, Ballard, explained that she had swerved because she was looking for something in her purse. At this time, the deputy did not smell any alcohol in the vehicle nor did he have any reason to suspect contraband in the car. The deputy then asked Ballard to accompany him to his patrol car, where he proceeded to run a license check and write up a warning ticket. While sitting in the patrol car, the deputy noticed that Ballard appeared to be "very fidgety" and her pupils looked constricted, behaviors that often indicated methamphetamine use in the deputy's experience. Ballard, Id., ¶ 4. Nevertheless, the deputy issued the warning ticket to Ballard and told her she was "free to leave." Id. After telling Ballard she was "free to leave," the deputy asked if he could search her vehicle because he was suspicious of drug use. Id. Ballard refused the search. In response, the deputy detained the vehicle until a drug detection dog arrived. The dog alerted to the vehicle and a subsequent search of the vehicle yielded the presence of marijuana and drug paraphernalia. The officers then arrested Ballard and the two passengers in the vehicle.
[¶ 20.] The trial court denied Ballard's motion to suppress, and she was subsequently found guilty of possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia after a bench trial. We reversed the trial court's denial of Ballard's motion to suppress because the deputy's "detention of Ballard after telling her she was free to leave was impermissible under the Fourth Amendment." Id., ¶ 15. While we recognized Ballard's actions afforded the deputy with reasonable suspicion to justify the initial traffic stop, once the traffic investigation was completed, the deputy was obligated to allow the driver to proceed without further detention unless he had additional reasonable suspicion to extend the stop. Id., ¶ 13. In addition, we held that "[a] refusal to give consent to search after the motorist is free to leave cannot give rise, of itself, to further suspicion and justification for a search." Id., ¶ 17. Much of our opinion in Ballard was due to our reluctance to approve the manner in which the search was carried out:
[W]e are concerned with the dubious message we send to law enforcement officers and the public if we validate a procedure allowing officers to falsely tell traffic offenders they are free to go, only for the purpose of eliciting their un-coerced agreement to search their automobiles.
Id.
[¶ 21.] We believe the present case is clearly distinguishable from the situation in Ballard. In Ballard, the officer specifically told the driver that she was "free to go" after he had completed the permissible license check and observed the suspicious behavior. Id., ¶ 15. Ballard's subsequent detention was impermissible because the officer did not gain a reasonable suspicion after telling Ballard that she was free to go. Id. In this case, Mechaley told Neff as a preliminary matter that he intended to issue a warning citation to Neff and then "get you on down the road." Unlike Ballard, Neff was not advised that he was presently free to go. Furthermore, it is clear the trooper told Neff he would "get you on down the road" before completing a computerized license check and before he became suspicious of drug use. An officer telling a driver at the beginning of a stop that he will issue a warning ticket and then "get [him] on down the road" is simply not the same as giving a driver a ticket and then telling him he is free to leave. Thus, the issue turns on whether or not Mecha-ley had a reasonable suspicion to justify extending his detention of the Neff vehicle beyond his investigation for the original traffic stop. Id., ¶ 13. See State v. Vento, 1999 SD 158, ¶ 8, 604 N.W.2d 468, 470.
[¶ 22.] In order to extend a traffic stop, "[w]e require 'a specific and artic-ulable suspicion of a violation.' " Ballard, 2000 SD 134, ¶ 13, 617 N.W.2d at 841 (quoting Spenner v. City of Sioux Falls, 1998 SD 56, ¶ 14, 580 N.W.2d 606, 610) (citation omitted). Here, Mechaley became suspicious of drug use as a result of his fifteen minute conversation with Neff and the constricted appearance of Neffs pupils. In determining whether a law enforcement officer permissibly extends a traffic stop, we look at the evidence "as a totality and in light of the officer's experience." Id. (quoting United States v. Bloomfield, 40 F.3d 910, 915 (8thCir.1994); see Pringle, 540 U.S. at-, 124 S.Ct. at 800, 157 L.Ed.2d at -). Under this standard, we conclude Trooper Mechaley had a reasonable suspicion of drug use justifying his extended stop of Neffs vehicle. Because Mechaley developed his reasonable suspicion of drug use after telling Neff he would "get you on down the road," the extended detention did not violate our holding in Ballard.
[¶ 23.] 3. May a passenger in a vehicle challenge the validity of the driver's consent to a vehicle search.
[¶ 24.] Wilson also challenges whether Neffs consent to Mechaley's request for a vehicle search was voluntarily given. The trial court, however, concluded Wilson lacked standing to challenge the validity of Neffs consent. Because we agree that Wilson does not have standing to challenge the nature of Neffs consent, we do not specifically address whether or not Neffs consent was voluntary.
[¶ 25.] As we have previously recognized, "Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which, like some other constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted." Krebs, 504 N.W.2d at 586 (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34, 99 S.Ct. 421, 425, 58 L.Ed.2d 387, 394 (1978) (citation omitted)). A passenger may challenge the consent to a vehicle search if he has "a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched." Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148, 99 S.Ct. at 433, 58 L.Ed.2d at 404; see State v. Caffrey, 332 N.W.2d 269, 274 (S.D.1983). Thus, in order to challenge the consent to the search of Neffs vehicle, Wilson had the burden of showing that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in Neffs vehicle. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 2561, 65 L.Ed.2d 633, 641 (1980).
[¶ 26.] In Krebs, we utilized the following factors in determining whether a passenger had a legitimate expectation of privacy in a vehicle:
[A] legitimate presence in the area searched, possession or ownership of the area searched or the property seized, prior use of the area searched or the property seized, ability to control or exclude others' use of the property, and a subjective expectation of privacy.
504 N.W.2d at 587 (citing United States v. Carter, 854 F.2d 1102, 1105 (8thCir.1988)); see LAFAVE, supra at 170. We analyze these factors under the totality of the circumstances. Id. (citing United States v. Aguirre, 839 F.2d 854, 856-57 (1stCir.1988)).
[¶ 27.] Wilson, as a passenger, bore the burden of proving he had a legitimate expectation of privacy. Id., at 586 (citing Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 105, 100 S.Ct. at 2562, 65 L.Ed.2d at 641). After consid ering all of the factors we conclude that Wilson was merely a passenger without a legitimate expectation of privacy in Neffs vehicle.
[¶ 28.] Wilson neither owned the vehicle nor operated it at the time it was stopped for the traffic violations. Wilson did not control the keys to the vehicle or the registration. When the officer announced he intended to search the vehicle, Wilson, rather than claiming an expectation of privacy in any of its contents, denied "knowing of any knowledge of anything in the car." However, after further conversation with the officer, and prior to any search, Wilson conceded there were drugs in the vehicle, although he did not specify who owned them. After the officer made the initial discovery of a needle cap, Wilson showed the officer the location of further drug paraphernalia and drugs in the car.
[¶ 29.] Wilson contends he had a legitimate expectation of privacy because he owned the sunglass case in which the drugs were found. Wilson also points out that the case was found underneath the seat in which he had been riding. Although it is a factor that we will consider, "[o]wnership of property seized is not determinative of a legitimate expectation of privacy." Id., 587 (citing Rawlings, 448 U.S. at 105, 100 S.Ct. at 2562, 65 L.Ed.2d at 642). In addition, the fact that the evidence was discovered under Wilson's seat is clearly not dispositive. See United States v. Elwood, 993 F.2d 1146, 1151-52 (5thCir.l993) (truck passenger without standing to object to search of the area under passenger seat); Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148, 99 S.Ct. at 433, 58 L.Ed.2d at 404; see also LAFAVE, supra at 174 ("Given the fact that in Rakas a justified expectation of privacy is deemed to be lacking . as to an area closer to the passengers under the seat, it is doubtful there is such an expectation anywhere in the vehicle.") (citations omitted).
[¶ 30.] The weight of Fourth Amendment authority strongly suggests Wilson may not challenge the search in this case, and he concedes as much when he argues in his reply brief that "states may adopt a standard for vehicle searches which affords greater protection to Constitutional rights than the United States Constitution." Wilson points us to the case of Nebraska v. Stott, 503 N.W.2d 822, 243 Neb. 967 (1993) for the proposition such passenger standing should be automatically recognized under the South Dakota Constitution. Wilson declares that such recognition would avoid "unjust results." Nebraska has apparently opted for a rule of automatic standing granted to all passengers in a motor vehicle:
[A]n occupant of an automobile has a legitimate expectation to be free of unreasonable governmental intrusion so as to give the occupant standing to challenge the stop as violative of his or her Fourth Amendment rights.
503 N.W.2d at 828 (quoting State v. Chavez, 240 Neb. 538, 543, 483 N.W.2d 122, 125 (1992)).
[¶ 31.] Such a blanket rule seems to us to be at odds with the more appropriate "legitimate expectation of privacy in an area search" doctrine of Krebs and Rakas. We cannot interpret the federal or state constitution to grant a blanket extension of standing to all who occupy a vehicle for whatever reason, be they invited guests, hitchhikers, cash paying patrons in a commercial vehicle, stowaways, or even car thieves.
[¶ 32.] Here, as in Krebs, Wilson cannot claim any possessory interest in the vehicle nor could he exclude others from the area searched. 504 N.W.2d at 587. In addition, Wilson has not established any prior use of the vehicle. Viewed under the totality of the circumstances, Wilson did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched, and, therefore, he does not have standing to contest the nature of the driver's consent. Id.
[¶ 33.] Affirmed.
[¶ 34.] KONENKAMP and ZINTER, Justices, concur.
[¶ 35.] SABERS and MEIERHENRY, Justices, dissent.
. Wilson does not contest the fact that the vehicle in which he was riding crossed the fog line. Rather, Wilson contends it was not a violation of South Dakota law when the vehicle crossed the fog line, and, therefore, the swerve did not provide the trooper with reasonable suspicion that supported a traffic stop. The trial court found that the swerve violated SDCL 32-26-1. The text of SDCL 32-26-1 provides as follows:
Upon all highways of sufficient width, except upon one-way streets, the driver of a vehicle shall drive the same upon the right half of the highway and shall drive a slow-moving vehicle as closely as possible to the right-hand edge or curb of such highway, unless it is impracticable to travel on such side of the highway and except when overtaking and passing another vehicle subject to the limitations applicable in overtaking and passing set forth in § 32-26-26 to 32-26-39, inclusive. A violation of this section is a Class 2 misdemeanor.
Wilson argues that nothing in the statute prohibits a vehicle from crossing the fog line to initiate a traffic stop. As we have already found the dangling object to be a legal basis for the stop of the vehicle, we need not address this alternative argument.
. Although Wilson bore the burden of proof at the suppression hearing, he did not testify even though he was present. He further called no witnesses on his behalf. His coun sel did cross-examine the sole witness, Trooper Mechaley. In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial court found the Trooper to be "credible."