Case Name: David Roy CALLIHAN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER of IRS, Respondent-Appellee
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2012-09-25
Citations: 490 F. App'x 327
Docket Number: No. 12-11586
Parties: David Roy CALLIHAN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER of IRS, Respondent-Appellee.
Judges: Before MARCUS, MARTIN and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 490
Pages: 327–328

Head Matter:
David Roy CALLIHAN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. COMMISSIONER of IRS, Respondent-Appellee.
No. 12-11586
Non-Argument Calendar.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
Sept. 25, 2012.
David Roy Callihan, Tallahassee, FL, pro se.
Laurie Snyder, Joan I. Oppenheimer, U.S. Department of Justice, Robert R. Di Trolio, U.S. Tax Court, William J. Wilkins, Chief Counsel-IRS, Washington, DC, for Respondent-Appellee.
Before MARCUS, MARTIN and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM:
David Roy Callihan, proceeding pro se, appeals the Tax Court's decision to sustain the Internal Revenue Service's ("IRS") determination of his income tax deficiency. Callihan concedes that in tax year 2007, he resided in Florida and that he worked for the School District of DeSoto County in exchange for $37,640, as well as the Sarasota Family YMCA, Inc. in exchange for $616. He insists, however, that none of his work constituted "employment" within the meaning of section 3121(b) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), 26 U.S.C. § 3121(b), and thus, the money he received in compensation for the services he rendered is not taxable.
Callihan acknowledges that section 3121(b) defines "employment" as "any service . performed . by an employee . within the United States." Id. But he notes that the section defines the term "State[s]" as "includ[ing] the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, and American Samoa," id. § 3121(e)(1), and that the term "United States" is similarly defined as "includfing]" some of these territories, id. § 3121(e)(2). According to Callihan, because these definitions do not specifically mention the fifty states, the work that he did in Florida did not constitute "employment" under section 3121(b).
The Tax Court rejected this argument as "thoroughly discredited and frivolous," and we are compelled to agree. Our precedent makes it abundantly clear that the term "United States" in the IRC is not limited to the District of Columbia and the territories and possessions of the United States. See United States v. Ward, 833 F.2d 1538, 1539 (11th Cir.1987) (rejecting the argument as "utterly without merit"); see also United States v. Bennett, 448 Fed. Appx. 991, 992 (11th Cir.2011); United States v. Morgan, 419 Fed.Appx. 958, 959 (11th Cir.2011). The Tax Court thus correctly dismissed Callihan's assertion that Florida is not part of the "United States," and its judgment must therefore be affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
. The IRS's tax deficiency determination also rested in part on Callihan's receipt of a $475 grant from the State of Florida in 2007. Although Callihan appears to challenge the Tax Court's conclusion that this was taxable, the only argument he makes here concerns the scope of the term "United States" in the definition of "employment." We therefore understand Callihan's argument to be that the grant was not taxable because he received it in Florida. This suggestion also fails for the reason stated above.