Case Name: The Territory of New Mexico v. Joseph Stokes and William Mullen
Court: Supreme Court of New Mexico
Jurisdiction: New Mexico
Decision Date: 1881-01-28
Citations: 2 N.M. 161
Docket Number: 
Parties: The Territory of New Mexico v. Joseph Stokes and William Mullen.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Mexico Reports
Volume: 2
Pages: 161–175

Head Matter:
The Territory of New Mexico v. Joseph Stokes and William Mullen.
January 28, 1881.
Burglary. (1) Prosecution for, under general railroad law.
1. The general railroad act, ch. 1, tit. 8, section 8, provides that “any person who shall in the day or night time enter by force, or otherwise, any car of any corporation-, formed under this act, with intent to steal any valuable thing then and there being, shall be deemed guilty of burglary, and upon conviction thereof shall be punished as in other cases of burglary.” This provision applied only to corporations created under this general act, but subsequently the legislature passed an act conferring upon all corporations organized before the passage of the general railroad law, ‘ ‘ all the powers, privileges and exemptions conferred upon corporations organized ” under that act. Upon the. theory that the “ privileges ” thus conferred would give to corporations formed before the passage of the general railway law, the “ privilege ” of being protected from burglary in the means provided by the section of the general law quoted above, the defendants were indicted under section 8, ch. 1, tit. 8 of the general railroad act for burglarizing the cars of the N. M. & S. P. R. R. Co., a company organized before the general railroad statute was passed.
Held, That the word “privilege,” as used in the second act, does not confer the right to prosecute any one for burglary under section 8 of the general railroad act, ch. 1, tit. 8, where the burglary was of cars owned by a company organized before the general act was passed; but that the defendants could be prosecuted under the criminal code of New Mexico.
Appeal from the District Court for Santa Fe county. Prince, J.
The defendants in this case were indicted by the grand jury of San Miguel county for burglary under sec. 8, chap. 1, title 8 of an act, entitled “An act to provide for the incorporation of railroad companies and the management of the affairs thereof, and other matters relating thereto,” approved February 2d, 1878 (Laws of 1878, p. 43).
Change of venue was taken to Santa Fe county, and the cause tried at the July term, 1880, of the district court at Santa Fe county.
After the evidence was in, defendants, by their counsel, moved the court to instruct the jury to find a verdict of “ not guilty,” for the reason that the territory had not shown that the defendants entered by force, or otherwise, any car of any corporation formed under the act of the legislature of New Mexico, approved February 2d, 1878, which motion the court overruled, and defendants duly excepted.
There was a'verdict of guilty, and motions in arrest of judgment and for new trial were filed in due time.
The bill of exceptions shows that no evidence whatever was introduced on the part of the prosecution to prove that the New Mexico and Southern Pacific Railroad Company (whose car defendants were charged with entering) was organized under the act of February 2d, 1878, above mentioned, and that the court admitted in evidence, against the objection of defendants, a copy of certain articles of incorporation, set forth in the record, pp. 19 to 28.
P. F. Conway and C. H. Gildersleeve for appellants.
I. — Appellants claim that the court below erred in admitting in evidence the articles of incorporation above mentioned, and in refusing to instruct the jury to acquit.
An examination of the record (pp. 19 to 28), will show that the articles of incorporation introduced by the prosecution are not drawn in accordance with the provisions of the act entitled “An act to provide for the incorporation of railroad companies and the management of the affairs thereof, and other matters relating thereto,” approved February 2d, 1878 (Laws of 1878, p. 17).
Sub-head 10, of sec. 2, title 1, chap. 1 of said act (p. 18, Laws of 1878), provides that articles of incorporation must set forth “ that at least ten per cent, of its capital stock subscribed has been paid to the treasurer of the intended corporation, giving his name and residence.” Section 4, same title and chapter of said act (p. 18, Laws of 1878), provides that, before filing articles of incorporation, the incorporators must have actually subscribed to the capital stock of the corporation at least one thousand dollars for each mile of its road and branches, and at least ten per cent, thereof must have been paid for the benefit of the corporation to a treasurer appointed by subscribers to articles of incorporation.
Section 5, same chapter and title of said act (p. 19, Laws of 1S78), is as follows : “ There must be securely attached to said articles of incorporation an affidavit of the treasurer-named therein, that the requisite amount of capital stock of the intended corporation has been actually subscribed, and that ten per cent, thereof has been actually paid to him for the benefit of said corporation, stating the amount of stock subscribed, and the amount actually paid in.”
The articles of incorporation admitted by the court below do not comply in any manner with the provisions of the statute last above quoted, and consequently the New Mexico and Southern Pacific Railroad Company is not a corporation formed under the provisions of the act of Feb. 2d, 1878. Section 8, title 8, chap. 1 of said act (p. 48, Laws of 1878), reads as follows: “ Any person who shall in the day or night time, enter by force or otherwise, any car of any corporation, formed under this act, with intent to steal any valuable thing there and then being, shall be deemed guilty of burglary, and upon conviction thereof, shall be punished as in other cases of burglary.”
There can be no doubt that the indictment in this case was brought under this section, and in view of the failure of the incorporators of the New Mexico and Southern Pacific Railroad Company to comply with, the provisions of this law in framing their articles of incorporation, it is plain that the objection of defendants to the introduction of said articles of incorporation was well taken, and that the court should have given the instruction to the jury to find the defendants not guilty as prayed for in their motion.
II. The action of the court below in admitting said articles of incorporation, and refusing to instruct the jury to acquit, was based upon section 1 of an act entitled “ An act in x-eference to certain incorporated companies ixx the territory of New Mexico,” approved Feb. 12th, 1878 (Laws of 1878, p. 52). We claim that this section cannot be so construed.
It provides that all powei-s, privileges and exemptions con ferred on corporations organized under the act of Feb. 2d, 1878, are also conferred on corporations organized for railroad purposes under the general incorporation law of Dee. 27th, 1867 and Jan. 30th, 1868. Section 8 of the act of Fob. 2d, 1878, under which the indictment is brought, confers no power, privilege or exemption upon a railroad company. It is an act of the sovereign declaring certain acts to be a crime of a nature different from what it was before, or rather making that a crime which was not prior to the passage of the law. It is in derogation of the common law, and should be strictly construed.
The words, powers, privileges and exemptions, used in the act approved Feb. 12th, 1878, Laws of 1878, p. 52, have no reference to sec. 8, title 8, chap. 1, act of Feb. 2d, 1878 (Laws of 1878, p. 43). The first thing requisite in the construction of an act of the legislature is to discover what is the intention of the legislature.
Let us see what was meant and intended by the legislature in the use by it of these words, powers, privileges and exemptions.
Fortunately for the purposes of this inquiry, the legislature has not left its meaning dark or obscure; the powers, privileges and exemptions meant and intended by the act of Feb. 12th, 1878, are set forth at large and in the utmost minutiae of detail, in the act of Feb. 2d, 1878.
First. As to powers, see title 6, chap. 1 of act approved Feb. 2d, 1878 (pp. 31 to 39, Laws of 1878); there they are defined to be the power of succession by its corporate name, to sue, and be sued in court, to make and use a common seal, and alter the same at pleasure, to acquire, purchase, hold and convey real estate, and so on to the end of the chapter.
Second. As to privileges and exemptions, see title 9, chap. 1, secs. 1 to 10 inclusive, of act approved Feb. 2d, 1878' (Laws 1878, p. 49).
The powers, privileges and exemptions meant are all referred to and defined in the sections above quoted, but no-. where among them do we find any reference to the section of the same act defining the offense of burglary; but this section is found under its proper heading : “ Regulation and Management.” The conclusion seems most reasonable, that the legislature referred to the powers, privileges and exemptions specifically granted, and not to the section defining a criminal offense.
“ The section of the statute under which the indictment is brought is in derogation of the common law, and to be strictly construed:” Melody v. Heab, 4 Mass., 471; Gibson v. Jermey, 15 Mass., 205 ; DuéWy v. DuelT/y, 46 Me., 377.
“ Penal statutes are to be taken strictly and literally, and cannot be extended by construction:” TJ. S. v. Starr, 1 ITempst., 469; Andrew v. TJ. S., 2 Story, 202; Hanson v. Starr, 19 Conn., 292.
“When the liberty of the citizen is involved statutes should be strictly construedOase of Pieroe, 16 Me., 255; Elam v. Hansom,, 21 Ga., 139; Ramsey v. Foy, 10 Ind., 493.
“ An offense cannot be created or inferred by vague implications. Penal laws must be construed strictly, but not so strictly as to defeat the obvious intention of the lawmaker ; but so strictly that the case in hand must be brought within the definitions of the law that is within its reach, taken in their ordinary significance :” Atla/nta v. White, 33 Ga., 229.
We submit that, in view of the foregoing, the law of Feb. 12th, 1878, does not bring railroad companies not organized under the law of February 2d, 1878, within- the operation of the section defining burglary here sought to be invoked, and that the court below erred in the admission of the testimony complained of and in overruling the motions for new trial, and in arrest of judgment.
The act of February 12th, 1878, attempts only to confer certain “ powers, privileges and exemptions” on railroad cor porations, and does not in any manner pretend or assume to confer on the territory the right of prosecution for any new character of statutory crime.
The act of February 12th, 1878, is wholly and totally null and void; it attempts to confer on railroad corporations organized previous to February 2d, 1878 (to wit, under the law of December 27th, 1867, and the act of January 30th, 1868, amendatory thereto), all the “powers, privileges and exemptions ” conferred on railroad corporations, and for the management of the affairs hereof, by the act approved .Feb. 2d, 1878, and hence is in violation of the act of congress, June 10th, 1872, Revised Statutes U. S., sec. 1889, p. 333, which says that “ legislative assemblies of the several territories shall not grant private charters or especial privileges,” etc.
This act of February 12th, 1878, attempts to grant an especial privilege, and to grant the same especially to railroad corporations, organized for railroad purposes.
It attempts to grant, especially to certain railroad corporations organized previous to a certain date (February 2d, 1878), “powers, privileges and exemptions” that other railroad companies, organized under the same act, but subsequent to that date cannot enjoy.
It not only attempts to grant that especial privilege, but to grant the same especially to railroad corporations organized previous to February 2d, 1878.
Which is an exercise of legislative power clearly not vested in the legislature of the territory of New Mexico ; said act of February 12, 1878, is hence null and void.
Gatron db Thornton, for appellee.
There is no error on the record in- this case. The indictment is for burglary in entering a car of the New Mexico & Southern Pacific Railroad Company, with intention to steal-its property, etc.
The defendants pleaded not guilty to the indictment, but made no objections to its form or sufficiency. They were-found guilty, and sentenced.
The bill of exceptions contains a statement of the judge as to evidence on a certain point, then sets out certificate of incorporation in full, which was given in evidence as stated,.' but does not pretend to give all the evidence.
The statement in the “ bill of exceptions,” that there was no evidence introduced to show that the N. M. & S. P. R. R. Co., was organized under the act of Feb. 2, 1880, is an attempt of the judge to forestall this court, and decide a matter pertinent to the issue.
This court cannot examine into the fact whether the evidence sustained the indictment or not, as all the evidence is not inserted in the bill of exceptions, without which it cannot pass on a question of fact: U. S. Digest, vol. 6, sec. 308, p. 14; Id., sec. 346, p. 19 ; U. S. Digest, vol. 6, sec. 437, p. 20; Id., sec. 450 ; 10 111., p.
The bill of exceptions does not show the reason for the objections made to the introduction of testimony. See 37 Missouri, p. 358.
If the case comes under the law referred to, still it is good,, as the exemption from robbery, and the jwivilege to keep and use cars free from robbers and armed bands, and the right to immunity from them will extend these provisions to the old companies.
A privilege is a right to an immunity or protection in-something, or some right.
Criminal law is nothing more than a protection of persons in their rights, privileges and immunities.
' It is the privilege of every citizen to insist on his rights and protection, and to defend himself, either personally, or by means of the law, punishing persons who injure him in the enjoyment of his rights.
There being no error apparent on the record, the court, must sustain the sentence.

Opinion:
Pakks, Associate Justice:
The % defendants in. this case were indicted at the last October term of the San Miguel district court for committing burglary in a baggage and express car of The New Mexico and Southern Pacific Railroad .Company, on the fourteenth day of said month of October last. The case was taken to Santa Fe county by change of venue; was tried there, defendants found guilty and sentenced, and the case brought to this court by appeal.
There is no general law of this territory making the acts charged against the defendants burglary, or by which they could be punished -under this indictment. The ground taken by the prosecution in this case is, substantially, that this indictment was founded upon and must and can be sustained by .the eighth section of title eighth of the railroad laws passed February 2d, A. D. 1878, taken in connection with section first of the act upon the same subject of February 12, A. D. 1878.
Section eighth aforesaid defines the crime of burglary in any case of any corporation formed under that act, and fixes the punishment, and section' one of the said subsequent act confers all the powers, privileges and exemptions of the said first act upon all the corporations incorporated under the laws of this territory for the purpose of constructing railroads, etc.
It was stated in the beginning of the, argument, and it is evident from the record and the argument of counsel, that this case depends upon the meaning of the word "privileges" in the act of February 12, 1878.
According to Jacob's Law Dictionary, the original legal meaning of the word " privilege " is exemption of a private man or a particular corporation from the rigor of the common law. Another definition given by him is, exemption from some duty, burden or attendance. Bouviersays a privilege is a particular law which grants special prerogatives to some persons contrary to common right. Webster defines it to be immunity, franchise, right, claim, liberty, special exemption from evil or burden, special enjoyment of good, peculiar benefit or advantage.
Without multiplying authorities or definitions, it is sufficient to say that in no usual or proper or legal meaning of. the word privileges can it be used as claimed in this case.
The right of the people of New Mexico to prosecute and punish wrong-doers under this, or any other law, is not a privilege of any particular person or persons, corporation or corporations. It is something more than that. It is part of the criminal law of the country, énacted for the public good ; for the punishment of crime, and in which the whole community are interested. We are of the opinion that there is no law of this territory under which this indictment, verdict and judgment can be sustained.
But it does not follow upon this opinion that acts such as are alleged to have been proved upon the trial of this case can be committed with impunity.
The criminal code of New Mexico is believed to be sufficiently comprehensive to punish all invasions of. the rights of personal liberty, personal security, and private or public property.
What part or parts of that code are applicable to the alleged facts of this case, if any, it is not the province of this court either to determine or indicate.
The judgment of the district court is reversed.