Case Name: GUICE v. POPE
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1972-04-20
Citations: 229 Ga. 136
Docket Number: 26972
Parties: GUICE v. POPE.
Judges: All the Justices concur, except Nichols and Hawes, JJ., who concur in the judgment only.
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 229
Pages: 136–140

Head Matter:
26972.
GUICE v. POPE.
Submitted February 15, 1972
Decided April 20, 1972
Rehearing denied May 3 and May 18, 1972.
Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General, Harold N. Hill, Jr., Executive Assistant Attorney General, Courtney Wilder Stanton, David L. G. King, Jr., Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.

Opinion:
Mobley, Chief Justice.
This appeal is from the sustaining of a motion to dismiss a complaint based on the ground that the court is without jurisdiction.
J. I. Guice brought his petition in Fulton Superior Court against "Ray Pope, Director, Department of Public Safety," alleging that: After the dismissal of charges of traffic violations against the appellant in the City Court of Atlanta, the judge ordered him to surrender his driver's license, "stating that upon satisfactory examination by the Department of Public Safety it would be returned to him." The license is now held by the Department of Public Safety. A valid demand was made for the license and its return refused, "it being stated that it was being held under an order of the said court pending a satisfactory examination." The order of the judge was void, and the license should be delivered to him. He has been deprived of a valuable right without due process of law.
It was prayed that the defendant be temporarily restrained and permanently enjoined from enforcing the order of the City Court of Atlanta, that the license be returned to him by the Department of Public Safety pending final hearing in the case, and that the license be returned to him permanently upon the hearing.
Temporary restraining order was granted, and it was ordered that the license be delivered to the appellant pending the final hearing in the case.
The defendant, Ray Pope, Director of the Department of Public Safety, moved to quash the temporary restraining order and dismiss the action upon the ground that the court is without jurisdiction, since the defendant (appellee) is a resident of Ware County, Georgia. The motion was supported by affidavit of the appellee.
The motion was granted, the complaint dismissed, and the temporary order vacated.
The appellant argues in his brief that the action was not brought against Ray Pope individually, but in his representative character as Director of the Department of Public Safety, the jurisdiction of which department is in Fulton County.
Code Ann. § 92A-422 (Ga. L. 1951, pp. 598, 604) provides that upon the suspension of a driver's license, a hearing shall be granted on demand before an authorized agent of the Department of Public Safety, which hearing shall be had in the county of the driver's residence. Code Ann. § 92A-423 (Ga. L. 1951, pp. 598, 605) provides that the decision of such agent of the Department of Public Safety shall be final unless the person whose license has been suspended shall desire an appeal, in which case he shall have the right to enter an appeal to the court of the county of his residence, other than a justice's court, having jurisdiction of misdemeanor cases, after notice to the Director, in the same manner as appeals are entered from the court of ordinary, except that he shall not be required to pay the costs in advance.
This appeal from an unfavorable ruling by the agent of the Department of Public Safety is the remedy provided by law for action against the Department of Public Safety to contest the suspension of a driver's license. A court of equity will not take jurisdiction of an action where an administrative remedy is provided by statute. Compare Burson v. Faith, 227 Ga. 526, 530 (181 SE2d 827).
As an action against the appellee individually, the complaint cannot be maintained, since he is not a resident of Fulton County.
The trial judge properly dismissed the complaint.
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur, except Nichols and Hawes, JJ., who concur in the judgment only.