Case Name: HOPKINS et al. v. HEBARD et al.
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1911-10-02
Citations: 194 F. 301
Docket Number: No. 2,031
Parties: HOPKINS et al. v. HEBARD et al.
Judges: Before SEVERENS and KNAPPEN, Circuit Judges, and COCHRAN, District Judge.
Reporter: Federal Reporter
Volume: 194
Pages: 301–324

Head Matter:
HOPKINS et al. v. HEBARD et al.
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
October 2, 1911.)
No. 2,031.
1. Equity (§ 455 ) — Bill or Review — -Newly Discovered Evidence.
The filing of a hill of review on the ground of newly discovered evi-dente is not a matter of right, but leave may be granted or refused by the court in the exercise of a sound discretion, in view of the circumstances of the particular case.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Equity, Cent. Dig. § 1111; Dec. Dig. § 455. ]
2! Equity (§ 450 ) — Bill or Review — Right or — Purchaser Pendente Bite.
Purchasers of land from one of the parties to a suit involving the title to a portion of the tract, which had been adversely decided and was-then ponding on appeal, by a conveyance which expressly excepted the tract in dispute from the covenant of warranty, held not entitled to maintain a bill of review on the ground of newly discovered evidence six years after the affirmance of the decree by the appellate court, as against a purchaser in good faith from the prevailing party after the final decree and in reliance thereon.
[Ed. Note. — For other clises, see Equity, Cent. Dig. § 1095; Dee. Dig.. § 450. ]
3. Vendor and Purchaser (§ 224 ) — Bona Fide Purchasers — Holders by Quitclaim.
A grantee under a quitclaim deed may be a bona fide purchaser.
TEd. Note. — For other cases, see Vendor and Purchaser, Cent. Dig. Si 469-473; Dee. Dig. § 224. ]
4. Equity (§ 456 ) — Bill of Review — Defenses—Effect of Granting Leave to File.
The granting of leave to file a bill of review is not, such an adjudication of the equitable right of the party to maintain it as to preclude a consideration of the question on final hearing and on appeal.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Equity, Dec. Dig. § 450. ]
Severens, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Tennessee.
Bill of review by W. R. Hopkins and others against Charles He-bard, the Smoky Mountain Land, Lumber & Improvement Company and others. From a decree dismissing the bill of review, complainants appeal.
Affirmed.
The following is the opinion of the Circuit Court by McCall, District Judge:
The case of Charles Hebard against D. W. Belding and others was pending and determined in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern Division of the Eastern District of Tennessee, and, on appeal, in the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. (103 Fed. 532.)
The purpose of the bill, filed by Hebard in the original case was to restrain trespass and remore a cloud from the title to a large tract of wild mountain land claimed to lie within Monroe county, Temí. The complainant claimed title to the land under a grant from the state of Tennessee. The defendants claimed title to the land under a grant from the state of North Carolina. The title turned upon the location of the boundary line between the state of Tennessee and the state of North Carolina. The object of the bill was to have the state line ascertained and determined between the points where the state line crosses the,Little Tennessee river and the junction of Hangover .and Big Fodder Stack ridges, near a mountain peak called Strat-ton Bald, a distance of about eight miles.
The claim of complainant, Hebard, was that the state line reaches the Little Tennessee river about one-half mile above, and nearly east, of where Slick Rock creek empties into said river; that it there crosses the river and follows a leading ridge of the mountain known as Hangover ridge, and along the extreme height of that ridge to its junction with “Ifodder Stack” ridge. This contention, if sustained, places the lands lying between Slick Rock creek a.nd Hangover ridge within the state of Tennessee, and would confirm the title to complainant Hebard under his Tennessee grant.
The defendants to the bill contended that the staté line crosses the Little Tennessee river at or near the mouth of Slick Rock creek and runs up-said creek, following its meanders, about five miles, thence up Little Fodder Stack ridge to Big Fodder Stack ridge, and thence southwesterly with the crest of Big Fodder Stack ridge to the junction with Hangover ridge, at or near “Stratton Bald” point. This contention, if sustained, places the lands lying between Slick Rock creek and Hangover ridge within the state of North Carolina, and would defeat the title of complainant Hebard under his Tennessee grant.
When the case was at issue, it was referred to Asbury Wright, Esa-, as special, master, to hear the evidence and to determine and report to the court “the true state line between the states of Tennessee and North Carolina from the Little Tennessee, river to the junction of Hangover and Fodder Stack ridges, as run and located by the Commissioners of the states of North Carolina and Tennessee in 1821, and confirmed by the respective Legislatures of said states.” Special Master Wright’s report was submitted July 7, 1898, wherein he finds and.reports, among other things, as follows, to wit: “After a careful consideration of the whole case, I am of the opinion, and so report, that the line between the states of Tennessee and North Carolina from the Little Tennessee river to the junction of the Hangover and Fodder Stack ridges, as run and located by the commissioners of said states, in 1821, and confirmed by the respective Legislatures of said states, crosses the Little Tennessee river at a point where it reaches the river on the northeast side, and from the river runs up the Hangover lead, as shown on complainant’s map, and along the extreme heights of this ridge, passing the black or red oak. Slick Rock Gap, Cold Springs Knob, Big Flat Knob, Hangover, Haoe, Grassy Gap, and Stratton Bald, to the junction of Hangover with Fodder Stack.”
Defendants filed exceptions to this report, which were heard by the court, and on June 10, 1899, a decree was entéred, overruling the exceptions and confirming the report of the special master in all things. The court found and decreed the line between the states of Tennessee and North Carolina to be located as reported by the special master, and that the titles of the complainant to the lands described in the bill were valid, and the titles, claimed by defendants thereto were void, etc. From this decree of the Circuit Court an appeal was prayed and pros'eeuted to the United States Cireuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit at Cincinnati, Ohio, where the same was heard on March 14, 1900, and decided July 13, 1900, in an opinion, by Judge Lurton, in which he carefully reviewed the whole case, affirming the decree of the Circuit Court. Charles Ilebard v. D. W. Beld-ing et al., 103 Fed. 532, 43 C. C- A. 296.
On August 6. 1907, more than seven years after this final decree was made and entered by the Circuit Court of Appeals, AW R. Hopkins et al. presented their petition to this court, alleging that on October 29, 3900, they became the purchasers of the 8,000 acres of land involved in the case of Ilebard v. Belding et al., and praying that they be permitted to file a bill of review which accompanied the petition, and in which was set out certain newly discovered evidence. This new evidence, it is alleged, when considered with the evidence in the original case, would lead the court to a different conclusion, and enable the court on reconsideration to right said petitioners in matters in which they were aggrieved by the decree in the original case. And it appearing to the court by affidavits and a certliied transcript of the record in the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, where said original case was decided on appeal, in which court, as appeared by said transcript, a petition for leave to file a bill of review was filed and leave given to apply to this court. Upon consideration this court permitted the hill of review to be filed, subject to all legal objections by demurrer, answer, plea, or otherwise as the defendants may lx; advised.
Thereupon the bill of review was filed, and, after stating the history of ihe original case, it is alleged: That while said original case was pending, on, to wit, December 9, 1899, the interests of all the defendants thereto in the lands involved in that, case, except Braggs and Coopers, came to petitioners, W. R: Ilopltins and his associates, and the title to said land is vested in said Hopkins and his associates. That some time in the year of 1905 the map made by the original commissioners of the states of North Carolina and Tennessee, who ran the line under the cession act (2 Ired. & B. Rev. St. N. C. p. 171), was discovered in a barrel of waste at Nashville, Tenn. A certified copy thereof is attached to the bill of review. That, in February, 1900, one if. E. Gozad heard a rumor for the first time of the discovery of said map, and that lie obtained on the 2(iih day of February, 1900. a certified copy thereof. That further attempts were made to find the written report of said commissioners accompanying the map, and the field notes of the survey, but, after the most diligent search, no other papers connected therewith could be found. That none of ihe grantees had any information of the finding of said map, and none of the defendants herein knew of it until about June 26, 1906, and the existence or contents of said report could not have been proven at the trial of the cause.
It is alleged: That said newly discovered map shows that the state line “crosses the Uittle Tennessee river at or near the mouth of Slick Hock creek, and that it includes all the land, and more, than said defendants claimed.” That said map is new and decisive evidence of the contention of the defendants in the original case, and that, if it liad been found and presented to the court, would have been decisive in favor of the defendants, and would have resulted in a decree in their favor. That petitioners and their grantees have exercised'time and perfect diligence, and could not have ascertained the existence thereof sooner than it is alleged.
Qn August 6, 1907, the day in which the petition was filed praying for permission to file the bill of review, an order was made and entered, directing that a rule issue and be served oil the Smoky Mountain Land, Dumber & Improvement Company, grantees of Charles Ilebard, the complainant in the original case, and T. E. II. McCroskey, attorney representing said company, to show cause why the prayer of said petition should not be granted and directing said company to answer thereto on or before the next rule day of this court, which was September 2, 1907. The said land company filed its answer to the petition and to the bill of review, setting up the following defenses necessary to be noticed: 'Pile suit sought to be reviewed was finally heard and determined in the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, July 13, 1900. The application by W. li. Hopkins et al. to file a bill of review was first made in the said. United States Circuit. Court of Appeals September 25, 3906. On August 6, 1907, said Hopkins and others filed in this court their petition to file a bill of review in said suit.
The petitioners and all other parties are barred by the statute of limitations. Section 4848, Shannon’s Code of Tennessee, provides that “no bill of review shall be brought or a motion made therefor, except within three years from the time of pronouncing the decree,” with certain exceptions not material 'here. Acts 1801, c. 6, § 53, Legislature of Tennessee. The newly discovered evidence, the map itself, is not such evidence as is decisive or controlling in character as to the essential merits of the litigation, or would justify the court in granting the relief prayed for in the bill of review. The petitioners having purchased the right, title, and interest of Belding et al. to the lands in dispute, after title to said lands had been by final decree vested in Hebard and before the discovery of any new evidence, have no interest which gives to them a right to secure a reversal of said final decree upon newly discovered evidence. The land company having in good faith purchased the right, title, and interest to said lands from Charles Hebard, the successful party in the suit sought to be reviewed after final decree vesting title in Hebard, its title cannot be affected by this bill of review filed by complainants, based upon newly discovered evidence, which was not discovered until after the land company purchased. The laches of complainants bars their right to any benefits from a bill of review.
An attentive examination of this record leads me to the conclusion that the relief sought by those filing the bill of review should be denied upon more than one of the grounds relied upon by the defendants. X shall content myself, however, with discussing only one of them, and that one goes to the merits of the controversy, and in my judgment is clearly conclusive of the case.
It must be assumed at the outset that the original case of Hebard v. Beld-ing et al. was decided correctly upon the testimony in that case. That decision must stand as the law of that case, and is not now subject to review, except in connection with the newly discovered evidence set out in the bill of review. As has been seen, the question to be determined in the original case was the correct location of the boundary line between the states of North Carolina and Tennessee, and especially between a point on the North Bank of the Little Tennessee river and the point of junction of Hangover and Big Fodder Stack ridges, a distance of about eight miles. By final decree in the original case it was held that said state line between these two points runs from the Little Tennessee river to and along the crest of Hangover ridge, to its junction with Big Fodder Stack. Why? Because, as pointed out by Judge Lurton in Hebard v. Belding et al., 103 Fed. 532, 43 C. C. A. 296, the cession act of North Carolina of 1789 (2 Ired. & B. Rev. St. N. C. p. 171) provides, among other things, that the line between Tennessee and North Carolina shall run “to the top of Bald Mountain; thence along the extreme heights of the said mountain to the Painted Rock, on French Broad river; thence along the highest ridge of said mountain to the place where it is called the Great Iron or. Smoky Mountain; thence along the extreme height of the said mountain to the place where it is called Unicoy or Unaka Mountain.” It is as to the last run named that the dispute arises, and from the point where the line reaches the Little Tennessee to a point, about eight miles southwesterly thereof, at the junction of Hangover and Big Fodder Stack ridges.
The act of the Tennessee Legislature 1821 (chapter 35, p. 45), confirming the report of the commissioners, after the Little Tennessee is reached, provides as follows: “From the Tennessee river to the main ridge and along the extreme height of the same to a place where it is called the Unicoy or Unaka Mountain.” “The general course of the line,” says Judge Lurton in Hebard v. Belding et al., supra, “as called for by the calls which brought the line to the river, was southwesterly, and this course was to be continued to the Unaka. This course would require the line to cross the river. The general direction of the cession act would keep the line on the extreme height'of the mountain range or ridge. Immediately across the river, and in the general course of the line was the Hangover ridge.” This is the main or highest ridge, and is the course which the line was given by the Circuit Court and approved by the Circuit Court of Appeals.
Now, what is there in tho newly discovered .map that would have warranted the Circuit Court in rendering a different decree in the original case, and to have found in favor of tho defendants in that case? Upon an examination of the newly discovered map, it appears that the state line crosses the Little Tennessee river at right angles, and at the point where the line first reaches the river, and that it proceeds in a southwesterly direction along the ridge, lying adjacent to and immediately south of the river, towards the Unicoy Mountains. There is a hlack line upon the newly discovered map, marked “creek” which Conns a junction with (he Tennessee river a short distance above where the line crosses the river, and east of the line. But there is no indication upon the map, nor in the report accompanying it, that this line ran up said creek for any distance, or that it touches tho creek at any point. Indeed, if tire line followed either the river or creek for any distance, that fact is not indicated upon the map, nor is there any reference to such thing in the commissioner's report.
In order that the map or the report of the commissioners be of any service to the petitioners, it should show that tho state line, after crossing the river, followed Slick Rock creek, if, indeed, it be Slick Rock creek that is indicated on the map, to a junction with Little Fodder Stack. From the location of this stream marked “creek” on the map, considered in the light of all the evidence in the case, I am inclined to the, opinion that it is Cheoah river, and not Slick Rock creek. The map and the report upon their faces failing to shed any new light upon the issues in the original case, let us examine the evidence taken upon the issues under the bill of review.
Here we are met with, the testimony of witnesses seemingly of equal credibility and of equal opportunity to know the facts about which they testify that is contradictory and unrcconcilable. Instead of elucidating the newly found map. it tends to confuse that which appears upon the face of the map, and also it is confusing- in its relation to the evidence and findings in the original case. Indeed, if this map sheds any additional light upon the issues, it is to make clearer and more certain the correctness of the conclusion reached in the original case, now under review.
An examination of the commissioners’ map discloses that the state line approaches the north bank of the Little Tennessee river, running in a southwesterly direction, crosses it at right angles, leaving the south margin of the river in a southwesterly direction immediately at the point of crossing, and runs along the crest of a ridge toward Unaka Mountain, and in this particular follows the direction of the cession act from the Smoky to tho Unaka Mountains, wherein it is provided as follows: “Thence along the extreme height of the said mountain to the place where it is called Unicoy or Unaka Mountain.” The report of tho commissioners and the confirmatory acts of tlie North Carolina and the ’Tennessee Legislatures all use identical language in describing this line (Tom the Tennessee river, to wit: “From the Tennessee river to the main ridge and along the extreme height of tho same to the place where it is called tho Unicoy or Unaka Mountain.” This is the course and location' given the state line by the final decree in the original case. There is nothing in the newly discovered evidence to warrant this court, in holding that, had it boon before the court at the original hearing, a different conclusion would have been reached, but, on the other hand, the newly discovered evidence rather tends to strengthen the correctness of the original decree. It would require a far stretch of the imagination to hold that the newly discovered map, which is silent on this point, except the use of the word “creek,” is sufficient to warrant the court to reverse the holding in the original case, and write upon the face of the map, and into tho commissioners’ report, according to the showing on the Burns’ map, the words: “Thence along the North bank of the Tennessee river to the mouth of Slick Rock creek; thence- westerly up said creek with its meanderings about five miles to Little Fodder Stack lead; thence along the extreme height of Little Fodder Stack to Big Fodder Stack; {lienee along the crest of Big Fodder Stack to its junction with Hangover.” Yet this, in substance, must be done, if the petitioners are granted the relief sought by their bill of review.
As indicated above, there are other grounds upon .which the relief sought by the bill of review should be denied, but I prefer to base my action upon the ground that the newly discovered evidence, if it had all been before the 'court at the original hearing, would not have led the court to a different conclusion than the one reached.
It is pointed out in the brief of counsel for petitioners that Judge Olark in deciding the original case in the Circuit Court said that “it is a very, close case on the facts and the equities of the case are rather with the defendants,” etc. And that Judge Burton, speaking for the Circuit Court of Appeals, said that “the case, on the whole, is one not free from doubts,” etc. And it is argued from this language and the further fact that permission was granted to file the bill of review that the court granting such permission must have entertained the opinion that the bill of review was. of sufficient merit to warrant the Circuit Court in granting the relief sought by it. If this were all, or the substance of all, that was said by these learned judges in the decision of the original case, it might be of great weight in tending to support the contention of the petitioners, but this is not all, or the substance of all, that was said.
Judge Clark used this language in his opinion deciding the case: “I do not underestimate the great force found in the better marked line of the defendant. It must not be forgotten, however, that the commissioners, in surveying and marking the line, followed the mountain range down to'the Tennessee river, and that, according to the calls actually made, they would cross that river and proceed along the mountain crest, where complainants contend the line is. It was the crest of this same mountain range which brought them to the river, and it was the obvious and conspicuous range to have followed by directly crossing the river and keeping up the xirevious course. It is extremely difficult to believe that the commissioners at this point would have dropped down the river for half a mile and then followed Slick Rock creek for a distance of five or six miles without ever making the slightest reference to this water stream.
Granting, as argued, that the creek may at that time have had no name whatever, nevertheless, it would have been so natural and so necessary to avoid misleading for the commissioners to have said that they changed their course, and, instead of going directly across tho river, went down, and then followed a creek or water stream up the valley and then to the ridge .which led' out to the junction, that it is next to impossible to think that such a deviation as this would have been made without a word to give any indication of the fact. Following the calls as actually given, it would he impossible to run the line as claimed by the defendants. “Looking at the case from the legal point of view (and no other seems permissible), I am certain that by the weight of the evidence the case is with the complainants.” This is a positive statement of the law and the evidence in the original case as viewed by Judge Clark, expressed in clear and positive terms, and this view was affirmed on appeal after careful consideration by the •Circuit Court of Appeals composed, as then constituted, of Judges Taft, Lurton, and Day.
But this is not all. When application was made to the Circuit Court of Appeals for leave to file the bill of review, that court declined to act upon it further than to enter an order allowing the petitioners to make application to the Circuit Court that originally trie'd the case for permission to file the bill of review. This application was made before the late Judge Clark, and in passing on it he said: “It does seem upon examination of this case that there is no ground on which the success of the proposed bill might finally be expected.” Yet out of a great abundance of caution he permitted the bill of review to be filed, because, as he said, he was not sure that his .act in refusing the application would be subject to review. So it appears from these utterances of the court trying the original case that it was satisfied that the conclusion reached in that case was correct. Tt further appears .that Judge Clark, after having considered the bill of review, in which was set out the newly discovered evidence, was of opinion that there was no-ground set out therein on which the relief prayed for might finally be expected.
in that view I concur. An order will be entered denying the relief prayed, for, and dismissing the bill of review, with costs.
C. B. Matthews, for appellants.
W. A. Stone and J. F. Shields, for appellees.
Before SEVERENS and KNAPPEN, Circuit Judges, and COCHRAN, District Judge.
For other cases see same topic & § ntlmbbií in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
KNAPPEN, Circuit Judge.
The appeal in this cause is from a decree of the Circuit Court dismissing the bill filed to review and reverse the decree of this court in Belding v. Hebard, the opinion in which case is reported in 103 Fed. 532, 43 C. C. A. 296. The bill in the original cause was filed by Hebard against Belding and others to quiet the title of, and restrain trespasses upon, the tract in question, containing (according to the allegations of the original bill) about 8,000 acres, and, as stated in one of the briefs of counsel, about 6,600 acres; Hebard claiming under grants from the state of Tennessee, Hopkins and his associates claiming under grants from the state of North Carolina.
The decision in the original suit turned upon the location of a portion of the boundary line between the states of Tennessee and North Carolina, as run in 1821 by commissioners appointed by the respective states. This court affirmed the decree of the Circuit Court, which was rendered in accordance with Hebard's contention as to the location of the boundary line, and thus held that the lands in dispute were in Tennessee and Hebard's title thereto good under the Tennessee grant. Before the final decree of this court (which was rendered July 13, 1900), but after the decree of the Circuit Court in the original case, Belding and his associates conveyed to Archer and McGarry, in trust, for the payment of certain indebtedness, a large tract of land of which the lands here in question formed part; and, after the final decree of this court, Archer and McGarry, trustees, conveyed to Hopkins and his associates, appellants here, the lands so conveyed to said Archer and McGarry by Belding and his associates. The contract of sale, in pursuance of which the deed was given, declared that it was dependent upon the condition that "there shall not be less than 38,000 acres of land in the purchase." The deed of conveyance to Hopkins and his associates recited that the conveyance from Belding and his associates to McGarry and Archer was subject "to all deductions, if any, arising by, through or under the 'state line' suit hereinafter mentioned. Grants Nos. 8,100 for 16,800 acres, and No. 2,336 for 14,800 acres, above mentioned, being for the same lands," and contained this further language :
"But there is especially excepted from the covenants of this conveyance, all those lands situated at or near the state line, between the state of North Carolina and Tennessee, which were recovered in a certain action known as the 'state line' suit which was pending in the United States Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee and was brought by one Hebard against David W. Belding and others if future proceedings do not recover the-title thereof."
Immediately after the final decree of this court, Hebard sold the lands in question, as part of a total acreage of 41,000 acres, to Blaisdell and others, who later conveyed the same entire tract to the Smoky Mountain Band & Improvement Company, which purchased with knowledge of the final decree and in .reliance upon it. September 25, 1906, and thus more than six years after the final decree of this court, Hopkins and his associates asked leave to file a bill in the name of the original defendants, Belding and his associates, but on behalf of Hopkins and his associates, to review said decree, upon the ground that the then newly discovered map of the commissioners' location .furnished evidence controlling and decisive of the actual location of the boundary line according to the contention of Belding and his associates, and thus that the lands here in question are in the state of North Carolina, and so belonged to Hopkins and his associates by virtue of the grants from that state. The Smoky Mountain Company was given'notice of this application, and allowed to intervene for the protection of its rights. This court granted the petition to apply to the Circuit Court for leave to file a bill; the per curiam opinion filed in connection with said order containing the following statement:
"Without deciding any question which may be involved in the application for leave to file such a hill, this court, for reasons satisfactory, now consent that the petitioners may apifiy directly to said Circuit Court, which court will grant or refuse permission as it may be advised."
The judge of the Circuit Court said in his opinion that it seemed to him that:
"There is no ground on which the success of the proposed bill of review might finally be expected. The objections which are made to permitting this bill to be filed go to the very merits of the bill, and can, and in my opinion should, more properly be taken up by demurrer to the bill if filed. If, in the exercise of discretion, I refuse to allow the bill of review to be filed, it is not certain that my refusal to do so would be subject to review. On the contrary, if the bill is filed and a demurrer should be sustained to it on the same grounds that are now urged against its filing, the action of the court would be subject to easy review, and so the petitioners for review would suffer no error at the hands of this court that could not be readily corrected. In view of these considerations I have determined to allow the bill of review to be filed, subject, of course, to all legal objections by demurrer, answer, plea or otherwise, as the defendants may be advised, and it is ordered accordingly."
The Smoky Mountain Company, both by answer to the petition for leave to file the bill and by its answer to the bill as filed, raised the objections, among others, that appellants, being assignees of the original defendants, could not properly file such bill, and that the Smoky Mountain Company, being a good-faith purchaser for value, should be protected in its purchase as against the leave asked; and in answer to the petition for leave to file invoked the.rule, among others, that a bill of review may be refused although the evidence, if admitted, would change the decree, when the court, looking to all- the circumstances, shall deem it productive of mischief to innocent parties or for any other cause unadvisable.
The Circuit Court, upon hearing on pleadings and proofs, dismissed the bill'of review, saying in its opinion that relief should be denied upon more than one of the grounds relied upon by defendants, but basing its decision specifically upon the fact that the newly discovered evidence was not such as to show that the original decree was wrong. 13 elding andl his associates did not appeal from this decree of dismissal, the appeal being taken by Hopkins and his associates "prosecuting a bill of review herein in the name of the original defendants."
In the opinion of a majority of the members of this court, the decree of the Circuit Court, dismissing the bill of review, should be affirmed. This bill of review is not filed for error apparent upon the face of the decree, but solely for newly discovered evidence. The rule is well settled that while a bill of review, on account of error upon the face of the decree, may be filed as matter of right, the.granting of a bill of review on account of newly discovered evidence is not of right but of sound discretion in the court. In Dexter v. Arnold, 5 Mason, 303, 315, Fed. Cas. No. 3,856, Justice Story, speaking of such a bill, said:
"it. may be refused, therefore, although the facts, if admitted, would change the decree, where the court, looking to all the circumstances, deems it productive of mischief to innocent parties, or for any other cause unad-visable. Bennet v. Lee, 2 Atk. 528, Wilson v. Webb, 2 Cox, 3, and Young v. Keighley, 16 Vez. 348, are strong exemplifications of the principle."
The rule thus laid down by Justice Story is not only adopted by the text-books generally, but has been declared and affirmed by numerous decisions, which, as well as the text-books, have generally stated the rule in the precise language of Justice Story. 2 Daniell's Ch. Pr. 1577; Story's Eq. Pl. § 417; Hughes v. Jones, 2 Md. Ch. 289, 296; Harris, Adm'x, v. Edmondson, 3 Tenn. Ch. 211; P. & M. Bank v. Dundas. 10 Ala. 661, 669; Massie's Heirs v. Graham's Adm'rs, 3 McLean, 41. Fed. Cas. No. 9,263; Craig v. Smith, 100 U. S. 226, 233, 25 L. Ed. 577; Ricker v. Powell, 100 U. S. 104, 107, 25 L. Ed. 827; Thomas v. Harvie's Heirs. 10 Wheat. 146, 150, 6 L. Ed. 287; Stockley v. Stockley, 93 Mich. 307, 313, 53 N. W. 523.
In Ricker v. Powell this language was used;
"A bill of review on the ground of newly discovered matter can only he filed on special leave, which depends on the sound discretion of the court to which the application is made. Thomas v. Harvie's Heirs. 10 Wheat. 146 [6 L. Ed. 287]; Rubber Company v. Goodyear, 9 Wall. 805 [19 L. Ed. 828]; Story. Eq. Pl. 421c; 2 Daniell, Ch. Pr. (4th Ed.) 1577. 'It may be refused, nli hough the facts, if admitted, would change the decree, when the court, looking to all the circumstances, shall deem it productive of mischief to innocent parties, or for any other cause unadvisablo.' Story, Eq. Pl. § 417; Griggs v. Gear, 8 Ill. [3 Gilman] 2."
In Craig v. Smith it was said:
"There is no universal or absolute rule which prohibits the courts from allowing the introduction of newly discovered evidence under a hill of review to prove facts which were in issue on the former hearing. 'But the allowance of it is not a matter of right in the party, but of sound discretion in the court, to be exercised cautiously and sparingly, and only under circumstances which demonstrate it to be indispensable to the merits and justice of the cause.' Such was the language of Mr. Justice Story in Wood v. Mann. 2 Sumn. 334 [Fed. Cas. No. 17,954], and he states the rule none too strongly."
In Stockley v. Stockley it was said:
"An application for leave to file a bill of review is the method employed to obtain a rehearing and to vacate a decree after its enrollment; but the results to be attained, and the facts properly to be considered, are the same as though it were.a motion for a new trial, or a motion for a rehearing and to vacate a decree before its enrollment, and in like manner it addresses itself to the fair discretion of a court. In passing upon it, each ease stands by itself, and is controlled by the circumstances surrounding it, and without reference to any other case. The power of the court in granting or denying it is largely discretionary, and is always to be exercised in view of the peculiar circumstances of each case, so as to effectuate substantial justice, and protect the legal and equitable rights of the parties."
In the opinion of a majority of the court the case is one calling for the application of the principle recognized by the decisions cited. The appellants here are purchasers of the lands after decree and under express exception thereof from the covenants of warranty. Their purchase, so far as concerns the lands here involved, was speculative. On the other hand, the Smoky Mountain Company was a good-faith purchaser for value and in reliance upon the decree.
In Thompson v. Maxwell, 95 U. S. 391, 397, 398 (24 L. Ed. 481), it is said that "none but parties and privies can have a bill of review. It does not lie for assigneesand that the fact that the original defendants were joined as complainants with their assignees does not obviate the difficulty. But we do not decide that an assignee cannot,, under any circumstances, file a bill of review, nor that this case is controlled by Thompson v. Maxwell, nor that the mere fact of a good-faith purchase by a party in reliance upon, but not under, a decree precludes the review and reversal of that decree. What we do mean to decide is that in our opinion, taking into account not only the speculative purchase by appellants, but also the good-faith purchase by the Smoky Mountain Company, a case is not presented which appeals to the equitable discretion of the court to allow the review of a decree upon the ground alone of newly discovered evidence. We rest our decision solely upon this proposition. Bearing in mind the rule that this bill of review for newly discovered evidence is not of right, no matter how persuasive of error in the original decree the new evidence may be, and that it should not be allowed if such allowance would result in mischief to innocent parties, and having in view the stability necessary to be afforded! to decrees, especiad}- of courts of last resort, where disturbance thereof is not essential to the protection of the real equities of the parties before the court, we think the review asked for should be denied. In our opinion, the stability of judgments, and thus the protection of rights acquired in reliance upon them, are such as, under the peculiar circumstances of this case, to make the review asked for inequitable. Nor do we think the situation is changed by the fact of the conveyance by Belding and his associates to the trustees pending the suit, nor by the fact that appellants were negotiating for, and possibly may be said to have had, to some extent, an option for the purchase of the land! previous to the final decree. The appellants were not bound to make the purchase until contract therefore was actually made, which was after the decree sought to be. reviewed was entered; and the purchase then made, as has been said, was speculative as to the land here involved.
It is urged that the Smoky Mountain Company is not a good-faith purchaser, because of an option taken by Peck and his associates previous to the decree of this court. But even if the Smoky Mountain Company or its grantors derived any interest from the Peck option, which does not clearly appear, the actual purchase was not in fact made until after the decree of this court, and is shown to'have been made with knowledge of and reliance upon that decree, and tints the earlier option could not affect the status of the Smoky Mountain Company as a good-faith purchaser.
It is urged that the original defendant lost his land by the decree of the court, and that the court was the means by which this result came about. But this court committed no error. It decided rightly upon the case presented to it. It was the misfortune of the defendants that the map was not discovered before the hearing of the original cause. But the reversal of this decree would result, on the one hand, not in benefit to the original defendants, but to purchasers of their rights after the unfavorable decree was made, and, on the other hand, to the detriment of those who bought in reliance upon that decree. Proceedings under bills of review are in the nature of applications for rehearings or new trials. In Pomeroy v. Noud, 145 Mich. 37, 44, 108 N. W. 498, it is said that the rules governing the granting of bills of review are, to some extent, founded upon considerations of public policy as well as those of private rights.
We have not overlooked the fact that the deed from Hebard to Blaisdell and his associates contained no covenants of warranty, except as against those claiming under the grantor, and that the deed to the Smoky Mountain Company was a quitclaim deed. But such facts are not controlling. A person holding under a quitclaim deed may be a bona fide purchaser. Moelle v. Sherwood, 148 U. S. 21, 28, 30, 13 Sup. Ct. 426, 37 L. Ed. 350; United States v. California & Oregon Land Co., 148 U. S. 31, 13 Sup. Ct. 458, 37 L. Ed. 354. In Moelle v. Sherwood, Justice Field, speaking for the court, said:
"The doctrine expressed ill many eases that the grantee in a quitclaim deed cannot be treated as a bona flcle purchaser does not seem to rest upon any sound principle."
And ag'ain:
"The character of a bona fide purchaser must depend upon attending cir-cuinslances or proof us to the transaction, and does not arise, as often, though, we think, inadvertently, said, either from the form of the conveyance or the presence or the absence of any accompanying warranty. Whether the grantee is to be treated as taking a mere speculative chance in property, or a clear title, must depend on the character of the title of the grantor when lie made the conveyance; and the opportunities afforded the grantee of ascertaining this fact and the diligence with which he has prosecuted them will, besides the payment of a reasonable consideration, determine ihe bona fide nature of the transaction on his part."
It is true that the specific proposition upon which we rest our -decision was not in terms presented by answer, but we think that the defense as presented, in connection with the objection to granting leave to file a bill of review, is sufficient to properly present it to this court. In reaching this conclusion, we have not overlooked the fact that leave to file the bill was granted by the Circuit Court. In our opinion, however, the granting of such leave, especially under the conditions we have before set out, was not so far an adjudication of the equities of the cause as to preclude their review. An order allowing the filing of a bill of review is not appealable, while an order denying permission is final and appealable. Maxfield v. Freeman, 39 Mich. 64; Scriven v. Hursh, 39 Mich. 98. Unless, therefore, this defense may be considered upon final hearing, the decision' of the Circuit Court granting the leave to file could never be reviewed. But, this consideration apart, we think the party against whom a bill of review is filed is not foreclosed from a defense of this nature by the mere granting of leave, especially where, as in this case, both this court and the Circuit Court have apparently refrained from adjudicating anything except the leave to file. See Massie's Heirs v. Graham's Adm'rs, 3 McLean, 41, 48, Fed. Cas. No. 9,263.
For the reasons above stated, the decree of the Circuit Court, dismissing. the bill of review, must be affirmed.