Case Name: Torrance E. WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
Court: Texas Courts of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1993-07-22
Citations: 859 S.W.2d 99
Docket Number: No. 01-92-00786-CR
Parties: Torrance E. WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
Judges: Before DUGGAN, MIRABAL and WILSON, JJ.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 859
Pages: 99–107

Head Matter:
Torrance E. WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
No. 01-92-00786-CR.
Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (1st Dist.).
July 22, 1993.
Bruce Erratt, W. Tyler Moore, Jr., P.C., Bryan, for appellant.
Bill R. Turner, Eric D. Smith, Bryan, for appellee.
Before DUGGAN, MIRABAL and WILSON, JJ.

Opinion:
OPINION
WILSON, Justice.
A jury convicted appellant of the offense of possession of less than 28 grams of cocaine. Appellant pled "true" to two enhancement paragraphs, and the trial court assessed punishment at 40-years confinement. In three points of error, appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction and his trial counsel was ineffective. We reverse.
Appellant did not testify. State's witnesses testified that on October 19,1991, at around 4:10 p.m., Bryan Police Officer Leroy Conerway received a call from the police dispatcher describing two persons who were allegedly involved in a narcotics transaction near the intersection of Martin Luther King and San Jacinto streets. Approximately 20 to 30 minutes later, Coner-way and Officer DeAnne Coleman drove to the area in separate cars.
As Conerway and Coleman drove southwest on San Jacinto, they saw appellant, who matched one of the descriptions given to them, walking down Martin Luther King street. Appellant looked at Conerway and began walking at a fast pace. No one else was near appellant when Conerway first saw him. Conerway drove up behind appellant and stopped his car. When appellant looked back, Conerway gestured for appellant to come back. Appellant began walking toward the patrol car, and Coner-way told appellant he was making an investigative stop because he had information appellant was possibly selling narcotics. As Conerway stepped out of his car, appellant began running away from him toward the Lone Star Grocery.
Conerway lost sight of appellant momentarily after appellant ran behind the store. Conerway ran after appellant while Coleman drove around the block in an attempt to cut appellant off. Approximately 20 seconds later, Conerway saw appellant go behind a house and come out next to a tree. Coleman also saw appellant "pacing around" behind the house and walking near a large tree. She saw appellant walk toward a fence at the back end of the house and then walk toward Conerway.
Appellant came out towards Conerway with his hands up and proceeded to lie on the ground and pull objects out of his pockets. Conerway then placed appellant under arrest and instructed another officer to search behind the house. No contraband was confiscated from appellant's person. Conerway testified that appellant "didn't appear to have all of his mental faculties together" at the time he was arrested, and that he "had been drinking a little bit."
Lieutenant Freddie Komar found a matchbox laying on top of some grass and leaves next to a tree appellant had been near. Komar testified there was no debris on the matchbox and that it looked like it had not been there very long. Inside the matchbox, Komar found what appeared to be two small rocks of crack cocaine and two shavings. One of the rocks fell out of the matchbox and was lost. The other rock and the shavings tested positive for cocaine.
In his first point of error, appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to support a finding that he possessed cocaine.
In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, the evidence is to be viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Chambers v. State, 711 S.W.2d 240, 245 (Tex.Crim.App.1986); Winter v. State, 725 S.W.2d 728, 730 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no pet.).
To prove unlawful possession of a controlled substance, the State must prove: (1)that appellant exercised care, custody, control, and management over the substance; and (2) that appellant knew the substance was contraband. Winter, 725 S.W.2d at 730. Possession describes the accused's relationship to the property. Id. Possession may be proved by circumstantial evidence. Id. However, in the absence of direct evidence, the circumstances must affirmatively link the defendant to the offense such that a reasonable inference arises that the accused knew of the contraband's existence and exercised control over it. Id. at 731.
This Court set forth its own non-comprehensive list of potential affirmative links in possession cases in Chavez v. State, 769 S.W.2d 284, 288-89 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, pet. ref'd) (citations omitted):
Circumstances the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals instructs us to consider . include:
(1) Defendant's presence when the search warrant executed;
(2) Contraband in plain view;
(3) Defendant's proximity to and the accessibility of the narcotic;
(4) Defendant under the influence of narcotics when arrested;
(5) Defendant's possession of other contraband when arrested;
(6) Defendant's incriminating statements when arrested;
(7) Defendant's attempted flight;
(8) Defendant's furtive gestures;
(9) Presence of odor of the contraband;
(10) Presence of other contraband or drug paraphernalia, not included in the charge;
(11) Defendant's ownership or right to possession of the place where the controlled substance was found;
(12) Place drugs found was enclosed.
In the present case, testimony was presented that appellant matched the description given to the officers by the dispatcher about a suspect possibly engaged in a narcotics transaction. Appellant attempted to flee when Conerway told him he was investigating a narcotics transaction, appeared not to have full control of his mental faculties, and appeared to have been drinking. The cocaine was found in the same general area the officers observed appellant moving around. No other persons or packages were found in this area.
However, appellant was not found to be in personal possession or exercising control over the cocaine, and there was no evidence of furtive gestures toward the cocaine. Conerway testified this was a heavy drug traffic area and that other drug suspects had run this same way before. Appellant did not make any incriminating statements, and no contraband or drug paraphernalia was found on his person. Further, no testimony was presented describing what, if anything, appellant did when he was near the tree. There was no testimony, for example, that appellant hid behind the tree, dropped anything next to the tree, or made any suspicious or unusual movements while near the tree.
Possession means more than being where the action is; it involves dominion and control over the thing allegedly possessed. Humason v. State, 699 S.W.2d 922, 923 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1985), aff'd, 728 S.W.2d 363 (Tex.Crim.App.1987). Affirmative links may be proved by circumstantial evidence, but proof amounting only to strong suspicion or even probability will not suffice. Humason, 699 S.W.2d at 923. We find the evidence is insufficient to sustain a finding that appellant possessed cocaine beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. (evidence was not sufficient to show affirmative link where 3/100ths of a gram of cocaine was found in unzipped gym bag in vehicle defendant had been driving but it was not shown he owned the vehicle or the bag or was under the influence of any drugs or made any furtive gestures or incriminating statements).
We sustain appellant's first point of error, reverse the conviction on the basis of insufficient evidence, and remand the cause to the trial court for entry of a judgment of acquittal. Therefore, it is unnecessary to consider appellant's remaining points of error.
MIRABAL, J., dissents.
. The dispatcher described one suspect as a black male wearing a white T-shirt with purple sleeves.
. We do not hold that the State must prove that someone actually saw the cocaine in appellant's possession. Rather, we merely find the circumstantial evidence in this case did not sufficiently link appellant to the cocaine, particularly given that the cocaine was found in a place not owned by appellant nor under his exclusive control.