Case Name: PEOPLE v. DeKORTE
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1999-01-29
Citations: 233 Mich. App. 564
Docket Number: Docket No. 203238
Parties: PEOPLE v DeKORTE
Judges: Before: Corrigan, C.J., and Doctoroff and Fitzgerald, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 233
Pages: 564–577

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v DeKORTE
Docket No. 203238.
Submitted October 6, 1998, at Grand Rapids.
Decided January 29, 1999, at 9:15 A.M.
Leave to appeal denied, 460 Mich __.
Garth C. DeKorte, a case manager at a foster care facility for mentally ill adults, was convicted by a jury in the Calhoun Circuit Court, James C. Kingsley, X, of abuse of a vulnerable adult, second degree. The defendant had refused to authorize an emergency room visit for a facility resident, thus delaying treatment for a fractured pelvis and left elbow and a dislocated hip and left elbow for sixteen hours. The defendant appealed, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction.
The Court of Appeals held-.
To support a conviction of second-degree vulnerable adult abuse, MCL 750.145n(2); MSA 28.342A(n)(2), the prosecution must prove that the defendant was a caregiver or other person with authority over the vulnerable adult, that the defendant engaged in a reckless act or reckless failure to act, and that the reckless act or reckless failure to act caused serious physical harm or serious mental harm to the vulnerable adult. Here, it was not disputed that the defendant was a caregiver and that the alleged victim was a vulnerable adult. With respect to reckless act or reckless failure to act— defined by MCL 750.145m(p); MSA 28.342A(m)(p) as conduct that demonstrates a deliberate disregard for the likelihood that the natural tendency of the act or failure to act is to cause physical harm, serious physical harm, or serious mental harm — a rational trier of fact could have found that the defendant had demonstrated a deliberate disregard for the likelihood that the alleged victim would suffer additional physical harm. Concerning the final element of serious physical harm — defined by MCL 750.145m (r); MSA 28.342A (m) (r) as physical injury that threatens the life of a vulnerable adult, that causes substantial bodily disfigurement, or that seriously impairs the functioning or well-being of the vulnerable adult— neither the threat of death nor pain suffered by the alleged victim as a result of the defendant’s actions constituted physical injury to the alleged victim. Accordingly, the evidence was insufficient for conviction.
Reversed.
Corrigan, C.J., dissenting, stated that “physical injury,” as used in the second-degree vulnerable adult abuse statute encompasses bodily pain that seriously impairs the functioning or well-being of the vulnerable adult, and that the defendant caused the victim such pain as to be guilty of second-degree vulnerable adult abuse.
1. Criminal Law — Second-Degree Vulnerable Adult Abuse — Elements.
Abuse of a vulnerable adult, second degree, is established upon proof that the defendant was a caregiver or other person with authority over the vulnerable adult, that the defendant engaged in a reckless act or reckless failure to act, and that the reckless act or reckless failure to act caused serious physical harm or serious mental harm to the vulnerable adult (MCL 750.145n[2j; MSA 28.342A[n][2j).
2. Criminal Law — Second-Degree Vulnerable Adult Abuse — Serious Physical Harm.
Threat of death or pain experienced by a vulnerable adult as a result of a caregiver’s decision not to seek immediate medical treatment for physical injury sustained by the vulnerable adult is not physical injury for the purposes of the statute that proscribes abuse of a vulnerable adult, second degree (MCL 750.145n[2], 750.145m[rj; MSA 28.342A[n][2], 28.342A[m][r]).
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, and David G. Edick, First Assistant Attorney General, for the people.
Willey & Chamberlain LLP (by Charles E. Chamberlain, Jr.), for the defendant.
Before: Corrigan, C.J., and Doctoroff and Fitzgerald, JJ.

Opinion:
Fitzgerald, J.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of abuse of a vulnerable adult, second-degree, MCL 750.145n(2); MSA 28.342A(n)(2), and was sentenced to five years' probation, with the condition that defendant serve one year in jail, consisting of four months' imprisonment followed by sixty days on a tether, with the remaining six months suspended. Defendant appeals as of right. We reverse.
The victim in this case is a 340-pound schizophrenic woman who was a patient at Newport Center, a specialized adult foster care facility for chronically mentally ill adults. The victim was placed at the facility as a result of being found not guilty of an offense by reason of insanity in 1994. On July 12, 1995, at approximately 9:00 P.M., the victim jumped or fell off the roof of the facility and onto the cement parking lot. The victim thereafter complained of pain and paralysis, and a house coordinator at the facility contacted defendant, the victim's primary case manager, to inform him of what had happened. Defendant, who was informed that the victim had indicated that she would get up off the ground if the staff would provide her with a cigarette, instructed the house coordinator to prompt the victim to get up if she was able and to advise him of any changes in the victim's medical condition. After assisting the victim into the facility and evaluating her condition, the house coordinator informed defendant that the victim continued to complain of pain. Defendant, noting that an emergency room visit would cost approximately $1,500 and that a physician's visit would cost approximately $50, advised the house coordinator to have the residential administrator arrange a physician's appointment for the victim for the following day.
Approximately sixteen hours following the fall, the victim was transported to a hospital by ambulance. She was diagnosed with a fractured pelvis and left elbow and a dislocated hip and left elbow.
Defendant argues that the prosecution presented insufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction of second-degree vulnerable adult abuse. This Court reviews sufficiency of the evidence claims by considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determining whether a rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the charged crime were proved beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Head, 211 Mich App 205, 210; 535 NW2d 563 (1995).
MCL 750.145n(2); MSA 28.342A(n)(2), the second-degree vulnerable adult abuse statute, provides:
A caregiver or other person with authority over the vulnerable adult is guilty of vulnerable adult abuse in the second degree if the reckless act or reckless failure to act of the caregiver or other person with authority over the vulnerable adult causes serious physical harm or serious mental harm to a vulnerable adult, [emphasis added.]
To establish the crime of second-degree vulnerable adult abuse, the prosecutor must prove (1) that the defendant is a caregiver or other person with authority over the vulnerable adult, (2) that the victim is a vulnerable adult, (3) that the defendant engaged in a reckless act or reckless failure to act, and (4) that the reckless act or reckless failure to act caused serious physical harm or serious mental harm to a vulnerable adult.
The parties do not dispute that defendant, as the victim's primary case manager, was a caregiver and that the victim was a vulnerable adult as defined under the vulnerable adult abuse statute. See MCL 750.145m(c) and (u); MSA 28.342A(m)(c) and (u). Thus, the first and second elements of the offense are not at issue.
The third element of the offense requires proof that the defendant engaged in a reckless act or reckless failure to act. The statute defines a "reckless act or reckless failure to act" as "conduct that demonstrates a deliberate disregard for the likelihood that the natural tendency of the act or failure to act is to cause physical harm, serious physical harm, or serious mental harm." MCL 750.145m(p); MSA 28.342A(m)(p). The statute defines serious physical harm as "physical injury that threatens the life of a vulnerable adult, that causes substantial bodily disfigurement, or that seriously impairs the functioning or well-being of the vulnerable adult." MCL 750.145m(r); MSA 28.342A(m)(r).
Here, there is no dispute that defendant was advised that the victim had fallen or jumped off the roof to the concrete below and that the victim was complaining of pain and paralysis following the fall. Douglas Segan, an emergency medicine physician, opined that when one is dealing with an injured person who is complaining of pain following a fall, the injured must be immobilized and medical help must be obtained. Moreover, Segan opined that a fall from a height of twelve to sixteen feet could possibly lead to a multitude of fractures and physical injuries. Segan further opined that a person complaining of pain and being semiconscious following such a fall could possibly have suffered life-threatening injuries.
Given this evidence, defendant's failure to summon immediate medical attention demonstrated a deliberate disregard for the likelihood that the victim would suffer additional serious physical harm. Therefore, we conclude that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to establish the "reckless act or reckless failure to act" element of second-degree vulnerable adult abuse.
The fourth element of the offense requires proof that defendant's reckless act or reckless failure to act caused serious physical harm. As previously noted, "serious physical harm" is defined as "physical injury that threatens the life of a vulnerable adult, that causes substantial bodily disfigurement, or that seriously impairs the functioning or well-being of the vulnerable adult." The prosecution's theory was that the "threat of death" and "pain" constitute physical injuries.
Because the Legislature did not define the phrase "physical injury," this Court must give those words their common, ordinary meanings. People v Fields, 448 Mich 58, 67; 528 NW2d 176 (1995). In ascertaining the meaning of words, this Court may refer to dictionaries for guidance. People v Wilson, 230 Mich App 590, 592; 585 NW2d 24 (1998). Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1997), pp 672 & 983, defines the term "physical" as "of or pertaining to the body" and the term "injury" as "harm or damage done or sustained." Clearly, the mere threat of death does not constitute a physical injury.
"Pain" is defined as "physical suffering typically from an injury or illness." Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1997), p 972. No published Michigan decision has addressed, in the context of the vulnerable adult abuse statute, whether evidence of pain is sufficient to satisfy the "physical injury" element. However, in the context of a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, which requires a plaintiff to establish that the emotional distress manifested itself in definite and objective physical injury, it has been held that a general claim of pain and suffering will not suffice. Parnell v Booth Newspapers, Inc, 572 F Supp 909, 917 (WD Mich, 1983). See also Stites v Sundstrand Heat Transfer, Inc, 660 F Supp 1516, 1526-1527 (WD Mich, 1987). In light oí Parnell, and given that pain is merely a "symptom" of an injury or illness, we conclude that pain alone does not constitute a "physical injury."
Although hypothetical testimony was presented regarding medical complications that could result from a fall similar to the one in the present case, absolutely no evidence was presented that the victim suffered a physical injury as the result of the delay in medical treatment. Orthopedic surgeon John Morgan, who saw the victim on July 13, 1995, was unable to say with any reasonable degree of medical certainty that the victim sustained any physical injury apart from the initial fall. Dr. Segan, who had never examined the victim, testified that he could not say with certainty that the movement of the victim had aggravated her physical injury. The prosecution did not present any evidence to contradict this medical testimony. In the absence of any evidence that defendant's failure to summon immediate medical attention caused a physical injury to the victim, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support defendant's conviction.
In light of our disposition of this issue, we need not address defendant's claim of instructional error.
Reversed.
Doctoroff, J., concurred.
Defendant was released on bond pending appeal.
The victim fell from a height of approximately twelve to fourteen feet.
The prosecution does not contend on appeal that defendant's allegedly reckless act or reckless failure to act caused serious mental harm.
Indeed, a medical expert testified that pain is generally a symptom of a physical injury rather than a physical injury itself.