Case Name: MEIXIA FENG, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2017-11-20
Citations: 702 F. App'x 657
Docket Number: No. 14-71896
Parties: MEIXIA FENG, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.
Judges: Before: CANBY, TROTT, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 702
Pages: 657–658

Head Matter:
MEIXIA FENG, Petitioner, v. Jefferson B. SESSIONS III, Attorney General, Respondent.
No. 14-71896
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Submitted November 15, 2017
Filed November 20, 2017
Armin Alexander Skalmowski, Alhambra, CA, for Petitioner
OIL, Leslie McKay, Esquire, Assistant Director, DOJ—U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, Chief Counsel ICE, Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of Homeland Security, San -Francisco, CA, for Respondent
Before: CANBY, TROTT, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument, See Fed, R, App. P. 34(a)(2).

Opinion:
MEMORANDUM
Meixia Feng, a native and citizen of China, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' ("BIA") order dismissing her appeal from an immigration judge's ("IJ") order denying her motion to reopen removal proceedings conducted in absentia. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen. Avagyan v. Holder, 646 F.3d 672, 674 (9th Cir. 2011). We deny the petition for review.
The agency did not abuse its discretion in denying Feng's motion to reopen as untimely, where it was filed almost 13 years after her final order of removal,, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4), and Feng failed to establish the due diligence required for equitable tolling of the filing deadline, see Avagyan, 646 F.3d at 679 (equitable tolling is available to an alien who is prevented from timely filing a motion to reopen due to deception, fraud, or error, as long as petitioner exercises,, due diligence in discovering such circumstances). Despite the BIA's determination that assertions, in Feng's declaration were inherently unbelievable, both the IJ and the BIA treated as true her statements regarding diligence. Thus, we do not reach Feng's contention that the determination was improper.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.