Case Name: Eliphas Linder v. The State
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1922-11-09
Citations: 94 Tex. Crim. 316
Docket Number: No. 6558
Parties: Eliphas Linder v. The State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Criminal Reports
Volume: 94
Pages: 316–326

Head Matter:
Eliphas Linder v. The State.
No. 6558.
Decided November 9, 1922.
Rehearing granted May 2, 1923.
1. —Assault to Rape — Requested Charges — Practice on Appeal.
Where the requested charges bore indorsement authenticated by the trial judge that they were presented before the general charge was read and were refused, and it appeared nowhere that exception was reserved to their refusal, the same cannot be considered on appeal. Following Barreos v. State, 83 Texas Crim. Rep., 548, and other cases.
2. —Same—Jury and Júry Law — Householder—Freeholder—Waiver.
Where defendant waived the challenge that the juror was neither a householder in the county nor a freeholder in the State, but the record failed to show that the State also waived it, the correctness of the court's action in discharging the juror must be presumed.
3. —Same—Evidence—Complaint of Prosecutrix — Res Gestae.
Where the prosecutrix was permitted to' testify that she told a third party that defendant had tried to rape her, etc., and the record showed that these statements of the prosecutrix precluded any idea of deliberateness but were the spontaneous speaking of the facts, the same was res gestae, and there is no reversible error. Following Sentell v. State, 34 Texas Crim. Rep., 260, and other cases.
4. —Same—Evidence—Cross-Examination—Chastity—Impeaching Witness.
It was no answer to the State’s objection that it had permitted the predicate to be laid without protest. It was an attempt to impeach upon an immaterial issue, and the State was not estopped from objecting, when the traversing testimony was offered. Neither was the evidence admissible upon the issue of character of the prosecutrix for chastity.
5. —Same—Impeaching Testimony — Chastity of Prosecutrix.
Where, upon trial of assault to rape, prosecutrix was permitted to state that she had kissed two-certain young men to whom she had been engaged, but denied ever having kissed a certain other party or having permitted him to kiss her, to all of which the State interposed no objection but did object to any testimony showing that said third party had in fact kissed the prosecutrix which the court sustained, there is no reversible error, and such testimony was not admissible in a case of rape or assault to rape. Following Ross v. State, 60 Texas Crim. Rep., 547, and other cases.
6. —Same—Character of Prosecutrix — Specific Acts of Misconduct.
As applied to cases of rape or assault to rape by force, specific acts of misconduct or immorality of the prosecutrix cannot be shown except it may have been with accused. Following Wood v. State, 80 Texas Crim. Rep., 398, and other cases.
7. —Same—Argument of Counsel — Practice on Appeal.
In view of the prompt action of the trial court, and in the absence of a requested charge to disregard the same, the argument of State’s counsel was not of that hurtful character which would call for a reversal.
8. —Same—Argument of Counsel — Invited Error.
Where the argument of State’s counsel was invited by the preceding argument of defendant’s counsel, there is no reversible error. Following Watson v. State, 237 S. W. Rep., 298.
9. —Same—Rehearing—Practice in Trial Court — Requested Charge.
Where the appellant insisted in his motion for a rehearing, that under the present practice it is not necessary that the record show that there was an exception to the refusal of a requested charge in order to require this court to review the action of the trial court in refusing the request. Held, in so contending the distinction between the practice in civil cases and that in criminal cases has not been given due consideration by the appellant, and an exception to such refusal to a requested charge is necessary in criminal cases. Following Phillips v. State; 19 Texas Crim. App., 165; .Distinguishing Goldstein v. State, 166 S. W. Rep., 161.
10. —Same—Civil Cases — Assignments of Error — Bills of Exception.
In civil cases, it is deemed sufficient that the special charge becomes a part of the record and be subject to review without bills of exception, as an assignment of error points out the reason upon which the appellant contends that there was error in refusing his requested charge, but is not sufficient in criminal cases, where neither assignment of error nor motion for a new trial is required, and it is therefore incumbent upon appellant, unless there be some indorsement upon the refused charge, to reserve the objection by bill of exceptions.
Appeal from the District Court of Anderson. Tried below before the Hon. W. R. Bishop.
Appeal from a conviction of assault with intent to rape; penalty, five years imprisonment in the penitentiary.
The opinion states the case.
Campbell, Greenwood & Barton, for appellant.
On question of charge of court, cited Fry v. State, 215 S. W. Rep., 563.
On question of complaint of prosecutrix, Maples v. State, 119 S. W. Rep., 105; Rice v. State, 112 id., 300.
On question of character of prosecutrix, Norman v. State, 230. S. W. Rep., 993, and cases cited in the opinion.
On question of argument of counsel, Roach v. State, 232 S. W. Rep., 505; Stanchel v. State, 231 id., 132; Brookreson v. State, 225 id., 376; Hollingsworth v. State, 199 id., 628; King v. State, 101 id., 238.
R. G. Storey, Assistant Attorney General, Seagler & Pickett for the State.
On question of argument of counsel, Lubbock v. State, 147 S. W. Rep., 258; Hilcher v. State, 131 id., 593; Ardry v. State, 233 id., 838.

Opinion:
HAWKINS, Judge.
Appellant was convicted of assault with intent to rape upon one Nona Whitlow and his punishment assessed at five years confinement in the penitentiary.
Appellant's family and that of prosecutrix lived in the same neighborhood. On the afternoon preceding the night upon which the offense was alleged to have been committed appellant appeared at the residence of prosecutrix's father and informed her there ivas going to be a "candy pulling" at his home on the night in question and made an engagement to take her. On the return from the party prosecutrix says appellant stopped the car in which .they were riding and made an assault upon her. She claims that he put his arms around her and asked if she loved him, and upon her reply in the negative he asked if she loved someone else, to which she replied in the affirmative, whereupon appellant told her she "would love him when he got through with her;" that while holding her around the neck with one arm he removed the glove from one of his hands with his teeth, unbuttoned his pants, got in front of her in the ear and placed his hand under her clothing on her knee; that she was struggling with him during all this time and finally got her feet out over the door of the car and slid out on the running board; that he was holding her around the arms and that as she wrenched loose from him he caught her by the hair and pulled some of it out as she broke away, whereupon appellant said: 11 Come back here, you bitch; ' ' that she immediately ran off in the woods and made her way to the home of Mr. Carrol where she reported the matter. The evidence of appellant did not place himself in a very favorable light before the jury. He admitted that some two years before this occasion he had been in a buggy with Miss Whitlow when for some reason she got out of the buggy and it was with difficulty he persuaded her to get back in so he could take her home. The details of that transaction were not gone into and Miss Whitlow was not asked about it at all. Appellant admitted when he sought the engagement with prosecutrix to take her to the party she asked him "if she went with him would he treat her right.'' He admits that his purpose in making the engagement was to have carnal intercourse with her but denies that he intended to accomplish it by force, but intended to secure her consent thereto. He admits that she repulsed his advances and that he tried to hold, her, explaining his conduct upon the theory that he was trying to retain her in the car until she got over her fright when he intended to take her home. He also admits that as she got out of the car he grabbed at her and caught her by the hair. This is a sufficient statement of the facts further than as may be disclosed in the discussion of certain bills of exception.
Error is assigned because the court refused to give certain special charges. The charges bear endorsement authenticated by the trial judge that they were presented before the general charge was read, and were refused. Nowhere on the charges themselves does it appear that exception was reserved to their refusal. No separate bills of exception reserving the point appears in the record. In Barrios v. State, 83 Texas Crim. Rep., 548, 204 S. W. Rep., 326 it was held that refusal charges could not become the subject of review in the absence of bills of exception. To the same effect is Fry v. State, 86 Texas Crim. Rep., 73, 215 S. W. Rep., 560; Nichols v. State, 91 Texas Crim. Rep., 277, 238 S. W. Rep., 232. If the special charges bore notation over the trial judge's signature that they were presented to him before the main charge was read, were refused and to which refusal exception was reserved, we think it would be a sufficient bill to meet the requirements of the law, and would obviate the necessity of a more formal bill of exception; but in the absence of such showing on the charge itself a formal bill would be necessary; in the absence of both the matter is not before us for review.
Upon the voir dire examination of the jurors it was ascertained that one of them was neither a householder or freeholder. The bill of exception states that counsel for appellant stated to the court that he was a qualified juror but that he was excused, and exception reserved. The second ground of challenge for cause under Article 692 C. C. P. is, that a juror is neither a householder in the county nor a freeholder in the State. This challenge may be exercised either by the State or defendant. We do not stop to inquire into the matter further than to say while the bill shows that appellant waived the challenge, it fails to show that the State also waived it. The correctness of the court's action in discharging the juror must be presumed. So far as the bill shows the State may have been insisting on the challenge.
Complaint is made because over appellant's objection prosecutrix was permitted to testify that she told Mrs. Carrol that "Eliphas Linder had tried to rape her, ' ' and to Mrs. Carrol testifying that she said, "that trifling Linder boy has tried to rape me." It is insisted that the statement was not res gestae, and went further than the law permits in showing complaint made by prosecutrix, and where and to whom made.. Miss Whitlow testifies that after she broke loose from appellant and escaped from the car she ran through the woods to Mrs. Carrol's; while she dose not know exactly how far she traveled in the roundabout way she went, she says it was only about ten minutes from the time she left the car until she reached the Carrol .home, where the statement was immediately made. Mrs. Carrol says when prosecutrix reached her house and called her daughter, she bore every appearance of having been running, was very nervous, excited, crying and could scarcely talk. That she asked, "What in the world is the matter, Nona?" to which prosecutrix replied in the language complained of. We are unable to draw a distinction between the instant case and those of Sentell v. State, 34 Texas Crim. Rep., 260, 30 S. W. Rep., 226; Castillo v. State, 31 Texas Crim. Rep., 145, 19 S. W. Rep., 892; Fuller v. State, 69 Texas Crim. Rep., 534, 154 S. W. Rep., 1021; Stockton v. State, 80 Texas Crim. Rep., 521, 192 S. W. Rep., 236; Rogers v. State, 65 Texas Crim. Rep., 105, 143 S. W. Rep., 631; Sharp v. State, 71 Texas Crim. Rep., 633, 160 S. W. 369. The Carrols were the first people prosecutrix had seen after the assault, and the circumstances under which the statements were made preclude any idea of deliberateness; the statements appear to have Leen the spontaneous speaking of the facts. As said in some of the cases supra, even a more detailed statement would not have been objectionable.
Prosecutrix was asked upon cross-examination if she had ever kissed or permitted anyone to kiss her. She admitted having kissed two young men to whom she had been engaged.' She denied ever having kissed Clan Weems or having permitted him to kiss her. No objection was interposed by the State to these inquiries of prosecutrix. Appellant proposed to prove by Weems that he had kissed-her and she him. Objection by'the State was sustained. The bill of exception shows that appellant was offering Weems for the purpose of impeachment, but we understand he contends in his brief that it was also admissible on the issue of prosecutrix's character, for chastity. The credibility of a witness cannot be thus attacked. For the latest-expressions from this court upon the subject, together with citation of' authorities, see Barnes v. State, 90 Texas Crim. Rep., 51, 232 S. W. Rep., 312, Hays v. State, 90 Texas Crim. Rep., 355, 234 S. W. Rep., 898. It was no answer to the State's objection that it had permitted the predicate to be laid without protest. It was an attempt to impeach upon an immaterial issue, and the State was not estopped from objecting when the traversing testimony was offered. Neither was the evidence admissible upon the issue of the character of prosecutrix, for chastity. It must be borne in mind that the charge against accused was assault to rape by force. All the cases cited by appellant (save Norman v. State, 89 Texas Crim. Rep., 330, 230 S. W. Rep., 991) are- in prosecutions for seduction. In that offense the previous chastity of the female is directly in issue. In Norman's ease he was charged with statutory rape upon a female over fifteen years of age, and the statute (Art. 1063 P. 0.) now makes previous unchaste character of the female a complete defense to such charge, thereby placing eases of that character in a class analogous to seduction. This is not true in rape, or assault to rape by force. As applied to cases of this character, specific acts of misconduct or immorality of the prosecutrix cannot be shown except it may have been with accused. Ross v. State, 60 Texas Crim. Rep., 547, 132 S. W. Rep., 793; Lawson v. State, 17 Texas Crim. App., 302; Wood v. State, 80 Texas Crim. Rep., 398, 189 S. W. Rep., 474; Jennings v. State, 80 Texas Crim. Rep., 450; 190 S. W. Rep., 732. In the instant case the issue' of consent is not raised. It is excluded by the evidence of accused himself. Steinke v. State, 33 Texas Crim. Rep., 65, 24 S. W. Rep., 909.
It is shown by bill of exception number four that while counsel representing the State was making his closing argument to the jury he used the following language:
"that the defendant' counsel had brought out highly improper and insulting evidence from the' prosecutrix, and had acted unfairly, and had been guilty of conduct, the like of which he had never seen in the courtroom before, in propounding to the prosecutrix the question and compelling her to tell, 'how many times she had been kissed, and by whom, ' and that said conduct was infamous, and that counsel for the State had silently stood by and permitted the questions to be asked, because they know, if they objected, that the jury would not understand the objection, and thus, they had drawn from this witness improper and insulting evidence, in violation of law."
When the language above set out was objected to the court says in his qualification to the bill that he not only announced that this argument was improper but also in the presence of the jury stated to counsel for the State that he should not engage in that kind of argument ; that no request was made to instruct the jury to disregard the same. In view of the prompt action of the court we do not believe the argument was of that hurtful character which' would call for a reversal of the case, and especially so in the absence of a requested charge that the jury should not consider it. Another bill of exception appears in the record to the argument of the same attorney, who said. ' ' that he had no apology to offer for accepting a fee to prosecute this ease for the good people of Tennessee Colony. ' '
In approving the bill the trial judge says that one attorney for appellant in his argument had stated that "the good people of Tennessee Colony would have taken steps in this matter if there had been anything serious in the charge against defendant." As we understand the qualification to the bill the attorney representing appellant had undertaken indirectly to impress the jury with the idea that if the people hi the community where the offense is alleged to have occurred had believed there was anything serious in the charge against accused they would have taken some action about it. This was improper argument of the attorney representing appellant. The reference by him to the action of the "good people of Tennessee Colony" appears to have provoked the language complained of. (Watson v. State, 90 Texas Crim. Rep. 576, 237 S. W. Rep., 298, and cases cited therein.)
Having considered all questions discussed in appellant's brief and finding no error in the record calling for a reversal, an affirmance is ordered.
Affirmed.