Case Name: Union Pacific Railway Company v. William H. Young
Court: Kansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Kansas
Decision Date: 1878-01
Citations: 19 Kan. 488
Docket Number: 
Parties: Union Pacific Railway Company v. William H. Young.
Judges: 
Reporter: Kansas Reports
Volume: 19
Pages: 488–500

Head Matter:
Union Pacific Railway Company v. William H. Young.
1. Negligence oe Bailway Corporation ; Personal Injuries of Servant. In an action to recover damages for personal injuries by a brakeman in the employ of a railway company while in the discharge of his duties, where the testimony introduced on the trial under the pleadings tends to prove, that the plaintiff was injured through the negligence of the engineer of the company in charge of the locomotive of the train; that said engineer was an incompetent and unfit person to be a locomotive engineer; that the company was guilty of negligence in employing said engineer, and in retaining him in its employ after his unfitness had become known, or when by the exercise of ordinary care it would have been known; and thereon the jury find a verdict for the plaintiff against the railway company, and the trial court approves the same, and sufficient evidence is offered to sustain the verdict, held, that this court will not disturb the judgment on the claim of the railway company that the preponderance of the evidence proves the injury to the plaintiff was due solely to his own fault, or misfortune, growing out of his own errors of judgment.
2. Damages ; Excessive; When Verdict will not he set Aside. In an action which has been pending in the courts for nearly nine years before the verdict, where the plaintiff seeks to recover for personal injuries result ing in the loss of a right hand at the wrist, and such plaintiff at the time of the injury was only twenty-five years of age, and engaged in an employment which has a regular system of promotions, and two juries have returned substantially the same amount of damages, and the verdict has been approved by the trial court, held, that a verdict of ten thousand dollars, under all the circumstances of the case, is not so flagrant as to compel a reviewing court to disturb the same solely on the ground of its being excessive.
Error from Leavenworth District Court.
At the March Term 1876 of the district court, Young recovered judgment against the Railroad Company for $10,000, for the loss of his right hand, which was injured and crushed while he was trying to couple cars on defendant’s railroad, at Lawrence, in September 1867. Young was a brakeman, in the employ of defendant company, and he alleges that the accident happened through the negligence of one Frank Crane, an engineer, who was wholly incompetent and unfit, and that the Railroad Company had knowledge of such incompetency and unfitness. The Railroad Company brings the case here on error.
J. P. Usher, and C. E. Bretherton,
for plaintiff in error. An elaborate printed brief was filed by each counsel, and the case was also argued orally by Mr. Usher. The Railroad Company contended, that the main questions of law involved in the case are, that the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to establish, 1st, that plaintiff was injured through the negligence of Crane, the engineer; 2d, that the plaintiff did not by his negligence contribute to his own injury; 3d, that Crane was an incompetent and unfit person to be a locomotive engineer; and 4th, that tjie company was guilty of culpable negligence either in employing him or retaining him in its employ. Upon the general question of negligence, counsel cited 59 N. Y. 366; 20 Mich. 128. The definition of negligence given by this court in the Rollins case, 5 Kas. 169, literally followed by trial courts as it was in this, has resulted in very great wrong. An instruction from the court, “but when the plaintiff’s negligence is only slight, and that of the defendant is gross, such negligence on the part of the plaintiff will not prevent his recovery,” conveys to the minds of the jury no definite idea of the true rule of law upon the subject, and leaves them to find a capricious verdict. Now this rule of law is not the rule of the federal courts, nor of the courts of any state except Illinois and Georgia, according to Justice Cole, in O’Keefe’s case, 32 Iowa,-467. To those states, of course, must be added Kansas. Many, and among them the writer, regard it a great misfortune that this rule was adopted in this state; but since it has been, the rule of decisions in Illinois, from which it was borrowed, ought in common justice to be adopted here. The courts in that state habitually look into the evidence and determine from it whether the negligence of the plaintiff was such when compared with that of the defendant as to show that the injured party was not negligent and blamable, and if so, they hold he cannot recover. (65 111. 178; 52 111.330; 75 111. 106.) The characterization of negligence by the term “gross,” adds nothing; and the jury in this case no better understood what rule of law was' intended to be given than if it had been given as above stated. The fact is, the rule is radically wrong. The courts in Illinois have found constant difficulty in its application. Repeatedly they find it necessary to carefully explore the testimony and weigh the evidence to determine whether the verdict is within their most inconvenient rule of law. (C. L. J., vol. 2, p.84.) Again: The damages assessed by the jury are excessive. When the case was first here, (8 Kas. 658,) this court, upon' full consideration, decided that $9,000 was excessive damages for the loss of a hand. There was no proof magnifying the injury or changing the condition of the case in any respect from what it was before, and yet the verdict now is for $10,000, and must have resulted from prejudice and passion, if not from malice.
Thomas P. Fenlon, and Clough & Wheat,
for defendant in error, as to the liability of the Railroad Company for em ploying Crane without sufficient care, and retaining him in its employ after knowledge, and after being informed of his incompetency and unfitness, cited 10 Kas. 471; 14 Kas. 38; 18 Kas. 59, 62. As to the measure of damages, it was a question for the jury, with which this court has not under the evidence and rules of decision in relation to such matters anything to say. This is the second verdict; and we think it will not be of any use to attempt to convince twelve jurors that ten thousand dollars is too much, especially when that sum is considered in connection with the many years which have elapsed since the injury was inflicted. 17 Kas. 168 to 173.

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Horton, C. J.:
This action has been pending in the courts for nearly ten years, and the injury for which the damages were assessed occurred on the 19th of September 1867. The case was before this court at the July Term 1871, and is reported in 8 Kas. 658. On its return to the court below the parties filed new pleadings. The cause was tried the second time on 6th March 1876, and resulted in a verdict and judgment for the defendant in error for $10,000. The railway company again invokes the aid of this court to reverse the judgment against it.
Young was in the employment of the railway company, and by reason of such employment it became his duty to couple the cars upon the trains on which he was employed; and at the Lawrence station, while attempting to couple the cars by setting an iron pin in the drawhead of one of the cars, his right hand dropped between the bumpers of the two cars he was trying to couple, and was crushed so that amputation at the wrist became necessary. The petition alleged that the injuries resulted wholly and entirely from the negligence, carelessness, and recklessness of the railway company and its engineer then having charge and control of the engine attached to the train; that said engineer, in backing his engine and the cars attached for the purpose of having the same connected to other cars on the track, and where Young was standing to fasten the cars together, so violently, recklessly and negligently ran the engine and cars to, against and upon the cars where Young was, that he received the injury complained of; that the railway company was at said date informed and fully aware that the said engineer had been for a long time theretofore and was then totally incompetent to perform the duties of an engineer; that he was careless, negligent, and reckless; that the engineer was employed without reasonable inquiry either as to his fitness or competency to be or to act as such engineer, or to have control or power as such, and without reasonable diligence having been exercised to ascertain the fitness of said engineer to act in that capacity, and without reasonable grounds to believe he was competent for such service, and that the company continued him in its employment until after the happening of said wrongs and grievances without using reasonable diligence or care to know or ascertain or be informed of the fitness, care, knowledge, or skill of said engineer, or the want thereof on his part. Upon the trial the plaintiff in the court below offered evidence tending to prove that he was injured through the negligence of the engineer; that he did not by his negligence contribute to his own injury; that the engineer was an incompetent and unfit person to be a locomotive engineer, and that the company was guilty of negligence in employing him and retaining him in its employ.
That the evidence fully established the unfitness and incompetency of the engineer for the business intrusted to him, and that the company knew and ought to have known of such unfitness and incompetency, we do not think can be fairly questioned. The critical points in the case of the defendant in error were, in our view, whether the injury received was caused by the negligence of the engineer, and whether Young was guilty of contributory negligence. These questions however were properly submitted to the jury for their determination, upon instructions fully warranted by the previous decisions of this court, and from the verdict must have been decided adversely to the railway company; and as there was evidence introduced to sustain the same, we cannot interfere, although the preponderance might be opposed to the verdict. Notwithstanding the exhaustive and elaborate briefs presented by the counsel of the plaintiff in error to this court, no new questions are raised concerning the allegations of the petition, the objections to the testimony, or the instructions of the court; hence we do not feel justified in incorporating in this opinion the voluminous testimony given on the trial, or in reviewing law-points deemed settled by the adjudications of this court. We refer to the following cases as decisive of the material questions to which our attention has been called by the arguments of counsel upon the testimony and instructions: Rollins v. U. P. Rly. Co., 5 Kas. 167; K. P. Rly. Co. v. Milliken, 8 Kas. 647; Sawyer v. Sauer, 10 Kas. 466; K. P. Rly. Co. v. Pointer, 14 Kas. 37; K. P. Rly. Co. v. Salmon, 14 Kas. 512; K. P. Rly. Co. v. Kunkel, 17 Kas. 145; C. & R. I. Rld. Co. v. Doyle, 18 Kas. 58.
The most serious matter in the case for our consideration is the objection urged against the verdict on the ground that it is excessive. In determining this objection, in addition to the many other elements that enter into the estimate of the real amount of damages sustained by the defendant in error, we are to consider the fact that he was only twenty-four or five years of age at the time of the amputation of his hand, that he was engaged in an employment in which there is a regular system of promotions, that many years 'elapsed between the injury and the verdict, and that two juries have decided substantially in favor of the sum of $10,000. Again, the trial court, whose imperative duty it was to set aside the verdict, or reduce its amount, if the jury erred from prejudice or other cause, has approved the same, and added its sanction to the award. The question was one peculiarly proper for the jury to determine; and although the verdict is large, larger perhaps than any member of this court would, as a juror, have returned, we cannot, in view of all the cir cumstances, say that such damages are so excessive as to strike the mind at first blush as being the result of bias or prejudice. To interfere, we must say that the jury acted under some improper influence or bias in the matter. This we cannot say. If the defendant in error had obtained $6,000 for his injury soon after the same occurred, this sum kept at seven per cent, interest per annum would have now exceeded the verdict. The first verdict was for $9,000. This sum at seven per cent, interest during the time between the verdicts would have exceeded largely the second verdict; hence in fact the second verdict, comparing the time it was rendered, is really much less than the first one- The amount which the defendant in error earned per year at the time of the injury is not alone to be considered in the award to him of such compensation as shall net him in his present maimed condition a like income in the future, because the opportunities of promotion and the occupancy of a more lucrative position are also to be regarded. The yearly interest of the judgment at the rate of seven per cent, (and this is all that money will usually realize, even in our state with its high rates of interest, after deducting taxes,) will amount to $700; and when there is taken into account the advancement of firemen, brakemen and station-keepers on railways from one position to another, till they oftentimes become conductors, superintendents, and managers of railways, with salaries ranging from $1,200 to $10,000 and upwards per annum, it is neither unreasonable nor imaginative to suppose that an attentive, intelligent, and energetic brakeman of twenty-five would in time earn a much larger sum'per annum than $700 in a higher position if the possibilities of the future had not been forever closed to him by the loss of his right hand. The trial judge had some opportunity to determine from the defendant in error while on the witness stand as to his capacity for business, and h'is general intelligence, which is denied to us; and considering all the facts in the case, we do not feel the liberty of saying that the verdict of the jury is so flagrant, or outrageously unjust, as to require of us, as a reviewing court, to set it aside and grant a new trial solely for excessive damages.