Case Name: Aaron THOMAS et al., Plaintiffs and Appellees, v. HANOVER INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant and Appellant
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1975-10-17
Citations: 321 So. 2d 30
Docket Number: No. 5170
Parties: Aaron THOMAS et al., Plaintiffs and Appellees, v. HANOVER INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant and Appellant.
Judges: Before HOOD, CULPEPPER and MILLER, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 321
Pages: 30–37

Head Matter:
Aaron THOMAS et al., Plaintiffs and Appellees, v. HANOVER INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 5170.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.
Oct. 17, 1975.
Dissenting Opinion Oct. 23, 1975.
Rehearing Denied Nov. 13, 1975.
Lewis & Lewis by John M. Shaw, Ope-lousas, for defendant and appellant.
Pucheu & Pucheu by Jacque B. Pucheu, Jr., Eunice, for plaintiffs and appellees.
Before HOOD, CULPEPPER and MILLER, JJ.

Opinion:
CULPEPPER, Judge.
Plaintiffs seek damages for personal injuries sustained when Mrs. Agnes Thomas stepped on a mouse and slipped and fell in laundramat. The defendant is the liability insurer of Convenient Wash & Dry, Inc., lessee and operator of the laundramat. The trial judge found defendant liable. He awarded to Mr. Thomas $1,876 for medical expenses and to Mrs. Thomas $10,000 in general damages plus $592.28 for loss of income. Defendant appealed.
The injuries occurred on March 6, 1973 at about 8:30 p. m. Plaintiff, a school teacher, had gone to the laundramat to dry a bedspread. After placing the spread in the dryer, she seated herself in one of a row of chairs provided for customers' use and began grading school papers. Shortly after she sat down, she felt something on her foot. She looked down and saw a mouse. She screamed and jumped from her seat. It is not clear from the evidence whether she jumped once or twice. The testimony shows she did not intend to jump on the mouse. Nevertheless, her foot came down on the mouse, mashing it on the floor. This caused her foot to slip. She fell and injured her hip and back.
There is little dispute as to the facts. The principal issue is whether, un der the duty-risk method of analysis established by our Supreme Court, defendant's insured is liable to plaintiffs. Under the duty-risk method, there are usually the following inquiries: (1) What, if any, duty was owed by defendant to plaintiff? (2) Was there a breach of the duty? (3) Was the breach of duty a substantial cause in fact of the injury? (4) Was the risk and harm within the scope of the protection afforded by the duty breached? Jones v. Robbins, La., 289 So.2d 104 (S. Ct.1974); Hill v. Lundin, La., 256 So.2d 620 (S.Ct.1972).
THE DUTY
The duty of the operator of the laundramat is well established by our jurisprudence. Shopkeepers are not insurers of the safety of their patrons. They owe them a duty to maintain the premises in a condition reasonably safe for use in a manner consistent with the purposes of the establishment. Stewart v. Gibson Products Company of Natchitoches Parish, 300 So. 2d 870 (3rd Cir. 1974); Sigler v. Mt. Vernon Fire Insurance Company, La.App., 201 So.2d 656 (3rd Cir. 1967). This includes the duty to discover reasonably discoverable conditions on the premises which may foreseeably constitute a hazard to business guests. Jones v. Firemen's Fund Insurance Company, La.App., 298 So.2d 337 (3rd Cir. 1974). But the storekeeper is not liable for injury resulting from a hazard unless it is shown that he had actual knowledge thereof, or that he had constructive knowledge, as by his failure to make reasonable inspections. Levine v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, 149 So.2d 433 (3rd Cir. 1963) ; Fedrowisch v. Fidelity Phenix Insurance Company of the Continental Insurance Companies, 265 So.2d 618 (1st Cir. 1972).
We find no case in which the specific issue was the duty of a shopkeeper to keep the premises free of mice. However, we think that if the circumstances are such that mice would constitute an unreasonable risk of foreseeable harm to customers, the shopkeeper has a duty to take reasonable precautions to keep these rodents from his premises. In a business establishment such as a laundramat, where the customers are principally women, whose fear of mice is well known, a reasonably foreseeable hazard is that if a woman sees a mouse on or near her person, she will jump or run and, in so doing, may suffer injury.
BREACH OF THE DUTY
Under these rules, let us examine the facts of the present case to determine whether the operator of the laundramat breached its duty. Plaintiffs contend that most of the time the laundramat was littered with candy wrappers, food droppings, potato chips, fritos, soft drink containers and other food particles which attracted mice. They argue that the defendant, through its employees, had actual or constructive knowledge of the filthy condition of the premises and knew or should have known this would attract mice, which would constitute a hazard to female patrons.
The evidence shows that during the period of time in question, Mr. Miller, the manager, had employed Mrs. Onezime Courville, who lived next door to the laun-dramat, to clean and watch after it. Mrs. Courville testified that she swept and mopped the floor of the laundramat every morning at about 7:00 a. m. However, during the day and in the late evening the place usually became filthy because customers would not place their trash in the cans which were provided. They dropped their candy wrappers, bits of food, potato chips, fritos and soft drink bottles all over the floor. She also stated that "kids" would congregate in the laundramat and contribute to the litter. On some occasions, she would go back in the evening and empty the trash cans and do some cleaning. On week ends, usually Sunday afternoon, Mr. and Mrs. Miller went to the laundramat and gave it a thorough cleaning.
As to the particular question of the presence of mice on the premises, Mrs. Cour-ville testified that on one occasion prior to the accident she had seen a mouse. She informed Mrs. Miller, and traps were put out, but no mice were caught. After failure to catch any mice, the traps were picked up and placed in a closet.
The only other evidence of mice in the laundramat was the testimony of Patricia Hebert. She testified she was a frequent customer and that on one occasion she saw three small mice in the laundramat. However, she did not report this to Mrs. Cour-ville or to the Millers.
Immediately after the accident, Mr. Miller employed Terry Bertrand, who operates a pest control service, to investigate for evidence of mice. Bertrand found no nests, tracks or other indications of the presence of mice on the premises. He placed poisoned bait in different locations about the laundramat, but he found no evidence that any of the bait had been eaten. Mr. Bertrand testified that food attracts mice and if an abundance of food is present, they are less likely to eat the poisoned bait. He said that mice also enter buildings to make nests or to find shelter from bad weather.
Under the evidence outlined, we conclude that the operator of the laundra-mat, either through Mrs. Courville or Mr. Miller, had knowledge that usually in the evenings the laundramat was littered with food droppings and other trash. On the night of the accident in question here, several witnesses testified that the floor of the laundramat was "filthy" and that the trash cans were overflowing. We also conclude a preponderance of the evidence shows the mouse was in the laundramat because it was attracted there by the food on the floor. We find also that the operators of the laundramat knew or should have known that the food particles would attract mice. Yet, they failed to take reasonable precautions to keep these rodents from the premises. They allowed the premises to remain in a filthy condition most of the time, and they failed to employ a pest control service on a regular basis prior to the accident.
We conclude that under the circumstances of this case the operators of the laundramat had a duty to take reasonable precautions to keep the premises free of mice and that they breached this duty.
CAUSATION
There is no question that the breach of the duty to keep the premises free of mice was a substantial cause in fact of the injuries suffered by Mrs. Thomas. She felt the mouse on her foot, saw it, screamed and attempted to jump away from it. In so doing, she accidentally stepped on the mouse and slipped and fell.
RISK AND HARM WITHIN PROTECTION OF THE DUTY
In Hill v. Lundin & Associates, Inc., supra, the court stated:
"All rules of conduct, irrespective of whether they are the product of a legislature or are a part of the fabric of the court-made law of negligence, exist for purposes. They are designed to protect some persons under some circumstances against some risks. Seldom does a rule protect every victim against every risk that may befall him, merely because it is shown that the violation of the rule played a part in producing the injury. The task of defining the proper reach or thrust of a rule in its policy aspects is one that must be undertaken by the court in each case as it arises."
In the present case, the duty breached was to take reasonable precau tions to keep mice out of the premises. A purpose of this duty was to protect against the risk that a woman might become frightened by a mouse and, in attempting to flee, suffer injury. This is precisely the risk and harm suffered by Mrs. Thomas. Although we have here the unusual fact that Mrs. Thomas stepped on the mouse, and this caused her foot to slip, the result would be the same had she not stepped on the mouse but, instead, had fallen from the chair or had attempted to run and fell over some other object.
QUANTUM
Defendants also contend the award of $10,000 to Mrs. Thomas in general damages for her pain and suffering is excessive. They suggest the award should be reduced to no more than $3,500.
On March 7, 1973, which was the day after the accident, plaintiff was examined by Dr. R. E. Landreneau, Jr. who hospitalized her for a period of ten days. He found bruises and contusions over her hip and low back, with ligamentous injury in the area of the lumbar spine. While in the hospital, she was treated with physical therapy and drugs for pain and muscle relaxation. On her discharge from the hospital, she continued physical therapy for about six weeks and then continued to see Dr. Landreneau until he discharged her on August 27, 1973. Here total medical expenses were $1,876.76.
At the trial on August 25, 1974, Mrs. Thomas testified she was still having pain in her back after sitting in her classroom for long periods of time. She is a woman who weighs 185 pounds and this has prolonged her recovery from the back injury.
Under all of the circumstances, we are unable to say that the trial judge abused his great discretion as to the quantum of the award in general damages for personal injuries.
For the reasons assigned, the judgment appealed is affirmed. All costs of this appeal are assessed against the defendant-appellant.
Affirmed.
HOOD, J., dissents and will assign written reasons.