Case Name: PEOPLE v. MATHIS (ON REMAND)
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1977-05-02
Citations: 75 Mich. App. 320
Docket Number: Docket No. 26638
Parties: PEOPLE v MATHIS (ON REMAND)
Judges: Before: Allen, P. J., and D. E. Holbrook and D. C. Riley, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 75
Pages: 320–336

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v MATHIS (ON REMAND)
Opinion of the Court
1. Criminal Law — Walker Hearings — Instructions to Jury — Voluntary Statements by Defendant.
It is reversible error for a trial judge to inform a jury that he has determined in a separate Walker-type hearing that the defendant had voluntarily uttered a statement to a policeman concerning the alleged crime, before submitting to the jury the question (1) whether the statement was made, and (2) whether, if made, it was true; fundamental fairness and elementary logic dictate that a jury not be asked to decide a question which, by necessary implication, the judge has already decided for them.
2. Criminal Law — Instructions to Jury — Presumed Malice or Intent — Jury as Factfinder.
Language in a jury instruction in a murder trial which speaks in terms of presumed malice or intent is reversibly erroneous, since such language may tend to invade the jury’s province as factfinder.
3. Homicide — Criminal Law- — Self-Defense—Duty to Retreat— Instructions to Jury — Co-Dwellers—Deadly Force.
A jury should be instructed on self-defense regarding the duty to retreat where a defendant charged with a homicide claims that he had been residing with the decedent in her home at the time of her death and where one view of the facts supports this argument; this evidence, if believed by the jury, would absolve the defendant of an obligation to retreat from an attack in the home before resorting to the use of deadly force in self-defense.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 400, 441.
[2] 75 Am Jur 2d, Trial § 656 et seq.
[3, 4, 13] 40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide ■§§ 519-521.
Homicide: duty to retreat where assailant and assailed share the same living quarters. 26 ALR3d 1296.
[5] 40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide §§ 44-48, 52.
[6] 40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide § 454.
[7] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 441, 451.
[8] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law § 440 et seq.
[9] 30 Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 1086.
75 Am Jur 2d, Trial §§ 336, 489.
[10] 75 Am Jur 2d, Trial §§ 623, 938, 929.
[11, 12] 40 Am Jur 2d, Homicide §§ 498-500.
[14] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 204, 207.
4. Homicide — Self-Defense—Charges to Jury.
The defense of self-defense is not available to a defendant charged with a homicide unless it appears that the accused was without fault or was not the aggressor in bringing about the conflict; a defendant may only be held legally accountable as an aggressor for responsive conduct by another that is reasonably attributable to the defendant’s own conduct.
Dissent by D. E. Holbrook, J.
5. Criminal Law — Prosecutors—Preliminary Examinations — Elements of Crime — First-Degree Murder.
The prosecution must show at a preliminary examination that the offense charged has been committed, and there must be evidence on each element of the crime charged or evidence from which these elements may be inferred; a showing of premeditation is therefore required where the charge is first-degree murder.
6. Homicide — Premeditation—Inferences.
Premeditation may be inferred from the entire circumstances surrounding a killing.
7. Criminal Law — Preliminary Examinations — -Magistrates— Complaint.
An examining magistrate is not bound by the limitations of a written complaint and may examine not only the truth of the charge in the complaint; but may consider other matters connected with the charge which he deems pertinent.
8. Criminal Law — Preliminary Examinations — Magistrates— Adding Counts — Prosecutors—Unfair Surprise — Prejudice.
An examining magistrate may in his discretion add a count not originally charged, upon a proper motion by the prosecutor, where there is no unfair surprise nor any showing of prejudice.
9. Homicide — Directed Verdicts — First-Degree Murder — Premeditation — Deliberation.
Denial of a defendant’s motion for a directed verdict of acquittal of first-degree murder is not error where sufficient evidence had been adduced at trial to support an inference of every element of the crime of first-degree murder, including premeditation and deliberation.
10. Criminal Law — Appeal and Error — Instructions to Jury — Defendant’s Theory of Case.
Reversal of a defendant’s conviction is not justified on the basis of claimed errors in the jury instructions where (1) the defendant fully approved the instructions after they were given, (2) injustice did not result, and (3) the jury was instructed as to the defendant’s theory of the case.
11. Homicide — First-Degree Murder — Malice—-Instructions to Jury — Implied Malice — Deadly Weapons.
A trial court commits error in a trial for first-degree murder where its instructions result in taking the question of malice from the jury.
12. Homicide — Instructions to Jury — Malice—Deadly Weapons. There is no error in instructing the jury that it may ñnd malice
from the use of a deadly weapon in such a manner that the natural consequence would be to result in the death of the deceased; such a charge does not take away from the jury’s determination the important element of malice aforethought (1) where the preliminary facts are for the jury to decide, and (2) where the jury is permitted, not required, to ñnd malice if it finds that the defendant used a deadly weapon in such a way that the natural and ordinary probable use of such weapon would be to take a life.
13. Homicide — Self-Defense—Duty to Retreat — Co-Dwellers— Deadly Force.
A defendant was not a co-dweller with the deceased such that it granted him the right not to retreat from an assault by the deceased in her home before resorting to deadly force in self-defense where the evidence shows that the defendant had been living on and off with the deceased in her home but had a family elsewhere, the deceased had given the defendant notice that he no longer had the right to be there, and where the fatal confrontation occurred that same day after the defendant had left the home for a period of time and returned.
14. Constitutional Law — Criminal Law — Double Jeopardy — New Trials.
A defendant is not unconstitutionally twice put in jeopardy when a new trial results because the jury is unable to agree on a verdict.
Appeal from Recorder’s Court of Detroit, Joseph A. Gillis, J.
Submitted January 4, 1977, at Detroit.
(Docket No. 26638.)
Decided May 2, 1977.
Paul C. Mathis was convicted of second-degree murder. Defendant appealed. Affirmed, 55 Mich App 694 (1974). Defendant filed a delayed application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. In lieu of leave to appeal, remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted of the issues raised in appellant’s application to the Supreme Court, 395 Mich 788 (1975).
On remand, reversed and remanded.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William L. Cahalan, Prosecuting Attorney, Edward Reilly Wilson, Research, Training & Appeals, and Larry L. Roberts, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Lawrence Baron, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for defendant.
Before: Allen, P. J., and D. E. Holbrook and D. C. Riley, JJ.

Opinion:
On Remand
D. C. Riley, J.
Following his second trial and conviction of second-degree murder (the first trial having failed for want of jury consensus), defendant Paul Mathis appealed unsuccessfully to this Court. People v Paul Mathis, 55 Mich App 694; 223 NW2d 310 (1974). Acting upon defendant's delayed application, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of the issues raised in defendant's application for leave. 395 Mich 788 (1975).
Defendant alleges a variety of instructional and other errors which, he argues, deprived him of a fair trial. With four of his contentions, we agree.
Defendant's first claim of error raises an issue that has been resolved in his favor by People v Gilbert, 55 Mich App 168; 222 NW2d 305 (1974), and People v Skowronski, 61 Mich App 71; 232 NW2d 306 (1975). As in Gilbert and Skowronski, the judge below informed the jury that he had determined in a separate hearing that defendant had voluntarily uttered a statement to a policeman concerning the alleged crime. The jury's task, the judge then declared, was twofold: to determine (1) whether the statement was made; and (2) whether, if made, it was true. Although the defendant did not object at the time, he did object when the matter was revived by the prosecutor in rebuttal argument. While a more prompt objection would have been preferable, we consider defendant's effort sufficient to have preserved the error on appeal.
We therefore hold with Gilbert and Skowronski, supra, that the trial court erred reversibly in apprising the jury of his earlier finding at the Walker hearing. It is senseless to ask the jury whether a statement has been made after informing them that the statement was voluntary. The jury is thus left to wonder whether it is being asked, on the one hand, to side with the judge's conclusion and proceed to determine the truth of the statement, or on the other, to overrule the judge and conclude on their own that the statement (no matter how voluntary) was never made. We cannot and do not expect a jury, so perplexed, to render a fair and impartial verdict. Consequently, we reverse.
Defendant next asserts as error the lower court's sua spon te instruction on voluntary manslaughter which failed to incorporate a charge on involuntary manslaughter. This issue is a mirror image of a question addressed and resolved in People v Ora Jones, 395 Mich 379, 390-391; 236 NW2d 461 (1975). We trust that it will not recur on retrial.
Defendant argues that reversible error arose from the following instruction:
"The element of malice is present in murder and not in manslaughter. Murder may be and often is committed without any specific intent or actual intention of killing.
"It is not necessary in all cases that one charged with murder must have intended to take the life of the person he slays by his wrongful act.
"If the intent with which he acted shall be equivolent [sic] in legal character to a crime purposely aimed against human life, you find the accused uses upon another a deadly weapon such as a pistol in such a manner that the natural and ordinary probable use of such a deadly weapon in such a manner would be to take the life, the law presumes that such a person so assaulting intended to take the life.
"You may find malice from the use of such a deadly weapon in such a manner in which it was used that the natural consequence would be to result in the death of the deceased." (Emphasis added).
While the instant instruction is perhaps slightly less egregious than the charge condemned in People v Martin, 392 Mich 553; 221 NW2d 336 (1974), it is nonetheless reversibly erroneous. People v Conway, 70 Mich App 629; 247 NW2d 317 (1976). Compare People v Rosemary Gibson, 71 Mich App 543; 248 NW2d 613 (1976). Hence, instructional language speaking in terms of presumed malice or intent should be avoided on retrial, lest the jury's province as factfinder be invaded and a possible •conviction undermined.
The trial court should also upon remand take pains to. see that the jury is properly instructed on self defense. In this regard, we note that one view of the facts would support defendant's present argument that he had been residing with the decedent in her home at the time of her death. Thus, this evidence, if believed by the jury, would absolve defendant of an obligation to retreat before resorting to deadly force in self defense. See People v Smith, 54 Mich App 652; 221 NW2d 464 (1974), People v McDaniels, 70 Mich App 469; 245 NW2d 793 (1976), and People v McGrandy, 9 Mich App 187; 156 NW2d 48 (1967). Moreover, with regard to the requirement that defendant be non-aggressive, i.e., without fault in bringing on the deadly affray, People v Bright, 50 Mich App 401, 406; 213 NW2d 279 (1973), the lower court should charge (assuming sufficient evidence is adduced on the point) that defendant "may only be held legally accountable as an aggressor for responsive conduct by another that is reasonably attributable to appellant's [defendant's] own conduct". People v Townes, 391 Mich 578, 592; 218 NW2d 136 (1974). See also LaFave & Scott, Criminal Law, p 395, quoted in People v Joeseype Johnson, 75 Mich App 337; 254 NW2d 667 (1977).
On all other claims of error, we agree with Judge Holbrook's analysis.
Reversed and remanded.
Allen, P. J., concurred.
People v Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich 331; 132 NW2d 87 (1965).
This is not a case where a newly-carved rule, applied retroactively, works vexation upon a trial court which relied on established precedent for support. Rather, this is a case where fundamental fairness and elementary logic dictate that a jury not be asked to decide a question which, by necessary implication, the judge has already decided for them.