Case Name: STEPHEN L. DENTON, Appellee, v. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS et al., Appellants
Court: Illinois Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 1997-04-24
Citations: 176 Ill. 2d 144
Docket Number: No. 80712
Parties: STEPHEN L. DENTON, Appellee, v. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS et al., Appellants.
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Reports, Second Series
Volume: 176
Pages: 144–159

Head Matter:
(No. 80712.
STEPHEN L. DENTON, Appellee, v. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS et al., Appellants.
Opinion filed April 24, 1997.
MILLER, J., joined by FREEMAN and McMORROW, JJ., dissenting.
James E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Barbara A. Preiner, Solicitor General, and Jan E. Hughes, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellants.
Mary Lee Leahy and Cheryl Redfield Jansen, of Leahy Law Offices, of Springfield, for appellee.
Samuel J. Cahnman, of Springfield, and Richard J. Phelan, of Chicago, for amici curiae Veteran’s Legal Defense Fund et al.

Opinion:
CHIEF JUSTICE HEIPLE
delivered the opinion of the court:
The issue before this court is whether section 8b.7(f) of the Personnel Code (20 ILCS 415/8b.7(f) (West 1992)) affords veterans an absolute hiring preference over non-veterans within the same grade category. The Civil Ser vice Commission (the Commission) and the circuit court determined that section 8b.7(f)'s hiring preference was not absolute. The appellate court disagreed, holding that section 8b.7(f) does indeed grant veterans an absolute hiring preference over nonveterans of the same grade category. 277 Ill. App. 3d 770. This court granted leave to appeal (155 Ill. 2d R. 315), and, for the reasons which follow, we affirm the appellate court.
Appellee, Stephen L. Denton, served in the United States Army from December 1965 until he was honorably discharged in December 1968. On June 12, 1991, Denton submitted an application to the Illinois Department of Central Management Services (CMS), seeking employment for an open "Executive IV" position. Den-ton indicated on the application that he was eligible for a veteran's preference. On July 10, 1991, Denton received notice from CMS that his application had been graded and that he had been given a category grade of "A," the highest grade possible. Denton was also notified that his name and grade had been placed on a CMS eligibility list requested by the Illinois State Police.
On August 27, 1991, Denton joined 13 veterans and three nonveterans who interviewed for the Executive IV position of assistant bureau chief in the Drug Abuse Resistance Education (D.A.R.E.) program. With the approval of CMS, however, the State Police hired a non-veteran, namely, Linda Lang. Lang, like Denton, had also been given a category grade of "A." After receiving a letter from the State Police informing him that he had not been chosen, Denton wrote to the Commission contending that the failure to hire him violated section 302.30(c)(3) of Title 80 of the Administrative Code. This section provides that "[i]f category ratings are used, the veteran eligibles in each category shall be preferred for appointment before the nonveteran eligibles in the same category." 80 Ill. Adm. Code § 302.30(c)(3) (1990) (identical language now at 80 Ill. Adm. Code § 302.30(d) (1996)). The Commission staff responded by letter that Lang's overall credentials were superior to those of all the other candidates. The Commission staff's letter further explained that section 302.30(c)(3) of the personnel rules had been interpreted to permit an agency to bypass a veteran only when the qualifications of the nonveteran eligible were superior to the bypassed veteran eligibles. Having thus found no violation of the personnel rules or the Personnel Code, the Commission staff notified Den-ton that if adopted by the Commission, the staff's determination would become a final administrative decision.
Denton thereafter asserted by letter that section 8b.7 of the Personnel Code had been violated when he or another qualified veteran was not appointed to the Executive IV position with the State Police. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 127, par. 63bl08b.7 (now codified as 20 ILCS 415/8b.7 (West 1992)). Nevertheless, the Commission rendered a final administrative decision by adopting its staff's findings on May 13, 1992.
Denton subsequently filed a complaint for administrative review in the circuit court of Sangamon County on June 17, 1992, against the Commission, including Executive Secretary Bruce J. Finne and Commissioners J.J. Moffat, William G. Stratton, and Harry Conlon; the State Police, including Director Terrance W. Gainer; and CMS, including Director Stephen B. Schnorf. The circuit court affirmed, holding that a veteran may be bypassed for employment in favor of a more qualified nonveteran. Denton appealed. The appellate court reversed, holding that section 8b.7(f) of the Personnel Code grants veterans an absolute hiring preference over non-veterans within the same grade category. 277 Ill. App. 3d 770.
ANALYSIS
The sole issue on appeal is whether section 8b.7(f) of the Personnel Code guarantees veterans an absolute hiring preference over nonveterans of the same grade category. Section 8b.7(f) provides:
"The rank order of persons entitled to a preference on eligible lists shall be determined on the basis of their augmented ratings. When the Director [of CMS] establishes eligible lists on the basis of category ratings such as 'superior', 'excellent', 'well-qualified', and 'qualified', the veteran eligibles in each such category shall be preferred for appointment before the non-veteran eligibles in the same category." (Emphasis added.) 20 ILCS 415/8b.7(f) (West 1992).
The Commission contends that the above-emphasized portion of section 8b.7(f) provides an absolute hiring preference only in situations where the veteran and nonveteran of the same grade category are equally qualified. Denton counters that the emphasized portion of section 8b.7(f) unambiguously mandates an absolute hiring preference for veterans in the same grade category as nonveterans.
While courts afford considerable deference to an agency's interpretation of a statute it administers, an agency's determination is not binding as to questions of law and will be rejected if erroneous. City of Decatur v. American Federation of State, County, & Municipal Employees, Local 268, 122 Ill. 2d 353, 361 (1988). Indeed, the primary rule in statutory construction is to give effect to legislative intent as evidenced by the language of the statute. Solich v. George & Anna Portes Cancer Prevention Center of Chicago, Inc., 158 Ill. 2d 76, 81 (1994). Words in the statute should be given their popularly understood meaning (Kozak v. Retirement Board of the Firemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund, 95 Ill. 2d 211, 215 (1983)), and only where the statutory language is unclear may a court look beyond it (Solich, 158 Ill. 2d at 81).
As well as contending that the language of section 8b.7(f) does not provide veterans with an absolute hiring preference over more qualified nonveterans in the same grade category, the Commission further argues that the emphasized portion of section 8b.7(f) is satisfied by procedures CMS has developed to favor veterans over nonveterans in the hiring process. These CMS procedures require that the employing agency interview and consider veterans of a given category before nonveterans of the same category; that the employing agency request CMS approval before selecting a nonveteran over available veterans; and that veterans, upon request, receive a written explanation of the reasons why another candidate was selected. The Commission argues that these procedures satisfy section 8b.7(f) in that they reflect a reasonable interpretation of the veteran's preference provision.
The appellate court held that CMS's failure to record these procedures in the administrative code renders them invalid. See 5 ILCS 100/1 — 70 (West 1992); Senn Park Nursing Center v. Miller, 104 Ill. 2d 169,181 (1984) (holding that when an agency fails to follow the proper procedure under the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act for the adoption of rules, the rule is invalid). Our interpretation of section 8b.7(f), however, obviates the need to reach this issue.
While all the parties concede that the CMS procedures grant veterans preferential treatment in the hiring process, the relevant question is whether these procedures, even if valid, satisfy section 8b.7(f), which requires that the "veteran eligibles in each such category shall be preferred for appointment before the non- veteran eligibles in the same category." The term "preferred" means "[possessing or accorded a priority, advantage, or privilege." Black's Law Dictionary 1178 (6th ed. 1990). Admittedly, interviewing and considering veterans before nonveterans and permitting veterans to question an agency's decision to hire a nonveteran over veterans grant veterans an advantage. But an advantage is not what section 8b.7(f) calls for; rather, it mandates appointment.
Because there is no value in a "prefer[ence] for appointment" that does not result in appointment, we conclude that the unambiguous language of the statute requires that veterans receive an absolute preference in being hired over nonveterans of the same grade category. In other words, when the Director of CMS chooses to organize eligibility lists on the basis of category ratings, a veteran must receive an offer for the job before nonveterans of the same grade category. Accordingly, to the extent that the CMS hiring procedures do not afford an absolute hiring preference as mandated by section 8b.7(f), they are insufficient.
The Commission argues that so interpreting section 8b.7(f) improperly diminishes the employing agency's role in the selection process and further undermines the merit principles upon which the Personnel Code is based. In support of this argument, the Commission points out that Denton's "A" grade indicated only that he met the minimum qualifications for Executive IV positions and not that he was as qualified as Lang for the D.A.R.E. position.
It is, however, for the legislature to decide whether and to what extent state agencies should be constrained in their employment decisions. Indeed, the Personnel Code requires CMS, not the employing agency, to establish a position classification plan for all positions governed by the Personnel Code (20 ILCS 415/8a (West 1994)); to eliminate those who are not qualified for entrance into state service and to discover the relative fitness of those who are qualified (20 ILCS 415/8b.1 (West 1992)); and to establish lists of names of candidates in order of their relative excellence in respective examinations (20 ILCS 415/8b.3 (West 1992)). The Personnel Code further provides that CMS may substitute categories for numerical ratings and establish lists of candidates accordingly. 20 ILCS 415/8b.3 (West 1992). If CMS uses numerical lists, the employing agencies may consider for appointment the three highest applicants on the list. 20 ILCS 415/8b.5 (West 1992). If, as in the instant case, CMS uses categories rather than numerical lists, the employing agency must prefer for appointment the veterans over the nonveterans of the same category. 20 ILCS 415/8b.7(f) (West 1992). This is what the Personnel Code requires, and we are duty bound to enforce it.
The Commission additionally argues that granting veterans an absolute hiring preference over nonveterans of the same grade category renders sections 8b.3 and 8b.5 meaningless in certain situations. As noted above, section 8b.3 authorizes CMS to establish eligible lists of candidates and to provide these lists to the employing agencies. The Commission argues that if only one veteran were placed in the "A" category, an eligible list would be redundant because the veteran's selection would be automatic. Perhaps the Commission is correct in that a list of candidates would be unnecessary in such a situation, but we fail to see how this renders the statute meaningless.
Section 8b.5 provides:
"For the appointment of the person standing among the 3 highest on the appropriate eligible list to fill a vacancy, or from the highest ranking group if the list is by rankings instead of numerical ratings, except as otherwise provided in Sections 4b and 17a of this Act.
The Director may approve the appointment of a person from the next lower ranking group when the highest ranking group contains less than 3 eligibles." 20 ILCS 415/ 8b.5 (West 1992).
The Commission argues that this court's interpretation of section 8b.7(f) renders section 8b.5 meaningless because if the only candidate in the "A" category is a veteran, the veteran would be guaranteed the job and there would not be a third or even a second candidate for the agency to consider. Moreover, the Commission contends that if the legislature intended to exclude section 8b.7(f) from the three-candidate provision of section 8b.5 it would have included section 8b.7(f) among the specifically designated exceptions to section 8b.5. We observe, however, that section 8b.5 does not mandate that an agency have at least three candidates to choose from, but merely provides that CMS may approve the appointment of a person from the next lower ranking group when fewer than three candidates are available. CMS is not compelled to do so, however, and we therefore conclude that our interpretation of section 8b.7(f) is wholly compatible with section 8b.5.
The Commission next observes that veterans are not guaranteed an absolute hiring preference over nonveterans when candidates are ranked in numerical order. Indeed, section 8b.5 permits a hiring agency to consider for appointment any one of the three highest numerically ranked candidates. The Commission argues that it is illogical to suggest that the legislature intended a different result simply because CMS chooses to rank candidates by category instead of numerically. This court, however, will not pass on the wisdom of the legislature's handiwork. Our duty is to interpret section 8b.7(f) according to its plain and unambiguous language. We thus enforce section 8b.7(f) according to its unambiguous mandate that when categories are used veterans shall receive an absolute hiring preference over nonveterans in the same category.
CONCLUSION
Whether and to what extent veterans preferences should be granted are matters for legislative determination. Hiring preferences for veterans have traditionally been adopted to reward veterans for the sacrifice of military service, to ease the transition from military to civilian life, to encourage patriotic service, and to attract loyal and well-disciplined people to civil service occupations. Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 265, 60 L. Ed. 2d 870, 879, 99 S. Ct. 2282, 2289 (1979); People ex rel. Jendrick v. Allman, 396 Ill. 35, 38, 39 (1947); People ex rel. Sellers v. Brady, 262 Ill. 578, 594 (1914).
For the reasons stated above, we determine that section 8b.7(f) of the Personnel Code (20 ILCS 415/8b.7(f) (West 1992)) provides veterans an absolute hiring preference over nonveterans within the same grade category. Accordingly, we affirm the appellate court's judgment reversing and remanding this cause to the circuit court of Sangamon County.
Affirmed.
Section 302.30(c)(3) of Title 80 of the Administrative Code is part of a program designed to satisfy the requirements and standards imposed by section 8b.7 of the Personnel Code.
For purposes of this appeal, we refer to defendants/ appellants jointly as the Commission.