Case Name: MICHAEL FRICKS, plaintiff in error, v. ARCHIBALD MILLER, defendant in error
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1870-06
Citations: 41 Ga. 274
Docket Number: 
Parties: *MICHAEL FRICKS, plaintiff in error, v. ARCHIBALD MILLER, defendant in error.
Judges: McCAY, J., concurred, but furnished no opinion.
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 41
Pages: 274–278

Head Matter:
*MICHAEL FRICKS, plaintiff in error, v. ARCHIBALD MILLER, defendant in error.
(Atlanta,
June Term, 1870.)
CONSIDERATION—SATISFACTION' OE JUDGMENT.—The officers of a company in the Confederate service, purchased a horse for Miller, a member of the company, to ride into service, from Fricks, the plaintiff. Miller died, and the officers turned over the horse to the defendant, who was the father of the deceased, who sold him for more than the officers gave Fricks for him. Fricks, in 18G6, sued the officers for the price of the horse, and obtained judgment for the amount. The defendant in the judgment then referred the plaintiff’s attorney to Miller, the present defendant, as the person who -was to pay the judgment. He admitted his liability, and gave the note now sued on, in payment of the judgment, with the understanding that if the Legislature passed any law “killing old debts,” he was to have the same benefit as if the note had not been given by him:
Held, That the satisfaction of the judgment against the officers, was a sufficient consideration to support the note, which is the foundation of this action, and that no Act passed 'by the Legislature would have relieved the defendant if no note had been given, and n a io lia nip
JUDGMENT—FAILURE TO APPEAR AND PLEAD ILLEGALITY—EFFECT.—When a suit was brought since the war in the Courts of this State, recognized by the Government of the United States, it was the defendant’s duty to appear and make his defense; and if he failed to do so, and permitted judgment to go against him upon a note, the consideration of which was illegal, he will not afterward be heard to deny the validity of the judgment, unless he can show that there was fraud, illegality or error of law in obtaining the judgment. If he wished to set up the illegality of the consideration, he should have done so on the trial, prior to the judgment.
Constitutional Law. Before Judge Parrott. Gordon Superior Court. April .Term, 1870.
The facts of this case are fully stated in the concurring opinion of Judge Warner, [q. v.]. The Court charged the jury the constitutional provision as to debts made to aid the rebellion, and said if the note were given in lieu of an old judgment, it was a novation 'and plaintiff should recover, but if it was agreed that defendant was to have the benefit of any subsequent legislation which might be made, the jury should find for the defendant, otherwise the defendant would be defrauded. (The evidence was, that when Miller made the note he hesitated because of a desire to avail himself of ány ^'legislation affecting old debts, and Fricks said that he supposed that the giving of a note would not change his rights in that regard, and then the note was given.)
The jury found for the defendant. Plaintiff moved for a new trial upon the grounds that the latter part of the charge was erroneous and the verdict was contrary to law and the evidence. The refusal of a new trial is assigned as error.
Cantrell and Kiker. D. A. Walker, for plaintiff in error.
William H. Dabney, for defendant in error.

Opinion:
By the Court.—
BROWN, C. J.,
delivering the opinion.
The judgment against (Collins and the other officers was obtained in 1866, after the Courts of this State, recognized by the Government of the United States, had been opened, in which the .defendants 'would have been heard to set up the illegality of the consideration of the note. If they 'desired to defend on that ground, it was their duty to make the defence before (judgment. Having failed to do so, we think they are not now entitled to go behind the judgment to allege the illegality of the consideration of the contract, and that they could only have opened it within twelve months after the adoption of our present constitution, for fraud, illegality, or error of law, 'in procuring the judgment.
If the suit had been brought in the Courts during the war upon such a note, and judgment had been rendered upon it, we are not prepared to say the same rule would apply. The Courts as then organized would not have heard such a defense, as they would have been bound to hold the consideration a legal one: and in such a case, we think the defendant might have moved to open the judgment, at any time before the expiration of the year, after the adoption of the Constitution, for the purpose of showing the illegality of the consideration. But no such reason applies where the suit was brought in the Courts, since the war, as no such rule of public policy then excluded the defense.
*We hold that the judgment against Collins and others, which it was the duty of Miller, the defendant, to pay, is a sufficient consideration to support the note, given in payment of it, which is the foundation of the present action. But it is insisted that Miller gave the note with the understanding that he was to have the benefit of any action of the. legislature "killing old debts." Admit this, and we do not see how he is benefited, as there is no such Act killing the judgment for which he gave this note, unless it were attacked within the year, for fraud, illegality or error of law, in procuring it. If the defendants intended to rely upon the illegality of the original contract, they should have done so at the proper time and in the proper form.
Judgment reversed.
McCAY, J., concurred, but furnished no opinion.