Case Name: Thomas E. WALTON; Le'Ellen Walton, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. ROSE MOBILE HOMES LLC; et al., Defendants, Southern Energy Homes, Inc., Defendant-Appellant
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2002-07-30
Citations: 298 F.3d 470
Docket Number: No. 00-60742
Parties: Thomas E. WALTON; Le’Ellen Walton, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. ROSE MOBILE HOMES LLC; et al., Defendants, Southern Energy Homes, Inc., Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: Before KING, Chief Judge, and JOLLY and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: Federal Reporter 3d Series
Volume: 298
Pages: 470–492

Head Matter:
Thomas E. WALTON; Le’Ellen Walton, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. ROSE MOBILE HOMES LLC; et al., Defendants, Southern Energy Homes, Inc., Defendant-Appellant.
No. 00-60742.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
July 30, 2002.
Amanda Lee Trawick (argued), John Gibson Compton, Witherspoon & Compton, Meridian, MS, for Plaintiffs-Appel-lees.
James L. Quinn (argued), Zachary & Leggett, Hattiesburg, MS, Robert Emmett Kerrigan, Jr. (argued), W. Clay McGehee, Isaac H. Ryan, Deutsch, Kerrigan & Stiles, New Orleans, LA, Wayne Scott Simpson, Southern Energy Homes Inc., Birmingham, AL, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before KING, Chief Judge, and JOLLY and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge:
Defendantr-Appellant Southern Energy Homes, Inc. appeals the district court's denial of its motion to compel arbitration of the Waltons' claim for breach of express written warranty under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301-12 (1994). For the following reasons, we REVERSE and REMAND.
I
In January 1999, Plaintiffs-Appellees Thomas and Le'Ellen Walton ("the Wal-tons") purchased a mobile home manufactured by DefendanL-Appellant Southern Energy Homes, Inc. ("Southern Energy") from a retail seller, Rose Mobile Homes ("Rose"). Southern Energy issued the Waltons a one-year manufacturer's warranty against defects in materials and workmanship. This warranty contained an arbitration provision requiring the Waltons to submit any claims under the warranty to binding arbitration.
The Waltons discovered a variety of defects in their mobile home. They requested repairs from both Southern Energy and Rose on numerous occasions, but these repairs never were completed to the Wal-tons' satisfaction. Consequently, in October 1999, the Waltons revoked their acceptance of the mobile home by letter.
In December 1999, the Waltons filed suit against Southern Energy and Rose in the Circuit Court of Kemper County, Mississippi, alleging negligence, breach of contract, breach of express and implied warranties, and violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (the "MMWA"). The defendants removed the case to federal district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and the MMWA's jurisdictional provision, 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d).
Both Southern Energy and Rose filed motions to compel arbitration of the Wal-tons' claims. They contended that the arbitration provisions in the warranty and sales contracts and the separate "Binding Arbitration Agreement" signed by Thomas Walton at the time of sale are valid and enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act (the "FAA") with respect to all of the Waltons' claims. In response, the Waltons argued that the MMWA precludes the enforcement of binding arbitration provisions contained in express written warranties. The Waltons maintained that, because of this statutory prohibition, neither their warranty claims under the MMWA nor their related state law claims are subject to compulsory arbitration. A federal magistrate judge agreed with the Waltons and denied Southern Energy and Rose's motions to compel arbitration with respect to all of the Waltons' claims.
Upon review of the magistrate judge's order, the district court agreed with the magistrate judge's conclusion that the MMWA precludes Southern Energy (the warrantor) from requiring the Waltons to submit their written warranty claims to binding arbitration. Contrary to the magistrate judge's conclusion, however, the district court compelled arbitration of the Waltons' claims that did not arise under the MMWA. Thus, the district court or dered the Waltons to submit their negligence, breach of contract and breach of implied warranty claims to arbitration. Southern Energy now appeals the district court's denial of its motion to compel arbitration of the Waltons' MMWA claim.
II
We review a district court's grant or denial of a motion to compel arbitration de novo. Webb v. Investacorp, Inc., 89 F.3d 252, 257 (5th Cir.1996). We have determined that a two-step inquiry governs the adjudication of motions to compel arbitration under the FAA: "The first step is to determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the dispute in question.... The second step is to determine whether legal constraints external to the parties' agreement foreclosed the arbitration of those claims." Id. at 257-58 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Because neither party disputes that the warranty contains a valid arbitration agreement that encompasses the Waltons' breach of express warranty claim, we focus our attention on the second step of the Webb inquiry: whether the MMWA presents a legal constraint that forecloses arbitration of the express warranty claim.
We first consider the background and dictates of the Federal Arbitration Act, and then of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.
A
The Federal Arbitration Act was enacted in 1924 to "revers[e] centuries of judicial hostility to arbitration agreements by plac[ing] arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts." Shear-son/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 225-26, 107 S.Ct. 2332, 96 L.Ed.2d 185 (1987) (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510-11, 94 S.Ct. 2449, 41 L.Ed.2d 270 (1974)) (internal citations and quotations omitted, alterations in original). The FAA provides that:
A written provision in . a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
There is a "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration," and the Supreme Court has read the FAA to establish a presumption in favor of the enforceability of contractual arbitration agreements. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983). The presumption of enforceability of arbitration agreements applies equally to "claim[s] founded on statutory rights." McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226, 107 S.Ct. 2332. Only a contrary congressional command can override the dictates of the FAA. Id.
In order to overcome this presumption in favor of arbitration, the party opposing arbitration bears the burden of demonstrating that "Congress intended to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue." Id. (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985)). Courts consider three factors in determining whether Congress intended to preclude ap plication of the FAA to a particular statutory right: (1) the statute's text; (2) its legislative history; and (3) whether there is "an inherent conflict between arbitration and the statute's underlying purposes." Id.
In every case the Supreme Court has considered involving a statutory right that does not explicitly preclude arbitration, it has upheld the application of the FAA. This includes cases falling under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Sherman Act, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act, Securities Act of 1933, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the Truth in Lending Act.
B
We now turn to the provisions of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act ("MMWA"). The MMWA was enacted in 1974 to "improve the adequacy of information available to consumers, prevent deception, and improve competition in the marketing of consumer products." 15 U.S.C. § 2302(a). In addition to establishing standards governing the content of warranties, the MMWA creates a statutory cause of action for consumers "damaged by the failure of a supplier, warrantor, or service contractor to comply with any obligation [imposed by the Act] or [established by] a written warranty, implied warranty, or service contract." Id. § 2310(d)(1). Suits under the MMWA may be brought in either federal or state court, id., and consumers are permitted to recover reasonably-incurred costs and expenses, including attorneys' fees, if they prevail in such suits. Id. § 2310(d)(2).
Before bringing a suit for breach of warranty, the consumer must give persons obligated under the warranty a reasonable opportunity to "cure" their failure to comply with the obligations at issue. Id. § 2310(e). The MMWA also permits war-rantors to establish "informal dispute settlement procedures" for breach of written warranty claims, and to require consumers to resort to such procedures before bringing a civil action. Id. § 2310(a). While the term "informal dispute settlement procedure" is not defined anywhere in the text of the Act, the Federal Trade Commission (the "FTC") is instructed to "prescribe rules setting forth minimum requirements for any informal dispute set tlement procedure which is incorporated into the terms of a written warranty." Id. § 2310(a)(2). If a warrantor establishes an informal dispute settlement procedure in accordance with the FTC rules, the warrantor is permitted to include language in the warranty requiring consumers to resort to this procedure "before pursuing any legal remedy" under the Act. Id. § 2310(a)(3)(C). The FTC has adopted a regulation stating that informal dispute settlement procedures under the MMWA cannot be legally binding on any person. See 16 C.F.R. § 703.5(j). The FTC therefore has found that written warranties cannot require binding arbitration. 40 Fed. Reg. 60168, 60211 (1975) ("[T]here is nothing in the Rule which precludes the use of any other remedies by the parties following a Mechanism decision . However, reference within the written warranty to any binding, non-judicial remedy is prohibited by the Rule and the Act.") Thus, according to the FTC's interpretation, binding arbitration is simply impermissible under the MMWA.
Ill
When we review an agency's construction of a statute that it administers, we must defer to that agency's interpretation of the statute if: (1) Congress has not spoken directly to the issue; and (2) the agency's interpretation "is based on a permissible construction of the statute." Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). "The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent. . If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect." Id. at 843 n. 9,104 S.Ct. 2778.
There is no doubt that Congress has expressed a clear intention in favor of arbitration for contractual claims. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 ("A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.") We therefore must determine if Congress expressed any contrary intent with respect to such claims arising under the MMWA.
A .
Under McMahon, in order to determine if Congress intended to preclude arbitration of a statutory claim, we consider the statute's text, its legislative history, and its purpose. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226, 107 S.Ct. 2332. The text of the MMWA does not specifically address binding arbitration, nor does it specifically allow the FTC to decide whether to permit or to ban binding arbitration. Although the MMWA allows warrantors' to require that consumers use "informal, dispute settlement procedures" before filing a suit in court, and allows the FTC to establish rules governing these procedures, it does not define "informal dispute settlement procedure." However, the MMWA does make clear that these are to be used before filing a claim in court. Yet binding arbitration generally is understood to be a substitute for filing a lawsuit, not a prerequisite. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1986) ("By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.")
In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 111 S.Ct. 1647, 114 L.Ed.2d 26 (1991), the Court held that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") does not preclude compulsory arbitration of ADEA claims, even though the ADEA allows the EEOC to pursue " 'informal methods of conciliation, conference, and persuasion.' " Id. at 29, 111 S.Ct. 1647 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 626(b)). Therefore the availability of informal methods of settling a dispute plainly does not itself preclude the availability of arbitration. Further, the fact that the MMWA creates a judicial forum for MMWA claims is insufficient evidence of congressional intent to preclude application of the FAA. See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227, 107 S.Ct. 2332 (finding that a provision of the Securities Exchange Act stating that "[t]he district courts of the United States . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of this title or the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this title" did not preclude application of the FAA to claims brought under the statute) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78aa); Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 29, 111 S.Ct. 1647 (rejecting the argument that compulsory arbitration under the ADEA is improper because the statute provides claimants with a judicial forum); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 385, 116 S.Ct. 873, 134 L.Ed.2d 6 (1996) ("[A] statute- conferring exclusive federal jurisdiction for a certain class of claims does not necessarily require resolution of those claims in a federal court"). In short, the availability of a judicial forum is no basis for precluding arbitration of claims under the MMWA.
We also note that binding arbitration is not normally considered to be an "informal dispute settlement procedure," and it therefore seems to fall outside the bounds of the MMWA and of the FTC's power to prescribe regulations. We thus conclude that the text of the MMWA does not evince a congressional intent to prevent the use of binding arbitration.
B
We next consider the legislative history of the MMWA. The legislative history does not specifically discuss the availability of arbitration, nor does it define or shed light on the meaning of "informal dispute settlement procedure." The legislative history does indicate that such procedures were meant to be non-binding. For example, the House Report on the MMWA states that "[a]n adverse decision in any informal dispute settlement procedure would not be a bar to a civil action on the warranty involved in the proceeding...." H.R. Rep. No. 93-1107 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7702, 7723. The Conference Committee report also indicates that if a consumer chooses not to pursue an informal dispute settlement procedure, a consumer can still pursue "all alternative avenues of redress." S. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1408 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7755, 7758. However, there is still no evidence that Congress intended binding arbitration to be considered an informal dispute settlement procedure. Therefore the fact that any informal dispute settlement procedure must be nonbinding, does not imply that Congress meant to preclude binding arbitration, which is of a different nature. The legislative history's reference to "civil action" neither explicitly includes nor precludes binding arbitration. However, the refer ence to "informal dispute settlement procedure" seemingly precludes binding arbitration from its scope, as binding arbitration is not normally considered an informal procedure. Binding arbitration simply is not part of these reports. These passages therefore do not support an assertion that Congress intended to preclude binding arbitration.
Additionally, the Conference Committee Report states that the legislation requires "provision [by the warrantor] for governmental or consumer participation in internal or other private dispute settlement procedures.... " Id. Again, this does not indicate an intent to preclude binding arbitration. It simply requires that the consumer (or perhaps the government) participate in the informal procedures established by the warrantor. The Committee cannot have had in mind binding arbitration in its comments, as the government does not normally participate in private binding arbitration procedures. Again, these congressional reports do not demonstrate that Congress intended for binding arbitration to be included within the scope of these informal dispute settlement procedures, nor that it intended to preclude binding arbitration under the MMWA.
In McMahon, the Court found that language in the legislative history of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 — language that appears more persuasive than that above — did not evince a congressional intent to bar all pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate Securities Exchange Act claims. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 238, 107 S.Ct. 2332. Specifically, the legislative history stated:
The Senate bill amended section 28 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 with respect to arbitration proceedings between self-regulatory organizations and their participants, members, or persons dealing with members or participants. The House amendment contained no comparable provision. The House receded to the Senate. It was the clear understanding of the conferees that this amendment did not change existing law, as articulated in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 74 S.Ct. 182, 98 L.Ed. 168 (1953), concerning the effect of arbitration proceedings provisions in agreements entered into by persons dealing with members and participants of self-regulatory organizations.
Id. at 236-37, 107 S.Ct. 2332 (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 94-229, at 111 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 179, 342). This legislative history implied a congressional intent to adopt the then-valid holding in Wilko that arbitration is an inadequate forum for the enforcement of Securities Act of 1933 statutory claims. The Court found that this reference was not clear enough to evidence congressional intent to preclude pre-dispute arbitration agreements as to Securities Exchange Act claims. Id. at 237-38, 107 S.Ct. 2332.
The legislative history here is not as persuasive as that in McMahon — which was found unpersuasive by the Supreme Court — and consequently we must conclude that the legislative history here does not evidence a congressional intent to preclude arbitration of MMWA claims.
C
Finally, we examine the purposes of the MMWA, and whether there is an inherent conflict between the MMWA and the FAA. We know that the MMWA was enacted in order to "improve the adequacy of information available to consumers, prevent deception, and improve competition in the marketing of consumer products." 15 U.S.C. § 2302(a). The House Report on the MMWA states that "[t]he purpose of this legislation is (1) to make warranties on consumer products more readily understood and enforceable, (2) to provide the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) with means of better protecting consumers and (3) to authorize appropriations for the operations of the FTC for fiscal years 1975, 1976, and 1977." We do not see any inherent conflict between arbitration and these purposes. Consumers can still vindicate their rights under warranties in an arbitral forum. Warranties can provide adequate and truthful information to consumers, while also requiring binding arbitration. Arbitration is not inherently unfair to consumers. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 280, 115 S.Ct. 834, 130 L.Ed.2d 753 (1995) ("Congress, when enacting the [FAA], had the needs of consumers . in mind") Although the legislative history of the MMWA expresses a concern with the unequal bargaining power of consumers, see S. Rep. No. 93-151, at 22-23 (1973), a perception of unequal bargaining power is not enough to unilaterally hold arbitration agreements unenforceable. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33, 111 S.Ct. 1647. Of course, courts can consider individual claims of fraud or unconscionability in arbitration agreements as they would in any other contract. See id. We thus can find no inherent conflict between the MMWA and the FAA.
We therefore hold that the text, legislative history, and purpose of the MMWA do not evince a congressional intent to bar arbitration of MMWA written warranty claims. The clear congressional intent in favor of enforcing valid arbitration agreements controls in this case. The Waltons signed a valid binding arbitration agreement, and they must arbitrate their MMWA claims.
IV
We recognize that some courts have found that the MMWA precludes binding arbitration, and that a number of courts have agreed with us. We have found no other federal appellate opinions on point, outside of the Eleventh Circuit. Those cases that have found arbitration to be precluded have relied, at least in part, on the fact that the MMWA provides consumer access to a judicial forum. However, as discussed in Part III.A, this is not evidence of an intent to prohibit arbitration of a statutory claim.
Some of those eases also rely on the FTC regulations to determine congressional intent, and note that the regulations state that consumers should have full access to the courts and that informal dispute mechanisms should be non-binding. For example, in Wilson v. Waverlee Homes, Inc., 954 F.Supp. 1530, 1537-39 (M.D.Ala.1997), aff'd, 127 F.3d 40 (11th Cir.1997) (table op.), the court held that the MMWA precludes binding arbitration of MMWA claims. The court relied on: (1) the MMWA's provision of access to a judicial forum; (2) the fact that informal dispute settlement mechanisms are a prerequisite to suit; (3) the FTC regulations which reflect the MMWA's "command" that consumers should have access to the courts; and (4) the history of the FTC regulations which prohibit binding arbitration. Id.; see also Yeomans v. Homes of Legend, Inc., 2001 WL 237313 (M.D.Ala.) (expressly adopting the reasoning and result in Wilson). But see Richardson v. Palm Harbor Homes, Inc., 254 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir.2001) (predispute arbitration agreement not rendered unenforceable by MMWA with respect to breach of oral express warranty claim under the Alabama Uniform Commercial Code). Again, the provision of access to a judicial forum is not evidence of intent to prevent the use of arbitration. Further, it is improper to use the FTC regulations themselves to determine congressional intent here. As noted previously, we must consider the statute's text, legislative history, and whether its purpose conflicts with another statute, to determine congressional intent. An agency's regulations, promulgated pursuant to a statute, are not part of this test. It is only after considering these three factors and determining that Congress's intent is ambiguous, that we would then proceed to consider the FTC's regulations and whether they are a permissible interpretation of the statute, per Chevron. We would not, in any case, use the regulations themselves to determine congressional intent.
Y
We hold that the MMWA does not preclude binding arbitration of claims pursuant to a valid binding arbitration agreement, which the courts must enforce pursuant to the FAA. The Waltons are bound to arbitrate their claims. We REVERSE the judgment of the district court and REMAND for entry of judgment in accordance with this opinion.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
.The sales contract also contained a binding arbitration provision that stated: "[A]ny controversy or claim . arising out of or relating to this Contract or any agreements or instruments relating to or delivered in connection with this Contract . shall . be determined by arbitration, reference, or trial by a judge as provided below. A controversy involving only a single claimant, or claimants who are related or asserting claims arising from a single transaction, shall be determined by arbitration [pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act]." Separate and apart from the warranty and the sales contract, Thomas Walton also signed a "Binding Arbitration Agreement" at the time of sale. This agreement stated: "All disputes . resulting from or arising out of the design, manufacture, warranty or repair of the manufactured home . will be submitted to BINDING ARBITRATION [pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act]."
. The Waltons also named Greenpoint Financial Corporation (the company that financed the purchase) as a defendant in the lawsuit, arguing that the failure of the mobile home purchase gives the Waltons a defense to Greenpoint's secured claim against them. This issue is not before this court.
. The MMWA establishes standards governing the content of consumer product warranties, see 15 U.S.C. § 2301-08 (1994), and creates a legal remedy for consumers who are harmed by a warrantor's failure to comply with the obligations established in a warranty, see id. § 2310. Both parties agree that the MMWA's provisions are applicable to the transaction at issue.
. Because Rose issued no express written warranty to the Waltons, all claims against Rose were deemed subject to arbitration. Accordingly, Southern Energy is the only remaining defendant in this action.
. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35, 111 S.Ct. 1647, 114 L.Ed.2d 26 (1991).
. Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 628-40, 105 S.Ct. 3346.
. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 242, 107 S.Ct. 2332 (civil RICO claims).
. Rodriguez de Quijos v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484-86, 109 S.Ct. 1917, 104 L.Ed.2d 526 (1989), overruling Wil-ko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 74 S.Ct. 182, 98 L.Ed. 168 (1953).
. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 238, 107 S.Ct. 2332.
. Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 88-92, 121 S.Ct. 513, 148 L.Ed.2d 373 (2000).
. The MMWA also empowers the Attorney General and the Federal Trade Commission to initiate proceedings for deceptive warranty or noncompliance with the requirements of the Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 2310(c).
. The provisions of the MMWA governing informal dispute settlement procedures appear to be applicable only to claims brought pursuant to written warranties. See 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(2) (1994) ("The Commission shall prescribe rules setting forth minimum requirements for any informal dispute settlement procedure which is incorporated into the terms of a written warranty to which any provision of this chapter applies.") (emphasis added).
. The Supreme Court later overruled Wilko and upheld agreements to arbitrate Securities Act claims. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shear-son/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485, 109 S.Ct. 1917, 104 L.Ed.2d 526 (1989).
. We therefore need not consider the second prong of the Chevron analysis.
. We note again, as we stated in Part II.B, that the MMWA requires consumers to submit to informal dispute settlement procedures for breach of written warranty claims, if the war-rantor has established such procedures, before filing a civil action. See 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(3). Our holding in no way conflicts with this provision.
. Compare Parkerson v. Smith, 817 So.2d 529, 2002 WL 358678, *3 (Miss.) (en banc) (not yet released for permanent publication) (MMWA precludes arbitration, as it was enacted more recently than the FAA and is more specific; relying on Waverlee Homes, infra, the MMWA's provision of a judicial forum, and the FTC regulations under the MMWA); Browne v. Kline Tysons Imports, Inc., 190 F.Supp.2d 827 (E.D.Va.2002) (claims under MMWA based on written warranties not subject to binding arbitration because Congress intended to allow consumers to adjudicate such claims in court); Yeomans v. Homes of Legend, Inc., 2001 WL 237313 (M.D.Ala.) (finding that Congress intended to preclude binding arbitration of express and written warranty claims under the MMWA; relying on the reasoning in Waverlee Homes, infra, which states in part that arbitration is precluded because the MMWA grants access to a judicial forum); Pitchford v. Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc., 124 F.Supp.2d 958, 962-65 (W.D.Va.2000) (relying largely on FTC's regulations finding binding arbitration to be impermissible and on the MMWA's grant of access to a judicial forum to find that the MMWA precludes binding arbitration of disputes over written warranties); Raesly v. Grand Housing, Inc., 105 F.Supp.2d 562, 573 (S.D.Miss.2000) (finding that MMWA precludes binding arbitration of written warranty claims, relying on Waverlee Homes)', Wilson v. Waverlee Homes, Inc., 954 F.Supp. 1530, 1532 (M.D.Ala.1997) (MMWA precludes binding arbitration of MMWA claims, in part because it provides access to a judicial forum and because the FTC regulations have so interpreted it), with In re American Homestar of Lancaster, Inc., 50 S.W.3d 480, 490 (Tex.2001) (MMWA's text, legislative history, and purpose do not preclude binding arbitration); Results Oriented, Inc. v. Crawford, 245 Ga. App. 432, 538 S.E.2d 73, 79-81 (2000) (MMWA does not preclude arbitration of express and implied warranty claims, unless arbitration clause is unconscionable), aff'd as Crawford v. Results Oriented, Inc., 273 Ga. 884, 548 S.E.2d 342 (2000); Southern Energy Homes, Inc. v. Ard, 111 So.2d 1131, 1135 (Ala.2000) (holding arbitration provisions of a written warranty to be binding).
. See note 16.
. See also cases in note 16.