Case Name: STATE of Louisiana, In the Interest of Houston HOLIFIELD, Jr., a child under seventeen years of age
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1975-09-25
Citations: 319 So. 2d 471
Docket Number: No. 5746
Parties: STATE of Louisiana, In the Interest of Houston HOLIFIELD, Jr., a child under seventeen years of age.
Judges: Before SAMUEL, REDMANN, LEM-MON, GULOTTA, STOULIG, BOU-TALL, SCHOTT, MORIAL, GAUTHIER and FEDOROFF, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 319
Pages: 471–475

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana, In the Interest of Houston HOLIFIELD, Jr., a child under seventeen years of age.
No. 5746.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth Circuit.
Sept. 25, 1975.
Norman J. Pitre, Luling, for State-appel-lee.
Jerome Friedman, Metairie, for juvenile-appellant.
Before SAMUEL, REDMANN, LEM-MON, GULOTTA, STOULIG, BOU-TALL, SCHOTT, MORIAL, GAUTHIER and FEDOROFF, JJ.

Opinion:
SAMUEL, Judge.
This is an appeal from an adjudication of delinquency and an order of commitment to the Louisiana Department of Corrections.
The case was tried pursuant to R.S. 13:1570 subd. A(5), which provides for exclusive original juvenile court jurisdiction over a juvenile who violates any law or ordinance. The defendant juvenile was charged with violation of R.S. 14:62 which proscribes and defines the crime of simple burglary. Since there is no evidence in'the record to indicate Holifield entered the burglarized premises, the adjudication presumably was made pursuant to R.S. 14:24, which defines one who aids and abets the commission of a crime as a principal thereto.
The evidence shows Holifield was arrested at 3 a. m. while seated on the right front seat of an automobile which belonged to another principal and which was parked in front of the burglarized premises, a grocery establishment closed for the night. A search of the vehicle revealed it contained merchandise bearing the name tag of that grocery. The primary inculpatory evidence offered by the state was the confession of Holifield.. On the day of his arrest he signed a waiver of his rights at 7:20 a. m. and an inculpatory statement at approximately 7:25 a. m. He was not permitted to call his parent or to talk to an attorney prior to signing either the waiver or the inculpatory statement. The trial judge found Holifield's waiver of his rights was knowingly made and that the inculpatory statement or confession was a voluntary one.
The defense called Mrs. Ethel Holifield, the juvenile's mother. She testified he was fourteen years of age and in the ninth grade at the Helen Keller School for retarded children, a school designed to afford special education for slow learners. Her testimony, which is essentially unre-futed, is that her son functions on a third grade level and is unable to read. She also testified her son has been under the care of a psychologist at the East Jefferson Mental Health Clinic for approximately two years because of behavioral problems, which she characterized as his acting essentially like an eight year old child. When shown the confession, she stated without equivocation that many of the words contained therein were beyond the scope of her son's vocabulary. Prior to Holifield's attendance at the Helen Keller School, he attended Deckbar Special School and Kenner Junior High School, which has special education classes.
The defendant juvenile also was called to the witness stand. His testimony leaves considerable doubt regarding his capacity to understand the meaning of words used in the normal criminal process. For example, when asked to define the word "rights" the following colloquy resulted between him and his attorney:
"Q What are rights?
A Something you're supposed to do with.
Q Rights are when you're supposed to do right?
A Yes sir."
When asked the meaning of the word "afford" he responded it meant "a Ford car." He could not read the word "lawyer." Moreover, he was asked to explain the meaning of the following right which the state contends he voluntarily waived:
"You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions, to have him with you during the questioning."
He responded that this sentence meant "If you want the lawyer to defend you you got to tell him what it's about." In addition, he denied knowing the meaning of the statement "If you cannot afford a lawyer one will be appointed for you before any questioning if you wish."
While these and other portions of the juvenile's testimony may have been suspect as self serving, they nevertheless raise substantial questions regarding his competence to waive his rights and sign a confession in view of his mother's testimony and in view of the circumstances under which the waiver and confession were obtained.
A motion for new trial was filed by the defendant. It is based on evidence allegedly not available at the time of trial which was held on November 9. A medical report, also dated November 9, was attached to the motion for new trial. Counsel for defendant alleges the report was not received by him until November 14. In any event, the report purports to be made by Dr. Walter L. Prickett, the Psychiatric Director of the East Jefferson Mental Health Center. It states the defendant juvenile was mentally retarded with an I.Q. of 67. The trial court nevertheless denied the motion for new trial and' entered the commitment judgment.
As the report was dated the same day as the hearing in the trial court, there is little doubt counsel for defendant did not receive the report until after the hearing had been concluded. The content of the report, if substantiated at trial, shows the juvenile as a mental retardate requiring regular, daily supervision to survive in a manner acceptable to society. The indicated prognosis is quite poor since there is no known method of treatment which could result in raising a mentally retarded person to the average level of intellectual function. If the statements contained in this report are true, the juvenile obviously did not have the capacity either to waive his rights or to sign a voluntary confession. Under all of these circumstances we are of the opinion the adjudication and order of commitment must be set aside.
Having reached this conclusion, it is unnecessary to engage in a discussion of State v. Melanson, La.App., 259 So.2d 609, which held admissible a confession by a juvenile.
For the reasons assigned, the adjudication of delinquency and order of commitment appealed from are annulled and set aside and the matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with law and with the views expressed in this opinion.
Annulled and set aside; remanded.
GAUTHIER, J., concurs.
REDMANN, LEMMON and FEDO-ROFF, JJ., concur with written reasons.