Case Name: STATE of Maine v. Alan R. CARON a/k/a Allen Caron
Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court
Jurisdiction: Maine
Decision Date: 1975-03-03
Citations: 334 A.2d 495
Docket Number: 
Parties: STATE of Maine v. Alan R. CARON a/k/a Allen Caron.
Judges: Before DUFRESNE, C. J., and WEA-THERBEE, POMEROY, WERNICK, ARCHIBALD, and DELAHANTY, JJ.
Reporter: West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 334
Pages: 495–507

Head Matter:
STATE of Maine v. Alan R. CARON a/k/a Allen Caron.
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.
March 3, 1975.
Donald H. Marden, County Atty., Augusta, for plaintiff.
Alan C. Sherman, Waterville, for defendant.
Before DUFRESNE, C. J., and WEA-THERBEE, POMEROY, WERNICK, ARCHIBALD, and DELAHANTY, JJ.

Opinion:
WERNICK, Justice.
Defendant, Alan R. Caron, has appealed from a judgment of the Superior Court (Kennebec County) which terminated his status as a probationer and committed him to the Men's Correctional Center in execution of a sentence previously imposed but execution of which had been suspended when defendant was placed on probation.
On July 19, 1971, several articles — including jewelry, cameras and guns — were taken from the Waterville home of Denni-son Bancroft. A week later, sparsely informed by an unnamed informant, the Wa-terville police obtained a search warrant. Pursuant to it they searched an apartment rented and occupied by defendant's wife and frequently used by defendant. The police seized'items disclosed by the search as fitting the general description of the articles taken from the Bancroft home. After the Bancrofts had identified as their property the items found in the apartment, defendant was arrested on a charge of "breaking and entering with intent to commit larceny." While defendant was being held in custody at the Waterville Police Station, a search was made of his person, and the search disclosed a diamond ring similar to one taken from the Bancroft home and later identified as the property of the Bancrofts.
On October 6, 1971 defendant was indicted, accused of "breaking and entering with intent to commit larceny" in violation of 17 M.R.S.A. § 754.
Upon arraignment defendant pleaded not guilty, and on December 23, 1971, defendant went to trial. After the jury had been duly impanelled and sworn but before the prosecutor had begun the presentation of the State's case, defendant moved (in the absence of the jury) for the suppression as evidence of all the articles seized in his wife's apartment and the diamond ring taken by the police from his person. The theory to support the claimed suppression was that: (1) the search warrant was defective because the affidavit upon which it rested inadequately reflected probable cause and, therefore, the articles in the apartment were the products of an illegal search; and (2) with the police deprived of the benefit of the items found in the apartment, probable cause was lacking for a custodial arrest of defendant and, hence, the search of his person at the police station was unlawful and the diamond ring disclosed by such unlawful search was illegally seized.
The presiding Justice granted defendant's motion to suppress and ordered the articles taken from the apartment and the diamond ring suppressed as evidence. Thereupon, the prosecutor moved that the indictment against defendant be dismissed. The presiding Justice granted the motion and dismissed the indictment, and defendant was discharged.
Later the same day, the State Probation and Parole Board filed a probation-violation report with the Superior Court (Ken-nebec County) alleging that defendant had "violated the terms and conditions of his probation" in that:
"On July 22, and July 26, 1971, at Wa-terville, . . . [he] was in possession of stolen property, under circumstances such that he knew it was stolen. On 7-22-71 he was in possession of jewelry, camaras, and a gun; and on 7-26-71 he was in possession of a ring, all the property of Dennison Bancroft which was taken from his home in Waterville, Maine, on July 19, 1971.
On December 28, 1971 a hearing to determine whether defendant's probation should be revoked was held before the same Superior Court Justice who, five days earlier, had suppressed as evidence the articles taken from the apartment of defendant's wife and the diamond ring found on defendant's person — and which the Probation and Parole Board was alleging was the stolen property possessed by defendant with knowledge that it was stolen.
At the hearing defendant moved (anew) that the articles seized at the apartment and the diamond ring discovered on defendant's person be suppressed as evidence for the purposes of the revocation of probation hearing. After extended discussion concerning the constitutional protections available to a defendant at such a hearing, the presiding Justice denied defendant's motion to suppress. The articles taken from the apartment and the diamond ring were subsequently admitted into evidence over defendant's objection.
During the further course of the hearing defendant objected to the admission into evidence of police testimony relating tó the Bancrofts' having identified as their property the articles which had been found in the apartment of defendant's wife as well as the diamond ring found on defendant's person. The ground of defendant's objection was that the testimony was offered in "hearsay" form. Despite the "hearsay" nature of the police testimony the presiding Justice ruled it admissible for the purposes of a hearing to revoke probation.
In his appeal defendant claims that the foregoing two rulings of the presiding Justice were error requiring reversal of the judgment revoking his probation and committing him to the Men's Correctional Center.
We deny the appeal.
1.
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972), dealing with constitutional due process requirements as operative in a revocation of parole context, and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973), extending the conceptual framework of Morrissey v. Brewer to proceedings for revocation of a probation which, as here, has been granted as an incident of the imposition, and suspension of the execution, of a sentence for guilt of crime, establish that: (1) the instant revocation of probation proceeding was not "a stage of a criminal prosecution" but (2) since it had potential to result in a deprivation of defendant's liberty, the federal constitutional guarantee of "due process of law", conceived to require fundamental governmental fairness, mandates that the proceeding embody
" . . . an informal hearing structured to assure that the finding of a . violation will be based on verified facts and that the exercise of discretion will be informed by an accurate knowledge of the . . . [probation er's] behavior." (emphasis supplied) (p. 484 of 408 U.S., p. 2602 of 92 S.Ct.)
Insofar as the instant revocation of probation hearing was not "a stage of a criminal prosecution" and is to be viewed as calculated to achieve in "informal" manner an expeditious determination of whether the probationer's activities were viola-tive of the conditions upon which he was allowed to be free of confinement as well as whether his behavior was such as to move the Court to exercise a discretion to return the probationer to confinement, there is neither constitutional nor sound policy reason to require automatic transposition to the proceeding of the entire body of evidentiary rules conventionally operative in a criminal prosecution.
As to the "hearsay" rule of evidence in particular, although in a criminal prosecution it may in part be embraced within the constitutional guarantee of a "right of confrontation", no such potential constitutional sanction can attach when, as here, the proceeding is not "a stage of a criminal prosecution." Further, the use of "hearsay" evidence is, per se, consistent with constitutional fundamental fairness "due process" guarantees as applicable to a proceeding to revoke a probation granted as an incident of the imposition, and suspension of the execution, of a sentence for guilt of crime (or a proceeding for revocation of parole). Hyser v. Reed, 115 U.S.App.D.C. 254, 318 F.2d 225 (1963) cert. den. sub. nom., Jamison et al. v. Chappell, Chairman, U. S. Board of Parole et al., 375 U.S. 957, 84 S.Ct. 447, 11 L.Ed. 2d 316 (1963); Arciniega v. Freeman, 439 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1971).
In terms of policy, a minor use of hearsay testimony can be consistent with the informality and expedition desirable for the kind of revocation of probation hearing now under scrutiny; therefore, we see no reason to prohibit hearsay evidence in such proceeding to the same extent it is prohibited in a criminal prosecution. We add the caveat, however, that if, in a given context, the hearsay evidence is unreasonably abundant and its substantive reliability highly suspect, a decision founded on it may be subject to vitiation for violation of "due process of law" fairness standards.
Clearly, there was no such abuse here, either in terms of the amount or the substantive reliability of the hearsay testimony. The presiding Justice acted without error in admitting it as evidence.
2.
More complex is the issue raised by defendant's second point of appeal:—whether evidence "suppressed" because obtained in violation of the "search and seizure" protections of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States may be admitted in a hearing to revoke a probation granted as an incident of the imposition, and suspension of the execution, of a sentence for guilt of crime.
Rule 41(e) M.R.Crim.P. governs the procedure for the "suppression" of evidence, stating:
"A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move to suppress for use as evidence anything so obtained . . . ."
As Rule 1 M.R.Crim-.P. elucidates, however, Rule 41(e) M.R.Crim.P.—as the "criminal" rules in general—applies only to "criminal proceedings." Under Morrissey v. Brewer and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, supra, a hearitig to revoke a probation granted incident to the imposition, and suspension of the execution, of a sentence for guilt of crime is not "a stage of a criminal prosecution" within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States. Guided by this analogy, we now decide that such a hearing is not a "criminal proceeding" as to which Rule 41(e) M.R.Crim.P. has applicability. The presiding Justice was, therefore correct in his conclusions that: (1) his suppression ruling for the purposes of the prosecution of defendant for the crime of "breaking and entering with intent to commit larceny" was without carry-over effect to the revocation of probation hearing ; and (2) under Rule 41 (e) M.R.Crim.P. the procedure of a motion to suppress was not available for separate and independent use in defendant's revocation of probation hearing.
That "suppression" procedures and benefits as afforded by Rule 41(e) M.R. Crim.R. were not available in the instant revocation of probation hearing is, how-, ever, not ultimately dispositive. The further question remains whether the "evidence-exclusionary" rule, as an independently operative remedy for violations of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States made binding on the States by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), has applicability to a hearing for revocation of a probation granted incident to the imposition, and suspension of the execution, of a sentence for guilt of crime (or for revocation of parole).
The Courts, federal and state, which have considered the question have, with virtual unanimity, answered it in the negative. United States v. Hill, 447 F.2d 817 (7th Cir.1971); United States ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v. Allen, 349 F.Supp. 749 (N.D.Cal.1972); United States ex rel. Lombardino v. Heyd, 318 F.Supp. 648 (E.D.La.1970), aff'd., 438 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1971); People v. Atencio, Colo., 525 P.2d 461 (1974); People v. Dowery, 20 Ill.App. 3d 738, 312 N.E.2d 682 (1974); In re Martinez, 1 Cal.3d 641, 83 Cal.Rptr. 382, 463 P.2d 734 (1970), cert. den. sub nom., Martinez v. Craven, 400 U.S. 851, 91 S.Ct. 71, 27 L.Ed.2d 88 (1970).
The rationale of the decisions is that since the Federal Fourth Amendment "evidence-exclusionary" rule is operative in any event in all "criminal prosecutions", the additional furtherance of its policy objectives achieved by extending the rule to hearings for revocation of probation (or parole) is insufficient to justify the concomitant impairment of the proper functioning of the probation-parole system.
We agree.
The presiding Justice acted without error in allowing into evidence at defendant's revocation of probation hearing the articles seized at the apartment of defendant's wife and the diamond ring taken from defendant's person.
The entry is:
Appeal denied.
Five Justices concurring.
DUFRESNE, C. J., dissents.
. In February of 1971 defendant bad been found guilty of the crime of "concealing stolen property" in violation of 17 M.R.S.A. § 3551. He was then 19 years of age. He was sentenced to the Men's Correctional Center but execution of sentence was suspended and defendant was placed on probation for two years.
. The record suggests that defendant and his wife were not living together on a full-time basis.
. The decision in Morrissey v. Brewer came after the revocation of probation proceeding here at issue. While not explicitly holding that the Morrissey constitutional requirements as to a hearing, and its nature, should be given full retrospectivity, Gagnon v. Scarpelli applied the Morrissey "hearing" criteria in that case which, as here, involved a revocation of probation proceeding occurring prior to the opinion in Morrissey. Accordingly, we approach the instant case in terms of the Morrissey criteria as to the "hearing" constitutionally required in proceedings for revocation of probation (or parole).
. Rule 32(f) M.R.Crim.P. — relative to the general subject-matter, "Sentence and Judgment", addressed by Rule 32 — deals with particular aspects of procedure for "revocation 'of probation." By itself this fails to warrant a conclusion that a proceeding for the revocation of a probation granted in connection with the suspension of the execution of a sentence actually imposed is itself a "criminal proceeding" to which all the criminal rules, as they may have relevance, are applicable.
. Illustrative of the point is the language of United States ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, supra:-
"A [probation] revocation proceeding is not an adversarial proceeding. [It] is concerned not only with protecting society, but also, and most importantly, with rehabilitating and restoring to useful lives those placed in the custody of the [Probation and] Parole Board. To apply the exclusionary rule to [probation] revocation proceedings would tend to obstruct the . . . [probation] system in accomplishing its remedial purposes.
"There is no need for double application of the exclusionary rule, using it first . . . in preventing criminal prosecution of the . . . [probationer] and a second time at a . [probation] revocation hearing. The deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule is adequately served by the exclusion of the unlawfully seized evidence in the criminal prosecution." (pp. 1163, 1164 of 426 F.2d.)
. Simultaneously, we have in mind the warning of Chief Judge Lumbard in his concur ring opinion in United States ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, supra:
"The time may come when the balance will shift. Proof of widespread police harassment of [probationers] would cause such a shift since the exclusionary rule is a deterrent which should be used when the need for deterrence is clearly shown." (p. 1166 of 426 F.2d.)