Case Name: DAVIS v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1946-12-18
Citations: 199 S.W.2d 155
Docket Number: No. 23509
Parties: DAVIS v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 199
Pages: 155–159

Head Matter:
DAVIS v. STATE.
No. 23509.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Dec. 18, 1946.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 12, 1947.
Ben J. Hagman and Borden M. Seaberry, both of Weatherford, for appellant.
Sam Cleveland, Dist. Atty., of Stephen-ville, and Ernest S. Goens, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

Opinion:
BEAUCHAMP, Judge.
Appellant was sentenced to two years in the penitentiary on a jury's verdict finding him guilty of failing to stop and render aid to a party whom he had injured by striking her with his automobile.
The accident occurred on the highway running west and near the edge of the town of Mineral Wells. The hour was late and appellant, with two men and a girl in his car, was travelling west. Two military policemen in a jeep had stopped on the north side of the road, their car facing east, and were talking to two soldiers and two girls. Appellant's car was observed as swaying from one side of the road to the other. As it approached the jeep it went off the road and around to the north of the jeep, striking the young lady who was described as being seriously injured. The car went on some distance and stopped in the middle of the highway. The engine was dead. The M. Ps. in the jeep whirled their car around and drove back to where appellant was stopped, and found him trying to start his car.
The evidence differs sharply as to what occurred at this point. Appellant testified that he had stopped his car and insisted on going back to give aid to the party or parties whom he had injured. The M. P. testifying at the instance of the state contradicted this. He did say he had appellant under arrest and would not have let him drive away, but he denies that the appellant said anything about going back to render aid to the parties, and further states that if he had done so he would have gone back with him.
Appellant's brother-in-law, Jack Smeth-ers, testified in his behalf but does not aid him in his contention that he was prevented from going back to render aid. He had been asleep and was awakened by the stopping of the car. He heard some M. P. tell him he could not go back, but did not know why, and apparently was too dazed to realize the situation. Thus an issue was drawn on appellant's defense which was fairly submitted to the jury and by them found against his contention.
Several bills of exception are in the record. The first brings forward appellant's motion for continuance which the court overruled. The ground for this continuance was the absence of Frank Strength, who was said to be in a hospital and unable to attend. The evidence which the motion asserts he would give is pertinent, but the court qualified the bill by attaching the affidavit of Frank Strength which the state presented in the contest of appellant's motion for a new trial. This affidavit is contrary to the allegations in the motion as to what he would testify, and makes his evidence harmful and not helpful to the appellant. The court overruled the motion for a new trial and we cannot say this was error.
Bills of Exception Numbers 2 and 3,raise no serious issue and will not be discussed.
Bill of Exception No. 4 complains of the conduct of the state in bringing Mary Louise Whitehead before the jury to exhibit her injuries. The court qualifies the bill by saying: "At the time the injured party was offered as a witness no objection was made to same." With this qualification the bill brings nothing for our consideration.
Bills of Exception 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9, are incomplete and will not be considered. In each bill a question is presented but the complete answer is not given, or, if given, it is in question and answer form. We are referred to some place in the record for the matters complained about. Such bills have uniformly been held under our statute to be incomplete, and are not considered. Article 667, Vernon's Ann.C.C.P. Note 23, and authorities listed thereunder; Jones v. State, 142 Tex.Cr.R. 426, 154 S.W.2d 456; Rowe v. State, 147 Tex.Cr.R. 260, 179 S.W. 2d 962.
Bill of Exception No. 10 complains of the opening argument of the County Attorney, which stated that the defendant lost control of his vehicle prior to reaching the parked jeep and the striking of the injured party. This is alleged to be contrary to the record. We are unable to say that it is. The evidence on the subject is not definite that he lost control before or immediately after the collision. He was entirely off the highway when the accident did occur and admits that immediately thereafter his car was not under control, for which reason he could not stop it any closer. The argument probably presents a reasonable deduction from the evidence as presented to the jury.
Bill No. 11 complains of the argument of the District Attorney when he said: "That this defendant at the time of striking the injured party was full of beer." The evidence in the case as to how much beer the parties had been drinking may not warrant a conclusion as to the number of bottles consumed, but, considered with all of the circumstances, forms a reasonable basis for the argument. At least he was discussing the evidence in the case and that he had a right to do. Jack Smethers, the brother-in-law of appellant who was asleep with a girl in the back of the car at the time of the accident, had been with appellant during the day on a trip to Fort Worth. On their way they stopped at Mary's Creek and drank some beer, "one or two." They next stopped at the "Last Place", a beer joint. He did not remember whether they drank one or three, he did not keep a count. On their way back they stopped to eat at some place and drank a bottle of beer. They stopped at another place, back towards Mineral Wells, where he drank another bottle. They also stopped at Mary's Creek on their way back, but he does not remember how much he drank there. The appellant did not drink every time the witness did, but he drank some. Both the witness and appellant lived in Weatherford. They picked up a girl at one of these beer joints. On the round they picked up Frank Strength. They passed through Weatherford and went on to Mineral Wells. The witness went to sleep, on the way, and did not know what happened until the car stopped after the accident.
The M. P. testified to a case of beer, some of it empty bottles, in the car, and that appellant had been drinking.
Appellant himself testified that he was just driving around to entertain the two boys who had recently been discharged from the army, and had no particular place to go. It is our conclusion that this testimony before the jury warranted the argument complained of.
The case was submitted by proper charge in which the jury was instructed to acquit the defendant if they should find that he was prevented from offering to aid the injured parties by the action of the military police. This is the crux of the case and the jury found in favor of the state. The judgment is affirmed.