Case Name: Denoris RICHARDS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1977-11-23
Citations: 562 S.W.2d 456
Docket Number: No. 54344
Parties: Denoris RICHARDS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
Judges: Before ONION, P. J., and DOUGLAS and ODOM, JJ.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Second Series
Volume: 562
Pages: 456–463

Head Matter:
Denoris RICHARDS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
No. 54344.
Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Nov. 23, 1977.
Opinion On State’s Motion for Rehearing March 1, 1978.
Rehearing Denied March 22, 1978.
Brad D. Reid, Abilene, for appellant.
Lynn Ingalsbe, Dist. Atty. and Jorge A. Solis, Asst. Dist. Atty., Abilene, Jim D. Vol-lers, State’s Atty., Austin, for the State.
Before ONION, P. J., and DOUGLAS and ODOM, JJ.

Opinion:
OPINION
ONION, Presiding Judge.
This appeal is taken from a conviction for burglary of a building. See V.T.C.A., Penal Code, § 30.02. Following a plea of guilty, punishment was assessed at fifteen (15) years by the jury.
At the outset we are confronted with appellant's contention that in admonishing the appellant as to his guilty plea the court failed to inquire whether or not he was influenced by any consideration of fear, or by any persuasion or delusive hope of pardon prompting him to confess his guilt. The real thrust of his contention is that the court did not determine whether the plea was freely and voluntarily made.
While the inquiries mentioned by the appellant were included in a former version of Article 26.13, Vernon's Ann.C.C.P., such statute has been amended.
The amendment in effect at the time of the guilty plea reads as follows:
"(a) Prior to accepting a plea of guilty or a plea of nolo contendere, the court shall admonish the defendant of:
"(1) the range of punishment attached to the offense; and
"(2) the fact that any recommendation of the prosecuting attorney as to punishment is not binding on the court.
"(b) No plea of guilty or plea of nolo contendere shall be accepted by the court unless it appears that the defendant is mentally competent and the plea is free and voluntary.
"(c) In admonishing the defendant as herein provided, substantial compliance by the court is sufficient, unless the defendant affirmatively shows that he was not aware of the consequences of his plea and that he was misled or harmed by the admonishment of the court." (Acts 1975, 64th Leg., p. 909, ch. 341, § 3, eff. June 19, 1975)
Under the amendment the court does not have to use the exact inquiries found in the former version of the statute but should still determine whether the plea is free and voluntary, and the former inquiries are helpful in this regard.
The record before us reflects that the court admonished the appellant as to the range of punishment and inquired as to his mental competency. The court made no inquiry as to the plea being free and voluntary except to ask if the appellant had been "promised anything." There was no inquiry as to whether, despite the lack of a promise, the appellant was entering his plea because of any duress, fear, undue compulsion, and persuasion or other offers of leniency, improper influence, etc. He was not even asked in a broad and general way if the plea was being freely and voluntarily made.
We cannot agree that there was even a substantial compliance with the statute under the circumstances presented. Reversal is thus mandated.
Further, there exists a federal constitutional problem. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), held that it was error, plain error, for a state trial judge to accept a guilty plea without an affirmative showing that it was intelligent and voluntary. The basic mandate of the Constitution of the United States as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States is that a trial court must determine that a plea of guilty is "knowingly, intelligently, voluntarily and willingly entered." See Pinson v. State, 530 S.W.2d 946, 951 (Tex.Cr.App.1975) (dissenting opinion). See also Goode v. State, 312 N.E.2d 109 (Court of Appeals, Indiana, 3rd Dist. 1974); Branan v. State, 316 N.E.2d 406 (Court of Appeals, Indiana, 3rd Dist. 1974).
Since the record does not reflect an affirmative showing that the guilty plea was intelligently and voluntarily given, we conclude that Boykin v. Alabama, supra, also calls for reversal.
The judgment is reversed and cause remanded.
DOUGLAS-and ODOM, JJ., dissent.
. After the court learned that appellant had been treated in "mental hospitals" for use of heroin, it spent some time inquiring into appellant's mental competency, and for this reason may have overlooked other inquiries.
. There was no admonishment that any recommendation as to punishment by the prosecuting attorney is not binding on the court. This was perhaps due to the fact that a jury had been impaneled. It would be good practice to admonish the defendant that any recommendation by the prosecutor to the jury as to punishment is not binding on the jury and they can assess any punishment within the range of penalties set for the particular offense.