Case Name: Mrs. Mary Berwick, Wife of James D. Capron, vs. A. G. Frere, Sheriff, et al.
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1896-06-23
Citations: 49 La. Ann. 201
Docket Number: No. 12,120
Parties: Mrs. Mary Berwick, Wife of James D. Capron, vs. A. G. Frere, Sheriff, et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Louisiana Annual Reports
Volume: 49
Pages: 201–230

Head Matter:
No. 12,120.
Mrs. Mary Berwick, Wife of James D. Capron, vs. A. G. Frere, Sheriff, et al.
Tlie certificate of the judge authorizing a married woman to borrow money and mortgage her property for her separate use aud benefit shifts the burden of proof as to the character of the engagment from the creditor to the Wife.
The mere fact that a married woman has been authorized to borrow a fixed amount does not necessarily bind her if she subsequently undertakes to bind herself for that amount.
Where, on the face of an act of mortgage by the wife, knowledge was brought home to the mortgagee that the money about to be borrowed was intended to be used for the purposes of cultivating a plantation carried on by the husband for the benefit of the community, the wife will not be bound.
A PPEAL from the Seventeenth Judicial District Court for the Parish of St. Mary. Allen, J.
D. Oaffery & Son for Plaintiff, Appellant:
One who takes a mortgage from a married woman, knowing that the money loaned will enure to the benefit of the husband, or with good ground to believe that it will, has no valid claim against the wife, even though the mortgage was granted under the judicial authorization provided for in Arts. 126, 127 and 128 of the Civil Code. C. O., Art. 2398; Ohaffe vs. Watts, 37 An. 333; Gibson vs. Hitchcock, 37 An. 209; Barthe vs. Kasa, 30 An. 940; Olaverie vs. Gerodias, 30 An. 292.
The ownership of a plantation in indivisión by a husband and wife, and the joint cultivation thereof by them, implies and necessitates the existence between them of a partnership,or some other contractual relation not permitted by law. Smith vs. Wilson, 10 An. 255; Benton vs. Roberts, 4 An. 216; Valensin vs. Valensin, 28 Fed. Rep. 599; Vaiden vs. Hawkins, 6 Sou. Rep. 22^; Burgess vs. Badger, 12 West, 810; Dame vs. Kempster, 8 N. Eng. 93; Bank vs. Altheimer, 8 West, 562; Domat, Part 1, Book II, Tit. Y, Sec. 2, Art. 1488; Toullier, Droit Civil, Book 7, Sec. 155, p. 91; Merlin Repertoire, Tome 6, p. 86, verbo Indivis.
A creditor who knows of the joint ownership and joint cultivation of the spouses is bound to know the legal status of such joint ownership and cultivation. Ignorantia legis neminem exeusat. C. C., Art. 2285.
A mortgage t ken by a creditor aware of a state of facts from which the law would deduce non-liability of the wife, is not protected by the certificate granted under the Act of 1855; a fortiori, must such protection be denied where the wife produces direct evidence assailing the bona fides of the creditor, and showing that he regarded the husband as his debtor.
When a wife is authorized by a judge, under the Act of 1885, to mortgage her separate property for a certain sum, for a certain purpose, and for a loan of a certain character, and she thereupon executes a mortgage for a different sum, for a purpose in addition to the one recited in the certificate, and for a loan of a different character than that authorized, whoever endeavors to enforce the mortgage must prove aliunde that the debt enured to the separate benefit of the wife. Oonrad vs. LeBlane, 29, An. 123.
The certificate of the judge is authority for both the security and the contract; and if the wife is directed to mortgage her property and to pledge the crop thereon for the purpose of securing advances on a crop to be made on the property, and the pledge of the crop is disregarded, and the property alone is encumbered for the whole amount of the loan, the certificate has been violated in that there was an injurious variance between the security allowed and that given. O. O., Art. 128.
There can be no valid sale, either directly or indirectly, and either with or without a consideration, from a wife to a husband. O. 0., Arts. 1790 and 2446.
Where a person avowedly interposed takes title to a wife’s property, and on the same day, before the same notary and in the presence of the same witnesses, immediately sells same to her husband, taking the notes of the husband to represent the price, the confessed object of the transfer being to give an extension of time on a mortgage previously affecting the wife’s property, the whole transaction must be considered as one between wife and husband, andáis, therefore, null. Parnell vs. Petrovie, 14 An. 601; Yicknair vs. Troselair, 45 An. 373; Layman vs. Vick- • nair, 4'7 An. 679.
Any third person is placed on his guard by records showing that the wife’s property had passed from her into the immediate possession of her husband; and much more is a person who actively procured the transaction held chargeable with the equities. Layman vs. Yicknair, 47 An. 679.
Mortgages are not negotiable, and the equities are always pleadable against a third holder who has not been deceived into purchas ing by the apparent straightness of the records. Layman vs. Vicknair, 47 An. 679.
One who buys without warranty gets nomore than a mere quit-claim, an equitable right, which is not bettered or strengthened by the circumstance that one who buys with such a title is a third holder. Eastman vs. Beller, 3 R. 253; 11 R. 441; 17 La. 403; 20 An. 250.
An administrator can not, without an order of court, transfer negotiable assets belonging to the succession represented by him; still less can he divest the succession of title by a private agreement to sell, in the absence of the fixing or payment of the price and without a delivery of the thing agreed to be sold. Nicholson vs. Ohapman, 1 An. 222; Burbank vs. Payne, 17 An. 15.
L. F. Suthon for W. J. Suthon, Defendant, Appellee.
E. Howard MoOaleb for Mrs. M. G. T. Stemple, Guardian, Defendant, Appellee:
Where a married woman borrows money, and is properly authorized by the judge to do so under Arts. 126, 127 and 128 of the Civil Code, she is absolutely bound in the absence of proof of: (1) Fraud or marital coercion, concurred in by or known to the creditor. Gibson vs. Hitchcock, 37 An. 209. (2) When the loan was, to the creditor’s knowledge, for the benefit of the husband or to secure his debt. 30 An. 940, 291; 31 An. 734; 26 An. 737.
In the absence of such guilty knowledge, on the creditor’s part, the judge’s certificate is a complete protection to him. 32 An. 1103; 28 An. 232, 494.
To destroy the legal effect of the judge’s certificate, “themost positive and satisfactory proof” is required. Blake vs. Nelson, 29 An. 249.
Evidence of the loose confession of a deceased person has little or no effect, particularly when contrary to rights shown by written evidence, or when other evidence can be procured. 10 L. 355; 6 An. 763; 2 R. 299; 7 R. Ill, 146; 8 An. 277; 10 An. 279; 14 An. 274; 12 An. 401.
If the original mortgage granted by a married woman is valid and legal, a subsequent transfer to the creditor of the property mortgaged, in satisfaction of the mortgage debt, is likewise valid and legal, when the consideration is adequate. The interposition of a person to receive title for the creditor does not affect the validity of such a transfer. Lester vs. Sheriff, 46 An. 340.
The consideration is adequate when it exceeds the assessed value-of the property on the assessment roll, which, after the approval of the police jury, as a board of reviewers, has a gwasi-judicial character. Railroad Company vs. Sheriff, 38 An. 760.
The good faith of a money lender is to be tested by the public records alone. “ No other notice can' prove knowledge ” as to the ownership of property. The rule applies to married women. Boyer vs. Sheriff, 40 An. 660; Broussard vs. Broussard, 45 An. 1085.
If the condition of the property is such as to invoke inquiry, then where the public records disclose no equities, in the case of married women, “an affirmative showing may be required against an attack made by the wife.” If such be the case here, such affirmative showing has been made, and a valid consideration to the wife has been proven. Layman vs. Vicknair, 46 An. 679.
Argued and submitted May 20, 1896.
Opinion handed down June 23, 1896.
Rehearing refused January 4, 1897.
Statement.
On the 4th of February, 1890, Mrs. Mary Berwick, wife of James D. Capron, aided, authorized and assisted by her husband, presented a petition to the judge of the Nineteenth Judicial District Court for the parish of St. Mary, in which she averred that she was the owner in her own right as her separate paraphernal property of the undivided half of a certain plantation in that parish, which she described. That she was administering the same for her benefit and account outside of the community between herself and her husband; that she was engaged in the cultivation and administration of same as a sugar plantation, and was in need of funds for the proper and profitable cultivation and working of the same; that she had applied to Mr. D. C. MeCan, of the city of New Orleans, for funds for the pur poses aforesaid, and the said D. C. McCan agreed to advance her the sum of ten thousand dollars as it might be required during the •current year 1890, in order to enable her to procure the necessary supplies and pay the necessary expenses of working, cultivating, harvesting and marketing the crops of cane, corn and other produce to be grown and cultivated on said plantation; that the said D. C. McCan required from her a special mortgage on her aforesaid property, and a factor’s lien and privilege on all the crops and products of the aforesaid property for the current year 1890, to secure him in his aforesaid advances not exceeding ten thousand dollars. • Wherefore she prayed the said judge to authorize her to make the aforesaid loan for the purposes aforesaid, and to secure same by a special mortgage on her aforesaid property, and also a lien and privilege on all the crops and products grown and produced on same during the current year 1890. The District Judge rendered the following order upon this petition:
“ Having examined Mrs. Mary D. Capron separate and apart from her husband, James D. Capron, and being satisfied from such examination that the sum of money which she contemplates borrowing from D. C. McCan, as stated in the foregoing petition, is for her own use and benefit, and that of her separate estate, and not for the benefit of her said husband, or the payment of his debts, nor those of the community heretofore existing between said parties, I hereby authorize the said Mrs. Mary D. Capron to borrow the said sum of ten thousand dollars from the said D. C. McCan, and to secure the same by a special mortgage on her paraphernal property, and also by a lien, privilege and pledge on the crops to be grown on her said property during the year 1890. Granted in chambers, this 4th day of February, 1890.”
On the 7th of February, 1890, a notarial act was executed before Andrew Hero, notary, to which James D. Capron and his wife and D. C. McCan were parties. In this act Mrs. Capron appeared,as acting under the authority of her husband and of the certificate or order of the District Judge just copied. The act recited that she acknowledged herself indebted to McCan in the sum of ten thousand dollars, borrowed money had of him under and by virtue of the said certificate ; that in settlement and as evidence of said indebtedness, she had furnished her two promissory notes of five thousand dollars •each,.drawn by her to her own order and by her endorsed, counter signed by her husband, payable one and two years after date, with interest at the rate of eight per cent, per annum from maturity until paid; that interest for the first year had been paid in advance, and that the interest for the second year was represented by a promissory note also then executed by Mrs. Oapron of like tenor for four hundred dollars, payable two years after date.
That in order to secure payment of the said notes Mrs. Oapron specially mortgaged in favor of McOan her undivided half interest in the property mentioned, cultivated as a sugar plantation. ' That in order to more fully secure the punctual payment of the said notes, James D. Oapron specially mortgaged his undivided half of said property in favor of McOan — to the end and effect that the plantation and appurtenances in its entirety should be mortgaged as security for the payment of the notes. It was expressly declared in the act that it was agreed and understood by and between the parties to the act that the said mortgagee should have the exclusive right to apply the net proceeds of all products shipped and all payments of money made to him to the payment of any indebtedness which might (may) be then due or which might (may) hereafter become due to said mortgagee by said mortgagors, whether upon an open account or to the debt secured and intended to be secured by the act, ■ according to the said mortgagee’s view of the exigency of the case; that such application might (may) be made at such times and in such manner as said mortgagee might (may) elect; that no application of such proceeds of sales or money to the payment of any debt on open account which might be due to the said mortgagee by the said mortgagors should impair, lessen or prejudice the indebtedness evidenced by the notes and secured by the mortgage, and that said mortgagee should have the full and undisputed right to impute payment as he might determine to whatsoever debt might (may) be due him by said mortgagors. Production of the certificate of mortgages in the parish of St. Mary was waived. The certificate or order of the District Judge was annexed to the act.
On the 18th of April, 1893, by act before John J. Ward, notary public, James Oapron sold his undivided half of the property mortgaged to Charles J. McMurdo in consideration of the price of nine thousand one hundred and twenty-four dollars. The act of sale recited that the purchaser was the holder and owner of four promissory notes, for the sum of two thousand dollars each, drawn by Oapron to his own order and by himself endorsed, bearing interest at the rate of eight per cent, per annum from January 1, 1890, until paid, said notes amounting, at'the date of the sale, in principal and interest, to the sum of nine thousand one hundred and twenty-four dollars, and being the notes given by Oapron to his vendor, Mrs. Allen, in payment of the property conveyed. That their payment was secured by special mortgage on the property sold, with vendor’s privilege, and that the vendor had agreed to accept and receive said notes in settlement of said purchase price. The act declared that in full settlement of the purchase price the purchaser had surrendered and delivered the four aforesaid notes to the vendor, who acknowledged receipt of the same, declaring himself therewith fully satisfied and paid and granted the purchaser a full acquittance and discharge for the aforesaid price.
The notes having been produced and canceled, authorization was given to the recorder to cancel and erase the inscription of the mortgage securing the same.
On the same day, before the same notary, Mrs. James D. Oapron sold her undivided half in the same property to Charles J. McMurdo for the price of ten thousand nine hundred and fifty-five dollars. The act recited that the pimchaser was the holder and owner of two notes, of five thousand dollars each, drawn by Mrs. Oapron to her own order and by her endorsed, countersigned by her husband, which notes, in principal and interest, at the date of sale, amounted to said sum of ten thousand nine hundred and fifty-five dollars; that said notes w>re those secured by the special mortgage on the property sold in favor of D. C. McCan by the act of February 1Y, 1890, before Hero, notary, and that the vendor had agreed to accept and receive said notes in settlement of the purchase price. The parties declared that said price had been settled and liquidated by the purchaser’s surrendering and delivering to the vendor the said notes, “ they having been canceled' in the presence of the notary, the holder acknowledging payment of the same and granting Mrs. Oapron full acquittance and discharge therefor.” The notes having been canceled, authorization was given to the recorder to erase the inscription on the mortgage books of the mortgage securing the same.
On the same day the same notary, Charles J. McMurdo, sold the property in its entirety to James 'D. Oapron (the act reciting that it was the same property which the vendor had acquired that day from the purchaser Oapron and from his wife by two acts passed before John J. Ward, notary) for the price of twenty thousand dollars, payable two thousand dollars in cash, three thousand payable in one year, four thousand payable in two years, five thousand payable in three years, and six thousand payable in four years, with interest on the entire credit portion payable annually; the credit portion being represented by promissory notes executed by Oapron to his own order and by himself endorsed, secured by special mortgage on the property sold. The interest portion of the purchase price was represented by notes separate and distinct from those for the principal amount, and notes being also secured by special mortgage on the property sold. One of the interest notes was for the sum of fourteen hundred and forty dollars. The notes were all delivered to McMurdo.
On the 23d of June, 1894, by act before Ward, notary, Harry H. Hall, as executor of D. C. McOan, transferred with their accessory rights but without warranty or recourse back to Walter J. Suthon two of the notes executed by James D. Oapron as representing the credit portion of the price of the sale made to him by McMurdo, with the agreement that the rights of Suthon as holder of the same would be subordinate to those of McOan as holder of the other notes.
Suthon, as holder of these two notes, having seized under an order of sale the entire property, was met by an injunction taken out by Mrs. Oapron, and we are called on to pass upon the issues raised by the parties in that injunction.
There was judgment for defendants, and plaintiffs appealed.

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Nicholls, C. J.
It is claimed on behalf of Suthon and the executor of McCan that Mrs. James D. Capron became indebted to McCan in the sum of ten thousand dollars and interest through a loan made to her on the seventh day of February, 1890, on the faith of the certificate or order of the District Judge of the court of her residence, authorizing her to contract said loan, and that said loan was legally secured under the same authorization by special mortgage on her undivided half of the plantation owned jointly between herself and husband, and cultivated as a sugar plantation; that she legally sold her interest to McCan through McMurdo (acting on his behalf) in payment of her indebtedness; that her husband having sold his undivided half also to McMurdo (for McCan) the latter then becoming the owner of the entire property, sold the same to plaintiff's husband, the price being secured by mortgage; that said sale was legal, and that plaintiff, through her own sale to McCan, divested herself of all interest in the premises; that if the sale should be set aside McCan should be reinstated in bis position, quoad Mrs. Capron and the property to the position which he occupied prior to her sale.
The property in question at the time of the loan made by McCan was as to one undivided half of the paraphernal property of the wife of James D. Capron. The other undivided half belonged to the husband, he having acquired it from his wife's sister. At the time of the loan the husband's half was struck by a special mortgage and vendor's privilege securing notes given by the purchaser to his vendor. The property had been cultivated for some years as a sugar plantation, and the wife had for several years, under the authorization of the judge, mortgaged her undivided half to different factors to assist in carrying on the place.
On February 7, 1890, D. C. McCan made the loan which has given rise to this litigation. On the face of the papers McCan appears to have loaned Mrs. Capron ten thousand dollars, for which he executed notes and secured the same by special mortgage on her undivided half of the property. On the face of the papers James D. Capron secured the whole amount by mortgage on his half.
It is urged that McCan is protected by the authorization of the judgw to the wife from the attack she makes in this case.
The mere fact that a married woman has been authorized by the judge to contract a debt of ten thousand dollars does not necessarily conclusively bind her if she subsequently undertakes to bind herself for that amount. The certificate of the judge shifts the burden of proof as to the character of the engagement. An examination of the act of mortgage between McCan, James D. Capron and Mrs. Capron satisfies us that the act does not truly disclose the relations of the parties to it. We are of the opinion that on its face, knowledge was brought home to McCan that Capron and wife owned the plantation jointly in equal, proportions; that the money about to be borrowed was intended to be used for the purpose of cultivating the plantation that year; that the lender knew that the husband was really carrying on the whole place for and on behalf of the community. The husband's half at that time, as we have said, was encumbered by a special mortgage. It was important that whatever advances should be made should, if possible, be secured to their full extent by mortgage. It was evidently supposed that under and through the wife's authorization the lender would be protected on her half of the property to the full amount which she was authorized to borrow, but if not, then by making the husband secure it in its entirety by a second mortgage on his own behalf, McCan would still occupy a safe position. Matters were made to take that shape, but we think that the act bears intrinsic evidence that McCan was not dealing with James D. Capron really as a surety; that he was dealing with the husband as a principal, and that she was really mortgaging her property for her husband's debts. (Moore vs. Staneel, 36 An. 824.) Defendants say that McCan did not occupy the position of factor toward James D. Capron; that he was simply an " out and out" lender of money to Mrs. Capron, and that the mortgage was a " flat" mortgage.
If this be true what means that portion of the act in which it is declared that "it was expressly agreed and understood that McOan should have the exclusive right to apply the net proceeds of sale of all products shipped and all payments made to him to the payment of any indebtedness which may be due now, or which may hereafter become due to him by said 'mortgagors,' whether upon an 'open account' or to the debt secured and intended to be secured by these presents according to his view of the case; that such application might be made at such times and in such manner as he might elect; that no application of such proceeds of sales or money to the payment of an indebtedness on an open account which may at any time be due to him by the said ' mortgagors ' shall impair, lessen or prejudice the indebtedness evidenced by notes and secured or intended to be secured by this instrument or the security herein and hereby provided for, and that said mortgagee shall have the full and undisputed right to impute payment as he may determine to whatsoever debt may be due by said' 'mortgagors.' " What " debts made by open account," what "debts due by mortgagors," are here referred to? Certainly not any due by her.
It is very true that a husband may become a surety for his wife; (it has been so held), but we think the term of the mortgage act point unmistakably to the fact that the form in which this act was drawn was resorted to simply as a means to enable the lender to get secured on the wife's property for debts of her husband. On the face of the papers the crop (the means by which the District Court contemplated that any liability to be incurred under his certificate was to be paid) was expressly authorized to be taken from her and applied to her husband's debts, either upon open account or otherwise, leaving her property utterly without protection.
What effect did the acts between McMurdo and her husband and between McMurdo and herself have upon the situation ? It is conceded that McMurdo and McOan are to be taken and considered as one and the same person.
We think that the two acts of sale (those to McMurdo and that of McMurdo to Oapron, the husband) are to be read together and as forming one continuous transaction. Were the acts of sale from Mrs. Oapron to McMurdo, and from McMurdo to James D. Oapron, intended really as sales, or were they merely resorted to in order to place the matter in more satisfactory form than they had been in before? What was the object and what the motive of these acts, and what did they rest on? At that time McOan held the notes secured by special mortgage and vendor's privilege on Capron's half of the property. It was thought best that the property should be made to stand in its entirety in the name of Oapron, the husband, and that the indebtedness should appear what it really was, an indebtedness due by himself, but the apparent mortgage to McOan, indebtedness of the wife was made use of as an instrumentality by which to shift ownership from herself to her husband and mask the character of the wife's connection with the debt.
We are of the opinion that the sale from Mrs. Capron. to McMurdo can not stand, there being no legal consideration for the same, and that sale being the basis of the sale to Capron from McMurdo of Mrs. Capron's half of the property, the sale of that undivided half to Capron falls also.
We do not think that the plaintiff, Walter J. Suthon, occupies a better position than does the succession of McCan. We think his knowledge of the situation (although he may have drawn erroneous conclusions from it) effectually prevents his pleading that the equities have been cut off in his favor.
We are of the opinion that the judgment appealed from is erroneous.
It is ordered, adjudged and decreed that the judgment appealed from be and the same is hereby annulled, avoided and reversed; and it is now ordered, adjudged and decreed that Mrs. Mary Berwick, wife of James D. Capron, be and she is recognized and declared to be the owner of the undivided half of the plantation seized herein and described in the pleadings, and she is restored to the possession and enjoyment of the same, free from the encumbrances placed upon it by her husband, James D. Capron, in favor of D. C. MeCan or Charles McMurdo, the said mortgage being declared to be null, void and of no effect as against said undivided half of said property.
It is also ordered, adjudged and decreed that the sale of the undivided half of said property, made on the 18th of April, 1898, by act before John J. Ward, notary public, by Mrs. Mary Berwick, wife of James D. Oapron, to Charles J. McMurdo, and the sale made by Charles J. McMurdo on the same day, before the same notary, to James D. Oapron, of the undivided half of said property herein adjudged to be the property of said Mrs. Mary Berwick, wife of James D. Oapron, be and the same are hereby decreed null, void and of no effect.
It is further ordered that the injunction herein issued be and the same is reinstated and the same is now perpetuated.
Rehearing refused January 4, 1897.