Case Name: STATE v. MORGAN
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1917-06-30
Citations: 142 La. 755
Docket Number: No. 22648
Parties: STATE v. MORGAN.
Judges: O’NIELL, J., adhering to the views expressed in the original opinion rendered in this case, dissents from the ruling on bills of exception C, D and E, and from the de^ cree annulling the verdict and sentence.
Reporter: Louisiana Reports
Volume: 142
Pages: 755–785

Head Matter:
(77 South. 588)
No. 22648.
STATE v. MORGAN.
(June 30, 1917.
Rehearing on Rule Denied Oct. 2, 1917. On the Merits, Oct. 29, 1917. On Rehearing, Jan. 28, 1918.)
(Syllabus by Editorial Staff.)
On Rule to Show Cause.
1. Crimiiíal Law <&wkey;1110(9) — Transcript-Return por Completion.
Defendant’s rule to show cause why the transcript should not be returned to the clerk to be completed would be denied, where the clerk had since returned all exhibits, documents, etc., necessary to an intelligent understanding and hearing of the case.
(Syllabus by the Court.)
On the Merits.
2. Criminal Law &wkey;3ll60 — Discretion op Trial Court — Change op Venue — Number op Witnesses.
The number of witnesses that the defendant in a criminal prosecution should be allowed to summon for the trial of a motion for a change of venue is a matter largely within the discretion of the trial judge. His ruling in the premises should be affirmed, unless he abused his discretion.
3. Criminal Law <&wkey;1090(l) — Ruling or Conduct op Court — Bill op Exceptions.
An incorrect ruling or improper conduct on the part of the trial judge in a criminal case might be cause for setting aside the verdict, without being an indication of bias or prejudice on the part of the judge. Whether the rulings were correct or incorrect is to be determined from the bills of exception reserved to the rulings.
4. Judges <&wkey;51(4) — Motion por Recusation —Determination.
The judge to whom a motion for recusation is addressed is not compelled to refer it to another judge to determine whether the allegations in the motion are true, but may overrule the motion himself, if the allegations do not set forth a legal cause for recusation.
5. Judges <&wkey;49(l) — Recusation—Prejudice or Bias.
Prejudice or bias on the part of the judge has not been declared by statute in this state to be a cause for which the defendant in a criminal prosecution may demand that the judge recuse himself.
6. Judges &wkey;>51(3), 53 — Recusation—Motion —Waiver.—Allegations.
In those jurisdictions where bias or prejudice on the part of the judge is a cause for which the defendant in a criminal prosecution may demand that the judge be recused, the rule is that an objection, on that ground, to the judge’s presiding in the case, must be made before any issue has been presented or submitted by the defendant to the judge for decision, or the objection will be considered waived. If the defendant has discovered, after having tendered or submitted a preliminary issue to the judge for decision, that the judge is prejudiced against him, he must allege, in his motion for recusation, that he did not know of the prejudice of the judge, or know the facts on which he bases his belief that the judge is prejudiced, when he tendered or submitted the preliminary issue to the judge for decision.
7. Criminal Law c&wkey;134(l), 139 — Change op Venue — Question—Determination.
The only Question on which testimony is admissible on the trial of a motion for a change of venue is whether the party applying for the change of venue can or cannot obtain a fair or impartial trial in the parish in which the case is then pending. If the judge concludes that the change of venue should be granted, it is for him to decide which parish in his or an adjoining district he will send the case to for trial.
8. Criminal Law <§=^139, 1150 — Review — Venue — Discretion.
Although the district attorney has no right to select the parish to which a case shall be sent for trial, in an application on behalf of the state for a change of venue, nevertheless, his selection or suggestion of a particular parish to which the case should be sent does not deprive the judge of his discretion in the premises. The sending* of the case to the parish named by the district attorney in his application for a change of venue is not a reversible error on the part of the judge.
9. Criminal Law <&wkey;752%, 1090(1) — Discontinuance op Trial — Remedy op Depend-ant.
A district judge is not compelled to stop the trial of a criminal ease before a jury whenever the defendant or his attorney sees fit to notify the judge that he intends to apply to the Supreme Court for supervisory writs to correct what he considers an erroneous ruling on the part of the judge. TheVremedy of the defendant or his attorney in such case is to reserve a bill of exception to the ruling complained of and urge his complaint on appeal if a verdict be rendered against him.
10. Criminal Law &wkey;>419, 420(2) — Homicide <&wkey;166(l) — Motive—Hearsay Evidence.
The rule excluding hearsay evidence does not apply to a statement, the mere making of which is relevant to an issue in the case. Therefore, in a prosecution for the killing of a deputy sheriff, the evidence against the accused party being mainly circumstantial, it is permissible for the state to prove that, several hours before the homicide, the deputy sheriff was looking for the accused and asked a witness whether the accused had received whisky from the railroad station that afternoon, and was told by the witness that the accused had received the whisky, and that the officer replied that he would get the accused for bootlegging that night. The evidence was admissible as a circumstance tending to prove motive on the part of the accused party.
11. Criminal Law <&wkey;l 159(1) — Appeal—'Verdict.
The .Supreme Court has not jurisdiction of the question whether the verdict of the jury in a criminal case was contrary to the law and the evidence, even where all of the evidence heard by the jury was reduced to writing and is attached to the bill of exception taken to the overruling of the defendant’s motion for a new trial, if the bill does not present a question of law that can be considered and decided separately and apart from any question of fact pertaining to the guilt or innocence of the defendant.
(Syllabus iy Editorial Staff.)
On Rehearing.
12. Criminal Law <&wkey;121 — Change on Venue — Statute—Discretion of Court.
Under Const, art. 9, providing that an accused shall have the right to a trial by an impartial jury, and Rev. St. §§ 1021-1023, authorizing a change of venue where defendant cannot have the fair trial in the parish where the case is pending, and providing for an application for a change of venue and for notice to the district attorney and for a hearing and determination, the judge has a judicial discretion and must pass upon the evidence and decide whether it justifies a change of venue, in view of the defendant’s rights and of the enforcement of the criminal statutes.
13. Criminal Law <&wkey;1160 — Review — Change of Venue — Discretion.
Such judicial discretion will always be presumed to have been wisely exercised, and, as a rule, will not be lightly interfered with, though it is reviewable, but where the judge refuses to permit an accused to offer evidence on the application the appellate court cannot say whether he has abused his discretion.
14. Criminal Law <&wkey;134(l) — Venue—Proof.
Where accused objected to a change of venue, but prayed in the alternative that, if the venue should be changed, it be changed to some other parish than that requested by the district attorney, because he believed he could not obtain a fair trial in that parish, he was entitled, in the exercise of his constitutional right to a fair trial before an impartial jury, to offer evidence to that effect and to have such proof put on the record so that the ruling of the judge might be subjected to review, and a deprivation of such right entitles him to have a conviction set aside.
O’Niell, J., dissenting.
Appeal from Fifth Judicial District Court, Parish of Jackson; Cas Moss, Judge.
Pete Morgan was convicted of murder, and he appeals.
Conviction annulled, and cause remanded to the district court for parish of Winn for a reopening of trial of State’s motion for a change of venue, and for a new trial.
R. E. Milling, of New Orleans, W. M. Wallace, of Winnfield, J. B. Roberts, of Colfax, W. J. Hammon, of Jonesboro, and George Wear, Sr., of Alexandria, for appellant. A. V. Coco, Atty. Gen., and Julius T. Long, Dist. Atty., of Winnfield (Thomas S. Price, of Ruston, and Vernon A. Coco, of New Orleans, of counsel), for the State.

Opinion:
On Rule to Show Cause.
LECHE, J.
The defendant and appellant in the above cause, alleging many omissions and deficiencies in the transcript filed herein, prayed for and obtained from this court, a rule on the Attorney General and the clerk of the Fifth judicial district court for the parish of Jackson, to show cause why the said transcript should not he returned to the said clerk to be fully completed in accordance with the prayer of his (relator's) petition.
The Attorney General and the clerk have made a return to said rule, in which they account in detail and categorically, for all of the alleged omissions and deficiencies and in which they pray that said rule be recalled and the writ of mandamus prayed for by relator he refused.
The transcript originally filed herein on June 5, 1917, consists of two volumes, and on June 11th an additional volume containing all the testimony taken on defendant's preliminary trial was also filed. Annexed to the answer of defendants in rule there was also filed another volume marked as "Exhibit A" containing a lot of original papers and memoranda and in connection therewith a certificate from tlie said clerk of tie Fifth judicial district court for tlie parish of Jackson, in which that officer certifies:
"That said Exhibit A contains a full and complete list of the documents and papers forming part of the record of the case of State of Louisiana v. Pete Morgan, No. 2761 on the docket of this court and No. 22648 on the docket of the Supreme Court, and all of which documents and papers are hereto attached, which were not transcribed and made part of the transcript of this case sent to the Supreme Court of Louisiana June 1, 1917, except the testimony taken upon the preliminary trial of the accused, Pete Morgan, which testimony has already been sent to said co.urt by request of Hon. J. B. Roberts, one of counsel for defendant, it being sent by prepaid express on or about the 9th day of June, 1917."
It appears to us that the clerk has substantially remedied all the defects complained of in relator's petition for the writ of mandamus, that he has supplied, in the documents filed in this court on June 11th, those filed on June 16th, and in his return to the rule nisi, all the information necessary to a fair and intelligent hearing and understanding of the case, and that if-upon such hearing it should develop that the record is still incomplete to the extent of injuriously affecting- relator's rights, the court will yet he in a position to grant him adequate remedy.
For these reasons, the rule herein issued is recalled, and the writ prayed for is denied.