Case Name: Francine S. SCHILLER, Appellant, v. Paul MILLER, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1993-05-26
Citations: 621 So. 2d 481
Docket Number: No. 92-2386
Parties: Francine S. SCHILLER, Appellant, v. Paul MILLER, Appellee.
Judges: ANSTEAD and STONE, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 621
Pages: 481–485

Head Matter:
Francine S. SCHILLER, Appellant, v. Paul MILLER, Appellee.
No. 92-2386.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
May 26, 1993.
Gary A. Dumas and Karen L. Trafford of Styles, Dumas & Trafford, P.A., Fort Laud-erdale, for appellant.
Bruce L. Hollander of Hollander & Associates P.A., Hollywood, for appellee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
We affirm a temporary restraining order enjoining Schiller from disposing of four pieces of jewelry, including a 5.8 carat diamond engagement ring, and limiting Miller's bond to $1,000.00. During the parties' lengthy personal relationship Miller purchased jewelry which was kept in a safe in the parties' home. They also purchased real property together which is held by Schiller. When the relationship ended, Schiller claimed the jewelry and placed it in a safe deposit box. Miller's complaint seeks both legal and equitable relief.
Initially, the court entered an ex parte restraining order. Schiller moved to dis solve that order because it failed to meet the requirements of rule 1.610, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.
The matter was set for an evidentiary hearing. After that hearing, the court entered an interim order dissolving the ex parte injunction, but ordering Schiller not to dispose of the jewelry pending further order of the court. The court then entered an order prohibiting dissipation of the assets.
We recognize that injunctions may not be granted for the retention of personal property unless it is found to be unique or otherwise peculiar, and unless the plaintiff demonstrates that there is no adequate remedy at law. E.g. Esposito v. Horning, 416 So.2d 896 (Fla. 4th DCA1982). However, here the trial court made the following findings:
C. That the personal property which is the subject matter hereof, hereinafter referred as the "jewelry", is as follows:
(a) One handmade platinum ladies engagement diamond ring with a center pear shaped diamond of 5.81 cts., G-H in color, S12 in clarity with matching tapered baguettes with 1.40 cts. total weight.
(b) One florentine tennis bracelet containing 34 genuine brilliant round cut diamonds, eye clean, near colorless weighing approximately 8.04ct. hand set in a 14K gold mounting.
(c) One ladies aquamarine and diamond ring.
(d) One ladies tourmaline necklace.
D. A few months after the purchase of each of the aforementioned pieces of jewelry, same were appraised for considerably more than their original purchase price. By way of example, the engagement ring which was purchased for $38,-000.00 and that a few thousand dollars more was spent on baguettes for same appraised for $60,000.00.
E. Although it is a given that items of jewelry can always be sold, the testimony of the Defendant was that she did not know the value of any of the pieces and that if same were sold on a rush or quick basis, that such a sale would greatly diminish the sales price. Additionally, the Defendant testified that tourmaline is difficult to obtain and is not currently readily available in the marketplace.
F. The Defendant testified that the jewelry is in her possession in her box at Citibank and that both she and her sister, Lisa, have access to the box.
G. The Defendant stated that she had no intention of disposing of any of the aforementioned four pieces of jewelry during the pendency of Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief.
H. That the actual present market value of the aforementioned four pieces of jewelry is difficult to ascertain as they are all unique one of a kind creations and that inasmuch as neither of the parties hereto could ascribe a value to same, this Court cannot place a value on the jewelry-
I. That all of the jewelry was purchased with the funds of the Plaintiff.
J. That each of the parties claim an interest in the jewelry.
Given the findings with respect to the unique aspect of the property, the findings as they bear on whether Appellee has an adequate remedy at law, and the presumptions accorded the court's findings, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion. Cf. Price v. Gordon, 129 Fla. 715, 177 So. 276 (Fla.1937).
We also note that the effect of the court order is essentially to maintain the status quo, other than to improve the security arrangements with respect to the safe deposit box. Further, the Appellant has not demonstrated that the bond posted is grossly inadequate under these circumstances. See Minimatic Components, Inc. v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation, 494 So.2d 303 (Fla. 4th DCA1986).
Appellant is not precluded from seeking a modification of the injunction in the event that the bond should subsequently prove to be insufficient. However, at this time Appellant acknowledges that she has no intention of disposing of the property.
ANSTEAD and STONE, JJ., concur.
FARMER, J., dissents with opinion.