Case Name: Susan Geoghegan, as Administratrix of John M. Geoghehan, Deceased, Appellant, against The Atlas Steamship Company, Respondent
Court: New York Court of Common Pleas
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1890-06-02
Citations: 16 Daly (N.Y.) 229
Docket Number: 
Parties: Susan Geoghegan, as Administratrix of John M. Geoghehan, Deceased, Appellant, against The Atlas Steamship Company, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: Daly's Common Pleas Reports
Volume: 16
Pages: 229–232

Head Matter:
Susan Geoghegan, as Administratrix of John M. Geoghehan, Deceased, Appellant, against The Atlas Steamship Company, Respondent.
(Decided June 2d, 1890.)
A commission should not be granted to take testimony of lawyers of a foreign country to prove a statute of that country, and its interpretation, where it is not shown that there is any ambiguity or uncertainty in its meaning, or that it has received any judicial interpretation there, or that it cannot be proved, under section 942 of the Code of Civil Procedure, by an officially printed copy.
Evidence by lawyers of a foreign country, as to the opinion of lawyers there on the construction of a statute of that country, is not admissible where the language of the statute is plain and there is no decision by the courts of such country upon the point in controversy.
Appeal from an order of this court denying a motion for a commission to take testimony.
The facts are stated in the opinions.
JRoger M. Sherman, for appellant.
‘Wheeler, Oortis, $ GfodMn, for respondent.

Opinion:
Larremore, Gh. J.
This is an appeal from an order denying an application, made by plaintiff, for a commission to take the testimony of two advocates in active legal practice in the Republic of Colombia, as experts. It was conceded on the argument that the object of such examination was to prove a certain statute law, alleged to have been in operation in the United States of Colombia (which government has since-been merged into the.present Republic of Colombia), and the interpretations of sucli statute made and accepted by the courts of such foreign country.
Section 942 of the Code provides a simple manner of proving foreign statutes by officially printed copies. The learned counsel for appellant argues that the law does not restrict him to such form of proof, and further contends that he should not be so limited, because there is nothing to show that printed copies of the law in force when the accident occurred exist. Undoubtedly, the learned judge didin effect presume that printed copies were obtainable, but we think it was not error for him to entertain such presumption, under the circumstances disclosed, in a matter addressed-to his discretion. Section 888 is not mandatory, but the discretion granted by it is to be exercised with the greatest latitude and always in the interests of substantial justice. Nevertheless, the judge was not precluded from considering that, in the present state of civilization, most governments officially print their statutes, and from supposing such to be the fact here, as there was no allegation in the papers, or suggestion on the argument, to the contrary. On the basis that the proof could be made under section 942, we think it was a proper exercise of discretion not to put the parties to the trouble and expense of any other form of procedure.
On the question of the alleged interpretation of the statute by the courts of Colombia, we think the rule well settled that the evidence of the proposed witnesses would be incompetent if obtained (Molson's Bank v. Boardman, 47 Hun 142, and cases there cited). It would have been an unwise exercise of discretion to grant plaintiff a commission to take evidence, which, on her own showing, would certainly have been inadmissible.
The order should be affirmed, with costs.
Bookstaver, J.—The action in which the motion was made is brought to recover damages from the defendant for the alleged death of plaintiff's intestate, caused as it is claimed by the negligence of defendant in the harbor of Savanilla, Republic -of Colombia. The learned judge who heard the motion says in his opinion it was conceded on the argument by plaintiff's counsel that the sole object of the proposed commission was to secure proof of a certain statute law of the Republic of Colombia and its interpretation in that country. No other ground for the motion is suggested by the moving papers. They do not show that there is any ambiguity or uncertainty in the meaning of the law, or that it has received any judicial interpretation in that republic, or that it cannot be proved under section 942 of our Code. We think the latter fact at least must be made to appear before the court would be authorized to grant the commission.
It has been held that the statute law of another state cannot be proved by parol (Toulandou v. Lachenmeyer, 6 Abb. Pr. N. S. 215 ; Kenny v. Clarkson, 1 Johns. 385).
But if the object of the commission had been stated in the papers to be to prove the construction and interpretation of this foreign statute, the opinion of the persons sought to be examined would not be admissible to prove it.
Where the evidence of a foreign law consists entirely of a written document, statute or judicial opinion, the question of its construction and effect is for the court to determine, and evidence of a lawyer of another state or country as to what, in the opinion of lawyers there, should be the construction of a statute of that state or country, is not admissible where the language of the statute is plain and there is no. decision by the courts of that state or country upon the points in controversy (Molsons' Bank v. Boardman, 47 Hun 142; Kline v. Baker, 99 Mass. 255 ; Shoe & Leather Bank v. Wood, 142 Mass. 564; Hennessy v. Farrely, 13 Daly 468; Dupuy v. Wurtz, 53 N. Y. 571).
The motion was therefore. properly denied, and the order appealed from should be affirmed, with costs.
Order affirmed, with costs.