Case Name: Frank Burns, Appl't, v. Devine M. Munger, Resp't
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1887-06-25
Citations: 9 N.Y. St. Rep. 573
Docket Number: 
Parties: Frank Burns, Appl’t, v. Devine M. Munger, Resp’t.
Judges: 
Reporter: New York State Reporter
Volume: 9
Pages: 573–577

Head Matter:
Frank Burns, Appl’t, v. Devine M. Munger, Resp’t.
(Supreme Court, General Term, Fifth Department,
Filed June 25, 1887.)
1. Contract—Action on—Conditions precedent must be performed BEFORE BRINGING.
This action was brought by the assignee of a party to a written contract by which the defendant agreed to pay a sum stated to that party in consideration of his delivering to him a perfect title to a certain canal boat “and clearing up the record title to the same, nullifying all liens, mortgages, etc.,” to the satisfaction of that party and delivering to him all papers necessary to properly transfer the boat to him or his order. Held, that conditions precedent must be fully performed to give a right of action to the party on whom their performance rests.
2. Same—Construction of
Held, that the purpose of the parties to the agreement was to vest in the defendant a perfect title to the boat. That the provisions of the agreement were entitled to reasonable interpretation and that reference should be had to the purpose in view to ascertain the intention of the parties making the agreement.
3. Same—Construction—Laws 1864, chap. 412, in regard to chattel MORTGAGES ON CANAL BOATS—PROVIDES NO METHOD OF DISCHARGE FROM RECORD.
Provision is made by Laws 1864, chapter 412, for the filing of chattel mortgages on canal boats in the office of the auditor of the canal department, and an entry of the fact in a book kept in his office, but no provision for discharging such mortgages of record. Held, that the agreement could not have contemplated that an entry should be made in the books of the auditor which was not authorized by statute.
4. Chattel mortgages on canal boat—Piling—Effect of as against JUNIOR MORTGAGES.
Held, that a senior mortgage having been filed as required by statute at the time of filing two junior mortgages, was effectual against them and remained so without refiling.
6. Same—Foreclosure—Effect of.
Held, that by a foreclosure and sale under such senior mortgages the record title represented by the junior mortgages and the filing and registering of them was cleared up so far as practicable and as effectually as if discharges had been executed by the mortgagees.
6. Contract—Construction of
Held, that the clearing up of the title was all that was required by the agreement. That this having been effectually done, the contract providing no manner in which it should be done except to the satisfaction of the defendant, his caprice could not properly take the place of satisfaction on his part.
Appeal from judgment entered on report of referee.
The action is to recover the purchase price of a canal boat sold by one Collins to the defendant and alleged to be due and payable to the plaintiff who is the assignee of the claim. The action is upon the agreement of the plaintiff made in writing as follows:
“Few York, April 28, 1880.
In consideration of Patrick J. Collins deliveing to me a perfect title to the canal boat H. H. Sabey, and clearing up the record title to the same, nullifying an liens, mortgages, etc., to my satisfaction, I will pay to the order of said Patrick J. Collins, and on delivery of all the papers necessary to properly transfer said boat to me or to my order, the sum of one thousand dollars. D. M. MUHGER.”
The referee has found that the agreement was on April 28, 1880, executed and delivered by the defendant to Collins, and that on April 29,1880, Collins delivered the boat and a bill of sale of it, duly executed by him to the defendant or to his agent, and that although the name of the purchaser in the bill of sale was left blank, it and the boat were so delivered with the intent to convey title to the said boat to the purchaser. The referee also found that the condition in the agreement of April 28, 1880, providing for clearing up the record title nullifying all liens, mortgages, etc., to the satisfaction of the defendant had not been performed and directed judgment for the defendant.
This conclusion is based upon the further facts found by him that one Glenn being the owner of the boat, sold it to Helen Herring in August, 1877, and took from her a chattel mortgage upon it to secure $1,550 of the purchase money, that pursuant to the mortgage the boat was taken from the-possession of the mortgagor, the sale of it duly advertised and on July 24, 1879, sold at public auction to Collins who took possession and held it until the delivery of it to the defendant or his agent April 29, 1880, that after her purchase of the boat and in 1878 and 1879, Herring made to Ryan and Hogan, respectively, mortgages upon it which were filed in the office of the Auditor of the Canal Department, that the mortgage to Ryan was renewed by filing a copy in 1879, and not after, and that the mortgage to Hogan was in like manner renewed annually to and including 1881. There is no finding that the lien of those two mortgages, or of either of them, continued on the boat after the sale on the prior and purchase money mortgage.
■ The party who took possession of the boat under such purchase by the defendant and ran it, caused the boat to be placed upon a dry dock in Hew Jersey for repairs in July, 1881, and failing to pay charges for the repairs there made, it was sold by a United States marshal pursuant to a decree on account of the claim and in execution of the lien of the dry dock man.
P. Brundage, for app’lt; William Nathaniel Cogswell, for resp’t.

Opinion:
Bradley, J.
It must be assumed, for the purpose of this review, that by the sale of the boat to the defendant, and the delivery of it and the bill of sale, he took title free from all liens. The view of the referee evidently was that the two subsequent mortgages ceased to be effectual liens or charges upon the boat from and after the sale of it upon the prior and purchase money mortgage, and that the title of the defendant was, so far as appeared, perfect on the de livery of the property on April 29, 1880, and put his determition on the ground that the right to require payment was dependent upon the condition precedent, that the record in the auditor's office should in some manner represent that those two junior mortgages, or that the apparent lien appearing by such record should be made to disappear. The general rule upon the subject is that a condition precedent must be fully performed to give a right of action to the party on whom its performance rests. Oakley v. Morton, 11 N. Y., 25. And this proposition is asserted as the defense. The purpose of the parties to the agreement of sale was to vest in the defendant a perfect title to the boat, and to that end the provision referred to was inserted by the defendant in the instrument containing his promise to pay. It is entitled to a reasonable interpretation, and some reference may be had to the purpose in view to ascertain the intention of the parties in making and taking the agreement. There is no provision furnished by the statute for making the discharge of chattel mortgages of record. It is provided that they may be filed with the auditor, and that an entry .be made in a book kept in his office, in a manner specified. Laws 1864, chap. 412. It could not have been contemplated that any entry should be made in the books of the auditor not authorized by the statute. The consideration upon which the defendant agreed to pay the purchase price was that Collins should deliver the papers necessary to transfer the boat to the defendant, and deliver to him a perfect title to it, but it is said that this is not all, because the further requirement embraced within the consideration is the clearing up of the record title, nullifying all liens, etc. How is this to be done otherwise than by transferring a perfect title by delivery of the papers requisite for such purpose? The liens and mortgages were nullified when the perfect title was transferred. There could then remain no record title or title on the record in the application of that term to personal property. The clearing up the title seems to be all that was required to accomplish what was within the meaning of the agreement. How it should be done is not provided for by the contract other than that it should be done to the satisfaction of the defendant. And when it is effectually done, his caprice cannot properly take the place of satisfaction on his part. Assuming, as we do, that the defendant, so far as relates to the title and to its freedom from lien, received by the sale and delivery of the property all that was bargained for, the continued appearances upon the files and register of the auditor's office of the two junior mortgages is not a substantial cause for failure to pay, and the rigor of a condition precedent will not in such case be applied unless the construction of the 'agreement requires. The formal discharge of those mortgages by the mortgagees would not change the apparent situation of the record in the auditor's office, but the fact would have to appear aliunde the record. The manner in which the lien of these mortgages are discharged is not important, as no method of doing it is provided by the contract, and the effect is the same if such lien had been in fact discharged at the time of the sale and delivery of the boat to the defendant or to the person for whom he made the purchase.
The "legal effect of the first and purchase money mortgage made by Herring to Glenn was a sale by the mortgagor to the mortgagee of the property with a right of redemption in the former which was cut off by the sale, and the effect of the sale was the same upon the subsequent mortgagees of Herring. "When these two junior mortgages were filed, the prior one had been filed and there had been no omission to refile it in the manner prescribed by the statute. It was then effectual as against them and would continue so without any subsequent refiling of it. Meech v. Patchin, 14 N. Y., 71. There is therefore no opportunity upon the facts as they appear by the record to conclude that this mortgage had not priority in fact and legal effect at the time the boat was taken and sold pursuant to it, or that the sale was not in the proper or approved manner to cut off any subsequent liens on the property. It seems to follow that the lien of these junior mortgages was discharged by such foreclosure of the senior mortgage and the sale pursuant to it, and the record title, if it may be called such, represented by those two mortgages, and the filing and registering them was cleared up so far as practicable and as effectually as if discharges to that effect had been executed by the mortgagees. Bragelman v. Dane, 69 N. Y., 69; Edmiston v. Brucker, 40 Hun, 256.
There is no claim made that there was any appearance of liens upon the boat other than that represented by those two junior mortgages. And to say that the seller of the boat undertook to obtain from the mortgagees a satisfaction or discharge of those mortgages is the expression of a requirement not within his power to perform without their consent and as the performance of the contract does not require that to be done a construction cannot properly be given to it which will impose an impossible condition, or one the performance of which does not come within the power or control of the seller of the property or his assigns.
The view of the referee was that at the time of making the sale and agreement it was contemplated by the parties to it that something further should be done by way of clearing up the record title and nullifying lions, and that nothing having been done in that direction it is not sufficient that the mortgages were then in fact no lien, and that the satisfaction of thé defendant was not required until those mortgages were in some manner removed from the records or files of the auditor's office. This is reasoning the contract into a construction which is neither substantial in its effect or practicable for performance.
But he has found that the agreement in question was made the day prior to the delivery of the property and bill of sale, and while such delivery may not be treated as a waiver of any condition in the contract of the day previous, it may be entitled to some consideration upon the question of the purpose and construction of the agreement in view of the delivery and acceptance which thus followed the time of its execution, and of the fact that the agreement of sale had not been executed on the part of the seller at the time the contract in question was made.
The conclusion that a new trial should be granted is reached upon the assumption which we think the facts as found by the referee require, that a perfect title to the property passed by the sale in question.
The judgment should be reversed and a new trial granted costs to abide' the event.
Smith, P. J., and Haight, J., concur.