Case Name: McCARTHY v. BELCHER
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1983-07-21
Citations: 128 Mich. App. 344
Docket Number: Docket No. 62495
Parties: McCARTHY v BELCHER
Judges: Before: Bronson, P.J., and J. H. Gillis and Mackenzie, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 128
Pages: 344–353

Head Matter:
McCARTHY v BELCHER
Docket No. 62495.
Submitted April 20, 1983, at Detroit. —
Decided July 21, 1983.
Leave to appeal applied for.
Terrance McCarthy brought an action against Bobby Belcher for assault and battery and against Sandra Nichols under the dramshop act. The Oakland Circuit Court, Robert B. Webster, J., entered a judgment on a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff. Defendants appealed, alleging that the trial court erred by denying their motion for a mistrial after plaintiffs counsel questioned defendant Belcher regarding a police report on the incident giving rise to the action, and by excluding the deposition testimony of a physician who examined the plaintiff at the behest of plaintiff’s counsel. Held:
1. While the cross-examination of Belcher regarding the police report was improper because the report had been used as the factual basis for Belcher’s plea of nolo contendere to criminal charges arising from the incident, the error does not require reversal because the criminal nature of the prior proceeding was not disclosed to the jury, Belcher denied knowing of any admission by his attorney as to the accuracy of the report, and the trial court gave a prompt cautionary instruction. No miscarriage of justice resulted.
2. Any attorney-client privilege which resulted when plaintiff was sent to the doctor for an examination in preparation for litigation was waived when the plaintiff testified concerning the doctor’s examination. Also, it cannot be said that the doctor’s testimony would have been merely cumulative. Therefore, the trial court erroneously excluded the doctor’s deposition testi mony. Because that testimony related only to the plaintiffs damages, a remand is necessary for a new trial on the issue of damages.
References for Points in Headnotes
76 Am Jur 2d, Trial § 1080.
81 Am Jur 2d, Witnesses § 493.
81 Am Jur 2d, Witnesses § 218.
Persons, other than client or attorney affected by or included within, attorney-client privilege. 96 ALR2d 125.
81 Am Jur 2d, Witnesses §§ 226, 227.
Party’s waiver of privilege as to communications with counsel by taking stand and testifying. 51 ALR2d 521.
23 Am Jur 2d, Depositions and Discovery §§ 30, 31.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Bronson, P.J., concurred that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial. He disagrees, however, with the majority’s conclusion that the court erred in excluding the doctor’s deposition. He would hold that the substance of the deposition was subject to the attorney-client privilege and that the privilege was not waived. Under the circumstances herein, objection to the admissibility of the deposition was not waived by plaintiffs attorney’s questions to the plaintiff, nor did the plaintiff testify to the substance of the medical examination or of any conversation with the doctor. Even if there had been a waiver, Judge Bronson would hold that exclusion of the testimony could not have prejudiced the defendants. Judge Bronson would affirm.
Opinion of the Court
1. Motions and Orders — Mistrial — Judge’s Discretion.
Decisions on motions for mistrial are committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge and will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion resulting in a miscarriage of justice.
2. Trial — Evidence — Prior Criminal Proceeding.
Cross-examination of a defendant in a civil action regarding the factual basis for the defendant’s prior plea in a criminal proceeding arising from the same incident is improper; however, reversal on the basis of such improper questioning is not required where, on the facts of the case, no miscarriage of justice is shown (MRE 410).
3. Attorney and Client — Attorney-Client Privilege — Medical Examination.
The results of a medical examination made where an attorney sends his client to a doctor in preparation for litigation are treated as a confidential communication between the client and the attorney.
4. Attorney and Client — Attorney-Client Privilege — Waiver of Privilege.
The attorney-client privilege is waived as to a confidential communication when the client testifies on direct examination concerning the communication and, once waived, the privilege may not be reasserted at a subsequent trial.
Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Bronson, P. J.
5. Evidence — Deposition Testimony — Attorney-Client Privilege — Waiver of Privilege.
A party who waives the attorney-client privilege for the purpose of cross-examination of a witness’s deposition testimony, where the deposition was taken without the party having had the opportunity to object to its taking, does not thereby waive the right to object at trial to the admissibility of the deposition.
Lopatin, Miller, Freedman, Bluestone, Erlich, Rosen & Bartnick (by Richard E. Shaw), for plaintiff.
Plunkett, Cooney, Rutt, Watters, Stanczyk & Pedersen, P.C. (by John P. Jacobs), for defendants.
Before: Bronson, P.J., and J. H. Gillis and Mackenzie, JJ.

Opinion:
Per Curiam.
Plaintiff brought this action against defendant Belcher for assault and battery, and against defendant Nichols under the dram-shop act, MCL 436.22; MSA 18.993. After a jury trial, a verdict for plaintiff was returned against both defendants. The jury computed plaintiff's damages at $180,000, but found that 25% of plaintiff's damages were attributable to plaintiff's negligence. A judgment for plaintiff for $135,000 plus costs and interest was entered, and defendants appeal by right.
I
Defendants argue that the trial court erred by denying their motion for a mistrial. The motion was made after counsel for plaintiff cross-examined defendant Belcher concerning a police report and asked defendant if his attorney in another proceeding had admitted that the report was accu rate. Defendant testified that he had no knowledge of any such admission. The report was used as the factual basis for the acceptance of a nolo contendere plea by defendant Belcher to criminal charges arising out of this incident, but the criminal nature of the other proceeding and defendant's plea were not mentioned before the jury. After counsel for defendant objected, the trial court instructed the jury to disregard all references to the other proceeding.
Decisions on motions for mistrial are committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge and will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion resulting in a miscarriage of justice. Anderson v Harry's Army Surplus, Inc, 117 Mich App 601, 615; 324 NW2d 96 (1982). The cross-examination at issue here was prohibited by MRE 410 and Wheelock v Eyl, 393 Mich 74; 223 NW2d 276 (1974). However, such an error does not require reversal in every case in which it appears. See Ilins v Burns, 388 Mich 504, 510-511; 201 NW2d 624 (1972). Because the criminal nature of the other proceedings was not disclosed to the jury, because defendant Belcher denied having admitted the accuracy of the police report, and because the trial court gave a prompt cautionary instruction, we cannot say that denial of the motion for a mistrial presents an abuse of discretion resulting in a miscarriage of justice.
II
Defendants also argue that the trial court erred by excluding the deposition testimony of Dr. Kent Wu. We will assume without deciding that Dr. Wu's testimony falls within the attorney-client privilege; see Lindsay v Lipson, 367 Mich 1; 116 NW2d 60 (1962). We hold, however, that any such privilege was waived by plaintiff when plaintiff testified on direct, cross-, and redirect examination concerning his examination by Dr. Wu. Under the rule stated in Lindsay, when an attorney sends his client to a doctor for an examination in preparation for litigation, the results of the examination are treated as a confidential communication between the client and the attorney. However, the attorney-client privilege is waived as to a confidential communication when the client testifies on direct examination concerning the communication. Hartford Fire Ins Co v Reynolds, 36 Mich 502, 504 (1877); Passmore v Estate of Passmore, 50 Mich 626, 627; 16 NW 170 (1883); Leverich v Leverich, 340 Mich 133, 137; 64 NW2d 567 (1954); In re Arnson Estate, 2 Mich App 478, 484-485; 140 NW2d 546 (1966). See also Anno: Party's Waiver of Privilege As to Communications With Counsel by Taking Stand and Testifying, 51 ALR2d 521, § 5, pp 529-537, and the cases cited therein. Once waived, the privilege may not be reasserted at a subsequent trial. In re Arnson Estate, supra, p 485.
Plaintiff argues that the exclusion of Dr. Wu's deposition testimony was, at most, harmless error. Dr. Wu testified that he could not substantiate plaintiffs claimed injuries "in any way whatsoever". Because none of the other medical experts whose testimony was admitted at trial was willing to go so far, we cannot say that Dr. Wu's testimony would have been merely cumulative or that its exclusion was harmless. However, because Dr. Wu's testimony was relevant only to the issue of plaintiffs damages, a new trial is necessary on remand only as to that issue.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.