Case Name: John H. WRIGHTINGTON, Appellant, v. UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS COMMISSION, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2002-12-13
Citations: 833 So. 2d 202
Docket Number: No. 5D01-3698
Parties: John H. WRIGHTINGTON, Appellant, v. UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS COMMISSION, Appellees.
Judges: SHARP, W., J., concurs specially with opinion.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 833
Pages: 202–205

Head Matter:
John H. WRIGHTINGTON, Appellant, v. UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS COMMISSION, Appellees.
No. 5D01-3698.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Dec. 13, 2002.
John H. Wrightington, Edgewater, Pro Se.
John D. Maher, Tallahassee, for Appel-lee.

Opinion:
COBB, J.
This is an appeal from an order of the Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission upholding the determination by the appeals referee that John Wrightington was properly terminated from employment by the Greater Daytona Beach Area Young Men's Christian Association, Inc. (YMCA) on the basis of misconduct connected with work within the meaning of unemployment compensation law; more specifically for "insubordination involving the use of profane language."
It is uncontroverted that Wrightington directed vulgar and abusive language to the employer's chief executive officer, Randy Brown, during a meeting between the two in July, 2001, at which meeting Wrightington was terminated. Although Wrightington asserts that his termination preceded the verbal abuse, Brown testified that the abuse preceded the termination— and the referee accepted Brown's version. Since the finding in regard to a disputed fact has record support, we accept it for appellate purposes. See Scholastic Book Fairs, Inc. Great American Division v. Unemployment Appeals Commission, 671 So.2d 287 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996).
On the other hand, the Commission asserts in its brief that the conversation between Brown and Wrightington "was overheard by the business manager [Hickey] who was standing at the open door of the CEO's office." The referee did not make this finding and the business manager did not testify. The testimony is conflicting as to whether Hickey stood outside the office open door or was busy doing other things with computers during the exchange between Wrightington and Brown. Hickey was asked to leave the room prior to the exchange between Brown and Wrightington and did so. The testimony of Brown was to the extent:
I asked to meet with Jack [Wrighting-ton]. When Jack got through with doing some of the things he was doing, working with people, he came into the office. We sat down, and at that time, Hal Hickey, who was our business manager, was sitting there as a witness. Jack said that he would not meet if there was a witness. So Hal was excused and Hal stood right outside the door. The door was left open. At that point Jack wanted to start the conversation .
Whether or not Hickey overheard anything is problematic. What is clear is that Wrightington did not want anyone except Brown to hear his statement.
In determining whether the use of vulgar language comes within the purview of an unemployment compensation statute's definition of misconduct, courts have considered several factors including the frequency of the vulgar utterance, the presence of any fellow employees or clients, the existence of any provocation, and the object of the abusive language. Benitez v. Girlfriday, Inc., 609 So.2d 665 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1992). In Benitez, the issue was whether Benitez's isolated use of obscene language, directed to a supervisor outside the presence of other persons, constituted misconduct under the unemployment compensation statute so as to bar a claim for benefits. The Third District found that the use of offensive language in such an isolated and private argument was not misconduct as defined by the statute. See also Cullen v. Neighborly Senior Services, Inc., 775 So.2d 392 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2000) (meeting between claimant and supervisor during which claimant raised his voice at supervisor did not constitute misconduct that warranted denial of unemployment benefits to claimant since meeting occurred in a private office and there were only two other employees present); Jorge v. Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission, 765 So.2d 889 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2000) (claimant's use of an obscenity when the manager of the restaurant where he was employed ordered him to continue working did not amount to misconduct where use of foul language was an isolated incident and other employees and restaurant patrons did not hear the claimant's comments); Johnson v. Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission, 513 So.2d 1098 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1987) (employee was not disqualified from unemployment benefits for using vulgar language where such language was not part of a pattern of behavior and did not occur in the presence of others). Compare Davis v. Unemployment Appeals Commission, 715 So.2d 1157 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (unemployment compensation properly denied where record was clear that Davis uttered profanities directed toward her manager in the presence of other employees); Suluki v. Unemployment Appeals Commission, 644 So.2d 552 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (unemployment compensation denied where Suluki openly and loudly cursed the company president and undermined her authority in front of other employees, including two new employees in training); Hines v. Department of Labor and Employment Secu rity, 455 So.2d 1104 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1984); and Varig Brazilian Airlines v. Florida Department of Commerce Division of Employment Security, 354 So.2d 921 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1978) (employee's repeated use of vulgarities in front of customers, among other things, was sufficient to warrant disqualification from benefits).
Given the fact that this was an isolated incident of cursing and that it took place within the confines of a private office there is no substantial and competent evidence to support a finding of misconduct under the unemployment compensation statutes.
Since our foregoing considerations mandate reversal of the Commission's order, we do not reach the due process concerns raised by the appellant in regard to notice that insubordination regarding profanity was an issue for consideration at the hearing before the referee.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
SHARP, W., J., concurs specially with opinion.
PLEUS, J., dissents with opinion.