Case Name: James Richard FENWICK, Petitioner, v. OKLAHOMA STATE PENITENTIARY, State Insurance Fund, and Workers' Compensation Court, Respondents
Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oklahoma
Decision Date: 1990-05-15
Citations: 792 P.2d 60
Docket Number: No. 69691
Parties: James Richard FENWICK, Petitioner, v. OKLAHOMA STATE PENITENTIARY, State Insurance Fund, and Workers’ Compensation Court, Respondents.
Judges: HARGRAVE, C.J., and LAVENDER, SIMMS and SUMMERS, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Pacific Reporter 2d
Volume: 792
Pages: 60–76

Head Matter:
James Richard FENWICK, Petitioner, v. OKLAHOMA STATE PENITENTIARY, State Insurance Fund, and Workers’ Compensation Court, Respondents.
No. 69691.
Supreme Court of Oklahoma.
May 15, 1990.
Crowe & Dunlevy by Randal A. Sengel, Oklahoma City, for petitioner.
Fred Nicholas, Jr. and Gary L. Warden, State Ins. Fund, Oklahoma City, for respondent Ins. Carrier.

Opinion:
HODGES, Justice.
This case arose after James R. Fenwick (Claimant) sought workers' compensation for permanent partial disability. The Workers' Compensation Court found that Claimant had not suffered an accidental injury. The Oklahoma Court of Appeals reversed the Workers' Compensation Court, and this Court granted the Petition for Writ of Certiorari. The issue on appeal is whether the claimant's mental stress, which arose out of an isolated incident, without any accompanying physical injury is compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act. We find that it is not.
On August 8, 1979, Claimant, while working as a psychological assistant at the Oklahoma State Penitentiary, encountered a situation where four women were being held hostage by an inmate. Claimant negotiated the release of three of the hostages in exchange for himself. Subsequently, the fourth woman was released. After being held hostage for approximately four and one-half hours, Claimant was released without physical injury.
Although Claimant took two days off work immediately following the hostage incident, he continued to work in the same position until October 1, 1982. At that time he resigned to take a similar job with the Carl Albert Community Mental Health Center.
On July 9, 1982, Claimant filed his Form 3 seeking disability compensation. The State Insurance Fund paid for Claimant's medical and psychiatric treatment until April, 1986. Then on January 6, 1987, Claimant filed a Form 9 seeking permanent partial disability.
Claimant was diagnosed by Dr. Nolan L. Armstrong as suffering from major depression, generalized anxiety disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder. He was diagnosed by Dr. Larry M. Prater as suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder and personality disorder. Although Claimant complains of periodic shakiness, headaches, tingling in the hands, discomfort in the pit of his stomach, and several other physical disorders, none of the diagnosis included physical injury.
An employee is entitled to compensation, regardless of fault, when the employee suffers disability or death "resulting from an accidental personal injury . arising out of and in the course of his employment." The causation of the claimant's mental dis orders are not disputed leaving the question of accidental personal injury as the only issue.
A definition of injury is provided in the Workers' Compensation Act (the Act) itself. This definition is more repetitive of the requirements set out under section 11 than it is definitive. Since the definition in the Act is not comprehensive, it has been the duty of the courts to further define "accidental personal injury."
This Court has long recognized that "[a] disease of the mind or body which arises in the course of employment, with nothing more" is not an accidental injury and, thus, not compensable. Claimant argues that the additional element requirement of "nothing more" is satisfied by the fact that the event which caused his stress is a definite and identifiable occurrence. This is not the case. This Court has consistently held that physical injury must be present for a disability to be compensable. Just as physical symptoms such as pain, tingling of the limbs, and nausea do not constitute accidental injury, neither does mental stress. Because there is no evidence in the present case that Claimant suffered any physical injury, he has not shown that he suffered an accidental injury. Therefore, his disability is not compen-sable under the Act.
In Daugherty v. ITT Continental Baking Company, the claimant suffered from mental stress, without accompanying physical injury, after her company's sales manager and his superior visited her at her work location, criticized her job perform-anee, and asked for her resignation. This Court held that the claimant had not suffered an accidental injury as defined by the Act.
We reached the same result in Vernon v. Seven-Eleven Stores. Claimant failed a polygraph test which resulted in his being discharged. He then received psychiatric treatment but did not suffer physical injury. The claimant's doctor testified that the claimant's mental problems were caused by the polygraph test and the subsequent events. We found that the claimant had not suffered an injury compensable under the Act.
In Haynes v. Pryor High School, a coach suffered chest pains after trotting uphill 50-100 yards, but there was no evidence of myocardial infarction. We found that pain with actual physical injury was insufficient to constitute an accidental injury. Thus, compensation was denied.
All of these cases involved mental stress or physical pain unaccompanied by a physical injury and caused by an identifiable event which occurred at a definite time. Yet, in all three cases, the claimant's disability was not compensable. The present case presents the same situation. Here we have a disability without any evidence of a physical injury, caused by an identifiable event which occurred at a definite time.
For the first time in 1977, the American Medical Association (AMA) included a chapter on the evaluation of mental disorders in its guidelines. Then in 1985, the Legislature mandated that the AMA's guidelines were to be used by physicians when evaluating impairment. The legislative intent behind this mandate was to provide some consistency in the evaluations of mental disorders accompanied by physical injury. Had the Legislature intended to make disabilities from mental disorders without accompanying physical injury compensable, they would have changed the statutory definition of injury rather than only including a method for consistently evaluating mental disorders.
It has long been the rule that disability, either mental or physical, which is not accompanied by a physical injury is not com-pensible under the Act. This rule is based on the statutory definition of injury. This definition has remained substantially unchanged since 1915 even though the Act has frequently been amended. In fact, the Act has been amended annually since the establishment of this rule.
In Lekan v. P & L Fire Protection Co., we stated:
Legislative familiarity with extant judicial construction of statutes in the process of being amended is presumed. Unless a contrary intent clearly appears or is plainly expressed, the terms of amend-atory acts which retain the same, or not substantially dissimilar, portions of provisions formerly in force will be accorded the construction identical to that placed upon them by preexisting case law.
Since the Legislature has not substantially changed the statutory definition of injury, nor has it enacted any statute which would conflict with our prior decision, we must presume that the Legislature is in agreement with our judicial interpretation. Therefore, without a legislative mandate, we decline to alter the rule that disability unaccompanied by physical injury is not compensable under the Act. The Workers' Compensation Court was correct in ruling that Claimant was not entitled to compensation.
CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; COURT OF APPEALS' OPINION VACATED; ORDER OF THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION COURT SUSTAINED.
HARGRAVE, C.J., and LAVENDER, SIMMS and SUMMERS, JJ., concur.
OPALA, V.C.J., and DOOLIN, ALMA WILSON and KAUGER, JJ., dissent.
. Okla.Stat. tit. 85, § 11 (1981).
. Okla.Stat. tit. 85, § 3(7) (1981) provides:
"Injury or personal injury" means only accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of employment and such disease or infection as may naturally result therefrom and occupational disease arising out of and in the course of employment as herein defined. Provided, only injuries having as their source a risk not purely personal but one that is reasonably connected with the conditions of employment shall be deemed to arise out of the employment.
. Keeling v. State Industrial Court, 389 P.2d 487, 491 (Okla.1964) (quoting Shoren v. United States Rubber Company, 87 R.I. 319, 140 A.2d 768 (1958)).
. See Haynes v. Pryor High School, 566 P.2d 852 (Okla.1976); Daugherty v. ITT Continental Baking Company, 558 P.2d 393 (Okla.1976); Vernon v. Seven-Eleven Stores, 547 P.2d 1300 (Okla. 1976).
. Haynes, 566 P.2d at 854.
. 558 P.2d 393 (Okla.1976).
. 547 P.2d 1300 (Okla.1976).
. 566 P.2d 852 (Okla.1976).
. American Medical Association, Guides to Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, p. 149 (AMA 1977).
. Okla.Stat. tit. 85, § 3(11) (Supp.1985) provides in part:
[A]ny examining physician shall evaluate impairment in substantial accordance with such guides to the evaluation of permanent impairment as have been officially approved by a majority of the Workers' Compensation Court. These guides may include, but shall not be limited to, the "Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment" published in 1971 by the American Medical Association....
. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
. Vernon v. Seven-Eleven Stores, 547 P.2d 1300 (Okla.1976); Daugherty v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 558 P.2d 393 (Okla.1976). There is no need to discuss the definition of "occupational disease" since the Claimant has only alleged that he suffered a disability resulting from "accidental injury."
. See, Okla.Stat. tit. 85, § 3(7) (1981).
. 1915 Okla.Sess.Laws 575 states:
7. "Injury or personal injury" means only accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of employment and such disease or infection as may naturally and unavoidably result therefrom.
. 609 P.2d 1289, 1292 (Okla.1980).