Case Name: SALT LAKE CITY WATER & ELECTRICAL POWER COMPANY, a Corporatoin, and JOSEPH GEOGHEGAN, Receiver, Respondents, v. SALT LAKE CITY, a Municipal Corporation, and ANN AMANDA CANNON, Petitioners
Court: Utah Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Utah
Decision Date: 1902-02-11
Citations: 24 Utah 282
Docket Number: No.1326
Parties: SALT LAKE CITY WATER & ELECTRICAL POWER COMPANY, a Corporatoin, and JOSEPH GEOGHEGAN, Receiver, Respondents, v. SALT LAKE CITY, a Municipal Corporation, and ANN AMANDA CANNON, Petitioners.
Judges: MINEE, C. J"., concurs.
Reporter: Utah Reports
Volume: 24
Pages: 282–304

Head Matter:
SALT LAKE CITY WATER & ELECTRICAL POWER COMPANY, a Corporatoin, and JOSEPH GEOGHEGAN, Receiver, Respondents, v. SALT LAKE CITY, a Municipal Corporation, and ANN AMANDA CANNON, Petitioners.
No.1326.
(67 Pac. 791.)
1. Certiorari: Remedy: Questions Considered on their Merits: What Questions Reviewable by.
Where a petition for a writ of certiorari is filed in the Supreme Court, and an order to show cause why the writ should not issue is made, and the record of the trial court certified to the Supreme Court, the questions presented may be considered on their merits.
2. Same.
The Supreme Court, on certiorari, is not limited to the mere question whether the trial court has exceeded its jurisdiction, but may review errors of law affecting the substantial rights of the parties, and determine if there is competent evidence to warrant the judgment; but it is not authorized to set the judgment aside by reason of a conflict in the evidence, or errors not affecting substantial rights.
3. Same: Eminent Domain: Taking Possession before Condemnation: Validity of Statute.
Revised Statutes 1898, section 3597, providing that the plaintiff in proceedings to condemn land for public purposes may be allowed by the court, upon filing a sufficient bond, conditioned to pay the adjudged value of the property and damages if condemned, to enter into possession of the property and do certain work, is not in conflict with Constitution, article 1, section 22, providing that private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation, as the statute only relates to the occupation and use of the property pending the proceedings, and the payment for property condemned on final hearing is required by section 3604. Baskin, J., dissenting.
(Decided February 11, 1902.)
Original petition for a writ of certiorari by Salt Lake City against tbe Salt Lake City Water & Electrical Power Company to review tbe proceedings of tbe Third District Court, Hon. O. W. Morse, Judge, in an action pending between respondents and petitioners.
WRIT DENIED.
Frank B. Stephens, Fsqcity attorney, for petitioners; Messrs. Richards & YaÁ'ian of counsel.
Tbe statute authorizing possession is unconstitutional. Section 3597 of tbe Revised Statutes, wbicb is relied upon to support tbe action of tbe court below, is unconstitutional and void, in so far as it authorizes tbe taking of possession of property upon tbe giving of a bond, because a bond is not compensation, nor tbe equivalent thereto, or to a fund providing compensation for tbe property so taken. Tbe Constitution provides that: “Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation.” Art. 1, sec. 22.
Tbe present Constitution of California, which went into effect July 4, 1879, in terms provides that just compensation shall be first made to or paid into court for the owner, before private property shall be taken or damaged for public use. Sec. 14, art. 1. Yol. 1, American Constitutions, p. 168.
But the original Constitution of 1849, omitting the word “damaged,” is word for word with that of Utah. Sec. 8, art. 1. Yol. 1, Charters and Constitutions of the U. S. (Poore’s Compilation), p. 195.
At an early day the Supreme Court of California gave a just and fair interpretation to the language of the Constitution, and, in a series of cases, uniformly held as contended here, with one exception. San Francisco v. Scott, 4 Cal. 114; McCann v. Sierra Co., 7 Cal. 121; McCauley v. "Weller, 12 Cal. 500; Benzley v. Mountain Lake Co., 13 Cal.-306; 14 Cal. 106; 16 Cal. 153; 9 Cal. 592; 12 Cal. 76; 24 Cal. 427.
In the case of Eox v. The Western Pacific Railroad Company, 31 Cal. 538, the court held to the cbntrary, but in subsequent cases this case was overruled and the principles of the former cases reaffirmed; and the principles of the former cases were reaffirmed in Davis v. Railroad Co., 47 Cal. 517; Railroad v. Railroad, 47 Cal. 528; San Mateo W. Co. v. Sharp-stein, 50 Cal. 285; Sanborn v. Belden, 51 Cal. 266; Yilhac v. Railroad, 53 Cal. 208.
In three of these last cases the court annulled, on cer-tiorari, similar orders to that complained of here.
The statute does not authorize nor provide for the subjecting of this kind of property to the law of eminent domain, and the Constitution, by necessary implication, prohibits it.
A final and complete answer to the claim of the power company and the assumption of power by the court in the premises is found in the fact that this property of the city is not subject to condemnation. It is provided by tbe Constitution that:
“No municipal corporation shall, directly or indirectly, lease, sell, alien or dispose of any waterworks, water rights or sources of water supply now, or hereafter to be owned or controlled by it; but all such waterworks, water rights and sources of water supply now owned or hereafter to be acquired by any municipal corporation, shall be preserved, maintained and operated by it for supplying its inhabitants with water at reasonable charges; provided, that nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent any municipal corporation from exchanging water rights or sources of water supply for other water righjs or sources of water supply of equal value and to be devoted in like manner to the public supply of its inhabitants.” Art. 11, sec. 6.
Restrained by this enactment, the Legislature itsélf has no power to authorize the disposition of any waterworks, rights, or sources of supply of the city, which is required to maintain and operate the same for supplying its inhabitants with water. The Legislature can not change the use, nor can the city, and, of course, neither can authorize or permit any surrender, in. whole or in part, of the control or regulation of the property.
It is idle to say that there is no attempt here to take the property of the city. By the complaint in the action, the claim of the plaintiff is presented. It seeks to acquire a permanent right of way and easement in the city’s canal. The record shows that to do this for the purpose of the power company, it will be necessary to abandon the city’s dam and head-gates, together with a mile and a half or two miles of. its canal, and turn over to the power company the control and regulation of the diversion and flow of the water from the river into the city’s canal. If this is not an invasion of and taking of property, we are unable to conceive what would be considered so. Yet this was denied in argument in the court below. But, the city is charged, as a public trustee, with the control and management of tbis property. This appears sufficiently in the express language of the Constitution. But, moreover, it is undoubtedly true that water rights and easements connected necessarily therewith, held, as here, for the purpose of municipal uses, and supplying the inhabitants of the municipality with water, are of such public utility and necessity that they are held in trust for the use of the citizens. Ogden City v. Bear L. & R. W. W. Co., 16 Utah 451; Meri-wether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 513.; New Orleans v. Morris,_ 105 U. S. 602; Smith v. Mayor of Nashville, 7 L. R. A. 469; Huron W. W. Co. v. Huron, 30 L. R. A. 844; R. S., sec. 206, pars. 15, 17, 18, 76.
The order permitting occupancy is made under section 3597, but the property which may be taken as subject to condemnation is defined and classified in section 3590. Under this section, section 3597 could only refer to private property. The opening statement of the section declares that “the private property which may be taken under this chapter includes,” followed by an enumeration thereof. What does it include? Eirst, all real property-belonging to any person. Second, lands belonging to the State, or to any county or incorporated city or town, not appropriated to some public cause. Third, property appropriated to public use; provided, that such property shall not be taken unless for a more necessary public use than that to which it has already been appropriated. Eourth, franchises. Eifth, rights of way for the purposes mentioned in section 3588, with structures and improvements thereon, and lands used in connection therewith, shall be subject to be connected with, crossed or intersected by any other right of way or improvement or structure thereon. Such rights of way shall also be subject to the limited use in common with the owner thereon, when necessary.
In the above enumeration of property subject to condemnation, the property of municipal corporations, actually devoted to a public use, is not found; on the contrary, the distinction between sncb property and that held in a proprietary capacity is clearly made. Lands belonging to the State or to any county or incorporated city or town, not appropriated to some public use, are, by paragraph two, included in the enumeration of property which may be taken under the law. Here the Legislature makes a manifest distinction between property held by municipalities .in their proprietary capacities and that which, being appropriated to a public use, is possessed in a governmental capacity. Could there have been used language more appropriate than this to indicate the legislative mind ? The public use referred to here is a governmental or municipal use evidently. The word “lands,” by express statutory definition, includes and means hereditaments, water rights, possessory rights and claims. Revised Statutes, sec. 2498, par. 10.
In its common and ordinary meaning it includes easements. Groggins v. Boston & A. Ry. Co., 155 Mass. 505; 30 N.'E. 72.
L. R. Rogers, Esq., and Ogden Hiles, Esq., for respondents.
This application can not be allowed. The chapter of our code of civil procedure relating to certiorari was adopted, in totidem verbis from the code of California, and by repeated decisions of the Supreme Court of that State before the enactment of the statute by this State, the -following interpretations and applications of it were established:
1. The writ of certiorari can not be made to do the,office and functions of a writ of error. Coulter v. Stark, 7 Cal. 244; Central Pac. R. R. Co. v. Placer County, 46 Cal. 668; Whitney v. Board, 14 Cal. 499; People v. Dwinelle, 29 Id. 632; Will v. Sinkwitz, 39 Id. 570; People v. Burney, 29 Id. 459-460; Winter v. Eitzpatrick, 35 Id. 269; Morley v. Elkus, 37 Id. 454; People v. Elkins, 40 Id. 642; Barler v. San Fran cisco, 42 Id. 630; Central Pac. R. R. Co. v. Placer County, 43 Id. 365; Monreal v. Rues, 46 Id. 80; Hutchinson v. Superior Court, 61 Id. 119; Reynold v. County Court, 41 Id. 604; Sherer v. Superior Court, 94 Id. 354; Buckley v. Superior Court, 96 Id. 119; Sherer v. Superior Court, 96 Id. 653; History Company v. Light, 91 Id. 56.
2. The only thing which can be inquired of, is whether the court has exceeded its jurisdiction. People v. Dwinelle, 29 Cal. 632; People v. Johnson, 30 Id. 98; Sayers v. Superior Court, 84 Id. 645. And cases cited under the first paragraph.
3. When the jurisdiction of the court depends on the finding of a fact, and that fact is found by the lower court, that finding conclusively establishes the jurisdiction of that court on a proceeding in certiorari, and such finding can not be assailed on a writ of review. Farmers and Merchants’ Bank v. Board of Equalization, 97 Cal. 318, 328; Sayers v. Superior Court, 84 Id. 642.
4. That the words in section 3630 of the Revised Statutes: “Has exceeded the jurisdiction of such tribunal,” etc., and the words in section 3636: “Has regularly pursued the authority of such tribunal,” etc., means the same thing. Central Pac. R. R. Co. v. Placer County, 46 Cal. 365; Bank v. Board of Equalization, 97 Id. 326.
5. • That errors of law of the lower court will not be reviewed on certiorari even though there is no appeal. People v. Barney, 29 Cal. 460.
The petitioner declares that section 3597 is repugnant to the Constitution of Utah, because it provides for the taking of petitioner’s property without compensation.
The constitutional enactment in some states is different from that of Utah; in some it is similar, -and in others it is the same. Considering all the states in which it is the same or substantially so, there seems to be no doubt that the majority of the.courts, and the weight of authority• sustain the constitutionality of the legislation under notice. Lewis on Eminent Domain, see. 455-456, and cases cited in note. Cherokee Nation y. Kansas Railway Co., 135 U. S. 644-658; Sweet y. Rechel, 159 U. S. 380.
In the case of Backus v. Eord Union Depot Company, 169 U. S. 557, the doctrine of the above cases was approved on a writ of error to the Supreme Court of Michigan.
"Within the meaning of the Constitution, the property, although entered upon pending the appeal, is not taken until the compensation is ascertained in some legal mode, and, being paid, the title passes from the owner. Such was the decision in Kennedy v. Indianapolis, 103 U. S. 599-604, where the Court construed a clause of the Constitution of Indiana declaring that no man’s property “shall be taken or applied to public use without just compensation being made therefor,” substantially the provision found in the national Constitution.
The decisions cited in the petitioner’s brief are now of little worth either in Utah or in California, because they were made with relation to legislation different from that of Utah and from that now existing in California.
It is the certainty and adequacy of the provision for payment of the compensation, and not the time when it is to be paid, which determines the validity of the statute which permits occupation of the premises pending the suit.
The foregoing considerations seems to justify the conclusion that a statute such as ours is not within the interdiction of the Constitution without attempting to cite the numerous decisions from various states, which affirm the validity of statutes such as these; we will rest the point on the following citations: Cherokee Nation v. Railway Company, 135 U. S. 641; Sweet v. Rechel, 159 Id. 402; Backus v. Ford Street Union Depot Co., 168 Id. 568; Railway Company v. Payne, 49 Fed. 118; 4 U. S. App. 77; Kennedy v. Indianapolis, 103 U. S. 599; Lewis on Eminent Domain, secs. 456, 457, 458, 459; Mills on Eminent Domain, sec. 124 et seq., Secs. 35,97 and 3604, Rev. Stat. Utah.
Section 6 of article 11 of tbe Constitution of Utah has no application. That section is an inhibition on the power of a municipal corporation to lease, sell, alien or dispose of waterworks, water rights or sources of water supply now or hereafter owned or controlled by it.
It does not seem to be any limitation on the State’s power of eminent domain. The cases cited by petitioner hold merely that waterworks and other public property which has been dedicated to a public use, is held upon a public trust and can not be alienated by a municipality without the authority of an act of the Legislature.
This constitutional enactment seems to be a reaffirmance of that doctrine, and possibly an interdiction to the Legislature, against its giving any such authority to a municipal corporation.
A public street of a town is a thing of public necessity, and dedicated to a public use, but it is crossed and occupied and partially impeded in countless ways, by railroad tracks, telegraph and telephone poles and wires, with water ditches, public and private, and the numerous other instrumentalities of our commercial and industrial life. They all are cases where two or more public uses are from the necessities of the case made to stand together.
Mr. Chief Justice Shaw in an early case in the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, speaking for the court, said: “Both uses may stand together, with some interference of the later with the earlier.”
And this court, following the unbroken current of authority on the point, has lately decided the same thing. Postal Tel & Cable Co. v. O. S. L. R. R., 23 Utah 474.

Opinion:
BARTOH, J.
The petitioners made application to this court for a writ of certiorari commanding one of the judges of the district court of tbe Third judicial district to certify to the Supreme Court a complete transcript of the record and proceedings relating to the granting of a certain motion by the district court made in a certain action pending in that court. An order to show cause why the writ should not issue was made, and thereupon the record referred to was duly certified to this court, and the questions presented may thus be considered upon their merits.
It appears from the certified record that originally the petitioners, Salt Lake City et al., brought an action in that court against the respondents, Salt Lake City Water & Electrical Power Company et al., to quiet title to the water of the Jordan river, and to the right to store the same in the river and Utah Lake. The power company filed an answer in that action, and by counterclaim set up a right to the use, for power-creating purposes, of the water of the river, theretofore appropriated by the plaintiff city, by virtue of an appropriation in accordance with the statute. The power company also instituted condemnation proceedings to condemn the right to make connection with the canal of the city for the purpose of discharging the water, after use by the power company, through a flume across the river, into the canal opposite the respondent's power-creating plant. Thereafter, in these suits, the power company moved the court for permission to construct its flume and connect it with the canal pending the condemnation proceedings; and at the hearing of the motions the court entered an order permitting the power company and its receiver, pending the action, or until the further order of the court, to occupy the city's premises and make connection of the flume with the canal, and to discharge the water, after use by the power company, through the flume into the canal, upon executing and filing in the court a bond, to be approved by a judge thereof, in the sum of $5,000. This action of that court the petitioners now seek to have reviewed by means of the writ of certiorari, insisting that they have no other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy. Their principal contention appears to be that the action of the court in the premises was erroneous and without its jurisdiction. The respondents insist that the writ of certiorari can not be used to perform the functions of a writ of error, and that the only thing which can be inquired of, under our statutes, by certiox*ari, is whether the inferior court has exceeded its jurisdiction. The same question here presented was before this court in the case of Gilbert v. Board, 11 Utah 378, 40 Pac. 264; and, upon a careful review of authorities and statutes, it was held, adversely to the contention of respondent herein, that on cer-tiorari the appellate court may review the evidence to find if there is any proof to legally warrant the judgment or decision of the inferior tribunal, and whether it had jurisdiction, and whether its proceedings were had in accordance with law. It was there said: "The office of the common-law writ has been much enlarged by statute and decision in cases where there is no other proper remedy, and, in addition to determining questions of jurisdiction, errors in law affecting the substantial rights of the parties may now be corrected, and the testimony may be included in the return, and examined to determine whether there is competent evidence to warrant and justify the judgment of the inferior tribunal. Such enlargement of the writ, however, does not warrant the setting aside of a judgment when it is based on conflicting evidence, nor when there are errors in the proceedings in matters not material as affecting the substantial rights of the party, and not violating any rule of law or affecting the jurisdiction; but where there is an entire absence of proof to support the judgment or decision or order, or where the adjudication made is entirely unauthorized by the proof, it will be set aside and reversed, even though the inferior tribunal had jurisdiction of the person or subject-matter, and so where the proceedings culminating in the judgment are manifestly erroneous, and in violation of those prescribed by law. Tbe same rule applies to new jurisdictions created by statute, wben tbe proceedings required are different from those of tbe common law. Tbe examination of tbe evidence by tbe appel-. late court is not for tbe purpose of determining whether tbe preponderance thereof is on one side or tbe other, but to determine whether there is any testimony which will justify the judgment or finding of the inferior tribunal, as a legitimate inference, under the rules of law, from the facts proven, regardless of whether or not the appellate court would draw such inference from such facts. And this power of review on cer-tiorari is recognized as the settled law in England as well as in this country. The English courts have long exercised the power under this writ to review the record and proceedings of inferior tribunals, to determine questions of law arising therein, in eases where there was no other remedy for review." We have no disposition to depart from the doctrine of that ease, and do not regard this question as any longer an open one in this jurisdiction.
The petitioners insist that section 3597, Revised Statutes 1898, which is relied upon to support the action of the court in the premises, is unconstitutional and void, in so far as it authorizes the taking of possession of property sought to be condemned upon the giving of a bond; claiming that a bond is not compensation, nor the equivalent thereto, or to a fund providing compensation for the property to 'be so taken. In that section it is provided: "The plaintiff may move the court or a judge thereof, at any time after the commencement of suit, on notice to the defendant, if he is a resident of the county, or has appeared in the action, otherwise by serving a notice directed to him on the clerk of the court, for an order permitting the plaintiff to occupy the premises sought to be condemned, pending the action, and to do such work thereon as may be required for the easement sought, according to its nature. The court or a judge thereof shall take proof by affidavit or otherwise, of the value of the premises sought to be condemned and of the damages which will accrue from the condemnation, and of the reasons for requiring a speedy occupation, and shall grant or refuse the motion according to the equity of the case and the relative damages which may accrue to the parties. If the motion is granted, the court or judge shall require the plaintiff to execute and file in court a bond to the defendant, with sureties to be approved by the court or judge, in a penal sum to be fixed by the court or judge, not less than double the value of the premises sought to be condemned and the damages which will ensue from condemnation, as the same may appear to the court or judge on the hearing, and conditioned to pay the adjudged value of the premises and all damages in casé the property is condemned, and to pay all damages arising from occupation before judgment in case the premises are not condemned, and all costs adjudged to the defendant in the action." It is claimed that these provisions are repugnant to section 22, article 1, Constitution, which reads: "Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation." Doubtless, under this provision of the Constitution, no private property can be taken or damaged, by right of eminent domain, for public use, without just compensation being made to the owner; but there is no requirement that compensation must actually precede occupation. It is evident, however, that some reasonable and adequate provision must be made for compensation before the party seeking to condemn has the right to take possession of the premises. Does, then, the portion of the statute above quoted violate the Constitution, in not making reasonable and adequate provision for compensation before occupancy? We think not. It will be noticed that the order provided for in this section of the statute simply permits the plaintiff in the suit to occupy the premises sought to be condemned, temporarily — "pending the action" — for the purpose of doing "such work thereon as may be required for the easement sought, according to its nature," and the bond is provided to secure to the owner the payment of the adjudged value of the property, and all damages in case the property is condemned, and all damages arising from occupation before judgment in case the property is not condemned, and the costs of the action. But these provisions are not the only ones for compensation to be found in the statutes; for when section 3597 is read with 3604, Revised Statutes 1898, as it may be in determining the question whether the Legislature has made reasonable, certain, and adequate provision for compensation where property is sought to be condemned, it will be found that provision is made for the payment into court of the full value of the premises condemned as assessed by judgment upon trial de novo, and such further sum as may be required by the court as a fund to pay all further damages and costs which may be recovered in the proceedings, and all damages which the owner may sustain if the property, for any cause, be not finally taken for public use. And from an examination of the various sections composing the chapter of the Revised Statutes on "Eminent Domain," it is apparent that, although the plaintiff in a proceeding to condemn may be permitted to occupy the premises for certain purposes pending the suit, before actual compensation has been made, the legal title to the property does not pass until the compensation has been paid. It would thus seem that the several statutory provisions are reasonable and adequate to protect the rights of the owner. Our conclusion, therefore, is that section 3597, Revised Statutes 1898, is not repugnant to section 22, article 1, Constitution, but is a valid enactment, and that with section 3604 the'statutory provision for compensation is wholly sufficient to meet the requirements of the Constitution.
We are aware that the decisions of the several states respecting the question above determined are not all harmonious and are irreconcilable, but the decided weight of authority, where the constitutional provisions on this subject are similar to ours, doubtless sustains the conclusion reached herein. In section 456, 2 Lewis, Em. Dom., it is said: "In most states it is Leld that tbe making of compensation need not precede an entry upon the property, provided some definite provision is made whereby the owner will certainly obtain compensation." The Supreme-Court of Massachusetts, in Old Colony R. Co. v. Framingham Water Co., 153 Mass. 561, 27 N. E. 662, 13 L. R. A. 332, held that a statute empowering a town water company to take land, and providing that the damages therefor might be assessed as in the case of the laying out of highways, and that the company might be required to give security for such damages, "satisfactory to the selectmen of said town," failing which its rights should be suspended except for making surveys, made adequate provision for compensation for the land taken. In Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas R. Co., 135 U. S. 641, 10 Sup. Ct. 965, 34 L. Ed. 295, Mr. Justice Harlan, delivering the opinion of the court, said: "It is further suggested that the act of Congress violates the Constitution, in that it does not provide for coinpensation to be made to the plaintiff before the defendant entered upon these lands for the purpose of constructing its road over them. This objection'to the act can not be sustained. The Constitution declares that private property shall not be taken Tor public use without just compensation.' It does not provide or require that compensation shall be actually paid in advance of the occupancy of the land to be taken. But the owner is entitled to reasonable, certain, and adequate provision for obtaining compensation before his occupancy is disturbed." And again he observed: "The plaintiff asks, what will be its condition, as to compensation, if, upon the trial de novo of the question of damages, the amount assessed in its favor should exceed the sum which may be paid into court by the defendant? This question would be more embarrassing than it is, if by the terms of the act of Congress the title to the property appropriated passed from the owner to the defendant, when the latter, having made the required deposit in court, is authorized to enter upon tbe land pending tbe appeal, and to proceed in tbe construction of its road. But, clearly, tbe title does not pass until compensation is actually made to tbe owner. Within tbe meaning of tbe Constitution, tbe property, although entered upon pending tbe appeal, is not taken until tbe compensation is ascertained in some legal mode, and, being paid, tbe title passes from tbe owner." 2 Lewis, Em. Dom., secs. 457-462; Mills, Em. Dom., sec. 124; Nichols v. Railroad Co., 43 Me. 356; Railroad Co. v. Turner, 31 Ark. 494, 25 Am. Rep. 564; In re United States Com'rs, 96 N. Y. 227; Cushman v. Smith, 34 Me. 247; Rider v. Stryker, 63 N. Y. 136; Doe v. Railroad Co., 1 Ga. 524; Wellington & P. R. Co. v. Cashie & C. R. & Lumber Co., 116 N. C. 924, 20 S. E. 964; Walther v. Warner, 25 Mo. 277; Railway Co. v. Payne, 4 U. S. App. 77, 1 C. C. A. 183, 49 Fed. 114; Kennedy v. City of Indianapolis, 103 U. S. 599, 26 L. Ed. 550; Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U. S. 380, 16 Sup. Ct. 43, 40 L. Ed. 188; Backus v. Depot Co., 169 U. S. 557, 18 Sup. Ct. 445, 42 L. Ed. 853.
Tbe remaining question of importance presented herein (tbe same relating to section 6, article 11, Const.) was passed upon in tbe case of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Water & Electrical Power Co., 24 Utah 249, 67 Pác. 672, and requires no further discussion here.
We are of tbe opinion that tbe action of tbe court below in tbe premises was neither in excess of jurisdiction nor erroneous, but was in pursuance of authority, and the order in question must be affirmed, with costs. It is so ordered.
MINEE, C. J"., concurs.