Case Name: Otho G. BELL, William A. Cowart and Lewie W. Griggs v. UNITED STATES
Court: United States Court of Claims
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1960-03-02
Citations: 181 F. Supp. 668
Docket Number: No. 547-56
Parties: Otho G. BELL, William A. Cowart and Lewie W. Griggs v. UNITED STATES.
Judges: 
Reporter: Federal Supplement
Volume: 181
Pages: 668–682

Head Matter:
Otho G. BELL, William A. Cowart and Lewie W. Griggs v. UNITED STATES.
No. 547-56.
United States Court of Claims.
March 2, 1960.
Madden, J., dissented.
Robert E. Hannon, Castro Valley, Cal., for plaintiffs.
Francis X. Daly, Washington, D. C., with whom was Asst. Atty. Gen., George Cochran Doub, for defendant. Sheldon J. Wolfe, Washington, D. C., was on the brief.

Opinion:
JONES, Chief Judge.
The plaintiffs sue for pay and allowances which they claim to be due them as prisoners of war from the dates of capture in 1950 and 1951 until their discharge from the Army on January 23, 1954.
They had enlisted in the United States Army at different dates in 1949. At the time of their capture they were privates, first class.
The applicable statutes are set out in the footnote. The plaintiffs claim that from the date of their capture until their actual discharge they were entitled under the statutes to the regular pay and allowances of soldiers of their classification.
The defendant alleges in the pleadings and it is not denied by the plaintiffs that they were among prisoners who were captúred; that these three refused to be repatriated and return to the United States when they were released from prison; that instead they chose to remain with the Communists and in a communist country; that between the time of the plaintiffs' capture and the time of their dishonorable discharge each plaintiff adhered to, worked for, and collaborated with the enemy of the United States; that since they refused repatriation when they were released from prison and since they continued in their election until January 23,1954, they were on that date dishonorably discharged from the Army.
These allegations are nowhere disputed.
The defendant asserts that because of these admitted facts the plaintiffs were guilty of a breach of the contracts of enlistment and of their oaths of faithful service; and that therefore each plaintiff abandoned his status as a soldier in the United States Army and forfeited all pay and allowances to which he might have been entitled otherwise.
The undisputed testimony shows that •during the period of their confinement •each of the three plaintiffs became monitors for the "forced study groups," the sessions of which the prisoners were compelled to attend. Armed guards attended these sessions. The programs included lectures picturing what were declared to be the bad aspects of life in the United States as contrasted with idyllic life under communism. As monitors, they procured and distributed propaganda literature, and threatened to turn in names of any prisoners who refused to read and discuss favorably these propaganda handouts.
Each of the plaintiffs made tape recordings which were used as broadcasts and over the camp public address system. Each of them wore Chinese uniforms and were permitted to attend meetings outside the camp. The details of the plaintiffs' consorting, fraternizing and cooperating with their captors and the devious ways in which they sought favors for themselves, thus causing hardship and suffering to the other prisoners, are set out in our findings 7 to 30, inclusive.
Two of Bell's recordings were broadcast over the Peiping radio, stating among other things that on the orders of his platoon leader, his men had killed North Korean prisoners of war, and that President Truman was a warmonger. In written articles for the camp newspaper he alleged that American troops had committed atrocities and he personally had been ordered to kill women and children and not to take prisoners of war, and that if given the opportunity he would run a tank over the President's body.
Bell was paid money to write these articles. He also delivered lectures before his company and to the camp on American aggression. He appeared voluntarily in a motion picture and appeared in bimonthly plays. He stated that if given a weapon he would fight against the United States. He sold food intended for the sick to other prisoners of war. By making reports to the Chinese, he caused one man to be bayonetted and others to be placed in solitary confinement.
Cowart did many similar things, wrote propaganda articles accusing American soldiers of atrocities and of using germ warfare. He drew posters and cartoons for the enemy, acted in plays, walked and talked with the Chinese officers, guards and interpreters, lived part of the time at Chinese regimental headquarters, stated he hated America, desired to study in China and to return to the United States in five years to help in the overthrow of the government.
Griggs did many similar things, attended enemy parties, visited Chinese headquarters frequently, referred to the Chinese as comrades, was accorded special privileges, made broadcasts, signed leaflets, wrote articles accusing the American soldiers of atrocities and declared the United States had used germ warfare.
These and many other acts of perfidy are abundantly proved by the record and are nowhere denied either in the pleadings or in the evidence. The record does not disclose any suggestion whatever of brainwashing. As a matter of fact, the record justifies the conclusion that at all times these men did these acts voluntarily for the purpose of helping themselves, in complete disregard of the effect it might have on the treatment of their fellow prisoners. The record does not indicate a touch of loyalty either to their compatriots or to their country after the period they were taken prisoners of war.
The defendant produced at the trials as witnesses certain Army staff officers who testified authoritatively that the United States did not authorize the use of germ warfare in Korea, did not ship any materials or equipment to Korea for that purpose, and received no requests for such materials or equipment. Rather than have this testimony remain in the record as evidence, the plaintiffs' counsel stipulated that neither the United States nor any of the United Nations forces engaged in germ warfare in Korea. In view of this stipulation and concession, the commissioner sustained plaintiffs' objection to this part of defendant's testimony but permitted it to remain in the record as defendant's offer of proof under Rule 41(c), 28 U.S.C.
In reference to plaintiff Bell's statement, as shown in finding 14, that the American troops had injected poison gas into the blood of communist prisoners of war on a ship, plaintiffs' counsel stipulated at the trial that this had not been done.
After the Korean armistice, which was signed July 27, 1953, and prisoner repatriation had begun on August 5, 1953, each of the plaintiffs refused repatriation and voluntarily elected to go to Communist China. After the plaintiffs were discharged on January 23, 1954, they filed this suit for their pay during the period indicated.
R.S. 1288, 10 U.S.C. § 846, supra, was enacted in 1814. Numerous statutes have been enacted and committee reports made since that time. These latter statutes, including sections 1002, 1006, and 1009, supra, of the legislation entitled the Missing Persons Act, as amended, cover the cases here presented. In fact, not only the language of the acts themselves, but the committee reports at the time these sections were enacted clearly show that but for this Missing Persons Act there would be no basis of a claim for compensation. 3
It will be noted that section 1002, as quoted in the footnote, states in effect that any person determined to be "interned in a foreign country, captured by a hostile force, beleaguered or besieged shall, for the period he is officially carried or determined to be in any such status, be entitled" to pay and allowances. (Emphasis supplied.) Section 1006 states in effect that when it is officially reported that a person missing under the conditions specified is alive and in the hands of a hostile force or is interned in a foreign country he shall be paid.
Section 1009, which is a part of the same Act, states that "the head of the department concerned, or such subordinate as he may designate, shall have authority to make all determinations necessary in the administration of this Act, and for the purposes of this Act determinations so made shall be conclusive as to death or finding of death, as to any other status dealt with by this Act . Determinations are authorized to be made by the head of the department concerned, or by such subordinate as he may designate, of entitlement of any person, under provisions of this Act, to pay and allowances . When circumstances warrant reconsideration of any determination authorized to be made of this Act the head of the department concerned, or such subordinate as he may designate, may change or modify a previous determination." (Emphasis supplied.)
This modification in the language of the law completely changes the original act, which was unconditional. These changes in the original act leave not the slightest doubt that it was the intention of the Congress to authorize the head of the department or his agent to determine not only the status but the entitlement to pay.
It is inconceivable that the plaintiffs should be paid in the circumstances disclosed by the undisputed facts in this record. The fact is that essentially they were not confined. They were permitted to go outside the camp, were given practical freedom and in the essence of things they were no longer in the status of prisoners.
The Department, in denying plaintiffs' claims, which were filed with the Department for pay, necessarily determined under the provisions and authority of the statute just quoted that during the period involved these plaintiffs did not have a status as prisoners, and were not entitled to pay under the quoted statutes. It was determined under the provisions of section 1009, quoted above, that they were not entitled to their pay. Such a finding was implicit in a determination that they should not be paid for the period following capture. This determination is fully supported by the record made here.
It is almost incredible that these men would ask for pay in light of the conduct disclosed by the record.
In arriving at the intent of the Congress, it is necessary to construe all the provisions of the law together even if sometimes it seems not to be in strict accord with certain specific provisions when they are lifted from the body of the law and read out of context. Luna v. United States, 1952, 108 F.Supp. 510,124 Ct.Cl. 52; Olney v. United States, 1952, 105 F.Supp. 1005, 123 Ct.Cl. 285, certio-rari denied 344 U.S. 898, 73 S.Ct. 275, 97 L.Ed. 694; United States v. Kirby, 1868, 74 U.S. 482, 19 L.Ed. 278; and Heydenfeldt v. Daney Gold & Silver Min. Co., 1876, 93 U.S. 634, at page 638, 23 L.Ed. 995, from which we quote the following:
"It is true that there are words of present grant in this law; but, in construing it, we are not to look at any single phrase in it, but to its whole scope, in order to arrive at the intention of the makers of it. If a literal interpretation of any part of it would operate unjustly, or lead to absurd results, or be contrary to the evident meaning of the act taken as a whole, it should be rejected. There is no better way of discovering its true meaning, when expressions in it are rendered ambiguous by their connection with other clauses, than by considering the necessity for it, and the causes which induced its enactment." (Emphasis supplied.)
The Kirby ease involved an indictment of a sheriff and his posse under a statute which prohibited a willful obstruction of the United States mails. The sheriff had arrested a mail carrier who had been indicted for murder. In holding the statute not applicable, the Supreme Court, 74 U.S. at page 487, made the following statement:
"The common sense of man approves the judgment mentioned by Puffendorf, that the Bolognian law which enacted, "that whoever drew blood in the streets should be punished with the utmost severity," did not extend to the surgeon who opened the vein of a person that fell down in the street in a fit. The same common sense accepts the ruling, cited by Plowden, that the statute of 1st Edward II, which enacts that a prisoner who breaks prison shall be guilty of felony, does not extend to a prisoner who breaks out when the prison is on fire — -'for he is not to be hanged because he would
not stay to be burnt.' And we think that a like common sense will sanction the ruling we make, that the act of Congress which punishes the obstruction or retarding of the passage of the mail, or of its carrier, does not apply to a case of temporary detention of the mail caused by the arrest of the carrier upon an indictment for murder."
The defendant urges numerous defenses, including the claim that the statute which provided for pay "during captivity" is inapplicable because the plaintiffs were not really in captivity.
The Army regulations promulgated under the Missing Persons Act and in force at the time provide that the determination of the head of the Department, or his designated subordinate, as to status and as to entitlement to pay and allowances under this Act shall be conclusive. A.R. 35-1325, dated July 15, 1953.
We held in the case of Moreno v. United States, 1950, 93 F.Supp. 607, 118 Ct. Cl. 30, certiorari denied 342 U.S. 814, 72 S.Ct. 29, 96 L.Ed. 616, that under the provisions of section 1009, supra, of the Missing Persons Act, the Department head was authorized to conclusively determine both the status and entitlement to pay under the Act.
To adopt the construction for which plaintiffs contend would lead the entire purpose of the law into an absurdity.
The plaintiffs admit that they gave aid and comfort to the enemy. The pleadings and stipulations establish that fact. They made it far more difficult for their compatriots who were there with them. They made tape recordings to be used for encouraging the enemy and for discouraging the people of their own country. One of them took pay for these admitted acts. The others were paid in various privileges and advantages. Who can say that these broadcasts and other acts did not cause loss of life in the struggle? Certainly it added to the hardships and suffering of their compatriots. The proof of these acts is overwhelming in the record. They were denied neither in the pleadings nor in the evidence.
For the purposes of a suit for civilian pay these facts are abundantly proven. For penalty or punishment purposes a trial by a court martial or for treason is perhaps necessary, but this is a civil court in which plaintiffs must establish their rights to affirmatively recover. In the face of these admitted facts the showing of a right to recovery fails. Neither the light of reason nor the logic of analysis of the undisputed facts of record can possibly justify the granting of a judgment favorable to these plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs start up a difficult mountain to a summit of sheer legalism. Somewhere amid the mists and clouds along the way the spirit of the law completely disappears and its broken body lies in an unmarked spot under an avalanche of technical snow.
We cannot believe that any law can be as cold and lifeless as that. The law has for its primary purpose the ends of justice ; otherwise it is as useless as a child trying to grasp a handful of sunlight. The law is a living thing, is not an end in itself but a means to an end. If it fails in this one thing it fails in everything.
To allow recovery in these cases would be to put a premium on dishonor and a penalty on courageous loyalty. We do not see how this court, or any court, can construe the law in such a fashion.
During the period involved here the defendant made certain payments for insurance and dependents. These were made largely for the benefit of the dependents of these soldiers and were not paid directly to the soldiers. The dependents in this record are not shown to have had any part in the actions of these unfortunate soldiers during the period involved here and are not parties to this suit. We do not believe that the ends of justice would be served by granting a judgment for the Government on its counterclaims.
The plaintiffs' petition and the defendant's counterclaims are dismissed in each of the cases.
It is so ordered.
LARAMORE and WHITAKER, Judges, concur.
. 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 1002 provides as follows:
"Any person who is in active service and who is officially ¿[gtermined to be absent in a status of missing, missing in action, interned in a foreign country, captured by a hostile force, beleagured or beseiged shall, for the period he is officially carried or determined to be in any such status, be entitled to receive or to have credited to his account the same pay and allowances to which he was entitled at the beginning of such period of absence or may become entitled thereafter, and entitlement to pay and allowances shall terminate upon the date of receipt by the department concerned of evidence that the person is dead or upon the date of death prescribed or determined under provisions of section 5 of this Act [section 1005 of this Appendix] : Provided, That such entitlement to pay and allowances shall not terminate upon expiration of term of service during absence and in case of death during absence shall not terminate earlier than the dates herein prescribed: Provided further, That there shall be no entitlement to pay and allowances for any period during which such person may be officially determined absent from his post of duty without authority and he shall be indebted to the Government for any pay ments from amounts credited to his account for such period."
50 U.S.O.A.Appendix, § 1006 provides as follows:
"When it is officially reported by the head of the department concerned that a person missing under the conditions specified in section 2 of this Act [section 1002 of this Appendix] is alive and in the hands of a hostile force or is interned in a foreign country, the payments authorized by section 3 of this Act [section 1003 of this Appendix] are, subject to the provisions of section 2 of this Act [section 1002 of this Appendix], authorized to be made for a period not to extend beyond the date of the receipt by the head of the department concerned of evidence that the missing person is dead or has returned to the controllable jurisdiction of the department concerned. When a person missing or missing in action is continued in a missing status under section 5 of this Act [section 1005 of this Appendix], such person shall continue to be entitled to have pay and allowances credited as provided in section 2 of this Act [section 1002 of this Appendix] and payments of allotments, as provided in section 3 of this Act [section 1003 of this Appendix], are authorized to be continued, increased, or initiated."
50 U.S.O.A.Appendix § 1009 provides as follows:
"The head of the department concerned, or such subordinate as he may designate, shall have authority to make all determination necessary in the administration of this Act [sections 1001-1012 and 1013-1016 of this Appendix], and for the purposes of this Act [said sections] determinations so made shall be conclusive as to death or finding of death, as to any other status dealt with by this Act [said sections], and as to any essential date including that upon which evidence or information is received in such department or by the head thereof. The determination of the head of the department concerned, or of such subordinate as he may designate, shall be conclusive as to whether information received concerning any person is to be construed and acted upon as an official report of death. When any information deemed to establish conclusively the death of any person is received in the department concerned, action shall be taken thereon as an official report of death, notwithstanding any prior action relating to death or other status of such person. If the twelve months' absence prescribed in section 5 of this Act [section 1005 of this Appendix] has expired, a finding of death shall be made whenever information received, or a lapse of time without information, shall be deemed to establish a reasonable presumption that any person in a missing or other status is no longer alive. Payment or settlement of an account made pursuant to a report, determination, or finding of death shall not be recovered or reopened by reason of a subsequent report or determination which fixes a date of death except that an account shall be reopened and settled upon the basis of any date of death so fixed which is later than that used as a basis for prior settlement. Determinations are authorized to be made by the head of the department concerned, or by such subordinate as he may designate, of entitlement of any person, under provisions of this Act [sections 1001-1012 and 1013-1016 of this Appendix], to pay and allowances, including credits and charges in his account, and all such determinations shall be conclusive: Provided, That no such account shall be charged or debited with any amount that any person in the hands of a hostile force may receive or be entitled to receive from, or have placed to his credit by, such hostile force as pay, wages, allowances, or other compensation: Provided further, That where the account of any person has been charged or debited with allotments paid pursuant to this Act [said sections] any amount so charged or debited shall be recredited to such person's account in any case in which it is determined by the head of the department concerned, or such subordinate as he may designate, that payment of such amount was induced by fraud or misrepresentation to which such person was not a party. When circumstances warrant reconsideration of any determination authorized to be made by this Act [said sections] the head of the department concerned, or such subordinate as he may designate, may change or modify a previous determination. Excepting allotments for unearned insurance premiums, any allotments paid from pay and allowances of any person for the period of the per son's entitlement under the provisions of section 2 of this Act [section 1002 of this Appendix] to receive or have credited such pay and allowances shall not be subject to collection from the al-lottee as overpayments when payment thereof has been occasioned by delay in receipt of evidence of death, and any allotment payments for periods subsequent to the termination, under this Act [sections 1001-1012 and 1013-1016 of this Appendix] or otherwise, of entitlement to pay and allowances, the payment of which has been occasioned by delay in receipt of evidence of death, shall not be subject to collection from the allottee •or charged against the pay of the deceased person. The head of the department concerned, or such subordinate as he may designate, may waive the recovery of erroneous payments or overpay-ments of allotments to dependents when recovery is deemed to be against equity and good conscience. In the settlement of the accounts of any disbursing officer credit shall be allowed for any erroneous payment or overpayment made by him in carrying out the provisions of this Act [sections 1001-1012 and 1013-1016 of this Appendix], except sections 13, 16, 17, and 18 [sections 1013 and 1016, and former sections 1017, 1018 of this Appendix], in the absence of fraud or criminality on the part of the disbursing officer involved, and no recovery shall be made from any officer or employee authorizing any payment under such provisions in the absence of fraud or criminality on his part."
10 U.S.C. § 846 (1952) provides as follows:
"Every noncommissioned officer and private of the Regular Army, and every officer, noncommissioned officer, and private of any militia or volunteer corps in the service of the United States who is captured by the enemy, shall be entitled to receive during his captivity, notwithstanding the expiration of his term of service, the same pay, subsistence, and allowance to which he may be entitled while in the actual service of the United States; but this provision shall not be construed to entitle any prisoner of war of such militia corps to any pay or compensation after the date of his parole, except the traveling expenses allowed by law. (R.S. § 1288.)" Now 37 U.S.C.A. § 242.
. See committee report, U.S.Cong. & Adm. News, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 1953, p. 1344.
. The Army in denying payment of plaintiffs' claims stated in part as follows:
"I have been advised that the following determinations have been made regarding the status of all United States Army Voluntary Non-Repatriates who elected not to accept repatriation to United States control under the terms of the Korean Armistice Agreement prior to 23 January 1954:
"a. That all Voluntary Non-Repatriates who refused to elect repatriation prior to 23 January 1954, under the terms of the Korean Armistice Agreement have, as demonstrated by their refusal to elect repatriation to the United States and their records as prisoners of war, adopted, adhered to or supported the aims of Communism, one of which is the overthrow of all non-Communist governments, including the Government of the United States, by force or violence."