Case Name: First National Bank of University Place, appellee, v. George M. Gates et al., appellants
Court: Nebraska Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Nebraska
Decision Date: 1920-02-28
Citations: 104 Neb. 230
Docket Number: No. 20795
Parties: First National Bank of University Place, appellee, v. George M. Gates et al., appellants.
Judges: Letton and Day, JJ., not sitting.
Reporter: Nebraska Reports
Volume: 104
Pages: 230–231

Head Matter:
First National Bank of University Place, appellee, v. George M. Gates et al., appellants.
Filed February 28, 1920.
No. 20795.
Appeal: Supersedeas Bond. The time within which to file a supersedeas bond under section 8189, Rev. St. 1913, for an appeal to the supreme court in a law action begins to run, not from the entry of the judgment, but from the overruling of the motion for a new trial.
Appeal from the district court for Lancaster county: Leonard A. Flansburg, Judge.
Affirmed.
Burkett, Wilson, Brown é Wilson, for appellants.
Hainer, Graft & Lane, contra-.

Opinion:
Morrissey, C. J.
The question before us is whether, under section 8189, Rev. St. 1913, a party appealing to the supreme court from a judgment in a law action, in order to supersede the judgment, must file a supersedeas bond within 20 days after the entry of the judgment, or-whether it is sufficient to file such bond within 20 days after the overruling of the motion for a new trial.
Section 8189,- Rev. St. 1913, provides that an appeal shall not operate as a supersedeas in any case, unless the appellant executes a proper bond "within twenty days next after the rendition of such judgment or decree, or the making of such final order." A judgment or decree in an equity case may be treated as final, so as to give a right of appeal, immediately upon its rendition, but in a law action the character of finality which a judgment must possess in order to be reviewable in this court does not attach until the overruling of a motion for a new trial. If the time for filing a supersedeas bond begins to run from the day the judgment is entered, it might operate so as to require the execution of this instrument while the motion for a new trial was still pending, while the judgment was not yet subject to review by this court, and while it was still uncertain whether an appeal would be necessary. Such a situation was not intended by the legislature. The time does not begin to run until the motion for a new trial is overruled.
Affirmed.
Letton and Day, JJ., not sitting.