Case Name: In re ESTATE of Byron B. FREELAND a/k/a B. B. Freeland, deceased. Nola Bradford SCOTT, Executrix of the Last Will and Testament of Byron B. Freeland, Deceased, Petitioner, v. Helen GRATIGNY, Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1965-10-13
Citations: 182 So. 2d 425
Docket Number: No. 33836
Parties: In re ESTATE of Byron B. FREELAND a/k/a B. B. Freeland, deceased. Nola Bradford SCOTT, Executrix of the Last Will and Testament of Byron B. Freeland, Deceased, Petitioner, v. Helen GRATIGNY, Respondent.
Judges: THORNAL, C. J., DREW, J., and CUL-VER SMITH, Circuit Judge, concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 182
Pages: 425–429

Head Matter:
In re ESTATE of Byron B. FREELAND a/k/a B. B. Freeland, deceased. Nola Bradford SCOTT, Executrix of the Last Will and Testament of Byron B. Freeland, Deceased, Petitioner, v. Helen GRATIGNY, Respondent.
No. 33836.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Oct. 13, 1965.
Rehearing Denied Feb. 22, 1966.
Hendricks & Hendricks, Miami, for petitioner.
Hudson, McNutt, Campbell & Isom, Miami, for respondent.

Opinion:
CALDWELL, Justice.
Petitioner Scott,' executrix of the Last Will and Testament of Byron B. Freeland, deceased, seeks review of a decision of the District Court of Appeal, Third District, affirming a summary judgment awarding respondent Gratigny $100 per month from the assets of the estate of Byron Freeland from the date of Freeland's death for so long as respondent shall live or remain unmarried.
The District Court certified the cause as one passing upon the question of great public interest "because it relates to a matter which may have material bearing on many existing divorce decrees and on future divorce litigation as to alimony."
Petitioner and the decedent were divorced on October 14, 1937. The final decree of divorce provided in part as follows:
" and it further appearing that by consent of the parties and their solicitors of record an agreement has been reached, as hereinafter set forth, providing for payment of permanent alimony
"4. That alimony and support money to the Plaintiff, Mrs. Helen Gratigny Freeland, now Helen Gratigny, is hereby decreed to be paid by the Defendant in the amount of $500.00 cash upon the signing of this decree, and the further sum of $100.00 per month during the remainder of the life of the Plaintiff, or until the remarriage of the Plaintiff
Alimony was paid in accordance with the decree until the death of Byron Freeland whereupon respondent filed a claim in the decedent's estate for payment under the above decree and petitioner filed her objection. The trial court entered its summary judgment for respondent and the District Court affirmed, 166 So.2d 816, Judge Carroll dissenting.
Our question for determination is whether there was a contract or an agreement between the parties, reflected by a clear decree of the chancellor, evidencing the intention of the husband to obligate his estate to continue the payment of alimony after his death.
The District Court held (1) the decree evidenced a sufficient agreement by the husband to pay permanent alimony and that in such a case the representative of the decedent's estate had no right to question the permanency of the award if the same was not contested by the husband during his lifetime and (2) "[Ujnless it is specifically agreed to the contrary, payments to a wife which are described as permanent in nature will continue subsequent to the demise of the former husband, if she is not prevented by any other condition subsequent from collecting same."
By weight of authority and in this state, alimony awarded by a chancellor terminates upon the death of either of the parties or upon the remarriage of the wife. The exception to the general rule is allowed where there is a contract or an agreement clearly evidencing the intention of the husband to bind his estate to continue payments in the nature of alimony after his death. In the Underwood case, in which post-demise payments were ordered, there was a separation agreement which provided:
"If the husband shall die before the wife, the said monthly payment shall not cease but the payment thereof shall be a first charge and lien against the estate of the husband, subordinate only to the expenses of his last illness and funeral expenses."
In the. Johnson case, awarding post-demise payments, there was a property settlement agreement prior to divorce which provided for weekly payments and stipulated that such payments would be made while the contract remained in force and "shall only be terminated by the death of the party of the second part [the wife] This court, three justices dissenting, held:
"We subscribe to the proposition that in the absence of an express contract or a provision in a decree such as the one before us, a divorced husband's liability for alimony terminates with his death. On the other hand, where the decree of property settlement agreement expressly provides for the continuance of the payments 'until the, death of the wife' then the husband's estate remains liable for the obligation in the same manner as it is liable for any other legitimate obligation outstanding at the time of his death. Here there was a provision in the final decree as well as in the property settlement arrangement to the effect that the payments would be made during the life of the wife or until she remarried."
The Johnson case is discussed and construed in the Aldrich opinion as not receding from our precedent respecting the obligation for alimony after the death of the husband.
In Aldrich, supra, a final decree of divorce awarded payments in the nature of alimony to the wife and provided expressly that such monthly sums should be a charge against the husband's estate during her lifetime, in the event he predeceased her. This court found that, although the decree was erroneous because the husband had not agreed his estate would be bound, the husband's failure to appeal allowed the decree to become final and not subject to collateral attack. We held:
"We therefore hold expressly what has been impliedly held by our decisions, supra, respecting this matter, and that is, that there is nothing in Ch. 65, Fla. Stat., F.S.A., or any other statute of this state that authorizes a trial judge to decree that 'alimony' in its technical sense — the 'nourishment' or 'sustenance' of the wife- — may continue as a charge against the deceased ex-husband's estate during the lifetime of the wife, unless the husband has stipulated or agreed that his estate may be so bound. To hold otherwise would, in our opinion, be judicial legislation— and this we are not authorized to do."
But we cannot agree the Johnson, Underwood and Aldrich cases support the holding of the District Court herein. In this cause there was no agreement between the parties evidencing a clear intention that the estate of the deceased be bound to continue the payments awarded in the decree for divorce.
The petition for writ of certiorari is granted, the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Third District, is quashed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith.
THORNAL, C. J., DREW, J., and CUL-VER SMITH, Circuit Judge, concur.
THOMAS, J., dissents with opinion.
ROBERTS, J., dissents and agrees with THOMAS, J.
ERVIN, J., dissents.
. The District Court, in support of its conclusions, cited Aldrich v. Aldrich, 163 So. 2d 276 (Fla.1964); Underwood v. Underwood, 64 So.2d 281 (Fla.1953); and Johnson v. Every, 93 So.2d 390 (Fla. 1957).
. Allen v. Allen, 111 Fla. 733, 150 So. 237 (1933); Deigaard v. Deigaard, 114 So. 2d 516 (Fla.App. 3rd 1959), cert. denied, 117 So.2d 843 (Fla.1960).
. Underwood v. Underwood, 64 So.2d 281 (Fla.1953).
. Johnson v. Every, 93 So.2d 390 (Fla. 1957).
. Aldrich v. Aldrich, 163 So.2d 276, 280 (Fla.1964).
. Ibid.