Case Name: QUINN v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1914-10-28
Citations: 170 S.W. 783
Docket Number: No. 3255
Parties: QUINN v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 170
Pages: 783–785

Head Matter:
QUINN v. STATE.
(No. 3255.)
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Oct. 28, 1914.
On Motion for Rehearing, Nov. 25, 1914.)
1. Homicide (§ 250 ) — Manslaughter—Sufficiency of Evidence.
In a prosecution for homicide in a fight bordering closely on a mutual combat, evidence . held to sustain a conviction of manslaughter. [Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. §§ 515-517; Dec. Dig. § 250. ]
2. Criminal Law (§ 941 ) — New Trial— Newly Discovebed Evidence.
In a prosecution for homicide, newly discovered evidence, that deceased had hired an auto and chauffeur to search for accused after making threats against his life, is not ground for new trial, where the evidence on the trial clearly showed that accused was informed that
deceased was looking for him, as it was cumulative.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law,] Cent. Dig. §§ 232S-2330; Dec. Dig. § 941. ]
3. Ceiminal Law (§ 939 ) — New Trial— Newly Discovered Evidence — Diligence.
In a prosecution for homicide, newly discovered evidence of a witness, who testified at the trial that accused had rented a revolver at a pawnshop, is not ground for new trial, where the defense at the trial cross-examined another witness as to the fact of rental and such witness denied knowledge of it.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2318-2323; Dec. Dig. § 939. ]
On Motion for Rehearing.
4. Homicide (§ 112 ) — Self-Defense—Bringing on Difficulty.
A defendant, who armed himself after hearing that deceased had .threatened his life and was armed and out looking for him, would lose his right to self-defense if he sought the deceased for the purpose of killing him! or bringing on a difficulty so that he might be killed or injured, though he had the right to go to accused to demand an explanation.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. §§ 145-150; Dec. Dig. § 112. ]
Appeal from District Court, Galveston County; Robt. G. Street, Judge.
A. Quinn was convicted of manslaughter, and he appeals.
Affirmed.
T. C. Turnley and Aubrey Fuller, both of Galveston, for appellant. C. E. Lane, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
DAVIDSON, J.
Appellant was convicted of manslaughter; his punishment being assessed at three years' confinement in the penitentiary.
Two questions are presented: First, the insufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction; second, newly discovered testimony. We do not think there is any merit in the first proposition. These parties had been at enmity, each making threats against the other; both armed themselves the day of the killing. It is in evidence that the deceased made threats against the life-of appellant, and also that appellant made threats against the life of deceased. This is the conclusion to be reached from the evidence, without stating it in full.
Within an hour of the killing, appellant walked into the saloon of Habine and was informed by Habine, his brother, and others that deceased had been in the saloon shortly before and had made threats against him. He borrowed a pistol from Habine and left. Shortly afterward he came upon deceased on the corner of a street. A conversation began by appellant stating to deceased he understood he had been looking for him. Deceased replied, "Ves, I understand you have been looking for me," and struck appellant with his fist. They "clinched." When pulled apart, appellant had his pistol, snapped it once or twice, and either the second or third time it was discharged, in flicting the fatal wound. The testimony is not altogether harmonious at what time deceased pulled his pistol or attempted to pull it. Appellant introduced evidence to the effect that the deceased was pulling or seeking to pull his pistol before he pulled his. When deceased fell, he had his pistol in his hand; or, if not, it had just been taken from him by an officer. Evidently the state's idea was that the trouble arose between them on account of a prostitute with whom appellant had been living prior to the homicide but had for a month or two not lived with her, but that deceased was keeping her as his mistress at time of difficulty. They were engaged to be married, and she was going to rectify her life by moving from Galveston to Houston and become, as she says, a better girl. This case borders closely upon mutual combat, under circumstances that meant a deadly conflict.
As to the newly discovered testimony, affidavits are appended to the motion, in substance, that deceased had hired an auto and chauffeur to carry him about the city in search of appellant. The chauffeur had been discharged shortly before the meeting. We do not think there is anything in this phase of the motion. Appellant was thoroughly informed of the fact that deceased was seeking him and had threatened his life. Acting upon this information, he armed himself and went to where the deceased was located. If the witness had been present at the time and introduced before the jury, this testimony would have been admissible as intensifying the fact that deceased had been looking for appellant; but appellant fully knew that fact prior to the killing. This was in the nature of cumulative evidence, and a matter of no very material importance, as we understand this record. 'Appellant w,as informed and knew of the threats and that deceased intended to kill him and was seeking him for that purpose.
The other phase of the motion was, in substance, that deceased had gone to a pawnshop before driving in the auto and rented a pistol. This affidavit and the motion shows that deceased had rented this pistol from the pawnshop for 20 days, paying $10 for it. It is claimed that this is newly discovered and material. It would have been admissible testimony, but it is far from clear from the record that appellant was in position to take advantage of that as newly discovered testimony. The witness by whom they expected to prove this was a witness and present at the trial and was not asked in reference to the matter. Qualifying the bill in this respect, the court says: "It is cumulative of the testimony of other witnesses who testified upon the trial." No witness, however, in the case testified to the fact that deceased had leased the pistol. From the witness Pearl Brooks upon cross-examination the defendant elicited the following;
"Q. Now then, Pearl, didn't you, on the day of the killing, on that morning, furnish to Mr. Smith money to buy him a six-shooter? A. No, sir; I didn't. Q. Didn't you give him $10? A. No, sir. Q. Didn't Mr. Smith buy a sixshooter on the morning of the killing, from a pawnship in the city of Galveston? A. If he did, I don't know about it; I didn't give him $10, and as to Mr. Smith never paying me back the $10, I didn't give him the $10 to pay me back. Pie had money; • he made $35 that night, and I got half of it."
By this witness threats were proved by the defendant against the deceased. It will be noticed by this statement that defendant on cross-examination of the woman Pearl Brooks, who had been appellant's former mistress, proved that she was then the mistress of deceased; that she did not let deceased have the $10 to buy a pistol or get one from the pawnshop. He asked her particularly if she had not let him have the money to get it from the pawnshop. From this appellant must have been aware of the fact that deceased got the pistol from the pawnshop or believed it, as he asked particularly in reference to that very matter. Ten dollars was the exact amount deceased paid the pawnshop for the pistol. If he knew or believed that deceased had been hunting him over the town, ordinary diligence would have-required him to inquire at the different pawnshops whether or not deceased had gotten-this pistol. There is no evidence connected with the motion for new trial or in the statement that he had gone to any pawnshop to ascertain this fact, and yet he developed on the trial by cross-examination of the witness Pearl Brooks that he knew or believed the fact that deceased had gotten the pistol from the pawnshop and had paid $10 for it. Under this statement, we do not believe this case is brought within any of the' rules which, would require the court-to grant a new trial. It is sometimes the case that justice may require granting a motion for new trial where the matters are not brought strictly within the rules in regard to newly discovered testimony; but we are of the opinion that this is not one of those cases. Appellant was apprised, if his examination of the witness Pearl Brooks means anything, of the-fact that deceased had leased the pistol from some pawnshop and had paid $10 for it, because he was inquiring of this witness if she-had not furnished deceased the money. As soon as the trial was over and conviction had, he discovered this quickly, and from one of the witnesses who w.as used on the trial. Now the fact that deceased had leased the pistol from the pawnshop could have had but little bearing upon the real merits of the case. Appellant's personal testimony is to the effect that he was afraid the deceased would kill him; that they had had previous-difficulties., Taking the case all in all, we do-not believe this testimony comes within even any equitable rule that would require the court to grant a new trial or this court to- reverse for failure to grant a new trial. This seems to be one of those eases where the two antagonists threatened each other, both apparently willing to enter into a deadly conflict, both armed for this purpose, with some intimation that appellant sought the deceased.
We are of the opinion, therefore, the court did not err, and this judgment ought to be affirmed, and it is accordingly so ordered.