Case Name: THE STATE ex rel. PENROSE INVESTMENT COMPANY et al. v. JAMES N. McKELVEY
Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1923-10-06
Citations: 301 Mo. 1
Docket Number: 
Parties: THE STATE ex rel. PENROSE INVESTMENT COMPANY et al. v. JAMES N. McKELVEY.
Judges: Woodson, G. J., and David E. Blair, J., concur; Graves, J., concurs in result in separate opinion; White, J., dissents in separate opinion in which Ragland, and James T. Blair, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Missouri Reports
Volume: 301
Pages: 1–49

Head Matter:
THE STATE ex rel. PENROSE INVESTMENT COMPANY et al. v. JAMES N. McKELVEY.
In Banc,
October 6, 1923.
1. CITIES: Police Powers: Zoning Ordinance. A city has no power to enact, as a police regulation, an ordinance dividing the city into residence, commercial, industrial and unrestricted districts and preventing the owner of a lot in a residence district from erecting an electrically-driven ice manufactory thereon, without compensation for the damage resulting from the restriction.
Held, by WALKER, X, with whom WOODSON, C. X, and DAVID E. BLAIR, X, concur, that an ordinance which prevents the owner of a lot from constructing an electrically-driven ice-manufacturing plant thereon is not embraced in charter provisions authorizing the city to prohibit, abate and suppress all business, occupations and uses of property detrimental to the health, morals, comfort, safety, convenience or welfare of the inhabitants of the city and all nuisances and causes thereof, and to prescribe limits within which business, occupations and practices liable to become nuisances or detrimental to the health, security or general welfare of the people may be established, conducted or maintained, because such an ice manufactory, though situated in a congested residential district, is not a nuisance and is not detrimental to the public health, morals, safety or material welfare.
Reid, by GRAVES, X, concurring in the result, that a zoning ordinance, which prevents the subsequent establishment of manufacturing plants in residence districts, is the devotion of private property to a public purpose, at least to the extent that the property is- damaged by such restriction, and unless it provides for just compensation the city has no constitutional authority to enact it.
Reid, by WHITE, X, dissenting, with whom JAMES T. BLAIR and RAGLAND, JJ., concur, that such charter provisions afe comprehensive enough to embrace a reasonable zoning ordinance; that the police power expands and enlarges to meet the increased dangers to the public health, safety and general welfare produced by the congestion and density of populations of large cities and the industrial complexities of modern society; that manufacturing plants produce unsightly surroundings, disagreeable odors, disturbing noises, congested traffic and overcrowded areas, multiply casualties and inconveniences and render residences in their neighborhood uninhabitable, all of which directly affect the public health, safety and general welfare, of all of which courts take judicial notice; and a fair ordinance preventing their future establishment within a designated residence district is a reasonable police regulation.
2. ZONING ORDINANCE: Police Regulation: Eminent Domain: Distinction: Infringement on Rights of Private Property: Unconstitutional Ordinance.
Reid, by WALKER, X, with whom WOODSON, C. X, and DAVID E. BLAIR, J., concur, that the police power extends to the protection of the public, and may be employed to prevent the use of private property in such a way as to injure the public health, safety, morals or general welfare, and its exercise does not imply compensation to the owner for its decreased value due to the restricted use, and in consequence it cannot be employed unless the restricted use is necessary and essential to the public health, safety, morals or material welfare; eminent domain is the power to take private property for a public use or enjoyment, and just compensation is a prerequisite to its exercise. The effect of a police regulation is to restrict a property right as harmful to the public; the effect of condemnation is to appropriate a property right because it is useful to the public. A zoning ordinance, which divides a city into residence, industrial, commercial and unrestricted districts and pi-events the owner of a lot in the residence district from constructing an electrically-driven ice manufacturing plant thereon, without providing any compensation for the restricted use, is not an exercise of either power, and is therefore void.
Held, by GRAVES, X, with whom WOODSON, C. X, and DAVID E. BLAIR and WALKER, JX, concur,, that eminent domain in ultimate analysis is but a limited use of the inherent police power; that the value of property is dependent upon the uses to which it may be put, and private property can neither be taken nor damagjed without just compensation; that to limit the use of private property is to impose a restriction upon the right of property, which cannot be made without just compensation, and cannot be made under the guise of a police regulation, so long as the use is not harmful to the public; that while a city has a right to enact a reasonable zoning ordinance, preventing the owner of a lot in a residence district from constructing a manufacturing plant thereon, it cannot enact such an ordinance without providing for just compensation for its decreased value caused by such restriction and for a judicial hearing on the amount of damages, unless the right thus restricted would, if exercised, rise to the plane of a public nuisance. Held, also, that city zoning is a public purpose and a public use; and where an attempt is made to take or damage private property for an alleged public use, the question whether the contemplated use be really public is for the courts to determine, irrespective of legislative expression on the subject.
Held, by WHITE, X, dissenting, with whom JAMES T. BLAIR and RAGLAND, JJ., concur, that, even admitting that a zoning ordinance is the damaging of private property for a publlic use, the damages are common to all owners of lots in a residence district, and are not special or peculiar to the owner of one lot, and when such is the case it is the universal rule that the lessened value of the one lot caused by the restriction is not included in the term “damages;” that the damages to the many owners of homes in the residence district should have equally as great weight as the lessened value to one lot caused by its prevented use for a manufacturing plant; that the return in this case specifically alleges that the construction of such a plant would deprive the owners of other lots of the full use of them for residence purposes, and would transform the neighborhood into a manufacturing district, and alleges other facts authorizing the legal conclusion that said plant would constitute a nuisance to all residents and property owners in the neighborhood, and these allegations are not denied in the reply, and must therefore be taken as true, and consequently if relators are entitled to damages, so is every other person who is prevented by a police regulation from devoting his property to a use that is hurtful to the public health, safety and general welfare; that the provisions of the Constitution relating to eminent domain and just compensation do not affect the power to establish reasonable regulations to secure the public health, safety, convenience and the rights of property, and a "proper zoning ordinance, designed to secure owners in the use and enjoyment of their homes for themselves and their families and to protect from ruinous depreciation the value of such homes, and to protect such homes from all the objectionable things that render uninhabitable residences in a manufacturing neighborhood, is such a regulation.
Mandamus.
Peremptory writ awarded.
Foristel & Eagleton and Frank X. Siemens for relators.
(1) The ordinance set forth in respondent’s return is invalid, in that, it violates the Constitution of the United States and of this State. Article V of U. S. Constitution (5 Amdt.) sec. 1; Fourteenth Amendment, U. S. Constitution; Secs. 23 and 30, art. 2, Mo. Constitution; St. Louis v. Dreisoerner, 243 Mo. 217; St. Louis v. Dorr, 145 Mo. 466; St. Louis v. Hill, 116 Mo. 527; River 'Rendering Co. v. Behr, 77 Mo. 91; Ex parte Lerner, 218 S. W. 331; Buchanan v. Wooley, 245 U. S. 60. (2) Depriving an owner of the use of his real property or arbitrarily restricting or limiting the use thereof without adequate compensation is a deprivation of property without due process of law, and while none of relators’ property was actually taken the limitations and restrictions placed thereon by the ordinance deprive them of the right to use it for any lawful purpose, and amounts to a taking thereof contrary to Articles V and XIY, U. S. Constitution, and Secs. 21 and 30, art. 2, Mo. Constitution. Haller Sign Works v. Training School, 249 111. 436. (3) The ordinance is unreasonable, arbitrary, harsh and oppressive and is not of uniform application throughout the city of St. Louis and for that reason is invalid. Ex parte Lerner, 218 S. W. 331. (4) The enactment of the ordinance is not within the charter powers of the city of St. Louis; its power on this subject is granted and limited in and by, Secs. 25-36 and 34 of the charter; St. Louis v. Atlantic Quarry & Const. Co., 244 Mo. 479. (5) The ordinance is not a bona-fide regulation of the peace, health, safety and welfare of the inhabitants of the city, nor can its enactment be sustained as a regulation for peace and good order in society. St. Louis v. Dreisoerner, 243 Mo. 217; St. Louis Gunning Co. v. City, 235 Mo. 99; St. Louis v. Packing Co., 141 Mo. 375. (6) It is fundamentally based on aesthetic reasons; it seeks to limit and deprive the owner of the use of real property that in law amounts to a tailing or damaging thereof without provision for ascertaining or mailing compensation therefor; it bears no relation whatever to a municipal by-law enacted under the police power for the health, welfare or safety of the inhabitants of the city and is therefore invalid. St. Louis v. Dreisoerner, 243 Mo. 217; St. Louis Gunning Co. v. St. Louis, 235 Mo. 99; Haller Sign Works v. Training School, 249 111.436. (7) Its object is not in anywise to enlarge the law of public or private nuisance, nor by its terms does it purport to regulate public or private nuisances, or to abate, suppress or prevent their coming into existence, but, on the contrary, by its terms attempts to limit and regulate the use of all real property in the city, in divers ways and means without regard to the use of which said property can.be put, and irrespective of whether the use thereof be proper or legal, or whether the use thereof constitutes a nuisance or otherwise, and all of this under the guise of the police power, the essential elements of which are wholly lacking; and without any reasonable basis or reason therefor whatsoever, and in so doing exceeds its charter powers. Secs. 25, 26 and 34, Charter of St. Louis. (8) The Legislature of a state (in this case the Municipal Assembly of St. Louis) cannot constitutionally under color of preventing' public or private mischief, or under the guise of the police power, prescribe the hind of improvements the owner of land shall or shall not make, and in what part of the city he may or may not make them, for the toleration of such power on the part of the government would concede to it the right to control every man, and point out to him the road he shall travel in the pursuit of happiness. Gunning Co. v. St. Louis, 235 Mo. 99; People ex rel. v. Chicago, 261 111. 16; Chicago v. Gunning System, 214 111. 628; Buffalo v. Kellner, 153 N. Y. Supp. 472; St. Louis v. Dreisoerner, 243 Mo. 217.
George F. Haid and Oliver Benti for respondent; Glendy B. Arnold, amicus curiae.
(1) The city of St. Louis derives its charter in pursuance of the provisions of the Constitution of Missouri, and the police powers delegated therein are conferred by the State upon the city. St. Louis Gunning . Co. v. St. Louis, 235 Mo. 149; St. Louis v.. Liessing, 190 Mo. 480. (2) The “zoning” ordinance in question is within the charter powers of the city. St. Louis Gunning Co. v. St. Louis, 235 Mo. 148; Charter of St. Louis, art. 1, secs. 25, 26, 35. (3) The police power extends to all matters affecting the peace, order, health, morals, convenience, comfort'and safety of its citizens. Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. Ill; Moses v. United States,' 16 App. D. C. 428, 50 L. R. A. 536; State v. Railroad, 242 Mo. 355; Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 26; C. B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Drainage Commrs., 200 U. S. 592; Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U. S. 683; Bacon v. Walker, 204 U. S. 317; St. Louis Gunning Co. v. St Louis, 235 Mo. 148 ; Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 62; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 31; Des Moines v. Manhattan Oil Co., 184 N. W. 826; Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U. S. 176. (4) Prima facie, the Municipal Assembly is the sole judge of the necessity for an ordinance, and if reasonable on its face the ordinance will be sustained, unless facts are shown which make it unreasonable. St. Louis v. Theatre Go., 202 Mo. 699; St. Louis Gunning Co. v. St. Louis, 235 Mo. 201; Cusack Co. v. Chicago, 242 U. S. 531; Ex parte Quong Wo, 118 Pac. 714. (5) The party attacking the validity of an ordinance upon the ground of unreasonableness has the burden of showing unreasonableness. St. Louis v. Theatre Co., 202 Mo. 700; Wagner v. St. Louis, 224 S. W. 413, 12 A. L. E. 495; State v. Addington, 77 Mo. 118; Des Moines v. Manhattan Oil Co., 184 Ñ. W. 829. (6) The zoning ordinance in question is reasonable and does not violate any of the provisions of the Constitution of Missouri, and is a valid exercise of the police power by the Municipal Assembly. Hadacheck v. Los Angeles, 239 IT. S. 394; In re Opinion of Justices, 127 N. E. (Mass.) 525; Lincoln Trust Go. v. Williams Building Corp., 229 N. Y. 313; Eeinman v. Little Bock, 237 IT. S. 171; Biggs v. Steinway & Sons, 229 N. Y. 320; Ex parte Quong Wo, 118 Pac. 714; Ex parte Montgomery, 125 Pac. 1070; Boyd v. Sierra Madre, 183 Pac. 230; Welch v. Swasey, 79 N. E. (Mass.) 745; Cochran v. Preston, 108 Md. 220; State ex rel. v. Cunningham, 97 Ohio St. 130; Salt Lake City v. Western Foundry Works, 187 Pac. (Utah) 829. (7) The fact that aesthetic considerations may enter into the reasons for the passage of an ordinance of the character in question does not invalidate the ordinance. St. Louis Poster Adv. Co. v. St. Louis, 249 U. S. 269; Welch v. Swasey, 214 U. S. 91; State ex rel. v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 13. (8) A proper exercise of the police power does not constitute the taking of property for public use without compensation, although its exercise may interfere with the full enjoyment of the property. 1 Dillon on Municipal Corp. (5 Ed.) sec. 301, p. 555; St. Louis Gunning Co. v. St. Louis, 235 Mo. 171; Eichenlaub v. St. Joseph, 113 Mo. 404; Knox v. Lee, 12 Wall. 551; St. Louis v. Galt, 179 Mo. 16; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 125; State ex inf-, v. Standard Oil Co., 218 Mo. 383; Des Moines v. Manhattan Oil Co., 184 N. W. 828. (9) The limitations as to use of property under the ordinance in question do not infringe upon the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 31; C. B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Drain. Commrs., 200 U. S. 593; Cusack Co. v. Chicago, 242 U. S. 530; Rein-man v. Little Rock, 237 U. S. 177.
tJohn B. Pew, E. F. Halstead, Edwin G. Meservey and James E. Goodrich, amici curiae, on motion for rehearing.
(1) From a careful reading of the various opinions in these cases we feel that the question causing the greatest diversity of opinion is this: Do the restrictions imposed by the ordinance constitute a taking of property without compensation? In an orderly consideration of the foregoing question we should first determine exactly what is embraced within the term “properly,” as the word is used in its constitutional sense. In conformity with the past rulings of this court, we believe that all will agree upon the following fundamental propositions: (a) By the term property is meant, not the tangible, physical thing, but the right to use or exercise dominion over the thing. 22 R. C. L, 37; St. Louis v. Hill, 1.16 Mo. 533. (b) That this right to use or exercise dominion over the thing is limited to those uses and those acts of dominion which are not injurious to others or to the community. 22 R. C. L. 39. From the two foregoing propositions, which are so elemental that we will not at this time burden the court with citation of other authorities, it necessarily follows: (c) That “property,” as used in the Constitution, does not include those uses or acts of dominion which are injurious to others or to the community. And since those uses and acts of dominion which are injurious to others or to the community are not property, and are not property rights, it also necessarily follows: (d) That a police regulation, restraining or restricting those uses or acts' of dominion which are injurious to others or to the community, does not constitute a taking of property within its constitutional meaning. 22 R. C. L. 40, 41. (2) Under numerous decisions heretofore cited in those cases, it may be conceded that by the words “injurous to others or to the community” is meant those uses and acts of dominion which are injurious or detrimental to the public health, safety, morals, comfort, conveninence, prosperity or general welfare. We believe that it will stand admitted by all: (a) That the natural tendency of an invasion of a quiet, clean district of residences (whether it be a district of mansions or cottages) by apartments, hotels, retail stores or factories, is to bring about a marked depression of property values in such district; that the natural tendency of such invasion is to destroy the comfort, quiet, cleanliness and restfulness of such district; that the natural tendency of such invasion is to cause an exodus of the home owners of such district, followed by a condition of landlordism and tenantry resulting generally in a neglected, run-down district with original values practically wiped out; and that the natural tendency of such an invasion (varying in degree with the character and extent of the invasion) is toward the destruction of the healthful, wholesome, moral surroundings which should safeguard home and family life, and the rearing of ‘children. It is a matter of common knowledge that practically all the large cities of the country contain large areas of blighted district where business and industry have invaded residence districts which were naturally suited for residence purposes, and not for business or industrial purposes. As a result, these districts are now ruined for residence purposes, and practically unused for business and industry, (b) It is a matter of common knowledge that this shifting of uses and districts has cost the public millions of dollars in useless expenses in rearranging public improvements and public utility service to take care of demands “that would have been avoided by a stabilization of uses and use districts, (c) Zoning laws do not tend to‘destroy this economic and natural development; on the contrary, their purpose is to secure and stabilize such development, and at the same time give protection to the beneficial uses of property, and the general welfare of the community, (d) The question of cheap transportation is one of the most serious problems confronting large cities. Such large areas of near in property have been invaded by scattered business and industrial uses that a general exodus of home owners to the far out districts has resulted. (3) All will concede that an invasion of a residence district by apartments, hotels, business and industry is, as a matter of plain fact and common knowledge, usually and naturally attended by all or some of the evils pointed out above. If such concession be made, then follows the final proposition, as follows: Are these evils such evils as are detrimental to the public health, safety, morals, comfort, convenience, prosperity or general welfare? The answer to this proposition is so plain that the question almost answers itself. Who will contend that crowded traffic laden streets, contaminated atmosphere, increased fire hazards, decreased efficiency of fire fighting apparatus, overtaxed water mains, overtaxed sewers, increased dirt, smoke and germ laden dust, and the erection of huge buildings cutting off light and air is not detrimental to the health and safety of all persons, and particularly to the children and the old and infirm living in a district so affected? (4) From a consideration of all the indispensable facts and legal principles heretofore discussed, the general summing up must be as follows: (a) Our Constitution prohibits the taking of private property without compensation, (b) “Property” as used in the constitutional prohibition is not the physical thing, but is the right to make such uses and to exercise such acts of dominion over the thing as are not detrimental to the public health, safety, morals, comfort, convenience, prosperity or general welfare, (c) The invasion of a residence district by apartments, hotels, business places and factories is, in its natural tendency, an evil which is detrimental to the public health, safety, morals, comfort, convenience, prosperity and general welfare, (d) It therefore follows that the act of the State in remedying this evil by restricting and restraining those uses and acts of dominion which are detrimental to the public health, safety, morals, comfort, convenience, properity and general welfare, does not amount to a taking of property. Hibbard v. Halliday, 158 Pac. 1158, L. E. A. 1916F, 903. (5) None of the courts which uphold the validity of zoning laws have done so upon the theory that the evils sought to be remedied are public nuisances. On the contrary, as in the case of Des Moines v. Manhattan Oil Co., 184 N. W. 823, the court enters an express disclaimer of resting its decision upon the ground of nuisance.

Opinion:
WALKEE, J.
This is an original proceeding brought by the State at the relation of the corporation named and another against the respondent as Building Commissioner of the City of St. Louis to require him to issue to relators a permit under an ordinance of said city for the erection on .a lot belonging to relator of a building in which it is contemplated to install and conduct an electrically-driven ice manufactory. A compliance with the ordinances of the city other than that designated as the-Zoning Ordinance, No. 30,199, approved July 15, 1918, and the observance of other formal requirements requisite to the granting of a building permit, are alleged to have been made, despite which the respondent has refused to authorize the erection of the building.
Eespondent in his return admits all of the facts set forth in the alternative writ, except a compliance with the Zoning Ordinance, particularly, sections 2, 3, 6, 7 and 29 of same, a failure to comply with which he assigns as the sole reason for his refusal; that under said sections the erection of the proposed building at the location designated for the purpose stated is forbidden by said ordinance, and he is therefore unauthorized to issue said permit.
To this return relators reply that the Zoning Ordinance is void as in violation of Article V (5th Arndt.) and Section I, Article XIV (14th Amendment) of the Constitution of the United States, and of Sections 21 and 30, Article II, of the Constitution of this State; and that it is arbitrary, unreasonable, oppressive and not uniform in its application throughout the city of St. Louis; and hence invalid, and that the business proposed to be conducted in said building will not constitute a nuisance either per se or potential; that the city block, No. 2485, on which it is proposed to erect said building is, under said Zoning Ordinance dividing said city, partly in a residential and partly- in a commercial district, in that lots numbered 1 to 7, both inclusive, of said block, and certain other property lying to the north, south and west thereof, are classified as a part of the Second Residential District, and that lots 18 to 24, both inclusive, as well as other adjacent property, are classified as belonging to the Commercial District. That the sections of the Zoning Ordinance, No. 30,199, heretofore enumerated and relevant under their terms to the matter at issue, are as follows:
"Section Two. In order to designate, regulate and restrict the location and locations of commerce, business, trades and industries and the location of all buildings designed or occupied for specified uses, the city of St. Louis is hereby divided into five districts, which shall be known as: (a) first residence district; (b) second residence district; (c) commercial district; (d) industrial district; and (e) unrestricted district. The city of St. Louis is hereby divided into the five classes of districts aforesaid and the boundaries of the districts are shown upon the map attached hereto and made a part of this ordinance, being designated as 'Use Zone Map,' and said map and all the notations, references and other things shown thereon shall be as much a part of this ordinance as if the matters and things set forth by said map were all fully described herein.
"Section Three. Except as hereinafter provided, the use or uses of all buildings and premises existing at the time of the adoption of this ordinance may be continued. Except as hereinafter provided, no building now existing and no building hereafter erected shall be occupied, or altered for occupancy, for a specified use in a district restricted against such use, as shown on the map hereinabove mentioned.
' ' Section Six. All lands and buildings in the second residence districts, except as hereinafter provided, shall be erected for and used exclusively as dwellings, tenements, hotels, lodging or boarding houses, churches, private clubs, hospitals or sanitariums, public or semi-public institutions of an educational, philanthropic or eleemosynary nature, railroad passenger station and the usual accessories located on the same lot or plot with these various buildings, including the office of a physician, dentist or other person authorized by law to practice medicine, and including private garage containing space for not more than four automobiles; provided, however, that no tenement, hotel, lodging or boarding house shall hereafter be erected, maintained or conducted except as provided in section three of this ordinance in any second residence district occupied exclusively by one and two-family residences, without the unanimous consent of the Board of Public Service after public hearing, duly advertised, has been held thereon. Farming, truck gardening, nurseries or greenhouses may be erected and maintained in second residence districts.
"Section Seven. All land and buildings in commercial districts as shown upon the map hereinabove mentioned shall be erected for and used as a store or shop for the conduct of a wholesale or retail business, a place of amusement, an office or offices, police or fire department station house, post office, studios, conservatories, dancing- academies, carpenter shop, cleaning and dying works, painting, paper hanging and decorating store, dressmaker, laundry, millinery store, photograph gallery, plumbing shop-, roofing or plastering establishment, tailor, tinsmith, undertaker, upholsterer and other similar enterprises or institutions, and also any provided, however, that no building shall have more than fifty per cent of the floor area devoted to industry or storage purposes incidental to its primary use, and provided that not more than five employees shall be engaged in any trade or industry which shall be incidental or essential to the primary use. A telephone exchange, electric substation, or car barn may be established in the commerical district upon permit being issued therefor by the Board of Public Service where such a structure will not be detrimental to or tend to change the character of the neighborhood. In a commercial district a garage containing space for more than four automobiles may be established, erected or enlarged, provided that before permit for such garage is issued by the Board of Public Service there be on file with said Board of Public Service the written consent of the owners of seventy-five per cent of (a) the property within the block where it is proposed to establish, erect or enlarge such garage; or (b) any other property within two hundred feet of the proposed establishment and not separated therefrom by a street. In computing the area of consents required under this regulation so much of the property as is used as garages or stables shall be counted as consenting.
"Section Twenty-nine. The City Plan Commission may of its own initiative or upon petition duly signed and acknowledged by the owners of fifty per cent of the property in any given district or part thereof, cause to be prepared and introduced an ordinance altering the height, area or use restrictions herewith or subsequently established for such district or part thereof as may be deemed affected by such change. Appeal from the decision of the City Plan Commission on all petitions may be taken to the Board of Public Service."
I. Statements of counsel and exhibits filed are of a nature to challenge the correctness of the action of the City Plan Commission in the classification of the district in which it is proposed to erect the building in question, as a "second- residence district" rather than a commercial one. With that contention, however, we' are not concerned in the determination of the matter at issue. The vexing question as submitted by the contesting parties is not the legal propriety of the act of the commission, which would involve an admission of its power to act, but whether or not the Zoning Ordinance conferred power on the commission to act in the manner here shown; or in other words, is the ordinance valid in that it constitutes such an exercise of the police power as will sustain th<3 limitation therein prescribed in regard to the use of private property by the owner of same? It is pertinent, although perhaps elementary, to say that the power here sought to be exercised by the city is to regulate the mode of living of the inhabitants, and thus viewed from a sociological vantage, to provide for their health, comfort and welfare. This right, so far as the matter in controversy is concerned, is primarily classified as the police power or that of eminent domain. We took occasion in the dissenting opinion in In re Kansas City Ordinance No. 39946; Kansas City v. Liebi, 298 Mo. l. c. 691, 252 S. W. l. c. 413, to define with care the distinctive differences, so far as determinable from cases and texts, between these two powers. It will suffice here,' therefore, to say that the police power may be defined as extending to the protection of the public health, morals and safety and to the promotion of the general welfare (C. B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. People, 200 U. S. 561; Beer Co. v. Mass., 97 U. S. 25; Thayer's Legal Essays, p. 27, note 1); while that of eminent domain extends to the taking from the owner of property or an easement therein and applying it to a public use or enjoyment — compensation to the owner being a constitutional prerequisite to the exercise of this power. [Art. 2, sec. 21, Mo. Const.; Bridge Co. v. Stone, 174 Mo. 1; Meyers v. Williams, 199 Mo. App. 21; McGrew v. Pav. Co., 247 Mo. 549.] A further distinguishing feature is that the effect of the police power is to restrict a property right as .harmful, while that of eminent domain is to appropriate, a property right because it is useful. [Comm. v. Alger, 7 Cush. (Mass.) l. c. 86; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623.] The exercise of either of these powers is not dependent upon a constitutional delegation therefor, but may be said to underlie the same and to rest upon necessity as an essential to the effective conduct of the government. As has been tersely said (Bridge Co. v. Stone, 174 Mo. 1, and People v. Adirondack Ry. Co., 160 N. Y. 225) this power "exists as a necessary attribute of sovereignty." While, as stated, it is not due to any declaration of the organic law, experience has demonstrated the wisdom of placing restrictions upon its use in the National and State constitutions (XIV. Arndt. Const. U. S.; Secs. 21 and 30, Art. 2, Const. Mo.), that those charged with the conduct of public affairs may not in disregard of the rights of the individual render the government despotic. It is rather to the extent of these restrictions than the inherent scope of the power that we should look in determining whether it has been properly exercised. Since the object of this ordinance is ostensibly to promote the general welfare it may be classified, if found to be authorized, as within the purview of the police power.
The charter provisions (Article I, City Charter 1914, p. 540') having their origin in the police power delegated by the State to the city (State ex rel. v. Mer. Ex., 269 Mo. 346) and which are applicable to the matter at issue, are as follows:
"Sec. 25. To define and prohibit, abate, suppress, and prevent or license and regulate all acts, practices, conduct, business, occupations, callings, trades, uses of property, and all other things whatsoever detrimental or liable to be determintal to the health,.morals, comfort, safety, convenience, or welfare of the inhabitants of the city and all nuisances and causes thereof.
"Sec. 26. To prescribe limits within which business, occupations and practices liable to be nuisances or detrimental to the health, morals, security, or general welfare of the people may lawfully be established, conducted, or maintained.
"Sec. 35. To exercise all powers granted or not prohibited to it by law which it would be competent for this'charter to enumerate."
That a municipal corporation possesses and can exercise only such powers as are declared in express words, or which may fairly or necessarily be implied in or are incident to those expressly granted, or are essential to the objects and purposes of its existence and are indispensable, not simply convenient or desirable, are canons of construction in the interpretation of municipal powers too well established by numerous decisions to require- citations in their support. It follows that where a corporation is empowered by its charter, as in this instance, to enact an ordinance for a specific purpose its power is limited to the object specified. [St. Louis v. Transfer Co., 256 Mo. 476.]
It may be admitted that such a construction should not be given as to defeat the evident purpose of the enactment, but that the intent of the framers should be determined, not from a strict or strained interpretation, but from a reasonable one in view of the terms employed and the object sought to be attained. [State ex rel. v. Allen, 183 Mo. 283; State v. Herthel, 88 Mo. 128; Union Depot Railway Co. v. Railway, 105 Mo. 562.]
Guided by these general rules the meaning of the charter provisions, above quoted, and the extent to which they may he applied in the enactment of the ordinance should not be difficult of determination.
It is scarcely necessary to add in this connection, that these provisions, constituting as they do, a part of the organic law of the city, define the limits within which the power delegated to the latter by the State may be exercised. Section 25, as is evident from its terms, authorizes legislation to prohibit, suppress or regulate objectionable businesses or vocations; and Section 26 confers power to enact ordinances defining the territory within which certain occupations may be conducted. If, as we hold, these sections embody the city's grant of power in this behalf, we need not consider Section 35. The dominant factors of these permissive provisions are the material welfare or the health and safety of the people. These accomplished and the limit of the restrictions upon the exercise of the police power, not only as contemplated by the National and State constitutions, but by these charter provisions, has been reached.
It may be admitted that we are living in an age of the rapid development of the'police power which, as expressed by some authors, is no longer static, but has become progressive and moves, so far as concerns our civic and social relations, with the movement of public opinion. Justice Holmes of the United States Supreme Court, in Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, gives definite expression to- this thought in saying that "It may be said in a general way that the police power extends to all the great public needs. . It may be put fourth in aid of what is sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevailing morality or strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary to the public welfare."
In a later case in which the United States Supreme Court upheld a regulation upon the rental of buildings, Justice Holmes, in further intimation of the extension of the police power, said: "Circumstances might so change in time as to clothe with a public interest what at other times would be a matter of purely private concern. ' '
In a learned and interesting article by Mr. Henry W. Chandler, of the Chicago bar, in a recent number of the American Bar Association Journal on the Attitude of the Law toward Beauty, it is said: "The recognition of beauty as an element to justify the exercise of the police power, which regulates without direct compensation to the person limited, has lagged after its recognition in the field of eminent domain where damages are paid. The police power is always drastic; whatever burden it entails the individual has to bear alone, and the courts therefore are cautious about imposing it. . . . They have not been willing to acknowledge beauty as a justification, but without admitting it they are more and more giving weight to the consideration of fitness and propriety in a man's use of his own. They may profess to put their decisions on other grounds, but in their hearts this is the directing motive."
This conclusion' clearly defines the prevailing attitude of the courts. While their reasoning recognizes the aesthetic, their rulings, following the principles which had their origin in the common law concerning individual and property rights, are definitely utilitarian. Not only is this manifested in the adjudicated cases, but it finds frequent expression in the organic and statutory laws of the State and the charter and ordinances of its municipalities.
The terms of the charter provisions here under review are indicative of this purpose on the part of their framers. Certainly no more can be meant from the terms employed in the prohibition and suppression of certain callings than those which detrimentally affect the material welfare of the people; and the limiting of certain occupations and callings to a- prescribed territory must in reason be subjected to a like interpretation. If this be true and these charter provisions lend no other reasonable coloring to the conclusion as to their meaning, then this ordinance, the avowed purpose of which is simply an arbitrary exclusion of a definite business from a prescribed district, is in excess of the power with which the city saw fit to invest itself when it framed its organic law.
We are not without warrant for this conclusion. While the language of the charter is, in our opinion, sufficient to sustain..the conclusion we have reached as to its object and purpose, the Supreme Court of Illinois, in People v. Chicago, 261 Ill. 16, denied the right of that city under its police power to prohibit the establishment of retail stores in a residential district^ on the ground that they were detrimental to the public health morals, comfort and the general welfare — in almost the exact terms employed in the instant case — and held that there was nothing inherently dangerous to the health or safety of the public in a retail store and that the objections to same arose from a purely aesthetic consideration and could not be sustained.
In an earlier case, Sign Works v. Training School, 249 Ill. 436, that court held that matters of taste could not be regulated by statute when unconnected with the safety, comfort, health, morals and material welfare of the people. Unless therefore, a different meaning be given to the words employed, the charter itself constitutes a sufficient restriction upon the enforcement of the ordinance. An ice manufactory, electrically conducted, in the absence of any objectionable features connected with its operation, is certainly no more subject to prohibition or restriction than a retail store.
Our rulings in this State concerning the exercise of the police power are in harmony with the conclusion reached in this case. In St. Louis v. Dreisoerner, 243 Mo. l. c. 223, the limitations of the police powers were thus defined : ' ' The police power is a necessary and wholesome faculty of municipal government, but it only extends to the regulation of employments prejudicial to the public safety, health, morals and good government of the citizenry, and it 'ends where those public interests are not beneficially served thereby.' [Gunning Co. v. St. Louis, 235 Mo. l. c. 200.] It cannot sanction the confiscation of. private property for aesthetic purposes."
In St. Louis v. Liessing, 190 Mo. l. c. 480, which construed an ordinance subjecting milk and cream to inspection and regulating the sale of same, this court speaking through G-antt, J., in upholding the validity of the ordinance, said, in effect, that the inspection of the food product there in question was authorized by the charter and that the purpose of its adoption was to secure the general health of the inhabitants, which constituted a sufficient ground for the upholding of the police power delegated by the State to the city.
In an opinion by Higbee, J. (City of St. Louis v. Evraiff, 301 Mo. 231), this court held, upon like grounds to those stated herein, that .the ordinance under review was invalid in that it imposed restrictions upon the use of private property having no relation to the health, safety, comfort or welfare of the inhabitants, and constituted a deprivation of the use of same in violation of the Constitution. We have found no reason for differing from the conclusion there reached.
In conclusion it is deemed pertinent to add in a general way that the necessity for the existence of civil government lies in the protection it affords to the rights of the individual. Laws enacted for this purpose, by which the government manifests its power, are necessarily more or less restrictive in their nature. They should therefore embody in their terms evidence that they will at least not lessen if they do not add to inalienable rights. That enactments in the exercise of the police power are restrictive in character does not admit of argument. Unless, therefore, it can be shown that they add to or tend to make an addition to fundamental rights they are not justified.
It therefore follows that our peremptory writ herein should issue and it is so ordered.
Woodson, G. J., and David E. Blair, J., concur; Graves, J., concurs in result in separate opinion; White, J., dissents in separate opinion in which Ragland, and James T. Blair, JJ., concur.