Case Name: FLORENCE GREENE, as Administratrix of the Estate of MICHAEL T. GREENE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JOHN TEXEIRA and MAXINE TEXEIRA, Defendants-Appellees
Court: Supreme Court of the State of Hawaii
Jurisdiction: Hawaii
Decision Date: 1973-01-23
Citations: 54 Haw. 231
Docket Number: No. 5082
Parties: FLORENCE GREENE, as Administratrix of the Estate of MICHAEL T. GREENE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JOHN TEXEIRA and MAXINE TEXEIRA, Defendants-Appellees
Judges: Richardson, C.J., Abe, Levinson, Kobayashi, JJ., and Circuit Judge Chang in Place of Marumoto, J., Disqualified
Reporter: Hawaii Reports
Volume: 54
Pages: 231–249

Head Matter:
FLORENCE GREENE, as Administratrix of the Estate of MICHAEL T. GREENE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JOHN TEXEIRA and MAXINE TEXEIRA, Defendants-Appellees
No. 5082
January 23, 1973
Richardson, C.J., Abe, Levinson, Kobayashi, JJ., and Circuit Judge Chang in Place of Marumoto, J., Disqualified

Opinion:
OPINION OF THE COURT BY
RICHARDSON, C.J.
This appeal arises out of consolidated actions brought by Florence Greene, the appellant herein, in her individual capacity and as administratrix of the estate of her son, Michael T. Greene, against John and Maxine Texeira, parents of Ronald Texeira, a minor, pursuant to HRS § 663-3 and 663-7. The claims were the result of an automobile accident involving a single vehicle driven by Ronald Texeira. Michael T. Greene, a passenger in the car, sustained injuries from which he died, following 45 days of hospitalization. Michael was 19 years of age, unmarried, and a college freshman at the time of his death.
On April 27, 1970, verdicts were returned. The jury awarded the mother $30,000 under the Wrongful Death Act, HRS § 663-3, and $6,000 under the Survival Statute, HRS § 663-7. Judgment was entered in accordance with the verdicts on April 30, 1970. The Wrongful Death Act judgment was satisfied, but the administratrix appealed from the judgment under the Survival Statute.
The appellant alleges four specifications of error on appeal: (1) that the circuit court (a) erroneously permitted the introduction of evidence relating to the effect of federal and state income taxes upon the probable net excess earnings of the decedent, and (b) erroneously instructed the jury that these taxes were to be deducted from the present value of such earnings; (2) that the circuit court erroneously permitted the introduction of evidence concerning the cost of supporting a hypothetical wife and two hypothetical children and allowed the jury to deduct this amount from its award of probable net excess earnings; (3) that the circuit court improperly permitted the appellees to pose hypothetical questions to a witness based on the assumption that the present value of decedent's probable excess earnings should be determined on the basis of a 6% discount factor; and, (4) that the circuit court erred in refusing certain jury instructions concerning injuries which the decedent allegedly suffered as a result of the automobile accident.
The first three specifications of error alleged by the appellant concern the probable future earnings of the decedent, in excess of the probable cost of his own maintenance and the provision he would have made for his family and dependents during the time he would likely have lived but for the accident. That such earnings are a proper item of damages in an action under HRS § 663-7 was determined by this court in Rohlfing v. Akiona, 45 Haw. 373, 369 P.2d 96 (1961).
Following the submission of briefs and oral argument, the court began to reconsider the merits of the Rohlfing interpretation of § 663-7. On September 6, 1972, additional briefs were requested of counsel on both sides, directed to the question whether HRS § 663-7 or any other section of the Hawaii Revised Statutes, or the common law of Hawaii as defined in HRS § 1-1, provides a right to recovery in favor of an estate for damages based on the probable net excess earnings of a decedent projected beyond the date of his death, special consideration being given to whether Rohlfing v. Akiona should be overruled. Simultaneous reply briefs were thereafter requested and submitted, directed to the same issues.
Much deliberation and thorough consideration of this issue have led us to conclude that the probable future excess earnings of a decedent are not a proper item for damages under the Hawaii Survival Statute, HRS § 663-7. Insofar as Rohlfing v. Akiona, supra, conflicts with this determination it is hereby overruled.
A preliminary question on this appeal is whether it is proper for this court to consider an issue raised for the first time on the court's own motion, subsequent to submission of briefs and oral argument. We feel that in the circumstances of this case such a procedure is proper.
Rule 3 (b) (3) of the Rules of the Supreme Court provides that the opening brief shall contain a "short and concise statement of . . . questions presented for decision," and further that "fqjuestions not presented . . . will be disregarded." This cautionary admonition is modified by the final sentence in that paragraph, however, which provides: "The court, at its option, may notice a plain error not presented." This court is of the opinion that Rohlfing, supra, upon which three of appellant's four specifications of error are based, does not correctly state the law of Hawaii and reliance upon it is a plain error contemplated by the rule.
A similar issue was recently presented to this court in In re Taxes, Hawaiian Land Co., 53 Haw. 45, 487 P.2d 1070 (1971). In that case an issue of statutory application was raised for the first time in the reply brief. Id., at 52. This court allowed both parties to submit further supplemental briefs on the matter. Id. We then listed three factors which should be considered before allowing a decision on an issue not raised in the opening brief: (1) whether the issue goes to the integrity of the fact finding process; (2) to what extent an error may have been correctable if properly raised; and (3) whether the issue involves questions of fact that were not but could have been fully developed in the trial court. Id. at 53. We concluded that "If none of these factors are present, it is well within our discretion to hear new legal arguments, especially if it involves a question of great public import." Id.
In the present case, appellant at trial had full opportunity to present his facts on all issues concerning damages. Overruling Rohlfing by this court merely rendered trial of one issue, that concerning decedent's excess earnings, superfluous. The great importance to the public of a proper interpretation of Hawaii's Survival Statute is obvious. Thus, we will consider the issue whether the decedent's excess earnings are a proper item of damages under HRS § 663-7.
Under HRS § 663-7 there survives in favor of the decedent's legal representative only such cause of action as the decedent himself had at the moment of his death. Rohlfing v. Akiona, supra at 377, 400. The crux of the majority opinion in Rohlfing was that an injured person has a right to recovery of all future earnings lost as a result of his injury and that the intervention of death should not divest the decedent's estate of that right.
We have come to the conclusion that the minority opinion in Rohlfing presents the most sound position on this issue; that an injured plaintiff is not entitled to recover damages "for any earnings he might be supposed to make, if living, in that part of his life lost by reason of his injuries." Krakowski v. The Aurora, Elgin & Chicago R.R., 167 Ill. App. 469, 472-73 (1912). As the decedent would not have been entitled to recover such earnings in his lifetime, it follows that his representative is not entitled to recover such earnings in a later survival action under HRS § 663-7.
Our interpretation of HRS § 663-7 is .in accordance with the view of most states with statutes such as ours. In the majority of jurisdictions with both Survival and Wrongful Death statutes, recovery for lost earnings under the Survival Statute is not permitted beyond the time of death. McCormick, Damages, § 94 (1936); Prosser, Torts, § 127 (4th ed. 1971); Speiser, Recovery for Wrongful Death, § 14:4 (1966). See, e.g., Farrington v. Stoddard, 115 F.2d 96 (1st Cir. 1940); O'Leary v. United States Lines Co., 111 F. Supp. 745 (D. Mass. 1953); Ellis v. Brown, 77 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 1955); Hindmarsh v. Sulpho Saline Bath Co., 108 Neb. 168, 187 N.W. 806 (1922); Gochenour v. St. Louis San Francisco Ry., 205 Okla. 594, 239 P.2d 769 (1952).
Our interpretation of HRS § 663-7 recognizes that the aim of the statutes in this area of the law is compensation for loss rather than punishment. Our wrongful death statute, HRS § 663-3, compensates a deceased's survivors for economic loss and deprivation of love, affection and companionship. Decedent's mother has already been awarded $30,000 under HRS § 663-3. To press HRS § 663-7 into service to further compensate the decedent's survivors for the loss of their loved one would result in excess damages, justifiable only on a theory of punishment, rather than compensation.
Our holding that future excess earnings are not an element of damages in an action under HRS § 663-7 renders irrelevant the first three specifications of error alleged by appellant, all of which concern the measure of decedent's future excess earnings.
We turn now to appellant's fourth allegation. The appellant alleges as error the circuit court's refusal of two requested jury instructions. The first instruction sets out the injuries which the decedent allegedly suffered as a result of the automobile accident, as well as the criteria to be considered by the jury in fixing damages, in the event the injuries were found to be the proximate result of the accident. The second instruction concerned the degree of certainty as to the amount of damages necessary for the appellant to meet her burden of proof. The appellees urge that the requested instruc tions were substantially covered by other instructions given by the court.
The recurrent and nagging problem of selecting those instructions by which to inform the jury of the law applicable to the current case subjects the trial court to the danger of being "whipsawed by the obligation to give sufficient instructions and the opposing requirement not to give cumulative instructions." Barretto v. Akau, 51 Haw. 383, 399, 463 P.2d 917, 926 (1969). See Tittle v. Hurlbutt, 53 Haw. 526, 497 P.2d 1354 (1972). While "[i}t is generally considered error to refuse to give a requested instruction on a given point which is accurate and applicable though the point may have been unequivocally covered by a general instruction," Young v. Price, 50 Haw. 430, 439, 442 P.2d 67, 73 (1968), "the fact that more specific instructions are offered does not require the trial court to accept them and reject slightly more general instructions or give cumulative instructions on the same point." Id., 50 Haw. at 450, 442 P.2d at 79 (Levinson and Marumoto, JJ., dissenting.)
Nevertheless, there are some clear signposts. In Barretto v. Akau, supra, 51 Haw. at 398, 463 P.2d at 926, we held that a plaintiff in a personal injury suit is "entitled to separate consideration as to each [alleged injury}, any one of which might have supported an action for damages, although it [is} preferable to combine the instructions and eliminate repetition wherever possible." Plaintiff's Instruction No. 31 complied with these guidelines and cannot realistically be said to have been covered adequately in Court's Instruction No. 23. Therefore, we hold that the circuit court erred in refusing to give it. On the other hand, Plaintiff's Instruction No. 35, while a correct statement of the proposition contained in Coney v. Lihue Plantation Company, Ltd., 39 Haw. 129, 139 (1951), added nothing to Defendant's Instruction No. 5; refusal to give that instruction was a proper exercise of the circuit court's discretion.
Burnham H. Greeley (Padgett, Greeley, Marumoto & Steiner of counsel) for plaintiffs-appellants.
Dennis E. W. O'Connor and Peter G. Wheelon (Anthony, Hoddick, Reinwald & O'Connor of counsel) for defendants-appellees.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial on the issue of the amount of damages accrued between the time of decedent's injury and the time of his death.
See HRS § 286-112 and 577-3.
HRS § 663-3 provides:
Death by wrongful act. When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act, neglect, or default of any person or corporation, the deceased's legal representative, or any of the persons hereinafter enumerated, may maintain an action against the person or corporation causing the death or against the person or corporation responsible for the death, on behalf of the persons hereinafter enumerated.
In any action under this section, such damages may be given as under the circumstances shall be deemed fair and just compensation, with reference to the pecuniary injury and loss of love and affection, including (1) loss of society, companionship, comfort, consortium, or protection, (2) loss of marital care, attention, advice, or counsel, (3) loss of filial care or attention or (4) loss of parental care, training, guidance, or education suffered as a result of the death of the person by the surviving spouse, children, father, mother, and by any person wholly or partly dependent upon the deceased person. The jury or court sitting without jury shall allocate the.damages to the persons entitled thereto in its verdict or judgment, and any damage recovered under this section, except for reasonable expenses of last illness and burial, shall not constitute a part of the estate of the deceased. If an action is brought pursuant to this section and a separate action brought pursuant to section 663-7, such actions may be consolidated for trial on the motion of any interested party, and a separate verdict, report, or decision may be rendered as to each right of action. Any action brought under this section shall be commenced within two years from the date of death of the injured person.
HRS § 663-7 provides:
Survival of actions. A cause of action arising out of a wrongful act, neglect, or default, except actions for defamation and malicious prosecution, shall not abate by reason of the death of the injured person. The action shall survive in favor of the legal representative of the person and any damage recovered shall form part of the estate of the deceased.
Plaintiff's Instruction No. 31, refused, provided:
Plaintiffs claim that as a result of the accident of August 26, 1965, MICHAEL T. GREENE suffered the following injuries and conditions which ultimately resulled in his death:
Severe head injury
Cerebral edema and congestion
Brain stem injury .
Loss of consciousness
Cranial surgery
Tracheostomy wound
Jej unostomy
Pulmonary congestion and edema
Fractured nose
Cerebral concussion
Emaciation
Focal necrosis of the brain
Congestion of the liver
Acute renal congestion
If you find from the evidence that as a proximate result of the accident MICHAEL T. GREENE suffered the above injuries and conditions, or any of them, then in determining the damages to be awarded you may consider the following:
The severity of the symptoms or conditions;
The duration of the symptoms or conditions;
The pain and suffering created thereby;
The mental distress arising therefrom;
The length of said pain and suffering and mental distress;
The effect of medication to relieve the pain and suffering; and
Any other evidence which may be of assistance to you in arriving at a fair and impartial verdict.
Plaintiff's Instruction No. 35, refused, provided:
The law never insists upon a higher degree of certainty as to the amount of damages than the nature of the case admits.
Thus, while plaintiff has the burden of proof on the issue of damages, she needs to produce only such evidence on that issue as the circumstances of the case allow.
Court's Instruction No. 23, supra, n. 5, informed the jury that the measure of damages should include that sum of money which would fairly compensate the decedent's estate for " (a) the pain, suffering, and mental anguish which Michael T. Greene may have consciously suffered as a result of the accident . . . ."
Defendant's Instruction No. 5, given as modified, provided:
While the burden rests upon the party who asserts the affirmative of an issue to prove his claim by a preponderance of the evidence, this rule does not require demonstration, or such degree of proof as produces absolute certainty, since in human affairs absolute certainty is seldom possible.