Case Name: PEOPLE v. ELIJAH SMITH
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1976-04-26
Citations: 68 Mich. App. 551
Docket Number: Docket No. 22097
Parties: PEOPLE v ELIJAH SMITH
Judges: Before: J. H. Gillis, P. J., and Allen and M. J. Kelly, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 68
Pages: 551–558

Head Matter:
PEOPLE v ELIJAH SMITH
Opinion op the Court
1. Criminal Law — Sentencing—Mitigating Circumstances — Opportunity to Address Court — Court Rules — Allocution.
A defendant was afforded sufficient opportunity to inform the trial court of any specific or mitigating circumstances relevant to the imposition of sentence where the defendant and his counsel were both present at the sentencing proceeding and where, after some discussion in which defense counsel participated, defense counsel was asked "anything more?” and replied in the negative; direct questioning of the defendant was not necessary in such a situation (GCR 1963, 785.8[2]).
Dissent by M. J. Kelly, J.
2. Criminal Law — Evidence—Sufficiency of Evidence — Elements of Offense.
Evidence in a criminal trial is not sufficient to convict the defendant if it can not support a finding of gufity beyond a reasonable doubt because one or more of the essential elements of the crime is not proved.
3. Larceny — Elements of Offense — Criminal Law.
The elements of larceny are: (1) an actual or constructive taking of goods or property, (2) a carrying away or asportation, (3) the carrying away must be with a felonious intent, (4) the subject matter must be the goods or personal property of another, and (5) the taking must be without the consent and against the will of the owner.
References for Points in Headnotes
[1, 8] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 578, 584, 585.
[2] 21 Am Jur 3d, Criminal Law §§ 226, 447, 449.
[3, 4] 50 Am Jur 2d, Larceny §§ 9-54.
[5] 50 Am Jur 2d, Larceny §§ 23-34, 139.
[6] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 81, 82.
[7] 5 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error § 684 et seq.
[9] 21 Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law §§ 533, 545, 600.
4. Larceny — Larceny from Person — Elements of Offense — Proofs Required — Criminal Law.
A conviction of larceny from the person, in addition to requiring proof of the elements of larceny, requires proof that the goods or property taken were removed from the actual possession or custody of the person or his immediate presence.
5. Larceny — Criminal Law — Evidence—Taking Without Consent.
Evidence that a complainant offered his money to a defendant only because the defendant was armed and because the complainant was afraid of being hurt if he did not turn over the money is sufficient to support a finding that the taking was without the consent and against the will of the complainant.
6. Criminal Law — Intent—Inferences—Larceny.
Intent may be inferred from facts and circumstances established beyond a reasonable doubt, and the intent to commit a larceny in particular can be inferred from the nature of a defendant’s acts.
7. Appeal and Error — Appellant’s Brief — Court Rules.
The Court of Appeals need not consider any point not set forth in or necessarily suggested by the statement of questions involved in an appellant’s brief (GCR 1963, 813.1).
8. Criminal Law — Sentencing—Mitigating Circumstances — Opportunity to Address Court — Court Rules — Allocution.
A defendant should be given an opportunity at sentencing to personally address the trial court as to any speciñc or mitigating circumstances affecting the sentence; this requirement is not satisñed by answers of defense counsel to inquiries directed to defense counsel (GCR 1963, 786.8[2]X
9. Criminal Law — Sentencing—Credit for Time Served — Court Rules.
A defendant should receive any credit for time served to which he may be entitled (GCR 1963, 785.8[3]).
Appeal from Recorder’s Court of Detroit, Elvin L. Davenport, J.
Submitted December 2, 1975, at Detroit.
(Docket No. 22097.)
Decided April 26, 1976.
Leave to appeal applied for.
Elijah Smith was convicted of larceny from the person. Defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Robert A. Derengoski, Solicitor General, William L. Cahalan, Prosecuting Attorney, Patricia J. Boyle, Principal Attorney, Research, Training and Appeals, and Charles P. Kellett, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Durant, Talbot, Grant & McQuarrie, for defendant on appeal.
Before: J. H. Gillis, P. J., and Allen and M. J. Kelly, JJ.

Opinion:
J. H. Gillis, P. J.
Judge Allen and I are in agreement with that portion of Judge Kelly's opinion which affirms the conviction. We agree with the language set forth therein and the reasoning embodied in his opinion for affirmance.
We further agree that the defendant should receive any credit for time served to which he may be entitled. GCR 1963, 785.8(3), People v Peterson, 62 Mich App 258; 233 NW2d 250 (1975).
We, however, disagree with Judge Kelly's determination that the trial court erred when sentencing defendant by failing to provide him with an opportunity to inform the court of any specific or mitigating circumstances relevant to imposing sentence.
The total sentencing transcript consists of 7-1/4 pages. The attorney had some input at the time of sentence, and towards the end of the transcript covering the plea, the trial court said, "Anything more, Mr. Pliskow?" We all recognize that it is the duty of the attorney to speak for and on behalf of his client. When Mr. Pliskow advised the court that there was nothing further, we would construe this statement to mean that neither defense counsel nor his client had any additional statements to make to the court. We cannot equate the facts in this case with those in People v Gonzales, 60 Mich App 450, 454; 231 NW2d 393 (1975). In the Gonzales case, the court advised the defendant that he had discussed the matter in chambers with his counsel. It was apparent that defendant was not present during the discussion. Such is not the situation in our case where the record clearly denotes that the defendant was standing with counsel before the bench during the entire discussion.
Again, in People v Brewer, 60 Mich App 517, 523; 231 NW2d 375 (1975), the judge's remarks at sentencing indicated he had discussed the matter of sentencing at length with defense counsel in chambers; on appeal we stated that this Court could not assume that this off-the-record discussion allowed the defendant any opportunity to allocute. The facts here, again, are contra to those in the Brewer case.
We, therefore, vote to affirm the conviction without a remand to the trial court for the purpose of resentencing.
Allen, J., concurred.