Case Name: TRAVELL v. BANNERMAN
Court: New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1902-04-18
Citations: 75 N.Y.S. 866
Docket Number: 
Parties: TRAVELL v. BANNERMAN.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 75
Pages: 866–875

Head Matter:
TRAVELL v. BANNERMAN.
(Supreme Court Appellate Division, Second Department.
April 18, 1902.)
Explosives—Dumping on Vacant Lots—Injury to Children—Negligence-Actions—Questions for Jury.
An ammunition manufacturer used as a temporary dumping place for refuse material an unfenced lot adjacent to the factory, on which boys were accustomed to play. Plaintiff, while near the vacant lot, was approached by two other boys with a mass of material composed of caked gunppwder, which they had found on the vacant lot, and they all proceeded to extract pieces of brass therefrom. A part of the material operated on by a companion exploded, injuring plaintiff. HeldI, that-an action may be maintained against the manufacturer for the injuries; it being a question for the jury whether proper care had been taken in dumping the material on the vacant lot.
Goodrich, P. J., dissenting.
Appeal from trial term, Kings county.
Action by Frank Travell, by George J. Travell, guardian ad litem, against Francis Bannerman. From a judgment for plaintiff, and an order denying defendant’s motion for a new trial, he appeals.
Affirmed.
Argued before GOODRICH, P. J., and BARTLETT, JENKS, WOODWARD, and HIRSCHBERG, JJ.
H. C. Smyth, for appellant.
Frederick E. Crane, for respondent.

Opinion:
WOODWARD, J.
The defendant seeks the reversal of the judgment below for the sum of $6oo damages awarded against him by the jury as compensation to the plaintiff for personal injuries alleged to have been suffered by him as a result of the want of due care on the part of the defendant in managing certain premises belonging to him. The evidence tends to establish the following facts: At the time of and before the injuries in question the defendant was the owner and in possession of a gun and ammunition factory in the block bounded by Bergen street, Utica, St. Marks, and Schenectady avenues, in the borough of Brooklyn. The factory premises were inclosed by a fence, but the adjoining lot, also owned by the defendant, and casually used as a temporary dumping place for ashes and other refuse material from the factory, was unfenced, and crisscrossed by paths worn by people of the neighborhood. For a long time the plaintiff, 14 years of age, and other boys, had used this open lot as a playground. On September 14, 1900, the plaintiff was standing in St. Marks avenue, just outside this vacant lot, when two younger boys approached him with a mass of black, asphajt-like material, composed of caked gunpowder and old cannon primers. This mass, which was about a foot long, the boys had found among the rubbish on the vacant lot; and, after joining the plaintiff, they proceeded to extract the pieces of brass which it contained. In doing so, one of the boys (not the plaintiff) pounded the lump with a rock, and an explosion resulted, in which the plaintiff received the injuries which form the basis of this action.
There was sufficient evidence from which the jury could infer that the explosive material had been placed in the defendant's lot by his servants; but the defendant contends that, even admitting that the facts warrant this inference, no cause of action was made out. Counsel relies upon the well-known legal principle that for injuries caused by mere defects in the premises the owner is not liable to a bare licensee. It is certain that the plaintiff was not what the law calls a "licensee," for the injury occurred on the highway and the plaintiff had not on that day been on the defendant's land. It is also almost certain that the placing of highly explosive materials in a rubbish heap on an open lot resorted to by boys for a playground, and in a thickly inhabited neighborhood, does not come within the category of "mere defects in the premises." On the other hand, it would seem that the lump of caked gunpowder and pieces of brass would fall within the description of a dangerous and enticing machine, referred to in the leading case cited by counsel for the defendant (Walsh v. Railroad Co., 145 N. Y. 301, 307, 39 N. E. 1070, 27 L. R. A. 724, 45 Am. St. Rep. 615), where the court say that the turntable was, "as to children of tender years, a dangerous and at the same time an enticing machine,—one which, when seen, would inevitably and infallibly allure children to come upon it, and that the natural and probable result of such play would be the injury of the child." The pieces of brass were not without value as junk, and their presence in the rubbish would inevitably attract children eager to obtain a few pennies by selling what of value they might find among the refuse.
Beetz v. City of Brooklyn, 10 App. Div. 382, 41 N. Y. Supp. 1009, also relied upon by the defendant, had to do with a situation quite different from the one in our present case. The alleged dangerous material there was quicklime, commonly used as building material, and this court rejected the view that it was "as dangerous as exposed gunpowder"; the fair inference being that if it had been anything like gunpowder a different result would have been reached.
In Dixon v. Bell, 5 Maule & S. 198, the defendant sent a young girl to bring a loaded gun, after having instructed the man who had the gun to remove the priming. The girl brought the gun, and, thinking the priming had been removed, pointed the gun at plaintiff's son and pulled the trigger, discharging the contents of the gup and injuring the child. The defendant was held liable for negligence in leaving the gun without withdrawing the charge. "As by this want of care," says Lord Ellenborough, "the instrument was left in a state capable of doing mischief, the law will hold the defendant responsible."
In the case of Illidge v. Goodwin, 5 Car. & P. 192, a horse had been left unattended in a public street. A passer-by struck him, causing him to back the cart into plaintiff's shop window. The court, per Tindal, C. J., held that the intervention of the passer-by did not absolve the defendant from liability for leaving his horse unattended. And in Lynch v. Nurdin, i Q. B. 29, Lord Denham says:
"If I am guilty of negligence in leaving anything dangerous, where I know it to tie extremely probable that some other person will unjustifiably set it in motion, to the injury of a third, and if that injury should be so brought about, I presume that the sufferer might have redress by action against both or either of the two, but. unquestionably against the first."
For illustration, he gives the case of a gamekeeper who leaves a loaded gun against the wall of a playground, and a boy discharges it and wounds another boy. The chief justice continues:
"I think it will not be doubted that the gamekeeper must answer in damages to the wounded party."
These English authorities were cited and approved in Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N. Y. 397, 57 Am. Dec. 455, where a manufacturer, who had carelessly labeled a deadly poison as a harmless medicine, and sold the same to a druggist, was held liable to a person who had bought the poison so labeled from the druggist, and was injured, without fault on her part, in consequence of the false label. Judge Ruggle's definition of "proximate cause" was repeated in Ryan v. Railroad Co., 35 N. Y. 210, 91 Am. Dec. 49,—a leading case on that subject, where the doctrine of Dixon v. Bell, supra, was approved; the court saying in reference to that case (page 211):
"The Injury is a natural and ordinary result of the folly of placing a loaded gun in the hands of one ignorant of the manner of using it, and incapable of appreciating its effects."
The case of Williams v. Eady, 9 Times Law R. 637, affirmed in ro Times Law R. 41, held defendant liable for not keeping a dangerous substance out of reach of boys at school. The jury were directed that, if a man keeps dangerous things, he must keep them safely, and must take such precautions as a prudent man would take, and to leave such things about in the way of boys would not be reasonable care. The court of appeal (Lord Esher, M. R., and Lopes and Kay, L. JJ.) dismissed the appeal; Lord Esher saying that there could be no doubt that the law was correctly laid down by the judge below.
Earl, C. J., in Potter v. Faulkner, 1 Best & S. 805, declared that "the law of England, in its care for human life, requires consummate caution in the person who deals with dangerous weapons."
In this state it has been held that a very high degree of care is required to be exercised by all persons using firearms in the immediate vicinity of others, no matter how lawful such use may be. Castle v. Duryea, 32 Barb. 480, 486, affirmed in *41 N. Y. 169. If defendant had gone upon or near the highway, and there exploded cartridges or firecrackers, to the injury of the plaintiff, he would have been liable. Conklin v. Thompson, 29 Barb. 218.
Judge Cooley, in his treatise on Torts (2d Ed., p. 356), says:
"Thus, leaving a tempting thing for children to play with exposed where they would be likely to gather for that purpose may be equivalent to an invitation to them to make use of it; and, perhaps, if one were to throw away upon his premises, near the common way, things tempting to children, the same implication should arise."
And in Powers v. Harlow, 53 Mich. 507, 19 N. W. 257, 51 Am. Rep. 154, where a boy had been injured by playing with dynamite carelessly stored, the same learned author, then chief justice, said:
"Children, wherever they go, must be expected to act upon childish instincts and impulses; and others who are charged with a duty of care and caution towards them must calculate upon this, and take precaution accordingly. If they leave exposed to the observation of children anything which would be tempting to them, and which they, in their immature judgment, might naturally suppose they were at liberty to handle or play with, they should expect that liberty to be taken."
Every consideration of public policy demands the exercise of a very high degree of care of those who have in their possession or control explosive material inherently dangerous to life or limb, and especially is this true in thickly settled communities.
But the defendant contends that the materials in question in the case at bar were harmless until two outside agencies intervened,— the boy who carried the materials from the lot to the street, and the boy who struck the mass with a rock. Counsel continues with the following extraordinary statement in italics: "In other words, it [the lump which exploded] was not dangerous until made so, not by the defendant, but by the plaintiff and his companions." As well might he urge that the loaded gun in Dixon v. Bell, supra, was harmless until made dangerous by the pressure applied to the trigger by the child's hand. However, the question of intervention by a responsible human agency is raised, and should be met. It is a general rule that a person injured by the fault of another, without which fault the injury could not have occurred, is not to be deprived of his remedy because the fault of a stranger not in privity with him also contributed to the injury; for the original negligence still remains as a culpable and direct cause of the injury, and the intervening events and agencies which may contribute to it are not to be regarded. Lane v. Atlantic Works, 111 Mass. 136. See, also, Sheridan v. Railroad Co., 36 N. Y. 39, 93 Am. Dec. 490; Webster v. Railroad Co., 38 N. Y. 260; Barrett v. Railroad Co., 45 N. Y. 628; and Spooner v. Railroad Co., 54 N. Y. 230, 13 Am. Rep. 570. In the Lane Case the defendants had carelessly left standing iri a public highway a truck loaded with iron. A boy 12 years of age called to the plaintiff, a boy of 7, to come across the street and see him make the wheels move, and while doing this a piece of iron fell from the truck and injured the plaintiff. The court say (page 141):
"It is immaterial whether the act of [the older boy] was mere negligence or a voluntary intermeddling. It was an act which the jury have found the defendants ought to have apprehended and provided against."
The maxim, "Causa próxima, non remota, spectatur," does not mean that the cause which is nearest in time or space to the result is necessarily to be regarded as the proximate cause (Vandenburgh v. Truax, 4 Denio, 464, 47 Am. Dec. 268; Guille v. Swan, 19 Johns. 381, 10 Am. Dec. 234; Thomas v. Winchester, supra; Eckert v. Railroad Co., 43 N. Y. 502, 3 Am. Rep. 721; Gibney v. State, 137 N. Y. 1, 33 N. E. 142, 19 L. R. A. 365, 33 Am. St. Rep. 690); and as Mr. Justice Jenks has pointed out, in Trapp v. McClellan, 68 App. Div. 362, 368, 74 N. Y. Supp. 130, the primary cause may be the proximate cause of a disaster. It is also a well-known rule that if the' concurrent or successive negligence of two persons, combined together, results in an injury to a third person, he may recover damages from either or both, and neither can successfully plead that the negligence of the other contributed to the injury. Congreve v. Morgan, 18 N. Y. 84, 72 Am. Dec. 495; Colegrove v. Railroad Co., 20 N. Y. 492, 75 Am. Dec. 418; Barrett v. Railroad Co., 45 N. Y. 628.
A case wherein the facts bear a strong resemblance to those in our present action is that of Harriman v. Railway Co., 45 Ohio St. 11, 12 N. E. 451, 4 Am. St. Rep. 507. The defendant for.a long time had permitted the public to pass over its road at a given point; and the court held that it was bound to exercise care, having due regard to such probable use; that it was negligence for the servants of such railroad company wantonly and needlessly to place at such point an apparently harmless, but in fact highly explosive and dangerous, object, like a signal torpedo, easily picked up and handled by children, and likely to attract them. A child of 9 picked up at the place in question such a torpedo, in ignorance of its dangerous character, carried it about 150 feet away, where the plaintiff, a boy of 10, and some companions, were standing. While there attempting to open the torpedo, it exploded, severely injuring the plaintiff. The court held that the negligence of the servants in placing and leaving such torpedo was the proximate cause of the injury, and that the defendant was liable., See, also, Penso v. McCormick, 125 Ind. 116, 25 N. E. 156, 9 L. R. A. 313, 21 Am. St. Rep. 211.
Walsh v. Railroad Co., supra, has been so strongly urged as an authority in the case at bar that a further reference to it is perhaps necessary. In affirming a principle opposed to the United States rule (Railroad Co. v. Stout, 17 Wall. 657, 21 L. Ed. 745), the court of appeals are careful to limit the doctrine to the facts in the case under consideration. After distinguishing Lynch v. Nurdin, supra, the court say (page 312, 145 N. Y., page 1071, 39 N. E., page 724, 27 L. R. A., and page 615, 45 Am. St. Rep.):
"In the case of this defendant, on the other hand, the turntable was on its own land; it was a proper and appropriate machine for the carrying on of its business; it was properly made; and it was properly used by the defendant."
Paraphrasing the sentence immediately following the quotation, we may say that to liken a turntable case to the allurement of children by throwing gunpowder and brass primers onto a rubbish heap in a lot commonly used as a playground is "to lose sight of the different principles upon which the cases rest." See, also, the case of Knight v. Lanier (Sup.) 74 N. Y. Supp. 999, where Mr. Justice Hirschberg has carefully distinguished the Walsh Case.
There was sufficient evidence in the case at bar of the lack of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff.
In view of the authorities above referred to, we think there was at least enough evidence to go to the jury upon the question whether proper care had been taken by the defendant in dumping material upon the lot in question; and the action may be maintained on the principle that the consequences complained of naturally and directly resulted from the careless and improper conduct of the defendant's servants.
No reversible error is revealed by our examination of the exceptions to the admission and exclusion of evidence. The charge fairly stated the law governing the case, and the judgment and order should be affirmed, with costs. All concur, except GOODRICH, P. J., who dissents.