Case Name: Roger R. RHINES, Appellant, v. Marcia L. RHINES, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1985-10-04
Citations: 483 So. 2d 4
Docket Number: No. 84-2555
Parties: Roger R. RHINES, Appellant, v. Marcia L. RHINES, Appellee.
Judges: CAMPBELL, A.C.J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 483
Pages: 4–8

Head Matter:
Roger R. RHINES, Appellant, v. Marcia L. RHINES, Appellee.
No. 84-2555.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Oct. 4, 1985.
Rehearing Denied Nov. 12, 1985.
Roger R. Rhines, pro se.
P. Allen Schofield, Bradenton, for appel-lee.

Opinion:
LEHAN, Judge.
A husband appeals from a final judgment of dissolution of marriage which, among other things, granted custody of the parties' minor children to the wife. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
The husband, who resided in Michigan at the time the dissolution action was filed by the wife, contends that the final judgment entered on October 2, 1984, was premature and without proper notice to the husband because a notice of action which he received by mail incident to constructive service of process on him gave him until October 12, 1984, to respond. We do not agree. The last service of process on the husband was by personal service through delivery to him of a summons by a Michigan sheriff. The husband was in default on October 2, 1984, under the wording of that summons.
We also disagree with the husband's contention that the trial court erred as a matter of law in denying the husband's motion for relief from judgment filed pursuant to rule 1.540, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. Whether or not under the particular facts of this case we would have found excusable neglect by the husband had we been in the position of the trial judge is not determinative. The test for determining whether the trial court erred is whether its denial of the motion constituted a gross abuse of discretion. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Wright, 342 So.2d 503 (Fla.1977); Kapetanopoulos v. Herbert, 449 So.2d 947, 950 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). Of course, no abuse of discretion generally exists when "reasonable men could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court_" Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197, 1203 (Fla.1980). We believe that reasonable men could differ as to whether the husband's conduct constituted excusable neglect. A fortiori, we cannot say that there was a gross abuse of discretion by the trial court. Under the record in this case we cannot say there was no basis for a conclusion that the husband disregarded the summons without justification.
The husband cites Rudd v. Zimmerley, 363 So.2d 831 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), as support for his contention. However, in Rudd the defaulting defendant who received successive services of process was found to have properly responded to the last service of process upon him. In the case at hand the husband failed to respond to the last service of process upon him. In contrast to the situations in Fratus v. Fratus, 467 So.2d 484 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985), and American Agronomics Corp. v. Varner, 413 So.2d 484 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982), cited in the dissenting opinion in this case, as well as in contrast to the facts of Savela v. Fisher, 464 So.2d 240 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), the husband's default was not attributable in any way to the actions or nonactions of an attorney. The husband, who has ably argued on his own behalf to this court, relied solely upon himself. Also, in contrast to American Agronomics and Savela, the husband in his briefs filed with this court in effect acknowledged that he knew that the personally served summons contained an earlier return date. His argument on appeal was the legal argument that he was entitled to conclude that the constructive service return date in the initial service controlled over the return date in the later personal service; the argument presupposes awareness of both return dates. Neither his first brief nor his reply brief argues that he was confused. Nothing in his affidavit says that he was unaware of the return date in the personally served summons.
The dissenting opinion refers to the husband's affidavit asserting that he believed that the personal service of process involved a twenty-day response time pertaining to a hearing on temporary custody, notice of which was served upon him in a separate document at the time of the personal service of the summons. But his affidavit also asserted, in a paragraph immediately following two successive paragraphs referring to the return date in the constructive service and the return date in the personal service, that "[t]he two conflicting notices caused confusion regarding what needed to be answered and when." That statement, which again seems to acknowledge awareness of the return date on the personally served summons, refers to which of the two services of process, con structive or personal, should be answered, not confusion with the notice of the custody hearing. It does not appear that anything needed to be answered or responded to with reference to the notice of hearing on temporary custody. Accordingly, there was inconsistency between, and could be questionable validity to, assertions in the affidavit as to whether there was confusion of one type or another. And, again, there was no showing of a lack of awareness, due to confusion or for any other reason, of the return date announced in the summons personally served by the Michigan Sheriff. Against this background we cannot say that the trial judge could not in his discretion have concluded that the husband's assertions failed to establish excusable neglect. Also, as we have said, the husband's argument to us similarly was not based on lack of awareness of the return date in the last service of process, presupposed the existence of such awareness, and was not an argument claiming confusion. Under these circumstances it does not appear to us that the trial court abused its discretion, much less grossly abused its discretion.
The effect of the husband's argument is to say that personal service is not binding upon a party who has been served constructively. This is not the law. Nor do we believe it is, or should be, the law that a twice-served defendant is ipso facto confused as a matter of law so as to excuse his failure to respond to personal service. It is not our province to now rescue him from the consequences of what could well have been determined in the trial court to have been his decision to close his eyes to the admonition in the second summons.
The husband also contends that he had been given insufficient notice of a hearing as to temporary custody. This aspect is not determinative, and we need not address it. See Jackson v. Jackson, 468 So.2d 1098 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985).
Nonetheless, we sua sponte remand for a further hearing on the child custody aspect. The final judgment provides that the wife shall be the primary residential custodian of the minor children. But there is in the final judgment no recognition of the provisions of section 61.13(2)(b)2, Florida Statutes (1983), that shared parental responsibility shall be ordered "unless the court finds that shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to the child." As in Nichols v. Nichols, 432 So.2d 648 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), the trial court here found that it would be in the best interests of the children that they reside with the wife, but, as in Nichols, the lack of any finding by the trial court of the type referred to in section 61.13(2)(b)2 requires reversal. Upon remand the trial court should order shared parental responsibility unless the court finds that such responsibility would be detrimental to the children. Whether or not further evidence should be taken in that regard shall be determined by the trial court. However, if without further evidence the trial court may contemplate making a finding that shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to the children, the husband should first be given an opportunity to appear in that regard. Notwithstanding our conclusion that the trial court did not err in failing to set aside the husband's default, the husband should not be precluded from asserting valid parental rights. All child custody issues should not be foreclosed upon a pleading default. Seibert v. Seibert, 436 So.2d 1104, 1105 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); Duckworth v. Duckworth, 414 So.2d 562 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings.
CAMPBELL, A.C.J., concurs.
SCHOONOVER, J., dissents with opinion.