Case Name: FOOTSTAR CORPORATION, a foreign corporation; f/k/a and a/k/a Foot Action, Inc., a foreign corporation; f/k/a and a/k/a Foot Action USA, a foreign corporation; f/k/a and a/k/a Regency Square Foot Action 209, f/k/a and a/k/a Gulf View Square Foot Action, f/k/a and a/k/a Foot Action, Appellant, v. John DOE and Jane Doe, as next friends and guardians of Minor Child, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2006-07-14
Citations: 932 So. 2d 1272
Docket Number: No. 2D05-4134
Parties: FOOTSTAR CORPORATION, a foreign corporation; f/k/a and a/k/a Foot Action, Inc., a foreign corporation; f/k/a and a/k/a Foot Action USA, a foreign corporation; f/k/a and a/k/a Regency Square Foot Action 209, f/k/a and a/k/a Gulf View Square Foot Action, f/k/a and a/k/a Foot Action, Appellant, v. John DOE and Jane Doe, as next friends and guardians of Minor Child, Appellees.
Judges: WHATLEY, J. and ANDREWS, MICHAEL F., Associate Judge, Concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 932
Pages: 1272–1278

Head Matter:
FOOTSTAR CORPORATION, a foreign corporation; f/k/a and a/k/a Foot Action, Inc., a foreign corporation; f/k/a and a/k/a Foot Action USA, a foreign corporation; f/k/a and a/k/a Regency Square Foot Action 209, f/k/a and a/k/a Gulf View Square Foot Action, f/k/a and a/k/a Foot Action, Appellant, v. John DOE and Jane Doe, as next friends and guardians of Minor Child, Appellees.
No. 2D05-4134.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
July 14, 2006.
Robert E. Biasotti of Carlton Fields, P.A., St. Petersburg, for Appellant.
Kennedy Legler, III, and Edwin Bradley of Legler & Flynn, Bradenton, for Appellees.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Footstar Corporation, a footwear retailer, appeals from an order denying its motion for summary judgment based on its affirmative defense of workers' compensation immunity. We must dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction.
The substance of the trial court's order is as follows:
Defendant's, Footstar Corporation, Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. See, Byrd v. Richardson-Greenshields Securities, Inc., 552 So.2d 1099 [ (Fla.1989) ].
Although there is no common law cause of action for sexual harassment in Florida, City of Miami Beach v. Guerra, 746 So.2d 1159 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), the Byrd decision apparently does not require a discrfete] statutory cause of action for sexual harassment to be pled in order to avoid the exclusivity of the Workers' Compensation Act remedy.
Footstar contends that Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(C)(v) authorizes an appeal to the district court from this order. That rule provides jurisdiction over orders determining "that, as a matter of law, a party is not entitled to workers' compensation immunity." After oral argument and our further review of the parties' arguments and appendices, we realize that Footstar is incorrect and that this court lacks jurisdiction.
The order under review does nothing more than simply deny the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The order does not explicitly state, as a matter of law, that Footstar is not entitled to rely upon a workers' compensation immunity defense at trial, nor does it enter judgment against Footstar on the issue of workers' compensation immunity. "There is no determination, on the face of the order, that the respondents are precluded and prohibited, as a matter of law, from asserting the application of workers' compensation immunity from liability at the time of trial." Reeves v. Fleetwood Homes of Fla., Inc., 889 So.2d 812, 821 (Fla.2004). The supreme court in Reeves reiterated its holding in Hastings v. Demming, 694 So.2d 718 (Fla.1997), in which it had settled a conflict among the district courts, and held that "[njonfinal orders denying summary judgment on a claim of workers' compensation immunity are not appealable unless the trial court order specifically states that, as a matter of law, such a defense is not available to a party." Hastings, 694 So.2d at 720 (emphasis supplied). The clear language from Reeves and Hastings convinces us that the order is not appeal-able unless it includes the specific words denying the motion as a matter of law; the appellate court cannot supply the jurisdictional language by inference. The order must "conclusively and finally determine[ ] a party's nonentitlement to such immunity." Pizza Hut of Am., Inc. v. Miller, 696 So.2d 340, 341 (Fla.1997).
The difficulty in this case stems from the state of the pleadings and the facts toward which the motion for summary judgment was directed. The trial court never determined that there was an absence of genuine issues of material fact, the prerequisite to determining entitlement to summary judgment as a matter of law. To the contrary, at the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, the trial court specifically stated that factual issues remained. Furthermore, the amended complaint, when examined in light of the law surrounding the availability of the workers' compensation immunity defense in the context of sexual batteries in the workplace, further obfuscated the issues. The trial court was precluded from determining, as a matter of law, that Footstar was not entitled to its workers' compensation immunity defense, and it did not do so.
Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed.
WHATLEY, J. and ANDREWS, MICHAEL F., Associate Judge, Concur.
CASANUEVA, J., Concurs specially with an opinion in which WHATLEY, J., Concurs.