Case Name: OLIVER v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1911-10-11
Citations: 144 S.W. 604
Docket Number: 
Parties: OLIVER v. STATE.
Judges: DAVIDSON, P. J., absent.
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 144
Pages: 604–617

Head Matter:
OLIVER v. STATE.
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Oct. 11, 1911.
On Motion for Rehearing, Nov. 29, 1911.
Dissenting Opinion Jan. 1, 1912.)
1. Criminal Law (§§ 1091, 1144 ) — Appeal— ■ Bill of Exceptions — Sufficiency — In General.
Inferences will not be drawn to aid a bill of exceptions; but parties asserting the availability of alleged errors must make their bill of exceptions so full and certain that in itself it will disclose all that is necessary to manifest the alleged error.
[Ed. Note. — Por other cases, see Criminal1 Law, Cent. Dig. § 3037; Dec. Dig. §§ 1091, 1144. ]
2. Cbiminal Law (§ 1091 ) — Bill of Exceptions — Sufficiency—Eebok Not Definitely Pointed Out.
A bill of exceptions, on an appeal from a conviction for permitting a theatrical performance to be given on Sunday, which merely stated that a witness for the state, in describing a missionary scene shown at the performance, said, “And it was quite a nice little play,” was not sufficient in its specification of error to the admission of evidence to require consideration.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2931-2935; Dec. Dig. §. 1091. ]
3. Cbiminal Law (§ 448 ) — Opinion Evidence-Facts ob Conclusions.
A question to a witness whether a certain theater was a place of public amusement does not call for the opinion of the witness, but for a fact.
[Ed. Note. — Por other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1035-1051; Dee. Dig. § 448. ]
4. Criminal Law (§ 507 ) — Testimony of Accomplice — Con viction .
Under Pen. Code 1895, art. 91, which provides that persons charged as principals, accomplices, or accessories, whether in the same or different indictments, cannot be witnesses for each other, one convicted for permitting a theatrical performance to be given on Sunday, and who had not paid his fine, but whose appeal was pending, was incompetent to testify in a prosecution of another employé for the same offense, on the same day, and at the same theater.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law. Cent. Dig. §§ 1086-1098; Dec. Dig. § 507. ]
5. Sunday (§ 29 ) — Sunday Theatrical Performan ce — Prosecution — Evidence.
In a prosecution of an employé of the lessee of a' theater for permitting a Sunday performance, the lease was admitted in evidence for the prosecution, over objection that it was dated four years previously and was too remote, that it contained many conditions of forfeiture, whereby it might be canceled, and was not shown to be still in force, and because the lessee therein named, who was defendant’s employer, was expressly authorized to assign or sublet, which was not negatived. Held, that the objections were directed only to the weight of the evidence and not to its admissibility, and were properly overruled.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Sunday, Dec. Dig. § 29. ]
6. -Criminal Law (§ 829 ) — Trial—Requests for Instructions — Refusal.
Requested instructions, which, so far as applicable, have been covered by instructions given, are properly refused.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. § 2011; Dec. Dig. § 829. ]
7. Criminal Law (§ 59 ) — Parties to Crime —Principals and Accomplices.
In misdemeanor cases, the parties are all principals.
TEd. Note. — For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 71-81; Dec. Dig. § 59. ]
8. Sunday (§ 6 ) — Criminal Prosecution-Permitting Theatrical Performance— “Place of Public Amusement” — Statutory Provisions — “Permit.”
Pen. Code 1895, art. 199, provides that the proprietor of any place of public amusement, or the agent or employé of any such person, who shall permit it to be open for the purpose of public amusement on Sunday shall be fined, and defines the term “place of public amusement” to include circuses, theaters, variety theaters, and such other amusements as are exhibited. and for which an admission fee is charged. Defendant, in a prosecution under such section as the agent and employé of an amusement company, was shown to have been the ticket agent and in the ticket office of the building in which the performance was given, and to have sold admission tickets thereto, but urged that under the statute only the proprietor could “permit” the place to be open; and hence that no mere subordinate could be convicted thereunder. Held, that the intent of the section was to make it an offense for any agent or employé of the proprietor to do any_ act toward keeping the theater open and running on Sunday, whether he had control of it, or could permit it to be opened, or not; and hence that defendant was guilty of the offense.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Sunday, Cent. Dig. §§ 11, 12; Dec. Dig. § 6.
For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 6, pp. 5315-5318; vol. 8, p. 7752; vol. 6, pp. 5389, 5390.]
On Motion for Rehearing.
9. Statutes (§ 181 ) — Construction—Intention of Legislature.
All rules for the interpretation of statutes are for the sole purpose of determining what was the intention of the Legislature in the use of the language found therein.
[Ed. Note. — For other eases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. §§ 259, 263; Dec. Dig. § 181. ]
10. Statutes (§ 241 ) — Construction — Penal Statutes.
Even if penal laws are to be construed strictly, they are not to be construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious intention of the Legislature; nor should the words be narrowed by interpretation, so as to exclude cases which, in their ordinary acceptation or in the sense in which the Legislature has obviously used them, they would comprehend, though the intention is to be collected from the words.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. §§ 322, 323; Dec. Dig. § 241. ]
11. Statutes (§ 241 ) — Construction — Penal Statutes — Statutory Provisions.
Code Cr. Proc. 1895, art. 25, which provides that the Code shall be liberally construed, Rev. St. 1895, art. 3268, subd. 6, which provides that in all interpretations the court shall look diligently for the intention of the Legislature, keeping in view the old law, the evil, and the remedy, Pen. Code 1895, art. 9, which provides that criminal laws shall be construed according to the plain import of the language in which they are written, without making the designation usually made between the construction of penal and civil laws, and Pen. Code 1895, art. 10, which provides that when the statute specially defines the words used they shall have that special meaning, but when not so specially defined they are to be construed in the sense in which they are understood in common language, taking into consideration the subject-matter and context, when construed together, abrogate the common-law rule that penal statutes are to be construed strictly, and require the court to construe all penal enactments liberally.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. §§ 322, 323; Dec. Dig. § 241. ]
12. Statutes (§ 181 ) — Construction—Remedial Effect.
Statutes should be construed as to prevent mischievous consequences, and more especially if such a construction be in opposition to one that would tend to bring about evil results.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. §§ 259, 263; Dec. Dig. § 181. ]
13. Statutes (§ 183 ) — Construction—Spirit or Letter.
When an intention of a statute is plainly discernable from its provisions, it is as obligatory as the letter of the statute, and will even prevail over the strict letter; and a thing which is within the intention of the Legislature is as much within the statute as if it were within the letter, while a thing which is within the letter is not within the statute, unless it be within its intention.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. § 261; Dec. Dig. § 183. ]
14. Statutes (§ 184 ) — Construction—Reasonable Construction.
Where a reasonable construction of the language of the statute would tend to effectuate its obvious purpose, and another construction equally reasonable would have the contrary tendency, the former construction should prevail.
[Ed. Note. — Eor other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. § 262; Dec. Dig. § 184. ]
15. Statutes (§ 184 ) — 1Construction—Lit-eral Meaning.
Courts, in the construction of statutes, are not confined to the literal meaning of the words employed; but the intention may be collected from the cause or necessity of the act.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. § 262; Dec. Dig. § 184. ]
16. Sunday (§ 6 ) — Amusements—Statutory Provisions.
Pen. Code 1895, art. 199, which provides that the proprietor of any place of public amusement, or the agent or employé of any such person, who shall permit it to be open for the purpose of public amusement on Sunday shall be fined, was intended to prevent the Sunday theater when an admission was charged thereto.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Sunday, Cent. Dig. §§ 11, 12; Dec. Dig. § 6. ]
17. Sunday (§ 6 ) — Parties to Offenses— Misdemeanors — Principals.
Pen. Code 1895, art. 74, which provides that all persons are principals who are guilty of acting together in the commission of an offense; article 75, which provides that persons present at the commission of an ..offense, who know the unlawful intent, and who aid those actually committing the unlawful act, are principal offenders, and may be prosecuted and convicted as such, and article 79, defining accomplices, were intended to apply to every subsequent enactment; and hence apply to Pen. Code 1895, art. 199, making it an offense to permit a public theatrical performance on Sunday, and make all aiding in the commission of the offense principals.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Sunday, Cent. Dig. §§ 11, 12; Dec. Dig. § 6. ]
18. Sunday (§ 29 ) — Amusements—Statutory Provisions— “Agent” — “Employé” — “Servant.”
The word “employé,” used in Pen. Code 1895, art. 199, which makes the proprietor of any place of public amusement, or the agent or employé of any such person, who shall permit it to be opened for the purpose of public amusement on Sunday subject to fine, is synonymous with servant, a “servant” being a person employed to labor for the pleasure or interest of another, or as a legal term, one employed to render service or assistance in some trade or vocation, but without authority to act as agent in place of his employer; and, while an “agent,” in the broadest sense of the word, may be construed to have the same power of authority as his principal, no such inference can be drawn from the term “em-ployé”; and by the use of such terms it was intended to include any subordinate, though •without the authority of his principal or the proprietor, who, in any way, acted together with the proprietor in the commission of the offense.
[Ed. Note. — For other cases, see Sunday, Dec. Dig. § 29.
For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 1, pp. 262-270; vol. 8, p. 7569; vol. 3, pp. 2369-2377; vol. 8, p. 7649; .vol. 7, pp. 6422-6429; vol. 8,.p. 7798.]
19. Indictment and Information (§ 82 )— Requisites — Principals.
It is not necessary to allege the facts relied upon to show the defendant to be a principal, although the offense may not have been actually committed by him, since, if he is a principal by reason of his part in the commission of the offense, he may be convicted under an indictment charging him directly with its actual commission.
[Ed. Note. — For.other cases, see Indictment and Information, Dec. Dig. § 82. ]
Davidson, P. J., dissenting.
Appeal from Dallas County Court, at Law; W. M. Plolland, Judge.
Charles Oliver was convicted of a misdemeanor, and he appeals.
Affirmed.
Crawford, Walker & Williams, for appellant. C. E. Lane, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Deo. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Rep’r Indexes
For other oases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Rep’r Indexes
For other eases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Rep’r Indexes

Opinion:
PRENDERGAST, J.
By complaint and information filed December 10, 1909, it was charged that the appellant, on November 14, 1909, in Dallas county, Tex., was the agent and employé of the Interstate Amusement Company, a corporation, which was the proprietor of a place of public amusement, to wit, a theater, situated in the city of Dallas, and as such agent and employé, he, on said last-named date, the same being Sunday, did unlawfully open and permit to be opened said theater and public amusement, and on said day did permit a theatrical performance to be given and exhibited in said theater for public amusement, and for admission to which a fee was charged. He was tried, found guilty, and a fine of $20 was assessed against him.
The appellant introduced no evidence. The state proved that on Sunday, November 14, 1909, the appellant was selling tickets to this show, or theater, in Dallas, Tex., fixing the particular house in which it occurred. Two witnesses testified that they bought tickets from him, and that many other people did likewise, and went into and saw the show. There was a good big crowd therein. There was a woman and two or three men on the stage. It was called and known as the "Majestic Theater." Appellant told the witnesses that he was the ticket seller. Another witness described the show or play as a scene in which a very beautiful lady was cast upon an island, and the natives were more animals than human in appearance, and they almost worshipped her because of her beauty, and made her queen of the island. Later a missionary came over to do missionary work and fell in love with her, and wanted to marry her. There was singing and some music, also, on the stage. It was a place of public amusement, and all this occurred on Sunday, November 14, 1909. The appellant sold tickets to this show on this occasion to the two witnesses who tes tified and to many others. Each purchaser of tickets, after purchasing same, went into the theater and saw the play.
The state also introduced in evidence a certificate by the Secretary of State of the state of Texas, dated June 23, 1905, certifying that a certified copy of articles of incorporation of the Interstate Amusement Company, incorporated under the laws of Missouri, was filed in the department on June 22, 1905, in accordance with the requirements of the laws of Texas, and paid the full fees therefor, and is entitled to, and granted permission to, do business in the state of Texas, for the purpose of the promotion of fine arts, for the term ending May 1, 1915. The certificate certifying to the copy by the Secretary of State was dated November 22, 1909. '
In addition, the state introduced in evidence a properly certified copy from the records of the county clerk of Dallas county, Tex., a lease from the Dallas Amusement Company to the Interstate Amusement Company, whereby the said Dallas Amusement Company leased to the said Interstate Amusement Company the building in Dallas, known as the Majestic Theater, which was the same that was shown by the testimony to be wherein the show, or theater, was held on said date, November 14, 1909, for the term beginning November 1, 1905, for five years. This lease specified the amount of rent that the lessee was to pay to the lessor and the times of the respective payments during the full term of the lease. It had many other provisions between the parties about repairs, lights, water, rent, etc., and gave the lessee specific authority to assign or transfer the lease, and also provided that the property leased was to be used for any and all theartrical purposes. It provided for a forfeiture of the lease in case the lessee failed to pay the rent, at the specified times for 30 days after maturity, and that if the state should pass any law prohibiting the carrying on of the business for which said property was leased that would render the lease null and void. There were other contingencies which provided for a termination of the lease unnecessary to here state.
The record is rather large. It shows that appellant requested 11 special charges, and contains 17 bills of exceptions. Eleven of the bills of exceptions are to the refusal of the court to give the respective 11 special charges. Another one of the bills is to the overruling of the motion for new trial, which contained 15 separate and distinct grounds. It is unnecessary to notice this bill, especially as the matters proper to be discussed are contained in the others.
Bill No. 2 states that while the witness W. H. Cullum was testifying for the state in chief, and while he was attempting to describe what he denominated a 'missionary scene," he used the expression, "And it was quite a nice little play." The appellant at the time objected to this answer, and asked that it be excluded from the jury, on the ground that it was not responsive to the question propounded, and was the expression of the opinion of the witness. In allowing the bill, the court qualified it by stating that the trial court deemed -said expression as merely a shorthand rendition of the facts. It is the uniform holding of this court that inferences will not be indulged to supply omissions in bills of exceptions. Parties asserting the availability of supposed errors must make their bill of exceptions so full and certain in statement that in and of itself it will disclose all that is necessary to manifest the supposed error. Davis v. State, 14 Tex. App. 645; Eldridge v. State, 12 Tex. App. 208; McGlasson v. State, 38 Tex. Cr. R. 351, 43 S. W. 93. A bill of exceptions, to be considered, must sufficiently set out the proceedings and attendant circumstances, to enable the court therefrom to know certainly that an error has been committed Thompson v. State, 29 Tex. App. 208, 15 S. W. 206; Livar v. State, 26 Tex. App. 116, 9 S. W. 552; Ballinger v. State, 11 Tex. App. 323, and McGlasson v. State, supra. The error complained of must be made to appear by the allegations of the bill itself. And when too indefinite to point out distinctly an error, it will not bring such matter properly before the appellate court for review. Quintana v. State, 29 Tex. App. 401, 16 S. W. 258, 25 Am. St. Rep. 730; Walker v. State, 19 Tex. App. 176; Hooper v. State, 29 Tex. App. 614, 16 S. W. 655; Hennessy v. State, 23 Tex. App. 340, 5 S. W. 215; Rahm v. State, 30 Tex. App. 310, 17 S. W. 416, 28 Am. St. Rep. 911; Wilkerson v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. R. 86, 19 S. W. 903; Walker v. State, 33 Tex. Cr. R. 359, 26 S. W. 507; Yungman v. State, 35 Tex. Cr. R. 80, 31 S. W. 663; Gonzales v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. R. 611, 25 S. W. 781; Attaway v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. R. 475, 20 S. W. 925. These are but some of the earlier decisions on the subject. They have been uniformly followed by this court in all recent decisions down! to the present time. This bill, thus tested, is clearly insufficient to require this court to consider it. Even if we could, we cannot see how it would be possible for the appellant to be injured by the expression of the witness as quoted in the bill, and how it is possible for any reversible error to have been committed by the court in not excluding the answer.
The next bill complains that while this same witness was on the stand the state asked him: "Q. State to the jury whether or not that is a place of public amusement?" The appellant objected to this question, on the ground "that the answer would be a conclusion of the witness, and the question called for a conclusion and opinion of the witness, and that one of the material allegations in the complaint was that the Majestic Theater was a place of public amusement." The court overruled the objection, and the witness answered, "So I understand it." The court, in allowing the bill, qualified it as follows: "The witness Laws, prior to this trial, had testified that said performance occurred in the Majestic Theater, corner of Commerce and Stone streets; that there were a lot of people in the theater; that they bought tickets and went in the door; that it was a big crowd; that the stage curtain was up, and that a woman and two or three men were on the stage; that there was music in the theater; that he asked the defendant if he [defendant] was the ticket seller, and he [defendant] informed him [witness] that he [defendant] was the ticket seller; that said occurrence took place on November 14th; that the witness Cullom's testimony was substantially the same, and both witnesses were testifying about November the 14th as being time their testimony referred to."
This bill is clearly insufficient, as the previous one noticed was, and for the same reasons. Tested by the authorities cited, it does not in and of itself disclose what was necessary of the proceedings in the case to show any error to this court. It does not set out the proceedings and attendant circumstances sufficiently to enable this court to know certainly that an error hás been committed. Even if we could consider it, it occurs to us that whether or not the theater mentioned was a place of public amusement was a question of fact, and that a witness could be asked that question correctly, and could, if he knew, legally answer the question. It would not be such a conclusion, nor call for such a conclusion, as would make the testimony unlawful in view of the character of fact that was under investigation.
The next bill "(No. 4) shows that the appellant objected to the copy of the permit admitted in evidence, which is described in the preliminary statement herein, on many grounds. It is unnecessary to state them. This same question was before this court in the case of Gould v. State, 134 S. W. 695, wherein this court held that the said certificate which evidently is the same that was introduced in this case, was properly admitted in that case. It is unnecessary to here further discuss this matter.
The next bill shows this: "That after the state had introduced its evidence and rested the defendant had sworn and placed on the stand as a witness in his behalf O. E. Gould, and offered to prove by him that he was manager of the said theater, and was present at the same on the day and date alleged in the complaint herein; that he alone opened the theater on that date, and permitted same to be opened, for the purpose of public amusement.at said time, and that he alone had' the power to open and permit said theater to be opened for the purpose of public amusement on said date; and that the defendant Oliver was not, on said date, either the agent or employ® of the Interstate Amusement Company in Dallas, or elsewhere in Texas or the United States." The state objected to this witness testifying, because the witness himself was also charged in the same court with the same offense that the appellant herein is charged with, and that he had been convicted for such offense. The court sustained the objection, and in allowing the bill qualified it as follows: "Said O. E. Gould had been convicted in the county court, at law, on the charge of violating the law in reference to this same Majestic Theater on the same identical date, viz., November 14th. Said Gould had not paid his fine in said cause, but had appealed same to the Honorable Court of Criminal Appeals and the appeal in said Gould Case was pending and undetermined at the time of the trial of the defendant, Oliver." Article 91, Penal Code, is as follows: ' "Persons charged as principals, accomplices or accessories, whether in the same indictment or by different indictments, cannot be introduced as witnesses for one another, but they may claim a severance ; and if any one or more be acquitted they may testify in behalf of the others." The witness clearly was incompetent to testify. Rutter v. State, 4 Tex. App. 57. The conviction need not be for the same offense. Muckenfuss v. State, 55 Tex. Cr. R. 216, 117 S. W. 853.
The next bill shows that the appellant objected to the introduction of evidence of the lease above recited from the Dallas Amusement Company to the Interstate Amusement Company. The grounds of the objection, briefly stated, are that the lease, being dated November 1, 1905, was too remote to be of any probative value, and because the lease had many .conditions of forfeiture which could have canceled and annulled it and taken it out of existence long before the date of the charge herein, and there was no evidence that said lease was still in force and effect; and because it showed that the Interstate Amusement Company had the right therein to sublease the leased premises and to assign and transfer the lease, and no testimony is shown that none of this has not been done. This bill is also clearly insufficient for the same reason as the others herein above called attention to. Even if *not insufficient, the several objections made would go to the weight of the evidence, and not to its admissibility. Such testimony could be, and doubtless was, discussed before the jury. There was no error of the court in admitting the lease.
The sixteenth and seventeenth bills of exceptions complain of the refusal of the court; the sixteenth, refusing to give a requested peremptory charge to acquit the defendant; and the seventeenth, that as the state had failed to prove that the defendant was the agent or employé of the amusement company, a peremptory charge to acquit. The court did not err in refusing to give any of these charges.
All of the other bills of exceptions complain of the refusal of the court to give his several special requested charges, numbered from 1 to 9, inclusive. It is unnecessary to state severally these special charges. There is much repetition in them. They request charges, among other things, of the definition of a theater and of the proprietor of the Interstate Amusement Company, as to what is a musical performance, the definition of a drama, of agent, employé, and permit, as to what is meant by control, etc., of the theater, the definition of a theatrical performance, and the seventh, as to the defendant acting as servant or clerk of Gould.
Not a single one of these bills of exceptions is complete in and of itself, and does not set out the proceedings and attendant circumstances and the evidence in the case to show whether or not they were proper. However, we have considered each and every one of them. The court, in allowing each one of the bills, qualified it substantially by stating, the seventh as not raised by the testimony, and the others that, so far as they were proper to give, had been embraced and covered fully by the court's main charge; and that the second, defining a musical performance, was not called for by the testimony. As stated above, these several charges, in many instances, were mere repetitions, and were more or less a mere change of the verbiage which was substantially given and contained in the court's charge. The court's charge on the several matters is as follows: "A theater is a playhouse; a building for the representation of theatrical performances. A theatrical performance is an exhibition, given for the instruction or amusement of the audience, and may include tragedies, comedies, farces, and vaudeville performances. An agent is one who acts for another by authority from him. An employé is a person who is employed; one who works for wages or a salary. 'To permit' means 'to grant permission; to give leave; to grant express license or liberty to.' "
We have carefully examined the whole charge of the court, and, in our opinion, it clearly and aptly charged all that was necessary and proper to be charged in the case, so far as the special charges requested are concerned. There is no complaint by the appellant of the charge of the court itself, other than the refusal to give his said several special charges requested.
The appellant's attorneys have filed an able brief herein, wherein they vigorously contend that the court has committed the many errors claimed by their bills of exceptions. In addition, since the case has been submitted, they have filed a supplemental brief wherein they, with ability, contend in effect "that the appellant cannot be convicted in this cause as the 'agent and employé' of the Interstate Amusement Company, because the statute itself, under which the prosecution is had, contemplates in effect that only the 'proprietor' of the theater could be prosecuted and convicted thereunder, because he alone can open or permit the place to be opened or closed, unless the 'agent or employe' is affirmatively shown to occupy such a relation to the public amusement that he could permit it to be opened, and such control as that he could close it; that he must have the authority and exclusive control of the theater; that a mere clerk or servant, though an employé, if he were not in control of the theater, could not be guilty, because he could not permit it to be opened, nor close it." As we understand their brief, this position was not contended for by them in their first brief, and apparently not in the lower court.
The article of the Penal Code under which this prosecution was had (199) is as follows: "Any merchant, grocer, or dealer in wares or merchandise, or trader in any business whatsoever, or the proprietor of any place of public amusement, or the agent or em-ployé of any such person, who shall sell, barter or permit his place of business or place of public amusement to be open for the purpose of traffic or public amusement on Sunday, shall be fined not less than twenty nor more than fifty dollars. The term place of public amusement shall be construed to me'an circuses, theaters, variety theaters and such other amusements as are exhibited and for which an admission fee is charged; and shall also include dances at disorderly houses, low dives and places of like character with or without fees for admission."
The language of the Legislature in this enactment may not happily express what we believe was clearly intended thereby. It is our opinion that this enactment, as applicable to the character of offense charged in this case, in order to express the legislative intent which we think is clear, would make the article, leaving out what is applicable to the conducting of other businesses, read as follows: "The proprietor of any place of public amusement who shall permit his place of public amusement to be open for the purpose of public amusement on Sunday, or the agent or employé of any such person, shall be fined not less than twenty, nor more than fifty dollars. The term place of public amusement shall be construed to mean circuses, theaters, variety theaters and such other amusements as are exhibited and for which an admission fee is charged." It will thus be seen that we merely transpose the language used by the Legislature, in order to make clear what we believe was certainly intended by the Legislature. In transposing, we have taken nothing out and put nothing in the enactment of the Legislature on this subject. Simply have transposed, in order to make more readily seen the clear intent of the Legislature. Murray v. State, 21 Tex. App. 620, 2 S. W. 757, 57 Am. Rep. 623; Rigby v. State, 27 Tex. App. 55, 10 S. W. 760; C. C. P. art. 25; P. C. art. 9. This certainly, as we conceive it, is the construction that this court has uniformly placed upon this statute.
In Burnett v. State, 42 Tex. Cr. R. 600, 62 S. W. 1063, this court, in discussing whether or not a mere porter, hired for only one day (Sunday), would be guilty of making a sale as the agent of the proprietor, when all that he had done was work that one day as a porter in the saloon, and carried the pint of liquor from the keeper to the purchaser at the door, states: "We do not think the statute means that he must be employed as a salesman in order to make him guilty of the offense, but means, if he is in the employ of the merclumt or dealer in any respect about the particular business, the statute comprehends him; that is, suppose he was the bookkeeper of the establishment, and should make a sale on Sunday, the statute would cover such a case. Again, appellant complains that the charge in question authorizes the jury to convict, not on a sale or on an agency, but if he assisted in the sale. We think the statute covers this phase of the case. If he was in the ' employ, and knowingly aided in the sale, he would be a principal. The testimony on the part of the state shows that he went to the door, got the money, handed it to the barkeeper, who gave him the bottle of whisky and the change, which he carried and delivered to the purchaser, Fitts, at the door. He admits himself that he carried the pint of whisky to the door and gave it to said Fitts, but denies that he received the money for the whisky. The receipt of the money, it seems to us, would make no difference. If, being in the employ of Kearby on that day (and it does not matter as to the compensation he was to receive), he did any act in aid of the sale of the whislcy, though the sale may have been made by the barkeeper, he would be amenable under the law." P. C. art. 74; Collins v. State, 34 Tex. Cr. R. 95, 29 S. W. 274; Pigford v. State, 74 S. W. 323.
In misdemeanor eases all parties are principals; there are no accomplices. Bolton v. State, 43 S. W. 984; Rape v. State, 34 Tex. Cr. R. 615, 31 S. W. 652; Houston v. State, 13 Tex. App. 595; Schwartz v. State, 38 Tex. Cr. R. 26, 40 S. W. 976; Keith v. State, 38 Tex. Cr. R. 678, 44 S. W. 847.
It is clear to us that the Legislature intended, not only to make it an offense for the proprietor to permit his place of public amusement to be open for that purpose on Sunday when an admission fee is charged, but that any agent or employé of the proprietor, who should do any act towards keeping the theater open and run on Sunday, should also be guilty, whether the language of the enactment is transposed, as we have suggested above, or not. Appellant's counsel cite us to the opinion of this court in the case of Mitchell v. State, 34 Tex. Cr. R. 312, 30 S. W. 810, to sustain their position. That case was against a mere servant or employé under the disorderly house act as it existed at that time. The act at that time did not make it an offense for the servant, agent, or employé to in any way assist in the running of the disorderly house, but restricted the offense to the "owner, lessee, or tenant only," and this court in that case held that, as Mitchell, the appellant, was neither the owner, lessee, nor tenant, but merely a servant or employé, he was not embraced within the language of that legislative enactment. We think that that case but accentuates the construction of the act in question in this case, because it does expressly include "the agent or employé."
There being no reversible error, the judgment will, in all things, be affirmed.
DAVIDSON, P. J., absent.