Case Name: Glen LEE and Ada Lee, Appellants, v. Glenda S. MEEKS, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1991-12-13
Citations: 592 So. 2d 282
Docket Number: No. 90-243
Parties: Glen LEE and Ada Lee, Appellants, v. Glenda S. MEEKS, Appellee,
Judges: JOANOS, C.J., dissents with written opinion.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 592
Pages: 282–292

Head Matter:
Glen LEE and Ada Lee, Appellants, v. Glenda S. MEEKS, Appellee,
No. 90-243.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Dec. 13, 1991.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 22, 1992.
Jeffrey P. Whitton, Panama City, for appellants.
Cecile M. Scoon, Panama City, for appel-lee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Glen and Ada Lee appeal an order denying their petition for writ of habeas corpus requiring Glenda Meeks to appear before the court with her minor child. The order addresses a Tennessee court order decreeing that temporary custody of the child be awarded to the Lees pending further order of that court. We affirm the trial court's denial of the petition, holding that the court correctly resolved the issue before it.
Ada Lee is the paternal grandparent, and Glenda Meeks is the natural mother, of the minor child involved in the instant action. Based on the parties' court-approved statements of the evidence, it would appear that prior to the institution of this proceeding, extensive hearings were held in a Tennessee court pertaining to divorce and child custody issues involved in the dissolution of marriage of Meeks and Jackie Edward Parks, Ada Lee's son. Custody of their minor child was granted to Meeks. However, subsequent to the final dissolution of marriage, the Tennessee court also awarded grandparent visitation rights to the Lees.
Following her divorce, Meeks remarried and continued to live in Tennessee for a period of time during which she gave birth to twins. Due to health problems of one of the twins, Meeks was forced to seek a more amenable climate. Accordingly, in May of 1989, she and her new husband, along with their children — including the minor child at issue here — made the first of several moves to different states settling shortly thereafter in Bay County, Florida, in June or July of 1989. Meeks was not prohibited by the Tennessee final decree of dissolution from moving her eldest child out of the state of Tennessee, and upon their arrival in Panama City, Meeks called Ada Lee to inform her of her new address and to set up a visitation schedule. Meanwhile, the child had spent the entire month of July with the Lees.
On September 8, 1989, the Lees filed a petition in the Tennessee court seeking a court order to change custody of the child, and to have Meeks held in contempt of court. In their petition, the Lees alleged that they were informed by Meeks when she settled in Florida that the "only visitation available to the Petitioners would be one day during the child's spring break." The Lees then alleged:
3. It is not in the best interest of the minor child to be constantly moved as in the life of a nomad and further not in the childs [sic] best interest to be kept from the Petitioners. The course of conduct that has been exhibited by the Respondent over the years has always been calculated to harass the Petitioners, and this course of conduct is extremely detrimental to not only the Petitioners but the minor child.
4. The Respondent has willfully and maliciously removed the minor child to Florida for the sole purpose of denying the Petitioners' visitation.
The record next indicates that Meeks received a letter from the Lees' attorney on September 15, 1989, enclosing the above-mentioned petition filed in the Circuit Court for Stewart County, Tennessee, at Dover. An order was entered on October 17, 1989, transferring the cause to the Chancery Court for Stewart County, Tennessee, at Dover, certifying that a true and correct copy of the order was mailed to Meeks at her Florida address. Thereafter, Meeks received a certified letter, return receipt requested, from the Lees' attorney advising Meeks that the cause "has been set for Court on November 20, 1989, at 10:00 a.m. in the Chancery Court for Stewart County in Dover, Tennessee."
There is no dispute that Meeks received either letter. However, in their court-approved statement of the evidence the Lees maintain that Meeks did not request a continuance and had no contact with the court concerning the hearing. To the contrary, in her court-approved "Objections Or Proposed Amendments To Appellants^] Statements Of Evidence," Meeks asserts that, following receipt of the November 20 letter, she contacted Larry B. Watson, counsel for the Lees, to request a continuance due to the continuing ill health of one of her twins. According to Meeks, the attorney refused to cooperate. The infant twin was thereafter hospitalized from November 17 through November 21, 1989. Consequently, Meeks did not attend the hearing held on November 20, 1989, nor was she represented by counsel at the hearing.
Following the hearing, the Tennessee court entered an order decreeing that temporary custody of the child be awarded to the Lees pending further order of the court. In pertinent part, the Tennessee court found as follows:
That it is the intent of GLENDA S. MEEKS to frustrate any exercise or [sic] jurisdiction by this Court, she has evidenced and [sic] unwillingness to allow proper visitation with the parties [sic] minor child and she is now subjecting the child to unsafe environment for at least partially the purpose to deny visitation, GLENDA S. MEEKS has moved from a stable environment to an unstable one to remove the child from the jurisdiction of the Court; she had actual notice of the hearing and choose [sic] not to be present therefore the Court finds she is seeking again to frustrate the exercise of the jurisdiction by this Court; .
Thereafter, the Lees filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in Bay County, Florida, to require Meeks to appear before the circuit court and to have with her the minor child. An order to show cause was entered directing the parties to appear before the court on December 5, 1989. On that day, the Lees and Meeks appeared. An order granting the petition was entered on December 7 scheduling a full hearing for December 14. Following that hearing, at which a court reporter was not present and during which Ada Lee and Meeks testified, the trial court entered an order dissolving its order of December 7 and decreeing that the Lees would take nothing by their petition.
In the order, the trial court made several findings, one in particular being that since the Lees were "proceeding supplementary in the original divorce action," due process of law required that Meeks be served with supplemental process advising her of the consequences of her failure to respond or plead. The trial court observed that the only witnesses who testified before the Tennessee court were the Lees' daughter and son-in-law, who had visited with Meeks briefly in early September 1989, and who apparently never entered Meeks' home. The trial court noted that the child was enrolled in kindergarten and was receiving counseling from the Bay County Life Management Center.
The court went on to find that
[t]he order of the Tennessee court does not address the best interest of the minor child, but only deals with the allegation that Glenda S. Meeks is attempting to frustrate the jurisdiction of the Tennessee court by moving from a stable environment to an unsafe environment, and for at least the partial purpose of denying visitation to the paternal grandparents .
In a habeas corpus proceeding for the custody of a child under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act ., the controlling consideration in awarding custody of such a child is the best interest of that child. When all of the parties, and the child, are before a court of this State, the court is not bound by the full faith and credit clause to automatically enforce the judgment of the foreign state under the comity principal [sic]. In this case, it is clear from the face of the order which the Plaintiffs rely, that the Tennessee court did not address the best interest of the minor child. It is equally clear that none of the orders or judgments of the Tennessee court which were reviewed by this Court, restricted or prohibited the Defendant or the minor child from leaving the state of Tennessee. There was no evidence presented to this Court that would support a finding that the Defendant was an unfit mother or that the best interest of the minor child would be served by delivering it to the Plaintiffs pursuant to the Tennessee court order. On the contrary, the evidence was that the child is enrolled in school in Florida, living with his mother and step-father and siblings, and that he is being counseled by the Bay County Life Management Center. This court finds that the best interest of the minor child requires that the Plaintiffs' Petition be denied. Further, the Court finds that under the circumstances of this case, where the grandparents were proceeding supplementary in the original divorce action between the Defendant and her former husband, and the short informal notice of the hearing given by Plaintiffs' attorney, that due process of law requires she be served with supplemental process advising her of the consequences of her failure to respond or plead.
On appeal, the Lees raise two points challenging the trial court's final order. In their first point they argue that, contrary to the trial court's conclusion, the Tennessee court afforded full due process rights to Meeks in conformance with the relevant provisions of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. Their second point challenges the trial court's conclusion that the Tennessee court was not concerned with the best interest of the child on the basis that the finding is not supported by the record and is outside the jurisdiction of the court. To the contrary, we hold that the appealed order comports with well-established Florida law applicable to habeas corpus proceedings instituted to obtain custody of a child.
The Lees' selection of the remedy of habeas corpus is significant. In Walt v. Walt, 574 So.2d 205 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), we explained the difference between simply petitioning for enforcement of an order pursuant to the provisions of the UCCJA, section 61.1332, Florida Statutes (1989), and seeking enforcement via a petition for a writ of habeas corpus:
Initially, we point out that habeas corpus is by definition an independent proceeding to be used when no other appropriate proceeding for obtaining custody is pending or available. While its use as a remedy in this case was not challenged by appellant in the court below, ordinarily habeas corpus is not resorted to where there is another available and adequate remedy, such as the provisions of the UCCJA as adopted in Florida, e.g., § 61.1328, 61.1332, 61.1346, Fla.Stat. (1989), which provide an adequate remedy to a non-resident parent seeking to enforce a valid out-of-state custody decree. See Trujillo v. Trujillo, 378 So.2d 812, 815 n. 18 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). Habe-as corpus is recognized to be an appropriate remedy for enforcement of a foreign child custody decree, however, so the plaintiffs use of the remedy in this case is not, per se, grounds for reversal. See 28 Fla.Jur.2d Habeas Corpus § 65 (1981). However, the use of habeas corpus must at least accord with the applicable provisions of the UCCJA. Trujillo.
The nature of habeas corpus was concisely described by the supreme court in Crane v. Hayes, 253 So.2d 435 (Fla.1971):
As a general rule, a habeas corpus proceeding is an independent action, legal and civil in nature, designed to secure prompt determination as to the legality of restraint in some form.... When child custody is involved, however, a habeas corpus action takes on the nature of an equitable proceeding, and the trial judge has the duty and authority to enter orders which will best conserve the welfare of the child, subordinating if necessary the legal rights of the parents....
There is no question but that habeas corpus is a proper proceeding to obtain custody of a child wrongfully withheld. However, this does not mean that a habeas corpus retains its form as a special proceeding of high priority and limited scope, designed to secure summary determination of rights and needs relating to restraint. Upon entry of a judgment settling the question, jurisdiction terminates, and the judgment becomes subject to timely review just as any other final judgment.
. An order of a court in a sister state granting temporary custody is not res judicata, and a Florida court has a duty on petition for writ of habeas corpus to determine the child's best interest.... An order by a foreign court which is without jurisdiction is not binding.
253 So.2d at 439-40 (citations omitted) .
Although enforcement of a foreign custody decree remains subject to the requirements of the UCCJA, the following principles govern the use of habeas corpus as the enforcement remedy:
A custody award of another state will be enforced in Florida by habeas corpus absent any showing of legal reason why the court should not recognize and enforce the order of the court of the sister state. However, the trial court is not bound by the prior foreign decree to the extent that the court can refuse to determine the issue of who should have custody of the child. While the trial court may properly consider the foreign decree as a factor in deciding the custody issue, the trial court is not bound by the full faith and credit clause to automatically enforce the foreign decree. Under the comity principle the trial court may, in its discretion, enforce the foreign decree, but only after that court has determined whether it is in the best interests of the child to do so.
28 Fla.Jur.2d Habeas Corpus § 65, p. 496 (1981). .In determining the right to the custody of a child by habeas corpus, the welfare of the child is a controlling factor that must be considered by the court. 28 Fla.Jur.2d, Habeas Corpus § 114 (1981). Therefore, when using the writ to enforce a custody decree, the Florida court must make a finding that the requested change of custody is in the best interests of the child at the time the matter comes on for hearing before that court. See generally 28 Fla.Jur.2d, Ha-beas Corpus § 67. Where the order appealed is unsupported by the legal effect of the evidence, it becomes the appellate court's duty to reverse. Matera v. Buchanan, 192 So.2d 18 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966).
574 So.2d at 210-211. (Emphasis added.)
The UCCJA as enacted in Florida has not displaced these principles of law traditionally applied in habeas corpus proceedings involving child custody. On the contrary, it is only by determining the best interests of the child that the enforcing court can determine whether changes in circumstances intervening since entry of the order sought to be enforced would make it inequitable, unjust, or harmful to the child to enforce the other state court's custody decree. This is of particular significance in the case of an interlocutory order temporarily changing custody pending final determination of the issues raised in the petition for modification. The temporary custody ordered by the Tennessee court is obviously not a final custody order subject to change only by modification based on a substantial change in circumstances; it merely orders temporary custody pending final determination of the grandparents' petition for modification, presumably after further hearing. Consequently, as the Florida Supreme Court observed in Crane v. Hayes, quoted supra, this order is not res judicata on the issue of changing custody, so the Florida court has a duty on petition for writ of habeas corpus to determine the child's best interest.
The court below expressly recognized that the foregoing principles were applicable upon review of this temporary custody order in this habeas corpus proceeding, reciting that "the controlling consideration in awarding custody of such a child is the best interest of that child." The trial court explicitly ruled, after taking evidence, that the best interest of the child required that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus be denied and custody left with the appellee mother. This explicit ruling, being supported by the evidence, is dispositive of this appeal. The trial court's determination of the child's best interest was required by Florida law in passing on the petition for the writ of habeas corpus regardless of whether the Tennessee court had exercised its jurisdiction in accordance with the requirements of the UCCJA. Accordingly, for those reasons, the trial court's order is hereby AFFIRMED.
JOANOS, C.J., dissents with written opinion.
WIGGINTON, J., concurs.
ZEHMER, concurs with written opinion.
. See sections 61.1302-61.1348, Florida Statutes (1989); and sections 36-6-201-36-6-225, Tennessee Code Annotated (1988).
. Section 61.1304, Florida Statutes (1989), provides in part:
The general purposes of this act are to:
(1) Avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict with the courts of other states in matters of child custody which have in the past resulted in the shifting of children from state to state with harmful effects on their well-being.
(2) Promote cooperation with the courts of other states to the end that a custody decree is rendered in the state which can best decide the case in the interest of the child.
(3) Assure that litigation concerning the custody of a child takes place ordinarily in the state with which the child and his family have the closest connection and where the significant evidence concerning his care, protection, training, and personal relationships is most readily available, and that courts of this state decline the exercise of jurisdiction when the child and his family have a closer connection with another state.
*
(6) Avoid relitigation of custody decisions of other states in this state insofar as feasible.
(7) Facilitate the enforcement of custody decrees of other states.
(8) Promote and expand the exchange of information and other forms of mutual assistance between the courts of this state and those of other states concerned with the same child.