Case Name: Wm. Carey v. J. L. Brooks
Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1833-12
Citations: 1 Hill 365
Docket Number: 
Parties: Wm. Carey v. J. L. Brooks.
Judges: Johnson, J. concurred.
Reporter: South Carolina Law Reports
Volume: 19
Pages: 365–368

Head Matter:
Wm. Carey v. J. L. Brooks.
Tried before Mr. Justice Sicijardson, at Edgefield — ' Fall Term, 1833.
This was a special action on the case, to recover damages .sustained by the plaintiff, by reason of obstruction of a navigable stream.
1“for*1a .UV'indictment; but sráco,T‘p™ty i>° a not
The plaintiff had a quantity of raft timber floating in Col. Marsh’s mill pond, which he had contracted, under a penalty, to deliver by a certain day at burgh. The dam is across Horse creek, which, by an act of the legislature in 1820, was declared a vigable stream; but there is a passage for rafts and boats round the dani, according to the provisions ot that act. The defendant had lately recovered the right bank of the creek from Marsh, and had been put in possession by the sheriff: shortly after which, he cut a channel for the -water through the dam, but on his own side, and the water rushing through, bore down the bank below, swept off a bridge, and completely filled up the navigable channel of the creek, leaving the former passage round the dam, high and dry.
The plaintiff employed hands to clear out the channel, at an expense of one hundred and twenty five dollars, and his lumber was delayed in consequence of this act of the defendant, about one month. One witness was of opinion, taking into consideration the-penalty to -which the plaintiff was subject, that his loss would be from six hundred to a thousand dollars. The presiding Judge charged the jury-that the plaintiff was entitled to recover to the extent of his loss,, which arose from one month’s delay of his lumber, and the expense incurred by him in removing the obstructions 5 but that they ought not to find for any loss' sustained by reason of the contract to deliver lumber under a penalty. The jury found for the plaintiff, three hundred and fifty dollars. The defendant appealed, and moved for a non suit or new trial, on grounds which w-ili appear in the opinion of the court.
Bauskett & Jones, for the motion.
Butler & Griffin, contra.

Opinion:
Harper, J.
There is little doubt, I suppose, but that Horse creek must be regarded as a public high way. The several acts of the legislature in relation to it — that of 1796, of 1807, and of 1820, plainly so consider it. That of 1820, provides that no person shall obstruct Horse creek, so as to prevent the passage of boats, rafts, &c. and that all persons having mill dams on that stream, shall provide proper sluices or locks for the passage of such boats or rafts; in default of which, their dams are liable tobe cut, by the order of a magistrate. Under these acts, the citizens certainly have a right to navigate it, and it is not pretended that it comes under the description of a private way.
It was argued that Marsh was the original wrong doer, by erecting his dam on the defendant's land ; that defendant had a right to eat it, and that if injurious consequences have resulted, Marsh, and not he, must be answerable. It would be difficult to devise the form of action to be brought by the plaintiff against Marsh. Marsh was a trespasser on defendant's land and answerable to him for the trespass. Defendant had a right to abate that nuisance; yet certainly not a more perfect right than he would have had to drain a pond or lake found on his own land, by cutting through his own soil. Yet if he had drained such a pond or lake, in such a manner as to do an injury to his neighbour's plantation or his way, will it admit of question that he would have been answerable ? The maxim "so use your own as not to injure another," applies. A man is supposed to foresee the probable consequences of his actions. In exercising his right of abating the nuisance inflicted upon him by Marsh, the defendant was bound to do it in.such a manner as not to injure third persons.
It was argued that the act of 1820, provides the remedy for obstructing the navigation of Horse creek, and that any other remedy is impliedly excluded. The only remedy provided by the act, is in the instance of persons having mill dams,- who neglect to leave open a proper passage. No remedy is provided for any other obstructions ; though it is declared in general terms, to be unlawful to obstruct the navigation of Horse creek. If persons have_ a right to navigate Horse creek, there must be a remedy for an unlawful interruption of the exercise of that right.' fin general, the remedy for similar injuries is by an action on the case.
But as I have already said, this must be regarded as a public highway, and in general, the remedy for a nuisance on a highway is by indictment; and the case put, Co. Lit. 56, where that is said to he the proper remedy, is like the present; "if a ditch he made over-thwart the highway, so that he cannot go." In Bacon's Abridgement, Tit. Nuisance, D. it is said that common nuisances against the public are only punishable by indictment. "But if by such nuisance, the party suffer a particular damage, as if by stopping up a highway with logs, &e. his horse throws him, by. -which he is wounded or hurt, an action lies." It is added however, "but if a highway is stopped that a man is delayed in his journey a little while, and by reason thereof, he is damnified or some important affair neglected, this is not such special damage for which an action on the case will lie 5 but a particular damage to maintain this action, ought to be direct and not consequential; as for instance, the loss of his horse, or some corporal hurt in falling into a trench on the highway, &c." Referring to Carth. 194. This seems to be the settled law, founded on the inconvenience of allowing a separate action to every individual who suffers an inconvenience common to many. The motion for nonsuit is therefore granted.
Johnson, J. concurred.
O'Neall, J. dissented.