Case Name: J. A. D. Johnson v. The State
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1923-01-31
Citations: 96 Tex. Crim. 216
Docket Number: No. 7181
Parties: J. A. D. Johnson v. The State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Criminal Reports
Volume: 96
Pages: 216–229

Head Matter:
J. A. D. Johnson v. The State.
No. 7181.
Decided January 31, 1923.
Rehearing Granted December 19, 1923.
1. —Blowing up Building — Dipping Vat — Explosive—Indictment.
Where the prosecution was carried on under Article 1214, P. 0., which makes the wilful burning of a building which is not enclosed with a wall or not covered an offense which may be punished by confinement in the penitentiary, and the indictment alleged that said building was a dipping vat, and the building not enclosed with walls and covered, held, that the judgment of conviction must be reversed and the cause remanded. Lattimore, Judge, dissenting.
2. —Same-—-Evidence—Confession.
Where, upon trial of blowing up a certain building, towit, a dipping vat, defendant made a confession that on the same night the dipping vat in question was blown up he blew up other dipping vats, the same was admissible as showing system, identity and intent, same being properly limited by the charge of the court.
3. —Same—Grand Jury — Bailiff—Indictment.
The practice of having persons other than the grand jury and the State’s attorney present in the grand jury room while witnesses are being questioned is not to be encouraged, but if such presence extend no further than during the questioning of a witness, and it is shown that no consultation or deliberation of the grand jury was had in the presence of said outsider, as bailiff in the instant case, no error appears.
4. —Same—Change of Court — Words and Phrases — -Wilful—Article 743, C. 0. P.
The omission of the word wilful in the court’s charge, not being reasonably calculated to injure the rights of the defendant or affect the fairness of his trial the same does not constitute reversible error under Article 743, 0. 0. P.
5. —Same—Rehearing—Statutes Construed — New Offense.
Artice 1205, P. C., which provides that the explosion of a house by means of gun powder or other explosive matter comes within the meaning of arson creates a new offense, calls it arson, and punishes it as such, which otherwise would not have been arson under the law, unless fire was communicated to the house by means of the explosion; but Article 1214, P. 0., which denounces the wilful burning of a building, etc., does not denounce as a crime the explosion of such property. Lattimore, Judge,' dissenting.
6. —Same—Statutes Construed — Arson—Wilful Burning.
The proposition that Article 1213, P. C., making the rules and definitions as to arson apply to other wilful burning brought into Chapter 2 the provisions of Article 1205, P. C., relative to the explosion of a house, and made the explosion of any property included in the provisions of Chapter 2 a wilful burning whether fire was communicated to the property or not is not sound. Lattimore, Judge, dissenting.
7. —Same—Statutes Construed — Wilful Burning — Buie Stated.
The rules and definitions referred to in Article 1213 P. 0. as applicable to other wilful burning relate to the communication of fire to the property as making the other wilful burnings complete, whether the property be destroyed or not, etc., but it cannot be held that the explosion of such property which does not communicate to it is a wilful burning. Lattimore, Judge dissenting.
8. —Same—Statutes Construed — Arson—Explosion—New Offense.
The crime denounced in Article 1205, P. C., is not truly arson, but the explosion of a house is made an offense whether it burn or not, and therefore creates a new offense, and a person cannot simply be charged with arson as under Article 1200, P. C., and if the explosion does not so communicate fire the prosecution must be based on Article 1205, P. C. Following Landers v. State, 39 Texas Crim. Rep., 671; Lattimore, Judge, dissenting.
9. —Same—Statutes Construed — Explosion—Buie Stated.
This court, therefore, concludes that the provisions of Article 1205, P. C., denouncing the explosion of a house as an offense cannot by the terms of Article 1213 be regarded as “Such rule or definition” as may be brought forward as applicable in aid of the other provisions of Chapter 2, of Title 17, but in fact creates a distinct offense applicable to houses only, and is therefore not available in the present prosecution. Lattimore, Judge, dissenting.
10. —Same—Dipping Vat — Statutes Construed.
This court holds that one who destroys a dipping vat is not punishable under Article 1214, P. C., but may be proceeded against under Article 1235, P. C., which provides that if any person shall wilfully or mischievously destroy any real or personal property, etc., he shall be punished by fine, etc. Lattimore, Judge, dissenting.
11. —Same—Dipping Vat Building — Statutes Construed.
It is the opinion of the writer that the dipping vat designated in the indictment and described in the evidence in the present case is not a building within the meaning of Article 1214, P. C. Morrow, Presiding Judge; Lattimore, Judge, dissenting; Hawkins, Judge, refrains from discussing this phase of the case as being immaterial in the decision of this case.
Appeal from the District Court of Cass. Tried below before the Honorable Hugh Carney.
Appeal from a conviction of blowing up a building, towit, a dipping vat, by explosives, etc.; penalty, two years imprisonment in the penitentiary.
After formal matters, the indictment charged that J. A. D. Johnson, on or about the 15th day of March, 1922, and anterior to the presentment of this indictment, in the county of Cass and State of Texas, did then and there unlawfully, wilfully, blow up, explode and destroy by means of gun powder, and by means of dynamite and by means of some explosive matter, to the grand jury unknown, a building there situate, the same not being enclosed with walls and covered, towit, a dipping vat, the said building being then and there the property of Cass County, Texas, and of Jeff Tollison, against the peace and dignity of the State.
H. A. O’Neal and O’Neal & Harvey, for appellant.
On question of insufficiency of indictment, LaCrosse Ry. Company v. Vanderpool, 11 Wis., 119; Truesdell v. Gay, 13 Gray, 311; State v. Livermore, 44 N. H., 311; Cowdrick v. Morris, 9 Pa. Co., 312.
W. A. Keeling, Attorney General and C. L. Stone, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.
On question of grand jury, Porter v. State, 160 S. W. Rep., 1194; Simms v. State, 45 id., 703; Moody v. State, 121 id., 1117.
On question of construction of statute, Landers v. State, 39 Texas Crim. Rep., 672.

Opinion:
LATTIMORE, Judge.
— The The original opinion was rendered on a misapprehension and is withdrawn. Appellant was convicted in the District Court of Cass County of the offense of blowing up a building by means of gunpowder or other explosive, and his punishment fixed at two years in-the penitentiary.
It is alleged in this indictment that said building was a dipping vat, same being a building not enclosed with walls and covered. Article 1214 of our Penal Code makes the wilful burning of a building which is not enclosed with walls or not covered, an offense which may be punished by confinement in the penitentiary. Appellant moved to quash said indictment because it charged no offense against the laws.
Arson is defined by Article 1200 of our Penal Code, as the wilful burning of a house. The explosion of a house by the use of gunpowder, etc., is made arson by the terms of Article 1205, P. C., Chapter 1 of Title 17 of said Code deals with arson. Chapter 2 of said title deals with "other wilful burnings," and the first article of this latter chapter, Article 1213 P. C., is as follows: "The rules and definitions contained in the preceding chapter with respect to arson apply also to wilful burnings .under the provisions of this chapter, where they are not clearly inapplicable. "
Article 1214 next succeeding, is in part as follows: "Burning other buildings, hay, lumber, etc. — If any person shall wilfully bum any building not coming within the description of a house as defined in the preceding chapter, . he shall be punished by confinement in the penitentiary not less than two nor more than five years; or by fine not exceeding two thousand dollars."
Two questions here arise: Is the explosion of a building which lacks either walls or a roof, made punishable by Article 1214, supra, and, second, — is a dipping vat a building within the comprehension of said article? The first inquiry addresses itself to the indictment; the second, to the proof. Article 1205 of Chapter 1 of said title is as -follows: "The explosion of a house by means of gunpowder, or other explosive matter, comes within the meaning of arson."
This lays down a rule applicable to certain cases of explosion and states that if the subject of such, explosion be a house, i. e., a walled and roofed building or structure, the offense is arson. What if the exploded building have walls and no roof, — or vice versa? The answer seems plain by reference to Article 1213, supra, which in terms makes the rules and definitions laid down in Chapter 1 with reference to arson, apply to other wilful burnings, — as defined and punished under Chapter 2, unless "clearly inapplicable." The wilful burning of a building with walls and roof, is arson under Chapter. The wilful burning of a building which lacks either walls or roof, is "other wilful burning" under Chapter 2. One of said offenses is given a graver punishment than the other, but otherwise the only difference lies in the character of the building; ^therefore if it have walls and a roof, its explosion is arson, but if it lacks either walls or roof, its explosion would be "Other wilful burning." There seems to us no escape from this plain construction of Article 1213, supra, and so concluding we hold that the indictment charged an offense under Chapter 2 of said Title.
It was not necessary to allege that as a result of the explosion fire was communicated to the building. The law fixes the character of the offense committed when the allegation be that the house or other building be blown up by the use of gunpowder or other explosive, and this is true whether fire is communicated to the building or not. Landers v. State, 39 Texas Crim. Rep., 672. The fact that the building be denominated a dipping vat in the indictment, would not present ground for quashing same," it being clear that no house or building could have its character fixed by a name; nor would the fact that there is no such offense eo nomine as burning or blowing up a dipping vat, justify the quashing of said indictment.
The trial court told the jury in his charge that a dipping vat was a building within our statutes against wilful burning, but that same was not a house, and the exceptions to this charge together with the complaint of the insufficiency of the testimony, present for our consideration the second question above referred to.
The proof showed the dipping vat in question to have been built of cement furnished by the county, the work of erection being donated by citizens of the community in which same was located, and the vat being búilt on land belonging to a Mr. Tollison. Said vat was described in the testimony as being three or four feet wide, six or seven feet deep, and about twenty-seven feet long, the walls and floor being of concrete and sunk in the ground, the upper edge of the walls being near the surface of the soil, the exit end sloping to enable cattle to get out after being dipped. The structure had walls but no roof. Was it a building as contemplated by Article 1214, supra? In Yol. 6 of Cyc, pp. 115-116, appear many definitions of a building, among which we find: "A structure, an edifice, . . . designed for use in the position in which it is fixed, . . a fabric constructed, a thing built, a structure or edifice enclosing space within its walls." Many-other definitions will be found in Words & Phrases together with citation to many authorities. The material of which such structure is built is immaterial. That it is a structure less than a house, is evident. That it has walls but no roof, is beyond question. To be a building, or even a house, it need not be above ground, for a basement, a dugout having a dirt floor and roof, a cellar located underground, — have all been held to be houses within the statutes making entry of a house, burglary. The structure of the vat in question is such that it has walls and a floor of cement; space is enclosed by the walls; a wider space and a roof and same could be a house fit for human habitation. In our opinion said structure was beyond doubt a building within the meaning of that term in Article 1214, supra, and one whose explosion would be punishable thereunder. There was no controversy as to the structure of the vat, and the assumption of uncontroverted facts in the charge was not erroneous. If there had been conflicting testimony regarding the fact that said structure had walls and enclosed space and only lacked a roof, such assumption of fact might be erroneous.
There is complaint at the charge for telling the jury that if they believed said vat was then and there on premises in the possession of Jeff Tollison, occupied by Jeff Tollison, etc., they should find appellant guilty. No issue affecting the unlawful quality of the act of appellant, turned upon or was in any way affected by said charge. The land upon which said vat was located belonged to Tollison, and he had made no deed to Cass county therefor. Ordinarily in the absence of some written agreement to the contrary, any construction entering the soil becomes a part of the realty. The charge was not erroneous for its failure to submit to the jury the question of ownership in Cass county, or in Cass county and Tollison. Ownership of a burned building may be proved by oral testimony. Wylie v. State, 34 Texas Crim. Rep., 515; Hester v. State, 51 S. W. Rep., 932; Anderson v. State, 71 Texas Crim. Rep., 27, 159 S. W. Rep., 847. The ownership not having been alleged in appellant, the allegation thereof becomes of materiality .only for the purpose of identifying the property destroyed, and the courts will not submit issues involving title, unless the testimony makes it reasonably apparent that the allegation in this regard was misleading and one from which the accused was not put upon notice of the particular offense charged. Wylie v. State, supra.
Part of the descriptive averment in the indictment of the vat was, that it was "a building . . . not enclosed by walls and covered." Upon his construction of the testimony and asserting a variance between the proof and such allegation, an instructed verdict was asked, by appellant and also special charges upon this issue. Ap pellant is in error. "A building . . . enclosed by walls and covered," — must have both walls and a cover, and is a house under the law of arson. "A building . . . not enclosed by walls and covered" is a building which lacks either walls or a roof, and is, therefore, not a house, but is such building as is contemplated by article 1214, supra.
The confession of appellant that on the same night the vat in question was blown up, he blew up other dipping vats, was admissible as showing system, identity and intent, and the admission of such testimony was proper and was correctly restricted in the charge of the court. The refusal of a special charge restricting such testimony to the question only of intent presents no error.
Mr. Hardesty, who was bailiff for the grand jury, was permitted to be in the grand jury room and aid in the examination of certain witnesses. He was not consulted by any member of the grand jury with regard to the presentation of the bill of indictment, nor was he present during any discussion or deliberation of the grand jury with regard to finding same. A motion to quash the indictment based on the presence of Mr. Hardesty in the grand jury room as above stated, was properly overruled. We do not think the practice of having persons other than the grand jury and the State's attorney present in the grand jury room while witnesses are being questioned, is to be encouraged, but if such presence extend no further than during the questioning of a witness, and it is shown that no consultation or deliberation of the grand jury was had in the presence of said outsider, no error appears. Mr. Branch cites in Sec. 484 of his Annotated P. C. many authorities upon this proposition.
Complaint is made of the omission to instruct in the charge as to the meaning of the word "wilful". If from the case made by the proof there was any possible defensive issue referable to lack of wilfulness in the blowing up of the dipping vat in question, such omission might be serious, but we are forbidden by Article 743 of our Code of Criminal Procedure to reverse causes for errors in the charge unless same appear reasonably calculated to injure the rights of the accused or affect the fairness of his trial. The blowing up of this dipping vat resulted from no accident or mistake, and the record suggests no reason for same except that of objecting to its presence and use as a means of enforcing the law requiring the dipping of cattle in an effort to exterminate fever carrying ticks.
We have not discussed seriatim the special charges refused, nor all the bills of exception, but our opinion disposes of the contentions raised regarding each and all of them:
Binding no error in the record, the judgment will be affirmed.
Affirmed.