Case Name: J. Clyde DEAN v. HERCULES, INC.
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1975-05-21
Citations: 314 So. 2d 430
Docket Number: No. 10212
Parties: J. Clyde DEAN v. HERCULES, INC.
Judges: Before: SARTAIN, ELLIS, and BAR-NETTE, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 314
Pages: 430–440

Head Matter:
J. Clyde DEAN v. HERCULES, INC.
No. 10212.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
May 21, 1975.
Rehearing Denied June 30, 1975.
Writ Granted Sept. 19, 1975.
G. William Jarman, Baton Rouge, for appellant.
Paul G. Borron, III, Plaquemine, for ap-pellee.
Before: SARTAIN, ELLIS, and BAR-NETTE, JJ.

Opinion:
ELLIS, Judge.
This is a suit for property damage suffered by plaintiff J. Clyde Dean. Defendant is Hercules, Incorporated, which operates a chemical plant on property adjoining that owned by plaintiff. In his petition, plaintiff alleges his cause of action as follows :
III.
"During a time period in 1970 and/or 1971, the defendant's plant emitted certain chemical substances into the atmosphere which substances came onto and in contact with Petitioner's property upon which was situated an orchard of peach trees, a pecan orchard, moss-covered cypress trees and various other trees and fruit trees, all the property of the Petitioner herein.
IV.
"As a result of said contact by the chemicals emitted by defendant, the peach orchard was completely destroyed, the moss was killed in the cypress trees, the pecan orchard did not yield properly and other fruit trees were adversely affected.
VIII.
"Said damage is of a continuing nature in that Petitioner would have to remove all of the dead trees from the orchard in order to replant, and, further the area may still be affected by the chemicals emitted in such a manner as to make replanting impractical or impossible."
Defendant filed a peremptory exception of the prescription of one year, based on the allegations of Article III of the petition and the fact that plaintiffs suit was filed on April 1, 1974, more than one year after the damage allegedly took place. After a hearing, the exception was sustained, and plaintiff's suit dismissed. From the judgment of dismissal, plaintiff has appealed.
Plaintiff's cause of action is based on Article 667 of the Civil Code, which provides :
"Although a proprietor may do with his estate whatever he pleases, still he can not make any work on it, which may deprive his neighbor of the liberty of enjoying his own, or which may be the cause of any damage to him."
Under our system of fact pleading it is ordinarily not necessary for a party to characterize his cause of action or state the theory of his case. He is entitled to relief under any theory of law which may be justified under the relevant facts properly proven at trial. Articles 862, 2164, Code of Civil Procedure; Gray & Company, Inc. v. Ranger Insurance Company, 292 So.2d 829 (La.App.1st Cir. 1974).
In this case, however, defendant claims that plaintiff's cause of action is delictual in nature, and therefore subject to the prescription of one year under Article 3536 of the Civil Code. It is argued that a breach of the duty imposed by Article 667 constitutes fault under Article 2315, which deals with liability for offenses.
Plaintiff takes the position that an action under Article 667 is something other than delictual in nature, and prescribes in ten years under Article 3544 of the Civil Code.
Both this court and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal have held that an action for damages under Article 667 is delictual in nature and prescribes in one year. Gulf Insurance Company v. Employers Liability Assur. Corp., 170 So.2d 125 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1964); Union Federal Savings and Loan v. 451 Florida Corp., 256 So.2d 356 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1971).
In other cases, not concerned with the applicable prescriptive period, the cause of action has been called "neither ex contrac-tu nor ex delicto" and "not one in tort." Klein v. Dept. of Highways, 175 So.2d 454 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1965); Burke v. Besthoff Realty Co., 196 So.2d 293 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1967).
In Craig v. Montelepre Realty Co., 252 La. 502, 211 So.2d 627, 631 (1968), the Supreme Court said:
"Recent jurisprudence indicates that the courts have vacillated in their determinations as to whether a cause of action under LSA-C.C. Article 667 is ex contrac-tu or ex delicto. Such designation has a direct effect on the application of prescription to the facts of the case. Our findings infra make it unnecessary for us to pass on the question in this opinion."
In a concurring opinion in the same case, two of the justices expressed the opinion that the cause of action is one in quasi contract under Article 2292 of the Civil Code, and prescribes in ten years.
We further note, however, that in the majority opinion in Langlois v. Allied Chemical Corp., 258 La. 1067, 249 So.2d 133, 139 (1971), it was said:
"As recently as 1968 in Craig v. Montelepre Realty Co., 252 La. 502, 211 So.2d 627, this court allowed recovery for damage from pile driving. Although the court there applied Article 667, it specifically decided the action arose ex delicto and was prescribed by one year."
See also Hero Lands Company v. Texaco, Inc., 310 So.2d 93 (La.1975); Giardina v. Marrero Furniture Company, Inc., 310 S.2d 607 (La.1975).
Doctrinal writers in Louisiana have also differed as to the characterization of an action for damages under Article 667. See Stone, Tort Doctrine in Louisiana: The Obligations of Neighborhood, 40 Tul. L.Rev. 701, 708 (1966); Malone, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts, 1969-70; Torts, 31 La.L.Rev. 231 (1971); Yiannopoulos, Civil Responsibility in the Framework of Vicinage: Articles 667-69 and 2315 of the Civil Code, 48 Tul.L.Rev. 195 (1974); Dainow, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1965-66 Term, 26 La.L.Rev. 459, 538 (1966).
The nature of the obligation breached determines the applicable prescriptive period. Article 3531, Civil Code. In order to place the cause of action here presented in its proper place, it is necessary to examine the general principles pertaining to Obligations in the Civil Code, since offenses, quasi offenses, contracts, and quasi contracts all fall within this general area. In the general articles relating to Obligations, in Book III, Title III of the Civil Code, we find the following:
"Art. 1756. An obligation is, in its general and most extensive sense, synonymous with duty.
"Art. 1757. Obligations are of three kinds: imperfect obligations, natural obligations, and civil or perfect obligations.
"1. If the duty created by the obligation operates only on the moral sense, without being enforced by any positive law, it is called an imperfect obligation, and creates no right of action, nor has it any legal operation. The duty of exercising gratitude, charity and the other merely moral duties, is an example of this kind of obligation.
"2. A natural obligation is one which can not be enforced by action, but which is binding on the party who makes it, in conscience and according to natural justice.
"3. A civil obligation is a legal tie, which gives the party, with whom it is contracted, the right of enforcing its performance by law.
"Art. 1760. Civil obligations, in relation to their origin, are of two kinds:
"1. Such as are created by the operation of law.
"2. Such as arise from the consent of the parties who- are bound by them, which are called contracts or conventional obligations.
"Each of these divisions will form the subject of a separate title."
In the Civil Code of 1870, Article 2292, which is the general article of Title V, reads as follows:
"Certain obligations are contracted without any agreement, either on the part of the person bound or of him in whose favor the obligation takes place.
"Some are imposed by the sole authority of the laws, others from an act done by the party obliged, or in his favor.
"The first are such engagements as result from tutorship, curatorship, neighborhood, common property, the acquisition of an inheritance, and other cases of a like nature.
"The obligations, which arise from a fact, personal to him who is bound, or relative to him, result either from quasi contracts, or iron offenses and quasi-offenses."
The last paragraph of the foregoing article in the original French version, found in Article 2271 of the Code of 1825, reads as follows:
"Les engagemens, qui naissent d'un fait personnel á celui qui se trouve obligé, ou relatif á lui, résultent ou des quasi-contracts, ou des délits et quasi-délits."
The word "fait" would today be better translated as "act" rather than "fact." At the time of the drafting of the 1808 and 1825 Codes, "fact" and "act" were virtually synonymous. See Webster, A Compendious Dictionary of the English Language, Sidney's Press, New Haven,' 1806, in-which "fact" is defined as "an act, action, deed, reality, truth, product." The suggested translation would be consistent with the translation of "fait" as "act" in the second paragraph of Article 2292. The said paragraph should now read:
"The obligations, which arise from an act, personal to him who is bound, or relative to him, result either from quasi contracts, or from offenses and quasi-offenses."
It is apparent from the foregoing code articles that the law recognizes two major types of civil obligations: those arising from the consent of the parties, and those arising by operation of law, without an exercise of the will of the party bound.
The latter class of civil obligations is further subdivided by Article 2292 into (1) those "imposed by the sole authority of the laws" and (2) those resulting "from an act done by the party obliged, or in his favor." The first of these, "imposed by the sole authority of the laws," are those obligations or duties which devolve upon one by virtue of some status which he enjoys, which obligations are usually delineated by'*' the law. The article mentions tutorship, curatorship, neighborhood, common property and inheritance as examples of conditions which impose and define such obligations. The second class of civil obligations arising by operation of law includes those which result from an act by virtue of which a party becomes personally bound, regardless of his will or of any particular legal status. It seems clear that only this second class of civil obligations created by operation of law is included within the classification of offenses and quasi offenses (arising from an act done by the party bound) and quasi contracts (arising from an act done in his favor). ,
It is equally apparent that a civil obligation "imposed by the sole authority of the law" does not fall within the category of offenses and quasi offenses. The obligations arising under Article 667 result from neighborhood and from status as a proprietor. These obligations do not necessarily arise from delictual behavior, from conventional obligations, nor quasi contract, but rather from a duty imposed by, law on all persons enjoying that status. An action for the breach of such an obligation prescribes in ten years under Article 3544 of the Civil Code.
It is true that the breach of an obligation imposed by Article 667 could also constitute an offense under Article 2315, and the plaintiff may pursue his remedy under either theory or both. If it be necessary to elect a theory in order to escape the consequences of prescription, plaintiff may elect the theory more favorable to him in that respect. See Gray & Company, Inc. v. Ranger Insurance Company, supra.
We are of the opinion that an action for damages for breach of an obligation arising under Article 667 of the Civil Code is not delictual in nature, and is not subject to the prescriptive period of one year under Article 3536 of the Civil Code. We think such an action prescribes in ten years under Article 3544 of the Civil Code, and reverse our holding to the contrary in Union Federal Savings and Loan v. 451 Florida Corp., supra.
The judgment appealed from is therefore reversed and set aside, and the case' remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with law. Defendant is to pay all costs of this appeal. Assessment of other costs shall await the final disposition of the case on its merit.
Reversed and remanded.