Case Name: The NATURAL PARENTS OF J.B., Petitioners, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, etc., Respondent
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2001-02-22
Citations: 780 So. 2d 6
Docket Number: No. SC96171
Parties: The NATURAL PARENTS OF J.B., Petitioners, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, etc., Respondent.
Judges: WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING and LEWIS, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 780
Pages: 6–17

Head Matter:
The NATURAL PARENTS OF J.B., Petitioners, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, etc., Respondent.
No. SC96171.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Feb. 22, 2001.
Bruce Rogow and Beverly A. Pohl of Bruce S. Rogow, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Petitioners.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Charles M. Fahlbusch, Assistant Attorney General, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Respondent.

Opinion:
QUINCE, J.
We have for review a decision on the following question certified by the Fourth District Court of Appeal to be of great public importance:
IS SECTION 39.467(4), NOW SECTION 39.809(4), FLORIDA STATUTES (SUPP.1998), REQUIRING A MANDATORY CLOSURE OF ALL HEARINGS IN TPR PROCEEDINGS VALID UNDER THE UNITED STATES AND FLORIDA CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS RESPECTING ACCESS OF THE PUBLIC AND MEDIA TO JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS?
Department of Children & Family Services v. Natural Parents of J.B., 736 So.2d 111 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.
For the reasons expressed in this opinion, we conclude that section 39.467(4), Florida Statutes (1997), now section 39.809(4), Florida Statutes (2000), requiring mandatory closure of all hearings in termination of parental rights (TPR) proceedings is valid under the United States and Florida constitutional provisions respecting access of the public and media to judicial proceedings. Accordingly, we answer the certified question in the affirmative.
FACTS
The Department of Children and Family Services initially brought an action seeking a declaration that J.B., a minor child, was dependent and in need of care. The State alleged that the mother of the child suffers from Munchausen by Proxy Syndrome and intentionally caused her minor child to become so ill that she required numerous hospitalizations. Under section 39.507, Florida Statutes (1999), the adjudicatory hearing on a State's petition for dependency is required to be open to the public unless the judge orders the hearing closed upon determining that the public interest or the welfare of the child is best served by so doing. The parents moved to close the dependency proceedings and to enjoin all concerned from releasing information about the proceeding to anyone, arguing that it was against the child's best interests to be exposed to the press and media. The parents also filed a motion to impose a "gag" order to prohibit the release of any information. The tidal court eventually denied the motions but without prejudice to the parents to move to close any further proceedings.
At some point, the State moved to permanently terminate parental rights. Because the character of the proceedings changed to a TPR proceeding, the'requirements of section 39.467, Florida Statutes (1997), became controlling. This statute provides in part: "All hearings involving termination of parental rights are confidential and closed to the public." The parents then changed their position and alleged that the. mandatory closure required by the TPR statute is unconstitutional and violates the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. They allege here that the statute violates both the United States and Florida Constitutions.
The trial court declared section 39.467(4) facially overbroad and unconstitutional. The trial court reasoned that TPR proceedings should be treated like criminal prosecutions since the parents in a TPR proceeding face grave consequences. The trial court noted that the dependency proceedings were open as required by the dependency statute, and there had already been extensive media coverage.
The State filed a petition for certiorari, and the Fourth District quashed the trial court's order. The Fourth District began its analysis with the following "well-worn principles of constitutional adjudication":
Statutes are presumed to be valid and not unconstitutional. Courts are required to concede every presumption in favor of the validity of a statute. One who challenges the constitutionality of a statute has the burden of demonstrating its invalidity. Only a clear and demonstrated usurpation of power will authorize judicial interference with legislative action. It is therefore the duty of an appellate court to uphold the validity of a statute in all cases where that result can be lawfully reached.
Department of Children & Family Services v. Natural Parents of J.B., 736 So.2d at 113-14 (citations omitted). With those initial guidelines, the Fourth District held that the parents failed to meet their heavy burden of demonstrating the invalidity of this statutory provision. The Fourth District focused primarily on the Sixth Amendment and rejected the trial court and parents' criminal model for TPR proceedings. In so doing, the Fourth District refused to extend Sixth Amendment rights of the criminally accused, including the right to a public trial, to parents in TPR proceedings. The Fourth District added further that the Legislature has set the public policy of the state by including the mandatory closure language in the statute, that mandatory closure of TPR proceedings is consistent with other proceedings involving juveniles, and that mandatory closure falls within the exceptions to the general policy of openness enunciated in Barron v. Florida Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 531 So.2d 113 (Fla.1988). We agree with the decision and rationale of the Fourth District.
Closed Court Presumption in Juvenile Proceedings •
Petitioners advocate that a presumption of openness should be extended to TPR proceedings which, they argue, can only be overcome if the court determines on a case-by-case basis that the best interest of the child outweighs the public's right of access to the proceedings and that any such order of closure should be narrowly tailored to that end. "[I]n determining whether a particular proceeding is presumptively open, the Court examines whether the place and process have historically been open to the press and public and whether public access plays a significant role in the functioning of the process." In re N.H.B. 769 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah Ct.App.1989) (citing Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 106 S.Ct. 2735, 92 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986)). Petitioners present the lengthy history and rationale of the open court presumption in criminal cases. We agree with petitioners that criminal matters are traditionally open proceedings. However, we do not agree that the presumption of openness in criminal proceedings is or should be extended to juvenile proceedings.
The foundation of the juvenile system is to " 'preserv[e] and promot[e] the welfare of the child,' which makes a juvenile proceeding fundamentally different from an adult criminal trial." Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263, 104 S.Ct. 2403, 81 L.Ed.2d 207 (1984) (citation omitted). Although juvenile proceedings are civil proceedings, Ostrum v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services, 663 So.2d 1359 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995), and although the presumption of openness has generally been extended to civil proceedings, juvenile proceedings have historically been closed to the public in furtherance of the overriding interest in, among other things, protecting the child from stigma, publicity, and embarrassment and promoting rehabilitation.
It is a hallmark of our juvenile justice system in the United States that virtually from its inception at the end of the last century its proceedings have been conducted outside of the public's full gaze and the youths brought before our juvenile courts have been shielded from publicity. See H. Lou, Juvenile Courts in the United States 131-133 (1927); Geis, Publicity and Juvenile Court Proceedings, 30 Rocky MtL.Rev. 101, 102, 116 (1958).
Smith v. Daily Mail Pub. Co., 443 U.S. 97, 107, 99 S.Ct. 2667, 61 L.Ed.2d 399 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). All fifty states have some form of shield law to limit public access to proceedings involving juveniles. Id. at 99, 99 S.Ct. 2667. We have found no case that holds that the presumption of openness is a constitutional requirement in the context of juvenile proceedings. Indeed, the history of the juvenile justice system indicates the contrary, that it is in the best interest of the child to protect the child from publicity in certain proceedings and that this protection outweighs the public's right to access. We do not agree with petitioners that in TPR proceedings a presumption of openness is constitutionally required. A presumption that juvenile proceedings be closed to the public is consistent with the history and tradition of the juvenile justice system and furthers the sound and practical purposes of that system.
Mandatory Closure
Petitioners argue that closing court proceedings to the public is constitutional only if there is a compelling government interest to do so and only if closure is narrowly tailored to further that interest. While petitioners do not dispute the compelling government interest in confidential juvenile proceedings, they do argue that mandatory or per se closure of juvenile proceedings is not narrowly tailored.
Only in those proceedings found to be presumptively open, however, is it necessary for the court to make specific findings "demonstrating that 'closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.' " Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 13-14, 106 S.Ct. 2735, 92 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986) (quoting Press-Enter prise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 510, 104 S.Ct. 819, 78 L.Ed.2d 629 (1984)). Thus, where there is no presumption of openness, there is no need for specific findings demonstrating that closure is essential and narrowly tailored. Because there is no presumption of openness in TPR proceedings, a mandatory closure requirement does not unconstitutionally limit the public's right of access to the proceedings. Thus, mandatory closure of proceedings that have no presumption of openness is constitutionally valid.
Petitioners rely heavily on Barron v. Florida Freedom Newspapers, 531 So.2d 113 (Fla.1988). In Barron, we held that there is a strong presumption of openness in both criminal and civil proceedings and we relied in part upon Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 n. 17, 100 S.Ct. 2814, 65 L.Ed.2d 973 (1980), wherein Chief Justice Burger stated: "[Hjistorically both civil and criminal trials have been presumptively open." As we do herein, in Barron we considered the history and tradition of open proceedings in the civil context. In so doing, we recognized certain exceptions to the presumption of openness in judicial proceedings. We set forth certain factors to be considered by courts before closing certain civil proceedings, and held that closure of certain proceedings should occur when necessary
(a) to comply with established public policy set forth in the constitution, statutes, rules or case law; (b) to protect trade secrets; (c) to protect a compelling governmental interest [e.g., national security; confidential informants]; (d) to obtain evidence to properly determine legal issues in a case; (e) to avoid substantial injury to innocent third parties [e.g., to protect young witnesses from offensive testimony; to protect children in a divorce]; or (f) to avoid substantial injury to a party by disclosure of matters protected by a common law or privacy right not generally inherent in the specific type of civil proceeding sought to be closed.
Barron, 531 So.2d at 118. Most importantly, however, in Barron, we recognized that the Florida Legislature expressly made certain proceedings confidential by statute as a matter of public policy, id. at 119, and we specifically excepted such proceedings from the presumption of openness. By the time this Court decided Barron in 1988, we had already upheld the constitutionality of the mandatory closure statute in adoption proceedings. In re Adoption of H.Y.T., 458 So.2d 1127 (Fla.1984). Our decision today is consistent with our decision in Barron. Approving the Fourth District and upholding the constitutionality of section 39.809(4) complies with established public policy set forth in the statutes and case law and is consistent with the historical and traditional presumption of closed juvenile proceedings.
TPR proceedings are not the only proceedings the Florida Legislature has required by statute to be closed as a matter of public policy. Adoptions (section 63.162, Florida Statutes (1999)), actions establishing parental status in situations of gestational surrogacy (section 742.16, Florida Statutes (1999)), and hearings for appointment of a guardian ad litem (section 29.827, Florida Statutes (1999)), are also required, to be closed proceedings. There are other situations where the court is given discretion to close the proceedings, such as in the case of paternity actions (section 742.031, Florida Statutes (1999)). As stated above, this Court upheld the constitutionality of mandatory closure for adoption proceedings in In re Adoption of H.Y.T.
In H.Y.T., the press, like the parents in this case, challenged the mandatory closure of adoption proceedings, arguing that the mandatory nature of the closure was overbroad and a violation of the First Amendment right to public access. We held that the best interest of the child and the public policy of protecting the parties' privacy in adoption proceedings outweighed the interest the public might have in having access to the proceedings. We further noted that in such proceedings, the court itself takes an interest in the case and serves to protect the best interest of the child. This is a departure from the court's typical disinterested position. The Second District followed the rationale of H.Y.T., when it declared a similar statute mandating the closure of certain dependency proceedings to be constitutional. See Mayer v. State, 523 So.2d 1171 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988).
Petitioners argue that adoptions differ from TPR proceedings because TPR proceedings are adversarial in nature whereas adoptions are not. While the parents in a TPR proceeding may perceive the dissolution of their parental rights as a sanction, the purpose of the TPR proceeding is not to punish the parents. The paramount concern of the Court and the Legislature is the health and safety of the child or children involved. See § 39.001(l)(b)l, Fla. Stat. (1999). Because of this overriding concern, the mandatory closure of certain proceedings involving children is not an unconstitutional limitation on First Amendment freedoms.
Consistency with Other StaUttes
Petitioners argue that the statute's intended purpose is undermined by the fact that there is no mandatory closure provision in the statute providing the procedure for adjudication of dependency actions. Petitioners argue that most TPR proceedings are initiated as dependency eases. If there is no closure order at the dependency phase, there may already have been significant publicity by the time TPR proceedings are instituted. Petitioners argue that the better view would be a presumptively open proceeding that is only closed after a particularized showing is made that such closure is justified. This argument was asserted in H.Y.T. We did not find this argument compelling then, and do not find this argument compelling now. We do not believe the Legislature intended that the child bear the burden of proving the need for confidentiality in TPR proceedings, which is why the Legislature removed the discretion from the court. As we held in H.Y.T., petitioners' argument "attempts to lay on the shoulders of the child the burden of proving a need for the protection the people of the state, through the legislature, have attempted to afford parties to an adoption." H.Y.T., 458 So.2d at 1129.
Inconsistent though the dependency and TPR statutes may be, neither is unconstitutional.
Where a statute does not violate the federal or state Constitution, the legislative will is supreme, and its policy is not subject to judicial review. The courts have no veto power, and do not assume to regulate state policy; but they recognize and enforce the policy of the law as expressed in valid enactments, and decline to enforce statutes only when to do so would violate organic law.
City of Jacksonville v. Bowden, 67 Fla. 181, 64 So. 769, 772 (1914).
Conclusion
We approve the decision of the Fourth District and answer the certified question in the affirmative. Section 39.467(4), now section 39.809(4), Florida Statutes (2000), requiring mandatory closure of all hearings in TPR proceedings, is valid under the United States and Florida constitutional provisions respecting access of the public and media to judicial proceedings. There is no constitutional requirement that juvenile proceedings be presumptively open to the public. The Legislature has validly declared that the public policy of the State requires the mandatory closure of TPR proceedings. Because there is no presumption of openness in juvenile proceedings, and because none is constitutionally required, there is no requirement that an order of closure be made only after a case-by-case determination. Petitioners have failed to meet their heavy burden to overcome the presumption in favor of the validity of the statute and have failed to demonstrate that the statute clearly and unconstitutionally usurps the public's x-ight of access to TPR proceedings.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING and LEWIS, JJ., concur.
ANSTEAD, J., dissents with an opinion, in which PARIENTE, J., concurs.
PARIENTE, J., dissents with an opinion, in which ANSTEAD, J., concurs.
. Section 39.507(2), Florida Statutes (1999), provides:
(2) All hearings, except as provided in this section, shall be open to the public, and a person may not be excluded except on special order of the judge, who may close any hearing to the public upon determining that the public interest or the welfare of the child is best served by so doing. The parents or legal custodians shall be allowed to obtain discovery pursuant to the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure, provided such discovery does not violate the provisions of s. 39.202. Hearings involving more than one child may be held simultaneously when the children involved are related to each other or were involved in the same case. The child and the parents, caregivers, or legal custodians of the child may be examined separately and apart from each other.
. See § 39.809(4), Fla. Stat. (2000).
. Section 39.809(4), Florida Statutes.(1999), provides:
(4) All hearings involving termination of parental rights are confidential and closed to the public. Hearings involving more than one child may be held simultaneously when the children involved are related to each other or were involved in the same case. The child and the parents may be examined separately and apart from each other.
."In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a . public trial...." U.S. Const, amend. VI. "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall, upon demand . have a . public trial_" Art. I, § 16(a), Fla. Const.
. This list is not exhaustive.