Case Name: Lewis RUFFIN a/k/a Buster Brown, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1989-09-28
Citations: 549 So. 2d 250
Docket Number: No. 88-1054
Parties: Lewis RUFFIN a/k/a Buster Brown, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: DANIEL, C.J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 549
Pages: 250–252

Head Matter:
Lewis RUFFIN a/k/a Buster Brown, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 88-1054.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Sept. 28, 1989.
James B. Gibson, Public Defender and Barbara L. Condon, Asst. Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee and Dee R. Ball, Asst. Atty. Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee.

Opinion:
COBB, Judge.
The appellant, Lewis Ruffin, appeals his convictions for possession and sale of cocaine.
On October 21, 1987, a special police task force in the Sanford area engaged in controlled purchases of alleged cocaine. Paul James, a plain-clothes police officer, purchased from a "black male" two pieces of a rock-like substance represented to be cocaine. Thereafter, the man walked away. A video and audio machine recorded the transaction. James recalled that the man wore an orange hat, blue jeans, and a green shirt with white trim.
Immediately after the transaction, James drove his unmarked vehicle to meet with the support team, which tested the substance and determined that it was, in fact, cocaine. Thereafter, two officers (Walth-ers and Barnes) returned to the area where the transaction occurred and encountered Ruffin, who identified himself as "Buster Brown." Ruffin was not arrested at that time. Ruffin was arrested approximately one month later on an unrelated charge, and was ultimately identified as the seller of the cocaine to James.
At trial, Ruffin's defense was that he was not the same man as the one shown on the video selling cocaine to James. James testified that Ruffin was the man who sold him the cocaine.
The problem on appeal is that both Walthers and Barnes, as well as a third officer named Dubose, were allowed to testify, over objection, that in their opinion Ruffin was the man in the videotape. This was an invasion of the province of the jury. When factual determinations are within the realm of an ordinary juror's knowledge and experience, such determinations and the conclusions to be drawn therefrom must be made by the jury. See McGough v. State, 302 So.2d 751, 755 (Fla. 1974). Walthers, Barnes, and Dubose were not eyewitnesses to the crime, they did not have any special familiarity with Ruffin, and they were not qualified as any type of experts in identification.
REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR NEW TRIAL.
DANIEL, C.J., concurs.
GOSHORN, J., dissents with opinion.
. Walthers and Barnes could have properly (1) testified to the fact that they encountered Ruffin in the area shortly after the drug transaction occurred and (2) described his dress and physical appearance at that time.