Case Name: JOANNE KNOTT HAMLIN (WHITT) v. JOSEPH JOHN HAMLIN III
Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
Jurisdiction: North Carolina
Decision Date: 1981-04-07
Citations: 302 N.C. 478
Docket Number: No 55
Parties: JOANNE KNOTT HAMLIN (WHITT) v. JOSEPH JOHN HAMLIN III
Judges: Justice HUSKINS joins in this dissent.
Reporter: North Carolina Reports
Volume: 302
Pages: 478–490

Head Matter:
JOANNE KNOTT HAMLIN (WHITT) v. JOSEPH JOHN HAMLIN III
No 55
(Filed 7 April 1981)
1. Divorce and Alimony § 25; Infants § 6— child custody and visitation hearing- — absence of father
While the trial court should ordinarily require the presence of both parents at a child custody and visitation hearing so that the court might better evaluate the character and fitness of each parent, the trial court in this particular case did not err in conducting a hearing on a motion to modify a child custody and visitation order without the presence of defendant father where defendant had been working in Alaska for several years and his job schedule was the reason for his absence at the hearing; the child was 14 years of age when the order appealed from was entered and nothing in the record suggested that he had any physical or mental disability; defendant’s present wife and his parents were present at the hearing; numerous hearings had been conducted with respect to the child’s custody and visitation since 1973; defendant was represented at the hearing by the same attorney who had represented him in this matter since 1974; and the attorney had a written power of attorney from defendant which authorized the attorney “to guarantee in my name and bind me to comply with the orders of the court, as fully and completely as if I were present in court.”
2. Rules of Civil Procedure § 7— sufficiency of motion — failure to state rule number
Defendant’s motion for modification of a child visitation order was sufficient to comply with the requirements of G.S. 1A-1, Rule 7(b)(1), and plaintiff was not prejudiced by failure of defendantto state the number of the rule under which he was proceeding as required by Rule 6 of the General Rules of Practice for the Superior and District Courts.
Justice Carlton dissenting.
Jutice Huskins joins in the dissent.
APPEAL by plaintiff from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming order of Gash, Judge, entered at the 11 July 1979 Session of Rutherford District Court.
This appeal is another chapter in the long controversy between the parties relating to visitation by their son, John, with defendant, his father. The history of the controversy is summarized as follows:
On 31 August 1973, Judge Matheney entered a judgment in an action brought by defendant herein against plaintiff herein seeking, among other things, custody of John. The court found extensive facts including findings that defendant father was living and working with his parents on a dairy farm in Rutherford County; that plaintiff mother was teaching school in Person County and living with her mother; that plaintiff and defendant were fit and suitable persons to have custody of John; that plaintiffs mother and other members of her family and defendant’s parents were all of good character and would have wholesome influences on J ohn; but that it would be in John’s best interests that his mother be granted primary custody. The court provided that the mother be awarded primary custody of the child but that the father be awarded temporary custody for three months during the summer. The judgment further provided that John might visit with his father every third weekend during the winter months and with his mother every third weekend during the summer months.
On 6 March 1974 plaintiff instituted this action seeking an absolute divorce from defendant on the ground of one-year’s separation. She alleged that the parties were married to each other on 5 December 1964 and that they had separated on 5 March 1973. She also asked for permanent custody of their son, Joseph John Hamlin IV, who was born on 15 September 1965.
Defendant answered, admitting that plaintiff was entitled to an absolute divorce, but counterclaimed with the request that he be awarded permanent custody of John.
On 1 May 1974, plaintiff was granted an absolute divorce by Judge Gash. At the 17 June 1974 session of the court, a hearing was held on plaintiff’s motion to modify the custody judgment which had been previously entered in the matter by Judge Matheney. In her motion plaintiff sought an award of full-time custody of John. At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Gash entered an order denying the motion on the ground that no showing had been made of a change in circumstances since the entry of the original judgment. In the same order, the judge denied plaintiff’s motion for a change of venue to Person County, concluding that the ends of justice would not be served by such an action. Judge Gash also ordered that an action which had been previously filed by defendant relating to custody be consolidated with the present action.
On 14 October 1977 the parties filed a document entitled “AGREEMENT AND STIPULATION TO AMENDMENT OF JUDGMENT”. The document recites that in the summer of 1975 defendant took John to Alaska where defendant was then living; that defendant did not give plaintiff any notice that he was taking John outside of the State of North Carolina; and that defendant had been indicted in Person County for violating the provisions of G.S. § 14-320.1. The parties then agreed that neither of them would thereafter take John outside of North Carolina without the consent of the other or without permission of the court.
At the 26 J une 1978 session of the court, Judge Gash conducted a hearing on motions by each party that Judge Matheney’s judgment be modified. Plaintiff asked that the judgment be modified so as to forbid defendant from taking John out of the state. Defendant asked that the judgment be modified so as to permit John to spend the summer months with him in Alaska where defendant, his new wife and their children were then residing. On 30 June 1978, following the hearing, Judge Gash entered an order in which he made findings of fact and concluded, among other things, that John should be allowed to visit defendant in Alaska for a period not to exceed 18 days, including travel time. The order further provided that defendant, his present wife and his parents were to execute a good and sufficient bond in the amount of $40,000 to assure John’s return to the custody of plaintiff following the visitation. The parties were unable to agree on the form of the bond, and on 15 August 1978 Judge Gash entered an order specifying its form. Defendant gave notice of appeal from the 30 June 1978 order and the 15 August 1978 order but failed to perfect the appeal.
On 29 June 1979 defendant filed a motion asking the court to permit his son, then age 14, to spend four weeks of the summer with defendant and his family in Alaska. On 11 July 1979 Judge Gash conducted a hearing on this motion. Thereafter, on 13 July 1979, he entered an order finding facts and concluding, among other things, that the best interests of John “would be served by making provision for visitation during the remainder of his minority to and with his father”. The order provided that John could visit defendant at his home in Alaska for periods not to exceed 45 days, including travel time, and that defendant would pay all costs of travel. The order further provided that defendant would post a bond in the amount of $40,000 to assure John’s return to the custody of plaintiff at the end of the 45-day periods. Judge Gash also approved a bond tendered by defendant and executed by defendant (by his attorney-in-fact), his wife and his parents. Security for the bond was an indenture on real estate belonging to defendant’s parents located in Rutherford County.
Plaintiff appealed from the 13 July 1979 order. On 2 September 1980 the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion (48 N.C. App. 630, 269 S.E.2d 327 [1980]) written by Judge Webb with Judge Hedrick concurring affirmed the order from which plaintiff appealed. Judge Wells dissented and plaintiff appealed to this court pursuant to G.S. § 7A-30(2).
Robert W. Wolf and James H. Burwell, Jr., attorneys for plaintiff appellant.
Hamrick and Hamrick, by J. Nat Hamrick, for defendant appellee.

Opinion:
BRITT, Justice.
Plaintiff contends the following issues are presented by this appeal:
1. The Court erred in the proceeding with the hearing of the defendant appellee's purported motion in the absence of the defendant and in the absence of adequate authorization from the defendant appellee for the defendant to be bound by the results of such hearings.
2. The Court erred in proceeding with the hearing on the purported motion and notice filed by the defendant for that said purported motion and notice fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 7 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, and also Rule 6 of General Rules of Practice for the Superior Court, supplemental to the Rules of Civil Procedure.
We find no merit in either contention.
Addressing plaintiff's first contention, we note initially that G.S. § 1-11 provides that "[a] party may appear either in person or by attorney in actions or proceedings in which he is represented." In
5 Am. Jur. 2d, Appearance, § 1, we find:
The term 'appearance' is used particularly to signify or designate the overt act by which one against whom suit has been commenced submits himself to the court's jurisdiction, although in a broader sense it embraces the act of either plaintiff or defendant in coming into court. Generally, however, it is used in former sense,....
The decisions of this court which interpret the quoted statute have dealt generally with the question of representation in court proceedings, whether by counsel or in propria persona. We have held that the right is alternative and that a party has no right to "appear" both by himself and by counsel. See New Hanover County v. Sidbury, 225 N.C. 679, 36 S.E.2d 242 (1945); McClamroch v. Colonial Ice Company, 217 N.C. 106,6 S.E.2d 850 (1940); Abernethy v. Burns, 206 N.C. 370, 173 S.E. 899 (1934).
Nevertheless, our research fails to disclose, and counsel has not cited, any statute, rule of court or decision which mandates the presence of a party to a civil action or proceeding at the trial of, or a hearing in connection with, the action or proceeding unless the party is specifically ordered to appear. Those who are familiar with the operation of our courts in North Carolina know that quite frequently a party to a civil action or proceeding does not appear at the trial or a hearing related to the action or proceeding. A proceeding involving the custody of a child is in the nature of a civil action. See G.S. § 50-13.5 (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1979).
In the case at hand, plaintiff argues that she was deprived of the right to call defendant as an adverse witness and cross-examine him. If plaintiff desired to call defendant as a witness she should have had a subpoena issued for him or asked for an order of the court requiring him to be present. The record does not disclose that plaintiff advised the court that she wished to call defendant as a witness. In fact, it appears in the record that at the 11 July 1979 hearing "counsel for both parties stipulated that the evidence had not changed from the evidence offered at the hearing held on June 30, 1978, and that the Court should use its recollection of the evidence then offered, except that during the proceedings, it was stipulated that the defendant appellee no longer owned a residence in the State of Alaska."
Plaintiff also suggests that since defendant was not at the hearing, he might not be bound by the action of the court. We reject this suggestion for two reasons.
The first reason is that the record reveals that Mr. J. Nat Hamrick and his firm have represented defendant continuously since 1974 when they filed an answer duly verified by defendant. It is well-settled in North Carolina that counsel employed to conduct litigation has complete authority over the action, all that is incident to it, and all other matters which properly pertain to the action. Better Home Furniture Co. v. Baron, 243 N.C. 502, 91 S.E.2d 236 (1956); Coker v. Coker, 224 N.C. 450, 31 S.E.2d 364(1944); Harrington v. Buchanan, 222 N.C. 698, 24 S.E.2d 534 (1943).
The second reason is that Mr. Hamrick had a written power of attorney from defendant providing as follows:
I hereby nominate J. NAT HAMRICK my attorney as attorney-in-fact for me to execute any and all undertakings, bonds, agreements, covenants to judgment and any other papers written with regard to the hearing on the custody and visitation of my son, Joseph John Hamlin IV, and to guarantee in my name and bind me to comply with the orders of the court, as fully and completely as if I were present in court.
The power of attorney specifically authorizes Mr. Hamrick, among other things, "to guarantee in my name and bind me to comply with the orders of the court, as fully and completely as if I were present in court". The authority granted by a power of attorney will be presumed to continue in the absence of anything showing a revocation of that authority. See Morris Plan Industrial Bank v. Howell, 200 N.C. 637, 158 S.E. 203 (1931).
Our decision today should not be interpreted as a precedent that hearings relating to the custody of children, and their visits with their respective parents, should ordinarily be heard when one of the parents is not present, even though the absent parent appears through a duly authorized attorney. Except in unusual cases, both parents should be present at these hearings, to the end that the trial judge might better evaluate the character and fitness of each parent.
In view of the unusual facts in the case subjudice, we think the trial judge was justified in hearing the motion in question without the presence of defendant father. John was 14 years of age when the order appealed from was entered; he will be 16 in September of this year and nothing in the record suggests that he has any physical or mental disability. The record indicates that defendant has been working in Alaska for several years and that his job schedule was the reason for his absence at the hearing. Defendant's present wife and his parents, John's grandparents, were present at the hearing. Furthermore, it appears that numerous hearings had been conducted with respect to John's custody and his visits since the first hearing in 1973, some of which were attended by defendant. Judge Gash's order dated 30 June 1978 (also relating to visitation privileges) recites that the hearing was conducted at that time without defendant being present by agreement of the parties.
The procedure which was employed by Judge Gash is acceptable when applied to the facts of the present case. However, it would be unacceptable if it were applied as a matter of general practice. In those instances where the court is dealing with matters which affect children of tender years or children with special problems, or when compelling circumstances do not otherwise dictate, the presiding judge should require the presence of both parents so that the court is in the position to gauge what disposition is in the best interest of the child.
With respect to the second question raised by plaintiff, she argues that defendant's "motion" filed on 29 June 1979 should have been dismissed by the trial court for failure to comply with Rule 7(b)(1) of our Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 6 of the General Rules of Practice for the Superior and District Courts.
G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 7(b)(1) provides:
An application to the court for an order shall be by motion which, unless made during a hearing or trial or at a session at which a cause is on the calendar for that session, shall be made in writing, shall state the grounds therefor, and shall set forth the relief or order sought. The requirement of writing is fulfilled if the motion is stated in a written notice of the hearing of the motion.
Rule 6 of the General Rules of Practice provides in pertinent part that "[a]ll motions, written or oral, shall state the rule number or numbers under which the movant is proceeding. (See Rule 7 of Rules of Civil Procedure.)"
While defendant's motion is inartfully drawn, we agree with the Court of Appeals that it is clear from reading the motion that defendant was asking the court to modify its previous order with respect to John visiting his father during the summer. He gave as his reason a change in circumstances in that defendant had moved to and was working in Alaska. Defendant alleged that he had supported John continuously since the parties separated; that plaintiff not only did not want defendant to see his son but she would not allow John to talk with him on the telephone without her being present.
As to plaintiff's argument that defendant did not comply with Rule 6 of the General Rules of Practice in that he did not state the number of the Rule of Civil Procedure under which he was proceeding, we can perceive no prejudice plaintiff suffered by this omission. See City of Durham v. Lyckan Development Corp., 26 N.C. App. 210, 215 S.E.2d 814, cert. denied, 288 N.C. 239, 217 S.E.2d 678 (1975). The philosophy of the General Rules of Practice for the Superior and District Courts is stated in Rule 1 thusly: "They (the Rules) shall at all times be construed and enforced in such manner as to avoid technical delay and to permit just and prompt consideration and determination of all the business before them."
Since the written motion filed by defendant fully informed plaintiff of the relief he was seeking and his reasons therefor, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying plaintiff's motion to dismiss defendant's motion for failure to comply with the rules of court.
We can appreciate the substantial responsibility placed on district court judges in providing for custody of children. G.S. § 50-13.2(c) clearly authorizes the court to enter an order providing for the child to be taken outside of the state; however, if the order contemplates the return of the child to this state, the judge may require the person having custody out of this state to give bond or other security conditioned upon the return of the child to this state in accordance with the order of the court. Judge Gash exercised his option under this statute.
Since the trial judge has the opportunity to see and hear the parties and the witnesses, he is vested with broad discretion in cases involving custody of children. E.g., Blackley v. Blackley, 285 N.C. 358, 204 S.E.2d 678 (1974); see also Paschall v. Paschall, 21 N.C. App. 120, 203 S.E.2d 337 (1974); In Re Custody of Stancil, 10 N.C. App. 545, 179 S.E.2d 844 (1971). We perceive no abuse of discretion in this case. Unless the contrary appears, it is presumed that judicial acts and duties have been duly and regularly performed. Lovett v. Stone, 239 N.C. 206, 79 S.E.2d 479 (1954); Henderson County v. Johnson, 230 N.C. 723, 55 S.E.2d 502 (1949).
For the reasons stated, the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the order appealed from is
Affirmed.