Case Name: Gerald SIMPSON, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of His Minor Son, David S. Simpson, and Sally Prine Simpson, v. STATE of Louisiana Through the DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT; Troy LOFTON, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of His Minor Son, Troy Lofton, Jr. v. The STATE of Louisiana Through the DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT and Gerald Simpson, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of His Minor Son, David S. Simpson, and Champion Insurance Company; Patricia MILTON, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Her Minor Son, Robert Marc Huber v. STATE of Louisiana Through the DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT and Gerald Simpson, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of His Minor Son, David S. Simpson
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1993-12-07
Citations: 636 So. 2d 608
Docket Number: Nos. 92 CA 0115 to 92 CA 0117
Parties: Gerald SIMPSON, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of His Minor Son, David S. Simpson, and Sally Prine Simpson, v. STATE of Louisiana Through the DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT. Troy LOFTON, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of His Minor Son, Troy Lofton, Jr. v. The STATE of Louisiana Through the DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT and Gerald Simpson, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of His Minor Son, David S. Simpson, and Champion Insurance Company. Patricia MILTON, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Her Minor Son, Robert Marc Huber v. STATE of Louisiana Through the DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT and Gerald Simpson, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of His Minor Son, David S. Simpson.
Judges: Before WATKINS, CRAIN, GONZALES, WHIPPLE and PITCHER, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 636
Pages: 608–627

Head Matter:
Gerald SIMPSON, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of His Minor Son, David S. Simpson, and Sally Prine Simpson, v. STATE of Louisiana Through the DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT. Troy LOFTON, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of His Minor Son, Troy Lofton, Jr. v. The STATE of Louisiana Through the DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT and Gerald Simpson, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of His Minor Son, David S. Simpson, and Champion Insurance Company. Patricia MILTON, Individually and as Administratrix of the Estate of Her Minor Son, Robert Marc Huber v. STATE of Louisiana Through the DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT and Gerald Simpson, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of His Minor Son, David S. Simpson.
Nos. 92 CA 0115 to 92 CA 0117.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.
Dec. 7, 1993.
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Gonzales Jan. 20, 1994.
Opinion Granting Rehearings in Part, Denying Rehearings in Part March 21, 1994.
Writ Denied May 6, 1994.
Walter Landry Smith, Baton Rouge, Robert Carter, Greensburg, for Gerald Simpson.
William Quinn, Kentwood, for Patricia Milton.
Curtis K. Stafford, Jr., Baton Rouge, for Troy Lofton.
Randall Cashio, Baton Rouge, for State of La. Dept, of Transp. & Development.
T. Jay Seale, Hammond, AL, C.T. Williams, Metairie, for State of La.
Before WATKINS, CRAIN, GONZALES, WHIPPLE and PITCHER, JJ.

Opinion:
CRAIN, Judge.
This appeal stems from a tragic accident that occurred on May 23, 1987, on La. Hwy. 1054, which is a rural road in Tangipahoa Parish, Louisiana. Three boys received substantial injuries when the pickup truck in which they were riding went out of control and hit the railing of a trestle bridge under the "garde" of the State of Louisiana, Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD).
The driver was 15-year-old David Simpson; he was a irrelatively inexperienced driver, who had been driving for only six months and who had driven a truck only one time before the day of the accident. David Simpson was driving a pickup truck purchased by his father the day before the accident. The windshield wipers did not work, and both rear tires were bald.
Two 16-year-old Mends were guest passengers in the pickup truck; they were Troy Lofton, Jr., seated in the middle, and Robert Marc Huber, seated on the passenger side. The Simpsons lived on McElveen Road, a roadway that intersects with La. Hwy. 1054, and the boys had been to the residence a short while before the accident.
Although it had rained earlier that day, it was during a sudden, downpouring rain, according to the trial court's findings, that the Simpson truck approached the small stream crossed by the bridge. David Simpson braked the truck and it fishtailed, sliding at an angle perpendicular to the road. The driver's side of the cab was forward, and it struck the bridge railing at a ninety degree angle. The metal railing for almost the entire length of the bridge entered the driver's door, went completely through the cab, and exited the other side.
The record reveals that the timber trestle bridge involved in the instant case was erected by the State of Louisiana in 1956. Some time during the 1960s, the metal siderails consisting of deep beam "W" metal were attached. The ends of the railings were fitted with smaller pieces of the same metal, welded at 45-degree angles (referred to as "wing rails") that pointed toward the highway shoulders immediately in front of the bridge.
jjBy the date of the accident, May 23,1987, the bridge in question had been damaged by previous hits. At the northeast corner previously struck by vehicles, the outer piece of the welded joint had been knocked off, leaving the first two vertical wooden posts exposed, as well as exposing the sharp end of the metal railing. The bare rail end faced the direction of travel, approximately 12 feet from the middle of the roadway.
DOTD's bridge inspector Frank Legoria testified that the 1983 inspection report indicated the "wings" needed to be welded. The same report contained a recommendation that the bridge be rehabilitated. The department's inspection report for May 9,1984, stated that several bridge rail posts were decayed and needed replacing. Then, there were no reports for three years. But on May 11, 1987, just 16 days before the accident, an inspection report, with photographs, illustrated that the "wings" had never been repaired. The northeast corner was photographed, showing the bare vertical posts and the capless, horizontal metal railing pointing toward approaching traffic. It was this cap-less metal railing that penetrated the driver's door of the Simpson pickup truck and exited the other side for a considerable distance.
DOTD's duty to maintain all highways in the state system includes a duty to maintain reasonably safe roadways and shoulders. The duty is owed to those people who may drive onto the shoulder inadvertently, having no knowledge or reason to know of the defective condition that would make travel on the shoulder hazardous. Lang v. Prince, 447 So.2d 1112 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writs denied, 450 So.2d 1309 and 1311 (La.1984). Whether or not a condition of a highway is a dangerous and hazardous one is a factual determination. Dagnall v. Louisiana Department of Highways, 426 So.2d 276 (La.App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 433 So.2d 160 (La.1983).
In the instant case the trial court found that DOTD was negligent for not repairing the bridge and not eliminating an unreasonably dangerous condition, and that the defective bridge ucaused the injuries. The trial court found that there was no negligence on the part of the driver or his passengers.
Although we cannot agree with the trial court that the driver was without substantial fault that contributed to the injuries, we do not find that the trial court committed manifest error in deciding that DOTD was liable. Whether we decide that DOTD was strictly liable for the defect or that DOTD was negligent in failing to make repairs is immaterial, as liability attaches because DOTD breached its duty to the injured parties. See Buchanan v. Tangipahoa Parish Police Jury, 426 So.2d 720 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1983). The instant case is similar to the recent case of Rick v. State through Department of Transportation and Development, 619 So.2d 1149 (La.App. 1st Cir.1993), wherein we held that DOTD had assumed the responsibility to upgrade a railroad crossing, and its failure to do so within a reasonable time constituted a breach of duty to sign the crossing. Likewise, in the instant case DOTD recognized its duty to repair the damaged bridge as early as 1983, but the repairs were not made until after the 1987 accident.
Nevertheless, DOTD argues on appeal that its liability is barred because the condition of the bridge, however defective, was not the cause of the driver's losing control of his vehicle. We | sfind such an analysis of causation questionable. This case involved one, and only one, unfortunate event — a collision of the truck with the bridge — and the actions of the driver and the inaction of DOTD combined to cause the event. See Efferson v. State through Department of Transportation and Development, 463 So.2d 1342 (La.App. 1st Cir.1984), writ denied, 465 So.2d 722 (La.1985). Any other analysis, including the no-cause analysis urged by DOTD, is unwarranted and contrary to the concepts of comparative fault which we must apply.
Indeed, DOTD's argument in the instant case is similar to the no-duty analysis urged by the defendants and rejected by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Socorro v. City of New Orleans, 579 So.2d 931, 941 (La.1991), and Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc., 521 So.2d 1123 (La.1988). In two diving accident cases, the court expressly disapproved the no-duty argument which the defendants fell back upon after having failed to prevail on an assumed risk argument. The court explained that the defendant's duty is not to be defined in terms of the plaintiffs conduct:
Defendants suggest that . they should not be liable because they had no duty to protect the decedent from a danger of which he had knowledge. In essence, defendants contend here that they were not negligent because the plaintiff voluntarily encountered the risk- If accepted, defendants' argument would inject the assumption of risk doctrine into duty/risk analysis 'through the back door.' By that, we mean that the argument attempts to define the defendant's initial duty in terms of the plaintiffs actual knowledge, and thereby seeks to achieve the same result which would be reached if assumption of risk were retained as a defense, i.e., a total bar to the plaintiffs recovery. (Emphasis in original.)
Murray, 521 So.2d at 1135-36.
Likewise, in the instant case, DOTD attempts to define causation solely by plaintiffs action, without consideration of the simultaneous causation stemming from defendant's inaction. DOTD seeks to achieve the same result that would be reached if contributory negligence were still a bar to recovery of damages under Louisiana law.
It would be incongruous for us to divide causation | (¡between plaintiffs action and DOTD's inaction in a one-event case, such as the instant one, when our courts, in cases where there were two separate events, have held that there can be more than one cause in fact, making both wrongdoers liable. For example, in Hastings v. Baton Rouge General Hosp., 498 So.2d 713 (La.1986), a young man was taken into the emergency room with a stab wound to the neck, the first cause of his injury and subsequent death. The hospital's aborted attempt to transfer him to another hospital was a breach of duty constituting malpractice. The court held that "the question of whether the malpractice contributed to the death, i.e., lessened the chance of survival, is a question of fact for the jury.... A substantial factor need not be the only causative factor; it need only increase the risk of harm." (Emphasis supplied.) 498 So.2d at 720.
Indeed, one could make the no-eause argument in almost every case in which there were two or more negligent or strictly liable parties. For example, in the recent case of Hunter v. Department of Transportation and Development, 620 So.2d 1149 (La.1993), the decedent's vehicle was hit from the rear as he was waiting at a highway median to make a left turn; his vehicle was propelled in front of on-coming traffic, and he was killed. Using DOTD's analysis, one would conclude that the defendant driver's action and not the design of the highway and median was the sole cause of the accident. The' Louisiana Supreme Court held otherwise, finding the highway department's inaction was a substantial cause of the accident and wrongful death. Were we to follow the ruling in Hunter and yet extend the rationale urged by DOTD to its logical conclusion in a bridge case, such as the instant one, we would hold DOTD liable if a vehicle were hit by another vehicle and propelled into the bridge railing, but we would not hold DOTD liable in a situation where the plaintiffs own negligence caused his vehicle to collide with the railing. Such an analysis is clearly a "back door" attempt to bar any recovery by a negligent plaintiff, and we reject DOTD's argument as contrary to the tort law of Louisiana as presently constituted.
We find Lang v. Prince, supra, directly on point here. In Lang two guest passengers were killed when a driver of a pick-up truck left the roadway and struck a utility pole that was located in the middle of an improved highway shoulder. The trial judge concluded that DOTD was negligent, and this court affirmed. Although DOTD urged that the fault of the driver relieved DOTD of liability, we found that the question on appeal was whether the pole at its location on the shoulder created an unreasonable risk of injury. Concluding that the unusual location of the pole was hazardous, we did not find that the driver's negligence was an intervening cause that would relieve the other defendants from liability. See also Tabor v. Doctors Memorial Hospital, 563 So.2d 233 (La.1990). Likewise, in the instant case, the negligence of the driver merely reduces, but does not bar, his own damages, and his negligence makes him solidarily liable with DOTD for his passengers' injuries.
For another accident case similar to the instant case, see Efferson v. State through Department of Transportation and Development, supra. The driver and two passengers in a pickup truck brought suit for injuries received when the truck missed a curve on the River Road near Denham Springs, Louisiana. When the truck left the roadway, it made contact with a shoulder that sloped from the pavement toward two trees located approximately nine feet from the paved portion of the road. The truck struck one tree in the outside of the curve with its right rear fender, traveled a short distance farther, and struck another tree head-on.
In Efferson, 463 So.2d at 1349, we explained:
One may recover against the State on the basis of strict liability under La.C.C. art. 2317 by showing (1) that the thing which caused the damage was in the care or custody of the defendant, (2) that it had a vice or defect, i.e., some condition which occasioned an unreasonable risk of injury, and (3) that the injury was caused by the defect. Jones v. City of Baton Rouge, 388 So.2d 737 (La.1980).
|sWe held that the trees within nine feet of the road posed a "formidable obstacle for the inadvertent driver who found himself bearing down upon them." 463 So.2d at 1349. The fault of the driver in failing to keep his vehicle under control did not relieve DOTD of its duty to maintain a safe shoulder.
In Efferson, supra, we cited Sinitiere v. Lavergne, 391 So.2d 821 (La.1980) for the proposition that DOTD has a duty to see that the highways are reasonably safe for persons exercising ordinary care and reasonable prudence. We further concluded that "when the Sinitiere court wrote that the DOTD 'owes a duty to keep the highways and its shoulders reasonably safe for non-negligent motorists' (emphasis added) it did not mean to restrict the duty as being owed only to the non-negligent motorist." 463 So.2d at 1349. Finding that DOTD breached its duty to the negligent driver in Efferson, we apportioned fault between the department and the driver.
Turning now to the question of fault on the part of the driver, David Simpson, we note that the trial court's conclusion that he was without fault is inconsistent with some of the language delineating the court's factual findings. The court stated, in pertinent part:
During a sudden rainstorm and downpour, driver David Simpson lost control of the pickup truck, the pickup truck fishtailed and the truck bed swung around to the left causing the vehicle to broadside a bridge railing located upon the right hand side of the highway....
It is clear that the windshield wipers in the pickup truck were inoperative on the date and time in question, but I am unconvinced that the failure of the windshield wipers to work was a cause-in-fact of the accident in question.... Based upon the state of the evidence before the Court, the most logical and reasonable explanation for the sudden loss of control of the pickup truck by David Simpson was brake lockup causing hydroplaning of the vehicle. The driver's actions in reacting to a sudden cloudburst and deluge of rain was to brake the vehicle. This braking action caused the brakes to momentarily lock on the unloaded light weight pickup truck and caused the fishtailing action of the rear end of the pickup truck coming around to the left as a sudden and immediate response to the driver's braking action. Consequently, whether or not the windshield wipers of the pickup truck were in operation is of no moment in that it is more likely than not that David Simpson would have applied his brakes as a reaction to the sudden downpour in the same fashion that he did before attempting to turn on the windshield wipers.... (I)t is well recognized that the sudden application of brakes in an unloaded light 19weight pickup truck will cause fishtailing and possible loss of control. (Emphasis supplied.)
Apparently, the trial judge became so caught up in the question of inoperable windshield wipers that he failed to acknowledge that negligence stemmed from the action of the driver, however inexperienced, in applying the brakes under the existing conditions and circumstances. Accordingly, we find that the trial court's conclusion finding no fault on the part of David Simpson was manifestly erroneous.
Furthermore, we conclude in the instant case that fault should be apportioned between DOTD and Simpson. We allocate 50% to DOTD, 50% to Simpson, as the highest degree of fault a reasonable finder of fact could have found for DOTD, and the lowest percentage a reasonable finder of fact could have found for Simpson. See Efferson v. State through Department of Transportation and Development, supra, at 1352. The driver in the instant case was inexperienced, but relatively "innocent" when compared to drivers in other cases who merited greater percentages of fault. Compare the driver in Efferson, who failed to see a speed advisory sign, had been drinking earlier in the evening, and was driving at an excessive speed when he entered the curve; his percentage of fault was 80%.
As to the claim by DOTD that the trial court erred when it failed to find fault on the part of the two passengers, suffice it to say that the record does not reveal that the trial court's factual findings in this regard were manifestly erroneous. Although there is evidence that both passengers knew the windshield wipers were inoperable, the trial court could reasonably find that their failure to urge that the driver stop did not substantially contribute to the accident. We cannot replace our evaluation of the facts for the conclusion reached by the trial court. Sistler v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 558 So.2d 1106 (La.1990).
jipQUANTUM
The remainder of DOTD's assignments of error relate to the trial court's awards of damages and costs, which we will address one at a time.
In making an award of $6,000,000 in general damages to David Simpson, the trial court described his injuries as follows:
Turning to the issue of damages as related to David Simpson, this 15 year old boy suffered traumatic amputation of both of his legs, a severe head injury and concussion, and emotional and psychological problems as a consequence of the profound injuries which he sustained. He will require life long prostheses, ongoing phantom pain, and serious physical and mental limitations. He will be unable to pursue work relating to his primary interests due to his physical impairment. Although his prognosis is good for training and entry into a sedentary occupation, he has poor prostheses tolerance, he has decreased standing tolerance in braces limited to 15 minutes, he has suffered weight gain, must suffer frequent voiding, is dependent in lifting and reaching, is unable to swim, hunt, do farm work, drive a tractor, water ski, cut grass, play football or softball, to participate fully with friends in activities, to perform mechanidal work, to perform construction work, to perform welding jobs and is unable to dance. He will suffer a markedly decreased social life along with frequent anger, depression, irritability, a poor self-image and poor self-esteem. He has a decreased attention span, decreased memory, poor initiation skills, a decreased perceptual motor function, poor impulse control, a decreased ability to think abstractly, a low confidence level, a low motivation level, decreased learning potential, decreased fine motor control, decreased dexterity, decreased strength and endurance, and a low tolerance to pain and discomfort. Stated succinctly, he is a mere shell of the person that he once was and much of the enjoyment of life and life's expectations have been taken from him. Under these circumstances he is entitled to a general damage award in the amount of SIX MILLION DOLLARS.
In Hae Woo Youn v. Overseas Maritime Corp., 623 So.2d 1257 (La.1993), the most recent decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court addressing, the standard for appellate review of general damage awards, the court continues a jurisprudential trend of constricting the standard. The trier of fact now has vast discretion to award general damages and the appellate court should rarely disturb a general damage award.
Our attempts to follow the guidelines for the standard for appellate review of general damage awards set forth in Gaspard v. LeMaire, 158 So.2d 149 (La.1963) through Coco v. Winston Industries, Inc., 341 So.2d 332 (La.1976) and Reck v. Stevens, 373 So.2d 498 (La.1979) have been fraught with uncertainty. Not the least among the reasons for our uncertainty has been the repeated admonition that before a trial court award can be questioned as inadequate or excessive we must first and only look to the facts and circumstances peculiar to the case and the individual. We are instructed not to look to prior decisional awards in our determination of whether the trial court abused its discretion. By so limiting our consideration of prior awards in determining abuse of discretion, it seems to us that the determination is made on a highly subjective basis, leading to great disparity in awards by different courts for similar injuries. This necessarily makes it difficult for litigants to evaluate their claims, and appears to result in court resolution of disputes that might otherwise be resolved without litigation.
The trial judge here articulated the basis of the general damage award. We cannot find from that articulation an abuse of the vast discretion of the trial judge.
We find it necessary to reduce the award made to David Simpson by the trial court for future care expenses, which award included an amount for a paid attendant for home care. The trial court awarded $1,872,-241 based on an assumption of four hours of care per day for the next 20 years and eight hours per day thereafter. DOTD is correct in asserting that the hours of care necessary was a mere assumption tendered by counsel to Dr. G. Randolph Rice, an economics professor who testified as an expert on behalf of plaintiff Simpson. In his brief, plaintiff Simpson admits that if he will never need more than four hours per day of attendant care, the figure for future care would be $1,497,204. Because an assumption of counsel is not evidence, we will reduce the future care award to $1,497,204. However, we find the remainder of DOTD's arguments for reductions in the awards to Mr. Simpson to be without merit.
112Nor do we view the damage awards to Troy Lofton, Jr. and Robert Marc Huber as beyond the discretion afforded the trial court in LSA-C.C. art. 2324.1.
Appellant argues that the award of $250,-000 to Mr. Lofton includes a sum for impairment to future earning capacity and that there is no evidence in the record of his capacity for future earnings. Despite appellant's argument, we find the explanation given by the trial court for the award to this plaintiff to be reasonable. The court stated,
Although Mr. Lofton was not a good student, and dropped out of high school, he has since received a GED. It is probable that this young man will look forward to a life of manual labor with a significantly weakened right leg. As he ages it is reasonable to expect that the problems attending the weakness resulting from this accident will exacerbate and affect his ability to earn and make a living.
We conclude that the award to Mr. Lofton was based on the trial court's assessment of the evidence in the record and thus within the trial court's discretion. We will not disturb a damage award absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion by the trial court. Bergeron v. Blake Drilling & Workover Co., Inc., 599 So.2d 827 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 605 So.2d 1117 and 1119 (La.1992). Likewise, the award of $60,000 to Mr. Huber was not excessive in light of the fact that he was subjected to the severe trauma of the accident. Furthermore, considering the nature of the physical injuries to this high school student, we find that the award can be supported under an interpretation of the evidence most favorable to the plaintiff and that the award was a reasonable assessment made by the factfinder. O'Brien v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., 601 So.2d 330 (La.App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 604 So.2d 1003 (La.1992).
Thus, the appellant's assignment of error that the awards to the two guest passengers were excessive is without merit.
An assignment of error which does have merit is the appellant's objection to the loss of consortium awards to Gerald and Sally Simpson, the parents of the injured driver. The trial judge made no mention of an award to Mr. or Mrs. Simpson in his reasons for judgment, but he did pencil in an award of $50,000 each | lain the judgment for loss of "society and services." However, the record does not support such an award. The elements of a loss of consortium claim by parents are loss of love and affection, loss of society and companionship, loss of felicity, and loss of material services, support, aid and assistance. Finley v. Bass, 478 So.2d 608 (La.App. 2d Cir.1985). Our review of the record does not convince us that the parents in the instant case proved those elements by a preponderance of the evidence. They did not submit evidence that they were dependent upon their son materially, and they did not prove that they were deprived of his love and affection. Nor can the parents recover because of their mental anguish stemming from their son's injuries. Although the type of accident and injury to the young driver would support a conclusion that his parents suffered mental anguish over his injuries, the awards to the parents were erroneous because their cause of action for loss of consortium does not include a claim for mental anguish suffered as a result of the physical injury to the other person. Sharp v. Metropolitan Property & Liability Ins. Co., 478 So.2d 724 (La.App. 3d Cir.1985). We, therefore, reverse the judgment in favor of Gerald and Sally Simpson against DOTD.
For the final question regarding quantum, DOTD pointed out in its brief that the trial court erred in rendering the three judgments because they are contrary to the statutory provisions of LSA-R.S. 13:5106 and LSA-R.S. 13:5112. However, considering the recent holding of the Louisiana Supreme Court in Chamberlain v. State through Department of Transportation and Development, 624 So.2d 874 (La.1993), that the $500,-000 limit of general damages of LSA-R.S. 13:5106 is unconstitutional, we cannot so limit the general damage award.
Nevertheless, all three judgments are subject to the statutory provision of LSA-R.S. 13:5112 making pre-judgment interest payable at the rate of six percent. Although LSA-R.S. 13:5112 was one of six statutes enacted by the legislature in 1985 to relieve the state of some of the ordinary burdens of tort liability, the Louisiana Supreme Court has specifically pointed out l^that it.has not considered the constitutionality of LSA-R.S. 13:5112. See Chamberlain, supra at note 7. Accordingly, we amend the judgments to provide for interest at the rate of six percent from the date of judicial demand until the date of judgment, then at the rate provided in LSA-C.C. art. 2924 from the date of judgment until paid.
DOTD's final complaint concerns costs of court. The trial court held a separate hearing on costs and provided us with detailed reasons for the judgment rendered subsequent to the hearing. We note a duplication in one item: the award of $1,320 for Michael V. Aderman was listed previously as an award in the Lofton judgment. Accordingly, we will reduce the total of costs from $12,-766.83 to $11,446.83 to reflect a deduction for duplication. Furthermore, because of our holding on comparative fault, we amend the judgment for costs, easting DOTD for 50% of the total of $11,446.83 and David Simpson for 50% of the total.
Appellant's argument that the trial court erred in considering hearsay invoices at the hearing on costs is without merit.
In summary and for the foregoing reasons, we amend the judgment in favor of David Simpson to reduce the award for future medical care to $1,497,204. We also amend the judgment of the trial court in favor of the driver, David Simpson, and against DOTD, reducing the awards in the driver's favor by 50% to reflect the fault attributable to him.
Likewise, we amend the Lofton and Huber judgments to cast DOTD and David Simpson hable in solido, in the proportions of 50% and 50% respectively, for damages and costs.
We amend all three judgments to reflect interest owed by DOTD at the rate of six percent from the date of judicial demand until judgment, and statutory legal interest thereafter. We reverse the judgment in favor of Gerald and Sally Simpson for loss of consortium, and we dismiss their claim against DOTD.
We amend the judgment on rule for costs to reduce the total to $11,446.83, and we cast DOTD for 50% of the costs and lisDavid Simpson for 50% of the costs.
In all other respects we affirm the judgments of the trial court. Costs of this appeal are to be assessed against appellee, David Simpson.
REVERSED IN PART, AMENDED IN PART, AND AFFIRMED AS AMENDED.
WATKINS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part and assigns reasons.
GONZALES, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
. The three boys were minors at the time of the accident, but now they have reached the age of majority. David Simpson was substituted as party plaintiff in his amended petition, and Troy Lofton, Jr., was substituted as plaintiff in his suit, except for the claim by his father for past medical expenses.
. The plaintiffs argued that the wing rails were unreasonably dangerous, making DOTD liable for not retrofitting the bridge with a safer railing. Indeed, a maintenance engineer for DOTD's District 62 testified that the bridge railing that pierced the truck in this case was replaced after the accident with railings that ended with a "flared out piece," or short, curved rail sections that eliminated the 45-degree angle welded joints. It is unnecessary for us to decide whether the wing rails were unreasonably dangerous per se because of the poor condition of the bridge and the railing discussed hereinafter.
.DOTD's major assignments of error are that the trial court erred in failing to find that the sole cause-in-fact of the accident was the driver's inability to maintain control of the vehicle and that the sole legal cause was the driver's negligence in failing to maintain control.
An additional assignment of error is that the trial court erred in failing to allow into evidence Page 20 of the deposition of Robert Marc Huber.
Further, DOTD assigns more errors "alternatively" in the event that the liability of DOTD is affirmed on appeal. The alternative assignments are:
1. The trial court erred in failing to find that the driver was contributorily negligent and/or strictly liable.
2. The trial court erred in failing to find that the guest passengers were contributorily negligent.
3. The trial court erred in granting an excessive damage award to the driver, David S. Simpson.
4. The trial court erred in granting an excessive damage award to Troy Lofton, Jr. and Robert Marc Huber.
5. The trial court erred in dismissing the cross-claims of DOTD in the Lofton and Milton cases.
6. The trial court erred in granting and setting expert witness fees and other costs that were taxed against DOTD in the Simpson and Lofton cases.
7. The trial court erred in signing judgments in all three (3) consolidated cases that failed to conform to either LSA-R.S. 13:5106 and/or LSA-R.S. 13:5112.
. See discussion of David Simpson's negligence, infra. Our decision regarding solidary liability makes it unnecessary for us to discuss DOTD's assignment of error that the trial court should not have dismissed the cross-claims of DOTD in the Lofton and Milton cases.
. Our decision to reverse the trial court on the issue of David Simpson's negligence makes it unnecessary for us to address DOTD's assignment of error concerning Marc Huber's deposition. Although the testimony was about the nature of the rain storm, it was merely cumulative evidence relating to the driver's negligence vel non.
. Although we do not reach a consideration of prior awards we do note Bernard v. Royal Ins. Co., 586 So.2d 607 (La.App. 4th Cir.1991) awards general damages of $5,025,000 for a severe continuing leg injury.