Case Name: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner v. Michael Quinn TATE, Respondent; Tenarro Banks, Petitioner v. The People of the State of Colorado, Respondent; Erik Brendan Jensen, Petitioner v. The People of the State of Colorado, Respondent
Court: Colorado Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Colorado
Decision Date: 2015-06-01
Citations: 352 P.3d 959
Docket Number: Supreme Court Case No. 12SC932, Supreme Court Case No. 12SC1022, Supreme Court Case No. 13SC211
Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner v. Michael Quinn TATE, Respondent. Tenarro Banks, Petitioner v. The People of the State of Colorado, Respondent. Erik Brendan Jensen, Petitioner v. The People of the State of Colorado, Respondent.
Judges: CHIEF JUSTICE RICE concurs in part and dissents in part.
Reporter: Pacific Reporter 3d
Volume: 352
Pages: 959–982

Head Matter:
2015 CO 42
The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner v. Michael Quinn TATE, Respondent. Tenarro Banks, Petitioner v. The People of the State of Colorado, Respondent. Erik Brendan Jensen, Petitioner v. The People of the State of Colorado, Respondent.
Supreme Court Case No. 12SC932, Supreme Court Case No. 12SC1022, Supreme Court Case No. 13SC211
Supreme Court of Colorado.
June 1, 2015
Rehearing Denied July 13, 2015
Rehearing Denied August 3, 2015
C.A.R. 50 Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals, Court of Appeals Case No. 12CA634, Douglas County District Court Case No. 98CR422, Honorable Richard Cas-chette, Judge
Attorneys for Petitioner The People of the State of Colorado: Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, Elizabeth Rohrbough, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado
Attorneys for Petitioner Tenarro Banks: Samler & Whitson, P.C., Eric A. Samler, Denver, Colorado
Attorney for Petitioner Erik Brendan Jensen: Alison Ruttenberg, Boulder, Colorado
Attorneys for Respondent Michael Quinn Tate: Lord Law Firm, LLC, Kathleen A. Lord, Denver, Colorado
Attorneys for Respondent The People of the State of Colorado: Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, Elizabeth Rohrbough, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado
Attorneys for Amici Curiae Colorado Juvenile Defender Coalition, Colorado Criminal Defense Bar, Office of the Colorado State Public Defender, National Partnership for Juvenile Services, International Community Corrections Association, and American Probation and Parole Association: Colorado Juvenile Defender Coalition, Elizabeth C. Loge-mann, Denver, Colorado
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Juvenile Law Center: Juvenile Law Center, Marsha Lev-ick, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Samler & Whitson, P.C., Eric A. Samler, Denver, Colorado © |

Opinion:
JUSTICE EID
delivered the Opinion of the Court.
T1 We granted review in two cases to determine what remedy is appropriate for juvenile defendants who were given sentences that would be unconstitutional under the Supreme Court's decision in Miller v. Alabama, - U.S. -, 182 S.Ct. 2455, 2469, 183 LEd.2d 407 (2012). 'We granted review in a third case to determine whether that remedy applies retroactively.
T 2 The first two cases come to us on direct appeal. Both defendants in those cases, Te-narro Banks and Michael Quinn Tate, were convicted in 2004 of class 1 felonies for acts committed when they were juveniles. Tate was convicted of felony murder for the stabbing death of a friend's father during a burglary when Tate was sixteen. People v. Tate, No. 07CA2467, 2012 WL 4010238 (Colo. App. Sept. 18, 2012). Banks was convicted of first degree murder for shooting another teenager outside of a house party when he was fifteen. People v. Banks, 2012 COA 157, - P.8d -.
T3 Under the sentencing scheme in place at the time, which governed offenses committed between 1990 and 2006, both Banks and Tate were given mandatory sentences to life in prison without the possibility of parole ("LWOP"). While both cases were pending on appeal to the court of appeals, the Supreme Court released its opinion in Miller.
1 4 Miller holds that it violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment to give a juvenile a mandatory LWOP sentence. Miller, - U.S. at -, 182 S.Ct. at 2460. While Miller did not categorically bar LWOP sentences for juveniles in all cireumstances, it held that LWOP could not be imposed on a mandatory basis, and instead could be imposed only after an individualized sentencing process that takes into account the defendant's "youth and attendant characteristics." Id. at -, 132 S.Ct. at 2471. The Miller decision renders the Colorado statutory scheme for mandatory LWOP in place between 1990 and 2006 unconstitutional as applied to juveniles, including Tate and Banks.
15 The question, then, becomes one of remedy. The legislature has not acted to adopt a new sentencing scheme in light of Miller. We therefore are presented with the situation in which the only sentence adopted by the legislature-LWOP-cannot be applied to the cases before us on direct appeal.
6 In order to fill this gap, we take guidance from the U.S. Supreme Court, which cautions that we should "try not to nullify more of a legislature's work than is necessary." Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England, 546 U.S. 320, 329, 126 S.Ct. 961, 163 L.Ed.2d 812 (2006); see also Dallman v. Ritter, 225 P.3d 610, 688 (Colo.2010) ("[Wle strike as little of the law as possible. ."). Because Miller dictates that a juvenile cannot be sentenced to LWOP unless there is an individualized consideration of the defendant's "youth and attendant char acteristics," "we conclude that the proper remedy in these two cases, in the absence of legislative action, is to remand for such a determination. A hearing on whether a LWOP sentence is appropriate considering the defendant's "youth and attendant characteristics" is the remedy that preserves as much of the legislature's work as possible given Miller's holding.
T7 If the trial court should determine, after an individualized sentencing process, that LWOP is not warranted, the appropriate sentence, again in the absence of legislative action, is life in prison with the possibility of parole after forty years ("LWPP"). This is the sentence that was in place both before and after the mandatory LWOP scheme at issue in this case-that is, before 1990 and after 2006. We conclude that LWPP is the sentence that the legislature would have imposed had it known that LWOP could be imposed under Miller only after individualized sentencing, and that such individualized sentencing could lead to cases in which LWOP is unwarranted. We therefore find that this is the remedy that the "the General Assembly would have intended in light of our constitutional holding." People v. Montour, 157 P.3d 489, 502 (Colo.2007).
[8 Accordingly, we affirm the panel's decision in Tate to remand the case to determine whether LWOP is an appropriate sentence under Miller, but reverse its decision to decline to give guidance as to the appropriate sentence if LWOP is unwarranted. We hold that if the trial court determines LWOP is not warranted, LWPP is the proper sentence. In Banks, we reverse the panel's decision to the extent that it imposed a L WPP sentence without a remand to consider whether LWOP is appropriate considering the defendant's "youth and attendant characteristics" under Miller, but affirm the decision to the extent that it imposes LWPP after the Miller determination. We remand both cases for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
T9 The third case before us comes on collateral review, thus requiring us to consider whether the Miller remedy described above should be applied retroactively. Eric Brendan Jensen was convicted in 1998 of first degree murder for helping a friend kill the friend's mother and dispose of the body. He committed this crime when he was seventeen. Under the sentencing scheme in place at the time, described above, Jensen was given a mandatory sentence to LWOP. On direct appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment. People v. Jensen, 55 P.3d 135, 141 (Colo.App.2001). This court denied Jensen's certiorari petition, and the judgment became final. Jensen later filed two Crim. P. 35(c) motions for post-conviction relief, the second of which is at issue here. The trial court denied the motion, and Jensen appealed to the court of appeals. While that appeal was pending, the Supreme Court released Miller. Jensen filed a C.A.R. 50 petition with this court, asking us to review his sentence in light of Miller. We granted the petition for review.
T 10 We hold that the new rule announced in Miller is procedural, rather than substantive, in nature, and that therefore it does not apply retroactively. See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351-58, 124 S.Ct. 2519, 159 L.Ed.2d 442 (2004) (holding that procedural new rules are not applied retroactively). As the Supreme Court stated in Miller, "Our decision does not categorically bar a penalty for a class of offenders or type of crime.... Instead, it mandates only that a sentencer follow a certain process-considering an offender's youth and attendant characteristics, before imposing a particular penalty." - U.S. at -, 182 S.Ct. at 2471 (emphasis added). Because the Miller rule does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review of a final judgment, it does not apply to Jensen. We therefore affirm the trial court's order denying his motion for post-conviction relief.
I.
A.
{11 We begin by addressing the facts and procedural posture that apply to Tate and Banks. We then turn to Jensen.
[12 In 2004, Tate was convicted of felony murder for the stabbing death of a friend's father during a burglary. Tate was sixteen at the time of the crime. The trial court sentenced him to LWOP, because it was the statutorily-mandated sentence for crimes committed between 1990 and 2006. While his appeal was pending before the court of appeals, the Supreme Court released Miller.
T 13 On direct appeal, the court of appeals affirmed Tate's conviction in an unpublished opinion. Tate, No. 07CA2467. It also found that under Miller, Tate's LWOP sentence was unconstitutional because he did not receive an individualized sentence before being given LWOP. Tate, slip op. at 25. The court did not, however, invalidate any part of the statutory scheme. See id., slip op. at 21. Instead, it vacated the sentence and remanded the case for individualized resentencing to determine whether LWOP was warranted. Id., slip op. at 25. It also stated that if the trial court concluded on remand that LWOP was not warranted, "the parties are not restricted by this opinion in arguing for or against any other prison or parole terms." Id., slip op. at 26. The appellate court thus did not opine on what the trial court should do if it concludes that LWOP is not warrant ed under the cireumstances. Finally, the court of appeals rejected the Attorney General's suggestion that Tate's sentence need not be vacated, but instead that he be given LWPP automatically. The court reasoned that such a remedy "goes further than Miller requires." Id., slip op. at 28.
{14 The People petitioned this court for review, arguing that Tate's sentence need not be vacated, but instead that he be given a sentence of LWPP by applying either the doctrine of revival or severance to the sentencing statutes. This court granted the People's petition for review.
{15 In 2004, the trial court convicted Banks of first degree murder for the shooting death of a rival gang member outside of a house party. Banks was fifteen at the time of the crime. The trial court sentenced him to LWOP, because it was the statutorily-mandated sentence for crimes committed between 1990 and 2006. While his appeal was pending before the court of appeals, the Supreme Court released Miller.
T 16 On direct appeal, the court of appeals affirmed Banks's conviction. It also found that under Miller, Banks's LWOP sentence was unconstitutional. The court's remedy, however, differed from the remedy in Tate. Relying on Colorado's general severability clause in section 24-204, C.R.S. (2014), the panel "restricted] the applicability" of the offending portions of the statutes "to adult offenders." People v. Banks, 2012 COA 157, 1127, - P.3d -. Reasoning that the General Assembly intended to give juvenile class 1 offenders the most serious sentence possible, and that LWPP was the most serious sentence available in the statutes, the court vacated the sentence to the extent it denied Banks parole, and gave instructions to automatically sentence him to LWPP. Banks, 128-31. In essence, the court of appeals in Banks adopted the remedy proposed by the Attorney General in Tate.
17 Banks petitioned this court for review, arguing that the LWPP sentence was still unconstitutional under Miller because it was given mandatorily without individualized sentencing, and that the court of appeals exceeded its authority in its use of severability to arrive at the LWPP sentence. This court granted Banks's petition for review.
{18 Because the legislature has not acted to adopt a new sentencing scheme in light of Miller, we are confronted with the situation in which the only sentence adopted by the legislature-LWOP-cannot be applied to Tate and Banks. When presented with such a situation, the Supreme Court cautions that we should "try not to nullify more of a legislature's work than is necessary." Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 329, 126 S.Ct. 961; see also DalLman, 225 P.3d at 638 ("[Wle strike as little of the law as possible...."). Because Miller dictates that a juvenile cannot be sentenced to LWOP unless there is an individualized consideration of the defendant's "youth and attendant characteristics," we conclude that the proper remedy in these cases, in the absence of legislative action, is to remand for such a determination. Such a remedy preserves as much of the legislature's work as possible given Miller's holding.
119 If, after performing an individualized sentencing process, the trial court should determine that LWOP is not warranted, the appropriate sentence, again in the absence of legislative action, is life in prison with the possibility of parole after forty years. 'This sentence was in place both before and after the mandatory LWOP scheme at issue in this case-that is, before 1990 and after 2006. We conclude that LWPP is the sentence that the legislature would have imposed had it known that LWOP could be imposed under Miller only after individualized sentencing, and that such individualized sentencing could lead to cases in which LWOP is unwarranted. See Montour, 157 P.8d at 502 (adopting the remedy that "the General Assembly would have intended in light of our constitutional holding.").
[20 We thus affirm the Tate panel to the extent that it concluded that the proper remedy was a remand for individual consideration of the defendant's "youth and attendant characteristics" to determine whether LWOP is the appropriate sentence. The Tate panel took no position, however, on what sentence would be appropriate if LWOP is determined to be unwarranted. We reverse this portion of the decision and hold that, again in the absence of legislative action, if the trial court determines LWOP is not warranted after considering the defendant's "youth and attendant characteristics," the proper sentence is LWPP. '
{21 In Banks, we reverse the panel's decision to the extent that it did not remand the case for determination of whether LWPP is warranted under Miller, but affirm the decision to the extent that it imposes LWPP after the Miller determination. We remand both Tate and Banks for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
B.
1 22 In 1998, the trial court convicted Jensen of first degree murder for helping a friend kill the friend's mother and dispose of the body. Jensen was seventeen at the time of the crime. The trial court sentenced him to LWOP, because it was the statutorily, mandated sentence for such crimes committed between 1990 and 2006. On direct appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the con-viection. Jensen, 55 P.3d at 141. This court denied Jensen's petition for certiorari, and the judgment became final.
[23 Jensen later filed a collateral Crim. P. 35(c) motion for post-conviction relief which alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied the motion. Jensen appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. People v. Jensen, No. 05CA0864, 2007 WL 689483 (Colo.App. Mar. 8, 2007). Once again, this court denied Jensen's petition for certiorari.
124 Several years later, the Supreme Court released Grakam v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010). Jensen filed another post-conviction motion which argued that Grakam rendered his sentence unconstitutional. The trial court denied the motion. Jensen appealed to the court of appeals. While that appeal was pending, the Supreme Court released Miller. Jensen then filed a C.A.R. 50 petition which asked this court to grant review in order to analyze. the constitutionality of his sentence under Miller. This court granted his C.A.R. 50 petition, and stayed his petition before the court of appeals.
125 The question presented is whether Miller should be applied retroactively to cases such as Jensen's on collateral review of a final judgment We hold that Miller is not retroactive. Generally, new procedural rules are not applied retroactively. Schriro, 542 U.S. at 852, 124 S.Ct. 2519. The Miller rule is procedural, rather than substantive, because it does not bar the imposition of a LWOP sentence on a juvenile, but rather requires that a "certain process" be followed before a juvenile may be sentenced to LWOP. Miller, - U.S. at -, 132 S.Ct. at 2471. Because the new rule announced in Miller is procedural in nature, it does not apply to cases on collateral review of a final judgment such as Jensen's. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order denying Jensen post-conviction relief.
IL.
126 Tate and Banks involve the application of Miller to Colorado's sentencing scheme as it existed from 1990 to 2006. It is therefore necessary to discuss both the Mil-ter opinion and Colorado's statutory scheme in some detail.
127 In Miller,; the Supreme Court held that "the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders." Miller, - U.S. at -, 132 S.Ct. at 2469. The Court's analysis started with its understanding that the "central" principle of the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment is proportionality. Id. at -, 182 S.Ct. at 24638. The Court traced this proportionality principle through two strands of precedent, and found that both strands coalesced in the case before it. Id.
128 The first strand involves categorical bans on specific punishments for specific classes of offenders-for instance, barring a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for juveniles who commit nonhomicide offenses, Graham, 560 U.S. at 74, 130 S.Ct. 2011, or barring the death penalty for juveniles, Roper v. Simmons, 548 U.S. 551, 578, 125 S.Ct. 1188, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005). This strand applies to juveniles because they are different from adults in their "diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform." Miller, - U.S. at -, 182 S.Ct. at 2464. As a class, they are therefore "less deserving of the most severe punishments." Id. (quoting Grakham, 560 U.S. at 68, 130 S.Ct. 2011.).
%29 The second strand prohibits the mandatory imposition of the death penalty. Id. at -, 182 S.Ct. at 2468. Those cases require an individualized sentencing process, where the sentencer must "consider the characteristics of a defendant and the details of his offense before sentencing him to death." Id. at -, 182 S.Ct. at 2468-64. Miller found that this strand applies to juveniles with LWOP because, as with the death penalty, "(imprisoning an offender until he dies alters the remainder of his life 'by a forfeiture that is irrevocable." Id. at -, 132 S.Ct. at 2466 (quoting Solem v. Helm, 468 U.S. 277, 300-01, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983)).
130 These two strands converge on mandatory LWOP for juveniles. Because juveniles as a class are less culpable and have greater prospects for reform, the sen-tencer must first "take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison." Id. at -, 132 S.Ct. at 2469.
T31 Although Miller thought that appropriate occasions for giving LWOP to juve- - niles will be "uncommon" and "rare," it did not foreclose that sentence entirely. Id. As the Court stated, "Our decision does not categorically bar a penalty for a class of offenders or type of crime-as, for example, we did in Roper or Graham. Instead, it mandates only that a sentencer follow a certain process-considering an offender's youth and attendant characteristiecs-before imposing a particular penalty." Id. at -, 182 S.Ct. at 2471. In sum, Miller requires that a sentencer take into account "an offender's youth and attendant characteristics" before sentencing a juvenile to LWOP. Id. at -, 132 S.Ct. at 2471.
132 Turning to Colorado's statutory scheme, from 1985 until 1990, a "life sentence" meant life with the possibility of parole after forty years. § 18-1-105(4)(a), C.R.S. (1985) ("As to any person sentenced for a class 1 felony, for an act committed on or after July 1, 1985, life imprisonment shall mean imprisonment without the possibility of parole for forty calendar years."); § 17-22.5-104(2)(c), C.R.S. (1985) ("No inmate imprisoned under a life sentence for a crime committed on or after July 1, 1985, shall be paroled until he has served at least forty calendar years . .") (hereinafter ©1985 provision"). This definition did not differentiate between adults and juveniles.
T33 In 1990, the legislature changed the definition of a life sentence to mean life without the possibility of parole. This is the version of the statutes under which Tate and Banks were sentenced. In making this change, however, the legislature did not remove the 1985 provision. Instead, it added language stating that the new definition would apply to all crimes committed on or after July 1, 1990. § 18-1-105(4)(a), C.R.S. (1990) ("As to any person sentenced for a class 1 felony, for an act committed on or after July 1, 1990, life imprisonment shall mean imprisonment without the possibility of parole."); § 17-22.5-104(2)(d), C.R.S. (1990) ("No inmate imprisoned under a life sentence for a crime committed on or after July 1, 1990, shall be eligible for parole.") (hereinafter ©1990 provision"). Again, this definition did not differentiate between adults and juveniles.
[ 34 In 2006, the legislature made another change. Once again, it kept the 1985 provision and the 1990 provision substantively the same. But it added additional language stating that for juveniles convicted of crimes committed on or after July 1, 2006, a life sentence once again meant being eligible for parole after forty years. § 18-1.83-401(4)(b)(T), C.R.S. (2014) ("[AJs to a person who is convicted as an adult of a class 1 felony following direct filing of an information . the district court judge shall sentence the person to a term of- life imprisonment with the possibility of parole after serving a period of forty calendar years."); § 17-22.5-104(2)(d)(IV), C.R.S. (2014) ("[Aln inmate imprisoned under a life sentence for a class 1 felony committed on or after July 1, 2006, who was convicted as an adult following direct filing of an information . may be eligible for parole after the inmate has served at least forty calendar years.") (hereinafter "2006 provision"). Essentially, the legislature went back to the 1985 definition of a life sentence, but only for juveniles.
{35 Miller holds that it violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on eruel and unusual punishment to give a juvenile a mandatory LWOP sentence. Miller, - U.S. at -, 182 S.Ct. at 2460. Thus, Miller renders Colorado's mandatory LWOP unconstitutional as applied to juvenile defendants. There is no question that the mandatory LWOP sentences given to Tate and Banks are unconstitutional. In the absence of action by the General Assembly, we must determine what a constitutional sentence would be-that is, what is the appropriate remedy.
T 36 We return again to Miller, which held that a LWOP sentence could be imposed only after considering a defendant's "youth and attendant characteristics." Given Miller's command, we conclude that the appropriate remedy in these cases is to vacate the LWOP sentences and remand for the trial court to determine whether a LWOP sentence is appropriate given the defendants' "youth and attendant characteristics."
137 In Tate, the People contend that it is unnecessary to vacate a LWOP sentence and remand, and instead argue that a LWPP sentence should be imposed in Hieu of a remand. We disagree on the ground that, as noted above, Miller holds that LWOP may be imposed after considering the defendant's "youth and attendant characteristics." We thus echo the panel's observation in Tate that the People's proposed remedy "goes further than Miller requires." Tate, slip op. at 23. We take guidance from the Supreme Court, which cautions that we should "try not to nullify more of a legislature's work than is necessary." Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 329, 126 S.Ct. 961; see also Dallman, 225 P.3d at 638 (TWle strike as little of the law as possible. ."). We thus affirm the Tate panel with respect to the Miller remand, and reverse Banks to the extent that it does not require a Miller remand.
¶ 38 The imposition of a LWOP sentence, again as. Miller contemplates, should be "uncommon" and "rare." Thus we go on to consider what sentence should be imposed if, after considering a defendant's "youth and attendant characteristics," LWOP is not warranted. Accordingly, we reverse the Tate panel's decision not to opine on what the appropriate remedy would be if the trial court concludes that LWOP is inappropriate. Tate, slip op. at 26.
139 Here, we agree with the People and the Banks panel that a LWPP would be the appropriate sentence, and affirm Banks to the extent that it imposes LWPP after the Miller determination. We disagree, however, with the panel's reasoning. Both the People and the Banks panel suggest that LWPP should be imposed under a severance theory, while Banks argues that the panel improperly invoked severance. In addition, the People make the alternative argument that a revival theory would work as well. Because of the nature of these statutory provisions, however, we conclude that neither severance nor revival is applicable.
[40 The Banks panel purported to bring Colorado's statutory scheme in line with Miller using severance by "restricting the applicability of the last sentence of section 18-1.3-401(4)(a) and the first sentence of section 17-22.5-104(2)(d)(I) to adult offenders." Banks, 1127. Because the sentencing scheme in this case lacks a specific severability clause, however, any power to sever would derive from the general severability clause in seetion 2-4-204. See High Gear and Toke Shop v. Beacom, 689 P.2d 624, 638 n. 10 (Colo.1984). The general severability clause states that if a provision of a statute is found unconstitutional, the remainder of the statute is "valid, unless it appears to the court that the valid provisions of the statute are so essentially and inseparably connected with, and so dependent upon, the void provision that it cannot be presumed the legislature would have enacted the valid provisions without the void one." § 24-204. These statutory terms preclude the use of severance in this case for several reasons.
41 First, the People urge us to "limit the application" of certain phrases to adults, but do not actually suggest that we remove language from the statute. But severance involves removing language from the statute, or as section 2-4-204 explains, the offending passage becomes "void." Our case law assumes that severance means striking language from a statute. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Schutt, 914 P.2d 921, 929 (Colo.1996) ("We may sever and strike any portion of a statute which we hold to be unconstitutional .") (emphasis added); Montour, 157 P.3d at 502 ("[Tlhe General Assembly would have been satisfied with the portions of a statute that remain after the unconstitutional portions are stricken.") (emphasis added); Dallman, 225 P.3d at 638 ("[Wle strike as little of the law as possible .") (emphasis added). Only "severing" the statute for juveniles, therefore, is not a valid use of severance. We echo the Tate panel in noting that "the Attorney General cites no case, nor have we found one, where section 2-4-204 has been used to engraft exception language into a statute." Tate, slip op. at 22.
1 42 Furthermore, if we were to strike the offending statutory language, we would do damage to the statutory scheme. Because the statutes do not differentiate between juveniles and adults, severing anything would mean changing the application of the statute to adults as well.
43 Finally, and fundamentally, severance is not appropriate because the scheme has not been declared facially unconstitutional. Instead, it is unconstitutional under Miller as applied to juveniles. This fact precludes applying section 2-4-204, which allows the court to remove portions from a statute which are found to be "unconstitutional." Because the statutes here are not constitutionally void, they are not candidates for severance. See, e.g., Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Vail Assocs., 19 P.3d 1263, 1280 (Colo.2001), as modified on denial of reh'g (Mar. 19, 2001) ("[We sever any provision that we hold to be unconstitutional from those provisions that stand...."); Rodrigues, 914 P.2d at 929 ("We may sever and strike any portion of a statute which we hold to be unconstitutional...."
{44 As an alternative, the People urge this court to apply the revival doctrine to arrive at an LWPP sentence. Here, that would mean applying the 1985 statutory scheme instead of the 1990 scheme. This is not a viable option either.
$45 Revival is a doctrine which "generally operates to reactivate a prior statute which has been replaced by an invalid act." People v. District Court, 834 P.2d 181, 189 (Colo.1992). In White v. District Court, 503 P.2d 340, 341 (Colo.1972), this Court gave three considerations for concluding that revival was appropriate in that case: (1) the newer law had completely replaced the older law; (2) if the newer law were declared unconstitutional, there would be a void in the law if the older law stayed repealed; and (8) the legislature would have intended the older law to be revived if it could have known the newer law would be declared unconstitutional. In this case, there are problems with each of these three considerations.
T46 First, the 1990 provision did not replace the 1985 provision, but merely added to the statutes. See § 17-22.5-104(2)(c)-(d); § 18-1.3-401(4)(a). Second, the 1990 provision has not been declared facially unconstitutional: as noted above, it is unconstitutional as applied to juveniles. Third, it is implausible that the legislature would intend to have its newer statute be replaced by an older statute when the newer statute has. not been declared unconstitutional. Revival, therefore, is not an option here.
{47 Although we reject the application of severance and revival doctrines, we conclude that LWPP is the appropriate sentence if LWOP is deemed unwarranted because it is the sentence that best reflects legislative intent. The basic principle underlying our severance and revival jurisprudence is that the intent of the legislature should be our guide. See, eg., Rodrigues, 914 P.2d at 929 ("The intent of the General Assembly aids our determination of the propriety of severing statutory language."); District Court, 834 P.2d at 189 ("To determine whether to apply the revival doctrine, the test of legislative intent was invoked . ."). We acknowledge that no direct legislative intent exists to guide the determination here, because the only sentence adopted by the legislature-mandatory LWOP-is unconstitutional. There are, however, still principles we can turn to for guidance. In examining this legislative intent, we must strive to keep as much of the legislature's work intact as possible, as a "ruling of unconstitutionality frus trates the intent of the elected representatives of the people." Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 329, 126 S.Ct. 961 (citing Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 104 S.Ct. 3262, 82 L.Ed.2d 487 (1984) (plurality opinion)); Daliman, 225 P.3d at 638 ("[W]e strike as little of the law as possible. ."). The core consideration of legislative intent is determining what the enacting legislature would have done if it had known that this eventuality would happen. United States v. Booker, 548 U.S. 220, 246, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) ("We seek to determine what Congress would have intended in light of the Court's constitutional holding.") (internal citations omitted); Montour, 157 P.3d at 502.("We seek to determine what the General Assembly would have intended in light of our constitutional holding."). We thus ask what the legislature would have imposed had it known that LWOP could be imposed under Miller only after individualized sentencing, and that such individualized sentencing would lead to cases in which LWOP is unwarranted.
48 We hold that that sentence would be LWPP. LWPP was the sentence in place prior to the 1990 provision. See § 18-1-105(4)(a), C.R.S. (1985). It is also the sentence imposed upon juveniles since 2006. See § 18-1.8-401(4)(b)(D-(ID). Because LWPP was the sentence chosen by the legislature both before and after the period at issue in these cases, it is likely in keeping with legislative intent.
149 We note that, as a general principle, looking to the subsequent actions of the legislature is not an ideal method of determining legislative intent. See, e.g., United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 411, 82 S.Ct. 1354, 8 L.Ed.2d 590 (1962) ("[SItatutes are construed by the courts with reference to the cireum-stances existing at the time of the passage."). This situation, however, is unique, in that Miller dictates that Colorado's mandatory LWOP sentencing scheme cannot be applied to juveniles such as Tate and Banks. Given the limitations of this unique situation, looking to the statutory scheme in place before and after the mandatory LWOP provision is our best indication of legislative intent in this case.
$50 As a final matter, we turn to the primary argument made by Banks-namely, that LWPP is unconstitutional under Miller because, like LWOP, it is mandatory in nature. Miller expressly addressed the imposition of "mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes." Miller, - U.S. at -, 182 S.Ct. at 2460. It did not suggest that LWPP would be similarly unconstitutional as applied to juveniles. Banks thus reads Miller too broadly. Because Miller does not go so far as to declare LWPP unconstitutional as applied to juveniles, we find that it is not only the appropriate sentence but also a constitutional one if LWOP is determined to be unwarranted under Miller.
1 51 In sum, we hold that the proper remedy after Miller is to vacate a defendant's LWOP and to remand the case to the trial court to consider whether LWOP is an appropriate sentence given the defendant's "youth and attendant characteristics." If the trial court concludes that LWOP is unwarranted, LWPP is the appropriate sentence. We therefore vacate the LWOP sentences imposed upon Tate and Banks and remand the cases for consideration of whether LWOP is appropriate considering their "youth and attendant characteristics." If not, LWPP should be imposed.
IIL
Y52 Jensen was sentenced to LWOP under the scheme described above, but in contrast to Tate and Banks, his convietion is final and is before this court on collateral review. We must therefore decide whether Miller applies retroactively. As we have observed, "limiting the retroactive application of constitutional rules . is vital to effectuating finality, which is an essential component of the criminal justice system." Edwards v. People, 129 P.3d 977, 987 (Colo.2006).
158 In Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 108 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (plurality opinion), the Supreme Court set forth the analysis for considering whether a new rule of criminal procedure should apply retroactively to a case which has already become final. States are not required to adopt Teag- ue for their retroactivity determinations. Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 266, 128 S.Ct 1029, 169 L.Ed.2d 859 (2008). However, this court has chosen to adopt Teague as its test for applying new rules retroactively. Edwards, 129 P.3d at 988.
{54 Under Teague, the first step of the analysis is to determine whether a conviction is final. Edwards, 129 P.3d at 988. Here, there is no question that Jensen's conviction is final and comes before us on collateral review. |
$55 Second, the question is whether Miller announced a "new rule." Id. Generally, a new rule is not retroactively applicable to cases that have become final before its announcement. Teague, 489 U.S. at 310, 109 S.Ct. 1060. A case announces a new rule when it "breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government." Id. at 301, 109 S.Ct. 1060. We conclude that Miller "broke new ground" and "imposed a new obligation on states" by holding that states could not sentence a juvenile defendant to LWOP without first considering the juvenile's "youth and attendant characteristics." Miller, 182 S.Ct. at 2471.
156 Third, if the rule is found to be new, as in this case, the issue is whether it "meets either of the two Teague exceptions to the general bar on retroactivity." Edwards, 129 P.3d at 983. The first of these exceptions is a "watershed rule"-that is, one "without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished." Id. at 985 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This definition of a watershed rule is "extremely narrow." Schriro, 542 U.S. at 352, 124 S.Ct. 2519. In fact, the Supreme Court has given only one example of such a watershed rule: Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963). Edwards, 129 P.3d at 979. Jensen offers nothing to support his assertion that Miller announces a watershed rule, nor do we find any such support. Instead, we conclude that the "extremely narrow" watershed exception does not apply here because Miller does not involve the accuracy of conviction at all, but rather sentencing.
157 The second exception to the general rule of nonretroactivity is where a new rule of criminal procedure is substantive in nature. Schriro, 542 U.S. at 851, 124 S.Ct. 2519. A new rule is substantive if it "alters the range of conduct or the class of persons that the law punishes." Id. at 858, 124 S.Ct. 2519. By contrast, a rule is procedural when it regulates "the manner of determining the defendant's culpability." Id.
{58 This distinction between procedural and substantive rules is well illustrated by Schriro. There, the Court determined that the new rule announced in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 158 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), would not apply retroactively. Schriro, 542 U.S. at 358, 124 S.Ct. 2519. Ring ruled that aggravating factors needed for a death penalty sentence must be determined by the jury, rather than a judge. Ring, 536 U.S. at 589, 122 S.Ct. 2428. Schriro held that because the Ring rule was procedural, and because it was not a "watershed" rule, it did not apply retroactively. Schriro, 542 U.S. at 358, 124 S.Ct. 2519.
T59 The Ring rule is procedural, the Court held, because it "d[id] not produce a class of persons convicted of conduct the law does not make criminal," id. at 352, 124 S.Ct. 2519, but rather "altered the range of permissible methods for determining whether a defendant's conduct is punishable by death." Id. at 358, 124 S.Ct. 2519. Schriro's procedural determination squarely applies to Jensen. The Miller rule does not make Jensen's crime less criminal, nor does it act as a categorical bar to a particular sentence. Rather, it requires that a certain process be followed before a juvenile can be sentenced to LWOP. To use Schriro's terminology, Miller "altered the range of permissible methods" for sentencing juveniles to LWOP.
£60 Millers own language makes this point abundantly clear. As noted above, the Court stated: "Our decision does not categorically bar a penalty for a class of offenders or type of erime-as, for example, we did in Roper or Graham. Instead, it mandates only that a sentencer follow a certain process-considering an offender's youth and attendant characteristiecs-before imposing u porticular penalty." - U.S. at -, 182 S.Ct. at 2471 (emphasis added). Miller itself describes its holding as a procedural one. We therefore find that it is procedural, rather than substantive, in nature.
161 Because Miller is procedural in nature, and is not a "watershed" rule of procedure, it does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review of a final judgment. It therefore does not apply to Jensen. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order denying Jensen's post-conviction motion.
IV.
62 For the reasons stated above, in both Tate and Banks, we reverse in part and affirm in part, and remand the cases for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. In Jensen, we affirm the trial court's order denying post-conviction relief.
CHIEF JUSTICE RICE concurs in part and dissents in part.
JUSTICE HOBBS concurs in part and dissents in part.
JUSTICE COATS concurs in part and dissents in part.
JUSTICE HOOD concurs in part and dissents in part, and JUSTICE MARQUEZ joins in the concurrence in part and the dissent in part.
. The question upon which we granted certiorari is the following:
Whether, after Miller v. Alabama, - U.S. -, 132 S.C1. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), invalidated mandatory life without parole for juveniles, the court of appeals erred by remanding the defendant's case for resentencing instead of upholding the defendant's life sentence and remanding the case to reflect that the defendant will be eligible for parole after forty calendar years.
. The questions upon which we granted certiora-ri are the following:
1. Whether, after Miller v. Alabama, - U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is violated by the imposition on a juvenile of a sentence of mandatory life sentence with the potential for parole after forty years.
2. Whether the court of appeals exceeded its judicial authority by rewriting the criminal sentence statutes in a way not authorized or compelled by Colorado statutes or sound "sev-erability" analysis.
. The question upon which we granted certiorari is the following:
Whether the district court's determination that petitioner's life without parole sentence was unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment and Art. II, section 20, Colo. Const., because he was a juvenile when the crime was committed, and, assuming the sentence is invalid, what is the appropriate remedy.
. The Attorney General has conceded that Miller applies retroactively to Jensen. This concession, however, is not binding on this court. People in Interest of P.J.N., 664 P.2d 245 (Colo.1983) (holding that a specific precedent does not control the result, despite the fact that both parties conceded that it did); Denver & R.G.R. Co. v. Johnson, 50 Colo. 187, 114 P. 650, 651 (1911) (''The fact that opposing counsel may agree upon a proposition of law, does not commit the court to its approval."). The District Attorney is not bound by the concession either. See People v. Vigil, 2015 CO 43 ¶ 1, - P.3d - (Colo.2015) (noting that the District Attorney in that case argues that Miller does not apply retroactively). We therefore proceed to consider the Miller retroactivity question on the merits.
. Jensen was also sentenced under this scheme.
. The fact that the statutes are not unconstitutionally void also precludes an alternate theory of severance, namely, one that would remove the temporal restrictions in section 18-1.3-401(4)(b)(II), C.R.S. (2014), and section 17-22.5-104(2)(d). Because no one has claimed the temporal restrictions are constitutionally void, severance is not applicable to them. Additionally, striking the temporal restrictions would violate our goal of "limit[ing] the solution to the problem." Ayotfe, 546 U.S. at 321, 126 S.Ct. 961. The problem with the 1990 statutory scheme is not that it sentences juveniles to LWOP. The problem is that it sentences them to LWOP without individualized sentencing that takes their youth into account. See Miller, - U.S. at -, 132 S.Ct. at 2471. Striking the temporal restrictions from these statutes would eliminate the possibility of this individualized sentencing, which goes beyond the immediate problem and "nulliflies} more of a legislature's work than is necessary." Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 321, 126 S.Ct. 961.
. Because states are not required to adopt the Teague retroactivity analysis, Miller's inclusion of Jackson v. State, 194 S.M.W.3d 757 (Ark.2004), which was on collateral review, Miller, - U.S. at -, 132 S.Ct. at 2461, suggests that the Court left the retroactivity issue to the Arkansas courts to decide. Moreover, had the Court disposed of the retroactivity issue in Jackson, it would have been unnecessary for it to grant certiorari in Montgomery v. Louisiana, No. 14-280, which presents two issues: first, the issue raised by the petitioner, namely, whether the Louisiana Supreme Court erred in not applying Miller retroactively; and second, the issue added by the Court itself, namely, whether the state court's determination of non-retroactivity raises a federal question within the Court's jurisdiction to review.