Case Name: Angela Gonzales, Wife of/and Winston A. ST. HILL v. Carolyn Kass TABOR a/k/a Carolyn Falgout and State Farm Fire and Casualty Company
Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1988-07-26
Citations: 532 So. 2d 776
Docket Number: No. 87-CA-526
Parties: Angela Gonzales, Wife of/and Winston A. ST. HILL v. Carolyn Kass TABOR a/k/a Carolyn Falgout and State Farm Fire and Casualty Company.
Judges: Before KLIEBERT, BOWES and GAUDIN, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 532
Pages: 776–790

Head Matter:
Angela Gonzales, Wife of/and Winston A. ST. HILL v. Carolyn Kass TABOR a/k/a Carolyn Falgout and State Farm Fire and Casualty Company.
No. 87-CA-526.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fifth Circuit.
July 26, 1988.
Rehearing Denied Nov. 17, 1988.
Writ Granted Jan. 20, 1989.
Edward R. Drury, Morris W. Reed, New Orleans, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Daryl A. Higgins, Gretna, for defendants-appellees.
Before KLIEBERT, BOWES and GAUDIN, JJ.

Opinion:
GAUDIN, Judge.
This suit was filed in the 24th Judicial District Court by Mr. and Mrs. Winston A. St. Hill, whose 16-year-old son Shawn drowned in a residential swimming pool during a high school graduation party.
A 12-person jury found the pool-owner, Mrs. Carolyn Falgout, not negligent. We affirm.
Prior to trial, a settlement agreement between Shawn's parents and Mrs. Falg-out's insurance carrier, State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, was reached, and State Farm was dismissed as a party defendant.
Following the jury verdict, the plaintiffs moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, alleging that the trial judge erred (1) in not removing juror Harvey Rodriguez, (2) in limiting each side to six peremptory challenges, (3) in verbally communicating with the jury outside of the presence of the parties and their counsel and (4) in failing to declare a mistrial once it became known that the alternate juror, Selma Taylor, participated in jury discussions after having been excused.
This motion was denied by the trial judge, who did not give any reasons.
In their initial brief to this Court, petitioners-appellants again assigned errors relating to jury selection and jury activity. Appellee's brief attempted to deal with these issues.
In a reply brief, filed over appellee's objection, appellants again dwell on the alleged jury problems and they also, for the first time, argue that the jury verdict was contrary to the evidence and was not supported by a reasonable factual basis.
We shall initially consider the jury verdict and whether it was clearly wrong, then discuss appellant's assignments of error concerning jury selection and jury activity.
The backyard party in question was held on May 11, 1985 at Mrs. Falgout's home, 647 Ave. D in Westwego, Louisiana. Guests had been invited to an "Anything Goes Pool Party" beginning at 7 p.m. in honor of Mrs. Falgout's son, Steven Tabor, aged 18, Mrs. Falgout's son by a prior marriage and a member of John Ehret High School's graduating class. Actually Steve was a GED student and attended adult education classes.
Approximately 150 persons attended the party, including Shawn and some others under 18 years of age. Alcoholic beverages were available, including several kegs of beer and a fruit punch spiked with two bottles of rum. The punch was described as "weak" and hardly anyone drank it. Food, including 500 hot dogs, and soft drinks were also provided. One guest, Brian Pertuit, brought two watermelons to the party and someone spiked them. Most of the beverages and food were under a covered patio and guests would help themselves to whatever they wanted.
Mrs. Falgout testified that she assumed those under age would not drink thé alcoholic beverages. She said:
"... I figured they were old enough to know and obey their parents.
"I watched for them and also the policeman. I wouldn't let anyone get intoxicated or make a scene ."
Steve said that his mother cautioned him about serving alcohol to minors. He said:
"She told me that she didn't want, you know, any minors coming and drinking and I said, 'Mom, it is supposed to be a graduation party. Most people are going to be 18 or over,' and she said, 'Well, to make sure everything is okay, I will hire a policeman.' "
The affair was, according to witnesses, a normal high school graduation party. Music was played and there was a certain amount of so-called horseplay. Most of the guests who went into the pool had swimming attire while about four or five others were pushed in fully clothed. The horseplay was described as "playful ' not violent or unfriendly.
To prevent trouble Mrs. Falgout hired a uniformed police officer, Sgt. Anthony Waj-da. He said the poolside horseplay was "normal." Other than for those instances where guests were pushed into the pool clothed, the overall behavior of the guests, according to the officer, was "extremely great." He added: "The conduct of the participants was fantastic."
Sgt. Wajda was hired to keep order, not as a lifeguard. Steve, who doesn't drink, said:
"... I didn't feel we needed one (a lifeguard) because I am a certified lifeguard, and my sister and a couple of other friends are."
Shawn, who could not swim, nonetheless brought his swimming suit and entered the pool. He told a friend, Mark McGowan, that he would stay in the shallow end to avoid being tossed in where it was deep. The pool was 32 feet long, 22 feet wide and 10 feet deep at one end. The shallow end was three feet in depth.
Extra lighting was placed around the pool area while the pool itself had submerged lighting. The pool had clearly visible numerical markings showing the depth at various spots. Extra chlorine had been put in the pool before the party to keep the water as clear as possible.
During the evening, as many as 30 persons were in the pool at one time. This usage, along with the fact that some guests were shoved in fully clothed, caused the water to cloud as the evening progressed.
At close to 11 p.m. when the party was ending, only Steve and several other boys were in the pool, diving from the diving board. After a dive, Steve said that "he felt an arm" in the water. It was Shawn's arm.
Steve testified as follows:
"I dove off my diving board and I did a flip, and I went down in the water feet first and when I got to the bottom, I felt an arm and I grabbed it and I shook it, and when I opened my eyes, I saw him so I tried getting him out and I was holding onto his wrist, but I couldn't get up out of the water because it was ten and a half feet deep so I didn't want to let go of him so I stuck my head out and hollered for help. At first, they thought I was kidding because they couldn't see him. It was far down. I hollered "Help" once and they laughed and I said a curse word to let them know I was serious. When they realized I was serious, I went underneath him and tried pushing him to the side surface and then several people jumped in and helped and pulled him out and started giving him CPR immediately."
Keith Bouvier, one of several volunteer firemen who were there as guests, administered CPR until an ambulance arrived, according to Bouvier, "within a couple of minutes." The ambulance, from nearby West Jefferson General Hospital, was called at 11:03 p.m. and it reached the Falgout residence at 11:09 p.m. At 11:14 p.m., the ambulance was at the hospital. Bouvier and an ambulance attendant continued administering CPR while the ambulance drove to the hospital's emergency room, which had been put on alert by the ambulance driver. All of this was to no avail.
Following the drowning, Sgt. Wajda conducted an investigation for the Westwego Police Department. He interviewed a number of persons who were there but nobody could say how, where or why Shawn entered the pool shortly before he was found underwater. None of the witnesses who testified at the trial knew how, where or why Shawn got into the water.
In their petition, plaintiffs alleged in paragraph IX that Shawn "... was unwillingly shoved in the water and was caused to drown by reason of negligence of the defendant (Mrs. Falgout) and then its agents and the servants in failing to properly supervise the decedent and to rescue him from drowning."
The testimony, however, did not reveal that Shawn was "unwillingly shoved in the water." Not a single witness testified to that.
There is, of course, the possibility that Shawn was pushed into the water at the deep end of the pool. On the other hand, as appellee suggests, Shawn might have ventured out too far from the shallow end and slipped. This is all conjecture.
As the plaintiff's were not able to ascertain how Shawn drowned, they were obviously unable, as far as the jury was con- cemed, to establish a causal connection between Shawn's death and any breach of duty allegedly owed by Mrs. Falgout, such as her failure to hire a lifeguard, her failure to control horseplay around the pool or her failure to cease swimming activity once the water became cloudy.
There is no statutory or jurisprudential requirement that a lifeguard be hired for a backyard pool party, particularly if several guests are certified lifeguards; and while some guests were shoved into the water, the testimony showed that the horseplay was in fun and that it was never out of control.
Mrs. Falgout said that the water became cloudy about 9 or 9:30 p.m. because swimmers were unintentionally carrying grass, sand and dirt into the pool with them. She did not modify swimming activities, she stated, because "... they were all good swimmers in the pool. I thought everybody in the pool knew how to swim. I saw no danger in it."
The autopsy revealed that Shawn's blood alcohol level was .055, below the legal intoxication level of .10. Shawn, according to the testimony of his friends, had several drinks at the party but there was no testimony that this caused or contributed to the drowning.
Plaintiffs called William Lloyd, Tulane University's swimming team coach, in an attempt to cast negligence on Mrs. Falg-out. He was qualified as an expert in water safety and pool maintenance although most of his experience in and around pools has been in the State of Virginia. This was his first time testifying in court, here or there.
Mr. Lloyd testified about the problems associated with having a party around a backyard pool; and, in his opinion, Mrs. Falgout should have hired a lifeguard. He said:
when you introduce . alcohol you invite a lot of other horseplay and under that situation you need to have someone constantly in supervision of a pool activity. To be honest with you I would not allow it."
Mr. Lloyd also said that the pool water was too cloudy and that there should have been a floating rope divider between the deep and shallow portions of the pool, but he did not know how, where and why Shawn drowned so he could not and did not say that there was a causal connection between any alleged pool and/or party failing and Shawn's death.
Dr. Paul McGarry, who performed the autopsy and who testified as an expert witness, said that Shawn was submerged a "very few minutes . only a few minutes."
Dr. McGarry stated that when Shawn "... arrived at the hospital he was without any vital signs, he did not breathe and he did not have a pulse or heartbeat but his heart did respond to electrical shock and it did start working again, start pumping again. This indicates that the heart muscle was not long inactive . A matter of a few minutes is all that I suspect . before he was brought out of the water."
The response to the electrical shocks was described by Dr. McGarry as "... feeble and ineffective and did not bring him back."
Dr. McGarry was questioned at length, under direct and cross, as to exactly how long Shawn was under water. He explained the variables, such as how much oxygen is in a person's lungs when they go beneath the surface. Dr. McGarry gave this description of the drowning process:
"The first minute he has oxygen, he's stopped breathing he's under water and he can't breathe so he's using up whatever oxygen is in his lungs, whatever is in his blood at that time. The second minute he's beginning to feel a very definite need for more oxygen, this indicates that his organs are becoming oxygen deprived and giving him the reflex stimulation to breathe. He's unable to breathe so he makes breathing movements in a water atmosphere and within the next five to eight minutes after that his brain has been without oxygen for too long and the brain cells are lethally damaged."
Shawn, according to Dr. McGarry, could have been under water for two or three minutes or up to seven or eight minutes.
Mrs. Falgout's son was not named a party defendant and her insurer, State Farm, settled. The most significant issue before the jury when this case was tried was Mrs. Falgout's possible negligence and personal liability.
In anticipation of the poolside party, Mrs. Falgout had extra lighting installed, she hired a policeman to keep order and she did everything else she thought necessary and reasonable. The jury found her not responsible for the tragic and unforeseen drowning of a guest who could not swim yet went into the pool regardless.
In the total absence in the record of any causal connection between any alleged breach of duty and Shawn's drowning, we cannot say the jury erred. In Preston v. Granger, 517 So.2d 1125 (La.App. 5th Cir.1987), this Court said at page 1130:
"In cases in which the evidence is in disagreement, the trier of fact is obliged to make credibility decisions based on its reasonable evaluations of witnesses and on its reasonable inferences of fact from the evidence presented. Unless manifestly erroneous this decision should not be disturbed by this court in its appellate review. Arceneaux v. Domingue, 365 So.2d 1330 (La.1979)."
We turn now to the assignments of error regarding the jury. In their original brief, appellants made these arguments:
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DECLARE A MISTRIAL ONCE IT WAS REVEALED THAT THE ALTERNATE JUROR PARTICIPATED IN THE JURY DELIBERATIVE PROCESS.
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN VERBALLY COMMUNICATING WITH THE JURY OFF THE RECORD AND OUT OF THE PRESENCE OF PLAINTIFF COUNSEL DURING DELIBERATIONS.
III. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REFUSING POST-TRIAL INTERVIEW OF JURY AFTER ALTERNATE JUROR INVADED DELIBERATIVE PROCESS.
IV.THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN NOT EXCUSING A JUROR FOR CAUSE WHEN ONCE SEATED AND SWORN JUROR ADMITTED HE WAS NOT FORTHRIGHT DURING VOIR DIRE.
The alternate juror was Selma Taylor. When the trial ended, the district court judge gave Mr. Taylor a certificate acknowledging his jury service and thanked him for his participation. Mr. Taylor did not leave however; instead he inadvertently went to the jury room and listened to the deliberations for approximately 45 minutes before a court bailiff noticed his presence.
The trial judge immediately went to thé jury room where was advised that Mr. Taylor had not participated in the discussion. The trial judge called the foreman to the courtroom and questioned him in open court about Mr. Taylor. The foreman confirmed the fact that Mr. Taylor had just sat in the deliberation room and listened.
Louisiana's Code of Civil Procedure does not give a trial judge specific instructions in every instance but LSA-C.C. art. 21 states:
"In all civil matters, where there is no expressed law, the Judge is bound to proceed and decide according to equity. To decide equitably, an appeal is to be made to natural law and reason, or received usages, where positive law is silent."
Appellants contend in their brief that Mr. Taylor was an extraneous influence on the jury. No cases are cited.
It does not seem, however, that Mr. Taylor's mere presence had any effect on the jury. The trial judge correctly decided that this slight irregularity did not interfere with either orderly jury deliberations or the subsequent verdict.
The second assigned jury error is connected to the first. Neither appellants nor their attorney was present when the trial judge called Mr. Taylor to the courtroom, where he was questioned and again released. If a trial judge communicates with a jury or with an individual juror, he should do so in the presence of the parties or at least their counsel. However, appellants do not say how or why they were prejudiced.
The third assignment of jury error is also related to the first. Appellants say they were deprived of the opportunity to question Mr. Taylor or the jury foreman.
Mistrials are properly declared when, because of some circumstance, justice cannot be achieved. Such was not the case here. When the trial judge learned that Mr. Taylor neither spoke nor contributed in any other fashion to the jury discussions, he (the trial judge) rightly and appropriately denied the request for a mistrial.
In the fourth assignment of jury error, appellants contend that juror Harvey Rodriguez should have been removed for cause on the second day of trial after a witness named Don Gibson had been on the stand. Mr. Gibson was a party guest and he had been called by petitioners to testify.
During a break in the proceedings, Mr. Rodriguez told the trial judge that while he did not recognize Mr. Gibson by name, he did now recognize him as a person he had gone to school with. Rodriguez further said that other witnesses may fit into the same category. The trial judge then advised counsel that Mr. Rodriguez had approached the bench and suggested to the court that he had gone to school or knew several of the witnesses who were involved in this matter . I simply asked him if he felt that it would affect his ability to render a fair impartial verdict in this matter and he said it did not."
Appellant's attorney moved to strike Mr. Rodriguez for cause, saying Mr. Rodriguez had not been truthful during voir dire. Mr. Rodriguez, however, apparently had been truthful on voir dire when he said he didn't recognize any names, just as he was truthful when he later approached the trial judge saying he recognized Mr. Gibson's face. The trial judge no doubt felt Mr. Rodriguez was also telling the truth when he (Rodriguez) said he could render a just verdict.
Trial judges are vested with broad discretionary powers when determining the capability of jurors to serve. Only when an abuse of this power occurs should an appellate court intervene. See Druilhet v. Comeaux, 317 So.2d 270 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1975), writs denied at 321 So.2d 363 (La.1975), and many other cases with similar holdings.
Here, the trial judge assisted in the selection of a representative jury. He did not err either in his handling of the alternate juror or in his refusal to dismiss Mr. Rodriguez once the trial was under way.
We affirm the judgment in Mrs. Falg-out's favor with appellants to bear costs.
AFFIRMED.
. By Mark McGowan, Shawn's friend.