Case Name: ALICE E. MARTIN, Appellant, v. ANNIE KENEFIC O'BRIEN, Respondent
Court: North Dakota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: North Dakota
Decision Date: 1918-11-30
Citations: 42 N.D. 306
Docket Number: 
Parties: ALICE E. MARTIN, Appellant, v. ANNIE KENEFIC O’BRIEN, Respondent.
Judges: 
Reporter: North Dakota Reports
Volume: 42
Pages: 306–319

Head Matter:
ALICE E. MARTIN, Appellant, v. ANNIE KENEFIC O’BRIEN, Respondent.
(173 N. W. 809.)
Action to quiet title — adverse possession — what constitutes.
This is an action to quiet title to a quarter section of land in Ramsey county. As the proof shows the title stands of record in the name of the defendant, but the plaintiff is the owner of the land, and she and her deceased husband have been in actual and adverse and continuous possession for over twenty years and have paid all taxes. Hence, the title of plaintiff is quieted and confirmed.
Opinion filed November 30, 1918.
Petition for rehearing filed May 9, 1919.
Appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Ramsey County, Honorable C. W. Cooley, Special Judge.
Plaintiff appeals.
Reversed and remanded.
J. C. Adamson and JB. S. Blood, for appellant.
Where the plaintiff in ejectment has been in possession of the land for nearly thirty years, the fact that the land was embraced in a deed to the defendant is not sufficient to defeat the plaintiff’s title. Jones v. Graham, 80 Ga. 591; LaFrambois v. Jackson, 8 Cow. 589, 18 Am. Dec. 473; Draper v. Shoot, 25 Mo. 197, 69 Am. Dec. 462.
To constitute an adverse possession there need not be a fence, building, or other improvement made; it is sufficient if visible and notorious acts of ownership are exercised over the premises in controversy for the time limited by the statute. Ewing v. Burnet, 11 Pet. 53; Wallace v. Maxwell, 51 Am. Dec. 380; 1 Am. & Eng. Ene. L. p. 888.
The testimony of respondent that she had executed no deed to anyone, on account of her being a party to the action her evidence is incompetent, and the court cannot consider such testimony in an action of this nature. Regan v. Jones, 14 N. D. 693, 105 N. W. 613; Dowdy v. Watson, 115 G'a. 42, 41 S. E. 266; Webb v. Simmons, 3 Ga. App. 639, 60 S. E. 334; Georgia Chemical Works v. Cartledge, 77 Ga. 547, 4 Am. St. Rep. 96; Jarvis v. Andrews, 80 Ark. 277, 96 S. W. 1064; Steinwand v. Brown (N. D.) 166 N. W. 129; Nash v. Land Co. 15 N. D. 566, 108 N. W. 792.
In making up the time required by statute to acquire title to land by adverse possession, the wife is entitled to tack her possession to that of her deceased husband. Georgia Chemical Works v. Cartledge, 77 Ga. 547, 4 Am. St. Rep. 96; Jarvis v. Andrews, 80 Ark. 277, 96 S. W. 1064; Stein v. Brown (N. D.) 166 N. W. 129; Nash v. Land Co. 15 N. D. 566, 108 N. W. 792.
W. M. Anderson, for respondent.
In every action for the recovery of real property or the possession thereof the person establishing a legal title to the premises shall be presumed to have been possessed thereof within the time required by law; and the occupation of such premises by any other person shall be deemed to have been under' an insubordination to the legal title, unless it appears that such premises have been held and possessed adversely, to such legal title for twenty years before the commencement of such action. Comp. Laws 1913, §§ 7365, 7370, relating to landlord and tenant.
Where possession is originally taken under the true owner, a clear, positive, and continued disclaimer and disavowal of title, and an assertion or an adverse right brought home to the true owner, are indispensable before any foundation can be laid for the operation of the Statute of Limitation. If this were not so the greatest injustice might be done. Without such knowledge the owner has a right to rely upon the fiduciary relation under which the possession was originally taken and held. 1 Cye. 1022.
The possession of one who recognizes or admits title in another, ■either by declaration or conduct, is not adverse to the title of such other, until such occupant has changed the character of his possession, either express declaration or the exercise of actual ownership inconsistent with a subordinate character. 1 Cyc. 1033.
The mere fact that claimant has. had possession of the land for the statutory period will not suffice to satisfy the rale requiring the disseisor’s possession to be hostile. 1 Cyc. 1026 and cases cited.

Opinion:
Robinson, J.
The plaintiff is the widow and the legal successor of Daniel E. Martin. She brings this action to quiet her title to the southwest quarter of section 1 — Twp. 155 — Range 63. To a person who has lived in this state from early territorial times, and who knows how the titles were then acquired, the case presents not the least shadoiv of doubt. It is true the record title is in the defendant, but that is a matter which she just recently discovered.
In May, 1884, in the United States Land Office in Grand Forks, entry was made of the land and a receiver's receipt showing payment of $200 was issued to Elizabeth Kenefic. Then she made to her brother Daniel E. Martin a warranty deed of the land. As a question was raised concerning the validity of the entry, Martin through Frank Wilder quitclaimed the land back to the United States. Then he caused his sister, the defendant, to file on the land, and in December, 1889, in consideration of $200, the receiver of the United States Land Office issued the usual duplicate receipt for this land to Annie Kenefic. She at once mortgaged the land for $1,200, and in the course of a year the mortgage was paid by Daniel Martin. Doubtless at the time of mortgaging the land Annie Kenefic made to Daniel Martin a deed of the land in the same manner as her sister had done. But he wisely held the deed from record so as not to furnish evidence that the entry had been made for him. Manifestly the two sisters filed on this land and made entry of the same for Dan Martin, their brother. Neither of the sisters ever cultivated the land, made any improvements on it, or paid out a dollar for the making of final proof and entry. That was all done by Dan Martin. He caused the land to be mortgaged; he mortgaged it several times and paid the mortgages. From 1884 until the time of his death, in 1909, his possession of the land was continuous. During all of that time as owner in fee he was in the actual, open, adverse, and undisputed possession of the land, and he paid all taxes against it. And since then, the plaintiff, his legal successor, has continued in the open, adverse, and undisputed possession of the land and has paid all taxes against the same.
Just before this action was commenced, the plaintiff obtained an abstract of title and discovered that the title of record stood in the name of Annie Kenefic and applied to her for a quitclaim. In that way defendant discovered that the title was in her name and she concluded to hold it. The facts speak louder than words, and show beyond question that the plaintiff owns the land and the defendant has no title or interest in it. Hence, the judgment must be reversed and a judgment entered to the effect that the plaintiff is the owner in fee of the land and that her title be quieted and confirmed.
Reversed and remanded.