Case Name: Glen WEISMAN and Elliott Weisman, Individually and Trading as Weisman Investment, Appellees, v. The GREEN TREE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant. Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1996-01-17
Citations: 447 Pa. Super. 549
Docket Number: No. 1019
Parties: Glen WEISMAN and Elliott Weisman, Individually and Trading as Weisman Investment, Appellees, v. The GREEN TREE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant. Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
Judges: Before JOHNSON, HUDOCK, and OLSZEWSKI, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports
Volume: 447
Pages: 549–560

Head Matter:
670 A.2d 160
Glen WEISMAN and Elliott Weisman, Individually and Trading as Weisman Investment, Appellees, v. The GREEN TREE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant. Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
Argued Nov. 1, 1995.
Filed Jan. 17, 1996.
Thomas P. Bracaglia, Philadelphia, for appellant.
Joel D. Caney, Philadelphia, for appellees.
Before JOHNSON, HUDOCK, and OLSZEWSKI, JJ.

Opinion:
OLSZEWSKI, Judge:
Appellees Glen and Elliott Weisman own and rent property-located at 13043 Blakeslee Court in Philadelphia. On November 15, 1992, one of their tenants at the Blakeslee Court address committed suicide with a shotgun. Appellees incurred $5,020.15 in damages for emergency cleanup, repairs and replacement of damaged property, and lost rent.
Since the Blakeslee Court premises were insured under a Limited Peril policy with appellant Green Tree Insurance Company, appellees notified appellant of the damages and of their intent to make a claim under their policy. When appellant refused to pay, appellees filed the instant suit.
Initially, the case went to arbitration, where a panel of arbitrators found in favor of appellees in the amount of the alleged damages, plus interest. On appeal to the trial court, the parties stipulated to the facts and submitted briefs on a single issue: "whether the 'explosion peril' provision of [the] insurance policy encompassed damages sustained as a result of a shotgun blast." Trial court opinion, 6/14/95 at 1. On February 6, 1995, the Honorable Marvin R. Halbert found that the policy provision did cover the alleged damages, and entered judgment in favor of appellees. This appeal followed.
Appellant now claims that the trial court erred in concluding that the explosion provision provided coverage for gunshot damages. A question regarding the interpretation of an insurance contract is a matter of law for the courts to decide. E.g., Paylor v. Hartford Ins. Co., 536 Pa. 583, 585, 640 A.2d 1234, 1235 (1994). Our goal in interpreting an insurance contract is to ascertain the intent of the parties, as manifested by the language of the written policy agreement. Id. "When the policy language is clear and unambiguous, we will give effect to the language of the contract." Id. If the provisions of a policy are ambiguous, however, the ambiguous provision is "construed in favor of the insured and against the insurer, the drafter of the instrument." Bateman v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 527 Pa. 241, 244, 590 A.2d 281, 283 (1991).
We will not find a contract provision ambiguous simply because the parties do not agree upon the proper construction. E.g., Ryan Homes, Inc. v. Home Indemnity Co., 436 Pa.Super. 342, 346, 647 A.2d 939, 941 (1994), appeal denied, 540 Pa. 621, 657 A.2d 491 (1995). Rather, "[a]n ambiguity exists only when a policy provision is reasonably susceptible of more than one meaning." Id. See also Jefferson v. State Farm Ins., 380 Pa.Super. 167, 168, 551 A.2d 283, 284 (1988) (stating that a provision is ambiguous if reasonably intelligent persons could differ as to its meaning). Generally, courts should try to "read policy provisions to avoid ambiguities, if possible, and not torture language to create them." Carpenter v. Federal Ins. Co., 432 Pa.Super. 111, 117-18, 637 A.2d 1008, 1011 (1994), appeal granted, 540 Pa. 576, 655 A.2d 508, appeal denied, 540 Pa. 592, 655 A.2d 982 (1995).
In the present case, the policy provision under scrutiny reads as follows:
PERILS INSURED AGAINST
We insure for direct physical loss to the property covered caused by a peril listed below unless the loss is excluded in the General Exclusions.
sfc H? # # #
3. Explosion.
R.R. at 13a. The trial court found that the term "explosion," which was not defined in the policy, was ambiguous because it was reasonably susceptible to differing interpretations and could arguably encompass a shotgun blast. See trial court opinion, 6/14/95 at 3. Therefore, the court construed the provision in favor of appellees and held that their claimed damages were covered. Appellant asserts that the trial court erred because the term "explosion" was not ambiguous and clearly indicated that the parties did not intend to cover the discharge of a weapon. After careful review, we conclude that the trial court correctly' interpreted this policy provision.
As defined in Webster's, the verb "explode" is defined in part as follows:
1: to burst forth with sudden violence or noise from internal energy: as a: to undergo a rapid chemical or nuclear reaction with the production of noise, heat, and violent expansion of gases . b: to burst violently as a result of pressure from within....
Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 438 (9th ed.1984). See also Allen v. Insurance Co. of North America, 175 Pa.Super. 281, 283, 104 A.2d 191, 193 (1954) (holding that the term "explosion" must be taken in its ordinary sense, i.e., as "a violent bursting or expansion, with noise."). Under this definition, it is at least arguable that a shotgun blast is a type of explosion. A shotgun certainly bursts forth with sudden violence and noise, and the burst is the result of internal energy. Hence, a broad reading of the term "explosion" could seemingly encompass a shotgun blast. Cf. Allen, 175 Pa.Super. at 283, 104 A.2d at 193 (finding damage caused by oil seeping from a storage tank was not caused by an "explosion" because the court found no evidence of sudden violence, noise, smoke, sprayed oil, or any type of detonation).
Admittedly, the term "explosion" is not commonly used to describe a shotgun blast. Nevertheless, we find that the term is susceptible to more than one meaning and that reasonably intelligent persons could differ as to whether a shotgun blast could be described as an explosion. Therefore, we conclude that this policy provision, which simply states that "explosions" are covered perils, is ambiguous as it applies to shotgun blasts. See Ryan, 436 Pa.Super. at 346, 647 A.2d at 941 (defining an ambiguous policy provision); Jefferson, 380 Pa.Super. at 168, 551 A.2d at 284 (same).
Since the explosion provision in the policy is ambiguous, we must construe it against appellant, the insurer. Using this liberal interpretation, the trial court properly found that the shotgun damages to appellees' property were covered by their insurance policy.
' We highlight the fact that many of the other perils in this policy were expressly limited, and appellant certainly had the ability to further limit its coverage for explosions. It is incumbent upon appellant, however, to make these limitations clear. See Carpenter, 432 Pa.Super. at 116, 637 A.2d at 1011 ("As the drafter of an insurance policy, it is incumbent upon the insurance company to delineate as precisely as possible the full extent of coverage."). Since we find that appellant did not clearly limit its coverage so as to exclude shotgun damages, we agree with the trial court's ruling in favor of appellees.
Order affirmed.
. Wc also find it interesting to note that a gun is more commonly described as being "fired," and the verb "fire" is defined in part as "to cause to explode." See Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 465 (9th ed.1984).