Case Name: NIEBOER v. DETROIT ELECTRIC RAILWAY
Court: Michigan Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1901-10-22
Citations: 128 Mich. 486
Docket Number: 
Parties: NIEBOER v. DETROIT ELECTRIC RAILWAY.
Judges: Hooker and Long, JJ., concurred with Grant, J.
Reporter: Michigan Reports
Volume: 128
Pages: 486–495

Head Matter:
NIEBOER v. DETROIT ELECTRIC RAILWAY.
Street Railways — Injury to Passenger — Contributory Negligence-Riding on Bumper.
Plaintiff, -while riding on the rear bumper of an electric car, was struck by another car, and injured. In an action, against the company, he claimed that he rode where he did because the car was crowded; but it appeared that he could have taken another car two or three minutes later, in which there was ample room. There was nothing to show any custom authorizing him to ride on the bumper, and the conductor, on observing his position; told him he had better go inside or wait for another car. Held, that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, and could not recover for the injury. Moore, J., and Montgomery, 0. J., dissenting; being of opinion that the. facts warranted the inference that plaintiff occupied his position with the assent of the conductor.
Error to Wayne; Carpenter, J.
Submitted June 4, 1901.
Decided October 22, 1901.
Case by Peter H. Nieboer, by next friend, against the Detroit Electric Railway, for personal injuries. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant brings error.
Reversed.
Plaintiff, about 6 o’clock p. m., desired to take one of' the defendant’s cars on the usual route to his home. Under the plea that the car was crowded, he climbed upon the dead wood or “bumper” at the rear of the car. The deadwood is a block of wood 3 feet long at the longest part, beveled at the corners, about 6 inches wide, and at the outside is from 2 feet 4 to 2 feet 6-inches long. Two large bolts go through the deadwood, and are bolted to-a cast-iron drawhead in the center. A drawpin an inch thick goes through the deadwood into the drawhead. Above the head of the deadwood are the bolts with the nuts thereon, the head of the drawpin, the staple to which the drawpin is fastened, and the chain attached thereto. The slack of the chain is also on top of the deadwood. The car platforms are inclosed for a space about - 3 feet high, with a railing on top. The car was evidently in a crowded condition. Whether plaintiff could have obtained standing room on the platform or inside of the car is not clear. There was room for the conductor to go through the car and collect fares.
Plaintiff testified that he was riding with both feet on the deadwood and both hands hold of the railing, and that it was necessary for him to thus ride to keep from falling off. Two others got on and stood upon the deadwood with him, plaintiff being in the center. Cars were running at intervals of from two to three minutes.' The car on which plaintiff was riding had stopped. A rear car was approaching. The motorman, evidently not anticipating that the car in front would stop at that point, was unable to bring his car to a stop before it struck the one in front. The blow was not a severe one, and no one in either car was injured but the plaintiff. In some way his ankle was injured. He was unable to tell how. Either his foot must have been hanging over the deadwood, or he must have been standing with his foot at right angles with the deadwood, so that either his heel or his toes extended beyond it. Plaintiff testified that the conductor had not asked him for his fare. The conductor testified that he asked him for his fare, and that plaintiff replied that he would have to wait until he got his hands in his pockets. The conductor then said to him, “You better get around and get inside, or wait for another car,” and then went through the car to collect fares. The conductor did not collect his fare, but intended to return and collect it after he collected the fares of the other passengers. Before he returned, the accident happened. The case was submitted to the jury, who rendered a verdict for the plaintiff.
Thomas T. Leete, Jr., for appellant.
Ira A. Lieghley, for appellee.
Rehearing denied, but new trial granted, October 18,1902.

Opinion:
Grant, J.
(after stating the facts). Plaintiff was not invited to ride upon the deadwood. No custom was shown permitting him to ride there. The company had instructed its employés not to permit it. It was not intended or sanctioned for the use of passengers. It needs no, argument to demonstrate that the position was a dangerous one, and never intended as a place for passengers to ride. The place was so dangerous that the plaintiff considered it necessary to hold on with both hands. According to his own theory, then, it was a place where it would be next to impossible for him to pay fare. There was danger in rounding curves, from sudden stoppage and starting, and from collisions both' in front and from the rear, which are not of uncommon occurrence. The two passengers who were standing with plaintiff jumped from the car, which was then standing still, and escaped injury. Plaintiff testified that he did not have time to jump. There was neither an express nor implied assent for the plaintiff to ride in this dangerous position. The conductor advised him not to ride there, by telling him that he better get off and wait, or get inside. This language cannot be construed into an invitation. It was a busy time, when people were returning from their work apd business to their homes. The conductor was not called upon to stop and put the plaintiff off. He had done all that was required in warning, if, indeed, he needed any warning. Plaintiff knew that, if the car was crowded, others were coming within two or three min •utes, which he could have taken, and the testimony shows that there was room on the next car. Plaintiff voluntarily, and without invitation or permission, chose to ride in a dangerous place, rather than attempt to get inside or to wait a few minutes for another car. His negligent act was a continuing one, and directly contributed to the injury. When a place is one not provided or intended for passengers to ride upon, and is in itself dangerous, the •employe who assumes to permit a passenger to ride in such a place acts without authority, unless such authority be shown expressly or by common custom. The case comes within the principle established by the following authorities: Chamberlain v. Railroad Co., 11 Wis. 238; Jackson v. Crilly, 16 Colo. 103 (26 Pac. 331); L. R. & Ft. S. Ry. v. Miles, 40 Ark. 298 (48 Am. Rep. 10); Carroll v. Transit Co., 107 Mo. 653 (17 S. W. 889); Railroad Co. v. Jones, 95 U. S. 439; Bard v. Traction Co., 176 Pa. St. 97 (34 Atl. 953, 53 Am. St. Rep. 672). The last case is the parallel of this in its facts, except that the conductor in that case did not know that the plaintiff was standing upon the bumper. We have examined all the cases cited in support of the plaintiff's contention, and we think they are not applicable to this case.
Judgment reversed, and no new trial ordered.
Hooker and Long, JJ., concurred with Grant, J.