Case Name: Burt v. Oneida Community, Limited, et al.
Court: New York Supreme Court, General Term
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1891-02
Citations: 12 N.Y.S. 806
Docket Number: 
Parties: Burt v. Oneida Community, Limited, et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: West's New York Supplement
Volume: 12
Pages: 806–808

Head Matter:
Burt v. Oneida Community, Limited, et al.
[Supreme Court, General Term, Fourth Department.
February, 1891.)
Reference—Compensation . of Referee—Stipulation.
A stipulation that the referee may fix the amount of Ms fees without regard to the provisions of the statute is valid, and the amount charged by the referee will be allowed where it is not shown that it was excessive, unreasonable, or improper. Martin, J., dissenting. •
Appeal from-special term, Oneida county.
Action by Charles A. Burt against Oneida Community, Limited, and others. Upon the hearing before the referee a stipulation was entered in his minutes to the effect that the referee might fix his own fees; and thereafter a stipulation was signed by the parties in the following language: “It is hereby stipulated that the referee in this action may fix the amount of his fees without regard to the provisions of the statute. Dated July 10th, 1889.” This stipulation was signed by the parties to the action, and also by their attorneys. The trial was a long one, and some 237 pages of evidence were taken by a stenographer. There is no proof indicating that the amount charged by the referee was excessive, unreasonable, or improper in its extent. There is proof that the sum has been paid to the referee by the successful party, relying upon the stipulation made by the attorneys and by the parties. Erom an order sustaining a taxation of $500 for the fees of a referee, defendants appeal. •
Argued before Hardin, P. J., and Martin and Merwin, JJ.
J. & Q. Van Voorhis and George H. Hart, for appellants. W. G. Tracy, for respondent.

Opinion:
Hardin, P. J.
I think the facts presented upon the motion for taxation are such that this case is distinguishable from those eases cited in the opinion of Brother Martin. Here, in addition to the stipulation entered in the referee's minutes, there is a formal stipulation of the parties confiding the amount to be charged to the referee. The parties acted upon that stipulation. The successful party, having in mind that stipulation when the amount of fees were stated by the referee, relied upon the stipulation, and paid the same to him. It is a familiar principle that a party may waive a constitutional provision or a statutory provision in his own interest or benefit or protection. Evidently the parties intended that the referee should, in his performance of his duties as referee, be paid such sum as he deemed reasonable for his services as a referee. It is not too much to say that the referee performed the services upon the reliance of the stipulation so given. It is not too much to say that the party who paid the sum to the referee, after he had fixed it, relied upon the stipulation. The facts and circumstances disclosed are such as to indicate that no public policy was violated either by the referee or by the parties. Under the circumstances disclosed, I hesitate to come to a conclusion that shall disregard the action of the parties and the referee. The party who paid the fees of the referee, having relied upon the stipulation of his adversary, it seems to me, ought to be protected by an allowance of the sum so stated, fixed, and determined by the referee in accordance with the assent of the defeated party, coupled with the approval of his attorney and counsel. I do not therefore favor a reversal of the order of the special term.
Order affirmed, with $10 costs and disbursements.
Merwen, J., concurs.