Case Name: James R. RUSHING, Jr. a/k/a "Devil Catcher", Appellant, v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee
Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2000-02-08
Citations: 753 So. 2d 1136
Docket Number: No. 97-KA-01237-COA
Parties: James R. RUSHING, Jr. a/k/a “Devil Catcher”, Appellant, v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
Judges: McMILLIN, C.J., SOUTHWICK, P.J., DIAZ, J. CONCUR. PAYNE, J., CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY BRIDGES, AND LEE, JJ. IRVING, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY THOMAS, J. MOORE, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 753
Pages: 1128-1136–1158

Head Matter:
James R. RUSHING, Jr. a/k/a “Devil Catcher”, Appellant, v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
No. 97-KA-01237-COA.
Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
Feb. 8, 2000.
Certiorari Denied April 27, 2000.
Ross R. Barnett Jr., Jackson, Earl P. Jordan Jr., James A. Williams, Meridian, Attorneys for Appellant.
Office of the Attorney General by Jeffrey A. Klingfuss, Attorneys for Appellee.

Opinion:
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
KING, P.J.,
for the Court:
¶ 1. This Court having granted Rushing's motion for rehearing withdraws its prior opinion and substitutes this opinion in lieu thereof.
¶ 2. James R. Rushing, Jr. a/k/a "Devil Catcher" was convicted of aggravated assault and rape in the Lauderdale County Circuit Court and sentenced to terms of twenty years and ten years, respectively, in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, said sentences to run consecutively. Rushing assigns seven errors on appeal which we quote verbatim from his brief:
I. WHETHER A JURY INSTRUCTION ON AGGRAVATED ASSAULT WITH A "DEADLY WEAPON" WITHOUT THE ELEMENT OF "SERIOUS BODILY INJURY" IS A VARIANCE FROM AN INDICTMENT THAT DOES NOT HAVE "DEADLY WEAPON" AS AN ELEMENT BUT ONLY HAS "SERIOUS BODILY INJURY" AND THE DEFENDANT IS DENIED PROPER CONSTITUTIONAL NOTICE OF THE CHARGES, A FAIR TRIAL, THE RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
II. WHETHER JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON AGGRAVATED ASSAULT ARE "PLAIN ERROR" AS A JUDICIAL COMMENT ON THE EVIDENCE BY CONTAINING THE PHRASES "WHEN USED AS A WEAPON UNDER THE EXISTING CIRCUMSTANCES" AND THE PHRASE "A DEADLY WEAPON, SPECIFICALLY A BROKEN POOL STICK" AND THUS THE DEFENDANT IS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL, CONFRONTATION OF WITNESSES AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
III. WHETHER THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS UNDER FACTS WHICH SHOWED HITTING WITH A BROKEN POOL STICK, POINTING A GUN AND KICKING WITH A FOOT ARE FATALLY CONFUSING AND ABSTRACT WHEN THE ONLY SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO "DEADLY WEAPON" IN THE INSTRUCTIONS POINTS TO THE POOL STICK AND THUS THE DEFENDANT IS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND TRIAL BY JURY.
IV. WHETHER THE EVIDENCE OF FORCIBLE RAPE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A VERDICT OF GUILTY WHEN THERE WAS NO CONTEMPORANEOUS FORCE AND THE VICTIM HAD MANY OPPORTUNITIES TO SEEK AID, ASSISTANCE AND FLEE FROM THE PRESENCE OF THE DEFENDANT WITH WHOM SHE HAD A LONG TERM BENEFICIAL SEXUAL LIAISON AND SHE TRAVELED WITH HIM BACK TO HER TRAILER AND NEARLY TWELVE HOURS AFTER THE COUPLING FIRST TOLD THE INTERROGATING OFFICER SHE HAD NOT BEEN SEXUALLY ASSAULTED.
V. WHETHER THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION OF WITNESSES AND A FAIR TRIAL WHEN MOMENTS BEFORE THE VICTIM'S SON WAS TO TESTIFY, THE STATE FIRST DISCLOSED TO THE DEFENDANT THAT THE SON WOULD TESTIFY TO DEFENDANT'S ADMISSION OF ASSAULTING THE MOTHER AND TESTIFY THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD MADE THREE VALUABLE OFFERS TO THE MOTHER IF SHE WOULD DROP CHARGES.
VI. WHETHER THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION AND A FAIR REFUSED ADMISSIBILITY OF THE VICTIM'S CONTRADICTORY STATEMENT TO THE INTERROGATING OFFICER THAT SHE HAD NOT BEEN SEXUALLY ASSAULTED.
VII. WHETHER THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A VERDICT OF AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, WHEN THE VICTIM ONLY HAD BRUISES, REDNESS ON THE THROAT FROM ALLEGED CHOKING AND A BROKEN FINGER AND GAVE A CONTRADICTORY AND EXAGGERATED ACCOUNT OF THE INCIDENT WITH THE DEFENDANT AT THE BAR AND MUCH LATER ENGAGED IN VOLUNTARY SEX WITH HIM AFTER REJECTING AN OPPORTUNITY TO RETURN TO HER TRAILER ALONE WITHOUT DEFENDANT.
¶ 3. Finding merit in Appellant's argument on the jury instructions, this Court reverses and remands on the charge of aggravated assault and affirms on the charge of rape.
FACTS
¶ 4. Shortly after 12:00 a.m. on February 3, 1997, James Rushing used his car telephone to inform M.L., his mistress of five years with whom he had a child, to get dressed that he was on his way to pick her up. Since Rushing was married, it was not unusual for the couple to go out late at night. Fifty-one year old Rushing is retired from the United States Marine Corp. with a medical disability. Rushing wears a prosthesis because one of his legs was amputated below the knee after Rushing was injured while serving in Vietnam. Rushing had a house trailer in which M.L. lived.
¶ 5. When Rushing called, M.L. told him she was talking on the other line to her aunt, Terry Collier, and her sister who had called to wish her happy birthday. Rushing accused M.L. of lying because he had M.L.'s sister on his other line.
¶ 6. According to Rushing, upon his arrival at M.L.'s trailer, he noticed the washer, dryer and microwave oven were missing. Rushing had given money to M.L. to pay the rental company and therefore asked where the appliances were. M.L. insisted that she had paid the rental company, and did not know why it had repossessed the appliances.
¶ 7. As the couple was leaving, M.L. informed her son that she was leaving with "Devil Catcher," Rushing's street name.
¶ 8. M.L. testified that Rushing began driving to a nightclub which he owned. While en route, Rushing telephoned a friend who M.L. assumed was Fred Cole. Rushing told Cole that he had "this bitch in the car and was trying to find somewhere to kill her." Rushing and M.L. arrived at the club about 1:00 a.m. Rushing unlocked the door saying, "After tonight I am not going to worry about you lying to me; you will be out of my life." Once inside the club, Rushing cursed M.L. and told her to take off her clothes. M.L. saw he was serious and undressed. Rushing picked up a broken pool stick, which M.L. described as about three feet long, from under a counter. M.L. was positioned between two coolers. Rushing was standing between M.L. and the door.
¶ 9. Rushing began striking M.L. with the pool stick across her buttocks. When M.L. put her hand back, Rushing told her not to or he would hit her across the head. He then pulled a gun out from under the counter and pointed it at her while cursing. M.L. testified she was scared.
¶ 10. Rushing eventually put the gun down and picked up the pool stick. He again beat M.L. across her buttocks, back, arm and legs. Angry because M.L. put her hand back to protect her buttocks, Rushing repeatedly hit her head with the pool stick until she fell to the floor. Rushing used his foot to stomp M.L. Kneeling over M.L., Rushing choked her while saying that she needed to die.
¶ 11. When Rushing stopped choking M.L., he asked her for Terry's telephone number. M.L. put her clothes back on while Rushing called Terry about talking on the telephone with M.L.. M.L. heard Rushing tell Terry that the time was twenty minutes until 2:00 a.m.
¶ 12. Rushing was still angry when his conversation with Terry ended. Rushing told M.L. to undress again and struck her several more times with the pool stick. M.L. passed out. When she regained consciousness, Rushing had her by the arm pulling her off the floor. M.L. passed in and out of consciousness. Rushing drove M.L. to the trailer. M.L. testified that as she was getting out of his car, Rushing said, "Well, I suppose you don't want to f— now, huh?" She replied that she did not, since he had kicked her, beat her and pulled a gun on her.
¶ 13. M.L. laid across the hood of Rushing's car to compose herself. She managed to make it through the door of the trailer then passed out again. When she came to, Rushing was pulling her off the floor. She took off her jeans and laid across the bed on her stomach because her buttocks were hurting. Rushing began making sexual advances, but M.L. pushed his hand back and told him no. M.L. continued to drift in and out of consciousness.
¶ 14. After daybreak, Terry called M.L. and sensed something was wrong with her. M.L. did not confide in Terry because Rushing was lying beside her. Rushing again made sexual advances toward M.L. This time, M.L. submitted to sexual intercourse with Rushing as a means of getting him to leave her alone and to leave. Rushing left about noon on February 3. As soon as Rushing left, M.L. soaked in a tub of hot water to alleviate her pain. About 4:00 P.M., Terry came to check on M.L. and immediately took her to the hospital.
¶ 15. On February 3, 1997 at about 5:30 p.m., Jason McElhenney, a detective assigned to the criminal investigation division of the Meridian Police Department, was dispatched to the emergency room of Riley Hospital to investigate an assault. Upon arrival at the hospital, McElhenney saw bruises on M.L.'s arms and legs. Pursuant to McElhenney's instructions, Debbie Williamson, a nurse photographed the victim. After talking with the victim, McEl-henney told her to come to the police station to file charges against Rushing. The victim arrived at the police station at about 10:00 p.m. with Terry. McElhenney testified the victim left the police station at about 11:45 p.m. and returned to the hospital.
¶ 16. Paula Strickland, a registered nurse, was on duty when the victim returned to Riley Hospital after pressing charges against Rushing at the police station on February 3, 1997. Strickland testified that the victim arrived at the hospital with a police officer to have a sexual assault kit completed. During the physical examination, Strickland noted the victim had a red mark on the right side of her neck and bruises to her buttocks area, left thigh and upper arm. The victim was given medication to alleviate pain. According to Strickland, the victim "was crying, but she was relatively calm, very nervous."
¶ 17. In addition to the bruises found on the victim's head, buttocks, legs and arms, an x-ray of the victim's hand revealed a broken finger was sustained in the beating. A CAT scan was also performed on the victim at Riley Hospital.
¶ 18. Rushing's version of the events of February 3 differs. Rushing testified that he picked M.L. up after midnight on February 3, 1997. He inquired about the missing appliances. On the way to the club, Rushing accused M.L. of lying. When they arrived at the club, Rushing got M.L. a drink. He sat on a stool. M.L. began yelling at him for calling her a liar. As he was standing up, Rushing brushed against M.L. causing her to trip over a rubber mat. She fell, landing on her back. M.L. grabbed a cue stick and came up swinging at him. He took the stick from M.L. and hit her with it across the back side no more than four times. Rushing denied having choked M.L. or hit her on the head with the pool stick. He stated his prosthesis, made it impossible for him to choke M.L. by kneeling over her as described. Rushing stated that he was seated as he hit M.L. and that she was fully clothed. Any wounds inflicted upon M.L. were done through her clothes. Rushing acknowledged having struck M.L. with the pool stick. He struck her because she spent the money which was to pay the rent on the appliances. "I hit her out of anger because she had messed up the bill money."
¶ 19. Rushing testified that he offered to provide M.L. a cab to go home, however she declined. He then drove M.L. home and remained in the car. Having gotten out of the car, M.L. turned around and asked Rushing if he was getting out. Rushing followed M.L. into the trailer but never really looked at her because he was still upset about the bills. He went to sleep with M.L.
¶ 20. The next morning, they were awaken by the telephone. After answering the telephone, M.L. got back in bed nude and initiated sexual intercourse. M.L. expressed remorse about lying to Rushing. As they had sexual intercourse Rushing noticed no bruises on M.L.
¶ 21. Fred Cole was called as a witness for the defense. Cole testified he was in the hospital on February 2 and 3. Rushing called him around midnight the night of the incident and talked for about three or four minutes. Cole did not hear Rushing cursing M.L. during the telephone conversation.
¶ 22. Rushing was arrested on February 4, 1997. An indictment was returned on March 20, 1997, which charged Rushing with aggravated assault in violation of Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-7(2) (Rev.1994) and rape in violation of Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-65(2) (Rev.1994). Rushing entered pleas of not guilty on April 4, 1997. After a two-day trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on both counts. The court sentenced Rushing to twenty years on the aggravated assault verdict and ten years on the rape verdict to run consecutively. Rushing's motion for a new trial and/or judgment notwithstanding the verdict was denied. This appeal followed.
ARGUMENT AND DISCUSSION OF LAW
¶ 23. Given this Court's disposition of this case, it is appropriate to first address Rushing's issues IV, V and VI, and collectively address issues I, II and III. Because this Court has found merit in Rushing's issues regarding jury instructions, it is not necessary to address issue VII.
ISSUE IV. WHETHER THE EVIDENCE OF FORCIBLE RAPE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A VERDICT OF GUILT WHEN THERE WAS NO CONTEMPORANEOUS FORCE AND THE VICTIM HAD MANY OPPORTUNITIES TO SEEK AID, ASSISTANCE AND FLEE FROM THE PRESENCE OF THE DEFENDANT WITH WHOM SHE HAD A LONG TERM BENEFICIAL SEXUAL LIAISON AND SHE TRAVELED WITH HIM BACK TO HER TRAILER AND NEARLY TWELVE HOURS AFTER THE COUPLING FIRST TOLD THE INTERROGATING OFFICER SHE HAD NOT BEEN SEXUALLY ASSAULTED.
¶ 24. Rushing's fourth issue addresses the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction of rape. When the legal sufficiency of the evidence is challenged we will not retry the facts. Rather, we must assume that the fact-finder believed the State's witnesses and disbelieved any contradictory evidence. McClain v. State, 625 So.2d 774, 778 (Miss.1993); Griffin v. State, 607 So.2d 1197, 1201 (Miss.1992). To determine whether there is an insufficiency as to any element of the offense, we consider all the evidence as to that element in the light most favorable to the State. McClain, 625 So.2d at 778. All credible evidence which is consistent with Rushing's guilt "must be accepted as true," and the State is "given the benefit of all favorable inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence." Id. This Court will reverse only where, "with respect to one or more of the elements of the offense charged, the evidence so considered is such that reasonable and fair-minded jurors could only find the accused not guilty." Id.
¶ 25. Rushing argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury verdict finding him guilty of forcibly raping the victim because no contemporaneous force was used, the victim had many opportunities to seek aid, assistance, and flee from Rushing, the victim had had a long-term sexual relationship with Rushing, the victim had waited nearly twelve hours after the attack to report the rape, and the victim had denied she had been raped when first questioned by an officer.
¶ 26. Rushing was convicted under Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-65(2) (Rev.1994) which provides:
Every person who shall forcibly ravish any person of the age of fourteen (14) years or upward, or who shall have been convicted of having carnal knowledge of any person above the age of fourteen (14) years without such person's consent. .
¶ 27. Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we find the evidence was sufficient to establish and to support the three elements necessary to prove rape, ie., (a) carnal knowledge, (b) without consent and by force, and (c) of a female age fourteen or upward. Hailey v. State, 537 So.2d 411, 414 (Miss.1988).
¶ 28. As the Mississippi Supreme Court noted in Hull v. State, 687 So.2d 708, 723 (Miss.1996):
[O]ne of the elements of rape is that it is done "without consent and by force,".... While this is true, this Court stated in Stewart v. State, 466 So.2d 906 (Miss.1985):
The well-settled rule is that in a prosecution for rape, physical force on the part of the assailant or physical resistance on the part of the victim is not necessary if the proof shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim surrendered because of fear arising out of a reasonable apprehension of great bodily harm.
¶ 29. Thus, proof that Rushing used additional, contemporaneous force to have sexual intercourse with M.L. is unnecessary if the evidence establishes that she surrendered because of fear arising out of a reasonable apprehension of great bodily harm. The evidence established that the victim was cursed, severely beaten while nude, and threatened with a gun before she was returned to her trailer. The victim drifted in and out of consciousness throughout the remainder of the night and early morning. Although no contemporaneous force was inflicted upon the victim, the jury could reasonably find that the victim submitted to sexual intercourse with Rushing out of fear that to resist would cause Rushing to further inflict bodily injury upon her. Indeed, the victim stated her belief that Rushing would not leave her alone, or leave, until he had sexual intercourse.
¶ 30. Rushing contends that M.L. consented to sexual intercourse. Rushing suggests that the fact M.L. had the opportunity to seek, aid, assistance or to flee from him and did not do so, is consistent with acts of consensual intercourse. While the jury might appropriately consider these matters on the issue of consent, they were not dispositive. These matters must be weighed against the evidence offered in opposition to Rushing's suggestion of consensual intercourse.
¶ 31. The most important part of that evidence was the testimony of M.L. wherein she (1) denied having engaged in consensual intercourse, (2) stated that Rushing had, "beat me half senseless", and (3) stated her belief that Rushing would not leave her alone or leave her, until he had intercourse with her.
¶ 32. The conflict in testimony merely raised a question of credibility. Questions of credibility are to be resolved by the finders of fact, the jury. Eakes v. State, 665 So.2d 852, 872 (Miss.1995). When the record contains credible evidence consistent with the jury verdict, this Court is obligated to affirm that verdict, Holmes v. State, 660 So.2d 1225, 1227 (Miss.1995), unless to do so would work an unconscionable injustice. White v. State, 732 So.2d 961 (¶ 20) (Miss.1999).
¶ 33. Based upon the record before it, this Court finds that substantial credible evidence existed upon which the verdict could have found Rushing guilty of rape. Holmes v. State, 660 So.2d 1225, 1227 (Miss.1995). This assignment of error is without merit.
ISSUE V. WHETHER THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION OF .WITNESSES AND A FAIR TRIAL WHEN MOMENTS BEFORE THE VICTIM'S SON WAS TO TESTIFY, THE STATE FIRST DISCLOSED TO THE DEFENDANT THAT THE SON WOULD TESTIFY TO DEFENDANT'S ADMISSION OF ASSAULTING THE MOTHER AND TESTIFY THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD MADE THREE VALUABLE OFFERS TO THE MOTHER IF SHE WOULD DROP CHARGES.
¶ 34. Rushing argues the trial court erred by denying his motion to exclude R.L.'s (the victim's son) testimony that (1) Rushing offered the victim money, a house and car repairs to drop the charges against Rushing, (2) that Rushing admitted to R.L. that he hit M.L., and (3) that Rushing denied raping M.L. This argument is predicated upon the State's failure to provide Rushing a complete written summary of R.L.'s statement in a timely fashion in violation of URCCC 9.04.
¶ 35. The record reveals the following colloquy outside the presence of the jury:
BY THE COURT: . The State has furnished to the defendant a summary of a statement made by R.L. today. That substance of that summary in writing has been furnished to the defendant. Mr. Jordan, you had a motion that you would like to make?
BY MR. JORDAN: Your Honor, we make a motion that this witness, because of this particular statement, be excluded from testifying. Mr. Merchant had talked with him earlier concerning this matter, and that none of these matters were mentioned to Mr. Merchant, who is Mr. Rushing's investigator. We claim surprise, Your Honor.
BY THE COURT: Well, he will be subject to cross-examination on that. Is that your only objection? You have listed him as a defense witness.
BY MR. JORDAN: That's true, I did.
BY THE COURT: The State listed him as a State's witness. Both of y'all have had an opportunity to talk with him, so there is nothing for me to rule on.
¶ 36. There is no question that the defense knew for some time prior to trial that R.L. would be called as a witness for the State. R.L. was listed as a witness by the State in the discovery packet furnished pursuant to defense counsel's oral request on April 11, 1997. Prior to trial, Rushing's investigator interviewed R.L., who did not inform him that Rushing had offered certain items to M.L. if she would drop the charges against him. Nor was this information contained in the summary provided to Rushing. Rushing asserts the State had a continuing duty to supplement the information disclosed by furnishing defense counsel a copy of R.L.'s complete statement. The duty to seasonally supplement discovery exists even where the defendant and the State have listed the same person as a witness. Houston v. State, 531 So.2d 598, 610-11 (Miss.1988); URCCC 9.04(E).
¶ 37. While Rushing knew before trial that he had asked R.L. to relay the offers to M.L., he was not aware that R.L. had stated the offers were contingent upon M.L.'s dropping the charges.
¶ 38. We find the failure to inform Rushing of this to have been error. However, under the facts of this ease we hold it to be harmless error. We would caution the trial courts, that the duty to fully comply with URCCC 9.04, exists even where both parties have identified the same witnesses.
¶ 39. Rushing's argument that the trial court erred by not granting a continuance is without merit. In the case sub judice, defense counsel did not request a continuance after the trial court denied his motion to exclude R.L.'s testimony. "If, after this opportunity for familiarization, the defendant believes he may be prejudiced by lack of opportunity to prepare to meet the evidence, he must request a continuance. Failure to do so constitutes a waiver of the issue." Traylor v. State, 582 So.2d 1003, 1006 (Miss.1991) (citing Kelly v. State, 553 So.2d 517, 520 (Miss.1989)). ISSUE VI. RULING THAT THE VICTIM'S STATEMENT TO THE INTERROGATING OFFICER WAS INADMISSIBLE WAS MANIFEST ERROR
¶ 40. Rushing asserts the interests of justice require the reversal of his conviction and remand of the case due to the trial court's ruling that M.L.'s statement to the interrogating officer was inadmissible. The trial court is vested with broad discretion in the matter of judging the admissibility of evidence based on its relevance to the issue being tried. Johnson v. State, 655 So.2d 37, 42 (Miss.1995). The trial court's determination that the written statement of the victim to the investigating officer was inadmissible did nothing to deprive Rushing of the opportunity to cross-examine the victim and the interrogating officer about M.L.'s initial denial that she had been sexually assaulted on February 3, 1997 by Rushing. Indeed, in response to the specific question from Rushing's attorney, M.L. acknowledged having first told the investigating officer that no rape occurred.
ISSUE I. WHETHER A JURY INSTRUCTION ON AGGRAVATED ASSAULT WITH A "DEADLY WEAPON" WITHOUT THE ELEMENT OF "SERIOUS BODILY INJURY" IS A VARIANCE FROM AN INDICTMENT THAT DOES NOT HAVE "DEADLY WEAPON" AS AN ELEMENT BUT ONLY HAS "SERIOUS BODILY INJURY" AND THE DEFENDANT IS DENIED PROPER CONSTITUTIONAL NOTICE OF THE CHARGES, A FAIR TRIAL, THE RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
ISSUE II. WHETHER JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON AGGRAVATED ASSAULT ARE "PLAIN ERROR" AS JUDICIAL COMMENT ON THE EVIDENCE BY CONTAINING THE PHRASES "WHEN USED AS A WEAPON UNDER THE EXISTING CIRCUMSTANCES" AND THE PHRASE "A DEADLY WEAPON, SPECIFICALLY A BROKEN POOL STICK" AND THUS THE DEFENDANT IS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL, CONFRONTATION OF WITNESSES AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
ISSUE III. WHETHER THE JURY INSTRUCTION UNDER FACTS WHICH SHOWED HITTING WITH A BROKEN POOL STICK, POINTING A GUN AND KICKING WITH A FOOT ARE FATALLY CONFUSED AND ABSTRACT WHEN THE ONLY SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO "DEADLY WEAPON" IN THE INSTRUCTIONS POINTS TO THE POOL STICK AND THUS THE DEFENDANT IS DENIED A FAIR AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND TRIAL BY JURY.
¶ 41. The first three issues presented by Rushing on appeal involve the aggravated assault jury instructions. Rushing argues the State's aggravated assault jury instructions were at variance with the indictment, were a judicial comment on the evidence presented, and were fatally confusing to the jury. Viewing the instructions as a whole, we find the jury was not properly instructed.
¶ 42. Rushing contends he was charged with the crime of aggravated assault under Miss.Code Ann. § 97 — 3—7(2)(a) because the words "with a deadly weapon" were not included in the indictment. Rushing argues that Jury Instruction C-7 effectively • amended the indictment to charge him with aggravated assault under § 97-3-7(2)(b). In Quick v. State, 569 So.2d 1197 (Miss.1990), the supreme court held that "the state can prosecute only on the indictment returned by the grand jury and . the court has no authority to modify or amend the indictment in any material respect." Id. at 1199. Quick was indicted specifically under § 97-3-7(2)(b) of the aggravated assault statute, which requires purposeful, wilful, and knowing actions on the part of the accused. However, he was convicted under § 97-3-7(2)(a) of the aggravated assault statute, which requires recklessness and extreme indifference to the value of human life. The supreme court reversed and remanded the case finding that the jury instructions clearly contained a "new element which was not contained in the original indictment and . it was evidently this part of the instruction upon which the jury returned its verdict. Under these circumstances we have no alternative but to reverse and remand.... " Id. at 1200.
¶ 43. The record shows Rushing was indicted for aggravated assault under § 97-3-7(2). Neither subsection (a) nor (b) was specified. The relevant portion of that indictment reads, "did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, knowingly, and felo-niously and purposely cause or attempt to cause serious bodily injury to another, M.L., by hitting her with a broken pool stick and kicking her, in violation of Mississippi Code Annotated Section 97-3-7(2)(1972)."
¶ 44. Section 97-3-7(2) of the Mississippi Codes provides:
A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he (a) attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury purposely, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life; or (b) attempts to cause or purposely or knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon or other means likely to produce death or serious bodily harm;
¶ 45. A criminal defendant is entitled to a clear statement of the crime with which he is charged, and the conduct which allegedly constitutes criminal behavior. Peterson v. State, 671 So.2d 647, 653 (Miss.1996). The prosecution is held strictly to prove the allegations of the indictment and may not vary from the proof of those allegations unless the variance is a lesser-included-offense. Clark v. State, 181 Miss. 455, 461, 180 So. 602 (1938). See also Sloan v. State, 368 So.2d 228, 229 (Miss.1979).
¶46. By reading the indictment along side § 97-3-7(2), it becomes readily apparent that the State had indicted Rushing pursuant to § 97-3-7(2)(a). Therefore, any jury instruction given should be consistent with § 97-3-7(2)(a) and any resulting verdict of guilty must be based solely on the substantive allegations of the indictment. That is, it must be clear that the jury verdict was based upon the elements of § 97-3-7(2)(a).
¶ 47. Under the holding of Quick v. State, 569 So.2d 1197, 1199 (Miss.1990), the trial court may not directly, or indirectly amend the indictment to alter the substance of the charges against the defendant. By giving jury instruction C-7, the trial court indirectly amended the indictment, by dropping the serious bodily injury element of § 97-3-7(2)(a), and substituting the deadly weapon element of § 97-3-7(2)(b).
¶48. Having committed error by the indirect amendment of the indictment, the trial court compounded that error in jury instruction C-7 by declaring as a matter of law that "a broken pool stick" is a deadly weapon. Unless an item is inherently dangerous and deadly, it may not, as a matter of law, be declared a deadly weapon. State v. Sims, 80 Miss. 381, 386, 31 So. 907, 907 (1902). Whether an item which is not inherently dangerous may become a deadly weapon based upon its use is a question of fact to be determined by the jury. Id. at 386, 31 So. 907. See also State v. Ware, 102 Miss. 634, 59 So. 854 (1912)(pocketknife); Porter v. State, 616 So.2d 899 (Miss.1993)(garbage bag). Whether a broken pool stick is a deadly weapon, is a question of fact to be determined by the finders of fact, the jury.
¶ 49. Because this Court finds error in the granting of instruction C-7, we are constrained to reverse and remand Appellant's conviction of aggravated assault.
¶ 50. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LAUDERDALE COUNTY OF CONVICTION OF RAPE AND SENTENCE OF TEN YEARS AND $2,000 FINE, IN THE CUSTODY THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS IS AFFIRMED. THE JUDGMENT OF AGGRAVATED ASSAULT IS REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR PROCEEDINGS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. COSTS ARE ASSESSED AGAINST LAUDERDALE COUNTY.
McMILLIN, C.J., SOUTHWICK, P.J., DIAZ, J. CONCUR. PAYNE, J., CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY BRIDGES, AND LEE, JJ. IRVING, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY THOMAS, J. MOORE, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.
. Section 97-3-7 was amended effective July 1, 1998. Here, of course, we are concerned with the statute in the form in which it appeared at the time of trial. Nothing in the amendment alters the parts of § 97-3-7(2) construed here.
. Section 97-3-65 was amended effective July 1,1998. The amendment rewrote this section in its entirety.