Case Name: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Timothy James ROBBINS, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2001-04-27
Citations: 785 So. 2d 620
Docket Number: No. 5D00-769
Parties: STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Timothy James ROBBINS, Appellee.
Judges: GRIFFIN and ORFINGER, R. B„ JJ„ concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 785
Pages: 620–623

Head Matter:
STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Timothy James ROBBINS, Appellee.
No. 5D00-769.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
April 27, 2001.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and, Margaret A. Brenan, Assistant Attorney General, Miami, for Appellant.
James Russo, Public Defender, and Blaise Trettis, Assistant Public Defender, Melbourne, for Appellee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
The State of Florida appeals the trial court's dismissal of the State's petition to civilly commit Timothy James Robbins following the State's presentation of its case in an adversarial probable cause hearing as provided in section 394.915, Florida Statutes (2000). The petition was brought pursuant to sections 394.910-394.931, Florida Statutes, known as the Jimmy Ryce Act (Ryce Act). Robbins initially argues that the State has no right of appeal; we summarily dispose of that argument because this court has ruled to the contrary in State v. Osborne, 781 So.2d 1137 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001).
We perceive the primary issue on appeal to be whether the trial judge correctly established the standard that must be met by the State to prove probable cause. The trial court articulated the following standard in its denial of the State's motion for rehearing: "[T]here is no probable cause to believe that the State of Florida can ever prove by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent is a sexually violent predator under the act." We disagree with that standard, but recognize that the trial court had no guidance by statute or case law when it established it. In the absence of guidance within this state, we borrow the definition established in other states by statute or by courts which have construed their sexually violent predator statutes, to wit: "[Probable cause is established when] sufficient evidence [is presented] to cause a person of ordinary prudence and action to conscientiously entertain a reasonable belief that the respondent is a sexually violent predator." See State v. Watson, 227 Wis.2d 167, 595 N.W.2d 403, 418 (1999); In re Commitment of Shaw, 594 N.W.2d 419, 1998 WL 842756 at *6 (Wis.App.1998) (unpublished opinion), review denied, State v. Shaw, 233 Wis.2d 84, 609 N.W.2d 473 (2000) (TABLE, NO. 98-1396); In re Detention of Campbell, 139 Wash.2d 341, 986 P.2d 771 (1999) (en banc), cert. denied, Campbell v. Washington, — U.S. -, 121 S.Ct. 880, 148 L.Ed.2d 789 (2001); In re Detention of Dean, 100 Wash.App. 1067, 2000 WL 690142 * 5 (Wash.App. Div. 3, May 30, 2000) (unpublished opinion), review denied, — Wash. -, 11 P.3d 825 (2000) (TABLE, NO. 69905-4); State v. Callahan, 99 Wash.App. 1005, 2000 WL 60184 at * 2 (Wash.App. Div. 1, 2000), review denied, 141 Wash.2d 1008, 10 P.3d 1074 (2000) (TABLE, NO. 69395-1); In re Hay, 263 Kan. 822, 953 P.2d 666, 677 (1998); Commonwealth v. Toland, 2000 WL 576341 at *6 (Mass.Super.Apr.24, 2000). Because the purpose of a probable cause hearing is to prevent wrongful detention prior to trial, other states have held that the hearing in commitment cases is similar to the probable cause or pretrial release hearing held in criminal cases, neither of which requires strict adherence to the rules of evidence. See generally In re Dean, 2000 WL 690142 at *5; State v. Callahan, 99 Wash.App. 1005, 2000 WL 60184 at * 2; In re Hay, 953 P.2d at 677; Commonwealth v. Toland, 2000 WL 576341 at *6.
In order to establish probable cause, the State must present evidence that would cause a person of ordinary prudence to believe that the respondent is a sexually violent predator as defined by section 394.912(10). We remand the matter to the trial court to reevaluate the testimony presented in light of the standard observed by the courts of other states and now adopted by this court. Upon remand, it is within the discretion of the trial court after reevaluating the doctor's testimony to either continue with the adversarial hearing, or if the trial court finds probable cause under the new standard, the matter shall proceed to trial in accordance with section 394.916.
GRIFFIN and ORFINGER, R. B" JJ" concur.
PETERSON, J., concurs specially with opinion.
. Section 394.912(10) defines "sexually violent predator" as a person who (1) has been convicted of a sexually violent offense; and (2) suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility for long-term control, care and treatment. The court found that the State had sufficiently shown that Robbins had been convicted of a sexually violent offense as defined in section 394.912(2)(c), (9)(e), Florida Statutes (2000). In attempting to show that Robbins suffered from a mental abnormality that, makes him likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if not confined, the State presented evidence in the form of testimony from an evaluating psychologist previously qualified as an expert in other Ryce Act determinations that Robbins suffered from paraphilia NOS — a sexual and psychological disorder listed in the DSM-IV.