Case Name: MILLER v. STATE
Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1920-11-03
Citations: 225 S.W. 379
Docket Number: No. 5849
Parties: MILLER v. STATE.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Western Reporter
Volume: 225
Pages: 379–382

Head Matter:
MILLER v. STATE.
(No. 5849.)
(Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.
Nov. 3, 1920.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 1, 1920.)
1. indictment and information &wkey;sl 10(13), 120 —Indictment for embezzlement charging that accused was clerk or employee is sufficient.
Under Vernon’s Ann. Pen. Code 1916, art. 1416, enumerating persons who may be guilty of embezzlement from a corporation as officer, agent, clerk, or attorney, an indictment charging that accused was a clerk or employee of a corporation is sufficient; the term employee being treated as surplusage.
2. Embezzlement &wkey;>32 — Allegation held to show defendant’s fiduciary relationship.
Allegation that the property embezzled came into defendant’s possession by virtue of his employment as clerk sufficiently charged a fiduciary relation and defendant’s duty to receive and care for the money.
3. Criminal law <&wkey;370, 371(2) — Evidence of similar offenses admissible to show intent and knowledge.
In a prosecution for embezzlement, evidence of other transactions of a similar nature is admissible to prove intent and guilty knowledge.
On State’s Motion for Rehearing.
4. Embezzlement &wkey;>35 — Variance between charge accused was “clerk” and proof he was “cashier.” ,
A “cashier,” defined as a custodian of money of a bank, mercantile house, and the like, is not a “clerk,” who is defined as one to keep accounts or records, a higher assistant in an office, so that there is a variance between an indictment charging accused with embezzlement ■ of money, while clerk of a corporation, which charge must be construed under Vernon’s Ann. Pen. Code 1916, art. 10, by giving the ordinary meaning to the words, and proói that he was the cashier of the corporation, especially where the manager of the corporation expressly testified that he was not a clerk.
[Ed. Note. — For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Cashier; Clerk.]
5.Criminal law <&wkey;784( I) — Charge on circumstantial evidence necessary in prosecution for embezzlement.
In a prosecution for embezzlement where there was direct evidence that accused received the money in his .official capacity, but his conversion thereof was only shown by inferences from the accounts kept by him, it was error to refuse a requested charge on the question of conviction on circumstantial evidence alone.
Appeal from District Court, Bexar County; W. S. Anderson, Judge.
E. L. Miller was convicted of embezzlement and his punishment fixed at two years’ confinement in the state penitentiary, and he appeals.
Reversed and remanded.
Chambers, Watson & Wilson, of San Antonio, for appellant.
D. A. McAskill, Dist. Atty., and W. S. Anthony, Asst. Dist. Atty., both of San Antonio, and Alvin M. Owsley, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

Opinion:
LATTIMORE, J.
Appellant was convicted, in the Thirty-Seventh district court of Bexar county, of the offense of embezzlement of property of the value of more than $50, and his punishment fixed at two years' confinement in the state penitentiary.
Appellant urged various objections to the indictment in this case, none of which we think are sufficient. Article 1416, Vernon's Penal Code, which names those persons who may be held guilty of embezzlement from a corporation, enumerates "any officer, agent, clerk or attorney at law or in fact." The word "employee" is not used in this connection in the statute, and we infer that the trial court, in passing upon this motion to quash, held that the use of the word "employee" was surplusage where it occurred in said indictment. The accused was indicted for embezzlement, it being alleged that he was a clerk and employee of the Brown Cracker & Candy Company, a corporation.
The capacity in which the accused was acting for his employer, when the property came into his possession, in an embezzlement case, must be alleged in such manner as to bring it within the terms of the statute. In the instant case, the allegation that appellant was the clerk of the Brown Cracker & Candy Company, a corporation, is an allegation of a capacity named, and is therefore sufficient under the statute. Likewise, we think the further allegation in the indictment, that the* property of said corporation alleged to have been embezzled "came into the possession, and was then and there under the care of the said E. L. Miller by virtue of his sahj. employment and relation as clerk as aforesaid," was a sufficient charging that a fiduciary relationship existed, and that it was appellant's duty to receive and care for said money.
There are a great many errors complained of in the able brief filed by appellant's counsel; but, in our view of the case, it is only necessary to notice some of the more important ones presented. A- careful examination of the statement of facts discloses that the manager of the Brown Cracker & Candy Company, at San Antonio, under whom appellant worked for a number of years, testified in so many words that appellant never did work for the Brown Cracker & Candy Company in the capacity of clerk. All the witnesses spoke of appellant as the cashier or bookkeeper. While a cashier might be included under the term "agent," and in some instances might be an officer of a corporation, we are unable to find anywhere that he is classed as a "clerk." The designation of appellant in the indictment as an "employee" having been eliminated as sur-plusage, and the evidence failing to support the allegation of "clerk," there would seem to be a fatal variance between the proof offered and the allegations of the indictment. If one be charged as a "clerk," and the proof entirely rebut the proposition that he was ever employed in such capacity, we have no alternative but to hold that the evidence and the proof do not correspond.
On the trial, much testimony was offered in behalf of the state, showing other transactions on the part of the appellant of like kind as the one charged in the instant case. This was objected to. We think there was no error in admitting proof of those transactions. By vigorous cross-examination of other employees of the said corporation, as to their access to the books, and their opportunity to get the money, the embezzlement of which is charged against appellant, their need of such property, the character and amount of their investments, etc., were brought out by appellant, manifestly to create .the impression upon the jury of the improbability of appellant's connection with the appropriation of the property, and suggesting the appropriation thereof by such other employees. We think further that the very nature and character of the employment of the appellant, and of the circumstances surrounding the transaction and necessarily relied on by the state to make its proof of guilt, would make proof of other similar transactions admissible. Said corporation did a large business locally, and in its trade territory. Large sums of money, both cash and checks, came into appellant's hands, and after proper entry, indorsement, etc., should have gone to the bank to the credit of said corporation. Appellant kept the books, and had charge of the moneys received, made out the deposit slips, kept the bank books, and except when an auditor came at intervals of some months, and checked the books, no one took actual oversight of the actions of appellant in the performance of his duties. In a business so conducted, one occupying a position such as appellant might easily mislay a check, or overlook an entry, or erroneously O. K. a miscalculated collection slip turned in by a driver, and thus be guilty of no wrong should an error be discovered; but proof of the continuation of such happenings might rebut any presumption of innocence as to one independent transaction. Again, when appellant left the employ of said corporation without any notice to them, he seems to have left the state. No charge had been made against him; no suspicion attached to him; no property of said company was found on him when arrested; and practically all the proof offered against him was the manipulation of the books, cash accounts, checks, etc., of which he had charge before leaving. In order to show intent or guilty knowledge, we think evidence of such other transactions was admissible, subject to proper instruction in the ' charge, as to the purpose of such testimony, and that, before the jury could consider any of said transactions as evidence, they must believe beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant's guilt in such transactions was shown. See section 166, Branch's Ann. P. C.; pages 622-623, Vernon's C. C. P., for authorities; Fry v. State, 215 S. W. 560.
The state proved, over objection, the contents of two letters found in appellant's trunk when arrested in California. Said letters were shown to be in appellant's handwriting. They were neither dated, signed, nor addressed. Nothing in either referred to any of the facts of any transaction transpiring while appellant was employed by the Brown Cracker & Candy Company. Not a word in either of said letters, so far as we are able to see, related to any transaction under investigation. We think the letters were inadmissible.
An exception was taken to the court's failure to charge on circumstantial evidence. We think such charge should have been given. No one saw this appellant appropriate this money. No confession or admission of his appears in the record to take the case out of the rule of circumstantial evidence. He had the lawful charge of money and property prior to his disappearance, and after he had gone, by the process of cheeking and auditing, it was discovered that shortages existed. The state claimed that appellant was the party responsible for these shortages. Appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. The issue in the case then became the unlawful con version by appellant of money belonging to bis principal, and to establish this conclusion tbe state introduced a number of facts, from wbicb tbe guilt of tbe accused might be inferred, but no positive proof thereof. If tbe main fact sought to be proved is a matter of inference, tbe case was one of circumstantial evidence under all tbe authorities. Ward v. State, 10 Tex. App. 293; Lee v. State, 14 Tex. App. 266; Mathews v. State, 17 Tex. App. 475; Fuller v. State, 24 Tex. App. 597, 7 S. W. 330; Pace v. State, 41 Tex. Cr. R. 208, 51 S. W. 953, 53 S. W. 689; Jones v. State, 54 Tex. Cr. R. 37, 111 S. W. 653; Stewart v. State, 71 Tex. Cr. R. 480, 160 S. W. 381.
This disposes of tbe material issues raised in this appeal. ,
For tbe errors mentioned, tbe. judgment will be reversed, and the cause remanded.
<§=»For other oases see same topic and KEY-N (JMBBR in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes