Case Name: TREND COIN COMPANY, d/b/a the Trendline, and Precious Metal Brokers, Inc., Petitioners, v. HONEYWELL, INC. and Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, Respondents
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1986-02-27
Citations: 487 So. 2d 1029
Docket Number: No. 65532
Parties: TREND COIN COMPANY, d/b/a the Trendline, and Precious Metal Brokers, Inc., Petitioners, v. HONEYWELL, INC. and Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, Respondents.
Judges: BOYD, C.J., and OVERTON, MCDONALD and SHAW, JJ., concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 487
Pages: 1029–1032

Head Matter:
TREND COIN COMPANY, d/b/a the Trendline, and Precious Metal Brokers, Inc., Petitioners, v. HONEYWELL, INC. and Aetna Casualty & Surety Company, Respondents.
No. 65532.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Feb. 27, 1986.
Rehearing Denied May 30, 1986.
Larry B. Stewart and James B. Tilgh-man, Jr. of Stewart, Tilghman, Fox & Bian-chi, Miami; and Lawrence Fuller of Fuller and Fingold, Miami Beach,, for petitioners.
James E. Tribble of Blackwell, Walker, Fascell & Hoehl, Miami, for respondents.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
This cause is before us to review Honeywell, Inc. v. Trend Coin Co., 449 So.2d 876 (Fla.3d DCA 1984), because of direct conflict with Jacksonville, Tampa & Key West Railway v. Peninsular Land, Transportation & Manufacturing Co., 27 Fla. 1, 9 So. 661 (1891), and Bergen Brunswig Corp. v. State Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 415 So.2d 765 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), review denied, 426 So.2d 25 (Fla.1983). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.
Petitioner (plaintiff below), suffered the loss of jewelry, gold, and silver inventory as the result of a burglary on March 9, 1980. Petitioner sued respondent alleging intentional misrepresentation as to a burglar alarm system, negligent design, negligent installation and service, and breach of contract. The jury returned a verdict awarding compensatory damages of more than $8 million, punitive damages of $1 million and prejudgment interest of more than $3 million. In pertinent part the district court reversed the award of prejudgment interest on the ground that the exact loss was in dispute and could not be ascertained. We recently addressed this issue in Argonaut Insurance Co. v. May Plumb ing Co., 474 So.2d 212 (Fla.1985), by approving Bergen Brunswig Corp. and holding, as a matter of law, that a plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment interest at the statutory rate from the date of the loss on verdicts which liquidate damages. We disapprove the portion of the district court opinion here which holds to the contrary.
Having accepted jurisdiction of the case on the issue in conflict, we also choose to address briefly other issues raised by the parties. Petitioner urges that the district court erred in reversing for a new trial on damages and in holding that evidence of an inventory contained in an insurance application was admissible to impeach subsequent statements pertaining to the value of the loss. We see no error in the district court's decision on these points.
Respondents urge that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that a twelve percent prejudgment interest rate would be applied. We agree with respondents, at least in part. Section 687.01, Florida Statutes (1979), which was effective at the time of loss, prescribed an interest rate of six percent. Chapter 82-42, Laws of Florida, effective July 1, 1982, amended section 687.01 by prescribing that thereafter the interest rate would be twelve percent. This amendment reflects a legislative decision that a six percent interest rate was adequate until July 1, 1982, and that thereafter a twelve percent rate was applicable. In order to carry out legislative intent the interest rate here should be computed at six percent from the date of the loss until July 1, 1982. Thereafter, interest should be computed at twelve percent. Meigs & Cope Agency, Inc. v. Koffey, 435 So.2d 867 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983). In so holding we recognize an apparent divergence from Board of Public Instruction v. Wright, 77 So.2d 770 (Fla.1955), where we held that the statutory rate of interest in effect at the time of maturity of bond coupons applied uniformly until the time of judgment even though the legislature changed the statutory interest rate between the time of maturing and the time of judgment. The facts on Wright are skimpy, but it appears that the primary issue was whether there should be any interest at all, and, if there was to be, whether it should be that specified in the contract or the statute. So far as we can determine, there was no issue of whether a two-tier or single tier statutory rate should apply. In any event, our holding here is consistent with legislative intent. To the degree there is conflict, we overrule Wright.
For the reasons set forth above we hold that prejudgment interest may be awarded at the effective statutory rate for the period between time of injury and time of judgment. The decision of the district court below is quashed in part, approved in part and remanded for proceedings consistent with this decision.
It is so ordered.
BOYD, C.J., and OVERTON, MCDONALD and SHAW, JJ., concur.
ADKINS, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which EHRLICH, J., concurs.