Case Name: HELLINGS against AMEY
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1836-01-14
Citations: 1 Whart. 63
Docket Number: 
Parties: HELLINGS against AMEY.
Judges: 
Reporter: Reports of cases adjudged in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (Wharton)
Volume: 1
Pages: 63–65

Head Matter:
[Philadelphia,
January, 14,1836.]
HELLINGS against AMEY.
IN ERROR.
1. Where a defendant, who had been sentenced by a Coart of Quarter Sessions, upon a conviction of fornication and bastardy, to the payment of a certain gross sum to the mother of the child, and also to the payment to her of a weelily sum for a certain, term, applied for and obtained a discharge of his person under the insolvent act, it was held that the mother might maintain an action of debt upon the sentence of the Quarter Sessions, to-recover the amount ordered to be paid to her.
2, The-defendant in such action having pleaded payment, with leave to give the special mailers in evidence, it was held that the plaintiff was not bound to prove the averment in her declaration, that she had maintained and supported the child during the term, for which the defendant was liable to pay, by the sentence of the court.
"Writ of error to the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks county.
In the Court of Quarter Sessions for the oounty of Philadelphia, in October, 1827, John Hellings, the plaintiff in error, was convicted of fornication and bastardy, and sentenced by the court to pay to the prosecutrix, Hannah Amey, the sum of fifteen dollars for lying-in expenses, and seventy-five cents per week for the support of the child from its birth, until it should arrive at the age of seven years, and to give bonds to the guardians of the poor in three hundred dollars, to make such payments, &c. On the 26th of June, 1828, John Hellings presented his petition to the Court of Common Pleas for the city and county of Philadelphia, praying for the benefit of the insolvent laws. Hannah Amey was the only creditor returned by the petitioner, who was discharged on the 8th of July following. To February Term, 1834, of the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks county, Hannah Amey instituted an action of debt against the same John Hellings, in which a declaration was filed, setting forth the sentence of the Court of Quarter Sessions; and the plaintiff averred that she had maintained and supported the child from the time of its birth, until its arrival at the age of seven years, and that the said sum of fifteen dollars for lying-in expenses, and the allowance of seventy-five cents per week, had not been paid to her by the defendant; whereby an ac tion had accrued, &c. The defendant pleaded nul tiel record and payment, upon which issue was joined. Upon the first pie a'the court gave judgment for the plaintiff; and the cause coming on for trial, on the plea of payment, at April Term, 1835, the plaintiff gave in evidence the record of the sentence of the Court of Quarter Sessions, and the petition of the defendant for the benefit of the Insolvent Laws. The counsel for the defendant then prayed the court to charge the jury that the action could not be sustained, and that if the action would lie, it was necessary for the plaintiff to prove the averments in the declaration'respecting the maintenance of the child by her, during the term of seven years. The court, however, charged the jury upon these points in favour of the defendant, who excepted to the charge; and the jury having found for the plaintiff, the cause was removed to this court.
Errors having been assigned upon these points, Mr. Ross for the plaintiff in error, contended
1. That an action did not lie upon a sentence of the Court of Quarter Sessions, in a case like the present; the point having been expressly decided in Eby v. Burkholder, (17 Serg. fy Rawle, 1.)
2. That the plaintiff was bound to prove the averments in the declaration; in support of which he cited, Roof v. Brubacker, 1 Rawle, 307.
Mr. Porter, contra.

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Gibson, C. J.
When it was determined in Eby v. Burkholder, that an order of maintenance could not be enforced by action, the allowance to the mother had acquired no quality of a debt. By subjecting a sentence for the payment of money to the operation of the insolvent laws, as an ordinary duty, the legislature have authorized' the party convict to treat it otherwise. By the seventeenth section of the general insolvent act, it is directed, that " any person who shall be in confinement by order of any court, until he restore to the owner any stolen goods or chattels, or pay the value thereof; and any person who shall be confined for the payment of any fine or for the payment of the costs of -prosecution and for no other cause, shall be entitled to the benefit of this act." In its largest sense, the word fine includes the mulct for the maintenance of a bastard; and the case is clearly within the equity of the act. By the succeeding section it is further directed, that persons confined for fines or forfeitures, not separately exceeding the sum of fifteen dollars exclusive of the costs, be absolutely discharged by the sheriff at the expiration of thirty days; and consequently, without cession of goods. This section seems to operate as a statutory commutation and pardon; but not so the preceding one, which, by putting the case of the convict on the ordinary footing of insolvency,, discharges but the person and leaves the duty still in force. By a discharge, then, under the insolvent laws, the remedy by commitment in execution is gone; and by what other remedy than an action, can the duty be enforced against property subsequently acquired ? That the legislature intended that it should be so enforced, is inferrible from their intent to exonerate'no more than the person; and where the party convict procures such exoneration, the remedy by action results of necessity. In Eby v. Burkholder, the defendant had not been discharged; and the nature of the duty being unchanged by the act of the defendant, there was no such necessity; consequently the mother was not allowed to use the extraordinary means for which necessity gives occasion. It is entirely consistent with that case, therefore, to say, that in the circumstances of the present, recourse to an action was entirely proper. The question put to the court on the effect of the proof, was also properly ruled. The plaintiff averred that she had maintained the bastard at her own charge during the entire period; and to this the defendant pleaded payment; which, by every rule, was-an admission of the whole declaration, except the particular-part of it put in issue. It is true the fact of payment was.pleaded, "with leave to give the special matters in evidence," which by our practice makes way but for an equity where there is one; but where there is none, the leave_ thus taken goes for nothing, and the plea has no more than its common law effect. But even where it is properly pleaded, it has not the properties of a general issue plea; its office being to confess and avoid, by the introduction of the special matter relied .upon. The burthen of proving the issue, therefore, lay on the defendant, and the jury were rightly instructed that the failure was on his part.
Judgment affirmed.