Case Name: The People, on the relation of Orlando A. Fuller and Mary Fuller, vs. The Judges of Oneida Common Pleas
Court: New York Supreme Court of Judicature
Jurisdiction: New York
Decision Date: 1839-01
Citations: 21 Wend. 20
Docket Number: 
Parties: The People, on the relation of Orlando A. Fuller and Mary Fuller, vs. The Judges of Oneida Common Pleas.
Judges: 
Reporter: Wendell's Reports
Volume: 21
Pages: 20–25

Head Matter:
The People, on the relation of Orlando A. Fuller and Mary Fuller, vs. The Judges of Oneida Common Pleas.
A mandamus does not lie to a court of common pleas, directing the vacatur of a rule of that court, setting aside a. report of referees, although the common pleas in the decision made by them clearly erred.
A writ of mandamus setting forth an appeal from a justice’s judgment to a court of C. P., a reference there, a report of referees in favor of the relator, and an order of the court setting aside the report, shows a prima facie title to relief, was the remedy appropiate ; but the proper remedy in such case is by writ of errm' and not by mandamus.
Pleadings in justices’ courts are liberally construed ; but still the proof must correspond with the allegation ; it was accordingly held, where a suit was commenced in a justices’ court against Orlando F. and Mary F. without any intimation in the declaration that the relation of husband and wife existed between them, or that the suit was brought for the recovery of a demand due from the wife whilst sole, though it was avowed on the hearing before referees that the suit was for such a demand, that evidence of a promise by the husband to pay the demand, was inadmissible under the pleadings in the cause.
Demurrer, to a return to a writ of alternative mandamus. The writ of mandamus recited that John M. Mott had recovered a judgment against the relators before a justice of the peace, that the relators had removed the cause by appeal into the court of C. P. of Oneida county, where it was referred to three referees pursuant to the statute, that the referees reported that nothing was due to the plaintiff, and that the court on the motion of the plaintiff, set aside the report to the great damage of the relators, &c. The judges were then commanded to vacate their order setting aside the report, or show cause, &c. The judges made a return to the writ by which it appears that Mott brought an action before a justice of the peace against the relators, as “ Orlando A. Fuller and Mary Fuller,” and declared “ on book account to his damage of fifty dollars.” The plaintiff afterwards delivered a bill of particulars which commenced thus—“ Mary Gridley to John M. Mott, Dr.” There was a trial by jury and a verdict for the plaintiff for $29,46, on which judgment was rendered by the justice. The relators appealed to the O. P., where the cause was referred. The referees reported specially that on the hearing the plaintiff in opening the cause stated that it was an action brought against the defendants, on a book account against Mary Fuller, prior to her intermarriage with Orlando A. Fuller the other defendant, and offered to prove that Orlando A. Fuller had promised to pay the account in question. This evidence was objected to as inadmissible under the pleadings and excluded. The plaintiff having no further evidence, the referees reported that nothing was due to him from the defendants. The C. P. on the plaintiff’s motion made an order setting aside the report. To this return the relators demurred, and a joinder in demurrer was put in.
S. Stevens, for relators.
W. C. Noyes, contra.

Opinion:
After advisement the following opinions were delivered :
By Bronson, J.
The declaration was in the usual form for charging the relators as joint contractors. It contained no intimation that the plaintiff sought to recover a debt due from the wife dum sola, nor was it alleged that the relation of husband and wife existed between the relators. The bill of particulars was equally defective. Although the pleadings in justices' courts are liberally construed, we cannot wholly overlook matters of form. The declaration must show that the plaintiff has a good cause of action, and on the trial the proof must be confined to such a demand as is set up in the pleading. It is not enough that the defendant may be able to conjecture the ground on which he is sued ; nor is he bound to know that a plaintiff who declares for a cause of action arising in one form, intends to give evidence of a cause of action arising in another form. The referees decided correctly that the evidence offered by the plaintiff was inadmissible under the pleadings and the court of common pleas erred in setting aside the report.
It is objected that the writ of mandamus is defective— that it does not show any title in the relators to the relief which they seek. Commercial Bank v. Canal Commissioners, 10 Wendell, 25. If a mandamus will lie in this casé, 1 think the writ is well enough in point of form. It recites a judgment before the justice, an appeal to the C. P., a'reference of the cause and a report of the referees in favor of the relators. On that report the defendants were entitled to judgment. It is true that the court below had power, if any sufficient grounds existed, to order a rehearing ; but the writ makes out a prima facie case, one which called upon the court to show on what ground the report was set aside. In the case of the Commercial Bank the writ required the canal commissioners to'pay over money without showing any right whatever in the relators to receive it. But here the relators show a title, which, if neither denied nor avoided by other matter, is, for most purposes, conclusive.
The relators have another remedy, and that is a ground for denying a mandamus. On a rehearing, if the referees follow the decision of the common pleas and decide against the relators, the question can be put upon the record and reviewed by writ of error. Since the decision of the court for the correction of errors in The Judges of Oneida v. The People, 18 Wendell, 79, I think the case of The People v. Niagara C. P., 12 Wendell, 246, ought not to be followed. I do not adopt all the reasoning of Senator Tracy, in the case recently decided, but rest my opinion on the single ground that the relators have another remedy.
The Chief Justice concurred in the above views.
This case was decided in January term, 1839, since which time the question of the proper office of a writ of mandamus has been more fully considered by the court, and the views of Senator Tracy, as expressed in the case of The Judges of Oneida v. The People, 18 Wendell, 79, recognized as laying down the true rule on the subject, as will be seen in an opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Bronson, in The People, ex rel. Doughty v. The Dutchess C. P., 20 Wendell, 658, which, although published previous to the decision of this case, was in fact pronounced subsequently.