Case Name: Bailey against Musgrave
Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1816-03-30
Citations: 2 Serg. & Rawle 219
Docket Number: 
Parties: Bailey against Musgrave.
Judges: Brackenridge J. being absent, from sickness, gave no opinion.
Reporter: Reports of cases adjudged in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (Sergeant & Rawle)
Volume: 2
Pages: 219–221

Head Matter:
Bailey against Musgrave.
In Error.
MUSGRAVE, the plaintiff below, on the 13th March, 1813, obtained a judgment upon a promissory note, before an alderman, against Bailey the defendant, who appealed to the Common Pleas of Philadelphia county, where the. cause was tried by a jury, and a verdict given for the plaintiff. The defendant moved in arrest of judgment, because the declaration laid the assumption on the 1st June, 1813, which was subsequent to the commencement of the action. The Court, however, permitted the plaintiff to amend his declaration, by striking out the word • June, and inserting March, in the place of it. The motion in arrest of judgment was then rejected, and judgment entered for the plaintiff. The defendant then took a writ of error, and Hopkins in his behalf now insisted, that to commence a suit before the cause of action had accrued, was manifest error, and that the Court below had no right to permit an amendment in matter of substance after verdict, to which he cited 2 Tid Pr. 826, 827. 1 Bac. Ah. Amendment E. p. 161. (Wil. edit.) 1 Binn. 575. B Johns. 206. 3 Johns. 43.
A declaration in assumpsit may be amended after verdict, by altering the day on which the promise was laid, if it tends to the promotion of justice.
Amendments must be governed by the sound discretion of the Courts
A. Shoemaker, for the defendant in error,
admitted, that. the cause of action must precede the commencement of the suit, and must be so laid'in the narr.v'but contended, that the Court, for the purposes of justice, might permit an amendment after verdict, where there was any thing to amend by, as was done in the case of Benner v. Frey, where a habeas corpus for the removal of a cause, was amepded by the prmcipe.
1 Binn. 366.

Opinion:
Tilghman C. J.
(After stating the facts.) The declaration as it comes before us is right, and the only question is, whether the Court of Common Pleas had power to permit the amendment. Where the object .of an amendment is to do justice, Courts are vested with extensive powers, not only by statute but by the common law. This is a singular case. In the proceedings before the alderman which made part of the record, the Court saw that there was a cause of action existing, before the commencement of the suit, and they also saw, no doubt, that the same cause of action was proved before the jury. Under these circumstances, I cannot say, that they had not authority to permit an amendment according to the truth of the case. In ejectment it has been a common practice to amend the declaration by enlarging the term, after verdict. In old times, that would not have been done ; but it has been found to promote justice, and every body is satisfied. The Court of Common Pleas might in their discretion have refused this amendment; but having granted it, I do not see that they have exceeded their power. I am therefore of opinion, that the judgment should be affirmed.
Yeates J.
The strictness which formerly obtained in the granting of amendments, is said, in our books, to be almost entirely eradicated. But where leave is given to amend, the Court will take care that the other side be not prejudiced or delayed by it. 2 Burr. 756. 1161. Against the record as amended no exception is taken. The only question is, whether the Court below had authority to order an alteration of the day-on which the promise was made after verdict and before judgment.
It appears from the alderman's transcript, that the suit was brought by the indorsee of a promissory note against the indorser. There could be no recovery unless proof was given of the dishonour of the note by the maker, and due notice-to the indorser. It is idle to say-, that the day of the promise laid, would be material on the merits. On motion, after the jury were sworn, the Court would have directed the amendment to be. made, and the, trial to proceed. It would have been no surprise to the adverse party, nor have introduced a new defence. The term laid in a declaration in ejectment, although expired, may be enlarged without consent. 2 Bl. Rep. 940. A judgment has been amended, even after writ of error brought. 2 Str. 1132. And the plaintiff below has been permitted to enter a remittitur, of part of the damages found, where they have exceeded the sum laid in the declaration, after a.writ of error brought on that very ground, upon the judgment below. All these different instances have occurred in this Court, and the principle on which they were decided, will warrant the exercise of the power of amendment in the case before us. I am, therefore, of opinion, that the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas be affirmed.
Brackenridge J. being absent, from sickness, gave no opinion.
Judgment affirmed.