Case Name: Anthony K. HARMON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2003-08-08
Citations: 854 So. 2d 697
Docket Number: No. 5D01-3236
Parties: Anthony K. HARMON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: SAWAYA, C.J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 854
Pages: 697–703

Head Matter:
Anthony K. HARMON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 5D01-3236.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Aug. 8, 2003.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 24, 2003.
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and Allison Havens, Assistant Public Defender, Daytona Beach, for Appellant.
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Pamela J. Roller, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee.

Opinion:
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
ORFINGER, J.
We deny Appellant's motion for rehearing, but withdraw our previous opinion and substitute the following therefor.
Anthony K. Harmon appeals his judgment and sentence for burglary with an assault or battery. He contends the trial court improperly excluded certain testimony that supported his defense. We disagree and affirm.
Harmon was convicted of burglarizing Blane Morse's motel room. Morse, who worked for a Minnesota tree trimming company, was staying in a motel while working on a project in Florida. Morse testified that he had left the motel room door ajar to accommodate his roommate who did not have a key. He awoke to find Harmon, whom he did not know, hitting and choking him while screaming about money. Morse said that he struggled with Harmon until two co-workers pushed the door to his room open. Morse told the coworkers to grab Harmon because Harmon had taken his wallet, but Harmon eluded them. Morse also noticed that his green duffel bag and address book were missing. Morse denied giving Ms address book to Harmon as collateral for drugs, and was unsure how four empty beer bottles came to be in his room.
One of Morse's co-workers testified that he heard a commotion and went to Morse's room. Harmon, whose shirt was ripped, was walking out of Morse's room as the coworker approached. Morse was sitting on the edge of the bed, saying that Harmon had taken his wallet. A short time later, the police found Harmon nearby hiding in a large pipe. The police found Morse's address book and a motel room key among Harmon's possessions. The key opened another room at the same motel in which the police found Morse's duffle bag. Despite a search, Morse's wallet was not recovered.
During a proffer conducted outside the jury's presence, the co-worker testified that Harmon, who was angry as he left the room, said "he's [Morse] got my money." The court excluded the statement, concluding that it was irrelevant, inadmissible hearsay.
Harmon testified that he had been selling crack cocaine to Morse on credit. According to Harmon, Morse did not have any money so he "fronted" the crack to him, and took the duffle bag as collateral. On the evening of the incident, Harmon went to Morse's room to get paid. According to Harmon, while at the motel room, Morse offered Harmon more of his possessions as additional collateral in lieu of payment. Harmon declined at first, but after he and Morse had a couple of beers, Harmon agreed to take Morse's address book as additional collateral. When Morse asked for more crack, Harmon refused, and Morse then hit him over the eye with an object, drawing blood. After the fight, Harmon walked out the door, passing the two co-workers.
Harmon contends that his statement, "he's got my money" was admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. Section 90.803(2), Florida Statutes (2001), allows the admission of "[a] statement or excited utterance relating to a startling event or condition made while the declar-ant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition." To be admissible under this hearsay exception:
1) The declarant must have experienced or witnessed an event startling enough to cause nervous excitement;
2) The statement must have been made while under the stress of the excitement caused by the startling event; and
3) The statement must have been made before there was time to contrive or misrepresent.
See State v. Jano, 524 So.2d 660, 661 (Fla.1988).
We conclude that Harmon's statement meets the requirements of section 90.803(2). First, he made the statement as he emerged from a bloody fight, an event startling enough to cause nervous excitement. See Pope v. State, 679 So.2d 710, 713 (Fla.1996); Pedrosa v. State, 781 So.2d 470 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001). Second, Harmon was still under the stress of the excitement caused by the fight. The fight had ended only moments earlier, and the co-worker testified that Harmon was angry or excited when he made the statement. See Alexander v. State, 627 So.2d 35 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). Finally, the statement was made as Harmon retreated from the fight, a period of time too short to find that there was time to contrive the story. See id. Simply because the statement may be self-serving is not a sufficient basis to exclude it. Stiles v. State, 672 So.2d 850 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Alexander. But our conclusion that Harmon's statement was an excited utterance, standing alone, does not render the statement admissible, unless the statement is otherwise relevant. In determining whether the decision not to admit the proffered statement was an abuse of discretion, we must look at what evidence the judge had available to him at the time the ruling was made.
Harmon's counsel had reserved his right to make an opening statement. As a result, at the time the judge made his ruling, he had before him only the testimony of Morse, the alleged victim, and Morse's co-worker to whom the statement was allegedly made. The testimony of those two witnesses tended to show that Harmon had robbed Morse and did not support the defense Harmon would offer later. The judge had no way of knowing that Harmon's defense would be that he had been invited into Morse's hotel room and was defending himself against Morse's unprovoked attack.
Had the statement been offered during the defendant's case, after he had set forth his version of the incident, we would agree that the statement would have been admissible because it might support his contention that Morse owed him money for drugs and became enraged when he would not extend him further credit. But when we carefully examine the evidence the trial judge had before him when he made the ruling, we fail to see how the proffered statement could be viewed as relevant. The judge had no way of knowing what defense, if any, would be asserted later in the trial. Harmon should have sought to admit the statement during the presentation of his case.
AFFIRMED.
SAWAYA, C.J., concurs.
THOMPSON, J., dissents with opinion.
. Harmon contends that he attempted to present the excited utterance during the presentation of the defense case. The trial transcript reveals that when Harmon tried to present the statement, the State made a hearsay objection. Outside the presence of the jury, the trial judge invited defense counsel to lay the predicate for the admission of the statement. Defense counsel responded to the court's offer by saying "[N]o.... I know he (Harmon) doesn't need to say it." Defense counsel then proceeded to question Harmon on other matters. We conclude that by withdrawing the question without obtaining a definitive ruling from the court, defense counsel either waived or failed to preserve any alleged error for review. "The shifting sands of the trial in progress may cause a judge to rethink an earlier evidentiary ruling based on a maturing understanding of the case." Donley v. State, 694 So.2d 149, 150 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). The trial judge should have an opportunity to consider the evidence in light of the evidence previously admitted at trial and while a witness is present in court to testify "as to any factual inquiry made necessary by the circumstances." Gilliam v. State, 602 So.2d 986, 986 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992) (Farmer, J., concurring).