Case Name: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CORTEZ LOFTON, Defendant-Appellant
Court: Illinois Appellate Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 1977-06-09
Citations: 49 Ill. App. 3d 559
Docket Number: No. 76-389
Parties: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CORTEZ LOFTON, Defendant-Appellant.
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Appellate Court Reports, Third Series
Volume: 49
Pages: 559–563

Head Matter:
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CORTEZ LOFTON, Defendant-Appellant.
First District (4th Division)
No. 76-389
Opinion filed June 9, 1977.
ROMITI, J., dissenting.
James J. Doherty, Public Defender, of Chicago (Judith A. Stewart, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.
Bernard Carey, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Laurence J. Bolon and James S. Veldman, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

Opinion:
Mr. JUSTICE JOHNSON
delivered the opinion of the court:
Following a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County, Cortez Lofton was found guilty of theft. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 16— 1(a)(1).) On February 2, 1976, he was sentenced to 4 months work-release in the House of Correction. The defendant appeals.
The sole issue presented for review is whether the defendant was / proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
The offense of theft, pursuant to section 16 — 1(a)(1) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 16 — 1(a)(1)), is committed by a person:
«< o * o w}len he knowingly:
(a) Obtains or exerts unauthorized control over property of the owner # # #
and
(a) Intends to deprive the owner permanently of the use or benefit of the property;
The defendant argues on appeal that the State failed to present evidence sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly possessed stolen property with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of the use or benefit of that property.
On December 30,1975, at approximately 2:15 a.m., two Chicago police detectives witnessed the defendant and another man rolling two Firestone radial automobile tires along the alley located behind 5714 South Prairie Avenue in the city of Chicago. The defendant immediately dropped the tire and both he and his companion began to run as the unmarked police vehicle pulled up behind them. The officers "gave chase," and apprehended Lofton approximately 200 feet away from where he dropped the tire. He told the officers that he was just helping his friend with the tires. He offered no resistance and was subsequently arrested.
It was stipulated at trial that the two automobile tires were owned by the complainant, Ephriam Williams. Williams testified that he did not authorize anyone to take possession of his tires.
The defendant testified that he was proceeding to his home that morning when he observed Bernard Dokins rolling two tires down the alley. Dokins asked the defendant to help him move the tires, and the defendant agreed to help. The defendant explained that he ran immediately when the police car pulled up behind him, without looking back, because Dokins told him to run. He denied having any knowledge that the tires were stolen when he agreed to aid Dokins in moving them.
Bernard Dokins testified that he asked the defendant to help him transport the tires, and that he did not reveal to the defendant that the tires had been stolen until the two friends were in police cusody.
After hearing the testimony of the witnesses, the trial court considered the evidence presented sufficient to prove the defendant guilty of theft beyond a reasonable doubt. The court specifically found that under the circumstances in which the incident occurred, the defendant knew or should have known that the tires were stolen property.
The defendant asserts that the testimony of Dokins contraverts the circumstantial evidence against him. As authority, he cites People v. Baddeley (1969), 106 1Ill. App. 2d 154, 158, 245 N.E.2d 593, 595, wherein the court held:
"Although an intent to steal may ordinarily be inferred when a person takes the property of another, proof of the existence of a state of mind incompatible with an intent to steal precludes a finding of theft."
In Baddeley, the defendant was a lienholder who retained unauthorized possession of the complainant's automobile, and testified that he believed that he had a right to do so. The appellate court found that the facts, circumstances, and evidence did not indicate beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with the intent requisite to a conviction for theft.
Here, after reviewing the evidence, we do not believe that the trial court was unjustified in concluding from the facts and circumstances that the defendant was guilty of theft. The circumstances in the instant case differ greatly from the situation in Baddeley. Mr. Lofton was exercising control over the stolen property at 2:15 in the morning. The defendant had no relationship with the complainant other than possession of the stolen property. When approached from behind by an unmarked police vehicle, the defendant dropped the stolen property and ran. Flight from the police has been held to evidence a consciousness of guilt (People v. Lofton (1965), 64 Ill. App. 2d 238, 244, 212 N.E.2d 705, 708), and is a factor of circumstantial evidence to be considered by the trier of fact in arriving at a determination of guilt. (People v. Brown (1963), 27 Ill. 2d 23, 26, 187 N.E.2d 728, 730.) This court held, in People v. Lofton (1965), 64 Ill. App. 2d 238, 243, 212 N.E.2d 705, 708, that:
"A conviction based on circumstantial evidence may be upheld where the proof of circumstances leads on the whole to a satisfactory conclusion and produces a reasonable and moral certainty that the defendant committed the crime as charged."
The defendant offered his testimony and that of Dokins to explain his acts and the circumstances. However, the trial court, as trier of fact, was not required to believe the testimony of the defense witnesses.
The law is well established that since intent can seldom be proved by direct evidence, it may be deduced, or inferred, by the trier of fact from acts committed and circumstances in evidence. (People v. Heaton (1953), 415 Ill. 43, 46, 112 N.E.2d 131, 132; People v. Baker (1936), 365 Ill. 328, 336, 6 N.E.2d 665, 669; People v. Campbell (1975), 28 Ill. App. 3d 480, 484, 328 N.E.2d 608, 612.) The right to believe or disbelieve testimony as to the state of mind of the defendant or the existence of the requisite felonious intent is the prerogative of the trier of fact. (People v. Campbell, at 484; People v. Beans (1974), 20 Ill. App. 3d 1005, 1007-08, 313 N.E.2d 184, 187.) It is the duty of the trier of fact to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony, and on review, this court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact. (People v. Coulson (1958), 13 Ill. 2d 290, 295-96, 149 N.E.2d 96, 98.) This court will not substitute its judgment unless it clearly appears there is a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt. People v. Guido (1962), 25 Ill. 2d 204, 208, 184 N.E.2d 858, 860.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
LINN, J., concurs.