Case Name: In the Matter of the WELFARE OF J.R., Jr., and A.I.R.
Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Minnesota
Decision Date: 2003-01-09
Citations: 655 N.W.2d 1
Docket Number: No. C2-02-378
Parties: In the Matter of the WELFARE OF J.R., Jr., and A.I.R.
Judges: Concurring in part, dissenting in part, ANDERSON, PAUL H., J., and PAGE, J.
Reporter: North Western Reporter 2d
Volume: 655
Pages: 1–12

Head Matter:
In the Matter of the WELFARE OF J.R., Jr., and A.I.R.
No. C2-02-378.
Supreme Court of Minnesota.
Jan. 9, 2003.
Brian M. Olsen, Cokato, MN, for Appellant.
Michael J. Thompson, Meeker County Attorney, Gayle A. Borchert, Assistant County Attorney, Litchfield, MN, for Respondent.
Kathryn J. Bergstrom, Christopher A. Carlisle, Gray, Plant, Mooty, Mooty & Bennett, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, Guardian At Litem.

Opinion:
OPINION
BLATZ, Chief Justice.
Appellant, the mother of J.R., Jr. and A.I.R., appeals an order of the Minnesota Court of Appeals dismissing her appeal of the trial court order terminating her parental rights. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal because appellant failed to timely serve the guardian ad litem, a party to the matter, with the notice of appeal within the appeal period. Appellant argues that because termination of parental rights cases are such important cases, a technical violation of the rules of court procedure should not prevent the appeal from proceeding. While we agree that termination of parental rights cases are important, we disagree that the rules of court procedure can be ignored and affirm the court of appeals.
An order was filed by the trial court on February 5, 2002, terminating appellant's parental rights to J.R., Jr. and A.I.R. Because Rule 82.02, subd. 2 of the Rules of Juvenile Procedure requires that an appeal be taken within 30 days, the last day to perfect an appeal was March 7, 2002. On March 7, 2002, appellant timely filed a notice of appeal with the court of appeals and timely served the notice of appeal on respondent Meeker County. Appellant failed to serve the notice of appeal on the guardian ad litem until March 21, 2002, 14 days beyond the 30 day appeal deadline. See Minn. R. Juv. P. 82.02, subd. 3(a) (requiring service of notice of appeal on all parties within the appeal period). The court of appeals held that because the guardian ad litem was a party to a juvenile protection matter, dismissal of the appeal was required.
We are now asked to decide whether the failure to timely serve the guardian ad litem deprived the court of appeals of jurisdiction over appellant's appeal. Because jurisdiction is a question of law, the standard of review is de novo. Harms v. Oak Meadows, 619 N.W.2d 201, 202 (Minn.2000).
Before answering the jurisdictional question, it is important to recognize the procedural framework governing juvenile protection matters and appeals. In Minnesota, the Rules of Juvenile Procedure govern the procedures for juvenile protection matters in the juvenile courts, including termination of parental rights. Minn. R. Juv. P. 37.01, 38.01(h)(4). As to appeals, the Rules of Juvenile Procedure state that the Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure will apply to appeals of juvenile protection matters, "[ejxcept as provided in Rule 82.02." Minn. R. Juv. P. 82.01.
Rule 82.02 of the Rules of Juvenile Procedure differs from the comparable Rules 104.01 and 103.01 of the Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure in two relevant ways. First, Rule 82.02, subd. 2 provides that in juvenile matters "[a]ny appeal shall be taken within thirty (30) days of the filing of the appealable order." Minn. R. Juv. P. 82.02, subd. 2. This is contrary to the general rule that in civil cases an appeal must be filed within 60 days. Minn. R. Civ.App. P. 104.01, subd. 1. Second, Rule 82.02, subd. 3 further states:
Within the time allowed for an appeal from an appealable order, the person appealing shall: (a) serve a notice of appeal upon the county attorney and all parties or their counsel if represented; and (b) file a notice of appeal, together with proof of service upon all parties, with the clerk of appellate courts and the court administrator.
Minn. R. Juv. P. 82.02, subd. 3 (emphasis added). In contrast, Rule 103.01 of the Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure requires only adverse parties be served with notice of the appeal within the appeal period. Minn. R. Civ.App. P. 103.01, subd. 1.
In dismissing this case, the court of appeals did not apply Rules 82.01 and 82.02 of the Rules of Juvenile Procedure. Instead, the court relied on a statute, Minnesota Statutes section 260C.415 (2000), which provides that appeals from final orders in juvenile-protection matters must be taken within 30 days of the filing of the appealable order and that an appeal from juvenile court is taken to the court of appeals as in civil ca^es. The court of appeals then applied Rule 103.01, subd. 1 of the Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure, which provides that an appeal is made by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the appellate courts and serving the notice on the adverse party or parties within the appeal period. The court of appeals determined that the guardian ad litem was an adverse party and that the failure to timely serve the notice of appeal on an adverse party was a jurisdictional defect requiring dismissal.
While the result here is not affected by the court of appeals' application of the statute and Rule 103.01 (because the 30 day appeal period in statute and Rule 82.01, subd. 2 are identical and because there is no dispute that the guardian ad litem was an adverse party), we nonetheless note that the legal authority relied on by the court of appeals in the order issued in this case is not controlling. We have consistently held that the supreme court has the primary responsibility under the separation of powers doctrine to regulate matters of trial and appellate procedure. State v. Lindsey, 632 N.W.2d 652, 658 (Minn.2001); State v. Olson, 482 N.W.2d 212, 215 (Minn.1992). Therefore, the Rules of Juvenile Procedure should control over the statute in juvenile protection cases. Accordingly, we hold that under Rule 82.02 of the Rules of Juvenile Procedure, the guardian ad litem should have been served with notice of appeal by March 7, 2002. Because the guardian ad litem was not served until March 21, 2002, the appeal was not perfected.
Having concluded that the appeal was not timely served on a necessary party, we must then determine what consequences flow from such a failure. We have previously recognized that failure to abide by the rules of procedure deprives this court of jurisdiction to hear the appeal. See Tischendorf v. Tischendorf, 321 N.W.2d 405, 409 (Minn.1982); Kenzie v. Dalco Corporation, 309 Minn. 495, 497, 245 N.W.2d 207, 208 (Minn.1976); Schaust v. Town Bd. Of Hollywood Tp., Carver County, 295 Minn. 571, 573, 204 N.W.2d 646, 648 (Minn.1973). While the rules do not expressly state that failure to timely file is a jurisdictional defect, the 1998 Advisory Committee Comment to Rule 103.01 of the Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure provides that "[tjimely filing the notice of appeal with the clerk of the appellate courts and timely service on the adverse party are the jurisdictional steps required to initiate an appeal."
Despite this case precedent and the comment to the rules, in a limited number of other cases we have recognized our inherent authority to take an appeal in the interests of justice even when the filing or service requirements set forth in a rule or statute have not been met. See Ruberg v. Shelly Oil Co., 297 N.W.2d 746, 749 (Minn.1980); Krug v. Independent School Dist. No. 16, 293 N.W.2d 26, 29 (Minn.1980); State v. M.A.P., 281 N.W.2d 334, 336-37 (Minn.1979); E.C.I. Corp. v. G.G.C. Co., 306 Minn. 433, 435-36, 237 N.W.2d 627, 629 (Minn.1976). While the seemingly-conflicting language set forth in our decisions may create some confusion as to the effect of not following the rules, a review of the cases provides some clarity. When the court has deviated frorm the rules or statutes and instead relied on our inherent authority to allow an untimely appeal to go forward, it has been on the basis of peculiar facts, such as recent changes in the law or interpretation issues. See Ruberg, 297 N.W.2d at 749 (involving a recent rules amendment permitting appeals from orders for judgment); Krug, 293 N.W.2d at 29 (involving question of whether amended order raised a new, previously unappeala-ble issue and whether the appeal period ran from the original order or the amended order); E.C.I. Corp., 306 Minn, at 435-36, 237 N.W.2d at 629 (involving issue of whether appeal began to run from the original order or as amended, corrected order). Importantly, in none of the cases allowing an untimely appeal to go forward did this court make a wholesale exception for a class of cases or do so solely on the basis of simple attorney negligence, inadvertence, or oversight. Rather, it is an exceptional case that merits such a departure from the rules that we have recognized as jurisdictional and leads the court to invoke our inherent powers.
Relying on this court's willingness to make some, albeit rare, exceptions to the rules of procedure, appellant contends that in the instant case such an exception should be made because "[a]t best we have a technical violation of the rules" and because "[t]here is no prejudice to any party by reason of the insignificant delay of notice to the guardian ad litem ." Arguing that dismissal is a harsh result, the appellant urges this court to adopt an analysis similar to Rule 60.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a "good cause" exception to the rules that would excuse the delay and allow the appeal to go forward. We are not persuaded by appellant's argument.
A good cause exception at the appellate court level would eviscerate the uniform, impartial application of the rules. The rules as a whole are replete with provisions containing definite deadlines specifically "designed to expedite the final resolution of litigation, with due consideration to fairness and certainty of procedure." E.C.I. Corp., 306 Minn, at 435, 237 N.W.2d at 629. Were we to allow simple failure to follow the rules as a good cause exception, the majority of dismissals for failure to timely file and serve a notice of appeal would be appealed and reversed. Such a result would not only delay final resolution of these cases but would also strip the rules of their important function of providing litigants with clear guidelines in which substantive issues can be pursued. Further, if we wanted to avoid this wholesale result by limiting such an exception to child protection cases, we would be in direct conflict with our own policy, as reflected by the rules, that these cases in particular need to be expeditiously handled. Compare Minn. R. Juv. P. 82.02, subd. 2 (providing 30 days to appeal juvenile protection matters) with Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 104.01, subd. 1 (providing 60 days to appeal in other civil cases).
While it is true that strict application of the rules of procedure may result in some cases not being heard on appeal, equally true is that injustice may result to the children by not enforcing the deadlines set forth in the rules. The dismissal of an untimely appeal does not occur in a vacuum. Each delay in the termination of a parent's rights equates to a delay in a child's opportunity to have a permanent home and can seriously affect a child's chance for permanent placement. National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, Resource Guidelines: Improving Court Practice in Child Abuse & Neglect Cases 14 (Spring 1995). This simple but alarming truth is widely recognized in literature and has propelled courts across the nation to improve the administration of justice for children. As stated by the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges,
[t]he prolonged uncertainty for children of not knowing whether they will be removed from home, whether and when they will return home, when they might be moved to another foster home, or whether and when they may be placed in a new permanent home is frightening. This uncertainty can seriously and permanently damage a child's development of trust and security.
National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, Adoption and Permanency Guidelines: Improving Court Practice in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases 5 (Fall 2000). Accordingly, we stand with the appellant in her assertion that these cases are extremely important, but we part company with her singular focus on the parents.
Fundamental to this heightened concern for abused and neglected children is the growing understanding that time for a child is different than time for adults. National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, Resource Guidelines: Improving Court Practice in Child Abuse & Neglect Cases 14 (Spring 1995). We need to recognize that from a child's view, a delay is a delay regardless of the reason. To a child, time lost because of innumerable opportunities given to parents to complete a case plan is no different than time lost when courts allow parents more time then is set forth in the rules to perfect an appeal. While we recognize and support due process rights of all parties, we decline the invitation to elevate the parents' rights at the expense of the child's.
In addition to our concern about the effect of unnecessary delay on children, we are troubled by the fact that the guardian ad litem was not served. The importance of the guardian ad litem in the child protection system must be underscored. Guardians ad litem are parties, Minn. R. Juv. P. 57.01, appointed by the court "to protect the interests of the minor." Minn. Stat. § 260C.163, subd. 5 (2000). It is the child's best interests that are the overriding consideration in any termination of parental rights case, Minn.Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7 (2000); In re Welfare of P.R.L., 622 N.W.2d 538, 543 (Minn.2001); In re Welfare of M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d 370, 378 (Minn.1990), and it is the guardian ad litem who speaks for the child, Minn.fit,at. § 260C.163, subd. 5 (2000). It seems axiomatic that if we are to arrive at a just result in any particular case, the voices of the children must be heard. The failure to serve the guardian ad litem is not merely a "technical violation of the rules" but truly compromises the system's ability to serve the best interests of the children.
Accordingly, we hold that Rule 82.02 of the Rules of Juvenile Procedure is jurisdictional, and because the appeal was not timely served on the guardian ad litem, dismissal is required. The court of appeals order is affirmed.
Concurring in part, dissenting in part, ANDERSON, PAUL H., J., and PAGE, J.
. In its order, the court of appeals also cited to In re Welfare of J.B., Jr., 623 N.W.2d 640, 642 (Minn.App.2001), for the proposition that failure to serve a party who is not an adverse party is not a jurisdictional defect and does not require dismissal of the appeal. In Welfare ofJ.B., Jr., the court of appeals stated that Rule 82.02, subd. 3 did not govern but rather Rule 103.01 of the Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure, as set forth in the statute, controlled. Welfare of J.B., Jr., 623 N.W.2d at 642. Because this is incorrect, we overrule that portion of Welfare of J.B., Jr. that is inconsistent with this decision.
. Rule 57.01, subd. 1 of the Rules of Juvenile Procedure expressly provides that the child's guardian ad litem is a party to a juvenile protection matter.
. Rule 60.02 provides that the trial court may relieve a party from a final order, order a new trial, or "grant such other relief as may be just" in the case of "[m]istake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." In determining whether or not a trial court should have . granted relief under Rule 60.02, this court has traditionally employed a four-prong test. Nguyen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 558 N.W.2d 487, 490 (Minn.1997). Under the four-prong test, the party seeking relief must demonstrate: "(1) a reasonable defense on the merits; (2) a reasonable excuse for his or her failure to act; (3) that he acted with due diligence after notice of the entry of judgment; and (4) that no substantial prejudice will result to the opposing party if the motion to vacate is granted." Id. We have serious doubts as to the utility of a Rule 60.02 approach at the appellate level. Rule 60.02 motions are made typically to the trial judge who heard the underlying matter and can evaluate the reasonableness of the excuse, the prejudice to the other party, and whether the party has a reasonable defense. The appellate court is not similarly situated and would not be able to apply a Rule 60.02 analysis without getting into the merits of the case. Further, as noted below, it would be difficult for a party to clear the "prejudice" hurdle in that abused and/or neglected children would have to wait even longer than is required for a permanent home.