Case Name: Stephenson v. M'Intosh and Murchison
Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina
Jurisdiction: North Carolina
Decision Date: 1823-06
Citations: 2 Hawks 427
Docket Number: 
Parties: Stephenson v. M'Intosh and Murchison.
Judges: 
Reporter: North Carolina Reports
Volume: 9
Pages: 427–434

Head Matter:
Stephenson v. M'Intosh and Murchison.
From Robeson.
The act of 1820, relative to the removal of debtors, must be considered a total repeal of tlie act of 1796 on the same subject, and therefore a Plaintiff who sued out his writ iii .February. 1821, and declared on the act of 1796, was nonsuited.
The Plaintiff in Ibis caso sued oat his writ on the 8üa day of February, 1821, and declared on the-act of 1796, and on the trial gave such evidence of a just debt due to him from Roderick M’lntcsh, and of the removal of the said Roderick from the county of Cumberland to the county of Moore, in October, 1820, and of tbs cíhcr ma-teria] facts necessary to sustain bis action, as was proper to be left to the Jury. The Defendant contended, that the act of 1796 was repealed by the act of 1820, without any exception or saving by which this action could be maintained. The Court, on this ground, non-suited the Plaintiff. He, moved for a new tria!, which was refused, and the Defendants bad judgment for costs. Plaintiff appealed.
JictvfltVG.
Be it enacted, &c. that from and after the first day of May next, *.vhcn any persoir'who has resided six months or more in any county of this State shall be about to remove out of the same, either .by land or water, it shall be his duty to advertise his intention of removal in at least three public places of tlie county, ten days previous to his removing, one of which advertisement'; shall be set up at the door of the justice of the peace to v. bom such person may intend to apply for •a certificate of his having so advertised, or at such other public place on the premises of the said justice as he may direct: and if any per-•¡on m persons shall remove, or iaiowhigly assist to remove any debtor or debtors, out of the county in which he shall have resided for the space of six months or more, who shall not have advertised himself in the manner as by this act required, and sludi have procured a certificate of the same from under the hand of some justice of the peace of the county, then such person so removing, or knowingly assisting it-, rrtvive such debtor- shall be liable to pay all debts which the per-’.or so removed might justly owe in the county from which he was removed ; which debts may be recovered by the person legally entitled thereto, by an action on the case: Provided, suit shall be commenced for the same within twelve months from the time the proof of such removal shall come to the knowledge of the person to whom the debt was so due; any law to the contrary notwithstanding.
Act of 1820.
An act to repeal an act passed in the year 17 96, entitled, “ An act to punish persons for removing debtors out of one county to another, or out of the state,” and for other purposes.
1. Be it enacted, &c. That an act passed in the year 1796, entitled, “an act to punish persons for removing debtors out of one county to another, or out of the state,” be, and the same is hereby repealed.
2. Be it further enacted, That if any person or persons shall remove or shall aid and assist in removing any debtor or debtors out of any county in which he, she or they shall have resided for the space of six months or more, with an intent, by such removing, aiding, or assisting, to delay, hinder or defraud the creditors of such debtor or debtors, or any of them, then such person or persons, so removing, aiding or assisting, shall be liable to pay all debts which the debtors or debtor so removed shall or may justly owe, in the county from which he was so removed; which debts may be recovered by the creditors respectively, who may be entitled thereunto, their executors ot administrators, by an action on the case : Provided, such suit shall be commenced within three years from and after the time of such removal.
Gaston, for the Plaintiff,
contended, that the act of 1820 was not a repeal, but simply a modification of the act of 1796 j that the Legislature evidently intended to make liable an individual who violated the act of 1796, with a particular intention mentioned in the act of 18201 that there never was a moment when the act of the .De» fendant was not unlawful, for at the same time in which the act of 1796 is repealed, that of 1820 is enacted. Any other construction would be an adherence to the letter, not to the spirit of the law; it would impute to the Legislature an intention to destroy the right of an individual to recover, in a case in which it is manifest they uniformly believed, justice required he should recover
Ruffin, contra.
This suit is founded on the act of 1796 alone, and under no circumstances can it he maintained, 'Whether the act of 1.820 repealed that of 1796, is to be ascertained in one of two ways only : the repeal is cither by express words, or bv inference direct from the words not express. The repealing words are here express, but were they not, then there is still such an inconsistency between the acts, as amounts to the repeal of the former. The proper mode to ascertain the intent of the Legislature as to the repeal or modification only of an existing law, is to consider cases as they may arise, deeming, on the one hand, the last act a repeal, and, on the other, only the continuance of a former system ; if absurdity follow from the consequences resulting from either of these modes of considering it, such mode is not conformable in its construction to the legislative intention. Now the act of 1796 declares, suit must be brought within twelve months from the time proof of the removal comes to the knowledge of the person injured ; that of 1820, within three years from the time the act is committed. Again, how could the Court give judgment in such case as this ? It is brought on the act of 1796 3 that act is repealed expressly. To punish it under the act of 1820, the removal must have been made with a particular intent 3 the declaration avers nothing as to intent, and the Court cannot look at the evidence to learn it, for its judgment must he founded on the record before it. In truth, the act of 1820 has nothing to do with the cause of complaint in this action 5 but if it had, then Plaintiff should have declared on all the statutes which give him his right of action — (Jscrotcr v. Harrington, 1 Ilawks’s Hep. 192.) However the declaration might be, yet the nonsuit was proper, for the record shews that the Plaintiff offered no evidence as to intent,

Opinion:
Taylor, Chief-Justice.
It appears to me that the two acts of 1796 and 1820, are constructed upon prinoi pies, and intended to suppress acts so different from each °^er> that the last, would, of itself, have operated a repeal of the first, upon the rule leges posteriores, &c. An ac£¡on untjel. the first, statute, must be brought within a year from the time the removal came to the knowledge of the Plaintiffs : an action under the law of 1820, must be brought within three years from the time of removal. If then, an action is brought under the first law, upon the supposition that it is not repealed, and the limitation, of the second act is applied because the offence was committed after it, and the Plaintiff is able to prove a fraudulent removal, it follows that the Defendant may he liable after the period when he stood acquitted by the first .act. The effect of this construction is to give a highly penal law a retrospective force; for a person who removed a debtor, with whatever intention, is not liable at all under the act of 1796, provided advertisements were duly made $ yet if by superadding a fraudulent intent he could be made liable, and be then relieved upon the limitation of the first law, he would be repelled by the answer, that the act described in the declaration was not the one which the law of 1796 had barred within a year. I cannot perceive what necessity there was for declaring on the act of 1796, when the wrong complained of was committed after the enactment of that of 1820.
Whatever doubt, however, there might be as to the consistency of these two laws, if that were the sole question, and if in obedience to the advice of Lord Coke, in Foster's case, the statutes ought not to be abrogated by any constrained construction out of the general and ambiguous words of a subsequent statute, but that it is «to he maintained with a benign and favourable construction," these two laws could stand together; yet when the latter was made expressly to repeal' the former, and does repeal it in so many words, I feel myself directed by the legislative will, and in adjudging the act of 1796' to be repealed, that I am travelling over the " ancient high ways" of the law.
Hall, Judge.
This action is brought after the act of 1820 had repealed the act of 1790, hut the alleged cause of action happened before that time, and while the act of 1796 was in full force; and if it can be sustained it must be upon one or the other of these acts, or upon both of them, for at Common Law, the removal complained of was no offence. I think it cannot be sustained upon the act of 1796, because the act of 1820 totally repeals it, and it would seem equally clear that it could not be sustained upon the act of 1820, because the alleged cause of action happened before its passage, and I should think it could not rest'upon both acts for its support, because only the act of 1820 was in force at the time of the institution of this suit.
In addition to these considerations it may be observed, that, that which would amount to an offence under the act of 1796, would be no offence under the act of 1820 ; and that which is an offeuce under the act of 1820 would not have been an offence under the act of 1796. Thus, if before the act of 1820, one person had assisted another to move out of the county with the most wicked and fraudulent intent, yet if lie had given due notice thereof as the Jaw directs, he was guilty of no offence for winch an action could be sustained ; but if such notice was not given, he subjected himself to an action, however innocently the act was done. Under the act of 1820, the person doing the act is only answerable if he does it with a fraudulent intent, notice is immaterial. Under the first act, the intent was nothing, if due notice was given ; under the last act, the intent is every thing, whether notice be given or not. A new trial, 1 think, should be re-, fused.