Case Name: STATE of Louisiana v. Ricardo JORDAN
Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Louisiana
Decision Date: 1973-03-26
Citations: 276 So. 2d 277
Docket Number: No. 52838
Parties: STATE of Louisiana v. Ricardo JORDAN.
Judges: SANDERS and SUMMERS, JJ., dissent.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 276
Pages: 277–283

Head Matter:
STATE of Louisiana v. Ricardo JORDAN.
No. 52838.
Supreme Court of Louisiana.
March 26, 1973.
Rehearing Denied May 7, 1973.
Edward G. Koch, Jr., Orleans Indigent Defender Program, New Orleans, for defendant-appellant.
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Harry H. Howard, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jim Garrison, Dist. Atty., Louise Korns, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Opinion:
DIXON, Justice.
The defendant was convicted of murder, R.S. 14:30 and given the death sentence. He appeals his conviction and sentence relying on eight bills of exceptions reserved and perfected during the proceedings.
We need discuss only one bill.
Bill of Exceptions No. 7 was reserved by the defendant to the State's use of evidence of other offenses in its case in chief. The context in which the evidence of other offenses was used is important. The district attorney announced in the opening statement his intention to introduce bullets and shell casings used in other armed robberies for the purpose of showing system and intent.
Defendant Jordan was arrested as a result of a shooting incident on June 6, 1969 at the corner of Washington Avenue and LaSalle Street in New Orleans. Kenneth Augustine and Donald Weaver reported that a young Negro, not personally known to them, shot at them three times. Augustine and Weaver, on the day of the shooting, identified photographs of the defendant.
Ballistics experts recovered a shell casing and bullet at the scene of the Augustine and Weaver shooting. Examination dislosed that the casing had been fired in the same gun which had fired a bullet April 17, 1969 at 1901 Louisiana Avenue, in the killing of Claude Lee, and that Jordan's gun fired the pellet that killed Lee.
With a search warrant and an arrest warrant, the police arrested Ricardo Jordan, and testified that he made oral incul-patory statements concerning the shootings of Claude Lee, as well as Augustine, Weaver and two other persons. Jordan informed the police that the gun used was in the possession of one Judge Washington who resided at the Dewdrop Hotel.
With this information, the police arrested Washington, who admitted that he had Ricardo Jordan's pistol in his possession, and directed the police to the place where it was hidden. Two other persons, Smith and Tart, were arrested by the police in connection with the murder of Claude Lee, as a result of information obtained from Ricardo Jordan and Judge Washington. The police testified that each of them made inculpatory admissions concerning the homicides under investigation. The four were jointly indicted and tried for the murder of Claude Lee, but a mistrial resulted, Ricardo Jordan was severed and tried alone in this case.
The police testified that Jordan admitted shooting Claude Lee during a robbery, as well as Charles Watzke on May 3, 1969 in the 1400 block of Marengo Street, and Lucy Wilson May 5, 1969 in the 3700 block of Canal Street.
Jordan attempted to repudiate the oral confession. He contended that he had been beaten and abused by the police during interrogation, and, in any event, admitted only shooting at Augustine and Weaver. He denied, on the trial, participating in the shooting of Lee, Watzke and Lucy Wilson, and denied that the gun introduced was the gun he used in the altercation with Augustine and Weaver.
The damaging evidence introduced, m addition to the police testimony concerning the inculpatory statements, consisted of the gun found in the possession of Judge Washington and shell casings and pellets recovered from the body of Claude Lee, from the person of Watzke, and from the scenes of the Lucy Wilson shooting and robbery and the Augustine and Weaver shooting. Ballistics experts determined that all came from Jordan's gun.
The real reason for the introduction of evidence of other offenses in this case does not seem to be system or intent, as contended by the State in its opening statement. It is true, as argued by the State, that murder requires a specific intent. But that specific intent required in the crime of murder in Louisiana is to kill or to commit great bodily harm. No evidence of those facts is essential in this prosecution, for there is a presumption that one intends the consequences of his act. See, C.Cr.P. 432. If one shoots another, he is presumed to kill or maim. The defense is not that the shooting was accidental, but that the defendant did not commit the offense.
It is true that the police testimony indicated a system or a pattern in the shooting of Lee, Watzke and Lucy Wilson. The police were told by the young blacks that they intended to kill any white persons they robbed. Watzke testified that he was shot after the robber had taken his wallet. Lucy Wilson was shot from behind, and her purse was taken.
But the introduction of the bullets and shell casings and gun do not tend to prove that four young blacks were engaged in a pattern of shooting and robbing white victims. For this purpose, the introduction of these items had no relevance. It does not appear that the evidence was introduced for the purpose of showing a system, or plan, or modus operandi, or intent.
Nor does this evidence tend to identify this defendant as the perpetrator of the murder of Claude Lee. It has no probative value as to the identity of the offender. It tends to substantiate the testimony concerning the confession, but that is no exception to the general rule which excludes evidence of extraneous offenses. It tends to prove only that this gun shot Watzke and Wilson. If the defendant had made a separate confession to the shooting of Watzke and Wilson (and there were no bullets or shell casings), that confession would not be admissible in this case. The prejudicial effect of the introduction of such evidence far outweighs its probative value for proving this offense.
Formerly, evidence of other offenses was inadmissible, with certain limited and specified exceptions. See, State v. Rives, 193 La. 186, 190 So. 374. The Code of Criminal Procedure of 1928 seemed to permit the use of evidence of other offenses when the offense was one of a syste.m, when the evidence was admissible to prove continuity, but "not to prove the offense charged." Article 446 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1928; R.S. IS :446. However, article 495 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1928 contained a proviso which allowed a witness or a defendant to be cross-examined on arrests and indictments. Act 180 of 1952 eliminated this proviso, substituting the provision that neither a witness nor the defendant could be asked on cross-examination whether he had ever been arrested or indicted.
The proposition that evidence of other offenses was inadmissible was quickly eroded in Louisiana. Many Louisiana cases have approved the admission of evidence of other offenses when it has probative value, tending to prove the offense charged. State v. Bradford, 259 La. 381, 250 So.2d 375 (1971); State v. Dotson, 260 La. 471, 256 So.2d 594 (1971); State v. Morris, 259 La. 1001, 254 So.2d 444 (1971); State v. Kreller, 255 La. 982, 233 So.2d 906 (1970).
The cases are legion in armed robbery, narcotics, sex and homicide offenses where evidence of other crimes was admitted to prove the identity of the offender. See, e. g., State v. Dotson, supra; State v. Morris, supra; State v. Bradford, supra; State v. Spencer, 257 La. 672, 243 So.2d 793 (1971); State v. Kreller, supra; State v. Clack, 254 La. 61, 222 So.2d 857 (1969); State v. Crook, 253 La. 961, 221 So.2d 473 (1969); State v. Lawrence, 251 La. 1085, 208 So.2d 685 (1968); State v. Welch, 250 La. 719, 198 So.2d 902 (1967); State v. Reese, 250 La. 151, 194 So.2d 729 (1967); State v. Evans, 249 La. 861, 192 So.2d 103 (1966); State v. Morris, 245 La. 175, 157 So.2d 728 (1963).
Nevertheless, we have not and do not relax the general rule excluding evidence of extraneous offenses to such an extreme that we would approve the introduction of evidence which tends only to prove the bad character of the defendant when he has not put his character at issue.
Where the identity of the offender is an issue, evidence of other similar offenses related in time, place and method may be admissible, provided the nature of such evidence is explained in the opening statement; the defendant would, of course, be entitled to a jury instruction limiting the effect of such evidence.
The conviction and sentence are set aside, and the case is remanded for a new trial.
SANDERS and SUMMERS, JJ., dissent.
. Such as that in State v. Billstrom, 276 Minn. 174, 149 N.W.2d 281, 285 (1967) : "It is the court's duty to advise the jury in unequivocal language that defendant is not being tried and may not be convicted for any offense except that charged, warning them that to convict for other offenses may result in unjust double punishment."