Case Name: Kammas and wife, Appellants, vs. Karras and another, Respondents
Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Wisconsin
Decision Date: 1922-12-05
Citations: 179 Wis. 12
Docket Number: 
Parties: Kammas and wife, Appellants, vs. Karras and another, Respondents.
Judges: 
Reporter: Wisconsin Reports
Volume: 179
Pages: 12–20

Head Matter:
Kammas and wife, Appellants, vs. Karras and another, Respondents.
November 8
December 5, 1922.
Automobiles: Negligence: Death: Boy running from sidewalk into street: Nonsuit.
In an action to recover damages for the death of a boy three and one-half years old, caused by being struck by an automobile truck, a nonsuit was properly granted where the evidence showed that the driver of the truck turned onto an intersecting street, and that the deceased, unseen by the driver, started from the sidewalk, ran diagonally across the street, approached the truck, which was proceeding at the rate of three to four miles per hour, from the side and rear, and collided with its left front side. Crowni-iart, J., dissents.
Appeal from a judgment of the circuit court for Milwaukee county: E. T. Fairchild, Circuit Judge.
Affirmed.
Action to recover damages, for the death of the three- and-one-half-year-old son of the plaintiffs, caused by his coming in contact with a truck driven by a servant of the defendants. On the day of the accident, July 22, 1921, at about 7 o’clock in the evening, the truck was driven south on the west side of Sixth street, turned west on the north side of Poplar street, and came in contact with the boy about forty feet west of the turn. The evidence shows the accident took place either a short distance north of the center of Poplar street or from there to within three or four feet of the north curb of Poplar street. The truck at no. time reached the center of Poplar street, and the evidence all tends to show the turn was made not far from the north curb. When the truck was making the turn the boy was on the sidewalk on the southwest corner of Poplar and Sixth streets. The evidence is a little' in conflict as to whether or not the boy started to cross the street before the turn of the truck was completed. The driver did not see the boy till within a foot or so of the truck, when it was too late to stop it and avoid the accident. A man standing on the corner near the boy raised his. hand towards the driver when he was at or near the turn, but the driver mistook the signal for one of salute and not a stop signal. Immediately after the turn was made, a man, Kramer, sitting in the rear of the truck, noticed the boy crossing the street and running toward the truck and called to the driver to stop, but the driver did not hear him and the man at once jumped up and seized the driver by the shoulder and repeated his order to stop, which was immediately obeyed but too late. One of the defendants, who also sat in the rear of the truck, saw the boy running towards it, but he says he was so excited that he could not call out till the collision occurred. The boy ran into the front left side of the truck, was struck in some way, fell down, but before any one came to his assistance got up, ran back across the street to a plpce considerably south of the place he started from, where he fell down again and was taken in charge by the man on the truck and others. No especial visible signs of violence were observed except that he was bleeding. Pie died after being taken to a hospital. At the close of plaintiffs’ testimony the court granted a motion for a nonsuit, and from a judgment entered accordingly the plaintiffs appealed.
George Sfetsos, attorney, and Walter L. Gold, of counsel, both of Milwaukee, for the appellants.
For the respondents there was a brief by Kanneberg & Darnieder of Milwaukee, and oral argument by Francis A. Darnieder.

Opinion:
Vinje, C. J.
The trial court granted the nonsuit because no negligence on the part of the defendants was shown. We think it ruled correctly. Fairly construed, the evidence shows that the boy started from the sidewalk at about the time the truck made the turn into Poplar street; that he ran diagonally across the street, and at all times till just about the moment of impact to one side and a little behind the driver. The boy was a nephew of the defendants and had been given rides on the truck a number of times. It is probable that, seeing and recognizing the truck, he started across and after it for the purpose of getting a ride. At any rate it is certain that he approached it from the side and rear, and it is for that reason no one saw him till too late. The driver testified that he was looking ahead and did not see the boy till he was so close to the side of the truck that he could not stop' in timé to save him. The truck was proceeding at a rate of from three to four miles an hour after the turn, the driver stated. This is obviously correct, for several réasons: first, because the boy covered a greater distance than the truck did after the turn was made, and second, the driver intended to take the truck to the garage, the entrance of which was only about thirty feet west of Rhe place of collision and on the north side of Poplar street. Plaintiffs' witnesses were foreigners and testified m part without interpreters, and in answer to a few leading questions it is made to appear that the boy started across the street before the truck made the' turn, and in one or two places the testimony seems to show that the boy was even in front of the truck when he was struck. But such testimony was negatived when special attention was called to it, and we think the trial court was fully justified in viewing the effect of the testimony as'being in substance • what is set out in the statement of facts.
Under such circumstances we think it can be said as a matter of law that there was no negligence on the part of the defendants. ' The boy reached the truck from the side • and the rear and the driver did not see him till the moment of impact. The witness Kramer immediately upon seeing him used every reasonable effort to avoid the collision. The defendant in the truck did not see the boy till the peril was so great that it momentarily stunned him, and the collision occurred before he could do anything. The fact that the boy was seen on or near the sidewalk on the opposite corner as the truck made the turn could not charge the defendants with knowledge that he would attempt to cross the street and overtake the truck. It appears that a reasonable lookout was kept; that the truck was driven at a slow rate of speed, and that no one saw the boy running in such a direction that it was likely that he would collide with the truck till it was too late to save him by the exercise of the highest degree of care. Regrettable as the accident is, the result cannot be charged to the defendants.
By the Court.- — Judgment affirmed.