Case Name: STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. DAVID B. SCHUMM, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
Court: New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1977-01-03
Citations: 146 N.J. Super. 30
Docket Number: 
Parties: STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. DAVID B. SCHUMM, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Superior Court Reports
Volume: 146
Pages: 30–39

Head Matter:
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, v. DAVID B. SCHUMM, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division
Argued November 30, 1976
Decided January 3, 1977.
Before Judges Lynch, Milmed and Antell.
Mr. Martin G. Gilbert argued the cause for appellant (Messrs. Wharton, Stewart & Davis, attorneys).
Mr. Simon L. Rosenbach, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Mr. Stephen R. Champi, Somerset County Prosecutor, attorney).

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Lynch, P. J. A. D.
Defendant appeals from his conviction of having violated the compulsory insurance provision of N. J. S. A. 39:6B-2. In pertinent part that statute provides that "Any owner, or registrant of a motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this State who operates or causes to be operated a motor vehicle without motor vehicle liability insurance coverage and any operator who operates or causes a motor vehicle to be operated and who knows" that the vehicle is without such insurance, is subject to the penalties of the statute. (Emphasis added).
Defendant was not an "owner or registrant." His conviction in the County Court on de novo review of his municipal court conviction was based on a finding that the defendant "caused" a motor vehicle "to be operated" when he knew or should have known that it was not covered by the necessary insurance.
The facts as recited in defendant's brief are not in dispute: In the beginning of the summer of 1975 Stephen Rodziniak placed an advertisement in the newspaper offering for sale a 1965 Pontiac GTO. Defendant Schumm responded to this advertisement. After some discussion he agreed to purchase the vehicle for $150. Defendant gave Rodziniak an initial down-payment of approximately $30, and after some passage of time additional payments were made to bring the total payments up to $130 or $140. In either event, on September 3, 1975 defendant had not yet paid to Rodziniak the full amount of the purchase price.
At some time between the last payment and September 3, 1975 the vehicle in question was moved from Rodziniak's property to the street in front of defendant's girlfriend's house because Rodziniak's father wanted him to get the vehicle off their property.
Although defendant had thus taken custody of the vehicle, he had not fully paid the agreed upon purchase price, nor had Rodziniak delivered to defendant the certificate of ownership. The assignment of the certificate had been signed by Rodziniak but was otherwise still blank. Rodziniak had no intention of delivering title until the balance of the purchase price was paid. Thus, defendant was only in custody of the vehicle. He did not own it.
On September 3, 1975 the vehicle was being moved from its location in front of defendant's girlfriend's house to another area when it was stopped by Patrolman Mattera of the North Plainfield Police Department. Defendant was not driving the vehicle at that time but was a passenger in the right front seat. Mattera specifically identified Eranklin Sananstasso as being the driver of the vehicle.
Defendant had asked Sananstasso to drive the vehicle, and at that time inquired whether Sananstasso possessed a driver's license. In response, Sananstasso exhibited something to defendant which appeared to be a driver's license. However, Sananstasso did not in fact possess a valid driver's license.
Patrolman Mattera issued three summonses against defendant, charging him with these offenses: (1) failing to have insurance, in violation of the mandatory insurance provisions of N. J. S. A. 39:6B-2; (2) allowing an unlicensed driver to operate a vehicle, in violation of N. J. S. A. 39: 3-39(b), and (3) having "fictitious plates," in violation of N. J. S. A. 39:3-33.
It should be added that defendant conceded that the vehicle was in his custody and that at the time of the alleged offense he was in control of the vehicle. Further, at oral argument he conceded that he "caused it to be operated."
Defendant's sole contention on appeal is that the language of the section reading, "any operator who operates or causes a motor vehicle to be operated," can only be construed to mean that one must actually be an "operator" of the vehicle as defined in N. J. S. A. 39:1—1, to be subject to the statutory provision. This argument is premised on a literal analysis of the statutory language to the effect that the noun "operator" is the antecedent of the adjective clause "who causes a motor vehicle to be operated," as well as it is the antecedent of the adjective clause "who operates."
We disagree. Literally, defendant's interpretation of the statutory language is arguable. But literal interpretation of a statute is not to be accepted if it distorts the legislative intent. As the Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Mountain, said in N. J. Builders, Owners and Managers Ass'n v. Blair, 60 N. J. 330 (1972):
In reading and interpreting a statute, primary regard must be given to the fundamental purpose for which the legislation was enacted. Where a literal rendering will lead to a result not in accord with the essential purpose and design of the act, the spirit of the law will control the letter. This doctrine permeates our case law.
When all is said and done, the matter of statutory construction will not justly turn on literalisms, technisms or the so-called formal rules of interpretation; it will justly turn on the breadth of the objectives of the legislation and the commonsense of the situation. [Jersey City Chapter Prop. Owner's, etc., Assoc. v. City Council, 55 N. J. 86, 100 (1969)].
[T]he spirit of the legislative direction prevails over its terms. [Dvorkin v. Dover Tp., 29 N. J. 303, 315 (1959)].
In reviewing certain municipal legislation Justice Heher, in San-Lan Builders, Inc. v. Baxendale, 28 N. J. 148, 155 (1958), observed:
These regulations are to receive a reasonable construction and application, to serve the plan and course of action of the lawgiver; and in this quest for the true intention of the law, the letter gives way to the obvious reason and spirit of the expression, and to this end the evident policy and purpose of the act constitute an implied limitation on the sense of general terms and a touchstone for the expansion of narrower terms. The will of the lawgiver is to be gathered from the object and nature of the subject matter, the contextual setting, and the mischief felt and the remedy in view. Scholastic strictness is to be avoided in the search for the legislative intention. The particular terms are to he made responsive to the essential principle of the law. It is not the words hut the internal sense of the act that controls. Reason is the soul of law. [at 338-339; emphasis supplied]
In an earlier case the same Justice said,
The intention emerges from the spirit and policy of the statute rather than the literal sense of particular terms. [Caputo v. The Best Foods, 17 N. J. 259, 264 (1955)]
Here the purpose of the statute was to keep uninsured vehicles off the road for the protection of the public who may be injured or damaged by their operation. To that end the statute obviously intends to penalize all those responsible for creating a situation where the statutory protection given the public is denied to them. Thus, not only is an "owner or registrant" who operates such a vehicle within the prohibition of the statute but also such "owner or registrant" who "causes to be operated" such a vehicle. In the same paragraph is the language with which we are concerned, covering the operator who operates and one who "causes a motor vehicle to be operated" and who knows or should know that it is uninsured.
To construe the language as defendant would have us do, i. e., that only one who actually physically operates is subject to the statute, would amount to a rewriting of the section as though it applies only to "any operator who operates" with excision of the language "or causes a motor vehicle to be operated." Such interpretive surgery so as to make that language superfluous and meaningless is impermissible. The language has the same significance as the previous reference to an "owner or registrant" who (a) op erates or (b) "causes to be operated a motor vehicle etc. State v. Canola, 135 N. J. Super. 224, 235 (App. Div. 1975), certif. den. 69 N. J. 82 (1976); Hackensack Bd. of Ed. v. Hackensack, 63 N. J. Super. 560, 569 (App. Div. 1960); Quinn v. Quinn, 118 N. J. Super. 413, 414 (Ch. Div. 1972). Defendant's interpretation would exclude from the legislative blanket of responsibility one who is not an owner, registrant or operator, but who nevertheless was in control of the ear and who admitted he caused it to be operated. We find such frustration of the legislative purpose to be unacceptable.
We affirm the conviction.