Case Name: COALITION TO END THE PERMANENT CONGRESS, et al., Appellants, v. Marvin T. RUNYON, et al., Donald K. Anderson, et al.
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Jurisdiction: District of Columbia
Decision Date: 1992-07-30
Citations: 298 U.S. App. D.C. 280
Docket Number: No. 92-5239
Parties: COALITION TO END THE PERMANENT CONGRESS, et al., Appellants, v. Marvin T. RUNYON, et al., Donald K. Anderson, et al.
Judges: Before: WALD, SILBERMAN, and RANDOLPH, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Volume: 298
Pages: 280–287

Head Matter:
979 F.2d 219
COALITION TO END THE PERMANENT CONGRESS, et al., Appellants, v. Marvin T. RUNYON, et al., Donald K. Anderson, et al.
No. 92-5239.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued July 27, 1992.
Decided July 30, 1992.
Nov. 13, 1992.
Paul R.Q. Wolfson argued the cause for appellants. With him on the brief was Alan B. Morrison.
Charles Tiefer, Deputy Gen. Counsel to the Clerk, U.S. House of Representatives, argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief was Steven R. Ross, Gen. Counsel to the Clerk.
Before: WALD, SILBERMAN, and RANDOLPH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion:
Statement for the court filed Per Curiam.
Separate statement dissenting from the per curiam disposition filed by Circuit Judge SILBERMAN.
Separate opinion on the merits filed by Circuit Judge SILBERMAN.
PER CURIAM:
This case came before the court on an expedited appeal. On July 30, 1992, after briefing and oral argument, the court issued a judgment, joined by Judges Silberman and Randolph, with Judge Wald dissenting, declaring 39 U.S.C. § 3210(d)(1)(B) unconstitutional in violation of the First and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution. This provision, then part of the congressional franking statute, permitted incumbents to send free mass mailings to persons in areas added to their districts by redistricting. Accompanying the court's judgment were brief opinions by each member of the panel. The judgment contained a notation indicating that neither it nor the accompanying opinions were to be published. The judgment also stated that "Expanded opinions will issue at a later date."
Since the entry of the judgment, there has been a development — of which we take judicial notice — rendering it imprudent for us to issue expanded opinions. On October 6,1992, before the time for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court had expired, Congress repealed 39 U.S.C. § 3210(d)(1)(B). Pub.L. No. 102-392, § 309, 106 Stat. 1703 (1992). Our judgment therefore can have no future effect. If a petition for a writ of certiorari had been filed and granted, the long-settled practice of the Supreme Court would have resulted in an order vacating our judgment and remanding the case for dismissal on the ground of mootness. See United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39-40, 71 S.Ct. 104, 106-07, 95 L.Ed. 36 (1950); Bowen v. Kizer, 485 U.S. 386, 108 S.Ct. 1200, 99 L.Ed.2d 402 (1988) (per curiam); American Library Ass'n v. Barr, 956 F.2d 1178 (D.C.Cir.1992).
If we published full opinions now, after the time for filing a certiorari petition has expired, we would be making pronouncements about the constitutionality of a repealed provision in a moot case with no possibility of Supreme Court review. To the extent that the opinions of at least two members of the panel agreed on any point, we would also be creating circuit precedent regarding questions of constitutional law. It is true that full exposition in written opinions guards against judicial decision-making by whim. But several of the reasons behind the mootness doctrine and the bar against rendering advisory opinions— "concem[ ] with the need to avoid unnecessary judicial lawmaking, and the fear that courts may be more prone to improvident decision when nothing immediate seems to be at stake" (13A C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3533.1, at 218 (1984)) — counsel strongly in favor of restraint.
Technically the case is not now before us. The only thing we have "jurisdiction" to do, because we reserved this in our judgment, is to expound further. Prudence leads us to refrain. As matters now stand, Local Rule 11(c) precludes citing as precedent either our judgment or the summary opinions accompanying it. In light of the statute's repeal, this is where matters should remain.