Case Name: MEI HUI DONG, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER Jr., United States Attorney General, Respondent
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 2009-07-07
Citations: 336 F. App'x 64
Docket Number: No. 06-4204-ag
Parties: MEI HUI DONG, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER Jr., United States Attorney General , Respondent.
Judges: PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, Chief Judge, JON O. NEWMAN, WALKER, Circuit Judges.
Reporter: West's Federal Appendix
Volume: 336
Pages: 64–65

Head Matter:
MEI HUI DONG, Petitioner, v. Eric H. HOLDER Jr., United States Attorney General , Respondent.
No. 06-4204-ag.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
July 7, 2009.
Bruno Joseph Bembi, Hempstead, New York, for Petitioner.
Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General; Douglas E. Ginsberg, Senior Litigation Counsel; Ada E. Bosque, Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, Chief Judge, JON O. NEWMAN, WALKER, Circuit Judges.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. is automatically substituted for former Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales as respondent in this case.

Opinion:
SUMMARY ORDER
Petitioner Mei Hui Dong, a native and citizen of the People's Republic of China, seeks review of an August 23, 2006 order of the BIA denying her motion to reopen. In re Mei Hui Dong, No. [ AXXX XXX XXX ] (B.I.A. Aug. 23, 2006). We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case.
We review the agency's denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion. Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir.2006). Where the agency considers rele vant evidence of country conditions in evaluating a motion to reopen, we review the agency's factual findings under the substantial evidence standard. See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 169 (2d Cir.2008). We find that the agency did not err in denying Dong's untimely motion to reopen.
Dong argues that the BIA erred in concluding that she failed to demonstrate material changed country conditions sufficient to excuse the untimeliness of her motion to reopen. However, we have previously reviewed the BIA's consideration of similar evidence and have found no error in its conclusion that such evidence was insufficient to establish material changed country conditions or a reasonable possibility of persecution. See id. at 169-73 (noting that "[w]e do not ourselves attempt to resolve conflicts in record evidence, a task largely within the discretion of the agency"); see also Wei Guang Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 270, 275 (2d Cir.2006) (noting that while the BIA must consider evidence such as "the oft-cited Aird affidavit, which [it] is asked to consider time and again[,] . it may do so in summary fashion without a reviewing court presuming that it has abused its discretion").
Similarly, the BIA's determination that Dong was ineligible to file a successive asylum application was not in error. See Yuen Jin v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 143, 156, 158-59 (2d Cir.2008).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34(b).