Case Name: STATE v. ENGLISH
Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1921-04-11
Citations: 115 S.C. 535
Docket Number: 10601
Parties: STATE v. ENGLISH
Judges: Justices Watts and Eraser concur.
Reporter: South Carolina Reports
Volume: 115
Pages: 535–549

Head Matter:
10601
STATE v. ENGLISH
(106 S. E. 781)
1. Criminal Law- — -Exception to Argument oe Solicitor Held Not to Avail Dependant. — In a prosecution for murder resulting in a conviction of manslaughter, defendant’s exceptions based' on the solicitor’s argument to the jury that a report in the community, started by defendant, that deceased had been in defendant’s watermelon patch at some time prior to the immediate difficulty, operated to deprive defendant of the right of self-defense, held not availing to defendant, because assuming the fact that the accusation of deceased by defendant was without intention or expectation of provoking a difficulty; such issue was to be determined .by the jury, and not by the Court.
2. Homicide — Instruction Giving Example of Manslaughter Not Misleading. — In a prosecution for murder resulting in a conviction of manslaughter, instruction giving the jury as an example of manslaughter a killing under provocation of an assault, held not erroneous, there being no reasonable supposition that the allegations in any manner misled the jury.
3. Homicide — Instruction Thm Self-Defense Not Available to Person Who Provokes Difficulty by Opprobrious- Language Not Erroneous. — In a prosecution for murder resulting in a conviction of manslaughter, instruction that the true rule is that self-defense is not available to a person who uses language so opprobrious as to be calculated to bring on a difficulty, and which does actually contribute to the bringing on oí a physical encounter, etc., héld¡ not erroneous.
Before SeasE, J-, Fairfield, September term, 1919.
Ap-. peal dismissed.
Will English indicted for the murder of Roland Shelton and upon convicition for manslaughter appeals.
The appellant’s exceptions were as follows:
1 That his Honor erred in permitting the solicitor, over the twice-repeated objections of defendant’s counsel, to argue to the jury that the defendant had started a report in the community that the deceásed had been in defendant’s watermelon patch; that, by starting such a report, he was at fault in bringing on the difficulty, and could not claim the protection of the law of self-defense — the error being: (a) That such a statement by defendant, made some time prior to the immediate difficulty, without any intention or expectation of provoking a difficulty, could not operate to deprive him of the right of self-defense, and such argument was therefore improper, and highly .prejudicial to the defendant; (b) that under such a construction of the law, and ruling by his Honor upon defendant’s objection to such argument, the jury would have been compelled to find the defendant guilty, even though they believed that he had established -a clear case of self-defense in so far as the immediate difficulty was concerned.
(2) That his Honor erred in charging the jury as follows : “Now, to give you an example of what manslaughter is, it might be well to give you an example of what murder is, contrasting the two. If a person assaults you, not necessarily battery, if he strikes at you within striking distance, or whether he is within striking distance or not, and you then and there, by reason of the sudden heat and passion, resist the assault, strike, and kill him, that would be manslaughter” — the error being that such charge tended to lead the jury to believe that one has no right to resist, under any circumstances, an unprovoked assault upon himself.
(3) That his Honor erred in charging the jury as follows : “I charge you, gentlemen, that the true rule is that self-defense is not available to a person who uses such language, so opprobrious as is calculated to bring on a difficulty and which does actually contribute to the bringing on of a physical encounter? The general doctrine that mere words will not justify blows is involved in that rule. The true rule is that self-defense is not available to a person who uses language so opprobrious as is calculated to bring on a difficulty, and which really does contribute to a physical encounter” — the error being: (a) That such charge was not warranted by the testimony; (b) that such charge could only have been intended by his Honor to answer the objections urged by defendant’s counsel to the argument of the solicitor pointed out in the first exception, there being no other testimony in the case to which such charge was applicable, and that thereby the defendant was deprived of the right of self-defense; (c) that under such a construction of the law, one who has made any remark reflecting upon another, without any intention that such remark should be repeated, would have no right to defend himself against an otherwise unprovoked assault subsequently made upon him.
Messrs. McDonald & McDonald, for appellant,
cite: Statement made by accused to deceased was not such as to deprive him of the plea of self-defense: 13 R. C. L. 833; 55 S. C. 32, 74 Am. St. Rep. 733 and note; 45 L. R. A. ■687; 65 S. C. 324; 75 S. C. 494; 25 A. & E. Enc. Law 268; 89 Ga. 140; 92 Ga. 601; 85 S. C. 101; 16 L. R. A. <N. S.) 671..
/. K. Henry, Solicitor, and Samuel M. Wolfe, Esq., Attorney General, for the respondent.
Qral argument by Mr. Wolfe.
April 11, 1921.

Opinion:
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
Mr. Chiee Justice Gary.
The defendant was tried on an indictment, charging him with the murder of Roland Shelton. He admitted the killing, but pleaded self-defense. The jury found him guilty of manslaughter, and he appealed from the sentence imposed on him. The record contains this statement:
"It appears from the testimony that the deceased, in company with his father, a brother, and two friends, were sitting down near the public road on the plantation of T. W. Traylor, in Fairfield county, and nearby was a well, which was used by the tenants on the plantation. Will English, a tenant on the place, came down to the well with two of his little children and drew them a bucket of water, and then started -on down the road in the ' direction of the farm, which he was cultivating. He was carrying a shotgun, which he stated was for the purpose of shooting crows. His route led him by the party of which the deceased was a member, and when opposite' them he exchanged greetings with them. Brice Shelton, a brother of the deceased, then said to English that he had heard that English had accused him of going into his watermelon patch. The defendant denied this, and Brice Shelton told him that if he 'had not made such an accusation that it was all right. Then Roland Shelton, the deceased, took up the conversation, and there is a conflict in the testimony as to just what passed, but this started the.dispute which led up to the killing. The-testimony in this connection is set out in the record."
Turning to the testimony we find that Brice Shelton, brother of the deceased, thus testified:
"Ed Stevenson, Bub, Virgil Jones, and Roland and myself were sitting down on a pile of logs in front of our door, and we were laughing and talking. Will English come up with his gun, and I says to him, I hear he had me accused of going into his watermelon patch; he said no, he didn't say it, and I said if he didn't say it, it was all right. My brother, Roland, asked him, T hear you got me accused of going in there.' Will, he walks off a few steps, and he turned around and said: 'Yes, damn you, I said it and I stick to what I said.' Then Will and Bub started toward one another."
The record also contains this statement:
"During the course of the solicitor's argument to the jury he argued that the defendant had circulated the report in that community that deceased had been in defendant's watermelon patch, and therefore the defendant was at fault in bringing on the difficulty. Defendant's counsel, in the midst of the solicitor's argument, objected .to such argument, upon the ground that this provocation was too remote, that the defendant was not thereby deprived of the right of self-defense and after listening to arguments by counsel on both sides, the presiding Judge overruled the defendant's objection. The solicitor then argued to the jury that the defendant had circulated a report in the community that the deceased had been in his watermelon patch, and that when the deceased had asked him about it, he at first denied it, and had then repeated the accusation to his face with curses. The argument was that one who charged another with being a thief, and repeated it to his face in the manner described in the testimony, could^not claim'to be without fault. Defendant's counsel also objected to this argument, but their objection was also overruled."
The defendant appealed upon exceptions which will be reported. Neither subdivision (a) nor (b) of the first exception can be sustained, as the appellant assum.es the fact that the accusation of the deceased by the defendant was without any intention or expectation of provoking a difficulty. Such issue was to be, determined by the jury, and not by the Court.
The second exception must be overruled, as it cannot be reasonably supposed that the illustration in any manner whatsoever misled the jury.
The third exception cannot be sustained, as the charge of his Honor, the presiding Judge, is sustained by the cases of State v. Rowell, 75 S. C. 494, 56 S. E. 23, and State v. Lee, 85 S. C. 101, 67 S. E. 141, 137 Am. St. Rep. 869, and was applicable to the facts of this case.
Appeal dismissed.
Justices Watts and Eraser concur.