Case Name: ESTELLE, CORRECTIONS DIRECTOR v. WILLIAMS
Court: Supreme Court of the United States
Jurisdiction: United States
Decision Date: 1976-05-03
Citations: 425 U.S. 501
Docket Number: No. 74-676
Parties: ESTELLE, CORRECTIONS DIRECTOR v. WILLIAMS
Judges: BurgeR, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stewart, White, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Powell, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Stewart, J., joined, post, p. 513. Brennan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall, J., joined, post, p. 515. Stevens, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Reporter: United States Reports
Volume: 425
Pages: 501–535

Head Matter:
ESTELLE, CORRECTIONS DIRECTOR v. WILLIAMS
No. 74-676.
Argued October 7, 1975
Decided May 3, 1976
BurgeR, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stewart, White, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined. Powell, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Stewart, J., joined, post, p. 513. Brennan, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Marshall, J., joined, post, p. 515. Stevens, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Dunklin Sullivan, Assistant Attorney General of Texas, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief were John L. Hill, Attorney General, David M. Kendall, First Assistant Attorney General, and Joe B. Dibrell and Lonny F. Zwiener, Assistant Attorneys General.
Ben L. Aderholt, by appointment of the Court, 421 U. S. 907, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. [Reporter’s Note: Mr. Aderholt represented the respondent before this Court only. Cf. post, at 513-514, 514, and 523.]

Opinion:
Mr. Chief Justice Burger
delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari in this case to determine whether an accused who is compelled to wear identifiable prison clothing at his trial by a jury is denied due process or equal protection of the laws.
In November 1970, respondent Williams was convicted in state court in Harris County, Tex., for assault with intent to commit murder with malice. The crime occurred during an altercation between respondent and his former landlord on the latter's property. The evidence showed that respondent returned to the apartment complex where he had formerly resided to visit a female tenant. While there, respondent and his former landlord became involved in a quarrel. Heated words were exchanged, and a fight ensued. Respondent struck the landlord with a knife in the neck, chest, and abdomen, severely wounding him.
Unable to post bond, respondent was held in custody while awaiting trial. When he learned that he was to go on trial, respondent asked an officer at the jail for his civilian clothes. This request was denied. As a result, respondent appeared at trial in clothes that were distinctly marked as prison issue. Neither respondent nor his counsel raised an objection to the prison attire at any time.
A jury returned a verdict of guilty on the charge of assault with intent to murder with malice. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction. Williams v. State, 477 S. W. 2d 24 (1972). Williams then sought release in the United States District Court on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Although holding that requiring a defendant to stand trial in prison garb was inherently unfair, the District Court denied relief on the ground that the error was harmless.
The Court of Appeals reversed on the basis of its own prior holding in Hernandez v. Beto, 443 F. 2d 634 (CA5), cert. denied, 404 U. S. 897 (1971). 500 F. 2d 206. The Fifth Circuit disagreed with the District Court solely on the issue of harmless error.
(1)
The right to a fair trial is a fundamental liberty secured by the Fourteenth Amendment. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U. S. 162, 172 (1975). The presumption of innocence, although not articulated in the Constitution, is a basic component of a fair trial under our system of criminal justice. Long ago this Court stated:
"The principle that there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law." Coffin v. United States, 156 U. S. 432, 453 (1895).
To implement the presumption, courts must be alert to factors that may undermine the fairness of the fact-finding process. In the administration of criminal justice, courts must carefully guard against dilution of the principle that guilt is to be established by probative evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U. S. 358, 364 (1970).
The actual impact of a particular practice on the judgment of jurors cannot always be fully determined. But this Court has left no doubt that the probability of deleterious effects on fundamental rights calls for close judicial scrutiny. Estes v. Texas, 381 U. S. 532 (1965); In re Murchison, 349 U. S. 133 (1955). Courts must do the best they can to evaluate the likely effects of a particular procedure, based on reason, principle, and common human experience.
The potential effects of presenting an accused before the jury in prison attire need not, however, be measured in the abstract. Courts have, with few exceptions, determined that an accused should not be compelled to go to trial in prison or jail clothing because of the possible impairment of the presumption so basic to the adversary system. Gaito v. Brierley, 485 F. 2d 86 (CA3 1973); Hernandez v. Beto, supra; Brooks v. Texas, 381 F. 2d 619 (CA5 1967); Commonwealth v. Keeler, 216 Pa. Super. 193, 264 A. 2d 407 (1970); Miller v. State, 249 Ark. 3, 457 S. W. 2d 848 (1970); People v. Shaw, 381 Mich. 467, 164 N. W. 2d 7 (1969); People v. Zapata, 220 Cal. App. 2d 903, 34 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1963), cert. denied, 377 U. S. 406 (1964); Eaddy v. People, 115 Colo. 488, 174 P. 2d 717 (1946). The American Bar Association's Standards for Criminal Justice also disapprove the practice. ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Trial by Jury § 4.1 (b), p. 91 (App. Draft 1968). This is a recognition that the constant reminder of the accused's condition implicit in such distinctive, identi fiable attire may affect a juror's judgment. The defendant's clothing is so likely to be a continuing influence throughout the trial that, not unlike placing a jury in the custody of deputy sheriffs who were also witnesses for the prosecution, an unacceptable risk is presented of impermissible factors coming into play. Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 466, 473 (1965).
That such factors cannot always be avoided is manifest in Illinois v. Allen, 397 U. S. 337 (1970), where we expressly recognized that "the sight of shackles and gags might have a significant effect on the jury's feelings about the defendant . . . ," id., at 344; yet the Court upheld the practice when necessary to control a contumacious defendant. For that reason, the Court authorized removal of a disruptive defendant from the courtroom or, alternatively, binding and gagging of the accused until he agrees to conduct himself properly in the courtroom.
Unlike physical restraints, permitted under Allen, supra, compelling an accused to wear jail clothing furthers no essential state policy. That it may be more convenient for jail administrators, a factor quite unlike the substantial need to impose physical restraints upon contumacious defendants, provides no justification for the practice. Indeed, the State of Texas asserts no interest whatever in maintaining this procedure.
Similarly troubling is the fact that compelling the accused to stand trial in jail garb operates usually against only those who cannot post bail prior to trial. Persons who can secure release are not subjected to this condition. To impose the condition on one category of defendants, over objection, would be repugnant to the concept of equal justice embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12 (1956).
(2)
The Fifth Circuit, in this as well as in prior decisions, has not purported to adopt a per se rule invalidating all convictions where a defendant had appeared in identifiable prison clothes. That court has held, for instance, that the harmless-error doctrine is applicable to this line of cases. 500 F. 2d, at 210-212. See also Thomas v. Beto, 474 F. 2d 981, cert. denied, 414 U. S. 871 (1973); Hernandez v. Beto, supra, at 637. Other courts are in accord. Bentley v. Crist, 469 F. 2d 854, 856 (CA9 1972) Watt v. Page, 452 F. 2d 1174, 1176-1177 (CA10), cert. denied, 405 U. S. 1070 (1972). In this case, the Court of Appeals quoted the language of Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court in Harrington v. California, 395 U. S. 250 (1969):
"We held in Chapman v. California that 'before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.' We said that. . not all 'trial errors which violate the Constitution automatically call for reversal.' " Id., at 251-252 (citations omitted).
In Chapman v. California, 386 U. S. 18 (1967), the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Black, held:
"We are urged by petitioners to hold that all federal constitutional errors, regardless of the facts and circumstances, must always be deemed harmful. Such a holding, as petitioners correctly point out, would require an automatic reversal of their convictions and make further discussion unnecessary. We decline to adopt any such rule. All 50 States have harmless-error statutes or rules, and the United States long ago through its Congress established for its courts the rule that judgments shall not be reversed for 'errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.' . . . We conclude that there may be some constitutional errors which in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring the automatic reversal of the conviction." Id., at 21-22 (citation and footnote omitted).
In other situations, when, for example, the accused is being tried for an offense committed in confinement, or in an attempted escape, courts have refused to find error in the practice. In United States ex rel. Stahl v. Henderson, 472 F. 2d 556 (CAS), cert. denied, 411 U. S. 971 (1973), the Court of Appeals declined to overturn a conviction where the defendant, albeit tried in jail clothes, was charged with having murdered another inmate while confined in prison. "No prejudice can result from seeing that which is already known." 472 F. 2d, at 557. In the present case, the Court of Appeals concluded :
"A different result may be appropriate where the defendant is on trial for an offense allegedly committed while he was in prison, because the jury would learn of his incarceration in any event." 500 F. 2d, at 209 n. 5.
Contra: People v. Roman, 35 N. Y. 2d 978, 324 N. E. 2d 885 (1975).
Consequently, the courts have refused to embrace a mechanical rule vitiating any conviction, regardless of the circumstances, where the accused appeared before the jury in prison garb. Instead, they have recognized that the particular evil proscribed is compelling a defendant, against his will, to be tried in jail attire. The reason for this judicial focus upon compulsion is simple; instances frequently arise where a defendant prefers to stand trial before his peers in prison garments. The cases show, for example, that it is not an uncommon defense tactic to produce the defendant in jail clothes in the hope of eliciting sympathy from the jury. Anderson v. Watt, 475 F. 2d 881, 882 (CA10 1973); Watt v. Page, supra, at 1176. Cf. Garcia v. Beto, 452 F. 2d 655, 656 (CA5 1971). This is apparently an accepted practice in Texas courts, Barber v. State, 477 S. W. 2d 868, 870 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972), including the court where respondent was tried.
Courts have therefore required an accused to object to being tried in jail garments, just as he must invoke or abandon other rights. The Fifth Circuit has held: "A defendant may not remain silent and willingly go to trial in prison garb and thereafter claim error." Hernandez v. Beto, 443 F. 2d, at 637. The essential meaning of the Court of Appeals' decision in Hernandez has been described by that court as follows:
"We held [in Hernandez] that the defendant and his attorney had the burden to make known that the defendant desired to be tried in civilian clothes before the state could be accountable for his being tried in jail clothes . . . ." United States ex rel. Stahl v. Henderson, 472 F. 2d, at 557.
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit has indicated that the courts must determine whether an accused "was in fact compelled to wear prison clothing at his state court trial." Bentley v. Crist, 469 F. 2d, at 856. See also Dennis v. Dees, 278 F. Supp. 354, 359 (ED La. 1968), disapproved on other grounds, United States ex rel. Stahl v. Henderson, supra, at 557; People v. Roman, 35 N. Y. 2d, at 978-979, 324 N. E. 2d, at 885-886; People v. Shaw, 381 Mich. 467, 164 N. W. 2d 7 (1969).
(3)
The record is clear that no objection was made to the trial judge concerning the jail attire either before or at any time during the trial. This omission plainly did not result from any lack of appreciation of the issue, for respondent had raised the question with the jail attendant prior to trial. At trial, defense counsel expressly referred to respondent's attire during voir dire. The trial judge was thus informed that respondent's counsel was fully conscious of the situation.
Despite respondent's failure to raise the issue at trial, the Court of Appeals held:
"Waiver of the objection cannot be inferred merely from failure to object if trial in prison garb is customary in the jurisdiction." 500 F. 2d, at 208.
The District Court had concluded that at the time of respondent's trial the majority of nonbailed defendants in Harris County were indeed tried in jail clothes. From this, the Court of Appeals concluded that the practice followed in respondent's case was customary. Ibid.
However, that analysis ignores essential facts adduced at the evidentiary hearing. Notwithstanding the evidence as to the general practice in Harris County, there was no finding that nonbailed defendants were compelled to stand trial in prison garments if timely objection was made to the trial judge. On the contrary, the District Court concluded that the practice of the particular judge presiding in respondent's case was to permit any accused who so desired to change into civilian clothes:
"There is no doubt but that the [judge] had a practice of allowing defendants to stand trial in civilian clothing, if requested, a practice evidently-followed by certain of the other judges as well." Williams v. Beto, 364 F. Supp. 335, 343 (1973).
The state judge's policy was confirmed at the eviden-tiary hearing by the prosecutor and by a defense attorney who practiced in the judge's court.
Significantly, at the evidentiary hearing respondent's trial counsel did not intimate that he feared any adverse consequences attending an objection to the procedure. There is nothing to suggest that there would have been any prejudicial effect on defense counsel had he made objection, given the decisions on this point in that jurisdiction. Four years before respondent's trial the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had held: "It is inherently unfair to try a defendant for crime while garbed in his jail uniform . . . ." Brooks v. Texas, 381 F. 2d, at 624. Similarly, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals had held: "[E]very effort should be made to avoid trying an accused while in jail garb." Ring v. State, 450 S. W. 2d 85, 88 (1970). Prior Texas cases had made it clear that an objection should be interposed. See Wilkinson v. State, 423 S. W. 2d 311, 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968); Ring v. State, supra, at 88.
Nothing in this record, therefore, warrants a conclusion that respondent was compelled to stand trial in jail garb or that there was sufficient reason to excuse the failure to raise the issue before trial. Nor can the trial judge be faulted for not asking the respondent or his counsel whether he was deliberately going to trial in jail clothes. To impose this requirement suggests that the trial judge operates under the same burden here as he would in the situation in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 (1938), where the issue concerned whether the accused willingly stood trial without the benefit of counsel. Under our adversary system, once a defendant has the assistance of counsel the vast array of trial decisions, strategic and tactical, which must be made before and during trial rests with the accused and his attorney. Any other approach would rewrite the duties of trial judges and counsel in our legal system.
Accordingly, although the State cannot, consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment, compel an accused to stand trial before a jury while dressed in identifiable prison clothes, the failure to make an objection to the court as to being tried in such clothes, for whatever rea son, is sufficient to negate the presence of compulsion necessary to establish a constitutional violation.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
Mr. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
None of the authorities relied on by petitioner expressly approves the practice. Several cases hold, however, that a showing of actual prejudice must be made by a defendant seeking to have his conviction overturned on this ground. Hall v. Cox, 324 F. Supp. 786 (WD Va. 1971); McFalls v. Peyton, 270 F. Supp. 577 (WD Va. 1967), aff'd, 401 F. 2d 890 (CA4 1968), cert. denied, 394 U. S. 951 (1969).
The contumacious defendant brings his plight upon himself and presents the court with a limited range of alternatives. Obviously, a defendant cannot be allowed to abort a trial and frustrate the process of justice by his own acts.
We are not confronted with an alleged relinquishment of a fundamental right of the sort at issue in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458 (1938). There, the Court understandably found it difficult to conceive of an accused making a knowing decision to forgo the fundamental right to the assistance of counsel, absent a showing of conscious surrender of a known right. The Court has not, however, engaged in this exacting analysis with respect to strategic and tactical decisions, even those with constitutional implications, by a counseled accused. See, e. g., On Lee v. United States, 343 U. S. 747, 749 n. 3 (1952). Cf. Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11.
The Second Circuit has noted in a different context:
"Federal courts, including the Supreme Court, have declined to notice [alleged] errors not objected to below even though such errors involve a criminal defendant's constitutional rights." United States v. Indiviglio, 352 F. 2d 276, 280 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U. S. 907 (1966).
The reason for this rule is clear: if the defendant has an objection, there is an obligation to call the matter to the court's attention so the trial judge will have an opportunity to remedy the situation.
Significantly, in the Henderson case the Fifth Circuit interpreted Hernandez as requiring the accused to take aifirmative steps to apprise the trial court of his desire to be tried in civilian clothes. The Hernandez court had simply found, under the circumstances presented there, that the defendant "had met his burden." 472 F. 2d, at 557. This interpretation is particularly meaningful since the author of the Hernandez opinion was a member of the panel in the subsequent decision in Henderson. Moreover, the court in Hernandez indicated:
"We do not paint with a broad brush these types of eases. Each case must be considered in its own factual context." 443 F. 2d, at 637.
Moreover, there is nothing in the record in Hernandez to suggest that the state trial judge had, as here, a longstanding practice, known to members of the bar, to permit any defendant to change into civilian clothes on request. See infra, at 510-511.
The evidence showed that respondent was a Caucasian in his sixties. At the evidentiary hearing, he testified that he felt he had no real case to present at trial. The testimony of several eyewitnesses was clear and consistent. Under these circumstances, a desire to elicit jury sympathy would have been a reasonable approach and one which the trial judge might reasonably have assumed was deliberately undertaken.
This was based on the state judge's affidavit, which stated in part:
"I have never compelled a defendant to go to trial in jail clothes, and on every occasion when a defendant or his attorney requested that he be allowed to wear civilian clothes at his trial I have granted the request." 364 F. Supp., at 338.
Counsel testified that on a prior occasion, a different state judge had overruled his objection to the trial of his client in jail clothes. He also testified that he had seen other defendants dressed in jail garments in the courtroom where respondent was tried.
The Texas courts had admittedly not established a rigid rule invalidating the practice -per se. Instead, the courts ordinarily looked to whether actual injury or prejudice had resulted from the defendant's appearance in jail garb. Garcia v. State, 429 S. W. 2d 468, 471 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968); Xanthull v. State, 403 S. W. 2d 807, 809 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966). But these cases provided ample grounds for objection to the procedure, since they at least implicitly recognized that reversible error could result from the practice. Similarly, the 1970 decision in Xanthull v. Beto, 307 F. Supp. 903 (SD Tex.), did not render fruitless any objection on respondent's part. Instead, that case, like various state cases, simply imposed a burden on federal habeas petitioners to show actual prejudice resulting from a jury trial in jail garments.
It is not necessary, if indeed it were possible, for us to decide whether this was a defense tactic or simply indifference. In either case, respondent's silence precludes any suggestion of compulsion.
Petitioner has contended in his brief and in oral argument that the Court of Appeals' decision in Hernandez should not be applied retroactively. The petition for certiorari did not raise this issue and our disposition of the case renders it unnecessary to decide it.