Case Name: In re San Juanita SANCHEZ, Pete Garcia, and Esperanza Lopez Flores, Relators
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 2002-04-22
Citations: 81 S.W.3d 794
Docket Number: No. 02-0317
Parties: In re San Juanita SANCHEZ, Pete Garcia, and Esperanza Lopez Flores, Relators.
Judges: Justice HANKINSON did not participate in the decision.
Reporter: South Western Reporter Third Series
Volume: 81
Pages: 794–802

Head Matter:
In re San Juanita SANCHEZ, Pete Garcia, and Esperanza Lopez Flores, Relators.
No. 02-0317.
Supreme Court of Texas.
April 22, 2002.
Supplemental Opinion on Denial of Rehearing Aug. 29, 2002.
Israel Ramon, Jr., Law Office of Israel Ramon, for relators.
Jose R. Guerrero, Leo Montalvo, Jesus Ramirez, Montalvo & Ramirez, for respondent.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
In this mandamus proceeding, relators seek a writ directing San Juan's City Secretary, Vicki Ramirez, to accept their applications and place their names on the ballot for the upcoming city commission election. Ramirez refused to accept rela-tors' applications, claiming they were untimely. Although relators submitted their applications after the deadline in Election Code section 143.007, relators did submit them before the filing deadline San Juan's Home Rule Charter prescribed. On April 17, 2002, we issued an order conditionally granting relief, with opinion to follow, because early voting began that day. We now hold that Texas Election Code section 143.005 permits a home-rule city to set a deadline for filing applications for municipal elections that differs from the deadline contained in Election Code section 143.007. Because relators timely submitted their applications under San Juan's Charter, Ramirez was required to accept them and place relators' names on the ballot.
I
Relator San Juanita Sanchez seeks to run for mayor in San Juan's May 4, 2002, general election. Relators Pete Garcia and Esperanza Lopez Flores seek to run for city commissioner in the same election. San Juan is a home-rule city, and its voters have adopted a Home Rule Charter. See Tex. Const, art. XI, § 5; see also Tex. Loc. Gov't Code § 51.072. Under San Juan's Charter, relators had until thirty days before election day, which was April 4, 2002, to file their applications for a place on the ballot. The Charter Article X, section 10.07 provides, in relevant part: "Any qualified person who desires to become a candidate for election to a place on the City Commission shall file with the City Secretary at least thirty (30) days prior to the election an application for his name to appear on the ballot."
On March 21, 20Ó2, before the Charter's filing deadline, relators informed Ramirez that they intended to file their applications. Ramirez would not accept them, stating they were untimely under Election Code section 143.007. Section 143.007 provides, in relevant part: "Except as otherwise provided by this code, an application for a place on the ballot must be filed not later than 5 p.m. of the 45th day before election day." Tex. Elec.Code § 143.007(a). Ramirez claimed that section 143.007 controlled over the Charter and required relators to file their applications by March 20, 2002 — forty-five days before election day. Because Ramirez would not accept relators' applications in person, relators mailed them to her on March 27, 2002.
Relators then sought mandamus relief in the court of appeals, seeking to require Ramirez to accept their applications and place their names on the ballots. That court denied relief without opinion. Rela-tors next filed a mandamus petition with this Court. We conditionally granted relief, indicating that this opinion would follow.
II
The parties do not dispute that re-lators filed their applications before the Charter's deadline, but after the deadline set forth in Election Code section 143.007. Accordingly, we decide the legal question of which fifing deadline applies to relators' applications. See In re Canales, 52 S.W.3d 698, 701 (Tex.2001). We can then determine whether Ramirez had a duty to accept relators' applications and place their names, on the ballot. See Tex. Elec.Code § 273.061.
Ill
Home-rule cities, such as San Juan, derive their powers from the Texas Constitution. See Tex. Const, art. XI, § 5; see also Tex. Loc. Gov't Code § 51.072. They possess "the full power of self government and look to the Legislature not for grants of power, but only for limitations on their power." Dallas Merchant's and Concessionaire's Ass'n v. City of Dallas, 852 S.W.2d 489, 490-91 (Tex.1993). We presume a home-rule city charter provision to be valid; and the courts cannot interfere unless it is unreasonable and arbitrary, amounting to a clear abuse of municipal discretion. See City of Brookside Village v. Comeau, 633 S.W.2d 790, 792 (Tex.1982); City of Houston v. Todd, 41 S.W.3d 289, 295 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied).
A city charter provision that attempts to regulate a subject matter a state statute preempts is unenforceable to the extent it conflicts with the state statute. See Dallas Merchant's and Concessionaire's Ass'n, 852 S.W.2d at 491. However, if the Legislature decides to preempt a subject matter normally within a home-rule city's broad powers, it must do so with "unmistakable clarity." Id. Accordingly, courts will not hold a state law and a city charter provision repugnant to each other if they can reach a reasonable construction leaving both in effect. Id.
We must determine whether the Election Code preempts the Charter's thirty-day fifing deadline. We start with Election Code section 141.031, which enumerates the "general requirements" that a candidate's application must satisfy. Tex. Elec.Code § 141.031. For example, a candidate's application must be in writing, be signed and sworn to by the candidate, and must include the candidate's name, occupation, and office sought. Id. § 141.031(1), (2), (4). Another general re quirement is that the application must "be timely filed with the appropriate authority." Id. § 141.031(3). Thus, section 141.031's plain language makes "timely filling]" a requirement for a valid application. As we recently stated in In re Gamble, "the candidate has a duty to file a compliant application before the filing deadline." 71 S.W.3d 313, 318 (Tex.2002).
Section 141.031 does not specify when an application is "timely filed." However, section 143.007 requires a candidate to file an application no later than the forty-fifth day before election day, "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by this code." Tex. Elec. Code § 143.007(a). Thus, section 143.007 acknowledges that other Election Code sections may provide exceptions to the forty-five day filing deadline.
Section 143.005 embodies just such an exception. It governs applications for home-rule city office — the type of office at issue here. Id. § 141.005. Section 143.005(a) provides that "[a] city charter may prescribe requirements in connection with a candidate's application for a place on the ballot for an office of a home-rule city." Id. § 143.005(a). Accordingly, the Election Code expressly allows home-rule cities, such as San Juan, to establish their own application requirements in municipal elections. See Bejarano v. Hunter, 899 S.W.2d 346, 349 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1995, orig. proceeding).
Here, San Juan chose to establish a filing deadline that differs from the deadline in Election Code section 143.007. Instead of section 143.007's forty-five day deadline, San Juan's Charter requires a candidate to file an application with the City Secretary "at least thirty (30) days prior to the election day." The Charter's filing deadline does not conflict with the Election Code. Instead, section 143.005 expressly authorizes San Juan to establish a different filing date. See Tex Elec.Code § 143.005(a).
Certainly, the Election Code does not preempt with "unmistakable clarity" San Juan's ability to prescribe a different fifing deadline. See Dallas Merchant's and Concessionaire's Ass'n, 852 S.W.2d at 491. We reject Ramirez's contention that Election Code sections 144.005 and 143.008 show the Legislature "clearly reserved for itself regulation in this area." Section 144.005 provides: "[e]xeept as otherwise provided by law," an application for office other than a county or city office must be filed no later than the forty-fifth day before election day. Tex. Elec.Code § 144.005(a). Ramirez states that Election Code section 1.005(10) defines "law," as meaning, among other things, "city charter." Id. § 1.005(10). Ramirez argues that, if the Legislature intended to allow home-rule cities to create exceptions to section 143.007's deadline, it would have used the phrase "other law" rather than "as otherwise provided by this code." Compare Tex. Elec.Code § 144.005, with § 143.007.
Ramirez's argument lacks merit. Section 144.005 does not apply to municipal elections and does not govern here. Moreover, Ramirez's argument presumes no other Election Code provision allows home-rule cities to adopt their own fifing deadlines for municipal elections. But, as we have explained, section 143.005 does just that. Thus, section 144.005 in no way suggests that the Legislature intended to preempt home-rule cities from adopting their own fifing deadlines.
We reach the same conclusion about section 143.008. Section 143.008 applies to candidates for city office "with a four-year term," and states:
If at the deadline prescribed by Section 143.007 no candidate has filed an application for a place on the ballot for an office, the filing deadline for that office is extended to 5 p.m. of the 40th day-before election day.
Tex. Elec.Code § 143.008(a), (b).
Section 143.008 applies only when section 143.007's deadline applies. And, section 143.007's deadline does not apply when a home-rule city charter prescribes a different filing deadline than does section 143.007. Accordingly, section 143.008 does not apply here, and does not preempt home-rule cities from adopting their own filing deadlines under section 143.005.
In fact, under Election Code section 143.005(b), when a home-rule city establishes its own application requirements, the only Election Code application requirement that the city must retain is a statement that "the candidate is aware of the nepotism law, Chapter 573, Government Code." Id. § 143.005(b). Consequently, the Election Code prohibits a home-rule city from adopting a charter provision that does not require a candidate's application to contain this statement. Id. § 141.031(4)(L). However, section 143.005(b) unambiguously states that "[t]he other provisions of Section 141.031 do not apply." Id. § 141.005(b). Therefore, a home-rule city need not retain any other application requirement in section 141.031, including "timely fil[ing]" under section 143.007. Id.
This construction of the Election Code gives effect to both the Election Code and San Juan's Charter provisions, without holding one filing deadline repugnant to the other. See Dallas Merchant's and Concessionaire's Ass'n, 852 S.W.2d at 491. It also gives appropriate deference to the broad discretionary powers the Texas Constitution gives to home-rule cities. See id.
We accordingly conclude that San Juan's Charter filing deadline applies here. Ramirez does not dispute that relators attempted to file their applications within that deadline. Further, the only reason Ramirez gave for rejecting relators' applications was the deadline in Election Code section 143.007. We therefore hold that Ramirez was required to accept the applications and place relators' names on the ballot.
Without hearing oral argument, we conditionally granted the writ by order issued April 17, 2002, and directed Ramirez to accept relators' applications and place their names on the ballot. See Tex.R.App. P. 52.8(c). As we noted in that order, the writ will not issue unless Ramirez does not comply with our decision.
Justice HANKINSON did not participate in the decision.