Case Name: AMERICAN FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY v. STANDRIDGE
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1961-09-29
Citations: 104 Ga. App. 539
Docket Number: 38923
Parties: AMERICAN FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY v. STANDRIDGE.
Judges: Townsend, P. J., and Jordan, J., concur.
Reporter: Georgia Appeals Reports
Volume: 104
Pages: 539–541

Head Matter:
38923.
AMERICAN FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY v. STANDRIDGE.

Opinion:
Frankum, Judge.
Under an insurance policy whereby, for a stipulated consideration, the insurer is obligated to pay to the insured owner of a specified automobile ". . . for direct and accidental . . . damage to the automobile, . . . except loss caused by collision . . . or by upset . . ." and which policy provides, "[bjreakage of glass and loss caused by missiles, falling objects, fire, theft, explosion, earthquake, windstorm, hail, water, flood, malicious mischief or vandalism, riot or civil commotion shall not be deemed loss by collision or upset", the insurer is obligated to pay the insured for direct and accidental damage to the automobile, except damage to the same resulting from an event for which damage the insured is not liable under one or more of the exclusions stated in the policy. The policy specifically enumerates certain risks which are not excluded, and, therefore, they are risks for which coverage is provided. This case is before this court on petition and a general demurrer thereto, which petition is based upon an insurance policy containing the above stated provisions. The petition contains allegations, in substance, that while the policy was in full force and effect, the plaintiff was driving the automobile described in the policy, when the transmission of the same "exploded," thereby causing damage to the automobile in the amount sued for. However, the petition does not allege that the explosion was produced from an accidental cause. The unexplained allegation that the transmission "exploded" is not the equivalent of alleging that the explosion resulted from an accidental cause, and, therefore, such defect in the petition renders it subject to general demurrer. See Newman v. Benefit Association, 173 Ga. 881 (162 SE 122); Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Benion, 82 Ga. App. 571 (61 SE2d 579). The general demurrer to the petition should have been sustained.
Decided September 29, 1961.
Erwin, Birchmore & Epting, Eugene A. Epting, for plaintiff in error.
H. W. Davis, Jack S. Davidson, Rupert A. Brown, contra.
Judgment reversed.
Townsend, P. J., and Jordan, J., concur.