Case Name: CONSUMERS UNION OF UNITED STATES, INC., Appellant, v. John G. HEIMANN, Individually and in his official capacity as Comptroller of the Currency
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Jurisdiction: District of Columbia
Decision Date: 1978-08-31
Citations: 191 U.S. App. D.C. 8
Docket Number: No. 77-2115
Parties: CONSUMERS UNION OF UNITED STATES, INC., Appellant, v. John G. HEIMANN, Individually and in his official capacity as Comptroller of the Currency.
Judges: Before WRIGHT, Chief Judge, and TAMM, Circuit Judge, and HOFFMAN, United States Senior District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia.
Reporter: United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Volume: 191
Pages: 8–18

Head Matter:
589 F.2d 531
CONSUMERS UNION OF UNITED STATES, INC., Appellant, v. John G. HEIMANN, Individually and in his official capacity as Comptroller of the Currency.
No. 77-2115.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued June 9, 1978.
Decided Aug. 31, 1978.
Mark A. Cymrot, Washington, D. C., with whom Ellen Broadman, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellant.
Michael Kimmel, Atty., Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. C., with whom Earl J. Silbert, U. S. Atty., Barbara Allen Babcock, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Leonard Schaitman, Atty.; Dept, of Justice, Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellee.
Charles E. Hill and Douglas L. Parker, Washington, D. C., were on the brief for amicus curiae, urging reversal.
Before WRIGHT, Chief Judge, and TAMM, Circuit Judge, and HOFFMAN, United States Senior District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia.
Sitting by designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 294(d).

Opinion:
Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge, TAMM.
Concurring opinion filed by Chief Judge, J. SKELLY WRIGHT.
TAMM, Circuit Judge:
Appellant Consumers Union of United States, Inc., challenges an order of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia that granted summary judgment in a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) suit to appellee Comptroller of the Currency (Comptroller). The district court (Pratt, J.) held that exemption 8 of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(8) (1976), protects from disclosure documents relating to the extent of compliance by certain national banks with the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601-1691Í (1976), specifically those provisions known as the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601-1667e (1976). We agree with the district court that the documents at issue clearly fall within the express terms of the exemption, and thus we affirm.
I
Appellant is a nonprofit corporation chartered in 1936 to provide information, education, and counsel about consumer goods and services. In May 1976, it learned that a comprehensive examination of national banks in the New England region by the Comptroller had revealed a significant degree of noncompliance by those banks with regulations promulgated pursuant to the Truth in Lending Act. That same month, appellant wrote to the Comptroller requesting access under the FOIA, to: "(1) documents submitted to the Comptroller's Office by national banks which concern the extent of their compliance with the Truth-in-Lending Act, and (2) any analysis or summary by the Office of the Comptroller of those documents." The Comptroller denied the request on June 7, 1976, citing as authority for nondisclosure regulations of the Comptroller that incorporated exemptions 5 and 8 of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) & (8) (1976). Appellant's administrative appeal was rejected on the authority of regulations that incorporated exemption 8, and, additionally, exemptions 4, 6, and 7 of the FOIA. Id. § 552(b)(4) & (6)-(7).
On August 17,1976, appellant filed suit in the district court, arguing primarily that exemption 8 did not apply to the documents in question. The district court disagreed, and, on November 1, 1977, granted the Comptroller's motion for summary judgment. This appeal ensued.
II
This case presents this court with its first opportunity to discuss exemption 8 of the FOIA, which protects from disclosure those matters that are "contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(8) (1976).
The Comptroller contends that the term "examination, operating,' or condition reports" describes, and thus protects from disclosure, the documents in issue. Appellant takes the opposite view, arguing: 1) the language of exemption 8 must be interpreted in a manner consistent with the legislative intent at the time of its enactment in 1966; 2) legislative history demonstrates that, at that time, the Congress intended to protect only examination reports that re-fleeted upon the security and solvency of financial institutions; 3) "consumer bank examinations" did not come into being until 1968 at the earliest, when the Truth in Lending Act was passed, and do not reflect upon bank security or solvency; and 4) a narrow construction of exemption 8 does not permit its expansion to cover these new materials.
We are well aware of the fact that exemptions to the FOIA must be narrowly construed. Washington Research Project, Inc. v. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 164 U.S.App.D.C. 169, 175, 504 F.2d 238, 244, cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1974); Soucie v. David, 145 U.S.App.D.C. 144, 157, 448 F.2d 1067, 1080 (1971). However, we are also mindful that a reviewing court must accord first priority in statutory interpretation to the plain meaning of the provision in question. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485, 37 U.S. 192, 61 L.Ed. 442 (1917); accord, United States v. American Trucking Associations, 310 U.S. 534, 543, 60 S.Ct. 1059, 84 L.Ed. 1345 (1940). Thus, if the Congress has intentionally and unambiguously crafted a particularly broad, all-inclusive definition, it is not our function, even in the FOIA context, to subvert that effort. In our view, the wording of exemption 8 leaves no doubt that the documents in issue fit precisely and exactly within the statutory definition.
However, a court can look beyond the plain meaning of a statute in limited instances, most notably when there is an assertion of a significant change in circumstances since enactment, see Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392, 397-400, 86 S.Ct. 852, 15 L.Ed.2d 827 (1966), or when a literal reading leads to an unreasonable result, see United States v. American Trucking Associations, 310 U.S. at 543, 60 S.Ct. 1059. Because appellant vigorously asserts that both situations are present here, we have turned to the legislative history of exemption 8. See United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192, 199, 98 S.Ct. 444, 54 L.Ed.2d 444 (1977). In our view, that history supports the Comptroller's position that exemption 8 is clearly applicable to the documents under review.
It is true, as appellant urges, that the primary reason for adoption of exemption 8 was to ensure the security of financial institutions. Specifically, there was concern that disclosure of examination, operation, and condition reports containing frank evaluations of the investigated banks might undermine public confidence and cause unwarranted runs on banks. However, there is nothing in the legislative history to indicate that Congress, in seeking to guard against these possibilities, intended exemption 8 to apply only to the varieties of bank examinations then extant, for, in our view, the disclosure of bank examination reports of any type, including those under scrutiny here, could lead to the same adverse results. Furthermore, a secondary purpose in enacting exemption 8 appears to have been to safeguard the relationship between the banks and their supervising agencies. If details of the bank examinations were made freely available to the public and to banking competitors, there was concern that banks would cooperate less than fully with federal authorities. That secondary purpose would certainly be implicated by appellant's interpretation of exemption 8.
Appellant strongly urges, however, that the subsequent passage of the Truth in Lending Act narrows the broad language of exemption 8 insofar as consumer credit matters are concerned. We cannot agree. Appellant has been unable to bring to our attention any statutory language or legislative history of the Truth in Lending Act relating to disclosure of information by government agencies under the FOIA. Furthermore, congressional action subsequent to passage of the Truth in Lending Act sharply undercuts appellant's argument. In 1974, Congress enacted amendments designed to remedy deficiencies that had been illustrated since the FOIA's passage eight years before. Significantly, there was no alteration of exemption 8. Even more damaging to appellant's position, and especially supportive of the view we take, is the fact that the House Committee on Government Operations, which has oversight authority for the FOIA, recently considered the question whether records reflecting banks' compliance with the Truth in Lending Act should be made available to the public. The Committee concluded that the question needed to be "studied further," a conclusion that would have been unnecessary and incongruous had these records already been subject to disclosure under the FOIA.
Ill
We hold that the documents in issue here are expressly exempted from disclosure by exemption 8. Appellant and amici curiae maintain that this result runs counter to the spirit of the FOIA and to the need for full implementation of credit practices fair to consumers. Indeed, there have been suggestions that exemption 8 is both over-broad and superfluous. However, in our view Congress has left no room for a narrower interpretation of exemption 8, and, as so aptly stated by the district judge, "[i]f this is an unfortunate result, recourse is to the Congress rather than the Courts."
Affirmed.
. Memorandum Decision of Nov. 1, 1977, Joint Appendix (J.A.) at 72a-73a; see J.A. at la.
. J.A. at 60a; Brief for the Appellee at 15-16. See generally 12 C.F.R. § 226.1-.15 (1977).
. Record entry (R.E.) 10, exhibit (exh.) 1.
. Id. exh. 2. See 12 C.F.R. § 4.16(b)(5) & (8) (1977).
. R.E. 10, exh. 5. See 12 C.F.R. § 4.16(b)(4) & (6) — (7) (1977).
. R.E. 32, at 2; see J.A. at la.
. Because of. the result we reach concerning exemption 8, we find it unnecessary to address the Comptroller's other claims of exemption. See Brief for the Appellee at 25-26 n.24.
. Our research indicates that we may be the first appellate court to interpret exemption 8, although we did cite the exemption in Soucie v. David, 145 U.S.App.D.C. 144, 155, 448 F.2d 1067, 1078 n.45 (1971). See also Secretary of Labor v. Farino, 490 F.2d 885, 893 n.8 (7th Cir. 1973); First Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 426 F.Supp. 454, 458 (W.D.Ark.1977); Farmers Nat'l Bank v. Camp, 345 F.Supp. 622, 627-28 n.7 (D.Md.1971). Three district court cases have discussed the exemption to a limited degree, most recently Gerard v. Carey, Civil No. 76-259 (E.D.P.A. Mar. 21, 1978). Gerard involved a discovery request, and the court noted that a report by a bank regulatory body that would be exempt from disclosure to the public under the Freedom of Information Act might nevertheless be subject to discovery. Kaye v. Bums, 411 F.Supp. 897 (S.D.N.Y.1976), held only that attorney's fees should not be assessed against an agency that refused disclosure, under exemption 8, of a letter, based on an examination report, that concluded statutory violations had occurred; the court found that the agency had a reasonable basis in law for concluding that the item was exempt. Id. at 904. M. A. Schapiro & Co. v. SEC, 339 F.Supp. 467 (D.D.C. 1972), concluded that national securities exchanges and broker-dealers are not "financial institutions" under exemption 8, and that studies and documents relating to changing of trading rules are not bank examination reports. Id. at 470.
.See Reply Brief of Appellant at 3-5.
.The Senate and House reports are in striking accord. The Senate report states:
Exemption No. 8 is directed specifically to insuring the security of our financial institutions by making available only to the Government agencies responsible for the regulation or supervision of such institutions the examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by[,] on behalf of, or for the use of such agencies.
S.Rep.No.813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1965). Similarly, the House Report explains that exemption 8:
is designed to insure the security and integrity of financial institutions, for the sensitive details collected by Government agencies which regulate these institutions could, if indiscriminately disclosed, cause great harm. H.R.Rep.No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1966), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1966, pp. 2418, 2428.
. See Hearings on S.1663 Before the Sub-comm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm, on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 186 (1964).
. Indeed, there is some indication in the legislative history that Congress considered information concerning loans to be one of the more sensitive topics in an examination report. See id. at 196-97.
. See id. at 177E, 179, 186, 191, 549; see also 44 U.S.C. § 3507 (1970).
. Act of November 21, 1974, Pub.L.No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561.
. H.R.Rep.No.280, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1977) ("Because truth-in-lending compliance examinations are conducted at irregular intervals and do not cover all the kinds of creditors subject to the Act . . disclosure of overall compliance by individual creditors . should be studied further.").
. At oral argument, Chief Judge Wright asked counsel for the Comptroller whether the interpretation of exemption 8 that counsel was espousing would, in effect, exclude federal bank supervisory agencies from the FOIA. Counsel replied that some matters, such as bank charter applications, are obtainable.
. Consumer Federation of America; Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund; and National Organization for Women.
. See Brief of Appellant at 9; Brief of Amici Curiae at 6.
. See J. O'Reilly, Federal Information Disclosure § 18.01 (1977); Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U.Chi.L.R. 761, 800-01, 807 (1967); Note, Freedom of Information: The Statute and the Regulations, 56 Geo.L.J. 18, 50 (1967).
. J.A. at 73a.