Case Name: Timothy Tyrone WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2006-03-14
Citations: 924 So. 2d 897
Docket Number: No. 1D05-2306
Parties: Timothy Tyrone WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: KAHN, C.J., and PADOVANO, J., concur; THOMAS, J. concurs with written opinion.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 924
Pages: 897–904

Head Matter:
Timothy Tyrone WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 1D05-2306.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
March 14, 2006.
Appellant, Pro Se.
Charlie Crist, Attorney General, and Elizabeth Fletcher Duffy, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Attorneys for Appellee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
We have for review the trial court's denial of Appellant's motion for postconviction relief. We affirm the summary denial of five of Appellant's claims without further discussion. We must reverse the summary denial of Appellant's claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to properly advise Appellant of the statutory maximum before he rejected the State's three-year plea offer.
Appellant admitted below that his counsel conveyed to him the State's plea offer of three years in prison. Appellant rejected this offer and was convicted at trial of sale or delivery of cocaine, a second-degree felony. Appellant was sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment, which is within the statutory maximum term of 15 years' imprisonment for this offense. § 775.082(3)(c); 893.13(10)(a), Fla. Stat. (2002).
Appellant asserted below that his counsel failed to inform him of the statutory maximum term of this offense. He claims that he would have accepted the State's plea offer had he known that a second-degree felony was punishable by 15 years' imprisonment.
Our prior precedent requires that we remand this claim for an evidentiary hearing. In Tidwell v. State, 844 So.2d 701 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003), we stated:
[AJppellant alleged that he was charged with sexual battery with force likely to cause serious injury, a life felony; that the state offered to permit him to plead to the lesser-included offense of sexual battery without the use of force likely to cause serious injury, a second-degree felony, in return for a sentence of five years in prison, followed by five years' probation; that his attorney advised him to reject the offer; that his attorney failed to tell him that the offense with which he was charged carried a maximum penalty of life imprisonment; that he would have accepted the state's offer but for counsel's misadvice; and that, following trial, he was sentenced to seven years in prison, followed by five years' probation. Such allegations are facially sufficient to state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Cottle v. State, 733 So.2d 963, 967 (Fla.1999); Lewis v. State, 751 So.2d 715, 717 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000); Garcia v. State, 736 So.2d 89, 89-90 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). Nothing in either the trial court's order or the attachments to it conclusively refutes this claim.
Id. at 702 (emphasis added).
We are not free to reconsider or reject our prior decision in Tidwell. In addition, we have determined that an en banc consideration of Tidwell would not be a wise use of judicial resources. Even if this court were to recede from Tidwell en banc, the decision would only establish conflict with other district courts, as noted in the concurring opinion. Thus, the issue would be resolved by the Florida Supreme Court regardless of any en banc consideration. We do agree with the concurring opinion, however, that this case raises a question of great public importance.
We reverse the trial court's denial of Appellant's claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to properly advise Appellant of the statutory maximum sentence before he rejected the State's plea offer, and we remand for an evidentiary hearing. We also certify the following question of great public importance to the Florida Supreme Court:
DOES A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT WHO REJECTS A PLEA OFFER AND IS CONVICTED AT TRIAL STATE A CLAIM FOR POSTCON-VICTION RELIEF UNDER STRICKLAND V. WASHINGTON, 466 U.S. 668 [104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674] (1984), BY ALLEGING THAT DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO INFORM THE DEFENDANT OF THE STATUTORY MAXIMUM PENALTY FOR THE CHARGED OFFENSE PRIOR TO THE DEFENDANT'S REJECTION OF THE PLEA OFFER?
AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED.
KAHN, C.J., and PADOVANO, J., concur; THOMAS, J. concurs with written opinion.