Case Name: Isadore NADLER, Appellee, v. Albert H. TREPTOW and Elease Treptow, Appellants
Court: Iowa Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Iowa
Decision Date: 1969-03-11
Citations: 166 N.W.2d 103
Docket Number: No. 53354
Parties: Isadore NADLER, Appellee, v. Albert H. TREPTOW and Elease Treptow, Appellants.
Judges: GARFIELD, C. J., and LARSON, MOORE and STUART, JJ., concur.
Reporter: North Western Reporter 2d
Volume: 166
Pages: 103–108

Head Matter:
Isadore NADLER, Appellee, v. Albert H. TREPTOW and Elease Treptow, Appellants.
No. 53354.
Supreme Court of Iowa.
March 11, 1969.
Rehearing Denied May 6, 1969.
M. S. O’Brien, Oelwein, for appellants.
Peter Burk and Isadore Nadler, pro se, Waterloo, for appellee.

Opinion:
SNELL, Justice.
This is an action at law for the collection of attorney fees. Defendants denied the accuracy of the charges and counterclaimed claiming plaintiff's services were self-serving and not in the best interests of his client. The trial court sitting as the trier of the facts allowed a little less than 54% of plaintiff's claim against one de fendant and disallowed the counterclaim. Defendants appealed.
The judgment was against Elease Trep-tow only. She will be referred to as defendant.
The basic issues are factual. Our review is not de novo. Findings of fact in a law action are binding upon the appellate court if supported by substantial evidence. Citation of authority is not necessary. Rule 344(f) 1, Rules of Civil Procedure.
Appellant's brief is not in strict compliance with rule 344(a) (3), Rules of Civil Procedure, in setting out errors relied on for reversal. The failure, however, is not as flagrant as in Broadston v. Jasper County Savings Bank, Inc., 244 Iowa 1161, 58 N.W.2d 309 cited by appellee in his motion to dismiss.
In the spirit of leniency referred to in that case we overrule the motion to dismiss.
Plaintiff's employment as attorney for defendant and the rendition of service is admitted. The challenge is to the extent of the services and the propriety of the charges made therefor.
Plaintiff is a practicing attorney. Defendant Elease Treptow during the time involved was the operator of a tavern and restaurant known as Elease's Lounge. The details and intricacies of her interest do not appear and are not important in this case on appeal. She had been in partnership with Victor Anderson, who apparently was also the contract purchaser of real estate. The real estate contract called for payments of $300 per month to the Pappas estate. Mr. Anderson died so two estates were then involved.
Defendant by contract bought the Anderson interest in the real estate contract and Elease's Lounge. Plaintiff acted as her attorney.
Defendant was unschooled in accounting and business reporting and employed plaintiff to supervise, keep hooks and co-sign checks.
Defendant had business, financial and personal troubles. Her installment payments were too high. Negotiations for reduction were unsuccessful. Lending agencies declined help. Defendant's husband sued for divorce, but the husband and wife were soon reconciled.
Plaintiff rendered many and various services for defendant ranging from purely legal work to keeping books done mostly by his secretary. Defendant knew plaintiff was charging for the work and made payments on account.
Defendant's obligations to the Anderson estate included the obligations to the Pappas estate. In trust for his children plaintiff bought the Pappas real estate. Title was clouded and delays ensued. Defendant had no money and does not claim that she could have bought the real estate, but she challenges the propriety of plaintiff's actions.
The trial court found:
"To the Court's satisfaction it was established by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. NadlePs purchase of real estate in trust for his children subject to outstanding contracts was not against the interests of his clients; in fact if payments were reduced as a result of his purchase, it would be for her benefit. There is much testimony that Mr. Nadler, in his representation of Elease Treptow, was very concerned about her high payments and wanted to obtain a reduction in same. The evidence further shows a full disclosure of the facts to the Defendant Elease Treptow, and that Plaintiff acted in good faith, and as a practical matter the purchase could be for her benefit.
"From the evidence submitted the Court finds that the competent evidence in this case failed to disclose any violation of duty or any such transaction as would bring it within the condemnation of the law. »
The trial court then quoted from Shakespeare, "Who steals my purse steals trash! )>
Attached to the decision was a copy of # 12 Canons of Professional Ethics.
We will comment, infra, on professional ethics.
I. Plaintiff's petition was in two divisions. The first division claimed $1,653.20 as the unpaid balance on the general account. The second division claimed $200 for services in the divorce action.
A number of exhibits were offered and received. Defendant challenged the admissibility and probative value of plaintiff's books of account.
The rules governing the admission of written memoranda or records are procedural and considerable discretion is vested in the trial judge in determining admissibility. Section 622.28, Code of Iowa. Bingham v. Blunk, 253 Iowa 1391, 116 N.W.2d 447, Moffitt Building Co. v. United States Lumber & Supply Co., 255 Iowa 765, 124 N.W.2d 134.
The trial court found there were some discrepancies in plaintiff's records. Some of the items were general rather than specific and it was difficult to determine what part were legal services, what part were clerical and what were bookkeeping services. The court gave great weight to the testimony of a witness for defendant and to the testimony of defendant that before submitting an itemized statement plaintiff told defendant she owed him $1,000. The court subjected plaintiff's claim to a substantial discount and rendered judgment in the sum of $1,000.
We cannot say that the court's findings and conclusions were without support in the evidence. We find no reversible error.
II. As noted, supra, the trial court appended to the decision a copy of Canon 12 of the American Bar Association Canons of Professional Ethics. These Canons of Professional Ethics have been adopted by our court. See court rule 119, page 3014, Code of Iowa. They have also been adopted by the Iowa State Bar Association. The Canons of Professional Ethics having been inj ected into' the case we comment thereon.
Canon 12 considers the several matters to be considered in fixing fees including the poverty of the client. The entire thrust of the canon is that the fees should be fair and reasonable under all the circumstances. The last paragraph is as follows:
"In fixing fees it should never be forgotten that the profession is a branch of the administration of justice and not a mere money-getting trade."
There was some conflict in the testimony as to the time and extent of disclosure to defendant concerning plaintiff's negotiations for the purchase of the Pappas property. The court found specifically that "The evidence further shows a full disclosure of the facts to the Defendant Elease Treptow, and that plaintiff acted in good faith, and as a practical matter the purchase could be for her benefit."
We agree with the trial court that defendant was not damaged by plaintiff's purchase. She had no money with which to buy. However, neither that fact nor good faith alone justifies the purchase by an attorney of property that is the subject matter of his client's litigation. It is only the finding of full disclosure that saves the transaction from censure.
Canon 10 of the Canons of Professional Ethics provides:
"Acquiring Interest in Litigation. The lawyer should not purchase any interest in the subject-matter of the litigation which he is conducting."
Canon 11 provides:
"Dealing With Trust Property. The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client. "
7 Am.Jur.2d, Attorneys at Law, section 154, page 139, says:
"An attorney owes to his client an undivided allegiance, and after he has been retained by, and received the confidence of, a client, he cannot, without the free and intelligent consent of his client, given after full knowledge of all the facts and circumstances, act both for his client and for one whose interest is adverse to or conflicting with that of his client in the same general matter. It makes no difference how slight the adverse interest may be. And the fact that the motive and intention of the attorney are honest is immaterial. "
Section 160, page 142, says:
"An attorney cannot deal for himself in the subject matter of the litigation to the prejudice of his client's interest. Without his client's consent, he cannot buy and hold, otherwise than in trust, any adverse title or interest touching the thing to which his employment relates.
"The rule that prohibits an attorney employed to sustain a client's rights or title to property from purchasing any outstanding or opposing title against the interest of his client applies both before and after the cause is ended, and during the time the client holds for himself and after he has conveyed his interest. "
Attorneys must not only abide by the letter and spirit of the rules but also scrupulously avoid actions that might lead to suspicion and discredit of himself and his profession.
For the reasons stated, supra, the case is
Affirmed.
GARFIELD, C. J., and LARSON, MOORE and STUART, JJ., concur.
BECKER, MASON, RAWLINGS and LeGRAND, JJ., dissent.
. The Canons have been adopted by this court, Court Rule 119, page 3014, Code of Iowa, 1966.