Case Name: TERRI VAN WINKLE, P. A., Appellant, v. Barbara JOHNSTON and Keith Johnston, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2002-04-22
Citations: 813 So. 2d 1065
Docket Number: No. 1D01-1324
Parties: TERRI VAN WINKLE, P. A., Appellant, v. Barbara JOHNSTON and Keith Johnston, Appellees.
Judges: BENTON and POLSTON, JJ., concur. ERVIN, J., concurs with opinion.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 813
Pages: 1065–1069

Head Matter:
TERRI VAN WINKLE, P. A., Appellant, v. Barbara JOHNSTON and Keith Johnston, Appellees.
No. 1D01-1324.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
April 22, 2002.
Fred M. Johnson and William D. Hor-gan of Fuller, Johnson & Farrell, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Marsha L. Lyons of Lyons and Farrar, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellees.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
Appellant Terri Van Winkle, P.A. challenges a final order denying its claim to a setoff for the uninsured motorist benefits received by the appellees, Barbara and Keith Johnston, from their insurer, American Express Assurance Company ("AMEX"). We affirm the trial court's ruling that Van Winkle is not entitled to a setoff.
In 1995, appellee Barbara Johnston was involved in an automobile accident with an underinsured motorist. Ms. Johnston retained Van Winkle to represent her as a plaintiff in a lawsuit for personal injuries arising from the automobile accident, but Van Winkle missed the statute of limitations. After retaining different counsel, appellees instituted a lawsuit against AMEX for benefits under the uninsured motorist policy. Ultimately, AMEX paid the appellees $42,500 in uninsured motorist benefits and assigned its right to seek subrogation from the tortfeasor and/or Van Winkle to the appellees. Thereafter, the appellees instituted the instant action against Van Winkle for legal malpractice. The parties have stipulated that if Van Winkle is entitled to a setoff, then appel-lees shall take nothing by this suit, but if Van Winkle is not so entitled, the appellees shall receive a judgment for $42,500.
I.
Citing Kay v. Bricker, 485 So.2d 486 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), Van Winkle argues that the appellees stipulated that they incurred damages of $50,500, and because they have received that amount from insurance proceeds, there should be a setoff to prevent a double recovery.
However, in Kay, the defendant was entitled to a setoff on the basis of section 768.041(2), Florida Statutes, and the case did not involve uninsured motorist coverage benefits. Because section 768.041(2) does not authorize a setoff based on uninsured motorist coverage, Kay is not applicable. See Int'l Sales-Rentals Leasing Co. v. Nearhoof, 263 So.2d 569 (Fla.1972); Respess v. Carter, 585 So.2d 987 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991).
II.
We also reject Van Winkle's argument that the setoff is required under section 768.76(1), Florida Statutes (1995). Without addressing the issue of whether a set- off under section 768.76 is appropriate in a legal malpractice action, we conclude that the record does not support considering the insurance proceeds from AMEX as a collateral source. Section 768.76(2)(a)2. defines, in pertinent part, "collateral sources" as "any payments made to the claimant" by "automobile accident insurance that provides health benefits or income disability coverage." The record does not specify whether any of the non-PIP proceeds is for health benefits or loss of earnings, therefore Van Winkle has not demonstrated entitlement to a setoff pursuant to section 768.76.
Therefore, we affirm the trial court's denial of Van Winkle's claim to a setoff on legal malpractice damages it owes to ap-pellees.
BENTON and POLSTON, JJ., concur. ERVIN, J., concurs with opinion.
. In addition to the $42,500 received from AMEX, appellees received $8,000 in personal injury protection benefits from their PIP carrier. The parties stipulated that Van Winkle is entitled to a setoff against appellees' claim for the $8,000 paid.