Case Name: Pennebaker v. Parker, Appellant
Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Jurisdiction: Pennsylvania
Decision Date: 1907-04-15
Citations: 33 Pa. Super. 458
Docket Number: Appeal, No. 10
Parties: Pennebaker v. Parker, Appellant.
Judges: Before Rice, P. J., Porter, Henderson, Morrison, Orlad?, Head and Beaver, JJ.
Reporter: Pennsylvania Superior Court Reports
Volume: 33
Pages: 458–469

Head Matter:
Pennebaker v. Parker, Appellant.
' Res adjudicata — Parties—Cause of action — Evidence—Parol evidence.
In order to make a matter res adjudicata, there must be a concurrence of the four conditions following: (1) Identity in the thing sued for; (2) identity of the cause of action; (3) identity of persons and of parties to the action; (4) identity of the quality in the persons for or against whom the claim is made.
Whenever a judgment in a former case is relied on as conclusive in another, it may be shown by evidence aliunde, not inconsistent with the record, that the particular point was not adjudicated, if in law judgment could have been rendered on any other.
Where the record of a judgment of a justice of the peace shows an entry of judgment for one of two items of claim presented, and that there had been a dispute about the other, and a second suit is brought for the disputed items, but another person is added as an additional party defendant, parol evidence is admissible to show that the claim in question had been presented in the first suit but withdrawn, and had not in fact been adjudicated.
Argued March 12, 1907.
Appeal, No. 10, March T., 1907, by defendant, from judgment of C. P. Juniata Co., Sept. T., 1904, No. 106, on. verdict for plaintiff in case of S. E. Pennebaker v. Edmund S. Parker and James J. Horning.
Before Rice, P. J., Porter, Henderson, Morrison, Orlad?, Head and Beaver, JJ.
Affirmed.
Appeal from judgment of a justice of tbe peace. Before Shull, P. J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Supreme Court.
At the trial the following offer was made:
Judge Atkinson: We offer to prove by this witness that he presented two separate accounts before Squire Smith at the time of the first suit there, representing independent claims for lumber bought at different times; that Mr. Burchfield being present, representing the defendant Parker, objected especially to the claim now in suit and this plaintiff then withdrew the larger claim from the consideration of the justice and judgment was entered in his favor for the smaller claim.
Mr. Neely: Objected to, that the record of the justice cannot be contradicted by parol evidence; that the claim made there is distinctly for the lumber now sued upon and that there is no evidence of withdrawal, but that the justice, after hearing the parties and examining their accounts, gave judgment publicly in favor of the plaintiff for $19.50.
The Court: Objection overruled and'bill sealed for the defendant.
Verdict and judgment for plaintiff for $300.07. Defendant appealed.
Errors assigned among others were (1) ruling on evidence, as above, quoting the bill of exceptions; (4) in refusing defendant’s point, quoted in the opinion of the Superior Court; (5) in refusing binding instructions for defendant and (6) in refusing judgment for defendant non obstante veredicto.
J. Howard Neely, with him B. F. Burchfield, for appellant.—
The ease comes within the rule laid down in Hill v. Joy, 149 Pa. 243. See also Buck v. Wilson, 113 Pa. 423; Sterner v. Gower, 3 W. & S. 136; Logan v. Caffrey, 30 Pa. 196; Corbet v. Evans, 25 Pa. 310; Raisig v. Graf, 17 Pa. Superior Ct. 509; Hess v. Heeble, 6 S. &. R. 57; Pennock v. Kennedy, 153 Pa. 579; Amrhein v. Quaker City Dye Works, 192 Pa. 253.
April 15, 1907:
The plaintiff under the uncontradieted evidence did not have the right to withdraw a part of the claim sued on and the justice was bound to consider the whole in making up his judgment: Logan v. Caffrey, 30 Pa. 196; Smedly v. Tucker, 3 Phila. 259; Besecher v. Flory, 176 Pa. 23.
While it is settled law that a justice cannot give oral testimony to contradict or vary the cause of action as shown on his record, the law is equally well settled that the testimony of the parties to the proceeding cannot be admitted to contradict or vary the record: Williams v. McNeal, 3 Luz. L. R. 37; Springer v. Wood, 18 W. N. C. 520; Aiken v. Stewart, 4 W. N. C. 180.
F. M. M. Pennell, of Athinson Pennell, for appellee.
— The following cases go to sustain the right to withdraw the claim and prove the fact of withdrawal by parol, the justice’s record not clearly showing it: Haak v. Breidenbach, 3 S. & R. 204; Follansbee v. Walker, 74 Pa. 306 ; Roop v. Brubacker, 1 Rawle, 304; Haviland v. Fidelity Ins., etc., Co., 108 Pa. 236; Boyle v. Grant, 18 Pa. 162; Susquehanna Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Mardorf, 152 Pa. 22; Coleman’s App., 62 Pa. 252.
Although it appear by extrinsic evidence that the matter was within the issue of a former suit, if it be not shown that the verdict and judgment necessarily involved its consideration, it will not be conclusive: Springer v. Wood, 18 W. N. C. 520. See also S wayne v. Lyon, 67 Pa. 436; Bronson v. Lane, 91 Pa. 153 ; Susquehanna Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Mardorf, 152 Pa. 22; Hess’s Estate, 27 Pa. Superior Ct.,498, 502; Hartman v. Inclined Plane Co., 23 Pa. Superior Ct. 360; Blair v. McLean, 25 Pa. 77.

Opinion:
Opinion by
Beaver, J.,
The ostensible ground upon which the defendant based his points for charge, the refusal of which and the subsequent denial of his motion for judgment for the defendant, n. o. v., are complained of in the fourth, fifth and sixth assignments of error, is that the claim upon which the suit was founded was res judicata.
The facts upon which this claim is raised_are stated in the third point, which briefly summarizes them : " That the lum ber sued for to the amount of $272.87 on present suit began before H. F. Smith, a justice of the peace, was the same lumber included in the suit brought by the plaintiff, S. E. Pennebaker v. Edmund S. Parker, commenced before H. F. Smith, Esq., the same justice, by summons dated April 6, 1904, and tried April 13, 1904, in which a judgment was rendered for the plaintiff for $19.50 and costs, which judgment was unappealed from, and on which the plaintiff caused an execution to be issued in 1904. On execution the money was made. That the parties to these actions were the same; that the claim now sued upon is res adjudicata by the former action, and said action bars a recovery in this suit."
It thus appears that the original suit was against Edmund S. Parker alone.
At the trial the justice made the following entry: " Plaintiff claims $292.37 as a balance on timber furnished for the erection of a new barn and other timber furnished for defendant.
" And now, the 13th day of April, 1904, parties met, and, examining plaintiff and defendant and hearing their allegations, judgment for plaintiff for the sum of $19.50 publicly expressed and costs, there having been a dispute as to the $272.87 as to who should pay, Parker or the contractor, for building the barn."
The present suit, as appears from the transcript of the justice, was by S. E. Pennebaker against Ed. S. Parker and J. J. Horning.
In 2 Bouvier, Rawle's edition, 898, it is said : " In order to make a matter res judicata, there must.be a concurrence of the four conditions following: (1) Identity in the thing sued for; (2) identity of the cause of action; (3) identity of persons and of parties to the action ; (4) identity of the quality in the persons for or against whom the claim is made."
It seems to be conceded that the claim upon which this suit was founded was originally included in the claim made before the justice in the original suit against Edmund S. Parker, but in this case the parties are different, and, if it appears by competent evidence that the claim was excluded by the justice in the original hearing, it is clear that it was not adjudicated, and that the present suit is well founded. The entry made by the justice clearly shows that there was doubt as to whether the claim for $272.87, which was the exact difference between the total amount claimed and the amount for which judgment was rendered, should be paid by Parker or by the contractor for building the barn, the said contractor being, as appears from the testimony, J. J. Horning, who is joined with Parker as defendant in the present suit. The plaintiff and the justice of the peace, before whom the original suit was tried, were allowed to testify as to the withdrawal of the claim for the lumber entering into the construction of the barn. Objection was made to their testimony, and its admission constitutes the first and second assignments of error. The ground of objection was that the testimony contradicted the record of the justice made at the time. If this were so, of course the testimony was incompetent. An examination of the testimony leads us to the conclusion, however, that it was not in any sense a contradiction of the record of the justice. In may be regarded as an explanation of the entry, but it is in no sense a contradiction. A single answer of the justice describes the situation : " Q. State what Mr. Pennebaker said with reference to the withdrawal of that claim ? A. I understood Mr. Pennebaker to-say that he-would withdraw the consideration of that $272.87. I have here marked, after rendering the judgment, sufficient to show that I did not consider it--."
In Coleman's Appeal, 62 Pa. 252, it was held, as stated in the syllabus : " Whenever a judgment in a former case is relied on as conclusive in another, it may be shown by evidence aliunde, not inconsistent with the record, that the particular point was not adjudicated, if in law judgment could have been rendered on any other." See also Susquehanna Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Mardorf, 152 Pa. 22.
That extrinsic evidence is admissible to show what was adjudicated, see Hartman v. Pittsburg Incline Plane Co., 28 Pa. Superior Ct. 360.
We have, upon the record of the justice, the statement that there were two distinct items in the original claim : (1) "A balance on timber furnished for the erection of a new barn," and (2) " other timber furnished for defendant," and, second, that as to the first there was ' a dispute as to the $272.87 as to who should pay, Parker or the contractor for building the barn." We have also the fact that the second suit was brought against the appellant and Horning, the contractor. These entries of themselves would clearly indicate that the claim for the timber furnished for the barn was not passed upon by the justice for the apparently good reasons : First, that the liability for the items arose under different contractual relations, and, second, between different parties. It was not in any sense a contradiction of these entries in this record to show that for those reasons the claim for the barn timber was withdrawn and not considered.
This testimony in explanation of the entry of the justice having been properly admitted, we can see nothing erroneous in the submission of the question by the court to the jury, as complained of in the third assignment of error.
The question of the withdrawal of the claim, upon which the present suit is based, was one of fact, which was fairly submitted by the court.
Upon a consideration of the whole case, we see nothing erroneous which calls for our interference.
Judgment affirmed.