Case Name: Charles Rands and Wife vs. Uzziah Kendall
Court: Supreme Court of Ohio
Jurisdiction: Ohio
Decision Date: 1846-12
Citations: 15 Ohio 671
Docket Number: 
Parties: Charles Rands and Wife vs. Uzziah Kendall.
Judges: 
Reporter: Cases decided in the supreme court of ohio : upon the circuit at the special sessions in Columbus
Volume: 15
Pages: 671–688

Head Matter:
In Bank.
Dec. Term, 1846.
Charles Rands and Wife vs. Uzziah Kendall.
Where land is mortgaged by the husband and the condition is broken before the marriage, and the equity of redemption is released by the mortgagor during coverture, his widow is not entitled to dower, after his decease.
To entitle the widow to dower, her husband must have been seized of a legal estate of inheritance during the coverture, or of an equitable interest at the time of his death.
This is a Petition for Dower, reserved in the County of Hamilton.
The complainant, Rachel Rands, claims dower in certain real estate of the defendant, part of lot number forty-nine, in the city of Cincinnati, as the widow of Adbeel Coleman, deceased, who died November 16th, 1824, and to whom she Was married on the 18th of March, 1821.
The facts of the case, as they appear from the bill, answer, exhibits and testimony, are these: On the 24th of April, 1818, being before the marriage, Adbeel Coleman mortgaged out-lot, number forty-nine, to James Ferguson, to secure the payment of a note of that date to the said Ferguson, or his heirs or assigns, for the sum of $2910, on or before the 24th day of April, 1825, with lawful interest, to be paid annually, from the 24th of April, 1819. The condition of the deed is, that the same shall be void on the payment of said sum of money, according to the tenor and effect of said note, otherwise to be of full force.
On the 18th of March, 1821, Adbeel Coleman intermarried with the complainant, Rachel Rands.
On the 4th of October, of the same year, James Ferguson transferred said note and mortgage to Joseph Wright, by assignment duly made, and, on the same day, Wright agreed to an extension of credit on the note of three years.
On the 2d of November, 1824, Adbeel Coleman conveyed to Joseph Wright the said lot. The deed recites the mortgage; also recites that, “ on the 4th of October, 1821, the said James £ Ferguson, by his assignment in writing, indorsed on the back £ of said indenture of mortgage, did assign and transfer all his £ interest and claim of, in and to said mortgage," for a valuable "£ consideration: "And, whereas, the whole of said sum of $2910 ‘ still remains unpaid, and no part of the interest on' the said ‘ $2910 has been paid, but remains due, to the amount of £ $785.70; and whereas I, the said Adbeel Coleman; am fully £ satisfied that the principal sum, to become due as aforesaid, £ and the interest now due thereon, is the full value of the said £ mortgaged premises, and that I, the said Adbeel'Coleman, am £ not, nor shall be able to redeem the same: Now know ye £ that I, the skid Adbeel Coleman, in consideration thereof, and £ of my being fully and clearly exonerated from the debt and £ interest, secured by said mortgage,” &c. He releases the proviso, or condition in the mortgage, and all benefit of equity of redemption, and also grants, bargains and sells the premises, to Joseph Wright, his heirs and assigns.
This deed was executed by Coleman, and Rachel, his wife, with a relinquishment of dower on her part. It was acknowledged before a Justice of the Peace; but it is claimed that there is some informality in the acknowledgment, which, under a former decision of this Court, it is said rendered it void as to the feme covert.
On the 16th November, 1824, Adbeel Coleman died, and, on the 23d of December, 1831, Wright, on the margin of the mortgage, entered an acknowledgment of satisfaction, under his hand and seal.
• The defendant, Kendall, derives title from Wright, and holds the estate of inheritance. •
The complainants intermarried before the commencement of this -suit.
Corry fy Russell, for Complainants.
"First: The mortgagor of fee simple lands is seized of an •estate of inheritance, subject to the lien or incumbrance of the debt. The mortgagee is not seized of any “ estate of inheritanee.” either before or after condition broken, or before or after possession taken. He is a pledgee only-until foreclosure. Lessee of Perkins v. Dibble, 10 Ohio Rep. 439; Moore v. Burnet, 11 Ohio Rep. 341; 4 Kent’s Com. (5th Ed.,) 195. ■ It follows that a mortgagor’s widow is entitled to dower out of lands mortgaged before the marriage and conveyed by the husband alone afterwards. The claim in such case is subject to the mortgage debt, which must be paid by-her, if the same be not held by the heir or grantee of the freehold, in which latter case she bears her fair proportion. Montgomery v. Bruere, 2 South. Rep. 865; Collins v. Torry, 1 Johns. Rep. 282; Coles v. Coles, 15 Johns. Rep. 319; Russell v. Austin, 1 Paige’s Rep. 192; Van Dyne v. Thayre, 14 Wend. Rep. 233; Gibson v. Crehore, 5 Pick. Rep. 147; Cooyer v. Whitney, 3 Hill’s Rep. 96 ; Smith v. Eustis, 7 Greenl. Rep. 41; Bell v. Mayor of New York, 10 Paige’s Rep. 49.
Second: The mortgage money was not due when the marriage took place, nor when the husband alienated the land, and it is not proved that the condition had been broken in any respect.
Joseph Wright took possession as grantee of an estate of inheritance, and not as mortgagee. The mortgage was extinguished by the release of the debt.
Third: An outstanding mortgage estate, in a third person, cannot be set up even to defeat an action at law for dower. If the mortgage estate existed after the discharge of the debt, such estate was in James Ferguson, the original mortgagee. Hitchcock v. Harrington, 6 Johns. Rep. 290; Lessee of Perkins v. Dibble, 10 Ohio Rep. 433.
If Joseph Wright became the mortgagee, by virtue of the transfer to him, without a conveyance of the land, the mortgage estate must have been a mere pledge, and an incident to the debt, and the mortgagee was not “ seized as an estate of inheritance.” It follows that the mortgagor must have been so seized.
Fourth: A court of equity cannot set up a mortgage as an incumbrance upon the dower, although that is sometimes done where there is a merger at law, in consequence of a purchaser of the inheritance becoming assignee of the pledge. That is not the present case. The debt was released in consideration of the conveyance to Joseph Wright, and the mortgage was thereby extinguished.
Fifth: When a bill for dower is filed against the owner of the inheritance, and a mortgage exists, and is brought forward as an incumbrance upon the dower estate, the widow is entitled to dower, subject to her proportion of the mortgage. 4 Kent’s Com. 46 ; Swaine v. Perrine, 5 Johns. Ch. Rep. 482; Carl v. Butman, 7 Greenl. Rep. 102; Van Vrouker v. Eastman, 7 Met. Rep. 157, and cases cited above.
Storer. Gwynne, for Defendant.
Dower is subject to all incumbrances against the husband’s estate, at the time of the marriage. Her dower estate is subordinate to and grows out of the estate of the husband, as the latter existed at the date of the marriage, or the period of its acquisition. Green v. Green, 1 Ohio Rep. 542; Sumner v. Hampson, 8 Ohio Rep. 364; Nazareth Institute v. Lowe, 1 fe. Mon. Rep. 258; McArthur v. Porter, 1 Ohio Rep. 101; 7 Paige’s Rep. 287; 23 Pick. Rep. 80; 1 B. Mon. Rep. -76 ; 1 Ohio Rep. 415.
The mortgagor, at the time of the conveyance to Wright, had but an equity in the premises, and the release of this equity was equivalent to a foreclosure, and barred the wife of dower. 4 Kent’s Com. 45; 2 Serg. on Vend. 224, n.; Van] Dyne v. Thayre, 19 Wend. Rep. 173; Edwards v. Farmers’ Co., 21 Wend. Rep. 485."
No dower exists against the mortgage or his assignee, or against any one who can avail himself of and connect himself with the mortgage. Popkin v. Bumstead, 8 Mass.-Rep. 491; Bird v, Gardner, 10 Mass, Rep. 364; Scott v. Hancock, 13 Mass. Rep. 168; Gibson v. Crehore, 3 Pick. Rep. 475; Cooper v. Whitney, 3 Hill’s Rep. 102.
The mortgage in this case still exists, unextinguished by the release of the equity of redemption. 2 Conn. Rep. 161; 6 Conn. Rep. 388; Jones v. Morey, 2 Cow. Rep. 303 ; Dexter v. Harris, 2 Mason’s Rep. 539; Robinson v. Leavitt, 7 New Hamp. Rep. 95; Loud v. Lane, 8 Met. Rep. 518.
The estate of Coleman was equitable merely, and the statute of Ohio only gives dower in equitable estates,, where the husband was possessed- thereof at the- time of his death. Derush v. Brown, 8 Ohio Rep. 413 ; Smiley v. Wright,- 2 Ohio Rep. 507; St. Clair v. Morris, 9 Ohio Rep. 15; 2 Ohio Rep. 224; 8 Ohio Rep. 222; Raguet v. Roll, 7 Ohio Rep. (part 2,) 72; Cowles v. Raguet et al., 14 Ohio Rep. 56; Heth v. Cocke, 1 Rand. Rep. 347.

Opinion:
Hitchcock, J.
The claim of the complainants is not barred by the statute of limitation, for the bill was filed and subpoena served in January, 1825, being but little more than twenty years after the right of action accrued, whereas, under the statute, no period of time less than twenty-one years would operate as a bar.
Whether the acknowledgment of the deed executed in November,. 1824, is defective, so far as the wife is concerned, we do not deem it necessary to decide. It is a question upon which the Court is divided in opinion, and if the determination of the case depended alone upon the decision of that question, it would, probably remain undetermined.
The subject of dower, in this State, is regulated by statute, and the act upon this subject provides, in the first section, " That the widow of any person dying, shall, be endowed of £ one full and equal third part of all the lands, tenements and £ real estate of which her husband was seized, as an estate of £ inheritance, during the coverture; and she shall in like man-c ner be endowed of one-third part of all the right, title or £ interest that her husband, at the time of his decease, had in ' any lands and tenements held by bond, article, lease or other f' evidence of claim;"' There is no. mistaking of the provisions of this law.' Its terms.are clear, precise and explicit.. That a . widow may have dower, her husband must have had,..át some time during the coverture,' a legal .title to the premises in which dower is .demanded, or he must-have' had an equitable interest, at the time of his death. If, at any time during coverture' Of Adbéel Coleman with the complainant, Rachel Rand,, he. had a legal title to the land now in controversy, or if, he h'ad an equitable interest in the same land at the time ,of his death, the complainants are entitled to a. decree.
Then what are the facts ? .On the 24th of April, 1848, and before his marriage to the complainant, Rachel, Adbeel Coleman-mortgaged this land to " James. Ferguson, to .secure the payment of $2,910, with, a proviso or condition in the cj,ee.d, that if this $2,910 should be paid' .on or before the 24th of April, 1825, with lawful interest, to be paid annually, from 24th April, 1819, then the deed to be void/ The mortgage was not to secure the payment of the principal sum alone, but, also, to secure the annual payment of interest. On the 24th of April). 1820, the first installment of interest, fell due, but was'riot paid, and the condition was broken. . What is the consequence ?
Complainants' counsel contend, that as. it .was'a simple 'security for the payment of a- debt, the mortgage is a mere incident to the debt, and that although the condition is broken, yet that the' legal title, to the land remains, as before, in the mortgagor. The modern.decisions and the decisions of this'.Court, to a certain extent, favor this opinion. It has been repeatedly held that an execution might be levied upon the land, the- mortgagor being in possession; that the mortgagor was to-'be.considered' as having the legal title. But it has never been so held but with this restriction: that as between the parties to a mortgage, the deed, after condition broken, becomes obsolete. As . to all the world but the parties, the legal title is considéred as in the mortgagor; but, as between the parties and those claiming under them, the legal title is'vested in the mortgagee., I think I am not mistaken in saying, that such has been the uniform ' language of the Court; and, therefore, it is, that after •condition broken, the mortgagee may recover the possession of the land in an action of ejectment. Without the legal title, he could not so recover. Such being the law, it follows, that the condition being broken by the nonpayment of the interest which fell due on the 24th April, 1824, the legal title then became, as between Ferguson and Coleman, vested in Ferguson, and was never afterwards vested'in Coleman. It was after this period that his marriage vrith Rachel Rand took place, and during the coverture he had not an estate of inheritance in the land in which dower is demanded.
But during the coverture he had an equity — the equity of redemption. Did this equity continue in him at the time of his death? Wright, in 1821, acquired an interest by the assignment of the note and mortgage, and on the 2d of November, 1824, Coleman conveyed to him his interest in the land. That interest was nothing but an equity of redemption. In fact, it is apparent that the object was to convey or release this equity of redemption. But the language of the deed is broad and comprehensive enough to convey whatever interest he might have had in the property. His wife joined with him in this conveyance, undoubtedly supposing she had a right of dower, and intending to release that right. But now, supposing that there is some formal defect in the acknowledgment, she seeks to avoid the deed. She may, perhaps, avoid the deed, but if she does, it can do her no- good. ' She had not such an interest in the land, as that it was necessary.for her to join in the deed. Whether she could ever have an interest, depended ' upon the contingency that her husband should die possessed of an equity. Having but an equity, he could transfer it by his own deed, and, thereby, defeat his wife of dower. He did not wish to do this, however, without her consent, and, therefore, she joined him in the conveyance.
The complainant may, by possibility, be in a worse situation than she would have been had the equity of redemption not been conveyed; but it is by no means certain. In such case, it is true, she would have been nominally entitled to dower, not because her bus band was seized of a legal estate during the coverture, but because he died possessed of an equity. But her dower would have been subject to the lien of the mortgage, inasmuch as that was a subsisting lien at the time of the marriage. If, upon sale under a decree of a court of chancery, .the mortgaged premises had been sold for the satisfaction of the debt secured, and any surplus remained after the satisfaction of the debt, of this surplus she might have claimed a share in virtue of her right of dower. Beyond this, she could claim nothing.
But it is claimed that the debt was paid , and the mortgage satisfied by the execution of the deed, which operates as a relinquishment of the equity of redemption, and that the widow is to have dower as of legal estate. Now, what was the real nature of the transaction ? The land had been mortgaged in 1818, to secure the payment of a debt. In 1824, the mortgagor became satisfied that it was of less value than the amount of the debt. An arrangement was made between the mortgagor and the assignee of the mortgage and debt, by which the mortgagor was to transfer his remaining interest in the land to the assignee, which was to be received in full satisfaction of the entire debt. This arrangement was carried into effect, and now this Court is called upon, not as a court of law, but as a court of equity, to say that the effect of this agreement was such as to restore the mortgagor to his legal estate, or, at least, so far to restore him as that his widow shall have dower. This may be equitable, but I do not understand how. On the contrary, it is clear to my mind that such decision would be manifestly inequitable and unjust.
And who is it that makes this claim upon the Court ? Not the " lone widow," the " poor, unprotected female" The " widow made no complaint while a " widowthe " female " made no complaint while " unprotected." It is not the " widow," but it is Charles Band, the husband of that widow, who , is calling for the equitable interference of this Court. And in order to obtain that interference, his wife is compelled to do an act which she did not do during her widowhood, that is, to deny her solemn deed, on the ground that a magistrate made a mistake in reducing the acknowledgment to writing. '
Inasmuch as Adbeel Coleman had no legal estate in the land in which dower is demanded, during his coverture with the complainant, Rachel Rand, and inasmuch as he had no equitable interest in the same at the time of his death, she is not entitled to dower, and the bill must be dismissed at complainants' costs.