Case Name: Arthur GARY a/k/a Arthur L. Gary, Appellant, v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee
Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2001-10-09
Citations: 796 So. 2d 1054
Docket Number: No. 2000-KA-00851-COA
Parties: Arthur GARY a/k/a Arthur L. Gary, Appellant, v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
Judges: Before KING, P.J., LEE, and CHANDLER, JJ.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 796
Pages: 1054–1061

Head Matter:
Arthur GARY a/k/a Arthur L. Gary, Appellant, v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee.
No. 2000-KA-00851-COA.
Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
Oct. 9, 2001.
Bill J. Barnett, Attorney for Appellant.
Office of the Attorney General by Deirdre McCrory, Jackson, Attorney for Ap-pellee.
Before KING, P.J., LEE, and CHANDLER, JJ.

Opinion:
LEE, J.,
for the Court:
¶ 1. Arthur Gary was convicted in the Circuit Court of Lincoln County on two counts: (1) unlawful sale of cocaine and (2) unlawful possession of at least two grams but less than ten grams of cocaine with intent to distribute. Gary now appeals his convictions, and asserts the following issues: (1) whether the trial court committed reversible error regarding a potential discovery violation under Uniform Rules of Circuit and County Court Practice Rule 9.04, and (2) whether the trial court properly applied Mississippi Rules of Evidence Rules 401 and 403 regarding testimony and the admission of a handgun into evidence. Finding these issues without merit, we affirm the conviction and sentence of the lower court.
FACTS
¶ 2. This case evolved from Gary selling cocaine to a confidential informant. Later that same day, after the sale to the informant, a search warrant was issued for Gary's residence. In conducting the search, the officers first secured the home and discovered that neither Gary nor anyone else was inside the house; therefore, the officers proceeded to wait outside before conducting the actual search. Eventually, Gary approached the back of his house from a neighbor's yard and was detained and arrested by the officers. Subsequently, a search was performed on Gary's residence and automobile.
¶ 3. The search of the house disclosed numerous items containing what appeared to be cocaine. A search was also conducted of Gary whereupon the officers found a bag containing what appeared to be cocaine. The presence of cocaine was later confirmed by tests run by the Mississippi Crime Lab. The search of Gary's automobile also disclosed a handgun.
¶4. At trial, the State presented testimony regarding the handgun and had the handgun admitted into evidence. The use of the handgun by the State during the trial is the basis of Gary's appeal. However, to avoid repetition, we will leave further discussion of the testimony regarding the handgun and the actual admission of the handgun into evidence for our discussion of the issues.
DISCUSSION
I. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR REGARDING A POTENTIAL DISCOVERY VIOLATION UNDER UNIFORM RULES OF CIRCUIT AND COUNTY COURT PRACTICE RULE 9.04.
¶ 5. Gary argues that the trial court eired by allowing the handgun into evidence since he had previously requested discovery, and the State failed to furnish any information regarding its intended use of the weapon at trial. Additionally, Gary contends that error was committed because he was not given the opportunity to examine the evidence and prepare an adequate motion to suppress. Gary contends he made an objection to the handgun on the basis of a Uniform Rules of Circuit and County Court Practice Rule 9.04 discovery violation during a bench conference. However, as conceded by Gary and supported, by the record, there is no transcript regarding an objection on this basis. The only objection reflected in the record is based on relevancy. Gary's counsel tries to correct this oversight by submitting an affidavit that attests that an objection was made which advised the trial judge that its presence and intended use during trial by the State had not been revealed to Gary prior to trial. Several principles of law deny Gary relief.
¶ 6. First, to invoke the issue of a discovery violation before the trial judge, counsel for the defense must first raise the issue by making a contemporaneous objection on this basis. Box v. State, 437 So.2d 19, 23 (Miss.1983). If the objection is not raised contemporaneously, therefore, denying the trial court the opportunity to consider the issue and possible remedies, the issue is deemed waived. De La Beckwith v. State, 707 So.2d 547, 574 (Miss.1997); Nathan v. State, 552 So.2d 99, 108 (Miss.1990). As mentioned above, nothing in the official record reveals that an objection, much less a contemporaneous objection, was made regarding a possible discovery violation. Second, when a party makes an objection on specific grounds it is considered a waiver regarding all other grounds. Bums v. State, 729 So.2d 203, 219 (¶ 67) (Miss.1998). Once again, while the record reveals that Gary did make an objection on the basis of relevancy, the record does not show that the trial judge was presented with or considered a potential discovery violation. Third, this Court may not review facts asserted by a party that do not appear in the record. Dillon v. State, 641 So.2d 1223, 1225 (Miss.1994). Finally, the case of Cotton v. State, presents circumstances similar to ours regarding objections made during an unrecorded bench conference. Cotton v. State, 675 So.2d 308, 314 (Miss.1996). Like Gary, counsel for Cotton presented an issue on appeal which he alleged he had presented for the trial court's review during an unrecorded bench conference. Id. The Mississippi Supreme Court stated: "Although the defense suggests that a proper objection was entered at this point, [i.e., at an unrecorded bench conference] it is incumbent upon the party complaining of an error to preserve the record for appeal. The burden was on Cotton to make a contemporaneous objection." Id. The Mississippi Supreme Court held the issue was procedurally barred. Id. For the preceding reasons, we find this issue is without merit.
II. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY APPLIED MISSISSIPPI RULES OF EVIDENCE RULES 401 AND 403 REGARDING TESTIMONY AND THE ADMISSION OF A HANDGUN INTO EVIDENCE.
¶ 7. Gary argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed testimony regarding a handgun, as well as the admission of the handgun into evidence. See Gulley v. State, 779 So.2d 1140, 1149 (¶ 31) (Miss.Ct.App.2001) (The determination of the admissibility of evidence is mostly within the discretion of the trial judge and a decision will not be reversed unless the trial judge abuses his discretion). Gary contends that the trial court abused its discretion because he was indicted for the sale of cocaine and possession with the intent to distribute cocaine and was not charged with any offense relating to a firearm; therefore, the gun produced at trial had no relation to the offense charged. A review of the record and case law shows there were sufficient facts for the trial court to determine that the weapon was relevant in the case at bar. The testimony supporting the relevancy of the handgun came from the confidential informant.
¶ 8. The informant testified that he approached the house and knocked on the door of Gary's residence. The informant explained the role the handgun played in the drug transaction that occurred between himself and Gary:
Okay. He [i.e., Gary] said "you want to die, n-." And then that's when I began to get hanky, because I seen a pistol, you know, side of his pants there, and he said "what you want," and I said "a sixty," and he said "sixty." I said "sixty." That means sixty dollars worth of crack cocaine.
¶ 9. In Hemphill v. State, the Mississippi Supreme Court had to decide whether a gun and scale admitted into evidence where the individual was convicted for possession of marijuana with intent to sell discovered during the search of the individual's residence were relevant. Hemphill v. State, 566 So.2d 207, 209 (Miss.1990). The Mississippi Supreme Court considered the State's argument that the items were found in close proximity to the marijuana and were tools of the drug trade. Id. The supreme court stated: "In cases involving a narcotics charge, 'probative weight' of 'weapons,' 'scales,' and other 'tools of the trade' generally is not 'overbalanced by [possible] inflammatory' consequence of admitting these items into evidence." Id.
¶ 10. In comparing Hemphill with our case, we are aware that the record in the case at bar does not disclose that at the time the handgun was found it was in close proximity to any cocaine. However, the aforementioned testimony of the confidential informant pi'esented a fact issue regarding the close proximity of the handgun during the actual drug transaction. When we consider this with the law pronounced in Hemphill regarding a weapon's admissibility in drug cases, we find that the trial judge was within his discretion in this case when he performed the Rule 403 balancing test and found that the gun was "a significant piece of corroborating evidence" and was admissible. Therefore, this issue is without merit.
¶11. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LINCOLN COUNTY OF CONVICTION OF COUNT I UNLAWFUL SALE OF COCAINE AND SENTENCE OF FORTY-FIVE YEARS; COUNT II UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF AT LEAST TWO GRAMS BUT LESS THAT TEN GRAMS OF COCAINE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE AND SENTENCE OF SIXTEEN YEARS, WITH SENTENCES TO RUN CONCURRENTLY, ALL IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, AND RESTITUTION OF $85 IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO THE APPELLANT.
McMILLIN, C.J., KING AND SOUTHWICK, P.JJ., BRIDGES, THOMAS, MYERS AND CHANDLER, JJ., CONCUR. IRVING, J., DISSENTS WITH A SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. BRANTLEY, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.