Case Name: Executor of J. Palmer against Administrator of S. Dubois
Court: Constitutional Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1817-05
Citations: 1 Mill 178
Docket Number: 
Parties: Executor of J. Palmer against Administrator of S. Dubois.
Judges: The other Judges concurred.
Reporter: South Carolina Law Reports
Volume: 8
Pages: 178–181

Head Matter:
Executor of J. Palmer against Administrator of S. Dubois.
ouSwhi?h H ptwIorMyeara” m te.Sate ing found a verrefused.
This was an action of debt on bond. The bond was granted by Dubois to the plaintiff’s testator; it was dated 20th November, 1778, conditioned for the payment of £15,000 cur-On the bond two receipts were endorone. dated 20th November, 1779, for one interest, and the other the 24th January, 1787, for £524.3.7 sterling. The defendant pleaded solvit ad diem and solvit post diem, and relied on the presumption of payment from the lapse of time between the date of the bond and the commencement of the present suit.
The plaintiffs rebutted this presumption by proving that a suit had been instituted upon the bond by the present plaintiff in August, 1793. Thomas Parker, Esquire, testified that the suit had been commenced by him for the plaintiff at that time, and that before judgment was obtained it was stopped by the plaintiff, the bond sent to him at his request, and the costs charged to him. The defendant adduced no evidence, and the Jury found a verdict for the defendant.
A motion is now made for a new trial, on the ground that the verdict is contrary to law and evidence, inasmuch as the presumption of payment, arising from the lapse of time, was rebutted, by proof of a suit having been commenced within 18 years of the present suit, and no evidence whatsoever adduced to show that the bond was paid.
Charleston,
May, 1817.
The case was tried before- Mr. Justice Smith, at Charleston, in January Term, 1813.

Opinion:
Cheves, J.
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The general rule of the English authorities is, if no interest has been paid on a bond for 20 years, it shall be presumed in law to be satisfied. It has been left to a Jury on sixteen years, where there were circumstances to fortify the presumption. (1 Burr. 434. Cowp. 109.) And no precise time has been fixed. (1 Term Rep. 272.) Sir William Scott has refused to decree on a bottomrey bond after an interval of twelve years. (5 Rob. Adm. Rep. 96.) The foundation of the English' rule, it has been sometimes supposed, was the rate of interest in England, which is 5 per cent, at which rate, in 20 years bonds, the penal sum of which is usually double that of the condition, would cease to bear interest, unless interest had been paid within that period. But this cannot have been the foundation of it, for in Lord Hale's time, who was the author of the rule, the interest of England was not less than 6 per cent. It was more probably introduced by analogy from some of the provisions of the Statute of Limitations. On this supposition, it has been argued by defendant's counsel that the presumption should arise in this country in a shorter period than 20 years, because generally in the United States, and particularly in this state, the periods for the limitation of suits and rights are shorter. But a sufficient answer to this argument is, that in this state, and in other states of the union, the English rule has been adopted. (1 Bay, 482. 3 Day's Cases, 289. 3 Caines' Rep. 48. 7 Johns. 556, and 2 Cranch, 180.)
Though a shorter time than 20 years may be submitted to a Jury, as presumption of payment, yet it ought to be supported by Rome other evidence; though slight circumstances will be sufficient when the time approaches closely to 20 years.
But whatever, he the origin of the rule, its operation is entirely different from that of the Statutes of Limitation. Time, under them, is itself a legal bar of recovery; hut under this rule it only affords a presumption of payment, and this presumption may be obviated by circumstances which establish a contrary presumption. The rule is a reasonable rule, and the presumption may be rebutted by facts which destroy the reason of the rule. (1 Bay, 482. 2 Cranch, 184.)
Though it he true that a shorter time than 20 years may be submitted to a Jury, yet to authorize the presumption of payment in such cases there ought to he some other evidence. (1 Term Rep. 272.) But very slight circumstances will be sufficient, no doubt, when the time approaches closely to twenty years.
In this case no interest was paid on the bond after the 24th January, 1787, and this action was brought on the 27th September, 1810; a period of 23 years and upwards had therefore elapsed from the last receipt of interest, from which the presumption of payment clearly arises, unless it be rebutted by facts or circumstances which establish a contrary presumption. The only circumstance on which the plaintiff relies, is, that he commenced a suit on the bond in August, 1793, which he afterwards abandoned. This, so far from creating a presumption favourable to his claim, appears to be a very strong one against it. It is altogether unlike the case where two writs of testatum capias had been sued out, but not served, because defendant could not be found. There every exertion had been made to prosecute the claim; here it has been abandQned. The fact affords more than the presumption of omission; it is in the nature of an express and affirmative renunciation of the claim. ' There is another very strong circumstance, were any thing more necessary, in favour of .the presumption of payment. The bond was payable out of the funds of an intestate's estate, at the commencement of the suit, in 1793, and before that time. Now the payment of such a demand does not admit (except under very extraordinary circumstances, which would require to be proved as exceptions) of such a suspension, for reasons which are too cogent to be neglected by men of any prudence.
Prioleau, for the motion.
J. B. White and Richardson. contra.
I am, therefore, clearly of opinion a new trial ought not to be granted, and this is the unanimous opinion of the Court.
The other Judges concurred.