Case Name: Sharon L. ADAMS, Appellant, v. Douglas W. SHIVER, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2005-01-11
Citations: 890 So. 2d 1199
Docket Number: No. 1D04-1651
Parties: Sharon L. ADAMS, Appellant, v. Douglas W. SHIVER, Appellee.
Judges: DAVIS, J., Concurs; and BROWNING, J., Dissents with Opinion.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 890
Pages: 1199–1204

Head Matter:
Sharon L. ADAMS, Appellant, v. Douglas W. SHIVER, Appellee.
No. 1D04-1651.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Jan. 11, 2005.
Kristin Adamson of Novey, Mendelson & Adamson, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Russell S. Roberts of Roberts, Roberts & Roberts, Marianna, for Appellee.

Opinion:
HAWKES, J.
In this child custody case, the mother appeals the trial court's order awarding primary physical residence (PPR), modifying custody terms, and denying her petition to relocate. We affirm in all respects; and write only to clarify the appellate standard for two arguments raised by Appellant, which continue to occasionally arise.
First, Appellant argues the trial court applied the wrong legal standard when awarding PPR. However, Appellant requested to be, and was, appointed PPR. It is well settled that when a litigant requests and receives a favorable ruling, she cannot later, on appeal, be heard to complain of the trial court's action in acceding to her request. See Arsenault v. Thomas, 104 So.2d 120 (Fla.1958).
Appellant also argues reversal is required because the trial court failed to specifically cite and discuss subsection 61.13(2)(d), Florida Statutes (2003), when denying Appellant's relocation request. The order on appeal references section 61.13, Florida Statutes (2003), several times, but does not specifically reference subsection 61.13(2)(d).
However, the order states the trial court considered the enumerated factors set forth in section 61.13, Florida Statutes. Moreover, the trial court found the mother's relocation from Marianna, Florida, to Atlanta, Georgia, would not be in the best interest of the child because it is more than five hours away, the "only real constant" in the child's life is his contact with his current place of residence and his extended family with a stable home, school, and community, and that the mother's past conduct has been designed to frustrate Father's visitation, which would be significantly diminished by her relocation.
These findings constitute competent, substantial evidence that the trial court properly considered the elements in the required subsection when rendering its opinion. The fact that the trial court failed to expressly reference the subsection does not, per se, mean it failed to consider the factors it contained. We have found no case law that requires a trial court's order to contain "magic words," when its express findings sufficiently establish it properly considered the required factors. See generally Boca Casino Cruises, Inc. v. Monte Carlo Cruise Concessions, Inc., 760 So.2d 281 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). The trial court is not required to delineate in its final order everything it considered in its resolution of each contested fact. The trial court's order is AFFIRMED.
DAVIS, J., Concurs; and BROWNING, J., Dissents with Opinion.