Case Name: CONKLIN v. SHIAWASSEE COUNTY BOARD OF ROAD COMMISSIONERS
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
Jurisdiction: Michigan
Decision Date: 1983-07-19
Citations: 127 Mich. App. 313
Docket Number: Docket No. 54686
Parties: CONKLIN v SHIAWASSEE COUNTY BOARD OF ROAD COMMISSIONERS
Judges: Before: Danhof, C.J., and Beasley and J. P. Swallow, JJ.
Reporter: Michigan appeals reports; cases decided in the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Volume: 127
Pages: 313–323

Head Matter:
CONKLIN v SHIAWASSEE COUNTY BOARD OF ROAD COMMISSIONERS
Docket No. 54686.
Submitted June 3, 1982, at Lansing.
Decided July 19, 1983.
Clare L. Conklin, a guest passenger in an automobile driven by Daniel J. Beckman, was killed when the automobile was involved in an accident. Marilyn K. Conklin, administratrix of the estate of Clare L. Conklin, deceased, filed suit against Beckman and the Shiawassee County Board of Road Commissioners in Shiawassee Circuit Court. Plaintiff included the board in the suit because Beckman’s car hit a row of dirt and debris negligently left in the roadway for several weeks by the road commission. After hitting the dirt and debris, Beckman’s car went out of control and turned over, killing Clare Conklin. Plaintiff and Beckman entered into an agreement whereby plaintiff would agree not to sue Beckman if Beckman would pay $20,000 to the Conklin estate. As a result of the agreement, Beckman was dismissed from the case. The board had moved that Beckman be continued in the case for factual determination and apportionment of fault and liability by the jury as between itself and Beckman. The motion was denied, Harry P. Newblatt, J. The board then moved to add Beckman as a third-party defendant for purposes of contribution. That motion was also denied. Finally, the board moved that the jury be advised of the settlement between Beckman and the estate. That motion was denied. Following a trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff in the amount of $320,000. The trial court deducted from that amount the $20,000 the estate received from Beckman and entered judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $300,000. The board moved for a new trial but the motion was denied. The board appealed. Held:
References for Points in Headnotes
[1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 9] 18 Am Jur 2d, Contribution §§ 52, 55.
Contribution or indemnity between joint tortfeasors on basis of relative fault. 53 ALR3d 184.
18 Am Jur 2d, Contribution § 54.
15A Am Jur 2d, Compromise and Settlement § 48.
29 Am Jur 2d, Evidence § 629.
18 Am Jur 2d, Contribution § 43.
18 Am Jur 2d, Contribution §§ 42, 52.
73 Am Jur 2d, Statutes § 183.
59 Am Jur 2d, Parties § 190.
1. The trial court did not err in refusing to disclose to the jury the amount of the settlement between plaintiff and Beck-man.
2. The release given by plaintiff to Beckman under the then prevailing statute did not defeat the board’s right to seek contribution against Beckman. The trial court erred in refusing to allow the board to implead Beckman. However, the statutes in effect at the time of trial did not permit contribution to be determined in proportion to the relative fault of each tortfeasor. The case is remanded for trial between defendant and Beckman on the issue of whether they are joint tortfeasors. If so, defendant shall be entitled to recover contribution from Beckman on a pro-rata basis if it is established that defendant has paid plaintiff more than its pro-rata share.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.
J. P. Swallow, J., dissented in part and concurred in part. He would hold that comparative fault is the correct measure to be used in fixing pro-rata contribution between tortfeasors guilty of concurrent negligence. He would further hold that the trial court abused its discretion by denying defendants’ motion to implead Beckman but that reversal is not required on this ground because defendant can still proceed with its claim for contribution against Beckman. He would vacate the trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion to file a third-party complaint against Beckman and remand for a postjudgment trial on the issue of contribution. Judge Swallow is of the opinion that the majority’s holding that comparative negligence does not apply to the action for contribution although it does apply to the underlying action violates the Equal Protection Clauses of both the Michigan and the United States Constitutions.
Opinion of the Court
1. Negligence — Joint Tortfeasors — Contribution — Settlements.
The intent of the Legislature in providing for the allocation of liability according to the relative degree of fault of joint tortfeasors must be considered along with the judicial goal of encouraging settlements; recognition of both is best achieved by the reduction of a claim by the amount of settlement rather than by the proportionate amount of liability of the settling tortfeasor (MCL 600.2925b, 600.2925d; MSA 27A.2925[2], 27A.2925[4]).
2. Damages — Negligence — Joint Tortfeasors — Comparative Negligence — Contribution.
Adoption of a theory of "relative fault” which would allow apportionment of liability among joint tortfeasors was precluded by the former statutory provision that joint tortfeasors were liable for their pro-rata share of a damage award and a joint tortfeasor who paid more than his pro-rata share could maintain an action for contribution from the others for the excess paid (former MCL 600.2925[1]; MSA 27A.2925[1], repealed by 1974 PA 318).
Partial Dissent by J. P. Swallow, J.
3. Damages — Evidence — Settlements —■ Jury.
Juries shall not be informed of the existence of a settlement between parties or the amount paid where there is no genuine dispute regarding either the existence of a release or a settlement between the plaintiff and a codefendant or the amount to be deducted from the jury verdict unless the parties stipulate otherwise.
4. Torts — Damages — Joint Tortfeasors — Settlements.
The proper formula to be applied by a trial court in determining liability of a nonsettling defendant tortfeasor is the total liability of the joint tortfeasors minus the amount of the settlement of the.settling tortfeasor.
5. Torts — Joint Tortfeasors — Settlements — Contribution — Court Rules.
A settlement and covenant not to sue between a plaintiff and one joint tortfeasor in relation to a cause of action accruing prior to January 1, 1975, would not bar a nonsettling defendant joint tortfeasor from maintaining a contribution action against the settling joint tortfeasor concurrently with the principal action (MCL 600.2925; MSA 27A.2925, amended by 1974 PA 318; GCR 1963, 204.1).
6. Words and Phrases — "Pro Rata”.
Pro rata means a proportionate division according to a measure which fixes proportions and has no meaning unless referable to some rule or standard; when used in a statute, pro rata must be construed in its broadest sense based on equitable considerations.
7. Torts — Joint Tortfeasors — Contribution — Comparative Negligence.
Comparative fault is the measure that should be used in fixing pro-rata contribution between tortfeasors guilty of concurrent negligence.
8. Motions — Third-Party Complaints.
The decision to allow the filing of a third-party complaint is discretionary with the trial judge; when acting upon such a motion the judge should consider the probability of delay, the complications of trial, the timeliness of the motion, the similarity of the evidence, the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff and the possibility of prejudice to the third-party defendant.
9. Negligence — Comparative Negligence — Contribution — Constitutional Law — Equal Protection.
The doctrine of comparative negligence, which has as its express purpose the prevention of substantial injustice, has been established in Michigan and should apply to an action for contribution between joint tortfeasors where it applies to the underlying negligence action and both actions arose out of the same negligent occurrence and both have a basis in common law; application of the doctrine of comparative negligence to the underlying negligence action but not to the contribution action between the joint tortfeasors violates the equal protection clauses of both the United States and the Michigan Constitutions (US Const, Am XIV; Const 1963, art 1, § 2).
Cicinelli, Mossner, Majoros & Alexander, P.C. (by Eugene D. Mossner and Paul L. LaClair), for plaintiff.
Des Jardins, Des Jardins & Moorhead (by Jerry L. Des Jardins), for defendant.
Before: Danhof, C.J., and Beasley and J. P. Swallow, JJ.
Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.

Opinion:
Danhof, C.J.
We agree with Judge Swallow's disposition of the claims against plaintiff and its ruling that defendant's right to contribution against Beckman was governed by former MCL 600.2925; MSA 27A.2925, and that pursuant thereto the release given by plaintiff to Beckman did not defeat defendant's right to seek contribution against Beckman. We also agree that the trial court erred by refusing to permit defendant to implead Beckman. Therefore, we order the case remanded for trial between defendant and Beck-man on the issue of whether defendant and Beck-man are joint tortfeasors. However, we cannot agree with Judge Swallow's conclusion that the Supreme Court's decision in Placek v Sterling Heights, 405 Mich 638; 275 NW2d 511 (1979), permits an action for contribution with recovery to be based on the proportionate fault of each tortfeasor. The Supreme Court recently rejected a similar claim as it applied to the successor provisions of the contribution statute referred to above. MCL 600.2925a et seq.; MSA 27A.2925(1) et seq. Mayhew v Berrien County Rd Comm, 414 Mich 399; 236 NW2d 366 (1982). This Court has previously held that former MCL 600.2925; MSA 27A.2925 did not permit contribution to be determined in proportion to the relative fault of each tortfeasor. Sexton v American Aggregates, 60 Mich App 524, 537; 231 NW2d 449 (1975). Those decisions control our disposition of this case.
The case is remanded for trial between defendant and Beckman on the issue of whether they are joint tortfeasors. If so, defendant shall be entitled to recover contribution from Beckman on a pro-rata basis if it is established that defendant has paid plaintiff more than its pro-rata share. Defendant's recovery shall not be based on the proportionate fault of each tortfeasor.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part. Remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. No costs, neither party having prevailed in full.
Beasley, J., concurred.
See Judge Swallow's opinion for statement of facts.