Case Name: The State v. Sarah Cargill
Court: Constitutional Court of South Carolina
Jurisdiction: South Carolina
Decision Date: 1810-11
Citations: 2 Brev. 445
Docket Number: 
Parties: The State v. Sarah Cargill.
Judges: 
Reporter: South Carolina Law Reports
Volume: 4
Pages: 445–446

Head Matter:
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, COLUMBIA,
NOV., 1810.
The State v. Sarah Cargill.
Indictment for forcible entry, &c., cannot be supported without some evidence of actual force, or threats, and appearance of personal ill usage.
Defendant was indicted for a forcible entry and detainer, in Lau-rens district, before Bay, J. It appeared in evidence on the trial, that when the defendant took possession of the land in dispute, the prosecutor was not in possession thereof, or on the land, and had no crop growing thereon, or any property thereon, except an empty barrel, and a piece of leather. That after the defendant took possession, the prosecutor claimed and demanded possession ; and the defendant refused to quit, and yield up the possession on such demand. But no evidence was given of any force having been used, or threats, or menaces, to keep possession. But it was proved the prosecutor sowed oats on the laud, and made up a fence, which was privately pulled down in places by the defendant, or her family. The defendant produced no evidence, resting her defence on the ground that there was no proof of any degree of actual vi olence, or terror by threats, or otherwise; nor any appearance of force, to support the indictment. Bay, J., however, charged the jury that actual possession was not necessary to be proved in the prosecutor, but constructive possession was sufficient. That the prosecutor, having leased the land from the true owner, had virtual possession ; and also, that actual force, or appearance of actual force, was not necessary to constitute the offence of forcible entry ; but that an unlawful entry was equivalent to a forcible entry — as entering without the leave of the owner.
The jury found the defendant guilty ; whereupon a motion was brought m this courtfora new trial in arrest of judgmeut.
Yancey, in support of the motion,
cited I Haw. P.’ 0. 280, sec. 25. To constitute the offence of forcible entry, or forcible de-tainer, there must be circumstances of terror; just cause of fear, from acts, or words; fear of bodily harm ; acts indicative of using force. Refusing to go from the land, not sufficient. The motion' in arrest of judgment, was on the ground of a defect in the indictment, not necessary to notice.
FaRrow, on the contrary.
Keeping possession after demand, evidence of force; a constructive force.

Opinion:
By the coxiRT.
It does not appear that the public peace was violated, by any violent misconduct of the defendant, in obtaining or keeping possession of the land in question. If the prosecutor had a belter right to the possession than the defendant, he might have availed himself of his civil remedy. The law will not punish, criminally, a private injury of this nature. There must be, at least, some appearance of force, by acts, words, or gestures, to constitute the offence charged.
New trial granted.