Case Name: Wanda BLAILOCK v. Shirley O'BANNON and Higbee Company d/b/a Dillard's Department Stores, Inc.
Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Mississippi
Decision Date: 2001-09-27
Citations: 795 So. 2d 533
Docket Number: No. 2000-CA-00664-SCT
Parties: Wanda BLAILOCK v. Shirley O’BANNON and Higbee Company d/b/a Dillard’s Department Stores, Inc.
Judges: PITTMAN, C.J., BANKS, P.J., MILLS, DIAZ and EASLEY, JJ„ CONCUR. McRAE, P.J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY. SMITH, J„ DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY COBB, J.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 795
Pages: 533–539

Head Matter:
Wanda BLAILOCK v. Shirley O’BANNON and Higbee Company d/b/a Dillard’s Department Stores, Inc.
No. 2000-CA-00664-SCT.
Supreme Court of Mississippi.
Sept. 27, 2001.
Michael Breland, 'Robert Fred Lingold, Jr., Florence, Attorneys for Appellant.
Christy D. Jones, Jackson, Mary Margaret Sams, Attorneys for Appellees.

Opinion:
WALLER, Justice, for the Court:
f 1. Wanda Blailock filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County, Mississippi, against her employer, Higbee Company d/b/a Dillard's Department Stores, Inc. (Dillard's), and another of its employees, Shirley O'Bannon. Blailock claimed that, while she was working as a saleswoman at Dillard's, O'Bannon, a management-level employee, intentionally assaulted her, committed battery, falsely imprisoned her, and caused emotional distress when O'Bannon grabbed Blailock's arm and began pulling her to an office for disciplinary action. Blailock further claimed that Dillard's was aware of the "bullying and threatening tactics" used by O'Bannon and it therefore ratified her conduct.
¶ 2. Dillard's filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the Mississippi Workers' Compensation Commission (WCC) had exclusive original jurisdiction to hear the claims raised in Blailock's complaint. This motion to dismiss was granted after a hearing and after Dillard's presented evidence that a file pertaining to the matter had been opened at the WCC.
ANALYSIS
I. DID THE CIRCUIT COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY DISMISSING BLAILOCK'S COMPLAINT?
¶ 3. Blailock contends that the WCC does not have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear her claims because her claims consist of intentional torts which are not compensable under the Act. See Miss.Code Ann. § 71-3-3(b)(2000) (To be compensa-ble under the Act, there must be an accidental injury or an accidental death); Miller v. McRae's, Inc., 444 So.2d 368, 372 (Miss.1984) (WCC has exclusive jurisdiction if the injury arose out of and in the course of employment and if the injury is compensable under the Act). The standard of review for questions of law is de novo. Starcher v. Byrne, 687 So.2d 737, 739 (Miss.1997).
¶ 4. We have set out two elements which must be met in order to avoid the exclusivity of the Act:
(1) The injury must be caused by the willful act of the employer or another employee acting in the course of employment and in the furtherance of the employer's business; and
(2) The injury must be one that is not compensable under the Act.
Griffin v. Futorian Corp., 533 So.2d 461, 463 (Miss.1988) (citing Miller, 444 So.2d at 371-72).
¶ 5. Many states which have enacted statutory exclusivity provisions which allow civil claims, as opposed to physical injury claims which are compensa-ble under the Act, by the employee against the employer's insurance carrier for the commission of an intentional tort. We have held that a mere willful and malicious act is insufficient to give rise to the intentional tort exception to the exclusive remedy provisions of the Act. There must be a finding of an "actual intent to injure." Reckless or grossly negligent conduct is not enough to remove a claim from the exclusivity of the Act. Peaster v. David New Drilling Co., 642 So.2d 344; 348, 349 (Miss.1994). For a civil suit based on an intentional tort to proceed, the injury has been something other than physical injury or death, which are compensable under the Act. Id. at 348.
¶ 6. We find that the circuit court's dismissal of Blailock's complaint was error, and we reverse and remand for further proceedings. Part of the damages sought by Blailock (physical pain and suffering due to the alleged wrenching of her arm, emotional distress, loss of wages, special damages for the loss of the opportunity to compete in the Senior Olympics and punitive damages) are not compensable under the Act because they are alleged to have been caused by willful and intentional acts, not negligent or grossly negligent acts. The damages did not arise from an accidental injury or an accidental death. The allegations of Blailock's complaint certainly meet the two criteria set out by the Court in Griffin. Blailock must prove that O'Bannon was working in the course and scope of her employment when she allegedly committed the intentional torts, that O'Bannon's alleged acts were committed with an actual intent to inflict injury, and that Blailock suffered injuries as a result, but the allegations of intentional acts certainly take Blailock's non-compensable claims out of the jurisdiction of the WCC. Of course, a claim for her injuries that are compensable under the Act are still subject to the WCC. See, e.g., Sharpe v. Choctaw Elees. Enters., 767 So.2d 1002, 1007 (Miss.2000).
II. WHETHER BLAILOCK WAS PROVIDED WITH AN ADEQUATE OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD.
¶ 7. Blailock contends that the circuit court summarily dismissed her complaint after it reviewed the file opened at the WCC. However, Blailock admits that a hearing was held on the motion to dismiss and that the court's decision was taken under advisement until such time the file could be reviewed.
¶ 8. Because we reverse the circuit court's grant of Dillard's motion to dismiss, this issue is moot.
III. DOES THE FILING OF AN INJURY REPORT WITH THE WCC ESTOP A PARTY FROM PURSUING A CIVIL CLAIM FOR AN INTENTIONAL TORT?
¶ 9. The filing of a Notice of Injury Report with the WCC is required by Miss. Code Ann. § 71-3-67 (2000). However, the Notice does not ripen into a claim until the employee files a Petition to Controvert. M.W.C.C. Proc. R. 2. We find that an injured employee is not estopped from filing a complaint based on an employment-related intentional tort merely because a file has been opened at the WCC by the filing of a Notice of Injury Report.
CONCLUSION
¶ 10. We reverse the order dismissing Blailock's complaint and action and remand this case to the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶ 11. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
PITTMAN, C.J., BANKS, P.J., MILLS, DIAZ and EASLEY, JJ" CONCUR. McRAE, P.J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY. SMITH, J" DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY COBB, J.
. See, e.g., Gulden v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 890 F.2d 195 (9th Cir.1989) (Oregon); Quela v. Payco-General American Credits, Inc., 84 F.Supp.2d 956 (N.D.Ill.2000); Stapp v. Overnite Transp. Co., 995 F.Supp. 1207 (D.Kan.1998); Yale v. Town of Allenstown, 969 F.Supp. 798 (D.N.H.1997); Goodstein v. Bombardier Capital, 889 F.Supp. 760 (D.Vt.1995); Stefanski v. R.A. Zehetner & Assocs., 855 F.Supp. 1030 (E.D.Wis.1994) Roy ex rel. Charlot v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 838 F.Supp. 312 (E.D.Tex.1993); Vorvis v. Southern New England Tel. Co., 821 F.Supp. 851 (D.Conn.1993); Coello v. Tug Mfg. Corp., 756 F.Supp. 1258 (W.D.Mo.1991); McGreevy v. Racal-Dana Instruments, Inc., 690 F.Supp. 468 (E.D.Va.1988); Brewer v. Monsanto Corp., 644 F.Supp. 1267 (M.D.Tenn.1986); Koslop v. Cabot Corp., 631 F.Supp. 1494 (M.D.Pa.1986); McSwain v. Shei, 304 S.C. 25, 402 S.E.2d 890 (1991); Haddock v. Multivac, Inc., 703 So.2d 969 (Ala.Civ.App.1996); Potts v. UAP-Ga. Ag. Chem., Inc., 270 Ga. 14, 506 S.E.2d 101 (1998); Caudle v. Betts, 512 So.2d 389 (La.1987); Beauchamp v. Dow Chemical Co,, 427 Mich. 1, 398 N.W.2d 882 (1986); Sitzman v. Schumaker, 221 Mont. 304, 718 P.2d 657 (1986); Beavers v. Johnson Controls World Servs., 120 N.M. 343, 901 P.2d 761 (1995); Cottone v. County of Schenectady, 134 Misc.2d 805, 512 N.Y.S.2d 771 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1987); Regan v. Amerimark Bldg. Prods., 118 N.C.App. 328, 454 S.E.2d 849 (1995); Watson v. Aluminum Extruded Shapes, 62 Ohio App.3d 242, 575 N.E.2d 235 (1990); Pursell v. Pizza Inn, Inc., 786 P.2d 716 (Okla.App.1990); Harris v. Martinka Coal Co., 201 W.Va. 578, 499 S.E.2d 307 (1997).