Case Name: The State of Iowa v. Rankin
Court: Iowa Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Iowa
Decision Date: 1859-04-16
Citations: 8 Iowa 355
Docket Number: 
Parties: The State of Iowa v. Rankin.
Judges: 
Reporter: Iowa Reports
Volume: 8
Pages: 355–358

Head Matter:
The State of Iowa v. Rankin.
The testimony of a wife, when called as a witness on the part of her husband, in a criminal case, is not to be marked and distinguished from that of other witnesses ; she is entitled to be regarded as others are, and to stand free and unembarrassed upon her own character.
Where in a criminal case, in which the wife was called as a witness, and testified on the part of her husband, the court instructed the jury as follows : 11 The law permits the wife to testify for her husband in a criminal cause, but her peculiar relation to her husband, renders it incumbent on the jury to examine her testimony with peculiar care and caution, and if, from the whole testimony, they are satisfied that what she said is true, they should give her testimony the credit of any other witness. But if, from her testimony, taken together with that of other credible witnesses, the jury are satisfied that what she said was false, they should reject it altogether; Held, That the instruction was erroneous.
Appeal from, the DesMoines District Court.
Saturday, April 16.
Indictment for assault with intent to kill. On the trial, the prosecution called as witnesses, E. C. Hall, Abial Hall, and Maria Hall, who testified against the defendant. The wife of the defendant was then introduced on his part, whose testimony differed materially from theirs. She was the daughter of E, O. Hall, and the sister of the other witnesses.
The court instructed the jury as follows: “ The law permits the wife to testify for her husband in a criminal cause, buther peculiar relation to her husband, renders it incum bent upon the jury to examine her testimony with peculiar care and caution; and if, from the whole testimony, they are satisfied that what she said is true, they should give her testimony the credit of any other witness. But if, from her testimony, taken together with that of other credible witnesses, the jury are satisfied that what she said was false, they should reject it altogether.”
The defendant excepted to this instruction. A verdict of guilty was rendered, and he appeals.
Browning ds Traey, for the appellant.
S. A. Bice, Attorney General, for the state.

Opinion:
Woodward, J. -
-We think this instruction should not have been given. It is very similar to that in The State v. Guyer, 6 Iowa, 263, which this court held erroneous. No essential difference between them is perceived. The testimony of a wife is not to be thus marked and distinguished, from that of other witnesses. She should not be thus subjected to suspicion. Her relation to the defendant is, of itself, sufficiently calculated to excite this, and such remarks from the court, go to the jury with great weight, and add unjustly to the burden which that relation puts upon her. She is entitled to be regarded as others are, and to stand free and unembarrassed, upon her own character. And this is a right of the defendant, also. When . the law made her a witness, it placed her upon the stand just as it places others there.
The instruction is the more noticeable, as the other witnesses were of her own family, and thus standing between these near relatives and her husband, there was a more than usual presumption of uprightness.
Besides these considerations, the instruction requires that she should be supported by the evidence of others, before she can be believed. We might say, that it takes away all weight from her testimony, when taken alone. If, from the whole of the testimony, taken together, they are satisfied that what she says is true, they should give her testimony the credit of any other witness. What does this mean, {nit that they are to look away from her, first, to see if she is supported by the others ? What weight does this leave for her evidence where, as in this case, she is.opposed by others ? It leaves it a perfect blank; so that it would be futile to offer her testimony, in the very cases where it is most wanted — that is, where she differs from the others, or where the defendant wishes to contradict them.
The instruction should not have been given, and the judgment must be reversed, and the cause remanded.
JfWRiGiir, C. J., dissenting.