Case Name: DOROTHY J. COLLINS, Appellant, v. CHARLES REYNARD et al., Appellees
Court: Illinois Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Illinois
Decision Date: 1992-12-04
Citations: 154 Ill. 2d 48
Docket Number: No. 70325
Parties: DOROTHY J. COLLINS, Appellant, v. CHARLES REYNARD et al., Appellees.
Judges: 
Reporter: Illinois Reports, Second Series
Volume: 154
Pages: 48–56

Head Matter:
(No. 70325.
DOROTHY J. COLLINS, Appellant, v. CHARLES REYNARD et al., Appellees.
Opinion filed December 4, 1992.
Rehearing denied February 1, 1993.
MILLER, C.J., joined by BILANDIC, FREEMAN and CUNNINGHAM, JJ., specially concurring.
Duane D. Young and Steven C. Ward, of Heckenkamp, Simhauser & LaBarre, P.C., of Springfield, for appellant.
Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen (Karen L. Kendall, of Peoria, and Roy O. Gully, of Springfield, of counsel), for appellees.
John J. Lowrey, of Chicago, for amicus curiae Illinois Trial Lawyers Association.

Opinion:
JUSTICE HEIPLE
delivered the opinion of the court:
This is a case of professional malpractice brought by a client against her lawyer. The gist of the complaint is that the lawyer, in drafting certain sales documents for the client, failed to protect the client's security interest in the property being sold, thus causing a financial loss to the client.
The complaint against the lawyer, in separate counts, couched its claims in separate theories of both contract and tort. At the trial level, the lawyer defendant moved to dismiss the tort portion of the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. The motion was denied. The lawyer defendant then took an interlocutory appeal. A unanimous appellate court reversed the trial court and stated, in essence, that the plaintiff's complaint for lawyer malpractice is cognizable in contract but not in tort. 195 111. App. 3d 1067.
On further appeal to this court, we issued a decision affirming the appellate court. Thereafter the plaintiff's petition for rehearing was allowed (134 Ill. 2d R. 367), and the case was reargued.
Today we rule that a complaint against a lawyer for professional malpractice may be couched in either contract or tort and that recovery may be sought in the alternative. In so ruling, we adhere to that long line of Illinois cases allowing pleading and recovery in tort for lawyer malpractice. (See generally Barth v. Reagan (1990), 139 Ill. 2d 399; McLane v. Russell (1989), 131 Ill. 2d 509; Sexton v. Smith (1986), 112 Ill. 2d 187; Yates v. Muir (1986), 112 Ill. 2d 205; Ogle v. Fuiten (1984), 102 Ill. 2d 356; York v. Stiefel (1983), 99 Ill. 2d 312; Pelham v. Griesheimer (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 13.) Our ruling is grounded on historical precedent rather than logic. If something has been handled in a certain way for a long period of time and if people are familiar with the practice and accustomed to its use, it is reasonable to continue with that practice until and unless good cause is shown to change the rule. Certainty in the law enables parties to understand their relative rights and duties and facilitates rationality and planning in matters of commerce and social intercourse. Uncertainty, on the other hand, introduces disfunction and chaos.
The appellate court, in attempting to extend the rationale of the Moorman doctrine to the case at hand, ruled contrary to the ruling we announce today. (Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. National Tank Co. (1982), 91 Ill. 2d 69.) While we do not fault its logic, we do not follow its ruling. Rather, we adhere to long established practice and custom. Logic may be a face card but custom is a trump.
Moorman attempted to distinguish between recovery in tort and recovery in contract by looking to the nature of the damage suffered rather than to the relationship between the parties or to the act which caused the damage. In reaching its conclusion, the Moorman analysis began at the end of the transaction and reasoned in reverse. It defined a special category of damages as not cognizable in tort. A different analysis might have started at the beginning with a first consideration given to the relationship between the parties under a traditional contract or tort analysis. Though the ultimate decision in that case might yet have been the same, it would have been reached by a different route.
Contract law applies to voluntary obligations freely entered into between parties. Damages recoverable under a breach of contract theory are based upon the mutual expectations of the parties. The basic principle for the measurement of contract damages is that the injured party is entitled to recover an amount that will put him in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract been performed as agreed.
Tort law, on the other hand, applies in situations where society recognizes a duty to exist wholly apart from any contractual undertaking. Tort obligations are general obligations that impose liability when a person negligently, carelessly or purposely causes injury to others. These obligations have been recognized by society to protect fellow citizens from unreasonable risks of harm. Whether a duty will be recognized under tort law depends upon the foreseeability of the injury, the likelihood of the injury, the magnitude of the burden of guarding against the injury, and the consequences of placing that burden on the defendant. Kirk v. Michael Reese Hospital & Medical Center (1987), 117 Ill. 2d 507, 525; Lance v. Senior (1967), 36 Ill. 2d 516, 518.
Although the common law distinctions between contract and tort have been both modified and confused by different courts in different situations, differences between tort theories and contract theories still have validity. (Feinman, The Jurisprudence of Classification, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 661 (1989); Bertschy, Negligent Performance of Service Contracts and the Economic Loss Doctrine, 17 J. Mar. L. Rev. 249 (1984); W. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts §92, at 655 (5th ed. 1984).) For all of that, a punch in the nose remains, for all practical purposes, a tort and not a breach of contract. In the field of contract, however, some breaches have crossed the line and become cognizable in tort. See generally Knox College v. Celotex Corp. (1981), 88 Ill. 2d 407, 420; Nevin v. Pullman Palace Car Co. (1883), 106 Ill. 222; Sabath v. Mansfield (1978), 60 Ill. App. 3d 1008, 1014; Ledingham v. Blue Cross Plan for Hospital Care of Hospital Service Corp. (1975), 29 Ill. App. 3d 339, 344, rev'd on other grounds (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 338.
Finally, it is to be noted that the ruling we announce today is limited to the specific field of lawyer malpractice as an exception to the so-called Moorman doctrine and to the distinctions separating contract from tort. Today's decision neither changes the duties a lawyer owes his client, nor does it change the circumstances under which a lawyer may be sued for malpractice, nor does it change the damages recoverable. We merely restate the long-standing Illinois practice in this matter.
Accordingly the judgment of the appellate court is reversed and the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. The cause is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
Appellate court reversed; circuit court affirmed; cause remanded.