Case Name: MERRITT v. THE STATE
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 2010-03-15
Citations: 286 Ga. 650
Docket Number: S09A1476
Parties: MERRITT v. THE STATE.
Judges: All the Justices concur, except for Nahmias, J., who concurs specially.
Reporter: Georgia Reports
Volume: 286
Pages: 650–657

Head Matter:
S09A1476.
MERRITT v. THE STATE.
(690 SE2d 835)

Opinion:
Hunstein, Chief Justice.
Thomas Merritt has been charged with the offenses of rape and false imprisonment based on events alleged to have occurred in February 2008. We granted Merritt's application for interlocutory appeal to address whether the trial court erred by denying his motion to declare unconstitutional OCGA § 16-6-1 (b) and 17-10-6.1, the sentencing statutes for the crime of rape. Merritt claims the sentencing scheme created by these statutes for first convictions of rape violates his due process and Sixth Amendment rights because the statutes are so vague that they fail to apprise him with sufficient clarity of the maximum sentence that may be imposed should he be convicted of violating OCGA § 16-6-1 (a), with the result that he is unable to knowingly and voluntarily decide whether to plead guilty to the rape charge or proceed to trial. We hold that these statutes are not unconstitutional for the reasons alleged by Merritt and therefore affirm.
OCGA § 16-6-1 (b) sets forth four sentencing options as punishment available for a person convicted of the offense of rape: death; imprisonment for life without parole; imprisonment for life; or "a split sentence that is a term of imprisonment for not less than 25 years and not exceeding life imprisonment." Discussion of the first three options is relevant to Merritt's objections to the final sentencing option. The first option is not legally available in Georgia in that a death sentence cannot be imposed for a rape conviction. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U. S. 407 (II) (128 SC 2641, 171 LE2d 525) (2008); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U. S. 584 (III) (97 SC 2861, 53 LE2d 982) (1977). As to life without parole, we have held based on the language of OCGA § 17-10-16 and 17-10-32.1 that life without parole cannot be a punishment for rape under that statute. State v. Velazquez, 283 Ga. 206 (657 SE2d 838) (2008). Merritt does not take issue with the sentencing option of life imprisonment but instead challenges the term of years option, i.e., "for not less than 25 years and not exceeding life imprisonment." OCGA § 16-6-1 (b). Regarding that sentencing option, OCGA § 17-10-6.1 (b) (2) provides that the sentence shall
be a split sentence which shall include a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 25 years, followed by probation for life. No portion of the mandatory minimum sentence imposed shall be suspended, stayed, probated, deferred, or withheld by the sentencing court and shall not be reduced by any form of pardon, parole, or commutation of sentence by the State Board of Pardons and Paroles.
This language addresses the Legislature's decision to preclude any possibility of parole during the 25-year minimum mandatory sentence. OCGA § 17-10-6.1 (c) (4) addresses the issue of parole for any time exceeding the mandatory minimum. In that regard it provides that any such sentence "shall be served in its entirety as imposed by the sentencing court and shall not be reduced by any form of parole or early release . . . ." As Merritt correctly observes, when the language in OCGA § 16-6-1 (b) and subsection (c) (4) of OCGA § 17-10-6.1 are construed together, the result is that trial courts are authorized to impose what may constitute a "de facto" sentence of life without parole by sentencing a defendant to a term of years that, while "not exceeding life imprisonment" as provided by OCGA § 16-6-1 (b), may nevertheless equal a defendant's probable life span, which the defendant would then be required by OCGA § 17-10-6.1 (c) (4) to serve in its entirety without any possibility of parole.
Contrary to Merritt's argument, there is no conflict between the term of years sentencing option in OCGA § 16-6-1 (b) and 17-10-6.1 and our holding that life without parole cannot be a punishment for rape. See State v. Velazquez, supra, 283 Ga. at 208-209. That holding is predicated upon the codified and uncodified language enacting OCGA § 17-10-16 and 17-10-32.1, see Ga. L. 1993, p. 1654, § 1 et seq., and the effect on that legislation of case law precluding a death sentence for a rape conviction. See Coker v. Georgia, supra, 433 U. S. at 592 (III). See also Kennedy v. Louisiana, supra, 554 U. S. 407 (II) (grant of writ of certiorari referenced in Velazquez, supra at 208, n. 2). Nothing in the enactment of OCGA § 17-10-16 and 17-10-32.1 or our holding in Velazquez served to preclude the Legislature when it amended OCGA § 16-6-1 (b) and 17-10-6.1 in 2006 from authorizing trial courts to impose a "de facto" life without parole sentence for a first conviction of rape.
Nor do we agree with Merritt that the possibility of a "de facto" sentence of life without parole created by the term of years sentencing option in OCGA § 16-6-1 (b) and 17-10-6.1 violates his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process of law. Based on our review of the sentencing scheme for a first conviction of rape, we find that the applicable statutes give fair warning that a defendant may be sentenced either to life imprisonment, for which he is eligible to be considered for parole after 30 years, or to a term of years, with the minimum sentence being 25 years without parole and with any additional years, which may include a defendant's entire life span, being likewise not subject to any possibility of parole. See OCGA § 16-1-2 (purpose of Criminal Code is to give fair warning of nature of conduct forbidden and sentence authorized upon conviction). This statutory scheme puts a defendant on unambiguous notice that the possible statutory range applicable to a first conviction for rape is a minimum term of 25 years and a maximum term of years not exceeding the length of defendant's life, all without the possibility of parole, and that the only possibility of parole arises after 30 years in prison should a life sentence subject to OCGA § 17-10-6.1 (c) (1) be imposed.
We therefore reject Merritt's related due process and Sixth Amendment challenges to the rape sentencing scheme regarding a defendant's understanding of the consequences of pleading guilty to rape. We hold that a defendant never before convicted of rape who is contemplating a plea of guilty to a rape charge would reasonably understand that he faces either a life sentence, for which he would be eligible for consideration for parole after 30 years, or a term of years during which no parole was possible, with the term ranging from a minimum of 25 years to a number that would encompass the rest of his natural life. These statutes enable a defendant to readily ascer tain the relevant law governing the sentences available for a first conviction for rape such that a defendant can be apprised of and fully understand the possible consequences when weighing whether to enter a guilty plea to the charge. See Brady v. United States, 397 U. S. 742, 748-749, n. 5 (I) (90 SC 1463, 25 LE2d 747) (1970) (defendant must fully understand charges against him and possible consequences of his plea when pleading guilty). Moreover, to the extent any confusion may have existed previously in the law regarding the sentencing consequences regarding a first conviction of rape, that confusion is removed by this opinion.
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur, except for Nahmias, J., who concurs specially.
OCGA § 16-6-1 was amended in 2006 to substitute the final option in lieu of the previous ten to twenty year sentence, as provided in Ga. L. 1996, p. 1115, § 1.
Pertinent to Merritt's case, a person sentenced to life imprisonment is eligible to be considered for parole after serving a minimum of 30 years in prison. OCGA § 17-10-6.1 (c) (1).
We recognize that OCGA § 17-10-6.1 (b) (2) contains a double negative, specifically, "[n]o portion of the mandatory minimum sentence . . . shall not be reduced by any form of pardon, parole, or commutation of sentence by the State Board of Pardons and Paroles." (Emphasis supplied.) See also id. at (b) (1) (same). While a strict grammatical construction of this language would result in an affirmative, i.e., that all portions of the mandatory minimum sentence shall be reduced by pardon, parole or commutation, see generally Carroll v. State, 77 Ga. App. 251 (48 SE2d 491) (1948), the intention of the Legislature is the cardinal guide to construction of statutes and it is well established that that intent will prevail over the literal sense of terms. New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Freeland, 216 Ga. 491, 495 (117 SE2d 538) (1960). Applying these rules of statutory construction, we hold that OCGA § 17-10-6.1 (b) (2) provides for the punishment of "25 years to life, followed by life on probation, with no possibility of probation or parole for the minimum prison time of 25 years." (Footnote omitted.) Humphrey v. Wilson, 282 Ga. 520, 529 (652 SE2d 501) (2007).
We note that the 2009 amendment to OCGA§ 17-10-6.1 has further changed the sentencing for rape but this amendment is not applicable to Merritt because it applies only to crimes committed on or after its effective date of April 29, 2009. Ga. L. 2009, p. 223, § 8, 10.
Merritt makes no Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment challenge to these statutes.