Case Name: Heide M. Hess JONES, Appellant, v. Curtis Lee JONES, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1992-10-23
Citations: 606 So. 2d 748
Docket Number: No. 91-2258
Parties: Heide M. Hess JONES, Appellant, v. Curtis Lee JONES, Appellee.
Judges: W. SHARP and DIAMANTIS, JJ., concur specially, with opinions.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 606
Pages: 748–750

Head Matter:
Heide M. Hess JONES, Appellant, v. Curtis Lee JONES, Appellee.
No. 91-2258.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Oct. 23, 1992.
Jeffrey L. Dees, Ormond Beach, for appellant.
Peter Keating, Daytona Beach, for appel-lee.

Opinion:
PETERSON, Judge.
Heide M. Hess Jones, former wife, appeals the denial of her motion to modify a final judgment of dissolution to allow her to take the parties' six-year-old child to her native homeland of Germany where she had decided to reside. We affirm. Cole v. Cole, 530 So.2d 467 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988); Jones v. Vrba, 513 So.2d 1080 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987); Giachetti v. Giachetti, 416 So.2d 27 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). We also note that the trial court correctly applied the six-part test set forth in Hill v. Hill, 548 So.2d 705 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989), review denied, 560 So.2d 233 (Fla.1990), and made specific findings in the final judgment to determine the best interests of the child.
Paragraph four of the final judgment includes a finding that the former husband was the "prevailing party on the Giachetti issue" and awarded attorney's fees against the former wife who "is able to pay same." We are not sure whether the trial court awarded the fees based upon a prevailing party theory or whether the award was made after considering the financial resources of both parties. Hudgens v. Hudgens, 411 So.2d 354, 355 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982) (Absent a spurious claim, "[i]n the final analysis . the award of attorney's fees in a dissolution proceeding depends not upon who wins but rather upon the relative financial circumstances of the parties. § 61.16, Fla.Stat. (1981); [citations omitted].").
This court has previously discussed the problems in formulating consistent rules to govern the authority of appellate courts to award attorney's fees in dissolution cases. Thornton v. Thornton, 433 So.2d 682 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983), review denied, 443 So.2d 980 (Fla.1983). The primary premise set forth in Thornton is applicable to the consideration of an award of fees at both the trial and appellate levels and is rooted in the legislative direction set forth in section 61.16, Florida Statutes (1991):
The court may from time to time, after considering the financial resources of both parties, order a party to pay a reasonable amount for attorney's fees, suit money, and the cost to the other party of maintaining or defending any proceeding under this chapter, including enforcement and modification proceedings....
There is no language in section 61.16, however, that authorizes an award of fees on a "prevailing party" theory. Spurious claims in emotionally charged dissolution actions are recognized in Hudgens as an exception to the rule of section 61.16.
We remand for the trial court to consider whether either party is entitled to a full or partial award of attorney's fees under section 61.16 and, if so, the appropriate amount of fees for trial counsel. Additionally, we direct the trial court in this action to apply separately the test under section 61.16, to consider the financial resources of both parties, and to determine whether one party has the ability to pay and the other party has a real financial need for an award of attorney's fees for this appeal and, if so, to award a reasonable amount in full or in part.
AFFIRMED; REMANDED.
W. SHARP and DIAMANTIS, JJ., concur specially, with opinions.