Case Name: C. Vernon MIZE, Jr., Appellant, v. COUNTY OF SEMINOLE, Florida, et al., Appellees; Robert F. TUCKER, et al., Appellants, v. COUNTY OF SEMINOLE, Florida, et al., Appellees; Robert F. TUCKER, et al., Appellants, v. COUNTY OF SEMINOLE, Florida, et al., Appellees; SEMINOLE COUNTY, et al., Petitioners, v. Robert F. TUCKER, William T. Pratt, Jr., and James F. Latner, Respondents
Court: Florida Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1969-09-24
Citations: 229 So. 2d 841
Docket Number: Nos. 38014, 38200, 38201 and 38040
Parties: C. Vernon MIZE, Jr., Appellant, v. COUNTY OF SEMINOLE, Florida, et al., Appellees. Robert F. TUCKER, et al., Appellants, v. COUNTY OF SEMINOLE, Florida, et al., Appellees. Robert F. TUCKER, et al., Appellants, v. COUNTY OF SEMINOLE, Florida, et al., Appellees. SEMINOLE COUNTY, et al., Petitioners, v. Robert F. TUCKER, William T. Pratt, Jr., and James F. Latner, Respondents.
Judges: ERVIN, C. J., THORNAL and BOYD, JJ., and SPECTOR, District Court Judge, concur.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 229
Pages: 841–849

Head Matter:
C. Vernon MIZE, Jr., Appellant, v. COUNTY OF SEMINOLE, Florida, et al., Appellees. Robert F. TUCKER, et al., Appellants, v. COUNTY OF SEMINOLE, Florida, et al., Appellees. Robert F. TUCKER, et al., Appellants, v. COUNTY OF SEMINOLE, Florida, et al., Appellees. SEMINOLE COUNTY, et al., Petitioners, v. Robert F. TUCKER, William T. Pratt, Jr., and James F. Latner, Respondents.
Nos. 38014, 38200, 38201 and 38040.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Sept. 24, 1969.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 17, 1969.
Mack N. Cleveland, Jr., of Cleveland & Mize, Sanford, for C. Vernon Mize.
Harlan 'Tuck of Giles, Hedrick & Robinson, Orlando, for James F. Latner, Robert F. Tucker, and William T. Pratt, Jr.
W. C. Hutchison, Jr., of Hutchison & Leffler, and Harold F. Johnson, Orlando, for County of Seminole.
Abbott M. Herring, State’s Atty., and Thomas A. Speer, Asst. State’s Atty., for State of Florida.

Opinion:
DREW and ADKINS, Justices.
The pivotal point in each of the above cases is whether Sanford is the permanent county seat of Seminole County. They have been consolidated, orally argued, and will be disposed of in one opinion. The background and history of this involved litigation follows.
No. 38,014 is an appeal from a final judgment validating $2,900,000 of bonds of Seminole County proposed to be issued for the purpose of providing funds for building a courthouse and jail in the City of Sanford. The final decree was rendered September 12, 1968. The Notice of Appeal from the judgment validating these bonds was filed October 3, 1968.
No. 38,200 is an appeal from a post judgment order arising out of the validation proceeding (No. 38,014). After entry of the September 12, 1968, validation judgment by the Circuit Court, the District Court of Appeal, 4th District, rendered its decision reversing a final judgment of the same Circuit Court, which judgment had dismissed a complaint to enjoin construction of a jail and courthouse in Sanford and had declared Sanford to be the permanent county seat. The successful parties in the litigation in the District Court moved for relief under Rule 1.540(b) (5), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 31 F.S. A., from the final judgment validating the bonds. Upon hearing, such motion was denied and this appeal is from that order.
No. 38,201 is an appeal from a post judgment order in the validation proceedings denying a motion to 'strike certain portions of the record in the declaratory judgment proceedings (No. 38,040, infra) from the record in the validation proceedings.
No. 38,040 is a petition for certiorari which was filed in this Court November 20, 1968, seeking a review of the decision of the District Court of Appeal, 4th District, dated September 26, 1968, which reversed the final judgment of the Circuit Court of Seminole County dated October 4, 1967, in the declaratory judgment proceedings, supra, declaring that the City of Sanford was the permanent county seat of Seminole County subject to change only as provided by general law.
As will be noted, the proceeding in Seminole County for declaratory decree and the validation proceedings were taking place at about the same time. The declaratory judgment proceeding had been concluded in the trial court by the final. decree of October 4, 1967, and was, pursuant to a timely appeal, under consideration by the District Court of Appeal, 4th District, at the time the petition to validate was filed on August 13, 1968. The decision of the District Court of Appeal involved in No. 38,040, of September 26, 1968, rendered after the validation judgment, if allowed to stand, would squarely conflict with the final judgment of the Circuit Court of Seminole County validating the bonds.
JURISDICTION
There is no question concerning the jurisdiction of this Court in the bond validation proceedings in No. 38,014, nor is there any question of our jurisdiction in No. 38,200 or 38,201, which arise out of the validation proceedings.
A more serious question arises in con nection with the jurisdiction of this Court in No. 38,040, the declaratory judgment action. Jurisdiction is alleged to be vested in this Court in the Petition for Certiorari for the reason that said decision "affects a class of constitutional officers, to-wit, county commissioners, as demonstrated by the decision which enjoins petitioners from financing the construction of a courthouse in the City of Sanford under the provisions of Chapter 135, Florida Statutes, 1967 [F.S.A.]." ' We accept jurisdiction in this proceeding not because of the reasons assigned above in the Petition for Certiorari, but by virtue of the provisions of the constitution authorizing this Court to issue all writs necessary or proper to the complete exercise of its jurisdiction.
This Court, being vested with exclusive jurisdiction in all proceedings for the validation of bonds and certificates of indebtedness, would be completely frustrated in the necessary and proper exercise of that jurisdiction in the validation proceedings unless it could bring before it for review the decision of the District Court which enjoined the issuance of said bonds. Ultimate disposition of this case, therefore, is not only necessary and proper but essential to the complete exercise of our jurisdiction. We therefore accept jurisdiction in No. 38,040.
. This rule provides, inter alia: "On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party from a final judgment, for the following reasons: (5) a prior judgment or decree upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated or it is no longer equitable that the judgment or decree should have prospective application."
. "Appeals from trial courts may be taken directly to the supreme court, as a matter of right, from final judgments in proceedings for the validation of bonds and certificates of indebtedness." Fla.Const, art. Y, § 4(2), F.S.A.
. "The supreme court may issue all writs necessary or proper to the complete exercise of its jurisdiction." Fla.Const. art. V, § 4(2). Also see F.A.R. 4.5, subd. g (1), 32 F.S.A.; and Couse v. Canal Authority, 209 So.2d 865 (Fla.1968).