Case Name: Anthony W. Ashburn vs. Henry Poulter
Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Connecticut
Decision Date: 1869-02
Citations: 35 Conn. 553
Docket Number: 
Parties: Anthony W. Ashburn vs. Henry Poulter.
Judges: 
Reporter: Connecticut Reports
Volume: 35
Pages: 553–560

Head Matter:
Anthony W. Ashburn vs. Henry Poulter.
The defendant owed the plaintiff $17, and the plaintiff had brought a suit of foreign attachment on which service had been made upon a debtor of the defendant but no copy had been left with the defendant himself. Held that a tender made by the defendant after the service on the garnishee, of $17 without the costs, was sufficient, and that it made no difference that the defendant knew of the service upon the garnishee. [By Hinman, C. J., and Butler, J.; Park and Carpenter, Js., dissenting.]
The defendant met the plaintiff in the street and said, “ I am now ready to pay you tlie$17 which I owe you,” having money in his pocket sufficient to pay the debt and intending to pay it. The plaintiff replied, “ There have been costs made and you have got to settle with Mr. B., my attorney.” No money was produced by the defendant. Held that the actual production and presentation of the money was dispensed with by the declaration of the plaintiff that it must be paid to bis attorney, and that the offer to pay constituted in the circumstances a good tender.
Assumpsit for work and labor, with a process of foreign attachment, brought by appeal from a justice of the peace to the city court of the city of Waterbury. The defendant pleaded a tender of $17.85, the amount of the indebtedness as set forth in the bill of particulars, which plea was traversed and issue closed thereon to the court. The city court made the following fiuding of facts and made the same a part of the record.
The writ was issued on the 14th of July, 1868, and had a factorizing process attached to it, directing the officer serving the same to leave an attested copy of -the writ and process with James O. Scovill, of the town of Waterbury, as the debtor of the defendant, and further directing the officer to summon said Scovill to appear at the court to which the writ was returnable. On the day on which the writ was issued it was placed in the hands of an officer for service; and on the 15th of July the officer left in service with said Scovill a true and attested copy of the writ and process. After the service on the garnishee, and before the service of any copy on the defendant, and within the time allowed by law for such service, the defendant met the plaintiff upon the street in Waterbury, and stated to him that he was ready to pay his account, mean ing thereby to pay to the plaintiff the sum of $17.85, which was the amount of the debt. The plaintiff replied', “ There have been costs made, and you have got to settle with my attorney, Mr. Boughton.” The defendant then had in his possession more than enough to pay the $17.85, and would have then and there paid the plaintiff, but for his reference to Mr. Boughton and if the plaintiff had been willing to receive the same, the sum of $17.85 and no more. No copy of the process was left in service with the defendant _ until after the above conversation, on or about the 25th of July, 1868. Upon these facts the defendant claimed that a sufficient tender was made by him to the plaintiff of all that was due him. But the court held that it was not a good tender in form, and that, if good in form, it was insufficient in not tendering the amount of costs made by the service on the garnishee, amounting to $3.27. And the court rendered judgment for the plaintiff to recover $17.85 debt and his costs.
The defendant brought the case by a motion in error before the Superior Court in New Haven county, which (Phelps, J.,) reversed the judgment of the city court, and the plaintiff brought the record by a motion in error before this court.
Fields, for the plaintiff.
1. The tender was insufficient in form. To constitute a valid tender there must be an actual production of the money. 2 Parsons on Cont., 154; 2 Greenl. Ev., §§ 601, 602; 1 Swift Dig., 290. The money must be placed within the control of the creditor and the amount specified, and it is not enough that the debtor has the money in his pocket without an actual manual delivery. Foley v. Mason, 6 Maryl., 37; Sands v. Lyon, 18 Conn., 18. The reference to his attorney was not in law a waiver of the actual tender of the money.
2. The tender was insufficient because it did not cover the costs. It was not made until after the process was served upon the garnishee, who was described as the attorney and agent of the defendant, and that must be held to be constructive notice to the defendant. The attachment was perfected. The leaving the copy with such garnishee is such service and notice of the suit as to prevent any tender made after such service being sufficient without a tender of costs that had then accrued. The perfecting of an attachment under the statutory provision in relation to foreign attachments is a “ service,” and is so recognized in Fitch v. Waite, 5 Conn., 118.
O’Neil, with whom was Webster, for the defendant.
1. It was not necessary that the tender should embrace the costs. It has been decided in this state that a tender of the debt, without costs, is good, if made before the commencement of the suit, and that, even though the debtor have knowledge that a writ has been delivered to the sheriff. 1 Swift Dig., 293. It has also been decided here, that a suit is commenced “ when that notice is given to the defendant which makes him a party to the proceeding, and makes it incumbent on him to appear and answer to the cause or run the risk of having a valid judgment rendered against him in consequence of his default.” Sanford v. Dick, 17 Conn., 216.
2. The tender was sufficient in form. The actual production of the money is, as a general rule, necessary to constitute a legal tender of a pecuniary claim. But such production may be waived or dispensed with, by a refusal to receive it, or by language or conduct, by word or act, tantamount to such refusal. Sands v. Lyon, 18 Conn., 18; Hazard v. Loring, 10 Cush., 267 ; Holmes v. Holmes, 12 Barb., 137 ; Brown v. Gilmore, 8 Greenl., 107; Slingerland v. Morse, 8 Johns., 474. It is on the principle that no man is bound to do a nugatory act. Stone v. Sprague, 20 Barb., 509.

Opinion:
Butler, J.
Although the production and presentation of the money is ordinarily one of the necessary elements of a lawful tender, it is one the creditor may waive, and I am satisfied that the Superior Court was right in holding this tender sufficient, and reversing the judgment of the city court.
1. The plaintiff met the defendant upon the street and said in substance: " I am now ready to pay you the $17.85 which I owe you" — -having money in his pocket sufficient to pay the debt and intending to pay it. The plaintiff replied : " There have been costs made, and you have got to settle with my attorney, Mr. Boughton." No money was produced and presented by the defendant, but I think the right of the plaintiff to have the money produced and presented in connection with the offer to pay, was waived, and the production and presentation" dispensed with, by the unequivocal declaration that it would not be received, and must be paid to another. It is difficult to conceive of an expression more decidedly evincive of a determination not to receive the money, whether produced or not, or one more likely to prevent the production and presentation of it. It is certain that the expressions and conduct of the creditor in Sands v. Lyon, (18 Conn., 18,) which together were held a sufficient waiver, were not of a stronger character, and it was held in that case that the tender was good, - on the ground that an express refusal' to receive, or what was equivalent to it, was a waiver of formal production. And I think if we do not hold this tender good we must repudiate an important principle recognized and followed in that case. It is true that here it is not found that the debtor put his hand in his pocket to take out the money, but that can make no difference. No act in respect to production was necessary. And the intention of the creditor to refuse the money could not have been more clearly or strongly expressed if he had added, "Tou need not take out your money, I shall not receive it." In such case it is the intention of the creditor not to receive, intentionally and unequivocally expressed by words or conduct calculated and intended to convince the debtor that ¡oresentation is useless, which excuses the actual production or presentation of the money. In this case it is found that the money would have been produced, and the debt paid, if the declaration had not been made ; and it is clear that the plaintiff, by an express refusal to receive, intentionally prevented it, and placed himself within the rule as adopted in Sands v. Lyon.
2. And I also think that the defendant was not bound to tender any cost. A writ had been procured and issued and served upon a garnishee, but not upon the defendant. It does not appear that the defendant had any knowledge of such service, but that is immaterial. The expression " there have been costs made" does not import necessarily anything more than that a writ had been purchased and issued, and so far as I know it has always been understood to be law in this state that a debtor might tender the debt without cost after a writ was issued and delivered to the sheriff, and at any time before the actual commencement of the action ly service upon the defendant. To that effect are whatever of decisions or dicta we have upon the subject. - It is true that we have no decision directly to the point that costs made by an officer in making an attachment, whether of real or personal property, or of a debt in the hands of a garnishee, need not be tendered where no service has been made upon the defendant, but we have a decision of this court (Holdridge v. Wells, 4 Conn., 151) that the cost of the writ need not be tendered, and I do not see how any distinction can be made between the costs incurred in making service and the costs incurred in procuring the writ. They are alike taxable expenditures, and the principle involved is as precisely applicable to one as to the other. The argument founded on the alleged injustice is for the legislature. They have not authorized the collection of costs before action pending, of any kind or in any case, and until they do I think none can be recovered or need be tendered.
The plaintiff claims that there is a distinction to be observed in a case like this, founded on the idea that the garnishee is an agent, and that notice to him is notice to the debtor. To this there are two answers: 1st, that it does not appear in this case that the garnishee was any thing more than a mere debtor, or that he was even that; 2d, that actual knowledge even that cost has been made will not subject the defendant. Such knowledge existed in the case of Holdridge v. Wells above cited. Nor will any notice but the legal notice necessary to constitute the commencement of the action. For these reasons I think there is no error in the record.
In this opinion Hinman, C. J., concurred.