Case Name: DIBBLE v. DAVID HODES CO., Inc.
Court: Oregon Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Oregon
Decision Date: 1929-05-28
Citations: 132 Or. 596
Docket Number: 
Parties: DIBBLE v. DAVID HODES CO., Inc.
Judges: Brown, J., did not participate in this opinion.
Reporter: Oregon Reports
Volume: 132
Pages: 596–609

Head Matter:
Submitted on motion to dismiss appeal May 21;
motion denied May 28;
argued on the merits December 5, 1929;
affirmed April 8;
rehearing denied May 1, 1930
DIBBLE v. DAVID HODES CO., Inc.
(277 P. 820, 286 P. 554)
Leo Levenson and Jaureguy & Tooze, all of Portland, for appellant.
Henry Bauer of Portland for respondent.

Opinion:
COSHOW, C. J.
Plaintiff relies on the cases of Walker v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 122 Or. 179 (257 P. 701); Sitton v. Goodwin, 119 Or. 74, 79 (248 P. 163); Tallmadge v. Hooper, 37 Or. 503 (61 P. 349, 1127). Plaintiff's argument is based upon a technical construction of the word "within" as used in section 554, Or. L. The motion is ruled by White v. East Side Mill Co., 84 Or. 224 (161 P. 969, 164 P. 736); Vincent v. First Nat. Bank, 76 Or. 579 (143 P. 1100, 149 P. 938); Wolf v. City Railway Co., 50 Or. 64 (85 P. 620, 91 P. 460, 15 Ann. Cas. 1181); French v. C. F. & T. Co., 116 Or. 532 (241 P. 1010). In those cases the word "within" is given the meaning "not beyond." The policy of the law is to liberally construe the statutes giving a defeated litigant an appeal to this court. There is sound reason for construing the word "within" as meaning "not beyond 30 days from the date the appeal is perfected." The case of Walker v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. is consistent with this holding. The particular point here involved was not raised in that case. In that case the particular point in controversy was the sufficiency of the transcript of appeal to confer jurisdiction on this court. The statute was properly construed in the Walker case. The order extending the time must he made before the appellant is in default. The word "within" when considered in the light of the context means "not beyond 30 days from the time the appeal is perfected." The order extending the time in which to file the transcript was made after the entry of the judgment, the notice of the appeal and the filing of the undertaking were served and filed and for that reason was not premature. Probably the better practice would be to wait until time has expired for making objections to the undertaking, but it would be too narrow and technical to hold the court did not acquire jurisdiction when no exceptions were taken to the surety and nothing was done to in any way alter the judgment below. The cases of Graf v. Pearcy, 76 Or. 488 (149 P. 532); Cook v. City of Albina, 20 Or. 190 (25 P. 386), in as.far as the same are inconsistent with this opinion, are overruled.
Plaintiff tenders another undertaking, which relieves us of the necessity of passing upon the points raised as to the insufficiency of the original undertaking given by defendant. Defendant may file the amended undertaking tendered under the provisions of section 550, subd. (4), Or. L. The motion to dismiss the appeal is denied.
Brown, J., did not participate in this opinion.