Case Name: Jack RUDLOE and Gulf Specimen Company, Inc., Appellants, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION and Taylor County Board of County Commissioners, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1987-12-17
Citations: 517 So. 2d 731
Docket Number: No. BP-12
Parties: Jack RUDLOE and Gulf Specimen Company, Inc., Appellants, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION and Taylor County Board of County Commissioners, Appellees.
Judges: ERVIN, J., concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 517
Pages: 731–735

Head Matter:
Jack RUDLOE and Gulf Specimen Company, Inc., Appellants, v. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION and Taylor County Board of County Commissioners, Appellees.
No. BP-12.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Dec. 17, 1987.
Randall E. Denker of Lehrman & Denker, Tallahassee, for appellants.
Douglas H. MacLaughlin, Tallahassee, for appellee Dept, of Environmental Regulation.
Martin R. Dix, Silvia Morell Alderman and Marguerite H. Davis of Swann & Haddock, Tallahassee, for appellee Taylor County Bd. of County Com’rs.

Opinion:
SMITH, Chief Judge.
Appellants, Jack Rudloe and Gulf Specimens Company, Inc., seek review of two final orders of the Department of Environmental Regulation (DER) denying their petitions to intervene in and to initiate formal administrative proceedings with respect to DER's decision to issue Taylor County a dredge permit. We affirm.
Jack Rudloe resides in Panacea, Wakulla County, Florida where he operates his business, Gulf Specimen Company, Inc. Both Panacea and the project site, Keaton Beach, in Taylor County, are located along the gently curving coastal area of the Gulf of Mexico, Panacea lying in a north-northwesterly direction from Keaton Beach, the two areas being separated by some forty miles, more or less, of open water. The two counties (Wakulla and Taylor) are separated by Jefferson County.
On November 30, 1985, notice of DER's intent to issue to Taylor County a permit to dredge a channel in the Gulf of Mexico near Keaton Beach was published in the Perry News-Herald in Taylor County. Within fourteen days of the notice, Robert Sadousky petitioned DER for a formal administrative proceeding, contending that the permit should be denied because dredging and increased boat activity would damage the grass beds and eventually destroy the entire food chain in the area. About four months later, Sadousky filed a notice of voluntary dismissal of his petition. A short time afterward, on that same day, appellants' petition to intervene was filed. DER and Taylor County countered with a motion to dismiss. The hearing officer entered an order closing the file, and on July 3, 1986, DER entered a final order accepting Sadousky's voluntary dismissal, denying appellants' motion to intervene, and affirming issuance of the dredge permit to Taylor County.
On July 11, 1986, appellants petitioned for a formal administrative proceeding on the ground that the permit actually issued was substantially different from the original proposed permit. DER denied the petition, stating that its intent to issue Taylor County's dredge permit never changed, that the challenged conditions either applied to all permits or restricted the permitted activity, and that appellants could not now gain another point of entry, having missed their opportunity to intervene in the initial proceeding.
Appellants raise several issues on appeal, only three of which will be addressed herein. First, appellants contend that intervention should be permitted in an administrative proceeding any time prior to entry of a final order. This issue was recently resolved in Humana of Florida, Inc. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 500 So.2d 186 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), rev. den., 506 So.2d 1041 (Fla.1987), wherein the court held that where a petition is withdrawn, agency jurisdiction ceases to exist. See also RHPC, Inc. v. Dept. of HRS, 509 So.2d 1267 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). Appellants' reliance on Williams v. Nussbaum, 419 So.2d 715 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) is misplaced, for in that case no voluntary dismissal was filed, and the trial court still retained jurisdiction to entertain a post-judgment motion to intervene.
Second, appellants argue that they are entitled to a formal administrative proceeding because DER substantially changed the conditions of the permit. DER disagrees with appellants' characterization of the permit changes. However, this disputed issue of fact is not relevant to a resolution of the issue before us. In the published notice of proposed agency action, DER informed the public of its intent to issue Taylor County a permit to dredge a channel in the Gulf of Mexico near Keaton Beach. The notice also informed the public that the "file" was available for inspection at DER's office in Tallahassee. Appellants do not contend that they reviewed the agency file and that based on the conditions of the original proposed permit, they decided not to initiate a formal administrative proceeding. On the contrary, in their petition for a formal hearing, appellants contend that the permit should be denied regardless of any modifications or conditions. In addition, appellants concede that they missed the original point of entry because they were unaware of the proposed agency action until just before petitioning to intervene in Sa-dousky's proceeding.
While there are circumstances where the agency's action is so different from the proposed action, that a third party could not know from a review of the file that the agency would rule as it did, such is not the case here. See NME Hospital, Inc. v. State Dept. Of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 492 So.2d 379 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (third party could not have known from a review of an incomplete application that HRS would change its mind and approve the application). In the present case, DER's intent to issue a permit remained constant, and after the administrative petition was filed by Sadousky, appellants were put on notice that the final conditions of the permit might be different from those proposed. We agree with DER that appellants have missed their clear point of entry and are not entitled to a second chance.
Appellants also challenge the adequacy of the published notice of proposed agency action. From a careful review of the record, the only references to this issue which we found are contained in the orders of the hearing officer and DER. Apparently, appellants orally requested that their petition to intervene be treated as an initiating petition on the grounds that the notice was published in Taylor County where the project is to be undertaken and not in their county of residence, and that they filed their petition within fourteen days of actual notice. Their request was denied. We do not think that this information is sufficient so as to have preserved for appellate review the issues of the validity of Rule 17-103.150 which sets out a method for informing the public of proposed agency action on permit applications and the sufficiency of the notice itself to alert the public to the magnitude of the project. It is a well settled principle of law that questions not raised and ruled upon in the lower tribunal are deemed to be waived and will not be considered on appeal. As an exception to this general rule, on occasion, we have reviewed a rule challenge for the first time on appeal where the challenge involved essentially a matter of law to be determined by the ordinary rules of statutory construction. Nord v. Florida Parole and Prob. Com'n, 417 So.2d 1176 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). However, when a rule challenge implicates the agency's expertise, as in the present case, the issue must be raised in an administrative proceeding. Id.
AFFIRMED.
ERVIN, J., concurs.
BOOTH, J., dissents with written opinion.