Case Name: TIMOTHY HIGGINS, AN INFANT, ETC., PLAINTIFF, AND CHARLES A. HIGGINS, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. WILLIAM A. SCHNEIDER, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT
Court: New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division
Jurisdiction: New Jersey
Decision Date: 1960-04-12
Citations: 61 N.J. Super. 36
Docket Number: 
Parties: TIMOTHY HIGGINS, AN INFANT, ETC., PLAINTIFF, AND CHARLES A. HIGGINS, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. WILLIAM A. SCHNEIDER, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.
Judges: 
Reporter: New Jersey Superior Court Reports
Volume: 61
Pages: 36–50

Head Matter:
TIMOTHY HIGGINS, AN INFANT, ETC., PLAINTIFF, AND CHARLES A. HIGGINS, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. WILLIAM A. SCHNEIDER, DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT.
Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division
Argued February 29, 1960
Decided April 12, 1960.
Ereund, J. A. D., dissented.
Before Judges Cobeoed, Eeeund and Haxeman.
Mr. Stanley IP. Greenfield argued the cause for appellant.
Mr. Edward C. Hillis argued the cause for respondent {Messrs. Marley, Winkelried £ Hillis, attorneys; Mr. Joseph A. Horowitz, of counsel).

Opinion:
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Haetemast, J. A. D.
Plaintiff Charles A. Higgins appeals from a judgment of the Law Division, striking the second count of a two-count complaint filed by him both as guardian ad litem for his minor son, Timothy Higgins, and in his own right as father of the infant plaintiff.
In the first count of the complaint, filed on July 9, 1958, the infant plaintiff sought damages for personal injuries sustained on July 8, 1956 when he was struck by the automobile of defendant, William A. Schneider. Charles A. Higgins, in the second count of the complaint, sued for medical expenses and loss of his son's services as a result of injuries sustained by the latter. In his answer, defendant asserted that the father's cause of action, as alleged in the second count of the complaint, was barred by virtue of the limitations imposed by N. J. 8. 2A :14r-2 since the complaint was filed more than two years after the date of the accident.
A motion by defendant for summary judgment on the second count of the complaint was granted by Judge Barger, sitting in the Law Division, on the ground that the parent's cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff Charles A. Higgins, appeals to this court from said determination.
N. J. S. 2A :14-2 reads as follows:
"Every action at law for an injury to the person caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default of any person within this state shall be commenced within 2 years nest after the cause of any such action shall have accrued."
The cause of action of the infant plaintiff arising out of the accident of July 8, 1956 unquestionably is not barred by the statute of limitations. The running of the statute is stayed as against the infant during his minority and for two years thereafter. N. J. 8. 2A :14-21. Prior to the decision of our Supreme Court in Rex v. Hutner, 26 N. J. 489 (1958), it had been held that the two-year statute of limitations, dealing with personal injuries, did not apply to a parent's suit to recover damages for loss of services and medical expenses resulting from an injury to his minor child. Fryer v. Mount Holly Water Co., 87 N. J. L. 57 (Sup. Ct. 1915); Wagner v. Machetto, 7 N. J. Super. 547 (Cty. Ct. 1950); Whalen v. Young, 28 N. J. Super. 543 (Law Div. 1953). The courts held that the two-year statute of limitations, as now set forth in N. J. 8. 2A :14-2, supra, applied only to an action by the person injured, or on his behalf, for damages resulting to him from the wrongful act of the defendant. The action of the parents, according to those cases, was based upon a violation of their property rights_, and was thus governed by the six-year statute of limitations set forth in N. J. 8. 2A :14-1.
In the Rex case, supra plaintiff husband sought to recover consequential damages for the medical expenses incurred by him and for the loss of services of his wife occasioned by the alleged failure of defendant properly to perform and render medical services to the wife. The action therein was instituted more than two years from the date when the wife's personal injuries were sustained, and her cause of action eoncededly was barred by reason of the limitations of N. J. 8. 2A :14r-%. Ity virtue of the authority of the Fryer line of cases cited, supra, the husband in Rex contended that his per quod action was based upon an injury to his property rights and that it therefore was controlled by N. J. 8. 2A :14-1 which permits an action to be brought within six years after the cause of action has accrued. In rejecting his position, the Supreme Court held that the phrase "for an injury to the person," as used in N. J. 8. 2A :14 — 2, must be construed to mean "an action for damages by reason of an injury to the person," and at page 492 (26 N. J.) declared:
"The language of the statute is not restricted to actions for damages by reason of any injury to the person who sustains the physical injury. Viewed in this light, the statute not only applies to the action for damages by the wife by reason of an injury to her person but also encompasses the action for consequential damages by the husband, whose action is only maintainable by reason of an injury to the person — the person of his wife."
The Supreme Court did not arrive at its conclusion by holding that the husband's cause of action was simply a derivative right and thus necessarily governed by the same statute of limitations applying to the wife's cause of action. The holding in Rex was based solely on the court's interpretation of the language "injury to the person" contained in Ah J. 8. 2A ilA-2, and its conclusion that that phrase comprehends an action for consequential damages by a hus band, arising out of injury to the person of the wife. This is clearly indicated by the following language of the opinion, at page 492:
"Accordingly, we hold that a husband's action for consequential damages resulting from an injury to his wife is an action 'for an injury to the person' within the meaning of N. J. 8. 2A :14-2 and, since the plaintiff's action was not commenced within the two year period specified therein, it is barred."
To the extent that the prior New Jersey cases held that the two-year limitation in N. J. 8. 2A :14-2 applied only to an action by the person injured, and that a suit for consequential damages resulting from personal injuries sustained by another was based on a property right and not one for "an injury to the person," they were expressly overruled in Bex, and the above reasoning therefore applies to a consequential cause of action of a parent as well as to that of a husband. The court so expressly indicated (26 N. J., at page 494), referring to the Fryer, Wagner and Whalen cases:
"However, to the extent that these cases hold that the two-year limitation in N. J. 8. 2A :14r-2 applies only to an action by the person injured, and that suits for consequential damages resulting from personal injuries sustained by another is one based on a property right and not one for 'an injury to the person,' they are inconsistent with our construction of the statute and are overruled."
It is true that the court in Bex distinguished the Fryer line of eases on the ground that at the time the parents' suits therein were instituted, the two-year statute of limitations had not run against the infants' claim, the operation of the statute being suspended because the infants were under a statutory disability (26 N. J., at page 494). We read this expression, however, merely as a notation of a factual distinction between the case then before the court and the prior cases, as is evidenced by the succeeding sentence at page 494 quoted above, which represents the sole actual holding of the case.
It is obvious that the court in Rex did not intend by its point of distinction of the Fryer line of cases, just noted, a deliberate ox considered determination that a parent's, as well as an infant's, cause of action was entitled to the benefit of the provision of N. J. 8. 2A :14-21 which tolls the statute of limitations only in the ease of a minor or an insane person. In short, the Rex case stands for nothing more, in the parent-infant context, than that an action for consequential damages by a parent is an action for "an injury to the person" and must be commenced within two years after the cause of action has accrued.
The question posed by the instant case is whether or not the extension of the limitation period provided by N. J. S. 2A: 14-21 because of infancy or insanity can be applied to the parent's cause of action as well as to the infant's. This precise question has not yet been directly passed upon by any decision of this State.
In a somewhat analogous case the Law Division has stated that:
"The father's right of action is not for the injury to the infant plaintiff, but for the injury to the parent as a consequence of the injury to the child." Trevorrow v. Boyer, 52 N. J. Super. 215, 218 (1958).
There the court, citing Maccia v. Tynes, 39 N. J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 1956) and Kimpel v. Moon, 113 N. J. L. 220 (Sup. Ct. 1934), further declared that the right of a parent to the service of an infant injured in an accident and to reimbursement for medical expenses incurred by him on behalf of the child is not derivative, but independent and separate from that of the child. Also see Blanken v. Braslow, 130 N. J. L. 475 (Sup. Ct. 1943); Prosser on Torts, 702, 703 (2d ed. 1955) ; cf. Daneh v. PLommer, 9 N. J. 56, 60 (1952). Trevorroiv, supra, involved a personal injury action by a minor through her father as guardian ad litem and by her father individually for consequential damages. The father failed to file a required notice within 90 days of the acci dent with the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Board, and the court therefore denied his application for an order directing the Treasurer of the State of New Jersey to pay his judgment. On the other hand, the court held that since an infant was involved, her notice was timely so long as it was filed within 90 days of the commencement of the suit on her behalf by her guardian ad litem. The court gave tacit approval of a statement by Mr. Justice Heher in Giles v. Gassert, 23 N. J. 22, 34 (1956) that,
"[DJependent minor children could not be barred of their right to invoke the benefit of the Fund, by a failure of notice."
Hence Trevorrow additionally demonstrates that the parent's cause of action is not derivative but separate and independent. Furthermore, it provides an example of a New Jersey case where the father's claim was barred by the passage of time, but the infant's claim was not. The father could not claim the benefit of the privilege extended to the infant simply because she was an infant.
The following proposition is enunciated in 54 C. J. 8. Limitations of Actions § 235, p. 265 (1948) :
"The rule suspending the statute of limitations during minority is exclusively for the benefit of minors. " (Emphasis supplied)
The Hew York courts have uniformly held that an infant's action for personal injuries and his parent's action for loss of services and medical expenses, while springing from the same wrong, are separate causes of action predicated upon different rights, and that since the parent's action is an independent one, the tolling of the statute founded upon the infant's disability to sue does not inure to the benefit of the parent. Bernal v. Baptist Fresh Air Home Society, 300 N. Y. 486, 88 N. E. 2d 720 (Gt. App. 1949); Pitrelli v. Cohen, 257 App. Div. 845, 12 N. Y. S. 2d 71 (Sup. Ct. 1939); Caulston v. Rosenfeld, 175 Misc. 479, 23 N. Y. S. 2d 909 (Sup. Ct. 1950); Ballantine v. Ahearn, 170 Misc. 651, 10 N. Y. S. 2d 937 (Sup. Ct. 1939); Constantinides v. Manhattan Transit Co., 264 App. Div. 147, 34 N. Y. S. 2d 600 (Sup. Ct. 1942); Francies v. County of Westchester, 3 A. D. 2d 850, 161 N. Y. S. 2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
The appellant strongly urges that the ruling of the trial court is contrary to public policy because, in cases where an infant's injuries are such that their permanency cannot be determined until after the two-year period of limitations, and therefore institution of suit prior to the two years would be undesirable, the parent-guardian is in the dilemma of either losing his own claim for consequential damages by withholding both suits, or instituting and trying two separate suits, i. e., his own, filed prior to the running of the statute, and the infant's, filed later. However, the privilege extended to the infant by the statute — that of tolling the statute during infancy — is based upon an entirely different public policy, i. e., the protection of the rights of a person non sui juris. This court cannot construe the legislative intention effectuated by the statute upon the basis of an entirely extraneous supposed public policy which the Legislature has not seen fit to recognize in the statute. The argument on that ground should be addressed to the Legislature, not the courts.
We therefore conclude that the cause of action of plaintiff Charles A. Higgins, though consequential, is a separate and independent cause of action from that of his infant son; his consequential cause of action is governed by the provisions of N. J. S. 2AÚ4.-2; since he is neither an infant nor an insane person, the saving features of N. J. S. 2A :14-21 do not inure to his benefit. The tolling feature of N. J. S. 2A :14-21 based upon the disability of the infant is of a personal character, and can only be set up by the infant and his representative. Den ex dem. Watson v. Kelty, 16 N. J. L. 517, 524 (Sup. Ct. 1838). Hence the cause of action of plaintiff Charles A. Higgins was subject to the limitations of N. J. S. 2A :14-2, should have been instituted within two years from the occurrence of the accident, and is now barred by limitations.
Affirmed.