Case Name: Lea v. Hernandez
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Jurisdiction: Texas
Decision Date: 1853
Citations: 10 Tex. 137
Docket Number: 
Parties: Lea v. Hernandez.
Judges: 
Reporter: Texas Reports
Volume: 10
Pages: 69–70

Head Matter:
Lea v. Hernandez.
A lease by a corporation to hold until the property should be sold, created a tenancy at will only.
“Where a corporation fails to elect officers, and there are nono acting defacto, the corporation is* dissolved, unless the charter expressly provides otherwise.
It seems that in order to enable the plaintiff to recover on the strength of the possession alone, in the action of trespass to try title, it should be actual, corporeal, not merely constructive.
Under the evidence the plaintiff was not authorized to recover; and the court, therefore, did not err in instructing the jury to find fof the defendant. It is no infraction of the rule which forbids the court to charge upon the weight of evidence, where there is no evidence compelout for the jury to weigh, so to instruct them.
Appeal from Goliad. Action of trespass to try title, by Lea against Hernandez. Lea claimed under a lease from the corporation of the town of Goliad, dated in 18 Í7, to one Miller. The lease was to last until the corporation should sell or the possession should he recovered from the lessee by an adverse claimant. Miller was in possession at the time of the lease. He afterwards assigned his lease to Lea, who had a similar lease to land adjoining. Several witnesses testified that Lea “held possession of the premises in connection with the part “leased to himself.” Miller testified that “he knows that plaintiff did hold “possession of the premises described in the lease to witness as aforesaid, “preventing intrusion thereon as far as practicable, and keeping- doors of the “houses as well closed as convenient, to prevent intrusion.” “Defendant “first settled on the premises in the summer of 1830; afterwards went away “for several months; and then returned about the first of-, 1851; since “which time lie has continued to reside on the premises.” This suit was brought November 4th, 1850. The locus in quo was embraced within tito four leagues granted to the corporation of the town of Goliad by patent dated October 25th, 1844. It was admitted that the act of 1848 (Special Laws of 1848, p. ¡>0o) to “incorporate the town of Goliad in the county of Goliad,” not being acceptable to the citizens, no election of mayor and aldermen had been held tinder it; nor liad any such officers been elected, or acted in said town, for the years 1850 and 1851; hut that previously thereto, mayor and aldermen had been elected and acted under the former charter.
On motion of the defendant, who had pleaded not guilty, the court ruled out the lease, and instructed the jury to find for the defendant; to which the plaintiff excepted.
B. Hughes, for appellant.
A. 8. Cunningham, for appellee.

Opinion:
Wheeler, J.
It is insisted on behalf of the appellant, and plaintiff below, that he was entitled to recover, 1st, by virtue of his lease; 2d, by reason of his prior possession; and that the judgment of the court, denying- his right, is, consequently, erroneous.
The lease constituted the lessee the tenant at will of the corporation. The death of either lessor or lessee puts an end to the estate at will. By the dissolution or civil death of the corporation in this case, the estate at will was determined. No estate survived and subsisted in the plaintiff by virtue of the lease; and it consequently was no evidence of title to support the action.
Had the corporation alienated the land previous to its dissolution, that event would not have divested the title of the vendee; or, had the lease been for a certain period and not merely at will, the right of the lessee to his full term would not, I apprehend, have been affected. But the present, being- manifestly a mere tenancy at will, was determined by the dissolution of the corporation which created it; and there was an end of the rights of the plaintiff under the lease. The court, therefore, did not err in excluding it from the jury.
In respect to the remaining- point — tlie right of the plaintiff to recover by-reason of his prior possession — it is true that one in actual peaceable and lawful possession of lands may maintain an action against a mere trespasser by whom he has been dispossessed, but it is held that where the plaintiff claims to recover on this ground, the fact of his prior possession must be clearly and unequivocally proved. (3 Johns. R., 383.) Wo are of opinion that the evidence did not establish the fact of such possession in the plaintiff. One or two of the witnesses use the expression that the plaintiff held possession of the premises; but the evidence shows what they meant; that it was the mere expression of their opinion as to what constituted the holding of possession, and not the statement of a matter of fact. Tlie evidence of possession was not such as would have authorized a verdict for the plaintiff. Under the evidence tlie plaintiff was not entitled to recover; and the court, therefore, did not err in instructing the jury to find for the defendant. It would have been idle to have referred tlie case to the decision of the jury when there was not evidence before them on which they could legally render a verdict. And it is no infraction of the rule which forbids the court to charge upon the weight of evidence, when there is no evidence competent for the j ary to weigh, so to instruct them. The judgment is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.