Case Name: Houston D. PERKINS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 1994-01-12
Citations: 630 So. 2d 1180
Docket Number: No. 92-1793
Parties: Houston D. PERKINS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: SHIVERS, Senior Judge, concurs.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 630
Pages: 1180–1184

Head Matter:
Houston D. PERKINS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 92-1793.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Jan. 12, 1994.
Kathryn L. Sands, Jacksonville, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Sonya Roebuck Horbelt, Asst. Atty. Gen., Amelia L. Beisner, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept, of Legal Affairs, Tallahassee, for appellee.

Opinion:
LAWRENCE, Judge.
Houston D. Perkins was convicted of the offense of burglary of a dwelling, proscribed by statute as a second-degree felony. He contends that the structure involved in the burglary did not constitute a dwelling and that he should have been adjudicated and sentenced only for the offense of burglary of a structure, a third-degree felony.
The evidence at trial established that the burglarized structure was built in 1953 by the current owner. He occupied the house as his residence, but had moved out of the house prior to the burglary. The owner had rented it on occasion and hoped to rent or sell the house in the future "for someone to live in," but he had no intent to return to the house for the purpose of occupying it. On the day of the burglary, the house contained various items of personalty, such as: stove, refrigerator, washer, microwave, dining room chairs, and miscellaneous items in the closets and cabinets. The electricity was on, but the telephone had been disconnected. The water was turned off, although well-water was available on the property. The owner last visited the house three or four weeks before the burglary when he mowed the grass and picked up trash.
One could not be convicted of burglary of a dwelling at common-law if a house was unoccupied and merely capable of or suitable for occupation. Smith v. State, 80 Fla. 315, 85 So. 911 (1920). The legislature amended the burglary statute in 1982, expanding the common-law definition of a dwelling by defining it as any "building or conveyance . designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at night;" Ch. 82-87, § 1, Laws of Fla. (emphasis added). Occupancy is no longer a critical element under this definition. Rather, it is the design of the structure or conveyance which becomes paramount. If a structure or conveyance initially qualifies under this definition, and its character is not substantially changed or modified to the extent that it becomes unsuitable for lodging by people, it remains a dwelling irrespective of actual occupancy. It is, therefore, immaterial whether the owner of an unoccupied dwelling has any intent to return to it. However, we recognize that even under this rationale, credible evidence of the use or intent to use for a purpose other than a dwelling may be sufficient to disqualify a structure as a dwelling.
Our sister court, in State v. Bennett, 565 So.2d 803 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990), likewise interpreted the amended statute under consideration, and held that a mobile home, unoccupied, unconnected to utilities, and one of several models offered for sale on a sales lot, constituted a dwelling. We adopt their rationale, which discussed legislative staff comments but discounted their importance in view of the plain meaning of the word "designed" contained in the statute.
Another sister court, in L.C. v. State, 579 So.2d 783 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991), held that a house, unoccupied because the sole inhabitant had died, constituted a dwelling even under the common-law definition. By way of dicta however, that court reasoned that the legislature did not intend by its amendment to abrogate the common-law definition.
Judge Ervin, in his well-reasoned dissent, places great emphasis upon the history of this statute and the legislative intent giving rise to the 1982 amendment. Our view, however, is that the plain meaning of the statute precludes consideration of those factors cited in support of his position. The supreme court in Van Pelt v. Hilliard, 75 Fla. 792, 798-99, 78 So. 693, 694-95 (1918), held:
The Legislature must be understood to mean what it has plainly expressed, and this excludes construction. The legislative intent being plainly expressed, so that the act read by itself or in connection with other statutes pertaining to the same subject is clear, certain, and unambiguous, the courts have only the simple and obvious duty to enforce the law according to its terms.... Whether the law be expressed in general or limited terms, the Legislature should be held to mean what they have plainly expressed, and consequently no room is left for construction....
This holding was followed in State v. Egan, 287 So.2d 1, (FIa.1973), in construing a criminal statute relating to a common-law offense.
We certify the following question to the Florida Supreme Court as one of great public importance because of the dicta in L.C. v. State, and the questions raised by Judge Ervin in his dissenting opinion:
DO THE 1982 AMENDMENTS TO CHAPTER 810, FLORIDA STATUTES, SUPERSEDE THE COMMON-LAW DEFINITION OF A DWELLING, WHEREBY A STRUCTURE'S DESIGN OR SUITABILITY FOR HABITATION, RATHER THAN ACTUAL OCCUPANCY OR INTENT TO OCCUPY, IS CONTROLLING IN DETERMINING WHETHER A STRUCTURE CONSTITUTES A DWELLING.
AFFIRMED.
SHIVERS, Senior Judge, concurs.
ERVIN, J., Dissents With Written . Opinion.
. Section 810.011(2), Florida Statutes (1991), defines dwelling as follows: "a building or conveyance of any kind, either temporary or permanent, mobile or immobile, which has a roof over it and is designed to be occupied by people lodging therein at night, together with the curtilage thereof."