Case Name: Mariah NAPIERALSKI v. UNITY CHURCH OF GREATER PORTLAND
Court: Maine Supreme Judicial Court
Jurisdiction: Maine
Decision Date: 2002-07-09
Citations: 802 A.2d 391
Docket Number: 
Parties: Mariah NAPIERALSKI v. UNITY CHURCH OF GREATER PORTLAND
Judges: Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, ALEXANDER, and CALKINS, JJ.
Reporter: West's Atlantic Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 802
Pages: 391–395

Head Matter:
2002 ME 108
Mariah NAPIERALSKI v. UNITY CHURCH OF GREATER PORTLAND
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.
Argued: Jan. 9, 2002.
Decided: July 9, 2002.
Verne E. Paradie Jr., Esq. (orally), Traf-ton & Matzen, Auburn, Edward Rabasco, Esq., Gosselin, Dubord & Rabasco, P.A., Lewiston, for plaintiff.
Anne M. Carney, Esq. (orally), Norman, Hanson & DeTroy, Lie, Portland, (for Unity Church), Robert V. Hoy, Esq., Platz & Thompson, P.A., Lewiston, (for Kenneth Williamson), for defendant.
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, ALEXANDER, and CALKINS, JJ.

Opinion:
ALEXANDER, J.
[¶ 1] Maria Napieralski appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court (Cumberland County, Mills, C.J.) granting Unity Church of Greater Portland's motion to dismiss. Napieralski argues that (1) we should, for the first time, recognize a cause of action for negligent supervision, and (2) to accommodate her negligent supervision claim, we should re-examine and change our holding in Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 1997 ME 63, 692 A.2d 441. Because on these facts we do not adopt a cause of action for negligent supervision, we do not reach Swanson, and we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶ 2] According to the complaint, Napier-alski is a life insurance agent. She attended Unity Church between January and December 1996. During that time, Reverend Kenneth Williamson, a member of the clergy at Unity Church, approached Napi-eralsld about obtaining life insurance. Na-pieralski agreed to meet him at his home that was owned by Unity Church. Napier-alski alleges that Williamson "forced her to perform sexual acts and otherwise sexually assaulted her." Napieralski further alleges that Unity Church "knew or should have known that before Plaintiff was sexually assaulted by Williamson, he had engaged in inappropriate sexual behavior with at least two other women who attended the church," and that despite this knowledge, the Church did not warn or otherwise protect Napieralski.
[¶ 3] Napieralski filed suit against the Church for negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and negligent supervision. The Superior Court, relying on Swanson, 1997 ME 63, ¶ 13, 692 A.2d at 445, granted the Church's motion to dismiss the claims, concluding that they were barred by constitutional considerations. The claims were dismissed before any discovery took place. Napieralski appeals only the court's dismissal of the negligent supervision claim.
II. DISCUSSION
[¶ 4] When reviewing a trial court's dismissal of a complaint, we view the facts alleged in the complaint as if they were admitted. Johanson v. Dunnington, 2001 ME 169, ¶ 2, 785 A.2d 1244, 1245. We then "examine the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff to determine whether it sets forth elements of a cause of action or alleges facts that would entitle the plaintiff to relief pursuant to some legal theory." In re Wage Payment Litig., 2000 ME 162, ¶ 3, 759 A.2d 217, 220.
[¶ 5] Napieralski did not seek more time or a remand for discovery before the trial court or in argument to us. Thus, we take the facts alleged in the complaint as the best representation of Napieralski's case. To overturn the trial court's ruling, Napi-eralski must convince us .to change the law regarding both Swanson and negligent supervision. Change on only one point gets her nothing.
[¶ 6] We have not recognized the tort of negligent supervision in Maine. Hinkley v. Penobscot Valley Hosp., 2002 ME 70, ¶ 16, 794 A.2d 643, 647. Those states that have recognized a negligent supervision claim have typically based the claim on the elements articulated in section 317 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. E.g., Dairy Rd. Partners v. Island Ins. Co., Ltd., 92 Hawai'i 398, 992 P.2d 93, 121-22 (2000); Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 247 (Mo.1997); Trahan-Laroche v. Lockheed Sanders, Inc., 139 N.H. 483, 657 A.2d 417, 419 (1995); Hutchison v. Luddy, 560 Pa. 51, 742 A.2d 1052, 1062 (2000).
[¶ 7] Even if we were disposed to recognize a cause of action for negligent supervision, it would be problematic at best to undertake recognition of that tort in this case. Section 317 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts outlines the possible parameters of a negligent supervision cause of action as follows:
§ 817. Duty of Master to Control Conduct of Servant
A master is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control his servant while acting outside the scope of his employment as to prevent him from intentionally harming others or from so conducting himself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if
(a) the servant
(i) is upon the premises in possession of the master or upon which the servant is privileged to enter only as his servant, or
(ii) is using a chattel of the master, and
(b) the master
(i) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control his servant, and
(ii) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 317 (1965).
[¶ 8] The facts here involve contact between adults for the purpose of addressing a private, personal matter unrelated to the business or function of the Unity Church. The contact occurred at the residence of the individual who was allegedly negligently supervised. Recognizing a cause of action for negligent supervision, and extending it to such facts, would go far beyond the scope of any traditional negligent supervision action. Such an interpretation would suggest that employers should become the guarantors of their employee's good conduct in private matters merely because the initial contact with the employee occurred in the regular course of business.
[¶9] We decline to adopt such an extension of the law. The fact that this misconduct is alleged to have occurred at an employer-owned residence makes no difference in this analysis. Where an employer does provide a residence for employees, it is very different from the employer's premises as addressed in the Restatement. The employee retains rights of privacy and quiet enjoyment in the residence that are not subject to close supervision or domination by the employer. See State v. DeCoster, 653 A.2d 891, 893 n. 1, 894 (Me.1995) (holding that employees who live in employer-owned homes have a right to quiet enjoyment of their homes, including the right to receive visitors).
[¶ 10] Napieralski does not allege that Reverend Williamson was engaged in the Church's business, that she was attending any type of religious event with him, or that her presence at his home pertained to church-related matters. Indeed, the only fact alleged in her complaint connecting the Reverend's actions to the Church is the allegation that Napieralski met the Reverend "[a]s a result of her attending Unity Church." On these facts, we decline Napieralski's invitation to adopt an expansive view of the tort of negligent supervision.
[¶ 11] Because this action, limited to a negligent supervision claim, is barred, we need not address Swanson or the constitutional issues it raised.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
. In Hinkley, we stated: "Although we have never before recognized the independent tort of negligent supervision, Hinkley urges us to do so now." 2002 ME 70, ¶ 16, 794 A.2d at 647. We then resolved the. claim at issue on other grounds. Id.