Case Name: NETWORK PUBLICATIONS, INC., Appellant, v. Russell BJORKMAN and Pamela Bjorkman, Appellees
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2000-03-24
Citations: 756 So. 2d 1028
Docket Number: Nos. 5D99-1503, 5D99-2068
Parties: NETWORK PUBLICATIONS, INC., Appellant, v. Russell BJORKMAN and Pamela Bjorkman, Appellees.
Judges: DAUKSCH, J., concurs and concurs specially, with opinion.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 756
Pages: 1028–1034

Head Matter:
NETWORK PUBLICATIONS, INC., Appellant, v. Russell BJORKMAN and Pamela Bjorkman, Appellees.
Nos. 5D99-1503, 5D99-2068.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
March 24, 2000.
Rehearing Denied April 28, 2000.
Kimberly A. Ashby of Akerman, Senter-fitt & Eidson, P.A., Orlando, and Robert W. Hughes, Jr., Hughes & Kaplan, Stone Mountain, Georgia, for Appellant.
David B. Mankuta, Margaret Z. Villella, Mark B. Milrot, and Simone P. Firley of Atkinson, Diner, Stone, Mankuta & Plou-cha, P.A., Hollywood, for Appellee.

Opinion:
ANTOON, C.J.
In this consolidated appeal, Network Publications, Inc. (Network) appeals the final order entered by the trial court awarding Russell and Pamela Bjorkman damages after a jury found Network liable on the Bjorkmans' claim of breach of contract, and the trial court's subsequent ruling awarding prevailing party court costs to the Bjorkmans. We affirm the jury's finding of liability but must remand this matter for a new trial on the issue of damages because the trial court reversibly erred in issuing a curative instruction to the jury regarding the scope of expert testimony.
Network is a publishing company located in Georgia which owns and publishes "The Real Estate Book," a real estate sales promotion magazine. In September of 1989, the Bjorkmans executed an Associate Publisher's Agreement which entitled them to develop and distribute "The Real Estate Book" in Indian River County for a term of 15 years. The agreement provided, among other things, that Georgia law governed the terms of the parties' contract. At the time the agreement was executed, a Network representative executed a side agreement with the Bjork-mans which granted them the right of first refusal over the Brevard County territory.
The Bjorkmans began to operate their business in late 1990, under the name Treasure Coast' Network, Inc. About one year later,' the Bjorkmans discovered that Network had granted the Brevard County territory to Ray and Dalé Starling without ever offering the territory to them. The Bjorkmans sued Network claiming 'a breach of their right of first refusal. The matter proceeded to trial and the jury determined that Network had breached its obligation to offer the Bjorkmans the right to publish the magazine in Brevard County before awarding the contract to the Starlings. The trial court entered a money judgment in accordance with the jury's verdict.
Network appeals the final judgment, raising several claims of error relating to the award of damages. Network primarily argues that the trial court reversibly erred in issuing a mid-trial instruction to the jury regarding the scope of expert testimony.
During trial, in an effort to establish their claim of damage, the' Bjorkmans called two expert witnesses who testified that the Bjorkmans suffered a significant loss in profits as a result of Network's breach of contract. In response to this expert testimony, Network called Dr. Henry Fishkind, an economist, to testify as its expert on the issue of damages. During Network's examination of Dr. Fishkind, the trial court became concerned that Dr. Fishkind was being asked questions which fell outside the scope of permissible expert testimony and therefore the court interrupted the questioning to advise the parties of its concern. The court then cautioned counsel that "an expert can criticize the methodology of another expert, but he cannot criticize the other expert."
Questioning continued with counsel for Network asking Dr. Fishkind to explain why his damage calculations differed so significantly from the calculations reached by the Bjorkmans' experts. Dr. Fishkind responded by explaining that his methodology differed from that utilized by the Bjorkmans' experts. He also outlined the differences in the two methodologies. When asked whether, in his opinion, the Bjorkmans' experts used a reasonable methodology in estimating damages, Dr. Fishkind responded that he considered the experts to have used an "unreasonable methodology." Following this statement, the trial court called a bench conference during which the court provided case law to counsel relevant to the issue of the proper scope of expert testimony with regard to another' expert's opinion. When the Bjorkmans' counsel moved to strike Dr. Fishkind's testimony as being improperly outside that scope, the trial court denied the motion but over objections issued the following curative instruction to the jury:
Member of the jury I would like to charge you as follows in connection with this testimony. You've heard testimony here about expert opinions, validity of expert opinions from the other side. I charge you that under Florida law it is improper for an expert witness to express an opinion as to the validity or the invalidity of an opinion expressed by the other side's experts.
Network maintains that this cautionary instruction was legally incorrect. We agree.
We begin by noting that the trial court was correct in initially advising counsel that "an expert can criticize the methodology of another expert, but he cannot criticize the other expert." In Mathis v. O'Reilly, 400 So.2d 795, 796 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), rev. denied, 412 So.2d 468 (Fla. 1982), this court discussed the issue of the appropriate scope of an expert's testimony regarding the opinion of his or her counterpart, pointing out that a "question couched to cause, [one expert] to delineate the facts, factors, formulae and rationale used in the analysis leading to the [opposing expert's opinion] and to do the same as to his own opinion and then to compare the predicates upon which the two opinions were based" is proper. The court went on to explain:
The result of such a comparison may show that defendant's witness failed to consider all proper factors, or considered improper factors, or erred in the weight or effect attributed to certain factors, in the selection or use of formulas or in actual calculations or in other reasoning processes and thus might tend to impeach defendant's 'witness . . However, we feel the real value of such a question and answer is in giving the jury a better insight into the bases supporting the two differing opinions so that the jury can better evaluate and weigh the testimony of the witnesses by understanding and comparing how, why and in what particulars, the two expert witnesses reached different conclusions.
Id. (Citations omitted). Thereafter, we addressed this issue again in Carver v. Orange County, 444 So.2d 452, 454 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988), where we clarified our opinion, ruling that it is improper for a trial court to allow an expert witness to impeach the credibility of an opposing expert by testifying as to -his opinion of the opposing expert's ability. In so ruling, we cited to Ecker v. National Roofing of Miami Inc., 201 So.2d 586 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967), wherein the third district explained that the 'proper sense of professional delicacy precludes'[experts] from giving evidence as to the merits of each other.' Id. at 588 (quoting Bremer v. Freeman, (1857) 100 Moo.P.C. 306, 362). Apparently perceiving the risks presented by the unrestrained use of experts in. attacking the opinions of opposing experts, the Ecker court opined that "[a] trial should not be turned into a debate on irrelevant and immaterial issues such as the reputation of one expert witness, as determined or judged by the personal opinion of another expert witness for the other side." Id.
Review of this case law reveals that an expert may properly explain his or her opinion on an issue in controversy by outlining the claimed deficiencies in the opposing expert's methodology so long as the expert does not attack the opposing expert's ability, credibility, reputation, or competence. This rule recognizes that a trial should not be reduced to a debate regarding the ability, credibility, or reputation of an expert based on the perception of another expert.
Applying this case law to the instant facts, it becomes clear that the trial court's cautionary instruction failed to advise the jury of the controlling law on this issue. We recognize that the trial court's error arose as a result of the fact that, in drafting its instruction, the court relied upon language set forth by the court in Carlton v. Bielling, 146 So.2d 915 (Fla. 1st DCA 1962). In Carlton, defense counsel questioned his expert on whether the expert had an opinion as to the "validity" of the prior opinions expressed by the plaintiffs experts. On appeal, the first district held that such questioning was improper, explaining that questions' which seek "to elicit an opinion of the witness as to the validity of opinions expressed by plaintiffs expert witnesses" is improper. Id. at 916 (emphasis added). This language referring to the "validity" of an opposing expert's opinion is imprecise, and as' illustrated by the instant éase, can lead to confusion. In any event, we conclude that the error occasioned by the issuance of the curative instruction in this case mandates the grant of a new trial on the issue of damages.
In closing, we note that Network argues that the'trial court erred in awarding the Bjorkmans' their court costs. The cost award was based upon se'ction 57.041 of the Florida Statutes (1997), which provides that "[t]he party recovering judgment shall recover all his or her legal costs and charges which shall be included in the judgment . ." Since we have affirmed the jury's finding of liability, we also affirm the award of court costs. See Schneider v. DiPaola, 715 So.2d 284 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998).
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED.
DAUKSCH, J., concurs and concurs specially, with opinion.
HARRIS, J., concurs in part, dissents in part, with opinion.
DAUKSCH, J., concurring and concurring specially.
Athough I do not perceive the asserted error to warrant a new trial, I consider half a trial better than the reversal of the judgment. Therefore, I will agree with the decision to the retrial on damages.