Case Name: Mooney v. State
Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
Jurisdiction: Arkansas
Decision Date: 1919-03-10
Citations: 137 Ark. 410
Docket Number: 
Parties: Mooney v. State.
Judges: 
Reporter: Arkansas Reports
Volume: 137
Pages: 410–413

Head Matter:
Mooney v. State.
Opinion delivered March 10, 1919.
1. Larceny — indictment — allegation op ownership. — In indictments for larceny, the allegation of ownership' is material and must be proved as alleged.
2. Same — indictment—variance.—Where the indictment in a larceny case named the prosecuting witness as “Fincher,” and the evidence showed that his name was “Faneher,” though he was also called “Fincher,” there is no material variance.
3. Names — IDEM sonans. — “Fincher” and “Faneher” held within the rule of idem sonans.
Appeal from Johnson Circuit Court; J. H. Evans, Special Judge;
affirmed.
G. O. Patterson, for appellant.
The indictment alleges that the steer belonged to Grover Fincher but the proof showed that Grover Fancher owned it. The allegation of ownership is material, and should be proved as alleged. 111 Ark. 462; 102 Id. 629; 73 Id. 32; 55 Id. 244; Kirby’s Digest, § 2233. This section has no application where the correct name is not given. The variance is .fatal. Supra. The court should have instructed the jury to find for defendant as requested. The names are not “idem sonans.”
John D. Arbuckle, Attorney General, and T. W. Campbell, Assistant, for appellee.
There is no variance. Witness first stated that his name was Fincher. On cross-examination he stated that it was Faneher. The names are idem sonans and the variance is not material. 105 Ark. 82; 100 Id. 149; 62 Id. 516; 72 Id. 613; 50 Id. 97; 57 Tex. Crim. 625; 34 S. C. 59; 13 Mo. 91; 52 Tex. Crim. 344; 91 Va. 808; 14 R. C. L. 207; 20 Ark. 97.

Opinion:
WOOD, J.
The appellant was convicted of the crime of grand larceny on an indictment which charged him in apt words with stealing a calf, "the property of Grover Fincher."
The appellant duly appeals to this court, and the only question presented is whether or not the charge in the indictment is sustained by proof that the animal stolen was the property of Grover Faneher.
On direct examination the prosecuting witness testified, "my name is Grover Fincher," and on cross-examination he said, "my name is Faneher."
In indictments for larceny the allegation of ownership is material and must be proved, as alleged. McLemore v. State, 111 Ark. 402; Wells v. State, 102 Ark. 627; Fletcher v. State, 97 Ark. 1; Merritt v. State, 73 Ark. 32; Blankenship v. State, 55 Ark. 244.
The testimony of the prosecuting witness shows on direct examination that his name is "Fincher" and on cross-examination that his name is "Faneher." He is the same individual whether called "Fincher" or "Fancher." Although his name under the evidence was "Fancher," yet he was also called "Fincher," and under such circumstances there is no material variance between the allegation of ownership and the proof thereof.
Moreover, the majority of the court are of the opinion that there is sufficient similarity in the sound of the names "Fincher and Faneher" to bring the case within the well recognized doctrine of idem sonans. Birones v. State, 105 Ark. 82; Godard v. State, 100 Ark. 149.
In 14 Ruling Case Law, p. 207, sec. 51, it is said: " where the name as written in the indictment may be pronounced in the same way as the name given in the evidence, although such may not be the strictly correct pronunciation, the variance will not be regarded as fatal, unless the variant orthography be such as would be likely to mislead the defendant in preparing his defense."
The difference in spelling could not have misled the appellant in the preparation of his defense.
The judgment is, therefore, correct, and it is affirmed.