Case Name: Webb v. The State
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia
Jurisdiction: Georgia
Decision Date: 1912-05-07
Citations: 11 Ga. App. 850
Docket Number: 3785
Parties: Webb v. The State.
Judges: Pottle, J., not presiding.
Reporter: Georgia Appeals Reports
Volume: 11
Pages: 850–853

Head Matter:
3785.
Webb v. The State.
Decided May 7, 1912.
Reheahing denied September 20, 1912.
Indictment for assault witli intent to rape — conviction of assault and battery; from Milton superior court — Judge Morris. September 23, 1911.
The requests to charge, the refusal of wbicb was assigned as error, related to the presumption of innocence, the degree of proof required, and reasonable doubt. As to the presumption of innocence the following instruction was requested: “In all criminal cases the defendant is presumed to be innocent until the contrary appears by proof, and the presumption of innocence remains about him until the State legally and satisfactorily shows his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. So in this case the law presumes the' defendant to be innocent, and the burden is upon the State to show his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” The court charged the jury as to the burden on the State to show guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but did not charge expressly on the presumption of innocence. Counsel for the plaintiff in error contended that the accused was entitled to have the court charge on the presumption of innocence as well as upon reasonable doubt, and, on the motion for rehearing, cited Coffin v. United States, 156 U. S. 432, 452 (39 L. ed. 481).

Opinion:
Russell, J.
There is evidence as to the identity of the accused which authorizes the conclusion reached by the jury, and this court is without jurisdiction to disturb their finding upon disputed issues of fact. None of the special assignments of error are of sufficient mex'it to warrant a reversal of the judgment refusing a new trial. It is not made to appear that any one of the matters of which complaint is made could have prejudiced the accused, or have contributed to the verdict against him. It is plain that the ease depended entirely upon the identification of an assailant who was unknown to the prosecuting witness. The requests to charge, so far as appropriate, were sufficiently covered in the general charge; and though the competency of some of the evidence admitted was px-ima facie doubtful, a review of the evidence as a whole shows that the statements to which objection was made can properly be considered as part of the res gestee of the transaction.
Judgment affirmed.
Pottle, J., not presiding.
Gober & Griffin, J. T. Houze, for plaintiff in error.
J. P. Brooke, solicitor-general, contra.