Case Name: Eric William SMALLRIDGE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee
Court: Florida District Court of Appeal
Jurisdiction: Florida
Decision Date: 2005-06-20
Citations: 904 So. 2d 601
Docket Number: No. 1D03-4751
Parties: Eric William SMALLRIDGE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Judges: PADOVANO and THOMAS, JJ, concur; ERVIN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part with opinion.
Reporter: Southern Reporter, Second Series
Volume: 904
Pages: 601–610

Head Matter:
Eric William SMALLRIDGE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
No. 1D03-4751.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
June 20, 2005.
Robert Augustus Harper, and Robert Augustus Harper, III, of Robert Augustus Harper Law Firm, P.A., Tallahassee, and Michael Robert Ufferman of Michael Uf-ferman Law Firm, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Charlie Crist, Attorney General, and Carolyn J. Mosley, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

Opinion:
PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal from two convictions of manslaughter while driving under' the influence of alcohol (DUI) in violation of section 316.193(3)(c)3, Florida Statutes (2001). We affirm all issues and specifically address five of the eight issues raised.
Eric Smallridge first .contends the lower court erred by instructing the jury it could find appellant guilty if he caused or contributed to the cause of the deaths of the two victims, because, at the time of the offense, the DUI statute only criminalized conduct that "caused " the death of a victim, not conduct that merely "contributed to the cause " of the death, and the information filed in the case alleged only the "cause" theory. Smallridge timely objected to the court's use of Florida Standard Jury Instruction (Criminal) DUI Manslaughter, which provides that before a jury can find a defendant guilty of such offense, the state must prove, among other things, that the "(defendant) caused or contributed to the death of (victim)." Appellant argues that, the charge as given broadens the information by including a theory not authorized in the underlying statute, section 316.193(3)(c)3. We reject this argument and conclude the term "cause" encompasses a cause which contributes to an injury.
In creating the DUI manslaughter instruction, the Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases referred to the Florida Supreme Court's opinion in Magaw v. State, 537 So.2d 564 (Fla.1989), which, in construing the Í986 amendments to the DUI manslaughter statute, noted that before the revisions, the statute was, in effect, a strict-liability statute, and that the legislature had for the first time added to it a causation element. In particular, the court observed:
We conclude that the 1986 amendment introduced causation as an element of the . crimes proscribed by section 316.193(3). We caution, however, that the statute does not say that the operator of the vehicle must be the sole cause . of the fatal accident. Moreover, the state is not required to prove that the operator's drinking caused the accident. The statute requires only that the opera tion of the vehicle should have caused the accident. Therefore, any deviation or lack of care on the part of a driver under the influence to which the fatal accident can be attributed will suffice.
Id. at 567 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
Smallridge takes particular comfort in a concurring opinion contained in a later opinion of the supreme court wherein Justice Anstead expressed criticism of the language of the instruction by its addition of the words "caused or contributed to the cause" of the victim's death, noting that such language "greatly expanded] the reach of this penal statute." State v. Hubbard, 751 So.2d 552, 566 (Fla.1999) (Anstead, J., specially concurring). Notwithstanding Justice Anstead's assessment of the statute, the majority did not incorporate his views within its opinion, wherein it observed that the standard jury instruction, as it pertained to causation, reflected the Magaw analysis, which in turn had recognized that a vehicle's operator need not be the sole cause of injury. Id. at 564. The court specifically noted that the 1986 amendments "included only a nexus between an accident and the operation of a vehicle." Id. In fact, no Florida court, since the adoption of the instruction, has disapproved its use. See, generally, Tyner v. State, 805 So.2d 862 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Gerlitz v. State, 725 So.2d 393 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Carter v. State, 710 So.2d 110 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998). As a consequence, we reject appellant's arguments that the trial court erred in giving the standard instruction on DUI manslaughter.
Neither can we agree with the argument that the lower court erred in denying appellant's motion to suppress the results of a blood-alcohol test on the ground that the blood was seized from him in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and his statutory right to an independent blood test. The record reflects that following the accident, occurring early in the morning of May 11, 2002, resulting in the deaths of two young women, investigating officers at the scene told Smallridge of the statutory requirement that he submit to a blood-alcohol test. Smallridge then placed a call to his father, an attorney, on his cellular phone, attempting to explain to him what had occurred, and the officers at that point took the phone from him and ended the call. After the blood draw, appellant was placed in the back of a patrol car for another 1-1/2 hours, without access to a telephone. One officer placed calls to numbers appellant provided to assist him in obtaining a ride home, but no one then offered him the use of a telephone or the opportunity to call his father. Appellant's friends collected him between 5:30 and 6:00 a.m., two to three hours following the draw.
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, appellant's father testified that had appellant been allowed uninterrupted telephone access with him, he would have advised his son of his right, provided by section 316.1932(l)(f)3, Florida Statutes (2001), to obtain an independent blood test. Smallridge argues that because he was denied the right to consult with his attorney/father after he had been placed under custodial arrest, he was similarly denied the opportunity to make a knowing request for an independent test, to which he was entitled by law, and as a result of the denial, the blood draw should be suppressed.
Although we are cognizant the Florida Supreme Court has held that "law enforcement must render reasonable assistance in helping a DUI arrestee obtain an independent blood test upon request," Unruh v. State, 669 So.2d 242, 243-44 (Fla. 1996), we note that Smallridge did not make such a request. Accepting appel lant's argument that he was effectively under arrest, although he was not formally arrested and, in fact, later that night was released and allowed to return to his home, competent, substantial evidence, in our judgment, supports the trial court's findings in its order denying the motion to suppress, reciting that notwithstanding the act of the officers in terminating appellant's telephone conversation with his father, appellant otherwise had the opportunity, had he availed himself of it, of seeking an alternative test. Among other things, the lower court pointed out that appellant had made several telephone calls to his father following the accident and before his cell phone was taken from him, and had access to other phones after his release from custody, yet he never expressed any interest in obtaining an independent test. In fact, as noted in the order, Smallridge, upon his release, passed a hospital located two miles from the crash scene where a test could have been performed.
Smallridge further argues the trial court erred in allowing into evidence blown-up photographs of the decedents which depicted them inside the demolished automobile. The state answers that their admission was relevant for the reason that the photographs corroborated the expert opinion of an accident reconstructionist as to the speed appellant's vehicle was proceeding at, the time of its. collision. , Although we consider their admission to be only marginally relevant, we conclude, even if the trial court could be said to have erred in allowing them into evidence, the error, met the harmless-error standard of State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129, 1138 (Fla.1986), in that the state successfully met its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the jury's verdict. Other evidence, legally admitted, disclosed that at the time of the accident appellant had a blood-alcohol level of more than double the legal limit and had operated his vehicle at a speed of approximately 20 miles an hour or more in excess of the lawful limit.
Smallridge next contends the lower court erred in imposing restitution and costs upon him in the amount of $375 per month; notwithstanding the court's order declaring him an indigent defendant, recognizing he lacks the financial ability to make restitution or cost payments. We decline to reach this issue. The ability to pay restitution is a matter for consideration "at the time of enforcement of a restitution order-not at the time when the court is weighing the respective needs." Banks v. State, 732 So.2d 1065, 1070 (Fla. 1999) (emphasis omitted).
Finally appellant urges that the Florida Criminal Punishment Code (sections 921.002-.0027, Florida Statutes (2001)), under which he was sentenced, is facially unconstitutional in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). The facts in Blakely are altogether dissimilar to those at bar. In Blakely, the defendant pled guilty to kidnaping his estranged wife. Without departure, the presumptive sentence under the state of Washington's Guidelines Act was 53 months' imprisonment. Because, however, the sentencing judge found the offense was committed with "deliberate cruelty," pursuant to a provision of the statute that permitted an enhancement if "substantial and compelling reasons [were found] justifying an exceptional sentence," 37 months were added, for a total sentence of 90 months. Although under Washington law, the maximum penalty for the offense the defendant was convicted was 10 years, the United States Supreme Court held the sentence imposed in excess of the guideline range was unconstitutional because it was based on a fact found by the court that was neither alleged in the charging document nor admitted by the defendant. As the Court explained:
Our precedents make clear . that the "statutory maximum" for Apprendi [v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) ] purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant. In other words, the relevant "statutory maximum" is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional findings. When a judge inflicts punishment that the jury's verdict alone does not allow, the jury has not found all the facts "which the law makes essential to the punishment," and the judge exceeds his proper authority.
Id. at 2537 (citations omitted).
In the case at bar, appellant provides several examples which he contends show that the Code, as written, offends the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. Appellant points out that as applied to the victim-injury provisions of the Code, case law construes the Code as permitting a sentencing judge, rather than the fact-finder, to add victim-injury points pursuant to the range permitted in section 921.0024(1)(a), Florida Statutes, by a preponderance of evidence. See Gilson v. State, 795 So.2d 105, 110 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). Appellant also complains that the provisions of section 921.0024(2), are in facial violation of the constitution because they create a "floating maximum," allowing a judge, not a jury, to increase the lowest permissible sentence authorized by the Code, if it is greater than the statutory maximum, based on factors not found by the jury. He argues that without the improper enhancement, the trial court would have the discretionary authority to impose a lower sentence.
We decline to reach the merits of the constitutional challenge because we conclude appellant lacks the requisite standing to complain of the error he asserts. His facial constitutional challenge to the Criminal Punishment Code is not directed to a finding of fact the sentencing court made that had not been established by the jury. On his sentencing scoresheet, Smallridge was given 74 points for the primary offense of which he was convicted (DUI manslaughter), and 37 points for the second offense of DUI manslaughter. Finally, he was assessed 240 points for victim injury (the deaths of the two victims), for a total of 351 points, which translated into a permissible sentencing range of 20.1 years up to a maximum of 30 years. In' finding Smallridge guilty of two counts of DUI manslaughter, the jury obviously decided he had committed victim injury as well. His two consecutive sentences of 22 years (11 years for each of the two offenses) were within the sentencing range. Additionally, the lower court did not impose a single sentence in excess of the statutory maximum of 15 years for the second-degree felony of DUI mansláughter. § 775.082(3)(c), Fla. Stat. (2001). In fact, in entering the sentences, the lower court made no findings of enhancement, or otherwise, and sentenced Smallridge within the range established by the Code based solely on the jury's verdicts. The rule is well established that a person to whom a statute is lawfully applied cannot mount a facial challenge to it simply because its terms might be unconstitutional as applied to another person. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987); Sandstrom v. Leader, 370 So.2d 3 (Fla.1979); Chambers v. State, 752 So.2d 64 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000).
AFFIRMED.
PADOVANO and THOMAS, JJ, concur; ERVIN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part with opinion.
. We note that the 2002 legislature amended the statute, following the date of the offense, by adding the words "causes or contributes to causing." Because the final staff analysis explained the amendment was created in response to Justice Anstead's concurring opinion in State v. Hubbard, 751 So.2d 552, 566 (Fla.1999), we conclude that the amended language was added simply to clarify preexisting legislative intent. See Fla. H.R. Comm, on Crime Prevention, Corr. & Saf., CS/CS/HB 1057 (2002) Staff Analysis 3, 5 (final Jun. 13, 2002).
. We cannot agree with the lower court's alternative conclusion that Smallridge was not legally entitled to an independent test once probable cause, was established to believe that he had operated a Vehicle while under the influence of alcoholic beverages, resulting in the death of another human being. Such interpretation is clearly at vari-anee with the terms of section 316.1932(1)(f)3, authorizing the administering of an independent test, in addition to that administered at the direction of a law-enforcement official pursuant to section 316.1933(1)(a). The court should have read the two statutes in pari materia. See Mehl v. State, 632 So.2d 593, 594-95 (Fla.1993).
. Notwithstanding that the. statute provides the "permissible range for sentencing shall be the lowest permissible sentence [under the code] up to and including the statutory maximum, as defined in s. 775.082," it further states: "If the lowest permissible sentence under the code exceeds the statutory maximum sentence as provided in s. 775.082, the sentence required by the code must be imposed."