Case Name: The State ex rel. Klotz v. Ross et al.
Court: Supreme Court of Missouri
Jurisdiction: Missouri
Decision Date: 1893-11-09
Citations: 118 Mo. 23
Docket Number: 
Parties: The State ex rel. Klotz v. Ross et al.
Judges: 
Reporter: Missouri Reports
Volume: 118
Pages: 23–79

Head Matter:
The State ex rel. Klotz v. Ross et al.
In Banc,
November 9, 1893.
1. Circuit Court: special judge: adjournment: collateral attack. A special judge elected by the members of the bar, in case of the absence or disqualification of the regular judge, has, under Revised Statutes, 1889, section 3320, all the powers of the latter and is under no duty or obligation to the regular judge, and proof of the fact that the special judge adjourned court before the arrival of the regular judge, in violation of an agreement with him, is inadmissible to affect the integrity of the record in a collateral proceeding.
2. -: -: -. A special judge can adjourn court in course where the regular one can do so.
3. -: -: mandamus: receiver. An order of a special judge setting aside an order previously made by the regular judge in vacation, appointing a receiver for a corporation, cannot be assailed on the ground of the special judge’s kinship to a stockholder in the corporation in a mandamus proceeding by the person whose appointment is so revoked to compel the delivery to him of the corporate property by a receiver appointed by another court.
4. -: -: -: -. While such order may be attacked for fraud in a direct proceeding for that purpose, it cannot be collaterally assailed.
5. Court: adjournment: regular and special judge. A regular judge lias no power to reopen, a term of court after it lias been adjourned to the next regular term by a special judge.
Mandamus.
Pebemptoby wbit denied.
H. 8. Priest, Alex. G. Cochran and M. L. Clardy for relator.
(1) Mandamus is a proper remedy to test the right of relator to the possession of the property committed to his charge by the Stoddard court as its executive officer, or its hand; and more especially is this true under circumstances of a case where the contest is between two courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction involving priority of right and over which this court alone by the terms of the constitution has supervising and superintending control. Com. v. Denison, 24 How. 66; Lagrange v. State Treasurer, 24 Mich. 468; Tawas v. Bailroad, 44 Mich. 479; State v. Baggott, 96 Mo. 71; Constitution of Missouri, art. 6, sec. 3; State v. Tracy, 94 Mo. 217; State v. Laughlin, 75 Mo. 366; McGaryv. Bogers, 35 Ark. 298; Ex parte King, 27 Ala. 387; Ex parte Morgan, 30 Ala. 50; Ex parte Thornton, 46 Ala. 384; Merrill on Mandamus, sec. 198. (2) The Merriam suit was begun first. It was, in part, a proceeding in rem, and, by entertaining this suit, the Stoddard circuit court acquired plenary jurisdiction over the res, and had from thenceforth the legal priority of control over the res whenever, in the conduct of the suit, it became necessary or expedient to assume possession, as against all other tribunals, save those having a direct supervisory control over it, or one having some superior jurisdiction in the premises. Union Trust Co. v. Bailroad;, 6 Biss. 198; Gaylord v. Bailroad, 6 Biss. 290; Judd v. Bailroad, 24 Blatch. 420; Young v. Bollins, 85 N. C. 488; Heidritter v. Oil Go., 112 U. S. 294; Cooper v. Reynolds, 10 Wall. 308; Barton v. Barbour, 104 U. S. .126; French v. Hay, 22 Wall. 250; High on Injunctions, sec. 17. (3) If the order appointing Klotz on March 3, by Judge Wear in vacation, was void because 'the bill under which the order was made had not been filed, then, for the very same reason, the order of Judge Ross, made on the fourth of March, appointing Houck receiver, is also void. There is this difference, however. In Houck’s case, there is no subsequent order fortifying his appointment; whereas, in Klotz’ case, Judge Wear made an order on the thirteenth of March ■expressly ratifying and confirming the order óf the third and in terms appointing Klotz anew. Bank v. .Kent, 43 Mich. 297; s. c., 5 N. W. Rep. 627; Jones v. Schall, 45 Mich. 380; s. c., 8 N. W. Rep. 68; Jones v. .Bank, 10 Col. 473; s. c., 17 Pac. Rep. 272-276; Anonymous, 1 Atk. 578; Ex parte Whitfield, 2 Atk. 315; Ex parte Mountford, 15 Yesey, 445; Kattenstroth to. Bank, 2 Duer, 632; Crowder v. Moore, 52 Ala. 220; Hardy v. McClellan, 53 Miss. 507; Mining Co. v. Holleman, 27 Pac. Rep. 413; Baker v. Backus, 32 111. 79; Be Ham-cock, 27 Hun, 575. (4) Respondents rely, for the maintenance of their cause and the defeat of relators, upon the action of Special Judge Houck on March 13 in sustaining the motions to dismiss Klotz as receiver. These orders are absolutely void for the following reasons: First. Houck was disqualified to act because he was the brother of Louis Houck, who was interested in the ■case. This disqualification exists by virtue of the moral sense of mankind, the common law and the statute law. Revised Statutes, 1889, sec. 3247; Oakley v. Aspinwall, 3 N. Y. 547; Dimes v. Canal Co., 3 H. L. 793; Postv. Black, 5 Denio, 67; Stockwell v. Township .Board, 22 Mich. 345; Place v. Mfg. Co., 28 Barb. 503; Co. v. Key ser, 58 Cal. 322; Pierce v. Selden, 13 Johns. 190; Ins. Co. v. Price, 1 Hop. Oh. 3; Foot v. Morgan,. 1 Hill N. Y. 654; Petition, New Boston, 49 N. H. 329; Hall v. Thayer, 105 Mass. 219; Taylor v. Corners, 105 Mass. 225; Beams v. Kearns, 5 Cold. (Term.) 220. Second. They were collusively and fraudulently entered; and this can be shown collaterally. Callahan v. Gris-wold, 9 Mo. 792; Higgins v. Peltzer, 49 Mo. 152; Mandeville v. Beynolds, 68 N. Y. 528. Third. They were-void because the case of Merriam was not pending at that term of the court. It was only there upon a rule-to show cause. The motions upon which these orders-were entered were original motions, not a showing of cause in response- to the notice. Newton v. Newton, 32 Mo. App. 162. Revised Statutes, 1889, section 2086, provides that, “Motions in a cause filed in term shall be filed at least one day before they may be argued or determined.” State v. Undenvood, 76 Mo. 630; Valle v. Picton, 91 Mo. 210; Cashman v. Anderson, 26 Mo. 67. (5) Judge Wear had the power whether in term or chambers to make the order of the thirteenth of March, confirming his previous appointment and appointing Klotz anew. This he did, and not only had it entered upon the record but also signed as judge, and had it filed with the clerk. Its efficacy does not depend upon the' capacity in which it recites it was made, but upon the fact whether he had power to Make it at the time it was made. Com’rs v. January, 94 U. S. 202; State v. Berkum, 27 Mo. App. 628; Garlich v. Bunn, 42 Ala. 404; Venable v. Ctird, 2 Head, 582; Hensley v. State, 3 Heisk. 202; Carli v. Bhener, 27 Minn. 292; Revised. Statutes, 1889, sec. 2193; Greeley v. Bank, 103 Mo. 212; Cox v. Volkert, 86 Mo. 511; State ex rel. v. Bambauer, 104 Mo. 619; Walters v. Co., 50 Fed. Rep. 316. (6) The Cape Girardeau court of common pleas-had no jurisdiction to appoint a receiver under the bill, nor could it acquire, by virtue of the bill, any such jurisdiction, and its attempt in that behalf is absolutely void. Jones v. Bank, 10 Col. 473; s. c., 17 Pac. Rep.. 272; French Bank case, 53 Cal. 495; Hughv. McRhea, Chase’s Decs. 466; Kimball v. Goodbivrn, 32 Mich. 12; Bangs v. McIntosh, 23 Barb. 599; Attorney General v. Bank, 1 Hop. 354; Attorney General v. Ins. Go., 2 Johns. Ch. 271; Nealv. Hitt, 16 Cal. 145; Port Huron, v. Judge, 31 Mich. 456; Wait on Insolvent Corporations, sec. 183; Gregory v. Gregory, 1 Jones & Spencer, 39; French v. Gifford, 30 Iowa, 148. Judgment void: Fithian v. Monks, 43 Mo. 502, and cases cited. The following cases are clearly distinguishable: Railroad v; Humphreys, 145 U. S. 105; Railroad v. Trust Go., 23 Fed. Rep. 514 and 29 Fed. Rep. 618. (7) Upon the merits, the court should order the property delivered to the Stoddard court, where alone, as between it and the common pleas court, it can, according to the usual and orderly course, be administered.
John W. Noble, G. D. Reynolds and M. R. Smith, and Oliver <& Miller, of counsel, for respondents.
(1) The relator must show at the commencement of the proceeding a subsisting, valid and clear claim in himself to the relief sought. High’sExtraordinary Legal Remedies (1874), sec. 10, and authorities there cited. This relator did not have these and cannot acquire them now. (2) The relator must recover, if at all, not only on the strength of his own title, but in strict accordance with the averments of the alternative writ, and to enforce a special duty imposed bylaw — a duty resulting from official station or, if a corporation, expressly imposed by statute. Com. v. County Com’rs, 5 Rawle 75. It must be a duty resulting from official station. Dunklin County v. District County Court, 23 Mo. 449. (3) One and same writ cannot be directed to two or more respondents, having separate interests. 14 American and English Encyclopaedia of Law, p. 219; State v. Chester, 10 N. J. L. 292; State v. Railroad, 39 Minn. 219; State v. Reno Co. (Kan.), 16 Pac. Rep. 337; State v. Police Jury (La.), 3 So. Rep. 88; People v. Yates, 40 Ill. 126. The writ will not issue against a private citizen, and issues against a corporation only when the statute imposes a specific duty upon it. 14 American and English Encyclopaedia, p. 165, sec. 8; p. 152, sec. 7; State v. Powers, 14 Ga. 388. (4) The response of respondents to what, relator calls his reply, offered to be filed at trial, is allowable and required by statute. Revised Statutes, 1889, “Mandamus,” secs. 6812, 6813. (5) The relator should not be permitted to insert by amendment to writ new matter to strengthen his hold. (6) The Cape Girardeau common pleas had jurisdiction in equity. Fulenwider v. Fulenwider, 53 Mo. 439; Roth v. Tiedeman, 53 Mo. 489; Revised Statutes, 1879, sec. 1105; also 1889, sec. 3321; also 1889, p. 2219. Stare decisis et non quieta morere. (7) This is substantially admitted in relator’s answer to respondent’s return. (8) The particular action in which Mr. Houck was appointed receiver was within the jurisdiction of the common pleas court. Wabash, etc. Co. v. Trust Co., 23 Fed. Rep. 514; s. c., 23 Fed. Rep. 863, 868; s. c., 29 Fed. Rep. 618; Railroad v. Humphreys, 145 U. S. 105. (9) The judicial action taken in the appointment of Houck as receiver cannot be annulled or questioned by a proceeding by mandamus in the supreme court of the state. State ex rel. v. Wilson, 49 Mo. 146. Mandamus cannot control judicial action, nor be used to serve as an appeal or writ of error. State ex rel. v. Flad, 108 Mo. 614; State ex rel. v. Smith, 101 Mo. 527-535; State ex rel. v. Young, 84 Mo. 90. A writ of prohibition is the only writ by which a lower court can be restrained from the exercise of a jurisdiction it does not have. 12 American and English Encyclopaedia of Law, 311-316; Hander & Co. v. Keating, 26 Ark. 51; State ex rel. v. Lafayette Court, 41 Mo. 222; County Court v. Inhabitants, 10 Mo. 679; State, etc. v. Byers, 67 Mo. 704; Thomas v. Mead, 36 Mo. 247. (10) The relator has elected to proceed, and is proceeding, in the common pleas court on motion there filed by him, never withdrawn — and there pending and about to be heard — for same relief here asked. McClanahan v. West, 100 Mo. 322. Such action is a bar to mandamus.' High’s Extraordinary Legal Remedies (1874), sec. 188; Maynard v. Bond, 67 Mo. 315; Greeley v. Bank, 103 Mo. 212; Thompson v. Greeley, 107 Mo. 57. (11) The averment in the writ, that Mr. Houck conspired with Judge Ross and other respondents to procure his appointment as receiver, is not supported by the statement of a single fact, and there has not been a particle of proof adduced to warrant it. (12) The relator had, and has, no title on which to proceed, either here or elsewhere, to demand or require possession from respondents, or either of them. First. There was no suit commenced when he was appointed. Revised Statutes, 1889, sec. 2013. Second. A judge at chambers has no power to appoint a receiver in an action yet tobe commenced. Grey v. Doak, 47 Kan. 236; 27 Pac. Rep. 413; 27 Pac. Rep. 963; Crowder v. Moore, 52 Ala. 221; Hardy v. McClelland, 53 Miss. 511; Bank v. Kent, 43 Mich. 296; Jones v. Schall, 45 Mich. 380; Jones v. Bank, 10 Col. 473. (13) When the causes of action are different under which several receivers are appointed, the one that first gains possession of the subject-matter retains it. Ulmer v. Atlanta, etc. Co., 2 Woods (U. S;), 409. In a conflict of two co-ordinate courts, as to the jurisdiction over property, it is the universal rule that the tribunal in which jurisdiction first attaches by the seizure of the property and custody thereof under its process must prevail. Metzner v. Graham, 57 Mo. 404; see, also, 79 Mo. 667; 70 Mo. 217; 72 Mo. 632; 34 Mo. 432; 79 Mo. 431; 66 Mo. 660; 77 Mo. 332. (14) The mortgages under which Merriam claims, and under which alone relator Klotz was appointed, do not cover the property attempted to be given to Klotz, as receiver, and it would be against the law of the land and the constitution of the state and of the United States for this court to authorize or support his claim in this proceeding. Constitution United States, Amendments, art. 5; Constitution of Missouri, art. 2, sec. 30. Mays v. Rose, Freeman (Miss.) 730; Leavitt v. Yates, 4 Edw. Ch. 162; Beecher v. Bininger, 7 Black, 170. The plaintiff, to authorize a receiver, must show either a clear right to the property, or that he has some lien on it, or that it constitutes a special fund for his satisfaction. Chicago v. United States, etc. Co. 57 Pa. St. 91; Pullan v. Cincinnati, etc. Co., 4 Biss. (U. S.) Rep. 50; O’Mahony v. Belmont, 62 N. Y. 143; Cooley’s Constitutional Limitation [3 Ed.], *355, 356, 358, 362, 363 and notes; Clark v. Mitchell, 64 Mo. 564; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch Rep. 87; Wynchamer v. The People, 3 Kern. 378; State ex rel. v. Miller, 66 Mo. 328. (15) The order appointing relator Klotz a receiver, was duly and legally vacated by the then duly elected and acting special judge for the term, George Houck, on March 13,1893, and the action of the circuit court Judge, Wear, in attempting to expunge the record of the court, was illegal and void. Nor can this honor- . able court support the action of Judge Wear, in this proceeding, by mandamus. State v. Sanders, 106 Mo. 188; State ex rel. v. Bacon, 107 Mo. 627; Brewer v. State, 6 Lea (Tenn.) 203; Elms v. State, 10 Hump. 113; Littleton v. Smith, 21 N. E. Rep. 886. (16) There was no authority in Judge Wear to reconvene the court after it had been adjourned by the special judge for the term. Stovall v. Emerson, 20 Mo. App. 322-324, (17) The record was made up by Judge Houck’ signing the minutes, as he did, and which have been introduced and allowed as the record by this honorable court. The plea that there is no record (until record) is overthrown. 1 Chitty on Pleadings, 418; 3Blackstone, 331; 2 Tidd’s Practice, 741; 2 Black on Judgments, sec. 902, p. 1079; Jeffries v. Fisher, 51 Mo. 217; Frits v. Fisher, 5 Clarke (Penn.), 350; Dixon v. The Judge, 4 Mo. 286; Hill v. Mendenhall, 21 Wallace 454. (18) Judge Wear in making the entry attempting to annul the record of the court, not only acted without authority as a judge — but against all law. He proceeded . without notice — without inquiry, and condemned without a hearing. He did all the laws and the constitution are ordained to prevent. Clark v. Mitchell, 64 Mo. 564; Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations [3 Ed.], 365-363. (19) This honorable court cannot by mandamus on testimony, establish Judge Wear’s action, nor overthrow that of Judge Houck, and thereupon grant a peremptory writ. Mandamus cannot be used to alter a record. It has never been used for such purpose. This has been the law of Missouri for more than fifty years. Dixon v. The Judge, 4 Mo. 286; Merrill on Mandamus, secs. 3 and 61; High on Extraordinary Remedies, sec. 580, p. ¡414; Story on Equity Pleading [10 Ed.], secs. 322, 553 ; Gay v. Gilmore, 76 Ga. 225; Montague v. Dudman, 2 Ves. Sr. 396; Essex v. Bank, 14 N. J. L. 79. (20) The special judge was not disqualified. He was not interested in the controversy where he acted. He was not of kin to any of the parties in the suit where he acted, and he had not been of counsel in that suit. There are no sufficient allegations to show him disqualified. 1 Black on Judgments, sec. 266, p. 325; Fowler v. Brooks, 64 N. H. 423; Trawick v. Trawick, 67 Ala. 271; Rogers v. Felher, 77 Ga. 46; Littleton v. Smith, 21 N. E. Rep. 886. (21) There has been no testimony or proof adduced to support the charge of conspiracy alleged between George Houck, Louis Houck and his attorneys. There is no claimbut that to vacate the receivership of Klotz was a legal act, and the right thing to do. Conspiracy cannot be effectually affirmed of a lawful act. Hunt v. Simonds, 19 Mo. 583; Alexander v. Relfe, 9 Mo. App. 133.

Opinion:
Gantt, J.
This is an original proceeding in this court to obtain a peremptory writ of mandamus commanding the above named respondents to deliver to the relator, Eli Klotz, all and singular the railway property, effects and credits of the St. Louis, Cape Girardeau & Fort Smith Railway, a railroad organized under the laws of this state, and running from the city of Cape Girardeau westward to a point in Carter county, Missouri, about'one hundred miles in length.
Upon an application filed in this court on March 16, 1893, an alternative writ issued to the respondents to show cause, on March 25, 1893, why a peremptory writ should not issue. The alternative writ was duly served and return made on the twenty-fifth of March, and leave taken by both sides to take evidence. John W. Dryden, Esq,., of the St. Louis bar, was appointed a special examiner to f ake the proof and report to this court on May 2. This was done, and on the second day of May the evidence was submitted and argument heard and leave taken to file briefs.
The alternative writ alleges the incorporation and extent of the said railway; that Louis Houck was and is its president and general manager and the owner of a majority of its stock; that Alexander Ross the judge of the Cape Girardeau court of common pleas, and that said court is a court of limited jurisdiction,. created by an act of the legislature, approved February 23, 1851 (Acts of 1850, 1851), and an amendatory act approved February 2, 1853 (Acts of 1852, 1853, p. 80). It then avers that Eli Klotz was appointed receiver of said railway on the third day of March, 1893, by the Hon. John Gr. Wear, judge of the circuit court of Stoddard county, Missouri, m vacation, in a certain cause wherein E. Gr. Merriam is plaintiff, and the said' railway company, Leo Doyle, trustee, and the Mercantile- Trust Company are defendants, then pending in said Stoddard county circuit court ond returnable to the fall term thereof for the year 1893; that afterwards said provisional appointment, made in vacation as aforesaid, was duly confirmed by the circuit court of Stoddard county ón March 13, 1893; that in pursuance of said appointment the relator duly qualified as such receiver by taking the oath and filing his bond as such; that he demanded of said Louis Houck, the president of said railway, the possession thereof, but said Houck refused to deliver the same, claiming that he had been duly appointed receiver himself on the fourth day of March, 1893, by Hon. Alexander Ross, judge of the Cape Grirardeau court of common pleas, in a suit in said court, wherein said railway company was plaintiff, and Leo Doyle, Edward Hidden and the Mercantile Trust Company of New York are defendants; that he had qualified under said appointment and had taken possession of said railway by virtue thereof.
It is then averred that relator appeared in said Cape Grirardeau court of. common pleas and exhibited to Judge Ross a copy of his appointment by the circuit court of Stoddard county and suggested that Judge Ross had no jurisdiction to appoint said Houck, because of the prior proceedings in the circuit court of Stoddard county, and because said common pleas court had no jurisdiction over equity cases, especially such a case as is set forth in the bill filed by said railway company against said Leo Doyle et al., in which said Houck was appointed receiver. The said bill is copied in full .in the writ, and it is unnecessary to repeat it here.
It then appears that Judge Ross declined to take any action at the time, but in vacation continued the hearing till the May term of his court, to which relator excepted at the time.
It then avers that the petition in the Cape Girardeau court of common pleas does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The writ then avers that relator is thus unable to obtain possession of said railway and prays this court to command the respondents to show cause why they should not be directed by this court to turn over said property to him.
The returns of the railroad company and other respondents aver the order of the Stoddard circuit court appointing relator Klotz. receiver, was annulled on March 13, 1893, by that court; that he never had possession of the railroad, but that Houck, receiver, always has had since his appointment and qualification; that the common pleas had, and has, jurisdiction; that its judge, the respondent, Ross, has so adjudged, and in his orders and proceedings under the bill named had acted judicially, and is proceeding in due course to hear and determine the same, and all questions in relation thereto as the same may arise; that Klotz, pretending to be a receiver, appeared in this common pleas court on that proceeding and filed a petition for possession, which was ordered filed and continued to the May term, 1893, and is there now pending. This return also sets forth, as a separate defense, that the mortgages under which Merriam claims to hold the bonds, the coupons of which are not paid, and because whereof he begins suit, cover only twenty-five miles of this whole road of which it has been attempted to give Klotz,'as receiver, possession, which road is one ^hundred miles long; that, of the twenty-five miles covered, only five are in Stoddard county; and the bill seeks not a foreclosure, but that the road may be "sequestered for payment of interest heretofore accrued and that may hereafter accrue, and a receiver appointed to take possession and operate the railroad as a unit," and for general relief. This portion of the return also • states the provisions of each of these mortgages to the effect that the bonds do not mature until 1901, but .that, if interest was not paid, the trustee therein (Leo Doyle) should, on demand of holders of not less than one-fourth of outstanding bonds thereunder, take possession of the'road as far as covered by the mortgage and operate the same for bond holders; and that it was in said mortgages expressly provided that nothing 'therein could be construed to affect or put any burden >or liability on the right of way, bridges,.property or lands acquired or to be acquired on or along (in the first mortgage) the Lakeville division of the road, extending from the (Delta) junction to Lakeville or beyond that point, and (in the second mortgage) on or along the roadway lying and being southwest of Lake-ville, or any donation or gift made to aid the road. And the return avers and claims, on the facts stated, that an order taking the whole road under the circumstances and contracts just mentioned, is in violation of •the several constitutions of the state of Missouri and of the United States, declaring that no person shall be' deprived of property without due process of law, which guarantees are relied on and invoked by 'respondent.
This return further sets forth the proceedings on •.the thirteenth of March, 1893, in the Stoddard circuit court in the Merriam suit, when this respondent, as well as Leo Doyle, filed its motion to annul the order-appointing Klotz receiver, and for a change of venue; and that on that day the circuit court was open, and the court then and there having fully considered the matter vacated the appointment of Klotz, relator herein, and that the court was then adjourned to the next term in course by the legal and acting judge, who-had up to that time been holding the term; and that the pretended order confirming the appointment of Klotz, set up by relator, was illegally entered after said, adjournment and is void.
The relator's answer to this return is aimed at this last averment and sets forth the- original order of" March 3, 1893, of Klotz's appointment, and ordering the clerk to issue a summons and notice to defendants, therein, to appear before the circuit court at Bloomfield on March 13, and show cause why said order-appointing Klotz receiver should not be confirmed; that the railway company and Doyle did appear, and filed motions to vacate the receivership and for change of venue; that Greorge Houck pretended to exercise the functions of the temporary and provisional judge, conspired with Louis Houck and his attorneys to fraudulently circumvent the confirmation of receiver Klotz, knowing Judge Wear was on his way to hold court pursuant to notice, and convened court at eight o'clock, and although motions were required to be filed one day, Houck, judge, sustained said motion, and did immediately pretend to adjourn said court, and conspirators fled the town, but Judge Wear, circuit judge, did convene said court and did on investigation of the minutes enter an order as follows:
' 'Monday, March 13, 1893, the seventh day of March term, 1893. Court opened as usual, pursuant to adjournment, the Hon. John Gr. Wear, judge of the circuit court of this county, presiding pursuant to notice duly made to the clerk and sheriff of this court. It appearing to the court that prior to convening at the usual hour and pursuant to the aforesaid notices, that one George Houck, assuming to exercise the functions of a judge of this court, had, at an unusual hour, and with knowledge of the notices given that I, as judge of said court, would be present and open the court at the usual hour, and knowing that I as said judge was in the county and on my way to hold the same, did contrive with the attorneys for the St, Louis, Cape Girardeau & Fort Smith Railway Company, and the president of said company, Louis Houck, the brother of George Houck, to defeat the hearing of an application for the confirmation of a receiver heretofore by me, in vacation, appointed in the case of E. G. Merriam against the said St. Louis, Cape Girardeau & Fort Smith Railway Company et al., due notice of which had been given to be heard before me on this day, did attempt to fraudulently and conclusively convene said court and to make certain orders in said cause at an unusual hour, and did make orders dismissing the receiver appointed by this court upon the pretended motion of the defendants in said cause, although the same had not been docketed, and was not returnable until the December term of this court, and other orders therein, and did immediately attempt to adjourn the court. It is now ordered in view of said fraudulent purpose and want of authority in said Houck to hold this court, this day, that all minutes heretofore made this day, by said George Houck, while pretending to act as judge of this court, be expunged and stricken from the record, and all proceedings pretended to have been made in this court by said George Houck as pretended judge on this day is also stricken and expunged from the docket."
The respondents have replied to this that Houck, judge, was elected for the term under the statute in such case at the commencement of the term legally,, and had held court from day to day, that would otherwise have lapsed, and having on the eleventh of March adjourned to the thirteenth at eight o'clock a. m:., and said motions coming on to be heard in due course, disposed of the same, by vacating the receivership order and continuing the motion for change of venue- and the cause to the next term; that he, GeorgeHouck, was the lawful and acting judge for' the term and Judge Wear was without authority to act as he pretended to act, as set forth by relator; that there was no conspiracy, and the motion to vacate was sustained as it ought to have been, and the record and minutes are pleaded in support of this response.
This statement so far covers substantially the averments in pleadings filed and offered to be filed.
There is a large volume of parol testimony taken by the special examiner, and filed in the cause, and much documentary evidence filed on both sides. By this evidence the following facts appear: On the third day of March, 1893, the suit'of Merriam v. The St. Louis, Cape Girardeau and Port Smith Railway was filed in the office of the clerk of the circuit court of Stoddard county, and simultaneously the order of Judge Wear appointing the relator receiver. That order contains the following provision:
"LWÍ/Í72.. This order is a provisional one made by the undersigned judge in vacation, and it is hereby ordered, that the clerk of the circuit court of Stoddard county Missouri, issue a summons or notice to said defendants, returnable on Monday the thirteenth day of March, 1893, to appear at Bloomfield in said Stoddard county, before the circuit court of said county and show cause if any they have, why the appointment of said receiver should not be confirmed.
"(Signed) John G.Weak,
"Judge 22d Circuit."
By the statutes of this state the spring term of the Stoddard county circuit court was required to convene on the first Monday in March, 1893. Laws of Missouri (extra session) 1892, p. 13, sec. 50. Said first Monday was the sixth day of March, 1893.
The record of that court on the first day of said March term begins with the following convening order:
"The Hon. John G. Wear not being present to hold this court, and having failed to procure another judge to hold said court, a special election was held by the clerk of this court, at which the Hon. George Houck was duly elected special judge, there being more than five members of the bar present, to-wit, H. H. Bedford, W. E. Eord, Thomas Conley, C. L. Keaton., Ralph Wammick, William Kitchen and others, and the Hon. George Houck possessing all the qualifications of a circuit judge, took the oath of office and entered upon the duties as such." Again, there is no controversy between counsel as to these facts.
The said special judge held said court and disposed of the business from the sixth of March down to and including the morning hour of March 13, 1893. The record shows that on Monday, sixth of March, he adjourned court to Tuesday at nine o'clock in the morning. On Tuesday, he adjourned court until eight o'clock Wednesday morning. On Wednesday, he adjourned court to half past eight o'clock Thursday morning. On Thursday he adjourned court to eight o'clock Friday morning. Friday, he adjourned court until nine o'clock Saturday morning. .On Saturday, after transacting the business of the court, he adjourned the court until eight o'clock Monday morning. On Monday morning the record shows the court convened pursuant to adjournment, "Hon. George Houck, judge," etc.
On that morning, among other entries, appear the following:
"State v. "Napoleon Hickson.
"Arraigned. Plea of guilty on count of larceny. Count of burglary dismissed. Sentenced to the penitentiary for two years at hard labor. Ordered that sheriff convey him there with all convenient speed."
"E. G. Merriam v. "St. Louis, Cape Girardeau & Ft. S. R'y Co.
"Motion to vacate order filed."
"E. G. Merriam v. "St. Louis, Cape Girardeau & Ft. S. R'y. Co.
"Separate motion of Leo Doyle, trustee, limiting his appearance in this court for the purpose of the motion asking this court to vacate the order made by the judge of the court in vacation on March 3, 1893, appointing Eli Klotz, receiver of the St. Louis, Cape Girardeau & Fort Smith Railway Company, for the reasons filed. Which motion being submitted, taken up and heard and considered is in all things sustained; said order is vacated and held for naught."
"E. G. Merriam v. "St. Louis, Cape Girardeau & Ft. S. R'y Co., et al.
"Separate motion of the St. Louis, Cape Girardeau & Fort Smith Railway Company, limiting its appearance in this court for the purpose of his motion, asking this court to vacate the order made by the judge of this court in vacation on March 3, 1893, appointing Eli Klotz receiver of the St. Louis, Cape Girardeau & Fort Smith Railway Company, for reasons filed, which motion being submitted and by the court taken up, heard and considered is in all things sustained, said order is vacated and held for naught."
"E. G. Merriam v. "Leo Doyle, trustee, et al.
"Application for change of venue filed and cause continued."
"E. G. Merriam v. "St. Louis, Cape Girardeau & Ft. S. R'y Co., et al.
"Application for change of venue filed and cause continued."
"Ordered by the court that all business pending and undisposed of be, and the same is hereby, continued until the next regular term of this court, and the court adjourned until court in course."
"Geobge Houck,'
"Special Judge for March term, 1893."
After the special judge had adjourned the court Judge Wear arrived at the county seat that morning, and, finding that Judge Houck had adjourned, he' repaired to the court house, and caused the entry hereinbefore copied in full in relator's answer, to be spread' on the record,-by which he assumed to expunge and $et aside the record made by Special Judge Houck.
Two positions are assumed by the learned counsel for the relator, as to the proceedings on Monday, March 13. They claim first, that Special Judge Houck had no' right to adjourn the circuit court of Stoddard county,, before Judge Wear arrived on the thirteenth of March.. They base this claim upon some kind of inf ormal notice that Judge Wear would be present, that morning, or some promise on the part of Mr. Houck to Judge Wear to hold the court open until Judge Wear should arrive. It must be borne in mind that this record on its face affirmatively shows that the occasion had arisen within ' the contemplation of the laws of this state, when the bar of Stoddard county were authorized to elect a special judge. Moreover, it clearly appears that the requisite number of lawyers were present to elect the judge-, that the proper officer, to-wit, the clerk, held the election; that the person elected had all the qualifications of a circuit judge; that he was elected, and took the oath required by law, and entered upon the discharge of his duties as judge.
Can it .be questioned he was now the judge both d'ejure and de facto of that court? We think not. Nor do counsel deny this up to Monday morning, the thirteenth of March, but their contention is that at some point of time between the adjournment Saturday evening, and the convening of the court Monday morning, this special judge's commission expired, by virtue of a contract, express or implied, with Judge Wear, and that all the acts of the court that morning before Judge Wear arrived must be by us held for uaugbt in this proceeding, because a violation of that contract or was the result of a fraudulent conspiracy. The position óf the learned counsel, in short, amounts to this: That a special judge is under some obligation to the-regular judge; is under some kind of an implied contract to do just what the regular judge should desire,, and nothing else. . It must be evident upon consideration that no such principle has any foundation in our laws, or the principles underlying our form of government.
The very essence of the judicial office is that the-incumbent thereof shall be independent, and owe-allegiance only to the law of the land. If a regular-judge, he derives his title by election, or executive appointment. If a special judge, under our statute, to-an election by the bar of the court. When he qualifies-by taking the oath of office, he must act under a sense-of high responsibility to the public alone and the law of the land. No other security for his good conduct-can be,' or is, exacted. The law of this state, recognizing that a special judge is sometimes necessary for the transaction of the public business, has provided when and how he shall be selected. The legislature,, we think, rightly considered that, if a judge at all, he-should be invested with all the authority necessary to-command and enforce that respect due to the responsible position of a judge, hence it provided by section-3326, Revised Statutes, 1889, that "the person thus elected shall, during the period he shall act, have all the powers and be liable to all the responsibilities of the circuit judge."
Some discussion was had during the argument whether this election of a special judge could be chosen for a- whole term, or only until Judge Wear should return, and whether a special judge could be chosen for- a whole term so as to deprive the regular judge, of his right to preside should he appear in court, and seek to resume his duties.. The facts of this case do not require us' to pass upon that question. George Houck, Esq., was elected because Judge Wear was absent, and he did not attempt to hold the court at any time when • Judge Wear was present. That a regular judge may adjourn his court at any time he sees fit, and that his reasons therefor cannot be assailed in a collateral proceeding, we take it, needs no argument or reason to •support it. This necessarily results from the nature of his office. If a regular judge might have adjourned the circuit court of Stoddard county on Monday, March 13, at nine o'clock in the forenoon, then Special Judge Houck could do so. He, was the judge of that court and did adjourn it, and that action terminated the March term, 1893. The claim that there was an agreement between Special Judge Houck and Judge Wear outside of the court cannot be permitted to affect the rights of suitors in that court. The courts of record of this state speak by their records and such conventions as were offered to be shown in this case, are not competent to affect the integrity of the record. Upon the clearest principles of public policy no such proof is allowed to impeach the verity of the record in this collateral proceeding. Mobley v. Nave, 67 Mo. 546.
Secondly, it is argued that George Houck was incompetent by reason of his relation to Louis Houck to sit in the determination of the motions vacating the receivership of relator. Our statute,, section 3247, Revised Statutes, 1889, reads: "No judge of any court of record, who is interested in any suit or related to either party, or who shall have been of counsel in any suit or proceeding pending before him, shall, without express consent of the parties thereto, sit on the trial or determination thereof." It is not claimed by coun sel that George Houck had any pecuniary interest in-the suit of Merriam v. The Railway Company, or that he-had been of counsel in said suit, or that Louis Houck was a party to said action. On the face of the record he was clearly not incompetent by virtue of this statute; but it is argued that as Louis Houck was a stockholder in the railroad, this disqualified George Houck.
The contention of relator is that his action is void. If voidable or erroneous only, it does not fall within our jurisdiction in this proceeding to entertain it. The effect of a disqualification of a judge by reason of' relationship to the parties to an action, has often been adjudicated in the courts of the several states and the-rule obtaining in a majority of the states is that such a judgment is voidable only, and not absolutely void. Especially is this true in those states which, like Missouri, have statutes permitting the parties to waive an objection of this character. Fowler v. Brooks, 64 N. H. 423; Phillips v. Fyre, L. R. 6 Q. B. 1-22; Trawick's Heirs v. Trawick's Adm'rs, 67 Ala. 271; Rogers v. Felker, 77 Ga. 46.
The position of counsel for relator leads to this, conclusion. They would have this court in this mandamus proceeding determine that the record made by Special Judge Houck is not true and that he was a usurper when he made it; but, as.he was the judge of' that court, we know no reason why the record he made should not be accorded the same presumption of verity that is universally shown to the records made by other courts within their jurisdiction. We have heretofore, so held. Green v. Walker, 99 Mo. 68; State v. Gamble, 108 Mo. 500.
But it is asked how else can the fraudulent conspiracy be shown. We answer, by a direct proceeding for that purpose. The circuit court of Stoddard county has original jurisdiction to hear and determine whether the action of Special Judge Houck was tainted with fraud or corruption; but, most clearly, this court has no .jurisdiction to determine that fact in this collateral proceeding. That mandamus will not lie for such a /purpose we think is well settled. Dixon v. The Judge, 4 Mo. 286; State ex rel. v. Young, 84 Mo. 94; State ex rel. v. Smith, 105 Mo. 9.
Having reached the conclusion that the record made by Special Judge Houck could not be questioned by this proceeding and in this way, and that record having shown that the circuit court of Stoddard county had adjourned till the regular September term, it .follows that the action of Judge Wear in attempting to reconvene that court on the day after it had been adjourned by Judge Houck, ivas unauthorised and of no binding ejfect upon anybody. His proceedings on their face disclose their own infirmity, and the minutes of the court, and the adjourning order signed by Special Judge Houck, as-required by section 3231, Revised 'Statutes, 1889, fully corroborates the undisputed fact •that the term had been finally adjourned by the said .special judge.
.Was there any power in Judge Wear to reopen court, and hold it, under these circumstances?' We take it that it is immaterial' whether Judge Houck ought to have waited or not. Inasmuch as he did adjourn the term, could Judge Wear reopen the court again as a part of the regular March term? The judicial power in this state can only be exercised at the 'times and places prescribed by law. Accordingly the statutes have, with great particularity, specified the day •on which each court, whether circuit, county, probate or supreme court, shall meet. Out of abundant caution it is provided that, if the judge shall be detained, the sheriff may adjourn the court -till the third day, when .if the .judge is still absent he may adjourn to the next regular term, and it is provided that the courts may upon notice call special terms, but the whole scope of the legislation on this subject as well as the common law, is to the effect that only at the stated times, and at the places specified, can a court lawfully meet. Eevised Statutes, 1889, sections 3248, 3249, 3250.
The mere coming together of the judge, and the other .officers of the court, unless at a time fixed by law or on a day to which the court has been lawfully adjourned, does not constitute a court under our laws. Freeman on Judgments, section 121, and eases cited. This is so clear that we doubt whether any court or lawyer ever questions it. Galusha v. Butterfield, 2 Scam. 227; Brumley v. State, 20 Ark. 77; Dunn v. State, 2 Ark. 229, Stoval v. Emerson, 20 Mo. App. 322.
Again and again this court held that, after a term closes, the judge nor the court has any power to change a judgment, or entry. An adjournment to the next regular term concludes all further action by the officers at that term. Ashby v. Glasgow, 7 Mo. 320; Hill v. St. Louis, 20 Mo. 584; Harbor v. Railroad, 32 Mo. 423; Van Dyke v. State, 22 Ala. 57. It follows that the averment that the circuit court of Stoddard county confirmed the additional appointment of relator as receiver on March 13 is not sustained by the record and the evidence. Counsel, anticipating this, asked leave to amend their petition and writ by averring that the judge confirmed the appointment; but this amendment is earnestly opposed. In the view we take of the evidence, the amendment will not help relator. It is very evident that Judge Wear was not attempting to exercise his authority as a judge in vacation, but was attempting to hold a court. This is his own positive declaration. As already said, his acts as a court were clearly void, and this proceeding cannot now be upheld as the act of a judge in vacation.
The respondents were brought into court to answer to a record. They tendered the issue nul tiel record and have sustained it. The provisional order of March 3, 1893, having been vacated, and the order of March 13, by Judge Wear, confirming-it being void, the relator's title as receiver was destroyed, and he had no right to demand and take charge of said railroad.
Having reached this conclusion, it becomes unnecessary to pass upon the other important questions discussed by counsel, such as the jurisdiction of the Cape Girardeau common pleas court, and the conflict of jurisdiction between that court and the Stoddard circuit court. A decision of those questions will be deferred until a case-is made'calling for their determination.
The peremptory writ is denied, and the proceeding is dismissed at the cost of the relator, including the compensation of the special examiner, John W. Dryden, Esq., and the fees of the witnesses, and it is adjudged that respondents have execution therefor. All concur, except Shekwood, J., who dissents.